



**REPORT OF THE ROYAL PAPUA NEW GUINEA  
CONSTABULARY  
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW COMMITTEE TO THE  
MINISTER FOR INTERNAL SECURITY  
HON. BIRE KIMISOPA**

**GOVERNMENT OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA  
INSTITUTE OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS**

**SEPTEMBER 2004**

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## INTRODUCTION

324 murders in PNG in 7 months of 2004, 85 in Port Moresby **National 3<sup>rd</sup> September 2004**; This is the equivalent of **555 murders in PNG and 145 in Port Moresby** for the year. The equivalent figures for 7 months in **Fiji were 7 murders nationally and 3 in Suva**

Wrongful police conduct cost state K300m... **National 17th August 2004**

The incidence of armed car hijackings and armed robberies has increased significantly in Port Moresby and major urban centres in recent months. While the road and travelling conditions have improved along the highway between Lae and the Nadzab Airport, travellers should remain vigilant when travelling this road, particularly from the two to nine mile settlement areas....

### **Australian Travel Advisory**

**E) Canadians should not travel to the specified region(s) of these countries:**

[Albania](#) | [Algeria](#) | [Angola](#) | [Armenia](#) | [Azerbaijan](#) | [Bhutan](#) | [Bosnia and Herzegovina](#) | [Burma \(Myanmar\)](#) | [Cameroon](#) | [Chad](#) | [Chile](#) | [Congo \(Kinshasa\)](#) | [Ecuador](#) | [Egypt](#) | [Eritrea](#) | [Ethiopia](#) | [Georgia](#) | [Ghana](#) | [Guinea](#) | [Guinea-Bissau](#) | [India](#) | [Iran](#) | [Kenya](#) | [Laos](#) | [Lebanon](#) | [Malaysia](#) | [Moldova](#) | [Nicaragua](#) | [Nigeria](#) | [Pakistan](#) | [Panama](#) | [Papua New Guinea](#) | [Peru](#) | [Philippines](#) | [Rwanda](#) | [Sierra Leone](#) | [Sri Lanka](#) | [Thailand](#) | [Uganda](#) | [Uzbekistan](#) | [Venezuela](#) | [Yemen](#) | [Zambia](#) |

### **[Papua New Guinea](#) HIGH Risk (NEW ZEALAND TRAVEL ADVISORY)**

Given very high level of crime and violence in Port Moresby, Lae and Mt Hagen, visitors should seriously consider whether travel there is essential. Be extra vigilant, particularly at night

“An extraordinary 40 per cent of businesses considered their operations to be ‘very highly affected’ (the highest category) by PNG’s law and order problem and only 6% gave a response of ‘fairly unaffected, ‘highly unaffected’ or ‘completely unaffected’. These results were all the more extraordinary when it is considered ...those businesses still operating in PNG will be the most resilient to the law and order situation.....”...INA Survey 2002

**The Police Commissioner cannot restore law and order on his own. He needs a long-term commitment from the government to provide the resources to do the job.**

Shortage of police numbers and resources affect the Police's ability to do their job.

The Police need to change. They need to recognize that good policing requires cooperation with the public, so that the community and police solve problems of crime together. This is Community Policing, and must become the whole reason for and main method of doing Police business. Many actions of the Police do not assist Community Policing. The police need to restore discipline, and be more accountable for their actions and for the resources provided to them. Honest police are overwhelmed by lack of resources, poor leadership, bad management, apathy, and the condoning of sometimes openly corrupt behaviour of their colleagues and superiors

The Community wants an effective Police force. But, the community needs to accept that they have a part to play in policing. They cannot expect the Police to be effective if the public does not help. Effective policing is a partnership.

The starting point for these changes is an overwhelming government commitment to provide the resources for the police to do their job, and for the reform process within the police. Without government commitment, nothing will change. Law and order will deteriorate in to anarchy, and the future for our families and children will become hopeless.

**Without government commitment, nothing will change.**

However we look at the law and order problem in PNG, it is a serious problem. This report is about the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary. It is highly disturbing because it outlines weaknesses in every area and aspect of the constabulary. Some of the suggested reforms can be made immediately and some will take longer. The full solution is a long term one and is about attitudes within PNG from the top to the bottom.

Unless the government and the society commit themselves to reform and demand that it is carried out forthwith, with dedication and resolve, there will be no improvement. The government and the minister responsible need to be monitoring progress on a daily, weekly and monthly basis. Failure to implement reform must be met with stern sanctions and excuses cannot be tolerated.

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## 2.1 Purpose and Context

The Committee to review the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) was established by the Hon Bire Kimisopa, Minister for Internal Security. The review was commissioned in response to increasing unrest and violence in Papua New Guinea, with increasing use of firearms. Law and order is breaking down and there are serious discipline and morale problems with the RPNGC.

Most persons who appeared before the Committee confirmed those facts, and expressed a clear desire for the Government to resolve the law and order situation.

## 2.2 Morale and Discipline

There has been a serious failure in discipline and systems that has rendered the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary largely ineffective. It has been powerless to deal with rising incidents of violent crime, and unprofessional and unethical acts by some of its members have caused the community and the Government to lose confidence and trust. These problems are continuing.

The breakdown of discipline is reflected in the poor morale and confidence of the Constabulary itself. It is also reflected in the state of disrepair of equipment and premises, and the lack of professional pride by many members. Discipline is rarely enforced and few are held accountable for their actions. The RPNGC has lost integrity.

The root causes of the problems are complex. However, the solution is primarily in the hands of the Constabulary itself. The systems and processes are in place and substantial improvement could be implemented immediately without additional resources or cost. There has been a failure of will. The RPNGC must energise, prioritise and act to take charge of its future and begin the journey of reform. However, it will require the full support and assistance of the Government to succeed.

## 2.3 Government Action

To commence action and demonstrate that the Government and the Commissioner of Police will not tolerate continuance of the present appalling state of affairs, it is recommended that the Minister provide the Commissioner of Police with general policy direction on the need to take, within the powers and authorities available to him, whatever lawful action is necessary to restore an effective law enforcement capacity to sustain reasonable and acceptable levels of community safety.

The Minister should publicly confirm that the Commissioner has the full and united support of the Government for whatever action he may consider prudent to take to achieve the required outcomes, and that the Government will make available as a matter of priority those resources required to support and sustain emergency recovery action.

Over many years, Government funding to Police has not kept pace with population growth or with increased crime. An injection of resources is now essential if the Police are to be able to make serious inroads into the law and order situation. The Committee considers that, at the present time, police should take priority over government services such as health, education

and agriculture. Any further deterioration in the law and order situation will restrict the delivery of health and education services, and impact on the development of the human potential of PNG. It will also discourage farmers from taking cash crops to market, which will affect exports.

Government commitment to the Police is essential. Without government commitment, nothing will happen.

## **2.4 Accountability, Transparency and Corporate Governance**

The operational effectiveness of the Constabulary depends fundamentally on the quality of leadership and the strength of its discipline. Both were found to be weak and lie at the heart of the malaise of inaction and apathy that has gripped the Constabulary.

The lawless behaviour of some police has destroyed community confidence and trust. These perceptions have been strengthened where unlawful actions have gone unpunished. It was reported to the Committee that public confidence in the effectiveness of current disciplinary review machinery is at such a low level that many complaints against the police are no longer reported. A transparent process of review of police actions is essential for building confidence and trust.

The current internal arrangements for enforcing discipline, monitoring compliance and auditing performance are weak. To assist the Commissioner in coordinating the accountability monitoring and review processes within the Constabulary, it is recommended that an Office of Inspector General of the Constabulary be established, reporting direct to the Commissioner and working with the Ombudsman Commission.

The pivotal role of the Inspector General is to ensure effective corporate governance. It brings together the critical organisational performance management elements of Internal Audit, Internal Affairs, and Command Inspection and Review to give teeth and substance to the implementation of Commissioner's Directives. It also brings into being a Discipline and Employment Review Board to assist the Commissioner in the application of penalties and employment review.

A fundamental cultural change is required and must be enforced.

## **2.5 Community Confidence and Trust**

### **COMMUNITY POLICING**

**Community Policing means that the police respond to problems in the community and work with the community to regain their confidence and support. It does not entail a fundamental change in police practices, rather a change in attitude and culture.**

The Committee believes that the Constabulary must change long held attitudes, and must embrace the concept of Community Policing. Community Policing is a partnership between



the police and the community to jointly tackle the problem of crime. It is evident that many members of the Constabulary, throughout the ranks, fail to understand the principles of Community Policing. Their undisciplined actions have created problems for the communities they are meant to serve, for the Government and for the Constabulary itself.

Police must act in a professional and ethical manner and present in proper police uniform. The community must be in no doubt that they are dealing with a competent and trained person sworn into the Office of Constable. Wearing nametags is an important part of this process. There must be a continuous and positive dialogue and interaction between the community and police and a shared ownership of both the problems and the possible solutions.

Police Commanders should be instructed to enforce the dress code and standards of professional behaviour, and be held personally accountable for ensuring that these directions are enforced. The committee understands that new uniforms will be provided as part of the Enhancement Cooperation Programme and this will result in a marked difference in police dress and professional presentation. Firm action should be taken to ensure that the existing Discipline Code is applied and enforced.

Other initiatives to restore community confidence and trust include oversight of complaints made against police through the creation of the position of a special Police Ombudsman; introduction of a Gun Amnesty Program; and publication of the RPNGC Annual Report that would also include outcomes of investigation of complaints against police.

## **2.6 Auxiliaries, Reserves and Mobile Squads**

The RPNGC is handicapped by insufficient manpower to deliver effective police services. On any world scale, the ratio of **1 police per 1121** population is a major challenge. Police numbers have been supplemented by the use of Reserves and Auxiliaries.

Some Regular, Reserve and Auxiliary members have committed lawless acts while wearing police uniforms. Their undisciplined and violent actions have brought fear and distrust to the community and resulted in major compensation claims to Government. Immediate action should be taken to enforce discipline. The Committee considers that the roles and responsibilities of the Auxiliaries and Reserves should be reviewed and clarified. When this has occurred, the appointments of all Auxiliaries and reserves should be terminated, and a limited number of those who meet the new standards be invited to reapply for a three year term of appointment.

The undisciplined para-military operations of Mobile Squads and Task Forces have created fear and confusion among the community and resulted in considerable cost to Government through compensation claims. They are generally perceived as being very aggressive, ill disciplined and prone to violent acts. Contrary to policy, these members today work to the exclusion of general patrolling and policing duties with the community.

Urgent action is required to enhance police numbers allocated to the core function of general policing. The RPNGC cannot afford to carry “part-time” trained police resources. There

should be a review of the numbers of mobile squads in the country and an immediate instruction that they be used for ordinary police duties when they are not deployed in special operations. The culture of the mobile squads has to be changed to ensure that they use force only as a last resort and that the level of force employed is commensurate with the result they seek. The indiscriminate destruction of property has to cease.

It is recognised that adoption of this recommendation may be particularly difficult. However, having regard to the critical shortage of operational capacity and the rising crime rates, the Committee believes maintenance of the status quo is not an option. The Committee considers that in situations which require armed force, there is a role for the Defence Force to provide a secure environment within which police can operate.

## **2.7 Basic Resources**

A significant gap has developed between the resources that have been provided to the Constabulary and those it needs to deliver an effective policing service. The shortfalls are not only in people but also in the lack of fundamental supplies such as paper, pencils, desks, tables, chairs, typewriters, Police Notebooks, recording systems and a telephone.

In many cases the state of the dilapidated Police Stations reflects the apathy of the Station Commander and the resident police team. While enforcing discipline and Standing Orders would make some impact on current appearances, most Police Stations lack even the basic equipment to present an effective “shop-front” to the community with which to conduct effective police operations. There is a history of under-funding and broken promises.

The government has a critical role to play in energising the process of recovery. It must take immediate action to provide the Constabulary with the basic resources required to deliver effective policing. Every Police Station must be equipped with the essential basic resources, without which the Constabulary cannot do the job. This is seen as fundamental to the restoration of public confidence and police morale.

The government has a right to expect resources to be properly managed. When these basic items have been provided, senior police executives must ensure that Station Commanders are held personally responsible and accountable for the resources placed under their command. Any misuse or abuse must be dealt with swiftly, openly and firmly.

## **2.8 Mobility and Effectiveness**

To be effective, police require vehicles to respond to incidents and display a visible presence on the streets through patrols and traffic checks. The age and poor condition of the police vehicle fleet and the restrictions on fuel have largely rendered police mobility ineffective. These deficiencies have become an excuse for lack of effective response to community calls for assistance.

Redressing the state of the vehicle fleet is a longer-term initiative to be taken in partnership with the government. However, its management should immediately be put in the hands of a civilian experienced in fleet management. In addition, with the cooperation, dedication and

commitment of senior police members, action could be taken immediately to re-deploy vehicles currently allocated to personal use to regular police operations.

## **2.9 Pay and Conditions**

The barely adequate pay and poor conditions of police aggravate the current situation and contribute to poor discipline, lawless behaviour and a lack of commitment. There is a need to ensure that police are in receipt of reasonable terms and conditions of service that also act as a deterrent to corrupt practices. The history of non-payments of increments and leave fares to members is a major concern.

The Constabulary must rehabilitate itself. However, to achieve this there must be a clear partnership and shared responsibility with the Government. To positively address the deficiencies, action should be taken immediately to pay all outstanding leave and repatriation claims as specified in legislation. This would meet outstanding entitlements that members have already earned.

Current terms and conditions provide for a range of allowances to be paid to police members. To ensure members receive their basic entitlements and to reduce the cost of administering the conditions of service, it is proposed that a Constabulary Allowance be introduced that consolidates all individual allowance payments as a composite amount set as a percentage of the base salary. To take this idea further, the Committee recommends that the government announce an immediate review of police pay and allowances. This would signal to the members of the Constabulary that the Government is serious about effective policing and maintaining community confidence.

## **2.10 Effective Policing Operations**

Modern policing is smart policing. It relies upon expert analytical systems, appropriate technology and dynamic information management to maximise the effectiveness of trained manpower. In the RPNGC such systems were either absent or had fallen into disuse. Support services were ineffective and the fundamentals of basic policing could not be delivered reliably or consistently.

Urgent action is required to establish an effective foundation for effective police operations. In particular, action is required to rehabilitate the current Intelligence processes and systems and to develop an effective, fully staffed NCD Operations Centre that can respond effectively and quickly to community needs and expectations, and be established as a model for regional operations centres,

The Constabulary has suffered from a lack of leadership and effective command by senior police members. Discipline has been allowed to deteriorate and there is no accountability for members to apply their training in police operations. Established processes and procedures are ignored, and equipment is lost, abused or mislaid. Commanders do not take responsibility for developing and mentoring their teams and no follow-on training is identified or provided.

Immediate action should be taken to re-introduce local, regional and decentralised training that is focused on, and tailored to identified critical skill and behaviour needs to reinforce the need for operational police training and its effectiveness.

## **2.11 Strategic Directions**

To overcome the critical lack of strategic corporate governance of the organisation and to demonstrate total executive commitment to its improvement, it is recommended that the Commissioner establish a Strategic Policy and Planning Committee to establish clear strategic corporate policy directions for the Constabulary. It would also set corporate performance measures for the strategic objectives and allocate individual executive responsibility for their achievement

The Committee found a lack of understanding that “administrative jobs” should support and facilitate operational performance. If any activity being carried out in the RPNGC cannot be shown to support operations, it should not be carried out at all unless required by legislation or direct Government policy. Operational alignment must flow from strategic alignment.

Aligning operations with the strategic directions and priorities of the Constabulary provides a sharper focus to current activities increasing their effectiveness and efficiency. It also frees up resources from unnecessary tasks and acts as a resources “multiplier”.

## **2.12 Consolidating Reform**

Other recommendations in the report are aimed at building on the immediate, short-term initiatives and focus on consolidating reform.

These initiatives include the role of police and non-police including Reservists and Auxiliary police; establishing strategic organisational alignment and priorities setting frameworks; people development, promotion and recruitment; workforce planning strategies including senior management training; rationalising employment numbers; the balance between operational and operations support personnel; and exit and refreshment strategies.

There are significant weaknesses in financial and resources management. More effective use could be made of the resources currently provided to the RPNGC. Specific initiatives include improving the understanding of basic financial management processes and procedures; realistic budgeting and reporting arrangements; establishing with the Department of Finance a process to ensure the funding of “core” elements; and extensive training to inculcate sound resources management practices.

In particular, the budget formulation process will need to include clear identification of budgeting priorities, both in the bidding and appropriation processes. The need to set clear organisational budget priorities that reflect Government policy and strategic assessments has also been addressed.

Other recommendations are focused on improving management of organisational performance. These include the development of performance monitoring and reporting arrangements; revising the accountability structure and governance arrangements; the nature of provincial reporting requirements; and procedures to improve the communication of Force instructions and policies.

Effective community policing requires police to understand they are members of the community. The Committee recommends that the Constabulary generally get out of the business of supplying and maintaining accommodation. The provision of accommodation as a condition of service should be replaced by a rental allowance. The existing housing stock is in major disrepair and the cost of maintenance and restoration work is beyond the capacity of the RPNGC.

### **2.13 A process of immunity.**

To start the process of reform it will be necessary to introduce a process of immunity. It is clear to the Committee that many police have been involved in corrupt behaviour or malpractice at some stage of their careers. Knowledge of this previous unacceptable conduct may be held against any officer attempting to discipline other staff or to report unacceptable behaviour.

The Committee believes that a process should be put in place which will enable police to admit to previous unacceptable conduct and less serious malpractice and corruption, and be granted immunity from charges arising from these offences. This will allow police to do their duty and enforce discipline without fear of being reported for a previous indiscretion. Clearly, the public expects that this process would not include immunity from serious corruption or acts of serious criminal violence.

### 3.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

#### RECOMENDATIONS FOR IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION (Within 6 months)

No.	Recommendation	Text Reference	Cost estimate
1	<p><b>Minister to start the process.</b> As an immediate start, the Review Committee recommends that the Minister:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Issue a formal and public directive to the Commissioner of Police regarding the Government’s deep concern at the disintegrating state of law and order in Papua New Guinea, directing him to restore an effective law enforcement capacity across all provinces of PNG; and the need to minimise claims against the State which result from inappropriate police action;</li> <li>• Seek a commitment from the Government to make available, as a matter of priority, those resources required to support and sustain emergency action;</li> <li>• Instruct members of the RPNGC to refer to the Ombudsman Commission documented instances of political interference by leaders in due police process</li> <li>• request the Government to advise the Attorney General to include the Commissioner of Police in all claims against the state which involve the Police</li> </ul>	8.2	<p>No cost</p> <p>No cost</p> <p>No cost</p> <p>No cost</p>
2	<p><b>Monitoring Committee</b> Establish a Monitoring Committee comprising Police and members of the public to oversight the introduction of these recommendations and report regularly to the Minister on progress.</p>		
3	<p><b>Community policing</b> It is recommended that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Community policing becomes the primary focus of policing in PNG, and that the interactive, partnership, principles of community policing be fully integrated into all recruit and in-service training and development programs.</li> <li>• General Duties policing be responsible for community policing, and be officially recognised as the most important area of operational policing with incentives developed to attract high quality officers including the development of promotional criteria which requires satisfactory service in General Duties as a pre-requisite to promotion.</li> </ul>	8.3.1	<p>No cost</p> <p>No cost</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Re-labelling General Duties as “Patrol Command” or something similar in order to improve the image and status of the general policing role – both in the eyes of the police and the public</li> <li>• In order to reflect the change of focus to Community Policing, and to send a message to all serving officers, all references to “police force” should be replaced by “police service”.</li> </ul>		No cost  No cost
<b>4</b>	<p><b>Dealing with previous minor malpractice</b> The Committee recommends that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• a process be put in place which will enable Police to admit to previous unacceptable conduct and less serious malpractice and corruption, and be granted immunity from charges arising from these offences;</li> <li>• this process of immunity does not include acts of serious corruption or acts of serious criminal violence;</li> <li>• from the date of immunity forward, standards of police behaviour will be rigidly enforced without exception, and this enforcement will be supported by resources and by a commitment from all ranks of police leadership;</li> <li>• Any offence large or small should be immediately dealt with from the date of the indemnity and publicised both within and outside of the police force.</li> </ul>	8.9.3	No additional cost
<b>5</b>	<p><b>Payment of outstanding entitlements.</b> The Committee recommends that an immediate payment of outstanding increments and leave entitlements be made to police and civilian members of the RPNGC and a commitment made to pay future entitlements on-time, every time</p>	8.6.1	K11.8 million
<b>6</b>	<p><b>Certainty of Funding</b> It is a matter of urgency, the government agree to a realistic Core Budget for the RPNGC and ensure that it is received on time every time. The Core Budget will:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reflect the real costs of meeting agreed, practical and achievable operational goals;</li> <li>Determine the level of services that the Government will fund the Constabulary to deliver;</li> <li>Be supplemented by Government when it requires the Constabulary to deliver additional or new services, (e.g. for elections) and</li> </ol> <p>Be explained to Police Commanders and training be given to draft practical and realistic budgets</p>	8.7.2	No extral cost  Depends on circumstances

7	<p><b>Immediate actions to restore discipline.</b></p> <p>The Constabulary has a good, clear Disciplinary Manual which is not being enforced. The Committee strongly recommends that the Commissioner, with the support of government:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Issue a Directive to all RPNGC staff instructing that the existing Discipline Code be immediately put into effect (to improve the presentation of the Police, the enforcement of restrictions on chewing buai, drinking and smoking on duty are particularly important);</li> <li>• Issue a Directive to each Deputy Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner and civilian equivalent advising that he will hold them personally responsible and accountable for ensuring that the Discipline Code is complied with;</li> <li>• Direct the Internal Affairs Directorate to support the Police Executive by rigorously monitoring and enforcing compliance with the Discipline Code by all members; and</li> <li>• Direct all line Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs) to attend a Training Seminar run by the Internal Affairs Directorate to reinforce standards at all levels.</li> </ul>	8.9.1	<p>No cost</p> <p>No cost</p> <p>No cost</p> <p>K50,000</p>
8.	<p><b>Uniforms.</b></p> <p>The Committee recommends that:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) The Commissioner of Police instruct all Police and Station Commanders to enforce the dress code and standards of professional behaviour.</li> <li>(b) A standard uniform be provided to all Regular Constabulary members that clearly distinguishes them from Community Auxiliary and Reserve Constabulary members;</li> <li>(c) Action be taken immediately to recover items of Regular police uniform from Reserves and Auxiliaries,</li> <li>(d) All uniformed members of the Constabulary be required to wear their Regimental Number clearly displayed on their uniform; and</li> <li>(e) All uniformed members of the Constabulary be issued with nametags, which are to be clearly displayed on their uniform.</li> <li>(f) All officers must be issued with a current ID card, which must be produced on demand and it should be an offence not to carry an ID card while on duty.</li> <li>(g) Regular inspection parades should be held to inspect dress and other equipment.</li> </ol>	8.7.10	<p>No cost</p> <p>K3.5m.(being provided by ECP)</p> <p>No cost</p> <p>K100,000</p> <p>No cost</p> <p>50,000</p> <p>No cost</p> <p>No cost</p> <p>No cost</p> <p>No cost</p>



	<p>In addition, the Committee recommends that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• a more appropriate uniform be issued to policewomen engaged in field work</li> <li>• procedures taken to improve stock control, purchasing and management of uniforms and accoutrements</li> <li>• the civilianisation of the quartermaster function</li> </ul> <p>the provisions of the Police Act 1998 which make it an offence to be improperly dressed while on duty (Section 20 (1) 1) be enforced to ensure that Police officers are properly dressed in full uniform while on duty, and that the removal of Police Support Officer (PSO) or Reserve insignia from uniforms be deemed an offence under this section.</p>		
9.	<p><b>Police Firearms.</b></p> <p>The regulations and rules for the storage and handling of firearms are clear and adequate. They are not being enforced, and supervisors who are not enforcing the rules are not being sanctioned. The committee recommends that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the present rules and regulations on firearms and armouries be enforced and supervisors be held personally responsible for enforcing the rules,</li> <li>• firearms must only be carried by Police when on duty. It should be a serious offence for Police to carry a firearm while off duty, unless authorised in writing by a Provincial Commander or officer of similar or senior rank</li> <li>• Secure armouries to be used for the storage of Police firearms, or, if not available, built to that standard. (@Number of inadequate armouries is not known)</li> <li>• An immediate stocktake be conducted to identify the number and description of firearms actually on hand at each police post and the number and description of firearms unable to be accounted for.</li> </ul> <p>The public expects Police to be generally unarmed. The Committee further recommends that Police who are armed should not carry firearms openly unless the operational situation requires this level of preparedness.</p>	8.7.12	<p>No extra cost</p> <p>No cost</p>
10	<p><b>Restoring Effective Operations.</b></p> <p>It is recommended that immediate action is taken to clean and paint every Police Station and equip them with the basic resources required to deliver effective policing. Including basic items such as paper, pencils, desks, tables, chairs, Police Notebooks, typewriters, recording systems and a telephone, without which the police cannot do their job.</p> <p>These resources must be maintained to a standard expected by the PNG Government, the community. Action should be taken to:</p>	8.7.6	<p>K6.0 million(seek donations from paint firms?)</p> <p>No additional cost</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Insist that every Police Commander and Police Station Commander to be held personally responsible and accountable for the resources and equipment placed under their command. Senior police executives must ensure that any misuse or abuse is dealt with swiftly, openly and firmly</li> <li>• Ensure that follow-up inspections are conducted at least every six months</li> <li>• Improve the security at police stations to reduce unauthorized access, and enable proper security of assets.</li> </ul> <p>As part of the Constabulary’s commitment to community policing, each Police Station should:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establish a public Enquiry Desk that is continuously staffed by a Regular police member in full uniform and trained in public relations and is literate;</li> <li>• Require that the Enquiry Desk police officer record all contacts and incidents reported by the public and demonstrate their clear commitment to assist;</li> <li>• Institute arrangements to ensure that police provide feedback to the public on matters reported to them, and,</li> <li>• resume the practice of producing an Annual Report to the Government and people of PNG as required by current legislation.</li> </ul> <p>As an operational priority for immediate action, it is recommended that the Commissioner direct Police Commanders to ensure that all personnel turn up for duty and have access to the required equipment and materials to enable them to do their duty</p> <p>The Committee recommended that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Training be provided on financial guidelines and financial management to senior executives and junior managers made aware of financial controls and recording.</li> <li>• Provincial Police Commanders carry out their duties in relation to financial control and expenditure to ensure transparency in financial transactions with the support of civilian staff; and</li> <li>• Sound financial management skills are a prerequisite for promotion to any senior rank or position within the RPNGC.</li> </ul>		<p>No additional cost K1.8</p> <p>No cost No cost</p>
<p><b>Reserve Police</b></p>	<p>In respect of Reserve Police, it is recommended that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the Reserve police are reclassified as Police Support Officers and, unless expressly authorised by the Commissioner in respect of a specific emergency, be unarmed and with no authority to draw or carry a firearm</li> <li>• following proof of service, all outstanding pay and entitlements should be met by the state</li> </ul>	<p>8.3.5</p>	<p>No extra cost Not known No cost</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• all present appointments are terminated, and incumbents invited to re-apply</li> <li>• all future appointments are for three years, renewable at three year intervals subject to satisfactory service</li> <li>• the role and qualifications required of Police Support Officers are clarified and published</li> <li>• properly skilled people are appointed as Police Support Officers</li> <li>• management control is exercised over the number of Police Support Officers appointed, which should be no more than is absolutely necessary</li> <li>• a distinctive uniform is made available to Police Support Officers which must be worn when on normal duty. The uniform should be similar to a regular police uniform, but have clear identifying Police Support Officer insignia on each sleeve.</li> </ul> <p>It is recommended that the Police Act be amended to include details and boundaries of graded responsibilities for Police Support Officers.</p>		<p>Cost not known No cost</p>
	<p><b>Auxiliary Police</b></p> <p>In respect of the Auxiliaries, the committee recommends:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Auxiliaries should be used only in rural areas and settlements, and be responsible for policing locally identified problems in the local context</li> <li>• following proof of service, all outstanding allowances for the present Auxiliaries should be met by the State</li> <li>• all Auxiliaries presently operating in towns should be disbanded</li> <li>• all current appointments as Auxiliary police be terminated, and the incumbents be invited to re-apply</li> <li>• all future appointments as Auxiliary Police are for three years, renewable at three year intervals subject to satisfactory service</li> <li>• Auxiliary police should be selected in consultation with the local community, have powers that can only be exercised within a designated local geographic area and be unarmed</li> <li>• auxiliary police should report to the local regular police commander, and have the power to hold persons until they can be taken into regular police custody</li> <li>• a series of incrementally graded powers should be developed for auxiliary police in order to minimise the risk to government of misuse of powers. Auxiliary police should be appointed with particular powers depending on their training and experience.</li> </ul>	<p>8.3.6</p>	<p>No cost Not known No cost No cost</p>

13	<p><b>Vehicles.</b></p> <p>The management and use of police vehicles must immediately be taken under executive control. It is recommended that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) The Commissioner re-examine the issue of vehicles to ensure that they are restricted to essential use and available at all times if required for police duties.</li> <li>(b) All vehicles be operated in accordance with RPNGC Standing Orders and policy;</li> <li>(c) The 25 litres restriction on fuel be scrapped when effective management and control measures requiring that vehicles be used only for police purposes are in place; (*cost of extra 10 litres/vehicle/day). Ensure greater control of vehicles through use of a log book or electronic tracking devices.</li> <li>(d) The Government move to place the management of the RPNGC vehicle fleet under a private sector fleet management contractor with appropriate experience and facilities; (#One service/month cost K10,000/yr, offset against longer vehicle life. Repairs extra)</li> </ul> <p>An immediate stocktake be conducted to identify the number, type and condition of vehicles actually on hand at each police post, and the number and type of vehicles unable to be accounted for.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(e) As a matter of urgency review the use of the police helicopter and cost against the charter of a civilian aircraft</li> </ul>	8.7.11	<p>No cost</p> <p>K 3.6 million *</p> <p>No cost</p>
14	<p><b>Media Campaign.</b></p> <p>The Committee recommends that a professionally managed media campaign is undertaken as part of the re-focus on community policing. The committee also recommends that a notice be posted daily at every police station detailing occurrences and what action has been taken.</p>	8.7.17	K1.2 million
15	<p><b>Entry Standards for regular Police.</b></p> <p>The committee recommends that the entry standards for police should be a grade 12 education, a minimum age of 21 years, and wherever possible, demonstrated life experience. Police recruitment procedures should be changed to reflect this recommendation.</p> <p>Aptitude tests and fitness testing should form part of the recruitment process.</p>	8.4.2	No cost

16	<p><b>Transport to and from work.</b></p> <p>The Committee recommends that Police and civilian staff are no longer provided with transport to and from work during the day. Transport to and from work should only be available for night shifts.</p> <p>Vehicles are hired from the for transport to and from work are hired from the private sector, and staff that use this service pay a realistic fee which covers costs.</p>	8.7.11	Saving
17	<p><b>Redundancy.</b></p> <p>The Committee recommends that the Police identify those officers who are ineffective and unsuitable (and who cannot be retired) and seek NEC approval to have them declared redundant, and to fund the necessary redundancy payments</p>	8.7.15	Saving
18	<p><b>Fitness test.</b></p> <p>The Committee recommends that an annual fitness test be introduced for all members of the regular Constabulary. The test should be related to the age of the officer, and the duties performed by the officer, and must be passed every year. Officers who fail to pass the annual fitness test may, at the discretion of the Commissioner, be retired (Police Act, S.92) or dismissed or demoted (Police Act, S.55) as unfit for service. The Committee also considers that Reserve Police should pass a fitness test appropriate to their role.</p>	8.7.16	Not known
19	<p><b>Transfers</b></p> <p>Women Police to be transferred (if requested) and assisted in cases of domestic violence. Police to be generally more responsive to domestic violence and sex abuse.</p>		
MEDIUM TERM RECOMMENDATIONS (within 12 months)			
20	<p><b>Office of Inspector General of Constabulary.</b></p> <p>An Office of Inspector-General of the Constabulary at Deputy Commissioner level is created to exercise effective corporate governance of the RPNGC. The Office would:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Exercise the powers of the Police Act 1998 and attendant Regulations, Commissioner’s Directives and Standing Orders; report direct to the Commissioner of Police; coordinate the accountability and reporting</li> </ul>	8.9.2	Not known

	<p>requirements of the Constabulary; include the Directorates of Internal Affairs; Command Inspection and Review; and Discipline and Employment Review;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establish the Discipline and Employment Review Board to assist the Commissioner in dealing with the complexities of the PNG culture in the application of penalties and employment review, supported by the Discipline and Employment Review Directorate;</li> <li>• Exercise the functions of an expanded Internal Audit Directorate encompassing financial, performance and management audit functions across the Constabulary;</li> <li>• Record outcomes in the Annual Report of the Inspector General to the Commissioner; and</li> <li>• Ensure that the accountability machinery applies to all persons able to exercise powers under the Police Force Act 1998 including Regulars, Auxiliaries, Reservists, Special Constables, persons vested with authority under s.16 of the Act, and unsworn staff.</li> </ul>		
21	<p><b>Effective use of present funds</b></p> <p>It is difficult to quantify the extent of misuse of funds in the RPNGC, because the accountability mechanisms, management skills and discipline are not functioning effectively. The Committee recommends that the Constabulary enforce the existing accountability mechanisms, and reinforce discipline to ensure proper use of funds and resources</p>	8.7.4	No extra cost
22	<p><b>Review of salaries and allowances.</b></p> <p>It is recommended that the Government announce an immediate review of police salaries and allowances that should address issues such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• consolidating all allowances, and paying them as a percentage of salary</li> <li>• providing accommodation allowance in place of accommodation, and the amount of the allowance</li> <li>• that the Police are removed from the Unified Pay Policy for the Disciplined Services.</li> </ul>	8.6.3	No extra cost
23	<p><b>Act to Regulate the Security Industry.</b></p> <p>The committee recommends that the Act to regulate the Security Industry, which is currently before parliament, should be passed into legislation and improve links with reputable security companies.</p>		

24	<p><b>Threats.</b></p> <p>There is evidence of threats being made by politicians and other defendants against Police prosecutors and their families. This causes many cases to be poorly presented. Police prosecutors must have confidence that they can report instances of threats to an appropriate authority. The Committee recommends that the Commissioner of Police establish a confidential reporting network to record political interference in police matters, provide support to officers who are threatened, and in cases where there is documentary evidence initiate criminal proceedings, or refer the matter to the Ombudsman Commission.</p>	8.13	500,000
25	<p><b>National Functions.</b></p> <p>It is recommended that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Intelligence is a vital national function for policing inside PNG, protection against international crime and terrorism, and resources should be provided to ensure this function is effective</li> <li>(b) The Deputy Commissioner (Operations) to activate existing systems and processes for Intelligence gathering, input, analysis and dissemination</li> </ul>	8.3.2	K250,000 No additional cost
26	<p><b>Funding for major events.</b></p> <p>The National Government must provide adequate allocations for additional operational expenditure such as elections.</p>	8.10	As required
27	<p><b>Self transfers</b></p> <p>The Committee recommends that the practice of officers transferring themselves without authority, cease immediately, and disciplinary penalties be applied to those who refuse to serve where posted.</p>	8.8	No cost
28	<p><b>Tenure of Commissioner.</b></p> <p>The Committee recommends that steps be taken to make the Commissioner's term of appointment more secure.</p>		No cost
29	<p><b>Longer term initiatives to restore discipline.</b></p> <p>The Committee also recommends that independent accountability and review processes should be established as soon as possible and a separate Police Ombudsman created and be appointed.</p> <p>When the review machinery has been established, announcements should be made to the public about how these arrangements can be accessed.</p>	8.9.2	K500, 000  K50,000

30	<p><b>Restoring Strategic Corporate Governance.</b></p> <p>To overcome the critical lack of strategic corporate governance of the organisation and to demonstrate total executive commitment to its improvement, the Committee recommends that the RPNGC:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establish a Strategic Policy and Planning Committee (SPPC) to develop clear strategic corporate policy directions for the RPNGC;</li> <li>• Establish a Corporate Planning and Development Unit reporting direct to the Commissioner;</li> <li>• Develop an organisational performance management framework to give direction to activities carried out by the RPNGC; and set clear corporate goals to take the organisation forward;</li> <li>• Introduce coordinated corporate performance monitoring and management arrangements;</li> <li>• Specify in the Performance Agreements of every Deputy Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner and Assistant Secretary equivalent, their responsibility for ensuring the implementation of organisational performance management and accountability.</li> </ul>	8.7.8	No extra cost
31	<p><b>Corporate Priorities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There is an urgent need to reaffirm clear and consistent corporate priorities set for the organisation that reflect its strategic directions</li> </ul>	8.7.8	No extra cost
32	<p><b>Effective use of trained Police.</b></p> <p>The Committee recommends that police establish more civilian positions within the police and consideration be given to the splitting of departmental and policing responsibilities.</p> <p>(a) The Committee recommends that Mobile Squads and Rapid Response Units as currently configured be used for core police functions when not deployed on operational duties.</p> <p>(a) It is recommended that the Commissioner, acting on advice, review the number of mobile squads determine the optimum number and locations</p> <p>(b) Prepare a program of rotation, training and continuing development to maintain the required skilled specialist resources base; and</p> <p>(c) Set in place a process of continuing review to ensure that the Constabulary has available the right skilled specialist manpower in the right place all the time</p>	8.7.13	No extra cost No extra cost No extra cost Unknown
33	<p><b>Enhance Operational and Organisational Effectiveness. (See Organisational Chart, Appendix 8)</b></p>		



