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OBOK

A Study of Social Structure in Eurasia

By
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To

EDMOND WARREN BACON

PREFACE

WHEN the author began writing the present study in 1947, it was in the belief that she had discerned a pattern of social structure not hitherto fully recognized or described. Completion of the manuscript was delayed, however, and in the intervening years other anthropologists have come to recognize the type. Dr. Paul Kirchhoff, in an unpublished paper entitled "The Principles of Clanship in Human Society," distinguished between the "unilateral-exogamous" clan of traditional anthropological literature and the "conical clan," which is essentially the *obok* structure to be described and analyzed in the present work. Dr. E. E. Evans-Pritchard, in *The Nuer*, described segmented lineage structure in a Negro African society and so pointed the way to investigations of the segmented pattern in other societies. Following the publication of *The Nuer*, British Africanists have come to recognize the existence of a "segmented lineage" structure which is comparable to the *obok* structure described here.

Although the present study has lost some of its novelty because of delay in publication, the author hopes that it will still contribute to an understanding of social structure and its dynamic processes. Over half the present work is devoted to Central Asia, where historical documents have been utilized to discover the outlines of tribal social structure in the thirteenth century and to trace changes which occurred both in time and in space among several Central Asian tribes through the vicissitudes of the ensuing centuries. From Central Asia the author was led outward in several directions, lured by structural similarities in Southwest Asia, early Europe, and China. The sections devoted to these areas are brief—that on Europe is cursory—but this extension of the study outside Central Asia has, it is hoped, yielded a broader understanding of the range of variation possible within the type and also of the processes of change in social structure.

Twenty-five years ago, when the author first began her studies of Central Asian peoples, she encountered a confusing number of terms employed in the literature to describe social units among the Turko-Mongol Kazaks. There was no established usage; each author devised his own combination of terms. "Clan," "sept," and "phratry" were interspersed with words derived from the Russian, Turkic, Mongol, or Arabic languages. Most writers were agreed, however, in accepting the existence of clan structure. Brief field work among the Kazaks in 1934 did not produce data which would permit identification of the clan unit; informants employed a single term, *djuz*, to denote a number of disparate groups, and no one *djuz* appeared to stand out from any other *djuz* as a clan.

In 1938/39 the author made a field study of the Hazara Mongols of Afghanistan

and there obtained material which, when compared with the Kazak data, suggested an answer to the problems posed earlier. The term "clan" is confusing when employed in describing the social groupings of Central Asiatic tribes because it is inapplicable in its customary anthropological meaning. The Kazaks and the Hazara Mongols have a social structure which, although essentially unilinear, differs in a number of respects from the clan as it has generally been defined. Since this difference had not been recognized at the time much of the present work was written, the author adopted the descriptive term "tribal genealogical" to designate the type and proposed the Mongol term *obok* as a shorter and more convenient alternative. In the meantime, Evans-Pritchard's term "segmented lineage" came into use in referring to the structure which we have called *obok*. Because in Africa segmented lineages sometimes form part of a more complex structure, we shall retain our original terms and leave it to the reader to judge the convenience of employing *obok* to designate an uncomplicated form such as is found in Central Asia.

The Hazara Mongol material was obtained during the year 1938/39 in Meshed, Iran, and in Quetta, Baluchistan, where there are large Hazara colonies; and in the valleys of Sar-i Chashma and Puri on the eastern edge of the Hazarajat in Afghanistan. The conditions of field work did not permit the taking of a genealogical census of any Hazara community, nor was it possible to obtain as extensive genealogies, either family or tribal, as was desirable. Furthermore, since the writer did not fully perceive the *obok* pattern until after leaving the field, discussions with informants were not directed specifically toward gaining certain information which only later proved to be of first importance. The author is fully aware that the Hazara Mongol material is suggestive rather than comprehensive; an intensive study of Hazara culture was not possible under the conditions obtaining. However, the manuscript of the two chapters on the Hazaras has been read by Mr. Khuda Nazar Qambaree, a Hazara Mongol of the Besud tribe, who resides in Quetta. Neither he nor other Hazaras whom he consulted have taken exception to the statements made here; rather, new data provided by Mr. Qambaree have corroborated the structural scheme described.

The transliteration of names and terms belonging to a number of different language families has posed a problem in the present work. No one system of transliteration has been adopted by linguists for all of Asia. For each language area there is at least one, and sometimes several, traditional systems in use. To work out a common system and transliterate all terms according to this system would not have repaid the vast effort required; it would be of little help to the reader who was unfamiliar with the language involved and would obscure the terms for the reader accustomed to a traditional system.

The Hazara Mongol terms were originally transcribed phonetically. In order to bring these into harmony with the Persian and Persian-Arabic words from which the Hazara terms are frequently derived, they have been transliterated according to the system employed by E. H. Palmer in *A Concise Dictionary, English-Persian.*

This will enable anyone interested to see how the Hazaras have modified Persian words.

Choice of a transliteration system for the Mongol was made difficult by the fact that Pelliot employed a very different system from that adopted by Haenisch in their respective restorations of the text of the *Secret History of the Mongols;* Berezin and Quatremère employed still different systems in their translations of Rashid ed-Din's *History of the Mongols;* Aberle and Vreeland adopted still another system in their accounts of modern Mongol tribes. For terms taken from the *Secret History,* the transliteration of Haenisch has been adopted for practical reasons; there are fewer diacritical marks to plague the typesetter, and Haenisch has published a dictionary to which page references may be made. In the case of names taken from Rashid ed-Din's history, the form found in the *Secret History* has been included in parentheses whenever it was ascertainable. Terms taken from Aberle and Vreeland have not been changed.

For Turkic terms, the transliterations found in the sources have been followed. Where there has been a conversion from the Russian cyrillic alphabet, the standard system adopted by the Board of Geographic Names has been followed. In the use of Arabic terms, the words have been lifted from the several sources without change except for the omission of many of the diacritical marks.

Wherever reference is made to the Kazaks, the form "Kazak" has been used, although "Qazaq" would be a more precise transliteration, and the form "Kazakh" has been employed in the Russian literature since 1936.

The writer wishes here to express her appreciation of the generosity of the late Bayard Dominick, whose grant of a traveling fellowship made field work among the Hazaras financially possible. In 1940 the literature on Afghanistan was combed for additional data on the Hazaras and on the western Mongols in general, under a grant-in-aid from the Social Science Research Council.

A part of the Kazak material was obtained in the course of research in the library of the Orientological Institute, Leningrad, and of field work in Kazakstan, U.S.S.R., which was carried on in 1933–34 under the joint auspices of Yale University and the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. Field work in Kazakstan was made possible by the sponsorhip of that learned and gracious scholar, the late Academician A. N. Samoylovich, then Director of the Orientological Institute and President of the Kazakstan Branch of the Academy of Sciences. The first three chapters of the present study formed part of a doctoral dissertation in anthropology presented in 1951 in the University of California Graduate Division, Northern Branch.

The writer wishes to express her gratitude to Mr. Khuda Nazar Qambaree, who, in addition to reading the manuscript chapters dealing with the Hazara Mongols, provided valuable additional data on Hazara culture; to Professor Nicholas Poppe, of the University of Washington, who read preliminary drafts of the Hazara and medieval Mongol sections of the manuscript and identified Mongol words in the

Hazara kinship terminology; to Professor Franz Rosenthal, of Yale University, who provided definitions of Arab terms; to Mr. Wassef Youssef Wassef, of Cairo, for his illuminating explanation of Arab kinship usage; to Professor C. W. M. Hart, of the University of Wisconsin, who read an earlier draft of the manuscript and made many valuable suggestions; to the late Dr. Alfred E. Hudson, who made available to the author unpublished field notes on the Kazaks; and, finally, to the Hazara Mongol informants whose interest and integrity enabled the author to gain some understanding of their social structure.

ELIZABETH E. BACON

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PART I

The Hazara Mongols

CHAPTER 1

BACKGROUND

SOURCES

Most of the information on the Hazara Mongols contained in the following chapters was collected by the author in the course of field work in Iran and Afghanistan in 1938/39. The winter months were spent in Meshed, a city in northeastern Iran, where there is a large émigré colony of Hazaras, locally called "Berberis." Because of the political situation at the time, it was not possible to visit Hazaras in their homes or to observe them at their normal activities. Investigations were necessarily limited to interviews with selected Hazara informants in the author's home. After interviewing briefly a number of Hazaras, the author worked regularly with two informants. One, Seyyid Hasan, a middle-aged man of the Jaghuri tribe, was recognized by the Meshed community as being most highly versed in Hazara lore. He was born in India shortly after the Great Rebellion but while still a small boy returned with his family to Afghanistan. For a time the family lived in Besud; later it settled in Afghan Turkestan. As a young man, Seyyid Hasan traveled widely in the Hazarajat, and after he had established residence in Meshed he continued to visit relatives in Afghanistan at frequent intervals. The second principal informant, Ali Shefa, was an eighty-nine-year-old Uruzgani. He, too, continued to visit relatives in Afghanistan, but the events and relationships of his childhood in the Hazarajat were more clearly engraved in his memory than anything that had occurred in the twentieth century.

In April, 1939, the author spent ten days in Quetta, Baluchistan, where there is also a large Hazara colony, and there interviewed representatives of several different tribes. In Afghanistan, during July and August, 1939, the author camped and worked at the edge of the village of Pusht-i Mazar, a community of the Timuri tribe in the valley of Sar-i Chashma. Brief visits were made to other villages in Sar-i Chashma and in Puri Valley. This last high valley lies along the territorial boundary between the Timuri and Besud tribes. Formerly a part of Besud, it was later incorporated into the Timuri administrative territory and is inhabited by both Timuri and Besud families. The Timuri territory, which lies some forty to fifty miles west of Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, marks the eastern edge of the Hazarajat. Plans to visit other Hazara communities were cut short by the outbreak of World War II in September, 1939.

Most of the interviewing was done through an interpreter, and in Meshed the writer was fortunate in obtaining the services of an unusually sympathetic and intel-

ligent one. The author learned Persian, however, and obtained some information from her Besud cook without the aid of an interpreter. When he was unsure of the answer to a question, he consulted other Hazaras in Kabul, so that information obtained from him often represents a consensus arrived at by several informants.

HISTORY

The Hazara Mongols of Afghanistan represent one of the last surviving Mongol remnants in western Asia of the vast empire which was conquered by the armies of Chinggis Khan in the early thirteenth century and consolidated by his descendants. The Mongol origin of the Hazaras is attested by their high cheekbones and sparse beards, which readily distinguish them from Afghan and Iranian neighbors. The name "Hazara" is derived from the Persian word *hazara*, meaning "thousand," which came to be applied in the western Mongol empire to the military unit which the earlier Mongols called *ming* or *minggan*, "thousand."[1] Contrary to the tradition often reported in modern publications, there is no evidence that Chinggis Khan left garrisons south of the Oxus when he returned to Mongolia in A.D. 1227.[2] A study of historical records indicates that the Hazaras are descended from Mongols who entered what is now the Hazarajat in central Afghanistan at various times between A.D. 1229 and 1447. In 1229 a Mongol army was dispatched to the west, of which a part was stationed in the region of Ghazni until 1241.[3] In 1256 a grandson of Chinggis Khan, Hulagu (Hülegu), marched west against the Muslim caliphs of Baghdad, and his descendants, the Ilkhans, ruled Iran for nearly a hundred years. On more than one occasion troops stationed in northeastern Iran revolted against the Ilkhans, and it is possible that some of these rebels sought refuge in the central mountains of Afghanistan, where they could more easily avoid punitive expeditions.

The largest number of ancestral Hazaras, however, seem to have come from Transoxiana, the appanage north of the Oxus which Chinggis Khan left to his son Chagatai. During the latter part of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth centuries Chagataian armies swept repeatedly across the Hindu Kush and into India. Although they were unsuccessful in establishing a foothold in India, the Chagataians did gain control of the route to the Indus and, by the last decade of the thirteenth century, claimed as an appanage of Transoxiana the region which includes the present Hazarajat. Later this territory came under the nominal control of the Ilkhans of Iran, but it was assigned by them to generals of Chagataian origin. Following the fall of the Ilkhanate in A.D. 1337, there is a hiatus in the historical records, but it would appear that the Chagataians remained as permanent residents in the area between Kandahar, Ghazni, Kabul, and the Hindu Kush and became the chief ancestors of the Hazaras.

In A.D. 1380 another Chagataian, Timur, invaded Iran and laid claim to the provinces of Kandahar, Ghazni, and Kabul. Under his son and successor, Shah Rukh, troops and administrative officials were sent into the area, and it is probable that some of them remained when the Timurids returned north of the Oxus to Samarkand on the death of Shah Rukh in A.D. 1447. By the time another Timurid,

Babur, invaded Afghanistan at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Hazaras were a distinct people, dwelling in approximately their present habitat.

The modern Hazara Mongols have no tradition of descent from Chinggis Khan or from any of his family or followers. Indeed, the name of Chinggis Khan appears to be unknown to them except for a few individuals who have been told of the great Mongol conqueror by Europeans.

LANGUAGE AND RELIGION

When Mongols moved into the appanage of Chagatai in the thirteenth century, the area was occupied by Turkic-speaking peoples. The ancestors of the Hazara Mongols appear to have been influenced by their Turkic subjects during their stay in Transoxiana, for many Turkic as well as Mongol words are present in modern Hazara speech. In Afghanistan the ancestral Hazaras became Persian-speaking. At the beginning of the sixteenth century some Hazaras still spoke Mongol;[4] by the twentieth century, Mongol survived only as a minor vocabulary element. Bellew characterized the Hazara language as representing a thirteenth-century form of Persian.[5] Morgenstierne, a trained linguist, more cautiously described Hazara speech as "a peculiar dialect of Persian."[6] No descriptive study has been made of any of the Hazara tribal dialects. The Persian form of Arabic script is employed by such of the Hazaras as are literate.

At some period after their entry into Afghanistan the ancestors of the Hazara Mongols adopted the Shi'a Muslim "twelver" faith of the Persians. All Hazaras dwelling within the Hazarajat are "twelvers." Such Hazaras on the periphery of the Hazarajat as have been converted to other Shi'a sects or to the Sunni Muslim religion are not regarded by the twelvers as being properly Hazaras.

LOCATION AND POPULATION

The Hazaras proper traditionally occupied an area extending from the central spine of the Hindu Kush southward through the foothills to Ghazni, Mukur, and nearly to Kandahar and from the Paghman Range, just west of Kabul, to an undetermined point some distance east of Herat. The name "Hazarajat" has been given to this area south of the Hindu Kush. The Timuri, who live east of the Unai Pass toward Kabul, do not consider themselves as dwelling in the Hazarajat, although they are accepted without question as Hazaras. On the other hand, the Yek Aulang, who live in the Yek Aulang Valley on the north slope of the main Kohi Baba Range of the Hindu Kush, are included in the Hazarajat.

In the late 1880's and early 1890's many of the Hazara tribes revolted against Abdur Rahman, the first ruler to bring the country of Afghanistan under a centralized Afghan government. Consequent on this unsuccessful revolt, numbers of Hazaras fled to Quetta in Baluchistan and to the area around Meshed in northeastern Iran. Most active in the revolt were the Uruzgani, the southernmost of the Hazara tribes. Following their defeat, a considerable number of Uruzgani left the country, as did many Jaghuri, their nearest neighbors to the northeast. The territory

which they abandoned was occupied by Afghans of the Ghilzai tribe. In 1904 Habibulla Khan, successor to Abdur Rahman as amir of Afghanistan, issued a proclamation granting amnesty to the Hazaras who had taken refuge in India and Iran and inviting them to return to Afghanistan. They were promised new land in Turkestan to replace that in the south which had been appropriated by Afghans, and many took advantage of this offer. While considerable colonies remain around Quetta and Meshed, the majority of the emigrant Uruzgani, many Jaghuri, and fragments of other tribes are today to be found in the general area between Maimaneh and Mazar-i Sharif, in northern Afghanistan.

The author was unable to visit Turkestan, and data obtained from informants in Meshed were not adequate for mapping the distribution of tribes in the north. This group of Hazaras seems to have been completely overlooked by travelers in the area who have published their observations. For the Hazarajat, the former locations of a number of tribes are shown on Survey of India maps, and these locations can sometimes be checked with other sources. However, the locations of tribes shown on Map I should not be taken as representing the present location. Afghan tribes have been encroaching from the south, and a recent publication shows that, in the west, former Hazara territory is now occupied by tribes of the Chahar Aimak.[7] Just as the tribal map shown in this volume is out of date, so the tribal population estimates given below are over forty years old.[8] Lacking more recent data, the map and the population estimates will serve as a point of departure for an analysis of social structure. They should *not*, however, be accepted as representing the present location and population of tribes in the Hazarajat.

The largest and most stable of the Hazara tribes are the Dai Kundi (population 52,000), Dai Zangi (60,000), Besud (100,000), Polada (45,000), Jaghuri (117,500), and Uruzgani (65,000). The first four listed are traditionally considered as belonging among the "original" Hazara tribes, "Sad-i Qabar." The Uruzgani are said to be made up of two branches—the Dai Khitai and the Dai Chopan—which themselves formerly constituted independent "original" tribes. The Jaghuri are among those tribes considered as "Sad-i Sueka," of mixed descent. Of the other original tribes, the Sheikh Ali live north of the Hindu Kush and, because of their religion (Ismaili Shi'a and Sunni), are not accepted as part of the Hazara community. The Dahla, said by one informant to be extinct, were listed by another informant as a section of the Polada. According to a scholarly Hazara informant, Mr. Khuda Nazar Qambaree, Dahla is a place name, the abode of the Zauli, who belonged to the Dai or tribe of Dala-Mezo, of which the Sultan Ahmad formed another branch. Dala-Mezo no longer exists as a tribe. An Uruzgani informant named the Sultan Ahmad as the Uruzgani division to which he belonged and gave Zauli as another division of the Uruzgani.

Of the tribes not considered as among the original Hazara tribes, the Dai Mirdad, with an estimated population of 10,000, was named as a separate tribe by an informant familiar with the area as of 1910, whereas later it appears to have become a branch of the Besud. The Chahar Dasta (9,250), Muhammed Khwaja (16,650), and

MAP I



Location of Hazara Tribes in the Hazarajat

Jaghatu (42,350) are sometimes grouped together as the Ghazni Hazaras. The first two formerly constituted a single tribe which had branched off from the Dai Chopan; but, whereas they are listed as Sad-i Sueka, that is, of mixed origin, the Dai Chopan are Sad-i Qabar, of "pure" origin. The Babuli and Chora, formerly independent tribes, were listed by some informants as a consolidated subsection, known as the Sher Ahmad, of the Dai Khitai branch of the Uruzgani, although others regarded them as belonging to the Dai Kundi tribe. The Yek Aulang, mentioned earlier as dwelling just north of the Hindu Kush, are said to be an offshoot of the Dai Zangi. The Kalandar are said to be of the same stock as the Jaghuri. The Timuri, a tribe numbering about 1,000, with which this writer spent some time, are not mentioned by any of the earlier sources. The tribe seems to have been formed as a name group some time after the Great Rebellion, from lineages of Dai Kundi, Besud, and possibly other tribal origin.

Even before the Great Rebellion, as a consequence of which Afghans took over some of the territory of Uruzgani and Jaghuri sections, there had been a gradual encroachment of Afghans along the periphery of the Hazarajat. Masson, who spent several years in Afghanistan in the 1830's, wrote that the district of Wardak had formerly been "possessed by the Hazáras, who, about one hundred years since, were expelled by the Afghâns. The Hazáras would also seem to have held the country from Kárábâgh to Ghazni, but have been in like manner partially expelled. Indeed, the encroachments of the Afghân tribes are still in progress."[9] This encroachment continues today.

HABITAT AND ECONOMY

The Hazarajat is a country of high mountains and narrow valleys. It is estimated that the average elevation of the peaks is around 10,000 feet, and many rise to 12,000, 13,000, or even 15,000 feet.[10] In the northeastern corner of Besud, narrow rapid streams drain eastward into the Ghorband, a tributary of the Kabul River. In the Dai Zangi territory, just north of the Kohi Baba ridge, rise some of the sources of the Heri Rud. Much of the Hazarajat, however, is oriented toward the Helmand River and its tributaries, which flow in a long sweep southwestward toward the Sistan border of Iran. In the lower reaches of the rivers, the valleys are deep and marked with frequent gorges. The upper valleys are usually shallower and more open. Although occasional fertile plains are to be found, Broadfoot's description of one region is applicable to many parts of the Hazarajat: "I never saw anything wilder or more desolate. A steep footpath now descends the face of the hill, and ends in the valley of Jarmatu, a ravine between barren hills with a few yards of soil at the bottom."[11]

In this high, interior area the winters are severe. The first slight snows begin in October, and heavy snow lies on the ground from December into March or April. During this time many communities in the upper valleys are snowbound. In April the snows begin to melt, and for the next month or six weeks heavy rains swell the rivers. During the summer months no clouds dim the bright sky, and warm days are followed by cool, brisk nights. Except for an occasional wild almond in some of the

upper valleys, no trees break the naked sweep of mountain and valley, and only grasses and scattered shrubs soften the contours of the mountain slopes.

In such a habitat the Hazaras must painstakingly utilize every resource in order to survive. The narrow level floor of valleys which can be irrigated are intensively cultivated. In some places, where the mountain slopes rise directly from the river banks, the lower slopes are terraced for crops. Irrigation channels, carefully banked with stone, are laboriously constructed, sometimes over a course of several miles, in order that unwatered level areas may be cultivated. Dry farming is practiced on such upper meadows as are available, but for the most part the vast stretches of mountainside are suitable only for grazing.

As a consequence, the Hazara economy is carefully balanced between agriculture and stockbreeding, with the latter playing a major role in the less fertile regions. The staple crops are barley, wheat, several kinds of legumes, and, in some regions, maize. Cucumbers and melons are often raised, and poplar or fruit trees are sometimes planted along the edges of the fields. Rotation of crops is practiced, and alfalfa or clover is planted when needed to enrich the soil. Great flocks of sheep are kept, some of which are sold or bartered for additional grain or for commodities not available in the Hazarajat. Where the grass is rich, horses are raised for riding, and in the south, toward Ghazni and Kandahar, camels. A few cows and oxen are kept for milk and for drawing plows, ponies or mules serve as pack animals, and goats are also found, but the animal wealth of the Hazaras is in sheep. Except where clover or alfalfa is planted to enrich the soil, the Hazaras do not raise fodder for their animals. In the late summer, men and boys may be seen scattered about the mountainside for miles around every village, gathering wild grass and shrubs for use as winter fodder. Other plants and shrubs are collected for use as fuel. Hunting is unimportant in the economy.

Two tribes engage actively in trade—the Dai Mirdad and the Timuri, who send caravans deep into the Hazarajat to obtain goods for sale in outside markets. The chief products obtained by Timuri merchants for sale in Kabul are *roghan* (clarified butter), *baraq* (a kind of woolen cloth for which the Hazaras are noted), and pileless woven rugs. The other tribes do no professional trading. The few imported goods they require, such as embroidery silks, cotton cloth, and spices, are obtained from itinerant Indian merchants.

In spite of the most careful utilization of resources, the Hazaras cannot always obtain a living from the land. Many Hazaras go every winter to seek employment at Kabul, Kandahar, and Quetta, returning home in the spring. This is particularly true of the Besud and Ghazni Hazaras and to a lesser extent of the Jaghuri. A number of Hazaras live in Kabul throughout the year, returning to their homes only for visits.

The Hazaras live in fortified villages called *qale*[12] set on the lower slope of the mountain just above their cultivated fields. Until the twentieth century many tribes spent the summer with their flocks in pastures a short distance from the villages, leaving only a few workers to look after the fields. Timuri informants could not remember a time when they had lived in tents during the summer, and it is probable that most of the Hazaras now live the year round in their villages.

CHAPTER II

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE HAZARA MONGOLS

THE FAMILY

Basic to Hazara Mongol society is the joint family—an extended patrilineal family group which owns property in common. Such a family usually consists of a man and his wife, their unmarried children, and their married sons with their wives and children. It may also include one or more of the man's brothers with their wives and children. This family normally occupies a common dwelling; infrequently, a chiefly family may extend through a series of adjacent dwellings built around a common courtyard. Whether it occupies one or more dwellings, the extended family group jointly owns the residence, agricultural land, livestock, and tools and equipment which serve the family economy.

When a man marries, he is assigned a separate room. Young children occupy the room of their parents, while adult unmarried sons share a room among themselves. A daughter leaves the family home on marriage and takes up residence in the home of her husband's family. The extended residential family group has a single hearth, and its members take their meals in common. This extended family group is regarded as one family or household, known as *khánniwár*.[1] As Seyyid Hasan, the Jaghuri informant, expressed it, "when a son marries and brings his wife to live with his family, it remains one *khánniwár*. If he takes his wife somewhere else and sets up a separate establishment, there will be two *khánniwár*."

When the father dies, the eldest son becomes head of the family unit, which continues as before. The solidarity of this unit is illustrated by the family history of the chief Jaghuri informant. The family had returned from India after the Great Rebellion and was living temporarily in Besud when the father died. The eldest son succeeded him as head of the family, and, when it moved on to Turkestan as part of a larger group, the traditional family household was re-established there: two married brothers with their wives and children and four unmarried brothers. The one sister was married while in Besud and so became part of another household. One Timuri household in Pusht-i Mazar consisted of a widow and her three sons. The informant, a daughter of the widow, originally said that her mother lived with a son. Questioning disclosed that on the death of the father the eldest son had become head of the family and that not only his mother but two younger brothers lived with him.

Although residence is invariably patrilocal and a man—whether father or elder brother or husband—is in almost all cases the head of the family, this does not mean that the woman has low status in the home. She does not go out into the world of

men. She does not smile or laugh when talking to men; indeed "to laugh with a woman"—other than an immediate member of the family—is the greatest Hazara crime. If a strange man appears, she covers the lower part of her face with her veil, and, although she will answer practical questions in a straightforward way, she will not carry on a conversation unless her husband or the husband of some other woman in the gathering is present. Whenever this writer went into the courtyard at Pusht-i Mazar where the women were working, followed by her overconscientious male interpreter, a child would be seen to slip out of the courtyard, and in a few minutes a man would quietly ease through the gate and lean against the wall—the first man encountered by the child who stood in the position of husband to one of the women in the courtyard. He said nothing, did nothing, other than to contribute the presence which decorum required. Yet this writer had the strong impression that the very decorous behavior of the women was not something forced on them by their menfolk but was self-imposed, in conformity with the Hazara ideal of the proper behavior of women.

The writer's impression that the Hazara woman is not a nonentity is corroborated by Mr. Khuda Nazar Qambaree. He writes that "daughters and other women, though not regarded equal to sons and men, are not despised." It is usual for men to address their daughters or other little girls with the affectionate term *mádar-i khána*, "mother of the house."

> Indeed, the mother of the house has a great prestige in the family. . . . As a wife a Hazara woman is entirely responsible for her house, and is the independent mistress of her house. Among the Dai Zangi, the wife of the Mir is called *Ághai* and has vast authority. She reigns supreme in the Qala [fortified village], so much so that in the Qala the Mir is a secondary figure. A lot of the welfare of the tribe depends upon what sort of woman the *Ághai* is.[2]

Thus the woman not only has full control over her own household but exerts considerable influence over her husband in his dealings with the outside world.

On rare occasions a woman may be head of a household. The writer heard of one young woman in Meshed, an only child and an orphan, who had inherted the family dwelling and supported herself by weaving. She had declined an offer to become a second wife, preferring to continue her independent way until she received a suitable offer of marriage. Among the Timuri a man is obligated to marry the widow of his deceased brother if she wishes, but she may, if she prefers, remain in her husband's home and manage the family property until her sons come of age. The village headman will ask some man to do the heavy field work for her.

The members of a Hazara family are bound together by the strongest ties of mutual obligations and responsibilities. The family as a whole is responsible for the actions of any individual member. If a child appropriates the personal property of some other member of the family, the head of the family, after group consultation, delivers a serious lecture to the child on the gravity of the offense. For, as is explained, if the child does not learn to respect the property rights of those at home, he may be tempted later to take things belonging to others, and that would be a disgrace to the whole family. The family is penalized for the actions of one of its

members and, conversely, may collect compensation for injury to a member. The head of the family, who controls house, land, and flocks, may not dispose of such property arbitrarily; he normally sells property or borrows money only after gaining approval for the act in family conclave. Should the eldest brother, as head of the household, show a lack of generosity in dealing with one of his younger brothers or sisters, members of a more extensive kin group would put pressure on him in family council and would have the full support of the larger community in which they lived.

This interdependence of the family group deprives the individual of much possibility for independent action and thus offers little encouragement to individualistic expression. On the other hand, it provides a highly effective form of insurance. The orphan, the disabled, the aged, need never lack food or shelter.

THE LINEAGE

Beyond the residential family unit there is a more extensive solidarity group bound together by ties of patrilineal kinship. The term *alághe*[3] was used by the Jaghuri Seyyid Hasan to designate a group of from twenty to fifty families who "gave their daughters to each other." He went on to say that there might be from three to five *alághe* in a single village or that sometimes a rich *alághe* might have its own village. No other informant was familiar with the term *alághe*, but Ali Shefa, the Uruzgani informant, described a village containing some fifty or sixty families as constituting a group which gave their daughters to each other. It appears from the context that both informants were referring to a lineage or kin group, that is, a group of families related in the paternal line whose feeling of kinship and memory of descent from a common ancestor are strong. This lineage group might occupy a single village or a group of adjacent villages, or, in the case of large villages, it might share a village with several other lineage groups. Data obtained from Timuri informants help to clarify our understanding of the lineage, although they could not in most cases remember their full genealogies; the written genealogies which they had formerly kept had been destroyed during a recent revolt.

Most of the people in the valley of Sar-i Chashma belonged to the Timuri tribe, although families of three non-Timuri lineages were also represented in the valley. When the village elders were naming the lineages represented in the valley of Sar-i Chasma, they included the Islam, Gardi (Geddi?), and Tari, the latter from Mazar-i Sharif, and specifically stated that these three were not Timuri. Whereas members of the Timuri lineages were brought in to give their genealogies, these non-Timuri lineages were not again mentioned. They may have been represented in Sar-i Chasma by worker or artisan families; there was a Besud blacksmith at Pusht-i Mazar, but the author neglected to obtain the name of his lineage. In any event, these three lineages were not regarded as a part of the Timuri community. The Timuri were divided into seven lineage groups: Mahsud, Shádkám, Sabs, Afgháni, Shir Ahmad, Hasani, and Malang.

The Mahsud were descended from an ancestor, Beika'i, who came originally from

the Herat area. The Mahsud informant left no observable gaps in tracing his genealogy (Table 1); if the list of his ancestors as given was correct, Beika'i lived seven generations ago. Beika'i had two sons, Mahsud and Mawali, but the descendants of both considered themselves as belonging to the Mahsud lineage.

The Malang lineage is descended from a man named Malang. The genealogy in Table 2 has been worked out from the data given by one informant, Muhammad Iskháq, a man about thirty-five years old. The genealogy itself suggests omissions, for it makes the informant's uncle a five-year-old boy, whereas Muhammad Nabi,

TABLE 1

GENEALOGY OF THE MAHSUD LINEAGE ACCORDING TO KHAN MUHAMMAD KHAN



TABLE 2

GENEALOGY OF THE MALANG LINEAGE ACCORDING TO MUHAMMAD ISKHÁQ



of the same generation as the boy, according to the genealogy, was described as "still alive," as if he were an old man. In enumerating the members of the Malang group living in the village of Pusht-i Mazar, he mentioned one Ghulam Iskháq, whose name does not appear in the table. Another name omitted in the enumeration of Muhammad Iskháq was that of Mahmad Husein, who later gave his own genealogy (Table 3). Mahmad Husein, who was eighty years old, traced his ancestry back three generations without reaching one of the three sons of Malang. This adds to the suspicion that there were serious gaps in the genealogy given by Muhammad Iskháq. When the latter first named his ancestors, he said that he was the son of

TABLE 3

GENEALOGY OF THE MALANG LINEAGE ACCORDING TO MAHMAD HUSEIN

Ashur Beg
Mahmad Beg
Mirza Beg
Mahmad Husein
Mirza Husein
Ali Dást

TABLE 4

GENEALOGY OF THE SHÁDKÁM, SABS, AND AFGHÁNI LINEAGES



Haji Qadir Dád, who was the son of Haji Ali Dád and that he could remember no further. It was only later that he stated that Haji Ali Dád was the son of Mirza. He presented the tradition that Malang, founder of the lineage, had three sons—Mirza, Sháhli, and Nur. Then he jumped to the present and named living members of the lineage, indicating the recent ancestry of each as far back as he was able. He did not hesitate in designating which of the three sons each of his contemporaries was descended from but did not recall the names of ancestors between the recent and the remote.

The descendants of the three sons of Malang, like those of the two sons of Mahsud, considered themselves as belonging to a single lineage. On the other hand, the three sons (descendants?) of Ádil—Shádkám, Sabs, and Afgháni—each founded a separate lineage. These three brothers were said to have lived long ago, "before the time

TABLE 5

GENEALOGY OF THE HASANI LINEAGE ACCORDING TO GHULAM HASAN

Hasani

Faqir Muhmad

Ghulam Ali

Muhmad Karim

Háji Muhmad Aslam

Ghulam Hasan

of Beika'i," ancestor of the Mahsud lineage. Several informants, working in collaboration, were able to recall the names of five descendants of Shádkám and four of Sabs. Ali Akbar, working back from the present, could remember the names of his father and grandfather only. None of the informants was able to bridge the gap between the founding ancestors and the living members of the three lineages. It is possible that if the Timuri had not depended on the written records destroyed in 1932, there might have been at least some members of the community able to recite the lineage genealogies at greater length. An informant of the Hasani lineage traced his ancestry back for five generations without reaching the founder. No genealogy was obtained for the Shir Ahmad lineage.

The Shádkám, Sabs, and Shir Ahmad lineages were localized, respectively, in the villages of Dari Bugha, Qalai Sabs, and Qalai Islam. The Afgháni, Hasani, and Malang lineages shared the large village of Pusht-i Mazar with members of three non-Timuri lineage groups; and at least one family of the Malang lineage lived in

Qalai Sabs. Members of the Mahsud lineage were said to be scattered through several villages.

Although only the Mahsud had any recollection of where their founding ancestor had come from and most of the informants could give the names of their ancestors for only a few generations back, none of the numerous informants consulted had any doubt concerning either his own lineage affiliations or the names of the lineages represented in the valley. There was no uncertainty as to which lineages were Timuri and which were not. Furthermore, they appeared to regret strongly the loss of the written documents which were said to have contained the complete genealogical records of the various lineages.

According to our information, the Hazara lineage forms the core of a comparatively small group of families related through paternal descent from a not too distant common ancestor. The Jaghuri informant said that it would number from twenty to fifty families; the Timuri lineages averaged about twenty-five families each, although there was considerable variation in size. Sometimes the families of a lineage comprised a village unit or occupied several small adjacent villages; sometimes several lineages shared a large village. In Sar-i Chashma Valley the families of the Mahsud lineage were scattered among several adjacent villages, in association with members of other lineages. Details were not obtained on the circumstances of this dispersal; it may have been recent. In most cases for which we have information, the lineage was localized.

Our data suggest not only that the lineage was ideally a local group but that change of permanent residence was a first step toward the formation of a new lineage. The three "sons" of Ādil founded three different lineages—Shádkám, Sabs, and Afgháni—which were localized in three different villages of the valley. Malang also had three sons, and people remembered which of the three sons they were descended from, but separate lineages were not formed; most of the members of the Malang lineage lived in a single village, Pusht-i Mazar; only one family was recorded as living elsewhere, and this may have been that of a landless worker.

We do not suggest that any family which moves to another village automatically founds a new lineage but rather that leaving the ancestral village is a prerequisite to founding a new lineage. A landless worker who settled elsewhere temporarily would not found a new lineage. All information obtained concerning such families indicated that they retained affiliation with the ancestral lineage. The acquisition of land in a new locality would appear to be essential to the establishment of a new lineage. Localization, like remembrance of descent from a not too distant common ancestor, would seem to serve as a marker for designating degree of relationship and, at the same time, through the consequent proximity of its members, to reaffirm kinship solidarity.

LARGER KIN GROUPS

Above the lineage extend ever wider and more comprehensive segments, up to the tribe. An informant in Quetta gave an example of the usual conversational exchange which occurs when two strange Hazaras meet:

Q. *Az kudam mardum hasti?* ("From what people are you?").
A. Dai Zangi (the name of a tribe).
Q. *Az kudam mardum-i-Dai Zangi?* ("From what people of the Dai Zangi are you?").
A. "Bacha-i-Ghulam" (the name of a Dai Zangi subdivision).
Q. "*Az kudam ja-i-Bacha-i-Ghulam?*" ("From what part of Bacha-i-Ghulam?").
A. "Waras" (the name of the valley occupied by the informant's section or lineage of the Bacha-i-Ghulam).

Ali Shefa, the Uruzgani informant, belonged to a lineage which occupied four villages. A group of eighty villages[4] constituted the subsection named "Zoghi." This, together with several other subsections occupying adjacent territories, composed the Nukroz section. The Nukroz was a section of the Sultan Ahmad, which, in turn, was a subtribe belonging to the Dai Khitai branch of the Uruzgani. In a conversational exchange such as that recorded previously, Ali Shefa would properly have given his affiliations as: Uruzgani tribe, Dai Khitai branch, Sultan Ahmad subtribe, Nukroz section, and Zoghi subsection. A Jaghuri informant in Meshed, when asked what tribe he belonged to, without hesitation gave his affiliations as follows: Jaghuri, Izri, Musqa, and Bábá, explaining that he was naming the groups in order from the largest to the smallest.

The Timuri, a very small tribe of recent formation, had no subdivisions other than the lineage. Consequently, while individuals of other tribes usually omitted the name of the lineage in identifying themselves to strangers, the Timuri more often gave the name of the lineage. Timuri informants were able to name the common ancestor of their lineage and, in the case of the Shádkám, Sabs, and Afgháni, of related lineages, even though they were unable to remember all the links in the genealogy. A Besud informant stated that the section to which he belonged, the Mir Bacha, was descended from a man of that name who lived about two hundred years ago. In other cases, however, common descent was not emphasized. Ali Shefa said that the Sultan Ahmad, one of the largest and best-known subdivisions of the Uruzgani, took its name from the first man who had land in the Sultan Ahmad territory. Uruzgan, according to the same informant, was the name of "a man who lived very long ago." He was not described specifically as a tribal ancestor. Since the Uruzgani appear to result from a fairly recent coalition of two separate tribes—the Dai Khitai and the Dai Chopan—while the Sultan Ahmad is remembered as having formed a branch of a third tribe, it is significant that the tribe should have acquired an ancient founder. An informant in Quetta implied a common ancestor for the Jaghuri tribe when he said that they were not pure Hazaras, for Jaghuri, the founder, was the son of a Persian concubine and a Tatar Khan.[5] Another informant in Quetta stated that all the "pure" Hazara tribes were descended from a common ancestor, Qabar; the Besud were descended from one son, the other tribes from a second son.

Had it been possible to work with groups well inside the Hazarajat, instead of with exiles living in Meshed and Quetta and with the peripheral and in many ways atypical Timuri, it is possible that tribal genealogies might have been obtained. With the data available it is possible only to say that members of lineages, subsections,

and usually sections believed themselves to be descended from a common ancestor. Beyond this there appears to be a pattern which favors the belief that all groups, even at the subtribal, tribal, and intertribal level, had a common progenitor.

The founders were all men, human beings, who had become vague in outline but who had not acquired mythological attributes as they receded into the dim reaches of memory. Mir Bacha was a man who lived two hundred years ago. Ádil settled at Sar-i Chashma before Beika'i did. Sultan Ahmad was the first man to settle in the district. The memory is specific as far as it goes, but there is no attempt at embellishment. Reaching farther back into time, Jaghuri was the son of a Tatar Khan, name unknown, and a Persian concubine.

Whether members thought of the founder of their group as a direct ancestor or not, the subsections, sections, and larger units appear to have developed, in part at least, from actual lineages. Beika'i left his lineage in Herat and settled in Sar-i Chashma. Because of the difficulty in maintaining communications with his distant home, it was not unnatural that his son should become the founder of a new lineage. Though we are not told where the Uruzgani Sultan Ahmad came from, we do know that he settled in a new territory. We may suppose that he, like the Timuri Mahsud, established first a new lineage, but that in time it flourished and grew until it split up into a number of lineages; as the segmentation progressed, the Sultan Ahmad lineage would have become a subsection and, in time, as the numbers increased and more groups were formed by subdivision, a section of a tribe. The Besud Mir Bacha must have first founded a lineage, which, as it increased and expanded, achieved the status of a tribal subsection composed of a number of lineages. Such a process of fission as the result of increase would take time. The Besud Mir Bacha is said to have lived two hundred years ago. There is no way of checking by historical records the accuracy of this, but two hundred years appears a not unreasonable length of time for Mir Bacha's descendants in the male line to reach the present number of around five hundred, particularly as the descent group was sufficiently prosperous to maintain a family holding chiefship over the larger section. The Timuri lineages founded by the sons of Beika'i and of Ádil were not very old or very numerous. The process of formation of new groups by fission need not stop at the level of section or subtribe. The Chahar Dasta and Muhammad Khwaja, now independent tribes, were formed by the splitting into two of a single tribe, which itself had been formed by fission from the Dai Chopan.

Tribal groupings may also be formed by fusion. The Uruzgani, for example, include two subtribes—the Dai Khitai and the Dai Chopan—which were independent tribes as late as the early part of the nineteenth century. The Dahla, once an independent tribe, was said by informants to have become a section of the Polada; but Mir Adina, formerly a section of the Polada, later became a section of the Uruzgani. The Dai Mirdad, once a tribe, became a subtribe of the Besud, and the Chora and Babuli, once separate tribes, were later reduced to the status of subsections within the Uruzgani. Thus, while some sections, or even conceivably tribes, may be expanded lineages and so possibly descended from an actual common ancestor, in

other cases even sections may represent an amalgam of diverse lineages. The patterned structure of the society is a genealogical one, however, and when an informant wished to explain why the Jaghuri were regarded as not "pure," he did so in terms of descent from a single ancestor and ancestress.

Whatever the actual lines of descent, there is a feeling of kinship among the Hazaras, strongest at the level of the household and becoming gradually attenuated through the lineage, subsection, section, subtribe, and tribe to the Hazara group as a whole. As Hazaras themselves say, *Tamam Hazra Yaga*, "all Hazaras are one."[6]

GROUP TERMINOLOGY

In the preceding discussion the author has arbitrarily used the terms "lineage," "subsection," "section," "subtribe," and "tribe" for the various levels of groupings.

The word *alâghe* was employed on one occasion by the Jaghuri informant to designate a lineage, but elsewhere, in enumerating sections and subtribes of the various tribes, he used it before each name, as, for example, *alâghe-i* Sultan Ahmad. When asked the meaning of the word in this sense, he said that it was a Persian word meaning "property" and that the Hazara term was *tarwâba*, which referred to the land belonging to the group.[7] He employed both *alâghe* and *tarwâba* in referring to groups at several levels. When a Besud informant was asked whether he knew the word *alâghe*, he offered the word *âghela* as meaning "a group of villages." Mr. Qambaree, after reading this in manuscript, suggested a Hazara word of Turkic origin, *âghil*, meaning "neighbor, neighboring villages, adjacent territory." This is clearly the term which the Besud informant had in mind, and it is probable that *alâghe* is a variation of *âghela*. Certainly, among all the Hazaras encountered, the social group, of whatever level, was closely identified with the territory which it occupied or the locality with which it was associated.

When asked whether he was familiar with the word *aimak*,[8] the Jaghuri informant first defined it as "all the places one passes through in making a journey," then as a people, like Afghans or Turkomans. Here he was referring to the Chahar Aimak ("Four Tribes") of western Afghanistan, one tribe of which is said to be Mongol in origin. Neither he nor any other informant used the term *aimak* in reference to Hazara tribes or subdivisions thereof, but the Jaghuri informant's familiarity with the term and his association of it with place—he was the most widely traveled of all the informants interviewed—suggests that territoriality was such an integral aspect of tribe that where *aimak*, a Mongol word for tribe, persisted, it had the meaning of territory.

The Arabic words *qaum*[9] and *tâifa*[10] were used interchangeably by the various informants in reference to groups of all levels from the lineage to the tribe. When asked to what *qaum* or *tâifa* he belonged, an informant had the choice of naming any group of which he was a member, from the subsection to the tribe. One Besudi gave his *qaum* as Mir Bacha. A Besud blacksmith living among the Timuri gave his *qaum* as Daulat Pai. Consultation of a tribal list made available to the author revealed the fact that Mir Bacha was the section from which chiefs of the Daulat Pai sub-

tribe of Besud were drawn. Both informants might equally well have given the name Daulat Pai, but only one did. Informants living outside the Hazarajat and those of one tribe residing within the territory of another normally gave the tribal name first, then the name of a smaller subdivision, presumably that of the smallest segment likely to be recognized. The one Besud informant may have identified himself as belonging to Daulat Pai because he thought that foreigners would not be familiar with the names of smaller subdivisions. The other may have chosen Mir Bacha because it was the section to which the subtribal chiefly family belonged and so had special prestige.

The fact that there is no special terminology to distinguish groups at one level from those of another makes it very difficult for the field worker to obtain accurate and coherent lists of tribes and their subdivisions. More relevant in the present context, it reflects the attitude of the Hazaras toward the various groupings. All, from the lineage up to the tribe, are of the same kind. The difference is one of degree of relationship. The individual, when identifying himself, names those groups most likely to be known to a stranger, in order to fix his position in the segmented tribal structure. Because of a pattern which will be more clearly demonstrated for some of the cultural relatives of the Hazaras, the author has adopted the term "tribal genealogical" as being descriptive of this type of social organization.

TRIBAL GENEALOGICAL GROUPS IN RELATION TO POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

The basic governmental unit among the Hazaras is the village, normally headed by a chief or headman and assisted by several *rish safit.*[11] Uusually the *rish safit* are respected heads of families in the village, who consult with the headman in matters of interest to the village. In large villages with several hundred inhabitants, a *rish safit* might act as headman of each ward or section of the village, himself dealing with minor matters concerning individuals within his jurisdiction and for more serious affairs acting as representative of the ward in consultation with the village headman. In some small villages the *rish safit* act without a headman. This seems to have been true of a village in Puri Valley which consisted of seven households, only four of them landowners and permanent residents. Here the heads of the four landowning families constituted the *rish safit.* At the largest village in Puri Valley, with fifteen families, affairs were managed by five *rish safit.* Although one of them appeared to speak a little more authoritatively than the others, the variation seemed to be due to his personality rather than to any formal difference in status.

In the valley of Sar-i Chashma, the village of Pusht-i Mazar, which comprised forty households, had no formal headman, although there was a man functioning as such. He had no title, had not been elected or appointed, nor had he in any other way attained his position by formal process. He assured the writer that he was just a villager and had no position. Yet he received and looked after the welfare of the writer's party during the stay at Pusht-i Mazar, he entertained an Afghan government official who visited the village briefly, and it was observed that residents of

the village went to him for advice. Whenever several of the older men were to be seen sitting in a group talking, Ghulam Hasan was a member of the group. He was perhaps forty-five years of age, much younger than many other men of the village. He was, however, the one person in the village who could read and write, he was apparently one of the most prosperous, and he had an intelligence and dignity which naturally inspired confidence. The Besud informant, speaking of his own tribe, also knew of no title for the village headman but summed up the situation effectively when he said that "in the village one man who is wise takes care of everything necessary."

Information for the Uruzgani and Jaghuri indicated that the position of village headman was somewhat more formal among those tribes. Ali Shefa, the Uruzgani, applied the title *ish farish*[12] or *mehtar*[13] to the chief of the village and said that the position was hereditary. The eldest son normally succeeded his father, and, according to the informant, the line of succession could not be changed, even if the heir were unpopular with the people of the village. In considering this statement, it must be kept in mind that the villages described by Ali Shefa were composed of a single *khâniwâr* or household or of a single lineage group. Consequently, the head of the family would automatically become head of the village, and the oldest son would normally succeed his father as *ish farish*. One Jaghuri informant used the title *arbâb*,[14] the other, *dârugha*,[15] for village headman, but both agreed that he was chosen by the villagers on the basis of ability and the respect which he commanded.

Whether the headman was formally elected or whether he gradually found himself acting as headman because people turned to him for advice, the affairs of the village were administered with little show of formal authority. At Pusht-i Mazar the writer often observed small groups of older men sitting under a tree at the edge of the village in quiet conversation. Village affairs were to a great extent conducted in such casual sessions. If anyone had a problem which required group action, he mentioned it to the *rish safit* with whom he was best acquainted, who in turn brought it to the attention of the other *rish safit* and the headman. They talked the matter over among themselves and discovered the opinion of other villagers if they were not already familiar with it. Any decision made followed the consensus of the village. In a village where the houses are crowded close together, where the women work together in the courtyards, where the men work within view of each other in the fields during the summer and in winter spend much of their days together talking in the mosque, everyone knows what everyone else is doing. If two people quarrel, a *rish safit* hears of it and steps in to mediate before animosity can become acute. If an elder brother, head of the family, shows unwillingness to support an unmarried sister or to provide the marriage dowry which is her right, the village headman is called in to give the man fatherly advice on his responsibilities. His only authority is that derived from the weight of public opinion behind him, but that is sufficient.

The functions of the village headman are essentially those of the head of a household or of a lineage. A quarrel within a family is settled within the family. If it occurs between members of two different families, the *rish safit* or village headman acts

in the capacity of father, representing village opinion just as the father represents family opinion. Family or lineage normally cares for its members who need help. When they are unable to do so, the village representative steps in.

Actually, the village itself is so much of a co-operative unit that individuals frequently accept community responsibility without the intervention of the headman. For example, a woman informant at Pusht-i Mazar was the wife of a man whose father was dead and whose house had been destroyed in the 1932 rebellion. A brother worked in Kabul. The couple had no land and no money to rebuild the family dwelling. Another family in the village, not related in any way and so not obligated to help as a relative would be, offered the couple a room in their house. No rent was paid; the couple were not particular friends of the owner of the house; the husband worked for another landowner. The informant did not seem to feel that any special gratitude was due her benefactors. She and her husband needed a place in which to live; the family had an extra room. It was natural that they should offer it.

This attitude of unassuming responsibility for those in need was confirmed by another informant at Pusht-i Mazar, who said that if there were anyone unable to work because of age or other disability, who had no family or whose family was poor and unable to help, the members of the village would give him enough to keep him alive. Each would give according to his means, directly to the individual needing help, without the intervention of a collecting and distributing agency. In some tribes, village *mulla*'s (Muslim priests) act as agents in allocating aid to the needy, but, in any event, the villagers accept the principle of responsibility for their co-residents.

Thus within the village the headman and *rish safit* act quietly and without show of authority to keep interpersonal relationships within the village free from friction. In the nineteenth century, when many of the Hazaras left their villages during the summer and moved with their flocks into the upper mountain pastures, the headman took the initiative in setting the time for the migration, directing the order of movement, and choosing the camp site, although he undoubtedly consulted the *rish safit* and they the family heads before arriving at any important decision.

In matters which concern the relations of the villagers with the outside world, the headman and *rish safit* act more formally as official representatives of the village. When an Afghan government official visited Pusht-i Mazar, it was the unofficial headman who entertained him with due ceremony. He received the writer's party, arranged to have a camp site made available, and, without his having announced his position, made it clear that requests for informants and other facilities of work should be directed through him. According to informants of other tribes, the headman acts as agent for the subdivisional or tribal chief in collecting taxes, and in case of a disagreement or theft involving two villages the headmen of these two villages, together with the headmen of several disinterested villages, meet to resolve the difficulty. If they are unsuccessful, then the tribal or subdivisional chief is called in.

It will be seen from the foregoing account that, while the village does not always coincide with the lineage, the village community has some functions which are ex-

tensions of those of the family. According to the oldest informant, reporting for the Uruzgani, the culture of which appears to have been archaic, the village consisted of a single family or lineage. Among the Timuri, where the culture has been most affected by outside influences, three of the five villages were localized lineages. In Puri Valley only one of the villages for which information was obtained had more than one landowning lineage. Precise data could not be obtained for Jaghuri and Besud as to the proportion of villages which constituted lineages compared with those which contained representatives of two or more lineages. The impression of the writer is that village functions are extensions of those of the family and that where the village includes two or more lineages it continues to operate as an extended family or lineage.

Above the village level, political units, such as they are, coincide with the segmented tribal genealogical territorial divisions. Subsections and sections—the groups where the feeling of genealogical relationship is strongest—are normally political units under a chief. Subtribes and tribes are occasionally organized under a chief; frequently they are only territorial and population entities. Except for the Besud titles *asqál*[16] for the chief who governed a unit of from five to fifty villages (a subsection) and *qariadár*[17] for that over a unit of from a hundred to five hundred villages (a section), the term *malik*[18] was applied indiscriminately in referring to chiefs of all the tribal genealogical levels, from subsection to tribe, just as *qaum* and *tdifa* were applied to all levels of groups.

Ali Shefa, the Uruzgani, said that his father was *malik* over the Zoghi subsection, and he was able to name the chief of the Nukroz section. There is no reason to doubt his statement that there was no chief over all the Uruzgani, and no reference was encountered to chiefs over the two subtribes mentioned by another informant, the Dai Khitai and the Dai Chopan. The Uruzgani sections seem to have been autonomous, so much so that a traditional state of hostility existed between some sections of the same subtribe. These independent sections varied considerably in size. The Sholi (Zaoli), for example, were so populous that their traditional enemies—the Qadam, Khurdi, and Sekha, all small sections—made a pact of mutual assistance against their formidable enemy.

The Uruzgani, according to informants from other tribes, were the least united of all the Hazaras and the most prone to intratribal warfare. After the removal of many of the Uruzgani to Turkestan under restraints which prevented them from engaging in raids and feuds, one of the sections, the Sultan Ahmad, appears to have achieved the status and numerical strength of a subtribe, united under one chief with a well-established territory extending between Mazar-i Sharif and the Oxus River. The Jaghuri do not appear to have had a chief over the whole tribe. Since the principal Jaghuri informant normally enumerated, instead of group names, the names of chiefs together with the name of the territory over which they had jurisdiction, it was impossible in most cases to equate these with the names of tribal subdivisions mentioned by other informants. The Timuri, a small tribe numbering about a thousand souls and so no larger than many sections, has no divisions between

those of the lineage and village and the tribe. Thus there is a tribal chief, called *malik*, but no lesser chiefs.

Among the Besud, on the other hand, there are *malik*'s over some groups at the subtribal level, although not among all, and in the nineteenth century a *khan* ruled over the whole Besud tribe. At least until the time of the Great Rebellion there was a chief over all the Dai Zangi and another over the Dai Kundi. Nadir Shah (r. A.D. 1688–1747), who took refuge for a time among the Dai Kundi before he ascended the throne of Iran, appointed a leader named Daulat Beg as chief of all the Hazaras. The descendants of Daulat Beg held chiefship over the Dai Kundi for six generations, but the other Hazara tribes refused to accept either Daulat Beg or his successors. Elphinstone, who described the peoples of Afghanistan early in the nineteenth century, wrote: "They have constant disputes among themselves, so that there is scarcely a Hazaureh tribe which is not at war with its neighbours. They have also foreign wars; and sometimes two or three Sooltauns unite to rebel against the King; but they have never any solid or useful confederacy."[19] Since that time the Hazara tribes have never united as a political entity.

Hazara political organization coincides with the segmented tribal genealogical structure insofar as there is political organization. The village is characteristically a lineage group and has the functions of a lineage even when it includes several lineages. Above this the subsection and section, which are usually patrilineal kin groups, regularly have a political organization under chiefs. Among some tribes political leaders are found at the subtribal level; among others they are not. A few tribes have, or in the nineteenth century had, tribal chiefs.

SUCCESSION TO CHIEFSHIP

Among the Uruzgani the position of *malik*, whether of section or of subsection, normally passed from father to eldest son. It was necessary, however, that the succession be confirmed by the people, and, if the eldest son were unpopular or lacking in ability, another member of the chiefly family was chosen in his place. The Uruzgani informant, Ali Shefa, according to the rules of hereditary succession, should have become chief of his subsection following the death of his father and elder brothers. Yet it was his cousin who became chief of the group when it settled in Turkestan. Among the Besud, the subtribal chief was traditionally drawn from a single lineage, and, among the Dai Kundi, chieftainship of the tribe passed from father to son for six generations during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The accounts of nineteenth-century travelers in the Hazarajat indicate, however, that, among both Besud and Dai Zangi, chiefship at the tribal level went to him who led the strongest army.[20]

Within the memory of informants interviewed by the writer, chiefs of subsections and sections of the Jaghuri and Besud and of the tribe among the Timuri have been elected. The Jaghuri chief held his position as long as he was satisfactory, which might be for life. According to the Besud informant, a *qariadár* (chief of a section) remained in office for from one to three years only. Among the Timuri in recent

years, one *malik* held office for three years, until he died. Then, in rapid succession, there was a whole series of *malik*'s who were replaced after a month or so. These brief terms were followed by one of a year, while the incumbent at the time of the writer's visit had been in office for about six months. The brief terms among the Timuri might be explained by the fact that the *malik* was called on by the Afghan government to carry out its orders. When these were unpopular, the *malik* was blamed by the people. One informant said that the preceding chief had been replaced because "he was cruel." The deposed chief himself said that the government had made some unreasonable demands, and the people objected. The rapid changes in chiefs among Timuri and Besud appear to reflect a conflict between the central Afghan government and the independent Hazara tribe and probably do not represent the normal Hazara situation. The Besud informant said that the *qariadár*, the section chief, was simply the go-between between the people and the Afghan government, while the *asqál*, the subsection chief, was the real chief as far as looking after the general welfare of the people was concerned.

