



# HINDUSTANI FANATICS

AN 1895 BRITISH INTELLIGENCE REPORT

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About Tribal Analysis Center

## Hindustani Fanatics

*A band of fanatics who have inhabited various portions of the Yusafzai hills on the British border, and who have incessantly given trouble to the British authorities by their intrigues since the annexation of the Panjab [sic].*

“About A.D. 1823, and during the reign of Ranjit Singh in the Panjab, there came to Panjtar, in the Khudu Khel country, a pilgrim from Mecca, named Saiad Ahmad, accompanied by 140 Hindustani disciples. He proclaimed that he had, when at Mecca, heard a voice crying – ‘Go to the north country of the Yusufzai, and with them wage war on the infidel Sikhs.’”

“The chief of Panjtar, Fateh Khan, received him hospitably and became his disciple. He first subdued two chiefs of the Yusafzai who disowned his mission, and then made war on Yar Mahammad [sic], governor of Peshawar, for the Sikhs, and, having slain him, returned to Panjtar in triumph.

“Satana at that time belonged to Painsa Khan, the chief of Amb and western Tanawal; but the *Saiad* attacked and drove him from it. He then went against Peshawar a second time and defeated the Duranis [sic] a second time, and, leaving a garrison to hold it for him, returned to Panjtar. His force had now swelled to many thousand armed disciples, men full of enthusiasm in his cause as that of Heaven. For their support taxes were levied upon the surrounding villages, and armed parties were posted in various parts for their collection. Confident in his power, he now began to insist upon a strict performance of all the ceremonies enjoined in the Koran. The people, who had prayed twice, or at most thrice, in 24 hours, were obliged to pray five times. Fathers who had kept back their daughters until tempted by large presents to bestow them in marriage were punished severely if they kept a daughter unmarried after the age of 15, and thus in a single day 300 marriages were celebrated. He next began to compass the destruction of Fateh Khan of Panjtar, at least that chief believed, or chose to believe, such to be the case. Though considering how useful an agent this chief had proved, and how out of character anything like treachery or concealment was with the rest of the *Saiad's* actions, this charge appears very doubtful. It is more probable that Fateh Khan like others of his disciples in those parts, finding his own consequence annihilated and the tyranny of the *Saiad* unsupportable, was glad of any pretense for conspiring against him. It is certain that wherever his authority had spread, the people were heartily tired of him, and longed for the freedom he had overthrown.

“Saiad Ahmad was of the sect of the Wahabis [sic]. He denied the authority of all books excepting the Koran, and rigidly expected obedience to that volume. One of the peculiarities of the Afghan is the reverence in which they hold the tombs of their reputed saints, so that often a saint has with them more authority than God. Saiad Ahmad insisted upon the desecration of all their shrines, and by this act excited against him the strongest religious prejudices of those whom he had already exasperated by his tyranny. A secret and deep-laid conspiracy against the Saiad was set on foot by Fateh Khan. At an appointed hour of a certain night the armed inhabitants of each village rose upon his disciples posted in various parts for collection, and, having slaughtered them, lighted fires on conspicuous points to witness the deed. The whole country that night was afire. The Saiad was at Panjtar with 1,100 of his armed followers and some field pieces taken from the Duranis.

He was too strong to be openly attacked. Indeed, his probably reputed sanctity would have prevented Fateh Khan from attacking his person. That chief came therefore before him, apparently in great affliction, represented the horrible atrocity which had been committed upon his disciples, and offered in person to escort the Saiad to some region of the mountains where the people were not as yet hostile to him.

“They accordingly marched through the valley of Buner; but as the guns were represented to the Saiad as being far too heavy for conveyance by the wild paths he must follow, he during the night had them buried under his tents, it is believed in or near Panjtar. They were ten in number, and were demanded of Fateh Khan by the Sikhs; and Dost Mahammad, when encamped on the Indus in A.D. 1848, made the same demand, but in vain. Wherever buried, the secret has been well kept.

“The people of Buner had no wish for a master, and the Saiad left their valley for the mountain of the Chagharzais, trans-Indus, and thence crossing the river went to Tahkot, to the Tikri and Nandihar valleys north of Hazara. Thence he proceeded to Balakot, on the river Nainsukh, where he made proselytes of the Saiads of Khagan and some others.

