

THE FOOTNOTES FOR:

UNDERSTANDING POWER

THE INDISPENSABLE CHOMSKY

Edited by Peter R. Mitchell and John Schoeffel.

Preface

1. For George Bush's statement, see "Bush's Remarks to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks," *New York Times*, September 12, 2001, p. A4. For the quoted analysis from the *New York Times*'s first "Week in Review" section following the September 11th attacks, see Serge Schmemmann, "War Zone: What Would 'Victory' Mean?," *New York Times*, September 16, 2001, section 4, p. 1.

Chapter One

Weekend Teach-In: Opening Session

1. On Kennedy's fraudulent "missile gap" and major escalation of the arms race, see for example, Fred Kaplan, *Wizards of Armageddon*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983, chs. 16, 19 and 20; Desmond Ball, *Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, ch. 2.

On Reagan's fraudulent "window of vulnerability" and "military spending gap" and the massive military buildup during his first administration, see for example, Jeff McMahan, *Reagan and the World: Imperial Policy in the New Cold War*, New York: Monthly Review, 1985, chs. 2 and 3; Franklyn Holzman, "Politics and Guesswork: C.I.A. and D.I.A. estimates of Soviet Military Spending," *International Security*, Fall 1989, pp. 101-131; Franklyn Holzman, "The C.I.A.'s Military Spending Estimates: Deceit and Its Costs," *Challenge*, May/June 1992, pp. 28-39; *Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces*, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1983, especially pp. 7-8, 17, and Brent Scowcroft, "Final Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces," *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Vol. 22, Spring 1984, pp. 14-22 (the administration's own Scowcroft Commission's rejection of the "window of vulnerability" story). See also chapter 3 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 3 and 4.

On Kennedy in Latin America, see for example, Charles Maechling, Jr. [leading U.S. counterinsurgency planner from 1961 to 1966], "The Murderous Mind of the Latin American Military," *Los Angeles Times*, March 18, 1982, part II, p. 11 (discussing how the Kennedy administration shifted the mission of the Latin American military from "hemispheric defense" [i.e. defense against external enemies] to "internal security" [i.e. control of domestic dissidence] after the Cuban Revolution and the failed U.S.-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion attempt against Cuba, and thereby changed the U.S. position in the region from toleration "of the rapacity and cruelty of the Latin American military" to "direct complicity . . . [in] the methods of Heinrich Himmler's extermination squads"); Stephen Rabe, "Controlling Revolutions: Latin America, the Alliance for Progress, and Cold War Anti-Communism," in Thomas Paterson, ed., *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 105-122; Jenny Pearce, *Under the Eagle: U.S. Intervention in Central America and the Caribbean*, London: Latin America Bureau, 1982, Part II; A.J. Langguth, *Hidden Terrors*, New York: Pantheon, 1978, especially pp. 99, 115-116 (detailed description of how Kennedy liberals engineered the overthrow of Brazilian democracy in 1964 and replaced it with the subfascist regime that ruled for decades, after the Brazilian President Goulart had refused Robert Kennedy's admonition to end his flirtation with "romantic left-wing causes"). See also, David F. Schmitz, *Thank God They're On Our Side: The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1921-1965*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999, ch. 6.

Chomsky adds that military-controlled states dedicated to "internal security" constituted one of the two major legacies of the Kennedy Administration to Latin

America. The other was the Alliance for Progress, a 1961 program of U.S. aid to Latin America, which was a statistical success but a social catastrophe (apart from foreign investors and domestic elites). On the devastating effects of the Alliance for Progress, see for example, Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America*, New York: Norton, 1983 (2nd revised and expanded edition 1993), ch. 3; Walter LaFeber, "The Alliances in Retrospect," in Andrew Maguire and Janet W. Brown, eds., *Bordering on Trouble: Resources and Politics in Latin America*, Bethesda, MD: Adler & Adler, 1986, pp. 337-388; Simon Hanson, *Five Years of the Alliance for Progress*, Washington: Inter-American Affairs, 1967. And see generally, Robert Williams, *Export Agriculture and the Crisis in Central America*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986.

On Reagan in Latin America, see footnote 13 of this chapter; chapter 2 of *U.P.* and its footnote 15; chapter 4 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 3 and 10; and chapter 5 of *U.P.* and its footnote 48.

2. On U.S. terrorism against Cuba, see the text following this footnote in *U.P.*, and footnote 21 of this chapter; and chapter 5 of *U.P.* and its footnote 29.

3. On Kennedy's authorization of attacks against Vietnam beginning in late 1961, see *The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam*, Senator Gravel Edition, Boston: Beacon, 1972, Vol. II, pp. 656-658, 677; William Conrad Gibbons, ed., *The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships*, Part II (1961-1964), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 70-71. For early press coverage of these attacks -- which elicited little protest in the U.S. for several years -- see for example, A.P., "U.S. Pilots Aiding Combat In Vietnam," *New York Times*, March 10, 1962, p. A8.

4. On public opposition to U.S. intervention in Central America in the 1980s, see for example, Edward Walsh, "Reagan Gets First Public Opinion Backlash," *Washington Post*, March 27, 1981, p. A9 (mail to the White House was reported to be "running 10 to 1 against the administration's new emphasis on military aid and advisers" to El Salvador, and the strong public opposition was confirmed in polls); Cynthia Arnson, *El Salvador: A Revolution Confronts the United States*, Washington: Institute for Policy Studies, 1982, p. 73 (less than 2 percent of the U.S. public favored military intervention in El Salvador, and 80 percent opposed sending advisers, according to March 1981 Gallup polls); Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America*, New York: Norton, 1983 (2nd revised and expanded edition 1993), ch. 5.

The Reagan administration was so concerned about the public's attitudes towards its policies that it developed plans to suspend the Constitution and impose martial law in the event of "national crises," such as "violent and widespread internal dissent or national opposition to a U.S. military invasion abroad." On these plans, see for example, Alfonso Chardy, "Reagan advisers ran 'secret' government," *Miami Herald*, July 5, 1987, p. 1A (reporting based on internal government documents that in such an event the administration intended to turn control of the United States over to the national crisis-management unit F.E.M.A., an agency directed by Louis Guiffrida, a close associate of Reagan and Attorney General Edwin Meese, who while at Army War College in 1970 wrote a memorandum recommending the internment of at least 21 million "American Negroes" in "assemble-centers or relocation camps" in the event of an uprising by black

militants); Dave Lindorff, "Oliver's Martial Plan," *Village Voice*, July 21, 1987, p. 15; Christopher Hitchens, "The adoration of the mad guy," *New Statesman* (U.K.), July 17, 1987, p. 20.

For an example of how these revelations were treated by Congress, see *Taking the Stand: The Testimony of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver L. North*, New York: Pocket Books, 1987. An excerpt (p. 643):

REP. BROOKS: Colonel North, in your work at the N.S.C. [National Security Council], were you not assigned at one time to work on plans for the continuity of government in the event of a major disaster?

MR. SULLIVAN [NORTH'S LAWYER]: Mr. Chairman? (Gavel sounds.)

CHAIRMAN INOUE: I believe the question touches upon a highly sensitive and classified area. So may I request that you not touch upon that, sir?

REP. BROOKS: I was particularly concerned, Mr. Chairman, because I read in Miami papers and several others that there had been a plan developed by that same agency, a contingency plan in the event of emergency that would suspend the American Constitution, and I was deeply concerned about it and wondered if that was the area in which he had worked. I believe that it was, but I wanted --

CHAIRMAN INOUE: May I most respectfully request that that matter not be touched upon at this stage? If we wish to get into this I'm certain arrangements can be made for an Executive Session.

On the Reagan administration's move towards intervention in Central America, see for example its so-called "White Paper" on El Salvador, *Communist Interference in El Salvador: Documents Demonstrating Communist Support of the Salvadoran Insurgency*, Special Report No. 80, Washington: United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, February 23, 1981. On the subsequent exposure of the basis for the "White Paper" as fraudulent, see for example, Robert G. Kaiser, "White Paper on El Salvador Is Faulty," *Washington Post*, June 9, 1981, p. A1; Robert G. Kaiser, "The Man Behind the White Paper and the Unfolding of the Story," *Washington Post*, June 9, 1981, p. A14; James Petras, "White Paper On The White Paper," *Nation*, March 28, 1981, pp. 353f; Raymond Bonner, *Weakness and Deceit: U.S. Policy and El Salvador*, New York: Times Books, 1984, ch. 13; Jonathan Kwitney, *Endless Enemies: The Making of an Unfriendly World*, New York: Congdon & Weed, 1984, pp. 359-374.

5. On the Office of Public Diplomacy, see for example, Alfonso Chardy, "N.S.C. supervised office to influence opinion," *Miami Herald*, July 19, 1987, p. 18A ("If you look at it as a whole, the Office of Public Diplomacy was carrying out a huge psychological operation of the kind the military conducts to influence a population in denied or enemy territory,' a senior U.S. official familiar with the effort said"); Robert Parry and Peter Kornbluh, "Reagan's Pro-Contra Propaganda Machine," *Washington Post*, September 4, 1988, p. C1 ("the campaign came to resemble the sort of covert political operation the C.I.A. runs against hostile forces overseas but is outlawed from conducting at home"); Robert Parry and Peter Kornbluh, "Iran-Contra's Untold Story," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1988, pp. 3-30; Joanne Omang, "The People Who Sell Foreign Policies," *Washington Post*, October 15, 1985, p. A21; Martin A. Lee and Norman Solomon, *Unreliable Sources: A Guide to Detecting Bias in News Media*, New York: Lyle Stuart, 1990, pp. 131-141; Alfonso Chardy, "Secrets leaked to harm Nicaragua, sources say," *Miami Herald*, October 13, 1986, p. 12A (reporting that a disinformation campaign named "Project Truth," designed to set the agenda for debate over Nicaragua, apparently was

activated in a secret National Security Directive titled "Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security," dated January 4, 1983); Staff Report, *State Department and Intelligence Community Involvement in Domestic Activities Related to the Iran/Contra Affair*, Committee on Foreign Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1992, pp. 3-4 (the Comptroller General of the General Accounting Office condemned the Office of Public Diplomacy's activities as illegal).

President Wilson's propaganda office during the First World War was the "Committee on Public Information," also known as the "Creel Commission."

6. On Carter military spending projections, see for example, Robert Komer [former Under-Secretary of Defense], "What 'Decade of Neglect'?", *International Security*, Fall 1985, pp. 70-83. An excerpt (pp. 73, 76, 78-79):

Actual defense outlays went up in every Carter year, in strong contrast to the declines characteristic of every Nixon-Ford year from F.Y. 1969 through F.Y. 1976 [with a] substantial increase in F.Y. 1981 [i.e. under Carter]. . . . As it turns out, the F.Y. 1982-1985 outlays actually approved by Congress average slightly lower than the Carter projections. . . . Almost every Reagan equipment program to date was begun under Carter, or even before, with the notable exception of S.D.I. [i.e. "Star Wars"]. . . . Reagan rhetoric tended to obscure the fact that Reagan's program was mostly an acceleration of a buildup already begun under Carter.

Bernard Weinraub, "White House Plans Rise to \$124 Billion in Military Budget," *New York Times*, November 16, 1978, p. A1. An excerpt:

Administration sources said defense officials were especially gratified because the President [Carter] has decided to cut about \$15 billion out of the normal growth of a range of social and domestic programs . . . [while raising military spending by some \$12 billion]. Officials indicated that the "guns and butter" argument waged within the Administration had now been settled by Mr. Carter in favor of the Defense Department.

See also, Thomas B. Cochran et al., *Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume I: U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities*, Cambridge, MA: Ballinger/Harper & Row, 1984, p. 13; Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, Washington: Brookings Institution, 1985 (revised edition 1994), pp. 865-882.

On Reagan's military budget, see footnote 1 of this chapter.

7. On public opposition to Reagan's policies and popular attitudes remaining stubbornly social-democratic in important respects since the New Deal years, see for example, Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, *Right Turn: The Decline of the Democrats and the Future of American Politics*, New York: Hill and Wang, 1986 (tracing the myth of a "right turn" in public attitudes in the U.S., and discussing general popular opposition to Reagan's policies); Thomas Ferguson, *Golden Rule: The Investment Theory of Party Competition and the Logic of Money-Driven Political Systems*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995, chs. 5, 6, and Postscript (extending *Right Turn's* analysis and confirming its conclusions through 1994); Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992, chs. 3 and 4, at pp. 169-170 (after reviewing an enormous number of polls over time, the authors conclude: "Ferguson and Rogers [in *Right Turn*] are correct, therefore, in arguing that the policy right turn of the Reagan years

cannot be accounted for as a response to public demands"); Stanley Kelley, Jr., "Democracy and the New Deal Party System," in Amy Guttman, ed., *Democracy and the Welfare State*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988, pp. 185-205 (presenting poll results that demonstrate consistent public support for New Deal-type programs from 1952 to 1984, with only a brief dip in 1980); Vicente Navarro, "The 1984 Election and the New Deal: An Alternative Interpretation (2 parts)," *Social Policy*, Spring 1985, pp. 3-10 (reporting that polls during the 1980s regularly indicated that the public would support a tax increase devoted to New Deal and Great Society programs; support for equal or greater social expenditures was about 80 percent in 1984, and a greater number viewed social welfare programs favorably in 1984 than in 1980; 95 percent of the public opposed cuts in Social Security, people preferred cuts in military spending to cuts in health programs by about 2 to 1, they supported the Clean Air Act by 7 to 1, opposed cuts in Medicare or Medicaid by well over 3 to 1, preferred defense spending cuts over cuts in these medical aid programs by 3 or 4 to 1, and opposed a ban on abortions by over 2 to 1; three-fourths of the population supported government regulations to protect worker health and safety, and similar levels supported protection of consumer interests and other social expenditures, including help for the elderly, the poor, and the needy); Mark N. Vamos, ed., "Portrait of a Skeptical Public," *Business Week*, November 20, 1995, p. 138 (reprinting a *Business Week*/Harris poll on popular attitudes towards the role of government, and concluding based upon its findings: "the public agrees more with the Democratic notion of government as protector of society's most vulnerable than with the Republican vision of Washington as arm's-length guarantor of an 'opportunity society'"). See also footnote 50 of chapter 10 of *U.P.*

On Reagan's electoral "mandate," see for example, Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, *On Democracy: Toward a Transformation of American Society*, New York: Penguin, 1983. An excerpt (p. 33):

On election day in 1980, the 53.2 percent turnout was the third lowest in American history, higher only than the 1920 and 1924 elections that followed the abrupt swelling of the eligibility rolls resulting from the enfranchisement of women. In winning the victory that continues to be labeled a "mandate" and a "landslide" by the national press, Ronald Reagan gained a smaller percentage of the eligible electorate than did Wendell Willkie in his decisive 1940 loss to Roosevelt.

See also, E.J. Dionne Jr., "Bush Names Baker As Secretary of State, Hails 40-State Support," *New York Times*, November 10, 1988, p. A1 ("estimates put the turnout [in the 1988 Presidential election] at from 49 to 50 percent of eligible voters. That would make it the lowest since 1924"). On public attitudes and the 1994 Congressional elections, see the text of chapter 10 of *U.P.* and its footnote 18.

For a poll on how past Presidents are remembered, see Adam Pertman, "Carter makes a triumphant return," *Boston Globe*, July 15, 1992, p. 19 (among ex-Presidents, Carter is well in the lead in popularity ratings at 74 percent, followed by the virtually unknown Ford at 68 percent, with Reagan at 58 percent, barely above Nixon at 54 percent).

8. On the Congressional origins of U.S. human rights programs, see for example, Lars Schoultz, *Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981, especially ch. 2; Lars Schoultz, "U.S. Foreign Policy and Human Rights Violations in Latin America: A Comparative Analysis of Foreign Aid Distributions," *Comparative Politics*, January 1981, p. 155 ("Over the open and intense

opposition of the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations, since 1973 Congress has added human rights clauses to virtually all U.S. foreign assistance legislation"). See also, Edward S. Herman, *The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda*, Boston: South End, 1982, especially p. 244 n.10.

Chomsky adds that it is a real tribute to the propaganda system that the press can still refer to a "human rights campaign" during the Carter administration, a Presidency which sponsored and supported the Somoza family in Nicaragua, the Shah of Iran, Marcos in the Philippines, Park in South Korea, Pinochet in Chile, Suharto in Indonesia, Mobutu in Zaire, the Brazilian generals, and their many confederates in repression and violence (*The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism -- The Political Economy of Human Rights: Volume I*, 1979, Boston: South End, pp. 370 n.80, 40).

9. On continued funding of Guatemala despite Congressional legislation, see for example, Lars Schoultz, "Guatemala: Social Change and Political Conflict," in Martin Diskin, ed., *Trouble in our Backyard: Central America and the United States in the Eighties*, New York: Pantheon, 1983, pp. 187-191 and Tables pp. 188-189 (annual U.S. military aid deliveries to Guatemala for 1977 to 1980 continued at between 94 percent in 1979 and 61 percent in 1980 of the 1976 level, with economic aid continuing as well); Allan Nairn, "The Guatemala Connection: While Congress Slept, U.S. Arms Merchants Delivered the Goods," *Progressive*, May 1986, pp. 20-23 (and see the exchange of letters with a State Department official, at pp. 6-8 of the September issue).

10. On the 42-page document outlining the mercenary-state network, see for example, Stephen Engelberg, "Document in North Trial Suggests Stronger Bush Role in Contra Aid," *New York Times*, April 7, 1989, pp. A1, A11 (summarizing and quoting excerpts from the 42-page document); Joe Pichirallo, "Bush Joined Efforts by Reagan, Aides To Solicit Arms for Contras During Ban," *Washington Post*, April 7, 1989, p. A1.

On the rise of U.S. mercenary states and clandestine foreign policy activities in the 1980s, see for example, Jonathan Marshall, Peter Dale Scott, and Jane Hunter, *The Iran-Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in the Reagan Era*, Boston: South End, 1987.

On U.S. control over the World Anti-Communist League, a collection of Nazis, fanatic anti-Semites, death squad assassins, torturers and killers from around the world, see Scott Anderson and Jon Lee Anderson, *Inside the League: The Shocking Exposé of How Terrorists, Nazis, and Latin American Death Squads Have Infiltrated the World Anti-Communist League*, New York: Dodd, Mead, 1986.

11. On Israel as a U.S. mercenary state, see for example, Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, *The Israeli Connection: Who Israel Arms and Why*, New York: Pantheon, 1987; Israel Shahak, *Israel's Global Role: Weapons for Repression*, Belmont, MA: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1982; Jane Hunter, *Israeli Foreign Policy: South Africa and Central America*, Boston: South End, 1987; Bishara Bahbah, *Israel and Latin America: The Military Connection*, New York: St. Martin's, 1986. See also, "Carving a big slice of world arms sales," *Business Week*, December 8, 1980, p. 43. An excerpt:

Although excluded from the lucrative Middle East [armaments] market, Israel has made headway in other parts of the globe -- notably Latin America, the Far East, and Africa. The Latin American market has developed rapidly in recent years following the Carter Administration's decision to prohibit U.S. arms sales to many right-wing

regimes. Israel has become a leading supplier to such countries as Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Colombia, and Guatemala. Other major Israeli clients include South Africa, Taiwan, Nigeria, Thailand, and Singapore.

And see footnote 16 of this chapter.

12. For Arce's interviews in Mexico, see for example, Rubén Montedónico, "Militarily and Morally the *Contras* Are Finished: Horacio Arce," *Honduras Update* (Cambridge, MA; Honduras Information Center), November/December 1988, pp. 13-16 (from *El Día* of Mexico City, November 6 and 7, 1988); Marcio Vargas, "'This War Is Lost. It Is Over' -- Exclusive Interview With Top Contra Defector, *Comandante Mercenary*," *Central America Information Bulletin* (Managua; Agencia Nueva Nicaragua), No. 40, December 21, 1988, pp. 1, 4-5. Arce, whose *nom de guerre* as a contra leader was "Mercenario," explained:

We attack a lot of schools, health centers, and those sorts of things. We have tried to make it so that the Nicaraguan government cannot provide social services for the peasants, cannot develop its project . . . that's the idea.

13. On the death toll in Guatemala in the 1980s, see Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification (C.E.H.), *Guatemala: Memory of Silence*, 1999 (quotations are from paragraphs 1, 2, 15 and 82). This report of an international human rights investigatory panel administered by the United Nations concludes that "the number of persons killed or disappeared as a result of the fratricidal confrontation reached a total of over 200,000" in Guatemala since 1962, with 91 percent of these violations occurring between 1978 and 1984. The Commission found that "state forces and related paramilitary groups were responsible for 93% of the violations documented by the C.E.H., including 92% of the arbitrary executions and 91% of forced disappearances."

For additional sources, see for example, Susanne Jonas, *The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U.S. Power*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991, p. 149; Piero Gleijeses, "The Reagan Doctrine and Latin America," *Current History*, December 1986, pp. 401f at p. 435; Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America*, New York: Norton, 1993 (revised and expanded edition). An excerpt (p. 362):

[T]he years from 1979 to 1991 turned out to be the bloodiest, most violent, and most destructive era in Central America's post-1820 history. The number of dead and "disappeared" varies according to different sources. The minimum is 200,000 (40,000 in Nicaragua, 75,000 in El Salvador, 75,000 in Guatemala, 10,000 in Honduras and the frontier fighting in Costa Rica), but this is only an estimate. Millions have been displaced or made refugees. If a similar catastrophe struck the United States in proportion, 2.5 million North Americans would die and 10 to 20 million would be driven from their homes.

See also, Amnesty International, *Guatemala: A Government Program of Political Murder*, London: Amnesty International, February 1981. An excerpt (pp. 5-6):

The bodies of the victims have been found piled up in ravines, dumped at roadsides or buried in mass graves. Thousands bore the scars of torture, and death had come to most by strangling with a garrote, by being suffocated in rubber hoods or by being shot in the head. . . .

By far the majority of victims were chosen after they had become associated -- or were thought to be associated -- with social, religious, community or labor organizations, or after they had been in contact with organizers of national political parties. In other words, Amnesty International's evidence is that the targets for

extreme governmental violence tend to be selected from grass roots organizations outside official control.

And see footnote 54 of chapter 8 of *U.P.*

14. For the McNamara-Bundy intercommunication, see *Memorandum for the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs*, "Study of U.S. Policy Toward Latin American Military Forces," Secretary of Defense, June 11, 1965 (available in the Lyndon Baines Johnson library).

For similar statements in secret but now declassified U.S. government documents, see footnote 52 of chapter 2 of *U.P.*

On U.S. training of Latin American military leaders, see for example, Jan Knippers Black, *United States Penetration of Brazil*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977, pp. 220-221, 170-171 (over 200,000 Latin American military personnel had been trained in the U.S. by the late 1970s, and U.S. military training has purposefully built a network of personal relationships between United States and Latin American military cadres); Joanne Omang, "Latin American Left, Right Say U.S. Militarized Continent," *Washington Post*, April 11, 1977, p. A16 (over 30,000 Latin American officers had been trained in the U.S. "School for the Americas" alone by the 1970s, and the training of Latin American military personnel in U.S. bases and training schools has placed great weight on ideological conditioning and has "steeped young Latin officers in the early 1950s anti-Communist dogma that subversive infiltrators could be anywhere"); Jeffrey Stein, "Fort Lesley J. McNair: Grad School For Juntas," *Nation*, May 21, 1977, pp. 621-624 (on the Inter-American Defense College).

15. On the U.S. overthrow of the Chilean government, see for example, U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, Interim Report, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975, section III F, especially p. 231 n.2. This report explains that the White House and C.I.A. pursued a "two track" policy in Chile. The hard line called for a military coup, which was finally achieved. The soft line -- which included a White House directive to "make the economy scream" -- was explained by U.S. Ambassador Edward Korry, a Kennedy liberal, who stated: "not a nut or bolt will be allowed to reach Chile under Allende. Once Allende comes to power we shall do all within our power to condemn Chile and the Chileans to utmost deprivation and poverty, a policy designed for a long time to come to accelerate the hard features of a Communist society in Chile." Chomsky stresses (*Year 501: The Conquest Continues*, Boston: South End, 1993, p. 36):

[E]ven if the hard line did not succeed in introducing fascist killers to exterminate the virus, the vision of "utmost deprivation" [in Chile] would suffice to keep the rot from spreading, and ultimately demoralize the patient itself. And crucially, it would provide ample grist for the mill of the cultural managers, who can produce cries of anguish at "the hard features of a Communist society," pouring scorn on those "apologists" who describe what is happening.

On the coup itself, see for example, James Petras and Morris Morley, *The United States and Chile: Imperialism and the Overthrow of the Allende Government*, New York: Monthly Review, 1975; William Blum, *Killing Hope: U.S. Military and C.I.A. Interventions Since World War II*, Monroe, ME: Common Courage, 1995, ch. 34; John Gittings, ed., *The Lessons of Chile: The Chilean Coup and the Future of Socialism*, Nottingham, U.K.:

Spokesman, 1975 (providing first-hand accounts of the effect of the coup on socialist activists in Chile); Fred Landis, "How 20 Chileans Overthrew Allende for the C.I.A.," *Inquiry*, February 19, 1979, pp. 16-20 (on the role of the Institute for General Studies, a C.I.A.-funded think-tank that ran vast anti-Allende propaganda operations for the C.I.A.). See also footnote 17 of this chapter.

16. Chomsky points out that the principal weakness of the "October Surprise" theory is that the arms flow to Iran began during the Carter administration -- before the 1980 election -- whereas under the "October Surprise" theory the quid pro quo of delaying release of the hostages was that the Reaganites would secretly begin to provide arms to Iran after they were elected. With respect to the "arms for hostages" theory concerning the hostages taken in 1985, reams of documentation prove that there was an arms flow to Iran prior to the earliest period that was examined by the Congressional Hearings and the Tower Commission. In addition, many express statements by insiders explain that their goal was, in fact, to bring about a military coup in Iran.

For some of the evidence supporting these points, see for example, David Nyhan, "Israel plan was aimed at toppling Khomeini," *Boston Globe*, October 21, 1982, p. 1 (Israeli Ambassador Moshe Arens stated in an interview that Israel had provided arms to the Khomeini regime "in coordination with the U.S. government . . . at almost the highest of levels." "The objective," Arens said, "was to see if we could not find some areas of contact with the Iranian military, to bring down the Khomeini regime"); Robert Levey, "U.S. denies Arens' claim," *Boston Globe*, October 22, 1982, p. 1 (the U.S. State Department's immediate denial of Arens's account); David Nyhan, "Israeli disputes Globe story," *Boston Globe*, October 23, 1982, p. 4 (Arens's attempt to correct his story the next day, maintaining that the arms deal with Iran was discussed in advance with U.S. officials but saying that not enough equipment was sent to topple the Khomeini regime, although he reaffirmed that "the purpose was to make contact with some military officers who some day might be in a position of power in Iran"); Transcript of *Panorama*, B.B.C.-1 T.V. (U.K.) at 8:10 p.m., February 1, 1982. After David Kimche, head of Israel's Foreign Office and former director of its intelligence agency M.O.S.S.A.D., discussed Israel's sending American armaments to Iran from 1980, he stated:

QUESTION: So that if Israel wishes to see a strong Iranian army it would be in Israel's interests for America to supply those spare parts?

KIMCHE: Well, I don't want to reach the obvious conclusion here. I think I made our position plain. We think that the Iranian army should be strong, yes.

QUESTION: So, really, an army take-over is what you're saying?

KIMCHE: Possibly, yes.

Former C.I.A. Director and U.S. Ambassador to Iran Richard Helms then elaborated:

One doesn't mount coups to change governments or influence events without specific assets in the form of guns, people, groups desirous of helping, people who are prepared to take risk, all of these things, so that this is not a theoretical matter, it's a very practical matter and I wouldn't have any doubt that the United States is trying to find out what assets it can bring to bear.

On the timing of the arms sales, see for example, Zbigniew Brzezinski [Carter's National Security Advisor], *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981*, New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1983, p. 504 (reporting that the Carter administration had learned in 1980 of secret Israeli shipments of U.S. armaments

to Iran); Dan Fisher, "Israel-Iran Arms Flow Reportedly Began In '79," *Los Angeles Times*, November 22, 1986, p. 1. An excerpt:

Israeli arms dealers, with the acquiescence of the government, have maintained a nearly continuous supply of weaponry to Iran since 1979, including at least seven shiploads dispatched independently of a U.S.-sponsored Iranian arms program over the last 14 months, according to informed sources [in Israel]. . . .

Pleased initially that revelation of the Reagan program [of clandestine weapons shipments to Iran] made Israel appear as a loyal strategic ally aiding an effort to free U.S. hostages held by pro-Iranian elements in Lebanon, Israeli policy-makers have watched with growing discomfort as Washington news reports seem increasingly to depict Jerusalem as a villain in the affair. . . . "The State of Israel has never sold American arms or weapons containing American components without having received authorization from the U.S.," Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin told an Israeli Army Radio interviewer last week. . . . [T]hen-Israeli Defense Minister . . . [Ariel] Sharon argued that arms shipments would help keep channels open to "moderate" or "pragmatic" elements in Iran, particularly in the military, who would one day overthrow or at least inherit the reins of power from Khomeini.

"Carving a big slice of world arms sales," *Business Week*, December 8, 1980, p. 43 (according to Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Mordechai Tsippori, "Iran, once a big customer for Israeli arms under the Shah, [is] now purchasing Israeli weapons again through European intermediaries"); John Walcott and Jane Mayer, "Israel Said to Have Sold Weapons to Iran Since 1981 With Tacit Approval of the Reagan Administration," *Wall Street Journal*, November 28, 1986, p. 3 (noting that U.S. authorization of Israeli arms sales to be compensated by the U.S. goes back to 1981, with the knowledge of Haig, Weinberger, Shultz, Baker, and others; "Officials said both Israel and the U.S. hoped that the arms sales would curry favor with the military people in Iran, the so-called moderates, helping to position these men to take over if Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini died or there was a coup"); General Robert E. Huyser, *Mission to Tehran*, New York: Harper & Row, 1986 (Carter National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski's endorsement of Huyser's book about his dispatch to Iran to organize the Iranian military to carry out a coup states that Brzezinski remains convinced that only "procrastination and bureaucratic sabotage prevented the U.S.-sponsored military coup" he advocated and "that might have saved Iran from Khomeini" and "the masses").

See also, Samuel Segev, *The Iranian Triangle: The Untold Story of Israel's Role in the Iran-Contra Affair*, New York: Free Press, 1988; Jonathan Marshall, Peter Dale Scott, and Jane Hunter, *The Iran-Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in the Reagan Era*, Boston: South End, 1987, chs. 7 and 8; Scott Armstrong et al., *The Chronology: The Documented Day-by-Day Account of the Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Contras*, New York: Warner, 1987, pp. 7-8.

17. For unclassified U.S. military aid figures during the Allende years, see for example, *Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973*, Staff Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, U.S. Senate, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 18, 1975, pp. 32-38 (with tables on military assistance, military sales, and training of Chilean military personnel in Panama, based on "unclassified" figures from the Defense Department). An excerpt (p. 37; emphasis in original):

[M]ilitary assistance was *not* cut off at the time of Allende's confirmation. Military sales jumped sharply from 1972 to 1973 and even more sharply from 1973 to 1974 after the coup. Training of Chilean military personnel in Panama also rose during the Allende years . . . [increasing the number of trainees from 1969 to 1973 by 150 percent].

18. On C.I.A. involvement in overthrowing Sukarno in Indonesia, see for example, Peter Dale Scott, "The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967," *Pacific Affairs*, Summer 1985, pp. 239-264 (study documenting the C.I.A.'s role); Ralph McGehee [ex-C.I.A. officer], "The C.I.A. and The White Paper On El Salvador," *Nation*, April 11, 1981, p. 423f (this article was censored by the C.I.A. under a clause in the author's contract, and was published with deletions noted; the author reports that he is familiar with a highly classified C.I.A. report on the Agency's role in provoking the destruction of the P.K.I., the Indonesian Communist Party, and he attributes the slaughter to the "C.I.A. [one word deleted] operation"); Kathy Kadane, "Ex-agents say C.I.A. compiled death lists for Indonesians," *San Francisco Examiner*, May 20, 1990, p. A1 ("Silent for a quarter century, former high-ranking U.S. diplomats and C.I.A. officials described in lengthy interviews how they aided Indonesian army leader Suharto -- now president of Indonesia -- in his attack on the P.K.I. [Indonesian Communist Party]"); Gabriel Kolko, *Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1980*, New York: Pantheon, 1988, pp. 173-185 (concise summary of the events leading up to the massacre). An excerpt (p. 177 n."*"):

U.S. documents for the three months preceding September 30, 1965, and dealing with the convoluted background and intrigues, much less the embassy's and the C.I.A.'s roles, have been withheld from public scrutiny. Given the detailed materials available before and after July-September 1965, one can only assume that the release of these papers would embarrass the U.S. government.

During Congressional testimony, Pentagon official Paul Warnke, a reputed dove, acknowledged the purpose of U.S. military aid to Indonesia before the 1965 coup. See *Foreign Assistance Act of 1968 Hearings*, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 90th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968, p. 706:

[CONNECTICUT SENATOR JOHN] MONAGAN: Speaking of military assistance programs, I think of one that is in Indonesia, where at least in the latter days the purpose for which it was maintained was not to support an existing [i.e. the Sukarno] regime. In fact, we were opposed, eventually and increasingly, to the then existing regime. It was to preserve a liaison of sorts with the military of the country which in effect turned out to be one of the conclusive elements in the overthrow of that regime.

WARNKE: That is correct, sir.

On the subsequent massacre in Indonesia, and for more on the U.S. involvement, see footnote 23 of chapter 2 of *U.P.*

On U.S. government involvement in another "classic operation," overthrowing the democratic Goulart government in Brazil in 1964, see for example, A.J. Langguth, *Hidden Terrors*, New York: Pantheon, 1978, pp. 38-116; Jan Knippers Black, *United States Penetration of Brazil*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977; Phyllis Parker, *Brazil and the Quiet Intervention, 1964*, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979; Ruth Leacock, *Requiem for Revolution: The United States and Brazil, 1961-1969*, Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1990. See also, Thomas Skidmore, *The Politics*

of *Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-85*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1988 (comprehensive scholarly study of the post-coup period).

19. On the C.I.A. coup in Iran, see for example, William Blum, *Killing Hope: U.S. Military and C.I.A. Interventions Since World War II*, Monroe, ME: Common Courage, 1995, ch. 9; Bill A. James, *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988, ch. 2; Kermit Roosevelt, *Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979 (first-person account of the coup by a former C.I.A. officer; this book was recalled from stores by its publisher McGraw-Hill in 1979 under pressure from British Petroleum Company, the successor corporation to the petroleum entity which Roosevelt implicated in the coup). See also, William A. Dorman and Mansour Farhang, *The U.S. Press and Iran: Foreign Policy and the Journalism of Deference*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987, ch. 2 (on the distorted U.S. press coverage of the coup, and of Iran generally). On the recall of Roosevelt's book, see Ben H. Bagdikian, *The Media Monopoly*, Boston: Beacon, Fifth Edition, 1997, p. 39.

20. On the C.I.A. coup in Guatemala, see for example, Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999 (expanded edition); Richard H. Immerman, *The C.I.A. in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982; Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America*, New York: Norton, 1983 (2nd revised and expanded edition 1993), pp. 113-127; Stephen Schlesinger, "How Dulles Worked the Coup d'Etat," *Nation*, October 28, 1978, p. 425 (based upon more than 1,000 pages of State Department documents from 1953 and 1954, released to Schlesinger under the Freedom of Information Act; concluding that the coup "was conceived of and run at the highest levels of the American government in closest cahoots with the United Fruit Company and under the overall direction of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, backed by President Eisenhower").

For a statement of the U.S.'s reasons for the coup, see Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991, p. 365. This study quotes a State Department official's warning prior to the coup that "Guatemala has become an increasing threat to the stability of Honduras and El Salvador. Its agrarian reform is a powerful propaganda weapon; its broad social program of aiding the workers and peasants in a victorious struggle against the upper classes and large foreign enterprises has a strong appeal to the populations of Central American neighbors where similar conditions prevail."

21. On the scale, illegality and activities of Operation MONGOOSE, see for example, Raymond L. Garthoff, *Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis* (1989 edition), Washington: Brookings Institution, 1989. An excerpt (p. 32 and n.53):

[A] secret Special Group . . . [was] established in November 1961 to conduct covert operations against Cuba under the code-name "Mongoose." Attorney General Kennedy was a driving force in this covert action program. A Washington headquarters group had been set up under General Lansdale and a C.I.A. "Task Force W" in Florida under William K. Harvey, both veteran covert action managers. The operation came to involve 400 Americans, about 2,000 Cubans, a private navy of fast boats, and an annual budget of about \$50 million. Task Force W carried out a

wide range of activities, initially mostly against Cuban ships and aircraft outside Cuba (and non-Cuban ships engaged in the Cuba trade), such as contaminating sugar shipments out of Cuba and tampering with industrial imports into the country. A new phase, calling for more raids into Cuba, opened in September. . . . A Miami C.I.A. station was also established, in probable violation of the law banning C.I.A. operations in the United States, to say nothing of organizing activities that contravened the Neutrality Act.

U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans*, Final Report, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, Books II, III, and VI (Report No. 94-755), Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976; Warren Hinckle and William Turner, *The Fish is Red: The Story of The Secret War Against Castro*, New York: Harper & Row, 1981, ch. 4; Morris H. Morley, *Imperial State and Revolution: The United States and Cuba, 1952-1986*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 148-154; Edward S. Herman, *The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda*, Boston: South End, 1982, ch. 2.

One of the commandos who participated in paramilitary operations against Cuba under the command of William "Rip" Robertson describes them as follows (quoted in Taylor Branch and George Crile III, "The Kennedy Vendetta: How the C.I.A. waged a silent war against Cuba," *Harper's*, August 1975, pp. 49-63):

After the Bay of Pigs is when the great heroic deeds of Rip really began. I was on one of his teams, but he controlled many teams and many operations. . . . Our team made more than seven big war missions. Some of them were huge: the attacks on the Texaco refinery, the Russian ships in Oriente Province, a big lumberyard, the Patrice Lumumba sulfuric acid plant at Santa Lucía, and the diesel plant at Casilda. But they never let us fight as much as we wanted to, and most of the operations were infiltrations and weapons drops.

We would go on missions to Cuba almost every week. When we didn't go, Rip would feel sick and get very mad. He was always blowing off his steam, but then he would call us his boys, and he would hug us and hit us in the stomach. He was always trying to crank us up for the missions. Once he told me, "I'll give you \$50 if you bring me back an ear." I brought him two, and he laughed and said, "You're crazy," but he paid me \$100, and he took us to his home for a turkey dinner. Rip was a patriot, an American patriot. Really, I think he was a fanatic. He'd fight anything that came against democracy. . . . At the end of December, 1961, [commando Ramon] Orozco went on a ten-day operation with a seven-man team. The commandos blew up a railroad bridge and watched a train run off the ruptured tracks, then they burned down a sugar warehouse.

See also, U.P.I., "C.I.A. reportedly tried to dry up Cuban crop," *Boston Globe*, June 27, 1976, p. 3 (reporting the allegation by former Pentagon researcher Lowell Ponte that the C.I.A. and the Pentagon seeded clouds "to try to dry up the Cuban sugar crop in 1969 and 1970"; in the next day's issue the report is denied by the Pentagon); Drew Fetherston and John Cummings, "Canadian Says U.S. Paid Him \$5,000 to Infect Cuban Poultry," *Washington Post*, March 21, 1977, p. A18 ("The major details of the Canadian's story [i.e. in the title] have been confirmed by sources within and outside the American intelligence community"); Drew Fethersten and John Cummings, "C.I.A. tied to Cuba's '71 pig fever outbreak," *Boston Globe*, January 9, 1977, p. 1. An excerpt:

With at least the tacit backing of Central Intelligence Agency officials, operatives linked to anti-Castro terrorists introduced African swine fever virus into Cuba in 1971.

Six weeks later an outbreak of the disease forced the slaughter of 500,000 pigs to prevent a nationwide animal epidemic.

A U.S. intelligence source said in an interview that he was given the virus in a sealed, unmarked container at an Army base and C.I.A. training ground in the Panama Canal Zone with instructions to turn it over to the anti-Castro group. The 1971 outbreak was the first and only time the disease has hit the Western Hemisphere. It was labeled the "most alarming event" of 1971 by the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization. African swine fever is a highly contagious and usually lethal viral disease that infects only pigs and, unlike swine flu, cannot be transmitted to human beings. . . . [A]ll production of pork, a Cuban staple, came to a halt apparently for several months.

And see chapter 5 of *U.P.* and its footnote 29.

22. On U.S. assassination attempts on Castro, see for example, U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, Interim Report (S. Rept. 94-465), 94th Congress, 1st Session, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975, sections IIIB and IV, pp. 71f, 139-180 (reporting both MONGOOSE and non-MONGOOSE efforts to kill Castro).

One of the known assassination attempts on Castro was implemented the very day that John F. Kennedy himself was assassinated. See Thomas G. Paterson, ed., *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. An excerpt (pp. 153-154):

In mid-June [1963] the N.S.C. [National Security Council] approved a new sabotage program. The C.I.A. quickly cranked up new dirty tricks and revitalized its assassination option by making contact with a traitorous Cuban official, Rolando Cubela Secades. Code-named AM/LASH, he plotted with the C.I.A. to kill Fidel Castro. . . . On the very day that Kennedy died, AM/LASH rendez-voused with C.I.A. agents in Paris, where he received a ball-point pen rigged with a poisonous hypodermic needle intended to produce Castro's instant death.

See also, William Blum, *Killing Hope: U.S. Military and C.I.A. Interventions Since World War II*, Monroe, ME: Common Courage, 1995, Appendix III, p. 453 (listing all known prominent foreign individuals in whose assassination, or planning for the same, the United States has been involved since the end of World War II).

23. On MONGOOSE in the 1970s, see footnote 21 of this chapter.

24. On U.S. "contingency plans" for an invasion of Cuba and military deployment in the region before the Cuban Missile Crisis, see for example, Raymond L. Garthoff, *Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis* (1989 edition), Washington: Brookings Institution, 1989. An excerpt (pp. 6-8, 31, 50-51):

American exercises in the region continued apace through the summer and fall. An airborne assault was tested in *Jupiter Springs*. In August the U.S. Strike Command carried out *Swift Strike II*, a major limited war exercise in the Carolinas with four Army divisions and eight tactical air squadrons, some 70,000 troops in all. A strategic mobility command post exercise called *Blue Water* was conducted in early October, and a large Marine amphibious assault was planned for mid-October under the code-name *Phibriglex*. . . .

On October 1, two weeks before discovery of the missiles, Secretary McNamara met with Joint Chiefs of Staff and directed that readiness for possible implementation of the contingency plans [to invade Cuba] be raised. For example, U.S. Air Force tactical air units designated to meet the contingency war plan for an air strike (Oplan 312) were put under the operational control of CINCSTRIKE (Commander-in-Chief, Strike Command); U.S. Navy forces were earmarked for 6-hour, 12-hour, and 24-hour reaction times, and the war plan was revised to put the base at Mariel for Soviet Komar missile patrol boats on the air-strike priority target list. On October 6, increased readiness was also directed for forces earmarked for Oplan 314 and 316, the two war plan variants for invasion of Cuba.

See also, Thomas G. Paterson, "Fixation with Cuba: The Bay of Pigs, Missile Crisis, and Covert War Against Castro," in Thomas G. Paterson, ed., *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 140-142.

25. For Bundy's denial, see McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years*, New York: Random House, 1988, p. 416 ("We knew that we were not about to invade Cuba and we saw no reason for the Russians to take a clearly risky step because of a fear that we ourselves understood to be baseless").

26. On the "missile gap" being in the U.S.'s favor, see footnote 1 of this chapter.

27. For the two references to the factory bombing during the Cuban Missile Crisis, see David A. Welch and James G. Blight, "The Eleventh Hour of the Cuban Missile Crisis: An Introduction to the ExComm Transcripts," *International Security*, Winter 1987-88, p. 12 n.18; Raymond L. Garthoff, *Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis* (1989 edition), Washington: Brookings Institution, 1989, pp. 122-123.

28. On the General openly raising the level of security alert without informing Washington, see for example, Raymond L. Garthoff, *Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis* (1989 edition), Washington: Brookings Institution, 1989, pp. 61-62; David A. Welch and James G. Blight, "The Eleventh Hour of the Cuban Missile Crisis: An Introduction to the ExComm Transcripts," *International Security*, Winter 1987-88, p. 12 n.5.

29. On the enormous preponderance of U.S. military force at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Generals' attitudes, see footnotes 1, 24 and 28 of this chapter.

30. For Herodotus's analysis in the fifth century B.C., see *Herodotus: A New and Literal Version*, Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries, 1972, Book One, Stanzas 95-100, pp. 44-46 (describing the story of the Medes, who gained their freedom through revolt, then "were again reduced under a despotic government" when they voluntarily made Deioces their king and he decreed: "that no man should be admitted to the king's presence, but every one should consult him by means of messengers, and that none should be permitted to see him; and, moreover, that it should be accounted indecency for any to laugh or spit before him. He established such ceremony about his own person, for this reason, that those who were his equals, and who were brought up with him, and of no

meaner family, nor inferior to him in manly qualities, might not, when they saw him, grieve and conspire against him; but that he might appear to be of a different nature to them who did not see him").

For a classic American example of cult-making, see Lawrence Friedman, *Inventors of the Promised Land*, New York: Knopf, 1975, especially ch. 2, pp. xiii, 53-54. This study notes how in the early years of the American Republic, an absurd George Washington cult was contrived as part of the effort "to cultivate the ideological loyalties of the citizenry" and thus create a sense of "viable nationhood." See also the text following this footnote in *U.P.*, and footnote 41 of this chapter.

For examples of U.S. government information that was classified, see Evan Hendricks, *Former Secrets: Government Records Made Public Through the Freedom of Information Act*, Washington: Campaign for Political Rights, 1982 (five hundred case studies of the use of the Freedom Of Information Act).

31. On Jefferson's and other Revolutionary War leaders' repressive attitudes and actions, see for example, Leonard W. Levy, *Emergence of a Free Press*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985, chs. 7-10, especially pp. 177-181, 297, 337-348 (reviewing the writings and speeches of the leaders of the American Revolution and Framers of the U.S. Constitution, and documenting that none of them -- including Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Paine -- opposed criminalization of speech critical of the government and its officials; pointing out that Jefferson himself authorized the internment of political critics, and that the Continental Congress urged the states to enact legislation to prevent the people from being "deceived and drawn into erroneous opinion." Jefferson's statement that "a traitor in thought, but not in deed" should be punished is quoted at p. 178). See also, Leonard W. Levy, *Jefferson and Civil Liberties: the Darker Side*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, pp. 25f. An excerpt (p. 25):

During the Revolution, Jefferson, like Washington, the Adamses, and Paine, believed that there could be no toleration for serious differences of political opinion on the issue of independence, no acceptable alternative to complete submission to the patriot cause. Everywhere there was unlimited liberty to praise it, none to criticize it. David Kairys, "Freedom of Speech," in David Kairys, ed., *The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique*, New York: Pantheon, 1982 (revised and expanded edition 1990), pp. 237-272. An excerpt (p. 242):

[T]he experience of revolution and the emergence of the new nation generated a wave of intolerance immediately before and after the adoption of the Constitution. . . . Belief and pride in the attainment of freedom were turned against itself; nonconformity and dissent were greeted with extreme, legally sanctioned, and sometimes violent intolerance.

Although the issue of the relationship of the colonies to England was hotly and publicly debated before and during the war, any sign of even an early questioning of independence tended to be viewed as disloyalty. Many people had sentimental, familial, and economic allegiances to England, which was often also their birthplace. Because they believed or hoped differences could be settled without war, they were treated as traitors, regardless of whether they had actually acted or sided with England during the Revolution. They were subjected to special taxes, loyalty oaths, banishment, and violence; and laws in most states prohibited them from serving on juries, voting, holding office, buying land, or practicing certain designated professions. Chomsky comments (*Deterring Democracy*, New York: Hill and Wang, 1991, p. 399): "It was not until the Jeffersonians were themselves subjected to repressive measures in the

late 1790s that they developed a body of more libertarian thought for self-preservation -- reversing course, however, when they gained power themselves." See also chapter 8 of *U.P.* and its footnote 3.

32. For sources on the delivery of information to the media via news services, see for example, Martin A. Lee and Norman Solomon, *Unreliable Sources: A Guide to Detecting Bias in News Media*, New York: Lyle Stuart, 1990. An excerpt (pp. 22-23):

A few wire services provide the vast majority of newspapers with windows on the world beyond the local horizon. . . . America's most conservative major wire service, Associated Press, is also the most far-reaching -- with its articles and photos running in more than 1,400 daily papers, about 85 percent of all the dailies in the country. A.P. machines also chatter inside about 6,000 of the nation's T.V. and radio stations. In 112 foreign countries, A.P. wires are hooked into 8,500 news outlets. A.P.'s global audience: a billion people a day.

Jonathan Fenby, *The International News Services*, New York: Schocken, 1986, pp. 7, 9, 73-74 (the four major Western news-wire services -- Associated Press, United Press International, Reuters, and Agence France-Press -- account for some 80 percent of the international news circulating in the world today. Of these, A.P. is owned by member newspapers; U.P.I. is privately owned; Reuters was owned mainly by the British media until it went public in 1984, but control was retained by the original owners by giving lesser voting rights to the new stockholders; and Agence France-Presse is heavily subsidized by the French government. These wire services "exist to serve markets," and accordingly their prime concern "is with the rich media markets of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, and increasingly with the business community"); Anthony Smith, *The Geopolitics of Information: How Western Culture Dominates the World*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1980, ch. 3.

33. On corporate concentration of the media, see for example, Ben H. Bagdikian, *The Media Monopoly*, Boston: Beacon, 5th edition, 1997 (original 1983), pp. xiii, 21-22. The 1997 preface to Bagdikian's study notes that the number of controlling firms in books, movies, television, magazines, radio and daily newspapers has shrunk from the 23 listed in the book's 1983 text to about ten dominant companies: Time Warner, Disney, Viacom, News Corporation Limited/Murdoch, Sony, Tele-Communications, Inc., Seagram, Westinghouse, Gannett, and General Electric.

On Chomsky's views of the impact of concentrated ownership on the media product, see the text of chapter 6 of *U.P.*

34. On advertising rates and the media, see chapter 4 of *U.P.* and its footnote 36.

35. Chomsky and Herman summarize their "Propaganda Model" in *Manufacturing Consent* as follows (p. 2):

A propaganda model focuses on [the] inequality of wealth and power and its multilevel effects on mass-media interests and choices. It traces the routes by which money and power are able to filter out the news fit to print, marginalize dissent, and allow the government and dominant private interests to get their messages across to the public. The essential ingredients of our propaganda model, or set of news "filters," fall under the following headings: (1) the size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation of the dominant mass-media firms; (2) advertising as the

primary income source of the mass media; (3) the reliance of the media on information provided by government, business, and "experts" funded and approved by these primary sources and agents of power; (4) "flak" as a means of disciplining the media; and (5) "anticommunism" as a national religion and control mechanism.

These elements interact with and reinforce one another. The raw material of news must pass through successive filters, leaving only the cleansed residue fit to print. They fix the premises of discourse and interpretation, and the definition of what is newsworthy in the first place, and they explain the basis and operations of what amount to propaganda campaigns.

In a lecture, Chomsky described two flaws in *Manufacturing Consent's* presentation of the "Propaganda Model":

If the two of us were rewriting it today, we would change some things. For one thing, I think when we talked about those "five filters," we realized at the time -- but we left it in -- that the fifth one, "anticommunism," is too narrow. That's really a sub-case of something more general: for the system to work properly, people have to be frightened, and they have to shelter under the wings of authority. Fear of the Soviet Union was a good way to frighten them. But by the time we wrote that book in the late Eighties, it wasn't working anymore. It was clear to the Reagan administration that the use of the Soviet Union as a device to intimidate and terrorize people wasn't going to work very long, because it was going to collapse. And in fact, if you look through the Reagan years -- and we should have put this in the book -- there was a constant search for some new devil to frighten people. So I don't know if you remember, but in 1981 the White House was surrounded by tanks because Libyan hitmen were supposedly wandering around Washington trying to assassinate our leader and so on. . . . And all through the Reagan years, just to try to intimidate people, Arab terrorism was a tremendous fear. It was a good way of frightening the American population.

The drug scares are another one of them: those are mostly concocted as a technique of social control. . . . In fact, the whole crime story is a political-class and media concoction. I mean, crime is a pain, it's not nice. But crime in the United States is not off the spectrum, it's very much like in other industrial societies. . . . On the other hand, fear of crime is far higher. And this has been inspired by propaganda, and it goes way back.

So I think when we talked about the "fifth filter" we should have brought in all this stuff -- the way artificial fears are created with a dual purpose . . . partly to get rid of people you don't like but partly to frighten the rest. Because if people are frightened, they will accept authority. During the Second World War, for example, people voluntarily (and, in my view, rightly) accepted discipline and authority. You know, you follow orders because there are bigger fears out there, so yeah you huddle under the protection of the authority figures and you do what they tell you. But in order to maintain that when there's no actual threat requires concocting threats. And the "anticommunist" filter was one of those, but we treated it much too narrowly. So that ought to be changed.

The other big change -- and I think both of us agree on this -- is that in the book as case studies we picked only foreign policy examples. And that creates the illusion that somehow it's different when the media deal with domestic issues -- and it isn't different, it's the same. So what we should have done is mixed it. And in fact, since then, both of us when we deal with the media address mostly the media and domestic issues. So that was an imbalance and very misleading, because then you get the sense -- and you can understand how you would get the sense -- that the media kind

of conform to state power on international issues, but when you have domestic problems they don't do it. Which is totally false. It's dramatically the same on domestic issues: trade issues, crime, pick it, it's always the same. Those are the major changes that I would want to see made, and I think Ed Herman would probably agree on this.

See also, Robert W. McChesney, "The Political Economy of the Mass Media: An Interview With Edward S. Herman," *Monthly Review*, January 1989, pp. 35f.

36. The review's exact phrase -- stating the conventional view of the media -- was: "traditional Jeffersonian role as counterbalance to government power." See Ron Rosenbaum, "Staying the Course in the Go-Go Years," *New York Times Book Review*, April 9, 1989, section 7, p. 9.

37. For examples of use of terminology such as "the public mind," see footnotes 40 and 41 of this chapter; and chapter 10 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 74 to 78.

38. For the quotation from the English Revolution, see Clement Walker, *History of Independency*, I, 1661, quoted in Christopher Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas during the English Revolution*, New York: Viking, 1972. Walker's exact words (p. 58):

[T]hey have cast all the Mysteries and secrets of Government, both by Kings and Parliaments, before the vulgar (like Pearl before Swine), and have taught both the Souldiery and People to look so far into them as to ravel back all Governments, to the first principles of nature. . . . They have made the People thereby so curious and so arrogant that they will never find humility enough to submit to a civil rule.

On popular radicalism during the seventeenth-century English Revolution, see also, Fenner Brockway, *Britain's First Socialists: The Levellers, Agitators, and Diggers of the English Revolution*, London: Quartet Books, 1980. And see footnote 17 of chapter 6 of *U.P.*

39. For Walter Lippmann's exact words, see Clinton Rossiter and James Lare, eds., *The Essential Lippmann: A Political Philosophy for Liberal Democracy*, New York: Random House, 1963, pp. 91-92 ("The public must be put in its place, so that each of us may live free of the trampling and roar of a bewildered herd"); Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, New York: Macmillan, 1960 (original 1922). An excerpt (pp. 248, 310):

That the manufacture of consent is capable of great refinements no one, I think, denies. The process by which public opinion arises is certainly no less intricate than it has appeared in these pages, and the opportunities for manipulation open to anyone who understands the process are plain enough. The creation of consent is not a new art. It is a very old one which was supposed to have died out with the appearance of democracy. But it has not died out. It has, in fact, improved enormously in technic, because it is now based on analysis rather than on rule of thumb. And so, as a result of psychological research, coupled with the modern means of communication, the practice of democracy has turned a corner. A revolution is taking place, infinitely more significant than any shifting of economic power.

Within the life of the generation now in control of affairs, persuasion has become a self-conscious art and a regular organ of popular government. . . . Under the impact of propaganda, not necessarily in the sinister meaning of the word alone, the old constants of our thinking have become variables. It is no longer possible, for

example, to believe in the original dogma of democracy; that the knowledge needed for the management of human affairs comes up spontaneously from the human heart. . . . In the absence of institutions and education by which the environment is so successfully reported that the realities of public life stand out sharply against self-centered opinion, the common interests very largely elude public opinion entirely, and can be managed only by a specialized class whose personal interests reach beyond the locality.

40. For the public relations manual's opening words, see Edward L. Bernays, *Propaganda*, New York: Horace Liveright, 1928. The exact language (pp. 9, 31):

The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country. . . .

[C]learly it is the intelligent minorities which need to make use of propaganda continuously and systematically. In the active proselytizing minorities in whom selfish interests and public interests coincide lie the progress and development of American democracy.

41. For some articulations of this leading doctrine of liberal-democratic intellectual thought, see for example, footnotes 39 and 40 of this chapter. Also see for example, Edward L. Bernays [the leading figure of the public relations industry], *Propaganda*, New York: Horace Liveright, 1928. An excerpt (pp. 19-20):

In the days when kings were kings, Louis XIV made his modest remark, "L'Etat c'est moi." He was nearly right. But times have changed. The steam engine, the multiple press, and the public school, that trio of the industrial revolution, have taken the power away from kings and given it to the people. The people actually gained power which the king lost. For economic power tends to draw after it political power; and the history of the industrial revolution shows how that power passed from the king and the aristocracy to the bourgeoisie. Universal suffrage and universal schooling reënforced this tendency, and at last even the bourgeoisie stood in fear of the common people. For the masses promised to become king.

To-day, however, a reaction has set in. The minority has discovered a powerful help in influencing majorities. It has been found possible so to mold the mind of the masses that they will throw their newly gained strength in the desired direction. In the present structure of society, this practice is inevitable. Whatever of social importance is done to-day, whether in politics, finance, manufacture, agriculture, charity, education, or other fields, must be done with the help of propaganda. Propaganda is the executive arm of the invisible government.

Edward L. Bernays, "The Engineering of Consent," *The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 250 ("Communication and Social Action"), March 1947, pp. 113-120. An excerpt (pp. 114-115):

[L]eaders, with the aid of technicians in the field who have specialized in utilizing the channels of communication, have been able to accomplish purposefully and scientifically what we have termed "the engineering of consent." This phrase quite simply means the use of an engineering approach -- that is, action based on thorough knowledge of the situation and on the application of scientific principles and tried practices to the task of getting people to support ideas and programs. . . .

The average American adult has only six years of schooling behind him. With pressing crises and decisions to be faced, a leader frequently cannot wait for the

people to arrive at even general understanding. In certain cases, democratic leaders must play their part in leading the public through the engineering of consent to socially constructive goals and values. . . . The responsible leader, to accomplish social objectives, must therefore be constantly aware of the possibilities of subversion. He must apply his energies to mastering the operational know-how of consent engineering, and to out-maneuvering his opponents in the public interest.

Edward L. Bernays, *Public Relations*, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1952. An excerpt (p. 78):

An important factor in developing the climate of public opinion was the demonstration to the peoples of the world in World War I that wars are fought with words and ideas as well as with arms and bullets. Businessmen, private institutions, great universities -- all kinds of groups -- became conditioned to the fact that they needed the public; that the great public could now perhaps be harnessed to their cause as it had been harnessed during the war to the national cause, and that the same methods could do the job.

Harold Lasswell [one of the leading figures of modern political science], "Propaganda," in Edwin R.A. Seligman, ed.-in-chief, *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, New York: Macmillan, 1933, Vol. 12 (reprinted in 1954 edition). An excerpt (pp. 527, 523-526):

[R]egard for men in the mass rests upon no democratic dogmatism about men being the best judges of their own interests. The modern propagandist, like the modern psychologist, recognizes that men are often poor judges of their own interests. . . .

[The spread of schooling] did not release the masses from ignorance and superstition but altered the nature of both and compelled the development of a whole new technique of control, largely through propaganda . . . [which] attains eminence as the one means of mass mobilization which is cheaper than violence, bribery or other possible control techniques . . . [and] is no more moral or immoral than a pump handle. . . . [It is] certain that propaganda will in time be viewed with fewer misgivings.

Thomas Bailey [historian], *The Man in the Street: The Impact of American Public Opinion on Foreign Policy*, Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1964 (original 1948). An excerpt (p. 13):

Because the masses are notoriously short-sighted and generally cannot see danger until it is at their throats, our statesmen are forced to deceive them into an awareness of their own long-run interests. . . . Deception of the people may in fact become increasingly necessary, unless we are willing to give our leaders in Washington a freer hand.

Reinhold Niebuhr [highly influential moralist and theologian], *Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics*, New York: Scribners, 1952 (original 1932). An excerpt (pp. 221, 21):

The naïve faith of the proletarian is the faith of the man of action. Rationality belongs to the cool observers. There is of course an element of illusion in the faith of the proletarian, as there is in all faith. But it is a necessary illusion. . . .

The stupidity of the average man will permit the oligarch, whether economic or political, to hide his real purposes from the scrutiny of his fellows and to withdraw his activities from effective control. . . . Since the increasing complexity of society makes it impossible to bring all those who are in charge of its intricate techniques and processes, and who are therefore in possession of social power, under complete control, it will always be necessary to rely partly upon the honesty and self-restraint of those who are not socially restrained.

(For a discussion of Niebuhr's ideas and their reception, see Noam Chomsky, "Reinhold Niebuhr," *Grand Street*, Vol. 6, No. 2, Winter 1987, pp. 197-212.)

Roughly the same stance was taken by Woodrow Wilson, the President of the United States from 1913 to 1921. See Woodrow Wilson, "The Philosophy of Politics" (unfinished manuscript), in Henry Wilkinson Bragdon, *Woodrow Wilson: The Academic Years*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. An excerpt (p. 263):

It is asked . . . whether direct expressions of the will of the people be not the only just way of determining some of the graver questions of state policy, as, for instance, the question of peace and war. On the contrary is it not a pertinent suggestion that such questions may involve elements visible or appreciable only by the few -- the selected leaders of public opinion and rulers of state policy. Only to them will it be apparent upon which side lies obedience to the highest, most permanent and just ends of the nation. Only to them may it be revealed what these ends are. . . . The popular vote would probably have drawn us into the vortex of the French revolution, would doubtless have held us back from the second assertion of our rights against Great Britain. And, as regards other questions, are not the straight lines -- the projected course -- of national progress more likely to be seen by the thinking few who stand upon the high places of the nation than by the toiling multitudes in the valleys who give no part of their day to so much as an endeavour to descry these things? Must not the nation have trained eyes?

For the views of the *Washington Post's* publisher, Katharine Graham, see Mark Perry, "The Case Against William Webster," *Regardie's Magazine*, Vol. 10, No. 5, January 1990, pp. 90f. Graham explained in a speech delivered at C.I.A. headquarters:

"We live in a dirty and dangerous world," she said. "There are some things the general public does not need to know and shouldn't. I believe democracy flourishes when the government can take legitimate steps to keep its secrets and when the press can decide whether to print what it knows."

The influential Harvard government professor Samuel Huntington advocates a similar position (Samuel P. Huntington, *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981, p. 75):

The architects of power in the United States must create a force that can be felt but not seen. Power remains strong when it remains in the dark; exposed to the sunlight it begins to evaporate.

Likewise, a major publication of the Rockefeller-founded Trilateral Commission -- a private organization of elites in the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan, which achieved some notoriety when its members captured the posts of President, Vice-President, National Security Advisor, Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, and a host of lesser offices during the Carter administration -- written by scholars from the trilateral regions, also articulates these same positions. See M.J. Crozier, S.P. Huntington and J. Watanuki, *The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission*, New York: New York University Press, 1975, at pp. 113, 98, 5-6 (concluding that, in the wake of the popular mobilization of the 1960s, more "moderation in democracy" was needed to alleviate the "crisis" that the popular movements brought on; as the American contributor recalled, with a sense of nostalgia perhaps, before the "crisis of democracy" had erupted, "Truman had been able to govern the country with the cooperation of a relatively small number of Wall Street lawyers and bankers. But by the mid-1960s, the sources of power in society had diversified tremendously, and this was no longer possible"). An excerpt (pp. 8, 113):

Finally, and perhaps most seriously, there are the *intrinsic challenges* to the viability of democratic government which grow directly out of the functioning of democracy. Democratic government does not necessarily function in a self-sustaining or self-correcting equilibrium fashion. It may instead function so as to give rise to forces and tendencies which, if unchecked by some outside agency, will eventually lead to the undermining of democracy. This was, of course, a central theme in de Toqueville's forebodings about democracy; it reappeared in the writings of Schumpeter and Lippmann; it is a key element in the current pessimism about the future of democracy. . . .

Al Smith once remarked that "the only cure for the evils of democracy is more democracy." Our analysis suggests that applying that cure at the present time could well be adding fuel to the flames. Instead, some of the problems of governance in the United States stem from an excess of democracy -- an "excess of democracy" in much the same sense in which David Donald used the term to refer to the consequences of the Jacksonian revolution which helped to precipitate the Civil War. Needed, instead, is a greater degree of moderation in democracy.

The Trilateral Commission's study also addresses the role of the intelligentsia, who come in two varieties: (1) the "technocratic and policy-oriented intellectuals," responsible, serious, and constructive, and (2) the "value-oriented intellectuals," a group who pose a danger to democracy as they "devote themselves to the derogation of leadership, the challenging of authority, and the unmasking and delegitimation of established institutions," in part through the indoctrination of the young.

For a survey of the thinking that has underpinned the development of public relations-based democracy, see Stuart Ewen, *PR! A Social History of Spin*, New York: Basic Books, 1996. See also chapter 10 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 74 to 80.

42. On the public's views of the media, see for example, Thomas B. Rosenstiel, "'Serious Reservations' On Fairness Are Cited," *Los Angeles Times*, January 16, 1986, p. 1. An excerpt:

53% of those surveyed thought the press was one-sided when presenting political and social issues. . . . Contrary to the familiar charge that Americans consider the news media increasingly powerful and even arrogant, "a majority (53%) sees the press as often influenced by powerful people and organizations, not as independent," the study said. Heavy majorities see the press as influenced by the federal government (73%), corporations (70%), advertisers (65%) and labor unions (62%). . . .

[O]nly about one in five believes that the news product itself is liberally biased. . . . "[T]he public thinks powerful groups and institutions push the press around. . . . We find almost no evidence that the public regards the news media as too adversarial."

Barry Sussman, "Public Has Sharp Complaints About News Media, Poll Says," *Washington Post*, August 16, 1981, p. A1. An excerpt:

Media critics say the press tries to tear down the government in Washington. About one-quarter of the public feels that way, but four in every 10 people have exactly the opposite complaint: They feel the national news organizations are not critical enough of the government. . . .

Among the most stinging citizen complaints is a widely held belief that the news media hold back important news from the public, a sentiment that is apparently shared by more than half the people. Another is an even more pervasive perception that reporters and editors for T.V. network news operations and large newspapers

such as The Washington Post, The New York Times and others have little or no concern for the average person.

See also, "Is this how you see the press?" [this title is above a drawing of a sheep in a wolf costume], *New York Times*, January 14, 1986, p. A26 (full page advertisement for the 1985 study "The People and the Press," conducted for Times Mirror by the Gallup Organization, called "the most comprehensive study ever conducted of public attitudes toward the press," which concludes that public views the media as "a sheep in wolf's clothing"). And see the text following this footnote in *U.P.*, and footnote 46 of this chapter.

43. These detailed studies of closely paired examples can be found in, among other books, Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*, New York: Pantheon, 1988; Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism -- The Political Economy of Human Rights: Volume I*, Boston: South End, 1979; and Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, *After the Cataclysm: Postwar Indochina and the Reconstruction of Imperial Ideology -- The Political Economy of Human Rights: Volume II*, Boston: South End, 1979. Chomsky summarizes the studies' outcome (*Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies*, Boston: South End, 1989, p. 137):

The study of paired examples reveals a consistent pattern of radically dichotomous treatment, in the predicted direction. In the case of enemy crimes, we find outrage; allegations based on the flimsiest evidence, often simply invented, and uncorrectable, even when conceded to be fabrication; careful filtering of testimony to exclude contrary evidence while allowing what may be useful; reliance on official U.S. sources, unless they provide the wrong picture, in which case they are avoided (Cambodia under Pol Pot is a case in point); vivid detail; insistence that the crimes originate at the highest level of planning, even in the absence of evidence or credible argument; and so on. Where the locus of responsibility is at home, we find precisely the opposite: silence or apologetics; avoidance of personal testimony and specific detail; world-weary wisdom about the complexities of history and foreign cultures that we do not understand; narrowing of focus to the lowest level of planning or understandable error in confusing circumstances; and other forms of evasion.

44. The rare mainstream reviews in the United States of *Manufacturing Consent* and other works employing similar analysis provide a revealing study in themselves of the media. See for example, Nicholas Lemann, "Book Reviews," *New Republic*, January 9, 1989, p. 34 (stating that Chomsky and Herman want "more state control" over the media, along with other falsehoods; compare, for instance, *Manufacturing Consent's* p. 252 with the way that passage is quoted in the review); Michael Pollan, "Capitalist Crusaders," *New York Times*, April 6, 1986, section 7, p. 26 (criticizing Michael Parenti's analysis of the media in his book *Inventing Reality* -- which argues that the same groups, the "corporate class," control the state and the media -- on the ground that it "overlooks a key feature of American journalism," namely that "the press generally defines the news as what politicians say").

Willingness even to recognize the bare *possibility* of analysis of the media in terms of a "Propaganda Model" is so uncommon in the press that the few existing cases that do so, even when clearly failing to understand, are notable by this fact alone. One of the very rare attempts to evaluate the "Propaganda Model" with actual argument, instead of

mere invective, was by the outstanding and independent-minded historian Walter LaFeber. See Walter LaFeber, "Whose News?," *New York Times*, November 6, 1988, section 7, p. 27 (see also the ensuing exchange of letters with Edward Herman in the *New York Times*, December 11, 1988, section 7, p. 46; and Chomsky's discussion of how the cases that LaFeber cites as criticisms in fact closely fit the "Propaganda Model," in Noam Chomsky, *Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies*, Boston: South End, 1989, pp. 148-151). See also, Edward S. Herman, "The Propaganda Model Revisited," *Monthly Review*, Vol. 48, No. 3, July/August 1996, pp. 115-128 (discussing and refuting the few critiques of the "Propaganda Model" that appeared in the decade after *Manufacturing Consent*). And see chapter 9 of *U.P.* and its footnote 4.

Some other studies providing examples which support the "Propaganda Model" include: Edward S. Herman, *The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda*, Boston: South End, 1982, especially ch. 4, pp. 151-199; Edward S. Herman, *Beyond Hypocrisy: Decoding the News in an Age of Propaganda*, Montreal: Black Rose, 1992; Martin A. Lee and Norman Solomon, *Unreliable Sources: A Guide to Detecting Bias in News Media*, New York: Lyle Stuart, 1990; Michael Parenti, *Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media*, New York: St. Martin's, 1986; James Aronson, *The Press and the Cold War*, Boston: Beacon, 1970 (expanded edition, New York: Monthly Review, 1990).