Whether the tenure of office was short or long, the democratic principle operated in the election and deposition of a *malik* among all the tribes for which information was obtained. The *malik* was elected in general meeting by the people. In theory, every man in the tribe might attend the meeting and cast his vote. In practice, the electoral meetings seem to have been attended chiefly by the *rish safit*, the elders. They apparently consulted the other villagers in advance, however, for all informants were agreed that the election represented the wishes of the people. If it were felt that a chief was unsatisfactory, families would complain to the *rish safit*, and he in turn would lead a delegation of family representatives to the village headman. The headmen of dissatisfied villages would then lead their delegations to the *malik*, to whom they would present their complaints. He might be given a chance to improve his conduct, or he might be deposed at once. The chief had to accept the decision of the people, for, to quote a Hazara proverb, "The *malik* is not sent by God, but is chosen by the people." Should there be a difference of opinion among the people in regard to the choice of a chief, *seyyid*'s, who are highly respected among the Hazaras because of their believed descent from the Prophet Muhammed, would count the number favoring and opposing a given candidate and would try to persuade the minority group to accept the will of the majority. Occasionally, particularly in the old days, the minority might refuse to accept the choice and transfer its allegiance to the *malik* of a neighboring territory. If the first chief tried to collect taxes from the seceding group, war might ensue.

In all cases, whether the position of *malik* was hereditary or elective, he was necessarily dependent on the good will of the people, and they were ready to depose or secede from any leader who displeased them. Even in the case of the tribal chiefs who achieved their position through force, the size of the troops they commanded was a gauge of their popularity. They maintained no standing army. When they made a call to arms, they were dependent on the willingness of each village and of each subsection to provide its quota of men. Ferrier wrote in the middle of the nineteenth

century: "The Sirdar Hassan Khan ben Zorab is recognized as their supreme chief by the other three tribes i.e. Deh Kondi, Bolgar, Kudelane . . . though they are broken up into many separate camps, and each chooses a commander to be confirmed in his authority by Hassan Khan. This chief can assemble 5000 horse and 3000 foot, and even double that number in a case of pressing necessity."[21]

This ability to muster fighting men when needed was also a necessary qualification of a subdivisional chief in the days before the Hazaras were pacified. As the peaceful Seyyid Hasan expressed it, a man was chosen as chief by the *tâifa* "because he was a good man and had a family of two thousand tents," i.e., he could count on a goodly number of fighting men in the tribal genealogical group to support him against enemies.

TRIBAL GENEALOGICAL GROUPS AS TERRITORIAL UNITS

Hazara lineage groups, which, like the families, are patrilineal, are normally localized, whether the lineage coincides with the village or several lineages share a village. Above the lineage level, all data indicate that the tribal subdivisions at all levels are territorial units. In the Puri Valley one village was found containing landowners from both Besud and Timuri tribes, but this appears to have been unusual. The valley was originally considered a part of Besud territory, but some years ago, when the Afghan government established effective control over the region, the Puri Valley became a part of the administrative unit which includes Sar-i Chashma and is now subject to the Timuri tribal chief. All the Besud landowning families in Puri belong to a single section or subsection, the Geddi.

Normally, tribal subdivisions at the several levels are territorial units. The names of specific subdivisions were regularly used by the various informants both for a group of people and for the territory they occupied. Besud, Jaghuri, and Dai Zangi are tribal names, and individuals whose families have lived abroad for several generations still consider themselves as belonging to those tribes. But they are also place names and appear as such on maps. One makes a trip to Besud or Dai Zangi, as the case may be.

Below the tribal level, informants used the names of places and of tribal subdivisions interchangeably to such an extent that the author frequently had difficulty in distinguishing one from the other. The informant who was most precise in giving the full ramifications of his tribal affiliations also volunteered information concerning the location of his lineage. The most complete tribal list available to the writer gives the names of the obscure mountain valleys in which each subsection dwells. The use by informants of the terms *qaum* and *tâifa*, which primarily refer to people, for territorial subdivisions, and of *alâghe* and *tarwâba*, meaning "landed property," "earth," for tribal subdivisions indicates clearly that the group and the territory which it occupies are inseparable in the minds of the Hazaras.

The lineage occupies a part or the whole of a village; the subsection, a group of adjacent villages; the section, one or several adjacent valleys. When individual families leave the territory of their tribe and subdivision, they consider themselves

outsiders and are so considered by their new neighbors, until they have acquired land in the community.

In many village communities there are landless workers who are alien to the landowning lineages of the village. In the narrow mountain valleys of the Hazarajat, arable land is limited, and the amount under cultivation cannot be increased at will. In order to avoid a subdivision of the fields to a point where the resultant plot is inadequate to support a family, it is a frequent practice, when property is divided on the death of the father, for younger sons to take their share in movable property and go off to seek their fortunes elsewhere. Some may go to other parts of the Hazarajat and hire out as field laborers, while others seek employment in Kabul or Quetta. They and their descendants keep up their associations with the homeland. Their children take their spouses from the parent lineage, and eventually, when they have saved up enough money and when land is available for purchase, they return home. In the meantime, they are not active members of the communities in which they reside. The writer talked with such a worker in the Puri Valley. He had come from Yek Aulang and, after spending two years in Besud, had moved to the Puri Valley with his wife. Although he could give some information on the recent election of a Timuri tribal chief, he said that he had not attended the meeting, for he did not belong.

On the other hand, if a family or group should settle permanently in a new area and acquire land, it might establish a new lineage and, by the process of increase and subdivision, conceivably even a new tribe in the territory which it had acquired. In such a case it would break off connections with the homeland. The Timuri tribe was apparently formed by several families which had definitely left their former homelands and settled in Sar-i Chashma Valley. Each of them formed a new lineage —in one case, three lineages—while together they combined to form a new tribe. Territoriality seems to be an essential attribute of the Hazara tribe and its subdivisions.

PROPERTY OWNERSHIP AND INHERITANCE

Property ownership and inheritance will be considered together, since the rules of inheritance often throw light on the concept of ownership.

REAL ESTATE

The types of real estate to be found among the Hazaras are houses, cultivated fields, and uncultivated land.

A village dwelling belongs to the family. Although a house is usually spoken of as belonging to an individual, i.e., either the father or the eldest brother, one informant explicitly stated that this is a convenience of speech; the house belongs to the family. This is corroborated by the rules and practices of inheritance. When a father dies, the house is normally taken over by the eldest son, who assumes the role of head of the family. He is obligated to give shelter to his widowed mother, his brothers, and his unmarried sisters. If a younger brother wishes to leave the paternal residence,

the elder must pay him his share of the family property in movable goods. If, when the father dies, the sons are still minors, the widow continues to live in the house with her children unless she remarries. Even if she does remarry and join her husband's household, the dwelling of the former husband is held for his children until the sons reach adulthood.

In the days when the Hazaras moved to upland pastures for the summer, there were residences of two kinds. More prosperous families lived in tents, *khirgáh*, which will be discussed under movable property. Those who did not have tents spent the summer in huts with circular stone walls and roofs of grass or twigs. Since such huts could accommodate only a nuclear family and, furthermore, were built on communal village lands, the concepts of ownership and occupancy rights were somewhat different than for village houses. Seyyid Hasan, the Jaghuri informant, expressed it in this way: "If a man dies leaving adult sons, it would not matter which son used it, for the builder does not really own it, he only has the right to use it." This idea that only right of usufruct was involved, and not title of ownership, resulted in a more casual attitude toward occupancy of the hut than in the case of village houses. Prior right of occupancy was vested in the family of the builder, but within the family the eldest brother did not have priority over his brothers. Each year it was decided by the family which adult married son was to occupy the hut. Some families always remained in the village during the summer.

If no member of the builder's family happened to be moving to summer pastures, someone else might occupy the hut. In the spring, families which did not have priority on a hut would inquire around to discover what huts were available and obtain permission of the builder's family to use one. But, no matter how many seasons the builder and his sons might fail to occupy the hut, they continued to exercise prior rights of occupancy. Sometimes a prosperous landowner might build several summer huts for the use of poor people in the village. In this case the families for whom they were built had the right of usufruct: "Families might live in these houses for two or three generations and not have to pay anything or be evicted."

In these summer huts we appear to have a transitional stage between village and family ownership. The village community owned the land on which the hut was built, but the family had invested the labor of building the hut. Therefore, the family had prior right of usufruct, but if the family did not choose to exercise this right, it passed to the village which owned the land, and whichever villager asked first might use it.

Agricultural land, like dwellings, is the property of the family. During the lifetime of the father the sons aid him in the field work or, as he grows older, do the work under his supervision. On his death, all the family property, including land, "is divided among the children, with one part going to each son and a half part to each daughter, regardless of seniority." This is in accordance with Muslim inheritance law. Actually, no such division takes place. As each daughter marries, she receives her share of the family property in movable goods as her dowry. When the family fields will not support all the sons and their wives and children, younger

brothers take their shares of the estate in movable property, leaving the real estate still undivided, to the older brothers.

Only a very small part of the land in the Hazarajat is under cultivation. The mountain slopes which extend for miles on either side of the tiny clusters of fields are suitable only for grazing and the collecting of fuel and fodder. At Sar-i Chashma the pasture land above the valley is owned by the family. The property lines bounding the cultivated fields on either side of the river continue up the mountainside, so that the owner of a field also owns the adjacent strip of pasture. A man collects plants only from his own family property. In herding, a single shepherd takes out the sheep belonging to a number of families, and in this case the whole flock may graze in the pasture lands of any of the families who have sheep in the flock. The Timuri, who supplement agriculture by caravan trading, do not have large flocks of sheep.

The only land owned communally at Pusht-i Mazar is a very small area around the spring situated at the edge of the village and a small area around the mill. The spring supplies the village with water for domestic use, and the women do their laundry there. Thus the area is used by the whole community. Similarly, the space around the mill is set aside for the use of people who come to the mill to have their grain ground.

Family ownership of pasture lands appears to be a special development among the Timuri. A Jaghuri informant in Quetta said that pasture land was owned by the subtribe and that any member of that group might use it. Another Jaghuri informant, however, stated that the pasture land belonged to the village and that one could not send one's animals to graze on the land of another village. The Uruzgani informant confirmed this, adding that if adjacent villages were owned by near relatives, one village might on occasion grant permission to members of the second to use its pastures for grazing.

For collecting fodder and fuel, there is an informal subdivision among the families of the village. Seyyid Hasan described it thus:

> When it is time to cut fodder to be stored for winter, a man estimates how much he will need, and he will cut a bundle of grass here and there and leave his sign to indicate that it is his, and no one else will cut grass there. Anyone in the village, no matter how poor, has the right to cut the grass. If a person has no fields around the village, he can still use the summer land. They say: "Any place which does not need to be irrigated belongs to Allah, and the worshipper of Allah can use it."

The Uruzgani information, though less detailed, indicated that much of the same temporary subdivision was made each summer by the Uruzgani.

The statement of the Quetta Jaghuri that pasture land was owned by the "subtribe" is not necessarily inconsistent with that of the other informants. The territory occupied by all the members of a tribe is considered as belonging to that tribe, and so on down through subtribe, section, and subsection. But the words "own" and "belong" can and do have more than one meaning. The Hazarajat belongs to the

Hazaras; in times of peace a Hazara may travel freely throughout the Hazarajat without fear of molestation. Each autumn great flocks of sheep are driven from the interior to market in Kabul and Kandahar, and they are allowed to move freely along the caravan trails passing through various tribal territories. On the other hand, in times of war or among traditionally hostile groups, in the old days, a Hazara might be sure of hospitality and protection only within friendly territory. This might be within the territory of the tribe, the subtribe, or, among the warlike Uruzgani, even a tribal section.

A foreigner, on the other hand, would enter Hazara territory at his own risk except as the guest of the group "owning" the territory. The author was under the protection of the Timuri tribe as long as she remained in Timuri territory and, in addition, under the protection of the village of Pusht-i Mazar while she remained in village territory. Once the tribal chief had duly received her party and seen it established at Pusht-i Mazar, he withdrew. Whenever she made an excursion to another village, however, a representative of the tribal chief accompanied her. On one occasion, when she decided to make such an excursion on short notice, unaware of the implications in terms of political-territorial protection, the chiefly representative arrived at the scene of the visit in a breathless and worried state. It was delicately intimated that she should not move beyond the bounds of Pusht-i Maza without giving advance notice. Any outsider entering Hazara territory without the permission of the group "owning" it would be guilty of trespass, at the least.

This kind of ownership is, however, different from the type of communal ownership that is vested in the village, which gives village members the right to graze animals and to collect plants within the village territory. It is probable that, in some parts of the Hazarajat, clusters of villages are separated from each other by considerable distances, so that there is some pasture land too far from any village to be owned by it. In such circumstances it is possible that any family in the larger tribal group might have the right to graze his animals on such free pastures within the group territory and that this is what the Quetta Jaghuri informant had in mind.

MOVABLE PROPERTY

Movable property among the Hazaras includes livestock, weapons, household goods (bedding, an occasional rug, and utensils), agricultural implements, clothing, jewelry, and, formerly, tents (*khirgdh*) for summer use among the prosperous. Livestock and weapons are certainly regarded as family property, for they are mentioned by informants as part of the family estate which was apportioned among the sons on the death of the father.

The *khirgdh*, tent, which formerly served as summer dwelling, was occupied by a nuclear family, not by the extended family of the village dwelling, and, as each son married, the couple was given its own tent. Often this was included in the bride's dowry. If not, the groom's family provided one. On the death of the father, the parental tent was always inherited by the eldest son. Since the tents were durable

and lasted for several generations, a family might find itself with two, one inherited by the father, another brought by the mother as part of her dowry. In this case, the paternal tent was inherited by the eldest son, the other was passed on to any son who needed it.

While the case for family ownership of tents is not quite so clear-cut as for houses, the *khirgáh* nevertheless appears to be considered family property. On the death of the father, the paternal tent was inherited by the eldest son, who became head of the larger joint family which resided together during the winter. A father during his lifetime was expected to provide out of the family property a tent for each son at marriage, unless the bride brought one as part of her dowry; after the father's death, the eldest son, as head of the family, was expected similarly to provide tents for brothers married thereafter. As for the tent brought into the new family by the bride, the dowry was regarded as her share of her family's estate. It became the property of the new nuclear family which the marriage created and in due course was inherited by the progeny of that marriage. A tent belonged to a nuclear family, not to an individual. Neither son nor daughter received a tent until he or she married.

Household goods, like tents, appear to have constituted family property. Such items as bedding, copper jars, and rugs were regularly included in the bride price except among the trading Timuri, who had a money economy and paid the bride price in cash. The Jaghuri Seyyid Hasan, when itemizing the goods included in the bride price paid for his eldest brother's first wife, said that he remembered it well, for it came from the family property. Household goods also regularly formed a part of the bride's dowry. Since the dowry almost never included real estate and little or no livestock and since in the old days only prosperous families owned summer tents, the essential part of the dowry which was regarded as a daughter's share of her family's property and which became the property of the newly established nuclear family must have been the household goods.

Although clothing and jewelry were also normally included in the dowry and sometimes in the bride price, the person for whom these articles were intended was always specified by the informant in enumerating the goods passed in the transaction. The price paid for Ali Shefa's bride included clothes and veils "for the bride's mother." The dowry included clothing and jewelry for the bride. Further evidence that clothing is regarded as individually owned property came in another context. When the author was visiting a village in the Puri Valley, she was shown a pair of shoes which she wished to purchase for a museum collection because of their interesting construction. Although they were too worn for further wear, the man declined to sell them. The shoes belonged to his young son who was away in the fields, and the father could not dispose of his son's property without the latter's consent.

To sum up, among the larger groupings of Hazara society—the tribe, subtribe, section, and subsection—land is the object of territoriality rather than of actual ownership, although the Hazaras frequently speak of a region as "belonging" to such and such a group. At the village level there is communal ownership of pasture

land, and even among the Timuri, where pasture land is owned by families, some land, like that around the spring and mill, is owned by the village.

Except for pasture land, most productive property is owned by the family: irrigated agricultural land, the implements used to cultivate it, livestock, weapons, village dwellings, household goods, and, formerly, summer tents and the right to use summer huts. Ownership of agricultural land and village dwellings and formerly prior right of usufruct of summer huts are vested in the joint family, consisting normally of three generations. Movable property, such as livestock, weapons, and household goods, are part of the common fund of family property but may be apportioned out at each generation to individual members who leave the joint family to establish new households. Formerly, summer tents were the property of the nuclear family but were supplied out of the resources of the larger joint family from which it was derived. Comparatively little is individually owned: clothing, jewelry, and such items as container pouches and snuff boxes, which are used by individuals.

Except for such few things as are individually owned, property ownership follows the lines of the sociopolitical-territorial genealogical groupings. Some property is vested in the nuclear family, more in the joint family, some in the village. Beyond the village level the concept changes from actual ownership to territorial rights, with territoriality vested simultaneously in subsection, section, subtribe, and tribe. The rights and responsibilities of territoriality appear to be associated with the political structure. Where political organization ceases, territoriality becomes essentially that of a cultural geographic region.

CLASS

The Hazaras are a democratic people. Economically the difference between a "rich" family and a poor one is slight, and the prestige which a prosperous family enjoys seems to be based chiefly on respect for the industry and good management of the family head as evidenced by the prosperity. Thus there are no social classes among the Hazaras based on economic differences.

There are two hereditary classes which derive their status by virtue of their descent from Muhammed, the prophet of Islam, through his daughter Fatima. The seyyids trace their descent from Fatima and her husband Ali through both the paternal and the maternal lines and are therefore endogamous as a class. The *sáddti masáwi* trace descent from Muhammed through the paternal line only and so permit marriage outside the group. Normally, however, they prefer to marry within their own class and only occasionally take a wife from outside. Members of both the seyyid and the *sáddti masáwi* keep written genealogies; these trace the straight line of descent from Muhammed and Ali but show no collateral lines.

Seyyids and *sáddti masáwi* derive their prestige not only from their illustrious lineage but also from their behavior. They are expected to conform to the ideal of Hazara behavior and so to serve as a model for others. Behavior would seem to be more important than lineage, if the author's very limited observations can be accepted as characteristic. The one full seyyid encountered tended to be more con-

cerned with material acquisitions than with moral values and did not seem to enjoy any particular esteem in the village. The one member of the *sáddáti masáwi* whom the author came to know was greatly respected by the whole community for his goodness, knowledge, and wisdom.

The full seyyids do not seem to have been localized; there was only one seyyid family in the Timuri village of Pusht-i Mazar, none in the Puri Valley, and apparently no others in the valley of Sar-i Chashma. From the data obtained concerning *sáddáti masáwi*, it is not clear whether or not they were localized in villages. The informant spoke of separate "families," each with its own chief, living near each other. Information concerning the arrangement of marriages suggests that these families were dispersed among the villages of a region. Whereas most Hazaras tended to marry within their own village, if it was large, or into a neighboring village, the arrangement of a *sáddáti masáwi* marriage was preceded by investigations and visits among a number of villages, some of them quite distant. *Sáddáti masáwi* lineages were regarded as regional units, however, for the informant always specified the region in which a lineage dwelt. After the Great Rebellion, when the informant's family moved from exile in India to Afghan Turkestan, the informant's father and later his elder brother acted as chief of all the *sáddáti masáwi* of Hoqi Baqa'ul. It would appear that the *sáddáti masáwi* had their own territorial-genealogical structure.

MARRIAGE

Except for incest taboos forbidding marriage between relatives dwelling within a household, the Hazaras had no hard-and-fast rules governing choice of mate. As Seyyid Hasan expressed it, "there is no objection to intermarriage between members of different tribes, because all the Hazaras are related." In practice, however, there is a strong preference for marriage with a paternal relative.

Ali Shefa stated categorically that the Uruzgani never gave their daughters to another tribe and that the closer the relationship was, the better; a Jaghuri informant interviewed briefly in Quetta gave much the same information. Seyyid Hasan said that workers living with another tribe temporarily might intermarry with the group among which they were living. However, he admitted that this was not true of such workers living among his own seyyid section, because of the class endogamy usually practiced by seyyids, and his first statement was not confirmed by other informants. He was presumably thinking of his father's marriage, in which a poor worker, because of his *sáddáti masáwi* status, was regarded as a suitable match for a chief's daughter. Ali Shefa stated emphatically that workers of other tribes living among the Uruzgani did not marry Uruzgani, and a Yek Aulang worker living among Timuri in the Puri Valley said that if he were not already married he would send back to Yek Aulang for a wife rather than marry a Timuri woman. Thus there appears to be a strong feeling favoring marriage within the tribe.

There are exceptions, however. A famous Besud chief of the nineteenth century had two wives, one from Dai Zangi, the other from Sheikh Ali.[22] The Dai Kundi and Dai Zangi tribes were reported to have been intimately associated for so long that

sharp tribal barriers had broken down. If a family of one tribe took up residence in the territory of the other, it very soon began to think of itself as belonging to the second tribe and readily intermarried with its new neighbors.

The Timuri, whose culture differs in a number of respects from that of the other Hazara tribes studied, frequently practice intertribal marriage. Every summer many of the young men of the tribe go with trading caravans into Dai Zangi, and some of them, in order to have a place to stay while trading there, marry Dai Zangi women. The women remain in Dai Zangi until their husbands retire from the caravan trade, when the reunited family settles permanently in the husband's Timuri village.

The *sáddti masáwi* are normally endogamous as a group. While there is a marked preference for marriage within the tribal section of *sáddti masáwi*, exceptions are found. For example, Seyyid Hasan's father, a member of the Jaghuri tribe, took up residence in his youth among the Dai Zangi. Because of the prestige attached to the status of seyyid, a Dai Zangi chief offered his daughter in marriage to the young man, who by his acceptance cut across the lines of both tribe and class. In the next generation, however, Seyyid Hasan, his eldest brother, and his sister took their spouses from the father's Jaghuri *sáddti masáwi* lineage. Two other brothers took their spouses from *sáddti masáwi* lineages of Dai Zangi and Bamian, respectively, but these last two marriages may have been unusual, a consequence of the disturbed conditions which prevailed after the Great Rebellion.

The marriages of these five siblings bring out the patrilineal bias of the culture. None of them married maternal relatives, although the mother was a chief's daughter and the father's tribal subsection became closely attached to the political leadership of the mother's group after the Great Rebellion. In spite of close association with the maternal group, three of the five siblings married spouses in the father's territorial kin group, while the other two married women of the father's socioreligious class, although they belonged to other tribes.

While marriage within the tribe is much preferred, there are occasions when intertribal marriage is sanctioned. In practice, however, the marriage most favored is that with the father's brother's daughter or other paternal relative. Lacking a suitable paternal parallel cousin, the order of preference in choosing a mate is: paternal relative, maternal relative, unrelated neighbor. Ali Shefa stated that a paternal relative was greatly preferable, although a maternal relative would do, while Seyyid Hasan said that it did not matter whether one married a relative of one's father or of one's mother. However, Seyyid Hasan and all his siblings married paternal relatives, although they grew up among their mother's people. None of the informants, in recounting marriages made by members of their families, mentioned a marriage made with a maternal relative. Given a strong endogamous tendency, a maternal relative would normally also be a paternal relative, so that only in the case of intermarriage between members of two tribes or tribal subdivisions would an individual be related through the mother only. However, it was always the paternal relationship which was identified by the informants in recounting specific marriages.

There appear to be two factors involved in these expressions of marriage preference. First, Muslim tradition favors marriage with father's brother's daughter or other paternal relative. Second, Hazara parents, living in isolated mountain valleys, with not a great deal of travel between valleys, wish their daughters to live near home, where their welfare may be watched over.

Seyyid Hasan recounted the story of a girl who fell in love with a visitor from Turkestan, in the days when few Hazaras lived in Turkestan. Her parents resolutely opposed the match until the young couple eloped. Only when the pursuing posse came up with the pair and it was found that the young man had respected the girl's honor, did the parents consent to the marriage and permit their daughter to go off to a far country. Ali Shefa spoke strongly in favor of marriage with a close relative, yet his mother's brother married a woman belonging to another subsection of the tribe. Such a marriage was acceptable because both lived near the boundary line between the two groups, so that the wife was not separated by any great distance from her family. Elsewhere Ali Shefa stated quite specifically that a woman should not marry too far away from home, since then her family would not be able to protect her if her husband mistreated her.

In selecting a mate for a marriageable son, a family considers degree and line of relationship rather than group membership. It is true that Seyyid Hasan at one point described *alâghe* as being "a group of families who give their daughters to each other," by which he apparently meant a lineage. In discussing specific marriages, however, informants did not usually classify the spouses as belonging to a given *alâghe* or *qaum*. Seyyid Hasan, in telling of the marriages made by himself and the other members of his family, gave the specific relationship of the mate and named the subsection and homeland only if they were different from those of his family. His eldest brother married the widow of his father's brother's son; his sister married a man with whom she shared a common ancestor five generations back. In telling of outgroup marriages, the name of the subsection and homeland came first, then the relationship: his brother married a *sâdâti masâwi* from Bamian with whom he shared a common ancestor thirty-five generations back. Ali Shefa of the Uruzgani married his father's brother's daughter, and his sister married a man related within two or three generations. His mother's brother, on the other hand, had taken a wife from the Qadam subsection of the Nukroz, whereas the rest of the family belonged to the Zoghi subsection.

Both Seyyid Hasan and Ali Shefa thought in terms of specific genalogical relationship in the case of marriages within the group, whereas in discussing marriages with non-relatives they identified the outgroup individual by some tribal subdivision larger than the lineage. In other words, the endogamous tendency is based on a relationship which can be traced from two egos back to a specific common patrilineal ancestor rather than on membership in a lineage group as such.

With the exception of the Timuri traders, whose Dai Zangi wives remain in their own homes until their husbands retire from trade, Hazara residence after marriage is invariably patrilocal. It is true that Seyyid Hasan's father lived in Dai Zangi with

a Dai Zangi wife, but he had established residence in Dai Zangi before marriage and, after marriage, set up his own household (*khánìwdr*) rather than join the household of his father-in-law. Seyyid Hasan said that, should a rich girl marry a poor man, the man's father would insist that the girl come to live at his house. "He would not allow his son to become a slave of the rich man." A Timuri woman informant and her husband, whose house had been destroyed in the 1932 revolt, occupied a room in the house of an unrelated villager rather than live with her brothers, who had inherited their father's house.

The Hazaras appear to have no mechanism for continuing the line of a family when there are no sons. No instance of adoption of an heir was encountered. A daughter might inherit the family property, but she could not transmit her father's line of descent to her children, as is possible among some Mongol peoples.

KINSHIP TERMINOLOGY

A complete list of Hazara kinship terms was not obtained, because of circumstances beyond the control of the author. The fullest series came from the Timuri and was provided by a group of collaborating informants. The Besud and Uruzgani terms were obtained from one respresentative of each tribe. The Uruzgani terms were specifically those of address. The writer did not appreciate the importance of distinguishing between terms of reference and terms of address at the time the terms were obtained and so cannot be sure of the Timuri and Besud usage in all cases. Additional terms were later provided in correspondence by Mr. Qambaree of Quetta after he had read a draft manuscript of the present work. He obtained the terms from members of several Hazara tribes residing in Quetta and was particularly interested in seeking out non-Persian words. Where terms were used only in reference, he has noted this. A considerable proportion of the Timuri terms are of Persian or Arabic derivation, whereas a larger number of those supplied by the Uruzgani informant and by Mr. Qambaree are of Turkic or Mongol origin. Terms from these four sources are listed separately in Table 6.

All terms were given by male informants. In most cases there was no opportunity to discover explicitly whether any distinction was made according to the sex of the speaker. None of the data suggest the presence of any such distinction. No special terms were encountered which distinguished relative age within generation; informants, when discussing members of their immediate families, usually indicated descriptively that a brother was older or younger than the speaker.

The kinship terminology system is, in general, denotative. A study of Table 6 shows few classificatory terms. There are separate elementary terms for all primary relationships—father, mother, brother, sister, husband, wife, son, and daughter—and for a number of other relationships—lineal, collateral, maternal, paternal, consanguine, and affinal. For most other relationships, compound descriptive terms were employed.

The instances where classificatory terms appear are consequently of some note. There is a strong tendency toward lineal terminology for relatives two or more gen-

TABLE 6

HAZARA MONGOL KINSHIP TERMS

Relationship	Timuri	Uruzgani	Besud	Mr. Qambaree
Fa	*pada*[23]		*bábai*,[24] *átai*[25]	*ata; ábai*[26] (*Jaghuri*)
Mo	*ábai*[27]		*ábi*	*aika*;[28] *aya*[29] (*Dai Zangi*)
Ch			*zaudár*[30]	
So, boy	*bacha*[31]		*bacha*	
Da, girl	*dukhtar*[32]		*dukhtar*	
Br	*bráder*[33]		*birár*	
Si	*khwar*[34]			*aghai* (*Jaghuri*)
FaFa, MoFa, HuFaFa, HuMoFa	*bába*[35]	*barkul*[36]		*bakala*
FaFa			*bábá kálán*[37]	
MoFa			*bábá kálani mádar*[38]	
FaFaFa, MoFaFa				*bákul*
FaFaMo, MoFaMo				*achul*[39]
FaMo, MoMo, HuFaMo, HuMoMo	*mámá*[40]	*bibi*[41]	*mádar kálán*	*achul, aja*[42]
SoCh, DaCh	*nawasa*[43]			*aja*[44]
FaBr	*qáqá*[45]	*amu*[46]		*abgha*,[47] *tota*[48]
FaBrSo	*pisari*[49] *qáqá*	*pisari amu*		
FaBrDa	*dukhtari qáqá*	*khola*[50]		
FaBrSoCh	*nawasei qáqá*			
FaSi	*ama*[51]		*ama*	
FaSiDa	*dukhtari ama*	*h'ama*	*ama*	
FaSiSo, HuSiSo	*pisari ama*			
FaSiSoCh	*nawasei ama*			
BrCh	*bráderzádar*		*birárzaudar*	
BrDa			*ama*	
BrSoSo	*nawasei brádar*			
SiCh	*khwarzádar*		*khwarzaudar*	
SiSo, FaSiSo, HuSiSo		*jei'a*[52]		
MoBr	*taghái*,[53] *mámá*[54]	*dai*[55]	*taghái*	*naghchi, nakshi*[56]
MoBrSo	*pisari mámá*	*dai, naghchi*		
MoBrDa	*dukhtari mámá*			
MoSi	*khola*[57]		*khola*	
MoSiCh			*bola*[58]	*bola*
Hu	*shauhar*[59]			
Wi	*ayál*[60]		*khátun*[61]	
SoWi, bride		*'arus*[62]		
FaBrWi	*khusuli*[63] *brádar*			
FaSiHu	*shauhari ama*			
MoBrWi	*zani*[64] *taghái*	*naghchi*		
HuBr	*hiwar*[65]			
HuSi	*nanu*[66]			
HuBrSo	*pisari hiwar*			
HuBrDa	*dukhtari hiwar*			
HuFa, WiFa	*khusul*	*khusul*		
HuMo, WiMo	*khusul mádar*	*khusul mádar*		
WiFaFa	*khusul kálán*			
WiFaMo	*bibi kálán*			
WiBr	*khusul bara*			
WiBrSo	*bachai khusul bara*			
WiBrDa	*dukhtar khusul bara*			
WiBrWi	*zani khusul bara*			
WiBrWiFa	*bábi zani khusal bara*			
WiBrWiMo	*mádari zani khusul bara*			
WiSi	*khoshna*[67]			
WiSiHu	*bája*[68]		*bája*	
WiSiSo	*pisari khoshna*			
WiSiDa	*dukhtari khoshna*			

erations ascendant and descendant from ego. Expressed in another way, the Hazaras, like modern western Europeans, have terms for "grandmother," "grandfather," "grandson," and "granddaughter" and do not have separate terms which indicate line of relationship through father or mother, son or daughter. If they wish to indicate the line of descent, Hazaras employ compound descriptive terms which are the equivalent of "paternal grandmother," "daughter's son," etc. In addition to the lineal terms, the Hazaras have certain classificatory terms of address which cut across generation lines. Among the Uruzgani a man, his son, and his wife addressed his sister's son as *jei'a* (Mongol). Among the various tribes the *jei'a* addressed his mother's brother, his mother's brother's son, and his mother's brother's wife reciprocally as *dai* (Turkic), *taghái* (Turkic), or *naghchi* (Mongol). The fact that the Persian-speaking Hazaras have retained Mongol or alternative Turkic terms for these particular relationships seems significant. Among the medieval Mongols and among the modern Hazara Mongols, a family's responsibility toward a daughter is not discharged when she marries and joins the family of her husband. Responsibility for the welfare of a woman and her children passes from father to brother to brother's son. The reciprocal terms of *jei'a* and *naghchi* or *dai* appear to symbolize this relationship.

The Besud informant reported that the Arabic term *ama* ("father's sister") was applied to brother's daughter, father's sister, and father's sister's daughter. He was not asked for words designating the reciprocal relationships of these. In terms of responsibilities, a man stands in the relationship of *dai* or *naghchi* to his father's sister, father's sister's daughter, and brother's daughter. Thus the Arabic term *ama* employed by the Besud is functionally the equivalent of *jei'a*. For affinal relationships, a wife in many cases employs the same terms as her husband does in referring to his relatives, whereas the husband employs distinct terms for a considerable number of his wife's relatives.

In general, the Hazaras distinguish terminologically a very considerable number of relationships. Where two or more relationships are classed under a single term, as in the cases of grandparents and grandchildren, their linguistic pattern permits them to do so by means of descriptive adjectives when they feel the need to make a distinction. When they wish to refer to distant paternal relationships for which elementary terms are not available and compound descriptive terms would be cumbersome, the degree of relationship is indicated by a statement that two individuals are related through a common paternal ancestor three or six generations back, as the case may be.

CHAPTER III

TRIBAL GENEALOGICAL OR *OBOK* STRUCTURE ANALYSIS ON THE BASIS OF HAZARA MONGOL DATA

IN THE foregoing description of Hazara Mongol social organization the writer has nowhere used the terms "clan," "sib," or "gens." Although anthropologists differ somewhat in their definition of the clan or sib,[1] there is unanimous agreement that membership in the clan or sib is reckoned unilaterally.[2] Lowie,[3] Murdock,[4] Linton,[5] Goldenweiser,[6] and Rivers[7] agree that exogamy is one of the most common traits of such a group. Lowie[8] and Murdock[9] define a "sib" as a kin group theoretically or traditionally descended from a common ancestor.

Murdock,[10] Linton,[11] Lowie,[12] and Goldenweiser[13] concur in listing possession of a distinguishing name as an attribute of the clan or sib, and Linton points out that the common name is one of the mechanisms for reinforcing the feeling of kinship among clan members. Other possible mechanisms for maintaining community of feeling include some sort of group symbol, which may be totemic, or religious function.[14] Lowie has pointed out that sib affiliations are permanent, i.e., that an individual retains, throughout life, affiliations with the sib into which he was born, even though he or she may marry into another sib.[15]

Bringing together these various descriptions of clan or sib, we find that it comprises a group of people who trace descent unilaterally; who believe themselves to be descended from a common ancestor in either the paternal or the maternal line; who retain through life the clan affiliations which they acquired from one parent at birth; who are forbidden to marry a member of their own clan group; who as a group possess a name which distinguishes them from other similar groups; and who, in addition, may share one or more other symbols or functions which serve to reaffirm the feeling of kinship and of group solidarity. Let us see to what extent Hazara Mongol social organization conforms to this definition.

1. Members of Hazara lineages trace descent from a common ancestor. There is a tendency to think of tribe and tribal subdivisions as kin groups, although there is no strong cultural pressure to impose a concept of descent from a common ancestor upon groups which are clearly often heterogeneous in origin. The pattern of feeling of kinship is carried up from the smaller groups to the larger, but the fiction of common descent is not emphasized.

2. A man remains throughout life a member of the groups to which his father be-

longed. It is not so easy to determine whether a woman retains her original group affiliations after marriage, since in most cases she marries within the lineage. The only clear case of outgroup marriage which the writer encountered was that of Seyyid Hasan's father and mother, who were of different tribes. Seyyid Hasan clearly thought of his mother as being Dai Zangi, whereas he and his brothers were as clearly committed to membership in the father's tribe and lineage. This one example suggests that a woman does retain her original group affiliations after marriage, although she becomes closely identified with her husband's family.

In these respects Hazara organization conforms to our definition of clan structure. In other ways, however, it differs.

1. The Hazara Mongols trace descent patrilineally and, through this unilinear descent, acquire membership in all groups from the lineage up to and including the tribe. Residence is invariably patrilocal or virilocal, and the extended family which constitutes the usual household is oriented around the patrilineally related members. However, the distinction made between seyyids and *sáddti masáwi* indicates that some weighting is given to maternal descent. Thus the Hazaras do not trace descent through one parent "to the total neglect of the other," as is the case in clan organization.[16]

2. The clan, by general definition, is an exogamous group. The members of a clan consider themselves to be related, whether or not they can trace the actual relationship, and make membership in the group the guide in arranging marriages. An individual may not marry a member of his own clan, whatever the relationship may be. The Hazaras, on the other hand, are endogamous in tendency rather than exogamous and so fall outside the usual definition of a clan. Furthermore, they do not use group membership as the criterion of preferred marriage, but actual relationship. A Hazara family, in arranging a marriage for a son, does not say: "So and so is a member of our lineage, therefore she is a suitable mate." Rather, they think of various relatives, beginning with the father's brother's daughter and working outward, until they hit on a family which has a daughter of suitable age and reputation.

Linton writes: "Clans are usually exogamous units, i.e., their members are forbidden to intermarry. In a much smaller number of cases they are endogamous, i.e., their members are forbidden to marry outsiders. In either case, membership in the clan unit limits the individual's choice of spouses."[17]

Lowie takes exception to a part of this statement; he points out that "an endogamous clan is a contradiction in terms if clan indicates a unilateral descent group. Obviously, if both parents are of the same social unit, there can be no question of unilateral descent."[18]

Since all writers agree that a clan is a unilateral descent group and Linton himself agrees that group membership is the important criterion in the regulation of marriage, then Lowie's point would seem to be well taken that "an endogamous clan is a contradiction in terms." The Hazaras, on the other hand, trace their descent unilaterally and favor endogamous marriages without any contradiction, since trace-

able genealogical relationship and not group membership is operative in the regulation of marriage. As shown earlier, the lineage group as such does not seem to have any function in regulating marriage, and the same can be said of higher tribal genealogical subdivisions.

3. A number of writers agree that possession of a distinguishing name is a general attribute to the clan. An individual in a society having clan organization is a member of the Corn clan, for example, or he is not. There can be no question in his mind or in that of any other member of the society as to his group affiliation. Among the Hazaras, groups also have names, and, in general, there is no question about group affiliation. The difference lies in the fact that an individual is a member, simultaneously, of from two to as many as five or six unilateral descent groups, ranging from the lineage up to and including the tribe. Each group has a name, and an individual, when asked the name of his group, may with equal correctness offer the name of any of the several groups to which he belongs. The terms *qaum* and *tâifa* are applied to groups at all levels from the lineage on up, and there is no terminological means of distinguishing a group at one level from that at another. We may conclude, then, that, while the Hazaras have group names, these are not strictly analogous to clan names. Every individual belongs not to one name group of unilateral descent, as in societies having clan organization, but to a series of name groups.

4. Group symbols or religious functions such as are frequently found in association with clan organization are not present in Hazara culture, as far as could be discovered. It is possible that in earlier, more warlike, days some sort of distinguishing insignia were used in battle, but none were mentioned by any of the informants or by nineteenth-century writers on the Hazaras. No trace of totemism has been noted, nor do any of the groups have religious functions. The only sacred places are mosques and shrines, which are open to any believer of the Shi'a faith, while the religious leaders, *mulla's*, are qualified for the position through training, not through membership in any lineage or larger kin group.

5. The Hazara woman, although she retains through life affiliations with her own patrilineal kin group and is assured a measure of protection from her family, nevertheless is more fully identified with her husband's family than appears to be usual in clan society. In many cases she employs the same kinship terms as her husband in referring to his relatives, whereas he refers to her relatives by different terms. She becomes co-partner in ownership of the property of the new family founded by her marriage, and her interests are those of her husband's group. There appear to be no formal rites or obligations to pull her away from the interests and activities of her husband and children, as is frequently the case in clan society.

There are two other characteristics of Hazara organization which are not regularly associated with clan societies:

6. The Hazara patrilineal groups at the several levels are territorially oriented. Tribal names are employed to designate both a people and the territory which that people occupies. Similarly, the name of a subtribe or section indicates the locality of

an individual's residence as well as his patrilineal kin affiliations. In the Hazara mind the patrilineal group is strongly identified with the territory which it occupies. Thus territoriality is an important characteristic of Hazara social structure.

7. Since the Hazara tribal genealogical groupings are territorial, it is not surprising that they should form a basis for the political organization. The village is the basic political unit. In some cases, where the village consists of a single lineage, there is an exact coincidence of lineage and primary political group. Where several lineages are represented in a village, the village marks a point in the line between lineage and subsection but normally does not cut across it. The subsection is at once a patrilineal kin group and a political unit. In a few cases there is no political organization beyond the subsection; in some others the whole tribe may be organized under a single chief. However high in the tribal hierarchy the political organization may extend, it coincides with kin or pseudo-kin groupings.

The writer has gone to some length to demonstrate that the Hazara Mongols, although organized into unilinear descent groups, do not have clan organization, for they are not unique in this. As she will attempt to demonstrate, tribal genealogical organization is found over a considerable part of the continent of Eurasia. Since this type of unilinear, though clanless, organization is widespread, it would seem to merit a special designation to differentiate it from clan organization, which is also unilinear.

In the foregoing pages the writer has used the descriptive term "tribal genealogical" organization, since the structure of the tribe is that of a genealogical family tree, with larger and smaller branches, twigs, and leaves, representing subtribe, section, subsection, and lineage. The Hazaras referred to these several subdivisions by the Arabic terms *qaum* and *tâifa*. In searching for a concise alternative to "tribal genealogical," we chose the Mongol equivalent of *qaum*, which is *obok*. In a society having *obok* structure an individual determines his relationship with another individual and that of his group with other groups by tracing back, as best he can, to the common ancestor and then down again to the second individual or group. The names of all ancestors cannot be remembered indefinitely, and this is not necessary. Beyond the immediate ancestors in the male line it is the ancestors who mark the branching-off of a new line which are significant. These are remembered or if, because of the fission or fusion of larger groups, they cannot be remembered, the group is nevertheless given an appropriate position in the genealogical scheme as if the ancestor were remembered.

In clan organization, on the other hand, an individual assumes relationship with fellow clan members because all members are believed to be related, but the line of relationship is of no particular concern. A clan may be able to trace its genealogy back to the founding member, as in the case of some of the Hopi clans.[19] But in essential features the self-contained clan functions with equal effectiveness whether its members can trace the line of descent or whether they assume relationship. Like tribal genealogical groups, clans may be formed by fusion, as has been shown by Lowie and Eggan for the Hopi.[20] However, after fusion the component elements be-

come one through acquiring common functions and symbols. Actually, the Hopi have a system of "linked" clans which provides the mechanism by which one clan may take over the ritual duties and surviving members of a moribund clan. It is the larger group of linked clans which is the exogamous unit.[21] It is possible that other clan systems are not so clear-cut as our composite definition would suggest. For the sake of pointing up the nature of *obok* structure, however, we shall adhere to our definition.

The clan, by its rule of exogamy, by its name, and by the various ritual functions or symbols with which clans are often associated, is a well-defined group to which an individual either belongs or does not belong. Its functions set it sharply apart from other similar groups. In tribal genealogical organization a family may grow into a lineage group and a lineage into a tribal subsection composed of several lineages, without any radical change in the nature or functions of the group. The feeling of kinship, the mutual rights and responsibilities of members, are strongest in the family and lineage and become gradually attenuated as one ascends through the several levels of subdivisions to the tribe. When a family expands to form a lineage and a lineage to form a subsection, the newly formed components do not break sharply from the parent group but simply change their position in the line leading up from family to tribal subsection and beyond.

The statement that a family grows into a lineage and a lineage into a tribal subsection requires some amplification in regard to terminology. The family is universally bilateral, whereas the lineage is, by the usual anthropological definition, unilinear.[22] Among the Hazaras a patrilineal extended family, which includes a core of patrilineal kin plus the women who have married into this kin group, expands into a lineage which consists of a larger number of patrilineal kin plus, for practical purposes, their wives. These women, although retaining affiliations with their own families, nevertheless become very closely identified with the interests and activities of the husband's kin group. Thus the Hazara groups which we have designated "lineages," "tribal sections," "subtribes," etc., are what Murdock calls "compromise kin groups"—groups which, like the extended family, have a unilinear core but include spouses and exclude consanguine relatives who have married out of the group. To such a compromise kin group Murdock has applied the term "clan," as opposed to "sib," which he defines as a unilinear consanguineal kin group which excludes spouses and includes all individuals born into the group. Following Murdock's definition, a woman in a patrilineal system would belong to the sib of her father, to the clan of her husband.[23] This is a terminological distinction which the Hazara Mongols do not make. A lineage, which the Hazaras speak of sometimes as a "family," sometimes as a "tribe," may in one context refer to a strictly unilinear kin group, in another may include the spouses. The English term "lineage" appears originally to have had both these meanings.[24] Under the circumstances we have thought it preferable to employ "lineage" in its earlier double meaning rather than in the more restricted anthropological sense.

Thus when we write that a family may grow into a lineage and a lineage into a

tribal subsection, we are referring to a patrilineally related core of males and their wives. Since the Hazaras have a strong endogamous tendency, the wife usually belongs by birth to the same *obok* groups as her husband. Sometimes, however, outgroup marriages are made. On such occasions the woman would, in most of her interests and activities, become a member of her husband's lineage, although she would retain certain affiliations with her father's family and would be verbally identified as belonging to his *obok*.

A brief analysis of the social organization of some other societies having *obok* structure will serve to illustrate the differences between *obok* and clan structures.

PART II

Cultural Relatives of the Hazara Mongols

CHAPTER IV

THE MEDIEVAL MONGOLS

HISTORY

THE Hazara Mongols have been isolated from their Mongol and Turko-Mongol cultural relatives since the fifteenth century; on entering Afghanistan, they became subject to Persian Islamic cultural influence, as is indicated by their Persian speech, their religion, and their preference for marriage with the paternal parallel cousin. They have been sedentary village dwellers for several centuries, whereas most of their relatives to the north remained pastoral nomads into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. One might wonder, then, to what extent their social structure was changed as a result of their change in environment and economy. We have ethnographic data on several Central Asian groups and sufficient historical documentation to place most of them in some sort of historical perspective. By comparing the social structures of these groups with that of the Hazara Mongols, we may discover what similarities exist, what changes have occurred, and perhaps have some clue as to an early—we shall not say original—form of social structure.

The historical records do not take us back to the formation of the Mongol or Turkic peoples. Turkic pastoral nomads occupied what is now called Mongolia in the eighth century A.D. and extended westward across the steppes as far as the northern shores of the Black Sea. Mongols became dominant in Mongolia in the twelfth century. At that time some were pastoral nomads, some were woodland hunters, while others had become sedentary village dwellers with an increment of Chinese culture.[1] It is this writer's belief that the Mongols and probably the Turks before them were hunting tribes in the south Siberian woodlands before they adopted pastoral nomadism and moved out onto the steppes of Central Asia.[2]

One might suppose that their social organization was less elaborate in its ramifications during the woodland period than it became later when the adoption of pastoral nomadism brought an increase in population size and mobility. Furthermore, the struggles which brought the Mongol tribe to ascendancy over other Mongol tribes and led to the conquest of China and western Asia certainly produced some changes in the social structure. Consequently, one can hope to arrive, by historical-comparative means, at only a general pattern of early Central Asian social structure.

Our earliest documentary data on Mongol social structure are found in *The Secret History of the Mongols*,[3] which was compiled, in the newly acquired Mongol writing, *ca.* A.D. 1240, less than fifteen years after the death of Chinggis Khan. By that time

the simple tribal structure had been modified in the course of a struggle for power among the tribes within Mongolia and of conquests outside Mongolia, and the outlines of an incipient feudal class system were emerging. However, the first chapters of the *Secret History* are devoted to the traditional history of the Mongol tribe, and in these we have some glimpse of the earlier tribal culture and structure.

TRIBAL GENEALOGIES

A study of the *Secret History* shows that the Mongols were addicted to genealogies, both individual and tribal. The first chapter is devoted to the genealogy of the Mongol tribe.[4] A charting of this tribal family tree (see Table 7) gives an excellent idea of the kin ramifications of the tribe and the number of genealogical levels involved. The first part of the genealogy is obviously legendary, for the name of the first ancestor, Borte Cino, means the "Blue-gray Wolf," and that of his wife, Ḥo'ai maral, the "Fawn-colored Doe." Borte Cino was born of heaven by celestial mandate and crossed the sea to arrive at his first camping spot at the source of the Onon River, on Mount Burhan Ḥaldun.[5] His descendants are listed by name, without detail, for nine generations—nine is a mystic number among the Mongols—until we come to the two sons of Toroḫoljin-baiyan—Duwa-soḫor, founder of the Dorben tribe, and Dobun-mergan, who stands in the direct line of Chinggis Khan's ancestry.

In the tribal family tree no attempt is made to trace lines collateral to that of Chinggis Khan's direct line. At each level the brothers of the key ancestor are named, together with the name of the *oboh* (kin group) which they founded, but the genealogist takes no interest in later descendants. The one exception to this is the line which led to Jamuḫa,[6] who was at first a "sworn brother" (*anda*) and close ally of Chinggis Khan but who later fought against him in a struggle for Mongol supremacy. That not all of Jamuḫa's genealogy was remembered by the historians of Chinggis Khan is suggested by the fact that the former is shown to be only five generations removed from the common ancestor Bodoncar, while Chinggis Khan is ten generations removed.

The tribal genealogy shows the patrilineal bias of the Mongols. It traces the descent of males through males, and in many cases the mother is not named. There are two exceptions to this rule of patrilineality, however. The tree shows that Dobun-mergan had five sons by his wife Alan-ḫo'a of the Ḫorilar or Ḫorolas tribe. Actually, Dobun-mergan was the father of only two of these sons. The other three, including Bodoncar, the direct ancestor of Chinggis Khan, were said to have been sired, after the death of Dobun-mergan, by a supernatural golden man who entered and departed from Alan-ḫo'a's tent on a sunbeam or moonbeam.[7] The name of the presumptive biological father is remembered—Ma'alih baĭya'udai—a young man whom Dobun-mergan had adopted as a servant. Perhaps the supernatural sire was introduced to enhance the ancestry. In any event, the break in the paternal line was recognized; the line of descent passed through Dobun-mergan's wife, Alan-ḫo'a, and Alan-ḫo'a occupied a special position in the traditions of the group. The second case is that of Jamuḫa's line. His ancestor, Jajiradai, was born of a woman who was

pregnant when she was captured by Bodoncar. Because she became the wife of Bodoncar, her son and his descendants were regarded as members of the Mongol tribe.

In Rashid ed-Din's *History of the Mongols*, written about sixty years after the *Secret History*, there is an instance of the line of descent passing through a daughter. Isudar, the son of Hulagu (Hülegu) and grandson of Chinggis Khan, had a daughter

TABLE 7

GENEALOGY OF THE MONGOL TRIBE
Based on Data in the *Secret History of the Mongols*



TABLE 7—*Continued*



who bore a son one year and two months after the death of her husband. This infant was regarded as the son of Isudar.[8] Thus, while the medieval Mongol structure was essentially patrilineal, it was possible on occasion for the line of descent to pass through a female link.

The tribal genealogy shows the Mongol tribe to have been ideally a patrilineal kin group, with the tribe subdivided into a number of smaller kin groups which had branched off from the main stem in the course of passing generations. The tribe and its several subdivisions had names. Chinggis Khan, for example, belonged to the Mongol tribe, the Borjigin branch, and the Kiyan Borjigin subbranch. As among the Hazara Mongols, a speaker or writer might identify a camp by whichever name seemed most convenient. In one instance in the *Secret History* the Taiyici'ut subgroup of the Mongols was referred to first as Mongols, later as Taiyici'ut; in another a camp first described as Taiyici'ut was later identified as belonging to the Besut subgroup of the Taiyici'ut.[9] Non-Mongols were usually identified by both tribal and subtribal names.

THE EXTENDED FAMILY AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS

The basis of the social structure was the extended family camp. A Jalayir family which camped with the Jurkin consisted of three brothers. Two of the brothers were married and had two sons each. The third brother was still a young boy.[10] Duwa-soḫor and Dobun-mergan camped together with their wives and children until the death of the elder brother, when his four sons, not liking their uncle, went off and formed a separate camp.[11] The four sons remained together, however, in their new camp.

The list of warriors who came to the support of Chinggis Khan when he broke with his sworn brother Jamuḫa is indicative of extended family solidarity. Elder and younger brothers came together or father and sons. In some cases a younger brother left his tribal kin group to join an elder brother already with Chinggis Khan.[12]

Although the extended family encampment was patrilineally oriented and normally headed by a male, a woman might on occasion act as head of the encampment. This was true in the case of Alan-ḫo'a after the death of her husband and of Ho'elun-eke, mother of Chinggis Khan, after the death of his father. In the imperial period each of the important wives of the khan had her own encampment and herds which she administered. The extended family was also a joint family, with family property divisible among the sons at each generation. On the death of Alan-ḫo'a her five sons divided up the family property, which consisted of livestock and provisions.[13]

The Mongol tribe was, at least ideally, a patrilineal kin group, subdivided into smaller kin group branches, which in turn were often further subdivided into sections and subsections. The joint family stood at the base of the tribal genealogical structure in two senses: first, it was the basic social and economic unit of the tribal society; and, second, the tribe was conceived of as having originated from a single family, which, expanding through natural increase of sons from generation to generation, split into segments.

Toroḫoljin-baiyan was the head of an extended family which consisted of his two sons, Duwa-soḫor and Dobun-mergan, and their wives and children. After the death of the elder brother, Duwa-soḫor, his four sons branched off to form a second joint family. The record does not tell us what later subdivisions of the family occurred before the descendants of these four sons became sufficiently numerous to merit the designation of *oboh*. For the line of Dobun-mergan, the account in the *Secert History* suggests that almost every son in each generation established a family, the descendants of which became an *oboh*. We suspect that there had been a good deal of telescoping in the record and that, when the written genealogy was compiled, only those ancestors were remembered who had established separate families from which *oboh* were eventually formed. It seems probable that the neatness of the genealogy results from the omission of many names and that the *oboh*'s said to have branched off during a single generation may actually have done so in the course of a number of generations.

It is also possible that groups were fitted into the genealogy which were actually not related, even through the marriage of an ancestress to a member of the Mongol line. The tribal genealogy may be presumed to represent what ought to have been, in the Mongol way of thinking, rather than a rigorously accurate tracing of descent, and it is very possible that some of the Mongol subgroups named in the genealogy were pseudo- rather than actual kin groups.

THE PLACE OF NON-KIN IN A KIN SOCIETY

We have evidence in the *Secret History* of individuals who became attached to unrelated families. There are references to the adoption of boys, some captured in raids on enemy camps, others given by their fathers to some leader. The biological father of Bodoncar had been given to Dobun-mergan when his own father, apparently a wanderer without family, was too poor to support him. The son became a permanent member of Dobun-mergan's household, and his children were regarded as members of the adoptive family and larger kin groups. This kind of absorption may have occurred fairly frequently. Ho'elun-eke, mother of Chinggis Khan, brought up four boys captured from various camps and four boys given to Chinggis Khan by their grandfather.[14] We have not been able to trace their subsequent careers and so do not know whether or not they were absorbed into Chinggis Khan's line. We have a record of one captive who was not so absorbed. To'oril ḫan, also called Ongḫan, was descended from a great-great-grandfather who had been a captive servant to an ancestor of Chinggis Khan. His great-grandfather was also a servant in the family. Thereafter, however, To'oril's family appears to have been free and to have been regarded as a member of its tribe of origin, the Merkid. The master-servant relationship was later transformed into one of friendship on a basis of equality, for To'oril became a sworn brother (*anda*) to Chinggis Khan's father, and Chinggis Khan asked him to act as father on the occasion of his first marriage.[15]

We have indications that, during the period of struggle for Mongol supremacy, not only individuals but whole families and perhaps even whole larger kin groups

became attached to some strong family or *oboh*. The *Secret History*, summing up the line of Duwa-soḫor, elder brother of Dobun-mergan, states tersely that after the death of Duwa-soḫor his four sons left the camp of their uncle and, having taken the *oboh* name of Dorben ("four"), they became the Dorben *irgen*.[16] *Oboh* clearly refers to a patrilineal kin group. *Irgen*, on the other hand, may refer to the followers attached, either voluntarily or by conquest, to an *oboh*. For example, when Chinggis Khan defeated his enemies the Jurkin (his second cousins), he is said to have destroyed the *oboh* of the Jurkin and made their *irgen* and their *ulus* ("people") his own property.[17] This use of *irgen* and *ulus* to indicate the followers of a kin group, as contrasted to the kin group itself, which is referred to as *oboh* or *yasun* ("bone"), is encountered on several occasions.[18] Consequently, when the *Secret History* mentions the Tatar *irgen*, the Onggirat *irgen*, etc.,[19] one might infer that the term refers to a group consisting of an *oboh* core to which unrelated followers have become attached.

