

UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE POLITICAL
PROBLEMS IN SINKIANG; EXTENT OF SOVIET AID AND
ENCOURAGEMENT TO REBEL GROUPS IN SINKIANG;
BORDER INCIDENT AT PEITASHAN ¹

893.00/1-647

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Ringwalt) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent)

[WASHINGTON,] January 6, 1947.

Reference is made to Nanking's telegram 2123, Dec 18 10 a. m.,² a copy of which is attached, in regard to the drift of Sinkiang away from China as evidenced by developments in the Nanking visit of Sinkiang delegates to the National Assembly. Reference also is made to a note of JCV³ in regard thereto, reading as following: "ARR⁴— Can you EER,⁵ Ward⁶ or anybody think of anything we could do to slow down this drift?"

Ward makes the following suggestions:

(1) We should urge upon the Chinese authorities at Nanking the importance of extending fullest possible support to General Chang Chih-chung, Chairman of the Sinkiang Provincial Government. General Chang has the confidence of the Turkis, but alone and unsupported he cannot save Sinkiang for China. Because of the political rivalry and jealousy existing between Chinese leaders immediately subordinate to Chiang Kai-shek,⁷ there is danger that needed support will be withheld from him by T. V. Soong⁸ and others who for motives of rivalry would like to reduce his prestige. We can combat such tendencies by urging in the highest quarters at Nanking the necessity of fully supporting him.

(2) Urge upon the Chinese authorities, including Chang Chih-chung, the importance of carrying out in Sinkiang visible, constructive public works. Ward explains that the Turkis consider the Chinese to be burned out and hopeless. When General Kuo Chi-ch'iao⁹ made

¹ For previous correspondence regarding Sinkiang, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. x, pp. 1201 ff.

² *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. x, p. 1221.

³ John Carter Vincent.

⁴ Arthur R. Ringwalt.

⁵ Edward E. Rice, Assistant Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs.

⁶ Robert S. Ward, Consul at Tihwa, 1944-1946.

⁷ President of the National Government of the Republic of China.

⁸ President of the Chinese Executive Yuan.

⁹ Former Deputy Director of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's Headquarters in the Northwest.

everybody in Tihwa, including Turkis, turn out to assist in digging a defensive ditch entirely around the city, the resulting psychological effect was very good in spite of the fact that it was for defense against Turkis. The latter contemplated this show of determined energy with surprised approval. To both win and hold the Turkis the Chinese should get busy and build streets, roads, or anything visible and useful which will serve as convincing evidence that the Chinese retain a measure of vigor.

Major Chinese difficulties in holding Sinkiang, it would appear from Ward's past reports, are: (1) lack of transport facilities between intramural China and Sinkiang; and (2) scarcity of consumer goods. It is suggested that the Chinese be urged and perhaps aided to establish and maintain regular, frequent air and other transport schedules between intramural China and Tihwa, and thence to the various centers of Sinkiang. These transport facilities should be utilized in part to bring in as large amounts of consumer and other goods as possible. Such facilities should be operated if necessary at a loss, as essential to national defense.

Incidentally, we note from the reference telegram that the Chinese have thwarted efforts to have written into the constitution provisions for safeguarding minorities. We do not perceive why such provisions, if themselves unobjectionable, should not be written into national and provincial basic laws. It would seem to us, for instance, that a roving tribal people, if made responsible to the Chinese authorities through their own tribal leaders, could be controlled both more happily and more effectively than by trying to fit them into the government of a small fixed area such as the hsien. Possibly such views might be presented informally to the Generalissimo or to other responsible Chinese leaders, at an appropriate time, by Ambassador Stuart.¹⁰

A[RTHUR] R. R[INGWALT]

893.00/1-847

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

No. 395

NANKING, January 8, 1947.

[Received January 24, 1947.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose for the information of the Department an account of an interview with General Chang Chih-chung, Governor of Sinkiang, as published in the English Service of the Central News Agency on January 4, 1947.¹¹

¹⁰ J. Leighton Stuart.

¹¹ Not reprinted.

An officer of the Embassy spoke briefly to General Chang on the evening of January 3 and although the General merely stated that he had come to Nanking to report personally on conditions in Sinkiang, he intimated that one of his primary interests was to urge the allocation of sufficient funds to make possible the early implementation of the agreement between the ex-rebels and the Central Government signed at Tihwa on June 6, 1946 between the Central Government and the Ining regime.¹²

In this general connection, reference is made to Consul Ward's summary of the Sinkiang situation contained in Embtel 2009 of November 30, 1946,¹³ particularly to the fourth numbered section in which he refers to the urgent need for Central Government financial support of General Chang Chih-chung in Sinkiang. At the present time the Embassy feels that Consul Ward's estimate of the situation is valid, but that internal conditions in China and the generally parlous state of economic and financial affairs may make it impossible for the Government to meet the requirements of General Chang. If such proves to be true, further outbreaks in Sinkiang may be anticipated.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:
W. WALTON BUTTERWORTH
Minister-Counselor of Embassy

893.00/1-3047 : Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, January 30, 1947—9 a. m.

[Received January 30—5:45 a. m.]

163. Embassy has been informed by a foreign diplomatic source which it considers reliable that Generalissimo has advised Chang Chi-chung that he has another post in mind for him and that if he returns to Sinkiang at all, he will not be expected to remain for any extended period. This is in accord with other information available to Embassy which indicated that Chang Chi-chung would be replaced as Governor of Sinkiang by Pai Chung-hsi, present Minister [of] National Defense.

It is becoming increasingly clear that General Chang has been unable to move Central Government to appropriate sufficient funds to implement the agreement signed with Sinkiang rebels last June, and it is generally rumored here that he has been more outspoken in denouncing Central Government's responsibility for conditions in

¹² See telegram No. 965, June 13, 1946, 11 p. m., from the Counselor of Embassy in China, *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. x, p. 1207.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 1215.

Sinkiang in private conversation than he was in a recent press conference (reference Embassy's despatch 395, January 8).

It is difficult to estimate effect of General Chang's replacement on situation in Sinkiang, but his capture of public confidence there has been such that it cannot but increase the bitter skepticism of overwhelming non-Chinese population of province with regard to Chinese intentions, even though he may be replaced by the leading Chinese Mohammedan.

STUART

761.93/3-1747: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, March 17, 1947—5 p. m.

[Received 11:28 p. m.]

578. Following is substance Tihwa's¹⁴ 78, March 10, 79, March 11 and 80, March 12:

"Chinese and Russian refugees from Ining report following which may be exaggerated:

1. Soviet citizenship issued without application to White Russians and natives Ining, Suiting areas.

2. After Chang Chih-chung's August visit Red troops in uniform infiltrated Ili zone. Now appear openly in increasing numbers at Borotala iron mines, Wusu. Over 200 at commercial airfield and other points Ining.

3. Muslims aroused saying, 'we freed ourselves from the yellow men, now we must destroy the white'. Serious native attacks on people of other races frequent. White Russians in terror of uprising. Many high Ining Muslim leaders now planning move to Tihwa and eventually to inner China to escape Soviet pressure. If they repudiate Soviet citizenship acquired under duress, they fear murder by Soviet secret police whose operations extensive and ruthless.

4. General conscription all races continues in Ili zone. Uniforms, military equipment and supplies better than in Chinese Army."

Sent Department; repeat to Moscow.

STUART

761.93/3-2247: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 22, 1947—1 p. m.

[Received March 22—11:06 a. m.]

947. We offer following comment on rumors reported in Tihwa's 78, March 10, repeated to Department in Nanking's 578.

While it is entirely normal that Soviet citizenship should be pressed

¹⁴ J. Hall Paxton was Consul at Tihwa.

on White Russians, it seems improbable to us that natives on Ining and Suiting areas should received similar treatment. These natives can be of more use to USSR as part of indigenous Soviet movement manipulated by USSR.

We assume that by Red troops in uniform, Paxton means Soviet forces. Unless situation has radically changed since first of year, we would be surprised if Soviet troops in uniform were in evidence in Ining-Wusu area. Our reason for saying so is that in Asia as matter of principle USSR seems to be avoiding appearance of armed intervention. Furthermore, there is no apparent need for obvious Soviet garrisons in Sinkiang as native rebel forces appear to be adequately serving Soviet ends.

Rumor of Muslim resentment against Russians seems plausible. Such resentment is typical for areas taken over by Soviet puppet organizations and secret police. How effective resentment is depends on many factors not least of which is ruthless determination of Soviet secret police.

In connection with whole Sinkiang problem, our impression from reading a series of excellent reports prepared late last year and early this year by British Consuls at Tihwa and Kashgar is that extension of Soviet influence into Sinkiang is following closely Iranian-Azerbaijan pattern of last year. Our impression is that present is period of strong-arm consolidation by native stooges along border areas combined with political manipulation designed to bring about disintegration of central authority at Tihwa to the end that "democratic" forces are able to capture government at Tihwa. Simultaneously USSR is using economic tactics (much as Moscow urged oil agreement on Tehran) to insure parallel Soviet economic penetration. Combination of these pressures on gimcrack Central Government Authority in Sinkiang means that, unless there is drastic injection of new elements into situation, Sinkiang will be absorbed into Soviet orbit. Mere reforms introduced by Tihwa Government will not suffice to save Sinkiang. If central authority is to be effectively reasserted throughout province, other forces will be brought into play.

Azerbaijan was regained by a complex of factors: Wide publicity and world concern, UN commitment, active official American interest and Qavam's¹⁵ willingness boldly to force showdown. We are not in position to know whether similar combination of forces can be mustered with regard to Sinkiang. Nanking and Department may be able to answer this question. Our feeling is that question is worth explor-

¹⁵ Ahmad Qavam, Iranian Prime Minister.

ing—provided Department feels Sinkiang is politically and strategically worth attempt at rescue.

Repeated to London as 96. Department repeat to Nanking.

SMITH

893.00/3-3147: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, March 31, 1947—3 p. m.

[Received 11 p. m.]

697. Following is Tihwa's 103, March 24:

"After lunch here March 22 chairman discussed general situation with me. Expressing approval his policies I cited many improvements already evident. He emphasized intent to stay Sinkiang till solution of problems in satisfactory progress. Settlement incidents arising from parades (mytels 49 and 51, February 24, repeated Department as Embtel 395, February 28¹⁶) has been reached in principle. No attempt being made to unravel threads of events but precautions to be taken against further like disorders. These he believes can be prevented by good will both sides (provided no outside incitement given). Paxton."