“The heir-apparent of Ranjit Sing [sic], Rana Sher Sing, with a large army, now marched against him from Kashmir, and, bridging the Nainsukh at Ghari Habibula, crossed into Pakli, marched up the Bogarmang glen, climbed the intervening ridge of mountain, and came down upon the Saiad’s rear as he camped in the valley of Balakot. It was in vain that his friends entreated him to retreat to defensible ground, which he could easily have done. His answer was – ‘Sher Sing has come far to meet me. I will not disappoint him.’

“He stood his ground in the valley, where resistance against such an overwhelming force was manifestly hopeless. Not one of his Hindustani disciples flinched, but the men of the hills, unable to fight in such open ground, early deserted him. Three times the Hindustanis charged, and thrice beat the Sikh regiments. The young prince then put himself at the head of some fresh corps, surrounded the little party, and destroyed them to a man. A boy alone escaped slaughter. The head of the Saiad was cut off by a Nihang,<sup>1</sup> but the body was identified by the peculiarities of the hands and feet. It was buried with reverence by his conqueror, wrapped in Kashmir shawls, but the Sikh governor of Hazara, fearing it might become a shrine attracting all the fanatics of India, afterwards had it dug up, cut into pieces, and thrown into the river Nainsukh.

“The Saiad’s lieutenant, Mula Wali Mahamad, had been sent across the Nainsukh with some hundreds of the disciples to plunder the Sikh camp. They therefore escaped the slaughter, and, resorting to Nandihar, set up there and waged war upon the people of Alahi and Tikri. Being defeated, they fled to Panjtar. Here they were welcomed by Fateh Khan, who in the interim had endeavored to extract for himself the tribute taken by the saiad, but had been defeated and humbled. He now renewed this attempt with the aid of Wali Mahamad, but the people still resisted, and drove the Mula out of the country. He fled to Buner, and soon after Painsa Khan of Amb and made him the collector of the Agror valley, where he made war with the people of Tikri, who at length induced Painsa Khan to remove him.

“Mula Wali Mahamad then retired to Satana, and collecting 1,500 followers from those at feud with Fateh Khan of Panjtar, a battle occurred at Topi, and the Mula was defeated with great slaughter and fled to Hindustan.

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1. Editor’s note: This is the name of a Sikh sect that is derived from the Persian word for *crocodile*.

“About A.D. 1846, one of the disciples, Mula Kasim, writing to Hindustan that Saiad Ahmad was still alive, had soon around him some 600 disciples at Balakot. With these he defeated Amir Khan of Ghari, and took from him his castle. He then entreated Dost Mahamad to send a force in aid of the holy war, which he was assured the Saiad had risen from the dead to conduct; and through that chief would gladly have recovered by such instrumentality Peshawar and Kashmir, either or both, he wished to know before he lent any aid whether the Saiad had really escaped the slaughter, and therefore sent a eunuch, on whose sagacity he could rely, to ascertain this point.

“The emissary on reaching the place where the Saiad was supposed to be insisted upon paying his respects in person. He was told that the Saiad could not be approached without certain destruction to the intruder, but that he condescended a distant glance of his sacred person to his most favoured followers. They led him accordingly to the mouth of a dark cavern, made him take off his shoes and approach with much ceremony. He looked in and saw the saint kneeling at his devotions, and pretending to be seized in a fit of enthusiasm, rushed in exclaiming, ‘Oh, holy martyr, accept my services!’ No answer came, and his near approach assured him of the nature of the deception. He snatched the cloak from the shoulders of the saint, and found beneath that and the turban a goat’s skin inflated with air. These he threw out of the cave, and beat the man who had charge of the entrance. In spite of this trickery, many believe to this day that the Saiad was not slain, or, at any rate, that he is still alive.

“The faith of his proselytes there assembled was not shaken, and when, after the surrender to Captain Edwardes of Kahsmir, Lieutenant Lumsden led back the Sikh forces by the valley of the Jhelam, he was opposed at the Dub mountain, close to Muzaffarabad, by the Fanatics, with whom were associated the Saiads of Khagan and people of Balakot. But he forced this mountain by great personal exertion and exposure, and by the most masterly stratagem won the pass beyond the Nainsukh into Pakli and surprised the Fanatics at Balakot, threatening them with his camp equipage, flags, and trumpets from the eastern bank of the river, whilst his whole force, which crossed in the night, had ascended the Bogarmang glen, and came down on the rear of the fanatic army as they were gazing at the tremendous display on the other side. They fled up the valley to Khagan, and he followed and drove them up into the snow, when they surrendered, and were let loose south of the Margala pass upon condition of never returning.

