

MEASURING AFFECT AND ACTION IN INTERNATIONAL REACTION MODELS

EMPIRICAL MATERIALS FROM THE 1962 CUBAN CRISIS*

By

OLE R. HOLSTI, RICHARD A. BRODY
and ROBERT C. NORTH

Studies in International Conflict and Integration
Stanford University, Palo Alto, California

1. *The background — The Cuban crisis*

In October, 1962 the first nuclear confrontation in history was precipitated by the establishment of Soviet missile sites in Cuba. For a period of approximately one week, the probability of a full-scale nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union was exceedingly high. Speaking of the events of the week of October 22, Attorney General Robert Kennedy recalled: 'We all agreed in the end that if the Russians were ready to go to nuclear war over Cuba, they were ready to go to nuclear war, and that was that. So we might as well have the showdown then as six months later.'¹

An examination of the events immediately surrounding the crisis, analyzed in four rather distinct periods, offers the clear-cut case history of a conflict that escalated to the brink of war — and then de-escalated. This presents a useful contrast with another great crisis in history — which spiralled into major war. The two are almost classic patterns of international conflict.

During the 1962 pre-crisis period President Kennedy had been under considerable domestic pressure to take action against Cuba. In addition to attacks on Administration policy by Senators Capehart,² Bush, Goldwater, and Keating,³ the Republican Senatorial and Congressional campaign committees had announced that Cuba would be 'the dominant issue of the 1962 campaign. . . . Past mistakes toward Cuba could be forgotten if the Administration now showed itself willing to face

reality. But there is little evidence of willingness to recognize the developing danger and to move resolutely to cope with it' [6, p. 35]. Public opinion polls revealed an increasing impatience with American policy toward Communist influence in the Caribbean [37, p. 184]. When the President arrived in Chicago on a campaign tour in mid-October, one 'welcoming' sign read: 'Less Profile — More Courage' [37, p. 186].

There had been a number of rumors regarding the emplacement of Soviet missiles and troops in Cuba, but 'hard' evidence was lacking; those most critical of administration policy were not, in fact, willing to reveal their sources of information. Although Cuba had been under surveillance for some time, the first active phase of the crisis, from October 14 to October 21, began with the development of photographic evidence that Soviet missiles had indeed been located in Cuba. It was during this period that — according to President Kennedy — '15 people, more or less, who were directly consulted' developed 'a general consensus' regarding the major decision to invoke a limited blockade [4, p. 2]. Unfortunately for the purposes of this analysis, there are no publicly-available documents from either Soviet or American decision-makers for the period.

The second and third periods — October 22-25 and October 26-31 respectively — might be described as the 'period of greatest danger of escalation' and the 'bargaining period'. The present paper is

confined to this time span, and is not concerned with the final period, during which the agreements reached between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev were assertedly carried out and in which further questions regarding verification were raised.

The period of most acute danger of escalation began with President Kennedy's address to the nation on October 22 regarding recent events in Cuba and announcing the institution of certain policies designed to compel the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from the Caribbean. The President announced:

Within the past week unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island. The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere.

Additional sites not yet completed appear to be designed for intermediate-range ballistic missiles capable . . . of striking most of the major cities in the Western Hemisphere.

This urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base — by the presence of these large, long-range, and clearly offensive weapons of mass destruction — constitutes an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas, in flagrant and deliberate defiance of the Rio Pact of 1947, the traditions of this nation and hemisphere, the Joint Resolution of the 87th Congress, the Charter of the United Nations, and my own public warning to the Soviets on September 4 and 13.

The United States would, according to the President: (1) impose a 'strict quarantine' around Cuba to halt the offensive Soviet build-up; (2) continue and increase the close surveillance of Cuba; (3) answer any nuclear missile attack launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere with 'a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union'; (4) rein-

force the naval base at Guantanamo; (5) call for a meeting of the Organization of American States to invoke the Rio Treaty; and (6) call for an emergency meeting of the United Nations. At the same time he stated that additional military forces had been alerted for 'any eventuality'. James Reston reported 'on highest authority' that,

Ships carrying additional offensive weapons to Cuba must either turn back or submit to search and seizure, or fight. If they try to run the blockade, a warning shot will be fired across their bows; if they still do not submit, they will be attacked. [21, p. 1:4]

In accordance with the Joint Congressional Resolution passed three weeks earlier, the President signed an executive order on October 23 mobilizing reserves. It has been reported that decision-makers in Washington also wanted the North Atlantic Treaty forces placed on a maximum missile alert, which meant putting American-controlled nuclear warheads on the NATO-controlled missiles aimed at the Soviet Union. This would prepare them for instant firing. General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Commander of NATO, is reported to have objected successfully, on the basis that in the absence of secrecy, such preparations could bring war when neither side wanted it, by way of 'the self-fulfilling prophecy' [2, p. 6].

In its initial response the Soviet government denied the offensive character of the weapons, condemned the blockade as 'piracy', and warned that Soviet ships would not honor it.⁴ It was also reported that Defense Minister Malinovsky had been instructed to postpone planned demobilization, to cancel furloughs, and to alert all troops. Although the issue was immediately brought before the United Nations and the Organization of American States, the events of October 22-25 pointed to a possibly violent showdown in the Atlantic, in Cuba, or perhaps in other

areas of the world. President Kennedy apparently expected some form of retaliation in Berlin. In his October 22 address he specifically warned the Soviet Union against any such move: 'Any hostile move anywhere in the world against the safety and freedom of people to whom we are committed — including in particular the brave people of West Berlin — will be met by whatever action is needed.'

The blockade went into effect at 10 a.m. Eastern Standard Time on October 24. At that time a fleet of 25 Soviet ships nearing Cuba was expected to test the American policy within hours. Statements from Moscow and Washington gave no immediate evidence that either side would retreat, although the Soviet Premier dispatched a letter to Bertrand Russell in which he called for a summit conference. The next day rumors of an American invasion of Cuba were strengthened by the announcement by Representative Hale Boggs that if the Soviet missiles were not removed the United States would destroy them: 'if these missiles are not dismantled, the United States has the power to destroy them, and I assure you that this will be done' [21, Nov. 3, 1962, p. 6:1-2]. At the same time American intelligence sources revealed that work on the erection of missile sites was proceeding at full speed.