It seems probable that in earlier times the tribe was an *oboh*—a patrilineal descent group—but that during the struggle for power in Mongolia there was a considerable realignment of subgroup *oboh*'s through their attachment, either voluntary or by conquest, to families which provided strong leadership. The *irgen* would appear to be the result of this realignment of kin groups. The earlier tribes seem to have been quite small in comparison with the later *irgen*, as is brought out strikingly in the *Secret History* account of one battle between Jamuḫa and Chinggis Khan. The Jadaran, with Jamuḫa at their head, allied themselves with thirteen neighboring tribes, from which Jamuḫa formed three regiments (*tumen*). Chinggis Khan had thirteen inclosures (large military camps), from which he formed three regiments also.[20] Although the term *irgen* is not employed in this account, it seems clear that the thirteen inclosures were under Chinggis Khan's command, i.e., belonged to his *irgen*, whereas the tribes, *ḫarin*, were independent groups amenable to alliance but not to command. After the battle two of these small tribes joined Chinggis Khan.

After Chinggis Khan had established his authority over Mongolia, great armies were organized for the conquest of China and the western lands. There was an attempt, in the formation of these armies, to make the military units conform as far as possible to the natural social groupings of tribe and tribal subdivision. The very size of these armies, however, encouraged an emphasis on the *irgen*, with a small *oboh* core giving its name to a large group of unrelated followers, at the expense of the small earlier *oboh*-tribe.

In spite of the realignments of social groups which accompanied the period of conquest, tribal kin affiliations were regarded as important at the time the *Secret History* was compiled. If an individual is mentioned in the account, his relationship to the head of the family is indicated; if he is the head of family and fairly closely related to the Chinggisid line, the line of relationship to a common ancestor is traced. If more distantly related, the name of the subtribe or section is stated; if unrelated, the name of the tribe and subtribe. In the case of captive boys, the affiliation of the camp in which they were captured is specified. Although a full genealogy is given only for the Mongol tribe, the other tribes of the area appear to have had a

similar genealogical segmentation. We are told, for example, that the Tatars had at least four subgroups: the Ca'a'an-Tatar, the Alci-Tatar, the Duta'ut, and the Aluhai-Tatar.[21]

GENEALOGIES AMONG THE MONGOLS OF IRAN

A strong feeling of the importance of the pattern of tribal genealogical relationship is indicated in the *Secret History*, compiled in the imperial period. It is equally pronounced among the Mongols in Iran at the beginning of the fourteenth century. Rashid ed-Din, Tajik historian at the court of the Mongol Ilkhans of Iran, began his history of the Mongols by a tribal genealogy which related the Mongols to the Turks and traced the Turkic tribes back to the four sons of Dib-baku, son (descendant?) of Japheth, son of Noah. The Mongols are subdivided into four main groups of tribes. The first, "whose names in nature were not Mongol,"[22] includes such tribes mentioned in the *Secret History* as the Jalair (Jalayir), Tatar, Mergit (Merkid), and Oirat (Oyirat). In the second group, "to whom the name of Mongols passed not long ago,"[23] are listed such tribes as the Naiman, Ongut (Onggut), Kerait (Kereyit), Tangut (Tang'ut), and Tumat. A third includes the Khonkirat (Onggirat), Khorlas (Ḥorilas), and Arulat.[24] The fourth group, according to Rashid ed-Din's account, consists of the tribes "descended from the three sons of the wife of Dobun-baian [Dobun-mergan], named Alun-goa [Alan-ḥo'a], born after the death of her husband. Dobun-baian was of the Mongol stock . . . while Alun-goa was of the Khorlas [Ḥorolas] tribe."[25] It is of considerable interest that the tribes of this fourth group trace descent from an ancestress rather than from an ancestor.

The tribal genealogy has clearly been altered in the course of some sixty-five years. The Hebraic ancestors Japheth and Noah have been engrafted by way of Islam, while Dib-baku may be some Arabic or Turkic hero. In the tribal lists some names are readily identifiable with tribal groups mentioned in the *Secret History*, others are not. The Arulat and Khonkhotan (Ḥonghotan), who appear in the *Secret History* as descendants of Alan-ḥo'a, are given a different ancestry by Rashid ed-Din. The removal of these two tribes from among the descendants of Alan-ḥo'a may be of significance in interpreting the tribal genealogy of the *Secret History*. Throughout the genealogy found in the first chapter of the *Secret History*, the names of founding ancestors are, with one exception, explicitly stated. The one exception is that of the cluster including the Arulat and Ḥonghotan, of which it is written that the sons of Caojin-ortegai are those who had the *oboh* names of Oronar, Ḥong-ḥotan, Arula, Sünit, Ḥabturḥas, and Geniges.[26] A possible interpretation is that the six sons of Caojin-ortegai may have been unnamed because they were unknown; that the names were unknown because the six groups were actually not descended from a Borjigin ancestor; that the groups had been associated with the Chinggisids for a sufficient length of time before the compilation of the *Secret History* to be regarded as belonging and so incorporated into the tribal genealogy, but that the association had not continued.

An alternative interpretation of the different positions of these tribes in the two

genealogies would be that Caojin-ortegai was related to the Chinggisids but that he and his descendants had become so far separated from the Borjigin *oboh* that the compilers of the *Secret History* remembered only that the six groups were supposed to be related through this ancestor, while the relationship had been completely forgotten among the Mongols who served as informants to Rashid ed-Din.

Whichever interpretation is correct, this case suggests that the Mongol tribal genealogies were flexible. This flexibility is supported by other comparisons between the two genealogies. The compilers of the *Secret History* were content to limit their genealogy to the Mongol tribe. When the Mongols in Iran came into association with Turks, who had their own tribal genealogies, the Mongol genealogy was fitted into that of the Turks. The Turks themselves, having been in Iran for several centuries, had presumably already fitted Muslim and Hebrew ancestors into their own genealogical scheme.

It is very unlikely that the changes were deliberate. Rashid ed-Din did not have access to the *Secret History;* he was dependent on the memories of his informants. And even though, as Rashid ed-Din wrote, the Mongols preserved their origins like pearls,[27] they were not always accurate in their recollection. Indeed, the *Secret History* gives two slightly different genealogies for the Jurkin, who were closely related to Chinggis Khan. Table 7 follows the genealogy as it is presented in chapter i of the *Secret History*. In chapter iv there is a different version, which agrees with the first only in naming Okin-barḫaḫ, first of the line, as eldest son of Ḫabul-ḫahan.[28]

The importance of the genealogies presented in the *Secret History* and in Rashid ed-Din's *History of the Mongols* is not in their possible accuracy as genealogies but in the fact that the compilers of both felt it necessary to introduce their histories with traditional genealogies which indicated the relationship and degree of relationship among the groups about which they were writing. There appears to have been a cultural compulsion to regard tribal groupings of whatever size as patrilineal kin groups, related within the group and among groups by descent from a common ancestor.

We suspect that not long before Chinggis Khan rose to power, perhaps only a few generations before, the Mongol tribe and other tribes of Mongolia may actually have been kin groups except for occasional individuals or families who had become absorbed into the *oboh* as a consequence of common residence and intermarriage. At the time the *Secret History* was compiled, such was no longer the case, and the Mongol historians recognized this by differentiating between *oboh* and *irgen*.

Among the Mongols in Iran it is highly improbable, because of the constitution of the Mongol armies sent west in the second half of the thirteenth century, that many of the larger groups were actually common descent groups. This absence of actual kin groups of any size above the family did not destroy the interest of the western Mongols in tribal genealogies. On the contrary, the genealogy compiled by Rashid ed-Din goes far beyond that of the *Secret History*, in that it attempts to demonstrate the relationship of a multitude of tribes, both Turkic and Mongol, ranging over a vast area in Central Asia and Iran. The fact that the kinship demon-

strated by the genealogy is obviously fictitious by modern anthropological standards seems in no way to have disturbed the Mongol informants who contributed to the genealogy set down by Rashid ed-Din. The evidence of the two genealogies suggests that the tribal genealogical pattern was so strong in Mongol thinking that when tribal genealogical kin groups became scrambled in the imperial armies, the orderliness of a fictitious genealogy was preferred to the chaos of reality.

TRIBAL GROUPS AS TERRITORIAL UNITS

The Mongol-speaking tribes were territorial, as well as kin or pseudo-kin, units. In the earliest period described by the *Secret History* each tribe appears to have had its customary territory; the Mongol tribe traced its origin to the headwaters of the Onon River, around Mount Burhan Ḥaldun,[29] and the Onon River Valley was still a part of Mongol tribal territory in Chinggis Khan's lifetime.[30] The Naiman territory extended into the Altai Mountains, while the Merkid ranged along the Selenga River. Oyirat territory lay north of the forest belt, in Siberia.[31] Vladimirtsov was able to map the territories of a number of tribes, non-Mongol as well as Mongol, within the regions now known as Inner and Outer Mongolia, as well as in adjacent parts of southern Siberia.[32]

Although each tribe had its customary territory, the boundaries were not sharply delimited. Mount Burhan Ḥaldun appears to have been within the range of both the Mongol and the Uriangḥaï tribes, for families of the two tribes met there on occasion in the course of their nomadic rounds.[33] It was also possible for a family to enter the territory of an unrelated tribe: the father of Alan-ḳo'a, expelled from the territory of his own tribe, the Ḥori-tumat, received permission to establish a migratory circuit within the territory of the Uriangḥaï hosts, for the names of the heads of Uriangḥaï families near whom he migrated are mentioned.[34] A family migrating in the territory of another tribe without permission might be subject to attack or feel free to attack any camp encountered. It was in such an attack that Bodoncar captured the wife who became the ancestress of Jamuḳa.[35] Thus each tribe had a territory over which its members exercised rights of usufruct, although there was some overlapping of these rights along the boundaries and families on occasion entered the territory of another tribe.

Whether the subtribal kin or pseudo-kin groups were also territorial units is not readily ascertained. Vladimirtsov in his map places the Taiyici'ut branch of the Mongol tribe north of the Onon River, the Borjigit branch to the south, and other Mongols slightly south and west of the Borjigit.[36] Vladimirtsov's data presumably refer to a late period, when each of the two branches had become more numerous than the original Mongol tribe. One would not expect each small genealogical subdivision of the tribe to have its own territory, for pastoral nomads require space for their movements. In order to find pasture for the animals during the several seasons of the year, it is necessary to have access to a variety of ranges. If a tribe had a fairly large territory, each of the major subdivisions might establish rights over a part of the tribal area, as was the case for the two largest branches of the Mongols.

The smaller subdivisions, however, would require freedom of movement within the region held by the larger group of which they were a part. This will become more evident when we turn to the Kazaks, for whom there is fuller information on the movement of nomadic groups. Such data as the *Secret History* provides suggest a movement of smaller kin groups within the larger tribal territory.

Whether clusters of related families migrated within the same neighborhood is not certain. There is indication that, on occasion, related families did camp near one another. When Chinggis Khan as a young man was captured by some Taiyici'ut, their camp is described as composed of several clusters of tents, each cluster separated from the others by a little distance.[37]

In general, however, where the larger genealogical groups were territorial units, the smaller subdivisions appear to have been residential units. In times of peace the basic residential unit was the extended family, the members of which camped and migrated together. During the struggle for leadership in Mongolia, larger groups camped together for safety, arranging their tents or wagons in a circle. These inclosures, *gure'en*, appear to have been made up chiefly of related families, although they may also have contained some unrelated followers. They are identified sometimes by the *oboh* name, sometimes by the name of the leader, whose *oboh* affiliation is indicated. In at least some cases it is clear that all members of the inclosure were of the same *oboh*.[38]

Since comparatively little information is available in the *Secret History* concerning the nomadic range of the medieval Mongol subgroups, we can state with certainty only that the largest tribal genealogical group was a territorial unit and that the smallest kin group, the extended family, was a residential unit. There is a strong probability that related families often migrated and camped near one another and that in time of danger the large inclosure type of camp usually consisted of patrilineally related families.

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

The medieval Mongol tribal genealogical groups were political units. Before Chinggis Khan established supremacy over the tribes of Mongolia, the tribe appears to have been the largest political unit. The first chief of the Mongols to be mentioned by the *Secret History* was Ḥabul-ḥahan of the Borjigin branch, the great-grandfather of Chinggis Khan.[39] He was succeeded by Ambaḥai of the Taiyici'ut branch, who in turn was followed by the Borjigin Ḥutula-ḥa'han.[40]

Succession to the khanship was clearly not governed by rigid rules of patrilineal descent. Although Ḥabul-ḥahan had seven sons, he is said to have designated Ambaḥai-ḥahan, the second son of his grandfather's younger brother, as his successor.[41] Ambaḥai in turn designated the third and fourth sons of Ḥabul-ḥahan as suitable successors, and the Mongols in assembly chose the fourth son, Ḥutula-ḥa'han.[42] Chinggis Khan does not appear to have been designated by anyone, and, while one assembly proclaimed him khan, a second faction chose Jamuḥa.

During the struggle for leadership, Chinggis Khan sent a message to Jamuḥa

which indicates a feeling that leadership should properly go to a senior generation or line. In this message, as recorded in the *Secret History,* Chinggis Khan claims to have offered the khanship first to Ḥucar, son of Nekun-taize, that is, to the son of his father's elder brother; to Altan, the third son of Ḥutula-ḥan; and to Saca and Taicu, said in this message to be the sons of Bartan-ba'atur, Chinggis Khan's paternal grandfather, although in the tribal genealogy given earlier they appear as grandsons of Bartan-ba'atur's elder brother.[43]

The Mongol tribe was, then, in addition to being a pseudo-kin and territorial group, a political entity. Seniority both of generation and of line were factors in selecting a successor, but ability was also of importance. A khan might designate his successor or express a preference for certain candidates; or, as in the case of Chinggis Khan and Jamuḥa, self-designated candidates might fight it out. The tribesmen made the ultimate decision, for a khan held his position of leadership only through his ability to command support.

There is also indication that the smaller tribal genealogical subdivisions were political units. The Dorben, the group genealogically most distant from Chinggis Khan's line, had a chief, as did subdivisions of this group. The Hadagin and Salji'ut, descended from brothers of Bodoncar, each had a chief as well as leaders of subgroups. The same pattern of superior chief and subordinate chiefs was found among other tribes, such as the Unggirad, Ḥorolas, Naiman, Merkid, and Oyirat.[44] At lower levels in the tribal genealogical structure, each inclosure, *gure'en,* had a leader, and in the extended family encampment the eldest male, whether father or elder brother, held a similar position of leadership.[45] Thus there appears to have been a close correspondence between kin or pseudo-kin groups of different tribal genealogical levels and political organization.

GROUP SYMBOLS

There are some indications of symbols among the medieval Mongols, but these do not appear to be attached to groups at any one level in the tribal genealogy. The *Secret History* gives little information concerning property marks, *tamga.*[46] Rashid ed-Din illustrates *tamga*'s said to belong to the various tribal descent groups which he lists,[47] indicating that the Mongols had *tamga*'s and used them as animal brands. When we turn to the Kazaks, we shall have more information on the use and function of the *tamga.*

The *Secret History* mentions standards, *tuh,* which were set up, even sacrificed to, before battle. Chinggis Khan had one, as did Jamuḥa while still an ally of Chinggis Khan.[48] Ho'elun-ujin, Chinggis Khan's mother, tried to rally her husband's followers after his death by setting up his standard, in what appears to have been a struggle for authority over a camp by the widows of two former leaders.[49] In these contexts the standard seems to have been a symbol of leadership which might be used to rally any fairly large group, whether a kin group or an army which included contingents from unrelated tribes.

Vladimirtsov, who believed the ancient Mongols to have had clan structure, wrote of a clan sacrificial cult.[50] The instance he cites, however, does not seem to support

his interpretation. After the death of Bodoncar, his son by his first wife barred from participation in the sacrifices the son of Bodoncar's concubine, stating that he questioned the paternity of the young man.[51] The latter, on being barred, moved away and established his own camp. This suggests a family cult, and references are found in the *Secret History* to a family shrine, *ḫutuh*.[52]

After the death of Yesugai-ba'atur, his widow Ho'elun-ujin was left behind when the widows of the former khan, Ambaḫai-ḫahan, set out in the spring to make a first-fruits offering to the gods. When she complained of her exclusion, she was told that those who made the offering had the right to invite whom they pleased to partake of the food.[53] This first-fruits offering may have been made in the name of the tribal khan, or it may have been made for the group that was migrating together. In either case, the widows, by failing to inform Ḫo'elun-ujin of their plans for the sacrifice, appear to have been asserting their senior positions. Their statement that participation was by invitation does not suggest a clan cult.

From the information provided by the *Secret History* concerning symbols, we cannot pick out any one level in the tribal genealogical hierarchy as being set apart from groups at other levels by its symbols. There are insufficient data on *tamga*'s. A battle standard could apparently be used by any leader who had a following. There was a family cult, which was participated in by all members of the extended family, and a first-fruits ceremony, which, whatever else it may have been, has no observable attributes of a clan cult.

MARRIAGE

The medieval Mongols appear to have been strongly exogamous in regard to marriage with patrilineal kin or pseudo-kin. All marriages for which information is given in the *Secret History* are outside the tribe entirely. Alan-ḫo'a belonged to the Ḫorilar or Ḫorolas *oboh* of the Ḫori-tumat tribe.[54] Bodoncar's captured wife was a Jarci'ul.[55] Ambaḫai-ḫahan gave his daughter in marriage to a Tatar.[56] Ho'elun-ujin, a member of the Olḫuno'ut tribe, was being escorted to the home of her Merkid husband when Chinggis Khan's father captured her.[57] Chinggis Khan's first wife, Borte, belonged to the Unggirat tribe.[58] On one occasion Chinggis Khan discusses a bride exchange with a family of the Kereyit tribe.[59] It would appear from these cases that among the early Mongols marriage was forbidden between any two people who claimed descent in the male line from a traditional common ancestor.

Rashid ed-Din lists in considerable detail the marriages made by the children and grandchildren of Chinggis Khan's grandson, Hulagu (Hülegu) Khan.[60] All were with members of other Mongol or Turkic tribes or of Persian families, with one exception. A daughter of one of Hulagu's concubines married a member of the Dorban group.[61] However, Rashid ed-Din's genealogy begins with Alan-ḫo'a, indicating that the early part of the tribal genealogy contained in the *Secret History*, together with memory of relationship with the Dorban, had been forgotten.[62] Thus there would appear to have been an exogamous bar to marriage with any patrilineal relative, no matter how remote. Exogamy depended on memory of genealogical traditions;

the exogamous bar might shift downward, as earlier traditional ancestors were forgotten.

We must consider, however, the fact that Rashid ed-Din's tribal genealogy was far more extensive than that of the *Secret History,* for he traces the descent of all the Turkic and Mongol tribes back to a common ancestor, Japheth, son of Noah.[63] This seems to represent an assimilation of the Hebraic tradition that all men are descended from a common ancestor, Adam, a not inconvenient genealogy in a society where marriage with paternal parallel cousins was favored. Such an all-encompassing genealogy would be readily acceptable to the Mongols, who were genealogically minded by their own culture, but their exogamic principles could not feasibly be expanded with it, if they were to continue to marry and produce descendants. Consequently, when the genealogy was expanded in Iran, the exogamic bar remained attached to the earlier Mongol traditional tribal genealogy as it was remembered.

The Mongols practiced the levirate—that is, when a man died, his widow married a brother or other paternal relative of her deceased husband. There are two references to this practice in the *Secret History*[64] and a number in Rashid ed-Din.[65] Among the Mongols whose marriages are recounted by Rashid ed-Din, where important men had numerous wives and concubines, this levirate practice was extended to include the transmission of a man's wives to his son or even grandson. A son did not, of course, inherit his own mother. A woman was not required to remarry under the levirate, however. Hulagu's mother declined to remarry after the death of her husband; she became head of the household, responsible for the care and education of her four sons.

The sororaté was also practiced. Two instances are cited in the *Secret History.* Bodoncar's "concubine" was actually a companion—presumably a sister or other relative—of his first wife.[66] A Tatar wife of Chinggis Khan asked him to marry her elder sister also, a request with which the leader complied.[67] Rashid ed-Din also gives instances of the sororate in its broader sense. Two of Hulagu's wives were aunt and niece, two others were half-sisters by the same father.[68]

In general, although an extensive patrilineal exogamy was observed, there was a good deal of marriage among families related through females. Chinggis Khan's father was seeking a bride for his young son among the daughters of the boy's "maternal uncles" when another match, that with Borte, was proposed by Borte's father.[69] Three daughters of Jakembu (Jaḥagambu), brother of To'oril ḥan of the Keraits, were married, respectively, to Chinggis Khan and to his two sons Juchi and Tului.[70] There are several instances of marriage with mother's brother's daughter, none recorded for marriage with father's sister's daughter. Apparently more than two generations had to pass before it was safe to marry the descendant of a female in the paternal line. One of Hulagu's wives was his father's sister's daughter's son's daughter, while a son and daughter of Hulagu, by different mothers, married a sister and brother whose mother was a daughter of Chinggis Khan's brother.[71] There was clearly no objection to marriage across generation lines.

It would appear that, while marriage with patrilineal kin was forbidden, there was

a fairly strong preference for continuing to marry into another line, once marriage ties had been established with that line, and some preference for marrying a mother's brother's daughter. Marriages with entirely unrelated lines were acceptable, if they could be arranged. The preference appears to have been for marriage with a friendly group. Chinggis Khan arranged several marriages for himself and for his sons and brothers as a means of cementing relations with potential allies. Once friendly relations had been established, marriages between two lines would be likely to continue and would include both affinal and matrilineal consanguineal relatives. The exogamous tabu applied only to patrilineal kin.

KINSHIP TERMINOLOGY

A certain number of kinship terms were found in the *Secret History* (see Table 8), and it is probable that the medieval Mongols had other terms which do not appear in that work. The usage of the *Secret History* indicates, however, that the Mongols could designate relationships with some precision without employing a large number of terms.

The medieval Mongols had special elementary terms for all primary relationships, and to them the distinction between elder and younger sibling appears to have been primary. They had no general terms to express the idea of "brother" or "sister"; instead, they wrote always of "elder brother" or "younger brother," "elder sister" and "younger sister." A similar terminological distinction was made between the elder and younger brothers of the father. In addition to employing elementary terms for these relationships, the Mongols also distinguished the relative age of sons and daughters by means of compound terms.

Although the Mongols had special terms for paternal ascendants up to great-great-grandfather, they seem to have had few special terms for relatives in collateral lines. Paternal kin in general were referred to as *uruh* (*uruq*), *oboh* (*oboq*), or *yasun*, and the phrase *uruh un uruh* was employed to convey the notion of descendants extending into the infinite future.[72]

One phrase is encountered in the *Secret History* which appears to refer to collateral relatives. *Uye ḫaya* appears in the following context. Alan-ḫo'a bore three sons who were sired, according to tradition, by a supernatural man of gold after the death of her husband. The two elder sons, in discussing this circumstance between themselves, are reported as saying: "Our mother, who has no elder or younger brothers, nor any *uye ḫaya*, and thus is without a husband, has born these three sons. In the household the only man is Ma'alih baiya'udai [the adopted servant]. Are not these three sons his?"[73]

The two elder sons were clearly thinking in terms of the levirate, under which a widow would normally marry a brother or other paternal relative of her deceased husband. Since the text distinguishes between brothers and *uye ḫaya*, the term must refer to collateral relatives other than brothers. Pelliot translated *uye ḫaya* as "cousin german,"[74] Haenisch as "relative."[75] In modern Mongol and in some Altaian dialects of Turkic, *uye* has the meaning of "joint, link, generation."[76] In modern

Khalkha and Chahar Mongol, *uye* and *ḥaya* appear as roots in the terms *üyeeld, hayaald, üyincir,* and *hayincir,* which are employed to indicate distance of relationship of near collateral kin. In Dagor, the cognate terms *wiyel* and *kayal* also refer to distance of relationship of collateral lines,[77] while among the Kalmuk the term *üyener-hayanar* is a collective term referring to fairly close patrilineal kin.[78] On the basis of the usage of these terms among the modern Mongols, it is perhaps safe to infer that among the medieval Mongols *uye ḥaya* referred to collateral paternal kinsmen who were more distant than brothers but closely enough related to have fraternal responsibilities.

Ḥuda is translated by Pelliot as "relative,"[79] by Haenisch as "relative by marriage, brother-in-law."[80] In all instances where the term occurs in the *Secret History,* it is used by a man addressing the future father-in-law of his daughter. Since cognates of the word are found in most of the modern Mongol terminologies studied, with the meaning of "child's spouse's father," we infer that this was the medieval Mongol meaning.

Several of the terms for consanguineal relatives were used as honorific terms. A servant addressed the mistress of the house as "mother," *eke.*[81] Chinggis Khan addressed To'oril, his father's sworn brother (*anda*), as "father," and To'oril reciprocated by calling him "son."[82] Later, when Chinggis Khan became angry with him, he changed the term of address from "father" to "younger brother" and produced genealogical grounds for so doing.[83] Before the marriage of Chinggis Khan and Borte, Chinggis Khan's father was referred to as the "elder brother" of Borte's father.[84]

These usages were honorific, but they appear also to have implied obligations and rights of a relationship analogous to that designated by the term used. A servant stood in the position of child to the mistress of the house, owing obedience and service to her and expecting in return the care and provision to which a child was entitled. Chinggis Khan, when addressing To'oril as "father," also presented to him the gift which a bride's mother normally sent to the groom's father. Since Chinggis Khan's own father was dead at the time of the marriage to Borte, Chinggis Khan presented the gift to To'oril as if he were father.[85] Later, when To'oril allied himself with Chinggis Khan's enemies, Chinggis Khan apparently felt impelled to change the term of address from that of "father," representing a relationship in which armed hostility would be unthinkable, to that of "younger brother," in which it was at least possible. When Chinggis Khan's father, Yesugai, was poisoned by Tatars and knew himself to be dying, the nearest relative present was a member of a junior collateral line related through a common ancestor six generations back. He addressed this relative as "son" and charged him with the care of his younger brothers and sister-in-law, i.e., Yesugai's sons and his eldest son's affianced bride.[86] It is clear that Yesugai, on his deathbed and with his eldest son only nine years old, was asking this relative to assume the responsibilities which would normally fall to an adult eldest son on the death of the father. It would appear from these honorific usages that Mongol society was so strongly oriented toward kinship that relation-

ships between individuals and families were normally expressed in kinship terms, whether or not there was any actual, or even theoretical, consanguineal relationship.

When the medieval Mongols were concerned with actual consanguineal relationships, as they frequently were, they indicated the line of relationship through named individuals. Chinggis Khan traced To'oril's and his own ancestry back four generations to justify his change from the honorific title of "father" to that of "younger

TABLE 8

KINSHIP TERMS OF THE MEDIEVAL MONGOLS

Relationship	Mongol Term	Reference*
Fa	*ecige*	H., p. 41; SH, 69
Mo	*eke*	H., p. 42; SH, 18, 74
ElBr	*aḫa*	H., p. 3; SH, 11, 139, 269, 270
Eldest Br	*angḫa aḫa*	H., p. 8; SH, 139
YoBr	*de'u*	H., p. 36; SH, 5
ElSi	*egeci*	H., p. 42; SH, 155
YoSi	*doṇi, doiyi*	H., p. 38; SH, 165, 85
So	*ko'un*	H., p. 105; SH, 2
Eldest So	*yeke ko'un*	H., p. 105; SH, 270
Youngest So	*niluḫa ko'un*	H., p. 117; SH, 195
Da	*okin*	H., p. 122; SH, 8, 9, 66
Eldest Da	*egeci met*	H., p. 42; SH, 186
Second eldest Da	*doyimet*	H., p. 38; SH, 186
DaCh	*je, je'e*	H., p. 88; SH, 64, 176
FaFa	*ebugan, ebugen*	H., p. 40; SH, 120 ff
FaFaFa	*elincuk*	H., p. 43; SH, 180
FaFaFaFa	*borḫa*	H., p. 19; SH, 180
FaElBr	*ebin*	H., p. 40; SH, 171
FaYoBr	*abaḫa*	H., p. 1; SH, 11, 150, 177, 242, 275, 281
Link kin	*uye ḫaya*	P., p. 123; H., p. 167; SH, 18
Kin:		
Relative	*uruh*	H., p. 167; SH, 11, 165, 255, 276
Descendant	*uruh*	H., p. 167; SH, 51, 208, 216, 246, 278
Family	*oboh*	H., pp. 120–21; SH, 9, 11, 40, 41, 42, 44
Bone	*yasun*	H., p. 169; SH, 112, 148
MoBr	*naḫacu*	H., p. 112; SH, 61
Hu	*gu'un*	H., p. 53; SH, 6, 7, 12
	ere	H., p. 45; SH, 155
Wi	*gergai*	H., p. 49; SH, 1, 94
	eme	H., p. 43; SH, 169, 201
	ḫatun	H., p. 63; SH, 54, 257
ElBrWi	*bergen, berigen*	H., p. 14; SH, 47, 68
SoWi	*beri*	H., p. 14; SH, 177, 272
DaHu	*guregan*	H., p. 52; SH, 155, 269
ChSpFa	*ḫuda*	SH, 62, 63
Orphan	*oneci*	H., p. 124; SH, 171, 272

*The following abbreviations have been used: H. = Haenisch, *Wörterbuch zu Manghol un niuca tobca'an*, P. = Pelliot, *op. cit.*, translation of text; and SH = *Secret History*, text, cited by paragraphs.

brother."[87] Rashid ed-Din described Kokuz-khatun, the principal wife of Hulagu, as of the Kerait tribe, daughter of Iku, who was son of Ong-khan (To'oril).[88] Another wife, Kuik-khatun, of the Oïrat tribe, was the daughter of Turalji-kurkan and had for mother a daughter of Chinggis Khan, named Jijkan.[89] Her daughter, Bulukan-aka, married Jumeh-kurkan, who was the son of the Tatar Juchi, who was the brother of Bokdan-khatun, the principal wife of Abaka-khan (Hulagu's eldest son).

Juchi's father was Kurkan, who married Jijkan, daughter of Unji-Noyan, brother of Chinggis Khan.[90]

Because these early historians of the Mongols combined personal names with a limited number of kinship terms in tracing relationships, it is possible for the later student to work out and plot the specific relationships. Rashid ed-Din was not a Mongol and probably was familiar with only a limited number of Mongol kinship terms, if any. The compilers of the *Secret History* were Mongols and presumably familiar with most of the existing kinship terms. In writing for a general audience, they nevertheless followed the same method as that of Rashid ed-Din.

COMPARISON WITH THE HAZARA MONGOL SYSTEM

The pattern of tribal genealogies was much more strongly developed among the medieval Mongols than among the Hazara Mongols. The medieval Mongols had a traditional genealogy in which the names of the tribal progenitor and the founders of the various genealogical segments were remembered. Among the Hazara Mongols, traditions of a tribal genealogy were vague, and greater emphasis was placed on lineage genealogies.

Both the medieval Mongols and the Hazara Mongols gave names to the segments at different levels in the tribal genealogical structure, so that an individual might identify himself by naming any or all of the segments to which he belonged. Neither people had any terminological means of distinguishing groups at one level of the structure from those at other levels. The Hazaras employed the terms *táifa* or *qaum* interchangeably for all groups, from lineage to tribe. The medieval Mongols distinguished between kin groups—which might be referred to as *oboh*, *uruh*, or *yasun* —and *irgen*, which included unrelated groups attached to the *oboh* of the leader.

Among both medieval Mongols and Hazaras, women retained, after marriage, membership in the groups into which they were born. Among both, however, a woman became so fully identified with her husband's family and line that a widow might become head of a household in her husband's community.

Among the sedentary Hazara Mongols, all the tribal genealogical kin or pseudo-kin groups at the various levels were territorial units, with the possible exception of multilineage villages. Among the medieval Mongols, who were pastoral nomads, the tribe was a territorial unit, as were large tribal branches. Smaller groups, however, ranged within the territory of the tribe or tribal branch, since the requirements of the pastoral economy made impractical the localization of small kin groups.

Hazara Mongol political organization coincided with territorial kin organization insofar as there was political organization. This appears to have been true also of the medieval Mongols, although in the struggle for power between Chinggis Khan and Jamuḫa, as well as in the later imperial period, there was considerable scrambling of the original tribal genealogical groupings.

The Hazara Mongols had no group symbols. The medieval Mongols had symbols, but they do not appear to have been attached to groups at any particular level in the tribal genealogy, except for cults centered in the family.

The medieval Mongols, like the Hazaras, had a patrilineal bias in tracing descent, but both were essentially asymmetrically ambilineal. The Hazaras recognized descent through females when they distinguished between full seyyids and *sáddti masáwi*, who traced descent from Muhammed through the male line only. Among the medieval Mongols, descent occasionally passed through a female link, either a wife or a daughter.

In the regulation of marriage, the medieval Mongols forbade marriage between any two people descended patrilineally from a common ancestor included within the scope of the tribal genealogy. A change in the genealogy was accompanied by a corresponding change in the position of the exogamic bar. The Hazara Mongols, descended from these medieval tribesmen, had at some time after their departure from Mongolia reduced the exogamic bar to that of members of a household and had acquired a preference for marriage with paternal cousin. This shift from extensive exogamy to an endogamous tendency was not associated with any marked change in other aspects of the social structure.

Furthermore, the transition from nomadism to sedentary village life appears to have had little effect on the social structure of the Hazaras other than to sharpen the territorial attributes of the kin groups at the several tribal genealogical levels and, in multilineage villages, to develop informal paternalism in administration and a social solidarity among unrelated lineages similar to that found among single-lineage villages.

In political organization, although there was some tendency toward hereditary chieftainship among both medieval and Hazara Mongols, this was not firmly fixed. Leadership went to the individual and family best equipped to assume leadership, i.e., the one who could attract a following.

CHAPTER V

THE KAZAKS

HISTORY

When Chinggis Khan died in A.D. 1227, the vast area which had been conquered under his leadership was divided among his four sons. To his eldest son, Juchi, went the westernmost appanage. As carved out by Juchi's sons and later descendants, it included much of what is now Kazakstan and extended westward to encompass Moscow in the north and the Crimea to the south. The eastern and much of the southern parts of this area were inhabited by Turks, with whom the politically dominant Mongol minority intermarried. The appanage of the second son, Chagatai, extended southward from the Ili River into Turkestan and eventually included the city-states of Turkestan from Khotan and Kashgar in the east to Samarkand and Bokhara in the west. The pastoral nomadic population of the Chagataian appanage had been Turkic for several centuries, and most of the city-states had become Turkic-speaking by the time of the Mongol conquest. In the Chagataian appanage, as in that of Juchi, Mongols intermarried with Turks and became Turkic-speaking.

In an area comprising the eastern part of the appanage of Juchi and the northwestern part of that of Chagatai the Kazaks emerged as a people around the middle of the fifteenth century when they revolted from the domination of Abul Khair, descendant of Juchi's youngest son Chaiban.[1] The modern Kazaks represent an amalgam of Turko-Mongol nomadic groups from the appanages of Juchi and of Chagatai, of the Mongol tribe of Naiman which was already living in the Altai Mountain area during the lifetime of Chinggis Khan, and of fragments of other Mongol tribes from the east.

TRIBAL GENEALOGIES

Despite their obviously heterogeneous origin, the Kazaks managed to fit the bits and pieces into a tribal genealogical pattern. In the nineteenth century the Kazak nation comprised three ordas, called Great, Middle, and Small. Each orda was subdivided into tribes, which in turn were subdivided into smaller segments. Levshin, who traveled among the Kazaks in the third decade of the nineteenth century, shows the Small Orda to have had three major subdivisions, which in their turn were subdivided, respectively, into six, twelve, and seven subgroups. The Middle Orda had four main groups, with seventeen, nine, nine, and three subdivisions, respectively. The Great Orda had but two groups, each divided into nine tribes.[2]

The Kazaks had a tradition of descent from a single primogenitor and a tribal genealogical tree. That the tribal genealogies given by different informants at different times in the nineteenth century were not always identical is not surprising, since the Kazaks had a population of between two and three million[3] and very few were literate or could afford to employ literate secretaries. One genealogy comes from an informant of the Bukeevski Orda, a comparatively recent offshoot of the Small Orda, dwelling west of the Caspian. Once upon a time, as this tradition runs, there lived a man named Alasha. On the death of Chinggis Khan, Alasha divided the people into three groups, placing, at the head of each, one of his three sons, Uisun, Argyn, and Alchyn; thus were founded the Great, Middle, and Small Ordas. Alchyn in turn had three sons. From the eldest son, Alim, sprang the Alimuly branch of the Small Orda; from the second son, Khadyr-Kodzha, nicknamed "Baiuly" ("rich with sons"), came the Baiuly branch; from the third son, Kart-Kazaka, came the Dzhitiru (*dzhiti*, "seven"; *ru*, "tribe") branch. The informant then named twelve tribes of the Baiuly branch which were represented in the Bukeevsky Orda west of the Caspian.[4] This follows the general outlines of the genealogy given by Levshin, working with a number of informants living east of the Caspian.

Aristov, who collected several genealogies from members of the Great Orda, obtained different names for the founding ancestors of the Kazaks and a different genealogy from that obtained by Hudson for the Great Orda.[5] Instead of Alasha, the founding ancestor named was Abul Khair, whose genealogy was traced back through Japheth and Noah to Adam, like that of the Turko-Mongol genealogy given by Rashid ed-Din.[6] Abul Khair had three sons, named Baichur, Dzhanchur, and Karachur. Among the papers of a senior chief of the Great Orda, Aristov found a written genealogy listing eleven levels of descendants of Baichur, son of Abul Khair. From informants he was able to fill out the genealogy for collateral lines as well as to add three more recent genealogical levels.[7]

Margulanov in 1927 collected genealogies for two of the seven branches of the Naiman tribe of the Middle Orda which showed thirteen generation levels descending from the founders of the branches. These founders, in turn, were great-grandsons of the traditional primogenitor of the group, Naiman; they were sons of the two sons of Naiman's eldest son.[8]

Ideally, these subgroups and subdivisions of subgroups were formed as the result of fission consequent on population increase, and the genealogies are based on the theory that the founders of groups at the various levels had numerous sons. Actually, the traditional genealogies show some awareness that all subgroups were not descended from the primogenitor. Although Kharuzin's Bukeevski informant accepted the presence of the Dzhetiru in the tribal genealogy without question, some of Levshin's informants explained that, while the Alimuly and Baiuly groups of the Small Orda were descended from Alchin, the Dzhetiru group stemmed from seven small tribes brought together by Khan Tiavka in the early eighteenth century. The fourth branch of the Middle Orda is likewise attributed to the organization of Khan Tiavka.[9]

Some of Aristov's informants explained that certain ancestors were adopted sons, thus apparently rationalizing a tribal memory that some alien tribal fractions had joined the parent group of the Great Orda. Concerning this practice he wrote:

> According to the "genealogical table" written down by Yu. D. Yuzhakov ("Otechestv. zapiski," 1867, tome 171), on the word of a Chimkent Kirghiz-Kazak, Bakhtiar fathered Abad and Tarak and adopted Kangly; according to the word of some of my informants, Bakhtiar adopted the tribeless Katagan, from whom sprang Kangly and Chanshkly, but, according to others, the Chanshkly, "an alien, unknown people, were added to the Kangly."[10]

Similarly, one of Margulanov's informants explained that the third son of Naiman was actually a horse herder who had been adopted by Naiman.[11]

In addition to the changes in genealogies resulting from the processes of fission and fusion, there have also been changes in the names of groups. The process of name-changing has not been described, as far as the present writer knows, but the fact has been recorded by several observers of the Kazaks. It led Levshin to the conclusion that "dans cent ans, la plus grande partie des noms des branches kirghizes que nous avons citées ne subsisteront plus que dans les archives russes et dans la mémoire de quelques vieillards."[12]

In view of the fission, fusion, and name-changing which occurred, collecting a Kazak tribal genealogy was not an easy task. Levshin wrote, with a feeling which will be appreciated by anyone who has worked with a people having *obok* structure:

> Quel zèle et quel amour pour la généalogie ne faudrait-il pas avoir, pour se déterminer à verifier et compulser les rapports des Kirghiz! L'un dit que sa tribu se divise en cinq ou six sections; un autre affirme qu'elle se divise en douze; un troisième confond les sections de sa tribu avec celles des tribus voisines; un quatrième enfin, plus sincère que tous les autres, avoue franchement son ignorance.[13]

Nevertheless, despite the imprecision and impermanency of detail, the Kazaks cherished their tribal genealogies, suggesting as strong a cultural drive among the nineteenth-century Turko-Mongol Kazaks as among the medieval Mongols to fit all groups of their people into a neat genealogical framework, whatever the actual origin of the group.

All these groups, at whatever genealogical level, had names, but there was no terminological means of distinguishing groups of one genealogical level from those of another except by reference to the tribal genealogy. In some parts of the area, *dzhuz,* the Turkic word for "hundred," was applied indiscriminately to all groups, from the Kazak nation down to the lineage; in other regions *dzhuz* was replaced by *ru, uru,* or *siök.*[14]

FAMILY AND EXTENDED KIN SOLIDARITY

At the base of this segmented tribal structure was the patrilineal joint family. Normally each nuclear family, consisting of parents and unmarried children, occupied a separate felt-covered tent. As each son married, he was provided with a share of the family property in the form of bride price—a tent and livestock for the new ménage. The youngest son, however, usually remained in the parental tent after marriage and was expected to care for his parents in their old age. In return he in-

herited his father's tent and its furnishings, together with other property which his father had retained.[15] A daughter received her share of the family property in the form of dowry, which consisted of a tent, household furnishings, and often some livestock.[16] If the father died before all the children were married, the eldest son was responsible for apportioning out the family property as each of his younger siblings married. If all the children were minors at the time of the father's death, some near paternal relative acted as guardian and administered the family property.[17] Beyond this small joint family, which subdivided at each generation, there was a larger patrilineal kin group which was bound together by ties of mutual responsibilities and privileges.

Guardians for orphans and incompetents were chosen from among near paternal relatives. Apparently, the nearest male relative, such as an uncle, was preferred; but this responsibility might go to a more distant kinsman, for Grodekov wrote that, in general, the guardian was not more than seven generations removed in relationship.[18] If a man was accused of theft and an oath was required by the judge in support of the innocence or guilt of the accused, it was not the defendant or accuser who was required to take the oath, but more or less distant relatives who were called on to do so.[19] Blood money was paid by a group of kinsmen of the murderer to the kin group of the victim. The size of the kin group apparently varied according to circumstance. Grodekov stated that the responsibility of payment might rest with the camp of the murderer or, if the murder were an intratribal affair, with a cluster of related camps. If it were intertribal, the whole tribe might support the family of the victim in exacting payment of the blood money.[20] We cannot be sure just what group in the tribal genealogical structure is meant by the term "tribe," any more than we can identify *uru* in the statement of Hudson's informant that all the members of a man's *uru* were responsible for the payment of blood money.[21] The size of the group involved might depend on the importance of the victim and his family. But, whatever the size of the group, kin solidarity extended well beyond the bounds of the family encampment.

RESIDENCE AND TERRITORIALITY

When a son married, he normally continued to dwell in his father's camp. Consequently, the nomadic camp, *aul*, which might range in size from three to ten tents, even fifteen or more tents in the east,[22] usually consisted of an extended patrilineal family with spouses. There were variations on this general rule. A very wealthy man might need two or three camps for the supervision of his numerous herds; in such a case he might have a wife and children, together with hired workers, in each camp.[23] In addition to hired workers, a camp might also include occasional maternal relatives.[24] In general, however, patrilineally related families normally camped together, and some families branched off to form a separate camp whenever the extended family and its livestock became too numerous for effective grazing.[25]

This writer has not been able to determine whether or not closely related *aul*'s followed neighboring routes in the course of their migrations. Certainly, winter

quarters, which were fixed in one place for several months of the severe winter, brought together related *aul*'s.[26] Rudenko charted the migration route of three closely related *aul*'s belonging to the Naiman tribe. His data show that in winter they camped together, while during the other months of the year each followed a different route within the same general region.[27] According to Hudson's informant, all the members of the Daulet subgroup of the Small Orda wintered together in the same locality, although migrating in *aul*'s of five or six tents during the rest of the year.[28]

Whether in summer camp or in winter quarters, the residential group camped and grazed its livestock within the territory belonging by customary right to the larger tribal genealogical group to which it appertained. The Kazak nation occupied a continuous territory roughly equivalent to modern Kazakhstan. Within this vast territory, each of the three ordas had its customary territory,[29] and within the orda each tribe seems to have had a continuous range established by customary occupancy. In the case of the Naiman tribe of the Middle Orda, for which most detailed information is available, each of five of the seven subtribes had its own territory. The remaining two subtribes had become established in the territory of the Small Orda.[30] Within the territory of the subtribe, smaller subdivisions had the right to camp and migrate. The Naimans constituted one of the largest tribes of the Kazak nation. It is very possible that elsewhere the tribe was the smallest tribal genealogical unit having territoriality, as distinguished from the right of usufruct of tribal territory enjoyed by smaller subdivisions. It is difficult to obtain information as to where territoriality ends and the right of usufruct begins, since informants usually say simply that the land belongs to the *uru* or *dzhuz*, terms which may refer to a tribal genealogical group of any size above the family. The Naiman data were obtained by an ethnographic expedition which actually traced the seasonal migrations of several sample *aul*'s and also obtained genealogies for several sections of the tribe.[31]

Within the territory of the tribe or subtribe, winter quarters were usually fixed, in the sense that a kin group returned to the same place year after year. There was regional variation in the routing of the summer migrations. In the fertile Altai area, each *aul* tended to follow the same itinerary year after year.[32] In other regions, where there was greater variation in the annual itinerary, an *aul* might send out scouts to choose the next site. In this case a mark left on the site established rights of occupancy for that group.[33]

Thus we find that among the Kazaks the larger tribal genealogical groups were territorial units, while the smaller were residential units which enjoyed right of usufruct of the territory of the larger groups to which they belonged. On occasion, however, a tribal segment might move into the territory of a group other than that to which it was genealogically related.[34] If it were permitted to remain by the group exercising territoriality, it might eventually be incorporated into the genealogy of the host group, as seems to have happened in the case of the Dzhetiru, "seven tribes," of the Small Orda.

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Kazak political organization was, according to all accounts, so fluid that the term "organization" sometimes appears a misnomer to the student trying to obtain an understanding of the structure. Thus we cannot hope to find any regular conformity to the tribal genealogical structure. Indeed, Hudson goes so far as to "emphasize . . . the lack of correlation between the genealogical 'tribal' groupings and the political unions."[35]

All the Kazaks appear to have been under a single leader at the end of the fifteenth century, although this appearance may result from lack of detailed historical data. At the beginning of the eighteenth century the three ordas were united under Khan Tiavka. These seem to be the only periods when the Kazak nation enjoyed some sort of union under a single leader. At some periods there was a khan over each of the three ordas, but that the orda had no great stability is indicated by reports for the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Bergmann's Kalmuk informants could name the khans of the three Kazak ordas as of A.D. 1771.[36] In 1820 Meyendorff observed that both the Small and the Middle ordas had khans confirmed in their position by Russia but that the Great Orda was divided into a number of independent sultanates.[37]

Below the orda level, there were "big *bii*'s and little *bii*'s,"[38] i.e., leaders of larger and smaller subdivisions of the orda. As Aristov pointed out, there is little information available on past tribal groups and even less on tribal leaders,[39] so that it is impossible to make a detailed comparison between Kazak political units of any of the ordas with a tribal genealogy of the orda for the same period. There appears to have been some correlation, however, if Kazak military units are accepted as corresponding to political units. Many of the groups reported by Aristov as using a common battle cry may be identified in the tribal genealogy which he collected. This would suggest that tribal genealogical kin groups at the several levels fought as military units. At the lowest level in the tribal genealogy, the camp, *aul*, was headed by an *aqsaqal*, "white beard," who was the senior male of the most prosperous house of the extended family which constituted the camp.

The difficulty in obtaining any clear picture of the political structure appears to be related to the Kazak attitude toward chiefs in general. A chief, whether he be khan or *bii*, did not have great authority over his people. He was simply a leader to whom the people were willing to pay occasional taxes and follow in war, so long as he provided the services which were expected of a leader. The attributes of a successful chief were, as Levshin describes them, a great aptitude for disentangling lawsuits and rendering justice; a numerous family ready to support the chief; wealth and the generosity which wealth makes possible; an advanced age, which naturally inspires respect; and some extraordinary successes in the affairs of state or in war.[40] The extent of chiefly authority was directly proportionate to the willingness of the followers to accept authority. If a chief were popular and successful, he would have a large following. If he were considered unsatisfactory, some or all

of his following might move off and attach themselves to other chiefs. The Russians discovered to their grief that an impressive confirmation ceremony for a khan in no way guaranteed a docile orda.[41]

Theoretically, khans were sultans, that is, members of princely families which kept special family genealogies in addition to the tribal genealogies. But a sultan was dependent for a following on personal qualities of leadership rather than on his aristocratic birth, and a successful chief of lowly origin might become sultan by the acclaim of his followers.[42] Again in theory, the positions of khan and *bii* were hereditary, passing to son or brother within a family. Since a large and prosperous family was one of the necessary attributes of a chief, his successor would normally be chosen from that same family. But it was the people who made the choice, and if no son or brother were deemed suitable, the chiefship might go to someone outside the family. If there were a difference of opinion regarding the candidates, a group might be split into two, each with its own chief, or some families might move off and attach themselves to the chief of another group.

The emphasis on personal leadership naturally gave fluidity to the political groupings. Given this fluidity, one can scarcely expect a neat correlation between political structure and tribal genealogy. We noted Levshin's statement concerning the frequency with which groups changed their names. We have also noted the fact that, while all the Kazak groups had tribal genealogies, considerable variation was to be found within the genealogies. In addition, we have seen that, while the larger tribal groupings were territorial units, smaller subdivisions on occasion moved into the territory of some group other than that to which it belonged. We suggest that substantial changes in political or territorial alignments were eventually reflected in the tribal genealogy but that the political units often formed and re-formed in such kaleidoscopic fashion that the tribal genealogy could not adjust to all the changes and still survive. Thus an exact correlation between political structure and tribal genealogy would be impossible to achieve, given the fluidity of the political structure.

There can be no doubt that political fluidity has been characteristic of the Central Asian pastoral nomadic tribes. Anyone who has essayed a study of Central Asian history and encountered the attendant difficulties in trying to fix name groups and relationships in some sort of order is well aware of this. It would seem that the tribal genealogy, changeable as that may be, serves to give some sort of order to a society in which political realignments are often so frequent as to appear chaotic.

PROPERTY MARKS

The Kazaks had certain group symbols which have frequently been referred to as clan symbols. Like the medieval Mongols, the Kazaks marked their larger animals with brands called *tamga* or *tayba*. A study of the available literature on the Kazak *tamga* shows that these symbols were not attached to groups at any particular level in the tribal genealogy. Rudenko wrote of a "tribal" *tamga*,[43] while Radlov stated that every "clan" had its own brand. He added, however, that these brands were

used mostly by the rich, since the poor nomads could readily recognize their comparatively few horses.[44] Kharuzin reported that, in general, the Kazaks did not pay much attention to *tamga*'s, and that two "tribes" of the Bukeevski Orda, which claimed descent, respectively, from a sultan and from Muhammed, used the same *tamga*, whereas among the neighboring Nogai each of the five tribes and each of their subdivisions had its own *tamga*.[45] Karutz stated that among the Kazaks of the Mangyshlak Peninsula each camp had a distinctive *tamga*.[46] Grodekov[47] and Hudson's informant[48] both affirmed that any individual might invent a *tamga* and use it.

Aristov has made the most careful analysis of the Kazak *tamga*. As he pointed out, there was no need for *tamga*'s when a kin group was neither very numerous nor scattered over too large an area, since the individual members recognized almost all the animals in the herds of the group by color or other characteristic. But when such a group become large and subdivided into branches, then in course of time it was necessary to distinguish the cattle of one branch from those of another by means of *tamga*'s.[49] This statement is supported by the traditions which he collected concerning the origin of *tamga*'s. Of ninety-two Uzbeg groups near the Syr Darya, "it is recounted that when 92 brothers acquired wealth, their cattle became mixed up; in order to mark the live stock, the brothers, in council among themselves, invented 92 marks, tamgas."[50]

Rashid ed-Din, in his genealogical history of the Turks, recounts that when Kun Khan, eldest son and successor of Uguz, became leader of the Turks, he assigned a *tamga* to each of the twenty-four grandsons of Uguz.[51]

Tamga's were essentially property marks,[52] to be used when herds became so numerous that individual animals could not be otherwise recognized by their owners. Among the Kazaks, wealth in animals was evidence of a family's ability to take care of itself and its dependents, so that a man from a wealthy family would normally be chosen as chief of a nomadic political unit, whatever its size and relationship to the tribal genealogy. Following this, the people might have come to regard the *tamga* of their leader as an emblem of the group. We have no specific information on this point.

Aristov has brought together evidence, however, to indicate that, when fission occurred, the group branching off either adopted a mark which was a modification of the *tamga* of the parental group or placed the parental brand on a different part of the animal.[53] In assembling this evidence, Aristov has demonstrated that *tamga*'s were used by groups or leaders of groups at different levels in the tribal genealogy. Consequently, these *tamga*'s may not be regarded as clan symbols.

WAR CRIES

The Kazak *uran*'s, names shouted by Kazak warriors as they went into battle, have also been cited as clan symbols. Aristov made a considerable study of the *uran*'s of the Kazak Great Orda, and it may be clearly seen from his data that *uran*'s were not limited to any one level in the tribal genealogical system. Indeed, it is possible to locate on the tribal genealogy, which he also collected, the name groups

employing the *uran*'s which he mentions. The *uran* Bakhtiar was used generally by the Great Orda as well as by the Dzhalair, a subdivision of the Great Orda six levels down from the founder, and by the Dulat, four levels farther down in the genealogy in a line collateral to that of the Dzhalair. The Kangly had two *uran*'s, one unique to that group, another shared with the Chanshkly. Aristov's data show *uran*'s to have been used by groups at five different levels in the tribal genealogy. In the case of the Dulat, reported to use Bakhtiar as an *uran*, each of its four subdivisions used its own group name as an *uran:* Botpai, Chimyr, Seikym, and Dzhanys. In a number of instances the chief and his "clique" were said to use a different *uran* from that of the rest of his followers.[54] It would appear from this that *uran*'s were not a function of any particular level in the tribal genealogical scheme but were used by any group or groups which had occasion to fight together.

DESCENT AND INHERITANCE

The Kazaks were patrilineal in descent. The tribal genealogy and all the genealogical groups, from the Kazak nation down to and including the family, were patrilineally oriented. It is also clear that an individual retained throughout his life affiliation with the groups into which he had been born. An individual might take up residence with an unrelated group, but he could not transfer his *uru* affiliations.[55] If a child residing with the mother's group were murdered, it was the father's group which claimed the blood money.[56] In case of divorce, a daughter might accompany her mother, but she could not marry back into her father's group.[57] Conversely, an individual taking up residence with an alien group was free to marry into that group.[58] However, after the first generation of residence and intermarriage into an alien group, there appears to have been some blurring of the line of descent. No information is available concerning the number of generations required for the process, but there is evidence that in the course of time the descendants of alien slaves became incorporated into the kin groups which their ancestors had served as slaves.[59]

Although Kazak society was essentially patrilineal, it was apparently possible for descent to pass through a female link, for Dingelstedt reported that the child of an unmarried girl could inherit from its maternal grandfather.[60] This would seldom occur, however. Most Kazak girls were married shortly after puberty, and, in any event, chastity in a bride was so highly valued that if a girl should become pregnant, the child would usually be disposed of.[61] There is one clear-cut instance in which maternal descent is counted. There was a class stratification of sorts among the Kazaks. Those who could trace descent from some illustrious ancestor were known as "white bone," while the rest of the population belonged to the class of "black bone." Insofar as aristocratic birth was meaningful to the Kazaks, an individual whose mother was also a "white bone" enjoyed a higher status, that of sultan, than one who could trace an aristocratic genealogy only through his father.[62] A woman of the "white bone" might not marry a man of the "black bone."[63]

The case of the "white bone" indicates that descent is traced not only in the male line but in the female line as well. Otherwise there would not be a difference

in status between the individual whose mother was a "white bone" and the one whose mother was a "black bone." We do not have information as to whether, in general practice, marriage was forbidden with certain relatives related through females of the paternal line as well as with an extensive number of patrilineal relatives. The example of the "white bone"—analogous to the seyyids and *sâddti masâwi* of the Hazaras—in which class status was transmitted through the mother as well as through the father, suggests that the Kazaks, like the medieval Mongols, were asymmetrically ambilineal rather than rigidly patrilineal.

