

Authority NND 735017

By 13r NARA Date 12/9

1 July 1944

HISTORY

358th Infantry

Major Seeger called to report that an enemy artillery piece was firing from a point at 230 degrees to his front lines and also considerable motor movement was heard during the night. Lt. Aughtry, 1st Bn S-2, with a hastily formed patrol, moved to area and confirmed considerable enemy motor movement. The patrols of the night were greeted by stiff resistance from small fire while one patrol was ambushed in an attempt to penetrate enemy lines. Lt. Green, of 344th FA had a counter-fire mission and checked as to our patrol activities was given progress and told to fire mission at 28008595. Colonel Partridge, CO 358th Inf, went over the night's activities with duty officers and discussed plans for tonight's missions.

Today's activities consisted of various members of the Staff and the Commanders of the various units visiting with other units. Even though we were in a defensive situation holding the line until CHERBOURG was taken, we were busily engaged in immediate contact with the enemy, through active patrolling. Shellfire and mortar fire was sporadic but heavy in various sectors of the lines and Bn GP's. Capt. Falvey conferred with the artillery about leaflet shelling for tonight and reported little success with last night's activity. Liaison Officers were busy with orders and keeping up with the situation on our flanks. Col. Partridge held several conferences with commanders of the units, with the concern and emphasis of the next attack. Visitors of the day were Capt. Perry, S-3 of the 315th Eng Bn, Major Strickler, Ass't G-3 of 90th Division, Lt. Col. Munson, CO, 344th FA Bn, Capt., Lippert and Major Conn of the 344th FA Bn. One platoon of "L" Co made a recon in force to LES SABLONS but was ordered back due to a heavy artillery concentration being prepared for tonight. We received F. O. No. 7 from Division but no time for attack was stated. 90th Rem Trp Maxx. relieved "E" Co outpost on left flank at BAUFTE. In the late evening Lt. Col. Clarke, along with several officers, conducted a school for ME and WP rifle grenades which was very successful. Training in rear areas was carried on to a great extent for all concerned. One company of the 86th Cml. Co Bn was attached to the unit and were placed in their area after being thoroughly acquainted with the situation. Word was also received that the 357th Inf would relieve our 2nd Bn.

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2 July 1944

HISTORY

358th Infantry

The night of July 2 was relative quiet except for the motor movement and usual nightly sounds across the lines in enemy territory. The Germans also fired some mortar and artillery fire throughout the night. Our OP's were very active during the day and called for artillery as several groups of enemy were seen crossing the road and the railroad. Success of fire was very good. Lt. Godfrey of the 712th Tank Bn reported for Liaison with the unit. He was sent to report to Lt. Col. Bealks as plan called for at present. General Landrum, Commanding General of the Division, directs that a recon in force will be made to search out the enemy positions. Air Corps on mission from us to bomb ST JORES quite successful but missed town and cut one main road with one bomb - to be repaired by the Engineers. Another platoon of Cml. Mortars (M.2) will be attached to 2nd Bn. Commanders of special units had a conference with Col. Partridge for better control and use of these units. To date, supply and administration has been very good. Cannon Co has been very much in the fight with close support of fire. The plans for the coming attack are beginning to work out to advantage for all concerned. The OP is being moved to COLONY for better control of the front lines units in the action to come. Heavy artillery support has been placed at our disposal and we may expect heavy concentrations at jump off time. Plans are now completed and will jump off at time any time for the attack. It is possible according to G-2 that rain will be heavy for the attack. All personnel is getting any extra sleep possible for the sleepless nights that lie ahead when the attack jumps-off. Division CP moved to what has commonly been referred to as the "Pink Chateau". Was formerly used by the 359th. Throughout the day, patrols and OP report activity in the enemy lines and they appear to be digging in deeply. Later in the day and night the enemy fire became more intense. We have a Corps officer to visit us and will stay for the attack in the morning. CP is well at hand and Liaison officers are with their units. Check times with Bn and Division at midnight tonight.

Hq CT 358
2 July 1944INTELLIGENCE ANNEX TO ACCOMPANY F.O. NO. 6

1. The enemy OPL to the front of the 358th Infantry is manned by the 3d Bn of the 949 Infantry. (For dispositions, see overlay attached) The total strength of this battalion is 250 to 300. Each Company has 3 Platoons. Each Platoon has 4 Squads and each Squad has at least 1 MG and 1 Machine Pistol. It is thought that this regiment has only 2 battalions (2nd and 3rd). Strength of the 2nd battalion is 300 men. Its exact location has not been determined but it is probably in the zone of action of this Regiment.

The enemy has dug successive positions in rear of his OPL. Many of these positions are not manned but as we advance it is expected that he intends to withdraw to these prepared positions. (See overlay already distributed). The enemy MTR has not been located. A terrain study indicates that it might be generally along the line 240835 - 250817 - 265820. There is no confirmation of this. Special attention is called to mine field and booby trap locations on overlay. The booby traps at 282858 are teller mines with a pull type detonating device. A wire is stretched from road to hedge across the ditch about waist high.

2. a. All civilians passing from the German lines into our lines will be sent to IPW cage for questioning by French interpreter.
b. No civilians will be allowed to pass from our lines into the German lines.
c. All suspicious civilians will be evacuated to the IPW cage.

3. All troops will be informed that most of our enemy information is gained from PW's and for that reason, every effort will be made to capture prisoners and get them to the IPW cage as soon as possible so that the information gained may be given to the Artillery for immediate action.

PARTRIDGE
Comig

Official:

PALVEY
S-2

1 Incl: Intelligence Overlay

Hq 358 Ing.
2 July 44

F. O. #6

Maps: France 1/25,000

1. a. Intelligence - see Annex No. 1.
 b. 90th Div with 537 AAA Bn, 712th Tk Bn (less Co A), 607 TD Bn atchd attacks H-Hour, D-Day, secures line Pissot (218765) - Hau Parrey (262770) formation 359th Inf on right (W), 358th Inf on left (E), 357th Inf Res.

2. 358th Inf attacks with 1st Bn on right, 2nd Bn on left, and 3d Bn in reserve. LD, Obj, Phase Lines, (see Annex No. 2) Attached - Co B, 712th Tk Bn.

3. 1st Bn - attacking on the right, capture La Feverie, St Jores, and Les Belle Croix, advances S, will be prepared to assist the attack of the ~~358~~ 359th Inf on Objective "A" by pressure from SE.
2nd Bn - attacking on left, seizes Les Sablons and continues the attack on Objective "C". Will be prepared to continue advance on Objective "D" on order.
3d Bn - initially in reserve, will follow the 2nd Bn, echeloned to left rear, moves by bounds on Regt'l order and will be prepared to assist 2nd Bn in attack on Objective "C", "D" and/or "E". Maintains contact with 90th Rcn Troop on left. Will be prepared to drive out any enemy resistance in vicinity La Rue du Baux supported by light Tk (platoon)
Anti-Tank Co. - One (1) platoon AT guns in close support 1st Bn with particular attention to right (W) flank. One (1) Platoon AT guns in close support of 2nd Bn with particular attention to right (W) flank of that Bn. One (1) Platoon in reserve prepared to give AT protection to 3d Bn and Rear Elements of CT. Mine Platoon to sweep road net on axiw of advance of 1st Bn to Objective "C".
Cannon Co. in general support prepared to fire indirect fire missions as directed - move by bounds on previously prescribed axis.
Co B, 315 Engr Bn - (General Support) Clears mines from MSR and road net work to right (W) thereof. Be prepared to erect foot bridges on call.
344 FA Bn - (direct support) Fires 40 minute preparation on close in targets (commencing at H-40) and subsequent missions on call. All requests for Arty fire support direct to 344th FA Bn.
Co B, 712th Tk Bn - initially attached to 1st Bn, supports closely attack on first objective and will be prepared to move all elements of unit to support attack of 2nd Bn or 3d Bn on order.
1 Plat Cml Co - attached to 2nd Bn initially.

4. a. MSR - see Annex No. 3
 b. Rations - One (1) K, One (1) D to be carried by alltroops.
 c. Regt'l Train Biv - 31.3 - 88.8.
 d. Ammunition Pt. - 31.3 - 88.8/
 e. Water Pts. - 33.8 - 87.2 and 31.8 - 91.7.

5. a. SOI - Current
 (1) SCR 610 Net will be in operation as supplementary Regt'l Com'd Net.
 (2) Signal to lift Arty fires: 2rds. smoke.
 (3) Air-Ground Recognition: 3 double-star clusters in order, green, yellow, green.
 (4) Locations and positions to be reptd via reference pt or slidex.
 b. CP's and Ax.Sig.Com: See overlay. (Thereafter Bn's select and report locations of CP's.
 x. Time of attack to be announced. Arrival at each phase line will be reported and position will be reported fifteen (15) minutes before each hour.

PARTRIDGE
Cmde

Authority NND 735017By 13r NARA Date 12/9

3 July 1944

HISTORY

th Infantry

At 0100 in the morning, Lt. Josendale, of G-2, informed the Regiment that there would be a "big bombing" mission carried out in the front at approximately 0830. Twenty-four to twenty-eight planes would take part. This was to be a saturation bombing.

The hours from 0100 to 0430 were busy hours. They were spent in checking Bn and Co positions; mortar fire and placing; coordination of time (BEC). The CO, Ex O, and Ln O's checked in at Bn CP's making sure all plans were fully understood and the time coordinated so that all units would jump-off at the exact time. Division was kept informed of all progress in the preparation. Division reported mine fields and bits of enemy activity on our front. Capt. Shipe went out to check the wire crew.

At 0500 the Reg't was "Ready to Go!"

At 0515, the artillery opened fire.

2nd Bn ready to roll!

0530, and 2nd Bn crossed the LD right on time. 3rd Bn reported "moving along". 1st Bn 500 yards ahead of L D. Not "too much resistance". At 0600, 2nd Bn CP was being ~~shelled~~ shelled.

Capt Falvey ordered Regt'l OP move at 0620.

All Bns reported progress of their companies. All units in contact by wire or radio with CP.

At 0700, our front lines were 100 yards East of LES SABLONS. No casualties and prisoners were being taken.

0715 - "In contact" reported Major Chandler, CO 2nd Bn.

All in all, up to the present, opposition was lighter than expected.

Division was notified of our progress.

At 0725, our troops began receiving heavy machine gun fire and mortar and arty fire. General Devine, OG of the Division Artillery, through Lt. Col. Munson suggested flash system to locate these guns. System was used.

Col. Partridge told 2nd Bn to ask for all the arty support they wanted.

Lt. Col. Munson went to the 2nd Bn CP at 0745 after arranging for fire support for "G" Co. At same time, Engineers were notified to repair bridge at NOTOT.

At approximately 0800, Ln O's gave picture of 357 and 359.

Now came a problem. With our troops advancing and in contact, and receiving heavy fire, our communications must be kept open. At the present, front line communications were in bad shape. M/Sgt White, Wire Section Chief, left with a crew, to patrol the lines. Enemy shelling was playing havoc with the wire.

A prisoner stated that the enemy had captured one of our tanks and was using it against us. Up to this time (0830) 25 prisoners had been taken.

Col. Partridge, at 0900, explained situation as "Every thing OK".

Capt Shipe reported all wire personnel wounded by shells in 2nd Bn CP. 2nd Bn CP was swept by machine gun fire and 88 fire at 0900. Lt. Col. Munson and other officers were hit. Capt Spelee, AT CO, rode over mine. No one injured, but badly shaken up. He was, however, sending AT guns through despite heavy fire, both artillery and small arms from the enemy.

At 0915, the left flank of "G" Co reached the railroad - the first company.

Tank Ln O stated no tank captured, but one was "knocked out". Capt Stotler reported Germans had strong line.

Major Knouf, S-4, reported his ammunition and supply line. Major Knouf has kept his line open at all times.

45 prisoners now (0945).

At 1100, Col. Partridge requested Artillery fire and phosphorous. "Demolish the place", he said.

At 1200 hours Capt Shipe took tanks to 3rd Bn. 2nd Bn was in LES SABLONS. AT platoon will report to Major Chandler there. "Attack went good", claimed Major Chandler.

Now came a disturbing note. 3 enemy tanks hit "F" Co and completely disorganized it. The company was withdrawing. It had no bazookas ammunition. "E" Co could not be contacted. AT guns were going down the road to engage the tanks.

At 1230, 3rd Bn was ordered to move and relieve 2nd Bn, which went into reserve. At 1310, TD's were obtained and put in at cross roads 500 yards West of LES SABLONS. F and G Co's nearly in LA BUTTE.

Major Andre reported 120 casualties up to 1330. Major Seeger reported his Battalion in hand, but that the left flank was open. One squad in ST JORES inves-

3 July 1944

HISTORY

358th Infantry

The balance of the company past EW road and on the move. 2nd Bn, at 1330, was on the defensive and was plenty worried about flank. "A" Co attacked by two enemy tanks one German and one American captured tank. A tank part at 285846 was fired by 2nd Bn. Platoon of "C" Co, in ST JORES reported it "unoccupied", 1350.

At 1500 platoon in ST JORES reported it still unoccupied.

From LES SABLONS, "I" Co reported 1 tank and 2 half-tracks (possible SP guns) looming up the road from the South. AT Co notified and Lt. Grubbs took action. He sent AT guns to track down the enemy vehicles.

1st Bn found nothing in ST JORES so it pulled out of the town to the North to off-set a pending tank attack. 3rd Bn was finding resistance. Our light tanks were now behind "I" Co and the Medium Tanks behind "K" Co. Engineers reported "tangling" with a tank in LES SABLONS, and Capt. Burns, S-3 3rd Bn, was ordered to put AT guns in city and clean tanks out. Five minutes later "I" Co was at main CR of the city with light tanks and TD's. 3rd Bn was not stopped by tanks.

Division was notified of our position.

At 1545, B Co was still in reserve and through junction. "A" Co was on boundary advancing left on road. "C" Co was attempting to move SW on left flank and encountered resistance. Germans had apparently re-entered ST JORES.

1630 found 1st and 3rd Bns still with "tough going". "L" Co was put between "I" and "K" Co's. 2nd Bn was practically frozen in LES SABLONS. "K" Co requested ammunition.

1700 hours and 1st and 3rd Bns on line. 2nd Bn out in front, to the left. Col. Partridge informed General Landrum of the situation and expressed believe he would work it out all right. At this time, four shells landed in CP area. No damage.

"I" Co had LES SABLONS "cleaned out" at 1730.

Col. Fuller, at CP, phoned 1st Bn to learn of their present front line positions. He wanted "D" Co to push down and tie in with unit on 1st Bns's right. Suggested tanks that were left (1 Company less 6) be kept off the main road, and also suggested that one tank, at least use white phosphorous against enemy tanks. Stated that the units on the right were making progress. At this point, Col. Fuller spoke to Col. Partridge. "Unit on your right making progress. CG expects Bn on your immediate left to pass ST SUZANNE tonight. Get a line tied in and leave one Bn in reserve. Put in bomb-lines along RR, bearing SE to GORGES. No bombing East of that line or South of the units on your right."

At 1800, Bn CP's were: 1st (272861) 2nd (285856) 3rd (285864). 2nd Bn to be reserve. 2nd Bn reported fire mission completed. Would attack at 1830. "G" Co on right and "F" Co on the left and "E" Co intermediate.

Col. Partridge ordered regiment to keep moving until dark and gain as much ground as possible.

At 1900, plans for the night: "Dig in and prepare for H-Hour in the morning."

Col. Partridge wanted high ground around LES BELLE CROIX for an LD, and sent a company there to contact the friendly troops already there.

2000 hours and 2nd Bn not moving yet. 3rd Bn moving down to LES SABLONS. All Bn's warned that "tonight would be night of defense. Expect counter-attack".

2100: "K" Co counter-attacked!! Lt. Col. Bealke put "L" into breach to repel it. We were now in possession of the fact that a new German Division had pulled in in front of us. 1st Bn was notified of counter-attack on 3rd Bn. Major Seeger, 1st Bn, was ordered to stop his attack and just hold. He was given permission to outpost ST JORES. At 2130, counter-attack on 3rd Bn was stopped.

By 2300 ammunition situation was "OK". Mine sweepers were sent out to clear roads of advance. Arty was ordered to harass all night.

At 2400 all units were notified to "stand to" from 0430 to 0530. At 2400 information from G-2 stated that there were elements of three German Regiments in front of us. "Shee mines" were being reported as part of enemy method of retarding our advance. The enemy was also covering mined roads with deadly MG fire.

To summarize the day's activities:

Eight rounds of 105 artillery was fired into 35th area at approximately 0400. The 358th Inf progressed approximately 1000 yards, hedgerow to hedgerow, beyond LD before meeting mortar fire, and stiff enemy resistance, at which time the enemy seemed to be getting stronger and stronger against us. Also much small arms fire. Very heavy artillery concentrations landed on us throughout the day, both in the front lines and in the rear areas. Enemy tanks, with Infantry, counter-attacked in our sector at 1155. They were used again at 1330. 315th Engrs had 2 squads pinned down by tanks in LES SABLONS at 1530. The resistance continued to be heavy, but at 1830 LES SABLONS was cleared. However, at this time, the enemy shelled the city. As the 358th moved towards ST JORES, it was heavily machine gunned. We were counter-attacked again, unsuccessfully at 2115.

4 July 1944

HISTORY

358th Infantry

4 July 1944, and more fireworks than any of us had ever seen in the States! And Rain! A not so secondary thought in the minds of all was "doesn't it ever stop raining in Normandy"! However, Division and Reg'tl Comdrs had other things, more important, on their minds, as for example: The Division F.O. No. 8, which follows:

2. "Division halts for the night (3 July early AM 4 July) on the general line: FOUDEMER (237802) - STE SUZANNE (260856) ST JORES (267852) - edge of marsh (285837), and resumes the attack to assigned objective 040600.
3. b. 358th Inf, reinforced, will secure that portion of the line within its zone of action. It will gain and maintain contact with the 359th Inf on its right. It will resume attack at 0600."
- x. (3) All units will stand-to to repel counter-attack from 0430-0530."

The 358th Inf now issued its F.O. No. 7 as follows:

"The following supplements warning order issued 3 July 1944:

The Regiment, from its present positions, resumes the attack to the Southwest at 040600.

Objectives: No change.

1st Bn attacks the objective to phase line "A", halts, and supports, by fire, the remainder of the Regt. Thereafter, moves on Reg'tl order to capture Objective "E".

2nd Bn (See opns overlay) capture Objective "D".

3rd Bn (See opns overlay)

A ten minute artillery preparation begins H-10. Vigorous patrolling to the front and flanks for the remainder of the hours of darkness.

Armor will be placed within Bn perimeter defences.

AT wps will be brought well forward and sighted to cover all roads and approaches to the positions. CO, AT Co, will coordinate the AT defences."

And so the 358th was launched upon another day of battle.

From 0001 until 0430, were busy hours. Bn and adjacent units of the regiment, supporting units and adjacent units were all busy "tying in" and acquainting all with their situations and plans. Enemy information, through Lt. Dengler, IPW Officer, was received. At 0300, Capt. Beville reported that the 2nd Bn was "set". Major Wallace S-3 of the Regiment, discovered LD on Division overlay incorrect. Warned all units and gave correct one.

At 0525, all units coordinated time to Division time. 1st Bn captured a prisoner (German Officer) and was sending him rear-ward. G-3 warned regiment at 0558 not to go West of grid line 25 (vertical) and 3rd Bn was informed. A bombing mission was to take place there.

Enemy activity during the night was light.

0600 - h Hour. Artillery had already laid down a blanket of fire which lasted ten minutes on enemy positions in front of our troops. However, simultaneously with our attack, the enemy launched a counter-attack. Artillery, mortar, and small arms fire ran rampant from both sides of the line.

0630, found the resistance in front of "E" Co was so heavy that they were unable to get started. Concern was felt for their flank. 3rd Bn had moved. Reached railroad. No enemy. Then the 3rd Bn wire went out. The 2nd Bn was hit before it could start. However, there was no infiltration by the enemy thus far.

At 0645, mortars were fired in 1st Bn CP. Pressure on E and G Co's becoming more acute. No trouble on left flank. G-3 given situation at 0655 by Major Wallace.

By 0700, the right platoon, "B" Co was on RR tracks, and foot platoon nearly there. 357th reported they had moved in their new location. Lt. Col. Clarke worked on moving CP nearer IES SABLONS.

At 0730, the 3rd Bn reported its center as 100 yards south of artillery concentration 206, and that they were receiving mortar and small arms fire. Also, that a battery of artillery, which sounded unusually close, was firing into their rear. Couldn't, however, hear anything on their flanks. The platoon of "I" Co, with mortars atchd, that had moved into IES SABLONS the preceding afternoon, had not been heard from. Lt. Col. Clarke told 3rd Bn to get exact location of German artillery and "get out artillery on them".

4 July 1944

HISTORY

358th Infantry

S-3, 2nd Bn, reported at 0740, that the artillery reported by 3rd Bn is falling to their front, and that it was very helpful! Friendly fire now landing in front of "E" Co. 344th FA was now firing near LES BELLES CROIX.

At 0800, Lt. Col. Clarke ordered 2nd Bn to get in position for attack. It was Lt. Flynn who reported the 331st Inf Jump-off on schedule. Capt. Burns, S-3 3rd Bn, has two light and 1 assault tank and planned to use them on right flank.

At 0810, new Regt'l CP established. 1st and 3rd Bn positions were received as was 2nd Bns'. Co "B" of the 712th Tanks, to be attached to 1st Bn.. More tanks expected sometime today.

Capt Falvey, Regt'l S-2, received reports from IPW at 0850. 3rd Bn reported MG firing into their rear at 0910. 1st Bn reported they were getting lined-up so as to use artillery fire. Capt. Shipe and Capt. McKibben to go forward with Col. Partridge. Lt. Col. Clarke stated that phones were for tactical purposes and that all calls were to be brief. New set-up for CP's: One Operations Sgt. (Sgt Allen or Sgt Van Hagen) to be on map at all times. Col. Partridge will operate forward GP with one S-3 and one S-2 Officer. Rear GP will have S-2, S-3, and Ex O in it.

By 0940, liaison officers from 2nd and 3rd Bn's came to CP with information of their respective Bn's. An urgent call from CG for Col. Partridge. Bns notified to inform him. Overlays showing roads cleared of mines was sent to all CT units.