45. On support for welfare state programs, see footnote 7 of this chapter; and chapter 10 of *U.P.* and its footnote 50 (and for related information, its footnotes 18 and 74).

On opposition to Central America policies, see the text above this footnote in *U.P.*, and footnotes 4, 5, 49 and 52 of this chapter; the text of chapter 4 of *U.P.*; and chapter 7 of *U.P.* and its footnote 54.

On public attitudes towards the Vietnam War, see chapter 7 of *U.P.* and its footnote 57; see also the text following this footnote in *U.P.*, and footnotes 72, 73 and 77 of this chapter.

46. On the public's views of media coverage of Carter, see for example, Mark Hertsgaard, *On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency*, New York: Schocken Books, 1989, pp. 84-85; Barry Sussman, "Public Has Sharp Complaints About News Media, Poll Says," *Washington Post*, August 16, 1981, p. A1 ("42 percent say the major news media were too critical of Jimmy Carter while he was president -- a striking indictment" of the media; roughly the same number of Republicans and Democrats expressed this opinion). On the public's views of media coverage of Reagan in 1985 before the Iran-contra scandal broke, see for example, Michael J. Robinson, "Pressing Opinion," *Public Opinion* (American Enterprise Institute), Vol. 9, No. 3, September/October 1986, pp. 56-59 at p. 58 ("nearly eight in ten say the press is fair to Reagan"). On the public's views of Reagan at the time of the Iran-contra scandal in contrast to the media's coverage of it, see for example, *On Bended Knee*, p. 334 and ch. 14.

47. On public views of the media, see footnote 42 of this chapter.

48. On public support for the nuclear freeze movement, see chapter 6 of *U.P.* and its footnote 3.

49. On public attitudes towards U.S. Nicaragua policies in the 1980s, see for example, David K. Shipler, "Poll Shows Confusion on Aid to Contras," *New York Times*, April 15, 1986, p. A6 (reporting a *New York Times/C.B.S. News* Poll showing 62 percent of Americans were opposed to giving further aid to the contra rebels, with only 25 percent supporting President Reagan's request for an additional \$100 million in funding; strikingly, 52 percent of those who approved of Reagan's handling of the Presidency also opposed increased aid. "Opposition to aid for the contras crossed all political, ethnic and regional and socio-economic lines. No demographic group favored it. . . . The higher the education and income, the less the opposition." The same poll revealed that only 38 percent of the population knew that the U.S. was supporting the contras and not the Nicaraguan government); W. Lance Bennett, "Marginalizing the Majority: Conditioning Public Opinion to Accept Managerial Democracy," in Michael Margolis and Gary A. Mauser, eds., *Manipulating Public Opinion: Essays on Public Opinion as a Dependent Variable*, Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1989, pp. 321-361 (careful study of *New York Times* coverage of the contra issue, demonstrating that the *Times's* inclusion of opposition voices tracked Congressional opposition, plummeting during periods of Congressional red-baiting even though public opposition throughout the period remained constant and overwhelming); Adam Clymer, "Most Americans in Survey Oppose Aid for Overthrow of Sandinistas," *New York Times*, June 5, 1985, p. A8 (reporting the results of a heavily loaded poll question which nonetheless found that 53 percent of the public opposed U.S. assistance to the contras; notably, the loaded poll question asked: "Ronald Reagan says the U.S. should help the people in Nicaragua who are trying to overthrow the pro-Soviet Government there. Other people say that even if our country does not like the Government in Nicaragua, we should not help overthrow it. Do you think we should help the people trying to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua, or should we not help them?" Only 32 percent of respondents said that the U.S. should help overthrow the Nicaraguan government; approximately 62 percent of those who expressed an opinion opposed the Reagan administration's policies. Furthermore, only 24 percent of those polled said that they favored sending military weapons and supplies to the contras).

50. For the Nicaraguan Ambassador's letter, see Carlos Tunnerman, "Nicaragua's Peace Aims," Op-Ed, *New York Times*, March 19, 1987, p. A27.

51. For Cahill's letter, see Kevin Cahill, "Respect, Please, for Nicaraguans' Rights," Op-Ed, *New York Times*, February 14, 1987, section 1, p. 27.

52. On the defection of Latin America scholars from the "acceptable" range of debate on the issue, see for example, Lars Schoultz, *National Security and United States Policy toward Latin America*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987, pp. 22-23; Noam Chomsky, *The Culture of Terrorism*, Boston: South End, 1988, pp. 205f.

53. Bonner was dispatched to the Financial desk, where he labored for one year before taking a leave of absence to write a book about El Salvador. Upon returning to the *Times*, he first was sent back to the Financial desk, then later to the Metropolitan

desk, a clear demotion. He resigned from the *New York Times* on July 3, 1984. Asked in an interview with Mark Hertsgaard why he had recalled Bonner from El Salvador in the first place, Abe Rosenthal, then-Managing Editor of the *New York Times*, explained:

The general impression among me and some others was that Bonner was first-rate, but we were really screwing this guy, because he wasn't getting what you *really* need to be a reporter. You don't have to get it necessarily at the *Times*, but you have to have some background in reporting non-foreign affairs in order to be a foreign affairs reporter. You have to know how a paper runs, what a paper considers its standards, and so on.

See Mark Hertsgaard, *On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency*, New York: Schocken Books, 1989, p. 199.

For another account of Bonner's firing, see Mark Danner, "The Truth of El Mazote," *New Yorker*, December 6, 1993, pp. 50f. An excerpt (pp. 122-123):

According to Rosenthal, Bonner was removed because he had never been fully trained in the *Times'* particular methods. Bonner, he said, "didn't know the techniques of weaving a story together. . . . I brought him back because it seemed terribly unfair to leave him there without training. . . ." But "training" was not the only issue -- for that matter, as Bonner pointed out to me, he had spent a good part of 1981 on the Metro desk -- and, at least in Rosenthal's case, the question of Bonner's "journalistic technique" seems to have been inextricably bound up with what the executive editor came to perceive as the reporter's left-wing sympathies. . . . Several current and former *Times* employees (none of whom would speak for attribution) pointed to a scene in a Georgetown restaurant a few weeks after the El Mozote [massacre] story ran -- it was the evening of the annual Gridiron dinner -- in which Rosenthal criticized Bonner and angrily described the sufferings that Communist regimes inflict on their people.

Note that Rosenthal's most angry denial, which follows, conveniently sidetracks the central issue. Rosenthal declared (pp. 121-122):

"At no time did anybody in the United States government suggest to me, directly or indirectly, that I remove Mr. Bonner. . . . [A]nyone who would approach the *New York Times* and suggest to me that I remove or punish a correspondent would have to be an idiot. To imply that a man who devoted himself to journalism would remove a reporter because of the U.S. government or the C.I.A., or whatever, is ridiculous, naïve, cruel, and slanderous."

See also, Editorial, "On Credulity," *Wall Street Journal*, March 19, 1993, p. A10; A.M. Rosenthal, "Let's Set the Record Straight," Letter, *Wall Street Journal*, April 6, 1993, p. A15; Robert Parry and Peter Kornbluh, "Iran-Contra's Untold Story," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1988, pp. 3-30 at p. 6 ("U.S. embassy officials boasted in 1982 that they had forced the *New York Times* correspondent Raymond Bonner out of the country because of his unfavorable reporting on the Salvadoran government"); Robert Parry, *Fooling America: How Washington Insiders Twist the Truth and Manufacture the Conventional Wisdom*, New York: Morrow, 1992, pp. 207-211.

On the impact of Bonner's removal on press coverage of El Salvador -- including documentation of how the *New York Times'*s coverage took on the Reagan administration's perspective thereafter -- see Michael Massing, "About-face on El Salvador," *Columbia Journalism Review*, November/December 1983, pp. 42-49; JoAnn Wypijewski, "Shirley Christian and the *Times* on Chile," *Lies of Our Times*, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 14-15 (profile of a Latin America reporter hired by Rosenthal in the wake of the Bonner departure).

Similar pressures exist in far more mundane contexts than that of the Bonner case. See for example, Mark Hertsgaard, *On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency*, New York: Schocken Books, 1989, pp. 186-203. An excerpt (pp. 159, 163):

When the First Lady [Nancy Reagan] made a photo opportunity visit to Phoenix House, a drug rehabilitation center in New York City, for example, one *New York Times* reporter had the temerity to write a story lead noting the irony of Mrs. Reagan posing with impoverished junkies while wearing a designer dress worth thousands of dollars. The lead enraged one of the paper's senior editors. He stormed into the middle of the newsroom and, in front of numerous other reporters, loudly berated the reporter, warning that the reference to Mrs. Reagan's dress was injurious both to the *Times* and to the reporter's career and ordering the lead changed immediately. Likewise Lee Lescaze, who was transferred from the White House beat to *The Washington Post's* "Style" section in 1982, remembered how "it suddenly became clear we were not to take swipes at Nancy Reagan. . . ."

When asked to grant an interview [for Hertsgaard's book] to discuss colleagues' claims that her scripts had frequently been altered and her story proposals rejected by superiors in New York in order to make her coverage less critical of Reagan, [C.B.S. reporter] Lesley Stahl [denied Hertsgaard's request to go on the record about the matter but] quickly replied, "Well, all that happened, I can't deny it."

Martin A. Lee and Norman Solomon, *Unreliable Sources: A Guide to Detecting Bias in News Media*, New York: Lyle Stuart, 1990, pp. 21-22 (on Pulitzer Prize-winning columnist Sydney Schanberg's departure from the *New York Times*). An excerpt:

On August 20, 1985, page 18 of the [*New York Times*] carried a cryptic announcement: "After four years of writing his twice-weekly 'New York' column on the Op-Ed page of The New York Times, Sydney Schanberg has been asked to accept another assignment, which is now under discussion. . . ." What was the problem? Journalist Pete Hamill later described the evolving focus of Schanberg's op-ed pieces: "the homeless, the injured, the casualties of the indifference and greed of big builders, bankers, and other pillars of the Establishment. . . ." His twice-a-week column had been spotlighting the financial beneficiaries of various social ills -- "taking on some of the people and institutions for whom the *Times* itself was edited. . . ." After the *Times* terminated his column, Schanberg resigned from the paper. . . .

As Schanberg said in an interview with a small community newspaper, "The closer you may step on toes, the closer the toes get to the headquarters of the journalistic organization, the more loudly are the protests registered and the more loudly are they heard." Replying to hundreds of readers' irate letters about the axing of Schanberg's column, *Times* vice-chairman Sydney Gruson summarized the whole sequence of events this way: "We have come to conclude after four years that a better column might be produced by another writer."

Carole and Paul Bass, "Censorship American-Style," *Index on Censorship* (London), June 1985, pp. 6-7 (similar anecdotes about reporters Barbara Koeppel, Jonathan Kwitny, and Seymour Hersh); Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair, *White-Out: The C.I.A., Drugs and the Press*, London: Verso, 1998, chs. 1 and 2 (on the successful campaign to destroy the career of *San Jose Mercury-News* investigative reporter Gary Webb after his reporting about links between the C.I.A. and crack traffickers); Ramsey Clark [former U.S. Attorney General], *The Fire This Time: U.S. War Crimes in the Gulf*, New York: Thunder's Mouth, 1992. An excerpt (p. 139):

Even on the homefront, commentators who voiced the wrong opinion [about the Gulf War] ran into trouble. Warren Hinckle of the *San Francisco Examiner* was placed on a three-month "vacation" for his known views against the war. Dr. Orlando Garcia, a

popular talk show host on New York Spanish-language station WADO, was dismissed for his "unbalanced view of the war." Editor Joe Reedy of the Kutztown (PA) *Patriot* was fired for writing an editorial "How About a Little Peace?" just before the bombing started. In an editorial explaining why Reedy was fired, two weeks into the bombing, the paper said "the time for debate has passed."

See also, Ben H. Bagdikian, *The Media Monopoly*, Boston: Beacon, Fifth Edition, 1997 (original 1983), especially chs. 2 to 8 (many revealing examples of the pressures on journalists and editors); Michael Parenti, *Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media*, New York: St. Martin's, 1986 (updated edition 1993), especially ch. 3 (scores of examples of direct advertiser pressure on media outlets).

54. On the reactions to the slight editorial deviation at the *New York Times*, see "Behind the Profit Squeeze at the New York Times," *Business Week*, August 30, 1976, p. 42. An excerpt:

Editorially and politically, the newspaper has also slid precipitously to the left and has become stridently antibusiness in tone, ignoring the fact that the *Times* itself is a business -- and one with very serious problems.

The article then remarks on the *New York Times's* editorial supporting a "hefty tax increase for business," commenting as follows: "'Something like that,' muses a Wall Street analyst, 'could put the *Times* right out of business.'" An accompanying remark reminds that: "Following a *Times* series on medical incompetence," a magazine run by the parent company "lost \$500,000 in pharmaceutical advertising."

On the impact of these warnings, see James Aronson, "The *Times* is a-changing," *In These Times*, March 2-8, 1977, p. 24. An excerpt:

Most important of all were changes on the editorial side itself, designed, it would seem, to renew "business confidence." In April 1976, publisher Sulzberger had announced that cousin John B. Oakes, whose supervision of the editorial page had actually induced people to read a heretofore largely unread page, would retire in January 1977 to spend the two years before his mandatory retirement traveling the world in search of fresh insight for the readership. Eyebrows rose over Oakes' eight-month notice, and went even higher with the quick announcement of Oakes' replacement: Max Frankel, Sunday editor and former chief of the Washington Bureau, whom the Sunday staff had affectionately named Attila the Hun. Clearly the "lean to the left" would halt. . . .

Will all this make *Business Week* happy? First reports indicate that it will. . . . Advertising is up slightly, as is circulation. The battle for the suburbs has been joined.

For another similar example, see "Castor oil or Camelot?," *Economist* (London), December 5, 1987, p. 101. This article notes that "Projects unsuitable for corporate sponsorship tend to die on the vine" because "stations have learned to be sympathetic to the most delicate sympathies of corporations," citing the case of public T.V. station W.N.E.T. which "lost its corporate underwriting from Gulf + Western as a result of a documentary called 'Hungry for Profit,' about multinationals buying up huge tracts of land in the third world." These actions "had not been those of a friend," Gulf's Chief Executive wrote to the station, adding that the documentary was "virulently anti-business, if not anti-American." Even before the program was shown, in anticipation of negative corporate reaction, station officials "did all we could to get the program sanitized," according to one station source. "Most people believe that W.N.E.T. would

not make the same mistake today," the *Economist* concludes. Chomsky comments: "Nor would others -- the warning need only be implicit."

See also, Felicity Barringer, "Daily News Tries Flattery to Woo Back Grocery Ads," *New York Times*, June 14, 2001, p. B1 (after the New York *Daily News* published "a series of articles saying many city supermarkets were too dirty to meet state standards, all but one of the city's major supermarket chains have refused to advertise in the newspaper" and "some also stopped selling the newspaper"; "supermarket industry executives estimate the newspapers' weekly revenue loss at \$50,000 to \$100,000," leading to prompt "overture[s] by the newspaper's business executives to repair relations with an important group of advertisers").

And see Erik Barnouw, *The Sponsor: Notes on a Modern Potentate*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1978 (on the influence of advertising upon the growth and direction of U.S. radio and television); Ben Bagdikian, *The Media Monopoly*, Boston: Beacon, Fifth Edition, 1997 (original 1983), especially chs. 7 and 9; Michael Parenti, *Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media*, New York: St. Martin's, 1986 (updated edition 1993), ch. 9; Pat Aufderheide, "What Makes Public T.V. Public?," *Progressive*, January 1988, pp. 35-38 (discussing the failure of public television to raise public debate as a result of its reliance on corporate underwriting); James Aronson, *Deadline for the Media: Today's Challenges to Press, T.V. and Radio*, New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972, pp. 261-263 (discussing a vicious local advertisers' boycott). And see chapter 4 of *U.P.* and its footnote 36.

55. For an account of how one major newspaper lost money by increasing its readership -- and more on the role of advertising in the media -- see chapter 4 of *U.P.* and its footnote 36. See also, Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*, New York: Pantheon, 1988, p. 14 (elaborating on how, in the present market, major print media cannot support their production and distribution costs based on sales alone).

56. For polls on support for the opposition parties in Nicaragua in the 1980s, see for example, *Interamerican's Public Opinion Series*, No. 7, June 4-5, 1988, Los Angeles: Interamerican Research Center, and C.I.S.P.E.S. [Committee In Solidarity with the People of El Salvador], *Alert!*, March 1988 (reporting polls conducted under the auspices of the Centro Interamericano de Investigaciones in Mexico and the Jesuit University in Managua, showing that none of the opposition political groups in Nicaragua had the support of more than 3 percent of the population; combined, they had the support of 9 percent, less than one-third the support for the Sandinistas. As for President Ortega himself, 42 percent ranked him "good/excellent" and 29 percent "fair." For comparison, in a Jesuit University poll in El Salvador that received little notice, 6 percent of the respondents supported Duarte's Christian Democrats and 10 percent supported the ARENA party, while 75 percent stated that no party represented them).

On Kinzer's articles, see Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*, New York: Pantheon, 1988, ch. 3.

57. For Chomsky's article, see Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, "Propaganda Mill: The media churn out the official line," *Progressive*, June 1988, pp. 14-17.

58. On the funding of Accuracy In Media, see for example, Louis Wolf, "Accuracy in Media Rewrites News and History," *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, Spring 1984, pp. 24-38 (giving a list of major donors to A.I.M. and their contributions, and describing the organization's hierarchy and origins); Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*, New York: Pantheon, 1988, pp. 27, 343 n.105 (summarizing A.I.M.'s influence and funding base).

On overt corporate flak and pressures on the media, see footnote 75 of chapter 10 of *U.P.*; and footnote 54 of this chapter. On similar pressures in the education system, see footnote 8 of chapter 7 of *U.P.*

59. On the U.S. recruiting Nazis after World War II, see chapter 5 of *U.P.* and its footnote 80.

60. Leslie Cockburn's story was aired on the program *West 57th* on April 6, 1987, and is described in Tom Shales, "'West 57th,' Back With a Flash," *Washington Post*, April 6, 1987, p. C1. See also, Leslie Cockburn, *Out of Control: The Story of the Reagan Administration's Secret War in Nicaragua, The Illegal Arms Pipeline, and the Contra Drug Connection*, New York: Atlantic Monthly, 1987.

For documentation of U.S. government involvement in drug-running, and on the media's treatment of this issue, see chapter 5 of *U.P.* and its footnote 79.

61. For the *New York Times*'s reporting of the U.N.I.T.A. bombing, see A.P., "Pro-West Angola Rebels Say They Downed Plane," *New York Times*, November 11, 1983, p. A5 (one hundred-word report of U.N.I.T.A.'s downing of an Angolan airliner with all 126 passengers killed).

On the contrast in coverage with the K.A.L. 007 downing, see Edward S. Herman, "Gatekeeper versus Propaganda Models: A Critical American Perspective," in Peter Golding, Graham Murdock, and Philip Schlesinger, eds., *Communicating Politics: Mass communications and the political process*, New York: Holmes & Meier, 1986, pp. 181-195 at pp. 189, 184 (noting that "*Newsweek* and *Time* magazines never mentioned [the U.N.I.T.A. bombing]; the *New York Times* had three tiny wire services notices aggregating ten inches of space." In contrast, "The *New York Times* had 147 news items on the [K.A.L. 007 downing] in September 1983 alone, covering 2,789 column inches of space. For ten consecutive days, a special section of the newspaper was devoted to the case. C.B.S. evening News attended to the event on 26 separate evenings from 31 August to 30 September. *Time* and *Newsweek* each had three long and emotional articles on the subject in September, occupying a remarkable total of 1,490 column inches between them").

On the deficiencies of the Reagan administration's explanation of the K.A.L. 007 downing and its outright falsifications concerning the incident, see for example, R.W. Johnson, *Shootdown: Flight 007 and the American Connection*, New York: Viking, 1986; Seymour M. Hersh, "*The Target Is Destroyed*": *What Really Happened to Flight 007 and What America Knew About It*, New York: Random House, 1986. See also, Editorial, "The Lie That Wasn't Shot Down," *New York Times*, January 18, 1988, p. A18 (eventual acknowledgment that the Reagan administration knew that the Soviets did *not* know that K.A.L. 007 was a civilian aircraft, as proven by Freedom of Information Act discoveries made by Congressional Representative Lee Hamilton).

62. On the October 1976 bombing of the Cuban airliner, see for example, A.P., "78 Are Believed Killed as Cuban Jetliner Crashes in Sea After Blast," *New York Times*, October 7, 1976, p. 8 (fourteen-paragraph story); David Binder, "Havana Steps Up Airliner Security After Bombing Fatal to 73 and Seeks to Place the Blame on the C.I.A.," *New York Times*, November 1, 1976, p. 9 (another fourteen-paragraph report, noting the Cuban government's allegation that the C.I.A. was involved in the bombing); William Schapp, "New Spate of Terrorism: Key Leaders Unleashed," *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, December 1980, pp. 4-8 (on the rise of Orlando Bosch, the C.I.A.-trained terrorist who confessed to the bombing of the Cuban airliner, with the assistance of another C.I.A.-trained terrorist, Luis Posada); Martin A. Lee and Norman Solomon, *Unreliable Sources: A Guide to Detecting Bias in News Media*, New York: Lyle Stuart, 1990, pp. 283-284 (on Luis Posada, the reported mastermind of the 1976 bombing); "United Nations: Cuba Cites More Evidence In Charges Against U.S.," Inter Press Service, May 27, 1992 (available on Nexis database)(on Cuba's continuing efforts to have the U.N. condemn the United States for the C.I.A.'s role in aiding and abetting the bombers; this wire-service article was not published by U.S. newspapers).

For a rare article in the U.S. press mentioning the Cuban airliner bombing years later, see Editorial, "A terrorist test for Bush," *Boston Globe*, August 18, 1989, p. 12. An excerpt:

President Bush is fending off an embarrassing bid by some in Miami's Cuban-American community to prevent the deportation of the godfather of anti-Castro terrorism, Orlando Bosch. . . . The June deportation order describes Bosch as "having repeatedly expressed and demonstrated a willingness to cause indiscriminate injury and death." The 62-year-old Cuban-born political fanatic barely bothers to deny the charge. . . .

Bosch is in a class with terrorists such as Abu Nidal. There is overwhelming evidence that he masterminded the 1976 bombing of a Cuban airliner taking off from Barbados that killed 73. He spent 11 years in jail in Venezuela for that atrocity. Bosch's partner in the airliner bombing was Luis Posada Carriles, freed from jail in Venezuela to become a logistics officer in the support team supplying the C.I.A.-backed contras in San Salvador in 1986.

63. For the *New York Times's* treatment of the Israeli airplane atrocity, see Editorial, "After Sinai," *New York Times*, March 1, 1973, p. 40 ("No useful purpose is served by an acrimonious debate over the assignment of blame for the downing of a Libyan airliner in the Sinai peninsula last week"); Editorial, "Tragic Blunder," *New York Times*, February 23, 1973, p. A32 ("there simply was a series of dreadful blunders"); Terence Smith, "Israelis Down A Libyan Airliner In The Sinai, Killing At Least 74; Say It Ignored Warnings To Land," *New York Times*, February 22, 1973, p. A1. An excerpt:

The Israeli Cabinet in a communiqué said that the jetliner had been intercepted as a "last resort. . . ." The Cairo radio . . . [said] the pilot reported that he had been having radio difficulty and had lost his way because of bad weather. Shortly afterward, the radio said, the pilot radioed that the Israelis were demanding that he land. . . .

Official reaction was guarded. Premier Golda Meir expressed it in a statement issued last night that said: "The government of Israel expresses its deep sorrow at the loss of life resulting from the crash of the Libyan plane in Sinai and regrets that the Libyan [sic; the pilot was a Frenchman subcontracted from Air France] pilot did not respond to the repeated warnings that were given in accordance with international procedure."

64. On Prime Minister Meir's smooth visit to the U.S. after the airplane bombing, see for example, John W. Finney, "Mrs. Meir In U.S. For 10-Day Visit," *New York Times*, February 27, 1973, p. A1; John W. Finney, "Ms. Meir Says Israel Feared a Suicide-Bombing by Airliner," *New York Times*, March 2, 1973, p. A4 ("Mr. Nixon gave assurance to Mrs. Meir, who is seeking \$515-million in new credits and aid from the United States for additional weapons, 'of continuing United States support'").

After numerous lies -- including that the French pilot was not authorized to fly the jet plane -- Israel confirmed that there had been an "error of judgment" and agreed to make *ex gratia* payments (which were paid by the United States) to the families of victims "in deference to humanitarian considerations," while denying any "guilt" or Israeli responsibility. See for example, Terence Smith, "Israel Erred in Judgment On Libyan Jet, Dayan Says," *New York Times*, February 25, 1973, p. A1 ("we erred -- under the most difficult of circumstances -- but that does not put us on the guilty side"); Terence Smith, "Israel Decides To Pay Families of Crash Victims; Government Move Avoids Any Implication of Guilt," *New York Times*, February 26, 1973, p. A1; "Israelis Announce Payments In Crash," *New York Times*, March 7, 1973, p. A8 ("Israeli officials have not accepted full blame although they have stated that several mistakes were made, including some by the French pilot of the airliner"). For false claims by apologists that Israel "immediately accepted responsibility" and "paid reparations," see for example, Michael Curtis, "Flight 7: Faulty Analogy," *New York Times*, October 2, 1983, p. E18; Martin Peretz, "Washington Diarist," *New Republic*, October 24, 1983, p. 50.

65. On the Bandung plane bombing, see for example, "11 Reds in Air Crash On Way to Parley," *New York Times*, April 12, 1955, p. 1 (ten-paragraph article reporting the Air India plane's "crash in flames" in the South China Sea, with all of its passengers killed, including 8 Chinese officials flying from Hong Kong to the Bandung Conference); Brian Urquhart, *Hammarskjold*, New York: Knopf, 1972. An excerpt (pp. 121-122 n. "***"):

On November 21, 1967, John Discoe Smith, an American defector in Moscow, charged in an article in the weekly *Literaturnaya Gazeta* that the C.I.A. was involved in sabotaging the Air India plane on which Chou En-lai himself had been scheduled to travel to Bandung. Chou had changed his plans at the last minute, but all fifteen passengers had been killed when the plane crashed in the South China Sea off Sarawak. Smith claimed that he had delivered a suitcase containing the explosive mechanism to a Chinese Nationalist in Hong Kong. This mechanism was later recovered from the wreckage, and the Hong Kong police had called the incident a case of "carefully planned mass murder."

66. For U.S. media coverage of the *Vincennes's* attack, see for example, Richard Halloran, "The Downing of Flight 655: U.S. Downs Iran Airliner Mistaken For F-14; 290 Reported Dead; A Tragedy, Reagan Says; Action Is Defended," *New York Times*, July 4, 1988, p. A1 (the original press report); Editorial, "A Verdict on the *Vincennes*," *New York Times*, August 4, 1988, p. A24 ("the shutdown still seems the type of mishap almost impossible to avoid in the context. . . . From what is now known . . . the incident still must be seen not as a crime but as a blunder, and a tragedy").

For the eyewitness Navy Commander's revelations, see David R. Carlson [Commanding Officer of the *U.S.S. Sides*], "The *Vincennes* Incident," *Proceedings: U.S. Naval Institute*, Vol. 115, No. 9, Issue 1039, September 1989, pp. 87-92. The

Commander of a U.S. escort frigate in the vicinity of the *Vincennes* at the time of the attack denounced the official apologies as founded on lies, remarking:

When the decision was made to shoot down the Airbus, the airliner was climbing, not diving; it was showing the proper identification friend or foe -- I.F.F. (Mode III); and it was in the correct flight corridor from Bandar Abbas to Dubai. . . . My experience was that the conduct of Iranian military forces in the month preceding the incident was pointedly nonthreatening. . . .

Having watched the performance of the *Vincennes* for a month before the incident, my impression was clearly that an atmosphere of restraint was not her long suit. Her actions appeared to be consistently aggressive, and had become a topic of wardroom conversation. "Who's driving the problem in *Vincennes*?" was a question asked on numerous occasions prior to 3 July. "Robo Cruiser" was the unamusing nickname that someone jokingly came up with for her, and it stuck. My guess was that the crew of the *Vincennes* felt a need to prove the viability of Aegis [its missile system] in the Persian Gulf, and that they hankered for an opportunity to show their stuff. . . . During the incident, the *Sides* was less than 20 nautical miles from the *Vincennes* and under the *Vincennes*'s tactical command. . . . The *Vincennes* announced her intentions to take TN 4131 [the Iran Air plane] with missiles at 20 miles. I wondered aloud in disbelief.

David R. Carlson, "'Fog of War' Was a Cop-Out for Vincennes," Op-Ed, *Los Angeles Times*, September 3, 1989, part V, p. 5 (Carlson notes that the Commander of the *Vincennes* and the officer in charge of anti-air warfare were given the Legion of Merit award for the "calm and professional atmosphere" under their command during the period of the destruction of the Iranian airliner, and the air-warfare coordinator was given the Navy's Commendation Medal for "heroic achievement" and "ability to maintain his poise and confidence under fire," which enabled him to "quickly and precisely complete the firing procedure").

See also, Jane Fritsch and Ralph Frammolino, "Vincennes Crew Gets Upbeat Welcome Home," *Los Angeles Times*, October 25, 1988, p. 1. An excerpt:

The officers and crew of the *Vincennes*, the U.S. warship that mistakenly shot down an Iranian airliner in the Persian Gulf last July, got a boisterous, flag-waving welcome Monday. . . .

As the *Vincennes* pulled into a pier at the 32nd Street Naval Station on Monday morning, its loudspeakers blared the theme from the movie "Chariots of Fire" and nearby Navy ships saluted with gunfire. The reception, complete with balloons and a Navy band playing upbeat songs, was organized by Navy officials who did not want the *Vincennes* "to sneak into port," a public affairs officer said.

"U.S. disputes court's authority in Iran case," *Chicago Tribune*, March 6, 1991, zone C, p. 10 (noting that Washington rejected the World Court's jurisdiction when Iran called on the Court to order reparations); John Barry and Roger Charles, "Sea of Lies," *Newsweek*, July 13, 1992, p. 29 (four years after the incident, *Newsweek*, which had previously parroted the government line, broke ranks and reported the long-known facts).

67. Chomsky and Herman stress that this is the crucial point of the "Propaganda Model" -- and the observation should be underscored here, given our extensive citation in these footnotes to material that has been reported in the mainstream media. As Chomsky and Herman emphasize in *Manufacturing Consent* (pp. xiv-xv n.14):

In criticizing media priorities and biases we often draw on the media themselves for at least some of the facts. This affords the opportunity for a classic *non sequitur*,

in which the citations of facts from the mainstream press by a critic of the press is offered as a triumphant "proof" that the criticism is self-refuting, and that media coverage of disputed issues is indeed adequate. That the media provide some facts about an issue, however, proves absolutely nothing about the adequacy or accuracy of that coverage. The mass media do, in fact, literally suppress a great deal, as we will describe in the chapters that follow. But even more important in this context is the question of the attention given to a fact -- its placement, tone, and repetitions, the framework of analysis within which it is presented, and the related facts that accompany it and give it meaning (or preclude understanding).

That a careful reader looking for a fact can sometimes find it with diligence and a skeptical eye tells us nothing about whether that fact received the attention and context it deserved, whether it was intelligible to the reader or effectively distorted or suppressed. What level of attention it deserved may be debatable, but there is no merit to the pretense that because certain facts may be found in the media by a diligent and skeptical researcher, the absence of radical bias and de facto suppression is thereby demonstrated. A careful reader of the Soviet press could learn facts about the war in Afghanistan that controvert the government line -- but these inconvenient facts would not be considered in the West to demonstrate the objectivity of the Soviet press and the adequacy of its coverage of this issue.

68. For the Freedom House study, see Peter Braestrup, *Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington*, Boulder, CO: Westview, and New York: Praeger, 1977 (2 volumes)(published in cooperation with Freedom House); abridged edition, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983. On the role of Freedom House as a virtual propaganda arm of the international right wing and conservative elements of the government, see Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, *Demonstration Elections: U.S.-Staged Elections in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and El Salvador*, Boston: South End, 1984, Appendix I.

69. For the enthusiastic media reaction to the Freedom House study, see for example, Townsend Hoopes, "In the Press of Battle," *Washington Post Book World*, August 7, 1977, p. G7 (lauding *Big Story* as a "massive, impressive analysis," "a landmark work of high quality and fascination" that is "unlikely to receive the wide study and reflection it deserves"); Edwin Diamond, "The Tet Media Test," *New York Times Book Review*, November 27, 1977, p. 30 (calling *Big Story* "conscientious," "painstakingly thorough" and "meticulous," and praising "its valuable lessons on how press performance can be improved").

70. For Chomsky's article on the Freedom House study, see Noam Chomsky, "10 Years After Tet: The Big Story That Got Away," *More: The Media Magazine*, Vol. 8, No. 6, June 1978, pp. 16f. This article also was published in an expanded version as: "The U.S. media and the Tet offensive," *Race & Class* (London), Vol. 20, No. 1, 1978, pp. 21f. See also, Gareth Porter, "Who Lost Vietnam?," *Inquiry*, February 20, 1978, pp. 6-9 (another critique of *Big Story*). The topic also is discussed in detail in Herman's and Chomsky's *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*, New York: Pantheon, 1988, ch. 5 and Appendix 3.

71. On the indigenous nature of the opposition to both the U.S.-backed client regime in South Vietnam and the U.S. invasion and attack on South Vietnam, see *The Pentagon Papers*, Senator Gravel Edition, Boston: Beacon, 1972 (parenthetical citations in this footnote refer to this edition unless otherwise noted).

The *Pentagon Papers* -- the top-secret official U.S. Defense Department history of American involvement in Indochina -- makes clear the fallacy of claims both that the North Vietnamese government was a Soviet puppet, and that the peasant insurgency in South Vietnam was instigated and led by the North. When the *Pentagon Papers* was leaked to the press in 1971, one of its most remarkable revelations was that, in an internal planning record of more than two decades, the Defense Department analysts were able to discover only *one* staff paper "which treats communist reactions [to events in Indochina] primarily in terms of the separate national interests of Hanoi [North Vietnam], Moscow, and Peiping [China], rather than primarily in terms of an overall communist strategy for which Hanoi is acting as an agent" (Vol. II, p. 107, referring to "Special National Intelligence Estimate of November 1961"). Chomsky points out that it is amusing to trace the efforts to establish that Ho Chi Minh, the North Vietnamese leader, was merely a Russian (or Chinese) puppet. In July 1948, the State Department could find "no evidence of direct link between Ho and Moscow" -- but naturally "assumes it exists" (Vol. I, p. 5).

In the Fall of 1948, State Department intelligence found evidence of "Kremlin-directed conspiracy . . . in virtually all countries *except Vietnam*" -- Indochina appeared "an anomaly" (emphasis added). The most likely explanation for this, according to U.S. intelligence, is that "no rigid directives have been issued by Moscow" or that "a special dispensation for the Vietnam government has been arranged in Moscow" (Vol. I, pp. 5, 34). In September 1948, the State Department noted: "There continues to be no known communication between the U.S.S.R. and Vietnam, although evidence is accumulating that a radio liaison may have been established through the Tass agency in Shanghai." American officials in Saigon added: "No evidence has yet turned up that Ho Chi Minh is receiving current directives either from Moscow, China, or the Soviet Legation in Bangkok" -- "It may be assumed," they conclude from this, "that Moscow feels that Ho and his lieutenants have had sufficient training and experience and are sufficiently loyal to be trusted to determine their day-to-day policy without supervision." By February 1949, the State Department was relieved to discover that "Moscow publications of fairly recent date are frequently seized by the French" [France was the colonial power in Vietnam before the U.S.] -- indicating that "satisfactory communications exist," though their channel still remained a mystery (see U.S. Government Offset Edition of the *Pentagon Papers*, Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-67*, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971, Book 8, pp. 148, 151, 168 [while censored, this edition includes valuable documents unavailable elsewhere]).

It was the same story with China: for example, in June 1953, a National Intelligence Estimate noted that "there has been surprising[ly] little direct cooperation between local Chinese Communists and the Viet Minh" [i.e. the Vietnamese rebels during the struggle against France] -- "We are unable to determine whether Peiping or Moscow has ultimate responsibility for Viet Minh policy" (Vol. I, p. 396).

Indeed, so marginal was the Soviet interest in Southeast Asia prior to the American escalation of the war in 1964 that the U.S. National Security Council Working Group, in November 1964, expressed the view that "Moscow's role in Vietnam is likely to remain a relatively minor one," noting:

Moscow's *ability* to influence decisions in Hanoi tends consequently to be proportional to the North Vietnamese regime's fears of American action against it, rising in moments of crisis and diminishing in quieter periods. Moscow's *willingness* to give overt backing to Hanoi, however, seems to be in inverse proportion to the level of threat to North Vietnam.

The Report also concludes that "Chinese Communist capabilities to augment D.R.V. [North Vietnamese] offensive and defensive capabilities are slight" (Vol. III, p. 215). Following the escalation of the U.S. attack against South Vietnam in 1964, however, the "period of nearly three years of diligent [Soviet] detachment" came to an end, and "the Soviet Union. . . reentered Southeast Asian politics in an active way" with a "reported Soviet pledge in November [1964] to increase economic and military aid to North Vietnam" and subsequent warnings that it would support the D.N.V. in the face of the naval attacks on its coast and U.S. air attacks in Laos (which were then approaching the North Vietnamese border) (Vol. III, pp. 266-267). Furthermore, so far as was known, the only Chinese directly engaged in Indochina were the "few Chinese Nationalists" involved in covert operations *against* North Vietnam (Vol. III, p. 500).

Similarly unsupported were the U.S. government's claims that the South Vietnamese peasant movement was instigated and controlled by North Vietnam. The *Pentagon Papers* analyst -- discussing the origins of the 1958 South Vietnamese insurgency against the U.S.-client Diem regime, which was imposed as their government after the 1954 Geneva Accords -- notes that "no direct links" had been established between Hanoi and the Southern Vietnamese insurgents in the 1956-1959 period, though still he tends, rather cautiously, towards the view that "some form of D.R.V. [North Vietnamese] apparatus" may have "originated and controlled the insurgency" during those years (Vol. I, pp. 34, 243).

In the end, the *Pentagon Papers* analyst limits himself to the conclusion that "whether or not the rebellion against Diem in South Vietnam proceeded independently of, or even contrary to directions from Hanoi through 1958, Hanoi moved thereafter to capture the revolution" -- and the evidence that Hanoi did in fact "capture the revolution" is "the rapid growth of the N.L.F." after 1960, which, the analyst reasoned, "is a further indication that the Hanoi-directed communist party apparatus had been engaged to the fullest in the initial organization and subsequent development of the N.L.F." in South Vietnam [the "N.L.F.," or National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, was the popularly-based anti-colonial indigenous revolutionary movement, the so-called "Viet Cong"] (Vol. I, p. 265). Douglas Pike, a former U.S. foreign service officer and professor, using similar reasoning, offered as proof that Ho Chi Minh must be the N.L.F.'s "master planner" the fact that the N.L.F. "projected a social construction program of such scope and ambition that of necessity it must have been created in Hanoi" -- see Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam*, Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966, p. 76. Chomsky remarks: in the face of such powerful argumentation, one can only lapse into silence.

The *Pentagon Papers* also demonstrate conclusively that when the United States undertook its major escalation of the war in February 1965, it knew of no regular North Vietnamese military units in South Vietnam. In fact, the first reference in the U.S. government's internal planning record to regular North Vietnamese units being present in South Vietnam is in a C.I.A./D.I.A. [Defense Intelligence Agency] Memorandum of April 21, 1965, which "reflected the acceptance into the enemy order of battle of one regiment [sic] of the 325th P.A.V.N. Division said to be located in Kontum Province." As

the *Pentagon Papers* analyst notes, this was "most ominous . . . a sobering harbinger of things to come" -- not, however, a continuation of what had come before, and what had supposedly been the basis for the U.S. escalation: i.e. the U.S. government's January 1965 allegation that the entire 325th *Division* had entered South Vietnam, thereby entitling the U.S. to respond under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter to "aggression by means of an armed attack" (Vol. III, p. 438). Moreover, on July 2, 1965, the Assistant Secretary of Defense was still concerned with the *possibility* that there might be North Vietnamese forces in or near South Vietnam -- as he stated, "I am quite concerned about the increasing probability that there are regular P.A.V.N. forces either in the II Corps area [in South Vietnam] or in Laos directly across the border from II Corps" (Vol. IV, p. 291) -- and on July 14, 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff included only one regiment of the 325th P.A.V.N. Division in their estimate of the total of 48,500 "Viet Cong organized combat units" (Vol. IV, p. 295). By comparison, note that the Honolulu Meeting of April 20, 1965, had recommended that American forces be raised to 82,000, supplemented with 7,250 Korean and Australian troops (2,000 Koreans had been dispatched on January 8, 1965, and at the time there were 33,500 U.S. troops in the country) (Vol. III, p. 706). In June, the United States decided "to pour U.S. troops into the country as fast as they could be deployed" (Vol. II, p. 362). And in mid-July, probably by July 17, President Johnson approved the request that the United States troop level be raised to 175,000 (Vol. IV, pp. 297, 299). Chomsky comments: in light of these facts alone, the claim that the United States was defending South Vietnam from an armed attack when it dramatically escalated the war in 1965 is merely ludicrous.

Recall, for example, that April 1965 -- the date of the first mention in the internal record of a lone North Vietnamese regiment, not a "Division," in South Vietnam -- was two months after the initiation of regular and intensive U.S. bombing of North and South Vietnam; it was eight months after the U.S. bombed strategic targets in North Vietnam in "retaliation" for the Tonkin Gulf incident [in which the Johnson administration falsely claimed that two U.S. destroyers were fired upon by North Vietnamese torpedo boats]; and it was fourteen months after the earlier escalation of U.S. military pressure against North Vietnam on February 1, 1964. Furthermore, by the end of 1964, the U.S. troop level had reached 23,000, and the U.S. military by that point had been directly engaged in combat operations in Vietnam for three full years (Vol. II, p. 160). Moreover, the Johnson administration's "aggression from the North" thesis quickly was devastated by analyses of its White Paper of 1965 -- see for example, Editorial, "White Paper on Vietnam," *New Republic*, March 13, 1965, p. 5 (noting that the White Paper only names six North Vietnamese infiltrators, and pointing out that most "infiltrators" from the North were actually Southerners returning to their homes); I.F. Stone, "A Reply to the White Paper," *I.F. Stone's Weekly*, March 8, 1965, p. 1 (reporting, among other things, that less than two and one-half percent of weapons captured by the U.S. were of Communist origin).

Thus, the fundamental problem in establishing the United States' case was that American military intervention preceded and was always far more extensive than the North Vietnamese involvement -- leaving aside the question of the relative rights of North Vietnamese and Americans to be fighting in South Vietnam after the unification provisions of the Geneva Agreements were subverted. In general, the U.S. leadership knew that "The basic elements of Communist strength in South Vietnam remain indigenous," with a corresponding "ability to recruit locally"; and it also recognized that the N.L.F. "enjoys some status as a nationalist movement," whereas the U.S.-backed

military government of South Vietnam "is composed primarily of technicians and has about it a caretaker aura." As the National Security Council Working Group on Vietnam concluded: the Saigon government's "success so far in avoiding open mass opposition is encouraging, but even if the government can avoid a direct public confrontation, the lack of positive support from various key segments of the populace seems certain to hamper its effectiveness" (Vol. III, pp. 651-656, N.S.C. Working Group on Vietnam, Sec. 1: "Intelligence Assessment: The Situation in Vietnam," November 24, 1964, Document 240).

By February 1966, the American force level passed 200,000, and it was alleged that 11,000 North Vietnamese troops were in South Vietnam. By December 1967, the American force level was approaching half a million, and it was alleged that 50,000 to 60,000 North Vietnamese troops were in the South (about the same number as the force of South Koreans that were fighting for the United States). There also were Chinese forces -- namely, mercenaries from Chiang Kai-Shek's army introduced by Kennedy and Johnson to fight on the U.S. side, six companies of combat infantry by April 1965. Furthermore, North Vietnamese regular units, estimated by the Pentagon at about 50,000 by 1968, were largely in peripheral areas; in contrast, U.S. mercenary forces were rampaging in the heartland of South Vietnam, as was the U.S. military itself. Korean mercenaries reached 50,000 by 1969, along with another 20,000 "Free World," and over a half-million U.S. troops by that point. See George Kahin, *Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam*, New York: Knopf, 1986, pp. 207-208, 307-308, 333-336; Douglas Kinnard, *The War Managers*, Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1977, pp. 37-38; Chester Cooper, *The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam*, New York: Dodd, Mead, 1970, pp. 266-267, 277; Theodore Draper, *Abuse of Power*, New York: Viking, 1966, pp. 73-80.

Chomsky notes that none of these exposures made a dent on the typical mainstream editorial, news article, column, or presentation of administration handouts. Even after the *Pentagon Papers* was leaked -- vindicating the hardest of hard-line dove analyses of the real source of the aggression, locating it firmly in Washington -- the mythical truth about North Vietnamese aggression held firm in the U.S. press. Chomsky adds that some have been misled in their analysis of the media in the period by the fact that one journal, the *New York Review of Books*, was open to dissident opinion during the peak years of popular protest in the late 1960s: those doors closed in the early 1970s, and there were few other examples.

72. On U.S. intelligence's pessimistic assessment after the Tet Offensive, see for example, Document #132, "General Wheeler's [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] Report to President Johnson After the Tet Offensive," in the *New York Times* edition of the *Pentagon Papers*, New York: Bantam, 1971. An excerpt (pp. 615-617):

The enemy is operating with relative freedom in the countryside, probably recruiting heavily and no doubt infiltrating N.V.A. [North Vietnamese army] units and personnel. His recovery is likely to be rapid. . . . R.V.N.A.F. [the U.S.-client South Vietnamese army] is now in a defensive posture around towns and cities and there is concern about how well they will bear up under sustained pressure.

The initial attack [in the Tet Offensive] nearly succeeded in a dozen places, and defeat in those places was only averted by the timely reaction of U.S. forces. In short, it was a very near thing. There is no doubt that the R.D. Program [the so-called civilian "pacification" program] has suffered a severe set back. . . . To a large

extent the V.C. now control the countryside. . . . Under these circumstances, we must be prepared to accept some reverses.

Note that at the time of the Tet Offensive, the *Boston Globe* surveyed 39 major American newspapers -- with a combined circulation of 22 million people -- and found that not a single one of them had called for U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. See Min S. Yee, "Vietnam: The U.S. press and its agony of appraisal," *Boston Globe*, February 18, 1968, p. 2A.

73. At the left-liberal end of the mainstream spectrum, attitudes towards the Vietnam War have ranged from those expressed by Anthony Lewis [the argument against the war "was that the United States had misunderstood the cultural and political forces at work in Indochina -- that it was in a position where it could not impose a solution except at a price too costly to itself"; see "Ghosts," *New York Times*, December 27, 1979, p. A23] to those of Irving Howe ["We opposed the war because we believed, as Stanley Hoffman has written, that 'Washington could "save" the people of South Vietnam and Cambodia from communism only at a cost that made a mockery of the word "save"']; see "The Crucifixion of Cambodia," *Dissent*, Fall 1979, pp. 391f at p. 394]. In short, the argument against the war was either the cost to us or the cost to them -- as we determine it. In contrast, Chomsky notes, we opposed the Russian invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan because aggression is wrong, whatever its costs to either party.

74. For Sheehan's book, see Neil Sheehan, *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam*, New York: Random House, 1988.

75. For discussion of Vann's unpublished and untitled memorandum, which was circulated within the military in 1965 and given personally by Vann to Professor Alex Carey of the University of New South Wales in Australia, see Noam Chomsky, *For Reasons of State*, New York: Pantheon, 1973, pp. 232-233. Vann's premises were that a social revolution was in process in South Vietnam, "primarily identified with the National Liberation Front," and that "a popular political base for the [U.S. client] Government of South Vietnam does not now exist." "The dissatisfaction of the agrarian population . . . today is largely expressed through alliance with the N.L.F." "The existing government is oriented toward the exploitation of the rural and lower class urban populations." Therefore, since it is "naive" to expect that "an unsophisticated, relatively illiterate, rural population [will] recognize and oppose the evils of Communism," Vann called for the United States to institute "effective political indoctrination of the population" under an American-maintained "autocratic government."

76. On the main tradition of "democratic" thought in the West, see the text above this footnote in *U.P.*, and footnotes 39, 40 and 41 of this chapter.

77. For the American military leadership's statements of concern about a domestic crisis in the U.S., see the *Pentagon Papers* [the top-secret official U.S. Defense Department history of American involvement in Indochina, leaked to the press in 1971], Senator Gravel Edition, Boston: Beacon, 1972 (parenthetical citations in this footnote refer to this edition).

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, considering additional U.S. troop deployments to Vietnam after the Tet Offensive in 1968, noted that they had to make sure that "sufficient forces would still be available for civil disorder control" (Vol. IV, p. 541). Similarly, a Pentagon Working Group warned in a top secret Defense Department memorandum in March 1968 that increased force levels in Vietnam would lead to "growing disaffection accompanied, as it certainly will be, by increased defiance of the draft and growing unrest in the cities," and ran "great risks of provoking a domestic crisis of unprecedented proportions" (Vol. IV, p. 564). A classified internal document acknowledged that "[t]he massive anti-war demonstration organized in Washington on October 21 [1967]" and the "massive march on the Pentagon" were a serious problem for the administration, commenting: "the sight of thousands of peaceful demonstrators being confronted by troops in battle gear cannot have been reassuring to the country as a whole nor to the President in particular" (Vol. IV, pp. 217, 197). The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, John McNaughton, noted in secret that escalation of the land war beyond South Vietnam might lead to massive civil disobedience within the United States, particularly in view of opposition to the war among young people, the underprivileged, the intelligentsia, and women (Vol. IV, pp. 481-482, 478). He added (Vol. IV, p. 484):

[A]n important but hard-to-measure cost is domestic and world opinion: There may be a limit beyond which many Americans and much of the world will not permit the United States to go. The picture of the world's greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring 1000 non-combatants a week, while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission on an issue whose merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one. It could conceivably produce a distortion in the American national consciousness and in the world image of the United States -- especially if the damage to North Vietnam is complete enough to be "successful."

Note that here McNaughton is referring only to casualties from the U.S. attack on North Vietnam -- not to the much larger attack on the South.

See also, for example, Thomas Oliphant, "Harrington says admiral discussed N. Viet invasion," *Boston Globe*, April 15, 1972, p. 1 (reporting the testimony of Admiral Thomas Moorer before the House Armed Services Committee that "if domestic restraints were relaxed the U.S. would have the option of bombing Haiphong harbor in North Vietnam and launching amphibious assaults behind North Vietnamese lines," and quoting Congressman Michael Harrington that the "restraints" Moorer had in mind were "the activities of the peace movement and of the press"); David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest*, New York: Random House, 1969. An excerpt (p. 653):

In late March, Johnson summoned his Senior Advisory Group on Vietnam, a blue-chip Establishment group. These were the great names of the Cold War: McCloy, Acheson, Arthur Dean, Mac Bundy, Douglas Dillon, Robert Murphy. And over a period of two days they quietly let him know that the Establishment -- yes, Wall Street -- had turned on the war; it was hurting us more than it was helping us, it had all gotten out of hand, and it was time to bring it back to proportion. It was hurting the economy, dividing the country, turning the youth against the country's best traditions. Great universities, their universities, were being destroyed. It was time to turn it around, to restore some balance. At one of the briefings of the Wise Men it was Arthur Goldberg, much mocked by some of the others, who almost single-handedly destroyed the military demand for 205,000 more troops.

78. On the developments within the American army, see for example, David Cortright, *Soldiers in Revolt: The American Military Today*, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1975.

79. On the commonplace nature of My Lai-type massacres, see for example, Krista Maeots, "Vietnam has many My Lais -- Canadian M.D.," *Ottawa Citizen*, January 12, 1970, p. 13. Dr. Alje Vennema, director of a Canadian anti-tuberculosis hospital in Quang Ngai Province near My Lai until August 1968 -- he left because he felt that he could do nothing useful there anymore, since "My service was futile" -- reported that he knew of the My Lai slayings at once, but did nothing "because it was nothing new." He explained:

There was a massacre at Son-Tra in February of 1968, and another incident during the summer in the Mo-Duc district. . . . I had heard this type of story many times before, however, and had spoken to U.S. and Canadian officials about the senseless killings of civilians that were going on. . . . They were being talked about among the Vietnamese people, but no more than other incidents. . . . [T]here were 600 foreign correspondents in the country at that time. The story was effectively suppressed at the time.

For similar reports, see for example, U.P.I., "Colonel Says Every Large Combat Unit in Vietnam Has a Mylai," *New York Times*, May 25, 1971, p. 13 (Colonel Oran K. Henderson, the highest-ranking officer to have faced court-martial charges for the My Lai massacre, explained that "every unit of brigade size has its Mylai hidden some place," although such incidents remained undisclosed because "every unit doesn't have a Ridenhour [the Vietnam veteran who went public with the My Lai massacre more than a year after it occurred]"); "A Doctor Reports from South Vietnam -- Testimony by Erich Wulff," in John Duffett, ed., *Against the Crime of Silence: Proceedings of the Russell International War Crimes Tribunal*, New York: O'Hare, 1968, pp. 522-536 (testimony of Erich Wulff before Bertrand Russell's Tribunal on War Crimes in Vietnam in 1967, with descriptions of torturing of prisoners, creation of "free fire zones," and the destruction of the village of Phu Loc); Bertrand Russell, *War Crimes in Vietnam*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1967 (recounting almost unbearable narratives of torture and violence); Jonathan Schell, *The Military Half: An Account of Destruction in Quang Ngai and Quang Tin*, New York: Knopf, 1968 (describing the war in Quang Ngai and Quang Tin Provinces in unforgettable detail); Douglas Valentine, *The Phoenix Program*, New York: Morrow, 1990 (one of the best histories of what really happened in Vietnam).

80. For *Life* magazine's story on My Lai, see Hal Wingo, "The Massacre at Mylai," *Life*, December 5, 1969, pp. 36f. See also, Seymour Hersh, *My Lai 4: a report on the massacre and its aftermath*, New York: Random House, 1970; Seymour M. Hersh, *Cover-up: The Army's Secret Investigation of the Massacre at My Lai 4*, New York: Random House, 1972; Richard L. Strout, "Tragic human costs of war," *Christian Science Monitor*, November 24, 1969, p. 1. An excerpt:

American press self-censorship thwarted Mr. Ridenhour's disclosures [about My Lai] for a year. "No one wanted to go into it," his agent said of telegrams sent to *Life*, *Look*, and *Newsweek* magazines outlining allegations. . . . Except for the recent antiwar march in Washington the event might not have been publicized. In connection with the march a news offshoot (Dispatch News Service) of the left-wing

Institute of Policy Studies of this city aggressively told and marketed the story to approximately 30 United States and Canadian newspapers.

81. On the Piers Commission's findings, see for example, Seymour Hersh, "The Army's Secret Inquiry Describes a 2nd Massacre, Involving 90 Civilians," *New York Times*, June 5, 1972, p. 10.

Few winced when the *New York Times* published a think-piece from My Lai on the fifth anniversary of the massacre, and noted that the village and region remained "silent and unsafe," though the Americans were still "trying to make it safe" by relentless bombardment and shelling. The reporter then quoted villagers who accused the U.S. of killing many people, adding philosophically: "They are in no position to appreciate what the name My Lai means to Americans." See A.P., "Five years later, My Lai is a no man's town, silent and unsafe," *New York Times*, March 16, 1974, p. 2.

82. On South Africa's black soldiers, see for example, Kurt Campbell, "Marching for Pretoria" [cover title: "The Warriors of Apartheid: Inside South Africa's Military Establishment"], *Boston Globe Magazine*, March 1, 1987, pp. 16f.

Chapter Two

Teach-In: Over Coffee

1. On post-World War II U.S. and Soviet military presence, see for example, Center for Defense Information, "Soviet Geopolitical Momentum: Myth or Menace? Trends of Soviet Influence Around the World From 1945 to 1980," *Defense Monitor*, January 1980, p. 5 (tracing Soviet influence on a country-by-country basis since World War II, and concluding that Soviet power peaked in the late 1950s and by 1979 "the Soviets were influencing only 6 percent of the world's population and 5 percent of the world's G.N.P., exclusive of the Soviet Union"); Senate Subcommittee on Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, *Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad*, Report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 21, 1970, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970, C.I.S.# 70-S382-17, p. 3 (pointing out that the post-World War II U.S. global military presence reached over 3,000 foreign military bases "virtually surrounding both the Soviet Union and Communist China"); Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures 1981*, Leesburg, VA: World Priorities, 1981, p. 8 (study counting at least 125 military conflicts since the end of World War II, 95 percent of them occurring in the Third World and in most cases involving foreign forces, with "western powers accounting for 79 percent of the interventions, communist for 6 percent").

2. For Gaddis's justification of his use of the "containment" concept, see John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. The exact words (p. vii n.*); emphasis in original):

The term "containment" poses certain problems, implying as it does a consistently defensive orientation in American policy. One can argue at length about whether Washington's approach to the world since 1945 has been primarily defensive -- I tend to think it has -- but the argument is irrelevant for the purposes of this book. What is important here is that American leaders consistently *perceived* themselves as responding to rather than initiating challenges to the existing international order. For this reason, it seems to me valid to treat the idea of containment as the central theme of postwar national security policy.

3. For Gaddis's reference to "economic considerations," see John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. The exact words (pp. 356-357; emphasis in original):

What is surprising is the *primacy* that has been accorded economic considerations in shaping strategies of containment, *to the exclusion of other considerations*. One would not expect to find, in initiatives directed so self-consciously at the world at large, such decisive but parochial concerns. . . . To a remarkable degree, containment has been the product, not so much of what the Russians have done, or

of what has happened elsewhere in the world, but of internal forces operating within the United States.

4. For National Security Council [N.S.C.] 68, of April 14, 1950, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950*, Vol. I, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977, pp. 234-292. The exact words (section VI.B.2, pp. 261, 258):

[T]here are grounds for predicting that the United States and other free nations will within a period of a few years at most experience a decline in economic activity of serious proportions unless more positive governmental programs are developed than are now available. . . . Industrial production declined by 10 percent between the first quarter of 1948 and the last quarter of 1949, and by approximately one-fourth between 1944 and 1949. In March 1950 there were approximately 4,750,000 unemployed, as compared to 1,070,000 in 1943 and 670,000 in 1944. The gross national product declined slowly in 1949 from the peak reached in 1948 (\$262 billion in 1948 to an annual rate of \$256 billion in the last six months of 1949), and in terms of constant prices declined by about 20 percent between 1944 and 1948.

The document then proposes a build-up of "economic and military strength" through rearmament (pp. 258, 286):

With a high level of economic activity, the United States could soon attain a gross national product of \$300 billion per year, as was pointed out in the President's Economic Report (January 1950). Progress in this direction would permit, and might itself be aided by, a build-up of the economic and military strength of the United States and the free world; furthermore, if a dynamic expansion of the economy were achieved, the necessary build-up could be accomplished without a decrease in the national standard of living because the required resources could be obtained by siphoning off a part of the annual increment in the gross national product. . . .

One of the most significant lessons of our World War II experience was that the American economy, when it operates at a level approaching full efficiency, can provide enormous resources for purposes other than civilian consumption while simultaneously providing a high standard of living. After allowing for price changes, personal consumption expenditures rose by about one-fifth between 1939 and 1944, even though the economy had in the meantime increased the amount of resources going into Government use by \$60-\$65 billion (in 1939 prices).

For commentary, see for example, Fred Block, "Economic Instability and Military Strength: The Paradoxes of the 1950 Rearmament Decision," *Politics and Society*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1980, pp. 35-58; Melvyn Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992, ch. 8. See also chapter 3 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 7 to 10.

5. On the decision to increase military spending in the wake of the Marshall Plan's failure, see for example, Richard M. Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946-1948*, New York: New York University Press, 1985, pp. 329-334. An excerpt (pp. 330, 334):

Despite the rapid success of the aid program in inducing the recovery of western Europe's productive capacity, unsatisfactory progress was made with respect to the problem of increasing the dollar earnings of western European economies. In 1949 European exports to both the United States and Latin America actually declined. In this context Britain suffered another economic crisis and in September 1949 was forced to devalue the pound by 30 per cent; in subsequent months all other Marshall

Plan countries followed suit. By the end of the year both [the Council of Economic Advisors] and other federal agencies came to the conclusion that the [Committee for European Economic Cooperation] had asserted in 1948: the E.R.P. [European Recovery Program, the "Marshall Plan,"] offered no prospect for the countries of Europe to balance their payments through exports to the U.S. . . .

The decision to shift the emphasis of American policy toward Europe from economic aid to military aid occurred within the context of the recognized failure of the politico-commercial strategy that was an essential component of the E.R.P. This failure left the kind of rearmament program proposed by N.S.C.-68 as the sole means for building the Atlantic political community to which U.S. policy was consistently committed after 1946.

William Borden, *The Pacific Alliance: United States Foreign Economic Policy and Japanese Trade Recovery, 1947-1955*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984, especially pp. 12, 27, 50-60, 245-246 n.75 (reaching the same general conclusion; also pointing out that "few dollars changed hands internationally under the aid programs, the dollars went to American producers and the goods were sold to the European public" in local currencies).

See also, Melvyn Leffler, "The United States and the Strategic Dimensions of the Marshall Plan," *Diplomatic History*, Summer 1988, pp. 277-306 at pp. 277-278 (overcoming the dollar gap "which had originally prompted the Marshall Plan" required a restoration of the triangular trade patterns whereby Europe earned dollars through U.S. purchase of raw materials from its colonies; hence European, and Japanese, access to Third World markets and raw materials was an essential component of the general strategic planning, and a necessary condition for fulfillment of the general purposes of the Marshall Plan, which were to "benefit the American economy," to "redress the European balance of power" in favor of U.S. allies -- state and class -- and to "enhance American national security," where "national security . . . meant the control of raw materials, industrial infrastructure, skilled manpower, and military bases"). And see chapter 3 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 3, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11.

6. For Gaddis's characterization of the 1918 invasion of the Soviet Union, see John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. 10f, 21. His exact words (pp. 10-11):

This debate over the motives for intervention misses an important point, though, which is that Wilson and his allies saw their actions in a defensive rather than an offensive context. Intervention in Russia took place in response to a profound and potentially far-reaching intervention by the new Soviet government in the internal affairs, not just of the West, but of virtually every other country in the world: I refer here, of course to the Revolution's challenge -- which could hardly have been more categorical -- to the very survival of the capitalist order. . . . From this perspective, the interesting question regarding Western intervention in Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution is why it was such a half-hearted, poorly planned, and ultimately ineffectual enterprise, given the seriousness of the threat it sought to counter.

7. For Secretary of State Lansing's warning, see "Lansing Papers, 1914-1920," Vol. II, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940, p. 348. His exact words (referring to a 1918 communication from the Bolsheviks to "the peoples and governments of the Allied countries"):

The document is an appeal to the proletariat of all countries, to the ignorant and mentally deficient, who by their numbers are urged to become masters. Here seems to me to lie a very real danger in view of the present social unrest throughout the world.

For a similar warning by Lansing made elsewhere, see John Lewis Gaddis, *Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States: An Interpretive History*, New York: Knopf, 1978, p. 105:

[Bolshevism's appeal is] to the unintelligent and brutish elements of mankind to take from the intellectual and successful their rights and possessions and to reduce them to a state of slavery. . . . Bolshevism is the most hideous and monstrous thing that the human mind has ever conceived.

See also, Lloyd Gardner, *Safe for Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Revolution*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 242 (on President Wilson's fears about Bolshevism's potential effect upon American blacks).

For a study of Wilson's intervention in Russia, see David S. Fogelsang, *America's Secret War Against Bolshevism: U.S. Intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1917-1920*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995.

For sources on the Red Scare of 1919 in the U.S., see footnote 6 of chapter 8 of *U.P.* Chomsky remarks: "The Red Scare was strongly backed by the press and elites generally until they came to see that their own interests would be harmed as the right-wing frenzy got out of hand -- in particular, the anti-immigrant hysteria, which threatened the reserve of cheap labor" (*Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies*, Boston: South End, 1989, p. 189).

8. On popular reform under the Sandinistas, see for example, Latin American Studies Association, *The Electoral Process in Nicaragua: The Report of the Latin American Studies Association Delegation to Observe the Nicaraguan General Election of November 4, 1984*, Latin American Studies Association Official Publication, November 19, 1984, pp. 4-7 (summarizing the Sandinista government's priorities and why it gained popular support during the first half of the 1980s; noting that the Sandinista agenda "defined national priorities according to 'the logic of the majority,' which meant that Nicaragua's poor majority would have access to, and be the primary beneficiaries of, public programs"); Joseph Collins et al., *What Difference Could a Revolution Make?: Food and Farming in the New Nicaragua*, San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1985; Dianna Melrose, *Nicaragua: The Threat of a Good Example?*, Oxford (U.K.): Oxfam [British charitable relief and development organization], 1985 (preface 1989). An excerpt (pp. 1, 13-14):

[Oxfam's] long-term development work is most likely to succeed where governments are genuinely committed to the needs of the poor majority. Rarely is this the case. Nicaragua stands out because of the positive climate for development based on people's active participation, which Oxfam has encountered over the past five years [i.e. since 1979 under the Sandinista government]. . . . [S]ince 1979 the scope for development has been enormous, with remarkable progress achieved in health, literacy and a more equitable distribution of resources. . . .

The new Government of National Reconstruction stressed its desire to develop a mixed economy and political pluralism in a country that had no tradition of democracy or free elections. Great importance was also attached to achieving a high degree of national self-sufficiency and an independent, non-aligned foreign policy. This radically new focus of social policy in Nicaragua towards the needs of the poor

presented enormous scope for Oxfam's work. In addition to locally-based projects, Oxfam was now able to support nationwide initiatives to tackle problems rooted in poverty. The concept of actively involving people in development through community organisations is neither new nor radical, but widely recognised to be a precondition for successful development. However, as the World Bank points out: "Governments . . . vary greatly in the commitment of their political leadership to improving the condition of the people and encouraging their active participation in the development process." From Oxfam's experience of working in seventy-six developing countries, Nicaragua was to prove exceptional in the strength of that Government commitment.

This report documents a wide range of Sandinista reforms (pp. 14-26). They included a decline in the national illiteracy rate from 53 percent to 13 percent; popular education collectives established in 17,000 communities; 127 percent more schools, 61 percent more teachers, and 55 percent more children at primary school; a national program of mass inoculations against diseases which resulted in, among other successes, a 98 percent fall in new malaria cases; agrarian reform, including compensation for expropriated land, since up to a third of arable land (mainly on large estates) was idle or under-used; 49,661 families in a total population of three million receiving titles to land between late 1981 and late 1984; and an 8 percent increase in overall agricultural production between 1979 and 1983. The Inter-American Development Bank summarized: "Nicaragua has made noteworthy progress in the social sector, which is laying a solid foundation for long-term socio-economic development." As the *New England Journal of Medicine* put it: "In just three years, more has been done in most areas of social welfare than in fifty years of dictatorship under the Somoza family." See also footnote 52 of chapter 1 of *U.P.*

For the World Bank's 1980 prediction that it would take at least a decade for Nicaragua to reach the economic level that it had in 1977 -- because of the damaging economic consequences of the popular insurrection against the U.S.-client dictator Somoza's regime -- see Michael E. Conroy, "Economic Aggression as an Instrument of Low-Intensity Warfare," in Thomas Walker, ed., *Reagan versus the Sandinistas: The Undeclared War on Nicaragua*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987, pp. 57-79, especially p. 67 (citing "Nicaragua: The Challenge of Reconstruction," Washington: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development [the "World Bank"], October 9, 1981, p. 11). See also, Michael E. Conroy, "Economic Legacy and Policies: Performance and Critique," in Thomas Walker, ed., *Nicaragua: The First Five Years*, New York: Praeger, 1985, pp. 232-233.

9. On the "threat of a good example" as a preoccupation of U.S. foreign policy, see chapter 5 of *U.P.* and especially its footnote 32, and also its footnotes 7, 8 and 108. See also chapter 1 of *U.P.* and its footnote 20; and footnote 8 of this chapter.

10. A search on the Nexis computer database of newspapers and journals dating from the early 1980s for every instance in which the root-term "invade!" (i.e. including "invades," "invaded," etc.) was published within ten words of "South Vietnam" retrieved a total of two direct statements in American newspapers and journals that the U.S. invaded South Vietnam. One was by Chomsky in an interview -- see Eric Black, "Noam Chomsky: He's got a world on his mind," *Star Tribune* (Minneapolis), April 10, 1997, p. 17A. The other appeared in a letter to the editor from a reader in Lakeland, Florida -- see Fred Mercer, "U.S. caused 'Nam war," Letter, *The Ledger* (Lakeland, FL), December 1,

1995, p. A14. In addition, the *Washington Post* quoted the phrase one time in an article on North Vietnamese propaganda and reeducation camps; and the British news-wire Reuters and the British Broadcasting Corporation transmitted stories which utilized the terms in this manner. See Robert G. Kaiser, "Surviving Communist 'Reeducation Camp,'" *Washington Post*, May 15, 1994, p. A33; and, for example, John Chalmers, "Vietnam's party conclaves map turbulent history," Reuters, June 27, 1996.

11. For Gaddis's characterization of Dienbienphu, see John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. 129f.

12. For Bundy's statement about Dienbienphu, see McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years*, New York: Random House, 1988, pp. 260-270 at pp. 260-261.

13. On the indigenous opposition which confronted the French and then the U.S. in Vietnam, see footnote 71 of chapter 1 of *U.P.*

14. On Nicaragua's 1984 election, see for example, Latin American Studies Association, *The Electoral Process in Nicaragua: The Report of the Latin American Studies Association Delegation to Observe the Nicaraguan General Election of November 4, 1984*, Latin American Studies Association Official Publication, November 19, 1984; Canadian Church and Human Rights Delegation, *Nicaragua 1984: Democracy, Elections and War*, Toronto: Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America, 1984; Abraham Brumberg, "'Sham' and 'Farce' in Nicaragua?," *Dissent*, Spring 1985, pp. 226-237.

On El Salvador's 1982 election, see for example, Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, *Demonstration Elections: U.S.-Staged Elections in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and El Salvador*, Boston: South End, 1984, ch. 4.

15. On repression in El Salvador and Guatemala versus that in Nicaragua under the Sandinistas, see for example, Americas Watch, *Human Rights in Nicaragua 1986*, New York: Americas Watch Committee, February 1987, chs. 1, 2 and 6. An excerpt (pp. 140-141, 158-159):

One illustration of the Reagan Administration's employment of human rights rhetoric in its war against the Sandinistas is a joint State Department-Defense Department document that was distributed to those who attended the White House ceremony on December 10, 1986 marking International Human Rights Day. Printed on glossy paper with a silver cover and with four color illustrations (a format that stands out in contrast to U.S. government documents on human rights in other parts of the world) it is titled "The Challenge to Democracy in Central America." At page 28, it cites the following statement approvingly: "In the American continent, there is no regime more barbaric and bloody, no regime that violates human rights in a manner more constant and permanent, than the Sandinista regime." Whatever the sins of the Sandinistas -- and they are real -- this is nonsense. . . .