	<p>To enhance operational and organisational effectiveness the RPNGC it is recommended that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Deputy Commissioner (Administration) role be focused on managing all Operations Support functions;</li> <li>• Urgent attention be given to restructuring the processes for logistics and supply, to ensure that they are effective and appropriate and serve the needs of operational units;</li> <li>• A suitably qualified and experienced civilian at Deputy Secretary level be appointed to the Deputy Commissioner (Administration) position who is not only an able senior corporate executive but also understands the operational imperatives of the RPNGC and have corporate responsibility for Financial and Human Resource, operations; be responsible for ensuring effective corporate governance in the operations of the RPNGC meeting all legislative and policy requirements;</li> <li>• The Deputy Secretary will be responsible determining those functions that could be outsourced (such as Vehicle Fleet Management), recognising that responsibility cannot be outsourced;</li> <li>• The Deputy Secretary will be responsible for establishing and maintaining an effective and appropriate "tooth to tail" ratio of Operations to Operations Support for the RPNGC and ensure that this balance is consistent with best practice; and</li> <li>• Responsibilities of the Chief Financial Officer to ensure the preparation of budgets for the RPNGC and the effective, management of funds.</li> </ul>	8.7.9	<p>No extra cost No extra cost K200,000</p> <p>No extra cost No extra cost</p> <p>No extra cost</p>
34	<p><b>Recruitment.</b></p> <p>Recruitment of female officers should be maintained and further encouraged and enhanced.</p> <p>It is recommended that a more stringent reference checking procedure is adopted, which must include at least one reference from a community leader in the applicant's home village, or similar local area where the applicant has lived for a period.</p>	8.4.1	<p>No cost</p> <p>No additional cost</p>
35	<p><b>Training</b></p> <p>(a) Cadet officer training be reintroduced as a matter of urgency</p> <p>(b) The philosophy and practice of Community policing be built into all training, including recruit training</p> <p>(c) The Deputy Commissioner (Operations) direct Police Commanders to re-introduce on the job training using their trained members, and to report progress each month;</p> <p>(d) probationary officers should be properly supervised, and provided with adequate on-the-job training.</p>	8.5.4	<p>Unclear</p> <p>No extra cost</p> <p>No additional cost</p>

36	<p><b>Executive development</b> It is recommended that:</p> <p>Personal development programs be developed for all Senior Executive members to enable them to gain the specific management competencies that are required to deal with the needs of modern policing in the RPNGC including properly focused and targeted interchange and secondment programs;</p>	8.5.4	K200,000
37	<p><b>Career development.</b></p> <p>The Committee recommends that:</p> <p>(a) As a matter of policy to foster organisational development, the RPNGC encourage attendance of members at appropriate programs (such as offered by the universities);</p> <p>(b) As an integral part of building for the future, the RPNGC include “personal development” in the selection criteria for promotion; and</p>	8.5.4	<p>No cost</p> <p>No cost</p>
<b>LONGER TERM RECOMMENDATIONS (within 2 years)</b>			
38	<p><b>Links with other agencies</b></p> <p>The committee recommends that a small number of the Defence Force (approximately 4 platoons) be trained to support the civilian power, and be deployed to those duties under the command of Police. It is important that the members of the Defence Force assisting the Police receive proper training in the respective roles of, and boundaries between, the Defence Force and the Police.</p>	8.7.14	Savings to police budget
39	<p><b>HR Plan.</b></p> <p>The Committee recommends that the Constabulary develop a comprehensive human resource plan to address the present and future staffing needs of the organization, and it further recommends that the Constabulary use this plan to actively manage staffing numbers and career development issues.</p>	8.7.15	K300,000
40	<p><b>Cooperation.</b></p> <p>The Committee recommends that all provinces (which do not already do so) should convene monthly meetings of the Provincial Peace and Good Order Committee as a means of cooperation between the police and Provincial authorities</p>	8.10	No additional cost
41	<p><b>Personal Development for Executives</b></p> <p>It is recommended by the Committee that senior officers in the top command engage in some sort of personal development and be re-aligned to jobs based on their demonstrated strengths.</p>	8.12	No cost

42	<p><b>Rehabilitate Prosecutions.</b> The Committee recommends that the Constabulary take steps to rebuild the prosecutions directorate to enable it to perform in today's environment. The Committee also agrees that the Constabulary should have the capacity to call in civilian prosecutors when necessary</p>	8.13	K12 million
43	<p><b>Donor Support</b> The Committee recommends that donor support over the next 3 to 5 years be directed at activities that improve the ability of the Constabulary to perform its day-to-day functions. In order to achieve this, the Constabulary need:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• professional expertise</li> <li>• infrastructure</li> <li>• resources</li> <li>• funding to recruit and train extra police, and to pay wages until the RPNGC is refreshed</li> </ul>	8.15	No cost to PNG
44	<p><b>Employment of Reservists by Private Companies.</b> The Committee believes that employees of private companies should not use police powers in the course of their private employment and should cease.</p>	8.17	No cost
45	<p><b>Protective Equipment.</b> The committee recommends that Police are provided with appropriate protective equipment, ensure that this equipment is properly managed, accounted for and maintained.</p>	8.17	K1.2 million*
46	<p><b>Operations Centre.</b> The Committee recommends that an effective NCD Operations centre be established as a model for regional operations centres, and that the various Police Task Forces are tasked to perform sector patrols as directed by the Operations Centre.</p>	8.3.2	Not known
47	<p><b>Review of National Communications Centre.</b> It is recommended that an urgent review of the National Communications Centre be conducted to determine the functions and equipment needs for the next 10 years.</p>	8.3.2	No extra cost
48	<p><b>Employment of Police.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Committee recommends that the deployment of Police should be reviewed, and some of the tasks traditionally done by Police discontinued. In particular static guards,. escorts, serving summons and collecting debts..</li> </ul> <p>Approximately 100 Police are used for close personal protection work. The criteria for assignment to close escort should be reassessed, and excess officers returned to general duties</p>	8.3.3	No extra cost

49	<p><b>Police Band.</b> The Committee recommends that the Police Band be restructured and a proper strategy be developed to use the band for public relations, and operational duties. It should charge for private functions.</p>	8.3.3	No cost
50	<p><b>Regional Balance</b> The committee recommends that the Police adopt a recruitment policy that provides for appropriate representation from all provinces. Recruitment drives should be spread throughout the provinces, and specific recruitment strategies should be targeted to areas where there is poor recruitment.</p> <p>It is recommended that Police physical entry requirements are reviewed to ensure equitable representation of recruits from all provinces.</p>	8.4.1	No extra cost
51	<p><b>Training.</b> It is recommended that:</p> <p>The Constabulary develops a coherent training policy which reflects the position of training within a modern organization. Training which is targeted to the individual on-the-job, meets identified individual needs, and develops the person for the good of the organization</p> <p>The Deputy Commissioner (Administration) re-introduce decentralised training for operational police. Appropriate training courses in presentation, communication and negotiation skills be developed to support the reorientation towards Community Policing;</p> <p>A policy be developed to support, as widely as possible, individual personal development, and funds be provided to support it; and</p> <p>The Deputy Commissioner (Administration) and Deputy Commissioner (Operations) consider the future role of Bomana in the context of the major reforms being proposed;</p>	8.5.2	<p>No extra cost</p> <p>No extra cost</p>
52	<p><b>Accommodation.</b> The Committee recommends that the Constabulary should cease providing and managing accommodation (except in remote areas and for recruit and identified specialist training). The management of police accommodation should be contracted to the private sector which would charge commercial rents and be responsible for maintenance.</p>	8.6.2	Potential saving
53	<p><b>Police Pensions.</b> The administration of Police Pensions is transferred from the Constabulary to an organisation that undertakes similar functions.</p>	8.7.9	No cost

54	<p><b>Poor performance.</b> The Committee recommends that the Police Act be amended to allow the Commissioner to remove police on the grounds of unsuitability, or poor performance of duties, subject to suitable safeguards linked to performance management.</p>	8.7.15	No cost
55	<p><b>HR Practices.</b> It is recommended that immediate attention be given to aligning human resources management practices with best practice. This would include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fair and open procedures are established for promotion, appointments and transfers i and the reporting of outcomes to members;</li> <li>• Abolishing long-term acting appointments or filling them permanently;</li> <li>• Establishing generic duty statements that enable managers to redirect duties as circumstances change; and</li> <li>• Remuneration should be tied to performance at level, not to doing a particular job.</li> </ul>	8.8	No extra cost
56	<p><b>Performance agreements.</b> It is recommended that Performance Agreements incorporating performance goals be implemented for all Senior Executive members.</p>	8.12	No cost
57	<p><b>Executive training.</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Personal development programs be developed for all Senior Executive members including properly focused and targeted interchange and secondment programs;</li> <li>(b) The training programs should include strategic and corporate planning and statutory obligations of the RPNGC</li> <li>(c) Introduce short term Executive Development Awareness Programs that address the policy, strategic, legislative and operational environment of the RPNGC;</li> <li>(d) Every Senior Executive be given training in Financial Management and accountability, including statutory reporting requirements, as well as in Resources Management,</li> <li>(e) Personal development programs that enhance management skills should be a pre-requisite for promotion to senior executive positions, and</li> </ol> <p>It should be recognized that modern, up-to-date, management training requires a level of expertise in instructors that is unlikely to be maintained in-house and experts from outside the Constabulary should be contracted for this training.</p>	8.12	Not known

58	<p><b>Using alternative proceedings.</b></p> <p>Police workload can be reduced by using alternative proceedings. For example, there are offences where the police can proceed by way of summons as an alternative to arrest and charge. The alternatives are rarely used. Essentially, this is an issue of use and control of resources (both personal and physical), and should be improved with better management accountability for these resources.</p> <p>The use of dispute resolution techniques and agencies specialising in these should be sought as a matter of urgency</p> <p>Minor cases of misuse of financial powers can be dealt with by departmental officers by way of administrative action rather than refer cases to the Police Fraud Squad. The Committee recommends that the Police Executive should use the Law and Justice sector networks to work with government agencies to solve this problem.</p>	8.13	Saving  Saving
59	<p><b>Sentencing and Penalties.</b></p> <p>During consultations with the community, there was widespread condemnation of inadequate penalties imposed by magistrates and judges for serious crimes. There was a call for legislation to be enacted to withdraw magistrate's and judges discretionary powers and to impose mandatory minimum sentences for offences involving firearms, drugs, murder and rape to act as a real deterrent. It is recommended that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the most prevalent crimes which are causing public fear and a state of lawlessness be identified and mandatory minimum sentences be established for these crimes</li> <li>• that aggravated penalties be applied to a wide range of offences and intoxication be regarded as an act of aggravation (rather than an excuse for criminal behaviour)</li> <li>• that Police failure to properly investigate a crime be considered a serious criminal offence</li> <li>• where criminal assaults occur between the wives in polygamous marriages, it is made mandatory for police to investigate the husband to determine whether he should be charged with aiding and abetting, or inciting the act</li> <li>• group penalties are applied for tribal fighting.</li> </ul> <p>The Committee also recommends that Parliament should:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enact mandatory minimum sentences for the possession of unlicensed firearms, the supply, financing and trafficking of illegal firearms by individuals, (the mandatory sentence to be imprisonment for 5 years or a</li> </ul>	8.14.1	No extra cost

	<p>K50,000 fine), and;  Amend the relevant Acts to apply mandatory sentences to those who organize the arming, support or financing of armed clans or groups. The mandatory sentence to be 10 years imprisonment, or a fine of K500, 000, or confiscation of property of equivalent value.</p>		
<b>61</b>	<p><b>Tracking technology.</b>  Consider the gradual introduction of enhanced technology to monitor and track Police vehicles within the NCD to improve accountability and Operational effectiveness, subject to finance being made available</p>	8.7.11	Not known
<b>62</b>	<p><b>Disband the Reserve Police.</b>  If the behaviour of the Reserve police does not improve within a three-year period, the committee strongly recommends that the Reserve police are disbanded</p>	8.3.5	Saving

#### **4.0 BACKGROUND TO THE REVIEW**

In February, 2004, Hon. Bire Kimisopa, MP, and Minister for Internal Security appointed a Committee to review the administration and operation of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary. This move was in response to continued complaints about Police effectiveness and the abuse and misuse of Police powers.

The members of the committee are Mr. Robert Ali, (Chairman), president of the Police Association; Mr. John Toguata, Director of Operations, Ombudsman Commission; Mr. Phil Franklin, Vice-president, PNG Chamber of Commerce; Dr Betty Lovai, Lecturer, University of PNG, Mr. Molean Kilepak, representing the Attorney General's Office; and Mr. Mick Palmer, former Commissioner, Australian Federal Police.

The Terms of Reference for the Committee is as set out in **Appendix 1**.

The Institute of National Affairs was appointed by the Minister to provide the Secretariat for the Committee.

The Review was funded by the Government of PNG with supplementary support from AusAID.

#### **5.0 PROCESS OF THE REVIEW**

The Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary, for the purposes of this review is the force established under the Police Act, 1998. The terms of reference nominated the areas which the Committee should review. These cover all aspects of Police administration and operation including its links to other sectors and the Community. The aim is to identify the problems facing the Police and identify practical solutions that will make the Police more effective and enable public confidence to be restored.

The process of the review included:

- A review of the Documentation. Documents and previous reports were reviewed. Of particular relevance were the PSRMU report of 2002 and the Clifford Report of 1984 which contain recommendations relevant to this review. It is significant that most of the problems identified in those reviews are still in existence, even though recommendations for improvement were made. Refer to Bibliography in **Appendix 2**.
- Face to face consultations by committee members with the Police, private sector, community groups and individuals. The community groups consisted of, women's, church and youth groups and other NGOs including law and order committees, provincial and local level governments and the magisterial services. Consultations were held in Port Moresby, Lae, Mt Hagen, Goroka, Mendi, Rabaul, Popondetta, Daru and Vanimo. A list of persons who consulted with the Committee is in **Appendix 3**.
- Written Submissions. A request for submissions was published in all major papers, together with the Terms of Reference. A total of 74 written submissions were received from organizations and individuals as shown in **Appendix 4**.



- An Expert Working Group report **Appendix 9**. The Committee was conscious that a great deal had to be achieved in a short time with limited resources. Accordingly, the Committee employed a group of experienced practitioners to look at specific police operations and support functions and report back to the Committee with options for the Committee to consider.
- Visits were made by the Committee to several Police Forces within the region to inspect initiatives which were identified as able to provide different perspectives on Policing. Visits were made to the Solomon Islands and Fiji to investigate the processes used to rehabilitate those forces after their respective national crises. A visit was also made to the Northern Territory of Australia to inspect the interaction between Police and Community and to see how the aboriginal persons policed their own communities. The lessons learnt from those visits were an important input into the Committee's decision making.

The Committee wishes to thank all those who prepared submissions and consulted with the Committee. The review was enriched by their ideas, effort, time and concern. Their input demonstrates a wide public concern in the performance of police, a desire for things to be done better and a realization that reform is needed urgently. The Committee trusts this Report will be a part of the process.

Acknowledgements. The Committee wishes to express its appreciation to the Minister for Internal Security and to the Australian Agency for International Development for providing resources, to the Expert Working Group and the Police Review Secretariat for inputs to the process, and to all persons, groups and genuinely concerned police officers who submitted written responses or attended consultations.

## **6.0 INTRODUCTION**

This report brings together the results of the consultations held by the Review Committee with a wide range of stakeholders in the police, the private sector, community groups and individual citizens. It also includes the conclusions prepared by the expert working group which considered the remedial actions required to reform the Constabulary.

Generally, these groups all identified the same problems that were affecting the Constabulary, and there was a considerable degree of unanimity about the actions that needed to be taken. This unanimity has been important, as the management information systems within the police were not able to provide adequate quality information to the Committee. The widespread agreement on the problems and solutions give the committee confidence that they have captured the issues in this report.

This report is in two stages. An assessment of the present state of the Constabulary is followed by the Committee's recommendations linked to the Terms of Reference.

When reading the recommendations, it is important to recognize that many are linked, and their full impact will be reduced if they are considered in isolation. For example, the idea of

community policing is important in the philosophy and roles of the Constabulary, and is also linked to such issues as housing and transport.

## **7.0 PRESENT STATE OF THE ROYAL PAPUA NEW GUINEA CONSTABULARY**

### **7.1 Structure and Funding.**

The RPNGC has a funded strength of 5250 officers, commanded by the Commissioner of Police. Two Deputy Commissioners report to the Commissioner.

The Deputy Commissioner (Operations) is responsible for police operations. The five operational commands, each under the control of an Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP), are based on the regions of PNG. They are NCD and Central, Southern, Highlands, Momase and Islands. The ACP Crime, who is responsible for Criminal Investigation, reports to the DCP (Operations), who also controls Directorates responsible for special services, communications, traffic, dogs, prosecutions and auxiliary police.

The DCP (Administration) is responsible for administrative and support functions. ACPs in charge of Logistics, Management Services, and Human Resources, report to him, as do the Directors of Internal Affairs, and Legal Services, the officer in charge of Internal Audit, and the Assistant Secretary of Finance and Administration.

A structure chart of the present organization is at Appendix 7.

The distribution of police throughout the country is Police Headquarters 7.9%; Police Headquarters Operations (Special Services, Air wing, Forensics etc) 4.4%; Momase Region 19.1%; Highlands Region 25.2%; Islands Region 12.7%; Southern Region 9.3%; and, NCD/Central 21.2%.

Details of the Police budget for 2004 are shown in Table 1.

<b>Table 1.</b>	
<b>POLICE BUDGET 2004</b>	
Summary of Expenditure by Program Structure (in Thousands of Kina)	
<b>PROGRAM</b>	<b>APPROPRIATION</b>
Support Services (Logistics)	26,640.6
Personnel and Training	3,707.9
Prevention and Detection of Crime (Operations)	75,697.1
Ministerial Services	221.4
Policy and Administration	15,073.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>121,340.1</b>

(Source: PNG Department of Finance and Treasury)

## **7.2. Public Confidence**

There is strong support amongst community groups, local government, police officers and other stakeholders for the primary functions of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary as expressed in the Constitution: Namely to:

1. preserve peace and good order in the country; and
2. to maintain and, as necessary, enforce the law in an impartial and objective manner.

However, most stakeholders and interested parties that were consulted believe these functions are not being performed in almost any of their dimensions.

There is no public confidence in police members or in their performance and a strong and widespread belief, both within and outside the RPNGC that the management and leadership of the RPNGC is not competent and is ineffective

## **7.3. Collapse of Police Services**

RPNGC members are disillusioned and disaffected, have little personal or professional pride, suffer low morale and are largely unproductive.

This demoralization is the result of a combination of:

- lack of government support and direction
- ineffective police leadership
- inadequate and unreliable provision of resources to do the job
- unpaid allowances and entitlements
- barely adequate salaries
- system wide lack of discipline, accountability and self-respect within the Constabulary
- almost total absence of community trust and respect
- political interference in Police operations

In the opinion of many people who spoke to the review, policing was close to total collapse in many centres, with the speed of deterioration seen as increasing.

## **7.4. Government will and commitment**

There is a lack of demonstrable government will and commitment to effective law enforcement and the wider related issues of broad community safety and an effective, sustainable, law, order and justice framework.

This lack of commitment has continued through successive governments. While all recent governments have stated a commitment to law and order, this commitment has not been supported by resources. For example, for more than 20 years the Police have had an authorized establishment of over 6000, but successive governments have only funded between 4500 and 5250 Police. These figures are detailed in the section on staffing.

Over the years, the overall police budget has not kept pace with inflation as expressed by the Consumer Price Index. The effect of this decline can be illustrated by comparing expenditure on police per head of population. The following table shows actual police expenditure for the years 1983 and 1990 and the police budget for 2004. For comparison purposes, these figures are converted to 2004 kina. This comparison shows that expenditure per person on police (expressed in 2004 kina) was 48.31 Kina in 1983, and about the same at 50.43 Kina in 1990. Expenditure on police per head of population has fallen dramatically since then, and is now only 20.55 Kina per person. These figures indicate a long term failure of government to provide the police with sufficient resources to maintain police services.

<b>Year</b>	<b>Population (millions)</b>	<b>Actual police budget (million kina)</b>	<b>CPI (1977 = 100)</b>	<b>Police budget expressed in 2004 kina (millions)</b>	<b>Kina per person spent on Police (in 2004 kina)</b>
1983	3.179	13.651	160.9	153.573	<b>48.31</b>
1990	3.582	51.071	220.7	180.645	<b>50.43</b>
2004	5.888	121.000	780.7	121.340	<b>20.61</b>

Source: RPNGC Annual Reports, PNG Census, and PNG Department of Finance and Treasury

To put this in perspective, in Fiji the expenditure on police per head of population is K118.00. The corresponding figure in PNG is K20.61, which is a poor reflection of the PNG government's commitment to the Constabulary.

There is a community perception that most politicians do not recognize the serious deterioration of the Police force, and are not concerned about how close it is to total collapse. The community considers that many politicians ignore problems with the Police, because it is in the politicians' interest to keep the Police under-resourced and ineffective.

### **7.5. Resourcing**

The RPNGC is substantially under-resourced, in terms of budgetary appropriation and certainty, and suffers from a chronic lack of:

- basic operational resources (including uniforms, vehicles and fuel, communications and basic office stationery),
- housing and welfare support and
- police numbers.

The shortage of resources is displayed by such practices as:

- police officers operating without uniform, in part-uniform, or in a very old and worn uniform

- “police on hire” - police responding to incidents only after they receive the resources from the public (for example, payment for vehicle fuel)
- private sector funding of police overtime, meals, vehicle servicing and other resources including tyres, fuel and basic stationery.

The RPNGC has very limited ability to efficiently manage the financial and other resources which are available to it. This is due to a combination of:

- inadequate budgets and uncertain monthly allocations (unpredictable, monthly, cash flow driven allocations prevent meaningful forward planning or consistency of operation),
- the absence of appropriate accountability and rigour in expenditure,
- the lack of properly skilled, authorised and positioned finance and administrative personnel,
- an attitude of misuse and waste throughout the force, and
- misappropriation of funds.

Internal waste is a serious problem in the Constabulary. There is widespread lack of accountability, which is evidenced by:

- funds used for the wrong purposes
- poor budget discipline throughout the organisation
- resources misused or stolen (for example, a private sector sponsored “toll-free” line for use by the public to report crime, being misused by police to receive and accept reverse-charge calls)
- resources missing and not accounted for (in one location 21 radios were provided by private industry, but 9 were missing, and no action was being taken to account for them)
- resources not maintained
- wasteful practices allowed to continue (for example, broken taps in a police barracks were left running and not repaired even though the Police department faced large bills for the wasted water)
- apathy
- reckless misuse of property, particularly vehicles (for example, vehicles wrecked by careless driving, housing and dormitories severely damaged by officers under the influence of alcohol).

## **7.6 Discipline**

The consistent public, local government and the private sector view was that police officers were generally totally undisciplined, unresponsive and largely apathetic, often prone to unnecessary violence, and in many cases openly corrupt

Discipline is in a state of almost total collapse. There is widespread misuse and abuse of Police power throughout the country. Reports to the committee include:

- drunken behaviour, particularly on afternoon and night shifts
- extortion and theft from motorists by way of illegal on-the-spot fines

- bailing prisoners without issuing a bail receipt
- excessive and unprovoked violence when arresting suspects
- disregard of the law by, for example, conducting raids and seizing property without a search warrant
- rape or sexual assault, in some cases in Police stations or cells
- misuse of Police vehicles
- absence without leave
- destruction and theft of the property of citizens
- destruction and theft of Police property

The collapse of discipline is not being adequately addressed by management and supervisors. Individual Police are not held accountable for their actions - they have little self-discipline, and are not corrected for minor or major breaches of the rules. Supervisors do not accept or exercise appropriate responsibility and are not held accountable for the performance of their command, or not adequately censured for failing to ensure discipline in their staff.

Accountability for your own actions and for the actions of people under your command is the basis of a functioning system of discipline. It is not working in the Constabulary. Minor breaches of constabulary orders are openly ignored, and this leads to a situation where major breaches and criminal behaviour go unreported (or if reported, poorly investigated).

There is evidence that some members of the Constabulary use Police powers, weapons and equipment to commit criminal offences, secure in the knowledge that they will not be investigated in any serious manner. Inadequate investigations are characterised by insufficient evidence (often because it was not collected), procedural faults, and delays.

It was reported to the Committee from a variety of sources that, within some parts of Police management, there exists an influential and negative culture which appears to condone and/or protect corrupt behaviour and criminal conduct (including serious assaults) committed by police. The Committee was told that many officers are compromised and believe they are unable to act against this situation without genuine fear of retribution. This situation is clearly a serious concern to some senior police, and causes junior ranks to have little faith in management. This lack of respect and trust reflects in their work and in the attitude of the public.

It is clear to the Committee that, for a variety of reasons, many of which are outlined in this Report, many police have been involved in corrupt behaviour or malpractice at some stage of their careers. In an environment of change and improved discipline, knowledge of this previous unacceptable conduct, may be held against any officer attempting to discipline other staff or to report unacceptable behaviour. In order to commence the cultural change, which will be essential to meaningful performance improvement, it may be necessary to implement a time limited, amnesty style, “truth and reconciliation” process which allows police who admit less serious corruption or malpractice in the past (which can probably be best prescribed by exception rather than prescription) to have “the slate wiped clean” and to be granted immunity from prosecution or civil action.

The Police Internal Affairs Directorate investigates complaints against the Police. Stakeholders (including many Police) clearly indicated to the Committee that they had no confidence in this system, or of the ability of the Police to conduct a proper impartial disciplinary process. The perception within the community is that the Constabulary has done little, if anything, to discourage misconduct or criminal actions by Police, or improve its overall professional image.

Senior Management and Line Supervisors within the Constabulary are expected to:

- lead by example in demonstrating and promoting the highest ethics and professional standards;
- be decisive and intervene to prevent corrupt and unethical conduct, and
- create a work environment which encourages honesty, initiative and best practice by staff.

The committee has been told that this rarely occurs. The observations of Committee members during visits to various police posts and stations served, with a very few exceptions, to strongly corroborate this situation. The Constabulary has suffered badly from poor supervision and the lack of effective discipline. Failure of supervisors to prevent criminal behaviour or serious breaches of discipline, or at least deal with it appropriately at the time, has reached a crisis. While there has always been strong rhetoric by police of all ranks advocating improving discipline, accountability and transparency, the actual level of discipline and morale within the Constabulary has continued to deteriorate and those who could have done something have done very little, if anything at all, to improve discipline management, ethics and professional standards.

The lack of discipline results in:

- a clear and widespread public reluctance to assist police due to an almost total lack of trust or respect in the capacity or willingness of police to respond
- a fear of police methods, many of which have been widely witnessed or experienced, by ordinary citizens. For example, the use of excessive force against citizens selling buai and cigarettes on the streets.
- reluctance to report Police misconduct. The public consider that the complaint will not receive proper attention, and know that undisciplined Police are likely to take revenge on the complainant. A recently conducted perception survey found that the main reasons the public would not report incidences of police misconduct were a fear of retaliation from the police, and a belief that no action would be taken.

## **7.7 Executive management**

A consistent message from consultations, particularly from the private sector and community organizations, was that the majority of the senior and executive level managers in the Police are not presently exercising their responsibilities efficiently or effectively and, in many cases, do not appear to understand what their responsibilities or roles are, or to have the will or capacity to make decisions or accept accountability.

A result is that the executive concentrates on what it knows best, and where it has lots of experience – the mechanics of operational policing. There is little evidence of any positive strategic leadership and organizational guidance or any meaningful executive accountability or external credibility. The committee was told that important executive links between the Constabulary and other departments such as Treasury and Personnel Management appear to be weak. Clearly this will operate to reduce the influence of the Police when issues are considered and decisions are made by these agencies.

Many of the senior managers have been in executive positions for a considerable period, and have moved from one position to another within the force. The Committee was told that the ‘recycling’ of ineffective (and sometimes disinterested) senior managers allowed bad habits to continue and aggregate, and had a detrimental effect on the career prospects and morale of junior ranks.

### **7.8 Leadership vacuum**

Apart from the serious concerns expressed about the capacity of the senior executive, members of the RPNGC and the broader community recognised there is a general lack of leadership and responsibility at all levels of the organisation with almost no evidence apparent of effective operational management, guidance, support, decision-making or accountability.

The Committee has noticed that many leaders displayed a casual and unprofessional attitude towards the important work of Police. These officers appeared not to take seriously the implications of a breakdown in law and order.

There is a minority of leaders in the Police who are attempting to maintain proper standards, and do a good job. They are hampered by a lack of effective leadership support from more senior managers, with the result that the work of this minority tends to be overwhelmed by the general apathy apparent within most of the Constabulary.

### **7.9 Staffing**

As previously stated, for at least the last twenty years government has not funded the authorised establishment of Police. During this time the population of Papua New Guinea has almost doubled. Consequently, the ratio of police to population has continually increased, as shown in Table 3.

<b>Year</b>	<b>Authorised Police Establishment</b>	<b>Number of Police actually funded</b>	<b>PNG population (millions)*</b>	<b>Police – Population Ratio</b>
<b>1983</b>	6166	4460	3.179	1:712
<b>2000</b>	6300	5049	5.191	1:1028
<b>2004</b>	6300	5250	5.888	1:1121

\* census figures and estimates based on annual rate of population growth



The United Nations recommended Police-Population ratio is 1:450. Police:Population ratios for other jurisdictions are: Fiji 1:550, Solomon Islands 1:500, Queensland 1:475, Northern Territory of Australia 1:280.

PNG's ratio of police to population has been well over these figures since 1981, and the present ratio of 1:1121 (in 2004) represents a considerable challenge. This ratio almost guarantees poor police service to the community, as Police resources (even if maximally employed) are likely to be overwhelmed even in a relatively peaceful country. Given the present law and order situation in Papua New Guinea, and its seriously detrimental effect on personal and public safety and on business confidence and the broader economy, police numbers, no matter how well trained, positioned and motivated, are clearly grossly insufficient.

If the authorized establishment of 6,300 was funded, the Police:Population ratio would reduce to 1:823, which is still far in excess of the ratio in Solomon Islands and Fiji, which are comparable jurisdictions. Consequently, It is doubtful whether the present authorized RPNGC establishment will prove to be sufficient in the longer term although, approving recruitment to this level is seen as an important immediate initiative.

It is important, however, to recognize that the recruitment of extra Police would only be part of the solution to improving the effectiveness of Police, as a large proportion of the present force is not performing to acceptable standards. Any initiative to improve police numbers must be linked to a comprehensive program of reform aimed at fundamentally changing the culture of the RPNGC to one which embraces Community Policing as the normal method of operations, and within which an environment of pride, performance and accountability is created and maintained. These issues are addressed in this report.

The Constabulary has within its ranks a large number of regular police who, the Committee was told, are ineffective. Many of these are too old for 'active' service, and some are past retirement age. They continue to work because they are not certain that their entitlements and pension will be paid, or if paid, will be sufficient.

Many Police officers are not physically fit for Police service, based on fitness-for-age criteria, and no physical fitness test is presently applied to Police.

It was reported to the Committee that in one major town approximately 30% of the regular Police establishment was regarded as ineffective. The Police Association has estimated that throughout PNG approximately 1500 Police would accept redundancy if it were offered. Redundancy may not be necessary for all. There are more than 200 serving Police over the age of 55 years who can be retired immediately. Under section 91 of the Police Act, the Commissioner can retire Police who have completed 20 years service, even though they have not reached the age of 55 years. There are an undetermined number in this category that could be removed from the establishment at no extra cost other than normal pension entitlements.

There is another challenge to Police staffing. The Committee noticed that in many Police Stations there is a shortage of operational Police on duty. This was caused by absence without leave, poor rostering practices and time-off in lieu of overtime. Time off in lieu of overtime is an operational response to the non-payment of overtime by the Constabulary. The amount of time-off in lieu of overtime is known by station and unit commanders, but is not adequately captured in statistics, although the Committee is told that it is extensive. The use of time off in lieu of overtime further restricts the number of regular Police available to serve the public, particularly if it is poorly managed.

The committee was unable to find any recruitment strategy or other corporate policy or commitment aimed at remedying the deficiency in staff numbers. Of particular concern is the shortage of general duties police.

The distribution of Police to the provinces has not changed markedly over time to reflect the changes in population and police workload. It appears that the present distribution is based on historical precedents set before independence, and on the availability of Police accommodation and housing.

In order to meet the challenges of insufficient personnel, the Constabulary has increased the use of Reserve and Auxiliary Police. At present there are 1703 Reserve Police and 3538 Auxiliary police on the Police establishment (although not all are paid by the RPNGC).

Reserve Police should be part time persons who have other jobs and bring a needed skill to the Constabulary to allow regular police to concentrate on core functions. Reservists volunteer a small amount of their time to assist the Regular Police. They receive a Police uniform that should be clearly marked with a red 'Reserve' label. These labels are not always on the uniforms. They are paid an allowance of between K60 and K78 per month, which is paid whether they attend for duty or not.

Some Reserve police are funded by private sector organisations, which use them to Police their premises (although they may also do some other Police work). The Public Service Reform Management Unit Report suggests that a major incentive to join the Reserve Police is legal access to weapons.

Under the S 121 of the Police Act, Reserve Police have all the powers and functions of a member of the Regular Constabulary. They receive between 2 and 6 weeks training compared to 6 months for a regular Constable. Although they are supposed to be supervised by Regular Police, this is not always the case, and wrongful acts are committed by Reservists for which the government is liable.

Auxiliary Police were intended to work in the rural areas to supplement the small regular Police presence. They have powers vested in them by the Commissioner, and these powers are limited to a specific geographical area. They are now employed in towns, and are often funded by businesses. They should wear a uniform which distinguishes them from Police,

but, as this uniform is not available, they have been provided with regular Police uniform. Like the reserve, they receive between 2 and 6 weeks training. They are entitled to an allowance, of K60 per month, which is often not paid. The government is liable for the wrongful acts of Auxiliary Police when acting in their police capacity.

Reserve and Auxiliary Police are intended to support the regular Police, and operate under the close control of fully trained regular Police. This is not happening. Reserve and Auxiliary Police are increasingly exercising full Police powers with no regular Police presence. For example, Reserves and Auxiliary police are conducting road-blocks and are extracting illegal 'fines' from motorists to earn an income. They are responsible for much (though not all) of the improper use of firearms.

The committee received many reports of the abuse of power and corrupt practices of the Reserve and Auxiliary Police, and considers that they are a considerable part of the problems facing the Constabulary. The reality is, they are not equipped to perform the full range of regular police functions and should not be expected or permitted to do so. Consequently, as ordinarily the case in other jurisdictions, their numbers should not be included in Constabulary establishment when determining Police:Population ratios. They do not have sufficient training to effectively perform the duties of the regular police and their recruitment process is deliberately less rigorous. Most importantly, it needs to be kept in mind that the aim and purpose of Reserve and Auxiliary Police is to provide support to mainstream, fully trained, police officers, to draw from a wider recruitment pool and attract people seeking part time employment or who have a genuine community interest in assisting police and who either have respect within their own local communities (Auxiliaries) or specific support skills needed by the RPNGC (Reserves).

The Committee received many reports from regular police and from the community that Reserve and Auxiliary Police are not being properly coordinated, administered or supervised by the Constabulary. They are allowed to work unsupervised, and are allowed to carry firearms. This represents an unacceptable risk to the State, which is legally liable for the actions of all police, including Reserve and Auxiliaries, and reflects the inability of Police management to exercise control and command.

### **7.10 Claims against the State.**

Improper use of Police powers and unauthorised acts by Police, such as destruction of houses and property, result in legal claims against the State for damages and compensation. The evidence is that most of these claims arise from acts of the Mobile Squads, Task Forces, and the poorly trained Reserve and Auxiliary police, although any undisciplined police could be involved.

Claims against the State are dealt with by the Department of Justice and Attorney General, and where damages are awarded, these are paid by the Treasury. Generally, the Police are not a party to the proceedings, and the damages do not appear in the Police budget. Consequently, Police do not give these matters the attention they deserve.

The value of outstanding legal claims against the State as a result of Police actions is considerable. At present it is estimated that the total value of claims before the courts is in the order of K250 million. Some of these will be successfully defended, but many cases cannot be adequately defended as Police respond poorly (if at all) to requests for information on the circumstances which led to a claim. Poor police management and practices such as inadequate record keeping contribute to the poor response. However, in many cases, the police are reluctant to respond as the claim is the result of unlawful police actions, and is probably indefensible.