At 1025, Capt Falvey dispatched Sgt. Krauss into LES SABLONS to interview civilians and pick up information. Major Knouf consulted an ammunition supply. Major Wallace consulted Capt. Schulz, 2nd Bn, about the use of their mortars. Suggested 3rd Bn could use them to a greater advantage. Major Wallace also spoke to Col. Partridge about these. Major Davis, CA, checked to ascertain if it was safe to enter ST JORES. Major Wallace contacted 3rd Bn and arranged for an OP. Col. Fuller called G-3. Cml Mortars to be moved to LES SABLONS in support of Bn there.

At 1045, Major Wallace notified 3rd Bn that they were to furnish guide for the Cml. Mortars. Enemy MG's and barbed wire at (277848 and (275848). Enemy trying to infiltrate. Troops meeting stiff resistance back of railroad.

By 1100, 3rd Bn had passed through 1st Bn. 2nd Bn moving. 3rd Bn hit hard by enemy artillery. "K" Co forced back again.

2nd Bn reported at 1135 that artillery falling on "G" Co. It was enemy artillery. Long Range, overhead fire, harassing the rear areas and regimental CP.

At 1250, attack was postponed until 1400. Units concerned were notified.

Lt. Donohue reported, at 1315, 359th Inf plans. 25 enemy tanks were reported at (2500885). Lt. Grubbs, AT, notified to get his defences ready. Bn's notified of the tanks.

At 1325, Lt. Col. Clarke stated Col. Partridge had cancelled attack. Bns were notified by Major Wallace. Bns reported their positions. 1st Bn intermittent enemy 88 fire. Other Bns "no change".

At 1425, Capt Falvey sent overlays of the enemy situation to Bns and friendly units and also to G-2.

"Very slight gain made by the 331st Inf", reported by Lt. Flynn, At 1430, Self propelled guns (enemy) at (279837) reported by 1st Bn.

1440. New jump-off time 1700 hours. OP reported 50 enemy moving North (269820) Artillery laid on them.

Major Chandler, at 1510, called Col. Partridge and informed him that it would be difficult to prepare his battalion for an attack because of heavy mortar fire. Col. Partridge told him to get artillery fire to stop the mortars. Capt. Falvey arranged with artillery to shoot some leaflets to the enemy. 83rd Div reported no gain during the morning.

At 1600, attack plans were sent to all units. Tanks were now observed South of ST JORES, moving North. 2nd Bn requested more and men. Capt. Caldecott, Regt'l S-1, left for replacements. TD outfit notified that 20-25 tanks were 1 1/4 miles SW of ST JORES. At 1616 the tanks (now 1/4 miles away) were thought to be friendly and supporting our right Bn. The 359th had tanks in area reported (and so did the 358) up to 1637 hours, 25 prisoners had been taken. "G" Co had lost 60 men, and most of the NCO's gone. "H" Co has 18 men left in its mortar platoon. MG Platoon normal. "F" Co has only 1 officer (CO) left and only 65 men (or less) and no 1st Sgt.

4 July 1944

HISTORY

358th Infantry.

At approximately 1650, Gen. Landrum phoned and asked about casualties. Lt. Col. Clarke briefed him. TD's furnished liaison at 1715, with radio contact. Artillery will fire until 1800 (9 battalions) in enemy's rear areas. All units notified of this artillery shoot.

At 1733, the 1st Bn and the 2nd Bn reported "jump-off" ok. Major Andre reported 125 casualties today, plus 9 Germans who were brought through our aid stations. Approximately 90 per cent of casualties were due to artillery and mortar fire. The 2nd Bn was not as bad as was thought at first. 3rd Bn reported at 1750 that they had taken off "shortly" - this was as of 1730, and were still moving. PW's stated that 50 men and two tanks dug in front of our "K" Co. Division was notified "jump off on time".

At 1805, Capt Beveill, 2nd Bn, rear elements of "E" Co and G Co now at LD. Verified tank situation in front of "K" Co. Reports tanks were firing.

At 1830, 3rd Bn reported that they were moving ahead and that TD's were taking care of the tanks.

By 1815, "K" Co had reached its objective. "I" Co had moved considerably and was 300 to 400 yards South of the railroad. 1st Bn was still moving.

Lt. Flynn and Lt. Donohue reported conditions of adjacent units at 1815. Major Wallace requested fire from Cannon Co., and gave positions to fire upon.

At 1832, 1st Bn was pinned down by artillery fire 400 yards beyond LD. Was calling for artillery fire. Capt Shipe phoned in the progress of the Bns.

At 1843, "L" Co moved across railroad. "G" Co on point 226.

1925, and "G" and "E" Co's passed abreast, 226 on creek. At 2000 hours Col. Partridge ordered 2nd Bn to draw back to town and halt there for the night. Major Wallace called Major Chandler and gave him instructions.

At 2037, "G" Co was at 227. Major Wallace requested plane from 344th FA to fly over 3rd Bn area at once. There was now uncertainty concerning "G" Co's exact location. Every possible means was being used to get exact location. "G" Co finally found to be at point 227. Col. Partridge informed, who then gave instructions regarding deployment of the Bn. Bn sent patrol toward BEAU COUDRAY at 2100.

At 2110, Lt. Col. Clarke gave 2nd Bn their instructions for the night and where to tie-in with 1st Bn. Division was notified of 2nd Bn location, as was the artillery.

At 2130, adjacent units reported their positions. Our Bns requested for their positions.

At 2200, Capt Wagner's Co was "digging-in" at LA BUTTE. "Pretty much shot up", he said. Sgt Krauss sent to BAUPTE to see Priest who has valuable information. Capt Falvey reported to G-2 that there seemed to be plenty of enemy stuff in front of us.

Capt. Wagner, at 2300, was perturbed by the enemy to his rear. Was ordered to extend "goose-egg" to limiting point. "G" and "E" Co's had surrounded the town and had taken prisoners, including officers.

At 2310, 90th Rcn Trp reported mine field locations. At 2330 positions of 1st and 3rd Bns were received.

Now came security instructions from Division:

" 1. a. Division halts for night on general line: LE FRY 237853 -25008500 -266244; LA BUTTE 275835 - edge of marsh 281834.

b. Div Arty prepare defensive close in concentrations in front of positions occupied by our infantry.

c. Units, both combat and service, dispose for all around defense.

d. Attached armor withdraw from forward positions in near to permit service vehicles to contact them for purpose of re-arming and re-fueling. Armor concentrations for the night will be in areas occupied by reserve infantry elements.

e. AT and TD elements dispose well forward to cover all roads and avenues of approach by hostile armor.

f. Bns in contact with the enemy maintain aggressive patrolling to front and to neighboring units during hours of darkness. Patrols will be within own lines by 050700 July.

g. Commo personnel, Div and lower echelons, utilize hours of darkness to strengthen and repair wire lines.

h. All units from front to rear, incl. Regt'l Res., will stand-to, prepared to meet counter-attacks between the hours 0430-0600. Other units, incl., rear echelons will alert at 0500."

STILWELL

G-3

LANDRUM
Comdg

5 July 1944

HISTORY

358th Infantry

AT Co prepared defences. Engineers cleared roads and mine fields. Companies set-up patrols and OP's for defence. The Artillery prepared its defensive fires and its fires for the coming day. Division was informed periodically of the activities. Lt. Dengler reported all information gleaned from PW's.

At 0710, Capt. Falvey discovered position of an enemy 88 that was harassing 357th and passed it along. At 0800 all Ln O's were briefed on latest situation. F's of adjacent units brought in by the Ln O's, who also reported activity of the adjacent units. Major Davis briefed at 0945. AT Co set up, guarded, "friendly" mine fields at RR crossing 263847.

Major Knouf, at 1016, was questioned by Lt. Col. Clarke concerning supplies and ammo. He was instructed on routes and mined roads. Col. Partridge instructed Major Andre, Regt'l Surgeon, to submit a written report on casualties. Major Wallace asked division for complete Div picture. Overlays, showing roads cleared of mines were received from the Engineers.

3rd Bn reported at 1035 that they were moving into a defensive position between 357 and 359. "C" Co being shelled by artillery - reported by Capt Spotler. Ln O sent to investigate. Overlays showing cleared roads were sent to Bns.

By 1120, 1st Bn 357th had passed through and was proceeding South via road. Division ordered that the 358th put two AT platoons in LA BUTTE for direct fire. Col. Partridge notified Capt. Spelce, CO AT Co.

At 1200, Lt. Flynn, Ln O, reported progress of 357th Inf. New position of 1st Bn reported in.

At 1215, Capt Midyett, Engrs, reported that the Germans were now laying mines "three deep". Capt Whittinghill and Lt. Pyles were sent on a reconnaissance for a new CP at 1230. Major Wallace, at 1300, informed 2nd Bn to "hold up troops and reconnaissance for the present". Revised Regt'l area overlay was sent to units.

At 1350, Lt. Flynn reported that "B" Co 357th Inf had reached COUDRAY and would attack on 270 degrees azimuth due West. Cannon Co CO, Capt. Wise, was told he could move his Company right away. AT Co also informed that they, too, could now move. Division Order: "2nd Bn not to move until further orders". 2nd Bn notified at 1408.

By 1450, AT was in position to fire on any targets. 357th Inf was so informed. 1530 and 2nd Bn ready to move. Major Davis, CA, reported looting in 357th area especially.

1545 3rd Bn in new area. Cn Co in new location. 2nd Bn ready to move. 357th progress reported by Lt. Flynn. 1600 and Regt'l CP about to move forward. Civilians report Germans filling wine bottles with tear gas (unconfirmed). At 1640, Col. Partridge left for LA BUTTE to check on AT positions.

1700 found the last elements of 3rd Bn closing in their assembly area. Cn Co and AT Co CP's open. Overlay of enemy positions received from Corps. AT Co ready to fire.

At 1740, 1st Bn notified it would attack SW. 88's reported to be at 279805, 280806, 287804 and 295801. Arty piece at 265803. These were reported by G-2. At 1755, Major Knouf reported that there were still mines at RR station in ST JORES.

Division ordered 2nd Bn to move it at 1830, and Major Wallace notified the Bn. At 1930 3rd Bn submitted overlays of their disposition. 1st Bn jumped off at 1930, and is in a "hot spot already". Straggler reports were negative. 2nd Bn reported they were moving their CP.

Lt. Col. Clarke left for 2nd and 3rd Bns at 2100. He was in search of exact information. Capt. Bennett, Ln O, reported that the 1st Bn was moving along and getting just "some" resistance. Also stated that they were taking many prisoners. Their orders call for taking their objective and to hold.

2150 and 2nd Bn reported "closed in". No change in 358th missions (Be prepared to advance south in rear of 357th on order).

At 200 Major Wallace instructed 3rd Bn to furnish 2 platoons to patrol left flank of the Division. All around local security ordered for each unit.

At 2300, Col. Partridge decided to have an entire company patrol Division left flank. L Co was notified. A tank was heard West of 2nd Bn CP. It was believed to be our own. Lt. Col. Clarke stated that 2nd Bn was going to call for an investigation of the artillery fire that fell on it during the morning. 2nd Bn believed the fire definitely came from friendly batteries. Lt. Col. Clarke took the matter up with the artillery units. It was agreed to inspect the area during the coming morning.

G-3 advised the regiment at 2330 that the flank patrols could be withdrawn at 060800. Lt. Dengler stated that a Pw said his Bn, 3rd of the 894th, was so reduced from our attacks that it had been dissolved altogether.

5 July 1944

HISTORY

358th Infantry

At 2345 Col. Patridge gave "up to the minute" details to Division.
2350, Lt. Col. Clarke informed Capt. La Forge that he was to receive the
Silver Star and he promoted to the rank of Major. Capt Schulz was also notified
that he too would receive the Silver Star.

Battle casualties for the day.

1 Officer and 8 EM KIA

2 Officer and 58 EM WIA

Replacements received 142 EM.

Orders for the day - Division FO No. 9.

" 2. 90th Div resumes the attack at 050845 July from its present front lines in order to seize objectives "A", "B", "C", and "D".

3. c. 358th Inf hold present front line until passed through by 357th Infantry. After Objective "C" is secured by 357th Inf, 358th Inf less 1st Bn, (1st Bn 358) attached to 357th Inf, effective 050845 July) will assemble in the area LES BELLES CROIX, ST JORES, and cross roads (280856) as Division Reserve. Be prepared to attack between the sectors of the 359th Inf and the 357th Inf in order to seize Objective "B".

e. 712th Tank Bn : Tanks now in support of 358th Inf revert at once to the 357th Inf.

f. 86th Cml Bn: Co "D" and 1 platoon Co "A" now supporting 358th Inf attached to 357th Inf at once.

LANDRUM
comdg.

STILLWELL
G-3

The enemy front line at the start of 5 July was (237850 - 260846) (265840 SE - 278830). Elements of 4 enemy regiments and 1 engineer bn were known to be on our immediate front.

The engineers reported 2 booby-traps were discovered at 260855; a road block at 264850; mines on road between (274826 and 277847; mines at CR 267853; and mine fields at 277848, 262854, 278847, and 258854.

Civilians and PW's stated ammunition dumps at 261759, 242832, and one 3 1/2 miles SW of PERIERS; class I dumps at 241765 and 215650; 60 men and 2 tanks dug in at 278849; many SS troops along PERIERS - ST GERMAN road; Corps CP in CHATEAU at 288663.

The enemy, at the moment, was capable of fighting delaying action tactics at generally 270830, 220840, 188833, and then to hold. He was also capable of launching counter-attacks with his units now in contact. Units now in contact could easily be reinforced with troops, Inf and SS Px, now in vicinity of PERIERS.

At 050035, Col. Partridge issued Regt'l FO No. 8, which follows:

358th Infantry
050035 July 1944

F. O. No. 8
Maps: France G.S.G.S 1/25,000

1. See Intelligence overlay this date.
2. Attack of this division resumes this date at 0845 - LD, present front lines. Objective - no change. 357th Inf (with 1st Bn 358th Inf attached) passed line now held by 358th Inf and continues on objectives. 358th Inf (less 1st Bn) holds present line until objective "C" is captured by 357th Inf., at which time it will revert to Division Reserve. It will be then prepared to attack between sector of 357th and 359th Inf to seize objective "B".
3. 1st Bn attached to 357th Inf effective 0845. All other units hold present positions and upon order move to designated assembly area (see overlay). Atchd plat Co "A" 86th Cml Bn and Co "B" 712th Tank Bn revert to 357th Inf at once.
4. Adm. details - later.
5. CP's - organization comdrs select and report.

PARTRIDGE
Comdg.

WALLACE
S-3

The hours 0001 to 0600 were, as usual, busy hours. Col. Partridge, Lt. Col. Clarke, Major Wallace and Capt Falvey spent this time perfecting and coordinating the days plans and conferring with, and advising units concerned. Bns reported their positions and activities. The wire crew laid and repaired their lines.

6 July 1944

HISTORY

358th Infantry

The 90th Division FO No. 10, dated 052100 July 1944, gave the 358th Inf its orders for 6 July 1944.

2. 90th Division, reinforced, resumes attack at 060800B, from present front lines to seize objectives B, D, E, F, and G. Boundaries - no change.
3. c. 358th Inf (less 1st Bn): Remain in present location as Div Res; adv. by bounds in Z of left Reg't, on Div order; be prepared to pass between 357th Inf and 359th Inf and attack Obj B, after phase line 3 is reached; patrol left flank of Div along marsh between (298843 and (273825) with not to exceed two rifle platoons (reinforced)."

LANDRUM
Comdg

STILWELL
G-3

By 0220, 12 rounds of arty had landed 200 yds SE of the Regt'1 CP. OPs of L Co. were reported established at 0230 and that a line would be in by 0400. Div informed "little activity" at 0400. At 0445, Major Seeger, 1st Bn CO, reported that the 1st Bn had just completed a fire mission 400 yds East and 400 yds South of concentration pt. 228. This mission was against enemy dug-in positions. He was confident that a good job had been done. At 0610, 1st Bn reported that a good plan was being worked out with the 359th Inf. It is now Major La Force. 1st Bn captured 30 PW's during the night.

Capt Antoleck, S-1 2nd Bn, at 0610, reported little activity in 2nd Bn area during the night. At the same time 3rd Bn reported a quiet night. Our patrol did not make contact with 90th Rcn Tr. Div was notified of our activities during the night.

The Regt's learned, ~~at 0630~~ at 0630, that Col. Fales was relieved of his command of the 359th Inf. The G-2 Periodic Report and the Div Arty Fire Plan were received and studied by the Staff.

At 0800, Lt. Flynn returned from the 357th Inf and submitted their plans for the day. An enemy arty CP was reported to be at (254821).

Lt. Donohue reported in from the 359th Inf at 0830. They had "jumped off" on time. Col. Bacon now commanding the Reg't 359th.

During the morning Major Wallace followed closely the progress of the 357th and 359th. Capt. Spelce, AT CO 358th, informed him "Arty hitting just right". At 1012 Cols. Thompson, Welch and Rhoades (142nd FA) were given the situation showing cleared roads. They explained that they were going to make a preliminary reconnaissance.

Comdg. Officers of 2nd 3rd Bns, AT Co and Cn Co were notified that they were to attend a critique at 1100.

At 1050, the 3rd Bn was alerted for a move West. The critique was cancelled. Col. Partridge and Lt. Col. Bealke left for Div for instructions.

Col. Partridge phoned from Div and ordered the 3rd Bn AT platoon to rejoin its Bn at once. At 1225, Lt. Col. Clarke ordered 3rd plat, AT Co, to take over positions that the AT plat, 3rd Bn had just quit, (just East of LA BUTTE) and be prepared to fire to the Southeast. 1255, Col. Partridge (at Div) was informed that L Co was now in and that 3rd Bn AT plat was on its way, to the rear, as ordered.

Major Conn, (Arty) came to CP at 1320 to discuss the Arty concentrations that fell on our troops, with Lt. Col. Clarke. Capt. Whittinghill warned all personnel not to "make free" with local gardens. At 1330, the line to 315th Eng was in. 1340, 3rd Bn AT plat in with 3rd Bn. Col. Partridge was so informed.

1348, 1st Bn, 358th, now atchd to 359th Inf. At 1400, Major Wallace informed Capt. Spelce (AT CO), that there was an enemy patrol at (275836) and an 88 at (272826). Ordered a reconnaissance. G-3 was notified that a recon was under way. Col. Partridge returned and stated that the 3rd Bn would not be committed "right away". Col. Partridge and Capt. Shipe now left for the Regt'1 OP.

At 1515 Major Wallace and Capt Spelce decided to shoot on the 88 gun position. Arty now notified.

1610 - "Col. Partridge hit!" Major LaForge phoned this message in Status of wounds not known.

1610 - Lt. Col. Clarke now in command of the Reg't. Major Wallace to Major Strickler (Ass't G-3): "3rd Bn moving to LITHAIRE. Inform Div Arty and 79th Arty not to shoot in this area".

1615 - Col. Partridge was reported to be at the Bn Aid Station or CP. Capt Shipe left to get the details. He later reported that Col. Partridge had two wounds

6 July 1944

HISTORY

358th Infantry

Now comes a busy period for Lt. Col. Clarke. He phoned Div to get the plans Col. Partridge had made for the Regiment. The General ordered a tentative plan of attack using 1st and 3rd Bn's. Major Seeger submitted his dispositions as did Capt. Burns the 3rd Bn positions.

At 1650, Capt Shipe reported exact location where Col. Partridge had been wounded. Lt. Col. Clarke prepared two separate plans of attack for the General. Problem was a 1400 yard front for one battalion. I Co on the right (astride trail) K Co on the left. Going abreast. Should now be there (1652).

By 1705, Major Wallace informed 3rd Bn had hit phase line "A" and would report when phase line B was reached. L Co searching the woods. Instructed that if they meet a sizable force, no to become involved. 3rd Bn and stations traveling with the Engineers. Lt. Col. Clarke and Capt Shipe left for 1st Bn. 3rd Bn notified of 359th positions.

At 1720, Lt. Col. Bealke (3rd Bn CO) phoned and stated he had conferred with Col. Bacon. He had asked to reconnoiter the area to increase distance of 800 to 900 yards to include a vital road net that was necessary for a 357 supply route. He had agreed to do so, provided he met organized resistance no greater than one company. If more was met, he was to call for a decision.

At 1725, Major Wallace notified Capt. Beville, S-3 2nd Bn, that his Bn might have to furnish a 2 plat flank protection during the night and to be prepared.

Div was no "brought up to date on he situation."

1740, and Lt. Col. Clarke and Major Wallace go over the plans of the attack.

At 1745, Lt. Clark, Div Ln O, brought Lt. Col. Loomis (later Ex O) to the CP.

I Co reported position at 1748 (218847) and was in contact with enemy MG (218846). L Co in woods at (226845).

1750 - Regiment alerted. Troops attd to other units expected to rejoin the reg't. Movement to be due West in vicinity of LE FRY, (about 4 km West of present CP.) 3rd Bn to reassemble at LE FRY. Reg't 1 CP will move. Stress of Div is being switched from left to right. Bns will rejoin Reg't about dark. Division to move in our present CP.

At 1800, Capt Shipe alerted 2nd Bn to be ready for movement in 2 hours. Capt. Shipe was given assembly area instructions and he left to pick out the location. Major Wallace checked the 359th positions with Major Booth and then checked dispositions of our 3rd Bn.

At 1820, Capt. Wise was informed where he was to move and when. 1850, Lt. Col. Bealke phoned that he had by-passed the remnants of a company. His left company on phase line "C", right company on Phase line "B". He had met some resistance but not enough to keep him from accomplishing his mission.

M/Sgt Midener, IPW, reported at 1850 that PW's claim next enemy MLR was along road running East and West through LA SALIE and that mortars had been moved to the reverse side of the slope on ground South of this road. There is also one assault gun in this vic.

Capt. Beville, at this time, enquired about his plat of AT which is at LA BUTTE on Reg't 1 order. He was informed it would be alerted by Capt Spelce, and if we move it will repair to its Bn. At 1905, Lt. Col. Clarke arrived at the CP. He was briefed on the 3rd Bn situation. He now ordered the 3rd Bn to move to the West, in the vic of the bridge and to secure that ground. He was to block the corridor of anything coming from the West and to cover the road East of LA HAYE DU PUITTS. He was to operate under Reg't 1 control.

At 1916, AT Co was ordered to move "at once" to vic of LE FRY, and the AT Co was instructed that his company would furnish protection for the regiment, on all roads West, Southwest, and Southeast from LE FRY and South to the mountain. AT defences along roads to be in depth. 2nd Bn on highest hill.