Between 40,000 and 50,000 Salvadoran civilians were murdered by government forces and death squads allied to them during the 1980s. A similar number died during [the U.S. client] Somoza's last year or so in Nicaragua, mostly in

indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population by the National Guard. The number of civilian noncombatants killed by the armed forces in Guatemala during the 1980s cannot be known, but it is probably the highest in the hemisphere. . . . As to Nicaragua, taking into account all of the civilian noncombatant deaths attributable to government forces in the more than seven years since the Sandinistas consolidated power, it is difficult to count a total of more than 300 . . . of which the largest number of victims were Miskito Indians on the Atlantic Coast in 1981 and 1982. . . . [Furthermore], Americas Watch knows of two cases of [Nicaraguan] political prisoners in the sense in which that term is used in the United States . . . [one of these] had been arrested for evading the military draft. . . . He was subsequently released without charges and is not presently serving in the military. . . . Also at this time, Amnesty International has no currently adopted "prisoner of conscience" in Nicaragua under the Sandinistas.

See also footnotes 8, 16 and 17 of this chapter; footnote 13 of chapter 1 of *U.P.*; footnote 48 of chapter 5 of *U.P.*; and footnote 54 of chapter 8 of *U.P.*

The true nature of the U.S.-client regimes in El Salvador and Guatemala should be fully appreciated. See for example, Reverend Daniel Santiago [Catholic priest working in El Salvador], "The Aesthetics of Terror, The Hermeneutics of Death," *America* [Jesuit journal], Vol. 162, No. 11, March 24, 1990, pp. 292-295. An excerpt:

I have heard Tonita tell her story at least a dozen times. She has recounted the horror for each delegation of North Americans who visited the refugee camp on the outskirts of San Salvador. With so many tellings, Tonita's testimony has acquired a repetitive quality. When translated and transcribed, it is somewhat unbelievable. What is convincing, however, is not the story itself, but Tonita's visceral reaction to each telling. Her tears are not the stage tears of an actress; the lines of pain that cross her wrinkled face have not been enhanced with makeup. Tonita's story is quite believable and that is the problem.

Tonita is a peasant from Santa Lucia, a rural village near the volcano of San Vicente in El Salvador. One day, two years ago, at 11:00 A.M., Tonita left her one-room home to carry lunch to her husband, Chepe, and their two teen-age sons who were cutting firewood on the volcano. She left her three smallest children -- an 18-month-old daughter, a 3-year-old son and a 5-year-old daughter -- in the care of her sister and mother. . . . Entering the house [on her return], Tonita was greeted by the grisly spectacle of a feast macabre. Seated around a small table in the middle of her house were her mother, sister and three children. The decapitated heads of all five had been placed in front of each torso, their hands arranged on top, as if each body was stroking its own head. This had proven to be difficult in the case of the youngest daughter. The difficulty had been overcome by nailing the hands onto the head. The hammer had been left on the table. The floor and table were awash with blood. In the very center of the table was a large plastic bowl filled with blood; the air hung heavy with its sweet, cloying smell. Tonita's neighbors had fled when the Salvadoran National Guard began their killing. The *Guardia* had not tried to stop the people from fleeing and, indeed, they encouraged it. One neighbor, Doña Laura, returned for Tonita and found her standing in the doorway, moaning and staring at her decapitated mother, sister and children. . . .

This is only one tableau of many. Other *scènes macabres* have been created by the armed forces in their 10-year exhibition of horror and death. People are not just killed by death squads in El Salvador -- they are decapitated and then their heads are placed on pikes and used to dot the landscape. Men are not just disemboweled by the Salvadoran Treasury Police; their severed genitalia are stuffed into their mouths.

Salvadoran women are not just raped by the National Guard; their wombs are cut from their bodies and used to cover their faces. It is not enough to kill children; they are dragged over barbed wire until the flesh falls from their bones while parents are forced to watch. . . . There is a purpose to all of this. One embraces a certain style in order to achieve a certain effect. Stories of atrocities committed by Government security troops spread by word of mouth. It is the attention to detail that captures people's imagination and leaves them shaking. But these stories are not fairy tales. The stories are punctuated with the hard evidence of corpses, mutilated flesh, splattered brains and eyewitnesses. Sadomasochistic killing creates terror in El Salvador. Terror creates passivity in the face of oppression. A passive population is easy to control. Why the need to control the peasants? Somebody has to pick the coffee and cotton and cut the sugar cane.

Craig W. Nelson and Kenneth I. Taylor, *Witness to Genocide: The Present Situation of Indians in Guatemala*, London: Survival International, 1983 (collection of depositions taken in Mexico of refugees from Guatemala). An excerpt (p. 19):

[A mother of two children, who fled her village as it was burned down with many killed by the Guatemalan army, reports]: "In July, 1982, soldiers flew into the area by helicopter. First they went to [the name is redacted to avoid possible retributions], a nearby town, and killed five people, burned the town, and threw people, including women and children, into the flames. . . . Children's throats were cut, and women were hit with machetes. . . ."

[A man reports that he] watched as the soldiers killed fifteen people, including women, with machetes. They set fire to the houses, and sometimes opened the doors of huts and threw hand grenades inside. In all, fifty people in his village were killed. Soldiers also killed forty-nine people in the nearby town of [name redacted], which they burned as well. Two of those killed were his uncles. From a kilometer away, he saw women from the village who were hung by their feet without clothes and left.

Elizabeth Hanley, "Tales of Terror from El Salvador," *In These Times*, April 17, 1985, p. 16 (recounting stories of Salvadoran women in a refugee camp in Honduras). An excerpt:

When the National Guard came to [the] village in U.S.-supplied helicopters, they chopped all the children to bits and threw them to the village pigs. "The soldiers laughed all the while," Luisa told me. "What were they trying to kill?" she asked, still able to cry two years later. . . .

Like [her], all of the women still had tears to cry as they told stories of sons, brothers and husbands gathered into a circle and set on fire after their legs had been broken; or of trees heavy with women hanging from their wrists, all with breasts cut off and facial skin peeled back, all slowly bleeding to death. A frenzy went with each telling, as though women had yet to find a place inside themselves to contain it. Now, to my right one of the women was rocking another. Everyone was trembling.

Representative Gerry Studds, *Central America, 1981*, Report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 1st Session, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1981. An excerpt (pp. 26-29):

January 17-18, 1981 -- Conversations with refugees from El Salvador (conducted in areas along the Honduras-El Salvador border):

The conversations . . . were tape recorded and are summarized in detail below. They describe what appears to be a systematic campaign conducted by the security forces of El Salvador to deny any rural base for guerrilla operations in the north. By terrorizing and depopulating villages in the region, they have sought to isolate the

guerrillas and create problems of logistics and food supply. This strategy was recently summarized by one military commander, who told the *Boston Globe*: "The subversives like to say that they are the fish and the people are the ocean. What we have done in the north is to dry up the ocean so we can catch the fish easily." The Salvadoran method of "drying up the ocean" involves, according to those who have fled from its violence, a combination of murder, torture, rape, the burning of crops in order to create starvation conditions, and a program of general terrorism and harassment. . . .

The following is an outline of the statements made by refugees to the [delegation led by Representative Barbara Mikulski], as summarized on the scene by the translator accompanying the group:

Interview -- Woman No. 1: "This woman fled in November 1980, and while she was then forced to flee, she was one of the last people from her village to flee. She was 9 months pregnant. She had her little baby, which she is holding in her arms right now, in the mountains on her way out to Honduras. The Army was setting up guns, heavy cannon artillery on the hills around their village, bombing the villages and forcing the people away. . . . If people were caught in the village, they would kill them. Women and children alike. She said that with pregnant women, they would cut open the stomachs and take the babies out. She said she was very afraid because she had seen the result of what a guard had done to a friend of hers. She had been pregnant and they took the child out after they cut open her stomach. And where she lived they did not leave one house standing. They burned all of them. . . ."

Interview -- Woman No. 2: Maria: "She say that she would like to tell us the following: That many of her family were killed, so many were killed that she doesn't even remember their names. . . . About 7 months ago they killed one of her family and the child was an infant and is now in a hospital in a nearby town close to death. The army threw the baby in the river when they found them, and they took them into the woods and later they were found. She personally saw children around the age of 8 being raped, and then they would take their bayonets and make mincemeat of them. With their guns they would shoot at their faces. . . ."

Question: "These were army troops or guards?"

Answer: "Troops. Army."

Question: "Did the left ever do these things?"

Answer: "No. No, they haven't done any of those kinds of things . . . but the army would cut people up and put soap and coffee in their stomachs as a mocking. They would slit the stomach of a pregnant woman and take the child out, as if they were taking eggs out of an iguana. That is what I saw. That is what I have to say. . . ."

Interview -- Man No. 2: "[United States helicopters] are up in the air and they shoot at us. And we are completely defenseless. We have our ax and machetes to clean the earth with and to cultivate the land, and that is all we have against the helicopters."

Ms. Mikulski: "Has the left done anything against him?"

Answer: "No, they don't kill children. We don't complain about them at all. . . ."

Interview -- Woman No. 5: "[O]nce she saw [the army] kill six women. First they killed two women and then they burned their bodies with firewood. She said, one thing she saw was a dog carrying a new born infant in its mouth. The child was dead because it had been taken from the mother's womb after the guard slit open her stomach."

Ms. Mikulski: "How were the other two women killed?"

Answer: "First, they hung them and then they machinegunned them and then they threw them down to the ground. When we arrived the dogs were eating them and the birds were eating them. They didn't have any clothes on. They had decapitated one of the women. They found the head somewhere else. Another woman's arm was sliced off. We saw the killings from a hillside and then when we came back down we saw what had happened. While we were with the bodies we heard another series of gunshots and we fled again. . . . [I]t's the military that is doing this. Only the military. The popular organization isn't doing any of this."

See also, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, "Bach and War in El Salvador," *Spectator* (London), May 10, 1986, pp. 16-17 (quoting a Salvadoran death squad member: "We learnt from you [i.e. Americans], we learnt from you the methods, like blowtorches in the armpits, shots in the balls"); Allan Nairn, "Behind the Death Squads," *Progressive*, May 1984, pp. 1f (documenting U.S. training of, support for, and behind-the-scenes involvement in Salvadoran Death Squad activities).

16. On freedom of the press in Sandinista Nicaragua, see for example, Thomas Walker, ed., *Reagan versus the Sandinistas: the Undeclared War on Nicaragua*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987, pp. 6-10. An excerpt (pp. 7-10):

As is true in all states in time of war or threat of war, certain human rights were gradually infringed upon in the name of national security [in Sandinista Nicaragua]. . . . [O]n a half-dozen occasions, *La Prensa* was closed for two-day periods [in late 1981]. This action was taken under the terms of a press law decreed by the original Junta (of which, ironically, *La Prensa* owner Violeta Chamorro had been part). . . . However, even with these shutdowns, *La Prensa* continued to operate freely and in bitter opposition to the government more than 95 percent of the time. . . .

In spring 1982 following contra attacks on important Nicaraguan infrastructure and the disclosure in the U.S. media of President Reagan's earlier authorization of funding for C.I.A.-sponsored paramilitary operations against its country, the government declared a state of prewar emergency under which certain civil and political rights were temporarily suspended. . . . *La Prensa*, though now heavily censored, continued to function until June 1986, when it was finally closed in the wake of the House approval of the \$100 million [for the contras]. (In El Salvador the only real opposition papers had long since been driven completely out of business through the murder or exile of their owners.)

John Spicer Nichols, "The Media," in Thomas Walker, ed., *Nicaragua: The First Five Years*, New York: Praeger, 1985, pp. 183-199 (on the degree of censorship in Nicaragua during the contra war, with comparisons to censorship in the U.S. during wartime). See also chapter 4 of *U.P.* and its footnote 9. On civil liberties violations in times of war in the United States, see chapter 8 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 4 to 7.

17. On the fate of El Salvador's independent press, see for example, Jorge Pinto [editor of the former Salvadoran newspaper *El Independiente*, writing after he fled to Mexico], "In Salvador, Nooseprint," Op-Ed, *New York Times*, May 6, 1981, p. A31. An excerpt:

In January 1980, *El Independiente*'s offices were bombed. In April, an office boy standing in the front entrance was killed in a machinegun attack. On June 27, armed men arrived at the printing shop and gave the 40 workers there one minute to leave before they placed dynamite under the press and destroyed it. Two days later, my

car was sprayed with machine-gun fire, pocking it with 37 bullet holes. Two other such attacks were made on my life.

Raymond Bonner, *Weakness and Deceit: U.S. Policy and El Salvador*, New York: Times Books, 1984. An excerpt (pp. 206, 212):

The country's small opposition newspapers, *El Independiente* and *La Crónica*, were repeatedly bombed. *La Crónica's* editor in chief, Jaime Suárez, and a photojournalist, César Najarro, were seized mid-day while sitting in a downtown coffee shop. Their bodies, hacked to pieces by machetes, were found a few days later. . . . Two weeks after Reagan's triumph, troops stormed into the archdiocese's building, where they ransacked the offices of the church newspaper, *Orientación*, and destroyed the facilities of the radio station, YSAX.

Aside from Pinto's Op-Ed, there was not one word in the *New York Times's* news columns and not one editorial comment on the destruction of *El Independiente*. Before it was finally destroyed, there had been four bombings of *La Crónica* in six months; the last of these received forty words in a "News Brief" in the *New York Times*. See World News Briefs, "Salvador Groups Attack Paper and U.S. Plant," *New York Times*, April 19, 1980, p. 7. Chomsky comments (*Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies*, Boston: South End, 1989, p. 42):

Contrasting sharply with the silence over the two Salvadoran newspapers is the case of the opposition journal *La Prensa* in Nicaragua. Media critic Francisco Goldman counted 263 references to its tribulations in the *New York Times* in four years [see Francisco Goldman, "Sad Tales of La Libertad de Prensa," *Harper's*, August 1988, p. 56]. The distinguishing criterion is not obscure: the Salvadoran newspapers were independent voices stifled by the murderous violence of U.S. clients; *La Prensa* is an agency of the U.S. campaign to overthrow the government of Nicaragua, therefore a "worthy victim," whose harassment calls forth anguish and outrage. . . . These matters did not arise in the enthusiastic reporting of El Salvador's "free elections" in 1982 and 1984.

The situation was much the same in U.S.-client Guatemala. For example, on June 10, 1988, fifteen heavily armed men broke into the offices of the newspaper *La Epoca*, stole valuable equipment, and firebombed the offices, destroying them. They also kidnapped the night watchman, releasing him later under threat of death if he were to speak about the attack. Eyewitness testimony and other sources left little doubt that it was an operation of the security forces. The editor, Byron Barrera Ortiz, held a press conference on June 14th to announce that the journal would shut down "because there are not conditions in the country to guarantee the exercise of free and independent journalism." The destruction of *La Epoca* "signaled not only the end of an independent media voice in Guatemala, but it served as a warning as well that future press independence would not be tolerated by the government or security forces," as Americas Watch put it. See "Guatemala: Independent press silenced by bombing," *Central America Report* (Guatemala City, Guatemala: Inforpress Centroamericana), Vol. XV, No. 23, June 17, 1988, p. 182; "Guatemala: Low-intensity political violence," *Central America Report* (Guatemala City, Guatemala: Inforpress Centroamericana), Vol. XV, No. 22, June 10, 1988, pp. 175-176.

These facts were not even reported contemporaneously in the *New York Times* or *Washington Post*. One month later, the seventeenth paragraph of a story on Guatemala by Stephen Kinzer mentioned the bombing of *La Epoca*, which "some diplomats attributed to the security forces," and it was referred to again in August in the *Times* book review in a report on a conference of Central American writers. See Stephen Kinzer,

"Top Guatemala Officers Solidly Behind President," *New York Times*, July 6, 1988, p. A2; David Unger, "Central American Writers Meet Amid the Death Squads," *New York Times*, August 7, 1988, section 7, p. 25.

18. On the U.S. opposing the Central America peace process, see for example, Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America*, New York: Norton, 1993 (revised and expanded edition). See also, Noam Chomsky, *Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies*, Boston: South End, 1989, ch. 4 and Appendix 4.5.

On the U.S. opposing the Middle East peace process, see chapter 4 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 41, 47, 48, 49 and 56; chapter 5 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 104 and 111; and the text of chapter 8 of *U.P.*

19. For King Hassan as a "moderate," see for example, Eleanor Blau, "A King of the Unexpected," *New York Times*, July 23, 1986, p. A6 (King Hassan "has been described as charming and extremely self-confident . . . he is usually regarded as pro-Western, moderate and eager to preserve his throne against Islamic militants").

For useful lists of common media buzzwords and deceptive terminology, see Martin A. Lee and Norman Solomon, *Unreliable Sources: A Guide to Detecting Bias in News Media*, New York: Lyle Stuart, 1990, pp. 10-13, 39-41 ("A Lexicon of Media Buzzwords"); Edward S. Herman, *Beyond Hypocrisy: Decoding the News in an Age of Propaganda*, Montreal: Black Rose, 1992, pp. 113-187 ("A Doublespeak Dictionary for the 1990s").

20. For Saudi Arabia as "moderate," see for example, Jonathan C. Randal, "Iran's Rivalry With Saudis Seen as Factor in Book Row," *Washington Post*, February 21, 1989, p. A17 ("Saudi Arabia and other moderate, pro-western regimes in the Arab world").

21. On Iraq being described as "moving towards moderation," see for example, Henry Kamm, "Iraq Is Improving Links to Both U.S. and Soviet," *New York Times*, March 29, 1984, p. A12 ("a dramatic but little discussed Iraqi swing from Arab radicalism toward moderation and a warming relationship with the United States"); E.A. Wayne, "Iraq Returns to Mideast Political Lineup," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 17, 1989, p. 7 ("Iraq's leadership remains 'tough-minded' says one official, but it is less ideological and is aligning itself with moderates").

22. For the article on Indonesia, see John Murray Brown, "Bringing Irian Jaya into 20th century," *Christian Science Monitor*, February 6, 1987, p. 9 ("With the downfall in 1965 of then President Sukarno, many in the West were keen to cultivate Jakarta's new moderate leader, Suharto").

23. On U.S. support for the 1965 coup in Indonesia, see footnote 18 of chapter 1 of *U.P.*

For casualty estimates for the post-coup massacres in Indonesia, see for example, Amnesty International, *Indonesia: An Amnesty International Report*, London: Amnesty International Publications, 1977. An excerpt (pp. 12-13, 22, 41):

In the aftermath of the attempted coup [in 1965], the Army carried out a massive and violent purge of people identified as or suspected of being members of the Communist Party, or affiliated to left-wing organizations. . . . In a Dutch television

interview in October 1976, the head of the Indonesian state security agency, Admiral Sudomo, gave a definitive estimate: he said that *more than* half a million people were killed following the attempted coup. There can be no doubt about the authority of that estimate, except that the true figure is possibly much higher. . . . [Sudomo added] that after the coup, 750,000 people were arrested. (*Televisie Radio Omroep Stichting*, 9 October 1976). The official figures of 600,000 [given by Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik] or 750,000 arrested, do not include the number who were killed.

Ernst Utrecht, "The Indonesian Army as an Instrument of Repression," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1972, pp. 56 n.1, 62 (relating "reliable" estimates of 500,000 killed after the 1965 coup, and 700,000 killed by the Indonesian military by the 1970s).

On the U.S. government's view of the slaughter in Indonesia, see for example, Audrey R. Kahin and George McT. Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia*, New York: New Press, 1995. An excerpt (pp. 226, 229-230):

[T]he 1965-66 massacres constituted one of the bloodiest purges in modern history: in the words of the C.I.A. study, "In terms of the numbers killed the anti-P.K.I. [Indonesian Communist Party] massacres in Indonesia rank as one of the worst mass murders of the 20th century, along with the Soviet purges of the 1930's, the Nazi mass murders during the Second World War, and the Maoist blood bath of the early 1950's. . . ."

The U.S. embassy's attitude [towards these killings] was clearly expressed when, almost a month after the mass killings had begun, Francis Galbraith, the deputy chief of mission (later to succeed Marshall Green as ambassador), reporting to Washington on his conversation with a high-ranking Indonesian army officer, said that he had "made clear" to him "that the embassy and the U.S.G[overnment] were generally sympathetic with and admiring of what the army was doing." Careful study of all declassified U.S. government documents that bear on the physical liquidation of the P.K.I. disclose no instance of any American official objecting to or in any way criticizing the 1965-66 killings. . . . American input went beyond mere approbation and encouragement. As Bunnell has established from U.S. government documents and corroborative interviews with General Sukendro (in 1965 the ranking army intelligence chief), the United States quickly fulfilled the army's request, relayed by Sukendro on November 6, 1965, for weapons "to arm Moslem and nationalist youth in Central Java for use against the P.K.I." in the context of overall army policy "to eliminate the P.K.I."

For a rare investigative report on U.S. involvement in the Indonesia coup, see Kathy Kadane, "Ex-agents say C.I.A. compiled death lists for Indonesians," *San Francisco Examiner*, May 20, 1990, p. A1. An excerpt:

The U.S. government played a significant role in one of the worst massacres of the century by supplying the names of thousands of Communist Party leaders to the Indonesian army, which hunted down the leftists and killed them, former U.S. diplomats say. For the first time, U.S. officials acknowledge that in 1965 they systematically compiled comprehensive lists of communist operatives, from top echelons down to village cadres. As many as 5,000 names were furnished to the Indonesian army, and the Americans later checked off the names of those who had been killed or captured, according to U.S. officials. . . .

Silent for a quarter century, former senior U.S. diplomats and C.I.A. officers described in lengthy interviews how they aided Indonesian President Suharto, then

army leader, in his attack on the P.K.I. [Indonesian Communist Party]. "It really was a big help to the army," said Robert J. Martens, a former member of the U.S. Embassy's political section who is now a consultant to the State Department. "They probably killed a lot of people, and I probably have a lot of blood on my hands, but that's not all bad. There's a time when you have to strike hard at a decisive moment. . . ." Approval for release of the names came from top U.S. Embassy officials, including former Ambassador Marshall Green, deputy chief of mission Jack Lydman and political section chief Edward Masters, the three acknowledged in interviews.

For a reply by Martens, see Robert Martens, "Indonesia's Fight Against Communism, 1965," Letter, *Washington Post*, June 2, 1990, p. A18 ("If I said anything like [that], it could only have been a wry remark"; although "[i]t is true I passed names of the P.K.I. leaders and senior cadre system to the non-Communist forces," Suharto's men probably could have obtained the information in any event).

See also, Kathy Kadane, "U.S. had role in '65 Indonesia massacre, ex-officials say," *Orange County Register* (CA), May 20, 1990, p. A8 (reporting that the U.S. also provided "logistical support" including "state-of-the-art radio field equipment" on which Indonesia's orders to attack villages and individuals were monitored).

On Suharto's genocidal occupation of East Timor with U.S. support, see the text of chapter 8 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 41 and 57.

24. For the articles describing the "welcome developments" in Indonesia, see James Reston, "Washington: A Gleam of Light in Asia," *New York Times*, June 19, 1966, p. E12; Robert P. Martin, "Indonesia: Hope . . . Where Once There Was None," *U.S. News and World Report*, June 6, 1966, p. 70.

Similarly, in a cover story titled "INDONESIA: The Land the Communists Lost," *Time* magazine celebrated "The West's best news for years in Asia" under the heading "Vengeance with a Smile," devoting 5 pages of text and 6 more of pictures to the "boiling bloodbath that almost unnoticed took 400,000 lives." *Time* happily announced that the new army is "scrupulously constitutional" and "based on law not on mere power," in the words of its "quietly determined" leader Suharto, with his "almost innocent face." Interestingly, details of the slaughter are not even minimized, as *Time* notes that:

During the eight months the terror lasted, to be a known Communist was usually to become a dead Communist. . . . Many were decapitated, their heads impaled on poles outside their front doors for widows and children to see. So many bodies were thrown into the Brantas River that Kediri townfolk are still afraid to eat fish -- and communities downstream had to take emergency measures to prevent an outbreak of the plague.

Still, *Time* assures us, "there was little remorse anywhere," using as an illustration an Imam (Islamic leader) from a village whose population was cut in half, who states: "The Communists deserved the people's wrath." Families of victims were not consulted. See "Vengeance with a Smile," *Time*, July 15, 1966, p. 22.

See also, C.L. Sulzberger, "Foreign Affairs: As the Shadow Lengthens," *New York Times*, December 3, 1965, p. 38 ("From an American viewpoint, this represents a positive achievement"); "The extended family; Two fathers: Sukarno and Suharto," *Economist* (London), August 15, 1987, p. 3. An excerpt:

The president of Indonesia today is a Javanese general called Suharto. . . . [H]e will remain so -- health permitting -- until at least the early 1990s, since there is no other candidate for next year's presidential election. It is easy, therefore, for western liberals to assume he is a dictator in the manner of South America's generals. The

assumption is logical, but it does scant justice to General Suharto. . . . His Indonesian critics concede he is at heart benign.

25. For the *Times* editorial, see Editorial, "Aid for Indonesia," *New York Times*, August 25, 1966, p. 36. An excerpt:

[T]he staggering mass slaughter of Communists and pro-Communists -- which took the lives of an estimated 150,000 to 400,000 -- has left a legacy of subsurface tension that may not be eased for generations. . . .

Washington wisely has not intruded into the Indonesia turmoil. To embrace the country's new rulers publicly could well hurt them. They themselves want to retain a neutralist posture. There is an urgent need for a large international loan -- perhaps as much as a half-billion dollars. . . . [I]t is vital that the United States play a positive role in building an international aid consortium.

See also, Editorial, "Indonesia's New Phase," *New York Times*, December 22, 1965, p. 30. An excerpt:

Washington, which has wisely stayed in the background during the recent upheavals [in Indonesia], would do well to encourage the International Monetary Fund, the new Asian Development Bank and, perhaps, an international consortium to take the lead.

Editorial, "The Indonesian Irony," *New York Times*, February 17, 1966, p. 32; Editorial, "Return to the Fold," *New York Times*, September 29, 1966, p. 46.

26. On middle class pessimism about future standards of living, see chapter 9 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 10, 42 and 44; and chapter 10 of *U.P.* and its footnote 101.

27. There is further discussion of contemporary poverty in the U.S. in chapter 10 of *U.P.*

28. On the rate of return to Europe of immigrants to the U.S., see for example, Richard B. DuBoff, *Accumulation and Power: An Economic History of the United States*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1989. An excerpt (p. 179):

Between 1870 and 1900, it appears that more than one-fourth of all immigrants eventually returned home. The proportion rose to nearly 40 percent in the 1890s and remained at that level until the legislative restrictions of 1921-24. From 1900 to 1980, the 30 million legal immigrants admitted to the United States must be balanced against 10 million emigrants who left to settle elsewhere.

29. On violent crime being disproportionately poor people preying on one another, see chapter 10 of *U.P.* and its footnote 46.

30. Although claims about intentional introduction of drugs into the inner cities have been widely ridiculed, they become less ludicrous -- though they remain unsubstantiated -- when one considers (1) the extensive history of U.S. government involvement in the international drug trade, and (2) the U.S. government's vast covert operations against domestic dissidence, such as COINTELPRO, which had as an explicit goal the disruption of black community organizing. On the first of these points, see chapter 5 of *U.P.* and its footnote 79. On the second, see chapter 4 of *U.P.* and its footnote 33.

31. On the criminal prosecution rates of the poor and minorities, see chapter 10 of *U.P.* and especially its footnotes 38 and 46; also its footnotes 31 to 37, and 48.

32. On the health impact of tobacco and marijuana, see for example, Ethan A. Nadelmann, "Drug Prohibition in the United States: Costs, Consequences, and Alternatives," *Science*, September 1, 1989, pp. 939-947 at p. 943 (reporting that there have been no deaths attributable to marijuana among 60 million users, while all illegal drugs combined resulted in 3562 reported deaths in 1985; in contrast, deaths attributable to tobacco are estimated at over 300,000 a year, while alcohol use adds an additional 50,000 to 200,000 annual deaths and alcohol abuse is a factor in some 40 percent of roughly 46,000 annual traffic fatalities); Philip J. Hilts, "Wide Peril Is Seen In Passive Smoking," *New York Times*, May 10, 1990, p. A25 (the Environmental Protection Agency has tentatively concluded that second-hand smoking causes "3,000 or more lung-cancer deaths annually and a substantial number of respiratory illnesses and deaths among the children of smokers"); Catherine Foster, "Alcohol Abuse: Sleeper in Drug War," *Christian Science Monitor*, September 18, 1989, p. 8 (the National Council on Alcoholism reports that there are 2 million drug addicts but 10.5 million alcoholics, and alcohol "is the leading cause of death among 15- to 24-year-olds"). See also chapter 10 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 36 and 55.

33. For the cross-cultural study of "religious fanaticism," see Walter Dean Burnham, "Social Stress and Political Response: Religion and the 1980 Election," Appendix A to Burnham's "The 1980 Earthquake: Realignment, Reaction, or What?," in Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, eds., *The Hidden Election: Politics and Economics in the 1980 Presidential Campaign*, New York: Pantheon, 1981, pp. 132-140, especially p. 135.

34. For polls on Americans' religious beliefs, see for example, George Gallup, Jr. and Jim Castelli, *The People's Religion: American Faith in the 90's*, New York: Macmillan, 1989, pp. 46-48, 4, 14. This study gives the United States a rating of 67 on its "Religion Index," based on various indicators -- whereas West Germany, Norway, the Netherlands, Great Britain, and France all had scores in the thirties, and Denmark brought up the rear with a 21. It also finds that:

- o Nine Americans in ten say they have never doubted the existence of God.
- o Eight Americans in ten say they believe they will be called before God on Judgment Day to answer for their sins.
- o Eight Americans in ten believe God still works miracles.
- o Seven Americans in ten believe in life after death.

Richard Severo, "Poll Finds Americans Split on Creation Idea," *New York Times*, August 29, 1982, section 1, p. 22 (reporting a Gallup poll which found that 44 percent of Americans believe "God created man pretty much in his present form at one time within the last 10,000 years," 38 percent accept divine guidance of evolution, and a mere 9 percent accept Darwinian evolution -- a number not much above statistical error).

35. Walter Mondale actually was the *son* of a Methodist minister. See "Text of the First Reagan-Mondale Debate," *Washington Post*, October 8, 1984, p. A23. Asked whether he was a Born-Again Christian, Mondale explained:

I am a son of a Methodist minister. My wife is the daughter of a Presbyterian minister. And I don't know if I've been born again, but I know that I was born into a Christian family. And I believe I have sung at more weddings and funerals than anybody to ever seek the presidency. Whether that helps or not, I don't know. I have a deep religious faith; our family does. It is fundamental. It's probably the reason I'm in politics. I think our faith tells us, instructs us about the moral life that we should lead. And I think we are all together on that.

The passage followed a question to Reagan asking why he did not regularly attend religious services given his professed strong religious beliefs.

On the three candidates in the 1980 election saying that they were "Born Again," see for example, George Gallup, Jr. and Jim Castelli, *The People's Religion: American Faith in the 90's*, New York: Macmillan, 1989, p. 19.

36. On Bush's version of the Oath of Office, see for example, Ann Devroy, "A Matter-of-Fact Bush Takes His New Place in Nation's History," *Washington Post*, January 21, 1989, p. A7. For the Constitution's specification of the text of the Oath of Office, see U.S. CONST., art. II, §1, cl. 8.

37. On the Nazis in the 1988 Bush campaign, see for example, Russell C. Bellant, "Will Bush Purge Nazi Collaborators in the G.O.P.?", Op-Ed, *New York Times*, November 19, 1988, section 1, p. 27 (reporting that seven of the neo-Nazis and anti-Semites were discharged from the Bush campaign after the revelations, but four of them retained leadership positions in the Heritage Groups Council, the "Ethnic Outreach" arm of the Republican National Committee); John B. Judis, "Bush's teflon on anti-Semitic links," *In These Times*, September 28-October 4, 1988, pp. 6-7 (reviewing the "curiously blasé" reactions of the leading Jewish organizations "about both the revelations and Bush's response to them"); David Corn, "G.O.P. Anti-Semites," *Nation*, October 24, 1988, p. 369; Charles R. Allen, "The Real Nazis Behind Every Bush," *Village Voice*, November 1, 1988, p. 24; Fairness and Accuracy In Reporting, "The G.O.P.-Nazi Connection," *Extra!*, September/October 1988, p. 5 (on the media's minimization of the episode).

See also, Martin A. Lee and Norman Solomon, *Unreliable Sources: A Guide to Detecting Bias in News Media*, New York: Lyle Stuart, 1990. An excerpt (p. 161):

An exception [to the media's downplaying of the story] was the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, which featured a series of investigative pieces documenting the Nazi link. A front-page lead story detailed the sordid past of men like Florian Galdau, the national chairman of Romanians for Bush, who defended convicted war criminal Valerian Trifa; Radi Slavoff, co-chairman of Bulgarians for Bush, who arranged a 1983 event in Washington that honored Austin App, author of several texts denying the existence of the Nazi Holocaust; Phillip Guarino, chairman of the Italian-American National Republican Federation, who belonged to a neofascist masonic lodge implicated in terrorist attacks in Italy and Latin America; and Bohdan Fedorak, vice chairman of Ukrainians for Bush, who was also a leader of a Nazi collaborationist organization involved in anti-Polish and anti-Jewish wartime pogroms.

38. For the *New Republic's* editorial, see Editorial, "Anti-Semitism, Left and Right," *New Republic*, October 3, 1988, p. 9. An excerpt:

[There is a] comfortable haven for Jew-hatred on the left, including the left wing of the Democratic Party, [parts of the Jesse Jackson campaign, and] the ranks of increasingly well-organized Arab activists. . . .

Salient anti-Semitism is anti-Semitism with a program. One tenet of that program is the delegitimization of the Jewish national movement -- about the only national movement these people don't seem to thrill to. Another tenet -- sometimes disguised, sometimes not -- is that a just society would not have individuals from any group underrepresented or overrepresented in its positions of prestige and influence. This attack on talent was the central doctrine of the politics of resentment for which civilization (and the Jews) have already paid dearly. It's strange how some Democrats so alert to rather antique and anemic forms of anti-Semitism among the Republicans, haven't noticed far more virulent forms in their own contemporary habitat.

For the book by Anti-Defamation League's former National Director, see Nathan Perlmutter and Ruth Ann Perlmutter, *The Real Anti-Semitism In America*, New York: Arbor House, 1982. For discussion of the Perlmutter's thesis, see Noam Chomsky, *Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians*, Boston: South End, 1983 (updated edition 1999), pp. 14-16.

39. On the letters opposing the Brookline Holocaust project, see Barbara Vobejda, "Education Grant Process Assailed; Holocaust Program Bypassed After Criticism by Schlafly," *Washington Post*, October 20, 1988, p. A21. An excerpt:

Schlafly charged "Facing History and Ourselves" [the program] with "psychological manipulation, induced behavioral change and privacy-invading treatment" and urged the department to reject its proposals. . . . Concluding her remarks [one of the Education Department's reviewers] wrote: "The program gives no evidence of balance or objectivity. The Nazi point of view, however unpopular, is still a point of view and is not presented, nor is that of the Ku Klux Klan."

Ed Vulliamy, "Holocaust Project Funds: 'Eliminated' by Ideology?," *Washington Post*, October 4, 1988, p. A17 (the program also was described as "offensive to fundamentalists," "leftist," "anti-war," and "anti-hunting"); Muriel Cohen, "Holocaust Study Program Gets Lesson in Rejection," *Boston Globe*, November 14, 1988, p. 21; David Corn and Jefferson Morley, "Beltway Bandits; Against Remembrance," *Nation*, November 7, 1988, p. 448.

In September 1989, the Education Department reversed course and approved a grant for the program. See Bill McAllister, "Education Dept. Clears Holocaust Study Grant," *Washington Post*, September 27, 1989, p. A15.

40. For books discussing Reagan's confusions while President, see for example, David A. Stockman [Reagan's Director of the Office of Management and Budget], *The Triumph of Politics: How the Reagan Revolution Failed*, New York: Harper and Row, 1986. A few of the many examples (pp. 356-358, 366, 375):

[Reagan] had managed to convince himself that [the three-year \$100 billion tax increase] wasn't really a tax increase at all. "This bill only collects taxes we are owed already," he told the group of dubious House Republicans in the Cabinet Room. "It won't raise taxes on the legitimate taxpayer at all." That was true only if you considered people who bought cigarettes and owned a telephone "illegitimate" taxpayers; they and millions of others were the ones who would now be paying more taxes. . . .

By the end of 1982, the fiscal situation was an utter, mind-numbing catastrophe. To convince the President [the economy] really was as bad as I was saying, I invented a multiple-choice budget quiz. The regular budget briefings weren't doing the job. I thought this might be the way. . . . The President enjoyed the quiz immensely. He sat there day after day with his pencil. . . . When we told him what his grade was early the next week, he was not so pleased. He had flunked the exam. . . .

When the discussion turned to taxes, [Reagan's] fist came down squarely on the table. "I don't want to hear any more talk about taxes," he insisted. "The problem is *deficit spending!*" It is difficult politely to correct the President of the United States when he has blatantly contradicted himself. . . .

[A colleague told Stockman:] "Don't get offended now," he began, "but you might as well know it. When you sit there going over the deficit projections, the man's eyes glaze over. He tunes out completely. . . ."

I couldn't believe I was hearing this. How was an unneeded inflation allowance supposed to stop Soviet tanks? But the President did not grasp the difference between constant dollars and current (inflated) dollars. . . .

What do you do when your President ignores all the palpable, relevant facts and wanders in circles. I could not bear to watch this good and decent man go on in this embarrassing way. I buried my head in my plate.

See also, Mark Green and Gail MacColl, *There He Goes Again: Ronald Reagan's Reign of Error*, New York: Pantheon, 1983; Mark Hertsgaard, *On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency*, New York: Schocken, 1988, especially ch. 7 -- titled "An Amiable Dunce" -- pp. 132-151 (presenting an incontrovertible case for the chapter's title, and noting such memorable but underreported moments as Reagan falling asleep during a one-on-one audience with the Pope, dozing off in the middle of speeches by the French and Italian Presidents, his beliefs that the Russian language has no word for "freedom," that trees cause eighty percent of air pollution, that the problem of segregated schools has been solved, his optimistic attitude towards limited nuclear war, and his tortured rewritings of history and only "passing acquaintance" with important policies of his administration); Mark Hertsgaard, "How Reagan Seduced Us: Inside the President's Propaganda Factory," *Village Voice*, September 18, 1984, pp. 1f at p. 14 (reporting how figures in the press considered Reagan's "abysmal ignorance" so common as to be unnewsworthy. As A.B.C. news reporter Sam Donaldson put it: "At first I thought it was important when Reagan would fudge up figures on the Health and Human Services budget to make it look like he wasn't cutting, but now I don't have time to put it in. I've told my audience before that he doesn't know facts so often, is it news that today he doesn't know facts again? If he got through a press conference flawlessly, I would certainly say so that night. That, to me, would be news. Now, that lets him off the hook, I agree").

41. On the role of the British monarchy in de-politicizing the country, see for example, Tom Nairn, *The Enchanted Glass: Britain and its Monarchy*, London: Radius, 1988.

42. Chomsky notes that, among other grounds for Nuremberg punishment -- based upon either direct or indirect involvement in atrocities and war crimes -- are Truman's counter-insurgency campaign in Greece; Eisenhower's role in the Guatemala coup; Kennedy's invasions of Cuba and Vietnam; Johnson's invasion of the Dominican

Republic; Nixon's invasion of Cambodia; Ford's support for the invasion of East Timor; Carter's support for the genocide in East Timor and his administration's activities in Nicaragua (where, for example, it helped to spirit Somoza's National Guard out of the country in planes with Red Cross markings, a war crime, in order to establish them elsewhere); Reagan's activities in Central America and his administration's support for Israel's invasion of Lebanon; Bush's invasion of Panama and activities in Nicaragua; and Clinton's missile strikes against Iraq, the Sudan, and Afghanistan.

On the rhetoric of the Nuremberg prosecutors, see for example, Richard A. Falk, "The Circle of Responsibility," *Nation*, January 26, 1970, p. 77 (quoting U.S. Supreme Court Justice and Nuremberg prosecutor Robert H. Jackson's statement of the basic principle: "If certain acts and violations of treaties are crimes, they are crimes whether the United States does them or whether Germany does them. We are not prepared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct against others which we would not be willing to have invoked against us").

43. For Taylor's account of the standards at Nuremberg, see Telford Taylor, *Nuremberg and Vietnam: an American Tragedy*, Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970, pp. 37-38; Telford Taylor, *The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir*, New York: Knopf, 1992, pp. 398f.

44. On the Tokyo trials, see for example, Richard M. Minnear, *Victor's Justice: the Tokyo War Crimes Trial*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971, pp. 6, 67f ("Some 5,700 Japanese were tried on conventional war crimes charges, and 920 of these men were executed"; "None of the defendants at Tokyo was accused of having personally committed an atrocity," but only of having conspired to authorize such crimes or having failed to stop them, and no evidence was submitted that the charged crimes were actual government policy); A. Frank Reel, *The Case of General Yamashita*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949, at p. 174 (book-length narrative of the Yamashita trial, written by a member of Yamashita's American defense team, noting: "There was no finding of any order, any knowledge, any condonation on General Yamashita's part. Crimes had been committed by his troops, and he had 'failed' to provide effective control. That was all. He was to hang").

45. Further important changes in the international economy in the 1990s are discussed in chapter 10 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 58 to 64.

46. Two principal threats to human existence are: (1) depletion of the atmospheric concentration of ozone (a form of oxygen whose presence in the atmosphere prevents most ultraviolet and other dangerous radiation from penetrating to the earth's surface, where it harms life) by pollutants; and (2) global warming through the greenhouse effect, wherein gases released in combustion (and water vapor caused by rising temperatures) trap more solar radiation from reflecting off the earth back into space, and thereby increase the temperature of the earth -- which could in turn melt polar ice sheets, raise the sea level, lead to flooding, drier soils, massive climate changes, and the extinction of species.

On the general state of these crises, see among many other sources, Ross Gelbspan, *The Heat Is On: The High Stakes Battle over Earth's Threatened Climate*, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997, especially pp. 34-59 (with a 40-page Appendix

titled "A Scientific Critique of the Greenhouse Skeptics," including point-by-point refutation of the claims and work of the most visible and prominent of the skeptics by several leading climate scientists). An excerpt (pp. 1-2, 5, 9, 17, 22):

In January 1995 a vast section of ice the size of Rhode Island broke off the Larsen ice shelf in Antarctica. Although it received scant coverage in the press, it was one of the most spectacular and nightmarish manifestations yet of the ominous changes occurring on the planet. As early as the 1970s, scientists predicted that the melting of Antarctica's ice shelf would signal the accelerating heating of the planet as human activity pushed the temperature of the earth upward. They were not wrong. Two months later, a three-hundred-foot-deep ice shelf farther north collapsed, leaving only a plume of fragments in the Weddell Sea as evidence of its twenty-thousand-year existence. . . . Measurements in the Antarctic peninsula show that its average temperature has risen by nearly 20 degrees Fahrenheit in the last twenty years. . . .

The reason most Americans don't know what is happening to the climate is that the oil and coal industries have spent millions of dollars to persuade them that global warming isn't happening. . . . The deep-pocketed industry lobby has promoted their opinions through every channel of communication it can reach. It has demanded access to the press for these scientists' views, as a right of journalistic fairness. Unfortunately, most editors are too uninformed about climate science to resist. They would not accord to tobacco company scientists who dismiss the dangers of smoking the same weight that they accord to world-class lung specialists. But in the area of climate research, virtually no news story appears that does not feature prominently one of these few industry-sponsored scientific "greenhouse skeptics. . . ." "There is no debate among any stured scientists of what is happening," says [Chairman of the Advisory Committee on the Environment of the International Committee of Scientific Unions James] McCarthy. By "stured" scientists he means those who are currently engaged in relevant research and whose work has been published in the refereed scientific journals. "The only debate is the rate at which it's happening."

Richard A. Kerr, "New greenhouse report puts down dissenters," *Science*, August 3, 1990, p. 481. An excerpt:

"THE GLOBAL WARMING PANIC: A Classic Case of Overreaction," screams the cover of *Forbes*. "U.S. Data Fail to Show Warming Trend," announces the *New York Times*. A greenhouse skeptic and a greenhouse advocate go head to head on "This Week with David Brinkley" in what looks like an even match. . . . [R]ecent media coverage has given the impression that scientists can't agree among themselves whether the buildup of greenhouse gases is going to scorch the globe or merely leave it imperceptibly warmed. But a soon-to-be-published report [produced by a working group of the International Panel on Climate Change], the most broadly based assessment of the greenhouse threat conducted to date, presents a very different impression: There's virtual unanimity, it says, among greenhouse experts that a warming is on the way and that the consequences will be serious. . . .

"I was amazed how simple it was to come to agreement," says climatologist Christopher Folland of the U.K. Meteorological Office in Bracknell, who is a lead author of the report's section on observed climate change. "In America, a few extreme viewpoints have taken center stage. There are none like that elsewhere." Not a single panel member or reviewer agreed with [M.I.T.'s Richard] Lindzen that there is no sign of global warming in the climate records, says Folland. "That's about 200 people," he notes.

For a useful study of the massive corporate propaganda campaign to distort the facts -- and block actions to address -- this crisis, see Sharon Beder, *Global Spin: The Corporate Assault On Environmentalism*, White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green, 1998, especially ch. 6.

On some of the thwarted international attempts to address the issue, see for example, Rose Gutfeld, "Earth Summit: How Bush Achieved Global Warming Pact With Modest Goals," *Wall Street Journal*, May 27, 1992, p. A1. An excerpt:

Until two weeks ago, it looked as if next week's Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro would become a widely publicized global morality play, with President Bush cast as the villain. He was the only major world leader unwilling to sign an agreement with firm limits on the "greenhouse" gases feared to cause global warming. Mr. Bush, who as a candidate in 1988 had promised to be the "environmental president," was in danger of being tagged in Rio as No. 1 Enemy of the Earth. But in an extraordinary coup . . . Bush administration negotiators persuaded the representatives of 142 other nations to reverse course. They all agreed to sign a vaguely worded pact that sets no binding timetables for reducing emissions, makes no commitments to achieving specific levels of emissions -- indeed, makes no commitments to do anything at all.

How did the White House manage to set the global-warming agenda for the coming conference on its own terms? The key, according to people familiar with the talks, was a clever bargaining ploy devised by an influential but little-known State Department official. The heart of his strategy: to use the threat that Mr. Bush would boycott the summit to wangle an agreement that wouldn't lock the U.S. into costly requirements that could threaten economic growth. . . . If the leader of the world's only remaining superpower didn't show, they figured, the conference would be judged a failure.

Farhan Haq, "Failure Of Rio Follow-Up Meeting A Wake-Up Call," Inter Press Service, June 27, 1997 (available on Nexis database). An excerpt:

By all admissions, the special session of the United Nations General Assembly this week to follow up on the 1992 Rio Earth Summit ended as a remarkable failure. . . . [T]he countries of both the North and the South honestly faced up to the lack of real action they had made on environmental promises made in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. . . . European leaders especially were frustrated that the two main achievements they sought at the conference . . . ran aground. U.S. President Bill Clinton refused to bind Washington to the 15-percent target [for reducing carbon emissions] despite massive pressure this week to sign on to the European Union (E.U.) plan.

For one example of minimization of the issue in the U.S. press, see William K. Stevens, "Cushioning the Shock of Global Warming," *New York Times*, November 30, 1997, section 4, p. 3. An excerpt:

There will surely be winners as well as losers [from global warming]: while Canadian and Russian farmers might reap more wheat, African farmers might reap drought-induced disaster. While summer heat in the southern United States might be more intense, northern winters might be milder. The economies of entire regions -- tourist-dependent New England, for instance -- might be transformed with uncertain results. . . . But humans are a resilient species. They have always had to contend with climatic change and have often been profoundly affected by it. Conventional wisdom now holds that *Homo sapiens* owes its very existence to a climatic adaptation. . . .

In North America, global warming would probably bring some benefits. . . . Milder northern winters could cut the costs of heating and snow removal. But for every benign impact, according to the intergovernmental panel, there would be at least one

negative counterpart. How will the New England tourist industry adjust, for instance, if brilliant fall foliage is replaced by duller oaks and hickories. . . . How disruptive and expensive would it be to progressively abandon beachfront developments as seas rise . . .? Fifty or 100 years from now, if scientists' predictions about climate change turn out to be right, it may be that people will take the new climatic order in stride. See also chapter 10 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 86 and 103.

47. For a statement of the geopolitical tradition, see for example, George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy 1900-1950*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951 (expanded edition 1984), p. 5. See also, Melvyn P. Leffler, "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48," *American Historical Review*, April 1984, pp. 346-400.

48. For comparisons of social welfare in the U.S. and other countries, see for example, Richard B. DuBoff, *Accumulation and Power: An Economic History of the United States*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1989. An excerpt (pp. 183-184):

A study of the U.S., Japanese, West German, and Swedish economies for 1960 to 1985 employs 17 indicators of quality of life and economic performance to assess how well each country provides its people with "adequate income, good health, a secure livelihood, leisure time, adequate shelter, a long life, and freedom from harm." On the basis of the indicators, the U.S. performance was the worst, while Sweden's was the best.

A more concrete view of the American social welfare function comes from comparing "number one" per capita incomes with specific facts of everyday life: among advanced industrial nations, the United States is "number one," or close to it, in the following categories. . . .

- Combined worst ranking for life expectancy and infant mortality. . . .
- Highest incidence of poverty in the industrial world, with exceptionally high infant and preschool child poverty. . . .
- Lowest level of job security for workers, with greatest chance of being dismissed without notice or reason. . . .
- Greatest chance for a worker to become unemployed without adequate unemployment and medical insurance. . . .
- Less leisure time for workers. . . .
- Lowest combined level of working-class mobilization, percent of the labor force unionized, and percentage of the electorate voting in national elections. . . .
- Lowest ratio of female to male earnings. . . .
- Among worst rankings of all advanced industrial nations for levels of pollutant emissions into the air.

Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein and John Schmitt, *The State of Working America, 1998-1999*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999, especially ch. 8 (detailed comparison of the economic performance of 20 rich industrialized countries, reaching similar conclusions about the U.S. economy in the late 1990s); Colin McCord and Harold P. Freeman, "Excess Mortality in Harlem," *New England Journal of Medicine*, January 18, 1990, pp. 173-177 ("Survival analysis showed that black men in Harlem were less likely to reach the age of 65 than men in Bangladesh"). See also chapter 10 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 4, 5, 8, 11, 12, 14, 27 and 28.

On Cuba's health and development standards, see chapter 5 of *U.P.* and its footnote 31.

49. On the attempt to maintain "veto power" over Japan's energy resources, see for example, Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. II ("The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950")*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. While Kennan advocated rebuilding Japan's economy, he noted (pp. 56-57):

"On the other hand, it seems to me absolutely inevitable that we must keep completely the maritime and air controls as a means . . . of keeping control of the situation with respect to [the] Japanese in all eventualities. . . . [It is] all the more imperative that we retain the ability to control their situation by controlling the overseas sources of supply and the naval power and air power without which it cannot become again aggressive." As if the listener might mistake his intent, he went on. "If we really in the Western world could work out controls, I suppose, adept enough and foolproof enough and cleverly enough exercised really to have power over what Japan imports in the way of oil and such other things as she has got to get from overseas, we would have veto power on what she does need in the military and industrial field."

Yoshi Tsurumi, "Japan," *Daedalus (The Gulf Crisis: In Perspective)*, Vol. 104, No. 4, Fall 1975, pp. 113-127. An excerpt (pp. 114-115):

During the immediate post-war years, occupied Japan was not permitted to reconstruct the oil-refining facilities that had been destroyed by Allied bombings, a policy widely attributed in the oil industry of Japan to the fact that the oil bureau of General MacArthur's headquarters was heavily staffed with American personnel on temporary leave from Jersey Standard and Mobil. . . . [When in] July, 1949, General Headquarters permitted the Japanese government to begin the reconstruction of oil refining facilities . . . Exxon (Esso's parent company), Mobil, Shell and Getty positioned themselves as *de facto* integrated oil firms in Japan, whose refining and marketing interests were tied to their crude-oil interests held outside Japan. Under the Allied occupation, the Japanese government was powerless to block such business links.

50. On the impact of combustion on the environment, see footnote 46 of this chapter.

51. On industries lobbying for regulation, see for example, Thomas Ferguson, *Golden Rule: The Investment Theory of Party Competition and the Logic of Money-Driven Political Systems*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995, especially chs. 1 to 4 (describing in detail how important sectors of the business community long have advocated government regulation); Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, *Right Turn: The Decline of the Democrats and the Future of American Politics*, New York: Hill and Wang, 1986, ch. 2 (outlining the role of powerful U.S. business coalitions in supporting government regulations and programs since the New Deal); Elizabeth Fones-Wolf, *Selling Free Enterprise: The Business Assault on Labor and Liberalism, 1945-1960*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992. An excerpt (pp. 23-24):

[T]he more sophisticated conservatives or moderates who joined together during the thirties in organizations like the Business Advisory Council and in the forties, the Committee for Economic Development [C.E.D.] . . . looked to central economic planning . . . to ensure prosperity. . . . The C.E.D. asserted that America could no longer afford wild economic fluctuations. Instead of "ignorant opposition to change," the business community should help define a new role for the state to promote

economic growth and stability. In 1946 [Paul G. Hoffman of Studebaker Automobile Company] challenged corporate leaders to "look one important fact squarely in the face -- that the Federal Government has a vital role to play in our capitalistic system." [National Association of Manufacturers] conservatives "who claimed that all that is necessary is to 'unshackle free enterprise' are guilty of an irresponsible sentiment. . . ."

Moderates tended to take an accommodationistic attitude toward organized labor. Rather than fearing unions, some welcomed them with open arms. . . . Through these means and without giving up real power, these executives hoped to gain organized labor's cooperation in increasing productivity and industrial stability. To these employers the [National Labor Relations Board] was not an enemy but an ally in the development of responsible unionism.

Edward S. Herman, *Corporate Control, Corporate Power*, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 173-174; Kim McQuaid, *Uneasy Partners: Big Business in American Politics, 1945-1990*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994 (discussing the general phenomenon). See also chapter 9 of *U.P.* and its footnote 18; and chapter 10 of *U.P.* and its footnote 94.

For the ultimate example of the conflict between unbridled competition for profits and self-preservation -- the destruction of the natural environment -- see footnote 46 of this chapter; and the text of chapter 10 of *U.P.*

52. For declassified U.S. government documents explaining the role of Third World countries, see for example, N.S.C. [National Security Council Memorandum] 144/1, "United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Latin America," March 18, 1953, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Vol. IV ("The American Republics"), Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983. The Memorandum begins (pp. 6-7, 9):

There is a trend in Latin America toward nationalistic regimes maintained in large part by appeals to the masses of the population. Concurrently, there is an increasing popular demand for immediate improvement in the low living standards of the masses, with the result that most Latin American governments are under intense domestic political pressures to increase production and to diversify their economies. Aiming to avoid this "drift in the area toward radical and nationalistic regimes" -- which is "facilitated by historic anti-U.S. prejudices and exploited by Communists" -- the Memorandum then lists the objectives and proposed courses of action for the United States, which include "Adequate production in Latin America of, and access by the United States to, raw materials essential to U.S. security"; "The ultimate standardization of Latin American military organization, training, doctrine and equipment along U.S. lines"; and "convincing them that their own self-interest requires an orientation of Latin American policies to our objectives."

A later N.S.C. document, N.S.C. 5432/1 of 1954, repeats much of the same language, adding that the U.S. should "encourage them by economic assistance and other means to base their economies on a system of private enterprise and, as essential thereto, to create a political and economic climate conducive to private investment, of both domestic and foreign capital, including . . . opportunity to earn and in the case of foreign capital to repatriate a reasonable return . . . [and] respect for contract and property rights, including assurance of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation in the event of expropriation." The Memorandum adds that the U.S. should "consider

sympathetically" independent Latin American economic initiatives, but only "with the understanding that any such proposal would not involve discrimination against U.S. trade." In addition, the document calls for the U.S. to "encourage through consultation, prudent exchange of information, and other available means, individual and collective action against Communist *or other anti-U.S. subversion* or intervention in any American state" (emphasis added). Such actions should involve "A greater utilization of the Organization of American States as a means of achieving our objectives, which will avoid the appearance of unilateral action and identify our interests with those of the other American states." See N.S.C. 5432/1, "United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect To Latin America," September 3, 1954, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Vol. IV ("The American Republics"), Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983, pp. 81-86.

For another memorandum stating the same reasoning, see N.S.C. 5613/1, "Statement Of Policy On U.S. Policy Toward Latin America," September 25, 1956, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957*, Vol. VI ("American Republics; Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean"), Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987, pp. 119-127.

A major State Department study on the international order in the wake of World War II explains that the "exploitation of the colonial and dependent areas of the African Continent" should be undertaken to aid in the reconstruction of Western Europe, adding that "the idea . . . has much to recommend it" and noting that the opportunity to exploit Africa will provide a psychological lift for the European powers, affording them "that tangible objective for which everyone has been rather unsuccessfully groping." In the same report, the head of the State Department Planning Staff articulates the general problem (pp. 524-525):

[W]e have about 50% of the world's wealth but only 6.3% of its population. This disparity is particularly great as between ourselves and the peoples of Asia. In this situation, we cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment. Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity without positive detriment to our national security. To do so, we will have to dispense with all sentimentality and day-dreaming; and our attention will have to be concentrated everywhere on our immediate national objectives. We need not deceive ourselves that we can afford today the luxury of altruism and world-benefaction. . . .

We should cease to talk about vague and -- for the Far East -- unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of the living standards, and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better.

See P.P.S. [Policy Planning Staff] 23, "Review of Current Trends; U.S. Foreign Policy," February 24, 1948, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948*, Vol. I, part 2 ("General, The United Nations"), Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, pp. 510f at p. 511.

See also, David Green, *The Containment of Latin America: A history of the myths and realities of the Good Neighbor Policy*, Chicago: Quadrangle, 1971, chs. VII and VIII at pp. 175-176, 188 (at the Chapultepec, Mexico, Hemispheric Conference in February 1945, the U.S. called for "An Economic Charter of the Americas" that would eliminate economic nationalism "in all its forms"; this policy stood in sharp conflict with the Latin American stand, which a State Department officer described as "The philosophy of the

New Nationalism [that] embraces policies designed to bring about a broader distribution of wealth and to raise the standard of living of the masses." State Department Political Adviser Laurence Duggan wrote that "Economic nationalism is the common denominator of the new aspirations for industrialization. Latin Americans are convinced that the first beneficiaries of the development of a country's resources should be the people of that country"; the U.S. position, in contrast, was that the "first beneficiaries" should be U.S. investors, while Latin America fulfills its service function and should not undergo excessive industrial development that infringes on U.S. interests). And see discussion and examples in chapter 1 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 1, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20 and 71; chapter 4 of *U.P.* and its footnote 42; and chapter 5 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 7, 8, 32 and 108.

One of the principal results of these commitments has been a sharp increase in global economic inequality over the years. See for example, Ian Robinson, *North American Trade As If Democracy Mattered: What's Wrong with N.A.F.T.A. and What Are the Alternatives?*, Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives/ Washington: International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund, 1993. An excerpt (Appendix 2):

[G]lobal economic inequality has grown dramatically in the last 30 years. The United Nations Development Programme (U.N.D.P.) estimates that between 1960 and 1989, the countries containing the richest 20 percent of the world's population increased their share of global G.N.P. from 70.2 to 82.7 percent, while the countries containing the poorest 20 percent of the world's population saw their share fall from 2.3 to 1.4 percent. In 1960, the countries with the top 20 percent received 30 times more than the countries with the bottom 20 percent; by 1989, the ratio had doubled to about 60:1. . . .

The scale of the gap is even more striking if, instead of looking at the income of rich and poor *nations*, we look at that of rich and poor *people*. For the 41 countries for which the data necessary to make such a calculation were available, the U.N.D.P. estimates that the ratio of the incomes of the richest and poorest 20 percent of the world's people was about 140:1 in 1989. . . . [M]ore than half of the inequality between the richest and the poorest 20 percent of the world's *people* -- the difference between the 1989 ratios of 60:1 and 140:1 -- is a function not of income inequalities *among* nations, but of income inequalities *within* nations.

53. Chomsky gives as another example of the U.S. opposing right-wing independence in the Third World the C.I.A.'s efforts to eliminate Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina, the dictator of the Dominican Republic who seized power in a military coup in 1930 and was assassinated in 1961. On the C.I.A.'s involvement in Trujillo's killing, see for example, John Stockwell [former Chief of the C.I.A.'s Angola Task Force], *In Search of Enemies: A C.I.A. Story*, New York: Norton, 1978. An excerpt (p. 236):

In late November 1975 more dramatic details of C.I.A. assassination programs were leaked to the press by the Senate investigators [in the Church and Pike Committees]. The C.I.A. had been directly involved with the killers of Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, Ngo Diem of South Vietnam, and General Schneider of Chile. It had plotted the deaths of Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba.

For the Congressional report on the C.I.A.'s involvement with Trujillo's assassins, see U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, Interim

Report (S. Rept. 94-465), 94th Congress, 1st Session, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975, section IIID, pp. 191-215.

54. On the new human species in northeast Brazil, see for example, Isabel Vincent, "Life a struggle for Pygmy family," *Globe & Mail* (Toronto), December 17, 1991, p. A15. An excerpt:

A diet consisting mainly of manioc flour, beans and rice has affected [northeastern Brazilian laborers'] mental development to the point that they have difficulty remembering or concentrating. Fully 30.7 per cent of children in the Northeast are born malnourished, according to Unicef and the Brazilian Ministry of Health. . . .

Brazilian medical experts have known of undernourishment in the country's poorest region for more than two decades, but they confirmed only recently the existence of a much more startling problem -- a severe lack of protein in their diet that is producing a population of Brazilian Pygmies known by some medical researchers in Brazil as *homens nanicos*. Their height at adulthood is far less than the average height recording by the World Health Organization and their brain capacity is 40 per cent less than average. . . . In the poorest states of the Northeast, such as Alagoas and Piaui, *homens nanicos* comprise about 30 per cent of the population. . . . Much of the Northeast comprises fertile farm land that is being taken up by large plantations for the production of cash crops such as sugar cane.

On the desperate conditions of poverty and repression in Central America, see for example, César Chelala, "Central America's Health Plight," *Christian Science Monitor*, March 22, 1990, p. 18 (the Pan American Health Organization estimates that of 850,000 children born every year in Central America, 100,000 will die before the age of five and two-thirds of those who survive will suffer from malnutrition, with attendant physical or mental development problems). See also chapter 1 of *U.P.* and its footnote 13; footnotes 15 and 52 of this chapter; and chapter 4 of *U.P.* and its footnote 8.

Chomsky notes that the one exception to the Central America horror story has been Costa Rica, set on a course of state-guided development by the José Figueres coup of 1948 with social-democratic welfare measures combined with harsh repression of labor and virtual elimination of the armed forces. The U.S. has always kept a wary eye on this deviation from the regional standards, despite the suppression of labor and the favorable conditions for foreign investors. In the 1980s, U.S. pressures to dismantle the social-democratic features and restore the army elicited bitter complaints from Figueres and others who shared his commitments. While Costa Rica continues to stand apart from the region in political and economic development, the signs of the "Central Americanization" of Costa Rica are unmistakable. For more on Costa Rica, see for example, Noam Chomsky, *Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies*, Boston: South End, 1989, Appendix V; Martha Honey, *Hostile Acts: U.S. Policy in Costa Rica in the 1980s*, Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994, chs. 3 to 7, and 10 (discussing U.S.-backed privatization programs in Costa Rica in the 1980s, as well as the militarization of the country); Anthony Winson, *Coffee and Democracy in Modern Costa Rica*, New York: St. Martin's, 1989.

55. For a historian's comparison of Japan and the Asante Kingdom, see Basil Davidson, *The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State*, New York: Times Books, 1992, ch. 2.

56. On the development of Japan's colonies, see for example, Robert Wade, *Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. An excerpt (pp. 74-75):

New research suggests that both Taiwan and Korea had higher rates of G.D.P. growth than Japan between 1911 and 1938. Moreover, Taiwan was already by the end of the 1930s the biggest trader in the region, though most of the trade was with Japan. . . . Levels of welfare improved. Indeed, some evidence suggests that the welfare of the Taiwanese peasant in the first half of the twentieth century may have exceeded that of the Japanese peasant. . . . The scope of primary education expanded so that by 1940 almost 60 percent of the relevant age group (males and females) were attending primary school. . . .

What is unusual about Taiwan's experience (and Korea's) is that this process did not give rise to a high concentration of capital and leadership in the hands of a Taiwanese elite, because the Japanese kept almost complete control. This delayed the emergence of a dynamic Taiwanese capitalist class; but it also contributed to a more equal class and income distribution than in most other developing countries.

57. On the death penalty for capital flight in South Korea, see for example, Alice Amsden, *Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 17-18 (questioning whether there has not been a lack of compliance with the law in the 1980s, but noting that as late as 1987 a bankrupt shipping magnate was believed to have committed suicide for fear of being prosecuted).

For a brief overview of Taiwan's and South Korea's defiance of the "laws of the free market," see Alice Amsden, "East Asia's Challenge -- to Standard Economics," *American Prospect*, Summer 1990, pp. 71-77. For a longer study on South Korea, see Amsden's *Asia's Next Giant* (cited above). For a study of economic development viewing Taiwan, South Korea and Japan as a political-economic unit and suggesting that Taiwan and Korea should be called "B.A.I.R.s" ("Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Industrializing Regimes") rather than "N.I.C.s" ("Newly Industrializing Countries"), see Bruce Cumings, "The origins and development of the Northeast Asian political economy: industrial sectors, product cycles, and political consequences," *International Organization*, Vol. 38, No. 1, Winter 1984, pp. 1-40.

For more on this subject, see for example, Stephen Haggard, *Pathways From the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990 (comparison of Latin America and East Asia); Rhys Jenkins, "Learning from the Gang: are there Lessons for Latin America from East Asia?," *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1991, pp. 37-54 at p. 38 (discussing the East Asian N.I.C.s as a model for Latin America, citing fraudulent uses of the East Asian N.I.C.s as triumphs of the free market, and noting the role that vast U.S. foreign aid may have played in the growth of South Korea and Taiwan: "In the 1950s and early 1960s aid accounted for over one-third of both gross investment and total imports in Taiwan, and more than two-thirds of both variables in South Korea"); Rhys Jenkins, "The Political Economy of Industrialization: A Comparison of Latin American and East Asian Newly Industrializing Countries," *Development and Change*, Vol. 22, No. 2, April 1991, pp. 197-231 (attributing the greater growth rate in South Korea and Taiwan to the greater relative autonomy of the state in those countries).

See also, Robert Pastor [former National Security Council Director of Latin American Affairs], "Securing a Democratic Hemisphere," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1988-89, pp. 41f at p. 52 (reporting that Latin America transferred some \$150 billion to the industrial West between 1982 and 1987, in addition to \$100 billion of capital flight -- a capital transfer which amounted to twenty-five times the total value of the Alliance for Progress and fifteen times the Marshall Plan). And see footnote 38 of chapter 7 of *U.P.*

58. On the costs and profitability of the British Empire, see for example, John Strachey, *The End of Empire*, New York: Random House, 1959, especially chs. 10 to 12 (an early investigation of the question).

On the costs of the 1980s interventions in Central America, see for example, Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, *Inequity and Intervention: The Federal Budget and Central America*, Boston: South End, 1986, p. 42.

Chomsky remarks that insight about the class interests underpinning empire goes back as far as the classical economist Adam Smith in the eighteenth century (*Year 501: The Conquest Continues*, Boston: South End, 1993, p. 15):

In his classic condemnation of monopoly power and colonization, Adam Smith has useful commentary on Britain's policies. . . . He describes these policies with some ambivalence, arguing finally that despite the great advantages that England gained from the colonies and its monopoly of their trade, in the long run the practices did not pay, either in Asia or North America. The argument is largely theoretical; adequate data were not available. But however convincing the argument may be, Smith's discussion also explains why it is not to the point.

Abandoning the colonies would be "more advantageous to the great body of the people" of England, he concludes, "though less so to the merchants, than the monopoly which she at present enjoys." The monopoly, "though a very grievous tax upon the colonies, and though it may increase the revenue of a particular order of men in Great Britain, diminishes instead of increasing that of the great body of the people." The military costs alone are a severe burden, apart from the distortions of investment and trade [citing Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976 (original 1776), Book IV, ch. VII, pts. II and III, and ch. VIII, pp. 75-181, especially pp. 131-133, 147, 180-181 (which also is quoted in footnote 1 of chapter 5 of *U.P.*)].

On Adam Smith, see chapter 6 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 10, 34, 35 and 36; footnote 1 of chapter 5 of *U.P.*; and chapter 10 of *U.P.* and its footnote 91.

59. In fact, the percentage of the American population that believes that the government is run by "a few big interests looking out for themselves" rose from 49 percent in 1984, to 71 percent in 1990, then to 79 percent by 1995.

For these figures, see Adam Clymer, "Americans In Poll View Government More Confidently," *New York Times*, November 19, 1984, p. A1 (reporting a poll which found that 49 percent of the U.S. population believed the government is "pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves," rather than "for the benefit of all." The article's title refers to a change from the 1980 low, though the 1964 level of confidence -- when 64 percent of the U.S. population believed that the government is run "for the benefit of all" -- has never again been reached); Robin Toner, "The Budget Battle," *New York Times*, October 12, 1990, p. A21 (by 1990, the percentage of people who thought that the government is run for the benefit of "a few big interests looking out for

themselves" had risen to 71 percent); R.W. Apple Jr., "Poll Shows Disenchantment With Politicians and Politics," *New York Times*, August 12, 1995, section 1, p. 1 (by 1995, the figure had risen to 79 percent). For other polls on increasing skepticism and dissidence, see chapter 9 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 10, 44 and 45.

Chapter Three

Teach-In: Evening

1. For discussion in the U.S. business literature of the need for continued military spending and the danger posed by alternatives to it, see footnotes 9 and 10 of this chapter.

On the general role that military spending plays in the U.S. economy, see the text following this footnote in *U.P.*, and footnotes 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of this chapter.

2. On the similar economic effects of civilian and military spending, see for example, Paul Samuelson, *Economics* (Seventh Edition), New York: McGraw, 1967. An excerpt (p. 767; emphasis in original):

Before leaving the problem of achieving and keeping full employment, we should examine what would happen if the cold war were to give way to relaxed international tension. If America could cut down drastically on her defense expenditures, would that confront her with a depression problem that has merely been suppressed by reliance on armament production? The answer here is much like that given in Chapter 18 to the problem of some future acceleration of automation. *If there is a political will, our mixed economy can rather easily keep $C + I + G$ [C = consumption, I = investment, G = government spending] spending up to the level needed for full employment without armament spending.* There is nothing special about G spending on jet bombers and intercontinental missiles that leads to a larger multiplier support of the economy than would other kinds of G expenditure.

