

Comparative Politics



Review: Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics
Reviewed Work(s): On the Autonomy of the Democratic State by Eric Nordlinger; Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali by Clifford Geertz; Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities by Stephen Skowronek; The Formation of National States in Western Europe by Charles Tilly; Crises of Political Development in Europe and the United States by Raymond Grew; Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru by Ellen Kay Trimberger

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Approaches to the State
Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics

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Eric Nordlinger, *On the Autonomy of the Democratic State*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981.

Clifford Geertz, *Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1981.

Stephen Skowronek, *Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1975.

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Ellen Kay Trimberger, *Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru*, New Brunswick, Transaction Books, 1978.

From the late 1950s until the mid-1970s the term state virtually disappeared from the professional academic lexicon. Political scientists wrote about government, political development, interest groups, voting, legislative behavior, leadership, and bureaucratic politics, almost everything but "the state." However, in the last decade "the state" has reappeared in the literature. Marxist scholars have made a self-conscious, theoretically grounded effort to develop a theory of the capitalist state. In *Between Power and Plenty*, an edited volume about the foreign economic policies of advanced industrial countries, Peter Katzenstein developed a typology of weak and strong states. Theda Skocpol's *States and Social Revolution* examined the political conditions, both international and domestic, associated with major social revolutions. Alfred Stepan's *The State and Society in Peru* investigated both the organic statist intellectual tradition and corporatist political structures that gave "the state" a major initiative role in the Peruvian and other Latin American political systems. The state is central to all of the studies reviewed here.¹

However, to note that terms have changed, that certain scholars have self-

consciously adopted a new vocabulary (or readopted an old one), does not necessarily imply that there has been a change in substance. The purpose of this essay is to examine the ways in which several recent books explicitly concerned with "the state" differ from and challenge prevailing intellectual approaches that emerged out of the behavioral revolution of the 1950s.

Recent literature on the state has been concerned with two central issues: the extent of state autonomy and the degree of congruity between the state and its environment. The issue of autonomy has generally been cast in a temporarily static framework in which the state is viewed as an exogenous variable. The central issue is: can the state formulate and implement its preferences? The issue of congruity has been placed in a temporally dynamic framework in which the state is viewed as an intervening variable. The central issue is: how do institutional structures change in response to alterations in domestic and international environments and then in subsequent time periods influence these environments?

Cutting across both of these analytic concerns is the prior question of how the state should be defined. In a recent essay Roger Benjamin and Raymond Duvall argue that the following conceptualizations have appeared in the literature.

1. The state as government," by which is meant the collective set of personnel who occupy positions of decisional authority in the polity."
2. The state as "public bureaucracy or administrative apparatus as a coherent totality" and as an institutionalized legal order.
3. The state as ruling class.
4. The state as normative order.²

The state as ruling class is, in one variant or another, the Marxist definition, and it will not be further considered here. The dominant conceptualization in the non-Marxist literature is the state as a bureaucratic apparatus and institutionalized legal order in its totality. The final phrase is critical, for it distinguishes statist orientations from the bureaucratic politics approaches which have parcelled the state into little pieces, pieces that can be individually analyzed (where you stand depends on where you sit) and that float in a permissive environment (policies are a product of bargaining and compromise among bureaus).³ Statist arguments have emphasized the overall structure of the bureaucratic apparatus, in particular the degree of centralization of power at the national level and the extent of state power vis-a-vis the society. Among the books reviewed in this essay, the two exceptions to the generalization that the state is seen as a bureaucratic apparatus and institutionalized legal order taken as a totality are Eric Nordlinger's *On the Autonomy of the Democratic State*, which adopts the state as government conceptualization, and Clifford Geertz's *Negara*, which views the state as a normative order.

There are five characteristics of the recent statist literature that distinguish it from orientations associated with the behavioral revolution. First, statist approaches see politics more as a problem of rule and control than as one of allocation; they are more concerned with issues associated with preserving order against internal and external threats than with the distribution of utilities to political actors.

Politics is not just about “who gets what, when, how;” it is a struggle of us against them.⁴

Second, statist approaches emphasize that the state can be treated as an actor in its own right as either an exogenous or an intervening variable. Whether in its institutional form or in terms of specific policies, the state cannot be understood as a reflection of societal characteristics or preferences.

Third, statist orientations place greater emphasis on institutional constraints, both formal and informal, on individual behavior. This is especially true for authors who view the state as the bureaucratic apparatus and legal order taken as a totality or as the normative political order.⁵ Actors in the political system, whether individuals or groups, are bound within these structures, which limit, even determine, their conceptions of their own interest and their political resources. Political outcomes cannot be adequately understood as simply the resolution of a vector of forces emanating from a variety of different groups.

Fourth, statist analyses have been more anxious to take what Gabriel Almond has called the “historical cure.”⁶ It is necessary to understand both how institutions reproduce themselves through time and what historical conditions gave rise to them in the first place. Current institutional structures may be a product of some peculiar historical conjuncture rather than contemporaneous factors. Moreover, once an historical choice is made, it both precludes and facilitates alternative future choices. Political change follows a branching model. Once a particular fork is chosen, it is very difficult to get back on a rejected path. Thus, the kinds of causal arguments appropriate for periods of crises when institutions are first created may not be appropriate for other periods.

Fifth, statist arguments are more inclined to see disjunctures and stress within any given political system. Systems are not composed of interrelated and compatible components. Structures do not exist because they perform certain functions, and functions do not necessarily give rise to corresponding structures. Rather, political life is fraught with tensions and conflicts, especially for the state. For instance, international pressures frequently lead the state to attempt to increase the level of resource extraction from its own society. But these efforts can engender negative reactions from social groups who see their economic utility, and even their sense of justice, undermined by new state policies. Political life is characterized, not simply by a struggle over the allocation of resources, but also periodically by strife and uncertainty about the rules of the game within which this allocative process is carried out.

These five characteristics do not constitute a coherent theory of the state. Only structural Marxists could credibly make such a claim, and even they are plagued by deep and probably insoluble difficulties related to the degree of autonomy that can be accorded to the state before fundamental tenets concerning the determining character of economic structures are compromised. The studies under review here do not set out to present a general theory of the state. Eric Nordlinger’s basic objective is to demonstrate that even in democratic polities public officials can autonomously determine public policy. Clifford Geertz is concerned with the sym-

bolic attributes of the state as a unifying element for the entire social community. Stephen Skowronek investigates the ways in which the functional political challenges posed by nineteenth-century industrialization were met, or not met, in the context of the fragmented and localized political system that existed in the United States. Tilly, Trimberger, and some of the authors in Grew emphasize the impact of external threats on state-building.

Despite their diversity these studies do pose a challenge to the analytic traditions that have dominated political science in the United States. They see a different political universe, ask different questions, investigate different empirical phenomena, and offer different kinds of answers.

The second section of this essay reviews Robert Dahl's theory of leadership in his seminal study, *Who Governs*, to provide a clearer contrast between pluralist and statist orientations.⁷ The third section deals with problems of public policy in which the central issue has been the degree of autonomy of the state. The fourth section deals with problems of state-building in which the central issue has been the degree of conformity or congruence of the state with its environment.⁸ The concluding section suggests that a model taken from recent evolutionary theory, punctuated equilibrium, can serve as an appropriate metaphor for understanding changes in the relationship between states and their environments.