STUART

893.00/4-1847: Airgram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, April 18, 1947.

[Received April 24—11:23 a. m.]

A-69. Following is substance of Tihwa's telegrams No. 136, April 11, 7 p. m. and 137 of April 12, 4 p. m., 1947:

"No present evidence apparent of any favorable reception for Communist economic theory here. Native agitation seems instigated by wealthy educated few seeking political liberty rather than economic upset. Political liberty is also Chairman's avowed goal. Accordingly, if China can avoid interference with Islamic customs, improve economic conditions without attacking present distribution of wealth, establish educational and health facilities and continue progressively to satisfy native desires for freedom, serious disorder can probably

¹⁶ Not printed; it reported measures to maintain order in view of demands made by some 800 Turks on the Sinkiang government and of counter-demands by several hundred Kazakhs and several hundred Han (Chinese) Muslims (893.00/2-2847).

be prevented until next winter by which time change policies may be accepted [so?] that it would be hard for agitators to break the peace.

"The danger of this winter's snow, which provided water for cavalry and at same time hampered infantry by blocked roads and unaccustomed cold, has now vanished with its melting. Warmer weather leaves Han foot and motorized units more mobile and better able to use their numerical advantage while lack of adequate waterholes seriously handicaps movement of native mounted troops.

"In event of serious Soviet intervention, even though covert, foregoing picture would of course be completely changed."

STUART

893.00/4-2547: Airgram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, April 25, 1947.

[Received April 30—8:22 a. m.]

A-78. Following is Tihwa's telegram No. 150, April 18, 4 p. m. to Embassy.

"Section 1 of 6. That Soviet Consulate General was of great assistance in arranging last year's peace terms, General Sung¹⁷ admits. At present, however, its staff seems to him neither cooperative nor even intelligent but merely stupidly grasping at every small advantage. Whether this alteration, if factual, is due to change in personnel or in government policy, there is yet insufficient evidence for judgment."

Following is Tihwa's 152 of April 19, 3 p. m.:

"Section 2 Mytel 150 April 18. Admitting that Chinese oppression, bad faith and cultural intolerance even at present stage would be enough to alienate considerable native support; and that Chinese xenophobia has always inclined conveniently to blame ills due to their own shortcomings on foreign interference, still there are certain indications that the USSR has not failed to add to China's recent problems by fomenting disorder here."

Following is Tihwa's 158 of April 21, noon:

Section 3 Mytel 150 April 18. Chinese charges of Soviet military assistance to insurgent forces have been previously reported. Recently Chairman told me that on his visit last year to Ining he himself saw 8 military planes and supply of artillery and machine guns which could only be of Soviet origin. While perhaps a modicum of small arms and ammunition might have been smuggled by tribesmen across the border, it is obvious that these larger weapons, (and ack-ack guns

¹⁷ Sung Hsi-lien, Commander of Chinese garrison troops in Sinkiang.

previously repeatedly seen by British Consul) could not have been brought in without official consent."

Succeeding sections will be forwarded as received.

STUART

893.00/4-3047 : Airgram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, April 30, 1947.

[Received May 7—9: 28 a. m.]

A-85. Ref. Embassy's airgram A-78, April 25, 1947, following is Tihwa's telegram 159, April 21, 3 p. m.:

"Section 4, mytel 150 April 18. Polinoff¹⁸ (See pg. 8 Ward's despatch 2, Dec. 10,¹⁹ and telegrams 4-6, November 17 and 18, all 1944²⁰), apparently the military brains of the Ili group in their revolt, though still claims to be 'White Russian', seems to have been in USSR 1940-44 for further strategic studies (after imprisonment by Sheng) and it is clear that his European associates have, to say the least, not often been in opposition to current Soviet policy. Most are perhaps soldiers of fortune with no stake in either state who are merely serving Soviet purposes at their own present convenience. The label of 'White' is no sure indication of side which each support at any given time, past, present, or future."

Following is Tihwa's telegram 160, April 22, 8 a. m.:

"Section 5, mytel 150 April 18. Irregularities in Soviet citizenship practices seem established beyond cavil. Chairman recently remarked in this connection, 'The land is ours but they are making the people theirs.' (Soviet record elsewhere indicates little reluctance to support an additional neighboring territory 'popular demand' for union with racial brethren across the border.)

"Chairman added three groups are now here: Pro-Soviets, who work for incorporation USSR; reactionaries who consider Sinkiang 'just another Chinese province' with certain lawless elements needing discipline; and those who recognize that this area presents a distinct cultural problem called for special treatment."

Following is Tihwa's telegram 161, April 22, 9 a. m.:

"Section 6, mytel 150 April 18. When asked if there was another group who seek independence without alliance with USSR he denied its existence. Chang claims that the third group has his full support.

¹⁸ Former White Russian leader and adviser to Gen. Sheng Shih-tsai, Chinese Defense Commissioner (*tupan*) and virtual ruler of Sinkiang, 1933-44.

¹⁹ Not printed.

²⁰ Not found in Department files.

These last he holds are racing against time on a basis of justice and permanence. The first two, from opposing motives but to the same effect, are blocking each forward step and the sands are running out. End. Paxton"

STUART

893.00/5-2047: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, May 20, 1947—8 a. m.

[Received—12:20 p. m.]

1093. Following is Tihwa's 196, May 14, 8 a. m.:

"General Sung told me last night that announcement is to be made within a week of appointment Masud Sabri²¹ as new Chairman of the Sinkiang Provincial Government. General Chang is expected, however, to remain as Chief of the National Government Northwest Headquarters and will presumably continue to exert influence on further steps in carrying out policies of his own initiation. Paxton"

STUART

893.00/5-2747: Airgram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, May 27, 1947.

[Received June 4—9:41 a. m.]

A-109. Following is Tihwa's 215, May 22, 10 p. m.:

"First section of 4. a) Sung claims belief that USSR is giving rather than selling arms to rebel forces in northwest Sinkiang (Mytel 193, May 12²²) as he says is being done for Manchurian Communists. Gift of military supplies to followers of Marxist line in Manchuria would seem, however, a better investment than like donation to natives in this area with whom Communist theory is not popular. Such presents unless their use were fully controlled would only muddy Sinkiang political waters and returns on cost would be problematical as there appears to be little natural wealth in Province except in northwestern portion, which is even now not under Chinese control. Paxton".

STUART

²¹ Turki leader. In telegram No. 1178, May 29, the Ambassador in China repeated the report from Tihwa that Masud Sabri formally took over the chairmanship on May 28 (893.00/5-2947).

²² Not printed.

893.00/5-2747 : Airgram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, May 27, 1947.

[Received June 4—9 : 41 a. m.]

A-110. Following is Tihwa's 218, May 23, 9 p. m. :

"Mytel 215, May 22, second section. *b*) If Soviet Union is nevertheless planning an eventual advance into Sinkiang when the world situation becomes more propitious, it might well be encouraging purchase of arms by dissidents to prevent Han troops from patrolling border and to keep alive native spirit of opposition to Central Govt for turning to Russian purposes later. Postulation of such a long term policy, apparently called for by evidence cited mytel 186, May 10²³ *inter alia*, could also explain assistance afforded in peace negotiations (mytel 150, April 18²⁴) and Ward's tel 6, January 3, last year,²⁵ in order that a grateful China might be put off guard while Soviet preparations for expansion continued. Third section to come. Paxton".

STUART

893.6359/5-2747 : Airgram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, May 27, 1947.

[Received June 4—9 : 40 a. m.]

A-112. Following is Tihwa's 222, May 24, 9 p. m. :

"Mytel 215, May 22, section 3: *c*) Russia might also be motivated by need for certain strategic minerals reported to exist in this Province, presumably thoroughly explored by the several Soviet mineralogical advisers to Sheng Shih-tsai. Wusu oil wells are still working (ante-penultimate para Mytel 184 May 9²³) and were observed with binoculars as we passed. There are said to be considerable wolfram deposits in Ashan zone (mytel 74, Mar 7²³) already being exploited by Russian engineers as well as some mines near Borotola, variously claimed to be of iron or some unidentified heavy mineral (Clubb's despatch 20, July 28, 1943²⁵) conceivably uranium, though we saw no signs of operation on our way. Should any deposits of this ore exist, they alone would of course be enough to account for Soviet interest. USSR might accordingly be willing to make considerable temporary ideologi-

²³ Not printed.²⁴ See airgram No. A-78, April 25, from the Ambassador in China, p. 552.²⁵ Not printed, but see despatch No. 1449, August 9, 1943, from the Ambassador in China, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, China, p. 312. O. Edmund Clubb, Second Secretary of Embassy in China, was detailed as Consul at Tihwa in 1943.

cal compromise and even forego immediate political sovereignty, allowing the natives assemblage or the independence they desire (mytel 202, May 15²⁶), provided Russian extraction of ores is permitted to continue. Chinese Central Govt could hardly be expected to consent to this if they exert eventual control over production areas as they do not now. Section 4 follows. Paxton."

STUART

893.00/5-3047: Airgram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, May 30, 1947.

[Received June 4—9:41 a. m.]

A-116. Following is Tihwa's 223, May 26, 10 p. m.

"Mytel 215, May 22, section 4: *d*) It is finally within reason that Russia is glad to keep restlessness stirring here and will continue to furnish enough ferment to prevent any conclusive settlement each time one approaches. Present amorphous status may suit Soviet book since it provides all that is required without serious effort or cost. Current 'war of nerves' which keeps everyone agitated, may be intended to conceal basic purpose of merely fomenting continued disorder. Chinese fear of actual Soviet attack calls for more Central Government armed forces than are needed to maintain local order and their presence in province is another disturbing factor in addition to general alarm arising from recurrent rumors of trouble to come.

"This hypothesis would of course render plausible Sung's proposition rebutted in foregoing paragraph (*a*) and would also account for failure of Ining group to implement terms of military agreement without explanation.

"No one with whom I have discussed the situation has brought forth any such suggestion nor have I yet mentioned it. However, analysis in past six months has produced no explanation accounting for more facts and indicating motivation for more rumors than this does. Paxton."