John Kenneth Galbraith, *The New Industrial State*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967, pp. 230-231 (adding that, to have the same effect, the civilian spending "would have to have somewhat of the same relation to technology as the military spending it replaces").

3. Public funding of the development of computers and other advanced industries - and the role of the Pentagon system in the U.S. economy more generally -- is an extremely important topic, which also is discussed at length in chapters 7 and 10 of *U.P.*

For sources on the Defense Department's role in fostering high-technology industries, see for example, Kenneth Flamm, *Targeting the Computer: Government Support and International Competition*, Washington: Brookings Institution, 1987, especially ch. 3 (on the crucial role of the Pentagon in the computer industry); Laura D'Andrea Tyson, *Who's Bashing Whom?: Trade Conflict in High-Technology Industries*, Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1992. An excerpt (pp. 88-90):

In its early years, up to 100 percent of the [semiconductor] industry's output was purchased by the military, and even as late as 1968 the military claimed nearly 40 percent. In addition, there was a derived defense demand for semiconductor output from the military's large procurement of computer output throughout the 1960s. Direct and indirect defense purchases reduced the risk of investment in both R&D and equipment for semiconductor producers, who were assured that a significant part of their output would be sold to the military. The willingness and ability of the U.S. government to purchase chips in quantity at premium prices allowed a growing

number of companies to refine their production skills and develop elaborate manufacturing facilities. . . .

The government continued to pay for a large share of R&D through the early 1970s, providing roughly one-half of the total between 1958 and 1970. As late as 1958, federal funding covered an estimated 85 percent of overall American R&D in electronics. . . . [T]he military, which remained the largest single consumer of leading-edge components throughout the 1960s, was willing to buy very expensive products from brand-new firms that offered the ultimate in performance in lieu of an established track record.

Winfried Ruigrock and Rob Van Tulder, *The Logic of International Restructuring*, New York: Routledge, 1995. An excerpt (pp. 220-221):

[O]ver the 1950s and 1960s, the Pentagon paid more than one-third of I.B.M.'s R&D budget. The Pentagon moreover acted as a "lead user" to I.B.M., providing the company with scale economies and vital feedback on how to improve its computers. In the 1950s, the Pentagon took care of half of I.B.M.'s revenues, enabling it to move abroad and flood foreign markets with competitively priced mainframe computers. Thus, I.B.M.'s defense contracts cross-subsidised its civilian activities at home and abroad, and helped it to establish a near monopoly position throughout most of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Along similar lines, all formerly and/or currently leading U.S. computers, semiconductors and electronics makers in the 1993 Fortune 100 have benefited tremendously from preferential defense contracts. . . . In this manner, Pentagon cost-plus contracts functioned as a *de facto* industrial policy.

The same mechanism can be observed in the aerospace industry. In the 1950s, for instance, Boeing could make use of government-owned B-52 construction facilities to produce its B-707 model, providing the basis of its market dominance in large civilian aircraft. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (N.A.S.A.) has often played a role comparable to the Pentagon. . . . [G]overnment policies, in particular defence programmes, have been an overwhelming force in shaping the strategies and competitiveness of the world's largest firms. Even in 1994, without any major actual or imminent wars, ten to fourteen firms ranked in the 1993 Fortune 100 still [conducted] at least 10 per cent of their business in closed defence markets.

David F. Noble, *Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation*, New York: Knopf, 1984. An excerpt (pp. 5, 7-8):

[B]etween 1945 and 1968, the Department of Defense industrial system had supplied \$44 billion of goods and services, exceeding the combined net sales of General Motors, General Electric, Du Pont, and U.S. Steel. . . . By 1964, 90 percent of the research and development for the aircraft industry was being underwritten by the government, particularly the Air Force. . . . In 1964, two-thirds of the research and development costs in the electrical equipment industry (e.g., those of G.E., Westinghouse, R.C.A., Raytheon, A.T.&T., Philco, I.B.M., Sperry Rand) were still paid for by the government.

On the important government-funding organization DARPA (the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), see for example, Elizabeth Corcoran, "Computing's controversial patron," *Science*, April 2, 1993, p. 20. An excerpt:

Lean by Washington standards, the 100-person corps [of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)] spurs researchers at universities and private companies to build the stuff of future defense technologies by handing out research grants -- a total of \$1.5 billion in fiscal 1992 and more this year. Among their achievements, DARPA managers can count such key technologies as high-speed

networking, advances in integrated circuits, and the emergence of massively parallel supercomputers. . . .

That track record has encouraged the new administration to drop the "Defense" from DARPA's name, renaming it ARPA and anointing it a lead agency in a new effort to help fledgling technologies gain a hold in commercial markets. But this role for DARPA isn't altogether new: Throughout the Reagan and much of the Bush Administrations, Congress pumped hundreds of millions of dollars into DARPA, enabling the agency to work hand in hand with industry on technologies that would be critical not just to defense but to U.S. competitiveness in civilian markets as well.

Andrew Pollack, "America's Answer to Japan's MITI," *New York Times*, March 5, 1989, section 3, p. 1. An excerpt:

At a time when more industries are seeking Government help to hold their own against Asian and European competitors, Darpa [the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency] is stepping into the void, becoming the closest thing this nation has to Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the agency that organizes the industrial programs that are credited with making Japan so competitive. . . . [U]nder the rubric of national security, the Pentagon can undertake programs like Sematech [a research consortium to help the U.S. semiconductor industry compete] that would arouse opposition if done by another agency in the name of industrial policy. . . .

Many fundamental computer technologies in use today can be traced to its backing, including the basic graphics techniques that make the Apple Macintosh computer easy to use; time-sharing, which allows several people to share a computer, and packet-switching for routing data over computer networks. . . . C. Gordon Bell, head of research at the Ardent Computer Corporation and one of the nation's leading computer designers [states,] "They are the sole drive of computer technology. That's it. Period." Darpa does no research on its own, only finances work.

See also, Frank Kofsky, *Harry S. Truman and the War Scare of 1948: A Successful Campaign to Deceive the Nation*, New York: St. Martin's, 1993 (on the origins of the system of government subsidies to high-tech industry). And see chapter 2 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 4 and 5; footnotes 4, 7, 9 and 10 of this chapter; the text of chapter 7 of *U.P.*; and chapter 10 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 22 and 23.

4. On the real function of "Star Wars," see for example, Dave Griffiths, Evert Clark, and Alan Hall, "Why Star Wars Is A Shot In The Arm For Corporate R&D," *Business Week*, April 8, 1985, p. 77. An excerpt:

Not surprisingly, the goings-on at the Star Wars office are closely watched from corporate boardrooms. Says Army Colonel Robert W. Parker, director of resource management at S.D.I.'s office: "One way or another, 80% of our money is going to the private sector." On any given day, representatives of dozens of companies and universities visit the headquarters. . . . [Star Wars head James Abrahamson] has given the private sector an unprecedented role in shaping a defense project. . . .

S.D.I. will need much more than existing technology if it is ever to fly. To get all the necessary advances, it will pump 3% to 4% of its projected budget [\$26 billion] over the next five years into pushing innovations in technologies ranging from advanced computers to optics. . . . Almost no cutting-edge technology will go without a shot of new research funds. . . . Whether or not Star Wars comes to fruition, Abrahamson and Isonson [head of S.D.I.'s Innovative Science and Technology Office] are convinced that it will produce a wealth of new technology. "Star Wars will create an industrial revolution," insists Isonson.

Malcolme W. Browne, "The Star Wars Spinoff" (cover story), *New York Times Magazine*, August 24, 1986, p. 18. The subtitles on the cover and in the story read:

For better or worse, the controversial Strategic Defense Initiative is already yielding new technologies that seem destined to change the world. . . . It is estimated that adapted Star Wars technology will eventually yield private-sector sales of \$5 trillion to \$20 trillion. . . . Experts say the computers and programs S.D.I. is helping to bring into being are powerful tools whose civilian counterparts will have incalculable civilian value.

"Will star wars reward or retard science?," *Economist* (London), September 7, 1985, p. 93. An excerpt:

[T]he share of American government R&D funds going for defence . . . rose from 47% in 1980 to 70% this year. Japan, in contrast, gives less than 1% of its government R&D funds to defence. . . . Yet the differences in research priorities between, say, America with its defence bias and Japan with its market bias are less stark than the raw statistics suggest. The makers of science policy in most industrial countries are investing in the same group of core technologies -- computers, materials and biotechnology. A review of science and technology policy by the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] notes that, biotechnology apart, the Pentagon and Japan's ministry of international trade and industry (Miti) are putting their money into very similar kinds of R&D.

In computer science, for example, both are trying to build a "fifth-generation" computer that can give a rudimentary imitation of human thinking. Miti has underwritten about a third of the development costs of very-large-scale-integrated (VLSI) circuits; the Pentagon has a \$300m development programme in the same area. Miti has a \$30m R&D programme on fibre optics; the Pentagon is spending \$40m a year on similar research. Both are also investing heavily in research on new materials such as polymers and metal-matrix composites. Both are spending about \$200m on manufacturing technology, including robots and factory automation. Does it matter whether the research sails under a military banner or a civilian one? Many scientists who oppose star wars say that its objectives are technically impossible. Enthusiasts counter that its ambitious aims make the SDI a perfect catalyst for the sort of innovative research that industry cannot afford but that will pay big dividends in the long run. . . . The search for a beam weapon to knock out missiles will spur research on lasers that operate at short wavelengths. Spin-offs could range from X-ray microscopes to excimer lasers that unclog blocked arteries.

See also, William J. Broad, "Star Wars Is Coming, But Where Is It Going?," *New York Times Magazine*, December 6, 1987, p. 80. An excerpt:

The best evidence indicates that . . . a space-based defense has no chance of working as envisioned by President Reagan. . . . The American Physical Society, in an exhaustive 424-page report, found that so many breakthroughs were needed for overall Star Wars development that no deployment decision should even be considered for another decade or more. The physicists, Nobel laureates among them, said that the survival of any space-based antimissile system against enemy attack was "highly questionable."

Nick Cook, "S&T: fuel for the economic engine," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, January 28, 1995, pp. 19f; Robert Reich, "High Tech, A Subsidiary Of Pentagon Inc.," Op-Ed, *New York Times*, May 29, 1985, p. A23. And see footnote 3 of this chapter.

5. On the Pentagon budget being higher in real terms in 1995 than it was under the Nixon administration at the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, see footnote 75 of chapter 8 of *U.P.*

On real wages for college-educated workers declining in 1987 after the Pentagon budget declined in 1986, see footnote 42 of chapter 9 of *U.P.*

6. For a Depression-era economist making the point about fascisms, see for example, Robert A. Brady, *Business As A System of Power*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1943, especially pp. 5-7, 16-17, 295.

7. On the failure of the New Deal but success of military spending in ending the Depression, see for example, Richard B. DuBoff, *Accumulation and Power: An Economic History of the United States*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1989, ch. 6. An excerpt (pp. 91, 98):

Despite the efforts of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, real G.N.P. [Gross National Product] did not regain its 1929 volume until 1939, when per capita income was still 7 percent below its 1929 level. Unemployment, reaching an estimated 25 percent of the labor force in 1933, averaged nearly 19 percent from 1931 through 1940 and never dipped below 10 percent until late 1941. The anemic nature of the recovery during the 1930s was a direct result of the inadequate increases in government support for the economy. . . .

Only the Second World War ended the Great Depression. "Rearmament" commenced in June 1940 and over the next year, before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, military spending jumped more than six-fold, to 11 percent of the G.N.P. It rose to 42 percent of G.N.P. in 1943-44. Under this mighty stimulus, real national product increased 65 percent from 1940 through 1944, industrial production by 90 percent. . . . What had really happened between 1929 and 1933 is that the institutions of nineteenth-century free market growth broke down, beyond repair. . . . The tumultuous passage from the depression of the 1930s to the total economic mobilization of the 1940s was the watershed in twentieth century capitalism. After that, nothing in the macroeconomy would ever be the same; there was no going back to the days of a pure, practically unregulated capitalist economic order.

Richard Barnet, *The Economy of Death*, New York: Atheneum, 1969, at p. 116 (summarizing the evolution of the military spending system, and quoting General Electric President Charles E. Wilson on the need to develop a "permanent war economy").

On corporate executives running the U.S. economy during World War II, see for example, Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., "The Role of Business in the United States: A Historical Survey," *Daedalus*, Winter 1969, pp. 23-40 at p. 36. See also chapter 2 of *U.P.* and its footnote 5; footnote 9 of this chapter; and chapter 10 of *U.P.* and its footnote 94.

8. For warnings about the necessity for government intervention in the economy after the war, see for example, Paul A. Samuelson, "Unemployment Ahead: (I.) A Warning to the Washington Expert," *New Republic*, September 11, 1944, pp. 297-299; Paul A. Samuelson, "Unemployment Ahead: (II.) The Coming Economic Crisis," *New Republic*, September 18, 1944, pp. 333-335. An excerpt:

Every month, every day, every hour the federal government is pumping millions and billions of dollars into the bloodstream of the American economy. It is as if we were building a T.V.A. [Tennessee Valley Authority, a massive New Deal public

works project] every Tuesday. Did I say every Tuesday? Two T.V.A.'s every Tuesday would be nearer the truth. We have reached the present high levels of output and employment only by means of \$100 billion of government expenditures, of which \$50 billion represent deficits. In the usual sense of the word, the present prosperity is "artificial," although no criticism is thereby implied. Any simple statistical calculation will show that the automobile, aircraft, ship-building and electronics industries combined, comprising the fields with rosiest postwar prospects, cannot possibly maintain their present level of employment, or one-half, or one-third of it. . . .

[I]t is demonstrable that the immediate demobilization period presents a grave challenge to our economy. . . . Our economic system is living on a rich diet of government spending. It will be found cheaper in the long run, and infinitely preferable in human terms, to wean it gradually. . . . For better or worse, the government under any party will have to undertake extensive action in the years ahead.

"Shall we have Airplanes?," *Fortune*, January 1948, pp. 77f. An excerpt (emphasis in original):

[The U.S. aircraft industry] is today producing at a rate that is less than 3 per cent of its wartime peak. . . . [Its spokesmen] speak frequently of "free enterprise," but they speak just as frequently of "long-range planning." It is crystal clear to them that they cannot live without one kind or another of governmental support -- yet "subsidy" is a shocking word to them. . . . Its respected heads . . . freely play the game of nagging and chiding the government, but it then transpires that their reproaches are made because the government has not gone far enough toward stating "clearly and frankly" its "obligation to help develop new and improved air transports and efficient networks of air transportation," as well as fostering new programs for military planes.

. . .
Every one of these proposals acknowledges the inability of unaided "private" capital to venture any deeper into the technological terra incognita of the aircraft industry. Every one acknowledges that only the credit resources of the U.S.A. are sufficient to keep the aircraft industry going: to enable it to hire its engineers, buy its materials, pay wages to its labor force, compensate its executives -- and pay dividends to its stockholders. The fact seems to remain, then, that the aircraft industry today cannot satisfactorily exist in a pure, competitive, unsubsidized, "free-enterprise" economy. *It never has been able to.* Its huge customer has always been the United States Government, whether in war or in peace.

"Aviation RFC (Reconstruction Finance Corporation)?," *Business Week*, January 31, 1948, p. 28 ("the aircraft builders, even with tax carrybacks, are near disaster. . . . Right now the government is their only possible savior -- with orders, subsidies, or loans"). See also, Frank Kofsky, *Harry S. Truman and the War Scare of 1948: A Successful Campaign to Deceive the Nation*, New York: St. Martin's, 1993, at p. 2 (arguing with substantial documentation that the Truman administration manipulated "war scares" for the purpose of sustaining and expanding U.S. industry through the military system; citing business magazines and newspapers of the period that "made it quite unmistakable that the aircraft industry would have collapsed had it not been for the big procurement orders that came in the wake of the war scare of 1948").

In the following years, the business press routinely recognized that continued high levels of military spending were essential to the U.S. economy. See for example, Ward Gates, "Approaching Recession in American Business?," *Magazine of Wall Street*, May 31, 1952, p. 252. An excerpt:

[R]earmament has played a large part in the increase in world trade directly after Korea and remains one of the basic elements in the future of world business. No better illustration could be had than the effects of the U.S. withdrawal from the primary markets when it had about completed its stock-piling program. When this occurred the primary markets practically fell apart. It is obvious that foreign economies as well as our own are now mainly dependent on the scope of continued arms spending in this country. . . . Basic to continued high activity in industry is the government program of defense expenditures, actual and projected.

Ward Gates, "Major Economic Adjustment -- If Shooting War Stops?," *Magazine of Wall Street*, July 28, 1951, p. 436. An excerpt:

Cynics both here and abroad have claimed, and not without some justification, that American business interests "fear peace." The moral aspect of this dilemma need not concern us but, on a realistic basis, there is no question that the prospect of peace is altering the thinking of economists, business men and investors. For that reason, it is imperative that a new view be taken of the over-all situation and to see whether the prospective ending of hostilities will produce marked changes in the industrial, business and financial picture. . . .

While the prospect of peace in Korea has exerted an unsettling act and probably will continue to do so during the next few months, we must consider whether these comparatively adverse conditions will not disappear as the enormous armaments program acquires momentum. . . . [T]he very high continued rate of arms production will greatly tend to support the economy and as long as this feature remains it is difficult to see the possibility for a genuine recession generally in the period ahead, although individual industries will have to contend with the uncertainties presented by the cessation of hostilities.

See also, "Newsgram From the Nation's Capital," *U.S. News and World Report*, May 26, 1950, pp. 7-8. An excerpt (emphasis in original):

Money Supply will continue to be abundant, rising. *Population* will go on rising. *Households* will grow proportionately faster than population. "*Cold war*," at the same time, will go on, uninterrupted. It's in that little combination of facts that Government planners figure they have found the magic formula for almost endless good times. They now are beginning to wonder if there may not be something in perpetual motion after all.

The formula, as the planners figure it, can work this way:

Rising money supply, rising population are ingredients of good times. *Cold war* is the catalyst. Cold war is an automatic pump primer. Turn a spigot, and the public clamors for more arms spending. Turn another, the clamor ceases.

A little deflation, unemployment, signs of harder times, and the spigot is turned to the left. *Money flows out*, money supply rises, activity revives. High activity encourages people to have bigger families. . . . *Good times* come back, boom signs appear, prices start to rise.

A little inflation, signs of shortages, speculation, and the spigot is turned to the right. Cold-war talk is eased. Economy is proposed. Money is tightened a little by tighter rein on Government-guaranteed credit, by use of devices in other fields. Things tend to calm down, to stabilize.

That's the formula in use. It's been working fairly well to date. . . . Truman confidence, cockiness, is based on this "Truman formula." *Truman era of good times*, President is told, can run much beyond 1952. *Cold-war demands*, if fully exploited, are almost limitless.

And see chapter 2 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 4 and 5; footnotes 3, 4, 7, 9 and 10 of this chapter; and chapter 10 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 22 and 23.

9. For an articulation in the business press of the problems with domestic public works and social welfare spending, see "From Cold War to Cold Peace," *Business Week*, February 12, 1949, p. 19. An excerpt:

But there's a tremendous difference between welfare pump-priming and military pump-priming. . . . Military spending doesn't really alter the structure of the economy. It goes through the regular channels. As far as business is concerned, a munitions order from the government is much like an order from a private customer. But the kind of welfare and public works spending that Truman plans does alter the economy. It makes new channels of its own. It creates new institutions. It redistributes income. It shifts demand from one industry to another. It changes the whole economic pattern.

Similarly, business leaders also feared that the public would demand ownership of publicly-subsidized industries if they became involved in or informed about industrial policy-making. See for example, Frank Kofsky, *Harry S. Truman and the War Scare of 1948: A Successful Campaign to Deceive the Nation*, New York: St. Martin's, 1993. An excerpt (p. 37):

Although the aircraft companies could not have been more eager to tap the U.S. treasury, their executives were also enormously concerned that any federal funds they might receive not even resemble -- much less be called -- a subsidy. Their reasoning was the same that impelled William Allen, the president of the Boeing Airplane Company, to insist that any computation of the airplane makers' wartime profits be on the basis of sales, not investments. If the taxpayers were ever to realize how much the creation, expansion and current well-being of the aircraft industry depended on money they had provided, Allen and his counterparts feared, their outrage might result in a demand for nationalization. Advocates of such a measure might plausibly argue that as long as the public was expected to continue footing the bill to keep the airplane builders in operation, it might as well own that for which it was being forced to pay. . . . The trick, therefore, was for the industry to achieve the beneficial *effect* of a subsidy without the *appearance* of having taken one.

Earlier, the same considerations applied with respect to the government's foreign-spending programs -- which ultimately became military-spending programs, as discussed in footnotes 4 and 5 of chapter 2 of *U.P.* -- namely, business leaders saw them as an economic stimulus that avoided the dangers of increased domestic social-welfare spending. See for example, David W. Eakins, "Business Planners and America's Postwar Expansion," in David Horowitz, ed., *Corporations and the Cold War*, New York: Monthly Review, 1969, pp. 143-171. An excerpt (pp. 150, 156, 167-168):

Corporate liberal businessmen were generally agreed that the government should continue to help sustain full production and employment, but most of them were opposed to more internal planning -- that is, to an expanded New Deal at home. . . . In 1944, the National Planning Association offered a foreign economic policy plan on the scale of that proposed by Secretary of State George C. Marshall three years later. It called for a great expansion of government-supported foreign investment, and it did so strictly on the basis of American domestic needs, using, of course, none of the later justifications that were to be based on a Cold War with Russia. . . . The

corporate liberal planners who began to work out the system during World War II [in groups such as the National Planning Association, the Twentieth Century Fund, and the Committee for Economic Development] were aware of the political potential of foreign aid -- in the sense that it would help create "the kind of economic and political world that the United States would like to see prevail." But their scheme had broader implications. It stemmed, first of all, from a well-learned lesson of the New Deal, that it was the duty of government to prevent the stagnation of the capitalist economy by large-scale compensatory spending. But that spending, if "free enterprise" at home was to be saved, had to be largely directed abroad. . . .

[The Marshall Plan's program of massive] foreign aid emerged to provide an elegantly symmetrical answer to several dilemmas. It was a form of government compensatory spending that avoided revived New Deal spending at home. . . . To have turned inward to solve American problems -- to allow foreigners to choose their own course -- might very well have meant, as [senior State Department and World Bank official] Will Clayton put it, "radical readjustments in our entire economic structure . . . changes which could hardly be made under our democratic free enterprise system." These men were fearful of the expanded New Deal solution to continued economic growth precisely because they felt that such a program would be compelled to move far beyond the most radical projections of New Deal planners.

For a more detailed description of the origins of the post-war military economy, and of military spending's general role as a "floor under the economy" to prevent the return to depression conditions, see Fred Block, *The Origins of International Economic Disorder: A Study of United States International Monetary Policy from World War II to the Present*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977, especially pp. 102-108.

For other articulations of these themes, see for example, Bernard Nossiter, "Arms Firms See Postwar Spurt," *Washington Post*, December 8, 1968, pp. A1, A18. This article quotes Samuel F. Downer, Financial Vice-President of the L.T.V. Aerospace Corporation, explaining why "the post-[Vietnam] war world must be bolstered with military orders":

"It's basic," he says. "Its selling appeal is defense of the home. This is one of the greatest appeals the politicians have to adjusting the system. If you're the President and you need a control factor in the economy, and you need to sell this factor, you can't sell Harlem and Watts but you can sell self-preservation, a new environment. We're going to increase defense budgets as long as those bastards in Russia are ahead of us. The American people understand this."

Robert Reich, "High Tech, A Subsidiary Of Pentagon Inc.," Op-Ed, *New York Times*, May 29, 1985, p. A23 ("national defense has served as a convenient pretext for the kind of planning that would be ideologically suspect if undertaken on its own behalf"); John Kenneth Galbraith, *The New Industrial State*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967. An excerpt (pp. 228-229):

In 1929, Federal expenditures for all goods and services amounted to \$3.5 billion; by 1939 they were \$12.5 billion; in 1965 they were approximately \$57 billion. In relation to Gross National Product they increased from 1.7 per cent in 1929 to 8.4 per cent in 1965 and earlier in the same decade they had been substantially in excess of 10 per cent. Although the cliché is to the contrary, this increase has been with strong approval of the industrial system. There is also every reason to regard it, and the social attitudes and beliefs by which it is sustained, as reflecting substantial adaptation to the goals of the mature corporation and its technostucture. For the cliché has noticed only the ritual objection of business to government expenditure.

Much of this objection comes from small businessmen outside the industrial system or it reflects entrepreneurial attitudes rather than those of the technostructure. And it is directed at only a small part of public expenditure.

All business objection to public expenditure automatically exempts expenditures for defense or those, as for space exploration, which are held to serve equivalent goals of international policy. It is these expenditures which account for by far the largest part of the increase in Federal expenditure over the past thirty years. . . . Legislators who most conscientiously reflect the views of the business community regularly warn that insufficient funds are being spent on particular weapons. No more than any other social institution does the industrial system disapprove of what is important for its success. Those who have thought it suspicious of Keynesian fiscal policy have failed to see how precisely it has identified and supported what is essential for that policy.

See also, Richard B. DuBoff, *Accumulation and Power: An Economic History of the United States*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1989, ch. 6, especially pp. 98-100; Gabriel Kolko, *Main Currents in American History*, New York: Harper and Row, 1976, pp. 316-330. And see chapter 1 of *U.P.* and its footnote 1; chapter 2 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 4 and 5; and footnotes 7, 8, 10 and 11 of this chapter.

10. On the importance of military spending as a cushion under the economy, see for example, Frank Kofsky, *Harry S. Truman and the War Scare of 1948: A Successful Campaign to Deceive the Nation*, New York: St. Martin's, 1993. An excerpt (pp. 258-260):

In supporting bigger armaments budgets, business journals repeatedly returned to the idea that military procurement could prevent or overcome recessions by keeping overall levels of spending high. Even as early as the spring of 1948, *The Magazine of Wall Street* was beginning to cast the matter in exactly those terms: "In fact, the contemplated scale of spending . . . may be just enough, together with tax reduction and other outlays such as foreign aid, to act as a cushion against a business decline" [see E.A. Krauss, "The Effect on Our Economy," *Magazine of Wall Street*, April 24, 1948, pp. 60, 100]. . . . "In a broad manner, the enlarged Government spending will inject new strength into the entire economy" [see Frederick K. Dodge, "Which Securities under Preparedness?," *Magazine of Wall Street*, April 24, 1948, p. 98]. . . .

Later in the year, *Business Week* gave this idea its official imprimatur [see "Where's That War Boom," *Business Week*, October 30, 1948, p. 23]. . . . "Industrialists generally are in accord with the military's program of preparedness," *Steel* noted as early as April of 1948, specifically citing "C.E. Wilson, president of General Electric Co.," as a case in point [see "Industry Sizing Up New Military Program," *Steel*, April 5, 1948, p. 46]. . . . "The country is now geared to a \$13-billion military budget," [*Business Week*] noted . . . "a big -- and reliable -- prop under business. For the country as a whole," a Pentagon budget of this size guaranteed "a high level of federal spending," while for "individual suppliers, it means a solid backlog of orders" [see "Defense Buying Hits Stride," *Business Week*, March 18, 1950, pp. 19-20]. The following month, the editors again drew the connection between fueling the arms race and maintaining a stable capitalist order: "Pressure for more government spending is mounting. And the prospect is that Congress will give in. . . . The reason is a combination of concern over tense Russian relations, and growing fear of a rising level of unemployment here at home" [see "Washington Outlook," *Business Week*, April 15, 1950, p. 15].

This important function of military spending in the economy continues to the present. For one study of its influence, see Maryellen R. Kelley and Todd A. Watkins, "The myth of the specialized military contractor," *Technology Review*, April 1, 1995, pp. 52f. An excerpt:

[O]ur research indicates that the image of a few highly specialized defense contractors occupying an enclave walled off from commercial manufacturing is largely a myth. . . . [T]he vast majority of defense contractors serve both military and civilian customers. What's more, strengths developed under the umbrella of national security are being tapped to benefit firms' commercial work, and vice versa. . . . Far from being responsible for most of the nation's military manufacturing, [the] major defense contractors stand at the top of diverse and deep supply structures. . . . This supplier base encompasses a significant percentage of all U.S. manufacturing companies. In a 1991 survey of firms in 21 durable goods industries, as well as an analysis of 1988 data gathered by the Census Bureau, we found that fully half of all plants make parts, components, or materials for military equipment.

See also, Maryellen Kelley and Todd A. Watkins, "In from the cold: prospects for the conversion of the defense industrial base," *Science*, April 28, 1995, pp. 525f; Karen Pennar, "Pentagon Spending Is the Economy's Biggest Gun," *Business Week*, October 21, 1985, pp. 60, 64 ("Big [armaments] contractors like Lockheed and McDonnell Douglas like to use defense spending as a cushion for times when other business gets weak"). And see footnotes 3, 4, 7 and 9 of this chapter; and chapter 10 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 22 and 23.

Chomsky points out that military-Keynesian initiatives have not been limited to the U.S. defense budget: a substantial proportion of the U.S. foreign aid budget is devoted to direct grants or loans to foreign governments for the purchase of U.S. military equipment, and there are many other programs shaped to serve the same ends. On U.S. armaments exports and the scale of U.S. military spending, see chapter 8 of *U.P.* and its footnote 75.

11. Air Force Secretary Symington's exact words were: "The word to talk was not 'subsidy'; the word to talk was 'security.'" He made the remark in a discussion following an Air Force presentation to the Combat Aviation Subcommittee of the Congressional Aviation Policy Board, on January 21, 1948. See Frank Kofsky, *Harry S. Truman and the War Scare of 1948: A Successful Campaign to Deceive the Nation*, New York: St. Martin's, 1993, pp. 48, 81, 319 n.7.

12. On the Reagan administration's immediate selection of Libya as its target, see for example, "Excerpts from Haig's Remarks at First News Conference as Secretary of State," *New York Times*, January 29, 1981, p. A10 (announcing that, under the new Reagan administration, "international terrorism will take the place of human rights in our concern because it is the ultimate abuse of human rights"). See generally, Edward S. Herman, *The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda*, Boston: South End, 1982; Edward S. Herman and Gerry O'Sullivan, *The "Terrorism" Industry: The Experts and Institutions That Shape Our View of Terror*, New York: Pantheon, 1990; Alexander George, ed., *Western State Terrorism*, New York: Routledge, 1991.

13. On Qaddafi's record of terrorism at the time, see for example, William D. Perdue, *Terrorism and the State: A Critique of Domination Through Fear*, New York: Praeger, 1989, chs. 3 and 6, especially p. 114 ("Amnesty International attributed 14

killings of political opponents (4 abroad) to Libya through 1985"). In contrast, torture victims and people killed in the U.S.-client state of El Salvador alone numbered 50,000. For comparison with victims of government terrorism in most-favored U.S. ally states such as El Salvador, Indonesia, Israel, and Colombia, see the text of *U.P.* and sources in these notes, throughout.

14. Chomsky notes that the U.S. government's Operation MONGOOSE terrorism campaign against Cuba -- launched primarily from Miami -- alone dwarfs terrorism coming from the Arab world. On MONGOOSE, see chapter 1 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 21 and 22. On the international terrorism coming from Washington, see examples throughout the text of *U.P.* and sources in these notes.

Chomsky explains his point about the main centers of international terrorism (*The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism -- The Political Economy of Human Rights: Volume I*, Boston: South End, 1979, pp. 85-87):

The words "terror" and "terrorism" have become semantic tools of the powerful in the Western world. In their dictionary meaning, these words refer to "intimidation" by the "systematic use of violence" as a means of both governing and opposing existing governments. But current Western usage has restricted the sense, on purely ideological grounds, to the retail violence of those who oppose the established order.

...

In the Third World, the United States set itself firmly against revolutionary change after World War II, and has struggled to maintain the disintegrating post-colonial societies within the "Free World," often in conflict with the main drift of social and political forces within those countries. This conservative and counter-revolutionary political objective has defined the spectrum of acceptable and unacceptable violence and bloodshed. From this perspective, killings associated with revolution represent a resort to violence which is both reprehensible, and improper as a means for bringing about social change. Such atrocities are carried out by "terrorists. . . ." The same Orwellian usage was standard on the home front during the Vietnam War. Students, war protesters, Black Panthers, and associated other dissidents were effectively branded as violent and terroristic by a government that dropped more than five million tons of bombs over a dozen year period on a small peasant country with no means of self-defense. Beating of demonstrators, infiltration of dissident organizations, extensive use of agent provocateur tactics, even F.B.I. complicity in political assassination were not designated by any such terms [on these tactics by the U.S. government, see chapter 4 of *U.P.* and its footnote 33].

Elsewhere, Chomsky comments about his use of the word "terrorism" (*Pirates and Emperors: International Terrorism in the Real World*, Boston: South End, 1991, pp. 9-10):

The term "terrorism" came into use at the end of the eighteenth century, primarily referring to violent acts of governments designed to ensure popular submission. That concept is plainly of little benefit to the practitioners of state terrorism, who, holding power, are in a position to control the system of thought and expression. The original sense has therefore been abandoned, and the term "terrorism" has come to be applied mainly to "retail terrorism" by individuals or groups. Whereas the term was once applied to emperors who molest their own subjects and the world, it is now restricted to thieves who molest the powerful [this reference to "emperors" and "thieves" refers to a story told by Saint Augustine, in which a pirate was asked by Alexander the Great, "How dare you molest the seas?" -- to which the pirate replied:

"How dare you molest the whole world? Because I do it with a little ship only, I am called a thief; you, doing it with a great navy, are called an emperor"].

Extracting ourselves from the system of indoctrination, we will use the term "terrorism" to refer to the threat or the use of violence to intimidate or coerce (generally for political ends), whether it is the wholesale terrorism of the emperor or the retail terrorism of the thief. The pirate's maxim explains the recently-evolved concept of "international terrorism" only in part. It is necessary to add a second feature: an act of terrorism enters the canon only if it is committed by "their side," not ours.

15. For one of the major texts in the propaganda campaign about "Kremlin-directed" terrorism, see Claire Sterling, *The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism*, New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Reader's Digest Press, 1981, especially pp. 1-24, ch. 16, and Epilogue, at pp. 291-293. This book's unifying theme is that all international terrorism has been part of a single, carefully-designed "Soviet enterprise" whose "primary value to the Kremlin lay in [its] resolute efforts to weaken, demoralize, confuse, humiliate, frighten, paralyze, and if possible, dismantle the West's democratic societies." Particularly noteworthy is Sterling's criticism of Western European governments for failing, out of timidity, to acknowledge this "Soviet design" even though their intelligence services "may have had pieces of the puzzle in hand for years."

The *New York Times* and *Washington Post* both published condensed versions and excerpts from the book in their Sunday Magazine sections. See Claire Sterling, "Terrorism: Tracing the International Network," *New York Times*, March 1, 1981, section 6, p. 16 ("There is massive proof that the Soviet Union and its surrogates, over the last decade, have provided the weapons, training and sanctuary for a worldwide terror network aimed at the destabilization of Western democratic society"); Claire Sterling, "The Strange Case of Henri Curiel," *Washington Post*, March 15, 1981, Magazine section, p. 26. For samples of the mainstream reception of Sterling's book, see for example, Daniel Schorr, "Tracing the Thread of Terrorism," *New York Times*, May 17, 1981, section 7, p. 13 (an "important study of terrorism," though flawed); Ronald Taggiasco, "The case for a global conspiracy of terrorism," *Business Week*, April 27, 1981, p. 9 ("although Sterling's evidence is circumstantial, it is overwhelmingly compelling in its logic").

For instant exposure of Sterling's book as a fraud and extensive discussion, see Edward S. Herman, *The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda*, Boston: South End, 1982, ch. 2.

16. Chomsky wrote in the 1981 introduction to *Towards A New Cold War: Essays on the Current Crisis and How We Got There*, New York: Pantheon, 1982 (p. 17):

The Reagan Administration also experimented with another device: "International terrorism," organized by the Soviet Union, is the key problem of the modern world and the mechanism by which the Soviet Union aims at global conquest. . . . [T]he Reagan Administration is seeking to raise the level of international terrorism and to create a mood of crisis at home and abroad, seizing whatever opportunities present themselves. . . . [T]he reasons are not difficult to discern. They are implicit in the domestic policies that constitute the core of the Reagan Administration program: transfer of resources from the poor to the rich by slashing social welfare programs and by regressive tax policies, and a vast increase in the state sector of the

economy in the familiar mode: by subsidizing and providing a guaranteed market for high-technology production, namely, military production

17. For *Newsweek's* reference to the disinformation campaign, see "A Plan to Overthrow Kaddafi," *Newsweek*, August 3, 1981, p. 19. An excerpt:

The details of the plan were sketchy, but it seemed to be a classic C.I.A. destabilization campaign. One element was a "disinformation" program designed to embarrass Kaddafi and his government. Another was the creation of a "counter government" to challenge his claim to national leadership. A third -- potentially the most risky -- was an escalating paramilitary campaign, probably by disaffected Libyan nationals, to blow up bridges, conduct small-scale guerrilla operations and demonstrate that Kaddafi was opposed by an indigenous political force.

On other Reagan administration press manipulations, see footnote 38 of this chapter.

18. For some of the lunatic disinformation stories about Libya -- keeping only to a single journal's coverage -- see for example, Michael Reese, "Uniting Against Libya," *Newsweek*, October 19, 1981, p. 43. An excerpt:

NEWSWEEK has also learned that Kaddafi . . . [is] ordering the assassination of the U.S. ambassador to Italy. . . . U.S. intelligence also picked up evidence that Kaddafi had hatched yet another assassination plot -- this time against President Reagan.

Fay Willey, "Kaddafi's Latest Plot," *Newsweek*, November 9, 1981, p. 29. An excerpt:

U.S. intelligence believes that Libyan strongman Muammar Kaddafi is planning terrorist attacks on four American embassies in Western Europe.

John Brecher, "New Threats From Kaddafi," *Newsweek*, November 30, 1981, p. 51. An excerpt:

[S]enior American officials told NEWSWEEK, Kaddafi's talk appears to be more than bluster. These officials say Kaddafi has expanded his hit list to include Vice President George Bush, Secretary of State Alexander Haig and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger -- and that he has equipped special assassination squads with bazookas, grenade launchers and even portable SAM-7 missiles capable of bringing down the President's plane.

"The Kaddafi Hit Squad At Large?," *Newsweek*, December 14, 1981, p. 36. An excerpt:

[A]n assassination squad dispatched by Libyan strongman Muammar Kaddafi [has] entered the United States.

David M. Alpern, "Coping With a Plot to Kill the President," *Newsweek*, December 21, 1981, p. 16. An excerpt:

Security around [President Reagan] tightened amid intelligence reports that placed his potential assassins either in the country or on its borders preparing to strike.

See also, James Kelly, "Searching for Hit Teams: There was no proof, but there was sufficient reason to believe," *Time*, December 21, 1981, p. 16 (summing up the status of the hitmen story in its title, while nonetheless continuing its publicity); Duncan Campbell and Patrick Forbes, "Tale of Anti-Reagan Hit Team Was 'Fraud'," *New Statesman* (U.K.), August 16, 1985, p. 6 (reporting that a secret official U.S. list of fourteen alleged "Libyan terrorists" was in fact a list of prominent members of the Lebanese Shiite party Amal, including its leader Nabih Berri and the religious leader of the Lebanese Shiite community, with most of the rest being aging Lebanese politicians; to compound the absurdity, the Amal party is passionately anti-Libyan).

On a later Reagan administration claim that Libya was planning to overthrow the government of the Sudan, see for example, Bernard Gwertzman, "Shultz Asserts Libyan Threat Has 'Receded,'" *New York Times*, February 21, 1983, p. A1. An excerpt:

Secretary of State George P. Shultz said today that what the Reagan Administration believed last week was a military threat by Libya against the Sudan had now "receded. . . ." Mr. Shultz, in his television appearance, said, "The President of the United States acted quickly and decisively and effectively, and at least for the moment Qaddafi is back in his box where he belongs." His comments were in line with the White House effort Friday and Saturday to convince reporters privately that Mr. Reagan was actually in charge of the operation, even though at his news conference on Wednesday he made factual errors. . . .

Administration officials have said the Awacs [that attacked Libya] were sent at the explicit request of President Mubarak, but Egyptian officials and news organizations have denied in recent days that any such request was made or that any threat to the Sudan exists. The Libyans have denied any plans to attack the Sudan [across six hundred miles of desert]. The lack of any tangible threat from Libya was reminiscent of the Administration's problems in late 1981 when it aroused considerable agitation in Washington over reports of a Libyan "hit squad" being sent to the United States to try to kill high officials. Nothing happened, and it was unclear whether the publicity forced cancellation of the Libyan plans or whether the Administration's information was faulty in the first place.

For a later exposure of some of the U.S. government's disinformation campaigns, see Jonathan Alter, "A Bodyguard of Lies," *Newsweek*, October 13, 1986, p. 43. An excerpt:

[I]n August national-security adviser John Poindexter sent President Reagan a memo outlining what Poindexter called a "disinformation program" aimed at destabilizing Libyan leader Muammar Kaddafi by generating false reports that the United States and Libya were again on a collision course. . . . Evidence that the disinformation campaign was under way first turned up on Aug. 25 in *The Wall Street Journal*. . . . "We relied on high-level officials who hyped some of this," [*Wall Street Journal* Washington Bureau Chief Albert] Hunt says. . . . [The lies] were profoundly disturbing, even to journalists hardened by a lifetime of covering dissembling officials. Edward P. Haley, *Qaddafi and the United States Since 1969*, New York: Praeger, 1984, pp. 257-264 (bitterly anti-Qaddafi study, summarizing the various stages of the "propaganda campaign designed to discredit the Libyan leader and turn him into an international outlaw"; making a praiseworthy effort to take the comedy seriously).

19. For Reagan's own remarks linking Qaddafi and the contra vote, see for example, Jonathan Fuerbringer, "Contras' Backers Lose A Close Vote On House Debate," *New York Times*, April 16, 1986, p. A1. An excerpt:

Before the House votes today, President Reagan, pressing his case for \$100 million in aid to the rebels [i.e. the contras], said he wanted to remind the House that Libya had sent money, weapons and advisers to the Nicaraguan Government. Addressing a group of business leaders a day after American planes bombed Libyan targets, President Reagan said the Libyan leader, Col. Muamar el-Qaddafi, was helping Nicaragua in an effort to "bring his war home to the United States."

"I would remind the House voting this week that this archterrorist has sent \$400 million and an arsenal of weapons and advisers into Nicaragua," Mr. Reagan said. "He has bragged that he is helping the Nicaraguans because they fight America on its own ground."

"Reagan's Remarks On Raid," *New York Times*, April 16, 1986, p. A20 (transcript of Reagan's speech to the American Business Conference, asserting a link between Qaddafi and Nicaragua).

See also, Edward P. Haley, *Qaddafi and the United States Since 1969*, New York: Praeger, 1984. An excerpt (p. 8):

[The Reagan administration was] exploiting the "Libyan menace" in order to win support for steps it wished to take in pursuit of Secretary [of State Alexander] Haig's "strategic consensus" against the Soviet Union, and as an element in the arrangements necessary for the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force [an intervention force targeted primarily at the Middle East, now the "Central Command"].

Chomsky adds that, in addition to the Reagan administration's seeking to create public hysteria in order to help ram through its policies, Qaddafi also was opposed because, increasingly, he was standing in the way of the U.S. "strategic consensus" in North Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere -- he was supporting (along with the United Nations) Polisario, the indigenous resistance movement to Morocco's illegal annexation of Western Sahara, as well as anti-U.S. elements in the Sudan; forging a union with Morocco; intervening in Chad; and in general being an obstacle to U.S. objectives in the region and interfering with its efforts to impose its will elsewhere.

20. On the legal backdrop of the Gulf of Sidra bombing, including U.S. objections to allowing the World Court to decide the dispute, see for example, R.C. Longworth, "Victory at Sea," *Chicago Tribune*, March 30, 1986, p. C1. An excerpt:

The Navy sailed into battle off Libya last week in defense of a treaty that the United States, almost alone in the world, has refused to sign. . . . The treaty in question is the Law of the Sea Treaty, signed in 1982 by 156 nations but not by the U.S., Britain and West Germany. The treaty establishes what part of the world's oceans are high seas, open to any shipping, and what part belongs to the countries along the coast. . . . It was ostensibly in defense of these provisions that the Navy last week steamed across Libyan strongman Moammar Khadafy's "line of death" and into the Gulf of Sidra. There were those, in Washington and elsewhere, who suspected that President Reagan invited the fracas because he was angered by the House of Representatives' refusal on March 2 to give him \$100 million for the Nicaraguan antigovernment rebels, and that he vented his rage on an easy unpopular target -- Khadafy. To such critics, the legal justification for the Navy's voyage into the gulf was only a figleaf for the presidential snit. The administration denied this and said the President's move amounted to a vital testing of the freedom of the high seas.

. . . .
The facts are these: First, the Law of the Sea Treaty gives every coastal nation sovereignty over the oceans up to 12 miles out from its shore. Ships of other nations may pass through these "territorial waters" under the right of "innocent passage," which means they must move with "dispatch" and pose no threat to the coastal nation. . . . But Alfred Rubin, professor of international law at Tufts University, said the concepts are so vague that, though "Libya is probably wrong, its claim is not absurd. We may be within our legal rights, but we may not be." Rubin's argument with the Reagan mission, however, has another basis. He notes that Libya did not shoot at U.S. ships but at the airplanes launched from them. The ships may have been exercising their right to the high seas, but Libya may have been exercising another well-established right -- the "law of self-defense." That law, as stated by Daniel Webster in 1842, permits action against a threat that is "instant, overwhelming

and leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation." Rubin argues that the appearance of U.S. planes off Libya's coast may have amounted to such a threat, considering the U.S. government's official and open hostility to Libya. At any rate, Rubin argues, the United Nations Charter provides for more peaceful means, the World Court, for settling such disputes as navigation rights, even though this would be "awkward," as one expert put it, for the U.S. after it denied the court's jurisdiction last year in a lawsuit brought by Nicaragua [see the text following this footnote in *U.P.*, and footnotes 43 and 44 of this chapter].

Brian Hoyle, director of the Office of Ocean Law and Policy at the State Department, was openly contemptuous of Rubin's arguments. . . . "I find it inconceivable that Libya could invoke this right [of self-defense]." As to the World Court, Hoyle said any case "would have taken years and years. I don't think we could live with this."

21. For the White House's immediate announcement of a Libyan connection to the disco bombing, see for example, Gerald M. Boyd, "U.S. Sees Methods Of Libya In Attack," *New York Times*, April 6, 1986, p. 1 ("Administration counterterrorism officials said there was 'strong circumstantial evidence' linking Libya to the bombing," and "a 'consensus' within the Administration that the nightclub attack was part of a pattern of activity directed against Americans and American installations in which Colonel Qaddafi has been responsible"); Bernard Gwertzman, "Fear of Flying," *New York Times*, April 6, 1986, section 4, p. 1 (also reporting that "American officials said they suspected there was Libyan involvement in the Berlin attack," without providing any specific evidence). See also footnotes 28 and 30 of this chapter.

22. The A.P. story appeared on the ticker-tape on April 14, 1986. It stated: [T]he Allied military command [in West Berlin] reported no developments in the investigation of the disco bombing. . . . U.S. and West German officials have said Libya -- possibly through its embassy in Communist-ruled East Berlin -- is suspected of involvement in the bombing of the La Belle night-club.

23. For Speakes's assertion, see for example, Gerald M. Boyd, "Genesis of a Decision: How the President Approved Retaliatory Strikes," *New York Times*, April 15, 1986, p. A11 (Speakes told reporters that the President decided to bomb Libya "[w]hen we were able to, in the last several days . . . tie Qaddafi in very directly to the Berlin disco bombing which resulted in the death of an American citizen").

24. In contrast to the enthusiastic reaction of the U.S. press, the bombing aroused extensive protest throughout Europe, including large demonstrations, and evoked editorial condemnation in most of the world. Chomsky summarizes (*Pirates and Emperors: International Terrorism in the Real World*, Boston: South End, 1991, pp. 131-132):

Spain's major newspaper, the independent *El Pais*, condemned the raid, stating: "The military action of the United States is not only an offense against international law and a grave threat to peace in the Mediterranean, but a mockery of its European allies, who did not find motives for economic sanctions against Libya in a meeting Monday, despite being previously and unsuccessfully pressured to adopt sanctions."

The conservative *South China Morning Post* in Hong Kong wrote that "President Reagan's cure for the 'mad dog of the Middle East' may prove more lethal than the

disease," and his action "may also have lit the fuse to a wider conflagration in the Middle East." In Mexico City, *El Universal* wrote that the U.S. "has no right to set itself up as the defender of world freedom," urging recourse to legal means through the United Nations.

25. For the German magazine, see *Der Spiegel* (Germany), April 21, 1986. The edition of the issue sold in the United States had a picture of Qaddafi on the cover, not Reagan.

26. For the West German investigator's statement, see Andrew Cockburn, "Sixty Seconds Over Tripoli," *Playboy*, May 1987, pp. 130f (Manfred Ganschow's exact words: "I have no more evidence that Libya was connected to the bombing than I had when you first called me two days after the act. Which is none").

On Helmut Kohl's alleged statement of support, see James M. Markham, "Libya Raids: Behind Allies' Reactions," *New York Times*, April 25, 1986, p. A6. An excerpt: A senior adviser to the Chancellor [of West Germany] said Mr. Kohl was "furious" when he read that Reagan administration officials had described him as willing to condone military action against Libya in private while publicly opposing such a step. "He said nothing like this," the adviser insisted. . . . [Italian Prime Minister Bettino] Craxi's aides, too, were shocked to hear him described by Washington officials as having privately endorsed the American raid.

27. For later stories about other suspects in the disco bombing, see for example, Robert J. McCartney, "Clues Hint Syrian Link In '86 Berlin Bombing," *Washington Post*, January 11, 1988, p. A13. An excerpt:

New clues have surfaced suggesting that the 1986 bombing of a West Berlin discotheque may have been ordered by a convicted Arab terrorist who has been linked by a court to Syrian officials in another bombing case, a West Berlin court spokesman said today. . . .

[A] U.S. official familiar with the case acknowledged that the revelations "may raise some questions about who was sponsoring what." The U.S. government has not altered its judgment that Libya was "involved" in the La Belle bombing, said the official, who spoke on condition that he not be identified. "We're still sticking to our original notion that the Libyans were involved in this thing, regardless of who else this woman may be tied in with," the U.S. official said. "It's not unusual for people involved in terrorism to have contacts with different countries," he said. President Reagan, in announcing the bombing raid on Libya, said the United States had "conclusive" evidence that the bombing was on "direct order by the Libyan regime."

James M. Markham, "Suspect Reportedly Asserts Syria Directed Bombing At A Berlin Club," *New York Times*, May 7, 1986, p. A1 (suggesting "possible Syrian involvement in the attack"); Roberto Suro, "New Data Linked to Terror Plots," *New York Times*, July 3, 1986, p. B11 (reporting the arrest of a Jordanian student in connection with the bombing). See also footnote 29 of this chapter.

28. The B.B.C.'s investigation, "Twelve Minutes Over Tripoli," aired on B.B.C.-1 T.V. on April 3, 1987. For a summary of some of its findings, see Bill Schaap, "The Endless Campaign: Disinforming the World on Libya," *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, No. 30, Summer 1988, pp. 70-71. An excerpt:

Not only was there no evidence of Libyan involvement, there was considerable evidence to the contrary. Every Western European government except Mrs. Thatcher's -- which would support President Reagan if he said the sun rose in the west -- expressed skepticism, as did the West Berlin police authorities in charge of the investigation.

In fact, U.S. Ambassador Burt, Secretary of State Shultz, and Secretary of Defense Weinberger all lied to bolster the story that the U.S. had clear proof of Libyan involvement. They said that the U.S. evidence -- intercepts of coded messages between Libyan People's Bureaus -- was so compelling that prior to the bombing U.S. military police in West Berlin had been put on the alert and had been clearing bars of customers that evening. Weinberger went so far as to say that the M.P.s were just fifteen minutes late to save the people at the LaBelle discotheque. In fact, this was a complete fabrication. As the Deputy Chief of West Berlin's military police told Bower, there was no alert, no one was going around clearing bars, and it would not have made any sense in the first place, since the intercepts made no mention of specific targets.

29. Fifteen years after the Berlin disco bombing, a German judge convicted four people, including a Libyan embassy worker and diplomat, of the crime and imposed 12 to 14 year sentences. The judge concluded that Qaddafi's personal responsibility was not proven, but that "Libya bears at least a very considerable part of the responsibility for the attack." The judge also criticized the U.S. and German governments for continuing unwillingness to disclose their "intelligence" about the incident. See for example, Steven Erlanger, "4 Guilty in Fatal 1986 Berlin Disco Bombing Linked to Libya," *New York Times*, November 14, 2001, p. A7.

Chomsky remarks about the relationship of this verdict to his comments in the text regarding the lack of proffered evidence of a Libyan connection at the time, and the media's treatment of the U.S. bombings: "As a matter of logic, the only relevant question is what was known at the time -- what might be discovered years later has nothing to do with the justification for the bombing of Libya or the disgraceful way the media handled the information that was known to them. Suppose, for example, that it is discovered twenty years from now that on Sept. 12, 2001, the U.S. was planning to drop nuclear weapons on Iraq, and the Sept. 11th attack aborted that effort. Would that vindicate bin Laden?"

Notably, the Reagan administration's assertion at the time it was bombing Tripoli and Benghazi that Qaddafi was "very directly" implicated in the disco bombing -- which is quoted in footnote 23 of this chapter -- was deemed insufficiently proven by the German judge. See for example, "No proof Gadhafi tied to blast: Four convicted in '86 Bombing of Berlin Disco," *Seattle Times*, November 14, 2001, p.A17.

30. For the story of the bombing alert, see for example, Bob Woodward, "Intelligence 'Coup' Tied Libya to Blast," *Washington Post*, April 22, 1986, p. A1. An excerpt:

As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization commander, Gen. Bernard W. Rogers, said in a speech in Atlanta on April 9, the [intercepted] intelligence provided "indisputable evidence" of Libyan responsibility and the United States was almost able to warn G.I.s to vacate the La Belle disco minutes before the explosion. "We were about 15 minutes too late," Rogers said.

See also footnote 28 of this chapter.

31. For Markham's selectively quoting the West German investigator, see for example, James M. Markham, "West Germans Question Suspect In Disco Bombing," *New York Times*, April 23, 1986, p. A6 (the only reference to Ganschow: "In a telephone interview, Manfred Ganschow, the head of a special commission investigating the discotheque explosion, confirmed that patrons who had been in the club on April 5 had been shown [a Jordanian not suspected of being the main perpetrator] in a police lineup with other Arabs. Mr. Ganschow declined to say what the results of the lineup had been"); James M. Markham, "Suspect Reportedly Asserts Syria Directed Bombing At A Berlin Club," *New York Times*, May 7, 1986, p. A1 (quoting Ganschow, but not his skepticism about the Reagan administration's claims or his statements about the lack of any evidence of Libyan involvement in the bombing); James M. Markham, "On the Trail of Arab Terror: Footprints In Berlin," *New York Times*, May 31, 1986, p. 2 (same).

32. For the account of the British engineers, see David Blundy, "Britons worked on Gaddafi's missiles," *Sunday Times* (London), April 6, 1986, p. 12. An excerpt:

[One of the engineers] said that he was watching the radar screens during the two days of fighting. He saw American warplanes cross not only into the 12 miles of Libyan territorial waters, but over Libyan land as well. "I watched the planes fly approximately eight miles into Libyan air space," he said. "I don't think the Libyans had any choice but to hit back. In my opinion they were reluctant to do so."

The engineer said the American warplanes made their approach using a normal civil airline traffic route and followed in the wake of a Libyan airliner, so that its radar blip would mask them on the Libyan radar screen.

See also, David Blundy with Andrew Lycett, *Quaddafi and the Libyan Revolution*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1987, pp. 7-8.

33. For Reagan's speech, see footnote 19 of this chapter.

34. For Andrew Cockburn's study of the Libya bombing, see Andrew Cockburn, "Sixty Seconds Over Tripoli," *Playboy*, May 1987, pp. 130f.

35. On the Grenada Medals of Honor, see for example, "Overdecorated," *Time*, April 9, 1984, p. 27. An excerpt:

For last year's invasion of Grenada, by any measure a quick and efficient operation, the U.S. Army last week disclosed it had awarded 8,612 medals. What made the back-patting noteworthy was that no more than about 7,000 officers and enlisted men ever set foot on the tiny Caribbean island.

"Medals Outnumber G.I.'s In Grenada Assault," *New York Times*, March 30, 1984, p. A1; Brad Knickerbocker, "Study criticizes invasion tactics in Grenada," *Christian Science Monitor*, April 6, 1984, p. 1 (the awards "included achievement medals to about 50 people based at the Pentagon").

36. On the official report about the Grenada invasion, see for example, Rick Atkinson, "Study Faults U.S. Military Tactics in Grenada Invasion," *Washington Post*, April 6, 1984, p. A3. An excerpt:

The invasion of Grenada last October was not the classic operation the Pentagon has implied but a poorly planned venture that raises "disturbing" questions about U.S.

military tactics and performance, a study released yesterday . . . concludes. An initial invasion plan developed by the Navy's Atlantic Fleet headquarters was "overruled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who demanded that all four services be involved -- just as in the Iran rescue mission" in 1980, according to the analysis prepared by William S. Lind. . . . [T]he resulting "pie-dividing contest" allowed the relatively small number of Cuban defenders on the island "to form and maintain a fairly effective defense. . . ."

[The study found that] the elite military units in the invasion, including Navy SEAL commandos and a Delta Force anti-terrorist squad, "failed in much of what they attempted." For example, the SEALs failed to knock Radio Grenada off the air because they "attacked the wrong building" after finding the station compound. Several SEALs drowned because of "poor weather forecasting. . . ." Of "approximately 100 U.S. helicopters used on Grenada, nine were destroyed and a number of others were damaged" although the Cubans lacked anti-aircraft missiles.

See also, Mark Hertsgaard, *On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency*, New York: Schocken Books, 1989, ch. 10 (discussing media coverage of the Grenada invasion); James Ferguson, *Grenada: Revolution in Reverse*, London: Latin America Bureau, 1990; Hugh O'Shaughnessy, *Grenada: An Eyewitness Account of the U.S. Invasion and the Caribbean History That Provoked It*, New York: Dodd, Mead, 1984.

37. On the performance of much of the most expensive weaponry, see for example, Tim Weiner, "The \$2 Billion Stealth Bomber Can't Go Out in the Rain," *New York Times*, August 23, 1997, p. A5. An excerpt:

Two years ago, the problem with the Air Force's B-2 Stealth bombers, which cost \$2 billion apiece, was that their radar could not tell a rain cloud from a mountainside. Now the problem is that the B-2 cannot go out in the rain. The investigative arm of Congress reported this week that the B-2, the world's most expensive aircraft, deteriorates in rain, heat and humidity. It "must be sheltered or exposed only to the most benign environments -- low humidity, no precipitation, moderate temperatures. . . ."

The Air Force issued a statement today saying that, for now, it will cancel plans to station the bombers overseas. . . . The Northrop Grumman Corporation is building 21 of the planes at a cost of \$44.7 billion. . . . The report by the General Accounting Office said . . . [i]t is unlikely that the problem "will ever be fully resolved. . . ." [T]he B-2 bombers were able to perform their missions only 26 percent of the time.

Alexander Cockburn and Ken Silverstein, *Washington Babylon*, London: Verso, 1996. An excerpt (pp. 176-178):

The \$500 million Aegis high-tech radar system . . . was designed to track and shoot down up to 200 incoming missiles at once. The Navy "tested" the Aegis in a meadow near Exit 4 of the New Jersey Turnpike, where it was charged with the difficult task of monitoring civilian air traffic over New York-area airports. In another set of tests, the Aegis performed brilliantly, shooting down 10 of 11 drones. It turned out that the system's operators were informed in advance of the path and speed of incoming targets. In 1988, its first time in combat after being installed on the U.S.S. Vincennes, the Aegis successfully bagged an Iranian Airbus with 290 civilians on board. Human and mechanical error led the crew to mistake the Airbus (length: 175 feet) for an F-14 (length: 62 feet), miscalculate its altitude by 4,000 feet and report that the civilian aircraft was descending in attack position when the plane was actually climbing. . . .

The Maverick air-to-surface missile, used with less than 50 percent accuracy during the Gulf War, has heat-seeking infrared sensors which "lock on" target. Unfortunately, the sensors are easily distracted. In one test during which the Maverick was supposed to be homing in on a tank, operators discovered that the missile had locked on a distant campfire where two soldiers were cooking beans.

One of the most outrageous pieces of pork in the Pentagon's budget is the C-17 transport plane, staunchly backed by the Clintonites. . . . The plane's purpose is to rush men and materials to distant wars. The Pentagon initially planned to buy 210 C-17s for \$32 billion (\$152 million apiece), but in 1990 cut the order to 120 planes for \$36 billion (\$333 million apiece). In late 1993, the Pentagon announced a further reduction of the program to 40 planes. No cost was given but the price tag is likely to hit \$28 billion, or \$700 million apiece. The original justification for the aircraft -- confronting the Red Menace -- has vanished. But the Pentagon still insists that the C-17 is a "must buy." A 1993 Congressional Research Service report detailed a few of the problems surrounding this wondrous boondoggle.

Officials described the C-17's wings as having "buckled" during an October 1992 "stress" test. A congressional staffer familiar with the program says "the wings didn't buckle, they were destroyed. They ripped like pieces of paper." After McDonnell Douglas spent approximately \$100 million on a major redesign -- an expense most likely passed on to the Pentagon -- a second test was conducted in July of 1993, only to be quickly halted when the wings began to splinter. In a third test conducted two months later, the C-17's left wing cracked in two places. Heartened because the right wing was undamaged, the Pentagon declared this test a rousing success and said no further experiments would be required. The C-17 also has a mysterious center-of-gravity problem, which makes take-off extremely dangerous unless the plane is fully loaded. When the aircraft is empty, Air Force crews keep two 7,950 pound cement blocks -- known as the "pet rocks" -- in the craft's forward area to ensure safe take-off. This means that the C-17 will either fly into action pre-loaded with nearly eight tons of cement or advance troops will be forced to tote along two "pet rocks" to load onto the plane after removing its cargo. Alas, the C-17 is incapable of carrying out its assigned task of forward resupply. The enormous aircraft needs at least 4,000 feet of runway to land, 1,000 more than the Air Force claims. The C-17 cannot come down on a dirt airstrip because its jet engines will "ingest" earth. A used Boeing 747 -- which can be bought and modified for less than \$100 million -- can carry three times as much cargo twice as far as the C-17.

See also, Mark Zepezauer and Arthur Naiman, *Take The Rich Off Welfare*, Tucson: Odonian, 1996, pp. 13-35. And see footnote 45 of chapter 5 of *U.P.*

38. For Reagan's comment, see for example, Francis X. Clines, "Military of U.S. 'Standing Tall,' Reagan Asserts," *New York Times*, December 13, 1983, p. A1.

For more on the masterful way that the Reagan administration used photo-opportunity sessions to manipulate the press, see Thomas Whiteside, "Standups," *New Yorker*, December 2, 1985, pp. 81f; Alexander Cockburn, "Viewpoint: Is Press Awakening to Reagan's Deceptions?," *Wall Street Journal*, November 13, 1986, p. 33; Mark Hertsgaard, *On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency*, New York: Schocken, 1988.

39. On the U.S. lead in U.N. Security Council vetoes since the 1970s, see for example, Anjali V. Patil, *The U.N. Veto in World Affairs, 1946-1990: A Complete Record*

and Case Histories of the Security Council's Veto, Sarasota, FL: Unifo, 1992, pp. 471-486. From 1946 to 1972, the U.S.S.R. used 116 vetoes, Britain 11, China 5, France 4, and the U.S. 2. From 1973 to 1990, the U.S. used 80 vetoes, Britain 22, China 17, France 14, and the U.S.S.R./Russia 8.

See also, Robert C. Johansen, "The Reagan Administration and the U.N.: The Costs of Unilateralism," *World Policy Journal*, Fall 1986, pp. 601-641 at p. 605 (from 1980 to 1986, the U.S. used 27 Security Council vetoes and the Soviet Union 4; from 1966 to 1980, the U.S. used 22 vetoes and the Soviet Union 10); Noam Chomsky, "The Rule of Force in International Affairs," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 80, No. 7, June 1971, pp. 1456-1491 (revised and reprinted as ch. 3 of Chomsky's *For Reasons of State*, New York: Pantheon, 1973); Noam Chomsky, "The United States and the challenge of relativity," in Tony Evans, ed., *Human rights fifty years on: A reappraisal*, Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 1998, pp. 24-56. And see footnotes 43, 44 and 46 of this chapter; and chapter 4 of *U.P.* and its footnote 48.

40. For "diaperology," see for example, Margaret Mead, "What Makes The Soviet Character?," *Natural History*, September 1951, pp. 296f. An excerpt:

The Russian baby was swaddled, as were most of the infants of Eastern peoples and as Western European infants used to be, but they were swaddled tighter and longer than were, for example, their neighbors, the Poles. . . . This early period seems to have left a stronger impression on Russian character than the same period of learning does for members of many other societies in which the parents are more preoccupied with teaching skills appropriate to later stages of development. . . . So we find in traditional Russian character elaborated forms of these very early learnings. There is a tendency to confuse thought and action, a capacity for impersonal anger as at the constriction of the swaddling bands. . . . We may expect everything we do to look different to them from the way it looks to us. . . . In communicating with people who think as differently as this, successful plans either for limited co-operation in the attainment of partial world goals or for active opposition depend upon our getting an accurate estimate of what the Soviet people of today are like. We must know just what the differences in their thinking and feeling are.

41. On U.S. vetoes at the U.N. from the 1970s, see footnote 39 of this chapter.

42. For the article on the U.N., see Richard Bernstein, "The U.N. Versus the U.S.," *New York Times Magazine*, January 22, 1984, p. 18. An excerpt:

The question is not why American policy has diverged from that of other member states, but why the world's most powerful democracy has failed to win support for its views among the participants in United Nations debates. The answer seems to lie in two underlying factors. The first and dominant one is the very structure and political culture that have evolved at the world body, tending in the process to isolate the United States and to portray it as a kind of ideological villain. The other fact is American failure to play the game of multilateral diplomacy with sufficient skill.

43. On Congress's response immediately after the World Court's decision, see for example, Linda Greenhouse, "Trump Cards; Reagan And The Contras Win A Round In The House," *New York Times*, June 29, 1986, section 4, p. 1.

For the World Court's decision, see International Court of Justice, *Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders: 1986*, "Case Concerning Military and

Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua" (*Nicaragua v. United States of America*), Judgment of June 27, 1986. The Court's conclusions are in paragraph 292, with the references to illegal economic warfare in subparagraphs 10 and 11. An excerpt (paragraphs 251, 252, 158-160):

[T]he assistance to the *contras*, as well as the direct attacks on Nicaraguan ports, oil installations, etc . . . not only amount to an unlawful use of force, but also constitute infringements of the territorial sovereignty of Nicaragua, and incursions into its territorial and internal waters. . . . These violations cannot be justified either by collective self-defence [the U.S. claim] . . . nor by any right of the United States to take counter-measures involving the use of force in the event of intervention by Nicaragua in El Salvador, since no such right exists under the applicable international law. They cannot be justified by the activities in El Salvador attributed to the Government of Nicaragua [i.e. an alleged arms flow to the Salvadoran guerrillas] . . . [of which] the evidence is insufficient to satisfy the Court.

44. For U.S. commentary on the World Court's decision, see for example, Thomas Franck [New York University international law specialist], "A Way to Rejoin the World Court," *New York Times*, July 17, 1986, p. A23 (agreeing that the United States should not accept the Court's jurisdiction in such matters, because we must maintain "the freedom to protect freedom"; apparently in denial that a Central America solidarity movement existed in the U.S., Professor Franck's article begins by asserting: "no American will rejoice that the United States has just lost a major lawsuit brought against it by Nicaragua"); Jonathan Karp, "Administration Dismisses Ruling: State Dept. Says World Court Is 'Not Equipped' For Complex Cases," *Washington Post*, June 28, 1986, p. A14; Editorial, "America's Guilt -- or Default," *New York Times*, July 1, 1986, p. A22 (calling the World Court "a hostile forum," the editors falsely claim that "even the majority [of the World Court] acknowledged that prior attacks against El Salvador from Nicaragua made 'collective defense' a possible justification for America's retaliation"). Two weeks later, the *Times* published the Nicaraguan Ambassador's letter responding to this editorial (Carlos Tunnermann Bernheim, "World Court's Definitive Ruling Against the U.S.," Letter, *New York Times*, July 17, 1986, p. A22):

You say "the majority acknowledged that prior attacks against El Salvador from Nicaragua made 'collective defense' a possible justification for America's retaliation." This is untrue. The Court's 142-page opinion, supported by 12 of the 15 judges, totally rejects "collective defense" as a justification for U.S. actions against Nicaragua. The Court found that there were no attacks by Nicaragua against El Salvador. With respect to U.S. allegations that Nicaragua sends arms to Salvadoran rebels, the Court found that "the evidence is insufficient to satisfy the Court that the Government of Nicaragua was responsible for any flow of arms." Thus, the Court determined that the factual underpinning of the "collective defense" argument was nonexistent. Moreover, it ruled that even if Nicaragua had supplied some arms to the rebels, under international law this would not constitute an "attack" against El Salvador and would not justify U.S. support of the *contras* or any other form of "collective defense. . . ."

[T]he Court's "hostility" is not directed at the U.S. but at actions by any state that flagrantly violates the most fundamental principles of international law -- such as U.S. support for the *contras*.

See also, Abraham Sofaer [State Department Legal Adviser], "The United States and the World Court," Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

December 4, 1985, *Current Policy*, U.S. Department of State: Bureau of Public Affairs, No. 769, December 1985 (explaining that when the U.S. originally accepted the jurisdiction of a World Court, most members of the U.N. "were aligned with the United States and shared its views regarding world order" -- but now, "A great many of these [countries] cannot be counted on to share our view of the original constitutional conception of the U.N. Charter, particularly with regard to the special position of the Permanent Members of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security. This same majority often opposes the United States on important international questions." Therefore, the author advises that we "reserve to ourselves the power to determine whether the Court has jurisdiction over us in a particular case").

45. On the unreported U.N. resolutions concerning the World Court decision, see for example, Andrew Katell, "U.N. Adopts Resolution Calling For End To U.S. Aid To Contras," November 12, 1987 (Westlaw database # 1987 WL 3190359). An excerpt from this article, which was on the news-wire but not reported by the U.S. press:

For the second year in a row, the General Assembly on Thursday approved a resolution calling on the United States to stop helping the Nicaraguan rebels. . . . The 159-member world body passed a similar resolution Nov. 3, 1986. The measure was adopted 94-2, with 48 abstentions. . . . Last year's tally was 94-3 in favor, with 47 abstentions.