An additional K100 million is owing for cases which have been concluded, but damages have not yet been paid. (Figures from Report 3.1 from the Case Management System of the PNG Office of Solicitor General, dated 22 June 2004)

To put this in perspective, the total police budget for 2004 was K121 million. Clearly, the unauthorized and undisciplined actions of police are a serious charge on the government's finances. The Police must take serious steps to reduce claims on the state if it requires additional funds from the government.

#### **7.11 Pay, allowances and conditions.**

The remuneration package for Police consists of:

- base salary
- service allowance
- overtime
- other allowances according to duty
- uniform
- accommodation and utilities.

Base salary and service allowance are paid together as salary, and are part of the Uniform Pay Policy for the Disciplined Services which establishes parity between the Constabulary, Defence force and Correctional Services.

Police overtime has been restricted, and even if authorised, is routinely not paid. There are a considerable number of outstanding claims in police headquarters awaiting payment. Operational police use time-off-in-lieu as an alternative to overtime.

Salary Increments have not been paid for some years, and other entitlements such as leave fares, are regularly delayed, often for some years. The police Association estimates that the current total of outstanding leave and repatriation fares is in the order of K1, 800, 000.

The provision of uniform is erratic, and many police have not had an issue for several years, particularly in provincial areas.

Accommodation is provided either in houses or single person barracks, and utilities are provided. Police pay a very small rent (K17 per fortnight), which goes to consolidated

revenue. Even if it was retained by the Police and applied to maintenance, the amount would not significantly reduce the backlog of maintenance.

Police barracks and married housing across the country are, with few exceptions, essentially in a state of total disrepair, as little or no maintenance has been undertaken for many years. It is estimated that between K240 million and K500 million (with some estimates as high as K800 million) will be required to bring the present accommodation up to a reasonable standard. (The Police Annual Report of 1983 estimated the total maintenance requirement at K2 million. This illustrates the cumulative effect of insufficient maintenance).

Police accommodation could be a significant benefit, but it is not available to all, and the benefit has been degraded by the very poor condition of most of the accommodation. Many single-person rooms in barracks are occupied by police families, and some police are housed in the community. Police administration was unable to provide the committee with the numbers of police affected in this way.

Police constantly told the Committee that they were poorly paid compared to other jobs. Comparisons of police pay with jobs in the public service and the private sector do not totally support that argument. Their salaries are not particularly low in PNG terms. A base grade constable after 6 months training (and subject to 18 months probation) receives an annual base salary plus service allowance of between K7, 317 and K8, 943 depending on length of service. This equates with Clerk Class 2 and Clerk Class 3 in the public service and in the private sector, with a skilled process worker, receptionist, typist clerk, driver, security guard, storeman, and truck driver (PWC Salary Survey 2003). Refer to Table4 for details.

**Table 4.**

**PAY COMPARISON - POLICE, PUBLIC SERVICE, PRIVATE SECTOR**

<b>Police</b>		<b>Public Service</b>		<b>Private Sector</b>	
<b>Grade</b>	<b>Annual Salary (Kina)</b>	<b>Grade</b>	<b>Annual Salary (Kina)</b>	<b>Job</b>	<b>Annual Average Salary (Kina)*</b>
Constable (Base Grade)	7,317 to 8,943++	Clerk Class 2	6,898 to 8,430	Skilled Process Worker	7,000
				Storeman	7,000
				Truck Driver	7,000
				Security Guard	8,000
		Clerk Class 3	7,793 to 9,525	Typist Clerk	8,000
				Receptionist/Telephonist	9,000
				Bank teller	9,000

\* PriceWaterhouseCoopers Salary Survey 2003

++ Plus accommodation, utilities and uniform

A different picture emerges when the salary of PNG Constables are compared with their Fiji counterparts. The salary range for a Police Constable in Fiji is K13,285 to K17,551. Even though the Fiji police have to pay for their own accommodation and utilities, this is considerably more than is received by a PNG Constable.

At the senior management and executive level, it is apparent that salaries fall behind those offered in the private sector for similar responsibilities. For example, Provincial Police Commanders hold the rank of Chief Inspector or Superintendent. They are responsible for the management of at least 120 police officers, and for the peace and good order of a province with a population of up to 500,000 persons. They are paid a salary ranging from K21,961 to K29,614, which is clearly inadequate for the level of responsibility. (For comparison, private sector average salaries for various jobs are: Accountant K41,000; Bank Manager K41,000; Factory Manager K45,000; Production Engineer K47,000). A Police Superintendent in Fiji receives a salary of between K45,000 and K60,000.

Whether the PNG salaries are sufficient to make corrupt practices unattractive is another matter. It needs to be recognised that many police duties are dangerous and unpredictable and that policing provides many opportunities for misconduct. Unless the terms and conditions of any police force properly reflects the reality of this environment it is likely that its members will continue to suffer low morale, be unprepared to accept responsibility or take necessary risks, and will be tempted into corrupt practices. The evidence is that corruption within the RPNGC has become established, but the Review Committee cannot determine whether this is the result of basic pay and poor conditions, unpaid allowances, or poor management and discipline. Whilst it is most likely a combination of all factors, an appropriate salary base is clearly, in the opinion of the Committee, an important component of an ethical policing culture. (There is evidence that Reserve and Auxiliary Police fund their service by corrupt practices, as their allowances are not always paid).

If police accommodation was of a better standard, and other entitlements regularly paid, then police would be better-off than comparable workers. But this is not the case. Police sometimes work in difficult and dangerous conditions. They have been subjected to a litany of broken promises, from both the Government and the Police leadership, regarding welfare support, the payment of properly due benefits and allowances, the supply of uniforms and the supply of adequate tools and equipment to do their job.

A barely adequate salary base, which at the lower levels is little more than a survival salary for someone with a family, creates severe difficulties for many police officers in their efforts to provide for their families. This is, in itself, a recipe for corruption and malpractice.

Collectively, the present terms and conditions, together with insufficient operational resources and infrastructure, plus poor management and leadership in an organisation which accepts poor discipline and accountability, provide a fertile ground for corrupt practices and an almost certain “guarantee” of apathy and poor performance.

## 7.12 Interference in Police matters

Political interference and cultural “wantok” pressures continue to impact negatively on the delivery of efficient and properly prioritised services.

Political interference is evidenced by politicians:

- commandeering the use of police for personal purposes. During its consultations the committee witnessed the use of a mobile squad as an escort for politicians in an area and in circumstances where the need for that level of personal protection was not apparent, and was not available to other citizens or sought by the members of the committee
- interfering in the transfer process
- interfering in the promotion process
- involvement in the appointment and removal of the Commissioner. Since independence there have been frequent changes to the Police Commissioner, particularly when there has been a change of government. Since 1976 the average length of a Police Commissioner’s term in office is two years, which causes instability throughout the organization
- Interfering in police investigations with threats of violence to police member’s families.

Wantok pressures are always evident, but with strong leadership can be managed.

**A change of culture is required in the Constabulary.  
Cooperation with the Community must be the way ALL  
police do their business.**

## 7.13 Change of culture required

There is a wide recognition, both within the RPNGC and across community groups which were interviewed, of the need to fundamentally change the culture and practice of the RPNGC as a basic and primary step towards measurably improving performance.

Police members, including Auxiliaries and Reservists, were seen as having a solely “enforcement and isolationist,” approach to their work, based essentially on the use of force and intimidation and the creation of fear. The common view was that this approach was contributing to or aggravating many of the problems rather than resolving issues or facilitating solutions. In the view of one senior executive police officer, these practices had created an environment of hostility to police within and across the community and that, as a result, the community had become a virtual impenetrable jungle into which criminals frequently fled and disappeared, even after the commission of the most serious and cowardly crimes of violence.

#### **7.14 Hope for the future**

Despite these serious concerns and deficiencies many RPNGC members are adequately trained and, with appropriate motivation, resourcing and leadership, have the capacity to deal efficiently with very serious and sensitive situations. This has been demonstrated during several national security incidents in recent years,

During the consultation process the review committee came across a small number of Police Stations which appeared to be professionally managed, and presented well to the general public. These stations were a credit to the individual officers concerned, and to their staff. There was no indication that these stations had been provided with more resources than other stations. They indicate that the present state of deterioration in most of the RPNGC need not occur if appropriate leadership and resource management is present.

**The future is not totally bleak. There are many officers in the RPNGC who want things to improve.**

**“When the cat's away the mice begin to play”.  
Quoted to the Committee to describe the fact that when the Police were withdrawn from Goroka for election duty, the crime rate increased. This demonstrates that Police presence does have an effect on criminal behaviour.**



## **8.0 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE.**

**8.1 Linkages.** The Review Committee consulted with, and received written submissions from, a wide range of the community, private sector and the police. Different stakeholders often raised the same issues and concerns, and these issues were often linked. For example, poor Police attitude to the public is a result of poor Police discipline, which is a consequence of ineffective leadership. There are many such linkages.

In making its recommendations, the Committee is aware of these linkages. The recommendations should therefore be regarded as a package. The value of this review will be reduced if its recommendations are introduced in isolation or in a piecemeal fashion.

The Review Committee had access to information on a wide range of practical steps necessary to restore the Constabulary, and to take it forward. This information has been included in this report.

### **8.2 The RPNGC is in a serious state of decline.**

The overwhelming opinion of the community, the private sector and a majority of the police who were consulted by, or who made submissions to, the Review Committee is that the effectiveness of the Constabulary in maintaining law and order is in a state of serious decline, and the pace of deterioration is accelerating.

**The effectiveness of the Constabulary is in a state of serious decline, and the pace of deterioration is accelerating.**

Urgent and decisive action is needed to restore effective Police operations. This will take time, resources, strong mature leadership, and continuing unequivocal Parliamentary support throughout the process. It must be recognised that the Commissioner alone cannot ensure law and order. Unwavering Parliamentary support and long term commitment to the Police is essential.

**The Commissioner alone cannot ensure law and order.  
Unwavering Parliamentary support and long term commitment to the Police are essential.**

As an immediate start, the Review Committee recommends that the Minister:

- write formally to the Commissioner of Police to convey the Government's deep concern at the disintegrating state of law and order in Papua New Guinea, and provide the Commissioner of Police with general policy direction on the need for him to take, within the powers and authorities available to him, whatever lawful action is necessary to restore an effective law enforcement capacity across all provinces of PNG; and the need to minimise claims against the State which result from inappropriate police action;
- Advise that the Government will make available, as a matter of priority, those resources required to support and sustain emergency action;
- Affirm that the Commissioner has the full mandate and united support of the Government for whatever action he may consider prudent to take to achieve the required outcomes, and implement the corporate plan;
- Issue a Media Statement on behalf of the Government advising the action that the Government has taken to date, and detailing plans for the future;
- Instruct members of the RPNGC to refer to the Ombudsman Commission documented instances of political interference by leaders in due police process,
- request the Government to advise the Attorney General to involve the Commissioner of Police in all claims against the state which involve the Police.

### **8.3 Terms of Reference 1.**

**Identify the roles and functions of the police force and make recommendations about which, if any, of these are outside its core functions and should be dropped.**

#### **8.3.1 The Philosophy of Policing in Papua New Guinea**

The Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary was raised as a colonial force that was used to pacify the country. It was essentially military in character, and recruited Police from one area to enforce the law in another area. As Police were operating away from their home area, they were provided with accommodation, subsistence, transport to work and leave fares. The philosophy was one of enforcing the rules on a suspicious population.

The Committee found that the philosophy of enforcing the rules in a military manner is still in existence in the Constabulary, and to some extent it exists within the wider community.

The modern philosophy of policing is Community Policing, and the committee believes that this philosophy should be used to conduct policing in PNG.

#### **COMMUNITY POLICING**

**Community Policing means that the police respond to problems in the community and work with the community to regain their confidence and support. It does not entail a fundamental change in police practices, rather a change in attitude and culture.**

The Clifford Report of 1984 and the PSRMU Report of 2002 both stated that the Police should move away from the military enforcement model to community policing, but little progress appears to have been made. Although there is now a small Community Policing Directorate in the RPNGC, it has not been provided with the resources or authority to change the previous culture.

Community policing is a partnership between police and community to reduce crime. The essential feature of Community Policing is that police and citizens cooperate to solve common problems. The manner in which the Constabulary conducts its present operations indicates that the principle of cooperation is not well understood by all ranks of Police. Heavy handed enforcement tactics destroy goodwill and create a significant problem for the Constabulary.

### **KOMUNITI POLIS**

**Community Policing is a philosophy of Policing. It must be the way of doing police business in PNG.**

**Community Policing involves cooperation between the community and police to prevent and solve crime.**

**Community Policing depends on trust between the police and community.**

**Trust is difficult to establish and easy to destroy.**

**Heavy tactics by police can easily destroy trust.**

**All police officers must think and act as Community Police.**

**All police officers must build trust in the Community.**

In the opinion of the Committee, Community policing must become the main method of operations in the Constabulary and be fully integrated into all areas of mainstream policing operations. This is not apparent in the present RPNGC. Mobile Squads and Task Forces absorb a great deal of resources and attention, while community policing appears to be a small specialist area which has not yet infiltrated into general duties and broader mainstream policing or been adopted as the way by which general duties policing should be practised.

This situation must be changed if the trust, respect and support of the community is to be achieved and police effectiveness improved. Community policing must receive the majority of resources and attention, and must be seen as “the way we conduct our business”. Mobile squads and Task Forces should become a small specialist area to be called on when all else fails or for specific emergent situations. No police service can hope to be effective unless its uniform general duties component is efficient, well motivated and properly recognised and resourced (both in skill and physical resource terms). The General Duties branch of the constabulary must be in the forefront of community policing. The resources available to General Duties policing should recognise the importance of its role, and it should be staffed with officers of the highest standard.

There has been an increase in the incidence of family violence and sexual offences in PNG and police need to be more reactive and sympathetic to victims.

It is recommended that:

- Community policing becomes the primary focus of policing in PNG, and that the interactive, partnership, principles of community policing be fully integrated into all recruit and in-service training and development programs.
- General Duties policing be responsible for community policing, and be officially recognised as the most important area of operational policing with incentives developed to attract high quality officers including the development of promotional criteria which requires satisfactory service in General Duties as a pre-requisite to promotion.
- Consideration be given to re-labelling General Duties as “Patrol Command”, “Operational Patrol Section,” or “Frontline Policing” or similar, in order to improve the image and status of the general policing role – both in the eyes of the police and the public
- In order to reflect the change of focus to Community Policing, and to send a message to all serving officers, all references to “police force” should be replaced by “police service”.

**It is recommended that Community policing becomes the primary focus of policing in PNG**

**In order to reflect the change of focus to Community Policing, all references to “police force” should be replaced by “police service**

### **8.3.2 National Functions**

The Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary performs a national function, and is responsible for policing the whole country. It does not have the resources to be everywhere. The committee considers that regular police presence should not go below the level of District headquarters. Policing in the villages should generally be the responsibility of Auxiliary police and village peace officers. However, wherever serious criminal offences and disorder occur, the national police must respond, and the Police must retain the ability to respond to these events.

Intelligence is a national function, and is the key to smart operational policing and the nation's protection against terrorism and international criminal activities. Without effective intelligence the nation is vulnerable. The Committee agrees that the immediate priority must be to get working what already exists.

It is recommended that:

- (c) Intelligence is recognised as a vital national function for policing inside PNG, and for protection against international crime and terrorism, and resources should be provided to ensure this function is effective
- (d) The Commissioner draws attention to the national importance of effective Intelligence and directs the Deputy Commissioner (Operations) to activate existing systems and processes for Intelligence gathering, input, analysis and dissemination).

The lead times for strengthening and deepening Intelligence capability are long. Action needs to be taken now to ensure that integrated and coordinated reconstruction of the Constabulary's intelligence capability, including linkages with international policing agencies and with the Community policing model within PNG can occur.

Urgent action is required to develop an effective, adequately equipped and staffed NCD Operations Centre, as a model for regional operations centres. This should have the ability to respond effectively and quickly to community needs and expectations. The Committee recommends that an effective NCD Operations centre be established as a model for regional operations centres, and that the various Police Task Forces are tasked to perform sector patrols as directed by the Operations Centre.

Many issues impacting on the continued operation and effectiveness of the National Communications Centre have compounded over the years and can no longer be ignored. It is recommended that an urgent review of the National Communications Centre be conducted to determine the functions and equipment needs for the next 10 years.

### **8.3.3 Employment of Police**

Police are employed in a wide variety of tasks, some of which are not closely related to the core functions of protecting the public. As Police resources are limited and stretched, the Committee recommends that the deployment of Police should be reviewed, and some of the tasks traditionally done by Police discontinued. In particular:

- police should no longer be employed as static guards. This is a function that can be performed by security companies

- police should generally not be employed as escorts. Approximately 100 Police are used for close personal protection work. The criteria for assignment to close escort should be reassessed, and excess officers returned to general duties
- the use of police to serve summons should cease
- police should not be used by private business to collect debts.

The Police Band provides a clear demonstration of pride and passion in the Constabulary. However, it is too large given the present pressure on Police resources. The Committee recommends that the Police Band be restructured into a core body supplemented by part-time support. The part-time support bandsmen would divide their time between general police duties and the band, and train one day each week (or as required by the needs of the government). A proper strategy should be developed to use the band for public relations, and it should charge for private functions.

### **8.3.4 Reserve and Auxiliary Police**

During consultations with the committee, the behaviour of the Reserve and Auxiliary police was almost universally condemned. These minimally trained officers are acting without proper supervision, and are responsible (along with some regular Police) for much of the corrupt behaviour and misuse of police powers, and a significant charge on the government for compensation and damages.

The committee recommends that all appointments for both Reserve and Auxiliary Police be terminated, and that incumbents be invited to re-apply. Strict eligibility criteria should be applied to all those re-applying.

### **8.3.5 Reserve Police.**

In respect of Reserve Police, it is recommended that:

- the Reserve police are reclassified as Police Support Officers and, unless expressly authorised by the Commissioner in respect of a specific emergency, be unarmed and with no authority to draw or carry a firearm
- following proof of service, all outstanding pay and entitlements should be met by the state
- all present appointments are terminated, and incumbents invited to re-apply
- all future appointments are for three years, renewable at three year intervals subject to satisfactory service
- the role and qualifications required of Police Support Officers are clarified and published
- properly skilled people are appointed as Police Support Officers
- management control is exercised over the number of Police Support Officers appointed, which should be no more than is absolutely necessary
- a distinctive uniform is made available to Police Support Officers which must be worn when on normal duty. The uniform should be similar to a regular police uniform, but have clear identifying Police Support Officer insignia on each sleeve.

The role of the Police Support Officers is to provide support to the regular police. They should not operate on their own. The powers and responsibilities of Police Support Officers should be graded according to training and responsible service, so that the liability to government for improper use of powers is minimised. These powers should be determined in letters of appointment to individual officers. It is recommended that the Police Act be amended to include details and boundaries of graded responsibilities for Police Support Officers.

If the behaviour of the Reserve police does not improve within a three-year period, the committee strongly recommends that the Reserve police is disbanded

### **8.3.6 Auxiliaries.**

In respect of the Auxiliaries, the committee recommends:

- Auxiliaries should be used only in rural areas and settlements, and be responsible for policing locally identified problems in the local context
- following proof of service, all outstanding allowances for the present Auxiliaries should be met by the State
- all Auxiliaries presently operating in towns should be disbanded
- all current appointments as Auxiliary police be terminated, and the incumbents be invited to re-apply
- all future appointments as Auxiliary Police are for three years, renewable at three year intervals subject to satisfactory service
- Auxiliary police should be selected jointly by the local community, and police recruitment officers have powers that can only be exercised within a designated local geographic area and be unarmed
- auxiliary police should be funded by the national government, take guidance from the community and should work to the local or village courts
- auxiliary police should report to the local regular police commander, and have the power to hold persons until they can be taken into regular police custody
- a series of incrementally graded powers should be developed for auxiliary police in order to minimise the risk to government of misuse of powers. Auxiliary police should be appointed with particular powers depending on their training and experience.

## **8.4 Terms of Reference 2.**

**To investigate the recruitment procedures of the RPNGC with regard to regional balance, education standards, fitness and aptitude testing.**

### **8.4.1 Regional balance.**

There is a large regional imbalance in the Constabulary, with a large proportion of Police recruited from one province. While this may present few problems for the military style of policing, it has implications for community policing where police are expected to serve in their own area. Community policing requires the Constabulary to reflect the community it

serves. The balance between the provinces must be maintained. The committee recommends that the Police adopt a recruitment policy that provides for appropriate representation from all provinces. Recruitment drives should be spread throughout the provinces, and specific recruitment strategies should be targeted to areas where there is poor recruitment.

It has been reported that recruits from some provinces are disadvantaged because the physical requirements for police entry are set too high (the height regulations have been specifically mentioned). Community policing requires police to interact with the community, and communication skills are at least as important as physical attributes. It is recommended that Police physical entry requirements are reviewed to ensure equitable representation of recruits from all provinces.

Recruitment of female officers should be maintained and further encouraged and enhanced.

#### **8.4.2 Entry standards for Regular Police.**

Many representatives of the community and business commented on the lack of maturity of new police constables, which is seen as one of the major causes of conflict with the police. There is general agreement that entry-level education for police should be year 12, but there is a considerable body of opinion that they should also have life experience. The committee recommends that the entry standards for police should be a grade 12 education, a minimum age of 21 years, and wherever possible, demonstrated life experience. Police recruitment procedures should be changed to reflect this recommendation.

Aptitude tests have been discontinued as part of the recruiting process. They should be re-introduced. A fitness test should form part of the recruitment process.

Many police and citizens reported that character references and police checks for new recruits are not rigidly enforced or checked, and often do not include references from persons who know the applicant well. These checks play a crucial role in maintaining the integrity of the police force. It is recommended that a more stringent reference checking procedure is adopted, which must include at least one reference from a community leader in the applicant's home village, or similar local area where the applicant has lived for a period. It will be important that the community leader is a person either with formal authority or who is otherwise respected in the community (such as a local councillor, pastor or school teacher) as designated .

### **8.5 Terms of Reference 3.**

**To investigate training methods throughout the RPNGPC, including basic training, on-the-job training, in-service training, officer training and higher education opportunities.**

#### **8.5.1 Present system of training.**

The present system of training in the Constabulary reflects its heritage with most training centred on the organisation's own training facility at Bomana Police College.



Central training facilities suffer from the disadvantage that they are remote from most of the staff, and may have difficulty providing courses which are relevant to individuals. The cost of transporting staff to attend courses is usually more expensive than sending trainers to the staff location. Staff who work and live close to the centralized training centre usually get better access to centralized courses, simply because they are located in the same area. These criticisms have been reported to the review committee, together with complaints about access to specialist and other courses particularly from police in the provinces.

The police exhibit a traditional approach towards training, where standard courses are prepared and delivered to the persons selected to attend. The courses are provided by the organization at no cost to the individual (and in many cases to the individual's advantage as they get transport, accommodation and allowances to attend), and, in some cases, courses are almost regarded as an entitlement for people in a particular position or aspiring to that position. The general attitude is that courses and development activities should be provided by the RPNGC, with little input required from the individual, and that there is no requirement for self-development.

### **8.5.2 Training Policy.**

The Constabulary requires a coherent training policy which reflects the position of training within a modern organization. Training which is targeted to the individual on-the-job, meets identified individual needs, and develops the person for the good of the organization. This requires:

- a comprehensive training needs analysis, particularly in the provinces
- a review of the content of the courses to see they are relevant
- the delivery of training on site, on-the-job, as part of normal police activities
- constant evaluation of the training outcomes to ensure the programs are delivering improved, relevant performance in the field.

The policy should recognize a model of training delivery based on a small core of trainers for recruit and basic training, supplemented by training co-ordinators who manage development programs which bring in persons with contemporary expertise to deliver up-to-date training that is relevant to the workplace. Training policy should include all career development activities including recruit training, specialist training, management training and personal development.

The completion of personal development activities should be a requirement for promotion to executive and management positions. A policy should be developed which recognises and supports a partnership between the individual and the Constabulary to develop a person for mutual benefit. (For example, persons who study management in their own time are a benefit to the Police, but the individuals also receive a benefit as their chances of promotion are enhanced).

A policy to support individual personal development should be prepared, and funds set aside to support approved individual study. The traditional method of supporting individuals was to pay course fees and subsistence for full time study, but this approach has been discredited as funds were usually available to support only one or two favoured persons. Graded

assistance should be available to support as many persons as possible who are developing themselves in areas which are of value to the police.

Given the nature of police work, those areas are extensive and could include, for example, psychology, management, and social studies. Graded assistance could include payment of exam fees, payment of course fees (when the course has been successfully completed), travel and subsistence to vacation courses, time off (with or without pay) to attend activities. Assistance should be negotiated between the police and the individual according to the perceived benefits and needs of the police and the individual. The aim would be to assist as many persons as possible.

### **8.5.3 Bomana Police College.**

Bomana Police College is a significant asset, which should be retained as a centre for recruit and specialist training. The committee particularly recommends the resumption of cadet officer training at Bomana and that the college interface with other tertiary institutions both within and outside PNG.

Most other training should be delivered on-the-job in the provinces by instructors, training officers and mentors as part of normal duties. A core of well qualified and experienced instructors should be retained at Bomana, who are sufficiently well qualified to allow relevant courses to be accredited by tertiary institutions such as the University of Papua New Guinea. Bomana is unlikely to be able to maintain current specialist expertise in all areas, and specialists should be brought in when necessary.

Given appropriate resources and management, there is potential for Bomana Police College to become a much more meaningful institution for the RPNGC and the community. The Committee recommends that the commercialisation of aspects of college operations should be considered. There is potential to hire out the facilities to public and private sector organisations to conduct their own training, and for the Police to offer courses to other organisations on a fee-for-service basis. For example, Bomana has the facilities and expertise to offer accreditation courses for the security industry.

### **8.5.4 Training recommendations.**

It is recommended that:

- a) The Constabulary develops a coherent training policy which reflects the position of training within a modern organization. Training which is targeted to the individual on-the-job, meets identified individual needs, and develops the person for the good of the organization
- b) The immediate re-introduction of local, regional and decentralised training, which is focused on identified critical skill and behaviour needs which reinforce operational police training;
- c) the philosophy and practice of Community policing be built into all training, including recruit training management development training;
- (e) The Deputy Commissioner (Operations) direct Police Commanders to re-introduce on the job training using their trained members, and to report progress each month;
- (f) The Deputy Commissioner (Administration) re-introduce decentralised training for operational police.

- (g) Appropriate training courses in communication and negotiation skills be developed to support the reorientation towards Community Policing;
- (h) a policy be developed to support, as widely as possible, individual personal development, and funds be provided to support it; and
- (i) probationary officers should be properly supervised, and provided with adequate on-the-job training.
- (j) That Cadet officer training should be recommenced as a matter of urgency.

**The Constabulary requires a coherent training policy which reflects the position of training within a modern organization. Training which is targeted to the individual on-the-job, meets identified individual needs, and develops the person for the good of the organization**

Action needs to be taken to empower the senior executives of the RPNGC and ensure that they maintain and develop necessary skills. It is recommended that:

- Personal development programs be developed for all Senior Executive members to enable them to gain the specific management competencies that are required to deal with the needs of modern policing in the RPNGC including properly focused and targeted interchange and secondment programs;
- The training programs should include strategic and corporate planning and statutory obligations of the RPNGC to enable Senior Executive members to focus effectively on the core role and functions of the Constabulary;
- In addition to individually structured personal development programs, short term Executive Development Awareness Programs should be developed that address the policy, strategic, legislative and operational environment of the RPNGC; and
- Every Senior Executive is given training in Financial Management and accountability, including statutory reporting requirements, as well as in Resources Management.

The funding problems of the Constabulary are recognised. However, every available opportunity should be taken to preserve the cohesion and effectiveness of the Bomana Police College as the Constabulary's primary training centre. The Committee recommends that:

- a) The Deputy Commissioner (Administration) and Deputy Commissioner (Operations) consider the future role of Bomana in the context of the major reforms being proposed;
- b) The Deputy Commissioner (Administration) make better use of relevant programs offered by other suitable providers such as the Divine Word University and University of PNG and the RPNGC encourage participation of members in appropriate programs (such as offered by the universities);
- (c) As an integral part of building for the future, the RPNGC include "personal development" in the selection criteria for promotion; and

- (d) The personnel development policies of the Constabulary recognise personal development programs as an essential element of succession planning and skills profile development to determine future placements and deployments.

## 8.6 Terms of Reference 4

**To investigate the terms and conditions of police personnel of all ranks comparing them with PNG public servants and police forces in comparable countries in the region. This should include salaries, allowances, uniforms, messing, accommodation, whether these are being paid and what needs to be done to ensure that are paid in a timely manner. This should be done with a view to making the police force attractive to young, well educated Papua New Guineans and ensuring they are retained as members of the force.**

### 8.6.1 Pay.

Police have lost faith in the pay system and have become disaffected by the frequent non-payment of their statutory entitlements and allowances. For example, some sergeants who appeared before the Committee reported that for over 10 years they had not received salary increments; a policewoman explained that her Higher Duties Allowance had not been paid for 7 years; properly authorised overtime is unpaid (there is a large backlog of unpaid claims in Police headquarters), and many officers do not receive leave fares for themselves and their families (the monetary value of unpaid leave and repatriation fares is in the order of K1.8 million.)

The Committee recommends that an immediate payment of outstanding increments and leave entitlements be made to police and civilian members of the RPNGC and a commitment made to pay future entitlements on-time, every time. This would send a clear signal to the members of the Constabulary that the Government recognises the difficulties and is serious about supporting the Constabulary

**Police have lost faith in the pay system and have become disaffected by the frequent non-payment of their statutory entitlements and allowances**

Although basic pay rates appear comparable with other jobs, this salary is not generous and base level police, especially with families, find it difficult to make ends meet. Poor accommodation, unpaid entitlements, poor working conditions, lack of resources, shortage of staff, poor management and leadership and a sometimes dangerous job lead to demoralisation and ideal conditions to encourage corrupt behaviour.

The issue of salary, conditions and entitlements in the Constabulary was too complex, interrelated and far reaching for the Committee to provide detailed solutions in the time available. However, the way forward is clear.

### **8.6.2 Accommodation.**

A key issue is accommodation. One of the major constraints on expanding the Police force is the additional cost of the accommodation required. The present stock of accommodation is badly run down, and neither the government nor the police have the resources to renovate it to a satisfactory standard. The Committee recommends that the Constabulary should cease providing and managing accommodation (except in remote areas and for recruit and identified specialist training). The provision of accommodation should be replaced by an adequate housing allowance which will allow police to choose their own accommodation. The management of police accommodation should be contracted to the private sector which would charge commercial rents and be responsible for maintenance. Police officers would pay for utilities.

**The Constabulary should cease providing and managing accommodation**

In consultations with the committee, the Police generally agree to the proposal for a housing allowance which gives them the opportunity of finding their own accommodation. Initially this is expected to be in existing police accommodation, but over time, as the private rental market develops, police will increasingly move into their own accommodation. As Community Policing is implemented, and more police serve in their own areas, it is expected that police will be able to purchase their own property. Home ownership may become a significant incentive to perform to a satisfactory level, and so avoid a transfer to another location. Home ownership also reinforces community policing, as police live in, and are part of, the community they police.

The Committee recognises that this will take time to implement and will have to be planned very carefully.

### **8.6.2 Consolidation of pay and allowances.**

The committee recommends that housing and all other allowances should be consolidated, and paid as a composite percentage of salary. This will significantly reduce the administrative workload. The expert working group proposed that the composite allowance should be set at 60 per cent of salary, but the Review Committee is unable to determine the amount of allowances that should be provided. A full examination and costing is necessary, which is beyond the present resources of the committee.

The committee believes that the Unified Pay Policy for the Disciplined Services has outlived its usefulness. Submissions for improved police pay and conditions are rejected because similar rises have to be passed on to the Defence Force and the Correctional Services, and the cost is too great. The committee believes that the Police should be treated separately, because their job is significantly different, and because an effective police force is required for the economic and physical well-being of the country. It recommends that the Police are removed from the Unified Pay Policy for the Disciplined Services.

It is recommended that the Government announce an immediate review of police salaries and allowances that should address issues such as:

- consolidating all allowances, and paying them as a percentage of salary
- providing accommodation allowance in place of accommodation, and the amount of the allowance
- that the Police are removed from the Unified Pay Policy for the Disciplined Services.

Outcomes from a review of accommodation policy will take some time to be implemented. Immediate priority should be given to carrying out urgent minor repairs to restore housing to habitable condition, thus raising morale and reducing family concerns.

## **8.7 Terms of Reference 5**

**Investigate management and administrative practices within the force with special emphasis on how funds are currently allocated, the best use of resources, what has to be done to ensure that the RPNGC uses its money to the best advantage and what level of funding would be necessary to ensure that the RPNGC is:**

- **Staffed at a level which will allow it to carry out its required functions and identify a desired police/population ratio;**
- **at least as well off as other police forces in the region;**
- **making the best use of its vehicle fleet and other transport and evolve procedures for adequate maintenance of the fleet to an acceptable standard;**
- **can adequately carry out its duties to restore law and order;**
- **able to account for all weapons at any time and that procedures for prevention of sale of police weapons are satisfactory**

### **8.7.1 More effective use of resources.**

Although most stakeholders recognised that operational Police require more resources to be effective, they also noted that if management and administrative practices were improved there would be more effective use of the resources presently available. A major issue is uncertainty of funding.

### **8.7.2 Certainty of Funding**

The present system of monthly cash-flow driven allocations to police is clearly unsatisfactory, as the Police do not know their allocation from month-to-month. Proper policing requires forward planning and the application of appropriate resources to emerging problems. As part of this process it is critical that budget appropriations are sufficient, reliable and flexible enough to allow response to unpredictable situations when they arise.

It is also required to enable sufficient police patrols to maintain a base level of police effectiveness and visible presence. These patrols should be for prevention of crime, and response to crime. In the current PNG law and order environment both of these criteria are

fundamental to improving police capacity and reducing crime and public disorder. Such outcomes are virtually impossible to achieve without some genuine certainty in funding and clear guidelines for the appropriation of additional funding in emergent circumstances.

The government should recognise that Policing is a key public service, that public safety is the basis of the nation's economic prosperity, and ensure that the Police receive more certain funding. This could be achieved by ensuring treasury provided a guaranteed monthly minimum allocation to the Police to ensure essential services and a base level of operations. Police could then negotiate extra funding for special events or crime prevention initiatives, and the government could decide if they wished to fund these initiatives.

The Police need to improve their budget bidding process, so that priorities and outcomes are clearly identified. Senior police need to open and maintain regular dialogue with the Central Agencies so that the operational problems of the Constabulary are understood and adequate funding provided. This will allow the government to make clear and measured decisions about Police funding, and will be able to identify what services will be omitted or curtailed if funding is cut.

It is not possible to plan and operate a police force that does not receive adequate funding when it is promised. If the government wants to do something about the worsening law and order situation it must make a clear and unambiguous commitment to providing sufficient funding on time every time.

It is recommended that, as a matter of urgency, a joint review be undertaken by the Department of Finance and the Constabulary to set a realistic Core Budget for the RPNGC. The Core Budget will:

- a) Establish the Financial Guidance for the Constabulary by the DOF and reflect the real costs of meeting agreed, practical and achievable operational goals;
- b) Form the basis for strategic and financial planning for the Constabulary and determine the level of services that the Government will fund the Constabulary to deliver;
- c) Be supplemented by Government when it requires the Constabulary to deliver additional or new services, (e.g. for elections) so that the additional requirement does not impact on the delivery of the agreed Core Services of the Constabulary; and
- d) Be explained to Police Commanders and training be given to them to be able to draft practical and realistic budgets within DOF Financial Guidance.

### **8.7.3 Additional funds and resources**

There is clearly a requirement for more funds. However, it is the responsibility of Police to explain why extra funds are required, and link those funds to specific projects with clearly definable outcomes. The government may then decide to fund those initiatives, but should expect the Police to achieve the outcomes for which the funds are provided. This will require the Police to improve its budget bidding process, and its whole attitude to financial control, operational accountability and management of outcomes.

The government should provide more funds only after it is confident that the present budget is being spent for its proper purposes and accounted for in a more professional manner.

#### **8.7.4 Demonstrated effective use of present funds**

In the present times of tight budget allocations, Police need to demonstrate proper use of the funds and resources currently allocated to them. At present there is almost no proper accountability for funds spent. There is clear evidence that funds are not being applied for the purposes for which they were allocated, and are not being used for operational policing. In most provinces, money is not being applied to the appropriate areas.

It is difficult to quantify the extent of misuse of funds in the RPNGC, because the accountability mechanisms, management skills and discipline are not functioning effectively. The Committee recommends that the Constabulary enforce the existing accountability mechanisms, and reinforce discipline to ensure proper use of funds and resources.

