

ENTHUSIASM FOR A HEREDITARY ENEMY: SOME ASPECTS OF THE ROOTS OF HUNGARIAN TURKOPHILE SENTIMENTS

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This paper examines the changes that took place in the image of the Ottoman Turks in Hungary during the 19th century. Though the Ottoman attacks in the 15th and 16th centuries destroyed the medieval Kingdom of Hungary and the following 150 years of the Ottoman rule in Hungary had considerable negative consequences, by the end of the 19th century negative sentiments regarding the Turks shifted, and during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 there were enthusiastic pro-Turkish demonstrations in Budapest. The paper analyses the causes of this turn in Hungarian historical thinking and demonstrates, e.g. through the themes of the most popular historical paintings of the 19th century, that more recent anti-Habsburg and anti-Russian sentiments among the Hungarians led to active support for the Turks, if only in a peaceful way, since the foreign policy of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy remained neutral.

Keywords: Ottomans, Mohács, historical painting; 1848; Russo-Turkish war; anti-Habsburg sentiment, Compromise of 1867, Kossuth

The 150-year-long Ottoman rule over Hungary's territory had very negative effects, demographically, economically and politically. While before the 16th century the Kingdom of Hungary had been a Central European great power, in modern history the country played only a peripheral role as part of the Habsburg Monarchy. There were – and still are – numerous Hungarian historians who consider the Ottoman occupation to have been the biggest catastrophe in the history of the nation, and according to them this militaristic empire should be held responsible for almost all the misfortunes of later Hungarian fate.¹

Though modern Hungarian historiography regards these historical processes as more complex,² it is obvious that there were no other empires and countries in Hungarian history that were inimical to the Hungarian state of nation for a longer period of time than the Ottomans. King Louis the Great was the first Hungarian king who fought against the Turks in the middle of the 14th century, and Austria, with considerable numbers of Hungarian soldiers in the imperial army, led the last war against the Ottoman Empire as late as the period between 1788 and 1791.

But not only is the length (more than 350 years!) of these hostile confrontation of the two (Hungary and the Ottoman Empire) important, the battle at Mohács in 1526 also acquired symbolic significance. It brought the powerful and prestigious medieval Kingdom of Hungary to an end. Hungarian tradition associates the fall of the medieval kingdom with the single battle at Mohács. All the humiliation, suffering, and loss of life and livelihoods that preceded and followed it, in the 150-year era of Ottoman rule, have been compressed into this one word: Mohács.³ This battle is seen as having been the most tragic event of Hungarian history, and the Turks have often been referred to as the scourge of God, who wanted to punish the Hungarian nation for their sins. (In the 16th and 17th centuries the Catholics and the Protestants blamed each other. A well-known Lutheran preacher, István Magyari, wrote in 1602 that the Turks were our enemies well before Luther was born, so the Protestants cannot be to blame for this blow of divine justice.⁴ His great disputant, the later Archbishop and Cardinal Péter Pázmány, stated that Hungary was victorious over the Turks during the Catholic centuries, and the catastrophe of 1526 happened only after Protestant thought had found its place in the country.⁵)

Modern historians do not think, however, that some historical events or even the most radical changes could be explained only by transcendental factors, so it is more important to realize that the tragic Mohács battle was seen as a great national catastrophe by both sides. And there is no question that all major political groups during the so-called Ottoman age wanted to expel the Turks. Even the political elite of the Principality of Transylvania felt that their vassal position was only a forced situation due to the power relations, and not a rationally or emotionally sought-after alliance. So it is not surprising that the Turks became symbols of the evil foreigners, the hated pagans, who were often depicted in terrible caricatures in propaganda texts written with the hope of obtaining help from the Christian West. And Mohács became a symbol for national mourning as later generations looked back on (or portrayed in cultural and historical artefacts) the battle with sorrow and regret.