The first real break in the chain of events leading to an apparently imminent confrontation came on October 25 when twelve Soviet vessels turned back in mid-Atlantic. It was at this point that Secretary of State Dean Rusk remarked, 'We're eyeball to eyeball, and I think the other fellow just blinked' [1, p. 16]. Shortly thereafter the first Soviet ship to reach the blockade area — the tanker *Bucharest* — was allowed to proceed to Cuba without boarding and search.

By the following day the crisis appeared to be receding somewhat from its most dangerous level. The Soviet-chartered

freighter, *Marula* (ironically, a former American Liberty ship now under Lebanese registry), was searched without incident and, when no contraband was discovered, allowed to proceed to Cuba. In answer to an appeal from Secretary General U Thant, Soviet Premier Khrushchev had agreed to keep Soviet ships away from the blockade area for the time being. President Kennedy's reply to the Secretary stated that he would try to avoid any direct confrontation at sea 'in the next few days'. At the same time, however, the White House issued a statement which said: 'The development of ballistic missile sites in Cuba continues at a rapid pace. . . The activity at these sites apparently is directed at achieving a full operational capability as soon as possible.' The State Department added that 'further action would be justified' if work on the missile sites continued. Photographic evidence revealed that such work was continuing at an increased rate and that the missile sites would be operational in five days.

The 'bargaining phase' of the crisis opened later in the evening of October 26. A secret letter from Premier Khrushchev acknowledged the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba for the first time.⁶ He is reported to have argued they were defensive in nature but that he understood the President's feeling about them. According to one source, 'Never explicitly stated, but embedded in the letter was an offer to withdraw the offensive weapons under United Nations supervision in return for a guarantee that the United States would not invade Cuba' [21, Nov. 3, 1962, p. 6:3]. A second message from Premier Khrushchev, dispatched twelve hours later, proposed a trade of Soviet missiles in Cuba for NATO missile bases in Turkey; the United Nations Security Council was to verify fulfillment of both operations, contingent upon the approval of the Cuban and Turkish governments.

In his reply to Khrushchev's secret letter of Friday evening, the President

all but ignored the later proposal to trade bases in Turkey for those in Cuba. At the Attorney General's suggestion, the President simply interpreted Premier Khrushchev's letter as a bid for an acceptable settlement [1, p. 18].

As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposal — which seems generally acceptable as I understand them — are as follows:

1) You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.

2) We, on our part, would agree — upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments — (a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurance against an invasion of Cuba.

He added, however, that,

... the first ingredient, let me emphasize, ... is the cessation of work on missile sites in Cuba and measures to render such weapons inoperable, under effective international guarantees. The continuation of this threat, or a prolonging of this discussion concerning Cuba by linking these problems to the broader questions of European and world security, would surely lead to an intensification of the Cuban crisis and a grave risk to the peace of the world.

In responding to Khrushchev's proposal to trade missile bases in Turkey for those in Cuba, a White House statement rejected that offer: 'Several inconsistent and conflicting proposals have been made by the U.S.S.R. within the last 24 hours, including the one just made public in Moscow. ... The first imperative must be to deal with this immediate threat, under which no sensible negotiation can proceed'.

Despite the advent of negotiations, the probabilities of violence remained high. On October 27 an American U-2 reconnaissance plane had been shot down over Cuba, and several other planes had been fired upon. The Defense Department warned that measures would be taken to 'insure that such missions are effective and protected'. At the same time it was announced that twenty-four troop-carrier squadrons — 14,000 men — were being recalled to active duty. The continued building of missile sites, which would be operational by the following Tuesday, was of even more concern. Theodore Sorensen, speaking of the events of October 27, said, 'Obviously these developments could not be tolerated very long, and we were preparing for a meeting on Sunday [October 28] which would have been the most serious meeting ever to take place at the White House' [20, p. 42].

On the following morning, however, Moscow Radio stated that the Soviet Premier would shortly make an important announcement. The message was broadcast in the clear to shortcut the time required by normal channels of communication.⁶ Premier Khrushchev declared that,

I regard with great understanding your concern and the concern of the United States people in connection with the fact that the weapons you describe as offensive are formidable indeed ... The Soviet Government, in addition to earlier instruction on the discontinuation of further work on weapons construction sites, has given a new order to dismantle the arms which you describe as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union.

The statement made no reference to the withdrawal of American missiles from Turkey.

In reply, President Kennedy issued a statement welcoming Premier Khrushchev's 'statesmanlike decision'. He added that the Cuban blockade would be re-

moved as soon as the United Nations had taken 'necessary measures', and further, that the United States would not invade Cuba. Kennedy said that he attached great importance to a rapid settlement of the Cuban crisis, because 'developments were approaching a point where events could have become unmanageable'. According to one source, all agreed that the Soviet missiles had to be removed or destroyed before they were operational; thus, an air strike against the missile sites was planned by no later than Tuesday, October 30 [1, p. 18].

Although Khrushchev stated that the Soviet Union was prepared to reach an agreement on United Nations verification of the dismantling operation in Cuba, Fidel Castro announced on the same day that Cuba would not accept the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement unless the United States accepted further conditions, including the abandonment of the naval base at Guantanamo. But the critical phases of the Soviet-American confrontation seemed to be over. Despite the inability to carry out on-site inspection, photographic surveillance of Cuba confirmed the dismantling of the missile sites. The quarantine was lifted on November 21, at which time the Pentagon announced that the missiles had indeed left Cuba aboard Soviet ships.

2. *The interaction model*

What research questions does the Cuban crisis suggest? The crisis may be analyzed from several perspectives. From one point of view, it was a unique event, and not comparable to previous situations. In relation to either World War, the weapons systems of the adversaries were of incomparable magnitude. The nations, as well as their leaders, were different. And certainly in its potential consequences, the Cuban crisis surpassed all previous cold war confrontations and, for that matter, any previous crisis in history. Even the alerting and mobilization of armed

forces, which were so crucial to the escalation into war in the summer of 1914, resulted in a different outcome in October 1962. From this perspective the investigator may focus his attention on the unique characteristics of the situation.

The analyst of international relations may, on the other hand, examine the events of October 1962 in such a manner as to permit relevant comparisons with other crisis situations, both those resolved by war and those eventually resolved by non-violent means. Are there, for example, patterns of behavior that distinguish the situation which escalates into general war — as in 1914 — from those in which the process of escalation is reversed? This concern for comparable, replicable, and cumulative studies requires a model and research techniques which permit the student to investigate international transactions, examine how they were initiated and received, and compare those of October 1962 with others as widely separated in time and circumstance as the events leading to world war in 1914, and the continuing Arab Israeli conflict.