Lt. Col. Clarke now explained the plans for tomorrow to Capt. Shipe. Lt. Col. Clarke now called G-3 and explained 3rd Bn situation. Explained 3rd Bn could clear the place by nightfall.

At 1837, 3rd Bn was informed: "Attack to West. Vertical grid 20.5 - go that far West. - clear those trails East and West and turn South so that 359 can use them."

At 2020, 2nd Bn again inquired about its AT guns. Capt Spelce informed them that they had left about an hour ago. Capt Whittinghill reported the new CP location was at (225847). 1st Bn CP (240838). Div Aid Station at (269857).

By 2115, 3rd Bn had struck heavy opposition and had committed its reserve and is making no progress.

Major Wallace immediately informed G-3 of this situation.

At 2133, Lt. Tylor, Ln Q with 2nd Bn, was dispatched with the message, "Hurry to top of the hill. Definite threat from the South." Capt Beville phoned and was instructed to "dig in and hold after securing the hill (120)" Capt Beville was given (roughly) positions of 1st Bn.

6 July 1944

HISTORY

358th Infantry

At 2200 an 82nd Paratrooper stated Germans planes on way to this area. 2nd Bn reported that a patrol was on objective 15 minutes ago and heard a column approaching about 2000 to 3000 yards away. Line went out.

2300, and forward elements of 2nd Bn now on edge of high ground.

2320, Lt. Clarke arrived from division with order. Lt. Col. Clarke informed Div of our situation. Also stated Lt. Col. Bealke wanted light tanks for tomorrow.

2325 - 1st Bn had a fight but was now under control.

H-Hour tomorrow - 0900.

Capt Spelce requested overlay of 1st and 3rd Bns.

Capt. Wise ordered to "set-up" and be read to fire tonight.

At 2350, Major Conn (344 FA Bn) reported Infantry and Tanks in swamp. Arty had cleared the infantry troops out and tanks were "fired".

At 2400, 1st Bn was reported as receiving a counter-attack between A and C Co. (A in Reserve).

Battle casualties: KIA 7 EM; WIA 4 O and 41 EM; Repl: 2 O and 4 EM.

7 July 1944

History

358 Infantry

Now came a day and a night that was filled with anxiousness, tenseness weariness, hope and despair. The Battle of the Forest de Mont Castro was looming. The enemy was trying, betterly, to regain some of their costly lost territory. Despite the savageness of their counter-attacks, they were consistantly being hurled back. The enem's use of small arms, martars and automatic weapons was lavish and costly to our forces. This was to be a bitterly contested battle. The enemy was capable of effecting stiff resistance and to counter-att ack with, at least, Bn. strength. It was known that they had recently committed their reserves. If they moved troops in from the S and SW they would be capable of lanuching a major counter-attack.

And now, in the early hours, came the Division FO #11, which excerpt, follows:

Hq 90th Inf Div.
APO 90 U.S.A.
062100 July 44

FO #11

2. 90th Div, reinforced, making its main effort on the right, resumes the attack at 070900 to secure Div. Objs.

LD, Bdrys, Scheme of Manoeuvres - see overlay.

3. g. 358th Inf:

Atchd: 1 Plat Co. D, 712th Tk Bn

- (1) Secure and hold obj "H" with 1 Bn to protect right rear of the Division.
- (2) Be prepared to mop up Forest de Mont Castro and the area N and NW of obj "H" to Div Bdrys."

Lt. Col. Clarke issued Reg'l orders to all units concerned.

At five minutes past midnight, 1st Bn, thru Major Seegers driver-mgr., reported that the enemy was "coming in on his left and are nearly on the top of the hill." The "Jerries" were in between the Bn's front and res. companies. The Reg'l CO was concerned about the Reg'l GP.

At 0020 Capt Beville, 2d Bn, called and told Capt Falvey about infiltration of 3d Bn. Capt Steckla informed GP that 1st Bn's fwd line would be in soon. 359 was informed of our situation. All of 357 had not, as yet, been committed. The arty closely watched developments and were ready to fire at a moments notice.

At 0050 3d Bn's Lt. Col Bealke, was informed of a large gap between 357 and our 1st Bn by Lt. Col. Clarke. He suggested that 3d Bn put a company in reserve in the event that the 1st Bn should need assistance. He also suggested that the 3d Bn rearrange its positions tonight rather than in the morning. Lt. Col. Clarke also suggested "a big arty barrage" on the enemy to push them back.

By 0100 the Reg'l CO had reported to G-3 the positions and situations. He informed G-3 that the 3d Bn, if able to get prpper positions now, would be able to "push ahead" in the morning.

The wire platoon, under M/Sgt William White, Sect. Ldr, reported "tough going" getting communication to 1st Bn. fwd. This was due to deep mud, heavy rain and the danger of being in enemy territory. The patrol had, however, a heavy, armed guard. 2d Bn, 359, now that the line was in, was to service the 1st Bn 358 line.

At 0120, word was received that Col. Partridge was to be sent to England. His was a chest wound. He sent all his regards. The 357 was now holding the E-W r road near Beau Coudray. 1st Bn was to patrol to "C" Co., 357. "L" Co., 358 was very likely to become the Division Reserve. The Germans on 3d Bn front seem to want to surrender.

At 0150 3d Bn reported it would be ready to "jump off" on time with a full battalion and no change of plan. G-2 was informed that the 358 could use the light tanks that had been offered. The 2d Bn was ordered to be ready to move at 0900 and to patrol tonight. 2d Bn reported that their patrols have made contact with the units on their right and left and also with the 1st Bn. 1st Bn stated that they had been attacked and driven "somewhat back". This information was relayed to Division.

By 0300 the Reg'l FO #7 was prepared and sent to units concerned.

At 0425 the 359th informed us that their 2d Bn would jump off at 0600 and wanted our 1st and 2d Bns to tie in with them. Their reason was that their movement would leave a gap.

By 0440 Capt Stottler, 1st Bn and Capt Burns, 3d Bn, had plans to take care of the gap and so informed Major Wallace. They will have gap area covered before 0600. At 0510 Capt Bennett, Ia O to 1st Bn, returned from that CP. He claimed it was a "very hot" spot. Enemy MG's covered the road leading to the CP!

At 0545 General Landrum phoned and Lt. Col. Clarke acquainted him with the situation. It was 0600 that Lt. P. Donahue, Ia O, reported our 1st Bn in contact with 2d Bn 359. Col. Gorton is going to send a patrol to clean out a group of 15 men and an English speaking officer, behind his lines. Major Seeger was forced back on to the 2d Bn 359. Capt. Wise reported that "a few" shells landed in his area during the night, but he had no casualties.

At 0650 Lt. Col. Clarke gave the Chief of Staff the particulars up to now and briefed him on coming actions. He informed Col. Fuller of the positions of the 2d Bn and also of the 3d and 1st Bns, 359.

Lt. Hougren was informed that the I&R Platoon was to be restored, soon, to its normal status. (it had recently been broken up into groups) and that a platoon was to go up to the 1st Bn CP. G-3 phoned and asked for our situation.

At 0830 we swapped 2nd Bns, temporarily, with the 359. An enemy company and some paratroopers were reported in front of "K" Co. 3d Bn will push off at 0910. our 1st Bn on right, 2d Bn 359 next to them. Lt. Col. Bealke asked for a delay until he could get some additional arty.

At 0905 Lt. Col. Clarke arranged for a guide to escort Col. Bacon to our 2d Bn. 0910 - Lt. Col. Bealke's Bn jumped-off! 2 enemy companies reported coming up trail at (207839). 90th Rcn attached to 3d Bn. 3d Bn CP at 240839.

At 0925 "C", "B", "A" Co's on line. The Germans seemed to be on top of the hill.

By 0945 it was decided that the Engineers occupy the 2d Bn area when it moves. The 2d Bn will move generally SW. The Rcn officer reported to Lt. Col. Clarke, who briefed him and directed him to the 3d Bn. 2d Bn, 358, now under control of 359. A gap was reported between the right of 358 and the left of 357.

At 1015 AT positions and defences were reported. They are subject to change. At 1055 the General phoned the Reg'l CO and warned him that it was imperative that the road not be taken. It is important to Corps as well as to Division. 3d Bn was notified of the General's order. Platoon Ldr, 607th TD's was ordered to report to 3d Bn at 1100. 8th Div. officers arrived at CP and conferred with Lt. Col. Clarke.

At 1130 Reg'l CO phoned Col Bacon to find out if any friendly troops were west of our 3d Bn. He wanted to give 3d Bn unobserved arty support.

At 1148 Lt. Col. Clarke informed Division 6 that the 3d Bn was receiving heavy MG fire and had many casualties. The General authorized Arty fire south from eastern quarry to Ganthran. Capt Midgett arrived at the 2d Bn, but his troops wont be there for an hours. Lt. Col. Clarke notified Lt. Col. Bealke that arty fire was now authorized and give him concentration boundaries.

At 1200, G-3 notified the Reg't that the 8th Div was "coming thru". We are to demine the roads and give them a good LD. Lt. Col. Clarke checked with 1st Bn. General Williams had just left there and arrived at Reg'l CP at 1245. He plotted 1st Bn on the map.

At 1300 a situation overlay was sent to Division. General Williams stated, on the phone, to G-3, that Col. Gorton was under control of 359 but could be used in our situation.

At 1315 Major Seeger was relieved for a rest. Lt. Col. Loomin replaced him. Lt. Col. Bealke reported that artillery helped immensely, but at present he is troubled with enemy SP guns. The General, who was following the situation closely, was informed.

By 1320 "L" Co. had committed two platoons. 3d Bn had taken 29 P W's. 1330 and Col Gorton still under Lt. Col. Clarke's control, and will remain so until the "nose" of the hill is taken. A "number of enemy" was observed in front of "G" Co.

At 1335 our 358 was complete, except for 2d Bn (which was attached to 359) but attached to us was the 2d Bn 359, 1 plat 4.2 Cal Mortars; 1 plat Med Tks and voluntary FA. Tanks and Ren were, in turn, attached to 3d Bn. Beau Coudray was still in enemy hands, and the 357 situation remained unchanged.

At 1345, Lt. Col. Clarke, who had been to Division, stated: "C of S directs 3d Bn be attached to 359th and it is to continue with present mission. This is effective at once. 2d Bn will come up on 3d Bns left."

This information was passed on to those concerned.. The 2d Bn was again was it would take orders from Col. Bacon.

At 1355 General Williams again came to the CP. He conferred with Lt. Col. Clarke on what was still attached to the 358. He suggested that the AT support the present elements of the regiment. He also conferred with Major Conn on Artillery support. (Major Conn's outfit was now supporting the 3d Bn) General Williams now phoned Col. Daly and checked to see what artillery would now support the regiment.

The General and the Reg'l CO now discussed plans for an attack, by the "present" regiment, on an enemy strong point to the front of 1st Bn.

At 1430 3d Bn reported 22 more PW's. A German Captain told Lt. Col. Bealke that a large Panzer Force was on 3d Bns left and was preparing a counter-attack. Division was notified of this and asked that prisoner be sent to them at once.

At 1450 Lt. Col. Clarke and Major Conn prepared to go to 1st Bn CP to contact Col. Gorton, and they will go into details of artillery with Lt. Col. Loomis. Lt. Col. Loomis now phoned that he thought the "Jerries" had pulled out. Was informed of the German Captain's ~~xxx~~ story. The prisoner was now at the CP and was interviewed by General Williams and (Major "for the occasion) Dengler.

At 1520 General Williams left for 1st Bn CP. 3d Bn reported "no change" and was still astride the RR. At 1535 "I" Co. reported that they had taken some prisoners. Aid station also "took" prisoners: Prisoners prefer "giving up" to the unarmed Aid men:

At 1540 CP was informed by 357 that they had been "hit" by units of the 15th Paratroop Co. Claimed these troops "just went" give up. 3d Bn now had 50 PW's.. Prisoners seem to be just "odd and ends". PW NCO stated "SS Das Reich" troops north of Coutances. 8th Division moving in between grid lines 20 and 24.

At 1550 Capt Falvey reported to Division that we had, roughly, 100 PW's and requested three trucks to haul them to Division. He stated we did not have guards or rations enuf to handle them.

At 1600 13th Inf. reported that they would "go thru" at 0600 in the morning. By 1625 "G" Co. was moving on pre-arranged route.

1st Bn jumped off at 1645! Capt Beville reported at 1710 that "G" Co. contacted enemy near objective. 3d Bn 100yds from objective, was held up by MG's.

At 1730, "B" Co. started up the hill! 3d Bn was still "mopping up" and was about ready to move again. "B" Co., 357, tied in with "A" 358 - stopped effort to take Coutances.

Capt Shipe explained situation, at 1825, to officer of the 8th Division.

At 1855 3d Bn was hit by counter-attack on its right front. (I & L Co.'s) 1st Bn moving and Lt. Col. Clarke is with them. "B" Co. is on high ground, their objective.

At 1915, IPW reported PW stated he was from the 15th Col, 15th Para Regt, and his outfit was to secure fland of the 16th Co. They have LMG's and Mortars. 3d Bn requested 90th Ren Trp. Request refused because they could not get up that far. 82/AB report mortar fire from our 3d Bn falling on them.

The enemy, it was reported at 1955, were infiltrating about our 3d Bn (right ~~flank~~ flank) in the vicinity of Lithaire. Reg'l Cndr ordered Ren to investigate.

By 2025 "K" Co. had advanced a short way. 3d Bn counter-attack repulsed and it was now ready to move on again. 1st Bn was on Bojective, but was pushed off again! 3d Bn moved CP. 1st Bn informed of 3d Bns situation. At 2050 90th Ren was ordered to "cover" between 2d and 3d Bn CP locations. The 2d Bn would push south as long as possible. At 2100 1st Bn fired "smoke" on their objective.

At 2115 357 reported that their "I" and "L" co's were isolated.

At this point a congratulatory message was received from the CG, 1st Army, dated 3 July. At 2130 Major Wallace phoned 3d Bn Ex. O. and was informed that the 3d Bn would organize on their route and would outpost, physically, a line along road with their right, or west limits, where vertical grid crosses their left limit.

At 2210, Lt. Col. Clarke, after conferences with Div and Reg'l Staff, advised 1st Bn that they could expect a counter-attack sometime during the night, and he suggested they move their CP. 3d Bn reported they were moving ahead.

1st Bn was busy rearranging their positions. They were also expecting a counter-attack. They would hold as much high ground as possible.

As an extra precautionary measure, they were laying two wires to reg't and bn hqs. The Bn was "pretty well beat up". "B" and "A" Co's were on reverse slope, which was difficult terrain. Lt. Col. Clarke conferred with Lt. Col. Loomis and informed him of the plan for 1st Bn and warned him it was not to be executed until further orders. The two tanks with 1st Bn were now heading rearward for refueling. 2d Bn had cleared thru the town. Lt. Col. Clarke received impression from General Williams that we would get some replacements. 1st Bn was now advised to have artillery harass enemy.

At 2250 two companies of Engineers were on there way to the Reg't. "C" Co., Engr., will reinforce 1st Bn. At 2300 AF defenses were coordinated. 3d Bn reached and passed phase line "C" and Capt Burns, S-3 3d Bn passed on captured German document.

At 2355 the CG directed "all troops stand by from 0400-0500 to repel any counter-attack by the enemy". All units were informed.

The 358th, thru bitter experience, had learned that the enemy resistance was well organized. All bridges not blown were mined. The enemy had resisted repeated heavy attacks. The reg't know now that they were fighting a MLR (Mahlman Line), which extended from La Haye du Puits eastward thru La Paterie and then SE to LaPlessis. A part of the assembly for the SS troops was the Foret De Mont Castre!

During the day the enemy used a great deal of artillery, mortar and small arms against our troops. Many counter-attacks were launched. Tanks were frequently, and effectively, used by them. During the day very little ground changed hands.

Casualties for the day:

KIA	3	Officers	19	EM
MIA	0		2	
WIA	1		93	
Repl Rd			5	

8 July 1944

HISTORY

358th Infantry

The following is an excerpt from 90th Div FO. 12 in so much as pertains to the mission of the 358th Inf:

" b. VII Corps, 3 Div's abreast, in the order from right to left 79th, 8th and 90th Divs, attack 080700 July 44 to penetrate the hostile position, establish a bridgehead over the AY RIVER and capture the city of COUNTANCES.

3. b. 358th Inf (less 2nd and 3rd Bns)
Atchd: 315th Engr Bn
2nd Bn 359th Inf
Co A, 86th Cml Bn

Assist by fire the attack of the 359th Inf to Phase Line A. Attack on Div order to secure Phase Line A.
3rd Bn 358th Inf reverts Regt'l control after passed through by the leading Bn 121st Inf.

LANDRUM
Comdg

STILWELL
G-3

Days or night didn't end or begin, it seemed, for the 358th Infantry. It was now a "period". Shortly after midnight the 8th Div troops were on the road, moving up. So reported Lt. B. J. Clark, Ln O with Div. The Division ordered 358th to "button-up" for the night. Security and patrols were effected throughout the Regt. All troops were told to "stand-by" from 0400-0500 as a precautionary measure, in the event of a counter-attack by the enemy. The 1st Bn was informed by Col. Clarke that the recently acquired two companies of Engrs had been in previous battles. Col. Gorton was informed that the "take over" by the 8th Division would be later than at first calculated. At 0115 Lt. Aughtry, S-2 1st Bn, arrived at the CP and guided the Engr Co's to his area. Division was informed regularly of our situation. At 0310 information was obtained from 8 PW's, captured by I Co pertaining to the positions of enemy mortars, 2 plats of of Cml Mortars and 1 plat of 12 Cml Mortars. Division was relayed this information and also that Engineers had "dlosed-in" as of 0200. At 0330, "nothing bothering anyone". 3rd Bn was notified as such. At 0355 more information from PW's explained that the enemy had planned a counter-attack, but reserves had failed to materialize, ammunition had run out, casualties had been heavy and the enemy was disorganized. This information held some cheer and hope for our future operation. However, hot on he heels of this information, the Reg't was informed that the 359th was being attacked heavily by SS Troops. At 0408, Major Gilchrist was informed of the situation. Lt. Rudes, S-2 3rd Bn, was notified of the mortar positions that the PW's claimed was near him. Now came a "minor" complication. "B" Co of the Engineers claimed our artillery was falling on them. Capt. Danovsky of the 344th FA checked with the batteries that were firing at this time. BCo Engrs reported that the artillery reported by them 15 minutes ago had ceased.

Between now and 0700 units exchanged information picked up from various sources and gave their positions to each other. All units concerned were instructed on what PW's stated was to their front and flanks.

At 0730, Major Wallace requested 3rd Bn to notify CP when the 8th Div passed through them and at 0735 CP was informed that some elements were then going thru. Lt. Col. Clarke informed G-3 at 0751 his plan of attack: Attack right to left; trail high ground and then clean out the woods; Gorton and Bealke ahead, Loomis in rear; would not use Engrs in the attack, but would like to hold them until 1st Bn was in a position to attack. (Let it be noted here that the Engrs, to a man, really wanted a chance to attack with the regular front line "doughboys". They were not in reserve because they were inefficient)

At this time, confusion reigned over the Cml Mortar Co that was to have been atchd to the 358th yesterday. No one seemed to know where they were. All units were notified to be on the look-out for them. At 0832, the Co A 86th Cml was "coming-in". Its CO reported to Col. Clarke and gave his position.

At 0840, Capt Shipe informed G-3 that the enemy did not patrol during the night and that there was only light activity. 8th Div passed L Co at 0925. Enemy was active 200 yards to the front of the 3rd Bn and also active in vic of Engineer area. Front lines were now give to the artillery. Capt Midyett, Engrs, stated he was firing mortars as the "Kratus" - 1 t Bn was now using artillery. At 1005, 3rd Bn went under Division control. 3rd Bn was directed to move to the rear. Capt Falvey, now, dis-

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credited the story that + SS Das Reich was directing its efforts mainly against the 90th Div. Their troops were along the entire Army front.

At 1015 Major Wallace asked advice of G-3 on flanking nose of the hill rather than direct attack. He (G-3) "says" he will work out a plan to that effect if possible. The 8th Div was difficult to find. No unit could contact them at proper places. At this time neither our 1st or 3rd Bn's nor 359th 3rd Bn was in contact with them. At 1045, Lt. Col. Bealke and Capt. Burns reported to the Regt'l Comdr. Capt Burns, after conference, notified his Bn to begin moving by companies, on designated trail leading south, to a designated field. They would launch their attack from the hill in that vicinity.

At 1145, Lt. Flynn reported in from the 357th. They were now holding line SE North of BEAU COUDRAY, and patrol black-top E to LA BUTTE. Fate of thier I and L Co's not yet known. And at 1155, the Regt'l Comdr requested G-3 for the support of the 915th Arty for the front of our 3rd Bn, Gorton and the Engineers. He also stated that 1500 would be the best time for an attack. At 1215, a patrol from "G" Co located the 8th Div and their position was given to Div. Major Comm phoned to state he had concentration for 3rd Bn set at H-20. G-3 notified Major Wallace that the 358 would be supported by both the 91th and the 344 FA Bns.

By 1300, the Regt'l CO was deep in conference with Capt Wise and Lt. Grubbs regarding the attack plans.

The plan of Attack: Attack with 2 Bns abreast. 3rd Bn on right, Gorton on left - make attack appear to be echeloned. All elements to attack simultaneously. Lt. Donohue was sent to 359th to get their plan. Much telphoning and coordination now took place, and at 1345, Lt. Donohue returned from the 359th with their plans. The Regt'l CO now planned not to move present CP but to establish a fwd OP with wire connections. Our plans were now sent to the 359th. Unit's concerned were briefed and given plans.

3rd Bn would wait until 359 came abreast, and then jump-off. H-Hour would be announced by Div. Col. Fuller, (Unicorn 5) was informed at 1430 that the 3rd Bn was in assembly area, and that it would pass through the left of the Engineers. The CO asked that the Engineers give support of fire until we pass by. At 1445, Lt. Col. Clarke phoned 359 and asked "when" they were going to jump off.

All units concerned were now in possession of the plans.

Major Stevens, 8th Corps, arrived at CP at 1505 and discussed ammunition movements with Major Knouf. At 1520, 357 reported that knocked out American Tanks were being used as pill - boxes by the Germans!