“In spite of this, a small body of them soon after collected at Satana, where gradually they increased, built a cantonment, had their drills and their bugle-calls, and sometimes swelled to the number of 800 or 900.

“During the second Sikh war Dost Mahamad openly took part against the British, and, fearing punishment, he is said to have induced Saiad Akbar to set up as king of Swat, hoping that the strength of those mountains would keep us employed, and prevent us for some time meddling with him. The Swatis, however, never entered heartily into these views. The Akhund was a man of sense, and dissuaded them from molesting the British and bringing upon themselves their vengeance.

“Saiad Ahmad, though an enthusiast in religion, was fond of power, and might, had he lived, have set up a little kingdom of his own. His immediate followers had employed enthusiasm as a means of conquest, attacking Musalmans as readily as infidels. But since the annexation a new turn was given to the movement, and the fanatic levy of the Panjab maintained for the avowed purpose of restoring the Mahamadan authority in India. With the exception of Saiad Akbar, the Hindustanis were objects of suspicion and fear to all the inhabitants of the Mahaban and the river borders. They were maintained by remittances sent them in gold coin concealed in various ways by fakirs from Hindustan. These remittances at one time amounted to not less than Rs. 40,000 per annum. They are believed to have been collected and sent them by Musalman friends in Central India.



“Soon after the annexation of the Panjab, Major Abbott wrote the Panjab government, noting the great increase of the Fanatics at Satana, and asking permission to attack and disperse them, which then could have been done easily, because the people of the river border were our friends and their ill-wishers. Colonel George Lawrence, then deputy commissioner of Peshawar, being consulted, gave his voice against this, pronouncing them to be utterly contemptible. In reply, Major Abbott urged that ‘it was most imprudent to leave live sparks, however contemptible, in our thatch until a wind should rise and give them power.’

“In 1852 the fanatics attacked the chief of Amb, and wrested from him his little castle of Kotla, trans-Indus; and soon afterwards the Saiads of Khagan, relying upon their aid, set up the standard of rebellion in that strong and remote valley.

The Wazir of the chief of Amb also, who is said to have had an understanding with the fanatics, was reported about the same time to have incited some Hasanzais of the Black Mountain (cis-Indus) to waylay and murder Messrs. Carne and Tapp, who, in spite of every remonstrance, had pursued a route which alarmed the Wazir’s jealousy. This caused expeditions against the Khagan and the Black Mountain.

“In 1853 the Panjab government agreed to Major Abbott’s crossing the Indus to attack the fanatics. The Hindustanis lost heart as he approached the castle, and fled from it, pursued by some of the people of Amb, who cut down more than a score of them. The rest climbed over a spur of the Mahaban separating Amb from Satana, and night obliged the relinquishment of the pursuit; and it would have been easy next day to have destroyed their cantonment, and to have slain all who resisted; but this was not permitted.”

In 1858 they had again become so troublesome that an expedition on a large scale was launched against them under General Cotton (*vide* Satana). This dispersed them for the time, and the Saiads and Hindustanis then retired to Malka, a village on the slopes of Mahaban, which was granted them by the Amazai tribe.

Engagements were then taken from the Utmanzais and Jaduns to unite in expelling and keeping out the Saiads and their followers. In 1861 these engagements were broken, but a blockade against the tribes induced them to compel the Hindustanis to retire. Fresh engagements were then taken, but were repeatedly broken. The Utmanzais represented that they were powerless to oppose the advance of the fanatics, who were supported by the Jadun tribe in violation of their engagements.

Whether there was collusion or inability to offer successful opposition, the result was that the Saiads and their fanatical followers re-occupied the forbidden lands of Satana, in consequence of which a blockade was established against the Jaduns.

On this threatening messages were sent to the British feudatory, the chief of amb. The chief Maulvi of the Hindustanis directed in person a night attack against the camp of the corps of guides; a fire was kept up across the Indus at one of our outposts; and a letter was sent to the Amb chief summoning all good Mahamadans to war against the infidel.

The Hasanzai tribe in the month of September also attacked some outposts of Amb in the Black Mountain, and subsequently the levies of the Tanawal chief, killoing several men.