STUART

893.00/6-447: Airgram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, June 4, 1947.

[Received June 10—12:09 p. m.]

A-120: Following is Tihwa's 242, June 1, 10 a. m.:

"Have learned from Foreign Office delegate Liu²⁷ that replace-

²⁶ Not printed.

²⁷ Liu Tse-jung, Chinese Foreign Affairs Commissioner for Sinkiang.

ment of Chang by Masud as chairman of Sinkiang provincial Govt was determined at Nanking prior to Chang's return here in mid-March but Liu himself was only recently informed. Chang disclaims initiative but move clearly suits his policy. His relief apparently also necessitated by general order expected shortly from Nanking cancelling civil appointments of military personnel.

"Liu feels appointment perhaps somewhat premature but Gen. Sung is much pleased. Soviet Congen unenthusiastic however and Achmad's coterie apparently in bitter opposition. On May 21 when rumor of imminent change in chairmanship reached Tihwa public, two sets of handbills appeared on streets; one attacked Achmad²⁸ and the other Masud and Central Govt. Although no other handbills have since been reported, opposition of Ili group will have to be reckoned with as a factor.

"New chairman has high repute for integrity and justice. He is probably only Turki well known to Central Govt qualified for position. His appointment seems intended to prepare the people, by giving them practice in self-govt under a high native official, for next year when chairman is to be elected. However he [is] over 60 years old and in poor health. Paxton".

STUART

761.93/6-1147 : Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, June 11, 1947—noon.
[Received June 11—2:22 a. m.]

1256. Following is Tihwa's 257, June 8, 5 p. m. to Embassy :

"Yesterday General Sung told me he had just received delayed telegram reporting that June 5, 4 marked Soviet planes bombed Peitashan near Ashan and Tihwa zone border. Bombing occurred on expiration of 48-hour ultimatum demanding return of 8 Outer-Mongolian soldiers captured by Chinese. These were taken when a combat battalion of Outer-Mongolian troops supported by Soviet battalion and 4 trucks attacked Chinese forces at point well within Sinkiang. Sung's order authorizing release of prisoners had not reached Peitashan commander before bombing occurred. Two Chinese soldiers killed and 30 horses destroyed.

Sung ascribes both Outer-Mongolian offensive and Soviet air attack to presence of Osman and their desire to break his hold on Kazaks in Ashan zone which he has strengthened by his long struggle. Sung still questions wisdom of Chang's appeasement policy as he feels it

²⁸ Achmad-Jan, Turki revolt leader, formerly Vice Chairman of the Sinkiang provincial government.

merely encourages further Soviet sponsored advances. He says Foreign Office delegate Liu has reported attacks to Nanking for protest through Chinese Embassy to Outer-Mongolian Legations, Moscow planes also having come from East. Paxton."

STUART

893.00/6-1247: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, June 12, 1947.
[Received June 12—3 a. m.]

1277. At the regular weekly press conference at the Ministry of Information on June 1 [11], the Director of the Division of Publicity and Intelligence of the Foreign Office made a statement on the Sinkiang situation as follows:

"The Chinese Government is in the position of reporting regarding the entrance of Outer Mongolian forces in Sinkiang and their attempt on the garrison at Peitashan, which is not far from the Sinkiang-Outer Mongolian border. This is no ordinary frontier incident. The Government views the matter with the deepest concern. While the local military authorities will be ordered to exercise all possible restraint in the defense of their position, the Government is instructing its Ambassador in Moscow²⁹ to protest to the Soviet Government as well as to the Outer Mongolian Government, through its Minister in Moscow. In the meantime, the Government is contemplating the despatch of a high-ranking official to Sinkiang to give the necessary directions to the local authority."

STUART

893.00/6-1247: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, June 12, 1947.
[Received June 12—4 a. m.]

1278. Following is Central News Agency release under Nanking, June 11 dateline:

"China is preparing to protest the invasion by Outer Mongolian troops of eastern Sinkiang Province, Central News learned from an authoritative source.

"Sources close to the Foreign Office informed Central News that at the time of writing, the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. George Yeh, is conferring with officials of the Soviet Embassy here on the matter.

²⁹ Foo Ping-sheung.

"An informed source indicated that should a protest be lodged against the invasion, it is likely that it would be handed to the Soviet Embassy since Outer Mongolia has no diplomatic representatives here nor has the Chinese Government any diplomatic representative at the Outer Mongolian capital."

STUART

893.00/6-1247 : Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, June 12, 1947—7 p. m.

[Received 11 : 45 p. m.]

1284. Reference Embassy's telegrams 1277 and 1278, June 12. The announcement of an Outer Mongolian invasion of Sinkiang has been surrounded by a number of curious circumstances. The incident has provoked a flurry in Chinese Governmental circles which seems somewhat artificial and out of proportion. The information on which action was taken would appear to have been in possession of the Government for several days before any announcement was made. The announcement did not appear as an ordinary Central News Agency release but was drafted in the Foreign Office which then directed the Chinese Government Information Office to distribute it as a news item. Foreign correspondents were first informed orally at 8:30 a. m., June 11 at the Chinese Government Information Office that "Soviet planes had bombed Peitashan". The official Government release 3 hours later, however, spoke of "planes bearing Soviet emblems". A Foreign Office spokesman at the regular weekly press conference of the Chinese Government Information Office on the same day confined himself to the written statement contained in Embassy's telegram 1277, June 12, and refused to answer any questions on the incident, most of which were directed toward eliciting more specific information with regard to Soviet complicity and evidence on which such charges could be based.

The Embassy understands that the Foreign Office policy meeting on June 10 which decided on a protest to the Soviets and publicity thereof was attended by Mr. J. John Beal [*John B. Beal*], on loan from Time-Life, Inc. to the Executive Yuan as adviser on foreign press relations. Another American employee of the Chinese Government Information Office told an Embassy officer that the attention given this incident is deliberate and designed to influence American public opinion in favor of financial aid to China.

It is also interesting to note that assistant American Naval and Military Attachés who attend their usual weekly briefing on military developments by Chinese G-2 on the morning of June 11 were sur-

prised to find that there was no information for them on any area except Sinkiang and in this case they were given an elaborate account of the background of Sinkiang problems and informed that Chinese armies would be moved to Sinkiang to repel invasion.

Official statement on the incident appear[s] to be designed to create the impression that the occurrence is a new and startling event. On the basis of information available it is impossible to determine whether the current raid is of an elaborate nature, well planned, and with a definite objective. In the Chuguchak area of Sinkiang where international frontiers are ill-defined at best, forays by rival nomads or unpremeditated clashes between border patrols have been of frequent occurrence in the past.

The question of the extent of Soviet complicity is academic. The Outer Mongolian Republic is to all intents and purposes Soviet puppet, its armies Soviet-trained, equipped, and disciplined, and thus Outer Mongolia itself is an instrument of Soviet foreign policy whenever it suits the purpose of Moscow. On the basis of what is presently known, there would appear to be three possible explanations: (1) a minor border clash without significance, (2) a Soviet attempt to embarrass the Chinese Government, having in mind China's current military difficulties in Manchuria and North China, and (3) Chinese exploitation of any incident involving the Soviet Union at this time to influence American public opinion. While Chinese Government reporting of the incident would tend to add weight to third possibility, it should be remembered that Soviet interest in Sinkiang and readiness to create and to exploit any opportunity to its own ends are beyond any reasonable doubt.

Sent Department as 1284; Department please repeat to Moscow as 20.

STUART

893.00/6-1347

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs
(Ringwalt)*

[WASHINGTON,] June 13, 1947.

On June 13, Counselor Tswen-ling Tsui of the Chinese Embassy transmitted by telephone the following oral statement from his Government on the recent Outer Mongolian—Sinkiang Border Incident.

According to a report from the Garrison Commander in Sinkiang, on June 5, Soviet planes invaded Chinese territory in Sinkiang. They bombed Peitashan, about 200 miles from the border of Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia, and strafed Chinese troops so as to protect the troops of Outer Mongolia in an attack on Chinese Garrison Forces at Peita-

shan. Both Chinese soldiers and civilians there suffered losses. In view of the fact that such acts on the part of the Soviet planes in invading Chinese territory are in violation of international law and particularly the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Amity,³⁰ the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs³¹ instructed the Chinese Ambassador to Soviet Russia on June 10 to lodge a protest to the Soviet Government demanding that the Soviet Government punish those connected with this incident, and guarantee that there be no recurrence of such incidents. At the same time the Chinese Government reserved the right to demand compensation of the Soviet Government for losses sustained by Chinese civilians and soldiers.

The Chinese Ambassador has also been instructed to lodge a protest with the Outer Mongolian Minister at Moscow demanding that the Outer Mongolian troops be withdrawn immediately from Chinese territory.

Peitashan, which is about 200 miles east of Tihwa, is garrisoned by Chinese as well as Kazak troops which are loyal to the Chinese Government. The main purpose of this Soviet and Outer Mongolian invasion is to try by the use of force to intimidate the chieftain of the Kazak tribes in Sinkiang to be pro-Soviet; as well as to create disturbances in Sinkiang.

The Chinese Government has now instructed the loyal garrison forces to avoid aggravating the incident. The outcome will of course depend upon what action Soviet Russia and Outer Mongolia may take.

A[RTHUR] R. R[INGWALT]

761.93/6-1447: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, June 14, 1947—1 p. m.

[Received June 14—7:45 a. m.]

1304. Following taken from Tihwa's 259, June 10, full text being sent airgram:³²

General Sung states that USSR resents presence Central Govt troops in Nanchiang because Aqsu and Kashgar are nearer Turki's railway just across border. Excessive shipments supplies for Soviet C[onsul] G[eneral] Kashgar reported being distributed to interest natives in Soviet citizenship, many applications resulting. Ili infiltration there also reported. Liu stressed Russia desires to prevent use Sinkiang as base for attack by China or other powers, but Soviet action hard to explain merely on score of defense.

One reason for interest of USSR in Nanchiang probably mineral resources including oil deposits which Russians know about. Sung

³⁰ Signed at Moscow, August 14, 1945, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 10, p. 300; for English translation of text, see p. 334.

³¹ Wang Shih-chieh.