#### **8.7.5 An example of what can be achieved.**

Fiji provides an illustration of what can be achieved with a limited budget, plus the desire to provide a disciplined service to the public, and a strong government commitment to the Police reform process. After the first coup in Fiji, the Police Force exhibited many of the problems facing the present day RPNGC. The Review Committee was told that at that time the Fiji Police Force:

1. was under strength, poorly resourced and poorly supported,
2. had a poor Police Vehicle fleet which severely restricted operational mobility and effectiveness,
3. had Police stations and police posts which needed substantial repair and maintenance, as well as a requirement for considerable capital works
4. Communications were poor and inefficient
5. had a serious problem with indiscipline
6. received widespread criticism about the apparent lack of fitness of police members
7. Cronyism and nepotism was rife and there was a lack of transparency in selection and promotion processes
8. suffered from poor financial management and accountability, with archaic, centralised, overly bureaucratic financial systems and processes
9. Fiji police were the lowest paid and had the poorest conditions in the public sector
10. Police were seen as being purely reactive and having poor relations with the wider community.





Badili Police Station 2004

A few years later, the Fiji Police now have:

- police stations that are clean and painted
- police stations adequately equipped with a radio, phone, photocopier, fax machine, stationery and the necessary books to record incidents and other events
- police stations that are functioning
- police properly uniformed
- police going out into the community (where there is no vehicle, beat patrols are undertaken, and in some cases bicycles have been donated by the private sector)
- police who are clearly held accountable for the resources under their control
- police who have accepted the responsibility for achieving the agreed objectives.



Fiji Police Station 2004

There was no evidence of this level of functioning in the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary, apart from a few exceptions. Those few exceptions demonstrate that there is capacity within the present budget to achieve similar objectives if the appropriate management skills and discipline are applied.

Table 5 shows a comparison of the budgets for the Fiji and PNG police. In terms of budget allocation per police officer (for comparison purposes) the budget for the Fiji Police is only 15% greater than that available to the PNG police. Fiji appears to get better results from this budget, which indicates that the provision of a basic level of police services is not beyond the reach of the RPNGC if accountability, discipline and leadership is improved (or the present rules enforced), and government provides support to the reform process.

It is important, however, not to view budgetary allocations in isolation. For example, Fiji has a police to population ratio almost twice as favourable as that of the RPNGC and thus has the capacity with similar, per capita, funding, to achieve a higher level of police visibility and responsiveness. Additionally, the crime rates and the nature of crime committed are lower and less aggressive than those in PNG.

<b>Table 5. BUDGET COMPARISON – FIJI and PNG POLICE</b>			
	<b>Police Numbers</b>	<b>Police Budget ( Kina)</b>	<b>Budget allocation per police officer (Kina)</b>
Fiji	3,700	98,000,000	26,486
PNG	5,250	121,340,000	23,047

### **8.7.6 Restoring Effective Operations.**

All Police Stations should be returned immediately to operational effectiveness and professional presentation.

It is recommended that immediate action is taken to clean and paint every Police Station and equip them with the basic resources required to deliver effective policing. This includes the supply of basic items such as paper, pencils, desks, tables, chairs, Police Notebooks, typewriters, recording systems and a telephone, without which the police cannot do their job. (A comprehensive list of equipment is provided in Appendix 5).

These resources must be maintained to a standard expected by the PNG Government, the community. Action should be taken to:

- Require every Police Commander and Police Station Commander to be held personally responsible and accountable for the resources and equipment placed under their command. Senior police executives must ensure that any misuse or abuse is dealt with swiftly, openly and firmly
- Ensure that follow-up accountability audits are conducted at least every six months
- Improve the security at police stations to reduce unauthorized access, and enable proper security of assets.

As part of the Constabulary's commitment to community policing, each Police Station should:

- Establish a public Enquiry Desk that is continuously staffed by a Regular police member in full uniform and trained public relations and be literate;
- Require that the Enquiry Desk police officer record all contacts and incidents reported by the public and demonstrate their clear commitment to assist;
- Institute arrangements to ensure that police provide feedback by the provision of a daily public notice at each police station reporting occurrences and what progress has been made; and
- resume the practice of producing an Annual Report to the Government and people of PNG as required by current legislation.

As an operational priority for immediate action, it is recommended that the Commissioner direct Police Commanders to:

- Immediately introduce accountable Rostering Practices;
- Immediately introduce a Reporting for Duty regime;
- Obtain the necessary Standard Policing Forms from the Central Store;
- Re-introduce Intelligence Collection processes at all levels of Police Operations;
- Issue to all members the Official Police Note Book and pens for recording purposes;
- Make all NCOs accountable for implementation of the Commissioner's Directions; and
- Put in place processes to ensure follow-up action is taken on these Directions.

Where gaps in knowledge are identified in Station Commanders and other relevant officers, which affect the performance of these duties, then specific on-the-job training should be provided which is targeted to the individual needs of these officers. Manuals should also be made available.

### **8.7.7 Restoring Financial Discipline**

As has been stated, budgetary discipline is poor in the RPNGC. A contributing factor to this is that there are presently 60 activity managers authorising the use of funds in the Constabulary. Many of these activity managers are not effective, and are not maintaining appropriate fiscal discipline

In an attempt to constrain financial indiscipline, all funds are now controlled centrally. This curtails Police operations in the provinces and in other operational areas because they have no funds for immediate operations, and must request an allocation from central office. The constabulary should move towards decentralising the control of the funds to the operational

areas, and place them in the hands of a smaller number of properly trained and properly accountable activity managers. The pace of decentralisation must be linked to the placement of better skilled and accountable activity managers, who report directly to the Director of Finance.

There is an urgent need to raise the financial and resources management capability of all RPNGC senior executives, police station commanders, and all personnel involved in the control of RPNGC funds and resources. There is also a need for awareness of financial and resource accountability procedures in all ranks. The Committee recommended that:

- Training should continue to be provided on financial guidelines and financial management to senior executives and junior managers
- Procedures be implemented to ensure that Provincial Police Commanders carry out their duties in relation to financial control and expenditure to ensure transparency in financial transactions; and
- Sound financial management skills be a prerequisite for promotion to any senior rank or position within the RPNGC.

### **8.7.8 Restoring Strategic Corporate Governance.**

To overcome the critical lack of strategic corporate governance of the organisation and to demonstrate total executive commitment to its improvement, the Committee recommends that the RPNGC:

- Establish a Strategic Policy and Planning Committee (SPPC) to develop clear strategic corporate policy directions for the RPNGC;
- Establish a small, highly skilled Corporate Planning and Development Unit reporting direct to the Commissioner;
- Develop an organisational performance management framework to give direction to activities carried out by the RPNGC;
- The collective Leadership of the RPNGC set clear corporate goals to take the organisation forward; corporate performance monitoring and management arrangements;
- Specify in the Perform
- Introduce coordinated ance Agreements of every Deputy Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner and Assistant Secretary equivalent, their personal responsibility for ensuring the implementation of organisational performance management and accountability arrangements in their area and undertaking corrective action.

There is an urgent need to reaffirm clear and consistent corporate priorities set for the organisation that reflect its strategic directions. It is recommended that the RPNGC:

- Develop arrangements for setting consistent strategic priorities to guide the allocation, deployment and use of resources across the organisation;
- Ensure that the priorities setting framework is linked directly to the strategic policy and planning machinery and the established strategic corporate directions;
- Implement assessment arrangements that review and test the competency of managers and commanders and identify up-skilling, redeployment and retirement requirements;
- Institute monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements to ensure that operational decisions are made consistent with the organisation's strategic priorities;

- Specify in the Performance Agreements of all executive managers and commanders their personal responsibility for the ethical, effective and efficient use of resources; and
- Identify sanctions for gross failure or negligence including the possibility of demotion and/or forced transfer.

### **8.7.9 Enhance Operational and Organisational Effectiveness.**

To enhance operational and organisational effectiveness the RPNGC it is recommended that:

- The Deputy Commissioner (Administration) role be focused on managing all Operations Support functions;
- Urgent attention be given to restructuring the processes for logistics and supply, particularly the ordering, acquisition and distribution of equipment and stores to ensure that they are effective and appropriate and serve the needs of operational units;
- A suitably qualified and experienced civilian at Deputy Secretary level be appointed to the Deputy Commissioner (Administration) position who is not only an able senior corporate executive but also understands the operational imperatives of the RPNGC;
- The Deputy Secretary will have corporate responsibility for organising, managing and structuring Financial, Human Resource and operations support functions to best meet the RPNGC operational needs;
- The Deputy Secretary will be responsible for testing and determining those functions that could be more effectively delivered by outside service organisations (such as Vehicle Fleet Management), recognising that responsibility cannot be outsourced;
- The Deputy Secretary will also be responsible for ensuring that effective corporate governance is exercised in the operations of the RPNGC and that it meets all legislative and policy requirements;
- The Deputy Secretary will also be responsible for establishing and maintaining an effective and appropriate “tooth to tail” ratio of Operations to Operations Support for the RPNGC and ensure that this balance is consistent with best practice; and
- The Deputy Secretary exercise the responsibilities of the Chief Financial Officer to ensure the preparation of realistic budgets across the RPNGC and the effective, efficient and ethical management of funds.

It is further recommended that the administration of Police Pensions be transferred from the Constabulary to an organisation that undertakes similar functions in relation to other PNG Government employees.

### **8.7.10 Uniforms.**

The police uniform is a badge of office. Immediate action is required to ensure that all sworn members present in a professional manner. The Committee recommends that:

- a) The Commissioner of Police instruct all Police and Station Commanders to enforce the dress code and standards of professional behavior, noting that they will be held personally accountable for ensuring that Commissioner’s Direction is enforced;
- b) The Commissioner of Police advise the Deputy Commissioners that he will hold them personally accountable for ensuring compliance with the Commissioner’s Direction;

- c) A standard uniform be provided to all Regular Constabulary members that clearly distinguishes them from Community Auxiliary and Reserve Constabulary members;
- d) Action be taken immediately to recover items of Regular police uniform from Reserves and Auxiliaries, to be reallocated to Regular police who have only partial uniform;
- e) All uniformed members of the Constabulary be required to wear their Regimental Number clearly displayed on their uniform; and
- f) All uniformed members of the Constabulary be issued with nametags, which are to be clearly displayed on their uniform.

In addition, the Committee recommends that:

- a more appropriate uniform be issued to policewomen engaged in field work
- penalties be enforced for unauthorised wearing of Police uniforms
- procedures taken to improve stock control, purchasing and management of uniforms and accoutrements
- the civilianisation of the quartermaster function be actively considered
- the provisions of the Police Act 1998 which make it an offence to be improperly dressed while on duty (Section 20 (1) l) be enforced to ensure that Police officers are properly dressed in full uniform while on duty, and that the removal of Police Support Officer (PSO) or Reserve insignia from uniforms is deemed an offence under this section.

#### **8.7.11 Vehicles.**

The public perception is that there is serious misuse of vehicles within the Constabulary. The public resents being told that Police cannot attend an incident because a vehicle is not available, or because there is no fuel, at the same time as they see Police vehicles constantly used non-operationally for personal errands, transporting Police families, and by groups of police obviously under the influence of alcohol. Improved discipline and enforced accountability will be necessary to improve this situation. A critical element of this process is the reintroduction of vehicle log books and their rigorous checking by managers, and swift action taken in cases of misuse.

Police vehicles are also used to transport Police officers and civilian staff to and from work. Although these trips are authorised, they may be confused with illegal use by the public. They are also expensive in terms of fuel, vehicle supply and use of trained Police as drivers. Given the sensitivity of the issue of misuse of Police vehicles, the committee believes that this practice should be reviewed. The committee recommends that Police and civilian staff are no longer provided with transport to and from work during the day. Transport to and from work should only be available for night shifts. If police management consider that transport to and from work during the day is essential, then the Committee recommends that vehicles are hired from the private sector, and staff that use this service pay a realistic fee which covers costs.

Police do not look after or maintain their vehicles. Suppliers report that many new Police vehicles are not brought in for the first service, even though it is free. The major vehicle companies are reluctant to undertake Police maintenance work because of a history of unpaid accounts. (Some of these are reported to be over K1 million, which have been outstanding

for over a year, and, in reality, constitute an interest free loan from the companies to the Police). Maintenance services, parts and fuel are also being provided without charge by some private sector companies in some provinces as a community service to assist in maintaining law and order. For example, transport companies using the Highlands Highway provide fuel and tyres to the Highway Patrol on a regular basis.

Vehicle servicing is being contracted out to small companies, but the level of service needs to be closely monitored as there are reports of poor performance.

There are a large number of unroadworthy Police vehicles awaiting major repair or write-off. The police should be able to cannibalise unroadworthy vehicles to maintain the rest of the vehicle fleet. In some cases it should be possible to produce serviceable vehicles from a number of wrecks. The Committee has been informed that such action is prohibited under the Finance regulations.

The committee heard that the police helicopter was seldom used in crime fighting and was more often used to transport senior officers around the country. It recommends that the use and funding of the helicopter be reviewed and compared with chartering a commercial helicopter when needed.

The management and use of police vehicles must immediately be taken under executive control. It is recommended that:

- a) The Commissioner issue a directive that all vehicles currently used by officers without entitlement be returned immediately to general police operational use;
- b) The arrangements for “home garaging” of police vehicles be discontinued immediately;
- c) All vehicles be operated in accordance with RPNGC Standing Orders and policy;
- d) The 25 litres restriction on fuel be scrapped when effective management and control measures requiring that vehicles be used only for police purposes are in place;
- (e) The Commissioner instruct senior police executives to make their Police vehicles be made available for Operational use unless the vehicles are, to the satisfaction of the Commissioner, required for official duties;
- (f) The Government place the management of the RPNGC vehicle fleet under a private sector fleet management contractor with appropriate experience and facilities;
- (g) Investigate the introduction of enhanced technology to monitor and track Police vehicles within the NCD and elsewhere to improve accountability and Operational effectiveness, depending on the cost.
- (h) An immediate stocktake be conducted to identify the number, type and condition of vehicles actually on hand at each police post, and the number and type of vehicles unable to be accounted for, and
- (i) The Finance regulations and rules are clarified to allow unroadworthy vehicles to be used for spare parts to maintain the rest of the vehicle fleet.
- (j) A review of the cost and use of the police helicopter be carried out and compared with the costs of chartering from a commercial firm.

### **8.7.12 Police Firearms.**

Much has been said about the indiscriminate use of firearms by the Police. Police (sometimes minimally trained Reservists and Auxiliaries) regularly use long-barrelled weapons to intimidate unarmed citizens. Police accountability for weapons and ammunition is very poor, with weapons often passed from one officer to another at the end of each shift, with no records kept.

The regulations and rules for the storage and handling of firearms are clear and are adequate. They are not being enforced, and supervisors who are not enforcing the rules are not being sanctioned. The committee recommends that:

- the present rules and regulations on firearms and armouries be enforced
- supervisors be held personally responsible for enforcing the rules, and subject to severe sanctions if the rules are not followed
- firearms must only be carried by Police when on duty. It should be a serious offence for Police to carry a firearm while off duty, unless authorised in writing by a Provincial Commander or officer of similar or senior rank
- armouries and firearms lockers of an appropriate standard are to be used for the storage of Police firearms. Armouries should be maintained to the appropriate standard, or, if not available, built to that standard.
- An immediate stocktake be conducted to identify the number and description of firearms actually on hand at each police post and the number and description of firearms unable to be accounted for.

The public expects Police to be generally unarmed. The Committee further recommends that Police who are armed should not carry firearms openly unless the operational situation requires this level of preparedness.

### **8.7.13 Effective use of trained Police.**

The government invests considerable resources in recruiting, training and accommodating police personnel. Trained Police are a valuable asset, and should be used to the best advantage. They were recruited and trained for Police duties, and they should be used in these duties.

There are many duties presently performed by Police which are not mainstream police functions, and do not require a trained police officer. For example, trained police drive trucks and buses on administration duties, and perform routine clerical duties in non-operational areas such as human resources. It is reported that there are 400 trained police working in headquarters in administration positions, such as human resources, information technology and logistics, which could be performed by civilians.

The costs to the organisation are more than the inefficient use of police staff. It prevents the improvement in services that should occur if permanent civilian staff were appointed to these positions. Civilian staff are generally more effective as they:

- Can be employed with the specific skills and/or experience required for a dedicated support function.



- Understand the nature and scope of the work for which they are being employed and are likely to not only be suited to the tasks assigned to them, but also motivated to perform them.
- do not require the benefits that are provided to trained police,
- are not transferred every few years, so can develop a corporate memory, which is an important factor in the internal efficiency of any organisation,
- can specialise in a particular area, and become proficient at it (one of the problems of employing Police is that they tend to be transferred as soon as they have mastered the job),
- can be more productive, and are more likely to understand corporate culture.

PNG Police manpower statistics indicate that approximately 3% of positions are held by civilians. Experience in other jurisdictions is that approximately 20% of positions can be held by civilians without compromising police integrity and security.

There are significant cost and efficiency savings to be made by increasing the number of trained civilian staff in the administration, and returning trained police to police duties. The Committee recommends that police establish a genuine dialogue with the Department of Personnel Management to establish more civilian positions within the police establishment. These civilians would report to the Commissioner, and would be subject to police security procedures. The Commissioner must be able to discipline civilian staff employed in the Constabulary, and the Committee recommends that the Police negotiate with the Department of Personnel Management to resolve any issues in this regard.

The Committee recommends that Mobile Squads and Rapid Response Units as currently configured be returned to Core Police functions “*to undertake ordinary routine police duties*” as provided for by the existing policy. Specialist operational capability would not be sacrificed in executing this fundamental change. It is expected that:

- (a) The members of Mobile Squads and Rapid Response Units be available for general duties when they are not deployed operationally or in training;
- (b) Members would be dressed in Regular police uniforms and report daily to their assigned Stations;
- (c) Members would retain the capability of being mobilized and deployed speedily to their now *secondary* role of rapid response in an assigned operation;
- (d) Every deployment of a mobile squad must be authorized in writing by the Deputy Commissioner (Operations);
- (e) Specialist members would continue to receive appropriate training to renew, maintain and develop their skills.
- (f) The police should institute a review of the location and numbers of mobile squads throughout the country.

The target numbers need to be determined on the basis of sound analysis and creative operational thinking. It is recommended that the Commissioner, acting on the advice of the Deputy Commissioner (Operations) and the Deputy Commissioner (Administration) determine the appropriate number and location of virtual “Mobile Squads”. It is recommended that the Deputy Commissioner (Operations) lead an operational policy team to review operations (see Working Group Recommendation No. 23):

#### **8.7.14 Links with other agencies.**

It is important that any response to this review of the police is not dealt with in isolation. The police are an integral part of the law and justice sector and any changes should take account of the view from the law and justice sector, and if necessary, include a whole-of-government perspective. In this regard, the committee believes that the present internal security situation in PNG is so serious, that law and order should be given priority over education and health agriculture and infrastructure. Services like health and education cannot be delivered or accessed if there is insufficient security. The operation against HIV/AIDS cannot be successful if there is no proper law and order.

**The committee believes that the law and order situation is more important than health, education and other essential services. Unless it is improved it will be impossible to properly provide other services.**

The relationship between the police and the defence force is equally important. The Defence Force has gained valuable experience in operations to support the civilian power in its deployment to the Solomon Islands as part of the Regional Assistance Mission. Their task was to provide a secure environment within which ordinary Police could operate. This experience should be built on, and should be used to assist the RPNGC.

It is recommended that regular consultations take place between the Police Commissioner and the Commander of the Defence Force about deployment of military personnel.

The committee recommends that a small number of the Defence Force (approximately 4 platoons) be trained to support the civilian power, and be deployed to those duties under the command of Police. It is important that the members of the Defence Force assisting the Police receive proper training in the respective roles of, and boundaries between, the Defence Force and the Police. The Committee believes that soldiers with experience in the Solomon Islands are the initial troops deployed to assist the Police, and it is paramount that the commanders of this Defence Force assistance have that experience. This training and experience should ensure proper co-ordination of Police and Defence force personnel during operations on the ground, and ensure that appropriate force is used only when necessary.

The troops would not receive police powers, but would work with Police to provide cover and support to Police operations. When required, the troops would be called out by the Commissioner of Police through the National Executive Council. Any legislative or other amendment necessary to facilitate these arrangements should be enacted as a matter of priority.

#### **8.7.15 Refreshing the Organisation.**

There is a need to refresh the Constabulary, so that police can present a new image to the public as the reorientation towards effective Community Policing occurs.

As has been previously stated, the Committee was unable to find any recruitment strategy or other corporate policy or commitment aimed at remedying the deficiency in staff numbers. This is a serious omission, as proper human resource planning requires forward looking policies based on appropriate information. For example, information is required on:

- the age structure of the police (in the present and at times in the future),
- a profile of those reaching retirement age,
- separation rates (resignations and retirements)
- recruitment necessary to maintain numbers
- promotion rates
- succession planning
- training

There are too many old, ineffective and unsuitable officers throughout the organisation. The Constabulary must identify the old, unproductive and unsuitable members of the police and either retire them or terminate them (with appropriate payment), and replace them with new officers who are selected and trained to the standards required of community policing.

Under section 91 (5) of the Police Act, the Commissioner can retire police who reach the age of 55 years, or who before attaining that age have completed 20 years service. The Commissioner should exercise this right.

The Police Act should be amended to allow the Commissioner to remove police on the grounds of unsuitability, or poor performance of duties. Section 108 of the Act allows the National Executive Council to approve a redundancy exercise. The Committee recommends that the Police identify those officers who are ineffective and unsuitable (and who cannot be retired) and seek NEC approval to have them declared redundant, and to fund the necessary redundancy payments. There should be suitable provisions to ensure that officers who are made redundant are not able to re-enter the regular Constabulary at a later date, although they should be able to become Auxiliaries.

Partly as a result of poor Human Resource planning, the Constabulary is now in a situation where it needs to expand rapidly if the Police:Population ratio is to be reduced to more acceptable levels, at the same time as it needs to shed a considerable number of ineffective or over-age workers. An increased recruitment and training effort is needed to increase the size of the force, and to replace those who are leaving. This will be an expensive exercise, and will require Government commitment to the process. In the meantime, retirements from the Police will have to be managed to ensure there are sufficient police available.

A large redundancy exercise may not be necessary, but the Police must start planning now to replace the older officers, as it is only a matter of time before they are too old for service. With this in mind, the Committee recommends that the Constabulary develop a comprehensive human resource plan to address the present and future staffing needs of the organization, and it further recommends that the Constabulary use this plan to actively manage staffing numbers and career development issues.

### **8.7.16 Fitness**

The Police Act requires a level of physical and other fitness in recruits and for transfers and promotions in the regular Constabulary. Many regular Police are not physically fit (based on fitness-for-age criteria), and no physical fitness test is presently applied to Police. The Committee considers that physical fitness is important for Police, as it enhances their ability to perform their duties, assists in a sense of pride, and presents an appropriate image to the public.

The Committee recommends that an annual fitness test be introduced for all members of the regular Constabulary. The test should be related to the age of the officer, and the duties performed by the officer, and must be passed every year. Officers who fail to pass the annual fitness test may, at the discretion of the Commissioner, be retired (Police Act, S.92) or dismissed or demoted (Police Act, S.55) as unfit for service. The option of a forced transfer is also available to the Commissioner. The Committee also considers that Reserve Police should pass a fitness test appropriate to their role. A fitness test similar to that used by the Fiji police should be suitable for PNG. (The Committee was told that in Fiji, police were allowed 3 attempts to pass a fitness test, with failures retired at the Commissioner's discretion).

### **8.7.17 Media Campaign**

Part of any effort to refresh an organisation such as the RPNGC, must include a professionally managed media campaign, which ensures that the public are fully informed. Such a campaign would include:

- the cooperation between police and community (community policing)
- the 're-birth' of the police
- any new acts or laws
- more effective reporting of police results.

Such a campaign also reminds police of their new responsibilities. The Committee recommends that a professionally managed media campaign is undertaken as part of the re-focus on community policing.

## **8.8 Terms of Reference 6**

**Look at policies governing the transfer of police throughout the country and make recommendations about how to ensure that they are carried out according to the best needs of the RPNGC and the officer involved rather than a particular province, governor or politician.**

The present system of deploying police away from their own area is an expensive exercise in terms of cost and administration. In addition to the cost of deploying a police member and family to their post, the Constabulary is required to pay leave fares back to the family's home province every two years.

The requirement for transfers will be considerably reduced when community policing becomes the normal method of operations, and more police are expected to serve in their own

areas. However, there will still be a need for a managed rotation of personnel, particularly of supervisors who are required to monitor performance.

The Police Association report that outstanding leave fares and repatriation benefits for the years 2003 and 2004 presently amount to approximately K1.8million. The committee recommends that government assist the Constabulary to pay these outstanding entitlements.

It is recommended that immediate attention be given to aligning human resources management practices with best practice. This would include:

- Ensuring that fair and open procedures are established for promotion, appointments and transfers including openness and the reporting of outcomes to members;
- Giving immediate attention to reviewing long-term acting appointments with a view to discontinuing them or to filling them permanently;
- Ensuring that these arrangements are carried out in an integrated way with a formal review of organisational structure;
- Commensurate with modern best practice in a dynamic organisation, moving to establishing generic duty statements that enable managers to redirect duties as circumstances change; and
- Remuneration should be tied to performance at level, not to doing a particular job.

The Committee recommends that the practice of officers transferring themselves to a preferred location, without authority, should cease immediately, and disciplinary penalties should be applied to those who refuse to serve where posted.

On several different occasions, women police reported to the Committee that they were refused transfers which were requested to allow the police officer to get away from domestic violence. Their concern was that domestic violence was not considered by management as a legitimate reason for seeking transfer. Poor domestic circumstances will reflect on the work performance of the police officers concerned, and management has a responsibility to provide reasonable assistance to their staff. The Committee recommends that Transfer procedures are revised to provide guidance to managers when considering instances of domestic violence and other severe domestic situations.

## **8.9 Terms of Reference 7**

**Make recommendations about strengthening the Internal Affairs division of the RPNGC and whether there should be a police ombudsman to hear complaints from the public.**

### **8.9.1 Immediate actions to restore discipline.**

Evidence of the collapse of Police discipline is regularly demonstrated by the widespread abuse of police power and the misuse of police resources. During consultations with the Committee, the public expressed an overwhelming concern to have police discipline restored. This concern was reinforced by many of the police, including senior officers, who appeared before the Committee.

The Constabulary has a good, clear Disciplinary Manual which is not being enforced. The Committee strongly recommends that the Commissioner, with the support of government:

- Issue a Directive to all RPNGC staff instructing that the existing Discipline Code be immediately put into effect (to improve the presentation of the Police, the enforcement of restrictions on chewing buai while on duty are particularly important);
- Issue a Directive to each Deputy Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner and civilian equivalent advising that he will hold them personally responsible and accountable for ensuring that the Discipline Code is complied with;
- Enhance the resources of (Direct) the Internal Affairs Directorate(IAD) to ensure that the IAD has the skills and capacity to fully support the Police Executive by rigorously monitoring and enforcing compliance with the Discipline Code by all members;
- As part of the above enhancement process, recruit or second to the Internal Affairs Directorate, a person or persons with extensive experience in the management of internal affairs investigations and the oversight of complaints against police and breaches of discipline; and,
- Direct all line Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs) to attend a Training Seminar run by the Internal Affairs Directorate to reinforce standards at all levels.

It is further recommended that a review of all existing matters under investigation should be carried out immediately by the Ombudsman Commission and a report on the outcomes be submitted to the Minister for recommended action. A public report, including a Newspaper Public Notice, should be (is ) issued on the outcomes and findings of any such review(s) in order to ensure that the detail of the review process is available to the general public.

As mentioned in the recommendations, above, this review should be reinforced by the targeted recruitment of expert and experienced personnel including someone with direct experience in the management of investigations into police corruption, malpractice and breaches of discipline. It is recognized that it may be necessary to consider recruiting people from agencies which have a primary mandate for anti corruption investigation. If appropriate skills and experience are not readily available from within the PNG Ombudsman Commission consideration should be given to recruiting or seeking to second personnel from such agencies as the Ombudsman Offices of neighbouring countries, the NSW Police Integrity Commission or similar Commissions such as Independent Commissions Against Corruption.

It will be important to also recognize that, without the strong support and active participation of middle level police managers, IAD initiatives, no matter how well targeted and managed, are likely to be, at best, only partly effective. Accordingly, it is essential that the training seminars for NCO's, mentioned in the recommendation above, be designed to clarify, unambiguously, the responsibilities and accountability of NCO's and to properly equip NCO's with the skills and knowledge needed to maintain discipline and deal promptly and effectively with complaints and other evidence of impropriety or unacceptable conduct.

In particular, it will be essential to develop clear protocols for the protection of complainants, witnesses and "whistle-blowers," which will ensure appropriate confidentiality to the person making the report and serve to encourage personnel, to report inappropriate conduct of which they become aware. This process is likely to require the development of a corporate

‘Confidante Policy’ which identifies and trains suitable volunteer police officers to act as ‘Confidants’ The Policy would allow any member who wishes to report breaches of discipline or other unacceptable conduct to make the report to any of the identified ‘confidants’ , in confidence and regardless of the normal line reporting requirements. The ‘Confidant’ would have the responsibility to record the complaint and refer the matter directly to the IAD for assessment and action. Similar policies operate effectively in a number of Australian and other police agencies.

It is further recommended that a review of all existing matters under investigation should be carried out immediately by the Ombudsman Commission and a report on the outcomes be submitted to the Minister for recommended action. A public report, including a Newspaper Public Notice, is issued on the outcomes and findings of such reviews in order to ensure that the detail of the review process is available to the general public.

One of the contributing factors to police indiscipline is that it is difficult for the citizens to identify police personnel when making a complaint, because Police do not wear, and often do not carry, any form of identification. The public urgently requires this to be corrected. It is recommended that:

- Uniformed police must clearly display name tags or numbers on their uniforms at all times
- All officers must be issued with a current ID card, which must be produced on demand
- It should be an offence for Police not to carry an ID card while on duty.
- Particular emphasis needs to be given to the children of police who are involved in criminal activities within and outside of barracks.

### **8.9.2 Longer term initiatives to restore discipline.**

The Internal Affairs Division of any police force is one of its most important functions. It builds the confidence of the public by ensuring that discipline is maintained and complaints are acted upon. The present Internal Affairs Directorate does not have sufficient power and authority within the RPNGC, as many of its rulings are not being enforced.

The Committee recommends that an Office of Inspector-General of the Constabulary be created to exercise effective corporate governance of the RPNGC. The Office would:

- Exercise the powers of the Police Force Act 1998 and attendant Regulations, Commissioner’s Directives and Standing Orders;
- Report direct to the Commissioner of Police who will appoint an appropriately qualified and experienced Inspector General at Deputy Commissioner level;
- Coordinate the accountability and reporting requirements of the Constabulary;
- Include the Directorates of Internal Affairs; Command Inspection and Review; and Discipline and Employment Review;
- Establish the Discipline and Employment Review Board to assist the Commissioner in dealing with the complexities of the PNG culture in the application of penalties and employment review, supported by the Discipline and Employment Review Directorate;

- The Board would be chaired by the Inspector-General and comprise the Deputy Commissioners of Police, the Assistant Commissioners of Police for Human Resources and Internal Affairs, the Director of Legal Services and a representative from the Department of Personnel Management;
- Exercise the functions of an expanded Internal Audit Directorate encompassing financial, performance and management audit functions across the Constabulary;
- Promote best practice and establish Best Practice Guidelines;
- Record outcomes in the Annual Report of the Inspector General to the Commissioner; and
- Ensure that the accountability machinery applies to all persons able to exercise powers under the Police Force Act 1998 including Regulars, Auxiliaries, Reservists, Special Constables, persons vested with authority under s.16 of the Act, and unsworn staff.

The Committee also recommends that independent accountability and review processes should be established as soon as possible and recommends that an Office of Police Ombudsman be created to oversight the review and investigation of complaints made by the public about police action.

When the review machinery has been established, announcements should be made to the public about how these arrangements can be accessed.

### **8.9.3 Dealing with previous minor malpractice.**

As has been stated previously, it is clear to the Committee that many police have been involved in corrupt behaviour or malpractice at some stage of their careers. In an environment of change and improved discipline, knowledge of this previous unacceptable conduct, may be held against any officer attempting to discipline other staff or to report unacceptable behaviour. In order to commence the cultural change, which will be essential to meaningful performance improvement, the Committee believes that a process should be put in place which will enable police to admit to previous unacceptable conduct and less serious malpractice and corruption, and be granted immunity from charges arising from these offences. This will allow police to do their duty and enforce discipline without fear of being reported for a previous indiscretion. Clearly, the public expects that this process would not include immunity from serious corruption or acts of serious criminal violence.

In conjunction with this process there must be a clear statement from the police executive that from that date forward there will be no excuses for incorrect behaviour or breaches of standards. After the date of immunity, standards of police behaviour will be rigidly enforced without exception, fear or favour. This statement must be supported by resources and by a commitment from all ranks of police leadership to ensure compliance.

The Committee believes that police resources should be used to seek out and prosecute malpractice from the time of the indemnity forward. Police resources should generally not be applied to investigating small offences which occurred before the date of indemnity, as there are insufficient resources to adequately prosecute each case, and the police will be



unable to move forward until the process ceases.

The Committee recommends that:

- a process be put in place which will enable Police to admit to previous unacceptable conduct and less serious malpractice and corruption, and be granted immunity from charges arising from these offences;
- this process of immunity does not include acts of serious corruption or acts of serious criminal violence;
- from the date of immunity forward, standards of police behaviour will be rigidly enforced without exception, and this enforcement will be supported by resources and by a commitment from all ranks of police leadership;
- police resources should be used to seek out and prosecute malpractice from the time of the indemnity forward, and should generally not be applied to investigate small offences which occurred before the date of indemnity.

### **8.10 Terms of Reference 8**

**Make recommendations about the relationship between provincial governors and governments with the RPNGC with particular emphasis on what happens if the province is required to provide some of the funding of policing within its borders.**

The committee was specifically asked to consider provincial and national funding for police operations within the provinces.

The Committee is informed that the legal position of devolving police powers to the provinces and funding those powers is unclear. Section 50 of the Organic Law on Provincial and Local Level Government (OLPLLG) provides that an Act of Parliament may provide for such a transfer of national powers and functions. The Provincial Government Administration Act (PGAA) makes reference to Section 50 of the Organic Law, yet it only provides that such national powers and functions transferred are to be exercised as prescribed. Both the OLPLLG and the PGAA do not prescribe which national powers and functions are to be transferred.

If the National Government wishes to delegate certain national powers to the Provinces, then the present uncertainties require clarification. The Committee is informed that this can be achieved by amending the PGAA, or making regulations under the PGAA, or alternatively altering the Police Act to refer to Section 50 of the OLPLLG and Section 17 of the PGAA.

However, the Committee believes that policing should remain a national function, and that Regular Police should be deployed throughout the country to the level of District Headquarters.

The Committee considers that, in the rural areas, Auxiliary police, or other community representatives, should be responsible for maintaining the general law and order in the districts and local government areas. These Auxiliaries should be selected from persons who

have the trust of the community, and should have limited powers, which do not include the power of arrest. The Committee believes that the National Government should fund auxiliaries and in consultation with the provinces and local governments should determine the number of Auxiliaries that are required in their own areas. Regular Police would ensure quality control of this process by providing guidelines for recruiting, and providing appropriate training to the Auxiliaries.

The role of the Regular Police at the district level should be to support the local Auxiliaries. Regular police should maintain close contact with their local Auxiliaries, and on operations auxiliaries would report to the Regular Police.

The committee considers that the national government has a responsibility to provide the Constabulary with sufficient budget to meet normal operational outcomes by Regular Police in the provinces. However, if a situation arises which requires significantly additional and unbudgeted police expenditure, and this situation is a provincial priority (e.g. tribal fighting), then the province should have the opportunity to provide funding for special operations. The government should provide the police with the additional resources necessary to achieve the outcomes, and the police executive should negotiate the outcomes and performance indicators with Treasury, and report against those outcomes.

It is recommended that the National Government continue to provide additional budget allocations for clearly identified major operational expenditure such as elections.

Cooperation between the Police and provincial authorities is particularly important in planning and responding to local issues of law and order. The Committee noted the cooperation that was occurring in Morobe Province, where a Provincial Peace and Good Order Committee meets on a monthly basis. At this meeting the provincial Police command reported on the provincial crime scene to representatives of the provincial administration, the community and the private sector. This interaction improves the coordination between the province and the police, and provides a mechanism for the Provincial Government to take more responsibility for police activities. The Committee recommends that all provinces (which do not already do so) should convene monthly meetings of a similar committee as a means of cooperation between the police and Provincial authorities.

## **8.11 Terms of Reference 9**

**Look at different police philosophies like the New York model of “zero tolerance” and other models to determine if any or a combination of them are applicable to the RPNGC.**

The committee considers that philosophies of policing such as the New York model of ‘zero tolerance’ have application in PNG but need to be targeted and publicised.

It is critically important to change the attitude of serving police to embrace the philosophy of community policing. The committee’s recommendations on the redeployment of the mobile squads to general duties policing, the use of defence force personnel in support of the civil power, and actions to enforce discipline and improve management in the Constabulary are

considered, by the Committee, to be crucial to the achievement of the necessary cultural change within the RPNGC.