In inheritance, a woman received her share of the family property in the form of dowry. This was normally combined with the property brought to the marriage by the husband and formed the basis of the family property which would be transmitted in time to their children. Recognition of the woman's interest in the dowry brought by her in marriage is indicated in the case of plural marriage. As Levshin wrote, prudent husbands never confused the livestock of their respective wives in the same herd, for the property of a woman went to her own children and not to other children of her husband.[64]

MARRIAGE

In marriage, the Kazaks were exogamous. Since their tribal genealogy included the whole Kazak nation, the exogamic bar could not include all those believing themselves descended from a common ancestor. Like the Mongols of Iran described by Rashid ed-Din, the Kazaks had a fixed exogamic point within the tribal genealogy—an ancestor whose descendants might not marry among themselves—and permitted marriage with more distant kin. The genealogical position of this arbitrary point varied according to region and to period. The point most frequently reported for the nineteenth century was that of seven generations; that is, two people could not marry if, in tracing back their respective family genealogies, they found a common ancestor in the paternal line within seven generations. In some places the point might be ten generations back, in others only three or four.[65] The lowering of the bar to permit marriage at the fourth or third degree appears to have been due to Muslim influence. Having become adjusted to marriage with such close paternal relatives, it was comparatively easy to accept the marriage of those related by the two degrees preferred by Islam, i.e., the marriage of first cousins.[66]

The Kazak rules of exogamy were clearly based on degree of genealogical relationship. But, since only the members of the "white bone" kept written genealogies, while the average Kazak tribesman was usually unable to remember the names of his ancestors for more than three or four generations back, the tribal genealogy was used as a basis for determining the propriety of a marriage. Those tribal subdivisions which had a traditional common ancestor not far removed did not intermarry.[67] Samoylovich was told by an informant belonging to the Kipchak tribe, which is one of the four major branches of the Middle Orda, that the group at the third level was the effective unit of exogamy, counting the lineage as the first level and the Kipchak tribe as the fifth and highest level below the Orda.[68]

On the other hand, a group of alien origin which had taken over the name of the adoptive group would, for a time at least, remember its separate origin to the extent of permitting marriage with other subdivisions of the adoptive parental group. Rudenko cites as an example of this the Argyn, which became a subdivision of the Naiman tribe and Karatai subtribe but permitted marriage with other subdivisions of the Karatai.[69]

On the death of her husband a woman normally married a member of her husband's family, usually a brother, although a father's brother or other collateral relative, on occasion even a stepson, might become husband of the widow, guardian of her children, and custodian of the family property.[70] A man might marry two sisters in succession, but the Kazaks prohibited several types of marriage practiced by the medieval Mongols. A man could not marry two sisters simultaneously, nor could he inherit his father's widow. Father and son might not marry mother and daughter. In some districts two brothers might not marry sisters, although it was permitted elsewhere,[71] and Hudson's informants were familiar with this last practice.[72]

KINSHIP TERMINOLOGY

Kazak kinship terms are available from several sources, two of which will be presented here. One series was obtained by Hudson in 1936 from an informant belonging to a branch of the Small Orda in the southern Urals. The second, more limited, series was obtained by Rudenko in 1927 from informants of the Naiman tribe of the Middle Orda.[73] The terms from the two sources are listed in separate columns in Table 9.

The terminology system in many respects is like that of the Hazara and medieval Mongols. There are elementary isolating terms for all the primary relationships except elder sister and for a considerable number of other relationships—patrilineal, matrilineal, and affinal.

The Kazaks, like the medieval Mongols, distinguish relative age within generation but have elementary terms for older and younger siblings only. Compound descriptive terms are employed for older and younger sons and daughters, as among the medieval Mongols. Unlike the latter, the Kazaks also employ compound terms for father's older and younger siblings. A single term, *apa* or *ana*, refers to both elder sister and father's sister.

For one relationship, that of younger sister, there are different terms according to the sex of the speaker. This distinction has not been reported elsewhere in Central Asia. The omission may result from the fact that most kinship terms have been obtained from male informants, who may not have thought to give the female equivalent. On the other hand, the one case, *siŋli*, is said to be of foreign origin; its use may reflect only a sex difference in borrowing.

The Kazaks have a classificatory terminology for paternal descendant and collateral relatives which is based on degree of relationship (see Table 10). *Nemere* is applied to paternal relatives who are two "links" removed from ego or his direct lineal ascendants. The sons of male *nemere* were *shibere*—three links removed. More

TABLE 9

KAZAK KINSHIP TERMS

Relationship	Hudson	Rudenko
Fa	*eke*	*ake*
Mo	*sheshe*	*sheshe*
ElBr	*agha*	*aga* (also FaYoBr)
YoBr	*ini*	*yny*
ElSi	*apa* (also FaFaSi?)	*ana* (also FaSi)
YoSi	*qaryndas* (m.sp.), *sinli* (w.sp.)	*karyndas*
So	*ul*	*ul*
ElSo	*ulken bala*	
YoSo	*kishi bala*	
Da	*qyz*	*kyz*
FaFa	*ata* (also FaFaBr, HuFaFa)	*ata, ul ake*
FaFaFa		*ul ata*
FaFaFaFa		*tub ata*
FaMo	*ezhe*	*azhe*
	keri sheshe	*ulu sheshe*
FaElBr	*nemere ata*	*ul'ken aga*
FaYoBr	*nemere agha*	
FaSi	*nemere apa*	
BrCh, FaBrCh, FaFaBrCh, SoCh	*nemere*	
BrCh, BrSoCh		*nemere*
BrSoSo	*shybere*	
Kin	*tuysqan*	*tuysqan*
SiCh, DaCh, FaSiCh, BrDaSo	*zhiyen*	*zhien* (SiCh only)
BrChDa, SiChCh, FaFaSiCh, MoFaBrCh, MoFaSiCh	*qudandaly*	
FaMoBr, FaMoSi, MoFaBr, MoFaSi, MoMoBr, MoMoSi, MoBrCh	*naghashy*	
MoFa	*naghashy ata*	*nagashy ata*
MoFaFa		*nagashy ul ata*
MoMo	*naghashy sheshe*	*nagashy azhe*
MoElBr	*naghashy agha*	
MoYoBr	*naghashy ini*	
MoSi	*naghashy apa*	
MoSiCh	*bole*	
Hu	*er*	
	bay	
Wi	*eyel*	
	qatyn	*katyn*
HuFa, WiFa	*qayyn ata*	*kain ata* (WiFa only)
HuMo	*qayyn ana*	
HuFaMo, WiFaElBrWi	*ene*	
HuElBr, WiFaYoBr, WiElBr	*qayynagha*	*kain aga* (WiElBr only)
HuYoBr, WiFaBrSo	*qayyn*	
HuElSi, WiElSi	*qayyn biyke*	*kain bike* (WiElSi only)
HuYoSi	*biykesh*	
WiMo	*qayyn ene*	*kain ene*
WiYoBr, WiYoSi	*baldyz*	*baldyz*
WiFaFa	*uly ata*	
WiFaMo	*uly ene*	
WiFaElBr	*ulken ata*	
SoWi, YoBrWi	*kelin*	*kelin*
DaHu, YoSiHu	*kuyeu*	*kuyeu*
DaHuFa, SoWiFa	*quda*	
DaHuMo, SoWiMo	*qudaghay*	
DaHuBr, SoWiBr	*quda bala*	
DaHuSi, SoWiSi	*qudasha*	

TABLE 9—*Continued*

Relationship	Hudson	Rudenko
ElBrWi, WiFaYoBrWi, WiFaBrDa	*zhenge*	*zhesyr*
YoBrWi	*kelınshek*	
ElSiHu	*zhezde*	*zhesde*
YoSiHu	*badzha*	
Stepfather	*ögey ake*	
Stepmother	*ogey sheshe*	
Stepson	*ogey ul*	
Stepdaughter	*ögey qyz*	

distant paternal collateral relatives were referred to as *tuuysqan*. There is some indication that, in the twentieth century, *shibere* were being absorbed into *tuuysqan*. In this usage of *nemere*, *shibere*, and *tuuysqan* we appear to have a type of classification of paternal relatives based on degree of distance of relationship which was hinted at in the *uye-ḥaya* phrase of the medieval Mongols and which we shall find more fully developed among the eastern Mongols. The pattern of Table 10 has suggested the term "stairstep" for this type of terminology. Hudson's informant volunteered the information that one could not marry any *nemere* or *shibere* relative; this suggests an exogamic bar restricted to second or third cousins such as we shall encounter among some of the modern Mongols.

The Kazaks have reciprocal terms, *zhiyen* and *naghashy*, which, in general, correspond to the Hazara Mongol *jei'a* and *naghchi* and the medieval Mongol *je'e* and *naḥacu*. However, *zhiyen* is applied to "daughter's children" and *naghashy* to "mother's mother's sister," in addition to the relationships normally included in the "sister's child–mother's brother" category. Since Hudson's informant was a young man, it is possible that his recollection was unsure. On the other hand, since little has been written about the mother's brother–sister's child relationship among the Kazaks, it is possible that the reciprocal responsibilities and rights were weakly developed, at least in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The use of *zhiyen* reported by Hudson fits into a pattern in which *zhiyen* refers to close relatives through females, whereas *qudandaly*, built on the root *quda*, meaning "child's spouse's father," refers to more distant relatives through females. In the usage as stated, *qudandaly* refers both to maternal relatives and to relatives through females in the paternal line. The emphasis in the usage of the two terms is on degree of distance of relationship rather than on line of descent.

For affinal relatives, *qayyn* serves as a qualifier in compound terms denoting relatives of both husband and wife. In many cases a man employs special terms in referring to his wife's relatives, whereas a wife employs the same terms as her husband in referring to comparable affinal relatives. There are several special terms worthy of note. *Bola*, meaning "mother's sister's children," is a term which we have already encountered in the same sense among the Hazara Mongols and which we shall encounter again among other modern Mongol peoples. Younger sister's hus-

band is also singled out for a special term, *badzha*, cognates of which are found among the Hazaras and other modern Mongol peoples. Wife's younger siblings are encompassed in *baldys* without regard to sex, and in *kelin* and *kuyeu* the spouses of children and younger siblings are classed according to sex and juniority to the speaker rather than to generation.[74] The concept of seniority, which cuts across generation lines, is indicated in the terms *zhenge* (Small Orda) and *zhesyr* (Middle Orda).

The Kazaks were concerned with relative age within a generation, with degree of distance of relationship, and with seniority. They distinguished between paternal, maternal, and affinal relatives. Female relatives in the paternal line and those related through females in the paternal line were set apart from maternal relatives where the relationship was fairly close. More distant relatives related through females in the paternal line were classed with equally distant maternal relatives.

TABLE 10

KAZAK "STAIRSTEP" SYSTEM



Relatives through females, whether related paternally, maternally, or affinally, disappear from the kinship terminology and presumably from the functioning kinship system, beyond a comparatively few degrees.

Among paternal male relatives the kinship relationship was extended much further. The degree of relationship was expressed in what we have called the "stairstep" type of terminology. *Tuuysqan* referred to paternal male relatives beyond those for which there were specific kinship terms—perhaps all those included in the Naiman's *süök*, i.e., those descended from a common ancestor seven generations back. Rudenko wrote that more distant generations were designated by the name of the ancestor.[75]

SUMMARY

The social structure of the nineteenth-century Kazaks does not appear to differ in any significant respect from that of the medieval Mongols. The Kazak tribal genealogy was more extensive than that of the thirteenth-century Mongols of the *Secret History* but less so than that of the fourteenth-century Mongols whose history

was recorded by Rashid ed-Din. Descent was patrilineal, but it was possible for the line of descent to pass through a female link, and among the "white bone," the aristocrats, both paternal and maternal descent were counted in establishing the social status of the offspring. Individuals retained, throughout life, affiliations with the groups into which they were born. In the course of several generations, however, an alien individual or group tended to become completely assimilated into the host kinship group.

The groups at the various tribal genealogical levels had names, and these name groups tended to be political units. There is some indication that the tribal genealogy and the names of groups might change in adjustment to the less ephemeral of the political realignments. The groups corresponding to the higher levels of the tribal genealogy were territorial. The small residential units, the camps, migrated within the territory of the smallest group having territoriality. As in the case of the political organization, there is some suggestion that when a group moved into the territory of another group and remained there, the tribal genealogy eventually became adjusted to this change. There appears to have been a strong cultural impulse toward a correlation between tribal genealogical social, political, and territorial groups, a correlation which was never fully achieved because of the great mobility of the pastoral nomads.

The Hazara Mongols did not have group symbols, while data on medieval Mongol symbols are limited. For the Kazaks, however, it is possible to identify certain symbols—property marks and war cries—as belonging to groups at several genealogical levels or to individuals who were leaders of such groups.

The Kazaks showed considerable variability in the exogamic restrictions on marriage, with the taboo on marriage ranging from that between any two people descended patrilineally from a common ancestor less than ten generations back to permitted marriage between the children of brothers. The extreme lowering of the exogamic bar appears to have been due to Islamic influence.

Flexibility is marked in Kazak structure. Political organization and territoriality show considerable fluidity, which is reflected in the tribal genealogy. There was flexibility in the rules of exogamy, not within a given group at a given period, but from period to period within that same group. And, although the society was strongly patrilineal, a female link in the line of descent was permitted on certain occasions.

CHAPTER VI

THE MODERN MONGOLS

WHEN we turn to the Mongols in eastern Central Asia, we find that their social history followed a somewhat different course from that in western Central Asia. Among the medieval Mongols the period of imperial conquest resulted in a shuffling of traditional territorial kin groups. In the ensuing period there was a tendency for the descendants of Chinggis Khan's family to assume the status of a hereditary nobility, the members of which ruled over the tribesmen in a feudal relationship of lord and vassal. This trend toward feudalism, the germs of which were inherent in the military organization of the conquest period, was observable in both the western and the eastern appanages of the Mongol empire. However, the ancestors of the Hazara Mongols, after a period of residence within the appanage of Chagatai, became separated from the Chagataians and enjoyed several centuries of comparative isolation within the central highlands of Afghanistan. There, although the principle of hereditary leadership was retained among some tribes, it became subordinated to the needs of tribesmen who refused to have their freedom curtailed by authoritarian leaders.

The Kazaks traditionally owe their origin as a people to a revolt from Chinggisid leadership and since then have followed the leaders of their choice, regardless of ancestry. The fact that the Kazaks, like the Hazara Mongols, were comparatively isolated appears to be relevant to the course they followed. The Mongols in Iran were not long in becoming completely Iranicized. The Uzbegs, tribal kinsmen of the Kazaks, who remained in Turkestan while the Kazaks spread over the steppes to the north, became Iranicized more gradually and served as feudal outposts of Iran in the southern steppes. Although Russians first came into contact with Kazaks in western Siberia at the end of the sixteenth century, Russian expansion did not strongly impinge on the Central Asian steppeland of the Kazaks until the end of the eighteenth century, and Russian political authority was not established over the area until the second half of the nineteenth century. The Kazaks were also some distance removed from the center of Mongol power in Mongolia; indeed, the western appanages became independent of the Mongol *khaghan* within a generation after their establishment.

In Mongolia the remembered glories of Chinggis Khan's empire were stronger. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries there appears to have been a fluctuation between a breaking-up of the component parts of the feudal organization into independent tribal segments and attempts to form new tribal confederations in the hope of restoring Mongolia to its former greatness.

Left to their own devices, the Mongols of eastern Central Asia might have reverted to a flexible tribal genealogical pattern in much the same way as did the Kazaks and Hazara Mongols. Two momentous cultural events occurred, however, to change the course of development of the social structure. First, at the end of the sixteenth century Lamaist Buddhism was introduced from Tibet into Mongolia, with an ultimate pervasive influence on Mongol social structure, economy, and cultural attitudes. Second, not long before the halfway mark of the seventeenth century the Manchus, assisted by Mongol cavalry, conquered China, and their leaders, asserting themselves as successors to Chinggis Khan, gradually brought most of the Mongol tribes under the authority of the Manchu-Chinese empire. Both these external events had the effect of hindering such tribal cultural readjustments as those made by the Kazaks and Hazara Mongols.[1]

Mongol tribal culture is not so well documented for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as is that of the Turko-Mongol Kazaks. Therefore, in our attempt to discover what happened to the tribal structure in Mongolia under Lamaist and Manchu influence, we shall draw on two monographs which have become available recently. One, by Vreeland, presents remarkably full data on the Khalkha, Chahar, and Dagor Mongols.[2] The second, by Aberle, is primarily concerned with the kinship system of the Kalmuk Mongols.[3] The data contained in these two volumes were obtained from Mongol émigrés to the United States. Vreeland worked over a considerable period of time with one representative of each of the three tribes studied.[4] Aberle had less than two weeks' time to spend with the several Kalmuk informants whom he interviewed.[5] The conditions under which the material was obtained thus necessarily limit the amount and type of information available.

THE KHALKHA MONGOLS

HISTORY

The Khalkha Mongols are the dominant tribal group in Outer Mongolia. They emerged as a name group after the fall of the Mongol empire established by Chinggis Khan, as a consequence of the territorial amalgamation of fragments of a number of different tribes, some of them non-Mongol in origin, who had been brought into the Mongol orbit during the imperial period.[6] Historical references to the Khalkhas during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries indicate a fluidity of political organization similar to that described for the nineteenth-century Kazaks.[7] In the seventeenth century the Khalkhas supported the Manchus in their bid for empire and thereafter became notable vassals of the Manchus. The latter, by establishing a system of indirect control through hereditary Khalkha princes, weighted the balance on the side of feudalism and a hereditary class system and so led to the destruction of some of the old tribal flexibility. Chinese administration after 1912 was similar to that of the Manchus, although more formally organized.[8]

In the eighteenth century some Chinese towns were established within the Khalkha domain, as well as a number of Buddhist monasteries.[9] The Khalkhas remained

nomadic pastoralists, however, into the twentieth century; such agriculture as was practiced was casual, sporadic, and limited to a few families.[10]

The Khalkha informant interviewed by Vreeland was born into a poor family of herdsmen of the Jassakhtu Khan Aimak.[11] At the age of five (in 1899) he was discovered to be a reincarnation of the Dilowa Lama and was thereupon taken to reside at one of the large Buddhist temples in western Outer Mongolia. His family followed him to the temple territory, away from their kin.[12] Thus the informant's experience as a participant in kin relationships cannot be regarded as typical. On the other hand, as a scholar and administrator he had an opportunity to learn, through reading and observation, many of the details of social organization which might be unfamiliar to the usual tribesman.

ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION

The Khalkhas as of 1912 were divided into four territorial administrative units called *aimak*.[13] Each *aimak* in turn was subdivided into a number of territorial-administrative units known as *husuu* ("banners"), with a range of from nineteen to twenty-four banners in each *aimak*. One of the *aimak*'s also included eight temple territories. Each banner was governed by a *jasak*, a hereditary prince who traced his descent from the family of Chinggis Khan. All the banners of an *aimak* were joined in a league under a chief elected in rotation from among the banner *jasak*.[14] Some of the temple territories were under banner administration. Others, of which that of Vreeland's informant was one, were administrative equivalents of banners, within the league.

For information concerning administrative subdivisions below the banner level, we are dependent on that provided by the informant for his own Narobanchin Temple Territory. This may have been uncharacteristic; the temple territory had been created from contiguous portions of two banners and, in addition, had attracted scattered families from other banners. There were no nobles in the territory.[15] The Narobanchin Temple Territory had a civil administration headed by an appointive official. The population was divided administratively into two main units, called East and West, respectively, although the informant stated that they were not geographical entities. Each of these in turn was subdivided into groups of about sixteen families under an elective *daraga*, "leader of ten households." The families in charge of a given *daraga* were not localized.[16]

The Narobanchin territory appears to have been roughly the size of the territory of the smallest Kazak group having territoriality, within which small residential camp groups migrated according to season. Since the Khalkhas, like the Kazaks, were pastoral nomads, we would not expect localization of smaller administrative groups within the territory. However, the smallest Kazak territorial unit was a pseudo-kin group, whereas the Narobanchin territory was not. Whether the members of some of the regular *aimak*'s and banners had a tradition of kinship through descent from a common ancestor we do not know. Such a tradition may have been absent, for, although these administrative units seem to have been based on earlier

segmented tribal subdivisions, the emergence of feudalistic class distinctions may have prevented a return to the pre-Mongol empire attitude that tribal groups should also be kin groups.[17]

Even within the temple territory, however, there is a hint that some administrative units may once have been kin groups. A son was always under the same *daraga* as his father;[18] since the *daraga* was elected, he may actually have been the leader of a kin group. The appointive officers of the civil administration had paternalistic functions similar to those described for territorial-administrative–kin group leaders among the Hazaras: "if an incompetent girl were left as legitimate heir of a family's property, and was unmarried, a suitable man would be found to marry her and care for her animals."[19] "In cases of desertion, non-support, or poverty, the yaaman assigned families to assist the needy individual or family. In custom, certain kinsmen were expected to care for needy relatives, but in the few cases where these failed to assume their responsibility, the yaaman forced them to assume it; if there were no close relatives, the yaaman assigned non-relatives to the task."[20]

KIN ORGANIZATION

As for kin groups proper, there are indications that kin ties have weakened among the Khalkhas within comparatively recent times. "Before 1910, fathers made a point of telling their sons how they were related to various other families; after that the practice fell into disuse, and by 1920 most persons had difficulty in tracing their patrilineal connections in their own generation beyond 1st and 2nd cousins."[21]

Formerly the term *obok* referred to the surname among the Khalkhas, and all people sharing a common surname considered themselves descended patrilineally from a common ancestor. But by 1920 "the surname had practically disappeared in Outer Mongolia, and the term *omok* was little used."[22] Presumably the practice of using surnames was a result of Manchu-Chinese influence. All the nobles had the surname Borjigit,[23] which was the name of Chinggis Khan's tribal kin segment. One would like to know whether other surnames were also derived from the names of tribal genealogical groups existing at the time the practice was adopted.

The basic social unit among the Khalkhas, as among the other Central Asian peoples we have considered, was the joint family. Division of the family property might be made at any time after a son reached maturity, depending on the decision of the father. One son was expected to remain permanently with his father and, on the death of the latter, would receive the paternal share of the family property, a somewhat larger share than that of his brothers. The other sons might remain indefinitely in the paternal camp, or a son might, at any time after marriage, ask for his share of the property and move off, either to set up a new camp or to join one already established. However, "it was considered a good thing for a father and his sons to continue living together in the same camp indefinitely, regardless of whether the property had been divided or not; in some cases the division might be delayed for many years."[24] The chief reasons for leaving the paternal camp were the usual

ones for Central Asian pastoral nomads: grazing needs and dissensions within the family.

We have no way of knowing what percentage of the camps were composed of patrilineally related families. The camp was an economic unit, requiring a certain amount of manpower for herding and other activities. These labor requirements set a minimum to the number of nuclear families which might camp together, while the requirements of pasturing the flocks set a maximum.[25] Consequently, a family with few sons might find it necessary to join forces with unrelated families.

The term for relatives was *törel*. This was applied to the largest group which could trace descent from a common ancestor; for example, all the nobles were *törel*, for they had written genealogies tracing their descent from the family of Chinggis Khan. *Törel* was also used to refer to a sliding lineage, that is, to those individuals patrilineally related within a specific number of degrees, ascending, descending, and collateral, to ego. In a third usage, *törel* referred to any relative, whether the link relative be male or female.[26]

MARRIAGE

In marriage practice, exogamy was based on genealogical relationship. It was forbidden to marry any member of one's patrilineal *törel*, however this was reckoned.

Since the nobles in the banners remained törel to each other indefinitely, marriage between any two persons of noble birth was prohibited. For commoners, exogamy was extended either to the traditional limits of the törel, or as far as relationship could actually be traced short of these limits. Most families of the Narobanchin territory found it difficult or impossible to trace their patrilineal connections beyond 2nd cousins, and the limit of exogamic extension appears to have been correspondingly contracted.[27]

Marriage was forbidden not only with anyone related in the paternal line but also with certain relatives related through a female. Among all Khalkha groups, marriage with a first cousin was prohibited, whether it be the child of father's sister or mother's brother or sister. Most of the Khalkhas disapproved of marriage with second cousins, although the marriage of second cousins descended from two sisters was not considered to be so objectionable as that between the descendants of a brother and sister. Among some groups marriage of second cousins related through a female was permissible, in some cases even desirable. The marriage of third cousins related through a female was entirely permissible among all groups.[28]

This asymmetrical ambilineality is to be found in other aspects of Khalkha social organization. If a family had no sons, it might adopt a daughter's husband. In this event, the groom joined his wife in her father's encampment and after the death of the father the daughter became titular head of the family and manager of the property. The children of the marriage belonged to her family line, and marriage was forbidden between her descendants and those of her paternal relatives. One such marriage was reported in which a father, very fond of his daughter and wishing to keep her with him, adopted the son-in-law, despite the fact that he also had a son.[29]

Although noble families did not enter the names of their daughters in the genealogical records, the noble woman raised the social status of the family into which she

married.[30] This is somewhat analogous to the Kazak situation, in which an individual whose mother was a "white bone" enjoyed higher status than one who could trace white-bone descent only through his father. The Khalkhas differed from the Kazaks, however, in that all Khalkha nobles were patrilineal kin and therefore were required to marry commoners, whereas the Kazak white bone preferred marriage within the aristocratic group.

In any class among the Khalkhas, a woman received on marriage her share of the family property in the form of dowry. This was usually less than the share received by her brother, but she had the right, if she and her husband lost their flocks and the husband's family was unable to help the couple, to ask for material assistance from her father or father's brother.[31]

SUMMARY

Among the Khalkhas of the twentieth century the tribal genealogical kin pattern appears to have fallen into decay. There was little correspondence between administrative units, territorial or residential units, and kin groupings, although appointive civil officials had taken over paternalistic functions associated with leaders of tribal genealogical groups in other Central Asian societies, and the *daraga*, the official at the lowest administrative level, appears to have been the head of a kin group. Extended kin ties became weaker within the twentieth century, and, in general, exogamous bars were lowered for lack of any device—whether tribal genealogy or surname —which would enable the Khalkha commoner to identify distant kin.

Only the hereditary nobility maintained extensive written genealogies, which set them apart as a separate class. The noble genealogy, instead of fixing the relationship of one tribal segment to another, fixed gradations of rank within the noble class according to the directness of the line of descent from Chinggis Khan or members of the great emperor's family.

At the base of the Khalkha social structure, however, the joint family remained strong, as did a sense of responsibility among a number of kin extending beyond the joint family.

KINSHIP TERMINOLOGY[32]

The Khalkhas had elementary terms for all the primary relationships except that of younger sister, which was designated by a compound term. Like the Kazaks and the medieval Mongols, the Khalkhas distinguished relative age within generation; they went beyond the Kazaks in making a clear distinction between senior and junior collateral lines. Whereas the Kazaks tended to classify relatives through females in accordance with the degree of distance of relationship, the Khalkhas were more concerned with line of relationship and so distinguished between maternal relatives and those related through females in the paternal line. Like the Kazaks, the Khalkhas had a much more extensive number of terms for paternal relationships than for relationships through females.

The "stairstep" type of terminology encountered among the Kazaks was much more fully developed among the Khalkhas. Whereas the Kazaks had only two terms,

nemere and *shibere*, to denote distance of relationship of descendant and collateral relatives, the Khalkhas had no less than five—*aca*, *üyeeld*, *hayaald*, *üyincir*, and *hayincir*. A diagram of this system is shown in Table 11. It is based on a composite of kinship terms employed in the Narobanchin territory and in two adjacent Khalkha *aimak*'s and so must be considered as representing an ideal rather than the everyday usage of kinship terms.

The descendants of the *hayincir* were known as *töreliin üye*, a term analogous both in usage and in origin to the Kazak *tuuysquan*. Both are built on the root words, in Mongol and Turkic, respectively, meaning "to be born."[33] All the relatives comprised in this scheme constituted the *törel*—paternal kin related through descent from a common ancestor five generations back. Among those Khalkha commoners who employed all the *uye-haya* terms, this five-generation *törel* represented the exogamous kin unit whose members were forbidden to intermarry. This *törel* is what we have called a "sliding lineage." Ego's *hayincir* of his own generation did not belong to the *törel* of his son. With each succeeding generation *hayincir* kin were dropped from the periphery of the *törel*, while new *aca* and *üyeeld* were added from within.

THE CHAHAR MONGOLS

HISTORY

Like the Khalkhas of Outer Mongolia, the Chahar Mongols, who reside in Inner Mongolia, came into being as a name group after the time of Chinggis Khan. During the sixteenth century they were divided into a multiplicity of khanates. In the early part of the seventeenth century they united under one leader in an attempt to found a new Mongol empire. When the Manchus were rising to power, other Mongol tribes in Inner Mongolia supported the Manchus against the Chahars, with the result that the Chahars were defeated.[34] As a consequence of their unsuccessful resistance, the Chahars were treated as conquered subjects of the Manchus, and their hereditary nobility was suppressed. Their proximity to China facilitated Manchu surveillance, and in the twentieth century there was an ever increasing flow of Chinese agricultural colonists into the Chahar area.

Vreeland's Chahar informant was born in 1921 in a village not far northwest of Peking. In the region where he lived, most of the Chahars had, by 1930, become village-dwelling pastoralists, who supplemented the insufficient products of their livestock with rents paid by Chinese tenant farmers and goods purchased from itinerant Chinese traders or from the markets of nearby Chinese towns. Various members of the informant's family held official positions in the Manchu and Chinese governments, and his grandfather owned the only commercial factory in the area.[35] The informant's early education was Chinese rather than Mongol. Thus he belonged to a highly Sinicized family in a detribalized area.

ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION

In the seventeenth century, at the time the Chahar Mongols were brought into the Manchu empire, they constituted a single *aimak*, divided into eight territorial

TABLE 11

IDEALIZED DIAGRAM OF KHALKHA "STAIRSTEP" TERMINOLOGY
(After Vreeland)



"banners," *husuu*. These eight banners were incorporated into the Manchu empire as territorial-administrative units under appointive rather than hereditary chiefs. Later, four new territorial-administrative units, called *süreg*, "pastures," to care for the herds of the Manchu empire, were formed out of parts of the populations and territories of the original eight banners.[36] Until nearly 1930 all land belonged to the banner or pasture. Mongol occupants had the right of usufruct only, even of house sites, while Chinese farmers were required to pay rent for their fields to the banner or pasture administration.[37]

Vreeland's Chahar informant belonged to one of the pastures, the Taibas Pasture. This was subdivided into five banners. Four of these bore the names of the original banners from which they had been drawn and were known as "mare" banners. The fifth, created after the establishment of the pasture and drawn from the four mare banners, was known as the "gelding" banner and had a low status. These five pasture banners were administrative units, under appointive officials. They also were territorial units, although their boundaries were not formally marked.[38] The pasture banners, in turn, were subdivided into smaller administrative units under "leaders of ten," *daraga*.

As in the case of the Khalkhas, there is no indication in the data that either the Chahar *aimak* or the banners or pastures were regarded as kin groups. Indeed, the old Gül Cagaan banner appears to have been formed from fragments of six different tribes, three of which—Borjigit, Orianhan, and Jercid—are named in the thirteenth-century *Secret History*, while a fourth—Hangin—is noted in the seventeenth-century account of Sanang Setsen.[39] Each of these six name groups became a *torel* in the Gül Cagaan banner. However, the Chahar informant believed that when the pasture banners were created, each pasture banner was drawn from a single *törel*—kin group—in the parent banner and that the Gül Cagaan pasture banner was formed from his own Hangin *torel*.[10] As late as 1930, there was a tendency for members of a *torel* to settle near one another. The Hangin family occupied three adjacent villages within the pasture banner territory,[41] and within the informant's village the Hangin households clustered in the center of the village, although not always in adjacent dwellings.[42]

Under Manchu-Chinese administration, neither the village nor the kin group seems to have constituted a political unit. The families of the pasture banner were organized under appointive officials called "leaders of ten," *daraga*, but there is no indication that the *daraga*ships followed kin lines.[43]

KINSHIP

The kin groups did, however, have an informal organization of their own. The base of the Chahar kin structure, as among all the previous groups studied, was the extended joint patrilocal family. The informant's family, probably unusually large because unusually prosperous, consisted of his grandfather with his third wife; his grandfather's only son and his wife and children; his grandfather's elder brother's wife and three of her five sons, the eldest of which had a wife and two children. Each

nuclear family had a separate room within the family compound, but meals for this extended family were prepared from a common food supply in one kitchen. The senior male was head of the family. This position passed in turn from the grandfather's elder brother to the grandfather, to the informant's father, then to the grandfather's brother's eldest son.[44]

Family property remained undivided as long as possible. The line of inheritance was first to sons; lacking sons, to father or brothers; to father's brother or brother's son; and, finally, failing any close patrilineal relatives, to more distant kin. "A man's törel (patrilineal descent group) had prior claim and anyone who could be counted in the most extended portion of this group, had a right to inherit in default of closer kinsmen."[45]

The term *törel,* "kin," was applied to all persons believing themselves descended patrilineally from a common ancestor. Where the line of descent could be traced, they were close kin, *oir törel;* if the relationship was based on tradition, they were distant kin, *hol törel.* The latter were distinguished by a common surname.

Within the *törel*—we are not told whether near or distant—an influential male member might rise to a position of informal leadership. Formerly the *törel* are said to have kept records, presumably genealogical ones.[46] *Törel* membership involved certain mutual obligations and rights:

> All törel relatives had a customary, traditional obligation to help each other in time of need, but in practice, one went first to close friends, who might or might not be törel relatives; failing close friends, one went to the törel with whom social contact had not been as close, but this was done only as a last resort. Socially distant kinsmen hesitated to admit to each other that they were having trouble, since they competed with each other for political and wealth status. . . .
>
> Customary obligations between kinsmen were generally recognized, however, and if one family failed to offer or to ask help of its kinsmen, the gusaidaa as head of the banner [appointive head of the pasture-banner], or the amban as head of the Pasture, could exert pressure to this end.[47]

This quotation suggests that, although kin ties had become weakened, the tradition of kin obligations was still present. Close friends would be fellow villagers, who, given the village structure, might or might not be kin. Apparently the situation in the Chahar village was similar to that described for the Hazara Mongol village. Where several kin groups occupied one village, the village acquired some of the attributes of a kin group. Concerning this, Vreeland writes: "Property disputes were usually settled by villagers—i.e. by prominent elders and close friends, including törel relatives; if these could not reach a settlement, more distant törel relatives were called in; as a last resort, the matter was brought before the civil authorities."[48]

Thus beneath the alien administrative structure imposed by the Manchus and Chinese, the blurred outlines of a curtailed tribal genealogical structure are to be discerned. At the base was the joint extended family household; above this, related families tended to cluster together within the village; the village, although not composed entirely of related families, had many of the informal paternal-political functions associated with the Hazara Mongol kin village and the Kazak kin winter-

quarters camp. Above the village, kin tended to be localized in adjacent villages, and this extended kin group had an informal organization, often with an unofficial leader, and definite obligations toward its members. Although kin responsibility had obviously become weakened under the influence of external cultural forces, extended kin solidarity remained the ideal pattern.

RELIGIOUS CULTS

The several levels of the Chahar structure, whether they were kin groups or not, had religious symbols and functions. Religious-social ceremonies were conducted at regular intervals for the pasture as a whole, for each pasture banner, by *törel* kin groups, by groups of families within the village, and by individual family households. Less regularly, ceremonies to insure good pasturage were conducted for the village group.

At the pasture level, there was an annual festival, at which religious services were followed by social entertainment, held at the large Buddhist temple under the administrative control of the pasture. Each pasture banner had a small temple, containing its guardian deity, at which an annual service was held, and one or more shrines (*oboo*), at which several rituals were performed each year. Men living outside the territory of their banners returned to the home banner for two of these annual ceremonies.

Each *törel* also had an *oboo* at which ceremonies were held. There were two such *oboo* near the informant's village, one belonging to the Hangin *torel*, the other to the Borjigit. Some kin groups in the pasture had formerly lived farther south, in pastures that had been colonized by the Chinese. These kin groups returned to their traditional *oboo* in Chinese territory for their *törel* sacrifices. It was possible to move such an *oboo*, but there appears to have been a feeling against such a transfer, quite apart from the considerable expense involved.

Some villages had small shrines, usually situated at a spring or well near the village, where sacrifices were made to the Lord of the Earth to assure good pastures.[49] And, finally, each household held a monthly religious service conducted by a Buddhist lama and two annual ceremonies to which friends were invited.[50]

Most of these ceremonies appear to have had some sort of territorial association, an association which is most striking in the cases of the banner and *törel oboo* sacrifices. The religious cults had political associations at the upper levels of the structure, kin associations at the lower.

MARRIAGE

Traditionally, marriage among the Chahars was forbidden between any members of the same *törel*, no matter how distant. However, the informant expressed the belief that members of the same *törel* might marry if the relationship was more distant than five degrees of collaterality, and he cited a case in which such a marriage had been considered.[51] Among the Chahars the use of a kin group surname after the Chinese fashion seems for the most part to have prevented the dropping of the exogamous bar to the level of known kin, as happened among the Khalkha com-

moners, although the idea that rules should be based on degree of relationship had not completely disappeared.

In regard to the marriage of individuals related through a female link, it was theoretically possible for the children of two sisters to marry or even for a man to marry his mother's brother's daughter. Marriage with a father's sister's daughter was definitely forbidden, probably because of the special relationship of responsibility which a Mongol man has toward his father's sister and father's sister's daughter. Despite the theoretical possibility of marriage with first cousins other than mother's brother's daughter, in actual practice it was felt that all first cousins were too close for marriage. However, distance of residence was a factor. If first cousins lived far away, marriage might be possible, whereas it would never be permitted if the cousins lived near enough for frequent social contact.[52]

There was some preference for the marriage of two closely related women—either two sisters or a woman and her brother's daughter—into the same extended family,[53] presumably so that they might have companionship in an alien household. This is reminiscent of medieval Mongol practice.

As among the Khalkhas, a woman inherited family property in the form of dowry and was entitled to such assistance as she might require after marriage from her brother. On rare occasions, if a father had no sons or for other reasons wished to keep his daughter at home, he might "hire" a son-in-law. Such a son-in-law might later contract a normal patrilocal marriage, but the first wife remained in her paternal home, and her sons were regarded as members of her father's line and inherited his property.[54] Thus the Chahar Mongols, although they were patrilineally oriented, had the same kind of asymmetrical ambilineality in marriage restrictions and descent that we have already encountered among the medieval Mongols, the Kazaks, and the Khalkha Mongols.

KINSHIP TERMINOLOGY

The Chahar system of kinship terminology is essentially like that of the Khalkhas.[55] It is less extensive; in the "stairstep" classification of paternal relatives the term *hayincir* is lacking from the *aca, uyeeld, hayaald, üyincir* series, so that only five collateral lines are included instead of six. This apparent contraction may be due to the fact that the Khalkha series represented a composite of terms employed by three different Khalkha groups and was obtained from an older informant, whereas the Chahar series represented the terms remembered by a comparatively young man as having been employed in one Chahar group. On the other hand, the contraction may reflect a decay in the system.

The Chahar terminology system had two characteristics which were not reported for the Khalkhas, although they may have been present. The Chahars distinguished terminologically three lines of maternal relatives: mother's relatives; father's mother's relatives; and father's father's mother's relatives. Second, a Chahar woman normally employed the same terms as did her husband when referring to his relatives, whereas a man used distinct terms in referring to his wife's relatives. A tendency in this direction has already been noted among the Kazaks.

THE DAGORS

ORIGINS AND HISTORY

The Dagor Mongols are found in northern Manchuria, along the Amur and Nonni River valleys. Little is known about their early history. The name "Dagor" is not found in early Mongol documents, and there is nothing in their culture or tradition to associate them with the Mongol empire except for one obscure report that they claimed descent from Habto Hasar, brother of Chinggis Khan, or from followers of Habto Hasar. The Dagors first appear in history early in the seventeenth century, when they were dwelling in the Amur River Valley. Late in that century a majority of them moved south to the Nonni, where the largest number of Dagors are found today. Ethnically they represent a blend of Mongol and Tungusic elements, and their language, which has been described as "archaic" Mongol, contains many Manchu terms.[56] It seems very possible that, long after the Mongols proper had moved out onto the steppes and established their empire, the ancestors of the Dagors remained in the south Siberian woodlands; that into the seventeenth century they may have been simple hunters and herders, formed into small tribal groups, and in general not very different in culture from the Mongols described in the early pages of the *Secret History*.

The ancestors of the Dagors were probably in close contact with Tungusic peoples in the Amur region; either there or after their descent to the Nonni, a Tungusic element became incorporated into the Dagor group. In Manchuria the Dagors became subject to strong cultural influence from their Manchu neighbors, as is clearly indicated by present Dagor culture.

Under the Manchu empire the Dagors were incorporated gradually into the empire as conscripts in military banners. They appear to have had no feudal nobility comparable to that which developed in other parts of Central Asia under the Mongol empire, and their culture seems to have been less influenced by Manchu political and Chinese commercial activities than that of the Khalkhas and Chahars. Instead, the main path of cultural diffusion appears to have been from Manchu peasant to Dagor tribesman and peasant rather than from Manchu government to Mongol prince or administrative official. Chinese cultural elements seem to have entered Dagor culture by way of Manchu village neighbors rather than directly from Chinese merchants, although some Chinese trading towns are to be found on the Nonni. Lamaist Buddhism did not reach the Dagors. The Dagors show strong Manchu influence in their economy. They are sedentary village-dwelling farmers; they raise pigs and chickens as well as horses and cattle and have given up sheep.

Under the Manchu empire, the Dagors, like the Khalkhas and Chahars, were organized into banners, but here the administrative similarity ends. In northern Manchuria the banner organization does not seem to have been based on existing tribal groupings. Rather, the banner appears to have been an artificial organization which included both Dagor Mongols and Tungusic Solons and was headed by a general, usually a Manchu, whose chief duties were to see that the annual tribute in furs was paid and that conscriptees appeared for their military service.[57] There

were no administrative subdivisions between the banner and the village. After 1912 the area was organized into a Chinese provincial system of administration which ignored the pattern of Dagor social structure.

We may therefore turn at once to the unofficial structuring of Dagor society. Our data are derived from Vreeland, whose Dagor informant was born in 1919 to well-to-do farmers in a village on the Nonni River. He remained in his natal village until the age of thirteen; later, whether student, government official, or teacher, he returned home at regular intervals.[58]

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

The basis of Dagor social structure was the patrilineal, patrilocal joint family: "When the family became too large for the house, or family disputes became unresolvable, new households were formed by budding—i.e. one or more married sons moved out of the parental household with their wives and children."[59] Ideally a new house was provided for the newly formed family next door to the parental household. However, since the expense of building a new house was considerable, a father might purchase for his son an available house in another compound. In such a case the distance between the parental household and that of its offshoot depended on the availability of dwellings. By strong preference, they were in as close physical proximity as possible and faced on the same village street.[60]

Beyond the household, but within the village, there were clusters of families related within five or six generations who had a particular feeling of solidarity. This solidarity group was comparable in size and degree of relationship to the Khalkha patrilineal *törel*, although the Dagors had no special term for the group.[61] Virtually all the families in the village considered themselves descended from a common ancestor, and it was this patrilineal kin group (*mokon*) which set the pattern of the village structure. The village was a political unit; its affairs were managed by an informal council of elders and an informally chosen headman, analogous to the *rish safit* and headman of the Hazara Mongol village. The village owned its territory in common. Any family might build a house on an unused site or cultivate unused land and, by so doing, established right of usufruct for as long as it continued to make use of the land. If a house or field were abandoned, however, another family might take it over.[62]

The informant's village was one of seven villages of the Onon kin group said to have been founded by seven brothers who had come into the Botaha area on the Nonni River some three hundred years earlier. The inhabitants of each of these villages believed themselves to be descended from one of the seven brothers; the informant expressed the belief that the original villages had been formed by close kin solidarity groups such as those described as existing within the modern village. The villages were ranked in seniority according to the relative age of the traditional founding brother, and the senior village kept genealogical records for the whole group. Every three or four years representatives of the several villages met in the senior village to bring the records up to date.[63] The seven related Onon villages had

no formal political organization. However, they had a social solidarity which "in terms of social control exerted strong pressure for conformity to accepted standards of behavior. There was a saying that if a person misbehaved in one of these villages, the word would spread in short order, and the 'seven Onon mokon would shake!' "[64] Six of the seven villages were clustered along the central sector of the Nonni River Valley; the seventh, apparently the last to be founded, stood some distance to the north.[65]

The related families of the seven villages all bore the surname Onon, derived from the name of the Onon River in Mongolia. There were also other Onon villages in the area, mostly situated near the seven villages, but the informant was not sure whether there was any tradition of kinship between these and the cluster of seven villages to which he belonged.[66] In another context, however, he gave evidence pointing to a tradition of such common descent.

All the families bearing the name Onon were regarded as belonging to one *hala*. The *hala* was the exogamous unit, and the ancestor cult indicated a belief in the common descent of all *hala* members. The souls of men who had lived good lives were believed to go to heaven after death, where they became gods, *barkan*. Almost all families kept pictures of certain *barkan*, but these were very generalized ancestors, belonging to "everyone." In addition to these, each segment of the patrilineal descent group had a cluster of *ongor*, "ancestral spirits," headed by a *hojoor*, "founder."

> The informant believes that originally his own hala . . . possessed only one group of ongor and one hojoor, and that as the surname group expanded and was divided up into numerous local mokon [village kin groups], each mokon adopted subsequent ancestral spirits for their own ongor and hojoor; as the mokon expanded and became subdivided into clusters of close kinsmen, the process of proliferating the ongor was repeated, so that eventually various segments of the mokon had their own ongor and hojoor. All of the separate groups of ongor were believed to be patrilineally descended from common ancestral spirits, in the same way that the various segments of the kin group with which they are associated were patrilineally descended from a common ancestor.[67]

In the Dagor ancestor cult we find an ideal tribal genealogy, with kin groups branching off at several generation levels from the original kin group. The *hala* is the largest group believing itself descended from a common ancestor. With the exception of the *hala*, all are actual kin groups, with the lines of relationship documented by written genealogies. It is very possible that the *hala* is also an actual kin group, in which the feeling of relationship has become indistinct through distance from the common ancestor and lack of reinforcement by political solidarity. The *hala*, then, is, by tradition, a common descent group. Below the *hala*, patrilineal kinship is strongly emphasized, with groups at several genealogical levels of kinship: the seven villages, the village, the group of families within the villages related within five or six generations, and the extended family household.

These kin groups tend to be localized. The village is a territorial kin group, although some outsiders may be permitted to reside there; and, within the village,

closely related families occupy adjacent dwellings whenever possible. The villages of each *hala* tend to be clustered together in one locality, although occasionally the continuity is broken by the intrusion of a village from another *hala*. Six of the seven Onon villages were adjacent to one another.[68]

The only political entity is the village, and even at this level the administrative organization is informal. At the levels of close kin and seven villages there is a feeling of social solidarity which achieves conformity of the group to its established customs without formal machinery. Only at the *hala* level is there lacking even quasi-political social solidarity.

MARRIAGE

The *hala* was the exogamous unit; marriage was forbidden between any individuals of the same surname. In addition, marriage between the children of two sisters was prohibited, and that between the offspring of brother and sister was discouraged. There was no objection to marriage between the grandchildren of brother and sister, and the Dagors strongly preferred marriages between great-grandchildren of brother and sister.[69] The Dagors did not permit the main line of descent or the inheritance of property to pass through a female link.[70]

COMPARISONS

Of the Mongol and Turko-Mongols studied thus far, Dagor social structure seems to resemble most those of the Hazara Mongols and of the early medieval Mongols. The resemblance to the Hazara Mongols is presumably due to the fact that both Dagors and Hazaras are sedentary village-dwelling cultivators. Whereas among pastoral nomads the economy limits the size of the residential unit and hence the size of the kin group within which there is close social and economic co-operation, the agricultural village permits the development of a strong co-operative pattern among a considerably larger aggregation of kinsmen.

The Dagors enjoyed a free land situation, so that, as kin groups increased in size, branching families could establish themselves near the parent group. This situation permitted a rough localization of kin groups above the village level, whereas grazing requirements among the pastoral nomads called for a migratory circuit which did not favor territoriality except for comparatively large tribal segments.

The Dagors are reminiscent of the early medieval Mongols in their interest in the genealogical relationships of a limited kin group. The Dagor *hala* is probably not very different in size from the pre-Chinggisid Mongol tribe, which, as the *Secret History* shows, was the largest group to keep a genealogy. The extensive tribal genealogy of the fourteenth-century Mongols and of the Kazaks appears to be a later development. Also, it seems probable that the early Mongol tribe may not have been politically organized, for in the *Secret History* no khan of the Mongols is mentioned before Ḥabul-ḳahan, great-grandfather of Chinggis Khan.[71] Thus there is the possibility that, in the lack of political organization at the *hala* level, the Dagors may resemble the early Mongol tribe before the Mongols became a political force in Central Asia.

It is, of course, impossible at this date to obtain a very full picture of pre-Chinggisid Mongol social structure. Perhaps the nearest recent approximation might have been found among horse-breeding Tungus tribes in southern Siberia. The fact that *obok* structure has considerable flexibility makes the reconstruction more difficult, as do the facts that the medieval Mongols had undergone the transition from simple tribe to empire leaders when their traditions were first recorded and that all the modern Mongol or Turko-Mongol tribes have been influenced by various vicissitudes of history.

The Dagors appear to have passed directly from a simple tribal stage analogous to that of the early medieval Mongols into that of settled agricultural communities. The Manchu-Chinese administrative policy under which a Manchu general dealt directly with the village community may have prevented a normal development of political organization at the seven village and *hala* levels. On the other hand, the adoption of written genealogies and the development of an extensive ancestor cult, both presumably under Chinese influence, favored the retention of an informal tribal genealogical structure. The adoption of agriculture from the Manchus encouraged the formation of village communities, which brought together into co-operative residential units larger kin segments than would have been possible among nomads.

KINSHIP TERMINOLOGY

Dagor kinship terminology[72] contains a number of Manchu terms and some Chinese. However, it has many affinities with the terminologies of the Chahars, Khalkhas, and Kazaks. There are elementary terms for all the primary relationships except younger sister, which, as among the Khalkhas and Chahars, is distinguished from younger brother by means of a modifier. Like the Kazaks, Khalkhas, and Chahars, the Dagors distinguish between older and younger siblings of ego and ego's father. They go beyond this in making a terminological distinction between older and younger sisters of the father and older and younger brothers and sisters of the mother. This is characteristic of Manchu terminology, which also distinguishes the relative age of father's father's siblings.[73]

The Dagors recognize six collateral lines of paternal relatives but place greater emphasis on generation terms than do the other Central Asian peoples studied. As among the Khalkhas, the Dagors have denotative terms for relationships in six collateral lines in ego's generation, two of which, *wiyel* and *kayal*, are cognates of *uye* and *haya*. However, Dagor usage differs from that of the other Central Asians in that the "stairstep" pattern is not found among the descendants of these cousins. Instead, it appears in an abbreviated form among collaterals of senior generations (see Table 12). The general pattern suggests that of a "sliding lineage" similar to that found among the other Central Asian groups, but Dagor terminology differs from that of the others in that terms for descendant generations specify only generation and line of collaterality, although degree of distance can usually be inferred from the terms. The terms for "grandchildren" (*omolo*) and "great-grandchildren" (*domolo*) of ego and his brothers and sisters are classed according to generation only.

Neither line of descent nor sex is indicated. These two terms are found among both Manchu and Tungus, but both these peoples distinguish by means of modifiers between lineal and collateral descendants and between the offspring of male and female lineal descendants.[74] It is possible that the Dagors have analogous modifying terms but that the Dagor informant had had no opportunity to become acquainted with them.

Hazara Mongols, Kazaks, Khalkhas, and Chahars all had special terms —cognates of the medieval Mongol *naḥacu*—for "mother's brother" and his descendants, and

TABLE 12*

DAGOR TERMINOLOGY FOR MATERNAL MALE RELATIVES



* After Vreeland, pp. 223*a*, 320. The letter "t." is an abbreviation of *tursen*, "born." In the terms for collateral relatives of the generation of ego and ego's father, only those for relatives senior to ego (*aha*) and to ego's father (*şiyhe ecig*) are included. Kinsmen younger than father are referred to as *susu;* those junior to ego are *dew*

most of the modern peoples had separate terms for "father's sister's children." The Dagors do not make such a distinction. A single term (*taar aha*) refers both to father's sister's son and to mother's brother's son, and another term (*taar juy*) to the grandchildren of these relatives. Some of the Tungus class father's sister's and mother's brother's children under the same terms, but these are part of a broader classification based on the principle of seniority rather than on generation.[75] A cognate of the Mongol *bole*, "mother's sister's child," is found in the Dagor *bule aha*, "mother's sister's son."

The Dagor kinship terminology and marriage practices appear to result from a combination of several elements: the adoption of surname exogamy from the

Chinese; the retention or adoption of the practice of marriage between paired kin groups which is characteristic of some of the Tungus tribes;[76] and the generation principle found in Manchu terminology. As a result, Dagor marriage practices and kinship terminology differ somewhat from those of any of their neighbors—Mongols, Manchus, Chinese, and Tungus—although they have elements in common with all these people.

THE KALMUKS

HISTORY

Whereas the Khalkha and Chahar Mongols belong to the group of tribes usually designated as eastern Mongol, the Kalmuks are classed as western Mongol. They are descended, at least in name, from the Oyirat or Oïrat, who dwelt in southern Siberia in the time of Chinggis Khan. From there they moved south and westward into Jungaria, which takes its name from one of the Oirat tribes. Following the breakdown of the Mongol empire the tribes of Jungaria were disunited until the end of the fourteenth century, when a union of four Oirat tribes was formed under a single khan. This union, after initial successes in conquering the tribes of Mongolia, fell apart in the middle of the fifteenth century, and the constituent tribes remained disunited until the beginning of the seventeenth century, when the chief of the Jungar tribe tried to make himself the leader of an Oirat empire. Some groups resisted his authority and migrated from Jungaria. Some of these emigrant groups, after moving first to Siberia, eventually settled along the banks of the lower Volga in southern Russia, where they became known as the "Kalmuks."[77] These Kalmuks increased and multiplied, until the Kalmuk domain as of 1761 was described as numbering a hundred thousand tents scattered over a vast pasturage extending from the river Jaik to the Don and from the Samara on the north to the Terek on the south.[78]

The Kalmuk princes had sworn allegiance to the Russian throne at various times after their settlement in the Volga area, but it was not until 1724 that they recognized Russian rule. In 1771 the khan of the Kalmuks, fearing a Russian curtailment of nomadic freedom, led a considerable body of Kalmuks back to Jungaria. Those dwelling west of the Volga were prevented from crossing the river and remained in the Volga-Don area until 1943, when some escaped to Germany, while others were reportedly resettled in other parts of the Soviet Union.[79]

Information on Kalmuk kinship was obtained from a group which escaped to Germany during World War II and was eventually resettled in the United States. The three informants who gave fullest information were a Buddhist lama, who was sixty-five or seventy years old; a young man of twenty-seven; and a layman of fifty, who had received the training of a lama. All were members of the Baga Dörbed subtribe, which had remained nomadic until the time of the Soviet Revolution.[80]

Although the Kalmuks enjoyed a considerable range of pasture land, Russian agricultural colonists began to settle in the Kalmuk steppes after the establishment of Russian authority over the area. By the middle of the eighteenth century the Kalmuks of the Don and Stavropol Province were living in the vicinity of Russian

or Cossack villages,[81] and in the nineteenth century Russian cities, towns, and colonies came to form a network within the Kalmuk territory.[82] By the time of the Soviet Revolution many of the Kalmuks had become settled agriculturists, although some in the Astrakhan area continued their pastoral nomadic way of life. During the Revolution many of the Kalmuks fought on the side of the White Russian forces and eventually either were annihilated or escaped from the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Russian peasants moved in and appropriated the most fertile of the Kalmuk lands.[83] After 1927, when the Soviets had finally established control over the Kalmuk area, the nomads were subjected to a policy of settlement. Given this long period of Russian influence, Kalmuk social structure might be expected to have undergone changes. We have clues to the earlier structure, however, in the law code which was in force among the Kalmuks into the nineteenth century,[84] as well as in sources of later date.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN THE SEVENTEENTH TO NINETEENTH CENTURIES

In A.D. 1640 princes and nobles of the Kalmuks met in Jungaria with leaders of the Khalkhas and of the Mongols of Kokonor and Siberia to draw up a code which would give the Mongols some solidarity against the rising power of the Manchus. These Mongol-Oirat regulations of 1640 did not remain long in force among the eastern Mongols. Among the Kalmuks, however, this code, with some supplementary articles added by decree in the late seventeenth century, was followed into the nineteenth century. Except for certain parts pertaining to military activities and punishment of crime, the code was recognized by Russian administrative officials as effective for the Kalmuks.

From the regulations of 1640 we learn that Kalmuk households were organized into camps, called *aul* or *khoton*, of closely related families. A cluster of related *khoton*'s formed an *aimak;* a number of *aimak*'s an *otok* or *ulus;* and several *otok*'s a tribe. At the base of the structure was the patrilineal joint family. The *aimak*'s as well as the *khoton*'s or camps appear to have been patrilineally oriented kin groups, for the term "*aimak*-brothers" is used in the sense of relatives, and individuals were forbidden to migrate in camps or *aimak*'s other than their own. To what extent the larger groupings were considered as kin groups is not made clear in the regulations. Not all *aimak*'s and *khoton*'s were kin groups, for one article concerns the formation of new *aimak*'s and *otok*'s from unattached individuals (or nuclear families?) migrating apart from any *khoton*.[85] Land was considered the common property of the *otok*, but within this general area each *aimak* had its established territory within which the camps of the *aimak* migrated.[86]

The political organization followed the lines of the socioterritorial structure. At the head of the tribe was a prince or khan, and each *otok* had a chief. A reference to "the Demchis of 50 Kibitkas [tents]"[87] as responsible for the welfare of the poor and homeless suggests an *aimak* chief. The *khoton* is specified as being a judicial unit.[88] As the residential kin unit, it must have had much more extensive sociopolitical functions than the code indicates.