³² Not printed.

indicated long term intention for Russian interest in Nanchiang is occupation of India, Nanchiang being needed as springboard to reach India. If freedom for exploitation rather than political sovereignty is immediate goal of Soviet Union, this might best be won by preventing peace and order in Nanchiang as well as elsewhere.

STUART

893.00/6-1747: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, June 17, 1947—4 a. m.

[Received 8:01 a. m.]

1320. Following is Tihwa's 267, June 15, 6 p. m.:

"Sung has shown us 1938 Soviet map, captured from Outer Mongolians in recent Ashan encounter, indicating border far west of Chinese claims apparently including Peitashan and other places he declares long held by Chinese. Copies of Chinese military map going forward this week show border east even of National Geographic and 1 to 4 million British maps but it seems never to have been clearly defined. Outer Mongolians said to be seeking 'recapture' of Peitashan from Chinese seizure.

Sung has also displayed military caps taken showing Red Star with hammer and sickle insignia but marked with owner's name in Mongolian and Soviet medals as well.

He states that after bombings by 5 planes on 4 days, no attacks reported since June 8.

Hope to transmit also photographs of Soviet map and Mongolian ultimatum with translation of latter this week. Paxton."



STUART

761.93/6-1747: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kohler) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 17, 1947.

[Received June 17—3:16 p. m.]

2182. Soviet press June 14 carries Tass denial:

"Chinese Central News Agency disseminated declaration by representative Chinese Ministry Foreign Affairs to effect airplanes with recognizable insignia Soviet Union took part in border incident which took place June 5 on Mongol-Sinkiang frontier between Chinese military detachment and border patrol Mongolian People's Republic. Tass is empowered to announce this declaration of representative

Chinese Ministry Foreign Affairs doesn't correspond to reality and is provocatory invention."

Dept please repeat Nanking as Moscow's 15.

KOHLER

893.00/6-1847: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, June 18, 1947.

[Received June 18—7:25 a. m.]

1332. Following is statement by director of Chinese Government Information Office at weekly press conference June 18:

"On behalf of the Government I wish to make the following statement in regard to question raised in connection with Sinkiang. There cannot be any dispute regarding the fact that Peitashan lies within the province of Sinkiang and therefore on Chinese territory. Either before or since the signing of the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945 there has always been a Sinkiang police station at Peitashan manned by a small Chinese police force together with Chinese sentry posts. Therefore, I must categorically deny the reported allegation that Chinese troops have ever either before or since the Peitashan clashes crossed any part of the Sinkiang border into Outer Mongolia. The Outer Mongolian communiqué as broadcast by Moscow is absolutely false. Pending the receipt of official replies from the Outer Mongolian and Soviet Governments I do not wish to say more than just to reiterate that the Peitashan case is neither a casual frontier incident nor a boundary dispute but involves political questions of wider significance."

In reply to question regarding present status of Peitashan, director said:

"Clashes in Sinkiang have come to a standstill. The Ministry of National Defense has received no new report since June 15th."

STUART

893.00/6-2047: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, June 20, 1947—10 a. m.

[Received June 20—5:05 a. m.]

1347. Following is Tihwa's 268, June 17:

"General Chang makes following comments on Peitashan incident: It was partly due to confusion whether place in question lies in

Chinese or Outer Mongolian territory lacking official demarcation of border.

This is complicated by mutual irritation engineered by accumulation of disputes between Russia and China particularly in Sinkiang.

He ascribes Chinese publicity to apparent willingness of Central Government to magnify incident for Chinese consumption in order to direct mind of public away from student strikes and other domestic difficulties and toward a border situation alleged to constitute a real threat. This is being done in hope of rallying all factions which may be loyal to Nanking but by so doing they may actually evoke the bogey whose existence they merely wish to pretend.

Nevertheless, general understanding that Outer Mongolia is Soviet satellite seems supported by evidence presented by General Sung (reference my telegram 267, June 15 sent Department as 1320, June 17). Activities previously reported in Ashan zone (my telegrams 223, May 25 to Department A-116, May 30 and 257, June 8 to Department 1256, June 11) also indicate that Soviet Union seeking to keep situation disturbed for its own purposes. Paxton."

STUART

893.00/6-2047: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, June 20, 1947—11 a. m.

[Received June 20—4:45 a. m.]

1349. Following is Shanghai's 1008, of June 18, 4 p. m. to Embassy :

"UP despatch datelined Moscow 17 reports *Pravda's* publication on that date of despatch from its Shanghai correspondent [that] reports 'circulating' here that Consul Paxton 'was connected with organization of June 5 Mongolian frontier incident' and that Paxton was acting under orders General Eisenhower³³ as 'substantiated by a report of a representative of State Department' at Shanghai.

"Have no knowledge on [of] any member of our staff making statements regarding incident or any related matter which could conceivably have been construed as basis for allegation. Am canvassing staff with view to discovering if any basis exists for attributing such statement to us and will report developments if any."

Actually text of Tass story stated that State Department Shanghai employee had said American Consul, Tihwa, reports coincided with recent news version, from which coincidence it was speculated that the Consul had been implicated in the incident. Tass story then went on to add its own details without giving the source.

³³ General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Chief of Staff, United States Army.

Embassy inclined to believe that Tass in putting out this foolish story was merely using the same tactics adopted by Chinese press for which accuracy is no desideratum.

Sent Department 1349, Department please repeat to Moscow.

STUART

761.93/6-2047 : Airgram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, June 20, 1947.

[Received July 1—8: 57 a. m.]

A-139. Reference Embassy's telegram No. 1270, June 11.³⁴ It has been noted that Chinese Government releases on the Peitashan incident make two seemingly contradictory statements. One is that Peitashan is 117 miles northeast of Kitai, which according to available maps would place it almost directly on the Sinkiang-Outer Mongolian border. Second statement is that Outer Mongolian forces have penetrated 200 miles inside Sinkiang, an obvious contradiction to the first statement.

In this connection, a usually reliable Embassy source discussing the question with Dr. George Yeh, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, was shown a map containing two different boundary lines. One line roughly is that shown on the map of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics published by the National Geographic Society in December, 1944 and near which Peitashan is located. Dr. Yeh admitted that this line is the present *de facto* line between the two areas. The second line is some 200 miles east of the first one and is, according to Dr. Yeh, the *de facto* line of some 40 years ago. In admitting further that there had never been any formal demarcation of the boundary, he added that the lines had changed because of the migration of Mongol tribes westward during the last 40 years.

STUART

893.00/6-2147 : Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, June 21, 1947.

[Received June 21—6: 55 a. m.]

1359. The following is Hsin Hua Agency release from north Shensi, datelined June 17:

"Tass broadcast reported this statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Outer Mongolian Republic (issued on June 15) on the Peitashan incident on June 5 as follows:

³⁴ Not printed.

“The Central News Agency of the Chinese Government reported on June 9 that a cavalry unit of the Outer Mongolian Republic attacked Peitashan (Mongolian name: Peitake-Buke) on June 5 and penetrated 200 miles into Chinese territory. The Central News release further reported that 4 airplanes, bearing the Soviet emblem, participated in this attack. At a press conference on June 11, held in Nanking, the spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not refute this Central News release. Furthermore, the Central News on June 11 affirmed that Peitashan is situated in Chinese territory, and is far from the Mongolian border. In view of this, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Outer Mongolian Republic is instructed to state that the statement by the Chinese Foreign Office spokesman, as well as Central News release, regarding the invasion of China by Mongolian cavalry units under the cover of Soviet planes, are not true but purely fabrications of a provocative nature.

“Peitake-Buke is not, as alleged by the spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, situated in Chinese territory, but is well within Outer Mongolian border.

“As to what has taken place on June 5 on the Mongolian-Sinkiang border, the true story is as follows: Chinese troops crossed the border and entered Outer Mongolia. At the foot of Peitake-Buke, 15 kilometers beyond the boundary line, Chinese troops pitched their tents and began searching activities and also erected defense constructions. At the same time, they assaulted the Mongolian border sentries, customarily stationed near there. Upon the discovery of the illegal entry of Chinese troops by the Mongolian National Defence Headquarters, the Mongolian authorities hoped to prevent the occurrence of any incidents, and sent officers to the Chinese troops requesting them to retreat from Mongolian territory. The Chinese commander not only refused to comply with this request, but, contrary to international practices, detained the Mongolian envoys, at the same time he ordered further advances into Mongolian territory. Under such conditions, the border forces of the Outer Mongolia Republic were compelled to drive the invaders out of Mongolian territory, which was successfully accomplished by the Outer Mongolian border forces with the aid of several Outer Mongolian aeroplanes. In doing so, Outer Mongolian troops did not enter into Chinese territory. After the Chinese troops were driven out, the bodies of the Mongolian officers were found at the old site of the Chinese tents. From the bodies, it could be seen that they were killed in a ruthless manner. Their hands and feet were burned to mere stumps, and even the abdomens were opened up. Besides these bodies, the bodies of four Mongolian sentries were also found with their eyes scooped out.’”

STUART

893.00/6-2147 : Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, June 21, 1947—11 a. m.

[Received June 21—6 a. m.]

1360. Paxton's 272, June 19 states that as he considers visit without delay to scene of Peitashan incident important he had that day sent

Mackiernan³⁵ in command car with Consulate chauffeur and Chinese-Kazak interpreter in attempt to reach that place. As Mackiernan speaks no Chinese, General Sung agreed send along his own interpreter. As road reported impassable in spots for motor vehicles, they may travel last part on horseback. Trip will probably last 10 days. Sung pledged to secrecy and no one else informed.

STUART

893.00/7-647: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, July 6, 1947—8 a. m.

[Received July 6—3:05 a. m.]

1466. Second of 4 telegrams.³⁶ Mackiernan's trip (Tihwa's 287, June 27, 4 p. m.):

"Following evidence observed of Soviet activities and influence:

Russian military matériel captured from Mongolians include: OBK single shot, 50 caliber, anti-tank rifle; several Degtyarev sub-machine guns; 30 caliber light machine guns; fragmentation grenades; and first aid kits.