However, the Committee recognises that, in the prevailing law and order climate of PNG there will be a need for uncompromising “zero tolerance” style policing strategies to deal with particular crime, violence and public disorder problems. Coupled with the obvious deterioration of law and order in PNG there has been an increase in the lack of respect that ordinary citizens show for the rule of law and the basic rules and regulations necessary to an orderly law abiding society. Zero tolerance policing principles require police officers to strictly enforce laws which are identified as being most flagrantly abused. In the PNG context these offences may include speeding and other traffic violations, illegal parking, loitering, disorderly behaviour and other street and anti-social offences. The aim of the strategy is to improve community behaviour and respect for police and the rule of law. It does not mean that police have a licence to bully or illtreat people or to otherwise act unlawfully but it does mean that police will be expected to police breaches of identified laws rigorously and without the exercise of much discretion. Zero tolerance tactics will also clearly need to be applied to more serious offences including possession of unlicensed firearms, being armed or in physical possession of any offensive weapon without reasonable excuse, and all offences involving assault, attempted assault, threats or other forms of intimidation. Such tactics, however, should be employed as part of specifically targeted, outcome focused and time limited operations, rather than being employed as the normal method of police practice. They should only be implemented when clearly necessary, should require appropriate senior officer approval, and for more serious problems, have predetermined and agreed outcomes with appropriate budget allocation, a timeline for implementation and appropriate benchmarks to determine effectiveness and results achieved.

## **8.12 Terms of Reference 10**

**Make recommendations about the competitive employment package and tenure of the top command structure in relation to other forces within the region and the public and private sectors in PNG.**

There was wide spread dissatisfaction expressed by the rank and file of the Royal PNG Constabulary in consultations on the top command structure at PHQ. Concerns were raised that there appeared to be too many Assistant Commissioners of Police with over lapping responsibilities. The general feeling was that the present structure of the executive included positions that were not aligned with the core functions of the RPNGC.

There was also concern that many senior officers did not have the qualifications for the job, lacked training in management and had been recycled from job to job.

Some of these issues can be addressed by the Human Resources plan recommended in the section on Refreshing the Organisation. The Human Resources plan should include career planning, appropriate training, and succession planning. It should also include performance management, and performance agreements. A Performance Agreement is essentially a “contract” of performance between a senior executive and their supervisor. For example, each Deputy Commissioner would have a Performance Agreement with the Commissioner, and each Assistant Commissioner would have a Performance Agreement with their particular

Deputy Commissioner. It is recommended that Performance Agreements be implemented for all Senior Executive members.

Action needs to be taken to empower the senior executives of the RPNGC. The range of operational and organisational initiatives recommended in this report will address some of these requirements. To support these initiatives it is recommended that:

- a) Personal development programs be developed for all Senior Executive members to enable them to gain the specific management competencies that are required to deal with the needs of modern policing in the RPNGC including properly focused and targeted interchange and secondment programs;
- b) The training programs should include strategic and corporate planning and statutory obligations of the RPNGC to enable Senior Executive members to focus effectively on the core role and functions of the Constabulary;
- c) In addition to individually structured personal development programs, short term Executive Development Awareness Programs should be developed that address the policy, strategic, legislative and operational environment of the RPNGC;
- d) Every Senior Executive be given training in Financial Management and accountability, including statutory reporting requirements, as well as in Resources Management,
- e) Personal development programs that enhance management skills should be a pre-requisite for promotion to senior executive positions, and
- (f) It should be recognized that modern, up-to-date, management training requires a level of expertise in instructors that is unlikely to be maintained in-house, even at a dedicated institution such as Bomana Police College. Experts from outside the Constabulary should be contracted to facilitate this training.

In the longer term, consideration could be given to implementing Performance Agreements for all RPNGC members of the rank of Sergeant and above.

It is recommended by the Committee that senior officers in the top command engage in some sort of personal development and be re-aligned to jobs based on their demonstrated strengths.

The question of instability caused by frequent changes of Commissioner was frequently raised during consultations. The Committee recommends that steps be taken to make the Commissioner's term of appointment more secure. In the short term, steps should be taken to change the Police Act to make the removal of the Commissioner more difficult. However, the Committee considers that the best long-term solution is to make the Commissioner of Police a constitutional office holder, and it recommends that legislation be enacted to bring this about. (The Committee has already made a submission to this effect).

The Committee strongly believes that Divisional Commanders should be posted to their divisions and not be located in Port Moresby.

### **8.13 Terms of Reference 11**

**Make recommendations regarding the ability to prosecute and convict criminals including white collar criminals.**

**“ A senior executive received a suspended sentence of nine years for misappropriating K3.1 million between September 1998 and July 1999 (six years ago)” Post Courier 8 September 2004**

The public is clearly dissatisfied with the performance of police in investigating crime, and bringing criminals to justice. Cases are characterised by poor investigative practices, poor evidence, lengthy delays and adjournments. Too many cases fail, and those that are successful take too long. It is reported that excessive delays occur because Police do not promptly respond to matters, and do not seem to care. A contributing factor may be that records are not properly maintained, and incidents are not adequately reported.

The Committee considers that training in simple prosecutions and basic investigations should be widely available to General Duties police. This would ensure that most police had sufficient knowledge of the requirements for a successful prosecution, and reduce the incidence of mistakes.

Police delays impact on the other agencies of the Law and Justice Sector. Courts are inconvenienced, and Correctional Institutions are responsible for a large number of unconvicted remandees.

Prosecutions require commitment and courage to investigate and conclude the case. Poor discipline, lack of accountability, poor management support and shortage of resources all play a part in failed prosecutions. The committee believes that the first stage to improving the situation is to improve discipline and management control (see Recommendations elsewhere) so that resources (physical and human) are more effectively allocated to tasks.

The capacity and training of Police prosecutors requires re-assessment. It takes considerable training and some years experience to become an effective prosecutor. Ambitious police cannot make a career in prosecutions, and tend to move on to other duties after a few years. Constant turnover of officers makes it difficult to maintain high standards, and inexperienced police are no match for full time professional defence lawyers. The Committee recommends that the Constabulary take steps to rebuild the prosecutions department to enable it to perform in today's environment. The Committee also agrees that the Constabulary should have the capacity to call in civilian prosecutors when necessary.

There is evidence of threats being made by politicians and other defendants against Police prosecutors and their families. This causes many cases to be poorly presented, evidence tampered with and files being lost, destroyed or hidden. Police prosecutors must have confidence that they can report instances of threats to an appropriate authority. The Committee recommends that the Commissioner of Police establish a confidential reporting network to record political interference in police matters, provide support to officers who are threatened, and in cases where there is documentary or other valid evidence, initiate criminal proceedings, or refer the matter to the Ombudsman Commission.

Police workload can be reduced by using alternative proceedings. For example, there are offences where the police can proceed by way of summons as an alternative to arrest and charge. The alternatives are rarely used. Essentially, this is an issue of use and control of resources (both personal and physical), and should be improved with better management accountability for these resources.

Police need to be trained in alternative dispute resolution and should enlist the services of NGOs specialising in this kind of work.

Another example concerns the use of administrative action for minor cases, rather than resorting to the police. For example, minor cases of misuse of financial powers can be dealt with by departmental officers by way of administrative action. Many Departments are not doing this, but refer cases to the Police Fraud Squad. The Fraud Squad is overloaded, which results in long delays and the public perception that justice is not being done. The Committee recommends that the Police Executive should use the Law and Justice Sector networks to work with government agencies to solve this problem.

Legislation for the recovery of the proceeds should receive high priority.

## **8.14 Terms of Reference 12**

In conjunction with the law and order sectoral project make recommendations about legislative changes regarding sentencing, penalties, and maximum periods of remand with particular emphasis on the carrying of dangerous weapons (Malaysia and Singapore). Identify legislative changes necessary to introduce any recommendations of the Review Committee.

### **8.14.1 Sentencing and Penalties.**

During consultations with the community, there was widespread condemnation of inadequate penalties imposed by magistrates and judges for serious offences involving firearms, drugs, murder and rape. There was a continuous call for legislation to be enacted to withdraw magistrate's and judges discretionary powers and to impose mandatory minimum sentences for the above offences to act as a real deterrent.

Offences are often committed with aggravation. For example, a firearm may be discharged, or a group may be involved in a rape. The use of alcohol and other intoxicating substances are often used as an excuse for violent criminal behaviour, and result in lesser penalties. Intoxication should be considered an aggravation as the natural and probable consequences of the intoxication can be foreseen. In this regard the Committee believes that consideration should be given to the enactment of an offence similar to that contained in section 154 of the Northern Territory of Australia's Criminal Code ("Dangerous Act"). Under this provision intoxication, and other circumstances, are considered as "circumstances of aggravation" that may operate to increase the severity of the offence and the possible penalties that may be imposed. The committee considers that the government should enact aggravated penalties for a wide range of crimes with the prevalence and violence of the crimes and community attitudes being used as indicators of those crimes which should be targeted. .

Many crimes are not being properly investigated by the Police, if they are investigated at all. Wantoks, politicians and influential people pressure Police not to investigate offences. This strikes at the root of a fair and impartial justice system, and is a serious situation which requires a strong and immediate solution. Police who condone or ignore a crime, or fail to properly investigate a crime, must be held criminally liable. The Committee recommends that the relevant Acts are changed to ensure that police commit a criminal act when they:

- fail to intervene, apprehend or report the perpetration of a criminal act;
- fail to take appropriate action in investigating offences;
- fail to competently prosecute cases.

The Committee believes that failure to properly investigate a crime by Police should be made a serious criminal offence, and recommends that the appropriate legislative changes be enacted.

It has been reported that the majority of murders committed by women are a result of polygamous marriages. The crime is often the result of actions of the husband, but he is not regarded as a party to the crime and is not included in any criminal proceedings. The Committee believes that where assaults occur between the wives in polygamous marriages the husband should be required to accept some responsibility for the situation.

Tribal fights are a concern to the general public, particularly in parts of the highlands. The community considers that group penalties should be applied for tribal fighting, and the committee considers that this should receive serious consideration, and the preparation of any necessary legislation.

It is recommended that:

- the most prevalent crimes which are causing public fear and a state of lawlessness be identified
- that mandatory minimum sentences be established for these crimes
- that aggravated penalties be applied to a wide range of offences
- that intoxication be regarded as an act of aggravation (rather than an excuse for criminal behaviour)
- that Police failure to properly investigate a crime be considered a serious criminal offence
- where criminal assaults occur between the wives in polygamous marriages, it is made mandatory for police to investigate the husband to determine whether he should be charged with aiding and abetting, or inciting the act
- group penalties are applied for tribal fighting.
- the carriage and/or use of a firearm or other offensive weapon are an express “circumstance of aggravation” in the commission of any offence against the person which operates to trigger the imposition of increased mandatory minimum penalties.

#### **8.14.2            Illegal Firearms.**

It is an offence to carry an unlicensed firearm. The Committee consulted in most areas of PNG (including three Highlands Provinces), and visited the Police forces in Solomon

Islands and Fiji to investigate the processes used by these forces to restore peace and credibility after their country's respective armed crises. The Committee believes that armed violence and the use of illegal firearms in present-day PNG are far worse than they were in the Solomon Islands before the intervention of the Regional Assistance Mission.

**The Committee believes that armed violence and the use of illegal firearms in present-day PNG are far worse than they were in the Solomon Islands before the intervention of the Regional Assistance Mission**

There is much evidence in PNG of armed violence being committed on the streets of many towns. There are reports that in certain parts of the country (notably the Highlands) villages are buying or manufacturing firearms for self-defence and for use in tribal fights. The Committee has been told of influential and wealthy persons purchasing illegal firearms to arm their clan group. From a law and order perspective, the situation in these areas is critical. Citizens appearing before the Committee expressed concern that a small incident could escalate into a full scale armed conflict, with a severe impact on the lives of the local people and the national economy.

The Committee considers that the Government must remove unlicensed firearms from the community. In this regard, the success of the weapons surrender program in the Solomon Islands should be noted. The surrender of weapons was a pre-requisite for the provision of government services, as services were only provided to villages that were certified as "gun free". The surrender program in the Solomon Islands was characterized by:

- guns handed in with "no ballistic examination",
- no "buy back" provisions,
- public, and frequently immediate, destruction of surrendered weapons, and,
- celebrations when a community achieved "gun free" status.

The Committee recommends that a three-month Gun Amnesty Program be implemented during which members of the community may hand back firearms with exemption from prosecution for the possession of illegal weapons. Particular attention should be given to:

- Establishing a transparent and trusted firearms destruction program to make sure the weapons are destroyed and do not re-enter the black market; and
- Ensuring that the destruction program is visibly and tightly policed and reliably reported to the community;

Although there are provisions in the PNG Firearms Act for 'buy back', the Committee recommends that illegal firearms are not purchased under the proposed gun amnesty.

The Committee notes that the previous gun amnesty in PNG was not conducted with sufficient transparency, and had limited effect.

The current proposal by the Minister for Internal Security for a gun summit is supported.



**“When you have children running around with firearms in their hands you have lost the battle”**

The Committee also recommends that parliament should:

- Enact mandatory minimum sentences for the possession of unlicensed firearms and specific aggravated firearm offences;
- Amend the relevant Acts to apply mandatory sentences for the supply, possession, financing and trafficking of illegal firearms by individuals, (the mandatory sentence to be imprisonment for 5 years or a K50,000 fine), and;
- Amend the relevant Acts to apply mandatory sentences to those who organize the arming, support or financing of armed clans or groups. The mandatory sentence to be 10 years imprisonment, or a fine of K500, 000, or confiscation of property of equivalent value.

### **8.15 Terms of Reference 13**

Make recommendations about the best use of donor assistance to the RPNGC over the next few years.

The Committee noted that the Enhancement Cooperation Package was starting at the time of its report. It had seen some of the proposed terms and conditions that will apply to the Australian police personnel who will take up duty in the Constabulary. The Committee was unable to access the detailed agreement made between the RPNGC and the Australian Federal Police and it hopes that the project will involve line policemen and recommendations made in this report will apply equally to PNG and Australian police personnel.

The Committee considered that donor assistance should:

- be sought for projects that are sustainable, and assist to develop police capacity
- add value to the PNG government’s approach to law and order

The Committee recommends that donor support over the next 3 to 5 years be directed at activities that improve the ability of the Constabulary to perform its day-to-day functions. In order to achieve this, the Constabulary need:

- professional expertise
- infrastructure
- resources
- funding to recruit and train extra police, and to pay wages until the RPNGC is refreshed

The reform process in the Constabulary will require some talented and experienced managers for executive positions in police management and financial administration. Suitable candidates are unlikely to be available from the present establishment, and it will be

necessary to look outside the Constabulary and in some cases, outside PNG for persons with appropriate skills. The Committee recommends that donor agencies should assist in recruiting and employing appropriate persons for a suitable contract period. In this regard they note that, at the present time, both Fiji and Solomon's have expatriate Police Commissioners.

The committee has considered the essential appointments necessary to ensure the Police reform and change process is successful. Suggested appointments are in Appendix 6

The Committee has identified a critical need for senior management training within the Constabulary. However, under present arrangements, Police are ineligible for some donor assisted scholarships for courses (outside Police Training Institutions) that are available to other public servants or the general public. The Committee recommends that the government negotiate with donors, including Australia, for RPNGC staff identified as having executive potential to be eligible under PATTAF and other scholarship schemes.

#### **8.16 Terms of Reference 14**

**Review the roles of Reserve and Auxiliary police and determine how best they should fit in with the regular police, staffing and funding levels.**

Refer to the recommendations under Terms of Reference 1 which consider the Reserve and Auxiliary Police.

#### **8.17 Terms of Reference 15**

**Examine the relationship between private sector security companies and the RPNGC and make recommendations about improving cooperation between the two.**

During consultations with the community, the impersonation of police by security guards was raised as a matter for concern. Some security guards are wearing uniforms which were of similar colour and design to police uniforms, which can cause confusion in the eyes of the public. The Committee recommends that the appropriate sections of the Police Act which deal with wearing of imitation uniforms be enforced.

The committee recommends that the Act to regulate the Security Industry, which is currently before parliament, should be passed into legislation as a matter of urgency. This will then allow penalties such as loss of registration to be applied to security companies who breach the regulations.

Some security guards are well armed. This is also causing concern with the public. It is recommended that the Constabulary review the present authorisations provided to security companies, and rigidly enforce the firearms regulations. The Committee recognises that it will probably be necessary to phase the introduction of changes to the increased effectiveness of RPNGC operations.

The Committee recommends that security guards should only be armed when necessary and should only be authorised to carry the type and calibre of firearm reasonably required by

their duties. Accountability for the training of security personnel and the carriage and safe storage of firearms should rest with the employing security company with non-compliance resulting in significant financial penalty and potential loss of licence or registration.

The employment of reservists as security guards by large private companies has been criticized by police and by the public. These officers wear police uniform and carry arms but their status as employees of a company confuse the roles of police and security in the eyes of the public. The Committee believes that employees of private companies should not be invested with the constitutional powers accorded to a sworn police officer, and then use those powers in the course of their private employment. The committee recommends that the practice of companies employing reservists as security officers should cease.

Relationships between the police and security companies have not been openly encouraged as there have been instances of serious crimes committed by security guards. However, serving police recognise that security companies can be quite useful in certain situations. Cooperation between the police and the security companies can be a sensitive issue, as the security companies are not yet regulated. The committee recommends that Police improve links with reputable security companies to clarify roles, and establish boundaries for operations. The Police should recognise that the security companies can be part of a community policing strategy, and in certain circumstances, the police and security companies should be able to work together to investigate and resolve situations.

Private security companies normally provide their employees with protective equipment such as helmets and body armour when they attend duties which require this level of protection. It is reported that the security guards are often better equipped than the police who do similar duties. The committee recommends that Police are provided with appropriate protective equipment, and that responsibilities are defined which ensure that this equipment is properly managed, accounted for and maintained.

**APPENDIX 1.**  
**ROYAL PAPUA NEW GUINEA CONSTABULARY ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW COMMITTEE**

**TERMS of REFERENCE**

1. Identify the roles and functions of the police force and make recommendations about which, if any, of these are outside its core functions and should be dropped.
2. To investigate the recruitment procedures of the RPNGC with regard to regional balance, education standards, fitness and aptitude testing.
3. To investigate training methods throughout the RPNGC, including basic training, on-the-job training, in-service training, officer training and higher education opportunities.
4. To investigate the terms and conditions of police personnel of all ranks comparing them with PNG public servants and police forces in comparable countries in the region. This should include salaries, allowances, uniforms, messing, accommodation, whether these are being paid and what needs to be done to ensure that are paid in a timely manner. This should be done with a view to making the police force attractive to young, well educated Papua New Guineans and ensuring they are retained as members of the force.
5. Investigate management and administrative practices within the force with special emphasis on how funds are currently allocated, the best use of resources, what has to be done to ensure that the RPNGC uses its money to the best advantage and what level of funding would be necessary to ensure that the RPNGC is:
  - Staffed at a level which will allow it to carry out its requires functions and identify a desired police/population ratio;
  - at least as well off as other police forces in the region;
  - making the best use of its vehicle fleet and other transport and evolve procedures for adequate maintenance of the fleet to an acceptable standard;
  - can adequately carry out its duties to restore law and order;
  - able to account for all weapons at any time and that procedures for prevention of sale of police weapons are satisfactory.
6. Look at policies governing the transfer of police throughout the country and make recommendations about how to ensure that they are carried out according to the best needs of the RPNGC and the officer involved rather than a particular province, governor or politician.
7. Make recommendations about strengthening the Internal Affairs division of the RPNGC and whether there should be a police ombudsman to hear complaints from the public.
8. Make recommendations about the relationship between provincial governors and governments with the RPNGC with particular emphasis on what happens if the province is required to provide some of the funding of policing within its borders.
9. Look at different police philosophies like the New York model of “zero tolerance” and other models to determine if any or a combination of them are applicable to the RPNGC.
10. Make recommendations about the competitive employment package and tenure of the top command structure in relation to other forces within the region and the public and private sectors in PNG.
11. Make recommendations regarding the ability to prosecute and convict criminals including white collar criminals.
12. In conjunction with the law and order sectoral project make recommendations about legislative changes regarding sentencing, penalties, and maximum periods of remand with particular emphasis on the carrying of dangerous weapons (Malaysia and Singapore). Identify legislative changes necessary to introduce any recommendations of the Review Committee.
13. Make recommendations about the best use of donor assistance to the RPNGC over the next few years.
14. Review the roles of Reserve and Auxiliary police and determine how best they should fit in with the regular police, staffing and funding levels.
15. Examine the relationship between private sector security companies and the RPNGC and make recommendations about improving cooperation between the two.

## **APPENDIX 2.**

## **Bibliography**

Clifford W, Morauta L and Stuart B: Law and Order in Papua New Guinea; INA, September 1984 (The Clifford Report)

Public Sector Reform Management Unit: A Review of the Law and Justice Sector Agencies in Papua New Guinea; PNG Department of Prime Minister and National Executive Council, October 2002. (The PSRMU Report)

Solicitor General PNG: Report 3.1 from the Case Management System; 22 June 2004

**APPENDIX 3. LIST OF THOSE CONSULTED BY THE COMMITTEE**

**Vanimo**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Organization</b>
Senior Insp. Joe Poema	Police Vanimo
Captain Benny Stanley	PNGDF Vanimo
Insp. Sombu Molkawul	Police Vanimo
Insp. Michael Tilae	Police Vanimo
Benjamin Aio (PAO)	Police Vanimo
Alex Paim (APAO)	Police Vanimo
Michael Yeki	Police Vanimo
Insp. Ben Laho	Police Vanimo
Ben Kambilapi	Police Vanimo
Joe Sungi	Provincial Govt
Derek Visser	Visser Enterprises Ltd
John Barry	Vanimo Trading
Johannez Seoi	Downunder Riverside Resort
Bonny Lela	Varmoneh Lodge
Fr.Siby Peedikayil,HGN	Vicar General
Most Rev.Cesare Bonivento,PIME	Bishop of Vanimo
Jeffrey Ling	Vanimo Forest Products
Joe Yourin	Police Vanimo
David Joel	Police Vanimo
Linus Waku	Police Vanimo
Martin Kalaroho	Police Vanimo
S/Sgt Robert Nalauk	Police Vanimo
Const. Bais Fortil	Police Vanimo
Const. Willie Bemabua	Police Vanimo
R/C Bonny Neien	Police Vanimo
F/C Howigo Peter	Police Vanimo
Sgt Kevin Waepka	Police Vanimo
S/C Saki Alphonse	Police Vanimo
Ludwig Hoi	Police Vanimo
Andrew Kwalam	Police Vanimo
Thomas Suwambu	Police Vanimo
Thomas Nianford	Police Vanimo
Joe Wangiromo	Police Vanimo
Anton Runnai	Police Vanimo
Joshua Umio	Police Vanimo

**Port Moresby**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Organization</b>
Mathew Minok QPM	ACP Operations
Fred Sheekiot QPM	ACP Personnel & Training
SOP Francis Tokura	Director HRM
Raphael Huafolo	ACP Crimes
CIP Lamu	Dir. Community Police

Greg Anderson	Chamber of Mines & Petrol.
Murray Woo	Manufacturers Council
Jim Wan	ACP Management Services
CSP John Maru	Director Internal Affairs
Lindsay Attrill	ACIL-Discipline Advisor
Sam Bonner	Director Legal Services
Bob Tate	Forest Industries Council
Dick McCarthy	Forest Industries Council
John Marru	A/ACP Southern Region
B Kakuma	Police Association
B Bakuwai	Police Association
D Wialu	Police Association
F Kerriss	Police Association
J Givere	Police Association
S Waula	Police Association
L Tambua	Police Association
Jerry Singirok	Red Dot Roadside Service
Mr. Mel Togolo	PNG Business Council
Don Fox	Ela Motors
Supt. Jerry Frank	Bomana Police College
Mr. Oring Gom	SDU Police HQ
Mr. Endy Kone	Police Chaplain
Mr. Tony Kavan	Welfare Police HQ
Insp. John Kerry	6 Mile Police
C/Sgt. Jerry Sivikil	Gerehu Police
Insp. Ben Turi	Gerehu Police
Insp. Noel levi	Port Moresby Police
Insp. Philip Mitna	Police Dog Unit
Insp. Allan Gwalin	4 Mile Traffic Police
Insp. Morgan Taimbari	Boroko Police
Insp. John Mark	Police Task Force
Archbishop Sir Brian Barnes	Mel. Council of Churches
Gari Gari	Rigo Informal Sector Youth
Evare Gari	Rigo Informal Sector Youth

### Lae

<b>Name</b>	<b>Organization</b>
Alan McLay	Lae Chamber of Commerce.& Industry.
John Lacey	President, Road Transport Association.
Hugh Greer	Niugini Oil Company
Andrew Bayak	Ex CIP C tech leader
Anne Barnabas	Catholic Women's Organization
Rosina Karikuru	Catholic Women's Organization
Peter Nessatt	A/PPC-Morobe
Giossi D. Labi	A/ Divisional Commander, Lae,
Leo.M.Lamei	PSC Lae
Manasupe Zrenoc	Administrator, Morobe Province
Sgt:J.Silas	Com 4721713m/Police
Insp. Geoffrey Orori	Training/Police

S/SGT Grake/Iwais	PSC Nadzab Police
Insp.Nacca.Paul	PSC 3mile Police
SIP. Donald Yamasomsi	OIC CID Lae
C/Sgt Sam Koliamba	PSC Market
C/Sgt.Patrick Wallis	OIC Dog unit
CST Noel Tumpi	Rural CID Investigator
CST George Avali	CID/SCS Lae
Sgt Felix Buingew	OIC Reserve
R Warruf	Sattleberg. Finschaffen
F/Const. Jack Madiring	CID Lae
F/Const. Simon Sonanu	Nadzab Police
Sgt. Ben Anton	Barracks Police
Sgt. James Luan	Training Police
CIP Johnsford Tura	Police Chaplain-Barracks
Insp. Pati Jack	OIC Prosecution
S/Sgt.V.Makele	CID Lae
Insp. K.Yawip	General duty
SIP. Bende Neneo	OIC Traffic
C/Sgt Mark Kaius	A/PSC Bundi
C/Sgt. Sam Sodeng	OIC Comm. Policing
C/Sgt.C.Kablius	PSC – Omili Suburb
S/Sgt A.Lolola	CID Lae
C/Sgt F. Kaiwa	PSC Tent city
C/Sgt C.Dalla	S/O Metsup, Lae
SIP J.Noah	S/O PPC Morobe
C/Sgt P.Siaguru	Welfare office, Morobe
Oiva Konsii	Police Lae
Doris Mararang	Police Lae
Colish Jameka	Police Lae
Sare Lui	Police Lae
Pauline Siaguru	Police Lae
Cathy Rimbao	Police Lae
Mary Watah	Police Lae
Dulcie Siaguru	Police Lae
Opha Nathan	Police Lae
Dorothy. Titus	Police Lae
Elsie Kawage	Police Lae
Bishop Wesley	Evangelical Lutheran Church (PNG)
Simon Kauba	Met Sup Lae
Demas Waki	OIC IIU Lae
Pius Kafur	IIU
Kim Janannis	OIC communications Technicians
Casper Wimbi	OIC Communications Technicians
David Kumayon	Task Force Lae
Genge Avali	CID/SCS Lae
Wirrenu Willie	2mile Traffic
Mahly Bigilam	CID motor SQD
Tivon Otto	Traffic
Pagasa Walis	3 mile GID
Ken Costigan	Chair/Morobe Community Development Scheme



	Core Group
Elliot Harding	Chair/Morobe NGO Kibung
Amet Fongemale	Morobe NGO Kibung
Rosa Koian	Morobe NGO Kibung
Nellie McLay	Soroptimist International
Jane Kenny	Soroptimist Interenational
Anastasia Wakon	Women & Children's Support Centre Angau Memorial Hospital.
Margaret Samei	Angau Memorial Hospital.
Naomi Wilkins	Soroptimist International
Kevin Bartels	Prosec Security & Communications
Bamua Kubu	Commanding officer – Buimo CIS
Thomas Cain	CIS Officer, Buimo
Gapil Sine	Kere Divine Blood Ministry
Mogia John	Kere Divine Blood Ministry
Mogia Bruce	Kere Divine Blood Ministry
Anna K. Buge	Morobe Prov. Council of women
Orim Karapo	District Court Lae
Karo Pala	Police Department
Charles Rossi	Coca. Coca Amatil PNG
Les Williamson	Konne International Ltd

### **Mount Hagen**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Organization</b>
Alfred Reu	Divisional Commander-Highlands Region
Ivan Lakatani	Mobile Group Commander
Jimmy Onopio Puikeke	Met. Supt
Kaiglo Ambane	PSC-Mt Hagen
John P Kale	OIC CID-WHP
Jeffrey Kera	S/O-D/Comm Highlands Region
Wini Henao	PPC
Samson Siguyaru	Squad Comm. M/S 11
Timothy Mataro	Squad Comm. M/S 09
Norman Kambo	A/PPC Simbu
S/Sgt. John Pand	Rural Police Station Cmd
Sgt. Peter Buka	MS 8 Commander
C/Sgt. Peter Wani	Shift Insp. Mt Hagen
S/Sgt. Kauga Maragil	OIC Reserve unit
Cnst. Nelson Nilkare	CID-Minj
Sgt. Josegh Sangam	Prosecutions-Minj
Sgt. Paul Alois	General Duties-Minj
S/Const. Samson Saliamungo	Airport Police-Kagamuga
PWSgt. Mary Gele	General Duties-Minj
PWSgt. Ann Aleim	General Duties-Minj
F/Const. M Pain	CID Mt Hagen
S/Sgt. Josiah Penk	PSC Kagamuga
PWSC S. Mondiai	CID –Mt Hagen
PWFC Anna Brown	Comm Police-Mt Hagen
PWC Anna Morokai	CID-Mt Hagen

PWC Christine Manka	CID-Mt Hagen
PWC Betty Pogo	Comm Police-Mt Hagen
PWC Rose Goro	General Duties-Mt Hagen
PWSGT Kerrie Duma	Prosecutions-Mt Hagen
PWFC Maureen Undaba	Internal Affairs-Mt Hagen
PWC Betty Ohuno	General Duties-Mt Hagen
PWC Emma Kos	Prosecutions-Mt Hagen
Mrs. Louise Parinjo (negma)	Police Spouse
Mrs. Grace Laman	Police Wives Rep
Mrs. Iyola Hehao	Police Wives Rep
Mrs. Amelia Reu	Police Wives Rep
Mrs. Rita Orovea	Police Wives Rep
Dulcie Niba	Prov. Comm Dev. Officer
Regina Kanza	Prov. Comm Dev. Officer
Paula Ameh	Pres. Prov. Council of Women
Pirip Kuin	Treasurer-Council of Women
Paha Kit	President of Hagen Central
Anna Tai	President of Dei District
Fr. Tei Kumie	V/President of Dei District
Susan Koiya	Church Women Leader
Ruth Mapun	City Council
Alice Elakan	Mama long haus
Joe Pali	Chairman WHP Youth Council
James Emere	Urban Councilor-Chairman Law & Order Committee
Mark Okpul	WHP Youth Coordinator-Dei District
Mufi Walua	WHP Deputy Chairman-Tambul District
Douglas Young	Auxillary Bishop-Catholic Archdiocese of Mt Hagen
Mr. Peter Suri	Catholic Education Secretary
Mark Pupaka	Senior. Provincial Magistrate
CSP Samson Mapi	PPC Simbu
Mr. Peter Wagairandu	Ex. SOP

### **Mendi**

<b>Names</b>	<b>Organization</b>
SOP Simon Nigi	PPC Mendi
Insp. Gideon Ikumu	Police Mendi
CIP A Billie	PSC-Mendi
Insp. Benson Osu	Police Mendi
Insp. M Aglua	Police Mendi
C/Sgt. J Bungtabu	2IC-Ialibu Police Station
Insp. P Kawage	PSC-Tari
Insp. P Moi	PSC-Kagua
C/Sgt F Gamea	Police Mendi
S/Sgt M Opi	Police Mendi
Det/Sgt E Puik	CID Mendi
C/Sgt. J Kani	Prosecution Mendi
S/Sgt. A Opila	Police Mendi

Mr. Y Taso	PAO Mendi
Sgt. P Kumo	Highway Patrol 17
S/Sgt. D Kewere	Prosecution Mendi
C/Sgt Edward	Prosecution Mendi
Det/Sgt. Pasongo	CID Mendi
Det/Sgt. Perea	CID Mendi
Sgt. Songonae	PTO SHP
Insp. E Gaima	S/O PPC SHP
Det/Sgt. B Napote	OIC CID Mendi
Sgt. L Walaget	OIC Barracks/Welfare
S/Sgt. W Ikumbe	GD-Police Mendi
F/Const C Jabu	Police Mendi
F/Const. N Boka	Police Mendi
F/Const. K Barot	Police Mendi
F/Const. R Molu	Police Mendi
S/Const. T Lyoko	Police Mendi
Const. Tore Loko	Police Mendi
S/Const. D Michael	Police Mendi
PWFC B Kandi	Police Mendi
Const. Jerry Otto	Police Mendi
F/Const. A Akoya	Police Mendi
Const. G Luyape	Police Mendi
R/Const. C Kerak	Police Mendi
PWFC P Kade	Police Mendi
PWC Eka	Police Mendi
PWC Tovue	Police Mendi
PWC Aupong	Police Mendi
PWC Takuru	Police Mendi
Rendy Skili	Secretary
Rose Gaima	Police wives representative
S/Const. M Mege	Police Mendi
F/Const. J Sali	Police Mendi
S/Const. Kalopa	Police Ialibu
Peter Lepaya	PAO Mendi
F/Const. J Kereme	Police Mendi
R/Sgt. J Kundjip	Police Mendi
F/Const. J Mai	Police Mendi
S/Const. J Monda	Police Mendi
S/Const. R Kuve	Police Mendi
Ms. Unu Iebi	Police Mendi
S/Const. W Ayuma	Police Mendi
Philip Moya	Provincial Administration
Robert Posu	Menduli Trading
Bishop Clarence Kapali	United Church Mendi
Vincent Lagaip	Catholic Church Youth
Fr. Roger White	Catholic Parish Priest
Jaki Yepa	Catholic Parish Priest

**Daru**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Organization</b>
Sgt. Herman Badu	Police Daru
S/Const. Utiam Agi	Police Daru
Sgt. Victor Taruwai	OIC Comm. Police Daru
S/Const. Sibuku Miria	Police Daru
PWSgt. Gegai Pauls	Rural Police Coordinator
Bira Ausi	Shift NCO Police Daru
Kawaki Aliba	Prosecutions Daru
Bill Warabe	General Duties Daru
F/Const. Trophy Baworo	OIC Weam
C/Sgt. Wamai Amega	Police Daru-OIC Barracks
S/Const. Evera Marke	OIC IIU
S/Const. Xina Xeinu	OIC Nakaku
Kally Pamuan	A/OIC Drug Vice Squad
Const. Taeni Veali	Police Daru
Philip Kupo	A/PAO
S/Const. Sevese Mapore	CID Daru
S/Const. Hessie Dabema	Prosecutions Daru
Sgt. Gaidi Matai	Police Daru
C/Sgt. M Mamaro	Police Daru
L Kiso	A/PPC- Police Daru
Michael Viriu	District Administrator-SF
Aung Ko Htet	TST Daru
Pastor John Wemin	Lasminit Tarding
Niula Menaos	Menaos Trading
Mipari V Mipari	Babae Ltd
Paul Johnston	Reg's Services
Sama Auru	Reg's Services
Luli Bani	B & R Enterprises
Tugai Songoro	M. A. Trading
Gerald Mapua	Mapua Canteen
Anne Frances Zahara	Sosi Podo Trading
Brenda Agwi	Soso Podo Trading
Silas Naso	Dwyers Ltd
Bamule Klowa	Stevewil Investment
Ronnie Gwere	PAS Motorist Canteen
Steven Douglas	Daru Trading
Sam Manlel	S R Trading
Ure Taina	Kiwai Electrical
Meremi Maima	Maru Marine
Lucas Gigiba	Severimabu village
Gibson Manasa	Parama village
Mamuru Omeme	Ipisia village
Tabua Harry	Ipisia village
Patrick Mareba	Ipisia village
Eva Senea	
Stone Dabu	Parama village

Simua Sam	Parama village
William Vamera	Iasa village
Nadere Bao'o	Iasa village
Joyce Konia	Catholic Church representative
Pompi Modi	Parama village Chairman
Sobi Manasa	Parama village
Reg Sampson	Daru Town Law/Order

### **Popondetta**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Organization</b>
CIP Teddy Tei	PPC Oro
Insp. Lomas Bedura	Rural Commander
Sgt. K Begola	CID Popondetta
Sgt. N Sepoa	CID Popondetta
S/Sgt. G Mang	Prosecutions Popondetta
C/Sgt. N Zozowa	CID Section
Sgt. B Avese	OIC Barracks
Sgt. B Waimona	Police Popondetta
S/Sgt. Bu Amoko	OIC IIU
S/Sgt. Roma Bogajiwai	NCIU
Sgt. C Ombi	Police Sangara
Sgt. Edward Jinga	Training Unit
S/Const. K Jivo	OIC Warrant & Summons
S/Const. David Wotong	2IC IIU
Sgt. Urovo Suma	Police Afore
Albert Farapo Oraka	Former Police Officer
John Atkins	Oro Business Services
Raymond Lim	Ambogo Sawmill
Craig Sheppard	USG Products
Peter Seeto	Oror Chamber of Commerce & Industry
Evelyn Pukari	Country Women Assoc.
Deborah Emboge	Anglican Mothers Union
Deborah Iagoro	Prov. Council of Women
Leah Arore	Afore Council of Women
Pastor Richard Arore	PNG Revival Church
Paul Pukari	Ex Servicemans League –Oro branch
Mildred Korima	Catholic Mothers Rep
Diana Tiu	Catholic Church
Justin Kasmer	Catholic Youth Rep
Gwenevia Vovote	LLG Womans Rep
Elliot D Tale	Prov & LLG

### **Goroko**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Organization</b>
John Sari	Provincial Coordinating Committee
SOP Philip Solala	PPC EHP
28 personnel (including. Station Commander.)	Police Goroka

Naomi Yupae	Eastern Highlands Family Voice
Henry Braun	Save the Children
Paul Roberts	AusAid Advisor-Mt Hagen
Terry Shelly	Goroka Chamber of Commerce
Noso Tenige	Court Users Forum
Paul Frame	Law & Justice Advisory Forum
Hon. Joksy Nakime	D/Governor EHPG
Deputy Administrtors	EHP Government
PEC members	EHP Government
Chairman of Law & Order Committee	EHP Government
Kaipas Ruta	Retired Public Servant
Elizabeth Joseph	YWCA
Edward Tarai	Retired Policeman
Ian Glanville	Businessman
Police Wives	
Community Youth Groups	
Ipea Maniha & 27 personnel	District Administrtrtor. Daulo District Office.
Cathy Rumints & 16 others	Farmers Group
Julie Soso	Provincial Council of Women

The police, citizens and business people of East New Britain Province whose names were not recorded.