The 1986 General Assembly vote received no mention in the *New York Times* -- the same day, its U.N. correspondent preferred to report on overly high salaries at the U.N. The 1986 Security Council veto merited only a brief note. See Stephen Engelberg, "Justice Department Opens Contra Study," *New York Times*, October 29, 1986, p. A3 ("The United States tonight vetoed a Security Council resolution that called for compliance with a World Court ruling banning United States aid to rebels fighting Nicaragua's Government"). The 1987 General Assembly vote was not reported by the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, or the three national television networks. See Fairness and Accuracy In Reporting, "Cold War Bias at the U.N. Beat," *Extra!*, December 1987, p. 10 (analyzing the media treatment). The August 1988 World Court announcement that the United States had failed to meet the court's deadline for determining war reparations to Nicaragua also passed virtually without notice. See A.P., "World Court Declares U.S. Misses Deadline," *Washington Post*, August 4, 1988, p. A24 (five-sentence item on the World Court's announcement).

46. On the United States's unpaid U.N. dues, see for example, John M. Goshko, "U.N. Reform Pits U.S. and Third World," *Washington Post*, March 10, 1997, p. A1. An excerpt:

A majority of Congress believes the United Nations spends too much of American taxpayers' money on programs that don't work or are not in the U.S. interest. The lawmakers have told new Secretary General Kofi Annan that he must carry out drastic cost-cutting, perhaps by eliminating as much as one-fourth of his staff, or they will not approve paying the dues the United States owes that the United Nations needs to save it from bankruptcy. . . .

Annan was told that a lot of back-seat driving by Congress would be the price if Congress is to approve paying the back dues and assessments that the United States has owed to the United Nations for years. U.N. officials estimate the amount at \$1.3 billion, but Congress says that by its reckoning the figure is closer to \$800

million. . . . Annan . . . reaffirmed his view that the United States is obligated by treaty to continue paying its U.N. obligations at existing rates. In this, Annan has the support of all other U.N. members, including Western European nations that Washington normally counts as allies.

See also, Paul Lewis, "Soviet, In Switch, Says It Is Paying U.N. All It Owes," *New York Times*, October 16, 1987, p. A1. An excerpt:

The Soviet Union announced today that it was paying all its outstanding debts to the financially troubled United Nations, including \$197 million for peacekeeping operations it has long refused to support. . . . The United States remains the United Nations' largest single debtor. . . . Herbert S. Okun, the American deputy permanent representative at the United Nations, called the [Soviets'] decision "long overdue. . . ."

The United States has . . . refused to pay all the dues assessed by the United Nations in recent years. . . . The United States even backed a request to the World Court at The Hague for a ruling on whether the Soviet Union should pay its share. The Court ruled that all members must pay, but Moscow still refused to do so. . . . [T]he failure of the United States to pay its assessed share of the United Nations budget . . . is the main cause of the organization's serious financial difficulties.

Unreported is the fact that according to the U.S. mission at the United Nations, the U.N. operation "funnels \$400 million to \$700 million per year into the U.S. and New York economies." See A.P., February 28, 1988 (unpublished news-wire report).

47. On the propaganda campaign against U.N.E.S.C.O., see for example, William Preston, Edward S. Herman, and Herbert I. Schiller, *Hope and Folly: The United States and U.N.E.S.C.O., 1945-1985*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989.

48. For selective reporting of the U.N. condemnations, see Paul Lewis, "General Assembly Handed Setbacks to U.S. and Soviet: Washington Lost on Budget, Moscow on Afghanistan in Session Just Ended," *New York Times*, December 26, 1987, section 1, p. 1 (reviewing the General Assembly session and reporting the vote denouncing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but mentioning nothing about the 94-to-2 vote on the World Court's decision condemning the U.S. contra war in Nicaragua -- in which the majority even included such U.S. allies as Australia, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Spain, as well as major Latin American countries including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, along with Sweden, Finland, and others); Paul Lewis, "U.N. Urges Soviet to Pull Forces From Afghanistan," *New York Times*, November 11, 1987, p. A12 ("The General Assembly voted overwhelmingly today for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, brushing aside Moscow's first concerted attempt to deflect such criticism by the United Nations"). On the following day's unreported General Assembly vote calling upon the United States to comply with international law, see footnote 45 of this chapter.

49. For a news-wire article on the General Assembly disarmament resolutions, see A.P., "General Assembly Opposes Star Wars, Calls For End To Nuclear Testing," November 30, 1987 (Westlaw database # 1987 WL 3193928). An excerpt:

The General Assembly voted overwhelmingly Monday to oppose an arms race in outer space and the United States cast the single dissenting ballot. . . . The vote was 154 to 1, with no abstentions. It was one of a series of more than 25 votes on arms

issues. In 14 cases, the United States opposed the resolutions, while the Soviet Union endorsed them. . . .

The United States was in a minority on other votes. It cast the single "no" vote on a resolution against developing new kinds of weapons of mass destruction. The vote was 135 to 1, with 18 abstentions. The assembly overwhelmingly called for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty by a vote of 143 to 2 with eight abstentions. The United States was joined by France, another nuclear power. The world body also urged a halt to all nuclear test explosions, by a vote of 137 to 3, with 14 abstentions. France and Britain, which has nuclear weapons, joined the American side. The General Assembly also voted for a freeze on nuclear weapons and for a prohibition on development and use of radiological weapons.

Note that this story was on the news-wire, but apparently was reported by only one major newspaper in the United States -- see A.P. "U.N. Condemns Space Arms Race," *San Francisco Chronicle*, December 1, 1987, p. A21.

These U.N. votes are discussed in Noam Chomsky, *Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies*, Boston: South End, 1989, pp. 83f; and Noam Chomsky, *Deterring Democracy*, New York: Hill and Wang, 1991 (expanded edition 1992), pp. 96-97.

50. For the *New York Times's* 1987 summary article on the U.N., see Paul Lewis, "General Assembly Handed Setbacks to U.S. and Soviet: Washington Lost on Budget, Moscow on Afghanistan in Session Just Ended," *New York Times*, December 26, 1987, section 1, p. 1 (note that this article is described in footnote 48 of this chapter).

51. On early opposition to public education in the United States, see chapter 7 of *U.P.* and its footnote 31.

52. On the devastation inflicted during the Indochina wars, see for example, Paul Quinn-Judge, "The confusion and mystery surrounding Vietnam's war dead," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 11, 1984, pp. 48-49 (reporting that from 1965, deaths in Vietnam alone -- not in all of Indochina, as Chomsky is discussing in the text -- may have exceeded three million people); Jean Lacouture and Simonne Lacouture, *Vietnam: voyage à travers une victoire*, Paris: Seuil, 1976 (graphic eyewitness description of the extent and character of the damage to property and persons throughout Vietnam, estimating that in South Vietnam alone 8 million people were displaced from their homes by the war); John Pilger, "Vietnam: Do not weep for those just born; John Pilger revisits the country whose war he reported for ten years," *New Statesman* (U.K.), September 15, 1978, pp. 324f. An excerpt:

Much of North Vietnam is a moonscape from which visible signs of life -- houses, factories, schools, hospitals, pagodas, churches -- have been obliterated. In some forests there are no longer birds and animals; and there are lorry drivers who will not respond to the hooting of a horn because they are deaf from the incessant sound of bombs; according to the Vice Minister of health, more than 30,000 children in Hanoi and Haiphong suffered permanent deafness during the twelve nights of bombing at Christmas 1972.

In Hanoi's Bach Mai Hospital, doctors have discovered that Napalm "B," an amalgam of benzene, polystyrene and gasoline, which the Dow Chemical Company created especially for Vietnam, continues to smolder under the skin's tissues through the lifetime of its victims. . . .

A place called Ham Long ought to be as famous as Dresden [site of the climax of Allied aerial bombing of Germany in World War II], because it was bombed more than Dresden: every day for four years, from five in the morning till two in the afternoon. . . . [I]n Vinh, a large mining community, the layer upon layer of bombing penetrated underground and today not even the foundations of buildings remain. . . . People here, living under straw, are today on the edge of famine; a Cuban agronomist I met told me that . . . people in devastated areas, such as Vinh, were being rationed to just six pounds of rice per *month*. "That is considerably less than Bangladesh," he reminded me.

John Pilger, "From Vietnam to El Salvador," *New Statesman* (U.K.), May 22, 1981, pp. 6f. An excerpt (p. 18):

In Cu Chi, near Saigon, which I remember as thick forest, there is today a shimmering horizon of wilderness which has been poisoned, perhaps for generations. Eleven million gallons of the herbicide Agent Orange were dumped on Vietnam; its chief ingredient, dioxin, is estimated to be a thousand times more destructive than thalidomide. Blind and deformed babies are now common in those areas sprayed during Operation Hades, later re-named Operation Ranch Hand.

Amnon Kapeliouk, "Thousands of Vietnamese still die from the effects of American chemical warfare," *Yediot Ahronot* (Israel), April 7, 1988 (describing the "terrifying" scene in hospitals in South Vietnam of children dying of cancer and hideous birth deformities caused by U.S. chemical warfare, and the "hair-raising stories that remind me of what we heard during the trials of Eichmann and Demjanjuk," told to the author on his visit to post-war Vietnam by victims who, remarkably, "express no hatred against the American people")(quotations are Chomsky's own translation); Arthur Westing, "Crop destruction as a means of war," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, February 1981, pp. 38-42 (on the devastating impact of U.S. crop-destruction programs from 1961, including aerial destruction using chemicals; ground operations to destroy orchards and dikes; and land-clearing by giant tractors called "Rome plows," which "obliterated" agricultural lands and entire rural residential areas and farming hamlets, often including extensive systems of paddy dikes, leaving the soil "bare, gray and lifeless"; the author likens the result of these operations to the "less efficient" destruction of Carthage by the ancient Romans in the Punic Wars); J.B. Neiland et al., *Harvest of Death: Chemical Warfare In Vietnam and Cambodia*, New York: Free Press, 1972 (study by four science professors and a doctor of the effects and the use by the United States of gas warfare and herbicides in Vietnam and Cambodia); Charles Mohr, "Studies Show Vietnam Raids Failed," *New York Times*, May 28, 1984, p. A6. Although the overwhelming majority of the casualties in the Vietnam War were in the South, this article reports C.I.A. casualty estimates only for North Vietnam (note the article's title):

C.I.A. reports, now declassified . . . essentially confirmed the North Vietnamese figures [estimating civilian and non-civilian casualties]. [A 1967 C.I.A. report] said the monthly air casualty rate in the North -- "heavily weighted with civilians" -- had gone from 2,200 a month in 1966 to 2,800 a month in early 1967 [i.e. well more than 33,000 by 1967].

Edward S. Herman, *Atrocities in Vietnam: Myths and Realities*, Boston: Pilgrim, 1970, pp. 44-45, 86 (careful early analysis of casualty figures, estimating that in South Vietnam alone civilian casualties by 1970 were more than 1 million dead and more than 2 million wounded, and noting that by 1968 the total number of refugees "generated" mainly by the American scorched-earth policy was estimated by the Kennedy Committee of the 90th Congress at almost 4 million people; the horrors described throughout this study

are nearly unbearable). See also chapter 1 of *U.P.* and its footnote 79; footnotes 61 and 62 of this chapter; and chapter 7 of *U.P.* and its footnote 57.

Chomsky remarks (*After the Cataclysm: Postwar Indochina and the Reconstruction of Imperial Ideology -- The Political Economy of Human Rights: Volume II*, Boston: South End, 1979, p. 83):

On the rare occasions when the devastating consequences of the [Vietnam] war are noted [in the West], care is taken to sanitize the reports so as to eliminate the U.S. role. The *New York Times*, for example, carried an A.P. report from Manila on a World Health Organization study, describing South Vietnam as "a land of widespread malaria, bubonic plague, leprosy, tuberculosis, venereal disease and 300,000 prostitutes . . . one of the few places on earth where leprosy was spreading and bubonic plague was still taking lives." The W.H.O. report states that "if the bomb-shattered fields are to be made fertile again, and the socio-economic conditions of the people improved, freedom from malaria will have to be first insured," while in the North the main health problem is to reconstruct the 533 community health centers, 94 district hospitals, 28 provincial hospitals and 24 research institutes and specialized hospitals that "were destroyed during the war" -- by some unknown hand.

The sole mention of the United States in this grisly report is the statement that the United States has been invited to a meeting "to consider helping the two countries" -- the "two countries" being North and South Vietnam; while the *Times* recognized the integration of East Timor into Indonesia in 1976 [on East Timor, see chapter 8 of *U.P.*], it had not yet recognized the unification of the "two countries" of Vietnam [see A.P., "South Vietnam, After 30 Years of War, Is Land of Widespread Disease, U.N. Group Says," *New York Times*, March 21, 1976, p. A13].

53. For Chomsky's view in 1970 of the prospects for Vietnam, see Noam Chomsky, *At War With Asia: Essays on Indochina*, New York: Pantheon, 1970. Chomsky warned (p. 286):

I left Southeast Asia, after this brief stay, with two overriding general impressions. The first was of the resilience and strength of Vietnamese society. It is conceivable that the United States may be able to break the will of the popular movements in the surrounding countries, perhaps even destroy the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, by employing the vast resources of violence and terror at its command. If so, it will create a situation in which, indeed, North Vietnam will necessarily dominate Indochina, for no other viable society will remain.

54. For the phrase "bleeding Vietnam" as a description of U.S. post-Vietnam War policies, see for example, Derek Davies, "Caught in history's vice" (Cover title: "Bleeding Vietnam White"), *Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 25, 1981, p. 17 (article criticizing the "bleed Vietnam" policy in that it is damaging U.S. and Asian interests and "is immensely helpful to the Soviet Union").

55. On U.S. support for Pol Pot as a way to "bleed Vietnam," see for example, Ben Kiernan, "Deferring Peace in Cambodia: Regional Rapprochement, Superpower Obstruction," in George W. Breslauer, Harry Kreisler and Benjamin Ward, eds., *Beyond The Cold War: Conflict and Cooperation In the Third World*, Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1991, pp. 59-82. An excerpt (pp. 67-70):

[Through 1990, the] three major planks of American policy towards Cambodia remained unchanged. The U.S. veto of aid, including U.N., World Bank, and

International Monetary Fund aid to Cambodia, U.S. support for a Khmer Rouge role, and U.S. military support of the Khmer Rouge's allies (\$17-32 million per annum), all continued. . . . Despite obvious difficulty in justifying it, the West has maintained an embargo on Cambodia (renewed by Washington in September 1990 for its twelfth year), yet still supports Pol Pot's allies and opposes Pol Pot's Cambodian opponents, and continues to offer the Pol Pot forces a veto over any proposed settlement. For over a decade, official Western support for Deng Xiaoping's China has spilled over into Western support for his protégé Pol Pot. . . . Washington also pressured U.N. agencies to supply the Khmer Rouge. . . . Congressional sources have also cited a figure of \$85 million for U.S. aid to Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge since 1979. . . .

In the diplomatic arena, the United States led most of the Western world to line up behind China in support of the Khmer Rouge. Both the Carter and Reagan Administrations voted for Pol Pot's representative to occupy Cambodia's seat in the United Nations. . . . [T]he Bush administration has threatened to punish Thailand for its defection from the aggressive U.S.-Chinese position. . . ." Washington has sought not a mere independent Cambodian government, but an *anti-Vietnamese* one. According to the *Far Eastern Economic Review* of 7 September 1989, "Thai officials believe that, despite its publicly expressed revulsion towards the Khmer Rouge, the U.S. has been quietly aiding the Khmer Rouge war effort for several years." [See Michael Field, Rodney Tasker and Murray Hiebert, "No end in sight: Failure of Paris talks signals return to battlefield," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 7, 1989, pp. 14-16.]

Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, Boston: Brookings Institution, 1985. An excerpt (p. 751):

American-Chinese collaboration in 1979 was also evident in the support given by the United States (and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, A.S.E.A.N.) in the U.N. General Assembly to the Chinese-supported Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot as the legitimate representative of Kampuchea [i.e. Cambodia]. . . . [R]ather than abstain (as many Western European countries did), the United States joined China in supporting the Khmer Rouge.

John Pilger, "America's second war in Indochina . . . Only the allies are new," *New Statesman* (U.K.), August 1, 1980, pp. 10f.

For some of Deng Xiaoping's statements, see for example, Nayan Chanda, *Brother Enemy: The War after the War; A History of Indochina Since the Fall of Saigon*, New York: Harcourt Brace, 1986, p. 379. In 1979, Deng explained his motive for China's supporting Pol Pot to Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira (note that Vietnam had invaded Cambodia in December 1978 and overthrown the Khmer Rouge regime, in response to years of murderous attacks on its borders by Pol Pot's forces):

"It is wise to force the Vietnamese to stay in Kampuchea [i.e. Cambodia] because that way they will suffer more and more and will not be able to extend their hand to Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore."

Nayan Chanda, "Sihanouk stonewalled," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 1, 1984, pp. 30-32. An excerpt:

China's senior statesman Deng Xiaoping said . . . "I do not understand why some want to remove Pol Pot. It is true that he made some mistakes in the past but now he is leading the fight against the Vietnamese aggressors."

56. On the "threat of a good example" as a motivation of U.S. foreign policy, see chapter 5 of *U.P.* especially its footnote 32, and also its footnotes 7, 8, 29 and 108. See also, chapter 1 of *U.P.* and its footnote 20; and chapter 2 of *U.P.* and its footnote 8.

57. On sadistic U.S. efforts to maximize the suffering in post-war Vietnam, see for example, Daniel Southerland, "U.S. blocks private shipment of wheat to Vietnam," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 13, 1981, p. 3 (on the U.S. government's rejection of a Mennonite application "to ship 250 tons of wheat flour from Kansas to Vietnam"); Nayan Chanda, "New Delhi Wants to Offer Help," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 25, 1977, p. 44 (on the U.S. trying to block a shipment of buffaloes from India to Vietnam); James Srodes, "An enigma at the World Bank," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 16, 1979, p. 82 (reporting that the U.S. successfully pressured the World Bank to "cave in" and withdraw its only development loan to Vietnam); Elizabeth Becker, "Milk for Vietnam," *New York Times*, July 3, 1981, p. A19 (reporting that the European Economic Community's decision to withhold food from U.N.I.C.E.F. for Vietnam was made under strong U.S. pressure: "'We had no choice on that one,' an E.E.C. source explained"); Louis Wiznitzer, "The news -- briefly: U.S. blocks Viet project meant to step up food," *Christian Science Monitor*, November 6, 1981, p. 2. An excerpt:

The United States is now using food as an instrument of its foreign policy. . . . It has succeeded in blocking a \$5 million project (already reduced from the originally intended \$25 million) by the World Food Program aimed at building dams in Vietnam that would improve the food situation there, which is reportedly dire.

Ted Morello, "Reagan's aid weapon: The axe hangs over U.N. agencies as Washington seeks revenge over Kampuchea," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 1, 1981, p. 22.

An excerpt:

Already there is a shadow over such U.N. agencies as the Food and Agriculture Organisation and Children's Fund [U.N.I.C.E.F.]. But the main target of the campaign is the U.N. Development Programme [U.N.D.P.]. . . . The U.S. hopes that the [U.N.D.P.'s governing] council can be persuaded to do what the U.S. cannot effectively accomplish alone: inflict a punitive aid slash on Vietnam.

John Pilger, "From Vietnam to El Salvador," *New Statesman* (U.K.), May 22, 1981, pp. 6-8. An excerpt:

Six million Vietnamese are faced with "serious malnutrition," according to a U.N. Food and Agricultural Organisation group. Rations are now less than even during the war years: less than half the daily amount of food needed for healthy survival.

A development programme drawn up by the Asian Development Bank was considered to be vital. "The Americans," said an official of the bank, "have told us to lose the file on Vietnam." The Japanese and the E.E.C. have sent nothing. Britain long ago cut off its piddling humanitarian aid.

Daniel Southerland, "U.S. squeezes Vietnam's economy," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 14, 1981, p. 1. An excerpt:

Through international aid donors, the United States is moving further to tighten the economic screws on Vietnam. The intention, State Department officials say, is to "isolate" Vietnam not only diplomatically but also economically. . . . At almost every turn, Vietnam's sources of outside assistance seems to be dwindling. The World Bank ended its program in 1979, partly because of conditions set by the U.S. Congress in exchange for approving U.S. contributions to that international institution.

François Nivolon, "Debt shackles Vietnam," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 22, 1981, pp. 59f. An excerpt:

Prospects for loans from the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank are very bleak, since many donor countries, especially the U.S. and Japan, are opposed to any assistance to Vietnam.

Louis Wiznitzer, "U.S. tries to punish Vietnam by paring U.N. assistance," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 26, 1981, p. 6. An excerpt:

The Reagan administration has launched a vigorous, behind-the-scenes campaign at U.N. headquarters to cut U.N. humanitarian and development aid to Vietnam. . . . Contrary to some reports, the U.S. initiative is backed by none of its major allies. Essentially, it is supported by China, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

Steven Greenhouse, "U.S. Open to Talks on Ties to Vietnam," *New York Times*, October 24, 1991, p. A17. An excerpt:

After decades of battling the Japanese, French and Americans, Vietnam is one of the world's poorest countries, with a per capita income of about \$200 a year. Vietnamese officials were irritated last week when the United States blocked a French proposal calling for the International Monetary Fund to lend money to Vietnam.

See also, Harold Ellithorpe, "Mass starvation looms in Vietnam with no aid in sight," *Business Week*, May 4, 1981, p. 70.

58. On the circumstances and development of the American colonies in the eighteenth century, for comparison to modern Third World countries, see for example, Robert W. Fogel, "Nutrition and the Decline in Mortality since 1700: Some Preliminary Findings in Long-Term Factors in American Economic Growth," in Stanley L. Engerman and Robert E. Gallman, eds., *Long-Term Factors in American Economic Growth*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986, pp. 466-467 (reporting that examination of European and American data has shown that mid-eighteenth century Americans achieved diets and had food allotments that were remarkably nutritious by European standards and were not achieved in Europe until well into the twentieth century; Americans achieved mean body heights and levels of life expectancy by the middle of the eighteenth century which were not achieved even by the British *upper classes* until the first quarter of the twentieth century, not to speak of less privileged parts of the world). See also, John W. Frank and Fraser Mustard, "The Determinants of Health from a Historical Perspective," *Daedalus (Health and Wealth)*, Vol. 123, No. 4, Fall 1994, pp. 1-19.

59. On pressures from American business to end the Vietnam embargo, see for example, Robert Greenberger, "U.S. and Vietnam Move Under Pressure Toward Normalizing Their Relations," *Wall Street Journal*, October 26, 1992, p. A13. An excerpt:

The U.S. . . . is under pressure from American companies to resolve the [M.I.A./P.O.W.] issue so that they can do more than talk about business with Vietnam. They don't want to be left behind in the race for access to Vietnam's markets and resources, including potentially rich offshore oil deposits. Washington also faces pressure from its allies, particularly Japan, who have been ready to relax the economic embargo on Vietnam since 1989, when Hanoi withdrew its troops from Cambodia. . . .

Through the 1980s, U.S. officials emphasized that Vietnam should end its occupation of Cambodia before the U.S. embargo could be lifted. After Vietnam withdrew its troops, the U.S. then stressed the need to resolve the M.I.A. and P.O.W.

issues before relations could be restored. Meanwhile, U.S. companies look on Vietnam, with its population of 70 million, as a rich market for consumer products and such other exports as earth-moving equipment, which will be needed to build Vietnam's infrastructure.

On the M.I.A./P.O.W. issue, see chapter 7 of *U.P.* and its footnote 56.

60. One work of recent scholarship estimates the number of "excess deaths" during the Pol Pot period at 1.5 million (see Ben Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-79*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996, pp. 456-460). Another detailed scholarly source, invoked in Chomsky's 1989 remarks in the text, suggests a lower figure of 750,000 deaths above the norm in the Pol Pot period -- 200,000 to 300,000 of these due to executions -- but maintains that, "[g]iven the lack of precision inherent in all the data and estimates, it is impossible to reach more accurate final totals" (see Michael Vickery, *Cambodia: 1975-1982*, Boston: South End, 1984, pp. 184-188). Another notable study estimates "excess deaths" of 1.05 million in the Khmer Rouge period, based upon the 1962 census and a 1980 administrative survey about which the authors warn "there is much uncertainty about [its] accuracy" (see Judith Banister and Paige Johnson, "After the Nightmare: The Population of Cambodia," in Ben Kiernan, ed., *Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge, the United Nations and the International Community*, New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1993, pp. 65-139 at p. 91). Finally, a slightly lower range of 700,000 to 1 million excess deaths for the Khmer Rouge period -- suggesting 75,000 to 150,000 as a possible range for the number of executions -- was given in the Report of the Finnish Inquiry Commission which studied Cambodia in the early 1980s (see Kimmo Kiljunen, ed., *Kampuchea: Decade of the Genocide*, London: Zed Books, 1984, pp. 31-33).

The most authoritative presentation of the official U.S. government view, noting that its "assumptions are highly speculative," alleged that in addition to deaths from inadequate food, lack of medical care, harsh labor, etc., "50,000 to 100,000 former military personnel, bureaucrats, teachers, and educated people may have been executed," and that the absolute population decline during the period was between 1.2 and 1.8 million people, with an additional 700,000 deaths occurring due to an April 1979 famine after the fall of the Pol Pot regime (see C.I.A. Research Paper, *Kampuchea: A Demographic Catastrophe*, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1980 (Doc. G.C. 80-10019U)).

It should be emphasized that calculations of total deaths in Cambodia for the years 1975 to 1979 -- often asserted with certainty in the mainstream U.S. press -- have had to rely heavily, if not completely, on highly speculative growth-rate projections based upon the one nationwide Cambodian census from the pre-war period, which was performed in 1962. As Michael Vickery comments in *Cambodia: 1975-1982* (p. 185):

[W]hen the war began in Cambodia in 1970 no one knew what the population was, there was a difference of over half a million between the official and the most reasonable expert estimates, and any figure could have been off by 2-300,000. The war, it may safely be assumed, both altered the normal growth rate and took a high death toll of which there could be no accurate count, but which both sides have put at around half a million. Thus estimates for 1975 contain an even larger margin of error. Studies employing more "impressionistic" estimates are still more unreliable, for obvious reasons. For instance, Vickery documents cases in which local death estimates proved

exaggerated by a factor of 60, and others in which the execution estimates for a district were several times larger than the entire population of the district (pp. 123, 185). Surveys such as those cited by Kiernan have been based on interviews with refugees on the Thai-Cambodian border and others in sample sizes of 100, 500 or 1,500 people, which were then extrapolated to the Cambodian population as a whole (approximately 6 to 8 million people). Apart from possible issues of reliability in the testimonies themselves, such studies may suffer from sampling problems.

It also should be stressed that while stories in the mainstream American media often give the impression that the Khmer Rouge actually *executed* one million or more people -- even going as far as to say that the Khmer Rouge "murdered" one million people (see for example, T.D. Allman, "Sihanouk's Sideshow," *Vanity Fair*, April 1990, pp. 150f at p. 152) -- all of the statistical studies cited above agree that executions accounted for only a *portion* of the total number of "excess deaths," with the remainder being attributable to various conditions of the period (though none contest that there was vast killing). There has been ample commentary that the brutality of the Khmer Rouge increased the overall misery of the period -- but based upon current data at least, the claim that the Khmer Rouge "murdered" one million people requires a somewhat expanded definition of that term. On the conditions in Cambodia at the time that the Khmer Rouge took power, see footnote 62 of this chapter. For an argument that the Khmer Rouge's food programs actually saved the lives of many peasants who would have starved to death in the conditions of post-war Cambodia, see Testimony of Gareth Porter, in Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, *Human Rights in Cambodia*, House of Representatives, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 95th Congress, 1st Session, May 3, 1977, pp. 19-32. For an example of one way that the *New York Times* has handled the issue, see Thomas L. Friedman, "U.S. Gulf Policy: Vague 'Vital Interest,'" *New York Times*, August 12, 1990, section 1, p. 1 ("The Khmer Rouge *are held responsible* for the deaths of more than a million Cambodians during their reign of terror in the 1970s")(emphasis added).

61. For estimates of the death toll in Cambodia in the first half of the 1970s, see for example, C.I.A. Research Paper, *Kampuchea: A Demographic Catastrophe*, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1980 (Doc. G.C. 80-10019U), p. 2 (concluding that between July 1, 1970 and April 17, 1975, "Death rates, high since the 1960s, soared with the addition of an estimated 600,000 to 700,000 war-related deaths"); Michael Vickery, *Cambodia: 1975-1982*, Boston: South End, 1984, pp. 184-188 (accepting as plausible a "war loss" of over 500,000 for the period prior to 1975, calculated from the C.I.A. estimates but lower than the C.I.A.'s conclusions); Judith Banister and Paige Johnson, "After the Nightmare: The Population of Cambodia," in Ben Kiernan, ed., *Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge, the United Nations and the International Community*, New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1993, pp. 65-139 (estimating 275,000 "excess deaths" in the pre-1975 period). See also footnotes 62 and 63 of this chapter.

62. For 1975 predictions of deaths in Cambodia following the U.S. war, see for example, Editorial, "Cambodia On The Rack," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 25, 1975, p. 9 ("Kissinger has been actively leaking White House intelligence on the tragic sufferings of the Cambodian people, including predictions that one million Cambodians

will die in the next 12 months"); John Rogers, "Cambodians Are Starving, Refugees Say," *Washington Post*, June 23, 1975, p. A7. An excerpt:

Diplomats and officials of international relief organizations . . . point to the food crisis in Phnom Penh in the months preceding the Khmer Rouge victory as a further indicator of what must be happening now. . . . [O]ne relief official [said,] "When you look at the facts, it's difficult to believe there is not mass starvation."

For a description of the conditions in Phnom Penh by the U.S. A.I.D. Director, see William Goodfellow [Director of the Center for International Studies], "Starvation In Cambodia," Op-Ed, *New York Times*, July 14, 1975, p. 25. An excerpt:

The evacuation of Cambodia's larger cities has been sensationalized in the Western press as a "death march." In fact, it was a journey away from certain death by starvation, for at the time the former Phnom Penh Government surrendered, starvation was already a reality in the urban centers, and widespread famine only a matter of weeks away, while in the countryside there was a sizable food surplus. . . .

The coup d'état of 1970 was followed by five years of death, suffering and destruction, with 600,000 Cambodians on both sides killed. Primarily because of a large-scale United States bombing campaign in which 539,129 tons of bombs were dropped on the Cambodian countryside, the agrarian economy was shattered. . . . Last March, the director of the United States Agency for International Development in Cambodia, Norman Sweet, estimated that in Phnom Penh alone 1.2 million people were in "desperate need" of United States food. . . . A.I.D. officials reported that stockpiles of rice in Phnom Pehn could last for six days.

For a U.S. government report on the conditions of vast starvation in Cambodia, which was issued a month *before* the Khmer Rouge takeover, see Office of the Inspector-General of Foreign Assistance, "Cambodia: An Assessment of Humanitarian Needs and Relief Efforts," Inspection Report, March 12, 1975, in *Congressional Record*, March 20, 1975, Vol. 121, 94th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 7891-7894. An excerpt:

The general level of health of almost the entire Cambodian population -- the refugees, the poor, families of military servicemen, and particularly the children, has deteriorated rapidly. Malnutrition, including the advanced stages of kwashiorkor and marasmus, has increased dramatically over the last several months. Measles, malaria, tuberculosis and other respiratory diseases also were increasing in incidence, often with fatal prognosis. . . . Dispensaries, clinics, hospitals and nutrition centers, limited in number, were forced to refuse treatment to gravely ill because of the lack of facilities and shortage of doctors. Overworked medical personnel were unable to cope with the numbers of people that presented themselves for treatment. . . .

In Phnom Penh, there are between one and two million refugees [from the U.S. bombing war] in a city that had a pre-war total population of about 375,000. The added hundreds of thousands of destitute victims has proven a burden with which relief programs cannot cope. . . . Almost the totality of those refugees entering Phnom Penh and the provincial capitals for protection were farmers from the neighboring countryside. The impact of this influx of farmers into urban areas and away from the productive farm areas had great economic impact, reducing the agricultural production of the country to the point where instead of being a substantial exporter of rice, fruit, fish and livestock Cambodia has become a massive importer of rice. . . .

Doctors treating Cambodian children reported an increase in malnutrition and nutrition-related diseases. They found that children were slipping fast into serious undernourishment and that the state of their health was such that ordinarily simple

childhood maladies were often fatal. Children were dying of complications brought about by enteritises, flu, measles, and respiratory diseases. . . . Doctors from the International Red Cross reported that "Malnutrition now exists on a large scale . . . complications are stronger now in malnourished children. . . . Thousands and thousands [of children] may be tipping over. Kwashiorkor, usually a disease in age 2 to 4 years, is occurring in 10-year olds. There is no hope for the future. T.B. is increasing. Cholera and typhoid have started in January [1975]. . . ."

One voluntary agency operates a child nutrition center in an old converted private house on the outskirts of Phnom Penh. . . . The Medical Director sadly recounted that there are never enough beds to take care of all of the children, that they must turn thousands needing hospitalization away, and without admission here, their fate is almost certain death. Visibly distraught over the critical situation and the plight of the children she was seeing daily . . . [she said]: "This morning at our clinic there were a thousand patients waiting. We numbered 200 this morning. This afternoon we'll see another 200. All those people are sick. 75 percent are children. We saw only the worst cases. 50 children should have been admitted this morning. I took six kids. . . ." [From December through the beginning of February, 1975, over a thousand were turned away from this center.] It requires little imagination to picture these wretchedly frail and sickly little bodies, borne away in their weak mothers' arms, carried to a shanty hovel, a concrete stadium bench or a dirty alley somewhere, to die; certain to suffer, then to die, untreated, unhospitalized, unfed.

For a similar chilling report in the U.S. press, also written before the Khmer Rouge took power, see Tom Matthews, "Phnom Penh: Trial by Fire," *Newsweek*, March 10, 1975, pp. 24-25. An excerpt:

In the Khmer Soviétique hospital, more than 1,300 patients struggled for survival last week. Doctors, nurses, medical corpsmen, drugs and plasma were scarce; malaria, tuberculosis and dysentery were rampant. Out of desperation, overworked staffers in some wards tied wounded men to their beds to prevent them from breaking open their wounds and sutures. Flies covered the face of one such patient, who could only shake his head feebly in a vain attempt to keep them from crawling into his mouth. . . .

[A] Brechtian army of impoverished women, orphans and mutilated war veterans panhandled their way along the boulevards and scoured garbage pails in the back alleys for edible scraps of food. Thousands of small children, their bellies swollen from hunger, lingered listlessly in the streets and, in their homes of thatch and waste lumber at the edges of the city, waited for slow death from kwashiorkor and marasmus, the terminal forms of malnutrition. . . . Well over 500,000 poverty-stricken refugees from the war in the countryside were struggling to get by in the capital last week. Nearly 500 of them squatted miserably in the Svay Dang Kum pagoda -- the men in loincloths, the women in rags, the children naked. A miasma of malaria, diarrhea and despair hovered over the shrine.

For the Finnish Inquiry Commission's findings about the conditions in Cambodia prior to the Khmer Rouge taking power, see Kimmo Kiljunen, ed., *Kampuchea: Decade of the Genocide*, London: Zed Books, 1984, pp. 5-8.

63. On the death rate from starvation in Phnom Penh at the time of the U.S. withdrawal, see for example, George Hildebrand and Gareth Porter, *Cambodia: Starvation and Revolution*, New York: Monthly Review, 1976, pp. 19-29 at p. 29 (using "a conservative estimate" based on numerous accounts of "250 deaths per day from starvation," and concluding that the death toll "for March alone comes to nearly 8,000

people," or a rate of 96,000 a year). See also, Michael Vickery, *Cambodia: 1975-1982*, Boston: South End, 1984, pp. 78-79.

64. For the A.I.D. report's prediction, see William Shawcross, *Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979, p. 375. The U.S. A.I.D. report's exact words:

"Slave labor and starvation rations for half the nation's people (probably heaviest among those who supported the republic) will be a cruel necessity for this year, and general deprivation and suffering will stretch over the next two or three years before Cambodia can get back to rice self-sufficiency."

65. On the predictability of a peasant backlash due to the nature of the U.S. war on Cambodia, see for example, Richard Dudman [captured war correspondent], *Forty Days with the Enemy*, New York: Liveright, 1971, p. 69 (reporting the author's observation, while in captivity, that "[t]he bombing and shooting [of the U.S. attack] was radicalizing the people of rural Cambodia and was turning the countryside into a massive, dedicated, and effective revolutionary base"). See also, Jon Swain, "Diary of a Doomed City," *Sunday Times* (London), May 11, 1975, pp. 15-19. Evacuated from Phnom Penh following the Khmer Rouge victory, this British correspondent summarized his impressions of the Cambodian countryside at the end of the U.S. war:

The United States has much to answer for here, not only in terms of human lives and massive material destruction; the rigidity and nastiness of the un-Cambodian like fellows in black who run this country now, or what is left of it, are as much a product of this wholesale American bombing which has hardened and honed their minds as they are a product of Marx and Mao. . . .

The war damage here [in the countryside], as everywhere else we saw, is total. Not a bridge is standing, hardly a house. I am told most villagers have spent the war years living semi-permanently underground in earth bunkers to escape the bombing. . . . The entire countryside has been churned up by American B-52 bomb craters, whole towns and villages razed. So far I have not seen one intact pagoda.

David Chandler, "Revising the Past in Democratic Kampuchea: When Was the Birthday of the Party," *Pacific Affairs*, Summer 1983, pp. 288-300. An excerpt (p. 295):

Aside from killing and maiming tens of thousands of Cambodians who had never fired a shot at an American, the bombing had several political effects, all beneficial to the C.P.K. [Khmer Rouge]. One was to demonstrate the party's contention that Cambodia's principal enemy was the United States. Another was to turn thousands of young Cambodians into participants in an anti-American crusade, while driving hundreds of thousands of others into the relative safety (and squalor) of Phnom Penh, Battambang, and other Khmer Republic strongholds. The destruction of so many villages, moreover, and the deaths and dislocation of so many people enabled the C.P.K. to collectivize agriculture in the zones under its control, in May 1973, while the bombing was going on. When it stopped, the party was able to claim that the Cambodian revolution, unlike any other in the history of the world, had defeated the United States. The bombing destroyed a good deal of the fabric of prewar Cambodian society and provided the C.P.K. with the psychological ingredients of a violent, vengeful, and unrelenting social revolution.

For a comparison of the Khmer Rouge phenomenon with other peasant rebellions and what has been called "peasant populism," see Michael Vickery, *Cambodia: 1975-1982*, Boston: South End, 1984, ch. 5, especially pp. 271-290.

66. Chomsky notes that the honor is shared by a collection of monsters which includes Henry Kissinger, F.W. de Klerk, Yasser Arafat, Yitzhak Rabin, Theodore Roosevelt, and many others -- although obviously not everyone who has received it fits this category.

67. For a portrayal of Eugene McCarthy as the hero of the Vietnam War opposition, see for example, Editorial, "The McCarthy Decade," *New Republic*, December 10, 1977, p. 5.

68. On strong opposition to Martin Luther King while he was alive, see chapter 9 of *U.P.* and its footnote 39.

69. For Neil Postman's analysis of popular media, see for example, Neil Postman, *Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business*, New York: Viking, 1985; Neil Postman, *Technopoly: The Surrender of Culture to Technology*, New York: Knopf, 1992.

70. On the number of colonists who fled the American Revolution, see for example, Carl Van Doren, *Secret History of the American Revolution*, New York: Viking, 1941. An excerpt (p. 433):

[Numbers leaving] the United States on account of loyalty to the British Empire . . . may have been as high as 100,000, of whom 35,000 may have gone from New York alone. About half the exiles settled in Canada, where they and their descendants were called United Empire Loyalists. The expulsion was so thorough that the next generation of Americans, with few former loyalists as reminders, almost forgot the civil aspects of the war and came to think of it as a war solely against England.

Richard B. Morris, *The Forging of the Union: 1781-1789*, New York: Harper & Row, 1987, pp. 13, 17 (giving a 1775 population of 2,600,000 in the American colonies, and a population of 2,389,300 at the end of the war; estimating the number of Loyalists who fled at 80,000 to 100,000, in a "vast exodus of Loyalists and blacks"). See also, Paul H. Smith, "The American Loyalists: Notes on their Organization and Numerical Strength," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd Series, Vol. XXV, 1968, pp. 259-277 (estimating that the white population of the American colonies was approximately two and one-half million, and "at least a fifth of the white population -- a half-million people -- behaved in ways that enable us to identify them as Loyalist"); Claude Halstead Van Tyne, *The Loyalists in the American Revolution*, New York: Peter Smith, 1929 (original 1902), pp. 104-105.

Proportional figures for South Vietnam would be about 4 million supporters of the United States and 800,000 refugees fleeing, while the total for all of Vietnam would be approximately double that. While the actual number of people who fled Vietnam is unknown, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated in late 1978 that "71,379 Vietnamese successfully escaped from their homeland by sea during the last four years." See "U.N. Seeks Solution for 'Boat People,'" *New York Times*, November 11, 1978, p. 6.

On blacks and native peoples in the American Revolution, see for example, Ira Berlin, "The Revolution in Black Life," and Francis Jennings, "The Indians' Revolution," in Alfred Young, ed., *The American Revolution: Explorations in the History of American Radicalism*, DeKalb: University of Northern Illinois Press, 1976, pp. 319-382.

71. On the Populists' migration to Canada, see for example, Gabriel Kolko, *Main Currents in American History*, New York: Harper and Row, 1976. An excerpt (pp. 28-29):

Perhaps most disturbing of all to conventional wisdom is the fact that between 1898 and 1914 about one million American residents, the vast majority of whom had been previously in the states with large agrarian radical movements, moved to Canada, predominantly the rich wheat-growing provinces. Many had been Populists, and some outstanding former Populist political leaders were among their ranks, and this constituency and its inheritance became an important strand in the Canadian social democratic movement.

Paul F. Sharp, "When Our West Moved North," *American Historical Review*, Vol. 55, January 1950, pp. 286-300. An excerpt (p. 290):

Many [emigrants to Canada from the U.S.] sought release from political conditions in the States which they considered intolerable. It was no accident that the movement into the Canadian West had its Populist contingent after the election of 1896. In the vanguard were men like John W. Leedy, an ex-Populist governor of Kansas, Bertram Wilson Huffman, a recruit in Coxey's famous army, George Bevington, an "expert" on money and credits, and Henry Wise Wood, whose Populism profoundly shaped the farmers' movements in western Canada. Many of the farmers who made the trek into the Northwest later insisted that this dissatisfaction had reinforced their decision to leave for Canada. They cited the growth of trusts and the overweening strength of the "money-power" as developments in the republic they hoped to escape. As one former Iowan testified, "I didn't much mind leaving the States, the trusts were getting so bad there it didn't seem to be the same country to me any more."

Chapter Four

Colloquy

1. For books critiquing the media, see for example, Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*, New York: Pantheon, 1988; Ben H. Bagdikian, *The Media Monopoly*, Boston: Beacon, Fifth Edition, 1997 (original 1983); Michael Parenti, *Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media*, New York: St. Martin's, 1986 (updated edition 1993); Mark Hertsgaard, *On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency*, New York: Schocken Books, 1989; Martin A. Lee and Norman Solomon, *Unreliable Sources: A Guide to Detecting Bias in News Media*, New York: Lyle Stuart, 1990; Edward S. Herman, *Beyond Hypocrisy: Decoding the News in an Age of Propaganda*, Montreal: Black Rose, 1992. See also, John C. Stauber and Sheldon Rampton, *Toxic Sludge Is Good For You!: Lies, Damn Lies and the Public Relations Industry*, Monroe, ME: Common Courage, 1995, especially ch. 11.

2. Chomsky's article discussing the U.S. reaction to the 1990 election in Nicaragua is reprinted in Noam Chomsky, *Deterring Democracy*, New York: Hill and Wang, 1991 (expanded edition 1992), ch. 10.

3. For an example of the "liberal" reaction to the 1990 Nicaraguan elections, see Anthony Lewis, "Out of this Nettle," *New York Times*, March 2, 1990, p. A33 (at the dissident extreme within the mainstream media, Lewis noted that the U.S. policies produced "misery, death and shame," and that "the economic distress that no doubt moved some Nicaraguans to vote for Mrs. Chamorro was caused in part, after all, by U.S. sanctions" -- then stated that the result of Washington's "experiment in peace and democracy" gave "fresh testimony to the power of Jefferson's idea: government with the consent of the governed. . . . To say so seems romantic, but then we live in a romantic age").

For another example, see Michael Kinsley, "Taking Responsibility: Effect of 80's U.S. Nicaragua Policy on Chamorro Victory," *New Republic*, March 19, 1990, p. 4 (noting that "the contra war managed to kill more than 30,000 Nicaraguans," that "Impoverishing the people of Nicaragua was precisely the point of the contra war and the parallel policy of economic boycott and veto of international development loans," and that "the economic disaster was probably the victorious opposition's best election issue" -- then hailing the "free election" as a "triumph of democracy" that "turned out to be pleasanter than anyone would have dared to predict").

For a third example, see Tom Wicker, "Bush and Managua," *New York Times*, March 1, 1990, p. A27 (noting that the Sandinistas lost the election "because the Nicaraguan people were tired of war and sick of economic deprivation" -- but nonetheless calling the elections "free and fair").

For another typical reaction by a U.S. commentator, see Johanna McCreary, "But Will It Work?," *Time*, March 12, 1990, p. 12. This article acknowledges that U.S. policy was to:

wreck the economy and prosecute a long and deadly proxy war until the exhausted natives overthrow the unwanted government themselves. . . . Since 1985 Washington has strangled Nicaraguan trade with an embargo. It has cut off Nicaragua's credit at the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The contra war cost Managua tens of millions and left the country with wrecked bridges, sabotaged power stations and ruined farms. The impoverishment of the people of Nicaragua was a harrowing way to give the National Opposition Union (U.N.O.) a winning issue. . . . Nicaragua had been devastated by a 40% drop in G.N.P., an inflation rate running at 1,700% a year and constant shortages of food and basic necessities. At least 30,000 people had been killed in the war, and 500,000 more had fled.

Nevertheless, McGreary states that, with the victory of U.N.O., democracy burst forth where everyone least expected it. Given the chance to vote in an honest and secret election, Nicaraguans decisively repudiated the Sandinista government, which the U.S. had been struggling to overthrow for a decade.

4. For the *New York Times* article, see David Shipler, "Victory for U.S. Fair Play," Op-Ed, *New York Times*, March 1, 1990, p. A27. An excerpt:

It is true that partly because of the confrontation with the U.S., Nicaragua's economy suffered terribly, setting the stage for the widespread public discontent with the Sandinistas reflected in Sunday's balloting. But few governments become moderate during a war; the contra war strengthened Sandinista hard-liners and probably contributed to their oppressive policies. The way to resolution opened only when Congress suspended the war, in effect, to give the Sandinistas a chance to proceed democratically. . . . Thus, Nicaragua's election has vindicated Washington's fledgling program of providing public, above-board funding to help democratic procedures take root in countries with authoritarian regimes.

5. For the *Boston Globe's* article, see Editorial, "Rallying to Chamorro," *Boston Globe*, February 27, 1990, p. 12. An excerpt:

[H]aving supported the election of Chamorro, the U.S. must, to shore up the Chamorro regime, match the millions it spent trying to overthrow Ortega. Ortega's defenders in the U.S., if they love Nicaraguans and not just Sandinistas, must now rally to Chamorro. . . . The Sandinista revolution, still potent as an opposition force, is now, like so many Marxist-Leninist phenomena, consigned to the dustbin of history. Another blessing of democracy is that outside theories mean little. At long last, Nicaragua itself has spoken.

6. For Sciolino's article, see Elaine Sciolino, *New York Times*, February 27, 1990, p. A14 (the headline "Americans United In Joy, But Divided over Policy" appeared in the "News Summary" section on p. A2).

7. For Cranston's statement, see U.S. Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, *U.S. Policy Toward Nicaragua: Aid to Nicaraguan Resistance Proposal*, 99th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 27 and March 4, 1986 (C.I.S. #S381-20), p. 5 (Cranston stated: "So how do we deal with a government which we deplore, like the government of Nicaragua? I believe we should isolate it, leave it to fester in its own juices"). On the methods used in El

Salvador and Guatemala, see chapter 1 of *U.P.* and its footnote 13; and chapter 2 of *U.P.* and its footnote 15.

8. For Cockburn's and Ryan's articles, see Alexander Cockburn, "U.S.-Backed Terrorism Won in Nicaragua, Not Democracy," *Wall Street Journal*, March 1, 1990, p. A17; Randolph Ryan, "In Nicaragua, a win but not a victory," *Boston Globe*, February 28, 1990, p. 11.

For a chilling review of Nicaragua's fate since the elections, see for example, Noam Chomsky, *World Orders Old and New*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, pp. 131-135; Kevin Baxter, "Under the Volcano: Neoliberalism Finds Nicaragua," *Nation*, April 6, 1998, p. 21; Hugh O'Shaughnessy, "Nicaragua vies with Haiti as West's nightmare," *Observer* (London), September 12, 1993, p. 15. An excerpt:

Nicaragua is now challenging Haiti for the unwanted distinction of being the most destitute country in the Western Hemisphere. . . . Retinues of tiny, hungry children wait at every set of traffic lights [in Managua], eager to wipe your car or simply begging. Infant mortality is the highest in the continent and, according to the U.N., a quarter of Nicaraguan children are malnourished. Diseases such as cholera and dengue fever are rampant. Only four in 10 people have jobs. Begging, theft, robbery and prostitution are on the increase.

People will do anything for a meal. There are soup kitchens on virtually every street corner. Women boil up fish heads in large cauldrons or cook bitter-tasting but nutritious soya biscuits in order to save tens of thousands of youngsters from starvation. . . . The country's leaders seem to care little. Finance Minister Emilio Pereira boasts that Nicaragua has the lowest inflation in the western hemisphere -- never mind that its four million people are starving. Most Nicaraguans say life was much better under the Sandinistas, who ruled in the Eighties. Their health, nutrition, literacy and agrarian programmes have been scrapped by a government pressed by the International Monetary Fund and Washington to privatise and cut public spending.

9. On U.S. propaganda in rural Nicaragua, see for example, Howard Frederick, "Electronic Penetration," in Thomas Walker, ed., *Reagan versus the Sandinistas: the Undeclared War on Nicaragua*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987, pp. 123-142. For comparison of media conditions in Sandinista Nicaragua and those in the United States during wartime -- as well as in the leading U.S. client-state, Israel -- see Noam Chomsky, "U.S. Polity and Society: The Lessons of Nicaragua," in Thomas Walker, ed., *Reagan versus the Sandinistas: the Undeclared War on Nicaragua*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987, pp. 285-310. See also, John Spicer Nichols, "The Media," in Thomas Walker, ed., *Nicaragua: The First Five Years*, New York: Praeger, 1985, pp. 183-199; Michael Linfield, *Freedom Under Fire: U.S. Civil Liberties in Times of War*, Boston: South End, 1990 (reviewing censorship and other civil liberties violations in the United States during wartime). And see chapter 8 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 4, 6 and 7.

10. On the contras' mission to attack "soft targets," see for example, Fred Kaplan, "U.S. general says contra chances improving," *Boston Globe*, May 20, 1987, p. 9. An excerpt:

Gen. John Galvin, leader of the U.S. southern command, told a House subcommittee yesterday that the contra rebels fighting to overthrow the Nicaraguan government have a better chance of winning than they did just a few months ago and

attributed his growing optimism to the contras' new strategy of attacking civilian targets instead of soldiers.

Testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Western Hemisphere subcommittee, Galvin said, "The contras have a fighting chance if we sustain them" with continued military aid. "It's getting better. In the past few months, I'm more hopeful than I was before." Asked after the hearing what the contras have achieved the past few months, Galvin replied, "Lots of victories. They're going after soft targets. They're not trying to duke it out with the Sandinistas directly."

Julia Preston, "Rebels Still Seeking a Win," *Washington Post*, September 8, 1987, p. A1 (quoting a U.S. military analyst that the contras are "'still going after small, soft targets,' like farmers' cooperatives"); Editorial, "America's Guilt -- Or Default," *New York Times*, July 1, 1986, p. A22 (noting that the World Court ruled unanimously "that the C.I.A.'s manual encouraging 'contra' attacks on civilians breached humanitarian principles"); Julia Preston, "Contras Burn Clinic During Raid on Village," *Washington Post*, March 7, 1987, p. A25 (reporting that the contras, "reportedly in high spirits and outfitted by the C.I.A.," among other things "burned down a church-sponsored health clinic that had been the pride of the community" in the isolated Nicaraguan village of Tapasle); Ellen V.P. Wells, "Letter," *New York Times*, December 31, 1988, section 1, p. 22 (describing a contra attack on a coffee-harvesting cooperative, in which two people were killed, the coffee equipment was ruined, and ten houses and a health clinic were destroyed).

For additional accounts of contra atrocities, see Reed Brody [Assistant Attorney General of New York State], *Contra Terror in Nicaragua -- Report of a Fact-finding Mission: September 1984-January 1985*, Boston: South End, 1985. This book reprints 150 affidavits and 140 pages of testimony gathered in a fact-finding mission conducted in the early 1980s, the results of which were independently corroborated by the Washington Office on Latin America, a private church-supported human rights organization, and other human rights organizations. In the affidavits, a mother of two from the Nicaraguan village of Esteli reports (p. 120):

[F]ive of them [i.e. contras] raped me at about five in the evening . . . they had gang-raped me every day. When my vagina couldn't take it anymore, they raped me through my rectum. I calculate that in 5 days they raped me 60 times.

A man describes a contra attack on his cooperative in April 1984 (p. 71):

They had already destroyed all that was the cooperative; a coffee drying machine, the two dormitories for the coffee cutters, the electricity generators, 7 cows, the plant, the food warehouse. There was one boy, about 15 years old, who was retarded and suffered from epilepsy. We had left him in a bomb shelter. When we returned . . . we saw . . . that they had cut his throat, then they cut open his stomach and left his intestines hanging out on the ground like a string. They did the same to Juan Corrales who had already died from a bullet in the fighting. They opened him up and took out his intestines and cut off his testicles.

See also, Thomas Carothers, "The Reagan Years: The 1980s," in Abraham F. Lowenthal, ed., *Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991, pp. 90-122 at p. 104 ("Over thirty thousand Nicaraguans were killed in the contra war and tens of thousands wounded, which in per capita terms was significantly higher than the number of U.S. persons killed in the U.S. Civil War and all the wars of the twentieth century *combined*"). And see footnote 12 of chapter 1 of *U.P.*

11. On U.S. economic warfare against Nicaragua, see for example, Michael Conroy, "Economic Aggression as an Instrument of Low-Intensity Warfare," in Thomas Walker, ed., *Reagan versus the Sandinistas: the Undeclared War on Nicaragua*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987, pp. 57-79, especially pp. 67f.

12. On Nicaragua's economic devastation by the late 1980s, see for example, Richard Boudreaux, "Poor Pay, Inflation Spur Exodus; Nicaraguans Leaving in Drove as Economy Sinks," *Los Angeles Times*, November 20, 1988, part 1, p. 1 (quoting economic advisor Francisco Mayorga that: "We are watching Nicaragua become a land of peasants, a place so poor that it resembles Haiti or the northeast of Brazil. The country is disintegrating"); Mark Uhlig, "A Sandinista Promise Gone Sour Alienates Nicaragua's Working Class," *New York Times*, November 7, 1989, p. A10. An excerpt:

Battered by galloping inflation, Nicaraguan workers have seen their real wages fall by more than 90 percent since 1981. . . . Over the last two years, the Sandinista government has taken tough measures to halt the economy's rapid deterioration, which Government officials ascribe to the heavy burden of the eight-year war against American-backed rebels. . . . Economists [point out that] it was compounded by an American embargo on trade with Nicaragua, poor Government management and uncontrolled inflation caused by high military expenditures. . . . [O]fficial figures show that per capita private consumption has fallen by at least 70 percent under Sandinista rule.

The article also notes the connection drawn by Nicaraguans between the election result and ending the embargo:

Several [Managua workers] said that if relations with the United States were the answer to the economic crisis the opposition was better suited for the job. Well-publicized foreign donations to the opposition parties here have been interpreted by many Nicaraguans as proof that the opposition, not the Sandinistas, has better access to the foreign money necessary to relieve Nicaragua's crisis.

13. On the White House's announcement that the embargo against Nicaragua would continue unless Chamorro won, see for example, A.P., "Bush Vows To End Embargo If Chamorro Wins," *Washington Post*, November 9, 1989, p. A56. The opening paragraphs:

President Bush promised Wednesday to lift the trade embargo against Nicaragua if the U.S.-backed presidential candidate, Violeta Chamorro, defeats leftist President Daniel Ortega in the February election. The statement came after a meeting in which Chamorro asked Bush for aid to help with economic reconstruction after the election.

. . .

[Bush] supports Chamorro's candidacy and signed a \$9 million election aid package that will in large part boost her campaign. A statement issued by White House spokesman Roman Popadiuk said Chamorro had stressed in a letter to Bush that her administration "would be committed to reconciliation . . . and reconstruction of the economy in peace and democracy." "Should this occur, the president said the United States would be ready to lift the trade embargo and assist in Nicaragua's reconstruction," the statement said. The embargo was imposed in May 1985, banning imports from or exports to Nicaragua.

See also footnote 12 of this chapter.

The "election aid package" mentioned in the above article would be equivalent to a flow of \$2 billion into a U.S. election campaign. The United States spent more than \$10

per Nicaraguan voter, in a country where the average wage is \$20 per month. The U.S. - as distinct from totalitarian Nicaragua -- does not permit any monetary contributions from abroad for such purposes. See C. Scott Littlehale, "U.S. ignores most candidates in Nicaragua," *C.O.H.A.'s [Council On Hemispheric Affairs] Washington Report on the Hemisphere*, November 8, 1989, p. 5.

14. For Orwell's introduction, see the fiftieth anniversary edition of *Animal Farm*, New York: Harcourt Brace, 1995 (the introduction also is reprinted in *Guardian* (U.K.), Features Page, August 26, 1995). An excerpt (pp. 162-163 of the Harcourt Brace edition):

The sinister fact about literary censorship in England is that it is largely voluntary. Unpopular ideas can be silenced, and inconvenient facts kept dark, without the need for any official ban.

Anyone who has lived long in a foreign country will know of instances of sensational items of news -- things which on their own merits would get the big headlines -- being kept right out of the British press, not because the government intervened but because of a general tacit agreement that "it wouldn't do" to mention that particular fact. So far as the daily newspapers go, this is easy to understand. The British press is extremely centralised, and most of it is owned by wealthy men who have every motive to be dishonest on certain important topics. But the same kind of veiled censorship also operates in books and periodicals, as well as in plays, films and radio. At any given moment there is an orthodoxy, a body of ideas which it is assumed that all right-thinking people will accept without question. It is not exactly forbidden to say this, that or the other, but it is "not done" to say it, just as in mid-Victorian times it was "not done" to mention trousers in the presence of a lady. Anyone who challenges the prevailing orthodoxy finds himself silenced with surprising effectiveness. A genuinely unfashionable opinion is almost never given a fair hearing, either in the popular press or in the highbrow periodicals.

15. There is a more detailed discussion of the educational system in chapter 7 of *U.P.*

16. On exposure to media in the Soviet Union in the 1980s, see for example, James R. Miller and Peter Donhowe, "The Classless Society Has a Wide Gap Between Rich and Poor; But poll finds most satisfied with living conditions," *Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, February 17, 1986, p. 16 (studies of Soviet society based on interviews with former Soviet citizens now living in the United States found that 96 percent of the middle elite and 77 percent of blue-collar workers in the Soviet Union listened to foreign radio broadcasts, while the alternative press reached 45 percent of high-level professionals, 41 percent of political leaders, 27 percent of managers, and 14 percent of blue-collar workers).

17. On Danchev's broadcasts, see for example, "Moscow Radio (Oops!) Calls Soviets 'Invaders,'" *New York Times*, May 24, 1983, p. A5; Serge Schmemmann, "Moscow's Facade on War and Peace Cracks a Bit," *New York Times*, May 29, 1983, section 1, p. 6.

18. On the U.S. media and the "invasion" of Vietnam, see footnote 10 of chapter 2 of *U.P.*

19. For LeMoyne's story, see James LeMoyne, "As Salvadoran Vote Nears, Political Killings Increase," *New York Times*, February 29, 1988, p. A12. The relevant passage:

In addition, there have been rebel killings aimed directly at stopping the elections next month. Villagers say guerrillas publicly executed two peasants in the town of Guatajiagua in Morazan department three weeks ago because they had applied for and received new voter registration cards.

According to the villagers, the guerrillas placed the voting cards of Juan Martin Portillo and Ismael Portillo in their mouths after executing them as a warning to others not to take part in the elections. Rebel units in the area have told all villages not to vote and not to propose candidates for mayor.

20. For Norton's story, see Mark Cooper, *L.A. Weekly*, May 27-June 2, 1988; Chris Norton, "U.S. Media Promotes Salvadoran Army Disinformation," *Extra!* [F.A.I.R. journal], Vol. 12, No. 1, July/August 1988, p. 1; Alexander Cockburn, "The Natural History of LeMoyne, Continued," *Nation*, August 27, 1988, p. 155.

21. For the *New York Times*'s correction, see "Editors' Note," *New York Times*, September 15, 1988, p. A3. An excerpt:

The article fell short of the Times's reporting and editing standards. It should not have left the impression that it was based on firsthand interviewing, and it should have explained why firsthand confirmation was not available.

LeMoyne later conceded that he was not even in El Salvador at the time. See D.D. Guttenplan, "Perestroika at the Times?," *Newsday* (Long Island, NY), September 21, 1988, part II, p. 2.

22. On the contras' technological sophistication and support, see for example, James LeMoyne, "In Nicaragua, Forebodings of Warfare Without End," *New York Times*, June 28, 1987, section 4, p. 3. An excerpt:

The Central Intelligence Agency has equipped the rebels with a computer center that intercepts and decodes hundreds of Sandinista radio messages a day. The intelligence is then sent via portable computers with special encoders to rebel units in the field. The C.I.A. also makes weekly air drops to the units, a highly effective tactic that has allowed the contras to remain inside Nicaragua rather than to have to return to Honduras as they did in the past. "The air operation is the key to the war," said a Western diplomat in Managua who monitors the rebels. "Without it, the contras couldn't make it."

Marjorie Miller, "Lagging C.I.A.-Run Resupply Called Factor in Slow Progress of Contras," *Los Angeles Times*, March 1, 1987, part 1, p. 6 (reporting the contras' complaints that they need more pilots and aircraft, and discussing their reliance on U.S. air supply); Peter Grier, "Contras, Awash in U.S. Funds, Buy Weapons," *Christian Science Monitor*, June 23, 1987, p. 1 (on contra leaders' requests for "more light planes, and small boats for river patrol"); Julia Preston, "Civilians Still Caught in the Cross Fire of Contra War," *Washington Post*, February 4, 1988, p. A25 (noting that the contras had equipment so modern that all U.S. military units did not yet have it).

23. On the State Department's allegations about an arms flow from Nicaragua to the F.M.L.N. in El Salvador, see for example, Morris Morley and James Petras, *The*

Reagan Administration and Nicaragua: How Washington Constructs Its Case for Counterrevolution in Central America, New York: Institute for Media Analysis, 1987, pp. 40-45 (reviewing the major State Department claims).

24. For David MacMichael's testimony before the International Court of Justice (the World Court) on September 16, 1985, see U.N. General Assembly Record, U.N. A/40/907, S/17639, November 19, 1985, pp. 24-66, especially pp. 29-39.

For the World Court's decision, see International Court of Justice, *Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders: 1986*, "Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua" (*Nicaragua v. United States of America*), Judgment of June 27, 1986. An excerpt (paragraph 153):

[E]vidence of military aid from or through Nicaragua remains very weak. This is so despite the deployment by the United States in the region of extensive technical resources for tracking, monitoring and intercepting air, sea and land traffic . . . and its use of a range of intelligence and information sources in a political context where, moreover, the [U.S.] Government had declared and recognized surveillance of Nicaragua as a "high priority." The Court cannot of course conclude from this that no transborder traffic in arms existed, although it does not seem particularly unreasonable to believe that traffic of this kind, had it been persistent and on a significant scale, must inevitably have been discovered, in view of the magnitude of the resources used for that purpose. The Court merely takes note that the allegations of arms-trafficking are not solidly established; it has not, in any event, been able to satisfy itself that any continuing flow on a significant scale took place after the early months of 1981.

The Court also ruled (pp. 126-128, especially paragraphs 249 and 252) that, as a matter of law, even if such an arms supply existed, it would not constitute "armed attack" justifying a U.S. response, as the U.S. government had claimed. See also chapter 3 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 43, 44 and 45.

25. For a foreign report of Nicaraguans' ability to locate contra arms-supply flights, see for example, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, "Who Helped Oliver North?," *Spectator* (U.K.), May 16, 1987, p. 13 ("Captain Ricardo Wheelock, the head of the Sandinista military intelligence, was even able to give us fairly precise details of these flights, but nobody bothered to chase the story until Eugene Hasenfus [a C.I.A. pilot] was shot down and captured last October"). See also footnote 27 of this chapter.

26. For LeMoyné's story on arms supplies to El Salvador, see James LeMoyné, "Latin Pact Seen as Helpful to Duarte," *New York Times*, August 13, 1987, p. A10 ("The rebels deny receiving such support from Nicaragua, but ample evidence shows it exists, and it is questionable how long they could survive without it").

27. On escalating U.S. supply flights after the peace accords, see for example, U.N. General Assembly [Plenary Meetings], A/42/P.V.67, November 16, 1987, p. 7 (report of 275 supply and surveillance flights detected from August 7, 1987 to November 3, 1987). Chomsky clarifies his point about the United States's actions (*Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies*, Boston: South End, 1989, p. 92):

The United States was of course not a signatory, so technically speaking it could not "violate" the accords. An honest accounting, however, would have noted -- indeed,

emphasized -- that the United States acted at once to render the accords nugatory. Nothing of the sort is to be found.

28. On Lelyveld's letter, see Fairness and Accuracy In Reporting, "LIE: The Sandinistas seek to export their revolution by arming Salvadoran guerrillas," *Extra!*, October/November 1987, p. 5 (Lelyveld stated that LeMoyne's terminology was "imprecise," but "even our best correspondents -- and James LeMoyne is one of our best -- are not perfect").

29. For repetitions of the arms flow falsehood in the *New York Times*, see for example, statements and assumptions in George Volsky, "Contras Agree to Attend Truce Talks," *New York Times*, January 18, 1988, p. A6; Stephen Engelberg, "Salvador Rebel Arms: Noriega Link?," *New York Times*, December 18, 1987, p. A8; Bernard Trainor, "Contras' Future: Crippled as Warriors," *New York Times*, April 3, 1988, section 1, p. 16.

30. For the interchange of letters with Lelyveld, see Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, "The New York Times Recants," *Extra!*, Vol. 2, No. 2, September/October 1988, p. 2.

31. For LeMoyne's final story on the topic, see James LeMoyne, "Salvador Rebels: Where Do They Get the Arms?," *New York Times*, November 24, 1988, p. A14. An excerpt:

The charges are extremely difficult to prove. Evidence of Sandinista support for the rebels is largely circumstantial and is open to differing interpretations. It includes accounts of deserters who could lie or exaggerate.

32. For discussion of the media as a propaganda organ, see chapter 1 of *U.P.*

33. For the Congressional report on COINTELPRO, see U.S. Senate, Final Report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, *Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans*, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, Report No. 94-755, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, Books II and III, especially Book III, p. 223. This report extensively reviews the F.B.I.'s COINTELPRO program; provides reprints of F.B.I. memoranda and fake letters sent to disrupt and promote violence within activist groups; and also documents the Bureau's role in the killing of Black Panther leader Fred Hampton on December 4, 1969.

The extensive literature on COINTELPRO includes the following studies: James Kirkpatrick Davis, *Spying On America: The F.B.I.'s Domestic Counterintelligence Program*, New York: Praeger, 1992; Ross Gelbspan, *Break-ins, Death Threats, and the F.B.I.: The Covert War Against the Central America Movement*, Boston: South End, 1991; Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Wall, *The COINTELPRO Papers: Documents from the F.B.I.'s Secret Wars Against Dissent in the United States*, Boston: South End, 1990 (includes dozens of photographically-reproduced COINTELPRO documents, mostly stolen from top secret F.B.I. files); Brian Glick, *War at Home: Covert Action Against U.S. Activists and What We Can Do About It*, Boston: South End, 1989; Ward Churchill and James Vander Wall, *Agents of Repression: The F.B.I.'s Secret Wars on the Black Panther Party and the American Indian Movement*, Boston: South End, 1988;

Robert J. Goldstein, *Political Repression in Modern America, From 1870 to the Present*, Cambridge: Schenkman, 1978; Morton H. Halpern et al., *The Lawless State: The Crimes of U.S. Intelligence Agencies*, New York: Penguin, 1976; Nelson Blackstock, ed., *COINTELPRO: The F.B.I.'s Secret War on Political Freedom*, New York: Random House, 1976 (includes dozens of reproduced documents). See also, John C. Stauber and Sheldon Rampton, *Toxic Sludge Is Good For You!: Lies, Damn Lies and the Public Relations Industry*, Monroe, ME: Common Courage, 1995, especially ch. 5 (on COINTELPRO-style tactics that are being carried out by corporations, with the assistance of P.R. firms).

On the scale of the COINTELPRO program, see for example, Frank J. Donner, *The Age of Surveillance: The Aims and Methods of America's Political Intelligence System*, New York: Knopf, 1980. An excerpt (pp. 127, 131, 137):

Despite widespread criticism of over-targeting, as late as 1975 the [F.B.I.] was conducting surveillance of 1100 organizations and their subdivisions. But this is only the tip of the iceberg. Thousands of individuals fall under intelligence scrutiny, either as primary targets or as the subject of an "investigative matter" as a result of their suspected or confirmed involvement in group activities. Thus, the G.A.O. [Congress's General Accounting Office] . . . concludes that in 1974, out of a sample of some 19,659 domestic intelligence case files, about 90 percent (17,528) involved individual targets investigated because of a suspected relationship (membership, support) to a target group or, in a relatively small number of cases, because of a suspected personal involvement in an activity, such as a demonstration. This concentration on individuals accounts for the enormous number, 930,000 in all, of investigations conducted by the Bureau from 1955 to 1978. In a single year, 1972, the Bureau opened some 65,000 domestic files with an internal or national security classification. . . .