Our knowledge of the political structure of the Kalmuks may be filled out by information from travelers who visited the Kalmuks in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. From the period of their first settlement on the Volga into the nineteenth century, the whole Kalmuk group in the west seems normally to have had a prince or khan. In theory the khanship passed from father to son, and this line of succession was sometimes followed in practice. In spite of frequent intrigues and armed struggles over the succession to the khanship, the title usually went to some member of a princely family tracing descent from an early khan of the Kalmuks. After the flight of the Kalmuk khan and a large following to Jungaria in 1771 the Kalmuks in southern Russia were governed for thirty years by a council composed of one representative of each of the three tribes, Derbet (Dörbed), Torgot (Torgod), and Koshot.[89] In 1801 the Russian czar appointed as leader of the Kalmuks the chief of a Derbet *aimak* who was not of princely rank.[90]

Within the Kalmuk group, chiefships of the *ulus* (*otok*) were, according to Pallas, apportioned out among the children of the khan.[91] This did not necessarily mean that there was a change in leadership of each *ulus* every time a new khan rose to power but that, in general, the *ulus* chiefs were aristocrats belonging to lines collateral to that of the ruling family.[92] The *aimak* chiefs were apparently not members of the nobility, for the khan appointed by Czar Paul I in 1801 was described as a simple *aimak* chief whom the princely families resented because of his lack of aristocratic birth.[93] The chief of the camp or *khoton* appears to have been a senior male of the extended family group.[94]

POLITICAL AND TERRITORIAL SEGMENTS

By the twentieth century, Kalmuk tribal structure, as described briefly by Aberle, had undergone considerable change, although the modern data may in many cases be used to supplement the earlier information in giving us a fuller understanding of Kalmuk structure. The Kalmuks in the Don region had become sedentary farmers before the Soviet Revolution, and those in the Stavropol area had come to depend more on agriculture than on stockbreeding. Following the Soviet Revolution the nobility was liquidated or driven out of the Kalmuk steppes, and during the 1930's herds were collectivized and nomads settled in villages.[95] In describing Kalmuk tribal structure, Aberle's informants were recalling what they could from the past.

The term *ulus* was applied to the Kalmuks as a people, although there seemed to be some question in the minds of the informants as to whether the Kalmuks on the Don might be regarded as belonging to the same *ulus* as those farther east, since the two groups were territorially separated.[96] This uncertainty on the part of the informants suggests a nebulous feeling that an *ulus* should be a territorial entity. The Kalmuk *ulus* was subdivided into three *nöteg* (*otok*?)—the Dörbed (Derbet), Torgod (Torgot), and Buzava—roughly comparable to the groups described in the earlier literature as "tribes" or "races." The Dörbed were subdivided into two groups, while the Torgod had six similar subdivisions. These subdivisions,

like the parent groups, were referred to as *nöteg*. The lower-level *nöteg*'s were subdivided into *äämag*'s (*aimak*'s), which varied in size from 200 to 5,000 souls,[97] and the *äämag*'s in turn were subdivided into *hotan*'s (*khoton*'s), camps, of families "who live and work together."[98]

It is possible that in earlier times *nöteg* and *ulus* were applied to groups at various levels of the segmentation. *Ulus*, in both medieval and Hazara Mongol usage is a very general term meaning "people," "a large group of people," and the apparent change in Kalmuk usage of the term may reflect a general lack of explicitness rather than a change from one explicit meaning to another. Likewise, from what we know of Mongol and Kazak terminology, it seems probable that *otok* formerly was applied to groups at several levels, just as *noteg* was in more recent times. One of Aberle's informants equated *äämag* with *otok*. The systematic terminology employed in the code of 1640 would appear to be the work of legalists. The only term which seems to have a specific meaning in relation to one of the several levels of segmentation is *hotan* or *khoton*, "camp."

Ulus, *nöteg*, and *äämag*, however they were employed, were territorial units.[99] The *hotan* was a residential group which camped and migrated together within the territory of the *äämag*. But, although the segments at various levels of the structure were political-territorial units, the sense of kinship appears to have been lost. Of the *äämag*, Aberle writes: "According to my informants [it] is not based on kinship. But whatever the basis of membership, it is not simply a matter of happening to reside in a particular district, or on a particular piece of land, but rather a matter of belonging to a particular *äämag*, viewed as a social unit, and not a geographical one—comparable to the difference between *belonging* to a band and *residing* in a country."[100] Even the *hotan*, "camp," was not necessarily a patrilocal kin group: "In some cases a *hotan* may include one or only a few patrilocal extended families, but this is not necessarily the case. A *hotan* may include families affiliated by kinship through females, and may also include families affiliated by friendship and the families of hired laborers."[101]

KINSHIP

The Kalmuks had only three interchangeable terms for patrilineal kin—*törel*, from *tör*, "be born"; *yasun*, "bone"; and *omok* or *obok*—all of which terms we have previously encountered among the eastern Mongols. Within the circle of *törel*, "relatives," the Kalmuks distinguished *üyener-hayanar*, which appears to represent a sliding lineage consisting variously, according to region or time, of a cluster of kin related patrilineally from a common ancestor from four to eight generations back. Those kin beyond the *üyener-hayanar* whose actual genealogical relationship could be traced were regarded as *örehen törel*, "near kin," while those whose kinship was assumed but not readily traceable were termed *hol törel*, "far kin."[102] Until recently, written genealogies were carefully kept, in order that the exogamic bars to marriage of patrilineal kin might be rigorously observed.

The kinship system as described is similar to that of the other Central Asian tribes. Furthermore, *aimak*'s and camps were described as patrilineal kin as well as

political-territorial groups in both the seventeenth and the late eighteenth centuries. Thus we must suppose that the lack of localization of kin groups as described by Aberle's informants is a recent development and that the Kalmuk structure formerly resembled that described for the Kazaks and inferred for the medieval Mongols, in that patrilineal kin groups were also political and territorial or residential units.

However, one must guard against assuming that there was ever a rigid coincidence of the three. We know that the Oirat ancestors of the Kalmuk were caught up in the armies of the Mongol empire and that in the ensuing period there was a fluidity of tribal organization similar to that described for the Kazaks.[103] The pattern of feudal hereditary aristocracy which was present in the medieval period of empire was still present when the Kalmuks entered south Russia. It is possible that in another situation the aristocracy might have become a weak and ineffectual class, as among the Kazaks. Shortly after their arrival on the Volga in the seventeenth century the Kalmuks entered on a period of uneasy vassalage to the Russian government, into which the Kazaks were not drawn until the end of the eighteenth century, and in 1724 the Kalmuks recognized Russian rule,[104] whereas the Kazaks did not do so until well into the nineteenth century. The Russians, by recognizing the authority of the hereditary princes under their policy of indirect rule, presumably strengthened the position of the princely class among the Kalmuks.

Given leadership by a hereditary aristocracy which kept its own genealogy and was more concerned with asserting ties of kinship within its own group than with unaristocratic followers, it is possible that the Kalmuk tribe and *otok-nōteg* may have been from the first primarily political-territorial groups, held together by a sharing of common cause and common territory rather than by belief in descent from a common ancestor.

At lower levels in the tribal structure, the *aimak*'s and *khoton*'s appear to have been kin groups during most of Kalmuk history. The changes which occurred during the nineteenth century as a consequence of Russian colonization in the Kalmuk steppes and more direct Russian administrative interest might be expected to have caused some disturbance of the kin patterning of these groups. However, we suspect that the *aimak*'s and *khoton*'s may always have contained some unrelated families or individuals. Had there been no tendency for individuals or families to leave their own camps or *aimak*'s, there would have been no need for such movement to be forbidden by the regulations of 1640 or for this prohibition to be reaffirmed by decree later in the century.[105] Certainly such movement is recorded for the medieval Mongols in the *Secret History* and for the Kazaks.

Aberle's informants, in describing a Kalmuk camp, stated that it might include, in addition to one or a few extended patrilocal families, some families affiliated by kinship through females, by friendship, or by service as hired laborers.[106] A Kazak camp, although having a basic patrilineal kin orientation, also occasionally included hired servants, relatives through females, or even friends. Aberle's informants described outsiders residing in a Kalmuk camp in terms of their relationship to what must have been a patrilocal kin core. Both Kalmuk and Kazak camps might be

described as having a patrilocal kin core to which other families might become attached on occasion. The difference between the two might be that, whereas the Kazaks and the seventeenth-century Kalmuks regarded the camp as essentially a patrilocal kin camp, in which attached non-kin were either looked on as temporary residents or absorbed into the kin group through intermarriage, the modern Kalmuks, whose tribal genealogical structure had been considerably disrupted by the growth of feudalism and the pressures of Russian colonization, had lost the cultural compulsion to regard the camp as a kin group. Without population statistics, unfortunately not available for any of the Central Asian peoples, we cannot know how great the differences actually were in the proportion of kin and non-kin to be found in the average camp.

We have little data on the modern Kalmuk *aimak* (*äämag*). Among the pastoral nomads of Central Asia the strong tendency toward the geographical clustering of patrilineal kin was opposed by another tendency toward the breaking-away of segments from the parent kin group because of internal frictions or lack of adequate pasturage. Among the Kazaks, who were for the most part illiterate, such emigrant groups became rather quickly absorbed into the host kin group. The fact that the Kalmuks kept written genealogies of family lines might have prevented such ready absorption of immigrant families. This deterrent could result in the *aimak* as described by Aberle as a group having a strong sense of social solidarity while lacking belief in descent from a common ancestor.

THE EXTENDED FAMILY

Even in the twentieth century, however, the base of Kalmuk social structure was the patrilineal, patrilocal, extended, joint family. Because of the unusually large size of the Kalmuk encampments, it was economically possible for the Kalmuk joint family to attain a greater size than elsewhere in Central Asia:

> Ideally it includes as many patrilineally related nuclear families as can live and work together. . . . An extended family may consist of several generations of consanguine male relatives, connected more or less closely by patrilineal descent, together with wives and immature children, and headed by the senior male of the senior family. After marriage a son may demand his share of livestock and move away, but ideally he should remain with his father and brothers. Moving away is a sign of trouble between kin. There is a tendency for extended family herds to be held in common for as long as possible.[107]

That this family group might reach considerable size is indicated by the rules of succession to leadership:

> In an extended family the oldest generation of which is a group of brothers, leadership is vested in the oldest brother, passing to the next oldest on the death of the first, and so on, until each brother has served in order of relative age. Leadership then passes to the second generation—to the oldest son of the oldest brother, second son of the oldest brother, etc., until the second generation of the senior family has been exhausted. It then passes to the oldest son of the second brother, and so on.[108]

Such a rule of succession, however seldom it may have been applicable in recent times, suggests at least the tradition of an ideal extended family large enough to constitute a whole camp.

Groups at the several levels in the Kalmuk social structure had names. The names of the three Kalmuk tribes were recorded by earlier writers as well as by Aberle, and Aberle named the two subdivisions of the Derbet, from which one may infer that the major subdivisions of the other two tribes also had names. The *äämag* also was a named group.[109]

The only references encountered by the present writer to group symbols are certain religious rituals described by Bergmann—a fire ritual and a lamp ritual. These were both clearly family cults; indeed, each household, that is, each nuclear family, celebrated the fire cult in its own tent.[110]

DESCENT AND MARRIAGE

Descent was invariably patrilineal. If a man had no sons, he might adopt a brother's son. In instances where a daughter's husband lived and worked with her family group, property might pass to the daughter and her husband, but descent could not. The children would be regarded as belonging to their father's line, while the mother's line would die out.[111]

Marriage regulations were based on degree of relationship, although the position of the exogamic bar varied among different Kalmuk groups. The Buddhist church prohibited marriage between any two people descended from a common ancestor less than eight generations back, through either male or female links, and careful genealogical records were kept to insure observance of these prohibitions. The Kalmuks in general favored a more extensive patrilineally oriented exogamy. The Buddhist lama himself stated that the Kalmuks forbade marriage between people descended patrilineally from a common ancestor less than fifteen generations removed and between those descended through a female link from a common ancestor less than four generations removed. Marriage was also forbidden with maternal first cousins—the children of sisters—but permitted with more distant maternal relatives. Other informants stated that, among patrilineal relatives, marriage was forbidden with anyone bearing the same *törel* name.[112] The marriage regulations indicate that the Kalmuks were asymmetrically ambilineal rather than rigidly patrilineal, even though the main line of descent could not pass through a female link.

KINSHIP TERMINOLOGY

The Kalmuk kinship terminology is similar to that encountered among the other Central Asian peoples studied.[113] There are isolating terms for all primary relationships. The Kalmuks distinguish the relative age of siblings—though not of father's siblings—and the generation of ascendants and collaterals. Among the terms for descendant lineal and collateral relatives there are traces of what we have called "stairstep" terminology, but this pattern is weakly developed. A distinction is made between maternal relatives and those related through females in the paternal line. As among the other Central Asian peoples, the number of isolating terms for relationships through females in either the paternal or the maternal line is much less extensive than for patrilineal male relationships. A woman tends to employ the same terms as her husband in referring to his relatives, while a man employs distinct terms for his wife's relatives.

CHAPTER VII

COMPARISONS

VARIATIONS IN HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

THE modern Mongol and Turko-Mongol peoples whose social structures have been analyzed in the preceding chapters all appear to have evolved from a similar cultural base. The Hazara Mongols, the Khalkhas, and the Chahars are descended, at least in part, from the medieval Mongols of the *Secret History*, although under the empire many increments from other tribes became attached to the Mongol core. The ancestors of the Kalmuks were neighbors of the Mongol tribe of the *Secret History*, and their history ran parallel to that of the eastern Mongols from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century. Kazak origins may be traced to medieval Mongol tribes, such as the Naimans, and to Turkic tribes whose culture appears to have been similar to that of the Mongols. The Dagors are descended from ancestors whose culture seems to have been very like that of the medieval Mongol tribe as it is described in the early pages of the *Secret History*.

Except for the Dagors, the ancestors of all these peoples were caught up in the vast Mongol empire founded by Chinggis Khan, and so were subject to the exigencies of the imperial military organization. This often had the effect of disrupting and scattering territorial kin groups and favored the development of a feudal aristocratic class holding political-military leadership over the tribes and smaller subdivisions.

In the course of their later history these tribes were subject to different vicissitudes and influences. The Khalkhas, Chahars, and Dagors came under Manchu-Chinese influence, but for each group the influence was different. Among the Khalkhas, indirect rule strengthened the feudal aristocracy; among the Chahars, direct rule and Chinese immigration destroyed the aristocracy and upset the tribal structure; among the Dagors tribal government was supplanted by colonial administration. The Hazaras, moving into southern Asia, were strongly influenced by the culture of their Iranian neighbors but were subject to little external governmental control until the last decades of the nineteenth century. The Kalmuks, after dwelling for several centuries on the borders of Mongolia, moved west and came under Russian influence. Only the Kazaks remained comparatively free from alien cultural influence and political domination until the nineteenth century. In their economy, three of the six modern groups remained pastoral nomads, like their medieval ancestors. The Hazaras and Dagors became village-dwelling cultivators, while the Chahars were in a transitional stage of sedentary pastoralism, dependent on agricultural neighbors.

A comparison of the social structures of these six modern peoples with that of the medieval Mongols should give us some understanding of the nature of *obok* structure and its processes of change. The fact that information for some of the groups refers to the twentieth century, while that for the Kazaks refers principally to the nineteenth century, should not invalidate our conclusions, for we are concerned with process and range of variation rather than with the cultural stage that each group had attained at any particular point in time.

GENEALOGICAL SEGMENTATION

The medieval Mongol social structure followed a pattern in which the whole society was conceived of as descended from a common paternal ancestor and subdivided into groups which originated by the branching-off of two-generation joint families from larger extended family groups. The relationship of these tribal segments to one another was established by tribal genealogies which were transmitted orally from father to son. Although the whole tribe was conceived of as a patrilineal lineage group, this concept did not restrict membership to those who had been born in, or had married into, the group. Unrelated individuals might in time become members of a family, and families and tribal segments might be absorbed into the tribe and given a place in the tribal genealogy if they became permanent residents in the tribal territory and made common cause with their hosts.

Both large and small segments of the tribe were political as well as kin units, in which the functions of the leader represented an extension of those of the family head, the paterfamilias. In addition, the segments were territorial or residential units as far as was possible among pastoralists whose economy required seasonal migrations within a larger region.

The foundation of the tribal genealogical structure was the joint patrilocal family. Although the segments were patrilineally oriented and the names which occurred in the tribal genealogies were normally those of paternal male ancestors, the society was not rigidly patrilineal. When a woman married, she became an integral part of both her husband's household and the larger lineage groups to which he belonged; a woman might become head of the family on the death of her husband. On occasion a woman was accorded a place in the tribal genealogy of her husband's group as ancestress of lines sprung from children sired by other men; and there were instances in which the line of descent was traced through a daughter. The structure thus was asymmetrically ambilineal with a patrilineal bias rather than rigidly patrilineal.

The medieval Mongols were broadly exogamous. During the period described in the early sections of the *Secret History*, marriage within the tribe was not permitted. Later, when the tribe had expanded greatly in numbers and the genealogy extended to include many tribes, marriage was forbidden with anyone related through descent from the common ancestor of the truncated original genealogy of the Mongol tribe. The rules of exogamy were related to degree of distance of relationship, not essentially to group membership.

Among the modern Mongol or Turko-Mongol peoples considered, the tribal gene-

alogical pattern was most strongly developed among the Kazaks. They had a tribal genealogy which included the whole tribe and was as flexible as that of the medieval Mongols in adjustment to population movements. Tribal genealogical segments tended to be political units; political groups which endured for any length of time were incorporated into the tribal genealogy. They were also territorial units insofar as the requirements of nomadic migrations permitted. The feeling that a kin unit should be a territorial unit was sufficiently strong that a permanent shift in territory by a tribal segment was frequently followed by a compensatory adjustment in the tribal genealogy. The Kazaks were asymmetrically ambilineal, and rules of exogamy were based on degree of distance of relationship. In general, however, the Kazaks did not insist on so great a degree of distance as did the medieval Mongols, and those in the south, who had Muslim neighbors, had, by the 1880's, lowered the bar to permit the marriage of third cousins.

EVOLUTION TOWARD FEUDALISM

The modern people most unlike the medieval Mongols in social structure was the Khalkha group, who remained in the homeland of their medieval ancestors. Since our information comes from one probably atypical territory, we cannot know to what extent it is valid for other parts of the area. It would seem, however, that among the Khalkhas there had been a change of emphasis from tribal genealogy to aristocratic family genealogy. The medieval Mongols also kept family genealogies. When the writers of the *Secret History* introduced a new character, they usually traced a brief family genealogy in order to show his relationship to characters already known. The tribal genealogy presented in the first chapter is also the family genealogy of Chinggis Khan, for in its enumeration of the ancestors of the various levels of segments the founder of a collateral line was indicated at each branching, but only the line of Chinggis Khan's family was continued. However, the Khalkhas appear to have been concerned only with family or class genealogies.

The shift away from tribal kin organization toward feudalism was a concomitant of the Mongol empire, when unrelated peoples were brought together under an arbitrarily designated leader in the imperial armies and in the appanages which were assigned to the sons of Chinggis Khan and to other leaders. All the tribes who were involved in the expansion of the Mongols developed such an aristocracy. When the normal pattern of tribal genealogical-territorial-political segments was disturbed, there was a strong tendency for the descendants of Chinggis Khan and his family to cherish their own genealogy rather than that of the tribe. It is probable that successful leaders, or even followers of successful leaders, were fitted into the aristocratic genealogy, just as earlier tribal segments had been fitted into the tribal genealogy.

Among the Khalkhas, encouraged by the policy of indirect rule of the Manchu-Chinese administration, this aristocratic pattern hardened into feudalism. The Khalkha segments of *aimak* and *husuu* appear to be modeled on a former tribal genealogical pattern, but they have become territorial-administrative units, ruled

by hereditary princes. The idea that these units should ideally be kin units and that the leader should be head of the kin group has disappeared. The flexibility of the tribal genealogical scheme has been lost; the boundaries of the territorial-administrative units are rigidly fixed; and the leader is the eldest son of the senior line, whatever his qualifications.

Among the Chahars the hereditary aristocracy was destroyed by the Manchu-Chinese administration, which nevertheless retained the form of the "banner"—the feudal territorial-administrative unit—for its own administrative purposes. The Manchu-Chinese government, in destroying feudalism among the Chahars, did not permit a return to the former tribal genealogical pattern. However, to some extent it did allow kin to follow their own inclinations and settle in the same locality, and even the pressure of Chinese immigration into Chahar territory did not at once destroy the religious association of a kin group with a locality. Manchu-Chinese cultural influence even encouraged retention of non-political kinship ties by offering the models of written genealogies and of surnames for members of common descent groups.

The Kalmuks, by their code of 1640, attempted to fix both a hereditary political leadership and a political-territorial-kin segmentation. Left to their own devices, they probably would have reverted to a tribal genealogical structure like that of the Kazaks. However, the aristocracy was first strengthened by Russian support, then weakened both by the flight of their paramount chief and by the shift of Russian support to a commoner. Finally, the social structure was disturbed by direct Russian political control and Russian immigration into Kalmuk territory. Following these events, the larger segments in the structure became purely territorial units, while the lower segments—the *aămag* and camp—were territorial and residential units. These had a special social solidarity which was not attributed to kinship but which seems derived from the pattern of kinship solidarity. Although the tribal segments acquired the connotation of territorial or residential groups rather than of kin groups, actual kinship ties were reinforced by written family genealogies. Perhaps it was in part the presence of written genealogies which prevented individuals and families from being absorbed as kin into the *ăămag* and camp to which they were attached.

The Kazaks, who were comparatively isolated in Central Asia until the nineteenth century, subject to the control of neither Chinese nor Russian governments, reverted to the old tribal genealogical pattern. The pattern of hereditary aristocratic leaders which developed into feudalism among the Khalkhas did not become fixed among the Kazaks. The descendants of former heroes cherished their genealogies, but they became no more than a class which enjoyed some prestige but no authority as members of the class; the title of *sultan*, theoretically reserved to members of this class, was accorded to any strong leader, whatever his ancestry.

It would appear that the Mongol tribal structure of the imperial period offered two alternative evolutionary directions—one a development of a feudal aristocracy, the pattern of which was present in the empire structure; the other a return to the

classless leadership of kin by kin, characteristic of the pre-empire Mongols. In normal tribal society the tribal genealogy is an extension of the family genealogy; leadership is a function of the territorial or localized kin group. When kin groups are broken and scattered, so that the local or territorial group is no longer a kin group, and other historical factors prevent retention of the tribal genealogical structure, then it is the genealogy of the leader's family that tends to be extended into that of an aristocratic class rather than of the tribe. At the same time, territorial administrative units tend to become more rigid.

The Khalkhas and Kalmuks, encouraged by foreign governments who were more familiar with the pattern of feudalism than with that of tribal kin leadership, followed the first alternative. The Kazaks, left to their own devices, followed the second. The feudal aristocracy of the Chahars was destroyed by the Manchu-Chinese administration, which set up a bureaucracy to take the place of the former tribal government and so also prevented a resumption of the former tribal pattern.

As for the two sedentary tribes, there is no record of the Dagors ever having had a hereditary aristocracy. It is very possible that at the time the ancestral Dagors moved out of the Siberian woodlands into Manchuria they had not yet achieved a tribal political organization—the Mongol tribe did so only a few generations before the time of Chinggis Khan. The "banner" of the Manchu-Chinese administration was an ethnically artificial administrative unit, comprising not only Dagors but Tungus; the Manchu general in charge of the banner dealt directly with the Dagor village. There was no administrative pretense at emulating the segmented structure of the Khalkhas. However, apart from this externally imposed administrative structure, the Dagors had a segmented lineage structure which enjoyed its own informal agencies of social control and in which segments tended to be localized. The essential tribal genealogical pattern appears to have been present. The alien political administration perhaps prevented its full development.

KINSHIP VERSUS TERRITORIALITY AS A UNIFYING FACTOR

For the Hazara Mongols there is little information concerning their social structure prior to the nineteenth century. There are records of hereditary chiefships, but, wherever details are available, the evidence indicates that the position passed to the most able man in the family—whether it be brother, son, nephew, or cousin—and that the main requirements were ability and a large following. This conforms to the medieval Mongol and Kazak pattern. In general, the segmented pattern of tribal genealogical structure pertained among the Hazaras, but the emphasis was on territoriality rather than on genealogical kinship. The functions of the political leader were essentially those of the paterfamilias, and there are suggestions of a traditional belief that the Hazara people were descended from a common ancestor.

In many ways, Hazara structure is the sedentary counterpart of Kazak structure. Among both peoples the whole society was organized according to a pattern in which the segments were structured in a hierarchical order. Political organization, insofar as it existed, followed this hierarchical arrangement. The structure was flexible, per-

mitting realignments of groups within the segmented structure. Among the nomadic Kazaks, kinship and territory were so closely associated that when a tribal kin segment shifted to another territory, it was shortly incorporated into the tribal genealogy of its host group. Among the sedentary Hazaras, sharing of a common territory gave a sense of kinship, even when tribal genealogies were not emphasized. It is possible that the Hazaras had more extensive tribal genealogies than were recorded. The Timuri tribe, the only one for which it was possible to collect genealogies, was of such recent formation that there had been little time to develop a tradition of common ancestry. The Uruzgani, which appear to have been formed as a tribal group only in the nineteenth century, had created the tradition of an ancient founder named Uruzgan.

However, judging from present evidence, it would seem that the Kazak structure was oriented more toward tribal genealogy, the Hazara more toward territoriality. This would seem a logical development. The nomadic Kazaks, scattered in small mobile camps, would have a greater need for a conceptual framework, such as the tribal genealogy, to give some sort of order to their social organization, whereas the settled Hazaras could readily find this order in territorial affiliations. The difference in emphasis appears to be slight. The ancestral Hazaras had much the same background as the ancestral Kazaks; the two peoples were formed from tribal segments that had been caught up in the maelstrom of Mongol conquest, then released to reform their society in comparative isolation. They evolved structural patterns that in outline seem very similar.

The Dagors, on the other hand, appear to have had a less extensive tribal genealogy when they settled in Manchuria; the kin group was smaller but seems to have been made up largely of actual kin. Manchu administration prevented the development of an extensive political-territorial organization and so of expansion of kin segmentation. The adoption of the Chinese use of the surname also would seem to have been a factor in limiting the expansion of the kin group. Kin settled in the same locality whenever possible and maintained an informal segmented organization of social control. Settlement on the land does not appear to have greatly affected the pattern. In fact, it may have served to strengthen kinship ties within the limited group, since it brought together in co-operation larger aggregations of kin than would have been feasible among the nomadic ancestors of the Dagors.

The sedentary Hazaras and Dagors, with a relatively free-land situation to permit expansion, retained the tribal genealogical pattern more fully than did the nomadic Khalkhas and Kalmuks and the sedentary pastoral Chahars. Thus it would appear that settling down on the land did not in itself seriously disrupt the tribal genealogical pattern. Empire and the associated scrambling of kin groups encouraged the development of feudal aristocracy among Khalkhas, Kalmuks, and Chahars. External influences encouraged the hardening of feudalism among the Khalkhas, first fostered and then discouraged feudalism among the Kalmuks, and shattered both tribal genealogical pattern and feudalism among the Chahars.

Even among these three peoples, however, political-territorial segmentation and

concern with family genealogies were not destroyed. The several characteristics of the tribal genealogical pattern became separated. Political-territorial segments, particularly at the upper levels, lost their flexibility and their identity as kin units; genealogical kinship, extending upward from the residential family, continued to operate, often without reference to political-territorial segmentation. The segmented pattern and the concept of genealogical kinship continued to keep their strength. The Kalmuks, despite many disturbances, retained extensive family genealogies which permitted them to observe taboos on marriage with kin up to fifteen degrees removed. The Khalkhas, within recent memory, had kinship terms for relatives belonging to up to six collateral lines. The Chahars, through the institution of the surname, were able to identify any paternal kin, no matter how distant.

PRACTICES FAVORING THE PERSISTENCE OF KIN TIES

Among all the groups studied, the joint family continued to flourish, ranging in size from a three-generation family to one more extensive. Among all, the joint family stood at the center of a larger cluster of kinsmen who had rights and obligations of mutual aid. There were variations in the extent and solidarity of this kin cluster in a society where the tribal genealogical structure was breaking down. Among the Khalkhas of the temple territory the cluster was not extensive, in terms of either mutual aid or marriage regulations. Among the aristocratic class it was all-comprehensive, at least where marriage regulations were concerned. Among both the Chahars and the Kalmuks the number of kin included in the marriage taboos was extensive.

There are two factors which seem to encourage the retention of extensive kin ties: the possession of writing and the practice of employing a surname. The Khalkha aristocracy regularly recorded the births of males in registers kept for the purpose and so were able to trace the ancestry and line of descent of any member of the class. Kalmuk commoners, themselves illiterate, depended on Buddhist priests to keep their family genealogical records. The Chahars, whose society was most disorganized by Manchu-Chinese rule and cultural contacts, had adopted the use of the kin surname—derived from a former tribal or subtribal name—and so were able to maintain extensive exogamy in their marriage regulations. The Dagors had both surname and written genealogies to reinforce an extended kin cluster. Khalkha commoners, after the use of the surname fell out of practice around 1910, seem also to have lost interest in the oral transmission of family genealogies from generation to generation.

The use of written genealogies and of surnames served as aids to memory of kinship relationships and so supported extended kin solidarity or, in the case of the Chahars, extensive exogamous taboos. These devices, however, although they reinforced memory of kinship, gave rigidity to the kinship system. While it was possible for an individual to be adopted into a family and duly recorded in the family genealogy and given the kin group surname, the flexibility of the earlier tribal genealogical structure had been lost. When a Kalmuk family joined an unrelated camp, there was no possibility that its descendants might come to be regarded as fellow

kinsmen of the other families in the camp. When one Dagor family cluster settled in a village some distance away from closely related family clusters, it would represent an anachronism, unrelated to neighboring villages and geographically distant from its recorded kinsmen. Even when memory of kinship is reinforced by written genealogies or surnames, kinship solidarity—the solidarity based on common residence and common cause—tends to be lost. The devices are likely to become artificial props to marriage regulations and little more.

SHIFTS IN RULES OF EXOGAMY

The early medieval Mongols practiced a broad exogamy, forbidding marriage within the tribe. Among the modern Mongols there was considerable variation in the regulation of marriage. The Dagors forbade marriage with anyone of the same surname; and the Chahars, although admitting the possibility of marrying a distant relative of the same surname, strongly preferred surname exogamy. The Kazaks in general practiced a broad exogamy based on tribal genealogical relationship. During the latter part of the nineteenth century, however, there was a gradual lowering of the exogamic bars to permit the marriage of third cousins, particularly in the south, where the Kazaks had Muslim neighbors. The Hazaras, whose ancestors had been converted to Islam, came to accept the marriage of first cousins as desirable. Because marriage regulations among the Central Asian tribes were based on degree of relationship rather than on group membership, it was possible for the Hazaras and for those Kazaks who were converted to Islam to shift from an abhorrence of marriage with close kin to a preference for such marriage without any disturbance to the larger tribal genealogical pattern. In marriage regulations, as in other aspects of the culture, *obok* structure is flexible. The Dagors and Chahars appear to have adopted surname exogamy as a result of Chinese influence. The Hazaras and some of the southern Kazaks exchanged the exogamy of their ancestors for cousin marriage under the influence of Muslim neighbors.

KINSHIP TERMINOLOGIES

A comparison of the kinship terminologies of the modern Central Asian peoples with the medieval Mongol system should give us some idea of the kinship structure of the medieval Mongols and of the changes that have occurred through time and space. In Table 13 are listed all the kinship terms found in the *Secret History*, together with their equivalents among modern Mongol and Turko-Mongol peoples. Presumably not all terms in use in the thirteenth century are recorded in the *Secret History*. Indeed, two terms absent from this work occur so persistently among all the modern peoples studied that we can safely infer their presence in medieval Mongol speech. Therefore, these two—the terms for "mother's sister's children" and for "wife's sister's husband"—have been included in the table. A study of this comparative table shows, first, that a large number of the medieval Mongol terms have cognate forms in the modern Khalkha, Chahar, Kalmuk, and Dagor languages. The Kazaks have analogous Turkic terms. The Hazara terms, many of which are

derived from Persian, Arabic, or Turkic, are not always comparable. Since the Hazara terminology system differs somewhat from that of the others, it will be discussed separately.

The medieval Mongols had elementary denotative terms for all primary relationships, including those of older and younger brothers and sisters; for direct lineal male ascendants through great-great-grandfather; for father's older and younger brothers; and for son's wife and daughter's husband. All the modern groups have replaced some of these elementary terms with compound terms. The relationships for which

TABLE 13

COMPARATIVE TABLE OF CENTRAL ASIAN KINSHIP TERMS

	Secret Hist	Khalkha	Chahar	Kalmuk	Dagor	Kazak	Hazara
Fa..	*ecige*	*eceg*	*eceg*	*ecke*	*eceg*	*eke* (T.)	*pada* (P.), *bábaı* (A.)
Mo.	*eke*	*eke*	*eke*	*eke*	*eke*	*sheshe* (T.)	*ábaı* (T.), *aıka* (M.)
ElBr	*aha*	*aha*	*aha*	*aha*	*aha*	*agha*	
YoBr .	*de'u*	*düü*	*düü*	*düü, kobú'ın*	*dew*	*ini* (T.)	.
ElSi. .	*egeci*	*egci*	*egci*	*ekci*	*egci*	*apa, ana* (T.)	.
YoSi .	*doyi*	*okin-düü*	*düü*	*düü, kuuken*	*wiyen dew*	*qaryndas* (T.)	
So .	*ko'un*	*hüü*	*hüü*	*kobú'ın*	*keku*	*ul* (T.)	*bacha* (P.)
Da..	*okin*	*hüühen*	*hüühen*	*kuuken*	*wiyen*	*quz* (T.)	*dukhtar* (P.)
FaFa, ancestor... .	*ebugan*	*obeg aab*	*obeg aab*	*obeke ecke*	*yeyee* (Ch.), *otacı*	*ata* (T.)	*bábá kúlán* (P.)
FaFaFa...	*elincuk*	*elenc aab*	*elenc aab*	*elenceg ecke*	*law yeyee* (Ch.)	*ul ata* (T.)	*bakul* (T.?)
FaFaFaFa	*borha*	*hulanc aab*	*hulanc aab*	*olancag ecke*	.. ..	*tub ata* (T.)	... .. .
FaElBr...	*ebin*	.	. ..	....	*šiyhe ecig*	*nemere ata* (T.)	
FaYoBr.	*abaha*			. .	*šušu*	*nemere agha* (T.)	
FaBr..	.....	*abaga aha*	*abaga aha*	*abaga*	. .	...	*abgha*
DaCh..	*je, je'e*	*jee*	*jee*	*zee*	*je*	*zhiyen*	*jei'a*
MoBr..	*nahacu*	*nagaca*	*nagc*	*nahaca*	*nawc*	*naghashy*	*nagachı*
MoSiCh.	....	*boli*	*boli*	*bol*	*bule aha*	*bole*	*bola*
link kin .	*uye haya*	*uyeeld, hayaald, uyincir, hayincir*	*uyeeld, hayaald, uyincir*	*uyener-hayanar*	*wiyel, kayal, kancı, hwaram*	*nemere, shibere*	.. ....
Hu	*qu'un, ere*	*ere*	*ere*	*zaluu*	*ere*	*er*	*shauhar* (P.)
Wi...	*gergai, eme, hatun*	*geergii, emegen*	*eme, gatan*	*gergin*	*emeke*	*eyel, qatyn*	*khátun, ayál* (A.)
SoWi	*beri*	*ber*	*ber*	*ber*	*ber*	*kelin* (T.)	*'arus* (A.)
DaHu.	*guregan*	*hürgen*	*hürgen*	*kürgin*	*hurgen*	*kuyeu* (T.)	.... . .
ChSpFa	*huda*	*huda*	*huda*	*hudanar*	*hwad*	*qula*	
ElBrWi...	*bergen*	*bergen*	*bergen*	*(aha) bergen*	*bergen*	*zhenge*	
WiSiHu.. ..	....	*baj*	*baj*	*baza*	*baji*	*badzha*	*bája*

elementary terms have been retained by all the modern peoples are father, mother, elder brother, elder sister, son, daughter, husband, wife, son's wife, and daughter's husband. Except in two cases, that of the Dagor term for "son" and the Kalmuk term for "husband," the modern Mongols have retained cognates of the medieval Mongol terms. The medieval Mongol terms for "younger brother" and "younger sister" were phonetically very similar. This perhaps explains, at least in part, why they have been assimilated into a single term among the modern Mongols and a modifier added to distinguish between the two relationships.

Distinction between older and younger brother of father has been lost by all except the Dagors, who have borrowed a Chinese term for "father's younger brother," and by the Turko-Mongol Kazaks, who employ compound terms for the relationships. The medieval Mongol term *abaḥa*, "father's younger brother," survives among the Khalkhas and Chahars in a compound including *aha*, the term for "elder brother," whereas the Kalmuks designate "father's brother" by the single term *abaga*. Among all three groups—Khalkha, Chahar, and Kalmuk—*abaga* is also employed as a modifier in terms for various paternal collateral relatives. For reference to male lineal ascendants, elementary terms have been replaced by compound terms among all the modern peoples, with two exceptions—the Kazak and Dagor terms for "paternal grandfather."

The impression given by these changes in terminology suggests a tendency toward loss in distinction between elder and younger siblings, a loss which is most pronounced at the parental generation. In addition, there seems to have been a fading-out in the memory of terms for lineal ascendants. The terms *hulanc aab* (Khalkha, Chahar), *olancag ecke* (Kalmuk), and *tub ata* (Kazak) suggest mnemonic devices for remembering terms for relationships which are seldom referred to and for which the original elementary terms have been forgotten.

On the basis of a single usage of *uye haya* in the *Secret History* we cannot know the state of elaboration among the medieval Mongols of the "stairstep" system of terminology which designates degree of distance of relationship. Attempts to reconstruct the form are made difficult by the considerable differences among the modern systems.

The Khalkha "stairstep" terminology is the most elaborately developed; the Chahar terms closely resemble those of the Khalkhas but are less extensive. The Dagors have "stairstep" terms for senior collaterals only; contemporaries and juniors are designated by terms which indicate the distance of the collateral line and the generation and thus are not classed according to the degree of distance of relationship. The Kazaks have a limited "stairstep" system of classification, but this may not be of any great age, for the terms *nemere* and *shibere* are not to be found in Radlov's vast dictionary of Turkic dialects. The Kalmuks employ *üye* in compound terms for collateral relatives descended from a common great-grandfather. One Kalmuk informant expressed the feeling that *hayanar* referred to more distant collaterals than *üyener*, although *hayanar* was used only in the phrase *üyener-hayanar*.[1]

It is very possible that the medieval Mongol *uye ḥaya* was similar in usage to the *üyener-hayanar* of the Kalmuks and that the "stairstep" system of classifying collateral relatives was evolved among the Khalkhas to fix degree of relationship in mind at a time when kinship solidarity was weakening. The medieval Mongols, if one may judge by usage in the *Secret History* and in Rashid ed-Din's *History of the Mongols*, kept track of line and distance of relationship by recalling the family genealogies and so would have had no particular need of special terms for collaterals. Thus the general classificatory term *uye ḥaya* may have been adequate for referring to collaterals. Whatever the reason for the evolution of the "stairstep" terms, the twentieth-century distribution would suggest that the system had been developed and elaborated by the Khalkhas, from which the pattern diffused to the Chahars and Dagors in the east and to the Kazaks in the west. Since the pattern is not found among the Kalmuks, one might infer that it had evolved in Mongolia after the Kalmuks had moved west or at least that it had not become firmly established among the Kalmuks at the time of their migration.

The Khalkha terms for lineal male ascendants—*aca*, *jici*, *oci*, and *huci*—appear also to represent invention and elaboration. No such terms are found in the *Secret History;* the only term encountered there applicable to son's descendants is *uruh un uruḥa*, meaning "descendants," "to the furthest descendants."[2] Since *aca* in the meaning of "son's child" is found among Khalkhas, Chahars, and Kalmuks and a cognate, *aja*, has been reported for the Hazara Mongols as well, one might infer that the medieval Mongols also employed the term. The *jici*, *oci*, and *huci*, however, suggest elaboration of the order of the *uyeeld*, *hayaald*, *uyincir*, and *hayancir* terms of the Khalkha. The Chahars lack the *huci* of the Khalkha series. The Kalmuks not only lack *huci* but have substituted *ziliike* for *oci*. The Dagors employ Manchu terms—*omol* and *domol* in referring to grandchildren and great-grandchildren. No terms comparable to the Khalkha series have been reported for the Kazaks. Phonetically, *jici*, *oci*, and *huci* appear to be elaborations on the theme of *aca*. The distribution would suggest that this series of terms evolved among the Khalkhas and diffused only as far as the Chahars and Kalmuks in Mongolia.

The medieval Mongols had three general terms for paternal kin—*oboh*, *uruh*, and *yasun* ("bone"). These three were used interchangeably, although *oboh* seems to have been employed more frequently in the *Secret History* in reference to a tribal genealogical kin group, while *uruh* was a general term for kin. *Oboh*, in the forms *obok* or *omok*, survives among the Kalmuks in what appears to be the medieval Mongol sense and among the Khalkhas and Chahars, where it has come to mean surname, "family" name. The Dagors employ the Manchu term *hala* in this latter meaning. A cognate of *uruh* is found only among the Kazaks, who employ it in the sense of a tribal genealogical group, for which there is an alternative term, *djuz*. The Kalmuks employ *yasan* in the medieval sense, as do the Kazaks their Turkic equivalent, *suok*. Among the Khalkhas and Chahars *yasa* has come to have the meaning of "aristocratic class." The Kazaks also employ *süök* in the meaning of

"class" but apply it equally to aristocrats, "white bone," and commoners, "black bone."

There appear to have been deviations in the meanings of terms for kin in two directions. In the east *obok* became a surname group, and among the Dagors it was supplanted by a Manchu term. Among the Khalkhas and Kazaks the equivalent terms for "bone"—analogous to the European term "blood"—came to refer to class. The change in meaning of *obok* in the east would appear to be the result of Chinese influence. This inference has corroboration in the fact that when Outer Mongolia was asserting its political independence from China in the early twentieth century, the practice of using a surname and the term *obok* both fell into disuse.[3] The use of "bone" in the meaning of "class" among Khalkhas, Chahars, and Kazaks would appear to represent an internal adjustment to the development of a hereditary class system within the region, although the distribution suggests that diffusion may also have been operative.

All the modern groups except the Dagors had a generalized term for patrilineal kin—*törel* among the Khalkhas, Chahars, and Kalmuks—and the Turkic analogue *tuuysqan* among the Kazaks. *Törel* is a cognate of the medieval Mongol *torugu*, "to be born,"[4] and *tuuysqan* is a cognate of the Turkic *tu*, "to be born."[5] The Dagors appear to have no terms for a common descent group other than the Manchu terms *hala*—"common surname group"—and *mokon*—"common descent village," but *tursen*, "born," is employed as a modifier to designate close kin.[6]

In terms for kin and common descent groups, the Kazaks and Kalmuks follow the medieval practice most closely in meaning. The Khalkha usage of *yasa* appears to be associated with the decay of the tribal kin group structure among that people and the development of a rigid aristocratic class. The use of *obok* among the Khalkhas and Chahars and of *hala* among the Dagors as a surname group suggests that, as the tribal structure decayed, the tribal name came to be emphasized under Chinese influence.

A study of Table 13 shows that a considerable number of the medieval Mongol terms found in the *Secret History* have persisted in the vocabulary and usage of the modern Mongol peoples. The Kazaks, although they speak another language, have Turkic equivalents for all the medieval Mongol terms and in some cases employ cognates of the Mongol. It would appear that Kazak practice, allowing for language differences, conforms most closely to that of the medieval Mongol. The exceptions would seem to be in that of the *uye-ḫaya* pattern, where the Kalmuk usage appears to be more in keeping with the little we know of medieval Mongol practice.

Thus far we have omitted the Hazaras from our discussion of kinship terminology. While both the Kazaks and Hazaras speak non-Mongol languages, the Kazak Turkic terms are regularly equivalent to the Mongol terms. The Hazaras' Persian terms belong not only to a different language family but to a different culture area. The Hazara Mongols, like the peoples of Central Asia, have elementary denotative terms for all the primary relationships. They do not, however, distinguish

between older and younger siblings by means of elementary terms. Relative age within generation is expressed only by qualifying adjectives meaning "older" and "younger," although relative age is of considerable importance in establishing behavior, responsibilities, and inheritance. There is no trace of the "stairstep" terminology in any of its variant forms, although the Hazaras are concerned with degree of distance of relationship. They express the degree not by means of kinship terms but by saying that two people are descended from a common ancestor three, five, or fifteen generations back, as the case may be.

Whereas the Central Asians were terminologically concerned with ancestors and descendants in the male line, the Hazaras have lineal terms for grandparents and grandchildren. No distinction is normally made between father's and mother's parents or between son's and daughter's children, although such a distinction can be made, and frequently is, by means of a qualifying adjective. The behavioral distinction between the two lines would appear to be as great among the Hazaras as among the Central Asians in terms of responsibilities and the reckoning of lines of descent. No comprehensive kinship terminology is available for the Persians or Tajiks from whom the Hazaras acquired much of their vocabulary. As we shall see later, these characteristics of Hazara terminology have much in common with western Eurasia.

However, the Hazaras have retained some medieval Mongol terms or Turkic equivalents of these, which emphasize the importance of the relationships to which they refer. These are the reciprocal terms *jei'a* and *naghchi* and *bola* and *bája*. In Table 6 *jei'a* was given the meanings of "sister's son," "father's sister's son," and "husband's sister's son," because the term was employed in these meanings by the Uruzgani informant in speaking of his own relatives. The medieval Mongol *je'e* was interpreted as meaning "daughter's children" on the basis of the two contexts in which the term was found in the *Secret History*. The modern usages—for Khalkha ("father's sister's children," "sister's children," "daughter's children"); for Chahar and Kalmuk ("father's father's sister's children," "father's sister's children," "sister's children," "daughter's children"); for Dagor ("sister's children"); and for the Kazak cognate *zhiyen* ("father's sister's children," "sister's children," "daughter's children," "brother's daughter's son")—suggest that, in the medieval Mongol usage and perhaps among the Hazara Mongols, *je'e* and its cognates were applied to the offspring of females in the paternal line, toward whom male members of the paternal line had customary obligations. Similarly, it may be inferred from the modern usages that *naḥacu* was applied to any maternal relative who might be called on to play the social role of mother's brother.

The terms *bola* ("mother's sister's child") and *bája* ("wife's sister's husband") denote relationships through two sisters. No information has been encountered concerning the customary behavior of these relatives. The persistence of the terms among all the modern groups studied, including the Kazaks and Hazaras, suggests the presence among Central Asian peoples of a special relationship between sisters which merits further investigation. The Hazara use of *ama* ("brother's daughter,"

"father's sister," "father's sister's daughter"), derived from the Persian version (*'ammah*) of an Arabic root, is more consistent with Central Asian usage than with Arabic usage.

The Hazaras, in adopting Persian speech, have lost some elements characteristic of Central Asian terminology but have retained certain others. It is unfortunate that adequate data are not available on kinship terminology usages for neighboring Iranian-speaking peoples. A comparison of Hazara and Tajik or Persian terminologies should indicate whether the Hazara retentions of Mongol terms persist in spite of Tajik or Persian practice or whether they received support from the Tajik or Persian.

PART III

Obok Structure in Western Eurasia

CHAPTER VIII

SOUTHWEST ASIA: THE BEDOUINS OF ARABIA

THE preceding chapters have been concerned with tribal genealogical structure in Central Asia. Available evidence points to the present or past occurrence of *obok* structure over a much wider part of the Eurasiatic continent. In Southwest Asia the ancient Hebrews had a tribal genealogical organization; the Holy Bible, like the *Secret History* of the Mongols, begins with the traditional genealogies of the people, in which all mankind is traced to the common progenitor, Adam.[1] Among modern settled peoples in the area a limited segmented lineage structure appears to be characteristic of many village communities.[2] A recently published study of Kurds in Iraq shows that segments of this tribal people are in various stages of transition from a tribal genealogical structure to feudalism,[3] and the limited data available indicate that the process of transition to feudalism has been active in many parts of Southwest Asia. Such information as we have suggests that all the fully tribal peoples surviving in the area have *obok* structure. Many of the Afghan tribes still cherish their traditional tribal genealogies,[4] and the tribes of southern Iran have the segmented pattern characteristic of *obok* structure. For the social organization of the Bedouins of Arabia we have comparatively full information.

GENEALOGICAL SEGMENTATION

The nomadic Bedouins, whose tribes range from the empty spaces of southern Sa'udi Arabia northward into Syria, have retained a tribal genealogical structure into the twentieth century. As among the tribes of Central Asia, the Bedouin social structure is based on and derived from the extended joint family. But whereas the Central Asian nomadic tent accommodated only one nuclear family or at most two, the more capacious black tent of the Arab tribesmen affords shelter to a more extensive family group. The Bedouin household normally consisted of a man and his wife, unmarried children, and married sons and their wives and children. The eldest son was expected to remain in the paternal tent after marriage, and it was preferred that the other sons likewise remain. A younger son had a right, however, to ask for his share of the family property and set up a separate household when he married. When the father died, those sons who remained in the paternal tent had the choice of continuing as a joint family under the leadership of the eldest brother or of dividing the family property among them and setting up separate establishments. In this latter event the eldest brother received a larger portion of the family property than was given to a junior brother. Daughters did not inherit, nor did they receive a

dowry from their parents. Unlike daughters among the Central Asian tribes, they had no share in the family property.[5]

Above the family is the lineage (*ahl*)—the group of paternal kin whose relationship can be traced. Among the Arabs there appear to be two types of lineage. One is of the kind which we have termed "sliding lineage" because its composition is based on degree of relationship to a specific individual, and so varies from father to son, cousin to cousin. The sliding lineage of a Bedouin consists of all the male patrilineal descendants of his great-grandfather, down to and including those in the generation of his great-grandsons. Although seven generations altogether are included in this lineage, not all members of the kin group would be living at one time. The *ahl* of a boy would consist chiefly of his ascendants and senior collaterals; that of an old man, of descendants and junior collaterals. Horizontally, the *ahl* did not go beyond the second collateral line—second cousins.[6] This sliding lineage had well-defined functions. If a man were murdered, for example, it was the obligation of members of the victim's *ahl* to track down the murderer and take revenge.[7]

In addition to the sliding lineage, the Bedouins had another kind of lineage, also called *ahl*, which was similar to that found among the Hazara Mongols. In one such *ahl* described by Jaussen, the lineage comprised twelve households which were descended from a common ancestor eight generations back.[8]

Such a lineage might in time multiply and split up to produce a series of similar lineages and in due time might grow into a tribe consisting of a number of genealogical segments. Jaussen recounts the traditional genealogy of one such tribe, the Saher, also sometimes called the Toueiq or Dahamsheh. A Bedouin named Dahamsh, or Saher, coming from the east, found an infant abandoned in the desert and brought the child up. His foster father called him *loqtat Dahamsh*, "Dahamsh's foundling," but this name was later replaced by "Toueiq," hence the two names of the tribe. Toueiq in due time was given Dahamsh's daughter in marriage, and from this union were born four sons: Gofel, Sehim, Gebein, and Qe'oud, founding ancestors of the four subtribes of the Toueiq tribe. Sehim and Qe'oud did not prosper; at the time the tribal genealogy was obtained, the Sehim subtribe numbered only twelve households and that of Qe'oud, four households. Gofel's descendants, on the other hand, were so numerous that in time they subdivided into the two sections of 'Amer and Heqish, while the descendants of Gebein produced three sections, Hamed, El-Meteirat, and Faiz[9] (see Table 14).

Among the Bedouins, as among the Kazaks, "tribal" genealogies extended above the tribal level. The tribes found in a large part of the Arabian Peninsula are known as the 'Aneze. These are divided into two main groups, the northern and southern 'Aneze: "All the tribes and all the clans of the 'Aneze, in the opinion of the Rwala, have a common father and therefore are their *beni al'-amm*, their paternal cousins."[10] But the tribal genealogy of the Bedouins extends even beyond the 'Aneze group, extensive as this is. According to one tribal genealogy of the northern 'Aneze (see Table 15), 'Annaz, their progenitor, was brother to Ma'az, founding ancestor of the el-Maazy or Beni Atieh, a constellation of tribes dwelling in Jordan near the Sinai Peninsula.[11]

Just as the Bedouins show a preoccupation with tribal genealogies similar to that of the Kazaks, so these genealogies are as idealistic as those of the Central Asian people in the upper levels of the genealogical pyramid. The sliding lineage normally represents a true kin group, as does the larger fixed lineage. Segments at higher levels in the tribal genealogy appear to be as subject to fission and fusion as are those of the Kazaks.

Two recent genealogies of the northern 'Aneze differ slightly from each other,[12] and a comparison of tribal lists made at different earlier periods indicates considerable changes within the groups. Burckhardt, writing in 1810, reported that the Dana Bishr were divided into two main branches whose names were completely different from those recorded by Ashkenazi. Furthermore, whereas Ashkenazi listed the el-Fed'an, as-Sba'a, and Wuld Sleyman as segments of one branch, Burckhardt attributed the first two named to one branch, the third segment to the second branch.[13]

TABLE 14

GENEALOGY OF THE SAHER TRIBE*



* From Jaussen, *Coutumes des Arabes au pays de Moab*, p. 108.

Doughty, who traveled in Arabia in the 1870's, listed thirteen segments of the Bishr; he was told that the Rwala were reckoned as a part of the Bishr, although they had formerly been incorporated with the el Jellàs, a major group which comprised sixteen segments.[14] By the 1920's, according to Musil, Âl Ğlâs (el Jellàs) had become an alternative name for the Rwala.[15] It is clear that tribal genealogies among the Bedouins were as fluid as among the Kazaks. For the Bedouins we have more information on the process of change.

PROCESS OF REALIGNMENT

The northern movement of 'Aneze segments from Nejd into what is now northern Sa'udi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and even southwestern Iran, encouraged fragmentation and realignment of pseudo-kin groups.[16] The fortunes of war caused realignments and changes of status; Lady Anne Blunt wrote of the Hesenneh (Hsene, Hósenny) as "once the leading tribe of the Anazeh, but destroyed by a combination against them, about sixty years ago."[17] The allies who brought about the downfall of this segment were the Rwala, who were their close tribal kin, and the as-Sba'a, who belonged to another branch of the 'Aneze.

TABLE 15*

GENEALOGY OF THE NORTHERN 'ANEZE TRIBES



* From Ashkenazi, "The 'Anazah Tribes," p. 227.

Small segments shifted their allegiance and affiliations from one chief to another, attaching themselves to the leader who had achieved success in war and a reputation for generosity and justice in peace. Should he suffer reverses, the families of his following would shift their allegiance to some other leader.[18] Jaussen described the case of one man who, regarding the chief of the group as oppressive, led a number of his fellow tribesmen to break away and form a separate group. Other families joined his following until he became the chief of a considerable tribal segment which bore his name.[19] In another instance, a fraction which had broken away from its tribal segment as the consequence of a quarrel sought refuge with the segment of another tribe. Sixteen years later, this fraction was counted as one of the sections of the adoptive tribe. However, Jaussen noted that, since no intermarriage had occurred between the new section and the host group, the feeling of kinship was not yet complete.[20] It would appear from this that intermarriage hastened the process of fusion. Jaussen also pointed out that it was more difficult for a political unit to become absorbed into another tribe than it was for a cluster of families which had no formal political organization. Since the group had its own organization, with a chief, traditions, and group identity, the process would be slow until marriages brought about a merging of interests and affections.[21]

Fusion was facilitated by assumption of the mutual obligations of protection against the enemy which are a function of the kin group. Such obligations did not prevent related segments from raiding one another, but they were expected to join forces when attacked by an outside enemy.[22] Proximity was also a factor conducive to fusion. If families regularly grazed their herds in the same pastures and shared a common well or oasis camp site, a feeling of kinship was likely to develop.[23] It would appear that when a feeling of kinship between parent and adoptive group had developed through proximity, intermarriage, and observance of mutual obligations for protection from outside enemies, the adoptive group was somehow fitted into the tribal genealogy of the host group.

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Bedouin political organization was very similar to that of the Hazara Mongols and Kazaks. The senior male of the family was head of the household and had authority over members of the household. The fixed lineage, *ahl*, did not necessarily have formal political leadership, although it sometimes had a chief.[24] The segment at the next higher level in the tribal genealogy was under the leadership of a sheikh, and the sheikh of one of the subtribes acted as sheikh of the tribe. Normally the larger genealogical segments did not function as political units, but on occasion a tribal confederation was formed under a paramount chief. The sheikh of the Rwala, for example, became paramount chief of the Al-G̃las confederation.[25] Lady Anne Blunt wrote of a sheikh of the al-Fed'an who was elected war leader of the as-Sba'a as well. In this case, however, his position as war leader of the as-Sba'a was "merely a personal one,"[26] and he was not accorded the status of a paramount chief.

