

Kant on the Generality of Logic

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§1. It became commonplace around the turn of the 20th century, and especially after the revolution in logic ushered in by Frege, to ridicule Kant for having thought that the logic of his day represented the final stage of the science. Indeed, Kant's own views on logic came to be treated as a relic of a tradition that had been superseded in every respect.

More careful consideration of Frege's own writings, however, has shown that Frege himself did not see things in this way. In fact, far from simply cataloguing his disagreements with Kant, we find Frege positioning his own contribution to logic in a way that takes pains to highlight features of Kant's views on logic that he means to accept. This has led to a healthy reassessment of Frege's relation to Kant and the Kantian tradition, with some going so far as to claim that Frege intended his own views to represent a defense of Kantianism itself.¹ It has also led to numerous claims about various ways in which Kant might be thought to anticipate Frege's conception of logic, at times in ways that Frege himself did not even recognize.²

Yet though such revisiting of this relation has surely helped to challenge a good deal of unwarranted assumptions about the distance separating Frege from Kant, there is reason to worry that things are now in need of a correction in the other direction – that in the zeal to co-opt Frege as a Kantian, or to show Kant to be a respectable Fregean,

¹ See Sluga, *Gottlob Frege* (Routledge, 1980).

² See Thompson, 'Singular Terms and Intuitions in Kant's Epistemology', *Review of Metaphysics* 26 (1973); Parsons, 'Kant's Philosophy of Arithmetic', *Mathematics in Philosophy* (Cornell, 1983); Bauch, *Wahrheit, Wert, Wirklichkeit* (Meiner, 1923).

something genuinely distinctive about each philosopher's point of view will have been lost.

In what follows I argue that such correction is especially needed on one crucial point of interpretation. There is a growing consensus that Kant and Frege ultimately agree on the nature of the *generality* of logic – more specifically, that, whatever else they might disagree about, Kant and Frege agree that logic's laws and forms are constitutive of *all* thought and reasoning *as such*, no matter what its object.³ Now, such an interpretive claim is encouraged by the fact that Kant and Frege do make *terminologically* parallel claims about the nature of logic's generality, as I show below. Nevertheless, I will argue that such verbal agreement covers over a deeper *conceptual* disagreement – disagreement, in particular, over the nature of the thinking and reasoning that logic is taken to have in view. For while Frege defines 'thought', and with it the subject-matter of logic, in terms of what can be *true or false*, Kant takes logic to be concerned with anything that can be *understood*. What is more, Kant takes this latter concept to be one that extends well beyond the sphere of theoretical cognition to what is involved in such acts as the issuing and heeding of imperatives and the expressing of aesthetic assessments.

I will conclude, first of all, that, once we see our way past the terminological similarities, Kant's 'general or universal [allgemeine]' logic has a clear claim to be *more general* than Frege's logic. I will argue, furthermore, that Kant would view Frege's more restricted conception as ultimately a step backward in the philosophy of logic. For what would seem to Kant to be the absence of the very idea of a *truly* 'general' logic in Frege's picture – not to mention its continuing absence in the tradition that he initiates – is

³ See Sluga (op.cit.); MacFarlane, 'Frege, Kant, and the Logic of Logicism', *Philosophical Review* 111 (2002); Linnebo, 'Frege's Conception of Logic', *Manuscripta* 26 (2003).

something Kant would take to obscure what he believes to be the essential *unity* of theoretical and practical reason, that *one and the same* capacity for reasoning manifests itself in both theoretical and practical guises within human existence. From Kant's point of view, Frege's more restricted conception of reason simply paves the way for the positivist's suspicion that all spheres outside of the theoretical sciences are ultimately non-rational altogether – something manifest, for example, in the early Wittgenstein's relegation of ethical and aesthetic propositions to the 'nonsensical', and in Ayer's subsequent claim that, properly understood, what appears to be ethical 'reasoning' and 'argument' is nothing of the sort, but merely expressions of feelings.

