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HOMELAND OPERATIONS RECORD

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PREFACE

This monograph was adapted from studies prepared under instructions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to the Japanese Government (SCAPIN No. 126, 12 Oct 45). The entire series, written in accordance with the cited directive, records not only the operations of the Japanese armed forces during World War II but also covers the operations in China and Manchuria which preceded the world conflict. The original manuscripts were written by former officers of the Japanese Army and Navy under the supervision of the Historical Records Section of the First (Army) and Second (Navy) Demobilization Bureaus of the Japanese Government. Manuscripts on which this monograph was based were translated by the Allied Translator-Interpreter Service, G-2, Headquarters, Far East Command. Additional research, re-writing and editing were accomplished by the Foreign Histories Division of the Office of the Military History Officer, Headquarters, United States Army Japan.

Japanese Monograph, No. 17, "Homeland Operations Record" was compiled from material contained in the following manuscripts:

No. 17, "Homeland Operations Record, Vol. I
(General Defense Command)"

No. 18, "Homeland Operations Record, Vol. II
(First General Army)"

No. 19, "Homeland Operations Record, Vol. III
(Second General Army)"

No. 20, "Sixteenth Area Army Records, 1944-45"

As now presented, the monograph covers plans and preparations for the defense of Japan against air attack and seaborne invasion for the period from 1941 until the end of World War II. No ground combat operations are discussed in this study as the Japanese surrender obviated the necessity to activate the "Ketsu-Go" Operation, the final, all-out defense of the Japanese homeland.

Basic manuscripts were compiled by the First Demobilization Bureau with the assistance of the ex-officers whose names appear on Page v, under "List of Contributors".

The editor is deeply appreciative of the assistance rendered the Foreign Histories Division by Mr. Susumu Nishiura, Chief of

the War Histories Room, Japanese Ground Self Defense Force, Key Personnel School, and is indebted to Colonel Akira Takahashi and Mr. Masao Inaba, members of the War Histories Room staff, whose research enabled the editor to correct many errors and fill numerous gaps in the original manuscript. Invaluable assistance was also rendered the editor in the conduct of research, preparation of maps and re-translation of ambiguous portions of the original manuscript by former Lieutenant Commander Ryosuke Nomura and Lieutenant Colonel Tadao Shudo, Military Operational Analysts with the Foreign Histories Division.

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CHAPTER 1

THE GENERAL DEFENSE COMMAND

The Japanese "Homeland" was generally considered to consist of four principal islands (Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu), together with the hundreds of smaller islands immediately adjacent to the main islands. The Homeland Defense Area, however, extended from Sakhalin to Formosa and included Korea as well as the Kuril, Ryukyu, Bonin and Volcano Islands.

General Concept of Defense

In developing the strategy for the conduct of the Greater East Asia War, an invasion of Japan was not seriously considered, although it was necessary to make plans and preparations for even such a remote contingency.

The defense of Japan was conceived as a joint effort of the Army and Navy, with the air arms of both services being most vitally concerned. Medium range bombers of both services would be employed in the destruction of any enemy invasion fleet while it was still far out at sea. Long range bombers would assist in this mission and would also be utilized in the destruction of enemy carriers or air bases in China which might be established to support an invasion. If, in spite of the joint efforts of the two air forces, some elements of an invasion fleet should contrive to approach the shores of the homeland, the ships of the Navy would undertake the destruction

of transports and escort vessels. While the possibility of an enemy fleet breaking through two such formidable barriers was felt to be extremely remote, the shores of Japan would be still further protected by its ground forces. Any attempted landings would be effectively thwarted by emplaced artillery and any beachheads established would be immediately overrun by the infantry.

It was recognized that small scale retaliatory air raids, launched for political or morale purposes, might well be an inevitable consequence of the outbreak of war. Emphasis was, therefore, laid on preparing an air defense which would frustrate such raids and discourage their continuance.

Local defense against sporadic or occasional air raids would be accomplished by land based fighter planes and antiaircraft artillery. Army and Navy bombers would cooperate in striking at the source by destroying enemy carriers and in knocking out air bases which might be established in China.

Defense Organization

The General Defense Command (GDC), headed by the Commander-in-Chief of Defense, was organized on 12 July 1941 and assigned the responsibility for directing defense efforts throughout the entire Homeland Defense Area.

For several years, Japan proper had been divided into four military districts, within each of which a tactical army was organized.

In addition to ground forces, the district armies controlled anti-aircraft artillery and defensive air force units. Commanders of the military districts acted in a dual capacity, being also the commanders of the tactical armies. As commander of the military district, each was responsible for military and necessary civilian administration as well as line of communications activities within his district. As commander of the tactical army he was responsible for the defense of the district and the training of the various component groups of the army. Each commander had both an administrative and a tactical staff through which orders were channelled to the appropriate subordinate units of his two commands. The four military districts and armies were as shown on Map No. 1:

<u>District and Command</u>	<u>Headquarters Location</u>	<u>Zone of Responsibility</u>
Northern District) Northern Army Cmd)	Sapporo	Hokkaido
Eastern District) Eastern Army Cmd)	Tokyo	That portion of Honshu lying generally north of a line extending west from Suruga Bay to Wakasa Bay, passing north of Nagoya
Central District) Central Army Cmd)	Osaka	That part of Honshu lying west of the Eastern District and extending as far as a line drawn between Awaji Island and Shikoku, passing through Fukuyama north to Yonago


<u>District and Command</u>	<u>Headquarters Location</u>	<u>Zone of Responsibility</u>
Western District) Western Army Cmd)	Fukuoka	The western end of Honshu and all of Kyushu

Since the headquarters of the GDC did not include any line of communications departments, such as Ordnance, Medical, Signal, etc., all logistics were under the control of the commanders of the military districts. These commanders did not report to the GDC in connection with such matters, submitting their communications directly to the War Ministry, thus by-passing not only the GDC but also Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ). The GDC was also without the power to direct disposition of major troop commands or the construction of large scale fortifications, as control of these important defense functions was reserved to the Chief of Staff, IGHQ. In actual fact, the GDC was primarily a coordinating link between IGHQ and the district commands, with little command authority.

Organization of Air Defenses

Plans for air defense, based on instructions from IGHQ, considered the four areas of Tokyo-Yokohama, Osaka-Kobe, Nagoya and northern Kyushu to be the most important to be protected. It was planned to utilize the combined strengths of the defensive air units and the antiaircraft artillery in a cooperative defense of those areas.

MAP NO. 1



Coincident with the opening of hostilities on 8 December 1941, instructions were issued to execute the defense plans of the Eastern, Central and Western Districts as well as Formosa. The Northern District and Korea were exempted from the order as the Japanese Government did not wish to antagonize the U.S.S.R. In addition, although it was recognized that Hokkaido might offer a target to the enemy, the Pacific coasts of Honshu and Kyushu were more vulnerable to air attack and presented more profitable targets. At that time the air defense strength was approximately 300 antiaircraft artillery pieces and 100 planes. Compared with the Japanese forces in the overseas areas, the air defense units in the home islands were poorly equipped and trained. The antiaircraft units were equipped mainly with 75-¹mm guns while the air units had Type 97 Fighters.

Estimate of the Air Defense Situation

The GDC assessed enemy capabilities as of the time of the outbreak of war as follows:

Although the United States may not be in a position to make a major air raid on Japanese homeland, it is possible that small scale attacks will be attempted: either for political reasons or to divert the attention of the Japanese air force from its offensive operations. The targets of their aerial assaults will probably be the northern and eastern portions of the Homeland which can be reached by planes

-
1. The Type 97 Fighter was a single-engine, low-wing single-seat plane with a nine cylinder "Hikari" radial engine.

based in the Aleutians or Midway or the Central District and western part of Japan which can be reached by carrier based planes or large type land planes operating from bases in Chekiang Province in China.

Disposition of Air Defenses

Basing his actions on the foregoing estimate of the situation, the C-in-C of Defense ordered the disposition of air defense units within the various districts:

The Eastern Army Command will exercise command over the 5th and 244th Air Regiments and the Eastern Air Defense Brigade (antiaircraft artillery) and will protect the important military, governmental and industrial installations in the Tokyo-Yokohama Area.

The Central Army Command will control the 13th Air Regiment and the Central Air Defense Brigade and will protect the important industrial centers, particularly in the Kokura-Yawata Area and in Shimonoseki and Moji.

The Northern Army Command, the Korea Army and the Formosa Army will direct their antiaircraft artillery units in protecting strategic points in their respective areas.

Defensive air units and antiaircraft artillery were disposed throughout the four critical areas:

<u>Defense Area</u>	<u>Air*</u>	<u>AAA*</u>
Tokyo-Yokohama	50 planes	150 guns
Nagoya	10 planes	20 guns
Osaka-Kobe	20 planes	70 guns
Kokura-Yawata	20 planes	70 guns

* All figures approximate.

Air Raid Warning System

At the beginning of the war the only type of radar in use was the non-standard Type A Unit which had a limited capability of detecting planes by means of a reflected beam and the Doppler Effect. The Type B radar units which were capable of determining the position of incoming planes had not been installed. The air raid warning system was, therefore, mainly dependent on visual observation by military and civilian observers.² To form a long-range air raid warning net, the Navy had stationed a number of radio-equipped patrol boats about 600 miles off shore.

The Doolittle Raid

On 17 April 1942, the Navy warned the GDC of the approach of a U.S. fleet and predicted that an air raid would be launched. At 0800 hours on the 18th, a preliminary air raid warning was issued to the Eastern Army Command, which alerted all air defense units. Later, on the 18th, Navy patrol boats detected the U.S. task force about 600 miles east of Japan. Since the GDC believed the carriers were only capable of launching small planes, a calculation of the effective range of such planes led the command to believe that the carriers would be required to move to a point approximately 300 miles

2. For more complete information on Japan's air raid warning system, see Japanese Monographs Nos. 157, 158 and 159.

off shore before launching their planes. Basing time schedules on these conclusions, it was estimated that the attack would come in the early morning hours of 19 April. Issuance of a final air raid warning was withheld pending additional information.

About noon on the 18th, incoming planes were observed by an observation post near Mito (approximately 70 miles northeast of Tokyo) but the air raid warning came too late for effective action, as the planes arrived over Tokyo within a few minutes after being spotted. As soon as the attack began, the Eastern Army Command issued air raid warnings and the air defense forces went into action.

The Type 97 plane and its machine gun armament was found to be ineffective against U.S. medium bombers (B-25's). It was also discovered that the antiaircraft guns were useless against low flying planes. Other defects in air defense preparations and the warning system were also disclosed.

Strengthening of Air Defenses

The C-in-C of Defense, General Prince Higashikuni, laid great stress on the need for a strengthened air defense and, immediately following the Doolittle Raid, directed intensive practice and training for air and antiaircraft units. By revising air defense tactics

3. The Japanese Navy also believed that the carriers would have to move several hundreds of miles closer to the mainland before launching their planes. To intercept the fleet, Japanese naval vessels were being concentrated about 300 miles off the east coast.

he hoped to compensate for the inadequacy of antiaircraft weapons and the lack of high speed planes.

As a result of the lessons learned from the Doolittle Raid, steps were taken to strengthen the defensive air forces under the GDC. The 1st Air Army, with the 17th, 18th and 19th Air Brigades, was organized and placed directly under the C-in-C of Defense. He, in turn, placed the three brigades under the district army commands, giving them the following air strength:

Eastern Army Command

17th Air Brigade

Hq. Reconnaissance Squadron
5th Air Regiment
244th Air Regiment
47th Air Squadron

Central Army Command

18th Air Brigade

Hq. Reconnaissance Squadron
13th Air Regiment
246th Air Regiment

Western Army Command

19th Air Brigade

Hq. Reconnaissance Squadron
4th Air Regiment
243th Air Regiment

Plans were made to ensure cooperation between the army commands in the shifting of portions of their air strength to other districts when needed.

Further agreement was concluded with the Inspector General of Army Aviation and the Chief of the Army Aviation Headquarters to immediately assign all fighter planes in the Akeno Army Aviation School and the Army Air Technical Research Laboratory to the GDC upon issuance of an air raid warning. In the event of an air raid the planes of the School would be assigned to the Central Army Command and those of the Laboratory to the Eastern Army Command. Upon the conclusion of the air raid or the ending of the alert, all planes would be released to their original assignment.

To increase the efficiency of the antiaircraft artillery the air defense brigades were reorganized as antiaircraft artillery groups and their strength augmented. Every effort was to be made to increase the number of weapons capable of conducting effective fire at low level targets. Intensive research was conducted in re-studying the air defenses of important areas and plans were made to increase the number of barrage balloons. Increased numbers of 80-mm and 120-mm antiaircraft guns were planned as was the mass production of Type B radar installations.

To improve the early warning system, closer liaison with the China Expeditionary Army and the Kwantung Army was effected.

Intensified training for both air units and antiaircraft artillery was conducted to increase efficiency in hitting targets traveling at high speed and low altitude. At the same time, assuming

that the next air raid might well employ radically different tactics from those used in the Doolittle Raid, training in night flying and high altitude combat tactics was emphasized.

The weaknesses of the Type 97 planes were recognized but immediate replacement was not possible. The only alternative to overcome their slow speed and low rate of climb was to keep some planes in the air above the important areas at all times. A few high speed fighters were assigned to air defense missions to be utilized in intercepting the enemy planes as far from their targets as possible.

Adjustment of Responsibilities

On 5 February 1943, the Northern Army Command was renamed the Northern Army and became a major operational command charged with the responsibility of supporting operations in the Aleutians. Simultaneously with the changed function of the Northern Army, the GDC was relieved from responsibility for the defense of Hokkaido, Karafuto and the Kuril Islands. The three remaining district armies were known as the Homeland Defense Army.

Invasion Possibilities

The anomalous position in which the GDC was placed and the obvious impossibility of its being able to conduct effective defense preparations with the limited powers accorded it, was indicative of the optimistic viewpoint of the high level planners. While it was realized that air raids and naval bombardments of

Japan's shores were a possibility, an actual invasion of the Japanese homeland was not seriously considered. In fact, defense planning, through 1943, was based on the assumption that the landing of enemy troops in Japan was virtually impossible. Two routes of approach were available for an invasion convoy: from the north, via the Aleutians, or from the east, using Midway and Wake as bases. Considered as a very remote third possibility was an invasion route from the south, provided the U.S. could gain control of the Philippines or establish other south Pacific bases. All of these routes of approach entailed the traversing of long sea routes and IGHQ was confident that any invasion fleet would be detected in ample time to permit its destruction by the Navy and Air Force. Therefore, although there was some construction of coastal defense positions, the principal defenses developed, through 1943, were additional air bases and air fortresses.

In spite of strong recommendations by the C-in-C of Defense for the construction of adequate coastal defense positions, comparatively little was accomplished. In addition to IGHQ's confidence in the inability of an invasion fleet to reach the shores of Japan, the lack of response to the GDC's pleas for coastal defenses was due to the adverse economic condition of the country and the absorption of IGHQ with other, and more pressing, operational areas.

4. For a description of an air fortress, see Japanese Monograph No. 23, "Air Defense of the Homeland".

Preparation for Future Air Raids

In April 1943, intelligence reports indicated that the United States had started production the B-29 bomber, to be used in attacks on Japan. It was estimated that the enemy would start using this new type plane in the fall of 1943, utilizing air bases in China. When the expected attacks did not develop at that time, estimates were revised and it was then believed that the U.S. would have some 50 of the new type planes in China by April or May of 1944.

Improved Equipment and Training

To combat the anticipated B-29 raids, exhaustive efforts were devoted to producing high altitude fighters armed with heavy guns. It was not possible, however, to get this type of plane into mass production and the number produced even up to the end of the war was not sufficient for distribution to the air defense units. Somewhat better success was encountered in the production of 120-mm guns which began to be installed in the important areas during the early part of 1944.

The training to improve high altitude combat proficiency consisted primarily of increasing the rate of climb by using maximum booster. This method, however, increased the incidence of engine malfunctions and necessitated increased engine overhauls. In addition, the fuel available for training purposes was extremely limited and it was not possible to give pilots the flying time they

needed to achieve maximum proficiency.

Night and inclement weather combat training was extremely difficult because of the fact that no air units possessed adequate equipment or instruments for night navigation and flying. Makeshift devices, inventions and expedients showed varying degrees of success. Air-ground radio installations were adapted for night navigation and planes were equipped with balancing guides. Inasmuch as the average pilot or ground crew member was not qualified, by training or experience, to perform these technical installations the results were often unsatisfactory and a high accident ratio developed. In addition, the pressure of day and night training strained the pilots beyond their endurance, resulting in physical exhaustion which also was the cause of many fatal accidents occurring during the course of night training. In spite of these handicaps and high loss ratios, intensive night training continued. Electronics research by which it was hoped to produce night flying instruments in sufficient quantities was unsatisfactory and night combat training was performed in coordination with searchlight units.

Improvement in antiaircraft firing was accomplished by sending out highly trained teams which travelled from one antiaircraft unit to another, conducting intensified training courses. Special emphasis was laid on calculation of range and effective coverage of

sectors of fire. In April 1944, a training battalion was activated within each antiaircraft group of the three army commands. These training battalions were charged with training junior officers and gun crews of their own group. They were, of course, also employed as operational units.

Activation of New Air Units

In April 1944, the 53d Air Regiment was activated as a night fighter unit and the 4th Air Regiment was also reorganized to perform the same mission. The Headquarters Reconnaissance Squadron of each air brigade was reorganized, with personnel and plane augmentation, and assigned the mission of high altitude flying. Each squadron was divided into two units, one to be used in high level combat and the other in high level reconnaissance. The 3d Air Regiment was recalled from Manchuria, reorganized as a fighter regiment, and placed under the Eastern Army Command.

Intensified Defense Efforts

The spring of 1944 saw Japan suffering serious military reverses in the south Pacific and IGHQ was finally spurred into making greater efforts to improve the defenses of the homeland.

In order to localize the defense efforts of the GDC and to enable it to concentrate on the defense of Japan proper, it was relieved of responsibility for the defenses of Formosa, the Ryukyu, Bonin and Volcano Islands in March. This change narrowed the direct responsibility of the GDC to the main islands of Honshu,

Shikoku and Kyushu, although the C-in-C of Defense still retained limited control over the defense preparations of the Korea Army and the 32d Army in the Ryukyus remained under the operational control of the Western Army Command.

Reorganization of Air Defenses

Since the defensive air units were under the jurisdiction of the 1st Air Army, which was primarily a training organization without a tactical mission, it was considered necessary to develop its combat potential. To this end the 17th, 18th and 19th Air Brigades were reorganized as the 10th, 11th and 12th Air Divisions. The divisions remained under the operational control of the army commands which were also augmented by the addition of naval air groups: the 302d Fighter Group in Yokosuka and Atsugi, under the Eastern Army Command, the 332d Fighter Group in Kure, under the Central Army Command and the 352d Fighter Group in Sasebo, assigned to the Western Army Command. These defensive air forces, combined with the planes of the Akeno Army Aviation School and the Army Air Technical Research Laboratory provided the army commands with greatly increased air strength.

Increased production and distribution of antiaircraft weapons had improved air defense still further. By 1 June 1944, approximately 750 planes and 550 antiaircraft guns could be pressed into service in the event of an emergency:

<u>Army Command</u>	<u>Air* Strength</u>	<u>AAA* Strength</u>
Eastern	400 planes	300 guns
Central	200 planes	150 guns
Western	150 planes	150 guns

* All figures approximate.

New Command Program

On 5 May 1944, IGHQ announced a new command program aimed at further unifying and strengthening the defenses of the homeland. The authority of the GDC was considerably broadened by placing the three army commands completely under its control. Coincident with the broadening of the powers of the GDC, an IGHQ directive, titled "Defense of the Homeland", assigned it a new series of missions (see Appendix I). Although the new directive called for the construction of defense positions in strategic areas, IGHQ was still primarily concerned with defense against air attack. The new defense concept continued to visualize any approaching invasion convoy being destroyed at sea by combined naval and air attacks and although defense positions were prepared, the possibility of a successful landing operation was not seriously contemplated.

The C-in-C of Defense was instructed to prepare a comprehensive plan for the defense of Japan to be submitted not later than the 15th of June. In general, the defense missions of each of the district army commands and the 1st Air Army, as outlined by the GDC, were as follows:

The Eastern Army Command will employ the 10th Air Division and the Eastern Antiaircraft Artillery Group to protect the Imperial Palace and the governmental, military and industrial centers in the Tokyo-Yokohama area. The command will also dispose antiaircraft artillery elements at Tachikawa, Ota, Hitachi, Kamaishi and similar vital areas to defend industrial installations.

For coastal defense the Eastern Army Command will strengthen the defenses of the Izu Islands (Hachijo, Niijima and Oshima) immediately and will then strengthen the defenses of the Hachinohe, Sendai and Mito Plains, the Boso (Chiba) Peninsula and the Sagami Bay areas. Particularly strong positions will be established on the Izu Islands, Hachinohe Plain and Boso Peninsula.

The Central Army Command will employ the 11th Air Division and the Central Antiaircraft Artillery Group to protect the industrial installations in Nagoya, Hirohata, Kyoto and other vital areas.

For coastal defense the Central Army Command will strengthen the defenses of the strategic areas in and around the Hamamatsu and Toyohashi Plains, the Kii Peninsula and the Kochi Plain. Emphasis will be placed on the Hamamatsu area.

The Command will be prepared to transfer one division to other districts when necessary.

The Western Army Command will employ the 12th Air Division and the Western Antiaircraft Artillery Group to protect important industrial installations in the Kokura-Yawata area, including the Moji-Shimonoseki Strait. It will also provide antiaircraft protection to Nagasaki, Fukuoka, Omuta and other vital areas.

For coastal defense the Western Army Command will strengthen the defenses in the Ryukyu Islands immediately and then strengthen positions in and around Tanegashima Island, the Miyazaki and Kanoya Plains and the Satsuma Peninsula. Emphasis will be placed on the Ryukyu Islands and the Miyazaki Plains.⁵

The Command will be prepared to dispatch one division to the Ryukyu Island if required.

The 1st Air Army will, in the event of carrier-borne air strikes, assume tactical command of the 5th Air Brigade⁶ and cooperate with the Navy in destroying enemy carriers.

In the event of an invasion attempt it will assume command

5. The Western District was still charged with responsibility for construction of defenses in the Ryukyus.

6. 5th Air Brigade, located at Nishitsukuba, was composed of two regiments of heavy bombers.

of the 5th Air Brigade and, in cooperation with the Navy, will destroy the enemy transports.

Further U.S. Air Raids

On the night of 15 June, about 100 U.S. planes took off from bases in Chengtu, northern China, and bombed the Kokura-Yawata area. Radar installed on Tsichou Island detected the incoming planes and air and antiaircraft units were alerted in ample time. As a result of the timely warning, seven enemy planes were brought down. Those who participated in the air battle were under the impression that the U.S. planes were either B-17's or B-24's and it was not until the wreckage of the downed planes was examined was it discovered that they were B-29's.

In anticipation of future air raids from the same quarter additional defense preparations were made. A number of air defense units were established on Tsichou Island and some units were transferred from the Central Army Command to the Western Army Command. These steps were successful in thwarting future air raids on the Kokura-Yawata area, although an occasional one or two planes did penetrate into adjacent areas of less importance.

Establishment of Additional Enemy Bases

The capture of Saipan and Tinian, in July, gave the U.S. additional air bases from which attacks could be launched against Japan. Although the reconstruction of airfields was known to be

a project of some magnitude it was estimated that by October the U.S. would be prepared to launch attacks from these bases with at least 50 planes and that this number would be increased by an additional 50 to 100 each month thereafter.

Re-evaluation of the Defense Concept

After the fall of Saipan in July 1944, the military potential of the U.S. was fully recognized by IGHQ and the construction of defense positions in Japan became of greater urgency. It was at that time, too, that IGHQ first learned of the severe losses which the Imperial Japanese Navy had suffered and realized that Japan would have difficulty in holding the Philippines against a determined American attack. With this realization came a need to re-evaluate the possible invasion routes that might be open to the U.S. Forces. Since it was believed that almost all of the available military strength of the U.S. was already committed either in Europe or the south Pacific, the possibility of an invasion from the north or east seemed somewhat lessened. The development of approaches from the south and west, however, loomed as very strong possibilities. Defense plans were now predicated on the U.S. gaining control of the Philippines and either making a direct invasion from those islands or taking the intermediate step of establishing bases on the coast of China from which to attack Kyushu. It was recognized that attacks on Kyushu could also be launched from either

Formosa or Okinawa. That the U.S. might by-pass Okinawa and Formosa and attempt to establish bases on Iwo Jima or the Bonin Islands loomed as another possibility. Of all the possible routes of approach, an advance to Okinawa and subsequent strike at Kyushu seemed the most likely.

New estimates of enemy intentions and capabilities resulted in a changed concept of defense planning. It was obvious that from bases in Okinawa, northern China or even Korea, the U.S. could provide an invasion operation with greater air support. In addition, since approach routes would be much shorter than those earlier considered possible, detection and interception of an invasion fleet would be more difficult and its complete destruction less likely. With these considerations in mind, IGHQ directed that greater impetus be given to the construction of coastal defenses. Fortifications in the southern and western parts of Kyushu were enlarged and reinforced as were several of the more important installations in the Central District.

In an effort to thwart the establishment of American bases on the China coast, on 18 July, IGHQ ordered the China Expeditionary Army to capture and fortify certain strategic points, to enlarge and strengthen defense installations already maintained along the coast and to deploy major troop units to meet any invasion attempts that might be made.⁷

7. For further details on Japanese preparations against a possible U.S. invasion of the China coast, see Chapter VI, Japanese Monograph No. 72, "Army Operations in China".

CHAPTER 2

ACCELERATED DEFENSE ACTIVITY

1

The Sho-Go Operation

On 21 July 1944, Imperial General Headquarters issued a broad defensive plan covering the entire Pacific combat area. Known as the Sho-Go (Victory) Operation, the plan contemplated the forces of Japan encountering a series of U.S. offensives from the Philippines to northern Japan. The operational plan was divided into four areal parts:

- Sho-Go, Number 1 The Philippines
- Sho-Go, Number 2 Formosa and the Ryukyus
- Sho-Go, Number 3 Japan (Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku)
- Sho-Go, Number 4 Japan (Hokkaido, the Kuriles, and Karafuto)

Primarily defensive in nature, the planned Sho-Go Operations were to be activated as the designated areas were threatened. Carefully coordinated defense plans were prepared for each area and, in turn, detailed plans were made for various sub-areas within each general area.

Operational instructions for Sho-Go, Number 3, concerned with the defense of Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku, designated five defense zones:

1. See Appendix II, Japanese Monograph No. 23, "Air Defense of the Homeland".

<u>Sho-Go, Number 3 Sub-Areas</u>	<u>To Combat an Invasion Aimed at Vicinity of:</u>
"A"	Hachinohe
"B"	Sendai
"C"	Tokyo
"D"	Hamamatsu
"E"	Kyushu

General defensive concepts and instructions were similar in most respects to those contained in the previously issued Homeland Defense Directive. Since Sho-Go, Number 3 provided for the defense of coastal stretches rather than a definite area, it did not affect the already established three defense districts, but did require some changes in the defense missions and areas of responsibility of both the air and ground defense forces. (See Appendix II)

Army Command Responsibilities

The Eastern Army Command was responsible for conduct of the "A", "B" and "C" portions of the plan, with its 36th Army to be employed primarily in "C".² Troop dispositions were to be sufficiently fluid to permit the use of the 36th Army, or elements thereof, in the event the activation of "B" or "E" required greater strength than locally available.

2. Composed of the 81st Division, 93d Division and the 4th Tank Division, the 36th Army was activated 21 July 1944, primarily for the defense of Tokyo and immediate vicinity.

The Central Army Command, with the responsibility for "D" was also to be prepared to dispatch one division to aid either "C" or "E".

The Western Army Command, charged with the defense of "E", was to be prepared to transfer one of its divisions to the 32d Army in the Ryukyu Islands, when and if, Sho-Go, Number 2 was activated. In the last part of July, however, the 32d Army was released from the Western Army Command and placed under the Tenth Area Army.

Imperial General Headquarters recognized the necessity for prompt action in the event of an invasion, as they knew that in order to keep production and transportation facilities operating it would be necessary to stop any invasion attempt at the beach. It was emphasized that every invasion attempt should be regarded as a decisive battle and if a beachhead should be established, every available man and weapon must be thrown into a counterattack to liquidate the landing force. Plans were made to not only reinforce troop strengths and fortifications on strategic islands off the Japanese coast, but also for counter-landing operations to be conducted by amphibious forces should the enemy succeed in occupying any of those islands.

Defense Construction Principles

Anticipating the issuance of the Sho-Go Operation plan and implementing its provisions, the First Phase Fortification Plan was

issued in June of 1944. This plan called for the completion, by March of 1945, of the main portions of the most urgently needed defense positions. (Table No. 1) A Second Phase Plan covered the reinforcing and enlarging of construction completed under the First Phase Plan. At the end of July the Defense Fortification Department was created at the direction of the C-in-C of Defense and placed under the Eastern Army Command. This new department had the mission of planning and preparing specifications for fortifications as well as issuing detailed instructions to those responsible for defense construction. Work was started under the First Phase Fortification Plan in the fall of 1944, although the instructions from the Defense Fortification Department were not published until early 1945. (See Appendix III.)