Chiefship was hereditary within a family but did not necessarily pass to the eldest

son. The successor was chosen on the basis of experience and ability and might be the son, brother, or even a more distant relative of the deceased sheikh.[27] Occasionally, when no leader of ability could be found within the hereditary sheikhly family, an outsider might rise to the position of sheikh. However, according to Lady Anne Blunt, this occurred but rarely.[28]

TERRITORIALITY

As among the Kazaks, Bedouin genealogical-political segments were territorial units. Each tribe had its traditionally established area within which the member segments migrated, and summer and winter quarters were sufficiently fixed to be mappable.[29] Members of one tribe occasionally grazed their livestock or sought water on the territory of a friendly neighboring tribe—this appears to have been fairly frequent in the former Palestine—but in such cases they did so only with the permission of the host tribe and were sometimes asked to pay a fee for the privilege.[30] Tribal segments shared the territory of the tribe, as among the Kazaks. Wells, on the other hand, were the property of the smaller segments.[31]

GENEALOGIES

As among the Kazaks and Kalmuks, chiefly families among the Bedouins maintained family genealogies. In much of the nomadic area in the north, these noble family genealogies supplemented the tribal genealogies. For the southern and eastern parts of the Bedouin area, however, no tribal genealogies have been published comparable to the several available versions of the northern 'Aneze genealogy. The names of several sections of the southern 'Aneze are known,[32] but even Dickson, who spent many years in Kuwait and recorded voluminous data on the tribes of eastern Arabia, published a tribal genealogy for the northern 'Aneze only. For eastern Arabia he recorded, instead, the family genealogies of several sheikhly families, including that of the ruler of Sa'udi Arabia.[33] For several centuries some parts of eastern Arabia have been ruled by hereditary feudal sheikhs with fixed capitals in towns or cities. The peoples of eastern Arabia appear to have made a transition from tribalism to feudalism similar to that made by the Khalkha Mongols, although the feeling of tribal kinship appears to be stronger in Sa'udi Arabia.

The keeping of aristocratic family genealogies appears to be associated with the weakening of tribal kin ties. Both tribal and aristocratic family genealogies may be maintained side by side, as among the northern 'Aneze and Kazaks, or aristocratic family trees may displace tribal genealogies, as appears to have been the case among the southern 'Aneze and the Khalkhas.

NOMENCLATURE

The Bedouins are no better equipped terminologically to distinguish between segments at different levels in the tribal genealogy than were the Hazara Mongols or the Kazaks. *Ahl*, meaning "tent," refers, by extension, to the household and to both the sliding and the fixed lineage. Beyond this, the Arabs have a number of terms ap-

plicable to tribal genealogical groups, but none of them has any very precise meaning in this sense. Jaussen, whose observations were made among tribesmen in the former state of Palestine, offered the terms *hamouleh*, *samieh*, and *'ashireh* for segments above the *ahl*. He equated *hamouleh* with *samieh* as applicable to a smaller group than the *'ashireh* and stated that, whereas an *'ashireh* had a chief, the political organization of the *hamouleh* was less formal. However, he reported that in one region of Moab the *hamouleh* was the larger group, subdivided into several *'ashair* (plural of *'ashireh*), and elsewhere he stated that a *hamouleh* might have a sheikh at its head. *Qabileh* and *fendeh* were alternative terms for "tribe."[34]

According to Musil, the Rwala employed somewhat different terms. *Kabile*, *bedide*, and *'ashire* referred to "tribe." "The clan and sometimes the kin are denoted by the word *âl*. . . . Generally . . . *âl* denotes the same as *beni* or *eben*, its meaning being larger than that of *ahl*. *Ferîž* is the name given to a group of kindred descended from the same ancestor; a *ferîž* is also wider than an *ahl*."[35]

After pondering over Musil's statement for some time, the author consulted an Arabic specialist, Professor Franz Rosenthal, concerning the meaning of the various terms; he was good enough to provide the following information. *Âl* is etymologically related to *ahl*, meaning "tent." "*Âl* seems to be used where direct relationship (real or fictitious) can be assumed. (The royal family of Sa'udi Arabia is an *âl*.)" *Beni* is the term usually employed in referring to an actual tribal group. "*Ferîž* is an ordinary word, meaning 'group' (root *faraqa*, 'to divide, split,' thus, 'section')—according to dictionaries, a rather large group. It can be used for any group of people. Musil is probably right when he states that *ferîž* is larger than *ahl* and *âl*, because *ferîž* does not contain the element of relationship implicit in the other two terms."[36] The author also asked Professor Rosenthal for information concerning the Arabic terms *qaum* and *ta'ifah* which the Hazara Mongols apply to groups at all levels of tribal segmentation. He replied that *qaum* is the ordinary word for "people"; although it is often employed in reference to tribe, it is in no sense a technical term, and its usage is not restricted to tribal terminology. *Ta'ifah* is a general term for "group," "subsection," with no fixed place in Bedouin terminology.

From the foregoing it would appear that the Bedouins have no more precise means of distinguishing segments of different levels in the tribal genealogy than did the Hazara Mongols, medieval Mongols, or Kazaks. Whereas the Hazaras had only the interchangeable terms *qaum* and *táifa* for tribal segments at all levels above the family and the medieval Mongols and Kazaks had only a few more or less interchangeable terms, the Bedouins had a considerable number of terms. Some had the connotation of groups smaller or larger than did others; some placed more emphasis on kinship, actual or fictitious, than did others. But there seems to have been no precise means of distinguishing terminologically between segments at different genealogical levels.

Whether few terms or many, the reasons for the lack of explicitness would appear to be the same. Among peoples having *obok* structure, all groups, at whatever level, are of the same order; they are conceived of as having evolved originally from the

household family. All have much the same functions, in more or less attenuated form. Since the Bedouin, like the medieval Mongol and Kazak, has in mind the general position in the tribal genealogy of any group with which he is likely to come into contact, he has no particular need for precision. A fixed terminology for groups of different levels would destroy the flexibility which permits adaptation of the genealogy to territorial and political changes, an adaptation that is essential to the preservation of a sense of kinship among those who migrate and fight together.

GROUP SYMBOLS

The Bedouins have several symbols for distinguishing one group from another. The *wasm*, property mark, is analogous to the Kazak *tamga*. It is used in branding camels, in marking wells, and in identifying the ownership of goods temporarily abandoned on the desert. *Wasm*'s are used by groups at different levels in the tribal genealogy:

> The tribal *wasms* which exist, and could be collected by anyone interested in the study, are legion, for the 'Awazim tribe of Hasa, as far as I can ascertain, is alone among all the tribes of Arabia in possessing one *wasm* mark only for the whole tribe. All other tribes have dozens and dozens of different brands in accordance with the number of sections and subsections into which they are divided, or the number of their shaikhs who think they ought to have their own special distinguishing mark for their camels.[37]

The Bedouins also had war cries, but, as among the Kazaks, these appear to have appertained to any and every fighting unit which chose to adopt a war cry. "Every Arab prince and Arab tribe has a special war cry. Some have several and some a single one."[38] The Bedouins formerly had another distinguishing emblem which was brought out in time of serious war, as opposed to raids. This was the sacred camel litter, the *markab*. In modern times the Rwala has been the only group reported to have such a symbol,[39] although Dickson compared it to the herd of thoroughbred black camels, *al Shuruf*, of the Mutair tribe.[40]

Both the sacred camel litter of the Rwala and the herd of black camels of the Mutair appear to be remnants of symbols which were more numerous in the past. Lammens, in his study of western Arabia before the Hegira, mentions mobile idols, fetishes, or oracles, comparable in function to the stationary Ka'ba at Mecca.[41] In that pre-Islamic period it was customary to place in the forefront of the fighting a camel and a pavilion, *qobba*, when all was at stake and it was essential that the warriors fight to the death. In a war which occurred a few years before the Hegira, a chief called his four daughters to the battlefield, where they set up a pavilion and rallied the warriors to protect it. In the Battle of the Camel, 'Aisha, wife of Muhammed, is said to have taken the place of the fetish in rallying the forces, since under Islam it was no longer proper to use a fetish as a rallying symbol.[42] The *qobba* later became a tent of some size, of red leather, which was set up beside the dwelling of an important chief. Among other functions, it served as a place of refuge, a sanctuary which offered protection to anyone passing through its portals. The practice of a woman, riding a camel, rallying her tribe in war, continued until recent times. The

Rwala used their *Markab* into the twentieth century, and the tradition of a woman of chiefly rank, mounted on a camel, who acted as a special symbol in war, was widespread in Arabia.[43]

To what group or levels do or did these symbols belong? The mobile fetishes disappeared with the rise of Islam, so that we can have no precise data. Although the red-leather tent, *qobba*, has long since disappeared, there is information to indicate that the *qobba* was associated with important chiefly families. It was pitched next to the dwelling of the chief, and its guardianship was an object of inheritance within the family. It was, in effect, a symbol of political power.[44]

The Rwala *Markab* was kept in the tent of the paramount chief, and it was the chief who each year sacrificed a camel for it.[45] It was displayed as a symbol only when all the Rwala were concerned. Of the *Markab* Raswan wrote:

> They all hold the belief that the possession of this symbol . . . means safety and power to the tribe holding it, while its loss spells disaster to the tribe and its subsequent dispersion. The Rwala have held it uninterruptedly for nearly a century and a half, but even today the sight of "Ishmael's camel-throne," with the chosen maiden sitting on it in times of war, will inspire them to greater heroism. . . .
>
> Before coming into the keeping of the Rwala, the *Markab* was held by the Amarat. More precisely, it was in possession of the Ibn Hadhdhal family of that tribe until 1793. . . . Since then this sacred emblem has been in the hands of the Sha'lan family and has accompanied the Rwala in all their victorious wars, a symbol of their dominant position among all the Bedouin tribes of Arabia.[46]

This suggests that the *Markab*, like the earlier *qobba*, was essentially a family possession and that only secondarily, through the leadership exercised by the family possessing it, did it become a symbol for the group which constituted the following of that chief. Since in recent times there has been only one *Markab*, it is unsafe to generalize from it alone. The red-leather *qobba* of early Islamic times was not similarly unique. These symbolic tents appear to have been the chiefly symbols of powerful paramount chiefs with large followings, that is, to have held positions similar to that of the Sha'lan family of the Rwala. The *Markab*, as well as the earlier *qobba*, appear to be analogous to the medieval Mongol *tuq*, "standard," in that it was essentially a symbol of leadership rather than a group symbol.

MARRIAGE

In marriage the Bedouins are endogamous in tendency. They go beyond the Hazara Mongol practice, in that the nearest male relative in the paternal line with whom marriage is permitted has the right of refusal of the girl in marriage. Such relative would usually be the father's brother's son. Lacking a cousin of this type, a paternal cousin sharing a common great-grandfather with the girl would have this right. The *eben al-'amm*, as such a man is called, has an absolute first claim over his cousin. He may forbid her marriage with another man, and if she refuses to marry him or elopes with another, he may kill her without becoming liable for payment of blood money.[47]

Although a man may and sometimes does exact his right, both public opinion and the free camp life of the Bedouins favor love matches. If another young man wishes to marry the girl, he often enough receives the permission of the *eben al-'amm* to do so and pays the bride price to the latter instead of to the girl's father.[48] No statistics or other data are available on the proportion of cousin marriages occurring among the Bedouins. Instances are available of girls refusing to marry their *eben al-'amm* and of marriages entirely outside the tribe which were socially approved.[49] A majority of marriages, however, appear to be with fairly close paternal kin or at least within the tribe.

Certain families among the Bedouin tribes are regarded as of noble descent, and marriages among or into these families are favored.[50] The Bedouins forbid marriage with members of certain slave, outcaste, and "impure" tribes.[51] In general, although a cousin has first right to marry a girl, marriage is permitted between members of all Bedouin tribes of "pure" descent, so that the effective endogamous unit is a very broad one.

DESCENT

The Bedouins appear to have a more strongly patrilineal bias than the Central Asian tribes. There are, nevertheless, some indications of flexibility or asymmetry in the tracing of descent. The tradition of origin of the Touciq or Dahamsheh tribe recounted previously traces descent to Dahamsh through his daughter and adopted son-in-law. The fact that members of "pure" tribes—those of pure descent—are forbidden to marry into certain "impure" tribes—those whose ancestry is uncertain or inferior to that of the aristocratic tribes—suggests that some weighting is given to descent through the female. Indeed, the Rwala say of children born of a marriage between a Rwala man and a woman of a less aristocratic tribe: "Thou wilt come to nothing, for thou art only half a Rwajli."[52]

Bedouin social structure is very similar to that of the Central Asian tribes; it resembles most closely that of the medieval Mongols and Kazaks in the extent and flexibility of its tribal genealogy. It differs from the Central Asian tribes chiefly in its preference for marriage with close paternal kin. Since the peoples of both areas are concerned with tracing line of descent and degree of relationship between individuals and tribal segments rather than with group membership as such, the differences in marriage practices do not produce differences in the tribal genealogical pattern. As has already been shown, the Hazara Mongols, whose ancestors were strongly exogamous, adopted Islamic Arabic marriage preferences without disturbance to their segmented lineage structure. In Arabia, as in Central Asia, the decay of tribal genealogical organization was associated with a development of feudalism.

KINSHIP TERMINOLOGY

No complete list of tribal Arabic kinship terms was available to the author. Consequently, terms were obtained from an Egyptian engaged in graduate studies in the

United States, Mr. Wassef Youssef Wassef of Cairo, in the hope that these might be of some assistance in understanding the tribal kinship terminology. The Egyptian terms correspond closely to those Bedouin terms found in the literature,[53] although it is possible that the Bedouins did not normally employ denotative terms for so extensive a number of relationships as did the Egyptians. The Egyptian terminology is also very similar to that obtained by Davies from a Palestinian Christian[54] and so will not be listed here.

The Bedouins, like the urbanized Arabs, have denotative terms for all primary relationships and also for "father's brother." The terms for "brother" and "sister" are derived from the same root, and, among the urbanized Arabs at least, the term for "father's sister" is formed by the addition of a suffix to the term for "father's brother." Similarly, the urbanized Arabs have an elementary term for "mother's brother," from which the term for "mother's sister" is formed by the addition of a suffix. There is also an elementary term for "grandfather." Terms for other relationships are formed by combining the appropriate elementary terms, as, for example, *bint binti*, "my daughter's daughter." Such Bedouin compound terms as are available are formed in the same way as the urbanized Arab terms.

The Arabs differ from the Central Asians in that they do not distinguish relative age within generation, and there is no hint of a "stairstep" type of terminology, although both the Bedouins and the urbanized Arabs have "sliding lineages" and so are concerned with degree of distance of relationship.

The urbanized Arabs—we have no comparable data for the Bedouins—normally employ lineal terms for grandparents and grandchildren, although the line of ascent or descent can be indicated by compound descriptive terms. Classificatory terms are normally applied to a number of collateral and affinal relatives; for example, *bint 'ammi*, "father's brother's daughter," is also applied to "father's brother's son's daughter" and "father's brother's daughter's daughter," and *nisibi* may refer to either "husband's brother" or "wife's brother."

However, Mr. Wassef explained that classificatory terms were employed only when the precise relationship was known to both the speaker and the person spoken to. In situations where the relationship was not known, precise descriptive terms were used. For example, if a host at a party were explaining to a guest who the other guests were, he would employ the full descriptive term in indicating the relationship. In legal documents the precise relationship is always indicated by means of descriptive compounds.

It is probable that among the Bedouins such situations as those described by the Egyptian informant would seldom occur, since in the normal tribal context everyone would be familiar with the actual relationship of all members of the local group. Outsiders identified themselves by means of family or tribal genealogy. Once the outsider was accepted into the group, he was addressed by a kinship term; a guest addressed his host as "my father's brother," for example, and the host reciprocated with the term for "son of my brother."[55]

This practice of applying kinship terms to non-kin is comparable to that found among the medieval Mongols. It would appear that where the community is thoroughly familiar with the actual relationships of its members, classificatory terms can be used freely. In a large city like Cairo, on the other hand, where unrelated people come together socially, there is a felt need to describe the precise relationship. And where neighbors do not know all the details of a family's kin affiliations, lawyers must be able to record precise relationships in order to establish the rights and obligations of kin. The Arab language provides the means in the form of descriptive adjectives. The Khalkha "stairstep" terminology was perhaps an analogous attempt, by different linguistic means, to arrive at the same end—precision.

CHAPTER IX

EARLY EUROPE

That the Bedouin tribes of Arabia should have a social structure similar to that of the tribes of Central Asia is perhaps not surprising, for both peoples had a pastoral nomadic economy. There is some evidence to suggest, however, that the social structure of the early European tribes was also of the tribal genealogical type and that the Roman gens and the Scottish clan, whose names have been employed by anthropologists to designate "clan" structure, were not clans but *obok*. Full evidence is difficult to obtain for the peoples of Continental Europe; written records were scant or non-existent for the period before tribal social structure had been altered by statehood and empire in Rome and by feudalism in western Europe.

In our study of several Central Asian societies, we found that the segmented kin pattern of *obok* structure did not collapse under the impact of radical changes in the economy (Hazaras, Dagors, Chahars) or changes in government (Khalkhas, Chahars). Structural adjustments in the pattern were made, according to the kind of stimulus exerted. There tended to be a shift toward family rather than tribal genealogies, and the pattern according to which kin groups were also sociopolitical-territorial groups changed into a pattern in which territorial-political groups were not necessarily kin groups. The idea that kin groups should be residential or territorial units was slow to disappear, and segmentation remained an attribute of territorial-administrative groups, just as line of descent and degree of distance remained a concern of kinship groups. The joint extended family, of which tribal genealogical structure is an extension, continued to flourish in all the societies studied. With these characteristics in mind, we shall turn to such historical documentation as is readily available in search of clues concerning the social structure of the early Europeans.

THE ROMANS

FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS AS REVEALED BY INHERITANCE LAWS

The Romans, at the earliest period for which we have any record, were settled cultivators who had evolved from a tribal society into that of a republican state and were far on the road to empire. Thus, at best, we can expect to find only survivals, in the form of traditions and persistent customs, of the tribal period. Even in full historical times, the foundation of Roman society was the extended patrilocal joint family. The nature of the family is indicated in the several Roman legal codes which have come down to us. The earliest of these, the "Twelve Tables," survives only in

fragments preserved by later writers. These fragments, which were concerned chiefly with "private law and religious custom"[1] were incorporated, with some emendation, into the *Institutes* of Gaius of the second century A.D., and, with further adjustments to culture change, into the *Institutes* of Justinian of the sixth century.

During all periods the eldest male, whether father or grandfather, was head of the family and administrator of the family property. All those under the *patria potestas*, i.e., members of the household, were the natural heirs, *heredes sui*. In very early times the family property normally was not divided at the death of the head of the household; all the heirs continued to enjoy it in common. However, although the early Romans, like the Kalmuks, preferred to keep the property undivided as long as possible, any heir had the right to demand a division.[2]

If there were no natural heirs, the property passed to the agnate (patrilineal collateral relative) who was nearest in degree of relationship. If there were several agnates related in the same degree, they inherited together. If there were no near kin, the property passed to the "gens," an undefined group of kin, perhaps analogous to that described for the Kazaks as responsible for the guardianship of orphans.[3]

Inheritance by the gens had become practically obsolete by the latter part of the republican age. By the second century A.D., when the *Institutes* of Gaius were compiled, written wills had come into fashion, and it was possible for the head of the family to make bequests deviating from customary practice. If he died intestate, however, the customary rules applied, and the property was inherited by the natural heirs: "a son or daughter, a grandson or granddaughter by the son, and further lineal descendants, provided that they were under the power of the ancestor when he died."[4]

As in earlier times, if there were no natural heirs—descendants—the nearest collaterals inherited:

> . . . there are various degrees of agnation.
>
> Agnates are not all called simultaneously to the inheritance by the law of the Twelve Tables, but only those of the nearest degree. . . .[5]

The family might include, in addition to the core of patrilineal kin and their spouses, an occasional adopted son or slave.[6] Adopted sons apparently had the same status as consanguine sons. In the early period, when there were at most one or two slaves in a household, the slaves shared the family life and appear to have become gradually incorporated into the patrilineal kin group of the master, in the course of several generations, in much the same manner as among the Kazaks.

SEGMENTS ABOVE THE FAMILY

Above the extended family were larger groups—*gentes*, *curiae*, and *tribus*—which appear to be derived from the segmented expansion of the extended family. No tribal genealogy survived into the historic period, and the origin traditions found in Roman literature suggest later accretions. One of these traditions begins with King Latinus, who gave his name to the Latins. Aeneas, fleeing with his followers from Troy after the fall of that city, married Lavinia, the daughter of Latinus, and their

son Ascanius or Iulus eventually became king. There followed a series of twelve kings; after the twelfth, a younger brother seized the throne in place of his elder brother, Numitor, and forced Numitor's daughter to become a Vestal Virgin. Despite this attempt to prevent issue of a potentially rival collateral line, Numitor's daughter had twin sons, Romulus and Remus, who were sired by the god Mars. Romulus in due time restored the throne to his grandfather Numitor and founded Rome.[7]

In this tradition, as it survives in Roman literature, neither Latinus nor Romulus is presented as an ancestor of the people, but only as early kings who gave their names to the peoples over whom they ruled. They may once have been regarded as tribal ancestors; on the other hand, it is possible that the tradition refers to the genealogy of a feudal aristocracy.

According to another tradition, Rome was established by the union of three tribes, of which Romulus was the chief of one, the Ramnes. Since five of the traditional seven kings who followed Romulus were drawn from the other two tribes, this king list is clearly not a genealogy.[8] The population mixture and the political conditions consequent on the founding of Rome do not seem to have been conducive to the evolution of a tribal, or even a feudal, genealogy, tracing descent from Romulus as a progenitor.

That the tribe was once regarded as a kin group is suggested, however, in the recorded creation of what was regarded as a new type of tribe—one which was not genetic but based only on territoriality.[9] This would seem to indicate that the early tribes were thought of as being genetic, i.e., descended from a common ancestor. Sir Henry Maine, whose researches into Roman law were extensive, envisaged early Roman society as having a segmented structure modeled on and growing out of the family: "The Agnatic Union of the kindred in ancient Roman law, and a multitude of similar indications, point to a period at which all the ramifying branches of the family tree held together in one organic whole."[10]

The tribes were subdivided into *curiae*. Traditionally there were ten *curiae* in each tribe, and each *curia* in turn was subdivided into a number, traditionally ten, of *gentes*.[11] Of this structure Moyle wrote:

> Each gens [consisted of] an indefinite number of families, between which there was originally perhaps a genuine tie of blood, which gradually became a mere fiction, respected and supported for the sake of the ancient family worship and religious rites. The family was thus not merely a microcosm of the state; it was the foundation on which were based all the privileges which the Roman citizen enjoyed within the state; the populus contained the tribe, the tribe the curia, the curia the gens, the gens the family, the family the individual; to belong to the first a man must also belong to the last member of the series. . . .[12]

Although the terms *tribus*, *curia*, and *gens* were employed administratively as having precise meanings in reference to fixed levels of the segmented structure, in general the Latins seem to have used these terms more loosely. Gens had as synonyms *familia*, *stirps*, *genus*, *natio*, and *populus*.[13] It was derived from the same root as *genus*, which had the meanings of "birth, descent, origin"; "a race, stock"; "a

descendant, child"; "descendants, posterity."[14] *Stirps* had the primary meaning of "the lower part of the trunk of a plant"; secondarily it referred to "a stem, stock, race, family, lineage."[15] Originally *natio*, which later came to be used in the sense of "nation," had the meaning of "being born, birth."[16]

These terms seem to be analogous, in both original and derived meanings, to the Mongol and Turkic *oboh*, *uruh*, *törel*, and *tuuysqan*. The Latin *curia*, on the other hand, "has all the appearance of having originated in a definite act of legislation."[17] Late in origin, it is much more specific in usage than the earlier terms. *Tribus* originally had the meaning of "a third" of the Roman people, harking back to the tradition that Rome was founded by the union of three tribes. It came to mean a division of the people, "a tribe,"[18] and was employed as a synonym of *populus*, "people."[19] Thus *tribus*, which originated with a precise meaning, acquired more general meanings.

From the point of view of the anthropologist it would appear that the fixed division of tribes into *curiae* and of *curiae* into *gentes* came into being at a time when an originally flexible tribal genealogical structure had decayed and been replaced by a rigid state administrative structure. The transformation would seem to be analogous to that of the Khalkha *aimak* and *husuu*. Among a tribal people, flexibility in terminology is desirable, since segments are of the same order, whatever their position in the tribal genealogy, and, indeed, may change their position. A fixed terminology better satisfies the needs of a state administrative organization.

Gens seems originally to have had the general meaning of its Germanic cognate, "kin"; as Rome grew into a town, those kin who could trace descent from a common ancestor were established as an administrative unit. Finally, as Rome became a state, the *gens* became a family name, a surname, analogous to the surnames of the Mongol Dagors and Chahars, although the gentile surname was never applied to so extensive a group.

Segmentation of kin groups survived into the historical period, as is indicated by the Roman system of naming individuals. Under the Republic, members of patrician families usually had three names—the praenomen, nomen, and cognomen. The praenomen was the personal name of the individual, the nomen represented the *gens* or family name, while the cognomen indicated the particular branch of the *gens* to which he belonged. Members of some famous and extensive families employed as many as three cognomens, as in the case of P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica Corculum.[20] This usage is analogous to that of the Hazara Mongol informant who named in order the several groups to which he belonged, but, whereas the Hazara referred to tribal segments, the Roman patrician employed cognomens to distinguish family segments.

TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

There is evidence to suggest that patrilineal kin groups originally were also territorial and political units. Rome, according to tradition, was founded by a union of three tribes. As it expanded to include more and more of its neighbors, the con-

quered peoples were incorporated as additional tribes. The thirty-five tribes said to have been created between the time of the founding of Rome and 241 B.C. had either gentile or geographical names. These tribes were indubitably political-territorial units. The presence of gentile names suggests that some of the tribes at least were regarded as kin groups.[21]

The senate appears to have had its origin in a council of elders, analogous to the Hazara Mongol *rish safit*, known as the *comitia curiata*. Of this Moyle wrote that originally it "was composed of all the patres-familia [heads of families], possibly of all the males, of the gentes; it was thus a gathering arranged on the principle of real or fictitious relationship . . . in which the voting was 'curiatim,' each curia expressing its opinion on the matter in hand in turn."[22]

Roman military organization was closely associated with its tribal organization. According to tradition, the original Roman army consisted of three regiments, each of which was drawn from one of the three founding tribes. The regiment comprised a thousand infantry and was led by a hundred cavalrymen, who were the leaders of the *gentes* and *curiae*. Except that the Roman soldiers did not ride horses, this pattern appears to be identical with that of the medieval Mongol regiment, *ming* ("thousand"), in which the head of the Roman *curia* corresponded to the Mongol leader of a hundred, and the chief of the Roman *gens* to the Mongol *daraga*, "leader of ten men." This three-regiment army, which was traditionally drawn from the original three tribes of Rome, formed the pattern for the later Roman legion.[23]

RELIGIOUS CULTS

The religious cults of Rome appear to have been associated chiefly with family and kin and with spirits or deities of the land to which the family was attached:

> In the house, Vesta, the spirit of the hearthfire, the Penates, the spirits of the store-closet, and Janus, the spirit of the doorway . . . were all worshipped daily. . . . Outside on the land, the Lar and his cult had been fixed at the point where the arable of the farm met those of other cultivators. . . . The ritual was in the hands of the *paterfamilias*, who was in fact the priest of the family, as he continued to be throughout Roman history.
>
> At the head of the whole system was the *Rex*, who represented in the State the position of the *paterfamilias* in the family, and had certain sacrificial functions. The hearthfire of the State was cared for by the Vestal Virgins. . . .[24]

The state also had its Penates, and its Janus, "who resided in the sacred gate of the Forum."[25]

The ancestor cult, or cult of the dead, was shared by family and *gens*. The *gens* had a common burial ground outside the city. Once a year the spirits of the dead were believed to return to the upper world for three days. After a ceremony in which the members of the *gens* appear to have participated, there was a family festival, "which is described by Ovid as a reunion of the living members of the family after they have discharged their duties to the dead."[26] The *gens* was apparently responsible for providing appropriate funeral and commemoration ceremonies for its dead. In later times, when gentile organization was breaking down, associations were formed which had as their main purpose that their members, "united in life in acts

of common worship . . . like the *gentiles*, formed as it were a great family and desired to sleep their eternal sleep together as members of a *gens* or family."[27]

DESCENT AND MARRIAGE

In tracing descent, the Romans appear to have been always asymmetrically ambilineal, but there was a shift from a strong emphasis on patrilineality in the early period toward a point nearer ambilineality in the period of empire. In Roman traditional history we have encountered two instances in which the line of descent and succession to the throne passed through female links: through Lavinia, daughter of Latinus and wife of Aeneas, and through Numitor's daughter, mother of Romulus.

In the early legal codes, agnates only—paternal kin—were considered in matters pertaining to inheritance, the appointment of guardians, and other rights and obligations appertaining to kin. Gradually, however, the privileges of cognates—those related through females—came to be recognized, and by the time of Justinian, in the sixth century A.D., the distinction between agnates and cognates had disappeared.[28] Even in the early periods a wife was classed legally as an agnate of her husband and his line. This would appear to be comparable to the attitude of the Central Asian tribes toward the position of a woman in relation to her husband's family and more extended kin groups.

In the regulation of marriage, there is no hint that the ancestors of the Romans ever practiced such wide exogamy as did the medieval Mongols. The patricians—the descendants of the original three tribes of Rome—became an aristocratic class,[29] somewhat analogous to the Khalkha aristocrats who traced descent from the family of Chinggis Khan. But whereas the Khalkha nobles were exogamous as a group, the Roman patricians became endogamous. Among the patricians, marriage was forbidden between second cousins at the earliest period for which information is available. By the first century A.D., however, this restriction had been relaxed, so that the taboo on marriage with collaterals was limited to first cousins.[30] Still later, after the Romans had adopted Christianity, the exogamous bar was pushed outward again to include second cousins.

The Romans were as concerned with establishing the line and degree of relationship as were the Central Asian tribes, but they employed a somewhat different method of calculating degree. Second cousins, by the Roman method of calculation, were six degrees removed, whereas among the Central Asian tribes two individuals who were six degrees removed would be descendants of an ancestor six generations back. In Table 16 this difference is illustrated. The Roman F, in calculating the degree of relationship with G, would count his father, D, as one degree removed; his grandfather, B, as two degrees; his great-grandfather, A, as three degrees; his grandfather's brother, C, as four degrees; and so on. According to this system, a man would be two degrees removed from brother or sister, three from nephew or niece.[31] If the Kazaks L and M wished to calculate the degree of their relationship, on the other hand, they would both count back until they reached the common ancestor, A. Both Romans and Central Asians, however, shared a common principle in their concern with degree of genealogical relationship rather than with group membership.

CHANGES UNDER EMPIRE

The changes in regulations regarding marriage were slight in comparison with other changes which occurred in Roman social structure. As Rome expanded, conquered Latin communities were admitted into the Roman state as tribes. These territorial tribes were administrative units, the basis of the census, of taxation, and of citizenship itself. It was possible to perpetuate the tribal pattern in administration while the neighboring communities incorporated had a similar pattern; but when Roman expansion by conquest brought many aliens within the state, the concept and pattern of tribe became meaningless, and "the old tribes . . . ceased to exist, excepting as organisations of persons entitled to receive doles of corn in the city."[32]

TABLE 16

METHODS OF RECKONING DEGREES OF RELATIONSHIP
(Cousins Six Degrees Removed)



The original Roman legion, an army made up of citizen farmers organized as kin units, became a body of professional soldiers which resembled its prototype only in form. The patricians, descendants of citizen tribesmen, became a hereditary aristocracy. By the first century B.C. the *comitia curiata* had become a few officials who met occasionally to perform certain formal acts.[33] The *gens* gradually lost both form and function and survived only as a surname. Of this slow decay Maine wrote: "Our studies in the Law of Persons seemed to show us the Family expanding into the Agnatic group of kinsmen, then the Agnatic group dissolving into separate households; lastly the household supplanted by the individual."[34]

KINSHIP TERMINOLOGY

The Roman kinship terminology available comes from the full historical period.[35] Since these terms are drawn from Roman legal literature, one might infer that it stands in about the same relationship to Latin tribal kinship terminology as Cairo Egyptian terminology does to that of the Bedouin Arabs. Many of the terms listed in Table 17, such as *tritavia*, *abpatruus*, and *abavunculus*, were probably seldom

TABLE 17*

LATIN KINSHIP TERMS

Relationship	Latin Term
Fa	*pater*
Mo	*mater*
Br	*frater*
Si	*soror*
So	*filius*
Da	*filia*
FaFa, MoFa	*avus*
FaFaFa, MoFaFa	*proavus*
FaFaFaFa, MoFaFaFa	*abavus*
FaFaFaFaFa, MoFaFaFaFa	*atavus*
FaFaFaFaFaFa, MoFaFaFaFaFa	*tritavus*
FaMo, MoMo	*avia*
FaFaMo, MoFaMo	*proavia*
FaFaFaMo, MoFaFaMo	*abavia*
FaFaFaFaMo, MoFaFaFaMo	*atavia*
FaFaFaFaFaMo, MoFaFaFaFaMo	*tritavia*
FaFaFaFaBr	*abpatruus*
FaFaFaFaSi	*abamita*
FaFaFaBr	*propatruus*
FaFaFaSi	*proamita*
FaFaBr	*patruus magnus*
FaFaSi	*amita magna*
FaBr	*patruus*
FaSi	*amita*
FaFaFaMoBr	*abavunculus*
FaFaFaMoSi	*abmatertera*
FaFaMoBr	*proavunculus*
FaFaMoSi	*promatertera*
FaMoBr	*avunculus magnus*
FaMoSi	*matertera magna*
MoBr	*avunculus*
MoSi	*matertera*
SoSo, DaSo	*nepos*
SoDa, DaDa	*neptis*
SoSoSo	*pronepos*
SoSoDa	*proneptis*
SoSoSoSo	*abnepos*
SoSoSoDa	*abneptis*
SoSoSoSoSo	*adnepos*
SoSoSoSoDa	*adneptis*
SoSoSoSoSoSo	*trinepos*
SoSoSoSoSoDa	*trineptis*
FaBrSo	*frater patruelis*
FaSiSo, MoBrSo	*frater amitinus*
MoSiSo	*frater consobrinus*
FaFaBrSoSo	*sobrinus*
FaFaBrSo	*proprior sobrinus*

* Based on "A Table of the Relationships of a Man," by F. H. Marshall, in *A Companion to Latin Studies*, ed. Sir John Edwin Sandys, p. 173.

TABLE 17—*Continued*

Relationship	Latin Term
BrSo	*fratris filius*
BrSoSo	*fratris nepos*
SiSo	*sororis filius*
Hu	*vir, maritus*
Wi	*mulier, uxor*
SoWi	*nurus*
DaHu	*gener*
WiFa, HuFa	*socer*
WiMo, HuMo	*socrus*
WiSo, HuSo	*privignus*
WiDa, HuDa	*privigna*
FaWi	*noverca*
MoHu	*vitricus*
HuBr	*levir*
HuSi	*glos*

employed except in legal documents. The Romans had elementary terms for all the primary relationships and also for "father's sister," "son's wife," "daughter's husband," "husband's brother," and "husband's sister." The terms for "son" and "daughter" are derived from a common root; the term for "father's brother" is a derivative of that for "father," while "mother's brother" has the meaning of "little grandfather."

Sobrinus, which originally had the meaning of "second cousin" (father's father's brother's son's son),[36] later came to be employed in the sense of "cousin on the mother's side."[37] *Consobrinus* shifted in meaning from "father's brother's son" to "mother's sister's son,"[38] and finally to "male cousin."[39] There are lineal terms for six generations of ascendants and six generations of descendants, but the more distant of these, which are formed by the addition of prefixes to *avus* and *nepos*, have the contrived appearance of the Khalkha *huci, oci, jici* series, so that one suspects the Roman lineal terms of being late legalistic inventions. Indeed, Morgan has pointed out that *nepos* was used in the meanings of both "nephew" and "grandson" until well into the imperial period, when it finally became fixed as denoting "grandson."[40]

The terms for ascendants and descendants listed in Table 17 are lineal; that is, the line of relationship is not indicated for lineal ascendants and descendants. In legal documents, however, descriptive modifiers were employed to distinguish between paternal and maternal ancestors and between offspring of sons and daughters. Terms for collateral relatives appear to have been restricted chiefly to two collateral lines, those stemming from father's brother and those from father's father's brother. These were the lines within which marriage was forbidden.

THE GAULS

When Caesar conquered Gaul in 59–51 B.C., the tribes were in a transitional stage between a shifting cultivating-herding nomadism and settled agriculture or trade;

pressed by the Germans on the northeast and by the Romans on the southwest, many tribes and tribal fragments were in movement. Given this situation, it would have been difficult at best to discern the pattern of the tribal structure. Caesar was a soldier and tended to observe and record only those aspects of Gallic culture which related to the problems of military conquest. Nevertheless, a few bits and pieces of information on Gallic social organization may be gleaned from Caesar's account of the Gallic Wars. These suggest a transitional *obok* structure. Although Caesar recorded no tribal genealogies, he did write that "the Gauls affirm that they are all descended from a common father, Dis."[41] There is a reference to the Aedui Ambarri, close allies and kinsmen (*necessarii et consanguinei*) of the Aedui,[42] which suggests that the Aedui Ambarri were a tribal genealogical branch of the main Aedui group. Concerning the Belgian tribe of Remi, Caesar wrote:

> The Remi affirmed that they had exact information in all particulars, because, as they were closely connected by relationship and intermarriage [*propinquitatibus adfinitatibus coniuncti*], they had learnt how large a contingent each chief had promised for the present campaign in the general council of the Belgae.[43]

The Remi further reported that they

> had not been able to dissuade even the Suessiones from taking part with them, though these were their own brethren and kinsfolk [*fratres consanguineosque*], observing the same law and ordinances, and sharing one government, one ruler with themselves.[44]

It is probably not accidental that the most clear-cut statements concerning relationships among tribes concerned the Belgians. These tribes were the last to feel the force of Roman armies and German invasions and so might be expected to retain longer their normal tribal structure.

At the time described by Caesar, the political organization tended to be fluid to the point of chaos. There were such constant alignments and realignments of tribal confederations and of leaders that few confederations could be regarded as based primarily on kinship other than that expressed in the belief that all Gauls were kin. Actually, the situation in Gaul seems to have been not too different from that described for the Kazaks in the nineteenth century, and there is a hint that if a fragment of one tribe settled in the territory of another, it might in time come to be regarded as related. When the Boii asked and were granted permission to settle in the territory of the Aedui, "the Aedui gave them farmlands, and afterwards admitted them to like measure and privilege and liberty with themselves."[45]

THE EARLY GERMANS

SOURCES

Caesar's account of the Gallic War contains some information concerning the German tribes of his day. Tacitus, who appears to have occupied a post on the Belgian borders of Germany *ca.* A.D. 89–93, provides considerably fuller data on that people. A difference of opinion exists among Latin scholars as to the validity of Tacitus' reporting. Some regard him as completely unreliable; others take a middle view, admitting some of his statements and rejecting others; a third group, less

critical, accepts his work without qualification. The present writer has not made an intensive study of the criticisms of Tacitus' *Germania;* a sampling of these suggests that some of the statements which Latin scholars find most disturbing are those which enhance the impression of authenticity for the anthropologist. The classical scholars, for example, appear to be much puzzled by Tacitus' description of what the anthropologist readily recognizes as a migratory slash-and-burn cultivation. Tacitus is regarded as credulous for believing that all the Germans were really descended from a common ancestor. We gladly forgive him this naïveté, since he has transmitted to us the Germans' own belief. Because Tacitus has been accused by some of being completely unreliable, it seems worthwhile to quote at some length the evaluation of Henry Furneaux, who neither rejected *Germania* out of hand nor accepted the report uncritically:

> We have . . . certainly no earlier extant account in which any approach is made to so complete an enumeration of tribes, or to so systematic a mapping out of their territory; and in many cases the locality assigned to a people is confirmed by other authorities, sometimes even by modern local survivals of the name; so that there is no reason on the whole to doubt that the distribution of the country given by him was at the time substantially correct, so far as correctness was possible in a race among whom the prevalent internecine feuds might at times bring a hitherto unknown tribe into prominence, or reduce a once famous name to insignificance or even extinction, relegate a frontier nation to the forest recesses of the interior, break up a large people into subdivisions with specific names, or otherwise alter the distribution of territory in ways not afterwards traceable.[46]

The reader is reminded of Levshin's complaint about the ephemeral nature of Kazak tribes and tribal names (see chap. v) when one reads Furneaux's comment on the German tribal names listed by Tacitus:

> It is thus perhaps hardly matter for surprise that among the comparatively few names given by his predecessors, he omits some that had once been famous, or that afterwards became so, and that his list of names and arrangements differs much from that given some fifty years later by Ptolemy.[47]

In the century and a half which elapsed between Caesar's brief report and the more detailed one of Tacitus, German culture does not appear to have changed greatly except among the tribes bordering on Roman Gaul. The tribes were primarily cattle-breeders, whose diet, like that of the early Mongols, consisted chiefly of milk products and of meat obtained by hunting. The grain produced by their crude migratory methods of cultivation was just about sufficient for brewing the beer which they consumed in quantity at all gatherings. The horse, which gave the Germans mobility in war, was the prestige animal. War appears to have been the chief preoccupation of the German men, and their women followed them to battle and urged them on.

SEGMENTED TRIBAL STRUCTURE

The German tribes, at the time of Tacitus, had a well-developed tradition of descent from a common ancestor:

> In all the songs and ballads, the only memorials of antiquity amongst them, the god Tuisto, who was born of the Earth, and Mannus, his son, are celebrated as the founders of the Ger-

man race. Mannus, it is said, had three sons, from whom the Ingaevones, who border on the sea-coast; the Herminones, who inhabit the midland country; and the Istaevones, who occupy the remaining tract, have all respectively derived their names. Some indeed, taking advantage of the obscurity that hangs over remote and fabulous ages, ascribe to the god Tuisto a more numerous issue, and thence trace the names of various tribes [*gentis*], such as the Marsians, the Gambrivians, the Suevians, and the Vandals. The ancient date and authenticity of those names are, as they contend, clearly ascertained.[48]

Although the classic tradition attributed three sons to the progenitor, the Germans, like the Kazaks, apparently found no difficulty in adjusting the genealogy to accommodate tribal accretions.

The German tribes had segmented subdivisions. Of the Suevi, Tacitus wrote that they "have among themselves several subdivisions, or inferior tribes, known by distinct appellations, yet all comprehended under the general name of Suevians."[49] The tribes comprising the Suevian group were held together by religious ceremonies, held in a sacred wood where the Suevian people were believed to have had their origin. The ceremony was attended by representatives of the several tribes, foremost among them the Semnones, who claimed seniority in the Suevian tribal genealogy. The Semnones, a populous tribe (*natio*) who occupied a vast territory, were distributed among a hundred cantons (*pagus*).[50] Tacitus referred to four levels in the German tribal structure: the German people; the Suevians; the Semnones and other tribes of the Suevian group; and the canton or *pagus*. The size of the canton is not indicated. It seems likely that the hundred cantons of the Semnones may have been organized into clusters within the tribe and that the cantons themselves may have been subdivided into smaller kin groups. Although this is speculative, Tacitus' description of German political organization (see below) suggests several levels of segmentation below the tribe.

These tribal genealogical segments were territorial units. Tacitus indicated the location of tribes and subtribes. The term *pagus*, which has been translated as "canton," had in Latin the primary meaning of an area occupied by a group; only secondarily was it applied to the inhabitants of the area.[51] The various tribal segments did not always occupy the same territory; because of their crude methods of cultivation, they were forced to move at intervals: "In cultivating the soil, they do not settle on one spot, but shift from place to place. The State or community takes possession of a certain tract proportioned to its number of hands; allotments are afterwards made to individuals according to their rank and dignity."[52] Although the actual territory occupied by the group changed at intervals, at any given time the group was a territorial unit.

As among the Kazaks and Hazara Mongols, the tribal genealogical segments of the Germans were political entities insofar as there was any political organization. The Germans as a people had no common government. Tacitus' statement that the Semnones were "ambitious to be thought the most ancient and respectable of the Suevian nation"[53] suggests that the Semnones exercised no formal political leadership. Whether or not a tribe had a chief seemed to depend on circumstances. Caesar

wrote that "in time of peace there is no general officer of state, but the chiefs of districts and cantons do justice among their followers and settle disputes."[54] Tacitus reported that "the Marcomanians and the Quadians [tribes of the Suevian group], within our own memory, obeyed a race of kings, born among themselves,"[55] implying that these two tribes did not have chiefs at the time he wrote.

That there were chiefs at several subdivisional levels is suggested by another passage of Tacitus:

> Very noble birth or great services rendered by the father secure for lads the rank of a chief; such lads attach themselves to men of mature strength and of long approved valour. It is no shame to be seen among a chief's followers. Even in his escort there are gradations of rank, dependent on the choice of the man to whom they are attached. These followers vie keenly with each other as to who shall have the most numerous and the bravest followers.[56]

Here Tacitus gives no indication that these chiefs were leaders of kin and territorial groups. Elsewhere, however, he indicates that the fighting units led by these chiefs were kin groups: "What most stimulates their courage is, that their squadrons or battalions . . . are composed of families and clans [*propinquitatus*, 'relatives']."[57] However, the references to young men who attach themselves to leaders because of the prestige involved and to gradations of rank among these followers suggest that the fighting units were not made up entirely of kinsmen. It is reminiscent of the period when Chinggis Khan was rising to power and hints at the beginning of the feudal pattern among the Germans.

Elsewhere in Tacitus' account there are indications of extended kin solidarity at the lineage level. A groom presented the bride price to his bride in the presence of her parents and relatives.[58] On the rare occasion when a wife committed adultery—the only cause for divorce among the Germans—the husband called together her relatives before expelling the transgressor.[59] An extended kin group was concerned with injury to one of its members:

> To adopt the quarrels as well as the friendships of your parents and relations is held to be an indispensable duty. In their resentments, however, they are not implacable. Injuries are adjusted by a settled measure of compensation. Atonement is made for homicide by a certain number of cattle, and by that satisfaction the whole family [*universa domus*] is appeased.[60]

Tacitus offers no information on restrictions or preferences in choice of mate in marriage and none on kinship terminology. However, his account, taken together with Caesar's notes on the Germans, presents fairly clear evidence for the presence of a tribal genealogical structure among the early German tribes.

THE MEDIEVAL WELSH

Traditional tribal generalogies persisted in Europe into the sixth century A.D., when Jordanes recorded some of them;[61] in the eighth century Britains were still sufficiently aware of their Germanic kinship that Bede wrote of the Continental Saxons that "we are of one blood and one bone."[62] In some parts of the British Isles tribal society survived into the late Middle Ages, so that fuller data are available on the process of transition from tribe to state than for Rome or Gaul.

A picture of early tribal kin structure in Wales is obtainable from detailed surveys of Welsh landholdings made by Anglo-Norman officials in the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, as well as from earlier Welsh church records and legal codes. This information comes from a period when the Welsh tribesmen were primarily dairymen, migrating seasonally with their cattle from valley to highlands but also cultivating several kinds of grain and keeping sheep, pigs, and chickens. Politically, they appear to have been in process of transition from tribalism to feudalism.

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

No tribal genealogy similar to that of the medieval Mongols has been found, but the Welsh had a feeling of kinship which suggests the earlier existence of such a genealogy: "the whole tribe or federate country (*gwlad*) . . . was regarded as the supreme kindred *cenedl benbaladr*."[63] The tribe of Cymry was subdivided into a number of kin groups, *cenedl*, which traced descent patrilineally from a common ancestor nine generations back; these kin segments were subdivided in turn into patrilineally oriented groups, *wele*, whose members were descended from a common great-grandfather. Between these two formally organized segments, kin related through a common ancestor seven generations back had certain rights and obligations.

The political structure of the Cymric people was correlated with that of the patrilineal kin structure at the lower levels. The kin group of four generations, the *wele*, had at its head a *penteulu*, chief of household, who held responsible control of the land allocated to the *wele*, held a court of justice, and mounted a horse in war, as contrasted with his fellow kinsmen, who marched on foot.[64] The kin group of nine generations, the *cenedl*, was headed by a chief of kindred, *pencenedl*. It was required of the *pencenedl* that he be a chief of household and a Cymry by paternal and maternal descent; that he be the eldest of the efficient men of his *cenedl;* and that he not be an official of the ruling prince of the tribe. He represented his kinsmen in the larger affairs of the tribe and acted as mentor to these kinsmen. "His privilege and office are to move the country and court in behalf of his man, and he is the speaker of his kindred in the conventional raith of country and federate country, and it is the duty of every *man* of the kindred to listen to him, and for him to listen to his *man*."[65]

The *pencenedl* was assisted by two officials, one the avenger of kindred, who appears to have combined the duties of war chief and police officer, and the other the representative, who was "the mediating man—in court, and in congregation and in combat, and in every foreign affair."[66] This latter official was chosen, because of his wisdom, from among the "seven Elders of the kindred," who were chiefs of household within the *cenedl* and seem to have served as an advisory council to the *pencenedl*. It was their duty to "preserve by tradition the knowledge of kinship, [and they] had an important place in judicial proceedings, inasmuch as it was their duty . . . to swear to the kin of anyone claiming by kin and descent."[67]

Above the *cenedl* the political organization approached that of feudalism. The

Cymry tribe was headed by a king, the *brenhin;* he was apparently conceived of as descending from the senior line of the founding ancestor of the tribe or, perhaps, of the traditional king who had led the Cymry into Wales from the north.[68] There appears to have been a shift in dynasty from the Powys family—believed to have led the first Cymric migration into Wales—to the descendants of Cunedda, the traditional leader of the second migration. Among the descendants of Cunedda, the kingship was held by one line for several generations, then passed to a collateral line.[69]

Within the royal family, succession to the kingship did not necessarily pass to the eldest son. During his lifetime the king designated both his successor and the chief of household of the royal family—the king did not hold the position of chief of household—from among his sons, nephews, and first cousins.[70] Others of these relatives were assigned to chiefships of territories within the tribe, where they administered the fief as feudal vassals to the king and as overlords to the chiefs of kin, *pencenedl.* Still other members of the royal family were assigned territory as homesteaders; the descendants of these, as they increased, formed *wele* and *cenedl.* Once a member of the royal family was assigned land as a homesteader, he ceased to have privileges as a member of the royal family and became an ordinary tribesman.[71]

TERRITORIAL AND LAND RIGHTS

Whereas there was a close correspondence between kin and political units at the lower levels of the segmented structure, at the upper levels there was greater correspondence between political and territorial units. Wales, under its king, was a political-territorial entity, in which kin groups of the Cymry tribe were interspersed with "aliens." These included the original inhabitants of the land conquered by the Cymry, as well as later immigrants into the area. Wales was divided into three *cantref,* governed by chiefs who were often members of the royal family. Some of these chiefs may have been descendants of relatives of earlier kings, even of earlier dynasties. The *cantref*'s were subdivided in turn into *cymwd*'s, usually two *cymwd*'s to a *cantref.*[72]

The royal family, as represented by the king, was regarded as controlling all the territory of the kingdom. Right of usufruct of land was granted to tribesmen and other tenants in his name, but the king did not have the power to alienate tribal land. He was able to obtain rights of ownership and of alienation over allotments of tribal lands which had fallen into escheat through either the extinction or the revolt of the tribal kin group which had enjoyed right of usufruct of the allotment.

The concept of "escheat" appears to represent a trend toward feudal ownership. It is clear that, in general, the land was regarded as belonging to the tribe and that the king did not have the right to alienate it. According to the legendary life of St. Beuno, who is believed to have lived early in the seventh century A.D., the king granted St. Beuno land on which the saint built a church. After the church had been erected, a widow came forward to claim the land as the inheritance of her child. The widow was a tribeswoman who had married an alien. The king had taken the

land in escheat because of the extinction of male members of her kin; she claimed it for her child by the right of maternal inheritance permitted in such marriages. St. Beuno, on learning this, refused to accept the land.[73]

The king delegated control of the tribal lands to the other chiefs of *cantref*—he acted as chief of *cantref* in the territory of his capital—and the chiefs of *cantref*, in turn, appear to have delegated this control to the chiefs of *cymwd*. These last allocated to tribal kin groups the right of usufruct of specific plots of land. Land was assigned to a family, an assignment which endured for four generations. The original recipient of the grant apportioned his allotment among his sons; the youngest son received his father's farm buildings. At the next generation, since all the grandsons might not have the same number of male offspring, there was a per capita reapportionment of the holding among the grandsons. At the next generation, a similar reapportionment took place. At the end of the fourth generation, the right of usufruct to the plot reverted to the lord. Although details are lacking on the process of reassignment, it would appear that at this point the chief of the *wele* which had reached its maximum expansion applied to the chief of kin—the *pencenedl*—requesting the assignment of new lands to each household in the *wele*—sufficient land to accommodate the natural expansion of the household for four generations.

When a *wele* was subdivided at the end of four generations to form a number of new *wele*'s, these appear to have been assigned contiguous plots of land wherever possible. Information on such landholdings has been preserved in survey reports compiled by Anglo-Norman surveyors in A.D. 1335 for Denbigh, in northern Wales. Seebohm, following the data in the Denbigh Extent, mapped the *wele* holdings in several Anglo-Norman administrative districts. A study of the map and of the accompanying data indicates that, where free land was available, related kin groups were clustered together. In one case discontinuity of holdings of related kin groups was associated with the settlement of English farmers on land adjacent to the holdings of the ancestral lineage, so that some of the descendants had to be assigned land elsewhere.[74] The data suggest that, while in 1335 the holdings of related kin groups did not always constitute a continuous region uninterrupted by the holdings either of other kin groups or of aliens, there was a marked preference for territorial continuity. The law concerning the payment of blood money assumed that a preponderance of the kin liable would be found within one locality, although it accepted the possibility that some members might be scattered more widely.[75]

MEMBERSHIP IN THE TRIBE

An individual who did not belong to a *wele* and *cenedl* and the Cymric tribe by virtue of birth had few rights in comparison with the born Cymro. A born *boneddig* ("having a stock or pedigree")[76] by right received cattle, the use of tillage and grazing land, and hunting rights, when he arrived at manhood. If he insulted or injured a member of another kin group, he could call on his own kin as far as second cousins to contribute to the payment made in compensation for his act.[77] If he committed murder, he could call on collaterals through fifth cousins to help raise the

blood price, and if these relatives were unable to raise the full amount required, the murderer had the right to ask for contributions from more distant members of the *cenedl.*[78]

In north Wales it was not possible for an alien individual or family to become a member of the Cymry tribe. In south Wales, on the other hand, some aliens, *aillt,* who had been granted the use of land in tribal territory, might eventually be absorbed into the tribe. At the fourth generation of uninterrupted residence within the tribal community, when there had "arisen brothers, cousins, second cousins and third cousins, and nephews to each of those,"[79] the members of this kin group were permitted to swear an oath in defense of kin and to collect blood money for the murder of one of its members. At the ninth generation of residence, this kin group of alien origin was accepted into the full rights and responsibilities of a born Cymry.[80] It was also possible for an *aillt* family to become Cymry after four generations through intermarriage at each generation with Cymric women, "for it is the privilege of every innate Cymraes to advance a degree for her *aillt* husband with whom she shall intermarry."[81] A man was normally counted as being one degree more distant from the founding ancestor than his father; when he married a Cymric woman he advanced a second degree of distance. As a result, his descendants attained the ninth degree and full tribal membership much sooner than did an alien who took an alien wife. The first descendant of an immigrant *aillt* to achieve the ninth degree of descent, together with tribal rights and privileges, became the chief of his kin group; his kin—ascendants and collaterals as well as lineal descendants—achieved tribal status through him.[82]

DESCENT AND MARRIAGE

The process by which a family of alien origin might hasten assimilation into the tribe by marriage with Cymric women illustrates the nature of the Welsh rules of descent. The Welsh had a patrilineal bias, but descent in the female line was given weighting. "The *innate boneddig* was the fully freeborn Cymro, of pure Welsh blood, both on his father's and his mother's side, *without mixture of kin.*"[83] Normally, a young woman of the tribe had the right to expect that her family would arrange a marriage for her with a fellow tribesman. Thus the type of marriage described above was probably rare. However, its existence indicates the importance which the Welsh placed on descent through females. When such a marriage was arranged, with the permission of her paternal kin as far as second cousins, the woman's sons inherited from their maternal kin and could look to these maternal kinsmen to pay compensation for any crime they might commit.[84]

In normal marriages within the tribe, matrilocal residence—or at least matrilocal land use—was also possible; according to the law, a mother's brother or a mother's cousin had the right to share the family land.[85] Furthermore, maternal relatives, sisters, and daughters were required to contribute to the blood money payable for homicide, although each of these relatives was expected to pay only half the amount required of a patrilineally related male of comparable degree of relationship. One-third of the total was paid by the murderer, his parents, and his brothers and sisters;

of the remaining portion, the paternal kin paid two-thirds, the maternal kin, one-third.[86] When a daughter married, she received a share of the family property in movable goods which was calculated at one-half the share received by her brother when he married.[87] While the Welsh were patrilineally oriented, they were ambilineal. Descent passed through females as well as males, and maternal relatives shared in many of the rights and responsibilities of kin. Welsh law evaluated maternal and female kin as having half the weighting of paternal kin.