**APPENDIX 4. WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS RECEIVED**

<b>Number</b>	<b>Received from</b>	<b>Category</b>
1	RPNGC	Police
2	RPNGC	Police
3	ASPI	Police
4	Aus Aid	Public
5	Sgt. Endy Kone	Police
6	Graham Ainui	Public
7	Reserve Const. Jerry P Tina	Police
8	CSP Samson Mapi	Police
9	Xavier Kavali	Police
10	Peter Murray	Public
11	Sgt. Huaiembandi John	Police
12	COP & DCP	Police
13	S/Insp. Joseph Tabali	Police
14	Comm. Buimo Corr. Institute	CIS
15	A/ACP G Labi	Police
16	B Stevenson-Nuigini Coffee	Public
17	Philip Kaumba-Nat. Court Gka	Public
18	Jonas Aneto	Public
19	Sgt. D Wialu	Police
20	Mr. Bai Don	Public
21	CommCentre Madang	Police
22	OIC IIU Lae	Police
23	CSP Simon Kauba	Police
24	Peter Wangian	Public
25	Xavier Kavali	Police
26	Dir. Internal Affairs	Police
27	David Nasala	Public
28	Amum john	Police
29	Chinese Comm. Rabaul	Public
30	SGT. James Luan	Police
31	Oro Chamber of Commerce	Public
32	Oro Business Services	Public
33	Insp. P Kawage-Tari	Police
34	Mendi Police	Police
35	Insp. Aia-Alotau	Police
36	Steve Sims-ACIL	Public
37	Mr. Ted Diro	Public
38	Dir. Legal Services	Police
39	Anton Goie & Group	Public
40	ICRAF	Public
41	Woman's View Consultative Committee	Public
42	Forest Industries Assoc.	Public
43	Leo Gage	Public
44	National Forest Services	Public
45	Anonymous	NN
46	Hon. Joksy Nakime	Public

47	Nosone Tenige	Public
48	Paul Roberts	Public
49	Col. Ian Glanville	Public
50	EHP Prov. Council of Women	Public
51	Goroka Chamber of Commerce	Public
52	F/Const. R Luloe	Police
53	S/Insp. Kalaut	Police
54	Anonymous	Public
55	NCIU	Police
56	ENB Sesel Eksen Komiti	Public
57	S/Insp. Martin Kigare	Police
58	PNG Balsa Company	Public
59	Concerned member CID-Hagen	Police
60	Moses Pain	Police
61	D/Const. John Gurepe	Police
62	S/Sgt. Kauga Karagil	Police
63	Ex Sgt. Toligai Soka	Public
64	Peter Wagarandu	Public
65	CIP Jimmy Onopia	Police
66	OIC Barracks –Mendi Police	Police
67	Forest Industries Assoc	Public
68	June Valley/Tokarara Youth	Public
69	RCPW Deborah Kanu & others	Police
70	C/Sgt. Paul Kipak	Police
71	Mr. Orim Gom-OIC SDU	Police
72	CIMC	Public
73	Police Officer	Police
74	Morobe Prov. Police & CIS Pension Assoc	Public



## **APPENDIX 5.**

### **COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR POLICE OFFICERS AND POLICE STATIONS**

#### **Personal Items**

- Uniforms
- Weapons (pistols)
- Handcuffs
- Baton
- Torch
- Notebook
- Pens

#### **Police Station Items**

- Armoury
- Gun Lockers (safe type)
- Secure Exhibit Area (i.e. a Safe – similar to Armoury)
- Telephones and Communications (radios)
- Clothing Lockers
- Stationery Items – (paper, forms, staplers, hole punch, pens, pencils, trays, etc)
- Desks and Chairs
- Bench style seats in public areas
- Typewriters
- Computers (this is a desirable but long-term option)
- Filing Cabinets and Suspension Folders
- Copy Machine
- Whiteboards
- Pin Boards for Community reception areas
- Card Index Containers and cards
- Manila Folders
- Body Bags
- Exhibit Bags and Labels
- Exhibit Ledgers (to be used as registers for drugs, seized property etc.)
- First Aid Kits
- Fire Extinguishers
- Metal lockable Filing Cabinets

## **APPENDIX 6. Appointments**


Appointments necessary to support the change process in the Constabulary.  
Immediate requirements to support the Commissioner

1. Executive Project Officer to the Commissioner
2. Budget Manager (with Corporate experience)
3. Legal Officer (to provide advice and assistance to the Minister)
4. Media Manager (experienced civilian).

### Other appointments


5. Inspector General of Constabulary (experienced police officer at Deputy Commissioner level, to enforce regulations, restore discipline and regain the confidence of the public)
6. Chief Operations Officer/Deputy Secretary (Administration). A civilian administration executive to operate at Deputy Secretary/Deputy Commissioner level
7. Police Ombudsman and staff.

**APPENDIX 7 ROYAL PAPUA NEW GUINEA CONSTABULARY ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE**



**APPENDIX 8**

**PROPOSED ORGANISATIONAL CHART**





REPORT

## WORKING GROUP

to the

**RPNGC Administrative Review Committee**

on the

**Administrative Review - Royal**

**Papua New Guinea Constabulary**



26 July 2004

# CABINET-IN-CONFIDENCE

*Report of the Working Group to the Review Committee  
– Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary*

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### APPENDICES

#### **Appendix 1:** Terms of Reference for the Review

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### 1. INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1 Purpose and Context

The Committee to review the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) was established by the Hon Bire Kimisopa, Minister for Internal Security. The review was commissioned in response to increasing unrest and violence in Papua New Guinea, with increasing use of firearms. Law and order is breaking down and there are serious discipline and morale problems with the RPNGC.

These events have led to a loss of confidence and trust in the Constabulary by the community and by the government. The breakdown of discipline and general malaise of learned helplessness is reflected in the poor morale and confidence of the Constabulary itself. It is also reflected in the state of disrepair of equipment and premises, and the lack of pride in presentation by the members.

The Terms of Reference for the Review are at **Appendix 1**.

#### 1.2 The Working Group

Recognising the critical importance of the Review and the tight timeframe for reporting, the Minister directed that a Working Group of Experts be established to assist the Committee. The purpose of the Working Group was to bring together experienced practitioners to address the wide scope of the Terms of Reference within a ten day period, identify where key problems lie and recommend what could be done immediately to restore the effectiveness of the Constabulary.

Four experienced RPNGC officers, A/g Chief Inspector Peter Philip, Senior Inspector Joanne Clarkson, Senior Inspector Sylvester Kalaut and Superintendent Francis Tokura, were assigned to facilitate the efforts of the Working Group. The Working Group appreciated their assistance and advice and valued their incisive comments on the issues raised.

Within the limitations of the ten-day period, the Working Group consulted widely and attended a number of key hearings where senior police executives provided their perspectives to the Review Committee. They also visited facilities in Port Moresby and at Mt Hagen and researched such documentation that could be provided. Often documentation could not be found and performance statistics were not captured at all. Institutional record keeping was generally found to be poor.

The Working Group is grateful to the many people of the RPNGC who gave their time to be interviewed. They provided valuable insights from their experience and knowledge.

The members of the Working Group assisting the Review Committee were Doug Carney, Robin Chalker, Garry Fulton, John Ireland, Denis McDermott and Rein Mere.

#### 1.3 The Report

It is recognised that the Review Committee has an urgent and difficult task. To facilitate their deliberations the key findings and recommended immediate action have been presented in the Executive Summary as a separate document. This report supports the recommendations and findings, and addresses medium and longer-term action to consolidate the journey of reform.

The Chapter headings of the report support the key themes that have emerged, the most urgent and important of which is to instil discipline and restore the confidence and trust of the community and the Government. Other themes address the people of the RPNGC and their working conditions, the Constabulary budget and resources, and operational and organisational effectiveness.



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### 2. INTEGRITY, COMMUNITY CONFIDENCE AND TRUST

#### 2.1 The National Priority

Law and order is breaking down in Papua New Guinea and there are serious discipline and morale problems within the RPNGC. These events have led to a loss of community confidence and trust.

The breakdown of discipline and general malaise of learned helplessness is reflected in the poor morale and confidence of the Constabulary itself. It is also reflected in the state of disrepair of equipment and premises, and the lack of professional pride by many members. It has lost integrity.

The immediate priority is to restore the confidence of the Government and the community in the ability of the RPNGC to enforce the law impartially and free from corrupt influences. Clearly, the Constabulary must rehabilitate itself to earn the respect and confidence of the community and government. However, to achieve this there must be a clear partnership with the Government.

Additional resources are only part of the answer. The Constabulary must first get its own house in order. Priority must be given to reviving discipline and professional pride, and rehabilitating existing systems, processes and procedures to restore an effective base for operations.

Unless discipline is quickly restored and enforced transparently, firmly and fairly according to the law, the Constabulary cannot be effective. The decline in community confidence and trust will continue, with potentially catastrophic consequences for Papua New Guinea.

Urgent Government action to galvanise corrective action and launch the process of recovery is proposed in **Recommendation 14** in *Section 4.1.1*.

#### 2.2 Community Visibility

The Police Force must command the confidence of the community and the Government if it is to be effective in its law enforcement role and trusted with scarce national resources. It is not good enough for the police to rely on their authority to justify their place in the community and in their demand for resources. The exercise of authority by the Constabulary needs to be accompanied by demonstrated accountability to the Government and the Community for the actions taken.

Effective policing and community confidence depend on the visible, ethical and active police presence on the streets. Police must act in a professional manner and present in proper uniform. The community must be in no doubt that they are dealing with a competent and trained person sworn into the Office of Constable. The community judges a Police Force not only on the basis of its performance but also on the appearance of its members.

Police uniforms serve a dual purpose. They readily identify a member of the Constabulary and are designed to facilitate the work of police. All members of the Regular Constabulary need to have a standard uniform that differentiates them from members of the Community Auxiliary and the Reserve Constabulary. The uniform provided to these members must reflect their lower level of training, and their responsibility for *assisting* members of the Regular Constabulary.

Reserve and Auxiliary officers have committed lawless acts while wearing Regular police uniforms and created confusion and distrust in the community. Action to fundamentally reform the role of the Auxiliaries and Reserves and to phase out the Reserves is addressed in *Section 4.3.2*.

The police uniform is a badge of office and a symbol of competence and accountability. Action should be taken immediately to recover items of Regular police uniform from Reserves and

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Auxiliaries and reallocate these to Regular police who currently have only partial uniform. Police Commanders must be instructed to enforce the dress code and standards of professional behaviour, and be held personally accountable for ensuring that these directions are enforced.

The cost of enforcing ethical and professional behaviour is nil and would result in a marked difference in police dress and professional presentation almost overnight.

Consistent with the proposed strengthening of the Constabulary's integrity and accountability regime and encourage community confidence, it is important that Regular police uniforms should clearly display the member's Regimental Number on their uniform. Accountability would also be assisted by members wearing "nametags" on their uniform, which would help in communicating with members of the public.

**Recommendation 1:** The police uniform is a badge of office. Immediate action is required to ensure that all sworn members present in a professional manner. It is recommended that:

- (h) The Commissioner of Police instruct all Police and Station Commanders to enforce the dress code and standards of professional behaviour, noting that they will be held personally accountable for ensuring that Commissioner's Direction is enforced;
- (i) The Commissioner of Police advise the Deputy Commissioners that he will hold them personally accountable for ensuring compliance with the Commissioner's Direction;
- (j) A standard uniform be provided to all Regular Constabulary members that clearly distinguishes them from Community Auxiliary and Reserve Constabulary members;
- (k) Action be taken immediately to recover items of Regular police uniform from Reserves and Auxiliaries, to be reallocate to Regular police who have only partial uniform;
- (l) All uniformed members of the Constabulary be required to wear their Regimental Number clearly displayed on their uniform; and
- (m) All uniformed members of the Constabulary be issued with nametags, which are to be clearly displayed on their uniform.

### 2.3 Accountability and Transparency

The lawless behaviour of some police has destroyed community confidence and trust. These perceptions have been strengthened where unlawful actions have gone unpunished. It was reported to the Working Group that public confidence in the effectiveness of current disciplinary review machinery is at such a low level that many complaints against the police are no longer reported.

A transparent process of review of police actions is an essential element for building confidence and trust. The review process would have greater credibility if it were to be oversighted by an eminent person or body independent to the police. Such arrangements do not currently exist.

The Government has established a highly respected Ombudsman Commission that could serve as the primary vehicle for the independent review arrangements. The Commissioner of Police could enter into an agreement with the Ombudsman Commission for the Office to oversight the review and investigation of complaints made by the public about police action. Within the Constabulary this process could be established by a Commissioner's Standing Order as part of the maintenance of good order, and good conduct, discipline and efficiency of the Force.

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The outcomes of the review process would be reported to the public.

**Recommendation 2:** Independent accountability and review processes should be established as soon as possible. It is recommended that:

- (a) The Commissioner of Police enter into an agreement with the Ombudsman Commission for the Office to oversight the review and investigation of complaints made by the public about police action; and
- (b) When the machinery has been established, announcements be made to the public about how these arrangements can be accessed.

### 2.4 Inspector General of the Constabulary

The current internal arrangements for enforcing discipline, monitoring compliance and auditing performance are weak. While an Internal Audit unit has been established, it has a staff of one. The Corporate Planning and Evaluation area undertakes good work, but their efforts are not followed through by the organisation. The chain of command and accountability is ineffective.

To assist the Commissioner in coordinating the accountability monitoring and review processes within the Constabulary, it is proposed that an *Office of Inspector General of the Constabulary* be established at Deputy Commissioner level, reporting direct to the Commissioner. The Inspector General would also be responsible for day-to-day relations with the Ombudsman Commission.

The functions covered by Directorates of the Office of Inspector General of the Constabulary are:

- *Internal Affairs* – including the investigation of allegations and complaints;
- *Internal Audit* – which needs to have an expanded role so that it is able to competently undertake financial, performance and management audits;
- *Command Inspection and Review* – including reinforcing good practice at all levels; and
- *Discipline and Employment Review* – including support for a Discipline and Employment Review Committee.

The pivotal role of the Inspector General is to ensure effective corporate governance. It brings together the critical organisational performance management elements of Internal Audit, Internal Affairs, and Command Inspection and Review. The *Command Inspection and Review Directorate* is intended to give teeth and substance to the implementation of Commissioner's Directives, Regulations and Standing Orders and the outcomes of evaluations conducted of Action Plans.

The current dilapidated state of many Police Stations and Posts does not present a professional or reassuring interface to the public. Their upkeep and presentation is the responsibility of the Station Commander. The Directorate would conduct spontaneous inspections of Police Stations and Posts, and assess their operational effectiveness and professional appearance. It would also assess whether ethical, effective and appropriate use is being made of scarce police resources.

The Office also brings into being a *Discipline and Employment Review Board* to assist the Commissioner in dealing with the complexities of the PNG culture in the application of penalties and employment review. The Board would recommend to the Commissioner action in relation to proven disciplinary matters and on individual performance issues including termination of employment. The outcomes would be recorded in the Annual Report of the Inspector General.

The Board would be chaired by the Inspector-General and comprise the Deputy Commissioners of Police, the Assistant Commissioners of Police for Human Resources and Internal Affairs, the

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Director of Legal Services and a representative from the Department of Personnel Management. The Committee would be convened as necessary to deal swiftly with matters.

The accountability machinery would apply to all persons able to exercise powers under the *Police Force Act 1998* including Regulars, Auxiliaries, Reservists, Special Constables, persons vested with authority under s.16 of the Act, and unsworn staff.

**Recommendation 3:** It is recommended that an *Office of Inspector-General of the Constabulary* be created to exercise effective corporate governance of the RPNGC. The Office would:

- (a) Exercise the powers of the *Police Force Act 1998* and attendant Regulations, Commissioner's Directives and Standing Orders;
- (b) Report direct to the Commissioner of Police who will appoint an appropriately qualified and experienced Inspector General at Deputy Commissioner level;
- (c) Coordinate the accountability and reporting requirements of the Constabulary;
- (d) Include the Directorates of Internal Affairs; Command Inspection and Review; and Discipline and Employment Review;
- (e) Establish the *Discipline and Employment Review Board* to assist the Commissioner in dealing with the complexities of the PNG culture in the application of penalties and employment review, supported by the Discipline and Employment Review Directorate;
- (f) The Board would be chaired by the Inspector-General and comprise the Deputy Commissioners of Police, the Assistant Commissioners of Police for Human Resources and Internal Affairs, the Director of Legal Services and a representative from the Department of Personnel Management;
- (g) Exercise the functions of an expanded Internal Audit Directorate encompassing financial, performance and management audit functions across the Constabulary;
- (h) Promote best practice and establish Best Practice Guidelines;
- (i) Record outcomes in the Annual Report of the Inspector General to the Commissioner; and
- (j) Ensure that the accountability machinery applies to all persons able to exercise powers under the *Police Force Act 1998* including Regulars, Auxiliaries, Reservists, Special Constables, persons vested with authority under s.16 of the Act, and unsworn staff.

### 2.5 Community Access

Many instances of poor police response to requests for assistance by the public were reported to the Working Group. These ranged from no police in attendance at Police Stations, intoxicated police, failure to answer telephone calls, to no action taken on recorded calls for assistance. A common theme was incapacitation by alcohol, lack of fuel, and lack of responsiveness by the police.

The current situation is unacceptable to the Government and the community. It is also found abhorrent by many committed police. Urgent action must be taken to turn around the current malaise in delivering effective community policing to the public. Effective and professional access to the Constabulary by all stakeholders including the public, business and tourist community who need to report crime or seek other assistance must become a key objective of all police.

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Community access is not only a key element of building confidence in the Constabulary but it also increases the positive profile of the police. Improving the way in which members of the public, business, tourists and other stakeholders can contact the police should be given immediate priority. Arrangements should also be instituted directing police to provide feedback on matters reported to them to reinforce the willingness and commitment of police to support the community.

Papua New Guinea comprises a range of communities and cultures. While each of the provinces enjoys a rich and unified culture, the diversity of the community converges in the cities and large towns. The diverse cultural issues cannot be underestimated in developing effective strategies to provide a responsive and targeted police service to meet the needs of the whole community. In particular, in cities and large towns the cultural needs of the public must be managed sensitively and reconciled with the competing demands of the business community and tourism.

**Recommendation 4:** It is recommended that all Police Stations be returned immediately to operational effectiveness and professional presentation. As part of the Constabulary's commitment to participative and integrated policing to assist the community, each Police Station should:

- (a) Establish a public Enquiry Desk that is continuously staffed by a Regular police member in full uniform and trained in Community Policing issues;
- (b) Require that the Enquiry Desk police officer record all contacts and incidents reported by the public and demonstrate their clear commitment to assist; and
- (c) Institute arrangements to ensure that police provide feedback to the public on matters reported to them.

The Working Group received many reports about telephone calls not being answered, not being dealt with responsively or not being able to find the correct number to call. For example, in Port Moresby there are several police numbers that could be called. Police Headquarters is not always the most appropriate number to call for assistance to an emergency incident at a particular location. There were incidents reported of such calls simply not being attended to because of lack of fuel.

To assist the public in reporting matters over the telephone, one central Community Access Number should be established and publicised to the community. All calls would be answered promptly by trained staff, logged and referred to the relevant Police Station or specialised police team for action. The caller would also be advised where their inquiry is to be referred. This would significantly enhance community access to police services and raise the image of the police.

To further assist the development of community confidence the RPNGC should institute national arrangements to ensure that those matters requiring urgent attention receive an immediate response. All other calls for assistance should be attended to in a timely manner.

**Recommendation 5:** To assist the public in reporting matters over the telephone, it is recommended that all telephone calls seeking police assistance be made to one telephone number (Community Access Number or CAN) in Port Moresby, and:

- (a) The requests for assistance be recorded and dispatched by a trained central Community Team to the relevant Police Station or specialist police team; and
- (b) The RPNGC should develop a model to deliver immediate response to life threatening situations and a capability to respond to all other matters within a reasonable time.

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### 2.6 Reporting to the Community

The Community Policing initiative is predicated on establishing and maintaining effective, supportive and interactive relationships with the community. It is integrated policing. For reasons already outlined, the police have lost community confidence and communication between the police and the community has fallen to an all time low.

The recommendations made above seek to address the situation. An important area that has been neglected is communication with the public. The Working Group notes that it has been some years since the Constabulary produced an Annual Report to Government.

An Annual Report is an effective way of maintaining a dialogue with key stakeholders. It is also a key accountability measure to the Government and to the people of Papua New Guinea. The report should be factual and informative and focus on the Constabulary achievements against declared Government objectives (or explain why they could not be achieved). It also demonstrates to the community that the Constabulary is prepared to report on its activities and be judged against them.

Accountability in the report would cover all aspects of performance and corporate governance including financial management, audited financial statements and reporting on discipline, appeals and review issues.

**Recommendation 6:** It is recommended that the Constabulary as required by current legislation resume the practice of producing an Annual Report to the Government and the people of Papua New Guinea. In covering the range of activities undertaken by the Constabulary including financial management and corporate governance issues, the Annual Report should also include a review of complaints and allegations received and investigated, and present the outcomes of investigations.

### 2.7 Gun Amnesty Program

The breakdown in law and order in PNG has been accompanied by a steady increase in violence accompanied by the use of firearms. This has created significant fear in the community and concern among police who are not normally armed. The Working Group established that firearms have increasingly become a major factor in the development of crime trends and criminal activity.

It is an offence to carry an unlicensed firearm. To have a licensed firearm a member of the public is required to obtain a licence from a Police Station. However, the community response has been to move away from traditional methods of defence and is now using illegally obtained or homemade firearms to combat the growth in criminal activity.

This has created a situation where the RPNGC have developed a mindset that to defend themselves they must have, as a basic requirement, long barrel weapons. These are now being displayed in all facets of Policing. During the review the Working Group observed police carrying rifles at roadblocks and Homicide Squad members carrying a rifle during investigations of a murder. This approach is seen as threatening by the community and contrary to the philosophy of participative policing with the community.

The study by Alpers and Tyford “*Small Arms in the Pacific*” released in March 2003 addressed case studies of Fiji, the Solomon Islands and Bougainville, which “show how devastating the impacts of armed conflict can be. The Solomon Islands continue to teeter on the edge of economic collapse, while in Bougainville the production base has been almost destroyed. Public confidence in the institutions of state has been badly shaken in all three communities.” The current state of lawlessness in mainland PNG makes this statement strongly relevant.

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The report also stated “ in light of recent experience in the Pacific, there now seems to be broad consensus among donor agencies, governments and civil society that disarmament and security and destruction of small arms are urgent prerequisites for future development, good health and prosperity.” This is corroborated by events in the Solomon’s where the success of the Weapons Amnesty has gone a long way to creating a firearms free society and changing the social culture.

In Fiji as well as in the Solomon Islands (and according to the information provided to the Working Group, in PNG), criminals and insurgent groups have treated “state owned armouries as their supermarkets, taking weapons when needed.” Again there are strong suggestions that this continues to be a problem in PNG where the security of armouries and the accountability of weapons by both the military and the police is poor. This situation must be remedied.

To facilitate the overall strategy of implementing Community Policing and to bring about a change of culture in the RPNGC, the Working Group proposes a three-month Gun Amnesty Program during which members of the community may hand back firearms with exemption from prosecution for the possession of illegal weapons. The success of the Amnesty Program would depend fundamentally on a transparent and trusted firearms destruction program to make sure the weapons are destroyed and do not re-enter the black market.

**Recommendation 7:** It is an offence to carry an unlicensed firearm. It is recommended that a three-month Gun Amnesty Program be implemented during which members of the community may hand back firearms with exemption from prosecution for the possession of illegal weapons. Particular attention should be given to:

- (a) Establishing a transparent and trusted firearms destruction program to make sure the weapons are destroyed and do not re-enter the black market; and
- (b) Ensuring that the destruction program is visibly and tightly policed and reliably reported to the community; and
- (c) The enactment of mandatory minimum sentences for the possession of unlicensed firearms and specific aggravated firearm offences.

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### 3. MORALE AND WORKING CONDITIONS

#### 3.1 Learned Helplessness

Morale in the RPNGC is low and a malaise of learned helplessness paralyses the effectiveness of the Constabulary. Discipline is rarely enforced and few are held accountable for their actions. Many instances of flagrant disregard for lawful disciplinary procedures have been reported to the Working Group. With a few but notable exceptions, most Police Stations are generally run down, poorly maintained and lack professional presentation to the community.

Working conditions are poor. In many cases the state of the dilapidated Police Stations reflects the apathy of the Station Commander and the resident police team. While enforcing discipline and Standing Orders would make some impact on current appearances, most Police Stations lack even the basic equipment to present an effective “shopfront” to the community. They lack the fundamental tools with which to conduct effective police operations.

The working conditions are aggravated by the poor state of housing provided to police. Little maintenance has been carried out for some years and the state of repair of the housing stock has deteriorated significantly. The lack of proper maintenance extends to Police Stations, where there are reports of non-functioning toilets, general deterioration of facilities and unhygienic conditions.

There is no question that the Constabulary must rehabilitate itself to earn the respect and confidence of the community and government. However, it cannot achieve this without a clear partnership and shared responsibility with the Government.

#### 3.2 Pay and Conditions

Trust and confidence of the community and the Government in the Constabulary is demonstrated to the members of the Constabulary through the provision of reasonable salaries and conditions of service. The conditions of service do not only address individual entitlements but also recognise the responsibilities the police have to the public and the Government, and to discharge ethically and fairly the authority entrusted to the police by the community as a whole.

Poor or inadequate conditions of employment encourage corrupt and inappropriate practices to emerge and flourish as employees seek to supplement their incomes. The present conditions of service for members of the Regular Constabulary are set out in the *Police Force Act 1998* and in Standing Orders. However, even though some conditions are specified as a statutory entitlement, the Working Group has found that this does not guarantee members receive them.

While reports vary, it would seem that annual increments have not been paid since 2000 and only cost of living increases have been paid for the past three years. For reasons the Working Group was unable to fully determine, processing of leave fares to homelands is up to two years behind and is dependent upon funds being available. There is evidence that police have lost faith in the system and have become disaffected when they have not received even their statutory entitlements.

To galvanise the process and positively address the key deficiencies, action should be taken immediately to pay all outstanding increments and leave claims as specified in legislation. This would meet outstanding entitlements that members have already earned and send a positive signal to the members of the Constabulary.

**Recommendation 8:** Police have lost faith in the pay system and have become disaffected when they have not received even their statutory entitlements. It is recommended that an



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immediate payment of outstanding increments and leave entitlements be made to police and civilian members of the RPNGC and a commitment made to pay future entitlements on-time, every time. This would send a clear signal to the members of the Constabulary that the Government recognises the difficulties and is serious about supporting the Constabulary.

### 3.3 Allowances

Current terms and conditions provide for a range of allowances to be paid to police members. The quantum of these allowances has not been reviewed for some years and is generally inadequate for the purposes they were intended to address.

To ensure that members receive their basic entitlements in the future and to reduce the cost of administering the conditions of service, it is proposed that conditions of service be simplified and consolidated in a single allowance payment. Rationalising salary, allowances and other conditions of service would involve consolidating individual allowance payments as a composite amount set as a percentage of the base salary.

A key element in the application of conditions of service is the ability of an employee to decide on what they will do with the remuneration they receive. This flexibility empowers employees and lessens their dependency on the organisation to resolve a wide range of personal issues.

The composite allowance should include a provision for residential accommodation. This has been a consistent source of dissatisfaction among police. An appropriate provision for residential accommodation in the composite allowance would enable employees to choose whether or not to live in police housing in cities and towns.

To overcome the difficulties that have arisen with the management and payment of leave fares, the composite allowance should include an appropriate provision for leave fares. This would ensure that employees receive their current leave fare entitlement on a fortnightly basis and significantly reduce administrative costs involved in processing one-off entitlements. It would also remove the possibility of funds being diverted to other urgent purposes.

The composite allowance would subsume all other individual allowances and include in particular the leave fares entitlement. This would overcome a number of current problems and considerably simplify administration.

The composite allowance would need to be set as a fixed percentage of the employee's base salary, which would ensure that it is updated as a consequence of cost of living adjustments to the base salary. To cover the range of purposes that these allowances are intended to compensate, it is suggested that the composite allowance be set at 60% of an employee's base salary.

**Recommendation 9:** To ensure that members receive their basic entitlements in the future and to reduce the cost of administering the conditions of service, it is recommended that a composite allowance be introduced that subsumes all other allowances and the leave fare entitlement. The composite allowance would subsume the payment of separate allowances and entitlements for:

- Personal allowance
- Shift/On call allowance
- Service allowance
- Specialist allowances (eg plainclothes, dog handling)
- Leave fare allowance
- Rental allowance
- Overtime allowance

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The composite allowance should be known as the *Constabulary Allowance* and be set at 60% of an employee's base salary. It would be updated automatically with cost of living adjustments to salary and paid fortnightly through the salary system.

### 3.4 Review of Salaries and Allowances

The initiatives recommended above are designed to make an immediate positive impact on current difficulties. However, there are systemic problems that are aggravated by generally low levels of salaries. The task of remuneration reform is a longer-term challenge for the Government.

A comprehensive review of pay and conditions is a major task that would also need to address the establishment of distinct conditions of service for employees of the Constabulary including the employment of all personnel under the authority of the Commissioner and the Police Force Act.

Any review of salaries and allowances would need to be accompanied by a strategically focused structural review and intensive organisational reform. Firm costs will be essential to the further development of this initiative. While this is a longer-term challenge, the initiative should be announced as a package of reforms for the RPNGC.

**Recommendation 10:** While implementation is a longer-term challenge, to the extent that these issues are not addressed by the Review Team in its report, it is recommended that the Government announce a review of police salaries and allowances. This presents an opportunity for a fundamental review of the RPNGC that should address critical issues such as:

- (a) The purpose and effective size of the Constabulary and how it should operate;
- (b) The appropriate balance between sworn and civilian officers;
- (c) The role of the Community Auxiliary and Reserve Constabulary;
- (d) The structure of governance arrangements including provincial reporting requirements;
- (e) The communication and maintenance of Force instructions and policies; and
- (f) The form of the most appropriate and effective organisational structure for the RPNGC.

### 3.5 Housing

The state of housing provided to police is poor. Little maintenance has been carried out for some years and the state of repair of the housing stock has deteriorated significantly. Advice is that the Constabulary maintains some 4200 residences including barracks and houses, and it would take an estimated K500m to bring the residences to an appropriate standard. An ongoing maintenance program of not less than K15m per annum would then be required.

Proposals are in train to rehabilitate the current housing stock. While urgent maintenance should be undertaken to overcome the pressing short-term problems, major expenditure on longer-term rehabilitation may not be the most effective use of scarce Government resources.

In the longer term, the Constabulary should review its policy of providing residences other than for recruits in training and in remote localities. If it is established that there is a need to provide residences, then consideration should be given to outsourcing their supply and maintenance. The Constabulary needs to recognise that its core business is the provision of police services, not providing housing.

The payment of the composite allowance would facilitate transition to well-founded longer-term housing strategies. The Constabulary Allowance would enable employees to seek alternative accommodation in the community should they wish, reducing demand for police housing.

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**Recommendation 11:** It is recommended that the Constabulary review its policy of providing housing to employees other than to recruits in training and in remote localities. However, these outcomes will take some time to be implemented. Immediate priority should be given to carrying out urgent minor repairs to restore housing to habitable condition, thus raising morale and reducing family concerns.

### 3.6 Basic Resources

There are many police who would like to make a difference and contribute to the effectiveness of the Force. However, in addition to poor leadership and example, their efforts are often hampered by the lack of basic supplies to carry out policing duties effectively. The sense of powerlessness has a significant effect in depressing morale of the very people to whom the Constabulary must look to lead remedial action.

A significant gap has developed between the resources that have been provided to the Constabulary and those it needs to deliver an effective policing service. The shortfalls are not in people but in the lack of fundamental supplies required to deliver an effective policing service such as paper, pencils, desks, tables, chairs, Police Notebooks, typewriters, recording systems and a telephone.

The government has a critical role to play in energising the process of recovery. It must take immediate action to provide the Constabulary with the basic resources required to deliver effective policing, without which the Constabulary cannot do the job. Every Police Station must be equipped with these basic resources, which are essential and could be provided at limited cost. Basic remedial action is seen by the Working Party as fundamental to the restoration of public confidence and police morale.

**Recommendation 12:** It is recommended that immediate action be taken to equip every Police Station with the basic resources required to deliver effective policing. This includes the supply of basic items such as paper, pencils, desks, tables, chairs, Police Notebooks, typewriters, recording systems and a telephone, without which the police cannot do their job.

The government has a right to expect these newly supplied resources to be properly managed. When these basic items have been provided, senior police executives must ensure that Station Commanders are held personally responsible and accountable for the resources placed under their command. Any misuse or abuse must be dealt with swiftly, openly and firmly.

These initiatives will be followed up through a program of inspections carried out by the Command Inspection and Review Directorate of the Office of the Inspector General of the Constabulary.

**Recommendation 13:** It is recommended that Station Commanders be held accountable through a directive from the Commissioner that they are held personally responsible for the resources placed under their command. Senior police executives must ensure that any misuse or abuse is dealt with swiftly, openly and firmly.

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### 4. OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

#### 4.1 Leadership and Discipline

The Working Group gave particular attention to the key factors that influence the operational effectiveness of the RPNGC. Irrespective of the extent and quality of resources that might be placed at its disposal, operational effectiveness of the Constabulary depends fundamentally on the quality of leadership and the strength of its discipline. Both were found to be weak and lie at the heart of the malaise of inaction and apathy that has gripped the Constabulary.

##### 4.1.1 Inconsistent Discipline

The RPNGC has a comprehensive Police Force Act and Discipline Code that adequately stipulate what the Government expects from the RPNGC. The Working Group found clear evidence of non-compliance in a wide range of responsibilities by all ranks. The Code of Ethics, which was displayed in some police stations, is enunciated in a discipline document prepared by the Director Internal Affairs. This document is of a high standard. However, it is almost universally ignored, as are the requirements of the Police Force Act. Some examples of abuse are:

- Undertaking of outside interests (eg secondary employment).
- Poor performance of duties.
- Dishonest behaviour.
- Intoxicated while on duty.
- Misuse of police vehicles.
- Evidence of extensive use of baui inside police premises.

There was also evidence of non-compliance with the Police Force Act and Standing Orders when dealing with disciplinary matters. The Commissioner has the authority to take firm disciplinary action regarding offences committed by members. It was found that in many cases soft options are applied or no action is taken at all. Evidence also existed of situations where criminal offences had been committed but the members involved had not been criminally charged or even subjected to disciplinary action or suspended.

The Executive of the RPNGC should immediately take firm action to ensure that the existing Discipline Code is applied and enforced consistently. Until all members exercise appropriate discipline and display a professional standard of performance, there will be little to encourage the community and Government to have confidence in the Constabulary. Discipline must be administered firmly and fairly, and all members must be held accountable for their actions.

These issues have also been addressed through the recommended establishment of the *Office of the Inspector General of the Constabulary*. A clear message must be sent from the Commissioner and the Minister on behalf of the Government to indicate that poor and inconsistent discipline will no longer be tolerated. A fundamental cultural change is required and must be enforced.

