An Architectural Response to Real-world Demands

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Hypothesis

- Given the increasing integration of the Internet into the real world, it is worth revisiting its core design principles.
- The hardest problems to be solved do not derive from technical deficiencies but from a better understanding of real world requirements.

Three high-level tenets

- Design for change.
 - Not motherhood--it has costs.
- Controlled transparency and trust.
 - Unmitigated transparency is no longer workable.
- Acceptance of conflict of interest.
 - Design to tolerate tussle, not to resolve it.

A first topic--packets

- Our conclusion: fine-grained multiplexing is a good idea that has passed the test of time.
 - Design for change: +
 - Tussle: ?
- Missing: architecture for aggregates.
 - Triggers an erroneous call to replace packets.
- Later: the stateless faith

Security

- Need a new security architecture.
 - Disclosure and integrity among trusting parties is not the hardest problem.
 - Control of bad guys and what they do is.
 - Theft of service, denial of service, end-node attack
 - Communication among untrusting parties.
- Implication: must use degree of shared trust to regulate transparency.
 - Transparency: -
 - Packets (stateless) make it harder.
- Implication: must have an approach to identity.

The power of understatement

- The weak semantics of the Internet has benefited us.
 - Permits operation over diverse infrastructure.
 - Permits creative use of "raw" capability.
- This flexibility is eroding.
 - Drive to the common denominator.
 - Security.
- Trust-moderated transparency again.

Naming and addressing

- Separate location and identity.
 - Helps mobility: + (well known)(all kinds)
 - Hurts security: (get over it)
 - Adds complexity: what names are needed for identity?
 - Thesis: a single, global, universal namespace of identities is NOT needed.
- FARA (a later talk) argues that this separation can be achieved.

An application perspective

- Study what they do.
 - They exploit generality.
 - But selectively.
 - They trade what they choose to exploit for the reach they achieve.
- Suggests a principle: accept that "non-general" nets will be attached to the edge of a general "Internet" core.
 - "Architect" this. Implies application-level state.

Help the application designer

- We don't help the application designer enough.
 - Praising transparency is not much help.
- Help the application designer think about:
 - What transparency the app needs.
 - What is the desired scope of the app.
 - What naming and addressing is needed.
 - What is the "end to end" analysis.
 - What relay architecture is needed.

Reconsider the stateless faith

- We are drifting away. Design the future, don't drift from the present.
- Issues:
 - Controlled transparency
 - Theft/allocation of service
 - Region structure
- Approach:
 - End-system reconstituted soft state.
 - Note: a tussle space

Note the unstated

- Things we took into account.
 - Mobility
 - Sensor nets
- Things we did not take into account.
 - An intermittently connected core.