A Contrast with Pluralist Theories of Leadership

One way to illuminate the distinctive characteristics of statist approaches is to contrast them with the pluralist approach. This is not only because pluralism is the prevailing model for the study of politics in the United States, but also because some major authors identified with the pluralist school have been explicitly concerned with the role of public actors. By examining how their studies, in particular, differ from the books reviewed here, one can clarify the distinct features of a statist orientation.

The more obvious general differences can be noted first. Pluralism emphasizes problems of allocation rather than ones of rule and control. Nordlinger points out that as "portrayed by pluralism, civil society is made up of a plethora of diverse, fluctuating, competing groups of individuals with shared interests. Many effective political resources are available to them. . . ."⁹ These groups struggle to maximize their own, autonomously defined self-interests. Cross-cutting cleavages and broad consensus on the rules of the game guarantee moderate political behavior.

Within the literature on American politics the central debate has not been about the relative power of societal and state actors, but rather about which societal actors most influence public policy. Conventional pluralists see a very wide array of interest groups, virtually all of which have some political resources. Neo-pluralists such as McConnell, Lowi, and especially Lindblom see a more constricted universe. Only a limited range of groups, among which business is particularly prominent, possess significant political resources.¹⁰ But this debate takes place within the

confines of an intellectual universe that understands politics to be a problem, both analytically and normatively, of allocation.¹¹

Pure interest group versions of pluralism virtually ignore public actors and institutions. The government is seen as a cash register that totals up and then averages the preferences and political power of societal actors. Government may also be seen as an arena within which societal actors struggle to insure the success of their own particular preferences. The major function of public officials is to make sure that the game is played fairly. If public institutions are viewed as figurative cash registers or as literal referees, there is no room for anything that could be designated as a state as actor with autonomous preferences capable of manipulating and even restructuring its own society.

However, most pluralist models are much more explicitly concerned with the role of political leaders and public officials. Robert Dahl's *Who Governs* offers an example. The simple answer to the question "Who governs?" is that everyone does, including political leaders. If there is a hero in Dahl's book it is Richard Lee, a working-class boy without a college education who made good not only as an official of Yale University but also as a dynamic and active mayor of New Haven. Dahl argues that Lee's preferences were critical especially for urban renewal, a program that came to dominate the city's public life. Lee was motivated initially by his own concern with conditions in New Haven, not by pressure from any particular societal group. In fact, there were no groups particularly interested in urban renewal one way or the other. The concluding sentence of *Who Governs* says that there are "complex processes of symbiosis and change that constitute the relations of leaders and citizens in a pluralistic democracy."¹²

What distinguishes Dahl's treatment, a seminal study of pluralist politics, from the more explicitly and self-consciously state-oriented works of the kind under consideration in this essay? The most critical difference is that Dahl views the state as a collection of individuals occupying particular roles, not as an administrative apparatus or legal order. Benjamin and Duvall have referred to this formulation as "the state as the government." They note that this "concept of the state is compatible with extreme liberal tenets of the behavioral revolution, in treating the state as merely a collection of individuals who occupy role positions (those of governing authority) and who act as a group to govern."¹³ Institutional imperatives and constraints, including general political beliefs, do not play a significant role in Dahl's formulation. The pluralist universe is atomistic. Different societal groups and political leaders have different objectives and political resources. Public policy is the outcome of the resolution of vectors resulting from interests and resources. Formal, authoritative institutions are of little importance. There is no detailed discussion in *Who Governs* of New Haven's governmental structure or of state and national institutions. The defining characteristics of New Haven's political system are, for Dahl, "universal suffrage, a moderately high participation in elections, a highly competitive two-party system, opportunity to criticize the conduct and policies of officials, freedom to seek support for one's views among officials and citizens, and surprisingly frequent alternations in office from one party to the

other. . . ."¹⁴ Dahl points out that at the very moment when Lee was being reelected by an unprecedented majority the same voters were rejecting proposed revisions of the city charter that would have invested the office of the mayor with more power.

Dahl also disputes Tocqueville's proposition that American republican beliefs embodied in the legal structure are an important factor in American political behavior.¹⁵ While there is widespread endorsement of general democratic values by the citizenry and the political stratum, these values are too vague, Dahl argues, to have much impact on actual political affairs. There is only limited agreement on the specific application of general principles. Even general consensus is only maintained by a complex and difficult process involving childhood socialization, particularly by the schools, and a "recurring *process* of interchange among political professionals, the political stratum, and the great bulk of the population. The process generates enough agreement on rules and norms so as to permit the system to operate, but agreement tends to be incomplete, and typically it decays" (*italics in original*).¹⁶

Statist orientations take institutions and political beliefs more seriously. The political universe is not atomistic. Atoms are bound within stable molecules and compounds. The preferences of public officials are constrained by the administrative apparatus, legal order, and enduring beliefs. There are only a limited number of ways in which political actors can combine their resources. The nature of political resources is itself defined by institutional structures. The ability of a political leader to carry out a policy is critically determined by the authoritative institutional resources and arrangements existing within a given political system. Industrial policy can be orchestrated in Japan through the ministry of international trade and industry. There is no American institutional structure that would allow a political leader, regardless of the resources he commanded, to implement a similar set of policies. Moreover, at least some statist arguments have emphasized the importance of ideology, not simply as an instrument of governance, but as an end in itself. Ideology may not only coordinate expectations and delineate legitimate modes of interaction between state institutions and societal actors, but it may also serve as a basic source of identity, and its preservation may be a consummatory function of the state. One of the critical purposes of the state is to represent symbolically the existence and unity of the political community.

A second distinction between sophisticated pluralist and statist views is that pluralism does not sharply differentiate public actors from their own society. Dahl's unit of analysis most closely related to the state is the political stratum, composed of subleaders and leaders. Members of the political stratum possess more political resources than ordinary citizens. Some of these resources are drawn from the public arena, including legality, but most derive from the society, including control over jobs and information. Individuals carry many of these resources with them both in and out of public office. Many important members of the political stratum never hold public office at all. Statist perspectives contrast individuals in and out of public office. Political leadership is closely related to official position. The administrative apparatus and legal order constrain preferences and provide means of influ-

ence. Political leaders are state actors pursuing either particular state goals or collective societal objectives and utilizing resources primarily derived from their official positions.

A third distinction between pluralist and statist approaches is that pluralist theories of leadership see public officials as relatively more constrained by societal pressures. Dahl argues that the support of the business community as well as other societal elements was a necessary condition for the urban renewal program. Lee was able to alter the societal forces he confronted by activating slack or latent resources. However, Lee is not seen as being able to change the underlying distribution of political resources. The ability of leaders to alter the preferences of citizens depends upon the extent of agreement among leaders, and this in turn depends in large part on the degree to which they are drawn from the same "social strata."¹⁷ Only a coherent leadership cadre can change the desires of citizens. In contrast, statist orientations see political leaders as less constrained by societal forces. They can alter preferences using the state's own resources. They may even be able to change the distribution of political resources possessed by societal groups.

In sum, the pluralist tradition in America has not simply ignored the role of political leaders. However, it has seen these leaders as being substantially constrained by societal forces, commanding resources that are derived from a wide variety of public and private sources, and functioning in a fluid, institutional environment which has a limited impact on the power and interests of actors.