However, at the dawn of the era of modern Hungarian nationalism, the symbolic meaning of the tragic Mohács battle slowly began to change. There were several poems, dramatic plays, articles, and pamphlets that had one main goal: to make the apparently sleeping nation, which was blamed for the not particularly glorious condition of the country, awake. For these romantic generations, history provided examples to follow or to avoid. The medieval significance of Hungary during the Árpád or Anjou dynasty's rule made these romantic nationalists very proud of their historic origins and their national roots, and they were embarrassed because they felt they had lost this power. The medieval kings, great military leaders who defeated their enemies, were praised as national heroes, and their virtues were presented as exemplary legends for the contemporary youth. From this point

of view, the lost battle at Mohács was a turning point, as Mihály Vörösmarty, a famous poet of later decades, wrote in one of his earliest poems: “Mohács, cemetery of glory, my name is the curse of the Hungarians.” The Catholic bishop of the nearby city of Pécs ordered to build a small chapel at the battlefield in 1813, and since 1817 the priests of the diocese have organized memorial holy masses on August 29, the anniversary of the battle. One of the priests, János Kövér, said in his sermon in 1837: “The Mohács tragedy hurts to every real Hungarian, and, in particular, when he thinks about those golden ages, when our glorious fatherland stood with its one leg upon the Black sea, with the other upon the Tyrrhenian, blood flows from his heart...” In 1842 the noble estates of Baranya county suggested building a national monument to the very place where king Louis II died in the battle in order to draw the attention of later generations to heroes of the past. They were seen not only as victims, but also as heroes who sacrificed themselves, who died for the fatherland. This self-sacrifice and heroism was presented as an example to follow, and the tragic meaning of the historical event became an inspiring recollection of the national past. József Eötvös, one of the finest political thinkers of his day – and a less talented poet – wrote in his poem *Mohács* in 1847: “The faithful bosom, who lived for the fatherland / fertilizes its soil as he returns to ash / and his spirit remains by the grave / urging descendants to act.”⁶

So, the optimism of the so-called Reform Era (the 1830s and 1840s, when the Hungarian political and cultural elite made tremendous efforts to revitalize the country by pushing through political and social reforms in order to create a system that resembled the developed West European countries) changed the symbolism of Mohács, too. The “awakeners” used this poetic picture for their own purposes, claiming that even after such a terrible catastrophe there a better period in history could come if their contemporaries were worthy successors of their heroic ancestors.

Though the symbolic meaning of the Mohács battle and the whole Ottoman period changed a great deal in the Romantic era, the fights with the Turks remained the most popular historic age, apart from the medieval Hungarian great power. The themes of the most celebrated historical paintings of this period offer evidence of this. Romantic nationalism was very keen on presenting the dramatic events of the past, so these genres of paintings enjoyed considerable popularity in the 19th century. There were paintings with themes related to the Ottoman period among the earliest paintings: the monumental canvas of Peter Krafft from 1825, showing the last storm of Miklós Zrínyi at Szigetvár 1566, and another painting of rather low quality by an artist from Vienna depicting a Hungarian warrior, Mihály Dobozi, whose wife asked him to kill her rather than allow her to fall into the hands of the Turks.⁷ These historic paintings portrayed the martyrdom of Hungarian men and women as patterns to be followed, if perhaps in a more modern and less bloody way. Other later works of art portrayed the most popular family of the

medieval Hungarian Kingdom: the Hunyadi family. János Hunyadi, the governor, who defeated the Ottomans in numerous battles, first at the victorious siege of Nándorfehérvár/Belgrade in 1456, and his son, the great Hungarian king, Matthias (1458–1490), for whom the Hungarian noble diet (the parliament of the estates) wanted to set up a national monument in the 1840s, though they were unable to collect enough money.⁸ So a more glorious past had become popular by that time, adapting to the more optimistic national sentiments.