A conceptual framework developed for such analysis is a two-step mediated stimulus-response model [26]; $S - r : s - R$. Within the model the acts of one nation are considered as inputs to other nations. The nations are information processing and decision-making units whose output behavior (responses), in turn, can become inputs to other nations (Figure 1). The basic problem is this: given some action by Nation B, what additional information is needed to account for Nation A's foreign policy response?

Within the model a stimulus (S) is an event in the environment which may or may not be perceived by a given actor, and which two or more actors may perceive and evaluate differently. A stimulus may be a physical event or a verbal act.

A response (R) is an action of an actor, without respect to his intent or how either he or other actors may perceive it. Both




Figure 1: The Interaction Model

S's and R's are non-evaluative and non-affective. For example, during the early autumn of 1962, the Soviet Union began erecting launching sites for medium range ballistic missiles in Cuba (R). Regardless of the Soviet motives or intent behind this act, it served as an input or stimulus (S) to the United States, which responded by a series of steps, including the blockade of Cuba (R).

In the model the perception (r) of the stimulus (S) within the national decision system corresponds to the 'definition of the situation' in the decision-making literature [31] [18]. For example, the Soviet missile sites in Cuba (S) were perceived by President Kennedy as a threat to the security of the Americas (r). Finally, the 's' stage in the model represents the actor's expression of his own intentions, plans, actions or attitudes toward another actor, which becomes an action response (R) when carried out. Both 'r' and 's' carry evaluative and affective loadings.⁷ Thus, irrespective of Russian intent, the Cuban missiles were perceived as a threat (r) by President Kennedy, who expressed American intent (s) to remove them from Cuba. This plan was put into effect by the blockade (r), which then served as an input (S) to the Soviet decision-makers.

Operationally it would be much simpler, of course, to confine oneself to an analysis of actions (S and R) as do many classical formulations of international politics [29,

p. 2]. In some situations the one nation's actions may be so unambiguous that there is little need to analyze perceptions in order to predict the response; consider, for example, the case of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Unfortunately, as Kenneth Boulding and others have pointed out, it is less clear that rewarding actions will lead to reciprocation.

In any case, not all — or even most — foreign policy behavior is consistent or unambiguous. For political behavior, what is 'real' is what men perceive to be real. Boulding [3, p. 120] has summarized this point succinctly:

We must recognize that the people whose decisions determine the policies and actions of nations do not respond to the 'objective' facts of the situation, whatever that may mean, but to their 'image' of the situation. It is what we think the world is like, not what it is really like, that determines our behavior.

At this point one might protest that surely well-trained statesmen will find little difficulty in interpreting the facts as they pertain to foreign policy. Yet one can cite example after example to the contrary. Consider, for example, the various interpretations — even among foreign policy professionals — which in the USA and other NATO countries almost inevitably follow nearly every turn in Soviet policy. Such problems of interpretations are en-

countered at every point in the stream of decisions which constitute foreign policy, and *mis*perceptions may have behavioral consequences as 'real' as more accurate perceptions do.

If the real world for a President, Prime Minister or Foreign Secretary — and for their counterparts in friendly and hostile nations — is the world as they perceive it, perceptual variables are crucial in a conflict situation [22]. Thus, since all decision-making is rooted in the perceptions of individuals, our model attempts to assess both objective and subjective factors. Our research indicates the necessity of accounting for perceptual variables [23] [12].

There have been serious doubts about the feasibility of quantifying perceptual and affective data, and the inclination, until recently, has been to emphasize 'hard' variables and aggregate data; to measure gross national products and populations, or to count troops or planes or ships or megatons and assume that decision-makers respond to the 'objective' value assigned to these capabilities by the investigator.

As important as these 'objective' data are, they may fail to take into sufficient account how human beings react to these factors. Moreover, objective data are usually compiled on an annual, quarterly, or monthly basis. Thus, while these indices may well be relied upon to reveal the existence of an environment conducive to crisis [28] [36] [8] such as Europe in 1914 or the Cold War since 1945 — they may prove less useful for the intensive study of a short time period and for identifying human factors giving rise to conflict. Thus it is particularly important for the investigator who seeks to analyze short term changes in the international system — such as the crisis situation — to incorporate subjective data into his model.

Some objective indices — such as commodity futures, exchange rates and securities prices — are available on a day-to-day basis. A study of the 1914 data had

revealed a striking correlation between fluctuations of the economic indices and such psycho-political variables as perceptions and expressions of hostility [10]. These indices are particularly useful as an independent check on the validity of one's techniques of measurement, and will be incorporated into this analysis of the Cuban crisis.

3. *Methodology and data*

The premise that the analysis of political behavior is enriched by the incorporation of perceptual data poses special problems for the student of international relations. Clearly the standard method of attitude measurement — the personal interview, the questionnaire, or the direct observation of decision-makers in action — can rarely be used by the social scientist who seeks to study human behavior at the international level. What he needs are instruments for measuring attitudes and actions 'at a distance'. This is perhaps the primary rationale for settling upon the content analysis of the messages of key decision-makers — those who have the power to commit the resources of state to the pursuit of policy goals at the international level — as an important research tool.

Source materials used for the analysis of perceptions (*s* and *r* in the model) consist of 15 United States, 10 Soviet, and 10 Chinese documents, a total of approximately fifty thousand words, from the ten-day period opening on October 22 — the day of President Kennedy's address on the Cuban crisis — and closing on October 31.⁸ Whereas all Soviet and American documents focus on the situation in Cuba, five of the Chinese documents are concerned solely with the border fighting in India. After relevant decision-makers had been selected, *all publicly-available documents*, rather than a sample, were used. For example, President Kennedy, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Ambassador Stevenson, and Attorney General Kennedy

were selected as the key American decision-makers. *The entire verbatim text of every available document* authored by these five persons during the ten-day period was included.

These documents were subjected to analysis by means of the General Inquirer system of automated content analysis via the IBM 7090 Computer [33]. The Stanford version of the General Inquirer includes a dictionary which can be used to measure changes in verbalized perceptions — the 'r' and the 's' sectors in the basic model — in terms of both frequency and intensity [9] [11].