These characteristics are shared by most of the major theoretical perspectives that blossomed in the 1960s, including studies of mass behavior, political development, and bureaucratic politics, as well as pluralism. The general rejection of "the state" as a meaningful analytic concept by all of these modes of analysis was not coincidental. They were part of a larger intellectual change—the behavioral revolution. Behaviorism was a reaction against formal legalism, the approach that had dominated the discipline of political science in the United States from its inception during the last part of the nineteenth century through the 1940s. Formal legalism virtually identified political life with the state, understood as an institution that promulgated binding laws and stood in a superior hierarchical position to other parts of the polity. Formal rules were seen as independent variables. The statement of rules was "treated as tantamount to the explanation for behavior."¹⁸

Behaviorism rejected the identity between rules and behavior. Empirical studies did not demonstrate a close relationship between formal rules and political activity. Rules did not necessarily lead to regularities; and regularities existed without rules. In a world that included polities as different as the United States, the Soviet Union, and Upper Volta, behaviorism suggested that it was impossible to understand much about actual political life simply by studying formal legal institutions.¹⁹

As a corollary to rejecting formal legalism behaviorist approaches focused on the society. They reversed the causal relationship that had been posited by formal legalism. Societal forces were viewed as the independent variable. Political outcomes were determined primarily by the preferences and power capabilities of societal actors. Furthermore, the introduction of statistical methods and the com-

puter made it much more attractive to collect data on many variables from a large number of cases. Such an empirical strategy was peculiarly compatible with a pluralistic view of the political universe as heterogeneous and atomistic. (Obviously statistical methodology and theoretical perspectives are not linked in any rigid way. But computers and statistics did facilitate the acceptance of pluralist arguments by making it easier to publish and conduct research.)²⁰ Hence pluralism is part of a more general intellectual orientation that has dominated American political science for the last twenty years. The new concern with the state must be seen, in the first instance, as a reaction against prevailing fashion.

Two central concerns have informed this new literature. The first involves the autonomy of the state, its ability to formulate and implement public policy. The second involves the extent of congruity between the state and its environment, a central issue for the study of political development. These issues are addressed in the next two sections of this essay.

Public Policy: The State as Exogenous Variable

Both Nordlinger and Geertz are concerned with public policy broadly defined, that is, with authoritative actions taken by public institutions. Nordlinger investigates the relationship between state and private actors in modern industrialized democracies, arguing that if the autonomy of the state can be demonstrated in this political setting it should hold in others as well. Nordlinger notes that this is the case most likely to disprove assertions that public officials can formulate and authoritatively implement their preferences. Geertz guides his readers into a much more exotic political environment, nineteenth-century Bali, to show that symbolic activities, which have been largely ignored by western political theory for several hundred years, can be the consummatory end of public life and the central attribute of the state.

Nordlinger's basic objective is to demonstrate that "the preferences of the state are at least as important as those of civil society in accounting for what the democratic state does and does not do; the democratic state is not only frequently autonomous insofar as it regularly acts upon its preferences, but also markedly autonomous in doing so even when its preferences diverge from the demands of the most powerful groups in civil society."²¹ The preferences of the state, which Nordlinger defines as "all those individuals who occupy offices that authorize them, and them alone, to make and apply decisions that are binding upon any and all segments of society,"²² may be generated within the state itself or from the wider society. The critical point with regard to state autonomy is that these preferences not simply be designed to curry favor or avoid punishment from particular societal groups. The final measure of autonomy is the ability of state officials to translate their weighted preferences into authoritative actions.

The heart of *On the Autonomy of the Democratic State* is three chapters delineating state autonomy under different relationships between the preferences of

state and societal actors. Type III state autonomy refers to situations in which there is non-divergence between the preferences of the state and the society. Nordlinger argues that even under these conditions state-oriented accounts can explain authoritative actions at least as well as society-oriented ones. The state may initiate policy and provide access for particular societal groups. The state can reinforce a weak level of convergence by manipulating information, inflating the success of ongoing programs, setting agendas, appealing to widely shared symbols, playing upon deference to official expertise, and deflecting potential opposition. In all Nordlinger lists fifteen specific tactics that state officials can use to reinforce convergence.²³

Type II state autonomy refers to situations in which state action changes divergent societal preference to convergent ones. The state can use four general strategies to effect such changes: altering the views of societal opponents; limiting the deployment of resources by societal opponents; gaining the support of indifferent actors; and increasing the resources of societal actors holding convergent views.²⁴

Type I state autonomy refers to situations in which state actors translate their preferences into authoritative action despite divergent societal preferences. They can accomplish this by using the resources of the state to neutralize societal opponents by measures such as deploying public capital, threatening to withhold specific government programs, and masking the state's decision making procedures. The state may even be able to act peremptorily by relying upon its inherent powers. Public officials have the authority "to take any and all actions other than those which violate the constitutional format and other legitimized procedural principles."²⁵

Nordlinger's book is at once the most and least ambitious of the studies under review. It is the most ambitious with regard to specifying the wide array of resources that public officials can use to secure their preferences and in arguing for their autonomy even in those settings where it has been most strongly denied. It is the least ambitious with regard to delineating the institutional arrangements that constrain political actors. Nordlinger's view of the political universe is not qualitatively different from earlier pluralist positions. Nordlinger does place much greater emphasis on the role of the state. This is an important departure from prevailing traditions. But like the pluralists, he sees a world of atomistic political actors, albeit one in which relatively more of the atoms are public officials. Nordlinger conceptualizes the "state as government;" the state is defined as a collection of individuals in official positions. It includes mayors as well as presidents, prefects as well as cabinet ministers. These individuals may derive their preferences from a variety of sources including other public officials, bureaucratic interests, distinctive experience and information, some conception of the public interest, and a desire for greater autonomy.²⁶ When more than one state unit is involved in a policy, "state preferences are based exclusively upon the weighted intrastate resources of those public officials who have an interest in the issue at hand. . . ."²⁷ Nordlinger endorses the pluralist image of politics as a resolution of vectors.²⁸

Nordlinger explicitly rejects state structures as an explanation for variation in the degree of state autonomy. He argues that the ability of state officials to carry out

their preferences is not a function of the institutional structure within which they must function but rather of the amount of societal resistance that they encounter.²⁹ Nordlinger does note that it may be easier for a strong state than for a weak one to change preferences, that appeals to common values may enhance support for the state, and that the inherent power of public officials is limited by constitutional rules; but he does not give much credence to such institutional constraints. The political world is fluid; the preferences and capabilities of actors shift across issue areas and over time. *On the Autonomy of the Democratic State* is focussed more on the state than even nuanced pluralist arguments; it is concerned more with state-society relations than with bureaucratic politics perspectives; but it does not differ from these orientations in its basic depiction of the atomistic character of political life.