Air Force Employment

Under the provisions of the Sho-Go Operation, the Air Force mission in the defense of Japan was closely tied to naval defense. Instructions to the air arm were substantially as follows:

Preparations will be so effected that in the event of an enemy invasion, the air strength can be promptly and completely concentrated in the needed area and, in close collaboration with the Navy, will endeavor to locate enemy vessels, especially their transports, and destroy them at sea. All preparations for this mission will be accomplished by the end of October 1944.

Established as a secondary mission was the countering of enemy air power by attacking any air bases which the U.S. might establish in

Table No. 1

COASTAL DEFENSE
CONSTRUCTION PLANNED UNDER THE
FIRST PHASE FORTIFICATION PLAN

Area	Fortification to Accomodate	Type of Position	Priority of Work
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Eastern District

	Hachinohe Plains	3 Inf Bns	Infantry	1
	Sendai Plains	1½ Inf Bns	Infantry	3
	Izu Islands (Hachijojima, Niijima and Oshima)	3 Inf Bns on each island	Infantry	1
Tokyo-Yokohama Area	Mito Plains	2 Inf Bns 20 Med Arty Guns	Infantry Artillery	2 1
	Kujukuri-hama Kashima seacoast	5 Inf Bns 20 Med Arty Guns	Infantry Artillery	2 1
	Izu Peninsula	1 Inf Bn 20 Med Arty Guns	Infantry Artillery	2 1
	Sagami Bay	3 Inf Bns	Infantry Artillery	2 1

Central District

	Toyohashi Plains Incl Ise Bay	5 Inf Bns 30 Med Arty Guns	Infantry Artillery	2 1
	Wakayama Area	2 Inf Bns	Infantry	3
	Kochi Plains	3 Inf Bns	Infantry	2

Western District

	Miyazaki Plains	2½ Inf Bns	Infantry	2
	Osumi and Satsuma Peninsulas	6 Inf Bns 20 Med Arty Guns	Infantry Artillery	2 1
	Ryukyu Islands	1½ Inf Bns	Infantry	1

areas adjacent to Japan:

Previous to the final decisive battles, all air operations should be skillfully conducted by an active and flexible tactical command, aiming at the destruction of the enemy's combat strength and the prevention of loss to our own. To accomplish this mission, our air forces should be dispersed deep inland and employed in making hit and run surprise attacks on enemy bases and in making resourceful counterattacks against enemy offensives. The direct support of our own air bases will, as a general rule, be the responsibility of the antiaircraft artillery.

In August 1944, the Training Air Army was activated and assigned the task of preparing for air operations in defense of the homeland. The newly activated army was to come under the control of the C-in-C of Defense in the event of a decisive battle in Japan proper. In December, the Training Air Army was redesignated as the 6th Air Army and assigned directly to the General Defense Command. The C-in-C of Defense established the 6th Air Army as a strategic reserve to be employed against enemy invasion operations and exempted it from all current air defense responsibilities.

The original plan of IGHQ had been to place all defensive aircraft and antiaircraft artillery under the 6th Air Army as a unified air defense command. Further study of this plan indicated, however, that since the district commands controlled all intelligence channels and communications and the army controlled the antiaircraft artillery and searchlight units, it would take too long to effect the necessary transfers and unification of services.

Korea Defenses

Realizing that Korea, as well as China, might be used as a possible intermediate objective for an invasion attempt against Japan; in December 1944, the Korea Army was instructed to strengthen existing fortifications and to build additional defense positions along the south and west coasts and on adjacent islands, particularly Cheju-do.³

Coastal defense plans for both Japan and Korea were revised to furnish protection for the harbors which were the terminal points of the transport routes across the Korea Strait between Japan and Korea. Airfields were built in the vicinity of the terminals to give protection to shipping en route from Nagasaki and Moji-Shimonoseki, in Japan, to Yosu and Pusan, in Korea.

Ground Forces for the Defense of Japan

By the end of 1944, an enemy invasion of Okinawa appeared to be a distinct possibility. Defensive plans were changed to include the reinforcement and enlargement of fortifications in the southern and western parts of Kyushu as well as in the Shanghai region.

For ground defense of Japan's shores it was planned to use the standing homeland divisions and the garrison forces. It was also planned to transfer units from the Kwantung Army in Manchuria to

3. For a discussion of defense efforts in Korea, see Japanese Monograph No. 22, "The Seventeenth Area Army".

bolster the homeland defenses. There were, however, a number of difficulties to overcome before the plan could be put into execution. The homeland divisions were responsible for organizing and training replacement units for the field armies. In addition, the strength of the ground forces stationed in Japan was not constant, as units were constantly being shipped to the field armies and the field armies were returning units to Japan for retraining and rehabilitation.

The complexity of the missions assigned to the homeland divisions made it impossible for them to conduct defense preparations with maximum efficiency.

Although it was known that fluctuations in strength would continue, defense planning was based on the divisions available (Map No. 2) at the end of 1944:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Hqs Location</u>
Eastern Army Command	Tokyo
36th Army	Tokyo
44th Division	Utsunomiya
93d Division	Shizuoka
1st Tank Division	Chiba
Hirosaki Division	Hirosaki
Sendai Division	Sendai
Kanazawa Division	Kanazawa
Tokyo Division	Tokyo

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Hqs Location</u>
Central Army Command	Osaka
Nagoya Division*	Nagoya
Osaka Division	Osaka
84th Division*	Himeji
Kyoto Division	Kyoto

* One artillery and three infantry battalions from the Nagoya Division were earmarked for transfer to the Izu Islands. The 84th Division was alerted for overseas shipment.

Western Army Command	Fukuoka
Zentsuji Division	Zentsuji
Kurume Division	Kurume
Kumamoto Division*	Kumamoto
Hiroshima Division	Hiroshima


* A portion of the Kumamoto Division was in preparation for shipment to the Ryukyu Islands.

In addition to the already in Japan, preparations were being made to transfer two divisions from the Kwantung Army in Manchuria.

Progress of Defense Construction

Serious shortages of steel and cement delayed fortification construction. In addition, since the Japanese had not, for some centuries, considered the possibility of an invasion of their homeland, little planning or research had ever been devoted to methods of defending its shores. It was extremely difficult for the Japanese

MAP NO. 2



military mind to accept the fact that such defenses were now necessary. Furthermore, Japanese military training had not given army officers thorough training in the theory and practice of constructing defenses. ⁴ Further hampering defense construction effort was the need for keeping the operations concealed and secret. It was necessary to conceal or disguise construction projects to prevent aerial observation. In addition, military and governmental leaders were fearful of public reaction should the great mass of the Japanese people learn that their homeland was in danger of being invaded. To avoid the possibility of panic, much defense construction was done in secret - a procedure not conducive to rapid progress.

By the end of 1944, planners had definitely established the defense construction goals which should be met in order to defend the country against any invasion attempts. A survey, conducted in early 1945, showed the percentage of completion of the principal fortification construction:

Eastern District

Hachinohe Plains	Approx. 10%
Sendai Plains	None
Izu Islands (Hachijojima Nijima and Oshima)	Approx. 60%

4. For a discussion on the Japanese Army's attitude toward offensive and defensive combat, see Appendix A, Volume V, Japanese Studies on Manchuria, "Infantry Operations".

Tokyo-Yokohama Area (Mito, Kujukuri-hama Izu Peninsula and Sagami Bay)	Some medium artillery positions
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Central District

Toyohashi Plains	Approx. 10%
------------------	-------------

Wakayama Area	None
---------------	------

Kochi Plains	Approx. 15%
--------------	-------------

Western District

Miyazaki Plains	Approx. 40%
-----------------	-------------

Osumi and Satsuma Peninsulas	Approx. 50%
---------------------------------	-------------

5 Ryukyu Islands	Approx. 25%
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As the survey indicated that the construction completed had approximately attained the goal established for the First Phase Fortification Plan, the Second Phase was immediately started.

Raids by Marianas Based Planes

As expected, the United States began launching air raids against Japan from bases in Saipan and Tinian in October 1944, although the number of planes participating was initially very small. On 25 November, the first large scale raid on Tokyo was made with about 50 B-29's.

The 6th Air Army had been given the mission of destroying the

5. The Western Army Command continued to be charged with the responsibility for defense construction in the Ryukyu Islands.

enemy bases in the Marianas and on 2 November had conducted the first bombing. This first raid was followed by three others within the next few months. The bombings were, however, ineffective as they were conducted in limited force, with ten or less planes. Planning for a large scale attack with the full strength of all available 6th Air Army planes was well advanced when the invasion of Iwo Jima required the diversion of the 6th Air Army to the defense of that island.

The futility of the attacks on the Marianas bases was indicated by the increase in enemy raiding activity in the early part of 1945. Approximately 50 planes per month were involved in raids through the latter part of 1944 and early 1945, but in February the numbers began to increase rapidly until by April over 1,000 B-29's attacked targets in Japan.

At first, only important aircraft plants were the objects of the bombings but later attacks were directed less important facilities and at cities of all sizes, with the aim of disrupting the transportation systems and knocking out all types of industrial plants.

Aircraft Conversions

The B-29's, flying out of Chengtu, came over Japan at an altitude of approximately 8,000 meters, while those from the Marianas flew at about 10,000 meters. The defensive aircraft which were only

effective at 8,000 meters, or less, were totally ineffective against the Marianas raiders and only partially successful in combatting those from China.

Efforts were intensified to develop the "Shusui" rocket propelled plane which was modelled on the German Me-163 but it was obvious that production of this new type aircraft would not come in time to be used in the solution of the immediate problem. Other ways of combatting the B-29 threat were developed.

To increase climbing rate and raise ceiling levels, planes were stripped of armor and by dint of hard training, pilots became capable of waging battle at altitudes of 9,000 meters.

The armament of the defensive planes being inadequate, attempts were made to increase fire power by mounting 75-mm AAA guns on the twin-engine, heavy bombers (Ki-67 Type) with the intention of using them to combat the B-29's. Several types of army fighters were also equipped with large caliber guns in the expectation that they, too, would be effective in defending the homeland against the raids from China and the Marianas. The principal types so equipped were:

Type 2, One-seat Fighter, Model A
Two 40-mm guns
Two 13-mm guns

Type 4, Fighter, Model C
Two 30-mm guns
Two 20-mm guns

Type 2, Two-seat, Fighter, Model B
One 37-mm gun
Two 13-mm guns

Ki 102, Fighter
One 37-mm gun
Two 20-mm guns

Ki 109, Fighter
One 75-mm gun

It was found, however, that the performance of the planes was adversely affected by the increased armament and their climbing rate and maximum combat ceiling reduced.


New Air Defense Tactics

Experiments were conducted in the use of bombs, timed for air bursts, to be dropped in the path of oncoming planes and all fighters were remodelled to carry bomb loads. Because of the irregular trajectory of the bombs and the difficulties in controlling the fuze time and release action, the method was not deemed practical by the army. On the other hand, the navy reported very effective results in the use of this method by its interceptor fighters. (See Sketch No. 1.)

As a last resort it was determined to adopt suicide attacks in which the plane itself would be the projectile. Special Attack Units with personnel trained and dedicated to the suicide mission were established in the 10th and 12th Air Division to which the C-⁶in-C of Defense gave the names "Shinten" and "Kaiten", respectively.

6. "Shinten", literally translated as "Heaven Shaking" may be freely translated as expressing the thought of "Changing the fortunes of the Japanese". "Kaiten", literally translated as "Reversing the Heavens" may be freely translated as "Reversing the fortunes of the Japanese".

BOMBING PROCEDURE USING THE SAN-GO BOMB



The San-Go Bomb was detonated by a time fuze which was set prior to take-off. The fighter pilot would bring his plane to a pre-calculated height (H), above an oncoming enemy plane. As the enemy bomber entered his line of sight (also precalculated) the bomb was released. Height and sighting was so calculated as to effect an air burst immediately in the path of the enemy bomber. If the operation was correctly calculated the detonation or fragmentation (25 meter radius) would either damage or down the enemy plane. This method was used successfully by navy interceptor bombers against B-17's, B-24's and B-29's.

As the enemy increased the number of night raids, every effort was made to provide effective countermeasures. The mission of night action was given to the Central Army Command's 5th Air Regiment which was equipped with twin-engine, two seat, heavy fighters. Since airfields were not equipped with landing strip lights, a very high ratio of losses due to take off and landing accidents was experienced. Research was pushed to develop methods of guiding planes by radar but results were negligible and it was found necessary to employ searchlights to mark the fields and strips - unfortunately, this also marked them as targets for the enemy.

During the latter half of 1944, with a limited number of fighter units available, air defense was handicapped by the necessity of deploying planes above probable targets. In many cases defending planes were not deployed over the enemy's targets and were not successful in attacking the raiders before they had completed their bombing mission. Frequently, however, they were able to engage the raiding aircraft by intercepting them along their return routes. Some success was gained through coordination with the China Expeditionary Army, which not only radioed air raid warnings but also attacked the China based B-29's on their return flight.

Reorganization of the Army Commands

Recognizing that defeat in the Philippines was only a question of time and with the knowledge that an invasion of Japan proper was

now a definite probability, in early 1945, IGHQ again moved to strengthen the homeland's defensive forces.

On 6 February 1945, the three districts (Chiku) (i.e. Eastern, Central and Western) were inactivated and five military districts were (Kanku) established. The army commands (Gun Shireibu) within the districts were also increased to five and redesignated as area armies (Homen Gun). Aside from the adding of two additional districts, a reshuffling of areas and the redesignation of the commands, there was little change in the command organization and the commanders of the area armies continued to act as commanders of the military districts. As had been the case prior to the reorganization, the commanders reported to the C-in-C of Defense of matters concerning the area armies and to the War Ministry on all military district affairs.

The five military districts and area armies were organized as follows (Map No. 3):


<u>Military District and Area Army</u>	<u>Headquarters Location</u>	<u>Prefectures and Areas in Zone of Responsibility</u>
Northeastern Mil Dist Eleventh Area Army	Sendai	Aomori, Fukushima, Miyagi, Yamagata, Iwate and Akita
Eastern Mil Dist Twelfth Area Army	Tokyo	Yamanashi, Ibaraki, Gumma, Saitama, Kanagawa, Chiba, Tochigi, Tokyo, Niigata and part of Shizuoka and Nagano

<u>Military District and Area Army</u>	<u>Headquarters Location</u>	<u>Prefectures and Areas in Zone of Responsibility</u>
East Coast Mil Dist Thirteenth Area Army	Nagoya	Toyama, Ishikawa, Gifu, Aichi, Mie and part of Shizuoka and Nagano
Central Mil Dist Fifteenth Area Army	Osaka	Fukui, Hiroshima, Hyogo, Kyoto, Nara, Okayama, Osaka, Shiga, Shimane, Tottori, Wakayama and all of Shikoku
Western Mil Dist Sixteenth Area Army	Fukuoka	All of Kyushu

The C-in-C of Defense, General Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni, and the five area armies received orders from IGHQ outlining the duties and missions of the reorganized command. These latest instructions differed from previous directives in that defense against air attack was no longer the primary consideration. The strengthening of land defenses at the most logical invasion points was emphasized and the protection of land transportation and harbor facilities was stressed. As was customary in IGHQ orders of this type, the GDC was instructed to cooperate with the Navy and, "by aggressive use of the air arm, destroy any invasion fleet while it is still at sea".

Continued Defense Efforts

Construction of defenses continued to be pushed energetically with, however, something less than unqualified success. By the first part of April 1945, the following conditions existed within the zones of the various area armies:



Eleventh Area Army: The huge area for which this army was responsible, combined with an inadequate transportation system, had retarded defense construction. In addition, the recently activated army had not yet achieved full strength and the shortage of manpower slowed operations. Defense preparations in the more important areas of the Sendai Plain and on the neck of the Shimokita Peninsula were the only places in which definite progress had been made.

Twelfth Area Army: The Kanto Plain, for which the army was responsible was considered the most important area of the entire homeland. For this reason the Twelfth Area Army had more material and greater strength at its disposal than did the other area armies. Unfortunately progress in fortification construction was hampered by real estate difficulties and political interference. Defense positions had been planned on the assumption that the most logical points for landings of invasion forces were Kujukuri-hama, Sagami Bay or along the Kashima Sea. By April only the defense positions at Kujukuri-hama had made significant progress. The others were still in the initial stages of construction.

Thirteenth Area Army: Primary importance was placed on defenses for the coastal areas west of Hamamatsu and along both shores of Ise Bay and work in those areas was proceeding

satisfactorily. Defense construction was also started along the shores of Cape Omaezaki, which appeared to offer invasion opportunities to the enemy.

Fifteenth Area Army: Since its zone of responsibility was large and covered widely dispersed areas, including Shikoku and the Kii Peninsula, the Area Army was faced with particularly difficult construction problems. In addition, the Army had to consider several logical invasion points on the coast of the Japan Sea. Defense preparations had proceeded very slowly because of transportation difficulties and only a comparatively small part of the defenses on the Southern shore of Shikoku had been completed. Virtually no progress had been made on defense construction in other parts of the Fifteenth Area Army's Zone.

Sixteenth Area Army: That the enemy would attempt an invasion of Kyushu was regarded as a virtual certainty and, as a consequence, its fortifying was of the greatest urgency. By dint of strenuous efforts, positions on the Osumi and Satsuma Peninsulas and on the Miyazaki Plains had been about 50% completed. Defenses in the Ryukyus were also well advanced. In addition, communication facilities had been vastly improved and stockpiling of supplies and ammunition was proceeding satisfactorily.

6th Air Army: The missions assigned to the 6th Air Army were more complex than those of the area armies. To conduct effective air operations in the event of an invasion attempt, the Army would be required to step up air training, construct additional airfields, arrange for maintenance of equipment as well as stockpiling of fuel and other supplies. The Air Army was prepared to defend Japan to the last man and, if necessary, the entire Army would be reorganized as a special suicide attack unit. In spite of almost frantic efforts, however, only a small amount of progress was made and by April of 1945 the 6th Air Army was still in the initial stages of preparing for its role in the defense of Japan. Only a few airfields had been built and camouflaged, fuel and ammunition dumps were not completely stocked nor dispersed and the number of underground shelters constructed were not adequate.

Early in February the 6th Air Army was called on to lift some 30 tons of supplies to Iwo Jima and in the middle of that month was engaged in attacking the U.S. invasion fleet headed for Iwo Jima. In March, the headquarters of the Air Army moved to Fukuoka to prepare for the probable enemy invasion of the Ryukyus. Preparations for the 6th Air Army's defense of Japan were still incomplete when, on 21 March the Army was placed under the command of the C-in-C, Combined Fleet, to participate

in the Okinawa battle.

Defense Against Air Attack

The 10th, 11th and 12th Air Divisions which had been under the operational control of the Eastern, Central and Western Army Commands, remained under the control of their successor commands. The 10th Air Division coming under the command of the Twelfth Area Army, the 11th Air Division under the Fifteenth Area Army and the 12th Air Division under the Sixteenth Area Army.

By the end of March 1945, with enemy air raids reaching a peak, the defensive air force could muster a strength of 335 fighters plus an additional 220 which could be drawn from the training commands in the event of an emergency. (Table 2)

Antiaircraft artillery units were reassigned within the five military districts, providing a total of approximately 1,250 guns of various calibers. (Table 3)

Complete Re-organization of Japan's Defense Forces

In early April 1945, with invasion imminent and inevitable, it was realized that the defense of Japan was too great a task for the one defense headquarters. Accordingly, it was decided to divide the country into two large defensive areas, the Eastern and Western, and to establish the First and Second General Armies to

7. Operations of the 6th Air Army will be covered in greater detail in Japanese Monograph No. 51, "Iwo Jima and Ryukyu Islands Air Operations Record". (No date for publication yet established.)

Table No. 2

ORGANIZATION AND DISPOSITION OF
DEFENSIVE AIR UNITS
MARCH 1945

EASTERN MILITARY DISTRICT (Kanto Area)
(Twelfth Area Army)

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type of Plane</u>	<u>No. of Planes</u>
10th Air Division			
17th Air Regiment	Chofu	Hq Recon*	6
23d Air Regiment	Chofu	Fighter	25
28th Air Regiment	Chofu	Fighter	12
47th Air Regiment	Narimasu	Fighter	35
70th Air Regiment	Matsudo	Fighter	35
244th Air Regiment	Chofu	Fighter	35
53d Air Regiment	Kashiwa	Two-seat Fighter**)	25
Total Planes 10th Air Division			173
Available for temporary assignment from training units			90
TOTAL FOR DISTRICT			263

Table No. 2 (Cont'd)

ORGANIZATION AND DISPOSITION OF
DEFENSIVE AIR UNITS
MARCH 1945

CENTRAL MILITARY DISTRICT (Kansai Area)
(Fifteenth Area Army)

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type of Plane</u>	<u>No. of Planes</u>
11th Air Division			
16th Air Regiment	Taisho	Hq Recon*	6
56th Air Regiment	Taisho	Fighter	30
5th Air Regiment	Komaki	Two-seat) Fighter**)	20
Total Planes 11th Air Division			56
Available for temporary assignment from training units			70
TOTAL FOR DISTRICT			126

Table No. 2 (Cont'd)

WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICT (Kyushu)
(Sixteenth Area Army)

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type of Plane</u>	<u>No. of Planes</u>
12th Air Division			
19th Air Company	Ozuki	Hq Recon*	6
16th Air Brigade	Bofu		
51st Air Regiment	Bofu	Fighter	15
52d Air Regiment	Bofu	Fighter	15
59th Air Regiment	Ashiya	Fighter	35
4th Air Regiment	Ozuki	Fighter**	35
Total Planes 12th Air Division			106
Available for temporary assignment from training units			60
TOTAL FOR DISTRICT			166

* Headquarters Reconnaissance Planes were used as high altitude fighters.

** Two-seat Fighters were assigned night combat missions.

Table No. 3

ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY UNITS

MARCH 1945

NORTHEASTERN MILITARY DISTRICT
(Eleventh Area Army)

4 Antiaircraft Guns

EASTERN MILITARY DISTRICT
(Twelfth Area Army)

Hq 1st Antiaircraft Artillery Division

8 Antiaircraft Artillery Regiments

4 Independent Antiaircraft Artillery Battalions

2 Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalions

1 Searchlight Regiment

2 Machine Cannon Battalions

TOTAL: Approximately 600 Antiaircraft Guns

EAST COAST MILITARY DISTRICT
(Thirteenth Area Army)

Hq Nagoya Antiaircraft Gun Unit

2 Antiaircraft Artillery Regiments

1 Independent Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion

1 Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion

1 Searchlight Battalion

2 Machine Cannon Battalions

TOTAL: Approximately 150 Antiaircraft Guns

Table No. 3 (Cont'd)

ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY UNITS

MARCH 1945

CENTRAL MILITARY DISTRICT
(Fifteenth Area Army)

Hq Central District Antiaircraft Artillery Group

3 Antiaircraft Artillery Regiments

3 Independent Antiaircraft Artillery Battalions

1 Machine Cannon Battalion

TOTAL: Approximately 200 Antiaircraft Guns

WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICT
(Sixteenth Area Army)

Hq Western District Antiaircraft Artillery Group

4 Antiaircraft Artillery Regiments

3 Independent Antiaircraft Artillery Battalions

1 Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion

1 Searchlight Battalion

1 Machine Cannon Battalion

TOTAL: Approximately 300 Antiaircraft Guns

control the ground defense forces in the two areas. (Appendix IV)

At the same time the Air General Army was established to assume the task of directing air defense.⁸ The 1st Air Army, which had been primarily concerned with training missions, and the 6th Air Army, as a tactical force, were brought under the operational control of the Air General Army. (Appendix IV)

The two ground armies and the air army came under the direct command of Imperial General Headquarters and the General Defense Command was inactivated. (Table No. 4)

8. Further information on the Air General Army may be found in Japanese Monograph No. 23, "Air Defense of the Homeland".

MAJOR CHANGES IN COMMAND OF JAPAN'S DEFENSE FORCES
1941 to 1945

Jul 41 - Feb 43 IGHQ War Ministry* GDC	Feb 43 - Feb 44 IGHQ War Ministry* GDC	Feb 44 - Feb 45 IGHQ War Ministry* GDC	Feb 45 - Apr 45 IGHQ War Ministry* GDC	Apr 45 - Aug 45 IGHQ
Northern Dist* Northern Army Cmd	Northern Dist* Northern Army (Directly under IGHQ)	Northern Dist* Fifth Area Army (Directly under IGHQ)	Northern Mil Dist* Fifth Area Army (Directly under IGHQ)	Fifth Area Army
Eastern Dist* Eastern Army Cmd			Northeastern Mil Dist* Eleventh Area Army	FIRST GENERAL ARMY Eleventh Area Army
			Eastern Mil Dist* Twelfth Area Army	Twelfth Area Army
			East Coast Mil Dist* Thirteenth Area Army	Thirteenth Area Army
Central Dist* Central Army Cmd			Central Mil Dist* Fifteenth Area Army	SECOND GENERAL ARMY Fifteenth Area Army
			Western Mil Dist* Sixteenth Area Army	Sixteenth Area Army
Western Dist* Western Army Cmd			Western Mil Dist* Sixteenth Area Army	Sixteenth Area Army
		1st Air Army	1st Air Army 6th Air Army	AIR GENERAL ARMY 1st Air Army 6th Air Army
* District commands were under the control of the War Ministry. Army Commands under the General Defense Command.				

CHAPTER 3

THE KETSU-GO OPERATION

Situation in April 1945

The over-all war picture in April 1945, was extremely grim for Japan. The Axis Forces, in Europe, were being routed and Germany was on the verge of collapse. On 5 April, the U.S.S.R. denounced the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact, implying future hostile actions against Japan. The Philippines Operation, for which great army and navy forces had been concentrated, was ending in disaster. United States forces had captured Iwo Jima, only a few hundred miles from the coast of Japan, and were attacking Okinawa. The situation in Burma and China was also very discouraging. An attack against the Japanese homeland was now inevitable.

The greater part of Japan's troop strength was overseas, material resources and production had been strained to the utmost, transportation and communications facilities had suffered badly from air raids, defense preparations had made comparatively little progress and coastal fortifications were still far from complete. It was obvious that the defense of Japan would require herculean efforts.

Activation of the General Armies

The Army Section of IGHQ planned a complete mobilization of Japan's manpower, with the formation of several additional armies and area armies. On 8 April 1945, orders were issued, to be effective

15 April, activating two general armies which would be responsible for the ground defense of Japan.

The Order of Battle, published for the First General Army, directed it to defend the Northeastern, Eastern and East Coast Military Districts and to command the Eleventh, Twelfth and Thirteenth Area Armies. The Second General Army was to defend the Central and Western Military Districts and command the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Area Armies. The defense of the Northern Military District (Hokkaido) would be the responsibility of the Fifth Area Army, which would be directly under IGHQ.¹ Similarly, the Seventeenth Area Army was charged with the defense of Korea, under the direction of IGHQ.²


(Map No. 4)

Although it was desirable for the general armies to have the fullest command powers and the highest degree of autonomy, there were certain factors which prevented attainment of these goals. Despite the urgent necessity of making all-out efforts for defense and achieving complete unity of command, the size of the two general army headquarters were restricted by the number of qualified persons available.

1. See Japanese Monograph No. 21, "Homeland Operations Record, Vol IV, Fifth Area Army" for details of defense preparations for Hokkaido, the Kuriles and Karafuto.

2. See Japanese Monograph No. 22, "Seventeenth Area Army Operations, 1941-45" for details of defense preparations in Korea.

MAP NO. 4



Should the tremendous task of providing logistic support for the area armies be added to the duties of the First and Second General Armies, the time involved in making the necessary adjustments might handicap the area armies in their defense construction missions. For this reason it was decided that rear echelon services, such as communications, transportation and supply, would continue to be handled by the commanders of the military districts. Areas of friction arose due to the fact that commanders of the area armies were under the command of the general armies and were responsible for defense preparations in their areas while, in their dual capacity as commanders of the military districts, they were responsible to the War Minister for matters of logistics. The general armies had only Ordnance, Finance, Quartermaster, Medical, Veterinary and Judicial staffs. This dual nature of the district commands acted to limit the powers of the general armies. Since the military districts were on the same command level as the area armies, the general armies could only control the military district commanders indirectly and many of the general armies' defense projects required negotiation to correlate administrative and operational matters. Because communications lines were controlled by the military districts, the general armies encountered difficulties in obtaining intelligence information. There were also problems connected with liaison between adjacent military districts and area army commands.

The commanders of the two general armies were authorized to direct any unit, exclusive of air units, stationed in their areas. It

was stipulated, however, that they must first consult with the respective commanders of the units concerned and then report all details to the War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff. Deviation from this unwieldy procedure, which weakened the effectiveness of the general armies, was permitted only in case of emergency. The general armies which were to be given the broadest powers and highest degree of autonomy were responsible to the War Minister on matters of administration and personnel, to the Chief of the General Staff for operations and operational planning and to the Inspector General in regard to training. (Chart No. 1)

3

The Air General Army

On 8 April 1945, IGHQ issued an order activating the Air General Army, effective 15 April. The purpose of the new general army was to coordinate the air defense of Japan, providing a single headquarters through which cooperation with the ground forces and the navy could be expedited in implementing the defense of Japan.