SUMMARY

Within the Welsh social structure, kin solidarity was strong. Rights and obligations were based on membership by birth in a series of segmented groups and on degree of genealogical relationship. At the base of the segmented structure was the extended joint family, which held land in common but which repartitioned holdings among its constituent nuclear families at each generation. Descent was asymmetrically ambilineal, with a patrilineal weighting.

While kin relationships predominated at the lower levels of the segmented structure, the feudal pattern had developed at the upper levels. The process of transition from tribalism to feudalism appears to have been a very gradual one which had begun several centuries before the Anglo-Norman conquest of the fourteenth century and was far from complete at that time. The transition was accompanied by a shift away from tribal genealogies and toward family genealogies. The royal family maintained one genealogy; the tribesmen kept their own genealogies, up to the ninth generation. The Welsh had few mechanisms for the absorption of non-kin into their kinship-structure. In the north there were none at all; in the south, alien families might be incorporated into the tribe only if they were settled in tribal land and only after a number of generations. This resistance to absorption may be due to the fact that the Cymry entered Wales as alien conquerors of a people alien in culture as well as in tribe. The early Germans enslaved the earlier inhabitants of the country they invaded, and the descendants of the three tribes who founded Rome set themselves up as an aristocratic class when Rome's conquests extended to include alien peoples. But whether based on feudal territorial-administrative units or on sociopolitical extensions of the joint family, a segmented pattern of organization was maintained.

KINSHIP TERMINOLOGY

It is possible that a search through ancient Welsh law codes would produce a series of kinship terms analogous to those found in the *Secret History*. The source consulted lists some terms which are significant of the kin ramifications. The medieval Welsh had terms for paternal collateral kin extending from brother through fifth cousin; they also had terms for great-grandchildren.[88] Since collaterals through fifth cousins were responsible for contributing to the payment of blood money, the terms for these collateral relatives had functional importance. One might expect the terms for great-grandchildren to be balanced by comparable terms for great-grandfather, in view of the Welsh practice of reallotting land at every fourth generation.

THE HIGHLAND SCOTS

TRIBAL SEGMENTATION

The ancient Scots had a segmented kin structure similar to that of the Welsh and retained their tribal genealogies longer than did the latter.[89] Even modern Scots, far removed from the tribal stage, continue to dwell on the traditional and documentary history of the tribal segments from which they are descended. Among the tribal genealogies of the ancient Scots which have been preserved, there is no record of a single, all-inclusive genealogy comparable to that reported for the first-century Germans or the nineteenth-century Kazaks. Instead, the Scots were formed into several great tribes, each with its own genealogy. A modern account of Clan Fingon, for example, opens with a tribal genealogy similar to that with which the medieval Mongols began the *Secret History*. The traditional genealogy of this clan, which was recorded in the eleventh century A.D., traces the main line of its ancestry through fifteen generations from the founder.[90] This appears to be characteristic of the Scottish tribal genealogies. "In the old genealogies each tribe is invariably traced to a common ancestor, from whom all the different branches or clans are supposed to be descended."[91] These great tribes were subdivided into segments known as *clann*'s, which had the meanings of "children or descendants"[92] and "family, stock, race,"[93] and so were analogous to the Roman *gens* and the Kazak *uru*. The term "clan" was also comparable to the Kazak *uru*, in that it referred without distinction to segments of various levels of the tribal genealogical structure.

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

The Scottish clans differed from the Kazak *uru*, in that clans at all levels were political units. "The Highlanders . . . are divided into tribes or clans, under chiefs or chieftains, and each clan is again divided into branches from the main stock, who have chieftains over them. These are subdivided into smaller branches of fifty or sixty men, who deduce their original from their particular chieftains, and rely upon them as their more immediate protectors and defenders."[94] Originally, the chief of the tribe seems to have been elected from among the chiefs of the largest segments;[95] later, with the encouragement and support of the English government, he became a feudal lord. With the advent of the feudal system, in which a hereditary king was supported by an alien government, the clans which had formed the great tribes became independent.[96]

During the feudal period the political-military organization of the clans appears to have taken a form very similar to that among the Welsh. In one way, however, the Scots differed from the Welsh. The ancestors of the Welsh Cymry entered Wales as invaders and did not readily assimilate the earlier population into tribal membership. Consequently, the larger segments of the feudal state could not be regarded as kin groups. The tribal ancestors of the Scots must have intermarried with the native population when they entered Scotland from Ireland or Denmark, for the Scottish

highlanders had the social characteristics of a homogeneous people. Even with the advent of hereditary feudal leaders, the tribesmen regarded their clan chiefs as kin.

Under the Scottish feudal system relatives of the clan chief

> formed the class of *duinewassels*, or gentry of the clan, intermediate between the chief and the body of the clan. . . . "These, again, had a circle of relations, who considered them as their immediate leaders, and who in battle were placed under their immediate command. Over them in peace, these chieftains exercised a certain authority, but were themselves dependent on the chief. . . . As the *duinewassels* received their lands from the bounty of the chief, for the purpose of supporting their station in the tribe, so these lands were occasionally resumed or reduced to provide for those who were more immediately related to the laird; hence many of this class necessarily sank into commoners. This transition strengthened the feeling which was possessed by the very lowest of the community, that they were related to the chief, from whom they never forgot they originally sprang." The Duinewassels were all cadets of the house of the chief, and each had a pedigree of his own as long, and perchance as complicated as that of his chief.[97]

Among the Scots, as among the Mongols, the growth of feudalism was accompanied by a shift from traditional tribal genealogies to written genealogies kept by chiefly families. Because these chiefly families were regarded as related to their followers, their genealogies provide a record of the branching-off of new clan segments, a process which continued long after the feudal pattern began to take form. Smibert, using historical documents of the feudal period, was able to trace the linkage of several clusters of modern clans, such as the Macintoshes, Macphersons, and Camerons, by tracing the descent of their lairds from common ancestors who lived in the twelfth century or later.[98]

TERRITORIALITY

The Scottish clans were mappable territorial units.[99] Smibert indicated the locations, past and present, of the various clans whose histories and genealogies he recounted; in so doing he demonstrated that the branching-off of new sociopolitical segments was a concomitant of geographic separation. For example, the Macleods, who occupied the two islands of Lewis and Harris, evolved two branches, one on each island.[100] He also offers an example of the fusion of various segments as a result of propinquity. The Campbell clan multiplied and expanded until it had taken over the territory formerly occupied by several smaller clans:

> The men, and even the gentry, bearing the name . . . are certainly not all Campbells, but Gaelic houses of varied denominations, enlisted into its ranks through necessity, or because they could not help themselves otherwise. But the wonder still remains, that this name and race have been able to swallow up so many others, lands and all, leaving but to a few, like Lamont and Macdougal, a corner of the ancient patrimonies of their families.[101]

As among the Hazara Mongols, each segment enjoyed rights over certain lands within the territory of the larger segment of which it was a part. This applied also to the village community, which, like the larger clan segments, was made up of kinsmen. Member families of the local community enjoyed in common the right of usufruct of pasture and bog lands appertaining to the village. Arable land was redistributed at fixed intervals among the families.[102]

SYMBOLS

Each of the clan segments had a distinguishing name. The clans also had distinguishing symbols. The best known of the clan symbols is the tartan, a colored pattern woven into cloth. However, clan tartans do not appear to be of any great antiquity. The practice of weaving tartans was first noted in the seventeenth century, long after the larger ramifications of the segmented structure had disappeared. Apparently, any individual might have a tartan woven according to his taste, although an eighteenth-century traveler in Scotland reported that "a connoisseur could tell the district where a plaid came from by its appearance."[103] It seems probable that, given the Scots' feeling of kin solidarity, the members of a kin group tended to adopt a pleasing pattern which had been devised by one of their number. One might suppose that they would be inclined to adopt a pattern worn by their chief. One of the Macpherson tartans was attributed in 1892 to the wife of the great-grandfather of the then chief of the Macphersons.[104] Smibert suggested that the Scottish Civil Wars in the seventeenth century were "largely instrumental in causing a closer adherence to fixed forms of the Tartans by the Clans"[105]—in other words, that clan tartans evolved as symbols of fighting units.

The Scots also had war cries, similar to the *uran*'s of the Kazaks. These Scottish cries are, for the most part, place names—of the chief's castle or of some lake, rock, or other natural feature within the clan territory. As among the Kazaks, the war cry appears to have been a means of rallying a fighting band and intimidating the enemy; it could be used by any group which had need for such a symbol.[106]

The Scottish clans also had badges or emblems, usually a plant or tree. Frequently, emblems were shared by clans who were descended from a common stock or who at some time in history had fought together against a common enemy. Such emblems were attached to segments at several levels in the tribal genealogical structure.[107]

Some modern clan manuals attribute coats-of-arms to the clans. Since heraldry appears to have been introduced into the British Isles by the Normans,[108] Scottish coats of arms are not pertinent to the present discussion, although heraldry may have evolved in early western Europe from emblems analogous to those of the Scottish clans.

Scottish symbols, whether tartans, war cries, or emblems, appear to have been basically a means of identifying the members of a group that fought as a unit. They were not attached to segments at any particular level in the tribal genealogical structure, and it would appear that in the past a group was free to change its symbol whenever circumstances made this desirable.

MARRIAGE AND DESCENT

Little information is available concerning the marriage regulations of the early Scots. One case encountered in the genealogy of the Macdonalds indicates that the Scots had no cultural objection to the marriage of second cousins. In the fourteenth century John, Lord of the Isles, married his second cousin, Amy McRory. Because

he was a Christian, a papal dispensation was necessary for the marriage, but the Scots themselves seem to have found nothing wrong with the union.[109] Indeed, there appears to have been a strong preference for ingroup marriage. Smibert, in recounting the genealogy of the Colquhoun family, tells of the marriage of a fourteenth-century Colquhoun with the daughter and heiress of one Goldfridus de Luss: "Buchanan of Auchmar, who could scarcely fail to know well the family annals of his friends and neighbours, admits such a marriage, but appears to hold, at the same time, that the Colquhouns and the Luss family were all of one common and native line."[110] Logan, without indicating his source, wrote of continued intermarriage within the clan.[111] It would appear that, whatever the details of Scottish marriage regulations, they did not include clan exogamy, using "clan" in either its Scottish or its anthropological meanings.

Evidence is available to indicate that the Scots were asymmetrically ambilineal with a patrilineal bias. Normally, both tribal and family genealogies traced descent through the male line. The Campbell clan, however, traces its origin to an ancestress —Eva, heiress of the O'Duins, who married the Anglo-Norman Gillespie Campbell. This marriage resulted in a change of name for the group, but the Campbell clan consisted of the kin and territories of the O'Duins.[112] Some centuries later an ancestress is found in the genealogy of the Loudon branch of the Campbell clan. In this case the heiress married a kinsman, a member of another branch of the Campbells, but in the genealogy she appears as the link in the line of succession.[113]

The Macdonald genealogy demonstrates that among the Scots, as among the medieval Mongols, a plural marriage might result in a segmentation of the clan. In the fourteenth century John Macdonald, Lord of the Isles, married his second cousin Amy McRory, who belonged to a collateral line senior to his own. Later he married Margaret Stuart, daughter of the English-supported royal house of Scotland. The clans descended from the two sons of Amy considered themselves senior to the line descended from Margaret, although the title of Lord of the Isles passed to Margaret's son.[114]

PERSISTENCE OF TRIBAL GENEALOGICAL STRUCTURE

The Scots appear to have maintained their tribal genealogical structure longer than any of the other peoples of western Europe. They evolved from tribalism into feudalism, as did so many of the peoples we have studied, but, even when the political structure was feudal in form, Scots cherished their sense of tribal genealogical kin solidarity. One might suggest several reasons for this. First, unlike the Welsh and Germans, who invaded Wales and Germany, respectively, in large tribal groups, the ancestral Scots entered Scotland in small bands. This factor seems to have encouraged the Scots to intermarry with the native population and so blend with them, much as the Turkic and Mongol ancestors of the Kazaks must have done. The Welsh and Germans, on the other hand, tended to maintain an identity separate from that of the people whose land they conquered.

Second, the Scots were comparatively isolated in their highlands, just as the

Kazaks were isolated on their steppes and the Hazara Mongols in their mountain highlands. Consequently, they were not subject to external pressures comparable to those experienced by the Khalkhas and Kalmuks. English pressures on the Scots seem to have been just strong enough to strengthen clan solidarity, not enough to destroy it. There appears to have been a free-land situation. When the Campbells expanded into the territory of neighboring clans, they did not evict the earlier occupants; they were able to assimilate them.

The Scots never achieved so extensive a tribal genealogy as did the Kazaks, but within their great tribes they seem to have maintained a genealogical flexibility which permitted the occupants of political-territorial units to consider themselves kin. Because they were settled cultivators, the Scots achieved a greater correspondence of kinship and territoriality than did the nomadic Kazaks. Because of their emphasis on kinship, they achieved a greater correspondence of kinship and territoriality than did the Hazara Mongols. Among the Scots, feudalism appears to have had the effect of regularizing their political-kin organization, not of destroying it.

RUSSIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE

EVIDENCE DERIVED FROM EARLY LAW CODES

Readily available data on early Russian social structure are even more limited than for the early Germans. There are some indications, however, that the social structure of the early Russians was of the *obok* type. Vernadsky, in his Introduction to *Medieval Russian Laws*, wrote:

> There is . . . a great similarity between the basic principles of the old Slavic common law and those of the Frankish and the Anglo-Saxon law. . . . It would be a mistake, however, to attribute the existence of all those parallels and similarities to the influence, at that early stage, of the Germanic law on the Slavic, or vice versa. The similarity must have been chiefly the result of the similarity in general conditions of life, in social organization . . . rather than that of a conscious imitation on the part of either of them.[115]

If one accepts the presence of *obok* structure in early western Europe and Vernadsky's conclusions concerning the similarities between the early Slavs and the early Germans, then one might expect *obok* structure to have existed in Russia.

That the joint family stood at the base of the social structure is indicated by early law codes relating to inheritance. On the death of the head of the family, the estate was divided equally among his children. This apparently referred to male children, for in another article it is stated that "if there is [an unmarried] sister in the house, she has no share in the estate, but her brothers marry her [off] with such dowry as they can."[116] If the children were small at the time of the father's death, the widow might administer the estate until they became of age, or, if she remarried, "he who is their nearest relative assumes care of them as well as of all their property . . . until they be of age."[117]

There is also a hint of extended family solidarity in the first article of the first Russian law code, compiled in the reign of Iaroslav (A.D. 1015–54), concerning blood vengeance:

ARTICLE 1. If a man kills a man [the following relatives of the murdered man may avenge him]: the brother is to avenge his brother; the son, his father; or the father, his son; and the son of the brother [of the murdered man] or the son of his sister.[118]

Concerning this law, Vernadsky commented: "The old custom of blood revenge is here limited by the prince's authority in so far that a precise list of the relatives entitled to avenge a murder is offered."[119] There is a suggestion that we have here an enumeration of the members of a truncated sliding lineage, once more extensive, almost at the moment of its disappearance as a legal entity. Twenty years after this code was written, the sons of Iaroslav abolished the practice of blood vengeance. In this first article of the most ancient code there is an indication of asymmetrical ambilineality similar to that found among the medieval Welsh. A sister's son as well as a brother's son might avenge a murder. These early law codes give only hints of the early social structure of the Slavs. At the time they were compiled, the Russians had already left tribal society behind and were moving toward a state structure.

MODERN KIN ORGANIZATION

In modern Russia the joint family prevailed among the peasants up to the time of the Soviet Revolution. More extensive local kin groups appear to have endured into the nineteenth century, for, according to Maine, "the Russian peasants of the same village really believe . . . in their common ancestry."[120]

Although the family was essentially patrilineal and patrilocal, there was in the twentieth century a strong ambilineal tendency. Daughters as well as sons inherited family property, and descent occasionally passed through a female link. If a family had no sons, a daughter's husband was adopted to carry on the family line.[121] Actually, the peasants of central Russia appear to have been ambilocal. Sons-in-law were frequently taken into the family of the bride, even when there were sons; the decision as to whether a newly married couple joined the husband's family or the wife's depended on the amount of land available to each family and the number of men needed to cultivate it.[122] Marriage regulations provided for a symmetrically ambilineal exogamy; marriage was forbidden between kin related within four "links," i.e., between third cousins, whatever the line of relationship.[123]

Such fragments of information as we have assembled suggest that tribalism was already giving way to feudal statehood at the time the first law codes were compiled but that the joint family, which is basic to *obok* structure, survived into the twentieth century. The asymmetrical ambilineality would appear to preclude clan structure. Perhaps the strongest present evidence of former *obok* structure is to be found in the vocabulary.

KINSHIP TERMINOLOGY

Russian writers have no vocabulary difficulties in discussing Central Asian tribal groupings. Russian terms ready for use in describing segments of tribal genealogical structure are: *plemiya* ("tribe, race, generation, family"); *vetv'* ("branch, bough, twig"); *koleno* ("knee, joint, node; tribe, generation"); *rod* ("family, generation, kin, tribe").[124] In usage, *plemiya* has the connotation of a larger segment, *rod* of a

smaller one, whereas *vetv'* and *koleno* emphasize the segmented nature of the group rather than the size. None of these terms is at all precise, however, and any of them might be applied to the same tribal segment in different contexts.

Rod appears to have been the basic Russian term for kin or kin group comparable to the medieval Mongol *obok* and the Roman *gens*. As a root, *rod* contributes to *rodit'sya*, "to engender"; *roditel'*, "father"; *roditeli*, "parents, forebears"; *rodstvo*, "relationship, kinship, parentage, blood, consanguinity"; *rodonachal'nik*, "ancestor, progenitor, forefather"; *rodovoy*, "ancestral, tribal, patrimonial," as in *rodovaya mest'*, "blood feud," and *rodovoi pomest'e*, "patrimony"; and *rodina*, "native country." According to a Russian informant, *rodonachal'nik* also was applied to the head of an extended family peasant household in central Russia.

To continue our list of derivatives of *rod*, there are *rodoslovie* and *rodoslovnaya*, both meaning "genealogy" or "pedigree"; *rodoslovnoe derevo*, "family tree"; and *rodstvennik*, "kinsman, relative, kin." This last may be qualified by descriptive modifiers to denote relationships according to their position as "near" (*blizkiy*), "distant" (*dal'niy*), collateral (*r. po bokovoy linii*), ascendant (*r. po voskhodyashchey linii*), paternal (*r. po ottsu*), or maternal (*r. po materi*). All these terms refer to line, direction, and degree of distance of genealogical relationship.

The Russians have no term for "cousin" except for *kusen*, borrowed from western Europe. Instead, they have terms, built on the root *rod*, for "first cousin," and so on up to "fourth cousin"—"relatives of the fifth joint"—which is applied to distant collateral relatives in general.

Russian kinship terms include elementary isolating terms for all primary relationships and for a number of affinal relationships as well. The terms for consanguineal ascendants, descendants, and collaterals shown in Table 18 are lineal throughout; they do not distinguish the line of relationship, whether through male or female. However, Russians are able to make such a distinction by means of modifiers whenever the occasion demands, as in *brat moego ottsa*, "my father's brother," and *babushka po materi*, "maternal grandmother."

It is hoped that this cursory statement will provoke a more intensive study of the literature in search of data concerning Russian social structure. The rich vocabulary referring to line of descent, degree of distance of relationship, and tribal segments suggests that a genealogically segmented structure must have been deep-seated in Russian culture.

OBOK STRUCTURE IN EUROPE

THE GENEALOGICAL PATTERN

Our discussion of the social structure of several selected European societies has been based on very limited research. However, the data available point toward the former presence of an *obok* structure in western Europe rather than to a "clan" structure in the anthropological meaning of that term. In parts of the Balkan area, a genealogical segmented lineage structure survived into the twentieth century.[125] The present writer is not the first to have observed *obok* characteristics in the

TABLE 18

MODERN RUSSIAN KINSHIP TERMS

Relationship	Term
Fa	*otets*
Mo	*mat'*
So	*syn*
Da	*doch'*
Br	*brat*
Si	*sestra*
FaFa, MoFa	*ded*
FaMo, MoMo	*babushka*
FaFaFa, MoFaFa, FaMoFa	*praded*
FaFaMo, MoFaMo, FaMoMo, MoMoMo	*prababushka*
FaFaFaFa and more distant lineal ascendants	*prapraded*
FaFaFaMo, etc.	*praprababushka*
SoSo, DaSo	*vnuk*
SoDa, DaDa	*vnuchka*
SoSoSo, SoDaSo, DaSoSo, DaDaSo	*pravnuk*
SoSoDa, SoDaDa, DaSoDa, DaDaDa	*pravnuchka*
SoSoSoSo and more distant male descendants	*prapravnuk*
SoSoSoDa, and more distant female descendants	*prapravnuchka*
Descendant, offspring	*potomok*
FaBr, MoBr	*dyadya*
FaSi, MoSi	*tetka*
FaBrSo, FaSiSo, MoBrSo, MoSiSo	*dvoyurodnyy brat; plemyannik*
FaBrDa, FaSiDa, MoBrDa, MoSiDa	*dvoyurodnyy sestra; plemyannitsa*
male second cousin	*troyurodnyy brat*
female second cousin	*troyurodnyy sestra*
male third cousin	*chetveroyurodnyy brat*
female third cousin	*chetveroyurodnyy sestra*
fourth cousin, distant relative	*rodstvenniki do piatogo koleno*
Hu	*muzh*
Wi	*zhena*
SoWi	*snokha*
SoWi, BrWi	*nevestka*
DaHu, SiHu	*zyat'*
WiFa	*test'*
WiMo	*tëshcha*
WiBr	*shurin*
WiSi	*svoyachenitsa*
WiSiHu	*svoyak*
HuFa	*svëkor*
HuMo	*svekrov'*
HuBr	*dever'*
HuSi	*zolovka*

European subcontinent. Sir Henry Sumner Maine, who was widely read in early European legal codes, came to the conclusion that European tribal structure was of the type which we have called "tribal genealogical" or *obok*. The following quotation sums up his frequently expressed views:

The tribes of men with which the student of jurisprudence is concerned are exclusively those belonging to the races now universally classed, on the ground of linguistic affinities, as Aryan and Semitic. Besides these he has at most to take into account that portion of the outlying mass of mankind which has lately been called Uralian, the Turks, Hungarians, and Finns. The characteristic of all these races, when in the tribal state, is that the tribes themselves, and all subdivisions of them, are conceived by the men who compose them as descended from a single male ancestor. Such communities see the Family group with which they are familiar to be made up of the descendants of a single living man, and of his wife or wives; and perhaps they are accustomed to that larger group, formed of the descendants of a single recently deceased ancestor, which still survives in India as a compact assemblage of blood-relatives, though it is only known to us through the traces it has left in our Tables of Inheritance. The mode of constituting groups of kinsmen which they see proceeding before their eyes they believe to be identical with the process by which the community itself was formed. Thus the theoretical assumption is that all the tribesmen are descended from some common ancestor, whose descendants have formed sub-groups, which again have branched off into others, till the smallest group of all, the existing Family, is reached. I believe I may say that there is substantial agreement as to the correctness of these statements so long as they are confined to the Aryan, Semitic, and Uralian races.[126]

TRANSITION TO FEUDALISM

Maine was also concerned with the processes of transition from tribe to state in Europe. We have seen that the early Germans as described by Tacitus were semi-nomadic stockbreeders and cultivators who held territory as a tribe or tribal confederation and who allotted to smaller subdivisions of the tribe the right of usufruct of portions of the tribal territory. These early Germans had not only the segmented structure of the *obok* pattern but also a tribal genealogy. In fourteenth-century Wales the tribesmen were semisedentary cultivators and herders. The tribal territory and its population were administered by a feudal lord and his vassals, who held some land as owners but allotted right of usufruct of tribal land to extended families among the tribesmen. When an extended family multiplied and split up to form a series of new extended families, the kin attempted to expand into adjacent territory. When free land was not available, however, some families were assigned land apart from their kin. The kin group was not always localized, and the larger districts of the feudal administration no longer constituted kin groups.

Maine, in the course of his extensive research, found that regularly, when the European tribes settled down on the land and kin were separated from kin in their landholdings, there was a shift in emphasis from kin communities to land communities. The transition, however, was a very gradual one:

It has long been assumed that the tribal constitution of society belonged at first to nomad communities, and that, when associations of men first settled down upon land, a great change came over them. But the manner of transition from nomad to settled life, and its effects upon custom and idea, have been too much described . . . from mere conjecture of the probabilities; and the whole process . . . has been conceived as more abrupt than such knowledge as we

have would lead us to believe it to have been. . . . From the moment when a tribal community settles down finally upon a definite space of land, the Land begins to be the basis of society in place of the Kinship. The change is extremely gradual, and in some particulars it has not even now been fully accomplished, but it has been going on. . . . The constitution of the Family through actual blood-relationship is of course an observable fact, but, for all groups of men larger than the Family, the Land on which they live tends to become the bond of union between them, at the expense of Kinship, ever more and more vaguely conceived.[127]

The transition from kin to territorial emphasis was in process in fourteenth-century Wales; in fourteenth-century Scotland the idea that territorial units should also be kin units still prevailed.

As a further part of this transition, European tribal chiefs were transformed into feudal lords:

It has often . . . been noticed that a Feudal Monarchy was an exact counterpart of a Feudal Manor, but the reason of the correspondence is only now beginning to dawn upon us, which is, that both of them were in their origin bodies of assumed kinsmen settled on land and undergoing the same transmutation of ideas through the fact of settlement. The history of the larger groups ends in the modern notions of Country and Sovereignty; the history of the smaller in the modern notions of Landed Property.[128]

In the political transition from tribe to feudal state, the chiefs of great tribes became kings or barons; those of tribal subdivisions became lesser lords, who held land and exercised authority over the inhabitants of the land as vassals to the king. Ambitious young men became knights by attaching themselves to some chief in a fashion similar to that followed by young Germans described by Tacitus and by young Mongols at the time when Chinggis Khan was building his empire. Tribesmen became farmers, who paid taxes in goods and services to their leader in return for protection and who followed him in time of war. As feudalism developed and the feeling of kinship between lord and follower weakened, these taxes sometimes became onerous. But it is probable that they originated from the contributions which kinsmen made voluntarily to their chief, in the spirit of modern Hazara Mongols, who supply their leader with the provisions he needs to carry out the duties of a chief.

The segmentation of the tribal genealogical structure lends itself readily to adaptation to the feudal pattern, for the pattern of territorial segmentation is administratively convenient. When kinsmen become separated from one another, the sense of kinship gradually fades and is replaced by a feeling of common cause derived from the sharing of a common territory. The transformation is a gradual one, as Maine observed. The loss of kin feeling among the larger segments of the structure is not accompanied by a sudden breakdown in the whole kin structure. In fourteenth-century Wales the tribal chief had become a feudal lord, who administered the country through vassal lords. But below this feudal superstructure, segmentation based on genealogical kinship remained predominant. In highland Scotland the sense of kinship between tribesmen and chief persisted long after the chief had taken on some of the attributes of the feudal lord. Everywhere in Europe, family genealogies gradually replaced tribal genealogies.

ATTENUATION OF EXTENDED KIN TIES

The joint family, from which the tribal genealogical system developed, has persisted sporadically into the twentieth century in western Europe. Even in the United States some fully functioning three- and four-generation joint families of European origin are still to be encountered. Although these are admittedly rare, United States laws and practices in inheritance tend to reflect the joint family of an earlier period when widow and offspring had a clear right to the family property on the death of its head. Concerning this, Parsons wrote: "The American law of intestacy . . . gives all children, regardless of birth order or sex, equal shares. But even more important, the actual practice of wills overwhelmingly conforms to this pattern."[129]

Rome had already become a conquest state by the earliest period for which we have historical documentation. However, many of the traditional thirty-five tribes incorporated before 241 B.C. bore gentile names, and when new tribes were created which were not genetic but only territorial-administrative units, this was regarded as an innovation. This suggests that many of Rome's neighbors retained the tribal kin pattern at the time of their incorporation. A segmented kin structure persisted into the historical period. Within the historical period the *gens* changed from a kin group which exercised some functions as guardians of orphans and incompetents to an aggregation of families which had little in common other than the family name. The segmented pattern persisted chiefly in the use of the nomen and cognomen.

The Roman state assumed many of the regulatory functions of the *gens* over member families. The joint family persisted, however. According to the legal codes of the sixth century A.D., property, with some exceptions, was still held to belong to the family. Family genealogies persisted throughout the historical period and, indeed, continue to be cherished up to the present time.

One might conclude from our brief review of early European social structure that among peoples who had *obok* structure the breakdown of tribal life did not at once, or even within a few centuries, obliterate the segmented genealogical pattern. The upper levels lost their functions gradually or became transmuted into feudal structure. Lineage solidarity continued under feudalism; long after lineage solidarity had disappeared, the joint family continued. Even when that began to fade out, an interest in family genealogies lingered on.

THE LINES OF DESCENT

All the European tribes had a patrilineal bias, but, among those for which evidence is available, asymmetrical ambilineality was characteristic. In Rome, the only society for which we have a record running over several centuries, there was a gradual change from strong emphasis on the paternal line in the period when the Twelve Tables were operative to nearly full ambilineality in the sixth century A.D., when the *Code of Justinian* was compiled. There appears to have been a similar shift in emphasis among the Russians.

Material is not available to the writer to permit a tracing of the practices of descent and inheritance among the Welsh and Scots over a period comparable to

that between the Twelve Tables and the *Code of Justinian* among the Romans. Consequently, we cannot know whether there was a comparable change from strong patrilineality toward ambilineality among the peoples of western Europe. We can only note that the peoples of Europe have been asymmetrically ambilineal—examples of descent, inheritance, or succession through females are readily found—and that in modern times there has been a marked shift toward ambilineality. For example, in many parts of the United States, which has a European cultural heritage, the kin structure has become almost entirely ambilineal. Often only the inheritance of the father's family name gives a weighting toward patrilineality.

In the present study it has been possible only to suggest the outlines of European tribal kin structure and of the processes of gradual disintegration of kin ties which occurred as tribe was transformed into state. Studies by anthropologists of historical documents relating to various parts of Europe might greatly enhance our understanding of the nature of *obok* structure and the processes by which it changes.

KINSHIP TERMINOLOGY

There is little possibility of obtaining kinship terms for most of tribal Europe, although a search through early historical documents might disclose the pattern or patterns current during the period of gradual transition from tribe to state. In most parts of modern Europe elementary terms are limited to the primary relationships; terms for all other relationships—ascendant, descendant, and collateral—tend to be lineal. "Uncle," for example, refers equally to father's brother and to mother's brother. In Montenegro, however, where tribal structure persisted until modern times, paternal and maternal relatives are denoted by distinct terms.[130]

In western Europe there is comparatively little terminological concern with degree of distance or generation of collateral relatives. "Cousin" is a classificatory term which may be applied to a considerable number of collateral relatives. The terms "clan," "sib," and "gens," which originally were comparable to the medieval Mongol *obok*, have lost their meaning to such an extent that anthropologists have felt free to give them meanings which are often quite different from those recorded in historical dictionaries. Among the modern Russians, on the other hand, *rod* retains what appears to be its original meaning, and Russians are still terminologically concerned with the degree of distance of collateral relatives.

In general, although modern Europeans are inclined to employ classificatory terms extensively in everyday usage, they, like modern Arabs and imperial Romans, are able to denote any relationship precisely by the use of affixes or descriptive modifiers. Not only anthropologists and lawyers but also laymen regularly take advantage of this linguistic phenomenon of western Eurasia. It was this characteristic which Morgan apparently had in mind when he classed kinship terminologies into two broad categories, "descriptive" and "classificatory."[131] A terminology system can be denotative without being descriptive, as is demonstrated by Chinese kinship terminology. However, the term "descriptive" remains generally descriptive of the kinship terminologies of western Eurasia, the area which Morgan had in mind when he coined the term.

PART IV

East Asia

CHAPTER X

CHINA

WHEN the seminomadic European tribes settled permanently on the land, their segmented structure became attached to the political-territorial units of feudalism, and their extensive kinship system gradually disintegrated. China passed through a feudal period, but became a conquest state with a centralized government before the beginning of the Christian Era. One might expect, on the basis of the European pattern of change, that segmented kin structure would long since have disappeared in China. This did not happen. Beneath the superstructure of a central governmental administration, segmented kin groups persisted through the millennia into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. China has frequently been credited with having a "clan" structure, in the anthropological meaning of that term. In a recent study by Hsien Chin Hu, data are presented which show clearly the genealogically segmented patterning of Chinese society, particularly in central and eastern China.[1]

CLOSE KIN

At the base of the structure is the patrilocal joint family, *chia*, which usually comprises three generations of paternal kin and their spouses but may include four or even five generations. One family famous in Chinese history continued for nine generations without splitting into smaller joint family households.[2] Normally, however, the family property is divided, and new households are formed by the sons on the death of the father. This splitting-up of the family into smaller units does not imply a break in the continuity of kin solidarity.

Binding members of several households together is the circle of mourning relatives, "which comprises all those descended from one great-great-grandfather."[3] "These relatives not only are obliged to attend each other's family rites: births, weddings and funerals, but also act as negotiators and arbitrators in disputes arising within and between the individual *chia*. At the division of property particularly, the elders in the circle of mourning relatives make decisions and witness the transaction."[4] The circle of mourning relatives is a "sliding lineage" similar to the Arabic *ahl* and has no permanence in its membership.

TSU ORGANIZATION

Above the circle of mourning relatives is the larger, more permanent, kinship group known as *tsu:*

> The *tsu* regards itself as having grown out of one single family, that of the founder, and relationship terms and approved patterns of behavior are derived from family organization.

If any emotional appeal is made, it is in terms of obligations such as exist among near relatives. Since inter- and intra-family dissension endangers the solidarity of the *tsu*, the group is vitally interested in maintaining harmonious relations between members and discourages behavior that might break up its individual units.[5]

This characterization of the *tsu* might be applied to a "clan." Evidence is presented elsewhere, however, which indicates the existence of *tsu*'s segmented into at least three genealogical levels. The segmented kin structure did not reach its apex at the major *tsu*, however. Hu writes of "*tsu* aggregates," which were apparently federations of *tsu*'s which bore a common family name and traced descent, real or fictitious, from a common ancestor. Furthermore, she refers to one *tsu* aggregate in Kwangtung Province, where the segmented kin structure was highly developed, which was subdivided into *lien*, "federations."[6]

Although *tsu* was the term generally applied to groups at the several levels in the segmented structure, the Chinese, like the Arabs, had terms by which *tsu*'s of one level might be distinguished from those of another. Terms were employed such as *fang*, which usually refers to the nuclear family unit within an extended family household;[7] *fên*, meaning "part";[8] *chu*, "column";[9] and *ku*, "branch."[10] As in the case of the Arabic terminology, these terms had no specific meaning in themselves as referring to kin groups. But, like the Arabs, the Chinese appear to have felt a need for differentiating among *tsu*'s at different levels in the segmented structure, and so within a region or *tsu* they appropriated from their general vocabulary such terms as seemed suitable.

Genealogies were kept by *tsu*'s and sometimes by families. Often at New Year's ceremonies the births, deaths, and marriages that had occurred within the year were reported by the family heads and recorded at the local headquarters of the *tsu*.[11] Nearly all localized *tsu*'s had printed genealogies which were revised on an average of every thirty years. Copies were deposited in the ancestral halls of the *tsu* and its subdivisions, with subdivision leaders, and with some families.[12] Individual families who belonged to no *tsu* organization frequently kept a hand-written genealogy, and sometimes *tsu*'s of the same surname who were settled in different localities compiled combined genealogies tracing the descent of the several *tsu*'s from a remote common ancestor.[13]

UNIFYING FACTORS OF *TSU* ORGANIZATION

The Chinese *tsu* was more formally organized than the segments in most parts of Eurasia for which we have data. Indeed, Hu wrote that "the *tsu* derives its strength from the maximizing and formalizing of kinship ties."[14] One of the ties that holds *tsu* members together is the written genealogy. Closely associated with the genealogy is the ancestor cult. "As the ancestors are the main symbol by which the solidarity of the *tsu* is maintained, the rites of ancestor veneration are the means for reminding the members of their affiliations with the group."[15]

Ceremonies of the ancestor cult were performed at several levels in the segmented kin structure. In the home, ancestral rites were performed once a year for four gen-

erations of ancestors—from the father to the great-great-grandfather. The participants in this ritual, which was held in the central hall of the home, in a special room, or, among the wealthy, in a special ancestral hall, comprised the members of the circle of mourning relatives. Families who lived some distance from the *tsu* ancestral hall kept tablets for a more extended number of ancestors.[16]

The localized *tsu* maintained an ancestral hall, as did *tsu*'s at higher levels in the segmented hierarchy. In general, the parent *tsu* maintained its ancestral hall. When segments of the *tsu* split off and moved to other localities in search of land, its members at first returned to the parent ancestral hall for the annual ceremonies whenever this was possible. But "as it grows into a *tsu* it soon thinks of constructing its own. The *tsu* of Informant P in Kwangtung had moved into their present village only fifty years ago. The parent village lying at some distance, the annual visit was soon felt as too inconvenient, and they built their own ancestral hall."[17] Thus, as new segments formed, there was a proliferation of ancestral halls. All the members of the local group venerated their ancestors at the local ancestral hall. They sent delegates to participate in the ceremonies held at the halls of the several parent segments from which they were derived.[18]

In addition to the ancestor cult and the ancestral hall which served as the center of cult activities, the *tsu* maintained other projects and property which contributed to a closely knit kin solidarity. The *tsu* often maintained *i-t'ien*, "land for common welfare," which was usually established by deed of some prosperous member of the *tsu* to provide for impoverished members of the *tsu* community and for projects of benefit to the whole *tsu* group. Sometimes funds from this source were employed to provide education for promising young members of the *tsu*.[19] At other times wealthy members of the *tsu* granted land specifically for the support of a school, or scholars undertook to teach the children of their *tsu* without charge.[20] Such communal foundations were found at various levels of the segmented structure, depending on the wishes of the donor.

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Because of the many activities in which the *tsu* engaged, more formal leadership was required than among many of the peoples we have studied:

> The rites of aggregation, the ancestral ritual, have to be decided upon and organized. The disputes and disharmonies in individual *chia* have to be smoothed out. Regard for the traditional patterns of *li* and ethical attitudes has to be enforced, the education of the young to be attended to, and the common property of the *tsu* to be administered. If it inhabits a single village, civic responsibilities, like the building of roads and bridges, have to be attended to. Further, friendly relations with other groups have to be maintained, and in any difference with another *tsu* or village the interests of the group have to be represented. This is necessary also when the *tsu* has to deal with government authorities. If any member has difficulties with these authorities, the *tsu* leaders are expected to give him every possible assistance, the group to a certain extent bearing a joint responsibility for the conduct of its members.[21]

Administrative responsibilities were in the hands of an appointive official, who was assisted by an informal advisory council of *tsu* members. The localized *tsu* had

the greatest administrative burden, but *tsu* and *tsu* aggregates at higher levels in the segmented structure also had their administrative officers.[22]

Above the *tsu* organization was superimposed the bureaucratic structure of the Chinese central government. The Chinese state was not a kin organization, although under the emperor it had some kin attributes, such as the imperial ancestor cult and other rituals regarded as necessary to the welfare of Chinese society. Confucianism, with its code of respect for and obedience to the head of the family, was regarded as reinforcing the strength of the state.

Kinship played no part in the administration of the central government. Indeed, under the empire it was forbidden to appoint officials to administrative positions in their home provinces, since it was taken for granted that an official would favor the interests of his kin rather than those of his country. The central government was, nevertheless, to a large extent dependent on the *tsu* organization for local administration:

> In rural districts far from the capital the county magistrate has to take into account the wishes of the leaders of the most important *tsu*. For his own sake he often finds it advisable to refrain from interference with the autonomy of the group, particularly in judicial matters, until he is formally consulted. . . . By joining with other *tsu* on the basis of kinship, real or fictional, the common descent group may even exert pressure on the provincial administration.[23]

The evolution of political-kin organization took a different direction from that in western Europe. There the fading-away of the segmented kin structure was a concomitant of the development of statehood. In China segmented kin groups retained their vigor and participated in local political administration. Many activities which in the West are a function of the state were in China delegated by the state to the kin group.

LOCALIZATION OF *TSU*'S

Although there was not a complete coincidence between kin group and locality or territory, there was a marked cultural preference for *tsu* localization. In central and eastern China, where *tsu* organization was most highly developed, "many villages are inhabited completely or predominantly by people of a single surname, recognizing a relationship among themselves. A few families of different surnames may be tolerated, but they are always regarded as strangers, even after generations of residence, and have no part in community affairs."[24]

Statistics are available for one county in western Kiangsi, the population of which was grouped into 1,291 villages. In 1871 nearly 87 per cent of these villages had inhabitants of one surname only; less than 1 per cent had more than four surnames in the village.[25] These statistics, although they relate to a limited region, suggest that local groups were predominantly and ideally kin groups, although kin segments in their broader ramifications might be scattered. Dr. Shu-ching Lee, a native of north China near the Korean border, whose ancestors migrated there from Shantung, stated that in his region single-surname villages were in a minority. According to Dr. Lee, the difference between villages of one surname and those in

which families of several surnames shared a village was generally a geographical one. In hilly areas a family was able to settle in a river basin and expand throughout the valley without competition from unrelated families. In the fertile plains of north China, where the population was greater and the villages were much larger, three, four, or even five kin groups shared a single village. In such a multi-kin village, each kin group had its own *tsu* organization.[26] In matters pertaining to the welfare of the whole village or the relations of the village with the central government, the several *tsu*'s usually co-operated.

When a *tsu* flourished, the excess population expanded by preference into adjacent localities. But if land were not available nearby, the splinter groups, of necessity, moved farther afield, even into other provinces. Whether splinter segments clustered in the neighborhood of the parental *tsu* or scattered into other regions depended entirely on the availability of land.

In north China *tsu* organization did not normally extend beyond the village, although its members retained the tradition of kinship with *tsu*'s of the same name in neighboring villages and in the ancestral homeland. In central and eastern China, where there was an elaboration of *tsu* organization, the village appears to have been predominantly a kin community, and branches of the parent *tsu* settled in adjacent land whenever possible. When branches were forced to scatter into other localities and even other provinces, because of land scarcity, the obligations of the ancestor cult served as a tie between related *tsu*'s.

On occasion, a *tsu* might split into two or more branches within a single village, and each establish its own graveyard and ancestral hall.[27] In general, however, the first step in the formation of a *tsu* branch was the settlement of a family some distance away from the ancestral village. Because of distance and new interests, the migrant group established its own ancestral hall and took on functions analogous to those of the parent *tsu*. But the parent *tsu* employed "every means . . . to hold the allegiance of faraway members."[28] In spite of the strong drive toward maintaining relations with the ancestral *tsu*, ties were often broken as a consequence of separation in time and space. There was a counter tendency, however, for separate *tsu*'s to seek out a common ancestor with other *tsu*'s of the same surname in the region of residence. By a comparison of the genealogies of the several *tsu*'s, it was usually possible to discover a common ancestor, real or fictitious. Once kinship had been established, a *tsu* federation was formed.[29]

While the sedentary economy and the scarcity of cultivable land in China did not permit a close correlation between kin group and territorial group, the evidence indicates that territoriality was associated with kinship in the Chinese mind. The formation of a new *tsu* branch as a consequence of migration to another locality or region was similar to the process of formation of a new lineage among the Hazara Mongols. Although the written genealogies of the Chinese *tsu* were much more rigid than the traditional tribal genealogies of the medieval Mongols or Kazaks, they were susceptible to interpretations which permitted the *tsu*'s occupying the same region to find a common ancestor somewhere in the dim past.

SURNAME EXOGAMY

Altogether, the segmented genealogical pattern survived in China to a remarkable degree. The ancestor cult and the keeping of genealogies have undoubtedly contributed to this survival. Another practice which perhaps encouraged a continuing sense of kinship among kin long separated was that of the family surname. The institution of the family surname would seem to have evolved from the use of the tribal name as a means of identification. This transition occurred among the Dagor and Chahar Mongols in recent centuries, and in modern Iran erstwhile tribesmen adopt their tribal name as a family surname when they enter societies where the use of surnames is in order.

But, although the surname in China may once have implied genealogical relationship, it no longer does. "Today one rarely meets with a surname which does not occur in the *Hundred Family Names*, containing about 470 names."[30] Since China has an estimated population of over four hundred and fifty million, this means that, on the average, nearly a million people bear the same surname. It is highly improbable that, given the invasions to which China has been subjected throughout history and the non-Chinese peoples who have been absorbed by an expanding Chinese population, all people bearing the same surname are related.

The Chinese themselves harbor no belief that a common surname demonstrates descent from a common ancestor. It is well established that many non-Chinese have, in the process of Sinification, adopted traditional Chinese names and that such families are unrelated to those of authenticated Chinese ancestry bearing the same name.[31] On the other hand, many families whose remote ancestors branched off from the parent stem and migrated to other parts of China have forgotten their original kin affiliations.

The Chinese, like the medieval Mongols, forbid marriage with paternal kin, no matter how distantly related. Because families bearing the same surname might possibly be related, marriage was forbidden between any two families of the same surname. If people of the same name were to marry and discover later a common paternal ancestor, they would "feel very wrong."[32] It would appear that the family-name exogamy of the Chinese is associated with an early evolution of tribal name into family name. Among the early medieval Mongols, who did not have family names, the group sharing a common tribal name—Mongol—was regarded as related through descent from a common ancestor. Since it was forbidden to marry any paternal kin, no matter how distantly related, it was likewise forbidden to marry anyone of the same tribal name. Among the eastern Mongols subject to Chinese cultural influence, tribal names became family names—among the Chahars, Dagors, and the Khalkha aristocracy. These peoples adopted family-name exogamy. Khalkha commoners, who did not have surnames, based their marriage regulations on traceable genealogical relationship. Although the eastern Mongols probably adopted the practice of the surname from the Chinese, it seems likely that the Chinese them-

selves, long ago, effected the transition from tribal name to family name and that family-name exogamy is a heritage of tribal exogamy.

KINSHIP TERMINOLOGY

The Chinese have a completely denotative system of kinship terms. There are elementary terms for all the primary relationships—this includes a distinction between older and younger siblings—and also for a considerable number of other relatives. Beyond these there are compound terms for a large number of relationships. Altogether, Fêng lists terms for 176 paternal relationships, for 62 maternal, for 34 relationships through the wife, and 10 through the husband.[33]

The compound terms are not of the derivative or descriptive type found in western Eurasia. In Chinese, precise relationships are denoted by combining elementary terms with classifying terms in such a way that any given combination, although made up largely of classifiers, refers to only one relationship.[34] By means of this system, the Chinese distinguish relative age within generation for brothers of paternal ancestors as far back as great-grandfather and of mother's and wife's father. There are also separate terms for the wives of these ascendant collaterals. In ego's generation relative age within generation is distinguished not only for brothers but for sisters of ego and of his wife. The wife, however, distinguishes relative age within a generation only for the brothers of her husband. A single term is employed for husband's sisters.

The Chinese have terms for four generations of ascendants and four generations of descendants in the male line. Fêng lists terms for four additional generations of descendants which he culled from a document dating back to the third or second century B.C.[35] Terms for maternal ascendants include that for "mother's father's father." In a patrilineal system there are, of course, no maternal descendants.

There are terms for paternal collateral relatives descended from a common great-great-grandfather. At each generation the sons of older and younger brothers of the lineal ancestor are merged in a common term; there are terms for the children of sisters of the head of all collateral lines, but the descendants of these do not usually continue social relations with ego's line, so that kinship terms are not needed. Fêng points out, however, that "if the relationships are maintained, terms could easily be constructed."[36]

Essentially, the kinship terms in use apply to the members of the "circle of mourning relatives," which is a sliding lineage. At each generation a peripheral collateral line is lost from the kin group, and a new collateral line is formed from within.

The Chinese terminology system is a completely denotative one, and a considerably larger number of relationships are denoted than among the Romans or the Arabs. It differs from these, however, in that it does not denote specific relationships by means of descriptive terms but rather by a combination of classificatory terms. As Fêng has pointed out, the Chinese classify relationships according to generation and age within generation; according to line—whether consanguineal or affinal,

lineal or collateral—and according to sex of the relative referred to and of the connecting relative.[37] They do not, however, arrive at what is usually regarded as a classificatory system of terminology. In their terminological concern with relative age within generation and with a number of collateral lines of relationships, the Chinese show affinities with the tribes of Central Asia.

OBOK STRUCTURE ELSEWHERE IN EAST ASIA

There is evidence to suggest the former presence of *obok* structure in other parts of East Asia—in Korea, Japan, Viet-Nam, and India. Dr. Irawati Karve, in her *Kinship Organization in India*, has presented data from traditional Indian literature which points clearly to *obok* structure in ancient north India.[38] However, we shall not attempt here to analyze social structure in East Asia other than that of the Chinese. The samples which have been presented are perhaps sufficient to provide a basis for generalizations concerning the character of *obok* structure in Eurasia.

PART V

Obok Structure and Its Implications

CHAPTER XI

CONCLUSIONS

CHARACTERISTICS OF *OBOK* STRUCTURE

WE HAVE analyzed the social structure of several sample societies in Eurasia —in Central Asia, Southwest Asia, Europe, and the Far East—insofar as data were available. Some of these societies were still tribal during the period described; some were in various stages of detribalization, and two—Rome and China—had long since left the tribal stage. By a comparison of these several peoples who have, or have had, *obok* structure, we may gain some idea of the characteristics of *obok* and the possible range of variations among both tribal societies and those who have evolved from tribalism. Of the tribal societies, the three in which the tribal genealogical pattern was most fully developed were pastoral nomads—the medieval Mongols, the Kazaks, and the Bedouin Arabs. Of the Central Asian tribes, the social structure of the Kazaks approximated most closely that of the medieval Mongols. By comparing Kazak social structure with that of the Bedouins, who belong to a different culture area, we may obtain some idea of the possible range of characteristics among tribal nomadic peoples.

Among both peoples the joint family stood at the base of the structure, and both societies were organized according to a tribal genealogical scheme which assumed the formation of tribal segments by the branching-off of nuclear family parts from a joint family base. Among both peoples the segments at different genealogical levels had names, often derived from the name of the founding ancestor, but neither people had specific terms for distinguishing groups at one level from those at another. The segmentary kin units were also territorial units; each large segment occupied, by customary right, a certain territory within the customary territory of the next larger segment. Small kin segments, however, because of the need for seasonal changes in pasturage, enjoyed the right to migrate within the territory of the smallest segment having territoriality. Among the Arabs these small segments owned wells, and among the nineteenth-century Kazaks comparable segments had established rights to the camp sites of winter quarters. Among both peoples the nomadic camps consisted of extended family groups. Political organization followed the lines of the segmented kin-territorial groups, insofar as there was political organization.

Kinship ties and attendant rights and responsibilities were strongest at the joint family level but were extended with considerable strength to the members of a lineage—those individuals who were descended patrilineally from a common ancestor a few generations earlier. Among the Bedouins this was a "sliding lineage"; that

is, at each generation the most distant collateral line was dropped from the responsible kin unit, while a new collateral line was added from within. Although data are not so specific for the Kazaks, the "stairstep" terminology suggests such a sliding lineage.

Beyond the lineage, there was a gradual attenuation of kin rights and responsibilities, and the tribal genealogical organization was remarkably fluid. The migration of a fragment from the territory of one segment to that of another or the formation of new political alignments was reflected in adjustments of the tribal genealogy within a generation or two. At any given moment there might be no complete coincidence between kin, territorial, and political units; given the physical and social mobility of the nomads, there were probably few occasions when the coincidence was complete. Because there was a strong cultural drive toward conformity to the tribal genealogical pattern, the tribal genealogies themselves were constantly changing; considerable variations were to be found in the genealogies of different segments and of the same segments at different times. The genealogical pattern, however, remained constant.

Both Kazaks and Bedouins were patrilineal but gave some weighting to maternal descent. Among both, maternal descent was considered in fixing social status—that of the "white bone" class among the Kazaks, and of "pure" descent among the Bedouins.

The Kazaks were exogamous; they prohibited marriage with anyone related through paternal descent from a common ancestor eleven, seven, or four generations back, depending on region and period. The Bedouins, on the other hand, preferred marriage with father's brother's daughter, although they permitted marriage between members of any "pure" tribe. But, although the two peoples differed in this respect, they were alike in that they based their marriage regulations on genealogical relationship and not on membership in any particular group comparable to that known to anthropologists as the "clan."

It is not possible to make an exact comparison of Kazak and Bedouin kinship terminology because no extensive list of Bedouin terms is available. From the Bedouin terms at hand, it is possible to state that both had denotative terms for all the primary relationships and for father's brother and mother's sister. But the Kazaks distinguished terminologically between older and younger siblings, whereas the Bedouins did not. And, whereas the Kazaks employed classificatory terms to indicate degree of distance and line of relationship (whether through male or female) for more distant kin, the Bedouins employed descriptive modifiers to denote each relationship. The Bedouins, like the medieval Mongols—comparable data are not available for the Kazaks—made a practice of applying kinship terms to non-kin in social situations. Because most social behavior was based on kinship relationship, unrelated individuals were fitted into social contexts on the analogy of kin.

The Hazara Mongols and the medieval Scots were settled cultivators and herders, but both retained much of the tribal pattern in the period for which we have information. Among the Hazaras a segmented structure with many ramifications per-

sisted in full force. A traditional belief in the descent of the Hazara people and of various tribes and tribal segments from a common ancestor lingered on, but community of interest tended to be based more on the sharing of a common territory than on genealogical kinship. Since the Hazaras were settled village dwellers, even the smallest segments could be localized. Otherwise the Hazara structure was very similar to that of the Kazaks. The chief difference seems to have been that the Hazaras did not have so strong a cultural drive to fit the larger segments into a tribal genealogical framework and were satisfied to identify a sociopolitical segment with a locality or region. The Kazaks identified a genealogical kin segment with a region. It is possible that, when the Hazaras settled down and became less mobile, they found the regional identification easier to remember than the tribal genealogical one. Among some of the tribes, such as the Uruzgani, there was as much fluidity of alignment and realignment of segments as among the Kazaks, but these changes do not seem to have involved any extensive territorial movements. The Khitai and the Dai Chopan, for example, continued to occupy their former territories when they merged to form the Uruzgani tribe.

Among the medieval Scots the sense of kinship remained as strong as that of territoriality. When segments of one group settled in the territory of another, they absorbed the earlier occupants into their own kin group, as in the case of the Campbells. Scottish tribal genealogies appear never to have been so extensive as those of the Kazaks, Bedouins, and Hazara Mongols; each Scottish major clan had its own genealogy, but no attempt was made to construct a vast genealogy into which all the clans could be fitted. The Scottish tribal genealogy resembled most closely in extent that of the original Mongol tribe as outlined in the first chapter of the *Secret History*. It is possible that the settlement of the Scottish invaders in isolated highland valleys and their practice of ingroup marriage discouraged expansion of the genealogies beyond those recorded for the earliest period.

When feudal lords were imposed on the Scots from outside, the largest segments ceased to function as political units, but the segmented kin structure at lower levels continued in force. Perhaps it was because the most extensive clan was small and compact that a strong feeling of kinship persisted. Perhaps also the innumerable wars of the clans against the English, in which the military organization followed the segmented kin structure, encouraged the retention of a feeling of kinship among fellow clansmen.

Both the Hazaras and the Scots preferred marriage between kin. However, neither group appears to have had any objection to intermarriage with aliens settled within their territory. Both the Hazarajat and the Scottish highlands were presumably populated before the entry of the ancestral Hazaras and Scots. Since the aborigines do not survive as a class or group, it is to be supposed that the invaders, by intermarriage, absorbed the peoples whose lands they occupied. This inference is corroborated for the Hazaras by traditions that some of the Hazara tribes are of mixed ancestry.

The early Germans and Welsh, on the other hand, do not appear to have inter-

married freely with aliens. Since our information on the "slaves" of the early Germans is very limited, we cannot know whether these were later absorbed into the German tribal population. We know only that Tacitus mentioned a slave class among the Germans. For the medieval Welsh there are more detailed data which indicate that the northern Welsh tribesmen did not intermarry with either the aboriginal inhabitants or later immigrants, while in the south such intermarriage was limited. Why the Scots were ready to absorb aliens within their midst whereas the Welsh were not is not readily explainable. Perhaps a careful study of ancient Scottish and Welsh historical documents might reveal the answer.

The fact that permanent alien residents of a clan territory became members of the kin clan seems to be related to the direction which feudalism took in the Scottish highlands. There feudalism in a sense seems to have been little more than the fixing and regularization of the tribal genealogical political pattern. The feudal lairds were regarded as leaders of their fellow kinsmen, and, because they and their children usually married within the clan, they were in effect kinsmen. In one respect, early Scottish feudalism might be described as comparable to the political organization that the Kazaks might have had if they had not been so mobile and politically anarchic. The organizations of the two peoples differed in another respect, in that Kazak leaders were chosen from within the segment, whereas the laird of the major Scottish clan assigned brothers and sons to act as leaders of subclans. This gave the Scottish clan greater political cohesion than was possible among the Kazaks. Since, at each generation, collateral relatives of the chief fell back into the ranks of the tribesmen, no aristocratic class was formed among the Scots. There was only the hereditary chiefly family, which was regarded as representing the senior line of the many collateral lines which comprised the clan.