§2. As I have already noted, the main reason for thinking that Frege and Kant stand in accord on the nature of the generality of logic is that Frege's choice of language closely parallels Kant's own. Throughout his work, Frege, like Kant, claims that logic is the science of the most general forms and laws of *thought* and of *reason* as such, in abstraction from whatever particularities differentiate the various objects to which thought and reason might be directed.⁴ A striking claim in this respect comes from an unpublished manuscript on logic from 1897: 'we do not demand of logic that it go into what is particular [das Besondere] to each domain of knowledge and its objects, but rather only assign to logic the task of saying only the most general [das Allgmeinste], what has validity for all domains of thinking [Denken]' (NS, 139). Indeed, the very project of logicism that Frege famously undertakes in his major works is described as the task of showing that certain inferences which seem peculiar to arithmetic are in fact based upon

⁴ See *Begriffsschrift* ('Bs') Preface, and *Grundlagen* ('Gl') §14 and §26. I will abbreviate Frege's other works as: *Grundgesetze* I 'Gg'; *Kleine Schriften* 'KS'; *Nachgelassene Schriften*, 'NS'. Translations throughout of both Frege and Kant are my own.

‘general logical laws’ alone (Gl iv). The completion of this project would show that ‘in arithmetic we are concerned with objects given immediately to our *reason*’, such that, in this science, as in the underlying logic itself, ‘the genuine object of reason is reason itself’ (Gl §105; my ital.).

Now, the extent to which these claims about logic unfold in language that follows Kant’s own claims is surely worthy of note. In the first *Critique*, for example, Kant writes that the most ‘elementary logic’ is the science which ‘contains the absolutely necessary rules for thinking [Denken]’ and ‘concerns these rules without regard to the difference of the objects to which [thinking] might be directed’ (B76). Because it abstracts from all differences among the objects of thinking – and with this, abstracts from the ‘content [Inhalt]’ of thinking – Kant, too, claims that this most elementary logic is a ‘universal or general [allgemeine] logic’ whose subject-matter is thus provided by ‘the mere *form* of thinking’ (B78; my ital.). Similarly, in the Preface to the *Groundwork*, Kant describes the task of logic as that of being concerned ‘solely with the form of understanding and of reason itself and the general rules of thinking as such [überhaupt] without distinction of objects’ (GMS AA04:387; cf., Bix).

On a first encounter, then, such parallels in terminology naturally convey the impression that, whatever ultimate disagreements Frege has with Kant, such disagreements nevertheless take place within the context of an overarching *agreement* on the essence of logic. That is, even if Frege ultimately disagrees with Kant over *which* particular forms and laws are the most basic and the most general – even if, for example, Frege disagrees with Kant whether the traditional subject-copula-predicate analysis adequately captures the most basic form of thinking – and even if Frege takes Kant’s way of treating this subject-

matter to encourage the distorted understanding of logic by the ‘psychological logicians’ (cf., Gg Preface, xvi ff; KS 183; Gl §27), Frege follows Kant in conceiving of logic as the *most universal or general* doctrine of thought as such. For both, the most fundamental task of logic appears to be exactly the same: to spell out the forms and laws that are constitutive of any thought whatsoever, no matter what content or object might differentiate one particular thought from another.

§3. If we look a bit further into their writings, however, it becomes apparent that such terminological overlap obscures an absolutely fundamental conceptual difference between the two thinkers – or, at least, this will be my main thesis in what follows.

We can work our way toward an understanding of this difference by recognizing, first of all, that *even by Frege’s own lights* Frege’s logic is concerned with a sphere that is defined explicitly by a restriction on an even wider domain – Frege’s official assertions to the contrary notwithstanding. As we have seen, Frege takes logic to be concerned with ‘thoughts [Gedanken]’. Thoughts, in turn, are defined by Frege in terms of their capacity for being *true*: a thought, for Frege is essentially something ‘for which in general the question of truth can arise’ (‘Der Gedanke’, KS, 344). Because of this, Frege takes thoughts to function as what is expressed by ‘a whole assertoric sentence’; a thought is what Frege calls the ‘sense [Sinn]’ of such a sentence (‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, KS 148). Frege recognizes, however, that not all sentences are assertoric; he recognizes, that is, that there are interrogatives, imperatives, optatives, and so on. What is more, Frege recognizes that these other types of sentences still express a ‘sense’ – i.e., are not non-sensical – though, to be sure, they do not express thoughts. Frege makes this point quite

clearly in ‘Der Gedanke’: ‘We should not wish to deny sense to a command-sentence [Befehlssatz], but this sense is not such that the question of truth could arise for it’ (KS 346). (Frege makes the same point about sentences expressing requests and wishes (*Wunsch-, Bittsätze*) (ibid.).)