The Turks were represented in these paintings always as *hostis naturalis*, hereditary enemies of Hungary. The greatest national heroes were those who had been able to defeat the Turks and the greatest national martyrs were those who perished at their hands. Thus the Turks, perhaps not surprisingly, were the perennial enemies for Hungarian national consciousness in the first half of the 19th century, as the devastating wars against the Turks could be cast as the historic age that had had the greatest and most overwhelmingly negative impact on the face of the country and nation.

Some decades later, however, during the 1876–78 wars in the Balkan Peninsula, Hungarian public opinion was mostly *in support of* the Turks. There were several demonstrations for the Ottoman Empire, students and the main opposition parties (not just the radical democratic parties of the so-called Independence Party, but the conservatives, too) demanded a pro-Turkish foreign policy.⁹ The university students decided to present a fancy sword to General Abdel Karem, who defeated the Serbs in a couple of battles in 1876. They travelled to Constantinople and on January 13, 1877 they gave their gift to Abdel Karem Pasha. They were received by the Minister of War Affairs, as well.¹⁰ Some months later, in April 1877, the Sultan, Abdül-Hamid II sent back three dozen illuminated manuscripts, which had been kept in his treasury since his ancestor, Suleiman the Great, captured Buda. These manuscripts, some of them from the old library of King Matthias, were seen as signs of the friendship between the two nations. This Turkish delegation had traveled to Vienna, because they were not allowed to visit Budapest directly, as the Austrian foreign ministry wanted to avoid any kind of complications with the powers at war. So they left the books there, and three days later a small group of librarians brought them from Vienna to the Budapest University Library quietly, without any great celebration.¹¹

But some days later another Turkish delegation arrived in Hungary. Though this was a non-official visit, they were received enthusiastically. Their train stopped at all major railway stations, and distinguished committees, headed mostly by the mayors and other celebrities, greeted them on behalf of the given towns. On April 29, 1877 the Turkish delegation was received by a huge Budapest crowd of 20,000 or 30,000. The speakers praised the Turkish nation and the Sultan, and expressed their hopes that after such long wars in the past, the Turkish and Hungarian nations would be friends forever, as they were brother nations.¹²

This visit of 15 men from the Ottoman Empire took place when the Russians declared war on the Ottoman Empire. At the beginning of the war the Turkish troops were able to defend themselves, first and foremost at the fortress of Plevna, where several thousand Russians died while attacking the Turkish trenches. The Hungarians were delighted, the defender of Plevna, Osman Nuri Pasha was celebrated as a hero, and the Hungarian newspapers – pro-government and opposition newspapers alike – all wished for the victory of the Ottoman Empire.¹³

Moreover, there was a smaller group of Hungarian patriots in Transylvania, who wanted to do more than just pray for the victory of the Turks. During the summer of 1877 some noblemen in the eastern region of Transylvania, the Magyar Székelyföld, decided to organize a smaller army to attack the Russians. They knew of course that a few thousand Hungarians would not be able to do considerable harms to the colossal army of the Tsar. They planned only a sabotage action in the hinterland of the Russians, namely, with several thousand brave volunteers they wanted to move forward to the Sereth River and blow up the bridge over it. They hoped to hinder the supply of the Russian troops fighting in the territory of contemporary Bulgaria, so they could be defeated by the Turks.¹⁴

Though this so-called Székely coup was denounced in September 1877, and the leaders Gábor Ugron and Miklós Bartha, young members of the radical opposition, had to flee, no one was punished and the king (following the advice of the government) decided to end the legal proceedings. This story demonstrates the general sympathy towards the conspirators. When the conspiracy was revealed, the leaders had to hide from the gendarmerie, but Miklós Bartha happened to meet Gábor Bethlen, one of the Transylvanian lord-lieutenants (leader of a county, appointed by the government) who asked him: “Where are you going?” “To Nagyszeben”, was the answer, a nearby bigger city in Transylvania. “Not enough”, confided the government official, instead of arresting him, so Bartha traveled to take refuge among relatives in the far northern part of the country.¹⁵

After bloody fights, Plevna was captured and the Russians were able to pass through the Balkan Mountains and by March 1878 they were only a few miles from Constantinople. Hungary was concerned, students and workers protested against the neutrality of the Habsburg Empire, and the crowd attacked even the palace of the prime minister.