While Do Not File procedures for destroying records of burglaries as well as cover-ups of field data preclude an accurate compilation, a more realistic estimate of burglaries to steal information and forcible entries to install microphones from the early forties until the early seventies against domestic targets is close to 7500. . . . [T]he relative prominence of informers as a surveillance tool [is] corroborated by subsequent government submissions in the course of litigation: from 1940 until April 1978, the F.B.I. deployed some 37,000 informers -- 29,166 in classification 134 (security) and 7893 in 170 (racial and extremist). . . . Even as late as 1976, in the face of mounting criticism, the F.B.I. fiscal year budget allocated \$7,401,000 for its political informer programs, more than twice the budget for organized crime informers. See also, William M. Kunstler, "Writers of the Purple Page," *Nation*, December 30, 1978, pp. 721f (presenting stories of F.B.I. anonymous mailings to employers, loved ones, and organizations to help destroy activists' lives and thereby help neutralize them, and to fragment and divert activist groups); John Kifner, "F.B.I., Before Raid, Gave Police Plan of Chicago Panther's Flat," *New York Times*, May 25, 1974, p. A14 (on the Fred Hampton assassination).

34. On the bombing of Cambodia being "secret" due to the U.S. media's failure to report what they knew, see for example, U.S. Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, *Bombing in Cambodia*, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, July/August 1974, pp. 158-160. These hearings confirm that information about the U.S. bombings of Cambodia was publicly available as early as nine days after they began, with a March 27, 1969, Press Release from the Royal

Government of Cambodia, distributed through the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. This Press Release stated that "the Cambodian population living in the border regions has been bombed and strafed almost daily by U.S. aircraft, and the number of people killed, as well as material destruction, continues to grow." On April 2, 1969, the same source then distributed excerpts from a press conference held by the reigning monarch of Cambodia, Prince Sihanouk, in which he stated:

[The media] pretend that I would not oppose U.S. bombings of communist targets within my frontiers. But I have never said that I would not oppose this. Nobody, no chief of state in the world placed in the same same [sic] situation as I am, would agree to let foreign aircraft bomb his own country. . . . It is not only the communists who receive U.S. bombs on their heads. Unarmed and innocent people have been victims of U.S. bombs. You know very well that in Cambodia . . . we were very bitter and angry [at] news about the latest bombing, the victims of which were Khmer peasants, women and children in particular. I wish to reaffirm that I have always been opposed to the bombings.

Prince Sihanouk then appealed to the Western press "to publicize abroad this very clear stand of Cambodia -- that is, I will in any case oppose all bombings on Cambodian territory under whatever pretext. I will oppose them under whatever pretext for the simple reason, I repeat, that the victims of U.S. bombings are never the communists but only the peasants and children." Sihanouk's opposition to the American bombing has since been erased from history. See for example, Seth Mydans, "Death of Pol Pot," *New York Times*, April 17, 1998, p. A14 (claiming that Sihanouk did not oppose the U.S. bombing).

See also, Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*, New York: Pantheon, 1988, pp. 274-280 (reviewing the dispatches from Cambodia which actually appeared in the U.S. press); Noam Chomsky, *At War With Asia: Essays on Indochina*, New York: Pantheon, 1970, pp. 122-125 (referring to numerous publicly available sources on the U.S. bombing of Cambodia, including a Cambodian Government White Paper of January 3, 1970, years before there was coverage of it by the U.S. press); Noam Chomsky, "Nixon's defenders do have a case," *More*, December 1975, pp. 28-29.

35. On the casualty figures for the U.S. bombing of Cambodia, see chapter 3 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 61, 62 and 63.

36. On the popularity of the daily labor press in England and its audience's involvement, but its fatal inability to attract capital, see for example, James Curran, "Advertising and the Press," in James Curran, ed., *The British Press: a Manifesto*, London: MacMillan, 1978, pp. 229-267. An excerpt (pp. 251-253):

The *Daily Herald's* central problem was not that it appealed to fewer people but that it appealed to the wrong people. . . . [The *Daily Herald* appealed] overwhelmingly to working-class rather than to middle-class readers. These characteristics had correlates in terms of purchasing behaviour that made the *Daily Herald* a highly marginal advertising medium. . . . But if the *Daily Herald* was lacking in appeal to advertisers it did not lack in appeal to a section of the general public. . . . The *Daily Herald* "idea" may be regarded as misguided, its readers can be dismissed as being of no social consequence. But there were, as it happens, a lot of them -- in fact over five times as many readers as those of *The* [London] *Times*. . . . With 4.7 million readers in the last year, the *Daily Herald* actually had almost double the readership of *The Times*, the *Financial Times* and the *Guardian* combined. Indeed, when it was

forced to close, the *Daily Herald* was probably amongst the twenty largest circulation dailies in the world. It died, not from lack of readers, but because its readers did not constitute a valuable advertising market. Regular *Daily Herald* readers were also exceptionally devoted to their paper. Unpublished survey research shows that *Daily Herald* readers thought more highly of [and read more in] their paper than the regular readers of any other popular newspaper. . . .

[T]he *Daily Herald* was only one of a number of casualties of the advertising licensing system. The *News Chronicle*, a legatee of the dissenting radical, liberal tradition, was forced to close in 1960 with a circulation six times that of the *Guardian*, and over double that of *The Times* and the *Guardian* combined. It paid a heavy price for appealing to an inferior quality of reader (even though its readers were almost as devoted as *Herald* readers). . . . The radical *Sunday Citizen* . . . also finally succumbed in 1967, after being progressively strangled by lack of advertising support.

Similarly, the study describes how the mainstream London *Times* lost money in the late 1960s and early 1970s by seeking a wider readership. Although its circulation rose by fully 69 percent through "an aggressive promotion campaign that recruited large numbers of lower-middle and even working-class readers," that change did not create a corresponding increase in advertising to offset the costs, and the paper "was forced to set about shedding part of its new readership as a conscious act of management policy" (p. 258).

See also, Martin A. Lee and Norman Solomon, *Unreliable Sources: A Guide to Detecting Bias in News Media*, New York: Lyle Stuart, 1990, p. 59 ("T.V. and radio get nearly 100 percent of their income from advertisers, newspapers 75 percent, and magazines about 50 percent. . . . Between 60 and 70 percent of newspaper space is reserved for ads, while 22 percent of T.V. time is filled with commercials"); Erik Barnouw, *The Sponsor: Notes on a Modern Potentate*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1978 (on the constraining influences of advertising on the media); Ben H. Bagdikian, *The Media Monopoly*, Boston: Beacon, Fifth Edition, 1997 (original 1983), especially chs. 6 to 9; James Curran and Jean Seaton, *Power Without Responsibility: The Press and Broadcasting in Britain*, London: Routledge, 1981, pp. 118-132; Alfred McClung Lee, *The Daily Newspaper in America: The Evolution of a Social Instrument*, New York: Macmillan, 1937. And see chapter 1 of *U.P.* and its footnote 54.

37. For the "breed, and bleed, and advertise their misery" statement, see Ruth Wisse [then a Professor at McGill University in Montreal, now a Professor at Harvard and Director of its Center for Jewish Studies], "Israel and the Intellectuals: A Failure of Nerve?," *Commentary*, May 1988, p. 20. The quotation in the text is exact.

38. For commentary in Israel on Palestinians "raising their heads" and similar degradation, see for example, Gad Lior, *Yediot Achronot* (Israel), January 24, 1988; Shulamith Hareven, *Yediot Achronot* (Israel), March 25, 1988; Avigdor Feldman, *Hadashot* (Israel), January 1, 1988; Amnon Denkner, *Ha'aretz* (Israel), January 9, 1994; Olek Netzer, *Davar* (Israel), January 20, 1993; Zvi Barel, *Ha'aretz* (Israel), April 20, 1982; Yedidia Segal, *Nekudah* (Israel), September 3, 1982.

On the conditions under which the Palestinians have lived since the 1967 Israeli occupation, see for example, Raymonda Hawa Tawil, *My Home, My Prison*, New York: Holt, Rinehart, 1980; Rafik Halabi, *The West Bank Story*, New York: Harcourt Brace,

1981; Raja Shehadeh, *The Third Way: A Journal of Life in the West Bank*, London: Quartet, 1982; Norman G. Finkelstein, *The Rise and Fall of Palestine: A Personal Account of the Intifada Years*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.

In a stirring early account -- unfortunately now out of print -- Chomsky described some of these conditions in more detail (*Towards A New Cold War: Essays on the Current Crisis and How We Got There*, New York: Pantheon, 1982, pp. 275-278):

Occasional reports in the U.S. press of the more sensational incidents (e.g. the terrorist bombings in which two West Bank mayors were severely injured, or the practice of firing on demonstrators) do not give an adequate picture of the real story of systematic degradation, humiliation, and suppression of even the most minimal form of national self-expression. The character of the occupation is revealed more clearly by these regular practices. A few examples will serve to illustrate the general picture.

In a Jerusalem suburb, the army forced hundreds of inhabitants from their homes at midnight, then "concentrating" them outdoors a kilometer away for a two-hour lecture warning against "rioting." A man of sixty-five who was ill was compelled to go by force. Inhabitants of the Daheisha refugee camp south of Bethlehem complain that on the night of December 25, 1979, the camp was surrounded by soldiers and all inhabitants between the ages of fourteen and sixty-five were compelled to stand outside in a driving rain from midnight to noon the next day while soldiers searched the houses; the governor warned of similar punishments if children continued to throw stones at Israeli cars. A man who asked why he was being arrested was beaten up while soldiers broke furniture in his house. On January 29, four hundred males from ages ten to seventy were again dragged from their houses at eight P.M. and made to stand outside in a cold winter rain for thirteen hours. The same thing happened at the refugee camp of Jalazoun, where inhabitants were compelled to spend an entire night out of doors in a snowstorm: "Children had probably thrown stones at Israeli cars after the chemistry laboratory of the school was destroyed by settlers, who did this in retaliation for stones being thrown, probably following cars being sabotaged in the camp by settlers, after children threw stones, etc., etc., etc." Refugees report that "the new method, actually not so new, but much more sophisticated, is humiliation. The soldiers and the settlers want first of all to humiliate us. But they don't understand that we have lost everything and the only thing we have left is our honor and that they will never be able to take that away from us." Shortly after, thousands of dunams of cultivated land were sprayed by planes with herbicides in villages near Hebron, partly within the Green Line and partly within the occupied West Bank; several weeks earlier the same punishment had been meted out by the Green patrol, under the command of Minister of Agriculture (now Minister of Defense) Ariel Sharon, in the area of Kafr Kassem.

"Residents of Silwad village, north of Ramallah, complain that during a curfew that was imposed last weekend on the village by the military government, soldiers broke into their homes, and that some of them beat up youths, humiliated adults and old people, stole vast sums of Israeli and foreign currency, and destroyed large quantities of food." The reporter, Yehuda Litani, writes that "at first I could not believe what I heard, but the details (which were also told to other reporters) were repeated again and again in all versions by different people in the village. Only one woman lodged a complaint, the others felt that it was useless to complain." Soldiers terrorized the village, beating old people and children with their hands and rifle butts. An eleven-month-old baby was taken out of a cradle and thrown on the floor. Schoolbooks and children's notebooks were destroyed. "Their whole aim was to

take revenge on us and to humiliate us," one villager reported. Brutal treatment continued when some were taken away for questioning. It was later announced that investigators "had verified some of the villagers' complaints."

There are many similar reports. Dani Rubinstein writes in *Davar* (May 9, 1980) that he witnessed a search in a West Bank refugee camp after two children had thrown stones at a military vehicle, during which all men and children from the camp were forced to sit out of doors for two whole days for intense questioning: "One of the officers who had conducted the questioning told me that he doesn't know whether he will find the two children, but he is sure that during the long hours of questioning under the hot sun many other children will decide to throw stones at us at the first opportunity." Amnon Kapeliouk reports that his daughter saw five soldiers "beating an Arab merchant who shut down his shop" in the Old City of Jerusalem; he reports also that all telephones in Bethlehem had been cut off for the past month and a half (*Al Hamishmar*, June 13, 1980). Knesset member Uri Avneri read in the Knesset a letter by soldiers reporting instructions concerning curfew violations given to them by a senior officer: "Anybody you catch outside his home -- first thing you beat him with a truncheon all over his body, except for his head. Don't have pity on anyone. Don't explain anything. Beat first, then, after you have finished, explain why. . . . If you catch a small child, get out the whole family, line them up and beat the father before all his children. Don't consider the beating a right; it is your duty -- they do not understand any other way."

It is standard practice in East Jerusalem and elsewhere for the military units to compel merchants at gunpoint to open their shops, sometimes after dragging them from their homes, to break business strikes. The army also arrested fifty-two members of the general committee of teachers who struck in violation of the governor's orders. Teachers report that they are beginning to think "that the military authorities and the Israeli government intend to starve the teachers in the West Bank so that in the end they shall all want to emigrate to the oil countries." The purpose of the collective punishments, Amnon Kapeliouk writes, is "to make the inhabitants want to leave . . . to make life unbearable and then the inhabitants will either rebel, and be expelled by means that are prepared for this event (as General Yariv has revealed, while condemning these horrifying plans) or they will prefer to leave voluntarily." The reference to General Yariv is in connection with his comment on "widely held opinions" in favor of exploiting any future war situation in order to expel seven to eight hundred thousand Arabs. Yariv stated that such opinions were circulating freely, and that he had received information that such a plan existed and that the means for its execution had been prepared. Yehuda Litani writes that a retired army officer told him that in 1969-70 there was an Israeli operation sponsored not by the army but by a "governmental body" (presumably, the secret police), with the full cooperation of the military administration, aimed at getting twenty thousand people from the refugee camps to leave the country (only ten thousand left).

Palestinian educational institutions have been the target of particular brutality. To cite only one example, in March 1978 Israeli troops surrounded a school in Beit Jala south of Jerusalem, "ordered the pupils, all in their early teens, to close their windows, then hurled beer-can-size canisters of U.S.-made antiriot gas into the packed classrooms. . . . The students in second-floor classes were so frightened that they leaped 18 ft. to the rocky ground below. Ten . . . were hospitalized with fractures; several, according to the head of the local hospital, will have lifelong limps. Though military authorities at first denied the incident, it was confirmed to *Time*

Jerusalem Bureau Chief Donald Neff by a score of local residents" (*Time*, April 3, 1978). There have been many similar cases.

Constraints on political expression have reached such a ludicrous extreme that even symbolic expression is banned. Painters are forbidden to exhibit their work because the military authorities claim that they have "political themes" -- e.g., a dove breaking out of prison. Or because they use the colors that appear on the Palestinian flag, whatever the theme. Under new laws, the curriculum of Palestinian educational institutions such as Bir Zeit College is controlled by the authorities; the college, in fact, barely functions because of regular military harassment. A Palestinian who owns a gallery from which paintings were confiscated comments that soon "they'll pass the 'Dream Law' (security) 1980 and throw us in prison for daring to dream about liberty and independence and prisons shall be filled with Palestinians." In fact, some two hundred thousand security prisoners and detainees have passed through Israeli jails, about 20 percent of the inhabitants of the territories; "this has led to horrendous overcrowding inside the jails, and to appalling human suffering and corruption." Reports of beatings and torture under interrogation, random arrests, endless harassment, and, in general, a pogrom-like atmosphere created both by settlers (who have a paramilitary status) and the military forces have become so common that it is almost superfluous to cite specific examples.

On torture of Palestinians during the Israeli occupation, see for example, "Israel and Torture," *Sunday Times* (London), June 19, 1977, pp. 1, 16-21 (careful and detailed study by the London *Sunday Times* Insight Team, which was offered to both the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* but rejected for publication). An excerpt:

[T]orture [of Palestinians] takes place in at least six centres. . . . All of Israel's security services are implicated. . . . Torture is organised so methodically that it cannot be dismissed as a handful of "rogue cops" exceeding orders. It is systematic. It appears to be sanctioned at some level as deliberate policy.

Torture seems to be used for three purposes. The first is, of course, to extract information. The second motive, which seems at least as common, is to induce people to confess to "security" offenses, of which they may, or may not, be guilty. The extracted confession is then used as the principal evidence in court: Israel makes something of the fact that it has few political prisoners in its jails, only those duly convicted according to law. The third purpose appears to be to persuade Arabs in the occupied territories that it is least painful to behave passively.

See also, U.N. General Assembly Special Political Committee, document A/SPC/32/L.12, November 11, 1977 (60 pages of testimony before the U.N. Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, by two members of the *Sunday Times* Insight Team, Paul Eddy and Peter Gillman); Amnesty International, *Five Years after the Oslo Agreement*, September 1998 (estimating that 1600 Palestinians are routinely arrested by Israeli military forces every year, half "systematically tortured"); Amnesty International, *Human Rights and U.S. Security Assistance 1995, 1996* ("Palestinians under interrogation continue to be systematically tortured or ill-treated"; thousands of Palestinians were detained on such charges as opposing "the peace process," while some have "been detained for nine years without trial"); Human Rights Watch, *Torture and Ill-Treatment: Israel's Interrogation of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories*, 1994 (condemning Israel's "systematic torture and ill-treatment of Palestinians under interrogation"); Nicholas Guyatt, *The Absence of Peace: Understanding the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, London: Zed, 1998, especially ch. 4.

Several forms of systematic and routine torture of Palestinian detainees finally were formally outlawed by the Israeli Supreme Court in 1999, pending their potential reinstatement by the Israeli legislature. See for example, Deborah Sontag, "Israel Court Bans Most Use Of Force In Interrogations," *New York Times*, September 7, 1999, p. A1 ("the Israeli Supreme Court today unexpectedly outlawed the security service's routine practice of using physically coercive interrogation methods, which critics have long denounced as torture," although the Court "suggested that Parliament draft legislation if it wanted to override the ruling").

On conditions for the Palestinians, see also chapter 8 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 77 and 78.

39. On the pre-Gulf War international consensus on a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, see chapter 5 of *U.P.* and its footnote 104.

40. It might be noted that, despite misrepresentations sometimes leveled against him to the contrary, Chomsky's stance on a preferred settlement in the Middle East has remained consistent since his first publications on the topic. See for example, Noam Chomsky, *Peace in the Middle East? Reflections on Justice and Nationhood*, New York: Pantheon, 1974, especially ch. 3, pt. II. An excerpt (pp. 132, 138):

A fifth approach [to a settlement] is the federal model . . . with federated republics, each dominated by one national group, and efforts, one would hope, to achieve social, economic, and political parity. With all of its problems, this approach has possibilities. The inevitable discrimination in a multinational society in which one group dominates might be relieved through the federal structure. . . . A federal approach would imply that in the short run, at least, Palestinian Arabs who wish to return to their former homes within the Jewish-dominated region would have to abandon their hopes; and, correspondingly, that Jews who wish to settle in the Arab-dominated region would be unable to do so. Personally, I feel that among those policies that are at all realistic, given present circumstances, some kind of federal solution is the most desirable. . . .

Surely it is obvious that a critical analysis of Israeli institutions and practices does not in itself imply antagonism to the people of Israel, denial of the national rights of the Jews of Israel, or lack of concern for their just aspirations and needs. The demand for equal rights for Palestinians does not imply a demand for Arab dominance in the former Palestine, or a denial of Jewish national rights. The same is true of critical analysis that questions the existence of the state institutions in their present form.

Noam Chomsky, *Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians*, Boston: South End, 1983. An excerpt (p. 39):

I will adopt [certain assumptions] as a framework for discussion. The first of these is the principle that Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs are human beings with human rights, equal rights; more specifically, they have essentially equal rights within the territory of the former Palestine. Each group has a valid right to national self-determination in this territory. Furthermore, I will assume that the State of Israel within its pre-June 1967 borders had, and retains, whatever one regards as the valid rights of any state within the existing international system.

For Chomsky's view of the P.L.O., see chapter 8 of *U.P.* and its footnote 87.

41. On Kissinger's goal of producing a "stalemate," see Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1979. An excerpt (pp. 1279, 1291):

In late February [1971], [U.N. Mediator] Jarring's explorations foundered on the Israeli refusal to accept the principle of return to the 1967 borders and the Egyptian insistence on such a principle. Jarring had made some progress, however; Egypt had agreed to a peace agreement, rather than a mere declaration of non-belligerency, if Israel returned to the 1967 borders. But since that was adamantly refused, the Jarring mission was in effect over. There was some sentiment in the U.S. government for imposing the Rogers Plan on the Israelis. But the President had no stomach for it in the middle of the Laotian crisis. And it made no strategic sense. As long as Egypt was in effect a Soviet military base, we could have no incentive to turn on an ally on behalf of a Soviet client. This is why I was always opposed to comprehensive solutions that would be rejected by both parties and that could only serve Soviet ends by either demonstrating our impotence or being turned into a showcase of what could be exacted by Moscow's pressure. My aim was to produce a stalemate until Moscow urged compromise or until, even better, some moderate Arab regime decided that the route to progress was through Washington. . . .

During March [1972], [Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.] Dobrynin was pressing me to formulate a more comprehensive peace program of our own. . . . My strategy had not changed. Until some Arab state showed a willingness to separate from the Soviets, or the Soviets were prepared to dissociate from the maximum Arab program, we had no reason to modify our policy.

Chomsky remarks about this passage (*World Orders Old and New*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, p. 209):

These comments are remarkable. Of the two major Arab states, Egypt was plainly showing "a willingness to separate from the Soviets," and the question doesn't arise for Saudi Arabia, which did not even have diplomatic relations with the hated Russians -- who had, furthermore, never associated themselves with the "maximum Arab program" but kept well within the international consensus. As Senate Foreign Relations Committee Middle East specialist Seth Tillman pointed out, "the official Soviet position has been consistent since 1948 in support of Israel's right to exist and consistent since 1967 in support of Israel's right to a secure national existence, as called for in Security Council Resolution 242, within its 1967 borders" [see Seth Tillman, *The United States in the Middle East*, Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1982, p. 246].

42. The reference to using Israel as a counterweight to "radical Arab nationalism" is in a declassified policy paper prepared by the National Security Council Planning Board commenting on the Memorandum. See "Issues Arising Out of the Situation in the Near East," July 29, 1958, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960*, Vol. XII ("Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula"), Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993, pp. 114-124 at p. 119 (the exact words are: "if we choose to combat radical Arab nationalism and to hold Persian Gulf oil by force if necessary, a logical corollary would be to support Israel as the only strong pro-West power left in the Near East").

The Memorandum identifying Arab nationalism as "inimical to Western interests" is N.S.C. [National Security Council Memorandum] 5801/1, "Statement By The National Security Council Of Long-Range U.S. Policy Toward The Near East," January 24, 1958, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960*, Vol. XII ("Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula"), Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993, pp. 17-32. An excerpt (pp. 18, 20-22, 31):

The Near East is of great strategic, political, and economic importance to the Free World. The area contains the greatest petroleum resources in the world and essential facilities for the transit of military forces and Free World commerce. . . . The strategic resources are of such importance to the Free World, particularly Western Europe, that it is in the security interest of the United States to make every effort to insure that these resources will be available and will be used for strengthening the Free World. . . .

Current conditions of and political trends in the Near East are inimical to Western interests. In the eyes of the majority of Arabs the United States appears to be opposed to the realization of the goals of Arab nationalism. They believe that the United States is seeking to protect its interest in Near East oil by supporting the status quo and opposing political or economic progress. . . . [T]he *mystique* of Arab unity has become a basic element of Arab political thought. Our economic and cultural interests in the area have led not unnaturally to close U.S. relations with elements in the Arab world whose primary interest lies in the maintenance of relations with the West and the status quo in their countries. . . . These relations have contributed to a widespread belief in the area that the United States desires to keep the Arab world disunited and is committed to work with "reactionary" elements to that end. The U.S.S.R., on the other hand, is not inhibited in proclaiming all-out support for Arab unity and for the most extreme Arab nationalist aspirations, because it has no stake in the economic or political status quo in the area. . . .

The area's indigenous institutions and religions lack vigor (partly as a result of the impact of nearly 200 years of Western culture), and native resistance to Communism per se has, therefore, been disappointing. Furthermore, Communist police-state methods seem no worse than similar methods employed by Near East regimes, including some of those supported by the United States. . . .

Where the United States and its friends seek a level of stability in the area to permit peaceful economic and social progress, nationalist Arabs and the Soviets need continuing chaos in order to pursue their separate aims. Many Arabs remain unconvinced of their stake in the future of the Free World. They believe that our concern over Near East petroleum as essential to the Western alliance, our desires to create indigenous strength to resist Communist subversion or domination, our efforts to maintain existing military transit and base rights and deny them to the U.S.S.R., are a mere cover for a desire to divide and dominate the area. . . . Of the countries covered by this paper . . . [o]nly Israel would be capable of effective delaying action against a military power. . . .

[The United States should] be prepared, when required, to come forward, as was done in Iran [i.e. in a C.I.A. coup in 1953], with formulas designed to reconcile vital Free World interests in the area's petroleum resources with the rising tide of nationalism in the area.

See also, "Petroleum Policy of the United States," Memorandum of U.S.

Department of State, April 11, 1944, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944*, Vol. V ("The Near East, South Asia, Africa, The Far East"), Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965, pp. 27-33. An excerpt (p. 30):

Furthermore, and of greater importance, United States policy should, in general, aim to assure to this country, in the interest of security, a substantial and geographically diversified holding of foreign petroleum resources in the hands of United States nationals. This would involve the preservation of the absolute position presently obtaining, and therefore vigilant protection of existing concessions in United States

hands coupled with insistence upon the Open Door principle of equal opportunity for United States companies in new areas.

For commentary about the Third World in general in declassified U.S. government documents, see chapter 2 of *U.P.* and its footnote 52; and chapter 5 of *U.P.* and its footnote 32. See also chapter 1 of *U.P.* and its footnote 14.

43. On U.S. planners' recognition of a tripartite system in the Middle East, see for example, Senator Henry Jackson [the Senate's ranking oil expert], *Congressional Record*, May 21, 1973. An excerpt (pp. 16264-16265):

Mr. President, such stability as now obtains in the Middle East is, in my view, largely the result of the strength and Western orientation of Israel on the Mediterranean and Iran on the Persian Gulf. These two countries, reliable friends of the United States, together with Saudi Arabia, have served to inhibit and contain those irresponsible and radical elements in certain Arab States -- such as Syria, Libya, Lebanon, and Iraq -- who, were they free to do so, would pose a grave threat indeed to our principal sources of petroleum in the Persian Gulf. Among the many anomalies of the Middle East must surely be counted the extent to which Saudi Arabia and the sheikhdoms -- from which, along with Iran, most of our imported oil will flow in the years ahead [i.e. until 1968 the Western Hemisphere was the major global oil producer] -- will depend for regional stability on the ability of Israel to help provide an environment in which moderate regimes in Lebanon and Jordan can survive and in which Syria can be contained. Iran, without whose protective weight Kuwait would almost certainly fall to Iraq, plays a similar and even more direct role in the gulf itself. . . .

The fact is, of course, that the principal threat to the oil producing countries of the Middle East and Persian Gulf is not Israel, but, rather, the have-not Arab States: Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Yemen. These Arab States, impoverished as they are and plagued by the most severe developmental problems, view the great riches of the oil producing states as a potential solution to their economic development problems.

Report of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources (Henry M. Jackson, Chairman), *Access to Oil -- The United States Relationships with Saudi Arabia and Iran*, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977 (Publication No. 95-70).

See also, Israel Shahak, "How Israel's strategy favours Iraq over Iran," *Middle East International*, March 19, 1993, p. 19. An excerpt:

In a remarkably forthright article in *Yediot Aharonot* in April 1992, [former commander of Israeli military intelligence General (reserve) Shlomo] Gazit lays bare the more decisive and lasting aspects of Israel's traditional role as a strategic asset for the West, especially after the demise of the U.S.S.R.[:]

"Israel's main task has not changed at all, and it remains of crucial importance. Its location at the center of the Arab-Muslim Middle East predestines Israel to be a devoted guardian of stability in all the countries surrounding it. Its [role] is to protect the existing regimes: to prevent or halt the processes of radicalization and to block the expansion of fundamentalist religious zealotry. . . ."

In Gazit's view, Israel thus performs a vital service in guaranteeing regional stability. Without Israel, the West would have to perform this role by itself.

On Israel and Iran being tacit allies, see for example, Uri Lubrani [Israeli Ambassador to Iran from 1973 to 1978], "Allon in the Palace of the Shah," *Davar* (Israel), April 20, 1980 (Independence Day Supplement)(reporting that "the entire upper echelon of the Israeli political leadership" visited Iran, including David Ben-Gurion, Golda Meir,

Abba Eban, Yitzhak Rabin, Yigal Allon, Moshe Dayan, and Menahem Begin)(title and quotation are Chomsky's own translations); Richard T. Sale, "S.A.V.A.K.: A Feared and Pervasive Force," *Washington Post*, May 9, 1977, p. A1 ("Innumerable Iranians, including many in a position to know, told me that the Israelis oversee SAVAK's [Iranian secret police] techniques"). See also footnote 16 of chapter 1 of *U.P.*

44. On Israel as a U.S. mercenary state, see chapter 1 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 11 and 16.

45. On U.S. aid to Israel, see for example, Donald Neff, "Massive aid to Israel," *Middle East International*, July 21, 1995, p. 8. An excerpt:

For the past decade, Israel has been receiving annually, as non-repayable grants, \$3bn and, for keeping its peace with Israel, Egypt has been getting \$2.2bn. Through special deals, grants from other programmes and loan guarantees, Israel's total contribution from the U.S. came to \$6,321,000,000 in fiscal 1993. . . . Israel's aid includes \$1.2bn in economic assistance (the rest goes to military transfers). The economic aid goes directly into Israel's budget without any pretense of being targeted for specific projects, as in other countries. In other words, Israel gets a direct boost to its treasury of \$1.2bn every year as though its own taxpayers had paid it. Yet Israel's economy is in its best shape ever . . . and Israelis are enjoying a lifestyle far beyond that of most people of the world. . . . Congress has never bothered asking why a country this prosperous needs continued economic assistance, whose purpose is to help develop struggling economies, not augment ones already well developed. . . .

The magnitude of aid to Israel becomes starker when it is realised that Israel's population of around 5 million is only a thousandth of the world total of 5.5 billion people. This small number is getting about a quarter of all the money the U.S. is spending worldwide on foreign aid -- not counting the additional \$3.3bn Israel receives by other means from the U.S. or the \$2.2bn the U.S. pays annually to Egypt for keeping peace with Israel.

See also, Robert Gibson, "Unique Situation"; Israel: An Economic Ward of U.S.," *Los Angeles Times*, July 20, 1987, part 1, p. 1 ("No parallel exists in the history of international capital flow").

On total U.S. foreign aid, see footnote 28 of chapter 10 of *U.P.*

46. On U.S. moves to block a political settlement in the Middle East before 1994, see footnotes 41, 47, 48, 49 and 56 of this chapter. On the Oslo Agreements as an outright imposition of U.S. and Israeli will, see chapter 5 of *U.P.* and its footnote 111; and the text of chapter 8 of *U.P.*

47. On Sadat's 1971 offer and its rejection, see for example, John Norton Moore, ed., *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974, Vol. 3, pp. 1106-1125, especially pp. 1107, 1110 (reproducing the documents). Offered through U.N. mediator Gunnar Jarring, the text of the 1971 plan accepted by Sadat included "respect for and acknowledgment of . . . [Israel's] sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence," and Israelis' "right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries"; there was no mention of a Palestinian state. The Israeli government welcomed the plan as a genuine offer of "a peace agreement," but stated that "Israel will

not withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines" -- thus rejecting it, and effectively terminating the initiative.

For acknowledgments in Israel of the offer, see for example, Editorial, *Ha'aretz* (Israel), October 8, 1981 ("Sadat was the first Arab leader who, a year after coming to power, declared his willingness to make peace with Israel in his famous reply to Dr. Jarring's memorandum")(quotation is Chomsky's own translation); Mordechai Gur, *Ma'ariv* (Israel), October 11, 1981 ("In February 1971 [Sadat] said that he was prepared to make peace with Israel")(quotation is Chomsky's own translation); Yitzhak Rabin, *The Rabin Memoirs*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996 (expanded edition; original 1979), p. 192. In these memoirs, Rabin describes Sadat's acceptance of the "famous" Jarring proposal as a "milestone" on the path to peace, the proposal having been a "bombshell." In contrast, in the U.S., the facts have disappeared -- see footnote 49 of this chapter. For an acknowledgment by Kissinger of Egyptian willingness to enter a peace agreement, see footnote 41 of this chapter.

48. On the 1976 offer at the U.N. Security Council and its rejection, see for example, Kathleen Teltsch, "U.S. Casts Veto On Mideast Plan In U.N.'s Council," *New York Times*, January 27, 1976, pp. 1, 4 (reproducing the text of the 1976 Security Council Resolution, which incorporated the wording of U.N. Resolution 242, but added a provision for a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; this proposal also was supported by the P.L.O.); "Palestine Guerrillas Seek to Close Ranks for War," *New York Times*, March 1, 1976, p. 4 (describing the U.S. veto of the 1976 U.N. peace initiative as a serious blow to Palestinian hopes for a negotiated settlement).

49. For examples of how rejected Arab peace offers have been eliminated from history in the U.S., see Thomas L. Friedman, "Seeking Peace in Mideast," *New York Times*, March 17, 1985, section 1, p. 1 (chronologically listing U.S. and U.N. Security Council proposals, but ignoring all of the Arab proposals prior to those that led to the Camp David Accords of 1978); Eric Pace, "Anwar el-Sadat, the Daring Arab Pioneer of Peace With Israel," *New York Times*, October 7, 1981, p. A10 (explicitly denying the facts, and referring to Sadat's trip to Jerusalem in 1977 as follows: "Reversing Egypt's longstanding policy, [Sadat] proclaimed his willingness to accept Israel's existence as a sovereign state"). See also, Edward Said and Christopher Hitchens, eds., *Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question*, London: Verso, 1988.

For contemporaneous reports of other rejected peace offers by Arab states, see for example, Bernard Gwertzman, "3 Key Arab Countries Link Signing Of Israel Treaty to Overall Accord," *New York Times*, August 21, 1977, p. 1. An excerpt:

Egypt, Syria and Jordan have informed the United States that they would sign peace treaties with Israel as part of an overall Middle East settlement. In addition Egypt and Jordan said they would consider a further American proposal that they also take up diplomatic relations with Israel. . . .

If the P.L.O. accepts United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967, which has been the basis for the negotiations, the United States -- but not Israel -- will talk with the group. . . . On the issue of the nature of peace the United States said that a settlement should go beyond a mere end of the state of war to include a peace treaty and normal ties between Israel and its Arab neighbors, including diplomatic relations. On the question of the final borders, the United States said Israel should withdraw in phases to secure and recognized borders -- as called for in Resolution

242 -- on the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian fronts, giving up the land captured in the 1967 war with minor modifications. On the Palestinian question, the United States said there should be a Palestinian "entity" the form of which should eventually be decided by self-determination of the Palestinians.

Peter Grose, "Only U.S. and Israel Are Opposed As U.N. Approves Geneva Talks," *New York Times*, December 10, 1976, p. A4 (reporting that the U.S. and Israel alone voted against an Egyptian proposal to convene a conference on the Middle East by March 1, 1977); Anna Safadi, "Fahmy names terms for M.E. settlement," *Jerusalem Post*, November 15, 1976, p. 1 (outlining Egyptian Prime Minister Ismail Fahmy's November 1976 peace offer, with its four conditions for a Middle East peace settlement: "Israel's withdrawal to the pre-1967 war frontiers; the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; the ban of nuclear weapons in the region; and the inspection of nuclear installations in the area -- specifically Israel's reactor in Dimona"). See also, Donald Neff, "The differing interpretations of Resolution 242," *Middle East International*, September 13, 1991, pp. 16-17 (noting that the secret State Department study of the negotiations leading to U.N. 242, leaked to the U.S. journalist and Middle East historian Neff, showed that the U.S. always shared the full Arab understanding of U.N. 242 requiring Israel to withdraw from the Occupied Territories seized in 1967). And see footnote 66 of this chapter.

For a list of U.S. vetoes of United Nations Security Council resolutions involving Israel from 1967 to February 1986 (20 in 20 years), see "Documentation," *American-Arab Affairs*, No. 32, Winter 1987-1988, pp. 144-145.

On the position of the Palestine Liberation Organization, see for example, Seth Tillman, *The United States in the Middle East: Interests and Obstacles*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982. An excerpt (pp. 217-218):

The present leadership of the P.L.O. had been ready for five years, and remained ready, said [Palestine National Council chairman Khalid] Fahoum, to open a dialogue with the United States, and it accepted the West-Bank-Gaza state. . . . In fact, said Fahoum, the P.L.O. accepted *all* United Nations resolutions pertaining to the Middle East adopted since 1947 and did so "without any reservations." "With open mind," Arafat added. . . .

Arafat spelled out the P.L.O.'s willingness to give de facto recognition to Israel and to renounce violence against it even more explicitly in an interview with Congressman Paul Findley of Illinois, the senior Republican on the House Middle East Subcommittee, on November 25, 1978. . . . Arafat issued the following statement: "The P.L.O. will accept an independent Palestinian state consisting of the West Bank and Gaza, with connecting corridor, and in that circumstance will renounce any and all violent means to enlarge the territory of that state. . . ." Arafat promised too, "We will give de facto recognition to the State of Israel," and gave assurance as well that "we would live at peace with all our neighbors. . . ." Findley concluded that Arafat's pledges to him met the conditions for American negotiations with the P.L.O. under the commitment made to Israel in September 1975 and that this justified "immediate talks with the P.L.O."

"Palestinians Back Peace Parley Role," *New York Times*, March 21, 1977, pp. 1, 5 (reporting that on March 20, 1977, the Palestinian National Council, the governing body of the P.L.O., issued a declaration calling for the establishment of "an independent national state" *in* Palestine, rather than a secular democratic state *of* Palestine, and authorizing Palestinian attendance at an Arab-Israeli peace conference; Prime Minister Rabin of Israel responded "that the only place the Israelis could meet the Palestinian

guerrillas was on the field of battle." The Rabin statement appeared under heading "Rabin Comments on Decisions"); David Hirst, "P.L.O. reaches limit of moderation," *Manchester Guardian Weekly* (U.K.), August 7, 1977, p. 6 (reporting that the P.L.O. leaked a "peace plan" in Beirut which stated that the famous Palestinian National Covenant would not serve as the basis for relations between Israel and a Palestinian state -- just as the founding principles of the World Zionist Organization were not understood as the basis for interstate relations -- and that any evolution beyond a two-state settlement "would be achieved by peaceful means"). In April and May of 1984, Arafat then made a series of statements in Europe and Asia calling for negotiations with Israel leading to mutual recognition; a United Press International article on these proposals was the featured front-page story in the *San Francisco Examiner*, and the facts were reported without prominence in the local quality American press -- but the U.S. national media suppressed the story outright, apart from a bare mention in the *Washington Post* some weeks later; the *New York Times* did not publish a word. See U.P.I., "Arafat wants Israel talks," *San Francisco Examiner*, May 5, 1984, p. 1. See also, Editorial, "A welcome move by the P.L.O.," *Christian Science Monitor*, November 16, 1988, p. 15. An excerpt:

By accepting United Nations Resolution 242 as a basis for Mideast peace, the Palestine Liberation Organization has taken a welcome step toward moderation. Its legislative arm, the Palestine National Council, now endorses a "two state" solution to the Arab-Israeli impasse.

The P.N.C., meeting in Algiers, has eased what had been a rock-bound determination not to recognize Israel. The U.N. resolution specifies the right of every state in the region, including (by implication) Israel, to live within secure boundaries. . . . Under the Palestinian proposal, U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338 (which implements 242) are to serve as a basis for an international peace conference, at which such thorny issues as the borders of a new Palestinian state would be resolved.

Chomsky remarked about the P.L.O. long before the Oslo Agreements of 1994 (*Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians*, Boston: South End, 1983, updated edition 1999, p. 164):

Quite generally, the P.L.O. has the same sort of legitimacy that the Zionist movement had in the pre-state period, a fact that is undoubtedly recognized at some level within Israel and, I think, accounts for the bitter hatred of the P.L.O.

50. For Will's article, see George Will, "MidEast Truth and Falsehood," *Newsweek*, August 2, 1982, p. 68 ("Sadat, remembered as a peacemaker, first made war. . . . Having failed to get to Jerusalem with Soviet tanks, Sadat went by Boeing 707"). On Sadat's earlier rejected peace offer, see footnote 47 of this chapter.

51. For *Newsweek's* article, see "Middle East: Small Blessings," *Newsweek*, February 8, 1971, p. 36. An excerpt:

In part, the Egyptian position [in a memorandum to U.N. special Mideast mediator Gunnar Jarring] echoed the U.N. resolution of November 1967, which called on Israel to withdraw from territories occupied during the six-day war. In exchange, Cairo promised to call an end to the state of war against Israel, respect Israel's territorial integrity and agree that Israel should have free access to all international waterways. . . . Security in the area could be guaranteed, the Egyptians added, by establishing demilitarized zones on both the Arab and Israeli sides of the frontier, zones that could be policed by a U.N. peace-keeping force made up, at least in part, of American,

Soviet, British and French troops. ("On no account," responded Mrs. Meir [the Israeli Prime Minister], "will a force of that kind come in place of secure, recognized and agreed borders.") . . .

[T]he Egyptian text specifically did not call for a Security Council meeting on the Middle East, a move that Cairo had been threatening and Jerusalem had warned would upset the Jarring applecart. Commented [Egyptian] Ambassador el-Zayyat: "We want Jarring's mission to succeed."

52. On the ambassadors' warnings to Kissinger, see for example, Charles William Maynes [*Foreign Policy* editor], "Military success breeds danger for Israel," *Boston Globe*, June 15, 1982, p. 15. An excerpt:

In the early 1970s, a similar act of neglect resulted in historic damage to U.S. interests. The Nixon administration sent a special envoy to a conference of U.S. ambassadors in the Mideast to announce . . . its belief that the region was not ripe for progress in the peace process. Consequently, Washington was going to suspend its efforts for awhile. To a man, the U.S. ambassadors replied that if the countries in the Mideast concluded that the process itself had ended, there would be a disastrous war. Several months later, Anwar Sadat moved Egyptian troops across the Suez Canal to begin the Yom Kippur War.

See also, Matti Golan, *The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger: Step-by-Step Diplomacy in the Middle East*, New York: Quadrangle/New York Times, 1976, p. 145 (Kissinger recalled: "[Hafez] Ismail told me several times that the present situation could not continue. He asked me whether the United States did not understand that if there weren't some agreement then there would be war").

53. On the oil companies' warnings, see for example, U.S. Senate, Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations by the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 2, 1975, Part III, Section VII, pp. 141-142.

54. On the intelligence view of the Arab armies, see for example, Norman G. Finkelstein, *Image And Reality Of The Israel-Palestine Conflict*, London: Verso, 1995. Some expressions of the general attitude (pp. 167-169):

Typically, General Ezer Weizman sneered "War, that's not for the Arabs." General and Professor Yehoshafat Harkabi "diagnosed" that Arabs were congenitally incapable of battle solidarity. . . . Two months before the October war, [Moshe] Dayan lectured the Israeli army's general staff that "the weakness of the Arabs arises from factors so deeply rooted that they cannot, in my view, be easily overcome: the moral, technical and educational backwardness of their soldiers," and that "the balance of forces is so much in our favor that it neutralizes the Arab considerations and motives for the immediate renewal of hostilities. . . ."

[Abba] Eban derisively recalls the "official doctrine . . . that an Egyptian assault would be drowned in a sea of blood, that the Arabs had no military option." He quotes from an article by [Yitzhak] Rabin in July 1973 that "reads like an anthology of all the misconceptions that were destined to explode a few weeks later": "Our present defense lines give us a decisive advantage in the Arab-Israel balance of strength. There is no need to mobilize our forces whenever we hear Arab threats. . . . The Arabs have little capacity for coordinating their military and political action. . . ."

Israel's military strength is sufficient to prevent the other side from gaining any military objective." "An atmosphere of 'manifest destiny,' regarding the neighboring people as 'lesser breeds without the law,'" Eban adds, "began to spread in the national discourse. [Ze'ev] Schiff casually mentions that the Israeli soldier's "nickname" for his opposite number in the Egyptian army was "monkey. . . ."

Crucially, Kissinger -- who effectively dictated U.S. policy, and thereby held a veto over Israeli policy, in the Middle East -- shared the belief that "war was not an Arab game." In a conversation with [Golda] Meir shortly after the war, Kissinger reportedly recalled: "Do you remember what we all thought before the war? -- that we never had it better, and therefore there was no hurry? We and you were both convinced that the Arabs had no military option which required serious diplomatic action. Instead of doing something we joked about the shoes the Egyptians left behind in 1967." Told by an Egyptian diplomat that "if there weren't some agreement then there would be war," Kissinger further rued, "in my heart I laughed and laughed. A war? Egypt? I regarded it as empty talk, a boast empty of content."

Matti Golan, *The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger: Step-by-Step Diplomacy in the Middle East*, New York: Quadrangle/New York Times, 1976, pp. 144-147 (on Kissinger's attitude).

55. For strategic analysts' recognitions about Camp David, see for example, Avner Yaniv, *Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy, and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. An excerpt (p. 70):

The Egyptian volte-face in 1977 was as momentous as the Egyptian decision in 1948 to join an Arab coalition in a military campaign against Israel. . . . [T]he Egyptian defection was bound to have a critical effect. Israel would be freed of the need to attend to an Egyptian front. Syria would become the mainstay of any future Arab campaign. Syria could not be expected to rally the same broad coalition that Egypt had so far led. The P.L.O. itself would lose much of its hard-won freedom of action and become as uncomfortably dependent on Syria's good will as it had been in the 1960s. Israel would be free to sustain military operations against the P.L.O. in Lebanon as well as settlement activity on the West Bank.

Harold H. Saunders, "Reconstituting the Arab-Israeli Peace Process," in William B. Quandt, ed., *The Middle East: Ten Years after Camp David*, Washington: Brookings Institution, 1988. An excerpt (p. 420):

[A]lthough the Camp David Accords gave lip service to Palestinian interests, they actually freed the Likud government in Israel to consolidate its hold on the West Bank and Gaza. Evidence shows a major Israeli push to enlarge the program of settlements in the West Bank from the period immediately after Camp David. . . . In the same vein, the Egyptian-Israeli peace freed Israel to invade Lebanon in 1982 to destroy or drive out the P.L.O.

Hillel Schenker, "Interview -- David Shipler [*New York Times* Israel correspondent]: a certain positive evolution," *New Outlook: Middle East Monthly* (Tel Aviv, Israel), May 1984, pp. 21-24. An excerpt (p. 23):

On the Israeli side, it seems to me that the peace treaty [agreed on at Camp David] set up the situation for the war in Lebanon. With Egypt no longer a confrontation state, Israel felt free to initiate a war in Lebanon, something it probably would not have dared to do before the peace treaty. . . . It is an irony that the war in Lebanon could not have taken place without the peace treaty, and yet I think there would not have been such tremendous opposition to the war among Israelis had it not been for this same peace treaty.

Chomsky comments that Shipler wrote nothing of the sort in the *Times* during his five years as its correspondent in Israel ending in June 1984, or since.

56. For Chomsky's recognition in 1977 -- before the Camp David Accords were signed in 1978 -- of their obvious implications, see for example, "American Foreign Policy in the Middle East," in Noam Chomsky, *Towards A New Cold War: Essays on the Current Crisis and How We Got There*, New York: Pantheon, 1982, ch. 11 (essay written in 1977). An excerpt (pp. 309-310):

Under Kissinger's initiative, the United States by late 1970 abandoned even a rhetorical commitment to a political settlement and was clearly supporting a very different program, namely, the Israeli program of developing and ultimately annexing substantial parts of the occupied territories, a policy that led directly to the October 1973 war. . . . The October 1973 war led to . . . [the U.S.] effectively removing Egypt from the military conflict, for the short term at least. . . . Previously, Sadat's efforts in this direction had been rebuffed, but unexpected Arab successes in the October war with their consequences within the Arab world led to a revision of American policy in this regard. U.S. military assistance, far surpassing previous levels, reinforced Israel's position as the dominant military power in the region. The Kissinger settlement [removing Egypt from the military conflict] thus made it possible for Israel to continue active pursuit of the policies just described, with tacit American support. It is evident that these policies entail a continued state of military confrontation, and quite probably, another major war.

57. For Beilin's book, see Yossi Beilin, *Mechiro shel Ihud*, Tel Aviv: Revivim, 1985.

58. For use of the phrase "demographic problem," see for example, Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, "Expelling Palestinians: It Isn't a New Idea, and It Isn't Just Kahane's," *Washington Post*, February 7, 1988, p. C1. An excerpt:

Two weeks after the end of the Six-Day War in June 1967, the Israeli cabinet convened for a secret meeting to consider a thorny issue: what to do about the demographic problems created by the capture of the West Bank and Gaza, which had added nearly a million Arabs to Israeli jurisdiction. One of the options discussed at the 1967 cabinet meeting was resettlement of Arabs living in refugee camps, according to the private diaries kept by Yaacov Herzog, who was at the time director-general of the prime minister's office. . . .

The 1967 cabinet meeting didn't reach a decision on the resettlement issue. But sentiment seemed to favor Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon's proposal that Palestinian refugees be transported to the Sinai Desert and that Palestinians should be persuaded to move abroad. According to Herzog's notes, Allon said: "We do not do enough among the Arabs to encourage emigration."

Editorial, "The real demographic problem," *Jerusalem Post*, January 22, 1995, p. 6. An excerpt:

[O]nce Judea and Samaria [i.e. the West Bank] come under the exclusive control of the Palestinian Authority there will be no way of preventing massive infiltration into Israel. This raises again the specter of the demographic problem.

Those who advocate Israeli withdrawal from Judea, Samaria and Gaza have always used the demographic demon as one of their main arguments. It is one thing, they would say, to rule over 800,000 Arabs in Israel. It is quite another to have another 1.5 million Arabs or more under Israeli rule. If they become Israeli citizens,

the country would soon have an Arab majority. . . . To ignore what the influx of hundreds of thousands of Arab "refugees" will do to both the Jewish character and the democratic nature of Israel is to invite a nightmare.

Elliott Abrams, "A Place Among the Nations," *National Review*, July 19, 1993, p. 58. An excerpt:

Israel requires the return of millions of diaspora Jews from all over the world, [Likud Party leader Benjamin Netanyahu] argues, to double its current population of about five million. Ten million citizens, he believes, will provide a better economic and military base and will prevent Arab numerical hegemony even if Israel keeps the West Bank. "The key to Israel's future, the solution to its demographic problem, is the continuing influx of Jews to Israel."

59. On the role of water in the conflict over the Occupied Territories, see for example, Jehoshua Schwarz, "Water Resources in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip," in Daniel J. Elazar, ed., *Judea, Samaria, and Gaza: Views on the Present and Future*, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1982, pp. 81-100 (detailed analysis of the technical aspects of the problem, including hydrogeology and salinity maps); David R. Francis, "Economic Issues Are Key to Mideast Peace," *Christian Science Monitor*, September 17, 1993, p. 9. An excerpt:

About 40 percent of all water consumed in Israel is tied to the territory taken in the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict. That amounts to more than 600 million cubic meters a year.

The largest part is diverted from the upper Jordan River and the Sea of Galilee. Control of the Golan Heights and of southeast Lebanon, [Washington economic analyst Thomas] Stauffer says, enables Israel to protect the system of canals, pumps and pipelines which move Jordan River water through Israel as far as the northern Negev desert. A second element is the aquifer underlying the West Bank. The use of that water by Arabs is currently limited by Israel so the water can be tapped by Israelis when it flows under the coastal plain of Israel itself, Stauffer says. Israeli economists, he adds, estimate it would cost \$1 billion or more each year to replace with desalinated water those diverted water supplies if peace meant Israel had to relinquish that water to residents upstream in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and the West Bank.

Julian Ozanne and David Gardner, "Middle East peace would be a mirage without water deal," *Financial Times* (London), August 8, 1995, p. 3. An excerpt:

Like many Palestinians, the villagers of Artas in the Israeli-occupied West Bank have running water one day every two to three weeks. The spring water is polluted by sewage and the men of the hillside village have to drive regularly to the fire station in Bethlehem to fill up containers with water. . . .

Water has become one of the most sensitive and intractable problems in the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations on extending Palestinian self-rule to the West Bank and the division of the scarce resource between Arab and Jew throughout the region evokes strong emotions. For decades Israel has drawn 80 per cent of the 670m cu. m. of water provided every year by the mountain aquifer, an underground water basin located mainly under the West Bank. Israeli military occupation orders in force since 1967, including a prohibition on drilling new wells, have prevented Palestinians getting better access to the aquifer. The aquifer provides a third of Israel's water consumption, 40 per cent of its drinking water and 50 per cent of its agricultural water. . . .

Nothing symbolises the inequality of water consumption more than the fresh green lawns, irrigated flower beds, blooming gardens and swimming pools of Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Experts say the 120,000 settlers there consume at least 60m cu. m. of water a year from the mountain aquifer, compared with the 137m cu. m. allocated to the 1.5m West Bank Arabs. Some 69 per cent of the land cultivated by settlers is irrigated compared with only 6 per cent of Palestinian land. . .

Israel also faces a battle over water rights in stalled negotiations with Syria, aimed at a land-for-peace deal restoring the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights to Syria. Water from the Golan provides 30 per cent of Israel's drinking water.

Anthony Coon, *Town Planning Under Military Occupation: An examination of the law and practice of town planning in the occupied West Bank*, Ramallah: Al-Haq, 1992. An excerpt (pp. 32-33):

Under Israeli occupation new deep wells have been bored and extensive irrigated areas have been opened up [in the West Bank] but these are for exclusively Jewish use. Four fifths of the underground water abstracted from the West Bank is used not by Palestinians but by Jewish settlements or pumped into Israel. New Arab wells have (with very few exceptions) not been allowed since the occupation, nor may rates of extraction be increased, and many Arab wells especially in the Jordan Valley have been confiscated.

Miriam R. Lowi, *Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin*, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1993; *Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip*, signed in Washington, September 28, 1995, Jerusalem: State of Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Annex III, Appendix I, Article 40 and Schedule 10 (the Interim Oslo Agreement provided the first official Israeli data on the allocation of the crucial water resources of the West Bank, in general confirming the analyses already cited).

For another case of Israel taking the resources of territory it allegedly occupies for "security," see "The great terrain robbery," *Economist* (London), November 14, 1998, p. 46. An excerpt:

A new interpretation of the land-for-peace principle has emerged from Israel. In the self-declared "security zone" that it occupies in southern Lebanon, Israel seems to have decided that if it cannot have peace, it will at least make sure that it has the land. Since September, Israeli lorries have been scooping up truckload after truckload of Lebanon's fertile topsoil and carting it off to Israel. The land has lain fallow for years, cut off from its Lebanese owners by an Israeli security fence. So it will make rich fertiliser for the Israeli terraces where it is now being spread, just across the border.

So far, estimate the United Nations peacekeepers stationed nearby, the Israeli lorries have made off with 75,000 cubic metres of soil. The Lebanese are left with an ugly open-cast mine. . . . At first, the Israelis denied everything. . . . But after the U.N. confirmed the story, first the Israeli army and then the government admitted the theft.

On the more general system of institutions that have been established to ensure that land use and development funds are reserved for only Jewish citizens and not Arabs -- to which U.S. citizens may make tax-deductible contributions -- see for example, Walter Lehn with Uri Davis, *The Jewish National Fund*, London: Kegan Paul, 1988; Ian Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Control of a National Minority*, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980; Ori Shohet, "No One Shall Grow Tomatoes . . .,"

Ha'aretz Supplement (Israel), September 25/27, 1985 [translated in *News From Within* (Jerusalem), June 23, 1986](discussing the devices that ensure discrimination against Arab citizens of Israel and Arabs in the Occupied Territories, and comparing Israeli laws and South African apartheid; the title of the article refers to military regulations that require West Bank Arabs to obtain a license to plant a fruit tree or vegetables, one of the devices used to enable Israel to take over the lands there on grounds of inadequate title); Eyal Ehrlich, *Ha'aretz* (Israel), November 13, 1987 (noting that Arabs in the West Bank are "facing a serious water crisis," resulting from a division of water resources favoring Jewish settlers by 12 to 1; "the Arab inhabitants, naturally, are forbidden to dig new wells")(quotations are Chomsky's own translation). See also, Israel Shahak, *Jewish History, Jewish Religion: The Weight of Three Thousand Years*, London: Pluto, 1994, chs. 5 and 6. And see chapter 8 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 77 and 78.

60. For the November 1947 U.N. recommendation on the partition of Palestine, see General Assembly Resolution 181 (II), Concerning the Future Government of Palestine, of November 29, 1947, in John Norton Moore, ed., *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, Vol. III, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974, pp. 313-342. Chomsky remarks (*Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians*, Boston: South End, 1983, updated edition 1999, pp. 92-93):

In later years, the indigenous Arab population rejected the idea, accepted as natural in the West, that they had a moral obligation to sacrifice their land to compensate for the crimes committed by Europeans against Jews. They perhaps wondered why a more appropriate response would not have been to remove the population of Bavaria [in Germany] and turn it into a Jewish state -- or given the self-righteous moralizing they hear from the United States, why the project could not have been carried out in Massachusetts or New York. . . . If someone were to take over your home, then offer you a few rooms in a "fair compromise," you might not be overwhelmed by his generosity, even if he were homeless, destitute, and persecuted. As for the wretched survivors of Hitler's Holocaust themselves, it is likely that many -- perhaps most -- would have chosen to come to the United States had the opportunity been offered, but the Zionist movement, including American Zionists, preferred that they settle in a Jewish state.

There is by now an ample literature on the shameful topic of U.S. responses to the plight of Jews fleeing the Holocaust. See for example, Alfred M. Lilienthal, *The Zionist Connection: What Price Israel?*, New York: Dodd, Mead, 1978 (on the unwillingness of American Zionists to support plans for bringing European Jews to the United States in 1942); Saul S. Friedman, *No Haven for the Oppressed: United States Policy toward Jewish Refugees, 1938-1945*, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1973; David S. Wyman, *Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis, 1938-1941*, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1973; Arthur D. Morse, *While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathy*, New York: Random House, 1967.

61. For the December 1948 U.N. recommendation on refugees and the resolution admitting Israel into the U.N. upon its agreement to accept that recommendation, see General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) of December 11, 1948 (on the right of return of Palestinian refugees), and General Assembly Resolution 273 (III) of May 11, 1949 (admitting Israel into the United Nations, and noting Israel's stated agreement to comply with Resolution 194 (III)), both in John Norton Moore, ed., *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, Vol.

III, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974, pp. 373-376, 418-419. See also, Simha Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, New York: Pantheon, 1987, pp. 214-215, 223-224.

62. On the extent of the Zionist-controlled territory and the number of Palestinian refugees through May 1948, see for example, David Hirst, *The Gun and the Olive Branch: The Roots of Violence in the Middle East*, London: Faber and Faber, 1977, pp. 123-143. An excerpt (pp. 136, 138-139, 142):

The rise of the State of Israel -- in frontiers larger than those assigned to it under the Partition Plan -- and the flight of the native population was a cataclysm so deeply distressing to the Arabs that to this day they call it, quite simply, *al-nakba*, the Catastrophe. . . . Deir Yassin was, as Begin rightly claims, the most spectacular single contribution to the Catastrophe. [Deir Yassin, an Arab town that had in fact refused to be used as a base for operations against the Jewish Agency by the foreign Arab volunteer force, was the site of a massacre of 250 innocent Arabs by the Jewish terrorist groups Irgun and the Stern Gang in April 1948.] In time, place and method it demonstrates the absurdity of the subsequently constructed myth [that Arab leaders had called on the Palestinian refugees to flee]. The British insisted on retaining juridical control of the country until the termination of their Mandate on 15 May; it was not until they left that the regular Arab armies contemplated coming in. But not only did Deir Yassin take place more than five weeks *before* that critical date, it also took place *outside* the area assigned to the Jewish State. It was in no sense a retaliatory action. . . .

In reality, Deir Yassin was an integral part of *Plan Dalet*, the master-plan for the seizure of most or all of Palestine. . . . Nothing was officially disclosed about *Plan Dalet* . . . although Ben-Gurion was certainly alluding to it in an address [on April 7, 1948] to the Zionist Executive: "Let us resolve not to be content with merely defensive tactics, but at the right moment to attack all along the line and not just within the confines of the Jewish State and the borders of Palestine, but to seek out and crush the enemy where-ever he may be. . . ." According to *Qurvot (Battles) of 1948*, a detailed history of the *Haganah* and the *Palmach* [the Zionist fighting forces], the aim of *Plan Dalet* was "control of the area given to us by the U.N. in addition to areas occupied by us which were outside these borders and the setting up of forces to counter the possible invasion of Arab armies." It was also designed to "cleanse" such areas of their Arab inhabitants. . . .

When the war ended, in early 1949, the Zionists, allotted 57 per cent of Palestine under the Partition Plan, had occupied 77 per cent of the country. Of the 1,300,000 Arab inhabitants, they had displaced nearly 900,000.

Benny Morris, "The Causes and Character of the Arab Exodus from Palestine: the Israel Defence Forces Intelligence Branch Analysis of June 1948," *Middle Eastern Studies* (London), January 1986, pp. 5-19. An excerpt (pp. 5, 6-7, 9-10, 14, 18):

A great deal of fresh light is shed on the multiple and variegated causation of the Arab exodus in a document which has recently surfaced, entitled "The Emigration of the Arabs of Palestine in the Period 1/12/1947-1/6/1948. . . ." Dated 30 June 1948, it was produced by the Israel Defence Forces Intelligence Branch during the first weeks of the First Truce (11 June-9 July) of the 1948 war. . . . Rather than suggesting Israeli blamelessness in the creation of the refugee problem, the Intelligence Branch assessment is written in blunt factual and analytical terms and, if anything, contains more than a hint of "advice" as to how to precipitate further

Palestinian flight by indirect methods, without having recourse to direct politically and morally embarrassing expulsion orders. . . .

On the eve of the U.N. Partition Plan Resolution of 29 November 1947, according to the report, there were 219 Arab villages and four Arab, or partly Arab, towns in the areas earmarked for Jewish statehood -- with a total Arab population of 342,000. By 1 June, 180 of these villages and towns had been evacuated, with 239,000 Arabs fleeing the areas of the Jewish state. A further 152,000 Arabs, from 70 villages and three towns (Jaffa, Jenin and Acre), had fled their homes in the areas earmarked for Palestinian Arab statehood in the Partition Resolution, and from the Jerusalem area. By 1 June, therefore, according to the report, the refugee total was 391,000, give or take about 10-15 per cent. Another 103,000 Arabs (60,000 of them Negev beduin and 5,000 Haifa residents) had remained in their homes in the areas originally earmarked for Jewish statehood. (This figure excludes the Arabs who stayed on in Jaffa and Acre, towns occupied by Jewish forces but lying outside the 1947 partition boundaries of the Jewish state.) . . . [The report] stress[es] that "without doubt, hostile [Haganah/Israel Defense Force] operations were the main cause of the movement of population. . . ."

Altogether, the report states, Jewish -- meaning Haganah/I.D.F., I.Z.L. and L.H.I. - military operations . . . accounted for 70 per cent of the Arab exodus from Palestine. . . . [T]here is no reason to cast doubt on the integrity of I.D.F. Intelligence Branch in the production of this analysis. The analysis was produced almost certainly only for internal, I.D.F. top brass consumption. . . . One must again emphasize that the report and its significance pertain only up to 1 June 1948, by which time some 300,000-400,000 Palestinians had left their homes. A similar number was to leave the Jewish-held areas in the remaining months of the war.

The article also explains how this Israel Defense Forces Intelligence Branch report "thoroughly undermines the traditional official Israeli 'explanation' of a mass flight ordered or 'invited' by the Arab leadership for political-strategic reasons" (p. 17). See also, Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949*, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1987; Benny Morris, *1948 And After: Israel and the Palestinians*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.

Since Morris's early publications, he has noted that later declassified documents have strengthened his conclusions. See Benny Morris, "Revisiting the Palestinian exodus of 1948," in Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim, eds., *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948*, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 37-59. An excerpt (pp. 49, 38):

[T]he documentation that has come to light or been declassified during the past ten years offers a great deal of additional information about the expulsions of 1948. The departure of Arab communities from some sites, departures that were described in *The Birth* as due to fear or I.D.F. [Israel Defense Force] military attack or were simply unexplained, now appear to have been tinged if not characterized by Haganah or I.D.F. expulsion orders and actions. . . . This means that the proportion of the 700,000 Arabs who took to the roads as a result of expulsions rather than as a result of straightforward military attack or fear of attack, etc. is greater than indicated in *The Birth*. Similarly, the new documentation has revealed atrocities that I had not been aware of while writing *The Birth*. . . . These atrocities are important in understanding the precipitation of various phases of the Arab exodus. . . .

Above all, let me reiterate, the refugee problem was caused by attacks by Jewish forces on Arab villages and towns and by the inhabitants' fear of such attacks,

compounded by expulsions, atrocities, and rumors of atrocities -- and by the crucial Israeli Cabinet decision in June 1948 to bar a refugee return.

See also, Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, New York: Norton, 2000. An excerpt (p. 31):

Plan D, prepared by the Haganah chiefs in early March, was a major landmark in the development of this offensive strategy. During the preceding month the Palestinian irregulars, under the inspired leadership of Abdel Qader al-Husseini, cut the main road between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem and started to gain the upper hand in the fighting with the Haganah. After suffering several defeats at the hands of Palestinian irregulars, the Haganah chiefs decided to seize the initiative and go on the offensive. The aim of Plan D was to secure all the areas allocated to the Jewish state under the U.N. partition resolution as well as Jewish settlements outside these areas and corridors leading to them, so as to provide a solid and continuous basis for Jewish sovereignty. The novelty and audacity of the plan lay in the orders to capture Arab villages and cities, something the Haganah had never attempted before. Although the wording of Plan D was vague, its objective was to clear the interior of the country of hostile and potentially hostile Arab elements, and in this sense it provided a warrant for expelling civilians. By implementing Plan D in April and May, the Haganah thus directly and decisively contributed to the birth of the Palestinian refugee problem. . . .

Plan D was not a political blueprint for the expulsion of Palestinian Arabs: it was a military plan with military and territorial objectives. However, by ordering the capture of Arab cities and the destruction of villages, it both permitted and justified the forcible expulsion of Arab civilians. By the end of 1948 the number of Palestinian refugees had swollen to around 700,000. But the first and largest wave of refugees occurred before the official outbreak of hostilities on 15 May.

Ilan Pappé, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-51*, London: I.B. Tauris, 1992, chs. 2 and 3, especially pp. 76-99. An excerpt (pp. 85, 96):

The Jews moved from defense to an offensive, once Plan D was adopted. The plan, *inter alia*, aimed at extending Jewish rule in Palestine. . . . [F]rom 1 April 1948 to the end of the war, Jewish operations were guided by the desire to occupy the greatest possible portion of Palestine. . . . By 15 May 1948, about 380,000 Palestinians had become refugees. By the end of the war the number was doubled and the U.N. report spoke of 750,000 refugees.

Simha Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, New York: Pantheon, 1987, pp. 81-118. An excerpt (pp. 42, 83-84, 132):

In April 1948, forces of the Irgun penetrated deep into Jaffa, which was outside the borders of the proposed Jewish state. . . . Ben-Gurion, despite harsh pronouncements against the dissidents [i.e. the Irgun and other terrorist squads], waited until after the establishment of the state to force them to disband. He could have done this earlier had it suited his purposes, but clearly it did not. The terrorists were very successful in extending the war into areas not officially allocated to the Jews. . . .

Between 600,000 and 700,000 Palestinian Arabs were evicted or fled from areas that were allocated to the Jewish state or occupied by Jewish forces during the fighting and later integrated *de facto* into Israel. During and after the exodus, every effort was made -- from the razing of villages to the promulgation of laws -- to prevent their return. . . . According to the partition plan, the Jewish state would have had well over 300,000 Arabs, including 90,000 Bedouin. With the Jewish conquest of areas designated for the Arab state (western Galilee, Nazareth, Jaffa, Lydda, Ramleh,

villages south of Jerusalem, and villages in the Arab Triangle of central Palestine), the Arab population would have risen by another 300,000 or more. Zionist leaders feared such numbers of non-Jews would threaten the stability of the new state both militarily -- should they become a fifth column for Arab armies -- and socially -- insofar as a substantial Muslim and Christian minority would challenge the new state's Jewish character. Thus the flight of up to 700,000 Arabs from Palestinian villages and towns during 1948 came to many as a relief. . . .

It wasn't until April 30, 1948, two weeks before the end of the [British] Mandate, that Arab chiefs of staff met for the first time to work out a plan for military intervention. Under the pressure of mounting public criticism, fueled by the increasingly desperate situation in Palestine -- the massacre of Dir Yassin, the fall of Tiberias, the evacuation of Haifa, the collapse of the Palestinian forces, the failure of the A.L.A. [Arab Liberation Army], and the mass flight of refugees -- the army chiefs of the Arab states were finally compelled to discuss the deployment of their regular armies.

Jon Kimche, *Seven Fallen Pillars: The Middle East, 1945-1952*, New York: Da Capo, 1976 (eyewitness report by a Zionist historian, also recounting the fact that well before May 1948 the Jewish guerrilla group Irgun and the Zionist military organization Haganah had driven most of the Arab population from Jaffa and from large areas of the proposed Palestinian state by force). An excerpt (pp. 226-227):

The battle of Mishmar Haemek [in the first half of April 1948] was an obvious sign of the turning tide, but the Jews were at the same time developing another tactic which, as we now know, made a far greater impact on the Arab population of Palestine. . . . Marching at night, they penetrated to Arab villages far in the heart of Arab-held territory. Occasionally they blew up a house occupied by an active Arab nationalist or by foreign Arab volunteers; in other villages they confiscated arms or plastered the village with warning notices. The effects of such nightly visitations soon made themselves felt throughout the Arab hinterland. They caused great disturbances and started an exodus from the areas lying near to Jewish districts. . . .

Plans were now laid for a crucial attempt to seize the ports of Haifa and Jaffa, and to open communications with the north by the occupation of Tiberias and Safed. On April 21st I noted in my diary: "Arabs increasingly leaving Jewish state area. Almost half have left Haifa. Villages in the coastal plains are being evacuated. Crowded boats also leaving Jaffa" (a predominantly Arab city).

And see Benny Morris, "Operation Dani and the Palestinian Exodus from Lydda and Ramle in 1948," *Middle East Journal*, Winter 1986, pp. 82-109 (on the expulsion of the Arab populations of Lydda and Ramle in July 1948); Erskine Childers, "The Other Exodus," in Walid Khalidi, ed., *From Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem Until 1948*, Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987, pp. 795-803 (refuting as thoroughly baseless the claim that the Palestinian refugees fled on orders from Arab leaders); Simha Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, New York: Pantheon, 1987, pp. 81-118 at p. 85 ("recent publication of thousands of documents in the state and Zionist archives, as well as Ben-Gurion's war diaries, shows that there is no evidence to support Israeli claims" that Arab leaders called for the exodus of Palestinian refugees. "In fact, the declassified material contradicts the 'order' theory, for among these new sources are documents testifying to the considerable efforts of the A.H.C. [Arab Higher Committee] and the Arab states to constrain the flight").