Clifford Geertz' *Negara: The Theater State in Nineteenth Century Bali* is concerned with a political world and a conception of politics very different from Nordlinger's, and for that matter from conventional western political thought. It is a brilliant, evocative, and poetic book, a book that at once draws the reader into a totally alien world and draws out of that world enduring insights about the nature of political life. Geertz shows that the essence of the state in nineteenth-century Bali was not allocation but ceremony. "Court ceremonialism was the driving force of court politics; and mass ritual was not a device to shore up the state, but rather the state, even in its final gasp, was a device for the enactment of mass ritual. Power served pomp, not pomp power."³⁰ The Balinese state, the *negara*, was "a constellation of enshrined ideas," whose central precept was that "worldly status has a cosmic base, that hierarchy is the governing principle of the universe, and that the arrangements of human life are but approximations, more close or less, to those of the divine."³¹ The main mechanism of political struggle in Bali was the court ceremony, especially cremation, designed to demonstrate the relative status of a particular noble house. These ceremonies were "not merely the drapery of political order, but its substance."³²

The *negara* was only one of several authoritative, decision making institutions in Bali. Issues involving civil society, including public works, local security, and civil disputes, were the preserve of the village. Wet rice cultivation, or more precisely the allocation of water rights, was regulated by irrigation societies. Religious commitments were defined by the temple congregation. Membership in these three groups intersected and overlapped.³³

The defining authoritative relationship between the *negara*, composed of the noble houses, and the rest of Balinese society was the obligation of individual commoners to specific lords for service in ceremonial functions and war. These commoners could be drawn from a number of different villages. They could belong to different irrigation societies and temple congregations. The overriding objective of each noble house was to control more men and resources in order to stage more elaborate ceremonies to demonstrate a higher position in the social order, which was seen as a reflection or mirror of a more encompassing hierarchical cosmos that linked man and the gods.

In the concluding chapter of *Negara* entitled "Bali and Political Theory," Geertz muses upon the broader implications of his presentation. He argues that since the sixteenth century western political thought has identified the state with governance or statecraft, with rule and control. However, Bali "exposes the symbolic dimensions of state power." It "restores our sense of the ordering force of display, regard, and drama."³⁴ Western analysis has been utterly incapable of providing an adequate account of this force. The ceremonial functions of the state have been regarded, as in Hobbes, as a device to reinforce the power of the monarch, or in Marx or Pareto as "great frauds" designed to facilitate the extraction of resources by the elite. "Political symbology is political ideology, and political ideology is class hypocrisy."³⁵ Symbolic activities have not been regarded as ends in themselves.

Geertz conceives of the state as a normative order. His observations about the central importance of symbolic activities in Bali are not merely of antiquarian interest, and he does not mean them to be so. Even in the modern era they are a common defining characteristic of the state. In its simplest form, what is universal and distinctive to what Harry Eckstein has recently called the princely realm, is that it symbolizes and represents in rules and laws the existence of a separate society. Rules "stand for the fact that a common, thus, moral life exists, and they celebrate the common life and make it compelling."³⁶ This symbolic function is the core activity of barely differentiated political institutions in primitive societies. While many other activities have entered the princely realm, the visible celebration of the polity's identity has not disappeared.

Symbols embodied in the state and representing basic political and ethical sentiments that permeate the polity can be seen as a fundamental institutional constraint that channels the behavior of individuals even to the point of endangering or sacrificing their lives. (Hobbes was too worried about desertion, at least once the existence of a moral community has been established.) Dahl's democratic creed cannot be dismissed because of disagreement over specific applications, because this creed defines a set of non-decisions that cannot be revealed by simple behavioral observation.³⁷ David Truman's latent groups are not groups at all, but rather generally accepted societal beliefs that are enshrined in the decorative activities and specific laws of the state and that delineate the acceptable range of political behavior.

The central importance of symbols illuminated by Geertz provides greater insight into the much maligned concept of the common good or the national interest. In allocative terms, promoting the common good can be conceived of as a policy that makes some or all actors better off without making any worse off. But seeing the state as the institution where the common identity and moral beliefs of the polity are embodied in ceremony and practice goes beyond questions of resource distribution among groups or of rectification of Pareto's suboptimal conditions. Political activity focussed on the state sustains the ethical and moral needs of citizens, not just their material ones. The destruction of the state by, for instance, alien conquest, is a loss for all citizens because it means the destruction or severe weakening of the individual's social and moral community.

Political Development: The State as an Intervening Variable

The arguments presented by Nordlinger and Geertz do not address questions of political development: they do not explain how various forms of the state that exist in the contemporary world took their present shape. Especially for Nordlinger, the focus of concern is the causal arrow from the state to the society. In contrast, for Skowronek and the other authors discussed in this section the focus of attention is on the causal arrow from the broader environment, both international and domestic, to the nature of state institutions. The state (understood as an administrative apparatus and legal order) is treated initially as the dependent variable, although in subsequent time periods changed institutional capabilities alter the state's ability to influence economic and social behavior.

All of the authors discussed here reject functional explanations of state development. Institutional structures do not respond in any rapid and fluid way to alterations in the domestic or international environment. Change is difficult. Incongruence between the needs and expressed demands of the state and various societal groups is the norm, not the exception. Institutional change is episodic and dramatic rather than continuous and incremental. Crises are of central importance. Skowronek defines a crisis as "a sporadic, disruptive event that suddenly challenges a state's capacity to maintain control and alters the boundaries defining the legitimate use of coercion. Crisis situations tend to become the watersheds in a state's institutional development. Actions taken to meet the challenge often lead to the establishment of new institutional forms, powers, and precedents."³⁸ During periods of crisis politics becomes a struggle over the basic rules of the game rather than allocation within a given set of rules. However, once crises are past institutional arrangements tend to rigidify. Institutions reproduce themselves and respond more to their own needs than to those of their domestic society or the international environment. Thus, different kinds of causal variables are appropriate for explaining the creation, as opposed to the maintenance, of state institutions.

Crisis may be generated internally or externally. Skowronek is concerned with the former case; the other authors discussed here with the latter. Internally generated crises are precipitated by dynamic changes in the society; externally generated crises by threats from the international system that lead to state efforts to increase extraction, efforts that can precipitate societal resistance. Hence, two patterns of incongruence between the state and its environment can be identified. Pattern I, public stasis and private dynamism, occurs when the exogenous sources of change are internal. Pattern II, state demands and societal resistance, occurs when the exogenous sources of change emanate from the international system.

Pattern I: Public Stasis and Private Dynamism The state as administrative apparatus and legal order will *not* smoothly adjust to changes in its domestic environment. Once institutions are in place they will perpetuate themselves. Power holders strive to select their own successors. Elaborate educational structures, such as France's *grands écoles*, may be created to socialize members of the higher civil service.³⁹

One of Skowronek's major points of emphasis is that, short of a total overthrow of the old regime, reforms must be carried out in the context of existing institutional structures. Some individuals occupying positions in these institutions are bound to resist change because it can undermine their budgetary support, policy scope, and personal status. The natural path for institutions is to act in the future as they have acted in the past.

Institutional stasis is also encouraged by sunk costs. Once a given set of institutional structures is in place, it embodies capital stock that cannot be recovered. This stock takes primarily the form of information trust and shared expectations. Long established institutional structures facilitate the exchange of information and tacitly coordinate behavior. There is more information, and therefore less uncertainty, about existing programs than proposed ones. If new institutions are created, these infrastructures must be recreated. Thus, even if there is widespread societal dissatisfaction with a particular set of institutions, it may be irrational to change them. The variable costs of maintaining the existing institutions may be less than the total costs of creating and maintaining new ones.⁴⁰ Moreover, when pressures are emanating from a rapidly changing domestic environment, it may be difficult to know whether to commit substantial resources to create new institutions because it may not be possible to distinguish transitory from enduring change.