All who are familiar with the history of 19th century Europe know what happened next. Alarmed by the extension of Russian power into the Balkans, the Great Powers forced modifications of the treaty at the Congress of Berlin. The main change here was that Bulgaria would be split, according to earlier agreements among the Great Powers that precluded the creation of a large new Slavic state, and so Russian dominance over the Balkans was over. The great powers wanted to prevent the Balkans from falling under the influence of their rival, Russia. But how should one understand the enthusiastic demonstrations in Hungary

for their hereditary enemy? Why had the Hungarians forgotten the bloody wars against the Turks? Why did they think that the Turks were their friends or even their brothers?

It is rather difficult to understand how the Hungarian national sentiments towards the Turks could change so dramatically in the space of only a few decades. These decades were, however, full of highly important historical events. The so-called Reform Era concluded with the lawful revolution of 1848, when the Habsburg kings let Hungary turn into a parliamentary monarchy and the April laws guaranteed the autonomy of Hungary within the Habsburg Monarchy. 1848 can be called the rebirth of the Hungarian nation, and Kossuth, Deák, Batthyány, Eötvös, Széchenyi and their compatriots established the modern Hungarian state. But this independent modern Hungary did not enjoy freedom for long. The Habsburg dynasty wanted to get back the rights the April laws had given to Hungary. By the end of 1848, Hungary, led by Lajos Kossuth, found itself forced to fight for its liberty against not only the rioting ethnic groups (first and foremost Serbs, Romanians and Croats), but the Austrian imperial army too. After sustaining bitter defeats, the Hungarian military force was able to start a counter-attack in the spring of 1849, and during the glorious spring campaign, the Hungarians defeated the Austrian imperial army in many battles, so the new emperor, the young Francis Joseph, had to ask for military aid from the most absolutistic monarch in Europe, Tsar Nicholas I. The Russians sent a huge army to fight against the Hungarians (200,000 men, the biggest army in Europe since the Napoleonic wars!), so there was no question about the defeat of Hungary.¹⁶

Kossuth and some other Hungarian leaders fled to Turkey and the Sultan, backed by Britain and the USA, refused to deliver up the Hungarian emigrants to the victorious Austrians, and in doing so saved their lives. Though Kossuth had no chance to return to Hungary, 18 years later Francis Joseph and the Hungarians negotiated the Compromise of 1867, which gave somewhat smaller autonomy to the country within the Habsburg Monarchy. Austria turned into a double state officially called the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and while the Hungarians enjoyed total autonomy in internal affairs, they had practically a veto right in the foreign affairs of the Habsburg Empire.

Some of the important changes that took place during the three decades before 1876 had a very important impact on the way Hungarians began to think about their neighbor to the south, the Ottoman Empire.

First of all, I would like to underline that the 1848–49 war of independence was the most decisive experience in the formation of the modern Hungarian nation. Though this struggle ended with a military defeat, the Hungarian patriots could be proud of their achievement, because the joint forces of two European great powers were needed to defeat them. And this heroic and partially victorious struggle brought together the heterogeneous parts of the Hungarian society: the noble mid-

dle class and the former serfs, who had just been liberated due to the April laws, fought together for Hungarian freedom and independence, as they must have felt that they were defending the new and free modern Hungarian state and their own personal freedom. If 1848–49 can be called the decisive experience in forging the modern Hungarian nation, then Lajos Kossuth was the leader of this romantic and uniting struggle. From that point on, Hungarians could not be indifferent to his personal fate. He was called “our father, Kossuth” by the peasants, as they thought of him as the person who had liberated them.¹⁷