63. For the scholarship on the Arab states' reasons for intervening against Israel in May 1948, see for example, Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim, eds., *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948*, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2001, especially chs. 4 to 8; Avi Shlaim, *Collusion across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. An excerpt (p. 193):

It was not only popular clamour for intervention, however, but the knowledge that Abdullah would intervene whatever happened that pushed the Arab governments, with Syria at their head, to the brink of war. From a military point of view, the Syrians had no illusions about their ability to handle the job alone. But from a political point of view they continued to see Abdullah as their principal enemy and were impelled to intervene, if only to prevent him from tipping the balance of power in the region against them.

Simha Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, New York: Pantheon, 1987, pp. 119-152. An excerpt (pp. 126, 128-129):

The overriding issue was the revival of the Hashemite plan for a United Arab Kingdom in Greater Syria -- ruled by the Hashemites, supported by the British, and embracing Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and at least the Arab part of Palestine. . . . [T]he Arab governments were aware of Abdallah's contacts with the Jewish Agency and of his expansionist plans. They tried to persuade him to adopt instead a policy of cooperation with the Arab League. These attempts were without success. For Abdallah, the Greater Syria plan was not only a vision but a concrete political aim to be realized through the efficiency of his own military forces, with British and Zionist support. . . . Although Abdallah continued to be an active member of the Arab League, his real relationships with the Arab states and with Israel became the very opposite of the way they were represented. Officially Israel was the adversary, and the Arab states were his allies. In practice, the roles were reversed. . . .

Philip C. Jessup, acting U.S. ambassador to the U.N. between 1947 and 1952, cast light on the Syrian situation in a report to the secretary of state, in which he concluded that "the real fear . . . is not so much fear of Israel as reason [sic] of the expansion of Transjordan and an increase in Abdallah's prestige in the light of his former Greater Syria ideas. In other words, a fear that a settlement between Israel and Abdallah would only be a stepping stone for the latter -- his next step being attempted expansion into Syria."

Itamar Rabinovitch [later Israeli Ambassador to the U.S.], *The Road Not Taken: Early Arab-Israeli Negotiations*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, especially pp. 171f; Ilan Pappé, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-51*, London: I.B. Tauris, 1992, ch. 4; Ilan Pappé, *Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-51*, London: Macmillan, 1988; Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, New York: Norton, 2000, ch. 1. See also footnotes 62 and 64 of this chapter.

64. On Abdullah's and the Zionists' plan to partition the area that was to have been the Palestinian state, see for example, Yoram Peri, *Between Battles and Ballots: Israeli Military in Politics*, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1983. An excerpt (pp. 58-59):

[Zionist leader Ben-Gurion had] reached a tacit understanding with King Abdullah of Transjordan, which allowed the latter to move into the territories west of the River Jordan, which had been allotted by the 1947 U.N. Partition Plan to the Arab Palestinian state. This would limit the war on at least one front, leading eventually to

peace; would absolve Israel from having to rule over about one million Arabs, and would pave the way for Israel to join the Western bloc by colluding with Britain's regional client, Transjordan. The crux of the arrangement was that Jerusalem, intended to be internationalized by the Partition Plan, should be divided between Israel and Transjordan. This plan was not revealed either to the Cabinet nor to the military command.

Avi Shlaim, "Israel and the Arab coalition in 1948," in Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim, eds., *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948*, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 79-103. An excerpt (pp. 82, 84):

King Abdullah of Transjordan was driven by a long-standing ambition to make himself the master of Greater Syria which included, in addition to Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. King Faruq saw Abdullah's ambition as a direct threat to Egypt's leadership in the Arab world. The rulers of Syria and Lebanon saw in King Abdullah a threat to the independence of their countries and they also suspected him of being in cahoots with the enemy. Each Arab state was moved by its own dynastic or national interests. Arab rulers were as concerned with curbing each other as they were in fighting the common enemy. Under these circumstances it was virtually impossible to reach any real consensus on the means and ends of the Arab intervention in Palestine. Consequently, far from confronting a single enemy with a clear purpose and a clear plan of action, the Yishuv faced a loose coalition consisting of the Arab League, independent Arab states, irregular Palestinian forces, and an assortment of volunteers. The Arab coalition was one of the most divided, disorganized, and ramshackle coalitions in the entire history of warfare. Separate and conflicting national interests were hidden behind the figleaf of securing Palestine for the Palestinians. The Palestine problem was the first major test of the Arab League and the Arab League failed it miserably. The actions of the League were taken ostensibly in support of the Palestinian claim for independence in the whole of Palestine. But the League remained curiously unwilling to allow the Palestinians to assume control over their own destiny. . . .

In 1947, as the conflict over Palestine entered the crucial stage, the contacts between the Jewish side and King Abdullah intensified. Golda Meir of the Jewish Agency had a secret meeting with Abdullah in Naharayim on 17 November 1947. At this meeting they reached a preliminary agreement to coordinate their diplomatic and military strategies, to forestall the *mufti*, and to endeavor to prevent the other Arab states from intervening directly in Palestine. . . . In return for Abdullah's promise not to enter the area assigned by the U.N. to the Jewish state, the Jewish Agency agreed to the annexation by Transjordan of most of the area earmarked for the Arab state. Precise borders were not drawn and Jerusalem was not even discussed as under the U.N. plan it was to remain a *corpus separatum* under international control. Nor was the agreement ever put down in writing. The Jewish Agency tried to tie Abdullah down to a written agreement but he was evasive. Yet, according to Yaacov Shimoni, a senior official in the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, despite Abdullah's evasions, the understanding with him was: "entirely clear in its general spirit. We would agree to the conquest of the Arab part of Palestine by Abdullah. We would not stand in his way. We would not help him, would not seize it and hand it over to him. He would have to take it by his own means and stratagems but we would not disturb him. He, for his part, would not prevent us from establishing the state of Israel, from dividing the country, taking our share and establishing a state in it."

See also, Ilan Pappé, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-51*, London: I.B. Tauris, 1992, especially pp. 115-119, 131; Tom Segev, *1949: The First Israelis*, New York: Free Press, 1986, pp. 11-15 (brief treatment of the covert relationship between Abdullah and the Zionist leaders); Simha Flapan, *Zionism and the Palestinians*, New York: Barnes and Noble, 1979, pp. 334-337 (detailing the interactions between Abdullah and the Zionists, including a Memorandum by U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk advocating the partition). And see footnote 67 of this chapter.

65. On Abdullah's plans for Syria and the Arab states' knowledge of them, see for example, Simha Flapan, *Zionism and the Palestinians*, New York: Barnes and Noble, 1979. An excerpt (pp. 331-332, 328):

[A Syrian report to the U.S. ambassador indicates that Syrian Foreign Minister Barazi:] "said seemingly fantastic story, now widely believed here, that Abdullah has made deal with the Jews 'not without foundation.' According story Haganah [the Zionist military] will counter-invade Syria after crushing Syrian Army then return quickly to Jewish Palestine as Abdullah rushes to rescue. Abdullah would receive plaudits of grateful Syrian population and crown of Greater Syria. . . . Barazi added Syria would not tolerate Abdullah with his royal airs and his black slaves. . . . [H]e added 'We must invade, otherwise the people will kill us. . . .'"

[The U.S. representative at the U.N. noted that the] real reason for present Syrian extremism is not so much fear of Israel as fear of the expansion of Transjordan and increase in Abdullah's prestige in the light of his former Greater Syrian ideas. In other words a fear that a settlement based on arrangements between Israel and Abdullah would be only a stepping-stone for the latter, his next step being attempted expansion into Syria.

Avi Shlaim, *Collusion across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, especially ch. 5 and p. 193. An excerpt (p. 424):

The Zionist leaders, of course, were well aware of Abdullah's long-standing scheme to make himself the ruler of Greater Syria. They knew about his family history, his thwarted dynastic ambitions, and his longing to break out of Britain's tutelage. They knew of his dream to make Damascus his capital and his feeling that Amman was no substitute -- a spring-board at best. Not only did they understand all this but they also professed themselves to be sympathetic and supportive. No doubt Abdullah's preoccupation with bringing Syria into his domain suited and was exploited by the Zionists as a means of diverting him from the equally burning preoccupation with bringing Palestine into his domain. Nevertheless, the Jewish Agency had always led the amir of Transjordan to believe that it looked with favour on his ambition to conquer Syria, and this was indeed one of the props of the unwritten alliance between the two sides. The Agency did not pledge its active support for the realization of this particular ambition, but it did promise not to stand in his way. An appeal by Abdullah to Israel to lend him military support for the long-awaited march on Damascus was therefore not as bizarre as it might seem at first sight.

Simha Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, New York: Pantheon, 1987. An excerpt (pp. 151-152):

Even though the Arab Legion was a crack army, it had at most five thousand men and no air force or heavy artillery. It could hardly be expected to defeat the fifty-thousand-strong, well-trained, and well-equipped Haganah. What the Arab states actually feared was that the implementation of Abdallah's secret agreement with

Israel would be the first step toward the creation of a Hashemite [Arab royal family] kingdom extending over Syria and Lebanon. This fear explains not only Egypt's intervention -- which was undertaken mainly to foil the plans of Abdallah and his British backers -- but also the overall logic of its military operations. The best of the units, nearly half of the invading force, did not attack Israel. They were sent to the Arab cities of Beersheba, Hebron, and Jerusalem to prevent Abdallah's annexation of these areas, which had been designated for the Palestinian state. The other forces moved along the seacoast northward to Tel Aviv, also in the area designated by the U.N. for the Palestinian state. . . .

Abdallah's first step after occupying Hebron and Bethlehem was to disband and disarm the Palestinian fighting forces and the Egyptians who remained in the area. One week after the signing of the Egyptian armistice, Israel was able to conquer Eilat without firing a single shot.

Itamar Rabinovitch [later Israeli Ambassador to the U.S.], *The Road Not Taken: Early Arab-Israeli Negotiations*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 15-16; Ilan Pappé, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-51*, London: I.B. Tauris, 1992, pp. 114, 121. See also footnote 63 of this chapter.

66. On Syria's and Egypt's 1949 peace offers, see for example, Itamar Rabinovich, *The Road Not Taken: Early Arab-Israeli Negotiations*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, chs. 3 and 5, especially pp. 108, 168-184 (asking whether Israel missed a "historic opportunity" for peace when the Syrian proposal was rejected in 1949, and briefly describing the 1949 Egyptian proposal which would have created a Palestinian state in the Negev desert and West Bank but would have let Israel keep other territory that was not given to it under the 1947 U.N. partition plan; also discussing Egypt's 1948 overtures); Simha Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, New York: Pantheon, 1987, pp. 205-212.

67. For early acknowledgment of the agreement between Ben-Gurion and Abdullah to partition Palestine, see for example, Jon and David Kimche, *A Clash of Destinies: The Arab-Jewish War and the Founding of the State of Israel*, New York: Praeger, 1960. An excerpt (p. 60):

[I]n November 1947, Abdullah secretly received Mrs. Golda Myerson as the representative of the Jewish Agency. They discussed the prospects of the resolution to partition Palestine which was then before the United Nations. The King told Mrs. Myerson that he would take over the Arab part of Palestine, for he would not permit another Arab state to be set up; he would then conclude a treaty with the Jewish State. Abdullah foresaw no exceptional difficulties in the way.

68. On the conflict between Allon and Ben-Gurion concerning the secret agreement, see for example, Yoram Peri, *Between Battles and Ballots: Israeli Military in Politics*, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1983. An excerpt (pp. 58-59):

Ben Gurion . . . had conceived a "grand plan" for the conduct of the war. He reached a tacit understanding with King Abdullah of Transjordan, which allowed the latter to move into the territories west of the River Jordan, which had been allotted by the 1947 U.N. Partition Plan to the Arab Palestinian state. . . . This plan was not revealed either to the Cabinet nor to the military command. The Haganah and Palmach commanders opposed a limited objective war on the eastern front; they wished to conquer the West Bank territories. On this front, military logic sometimes

dictated actions that contradicted the political and diplomatic consideration in Ben Gurion's grand plan. . . .

The incongruence between the battle situation and Ben Gurion's intentions was most notably shown in October 1948, when, after the "Yoav" and "El Hahar" operations, the I.D.F. [Israeli Defense Force] forces realized that these two strategic successes . . . made feasible an expedition towards the Hebron mountains and even to the Jericho valley. The Southern Commander, Allon, sought permission to launch the expedition, but was prevented by Ben Gurion's refusal. . . . Allon, astonished at Ben Gurion's decision, asked Yadin, the Head of Operations Branch, for the reason and was told that it was a political decision, imposed by the Prime Minister.

Avi Shlaim, *Collusion across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. An excerpt (p. 332):

Ben-Gurion . . . veto[ed] Yigal Allon's plan to extend the gains made in the first stage of Operation Yoav by sending a force to capture or at least encircle Hebron and advance towards Jerusalem from the south. That such an expedition was feasible from a military point of view, no one doubted. . . . [T]he only conceivable reason for the veto of an exceptionally promising military plan is that there were overriding political considerations.

69. Ben-Gurion's view of the extent of "Zionist aspiration" and his proposals about Southern Lebanon appear in numerous sources. For example, in his memoirs, Ben-Gurion expressed his support for a 1937 British proposal to partition Palestine, explaining:

The acceptance of partition does not commit us to renounce Trans-Jordan; one does not demand from anybody to give up his vision. We shall accept a state in the boundaries fixed today, but the boundaries of Zionist aspirations are the concern of the Jewish people and no external factor will be able to limit them.

Quoted in Simha Flapan, "The P.L.O.: A Step Backwards or Forwards," *New Outlook: Middle East Monthly* (Tel Aviv, Israel), April/May 1977, pp. 2-3.

Similarly, Ben-Gurion's biographer notes that Ben-Gurion wrote to his son that: A partial Jewish state is not the end, but only the beginning. . . . I am certain that we will not be prevented from settling in the other parts of the country, either by mutual agreement with our Arab neighbors or by some other means. Our ability to penetrate the country will increase if there is a state. Our strength *vis-à-vis* the Arabs will increase. I am not in favor of war . . . [but if] the Arabs behave in keeping with [their] nationalist feelings and say to us: Better that the Negev remain barren than that Jews settle there, *then we shall have to speak to them in a different language. But we shall only have another language if we have a state.*

See Michael Bar-Zohar, *Ben-Gurion: A Biography*, New York: Adama [the centennial edition], 1978, pp. 91-92 (emphasis in original). Later, in May 1948, quite confident of Israel's military superiority -- contrary to the common "David and Goliath" legend -- Ben-Gurion presented the following strategic aims to his General Staff (p. 166):

[W]e should prepare to go over to the offensive with the aim of smashing Lebanon, Transjordan and Syria. . . . The weak point in the Arab coalition is Lebanon [for] the Moslem regime is artificial and easy to undermine. A Christian state should be established, with its southern border on the Litani river [within Lebanon]. We will make an alliance with it. When we smash the [Arab] Legion's strength and bomb Amman, we will eliminate Transjordan too, and then Syria will fall. If Egypt still dares to fight on, we shall bomb Port Said, Alexandria, and Cairo. . . . And in this fashion,

we will end the war and settle our forefathers' accounts with Egypt, Assyria, and Aram.

The biographer also recounts the story of Ben-Gurion passing through the Jordan Rift Valley in February 1949, accompanied by a young general whom he admired. Gazing at the Mountains of Edom beyond the Jordanian border, Ben-Gurion asked the general: "How would you take those hills?" The general explained the route that he would take and the forces he would employ, then he asked in astonishment: "Why do you ask? Do you want to conquer those hills?" Ben-Gurion answered: "I? No. But *you* will conquer them" (pp. 186-187).

Ben-Gurion also made similar statements to an aide at the Egyptian/Israeli armistice talks in Rhodes in 1949:

Before the founding of the state, on the eve of its creation, our main interest was *self-defense*. To a large extent, the creation of the state was an act of self-defense. . . . Many think that we're still at the same stage. But now the issue at hand is conquest, not self-defense. As for setting the borders -- it's an open-ended matter. In the Bible as well as in our history there are all kinds of definitions of the country's borders, so there's no real limit. No border is absolute. If it's a desert -- it could just as well be the other side. If it's a sea, it could also be across the sea. The world has always been this way. Only the terms have changed. If they should find a way of reaching other stars, well then, perhaps the whole earth will no longer suffice.

See Tom Segev, *1949: The First Israelis*, New York: Free Press, 1986, p. 6.

In internal discussion in 1938, Ben-Gurion explained:

[A]fter we become a strong force, as the result of the creation of a state, we shall abolish partition and expand to the whole of Palestine. . . . The state will only be a stage in the realization of Zionism and its task is to prepare the ground for our expansion into the whole of Palestine by a Jewish-Arab agreement.

See Simha Flapan, *Zionism and the Palestinians*, New York: Barnes and Noble, 1979, pp. 265-266.

See also, Yigal Elam, "'Zionist Methods' In P.L.O. Policy," *New Outlook: Middle East Monthly* (Tel Aviv, Israel), April/May 1977, pp. 14-16. An excerpt:

Zionism never gave up its "vision" of the whole Land of Israel. No Zionist leadership ever admitted its abandonment of the Jewish people's right to any part of the historical Israel. ("Who am I to cede any right of the Jewish people," Weizmann used to say.) Even after the East Bank of the Jordan was severed from the area promised by the British as a national home, the Zionist leadership continued to amuse itself with ideas and even conducted negotiations for Jewish settlement in Trans-Jordan, Syria and Mesopotamia.

For additional discussion and ample similar quotations from Ben-Gurion, see Simha Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, New York: Pantheon, 1987, pp. 13-53. See also, Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, New York: Norton, 2000. An excerpt (p. 21):

Although Ben-Gurion accepted partition, he did not view the borders of the Peel commission plan [a 1937 recommendation of a three-way partition of Palestine into a Jewish state, an Arab state united with Transjordan, and districts under British Mandate] as permanent. He saw no contradiction between accepting a Jewish state in part of Palestine and hoping to expand the borders of this state to the whole Land of Israel. The difference between him and the Revisionists was not that he was a territorial minimalist while they were territorial maximalists but rather that he pursued a gradualist strategy while they adhered to an all-or-nothing approach. . . . Both his

mind and his heart told Ben-Gurion, "Erect a Jewish State at once, even if it is not in the whole land. The rest will come in the course of time. It must come."

Note that some other Zionist leaders did not even accept partition as a temporary plan. For example, Menachem Begin declared (p. 25):

"The partition of Palestine is illegal. It will never be recognized. . . . Jerusalem was and will for ever be our capital. Eretz Israel will be restored to the people of Israel. All of it. And for ever."

70. On Israel's nuclear capabilities, see chapter 8 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 70 and 73.

71. For the U.N.'s partition recommendation, see General Assembly Resolution 181 (II), Concerning the Future Government of Palestine, of November 29, 1947, in John Norton Moore, ed., *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, Vol. III, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974, pp. 313-342 ("Plan of Partition with Economic Union").

72. On the genocidal population decline in the Americas following Columbus, see for example, David E. Stannard, *American Holocaust: Columbus and the Conquest of the New World*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992, Appendix I. Stannard cites population estimates for the Western Hemisphere at the time of Columbus of as high as 145 million, with approximately 18 million people in the region that now constitutes the United States and Canada. He reports that even extremely cautious and conservative demographers now concede that the total population of the Americas before 1492 was at least 75 million, with 7 or 8 million people in the region north of what is now Mexico. An excerpt (pp. 120-121):

Between the time of initial contact with the European invaders and the close of the seventeenth century, most eastern Indian peoples had suffered near-annihilation levels of destruction; typically, as in Virginia and New England, 95 percent or more of their populations had been eradicated. But even then the carnage did not stop. One recent study of population trends in the southeast, for instance, shows that east of the Appalachians in Virginia the native population declined by 93 percent between 1685 and 1790 -- that is, *after* it already had declined by about 95 percent during the *preceding* century, which itself had followed upon the *previous* century's whirlwind of massive destruction. . . .

As a result, when the eighteenth century was drawing to its close, less than 5000 native people remained alive in all of eastern Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Louisiana combined, while in Florida -- which alone contained more than 700,000 Indians in 1520 -- only 2000 survivors could be found. Overwhelmingly, these disasters were the result of massively destructive epidemics and genocidal warfare, while a small portion of the loss in numbers derived from forced expulsion from the Indians' traditional homelands.

Kirkpatrick Sale, *The Conquest of Paradise: Christopher Columbus and the Columbian Legacy*, New York: Knopf, 1990. An excerpt (pp. 315-316):

[T]here is now a rough academic consensus, quite sharply at odds with figures conventionally accepted earlier in this century, that the total number of Indians in the New World at the time of the Discovery was between 60 and 120 million people. (That compares to a population for Europe outside Russia of 60 to 70 million.) Estimates for North America alone similarly range from about 40 to 56 million, the bulk of which -- perhaps 25 to 30 million -- occupied the area of the Mesoamerican

state systems south of the Tropic of Cancer and 8 million more the islands of the West Indies. That leaves from 7 to 18 million people north of Mexico, the majority of whom were probably in the mixed horticultural-hunting belt in the Mississippi basin and along the Atlantic coast to Maine.

Francis Jennings, *The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest*, New York: Norton, 1975, pp. 22, 30 (the "ratio of 90 percent [native population] decline within a century after European contact has been confirmed by other researchers in Spanish America, where work in the field is advanced far beyond anything yet done for the region north of the Rio Grande"; "a relatively conservative and meticulously reasoned estimate . . . has calculated a total aboriginal population for the western hemisphere within the range of 90 to 112 million" before European contact); Michael A. Dorris, "Contemporary Native Americans," *Daedalus*, Spring 1981, pp. 43-69 at p. 47 (citing figures that the Native American population was reduced from 12 to 15 million people north of the Rio Grande in 1491 "to a low of 210,000 in the 1910 census"); Howard Zinn, *A People's History of the United States: 1492-Present*, New York: HarperCollins, 1980 (revised and updated edition 1995), ch. 1, at p. 16 ("The Indian population of 10 million that lived north of Mexico when Columbus came would ultimately be reduced to less than a million"); Ronald Wright, *Stolen Continents: The Americas Through Indian Eyes Since 1492*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1992 (on genocidal population declines of the Aztecs, Mayas and Incas in South America, and Cherokee and Iroquois in North America).

On the nature of these population declines, see also, Francis Jennings, *The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest*, New York: Norton, 1975, ch. 13. An excerpt (pp. 164-165):

Virginia was not exceptional [in genocidal actions]. Puritan New England initiated its own reign of terror with the massacres of the Pequot conquest. David Pieterszoon de Vries has left us an unforgettable picture of how Dutch mercenaries acted, under orders of New Netherland's Governor Willem Kieft, to terrorize Indians into paying tribute.

"About midnight, I heard a great shrieking, and I ran to the ramparts of the fort, and looked over to Pavonia. Saw nothing but firing, and heard the shrieks of the Indians murdered in their sleep. . . . When it was day the soldiers returned to the fort, having massacred or murdered eighty Indians, and considering they had done a deed of Roman valour, in murdering so many in their sleep; where infants were torn from their mother's breasts, and hacked to pieces in the presence of the parents, and the pieces thrown into the fire and in the water, and other sucklings being bound to small boards, and then cut, stuck, and pierced, and miserably massacred in a manner to move a heart of stone. Some were thrown into the river, and when the fathers and mothers endeavoured to save them, the soldiers would not let them come on land, but made both parents and children drown -- children from five to six years of age, and also some old and decrepit persons. Many fled from this scene, and concealed themselves in the neighbouring sedge, and when it was morning, came out to beg a piece of bread, and to be permitted to warm themselves; but they were murdered in cold blood and tossed into the water. Some came by our lands in the country with their hands, some with their legs cut off, and some holding their entrails in their arms, and others had such horrible cuts, and gashes, that worse than they were could never happen."

Lenore Stiffarm with Phil Lane, "The Demography of Native North America," in Annette Jaimes, ed., *The State of Native America: Genocide, Colonization, and Resistance*, Boston: South End, 1992. An excerpt (pp. 34-36):

By the mid-19th century, U.S. policymakers and military commanders were stating -- openly, frequently and in plain English -- that their objective was no less than the "complete extermination" of any native people who resisted being dispossessed of their lands, subordinated to federal authority, and assimilated into the colonizing culture. The country was as good as its word on the matter, perpetrating literally hundreds of massacres of Indians by military and paramilitary formations at points all over the West. A bare sampling of some of the worst must include the 1854 massacre of perhaps 150 Lakotas at Blue River (Nebraska), the 1863 Bear River (Idaho) Massacre of some 500 Western Shoshones, the 1864 Sand Creek (Colorado) Massacre of as many as 250 Cheyennes and Arapahoes, the 1868 massacre of another 300 Cheyennes at the Washita River (Oklahoma), the 1875 massacre of about seventy-five Cheyennes along the Sappa Creek (Kansas), the 1878 massacre of still another 100 Cheyennes at Camp Robinson (Nebraska), and the 1890 massacre of more than 300 Lakotas at Wounded Knee (South Dakota). . . .

Sherburn F. Cook has compiled an excruciatingly detailed chronology of the actions of self-organized white "militias" in northern California, mostly along the Mad and Eel Rivers, for the years 1855-65. The standard technique was to surround an Indian village (or "rancheria," as they are called by Californians) in the dead of night, set it ablaze and, if possible, kill everyone inside. "Much of the killing in California and southern Oregon Territory resulted, directly and indirectly, from the discovery of gold in 1849 and the subsequent influx of miners and settlers. . . . It was not uncommon for small groups or villages to be attacked by immigrants . . . and virtually wiped out overnight. . . ." Thornton has observed that, "Primarily because of the killings -- which some scholars say had been . . . over 700,000 -- [the population] decreased almost by two-thirds in a single decade. . . . By 1900, the combined native population of California numbered only 15,377.

See also, Mark Cocker, *Rivers of Blood, Rivers of Gold: Europe's Conquest of Indigenous Peoples*, New York: Grove, 1998 (excellent overview focusing on case studies of the Spanish conquest of the Aztecs in Mexico, the British extermination of the Tasmanian Aborigines, the U.S. dispossession of the Apache, and the German subjugation of the Herero and Nama in South West Africa); Hans Koning, *Columbus: His Enterprise -- Exploding the Myth*, New York: Monthly Review, 1991 (original 1976)(exceptional brief summary of the real history of Columbus's life and voyages); Andrée Collard, ed., Bartolomé de las Casas, *History of the Indies*, New York: Harper and Row, 1971 (first-hand account, written at the time of Columbus by one of the very few churchmen to protest the savage treatment of the local populations of the Americas by the Spaniards).

For some further perspective on the ferocity of the European conquerors' war methods, see Geoffrey Parker, "Europe and the Wider World, 1500-1700: The Military Balance," in James Tracy, ed., *The Political Economy of Merchant Empires*, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 161-195. An excerpt (pp. 194, 163-164):

Cortés conquered Mexico with perhaps 500 Spaniards; Pizarro overthrew the Inca empire with less than 200; and the entire Portuguese empire from Nagasaki in Japan to Sofala in southern Africa, was administered and defended by less than 10,000 Europeans. . . .

[T]he Narragansett Indians of New England strongly disapproved of the colonists' way of making war. "It was too furious," one brave told an English captain in 1638, "and [it] slays too many men." The captain did not deny it. The Indians, he speculated, "might fight seven years and not kill seven men." Roger Williams, a colonial governor, likewise admitted that the Indians' fighting "was farre lesse bloody and devouring than the cruell warres of Europe." Meanwhile, on the other side of the world, the peoples of Indonesia were equally appalled by the all-destructive fury of European warfare. The men of Java, for example, were "very loth to fight if they can choose."

See also footnote 74 of this chapter; and chapter 7 of *U.P.* and its footnote 60.

73. On treaty violations against Native Americans, see for example, Charles Joseph Kappler, ed., *Indian Treaties, 1778-1883*, New York: Interland, 1972 (reproducing the texts of 371 ratified treaties with Indian nations); Ward Churchill, *Struggle for the Land: Indigenous Resistance to Genocide, Ecocide and Expropriation in Contemporary North America*, Monroe, ME: Common Courage, 1993, p. 46 ("Well before the end of the nineteenth century, the United States stood in default on virtually every treaty agreement it had made with native people"); Howard Zinn, *A People's History of the United States: 1492-Present*, New York: HarperCollins, 1980 (revised and updated edition 1995), ch. 7; Angie Debo, *And Still the Waters Run*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940 (updated edition 1991)(on how the "Five Civilized Tribes" in what became Oklahoma were deprived of their land and autonomy by the U.S. government). See also, Vine DeLoria and Clifford M. Lytle, *American Indians, American Justice*, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983, p. 34 ("treaties with Indians stand on the same footing as those made with foreign nations").

74. On Hitler's use of the treatment of the Native Americans as a model, see for example, John Toland, *Adolf Hitler*, New York: Doubleday, 1976. An excerpt (p. 702): Hitler's concept of concentration camps as well as the practicability of genocide owed much, so he claimed, to his studies of English and United States history. He admired the camps for Boer prisoners in South Africa and for the Indians in the wild West; and often praised to his inner circle the efficiency of America's extermination -- by starvation and uneven combat -- of the red savages who could not be tamed by captivity.

Joachim C. Fest, *Hitler*, New York: Harcourt Brace, 1973, p. 214 (Hitler's "continental war of conquest" was modeled "with explicit reference to the United States"); Richard L. Rubinstein, "Afterword: Genocide and Civilization," in Isidor Wallimann and Michael N. Dobkowski, eds., *Genocide and the Modern Age: Etiology and Case Studies of Mass Death*, Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1987, p. 288 ("Hitler saw the settlement of the New World and the concomitant elimination of North America's Indian population by white European settlers as a model to be followed by Germany on the European continent").

Hitler's attitude was far from unique. Comparing the Arabs in Palestine to a dog in a manger, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill remarked (Clive Ponting, *Churchill*, London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1994, p. 254):

I do not agree that the dog in a manger has the final right to the manger, even though he may have lain there for a very long time. I do not admit that right. I do not admit, for instance, that a great wrong has been done to the Red Indians of America, or the black people of Australia. I do not admit that a wrong has been done to these people

by the fact that a stronger race, a higher grade race, or at any rate, a more worldly-wise race, to put it that way, has come in and taken their place.

See also, Theodore Roosevelt [U.S. President, 1901-1909], *The Winning of the West*, New York: Current Literature Publishing Company, 1905 (original 1889), Vol. IV. An excerpt (pp. 54-56):

No other conquering and colonizing nation has ever treated the original savage owners of the soil with such generosity as has the United States. . . . It is indeed a warped, perverse, and silly morality which would forbid a course of conquest that has turned whole continents into the seats of mighty and flourishing civilized nations. All men of sane and wholesome thought must dismiss with impatient contempt the plea that these continents should be reserved for the use of scattered savage tribes, whose life was but a few degrees less meaningless, squalid, and ferocious than that of the wild beasts with whom they held joint ownership. . . .

Most fortunately, the hard, energetic, practical men who do the rough pioneer work of civilization in barbarous lands, are not prone to false sentimentality. The people who are, these stay-at-homes are too selfish and indolent, too lacking in imagination, to understand the race-importance of the work which is done by their pioneer brethren in wild and distant lands. . . . The most ultimately righteous of all wars is a war with savages, though it is apt to be also the most terrible and inhuman. The rude, fierce settler who drives the savage from the land lays all civilized mankind under a debt to him. . . . [I]t is of incalculable importance that America, Australia, and Siberia should pass out of the hands of their red, black, and yellow aboriginal owners, and become the heritage of the dominant world races.

Andrew Jackson [U.S. President, 1829-1837], "Indian Removal and the General Good," in Louis Filler and Allen Guttman, eds., *The Removal of the Cherokee Nation: Manifest Destiny or National Dishonor?*, Boston: Heath, 1962, pp. 49-52. President Jackson stated in his "Second Annual Message" of December 6, 1830:

Humanity has often wept over the fate of the aborigines of this country, and philanthropy has been long busily employed in devising means to avert it, but its progress has never for a moment been arrested, and one by one have many powerful tribes disappeared from the earth. To follow to the tomb the last of his race and to tread on the graves of extinct nations excite melancholy reflections. But true philanthropy reconciles the mind to these vicissitudes as it does to the extinction of one generation to make room for another. . . . Nor is there anything in this which, upon a comprehensive view of the general interests of the human race, is to be regretted. . . .

The present policy of the Government is but a continuation of the same progressive change by a milder process. The tribes which occupied the countries now constituting the Eastern States were annihilated or have melted away to make room for the whites. The waves of population and civilization are rolling to the westward, and we now propose to acquire the countries occupied by the red men of the South and West by a fair exchange, and, at the expense of the United States, to send them to a land where their existence may be prolonged. . . . Rightly considered, the policy of the General Government toward the red man is not only liberal, but generous.

David E. Stannard, *American Holocaust: Columbus and the Conquest of the New World*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. An excerpt (p. 120):

[T]he surviving Indians later referred to [President George] Washington by the nickname "Town Destroyer," for it was under his direct orders that at least 28 out of 30 Seneca towns from Lake Erie to the Mohawk River had been totally obliterated in

a period of less than five years, as had *all* the towns and villages of the Mohawk, the Onondaga, and the Cayuga. As one of the Iroquois told Washington to his face in 1792: "to this day, when that name is heard, our women look behind them and turn pale, and our children cling close to the necks of their mothers."

[President Thomas] Jefferson . . . in 1807 instructed his Secretary of War that any Indians who resisted American expansion into their lands must be met with "the hatchet." "And . . . if ever we are constrained to lift the hatchet against any tribe," he wrote, "we will never lay it down till that tribe is exterminated, or is driven beyond the Mississippi," continuing: "in war, they will kill some of us; we shall destroy all of them. . . ." Indeed, Jefferson's writings on Indians are filled with the straightforward assertion that the natives are to be given a simple choice -- to be "extirpate[d] from the earth" or to remove themselves out of the Americans' way. Had these same words been enunciated by a German leader in 1939, and directed at European Jews, they would be engraved in modern memory.

For a comparison of North America and Palestine, see Norman G. Finkelstein, *The Rise and Fall of Palestine: A Personal Account of the Intifada Years*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996, pp. 104-121.

75. For the German book, see Bruni Höfer, Heinz Dieterich, and Klaus Meyer, eds., *Das Fünfhundert-jährige Reich*, Médico International, 1990.

76. For Morison's statement, see Samuel Eliot Morison, *Christopher Columbus, Mariner*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1955. The exact words (p. 129):

By 1508 a census showed 60,000 of the estimated 1492 population of 250,000 [on Hispaniola] still alive, although the Bahamas and Cuba had been raided to obtain more slaves. Fifty years later, not 500 remained. The cruel policy initiated by Columbus and pursued by his successors resulted in complete genocide.

The book's final paragraph states (pp. 198-199):

He had his faults and defects, but they were largely the defects of the qualities that made him great -- his indomitable will, his superb faith in God and in his own mission as Christ-bearer to lands beyond the seas, his stubborn persistence despite neglect, poverty and discouragement. But there was no flaw, no dark side to the most outstanding and essential of all his qualities -- his seamanship.

One notable exception to the tradition in early scholarship on Native Americans that is described in the text is the nineteenth-century writer Helen Hunt Jackson. See Helen Hunt Jackson, *A Century of Dishonor: a Sketch of the United States Government's Dealings with some of the Indian Tribes*, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995 (original 1880).

77. On the Mexican War, see for example, Howard Zinn, *A People's History of the United States: 1492-Present*, New York: HarperCollins, 1980 (revised and updated edition 1995), ch. 8.

78. For media depiction of Israel as having a unique moral quality, see for example, Nat Hentoff, "The Compassionate Pilot and the Awkward Corpses," *Village Voice*, September 14, 1982, p. 6. An excerpt:

From the start of the Jewish state, there has indeed been a tradition, *tohar haneshek* ("purity of arms" or "morality of arms"), in the Israeli armed forces. Until now [i.e.

Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982] Israeli soldiers had to be very, very careful about injuring civilians, let alone killing them.

Editorial, "Israel and torture: A case for concern," *Sunday Times* (London), June 19, 1977, p. 16. Commenting on the paper's report on torture in Israel -- which is cited in footnote 38 of this chapter -- the editors remark:

The subject merits such intensive treatment . . . because Israel occupies a special place in our world. Israel itself has always made justice, the rule of law and the fair treatment of Arabs central to its claim to nationhood. It was founded in idealism following oppression and this is one of the emotional obstacles: few people are prepared to believe that Israelis, as members of an ancient community which has for centuries been victim of persecution, are capable of persecuting others.

Editorial, "Harshness, and Hope, in Israel," *New York Times*, February 19, 1988, p. A34. This editorial notes: "As Israel suffers, so do its friends. What are they to think, and feel, when this tiny nation, symbol of human decency, behaves unrecognizably?" The phrase "as Israel suffers" in this case refers to the reported killing of 59 Palestinians, and accusations of Israeli soldiers inflicting "bone-breaking beatings" and "burying four young Palestinians alive with a bulldozer."

Chapter Five

Ruling the World

1. Adam Smith used the phrase "principal architects" in decrying the mercantile system, which he argued benefited those who designed it at the expense of the vast majority. See Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976 (original 1776). His exact words (Book IV, ch. VII, pt. III, pp. 180-181):

It cannot be very difficult to determine who have been the contrivers of this whole mercantile system; not the consumers, we may believe, whose interest has been entirely neglected; but the producers, whose interest has been so carefully attended to; and among this latter class our merchants and manufacturers have been by far the principal architects. In the mercantile regulations, which have been taken notice of in this chapter, the interest of our manufacturers has been most peculiarly attended to; and the interest, not so much of the consumers, as that of some other sets of producers, has been sacrificed to it.

Smith's emphasis on the basic class conflict is evident throughout his work, though this fact is grossly misrepresented and falsified by contemporary ideology. See for example the following (Book I, ch. XI, p. 278; Book IV, ch. VII, pt. III, p. 133):

The interest of the dealers, however, in any particular branch of trade or manufactures, is always in some respects different from, and even opposite to, that of the public. . . . The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this order, ought always to be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after having been long and carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with the most suspicious attention. It comes from an order of men, whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public, who have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it. . . . [The monopoly of Great Britain over its colonies], I have endeavoured to show, though a very grievous tax upon the colonies, and though it may increase the revenue of a particular order of men in Great Britain, diminishes instead of increasing that of the great body of the people.

For more on Smith, see chapter 6 of *U.P.* and its footnote 10; and footnote 91 of chapter 10 of *U.P.* See also chapter 2 of *U.P.* and its footnote 58.

2. For more on anarchism, or libertarian socialism, see Peter Marshall, *Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism*, London: HarperCollins, 1992 (valuable survey of anarchist thought and experiments, with detailed bibliography). See also the text of chapter 6 of *U.P.* and its footnote 18; and chapter 10 of *U.P.* and its footnote 16.

3. On Lenin's and Trotsky's destruction of socialist initiatives in Russia and their guiding philosophies, see chapter 7 of *U.P.* and its footnote 3; and footnote 21 of this chapter.

4. On Russia's Third World status prior to 1917, see for example, Teodor Shanin, *Russia as a "Developing Society" -- The Roots of Otherness: Russia's Turn of the Century*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985, Vol. 1, pp. 103f, 123f, 187f. An excerpt (pp. 103-104, 124):

In 1900 the income per capita in Russia was three times lower than in Germany, four times below the U.K., one-third lower than even the Balkans. Because of the extreme diversity between the very rich and the very poor these average figures still understate the poverty of Russia's poor. . . . Much poorer than Western Europe, Russia was not actually "catching up" in terms of the aggregate income per capita, productivity or consumption.

D.S. Mirsky, *Russia: A Social History*, London: Cresset/ New York: Century, 1952, p. 269 ("by 1914, Russia had gone a good part of the way toward becoming a semi-colonial possession of European capital"); Z.A.B. Zeman, *The Making and Breaking of Communist Europe*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, ch. 1 and pp. 57-58. On the history of Eastern Europe as an underdeveloped region, see for example, John Feffer, *Shock Waves: Eastern Europe After the Revolutions*, Boston: South End, 1992, ch. 1.

On the East-West rift in the context of the Third World generally, see for example, L.S. Stavrianos, *Global Rift: The Third World Comes of Age*, New York: Morrow, 1981, chs. 3 and 16.

5. On comparative East and West European economic development in the twentieth century, see for example, World Bank, *World Development Report 1991: the Challenge of Development*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 14. The World Bank's statistics indicate that Eastern European per capita gross domestic product compared to that of the O.E.C.D. (the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which is composed of the rich Western countries) declined from 64 to 57 percent between 1830 and 1913, then rose to 65 percent by 1950; declined to 63 percent by 1973; then fell to 56 percent by 1989. The overall growth rate from 1913 to 1950 was higher for Eastern Europe than for the O.E.C.D. countries (1.4 percent versus 1.1 percent), and higher from 1950 to 1989 for the O.E.C.D. countries than for Eastern Europe (2.3 percent versus 2.0 percent). The Bank's statistics indicate that Eastern Europe's per capita gross domestic product was 15.7 percent higher than Latin America's in 1913, but 77.6 percent higher by 1989. Furthermore, none of these figures take into account wealth distribution, which was far more skewed in both the O.E.C.D. countries and Latin America than in Eastern Europe.

On the catastrophic economic decline in the former Soviet Empire after 1989, see footnote 10 of this chapter.

6. For the World Bank's assessment, see "The World Bank and Development: An N.G.O. Critique and a World Bank Response," in *Trócaire Development Review*, Dublin: Catholic Agency for World Development, 1990, pp. 9-27. An excerpt (p. 21, ¶9):

The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have until recently been among the most prominent examples of relatively successful countries that deliberately turned away from the global economy. But their vast size made inward-looking development more feasible than it would be for most countries, and even they eventually decided to shift policies and take a more active part in the global economy.

Chomsky remarks (*Year 501: The Conquest Continues*, Boston: South End, 1993, pp. 73-74):

A more accurate rendition would be that their "vast size" made it possible for [the Soviet Union and China] to withstand the refusal of the West to allow them to take part in the global economy on terms other than traditional subordination, the "active part in the global economy" dictated to the [Third World] in general by the world rulers. See also, Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962, p. 150 (noting the Soviet Union's "approximate sixfold increase in the volume of industrial output by the mid-1950s"). And see footnotes 8 and 108 of this chapter.

7. Western planners' concern over Communism as a form of economic independence is stated bluntly, for example, in an extensive 1955 study sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson Foundation and the National Planning Association, conducted by a representative segment of the U.S. elite (including the Chairman of the Board of the General American Investors Company, the Associate Director of the Ford Foundation, the Dean of the Columbia Business School, and the Dean of Harvard's Graduate School of Public Administration). See William Yandell Elliott, ed., *The Political Economy of American Foreign Policy: Its Concepts, Strategy, and Limits*, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1955. An excerpt (p. 42; emphasis added):

The Soviet threat is total -- military, political, economic and ideological. Four of its specific aspects are important for an understanding of present and prospective international economic problems. It has meant:

(1) *A serious reduction of the potential resource base and market opportunities of the West owing to the subtraction of the communist areas from the international economy and their economic transformation in ways which reduce their willingness and ability to complement the industrial economies of the West;*

(2) *A planned disruption of the free world economies by means of Soviet foreign economic policy and subversive communist movements;*

(3) *A long-term challenge to the economic pre-eminence of the West arising from the much higher current rates of economic growth (particularly of heavy industry) in the Soviet system;*

(4) *A source of major insecurity in the international economy due to the fact that Soviet communism threatens not merely the political and economic institutions of the West but the continued existence of human freedom and humane society everywhere.*

See also footnotes 8, 32 and 108 of this chapter; and chapter 2 of *U.P.* and its footnote 52.

8. On Western planners' fears of Soviet developmental success, see for example, Record No. 55, June 12, 1956, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957*, Vol. XXVI ("Central and Southeastern Europe"), Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992, p. 116. In June 1956, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles told German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer that "the economic danger from the Soviet Union was perhaps greater than the military danger." The U.S.S.R. was "transforming itself rapidly . . . into a modern and efficient industrial state," while Western Europe was still stagnating.

Similarly, after speaking to President Kennedy in 1961, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan wrote in his diary that the Russians "have a buoyant economy and will soon outmatch Capitalist society in the race for material wealth." See Richard Reeves, *President Kennedy: Profile of Power*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993, p. 174 [citing

Alistair Horne, *Harold Macmillan, Volume II: 1957-1986*, New York: Viking, 1989, p. 303].

Likewise, a State Department Report from the period warned:

[T]he U.S.S.R., like Dr. Johnson's lady preacher, has been able to do it all. We need always reflect that for the less developed countries of Asia, the U.S.S.R.'s economic achievement is a highly relevant one. That the U.S.S.R. was able to industrialize rapidly, and as they see it from scratch is, despite any misgivings about the Communist system, an encouraging fact to these nations.

See Dennis Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot: the United States and India's Economic Development, 1947-1963*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1992, p. 123.

A 1961 memorandum from President Kennedy's Special Assistant, Arthur Schlesinger, explained with respect to Latin America:

The hemisphere[s] level of expectation continues to rise -- stimulated both by the increase in conspicuous consumption and by the spread of the Castro idea of taking matters into one's own hand. At the same time, as living standards begin to decline, many people tend toward Communism both as an outlet for social resentment and as a swift and sure technique for social modernization. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union hovers in the wings, flourishing large development loans and presenting itself as the model for achieving modernization in a single generation.

See "Report To The President On Latin American Mission," March 10, 1961, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, Vol. XII ("The American Republics"), Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996, Record No. 7, p. 13. See also footnotes 7 and 108 of this chapter.

On U.S. Cold War policies, see for example, Melvyn Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992; Lynn Eden, "The End of U.S. Cold War History?," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 1, Summer 1993, pp. 174-207 (discussing Leffler's study and the new consensus on the Cold War that it helped to establish among diplomatic historians); Gabriel Kolko, *Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1980*, New York: Pantheon, 1988 (with further citations to the internal government planning record on U.S. Cold War policies); Frank Kofsky, *Harry Truman and the War Scare of 1948: A Successful Campaign to Deceive the Nation*, New York: St. Martin's, 1993, Appendix A (showing that internal U.S. government estimates of Soviet military capabilities and intentions after World War II were highly dismissive of their capabilities, and were "virtually unanimous in concluding that the Soviets currently had no wish to initiate hostilities with the West"). On the role of economic considerations in the Cold War, see also chapter 2 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 3, 4 and 5; and chapter 3 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11.

9. On profiteering from aid to the former Soviet Empire, see for example, John Fialka, "Helping Ourselves: U.S. Aid to Russia Is Quite a Windfall -- For U.S. Consultants," *Wall Street Journal*, February 24, 1994, p. A1. An excerpt:

The U.S. has pledged \$5.8 billion in aid to the former Soviet Union, most of it destined for Russia; there is dancing in the streets -- though not the streets of Russia. The chief celebrants? Hordes of U.S. consultants who are gobbling up much of the U.S. aid pie . . . pocketing between 50% and 90% of the money in a given aid contract. . . .

Nowhere is the disappointment more acute than in the aid targeted for nuclear disarmament -- a field where Russians have considerable unemployed expertise.

There was much excitement in Russia when Washington unveiled a \$1.2 billion program to help dismantle Russia's aging nuclear arsenal and re-employ its scientists in civilian research. The Russians thought much of the money was coming to them, but it hasn't. So far, the Pentagon, which runs the program, has contracted for \$754 million of U.S. goods and experts. Defense officials say it was Congress's suggestion to use Americans where "feasible"; they have taken the admonition a step further by making it a "guiding tenet."

Barry Newman, "Disappearing Act: West Pledged Billions of Aid to Poland -- Where Did It All Go?," *Wall Street Journal*, February 23, 1994, p. A1. An excerpt:

Under conditions attached by donors, more than half the country's potential [aid] credits must be spent on Western exports -- from corn to economists -- a practice called "tied aid" long frowned on in the Third World. . . . Just as aid for Western advice has mostly aided Western advisers, Western business has been the biggest gainer from the West's business loans. Aid agencies have a pronounced preference for safe bets. The money they are supposed to lend to inspire enterprise in the East often goes to Westerners, or it goes nowhere at all.

Janine R. Wedel, *Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe, 1989-1998*, New York: St. Martin's, 1998.

See also, "While the Rich World Talks," *Economist* (London), July 10, 1993, p. 13 (U.K. edition). An excerpt:

To the man in the street aid is synonymous with charity, money doled out to alleviate poverty abroad and guilt at home. But in the case of much of the aid rich countries give to poorer ones, the main motive has not been to end poverty but to serve the self-interest of the giver, by winning useful friends, supporting strategic aims or promoting the donor's exports. One glaring example is that almost half of America's aid budget over the past decade has been earmarked for Egypt and Israel. Peace in the Middle East may be worth a lot to America, and to the world, but neither Israel nor even Egypt is among the world's neediest countries. The cold war's end has not yet made the motives of aid givers any less political. . . .

The richest 40% of the developing world's population still gets more than twice as much aid per head as the poorest 40%. Countries that spend most on guns and soldiers, rather than health and education, get the most aid per head. And about half of all aid is still tied to the purchase of goods and services from the donor country.

This regular practice concerning Western "aid" money certainly is not new. See for example, Tom Barry and Deb Preusch, *The Soft War: The Uses and Abuses of U.S. Economic Aid in Central America*, New York: Grove, 1988, especially Part One (on the role of U.S. economic aid as an interventionary tool in Central America, focusing especially on U.S. A.I.D.); William Borden, *The Pacific Alliance: United States Foreign Economic Policy and Japanese Trade Recovery, 1947-1955*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984, pp. 182f (on the role of aid programs in East Asia).

For an early statement of the underlying policy by the Deputy Administrator for the U.S. Agency for International Development, see House of Representatives, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Winning the Cold War: The U.S. Ideological Offensive*, Part VIII ("U.S. Government Agencies and Programs"), January 15 and 16, 1964, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964, pp. 954-960 (Frank M. Coffin outlined the "Objectives of the U.S. A.I.D. Program" as being "not development for the sake of sheer development," but the "fostering of a vigorous and expanding private sector" in order "to open up the maximum opportunity for domestic

private initiative and enterprise and to insure that foreign private investment, particularly from the United States, is welcomed and well treated"). See also footnote 14 of this chapter; and footnote 28 of chapter 10 of *U.P.*

10. On some of the human costs of the capitalist "reforms" in Russia and Eastern Europe, see for example, Stephen F. Cohen, "Why Call It Reform?," *Nation*, September 7, 1998, p. 6. An excerpt:

Russia's underlying problem is an unprecedented, all-encompassing economic catastrophe -- a peacetime economy that has been in a process of relentless destruction for nearly seven years. [Gross Domestic Product] has fallen by at least 50 percent and according to one report by as much as 83 percent, capital investment by 90 percent and, equally telling, meat and dairy livestock herds by 75 percent. . . .

So great is Russia's economic and thus social catastrophe that we must now speak of another unprecedented development: the literal demodernization of a twentieth-century country. When the infrastructures of production, technology, science, transportation, heating and sewage disposal disintegrate; when tens of millions of people do not receive earned salaries, some 75 percent of society lives below or barely above the subsistence level and at least 15 million of them are actually starving; when male life expectancy has plunged to 57 years, malnutrition has become the norm among schoolchildren, once-eradicated diseases are again becoming epidemics and basic welfare provisions are disappearing; when even highly educated professionals must grow their own food in order to survive and well over half the nation's economic transactions are barter -- all this, and more, is indisputable evidence of a tragic "transition" backward to a premodern era.

On the earlier U.N.I.C.E.F. report discussed in the text, see for example, Frances Williams, "Unicef criticises economic reform's high human cost," *Financial Times* (London), January 27, 1994, p. 2. An excerpt:

Economic and social reforms in central and eastern Europe have proved far more costly in human terms than originally anticipated, with a massive rise in poverty and widespread social disintegration, the United Nations Children's Fund says in a report [*Public Policy and Social Conditions*] published yesterday. . . .

The report, which documents the impact of the economic slump on living conditions in nine countries since 1989, points out that . . . the spread of poverty, surging death rates, plunging birth rates, falling school enrollment and an unstoppable crime wave have reached "truly alarming proportions." "These costs are not only the cause of unnecessary suffering and waste of human lives but also represent a source of considerable instability and social conflict that could threaten the entire reform process," Unicef argues. Crude death rates (for the population as a whole) were up 9 per cent in Romania, 12 per cent in Bulgaria and 32 per cent in Russia. Between 1989 and 1993 the yearly number of deaths in Russia rose by more than 500,000.

The *New York Times's* article on the topic -- a few months after this report from the foreign press -- reviews some possible reasons for the growing death rate in Russia, but with a curious omission: the economic "reforms" which the paper so strongly advocated. See Michael Specter, "Climb in Russia's Death Rate Sets Off Population Implosion," *New York Times*, March 6, 1994, section 1, p. 1.

See also, Victoria Graham, "UNICEF Says Health Crisis Threatens Eastern European Reforms," *A.P.*, October 6, 1994 (Westlaw database # 1994 WL 10102786)("there were more than 800,000 avoidable deaths from 1989 through 1993 in

Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia and Ukraine"); Julie Corwin, "Russia in Crisis: The Next Battle," *U.S. News and World Report*, October 18, 1993, p. 47 (in June 1992, 43.2 percent of the Russian population lived in poverty, compared to 2.5 percent from 1975 to 1980; per capita G.N.P. has dropped to 65.4 percent of 1990 level); Martin Wolf, "The Birth Pangs of a Capitalist Eastern Europe," *Financial Times* (London), September 28, 1992, p. 5 (from early 1989 through mid-1991, according to International Monetary Fund and World Bank statistics, industrial output fell by 45 percent and prices rose 40-fold in Poland; figures for the rest of Eastern Europe were not much better); U.N.I.C.E.F., *Public Policy and Social Conditions: Central and Eastern Europe in Transition*, Florence (Italy), November 1993; Stephen F. Cohen, *Failed Crusade: America and the Tragedy of Post-Communist Russia*, New York: Norton, 2000. And see Eve Pell, "Capitalism Anyone?," *San Francisco Chronicle*, August 21, 1994, p. 5/Z1 ("more Mercedes are sold [in Moscow] than in New York").

For some examples of how Eastern Europe is being "reintegrated" into its traditional Third World service role, see for example, Kevin Done, "A new car industry set to rise in the east," *Financial Times* (London), September 24, 1992, p. 23 (commenting that General Motors opened a \$690 million assembly plant in the former East Germany, where workers are willing to "work longer hours than their pampered colleagues in western Germany," at 40 percent of the wage and with few benefits); Anthony Robinson, "Green shoots in communism's ruins," *Financial Times* (London), October 20, 1992, "Survey of World Car Industry" section, p. VII (wages in Poland are 10 percent of those demanded by West German workers, kept that way "thanks largely to the Polish government's tougher policy on labour disputes"); Alice Amsden, "Beyond Shock Therapy" [and related articles under the heading "After the Fall"], *American Prospect*, Spring 1993, pp. 87f.

11. For an article attributing votes for Communist Parties in the early 1990s to "nostalgia," see for example, Celestine Bohlen, "Nationalist Vote Toughens Russian Foreign Policy," *New York Times*, January 25, 1994, p. A6 ("As the elections showed, nostalgia for the old empire is a potent issue in Russia these days, with many Russians disillusioned by what they see as a string of unfulfilled promises from the West").

For other reports on public opinion in the former Soviet Empire at the time, see for example, "Poll finds most East Europeans have doubts about democracy," *Chicago Tribune*, February 25, 1993, p. 8 (a Gallup poll of ten East bloc countries found that 63 percent of those questioned opposed what's known as "democracy," an increase of 10 percent since 1991); Andrew Hill, "Ex-Soviet citizens fear free market," *Financial Times* (London), February 25, 1993, p. 2 (a European Community poll in February 1993 found that most Russians, Belarussians, and Ukrainians oppose the move to a free market and feel that "life was better under the old communist system"); Steven Erlanger, "2 Years After Coup Attempt, Yeltsin Warns of Another," *New York Times*, August 20, 1993, p. A2 ("Relatively reliable polls indicate that the number of Russians who believe that their lives will be better under capitalism has dropped from 24 percent in 1991 to 18 percent" in 1993); "Order disguised as chaos," *Economist* (London), March 13, 1993, p. 4 ("Surveys in nearly all [former Soviet bloc] countries show a swing back towards socialist values, with 70% of the population saying the state should provide a place to work, as well as a national health service, housing, education, and other services"). See also chapter 10 of *U.P.* and its footnote 63.

12. For Schoultz's study, see Lars Schoultz, "U.S. Foreign Policy and Human Rights Violations in Latin America: A Comparative Analysis of Foreign Aid Distributions," *Comparative Politics*, January 1981, pp. 149-170. An excerpt (pp. 155, 157):

The correlations between the absolute level of U.S. assistance to Latin America and human rights violations by recipient governments are . . . uniformly positive, indicating that aid has tended to flow disproportionately to Latin American governments which torture their citizens. In addition, the correlations are relatively strong. . . . United States aid tended to flow disproportionately to the hemisphere's relatively egregious violators of fundamental human rights.

Furthermore, with regard to *relative* (i.e. per capita) -- as opposed to absolute (i.e. per country) -- U.S. aid to Latin American countries and human rights violations by the recipient governments, Schoultz also found (p. 162):

As in the case of absolute aid levels, these correlations are uniformly positive. Thus, even when the remarkable diversity of population size among Latin American countries is considered, the findings suggest that the United States has directed its foreign assistance to governments which torture their citizens.

The study also demonstrates that this correlation cannot be attributed to a correlation between aid and need.

See also, Lars Schoultz, *Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981. And see footnote 14 of this chapter.

13. On rising U.S. aid to Colombia and its human rights record, see for example, Human Rights Watch/Americas Watch, *State of War: Political Violence and Counterinsurgency in Colombia*, Human Rights Watch, December 1993, at pp. 134, 131. In addition to documenting massive human rights abuses, this report notes that for fiscal year 1994, the Clinton administration requested that military financing and training funds for Colombia be increased by over 12 percent -- reaching about half of proposed military aid for all of Latin America -- and indicated that if Congressional budget cuts for the Pentagon interfered with these plans, it "intend[ed] to use emergency drawdown authority to bolster the Colombia account." From 1984 through 1992, 6,844 Colombian soldiers were trained under the U.S. International Military Education and Training Program, over two thousand of them from 1990 to 1992 as atrocities were mounting. See also, Human Rights Watch, *War Without Quarter: Colombia and International Humanitarian Law*, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1998; Human Rights Watch/Americas, *Colombia's killer networks: The military-paramilitary partnership and the United States*, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1996.

On the slaughter of dissidents in Colombia, see for example, Douglas Farah, "Leftist Politician Killed in Colombia," *Washington Post*, March 23, 1990, p. A15 (the Patriotic Union party had "lost some ground," "in part because so many of its local and regional leaders were killed," including at least eighty in the first three months of 1990 alone); James Brooke, "A Colombian Campaigns Amid Risks of Drug War," *New York Times*, September 24, 1989, section 1, p. 1 ("political violence is believed to have taken the lives of 4,000 people in Colombia last year"); Amnesty International, *Political Violence in Colombia: Myth and reality*, London: Amnesty International Publications, March 1994. An excerpt (pp. 1, 3, 5, 16):

Since 1986, over 20,000 people have been killed for political reasons -- the majority of them by the armed forces and their paramilitary protegés. . . . Perhaps the most dramatic expression of political intolerance in recent years had been the systematic elimination of the leadership of the left-wing coalition Patriotic Union (U.P.). Over 1,500 of its leaders, members and supporters have been killed since the party was created in 1985. Anyone who takes an active interest in defending human rights, or investigating massacres, "disappearances" or torture, is in a similar position. . . .

Colombia's backers, notably the United States of America, have also remained silent when aid destined to combat drug-trafficking was diverted to finance counter-insurgency operations and thence the killing of unarmed peasants. . . . [T]he perception of drug-trafficking as the principal cause of political violence in Colombia is a myth. . . . Statistics compiled by independent bodies and by the government itself clearly show that by far the greatest number of political killings are the work of the Colombian armed forces and the paramilitary groups they have created. . . . In 1992 the Andean Commission of Jurists estimated that drug traffickers were responsible for less than two per cent of non-combat politically motivated killings and "disappearances"; some 20 per cent were attributed to guerrilla organizations and over 70 per cent were believed to have been carried out by the security forces and paramilitary groups.

The report also describes so-called "social cleansing" programs in Colombia (16, 18, 23-24):

The murder of people designated "socially undesirable" -- homosexuals, prostitutes, minor drug peddlers, petty criminals and addicts, vagrants, street children and the mentally disturbed -- has become endemic in Colombia's major cities. These killings are known as "social cleansing operations" and are generally attributed to, if not claimed by, so-called "death squads" with fearsome names such as *Terminator*, *Kan Kil*, *Mano Negra*, *Los Magnificos*, *Cali Limpia*. . . . [S]everal cases have produced evidence that the "death squads" were drawn from the security forces, particularly the National Police, and were often supported by local traders. . . . The Catholic Church's Intercongregational Commission for Justice and Peace documented over 1,900 "social cleansing" murders between 1988 and 1992, 500 of them in 1992. . . .

The Council of State, Colombia's highest judicial administrative body . . . ordered the Ministry of Defence to pay the equivalent of 500 grams of gold each to [one victim's] parents. . . . The military attitude towards "social cleansing" was illustrated by the Ministry of Defence's response to the compensation claim: ". . . [t]here is no case for the payment of any compensation by the nation, particularly for an individual who was neither useful nor productive, either to society or to his family, but who was a vagrant whose presence nobody in the town of Liborina wanted."

On the Colombian government's strikingly effective public relations campaign to improve its image and justify continued massive U.S. aid, employing the P.R. firm Sawyer/Miller, see John C. Stauber and Sheldon Rampton, *Toxic Sludge Is Good For You!: Lies, Damn Lies and the Public Relations Industry*, Monroe, ME: Common Courage, 1995, pp. 143-148 ("the firm devised a multi-stage campaign: first, reposition Colombia in the public mind from villain to victim. Then, turn the victim into a hero, and then a leader in the war on drugs").

14. For other studies confirming Lars Schoultz's findings, see for example, Michael Klare and Cynthia Arnson, *Supplying Repression*, Washington: Institute for Policy

Studies, 1981, at p. 6 (study concluding that the United States provides "guns, equipment, training, and technical support to the police and paramilitary forces *most directly involved in the torture, assassination, and abuse of civilian dissidents*"); Edward S. Herman, *The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda*, Boston: South End, 1982, ch. 3 (showing that U.S.-controlled aid has been positively related to investment climate and inversely related to the maintenance of a democratic order and human rights); Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism -- The Political Economy of Human Rights: Volume I*, Boston: South End, 1979; Michael T. Klare and Cynthia Arnson, "Exporting Repression: U.S. Support for Authoritarianism in Latin America," in Richard R. Fagen, ed., *Capitalism and the State in U.S.-Latin American Relations*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979, pp. 138-168. See also, Teresa Hayet, *Aid As Imperialism*, New York: Penguin, 1971 (early work on the dominance of U.S. economic and political interests in the decision-making processes of the international financial and lending agencies, including their origination, funding, and staffing); Michael Tanzer, *The Political Economy of International Oil and the Underdeveloped Countries*, Boston: Beacon, 1969, ch. 8 (same). For Schoultz's study, see footnote 12 of this chapter.

Chomsky clarifies that this correlation between U.S. aid and human rights violations does not imply that the United States is rewarding some ruling group for torture, death squads, destruction of unions, elimination of democratic institutions, etc. Instead, he explains (*Towards A New Cold War: Essays on the Current Crisis and How We Got There*, New York: Pantheon, 1982, pp. 206-207):

These are not a positive priority for U.S. policy; rather, they are irrelevant to it. The correlation between abuse of human rights and U.S. support derives from deeper factors. The deterioration in human rights and the increase in U.S. aid and support each correlate, independently, with a third and crucial factor: namely, improvement of the investment climate, as measured by privileges granted foreign capital. The climate for business operations improves as unions and other popular organizations are destroyed, dissidents are tortured or eliminated, real wages are depressed, and the society as a whole is placed in the hands of a collection of thugs who are willing to sell out to the foreigner for a share of the loot -- often too large a share, as business regularly complains. And as the climate for business operations improves, the society is welcomed into the "Free World" and offered the specific kind of "aid" that will further these favorable developments.

15. On systematic hideous abuses in regions of greatest U.S. influence, see especially footnotes 23 and 24 of this chapter, and also its footnotes 12, 13 and 14. See also chapter 2 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 15 and 54; footnotes 8 and 38 of chapter 4 of *U.P.*; footnote 11 of chapter 7 of *U.P.*; and chapter 8 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 32, 57 and 85.

16. For Truman's attitude towards Stalin, see for example, Robert H. Ferrell, ed., *Dear Bess: the Letters from Harry to Bess Truman, 1910-1959*, New York: Norton, 1983. In letters to his wife, Truman wrote (pp. 520-522):

I like Stalin. He is straightforward. Knows what he wants and will compromise when he can't get it. . . . Uncle Joe gave his dinner last night. There were at least twenty-five toasts -- so much getting up and down that there was practically no time to eat or drink either -- a very good thing. . . . Since I'd had America's No. 1 pianist to play for

Uncle Joe at my dinner he had to go me one better. I had one and one violinist -- and he had two of each. . . . The old man loves music. . . . Stalin felt so friendly that he toasted the pianist when he played a Tskowsky (you spell it) piece especially for him. Robert H. Ferrell, ed., *Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman*, New York: Penguin, 1980. Similarly, in his private papers, Truman wrote (pp. 44, 53):

"A common everyday citizen [in Russia] has about as much say about his government as a stock holder in the Standard Oil of New Jersey has about his Company. But I don't care what they do. They evidently like their government or they wouldn't die for it. I like ours so let's get along." "I can deal with Stalin. He is honest -- but smart as hell."

For discussion of the attitudes of Truman and other Washington officials towards Stalin and his regime, see for example, Melvyn Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992. An excerpt (pp. 15, 52-53):

At the end of the war, U.S. officials . . . wanted to cooperate with the Kremlin. But they harbored a distrust sufficiently profound to require terms of cooperation compatible with vital American interests. Truman said it pointedly when he emphasized that the United States had to have its way 85 percent of the time. Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, the Republican spokesman on foreign policy, was a little more categorical: "I think our two antipathetical systems can dwell in the world together -- but only on a basis which establishes the fact that we mean what we say when we say it. . . ."

Humanitarian impulses also were a minor influence on U.S. policy. Principles were espoused because they served American interests and because they accorded with American ideological predilections and not because top officials felt a strong sense of empathy with the peoples under former Nazi rule and potential Soviet tutelage. . . . [I]n Washington, top officials -- Truman, Byrnes, Leahy, Forrestal, Patterson, Davies, Grew, Dunn, Lincoln -- rarely thought about the personal travail caused by war, dislocation, and great power competition. . . . Suffering had to be relieved and hope restored in order to quell the potential for revolution. Rarely does a sense of real compassion and/or moral fervor emerge from the documents and diaries of high officials. These men were concerned primarily with power and self-interest, not with real people facing real problems in the world that had just gone through fifteen years of economic strife, Stalinist terror, and Nazi genocide.

Perhaps nothing better illustrates this moral obtuseness than the way top U.S. officials felt about Stalin. Who could doubt his barbarism? Although the full dimensions of the Gulag were not known, the trials, purges, and murders of the 1930's were a matter of public record. Yet far from worrying about their inability to satisfy Stalin's paranoia, American officialdom had great hope for Stalin in 1945. He appeared frank and willing to compromise. Truman liked him. . . . Lest one think these were the views of a naive American politician, it should be remembered that crusty, tough-nosed Admiral Leahy had some of the same feelings. And so did Eisenhower, Harriman, and Byrnes. . . . What went on in Russia, Truman declared, was the Russians' business. The president was fighting for U.S. interests, and Uncle Joe seemed to be the man with whom one could deal. . . . Truman, among others, frequently voiced concern for Stalin's health; it would be a "real catastrophe" should he die. If "it were possible to see him [Stalin] more frequently," Harriman claimed, "many of our difficulties would be overcome."

See also, Frank Kofsky, *Harry Truman and the War Scare of 1948: A Successful Campaign to Deceive the Nation*, New York: St. Martin's, 1993.

17. On Churchill's attitude towards Stalin, see for example, Lloyd C. Gardner, *Spheres of Influence: The Great Powers Partition Europe, From Munich to Yalta*, Chicago: Ivan Dee, 1993, pp. 235, 207, 240 (Churchill praised Stalin as a "great man, whose fame has gone out not only over all Russia but the world"; he spoke warmly of his relationship of "friendship and intimacy" with the bloodthirsty tyrant; "My hope," Churchill said, "is in the illustrious President of the United States and in Marshal Stalin, in whom we shall find the champions of peace, who after smiting the foe will lead us to carry on the task against poverty, confusion, chaos, and oppression"; during the war he signed his letters to Stalin, "Your friend and war-time comrade"; in February 1945, after the Yalta Conference, Churchill told his Cabinet that "Premier Stalin was a person of great power, in whom he had every confidence," and that it was important that he should remain in charge).

18. For Churchill's remark about the British occupation of Greece, see Winston Churchill, *The Second World War, Volume 6, Triumph and Tragedy*, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1953. His exact words (p. 249):

Do not hesitate to act as if you were in a conquered city where a local rebellion is in progress. . . . We have to hold and dominate Athens. It would be a great thing for you to succeed in this without bloodshed if possible, but also with bloodshed if necessary.

For Churchill's praise of Stalin's restraint, see Lloyd C. Gardner, *Spheres of Influence: The Great Powers Partition Europe, From Munich to Yalta*, Chicago: Ivan Dee, 1993 (citing declassified British cabinet records). Churchill stated to the British Cabinet with regard to Stalin and Greece that (p. 244):

[T]he Russian attitude [at the Yalta conference] could not have been more satisfactory. There was no suggestion on Premier Stalin's part of criticism of our policy. He had been friendly and even jocular in discussions of it. . . . Premier Stalin had most scrupulously respected his acceptance of our position in Greece. He understood that the emissary sent to the U.S.S.R. by the Greek Communists had first been put under house arrest, and then sent back. . . . The conduct of the Russians in this matter had strengthened [Churchill's] view that when they made a bargain, they desired to keep it.

See also, Lawrence S. Wittner, *American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1982, pp. 6-9, 23-28; David F. Schmitz, *Thank God They're On Our Side: The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1921-1965*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999, ch. 4. And see footnote 72 of this chapter.

19. On the U.S. government and business community's support for Hitler and Mussolini before World War II, see for example, Christopher Simpson, *The Splendid Blond Beast: Money, Law, and Genocide in the Twentieth Century*, Monroe, ME: Common Courage, 1995, especially pp. 46-64; David F. Schmitz, *Thank God They're On Our Side: The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1921-1965*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999, chs. 1 and 3; David F. Schmitz, *The United States and Fascist Italy, 1922-1940*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988; John P. Diggins, *Mussolini and Fascism: the View from America*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972.

The reasons for the warm American response to Fascism and Nazism that are detailed in these books are explained quite openly in the internal U.S. government planning record. For instance, a 1937 Report of the State Department's European Division described the rise of Fascism as the natural reaction of "the rich and middle classes, in self-defense" when the "dissatisfied masses, with the example of the Russian revolution before them, swing to the Left." Fascism therefore "must succeed or the masses, this time reinforced by the disillusioned middle classes, will again turn to the Left." The Report also noted that "if Fascism cannot succeed by persuasion [in Germany], it must succeed by force." It concluded that "economic appeasement should prove the surest route to world peace," a conclusion based on the belief that Fascism as a system was compatible with U.S. interests. See Schmitz, *The United States and Fascist Italy, 1922-1940*, p. 140; see also, Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State*, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1977, p. 26 (U.S. Ambassador to Russia William Bullitt "believed that only Nazi Germany could stay the advance of Soviet Bolshevism in Europe").