The peace of our Hazara border for several years had been more or less disturbed by the fanatical preaching by the Hindustanis, and by the rapine of Saiad Mubarak Shah and his braves, who were in the habit of crossing the Indus, seizing and, in the event of close pursuit, murdering Hindi traders; and some respite had been procured by the removal of the fanatics and marauders from Satana on the southern to Malka on the northern slopes of the Mahaban, but their sudden return showed that stronger measures were necessary. The supreme government, therefore, ordered an expedition to be undertaken with the object of destroying Malka, and of expelling the fanatics from the country within the area defined by the Barandoh stream and the Guru and Mahaban mountains. Prior to the advance of the force, Maulvi Abdulla sent a letter to one of the chiefs of Buner, calling on him to occupy the Sarpatai and Chinglai passes, over the Mahaban into Chamla valely, which would otherwise, it was intimated, together with Buner and Swat, be annexed by the infidels to British territory, and during the operations which ensued the Hindustanis were among the most determined of our enemies. (For an account of the campaign *vide* Ambela.)

On the eventual defeat of the tribes by the force under the command of Sir J. Garvock, Major James, the commissioner of Peshawar, required that the Bunerwals should furnish a contingent of their own men to accompany Colonel Taylor, whom he deputed with an escort formed of the guide corps to burn Malka. This was effected without resistance; a signal proof was given of the power of the British government to punish its enemies in their most inaccessible fastnesses, in spite of the combined resistance of the whole hill population, and an obstruction to the future reunion of the Hindustanis with the Bunerwals was thus established.

The Hindustanis excluded from the Amazai and Buner cantons scattered in divided bodies, – some to Swat, others to the north of the Barandoh; but they did not relinquish their intrigues.

The accident of a police officer, named Ghazan Khan, led to the discovery that money and men had for many years past had been sent up from Hindustan and Bengal to the Hindustani fanatics at Satana and Malka. Patna, it was found, was the centre of operations. There was the family which supplied some of the principal leaders of the colony; there the pulpits from which the Wahabi doctrines were systematically preached, and the duty of contributing towards the expense of a religious war proclaimed; and from thence natives of Bengal were recruited and sent up in parties of five and six at a time to join the camp in the independent hills. At Thanesar they were received by a Rain lambardar named Jafar, a disciple strongly imbued with the Wahabi tenets and with personal devotion to Saiad Ahmad Shah, whom he designated as the “Imam of the world, the middle Mahdi, the Caliph of his time,” and whom, though long ago killed in action with the Sikhs, he believed to be still living and about to re-appear.

Ghazan Khan’s conduct deserves special notice. He had formerly served on the Peshawar border, and knew something of the doings and appearance of the fanatics. He was thus led to apprehend a party travelling down-country. The Magistrate, however, released them. Ghazan Khan then sent his son to Malka, and obtained intelligence concerning the part played by Jafar, who was therefore apprehended.

Another principal agent was Mahamad Shafi, a contractor for the supply of meat for the Europeans in all the cantonments from Ambela to Naoshera. This man’s money, position, and numerous servants in so many places, not within the superintendence of the organized police, enabled him to aid the cause effectually. It is not improbable that he communicated with the fanatics when procuring cattle for slaughter from the hills.

Eventually, through the exertions of Captain Parsons, Superintendent of Police, who was specially deputed to Patna to investigate the case, the individuals above mentioned, with some of the principal ringleaders, were brought to trial before Sir Herbert Edwardes, the Commissioner of Ambela, and sentenced to transportation for life.

After their expulsion from Malka, the greater number of fanatics retired, led by the Maulvi, to the Barandoh river; a few, including Mahamad Isak and Mahamad Yakub, two of their best leaders, returned to and remained at Malka with Mobarak Shah, son of Saiad Akbar, who succeeded Saiad Ahmad, and was elected king of Swat, and died in 1857. After a time the fanatics obtained from the Chagharzias grants of the village of Tangora and Batora, where they made a permanent settlement, and remained undisturbed up to the commencement of 1868. Their position was, however, by no means comfortable. The people amongst whom they dwelt made them pay dearly for the protection afforded them, and for the supplies they received; it was only by the greatest efforts that their agents in Hindustan were enabled to forward to them sufficient money for their support. They were, moreover, frequently threatened with expulsion by their hosts, who forcibly prevented the completion of two towers which the Maulvi Abdullah had commenced to erect in Batora. The Akhund also looked upon them with no friendly eye; their Wahabi inclinations were abhorrent to him, and their position in the country was a standing menace, for their leaders maintained their position only by intrigue, and were ready tools in the hands of rival faction in Buner and elsewhere, followers of the Kota Mulla. The reports received between 1863 and 1868 show that the Akhund and the chief Maulvi were at constant feud, for former denouncing the latter as a Wahabi and nonbeliever, and the Maulvi in turn accusing the Akhund of having deserting them, and betraying the cause of Islam by making peace with the infidels and allowing them to destroy Malka.