The United States offers an example of a pattern of national development in which the society has changed more dramatically than the institutional structures of the state. Skowronek suggests that there are four characteristics that can be used to describe any state: "the concentration of authority at the national center . . . , the penetration of institutional controls from the governmental center throughout the territory . . . , the centralization of authority within the national government . . . , the specialization of institutional tasks and roles within the government."⁴¹ The state that evolved in early nineteenth-century America rated low on all of these dimensions. Most governing tasks were carried out by state and local governments. The only national institutions of serious import were the parties and the courts. The courts became "the American surrogate for a more fully developed administrative apparatus."⁴² The parties helped to link the national and local levels through patronage. However, these were weak foundations upon which to develop national administrative capacity: the courts and parties were centered at the local level, and their operations were fluid and malleable. Even the Civil War did not lead to any permanent increase in the institutional capability of central governmental institutions.⁴³

There are straightforward functional explanations for the creation and reinforcement of a weak and fragmented state in eighteenth and early nineteenth century America. The American Revolution was a reaction against British efforts to increase penetration and control of American society. The United States was not confronted with any persistent external threat. Aristocratic traditions were weak, so it was not necessary to have a strong state to facilitate socioeconomic transformation. The frontier offered a safety valve for societal pressures that might otherwise have been directed at the central government. The physical abundance of the

United States made it easier to resolve conflict by increasing the size of the pie rather than by asking authoritative institutions to alter the relative distribution of the segments.

These social and economic conditions existed in symbiotic relationship with a pervasive set of values that legitimated a weak state. Louis Hartz has argued that the United States is a fragment society whose political beliefs were determined by its initial settlers. In leaving Europe, these settlers not only escaped from their contemporary conservative opponents but also from their future socialist ones.⁴⁴ The American creed emplaced "liberal, democratic, individualistic, and egalitarian values."⁴⁵ It is not necessary to hold that this ideology was merely a handmaiden of economic interest, or conversely that beliefs were entirely independent of societal conditions. Through the middle of the nineteenth century, Lockean liberal principles were particularly well suited to the social structure and economic conditions that existed in the United States. The liberal fragment could take root and flourish precisely because it legitimated prevailing social relationships.

Thus, at its premier constitutional moment, in the period of its birth, the American state was congruent with its environment. State structures were consistent with the functional needs of society, the preferences of state officials, and basic political beliefs.

However, over time the society and economy changed. Industrialization involved greater economic centralization and concentration in the United States as in other areas of the world. Commercial networks became more complex. Conflicts between labor and management became more frequent. Externalities multiplied. Market imperfections became more common. Information was no longer readily available. The United States became a significant actor in the international economy. The fundamentally rural, agrarian society of early nineteenth-century America was supplemented by an industrialized, urban society populated by diverse ethnic groups that had unevenly assimilated the American creed. Such an environment constantly placed strains on the weak and fragmented political system.

The response to industrialization is the major concern of *Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920*. Skowronek examines the way in which institutional structures changed in three major issue areas: business regulation, the military, and the civil service. A functional orientation suggests a major adjustment in institutional structures to bring them into congruence with the changing society; functionalist logic would predict the creation of a strong state to meet new societal needs and demands. But this did not happen.

Skowronek refers to the period 1877-1900 as one of "state building as patchwork." New institutions simply patched up the existing polity dominated by locally oriented political parties and the courts. The Interstate Commerce Commission, the major institutional innovation in government regulation of business, was gutted by a series of Supreme Court decisions. A new civil service system was created, but it was used only to fill in the interstices around the patronage appointments from which the political parties drew much of their strength. The army was made more professional, but at the same time the national guard, the representative institution of political localism, was maintained and even strengthened.

The development of stronger national capabilities was impeded not simply by the opposition of specific groups but more fundamentally by the existing institutional structure. "Institutions and procedures once created to serve socioeconomic development now appeared as self-perpetuating perversions of that purpose."⁴⁶ Local interests, especially in the South, opposed a strong, professional, national army. The political parties resisted a civil service system that would deny them patronage appointments. The courts "vigorously asserted and jealously guarded the prerogatives of the judiciary in regulating economic affairs."⁴⁷ The outcome of the struggle between these interests of the old order and the proponents of the new, including upper middle class professionals, regular army officers, government officials, and businessmen, was determined not just by the relative power of each faction but by the institutional structure within which the struggle took place. This was especially true for the fate of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Skowronek writes that "the key to understanding the early regulatory effort is not to be found in the interests themselves but in the structure of the institutions they sought to influence. In an archetypical case of the pluralist paradigm, each of the interests contesting the railroad issue found representation in American national government, and each was able to make its mark on the blank slate of national regulatory policy. Yet, in this new regulatory situation, the sum of the interests could not possibly serve any of them, let alone some 'public interest' standing apart from each; it only promised an incoherent, unworkable policy from which no one stood to benefit. A state that promoted pluralism promoted a formula for failure in regulation."⁴⁸ Public policy cannot be viewed simply as the resolution of a set of vectors. The interests and political resources of actors are a function of existing institutions, and this may make it impossible for any given actor or coalition of actors, whether state or private, to implement their preferences.

Skowronek argues that a more powerful set of state institutions was created between 1900 and 1920. However, even after the New Deal, more recent bursts of social legislation, and two world wars, there is still no effective, consistent, and coherent control of the national administrative apparatus. The old order of localistic parties and courts was destroyed, but the "reconstituted" American state, to use Skowronek's terms, did not successfully concentrate power. "Beyond the state of courts and parties lay a hapless administrative giant, a state that could spawn bureaucratic goods and services but that defied authoritative control and direction."⁴⁹ In the area of national administrative capability, institutions that were created or strengthened after 1900 included the Civil Service Commission, the Bureau of the Budget, and the General Accounting Office. However, the specific positions of these agencies "within the federal establishment were all somewhat obscure," and they all functioned in environments characterized by "parallel sets of controls pitted against each other. . . ." In the area of the military "[n]ationalism came to mean a proliferation of semi-independent and competing power centers at the national level rather than the establishment of a national center of power."⁵⁰

Thus, the institutional structures of the past placed constraints on the possibilities for the future. The preferences and capabilities of political actors cannot be treated as exogenous variables; they can only be understood within the context of a given

set of institutional arrangements. Although Skowronek does not place much emphasis on enduring political beliefs, these too have played a continuing and central role in the development of the American state. Huntington has pointed to the persistent tensions between beliefs and institutional development that have erupted during periods of creedal passion.⁵¹ The attack on the national bureaucracy by the Reagan administration only serves to underline the enduring, deep resistance to the concentration of political power at the center. The sinister connotations of the term "military-industrial complex" as well as the failure to agree on a consistent policy toward military service are constant reminders that even in the area of national defense the United States has failed to develop a coherent and legitimate set of institutional arrangements. Judicial activism remains a powerful tradition for American courts. And lest anyone think that localism is dead, consider the following statement from the preliminary report of a commission established by the State of Alaska to study deteriorating relations with the rest of the United States: "If Alaska wants to protect its resources, its revenues and its state prerogatives, the state government must vigorously defend [itself] against federal encroachments. It should not be afraid of suing, of mounting a national information campaign, of building political coalitions, or taking what otherwise might seem to be drastic steps, with the exception of secession."⁵²

In sum, Skowronek's study complements the work of other scholars, such as Huntington and Hartz, who see varying degrees of tension between state institutions and their environment as a constant theme of American political history. Skowronek's underlying causal model is one in which the outcome of institution-building during any particular period of crisis is a function of both contemporaneous environmental factors, such as industrialization, and existing institutional structures that are a product of past conditions, such as the nineteenth-century state of parties and courts. Crises reduce incongruence between state structures and the domestic environment. But during subsequent periods institutional structures reproduce themselves while society changes, leading to increased tensions which eventually precipitate another crisis.