**Recommendation 14:** It is recommended that the Minister write formally to the Commissioner of Police to convey the Government's deep and abiding concern at the disintegrating state of law and order in Papua New Guinea, and provide the Commissioner of Police with general policy direction on:

- (a) The need for him to take, within the powers and authorities available to him, whatever lawful action is necessary to restore an effective law enforcement capacity aimed at restoring and sustaining reasonable and acceptable levels of community safety across all provinces of PNG;

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- (b) Advise that the Government will make available as a matter of priority those resources required to support and sustain emergency action;
- (c) Affirm that the Commissioner has the full and united support of the Government for whatever action he may consider prudent to take to achieve the required outcomes; and
- (d) Issue a Media Statement on behalf of the Government advising the action that the Government has taken.

The action by the Minister on behalf of the Government is essential to launch recovery action and embark upon the journey of reform. However, immediate action is also required within the Constabulary to galvanise action and to demonstrate that the Government and the Commissioner of Police will not tolerate continuance of the present appalling state of affairs.

**Recommendation 15:** To reinforce the Government action recommended above and parallel the establishment of the *Office of the Inspector General of the Constabulary*, it is recommended that the Commissioner:

- (a) Issue a Directive to all RPNGC staff instructing that the existing Discipline Code be immediately put into effect;
- (b) Issue a Directive to each Deputy Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner and civilian equivalent advising that he will hold them personally responsible and accountable for ensuring that the Discipline Code is complied with;
- (c) Direct the Internal Affairs Directorate to support the Police Executive by rigorously monitoring and enforcing compliance with the Discipline Code by all members; and
- (d) Direct all line Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs) to attend a Training Seminar run by the Internal Affairs Directorate to reinforce standards at all levels.

In addition, action should be taken immediately to review all matters under investigation and to report on the outcomes to demonstrate that the Constabulary and the Government are committed to re-establishing effective discipline and governance in the RPNGC.

**Recommendation 16:** It is recommended that a review of all existing matters under investigation should be carried out immediately by the Ombudsman Commission and a report on the outcomes be submitted to the Minister for recommended action. A public report, including a Newspaper Public Notice, be issued on the outcomes and findings of such reviews in order to ensure that the detail of the review process is available to the general public.

### 4.1.2 Command and Control

Poor and inconsistent discipline renders command and control essentially ineffective. This has significant impact on the operational effectiveness of the Constabulary. In its visits to various police establishments the Working Group made the following observations:

- Supervisors were unsure of the numbers of people who would attend for duty within any given shift.
- There is no formal Daily Roster that specifies who is required to report for duty.
- Reserve and Auxiliary staff attend for duty on an ad hoc basis, rather than according to a predetermined roster.

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- Reserve and Auxiliary staff are usually dressed in Regular Police Uniforms contrary to existing policy.
- Auxiliary staff are performing duties contrary to the Charter and in some cases carry out General Duties functions outside existing policy because of staff shortages.
- There appears to be no advice forwarded to the Human Resources Directorate on who has reported for duty prior to salaries and allowances being paid.
- There is a lack of control and supervision within the existing ranks.
- There are no parades or formal handovers from one shift to the next.
- There is almost a total absence of Intelligence information.
- In many Police Stations there were no stocks of blank forms for recording purposes.
- Uniform dress standard in most cases was appalling.

There is a lack of commitment towards effective leadership and accountability, creating an ill-disciplined organisation. There is also a lack of willingness by all ranks to take control. It is believed that cultural differences and “wantok” imperatives inhibit action due to fear of retribution.

The current rank structure is affected by culture and inhibits effective command and control. Members do not seem to be able to make decisions without first referring to the next level above. Depending on cultural relationships, many decisions are not made or passed down the chain of command, particularly if the decision could be interpreted as disrespect or animosity.

The Working Group has established that many of the required standard forms for day-to-day policing are held in the Port Moresby Central Store. However, there is no will to obtain them or to ensure that they are distributed and actually completed. This state of apathy seems to be endemic across the RPNGC. One excuse was that the forms could not be picked up because there was no fuel, and they could not be distributed because there was no money to pay freight.

The inability to pay freight should not be an inhibiting factor in delivering forms to each District. Members of all ranks are travelling regularly from Port Moresby to outlying Districts and in all cases should be able to convey a small package when required. There is no plausible excuse for documentation not being available to members in the Port Moresby Centres. Apathy is entrenched.

The Working Group also discovered that many members do not have a Police Note Book or pencils, pens and biros. Consequently no attempt has been made to keep any form of records. Members occasionally use a piece of paper if some is available, but record keeping is almost non-existent. Generally there is no basic commitment when dealing with members of the Community.

The issues raised above are symptomatic of the range of other concerns affecting the RPNGC. Urgent action must be taken at all levels across the whole of the RPNGC to launch a committed approach to corrective action, which has been addressed elsewhere in this report. However, to improve command and control arrangements and enhance operational effectiveness of the Constabulary, the following action is proposed.

**Recommendation 17:** As an operational priority for immediate action, it is recommended that the Commissioner direct Police Commanders to:

- (a) Immediately introduce accountable Rostering Practices;
- (b) Immediately introduce a Reporting for Duty regime;

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- (c) Obtain the necessary Standard Policing Forms from the Central Store;
- (d) Re-introduce Intelligence Collection processes at all levels of Police Operations;
- (e) Issue to all members the Official Police Note Book and pens for recording purposes;
- (f) Make all NCOs accountable for implementation of the Commissioner's Directions; and
- (g) Put in place processes to ensure follow-up action is taken on these Directions.

Implementation of these recommendations will effect immediate improvements and begin the journey of rehabilitation of the effectiveness of the Constabulary. However, positive affirmation of progress is required to maintain the focus and commitment of the police. The following initiatives are proposed to support and consolidate implementation and effectiveness of the reforms.

**Recommendation 18:** To sharpen the focus and effectiveness of the initiatives proposed above, the following actions that should be implemented immediately, recognising that these will achieve their impact in the medium to longer-term. It is recommended that:

- (a) Three Police Stations be identified as reform models for Port Moresby (eg Badilli, Gerehu, 9 Mile and 6 Mile, and the badly depleted Port Moresby Central), which will be encouraged and reviewed on a progressive basis to demonstrate the progress and effectiveness of the reforms;
- (b) The need for all the current Police Stations in the Port Moresby be reviewed and rationalisation plans developed; and
- (c) The need for all current Police Stations in each province and district be reviewed to identify possible rationalisation including relocation of some Police Stations to better meet community needs.

### 4.2 Serving the Community

The clear purpose of the Constabulary is to serve the community. As enshrined in the Constitution, the duty of the RPNGC is to preserve peace and good order in the Community, and to maintain and as necessary enforce the law in an impartial and objective manner.

All activities of the Police Force should be focused on preserving law and order and protecting the people in every province and district of Papua New Guinea. There must be a visible and effective presence of police on the streets, and a positive and integrated relationship with the community. The actions of police must be firm, fair, ethical and responsive to community needs.

These are statements of community policy. To earn the trust and respect of the community, these fundamental principles must be carried through in the way that the Constabulary operates and discharges its responsibilities. At this time, such ideals are given little currency. Reform action must not only be operationally focused but it must be driven by a strong realisation of the primacy of the needs of the community and the duty that the Government has entrusted to the Constabulary.

#### 4.2.1 Interactive Policing

The Community Policing concept is a key initiative of the Papua New Guinea Government and is strongly supported by the Minister and the Commissioner of the RPNGC. Unfortunately, there is ample evidence that the concept has not been adopted by all members of the RPNGC. The reports of abuses by Regular, Reservist and Auxiliary members are many, and the required

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ongoing community interaction has not occurred. No action has been taken by Police Commanders to institute modern police practices or to encourage their acceptance.

A major reason for the lack of acceptance of the concept of Community Policing as the modern way to deliver effective and appropriate policing services to the community is that it has been treated as an isolated and inferior concept not related to the main stream of real police work. This attitude is exactly what the Government and the Commissioner are determined to eradicate. The prevailing separatist culture is unacceptable and must change.

The term Community Policing has become tainted. It is essential that the concept not be associated with such negative and counter-productive attitudes. Every member of the service must embrace the sound policing concepts, and every member of the Constabulary including civilian members must understand what it means. Consequently, the Working Group believes that a new term such as “*Interactive Policing*” is necessary to describe the concept.

The promotion of *Interactive Policing* should not be left to the few trained members in each Province to develop the concept of interactive and integrated policing in regional areas. There is a need for a new, dynamic and holistic approach to be taken by every member of the RPNGC who should engage with the community in a positive and fair manner.

The cultural change must begin with operations. For example, the RPNGC consistently use roadblocks as a method to detect illegal property, stolen motor vehicles, the movement of offenders across the city and for traffic enforcement. The Working Party found no evidence of a consistent program of foot or mobile patrols. Consequently it is not surprising that poor police practices have resulted in the visibility of police in the National Capital District (NCD) being very poor.

Every member of the RPNGC should be required to attend an education program to understand and promote the *Interactive Policing* concept and all aspects of community interaction.

The Working Group was advised that some members find it difficult to engage in community consultation because they lack consultation and liaison skills. They find it difficult to communicate positively with the community. Courses on *Interactive Policing* should include presentation skills and communication skills as an essential part of delivering modern, effective policing services.

**Recommendation 19:** To enhance the effectiveness of the Government’s initiative to promote more interactive and integrated policing to serve the community, it is recommended that:

- (a) Serious consideration be given to replacing the term “Community Policing” with a new title such as ‘*Interactive Policing*’ (or Partnership Policing) to better emphasise the aim and purpose of the new philosophy and to avoid the stigma and suspicions that clearly surround Community Policing principles under their current title;
- (b) Current courses and workshops on Community Policing be renamed *Interactive Policing* and reviewed to ensure they clearly embrace the philosophy that this is the modern way the Government expects police services to be delivered to the community (ie to the community, with the community, for the community);
- (c) The courses relate the concept of effective delivery of police services to the community to the wording of the Constitution with the principles being inculcated into all other in-service training programs;



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- (d) The courses on *Interactive Policing* be attended by all members of the RPNGC;
- (e) All NCOs be required to undertake a course on public speaking and presentation skills to develop their confidence in consulting with the community;
- (f) The Deputy Commissioner (Operations) be given responsibility for the development of this initiative; and
- (g) The Deputy Commissioner (Operations) report progress on the initiative each quarter to the Commissioner, together with recommendations on how the effectiveness of the initiative could be improved.

For Interactive Policing to be effective there must be a continuous and positive dialogue and interaction between the community and police and a shared ownership of both the problems and the possible solutions. In several cases current Community Policing Workshops between community representatives and police members seem to have been very successful, particularly where these have been conducted by appropriately skilled and trained police. These should be developed further.

**Recommendation 20:** To maximise the potential of *Interactive Policing Workshops* as an effective means of establishing a continuous and positive dialogue between the community and the police, it is recommended that:

- (a) *Interactive Policing Workshops* be developed as the primary means of ongoing community consultation in delivering effective police services to the community;
- (b) The Workshops be conducted and facilitated by appropriately skilled and trained police conversant with the issues;
- (c) Processes be put in place to solicit, capture and act on information (intelligence) provided by the community, including providing feedback at the next Workshop; and
- (d) The Workshops also be used for training police in the concept of delivering effective police services to the community and encouraging them to participate in the Workshops under the guidance and support of the qualified police representatives.

It is important that Interactive Policing Workshops become simply an integrated part of delivering effective policing services to the community. By inculcating sound policing practice, they would play an important role in shaping current perceptions and attitudes that Community Policing is a thing apart from real policing. Participation is the best way to change attitudes.

### 4.2.2 Traffic Enforcement

For the community, a constant and visible presence of police on the streets is in traffic enforcement. The Working Group observed that driver behaviour in the National Capital District (NCD) is very poor and there is generally little regard for traffic laws. It was advised that there are approximately 415 police officers conducting traffic duties including accident investigation throughout PNG.

The Working Group visited one Traffic Directorate in the NCD office, which had 47 officers performing traffic enforcement duties and accident investigation. On any given shift they usually have seven members performing traffic enforcement and four involved in accident investigation.

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Staff and vehicle allocation were considered to be inadequate to provide an effective traffic patrol, and consequently a large percentage of traffic enforcement was carried out by way of roadblocks.

It emerged that the RPNGC consistently use roadblocks for a variety of purposes, including as a method to detect illegal property, stolen motor vehicles and the movement of offenders across the city, as well as for traffic enforcement. While travelling around the NCD, over a two-hour period on one particular morning the Working Party encountered three separate groups of police officers conducting roadblocks. Only one of the groups was from the Traffic Directorate.

In their current form, roadblocks create fear in the community and are not a modern practice to be encouraged in Community Policing. Roadblocks should only be used for their primary police purpose of interdiction. The RPNGC should develop a traffic enforcement model that is consistent with the *Interactive Policing* philosophy to encourage better driver behaviour within NCD. Traffic Enforcement Officers should change existing methods used in traffic enforcement.

**Recommendation 21:** Traffic enforcement is a visible police presence and should be integrated into effective *Interactive Policing*. To move from reliance on using roadblocks as the primary method of traffic enforcement it is recommended that:

- (a) Traffic enforcement officers be encouraged to work closely with operational police;
- (b) Traffic enforcement programs be conducted by the effective use of properly targeted mobile patrols to improve police visibility (eg better use of motor cycle/traffic patrols, targeted action against high profile traffic offences and key problem areas such as speeding, dangerous driving, careless driving and illegal parking);
- (c) Traffic enforcement officers work closely with operational police officers in the education of students and young drivers to improve driver behaviour; and
- (d) The use of roadblocks be generally restricted to interdiction in response to specific serious crime and properly promoted traffic regulation and crime prevention initiatives.

### 4.3 Specialist Forces and Auxiliaries

The RPNGC is handicapped by insufficient manpower to deliver effective police services. On any world scale, the ratio of 1 police per 1000 people is a major challenge even in a country where crime rates are low. Urgent attention must be given to achieving maximum productivity from the existing resources and deploying them to greatest effect. Idle resources cannot be tolerated.

Much of this problem is self-imposed and the result of poor leadership, appalling lack of discipline and a significant element of poorly trained and old members who are incapable of effective police participation. The Working Group identified 221 staff over the age of 55. The RPNGC Police Association advised that there are 1500 police ready to leave, but there is no money to pay them out. The Commissioner has power to effect retrenchments under s.108 of the Police Force Act.

The present situation is reaching crisis proportions. It is essential to look for more effective deployment of under-utilised resources. In these circumstances careful scrutiny must be given to the trained resources allocated to specialist forces and the use of police auxiliaries.

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### 4.3.1 Mobile Squads and Task Forces

During visits to establishments and interviews the Working Group received considerable comment on the activities of Mobile Squads and Rapid Response Units (also known as Task Forces). Mobile Squads and Task Forces are purely reactive and there is no evidence of them being deployed on the basis of received intelligence other than to provide security during Elections.

Mobile Squads and Task Forces seem to act in a para-military manner. Their undisciplined operations have created fear and confusion among the community and resulted in considerable cost to Government through compensation claims. They are generally perceived as being very aggressive and ill disciplined, a law unto themselves and not operating within their standard operating procedures and existing Use of Force Policy. They are prone to violent acts.

The current Use of Force Policy is sound and acceptable in any policing environment. However the Mobile Squads and Task Forces ignore or generally do not comply with this policy.

There are 685 police attached to Mobile Squads throughout PNG. They are centralized bodies particularly in Port Moresby (4 Mobile Squads at McGregor Barracks) and Mt Hagen (3 Mobile Squads). About 100 police members are involved in Close Personal Protection. In addition, there are various Rapid Response Units in existence in Port Moresby, Mt Hagen, Madang, Lae and Enga Province, and a total of 67 members have been identified from outdated records.

The *Policy and Responsibilities of the Mobile Squads* are clearly established in the existing Manual of Standing Orders dated September 1992. The introductory remarks of the manual state in part:

- “That they be well trained/commanded, disciplined, coordinated and a decentralized body of police officers”.

The policy document further states in the introduction that:

- “The Mobile Squads should be able to undertake ordinary routine police duties and, in addition, must have the capability to be mobilized and deployed speedily to achieve desired law enforcement objectives in an assigned area of operation”.

These policy provisions are ignored. Contrary to policy, Task Force members today work to the exclusion of general patrolling and community policing duties. Their role is reactive and they are used primarily to support General Duties members when perceived dangerous situations arise.

There are serious issues to be considered. Immediate action is required to overcome the discipline and operational deficiencies and poor work practices of the Mobile Squads and the duplications of functions carried out by the Rapid Response Units. Urgent action is also required to enhance police numbers allocated to the core function of General Duties policing. The RPNGC simply cannot afford to carry “part-time” trained police resources.

**Recommendation 22:** It is recommended that Mobile Squads and Rapid Response Units as currently configured be returned to Core Police functions “*to undertake ordinary routine police duties*” as provided for by the existing policy. Specialist operational capability would not be sacrificed in executing this fundamental change. It is expected that:

- (g) The members of Mobile Squads and Rapid Response Units would be absorbed within all General Duties Stations in their current Districts;
- (h) Members would be dressed in Regular police uniforms and report daily to their assigned Stations;

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- (i) Members would retain the capability of being mobilised and deployed speedily to their now *secondary* role of rapid response in an assigned operation;
- (j) All assigned rapid response operations must be authorised in writing by the Deputy Commissioner (Operations);
- (k) At the successful conclusion of the assigned operation the members would disband and be returned to their ordinary routine police duties;
- (l) The Commander of the assigned operation must submit a full report on the operation within 48 hours of completion to the Deputy Commissioner (Operations); and
- (m) Specialist members would continue to receive appropriate training to renew, maintain and develop their skills.

Implementation of these recommendations would immediately inject significant numbers of trained police into the core function of providing policing services to the community. It would make a genuine contribution to placing more police on the streets and restoring community confidence.

It is recognised that the adoption of this recommendation may, in the first instance, be particularly difficult. In the view of the Working Group, however, the maintenance of the status quo, having regard to the critical shortage of operational capacity and the rising crime rates, is not an option. As an alternative to the above recommendation, and as a minimum response, the number of Mobile Squads should be reduced and the role of the Squads widened to enable and ensure their deployment to high crime areas and issues, as both a reactive AND a preventive strategy.

The further question is how many potential Rapid Response Teams should be provided for by maintaining trained specialist numbers, and where should they be located? The Working Group encountered a widely held belief that currently there are too many Mobile Squads and Task Forces. It was generally believed that the number of Mobile Squads in Port Moresby could easily be halved to two, the number in Mt Hagen reduced to one, and Task Forces should be refocused.

**Recommendation 23:** The target numbers need to be determined on the basis of sound analysis and creative operational thinking. It is recommended that the Commissioner, acting on the advice of the Deputy Commissioner (Operations) and the Deputy Commissioner (Administration) determine the appropriate number and location of virtual “Mobile Squads”. It is recommended that the Deputy Commissioner (Operations) lead an operational policy team to:

- (d) Analyse the strategic and operational environment to determine the likely nature and location of threats that may require a specialist rapid operational response;
- (e) Analyse the likely size of an operational task team required to deal with these events;
- (f) Determine on the basis of operational and tactical imperatives the most effective location for these potential operational task teams;
- (g) Determine on the basis of operational policing requirements the number of trained specialist members at each specified location to be able to reliably and quickly configure a competent and effective operational task team;
- (h) Prepare a program of rotation, training and continuing development to maintain the required skilled specialist resources base; and

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- (i) Set in place a process of continuing review to ensure that the Constabulary has available the right skilled specialist manpower in the right place all the time.

### 4.3.2 Auxiliaries and Reserve Members

Currently there are 3,538 Auxiliaries and 1,703 Reservists. Many situations were reported to the Working Group indicating that some Regular police and Auxiliaries and Reservists had become a liability to the effectiveness, morale and reputation of the Constabulary. Regular, Reserve and Auxiliary members have committed lawless acts while wearing Regular police uniforms.

Police are seen as having a solely “enforcement and isolationist” approach to their work, based essentially on the use of force and intimidation and the creation of fear. The common view was that this approach was contributing to and aggravating many of the problems facing the Constabulary rather than resolving issues or facilitating solutions. The more poorly trained and disciplined members are, the more likely it is that they will adopt this approach. Consequently, Auxiliaries and Reservists were identified as being particularly serious ‘offenders’.

In the view of one senior executive police officer, these practices had created an environment of hostility to police within and across the community. As a result the community had become a virtual impenetrable jungle into which criminals frequently fled and disappeared, even after committing the most serious and cowardly crimes of violence.

Effective policing and community confidence depend on the visible, ethical and active police presence on the streets. Police must act in a professional manner and present in proper uniform.

The police uniform is a badge of office and a symbol of competence and accountability. All members of the Regular Constabulary must have a distinctive uniform that differentiates them from members of the Community Auxiliary and the Reserve Constabulary.

The Working Group understands the reasons for which the Auxiliaries and Reservists were created. In view of the crisis situation facing the Government, however, it has formed the view that their continued current operations are aggravating the already serious national situation and not contributing to solutions. It is our strong recommendation that further recruitment of Auxiliaries and Reserves cease immediately and the use of Auxiliaries and Reserves be fully reviewed and refocused on only providing support and assistance to the regular Constabulary.

The use of poorly disciplined part-time Reservists is of doubtful value. The Commissioner and the Minister should consider whether the use of Reserves is consistent with the Government looking to the Constabulary as the nation’s pre-eminent law enforcement body to maintain law and order. Consideration should be given to phasing out the Reserves. Members could return to their full-time jobs or be given the option of full police training and being absorbed full-time into the Regular police force. There is no place in PNG for part-time poorly disciplined police.

District and Provincial Administrations may believe that there is a local need for Auxiliary staff to assist community liaison with the police. That is a matter best addressed by them. However, whatever arrangements they may decide, there must be no connection, real or implicit, with the operations of Regular police. In any event, this local requirement is likely to be overcome by the implementation of *Interactive Policing* strategies by the RPNGC.

**Recommendation 24:** It is strongly recommended that:

- (a) No further appointments be made to the Community Auxiliary or Reservist Constabulary;

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- (b) Distinct uniforms clearly different from the regular Constabulary be used for members of the Auxiliary and Reservists;
- (c) The role of Auxiliaries be reformed to one which only provides support and assistance to the Regular Constabulary;
- (d) The Commissioner and the Minister consider whether the use of Reserves is consistent with the Government looking to the Constabulary as the nation's pre-eminent law enforcement body to maintain law and order;
- (e) As an alternative, spill the positions and publicly re-advertise and re-appoint according to the new standards and requirements determined by local and organisational needs and including the implementation of incrementally graded powers; and
- (f) Reservists be given the option of undertaking full Police Training and becoming full-time members of the Regular Constabulary.

### 4.4 Sustaining Effective Operations

Modern policing is smart policing. It relies upon expert analytical systems, appropriate technology and dynamic information management to maximise the effectiveness of its trained manpower. It is supported by well-structured systems and processes that guide its operations and link it to the judiciary system and the community. It embodies effective, accountable closed-loop management.

The Working Group found that in the RPNGC such systems were either absent or had fallen into disuse. Support services were ineffective and the fundamentals of basic policing could not be delivered reliably or consistently. Even the basic tools of paper and pencils were generally absent, as was a culture of recording, analysis and follow-up.

#### 4.4.1 Intelligence

The Working Group found that the Intelligence arrangements to enable effective operations by the RPNGC are unsatisfactory and ineffective. Most aspects of the current intelligence processes and systems are failing or are not being used effectively.

The National Criminal Intelligence Unit (NCIU) members are attempting to provide a service and some Strategic Intelligence Assessments are being prepared. However, they received little or no support from management or from the operational members they were trying to assist. They were frustrated because the pervasive malaise of apathy that seems to be endemic across the organisation was stifling their efforts.

The working conditions and accommodation under which intelligence operations need to be conducted are extremely poor. The Data Base Software is very basic, given the standards available in this field at reasonable cost elsewhere in the world. Members are using the antiquated ORACLE system, which is linked to only five Provinces. This is unsatisfactory for providing an intelligence service across PNG. Further integration of elements of the intelligence system is required.

There seems to be sufficient staff within the NCIU. However, the Unit does not have a surveillance capability or even a camera, which is a basic requirement in the intelligence environment. Like in many areas of the RPNGC, the Working Group found that only one vehicle exists in the NCD NCIU and the Officer in Charge is responsible for that vehicle.

The gathering and analysis of accurate and timely data are crucial to conducting Police Operations effectively and forecasting future trends. However, little information is being entered

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because of the lack of input from operational police. The base data on which intelligence systems rely and are usually provided through Criminal Intelligence Noting Forms and daily Information Reports are simply not being submitted. Criminal checks and Warrant checks are seldom used.

In the current volatile world environment, the Government is very aware that the breaking down of law and order in PNG makes the nation vulnerable to terrorist activity. As no intelligence inputs are being provided by Operational Police, there is little knowledge of the mobility of criminals.

Urgent action is required to establish the effective use of Intelligence. It is the essential ingredient of smart operational policing and the nation's protection against international criminal activities. An effective Intelligence Culture can be the powerhouse for implementing the Government's Interactive Policing model, which should be based on the effective use of tactical and operational Intelligence. Smart policing creates enhanced police visibility on the streets.

Effective intelligence is the essential ingredient of layered security in depth. It drives the protective layers of Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Recovery that are essential to effective national security against terrorism and organised crime. The effective and professional performance of the Constabulary is crucial to the nation's preparedness.

**Recommendation 25:** Intelligence is the key to smart operational policing and the nation's protection against terrorism and international criminal activities. Without effective intelligence the nation is vulnerable. Immediate priority must be given to get working what already exists. It is recommended that:

- (e) Urgent action be taken to establish effective discipline and operational processes and procedures in the RPNGC (as also recommended elsewhere in this report);
- (f) The Commissioner draw attention to the national importance of effective Intelligence and direct the Deputy Commissioner (Operations) to activate existing systems and processes for Intelligence gathering, input, analysis and dissemination;
- (g) The Deputy Commissioner (Operations) direct District and Station Commanders to ensure that Criminal Intelligence Noting Forms and daily Information Reports are filled in regularly by operational police and submitted to the NCIU;
- (h) The Deputy Commissioner (Operations) conduct weekly checks to ensure that his direction is being complied with, and deal firmly, swiftly and effectively with non-compliance using the full extent of disciplinary powers available under the Act; and
- (i) The Commissioner require weekly written reports from the Deputy Commissioner (Operations) on progress in establishing an effective Intelligence system for the RPNGC, identification of blockages and action being taken to overcome them.

Kick-starting the existing Intelligence arrangements is only the essential commencement of the task. The problems facing PNG and countries in the region are unlikely to disappear and the nation must strengthen its security defences against terrorism and organised crime. The pillar is re-establishing effective law and order and community safety across the provinces of PNG.

Action must also begin now to achieve results in the medium and longer-term. In many ways, the consolidation of a sound and effective modern Intelligence capability is central to the growth and

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strengthening of the Constabulary. It is what drives effective, smart policing and acts as a resources multiplier. The Government cannot afford not to make investments in this critical area.

**Recommendation 26:** The lead times for strengthening and deepening Intelligence capability are long. Action needs to be taken now to ensure that integrated and coordinated reconstruction of the Constabulary can occur. It is recommended that:

- (a) With the intention of bringing both functions together to ensure effective Intelligence management, move to secure suitable accommodation to enable the co-location of the NCIU and the NCD to enhance security and enable effective operations;
- (b) Action be taken to create a National Data base for the collection and dissemination of all Operational and Tactical Intelligence;
- (c) The Deputy Commissioner (Operations) and Deputy Commissioner (Administration) explore acquisition options including possible aid sources and prepare a submission to the Government;
- (d) The Deputy Commissioner (Operations) consider how effective modern Intelligence can drive and enable smart Community Policing and develop a Community Policing Model based on the effective use of tactical and operational Intelligence; and
- (e) The Deputy Commissioner (Operations) and Deputy Commissioner (Administration) explore with other Government agencies and overseas partners how the RPNGC Intelligence arrangements best integrate with national and international resources including Interpol

### 4.4.2 NCD Communications

The NCD Communications Room is located at Boroko Police Centre. The facilities include Computer Aided Systems linked to other computers within the NCD Operations Centre. However, they are not linked to any outside systems. The system is basic, but better than any other system inspected by the Working Group. The collection of data from the system is limited, with the Customer Report being recorded and the results eventually obtained from the Patrols.

The established staffing for the NCD Operations Centre is 35. On examination, of the five Squads/Teams displayed on the roster more than half were absent because of redeployment to the Highlands for an Election. Statistical data on operations were not available. Given the manning situation; it was evident that the Unit would simply fail if it were inundated with incoming calls. The facility inspected at Mt Hagen was also considered unsatisfactory.

The Working Group heard regular complaints from the community that it was a waste of time phoning the police because no one ever answered the phone. The telephone directory clearly indicates that for emergencies a member of the community should telephone '000'. For non-emergency calls the directory lists a large number of numbers on which to contact police stations, squads, offices and individuals. This presents a complex maze of choices to the individual.

This demonstrates the overall problem faced by the community in contacting Police. Most Police Centres are not contactable after hours due to closure or shift shortages. When the Working Group checked the Public Phone system outside most Police Centres, there were no Police assistance numbers displayed, causing complaints and continued frustration by the community.

The Public Phone is the first point of contact for the community in calling for Police assistance. When telephones are not answered it sets a bad precedent and creates a very poor perception of



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the effectiveness of Police. Community confidence is fundamentally dependent on the ability of the community to contact Police quickly and effectively when assistance is required.

**Recommendation 27:** Urgent action is required to develop a sustainable fully staffed NCD Operations Centre, with the ability to respond effectively and quickly to community needs and expectations. It is recommended that:

- (a) A national Community Assistance Number (CAN) be established on which the community can access Police and which is actioned from one central location. The complexity of appropriately routing the call is in the system;
- (b) Call Centres supporting the CAN be established in each major town and city, to be staffed by appropriately trained operators following consistent national procedures;
- (c) The NCD Operations Centre be fully staffed and maintained at all times on a 24 hours operational basis; and
- (d) The NCD Operations Centre equipment be upgraded and linked to outside systems to enable quick, effective and coordinated response to the community.

### 4.4.3 National Communications Centre

The RPNGC National Communications Centre (NCC) is located at Police Headquarters in Konedubo. The telephone system is analogue and the PABX is that handed over at Independence. Although the NCC has not had any noticeable resource upgrades or equipment replacement since 1989 it seems to be performing effectively under very difficult conditions.

While the NCC deals with police communications and coordination requirements, there is no National Crisis Coordinator Centre to deal with national disaster, riots or serious operational issues.

The telephone backbone system is fragile and there has been no maintenance on the repeater transmission stations throughout PNG for 15 years. Repeater breakdowns create maintenance problems that cannot be addressed due to lack of funds for travel to the remote areas where they are located. There are also difficulties with the existing HF, VHF and UHF communications systems.

Progressive upgrade of the communications system has been inhibited by the NCC having to pay the Department's telephone bill from its budget. Almost five million Kina is committed each financial year out of a budget of about seven million Kina. The telephone bill seems to be inflated by significant unauthorised use and long-distance ISD and STD calls.

There is a saying "*If it ain't broke, don't fix it!*" That should not be confused with neglect. The communications system in PNG has proved to be robust and has survived far beyond reasonable communications network planning horizons. It is now only a matter of time before it falls over.

There is a need for an urgent review of the National Communications Centre. That will necessarily address possible upgrading of the antiquated equipment and improving communications throughout PNG. However, the primary focus of the Review should be to determine the functions of the NCC projected forward for the next 10 years. It must also address related and contingent national needs.

The NCC is also a major national asset. It must be fully integrated with meeting wider national needs including the long-overdue integration with a National Crisis Coordination Centre. In most

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national crisis situations it will be the Police who must take the lead. In the current environment of real terrorist threat, separate development is something the PNG Government cannot afford.

**Recommendation 28:** Many issues impacting on the continued operation and effectiveness of the NCC have compounded over the years and can no longer be ignored. It is recommended that the Deputy Commissioner (Administration) conduct an urgent review of the National Communications Centre to determine the path forward. The review should:

- (a) Recognise that the NCC is a major national asset and not only an essential high technology facility to enable the effective operations of the Constabulary;
- (b) Conduct an immediate internal audit of the operations of the NCC equipment and activities to identify key problem areas;
- (c) Immediately remove ISD and STD access privileges from all personnel not authorised to use it;
- (d) Move the payment of the Constabulary's telephone bill from the NCC's budget allocation to a centrally administered administrative vote that is the responsibility of the Deputy Commissioner (Administration) to ensure corporate visibility;
- (e) Determine the required functions of the NCC projected forward for the next 10 years, including the need to encompass related and contingent national needs;
- (f) Explore the issues and costs involved in upgrading the current antiquated equipment to improve police communications throughout PNG, including the advantages, costs and resources savings in consolidating national communications in three central hubs and explore the costs and benefits to the RPNGC of civilianisation of all positions within the NCC and the Information Technology Unit, including the amalgamation of these functions to reduce unnecessary duplication; and
- (g) Recognise in implementation of this recommendation that the Police Communications Centres and indeed Police Stations throughout PNG had previously been supplied with adequate equipment that, in the absence of appropriate accountability, has either gone missing or fallen into disrepair.

#### 4.4.4 Operational Training

The effectiveness of a police force reflects its training. Members of the RPNGC have received large amounts of training both in operations and general policing. Much of the training has been allowed to decay due to lack of leadership, example and effective command and control by senior police members at all levels.

As has been discussed, discipline has been allowed to deteriorate to a woeful state for a professional police force. There is no direction or accountability for members to apply their training in police operations. Well-established processes and procedures are honoured by neglect. Equipment is lost, abused or mislaid and not maintained. Commanders do not take responsibility for developing and mentoring their teams and no follow-on training is identified or provided.

The situation is a symptom of a deeper malaise. Discipline must first be restored before any system of training and development can be expected to work. However, there are initiatives that could be considered, which would also contribute to rehabilitation of the RPNGC.

**Recommendation 29:** It is recommended that:

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- (k) Local, regional and decentralised training, focused on and tailored to identified critical skill and behaviour needs, be re-introduced immediately to reinforce the effectiveness and need for operational police training;
- (l) The Deputy Commissioner (Operations) direct Police Commanders to re-introduce on the job training using their trained members, and to report progress each month;
- (m) The Deputy Commissioner (Administration) explore the likely effectiveness of re-introducing decentralised training for operational police in those locations where suitably qualified trainers are located; and
- (n) Appropriate training courses in presentation, communication and negotiation skills be developed to support and enable the introduction of Interactive Policing.

### 4.4.5 Review and Update of Documents and Standards

An effective organisation must ensure that the documentation that guides its operations is up-to-date, reflects current Government policies and directions, and is followed in police operations and training. The Working Group identified numerous existing Standing Orders and Procedures, in-house circulars, Operational Procedures Manuals and Directives that have not been reviewed or updated for a considerable period.

There has been a failure to maintain updated procedural and administrative documents. This calls into question the appropriateness and lawfulness of actions currently undertaken by police. It also reflects a poor image of organisational command and control that is not consistent with good management practice.

**Recommendation 30:** It is recommended that the Deputy Commissioner (Administration) immediately convene a Working Group to:

- (a) Review all existing Administrative, Procedural and Policy Manuals including Standing Orders and Procedures and update them to reflect Government policies and directions and the current trends in Smart Policing and good management practice;
- (b) Report progress within six months; and
- (c) Develop a practical system of six- monthly audit and review to ensure currency and report through the Deputy Commissioner (Administration) to the Commissioner.

## 4.5 Resources and Equipment

### 4.5.1 Basic Resources

The lack of basic resources and equipment to carry out policing operations was addressed as a key issue impacting on morale and community confidence. The Working Groups has formed the view that existing resource levels are inadequate and such equipment as exists is in disrepair and dated. At many Police Centres equipment was non-existent and what was available was generally broken.

Urgent action to overcome these deficiencies has been proposed at **Recommendation 12** and **Recommendation 13**.

In these difficult times when criminals are well armed, one area requiring immediate attention is the issuing of pistols to protect police and bring them up to a state of readiness now enjoyed only

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by the criminal element. Currently many members have no weaponry between their bare hands and the use of long barrel rifles. Improvement in the issuing and management of firearms should be extended to ensuring that all accoutrements of office are issued to members.