As in the case of the formation of the First and Second General Armies, the Air General Army was to organize its headquarters and build up slowly, taking over only a limited number of air units until it was entirely operational, at which time it would direct all the air power of Japan. Only a part of the 1st Air Army and the Air

3. See Japanese Monograph No. 23, "Air Defense of the Homeland" for complete details on the Air General Army, including its Order of Battle.

Training divisions were brought immediately under the control of the general army. The 10th and 11th Air Divisions were to remain temporarily under the operational control of the First and Second General Armies for air defense purposes and the 6th Air Army was to continue under the command of the Combined Fleet in the prosecution of the Okinawa Campaign.

The Navy General Command


The Imperial Japanese Navy, determined to strike a crushing blow at the enemy, organized a powerful striking force known as the 1st Diversion Attack Force. Consisting of the battleship Yamato, the light cruiser Yahagi and eight destroyers, under the command of Vice Admiral Seiichi Ito, the 1st Diversion Attack Force sortied from the western end of the Inland Sea, on 6 April, to attack the U.S. anchorage at Okinawa. Southwest of Kyushu, on the following day, the fleet encountered air units from a U.S. carrier force and, in the ensuing engagement, the greater part of the fleet was lost. Included among the casualties was the Yamato, the world's largest warship and flagship of the fleet. In view of this terrific loss, the operation was abandoned and the remainder of the Force limped back to Japan.

As a result of this disastrous setback, the Combined Fleet was so reduced in strength that it was compelled to adopt new tactics: To rely on its air force to operate as its principal strength with a small amount of assistance from the comparatively weak surface force and the

CHART NO. 1

ORGANIZATION AND CHAIN OF COMMAND

APRIL 1945



underwater special attack forces.

On 25 April, the Navy General Command was activated and took over the missions heretofore assigned to the Combined Fleet. On 1 May, the headquarters was established with Admiral Soemu Toyoda as Commander in Chief. Homeland air defense was included as a mission of the Navy General Command which assigned the 3d, 5th and 10th Air Fleets, together with antiaircraft and other air defense forces, under the command of the various naval districts, to the task. In the accomplishment of this mission, the navy was to cooperate with the army in intercepting enemy air raids.

The Ketsu-Go Operation

Simultaneously with the activation of the First and Second General Armies and the Air General Army, IGHQ issued orders for the implementation of the Ketsu-Go (Decisive) Operation (See Appendix V). This operation was designed as an all-out joint defense effort to be conducted by the entire strengths of the army, navy and air force. Entirely defensive in nature, the operation divided the Japanese home territory (including Hokkaido, the Kuriles, Karafuto and Korea) into seven zones in which might be fought the final decisive battles to determine the fate of the nation:

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Zone</u>
Ketsu-Go, No. 1	Northern Military District Fifth Area Army

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Zone</u>
Ketsu-Go, No. 2	Northeastern Military District Eleventh Area Army
Ketsu-Go, No. 3	Eastern Military District Twelfth Area Army
Ketsu-Go, No. 4	East Coast Military District Thirteenth Area Army
Ketsu-Go, No. 5	Central Military District Fifteenth Area Army
Ketsu-Go, No. 6	Western Military District Sixteenth Area Army
Ketsu-Go, No. 7	Korea Seventeenth Area Army

Ketsu-Go, No. 1, which involved the defense of Hokkaido by the Fifth Area Army would be directly under the control of IGHQ. This portion of the operational plan contemplated the containment and destruction of any invasion force which might seek to establish bases on Hokkaido or nearby islands from which to support an invasion of Honshu.

Ketsu-Go, No. 2, concerned with the defense of the Northeastern Military District by the Eleventh Area Army would be a responsibility of the First General Army. The operational plan for Ketsu-Go, No. 2, contemplated an enemy landing in the Sendai Plains area, with a possible approach via the Tsugaru Strait. Although every effort would be made to destroy the invading forces, action in this area would be considered as a secondary operation with the goal of holding the enemy until the over-all situation could be assessed and a decision reached.

as to the possibility or desirability of conducting a decisive battle in that region. Both the Fifth and the Eleventh Area Armies as well as the navy were responsible for the defense of the Tsugaru Strait and the forts which commanded its approaches.

Ketsu-Go, No. 3, provided for the defense of the Eastern Military District by the Twelfth Area Army under the direction of the First General Army. This Kanto Plain area was considered the most vital part of the nation, containing the Imperial Palace and the nation's capital, the centers of government and the highest military headquarters as well as the great Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama industrial complex. In addition, the Kanto Plain was one of the great rice producing centers upon which the populace of the area and the military forces of the Eastern Military District were dependent. The best prepared defense works were located in the Sagami Bay and Kujukurihama areas and, as these also offered the most advantageous landing sites for an invasion force, it was estimated that decisive battles would undoubtedly be fought in those areas. The shore of the Kashima Sea, north of the Boso Peninsula, was also considered to be a primary invasion target and defenses were strengthened in the area.

Ketsu-Go, No. 4, covered the East Coast Military District in which the Thirteenth Area Army, under the First General Army, was the defending force. This operation was second only the Ketsu-Go, No. 3, and contemplated the all-out defense of Nagoya and vicinity. The

operational plan called for defending against enemy attacks through Ise Bay and an eventual firm defense of the right bank of the Ibi River and the hills in the Okazaki area.

Ketsu-Go, No. 5, was an operational plan for the defense of the Central Military District by the Fifteenth Area Army operating under the command of the Second General Army. Emphasis in this region was laid on defending the approaches to the Inland Sea in order that the vital shipping lanes through that body of water should be maintained. In cooperation with the Sixteenth Area Army, the Moji-Shimonoseki Strait and its shipping lanes would also be protected. The shores of the Japan Sea, which were vulnerable to attack from Korea, should the enemy establish bases there, were also important defense areas. Included with this last defense project was the protection of shipping and the keeping open of the sea lanes between Japan and Korea.

Ketsu-Go, No. 6, was concerned with the defense of Kyushu by the Sixteenth Area Army under the Second General Army. The completion of defense preparations in Kyushu was of the greatest urgency as the initial enemy attack was almost certain to be directed at that island. Its defense was also the most difficult of all the districts as Kyushu had the greatest length of vulnerable sea coast to defend. Defense preparations for Ketsu-Go, No. 6, had an almost equal priority with those for Ketsu-Go, No. 3, and had an earlier completion date designated.

Ketsu-Go, No. 7, was the operational plan for the defense of Korea by the Seventeenth Area Army. Defense planning and preparations were designed to prevent enemy forces from establishing bases on southern and western Korea from which an invasion of Japan proper could be supported.

Inter-service Agreements

In the various orders and directives issued by IGHQ regarding the Ketsu-Go Operation, inter-service cooperation was stressed. The basic plan for the Operation called for the navy to defend the coasts by attacking invasion fleets with its combined surface, submarine and air forces. The Air General Army would cooperate with the navy in the accomplishment of this first phase of the defense. Should the enemy succeed in making a landing, the area army concerned would assume command of all naval ground forces in its area and would exercise operational control of air forces in support of ground operations. Although no specific agreement was ever reached regarding the operational control of land based naval planes, it is assumed that the First and Second General Armies and their subordinate area armies would have been given operational control of naval air units in the event of an invasion.

The details and actual implementation of the inter-service cooperative agreements would be worked out by mutual agreement between the commanders of the First and Second General Armies, the Air General Army and the Navy General Command. Commanders of the area

armies would also cooperate with, and could expect cooperation from, naval and air units in their areas.

Mutual Support

An integral part of the Ketsu-Go operational planning included reinforcement of sectors under attack by troops transferred from other districts. Since enemy air raids had already seriously disrupted the transportation system and it was known that every effort would be made to completely neutralize the entire system, time schedules were planned to provide for all troop movements to be made on foot. This, in turn, would require the defending force to conduct successful holding actions for long periods.

The Air General Army also recognized the need for mutual support, both in defending against enemy air raids and in combatting an invasion. Accordingly, on 1 July 1945, the principles of the "Sei-Go" Operation were published and the air forces organized to send the maximum support to any area under air or ground attack.⁴

Final Defense Efforts

With Japan's great overseas empire either recaptured or threatened by the Allied Forces, with Manchuria and northern Japan being aggressively eyed by the U.S.S.R. and her once powerful navy all but destroyed, the nation girded itself for the decisive battle to defend the home-

4. See Appendix II, Japanese Monograph No. 23, "Air Defense of the Homeland" for a complete description of the Sei-Go Operation.

land, confident that its combined armed forces, imbued with the spirit of Yamato Damashii, would successfully hold its shores against any invader and hurl the aggressor force back into the sea.⁵

5. Yamato Damashii has long been accepted as expressing the soul or spirit of Japan. Kitabatake Chikafusa, a 14th Century Japanese scholar, wrote: "Great Yamato is a Divine Country. It is only our land whose foundations were first laid by the Divine Ancestor. It alone has been transmitted by the Sun Goddess to a long line of her descendants. There is nothing of this kind in foreign countries. It is the duty of every man born on the Imperial Soil to yield devoted loyalty to his Sovereign, even to the sacrifice of his own life." This spirit had been strongly revived in Japan prior to, and during, the Greater East Asia War.

CHAPTER 4

THE FIRST GENERAL ARMY

The First General Army was activated at 0001 hours, 15 April, with the assigned mission, "To strengthen the defenses of the Homeland and to annihilate any enemy which may attack our shores." The defense zone assigned to the new general army was the northern and eastern part of Honshu, from Tsugaru Strait southwest to a line just west of Nagoya, covering the Northeastern, Eastern and East Coast Military Districts in which the Eleventh, Twelfth and Thirteenth Area Armies were the defending forces.

Organizational Meetings

On 13 April, the commander of the First General Army, Gen. Sugiyama, summoned the senior staff officers of each area army and subordinate army to Tokyo to discuss the more important aspects of the change in command and to acquaint them with the details of the newly formulated, "Agreement between the First General Army and the Combined Fleet concerning Homeland Defense Operations." The deliberations of the staff officers at this organizational meeting were somewhat disorganized by a U.S. air raid which destroyed the headquarters¹ of the First General Army at Ichigaya.

1. The Ichigaya section of Tokyo was the location of IGHQ. At the conclusion of World War II it was the site of the International Military Tribunal war crimes trials. The area was subsequently renamed "Pershing Heights" and, from 1952 to 1957, was the location of the headquarters of the United Nations Command and the Far East Command.

On 19 April, with the headquarters located in another building, the General Army summoned the chiefs of staff of the three area armies to indicate to them the key points for defense operations, to outline the utilization of the logistic channels and to establish standards for the communications network.

Defense of the Kanto Region

In connection with key point defenses, it was emphasized that the enemy would undoubtedly make its strongest drive against the Kanto Plain area in order to gain control of that vital zone. Because the primary mission of the First General Army was to stop that attack, and because defense preparations and fortifications were still incomplete, it would be necessary to concentrate the largest numbers of troops in the Eastern Military District.

The area army representatives were also told that it was highly important that the entrance to Tokyo Bay be blocked and, although the navy was primarily responsible for that task, it was the duty of the General Army to insure the denial of the bay to the enemy. The lower reaches of the Tone River and its estuary were vulnerable to attack and the General Army would be required to take the necessary steps to defend that sector of the coast as well as the surrounding lake and swamp area.² The Boso Peninsula would also be a primary invasion

2. The Tone River rises north of Tokyo and flows south and east to the Kashima Sea, cutting across the northern end of the Boso Peninsula.


target for the enemy, particularly the Kujukuri-hama sector, in the Northern part. The Southern end of the peninsula was important in the blockading of Tokyo Bay and efforts were being made by the General Army to reinforce the defenses in that area. (Map No. 5)

Defenses in Other Areas

Although the Kanto Plain and Tokyo area was considered the most important part of the country to be defended, defenses in the other areas could not be neglected. The Shimokita Peninsula and Tsugaru Strait, in the northern part of Honshu, and the entrance to Ise Bay and the Nagoya area were also of great importance. The First General Army, utilizing the Twelfth Area Army, would concentrate on building up the defenses of the Eastern Military District but would also render all possible assistance to the Eleventh and Thirteenth Area Armies in their defense preparations.

It was noted that the strengthening of the present defense positions and the building of additional fortifications was of paramount importance. The chiefs of staff were told that because of limited manpower and construction material, the coastal fortifications were often localized and did not offer protection to the entire seacoast, nor were they built in accordance with specifications. Emphasis was laid on the fact that defense areas must be continuous with no gaps between districts. The General Army and the area armies would have to exert every effort to correct these errors of omission and commission.

MAP NO. 5



Cooperative Efforts

It was pointed out that cooperation with other branches of service and between adjacent area armies was one of the key points of the Ketsu-Go Operation. The General Army would effect general liaison with the navy and air force, but it would be the responsibility of the commanders of the area armies and the military districts to arrange the details and to maintain relations on the working level.

Announcement was made of the special attack forces of the navy which would utilize suicide tactics to destroy enemy invasion fleets. Similar air force special attack forces would be based in strategic areas along the coast and the area armies were urged to give every assistance in the constructing of air bases for the special attack forces.

Supplies and Equipment

Assurances were given the area armies that the manpower of the nation would be mobilized as completely and speedily as possible. It would not, however, be possible to provide arms and equipment for such a great number of men immediately and the armies would be required to train and equip new troops with whatever was available. The General Army promised that the resources of the nation would be mobilized to produce the needed material and that every effort was being made to rectify deficiencies.

Troop Movement

The need to maintain the transportation systems was also a matter of concern, as maneuverability of troops and the ability to reinforce areas under attack were among the most important tactical considerations in the defense concept as outlined in the Ketsu-Go plan.

Conduct of the Defense

At the meeting, the commander of the First General Army also laid down four precepts for the guidance of his command:

First: To follow orders and maintain the command system is the only way to accomplish the mission of the First General Army.

Second: That all officers and men constantly bear in mind that the completion of operational preparations is as important as the winning of a decisive battle.

Third: That every officer and man exert his fullest efforts to completely annihilate the enemy which is expected to invade the Homeland.

Fourth: That all men and officers unite in demonstrating the national strength to the enemy.

He further stated that in concentrating the entire national strength to destroy the enemy, ten Japanese soldiers would be sacrificed to kill one enemy, if necessary. The main objective would be to annihilate every enemy soldier, leaving none alive in the homeland. He reiterated that this was not just a simple defense, but as

the final, glorious struggle to preserve the nation, the lives of men were of no consideration - men and officers would attack relentlessly over the bodies of their fallen comrades until the invaders were destroyed.

Estimate of U.S. Invasion Plans

The battle for Okinawa was at its height and although the defense was stubborn, it appeared that the U.S. would be successful in taking the island because of the massive forces assigned to the task. After the capture of Okinawa, the Allied Forces would immediately begin preparations for the invasion of Japan. Intelligence estimates indicated that while the invasion might come as early as July, it was not believed that the U.S. would be prepared to launch an invasion until the fall of 1945, probably some time after the 1st of October. It was believed, however, that the assault on Japan would be made as soon as possible after that date. All defense preparations, therefore, were to be completed by the end of September.

Mobilization

A mass mobilization, resulting in a tremendous increase in the strength of Japan's armed forces, particularly the ground forces, was one of the most important facets of defense planning. A series of three mobilizations were to be completed by late summer 1945.

Although the order of battle published for the First General Army showed a large number of division sized units, many of them were not operational at the time of activation and some of them were, in fact, still in the planning stage. The major ground force units actually available to the First General Army at the end of April were:

First General Army

Eleventh Area Army	Sendai
72d Division	Fukushima
95th Independent Mixed Brigade	Hachinohe
Twelfth Area Army	Tokyo
36th Army	Urawa
81st Division	Utsunomiya
93d Division	Kashiwa
51st Army	Takahama
44th Division	Ogawa
52d Army	Sasai
3d Imperial Guards Division	Joto
53d Army	Isebara
84th Division	Odawara
Tokyo Bay Defense Group	Funagata
96th Independent Mixed Brigade	Tateyama
1st Antiaircraft Artillery Division	Tokyo
1st Tank Division (Trfd. from the Kwantung Army)	Sano
4th Tank Division	Chiba
Thirteenth Area Army	Nagoya
73d Division	Toyohashi
97th Independent Mixed Brigade	Toyohashi
Nagoya Antiaircraft Artillery Division	Nagoya

First Stage Mobilization

Orders for the First Stage Mobilization had been issued in March and during late April and early May, seven divisions which had been organized as a result of the mobilization were assigned to the First General Army. The General Army, in turn, reassigned two divisions

(the 142d and 157th) to the Eleventh Area Army, three divisions (the 140th, 151st and 152d) to the Twelfth Area Army and the remaining two (the 143d and 153d) to the Thirteenth Area Army. During the same period the 147th Division which had been recently mobilized for service with the Fifth Area Army, was transferred to the Twelfth Area Army and was deployed on the Boso Peninsula. The 57th Division, one of the last remaining "elite" divisions of the Kwantung Army was also to be transferred to the Twelfth Area Army.³

Although mobilization plans were proceeding according to schedule as far as increase in manpower was concerned, firepower had not increased in the same ratio, as production of weapons had not kept pace with induction of men. Although the First General Army had almost doubled in numerical strength, many of the recently mobilized divisions were virtually unarmed.

Struggle for Equipment and Supplies

With the General Army restricted as to logistic efforts, the individual area armies made efforts to obtain weapons, ammunition and construction materials through their own channels. Since much of the shortage of supply at the troop level was attributable to lack of

3. See Pages 125-127 and Charts 9a and 9b, Japanese Monograph No. 138, "Japanese Preparations for Operations in Manchuria, January 1943 to August 1945" for listings of other troop units transferred from the Kwantung Army to Japan and Korea. Actually, the 57th Division was eventually assigned to the Sixteenth Area Army.

transportation, the area armies used their non organic transportation and were successful in obtaining much of the material required, particularly that which was needed for construction of coastal fortifications.

The commander and staff of the General Army made a number of tours of inspection to determine requirements and assisted in overcoming transportation and distribution bottlenecks.

As a result of the observations of the commander and staff of the General Army, new operational and logistical plans were made and on 7 May, at a meeting with the senior staff officers of the area armies, the new plans were outlined. Once more it was emphasized that an invasion could be expected in the fall and that operational preparations must be complete by that time.

Second Stage Mobilization

In the middle of May, seven new units activated as a result of the Second Stage Mobilization were added to the First General Army which assigned the 201st, 202d and 214th Divisions and the 2d, 3d and 7th Independent Tank Brigades to the Twelfth Area Army, while the 209th Division was assigned to the Thirteenth Area Army.

Third Stage Mobilization

The final mobilization order had been originally scheduled for July, but in order to accelerate defense preparations the Third Stage

Mobilization was ordered on 23 May. In this last marshalling of manpower, a total of two army headquarters, 18 divisions and 14 independent mixed brigades were formed for service in Japan. Of these new units, the two army headquarters, ten divisions and seven independent mixed brigades were assigned to the First General Army. About the middle of June the General Army made the following reassignments:

Hq Eleventh Area Army	Sendai
50th Army Headquarters	Aomori
222d Division	Iwayado
308th Division	Nohechi
322d Division	Taira
113th Independent Mixed Brigade	Okawara
Hq Twelfth Area Army	Tokyo
221st Division	Kashima
234th Division	Yamakura
316th Division	Kanbe
321st Division	Oshima
354th Division	Marumura
114th Independent Mixed Brigade	Makoto
115th Independent Mixed Brigade	Mashiwa
116th Independent Mixed Brigade	Hakata
117th Independent Mixed Brigade	Numazu
Hq Thirteenth Area Army	Nagoya
54th Army Headquarters	Shinjo
224th Division	Hiroshima * assigned to
229th Division	Kanazawa (Omaezaki)
355th Division	Himeji * being
119th Independent Mixed Brigade	Asahina (organized)
120th Independent Mixed Brigade	Shimizu

This Third Stage Mobilization exhausted practically all the reserve manpower of Japan and the majority of those called up were

4. One division and one independent mixed brigade were also organized for service in Korea.

either untrained or old. If Japan had been attacked at this time it would have been impossible to conduct an adequate defense. The strong defense by the troops on Okinawa was, however, buying time for the defense preparations of the homeland.

Two types of divisions were formed during the mobilization period: Coastal Defense and Assault Groups. In general, the divisions in the 100 and 300 series were earmarked for coastal defense while those in the 200 series had assault missions.

The Coastal Defense Divisions were strongly reinforced with artillery which increased their firepower but decreased mobility. The Assault Divisions also had firepower superior to that of the average division but were highly mobile. These latter divisions were to be used as shock troops to hit the enemy after the invader had been contained by the Coastal Defense Divisions.

Defense of Tokyo

On 23 June, in an effort to improve the defense of Tokyo, the Tokyo Defense Army was activated and placed under the Twelfth Area Army. Major units assigned to the Defense Army included both old and newly formed units:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Headquarters Location</u>
Tokyo Defense Army	Tokyo
1st Guards Division	Tokyo
321st Division	Oshima*
1st Guards Brigade	Tokyo

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Headquarters Location</u>
2d Guards Brigade	Tokyo
3d Guards Brigade	Tokyo
66th Independent Mixed Brigade	Niishima*
67th Independent Mixed Brigade	Hachijojima*
1st Antiaircraft Division	Tokyo

* The Izu Islands located off the mouth of Tokyo Bay.

Coincident with the activation of the Tokyo Defense Army, the First General Army issued a directive titled, "Principles of the Tokyo Defense Operation." In general, the directive covered the following aspects of the defense of greater Tokyo:

1. The defense of the metropolis will be conducted under the general principles of the Ketsu-Go Operation and will be known as the Retsu-Go Operation.

2. The objective of the operation is to protect the Imperial Palace and maintain the metropolis. To achieve these ends, elements of the Army will conduct a stubborn defense in the outlying areas of the city.

3. The Imperial Guards Division will have the mission of defending the Imperial Palace. It may, however, be employed in other areas during operational preparations, providing such employment does not interfere with the Division's primary mission.

4. The duration of this operation is estimated to be one year. Underground storage will be prepared for operational supplies and equipment which will be transferred from other areas.

5. Defense preparations will be principally concerned with the construction of fortifications, including strongly built underground fighting and storage sites.

6. Upon activation of the Retsu-Go Operation, all installations of possible use to the enemy, except those actually required in the defense, will be removed or destroyed to deny their use to the enemy.

Reinforcement of the Tokyo Area

Plans were perfected by IGHQ and the First General Army for a speedy concentration of troops in the Kanto area as intelligence estimates agreed that the U.S. would employ a force of not less than 30 divisions when the invasion on that sector was launched. The plan called for between eight and thirteen divisions to be advanced from other areas to reinforce the Twelfth Area Army within a period of ten to thirty days after the commencement of an attack. Sources of reinforcement were:

Fifth Area Army	1 to 2 Divisions
Eleventh Area Army	2 to 3 Divisions
Thirteenth Area Army	2 to 3 Divisions
Second General Army (Fifteenth Area Army)	3 to 5 Divisions

Influencing this planning was the revised intelligence estimate of U.S. invasion plans. At the end of July, IGHQ had come to the conclusion that although the U.S. would probably strike at Kyushu in October, as previously estimated, the invasion of the Kanto area would not begin before March or April of 1946.

Convinced that the initial invasion would be aimed at Kyushu, although tentative plans were made to reinforce the Kanto Plain area with troops from the Sixteenth Area Army, it was considered doubtful if that army would be in a position to lend support to any other area.

Re-disposition of Troop Units

Initially, troop dispositions were made by the area armies in conformity with the provision of the original Ketsu-Go Operation directive. As defense preparations developed, however, inspections by staff members of the First General Army disclosed a number of faults in the disposition as well as the deployment of units: the natural strengths and weaknesses of certain coastal areas had not been properly evaluated; units were not always deployed to gain the fullest advantage from their prepared positions; weak or newly activated divisions had been assigned to the defense of highly vulnerable or strategically important sectors and proper weapons were not invariably allotted to the positions where they could best be used. Many of these errors could be corrected on the spot, but to correct disposition faults it was determined that all troop dispositions would henceforth be directed by the General Army, particularly the disposition of those units formed during the Third Stage Mobilization.

Starting in July, changes effected by the First General Army were: the transferring of the 152d Division to the Tone River estuary while the 234th Division, which was scheduled to defend that area, was being organized and trained; the strengthening of the defenses of the entrance to Tokyo Bay by ordering the 354th Division to the southern tip of the Boso Peninsula and the 114th Independent Mixed Brigade to the Yokosuka area; while the reinforcement of the Omaezaki Cape, east

of Hamamatsu, was to be accomplished by assigning the 224th Division and the 119th Independent Mixed Brigade to that area. (Map No. 6)⁵

In the event that sectors in the zone of responsibility of the Second General Army should be attacked, the First General Army would attempt to reinforce those battle areas, provided the Kanto region was neither threatened nor under actual attack.


For emergency redistribution of troops and reinforcement of areas, attention was given to the reorganization of transportation lines to improve facilities for lateral movement of troops along the coast in place of the previous emphasis on transport between the interior and the coast.

Fortification and Training Improvements

In accordance with the instructions contained in the Second Phase Fortification Plan, promulgated in early 1945, emphasis had been laid on the importance of strengthening existing fortifications. The First General Army, however, corrected a tendency to place too much importance on this type of defense preparation and directed that greater stress be laid on the building of additional positions to support

5. Only a part of the staff and elements of the 224th Division actually arrived in the Omaezaki area, where they took over the direction of fortification construction by civilian workers. On 6 August the balance of the division still undergoing training in Hiroshima (Second General Army area) and suffered severe losses in the atomic explosion.

MAP NO. 6



the major defense fortifications. In addition, the General Army emphasized the necessity of teaching tactics and conducting training that would insure that the troops would gain maximum advantage from the positions and that the positions would be employed with maximum effectiveness.

Adjustment of Air Defenses

The tempo of U.S. air raids was stepped-up after air bases were advanced to Saipan and Tinian. The larger cities of Japan had been heavily bombed in the early part of 1945 and, in June, the scope of the attacks was increased to include small and medium-size cities. The enemy also included in its objectives the disruption of the transportation and communications facilities. The attacks on the smaller cities, in many of which were located installations of the decentralized war industry, together with the disruption of transportation lines had effected a material decrease in production of weapons and munitions. Since the army was expanding rapidly as a result of the mobilizations, further reductions in production would seriously hamper the defense effort. It was, therefore, determined that drastic steps would have to be taken to improve air defenses. In general, these steps included the improvement of the air raid and intelligence network, the unification of command of the air defense fighter units and the utilization of antiaircraft artillery to greater advantage.

Air Raid Warning System

A workable air raid warning and intelligence network had already been completed, utilizing both military and civilian personnel to man coastal lookout points. In addition, intelligence was received from special air signal units located throughout the Pacific area and from units in China and Korea. The system was not, however, completely satisfactory because centralized control and organization were lacking. The original net had been expanded in a series of emergency augmentations as enemy air activity increased or as new attack methods were employed. Furthermore, the gathering of topographic and atmospheric data had been neglected and air raid intelligence could not be properly evaluated. Air raids of the magnitude being mounted by the U.S. in June 1945, had not been anticipated during the early years of the war and it had not been realized that such a broad, over-all warning network would be needed.

Closer liaison between services and military districts was instituted, resulting in greater success in the interception of raiding planes. Later, the Communications Center was taken over by the Air General Army in an effort to expedite the dissemination of air raid intelligence. The backbone of the whole network was the communications system and the keeping of those facilities in operation

6. See Pages 50-55, Japanese Monograph No. 23, "Air Defense of the Homeland" for a discussion on the air raid warning system.

was a major operation, as the enemy's widespread bombing constantly disrupted communications lines and switchboard centers. Some success in improving communications was achieved by making greater use of radio communications in place of long-distance telephones. The number of signal units was, however, inadequate to permit the substitution of radio for telephones throughout the entire air raid warning net.

Antiaircraft Defense

In the employment of antiaircraft artillery, the General Army directed the area armies to make "dynamic use" of their weapons, as opposed to a static defense of certain specified areas. Although rapid movement of many of the antiaircraft units was not possible, attempts were made to anticipate enemy bombing objectives and to move mobile batteries to areas that were the most probable targets. Mobile units were also to be used as an auxiliary air defense against enemy planes supporting invading ground troops. As a result of the "Dynamic Use" system, approximately one-third of the antiaircraft artillery was constantly on the move from one strategic point to another to protect small cities, important rail and highway traffic junctions and various manufacturing areas. The remaining two-thirds was deployed in the Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama industrial complex (Keihin area) and in the Nagoya region.

Methods used to accomplish command unification of air defense fighter units will be discussed subsequently, under the section on "Cooperation with the Air General Army."

Cooperation

Realizing the importance of mutual support and complete cooperation in preparing for the defense of the homeland, inter-service rivalries were virtually forgotten and the various branches of the Japanese armed forces achieved a harmony of relationship never before known. The general and area armies which were actually in competition with each other for equipment, munitions and other material, held their controversies to a minimum and made a number of cooperative arrangements.