The scaling of action data (S and R in the model) resulted in the following ratings (1 is the highest level and 10 is the lowest level of violence or potential violence):⁹

Table 1: *Scaling of Action Data*

	October									
	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
United States	2	3	1	4	5	6	7	9	10	8
Soviet Union	3	1	2	5	6	4	7	8	9	10

The perceptual data generated by the General Inquirer are combined with the scaled action data into the S — r : s — R model for the United States and the Soviet Union in Tables 2 and 3. It is apparent that Soviet and American actions during the period are closely correlated; that is, the actions for both sides are most violent or potentially violent in the first three days, followed by a relatively steady decline through October 31. The Spearman rank-order correlation between Soviet and American actions ($r = .89$) is significant at the .01 level [30, Table P]. The correlation coefficient should not be interpreted to indicate that the level of violence in the actions of each of the two parties was of equal magnitude; the separate scaling of Soviet and American actions precludes such an inference. Rather, it indicates that as the level of violence in the actions of one party increased or

decreased, the actions of the other party tended to follow a similar pattern.

The input (S) and output (R) action may also be compared with the perceptual General Inquirer data (r and s). The pattern of perceptions was relatively consistent with the course of events surrounding the Cuban crisis.¹⁰ In each case October 25–26 — previously indentified as the point dividing two phases of the crisis — was the point at which mutual perceptions appeared to change. The rigidly negative-strong-active perceptions of the period of highest danger became somewhat modified at this point. Perceptions along the evaluative dimension became more neutral and, in some cases, actually became positive. As one would expect, during the latter days of the crisis there was also an increase

in perceptions of passivity. The potency dimension, on the other hand, remained predominantly on the strong side throughout the crisis period.

Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients across various steps in the model are presented in Table 4.¹¹ The evaluative dimension is the most sensitive to behavioral changes; the highest correlation coefficients are consistently those for positive affect (positive correlation with decreasing violence).

Table 4 also reveals that there is a relatively close correspondence between the actions of the other party (S) and perceptions of the adversary's actions (r). By themselves these findings are hardly conclusive. When compared with a similar analysis of the crisis which escalated into World War I [12], however, one interesting point emerges. The members of the Dual Alliance (Germany and Austria-

Table 2. Action and Perceptual Data — The United States

Oct. 1962	S	Posi- tive	Nega- tive	Strong	Weak	Ac- tive	Pas- sive	Posi- tive	Nega- tive	Strong	Weak	Ac- tive	Pas- sive	R
22	3*	1.3*	33.5	37.2	5.5	16.2	6.3	11.9	11.2	29.5	4.4	31.8	11.2	2
23	1	0.3	30.3	26.1	3.6	32.3	7.4	11.6	9.7	35.7	2.0	35.7	5.3	3
24	2													1
25	5	17.8	15.6	31.1	0.0	24.4	11.1	16.0	9.0	21.0	5.0	32.0	17.0	4
26	6	13.5	8.1	21.6	2.7	35.2	18.9	30.3	0.0	30.3	3.0	12.1	24.3	5
27	4	10.7	16.1	21.4	8.9	19.6	23.3	24.3	1.7	28.6	6.7	22.7	16.0	6
28	7	25.3	13.4	33.3	2.7	18.6	6.7	16.4	21.7	23.1	3.7	21.7	13.4	7
29	8													9
30	9													10
31	10													8

S — Soviet action

r — U.S. perceptions of Soviet action

s — U.S. statements of intent

R — U.S. action

* The values for S and R are rank-order figures.

* The values for r and s are percentages of the total loading on the three dimensions.

Hungary) consistently reacted at a higher level of violence than did the members of the Triple Entente (Britain, France and Russia). At the same time, they also consistently overperceived (r) the level of violence in actions (S) taken by members of the Triple Entente. British, French and Russian decision-makers, on the other hand, underperceived (r) the level of violence in the actions of the Dual Alliance. In terms of the S — r : s — R model, this relationship between one coalition's ac-

tions (S), the other coalition's perceptions of those actions (r), and the resulting policies (R) was apparently the crucial one.

In the Cuban crisis, however, both sides tended to perceive (r) rather accurately the nature of the adversary's actions (S), and then proceeded to act (R) at an 'appropriate' level; that is, as the level of violence or potential violence in the adversary's actions (S) diminished, perceptions of those actions (r) increased in positive affect and decreased in negative

Table 3. Action and Perceptual Data — The Soviet Union

Oct. 1962	S	Posi- tive	Nega- tive	Strong	Weak	Ac- tive	Pas- sive	Posi- tive	Nega- tive	Strong	Weak	Ac- tive	Pas- sive	R
22	2*													3
23	3	2.4x	27.2	28.8	1.6	34.0	5.0	17.7	13.6	31.2	6.4	22.8	8.3	1
24	1	5.9	19.6	21.6	3.9	31.4	17.6	24.5	10.5	27.8	3.5	15.1	18.6	2
25	4	0.0	16.7	22.2	2.8	30.5	27.8	22.2	7.4	22.2	3.7	7.4	37.1	5
26	5	0.0	29.7	21.6	0.0	48.7	0.0	21.2	1.9	26.9	0.0	32.7	17.3	6
27	6	15.9	12.9	22.1	9.8	27.0	12.3	24.7	6.9	20.1	9.2	20.7	18.4	4
28	7	12.6	16.6	23.4	4.0	30.3	13.0	24.6	8.1	25.9	4.5	21.4	15.5	7
29	9													8
30	10													9
31	8													10

S — U.S. action

r — Soviet perceptions of U.S. actions

s — Soviet statements of intent

R — Soviet actions

* The values for S and R are rank-order figures.

* The values for r and s are percentages of the total loading on the three dimensions.

affect, and the level of violence in the resulting policies (R) also decreased. Thus, unlike the situation in 1914, efforts by either party to delay or reverse the escalation were generally perceived as such, and responded to in a like manner. Whether the different patterns of action and perception found in the 1914 and Cuban cases will be found consistently to distinguish crises that escalate and de-escalate, of course, can only be determined through continuing research.