The huge significance of Kossuth in the souls of the Hungarians is one of the things that helps one understand why sentiments towards Turkey changed so dramatically. The peasants, who might have been taught about the old wars against the Ottoman Empire in the primary schools, had a direct and personal experience of 1848–49. They might have admired the heroism of Zrínyi, Dobó and other historical figures from the 16th or 17th centuries, but Kossuth was a living national hero for them. (The former governor of Hungary died in 1894 in his exile in Italy.) And the Turks might have been blamed because of their attacks on Hungary in bygone centuries, but the conflicts had taken place so long ago, whereas the willingness of the Ottomans to provide an asylum for Kossuth and other Hungarian refugees was part of the present. Something said by an old man after listening to the long speeches of the Turkish delegation in Budapest in April 1877, which he, of course, could not understand, offers a good illustration of how people may well have reacted: “Though we do not make sense of it, it is enough to know that they received our compatriots wholeheartedly.”¹⁸ And if we can trust the articles of a young journalist named Kálmán Mikszáth, written some months later, in August 1877, some participants in the demonstrations in Budapest who were celebrating the victorious Osman Pasha cheered for Kossuth, who actually had not done anything at the time, but he played an important role in popularizing the Turks, so it was not a mere coincidence that he was mentioned together with Abdül-Hamid II.¹⁹

But if we want to understand the sudden sympathy felt for the Turks, we have to consider some other factors as well. We could mention some more historic paintings just after the defeated Revolution of 1848, which show struggles from the Turkish age again. But the meaning of these works of art had been modified. The heroes of the anti-Turkish struggles could be understood during the 1850s as personifications of the later Hungarian efforts to defend the country’s independence, as well. Of course, the Habsburg censor did not allow people to praise the 1848–49 heroes openly, but a historic painting with a double-meaning could not be banned, as it depicted only some ancient fights against the Turks. So the images of Turks in these paintings did not refer to real Turks. Rather they were symbols of the perennial enemies of Hungary in general, which at the time meant the Austrians.

On the other hand, a new topic emerged among these historic paintings, namely, the events of the so-called “*kuruc*” – “*labanc*” struggles. These pictures had more sensitive meanings, as the *labanc* party was the loyal pro-Habsburg option, while the *kuruc* figures in the paintings recalled the anti-Habsburg warriors of 1848–49.²⁰ We can add some pictures to this group that portrayed the 15th century Hunyadi family, but not the traditional figures, the brave and mostly successful warrior János Hunyadi or King Matthias, but László Hunyadi, the elder brother of Matthias, who was executed by King László V, who apparently belonged to the Habsburg dynasty.²¹ The painting, which depicts the immense pain of the executed László Hunyadi’s mother and bride, reminded the spectators of the perfidy of Francis Joseph, who ordered the execution of leaders of 1848–49. After the Compromise of 1867, this veiled anti-Habsburg orientation lost its popularity, as the majority of Hungarians accepted the new political situation. The liberal institutions of the new political system gave more freedom for the expression of anti-Habsburg sentiments as well, so the political minority, the so-called opposition of 1848, was allowed to give expression to their anti-Habsburg feelings, but it was not as widespread and general as it had been in the 1850s.

As one can observe, by the mid-1870s the former assessment of the Turks had undergone a shift. Moreover, the contemporary Ottoman Empire was seen as a weak state, a dying old empire, often called “*the sick man of Europe*”, which, of course, could not be hated anymore, as it was more pitiful than terrifying. Modern nationalism created a new enemy: the Russians, who were not only responsible for the tragic defeat of the Hungarian war of independence, but remained an autocratic, despotic great power, an archenemy of all European liberals in the 19th century. The Hungarian war of independence was defeated by the Habsburgs and the Romanovs together, but after the 1867 Compromise the bitter hatred against the Austrians eased. (Actually, the reign of Francis Joseph became legal as he became the crowned king of the country.) So there remained one real enemy: Russia. Moreover, the colossal Russian empire was feared because of Pan-Slavic tendencies too: some influential St. Petersburg circles were blamed for having allegedly inciting the Slavic ethnic minorities in the Habsburg Monarchy.