Pattern II: State Demands and Societal Resistance Incongruity between the state and civil society can also arise because the state increases its demands upon the society. Such policies can lead to great social unrest, not simply because the level of extraction increases, but also because legitimacy is placed at risk by the imposition of new state practices. Political leaders do not bring such difficulties upon their heads for nothing.

Throughout the history of the western state system the most persistent sources of pressure on the state have been external. It is the threat of invasion, or the desire to act efficaciously in the international system, that has prompted rulers to increase their level of extraction from the society. This is a major theme of a number of studies published during the last decade. In the penultimate volume of the Social Science Research Council's (SSRC) series *Studies in Political Development*, *The Development of National States in Western Europe*, the editor Charles Tilly argues that the need to maintain and increase military establishments was the major

impetus for the growth of the state's administrative apparatus. Greater military capacity required higher levels of taxation. Higher levels of taxation required a more extensive bureaucracy. Extractive capacities initially used for military purposes could be applied in other areas as well. Taxes that began as extraordinary levies to fight specific wars often became normal and continuing sources of revenue.⁵³

One of the repetitive patterns noted in *Crises of Political Development in Europe and the United States*, the last volume of the SSRC series, is that external threats lead to crises of penetration. The articles on Germany and Russia by John R. Gillis and Walter M. Pintner, respectively, place particular emphasis on this point. Gillis argues that nineteenth-century German reforms were designed to increase the power of the state, not to create a more liberal society. The humiliation of Prussia at Jena in 1806 convinced leading members of the elite that rigid absolutism would perpetuate military inferiority. Reforms were initiated by military leaders and bureaucrats to mobilize the population in the service of the state. Citizenship was defined as a set of duties, not rights. Legislative changes and the extension of the franchise were introduced from above, not only to stave off the possibility of domestic unrest, but also to increase the state's level of extraction. Similarly Pintner shows that the perennial Russian problem was that the needs of the state, prompted by external threats, exceeded its extractive capacity. Russian rulers strove to maintain a large army on an anemic agrarian economic base. Nineteenth-century social reforms were prompted by external failures. Defeat in the Crimean War convinced the ruling elite (composed of the tsar and a small group of high officials) that basic change was necessary. Economic reform, including the emancipation of the serfs, was initiated from above to increase the level of resources that the state could secure from its society.

Ellen Kay Trimberger's *Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru* examines four cases of major social change initiated from above by military bureaucrats. Trimberger defines a revolution as "an extralegal takeover of the central state apparatus which destroys the economic and political power of the dominant social group of the old regime."⁵⁴ There are two basic preconditions for revolution from above: the military and civilian administration must be bureaucratized in a Weberian sense, and they must be independent of the dominant class. Given these preconditions a revolution from above can be precipitated "only in a crisis situation—when the existing social, political, and economic order is threatened by external forces and by upheaval from below. . . ." ⁵⁵ Foreign pressures lead to internal disorder which undermines the military's position. National degradation spawns nationalist ideologies that unite the military internally and provide a rationale for dramatic action. In Japan, Turkey, Peru, and Egypt the military initiated major social and economic changes after they had taken power. The purpose of these changes was to enhance the power of the state by promoting economic development. However, Trimberger is skeptical of the long-term impact of these initiatives because of the tendency of subsequent leaders to ally with the dominant economic forces and because of the constraining influence of the world economic system.

In sum, a number of recent studies point to external pressures as a major cause of the development of new state capacity. Such external pressures are almost certainly more compelling than internal ones. The failure to act effectively, as in Geertz's *negara* and in eighteenth-century Poland, means the destruction of the polity. But in cases of both external and internal environmental pressures, a similar pattern emerges, characterized by rapid change during periods of crisis followed by consolidation and stasis. To borrow a metaphor from recent work in evolutionary biology, such a pattern can be labeled punctuated equilibrium.

Punctuated Equilibrium

All of these studies of political development point to differential rates of change in social and political structures over time. A basic analytic distinction must be made between periods of institutional creation and periods of institutional stasis. The kinds of causal factors that explain why a set of state structures is created in the first place may be quite distinct from those that explain its persistence over time. New structures originate during periods of crisis. They may be imposed through conquest or be implanted by a particular fragment of the existing social structure. But once institutions are in place they can assume a life of their own, extracting societal resources, socializing individuals, and even altering the basic nature of civil society itself. The causal dynamics associated with a crisis of the old order and the creation of a new one are different from those involved in the perpetuation of established state institutions.

Furthermore, once a critical choice has been made it cannot be taken back. There may be a wide range of possible resolutions of a particular state-building crisis. But once a path is taken it canalizes future developments. Sidney Verba has referred to this conceptualization as the branching tree model of sequential development. A critical choice forecloses other options in part because the "choice to set up a program in relation to a particular problem area may lead almost inevitably to the maintenance and even expansion of the program because of the vested interests it creates."⁵⁶ It is not possible in human affairs to start *de novo* with every change in wants, needs, and power capabilities. Past choices preclude certain strategies or make them very costly. Institutions generated by functional demands of the past can perpetuate themselves into a future whose functional imperatives are radically different.

One of the clearest examples of a branching tree argument is Lipset and Rokkan's model of the development of European party systems.⁵⁷ They argue that there were three crucial historical junctures: first, the Reformation involving the struggle for control of the church; second, the Democratic Revolution after 1789 involving the struggle for control of the rapidly expanding educational system; and third the Industrial Revolution involving conflict between the urban center and agrarian periphery. At each of these critical junctures the nation-building elite that controlled the state machinery had alliance options. Once a particular alliance was chosen, however, it set the agenda for future party development. Thus, the settlement of the

sixteenth-century struggle between the church and the state “gave a very different structure to the cleavages of the nineteenth” century in Protestant and Catholic Europe.⁵⁸ In a more recent analysis Lipset has argued that “the nature of working class politics has been profoundly influenced by the variations in the historic conditions under which the proletariat first entered the political arena.” Formative experiences initiated “certain trends or institutional patterns that took on a self-perpetuating character and hence affected ideology, structure, and political outcomes in later years.”⁵⁹

In a particularly provocative set of analyses Charles Sabel and his collaborators have argued that the organization of industrial society has also followed a branching tree pattern. Fordism, the use of mass production techniques involving special purpose machines and unskilled labor to produce standardized products, was not foreordained by the nature of technology. Flexible specialization involving small firms using skilled workers and general purpose machines to produce more specialized products was a viable alternative. However, as a result of the distribution of property rights and income in Britain and the United States, Fordism became the dominant mode of industrial production. Once this choice was made, economic and political institutions were shaped to guarantee the existence of stable mass markets. Thus, an historically contingent set of conditions in the nineteenth century set the path for the future evolution of industrial society.⁶⁰

Fernand Braudel has argued that one of the critical determinants of the rise of capitalism in the West was that for a set of fortuitous reasons cities revived faster than states in the Middle Ages. Revivals, Braudel maintains, “always feature two runners, the state and the city. The state usually won and the city then remained subject and under a heavy yoke. The miracle of the first great urban centuries in Europe was that the city won hands down, at least in Italy, Flanders, and Germany.” Braudel goes on to suggest that the existence of free cities created a new state of mind, “broadly that of an early, still faltering, Western capitalism—a collection of rules, possibilities, calculations, the art both of getting rich and living.”⁶¹ Thus, small initial differences promoted a new kind of institutional structure with profound consequences over the long term.