Inter-Army Agreements

A number of district boundaries were adjusted to provide a more equitable defense responsibility and a major adjustment was effected between the Twelfth and Thirteenth Area Armies to improve transportation facilities and the maneuverability of troops of both armies.

In order to strengthen the defense of northern Honshu and to establish clearly defined zones of responsibility for the Fifth and Eleventh Area Armies, an agreement was made between the First General Army and the Fifth Area Army. Under the terms of the agreement, the Eleventh Area Army assumed tactical command of all Fifth Area Army units in the northern Honshu prefecture of Aomori and undertook the

training of troops and the strengthening of fortifications in the Tsugaru Fortress Zone. The Fifth Area Army agreed to provide logistic support for the units unless emergency conditions prevented.

At the end of July, in a meeting held in Kyoto, the First and Second General Armies concluded an agreement regarding air force cooperation. Some discussion was also devoted to determining a projected estimate of Sixteenth Area Army materiel requirements. Although IGHQ had ranked the Kanto area as the most important area defensively, it had also given Kyushu first priority on many items of supply as it was believed that the U.S. would hit first at western Japan. The First General Army had been cooperating in the build-up of Kyushu defenses but now found itself in difficulties in attempting to stockpile equipment and munitions for its own zone of responsibility. In addition, it was without arms and equipment for many of the men who had been called up in the Third Stage Mobilization. The Second General Army agreed to study the situation but no definite agreement was reached in connection with a projected cut-off date for the requirements of the Sixteenth Area Army.

Cooperation with the Air General Army

On 14 May an agreement regarding the defense of the homeland was concluded between the First, Second and Air General Armies. (See Appendix VI.) In general, this agreement established the right of com-

7. Stockpiling of ammunition was finally completed in August but the war ended before stockpiling for First General Army units was in full swing.

mand over air defense fighter units within the various military districts.

When the First General Army was activated, it was ordered to take command of the air defense fighter units located in the Eastern and East Coast Military Districts. The General Army, in turn, attached the units to the area army commands. Under the Twelfth Area Army was the 10th Air Division with three fighter regiments (later built up to five regiments) and under the Thirteenth Area Army was the 23d Air Brigade with one fighter regiment as a nucleus. During June, because of the increase in enemy air raid activity, two additional fighter regiments were transferred from the Second General Army, one regiment being attached to the Twelfth Area Army and the other to the Thirteenth.

At the end of June it was proposed to IGHQ that all air defense fighter units be brought under the command of the Air General Army for purposes of unifying command and improving tactical employment of defense aircraft. The ground forces made a number of objections to this proposal, raising questions on the difficulties of liaison and cooperation with ground defense units as well as control of communications facilities in the air raid warning network. It was, however, decided that in the interests of air defense efficiency, all air units would come under centralized control and, effective 1 July, all air defense fighter units were returned to Air General Army control. While it would have been advantageous to the air force to have

all intelligence and warning agencies under its control, it was feared that transfer of the entire communications network to the Air General Army would result in confusion and reduced efficiency. As a result, the agencies of the intelligence and communications net remained under ground force control and only the main Communications Center was brought under the Air General Army.

Another problem area arose as a direct result of the inability of the air force to overcome night flying equipment and training deficiencies. As a consequence of these deficiencies, it was necessary to employ searchlight units to assist the air force in night actions. As the searchlight units were under the command of the ground forces, a number of issues of a technical nature arose in connection with liaison and cooperation between ground air defense units and the Air General Army. No real solution to this problem was ever found.

Cooperation with the Navy

In order to have a clear-cut definition of the respective responsibilities of the army and navy, on 8 April, IGHQ had issued a directive titled, "Procedure for Army-Navy Cooperation in the Homeland Operation." As might be expected, the regulation indicated that, in general, the army would be responsible for, and in command of, land operations and the navy would control all sea operations. There were, however, areas of overlapping interest and authority in connection with the air forces of the two services as well as the naval bases.

A series of agreements between the First and Second General Armies, the Combined Fleet and the Air General Army sought to settle all differences and establish areas of command.

Army troops in areas which the navy controlled by virtue of having a naval base in the district, such as Yokosuka and Ominato Naval Bases, would come under the command of the naval commander of the district, while the naval base commander in turn, came under the command of the First General Army, for all ground operations. The General Army assigned the task of reinforcing the naval bases and the training of naval personnel in ground tactics to the area armies concerned, although direct command of the naval forces was not relegated to them. It was agreed, however, that in the event of an invasion all naval ground forces would come under the command of the area army in which the base was located.

The protection of Tokyo and Ise Bays was also covered in the agreement. Naval shore batteries would be under the operational control of the area armies although the passing of command would not take place until actual defensive action was required.

On 13 June, another agreement was concluded between the First General Army and the Combined Fleet which dealt with the problem of the defense of air bases. Under the terms of the agreement, certain designated naval air bases were opened for joint use with the army while specific army bases were to be jointly used with the navy.

Details of logistic support generally provided that the commander of the air base, either army or navy, would maintain and improve the base, construct protective revetments and provide for dispersion and concealment of planes.

The area armies were also to cooperate in constructing bases for the special attack (suicide) planes of the navy.

Information provided by air raid nets and intelligence agencies of both services was to be mutually shared.

Relocation of Army Headquarters

At the end of June, the First General Army received permission from IGHQ to move its headquarters to a less vulnerable location and, after a study of communications conditions and transportation facilities, determined that in September the command post would be relocated slightly west of Takasaki (about 50 miles northwest of Tokyo, on the upper reaches of the Tone River). Also in September, the command post of the Twelfth Area Army was also to be moved out of Tokyo to Matsuyama (about 50 miles northeast of Tokyo).

Defense of the West Coast


Although Japan's dependence on resources from the Asian continent and the importance of the west coast was recognized, little defensive preparation had been accomplished along the coast of the Japan Sea. Following the Third Stage Mobilization, studies were initiated regarding the disposition of troops and defense strategy. At this time,

however, the over-all situation was rapidly deteriorating and arms, ammunition and other supplies were in very short supply. In spite of the fact that there was a strong possibility that the United States might move through the Korea Strait to launch an attack on the west coast, little defensive development took place. The subject of the improvement of the defenses of the Japan Sea coast was still under study when the war ended.


Final Dispositions of Troops

By the first part of August all the divisions raised in the Third Stage Mobilization had been assigned to defensive areas and were moving into position as soon as their organization and basic training was complete (Map Nos. 7, 8 and 9).


MAP NO. 7




MAP NO. 8



DISPOSITION OF FORCES EASTERN DISTRICT AUG 1945



MAP NO. 9



CHAPTER 5

THE SECOND GENERAL ARMY

The Second General Army was activated at 0001 hours, 15 April 1945, and assigned the same mission as that of the First General Army, "To strengthen the defenses of the Homeland and to annihilate any enemy which may attack our shores". The defense zone of the Second General Army was that portion of Honshu lying generally west of Nagoya, the islands of Shikoku and Kyushu as well as the many small islands lying off that part of the Japanese coast. The General Army commanded the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Area Armies and had command of the Central and Western Military Districts insofar as defense preparations were concerned.

Organization

The combat organization of the Second General Army, at time of activation, was as shown below:

Second General Army

Fifteenth Area Army (Western Honshu and Shikoku)

144th Division*

55th Army

11th Division

155th Division

Sixteenth Area Army (Kyushu)

145th Division*

25th Division*

57th Army

156th Division

154th Division

146th Division
86th Division

* Attached directly to the area army.

The organization of the administrative military districts was as follows:

Second General Army

Central Military District (Western Honshu and Shikoku)

Zentsuji Sub-district
Hiroshima Sub-district
Osaka Sub-district
Kyoto Sub-district

Western Military District (Kyushu)

Kumamoto Sub-district
Kurume Sub-district

Organizational Meetings

On 8 and 9 April the commander and staff of the Second General Army were summoned to IGHQ in Tokyo to receive the Army's order of battle, to be briefed on operational plans, to discuss cooperative agreements with the navy and to be given instructions regarding the missions of the newly formed general army. On 13 April the commander and his staff met in Osaka and by the 15th when the change of command became effective, the organization of the headquarters was completed. During this two day period the commander also received situation reports from the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Area Armies and had, in turn, briefed the commanders on their missions.

At 0900 hours on 17 April the headquarters personnel of the Second General Army left Osaka and proceeded to Hiroshima where permanent headquarters was established on the 18th.

Estimate of the Situation

Although IGHQ had made it clear that the most important defense area in the country was the Kanto Plain region, which included Tokyo and the Imperial Palace, it was emphasized that Kyushu was next in importance. In addition, it was considered probable that the enemy would attempt to invade the western part of Japan first.

The Second General Army estimated that the U.S. would enlarge its foothold on Okinawa, establish air bases on that island and, as soon as possible, begin its thrust at the Japanese archipelago via southern Kyushu. It was believed that simultaneously an invasion attempt might be made against Shikoku and that possibly small islands, such as Tanegashima, might be occupied prior to forcing a landing on Kyushu.

The first objective of the enemy would be to secure operational bases for its navy and air force. Should the strategic southern part of Kyushu fall into the hands of the enemy, bases could be established which, with bases on Okinawa and other nearby islands, would enable the enemy to support an attack on the Kanto area.

The earliest possible time at which an invasion attempt might be made by the U.S. was estimated to be the first part of July, when it was estimated that a strength of ten divisions could be mustered.

Shikoku was particularly vulnerable, employment of defending

troops was restricted by the terrain and rapid deployment extremely difficult. An enemy invasion of that island would be comparatively simple and, if the airfields located on the Tosa Plain fell into their hands, Tokyo would be within easy striking distance of even small fighter planes.

The possibility of an invasion of northwestern Kyushu could not be discounted, although it was believed that an invasion of that coast would delay enemy operations considerably and would necessitate the enemy first securing the islands of Cheju-do, Goto, Tsushima and Iki.

Large scale landing operations in the Kinki District were not likely to be attempted prior to an invasion of southern Kyushu, although some small scale raids might be carried out along the shores of the Kii Peninsula in conjunction with an invasion of Shikoku.¹

In addition to landings on southern Kyushu, Shikoku and in the Kinki area, there was also the possibility that an invasion might be made almost any place along the practically defenseless coast of the Japan Sea. It was generally believed, however, that an enemy assault along that coast, like an invasion of northern Kyushu, would require considerably more time to effect.

1. The Kinki District is the region lying between Nagoya and Osaka, extending north to the Japan Sea and including the Kii Peninsula.

Operational Planning

Based on this estimate of the situation, the Second General Army formulated its operational plans in accordance with the provisions of the Ketsu-Go Operation, Nos. 5 and 6. The area armies had, however, already received verbal orders from IGHQ and had been pressing preparations under the direction of the now defunct General Defense Command. The General Army, recognizing that an invasion was possible anytime after June, had to give full consideration to the fact that assuming immediate operational control of the area armies might create confusion and cause delay in defense preparations.

There were two schools of thought regarding the conduct of the defense of the Second General Army's zone of responsibility. One group of the staff felt strongly that the best method would be to fight delaying actions which would husband the strength and resources of the Japanese and would, at the same time, be costly to the enemy. The thinking of this group was influenced by the knowledge that coastal defenses were unfinished, the organization of units was incomplete and the recently mobilized soldiers were untrained. They put forward the argument that if delaying tactics were to be planned and prepared for immediately, the change to an aggressive and positive defense could be undertaken as operational preparations progressed. The other school of thought insisted that

there was no alternative to a drastic initial action with the objective of crushing any invasion attempt at a single blow. This group held that a defense based on an attempt to balance Japanese strength with that of the enemy (i.e. a holding or delaying operation which attempted to weaken the enemy by gradual attrition) would be fatal to the defense of Japan. Such a defense, they claimed, would enable the enemy to establish bases and accomplish a build-up of manpower and material in southern Kyushu or Shikoku.

The final decision was in the nature of a compromise: Every effort would be made to build up troop strength and defenses to permit aggressive action in the earliest stages of the invasion, but the final decision as to the type of defense to be conducted would not be made until the time of the actual attack. Certain areas where landings might logically be anticipated, such as southern Kyushu and southern shore of Shikoku, would be prepared for positive and aggressive action immediately. Such action, in a slightly modified form, would also be prepared for on the Kii Peninsula. All other sections of the Second General Army's coast line would be prepared to conduct delaying actions until sufficient strength could be built up to permit changing to the offensive. Delaying actions, it was emphasized, would be strong and continuous.

Operational preparations were to be conducted in three phases. The first phase, during which defense preparations and troop unit

organization would be roughly completed, would continue through July. The second phase, during which all training and defenses would be improved, would continue through August and September. The third phase, would see the completion of troop training and deployment as well as the construction of all defense positions, would be completed during and after October.

Defense Positions

The principal defense positions in Kyushu had been constructed by the Kurume and Kumamoto Depot Divisions along the Miyazaki coast (eastern Kyushu) and on the Satsuma and Osumi Peninsulas (southern Kyushu). These positions were built in accordance with the precepts laid down in "The Three Basic Principles on How to Fight Americans", which had been developed as a result of lessons learned in south Pacific combat. In brief, these principles were:

1. Positions should be constructed beyond the effective range of enemy naval bombardment.
2. Cave type positions should be constructed for protection against enemy air raids and naval bombardment.
3. Inaccessible high ground should be selected as protection against flame throwing tanks.

The construction units had followed these instructions literally, paying little attention to terrain, liaison and mutual support of units. Many generally accepted principles of sound military planning had been violated and the location of many of the positions

precluded an effective defense of the beaches. Many staff members of the General and Area Armies had doubts as to whether any of the positions so constructed could be used effectively.

War Game

The Sixteenth Area Army determined to hold a war game for the purpose of indoctrinating the subordinate unit commanders on the defense plans and policies which had been developed. The game was held in Fukuoka for a three day period, starting 27 April and, in addition to the subordinate unit commanders, was attended by staff officers from IGHQ, the Combined Fleet, Sasebo Naval Base and the 7th Fleet. The war game was based on the premise that the decisive battle for the defense of Kyushu would be fought along the Miyazaki coastline. This situation was established due to the fact that the Miyazaki Plain was particularly vulnerable and had many possible airfield sites which would be attractive to the enemy. Although the Satsuma and Osumi Peninsulas and other terrain surrounding Kagoshima Bay had advantageous sites for airfields and were equally vulnerable to enemy invasion operations, little attention was paid to these areas during the war game. As a consequence, the subordinate units received the impression that the decisive battle could be fought only on the Miyazaki Plain and operational preparations and disposition of troops lagged in other areas. A month or two later, it was necessary for the Sixteenth Area Army

to forcibly revise their plans and impress on the subordinate units that decisive battles might well be fought in any or all of several different areas.

General Army's Defense Plan

Because the formulation of over-all defense plans would, in the final analysis, be dictated by the state of preparation of each of the area armies, the operational plan issued by the Second General Army was extremely general:

1. The purpose of the operational plan of the General Army is to enable the taking of decisive action against an enemy invading the area for which the Army is responsible and to annihilate that enemy on the beachhead.

2. Ketsu-Go Operation, Nos. 5 and 6, will be established in compliance with the "Outline of Preparation for the Ketsu-Go Operation" issued by Imperial General Headquarters. In this connection, it must be realized that although the two regions lie in different Ketsu-Go areas, planning for operations on Kyushu and southern Shikoku must be closely coordinated.

3. The principal decisive battles will undoubtedly be fought in the southern part of Kyushu and on southern Shikoku. The Wakayama coast district (Kii Peninsula) may also be the site of a decisive battle.

4. Completion of preparations will be in three phases, as follows:

First Phase By the end of July

Second Phase August and September

Third Phase October and after

Should an invasion take place during the first or second phases, losses will be held to a minimum in order to gain time for further mobilization and preparation. After third phase preparations have been completed and maximum strength achieved, operations will be positive and aggressive.

5. Basic operational preparations will be roughly completed by the end of June.

6. Close liaison will be maintained with the air force and the navy in order to carry out closely coordinated action.

Cooperation

There was much discussion in the headquarters of the Second General Army regarding the amount of cooperation that could be expected from the air force and the navy. Little assistance could be expected from these two services once the battle moved inland and this loss of support was recognized in the joint planning.

Cooperation with the Navy

By the middle of May agreements had been concluded between the Second General Army and the Navy General Command and between

each of the area armies and the naval stations in the various areas. In general, these agreements followed the principles established in the IGHQ directive, "Procedure for Army-Navy Cooperation in the Homeland Operation", and were similar in content to those concluded between the First General Army and the Navy General Command.

Command of land-based naval units was vested in the General Army, with responsibility for training and defense preparations being assigned to the respective area armies. The relocation of converted naval guns to important fronts and the joint utilization of naval armories, workshops and supplies of naval stations was also covered in the agreements. The reinforcement of ground air defense strength was also affected by the addition of naval antiaircraft weapons to the army antiaircraft strength.

Cooperation with the Air Force

On 14 May a cooperative agreement between the First, Second and Air General Armies was concluded, based on the general principles of the "Outline of Preparations for the Ketsu-Go Operation". The Second General Army expressed the opinion that it would not depend on, nor expect, the Air General Army to furnish direct support of ground operations at the time of an invasion. It was expected that the Air General Army would, however, expend every effort to annihilate the transports and escort vessels of the enemy. It would be desirable later for the Air General Army to support

the ground operations in accordance with the desires of the First and Second General Armies rather than attempt independent action.

At that time the Air Defense Fighter Units (the 11th and 12th Air Divisions) had been placed under the command of the Second General Army which, in turn, had reassigned the 11th Air Division to the Fifteenth Area Army and the 12th to the Sixteenth Area Army. In the latter part of June when enemy air activities became more intense, the conclusion was reached that a unified air defense command would be more efficient. At this time the fighter units were returned to the command of the Air General Army.

Mobilization

As discussed previously, complete mobilization of Japan's manpower was to be effected in three stages. The final mobilization, to be completed before the end of July, would bring every able bodied man into the defense of the homeland.

First Stage Mobilization

The divisions to be raised under the First Stage Mobilization were expected to be organized by the latter part of March, but since mobilization plans were not complete at that time, the actual organization of the divisions was delayed until April and May.

Of the 12 divisions organized at the conclusion of the First Stage Mobilization, five were assigned to the Second General Army. The General Army, in turn, reassigned two divisions (the 144th and

155th) to the Fifteenth Area Army and three divisions (the 145th, 146th and 156th) to the Sixteenth Area Army.

All the divisions formed from men inducted during the First Stage Mobilization were to be trained and equipped as "Coastal Defense Groups".

The disposition of principal Second General Army units at the end of the First Stage Mobilization was as follows:

	<u>Headquarters</u>
Fifteenth Area Army	Osaka
144th Division	Wakayama
Central Antiaircraft Artillery Group*...	Osaka
Maizuru Fortress Unit	Maizuru
Yura Fortress Unit	Awaji Island
55th Army	Kochi
11th Division	En route from Manchuria for deployment in Kochi area
155th Division	Kochi
Sixteenth Area Army	Fukuoka
25th Division	En route from Manchuria for deployment in Kobayashi area
57th Division	Fukuoka (En route from Manchuria for assignment to First General Army)
145th Division	Kokura-Fukuoka

Hoyo Fortress Unit	Hoyo
Iki Fortress Unit	Iki
Nagasaki Fortress Unit	Nagasaki
Shimonoseki Fortress Unit	Shimonoseki
Tsushima Fortress Unit	Tsushima (Island)
Western Antiaircraft Group*.....	Kokura
57th Army	Takarabe
86th Division	Ariake Bay
146th Division	Satsuma Pe- ninsula
154th Division	Miyazaki
156th Division	Miyazaki
98th Independent Mixed Brigade ...	Uchigaura
13th Independent Mixed Regiment ..	Tanegashima (Island)

* Included fighter aircraft as well as antiaircraft artillery units.

Second Stage Mobilization

At the conclusion of the Second Stage Mobilization in early May, four divisions were assigned to the Second General Army, but their reassignment was not immediately determined. Tentatively it was planned that since the 206th and 212th Divisions were to be mobilized in Kyushu, they would be assigned to the Sixteenth Area Army. The 205th would be trained in the vicinity of Hiroshima,

with probable subsequent transfer to Shikoku if circumstances demanded. The 216th Division would receive its training near Himeji (northwest of Kobe) and would probably be assigned to the Sixteenth Area Army. In late May the General Army decided to employ the four divisions as planned and, beginning in June, the 205th Division was moved to the Tosa Plain area on Shikoku and the 216th was sent to Kumamoto, in Kyushu.

These four divisions were designated as Assault Divisions, to be used as shock troops to reinforce areas under attack or to defend the more important sectors.

Also formed from men called up in the second mobilization and assigned to the Second General Army were the 107th and 109th Independent Mixed Brigades and the 4th, 5th and 6th Independent Tank Brigades - all of which were subsequently reassigned to the Sixteenth Area Army.

The disposition of units in the Fifteenth Area Army showed little change as a result of the Second Stage Mobilization, with only the 205th Division being trained in the vicinity of Hiroshima for eventual duty in Shikoku. There were, however, several changes in the Sixteenth Area Army, including the formation of the 56th Army Headquarters. Disposition of Sixteenth Area Army units was as follows:

Headquarters

Sixteenth Area Army	Futsukaichi
25th Division	Kumamoto
212th Division	Miyazaki Plain
216th Division	Kumamoto
4th Antiaircraft Division	Kokura
(Reorganized from the Western Antiaircraft Group)	
Hoyo Fortress Unit	Hoyo
Tsushima Fortress Unit	Tsushima (Island)
107th Independent Mixed Brigade	Goto (Islands)
56th Army	Iizuka
57th Division	Fukuoka
(Temporary Assignment)	
145th Division	Kokura-Fukuoka
4th Independent Tank Brigade	Fukumaru
Iki Fortress Unit	Iki Island
Shimonoseki Fortress Unit	Shimonoseki
57th Army	Takarabe
86th Division	Ariake Bay
146th Division	Kawabe
154th Division	Miyazaki area
156th Division	Miyazaki area
98th Independent Mixed Brigade	Uchigaura

109th Independent Mixed Brigade	Tanegashima (Island)
(Reorganized from 13th Independent Mixed Regiment)	
5th Independent Tank Brigade	Honjo
6th Independent Tank Brigade	Kirishima

Antiaircraft Defense

At the time of the activation of the Second General Army, the antiaircraft artillery of the Fifteenth Area Army was organized under the Central Antiaircraft Artillery Group, while that of the Sixteenth Area Army was under the Western Antiaircraft Artillery Group. The Central Group, with headquarters in Osaka, was composed of three antiaircraft artillery regiments, three independent battalions and one independent cannon battalion. The greater part of the weapons of the Central Group were disposed in the Osaka-Kobe region with a few scattered units in Hiroshima, Iwakuni, Kyoto and Niihama. The Western Group, with headquarters in Kokura, was composed of four antiaircraft artillery regiments, four independent battalions, one searchlight battalion, one cannon battalion and one stationary barrage balloon unit. The main force of the group was emplaced in and around the Kokura-Yawata area, a strong element was in the Nagasaki area and the balance in Fukuoka, Omuta and Chiran.

At the time of the Second Stage Mobilization, the two antiaircraft groups were reorganized as divisions. The Central Antiaircraft Group was reinforced by the addition of one antiaircraft

artillery battalion, two gun batteries and five cannon companies and was redesignated as the 3d Antiaircraft Division. The disposition of the division was virtually the same as that of the group although it was required to protect some additional areas. The Western Group was augmented by the addition of one antiaircraft artillery regiment, one battalion, two batteries and eight cannon companies and was redesignated as the 4th Antiaircraft Division. Its disposition, too, remained approximately the same as that of its predecessor unit, with the exception that defense of key points on rail and vehicular traffic arteries and some airfields were added to its responsibilities.

As the U.S. stepped up its bombing attacks, a certain amount of redistribution of antiaircraft units became necessary. The Fifteenth Area Army was required to devote greater strength to the protection of key rail lines, particularly bridges on the Tokaido and Sanyo railway lines. The main harbors on the Inland Sea as well as those along the Japan Sea were also afforded protection. The Sixteenth Area Army was required to provide protection for the Shimonoseki-Moji railroad tunnel and the harbor of Hakata, in addition to its previous commitments.

In June the headquarters of the 4th Antiaircraft Division was placed under the 57th Army and moved to Takarabe. The purpose of this transfer was to prepare for movement to the theater of operations and provide integrated and closely coordinated protection of

southern Kyushu airbases as well as close antiaircraft support for troops when an invasion became imminent.

Third Stage Mobilization

Because the organization of the Second General Army was steadily improving and liaison with IGHQ and the area armies was further advanced, employment of units organized under the Third Stage Mobilization was carried out smoothly. The divisional size units were completely organized by early July and the smaller units by early August.

In the meantime, it was recognized that the all-out mobilization of Japan's manpower had increased the number of divisions as well as other troop units and that additional army headquarters were required. In addition, it was obvious that if the enemy invasion operation should achieve any appreciable degree of success, communications and liaison between the area armies and their subordinate units might well be impossible. It was quite possible that Kyushu, Shikoku and Chugoku (the western portion of Honshu) would be completely cut off from each other. The establishment of at least one army command within each of these areas appeared, therefore, to be a vital necessity. Since an acute shortage of headquarters and staff personnel made the establishment of additional headquarters extremely difficult, it was determined to reorganize existing installations. The headquarters of the Zentsuji

Military Sub-district (Shikoku) was reorganized as the 55th Army Headquarters and the sub-district was redesignated as the Shikoku Military District. As in the area armies and military districts, the commander and some of the staff served in dual capacities as members of the army headquarters and military district headquarters staffs. In the same manner, the Hiroshima Military Sub-district was reorganized as the 59th Army and the sub-district redesignated as the Chugoku Military District.

In Kyushu, the Sixteenth Area Army had two subordinate army commands; the 56th, with the mission of defending northern Kyushu, and the 57th which would defend Miyazaki Prefecture and the Osumi Peninsula in the southeast. Since it had been definitely determined that Kyushu would undoubtedly be the scene of the initial invasion attempt, it was believed that two additional army headquarters would be required for that area; one to take command of the units on the Satsuma Peninsula and a second to form a nucleus about which would be built a highly mobile reserve force. Here, again, the shortage of personnel with command and staff experience posed a problem. To establish the army headquarters for the defense of the Satsuma Peninsula, the 40th Army headquarters was re-deployed from Formosa. The commanding general and staff officers arrived by air on 10 June, establishing the headquarters and assuming command by the 15th. The army headquarters for the mobile reserve was never organized, however.

Seven divisions were added to the strength of the Second General Army as a result of the third mobilization. The 225th, 230th and 231st Divisions were organized as Assault Groups, similar to those formed under the Second Stage Mobilization. These newly formed divisions were, however, inferior in quality of personnel and equipment to those previously organized. The 303d, 312th, 344th and 351st Divisions were organized as Coastal Defense Groups. These divisions, too, were inferior to those previously organized, although they were strongly reinforced with artillery.

The Hoyo Fortress Unit was strengthened and reorganized as the 118th Independent Mixed Brigade and the Nagasaki Fortress Unit, also reinforced, was reorganized as the 122d Independent Mixed Brigade. The Iki and Tsushima Fortress Units were reinforced but not reorganized.

For the most part, the critical sectors in the Sixteenth Area Army zone were defended by divisions formed in the second mobilization and by units re-deployed from Manchuria. The units organized in this last mobilization were assigned to other, less critical areas.


The organization of units and their dispositions, as accomplished after the Third Stage Mobilization remained virtually unchanged until the end of the war:

Headquarters

Fifteenth Area Army (Map No. 10) Osaka
 144th Division Wakayama
 225th Division Himeji
 123d Independent Mixed Brigade Gobo
 38th Independent Mixed Regiment Awaji Island
 3d Antiaircraft Division Osaka
 (Reorganized from Central Antiaircraft
 Group)
 Maizuru Fortress Unit Maizuru
55th Army (Shikoku) Shinkai
 11th Division Kochi
 155th Division Kochi
 205th Division Kochi
 344th Division Sukumo-Nakamura
 121st Independent Mixed Brigade Tokushima
59th Army Hiroshima
 230th Division Okayama
 231st Division Yonago
 124th Independent Mixed Brigade Kogushi Bay*


* Located in Yamaguchi Prefecture on Japan Sea coast.

Sixteenth Area Army (Map No. 11) Fukuoka
 4th Antiaircraft Division Kokura
 107th Independent Mixed Brigade Fukue (Goto
 Islands)



Tsushima Fortress Unit	Tsushima (Island)
40th Army	Ijuin
77th Division*	Kajiki
146th Division	Kawabe
206th Division	Isaku
303d Division	Sendai
125th Independent Mixed Brigade	Ibusuki
56th Army	Iizuka
57th Division*	Fukuoka
145th Division	Wakayama
312th Division	Karatsu
351st Division	Fukuma
4th Independent Tank Brigade*	Fukumaru
Iki Fortress Unit	Iki Island
57th Army	Takarabe
25th Division*	Kobayashi
86th Division	Shibushi
154th Division	Tsuma
156th Division	Honjo
212th Division	Tsuno
98th Independent Mixed Brigade	Takayama
109th Independent Mixed Brigade	Tanegashima (Island)

MAP NO. 11



DISPOSITION OF FORCES

WESTERN DISTRICT

AUG 1945



5th Independent Tank Brigade*	Honjo
6th Independent Tank Brigade*	Kirishima
Chikugo Force	Nagasaki
118th Independent Mixed Brigade	Saheki
122d Independent Mixed Brigade	Nagasaki
Higo Force	Kumamoto
216th Division*	Kumamoto
126th Independent Mixed Brigade	Amakusa

* Sixteenth Area Army Mobile Reserve.