Lt. Col. Clarke was insistent that he "would take care" of the tanks. His idea was not to demolish them, but rather to save them for salvage. At 1525 - 3rd Bn will take 30 minutes to reach line of departure. FA (344) reported that 1 Btry was in position 2nd on its way and the 3rd would come up when 2nd cleared. By 1654, Cml Mortars were ready to operate and had 8 mortars in positions now and expected some more later on.

At 1700, Arty fire again falling short and on "B" Co, Engr. 344th not the "culprits"; checking other units, however. Snipers (ours) set to watch knocked out American tanks. By 1805, it was reported that the enemy was "improving" their positions on the nose of the hill. The Germans had "crawled" to within 50 yards of the 1st Bn line.

At 1845, Lt. Col. Clarke announced: 3rd Bn would relieve Engrs under cover of darkness. H-Hour for attack to be announced tomorrow. All necessary recon to be tonight. A Co, Engrs, to dig in and remain in position until further orders. Cml. outfit might revert to Div. 1st and 3rd Bn to coordinate a change of their plans. Also that the 8th Div, right flank was under fire. At 1855, Capt. Steckla, Regt'l Como, informend CP that Capt. Wagner and his 1st Sgt were killed. Major Wallace informed 3rd Bn that they were to relieve Engineers. Engr CO also notified and told his A Co would sit tight on cross roads and give support by fire to either our 1st Bn or Col. Gorton's Bn. At 1905, the Engrs were instructed to "push off" high ground tonight and go into a position generally astride the road, approximately 1000 yards to rear, along same road A Co is on.

G-2 now informed CP of the latest enemy reports. At 1940, 359 reported a "break through" their lines. Major Wallace alerted our 3rd Bn, and then informed G-3. The left Co of the 8th hit and driven back. The Germans now seemed to be pretty active. Our 3rd Bn was ready to roll. 359th hasn't yet committed its reserve. Their Recon troops in "break-through" area.

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At 2000 hours Major Wallace informed 3rd Bn to "rest easy". Nothing definite yet. 359 now reports that Recon outfit found nothing in the "break-through" to worry too much about.

At 2020, however, 3 German companies were forming in the woods. Capt. Falvey contacted the Arty and advised them contact 359th and then to fire on the "Jerries". Major Wallace told Engrs to "signal" if any of the fire falls short. The Engrs reported that they had some PW's. 3rd Bn, 359th, being hit by enemy. Our artillery fire "doing good and is accurate." 359th now gave clearance for more artillery fire. Capt. Midyett, of the 315th Engrs, reports artillery fire falling on them. Told to keep all Engrs East of Grid 22. Arty warned of "short shots". The artillery was now ordered to stop firing. TD's now dropping Arty in Col. Gortons's CP. Capt Falvey thought it might be the 915th and ordered them to "stop the fire"! Now our forward switchboard was nit by our artillery. All artillery was checked and also Cannon Co. All around firing was ordered to halt.

At 2140, 315th Engrs stated enemy was advancing on them up the trail. 3rd Bn ordered to send 2 platoons over there to help them. Division was now informed of the events up to this time. Engineers suffered about 15 casualties for our own artillery.

Lt. Col. Bealke arrived at the Engr CP at 2200 and notified Regt that there was quite a fight going on there. He was told of the gap on the left flank, and told to have it filled up. Also instructed to have Engr observe artillery fire. At 2215, Lt. Col. Bealke reports "situation well in hand and attack repulsed". Patrols were now sent out.

At 2240, The Regt's CO stated CG wants to use the 8th Div in the attack tomorrow. H-Hour not yet announced. OP will be again set-up in same place.

The CG phoned at 2248 and stated that Bealke (3rd Bn) be left the defence responsibility. Also suggested that shelling during the evening, "may have come from an Infantry Cannon Co". He also stated Engrs would go back to original mission and would be used for assault "only when direly needed".

Col. Bealke was informed of the CG's call and was directed a squad at the RJ and the balance of his force west on the high ground. Informed that the 3rd Bn received 19 replacements today. Col. Bealke stated he would need 2 hours to make complete relief. At 2215, Corps Arty stated that they were going to have a "big shoot" during the night and to warn all our units about it. Disposition of troops and AT defences were now reported and at 2225, Capt Spelce, AT CO, reported he had hit 2 enemy tanks today, put big holes in the, but they didn't burn up. The tentative plan now is - 1st Bn will attack first and when the 2nd Bn comes abreast, it will attack. During the day, the enemy demonstrated its clever tactics by shooting smoke into the vic of our artillery while our air corps was flying around up above, thus hoping it would mistake the smoke for a signal and bomb our own troops. The ruse didn't work. The weather during the day was "wet".

Casualties for the day:

KIA	1	Officer	8	EM
WIA	2	"	80	E ^M
MIA	0	"	1	
Repl.	15	"	107	

9 July 1944

HISTORY

358th Infantry

The hands on the clock proclaimed a new day. To the officers and men of the 358th Infantry this meant---nothing. A situation continued---that was all that counted.

The 3d Bn, at 0030 reported all "OK". Lt. Col. Clarke remarked, very correctly, that we were in "Jungle-like terrain." Contact with units, in this type of terrain, proved to be very difficult. 1st Bn reported all was quiet. "B" Co. was exheloned behind "C" Co. As yet, they had not contacted 3d Bn.

At 0100 Major Wallace advised Lt. Col. Bealke to "cover main line" with at least two companies. He also informed the 3d Bn CO that the Engineers "will leave their mortars there to help you out."

By 0120 G-3 was notified of the 3d Bn plan and also that the Engineers were ready to "pull out". G-3 was also given 3d Bns Plan of Defense.

At 0215 Lt. Taylor, Ia O, took some replacements to the 3d Bn. Lt. Col. Stillwell, G-3, phoned at 0355 to state that the present plans would remain in effect for the coming attack. Time of attack would not be before 1000, and possibly, not before 1200. 2d Bn reported firing "somewhere" to their left. At 0410 the 3d Bn had not yet completed the relief of Engineers. At 0430 359 reported that some of their elements were on the hill, about 22 grid, and at 0440 1st Bn reported "all quiet". Two PW's were reported at 0520 by 2d Bn. At 0630 G-3 enquired about the relief of the Engineers. "Not quite complete", we was informed.

At 0730 Lt. Col. Gorton reported enemy mortar fire--25 shells--fell in his area. Lt. Col. Clarke passed this information on to Capt Dandasky, artillery Ia O., along with the approximate location of the enemy guns. The 359 now reported that they had received a counter-attack during the night---the pressure seemed to be in between their 3d Bn and our 3d Bn.

At 0750 the G-3 announced the time of attack---1400!

He wanted troops to have some rest first. All units concerned were notified. The 357th Inf reported "all quiet" on their front.

Capt Falvey, at 0910, called Division for the situation of the 8th and 4th Divs. He stated that "the boys in the front lines should know the "big picture"".

By 0934 the 8th Div (on our right) had passed thru the 1st Bn 359 and our 2d Bn. Again all units concerned were contacted and informed.

At 1000 Capt Wise, CO Cn Co., reported "plenty of mortar fire" falling in and near his CP.

Lt. Donahue, Ia O, reported, at 1017, that the 8th Div HAD NOT COME UP YET! It was only a patrol that had come up! Everyone was more or less confused by now, concerning the 8th Division. They didn't seem to be operating according to any particular plan.

Lt. Col. Clarke conferred with Major Conn as regards to the shooting for the coming plan. He also planned to use the Engineers automatic fire. At 1125 the Cml Mortar Unit was informed of the Jump-off time.

At 1155 the Commanding General, via Col. Fuller, ordered all Bns to dispatch "aggressive patrols" to the south and report the situation to him. Lt. Col. Clark them gave him a detailed report on the 358th situation.

Lt. Col. Clark then notified the Bns concerning the patrols, explaining that this was to enable us to use artillery effectively, prior to our attack.

Capt Falvey informed G-3 that patrolling was hardly necessary as our Battalions could see the enemy from where they were!

At 1900 the Cml Mortar outfit reported our 3d Bn had been heavily counter-attacked and needed reinforcements. The wire to the 3d Bn was shelled out, and there was no contact with radio. The Regimental Commander immediately contacted G-3 and got "B" Co., Engineers, released to him. He also started the artillery and Cml Mortar outfit going to aid the 3d Bn. Lt. Col. Clarke now informed the Commanding General of the 3d Bn's plight. Other Bns reported "all was quiet". At 1906, Capt Burns, 3d Bn S-3, reported "Germans coming down road--we need reinforcements!" He was informed that "B" Co of the Engineers had been released to him. The Regimental Commander explained the situation to Capt Spelce, AT CO, and ordered him to take a platoon "up there" and "help Bealke out!" With the help of the Engineers, AT Co and the Cml Mortars, the enemy attack was being, at 1925, successfully repulsed. This information was passed on to Division.

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By 1238, the Engrs were "pulling out" on 3rd Bn's right rear. 1st and 3rd Bns reported very little activity. Only harassing fires.

Engr Co's A & B reported their new position at 1300. 3rd Bn reported "tied-in" and in contact by patrols. Lt. Donohue reported flank positions of 121st. By 1315, Lt. Col. Clarke arrived at 1st Bn CP, on his way to 3rd Bn, and Col. Gorton. Lt. Flynn reported the plan of the 357.

Chaplain Esser (Catholic Chap) while riding in an ambulance and hearing the confession of a severely wounded German soldier, was hit by a bullet that came through the side of the ambulance, spun him around, and entered his left cheek. "Didn't even give me a headache," he stated as he proudly exhibited the bullet that had been extracted.

At 1435, 1st Bn was receiving fire. Switchboard operators were cautioned to keep checking lines, as fire out in front promised to get hot. By 1530, Lt. Col. Bealke was confident one of his patrols (three men) had been captured. He asked for tanks, claiming terrain very suitable for their use. Patrol from Co I reported one of their number dead and one wounded. They reported contact with the enemy and gave information concerning enemy's front lines. They stated if any trouble developed, it will be on 3rd Bn right and to left of 359. Patrols reported enemy practically "invisible" in their camouflage suits. Claimed enemy was attempting to move lines forward. They patrolled as far as the 359 patrol in the woods, contacted them and returned.

Major Wallace now informed 2nd Bn to call the Regt'l CP for Cml Mortar fire - "direct line here". G-3 was again notified of our immediate situation. Lt. Col. Clarke now ordered that large scale aerial photo maps be obtained and issued to the CO's of the companies.

At 1645, Major Wallace was informed that the CP of the 3rd Bn could be reached by jeep--through a deluge of fire from 88's.

It was now rumored that LA HAYE DU PUITTS had fallen to the allies.

It was 1715 when Capt. Shipe, upon request of G-2, phoned 3rd Bn concerning paratroopers they had captured. Lt. Aughtry, reporting to Lt. Col. Clarke on 1st Bn's patrol "out front" stated that the enemy was strong and in excellent dug-outs which would not be damaged too much by our artillery fire.

Major La Forge now requested the .50 cal's from service company and the Cook Personnel to go with them. Major Knouf told him he was free to use his own Bn personnel as he saw fit.

Major Knouf and Lt. Col. Clarke now discussed supply problems. The Regt'l CO commended Major Knouf on a splendid job of supply in the past. Major Knouf's only reply was "The credit goes to my men".

At 1755, Lt. Aughtry, 1st Bn, was authorized to shoot white phosphorous grenades or "whatever he choose" at the enemy to force them from their close range cover. At 1800, the Cml Mortars outfit checked their ammunition as to the type they had and how much. 2nd Bn 359 now reported "fire falling short" and landing on his "F" Co. Steps were taken immediately to shift the fire.

Photo maps were delivered. However, they were not the ones ordered. Div was notified. Lt. Donohue reported from 359 that as far as counter-attacks were concerned things were pretty quiet, but HE artillery was falling not infrequently. He also reported that the 8th Div, which had not yet cleared 359 was closer and in contact with our Co E.

Wire crews, under Capt Steckla, Reg'l Comm. O., and M/Sgt. White, Section Chief, were out in the "thick of it" checking and maintaining communications.

Now the 359 complained that some of our mortars were falling on them. Capt Shipe gave the mortar CO the "safety line" for the 359.

By 1940, with the Engineers enroute, Lt. Col. Bealke stated that he had the situation in hand. The Regimental Commander so reported to the Commanding General. "L" Co. has been committed on the right. At 1945 Lt. Donahue started back to 3d Bn for more "dope". The Cml Mortar CO was enroute to the Regimental CP.

At 2000 hours, G-3 informed the regiment that the Engineer Bn was not attached to the 358th Infantry. Major Gilchrist, its CO, was enroute to the CP.

Capt Steckla was ordered to get "more wire" to 3d Bn. 359 was now informed of the counter-attack and advised we might put another company in between the two regiments.

At 2030 Lt. Col. Bealke officially announced that the counter-attack had been repelled. He recommended, however, that six companies be used. 3d Bn could now be contacted through 3d Bn, 359.

By 2035 the Engineers submitted their plan of defense. Line to the 3d Bn again out! Lt. Col. Clarke conferred with Major Seibert (Engr) concerning their part to play in supporting the 3d Bn. "A" Co., Engr and "L" Co. 358 will be in reserve.

At 2040 Capt Burns arrived at the CP and stated 2d Bn must be receiving fire. He thought break-thru was thru 2d Bn. Their radio operator had been killed, hence the tie-up in communication. Capt Burns predicted another counter-attack tonight. He claimed that the enemy "fainted" about "I" Co. during the day and they attacked heavily around the other flank.

It was now decided that 3d Bn use a 610 radio. Capt Burns stated that the Germans fire less when our artillery harassed them. During the recent attack the enemy layed down a great deal of fire, but didn't seem inclined to move up.

At 2100, Col. Bacon, 359, requested our artillery fire plan. Lt. Col. Bealke again called Lt. Col. Clarke. "I" - "K" - "L", in that order close-in with "B" Co., Engr, on right. Still two companies in res. tonight. "C" Co., Engrs, probably be on left. "B" Co. Engrs will revert to Bn CO (Engr Control)" Capt Steckla reported he had ~~wire~~ wire to send to 3d Bn and would send it right away. Capt Burns reported that the terrain in the area was scrubby - foot high ferns, and woods.

By 2120 Radio contact with Cml Mortars and OP was established. At 2227 Lt. Donahue reported that the 8th Div would be behind 359 "sometime tonight". It was apparent now that the Germans were, or had been, feeling us out. 1st Bn now submitted their disposition and their plans of defense and defensive fires.

At 2245 Regiment was informed that Corps H*Hour was set at 1000. "Step ladder" plan would still be used. 1st and 2d ~~Bn~~ platoons of "B" Co., Engr, were now in position. Major Knouf reported that there was a supply shortage.

At 2330 Lt. Col. Clarke requested the 344 FA to include the 358th in their distribution of fire plans. He, at the same time, warned the artillery of several positions on the current plan which were too close to friendly troops. The Regimental Commander now phoned 3d Bn CO and discussed plans for now and tomorrow. Then he contacted Lt. Col. Loomis, 1st Bn actg CO.

Ans so the clock proclaimed still another day gone--but not forgotten!

The casualties for the day:	KIA	0 Officers	4 EM
	WIA	1	34
	MIA	0	38
	Repl Red	0	120

At 0025 Capt. Stottler, 1st Bn, informed the CP that two of the "short" arty concentrations were prearranged spots. They were to be used only if the 1st Bn fell back. At 0055 the Regiment was informed that the artillery was going to "Serenade" the enemy at 0130, 0300, 0400 and at 0430. All units were notified of this by Capt. Shipe. At 0140 G-3 phoned and stated that "B" and "C" Co's, Engineers, would stay in place until the 359 passed through. He suggested that our 3d Bn reorganize "a bit". At 0150 Capt Shipe was notified by Division that the Division Artillery had Polish and Russian propaganda shots. At 0245 Defensive Fire Plans were received from the Division Artillery. At 0300 the current situation was relayed to Division.

2d Bn, 359, reported artillery fire from an azimuth 178 and the Ia O. for the artillery, Capt Danousky, took care of the message. 1st Bn reported that everything was quiet, with the exception of some mortar and occasional artillery fire. The CP was warned to be especially alert at daybreak.

At 0600 Capt Falvey was informed that 1st and 3d Bns of the 121st (8th Div) were in position in rear of the 359. This information was passed on to those concerned.

A PW stated he could not understand why we didn't keep on advancing, since the Germans were "on the run".

At 0930 the artillery concentration firing for the day was discussed and determined as to where they would fire and the procedure of calling for fire was determined. Lt. Flynn returned from the 357--they think there is an attack on the left flank and is considering moving its CP due to the shelling of the previous night. Smoke was observed south of La Butte. At 0945 Lt. Clark, Ia O., arrived from Division with routine reports which were immediately distributed.

At 1000 hours a Training Program was received from Division. This program related to Replacements. The Regimental CO conferred with Capt Steckla in regards to a new CP. He cautioned him not to place Cml Mortars near CP as they draw heavy counter fire.

1030 and Lt. Coll Clarke stated 8th Div will attack at 1000 today! Major Davis, GAO, stated Germans are taking French civilians with them and making them bury the German dead!

At 1050 G-3 called and asked about Lt. Col. Gorton's patrols. Patrols came in at 1000, but no report at that time was issued. Capt Schultz reported that the radio operator, reported killed yesterday by Capt Burns, was not one of his men.

At 1110 the Commanding General phoned Lt. Col. Clarke and discussed the patrols of the 2d Bn 359 (attached to 358). The General was concerned about receiving an attack in the woods after dark. At this time, the following named officers were appointed Company Commanders: Fogel - G Co; Rosenbaum - E Co; Nickerson - H Co. The 8th Div had come up to the 359.

From now on plans were made for the coming attack. Reports from patrols were carefully worked into the plans. Units on the right and left were contacted so as to coordinate every angle of the coming battle. (details of the battle attached)

At 1200 units were issued a Warning Order and instructed that the 358 might attack without waiting for the 359 or the 357. The Engineers would support by fire but would make no movement. The bulk of the Division Artillery would support the Regiment. H-Hour would be announced later. Photo maps were assembled, reference points put on them and they were then sent to units concerned.

1200 and 3d Bn Patrols returned and stated "no enemy visible." (It was later learned that the enemy wore cleverly made camouflage suits that made them practically invisible!)

At 1345 H-Hour was announced for 1500. All units concerned were immediately notified. At this time some were of the opinion that the enemy was making a general withdrawal. The next three days proved how wrong they were!

1st Bn was still holding the Nose of the Hill and was receiving constant firing. At 1400 Lt. Col. Clarke ordered a forward OP established. Artillery coordination was arranged for all assault units.

1500 - H-Hour! (For minute details of the ensuing battle, see attached papers on the 31 July)

From both the forward OP and the Rear CP, Lt. Col. Clarke kept in close contact with the battle. He used all information received to the fullest advantage. This is well evidenced by the plans he drew up for the battle. During the Battle, Division was informed of all details. Tanks were obtained to assist our 3d Bn and also "B" Co., under the personal direction of Lt. Col. Loomis, went forward to assist.

The 2d Bn, 359, which was attached to the 358, moved forward slowly and, for the whole day, was to the rear of the 3d Bn, 358.

Positions of adjacent units were kept up to date by the alert Liaison Officers, Lt.'s Flynn and Donahue.

The 3d Bn, 358, with the 2nd Bn, 359 on its left, met very heavy resistance, but had "come out on top" as far as the battle had progressed.

At 2150 the cry to 1st Bn was "we must take the Hill!" In fact, the General ordered that it be taken tonight.

At 2230, Lt. Col. Gorton was informed of mine fields to his front. The Commanding General phoned to state "Resume the attack at 0600!" He was given the complete disposition of the 358 units. "A" & "C" Co's were on the east end of the hill and were confident they would take it before dark.

At 2315 Lt. Col. Bealke was directing artillery on the strong enemy positions. The artillery also had twelve (12) guns firing into Lastelle.

At 2330 Lt. Col. Clarke and Major Wallace started work on plans for tomorrow's attack.

And so the 358 again ended a day - a day of History making!

11 July 1944

HISTORY

358th Infantry

At 0030, companies and battalions were in position and defenses set-up. All units concerned knew that "jump-off" time was 0600. Plans were made for the coming day and were flexible enough to meet any situation. Co B, which had gone to the aid of Lt. Col. Bealke's battalion now reverted to its own battalion. 3rd Bn had two tanks left out of the original four. The TD's, though not officially attached, would stay with the 358th Inf. Lt. Col. Bealke stated he must have plenty of time to reorganize before he could again "jump off".

The hours now were busy ones for the aid men. Litter-bearers streamed up the forest trail carrying water and rations to the men and bringing the wounded back.

By 0530, 1st Bn had begun its operation of mopping-up in its area. At 0555, the artillery opened up, giving the enemy their famous harassing fire. At 0600, Gen. Landrum phoned and discussed the day's plans with Major Wallace. Lt. Col. Bealke, arrived at the CP and gave a report on the previous day's battle. He also gave the present strength of his units (for details see attached Battle report).

Lt. Col. Gorton, 2nd Bn 359th (attached to 358) phoned his plans to Lt. Col. Clarke. He was at that time reorganizing his battalion.

The 1st Bn 358th, would stay in rear and clean up resistance on nose of the hill.

At 0800, the 358th and 359th exchanged information as to regards to front lines. At 0900, 3rd Bn, 358th, was still reorganizing. 1st Bn now had complete control of the "nose". The CG ordered 3rd Bn to send a staff officer through the woods, collect the stragglers and send them to the front.

H-Hour was now set at 1030. All units were informed. At 1015, 3rd Bn reported they were exposed to artillery fire on three sides. Lt. Col. Doomis, as the Regt'l Comdr's representative, went to investigate. The 3rd Bn, 359, on Lt. Col. Bealke's right, was also receiving artillery fire.

At 1045, our troops (3rd Bn) were pinned down by small arms fire, mortar and artillery fire. Enemy was zeroed right in on them. Two artillery observation planes were seeking out the enemy guns. And at 1045, 2nd Bn, 359, (attached 358) jumped off.

1100, 3rd Bn was still held down, and was now out of contact - even by radio. Germans were reported to be in the disabled tanks and using them as pill boxes. Attempts were being made to dislodge them. Artillery fire was now ordered on LASTELLE. Capt. Burns of the 3rd Bn, stated that the enemy mortar was so close he could "hear it drop into the tubes". 3rd Bn still hammered in at 1150. 30 stragglers were rounded up. More were thought to be dug-in in an open field waiting for help. An enemy tank entered onto the scene and began causing havoc. High velocity shells fired the disabled tanks. Germans to the front were reported as a "new brand". "Absolutely fearless and won't crack until hit", stated Capt. Burns. Cub planes, as yet, had not located the enemy guns.