Up to this point Chinese actions and attitudes have not been considered. As an observer rather than direct participant in the crisis, there are few, if any, Chinese actions with respect to the Cuban situation. Despite China's peripheral role, however, the analysis of its attitudes has considerable significance. The suggestion has often been made that while the antecedents of the Sino-Soviet schism predate the Cuban crisis, the gulf between Moscow and Peking widened considerably as a

Table 4. Rank-Order Correlations Across S - r : s - R Model

	SOVIET UNION (n = 6)		UNITED STATES (n = 7)	
	U.S. Action (S)	Soviet Action (R)	Soviet Action (S)	U.S. Action (R)
Perceptions of Other State (r)				
Positive	+ .70	- .07	+ .93	+ .71
Negative	- .43	- .20	- .82	- .79
Strong	- .13	- .13	+ .11	- .25
Weak	+ .54	+ .09	- .24	+ .17
Active	- .43	- .20	- .18	- .14
Passive	- .31	+ .03	+ .18	+ .32
Self-Perceptions (s)				
Positive	+ .66	+ .32	+ .79	+ .71
Negative	- .31	- .60	- .11	- .11
Strong	- .31	- .49	+ .46	+ .21
Weak	+ .20	- .32	+ .29	+ .29
Active	+ .37	+ .14	- .86	- .71
Passive	- .37	+ .03	+ .79	+ .54

result of it. China, of course, was deeply involved in a concurrent crisis with India, but a number of Chinese documents during the period relate to the events in Cuba.

One immediate indication of differences is the seemingly calculated manner in which the Chinese ignored the role of the Soviet Union. A frequency count of the appearance of various nations in the documents (Table 5) reveals the extent to which Soviet and American decision-makers perceived the Cuban situation almost immediately as a Soviet-American issue, rather than one involving Cuba. The Chinese, on the other hand, referred con-

stantly to Cuba as a primary actor in the crisis, and only rarely mentioned the Soviet Union. This, of course, renders impossible any direct analysis of Sino-Soviet attitudes, although there are occasional veiled references to the Soviet Union. After the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement of October 28, for example, *Renmin Ribao* editorialized that, 'The peoples of the world cannot under any circumstances lightly put their trust in the empty promises of United States aggressors', implying that Premier Khrushchev had done so. The same editorial went on to praise Fidel Castro for the 'justified and absolutely necessary' opposition to the on-site

Table 5 Frequency of Appearance of Actors in Documents Relating to Cuban Crisis

Date	UNITED STATES DOCUMENTS			SOVIET DOCUMENTS			CHINESE DOCUMENTS		
	United States	Soviet Union	Cuba	United States	Soviet Union	Cuba	United States	Soviet Union	Cuba
Oct. 22	54.5%	37.2%	8.3%	-	-	-	-	-	-
Oct. 23	45.8%	34.6%	19.6%	59.6%	29.8%	10.5%	-	-	-
Oct. 24	-	-	-	27.5%	71.0%	1.5%	79.7%	0.0%	20.3%
Oct. 25	61.1%	38.9%	0.0%	60.5%	39.5%	0.0%	75.7%	2.0%	22.3%
Oct. 26	40.9%	59.1%	0.0%	53.9%	46.1%	0.0%	-	-	-
Oct. 27	41.0%	59.0%	0.0%	41.8%	48.2%	10.0%	-	-	-
Oct. 28	57.8%	41.4%	0.8%	30.8%	65.7%	3.5%	63.5%	1.0%	35.5%
Oct. 29	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Oct. 30	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Oct. 31	-	-	-	-	-	-	50.2%	0.9%	48.9%

Table 6a. *United States Perceptions in the Early and Late Periods of the Crisis*
 United States Perceptions of Soviet Actions

	October			October			October	
	22-25	26-31		22-25	26-31		22-25	26-31
Positive Affect . .	13*	40	Strong	153	57	Active	153	47
Negative Affect . .	203	36	Weak	28	13	Passive	39	38
X ² = 80.3	P = .001		X ² = 0.1	P = n.s.		X ² = 15.7	P = .001	

United States Perceptions of United States Actions

	October			October			October	
	22-25	26-31		22-25	26-31		22-25	26-31
Positive Affect . .	106	61	Strong	149	75	Active	280	60
Negative Affect . .	90	31	Weak	31	14	Passive	79	45
X ² = 4.2	P = .05		X ² = 0.1	P = n.s.		X ² = 15.9	P = .001	

* Figures are weighted (frequency × intensity) total.

inspection agreed to by the United States and the Soviet Union.

The data do not permit a direct comparison of Chinese and Soviet perceptions of each other, but some indirect analyses are possible. For the purposes of comparison, all documents have been divided into two periods — October 22–25 and October 26–31. The data are further divided to distinguish between perceptions of one's own actions toward others (*s* in the model), and the actions of others toward oneself (*r* in the model). From the General Inquirer output it was determined whether these actions were perceived as positive or negative, strong or weak, and active or passive, together with the intensity

level of each. The results yielded a series of fourfold contingency Tables.¹² Tables 6a and 6b reinforce the earlier finding that both the United States and the Soviet Union regarded *each other* as significantly less negative during the latter stage of the crisis period. They also regarded *themselves* as less negative toward the adversary than during the first four days of the crisis.¹³

Chinese perceptions of the Cuban crisis, on the other hand, differ markedly from those of both the Soviet Union and the United States (Table 6c). There is no change (at the .05 level of statistical significance) in Chinese perceptions of American actions during the two periods; the proportion of negative affect to positive

Table 6b. *Soviet Perceptions in the Early and Late Periods of the Crisis*
 Soviet Perceptions of United States Actions

	October			October			October	
	22-25	26-31		22-25	26-31		22-25	26-31
Positive Affect . .	16*	50	Strong	176	85	Active	216	115
Negative Affect . .	163	61	Weak	12	23	Passive	46	43
X ² = 52.1	P = .001		X ² = 14.4	P = .001		X ² = 5.2	P = .05	

Soviet Perceptions of Soviet Actions

	October			October			October	
	22-25	26-31		22-25	26-31		22-25	26-31
Positive Affect . .	76	128	Strong	127	127	Active	92	117
Negative Affect . .	56	35	Weak	21	29	Passive	46	85
X ² = 18.5	P = .001		X ² = 0.6	P % n.s.		X ² = 2.6	P = n.s.	

* Figures are weighted (frequency × intensity) total.

Table 6c. *Chinese Perceptions in the Early and Late Periods of the Crisis*
Chinese Perceptions of United States Actions

	October			October			October	
	22-25	26-31		22-25	26-31		22-25	26-31
Positive Affect ..	3*	20	Strong	110	306	Active	120	413
Negative Affect ..	96	300	Weak	14	41	Passive	14	63
$X^2 = 1.5$	P = n.s.		$X^2 = 0.0$	P = n.s.		$X^2 = 0.9$	P = n.s.	