This has the effect, however, of placing thoughts on a par with the other forms of sentential sense that Frege recognizes there to be. Considered in this regard, thoughts become one among several species of the higher genus: the *Sinn* of a sentence. Hence, though ‘a command’ is ‘indeed not a thought’, commands nevertheless ‘stand *on the same level* [Stufe] *with* thoughts’, as Frege puts it in ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’ (KS 153).

Now, Frege is quite explicit that logic will not be concerned with *all* forms of sentential sense, but rather *solely* with thoughts – that is, solely with sense for which the question of truth can arise: in logic ‘sentences expressing wishes, questions, requests and commands are *excluded*, and *only* assertoric sentences come into view, *only* such sentences in which we communicate facts and put forward mathematical laws or laws of nature’ (NS 140; my ital.). This has as its consequence, however, that the so-called logical constants (negation, the conditional, etc.) are defined by Frege only for cases when they conjoined to expressions of thoughts. Likewise, the logical acts of judgment and inference themselves are defined in such a way that only thoughts (in Frege’s sense) can function as their contents, which in turn restricts the validity of the rules of inference, such as modus ponens. (For the constants, see Bs §§5-6; for judgment, see Gg §5; for the rules of inference, see Bs §6 and Gg §§14-15.) Even the basic form of predicative unity specified by logic – in Frege’s eyes, the unity that arises when an object ‘saturates’ a concept, something that is, in turn, a species of the unity that arises when an argument saturates a

function – is a unity that, on Frege’s account, can only be genuinely manifest in distinctly truth-functional contexts. In fact, the very significance of ‘object’ and ‘concept’ that is at issue in logic is specified at one point by these terms picking out ‘parts’ of truth-values (cf., KS 151). This, in addition to Frege’s definition of a concept as ‘a function whose value is *always* a truth-value’ (KS 133; my ital.). Finally, Frege appears to think that inference itself can *only* occur with *true* thoughts as its content (cf., ‘Die Verneinung’, KS 364).

It is, of course, precisely this restriction that allows Frege to claim at one point that we could equally characterize logic as the ‘science of the most general laws of *being-true* [Wahrsein]’ (NS 139; my ital.). Nevertheless, the very same restriction also prevents us from hoping to find the very same logical structure present in our dealings with sentences with other forms of sense. Indeed, since both the rules of inference as well as the so-called logical constants are defined by Frege only for contexts in which what is being linked by their expressions is itself an expression of a thought, it becomes entirely unclear what significance the expressions for these constants and the applications of these rules could have when they are conjoined with sentences that do *not* express thoughts. As a consequence, it is hard to see how Frege could accept that the relations that obtain between instances of the other species of sentential sense – e.g., among senses that pertain to imperatival sentences – could count as particularly *logical* or *rational* forms of relations to one another. This, despite the fact that these relations mirror quite closely those that connect *Gedanken* or truth-functional senses (as has been emphasized, of course, by so-called ‘non-classical’ logicians).

In any case, Frege's restriction thereby lays the foundation for the prejudice, especially common early in the subsequent analytic tradition, that the term 'logic' in 'deontic logic' is being used equivocally or honorifically, for it threatens the idea that there is anything deeper shared, for example, by a theoretical judgment or syllogism and a practical judgment or syllogism, other than simply the name.

§4. In light of its ultimate commitment to the merely *nominal* unity of practical and theoretical 'reasoning', however, it becomes especially clear why *Kant*, at least, could not be satisfied with the Fregean demarcation of *das Logische*. This is because Kant is deeply committed to the *real* unity of theoretical ('speculative') and practical reason. As he famously claims in the *Groundwork*: 'in the end, there can only be *one and the same* reason...distinguished only in application' (GMS AA04:391; my ital.) – a claim that is repeated in the second *Critique*: 'It is still only *one and the same* reason which, whether from a theoretical or a practical perspective, judges according to a priori principles' (KpV AA05:121; my ital.). For Kant, then, Frege's restriction of the concept of reason itself to its manifestation in theoretical contexts, and the correlative restriction of logic to laws and forms that govern reason's 'application' in distinctly theoretical cognition, would the unacceptable effect of obscuring this all-important unity.