**Recommendation 31:** It is recommended that immediate action be taken to improve the existing resources provided to police and that these be maintained to a standard expected by the PNG Government, the community. Action should be taken to:

- (b) Purchase and distribute outstanding equipment entitlements for all police members;
- (c) Conduct an audit of equipment currently found in all Police Stations and establish a benchmark list of minimal basic equipment required for RPNGC Police Stations;
- (d) Identify the deficiencies and purchase required basic equipment to ensure that all Police Stations can operate effectively (see also Recommendations 11, 12);
- (e) Require the Deputy Commissioner (Operations) to write to every Police Commander to remind them that they are personally responsible and accountable for the resources and equipment placed at their disposal;
- (f) When minimal equipment levels have been established at all Police Stations, ensure that follow-up accountability audits are conducted every six months; and
- (g) Refer to the following indicative checklist as a starting point for identifying basic equipment with which every Police Station should be equipped:

### Personal Items

- Uniforms
- Weapons (pistols)
- Handcuffs
- Baton
- Torch
- Notebook
- Pens

### Police Station Items

- Armoury
- Gun Lockers (safe type)
- Secure Exhibit Area (ie a Safe – similar to Armoury)
- Telephones and Communications (radios)
- Clothing Lockers
- Stationery Items – (paper, forms, staplers, hole punch, pens, pencils, trays, etc)
- Desks and Chairs
- Bench style seats in public areas
- Typewriters
- Computers (this is a desirable but long-term option)
- Filing Cabinets and Suspension Folders

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- Copy Machine
- Whiteboards
- Pin Boards for Community reception areas
- Card Index Containers and cards
- Manila Folders
- Body Bags
- Exhibit Bags and Labels
- Exhibit Ledgers (to be used as registers for drugs, seized property etc.)
- First Aid Kits
- Fire Extinguishers
- Metal lockable Filing Cabinets

### 4.5.2 Motor Vehicles

The vehicle situation in the RPNGC is slowly grinding to a halt. There are some 785 vehicles of which 537 are operational. That means there are about 248 vehicles that are unserviceable and are being utilised for spare parts. Many of the “operational” vehicles are in very bad condition and are being “run into the ground”. The appearance of police vehicles conveys to the community a lack of professionalism and a disregard for the resources provided to the RPNGC by PNG Government.

Little consideration seems to have been given to meeting the police operational purpose that motor vehicles are intended to serve. Managers simply manage cars. The “fitness for purpose” criterion seems to have been lost. This is a sad indictment of any modern fleet management strategy.

Lack of fuel is a major problem. To conserve funds, an arbitrary limit of 25 litres per day has been introduced to control expenditure on fuel. This is a classic case of mixed messages and the use of inappropriate measures to control expenditure. The measure has not been evaluated in terms of its impact on the effective execution of the police function.

While the result may be a marginal saving in expenditure on fuel, the measure has created major problems for the Government and Constabulary because operational police are unable to respond to community calls for assistance. In addition, the restriction is sending the clear message to police that fuel is to be conserved and vehicle patrols must be curtailed. A further interpretation is that vehicles should not be used other than for responding to major emergencies.

The arbitrary restriction on fuel should be scrapped immediately and replaced with real and direct management measures. Fuel is a means of meeting a police objective - it should not become the objective. Managers must be held accountable and responsible for the effective and appropriate use of vehicles. Any resulting saving in fuel, and hence in scarce RPNGC funds, is an outcome.

The age and poor condition of the police vehicle fleet and the restrictions on fuel have rendered police mobility ineffective. These deficiencies have become an excuse for lack of effective and immediate response to community calls for assistance.

Another problem confronting the Constabulary is the unauthorised use of motor vehicles and abuse of the “home garaging” arrangement. Vehicles are not available for core police functions because they have been allocated to senior police and administrative personnel who have commandeered them for their personal use. The appropriate use of police vehicles is not policed.

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Redressing the state of the vehicle fleet is a longer-term initiative to be taken in partnership with the Government. However, returning vehicles currently appropriated by officers not entitled to them to general operational use should be effected immediately. With the cooperation, dedication and commitment of senior police executives, action could also be taken immediately at no cost to allocate, as a temporary measure, legitimate private use vehicles to supplement police operations.

It is recognised that Deputy Commissioners and Assistant Commissioners are entitled to the use of a private car as part of their terms and conditions of employment. However, extraordinary times require extraordinary measures. This initiative would present a unique opportunity for senior police executives to display selflessness in the interests of rehabilitation of the Constabulary.

In the longer term, support services including fleet and asset management should be outsourced. The police vehicle fleet should be placed under the management of an independent body that has fleet management experience. An audit of the operations of the Vehicle Fleet is required to establish the real cost of current operations and residual value of the investment.

**Recommendation 32:** The management and use of police vehicles must immediately be taken under executive control. It is recommended that:

- (k) The Commissioner issue a directive that all vehicles currently used by officers without entitlement be returned immediately to general police operational use;
- (l) The arrangements for “home garaging” of police vehicles be discontinued immediately;
- (m) All vehicles be operated in accordance with RPNGC Standing Orders and policy;
- (n) The 25 litres restriction on fuel be scrapped immediately and replaced by management and control measures requiring that vehicles be used only for police purposes;
- (o) The Commissioner write to his senior police executive colleagues and direct that their Police vehicles be made available for Operational use;
- (p) The Government move to place the management of the RPNGC vehicle fleet under an independent body that has fleet management experience; and
- (q) Consider the gradual introduction of enhanced technology to monitor and track Police vehicles within the NCD to improve accountability and Operational effectiveness, subject to finance being made available.

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### 5. ORGANISATIONAL EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS

#### 5.1 Strategic Focus

The RPNGC can only function efficiently and effectively when its structure and operations are aligned with its corporate strategic directions as determined by the Constitution of Papua New Guinea, the *Police Force Act 1998* and policies determined by the government. The strategic alignment must be reflected in every activity undertaken by the organisation and enabled by its procedures, processes and systems. Currently, this does not seem to be the case.

If activities are not consistent with the strategic goals and directions of the organisation and consistent with its role and responsibilities, they should not be undertaken at all. Considerable valuable effort can be wasted on duties and activities that are not within the legislated roles and responsibilities of the RPNGC. Tasks, such as policing elections are imposed on the Constabulary and dilute its already stretched resources.

To the extent that interviews and assessments of available documentation have permitted, the Working Group found that strategic alignment in the organisation was weak. That is not to diminish the efforts of a small number of energetic and dedicated officers trying to make a difference. They simply do not have the visible and dedicated support of the executive levels of the organisation, with committed senior executives prepared to take personal commitment. It is essential that the Leadership of the RPNGC champion the Mission of the Constabulary and establish clear corporate goals to take the organisation forward.

The organisation has also developed Strategic Plans for the period 2002 – 2007 for Divisions and principal areas, together with six high level goals for the RPNGC. The frameworks seem to exist, but the Working Group found little evidence that senior executives were actively engaged in ensuring that their activities were aligned with strategic corporate directions, goals and objectives. There was no evidence of actions flowing from the various area Action Plans.

Apart from the activities of the Corporate Planning group who also carry out well-structured evaluations, there was little evidence of monitoring arrangements being in place throughout the organisation to assess, analyse and provide information on progress. There seemed to be little understanding of the importance of managing performance throughout the organisation.

It was not clear whether managerial staff have been given the training and awareness necessary to understand and be able to act on such performance management information.

The organisation currently lacks reliable, up-to-date information on performance and on its holdings of resources and assets. Decisions on actions and commitments are based on limited or incomplete information or are simply guided by the current perceptions of managers. These decisions are not assessed in terms of their impact on the organisation, nor are the outcomes.

The Working Group found that in most cases where information was provided, it was not passed on to other ranks. This has particular implications for the operational effectiveness of decentralised units and emphasises the responsibilities of Provincial, Regional and District Commanders.

**Recommendation 33:** To overcome the critical lack of strategic corporate governance of the organisation and to demonstrate total executive commitment to its improvement, it is recommended that the RPNGC:

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- (a) Establish a Strategic Policy and Planning Committee (SPPC) chaired by the Commissioner that includes all the RPNGC Executive to establish clear strategic corporate policy directions for the RPNGC;
- (b) Ensure that the SPPC convenes at least monthly to review changes to the strategic and policy environment and submits a *Strategic Corporate Status Report* to the quarterly Commissioner's Conferences;
- (c) Establish a small, highly skilled Corporate Planning and Development Unit reporting direct to the Commissioner to undertake and manage the work of the SPPC and consult with other functional areas of the organisation as necessary;
- (d) Develop an organisational performance management framework that reflects the Constitution, the Police Force Act and government policies and directives to act as a "strategic compass" and give direction to activities carried out by the RPNGC;
- (e) The collective Leadership of the RPNGC champion the Mission of the Constabulary and set clear corporate goals to take the organisation forward;
- (f) Introduce coordinated corporate performance monitoring and management arrangements to give meaning to the development and implementation of Action Plans;
- (g) Establish training and development arrangements to ensure that members are able to operate confidently in a performance monitoring and accountability environment; and
- (h) Specify in the Performance Agreements of every Deputy Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner and Assistant Secretary equivalent, their personal responsibility for ensuring the implementation of organisational performance management and accountability arrangements in their area and undertaking corrective action.

### 5.2 Priorities Setting Framework

Organisational efficiency and effectiveness depends fundamentally on the ability of the organisation to set clear and consistent priorities for the deployment and use of its resources. Every executive manager and commander must clearly understand the organisation's priorities to be able to make effective use of the resources entrusted to their command.

Notwithstanding the identification of six high level corporate goals for the organisation, the Working Group found little evidence of a formalised corporate priorities setting framework or efforts being made to organise work and activities to be aligned with the organisation's priorities.

It was evident that little management discipline was being exercised to make managers and commanders accountable for their actions and their deployment and use of RPNGC resources. There seemed to be an acceptance that determining priorities was a matter for the operational commander, with little recognition that these decisions may not be consistent or effective.

**Recommendation 34:** There is an urgent need to reaffirm clear and consistent corporate priorities set for the organisation that reflect its strategic directions. It is recommended that the RPNGC:

- (a) Develop arrangements for setting consistent strategic priorities to guide the allocation, deployment and use of resources across the organisation;



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- (b) Ensure that the priorities setting framework is linked directly to the strategic policy and planning machinery and the established strategic corporate directions;
- (c) Ensure that the strategic organisational priorities are approved by the SPPC and distributed to all members under a directive from the Commissioner;
- (d) Establish appropriate training programs in effective resources management for all RPNGC managers and commanders that also explains the organisational impact of ineffective allocation of resources;
- (e) Implement assessment arrangements that review and test the competency of managers and commanders and identify up-skilling, redeployment and retirement requirements;
- (f) Institute monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements to ensure that operational decisions are made consistent with the organisation's strategic priorities;
- (g) Specify in the Performance Agreements of all executive managers and commanders their personal responsibility for the ethical, effective and efficient use of resources; and
- (h) Identify sanctions for gross failure or negligence including the possibility of demotion and/or forced transfer.

### 5.3 Performance Enabling Structure

The structure of an organisation is a management response to ensure that the mission, goals and strategic objectives of the organisation can be implemented effectively. These structures can and should change to meet the demands of changed circumstances such as the growing uncertainty and volatility in the regional and world environment created by the terrorist threat. Terrorism thrives where there is crime and institutional arrangements are weak.

The Working Group found that data on the deployment of personnel in various areas was either incomplete, out of date or absent, with few systems in place that could provide reliable information. In particular, there was no information on the placement of civilians throughout the organisation, although the Working Group was able to identify raw numbers based on payroll.

There was little evidence of an established framework to link the structure to strategic and operational requirements, or for determining the requirements for positions and their placement in the organisation. Appointments seemed to be based on historical structures and positions. There was no policy to review positions on vacancy and no criteria or framework against which such evaluations could be conducted.

**Recommendation 35:** In the new volatile environment it is essential that the RPNGC carry out a comprehensive review of the existing structure and functions and assess the appropriateness and effectiveness of current arrangements. It is recommended that the review:

- (a) Be conducted jointly by the Deputy Commissioner (Administration) and the Deputy Commissioner (Operations) and involve the whole executive team;
- (b) Identify the roles, functions, strategic directions and priorities of the RPNGC as determined by the Constitution, the Police Force Act and government policy;
- (c) Evaluate the actual roles and functions performed by the organisation against the strategic framework and identify and eliminate inconsistent activities;

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- (d) Assess the appropriateness and effectiveness of the existing structure to meet the organisation's operational, legislative and policy responsibilities;
- (e) Identify those roles that should be undertaken by suitably skilled and experienced civilian members and assess the police/civilian balance against current arrangements;
- (f) Explore with the Department of Personnel Management any need to vary civilian staff ceilings on RPNGC engagements;
- (g) Identify the appropriate deployment and distribution of Police around PNG to meet the operational requirements and responsibilities of the RPNGC;
- (h) Assess the adequacy and distribution of skills in the organisation to deliver the required operational and policy outcomes; and
- (i) Ensure that there is a common discipline code applying to sworn and civilian members.

### 5.4 Operations Support Services

There seemed to be a lack of understanding that “administrative jobs” should actually support and facilitate operational performance. The maintenance and management of vehicles, the provision of paper and forms, the operation of a fair and equitable selection and promotion system, and legal services each support operations. If any activity being carried out in the RPNGC cannot be shown to support operations, it should not be carried out at all unless required by legislation or direct Government policy. Operational alignment must flow from strategic alignment.

In many tasks being carried out by the “administrative” areas, there was little curiosity about the operational impact of the task. For example, the ordering and distribution of supplies is driven by the availability of funds, with ad hoc priorities being decided at the time. There seemed to be no established process for testing the impacts of changed funding priorities for purchasing supplies with the operational areas that would be affected by the decisions.

The Working Party perceived a fundamental disconnect between the acquisition and provision of equipment and supplies and the operational uses to which they were put. The unpredictability of Budget funding on a monthly basis is an unacceptable imposition on a stretched organisation where its members are regularly put in harm's way. The situation is made almost impossible where operational units are not consulted on the impacts of revised expenditure priorities.

Operations support services must be treated as an integrated whole. There must be an understanding and sensitivity to the impacts of funding and scheduling decisions on the operations of the Constabulary and its ability to discharge its responsibilities to the Government and the community. Equally, there must be honesty and reality in the preparation of budgets.

To enhance operational and organisational effectiveness the RPNGC will need to integrate the many disparate areas of support or “administrative” activity currently being carried out. This requires not only subtle restructuring but also a fundamental change of mindset and development of an “enabling” support culture. All activities must be assessed for their contribution to operations, and those that do not must be discontinued.

**Recommendation 36:** To enhance operational and organisational effectiveness the RPNGC it is recommended that:

- (a) The Deputy Commissioner (Administration) role be focused on managing all Operations Support functions;
- (b) Urgent attention be given to restructuring the processes for logistics and supply, particularly the ordering, acquisition and distribution of equipment

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and stores to ensure that they are effective and appropriate and serve the needs of operational units;

- (c) A suitably qualified and experienced civilian Deputy Secretary be appointed who is not only an able senior corporate executive but also understands the operational imperatives of the RPNGC;
- (d) The Deputy Secretary will have corporate responsibility for organising, managing and structuring Financial, Human Resource and operations support functions to best meet the RPNGC operational needs;
- (e) The Deputy Secretary will be responsible for testing and determining those functions that could be more effectively delivered by outside service organisations (such as Vehicle Fleet Management), recognising that responsibility cannot be outsourced;
- (f) The Deputy Secretary will also be responsible for ensuring that effective corporate governance is exercised in the operations of the RPNGC and that it meets all legislative and policy requirements;
- (g) The Deputy Secretary will also be responsible for establishing and maintaining an effective and appropriate “tooth to tail” ratio of Operations to Operations Support for the RPNGC and ensure that this balance is consistent with best practice; and
- (h) The Deputy Secretary exercise the responsibilities of the Chief Financial Officer to ensure the preparation of realistic budgets across the RPNGC and the effective, efficient and ethical management of funds.

### **6. PEOPLE EFFECTIVENESS**

#### **6.1 Executive Development**

The effectiveness of any organisation is judged by the efficiency of its people. The Working Group found that while many senior executives expressed a good understanding of the problems confronting the RPNGC, little action was taken. The organisation suffered from lack of consistent direction and lacked strong leadership. Supervision and discipline throughout the organisation was weak and the monitoring and evaluation of roles and functions poor.

There is a belief held by RPNGC members and the PNG community that the Senior Executives of the Constabulary do not possess the necessary skills, qualifications or competencies to perform the roles they occupy. On the other hand, there is evidence that many of them have undergone significant training. It is difficult to identify whether the problems stem from the wrong kind of training or from a paralysing apathy because they believe they have never been provided with the resources or support necessary to manage or because they have been unable to change corrupt practices.

Currently there are no Senior Executive Development programs in place. There is a need to acquire and develop new skills to perform effectively in the changing environment. For example the integration of Community Policing as the new way of doing business requires managers to have well-developed communication skills and negotiation and conflict resolution skills. To deliver these skills effectively, members will also need to acquire presentation skills.

To ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of the RPNGC it is necessary to have in place appropriate and relevant training programs for Senior Executive members. Fundamental skills for all senior executives include Financial Management, Human Resources Development, Leadership, Communication, Negotiation and Conflict Resolution. The Divine Word University

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of Papua New Guinea is well placed to develop and support such programs tailored for the RPNGC.

There is also an urgent need for Senior Executive members of the RPNGC to undertake personal development training in disciplines designed to address the good governance and command and control the of their respective Offices. They also need to be able to impart these important skills and perspectives to others and develop sound mentoring and facilitation skills. There is an urgent need for Leaders to lead and Managers to manage by example.

**Recommendation 37:** Action needs to be taken to empower the senior executives of the RPNGC. The range of operational and organisational initiatives recommended in this report will address some of these requirements. To support these initiatives it is recommended that:

- (g) Personal development programs be developed for all Senior Executive members to enable them to gain the specific management competencies that are required to deal with the needs of modern policing in the RPNGC including properly focused and targeted interchange and secondment programs;
- (h) The training programs should include strategic and corporate planning and statutory obligations of the RPNGC to enable Senior Executive members to focus effectively on the core role and functions of the Constabulary;
- (i) In addition to individually structured personal development programs, short term Executive Development Awareness Programs should be developed that address the policy, strategic, legislative and operational environment of the RPNGC; and
- (j) Every Senior Executive be given training in Financial Management and accountability, including statutory reporting requirements, as well as in Resources Management.

### 6.2 Promotion, Openness and Fairness

The Working Group received considerable comment about the lack of transparency and apparent fairness of promotion, appointments and transfer procedures. Arrangements have already been proposed to enhance discipline and the transparency and fairness of grievance procedures. The Working Group is reluctant to recommend more intrusive machinery such as the establishment of a Promotions Appeals Board until the introduction of effective discipline and sound management practices have been given a chance to become established.

Priority should be give to immediately ensuring that fair and open procedures are established for promotion, appointments and transfers including openness and the reporting of outcomes to members. To strengthen the arrangements, immediate attention should be given to reviewing long-term acting appointments with a view to discontinuing them or to filling them permanently.

Such arrangements should be carried out in an integrated way with a formal review of organisational structure as recommended elsewhere. That review should not only address the range of positions required by the RPNGC to deliver its responsibilities and accountabilities, but also to review existing positions and confirm, eliminate or reconstitute them as dictated by policy, organisational and operational imperatives.

The job required to be performed by members is to meet the dynamic needs of the Constabulary, not simply to focus on a Duty Statement. Commensurate with modern best practice in a dynamic organisation, the Constabulary should move to establishing generic duty statements that enable

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managers to redirect duties as circumstances change. Remuneration should be tied to performance at level, not to do a particular job. These may prove to be longer-term reforms.

**Recommendation 38:** It is recommended that immediate attention be given to aligning human resources management practices with world best practice. This would include:

- (a) Ensuring that fair and open procedures are established for promotion, appointments and transfers including openness and the reporting of outcomes to members;
- (b) Giving immediate attention to reviewing long-term acting appointments with a view to discontinuing them or to filling them permanently;
- (c) Ensuring that these arrangements are carried out in an integrated way with a formal review of organisational structure;
- (d) Commensurate with modern best practice in a dynamic organisation, moving to establishing generic duty statements that enable managers to redirect duties as circumstances change; and
- (e) Remuneration should be tied to performance at level, not to doing a particular job.

### 6.3 Education, Training and Development

With the support of the AusAID funded RPNGC Development Project, members of the RPNGC have undergone a wide range of training courses. For example, in Phase 2 about 736 RPNGC personnel received training in approximately 30 disciplines, ranging from general duties policing to crime scene examinations, prosecutions, domestic violence, equal opportunity, and conflict resolution. The RPNGC has also conducted numerous training courses at Cadet Officer level and at Non-Commissioned Officer rank.

Bomana Police College is the main Constabulary training centre, training Cadet Officers and Probationary Constables. It also coordinates additional training at the College for the regions and provinces. The success of its training courses has not been evaluated to ascertain ongoing value.

Approximately 1400 members were targeted for Community Policing training. Some 30 disciplines were covered, including conflict resolution, community issues, train the trainer and foot patrol procedures. The project training adviser, the College and the Divine Word University developed a Distance Education capacity within the RPNGC. At the beginning of 2003, some 54 RPNGC members were enrolled in, had completed or are completing the Diploma of Management.

The Working Group was advised that the RPNGC has not recruited for four years and the Officer Cadet course is no longer being developed because the establishment figures for Cadet Officers has been reached. As a result of the “no recruitment” policy, training personnel are being transferred to other duties and thus their expertise is being lost. The College is without funds to perform its role.

The Divine Word University of PNG has introduced a number of new courses. A number of Cadet Officers at the rank of Inspector have taken advantage of these opportunities, particularly the Diploma of Management or Diploma of Human Resource Management, which commenced in 2001. In addition a Diploma for Women in Public Sector Management was introduced in May 2003 and 25 policewomen commenced this program.

The running down of training at the Bomana College because of the “no recruitment” policy should be of concern to the Constabulary. Successful training and personal development programs are essential for the renewal of staff and enhance the professionalism and effectiveness

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of the RPNGC. Once the training resources have been dissipated, it will be very difficult to resurrect them.

**Recommendation 39:** The funding problems of the Constabulary are recognised. However, every available opportunity should be taken to preserve the cohesion and effectiveness of the Bomana Police College as the Constabulary's primary training centre. It is recommended that:

- a) The Deputy Commissioner (Administration) and Deputy Commissioner (Operations) consider the future role of Bomana in the context of the major reforms being proposed;
- b) The Deputy Commissioner (Administration) continue to monitor and evaluate the content of relevant programs offered by other suitable providers such as the Divine Word University of PNG and University of PNG;
- c) As a matter of policy to foster organisational development, the RPNGC encourage attendance of members at appropriate programs (such as offered by Divine Word);
- d) As an integral part of building for the future, the RPNGC include "personal development" in the selection criteria for promotion; and
- (e) The personnel development policies of the Constabulary recognise personal development programs as an essential element of succession planning and skills profile development to determine future placements and deployments.

### 6.4 Performance Appraisal

Performance Appraisal is a valuable management tool when used in its proper context. Where subordinates are constantly rated highly, it usually demonstrates a lack of understanding of the purpose of performance appraisal. The purpose is not to blame or reward, but to assist with personal development of the individual to become a more competent officer.

Strengths should always be identified and acknowledged. However, real value is provided where an experienced supervisor is able to identify weakness and skills deficiencies and recommend suitable courses of action to strengthen these factors. Without such guidance the subordinate continues as before and the opportunity for remedial action is lost.

Discussions with the Human Resource unit of the RPNGC indicated that there are no consistent mechanisms in place to regularly evaluate the performance and accountability of Constabulary members. Performance Appraisals are currently used only for salary increment purposes. There do not seem to have been any increments paid in the past four years because of funding shortages.

To overcome the current deficiencies in service delivery and good governance in the RPNGC there is an urgent need to introduce accountability mechanisms covering agreed goals, performance measures, evaluation and penalties (sanctions) for all senior personnel. There is a need for the Senior Executive members of the Constabulary to focus on their core roles and functions and encourage them to commit to the core business of the RPNGC.

Implementing Performance Agreements would foster accountability and focus effort. It would permit evaluation of the performance of an individual and demonstrate that they are capable of performing the duties or discharging the responsibilities outlined in the Agreement. Areas of specific responsibility and accountability can be identified and the individual can be assessed as to their capability to meet the requirements.

**Recommendation 40:** A Performance Agreement is essentially a "contract" of performance between a senior executive and their supervisor. For example, each Deputy Commissioner would have a Performance Agreement with the Commissioner, and each Assistant Commissioner would

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have a Performance Agreement with their particular Deputy Commissioner. It is recommended that Performance Agreements be implemented for all Senior Executive members.

In the longer term, consideration could be given to implementing Performance Agreements for all RPNGC members of the rank of Sergeant and above.

### 6.5 Financial and Resources Management

The overall quality of financial and resources management by members of the RPNGC at the Command and Control level is weak and audit procedures are inadequate. Concerns have been raised at the Headquarters Finance section that senior police and regional and provincial police station commanders do not display adequate or responsible skills in managing RPNGC finances. There is also evidence that police at all levels are reluctant to action FF3 and FF4 financial requisition and acquittal forms.

The primary purpose of financial audit is to ensure that funds have been correctly used and accounted for in accordance with rules and guidelines issued by the Department of Finance and reflected in the Instructions issued by the RPNGC. The Working Group found only limited evidence that financial audits having been carried out within the RPNGC. The current audit team has a staff of one.

Where there are Provincial Administration Officers (PAOs) instances of irregular and corrupt practices have been detected. However, there is lack of commitment by senior police and police at all levels to exercise oversight or audit financial transactions and accounts, or to hold the local PAO accountable. There is no central follow-up to monitor performance or check compliance.

There is an immediate need to conduct internal financial audits of all units/sections and police offices throughout the RPNGC to ensure that financial guidelines and management procedures are being adhered to. Recommendations establishing the Office of the Inspector General of the Constabulary have addressed this matter. However, the issue of training remains.

**Recommendation 41:** There is an urgent need to raise the financial and resources management awareness and capability of all RPNGC senior executives and police station commanders. It is recommended that:

- (a) Training should be provided on financial guidelines and financial management to all personnel involved in the use, control and expenditure of RPNGC funds including senior executives and police station commanders;
- (b) Basic financial management procedures workshops be conducted for all Provincial Police Commanders;
- (c) Procedures be implemented to ensure that Provincial Police Commanders carry out their duties in relation to financial control and expenditure to ensure transparency in financial transactions; and
- (d) Sound financial management skills be a prerequisite for promotion to any senior rank or position within the RPNGC.

### 6.6 Secondary Employment

Secondary employment has become a destabilising issue for the RPNGC. Business and commercial enterprises seek to employ Auxiliaries and Reservists as “security guards” and a number of Auxiliary and Reserve police are working with outside agencies. The private sector enterprises pay a wage but do not supply uniforms or equipment and are not liable for the actions of members in their employ.

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A particular outcome of such arrangements is that the RPNGC may be considered ultimately responsible for the actions of the Auxiliaries and Reservists and liable for any compensation arising from death or injury caused in the course of their secondary employment.

Information suggests that contrary to policy a large number of Regular, Auxiliary and Reservist police are engaged in unauthorised secondary employment to the detriment of their legitimate roles. This places demands on existing resources and limits the RPNGC's ability to deliver the police services required by the community.

The Constabulary is currently being blamed by the community for every unlawful activity carried out by a Regular, Reservist, Community Auxiliary Police or a Special Constable. There is an urgent need to examine and review the role and functions of the Community Auxiliary Police, the Reservists and Special Constables of the RPNGC.

This issue has already been addressed in Section 5.3.2. The fundamental reconsideration of the roles of Auxiliaries and Reserves was proposed in **Recommendation 24**. If the contentious issues created by Auxiliaries and Reservists can be resolved by the Government, the matter of secondary employment will be placed in its proper perspective. General issues of secondary employment should then be able to be managed according to existing policy and protocols.

### 7. BUDGET AND RESOURCES

#### 7.1 The RPNGC Budget

Responsibility for the development and administration of the Annual Budget rests with the Assistant Secretary, Finance and Administration. As the Working Group found with other areas of the RPNGC the effectiveness of operations was affected by poor management practices. Recent discipline action has been taken against a former Assistant Secretary and a number of his staff.

A consistent concern expressed to the Working Group has been that Budget appropriations are insufficient to meet operational needs. Over the last three years the appropriation has remained relatively static, which means that it has effectively been reduced due to price rises.

These problems for Budget management have been compounded because allocations for Goods and Services are only provided to the RPNGC on a month-by-month basis. The amounts released vary depending on the cash flow of the PNG Government. For example, in June the allocation was K4.88 million and in May it was K2.5 million. This makes planning difficult and results in the constant need to re-assess priorities and reallocate funds, with adverse results in the areas affected.

Salaries and Allowances (Personal Emoluments) are paid regularly through a centralised Public Service pay system and are not similarly affected.

The non-payment of scheduled funds has caused some Activity Areas to incur substantial debts, such as K23 million for fuel, vehicle repairs, and property repairs and maintenance. The need to service this debt until sufficient funds have been released has led to rationing of fuel and reducing vehicle maintenance, thus considerably affecting police operations.

Budget certainty is essential for effective policing. There is a strong need to explore with DOF how this might be achieved. Further debt must be avoided at all cost and efforts made to pay off current debt as a matter of urgency.

The processes involved in budget estimates and funds management are technically soundly based. However, responsible management seems to be lacking at all levels. Estimates provided by



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Activity Areas are generally accepted without refinement or question, when to do so may result in a more realistic bid being submitted to the Department of Finance (DOF).

### 7.2 A Realistic Budget

The perception held at all levels in the Constabulary is that the problems being experienced can be attributed to the lack of resources and budget. This is a common perception in policing. However, it is necessary for Police like all Government institutions to understand the competing demands for resources that confront Governments in their budgeting process. They need to be able to clearly advise Government about the operational implications of budget decisions.

The Strategic and Action Plans that are developed need to have close regard to what activities the Constabulary is able to undertake within the budget made available by the Government.

Clear plans and consistent priority setting processes within the Constabulary need to be accompanied by the provision of a realistic budget and certainty in ongoing funding if realistic operational commitments are to be met. The unpredictability of Budget funding on a monthly basis is an unacceptable imposition on an organisation whose members are regularly put in harm's way.

It is understood that monthly draw downs of funds are an essential element of the economic management of the Government. However, estimates of draw down levels must take account of scheduled inescapable commitments, particularly in relation to fixed costs such as those associated with fleet management and utility costs.

**Recommendation 42:** It is recommended that a joint review be undertaken by the Department of Finance and the Constabulary to set a realistic Core Budget for the RPNGC. The Core Budget will:

- a) Establish the Financial Guidance for the Constabulary by the DOF and reflect the real costs of meeting agreed, practical and achievable operational goals;
- b) Form the basis for strategic and financial planning for the Constabulary and determine the level of services that the Government will fund the Constabulary to deliver;
- c) Need to be supplemented by Government when it requires the Constabulary to deliver additional or new services, (eg for elections) so that the additional requirement does not impact on the delivery of the agreed Core Services of the Constabulary; and
- d) Need to be explained to Police Commanders and training be given to them to be able to draft practical and realistic budgets within DOF Financial Guidance.

### 7.3 Police Pensions

At the time of PNG Independence, serving Police were given the option of continuing under the existing Pension Scheme or transferring to a new scheme. Those who elected to remain under the existing scheme are paid pensions by the Constabulary from funds appropriated each year.

Those Police who transferred to the new scheme and those who have joined since Independence contribute to the Public Officers' Superannuation Fund (POSF) that is administered centrally.

A significant part of the RPNGC budget is required for the payment of police pensions for those members who opted not to contribute to the general Government Superannuation fund. The funds made available to the Constabulary for this purpose (K7.8M in 2004) are insufficient to meet commitments which are estimated at K10M.

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The Constabulary is faced with considerable difficulty where the level of appropriation fails to meet committed requirements. A shortfall occurred in 2003 when pensions were increased but no additional funds were provided to the RPNGC. As a result, pensioners in only five Provinces were paid the increase, creating shortfalls and dissatisfaction elsewhere.

The administration by the Constabulary of pensions, particularly when insufficient funds are made available, diverts administrative effort from supporting police operations and directs antipathy towards the Constabulary. This situation impacts adversely on the confidence people have in the Constabulary, even though the payment of pensions is not related to the delivery of police services.

**Recommendation 43:** It is recommended that the administration of Police Pensions be transferred from the Constabulary to an organisation that undertakes similar functions in relation to other PNG Government employees.

### 7.4 The RPNGC Budget Process

The Budget Process followed by the RPNGC is summarised as follows:

- Activity areas prepare estimates and submit to Finance and Administration. They are compiled and referred to the Executive who decide on the final bid.
- The bid is referred to DOF with justification and negotiations take place.
- DOF refer it to the Central Agency Co-ordination Committee who makes the final decision.
- Constabulary is notified of the allocation.
- Each month DOF liaises with the Bank of PNG who advises what funds are available and DOF then advises the Constabulary on how much can be drawn down.
- Each month a statement of accounts is prepared and referred to an internal Expenditure Review Committee.
- The accounts are audited twice a year by external auditors.
- This year the statement of accounts has been referred to the Public Accounts Committee for the first time since the early 1980s.

The formalised Financial Management arrangements are as follows:

- Minister for Finance appoints various officers to be Authorising Officers and to approve expenditure.
- The Commissioner provides financial delegations to separate officers (segregation of duties ) to sign that funds are available.
- The Constabulary makes payments by cheque from a drawing account at the Bank of PNG.

### 7.5 Estimates and Appropriations

The following tables provides a review of performance of Budget Estimates against Appropriations for the Financial Years from 2001/2002 to 2003/2004. The figures for Pensions are also provided.

<b>2001/2002</b>	<b>Budget Estimate</b>	<b>Appropriation</b>
Personal Emoluments	85,312,400	82,322,100
Goods and Services	72,417,100	42,209,800

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<b>Total</b>	<b>157,729,500</b>	<b>124,531,900</b>
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### **2002/2003**

Personal Emoluments	92,599,600	82,936,800
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Goods and Services	38,102,900	23,365,500
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<b>Total</b>	<b>130,702,500</b>	<b>106,302,300</b>
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### **2003/2004**

Personal Emoluments	86,627,900	84,601,800
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Goods and Services	53,219,700	36,738,300
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<b>Total</b>	<b>139,849,600</b>	<b>121,340,100</b>
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### **Pensions**

	<b>Estimates</b>	<b>Appropriation</b>
<b>2002/2003</b>	9,875,500	7,996,100
<b>2003/2004</b>	10,189,500	7,701,700

### **Staffing Numbers ( from Payroll)**

Sworn Police	4950
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Civilian Staff	162
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<b>Total</b>	<b>5112</b>
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### **Auxiliary Service ( as at 2 February 2004 )**

Funded by RPNGC	930
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Funded by other organisations	2608
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<b>Total</b>	<b>3538</b>
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### **Reserve Constabulary (as at 2 February 2004 )**

Funded by RPNGC	1236
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Funded by other organisations	467
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**Total** **1703**

**Grand total** **5241**

### TERMS OF REFERENCE

#### **ROYAL PAPUA NEW GUINEA CONSTABULARY ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW COMMITTEE**

1. Identify the roles and functions of the police force and make recommendations about which, if any, of these are outside its core functions and should be dropped.
2. To investigate the recruitment procedures of the RPNGC with regard to regional balance, education standards, fitness and aptitude testing.
3. To investigate training methods throughout the RPNGC, including basic training, on-the-job training, in-service training, officer training and higher education opportunities.
4. To investigate the terms and conditions of police personnel of all ranks comparing them with PNG public servants and police forces in comparable countries in the region. This should include salaries, allowances, uniforms, messing, accommodation, whether these are being paid and what needs to be done to ensure that are paid in a timely manner. This should be done with a view to making the police force attractive to young, well educated Papua New Guineans and ensuring they are retained as members of the force.
5. Investigate management and administrative practices within the force with special emphasis on how funds are currently allocated, the best use of resources, what has to be done to ensure that the RPNGC uses its money to the best advantage and what level of funding would be necessary to ensure that the RPNGC is:
  - Staffed at a level which will allow it to carry out its requires functions and identify a desired police/population ratio;
  - At least as well off as other police forces in the region;
  - Making the best use of its vehicle fleet and other transport and evolve procedures for adequate maintenance of the fleet to an acceptable standard;
  - Able to adequately carry out its duties to restore law and order;
  - Able to account for all weapons at any time and that procedures for prevention of sale of police weapons are satisfactory.
6. Look at policies governing the transfer of police throughout the country and make recommendations about how to ensure that they are carried out according to the best needs of the RPNGC and the officer involved rather than a particular province, governor or politician.
7. Make recommendations about strengthening the Internal Affairs division of the RPNGC and whether there should be a police ombudsman to hear complaints from the public.
8. Make recommendations about the relationship between provincial governors and governments with the RPNGC with particular emphasis on what happens if the province is required to provide some of the funding of policing within its borders.
9. Look at different police philosophies like the New York model of “zero tolerance” and other models to determine if any or a combination of them is applicable to the RPNGC.
10. Make recommendations about the competitive employment package and tenure of the top command structure in relation to other forces within the region and the public and private sectors in PNG.

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11. Make recommendations regarding the ability to prosecute and convict criminals including white-collar criminals.
12. In conjunction with the law and order sectoral project make recommendations about legislative changes regarding sentencing, penalties, and maximum periods of remand with particular emphasis on the carrying of dangerous weapons (Malaysia and Singapore). Identify legislative changes necessary to introduce any recommendations of the Review Committee.
13. Make recommendations about the best use of donor assistance to the RPNGC over the next few years.
14. Review the roles of Reserve and Auxiliary police and determine how best they should fit in with the regular police, staffing and funding levels.
15. Examine the relationship between private sector security companies and the RPNGC and make recommendations about improving cooperation between the two.