Revision of Plans

In June it appeared that the heroic, though unsuccessful, defense of Okinawa had gained time for the homeland defense preparations. Originally, the invasion had been expected as early as July, but in the first part of June a new estimate of the enemy situation indicated clearly that an invasion probably could not be launched until October. The additional time would, however, also enable the enemy to strike with a much stronger force as the U.S. would have time to re-deploy troops from the European Theater. In addition to the expected strike at Kyushu, the enemy might attempt to split Japan by subsequently driving a wedge through from the Nagoya-Osaka-Kobe sea coast. Since the boundary between the First and Second General Armies ran between Osaka and Nagoya, there was a possibility that confusion of command responsibilities might

weaken the defense of that area. Accordingly, the Second General Army suggested the revision of the boundary and the combining of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Area Armies into a single area army command. The new boundary would be established at the Tenryu River, just west of Shizuoka Prefecture, or at the Fuji River, slightly east of Shizuoka Prefecture. The establishment of an additional army command for the defense of the Japan Sea coastal area was also included in the plan.

A meeting, attended by staff officers of IGHQ, the two general armies and both area armies concerned was held in Kyoto on 21 July and a draft of the Second General Army's plan was presented and discussed. The war ended, however, before any action was taken on the recommended change.

Based on the new estimate of the probable time of an invasion, the Second General Army revised their plan for the strengthening of the defenses of the Central and Western Military Districts. One of the principal points was to prevent the isolating of the units on Kyushu and Shikoku from western Honshu. To this end the defenses along the shores of the Inland Sea were to be strengthened. Greater emphasis was also to be placed on the building of defense positions and the reinforcing of areas along the northwest coast of Kyushu.

Defense of Kyushu

Since it was generally conceded that the enemy would make his initial landings in Kyushu, the Sixteenth Area Army had been given priority in the receipt of supplies and in the build-up of troop strength. Fortification construction had also been emphasized and, in general, preparations were further advanced in Kyushu than in other areas of Japan.

Ketsu-Go Operation, No. 6, was the over-all guide for the defense of Kyushu but the Sixteenth Area Army prepared its own detailed defense plan. Known as the Mutsu Operation, the Army's plan divided Kyushu into three principal sectors which were, in turn, broken down into seven areal sub-divisions:

Mutsu Operation, No. 1 - Southern Kyushu

Part A Miyazaki Plain

Part B Ariake Bay

Part C Satsuma Peninsula

Mutsu Operation, No. 2 - Northern Kyushu

Part D Moji to Maebara

Part E Karatsu to Sasebo

Mutsu Operation, No. 3 - Central Kyushu

Part F Amakusa Area

Part G Bungo (Hoyo) Channel


Deployed throughout Kyushu and on adjacent islands, the Sixteenth Area Army had three armies and two special forces with a total of 15 divisions (including one antiaircraft division), 7

independent mixed brigades, 3 independent tank brigades and 2 fortress units. The defense concept under the Mutsu Operation Plan called for each army to hold one division in reserve. In the event of an invasion, the Sixteenth Area Army would concentrate a force composed principally of the armies' reserve divisions and the three tank brigades. This force would then be utilized as an assault group to be rushed to the areas where the main enemy effort was being directed (Map No. 12). During the period in which the assault force was being concentrated, the coastal defense units would make every effort to contain the enemy.

The special suicide attack forces of the air force and the navy were responsible for denying the bays and harbors to the enemy. The troops deployed as coast defense units would initially utilize attached artillery to destroy enemy transports and landing craft. When, and if, the enemy succeeded in establishing a beachhead, the artillery would be withdrawn from coastal positions and used in direct support of the counterattacking reserves. Tanks would not be used for mass attacks but would be employed as artillery and utilized in the same manner.

Having no way to counter enemy air support of an invasion, every effort would be made to confuse the battle lines so as to prevent the enemy from using naval bombardment and air power to support the ground troops. The advances of the mobile reserves would be accomplished under cover of darkness in order to prevent harassment and attack by enemy aircraft.

MAP NO. 12



In the event of simultaneous invasions in both north and south Kyushu, the northern battle would be the principal and decisive struggle.

Mutsu Operation, No. 1

Mutsu Operation, No. 1, covered the defense of southern Kyushu by the 40th and 57th Armies. This part of Kyushu was considered the most probable area to be invaded.

Part A was the defense of the east coast, particularly the plains area of Miyazaki Prefecture, by the 154th, 156th and 212th Divisions of the 57th Army. In the event of an invasion in this area, those units would hold the attackers until the mobile reserve could be assembled and moved from their inland locations. The counterattack phase would be carried out by a mobile reserve composed of the 25th, 77th and 216th Divisions together with the 4th, 5th and 6th Independent Tank Brigades which would move initially to Honjo and Tsuma. As an additional reserve to bolster the counterattack or launch a third phase attack, two divisions would be sent from the Fifteenth Area Army and, if possible, one additional division from the 40th Army.

Part B would be activated if the enemy invaded the Ariake Bay region. Initial defense would be conducted by the 86th and 156th Divisions plus the 98th Independent Mixed Brigade of the 57th Army. The mobile reserve for execution of the second phase would be composed of the 25th, 57th and 216th Divisions as well as the 4th, 5th

and 6th Independent Tank Brigades. These units would advance to Iwakawa to contain the invading force on the Shibushi Peninsula and counterattack when conditions warranted. The two divisions from the Fifteenth Area Army would be used as additional reinforcements to support the counterattack phase.

Part C provided for the defense of the Satsuma Peninsula region by the 146th and 303d Divisions and the 125th Independent Mixed Brigade of the 40th Army. In the second, or counterattack, phase the 25th, 57th, 77th, 212th and 216th Divisions together with the three tank brigades would advance to the vicinity of Ijuin to hold the invaders on the peninsula and be prepared to execute the counterattack. Here again, two divisions from the Fifteenth Area Army would be moved south to activate a third phase of the operation.

Mutsu Operation, No. 2

Mutsu Operation, No. 2, provided for the defense of the northwest coast between Moji and Sasebo by the 56th Army and the naval forces in the Sasebo area.

Part D would be activated in the event of an invasion attempt between Moji and Maebara. This region was defended by the 57th, 145th, 321st and 351st Divisions and the 4th Independent Tank Brigade. Mobile reserve for the execution of the second phase was composed of the 25th, 77th, 212th and 216th Divisions together with the 5th Independent Tank Brigade. As additional reinforcement, one

division would be dispatched from the Fifteenth Area Army and, if possible, two more from south or central Kyushu.

Part E covered the section of the coast from Maebara south to Sasebo where the defense was the responsibility of the Sasebo Naval Base marines, the Tsushima and Iki Fortress Units and the 4th Anti-aircraft Division. The second and third phases of this operation would be decided upon in accordance with the general situation at the time.

Mutsu Operation, No. 3

Mutsu Operation, No. 3, was the operational plan for the defense of a central belt extending from Shimabara Bay, on the west coast, northeast across Kyushu to the shores of the Bungo Channel. The western sector being the responsibility of the Higo Force, composed of the 216th Division and the 126th Independent Mixed Brigade, while the eastern sector was defended by the Chikugo Force, composed of the 118th and 122d Independent Mixed Brigades, the 2d Independent Infantry Battalion and other small units.

Part F, calling for the defense of Amakusa, the Hayasaki Channel, Shimabara Bay and the Ariake Sea as well as Part G, the defense of the coastline bordering the Bungo Channel, were to be conducted in much the same manner as that of Part E: the local units to hold against any invading force until reserves could be dispatched by Sixteenth Area Army headquarters in accordance with

the situation. Because of the location and topography of the areas covered by Parts E, F and G it was believed that invasion efforts in those areas would be on a small scale and could be easily contained.

To further protect the coasts of Kyushu, the Goto Group (107th Independent Mixed Brigade) was stationed in the Goto Archipelago (Goto Islands), west of Sasebo and Nagasaki, while the 109th Independent Mixed Brigade defended Tanegashima (island), south of the Shibushi Peninsula.

Logistics

The production, movement and distribution of supply was, of course, one of the most important aspects of the defense preparations. In spite of the obvious need for closely coordinated efforts to provide the operational armies with arms, ammunition and equipment, the General Defense Command had been given little control over logistic matters. Line of communications activities were the responsibility of the military districts which were, in turn, responsible to the War Minister. While this system had the advantage of relieving the C-in-C of Defense of many minor details of supply, it also meant that effective logistic support could not be rendered its subordinate units. In addition to lacking control over supply facilities, the GDC had little or no control over transportation and signal communications, although the maintenance of these facilities was vital to the success of its mission.

At the time of the activation of the Second General Army, stockpiles of supplies for the use of the operational armies were shockingly inadequate. Because it was believed that an invasion of Kyushu might come within a matter of eight to ten weeks, the General Army urged more rapid completion of logistic preparations. It was decided that first priority should be given to southern Kyushu and southern Shikoku, even though this meant a delay in furnishing supplies to the Kii Peninsula and the Chugoku area. In early May, the Second General Army issued a directive entitled, "General Principles for Preparation of Line of Communications of the Second General Army", an outline of which follows:

1. The greatest importance will be placed on the logistic support of Kyushu and Shikoku, especially southern Kyushu and southern Shikoku.

2. The time for the completion of all line of communications preparations will be as follows:

- a. Kyushu:

To be roughly completed by the end of July. Southern Kyushu: To be roughly completed by the end of May and fully completed by the end of June.

- b. Shikoku:

To be roughly completed by the end of July and fully completed by the end of August.

- c. Other Areas:

To be roughly completed by the end of August and fully completed by the end of October.

3. Preparations will include the storing of munitions in caves and other underground shelters to protect them from enemy air raids and naval bombardment.

4. Every effort will be made to achieve the highest degree of self-support, particularly the production of arms in Kyushu.

5. Civilian manpower will be utilized to the maximum.

Surveys conducted by the Second General Army staff showed that bottlenecks consistently developed at important railheads and harbor installations. The area armies were directed to render all possible assistance in the unloading and forwarding the huge quantities of supplies which had piled up at Shimonoseki, Moji, Hakata and other harbors in western Japan. The area armies were also encouraged to repair and maintain roads of strategic or tactical importance. Not having any signal communications facilities under its direct control, the General Army was forced to rely on the regular government facilities and the communications units of subordinate commands. Because of the dual nature of the command structure, the General Army made little progress in improving the transportation and communications systems within its zone of responsibility.

Transportation Test

Although the Second General Army directive resulted in accelerating line of communications preparations, movement of supplies to the armies was still unsatisfactory. It was, therefore, decided

to attempt a one week emergency transportation test. Scheduled to start on 27 May, this transportation drive had the objective of moving equipment and material (excluding arms and ammunition) to the operational armies. Results indicated, however, that insufficient time had been allotted to preparations and the emergency transportation week was not an unqualified success. Only 80 per cent of the planned quantity of supplies was transported and, because they were hurriedly assembled, the material shipped was not properly balanced so that the actual benefit to the receiving units was well below 80 per cent of requirements. Causes for the failure of the test were laid to four principal weaknesses:

1. Poor quality and training of transportation units and troops.
2. Lack of preparation on the part of receiving units and failure to accomplish prompt unloading and dispersal operations.
3. Last minute changes of schedules and shipments by forwarding organizations.
4. The general confusion of the rail transportation system due to enemy bombings.

Changes in Logistics System

The failure of the transportation test actually proved of some value to the Second General Army by graphically illustrating the need for more closely coordinated logistic support. In late April, the War Ministry had relinquished, to the commanders of the military districts, slightly greater authority in regard to the operation of

supply depots and in the early part of July, following the transportation test, all supply depots in Kyushu were placed completely under the commander of the Western Military District, who was also the commander of the Sixteenth Area Army. This effected a much closer relationship between the tactical units and the supply services.

Because an attack on Shikoku would undoubtedly result in the isolation of that island and would effectively prevent re-supply, an army supply depot was activated on the island and placed completely under the direction of the Shikoku Military District Commander. As the Shikoku Military District had been organized by, and was subordinate to the Second General Army, rather than the War Ministry, this supply depot was the only one under the direct control of the Second General Army. Under the new system of having close coordination between line of communication activities and the operational armies on Kyushu and Shikoku, preparations progressed rapidly throughout July and by the end of the month were practically complete in southern Kyushu and southern Shikoku. Although this unified system was obviously successful in Kyushu and Shikoku, it was not adopted in other Second General Army areas in which only 30 to 50 per cent of needed supplies had been accumulated.

Original plans called for the supplying of each division with one campaign unit of fire and by July this quantity was actually in

2

the possession of the area armies. The third mobilization, however, greatly increased the number of troop units and despite initial planning it was necessary to reduce ammunition stocks to a one-half unit of fire for each organization. This reduction in ammunition supplies made it necessary to adjust supply plans for the high priority areas and to plan for the rapid transfer of ammunition from one area to another when the invasion was actually launched and the place and direction of attack had been determined.

Intelligence

Immediately following its activation, the Second General Army promulgated and issued a plan for the collection of intelligence and directed it to the attention of the two area armies. Information was desired on enemy intentions to invade Japan: the time, direction and scale of attack. Information on the topography of the areas to be defended was also needed. The area armies were directed to establish an intelligence network, utilizing forces on the islands surrounding Japan and the lookout stations along the coasts. The subordinate commands were, however, already overtaxed by other defense efforts and showed little interest in the establishment of the intelligence network. The General Army, having no intelligence organization in its headquarters, was forced to depend

2. One campaign unit of fire was sufficient ammunition for one campaign - generally understood to be a three month supply.

primarily on IGHQ for all information. Surveys conducted by the Second General Army staff resulted in gaining some information on the military topography of the areas to be defended.

CHAPTER 6

TERMINATION OF THE WAR

The first of August 1945, found the First and Second General Armies with all major dispositions of troops completed, main coastal fortifications built and supplies of ammunition and other material in the hands of the tactical units. Supplies, although not adequate for a prolonged campaign, were sufficient for an initial defense and every effort was being made to increase the stockpiles of all organizations.

The ground defense force for Japan totalled 56 divisions, 25 mixed brigades, 2 tank divisions, 7 tank brigades and 4 antiaircraft divisions, 3 garrison brigades with a combined strength of over 2,000,000 men. (See Appendix VII)

Approximately 10,000 planes comprised the strength of the air force, although many of these could not be considered as combat planes, being training planes converted to special suicide attack (Kamikaze) planes.

The Navy had 19 destroyers, 38 submarines and 3,300 special suicide attack vessels.

A National Volunteer Force with an enrollment of 28,000,000 was receiving instruction in guerilla tactics and methods of defending the nation.

At 0810 on 6 August, the Atom Bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, destroying the headquarters of the Second General Army and killing 80 of

the headquarters personnel. The Central Military District headquarters was completely wiped out as were the headquarters of the 59th Army and the 224th Division.¹

Headquarters of the Second General Army was re-established in a previously prepared location and the commanding general radioed Tokyo that he was assuming command of all units in the area and would proceed to conduct relief activities and maintain public order in the disaster area.

On 15 August the Imperial Rescript announcing the termination of the war and Japan's surrender was received by the headquarters of the First and Second General Armies. The Imperial decision was immediately dispatched to all subordinate units with instructions for commanders to direct compliance with the terms of the surrender.

Imperial Guards Division Incident

On 14 August, learning that an Imperial Rescript was to be issued announcing the surrender of Japan, Lt. Col. Jiro Shiizaki and Maj Kenji Hatanaka of the Military Affairs Bureau conspired with Majors Sadakichi Ishihara and Hisashi Koga, staff officers of the 1st Imperial Guards Division, to prevent the surrender. They believed that the entire Japanese Army would follow the example of a key unit that re-

1. Although assigned to the Cape Omae area, the 224th Division was still in training at Hiroshima.

fused to surrender.

At midnight on the 14th, Shiizaki and Hatanaka called on Lt. Gen. Takeshi Mori to urge him to join the plot and commit the 1st Imperial Guards Division as the nucleus of the revolt. General Mori, although opposed to the surrender, refused to disobey the orders of his superiors and was promptly shot by Maj Hatanaka. Issuing orders in the name of General Mori, Ishihara and Koga were successful in having the 2d Imperial Guards Regiment increase the guard around the Imperial Palace and cut off all contacts with the outside. In the meantime, Maj Hatanaka was making efforts to find the phonograph record on which the Emperor had recorded the Imperial Rescript and which would be used in a broadcast the next day. His efforts to discover the whereabouts of the record were unsuccessful and events began to turn against the conspirators.

Learning of the death of General Mori, General Shizuichi Tanaka, commander of the Twelfth Area Army, immediately assumed direct command of the 1st Imperial Guards Division and, proceeding to the Imperial Palace, quelled the revolt. He then reported directly to the Emperor that he had the situation well in hand and that there would be no further difficulties.

Lt. Col. Shiizaki and Maj Hatanaka committed suicide in the palace grounds and Maj Koga took his own life at the headquarters of the 1st Imperial Guards Division. Maj Ishihara, apparently attempting to atone for his misdeeds was killed while trying to break up a demon-

stration of students from the Mito Army Air Signal School, who had assembled in Ueno Park (northeastern part of central Tokyo) and were preparing to fight against the surrender.

Atsugi Incident

There were several other demonstrations, more or less serious in nature, including a group of Navy flyers at Atsugi who attempted to carry on the fight and dropped leaflets urging the continuation of the war. These flyers were led by Capt Yasuna Kosono, commander of the 302d Naval Air Group, who expressed the belief that the Imperial Rescript was a forged document circulated by pacifists in direct opposition to the Imperial Will. The Atsugi Incident came to abrupt end when Capt Kosono became badly deranged mentally, only two days prior to the arrival of General MacArthur at the Atsugi landing strip.

By the time U.S. forces arrived in Japan, all incidents had been quelled and the occupation of Japan proceeded without further difficulty.

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APPENDIX I

Imperial General Headquarters Directive:

"Defense of the Homeland"

5 May 1944

1. Defensive Operation Policy

a. The Army and Navy will, by frustrating enemy invasion attempts, achieve the mission of safeguarding the Homeland.

2. Essentials of Defensive Operations

a. The frustration of enemy air raids is of primary importance in the defensive operation. For this purpose, all preparations for air defense operations will be completed as soon as possible. Simultaneously, the defenses of isolated islands will be strengthened to the maximum. Defenses of the vital areas of the Homeland will be reinforced immediately. In the event of an invasion, no time will be lost in amassing the combined strength of air and ground forces to make concerted use of them in defeating the enemy.

b. The Eastern, Central and Western Army Commands as well as the Korea Army are charged with the mission of conducting defensive operations in their respective areas. In the event of an enemy invasion within their areas they will concentrate all available fighting strength in defending and counterattacking.

c. The 1st Air Army will, in close collaboration with the Navy, search for enemy seaborne forces, especially transports, and strike to annihilate them at sea.

d. In the conduct of operations, the armies will coordinate their actions closely with the Navy as well as with adjacent armies.

3. Air Defense Operations

a. In case of enemy air raids, the fighting strength of air defense and antiaircraft forces will be thoroughly concentrated and employed to their full strength in shooting down enemy planes which threaten vital installations contributing to national defense. For this purpose, zones between combat areas of fighter planes and anti-aircraft units will not be definitely established, as it is expected that they will so coordinate their actions as to overcome and remedy their respective defects. The air units will directly defend the vital military areas with a sufficient number of planes, while with their remaining strength they will attempt to intercept the enemy planes as far from the Homeland as possible. In aerial combat our planes will give persistent pursuit, neglecting their prescribed areas of operation, and will attempt to shoot down all raiding planes so that none can return to their bases.

b. The mission of the Eastern Army Command is primarily to safeguard the Imperial Palace and vital military, governmental and industrial points in the Tokyo-Yokohama area. The army will also dispatch antiaircraft forces to Tachikawa, Ota, Hitachi and Kamaishi to protect industrial installations. For the protection of the Tokyo-Yokohama area, airbases large enough to accommodate approximately 20 fighter

regiments will be prepared. To improve the radar network, contact with the radar installation on Hachijo (island) will be established and preparations will be made to station two patrol boats equipped with radar approximately 300 miles off the coast.

c. The Central Army Command will defend primarily the vital productive installations in the areas of Nagoya, Osaka and Kobe. Air defense forces will be committed to Hiroshima, Hamamatsu, Shimizu, Hirohata and Kyoto to defend industrial installations. To perform the defense mission in this area, airbases sufficiently large to accommodate approximately five fighter regiments will be established in the vicinity of Nagoya and airfields of equal capacity will be established in the vicinity of Osaka and Kobe. Contact with the radar installation on Hachijo will be maintained and preparations will be made to station one radar equipped patrol boat approximately 300 miles off the coast.

d. The primary defensive task of the Western Army Command is the protection of the industrial installations in the Kokura-Yawata area, including Shimonoseki and Moji. Forces will be sent to protect productive installations in Nagasaki, Fukuoka and Omuta. Airbases capable of accommodating ten fighter regiments will be prepared for the protection of the Kokura-Yawata area.

e. The Korea Army will primarily defend the important installations in the Pusan and Seoul areas. Forces will be sent to protect the industrial centers of Heiijo and Suiho, particularly power plants.

Airbases to accommodate two fighter regiments will be prepared in the Pusan area and fields of equal size will be prepared in the vicinity of Seoul.

f. At the approach of enemy carrier forces, the 1st Air Army will place under its command the 5th Air Brigade which, in close cooperation with the Navy, will try to locate the enemy carriers to attack and destroy them.

4. Coastal Defense Operations

a. The defense preparations of isolated islands and vital Homeland areas will be accelerated immediately. In the event of an enemy invasion, the combat strength of air and ground forces will be concentrated and employed to their full power in destroying the enemy far out at sea.

b. The Eastern Army Command will first strengthen the defenses of the Izu Islands and then those defenses on the Hachinohe, Sendai, Mito and Sagami Plains as well as on the Boso (Chiba) Peninsula. Defenses will be so located that enemy amphibious operations can be met on the beach and destroyed. For the conduct of this type of operation, the emphasis on construction of defenses should be directed to the Izu Islands, Hachinohe Plains and the Boso Peninsula.

c. The Central Army Command will promptly reinforce the defensive installations in the vital areas located in the area of the Hamamatsu and Toyohashi Plains and on the Kii Peninsula. Defenses

shall be so prepared to permit destruction of the enemy on the beaches. In performing this task the main efforts should be directed to the Hamamatsu Plains. One division will be so deployed as to permit it to reinforce any of the areas promptly.

d. The Western Army Command will promptly strengthen the defenses of the Ryukyu Islands and then fortify the important areas around Tanegashima (island), the Miyazaki Plain and the Satsuma and Osumi Peninsulas. The army will prepare defenses so as to meet the enemy on the beach and destroy him. In the conduct of this operation, emphasis should be laid on the Ryukyu Islands and the Miyazaki Plain. One division (excluding horses) shall be held in readiness to reinforce the Ryukyu Islands in the event of an enemy invasion of that area.

e. The Korea Army will strengthen defenses of isolated islands and of areas along the coast of the Japan Sea north of Gunzan. Every effort will be made to safeguard the main rail lines running through the Korean Peninsula.

f. The 1st Air Army will complete all preparations and in the event of an enemy invasion will cooperate closely with the Navy in locating the enemy's transports and will destroy them at sea.

5. Guard

a. For the security of military activities and to facilitate counterintelligence, necessary guard and vigilance shall be brought into action whenever the circumstances demand.

APPENDIX II

General Defense Command Instructions

for Implementation of

"Sho-Go Operation, Number 3"
(Reconstructed)

21 July 1944

1. Territorial Divisions and Designations

a. Sho-Go Operation, Number 3, will be divided into five sub-operations to be activated and designated as follows:

<u>Invasion Directed at:</u>	<u>Sub-Operation</u>
Vicinity of Hachinohe.....	"A"
Vicinity of Sendai.....	"B"
Vicinity of Kanto Plain.....	"C"
Vicinity of Hamamatsu.....	"D"
Northern Kyushu.....	"E"

2. General Policy

a. The unified strength of the Army, Navy and Air Force shall be employed to its full strength and will attack and destroy enemy convoys at sea, preferably while lying at anchor. Necessary preparations shall be made for this type of operation.

3. Air Operation

a. Preparations will be so made that in the event of an enemy invasion, air strength can be promptly and completely concentrated

in the areas where needed. In close collaboration with the Navy, the Air Force will endeavor to locate enemy vessels, especially transport ships, and destroy them at sea or while they are lying at anchor. All preparations for this mission will be completed by the end of October.

b. Previous to the final decisive battles, all air operations will be skillfully conducted by an active and flexible combat command, aimed at the destruction of the enemy's combat strength and the prevention of the loss of our own. To perform these operations, our air forces will be dispersed deep inland and employed in making recurrent surprise attacks on enemy bases as well as resourceful counterattacks against enemy offensives. The direct support of our airbases will, in general, be the responsibility of the antiaircraft artillery.

c. It is planned to deliver a decisive blow against the enemy's amphibious force by initially destroying as many carriers as possible, utilizing the special attack forces of the Air Force and Navy (Kamikaze planes and Navy suicide boats). When the enemy approaches within range of our airbases, our entire air combat strength will be employed in delivering continual night and day assaults. In this action, enemy transports will be the main targets.

d. Upon activation of Sub-operation "A", the main force of the air units will be concentrated in northern Honshu and in Hokkaido so that they may be employed in making pincer attacks on the enemy convoy from all sides.

e. Upon activation of Sub-operation "B", the main force of the air units will be assembled in the Kanto region (including the Shinetsu district) and the northern part of Honshu so that they may be employed in making pincer attacks on the enemy convoy from all sides.

f. Upon activation of Sub-operation "C", the main force of the air units will be assembled in northern Honshu and in the Kanto region as well as the Central District so that they may be employed in making pincer attacks on the enemy convoy from all sides.

g. Upon activation of Sub-operation "D", the main force of the air units will be assembled principally in the Central District, with parts in the Kanto and Kinki regions so that they may be employed in making pincer attacks on the enemy convoy from all sides.

h. Upon activation of Sub-operation "E", the main force of the air units will be assembled principally in Kyushu, with parts in the Chugoku region, on Shikoku Island and in Korea, so that they can be employed in making pincer attacks on the enemy convoy from all sides.

i. Air units to be employed in the defense operation are:

(1) Units now located in Japan and Korea:

- 10th Air Division
 - 1st Air Regiment
 - 18th Air Regiment
 - 47th Air Regiment
 - 53d Air Regiment
 - 70th Air Regiment
 - 244th Air Regiment
 - 17th Air Squadron

11th Air Division

5th Air Regiment
55th Air Regiment
56th Air Regiment
246th Air Regiment

12th Air Division

12th Air Brigade
4th Air Regiment
11th Air Regiment
12th Air Regiment
19th Air Regiment
59th Air Regiment

16th Air Brigade

10th Air Regiment
51st Air Regiment
52d Air Regiment
60th Air Regiment

Akeno Air Training School (2 air squadrons)
Hamamatsu Air Training School (1 air squadron)
Hitachi Air Training School (2 air squadrons)
Hokoda Air Training School (1 air squadron)
Shimoshizu Air Training School (1 air squadron)
Utsunomiya Air Training School (a few planes)

(2) To be transferred from overseas:

From Formosa

1 Hq. Reconnaissance Regiment
2 Fighter Regiments

From the Philippines

2 Assault Regiments
1 Heavy Bomber Regiment

From China

2 Fighter Regiments
2 Light Bomber Regiments

j. Target assignments are as follows:

(1) Reconnaissance

Type 100, Headquarters Reconnaissance

- (2) Carrier and Transport Attack
 - Type 1 Fighters
 - Heavy Bombers
 - Type 2 Fighters (Bomber Escort)
 - Type 4 Fighters (Bomber Escort)
- (3) Carrier Attack
 - Type 67 Fighters
- (4) Transport Attack
 - Type 99 Assault Planes
 - Type 99 Twin-motor Light Bombers
 - Type 1 Fighters
 - Type 2, Two-seat Fighters
 - Type 3 Fighters
 - Heavy Bombers

k. In the event of any enemy air raid using carrier based planes to attack the Homeland, the air force must use initiative to take the offensive regardless of instructions contained in Paragraph 3e.*

4. Ground Force Operations

a. The Eastern Army Command will make preparations for Sub-operations "A", "B" and "C". The 36th Army will be employed principally in "C", but preparations will provide for sufficient flexibility of movement to permit its employment in "B" or "E".

b. The Central Army Command will make preparations for Sub-operation "D". It will keep one division in readiness to be dispatched to the "C" or "E" areas if required.