By 1210, the 3rd Bn was again moving, as was 2nd Bn 359th. Enemy fire had definitely slackened. Things were looking "brighter".

At 1230, the 3rd Bn was 200 yards north of bridge at Phase Line "A".

At 1310, 3rd Bn was again pinned down. Lt. Col. Clarke ordered Lt. Col. Bealke to return for a much needed rest, and sent Lt. Col. Loomis to replace him.

At 1400, the 358th and the 357th again jumped-off. 3rd Bn kept moving until 1510, when Co L ran into heavy resistance and was forced to draw back and reorganize. 3rd Bn out of contact again.

By 1545, the wire was again open to the 3rd Bn. Major Wallace informed Capt Burns that the 2nd Bn, 359, had reached a point 150 yards North of the trail that led to the 3rd Bn. Major Wallace suggested that Capt. Burns use white phosphorous to "blind enemy observers."

As information was received, it was immediately relayed to G-3.

During this period our troops were fighting a vicious and determined enemy at close range. Visibility was very poor and this aided the Germans, who were clad in camouflage suits. Trouble was always because the 359th units seemed to have trouble advancing, this causing again and again open flanks on the 3rd Bn 358th.

At 1700, the Engineers were released from their attachments to the 358th.

At 1845, Lt. Col. Loomis reported heavy resistance at the bridge and at LASTELLE. Stated he would use artillery.

By 1900, Capt Burns was informed that the 3rd Bn would jump off again at 1940 in conjunction with the 359th.

Lt. Col. Clarke now went forward to the 3rd Bn CP. the 2nd Bn, 359, still 200 yards short of Phase Line "A". At 2105, CG ordered 1st Bn to move as soon as possible. At 2111 all units were moving ahead together.

11 July 1944

HISTORY

3 58th Infantry

By 2216, the bridge enroute to LASTELLE had been crossed. The orders for 1st Bn were now that "Seeger would pass through Gorton and attack at 0800." At 2227 3rd Bn was ordered to "tie in" for the night. Lt. Col. Clarke asked permission for 1st Bn to relieve 2nd Bn 358th tonight and attack in morning. 3rd Bn 400 yards SE of bridge with 359th abreast.

At 2245, CG gave permission for the relief of 2nd Bn 359 by the 1st Bn 358. Arrangements were now made. The strength of the 1st Bn was now 596. Lt. Col. Gorton went to 1st Bn CP to make relief plans. Lt. Col. Loomis reported very light casualties, and that he was tie-ing in for the night.

At 2329, Gen. Williams directed that Lt. Col. Loomis, 3rd Bn, go down NS road East of LASTELLE (with 359) and if town, as supposed, was occupied, to occupy it tonight. If occupied, wait until morning.

At 2345, Lt. Col. Clarke, desiring that everything run smoothly, went to the 1st Bn CP.

General Summary:

The enemy activity lessened considerably during the night, especially their artillery fire. The 1st Bn, 358th Inf, had mopped up the high ground (234835). The enemy, in small groups, and in well dug - in positions, had resisted bitterly. The day's attack had begun at 1400, moving S and SE through the FORET DE MONT CASTRE. Resistance was stiff and there was an abundance of mortar fire. It was very evident that the enemy knew this territory and had its guns zeroed in just where an attack would have to come. The Germans took full advantage of their knowledge and utilized their small arms and MG's in conjunction with mortars and artillery. The 358th Inf was delayed more than once by heavy MG concentrations but every time they surmounted the obstacle and fought forward. At the close of the day, even though the enemy, had begun withdrawing, they still held a most formidable line.

The attack at (3) met little physical resistance. However, stiff resistance in the form of Mortars, 88's and Machine guns met our leading elements at 1300. The Germans were stubbornly defending their new line. Many hasty mine fields were encountered. Some were in pattern and others were just scattered. Interdiction of the roads by 250mm was reported throughout the day. Stubborn and hard fighting was encountered until the close of the day.

By 0108 the 3d Bn reported that they were practically in Lastelle. Bn CO's were directed to work out defensive fires. At 0245, 3d Bn was in Lastelle. All units now submitted their front lines. Front line of adjacent units were also called for and received. 3d Bn reported its strength as six (6) officers and 133 RM. All information was relayed to G-3.

At 0815 the news and whereabouts of the 1st Bn was unknown. They had jumped-off but were out of contact. 3d Bn reported they have 193 officers and men.

At 0835 General Landrum was notified that "straggler parties" were out. He was also informed that the 1st Bn affected their relief of 2d Bn 359 without incident.

At 0840: "No enemy in front of us - will keep moving ahead. Patrols out. No firing ahead." This was from CO 3d Bn. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ 350yards beyond LD-- abreast of the 359". This was from the CO 1st Bn.

By 0910 Lt. Col. Loomis reported mortar fire in Lastelle, also that he was 200 yards past the town. 1st Bn had moved 400 yards and was abreast of 2d Bn 357. At 0930 the 1st and 3d Bns, 358, were abreast. At 1053 3d Bn reported they were on phase line "C" and still moving.

At 1115 G-3 ordered the 358 to proceed to objective "C" and halt there, on the SE of the objective. By 1142 1st Bn was on Phase line "D" and 3d Bn was 100 yards short of objective.

The Regimental CP now moved forward. Position 260814. At 1227 Lt. Col. Clarke left for Lastelle. 3d Bn was reorganizing and about to move forward and was receiving mortar and artillery fire and was meeting some physical resistance.

By 1334 3d Bn was in La Sa Silmanare. 2d Bn, sweeping down on Beau Courdray. 1400 and 3d Bn again pushing forward. At 1538 the Regimental Boundaries were extended.

By 1710 1st Bn had patrols out "scouting". Major Oelshon ordered artillery fire. At 1727 the 3d Bn was counter-attacked! 1st Bn was attacked on the right flank. "A" Co. was in Gorges and between the Bn and the enemy! The counter-attack, though short, was vicious, but the enemy was repulsed and the regiment again moved forward.

At 1840 tanks were spotted. Capt Spelce, AT CO, was notified and he "went" after them. 3d Bn was reorganizing. 3d Bn was now down to three Letter Co. Officers! And no replacements were available! The relief of the 3d Bn was now underway.

2055 and Lt. Pyes, Ex. O. Regt'l Hq Co., reported that Capt Spelce, AT Co, and one of his sergeants had been hit by a sniper. By 2137 3d Bn was organized and in position with right on the Regimental Boundary. 1st Bn was moving to the right to tie-in. The 3d Bn was unable to advance any further. It could, however, split its force into two strongholds. 3d Bn ordered to hold the road. The 1st Bn was directed to protect cross roads and avenues by a series of strong points. The Commanding General directed Lt. Col. Loomis to "secure cross road where you are, provide all around defensive position--particularly south. Use strong AT measures, to the S and SE."

Lt. Col. Clarke now conferred with Lt. Grubbs, actg AT CO, about the AT defenses.

At 2303 - H-Hour to be 0730!

Plans were now discussed by the Regimental Commander and the S-3, and were drawn up for the coming day.

And so the Main Line of Resistance of the enemy was crumbled to dust, and its defenders scattered literally to the four winds!

For what the 358th Infantry accomplished during the days 8-9-10-11-12 July it and its Commanders should and very likely will, go down in History. The Battle of the Foret de Mont Castre, and its truly remarkable defense, was now a thing of the past!

Let it be noted that it was here, in this very forest, that Ceasar, way back BC, gave the Gauls such a beating---his cry was "I came, I saw, I conquered!" And the 358th Infantry also came--and its cry was "Paragimus!"

13 July 1944

HISTORY

358th Infantry

During the early morning hours, Lt. Col.'s Clarke and Stilwell discussed the previous day's activities and the activities of the coming day. Both agreed that it is never safe to assume that the enemy has retreated or withdrawn. The Germans, they agreed, were an unpredictable lot and it was always best to play safe. Lt. Col. Stilwell, before he left the CP, stated that we would have mobile showers at PRETOT when we were pinched out.

At 0045, the Artillery was requested to fire phosphorous and artiller on GORGES tonight but the artillery was unable to do so until morning.

Tomorrow's attack will be by 1st Bn with remnants of the 3rd Bn echeloned. There will be doubled AT defence. By 0225, the coordination of boundaries was taken up with the 357th Inf. Frontages were lessened.

At 0255, Lt. Col. Clarke telephoned G-3 and pointed out why the plan for the coming day can't work out. He explained that Col. Bacon's 359th is echeloned too far back to make coordination possible. Explained also that the attack was originally planned for a much larger attacking force than we have, and that, with the 359th so far back, the enemy could "walk right in" on the gaps we would leave.

By 0330, the following plan was submitted:

1st Bn jump-off first, with 3rd Bn echeloned to the right rear. 1st Bn to/by-pass East of GORGES and attack to SE to Regt'l Obj. Combat patrols to be sent out at daylight for 1000 yards. Artillery preparation on call. H Hour 0730. LD - present positions. Attack will pass E of GORGES and thence SE to contact 357th.

By 0700, patrols were out. All units were contacted. All units were ready.

At 0755, moved CP.

At 0903, established new CP at

By 0940, 1st Bn was held up 200 yards from the LD by heavy MG fire. General Williams arrived at CP. At 1000, German troops were reported behind the 1st Bn and also behind the 344th FA. "Roads cleared of mines" overlay was sent to the units concerned. At 1025, 1st Bn was again on the move, but at 1055 they ran into more resistance. Adjacent units were keeping the CP informed of all their movements and this information was passed on to the 358th units. By 1127, the 1st Bn had advanced 300 yards. 1st Bn, through French civilians, learned of forward German gun positions. They were turned over to the Regt'l S-2. The artillery was firing on GORGES only on call.

At 1230, reported that the Germans were mining ammo dumps were received. Units were informed and warned to be cautious.

At 1330, Lt. Donohue reported that the 359th, minus its 3rd Bn, is holding fast and pinching out the 1st Bn 358th. At 1340, 3rd Bn position at CP reported unchanged. The enemy, about a company, not far away. Lt. Col. Loomis reported he was using mortars and artillery.

At 1350, Major Seeger (CO 1st Bn) was directed to coordinate with CO 2nd Bn 357th to avoid incorrect artillery concentrations.

At 1400, 1st Bn reported that they were confronted with heavy flat trajectory fire. At 1435, Major Seeger stated he had advanced to within 150 yards of the enemy and was "pouring" HE and Mortar fire on them. He was also "creeping up" some arty. Smoke enable Co E, 357th, to cross to GORGES. Now part of the 357th opposition was crossing Major Seeger's front and he "was making targets" of them!

PW's stated that "about 100" Germans wanted to surrender but were afraid to do so. Capt Falvey made arrangements for a loud speaker system to contact them.

At 1525, Lt. Col. Clarke ordered Major Seeger to commit his reserve and push ahead. He then notified artillery of this action and advised them to keep their fire well in advance of the troops. Division was then notified.

At 1700, 1st Bn reported "some stuff" out in front, but "not much". The plan was now to use loud speaker on Germans about midnight. If any earlier, German officers and NCO's would "drown it out" with artillery fire. Capt Falvey planned to shoot propaganda leaflets first.

At 1750, word was passed along that ST PATRICE was to be bombed tonight. At 1800 G-3 was given positions of the 1st Bn. Co C was on the black-top. 3rd Bn 358 and 1st Bn 359 reported "no enemy movement". At 1822, 1st Bn CO stated enemy still in position. At 1845, Lt. Col. Stilwell phoned "Same objectives - same boundaries".

3rd Bn was notified of 1st Bn positions. Co A advanced 200 yards and took 5 PW's. At 1850, Major Wallace informed 3rd Bn that they would have 1 Co Medium Tanks atchd tomorrow and advised that they be used as Infantry support weapons.

13 July 1944

HISTORY

358th Infantry

At 1900, Lt. Col. Bealke arrived at CP and Lt. Col. Clarke explained the whole picture to him. At 1010, Lt. Flynn reported the positions and situation of the 357th Inf. And Lt. Donohue gave the situation of the 359th Inf.

The following information was given to G-2 at 1930:

Co A nearly to stream (270798). They pocketed resistance and captured several PW's. Co B echeloned 150 yards to the left rear. Co C still not committed, 500 yards down the road in the rear of 2nd Bn 359. (A PW stated that there were but a few Germans in GORGES.

At 1954, the situation changed: Co B moved into GORGES. Co A to right rear all around defence in town. By 2020, all w of Seeger's Co's across the stream. Permission for all around defense granted. Also told to hold bridgehead, and use radio.

At 2040, Lt. Col. Bealke is going to 3rd Bn soon and relieve Lt. Col. Loomis. General stated 2nd Bn would be returned to 358th tomorrow.

PW's stated that their units to the front had withdrawn without the order to do so. Capt Burns reported that the enemy was digging in. At 2130, Lt. Col. Bealke told Major Seeger to "button up". Lt. Col. Bealke took over the 3rd Bn again.

Plans were now under way for the coming day. Lt. Donohue brought attack orders of the 359th for 14 July 1944.

At 2300, Lt. Clark brought the Division Order. Lt. Col. Loomis back again as Ex Officer. At 2350, Lt. Flynn reported the disposition of the 357th Inf.

During the entire day any movement of the 358th Inf was immediately met with heavy mortar and artillery fire, or small arms and MG fire. The 1st Bn, 358, took the town of GORGES at approximately 2000 hours.

14 July 1944

HISTORY

358th Infantry

Division released its FO #13, and the order is excerpt below:

Hq 90th Inf Div
APO 90, US. Army
132100 July 1944

FO #13

3. b. 358th Infantry (less 2d Bn)

Atchd: Co. A 712th Tank Bn
Co A 86th Cml Bn.

(1) attack within its zone at 141000B and making its main effort on its left, secure Phase Line B

(2) 2d Bn reverts to Regt'l control on order this Hq.

The Regimental Commander, Lt. Col. Clarke, based his coming operations on the above order and issued the Regimental FO #11:

358th Infantry
14 July 1944

FO #11

1. Division resumes attack at 141000B July to secure ground in its zone to the north of the Seves River. (Phase Line B). 358th Inf, with 2d Bn 358th Inf. and one (1) company light tanks attacks on the right. The 358th Inf, with 86th Cml Bn Co A, and 712th Tk Bn Co. A attached attack in the center and 357th Inf with one (1) co light tanks attached attacks on the left. LD-present front lines.

2. 1st Bn continues its attack at 1000 making its main effort on the left of the Reg't. zone of advance, maintains contact with the 357th Inf on its left, seizes high ground NW of Nay.

3d Bn, initially supported by Co A, 712th Tank Bn will destroy the enemy in front of its present position and will then advance and seize the town of Duraville, on order.

AT Co. to provide protection of the assault Bns.

Cn Co. provides initial support of the 3d Bn.

Co "A" 86th Cml Bn in direct support of assault Bns.

Co. "A", 712th Tank Bn - initially in direct support of 3d Bn and will then prepare to support advance of 1st Bn on order. Liaison will be established.

344th FA in direct support fires preparations on call - priority 1st Bn.

By 0230 the plans were formulated and the order was in the hands of all concerned.

The "broadcast" to the German troops, under the direction of Capt. Falvey, went off very well. At 1014 the 2d Bn 358, was released to Regimental control. Manor Chandler, Bn Cndr, reported his Bn had had 220 casualties.

By 1030, the CP was informed that the Regiment jumped off on time and had contacted no enemy as yet. General Landrum phoned CP for the situation. At 1054, 1st Bn, with "A" on right and "B" on left, had moved 800 yards and were receiving mortar fire on their right flank. 1st Bn reported they were using artillery fire. At 1135 the 3d Bn advance was uneventful. 1140 and 1st Bn 500 yds further. The 359th was notified that their fire was falling near the 3d Bn, 358.

At 1220 3d Bn was on Phase line A and holding fast. The tanks were in Gorges and now confusion! The Cml Mortar Co. informed the CP it was ready to fire on Duraville. Our 3d Bn was IN Duraville! Fast phoning and talking on the part of Major Wallace saved the situation. Prisoners were now reported as a result of the broadcast. No definite total as yet. The Regimental Comm Officer now reported on the selected position for the new CP - on the other side of Gorges.

At 1300 358 troops in Duraville reported "friendly" mortar fire falling on them. 358 notified 359 and asked them to stop it. 1st Bn reached Phase Line A and met no resistance. 1st Bn was directed to hold bridge E of Gonfreyville.

14 July 1944 (p. 2)

HISTORY

358th Infantry

At 1316 Lt. Col. Bealke, 3d Bn CO, was informed that the 2d Bn will be up behind him in an hour or so and that the 1st Bn was moving up behind him now. He was directed to continue to Gonfreyville and tie-in with the 1st Bn there.

Once during the broadcast, it was learned, an enemy 88 shell blew out the wires. However, the damage was quickly repaired and the program continued. The Germans were told that as good soldiers, they had put up a good fight, but now their situation was now hopeless. They were urged to hide during the night, discard their arms, and in the early morning, give themselves up. They were assured that they would be treated as honorable prisoners of war. At about 0200 the "Show" was completed. Capt Falvey, who directed it, was very much pleased. Adjacent units were informed of the broadcast and warned that prisoners may give themselves up to them.

Prisoners of War stated that the Crack troops had withdrawn, leaving only "poor stuff". They also stated that the Germans were planning a large scale withdrawal at 0300. Patrols were dispatched to check on this bit of information. The patrols returned stating that they had seen no enemy--even where they had been observed digging in during the afternoon. However, they stated that a withdrawal of "sorts" had taken place.

At 0710 - "h-hour to be run up". All units were informed. It was now to be 1000. 26 men, formerly evacuated, now returned to the 3d Bn roster!

At 1320 General Williams arrived at the CP. He was briefed on the situation. Major Chandler also arrived at the CP. The 1st Bn was ordered to check the bridge at Gonfreyville because General Landrum wanted to send the Ron Troop thru there. 3d Bn reported its CP in St Jores. Germans were reported to be on the Island, to their front, and the Ron troop was dispatched to clean them out. The artillery sub plane was keeping the Island under close observation.

At 1430 the 1st and 3d Bns were tying-in. The PW's, who gave up because of the broadcast were surrendering to the 357 and the 359!

At 1455 the CP moved and reestablished at Gorges, at 1538.

At 1544 Lt. Col. Clarke directed 1st Bn to go forward to phase line "B". The head of 2d Bn was not at Duraville. The 1st and 3d Bns will have their CP's in Gonfreyville. At 1555 the 2d Bn was going into assembly area as Regimental Reserve. The 1st Bn now covered 3/4 of the Regimental area! 3d Bn 1/4!

At 1630 Lt. Col. Clarke left for Gonfreyville to get the complete picture.

At 1711 "I" Co contacted the enemy. "A" Co and "B" Co were moving up to the black-top. 3d Bn "opposition" was small group of stragglers and were quickly taken care of.

1932 - "357th will effect relief at 150300 July!" at 2000 Lt. Coghill, 3d Bn, was wounded. At 2125 enemy aircraft (six) flew over the area. The Reg'tl Cndr ordered all vehicles under cover and all camouflage checked.

At 2126, Lt. Clark, Ia O reported to CP with Div FO #14.

It was now LT. COL. SEEGER!

Plans were now made for the relief of companies and assembly areas were chosen and designated.

And thus did still another successful phase of Battle victoriously end for the 358th Infantry.

15 July 1944

HISTORY

358th Infantry

The 358th Infantry was now in the vicinity of the town of Gorges and was awaiting for the official relief by the 357th Infantry at 150300 July. (per Div FO #14)

The Regimental Commander called his staff together and outlined plans for the Regiment. The S-4, Major Knouf, was directed to bring forward the kitchens and have hot meals for the men. Showers were obtained and plans were formulated so that every one could use them. New clothes (much needed) were requisitioned and obtained. Arrangements were made for ordnance inspections.

By 0200 the 3d Bn was "closed-in" in its assembly area, as was the AT Co. By 0220 the 357th Inf phoned to notify the GP that they had "assumed responsibility" for the area. At 0437 1st Bn had "closed-in". At 0740 the G-3 informed the Regt'l Cmr that the 2d Bn was now released and under Regt'l control, and Major Wallace notified its Commander to move to the designated assembly area.

G-1 now informed the GP that replacements were obtained and would be sent out today. By 0930 the Cannon Co. had "closed in". At 1000 the Commanding General phoned Lt. Col. Clarke and directed that all wire be salvaged that could possibly be of use.

All units were briefed on the rehabilitation plans and were urged to make plans to coincide with plans. General Williams was kept informed of our progress. A nearby stream was inspected and found to be "OK" for swimming and bathing. Physical inspections were also in order.

The regiment now had the positions of all its units and also dispositions and plans of adjacent friendly units.

At 1907 a new Regimental Commander, Col ^{CORNUO} ~~Gonzaga~~ was introduced to the Staff.

By 2040 a schedule was prepared for the Regiment pertaining to its coming activities and it was distributed throughout the Regiment.

By 2300 nearly every man had been outfitted with new, clean clothing and those who hadn't been would be in the morning.

And now a diversion - an enemy plane suddenly appearing "out of the blue" dropped a bomb in the vicinity of the GP - no damage.

Thus ended a busy, but happy day for the 358th Infantry.

16 July 1944

HISTORY

358 Infantry

During the early morning hours of 16 July there was no activity in the 358th area. During these hours Division was contacted hourly. At 0927 General Landrum arrived at the Op and by 1000 hours the Bn and Reg't Staff had been assembled and General Landrum spoke to them.

Two platoons of tanks were assigned to the regiment and thence to the Bns. This was for practice procedure to enable the Infantry and Tank outfits to work more closely together. At 1300 Col. Conag called a meeting of the Arty, Engr and Tank representatives. He stated that during the coming operations, closer coordination was necessary between their units, the Infantry and Tanks. He further explained that a program was to be set up, effective 17 July. Bns were instructed to select areas where this demonstration could be held.

At 1530 Capt Burns, 3d Bn and two War Correspondents left for a tour of the Forêt De Mont Castre, the scene of the 3d Bns heroic battle. Word of the coming tank demonstration reached the 357 and they requested that they be allowed to send representatives. The rest of the day was spent in planning the tank demonstration.

Capt. Barndt arrived and stated he would try to have the men paid.