It is not surprising that with this constant pressure on them, both at home and abroad, the community was several times on the point of dissolution. During the autumn of 1866, Mahamad Ishak and Mahamad Yakub made several attempts to open communication with Colonel Becher through the instrumentality of Saiad Mahamad (formerly in our service); their letters were received and messages sent to them, but their plans were entirely frustrated by the vigilance of Maulvi Abdulla, who appears to have gained an entire ascendancy over all the other leaders. Matters remained thus until the beginning of 1868, the fanatics being too much engaged with their own quarrels and intrigues to annoy us or continue the system of highway robbery in our territories which had first led to the recommendation by the Panjab government of punitive expeditions of 1858 and 1863. In February 1868 news was received that the fighting men of the Hindustanis, numbering 400 or 500, had moved from Tangora and Batora to Bazkata in Buner on the invitation of Azim Khan of Bazkata, an opponent of the Akhund and firm supporter of his rival, the Kota Mulla. Azim Khan offered to give the Hindustanis houses and land in his village if they would bring over their families and settle there permanently. His offer was accepted, and the families abandoned Tangora and Batora, a few only remaining at Malka. Nothing more was heard of them until the 18<sup>th</sup> of April, when the arrival of Firoz Shah at Bazkata was reported by Azim Khan himself, who wrote to the commissioner of Peshawar to make his excuses for harbouring men whom he knew to be mortal enemies of the British government.

Firoz Shah had arrived some months before at Thana, the residence of the Akhund, and reported to be in high favour, until the evil news of the arrival in Buner of his countrymen reached the Akhund.

This movement of the fanatics into Buner was fatal to them; at a distance they might have been tolerated, and in time possibly regained their prestige; but the Akhund now lost no time in exerting all his influence to get rid of what he well knew would be a fruitful source of trouble to him. By skillful management he was able to conciliate and bring over all the Buner tribes of the opposite faction, Azim Khan, Zaidulla Khan, Nawab Khan,



and a few other chiefs remaining aloof. On the 25<sup>th</sup> of May, at a large meeting of all the Buner chiefs convened by the Mirji, the favourite minister of the Akhund, it was determined that the Hindustanis should be expelled from Buner, their presence being displeasing to the Akhund, and contrary to the terms of the treaty made with the British government. In consequence of this resolve, the fanatics, to the number of 700 fighting men, accompanied by Firoz Shah and Azim Khan, made a precipitate retreat to Malka, where they commenced to rebuild their houses and make arrangements with the Amazai for supplies. Afterwards the Maulvi Abdulla was induced to join a league that had been formed by Azim Khan and other Buner chiefs, together with the Amazais and Mubarak Khan, ex-chief of the Khudu Khels, to oppose the influence of the Akhund, and obtain for Mubarak Khan recovery of his former possessions and reinstatement at Panjtar. Mubarak Khan, who after his expulsion from the Totalai village, and the destruction of Panjtar and Mangal Thana by our troops, had come in to the commissioner of Peshawar, and been allowed to reside in British territory, was the prime mover in this plot, by which he sought to regain his former position. His money cemented the various alliances, and purchased the neutrality of some of the Buner chiefs; and on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of August Zaidulla Khan (Bunerwal) committed the first overt act of hostility by seizing a number of Swat traders passing through his lands. The Akhund immediately mustered his followers and directed the Buner tribes to break up the league by expelling the Hindustanis and putting to death the refractory chiefs. In pursuance of these orders, the Isazai and Salarzai Bunerwals attacked and killed Zaidulla Khan in his house. On the 12<sup>th</sup> they arrived, together with the Akhund's followers, before Bazkata, and sent a message to the chief Maulvi, giving him one day to remove all his followers, women and children. The fanatics at first thought of resistance, and exchanged a few shots with the Salarzais, but were induced by Azim Khan to give in and commence preparations for a retreat. The next day the whole body evacuated Bazkata, the women and children being sent on ahead, and the rear brought up by a guard of 50 or 60 men armed with rifles. For the first few miles all went well, the Buner men occupied in plundering and burning the deserted settlement; but as the fugitives neared the pass between Bazkata and Batora, they saw the hills on both sides held by the Akhund's followers. The mass of fugitives, including the Maulvi Abdulla, Azin Khan, and the Buner chiefs, pushed on through the pass and made their escape with only slight loss; but the rear-guard was cut off, and, after a gallant stand, entirely destroyed. From Batora the fugitives fled to Galima Bori in Chagharzai. Here they obtained a short respite, and even conceived hopes of being able to establish themselves permanently, being promised support in the event of attack by the Amazais and Guni Khel section of the Chagharzais.