The fact that the Fregean conception would dissolve the unity of reason is something that should give pause to anyone wishing to ascribe such a conception to Kant himself. Nevertheless, a substantial number of Kant's recent readers have not recognized this incipient conclusion, insofar as they have assumed without question that Kant, too, subscribes to just such a 'truth-theoretic' understanding of the subject-matter of logic. At

times this is claimed quite explicitly, by interpreting Kant's logic as a partially restricted version of our first-order (truth-functional) logic.⁵ More often, though, this is simply implied by the conception that Kant is taken to have of the essence of 'judgment [Urteil]' as such. Since Kant identifies judgment as the primary manifestation of understanding (cf., B94), this entails that judgment is the guiding notion for his logic. Hence those who take Kant to hold, like Frege, that something's being truth-evaluable is *the* distinctive mark of something's being a judgment in the first place, are also (ipso facto) saddling Kant with a truth-theoretic conception of logic itself.⁶

What I want to show now, however, is that closer inspection reveals that Kant does not define 'judgment' in terms of truth, nor does he take logic to be focused only upon what can be true.⁷ Rather, Kant takes logic to be concerned with *anything* that can be *understood*. In Kant's words, logic is 'the science of the rules of understanding *überhaupt*' (B76), and Kant clearly takes the scope of both understanding and also judgment to extend *well beyond* the theoretical sphere, to both practical acts of issuing and heeding commands and even to expressions of aesthetic satisfaction. Because of this, the sphere of logic itself – at least a truly 'universal or general [allgemeine]' logic – must also comprise within itself much more than the forms and laws of the theoretical use of understanding alone.

We can see that Kant accords this wider scope to his 'allgemeine' logic if we look a bit more closely at the account that Kant gives of the nature of the abstraction that is involved in arriving at its subject-matter, and the corresponding contrast that Kant draws

⁵ Cf., M. Thompson (op.cit.), 334; R. Hanna, *Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy* (Oxford, 2001), 93n49; M. Friedman, *Kant and the Exact Sciences* (Harvard, 1992), 63; and B. Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge* (Princeton, 1998), 103n53.

⁶ Longuenesse, op.cit., 106, 140, etc.; H. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism* (2nd ed.; Yale, 2004), 88; R. Hanna (op.cit.), 1, 30, 63, etc.; G. Prauss, *Erscheinung bei Kant* (De Gruyter, 1971), 86-7. Compare Frege himself: 'logicians often appear to understand by 'judgment' what I call 'thought'' (KS 379n15).

⁷ This is to be distinguished from the different claim (one that Kant accepts), that *only* judgments are true or false; cf., B350.

between the way a general logic treats thinking and ways in which thinking is treated by other disciplines. Recall, as we saw at the outset, that Kant takes general logic to treat thinking and understanding as such, without concern for the differences among the objects to which they can be directed (cf., §2). Yet Kant also recognizes that, instead of considering thinking and understanding in general, we can consider what pertains to ‘thinking about a certain *kind* [eine gewisse *Art*] of objects’ (B76; my ital.). To the extent that such a science would still count as a ‘logic’, it would no longer be general or universal in scope, since it would be restricted to a ‘particular or special [besondere]’ kind of thinking or understanding; in short, it would be what Kant would call a ‘particular or special’ logic (ibid.).⁸

What is of interest to us at this point – and what begins to signal the distance that separates Kant from Frege – is that Kant takes the division between objects of theoretical understanding and objects of practical reason to be a division *within* ‘kinds’ of ‘determinate [bestimmte] objects of understanding’ (cf., GMS AA04:387-8), not a division between objects of understanding and some other kind of object altogether. What is more, Kant claims that our understanding makes use of different *categories* in its dealings with these different kinds of objects, depending on which kind of object it is directed toward. This is what lies behind Kant’s provision of a second ‘table of the categories of freedom’ in the second *Critique*, in a chapter entitled ‘On the concept of an object of pure practical

⁸ In fact, once our inquiry is ‘*restricted* to determinate objects of understanding [auf bestimmte Gegenstände des Verstandes eingeschränkt]’, Kant thinks that we are actually engaging in one or another branch of *metaphysics* (cf., GMS AA04:388). (Presumably ontology (*metaphysica generalis*), by contrast, has the same *unrestricted* generality with respect to objects as does logic itself; this would fit well with Kant’s identification of what falls under ‘the proud name of ontology’ with the ‘mere analytic’ of understanding (B303).)

reason’, to complement the first *Critique*’s table of the concept of an object of *theoretical* understanding (cf., KpV AA05:65f).