At 2145 the new CP Gorges was established.

Lt. Col. Clarke announced at 2300 that General Williams had received an assignment to 1st Army. Lt. Col. Clarke now discussed the awarding of medals and awards to men of the regiment with Capt Caldicott, Regt'l S-1.

Lt. Col. Conag stated that the regiment would be up to full strength in two days.

Authority NND 735017

By 13r NARA Date 12/9

17 July 1944

HISTORY

358th Infantry

The early morning hours were unusually quiet. Division was so informed hourly. A hot breakfast was served this day.

At approximately 0900 representatives of friendly units and our own Bns arrived to attend the Infantry-Tank demonstration. Capt Falvey ordered and prepared maps for distribution. Lt. Col. Seeger stated his Bazookas ammo defective and received permission to test some out. Col. Barth requested permission to have "live" ammo used in the demonstration.

One hundred replacements arrived at approximately 1400. A Lt. Colonel from the WD Historical Section was escorted to the Forêt De Mont Castro to look over the battlefield.

At 1230 Col. Conag was relieved of his Command and given a new assignment. Lt Col. Clarke was once again the Regimental Commander.

Two officers from Corps arrived and briefed the Staff on the "Big Picture" and on future operations.

At 1430 General Landrum arrived. At 1505 Col. Conag left the 358th Infantry Regiment. Major Wallace requested Division that the Regiment be issued good aerial photo maps of the future areas.

At 1900 - and it was MAJOR Falvey;

At 2045 Lt. Col. Bealke and Major Chandler, Bn CO's were ordered to report to Lt. Col. Clarke.

The Division FO #15 was received, which, excerpt, follows:

Hq 90th Inf Div
APO 90, U.S. Army
172000 July 1944

FO #15

3. a. 358th Infantry

Atchd: Co B and Assault Gun Plat, 712th Tk Bn
Co A 86th Cml Bn

Attacks 190530B in column of Bns to seize and hold Obj and contain the enemy on the Island E of Grid 30. The rear Bn will not be committed except on Division order.

Plans were now underway to formulate the Regimental Plan.

18 July 1944

HISTORY

358th Infantry

At 2340, 17 July, two artillery shells landed in the vicinity of Gorges and two men in the 1st Bn Hq Co. Kitchen were hit.. So reported Lt. Col. Seeger at 0115. At this time, a FA Captain, who had been captured and had escaped, arrived at the GP. Lt. Clark, Div Ln O, conducted him to Division.

At 0855 it was decided to give awards at the GP at 1500. The awards would be given by the Commanding General.

The morning was spent in conferences and in planning for future operations. Capt. Steckla was directed to pick a location for a future GP in the vicinity of Gouffroyville. The Medics and Collecting Co. were oriented on our front lines - to be. At 1135 the Cml Col., now connected with the FA Fire Direction, stated they would rake the edge of the Island at H-5 - smoke according to direction of wind.

The first part of the afternoon was spent checking on plans with adjacent units and artillery concentrations. At 1335 Lt. Col. Clarke arrived from Division. He stated plans worked out yesterday and this morning were approved. 0100 would be "move-up" plan. All units concerned were informed.

At 1400 General Landrum phones and announced the postponement of the attack for 24 hours. All units were notified of the change.

At 1500 General Landrum presented the awards to the Officers and Men of the 358th Infantry. The ceremony, though simple, was impressive.

In a small farmhouse courtyard, a guard of honor stood at attention. The General's Aid read the name and accomplishment of each Officer and man, to receive a decoration. That man then was presented, by the General, with his award. The following named men were decorated:

SILVER STAR:

2d Lt. Woods, T/4 Sincowitz, Major La Forge, Capt Moniso, Major Schultz
1st Lt. Campbell, T/Sgt. Haggerness.

BRONZE STAR:

Lt. Col. Christian H. Clarke, Jr., T/Sgt. Renoff, S/Sgt Wilson,
Sgt Selmer, Sgt. Rovezzi, T/5 Hahn, Sgt. Larson, PFC Hartman, PFC Dugan.

At 1555 Lt. Col. Seeger conferred with Major Wallace on the coming attack and the various phases of it. Capt Wise, CO Cn Co., reported shells landed 200 yards in rear of his GP at 1700. By 1721 all lines were out due to enemy shelling. 3d Bn reported 10 casualties. At 1845 Major Falvey left for Division and the 4th AD. 1900 and Lt. Clark, Ln O to Division was promoted to 1st Lt!

At 2150 Major Wallace and Capt Steckla discussed the location of the New GP.

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Authority **NND 735017**
 By **13x** NARA Date **12/9**

19 July 1944 (page 43)

HISTORY

358th Infantry

All was quiet during the night for the 358th Infantry. Negative reports were filed hourly with G-3.

By 1015 FO #11 (Regt'1) was completed and Capt Shipe left for the units concerned with copies. Capt Midget, 315th Regt., stated he would be in CP later to "go into the plan" for the coming attack. Patrols stated Seves River as passable for tanks.

At 1045 General Lendrum arrived at the CP. Lt. Hougan was directed to bury the wire leading into the CP. Artillery was to be limited, after the initial preparation, (600 rds) to 17 rds per gun. Cml Bn to put smoke on hill during preparation. Arty was to zero in and fire at intervals.

General Lendrum toured the Division area and as a result, ordered that men, at all times, carry arms and ammunition. The General found (area not designated) gun crews asleep, soldiers out on roads without their arms, ammunition or helmets.

All units were acquainted with changes in attack order. At 1445 a German plane crashed nearby and another flew low and strafed. At 1500 G-2 phoned and stated that the pilot of the crashed plane was reported to have bailed out and requested that the 358 check this. More enemy planes now flew over. A number of the I&R was dispatched to the 1st Bn to check on the pilot.

At 1538 the British were reported "breaking thru" at Caen!

At 1600 Lt. Col. Clarke phoned Lt. Col. Loomis and informed him of the following:

"A fwd observer will accompany attacking Bns (1st & 2d). 4.2 Cml fire will precede advancing troops closely. Observer will use radio and pyrotechnics to direct mortar fire."

Capt Shipe now notified the 1st and 2d Bns of the above message.

At 1615 Sgt. Shannon, I&R, reported that the German pilot landed in a swamp, and that there wasn't much left of the plane. The 4th Rcn, however, had captured the pilot. "A" Co. of the Engineers, had the pilot first, but the 4th Rcn, took him from them.

The 1st Bn reported that during the plane attack, butterfly bombs landed in their area.

At 1640 the 359th Inf. reported that the Seves River, 10 to 15 feet wide and 1 1/2 feet deep, was fordable. However, grenades were thrown at the men who crossed and mortars fell on the men who did not. Lt. Col. Seeger notified CP that if the tanks left, as per order of attack, they would destroy the surprise element of his attack.

The "Butterfly Bombs" turned out to be a part of the wrecked plane!

The 357th Inf reported their positions at 1710, and at the same time reported that the 4th AB had attempted to "break thru" the 357! Result: three casualties for the 357! Tank plan and fires were now coordinated with the Regt'1 plan. Units were informed of the Seves River situation. Roads cleared of mines were reported. Capt Wise, Cn Co. CO, stated he would move his company by infiltration and emplace his guns.

At 1925, Lt. Col. Clarke phoned from Division that the 3d Bn would relieve 3d Bn 359, effective 2330. 2d Bn reported "no pyrotechnics". Artillery General Divine, reported "very little ammo". The attack would possibly be held off on this account. Capt. Steckla, Regt'1 Comm. O., was directed to get more flares and necessary flare signals. At 1940 the time of relief of the 358th 3d Bn was changed to 2000/200.

Three French civilians, who had come through the German lines, reported to Major Falvey, who questioned them. The Regt'1 Cndr. now stated that, for the coming attack, the Regt'1 CP would be well fwd, and the not required by Div, "M" Co and mortars would be ready to fire on call. By 2000 Major Strickler (Div) had 800 rds of mortar ammo for the Regiment. Mine field, both enemy and friendly, were reported and information passed on. At 2055 the attack was again postponed. Again, all units concerned were notified. The lack of ammunition was the reason for the postponement. The 3d Bn, however, would go right ahead with its plans.

At 2345, Capt Burns, 3d Bn S-3, reported that the Bn line-up would be: L on left; I on right; K in res. They would go into the same positions that the 358th had used. Division was notified by Major Wallace.

Authority NND 735017

By 13r NARA Date 12/9

20 July 1944 (page #1)

HISTORICAL

358th Infantry

At 0250 Lt. Col Bealke reported that his Battalion had completed the relief of the 3d Bn 359. No enemy activity. This information was reported to G-3. At 0345 mortar fire landed in "L" Co's area. There was, however, no damage. At 0415 "I" Co. reported intermittent artillery fire - 3 or 4 shells at a time. 1st and 2d Bns reported "all quiet". Artillery fire in "I" Co. area ceased at 0535. No casualties. At 0600 a summary of the night activities was phoned to G-3.

At 1050 "M" Co. reported two casualties as result of early morning shelling. By 1243, 3d Bn reported that patrols had been sent out but that visibility was very poor on the Island. The enemy was in front of "I" Co. and that Company was receiving MG fire. They would not send out patrols unless contact with enemy was lost. At 1300 the 3d Bn received artillery fire.

At 1307 General Landrum arrived at the OP.

Now Major Wallace and Capt Hawk, 712th Tk Bn worked out a series of Hand Signals for use between tankers and infantrymen. Capt Moore, our first casualty in Normandy, a Captain who had been wounded and evacuated, was reported back and would return tonight to the Regiment with 25 enlisted men who were also 358 and who had been wounded. Replacements were being instructed in hedgerow fighting and also in Infantry-Tank coordination.

At 1420 "I" Co. reported artillery falling on them and they believed it was coming from a mobile gun. Major Wallace contacted the artillery and requested that they send a plane aloft to spot enemy artillery guns.

At 1855 Division notified Lt. Col. Clarke that the attack would probably be 1200 or 1500 21 July. A four hour notice would be given. Troops must be ready and move anytime after 0900. At 2200 the 2d Bn reported the capture of a French civilian who had been caught tapping in on our wires. One civilian, who had resisted, had been beaten over the head by a soldier. Major Falvey sent these prisoners to the CIC at Division. The OP reported that the enemy track vehicles could be heard moving toward the south.

The story of the apprehended French civilians now ran into complications. The men who picked them up had been drinking. Eventually, the Frenchmen were released.

By 2256 overlays, accompanying Reg'l FO #11, were distributed to units concerned.

At 2310 the Rear Echelon reported that Major Nichols, Reg'l S-3, who had been wounded and sent to England, would return to the regiment in the morning.

The 3d Bn reported that they were sending out patrols, and that during the shelling during the day, one man was killed and one man was wounded.

21 July 1944

History

358th Infantry

The attack was again changed. This time to the 22nd of July. During the night all was fairly quiet in the Battalions. The OP reported lights on the Island. Patrols reported various noises coming from the Island. Track vehicles were heard. Artillery landed in the vicinity of the OP. The OP was directed to get a bearing on the SP gun that had been harassing them. There was also flat trajectory fire on a road leading to the OP. By 0200, however, the OP reported situation generally quiet. The SP gun, however, would fire 3 or 4 rounds and then move. It could not be definitely located. German planes flew high and one cut off its motor and coasted over the area.

At 0215 3d Bn reported it had a leaflet that the nazis had "shot" over our lines. Its contents were as follows:

On the front - a picture of a young man and a girl having a good time in the U.S. The caption read: "Why are you fighting here, 2000 miles from home when you could be home making money and having a good time? Why are you here, sucker? Just filling the big shots pockets with money!" It also went on to mention the Nazi threat in the western Hemisphere!

This leaflet and its message was reported to Division. The leaflet would be picked up later by Lt. Clark, Ia, O.

At 0500 Capt Burns, S-3 3d Bn, reported a gap between 3d Bn and 357's right. An "L" Co. patrol had been fired upon. Major Falvey notified 357 and Division.

Due to the stormy weather and the effect of the rain on the roads, Lt. Col. Loomis and Lt. Hougren made a reconnaissance of the roads that the regiment would be most likely to use.

And now came the news that a revolution had broken out in Germany!

At 1058 Major Falvey had an IPW man look over a German document that had been found by the 1st Bn. The OP reported Germans coming and going from a house at 281756.

At noon Lt. Col. Clark directed that all new officers be indoctrinated with the Regimental SOP as thoroughly, and as soon as, possible. At 1245 3d Bn patrols stated that the Bridge (3 Arch Stone) over the Seves was "out". No enemy was contacted this side of the river. Patrols were going out every hours.

General Landrum, at 1420, informed the Regimental Commander that the 358 plan of attack would probably go on tomorrow. The 358 would take the Island of St Germain Sur Seves.

At 1555 "L" Co. received small arms fire. By 1650 2d Bn was on the Island, AT Co. was south of the Island and Cannon Co. was in positions.

At 1700 Major Arthur L. Nichols, Jr. returned to duty after being wounded and evacuated at Etienville. The OP reported mortar fire and gave the azimuth. 3d Bn OP to check it. At 1750 General Devine (Arty) stated Arty Prep. would be H-2 and lift at H-Hours. At 1815 2d Bn reported that 20 shells landed in their area, 15 of which were dud!

At 1854 the area S/W of Gorges was being shelled by 88's or 75's. The 357 asserted they would coordinate their artillery with the 358th for the coming operation. The 3d Bn was informed by Major Falvey that they could move anytime now. 1st Bn reported that during the recent shelling 45 shells out of 102 were dud!

Authority NNDT35017By JGR NARA Date 12/9

21 July 1944 (pg #2)

History

358th Infantry

At 2000 hours the Regimental Commander directed the Bn CO's meet with him at the CP. Major Nichols and Capt Shipe left the CP to check on the tanks, then to go to the new CP. At 2030 the Bn Cmdr and the Reg'l Cndr conferred on the plans of attack. All supporting fires from B-2 to H Hour. TD's then go to targets of opportunity. Cml mortars to fire on call, and lift range after initial barrage. 2d Bn to have liaison with 359, 1st Bn with 357. 4th AD will coordinate fires. LD will NOT be road, but a row of trees. ATTACK AT 0630. Engineers will make two crossings - and will take all mine trucks. Questions arose concerning the SP weapon that has been harassing 3d Bn and the pill box that has been "bothering" Lt. Col. Sager. Ammunition was discussed. Major Knouf, S-4, informed the assembly that there was a surplus, in addition to basic loads.

At 2200 the CP reported "no activity". 2d Bn was to move about midnight.

Capt. Rice reported mortar fire near his Cannon Co. at 2300. All units were given overlays on Headquarters. The Regimental Commander and his Ex. O. left for the CP. Major Nichols briefed the TD Cndr and Major Wallace briefed the Cml Mortar Officer and explained where and when to "smoke". At 2340 Lt. Col.'s Clarke and Loomis returned to the CP.

All was now coordinated and planned for the coming battle, which was to go down in 358th Infantry annals as a splendid example of heroism, doggedness and loyalty - of heartache and disappointment.

Hq 90th Inf. Div
APO 90, U.S. Army
201200 July 1944

CORRECTED COPY

FO #15

3. By 368th Infantry

Attack: Co. A, 712 Tt Bn
Co. A, 88 Qml Bn.

- (1) Attack within Z at H-Hour clear enemy resistance from island E to St. Germain Sur Seves and seize obj C & D
- (2) Protect the left flank of the Division.

(NOTE—THIS ORDER WAS ALSO SUPERSEDED)

22 July 1944

HISTORY

359th Infantry

During the early morning hours Major Wallace requested the OP to locate the arty emplacements that had been harassing the Regiment, and, by sound and flash system, the OP reported several coordinates and azimuths during the night. The OP also reported many flares over the Island and the sound of much vehicular movement. The movement seemed to be going S and SE.

3d Bn reported that there were enemy flares in the vicinity of "L" Co. By 0318 the 2d Bn was "arriving" and had closed in by 0325. By 0400 the 3d Bn had been requested to send a patrol to the Island to the vicinity of the Chateau. This Bn reported that there was still considerable activity to the front of "L" Co.

At 0545 the 1st Bn was moving to the LD. The Sky was completely overcast. Visibility was poor. All units now coordinated their time. At 0555 the 2d Bn was moving to the LD.

At H-2 (0628) the artillery opened fire. When the preparation was over, the enemy shot several orange flares.

At 0630 the assault Bns moved. Lt. Col. Clarke, Reg'l CO was at the fwd OP. The tanks had, by 0655, been hit by mortar and artillery fire. General Landrum arrived at the OP. Lt. Col. Loomis notified the 3d Bn that the 1st and 2d Bns have crossed the LD on time. By 0700 the Cml Mortar Co. stated that they were ready to lay smoke on the high ground to provide cover for the bridge building team.

At 0712 the 1st Bn was held up by stiff enemy resistance, mostly MG's, but they were attempting a maneuver to by-pass the resistance.

Liaison officers with the 1st and 2d Bns reported at 0720 that no one yet was across the stream. The OP reported visibility zero, due to haze and smoke. 2d Bn, out of contact with fwd elements, was receiving heavy mortar fire.

At 0728 the 1st Bn had passed the resistance. The TD guns had gone fwd and were firing on selected targets. Co. "F" committed its reserve. They were receiving "everything the enemy had." They were 50 yards from the creek. By 0737 2d Bn reported two company commanders "out of action".

At 0755 there had been no stream crossing. The two Bns had been stopped. It was decided to have the artillery preparation again and to start again to cross the stream.

Several houses were strongholds, and the artillery was given their locations and directed to fire on them. The artillery prep. was set for 0840 to 0845. Units concerned were contacted and the new plans imparted.

At 0817 the 359th was requested by Major Wallace to give some assistance by firing on some targets on the 1st Bn's right flank. The Cub plane was sent up to locate artillery positions that were harassing and hampering the 2d Bn. The 357 was notified of the artillery prep to come and were invited to "join in". "F" Co. was still receiving heavy fire.

At 0840 the artillery again opened up, and finished at 0845. The range was now raised. An observer reported at 0848 that the 2d Bn had not moved under cover of the preparation.

At 0855 elements of "E" Co had reached the stream. Lt. Col. Clarke was now "up front" with Lt. Col. Seeger., Co, 1st Bn. When Lt. Col. Clarke returned he stated they were continuously being shot at. At 0910 "G" Co was committed to the left of "E" Co.

At 0925 Major Wallace informed the artillery that their fire landed just right. 2d Bn was using artillery to full advantage. By 0930 Lt. Col. Munson, artillery, stated that the enemy artillery was long range. At 0945 the Cml Mortar were ordered to fire more smoke. At 1000 "G" Co. replaced "E" Co. They were now near the river.

General Landrum, at 1010, notified Division of the long range artillery and ordered them to send up planes when the weather broke.

2d Bn now ran into more heavy mortar fire and also long range MG fire on its left flank. "F" Co., at the creek, was receiving heavy small arms fire and "G" Co. was receiving mortar fire.

Authority NND 735017
 By 13r NARA Date 12/9

22 July 1944 (pg #2)

History

358th Infantry

General Landrum, at 1017, advised G-3 to get some air support to knock out the artillery.

Lt. Col. Clarke told Major Chandler, CO 2d Bn, to make sure that the men be told that if they reached the Island, enemy artillery fire would cease, because their own troops were there also.

At 1020 General Landrum received a "promise" of air combat reconnaissance. "E" Co. reported 35 casualties, including their CO. "G" Co. was moving slowly. Gen. Landrum now advised artillery to consider their patterns of fire to see if they may have passed over some likely mortar positions. The artillery was also given permission to fire on the Chateau. The Bns now located enemy positions. Some they worked on themselves, and had artillery fire on others.

At 1055 the Reg'l CO suggested to 1st Bn CO that he rush small groups across the stream. "B" Co. was now up with "G" Co.

By 1101 an "I" Co. observer stated a part of "F" Co. was across the stream. Major Schultz, 2d Bn, stated he did not think there were many Germans on the Island. He added that "F" Co. was in buildings.

At 1215 1st Bn was "about ready" to cross the stream!

3d Bn now reported at 1245 that a great many shells were landing near their CP. They could only be coming from a battery of enemy artillery. By 1300 Lt. Col. Bealke reported that incoming shells causing casualties. 2d Bn CP was now under artillery fire and the CP was receiving mortar fire. 1st Bn was said (unconfirmed) to have advanced 100 yards. This advance should put them across the river.

Capt Steckla, Reg'l Comm. O., was ordered at 1325 to take a radio to the front lines to direct Cml Mortar fire. "C" Co. crossed the stream. "B" Co. also across and captured several PW's. General Landrum suggested that the artillery Cndr was not pushing his observers enough.

At 1338 Major Chandler complained that he couldn't get his men forward. General Landrum discussed putting up bridges to get tanks on Island to support the Infantry. Capt. Midget, Engr. O., stated that tanks could cross without bridges.

A PW stated that there were three (3) Companies (90 men ea) of the 6th Para. Reg't on the Island. At 1415 Lt. Col. Bealke reported that enemy artillery has 3d Bn pinned down. He suggested it would be easier to move at night. General Landrum ordered the laying of more smoke. At 1425 2d Bn was stopped. Corps now aided by furnishing counter-battery support. 2d Bn reported that heavy artillery fire completely disorganized three companies!

General Landrum again called Division concerning air observation. He stated he believed Germans were using church in St. Germain for their observation. He ordered more fire on the church.

At 1435 Major Chandler reported he was attempting to get "G" Co. across stream to join the 1st Bn. At 1453 the 1st Bn was still in same position. 3d Bn was still receiving heavy fire. Lt. Col. Bealke thought artillery fire coming from Periers.

General Devine, Artillery, was briefed at 1500 by Lt. Col. Clarke.

The Regimental Commander phoned the 2d Bn and asked if tanks could help "G" Co. cross the stream. Major Chandler was then ordered to get "E" and "G" Co's across the stream, with tanks, and get on the north flank of the island, on the left of the 1st Bn. The Bn CO stated he would use the route used by 1st Bn to cross. 357 reported no movement seen in the vicinity of the Chateau.

Lt. Col. Seeger reported he did not want to move tanks across until he had "more room". He stated that at present, 1550, he was "working on" some buildings that were giving him trouble. He was then notified of Major Chandler's plan of moving "E" and "G" Co's and tanks up behind 1st Bn and then to circle around to the east.

At 1600 correspondents from LIFE Magazine arrived at the CP and were briefed by Lt. Col. Clarke. They planned to visit the Bn CP's. Major Knouf, Reg'l S-4, arrived and reported on the ammunition situation.