* Editor's Note: Although not specifically stated, Tokyo and the Kanto region was considered the most vital and important part of Japan. This instruction apparently gave the Air Force permission to assume the attack rather than being restricted to a defense of the Kanto region.

c. The Western Army Command will make preparations for Sub-operation "E". It will also be prepared to provide for the transfer of one division (less horses) to the area of the 32d Army (Ryukyu Islands) in the event it is needed for the execution of Sho-Go Operation, Number 2.

d. Operational preparations of all armies will be completed by the end of March 1945.

e. Plans and details of construction of fortifications will be issued separately.

APPENDIX III

Defense Fortification Department Instructions

"Procedure for Homeland Fortification"

These instructions give the general procedures for Homeland fortification. Senior commanders will use these procedures appropriately and, based on these procedures, will issue necessary directives to their subordinate units according to their missions.

1. Outline

a. Senior commanders will draw up fortification plans in accordance with the operational policy as based on their missions. Each commander will decide on a detailed fortification plan based on his mission and suited to his tactics and combat command.

b. Fortifications are constructed by combining the excellent ideas of the commanders, especially the senior commanders, and the earnest and steady work of the troops. It must be remembered that perfect fortification can be expected only by combining the tactical knowledge of the commanders and the hard work of the soldiers.

c. Groups assigned to coastal defenses must contain the enemy while troops are being concentrated for the decisive battle or, in some cases, hold out for long periods of time until a decisive battle is won in some other area and permits the release of strength for a counterattack in the sector being held. The procedure to be followed by the coastal defense groups in constructing fortifications for this purpose is as follows:

- (1) Complete preparations against tank attacks.
- (2) Construction of cave type shelters which can withstand intense bombings and bombardments, especially naval gun fire.
- (3) Ability to conduct close range actions and withstand attacks with flame-throwers and gas.
- (4) In addition to keeping the fortification completely concealed from air reconnaissance throughout the entire period of construction, special attention will be given to camouflage of positions.

d. Since defense groups must expect to carry out operations even when the enemy has air superiority, fortification and construction work must be thorough in order to prevent losses while maneuvering, deploying and fighting.

e. Reserve troops of area armies as well as civilians will construct fortifications and obstacle zones inland to check mobile operations of the enemy.

f. The schedule for progress of fortifications is as follows:

- (1) Framework of all positions will be generally completed by July of this year.
- (2) Fortifications will be completed by October of this year.

2. Organization of Fortified Zones

a. Positions along the coast to contain the enemy.

(1) Beach Positions

These are used mainly in beach fighting and for firing against landing craft. It is very important to place installation so that they will not be affected by naval gun fire and to scatter, conceal and cover them, taking full advantage of the terrain.

(2) Foreground Zone

The enemy's attack will be delayed and his main force annihilated by our concealed strength, deployed in the areas where enemy attacks are expected, which will fight within the enemy lines and make counterattacks and raids. Obstacle zones, utilizing natural terrain features, artificial obstacles, etc., will be prepared in order to assist the initial defense. Hidden positions, timed land mines, assault tunnels, etc., will be prepared to assist counterattacking forces.

(3) Main Zone of Resistance

This will be established in the area where the main resistance is to be offered. Such positions will take full advantage of the terrain and will be placed so that fighting can be conducted flexibly. For this purpose a force with a nucleus larger than an ordinary infantry battalion will occupy key positions which are

independent of each other. The positions will be organized mainly for antitank warfare and the field of fire will be short. Installations will be underground fortresses capable of coping with close range actions in which flame throwers, gas, etc., are used.

(4) Dummy Positions

Dummy positions and dummy construction works must be set up, in addition to positions described in the foregoing paragraphs, for purposes of deception and attracting enemy fire.

b. Fortified Zones for Offensive Preparations

(1) Fortification of the Army Deployment Positions

Principally, these positions will provide cover and concealment for heavy equipment such as tanks, motor vehicles, and artillery as well as bomb proof storage of ammunition, fuel, etc.

(2) Fortification of Attack Preparation Positions

These will provide shelter for attack forces comprised of tank and heavy artillery as well as for ammunition and fuel. Shelters will be constructed on roads to be used for the advance of heavy equipment. Strong points must be established in important places to cope with enemy infiltration tactics, airborne raids and changes in the situation.

c. Holding positions will be formed in gaps between resistance positions and in sectors along the enemy's avenues of approach, in order to check advances and penetrations, particularly by enemy mechanized forces. It is also necessary to establish holding positions on communication lines inland. Antitank weapons will be the main armament of the foregoing positions.

d. Rear defense zones will be established in important areas inland as alternate positions for the area army to be used in holding out against a forceful penetration by the enemy or in support of a strategic offensive.

3. Fortification

a. The key to completing strong and large fortifications in the shortest time is dependent on the commander's vigorous enthusiasm and strong executive powers.

b. Fortifications must be commenced with the idea of large scale accomplishment. Higher headquarters will use materials, labor, communications, and transportation appropriately and will provide the troops with an incentive to enable them to proceed with fortifications whole-heartedly.

c. Troops assigned to fortification tasks will be thorough in establishing and forming positions for certain victory against the United States. Deficiencies and shortages of materials, labor and tools will be overcome by using improvised materials obtained from

local sources. Initiative must be taken and the terrain will be used to advantage.

d. In connection with materials and labor, each Army must remember to provide for self-support and employ local labor effectively.

e. In building fortifications, the underground installations which require the greatest time will be commenced first. The standard order of procedure will generally be as follows:

- (1) Essential pillboxes in main resistance positions, underground installations for storing ammunition and provisions.
- (2) Underground installations for command posts (especially for higher headquarters), observation posts, radio stations (and other communications facilities), medical stations of main resistance positions.
- (3) Connecting tunnels and shelters.
- (4) Fortification of beach positions and foreground zones.
- (5) Holding positions.
- (6) Measures against flame throwers and chemical warfare.
- (7) Preparation of obstacles, communications and sources of water supply.
- (8) Fortified zones for offensive preparation.
- (9) Rear defensive zones.

f. While fortifications are being built, training should not be neglected. Although fortification must be stressed initially, the efficiency of the Army must be raised by gradually emphasizing training. In order to do this, a daily fortification program based on operational requirements must be announced and a schedule for laying the foundations and completing the fortifications must be followed.

4. Determining the Form and Composition of Positions

a. The location and type of positions will be chosen after careful consideration of the mission and the frontal area assigned. Initiative will be exercised to utilize the terrain of the country to the fullest extent. Examples of a battalion holding position is shown in the appended supplement.

b. The essential factors in deciding on the composition of defensive positions are as follows:

(1) Absolute concealment from air, land and sea observation.

In order to achieve this, special attention must be given to the selection of sites for installations. Underground installations must be used. Concealment and camouflage measures must be taken against air reconnaissance being carried out by the enemy in conjunction with present air raids. Combustible material must not be used for camouflage.

- (2) Positions must be proof against bombardment, especially direct hits by naval gun fire. In other words, cave installations will be heavily reinforced.
- (3) We must be able to crush close range actions, especially attacks by flame throwers, gas, explosives and tanks. In other words, the relationship between cave pillboxes and assault positions for destruction of the enemy will be favorable. Measures will be taken to conceal openings, to check enemy approach by obstacles and to make positions soundproof. The sniper fire net and organization of close quarter combat will be thorough. An example of the essential qualifications is given in the supplement.

5. Miscellaneous

- a. Coastal defense group commanders must personally inspect fortifications and rectify errors.
- b. Consideration must be given to the effects of the elements, season, weather, etc.
- c. The order in which necessary materials will be stored and placed in positions is:
 - (1) Water.
 - (2) Ammunition, fuel and antitank defense equipment.
 - (3) Food, salt, vitamin pills and medical supplies.

d. Each unit must use its initiative to provide its own fortification tools and materials.

e. It is expected that airfields in the coastal zone will be difficult to secure at times. Therefore, preparations must be made to destroy them before they can be occupied by the enemy. Preparations for destruction (large, timed land mines) must be made and detonating fuzes set. Security and protection measures will be taken for inland airfields according to their importance.


Supplement

Procedure for Organizing Positions and Examples of Essential Elements.

16 March 1945

SKETCH NO. 2

EXAMPLE A - BEACH DEFENSE




EXAMPLE A - Beach Defense

1. Artillery will be emplaced to provide cross fire in front of position.
2. Reverse fire positions will be cleverly concealed and placed to permit fire to be directed against the rear of the enemy after he has advanced past the positions.
3. Antitank positions will be constructed to prevent tanks from moving inland. Detailed instructions on construction are shown in Examples D and E.
4. Reserve positions will be prepared further inland.
5. Positions from which to conduct delaying action will be constructed in depth.

SKETCH NO. 3


EXAMPLE B BATTALION POSITION



EXAMPLE B - Battalion Position

1. Primary emphasis will be on antitank defense.
2. All units will be connected with each other and with the command post by connecting trenches or tunnels.
3. One company will be held in reserve to be used as a mobile raiding party or to launch diversionary attacks.
4. Groups of selected infantrymen will be deployed about the perimeter of the defense position as Antitank Parties. Groups will be equipped with antitank mines or explosives.

Example of easily constructed antitank weapon:




Explosives bound to bamboo pole to be thrust into or under tank treads

5. Explanation of symbols:

- | | | |
|----|--------|---------------------------------|
| a. | ===== | Connecting Trench or Tunnel |
| b. | ~~~~~ | Antitank Ditch or Trap |
| c. | ⌒ | Outpost |
| d. | → | Machine Gun |
| e. | >= | Antitank Gun |
| f. | ≡ | Battalion Gun |
| g. | ⊖ | Platoon Position |
| h. | xxxxxx | Barbed Wire Entanglement |
| i. | ⊗ | Area for Concentration of Fires |
| j. | ⌒ | Antitank Party |

SKETCH NO.4

EXAMPLE C- PLATOON POSITION










EXAMPLE C - Platoon Position

1. Platoon position will have all-around defense. Heaviest fires will be concentrated on direction of enemy advance.


2. Platoon position, depending on location and terrain, will normally occupy a space approximately 600 feet long and 400 feet deep.

3. Explanation of symbols:

- | | | |
|----|---|--------------------------------|
| a. |  | Pillbox |
| b. |  | Machine Gun |
| c. |  | Grenade Launcher |
| d. |  | Connecting Tunnels or Trenches |
| e. |  | Underground Installations |
| f. |  | Barbed Wire Entanglements |
| g. |  | Covered or Concealed Route |

SKETCH NO.5

EXAMPLE D - ANTI-TANK HOLDING AREA




LEGEND

 ANTI-TANK POSITIONS


SKETCH NO. 6

EXAMPLE E- INDIVIDUAL ANTI-TANK POSITIONS

(A) DEFILE INTERDICTION



(B) TACTICAL TRAP



APPENDIX IV

Activation of the General Armies

and Orders of Battle

(Army Department Order No. 1297)

8 April 1945

1. The order of battle of the General Defense Command is hereby dissolved and the orders of battle of the First General Army and the Second General Army are established. Respective orders of battle are as per separate volume.
2. The Orders of battle of the Fifth Area Army and the Seventeenth Area Army are hereby revised as per separate volume.
3. The time designated for the change of command is 0001 hrs, 15 April. Those units which are not as yet completely mobilized at the designated time will make the change of command at the time they become completely mobilized. Those units designated to be placed under the command of the Seventeenth Area Army Commander which have not yet crossed over the Manchurian-Korean Border at the designated time will be placed under the command of the Seventeenth Area Army Commander at the time they cross the border. Those units designated to be placed under the command of the First General Army and the Second General Army respectively, which have still not departed from the harbors of Manchuria and Korea at the designated time will be placed under the command of the General Armies at the time they depart from the harbors in Manchuria and Korea.

4. Detailed directives will be issued by the Chief of the General Staff.

By Imperial Order:

Yoshijiro Umezu

Chief of the General Staff

Order of Battle of the First General Army

Commander-in-Chief: Field Marshal Sugiyama
First General Army Headquarters

Eleventh Area Army: Order of battle shown in Annex No. 1

Twelfth Area Army: Order of battle shown in Annex No. 2

Thirteenth Area Army: Order of battle shown in Annex No. 3

Annex No. 1

Order of Battle of Eleventh Area Army

Commander: Lieutenant General Teiichi Yoshimoto
Eleventh Area Army Headquarters

72d Division

142d Division

157th Division

95th Independent Mixed Brigade

44th Tank Regiment

15th Independent Machine-gun Battalion

21st Independent Antitank Battalion

34th Independent Heavy Artillery Battalion

34th Independent Anti-aircraft Artillery Battery

38th Signal Regiment

33d Garrison Unit:

33d Garrison Headquarters (B)

325th Special Garrison Company

333d Special Garrison Company

334th Special Garrison Company

63d Special Garrison Battalion (A)

30th Special Garrison Company
31st Special Garrison Company
32d Special Garrison Company
33d Special Garrison Company
34th Special Garrison Company
326th Special Garrison Company
332d Special Garrison Company

Annex No. 2

Order of Battle of the Twelfth Area Army

Commander: General Shizuichi Tanaka
Twelfth Area Army Headquarters

36th Army: Order of battle shown in Part 1, Annex No. 2
51st Army: Order of battle shown in Part 2, Annex No. 2
52d Army: Order of battle shown in Part 2, Annex No. 2
53d Army: Order of battle shown in Part 4, Annex No. 2
Tokyo Bay Defense Group: Organization shown in Attachment No. 1
66th Independent Mixed Brigade: Composition shown in Attachment No. 2
67th Independent Mixed Brigade: Composition shown in Attachment No. 3
1st Anti-aircraft Artillery Division: Composition shown in Attachment
No. 4

25th Independent Engineer Regiment (A)
27th Independent Engineer Regiment
30th Signal Regiment
3d Garrison Unit:
3d Garrison Headquarters (B)
2d Special Garrison Battalion (B)
3d Special Garrison Battalion (B)
21st Special Garrison Company
22d Special Garrison Company
8th Field Transport Headquarters
44th Independent Motor Transport Battalion
66th Independent Motor Transport Battalion
1st Manual Narrow Gauge Railway Unit
2d Manual Narrow Gauge Railway Unit
2d Field Construction Unit Headquarters

Attachment No. 1

Organization of Tokyo Bay Defense Group

Commanded by Tokyo Bay Fortress Commander.

Tokyo Bay Fortress Headquarters

65th Independent Mixed Brigade: Composition Shown in Part 2 of
Attachment No. 1

96th Independent Mixed Brigade

Tokyo Bay Fortress Heavy Artillery Regiment

1st Tokyo Bay Fortress Artillery Unit
2d Tokyo Bay Fortress Artillery Unit
6th Field Heavy Artillery Battalion (A)
1st Tokyo Bay Fortress Engineer Unit
2d Tokyo Bay Fortress Engineer Unit
Tokyo Bay Fortress Signal Unit

Part 2 of Attachment No. 1

Composition of the 65th Independent Mixed Brigade

65th Independent Mixed Brigade Headquarters

27th Independent Mixed Regiment
670th Independent Infantry Battalion
1st Special Garrison Battalion (B)
246th Independent Motor Transport Company
105th Special Sea Duty Company
65th Independent Mixed Brigade Field Hospital

Attachment No. 2

Composition of the 66th Independent Mixed Brigade

66th Independent Mixed Brigade Headquarters

18th Independent Mixed Regiment
427th Independent Infantry Battalion
Nijima Detachment
27th Independent Antitank Company

22d Independent Mountain Artillery Battalion
5th Independent Machine-gun Battalion
15th Special Garrison Company
16th Special Garrison Company
17th Special Garrison Company
66th Independent Mixed Brigade Field Hospital

Attachment No. 3

Composition of 67th Independent Mixed Brigade

67th Independent Mixed Brigade Headquarters

16th Independent Mixed Regiment
425th Independent Infantry Battalion
426th Independent Infantry Battalion
668th Independent Infantry Battalion
669th Independent Infantry Battalion
Hachijojima Detachment
16th Independent Machine-gun Battalion
15th Independent Antitank Battalion
24th Independent Antitank Company
12th Independent Field Artillery Battalion
23d Independent Mountain Artillery Battalion
100th Independent Field Heavy Artillery Battalion
4th Independent Heavy Artillery Battery
52d Independent Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battery
50th Field Machine-cannon Company
41st Special Machine-cannon Unit
42d Special Machine-cannon Unit
63d Independent Engineer Battalion (A)
5th Special Garrison Battalion (B)
219th Independent Motor Transport Company
112th Field Duty Company
67th Independent Mixed Brigade Field Hospital
1st Mobile Ordnance Repair Unit

Attachment No. 4

Composition of 1st Antiaircraft Artillery Division

1st Antiaircraft Artillery Division Headquarters

111th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment
112th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment
113th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment
114th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment
115th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment
116th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment
117th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment
118th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment
1st Independent Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion
2d Independent Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion
3d Independent Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion
4th Independent Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion
95th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion
96th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion
1st Machine-cannon Battalion
4th Machine-cannon Battalion
1st Searchlight Regiment
1st Base Balloon Unit

Part 1 of Annex No. 2

Order of Battle of the 36th Army

Commander: Lieutenant General Toshimichi Uemura
36th Army Headquarters

57th Division (less 57th Infantry Group Headquarters and 57th Recon-
naissance Regiment)

81st Division

93d Division

1st Armored Division (less 3d Tank Regiment and Antiaircraft Unit of
the 1st Armored Division)

4th Armored Division

27th Independent Antitank Battalion

21st Independent Machine-gun Battalion

7th Artillery Command

8th Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment

11th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment (A)

26th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment

52d Field Heavy Artillery Regiment (A)

8th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment (B)

19th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment (B)

62d Independent Engineer Battalion (A)

6th Signal Regiment

Part 2 of Annex No. 2

Order of Battle of the 51st Army

Commander: Lieutenant General Kengo Noda
51st Army Headquarters

44th Division
151st Division
7th Independent Tank Brigade
3d Artillery Intelligence Regiment
9th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment (A)
12th Independent Heavy Artillery Battalion (E)
35th Independent Heavy Artillery Battalion
8th Signal Regiment
4th Special Garrison Battalion (B)

Part 3 of Annex No. 2

Order of Battle of the 52d Army

Commander: Lieutenant General Tokumatsu Shigeta
52d Army Headquarters

3d Imperial Guards Division
152d Division
3d Independent Tank Brigade
48th Tank Regiment
24th Independent Antitank Battalion
8th Artillery Command
2d Artillery Intelligence Regiment
27th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment
7th Field Heavy Artillery Battalion (A)
14th Heavy Artillery Regiment
11th Independent Heavy Artillery Battalion (E)
40th Mortar Battalion
69th Independent Engineer Battalion
39th Signal Regiment
26th Special Garrison Company
28th Special Garrison Company
29th Special Garrison Company

Part 4 of Annex No. 2

Order of Battle of the 53d Army

Commander: Lieutenant General Yaezo, Akashiba
53d Army Headquarters

84th Division
140th Division
2d Independent Tank Brigade
5th Artillery Intelligence Regiment
2d Field Heavy Artillery Regiment (A)
13th Independent Heavy Artillery Battalion (E)
36th Independent Heavy Artillery Battalion
14th Mortar Battalion
74th Independent Engineer Battalion
14th Special Garrison Company
101st Special Garrison Company
107th Special Garrison Company

Annex No. 3

Order of Battle of the Thirteenth Area Army

Commander: Lieutenant General Tasuku Okada
Thirteenth Area Army Headquarters

73d Division
143d Division
153d Division
97th Independent Mixed Brigade
47th Tank Regiment
4th Artillery Intelligence Regiment
53d Field Heavy Artillery Regiment (A)
37th Independent Heavy Artillery Battalion

Nagoya Antiaircraft Artillery Unit: Organization is shown in attachment.

70th Independent Engineer Battalion
40th Signal Regiment
23d Special Garrison Company
24th Special Garrison Company
27th Special Garrison Company
102d Special Garrison Company
103d Special Garrison Company
104th Special Garrison Company

105th Special Garrison Company
108th Special Garrison Company
109th Special Garrison Company
3d Manual Narrow Gauge Railway Unit

Attachment

Organization of the Nagoya Antiaircraft Artillery Unit
Nagoya Antiaircraft Artillery

9th Company of the 123d Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment
124th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment
125th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment
5th Independent Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion
12th Independent Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion
97th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion
12th Machine-cannon Battalion
106th Machine-cannon Battalion
11th Independent Searchlight Battalion

The Order of Battle of the Second General Army

Commander-in-Chief: Field Marshal Shunroku Hata
Second General Army Headquarters

Fifteenth Area Army: Order of battle is as of the Annex No. 1
Sixteenth Area Army: Order of battle is as of the Annex No. 2

Annex No. 1

The Order of Battle of the Fifteenth Area Army.

Commander: Lieutenant General Hitaro Uchiyama
Fifteenth Area Army Headquarters

55th Army: Order of battle is as of the Part 1 of the Annex No. 1

144th Division

Yura Fortress Garrison Unit: Yura Fortress Headquarters

Yura Fortress Heavy Artillery Regiment

The Organization of the Central Antiaircraft Artillery Group:
Central Antiaircraft Artillery Group Headquarters.

121st Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment
122d Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment
123d Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment
11th Independent Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion
12th Independent Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion
22d Independent Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion
11th Machine-cannon Battalion
37th Signal Regiment
201st Special Garrison Battalion (B)
106th Special Garrison Company
111th Special Garrison Company

Part 1 of Annex No. 1

The Order of Battle of the 55th Army.

Commander: Lieutenant General Kumakichi Harada
55th Army Headquarters

11th Division
155th Division
45th Tank Regiment
6th Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment
39th Independent Heavy Artillery Battalion
5th Independent Heavy Artillery Battery
22d Independent Heavy Mortar Battalion
37th Mortar Battalion
79th Independent Engineer Battalion
118th Independent Wire Company
228th Special Garrison Company
229th Special Garrison Company

Annex No. 2

The Order of Battle of the Sixteenth Area Army.

Commander: Lieutenant General Isamu Yokoyama
Sixteenth Area Army Headquarters

57th Army: Order of Battle is as of Part 1 of Annex No. 2
25th Division
145th Division
107th Independent Mixed Brigade

4th Independent Tank Brigade
46th Tank Regiment
10th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment (A)
29th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment
9th Independent Heavy Artillery Battalion (E)
3d Engineer Unit Headquarters
71st Independent Engineer Battalion
7th Signal Regiment

Hoyo Fortress Garrison Unit: Hoyo Fortress Headquarters
Hoyo Fortress Heavy Artillery Regiment

Iki Fortress Garrison Unit: Iki Fortress Headquarters
Iki Fortress Heavy Artillery Regiment
1st Iki Fortress Infantry Battalion
2d Iki Fortress Infantry Battalion
3d Iki Fortress Infantry Battalion
4th Iki Fortress Infantry Battalion
5th Iki Fortress Infantry Battalion
6th Iki Fortress Infantry Battalion
219th Special Garrison Company

Tsushima Fortress Garrison Unit: Tsushima Fortress Headquarters
Tsushima Fortress Heavy Artillery Regiment
1st Tsushima Fortress Infantry Battalion
2d Tsushima Fortress Infantry Battalion
3d Tsushima Fortress Infantry Battalion
216th Special Garrison Company
217th Special Garrison Company
218th Special Garrison Company

Shimonoseki Fortress Garrison Unit: Shimonoseki Fortress Headquarters
Shimonoseki Fortress Heavy Artillery Regiment
21st Garrison Battalion
254th Special Garrison Battalion (A)
255th Special Garrison Battalion (A)
256th Special Garrison Battalion (A)
257th Special Garrison Battalion (A)
201st Special Garrison Engineer Unit
202d Special Garrison Engineer Unit
203d Special Garrison Engineer Unit
204th Special Garrison Engineer Unit
207th Special Garrison Engineer Unit

Nagasaki Fortress Garrison Unit: Nagasaki Fortress Headquarters
Nagasaki Fortress Heavy Artillery Regiment
253d Special Garrison Battalion (A)
1st Artillery Intelligence Regiment

Attachment No. 1

The Organization of the Western Antiaircraft Artillery Group
Western Antiaircraft Artillery Group Headquarters

131st Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment
132d Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment
133d Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment
134th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment
21st Independent Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion
23d Independent Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion
24th Independent Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion
21st Machine-cannon Battalion
21st Independent Searchlight Battalion
21st Base Balloon Unit
55th Special Machine-cannon Unit
202d Special Garrison Battalion (B)
201st Special Garrison Company
202d Special Garrison Company
212th Special Garrison Company
7th Field Transport Command
11th Tractor Company
12th Tractor Company
34th Independent Motor Transport Battalion
68th Independent Motor Transport Battalion
84th Independent Motor Transport Battalion
4th Manual Narrow Gauge Railway Unit
13th Field Duty Unit Headquarters
31st Field Duty Unit: Organization as Attached No. 2
32d Field Duty Unit: Organization as Attached No. 3
4th Field Construction Unit Headquarters
33d Construction Duty Company
45th Construction Duty Company
99th Line of Communications Hospital

Attachment No. 2

The Organization of the 31st Field Duty Unit:

31st Field Duty Unit Headquarters

137th Land Duty Company
138th Land Duty Company
139th Land Duty Company
140th Land Duty Company
141st Land Duty Company
142d Land Duty Company
143d Land Duty Company

Attachment No. 3

The Organization of the 32d Field Duty Unit:

32d Field Duty Unit Headquarters

144th Land Duty Company
145th Land Duty Company
146th Land Duty Company
147th Land Duty Company
148th Land Duty Company
149th Land Duty Company
150th Land Duty Company

Part 1 of Annex No. 2

The Order of Battle of the 57th Army

Commander: Lieutenant General Kanji Nishihara
57th Army Headquarters

86th Division
146th Division
154th Division
156th Division
98th Independent Mixed Brigade
23d Independent Mixed Regiment
5th Independent Tank Brigade
6th Independent Tank Brigade
1st Artillery Command
6th Artillery Intelligence Regiment
26th Independent Field Artillery Battalion
28th Independent Field Artillery Battalion
13th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment (A)
54th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment (A)
28th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment
40th Independent Heavy Artillery Battalion
98th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion
72d Independent Engineer Battalion
41st Signal Regiment
203d Special Garrison Battalion (B)
204th Special Garrison Company
205th Special Garrison Company
206th Special Garrison Company
207th Special Garrison Company
208th Special Garrison Company

Activation of the Air General Army
and Order of Battle

(Army Department Order No. 1298)

8 April 1945

1. The order of battle of the Air General Army hereby issued is as given in the annex.
2. The units given in the annex will be removed from the orders of battle of the Twelfth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth and Seventeenth Area Armies, as well as the 1st Air Division organization, and will be incorporated into the organization of 1st and 6th Air Armies of the Air General Army.
3. C-in-C, General Defense Command, and Commanders of the Fifth and Seventeenth Area Armies will place the 6th Air Army, as well as the foregoing units, under the command of Commander of the Air General Army.
4. Commander of the 1st Air Army will be placed under the command of Commander of the Air General Army.
5. Transfer of command will be effective as of 0001 hours 15 April. However, in the case of units which are scheduled to be removed from Manchuria to Korea or Japan but which have not crossed the Manchurian border on the above date, the transfer of command will be effective when said units cross the Manchurian border.