Finally, Kant thinks that each of these two kinds of use of our understanding and reason bears a different *relation* to its object. In theoretical use of understanding, our thought is ‘related to its object’ by ‘determining [bestimmen] the object and its concept’, though the object itself ‘must be *given* from elsewhere’ (Bix-x; my ital.). In the practical use, however, our understanding relates to its object by bringing it about itself – by ‘*making* it actual [wirklich zu machen]’ (Bx; my ital.). Because of this, a practical judgment paradigmatically takes the form of an imperative which ‘asserts [aussagt] a possible free act [Handlung], whereby a certain end is to be made actual [wirklich gemacht]’, whereas a theoretical judgments ‘assert, not what ought to be [was sein soll], but rather what is [was ist]’, and so ‘have as their object not an acting [kein Handeln] but a being [ein Sein]’, as Jäsche’s *Logic* puts the point (Log AA09:86; cf., Log §32 AA09:110, Refl 3116 AA16:666). In the *Groundwork* Kant explains an imperative in a similar fashion: it ‘says what act possible by me would be good’, as it ‘commands’ the act of bringing about a certain state of affairs (GMS AA04:414).

This difference in relation brings with it a difference in the direction of fit (to use J.L. Austin’s turn of phrase) between the two kinds of judgments: while theoretical judgments aim at indicating what is *true*, construed as a ‘correspondence [Übereinstimmung]’ (cf., B82) with ‘an object *given* from elsewhere’, practical judgments aim at commanding what is *right*, construed as ‘*making*’ an object (an act) that corresponds

with the moral law. Unsurprisingly, then, truth is simply not a topic in Kant's practical philosophy.⁹

Now, because, on Kant's view, theoretical and practical understanding are each tied to distinct kinds of objects, neither the science of the theoretical use of understanding nor that of its practical use can therefore be taken to represent the most 'general' logic. Each discipline will be 'restricted' to only one kind of thinking and understanding. Here, then, Kant agrees with Frege, that there is a distinction *in kind* between the contents and objects of commands (imperatives), on the one hand, and those of assertions (indicatives), on the other. Yet because Kant takes *both* of these 'kinds' of acts to be manifestations of the *same* capacity for thinking and understanding, he must also hold that any 'logic' which restricted itself to theoretical assertions, as Frege's logic does, must be viewed as a *special* logic.¹⁰ A truly *allgemeine* logic, by contrast, would have to abstract from the differences between these kinds of judgments and their objects – and with them, the differences between the kinds of 'uses' of understanding or ways of relating to each object in thought that are peculiar to each – and instead to provide only what forms and laws are *gemein* to *both* cases.

In fact, Kant extends the scope of logic even further, beyond both the theoretical and practical uses of understanding, to include what the third *Critique* identifies as its use in making a 'merely reflective judgment [bloß reflectirendes Urteil]' (EEKU §VII,

⁹ In the place of 'the much-cited query to the logicians 'what is truth?''', Kant thinks the jurist must instead address the question 'what is right?' (MS AA006:229). The one place that I am aware of where truth comes into focus in Kant's practical philosophy is in the discussion of the 'erring conscience' at MSTL AA06:401. I do not know of a text in which Kant calls imperatives (or permissives) true or false.

¹⁰ Both H.J. Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience* (Unwin, 1936), and M. Wolff, *Die Vollständigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel* (Klöstermann, 1995), have also claimed that Kant would classify Fregean logic as a special logic, but they take this to be due to the fact that Kant would presumably count *arithmetic* in particular as a special logic – which, though probably true, fails to get at the deeper reason for seeing Frege's logic as 'besondere'.