22 July 1944 (pg #3)

HISTORY

358th Infantry

At 1620 Lt. Col. Clarke notified 2d Bn that smoke was to be shot to blind enemy observers. "F" Co. was reported now to have but 50 men! They withdrew to allow tanks to work on buildings. Effect of tanks not great, however. At 1643 "A" Co. was across the stream, and "B" and "C" co's were swinging east. The Regimental OP asked if they could see any elements of "E", "G" or "F" Co's. The answer was "no". At 1700, General Landrum, who now expected a counter-attack, ordered the artillery to be prepared to bring down heavy concentrations.

At 1700 Major Chandler reported that "G" Co. was "going across" and that he was going to take "E" Co. over.

G-2 reported that the enemy was withdrawing from the Island. A PW gave the location of some German CP's. Major Falvey passed this information along to the Division Artillery. At 1743 1st Bn was using TD's of two enemy tanks!

By 1810, "F" Co. was reported (unconfirmed) across the stream. Lt. Col. Clarke ordered that the bridge be secured so that supplies could be brought out. He also ordered that wire be layed across the stream. At 1820 3d Bn was still being shelled and tanks were remaining fast.

At General Landrum's direction, Lt. Col. Clarke ordered Bns to get stragglers together at a point in the rear and then send them to their respective units. At 1838 Division was furnished an overlay giving the disposition of the 358 troops. Lt. Col. Loomis now assumed command of the 2d Bn, relieving Major Chandler. By 1853 "E" Co. and all of "G" Co was across the stream. The situation was now that all, or parts of all, companies were on the Island. "E" Co. was N-S along the trail about 200 yards, "G" Co. on the left and "F" Co. on the right. "F" Co was being resupplied with ammunition. Lt. Col. Seeger was ordered to lay wire to where his troops were. "E" Co. was now tied in with "A" Co.

At 1925 two Bns (less 1 rifle Co) were attempting to swing around and take the bridge out in reverse. They would block approaches to the eastern road and box-in anything that tried to reach the road. Mines were to be layed on approaches by AT Co. At 1940 3d Bn reported that Germans had "shot" propoganda at them. At 1945 1st Bn received a counter-attack! 2d Bn was informed and instructed to give aid. The 357th was also notified and they promised to "lay" mortar on the road. The enemy was using time fire.

Now a further complication - "E" Co was NOT across the stream! 2d Bn was now receiving heavy mortar fire. The 357 was laying long range machine gun fire on the road area. The Division arty was shooting all over the enemy held part of the Island. "C" Co. CP was now surrounded! (as of 1945)

At 2025 Lt. Col. Clarke ordered the reserve tank platoon committed. "E" Co. was now in contact with "G" Co. and the 1st Bn. The Germans were reported to be digging-in near the Chateaur. Major Wallace informed the artillery of this and requested fire. Major Falvey reported that green grease paint was now available to paint our troops faces.

At 2105 the S-3, 3d Bn, reported that a patrol had been sent to the bridge, but every time it moved it received small arms fire from buildings. 2d Bn reported that the leader of the tanks be contacted and ordered to report to him.

At 2113 the Regimental OP reported "things quieting down a bit". The tank leader reported to the Regimental Commander and stated he was ordered back by Major Schultz to refuel and rearm. He added his tanks had fired 100 rounds of ammunition in support of the 2d Bn. "E" Co. requested artillery fire. 1st Bn reported that our artillery fire was landing too close to the Bn.

Two 358th Infantry Men, who had been captured, escaped and were now at the 1st Bn CP. At 2140 G-3 requested that he get troops "spotted" before dark so he could plan artillery fire. At 2115 Major Falvey was informed by 1st Bn that five tanks had crossed the stream.

At 2200 Capt Steckla went aloft in the Cub plane in an attempt to contact companies by radio. Lt. Col. Seeger stated one AT gun got across but he thought it was now lost. Lt. Col. Loomis, CG 2d Bn, was ordered to consolidate and to rally everything he had.

By 2230 the 2d Platoon of tanks had crossed the stream and were promptly surrounded. They were in radio contact, and were told to "stay put" and not to withdraw. There were now 2 platoons of tanks on the Island.

22 July 1944 (pg #4)

HISTORY

358th Infantry

At 2300 Lt. Col. Loomis reported no small arms fire for thirty minutes, but he was receiving spasmodic artillery and mortar fire. He was now attempting to get the balance of his battalion across the stream.

The artillery was given specific points to zero in on and to fire on them on call. At 2320 Division was again given the front line positions. The artillery was now working on a defensive fire plan.

At 2326 2d Bn reported some tanks. At 2330, Lt. Col. Clarke to Lt. Col. Seeger: "Get two wires in to OP. Get up with your troops. Get actual trace of front lines." From Lt. Col. Clarke to Lt. Col. Loomis: "continue getting across. Tie-in with 1st Bn. Dig in. Rations, etc, on the way. Get wires in. You personally get troops organized."

At 2345 the 3d Bn was still rounding up stragglers of the 1st and 2d Bns.

At 2400 defense was all "buttoned up."

23 July 1944

HISTORY

58th Infantry

An aid man pulled him back to the North side of the creek, but due to persistent MG fire was unable to evacuate him. Major Knouf was only 30 yards from Lt. Col. Seeger when he surrendered. Co F was with the 1st Bn. (Due to the nature of Major Knouf's wounds, he was not questioned on the details of the surrender.) Sgt. Robt. L. Teaslie was with Lt. Col. Seeger when he gave the order to "cease firing". The Sgt was wounded and evacuated.

At 1822, Chaplain Stohler reported that the German Officer (of the truce) stated he had captured 200 of our men, 11 officers (one a Lt. Col.) Division ordered a meeting of Regimental Commanders at Div CP at 2000.

Due to the capture of so many men, an alternate SOI (Signal Operations Instr) was put into use. It had been reported that along with the capture of the men several of our radios had been taken by the Germans.

Colonel McNary directed that adjacent units be informed that some of the 358 men, who were not wounded, might be "roaming about the Island".

At 1934, General Landru, CG 90th Div, was given the latest situation and informed on the closing-in of the Bns for the night.

Overlays were now received of all battalions. At 2115, Lt. Col. Clarke called a meeting of all battalion commanders and special unit commanders. At 2130, enemy fire was falling in OP area.

At 2315, Capt Olson left the CP with orders to procure all the bazookas he could get.

At 2325, Major Lytle arrived and was introduced by Capt Caldecott and briefed by Major Wallace.

At 2355, Co "A" Cml Mortars reported mortar and artillery fire in their area.

And so the clock and time proclaimed a day's end - but a day that showed to all, that the 58 could take it. Only by overwhelming odds would sit them back a foot - and they met those odds today.

Casualties for the Day:

KIA	1 Off	68 EM
WIA	5	99
MIA	11	254
Repl	1	0

24 July 1944

HISTORY

358th Infantry

At 0108 the 3rd Bn, still occupying a defensive sector, reported considerable motor movement on the Island. As to the situation, the Bn reported but little shelling and no casualties. However, at 0220 L Co reported a shelling and three casualties.

At 0300, G-3 was notified of the activities. 3rd Bn Ex O, Major Oehlson, reported Motor movement on Island quieting down, and shelling had ceased.

The Regt'l CP at 0400 received artillery shells which landed just South of it, and twelve minutes later received a barrage of artillery and mortar fire. G-3 was notified by Capt. Shipe. This fire continued until 0540. All units were contacted and warned that this might be either a preparation for a counter-attack or a concentration on roads to keep us from making a dawn attack.

At 0600, the weather reports came in: Clouds to break at 1200, clear by 1500, visibility 1/2 mile in fog, 3 miles by 1200 - 6 miles by 1500.

By 0610, L Co and 3rd Bn reported all quiet. There were no casualties in the Bns as a result of the nights shelling except those reported (3) in L Co and 3 in the Regt'l CP. At 0735, L Co reported "a few" enemy to their front. At 0850, L Co reported an enemy patrol, 6 men, to their front and requested fire on them. This request was passed on to Division.

At 0912, Major Schulz was made Bn Comdr of the 2nd Bn and Major Lytle Ex O. It was expected that the Regt would go into a defensive position at noon.

At 0920 the Bn Command was:

1st Bn Lt. Col. Loomis CO
Major La Forge Ex O
2nd Bn Major Schulz CO
Major Lytle Ex O
3rd Bn Lt. Col. Bealke CO
Major Oehlson Ex O

Plans for defensive position were now began by Major Wallace.

At 1020, Col. McNary announced that at the earliest possible time, the 358th Infantry would assume the defensive position of the Div (less the 359th Inf) and will have combat groups covering the front. It must include a reserve, as it has a big front to cover. Offense weapons might be taken away and given to units attacking the Island. The Reg't is to be assisted by the 90th Rcn Tp. 3rd Bn to occupy its present position.

Col. McNary contacted the 357th Inf and coordinated plans for defense. Bn Comdrs were briefed.

At 1100, Col. McNary informed G-3 it would be after dark before the relief of the 357th would be completed. Bns were alerted and informed that orders would be issued later.

At 1110, Bn Comdrs were ordered to report to the CP. The S-4 left for the QM to obtain weapons for men without the proper arms. Bombers (friendly) passed over and circled the Island and PERIERS. Bn Comdrs arrived at CP at 1140 and were informed on newest plans - that there would be 4 OPs, also patrols to the bridge and the Chateau. The Bns would occupy sectors assigned by 1600. AT and Cn Co's would be prepared to fire in compliance with orders at that time.

The artillery was informed of the 358th plans. Bombing mission was delayed until aerial reconnaissance spots guns on Island.

At 1235, Col. McNary left for Division to confer with Gen. Landrum on the coming operation. The Division Historian arrived with newsmen to get the story of the two chaplains who arranged the truce on the island.

At 1333, Col. McNary returned from Div Hqs. The relief of the 357th by the 358th was now postponed. Reconnaissance, however, was to be continued. Units were now informed to hold up on moving troops. The arty was likewise informed.

Col. McNary stated that the tanks would remain with the 358th Inf. The 4th A.D. would not be used to attack the Eastern end of the Island. The air preparation today was not in the 90th Div sector. For movement onto the Island, our own artillery would be used, plus 2 other FA's on call. There would be no Cml. Mortars supporting us for offence or defence. However, tanks might be used on either offence or defence or both. The 358th Inf attack depended on the progress of the adjacent units. The 358 would be in Division Reserve when the next phase starts, hence must be ready to move in any direction. He directed that the S-3's plans for the use of tanks and the movement of troops.

At 1356, Lt. Col. Clarke briefed Major Nichols, who had just returned with information of the 357th on the newest plans. All Bns would be in their position not later than 1600.

At 1419, Lt. Donohue, Ln O, reported MP's are halting all vehicles to ascertain if arms and belts are being carried and worn.

Information on enemy strongholds and positions that the 358th had observed and hit on the Island was now passed on to units concerned.

At 1449, Major Chandler, relieved CO of 2nd Bn, arrived at the CP.

Information and plans were exchanged with adjacent units during the afternoon.

Lt. Hougen, I & R Leader, reported, after a reconnaissance, on possible OP locations.

At 1630, Gen Landru directed Col. McNary to have Bn CO report to the Regt'l CP at 1720. Major Nichols notified the Bns.

At 1715, the 3rd Bn reported that the Germans were dug in across the river, West of Seves. There was, however, no unusual activity.

By 1720, the three Bn CO's were at the CP. Major Wallace notified 3rd Bn that there were to be two (2) air missions; 1 at 1730 lat 1745. He suggested 3rd Bn "take cover".

At 1728, Gen Landrum entered the CP and had a conference with the Regt'l and Bn Staff Officers. By 1830, the conference was over and the General left.

The S-2's and S-3's now conferred with Tank Officers on the use of tanks in the forthcoming operations. The Bn commanders discussed personnel. The 712th Tank Officer notified his unit to move nearer to the 358th CP. It was learned that Major Knouf was now at the 45th Surgical Hospital.

Three Colonels from the IG arrived at 1950 and conferred with Col. McNary. Co I reported incoming shells at 2040 - no casualties. At 2115, the IG party left.

At 2210, Lt. Rudes, 3rd Bn, reported on the Island Bombing mission. The planes came in low and really bombed mortar and machine gun emplacements. Some bombs failed to explode because they were dropped from too low an altitude. The planes also strafed as they bombed. (Observers were unable to the effect of the strafing). The effect of this bombing was a 100 percent morale booster for the front line troops.

At 2227, 3rd Bn also reported shells that landed in their area. They were directed to get location or direction of fire.

At 2240, Lt. Aughtry reported the enemy was endeavoring to use our radios that they had captured. Major Wallace notified 1st and 2nd Bns that relief would be effected some time tomorrow as it had been scheduled for today.

By 2300 CO, Co A 712th Tank Bn, reported his unit all closed in its new area. The OP reported trucks moving on road on the South side of the Island. Capt Foster, 344 FA, called his unit to fire on this road.

Thus ended another 24 hours of History making for the 358th Infantry.

Casualties for the day:

KIA	Off - 0	EM - 2
WIA	1	16
MIA	0	0
Repl	0	3

25 July 1944

HISTORY

3rd Infantry

During the night 3rd Bn reported much vehicular movements on the Island and construed it was troop movements. The furnished this location and direction of movement and had artillery fire on it. A cub plane was requested for an early reconnaissance of the designated areas to ascertain results of the shelling. Flares were reported over 3rd Bn positions. A German plane flew over the Regt'l CP for quite a while, looking, no doubt, for the artillery positions. The CP received a great deal of shell fire in its immediate vicinity. Some of the shells landed in the 1st Bn. Division was kept informed of all activities. The 3rd Bn was warned that a German plane had strafed in the 359th and 357th sectors.

Cannon Co reported that a plane flew over them at 0245 and then rifle fire was heard. Suggested paratrooper landing. Major Falvey discounted this, however, but warned the Bns.

3rd Bn reported captured PW. They were instructed to send him along as soon as possible.

The enemy shot propaganda leaflets over the front lines. 3rd Bn stated more Germans "were going to surrender."

1st Bn reported 5 casualties as a result of shelling. Capt. Beville claimed over 100 shells had landed - some with delayed fuzes.

The German prisoners, now at the PW cage, wanted to return to their lines (with an American soldier) for five more Germans who wanted to surrender! The request was turned down!

At 0500, the weather report was received - low clouds, and thunder showers.

A PW from the Island stated that Germans had been instructed not to fire across stream but to wait until troops were crossing. He claimed they had plenty of ammunition and excellent food.

Arty fire was called for by 3rd Bn at 0650 on Island road running North and South. Vehicles running on that road reported to be personnel carriers. 3rd Bn also reported that they had laid mortar fire on a group of Germans who were digging in in an orchard and had driven them off. A patrol was now out.

At 0820, the Regt'l was informed as to D Day and H Hour. 3rd Bn was notified of a bombing mission on a town near PERLIERS. Major Falvey made plans to "broadcast" to the Island tonight. Replacements were reported as being frightened when they reached their units. Col. McNary questioned the training they were getting at the rear echelon.

At 1112, the Cannon Co forward observer "picked up" a concentration of enemy soldiers and asked permission to fire on them. Col. McNary stated that any concentration of enemy troops or vehicles should draw immediate fire.

The Regt'l Comdr left the CP for the 3rd Bn to help with the coming plans. Line company officers, at the CP, discussed the great harm that rumors were causing. Lt. Anderson, Co F, cited a case where Americans surrendered to the enemy when the Germans yelled in English "88's and mortars". Co I reported five artillery shells landed in their area, coming from due south.

At 1145, G-1 checked with Lt. Col. Clarke on the officers who had been captured. The relief for the 2nd and 3rd Bns to be effective at 1500. Major Nichols notified the units concerned.

By 1200, the 3rd Bn claimed they believed the artillery guns firing on them had been located and that they were going to take the "proper steps". The 3rd Bn also reports that mortar fire was now falling on their CP. The cannon company counter-battery fire landed in the vicinity of the Regt'l CP. Major Wallace took steps to rectify this.

At 1210, Major Wallace notified the Bns that each company should have at least one ground signal projector. At 1235, Lt. Donohue returned from the 359th and stated that the 359th 2nd Bn expected to close in their assembly area at 1630. The 3rd Bn would be close behind. Written orders were to be issued during the afternoon.

At 1237, Col. Davenport, Div Surgeon, and the Division Psychiatrist arrived at the CP and discussed the types of cases they were receiving.

At 1250, Lt. Col. Clarke ordered, that during Reserve Period, 1st and 2nd Bn and Spec Units would get hot meals (breakfast and supper at least) and that plans for kitchens for the 3rd Bn would be announced later.

At 1325, patrols reported that Germans were wearing American field jackets and helmets. Major Wallace returned from 359th with information on their attack plans and where and when they wanted the 358th supporting fires. Lt. Col. Stilwell, G-3, phoned that the Reconnaissance Mortars could be used to support the 2nd Bn and to shell the Chateau St Germain. He also stated that the responsibility for the present area passed to the 358th Inf at 1600.

25 July 1944

HISTORY

358th Infantry

At this time Lt. Dengler, IPW Officer, was ordered to Division for a few days and M/Sgt Midener, his Ass't, was put in charge of the PW Cage.

At 1430, the following message was received:

CO 358th Inf - Relief of 357th Inf by the 358th Inf will be initiated at 1500, 25 July. The responsibility for sector will pass to CO 358th Inf at 1800
25 July 1944 CG, 90th Inf Div.

By 1450, the 1st Bn had closed in its area. Gen. Devine (Arty) at the CP, discussed artillery part of tomorrow's attack. The use of flares at night was discussed and Capt Steckla, Regt'l Comm O, was questioned as to the amount and type of flares available. Col. McNary stated he would initiate patrols when attack begins.

All units, local and adjacent, were contacted regarding patrolling, of any unit, during the night.

At 1545, the clearing station inaugurated a new set-up to determine extent of "battle fatigue". It was now planned to send patrols tonight to the vic of where our troops crossed the stream, and to the buildings near there. They were to check on the alertness, activity, and presence of the enemy. These patrols would be officer-led. All members of the patrols would be thoroughly informed of the mission and oriented on photo maps.

Major Falvey, at 1630, conferred with the Bn S-2's on the forthcoming patrols. The patrols would be allowed to be 4½ hours gone from their area. Major Falvey also announced that he would "broadcast" to the Island tonight. 3rd Bn was almost completely closed-in. AT defence plan for the Regt'l sector was submitted.

At 1730, a Press representative of the Scripps-Howard papers arrived at the CP.

At 1800, the 357th had passed through. The relief was now completed.

Col. McNary now called for Spec Unit Comdrs. 1815 and the 3rd Bn was closed in.

The Colonel spoke to the Spec Unit CO's about the new set-up for "fatigue cases". Legitimate cases would be tagged and sent back to the rear.

At 1845, the artillery "was working on" an AT gun that was firing on I Co. 2nd Bn reported mortar fire. Enemy planes, 3, flew over the area on recon. Major Falvey now stated the "broadcast" would be at 2030. At 1910, L Co's front line received mortar fire. A smoke screen was to be laid over the island to allow the enemy to escape from their lines into ours.

At 1930, G-3 was informed of the activities and plans of the Reg't and also that there was small arms fire on the Eastern end of the Island. At 1956, Major Falvey and Sgt. Midener left to put on the broadcast from 3rd Bn's front. 2nd Bn was directed 2nd Bn was directed to establish a forward CP.

Plans and positions were now received from Bns and adjacent units. The broadcast was held up by a shelling of the selected area. The arty was informed that their fire was falling short of a designated area.

Track vehicles and regular vehicles were heard on the Island. The arty was informed. And so the 358th Inf with plans nearly complete for the coming day, bade a farewell to an eventful day.

26 July 1944

HISTORY

358th Infantry

The Div Order, FO No. 15 (Corrected) dtd 242300 July 1944 was the "Bible" for today, and is excerpted as follows:

Hq 90th Inf Div
242300 July 1944

FO No. 15

1. b. VIII Corps, 4 Divs abreast, (79th, 8th, 90th and 83rd from right to left). attacks H-Hour D Day to seize objectives to the South. 4th AD supports the attack of the 90th Div by fire.

2. 90th Inf Div:

Atchd: 712th Tk Bn
607th TD Bn (T)
537 AAA (AW) Bn (M)
Co A 86th Cml Bn.
687th FA Bn.

Attacks at H Hour, D Day and making its main effort on the right, captures PERIERS and objectives to the South.

Formation, Bdry, Objs, Phase lines, and Schemes of Maneuvers - see overlay.

LD: Present front lines.

3. c. 358th Inf:

Atchd: Co A and Mortar Plat, 712th Tk Bn

- (1) Relieve 357th Inf of present defences (25 July) on orders this Hq.
- (2) Support attack of 359th and 357th Inf by maximum fire of all wps.
- (3) Continue occupation of assigned sector to protect the Div center.
- (4) Be prepared to occupy and clear resistance from Island on order.
- (5) Atchd elements 712th Tk Bn will be prepared to assemble on two hours notice.

LANDRUM
Comdg

STILWELL
G-3

Using the Div Order as a basis, the 358th Inf planned and issued its Regt'l Order, which follows:

OPERATIONS OVERLAY
Map: France 1:25,000

- " 1. 358th Inf supports attack of 359th Inf and 357th Inf 260530 July by fire from its present positions.
 - a. 3rd Bn fires with supporting weapons, targets at (3) (4) (5) commencing at 0528. Fire sustained until 0533, and on targets of opportunity thereafter. Life on order.
 - b. 2nd Bn fires on (1) (2), same schedule, continues firing on targets of opportunity (1) to (5) incl. Lift on order.
 - c. Cannon Co engages targets of opportunity. Life on order.
 - d. 1st Bn - Regt'l Reserve. "

MCNARY
Comdg

WALLACE
S-3

Thus did the Regt prepare for the coming day. During the night the 3rd Bn called for fire on the vehicles moving on the Island. Flares, shot from the ground and dropped from enemy aircraft over the Bn areas were reported.

At 0320, a 1st Bn patrol reported contact with a German OP but got away. Rifle fire was heard on the South side of the Island. They also spotted some positions. The weather forecast stated that the clouds would rise and break by noon. Division was kept informed of all activities and developments. And at 0519, time was coordinated throughout the Reg't.

At 0530, the Arty preparation commenced.