No evidence Russian personnel actually directing Mongolian operations. Planes which bombed and strafed Chinese positions reported to have been single engine bi-planes with the insignia on wings and fuselage, Red Star with hammer and sickle thereon. (The addition of the implements on the regular Soviet star might have been imagined on analogy of captured Mongolian cap insignia thus marked as reported my telegram 267, June 15,^{36a} since the planes were bombing from a height and were not observed during strafing owing to personnel being busy seeking cover and planes flying fast. Five planes bombed on June 5, 3 and 2 on succeeding days, on 8th plane reconnoitered but without bombing. On 17 June another plane was heard but unseen.

Soviet mining expedition of about 200 men, according to Osman, Kazak chieftain, entered Ashan zone May 1946 through Fuwen and Ining by truck accompanied by Red Army guards and established airfield at Chenghua. Expeditions still in Ashan working mines near Chenghua and Fuwen for four types of minerals, called by Russians: 'Wolumbyet, beryl and spodumene,' fourth unidentified. Russians pay biggest price in cloth for first to Kazak natives. Chinese claim it

³⁵ Douglas S. Mackiernan, American clerk at the Consulate at Tihwa.

³⁶ First and fourth of this series of 4 telegrams not printed; they gave details of trip and of military situation (893.00/7-247 and 893.00/7-347, respectively). Mr. Mackiernan returned on June 25.

^{36a} See telegram No. 1320, June 17, 4 a. m., from the Ambassador in China, p. 562.

is wolfram but specific gravity as determined on return to Tihwa is 6.3 while wolfram is 7.5 (samples follow with despatch).

Coordinates of foregoing places mentioned as follows: Koktobai also called Fuwen 47 degrees 13 minutes north, 89 degrees 38 minutes east, Chenghua also called Aertai also called Sharasume 47 degrees 50 minutes north 88 degrees 7 minutes east.

Sample expedition Osman claims furnished matériel including mortars and light artillery to his Kazak opposition under general direction of Talihan, usurper of Osman's position but under the field direction of Bai Talihan, brother of former and this March Mongolians provided them some 100 rifles.

Soviet propaganda work performed by about 20 Kazak families, according to Kapaz. Russian born Karak, Ahung, a Muslim religious leader educated in Egypt, now working for Osman on counter-Soviet propaganda among Kazaks in (?) zone. They are now based on Chingho (90 degrees 30 minutes east by 46 degrees 30 minutes north) but operated from Peitashan to Chenghua. Kapaz declares his own appeal to Muslim faith provides effective counter-Soviet propaganda. Paxton."

STUART

893.00/7-247 : Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, July 2, 1947—10 p. m.

[Received July 3—12:10 a. m.]

1448. Tihwa's 3 of 4; Mackiernan trip (Tihwa's 288, June 28 to Embassy):

"Osman Bator, leader of Peitashan Kazaks, retreated there from Kurte (89 degrees 10 minutes east by 47 degrees 10 minutes north) with some 250 families mid-April this year. In May 100 odd more families came and others joined him later until he now has about 1200 yurts (families) under him.

Shortage of food at Peitashan reported by Osman. Kazaks brought all their goods with them as far as Chingil River (90 degrees 32 minutes east by 45 degrees 55 minutes north) but its water was too high to bring their 300,000 odd sheep across. Lack of mutton, their staple food, is causing hardship and discontent. Osman intends to meet this difficulty by sending men to bring back as many sheep as possible when military situation permits. The Chinese are also helping with provision of some sheep and flour. The Russians are playing on this discontent, he says, by promising sheep to all who return to northern Ashan Zone.

Most of Ashan Zone, according to Osman, is to all intents a part of the Soviet Union. He further says that Ili and Tahcheng zones are also Soviet dominated though activities are less openly carried on in these areas than in Ashan zone.

The Outer Mongolians now aim, Osman believes, to occupy Peitashan completely in order to secure eastern flank of Altai range and thus remove the last of Chinese influence from entire zone. Later on he says they may attempt to push southeast to the Barkul and Karliktagh mountains and thus threaten the roads from Kansu into eastern Sinkiang.

The Kazaks in Peitashan are all loyal to Osman and regard him as an able leader who will do his best to get them back to their native home in northern Ashan. Osman declares that given an initial supply of weapons and ammunition, sufficient to start an offensive, he could remove Outer Mongolian threat to Peitashan and clear Ashan zone of the Reds under Talihan, keeping themselves supplied as they advance by capture of material from the opposition. Paxton"

STUART

893.00/7-1247 : Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, July 12, 1947.

[Received July 12—10:57 a. m.]

1513. Following is Central News Agency English service at Nanking, July 11:

"It is learned from an official source that the Chinese Government has lodged fresh protests with Outer Mongolia.

In its note of June 22, 1947, the Outer Mongolian Government replied to the Chinese protest concerning Outer Mongolian attacks on Peitashan, giving an account composed mainly of falsehoods and evasions. On June 27 the Outer Mongolian Government addressed a note to the Chinese Government, making the false charge that Chinese troops had crossed the border to attack Outer Mongolian position. Based on facts ascertained through careful investigations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has on July 8 and 10 ordered the Chinese Ambassador at Moscow to lodge again notes of protest with the Outer Mongolian Government. The main points of the notes are as follows:

1. When the Chinese Government recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia it was agreed that the existing boundary of Outer Mongolia should become the boundary of that country after its independence. As Outer Mongolia was a part of China up to that moment, the legal existing boundary is the one defined by the Chinese Government before that date. Peitashan is clearly on this side of the boundary line and within the territorial limits of Sinkiang Province. This is substantiated by the fact that Chinese police and troops as-

signed by Sinkiang provincial authorities guard and patrol the district. It was the case before the independence of Outer Mongolia; it has been so ever since.

2. The troops of Outer Mongolia have penetrated over 200 kilometers of Chinese territory to make attacks on Chinese troops stationed at Peitashan. Such a grave situation certainly cannot be regarded as an ordinary border incident.

3. Even if the military attack of June 5 is regarded as having originated from a so-called "boundary incident", why did the Outer Mongolian Government fail to seek a peaceful settlement in accordance with international practice and terms United Nations Charter? ³⁷ Why did Outer Mongolian Government dispatch a 48-hour ultimatum to the local Chinese garrison and immediately afterwards launch an attack on the Chinese troops there? The conduct of Outer Mongolia clearly indicates that she has no regard either for peace or for international law observed and respected by other nations.

4. From June 6 to June 30, 1947, Outer Mongolian forces continued to violate Chinese territory and make attacks on Chinese troops. Military planes from Outer Mongolia also repeatedly flew over Chinese territory for purposes of observation, bombing and strafing.

5. Besides demanding the punishment of those responsible for the attacks and a guarantee against any further occurrence of similar attacks and reserving the right to claim damages, the Chinese Government insists that the Outer Mongolian Government must immediately order the withdrawal of its troops from Sinkiang."

Nanking, July 11 (Central): The Chinese Government has, after careful investigation of facts, addressed another note to the USSR reiterating the previous Chinese protest against air attacks made by Soviet military planes on Peitashan.

STUART

893.00/7-2547 : Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, July 25, 1947—3 p. m.

[Received July 25—7: 55 a. m.]

1587. Following is Tihwa's 311, July 21.

"Yesterday I again discussed with Abasoff ³⁸ present tension between Ili and Chinese. We conversed in Chinese lacking any reliable interpreters. He complains bitterly that the natives are being oppressed beyond endurance and while the Chinese spoke very fair words last fall, their actions are now becoming the same as Sheng's

³⁷ Signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945; Department of State Treaty Series No. 993, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031.

³⁸ Ili-appointed Deputy Secretary General of the Sinkiang provincial government.

regime. He claims that over 100 natives have been arrested here recently; repeats charge that no information regarding terms of agreement is yet permitted in Nanchiang (Embassy's A-51 April 8)³⁹ even in China and no Tihwa Turki news [or?] newspapers are allowed to circulate there; and adds that Ili publications are regularly intercepted and destroyed at Manass River crossing at Sulai and bearers imprisoned, 5 not having been heard from for over a month.

I pointed out that I had repeatedly requested Achmad, Abasoff himself, and other Ili leaders to provide a statement of their case written in Chinese or a Chinese Turki interpreter for Consulate, trusted by them, who could bring to my attention matters they felt should be reported to American Government. I made it apparent that the failure to furnish this information necessarily made [me dependent?] merely on Chinese sources and also left the impression that either the Ili case was too weak for presentation or that they felt no need for international interest in their problems. Abasoff promised to have Chinese translations made of news items from Turki press which would, he said, present their grievances clearly and have them sent to Consulate within a few days. While not sanguine of receiving them without further request if at all, I plan to send them to Embassy when received for carefully supervised translation.

General Sung believes that Ili troop effectives number more than 60,000 men and has reports that they are now being mobilized. General Chang seemed disturbed when I saw him on July 17. Mackiernan and I consider it possible that a sudden attack from several directions accompanied by cutting of the vulnerable road communications might produce a China routing. Paxton"

STUART

761.93/8-1147: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 11, 1947.

[Received August 11—3:45 p. m.]

2624. All Soviet papers August 9 carried text of communiqué by Mongolian People's Republic denying Mongolian and asserting Chinese responsibility for border incidents in Sinkiang.

Department pass Nanking.

SMITH

³⁹ Not printed.

893.00/9-947: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, September 9, 1947—5 p. m.

[Received 10: 57 p. m.]

1883. Embassy informed by credible source in West Asiatic Department, Foreign Office that General Chang Chih-chung will arrive Nanking within next week. Source states that Chang will probably make recommendations to Government amounting to granting of immediate Sinkiang autonomy. Source believes that Chang's recommendations will be unacceptable in Nanking and that Chang will request to be relieved of duty in the northwest. Source believes, however, that Chang's report on Sinkiang may result in early public promise from Nationalist Government of eventual Sinkiang autonomy and some preliminary steps may be taken to establish larger number local people in positions of authority in the province. Source is definitely skeptical that latter course will be carried out.

Sent Dept 1883; repeated Tihwa 156.

STUART

893.00/9-2347: Telegram

The Consul at Tihwa (Paxton) to the Secretary of State

TIHWA, September 23, 1947—10 a. m.

[Received 11: 26 p. m.]