Chinese Perceptions of Chinese-Cuban Actions

	October			October			October	
	22-25	26-31		22-25	26-31		22-26	26-31
Positive Affect ..	11	88	Strong	39	291	Active	20	231
Negative Affect ..	35	129	Weak	13	22	Passive	8	48
$X^2 = 2.9$	P = n.s.		$X^2 = 9.7$	P = .01		$X^2 = 1.8$	P = n.s.	

* Figures are weighted (frequency \times intensity) total.

affect remains relatively constant. Nor is there any difference in perceptions of Chinese and Cuban actions toward the United States during the two periods in question. Thus, despite the lack of data for direct comparison, the available data do suggest a considerable difference in evaluation of the course of events in October 1962. Subsequent direct Chinese attacks on Soviet policy during the crisis have confirmed these differences.

As indicated earlier, certain financial indications were used in a study of the 1914 crisis as a validity check against the measurement of other variables. A strictly analogous study — in which data are gathered from all nations involved in the crisis — is not possible for the Cuban crisis, owing to the absence of free markets in either Cuba or the Soviet Union. Data were gathered from major American markets, however, for a number of financial indices. As indicated in Table 7, there is a significant correlation between Dow-Jones average of industrial securities and the level of violence or potential violence in both Soviet and American actions; as the crisis intensified, the value of stocks fell sharply, followed by an even greater rise in stock prices as the crisis receded. The pattern for wheat futures was the reverse, with a significant increase in prices corresponding with the height-

ened tensions. Although the value of the American dollar — in relation to the Swiss franc — fluctuated in the predicted direction, the correlation coefficient is quite low.

The relationship between the financial indices and decision-maker's perceptions are roughly similar to those for the action data, although not significant at the .05 level for $n = 6$.

While the movements of the financial indices *by themselves* cannot be used as indicators of international crisis — the stock market crash of 1962 is a good case in point — the results during the Cuban crisis add to the confidence with which the other quantified data may be employed.

4. Discussion

Having utilized the S — r : s — R model to examine the pattern of Soviet and American interaction, it may be useful to attempt at least a partial explanation for the patterns with some comparisons with the 1914 crisis. Such an analysis will be concerned primarily with what might be called 'styles of decision-making', and must of necessity be based on incomplete data. Although there are several accounts of the process by which American policy was formulated, such data with respect to the Soviet Union are

Table 7. Relationship of Selected Financial Indices to Soviet and American Actions and Perceptions

October	Dow-Jones Average	December Wheat Futures	Swiss Franc
Average 8-21	585.55	2.04 1/2	23.13 1/4
22	568.60	2.07 1/2	23.14
23	558.06	2.10 1/2	23.17 1/4
24	576.68	2.08	23.17 5/8
25	570.86	2.07 3/8	23.17 1/2
26	569.02	2.07 7/8	23.17 1/2
27	—	—	—
		(Exchanges closed for weekend)	
28	—	—	—
29	579.35	2.05 1/4	23.16 1/2
30	588.98	2.06 3/4	23.17
31	589.77	2.06 7/8	23.17
Rank-Order Correlations			
	Dow-Jones Average	December Wheat Futures	Swiss Franc
U.S. Action (n = 8)	+ .83**	— .83**	— .37
Soviet Action (n = 8)	+ .69*	— .76*	— .36
+			
U.S. Perceptions:			
U.S. Action (n = 6)	+ .71	— .54	— .24
Soviet Action (n = 6)	+ .54	— .38	— .39

** Significant at .01 level

* Significant at .05 level

+ Net Affect (Positive — Negative)

much more fragmentary and inferential [14] [13].

One major characteristic of Soviet policy during this period is clear. Unlike German leaders in 1914, Premier Khrushchev did not irrevocably tie his policy to that of a weaker — and perhaps less responsible — ally. The Cuban response to President Kennedy's address of October 22 was stronger and more unyielding than that of the Soviet Union. Premier Castro in fact ordered a general war mobilization prior to the delivery of the President's speech. The following day Premier Castro in effect left no room for either Cuba or the Soviet Union to maneuver: 'Whoever tries to inspect Cuba must come in battle array! This is our final reply to illusions and proposals for carrying out inspections on our territory' [7, p. 42]. Premier Khrushchev, on the other hand, like President Kennedy, almost immediately

chose to interpret the crisis as one involving the United States and the Soviet Union alone. In his correspondence with President Kennedy during October 26-28, it is also apparent that the Soviet Premier was unwilling to let the intransigence of Dr. Castro stand in the way of a possible solution of the crisis. In his letter of October 28, in which Khrushchev offered to withdraw the missiles, there was, in fact, no acknowledgment of the necessity to obtain Cuban agreement on the terms of the settlement.

American decision-making in regard to the missiles in Cuba was characterized by a concern for action based on adequate information. The resistance of the Administration against action — despite public pressure — until photographic evidence of the missile sites was available, has already been noted.¹⁴ As late as Thursday, October 18 a series of alternatives

was being considered pending more accurate information, and while the decision to institute a blockade was being hammered out, open discussion of the alternatives was encouraged. The President recalled that 'though at the beginning there was a much sharper division . . . this was very valuable, because the people involved had particular responsibilities of their own' [4, p. 4]. Another participant in the decision-making at the highest level wrote: 'President Kennedy, learning on his return from a mid-week trip in October, 1962, that the deliberation of the NSC [National Security Council] executive committee had been more spirited and frank in his absence, asked the committee to hold other preliminary sessions without him' [32, p. 60]. Thus despite the very real pressure of time — the missile sites would be operational by the end of the month — the eventual decision was reached by relatively open discussion. Group decision-making does not ensure the emergence of sound policy, of course, but it does limit the probability of a decision performing a personality-oriented function [35, p. 103].¹⁵

Actually, it was not until Saturday, October 20 — almost a week after the photographic evidence became available — that the general consensus developed. The President himself acknowledged that the interim period was crucial to the content of the final decision: 'If we had had to act on Wednesday [October 17], in the first 24 hours, I don't think probably we would have chosen as prudently as we finally did, the quarantine against the use of offensive weapons' [4, pp. 2-3].¹⁶

Another characteristic of the decision process in October 1962 was the very conscious concern for action at the very lowest level of violence — or potential violence — necessary to achieve the goals. J. William Fulbright and Richard B. Russell, both Democratic policy leaders in the Senate, were among those who urged immediate invasion of Cuba, a suggestion

against which the President stood firm [20, p. 30].¹⁷ According to Kennedy, the decision to impose a blockade was based on the reasoning that: 'the course we finally adopted had the advantage of permitting other steps, if this one was unsuccessful. In other words, we were starting, in a sense, at a minimum place. Then, if that were unsuccessful, we could have gradually stepped it up until we had gone into a much more massive action which might have become necessary if the first step had been unsuccessful' [4, p. 4]. By this step, no irrevocable decisions had been made — a number of options remained.