Moreover, choices made by leading states at a particular point in time influence not only their future range of options, but also the options of later developing states. The functions that are viewed as proper and legitimate for the state are influenced by general international norms and practices. In the modern system the institutional characteristics of states in more industrially developed areas have set an agenda for states in less developed areas. These characteristics come to be associated with the essential nature of the “modern” state and cannot be ignored even by states with very different needs. In his study of social security systems in Britain and Sweden, Hugh Hecllo points out that the options pursued by the Swedes were heavily influenced by the bureaucracy’s assessment of policies that had been adopted in countries with more developed industrial structures. “Because of a process of transnational learning Sweden found unemployment insurance on its national agenda at about the same time that Britain did even though Sweden’s level of economic development and industrialization lagged considerably behind Brit-

ain's."⁶² Virtually every country today has, at least on paper, some kind of social security system, even though the economic resources of many Third World countries are totally incapable of actually implementing such a program. The organization of educational systems throughout the world has not only been seen as a responsibility of the state (as opposed to the church or some other private organization), but has also mimicked the characteristics of systems in the more developed countries.⁶³

Even the state itself can be seen in this light. The concept of a single hierarchical ruling structure governing a defined territorial area developed out of feudal Europe. New military technologies in the late Middle Ages were characterized by economies of scale providing an incentive to form larger territorial units. The revival of trade offered economic benefits to those political actors that could assure the safe movement of goods over longer distances. States, especially nation-states, were able to secure more intense affective commitment from their inhabitants than were empires.

Over time the national state has pushed aside all other forms of political organization. After the second world war demands for decolonization could only be met by granting formal independence, even though many of the areas that achieved this status lacked the economic, military, and bureaucratic capability to function effectively. Some intermediate form of political organization that divided functions between colonial territories and their home governments would almost certainly have been more politically and economically efficacious. But such solutions were not possible. They lacked legitimacy. They could not have commanded the support of colonial populations. The triumph of the national state in Europe became a triumph of the national state around the globe. Choices made in Europe's past dictated the possibilities for Africa's future. Once a particular path had been chosen, other paths, perhaps more functionally appropriate for contemporary problems, were foreclosed.

To borrow a term from another discipline, an imagery that expects short bursts of rapid institutional change followed by long period of stasis can be termed punctuated equilibrium. Punctuated equilibrium refers to a set of arguments about evolution whose main proponents are Stephen Jay Gould and Niles Eldredge. Gould and Eldredge have attacked the conventional Darwinian synthesis which pictures evolutionary progress as a slow, continuous process of change in which entire species slowly adapt to environmental conditions. They have argued instead that change tends to take place rapidly in geographically isolated groups which may then displace their ancestral populations. Such displacements are rare. Generally species do not change substantially over very long periods of time. Evolutionary change, Gould and Eldredge argue, is concentrated in geographically instantaneous events.⁶⁴

Gould has noted that the gradualist-punctualist debate in the largest sense "is but one small aspect of a broader discussion about the nature of change: Is our world (to construct a ridiculously oversimplified dichotomy) primarily one of constant change (with structure as a mere incarnation of the moment), or is structure primary and constraining, with change as a 'difficult' phenomenon, usually accomplished

rapidly when a stable structure is stressed beyond its buffering capacity to resist and absorb.”⁶⁵ This description of the basic nature of the debate in evolutionary theory has its close analog in social and political analysis. Punctuated equilibrium is an apt description of an analytic stance that sees political institutions enduring over long periods once they are established.

Critics of the Darwinian synthesis have also made branching tree arguments. Once a particular evolutionary path is taken, the direction of future evolutionary developments is constrained by the available genetic pool.⁶⁶ If the same set of environmental conditions exists at two different points in time or at two geographically isolated areas of the globe, they will not give rise to the same set of species. Speciation is a function not only of the contemporary environment, but also of past environments, of paths that have been followed and of paths that have not been followed. While the long time frames and slow change of the conventional Darwinian model offer the possibility of optimal functional adjustment (at least over the eons), such optimality is not anticipated by alternative approaches. In a world characterized by punctuated equilibrium there is more uncertainty and chance. A particular structural development reflecting marginal advantages at a particular point in time may constrain future evolutionary developments.

The metaphor of punctuated equilibrium suggests a very different world from that of pluralism and other orientations that emerged out of the behavioral persuasion. Central to these approaches was not simply a societally oriented focus but also reservations about institutional constraints. If institutions adjusted relatively quickly to societal changes, and if formal institutions did not explain political behavior, there was little point in making them an object of scholarly investigation. Attention could be focussed on the motivations of individuals or groups. Even the state, which Geertz refers to as “that master noun of modern political discourse,” could be ignored.⁶⁷ But if institutions—the administrative apparatus, legal order, and political beliefs—are seen as basic determinants of both the interests and the power of political actors, a different agenda is suggested for political research. How can political institutions, including the state, be adequately described? How do institutional structures constrain the behavior of individual actors? What factors best explain the creation of new institutions? What resources enable institutions, especially the state, to perpetuate themselves? What is the duration of lags between different kinds of environmental changes and changes in different kinds of institutional arrangements? When do state institutions fail to change, even when the polity’s survival is at stake? When state institutions are suboptimal or even counter-productive for those individuals living within a given territory, what possibilities are there for change?

The books discussed in this essay have taken the first steps in offering answers to these questions. Others will follow. The more comfortable and familiar world of the 1950s and 1960s is gone. American global hegemony has eroded. “Enlightened” policies have not ended social ills. Economic problems do not respond to conventional solutions. Third World countries will not follow the path trod by the United States. Institutional arrangements that seemed to be part of the basic nature of things have come undone. In such a world the attention of scholars will turn from

behavior within a given set of institutional constraints to the constraints themselves. The work of Nordlinger, Geertz, Skowronek, Tilly, Grew, and Trimberger show that the agenda is already changing. "The state" will once again become a major concern of scholarly discourse.

NOTES

An earlier version of this paper received critical and astute comments from Peter Evans, John Ferejohn, Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, John Meyer, Dietrich Reuschmeyer, Ronald Rogowski, Charles Sabel, Theda Skocpol, and Charles Tilly. I also benefitted from a series of papers presented at a conference on States and Social Structures held at the Seven Springs Conference Center, Mount Kisco, New York, in February 1982, especially "Bringing the State Back In" by Theda Skocpol.