The power of the Akhund, increased by his complete triumph over the rival faction in Buner, was however too great for them. The Chagharzais obeyed his order to expel the fanatics, who continued their flight through Tangora to Bihar, on the banks of the Indus, where they arrived about the 18<sup>th</sup> of September 1868 with 20 or 30 wounded men. Later accounts of them are very conflicting, but it is certain that the chief Maulvi, with some hundreds of followers, came over to Jodhbai, and that many of them remained there till the British force arrived on the crest of the Black Mountain. The fanatics were welcomed and assisted by the Pirzada, son of the late Haji of Kunhar, by the son of Baj Khan of Kabilgram, Akhund Khel, and by the Kahil Mian and the Saiads of Bihar. Through their instrumentality they obtained the grant of a hamlet in Jodhbai, and were enabled to purchase several rafts, thus getting command of the river, and making themselves independent of the extortionate Pashtun ferrymen. Whilst at Jodhbai, the Maulvi received letters (it is said) from Ghafur Khan of Tikri, who offered to give the whole body of fugitives an asylum in his fort and land in the Tikri valley; and from the Alahi jirga and chief of Tahkot, who promised to accompany the Pirzada to Jodhbai to hold a big council, and discuss measures of resistance against the British. Mubarak Shah was summoned by him, and the war party cis-Indus was daily increasing. It seems probable that a month later the force under General Wilde would have found a powerful coalition and some organized plan of defence; but its rapid approach disconcerting them, the fanatics hastily re-crossed the river, deserting their Chagharzai hosts, and thereby departing from their profession as soldiers of the faith, and destroying the last remnant of their former prestige, already injured by the treatment they had met with at the hand of the Akhund and his disciples. The main body went to Palozai, a village of the trans-Indus Hasanzais, who, however, refused to allow them a permanent settlement. From Palozai


they went to Tahkot, but finding no resting place there, they moved down the river to Bihar and Jodhbai of the Chagharzais; but ultimately being obliged to abandon this refuge also, they at last threw themselves on the mercy of the Hasanzais. Here they received some land called Maidan, which was granted them chiefly through the influence of the two leading men of Palozai, Malik Habib, and the Pirzada of the Hasanzais. The settlement now comprises a mud fort surrounded by huts, all erected by the Hindustanis themselves (*vide* Kala Mujhi-i-Din). They are said now to muster 400 efficient fighting men; and though not so well equipped and armed as they were at Ambela, they are still better armed than the neighbouring tribesmen, which fact, combined with their superior intelligence, gives them a certain amount of influence. They possess percussion muskets with bayonets, and manage to obtain caps for them. They also are reported to have four small brass guns. It is generally given out that they still receive money from Hindustan for their support. There are many Hindustani Wahabis in the Peshawar cantonment; the number of Wahabis in the city is not considerable at present, but it is said to be gradually increasing. Many of the Kazi Khel and Khalil Arbabs are also said to be Wahabis. Maulvi Ghulam Jalani, Mula Majid, and Kazi Mansur, in the Peshawar city, and Pir Ghias of Palozai in the Khalil division, are the leaders of the Wahabi sect in the Peshawar district.



# TRIBAL ANALYSIS CENTER

Traditional anthropological research conducted among tribes inhabiting remote areas where insurgents and criminals operate has become increasingly difficult to implement. Studies carried out among people living in small-scale societies now are nearly impossible due to the physical dangers associated with the civil and religious unrest found in those areas. Swat, for example, has become so dangerous that Frederick Barth's studies only could be repeated at the risk of the investigator's life. Similar research is not feasible among Burma's Rohingya tribes located on both sides of the border with Bangladesh, as well as with the Pashtuns in Afghanistan's interior and within Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, where even Pakistan's army enters with reluctance.

Given the difficulties of conducting direct fieldwork in conflictive areas, the Tribal Analysis Center utilizes an indirect approach. Using multidisciplinary research, we seek to collect and analyze data obtained from a wide variety of sources, both current and historical. In the absence of new ethnographic fieldwork to update our base of knowledge, the Tribal Analysis Center compiles and summarizes existing research and documents on tribal societies, combining this material with contemporary press reports and articles. We assume that much can be gleaned from well-informed observers who are not anthropologists, ranging from journalists and travelers to government officials.



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