AA20:221; cf., EEKU §I, AA20:200-1), which Kant takes to be exemplified in not only our judgments about natural organisms but also our aesthetic judgments about the beautiful and the sublime (cf., EEKU §VIII, AA20:223). Indeed, even in the case of an aesthetic judgment, which is expressive of something ‘subjective’ (namely, that a ‘mere representation in me is accompanied with satisfaction [mit Wohlgefallen begleitet]’ (KU §2, AA05:205)), Kant is explicit that *one and the same* logical forms of judgment are at work. As Kant puts it in §1 of the 3rd *Critique*, we know that the same ‘logical functions for judging’ will be present, because even in such acts ‘a relation to the understanding is always contained’ (KU AA05:203n). In his lectures on logic, Kant goes so far as to claim that even poets ‘must observe logical correctness [Richtigkeit]’ as a condition on their expressions’ ‘having unity’ that can be made sense of (V-Lo/Wiener AA24:835). This again contrasts sharply with Frege’s treatment of both aesthetic expression and poetry in particular; since, for Frege, neither requires that a *Gedanke* be expressed, neither is bound by the forms and laws of logic (cf., ‘Der Gedanke’, KS 343 and ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, KS 147 and 149).

§5. With Kant’s conception of logic, then, we find ourselves presented with a way of restoring practical reasoning and aesthetic expression to genuinely equal footing, so far as logical rationality is concerned, with truth-functional inference. Rather than excluding one, or attempting to reduce one to the other, in Kant’s scheme both are to be subsumed under a genuinely universal logic, one that displays those forms and laws which are common to *all* uses of our understanding. I have, of course, so far said very little concrete about what such forms or laws would look like, which forms and laws would be generic

enough to range over both theoretical (assertoric) as well as practical (imperative) as well as 'reflective' forms of Fregean *Sinn*. This will have to wait for another occasion (though see KU §40 AA05:294 and Anth §44 AA07:200).

Let me conclude by noting one final element of Kant's views that places even more distance between Kant and the Fregean tradition – namely, the methodological role that Kant assigns to the logical forms across his 'Critical' system of philosophy. For it is precisely the subject-matter of logic that Kant takes to provide the key to the 'architectonic' of philosophy as a whole. Though many of his readers have found Kant's seeming obsession with architectonic to be itself grounded in some irrational motive, Kant himself thinks that the identification of some such principle for the unity of philosophy is necessary, if we are to claim that there is any rational unity to philosophy itself, if philosophy is to be genuinely '*rational* cognition from concepts' (B741). Kant's proposal is that this principle is provided by our understanding or reason *itself*. It is only because we know that it is one and the same understanding, the same capacity for reason, that is at work that Kant thinks we can know apriori that the very same logical forms will be manifest, that each domain will be *intelligible*, and hence, we can allow our inquiry to be *guided* by these forms.

Frege, by contrast – along with much of the tradition after him – rests content with simply listing philosophical disciplines (cf., the opening of 'Der Gedanke', KS 342), leaving it entirely mysterious whether there is a *principle* that unifies them under one concept (let alone a rational one), or whether they simply hang together disjunctively or rhapsodically. Kant's commitment to a more general logic is thus a symptom of a *deeper*

philosophical rationalism than Frege's.¹¹ It is thus only Kant, and not Frege, who can assert that understanding and reason functions as 'the highest point' to which we must 'affix', not just 'the whole logic', but with it, *all of philosophy as well* (B134n).

If we now recall that Kant takes the questions of philosophy ultimately to be subsumed under one most fundamental question: *Was ist der Mensch?* (cf., Br AA11:429 and Log §III AA09:25), then we can see that what is *ultimately* at stake for Kant in the proposal of his 'allgemeine' logic is nothing less than the question of the rationality of the principle which provides fundamental unity to human life. Without such a common and rational basis informing our concern with the true, the good, the beautiful, and the purposive, the *de facto* unity of these dimensions in ourselves would be no better than an accidental, disjointed aggregation of pursuits, tied to one another or to ourselves by brute, *unintelligible* contingency.

Kant's alternative conception of the generality of logic should thus be taken seriously not only by those who are committed to the *unity* of reason, as well as by anyone committed to the ultimate *rule* of reason throughout *all* aspects of human existence, but also by anyone with a hope that there is a reason for why human existence is the way it is – in short, by anyone who hopes that the answer to the question 'What is a human being?' lies *within* the scope of reason or rationality itself.

¹¹ On Frege's rationalism, see again Sluga (op.cit.), T. Burge, *Truth, Thought, and Reason* (Oxford, 2005).