49. Gen. Sung says that Osman's forces have been pushing forward rapidly in Ashan zone and have taken Chingho and Fuwen. In their progress they have killed and captured many of the enemy, seized much booty and accumulated local Kazaks who welcomed Osman's victories and joined his fighters. One motive for advance was desire of most of Osman's men to rejoin their families long isolated in the north.

Reference my telegram to Nanking 306, July 19 and despatch to Department 20, June 30.⁴⁰ Sung states Osman's reports substantially confirm previous Chinese intelligence (my telegram to Nanking 72, March 6⁴¹) in regard to Soviet wolfram mines at Fuwen. These he has occupied but apparently not closed. Campaign for Chenghua is now under way and fighting spirit high.

Sung also reports that Soviet CG earlier orally protested Osman's attack on Ili forces in Ashan as violation of peace agreement, presumably in spirit as no specific mention made therein of truce line or

⁴⁰ Neither printed.⁴¹ Not printed.

even cessation of hostilities. Chinese replied that his troops have not been, consequently are not, under its control (rather than former justification to me that Osman was attempting to return after having been forcibly expelled from his post as legally appointed zone commissioner, Chuanyuan). Sung admits that Osman's advance was aided by Chinese materiel but insists no Chinese troops were sent and declares that present drive was disapproved by Chinese.

Sent Embassy 367; repeated Department 49.

PAXTON

893.00/10-647: Telegram

The Consul at Tihwa (Paxton) to the Secretary of State

TIHWA, October 6, 1947—9 a. m.

[Received October 7—4: 51 a. m.]

57. Yesterday informed by Garrison Commander Sung that delayed news recently received by courier from Osman, in absence of radio communications, that Chenghua (remytel to Nanking 367, repeated Washington 49, September 23) fell to his forces about September 21. Opposing leaders have fled leaving all important places in Ashan zone under Osman's control.

Sung maintains that no Chinese regular troops have been engaged in this fighting, [garbled group] cavalry (see page 7 of memo enclosed Tihwa despatch to Department 20, June 30⁴²) remaining at Peitashan.

Sent Nanking 379, repeated Department.

PAXTON

893.00/10-2347: Telegram

The Consul at Tihwa (Paxton) to the Secretary of State

TIHWA, October 23, 1947—4 p. m.

[Received October 24—8: 30 p. m.]

61. Garrison Commander Sung says that according to Kazak reports, supported by Chinese intelligence agents and relayed over latter's portable radio, on October 16 about 100 trucks transporting over 3000 heavily armed troops accompanied by 6 tanks entered northern Ashan zone from the west at Chimunai and reached Puerhtsin (see map enclosed Tihwa⁴³ at Puerhtsin and route thither was merely conjectured).

⁴² Not printed.

⁴³ Reference is to Tihwa despatch 16, June 17; neither despatch nor map is printed.

2. Ili troops have no source other than Russia of reported matériel particularly tanks which could not be claimed to have been captured from Chinese Army during the insurrection as it had none there.

PAXTON

893.00/10-2447 : Telegram

The Consul at Tihwa (Paxton) to the Secretary of State

TIHWA, October 24, 1947—6 p. m.

[Received October 26—10: 37 p. m.]

62. Analysis by General Sung (reference my telegram to Nanking 400, repeated Washington as 61, October 23) of possible plans of attackers follows:

1. Despite the supposed presence of Red Army personnel this force may have entered zone only to eject the Kazak troops and take back the mining project ("wolfram" mines at Fuwen, see Tihwa telegram to Nanking 215, May 22,⁴⁴ particularly sections 3 and 4, and despatch 32, August 29⁴⁵).

2. On the other hand even without active Soviet help it may still be planning to drive on south to the Peitashan area with the intention of eliminating the Chinese National troops stationed there. Assistance could be expected on this plan by a simultaneous attack of the Outer Mongolians from the east. Success in this sector might embolden the two bands to launch a joint full-scale push across the desert on Kitai (see Tihwa telegram to Nanking 200, May 14⁴⁵) in an attempt to cut the important northern line of communications. This menace would greatly distress Chinese Army and if accompanied by a sortie from Outer Mongolia threatening sole present through motor road at Hami, might panic and paralyze Chinese military effort throughout the entire province.

Sung added that he hoped to prevent premature Chinese publicity such as followed previous Peitashan incident. He felt that former might have been a Russian trap calculated to elicit just the type of response it did in order that world opinion, put off guard by first canard, might fail to recognize present attack as planned by USSR from the start.

Sent Embassy as 401, repeated Department as 62.

PAXTON

⁴⁴ See airgram No. 109, May 27, from the Ambassador in China, p. 554.

⁴⁵ Not printed.

893.00 Sinkiang/11-1047

The Consul at Tihwa (Paxton) to the Secretary of State

No. 46

TIHWA, November 10, 1947.
[Received August 23, 1948.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Consulate's despatch No. 45 of November 6, 1947 entitled "Visits to Ili and Tahcheng Zones"⁴⁶ and other despatches in the enclosed list⁴⁷ and to enclose copies of Tihwa's telegrams to the Embassy⁴⁸ giving reports of recent Soviet irregularities and interference in Sinkiang and to give a brief analysis of the policies that may be directing the program of the U. S. S. R. in this area.

It is a well-known tendency of the Chinese to blame most of the ills that curse their country on foreign machinations. To admit that they themselves are at fault is psychologically impossible in their ethos because it would involve a "loss of face" from which no escape is provided. Their system lacks the solution for this sort of moral problem, developed by Christianity in the west, which allows that "repentance" can be followed by "forgiveness". However, in our apportionment of blame for the present chaos in Sinkiang, the Chinese in this area do not appear alone guilty nor are those they accuse entirely innocent. It seems increasingly clear that considerable responsibility for existing conditions must be borne by agents of the Soviet Union.

As will be noted from the telegrams enclosed, though much unverified evidence has been cited from Chinese sources, whenever possible it has been confirmed by personal observation or from "White Russian", or other non-Chinese reports.

This documentation indicates to my personal satisfaction that Soviet agents have given "aid and comfort" to dissident elements in the province in armed revolt against the Chinese Government's control.

They provided matériel and military advice (either gratis or more probably for payment) for the Ili revolt. The strategy of this revolt, it seems well established, was Soviet-inspired. The date of its commencement in 1944 was November 7, the anniversary of the October revolution. The date of the truce negotiations, moreover, was also apparently timed to suit Russian purposes. It was just when the

⁴⁶ Not printed.

⁴⁷ None printed.

⁴⁸ Not printed as enclosures to this despatch. Many of these telegrams, however, are quoted or summarized in telegrams from the Embassy in China printed in this section.

Provincial Capital was the rebel army's for the taking but before such an outright threat to the National sovereignty, as the capture of the city would have been, was answered by a full-scale attack by the Chinese Army that it suited Moscow's current plans to end hostilities.

Parenthetically, Russia seems to have been involved also in the Sarikol "revolt" in August 1945, of which I have learned from Mr. Shipton, British Consul General at Kashgar, though little attention appears to have been paid to it by this Consulate at the time. According to his account, the Sarikol range in Nanchiang, not far from Kashgar, was occupied by a force of alleged tribesmen coming over the Sino-Russian border. Advancing from this base they laid siege for some weeks to Yarkand in early 1946. They were finally driven back over the border by August of that year. Other information implying Russian complicity in the Sarikol revolt was received from the Sinkiang Garrison Commander, Lt. General Sung. He had earlier stated that detailed Russian staff maps of Nanchiang were found on the bodies of uniformed Red Army officers killed in this area. If these accounts are correct, it would seem that this uprising failed because insufficient propaganda preparations had been made in advance of the invasion and the expected support of the people largely did not materialize. The Chinese troops, accordingly, were able in the end to settle the matter without need for any truce arrangements by the Soviet authorities.

Besides participation in open armed revolts it is common knowledge that Russian agents have been active in keeping the natives in a turmoil of opposition to their Chinese-appointed governors. This work is greatly assisted by the instability of the Turki population and the frustrated ambitions of their leaders as well as by the ineptitude of the Chinese as colonizers and their egregious blunder in sending corrupt and unimaginative satraps to represent them in outlying portions of the province. These subordinates antagonize the local people by abusing power to their own advantage at the expense of both the natives and their own national interests.

In addition to the simple task of stirring up dissensions to weaken Chinese control over its northwest province, there is evidence that considerable Soviet propaganda has been used to incline the predominantly Turki population toward the political ideology of the U. S. S. R., though here Communist economy is less stressed than in areas where conditions are more favorable to its development.

Another method of strengthening Soviet influence has been the Russian program of procuring additional nationals. Reports have been received that pressure has been applied in many cases and there is usually no requirement that the new citizens renounce their existing

allegiance. This creates a great deal of confusion since many inhabitants carry Chinese papers as well as Soviet passports, which they can use at choice as seems most advantageous at the moment. There is little reason to doubt that most of these citizens could be persuaded to cast their votes in favor of the Soviet Union if a plebiscite were held.

Opposition from "unreconstructed White Russian" refugees from the Communist State has not been permitted. Soviet officials resent their presence in this area and have been particularly flagrant in their attempts to convert them to the true faith or failing that, at least to prevent their escape into China proper beyond the borders of this province, where they could make reports of existing conditions here.

The purpose of Soviet Russia in interfering in Sinkiang affairs and assisting in armed revolts, it has been said, is that she has stood to gain sovereignty over the entire province or at least its pro-Soviet orientation. If this were true the Ili insurrectionists might temporarily have maintained a precarious independence under tacit protection of their Westerly Neighbor and the Russians would hardly have prevented the native armies from pursuing their Chinese oppressors, then in rout, to the very borders of the province. In opposition to this conjecture, however, is the fact that the truce negotiations unquestionably began at the initiative of the Consulate General of the U. S. S. R. in Tihwa.

Russia seemed disinclined to take early sovereignty over Sinkiang, even at the time of Sheng Shih-tsai, according to information I have recently received from my British colleague at Kashgar, which he had earlier collected from certain German missionaries who escaped during Sheng's ascendancy. They claimed to have knowledge of plans for a plebiscite to have been held in 1946 had the Tupan remained in power. This would have been a development of Sheng's plan, allegedly discussed during his visit to Moscow, for him to continue for his lifetime in supreme control of Sinkiang as a province of the Soviet Union. If such a plebiscite had been held it would have been a simple matter for Sheng to arrange its "satisfactory" outcome and the USSR would thus, in due course, have been able to acquire the area under a guise of legality.