The concern of the President and his advisers with maintaining a number of options was based at least in part on an explicit differentiation between a violent 'bid' or threat (such as the blockade), and a violent commission. The use of threats has become a more or less accepted tool of international politics in the nearly two decades of cold warring. The United States and the Soviet Union, on the other hand, had systematically abstained from direct violent action against each other. The desire to avoid killing Soviet troops was an important factor in the decision to refrain from an air strike against Cuba [20, p. 22]. Instead the blockade shifted the immediate burden of decision concerning the use of violence to Premier Khrushchev. Even if Soviet ships refused to honor the blockade, the initial American plan was to disable the rudders of the vessels, rather than to sink them [2, p. 6].

The flexibility provided by a number of plans requiring less than the use of unlimited violence stands in marked contrast to the situation in 1914. One factor in the rapid escalation in 1914 was the rigidity of various mobilization plans. The Russian attempt to mobilize against only Austria was anathema to the Russian generals because no such formal plan had been drawn up. According to General Dobrorolski, 'The whole plan of mobilization is worked out ahead to its final con-

clusion and in all its detail . . . Once the moment is chosen, everything is settled; there is no going back; it determines mechanically the beginning of war' [5, p. 343].

Similarly the Kaiser's last-minute attempt to reverse the Schlieffen plan — to attack only in the east — shattered Moltke, who replied: 'That is impossible, Your Majesty. An army of a million cannot be improvised. It would be nothing but a rabble of undisciplined armed men, without a commissariat . . . It is utterly impossible to advance except according to plan; strong in the west, weak in the east' [5, pp. 348-9].

American decision-makers also displayed a considerable concern and sensitivity for the position and perspective of the adversary as a vital variable in the development of the crisis. Unlike some of the key decision-makers in the 1914 crisis, those in October 1962 thought in terms of linked interactions — closely tied reciprocations — rather than two sides, each acting independently, *in vacuo*. Theodore Sorensen described the deliberation as follows: 'We discussed what the Soviet reaction would be to any possible move by the United States, what our reaction with them would have to be to that Soviet reaction and so on, trying to follow each of those roads to their ultimate conclusion' [20, p. 17].¹⁸

This sensitivity for the position of the adversary was apparent in a number of important areas. There was a concern that Premier Khrushchev should not be rushed into an irrevocable decision; it was agreed among members of the decision group that 'we should slow down the escalation of the crisis to give Khrushchev time to consider his next move' [20, p. 19]. There was, in addition, a conscious effort not to reduce the alternatives of *either* side to two — total surrender or total war. According to one participant, 'President Kennedy, aware of the enormous hazards in the confrontation with the Soviets

over Cuba in October, 1962, made certain that his first move did not close out either all his options or all of theirs' [32, pp. 20-21].

Sorensen added that:

The air strike or an invasion automatically meant a military attack upon a communist power and required almost certainly either a military response to the Soviet Union or an even more humiliating surrender . . . The blockade on the other hand had the advantage of giving Mr. Khrushchev a choice, an option, so to speak, he did not have to have his ships approach the blockade and be stopped and searched. He could turn them around. So that was the first obvious advantage it had. It left a way open to Mr. Khrushchev. In this age of nuclear weapons that is very important [20, p. 22].

Thus, unlike the 1914 situation, in which at least one ultimatum was worded so as to be incapable of execution, there was no demand which the Soviet Premier could not understand, none that he could not carry out, and none calculated to humiliate him unduly. During the summer of 1914, by way of contrast, there were numerous instances of failure on all three of these important points. The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was deliberately worded in such a manner as to humiliate Serbia and to provoke rejection. The policy of the other powers, on the other hand, was hardly characterized by clarity. Russian decision-makers failed to communicate their initial desire to deter Vienna rather than to provoke Berlin. This was matched by England's inability to convey to German leaders their intention to intervene should the local conflict engulf the major continental powers.¹⁹ And, in the culminating stages of the crisis, decision-makers in the various capitals of Europe made the very types of demands upon their adversaries — notably in regard to mobilizations — which they admitted they could not reciprocate.²⁰

METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

The Stanford General Inquirer is programmed to measure perceptions — as found in written documents — along three dimensions: strength — weakness, activity — passivity, positive affect — negative affect. These dichotomized dimensions correspond to the evaluative, potency, and activity dimensions which have been found to be primary in human cognition in a variety of cultures [25] [34] [5] [24]. The dictionary thus reflects the assumption that when decision-makers perceive themselves, other nations, events — or any stimulus — the most relevant discriminations are made in a space defined by these three factors. The computer can be used to analyze perceptual units defined in terms of the following elements: the *perceiver*; the perceived *agent* of action; the *action* or *attitude*; and the *target* of action. The components may be illustrated in a statement by President Kennedy (perceiver): 'Soviet missiles [agent] threaten [action] all the Americas [target]'. For the present analysis the computer has been instructed to measure the *action-attitude* component within a specified set of agent-target relationships involving the United States, Soviet Union, China and Cuba.

The scaling of action data (S and R in the model) was accomplished by the following technique. Three judges were given a set of cards concerning Soviet

and American actions for the ten-day period October 22–31 — the same period which encompasses all the publicly-available documents by key Soviet and American decision-makers. Each action was typed on a separate card and these were then aggregated on a day-to-day basis. Thus each judge was given a set of cards for both United States and Soviet actions, each set being subdivided into ten periods. The judges were instructed to rank order the events — using the day as the unit of analysis — for the degree of violence or potential violence. The Soviet and American actions were scaled separately largely because of the disparity of available data; published chronologies of American actions during the crisis period are detailed to almost an hourly basis, whereas the action data for the Soviet Union are relatively sparse.

The level of agreement between each pair of judges for scaling both Soviet and American actions was:

Judge	A	B
C	.800	.883
	.891	.842
B	.967	
	.939	

The top figure is level of agreement for the scaling of Soviet action; the bottom figure is that for the scaling of United States action. All figures are significant at beyond the .01 level.

NOTES

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¹ 1, p. 16.

² 'He [President Kennedy] said to Mr. Khrushchev you go ahead and do whatever you want to in Cuba, you arm in any way you wish, and do anything you want to. We'll do nothing about it...' [20, p. 8].