By 0720, elements of the 2nd Bn, 359th, were reported across the stream. 3rd Bn reported no small arms fire since 0600 but much mortar fire. At 0812, the 357 was by-passing RAIDS. Two companies of 359 were on the Island but were making very slow progress. At 0825, the 358th 3rd Bn was still receiving heavy 88 and artillery fire, and some of the fire, the heaviest yet, was coming from a tank.

At 0835, Co. McNary stated that the 2nd Bn had fired all its weapons to give the men confidence in them.

The Island attackers met fire- mortars, artillery, tanks and preponderance of automatic weapons.

At 0855, the 2nd Bn was notified that smoke was to be laid on the Island, and that when it was, they were to "loosen-up" with all kinds of fire, so that the 359th could move.

Gen. Landrum directed that the 3rd Bn place observers to note results of the smoke screen on the Island. Major Falvey stated that there was, at least, one Panzer Div on the Island. A PW stated that the Island defenders were well armed and expected to be reinforced. Arty knocked out a tank - type unknown. Companies on island were not moving.

At 1026, the 3rd Bn reported an OP knocked out by 88 fire. that everyone was dug in, that they received 6 or 7 casualties so far.

Positions of attacking units and adjacent units were reported and plotted as fast as they happened. Cannon Co knocked out a tank. Another was knocked out by a bazooka.

At 1120, Lt. Col. Clarke and Gen. Devine made plans in the event the 358th was called upon to attack the Island. "Fore-armed is the thing!" Road block overlays were prepared and sent to units concerned.

Hot meals for the day!

3rd Bn OP was receiving high velocity fire at 1200.

By 1215, the whole of the 359th had been committed. The Island resistance was still terrific.

German trickery was in evidence at noon when it was discovered that they were wearing american uniforms on the Island to confuse the observers.

Col. McNary and Major Falvey made plans for patrols to go out tonight. Bns were notified an 88 dud landed in 2nd Bn area.

Col. McNary, Lt. Col. Clarke, and Major Wallace made plans for a possible attack.

At 1330, the two companies of 359 on the Island reported they had been counter-attacked three times and were now expecting another. Each counter-attack had been supported by German armor, and at all times they were getting mortar, arty, MG fire.

The enemy was now reported to be booby-trapping all houses that they, themselves were not using.

By 1400, the 358th was generally enjoying comparatively little front line action except for a little mortar fire from the Island. The 357th, however, was pinned down in the vic of the LD and could not move. It was now waiting for the 8th Div to "come up" before attempting a further advance.

At 1405, Stotler, IG officer, arrived. An enemy aircraft was reported over ST 10. Bns were informed to check their camouflage.

The 607th TD Comdr, at the CP, stated that bazookas are effective against tanks, even those with skirts. He suggested that the 358th cover its attacking fronts with his guns.

At 1500, 1st Sgt. Cloutman, C Co, arrived and was interviewed by the Capt., from the IG. The 8th Div sent in an overlay of their positions.

At 1525, the OP moved to a church near NAY as their present OP was now "too hot".

At 1550, Col. Clayton, 6th AD, conferred with Lt. Col. Clarke. He stated he "might" take over the sector. He was briefed on the whole situation by Major Falvey.

At 1645, a platoon of tanks that crossed the stream to support the 2nd Bn, 359th ran into terrific resistance but were holding. The 90th Rcn Tp, less one plat, pulled out from our left flank to our right flank. The 8th Div reported to be having a difficult time. The 2nd Bn, 359th, now received its fourth counter-attack.

27 July 1944

HISTORY

Infantry

During the early morning hours patrols and observers heard motor movements on the island. One patrol saw two (2) Germans leave a house. Another patrol deliberately made a noise, but no one halted them. The 3rd Bn placed interdiction fire on the main island road, in the hope of blasting vehicles. Every indication pointed to a withdrawal. This information was phoned to G-2 and G-3.

At 0650, G-3 ordered that the 1st Bn be alerted. They were, upon order, to go onto the island. At 0705, combat patrols were ordered to go onto the island and check on anything there. The 2nd and 3rd Bns were to furnish these patrols and the patrols were to take plenty of automatic weapons.

It was now raining hard and visibility was practically nil. At 0720, Capt Midyett of the 315th Engrs, asked to have his Engrs assist in the river crossing. A Tank platoon was alerted to support the Bn crossing the river to the island.

At 0735, Col. McNary alerted the 3rd Bn. In the event that the island was to be occupied on short notice, the 3rd Bn would be the logical Bn to do it.

The 3rd Bn reported that there were Germans in SEVES and that Co L, was firing on them and also sending patrols there to investigate.

Col. McNary now called the 2nd Bn and instructed them to route their vehicles through the present 3rd Bn area and that when they crossed the island they would "clean out" their zone. He then gave them their boundaries. He ordered that they send out patrols to definitely establish the fact that there were Germans about.

At 0810, Lt. Col. Stilwell, G-3, reported a PW as stating the enemy had had orders to withdraw at 0100 that morning.

The 357th, in conjunction with the 329th Inf, would jump off at 0900. The 359th reported no enemy to their front and that they would attack at 0900. They were having difficulty, however, in erecting a bridge.

The Regt'l Motor Officer was instructed on how to coordinate with foot troops on the crossing.

One (1) minute before jump off time, 357th reported they still believed that the island was still occupied by the Germans and they were definitely in front of 359.

At 0908, Lt. Col. Bealke, 3rd Bn Comdr, reported enemy in front of Co L. They were receiving small arms fire from a group of houses. Patrol of Co L now moved out. The Regt'l OP reported they could see patrol and that there was no activity.

By 0920, the Engrs were ready to go. They were instructed to remain at the 3rd Bn CP (Fwd) and await orders to clear roads and trails of mines.

At 0930, OP reported Co L on Island and was now out of sight.

The 2nd Bn reported a casualty in a patrol due to a mine.

At 1008, Lt. Col. Bealke, 3rd Bn CO, reported a 3rd Bn patrol south of SEVES. Col. McNary asked the CG's permission to take the town. The CG agreed and the Colonel ordered a company of the 3rd Bn to move into SEVES, and also ordered that AT guns be emplaced there.

At 1012, Col. McNary left CP for 3rd Bn. Lt. Hollenbeck, Motor Officer, checked roads and crossing at CP. All troops were warned to stay out of hours because of the many booby-traps that were being discovered. At 1022, the 3rd Bn reached its first obj.

At 1030, the OP reported that Co I had begun to cross the stream and that there were some explosions in their immediate area. (It was thought to have been mines).

Capt Whittinghill, Hq Co CO, was ordered to reconnoiter for a new Regt'l CP. Engrs reported that the enemy has booby-trapped MG's and even their own dead. The 357th had jumped off on time and had advanced 100 yards and were hitting mines and booby-traps. The 358th patrols passed ST GERMAIN SUR SEVES and were pushing forward meeting opposition only in mines and booby-traps.

By 1100, 2nd Bn had cleared two points and were now beginning on a third. H Co reported that the Germans were now shelling the Island. Co I now had 2 platoons and a MG section on the island. Col. Stanton, IG's officer representative, arrived and conferred with Lt. Col. Clarke.

At 1110, Col. McNary announced, "We have SEVES". The Colonel directed that all troops be again cautioned about mines.

Div was now notified of the 358th activities and "brought up to date on the situation

At 1112, an AT platoon of the 3rd Bn entered SEVES. Lt. Col. Clarke arranged for Col. Stanton to go to the 1st Bn and interview individuals on Lt. Col. Seeger's surrender. Col. McNary directed that help be given the Engrs in the removal of mines.

At 1125 Col. McNary stated that Gen. Landrum had ordered the Island be cleared of Germans. Troops would be kept assembled for a forward move. Both crossings at SEVES would be kept secured with more than one company of the 3rd Bn.

At 1130, a patrol was fired on by a captured American MG. Col. McNary ordered tanks to cross to the island and await orders. 1st Bn was again alerted - this time to move without delay to an unknown (as yet) destination.

27 July 1944

HISTORY

358th Infantry

At 1143 Col. McNary phoned the 2nd Bn Comdr the following: Div directs that we (the 358th) commit as little as possible. 3rd Bn is placing two CPs and are mopping-up their end of the Island and securing bridges. 2nd Bn will mop up East end of Island with not more than one Co. Engineers will work south from SEVES across the Island.

Patrols reported in and were being questioned by the Bn S-2's and their reports were turned into Major Falvey and thence to Division. The Tanks were organized in a firing position, but were ordered to fire only in the event of a counter-attack.

By 1300 the Reg't CP was busy receiving and sending out information. Col. McNary and Major Wallace conferred on plans for a possible future movement.

At 1335, the Ass't Div Comdr, Gen. McClain, arrived and was given the present situation. The 4th AD was notified that the 358th Inf was on the island. The island held no more Germans. The 358th OP was on the lower edge of the island. There were snipers, however, still at large.

At 1357, Gen. Landrum directed that the Reg't be assembled, by Bn, (less troops needed to clean up island) and be prepared to make a forward move. All units were so informed. Lt. Isenberg (3rd Bn MTO) reported killed by a mine.

By 1515 mopping-up on the island was completed. Those units on the island were instructed they would be "picked-up" by their Bn's as they moved South.

The 357th and 359th Infantry's now reported considerable progress. Col. McNary issued the following order at 1535:

"The Regiment will move South of the Island of Seves tonight - sometime after 2000 hours - and will remain in Div Res. One (1) Bn will be prepared for motorized movement. They will move on main road on our (358) boundary. The Bn will be plus one (1) Co Light Tanks, a FA Btry, a TD Platoon, a platoon of Engineers. The CG desires that the Bn take and block road on right boundary South of PERIERS. The 1st Bn will be the motorized Bn"

At 1550, Lt. Col. Loomis, CO 1st Bn, was notified that his Bn was the Task Force that would occupy PERIERS and block the main road to the South.

Units were now notified to be ready to move South at 2000 hours.

At 1625, Capt Burns, S-3 3rd Bn, sent the following message to Col. McNary:

"Co I and AP Platoon cannot possibly clear their area of mines and booby-traps. They are too numerous. Most entrances to fields are booby-trapped, and the fields contain "mustard pots" mines, as well as other types. Island is definitely unsafe".

The 3rd Bn was then notified to concentrate on the roads, as the Div Obj was South of the Island. The Regt was to move in an area in the vicinity of GRUCHY. The 1st Bn would go with the Regiment to GRUCHY, but would remain alerted to go further.

At 1803, there were complications. The 359th Inf was also moving into GRUCHY, but would remain alerted to go further.

At 1803, there were still numerous reports of mines being encountered.

At 1837, Lt. Clark, Ln O, was sent to PERIERS to contact leading elements of the Recon Tp. He went to PERIERS, but passed the troop enroute. Hence, the 358th was the first to enter the city.

At 1845, the Quartering Party left for the new CP. At 1908, Capt Whittinghill reported that not only was the 359th setting-up at GRUCHY, but that Division was there also.

By 1910, the 359th had "hit" some tanks south of PERIERS. The 1st Bn submitted a defensive plan - to be executed on order.

At 1930, "1st Bn will not be motorized". It was understood that it might be later. The plan was now to move Special Units, then Bn foot troops, then Bn vehicles. All units were instructed. By 1950, Capt. Caldecott, Regt'l S-1, returned to CP and stated that areas were "all ready".

Major Wallace phoned all units and gave them the IP and the times of departure. At 2005, Major Nichols reported that the new area was receiving long range artillery fire. Major Wallace briefed Lt. Hollenbeck, Regt'l Motor Officer, on the movement, with the view that he could assist with the traffic problems. Div notified regiment that it's (Div) would not move tonight. The CP now closed.

At 2308, the new CP opened in a field at GRUCHY.

Major Falvey, upon return from 83rd Div, explained that, due to heavy mortar fire, that Div was making slow progress. By 2400, 1st and 2nd Bns closed-in.

Orders for the Day: The excerpted FO No. 16, 90th Div follows:

Hq 90th Inf Div
272300B July 1944

FO No. 16

1. b. VIII Corps, 4 Div's abreast, (79th, 8th, 90th, 83rd) from right to left attack at 280530B July 1944 to seize Objectives to the South.

2. 90th Inf Div:

atcd: 712th Tnk Bn
607th TD Bn (T)
537th AAA (AW) Bn (M)
Co A 86th Cml Bn
687th FA Bn

Attacks at 280530B July to drive south and join troops of the U.S. V Corps. Formations, Bdry's, Phase Lines, Scheme of Maneuver: See overlay. LD: Present Front lines.

3. c. 358th Inf.

attached: Co "A" and Mortar Plat, 712th Tnk Bn.
In Div Res in present Location.

LANDRUM
CG

STILWELL
G-3

This was the basic plan for the 358th Infantry. By 0115, all battalions had closed in. All vehicles were in their proper areas. AT Defences were completed. Liaison was functioning within the regiment and adjacent units. 1st and 2nd Bns were notified to be on the alert for small groups of Germans on their left front.

At 0200, the following message was received:

"CO 358th Inf. Desire you report to this Hq any attempt by GAF fighters - particularly FW 190's - use rockets. CG, 90th Div."

By 0245, the regiment received the "Big Picture" overlay. The Bns were warned to stay off the black top in front of 358th areas. AT Co and guns were warned that friendly tanks would cross our area in the early morning. Bns were instructed to have Ln O's at the CP by 0530 for instruction.

At 0815, Col. McNary was ordered to Division Hqs. Reports of assault units (adjacent and fwd) were received. All Bns and Sp Units alerted for movement on short notice.

At 0953, Col. McNary returned from Div with the order that the 358th infiltrate through the Armd column, and from thence to CATHELMAIS. Col. McNary, Lt. Col. Clarke, and Major Wallace made plans for the movement. Capt Shipe and Lt. Hougen were detailed on a road and route recon.

Plans and orders were give to all units. Each unit reconnoitered their area for best route out.

At 1105, Gen. Landrum arrived at the CP. Capt Shipe reported that PERIERS was in complete ruins and slowing down the advance of the Armd. Column. Gen. Landrum then contacted the Traffic Control Point at PERIERS for details of the stoppage.

At 1120, 1st Bn received its orders - move at 1145, to MILLE DIABLAS. IP route was also given them. 2nd Bn was then given their orders, to MILLE DIABLAS, and their IP and route. Units to keep in contact by radio.

At 1140, Div was informed by Major Nichols that a bulldozer was needed. Large craters in the roads need immediate attention before traffic could pass.

By 1205, an overlay showing routes, IP's, TD's was prepared to send to all units.

At 1315, Col. McNary ordered CP closed and stated: "We will hold vehicles and move forward footwise - the roads are too congested." By 1445, the New CP (near CATHELMAIS) was functioning. Troops were now on Div Objectives. COUTANCES was definitely captured. Division now had a new limited objective. However, a gap existed between COUTANCES and CATHELMAIS, and there was a possibility that the enemy had penetrated this gap.

Snipers were reported, (some in civilian clothes) and corrective measures were immediately taken. An American plan had recently crashed in this area and the bodies of the crew and the wreckage of the plan were strewn all over the area. The location of the bodies was reported to the GRO, Lt. Ackel.

28 July 1944

HISTORY

th Infantry

At 1600, the 3rd Bn, which was to "close in" in one hour, was instructed not to dig in "too deep" as the regiment might move soon.

By 1625, the Bns had closed-in, less vehicles.

By 2000, the I&R platoon had been sent out to recon roads forward. 15 enemy aircraft were reported to be operating in the vicinity. Three prisoners were taken in the 3rd Bn motor pool. An urgent message (German) to forward elements was intercepted. Lt. Byron J. Clarke was credited as being the first American to enter PERIERS! The 1st Div was directly in front of the 357. The 358 was instructed they would very likely "stay put" for the night.

At 2030, 2030, 2nd Bn reported a 155mm AA outfit was moving into his outfit. The 712th Tk Bn was released to Bn control. Bns were notified to post local security as they would remain in position over night.

Overlays of Bn positions were now received; at 2340 an enemy plane flew over the area. AA units and all available 50's opened up. It got away, only to return - no fire was thrown at the plane the second plan and after circling the area three or four times he went away.

At 2345, Gen. Landrum phoned. Major Wallace informed him about the mopping up of the island and added that the Reg't would send out reconnaissance parties early in the morning to check on routes and assembly areas. Gen. Landrum now ordered that the Recon be made with a view to advance or support assault regiments. He stated, however, that no plans had been made for the 358th Inf. He also directed that every effort be made to improve morale.

29 July 1944

HISTORY

8th Infantry

During the early morning hours positions of CP's of the 357th and 359th were received, as were overlays showing the disposition of their troops. The weather forecast (cloudy and rain) came in from Division. Division informed the regiment that the 8th and 79th Inf Div's were to the right of the 90th and the 83rd Inf Div was on the left. The 1st Inf Div was to the immediate front. At 0730, Lt. Hougen left on a road recon. Capt Steckla was instructed to pick up all wire available. Large explosions were heard close to our area. No explanation was forthcoming on them, but all units were checking.

By 0900, Capt. Olson, S-4, announced that all kitchens were in the area and had been released to respective companies.

At 0915, the sixth big explosion was heard. Div Hqs suggested that we be not concerned about them as they are apparently doing no damage.

By 0950, Col. McNary directed that all reconnaissance be called off. One (1) German Panzer Div and one (1) SS Division had escaped the trap. 1st Army would continue the attack with this Corps. The 358th Inf would move by motor, due W, to its new position in the line.

Units were all alerted. Unit commanders were ordered to the CP by 1130. At 1115, Gen. McClain, Ass't Div CO, arrived and met the staffs of the Bns.

Plans were now made for this coming move and instructions were issued.

Indications were that the 90th Div, with the 83rd Div, would be attached to the XX Corps.

By 1315, Col. McNary had left on a road recon. The Ordnance announced they would arrive soon and check equipment. Enemy planes reported over ST LO. Major Nichols was the official S-3 now and Major Wallace was to be just an extra Staff Officer.

At 1420, the "Big Picture" was received.

At 1510, the order was issued that all elements of the Field Train would be South of the ST LO - PERIERS road by 0700 30 July. M/Sgt Van Hagen phoned from Div Hqs that the Regt would not move today. This information was passed on to all units concerned.

At 1700, Col. McNary returned from road recon and stated that there were Germans in COUTANCES. Officer personnel was now changed. Lt. Morrison from Co H to Co M. Lt. Brown from "?" to F Co. Capt Spivey from "?" to CO Service Co. Lt. Monohue reported the advance of the 359th Inf. It was decided at this time that the propaganda leaflets shot to us from the Germans, could not be sent home. Hot dinner would be served tomorrow and also breakfast!

At 2000 hours information on the enemy defence line was received. Units were notified to make their schedules for tomorrow in such a manner that men be allowed to attend church services.

At 2100 G-3 stated he would try to get permission to use "live ammo" for bazooka training of the new replacements.

At 2300, a German officer (PW) stated that the "big plan" of the Germans was to let the Americans advance as far as the Brest Peninsula, and then attack from the rear through an amphibious operation. He claimed if this maneuver worked, Germany would win the war. If it didn't work, Germany would lose the war.

Major Falvey passed this onto G-2.

30 July 1944

HISTORY

th Infantry

The 3rd Bn captured some German documents which were translated by our IPW team, and then sent to the G-2 of Division. German aircraft continued its reconnaissance of the 358th Inf area during the night. EARLY morning and late afternoon showers were predicted by the weather man. Col. McNary was notified to report to the CG at 1000. At 1130, a new Commanding ~~General~~ General was announced - General McClain.

At 1200, Col. McNary returned from a conference with the new CG, and gave the following information:

The General does not want any officers reclassified - he wants them to be given a specific job. The General had changed the award board and wanted recommendations in immediately. Short, fast road marches were to be the thing in the future. (For physical hardening, Col. McNary suggested that it be done over hedge-rows, with short rushes) Bn Comdrs were urged to perfect their men in regards to their individual weapons. The General directed that artillery be used more. He stated we seldom use artillery during a counter-attack by the enemy. The general added "When I was ordered to the 90th Inf Div, I was told that there was a lack of alertness in REGIMENTS AND IN DIVISION." Colonel McNary added the following:

Men should dig deeper foxholes and not under the trees. "B" Rations for an indefinite period. Men be given their blanket rolls so they could get a change of clothing. ~~That~~ a reconnaissance be made for a swimming hole or a bathing spot of some sort.

AT 1330 Col. McNary had all the Bn and Sp Unit commanders at the CP for a conference. He passed on to them the orders he had received from the CG.

During the afternoon there was instruction and practice given in the firing of the bazooka. All personnel who might even remotely have the opportunity of firing the bazooka were in attendance.

At 1450, Gen. Weaver arrived at the CP. He was taken to the 2nd Bn by Major Nichols. Arrangements were now completed for the men to take much needed showers. Capt. Whittinghill reported the finding of an ammunition dump.

By 1830 Bn's and Sp Units were informed that they would conduct their training in their own areas. A meeting of all S-3's. A platoon of tanks was requested to help in the training program of the 3rd Bn tomorrow. A clothing issue was to be made and a bathing schedule sent to all units.

At 2027, The Reg't learned that the 2nd AD had captured 2700 PW's, during the day.

The question of Expert Infantry and Combat Inf Pay was discussed by Capt. Caldecott.

A PW, horse cavalry, Mongolian, reported that he had seen as prisoners, 100 Americans on road near Coutances two days ago. He stated GERMANS would make him work for 50 francs a day - and he would have been shot had he refused.

Major Falvey now requested that his french team be given special passes to enter "off limit" towns. G-2 is considering it.

31 July 1944

HISTORY

358 Infantry

All was quiet during the night. The weather forecast was received - Cloudy, rain in the afternoon. Captured German guns were inspected by Gen Devine and Col. McNary.

At 1030, the Ass't Div Comdr arrived at the CP. A meeting of all Regt'l O's was called for 2030 at the Division CP. The Ass't Div Comdr left at 1125 after a conference with Lt. Col. Clarke and Col. McNary.

At 1325, all units were notified of the Officers meeting at Division. During the afternoon, plans were made for transporting the officers to the meeting.

At 1830, G-3 couldn't give any definite information as to when the regiment would move. Enemy aircraft flew over the area and extremely low. Division reported another one coming from the SE.

By 1940, the Re'gt was brought up to date on the "Big Picture". The 2nd Bn reported a French family, with German equipment in their possession, was moving into a house in their area. G-2 was notified.

The day was spent in "cleaning up" of personnel and equipment, and the orienting of replacements, with regards to the mission and arms of the regiment.