That Russia may not now want full political control over Sinkiang was further suggested by information received by Mr. Robertson, a leftish sympathizer of Australian nationality, who has visited Kashgar. He stated that the Soviet Consul General there, one evening in an expansive mood being somewhat "fatigued" with wine, told him that the U. S. S. R. could have, at any time in recent years, taken all Sinkiang into the fold but did not consider it "worth the trouble".

Russian present reluctance to advance in Sinkiang may be due to the fact that they are not yet ready to take overt steps to arouse the ire of the Chinese Central Government or world opinion and they will probably not act now unless they can find a suitable stooge to hand over the territory to them without their having to seize it.

Little evidence is apparent that Russia has ever considered the whole of Sinkiang a desirable possession. Although Imperial Russia did in fact occupy the Ili Valley for a period in the mid-nineteenth century, there is no record known of its ever having exercised full political suzerainty over the area to the east of the Manass River—though the Soviet will was completely unopposed by Sheng during his pro-Russian period. Despite the undeniable economic connection of the entire area and its geographically easy trade communications (though officially blocked, at present, by Moscow's refusal to renew the trade pact with Nanking) political connections have generally followed the long and arduous desert route eastward to China.

Perhaps due to the fact that the U. S. S. R. is able to draw out of the three Zones all the advantages that might accrue from assuring the outright pro-Soviet alignment of the remainder of the province, it may not consider the assumption of responsibility for the whole province now desirable. These advantages presumably consist of trade (even though the border is officially sealed, barter undoubtedly continues), exploitation of natural resources (such as known workings of petroleum wells, alleged wolfram mines and conjectured uranium deposits), and establishment of a buffer-state friendly to the Soviet Union, in order to absorb the first shock of an attack against the latter or to mount one against Chinese territory.

At the same time Russia seems unwilling to consent to the exertion of actual Chinese control over any part of the three dissident zones. This was shown in the recent recapture by the Ili group of Ashan Zone from the Kazaks under the anti-Soviet Osman who had made a quick raid in the summer of this year and taken almost all the towns.

The withdrawal of the Ili group representatives from further negotiations at Tihwa was reported to the Chinese authorities through the Soviet Consul General here and, therefore, obviously had his approval. As a result of this cessation of negotiations in regard to the implementation of the terms of the Ili Agreement it remains impossible for Chinese troops to patrol the Soviet borders; it is consequently doubtful whether implementation of this step was ever planned by the Russian authorities. Perhaps they permitted the Ili group to agree merely because of Chinese insistence on the point (which was only natural) and because the Soviet advisors already had in contemplation the effective methods to burke it that they have now adopted.

It, accordingly, appears that the U. S. S. R., after Sheng's defection, followed by his overthrow, has had no immediate plan to take political suzerainty, either openly or through native puppets, over any of the trans-Manass River region. My conjecture is that, so long as Chinese troops are not patrolling the border, no direct move to expand the part of Sinkiang now under effective control by the Soviet Union is at present planned by their local representatives. This picture could be changed overnight, however, if the Kremlin world policy called for an advance in this area, when it considered that the price of world repercussions would be worth the prize of the rest of Sinkiang.

Respectfully yours,

J. HALL PAXTON

893.00/11-1347: Telegram

The Consul at Tihwa (Paxton) to the Secretary of State

TIHWA, November 13, 1947—6 p. m.

[Received November 14—11:48 a. m.]

69. Mme. Hate-Wan, Tihwa zone commissioner, yesterday brought Hereld Estson, recently with other Kazaks at Chenghua fighting, to Consulate. He confirmed previous reports (refmytel to Nanking 401, repeated Dept 62, October 24) of Red Army assistance in recent expulsion by Ili forces of Osman's men from zone capital, saying that entire campaign was under political direction of Dipshatoff, Acting Soviet Consul at Chenghua, and that expedition had entered from USSR under military leadership (see Tihwa telegram to Embassy 159, April 21⁴⁹) of Generals Polinoff and Madjoroff.

Much the same story was told by two White Russian "old believers" fleeing from same region who called earlier yesterday.

Sent Embassy, as 431, repeated Dept as 69.

PAXTON

893.00 Sinkiang/11-1647: Telegram

The Consul at Tihwa (Paxton) to the Secretary of State

TIHWA, November 16, 1947—3 p. m.

[Received November 17—4:02 p. m.]

70. Garrison Commander Sung has loaned me Chinese translation of Ili reply dated October 16 to General Chang's letter, see Tihwa despatch 35, September 19.⁵⁰ Ili note was transmitted to local foreign affairs commander [*commissioner?*] by Soviet CG October 22.

⁴⁹ See airgram No. A-85, April 30, from the Ambassador in China, p. 553.

⁵⁰ Not printed.

Achmad-Jan was summoned to Nanking but before going will probably await Chinese reply to Ili terms for reopening negotiations which are:

(1) Cessation of Chinese oppression of progressive elements in province.

(2) Release of all Muslim prisoners (taken in recent incidents at Kashgar, Turfan, Tokosun and Shanshan) and punishment of those responsible for their arrest.

(3) Recall of Masud as province chairman and

(4) Complete fulfillment by Chinese of terms of peace agreement. Chinese authorities may be expected to deny oppression; consent to release of some prisoners refusing punishments demanded; possibly change the chairman; but maintain stoutly that implementation of peace terms has been their unchangable objective which is blocked wholly by Ili procrastination.

No real change in the situation is likely to result from these discussions alone since, as reported in mytel to Embassy 43, February 15, the outcome for this area seems to depend less on plans or arrangements in China than on Moscow's world attitude. Furthermore it is believed that continued confusion in Sinkiang suits Soviet purposes. (See mytel to Embassy 223, May 25⁵¹) better than any clear settlement.

Sent Embassy as 439, repeated Dept. as 70, November 16, reference mytel to Nanking 422, repeated Washington as 66, November 10.⁵²

PAXTON

893.00/11-1847 : Telegram

The Consul at Tihwa (Paxton) to the Secretary of State

TIHWA, November 18, 1947—10 p. m.
[Received November 19—10:05 p. m.]

72. Halibek, leader of 20,000 Kazaks in the Wusu and Chingho vicinity, appointed by Ili group as magistrate of Shawan (all towns in Tahcheng or Ili zones) is said by Garrison Commander Sung to have secretly become pro-Chinese early this year, resenting Soviet domination of the three separatist zones and to be supplying info as to Ili activities and plans. Despatch quoting details given by Sung follows as soon as courier service is resumed. (Refer mytel to Nanking 403, repeated Washington as 63, October 26.⁵²)

General Sung has reports that Halibek's forces, against Chinese advice, are now attacking Ili troops near Wusu which might result in a debacle similar to that at Chenghua (see Tihwa telegram to Embassy

⁵¹ See airgram No. A-116, May 30, from the Ambassador in China, p. 556.

⁵² Not printed.

431, repeated Dept as 69, November 13) with further possibility that Kazaks fleeing across Manass River might draw their pursuers beyond the former "truce line" and greatly complicate the already tense situation along this clear cut boundary.

PAXTON

893.00 Sinkiang/11-2847

The Consul at Tihwa (Paxton) to the Secretary of State

No. 53

TIHWA, November 28, 1947.
[Received August 23, 1948.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to Tihwa's despatch to the Department No. 31 of August 27, 1947 on the subject: "Implementation of the Military Terms of the Ili Agreement"⁵⁴ and to make the following report of the present status of implementation of the political terms.

A translation of the Chinese text of the agreement was transmitted to the Department under cover of Tihwa's despatch No. 19 of June 24, 1947, entitled "Translation of the Agreement for the Settlement of the Ili Revolt"⁵⁴.

Copies of this office's telegrams to the Embassy at Nanking pertinent to the subject, are enclosed.⁵⁵

There is, as will be shown, little question that the Chinese authorities have carried out fully to the letter and, to surprising degree, in spirit as well, all the formal pledges given in the political terms, but the Ili faction is still not content.

The following possibilities, to explain the continued dissatisfaction of the Ili dissidents with the Chinese Government's actions to conciliate the native opinion, seem to cover the ground:

(a) The continued failure of the Ili group to accept the Chinese actions at face value is due entirely to the latter's persistence in its time-honored policy toward non-Chinese minorities. This policy is one of cultural imperialism, disguised in many forms, now waxing as opportunity permits, now waning as resistance strengthens, but never altogether abandoned, or possible to abandon, so long as Chinese culture remains convinced that it is the best for all mankind.

(b) The refusal of the Ili group to cease their obduracy springs wholly from Soviet instigation. It would vanish immediately were the support of the U. S. S. R. in arms (either by sale or gift) and advice (so extended as almost to imply control, in all but name, of the government of the dissident zones) withdrawn. This assistance

⁵⁴ Not printed.

⁵⁵ Not printed as enclosures to this despatch. Many of these telegrams, however, are quoted or summarized in telegrams from the Embassy in China printed in this section.

has been given due to the Russian desire to take over, as soon as possible, full sovereignty of these zones with a view to the eventual absorption of the rest of Sinkiang and its incorporation in the Soviet Union under the name of "East Turkestan".

(c) The cultural intolerance of the Chinese and their feeling of innate superiority to the natives has played into the hands of Soviet agents operating in the three zones. It is assisting them to strengthen their influence, amounting in fact to effective control of this area, but there is little present probability of their taking the overt step of assuming political sovereignty over any part of the Province until Russian world polity calls for a forward movement. This advance would undoubtedly be regarded with disfavor in international circles and might be expected to lead to complications in Russian relations with other powers, since it would be hard to disguise it as other than unprovoked aggression on China. Despite the case that could be made out for Chinese past misgovernment here, General Chang Chih-chung has said that open Soviet assistance to the Ili group would imply war on China. Though this risk may later appear justified to the Kremlin, it is felt that there is little likelihood of such a step being taken before the end of the summer of 1948. It is interesting to note that, despite the fact that the natural avenues of commerce are between Sinkiang and Russia rather than China, though the Tsar did have political sovereignty over the area of the present dissident zones for a brief period in the mid-nineteenth century, Russia has never taken over open political control of any part of Sinkiang east of the Manass River.