So the Turks were celebrated in 1876–78, not only because of their past positive role, the help they had given Hungarian refugees in 1849, but because of their present struggle against the Russians, the same autocratic empire that had helped Francis Joseph defeat the Hungarian war of liberty. Following very simple logic, “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”, the Ottoman Empire’s successful fight against Tsarist Russia could have been seen as revenge for 1849. This anti-Russian sentiment was so general that Balázs Orbán, the third main organizer of the Székely coup, agitated among the Székely peasants by saying the following: “We are going to pay back these Russian dogs for 1848 and 1849!”²² And the meetings after the fall of Plevna in December 1877 all over the country demanded almost in

unison, to quote Mikszáth again: “Lead us against the Russians! ... We wish to go to war.”²³ So the hatred against the Russians was greater than the love for the Turks, who enjoyed popularity among the Hungarians only for a short time.

The Hungarians loved the Turks because of radical national sentiments. The Turks were fighting against the Russians, defeating the symbols of tyranny, and taking vengeance against the oppressors of the Hungarian fight for independence of 1848–1849. Had the Turks gone to war against any other nation than the Russians, the Hungarians would not have been so enthusiastic about them. The Turks only played a role that theoretically could have been played by other nations as well, and in this case, the Hungarians would have cheered for them as they did for the Turks at the time.

However, these friendly sentiments for the Ottoman Empire made it possible for the Turks to lose their image as an enemy forever. They might have been considered the hereditary enemies of the Hungarian nation earlier, but since Hungary had in the meantime found other enemies, the negative consequences of the Ottoman wars were put a bit to the side.

Notes

- ¹ One of the first modern summaries of the effects of the Ottoman rule in Hungary: Szakály, Ferenc, 1988. *Mi veszett Mohács után? A magyarországi török uralom mérlege* [What was Lost after Mohács? The Balance Sheet of Turkish Rule in Hungary]. *Valóság*, 1988/3, 39–51.
- ² An excellent summary on the changing image of the Ottomans in Hungarian historiography: Ágoston, Gábor, 2008. *The image of the Ottomans in Hungarian historiography. Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hung.* Volume 61 (1–2), 15–26.
- ³ Perjés, Géza, 1989. *The Fall of the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohács 1526 – Buda 1541*. Co.: Boulder, N. J.: Highland Lakes, Columbia University Press, xix.
- ⁴ Magyari, István, 1979. *Az országokban való sok romlásnak okairól* [On the many Reasons for the Destruction in the Countries]. Published by Katona, Tamás. Budapest: Magyar Helikon.
- ⁵ Pázmány, Péter, 1983. *Felelet az Magyari István sárvári prédikátornak, Az ország romlása okairól írt könyvére* [Reply to Pastor István Magyari of Sárvár and his Book on the Reasons for the Destruction in the Country]. In: Tarnóc, Márton, ed. 1983. *Pázmány Péter művei*. Budapest: Szépirodalmi Könyvkiadó, 5–25.
- ⁶ All these texts are cited in B. Szabó, János, ed. 2006. *Mohács*. Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, 489–496.
- ⁷ Szvoboda Dománszky, Gabriella, 2001. *Régi dicsőségünk... Magyar történelmi képek a XIX. században* [Our Ancient Glory... Hungarian Historical Paintings in the 19th century]. Budapest: Corvina, 16–22, 25.
- ⁸ Mikó, Árpád and Sinkó, Katalin, ed. 2000. *Történelem – kép. Szemelvények múlt és művészet kapcsolatából Magyarországon* [History – Picture. Excerpts on the Relationship between the Past and History in Hungary]. Budapest: Magyar Nemzeti Galéria, 668–671.
- ⁹ Diószegi, István, 1983. *The Hungarian Opposition Parties and the Austro-Hungarian Common Foreign Policy*. In: Diószegi, István, *Hungarians in the Ballhausplatz. Studies on the*

Austro-Hungarian Common Foreign Policy. Budapest: Corvina Kiadó, 260–319, esp. 296–298.