³ 'I am sure the administration must have been fully aware of what has been going on for the past month and yet they have remained silent on the threat to our security now festering in Cuba' [20, p. 8].

⁴ William Knox, Chairman of Westinghouse Electric International, was told by Premier Khrushchev on October 24 — the day the blockade went into effect — that 'as the Soviet vessels

were not armed the United States could undoubtedly stop one or two or more but then he, Chairman Khrushchev, would give instructions to the Soviet submarines to sink the American vessels' [20, p. 36].

⁵ This is apparently the only communication between the United States and the Soviet Union during the crisis period which is not publicly available (cf. Larson, 1964).

⁶ 'During the Cuban crisis, it took four hours, with luck, for a formal message to pass between Kennedy and Khrushchev. Any such message had to be carried physically from the head of state to the local embassy, translated, coded, transmitted, decoded on the other side, and carried to the other leader' [2, p. 6].

⁷ A number of factors — including those of personality, role, organization and system — will affect the perceptual variables in the model. A further elaboration may be found in [11, Chs. 1–2].

⁸ The present analysis is concerned primarily with Soviet-American interactions during the crisis period. Data from the Chinese documents will be introduced at appropriate points, however, for the purpose of comparing Chinese and Soviet attitudes.

⁹ A more complete description of the research techniques may be found in the Methodological Appendix at the end of this paper.

¹⁰ The reader may wonder why, in Table 2, the highest level of negative affect in the 's' sector of the model is found on October 28, the day of the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement. This result is due primarily to President Kennedy's expressions of regret about an American weather airplane straying over Soviet territory; many of the words used by the President are 'tagged' for negative affect in the General Inquirer dictionary.

¹¹ Because there are no United States perceptual data for October 24, the average of the values of October 23 and 25 has been used for the purpose of calculating the correlation coefficients in Table 4.

¹² The cell entries, which are based on a weighted (frequency × intensity) total, are independent of each other. The frequency and intensity of positive actions, for example, have no bearing on the number of actions which are rated negative. Nor can a single action word be entered in both the positive and negative cells; no dictionary entry is tagged for both ends of a single dimension.

¹³ The figures in Table 6a and 6b support other studies which have found the evaluative dimension of cognition to be the most important (Osgood *et al.*, 1957; Levy and Hefner, 1962). It is also true, however, that the activity dimension provides rather consistent discrimination between the early and later periods of the crisis. Inasmuch as there was little, if any, actual change in Soviet and American capabilities during the short period under investigation, it is not surprising that perceptions of potency show little variation.

¹⁴ McGeorge Bundy recalled that upon receiving the first news of the photographic evidence, 'his [President Kennedy's] first reaction was that we must make sure, and were we making sure? And would there be evidence on which he could decide that this was in fact really the case' [20, p. 14].

¹⁵ In this respect the contrast to many of the crucial decisions made in 1914 is striking. That the German Kaiser underwent an almost total collapse at the time he made a series of key decisions — the night of July 29–30 — is evident from a reading of his marginal notes [19].

¹⁶ Despite the relative lack of speed — with the possible exception of the German army — with which European weapons systems could be mobilized in 1914, decision-makers in the various capitals of Europe perceived that time was of crucial importance — and they acted on that assumption. The Kaiser, for example, immediately upon learning of Russia's mobilization (which had been intended only to deter Austria-Hungary), ordered: 'In view of the colossal war preparations of Russia now discovered, this is all too late, I fear. Begin! Now!' [19, p. 368]. One can only speculate on the outcome had there been some delay in the making of such decisions in 1914.

¹⁷ According to one top official, 'invasion was hardly ever seriously considered' [21, Nov. 3, 1962, p. 6:3].

¹⁸ President Kennedy and others were aware of the possibility of misperception by their counterparts in the Kremlin, 'Well now, if you look at the history of this century where World War I really came through a series of misjudgments of the intentions of others ... it's very difficult to always make judgments here about what the effect will be of our decisions on other countries' [4, p. 3].

¹⁹ The failure of communication was not, of course, solely attributable to the sender. The Kaiser, for example, consistently dismissed the warnings of his able ambassador in London, Prince Lichnowsky.

²⁰ For example, both the Kaiser and the Tsar demanded that the other stop mobilizing. Nicholas replied that, 'it is technically impossible to stop our military preparations' [19, p. 402]. At the same time Wilhelm wrote: 'On technical grounds my mobilization which has already been proclaimed this afternoon must proceed against two fronts, east and west' [19, p. 451].

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S U M M A R Y

The Cuban crisis of October 1962 may be analyzed from several perspectives. The investigator may focus his attention on the unique characteristics of the situation and sequence of events which are outlined here. The analyst of international relations may, as is suggested in this paper, examine these events so as to permit relevant comparisons with other crisis situations, both those resolved by war and those eventually resolved by non-violent means. The conceptual framework for this analysis is a two-step mediated stimulus-response model in which the acts of one nation are considered as inputs to other nations. Such psycho-political variables as perceptions and expressions of hostility are traced over time by means of content analysis of documents to test the consistency of the model. In the Cuban crisis, both sides tended to perceive rather accurately the nature of the adversary's actions and then proceeded to act at an appropriate level. Efforts by either party to delay or reverse the escalation toward conflict were generally perceived as such, and responded to in like manner.

Краткое содержание.

Кубинский конфликт в октябре 1962 г. можно рассматривать с различных точек зрения. Исследователь может направить свое главное внимание на исключительные особенности создавшегося положения и на развитие событий, которые обрисованы в данной статье.

Исследователь международных отношений может, как это указывается в статье, изучать эти события с целью сравнения их с другими конфликтными ситуациями, решенными с применением военной силы, или урегулированными мирным путем, без применения насильственных мер.

Наглядной схемой для этого анализа может послужить двусторонняя взаимодействующая система: стимул и ответ на этот стимул, т. е. действия одного государства рассматриваются как импульсы для действий других государств.

Такие психо-политические и меняющиеся величины, как восприятия и выражения враждебных действий, исследуются на протяжении определенного промежутка времени при помощи анализа содержания документов с целью проверки состоятельности предлагаемой системы. В Кубинском конфликте обе стороны показали довольно точное восприятие характера действий противника, после чего и предпринимали соответствующие шаги.

Усилия обеих сторон приостановить или ускорить обострение конфликта воспринимались как таковые и вызывали у сторон соответствующие действия.