In Wales, on the other hand, where aliens were not absorbed into the tribe, classes were formed within the population; the hereditary tribal chief came more and more to be regarded as administrator of a territory and its mixed population rather than as a leader of tribal kinsmen.

In Central Asia the elements of feudalism were introduced among the nomads when kin groups became scattered in the Mongol imperial armies. After the disintegration of the Mongol empire there was a period of fluctuation between the feudal pattern and a more flexible tribal genealogical one. In Mongolia, Manchu-Chinese influence weighted the balance in favor of a feudal aristocratic class, members of which were administrators of a territory and its population rather than leaders of fellow kinsmen. The Kazaks reverted to the tribal genealogical pattern, and the aristocratic class became inconsequential. The Kalmuks appear to have reverted toward the tribal kin pattern in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but their hereditary leaders remained strong. When Kalmuk hereditary leadership was weakened by external forces, the Kalmuk segments came to be regarded as territorial and residential units rather than as kin groups. Among the Chahars, on the other hand, when their hereditary aristocracy was destroyed and they came under direct alien administration, kinship came to be emphasized—the kinship associated with

a particular surname. There appears to have been some feeling of association of kin groups with locality, but the circumstances of settlement and Chinese migration prevented any close coincidence of the two.

There is no indication that the settled Dagors ever passed through a feudal stage. Indeed, it is possible that they had no formal political organization before they came under Manchu administration; there was no hint that Manchu administration was derived from a native Dagor form, in the way that the Manchu-Chinese utilized the *aimak* and "banner" of the Khalkhas and the "pasture banner" of the Chahars. The Dagors did maintain informal mechanisms for social control at three segmentary kin levels above the household—the "close kin," the village, and the seven villages. The highest level, presumably comparable to the original tribe, survived only in the traditions of the ancestor cult and in the surname. Among the Dagors the kin segments appear to have been localized within the village or the region so far as was possible among settled peoples where adjacent space was not always available for expansion of the kin group.

In Rome and China, tribalism had long since given way to statehood at the period for which we have documentary records. Segmented kin structure had almost disappeared in Rome by the full historical period except for the segmentation of family genealogies. In China, on the other hand, a segmented kin structure survived and flourished for over two millennia after the end of the feudal period. Why was there this difference in the rate of decay? The time factor cannot be involved, for China appears to have acquired the arts of civilization and of governance earlier than the Latins. Both Rome and China had ancestor cults, and in both countries this cult was extended to the state. In Rome the ancestor cult gradually faded away. Perhaps the adoption of Christianity gave it the coup de grâce, but long before this the segmented lineage had become little more than a genealogical device by which important families kept track of distinguished collateral lines.

When Rome began its career of conquest, the original Romans became an aristocratic elite set above a populace which, as the Roman Empire expanded, became increasingly diversified in ethnic origin. Rome became a cosmopolitan center in which genealogical relationship to a person or family of consequence gave prestige but where the state had taken over many of the former functions of the extended kin group.

In China the ancestor cult flourished into modern times. The state, instead of taking over functions of the extended kin group, as in Rome, encouraged the local kin group to administer the affairs of the locality. The persistence of kin solidarity in China may perhaps be partly explained by the manner of China's growth into empire.

China grew not so much by conquest as by natural population expansion. By enculturation and intermarriage the Chinese absorbed the populations of the territories into which they expanded; they similarly absorbed the conquerors who invaded China periodically. Because of this continual process of assimilation of non-Chinese into the Chinese population and culture, there was no disruption of the

basic kin pattern such as occurred in Rome, where the small original population was overwhelmed by large numbers of immigrants of varied cultures.

Central and southeast China, where segmented kin organization reached its most extensive development in modern times, was little affected by the recurrent invasions which disturbed the population pattern of north China. Furthermore, north China is characterized by broad, fertile river plains; the dense population does not offer free land to accommodate the natural expansion of branching kin groups. Much of central and southeast China is hilly, where, as has been explained, one family may settle in a valley and expand throughout the valley without competition from other kin groups.

The ability of the Chinese to assimilate aliens and so bring these into harmony with their own pattern of segmented kin solidarity is probably one factor in the persistence of segmented genealogical structure in China. Another may have been the early development of writing among the Chinese. The Shang (*ca.* 1400–1100 B.C.) wrote out prayers and announcements to their ancestors.[1] The Chou, who followed them, continued this practice and apparently kept written genealogies. The Chinese veneration for writing made possible the recording and preservation of the philosophy of Confucius (*ca.* 550–480 B.C.). In his writings, which in later centuries came to be required reading for every schoolboy and every candidate for a civil service position, Confucius laid down rules—probably derived from the preferred practice of his day—concerning kinship obligations and ancestor cult ritual. It may be an oversimplification to say that "it is probably due more to Confucianism than to any other one factor that the cult of the dead has loomed so large in China,"[2] but it seems probable that the honor in which Confucius came to be held and the repeated reading of his *Analects* through the centuries contributed greatly to the retention of a code of family ethics and ritual from the fifth century B.C. into the twentieth century A.D.

The reasons for the different courses followed in Rome and in China are undoubtedly varied. In the West, kin segmentation and kin solidarity gradually faded away; in China they persisted. In the East the use of written genealogies gave a rigidity to the system which was absent from the tribal genealogies; but even the Chinese genealogies were capable of manipulation at upper levels in the segmented structure, so that flexibility was not completely lost. The adoption of the surname also gave rigidity, since it made difficult the absorption of non-kin into a kin group. Yet there is evidence that families or lineages changed their surnames. Around A.D. 1370, 1,918 surnames were recorded, mostly of foreign origin, whereas only about 470 names are listed in the *Hundred Family Names* of modern times.[3] Once a line changed its surname, there was a possibility of its identifying itself as collateral to a line bearing the adoptive surname.

It would seem that flexibility is an essential to *obok* structure in its full form. When the ability to adjust the pattern of genealogical kinship to the actuality of territorial population is lost, then the pattern begins to change. Political-territorial units gradually cease to be regarded as kin units, and family genealogies replace tribal genealogies.

The mobility which is a concomitant of nomadism or of a shifting cultivation such as that practiced by the early Germans appears to be most favorable to the retention of this flexibility. Yet the Scots retained the ability to absorb aliens and so to maintain the pattern of kin-territorial-political coincidence after they had become settled cultivators. The Khalkhas lost this flexibility while remaining nomads. Tacitus' brief description of the early Germans suggests that, although they were mobile, they were, as conquerors, beginning to develop the practice by which an ambitious young warrior attached himself to a leader who was not chief of his immediate kin segment; this practice, which was also reported for the Mongols at the time when Chinggis Khan was struggling with Jamuqa for Mongol supremacy, was a first step toward the development of a feudal pattern among the imperial Mongols, in which political-territorial leadership was emphasized at the expense of kinship.

Among most of the peoples studied, loss of flexibility was associated with the fixing of the segmented pattern to territorial-administrative units, while the genealogical kin structure, separated from its territorial base, gradually faded away. Tribal genealogies gave way to aristocratic family genealogies. In the East, however —among the Chinese, Chahars, and Dagors—a segmented kin structure persisted. These segments clung to a territorial locus as far as was possible, but kinship was reinforced by the ancestor cult and by written genealogies which included all the collateral lines of an extended kin group and not aristocratic families alone.

In marriage regulations the flexibility characteristic of *obok* structure was reflected in considerable variations among the sample societies. The early medieval Mongols forbade marriage within the tribe; later the exogamous bar was fixed at a tribal segment of an expanded genealogy. Among their modern descendants, the Khalkhas, the bar was set at traceable relationships in the paternal line, which among some families might not extend beyond second cousin. The Hazara Mongols, after conversion to Islam, shifted from the broad exogamy of the ancestral medieval Mongols to preference for marriage with father's brother's child. The Chinese and Dagors, on the other hand, moved toward a more extensive exogamy and forbade marriage with anyone bearing a common surname. It is probable that the surname had its origin in the tribal name and that tribal exogamy was the rule in the distant past, as among the early Mongols. In China, however, a surname came to include many unrelated lines and as many as a million people. Nevertheless, the exogamous bar remained attached to the surname.

The asymmetrical ambilineality of *obok* structure also gave flexibility. In the West there was a shift through time from a fairly strong patrilineal bias toward almost complete ambilineality, whereas among the Chinese and Dagors the shift appears to have been toward more pronounced patrilineality.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN *OBOK* AND "CLAN" STRUCTURE

To compare these two types of structure, a survey of clan societies should be made comparable to that made for *obok* structure in Eurasia. This the author does not propose to do, since the main purpose of the present study is to describe the phe-

nomenon of *obok* structure as it occurs in parts of Eurasia. The present comparison will be limited to clan structure as it has been defined, in the hope that this will in some measure add to our understanding of *obok* structure.

Perhaps the most significant difference between *obok* and clan structures is that the first is flexible, whereas the second appears to be rigid. A clan is a fixed group to which an individual belongs by birth. There seems to be no possibility for a family or larger kin group to shift clan affiliations gradually, as happens in *obok* society. If a shift is made, one would expect it to be an abrupt one, since the marital and symbolic status of the individual or group would be changed by the transfer. Lowie wrote of the sole survivor of one Hopi clan as having "joined" another clan.[4] Clans are considered to be strictly unilineal. Because of this, it would not be possible for membership in a patrilineal clan, for example, to pass through a female link. The families and the clan itself would die out if there were no sons, real or adoptive, to carry on the line.

Although in both clan and *obok* societies an individual acquires membership in the group by birth, a woman does not identify herself with her husband's patrilineal clan as fully as a woman in *obok* society, who becomes a member of her husband's family and lineage. Often the woman in clan society assists in rituals from which her husband and children are barred or observes taboos which set her apart from them. Whereas *obok* grows out of the family and reinforces it, clan membership is likely to have a divisive influence on the family.

The clan is exogamous as a group. Since exogamy is based on group membership and not on degree of distance of relationship, there would seem to be no possibility of shifting the exogamous bar up or down, as happened among the Romans and many of the Central Asian peoples.

Among our sample societies having *obok* structure, some had no reported group symbols. Among others, symbols were attached to the household family or were found at various levels of the segmented structure. In clan society there would be only one kin group above the household to which symbols could be attached. It would appear that the possession of symbols of some sort, such as rituals or taboos, might be a major factor in giving a clan its rigidity. The group name itself would be such a symbol, since in clan society the clan name is unique and not one of a series of group names to which the individual in *obok* society belongs.

Whereas kin segments of *obok* structure are ideally, and often actually, localized, a clan cannot be localized. Since the clan is strictly unilineal and is also exogamous, even nuclear family households—and consequently the local community to which they belong—necessarily contain representatives of at least two clans.[5] Thus when people move from one community to another, as people often do even in stable societies, one would expect them to be incorporated into the local community as separate clans. Consequently, a local group is likely to include representatives of several clans, and the members of a clan are likely to be scattered among a number of localities. Since a clan is not normally localized, one would not expect it to be a political unit comparable to that of the *obok* segment, for it would not be competent

to deal with affairs which are primarily the concern of the local group. The clan might, however, have an organization which deals with the affairs of the kin group.

We have traced the direction which *obok* structure has taken as a concomitant of detribalization, conquest, and settlement on the land. We have seen how the structure survived shifts from exogamy to a preference for endogamy and how it adjusted to migrations and political realignments. The question is raised as to whether clan structure could evolve so readily into another structural form. Greenberg has described the impact of Islam on the pagan Hausa of northern Nigeria. There the change from clan exogamy to preferred marriage with father's brother's child, together with the abolition of clan religious ceremonies, was accompanied by the "almost immediate collapse" of the political system, in which representatives of the several clans participated in governmental administration. Within a few generations after conversion, the clan structure had disappeared, and even the clan names were forgotten.[6] Additional data are needed for an understanding of the dynamics of clan change. The rigidity of clan structure would seem to prevent easy adaptation to changes in marriage practices or symbols; under the impact of such change a clan might be expected to collapse rather than evolve gradually into a somewhat different form, as *obok* structure is able to do.

Obok and clan are similar in some respects, notably in belief in descent from a common ancestor. Other apparent similarities, such as the asymmetrical ambilineality of *obok* structure, which has the appearance of unilineality, have in the past led anthropologists to identify *obok* as clan. *Obok*, because of its flexibility, has the potential of developing in several directions. Clan, because of its rigidity, appears to represent a cultural cul-de-sac.

DIFFUSION OF ELEMENTS OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE

In tracing the character of *obok* structure among several societies in Eurasia, we have found that different directions of development have been related to changes in the economy, to such historical accidents as wars and large-scale migrations, and to the intrusion of alien governments. Some phenomena, however, seem attributable only to diffusion.

The kinship terminologies of all the peoples studied had certain characteristics in common. There were denotative terms for all primary relationships and usually also for a number of other relationships, both consanguineal and affinal. All had linguistic devices for designating the line and degree of distance of relationship. Functionally, this type of terminology seemed admirably suited to *obok* structure, and the writer at one time concluded that a denotative system was characteristic of this type of social organization. However, a brief excursion into Polynesian literature disclosed that such an assumption was untenable. *Obok* structure was present in a considerable part of Polynesia, and in Hawaii it evolved into feudalism. Yet it is characteristic of Polynesian terminologies that relationships are classed according to generation, and neither line of descent nor degree of collaterality is indicated.

The basic pattern of the Polynesian terminological system is very different from that which we have found in Eurasia.

The distribution of one type of terminology in Polynesia and of another general type in that part of Eurasia which we have studied, both associated with *obok* structure, suggests the diffusion of the two different terminological patterns throughout their respective culture areas.

Within Eurasia, regional variations within the general pattern are to be discerned. In western Eurasia denotative terms are achieved by descriptive modifiers, as Morgan long ago pointed out.[7] In the Far East, particularly in China, the same end is reached by combinations of classifiers. Separate terms to distinguish relative age within generation are found in Central Asia and the Far East, but not in Southwest Asia or Europe.

In the West there is a strong tendency toward the use of lineal terms, whereas in Central Asia and the Far East the paternal line is kept terminologically distinct from lines related through females. There is one exception to this last generalization. The Dagors class the descendants of brother and sister and of father's sister and mother's brother according to generation, but without distinguishing the line of descent or sex of the individual. This usage may result from a combination of Manchu and Tungus traits. The Manchus, like the Chinese, employ generation classifiers in denoting specific relationships.[8] Some of the northern Tungus class the children of male and female collaterals together but distinguish between senior and junior lines and generations.[9]

The "stairstep" terminology has its greatest elaboration among the Khalkhas; it is found, in less developed forms, only among neighbors of the Khalkhas—the Kazaks on the west and the Chahars and Dagors on the east.

The distribution of these several characteristics is like that generally encountered when there has been a diffusion of culture traits. A similar pattern is found over a wide area; within this, regional subpatterns and local variations may be discerned.

Analogous regional patterns are also to be found in other characteristics of *obok* structure. In marriage regulations the peoples of central and eastern Asia were broadly exogamous. In western Eurasia, on the other hand, there was a preference for ingroup marriage. In Europe there appears never to have been a taboo on marriage with collateral relatives beyond second cousins. In Southwest Asia cousin marriage was preferred. The Hazara Mongols appear to have changed from the broad exogamy of their medieval ancestors to a preference for cousin marriage as the result of the diffusion of Islamic marriage practices.

In China, exogamy was tied to the surname; this association appears to have diffused from China to the Dagors and Chahars and temporarily to the Khalkhas, although the use of the surname did not long survive among the latter people except for the aristocratic lineage.

The Chinese practice of keeping written genealogies of all families and lineages appears to have diffused to the Dagors and Chahars, whereas in western Eurasia

MAP II



Obok STRUCTURE IN EURASIA: DISTRIBUTION OF FOURTEEN SAMPLE SOCIETIES

there tended to be a transition from tribal genealogy to aristocratic family genealogy.

The distribution of the *obok* pattern in Eurasia and the regional variations within the general pattern would seem to indicate that traits of social organization, like those of other aspects of culture, are subject to diffusion. This is contrary to Murdock's conclusions that "traits of social organization show practically no tendency to yield distributions" of the culture-area type.[10]

As we have attempted to demonstrate, changes have occurred in the social organization of various peoples of Eurasia as a consequence of internal changes in other aspects of the culture and of external accidents of history. That diffusion also operates does not nullify the effect of other forces conducive to change. As in the diffusion of other aspects of culture, the borrowing society must be culturally receptive to the trait offered. Once that is accepted, it becomes integrated, with some modification, into the borrowing culture. It is possible that the flexibility of *obok* structure makes it more amenable than clan structure to change through diffusion.

CHAPTER XII

SPECULATIONS

SUGGESTED ORIGINS OF *OBOK* STRUCTURE

WE HAVE shown how *obok* structure evolved into different forms among a number of sample societies in Eurasia. The question might be raised as to how *obok* structure originated. The author has encountered no people in Eurasia who were in process of transition from band to *obok* structure in isolation, and we do not know whether such a group might be found elsewhere in the world today. Simple band structure survives among only a few peoples, and most of these are subject to disruptive external influences which preclude independent evolution in any direction. It is possible that the Hottentot of South Africa developed *obok* structure independently when they acquired cattle and became pastoralists, but it is presumably too late now to test this theory or to obtain data on the process of change. Since no examples are available of the evolutionary process in action, one can only speculate as to how this segmented, asymmetrically ambilineal structure may have come into being.

We have seen that the extended joint family is basic to *obok* structure and that the segmented pattern is produced by the branching-off of units from the expanding family. Since joint ownership of economically valuable property is inherent in the joint family, the acquisition of property of this type would appear to be a first step in the evolution of *obok* structure. A people whose economy is dependent on nomadic hunting and collecting has little opportunity to amass property, for its equipment is limited to those items which can be carried from one camp to another. The few implements required for gaining a livelihood do not invite joint family ownership; if they are not destroyed at the death of the owner or user, objects normally employed by males are logically transmitted to males, and those used by females go to females. Because simple hunters and collectors are nomadic, there is no incentive toward ownership of land. It is enough to establish right of usufruct over the territory in which they range. But if a society were to acquire technological skills which enabled them to acquire more substantial property—ownership either of agricultural land and house sites or of domesticated animals—there would be an incentive to evolve social forms governing the transmission of this property from generation to generation.

The acquisition of durable and economically valuable property need not necessarily lead to the formation of a unilocal joint family system, however. Among the

reindeer-breeding Lapps, for example, sons and daughters receive reindeer in equal shares on marriage, so that the family may in a sense be regarded as joint. Residence is not unilocal, however. On marriage, a couple may elect to reside in the camp of either the husband or the wife, depending on individual circumstances.[1] It might seem that ownership and inheritance of fixed agricultural land would lead more naturally to the development of the unilocal joint family than would mobile livestock, but the Ifugao and Kalingas of the Philippines, whose terraced fields require a considerable investment of labor in construction and maintenance, nevertheless have a bilateral organization.[2]

Simple band organization appears to be fairly flexible in its structure. Although Steward has maintained that societies characterized by small band organization are most frequently patrilineal,[3] Benedict, following Swanton, held that bilateral organization was characteristic of peoples of simple culture.[4] Actually, since in a simple band society there is little need to trace descent for more than a generation or two, it would seem more pertinent to speak in terms of residence practice rather than of descent. Old World evidence supports Benedict's view, if we substitute "bi-" or "ambilocal" for "bilateral." The Semang of the Malay Peninsula apparently considered themselves patrilocal, but, in practice, nuclear families spent a good deal of time visiting the wife's band. This appears also to have been true of Negritos of the Ituri Forest in central Africa and of the Bushmen of South Africa. In many cases unilocality may have amounted to little more than an ideal. For example, the Lapps, who migrate in small band groups, "invariably state that at marriage, the woman should join her husband's band."[5] An analysis of data shows, however, that in actual practice as many couples join the wife's band after marriage as join the husband's.

It seems probable that residence rules were fairly flexible in a simple band society and that line of descent was of less concern than the bilateral and affinal relationships of the band members. Consequently, the acquisition of a technology which permitted the accumulation of economically valuable property might lead to an inheritance structure which was either bilateral, patrilineal, or matrilineal. Which direction any given society took might be a matter of historical accident.

However, the pattern of bilateral descent and inheritance is not capable of as extensive an expansion of kinship ties as is the unilateral pattern. At every generation, property, because it is attached to no enduring kinship unit, must be subdivided and its ownership dispersed. Furthermore, bilateral genealogies are difficult to remember for many generations into the past because of the multiplicity of ancestral lines. Consequently, bilateral structure, by its nature, limits the number of individuals that can be organized along kinship lines and can be effective only in a comparatively small community.

Unilineal organization, on the other hand, permits a more extensive social organization to develop out of the basic kinship structure, for the tracing of descent in a single line provides the framework for an almost indefinite expansion. In addition, the unilocal joint family, which gives continuity to an economic kin unit and permits

the perpetuation of family property holdings, appears to provide greater stability and security to the society and its members than does the nuclear family in a bilateral society.

The acquisition of reindeer by the Lapps did not greatly increase the size of the band over that of a hunting-collecting band, nor did it create the need for the establishment of formal social controls over any considerable population. Consequently, the simple bilateral structure which satisfied the economic and social needs of a hunting-collecting society was adequate also for the reindeer-breeders. The agricultural technology of the Kalingas and Ifugaos permitted a larger aggregation of population than is characteristic of band societies, but the mountainous habitat limited the amount of population expansion possible. Bilateral structure was still adequate to the social needs of the clusters of small mountain villages.

The Lapp and Kalinga examples indicate that the acquisition of technological skills which permit the accumulation of economically valuable property worthy of inheritance is not in itself sufficient to stimulate the development of the unilocal joint family and its extension into a flexibly unilinear *obok* structure. Additional factors seem to be required.

Spier has described a New World society in which the adoption of agriculture was associated with the formation of patrilocal extended family camps and patrilineal inheritance of cultivated land. Such camps might have represented the first step in an evolution toward *obok* structure, but the Havasupai environment did not encourage such a development.[6] The Havasupai occupied one small canyon, which permitted only a limited expansion, given the technological skills which they commanded. They were surrounded by an extensive area unsuitable for cultivation and by tribes whose warlike activities discouraged the Havasupai from moving any distance from the shelter of their valley. They were thus stopped from extensive population expansion and consequently had no need for extension of the unilineal kin group.

The development of *obok* structure seems to call for a habitat and social environment which would permit expansion of the population in general and of unilocal kin groups in particular. The Middle East, where agriculture began, would be an ideal locus for an evolution of *obok*. It is agreed by archeologists that agriculture began in the upland valleys, not in the plains. We might imagine an initial nomadic hunting-collecting band which ranged over a fairly wide territory in search of food; when it acquired the arts of agriculture and of domesticating animals, it would gradually settle in one part of its nomadic territory. As agriculture became increasingly important to the economy, the ownership of agricultural land would acquire a new significance. As the population of the band gradually increased, member families would be free to branch out and establish new settlements within the territory of the former band. Perhaps it was the requirement of keeping irrigation channels in repair that created a need for social control beyond the local community level and so encouraged the extension of a unilineal kin system. In any event, segmented lineage structure appears to have developed. The pattern was present among

the biblical Hebrews, whose traditional tribal genealogy is preserved in the Book of Genesis. It is present today throughout Southwest Asia.

Today all the peoples of Southwest Asia and all those extending in a band from the British Isles to China have a patrilineal bias. Yet the ancient Elamites of the Iranian plateau were matrilineal in tracing the line of succession to the throne.[7] From this we may infer that originally some of the peoples of Southwest Asia became patrilineal, some matrilineal, in the course of evolving an extended kin organization but that patrilineality eventually prevailed throughout the area.

It is our hypothesis that *obok* structure originated in a society or societies where agricultural techniques were being developed and where there was free-land space into which family segments might move as the population increased. Yet the most extensive development of the tribal genealogical pattern in modern times is found among pastoral nomads, the Kazaks and Bedouins, while most modern sedentary societies have no more than three or four segments. It is possible that a greater elaboration of segmentation occurred in the past in the Near East, for the ancient Hebrews traced all men to a common ancestor, Adam. Logically, however, it would seem that, beyond a certain point, the population expansion which encouraged the development of *obok* structure would, when kin groups had expanded to the extent of available territory, force segments to leave the ancestral territory and so prevent an indefinite extension of the territorial segmented structure. The very forces which originally encouraged the extension of unilinear descent organization might operate to curtail its development beyond a certain point.

The pastoral nomadic economy in itself does not appear to offer any particular incentive to the development of a unilocal joint family. Central Asian horse-breeders and Bedouin camel-breeders, like the reindeer-breeding Lapps, migrate in small camps during much of the year. However, once the segmented lineage pattern had diffused from settled cultivators to pastoral nomads or to seminomadic cultivators like the early Germans, the nomadic mobility would permit a much more extensive development of tribal genealogical structure than would be possible among sedentary cultivators, among whom landownership sets a limit to the expansion of regionalized unilineal kin groups.

PATRILINEAL VERSUS MATRILINEAL DESCENT

All the peoples in Eurasia sampled were patrilineal in bias, and one might conclude from this sample that *obok* structure is always patrilineal. However, the Nayars of south India until recently had a matrilineal segmented structure,[8] and even today the Minangkabau of Sumatra have several levels of segmentation,[9] as have the Mayombe-Kongo peoples of the western Congo region of Africa.[10]

These instances demonstrate that matrilineal *obok* structure is possible. There may be some factor that favors the acceptance of a patrilineal bias over a matrilineal in situations where diffusion is operative. Richards and Malinowski have described the conflicts which a father experiences in a matrilineal society when he is required to pass over his own son in favor of his sister's son,[11] and, among both the BaBemba of Africa and the Trobriand Islanders of Melanesia, chiefs usually manage to keep

their sons with them in patrilocal residence.[12] This suggests that asymmetrical matrilineal structure may be less stable than patrilineal. It is possible that matrilineal structure was formerly more widespread than today but that it either evolved toward patrilineality within itself or readily gave way to patrilineality as a result of diffusion. Because of the flexibility of *obok*, this transition might be effected with relatively little disturbance to the total social structure. Such a transition appears to be in process among the matrilineal BaBemba as described by Richards,[13] and there are other African societies which merit investigation from this point of view.

OBOK STRUCTURE AMONG HUNTERS AND COLLECTORS

We have suggested that *obok* structure is an extension of the unilocal joint family and that the formation of the joint family is dependent on the acquisition of valuable economic property which requires continued care and is capable of transmission from generation to generation. We have found it present among sedentary cultivators, semisedentary cultivators, and pastoral nomads.

The development of *obok* structure would also be theoretically possible among hunters and collectors, who, because of a high technological development and rich natural resources, were able to settle in villages and amass property. Peoples enjoying such an economy are found on the Northwest Coast of North America; Kirchhoff has expressed the opinion that one of these peoples, the Kwakiutl, did have *obok* structure, which he calls a "conical clan."[14]

Except among peoples of the economic level of the Kwakiutl, one would not expect to find *obok* structure among hunters and collectors if one accepts the thesis that *obok* structure grows out of the joint family and that the joint family is based on joint ownership of economically valuable property. However, there is a type of property that is not dependent on technology or materially related to the economy. This is incorporeal property.

SUGGESTED ORIGINS OF CLAN STRUCTURE

Peoples with a simple hunting-collecting economy are free to acquire incorporeal property in the form of symbols or religious ritual, and the ownership and perpetuation of this kind of property may be of as much concern to them as the perpetuation of arable land or livestock is to the agriculturist or pastoralist. Even among cultivators, such ritual or symbols may be as important culturally as land or permanent dwellings. Indeed, ritual may be regarded as essential to the economic prosperity of the people. Among the Hopi, for example, land in itself would be of little value without the fertilizing rains which are controlled by ritual.

Ritual may be individually owned, as in the case of the magic formulas which the Dobuans employ to protect themselves and their gardens.[15] It may be transmitted in a particular family line; among the Trobrianders special garden magic is usually controlled by the chiefly family.[16] Ritual may be centered in the family, as in the case of the Roman and Chinese ancestor cults. Or, finally, it may be owned and transmitted within a unilineal kin group. In this last instance, one element of clan structure is present.

The second element required to produce a clan is unilineal kin group exogamy. We have seen that the Kazaks, although they based marriage restrictions on degree of distance of relationship, found it more convenient to remember that certain name groups in the tribal genealogical structure were too close for marriage than to trace actual genealogical relationships. However, because of the flexibility of the structure, exogamous bars never became rigidly fixed to specific name groups, and degree of distance of relationship remained the criterion for deciding the permissibility of a marriage.

A cultural need to fix clearly the kin group within which marriage was forbidden and the adoption of a name to mark this group could result in clan structure, even if no other symbols or ritual were associated with the group. In other cases the possession and inheritance of group symbols and ritual might come first and marriage regulations later become attached to the unilineal kin group possessing the symbols. This may have been the case among the Hopi, where small clans have become linked, through the association of their symbols, to form a unit more adequate than the kinship group for the performance of ceremonial and exogamous functions.[17]

Lowie once expressed the opinion that "the transmission of property rights and the mode of residence after marriage have been the most effective means of establishing the principle of unilateral descent."[18] Yet he himself observed that some matrilineal peoples are patrilocal, and we have shown that the transmission of some kinds of property rights can be effected where there is asymmetrically ambilineal or bilateral descent.

Goldschmidt has suggested that, when "the population of a society grows more dense, its members will be increasingly surrounded by persons less intimately known. . . . Under such circumstances they will increasingly react toward persons in terms of some symbolic system. The clan system furnishes such a set of symbols."[19] While increased density of population may be a factor in the formation of a clan system, density in itself would not suffice, as Goldschmidt is the first to admit. Although most sparsely populated societies are characterized by simple band organization, the Australian aborigines, with an equally sparse population, have evolved what is essentially a clan (moiety) structure, segmented horizontally according to generation rather than vertically along collateral descent lines.

A need for some sort of symbolic system might be created by the delocalization of kin groups. Goldschmidt, in considering whether or not the Nomlaki of central California had a clan organization, finally decided that "the full possibilities of the clan system were never realized."[20] The Nomlaki village was patrilineal, patrilocal, and exogamous. In two cases kin groups of the same name occupied two separate villages, but in each case the villages belonged to different subtribal groupings, and there was little opportunity for interaction between the two. Goldschmidt came to the conclusion that the Nomlaki had not quite developed clan structure because "the recognition of the fiction of kinship was never carried to an extent which really integrated separate communities. The absence of ceremonial re-integration of the social group appears to have constituted the source of this failure."[21]

We suggest that, until members of a unilineal kin group expand beyond the local community and come into local association with members of other unilineal kin groups, clan structure is not likely to develop. If circumstances had caused some Nomlaki families to leave the ancestral village and settle in neighboring villages and if the taboo on marriage with patrilineal kin was highly valued in the Nomlaki system, symbols might have been developed to identify members of the patrilineal kin group, and clan structure would have resulted. On the other hand, the identification of patrilineal kin with village might have been culturally more tenacious than the value placed on patrilineal kin exogamy. In this event, any alien family which settled in the village might be gradually absorbed into the local kin group, and clans would not be formed.

There seem to be three requirements for the formation of a clan system: (1) that a unilineal group be exogamous; (2) that some kind of symbol or symbols be associated with this kin group; and (3) that members of the kin group become dispersed among adjacent local communities. The rigidity of clan structure, as contrasted with the flexibility of *obok* structure, seems to be derived, at least in part, from the fact that distinct kin groups have symbols which enable them to retain their identity in the local community in spite of daily association with members of other kin groups and to achieve "ceremonial re-integration" with members scattered among other local communities.

TRANSITION TO CLAN STRUCTURE

We have suggested earlier that clan structure, because of its rigidity, is likely to collapse in contact situations which undermine the marriage rules or symbolism of the group. However, there seems to be no reason why the clan pattern should not diffuse to societies having a more flexible type of social structure. A society having a band organization might borrow clan attributes from neighbors having a clan structure. The White Mountain Apaches, for example, seem to have effected such a transition under the influence of Pueblo and Navaho neighbors.[22]

It also seems possible that *obok* structure might be transformed into clan structure if symbols and the exogamic bar were to become fixed at one level in the segmented structure. The Chinese surname group is no longer a common descent group, but surname exogamy is based on the premise that people of the same surname might be related. Thus it is in a sense a clan, as is the Dagor *hala*. Below these surname groups, *obok* segmentation persists, although the structure is more rigid, as well as more persistent, than among the other societies in Eurasia that we have examined. The development of the surname group is associated with the pattern of broad exogamy which is characteristic of those societies in eastern Asia which we have studied.

In western Eurasia there was no such stimulus to the fixing of clan attributes at some point in the segmented structure. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when the Scottish clan had lost its upper segments and symbols had become attached to one remaining segment, the clan might have become a "clan" in the an-

thropological sense if it had been an exogamous unit. The Scots, however, had always preferred marriage within the common descent group and so had no cultural basis for the adoption of clan exogamy. Because of the narrow limits of exogamous bars characteristic of western Eurasia, one would not expect a clan to evolve from *obok* anywhere in that area.

In India there is historical evidence that among the Brahmans the *gotra* was originally a lineage which based marriage regulations on degree of distance of relationship but that it was later transformed into a fixed exogamous clan. The Brahmans, because of their profession as priests, did not remain localized in village communities in north India but spread throughout India, and in the south they came into association with clan structure.[23] Thus the transition from lineage to clan may have been in part the result of internal cultural forces associated with their mobility and their religious ritual and in part the effect of diffusion. Because of the prestige of the Brahmans, this clan-*gotra* structure has been adopted by some other north Indian peoples.[24]

Negro African culture is characterized by an exuberance of symbol and ritual. The ancestor cult is present, as is the joint family, and many Negro African societies appear to have a structure which is essentially *obok*[25] but which is complicated by a number of factors. The pattern of migratory agriculture makes difficult the localization of kin groups; conquest has introduced a feudal political pattern in many regions; age-grade associations cut across common descent lines. Furthermore, there are both patrilineal and matrilineal societies in Negro Africa and some which have made a compromise between the two. The scattering of kin groups as a consequence of the migratory agricultural pattern, combined with the proliferation of symbolism, would be conducive to the formation of clans. In the northern part of Negro Africa, in an area ranging from Uganda to northern Nigeria, clan structure is said to occur, and totemic symbols are present over a wider area. The Baganda have what appears to be patrilineal totemic clans, but these are segmented, and marriage is forbidden not only within the father's group but within the mother's.[26] The Ashanti of the Gold Coast, as described by Fortes, have segmented matrilineal clans which are exogamous, but the Ashanti also prohibit marriage "with any 'patrilineal' descendant of one's father's father's father."[27] The so-called "clan belt" of Africa would appear to offer a fruitful field for the investigation of possible transition from *obok* to clan structure.

Clan structure, for all the attention it has received, seems to be of rather limited distribution. It appears to result from a combination of circumstances—a cultural preference for exogamy, lineally inherited symbols, and delocalization of unilinear kin groups. The pattern might evolve from exogamous local communities—whether band or village—or from decaying *obok* societies; its characteristic traits might diffuse to societies having a more flexible kin structure. Once established, however, clan structure would appear to be too rigid to evolve readily into another structural form, as the more flexible *obok* structure is able to do. If either exogamy or ritual symbols were disturbed, one might expect the clan to disintegrate rapidly into an aggregation of families, after which a new structure might gradually take form.

Notes

NOTES

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

1. B. Vladimirtsov, *Le Régime social des Mongols*, p. 134.

2. Elizabeth E. Bacon, "An Inquiry into the History of the Hazara Mongols of Afghanistan," pp. 230–47.

3. Minhaj ibn Siraj Juzjani, *Tabakat-i-Nasiri*, II, 1119–26. According to Juzjani, this army reached Sistan in A.H. 625 (A.D. 1228).

4. Babur, *The Babur-nama in English* (*Memoirs of Babur*), I, 207.

5. Surgeon-Major H. W. Bellew, *The Races of Afghanistan*, p. 115.

6. Georg Morgenstierne, *Report on a Linguistic Mission to Afghanistan*, p. 6.

7. Klaus Ferdinand, "Afghanistans Nomader," p. 63.

8. No census has ever been taken. The figures given are based on a reliable estimate made in 1911.

9. Charles Masson, *Narrative of Various Journeys in Balochistan, Afghanistan, The Panjab, & Kalât*, II, 224.

10. William Griffith, *Journals of Travels in Assam, Burma, Bootan, Affghanistan and the Neighbouring Countries*, p. 518; C. R. Markham, "The Basin of the Helmund," pp. 192–93; see also Survey of India Map, Southern Asia Series, Afghanistan Section, 1932.

11. Lieutenant James Sutherland Broadfoot, "Reports on Parts of the Ghilzi Country . . . ," p. 344.

12. *kal'ah*, A., "fort," "castle." This term is used throughout Afghanistan for the fortified villages which are characteristic of the area.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

1. *Khánaváda*, P., "family, household."

2. Khuda Nazar Qambaree, "Folk Lore of the Hazara Mongols," unpublished MS.

3. Perhaps *alághe* results from the assimilation of *taalluqah*, A., "landed property, connection," to *ághil*, Turk., "locality, neighbor, neighboring villages, vicinity" (Khuda Nazar Qambaree, "Glossary of Non-Persian Words Spoken by the Hazaras of Quetta").

4. The number may be exaggerated. The informant's figures did not always seem reliable, and in this case he may have been unconsciously motivated by a desire to enhance the prestige of the group over which his father was chief.

5. He gave the somewhat fanciful etymology of the name as being derived from *jám* (P., "bowl") and *uri* (?, "plate"). The story might more plausibly have arisen as a result of the phonetic similarity between Jaghuri and *jawári* (A., "female slaves"). According to Mr. Qambaree and other Hazaras consulted by him in Quetta, the Jaghuri owe their tribal name, language, and religion to the Ghuri. Ghur was a Tajik kingdom which ruled over what is now the Hazarajat just before the Mongol conquest of Afghanistan in the thirteenth century. This seems the most likely derivation of the name.

6. Qambaree, "Folk Lore. . . ." The Jaghuri informant quoted a similar saying, which was translated as "all Hazaras are related."

7. *Turáb*, A., "ground, earth," with Persian particle, *turáb-i*, "ground pertaining to."

8. An East Turkic and Mongolic word originally meaning "tribe" (Barthold, "Aimaḳ," I, 211). Vladimirtsov describes the medieval Mongol *ayimaq* as a "subtribe," a group of families descended from a common ancestor (Vladimirtsov, *Le Régime social des Mongols*, pp. 176–77).

9. *Qaum*, A., "a tribe, nation." The Arabs normally employ *qaum* only in association with the name of a tribal chief, as "the *qaum* of Shalan," never with the name of a tribe (Musil, *The Manners and Customs of the Rwala Bedouins*, p. 50).

10. *Táifa*, A., "a sect, a tribe."

11. *Rish safit*, P., "white beard." The Turkic equivalent, *aq saqal*, was reported by Elphinstone to be used among some Hazaras (*An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul* [2d ed.], II, 211). *Apisqal*, "wise man of the village," and *oqi*, "wise man," terms supplied by Mr. Qambaree, are probably variations on *aq saqal*, as well as is *asqál*.

12. Probably a blend of *rish safit* and *ish äri*, Osmanli Turkic, "public official" (Radlov, *Versuch eines Worterbuches der Türk Dialecte*, I, 1548).

13. *Mihtar*, P., "greater"; "a chief."

14. *Arbab*, A., "possessors, masters, lords."

15. *Daruḫa*, medieval Mongol, "keeper, governor, administrator" (Haenisch, *Wörterbuch zu Manghol un niuca tobca'an*, p. 33); *daraga*, Khalkha and Chahar Mongol, "leader" (Vreeland, *Mongol Community and Kinship Structure*, pp. 21, 121).

16. The writer is indebted to Professor N. Pope for suggesting that *asqál* is probably derived from *aq saqal* (see n. 11).

17. *Kary*, T., "old" (?); *dár*, P., "possessing, having."

18. *Malik*, A., "proprietor, master, owner." This term is applied generally in Afghanistan to chiefs and provincial or district governors.

19. *Loc. cit.*

20. J. P. Ferrier, *Caravan Journeys and Wanderings* . . . , pp. 218–19; Charles Masson, *Narrative of Various Journeys* . . . , II, 295–96, 305.

21. *Op. cit.*, p. 220.

22. Masson, *op. cit.*, II, 305.

23. *Pidar*, P., "father."

24. Probably *bábá*, "father," a Persian and Arabic term, perhaps merged with *abai* (see n. 26).

25. *Ata*, T., "father" (Radlov, *op. cit.*, I, 449–51).

26. Perhaps from *ábáí*, A., "paternal ancestor"; perhaps from the Turkic *aba*, *abai*, which in various Turkic dialects have the meanings of "father," "father's brother," "elder brother" (*ibid.*, pp. 620, 621, 630, 631).

27. *Äbai*, T., "mother" (Professor Nicholas Poppe, personal communication).

28. *Eke*, med. M., "mother."

29. In some Turkic dialects *aya* or *äyä* refers to father's sister or elder sister (Radlov, *op. cit.*, I, 199, 720).

30. *Zádar*, *zaudar*, from *zadan*, P., "to be born," "to beget."

31. *Bacha*, P., "infant." This is the term normally employed in Afghanistan for "boy" or "son."

32. *Dukhtar*, P., "daughter."

33. *Barádar*, P., "brother."

34. *Kh'aher*, P., "sister."

35. *Baba*, T., is used in the meaning of "grandfather" in the dialects of the former appanage of Chagatai (see Radlov, *op. cit.*, IV, 1564).

36. *Bark*, T., "home"; *barklan*, T., "to marry," "to found a family" (?) (*ibid.*, pp. 1483–84).

37. *Kalán*, P., "large, great."

38. *Mádar*, P., "mother."
39. *Achi*, Chagataian T., "grandmother."
40. *Mámá*, P., "mother."
41. *Bibi*, T., "woman," "chief's wife."
42. *Áji*, Urdu, Hindi, "a grandmother" (*Student's Practical Dictionary*, p. 17).
43. In Persian, *nawásа* is "grandson," *nawási*, "granddaughter." The author could detect no phonetic difference in the Hazara pronunciation.
44. *Acha*, Khalkha, Chahar, Kalmuk Mongol, "son's children."
45. *Káká*, Urdu, "elder brother," "paternal uncle" (*Student's Practical Dictionary*, p. 422).
46. *'Ammu*, A., "father's brother."
47. *Abaḥa*, med. Mongol, "father's brother."
48. *Dada*, Chagataian T., "father," "father's elder brother" (?) (Radlov, *op. cit.*, III, 1640).
49. *Pisar*, P., "son."
50. *Khálu*, A., "mother's brother."
51. *'Ammah*, A., "father's sister."
52. *Je'e*, med. M., "daughter's child" (Haenisch, *op. cit.*, p. 88).
53. *Taghai*, Chagataian T., "mother's brother" (Radlov, *op. cit.*, III, 795); in sixteenth-century Turko-Mongol usage this term was applied to an uncle on the mother's side, of any degree (see Babur, *The Babur-nama in English*, I, 27, n. 3).
54. *Mámá*, Urdu, "maternal uncle" (*Student's Practical Dictionary*, p. 503).
55. *Tai, dai*, T., "mother's brother," "mother's father" (Radlov, *op. cit.*, III, 765–66, 1605, 1620).
56. *Naḥacu*, med. M., "mother's brother" (Haenisch, *op. cit.*, p. 112).
57. *Khála*, A., "mother's sister."
58. *Bola*, med. M., "mother's sister's child."
59. *Shauhar*, P., "husband."
60. *Ahlíyeh*, A., "wife." *Ayál* is the usual term for "wife" in Kabuli Persian.
61. *Ḥatun*, med. M., "woman" (Haenisch, *op. cit.*, p. 63); *khatun*, P., "lady."
62. *'Arus*, A., "bride," "daughter-in-law."
63. *Khusur*, P., "father-in-law."
64. *Zan*, P., "woman, wife."
65. Unidentified.
66. *Naman*, Punjabi, "husband's sister" (Karve, *Kinship Organisation in India*, p. 101).
67. *Khush*, P., "mother-in-law."
68. *Baja*, M., "wife's sister's husband."

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

1. In the following discussion we are employing "clan" and "sib" in the sense in which Lowie employs "clan" (Robert H. Lowie, *Social Organization*, p. 237) and Murdock employs "sib" (George Peter Murdock, *Social Structure*, p. 67).
2. Lowie, *op. cit.*, p. 236; Walter Goldschmidt, "Social Organization in Native California and the Origin of Clans," p. 447.
3. Robert H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, p. 113.
4. *Op. cit.*, p. 47.
5. Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man*, p. 203.
6. Alexander Goldenweiser, *Anthropology*, p. 304.
7. W. H. R. Rivers, *Social Organization*, p. 19.

8. *Primitive Society*, p. 115.
9. *Op. cit.*, p. 47.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 50.
11. *Op. cit.*, p. 198.
12. *Primitive Society*, p. 113.
13. *Loc. cit.*
14. Linton, *op. cit.*, p. 198; Lowie, *Primitive Society*, pp. 137–45; Murdock, *op. cit.*, p. 50; Rivers, *op. cit.*, p. 19.
15. *Primitive Society*, p. 115.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 111.
17. *Op. cit.*, pp. 203–4.
18. Personal communication.
19. Robert H. Lowie, "Notes on Hopi Clans," pp. 329–30.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 309–60; Fred Eggan, *Social Organization of the Western Pueblos*, pp. 61–80.
21. Eggan, *op. cit.*, p. 62.
22. Murdock, *op. cit.*, p. 46.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 66–70.
24. *Oxford English Dictionary*, VI, L-310.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1. W. Barthold, *Histoire des Turcs d'Asie Centrale*, pp. 5, 31, 118–19.
2. Elizabeth E. Bacon, "Types of Pastoral Nomadism in Central and Southwest Asia," pp. 49–51.
3. Erich Haenisch, *Manghol un niuca tobca'an* and *Die geheime Geschichte der Mongolen;* Paul Pelliot, *Histoire secrète des Mongols.* In subsequent references to the *Secret History*, paragraph rather than page references will be cited, so that the reader may readily consult either the Haenisch or the Pelliot text and translation.
4. *Secret History*, 1–68.
5. *Ibid.*, 1.
6. *Ibid.*, 40.
7. *Ibid.*, 17–21.
8. Étienne Marc Quatremère, *Histoire des Mongols de Perse écrite en persan par Raschid-Eddin*, I, 107–9.
9. *Secret History*, 119, 142, 144.
10. *Ibid.*, 137.
11. *Ibid.*, 11.
12. *Ibid.*, 120.
13. *Ibid.*, 23.
14. *Ibid.*, 137, 138.
15. *Ibid.*, 96, 180.
16. *Ibid.*, 11.
17. *Ibid.*, 139.
18. *Ibid.*, 148, 154.
19. *Ibid.*, 132, 133, 176.
20. *Ibid.*, 129.
21. *Ibid.*, 153.
22. I. N. Berezin, *Sbornik Letopisey.*
23. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
26. *Secret History*, 47.
27. B. Vladimirtsov, *Le Régime social des Mongols*, p. 56, quoting Rashid ed-Din.
28. *Secret History*, 139.
29. *Ibid.*, 1.
30. *Ibid.*, 144.
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Op. cit.*, end map.
33. *Secret History*, 5–9.
34. *Ibid.*, 8–9.
35. *Ibid.*, 28–40.
36. *Op. cit.*, end map.
37. *Secret History*, 81.
38. *Ibid.*, 122.
39. *Ibid.*, 52.
40. *Ibid.*, 57.
41. *Ibid.*, 52.
42. *Ibid.*, 57.
43. *Ibid.*, 179.
44. *Ibid.*, 141.
45. *Ibid.*, 6, 44, 122.
46. Vladimirtsov, *op. cit.*, p. 72.
47. Berezin, *op. cit.*, pp. 26 ff.
48. *Secret History*, 106, 181.
49. *Ibid.*, 73.
50. *Op. cit.*, p. 63.
51. *Secret History*, 44.
52. *Ibid.*, 105, 109.
53. *Ibid.*, 70–71.
54. *Ibid.*, 8–9.
55. *Ibid.*, 38.
56. *Ibid.*, 53.
57. *Ibid.*, 54–56.
58. *Ibid.*, 61–66.
59. *Ibid.*, 165.
60. Quatremère, *op. cit.*, pp. 85–113.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 113.
62. Berezin, *op. cit.*, p. 10.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
64. Paragraphs 18, 47.
65. Quatremère, *op. cit.*, pp. 101–13.
66. *Secret History*, 43.
67. *Ibid.*, 155.
68. Quatremère, *op. cit.*, pp. 93–97.
69. *Secret History*, 61.
70. Quatremère, *op. cit.*, pp. 85–91.
71. *Ibid.*, pp. 85–113.
72. *Secret History*, 103, 201, 208, 218, 268; Erich Haenisch, *Wörterbuch zu Mangḫol un niuca tobca'an*, p. 167.
73. Translated by the author from Pelliot, *op. cit.*, p. 123, par. 18.
74. *Ibid.*

75. *Op. cit.*, p. 167.
76. Herbert Harold Vreeland III, *Mongol Community and Kinship Structure*, p. 59; David P. Aberle, *The Kinship System of the Kalmuk Mongols*, p. 17; V. V. Radlov, *Versuch eines Wörterbuches der Türk Dialecte*, I, 1628.
77. Vreeland, *op. cit.*, pp. 57*a*, 60–61, 153*a*, 155–56, 223*a*, 229, 313, 315, 320.
78. Aberle, *op. cit.*, pp. 21–22.
79. *Op. cit.*, pp. 130–31, par. 62, 63, 65.
80. *Op. cit.*, p. 70.
81. *Secret History*, 98.
82. *Ibid.*, 96, 125.
83. *Ibid.*, 180.
84. *Ibid.*, 69.
85. *Ibid.*, 96.
86. *Ibid.*, 68.
87. *Ibid.*, 180.
88. Quatremère, *op. cit.*, p. 93.
89. *Ibid.*, p. 97.
90. *Ibid.*, p. 111.

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

1. W. Barthold, *Histoire des Turcs d'Asie Centrale*, p. 194; *The Tarikh-i-Rashidi of Mirza Muhammad Haidar, Dughlát*, p. 82; E. Delmar Morgan and C. H. Coote (eds.), *Early Voyages and Travels to Russia and Persia . . .*, pp. 90–91 and n. 3.
2. Alexis Levshin, *Déscription des hordes et des steppes des Kirghiz-Kazaks ou Kirghiz-Kaissaks*, pp. 302–4.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 300.
4. A. N. Kharuzin, *Kirgizy Bukeevskoy Ordy*, pp. 26–27.
5. Alfred E. Hudson, *Kazak Social Structure*, p. 20.
6. *Tarikh-i-Rashidi*, p. 230.
7. N. Aristov, "Opyt vyiyasneniya," pp. 394–97.
8. A. Margylanov, "Naymany," end tables.
9. Levshin, *op. cit.*, p. 302.
10. *Op. cit.*, p. 395, n. 2, translated from the Russian by the present author.
11. *Op. cit.*, p. 331.
12. *Op. cit.*, p. 304.
13. *Op. cit.*, note on pp. 301–2 n.
14. Hudson, *op. cit.*, pp. 17–19; A. N. Samoylovich, "Kazaki Koshagachskogo aymaka Oyratskoy avtonomnoy oblasti," p. 306. *Uru* is apparently related to the medieval Mongol *uruh*, "family, descendants" (see V. V. Radlov, *Versuch eines Worterbuches der Turk Dialecte*, I, 1658–59, for other Turkic forms). *Siok* is the Turkic equivalent of the Mongol *yasun*, "bone, kin."
15. Victor Dingelstedt, "Le Droit coutumier des Kirghiz d'après l'étude entreprise sous les auspices du gouvernement russe," pp. 153–54; R. Karutz, *Unter Kirgisen und Turkmenen*, p. 113.
16. Levshin, *op. cit.*, p. 363.
17. N. I. Grodekov, *Kirgizy i Karakirgizy Syr-dar'inskoy Oblasti*, p. 38.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 38–39.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
20. *Ibid.*

21. Hudson, unpublished field notes.
22. V. V. Radlov, *Aus Sibirien*, p. 513; Samoylovich, *op. cit.*, p. 311; Thomas Witlam Atkinson, *Oriental and Western Siberia*, p. 220; Henry Lansdell, *Russian Central Asia*, p. 319.
23. Radlov, *Aus Sibirien*, p. 484; Lansdell, *op. cit.*, p. 322; S. I. Rudenko, "Ocherk byta severo-vostochnykh Kazakov," p. 20.
24. Grodekov, *op. cit.*, pp. 109–10.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 16; Radlov, *Aus Sibirien*, p. 513.
26. Grodekov, *op. cit.*, p. 110.
27. Rudenko, *op. cit.*, p. 4; Margulanov, *op. cit.*, tribal genealogy following p. 334.
28. *Op. cit.*, p. 24.
29. Hudson, *op. cit.*, map, p. 6; Ch. E. de Ujfalvy de Mesö-Kovesd, *Expédition scientifique française en Russie, en Sibérie et dans le Turkestan*, II, 25.
30. Margulanov, *op. cit.*, p. 329.
31. Rudenko, *op. cit.;* Margulanov, *op. cit.*
32. Rudenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 4–6, 10; Colonel R. C. F. Schomberg, *Peaks and Plains of Central Asia*, p. 98.
33. Dingelstedt, *op. cit.*, pp. 214–15; Karutz, *op. cit.*, p. 30.
34. Levshin, *op. cit.*, pp. 302–4; Margulanov, *op. cit.*, p. 329.
35. *Op. cit.*, p. 65.
36. Benjamin Bergmann, *Voyage de . . . chez les Kalmuks*, p. 313.
37. M. le Baron George de Meyendorff, *Voyage d'Orenbourg à Boukhara, fait en 1820*, p. 53.
38. Hudson, unpublished field notes.
39. *Op. cit.*, p. 408.
40. Levshin, *op. cit.*, p. 397.
41. *Ibid.*, pp. 395–96; Meyendorff, *op. cit.*, p. 48.
42. Meyendorff, *op. cit.*, p. 47.
43. *Op. cit.*, p. 16.
44. *Aus Sibirien*, p. 279.
45. *Op. cit.*, pp. 27–29, 37.
46. *Op. cit.*, p. 49.
47. *Op. cit.*, p. 3.
48. *Op. cit.*, p. 31.
49. *Op. cit.*, pp. 412–13.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 409.
51. I. N. Berezin (trans.), *Sbornik Letopisey*, p. 24.
52. Radlov, *Aus Sibirien*, I, 455.
53. *Op. cit.*, pp. 413–17.
54. *Ibid.*, pp. 408–9.
55. Grodekov, *op. cit.*, pp. 13, 27; Rudenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 59–60.
56. Grodekov, *op. cit.*, p. 37.
57. *Ibid.*; Hudson, *op. cit.*, p. 53.
58. Rudenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 59–60.
59. Levshin, *op. cit.*, pp. 304–5, 341; Dingelstedt, *op. cit.*, p. 147; Rudenko, *op. cit.*, p. 60.
60. *Op. cit.*, p. 154.
61. Grodekov, *op. cit.*, p. 97.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 4; Levshin, *op. cit.*, p. 305.
63. Grodekov, *op. cit.*, p. 30.
64. *Op. cit.*, p. 363.
65. Hudson, *op. cit.*, pp. 43–45.
66. Grodekov, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 28; Karutz, *op. cit.*, p. 99; Levshin, *op. cit.*, p. 364.

68. A. N. Samoylovich, "Zapretnye slova v yasyke Kazak-kirgizskoy zamuzhney zhenshchiny," pp. 162–63.

69. *Op. cit.*, pp. 59–60.

70. Hudson, *op. cit.*, pp. 53–54.

71. Grodekov, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

72. *Op. cit.*, p. 54.

73. Hudson, unpublished field notes; Rudenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 58–59.

74. This usage of the two terms is general in Turkic (see Radlov, *Versuch eines Wörterbuches der Türk Dialecte*, II, 1116–17, 1432–33).

75. Rudenko, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

1. Herbert Harold Vreeland III, *Mongol Community and Kinship Structure*, pp. 290–93.

2. *Ibid.*

3. David F. Aberle, *The Kinship System of the Kalmuk Mongols.*

4. These informants were brought to Johns Hopkins University in 1949 by Professor Owen Lattimore.

5. These were selected members of a group of six hundred Kalmuks who escaped from the Soviet Union into Germany during World War II and took up residence in the United States in 1951.

6. B. Vladimirtsov, *Le Régime social des Mongols*, p. 169, n. 2; p. 170, n. 3; p. 176, nn. 2 and 3.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 200, nn. 1 and 5; 201; 228, n. 3; 229 n.; 230.

8. Vreeland, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

9. Vladimirtsov, *op. cit.*, pp. 243–44.

10. Vreeland, *op. cit.*, pp. 44, 49.

11. The chief of the Jasaktu Mongols traces his descent from Khasar or Ḥasar, brother of Chinggis Khan (Henning Haslund, *Mongolian Journey*, pp. 42, 52).

12. Vreeland, *op. cit.*, p. 306.

13. *Ayimaq*, med. M., "tribe."

14. Vreeland, *op. cit.*, pp. 10–16.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 19–20.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 11, 14–15.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 58.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 56. According to Vreeland, *omok* represents a phonetic transcription of the spoken word, while *obok* is the written form.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 56, n. 49.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 52–53.

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 34–38.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 56–57.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 64.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 64–65.

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