The presumed reasons for the former relinquishment of Russian control over the cis-Manass territory probably still govern now, i. e. the difficulty and expense involved in maintaining order in the area where mineral and agricultural resources exist, with the addition that, though the mineral resources are now understood to be more important than was formerly believed, there is less necessity to exert actual sovereignty in order to continue their exploitation. All that is needed is to prevent the patrolling of the border by Chinese National Government troops and to keep the local authorities of the area well disposed toward Russia. Both of these objectives seem to be gained by merely preventing a complete settlement between the representatives from Ili and those from Nanking. This the Soviet agents are in a position to do at little cost. It merely requires giving advice to the Ili leaders designed to prevent the implementation of the agreement and selling arms to them. The failure to reach full agreement on the political terms will continue to give excuse for refusal to permit the National troops to take up their stations along the border as provided by the military terms which form part of the same agreement. As this appears to be exactly what the Russians desire and as they seem able to keep the leaders of the three dissident zones compliant to their will in this respect, no early change in the picture is anticipated. The

hour when Moscow is willing to risk international disapproval to the extent of an open attack on Chinese territory in order to seize this mostly barren land may not come very soon.

(1)⁵⁶ As discussed in detail in the enclosed telegrams the Chinese Central Government has undoubtedly permitted and assisted in carrying out the elections called for under Article I of the agreement. Both the Ili group and independent Turki informants claim that the Chinese have, in certain instances, been guilty of coercion or fraud. This appears likely but the Chinese, on their part, make the same charges against their opponents, with apparently equal reason. It seems undeniable that elections have really been held and that where an obvious majority has been firmly in support of one candidate, this feeling was taken into consideration by the local administration. The people already have in their hands a democratic tool for power, faulty though it may be, and if they fail to use it to the full, the primary responsibility should fall on themselves. The significant fact is that these are the first direct popular elections ever held in China and that the Australian secret ballot has not yet been introduced is somewhat compensated for by the absence of ward-healers. Both may come later.

The Ili group seems to have accepted the elections in principle or they would not have sent delegates at all to the Provincial Consultative Assembly which met in Tihwa. Its disbanding in disorder, they claimed, was for another reason—the appointment of Mesud, a Turki, as Chairman of the Provincial Government.

(2) There is no present evidence of anything that could be called “religious discrimination” by the government in the area. There is no attempt to prevent anyone following his own religious observances as he sees fit, provided no proselytizing is done and others are permitted their own liberty. However, as this article was inserted at Muslim request, it is probably used as the basis for their recurrent charge that Muslim girls, being married by Chinese army personnel, are weakening their religious and cultural habits. The Chinese declare that this is now prohibited and that the prohibitions are being enforced. A few instances of violation might easily have been greatly exaggerated by zealous Mullahs and popular resentment could be fanned to flames by Soviet propaganda.

(3) The recognition of the use of the native language can not be denied. It is in effect and is a great step forward.

(4) The use of the native languages in the schools appears to be working satisfactorily though as yet there are not nearly enough schools, but this situation is gradually being improved. The prin-

⁵⁶ Marginal notation states that numbers in parentheses refer to articles of the June 6, 1946 agreement.

principle of respect for the non-Chinese tongues is being undeniably observed for the first time at least since the last Chinese conquest of the area.

(5) Presumably the insertion of this article in regard to free development of racial cultures and arts was a result of the feeling of Chinese cultural intolerance. If so, the natives can take satisfaction from the success of the musical and dancing troupe from Sinkiang, now apparently having a successful tour in the coast cities under the sponsorship of the government.

(6) Freedom of publication, assembly and speech, while not yet complete, is greatly improved over anything previously experienced in the province.

(7) Taxation no longer appears a serious ground for popular complaint, particularly in view of the remission of all taxes for 1946.

(8) Trade between Sinkiang and China is now permitted and even encouraged, though blocked absolutely during Sheng's time. The Chinese Government cannot be blamed for the failure of Moscow to make any reply to its proposed terms for renewal of the Sino-Soviet Trade Pact.

(9) Until the break-up of the Provincial Consultative Assembly over the appointment of Mesud to the chairmanship and the departure of the dissident members the "coalition" Provincial government committee had been functioning perhaps not perfectly, but well enough to weather the serious storm of the February incident. (See Tihwa's despatch No. 43 of October 28, 1947 on the subject: "Incident of February 25, 1947".)⁵⁷

(10) This article is exclusively concerned with military dispositions. The recriminatory charges of responsibility for failure to fulfill them have been previously discussed. (See Tihwa's despatch No. 31, "Implementation of the Military Terms of the Ili Agreement", dated August 27, 1947.)

(11) There is little reason to believe that either the Chinese or the Ili group now hold any prisoners who can properly be considered covered by this article. However the Chinese have charged that several months after the signing of the agreement, some seven hundred Chinese were murdered by a Turki mob in the Tacheng zone. The Ili group claims, on the other hand, that arrests during the summer of 1947 in Tulufan, Shan-shan, and Kashgar are connected with the Ili Revolt, though the Chinese deny any relation with these events of several years past.

Annex I—The selection of personnel of the Provincial Government Committee and specific appointments to the various positions of re-

⁵⁷ Not printed.

responsibility in the government appear to have been governed meticulously by the terms of this annex. In certain instances appointees have never appeared to assume their responsibilities and their absence has greatly handicapped the efficient operation of the government. Some of these absences, such as that of the Chief of the Board of Sanitation, have produced serious gaps. No effective public health program is possible without trained medical personnel in charge and, in this instance, it happens that the Vice Chief is a local (Tungan) Chinese Muslim who has only had limited education as a pharmacist. Chinese Government doctors can hardly be expected to work under his direction so the local hospitals are without medical specialists, except for two women volunteers whose husbands have other positions here. Not even a satisfactory supply of drugs is possible in these circumstances. Those patients not eligible for the attention of the Chinese military hospital can receive treatment only at the Soviet Consular hospital, with resultant credit to the U. S. S. R. It is conceivable that this situation is attractive to the Russian agents and their advice to the Ili group to insist on reservation of the post of Board of Sanitation for them may have had in mind this outcome. Certainly it was clear that the natives have no qualified physician for this post.

A similar case is that of the Chief of the Educational Bureau, an Ili appointee, who has returned to the dissident zones, leaving the responsibility for these important functions in the hands of the Vice Chief, a Chinese, who is making a valiant attempt under adverse conditions.

Accordingly, no charges can reasonably be laid against the Chinese authorities of failure to make a reasonable gesture toward implementation of all the political terms of the agreement and of apparent willingness to discuss any reasonable suggestions made by the Ili group for further compromises.

The Ili group, for its part, appears to have failed to assist in fulfilling the terms in every instance where any concession is required from them, meanwhile seizing on all points that serve their own advantage. They have not permitted government committees to supervise the elections in the zones under their control. They have blocked traffic in much needed food supplies across the Manass River, though continuing to carry on barter trade across the Soviet border. Also they have completely failed to carry out their obligations under the military terms agreed on in Article 10 of the main agreement and Annex II thereanent.

The Ili leaders, despite repeated requests by the Consulate, have failed to cite specific instances of Chinese noncompliance with the political terms. It is plausible, therefore, that the principal reason

for the reluctance of the dissidents to proceed with any of the concessions promised is that the Kremlin's agents refuse consent lest peace and popular satisfaction should disturb Soviet propaganda against the Chinese Government. It is difficult to see what the Chinese Government could do that it has not already attempted in order to alleviate the conditions of the people. Even granted that there may be full basis in fact for all charges of corruption and oppression by Chinese military and civilian officials which have been brought to the attention of the Consulate, as well as the common cultural intolerance of the Chinese for any way of life other than that of the Hans and their still rumored plans to Sinicize all the Muslims of Sinkiang, the Chinese Government has obviously made a far greater attempt to live up to its obligation under even the political terms of the Ili agreement than have the dissidents. The three zones appear to have fulfilled almost none of their commitments, either military (which they have flouted) or political (which they have ignored insofar as any occasion for action on their side arose).

The Administrative Program is being analyzed in a separate despatch.⁵⁸

Respectfully yours,

J. HALL PAXTON

893.00/12-1747 : Telegram

The Consul at Tihwa (Paxton) to the Secretary of State

TIHWA, December 17, 1947—9 p. m.
[Received December 19—12: 14 a. m.]

83. Foreign Office representative Liu says that another letter from General Chang in reply to Ili group is being translated into Turki and will shortly be given to Soviet CG for delivery.

Remytel to Nanking 439, repeated Department 70, November 16. Liu characterizes answer as firm since it refuses recall of Chairman Masud on the score that approaching elections will indicate popular choice and requires return of Ili leaders before negotiations will be resumed. Liu states that other choices: Use of force or full acquiescence to Ili demands were rejected by Nanking authorities so this alone remained. However he does not expect Ili leaders to appear here for conference for several months at least and hopes time will be used to improve conditions in remaining 7 zones under Chinese control.

It is doubtful whether provincial administrators generally will have the foresight to use such a fortunate respite for other purposes than their personal profit. The waste of this opportunity may shorten the

⁵⁸ No. 54, December 12, not printed.

remaining period of grace before the rest of the natives throughout Sinkiang join in revolt against present government and, working with Ili, attempt to overthrow Chinese rule altogether. They seem likely in this event to be given Soviet support or at least technical and strategical advice.

Sent Nanking 479, repeated Department.

PAXTON

893.00/12-2247: Telegram

The Consul at Tihwa (Paxton) to the Secretary of State

TIHWA, December 22, 1947—10 a. m.
[Received December 23—4:22 a. m.]

85. Certain Sinkiang elements are rumored to be favoring closer relations with bordering Muslim states of Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to escape dilemma of choice between present alleged Chinese oppression and supposed Russian plans for absorption of this area. Any available information as to attitude of first two nations toward USSR and estimate of future prospects of their entry into Soviet sphere would accordingly be appreciated.

Opposition to new direction of policy is to be expected from far-sighted natives on score that region needs quicker help in development of economic possibilities than is likely to come from such backward nations and that it would be better to choose between the known evils of the two large powers than to gamble on dubious benefits hoped for from the smaller ones, despite their religious, cultural affinity with the latter.

PAXTON