- ¹⁰ Tóth, Béla, 1877. A díszkard átadása Abdul-Kerimnek [The Bestowal of the Ceremonial Sword to Abdul-Kerim]. *Vasárnapi Ujság*, February 18, 1877, 99–102.
- ¹¹ Erődi, Béla, 2001. *Csok jasa. A török küldöttség látogatásának emlékkönyve* [Csok jasa. Presentation Volume of the Visit of the Turkish Delegation]. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó – Magyar–Török Baráti Társaság, 17–31. I would like to thank Professor Géza Dávid for his generosity and kind help that he presented this book to me. Fodor, Pál, Ivanics, Mária and Sudár, Balázs, 2011. A magyarok oszmán és török szemmel [The Hungarians through Ottoman and Turkish Eyes]. *Magyar Tudomány*, 2011/4, 416–424.
- ¹² Erődi, 2001, 32–92 and 112–118.
- ¹³ Diószegi, István, 1985. *Die Aussenpolitik der Österreich–Ungarischen Monarchie 1871–1877*. Wien, Köln, Graz: Böhlau Verlag, 294–5.
- ¹⁴ Szádeczky Kardoss, Lajos, 1927. A Székely Nemzet története és alkotmánya [The History and Constitution of the Székely Nation]. Budapest: Franklin-társulat, 379–385.
- ¹⁵ Szádeczky Kardoss, 1927, 384.
- ¹⁶ An excellent summary on the Hungarian War of Libery in English: Deák, István, 1979. *The Lawful Revolution. Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians, 1848–1849*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- ¹⁷ Another, typical metaphor for Kossuth was used by a Hungarian private in Debrecen who called him as Moses of the Hungarians, which symbolized the eminent role of Kossuth, who led his people from slavery into freedom. Hermann, Róbert, ed. 2006. *Kossuth Lajos, “a magyarok Mózesese”* [Lajos Kossuth, the Moses of the Hungarians]. Budapest: Osiris Kiadó.
- ¹⁸ Erődi, 2001, 45.
- ¹⁹ Mikszáth, Kálmán, 1877. Fecsegések [Gossiping]. *Budapesti Napilap*, September 20. Published in: Mikszáth Kálmán, 1968. *Cikkek és karcolatok* [Articles and Sketches] Volume III. Published by Bisztray, Gyula, Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 30–2. Mikszáth as a young journalist wrote his articles for oppositional newspapers, but some years later he turned to be a rather cynical member of the governing party.
- ²⁰ Viktor Madarász, a romantic painter who was educated in Paris might have had the most radical anti-Habsburg emotions. Almost all of his historical paintings were in connection with the defeat of Hungarian struggles, and he painted a picture entitled *Kuruc and Labanc*, too. (Mikó and Sinkó, ed. 2000, 602–3.)
- ²¹ Benczúr, Gyula’s *László Hunyadi’s Farewell* (1866) and Madarász, Viktor’s *Mourning of László Hunyadi* (1866), both paintings are in the Hungarian National Gallery, Budapest.
- ²² Szádeczky Kardoss, Lajos, 1920. *A székely puccs 1877-ben. Székely légió szervezése az orosz-török háborúban* [The Székely Putsch of 1877. The Organization of the Székely Legion in the Russo-Turkish War]. Budapest: Erdélyi Magyar – Székely Szövetség, 24.
- ²³ Mikszáth, Kálmán, 1877. A drágakövek [Precious Stones]. *Budapesti Napilap*, December 18. Published in: Mikszáth, Kálmán, 1968. *Cikkek és karcolatok* [Articles and Sketches] Volume III. Published by Bisztray, Gyula, Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 243–4.