1. Peter Katzenstein, *Between Power and Plenty* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1977); Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Alfred Stepan, *The State and Society in Peru* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978). My own *Defending the National Interest* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978) applied a statist interpretation to policy in the area of foreign raw materials investments.

2. Roger Benjamin and Raymond Duvall, "The Capitalist State in Context," unpublished manuscript, University of Minnesota, pp. 4-4 to 4-8. I have combined two of Benjamin and Duvall's categories, the state as public bureaucracy and the state as legal order, a strategy they also follow.

3. The classic presentation of the bureaucratic politics argument is Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little-Brown, 1971).

4. For the distinction between politics as allocation and politics as us-against-them, see Gianfranco Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978), chap. 1. The quotation is from Harold Lasswell, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How* (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1958).

5. Those who view the state as government, as a collection of individuals in authority, do not see the institutional structure as constraining.

6. Gabriel Almond, "Approaches to Developmental Causation," in Gabriel Almond et al., *Crisis, Choice, and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development* (Boston: Little-Brown, 1973), pp. 22-24.

7. Robert Dahl, *Who Governs: Democracy and Power in an American City* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961). Pluralism is the major strand of the behavioral approach in American political science.

8. The distinction between autonomy and congruity or conformity is developed in Benjamin and Duvall.

9. Eric Nordlinger, *On the Autonomy of the Democratic State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 151.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

11. *Who Governs* appeared over twenty years ago. However, more recent work by Dahl and Lindblom is as societally oriented, emphasizing in particular the corrupting influence of large corporations on democratic processes. See especially Charles Lindblom, *Politics and Markets* (New York: Basic Books, 1977). See John Manley, "Neopluralism: A Class Analysis of Pluralism I and Pluralism II," *American Political Science Review*, 77 (June 1983), for a discussion and critique of this evolution from a Marxist perspective.

12. Dahl, p. 325. For the purposes of this discussion I have emphasized Dahl's treatment of Richard Lee, the most important public actor in *Who Governs*. However, Dahl's study has generally been understood more as an effort to refute economically oriented, elite community studies by demonstrating that the number of societal actors and the dispersion of political resources are greater than Marxist-inspired formulations would indicate. *Who Governs* is concerned with demonstrating both that the menu of societal action is long and varied and that political leadership can influence outcomes.

13. Benjamin and Duvall, p. 4-4.

14. Dahl, p. 311.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 311-312.

16. Dahl pays more attention to political beliefs in *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), where he argues that beliefs are one of the critical determinants in the formation of an inclusive regime characterized by a high degree of contestation. Most of his treatment focuses on individual attributes and process rather than substance. However, the last part of the chapter about "The Beliefs of Political Activists," which Dahl entitles "Another Paradigm," offers arguments very similar to the ones presented in this paper. In this section Dahl discusses shifts in the substantive beliefs of whole populations during periods of instability and breakdown followed by periods of relative stability. See *Polyarchy*, chap. 8, esp. pp. 180-88.

17. Dahl, *Who Governs*, p. 165.
18. Harry Eckstein, "On the 'Science' of the State", *Daedalus*, 108 (Fall 1979), 4 and passim. While formal legalism was the dominant intellectual orientation before 1950, it was not the only one. The work of scholars such as Schattschneider, Merriam, and Lassell provided starting points for the behavioral revolution.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 10–11. See also Gabriel Almond, "Corporatism, Pluralism, and Professional Memory," *World Politics*, 35 (January 1983), 245–47, for a discussion of interest group literature as a reaction to formal legalism.
20. Thomas Kuhn has particularly emphasized the importance of heuristic power as a criterion for choosing among competing paradigms. See *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), chap. 12.
21. Nordlinger, p. 1.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
23. *Ibid.*, chap. 3, esp. p. 91–98.
24. *Ibid.*, chap. 4, esp. pp. 109–117.
25. *Ibid.*, chap. 5, esp. pp. 128–139.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 32–33.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
28. Theda Skocpol makes a similar argument. See her "Bringing the State Back In," paper presented at the Conference on States and Social Structures, Mount Kisco, New York, February 25–27, 1982.
29. Nordlinger, pp. 192–97.
30. Clifford Geertz, *Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 13.
31. *Ibid.*, pp. 135 and 102.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 153.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 122.
35. *Ibid.*
36. Harry Eckstein, "The Idea of Political Development: From Dignity to Efficiency," *World Politics*, 34 (July 1982), 472.
37. Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "The Two Faces of Power," *American Political Science Review*, 56 (December 1962).
38. Stephen Skowronek, *Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 10.
39. For an illuminating discussion of the French case see Ezra Suleiman, *Elites in French Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).
40. For discussions of sunk costs see Robert O. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); and Arthur Stinchcombe, *Constructing Social Theories* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968), pp. 120ff.
41. Skowronek, p. 20.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
43. *Ibid.*, chap. 2.
44. Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955).
45. Samuel P. Huntington, "American Ideals versus American Institutions," *Political Science Quarterly*, 97 (Spring 1982), 2.
46. Skowronek, p. 40.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 122.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 131.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 290.
50. *Ibid.*, pp. 208 and 247.
51. Huntington.
52. Quoted in the *Wall Street Journal*, January 18, 1983.
53. Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Building," in Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 42, 54, 73–74.
54. Ellen Kay Trimberger, *Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1978), p. 2.
55. *Ibid.*, pp. 4–5.
56. Sidney Verba, "Sequences and Development," in Leonard Binder et al., *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 308.

57. Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Party System and Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives* (New York: The Free Press, 1968).
58. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
59. Seymour M. Lipset, "Radicalism or Reformism: The Sources of Working Class Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 77 (March 1983), 1 and 16.
60. Charles F. Sabel, *Work and Politics: The Division of Labor in Industry* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), esp. chap. 4 and 5; Michael Piore and Charles F. Sabel, *The Industrial Divide* (New York: Basic Books, forthcoming); and Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, "Historical Alternatives to Mass Production," *Past and Present* (forthcoming).
61. Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century, Volume I, The Structures of Everyday Life: The Limits of the Possible* (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), pp. 511-513.
62. Hugh Hecllo, *Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 66.
63. The central importance of transnational values has been emphasized by John Meyer and his associates. See, for instance, John W. Meyer, "The World Polity and the Authority of the Nation-State," in Albert Bergesen, ed., *Studies of the Modern World-System* (New York: Academic Press, 1980); John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony," *American Journal of Sociology*, 83 (1977); Francisco Ramirez and John Boli-Bennett, "Global Patterns of Educational Institutionalization," in Philip Altbach et al., *Comparative Education* (New York: Macmillan, 1982).
64. Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould, "Punctuated Equilibria: An Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism," in Thomas J. M. Schopf, ed., *Models in Paleobiology* (San Francisco: Freeman, Cooper, 1972); Stephen Jay Gould, "Darwinism and the Expansion of Evolutionary Theory," *Science*, 216 (April 23, 1982); Stephen Jay Gould and Niles Eldredge, "Punctuated Equilibria: The Tempo and Mode of Evolution Reconsidered," *Paleobiology*, 3 (1977).
65. Gould, "Darwinism and the Expansion of Evolutionary Theory," p. 383.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 303.
67. Geertz, p. 121.