6. Detailed directives will be issued by the Chief of the General Staff.

By Imperial Command:

Yoshijiro Umezu

Chief of the General Staff

Annex

1. Units to be removed from the orders of battle of the Twelfth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth and Seventeenth Area Armies and incorporated into the order of battle of the Air General Army:

32d Air Intelligence Unit
35th Air Intelligence Unit
36th Air Intelligence Unit
37th Air Intelligence Unit

2. Units to be removed from the order of battle of the Seventeenth Area Army and incorporated into the order of battle of the 6th Air Army:

45th Air Sector Hq
49th Air Sector Hq
145th Airfield Bn
171st Airfield Bn
181st Airfield Bn
191st Airfield Bn
192d Airfield Bn
195th Airfield Bn
210th Airfield Bn
211st Airfield Bn
153d Field Airfield Construction Unit
154th Field Airfield Construction Unit
176th Field Airfield Construction Unit
177th Field Airfield Construction Unit
8th Air-Ground Radio Unit

3. Units to be removed from the organization of the 1st Air Division and incorporated into the order of battle of the 1st Air Army upon deactivation of the 5th Air Brigade:

5th Air Brig Hq
74th Air Regt (heavy bomber)
95th Air Regt (heavy bomber)

Annex

Order of Battle of Air General Army

Commander of Air General Army: General Masakazu Kawabe
Air General Army Headquarters

1st Air Army: Order of Battle Annex No. 1
6th Air Army: Order of Battle Annex No. 2
30th Fighter Group: Composition Chart No. 1
1st Parachute Group: Organization Chart No. 2
1st Troop Carrier Air Brigade: Organization Chart No. 3
7th Air Transport Unit: Organization Chart No. 4
8th Air Transport Unit: Organization Chart No. 5
32d Air Intelligence Unit
35th Air Intelligence Unit
36th Air Intelligence Unit
37th Air Intelligence Unit
8th Navigation Aid Unit

Order of Battle of Air General Army, Chart No. 1

Composition of 30th Fighter Air Group

30th Fighter Air Group Hqrs
16th Air Brig
16th Air Brig Hq
51st Air Regt (Fighter)
52d Air Regt (Fighter)
47th Air Regt (Fighter)
244th Air Regt (Fighter)
62d Air Regt (Heavy Bomber)
17th Ind Air Co (Hq Reconnaissance plane)

Order of Battle of Air General Army, Chart No. 2

Organization of 1st Parachute Group

1st Parachute Group Hq
1st Parachute Regt
2d Parachute Regt
1st Airborne Tank Unit
1st Parachute Group, Maintenance Unit

Order of Battle of Air General Army, Chart No. 3

Organization of 1st Troop Carrier Air Brigade

1st Troop Carrier Air Brig Hq
1st Troop Carrier Regt
2d Troop Carrier Air Regt
1st Glider Regt
3d Ind Air Unit
101st Airfield Co
102d Airfield Co
103d Airfield Co
1st Troop Carrier Air Brig, Signal Unit

Order of Battle of Air General Army, Chart No. 4

Organization of 7th Air Transport Unit

Commander, 7th Air Transport Unit Commander
7th Air Transport Unit Hq
11th Air Transport Co
12th Air Transport Co

Order of Battle of Air General Army, Chart No. 5

Organization of 8th Air Transport Unit
Commander, 8th Air Transport Unit Commander
8th Air Transport Unit Hq
14th Air Transport Co
15th Air Transport Co

Order of Battle of Air General Army, Appendix

Units under the Command of the Air General Army Commander

51st Air Div
52d Air Div
53d Air Div

Shimoshizu Air Instruction Div

Akeno Air Instruction Div

Hitachi Air Instruction Div

Hokota Air Instruction Div

Hamamatsu Air Instruction Div

Utsunomiya Air Instruction Div

2d Air Training Brig

Mikatahara Air Instruction Brig

1st Air Army Training Unit

Central Air Route Department

Army Air Transport Department

Army Air Base Construction Training Department

Annex No. 1

Order of Battle of 1st Air Army

1st Air Army Commander, Lieutenant General Takeo Yasuda
1st Air Army Headquarters

10th Air Div: Composition Chart No. 1
11th Air Div: Composition Chart No. 2
5th Air Brig Hq
12th Air Brig: Organization Chart No. 3
107th Air Regt (Fighter)
14th Air Regt (Heavy Bomber)
74th Air Regt (Heavy Bomber)
95th Air Regt (Heavy Bomber)
16th Ind Air Co (Hq Reconnaissance Plane)
40th Air Sector Command

66th Airfield Bn
74th Airfield Bn
144th Airfield Bn
164th Airfield Bn
165th Airfield Bn
169th Airfield Bn
170th Airfield Bn
175th Airfield Bn
176th Airfield Bn
189th Airfield Bn
190th Airfield Bn
232d Airfield Bn
233d Airfield Bn
234th Airfield Bn
237th Airfield Bn
238th Airfield Bn
239th Airfield Bn
56th Airfield Co
58th Airfield Co
71st Airfield Co
72d Airfield Co
20th Field Airfield Construction Unit
25th Field Airfield Construction Unit
26th Field Airfield Construction Unit
130th Field Airfield Construction Unit
131st Field Airfield Construction Unit
132d Field Airfield Construction Unit
141st Field Airfield Construction Unit
147th Field Airfield Construction Unit
148th Field Airfield Construction Unit
149th Field Airfield Construction Unit
150th Field Airfield Construction Unit
158th Field Airfield Construction Unit
159th Field Airfield Construction Unit
160th Field Airfield Construction Unit
162d Field Airfield Construction Unit
168th Field Airfield Construction Unit
169th Field Airfield Construction Unit
174th Field Airfield Construction Unit
13th Air Sig Regt
18th Air Sig Regt
1st Air-ground Radio Unit
2d Air-ground Radio Unit
13th Air-ground Radio Unit
21st Air-ground Radio Unit
63d Air-ground Radio Unit
64th Air-ground Radio Unit

65th Air-ground Radio Unit
66th Air-ground Radio Unit
67th Air-ground Radio Unit
68th Air-ground Radio Unit
69th Air-ground Radio Unit
176th Ind Maintenance Unit
177th Ind Maintenance Unit
183d Ind Maintenance Unit
184th Ind Maintenance Unit
188th Ind Maintenance Unit
187th Ind Maintenance Unit
198th Ind Maintenance Unit
310th Ind Maintenance Unit
311th Ind Maintenance Unit

Order of Battle of 1st Air Army, Chart No. 1

Composition of 10th Air Div

10th Air Div Hq
18th Air Regt (Fighter)
23d Air Regt (Fighter)
28th Air Regt (Fighter)
53d Air Regt (Fighter)
70th Air Regt (Fighter)
46th Air Sector Command
3d Airfield Bn
6th Airfield Bn
7th Airfield Bn
43d Airfield Bn
116th Airfield Bn
140th Airfield Bn
141st Airfield Bn
244th Airfield Bn
65th Airfield Co

Order of Battle of 1st Air Army, Chart No. 2

Composition of 11th Air Div

11th Air Div Hq
23d Air Brig Hq
5th Air Regt (Fighter)
55th Air Regt (Fighter)
56th Air Regt (Fighter)
246th Air Regt (Fighter)
82d Ind Air Co (Fighter)
47th Air Sector Command
42d Airfield Bn

61st Airfield Bn
62d Airfield Bn
143d Airfield Bn
163d Airfield Bn
246th Airfield Bn

Order of Battle of 1st Air Army, Chart No. 3

Organization of 12th Air Brig

12th Air Brig Hq
1st Air Regt (Fighter)
11th Air Regt (Fighter)

Order of Battle of Air General Army, Annex No. 2

Order of Battle of 6th Air Army

6th Air Army Commander, Lieutenant General Michio Sugawara
6th Air Army Headquarters

12th Air Div: Composition Chart No. 1
6th Air Div: Organization Chart No. 2
7th Air Brig Hq
21st Air Brig: Organization Chart No. 3
100th Air Brig: Organization Chart No. 4
206th Ind Air Unit: Organization Chart No. 5
200th Air Regt (Fighter)
208th Air Regt (Light Bomber)
7th Air Regt (Heavy Bomber)
60th Air Regt (Heavy Bomber)
98th Air Regt (Heavy Bomber)
110th Air Regt (Heavy Bomber)
27th Air Regt (Fighter-bomber)
45th Air Regt (Fighter-bomber)
31st Ind Air Squadron (Heavy Bomber)
2d Air Regt (Hq Reconnaissance Plane)
106th Air Regt (Hq Reconnaissance Plane)
19th Ind Air Co (Hq Reconnaissance Plane)
4th Ind Air Unit
20th Ind Air Squadron (Transport Plane)
41st Air Sector Command
45th Air Sector Command
49th Air Sector Command
142d Airfield Bn
145th Airfield Bn

146th Airfield Bn
162d Airfield Bn
171st Airfield Bn
172d Airfield Bn
173d Airfield Bn
174th Airfield Bn
181st Airfield Bn
191st Airfield Bn
192d Airfield Bn
196th Airfield Bn
210th Airfield Bn
211th Airfield Bn
55th Airfield Co
57th Airfield Co
27th Field Airfield Construction Unit
28th Field Airfield Construction Unit
30th Field Airfield Construction Unit
142d Field Airfield Construction Unit
151st Field Airfield Construction Unit
152d Field Airfield Construction Unit
153d Field Airfield Construction Unit
154th Field Airfield Construction Unit
163d Field Airfield Construction Unit
172d Field Airfield Construction Unit
173d Field Airfield Construction Unit
175th Field Airfield Construction Unit
176th Field Airfield Construction Unit
177th Field Airfield Construction Unit
1st Air Sig Command
19th Air Sig Regt
24th Air Sig Regt
One Radio Co and Materials Depot (B) of 21st Air Sig Unit
4th Air-ground Radio Unit
6th Air-ground Radio Unit
8th Air-ground Radio Unit
14th Air-ground Radio Unit
70th Air-ground Radio Unit
71st Air-ground Radio Unit
72d Air-ground Radio Unit
73d Air-ground Radio Unit
74th Air-ground Radio Unit
75th Air-ground Radio Unit
76th Air-ground Radio Unit
9th Air Special Signal Unit
7th Field Air Repair Depot
154th Ind Maintenance Unit

157th Ind Maintenance Unit
163d Ind Maintenance Unit
169th Ind Maintenance Unit
170th Ind Maintenance Unit
175th Ind Maintenance Unit
189th Ind Maintenance Unit
199th Ind Maintenance Unit
200th Ind Maintenance Unit
305th Ind Maintenance Unit
10th Field Air Supply Depot
12th Field Air Supply Depot

Order of Battle of 6th Air Army, Chart No. 1

Composition of 12th Air Div

12th Air Div Hq
4th Air Regt (Fighter)
59th Air Regt (Fighter)
71st Air Regt (Fighter)
83d Ind Air Co (Fighter)
51st Air Sector Command
4th Airfield Bn
64th Airfield Bn
65th Airfield Bn
193d Airfield Bn
194th Airfield Bn
235th Airfield Bn
236th Airfield Bn
248th Airfield Bn

Order of Battle of 6th Air Army, Chart No. 2

Organization of 6th Air Brig

6th Air Brig Hq
65th Air Regt (Fighter-bomber)
66th Air Regt (Fighter-bomber)

Order of Battle of 6th Air Army, Chart No. 3

Organization of 21st Air Brig

72d Air Regt (Fighter)
73d Air Regt (Fighter)

Order of Battle of 6th Air Army, Chart No. 4

Organization of 100th Air Brig

100th Air Brig Hq
101st Air Regt (Fighter)
102d Air Regt (Fighter)
103d Air Regt (Fighter)

APPENDIX V

Outline of Preparations for the Ketsu-Go Operation

(Army Directive No. 2438)

8 April 1945

Directive to: Gen Sugiyama, C in C, First General Army
Shunroku Hata, C in C, Second General Army
Masakazu Kawabe, C in C, Air General Army
Otozo Yamada, C in C, Kwantung Army
Yasuji Okamura, C in C, China Expeditionary Army
Kiichiro Higuchi, Commander, Fifth Area Army
Rikichi Ando, Commander, Tenth Area Army
Yoshio Kozuki, Commander, Seventeenth Area Army

Pursuant to Imperial General Headquarters Army Order Nos 1299, 968 and 1245.

1. Commander in Chiefs of the First and Second General Armies, Air General Army and the China Expeditionary Army and the Commanders of the Fifth and Seventeenth Area Armies will execute operations and preparations for operations in accordance with the Appendix, "Outline of Preparations for the Ketsu Operations".

2. The detailed boundary between the zones of operations of the Second General Army and the Seventeenth Area Army is as follows:

A line connecting the points 132°E-38°N, 132°E-37°N, 131°E-36°N, 129°30'E-35°N, 129°E-34°30'N, 128°30'E-34°N and 127°E-33°N.

Chief of the General Staff
Yoshijiro Umezu

Appendix

Outline of Preparations for the Ketsu-Go Operations

1. General

a. This outline indicates the manner in which each army will make combat preparations and conduct operations in the over-all operation to repel the American invasion of the Homeland, Korea, Karafuto and adjacent waters (hereinafter called Operation "Ketsu").

b. This outline covers operation to be completed by the fall of 1945, and are closely integrated with operations in the East China Sea areas (Operation "Ten").

c. In order to insure security and facilitate planning, the operational classifications and responsibilities shown in the following Chart, are determined for each operational area where enemy invasion is anticipated.

Chart of Operational Classifications and Responsibilities

Operational Classifications. Army Responsible for Operations

Area of Operation

Anticipated Enemy Movement

Ketsu Opn, No 1
Fifth Area Army

Chishima and Northern
Military District

1. Landing of enemy elements.
2. Break-through of Soya and Tsugaru Straits.

Ketsu Opn, No 2
Air Gen Army
First Gen Army

Northeastern Military
District

Landing of enemy
elements.

Ketsu Opn, No 3 Air Gen Army First Gen Army	Eastern Military District	1. Landing of enemy main force. 2. Penetration of Tokyo Bay.
Ketsu Opn, No 4 Air Gen Army First Gen Army	East Coast Military District	1. Landing of enemy elements. 2. Penetration of Ise Bay.
Ketsu Opn, No 5 Air Gen Army Second Gen Army	Central Military District	1. Landing of enemy elements. 2. Penetration of Inland Sea.
Ketsu Opn, No 6 Air Gen Army Second Gen Army	Western Military District	1. Landing of enemy main force or ele- ments. 2. Break-through of Korea Strait.
Ketsu Opn, No 7 Air Gen Army Seventeenth Area Army	Korea Military District	1. Landing of enemy elements. 2. Break-through of Korea Strait.

Remarks: (1) In the event any of the above Ketsu Operations are initiated, armies other than those designated as responsible for the operation on the Chart will participate in necessary operations and defense. Each army, therefore, will draft thorough plans and arrange dispositions in preparation for operations other than those for which they are responsible.

(2) In the event the enemy lands his main force where the Chart indicates landing of enemy elements only, the armies will plan operations and dispose troops as expeditiously as possible.

(3) Detailed instructions for those units responsible for air operations will be given later.

d. Considering the changes in the situation, increase of military strength, and progress of combat preparations, outline of operational preparation and execution of operation should be planned step by step according to the following phases:

First Phase: April 1945 to July 1945

Second Phase: August 1945 to September 1945

Third Phase: October 1945 and thereafter

e. Preparations for operations to counter enemy landings will be roughly completed during the First Phase (in the Kyushu and Shikoku areas, however, they will be carried out by early part of June). These preparations will be strengthened during the Second Phase and perfected during early part of the Third Phase.

2. Outline of Operations

a. Introduction

(1) The Imperial Army will rapidly establish a strategic disposition aimed at the ultimate annihilation of the enemy by strengthening its combat preparations and will encounter the American invasion at key areas on the Japanese Homeland. For this purpose, the Pacific Ocean and the East China Sea fronts shall be designated the principal fronts and combat preparations shall be concentrated chiefly in the Kanto and Kyushu areas. Defense of key points along the Japan sea coast shall be made perfect and at the same time, every effort will

be made to prevent enemy operations in this area.

(2) The Japanese Army will endeavor to repulse enemy air attacks and to restrict enemy plane activities and protect important points in Tokyo, particularly the industrial areas and communication centers. It will also complete combat preparations.

(3) Imperial Army will endeavor to crush the enemy invading key areas of the mainland while the invasion force is still at sea. Enemy forces which succeed in landing will be swiftly attacked by resolute defenders in order to seek the decisive victory.

(a) In conducting air operations, emphasis shall be on the disruption of the enemy's landing plans. The principal targets, as a consequence, shall be enemy convoys. To this end, attacks against enemy air bases and task forces unaccompanied by landing units, the air defense operations and ground operation support will be conducted so as to insure the accomplishment of aforementioned objectives. If necessary, the scope of these operations shall be limited in order that combat strength can be maintained most effectively to conduct operations to counter enemy landings.

(b) The principal objective of the land operation will be to destroy the enemy in the key areas along the coast. Even if they lack air support, ground units will carry out independent operations and endeavor to accomplish their operational missions.

(4) The Imperial Army will cooperate with the navy's surface traffic protection, its surface and underwater special attack units

and channel defense operations.

(5) The success of the operation will be insured by utilizing the advantageous points of fighting in the Homeland, by displaying the traditional spirit of the entire nation with the people and the military fighting as one. In order to meet the changes of the situation, such as possible penetration by enemy elements into inland sectors, emergency preparations shall be made for inland resistance throughout the Homeland and internal security shall be perfected.

f. Air Defense Operations

(1) Air Operations

(a) To counter enemy air attacks against strategic points on the mainland, we must at an opportune moment intercept enemy planes, and also neutralize their bases. We must also restrict the activities of enemy task forces at the proper time.

(b) We must preserve and increase combat strength by strengthening air bases and take other measures such as constructing secret airfields so that persistent air operations can be successfully conducted.

Bases in the Northeast Military District, Manchuria and China will be used when necessary.

(2) Ground AA Operations

(a) Antiaircraft units will muster as much strength as possible to cope with enemy air attacks, and thus weaken their strength by attrition.

The following points shall be emphasized in air defense:

- 1 Defense of the Capital, particularly the Imperial Palace.
- 2 Strategic points along the principal communication lines.
- 3 Vital industrial facilities.
- 4 Important airfields.
- 5 Vital munition dumps.

(b) Ground AA units and intelligence units shall be so disposed that they can cope swiftly with the strengthening and advancement of enemy air bases, coordinate with our interceptor fighter units and adjust to the situation in the areas being protected in order to establish a strong defense barrier at the proper time. To accomplish this, we must plan not only on troop reinforcements, but the preparation of alternate positions for AA units so as to allow for unit redistribution.

(c) To counter the increasing enemy land based air strength, greater emphasis will be placed on passive air defense.

(d) When ground armies initiate their operational movements to counter enemy landing plans, their concentration movement at strategic points must be protected by antiaircraft units. For this purpose, preparations must be made for the diversion of necessary air defense troops at the appropriate time.

c. Air Operations against Enemy Landings.

(1) Keep in close contact with radio intelligence and conduct strategic reconnaissance of enemy air and naval bases in the Pacific to secure data for estimating the general situation.

(2) Maintain strict observation of the enemy, particularly his convoys, and endeavor to foresee his plans at the proper time. Crush the enemy on the sea when he tries to invade strategic areas on the mainland, particularly those in the Kanto and Kyushu areas. In the meantime, an element will neutralize the principal enemy air bases from which planes can support landings.

(3) As soon as the enemy succeeds in landing, neutralize as many as possible of the escort vessels supporting the establishment of the beachhead so as to facilitate the fighting of our ground force. At the same time, continue operations to sever enemy supply lines.

(4) Although support of ground operations will be limited mainly to the liaison mission, in areas where support is needed and at the proper time, endeavor to gain local air supremacy, if air strength permits, in order to facilitate the execution of ground operations.

d. Ground Operations against Enemy Landings.

(1) The ground forces will quickly determine the area of enemy invasion and concentrate in this area as many troops as possible before the invasion starts. They will then take advantage of the

lateral extension of the enemy's lines and quickly force a decisive battle.

(2) When the enemy advances simultaneously in several locations, ground armies will direct the main operation against the main force. If the enemy's main force cannot be located, seek a decisive battle in an area where our main force can be most easily directed. In other operations areas, elements will carry on delaying actions in order to facilitate the operations of the main force.

(3) The above also holds when the enemy advances in several sectors in successive order. However, in the event an enemy element starts to advance ahead of the main force and the overall situation permits, the necessary forces will be directed against it to destroy it separately.

(4) The ground operational forces will conduct operations so as to destroy the enemy in coastal areas before he secures firm beachheads.

(5) Ground troops will be assembled at operational focal points from other sectors in accordance with a prescribed plan. Moreover, some troops assigned to areas where the enemy has not landed will be redeployed and diverted as operational reserves. When necessary, they will reinforce the main battle front or will be used to meet changes in the battle situation.

(6) Troops in those sectors where the enemy has not attacked will take appropriate measures to facilitate over-all operations. The supreme commanders of such sectors, in addition to previously laid plans and emergency instructions, will plan and be ready to swiftly divert the necessary troops and military supplies to other sectors at any time. Moreover, they will endeavor to perfect operational preparations and execution of operations in their areas of responsibility after the troops are redeployed.

(7) The islands near the Japanese coast will be defended strongly. Besides preventing the capture, establishment, and utilization of air and naval bases by the enemy, defense troops will, when necessary, strive to destroy enemy fighting strength by working with air, surface, and underwater special attack forces. The above also applies to the defense of remote areas on the mainland where transportation facilities are inadequate. In such an event, the condition of sites suitable for airfields and of anchorages will be studied for correlation with the over-all estimate of enemy landings on the mainland and thorough preparations shall be made to counter the enemy's plans.

(8) Against airborne troops utilized by the enemy in their landing attempts, ground troops will be employed to destroy them. In addition, important air bases, operational routes, and strategic transportation centers will be closely guarded against airborne troops. Moreover, thorough preparations will be made to counter enemy

plans for diversionary airborne operations in the interior.

e. Channel Defense

(1) The main objective of channel defense is to prevent enemy activities against the Japan Sea and Inland Sea areas. To this end, necessary Army troops will cooperate with the Navy and main emphasis will be laid on the Korea, Tsugaru, and Soya Straits and the Bungo (Moyo) and Kii Channels.

(2) The armies charged with channel defense will station their batteries so as to prevent a breakthrough by enemy vessels and prevent enemy landings. They will promptly strengthen bomb proof installations of batteries, and concentrate on direct defense of the fortresses against enemy amphibious or airborne attacks; moreover they will so dispose the armed boats assigned them that there will be no weakness in their channel defense.

(3) The above also applies to the defense of principal harbors.

3. Troop Employment

a. When an enemy invasion is anticipated in view of the over-all situation, each army will prepare to move its troops to other areas. Imperial General Headquarters, if necessary, will cope with the situation by revising the disposition of troops and by establishing the necessary reserve units under its direct command.

b. When the direction of enemy advance is learned, the troops will be concentrated in planned operational areas in accordance with previous or emergency plans, thereby preparing fully for the forthcoming operation.

c. Movement of ground forces will be primarily on foot; movement of war supplies and elements of ground forces will be by rail or water as the situation permits. Troop movements will be executed even under enemy air attacks. Operational routes will be selected in areas where enemy interference is relatively slight. A certain amount of flexibility in the maneuver planning should be provided in order to cope with the enemy situation, the condition of transportation facilities and the season. Minimizing loss of combat potential during movement must be emphasized.

4. Homeland Resistance and Internal Security

a. The main objective of interior resistance (action primarily directed against the enemy) and internal security (action primarily dealing with internal guard in general) is the destruction of the enemy in order to secure the possession of Homeland by utilizing unified power of the entire nation with the government and the people working with the armed forces. Moreover, internal security must contribute to military operations by eliminating various obstacles to the execution of the war.

b. Interior Resistance.

(1) Interior resistance is aimed at the obstruction of enemy activities and attrition of enemy strength through guerrilla warfare, espionage, deception, disturbance of camping areas, and blockading of supplies when enemy landing forces advance inland.

(2) Interior resistance will be planned and prepared, in close concert with the tactical command of the operational forces, so as to be able to meet the following emergency:

(a) When there are few or none of our operational troops.

(b) When the inland operations are to be directed in support of operational areas.

(c) When the coastal battle situation shows no prospect of successful ending and inevitably shifts to inland warfare.

(3) Various type guard units as well as Civilian Defense Corps with elements of field forces as a nucleus, will be employed as interior resistance troops under the unified command of the Military District commanders.

c. Internal security

(1) Internal security is aimed at protecting military activities, vital facilities and sources, transportation and military secrets and, if necessary, maintenance of public order, thus overcoming military obstacles in time of internal disorder and outbreak of rebellious activities occurring as a result of air raids, bombardments, enemy invasion, calamities, enemy propaganda or behind the line activities.

(2) The troops to enforce internal security will be the same as those employed in interior resistance; but troops to be assigned should be designated beforehand and particular effort should be directed at preventive action, discovery of espionage and employment of Kempei (LP) so as to conserve fighting strength.

d. Preparations for interior resistance will be completed promptly in areas where the Special Military Measure Regulations are applicable and then extended to other areas.

e. All personnel and materials necessary for interior resistance and for internal security will be provided locally by units concerned.

5. Collection of Information

The plan for collecting information for Ketsu Operation will be issued later.

6. Fortifications

a. Large scale and thorough construction of fortifications will be carried out, with special emphasis on fortifications for the use in supporting of offensives, thereby making them strong bases for our planned operations. At the same time, such fortifications will be aimed at supplementation of inferior troop strength and at the reduction of affect of enemy air bombardment, fire power, and maneuverability.

b. The outline for construction of fortifications shall be in accordance with IGHQ Army Directive No. 2419 "Procedure for Homeland

Fortification". Fortification materials will be allotted as shown on the attached Chart.

Chart of Allotment of Fortification Materials

	<u>Fuel</u> Unit: Kilolitre	<u>Explosives</u> Unit: Metric ton	<u>Cement</u> Unit: 1000 Metric ton	<u>Steel</u> Unit: Metric ton	<u>Lumber</u> Unit: 1000 Koku*
Fifth Area Army	100	130	10.0	500	Unk
First General Army					
Eleventh Area Army	200	150	18.5	700	281.6 (40.0)
Twelfth Area Army	650	450	30.0	2,000	823.4 (120.0)
Thirteenth Area Army	250	150	10.0	700	293.4 (40.0)
Second General Army					
Fifteenth Area Army	150	120	15.0	600	270.8 (30.0)
Sixteenth Area Army	250	300	21.2	1,000	545.4 (70.0)
Seventeenth Area Army	250	200	40.0	1,000	Unk
Total	1,850	1,500	144.7	6,500	2,214.6 (300.0)

* One Koku is approximately 6.35 cubic feet.

Note: (1) The allotments shown on this chart are for the period from April to July. Allotments thereafter will be made separately. All fuel allotments shall be completed by the end of June. One half of the cement and lumber allotments will be issued by the end of June and the remaining half in July.

- (2) The figures in parenthesis in the lumber column are included in the figure shown above, and indicate the amount that will be issued by IGHQ. The remainder will be obtained by troops in the form of special requisitions. The Korea and Northern Military Districts, however, will obtain lumber according to their needs.
- (3) The materials necessary for the construction of important command posts, concealed docks for boats, accessory installations for fortifications, etc., are included in the materials shown in this chart.

c. Each Army will strive to construct strategical obstacles and dummy installations in accordance with their operational plans to correlate with the fortifications.

d. Each Army will not only prepare operational routes in accordance with their own operational plans, but will also give consideration to troop employment of the whole Army and will prepare, construct and maintain operational routes to the fullest extent.

7. Training

a. All training will be given in accordance with battle front training procedures.

b. The senior commander will give immediate training to subordinate commanders and their headquarters in accordance with his opera-

tional plans and thoroughly familiarize them with operational policies and combat procedures. In the meantime, the training of the troops will be completed by advancing them successfully from basic training to general training and to actual group maneuvers.

c. The training of divisions organized under the First Stage Mobilization of 1945 in accordance with 1945 Army Regulation "A" No 34 (coastal defense groups) and those organized under the Second Stage Mobilization in accordance with 1945 Army Regulation "A" No. 6 (assault groups), will be conducted according to Imperial Headquarters Army Directive No 2433. Groups other than those listed in the foregoing paragraph will be trained in accordance with the above mentioned Imperial General Headquarters Army Directive. Groups deployed from Manchuria will be given immediate training in tactics to be used against American troops.

d. The time devoted to training courses will be determined by taking into consideration operational demands, chronological order of activation, time of recruits' entry into service, actual missions of construction of defense installations, etc. In scheduling training courses, accelerated specialized training limited to combat tactics against American troops will be given so that new troops can be immediately assigned to combat duties together with old troops. Later, if time permits, training will be extended so that troops can be assigned to any battle duty.

e. Training must be continued unremittingly even during construction of fortifications so that the combat power of troops can be

maintained and increased. This is especially true as regards specialists as well as recruits receiving basic training. Training given in a branch requiring special skill or constant practice, or training given to personnel requiring special ability will be facilitated through reduction or elimination of construction duty.

f. The headquarters and troop commanders of groups scheduled for movement to another area must be thoroughly familiarized with the topography, fortifications and tactics applicable in the new area. The armies concerned will mutually confer on these matters.

g. Training of air units will be dealt with separately.

8. Logistic Preparations

See Appendix 2, Outline of Line of Communications Preparations for Ketsu Operations.

Appendix 2

Outline of Line of Communications Preparations for the Ketsu Operations

1. Policies

a. The Homeland will be immediately converted to battle front conditions and logistic preparations will be generally completed by late June of this year and fully completed by late October. In particular, efforts will be made to complete preparations in the Kanto, Kyushu and Shikoku areas by the middle of this year.

b. Parallel with purely operational preparations, wartime production disposition will also be firmly organized and strengthened.

c. Everything will be converted to fighting strength and fighting strength for certain victory within the Homeland will be replete.

2. Outline

a. Taking advantage of Homeland facilities to the maximum extent, logistic preparations will be completed in the shortest possible time. In order to do this, the connection between logistic preparation and the training of the front line forces, fortification, guard, dispersion, stepped up production and the securing of food, will be regulated in the most satisfactory manner.

b. As the nucleus of the nation and country, the armed forces will concentrate total national strength and expedite the establishment of the Homeland battle dispositions.

c. Fighting strength will be concentrated in the Homeland by the middle of this year and will thus expedite the execution of the Ketsu Operations. For this purpose, the following matters will be given special consideration.

(1) The establishment of maximum fighting strength in the first half of the year, during which time operational preparations will be hastened.

(2) As much fighting strength as possible will be drawn from the continent and transferred to the Homeland.

(3) In particular, the utilization of idle materials for increasing fighting strength will be hastened.*

d. In line of communications preparations for air operations, importance will be attached to the strengthening of facilities for preserving aircraft, preparation of bombs of use by special attack planes, preparation of the communications network for command and intelligence purposes and sectional dispersal of aviation fuel. The deadline for fully completing these preparations will be late June.

e. The following matter will be considered in making operational preparations. The armed forces will carry out a portion of the production of food and fuel and, at the same time, will give as much support as possible to other producing sources.

* This part of the directive resulted in an intensified scrap drive to obtain brass ornaments from temple and shrines and the removal of brass railings from public buildings, etc.

f. Although the accomplishment of the Central Plan is at present, the prime objective in munitions preparation, in order to be prepared for increased demands on land and sea transportation services, independent operations by each military district will be encouraged. This will center chiefly around attaining self sufficiency in food, the repair of arms and materials and the production of fuel and certain arms and equipment.

g. In making operational preparations, close liaison will be maintained with naval forces concerned and the combined fighting power of the Army and Navy will be realized in the most expeditious manner.

3. Preparation of Supplies

a. The providing of individual arms and equipment for forces within the Homeland will receive priority over the stockpiling of operational supplies. Equipment for use by groups disposed along the coast will be fulfilled first, followed by those of other groups and forces in the order of their operational importance. In each case, emphasis will be placed on the Kanto and Kyushu areas.

b. The order of priority for building and maintaining aircraft, prior to the commencement of air operations for the Ketsu Operations, is as follows:

- (1) Fighter units directly covering special attack units.
- (2) Interceptor forces other than those mentioned above.
- (3) Other units.

Special attack planes, however, will be equipped according to separate provisions.

c. The transfer of materials of units diverted from Manchuria will be based upon the following, except where otherwise designated:

(1) When transferring units to the Homeland most of the horses will be left behind, and at the same time, the taking of supplies not urgently needed will be limited as much as possible. Horses and certain supplies will, in accordance with necessity, be replenished in the Homeland after the transfer. Aside from the above, together with completing the equipping of units, the following supplies will be taken:

(a) Ammunition - in general, enough for one campaign including the unit allowance; in particular, as much close combat and antitank equipment (about 1,000 armor-piercing mines and antitank mines for each group) as possible.

(b) Tools for fortification and construction - as many as possible.

(c) Motor vehicle fuel - approximately two weeks' supply.

d. The furnishing of horses and motor vehicles will be based upon the following.

(1) Until it is expected that operations will be commenced, the number of vehicles lacking will not be supplemented except when deemed absolutely necessary.

(2) Until operations are commenced, horses will not be requisitioned before July, except when deemed absolutely necessary.

e. In order to develop adequate local transport for operational preparations, motor vehicles, horses, etc. possessed by each Army will be used jointly whenever possible.

f. In concentrating groups at the commencement of operations, the equipping of units will be fully completed by the General Armies or Area Armies. Also each unit will carry as much ammunition and supplies for use in close combat or antitank warfare as possible.

g. In accordance with separate provisions, efforts will be made to supplement losses suffered by the concentrating groups while moving.

4. Basic Disposition of Supplies

a. The stockpiling of operational supplies is planned as follows:

(1) Total amount to be stockpiled - enough ammunition to meet the needs of the entire strength of the Homeland operations for one campaign, excluding the unit allowance; about one and one-half months' supply of motor vehicle fuel, provisions and other supplies of continuous issue.

(2) Storage classification: Supplies presently on hand in the Homeland, supplies in Manchuria which are to be transferred, and supplies planned for completion in 1945, will be combined, stockpiled and placed in the classification of supplies for use of groups disposed along the coast and reserve supplies.

(3) The supplies stockpiled for the Sho Operations will be included in the supplies to be stockpiled as given in this outline.

(4) In selecting locations for storing supplies, the first consideration will be the operational demand and joint consideration will be made of supplies already stockpiled for the Sho Operations, defense and dispersed dispositions.

b. The main points for stockpiling operational supplies will be the Kanto and Kyushu districts.

c. Supplies for use by groups disposed along the coast will be on the supplies necessary for those groups during the initial phases of the operations and will be stockpiled as follows, according to their respective strengths:

(1) Stockpiling standard:

Amunition: Approximately enough for one campaign in the Kanto area, Kyushu area and isolated islands and about a one-half campaign supply in other areas.

Fuel, provisions and other supplies of continuous issue: About three months' supply in isolated islands and one month's supply in other areas.

(2) Stockpiling:

The General Armies or Area Armies will decide the location of stockpiling supplies. Supplies will be gradually transferred from the High Command (War Ministry).

d. Reserve supplies will be the reserve supplies for use by the Imperial General Headquarters and the General Armies or the Area Armies. The reserve supplies will be stockpiled primarily aiming at facilitating the rushing of these supplies to the most probable areas of the main operation and also so as to insure ease of use throughout Homeland.

e. The stockpiling of reserve supplies for the time being will be the responsibility of the High Command.

f. The sequence and the deadline for stockpiling operational supplies are as follows:

(1) Supplies for groups disposed along the coast:

(a) Kanto and Kyushu areas and isolated islands - end of May.

(b) Other districts - end of June.

(2) Reserve supplies:

(a) Kanto and Kyushu areas - end of August.

(b) Other districts - end of October.

(3) Supplies on hand within the country will first of all be channeled to basic dispositions and then transferred supplies (from Manchuria and China) and supplies scheduled for production will be stockpiled, thus completing the stockpiling of all supplies.

g. Supplies for special battle ordnance will be stockpiled in accordance with the request of the general armies or the area armies. Artillery ammunition, in particular, will be stockpiled so as to match the type of gun of the operational forces, particularly of the forces to be concentrated.

h. The stockpiling of air supplies will be done according to the following:

(1) With generally two assaults by each unit as the standard, bombs for special attack planes will be gradually delivered to the Air General Army by the end of July.

100 kilogram bomb - 3,000
250 kilogram bomb - 7,000
500 kilogram bomb - 3,000
800 kilogram bomb - 300

(2) Reserve supplies for Imperial General Headquarters will be stockpiled near the following localities and the time, amount, etc. will be determined separately:

Northeastern Military District - Morioka and Sendai.

Eastern Military District - Masu, Utsunomiya, Miyota, Kumagaya and Yorii.

East Coast Military District - Seki and Hamamatsu.

Central Military District - Osaka, Himeji, Itosaki and Imabari.

Western Military District - Kumamoto, Tachiarai, Sone and Miyakonojo.

Korea Military District - Taegu, Taejon, Seoul and Pyongyang.

5. Storage

a. For the time being, various central supply depots will be responsible for the safekeeping of reserve supplies. If necessary, operational supplies delivered to the Military District Commanders will be placed in the custody of various central supply depots. Any drastic change in the location of the stockpiling of reserve supplies will be regulated by the High Command.

b. When necessary, a part of the supplies for groups disposed along the coast will be placed in the custody of various central supply depots.

c. In the storing of operational supplies, in consideration of enemy gunfire and bombing in particular, vital munitions, especially hazardous materials, breakables, scarce materials, deficient materials, materials difficult to replace, etc., will be sheltered underground. Efforts will be made to gradually move other supplies underground but, at present, they will be dispersed and concealed.

Thorough measures will be taken to preserve stockpiled supplies, particularly, the protection against damage caused by dampness for supplies sheltered underground.

d. In the selection and establishment of locations for stockpiling operational supplies along the Japan Sea coast, consideration will be given to antiaircraft defense and to the possibility of enemy landings from the Japan Sea.

e. In order to preserve aircraft, thorough measures will be taken for their concealment, cover and dispersion. Efforts will also be made to construct revetments for special attack planes and to prepare concealed airfields.

6. Outline for Use of Supplies

a. The approval of Imperial General Headquarters will be required for use of operational supplies prior to the commencement of the operation. In emergency cases, however, the General Armies or the Area Armies under the direct command of the Imperial General Headquarters are authorized to use supplies as the occasion demands.

b. At the commencement of the operation, operational supplies will be concentrated in the main operational area according to the following standard including the amount of basically disposed supplies:

(1) Ammunition: About two campaigns' supply.

(2) Fuel, provisions and other supplies of continuous issue: About four months' supply.

(3) For this purpose, when the commencement of the Ketsu Operations can be perceived as many supplies as possible in Manchuria

and China will be transferred to the Homeland. Also, in accordance with the determination of the main operational areas within the Homeland, reserve supplies will be successively concentrated in those areas. Imperial General Headquarters will regulate the foregoing measures in accordance with the prevailing situation.

c. In accordance with the determination of the main operational areas within the Homeland, reserve supplies in Military District areas will be delivered to the Area Armies concerned. In addition, the restriction on changing the location of stockpiles will be removed.

d. Operational supplies to be concentrated from other areas will also be delivered to the Area Armies concerned. Their supply points are scheduled as follows:

Eleventh Area Army	- Morioka, Fukushima and Aomori
Twelfth Area Army	- Utsunomiya, Omiya, Hachioji and Takasaki
Thirteenth Area Army	- Kofu, Iida and Nagoya
Fifteenth Area Army	- Gojo, Takamatsu, Osaka and Hiroshima
Sixteenth Area Army	- Moji and Oita
Seventeenth Area Army	- To be decided according to the prevailing situation.

e. Efforts will be made to make the best use of railways and ships in the concentration.

f. As for the supplies of continuous issue necessary for transient troops in the concentration of groups, General Armies or Area Armies will plan beforehand the use of their reserve supplies. These supplies will be transferred to necessary localities when strength to be transferred becomes certain.

7. Use of Line of Communications Units

a. The transfer of units from Manchuria will be carried out so that the transfer of the bulk of the units will be completed by the end of June.

b. The number of line of communications units to be organized by the High Command will be limited to the number actually needed to accomplish the mission in the operational areas. Line of communications duties for the rear areas will be accomplished by forces of the district army and auxiliary forces which will be organized as Volunteer Units.

c. In concentrating line divisions upon commencement of the operation, necessary line of communications units will be transferred to the area concerned at the same time.

Line of communications units to be transferred will chiefly be transport units. The standard will be three to eight motor transport companies for each division. Imperial General Headquarters or the General Armies will regulate transfers on such occasions.

d. The plan for transferring line of communications units will be shown separately.

e. General Armies and Area Armies will attach importance to the training of the line of communications units, particularly, the officers and non-commissioned officers of the transport units.

8. Requisition for Supplies

a. Requisition for supplies of units in the Homeland will be made directly to the Minister of War by the Air General Army Headquarters and Military District Headquarters. However, the Area Armies will direct requests to the minister of war through the First and Second General Army Headquarters.

APPENDIX VI

Agreement between the First and Second General Armies and the Air General Army Concerning the Homeland Operation

14 May 1945

1. Air attacks conducted in front of general army positions will, as a general rule, be directed at enemy convoys. Air units will concentrate all possible strength to smash convoys at sea. In the event the enemy attempts landings on isolated islands in the homeland area, necessary air strength will operate to reduce enemy strength.

2. For the purpose of protecting strategic sectors and installations in the homeland, necessary air strength under the Air General Army will be transferred to the commands of the First and Second General Armies. On each occasion, agreement will be made in advance concerning the strength to be transferred.

3. In case the main enemy air force attacks are directed at strategic points in the Nagoya area, the Fifteenth Area Army commander will dispatch a part of the air units under his command to the Nagoya area to cooperate with the forces in that area. Should the main enemy attack be directed at the Osaka-Kobe area, the Thirteenth Area Army commander will dispatch a part of the air units under his command to the Osaka-Kobe area to cooperate with the forces in that area.

4. During any operational period, if an air base ceases to function the ground crews will be attached to the ground force in control of the area. During the period of operational preparation air field units will receive instructions from the division or corresponding commander of the ground forces in the area regarding fortification, guard and other defense efforts. Details of preparations will be determined by consultation between the respective area army and air army commanders.

5. In cases of emergency, the ground forces are authorized to direct the use of reconnaissance planes of the air units under ground force command. Necessary fuel will be supplied from ground force stocks.

6. Repair and Supply

a. Supply Service for Air Units

In accordance with the provisions of "Principles of Air Units Supply Services" and "Outline of the Air General Army Supply Services", each air army commander will be responsible for providing supply service to air units. Military commanders will render local transportation support to the air units.

b. Mutual Repair Assistance

In consonance with the type of weapons and units concerned, ground and air units will render mutual support in weapons repair. Details will be settled between unit commanders.

c. Distribution of Fuel and Ammunition

Distribution of fuel and ammunition for all air unit ground use will be determined by the air army, allotted to the air units and reported to the respective area armies. Each air unit will receive their quota from the designated army supply depot.

7. Guard and AAA Defense for Air Installations

a. In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 4, direct guard of air installations will be performed by the air unit with local ground forces supporting them, as required.

b. In the event that antiaircraft support of any air base is required, the Air General Army or the air army concerned will request the appropriate area army to furnish such support, as required.

8. Air Installations

a. Future Construction

Future construction of air installations will be directed by the Air General Army with the appropriate ground force commander supplying necessary labor and material.

b. Current Construction

Air installations now under construction by ground force units will be transferred to an air unit upon completion of construction. Details of transfer will be settled by the air army and area army commander concerned or by the Air General Army and the general army commander concerned.

c. Destruction of Airfields

In case of an actual enemy landing, the following airfields will probably be destroyed:

First General Army Zone

Hachinohe, Masuda, Haramachi, Iwaki, Mito-Higashi, Toyokashima, Choshi, Yokoshiba, Togane, Fuji, Tenryu, and Oitsu.

Second General Army Zone

Karasebara, Niitabaru, Uenbyu, Mansei, Ashiya and Gannosu.

Destruction of airfields will be accomplished by the occupying air units with the assistance of the local ground force unit. Details will be arranged by the area army and air army commanders concerned.

d. Crucial Airfields

At the time of an enemy landing, the following airfields, situated close to the coast, will be maintained as long as possible and then destroyed:

First General Army Zone

Mito-Kita, Hamamatsu and Akeno

Second General Army Zone

Chiran, Yonago and Mikuni

9. Exchange of Information

a. Exchange of reports and intelligence information will be closely coordinated between air and ground units.

b. For the purpose of correctly identifying the location of enemy ships, the following map will be used by all headquarters of division size and larger:

Scale: 1/2,000,000

Sumner's Charts

APPENDIX VII

List of Principal Army and Air Force Units at the Termination of the War

<u>Name of Unit</u>	<u>Commander</u>	<u>Location of Hos.</u>
First General Army	Field Marshal, General Gen Sugiyama	Tokyo
Eleventh Area Army (Northeastern Army District)	General Yoshisuke Fujie	Sendai
50th Army	Lt Gen Toshimoto Hoshino	Aomori
72d Division	Lt Gen Kumaharu Chiba	Fukushima
142d Division	Lt Gen Tadao Teragaki	Yoshioka (North of Sendai)
157th Division	Lt Gen Kenichiro Miyashita	Sambongi
222d Division	Lt Gen Kahei Kasahara	Iwayado (North- east of Mizusawa)
308th Division	Lt Gen Torashiro Asano	Noheji
322d Division	Lt Gen Yuki Fukabori	Okawara (South- west of Iwanuma)
95th Independent Mixed Brigade	Maj Gen Iwata Ishiguro	Hachinohe
113th Independent Mixed Brigade	Maj Gen Yoshio Kamekawa	Taira
Twelfth Area Army (Eastern Army District)	General Shizuichi Tanaka	Tokyo
36th Army	Lt Gen Toshimichi Uemura	Urawa
81st Division	Lt Gen Takeshi	Utsunomiya
93d Division	Lt Gen Mitsuo Yamamoto	Kashiwa (North- east of Matsudo)

<u>Name of Unit</u>	<u>Commander</u>	<u>Location of Hqs.</u>
201st Division	Maj Gen Yoshikata Shigenobu	Kunitachi (East of Tachikawa)
202d Division	Maj Gen Tadashi Katakura	Takasaki
209th Division	Maj Gen Seiichi Kume	Tsubata (North-east of Kanazawa)
214th Division	Lt Gen Tsunoru Yamamoto	Utsunomiya
1st Armored Division	Lt Gen Koreo Hosomi	Sano
4th Armored Division	Lt Gen Shiori	Chiba
51st Army	Lt Gen Kengo Noda	Takahama (North-east of Tsuchiura)
44th Division	Lt Gen Maruji Taniguchi	Ogawa (East of Takahama)
151st Division	Lt Gen Yoshikata Shirokane	Mito
221st Division	Lt Gen Saburo Nagasawa	Kashima
115th Independent Mixed Brigade	Maj Gen Takeshi Aiba	South of Kashima
116th Independent Mixed Brigade	Maj Gen Kiyoo Iwane	Hokoda
7th Independent Tank Brigade	Col Hayahiko Mitamura	North of Ogawa
52d Army	Lt Gen Tokumatsu Shigeta	Shisui (West of Sakura)
3d Guards Division	Lt Gen Kiyotsugu Yamazaki	Naruto
147th Division	Lt Gen Kozaburo Ishikawa	Tsurumai (South-west of Mobara)
152d Division	Lt Gen Seiji Nozaki	Shiishiba Mura (Northwest of Choshi)
234th Division	Lt Gen Kameichiro Nagano	Yamakura Mura (North of Yokaichiba)
3d Independent Tank Brigade	Col Yosaburo Tabata	Sarashina (East of Chiba)

<u>Name of Unit</u>	<u>Commander</u>	<u>Location of Hqs.</u>
53d Army	Lt Gen Yaezo Akashiba	North of Isehara
84th Division	Lt Gen Tameto Sakuma	Odawara
140th Division	Lt Gen Choho Mononobe	Kamakura
316th Division	Lt Gen Toku Kashiwa	Godo (East Ise-Hara)
2d Independent Tank Brigade	Col Shizuo Saeki	South of Atsugi
117th Independent Mixed Brigade	Maj Gen Masakichi Hirasakura	Numazu
Tokyo Bay Force	Lt Gen Shihei Oba	Funagata (North of Tateyama)
96th Independent Mixed Brigade	Maj Gen Daishiro Eto	Tateyama
114th Independent Mixed Brigade	Maj Gen Makoto Yanase	Yokosuka
354th Division	Lt Gen Shinichi Yamaguchi	Marumura (North-east of Tateyama)
Tokyo Defense Army	Lt Gen Jo Iimura	Tokyo
1st Guards Division	Lt Gen Takeshi Mori	Tokyo
1st Anti-aircraft Division	Lt Gen Takashi Kanaoka	Tokyo
321st Division	Lt Gen Kanju Yazaki	Oshima
1st Guards Brigade	Maj Gen Yoshimasa Shigematsu	Tokyo
2d Guards Brigade	Maj Gen Setsuzo Yagasaki	Tokyo
3d Guards Brigade	Maj Gen Munagi Harada	Tokyo
66th Independent Mixed Brigade	Maj Gen Saburo Nakamura	Niishima

<u>Name of Unit</u>	<u>Commander</u>	<u>Location of Hqs.</u>
67th Independent Mixed Brigade	Maj Gen Yoshio Kihara	Hachijojima
Thirteenth Area Army (East Coast Army District)	Lt Gen Tasuku Okada	Nagoya
54th Army	Lt Gen Nobuo Kobayashi	Shinshiro
73d Division	Lt Gen Suesaburo Kawada	Toyohashi
143d Division	Lt Gen Sadaji Suzuki	Kiga (North-west of Hamamatsu)
153d Division	Lt Gen Toyojiro Inamura	Ujiyamada
224th Division	Lt Gen Saburo Kawamura	Hiroshima Deployed Omae
229th Division	Lt Gen Yoshio Ishino	Kanazawa
355th Division	Lt Gen Hisashi Takeda	Himeji Deployed Omae Zaki
2d Anti-aircraft Division	Lt Gen Kanji Irie	Nagoya
97th Independent Mixed Brigade	Maj Gen Shi Negishi	Toyohashi
119th Independent Mixed Brigade	Maj Gen Setsu Ito	Asahina (*Maezaki)
120th Independent Mixed Brigade	Maj Gen Takeo Kaji	Shimizu
8th Independent Tank Brigade	Lt Gen Hiromichi Toyama	Mikatagahara

<u>Name of Unit</u>	<u>Commander</u>	<u>Location of Hqs.</u>
Second General Army	Field Marshal General Shunroku Hata	Hiroshima
Fifteenth Area Army (Central Army District)	Lt Gen Eitaro Uchiyama	Osaka
55th Army	Lt Gen Kumakichi Harada	Shingai (North- east of Kochi)
11th Division	Lt Gen Koichi Ono	East side of Kochi
155th Division	Lt Gen Wao Iwanaga	East of Kochi
205th Division	Lt Gen Yasuo Karakawa	Kochi
344th Division	Lt Gen Toyoichiro Yokota	Nakamura
121st Independent Mixed Brigade	Maj Gen Tadamichi Yokoi	Tokushima
59th Army	Lt Gen Hisao Tani	Hiroshima
144th Division	Lt Gen Naomitsu Takano	Wakayama
225th Division	Lt Gen Kanego Ochiai	Himeji
230th Division	Lt Gen Sadayoshi Nakanishi	Okayama
231st Division	Lt Gen Takaiki Murata	Yamaguchi
3d Anti-aircraft Division	Lt Gen Kiyoshi Kawai	Osaka
123d Independent Mixed Brigade	Maj Gen Masatada Kanaoka	Gobo
124th Independent Mixed Brigade	Maj Gen Shin Ishii	Kogushi
Sixteenth Area Army (Western Army District)	Lt Gen Isamu Yokoyama	Futsukaichi
4th Antiaircraft Division	Lt Gen Noriharu Ito	Kokura
107th Independent Mixed Brigade	Maj Gen Yasokichi Kuze	Fukue (Goto)

<u>Name of Unit</u>	<u>Commander</u>	<u>Location of Hqs.</u>
Tsushima Fortress Unit	Lt Gen Buhei Nagase	Tsushima
40th Army	Lt Gen Mitsuo Nakazawa	Ijuin
77th Division	Lt Gen Masayasu Nakayama	Kajiki
146th Division	Lt Gen Fumio Tsuboshima	Kawabe
206th Division	Lt Gen Hide Iwakiri	Izaku
303d Division	Lt Gen Eikuma Ishida	Sendai
125th Independent Mixed Brigade	Maj Gen Hisashi Kurahashi	Ibusuki
56th Army	Lt Gen Ichiro Shichita	Iizuka
57th Division	Lt Gen Masao Yano	South of Fukuoka
145th Division	Lt Gen Kazuaki Obara	Ashiya
312th Division	Lt Gen Tamotsu Tada	Karatsu
351st Division	Lt Gen Yuzuru Fujimura	South of Fukuma
4th Independent Tank Brigade	Col Rinichi Ikoma	Fukumaru
Iki Fortress Unit	Maj Gen Koji Chichiha	Iki
57th Army	Maj Gen Kanji Nishihara	Takarabe
25th Division	Lt Gen Reizo Kato	Kobayashi
86th Division	Maj Gen Wataro Yoshinaka	Shibushi
154th Division	Maj Gen Akisaburo Futami	Tsuma
156th Division	Lt Gen Keishichiro Higuchi	Honjo
212th Division	Maj Gen Tokutaro Sakurai	Tsuno
98th Independent Mixed Brigade	Maj Gen Gennosuke Kurosu	South of Takayama

<u>Name of Unit</u>	<u>Commander</u>	<u>Location of Hqs.</u>
109th Independent Mixed Brigade	Lt Gen Sadao Senda	Tanegashima
5th Independent Tank Brigade	Col Hideki Takazawa	Honjo
6th Independent Tank Brigade	Col Akio Matsuda	Kirishima
Chikugo Force	Lt Gen Motojiro Taniguchi	Nagasaki
118th Independent Mixed Brigade	Maj Gen Takamichi Uchiyama	Saheki
122d Independent Mixed Brigade	Lt Gen Motojiro Taniguchi	Nagasaki
Higo Force	Lt Gen Ryoji Nakado	Kumamoto
216th Division	Lt Gen Ryoji Nakado	Kumamoto
126th Independent Mixed Brigade	Maj Gen Yuzo Hayashi	Amakusa
Fifth Area Army (Northern Army District)	Lt Gen Kiichiro Higuchi	Sapporo
7th Division	Lt Gen Gyoichi Koito	Obihiro
42d Division	Lt Gen Torata Sano	Wakkanai
88th Division	Lt Gen Juichiro Mineki	Toyohara (Sakhalin)
89th Division	Lt Gen Gonnosuke Ogawa	Etorofu Is.
91st Division	Lt Gen Fusaki Tsutsumi	Shumushu Is.
101st Independent Mixed Brigade	Maj Gen Asahiko Katsura	Tomakomai
129th Independent Mixed Brigade	Maj Gen Susumu Niho	Uruppu Is.
Air General Army	General Masakazu Kawabe	Tokyo
1st Air Army	Lt Gen Takeo Yasuda	Tokyo

<u>Name of Unit</u>	<u>Commander</u>	<u>Location of Hqs.</u>
10th Air Division	Lt Gen Kanetoshi Kondo	Tokyo
11th Air Division	Lt Gen Kumao Kitajima	Osaka
6th Air Army	Lt Gen Michio Sugawara	Fukuoka
1st Air Division (Under the command of the Fifth Area Army)	Lt Gen Shoichi Sato	Sapporo
12th Air Division	Maj Gen Hideharu Habu	Ozuki
51st Air Division	Lt Gen Ai Ishikawa	Gifu
52d Air Division	Lt Gen Shigeru Yamanaka	Kumagaya
53d Air Division	Lt Gen Yutaka Hirota	Ota
20th Fighter Air Group	Lt Gen Takezo Aoki	Komaki
30th Fighter Air Group	Maj Gen Yasuyuki Miyoshi	Kumamoto
Homeland Railway Unit	Maj Gen Shuji Mihara	Tokyo
Shipping Transport Command	Lt Gen Bunro Saiki	Hiroshima

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JAPANESE AIR-GROUND COORDINATION

In 1926, the Japanese Military Academy established an air cadet course for the first time. All cadets lived together and air cadets, in addition to special instruction in their own field, received exactly the same education and training as the ground cadets.

In 1937, the Military Air Academy was established. Air cadets were then selected from junior cadets who had already received two years' training at the Military Academy. Thus, air officers had a fair knowledge of army tactics. To further tighten the bond between the two services, every year picked infantry and artillery officers were seconded to the air force and received special training in reconnaissance work. During the war in China these officers were carried in the planes as liaison officers between the air and ground forces.

In December 1930, the Office of Inspectorate Army Training published "Air-Ground Communication Procedures" outlining the methods of communication to be used between air and ground units. From time to time, as planes increased in speed, amendments and additions were published, but the basic method of conveying instructions from ground to air remained the same.

As the air and ground forces at this time had not been trained in the use of radio communication techniques, panel signals and message tubes were used for simple communications. Complicated and more detailed communications were transmitted from Army headquarters

to Air headquarters by telephone and Air headquarters then transmitted these instructions to the pilot of the plane by radio.

Panel signals: Each ground headquarters of battalion or above was given its own identification panel. This was made of a large cotton sheet (6 meters x 3 meters), usually white but blue in snow country, with special markings in red to identify the particular headquarters involved. Special care had to be exercised to insure that contiguous armies did not use the same code designations on their panels to indicate divisions, brigades etc. An extra panel (1 meter x 3 meters) was added above the normal headquarters panel to indicate an artillery headquarters. Artillery headquarters panels were solid white or blue according to whether there was snow on the ground or not. In addition, a small white or blue triangular panel by its position indicated the code number designation of a particular artillery headquarters. (Figure 1)

Three "number" panels also were issued and the position of these panels in relation to the identification panel indicated by code number the instructions being signalled to the plane. (Figure 2) By consulting the code chart in "Air-Ground Communication Procedures" the pilot was then able to interpret the message. (Figure 3)

Message tubes: A strong wire with message tubes attached, was stretched between two poles at a height of approximately 5 meters. Low-flying planes would then pick up the wire by means of another

hooked wire trailing from the plane and draw the message tubes up into the plane. (Figure 4)

An Air-Ground Communication Squad was organized in each headquarters. Army and division squads consisted of one officer and ten or more men while brigade, regiment and battalion squads consisted of a non-commissioned officer and approximately five men. The squads were usually commanded by signal officers who had completed a short training course in air-ground communications at either the Air Reconnaissance Training School or with an air reconnaissance unit.

In addition to the panels, the squads were equipped with pyrotechnics, smoke candles and message tubes with their pick-up devices. Horses and bicycles were used by communications squads to relay reports to ground units which might be located several miles from available open fields or airfields.

When planning a coordinated air-ground action, agreement was first reached in regard to the air strength to be employed during the operation; missions of the air units; airfields to be used; code names to be employed for cities, rivers, mountains and roads, and the manner in which air-ground communications were to be made in accordance with the principles of the Air-Ground Communication Procedures. In this manner, close coordination between the two forces was readily maintained.

During the China Incident the air force supported the ground

force by reconnoitering enemy situations and topographic features; artillery spotting and assisting command liaison, and by bombing and strafing enemy units, installations and supply dumps. It also flew cover for ground units.

FIGURE 1a

IDENTIFICATION PANELS




FIGURE 1b

IDENTIFICATION PANELS

2d Army Hq




4th Div Hq




5th Div Hq



6th Div Hq





7th Inf Brig Hq



8th Inf Brig Hq



ARTILLERY PANEL



■ — RED

FIGURE 2




FIGURE 3

EXAMPLE OF PANEL SIGNALLING
(2d INF. REGT. HQ.)

NUMBER PANELS SIGNIFY 424,
CODE NUMBER 424 READS
"BOMB 'A' HILL"





FIGURE 4

MESSAGE TUBES FACILITY

VIEWED FROM GROUND



VIEWED FROM PLANE