At the same time, Britain's special emissary to Germany, Lord Halifax, praised Hitler for blocking the spread of Communism, an achievement that brought England to "a much greater degree of understanding of all his [i.e. Hitler's] work" than heretofore, as Halifax recorded his words to the German Chancellor while Hitler was conducting his reign of terror in the late 1930s. See Lloyd Gardner, *Spheres of Influence: The Great Powers Partition Europe, From Munich to Yalta*, Chicago: Ivan Dee, 1993, p. 13. See also, Clement Leibovitz, *The Chamberlain-Hitler Deal*, Edmonton, Canada: Les Éditions Duval, 1993 (fascinating 533-page study reproducing vast documentation, largely from recently-declassified British government sources, of the secret British deal allowing Hitler free rein to expand in Eastern Europe; this deal was "motivated by anti-communism" and was "not a sudden policy quirk but was the crowning of incessant efforts to encourage Japan and Germany 'to take their fill' of the Soviet Union" [p. 6]. Leibovitz's study also establishes conclusively, from a wide variety of sources, that there was great sympathy for Hitler's and Mussolini's policies among the British establishment).

Furthermore, although Hitler's rhetorical commitments and actions were completely public, internal U.S. government documents from the 1930s refer to him as a "moderate." For example, the American chargé d'affaires in Berlin wrote to Washington in 1933 that the hope for Germany lay in "the more moderate section of the [Nazi] party, headed by Hitler himself . . . which appeal[s] to all civilized and reasonable people," and seems to have "the upper hand" over the violent fringe. "From the standpoint of stable political conditions, it is perhaps well that Hitler is now in a position to wield unprecedented power," noted the American Ambassador, Frederic Sackett. See Schmitz, *The United States and Fascist Italy, 1922-1940*, pp. 140, 174, 133, and ch. 9; *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933*, Vol. II ("British Commonwealth, Europe, Near East and Africa"), Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949, pp. 329, 209.

The U.S. reaction to Fascist Italy before the war was similar. A high-level inquiry of the Wilson administration determined in December 1917 that with rising labor militancy, Italy posed "the obvious danger of social revolution and disorganization." A State Department official noted privately that "If we are not careful we will have a second Russia on our hands," adding: "The Italians are like children" and "must be [led] and assisted more than almost any other nation." Mussolini's Blackshirts solved the problem by violence. They carried out "a fine young revolution," the American Ambassador to

Italy observed approvingly, referring to Mussolini's March on Rome in October 1922, which brought Italian democracy to an end. Racist goons effectively ended labor agitation with government help, and the democratic deviation was terminated; the United States watched with approval. The Fascists are "perhaps the most potent factor in the suppression of Bolshevism in Italy" and have much improved the situation generally, the Embassy reported to Washington, while voicing some residual anxiety about the "enthusiastic and violent young men" who have brought about these developments. The Embassy continued to report the appeal of Fascism to "all patriotic Italians," simple-minded folk who "hunger for strong leadership and enjoy . . . being dramatically governed." See Schmitz, *The United States and Fascist Italy, 1922-1940*, pp. 14, 36, 44, 52; *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919*, Vol. I ("Paris Peace Conference"), Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1942, p. 47.

As time went on, the American Embassy was well aware of Mussolini's totalitarian measures. Fascism had "effectively stifled hostile elements in restricting the right of free assembly, in abolishing freedom of the press and in having at its command a large military organization," the Embassy reported in a message of February 1925, after a major Fascist crackdown. But Mussolini remained a "moderate," manfully confronting the fearsome Bolsheviks while fending off the extremist fringe on the right. His qualifications as a moderate were implicit in the judgment expressed by Ambassador Henry Fletcher: the choice in Italy is "between Mussolini and Fascism and Giolitti and Socialism, between strong methods of internal peace and prosperity and a return to free speech, loose administration and general disorganization. Peace and Prosperity were preferred." (Giolitti was the liberal Prime Minister, who had collaborated with Mussolini in the repression of labor but now found himself a target as well.) See Schmitz, *The United States and Fascist Italy, 1922-1940*, pp. 76-77f.

On the views of U.S. corporations towards Fascism, including details of participation in the plunder of Jewish assets under Hitler's Aryanization programs -- notably, the Ford Motor Company -- see for example, Christopher Simpson, *The Splendid Blond Beast: Money, Law, and Genocide in the Twentieth Century*, Monroe, ME: Common Courage, 1995, especially ch. 5 (on Ford's role in Aryanization of Jewish property, see pp. 62-63). An excerpt (p. 64):

Many U.S. companies bought substantial interests in established German companies, which in turn plowed that new money into Aryanizations or into arms production banned under the Versailles Treaty. According to a 1936 report from Ambassador William Dodd to President Roosevelt, a half-dozen key U.S. companies -- International Harvester, Ford, General Motors, Standard Oil of New Jersey, and du Pont -- had become deeply involved in German weapons production. . . .

U.S. investment in Germany accelerated rapidly after Hitler came to power, despite the Depression and Germany's default on virtually all of its government and commercial loans. Commerce Department reports show that U.S. investment in Germany increased some 48.5 percent between 1929 and 1940, while declining sharply everywhere else in continental Europe. U.S. investment in Great Britain . . . barely held steady over the decade, increasing only 2.6 percent.

Bradford C. Snell, *American Ground Transport: A Proposal for Restructuring the Automobile, Truck, Bus, and Rail Industries*, Hearings Before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974, pp. 16-23 (discussing the major role that General Motors, Ford, and to a lesser extent Chrysler, played in the

Nazi war effort); Edwin Black, *I.B.M. and the Holocaust: The Strategic Alliance Between Nazi Germany and America's Most Powerful Corporation*, New York: Crown, 2001; Reinhold Billstein et al., *Working for the Enemy: Ford, General Motors, and Forced Labor in Germany during the Second World War*, New York: Berghahn, 2000; Gerard Colby Zilg, *Du Pont: Behind the Nylon Curtain*, Englewood Cliffs (NJ): Prentice-Hall, 1974, especially pp. 292-314, 353-354 (on corporate leaders' plans for a fascist coup in the U.S. in 1934, and on the Du Pont Company's arming of the rising Axis powers in the 1930s). For more on the fascist coup plot -- discussed in Zilg's outstanding study -- see Union Calendar No. 44, Report No. 153, "Investigation of Nazi and Other Propaganda," February 15, 1935, House of Representatives, 74th Congress, 1st Session, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1935 (C.I.S. Serial Set #9890, pp. 9-10); Dickstein-McCormick Special Committee on Un-American Activities, "Investigation of Nazi Propaganda Activities and Investigation of Certain Other Propaganda Activities," beginning June 5, 1934, House of Representatives, 73rd Congress, 2nd Session, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1935 (C.I.S.#688-3-B), especially Testimony of Major-General Smedley D. Butler (Ret.) on November 20, 1934, pp. 8-20, and following testimony, pp. 20-128 (microfiche cards 7 and 8 of 15).

For a sample of the U.S. business press's attitudes, see "The State: Fascist and Total," *Fortune*, July 1934 [special issue devoted to Italian Fascism], pp. 47-48. This issue comments approvingly that "the purpose and effect of Fascism" is "to unwop the wops," and that the idea that the Italians ought to resent Fascism "is a confusion, and we can only get over it if we anesthetize for the moment our ingrained idea that democracy is the only right and just conception of government." See also, John P. Diggins, *Mussolini and Fascism: the View from America*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972; John C. Stauber and Sheldon Rampton, *Toxic Sludge Is Good For You!: Lies, Damn Lies and the Public Relations Industry*, Monroe, ME: Common Courage, 1995, p. 149.

On protection of former Nazis and Fascists after World War II by the U.S. and British governments, see footnote 80 of this chapter. On post-war protection by the U.S. of Japanese Fascists who developed and tested biological weapons, see footnote 62 of chapter 8 of *U.P.*

On the U.S. government's refusal to admit into the United States most Jewish and other refugees fleeing from the Holocaust, see for example, Arthur D. Morse, *While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathy*, New York: Random House, 1967; David S. Wyman, *Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis, 1938-1941*, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1973; Saul S. Friedman, *No Haven for the Oppressed: United States Policy toward Jewish Refugees, 1938-1945*, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1973; Alfred M. Lilienthal, *The Zionist Connection: What Price Israel?*, New York: Dodd, Mead, 1978 (on the unwillingness of American Zionists to support plans for bringing European Jews to the United States in 1942; instead, they wanted them to go to Palestine).

On U.S. attitudes towards the Spanish Fascist leader Francisco Franco, see footnote 61 of this chapter; and the text of chapter 6 of *U.P.*

On U.S. attitudes towards Fascist Japan, see for example, Noam Chomsky, "The Revolutionary Pacifism of A.J. Muste: On the Backgrounds of the Pacific War," in Noam Chomsky, *American Power and the New Mandarins: Historical and Political Essays*, New York: Pantheon, 1969, pp. 159-220.

Chomsky explains that it was not until European Fascism attacked U.S. interests directly that it became an avowed enemy, and the American reaction to Japanese Fascism was much the same.

20. For *The Nation's* cover story, see "Norman Rush contemplates the bust of socialism . . . and why we will all miss it so much," *Nation*, January 24, 1994, article on p. 90 ("The socialist experiment is over and the capitalist experiment roars to its own conclusion").

21. For contemporaneous criticism of the Bolsheviks by leftists, see for example, Rosa Luxemburg, *The Russian Revolution*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961 (original 1918)(sympathetic and fraternal, but incisive, critique of Bolshevism written in prison). An excerpt (pp. 62, 71):

To be sure, every democratic institution has its limits and shortcomings, things which it doubtless shares with all other human institutions. But the remedy which Trotsky and Lenin have found, the elimination of democracy as such, is worse than the disease it is supposed to cure; for it stops up the very living source from which alone can come the correction of all the innate shortcomings of social institutions. That source is the active, untrammelled, energetic political life of the broadest masses of the people. . . . The whole mass of the people must take part in [economic and social life]. Otherwise, socialism will be decreed from behind a few official desks by a dozen intellectuals. Public control is indispensably necessary. Otherwise the exchange of experiences remains only within the closed circle of the officials of the new regime. Corruption becomes inevitable. Socialism in life demands a complete spiritual transformation in the masses degraded by centuries of bourgeois class rule.

Bertrand Russell, *The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1962 (original 1920)(written after an invited, month-long official tour of Soviet Russia). An excerpt (pp. 9-10, 26-29):

By far the most important aspect of the Russian Revolution is as an attempt to realize socialism. I believe that socialism is necessary to the world, and believe that the heroism of Russia has fired men's hopes in a way which was essential to the realization of socialism in the future. . . . But the method which Moscow aims at establishing socialism is a pioneer method, rough and dangerous, too heroic to count the cost of the opposition it arouses. I do not believe that by this method a stable or desirable form of socialism can be established. . . .

When a Russian Communist speaks of dictatorship, he means the word literally, but when he speaks of the proletariat, he means the word in a Pickwickian [i.e. highly specialized] sense. He means the "class-conscious" part of the proletariat, i.e., the Communist Party. He includes people by no means proletarian (such as Lenin and Chicherin) who have the right opinions, and he excludes such wage earners as have not the right opinions, whom he classifies as lackeys of the bourgeoisie. . . . Opposition is crushed without mercy, and without shrinking from the methods of the Tsarist police, many of whom are still employed at their old work. . . . Bolshevism is internally aristocratic and externally militant. The Communists . . . are practically the sole possessors of power, and they enjoy innumerable advantages in consequence.

M. Sergven [probably a pseudonym for the Russian anarcho-syndicalist Gregory Maksimov], "Paths of Revolution," in *Libertarian Analysis*, Vol. 1, No. 1, Winter 1970, pp. 9-12 [originally published in *Voln'nyi Golos Truda* (The Free Voice of Labor), Moscow, September 16, 1918, pp. 1-2]. An excerpt:

[T]he proletariat is gradually being enserfed by the state. It is being transformed into servants over whom there has risen a new class of administrators -- a new class born mainly from the womb of the so-called intelligentsia. . . . We do not mean to say that . . . the Bolshevik party had set out to create a new class system. But we do say that even the best intentions and aspirations must inevitably be smashed against the evils inherent in any system of centralized power. . . . The Revolution . . . threw itself into the arms of the old tyrant, centralized power, which is squeezing out its life's breath. We were too unorganized, too weak, and so we have allowed this to happen.

Emma Goldman, "Afterword to *My Disillusionment in Russia*," in Alix Kates Shulman, ed., *Red Emma Speaks: Selected Writings and Speeches By Emma Goldman*, New York: Vintage, 1972, pp. 337-358 (original 1923)(written after two years of living in Soviet Russia). An excerpt (pp. 340, 343, 353-354):

For several months following October [the Bolsheviks] suffered the popular forces to manifest themselves, the people carrying the Revolution into ever-widening channels. But as soon as the Communist Party felt itself sufficiently strong in the government saddle, it began to limit the scope of popular activity. All the succeeding acts of the Bolsheviks, all their following policies, changes of policies, their compromises and retreats, their methods of suppression and persecution, their terrorism and extermination of all other political views -- all were but the *means to an end*: the retaining of the State power in the hands of the Communist Party. Indeed, the Bolsheviks themselves (in Russia) made no secret of it. . . .

True Communism was never attempted in Russia, unless one considers thirty-three categories of pay, different food rations, privileges to some and indifference to the great mass as Communism. In the early period of the Revolution it was comparatively easy for the Communist Party to possess itself of power. All the revolutionary elements, carried away by the ultra-revolutionary promises of the Bolsheviks, helped the latter to power. Once in possession of the State the Communists began their process of elimination. All the political parties and groups which refused to submit to the new dictatorship had to go. First the Anarchists and Left Social Revolutionists, then the Mensheviks and other opponents from the Right, and finally everybody who dared aspire to an opinion of his own. Similar was the fate of all independent organizations. They were either subordinated to the needs of the new State or destroyed altogether, as were the Soviets, the trade unions and the coöperatives -- three great factors for the realization of the hopes of the Revolution. . . .

It is not only Bolshevism, Marxism, and Governmentalism which are fatal to revolution as well as to all vital human progress. The main cause of the defeat of the Russian Revolution lies much deeper. It is to be found in the whole Socialist conception of revolution itself. The dominant, almost general, idea of revolution -- particularly the Socialist idea -- is that revolution is a violent change of social conditions through which one social class, the working class, becomes dominant over another class, the capitalist class. It is the conception of a purely physical change, and as such it involves only political scene shifting and institutional rearrangements. Bourgeois dictatorship is replaced by the "dictatorship of the proletariat" -- or by that of its "advance guard," the Communist Party; Lenin takes the seat of the Romanovs, the Imperial Cabinet is rechristened Soviet of People's Commissars, Trotsky is appointed Minister of War, and a labourer becomes the Military Governor General of Moscow. That is, in essence, the Bolshevik conception of revolution, as translated into actual practice. And with a few minor alterations it is

also the idea of revolution held by all other Socialist parties. This conception is inherently and fatally false. Revolution is indeed a violent process. But if it is to result only in a change of dictatorship, in a shifting of names and political personalities, then it is hardly worth while. . . . It is at once the great failure and the great tragedy of the Russian Revolution that it attempted (in leadership of the ruling political party) to change only institutions and conditions, while ignoring entirely the human and social values involved in the Revolution.

For a much earlier critique of Leninist organizational principles, see Rosa Luxemburg, *Leninism or Marxism?*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961 (original 1904). An excerpt (p. 102):

If we assume the viewpoint claimed as his own by Lenin and we fear the influence of intellectuals in the proletarian movement, we can conceive of no greater danger to the Russian party than Lenin's plan of organization. Nothing will more surely enslave a young labor movement to an intellectual elite hungry for power than this bureaucratic strait jacket, which will immobilize the movement and turn it into an automaton manipulated by a Central Committee. On the other hand, there is no more effective guarantee against opportunist intrigue and personal ambition than the independent revolutionary action of the proletariat, as a result of which the workers acquire the sense of political responsibility and self-reliance. What is today only a phantom haunting Lenin's imagination may become reality tomorrow.

For a classic discussion of the reactionary character of the Bolshevik takeover by a participant in the events, see Voline [i.e. Vsevolod Mikhailovich Eichenbaum], *The Unknown Revolution, 1917-1921*, Detroit: Black & Red, 1974 (original 1947).

22. For the Walters program, see "Americans Beware! -- Danger in Guatemala," *20/20*, A.B.C. television news-magazine, June 3, 1994, transcript #1422-1.

23. On kidnapping of children, see footnote 24 of this chapter. On child slavery, child sex slavery, and child labor throughout U.S.-dominated Third World domains, see for example, Reuters, "Exploitation of children documented in world study," *Christian Science Monitor*, December 19, 1979, "Living" section, p. 15. An excerpt:

Almost 200 million children throughout the world may be slaving away, often in dismal poverty, according to a new international study of child labor. Children have been maimed in India to become more effective beggars, sold to work under appalling conditions in factories in Thailand, and turned into Latin American chattel slaves at the age of three. . . . The 170-page book [*Child Workers Today*, by James Challis and David Elliman], sponsored by the London-based Anti-Slavery Society, is peppered with pitiful examples. . . .

Latin America is singled out in the book as the continent where child labor will probably be harder to eradicate than anywhere else in the world. In countries with large Indian populations like Bolivia, girls as young as three are "adopted" by white families, the book says. Traditionally they are sexually available to the sons of the family, not allowed to marry, and the children they conceive become virtual chattel slaves in turn.

George C. Moffett III, "Use of Child Labor Increases Worldwide," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 21, 1992, p. 8. An excerpt:

It is one of the grimmer ironies of the age that even as global employment rates for adults are declining, the incidence of child labor -- often forced, frequently debilitating -- is on the increase. As many as a quarter of all children between ages

10 and 14 in some regions of the world may be working, according to a report issued today by the Geneva-based International Labor Organization (I.L.O.) . . . The report defines child labor as a condition in which children are exploited, overworked, deprived of health and education -- "or just deprived of their childhood."

Just how many children are affected is hard to say, since most work illegally or for small merchants, family cottage industries, and farms, where they are "invisible to the collectors of labor-force statistics," says the I.L.O. study, entitled "Child Labor: A Dramatically Worsening Global Problem." It says the figure is certainly in the hundreds of millions, including 7 million in Brazil alone.

Amport Tantuvanich, A.P., "Slavery the fate of these children," *Boston Globe*, September 24, 1978, p. 32. An excerpt:

They labor hour after hour without a break around furnaces that generate 1450 degree heat. Their arms and hands bear scars from burns and cuts which management treats with herbal ointments, toothpaste, fish sauce and pain killers. But these workers in a Bangkok glass factory are children. They are among tens of thousands in Thailand that officials acknowledge are illegally employed and often cheated and abused. Some are sold by their parents to factory owners and become virtual slaves. . . .

In one of the biggest raids this year, police rescued 63 children from jail-like conditions in a tinsel-paper factory in Bangkok. Some of the children told police they were "purchased" by the factory, which had sent a broker to recruit young workers in northeastern Thailand. . . . The children in the glass factory work 10 hours a day, seven days a week. They are paid the equivalent of 90 cents a day. . . . Labor specialists say that a combination of wide-open free enterprise and a lack of labor-union power contributes to the child labor problem. Under laws laid down by Thailand's military government, strikes and other labor union activities are forbidden.

John Stackhouse, "The girls of Tamil Nadu," *Globe & Mail* (Toronto), November 20, 1993, p. D1. An excerpt:

On these drought-stricken plains of Tamil Nadu in Southern India, close to 100,000 children -- three-quarters of them girls -- go to work every morning in match factories, fireworks plants, rock quarries, tobacco mills, repair shops and tea houses. Together, they make up the single biggest concentration of child labour in the world.

In an age when child labour has disappeared from much of the world, it continues to be rampant in South Asia. The Operations Research Group, a respected Indian organization, has pegged the number of full-time child workers at 44 million in India, with perhaps 10 million more toiling in neighbouring Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka -- a total almost equal to the population of Britain.

See also, Ian Black, "Peace or no peace, Israel will still need cheap Arab labour," *New Statesman* (U.K.), September 29, 1978, pp. 403-404. An excerpt:

Just after 4 a.m., as the sky begins to pale, you can see small groups of people standing around the pumps, huddled in corners, leaning against walls. They have just scrambled off dilapidated trucks and vans that bring them daily from Gaza, Khan Younis and Rafiah in Northern Sinai, and they are clutching plastic bags containing their food for the day. Some are no more than six or seven years old. The scene has become known in Israel as the Children's Market at the Ashkelon junction.

By 5 o'clock the sun is up and the first employers are arriving. They come in jeeps from the prosperous *Moshavim* (small private or semi-collective farms) situated on either side of the now invisible "green line" -- the pre-1967 border. They are at once surrounded by swarms of waiting workers. In broken Hebrew -- but fluent enough to cover the bare essentials of selling themselves for the day -- the little

labourers persuade the Israelis of their skills: "Sir I good work sir, 60 pounds all day sir" and so on. . . . Sometimes they are paid in full for their work -- usually a meagre, subsistence wage; often they are cheated even on that. And since their employment is illegal, there is little they can do.

24. On kidnapping and murder of children in U.S.-dominated Third World domains -- for organ transplants and otherwise -- see for example, Hugh O'Shaughnessy, "Takeaway babies farmed to order," *Observer* (London), October 1, 1993, p. 14. An excerpt:

San Salvador's eastern slum suburb . . . [is] home to El Salvador's urban proletariat -- and to its flourishing baby trade. Here are the *casas de engorde*, or "fattening houses," where newborn babies, preferably male and not too dark-skinned, are brought to be plumped up for sale. Usually run by lawyers in collaboration with nurses and baby minders, the fattening houses have the job of cleaning up the babies, freeing them of worms, lice and nits, and feeding them so they fetch the best price. The best price for a good-looking male child is now between £7,000 and £10,000 -- double the price a decade ago, say lawyers familiar with the trade in El Salvador and Guatemala. Bought for, say, £200 from kidnappers or poor mothers, the baby farmers aim to sell the "goods" for at least 30 times their initial investment.

Though the furtive trade is impossible to quantify, estimates say several thousand children are sold every year from Central America. Though the majority of young people kidnapped or bought in El Salvador are destined for adoption in Canada, the United States or Italy, there can be little doubt that some go to Britain. In addition to the babies sold to childless couples in rich countries, there are others bought by criminals involved in pornography, prostitution or drugs, or by intermediaries in the growing international trade in human organs. . . . In Honduras . . . the practice is for baby farmers to adopt retarded children and use their organs as "spare parts." In Guatemala City, the fire service and the undertakers are notorious for trading in the organs of the dead, young and old, particularly in the corneas of the eyes. . . .

[O]n 1 June 1982, when Nelson was six months old, the Salvadorean army came to the untidy village of San Antonio de la Cruz on the banks of the River Lempa, supposedly as part of a military operation called *La Guinda* (The Glace Cherry) directed against the left-wing guerrillas of the F.M.L.N. Instead, they had a very successful day's baby-hunting. After surrounding the village, the army loaded their helicopters with 50 babies, including Nelson. Their parents have never seen them since. . . . [Nelson's mother, Maria Magdalena,] desperately clung to the helicopter, but the soldiers pushed her off.

Jan Rocha and Ed Vulliamy, "Brazilian children 'sold for transplants,'" *Guardian Weekly* (U.K.), September 30, 1990, p. 10. An excerpt:

Brazilian federal police have been ordered by the Justice Ministry to investigate allegations that children ostensibly adopted by Italian couples are being used for illicit organ transplants in Europe. Italian authorities have been asked by Interpol to look into the allegations, which include claims that Brazilian children are being killed in Europe and their kidneys, testicles, livers and hearts sold for between £20,000 and £50,000. Such a trade is known to exist in Mexico and Thailand. . . . Handicapped children are said to be preferred for transplant operations. . . .

False papers are obtained for stolen babies in many ways. Police discovered that Rita de Cassia Costa, aged 21, had "given birth" three times last year: once to her own child, and twice to give an identity to stolen babies. She was arrested with a lawyer, Dorivan Matias Teles, who is accused of involvement in an international

network allegedly supplying babies for "brain death" operations to enable them to be maintained alive until their organs were needed for transplants.

Robert Smith, "European Parliament Denunciation: The Trafficking of Central American Children," *Report on Guatemala* (Guatemala News and Information Bureau, Oakland, CA), Vol. 10, Issue 3, July/August/September 1989, pp. 4-5 (reprinting the text of the European Parliament's November 1988 resolution on the trafficking of Central American children). An excerpt:

Since 1987, numerous clandestine "human farms," houses where small children are kept and fed prior to being sold, have been discovered in Guatemala and Honduras. . . . According to Marta Gloria Torres, member of the Representation of the United Guatemalan Opposition (RUOG), "A few cases are for adoptions, but the great majority is for organ transplants or for prostitution." Near one farm discovered in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, the corpses of many infants were found, all with one or more organs removed. . . . There are some reports of widows and parents, driven by poverty, actually selling their own young children to these brokers. But in the last few years, Guatemalan newspapers have reported a great number of young children kidnapped from their parents' homes, from hospitals, and off the streets. . . .

The first "casa de engorde" ("fattening-up house") was discovered by the police in Guatemala in February, 1987. Children found inside were destined for the United States and Israel as organ donors, according to those arrested in the raid. In the following month, another house was closed down in the capital. Records found inside indicate that between October 1985 and March of 1986, 150 children were sold outside the country. In June of 1988 alone, the Military Police found and closed five of these underground houses. . . . Doctor Luís Genaro Morales, president of the Guatemalan Pediatric Association, says child trafficking "is becoming one of the principal non-traditional export products," and that it generates \$20 million of business a year.

Samuel Blixen [Uruguayan journalist], "'War' waged on Latin American street kids," *Latinamerica press* (Lima; Noticias Aliadas), November 7, 1991, p. 3. An excerpt:

Against a backdrop of increasing poverty and street crime a new type of death squad has sprung up: "clean-up squads," or "avengers." They target and exterminate street kids, and many believe they are assisted by police and financed by the business sector. Surviving as beggars, thieves, prostitutes, drug runners or cheap factory workers, street kids are considered the criminals of the future and their elimination will supposedly prevent future problems. Some victims are gunned down while they are sleeping below bridges, on vacant lots and in doorways. Others are kidnapped, tortured and killed in remote areas.

In Brazil, the bodies of young death squad victims are found in zones outside the metropolitan areas with their hands tied, showing signs of torture and riddled with bullet holes. . . . Street girls are frequently forced to work as prostitutes. . . . In Guatemala City, the majority of the 5,000 street kids work as prostitutes. In June 1990, eight children were kidnapped on a street in the capital by men riding in a jeep. Three bodies were later found in a clearing with their ears cut off and eyes gouged out: a warning about what could happen to possible witnesses. . . . In a rare case, 12 groups accused of murdering children were broken up in Rio de Janeiro last July. Minister of Health Alcení Guerra blamed business owners and merchants for financing the death squads. . . . Yet, the murders continue to increase. In Rio de Janeiro and in São Paulo reports indicate an average of three children under the age of 18 are killed daily. According to statistics from the Legal Medical Institute, 427

children in Rio de Janeiro have been killed this year. Almost all the murders have been attributed to death squads. . . .

In the Brazilian state of Rondonia on the Bolivian border, approximately 1,000 children work as virtual slaves extracting tin and another 2,000 adolescents work as prostitutes, according to union sources. Private employment agencies in Puerto Maldonado, capital of the Peruvian jungle department of Madre de Dios, recruit children to pan for gold. The children are sold to the highest bidder, according to Vicente Solorio, head of an investigation commission of the Peruvian Labor Ministry. . . . Children work 18 hours a day in water up to their knees and are paid a daily ration of bananas and boiled yucca, reported a young campesina who escaped after eight months of forced labor.

Gilberto Dimenstein (introduction by Jan Rocha), *Brazil: War on Children*, London: Latin America Bureau, 1991. An excerpt (pp. 21, 2):

"There is definitely a process of extermination of young people going on in various parts of the country. And I have to recognise that, unfortunately, there are members of the police force who are involved in the killing or who are giving protection to the killers," admits Hélio Saboya, head of the Justice Department in Rio de Janeiro. . . . Almeida Filho, head of the Justice Department in Pernambuco, the biggest state in the country's north-east region . . . is accustomed to reading reports of murders of young people in which the victims have suffered the most sadistic torture: genital organs severed, eyes poked out, bodies burned by cigarette ends and slashed by knives. . . .

There are an estimated 25 million deprived children in Brazil, and of these between seven and eight million are on the streets. . . . During the day, the street children's main concern is survival -- food. To get it they beg, pick pockets, steal from shops, mug tourists, look after parked cars, shine shoes, or search litter bins. Frequently glue takes the place of food. They sniff it from paper bags and for a few glorious moments forget who or where they are.

Amnesty International, *Political Violence in Colombia: Myth and reality*, London: Amnesty International Publications, March 1994. An excerpt (pp. 21-23):

A "social cleansing" operation uncovered in the northwest port city of Barranquilla in February 1992 caused widespread revulsion in Colombia. University security guards and police officers were killing people and selling their bodies to the illegal trade in organs and corpses. The operation came to light when one of the intended victims survived and escaped.

Oscar Hernández said that security guards had lured him and other paper collectors to the grounds of the Free University in Barranquilla by telling them they could collect discarded cartons and bottles outside the University's School of Medicine. Once inside the university grounds, the refuse collectors were shot or beaten to death with clubs. Oscar Hernández was beaten unconscious and was presumably believed to be dead. When he regained consciousness early the following morning he found himself in a room with several corpses. He escaped and raised the alarm to a passing police patrol. . . . Security guards and the head of the dissecting room were arrested and reportedly confessed that the traffic in bodies had been going on for two years.

U.N. Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/34, June 23, 1992 (testimony of University of São Paulo (Brazil) Professor of Theology Father Barruel that "75 percent of the corpses [of murdered children] reveal internal mutilation and the majority have their eyes removed").

On the "voluntary" sale of organs, see for example, Kenneth Freed, "Desperation: Selling an Eye or a Kidney," *Los Angeles Times*, September 10, 1981, section 1, p. 1. An excerpt:

Paulo Ricardo dos Santos Barreto and Maria Fatima Lopes don't know each other, but they share something -- an extraordinary despair that is driving them to risk mutilation of their own bodies, even blindness. The two young people -- he is 22 and she 19 -- are among the growing number of Brazilians so crushed by poverty that they are willing to sell their bodies. Not for prostitution, although that is common enough here. No, Barreto is advertising a kidney, Lopes a cornea. "I sometimes live on bread and water," Barreto said in explaining his situation. "I can't exist like this. There is no other way out. . . ."

Barreto and Lopes are not alone. In a country where at least 15% of the people are jobless and millions more earn less than \$200 a month and inflation is 120% a year, poverty is giving birth to monstrous acts of desperation. The Sunday classified ads of Rio's biggest newspapers are a register of this despair, increasingly full of offers by people to sell parts of themselves -- kidneys and eyes for the most part. In a recent Sunday edition of *O Globo*, there were 10 ads offering to sell kidneys and three more for corneas.

Hugh O'Shaughnessy, "Murder And Mutilation Supply Human Organ Trade," *Observer* (London), March 27, 1994, p. 27. An excerpt:

In January, a 29-year-old unemployed French electrician advertised in a Strasbourg newspaper to exchange one of his kidneys for a job. As in the Third World, so in cash-strapped Eastern Europe, where selling one's organs can be a source of hard currency. A call last week to Robert Miroz, a kidney agent in the Polish city of Swidnica, confirmed that organs were available; the price of a kidney was quoted as pounds 12,000. Polish middlemen send their potential donors to a hospital in Western Europe where the best-matched candidate sells his kidney for cash in hand and a written undertaking from the recipient to bear all the costs of his post-operative treatment.

It should be noted that trade in body parts does not pass entirely without censure: in 1994, President Clinton approved a National Security Council recommendation to impose limited sanctions against Taiwanese exports, to punish Taiwan "for its alleged failure to crack down adequately on trafficking in rhino horns and tiger parts." See Jeremy Mark, "U.S. Will Punish Taiwan for Trade In Animal Parts," *Wall Street Journal*, April 4, 1994, p. A8.

25. For the Amnesty International report discussing "social cleansing" in Colombia, see footnotes 13 and 24 of this chapter.

26. On the emerging market in organs in Eastern Europe, see for example, Hugh O'Shaughnessy, "Murder And Mutilation Supply Human Organ Trade," *Observer* (London), March 27, 1994, p. 27. An excerpt:

A children's home in St. Petersburg, Russia, is giving away children in its care to foreigners and does not bother to register the addresses to which they go. The evidence, though circumstantial, points strongly to the orphans being robbed of their organs and tissues. Dr. Jean-Claude Alt, an anaesthetist in Versailles and a leading campaigner against illegal trading in human organs, says: "People come to the home offering to adopt children with any ailment from a hare lip to Down's Syndrome and

severe mental disturbance. Their only stipulation is that they have no heart trouble. What reasonable conclusion can you draw from that?" . . .

[T]hose with money who have wanted to jump the queues for kidneys in Western Europe have gone to the Third World, where donors sell their organs for cash. At a hospital in Bombay last week, Dr. Martin de Souza said a kidney transplant would cost about pounds 7,500 fully inclusive. The price is similar in the Philippines capital, Manila.

On the emerging market in children in Eastern Europe, see for example, Gabrielle Glaser, "Booming Polish Market: Blond, Blue-Eyed Babies," *New York Times*, April 19, 1992, section 1, p. 8. An excerpt:

Poland's opening to Western market forces has brought an unexpected side effect: a booming traffic in the country's blond, blue-eyed babies. . . . Western embassies in Warsaw have reported a striking rise in the number of residence visas and passports granted to Polish infants and toddlers. . . . In some cases, officials say, poor, pregnant women give up their babies in exchange for money directly. But most often, they say, administrators of homes for single mothers, as well as the attorneys involved in the adoptions, receive up to tens of thousands of dollars. . . . [S]ome of the cases reported are linked to the Roman Catholic Church. . . .

In a recent article, Marek Baranski wrote about one woman in the city of Lublin who gave her unborn child up for adoption to an American couple in December 1991 after being pressed by the nuns caring for her in a church home for single mothers. Since the article appeared, Mr. Baranski said he has received several dozen letters, most of them anonymous, from women throughout Poland who wrote of having the same treatment in church-run homes. . . . [T]he mother superior of one home received up to \$25,000 for each baby boy and \$15,000 for each baby girl. . . . Two visitors driving a foreign car went to [this] home. . . . The mother superior at the home, Sister Benigna, greeted the visitors with blessings and proudly displayed her papal award for "defending life," an honor Pope John Paul II bestows on anti-abortion crusaders in his native Poland. "How can I help you, dears?" she said, offering tea. When the two said that they were journalists, Sister Benigna rose to her feet. "There was a very bad article about us," she said. "It has given us great moral discomfort. I cannot give you any information. Good-bye."

On the economic collapse in Eastern Europe, see footnote 10 of this chapter.

27. For Aviles's and other officials' statements about trade in children, see for example, Hugh O'Shaughnessy, "Takeaway babies farmed to order," *Observer* (London), October 1, 1993, p. 14. This article quotes Victoria de Aviles, the Salvadoran government Procurator for the Defence of Children, as follows: "We know there is a big trade in children in El Salvador, for pornographic videos, for organ transplants, for adoption and for prostitution. We want to extend the use of checking identities of children by using D.N.A. We will certainly look into what evidence you have -- even if it involves the army. . . . We found the latest casa de engorde [i.e. 'fattening house' where newborn babies are plumped up for sale] in San Marcos in July. There were six children there."

In addition, the article cites the Guatemalan police spokesman Fredy Garcia Avalos, and the European Parliament's findings, as follows:

The police in Guatemala, who are not known for exaggerating the seriousness of their country's problems, say they have investigated 200 cases of baby trafficking and discovered four casas de engorde. Fredy Garcia Avalos, the police spokesman,

says the racket is being run by lawyers, nurses, handlers and stand-in mothers. One little village, Boca del Monte, he says, has achieved modest fame as a centre for baby farming. The villagers make a standard charge of £18 a month to fatten up a baby while the legal documentation relating to foreign adoption is sorted out. . . .

According to a report on the trade in transplant organs adopted by the European Parliament in Strasbourg, only a quarter of the 4,000 Brazilian children authorised for adoption in Italy were really adopted. The rest, the report's authors say, were chopped up for their organs in undercover hospitals in Mexico and Europe to the order of the Camorra, the Mafia of Naples.

For reports by other sources about the organ trade and widespread abuse of children, see footnotes 23 and 24 of this chapter. See also footnote 13 of this chapter.

28. For Adams's phrase, see Robert F. Smith, *What Happened in Cuba? A Documentary History*, New York: Twayne, 1963, pp. 27-28, Document 5. His exact words:

Cuba, almost in sight of our shores, from a multitude of considerations has become an object of transcendent importance to the political and commercial interests of our Union. . . . [I]n looking forward to the probable course of events for the short period of half a century, it is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our federal republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself. It is obvious however that for this event we are not yet prepared. . . .

But there are laws of political as well as of physical gravitation; and if an apple severed by the tempest from its native tree cannot choose but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural connection with Spain, and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only towards the North American Union, which by the same law of nature cannot cast her off from its bosom.

See also, Richard Drinnon, *White Savage: the Case of John Dunn Hunter*, New York: Schocken, 1972, p. 158 (Thomas Jefferson advised President Madison to offer Napoleon a free hand in Spanish America in return for the gift of Cuba to the United States, and wrote to President Monroe in 1823 that the U.S. should not go to war for Cuba, "but the first war on other accounts will give it to us, or the Island will give itself to us, when able to do so"); Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America*, New York: Norton, 1983 (2nd revised and expanded edition 1993), pp. 13-25.

29. On the timing of the formal U.S. decision to overthrow Castro, see for example, Jules Benjamin, *The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution: An Empire of Liberty in an Age of National Liberation*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. An excerpt (pp. 186-189, 207):

Though State Department liberals were later pilloried by U.S. conservatives as pro-Castro dupes who had allowed a totalitarian regime to be constructed on the island, as early as October 1959 -- before there was any Soviet presence in Cuba and while opposition media still existed -- these liberals shifted policy to one of overthrowing Castro's regime. . . . "Not only have our business interests in Cuba been seriously affected," the [secret policy paper formulating the change] went on, "but the United States cannot hope to encourage and support sound economic policies in other Latin American countries and promote necessary private

investments in Latin America if it is or appears to be simultaneously cooperating with the Castro program. . . ."

On January 18 [1960] the C.I.A. set up a special task force (Branch 4 of the Western Hemisphere Division) composed mainly of veterans of the 1954 operation against Arbenz in Guatemala. The task force prepared a wide-ranging assault on the Castro regime. Early in March this plan was approved by the secret high-level study group that oversaw all major covert operations. The approved program was sent to Eisenhower on March 14. Three days later the president met with Allen Dulles and gave final approval to the plan. . . . A separate project to assassinate Castro and other top Cuban leaders, under discussion since December 1959, was also implemented by the C.I.A. Several of the actual attempts on Castro's life were carried out by the agency with the cooperation of the U.S. Mafia. All of these actions were to be complemented by a program of economic denial and, eventually, of widespread economic warfare. . . .

[T]he original plan for the overthrow of Castro [was] drawn up in March 1960 and set in motion by President Eisenhower. The planning document states: "The purpose of the program outlined herein is to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U.S. in such a manner as to avoid any appearance of U.S. intervention."

On Castro's early anti-Communist stance, see for example, Richard E. Welch, *Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution, 1959-1961*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985. An excerpt (pp. 10-14):

[A] widely held myth holds that Fidel Castro was a communist from the beginning of his career as a Cuban revolutionary. . . . Here is a myth that is not an exaggeration but a lie. Castro at twenty-one was a left-leaning student who disliked authority and had feelings of guilt and suspicion toward his own class, the Cuban bourgeoisie. He was a revolutionary in search of a revolution, but he was not a communist. By temperament a *caudillo* [military leader], and by the definitions of U.S. political history never a democrat, Castro only became a Marxist sometime between fall 1960 and fall 1961. Castro himself is partially responsible for the myths surrounding his conversion to Marxist ideology. During a long speech on 2 December 1961 he declared himself a Marxist-Leninist and in parts of that rambling oration seemed to imply that he had long been sympathetic to socialist doctrine. These portions were inaccurately translated in early press reports and subsequently taken out of context by his enemies in the United States. . . . Actually the chief theme of this confused and self-exculpatory address was that although he had always been a socialist intuitively, he was initially in thrall to bourgeois values. Only by hard study and several stages had he come to a full appreciation of the superior wisdom of Marx and Lenin. . . .

Castro's initial program called for representative democracy as well as social reform and made no demands for the nationalization of land and industry. . . . The Cuban Revolution evolved from a variant of democratic reformism to a variant of communism, and its radicalization is best understood when its early years are divided into three separate periods. These periods cannot be given specific dates, but a logical three-part chronological division identifies as phase one, January-October 1959; phase two, November 1959-December 1960; and phase three, 1961 and spring 1962. Historians differ over the labels to be given these three phases. For the historian who sees Castro's adoption of communism as the main theme of the Cuban Revolution, phase one might be labeled "from anticommunism to anti-

anticommunism"; phase two, "from anti-anticommunism to pro-communism"; and phase three, "from pro-communism to communist."

See also, William Appleman Williams, *The United States, Cuba, and Castro: An Essay on the Dynamics of Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire*, New York: Monthly Review, 1962, p. 112 ("Castro moved . . . to attack the Communist challenge to his leadership. He did so very bluntly and angrily on May 8 and 16 [1959], dissociating himself from the Communist Party and its ideas and programs. He subsequently acted in June to block Communist influence in the labor movement"); Wayne S. Smith, *The Closest of Enemies: A Personal and Diplomatic Account of U.S.-Cuban Relations Since 1957*, New York: Norton, 1987, p. 44 ("C.I.A. Deputy Director C.P. Cabell confirmed during testimony before a Senate subcommittee in November 1959 . . . 'Castro,' he said, 'is not a Communist . . . the Cuban Communists do not consider him a Communist party member or even a pro-Communist"); Warren Hinckle and William W. Turner, *The Fish Is Red: The Story of the Secret War Against Castro*, New York: Harper and Row, 1981, p. 33 (the C.I.A.'s Latin America political action officer, Frank Bender, concluded: "Castro is not only not a Communist . . . he is a strong anti-Communist fighter").

30. On Kennedy's implementation of Operation MONGOOSE, see chapter 1 of *U.P.* and its footnote 21.

31. On Cuba's achievements, see for example, Michael Stührenberg, "Pulling Cuban Soldiers Out of Angola," *Die Zeit* (West Germany), in *World Press Review*, December 1988, pp. 30-32. An excerpt:

Today, more than 10,000 Cuban doctors, teachers, construction workers, and engineers work in 37 African, Asian, and Latin American countries. . . . For Cubans, international service is a sign of personal courage, political maturity, and an uncompromising attitude toward the "imperialist enemy." In schools, civilian assistance is taught as the highest virtue. . . . Especially among teachers and construction workers, the will to do service exceeds the demand. "The waiting lists are getting longer," sighs the director of Cubatécnica, Cuba's state bureau for non-military aid. . . . "The more critical a situation becomes somewhere, the more people want to go. When we were trying to find 2,000 teachers for Nicaragua a few years ago, we got 29,500 applications. Shortly thereafter, four of our teachers were killed by the Contras. Subsequently, 92,000 teachers applied for service. . . ."

[T]he reservoir of volunteers for international service seems inexhaustible: In 1985, 16,000 Cuban civilians worked in Third World countries. In that same year, the U.S. had fewer than 6,000 Peace Corps development assistants in 59 countries and about 1,200 specialists from the Agency for International Development in 70 countries. . . . Today, Cuba has more physicians working abroad than any industrialized nation, and more than the U.N.'s World Health Organization. Countries, like Angola, with little money, an infant mortality rate of more than 30 percent, and life expectancy of less than 50 years, receive free Cuban aid. To get doctors from international organizations, Angola would have to pay \$1,500 to \$2,000 a month for one physician, not to mention the costs of accommodations that meet the requirements of a Western doctor. . . . Cuba's international emissaries indeed are . . . not party theoreticians, but men and women who live under conditions that most development aid workers would not accept. And that is the basis for their success. Tom J. Farer, "Human Rights and Human Welfare in Latin America," *Daedalus*, Fall 1983, pp. 139-170. An excerpt (pp. 155-157):

[T]here is a consensus among scholars of a wide variety of ideological positions that, on the level of life expectancy, education, and health, Cuban achievement is considerably greater than one would expect from its level of per capita income. A recent study comparing 113 Third World countries in terms of these basic indicators of popular welfare ranked Cuba first, ahead even of Taiwan.

Morris Morley and Chris McGillion, "That man in Havana may be there for some time," *Sydney Morning Herald* (Australia), January 7, 1992, p. 9. An excerpt:

That Cuba has survived at all under these circumstances [i.e. the U.S. embargo] is an achievement in itself. That it registered the highest per capita increase in gross social product (wages and social benefits) of any economy in Latin America -- and almost double that of the next highest country -- over the period 1981-1990 is quite remarkable.

Moreover, despite the economic difficulties, the average Cuban is still better fed, housed, educated and provided for medically than other Latin Americans, and -- again atypically -- the Cuban Government has sought to spread the burden of the new austerity measures equally among its people. Indeed, one only has to compare the growing inequality, decaying infrastructure, massive health problems, creeping stagnation, and rising poverty elsewhere in Latin America to believe that Fidel Castro's Cuba will be around for quite some time yet.

Tim Golden, "Health Care, Cuba's Pride, Falls on Hard Times," *New York Times*, October 30, 1994, section 1, p. 1. An excerpt:

Five years into the crushing economic crisis set off by the collapse of Cuba's preferential trading partnerships in the former East block . . . even the most basic medicines are often scarce. . . . And for a country now thought to have a per-capita income comparable to that of its poorest neighbors, the broad measures of its health may be even more impressive than in years past: infant mortality, estimated to have fallen to 9.4 deaths for every 1,000 live births last year, was only a shade higher than that in the United States; life expectancy at birth, 75.5 years in 1992, nearly equaled that of Luxembourg. . . . Health officials say the shortages have been aggravated by the United States economic embargo, which was tightened in 1992.

On Castro's repressions, see for example, Amnesty International, *Political Imprisonment in Cuba*, London: Cuban-American National Foundation and Amnesty International, 1987. For comparison with the human rights records of neighboring countries in Latin America, see footnote 13 of chapter 1 of *U.P.* (Guatemala); footnote 15 of chapter 2 of *U.P.* (El Salvador and Guatemala); footnotes 48 and 55 of this chapter (El Salvador and Haiti); and footnote 54 of chapter 8 of *U.P.* (Guatemala).

32. The "demonstration effect" on other poor countries -- or "threat of a good example" -- that occurs when one Third World nation begins successful independent development is an extremely important topic. Chomsky argues that it is crucial to understanding the Vietnam War and post-war U.S. policies towards Vietnam; the Central America interventions of the 1980s; U.S. attacks on Cuba and the longstanding embargo; the 1983 Grenada invasion; and other major foreign policy events.

For one example of an internal U.S. government warning about a potential "demonstration effect" on other Third World countries from Cuba, see Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America*, New York: Norton, 1983 (2nd revised and expanded edition 1993). An excerpt (p. 157):

"Cuba's experiment with almost total state socialism is being watched closely by other nations in the hemisphere," the Agency [the C.I.A.] told the White House in April

1964, "and any appearance of success there could have an extensive impact on the statist trend elsewhere in the area."

The same concern about Cuba's developmental successes also is expressed in other now-declassified U.S. government planning documents. See for example, "United States Policy Toward Latin America," July 3, 1961, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, Vol. XII ("The American Republics"), Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996, Record No. 15. An excerpt (p. 33):

Latin America today is in a state of deep unrest. Most of its countries are economically underdeveloped and socially backward. The distribution of land and other forms of national wealth greatly favors the propertied classes. The masses suffer from poor housing, malnutrition and illiteracy. In many countries large rural groups, which include most of the Indian peoples, are not integrated into the economic and social life of the nation. The poor and underprivileged, stimulated by the example of the Cuban revolution, are now demanding opportunities for a decent living. Meanwhile, the population is increasing much more rapidly than the rate of production. International communism, encouraged by its successes in Cuba and assisted by the Castro regime, is trying to take advantage of this explosive situation to subvert other countries of the hemisphere.

For another example of U.S. planners' concern about the threat of successful independent development having a "demonstration effect" in the Third World, see Seymour Hersh, *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House*, New York: Summit, 1983. This book recounts U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's warning that the contagious example of Salvador Allende's Chile might infect not only Latin America but also Southern Europe -- not in fear that Chilean hordes were about to descend upon Rome, but that Chilean successes might send to Italian voters the message that democratic social reform was a possible option and thus contribute to the rise of social democracy and Eurocommunism that was greatly feared by Washington and Moscow alike. An excerpt (p. 270):

[According to former National Security Council staff member Roger Morris,] Kissinger . . . seemed to be truly concerned about Allende's election: "I don't think anybody in the government understood how ideological Kissinger was about Chile. I don't think anybody ever fully grasped that Henry saw Allende as being a far more serious threat than Castro. If Latin America ever became unraveled, it would never happen with a Castro. Allende was a living example of democratic social reform in Latin America. All kinds of cataclysmic events rolled around, but Chile scared him. He talked about Eurocommunism [in later years] the same way he talked about Chile early on. Chile scared him." Another N.S.C. aide recalls a Kissinger discussion of the Allende election in terms of Italy, where the Communist Party was growing in political strength. The fear was not only that Allende would be voted into office, but that -- after his six-year term -- the political process would work and he would be voted out of office in the next election. Kissinger saw the notion that Communists could participate in the electoral process and accept the results peacefully as the wrong message to send Italian voters.

See also footnotes 7, 8, 68 and 108 of this chapter; chapter 1 of *U.P.* and its footnote 20; and chapter 2 of *U.P.* and its footnote 8.

The threat of independence in one Third World country being a dangerous example that might "infect" others often is masked by planners as a military threat. See for example, Dean Acheson [U.S. Secretary of State, 1948 to 1952], *Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department*, New York: Norton, 1969. An excerpt (p. 219):

In the past eighteen months . . . Soviet pressure on the Straits, on Iran, and on northern Greece had brought the Balkans to the point where a highly possible Soviet breakthrough might open three continents to Soviet penetration. Like apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to the east. It would also carry infection to Africa through Asia Minor and Egypt, and to Europe through Italy and France, already threatened by the strongest domestic Communist parties in Western Europe.

Chomsky remarks that, as Acheson well knew, Soviet pressure on the Straits and Iran had been withdrawn already and Western control was firmly established. Further, there was no evidence of Soviet pressure on Northern Greece -- on the contrary, Stalin was unsympathetic to the Greek leftists (see footnote 18 of this chapter).

The degree to which such deceptions are conscious is debatable -- but that issue is not particularly relevant. As Chomsky notes (*Deterring Democracy*, New York: Hill and Wang, 1991, pp. 100-102):

We need not suppose that the appeal to alleged security threats is mere deceit. The authors of [documents such as] N.S.C. 68 may have believed their hysterical flights of rhetoric, though some understood that the picture they were painting was "clearer than truth." In a study of policymakers' attitudes, Lars Schoultz concludes that they were sincere in their beliefs, however outlandish: for example, that Grenada -- with its population of 100,000 and influence over the world nutmeg trade -- posed such a threat to the United States that "an invasion was essential to U.S. security." The same may be true of those who, recalling our failure to stop Hitler in time, warned that we must not make the same mistake with Daniel Ortega [in Nicaragua], poised for world conquest. And Lyndon Johnson may have been sincere in his lament that without overwhelming force at its command, the United States would be "easy prey to any yellow dwarf with a pocket knife," defenseless against the billions of people of the world who "would sweep over the United States and take what we have. . . ."

In such cases, we need not conclude that we are sampling the productions of psychotics; that is most unlikely, if only because these delusional systems have an oddly systematic character and are highly functional, satisfying the requirements stipulated in the secret documentary record. Nor need we assume conscious deceit. Rather, it is necessary only to recall the ease with which people can come to believe whatever it is convenient to believe, however ludicrous it may be, and the filtering process that excludes those lacking these talents from positions of state and cultural management. In passing, we may note that while such matters may be of interest to those entranced by the personalities of leaders, for people concerned to understand the world, and perhaps to change it, they are of marginal concern at best, on a par with the importance for economists of the private fantasies of the C.E.O. while he (or rarely she) acts to maximize profits and market share. Preoccupation with these matters of tenth-order significance is one of the many devices that serve to divert attention from the structural and institutional roots of policy, and thus to contribute to deterring the threat of democracy, which might be aroused by popular understanding of how the world works.

Chomsky is referring in the above quotation to: Lars Schoultz, *National Security and United States Policy towards Latin America*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987, pp. 239f; Lyndon Johnson, *Congressional Record*, House of Representatives, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 94, Part II, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 15, 1948, p. 2883 (the full text of Johnson's first comment: "No matter what else we have of offensive and defensive weapons, without superior air power America is a bound and throttled giant; impotent and easy prey to any yellow dwarf with a pocket

knife"); Lyndon Johnson, "Remarks to American and Korean Servicemen at Camp Stanley, Korea: November 1, 1966," *Public Papers of the Presidents, 1966*, Book II, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967. The full text of Johnson's second comment (p. 563):

There are 3 billion people in the world and we have only 200 million of them. We are outnumbered 15 to 1. If might did make right they would sweep over the United States and take what we have. We have what they want.

The fact that the "Soviet threat" was consciously used as a false cover for concerns such as those articulated by Kissinger in the above quotation, however, has been acknowledged even by those who endorse the policies. See for example commentary in Stanley Hoffmann, Samuel P. Huntington et al., "Vietnam Reappraised" [colloquium], *International Security*, Summer 1981, pp. 3-26. Huntington, the Eaton Professor of the Science of Government and Director of the Olin Institute of Strategic Studies at Harvard University, frankly explained (p. 14):

[Y]ou may have to sell [intervention or other military action] in such a way as to create the misimpression that it is the Soviet Union that you are fighting. That is what the United States has done ever since the Truman Doctrine.

33. For future Secretary of State Albright's comment, see Robert S. Greenberger, "New U.N. Resolution Condemning Iraq May Spur Tensions Between U.S., Allies," *Wall Street Journal*, October 17, 1994, p. B10. An excerpt:

Ambassador Albright made clear yesterday that, if need be, the administration is prepared to act alone. "We recognize this area as vital to U.S. national interests and we will behave, with others, multilaterally when we can and unilaterally when we must," she said, speaking on A.B.C.'s "This Week with David Brinkley."

Julia Preston, "Security Council Reaction Largely Favorable to U.S. Raid," *Washington Post*, June 28, 1993, p. A12. An excerpt:

[Ambassador Madeleine Albright commented to the U.N. Security Council:] "President Clinton has often said we will act multilaterally where we can and unilaterally where we must. This [i.e. Clinton's 1993 missile attack against Iraq in retaliation for an alleged Iraqi plot to assassinate former President George Bush] was a case where we felt we were justified to act alone."

34. On the medical journal articles about Cuba, see for example, Colum Lynch, "U.S. embargo is blamed for increase in Cuban deaths, illness," *Boston Globe*, September 15, 1994, p. 12. An excerpt:

Two years after the United States further tightened trade restrictions on Cuba, the economic embargo has contributed to an increase in hunger, illness, death and to one of the world's largest neurological epidemics in the past century, according to U.S. health experts.

Two independent reports to be published next month in American medical journals say the 33-year-old embargo has driven the prices of imported medicines and vitamins well beyond the reach of the cash-strapped country, has prevented Cuba from gaining access to essential spare parts for life-saving medical equipment, and has eroded the country's capacity for manufacturing its own medical products. The upshot has been a rapid decline in the Cuban health care system. Mortality rates for people 65 and older rose 15 percent from 1989 to 1993. Deaths from easily treatable afflictions such as pneumonia and influenza have increased sharply, as have the number of fatal infectious diseases. . . .

"We always talk about Fidel Castro killing people," said Dr. Anthony Kirkpatrick, an anesthesiologist at the University of South Florida who co-authored an article on Cuba's health crisis to be published in October in the Journal of the Florida Medical Association. "Well, the fact is that we are killing people." A second report scheduled in the October issue of the journal *Neurology* cites the U.S. embargo for exacerbating the most alarming public health crisis in Cuba in recent memory. In the past two years, according to the study's author, Dr. Gustavo Roman, the former chief of neuro-epidemiology at the National Institutes of Health, U.S. restrictions on food, medicine and access to up-to-date medical databases, have helped to encourage the spread of a rare neurological disease that has stricken more than 60,000 Cubans, leaving 200 legally blind. The disease, an optic nerve disorder last observed in tropical prison camps in Southeast Asia in World War II, is caused by a combination of poor diet, scarcity of the vitamin thiamine, high consumption of sugar and overexertion.

See also, Anthony F. Kirkpatrick, "Role of the U.S.A. in shortage of food and medicine in Cuba," *The Lancet* (London), Vol. 348, No. 9040, November 30, 1996, pp. 1489-1491; Victoria Brittain, "Children die in agony as U.S. trade ban stifles Cuba," *Guardian* (U.K.), March 7, 1997, p. 3. An excerpt:

The United States trade embargo against Cuba has led to needless deaths, left hospitalised children lying in agony as essential drugs are denied them, and forced doctors to work with medical equipment at less than half efficiency because they have no spare parts for their machinery, according to an American study. Health and nutrition standards have been devastated by the recent tightening of the 37-year-old U.S. embargo, which includes food imports, a team of American doctors, research scientists and lawyers said after a year-long study of the country.

Cubans' daily intake of calories dropped a third between 1989 and 1993, the American Association for World Health reports [in its study, *Denial of Food and Medicine: The Impact of the U.S. Embargo on Health and Nutrition in Cuba*]. . . . A humanitarian catastrophe has been averted, the report says, only by the high priority the Cuban government has given to health spending, despite a steadily worsening economic environment. . . . The team visited a paediatric ward which had been without the nausea-preventing drug, metoclopramide HCl, for 22 days. It found that 35 children undergoing chemotherapy were vomiting on average 28 to 30 times a day. Another girl, aged five, in a cancer ward lacking Implantofix for chemotherapy, was being treated through her jugular vein because all her other veins had collapsed. She was in excruciating pain. . . .

Forty-eight per cent of the 215 new drugs being tested in the U.S. are specifically for treatment of breast cancer. The embargo denies them to Cuban women. "Only the pre-existing excellence of the system and the extraordinary dedication of the Cuban medical community have prevented infinitely greater loss of life and suffering," the report says. Despite the difficulties, the country's infant mortality rate is still only half that of Washington D.C., and in access to health services, immunisations and life expectancy, Cuba compares with Europe.

Chomsky remarks: "These do not count as human rights violations; rather, the public version is that the goal of the sanctions is to overcome Cuba's human rights violations" (*Rogue States: The Rule of Force in World Affairs*, Boston: South End, 2000, p. 147).

35. On U.S. corporate concern over the embargo and foreign companies' willingness to violate it, see for example, Gail DeGeorge, "Almost Tasting Trade: U.S. companies want to be ready for post-embargo Cuba -- whenever," *Business Week*,

September 19, 1994, p. 32; Gail DeGeorge, "Fidel's End Run Around Uncle Sam: Cuba is attracting more foreign investors -- despite the embargo," *Business Week*, May 9, 1994, p. 47.

36. One reference was found in the U.S. press to the roundups of Panamanian union leaders after the invasion -- in the 25th and 26th paragraphs of an article in the *Boston Globe*. See Diego Ribadeneira, "Resentment of U.S. spreads in Panama City," *Boston Globe*, January 1, 1990, p. 1. The reference:

Marco Gandasegui, director of the Center for Latin American Studies, a research institute [in Panama, stated:] "With thousands of American troops in the streets, you aren't going to see people staging anti-American demonstrations." But in what was perhaps the first public anti-American display, several dozen Panamanians demonstrated Thursday against U.S. soldiers as they arrested two leaders of the telecommunications union. They were suspected of possessing arms but none were found. They were arrested anyway, because, according to U.S. diplomats, they were on a list of several hundred people whom the Endara government seeks to detain.

As for why the people on the list -- mostly political activists and labor leaders -- were wanted, a senior official in the U.S. Embassy said, "We weren't given any details, just that the Endara government wanted us to get them. They're bad guys of some sort, I guess."

For reports about the Panama invasion and its aftermath outside of the mainstream U.S. press, see for example, Ramsey Clark [former U.S. Attorney General], *The Fire This Time: U.S. War Crimes in the Gulf*, New York: Thunder's Mouth, 1992. An excerpt (pp. 126-127):

I flew to Panama on the first day commercial flights were permitted to operate after the U.S. invasion. . . . Surveying devastated neighborhoods; finding a 120 x 18-foot mass grave; talking with Red Cross, hospital, and morgue workers, and religious, human rights, labor, student, and other leaders, I readily counted hundreds of civilians dead. The press, however, initially asked no questions about civilian casualties. When eventually prodded in early January, General Stiner repeatedly stated that 83 civilians were killed, and the media faithfully reported that number. A press conference I held before leaving Panama, like a number held thereafter by a private commission formed to investigate and report on Panama, was virtually ignored by the mass media. Estimates of casualties from that commission and many other religious, human rights, and health groups ranged from 1,000 to 7,000 dead. By 1992 a consensus was emerging around 4,000 Panamanians killed. Yet the media used only the final Pentagon figure of 345 Panamanian deaths when it explained why angry crowds disrupted President Bush's visit to Panama in June 1992.

Linda Hossie, "Skepticism growing in Panama over official invasion casualty toll," *Globe & Mail* (Toronto), January 8, 1990, p. A9. An excerpt:

Sources in Panama City tell stories of hundreds of Panamanian soldiers gunned down from U.S. helicopters after fleeing their headquarters in Old Panama or while trapped in a dead-end street near Fort Amador. Others claim that a large number of bodies were burned on a city beach and that as many as 600 people are buried in mass graves. . . . Virtually all the Panamanians interviewed agreed that the vast majority of the dead are civilians.

Alexander Cockburn, "Beneath a peak in Darien: the conquest of Panama," *Nation*, January 29, 1990, p. 114. An excerpt:

Roberto Arosemena, a professor of sociology well known in Panama for his fifteen-year nonviolent resistance to military dictatorship [said] . . . U.S. troops . . . had conducted rigorous searches, usually destroying property and acting without regard for children and old people. Now, he said, there is an extreme display of U.S. forces throughout the city. They patrol neighborhoods in eight-to-fifteen-person units, carrying combat rifles. When Panamanians accompany them, it is always in a ratio of the Panamanian to two G.I.s, and the Panamanians never carry anything heavier than a pistol.

According to Arosemena, about 1,200 people are currently detained in camps in the U.S. military compound. He spoke to one man who had been held, a civilian former government worker, who told him that detainees were bound hand and foot, eyes blindfolded and mouths bandaged. They were loaded into trucks and when they reached the installation they were thrown out, some of them suffering injuries. Then they were interrogated by U.S. military personnel.

John Weeks and Phil Gunson, *Panama: Made in the U.S.A.*, London: Latin America Bureau, 1991, especially chs. 1 and 5.

37. For the *New York Times's* report that Quayle did not tour El Chorrillo, see Robert Pear, "Quayle Gets Warm Welcome in Panama," *New York Times*, January 29, 1990, p. A3. The exact words:

Pro-American sentiment is expressed more forcefully by affluent and middle-class Panamanians than by those with lower incomes. Mr. Quayle did not visit impoverished neighborhoods like Chorillo, where houses were destroyed in fighting after the American invasion. Nor did he visit people made homeless by fighting.

38. For Beamish's article, see Rita Beamish, "Quayle Gets Assurances of Panamanian Drug-Money Reform," A.P., January 29, 1990 (Westlaw database # 1990 WL 5988786). The passage reads:

Before leaving Panama City, Quayle took a driving tour of the impoverished Chorrillo neighborhood. Several blocks were leveled by fire and bombing during the U.S. attack, including the headquarters of Noriega's Panamanian Defense Force. As his motorcade slowly drove by the area, onlookers gathered in groups and peered out windows, watching in stony silence. Their reaction was in stark contrast to the enthusiastic cheering Sunday from a well-dressed congregation at a Roman Catholic church Quayle attended in another neighborhood.

39. There have been, in fact, two references in the major U.S. press to Panama's annual day of mourning -- one in the "Metro" section of the *Los Angeles Times*, and the other in a story picked up from the French wire-service Agence France-Presse and published in the *Chicago Sun-Times*. See "A Troubled Panama One Year After," *Los Angeles Times*, December 21, 1990, p. B6; James Aparicio, A.F.P., "Endara's status slips in Panama," *Chicago Sun-Times*, December 22, 1991, p. 46.

A few local papers in the United States also have mentioned Panama's annual day of mourning. See for example, "Panama Notes Invasion Anniversary," *Courier-Journal* (Louisville, KY), December 21, 1990, p. A15 ("The government dubbed the date a 'day of national reflection,' while the families of Panamanians killed in the invasion set a 'grand black march' of protest for the evening"); A.P., "Mourning In Panama," *Sacramento Bee* (CA), December 21, 1993, p. A20.

40. On the Endara government's statement about the U.S. "military occupation," see for example, "News in Brief: Panama; Two Scathing Reports," *Central America Report* (Guatemala City, Guatemala: Inforpress Centroamericana), Vol. XXI, No. 4, February 4, 1994, p. 8. An excerpt:

In surprisingly strong terms for a government office, CONADEHUPA [the Panamanian governmental National Human Rights Commission] argues that the rights to self-determination and sovereignty of the Panamanian people continue to be violated by the "state of occupation by a foreign army." Among violations committed by the U.S. army, CONADEHUPA lists the campaign Strong Roads 93, air force flights in different provinces, the participation of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (D.E.A.) in search and seizure operations, a D.E.A. agent's assault on a Panamanian journalist and incidents of attacks on Panamanian citizens by U.S. military personnel.

41. On the international organizations' actions against the U.S. invasion and Panama's occupation, see for example, "Panama ousted from the Group of Eight," *Central America Report* (Guatemala City, Guatemala: Inforpress Centroamericana), Vol. XVII, No. 13, April 6, 1990, p. 99. An excerpt:

President Guillermo Endara's government receives one of its worst diplomatic setbacks since taking office, as the Group of Eight [what are considered the major Latin American democracies] formally ousts Panama from the organization, claiming the Endara government is illegal and demanding new elections. . . .

At the sixth meeting of the Group of Eight on March 30, foreign ministers from seven countries (Panama was suspended in 1988) issued their most forceful dictum against Panama to date. Basically they agreed on three points: Panama's permanent separation from the G-8, a call for immediate presidential elections and the limiting of activities by U.S. troops. . . . The final resolution noted that "the process of democratic legitimation in Panama requires popular consideration without foreign interference, that guarantees the full right of the people to freely choose their governments. . . ." The G-8 suggests that the U.S. military is operating outside of its mandate, affecting Panama's sovereignty and independence as well as the legality of the Endara government.

John Weeks and Phil Gunson, *Panama: Made in the U.S.A.*, London: Latin America Bureau, 1991 (on the U.S. invasion's illegality under international law, see Appendix 1). An excerpt (p. 92):

Regional bodies were unanimous in their condemnation of the invasion and their calls for fresh elections. The Organization of American States approved a resolution "deeply deploring" the U.S. military intervention, with only the U.S. itself voting against.

See also, Charles Maechling [former senior State Department official and professor of international law], "Washington's Illegal Invasion," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1990, pp. 113-131.

42. On Noriega being on the U.S. payroll during the height of his narcotics trafficking, see for example, John Weeks and Andrew Zimbalist, "The failure of intervention in Panama," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 11, No. 1, January 1989, pp. 3f. An excerpt (pp. 8-11):

It is generally recognised, indeed common knowledge, that Noriega enjoyed close relations with agencies of the United States government, particularly the Central

Intelligence Agency, but also the United States military. The role of Noriega as a U.S. informant and conduit for information began in the late 1960s, when he began serving as Director of Intelligence for the Panamanian National Guard, and continued uninterrupted until quite recently, despite allegedly strong evidence of his involvement in illegal activities associated with the drug trade. . . . [I]t is generally agreed . . . that the U.S. government was aware of these accusations long before it chose to rid Panama of Noriega: the drug charge apparently had been known almost twenty years previously; the election-rigging occurred in 1984 and the U.S. embassy in Panama was well aware of it; the murder in question (of Hugo Spadafora) happened in 1985. . . . [A]s Senator Paul Simon pointed out on 28 April 1988 to the U.S. Senate, "We tolerated [Noriega's] drug dealings because he was helping the Contras." And according to the February 1988 congressional testimony of José Blandón (Noriega's erstwhile consul in New York), Noriega received a monthly stipend from the C.I.A. . . .

Noriega's drug dealings did not present an insurmountable obstacle to cooperation with him in the view of U.S. officials. In 1986, after briefing the Attorney-General, Edwin Meese, about his investigation into drug-trafficking in Central America, U.S. Department of Justice Attorney for Miami, Jeffrey Kellner, was told by Meese to sidetrack his inquiry for political reasons. Other actions of the U.S. government itself suggest that it was not intensely concerned about the General's drug-related activities until after it had decided he had to go. As surprising as it may seem in retrospect, in May 1986 John Lawn, director of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, sent a letter to Noriega expressing "deep appreciation for [your] vigorous anti-drug policy." And in May 1987 (a year after the mid-1986 newspaper revelations about Noriega's drug involvement) Meese, the highest-ranking law enforcement official in the United States, congratulated the Panamanian government on its cooperation in joint U.S.-Panamanian anti-drug activities.

Frederick Kempe, "Ties That Bind: U.S. Taught Noriega To Spy, but the Pupil Had His Own Agenda," *Wall Street Journal*, October 18, 1989, p. 1. An excerpt:

Before American foreign policy set out to destroy Noriega, it helped create him out of the crucible of Panama's long history of conspirators and pirates. . . . In 1960, for example, when Mr. Noriega was both a cadet at an elite military academy in Peru and a spy-in-training for the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, he was detained by Lima authorities for allegedly raping and savagely beating a prostitute, according to a U.S. Embassy cable from that period. The woman had nearly died. But U.S. intelligence, rather than rein in or cut loose its new spy, merely filed the report away. Mr. Noriega's tips on emerging leftists at his school were deemed more important to U.S. interests. . . . Mr. Noriega's relationship to American intelligence agencies became contractual in either 1966 or 1967, intelligence officials say. His commanding officer at the Chiriqui Province garrison, Major Omar Torrijos, gave him an intriguing assignment: Mr. Noriega would organize the province's first intelligence service. The spy network would serve two clients: the Panamanian government, by monitoring political opponents in the region, and the U.S., by tracking the growing Communist influence in the unions organized at United Fruit Co.'s banana plantations in Bocas del Toros and Puerto Armuelles. . . .

During the Nixon administration, the Drug Enforcement Administration became dismayed at the extent of the G-2's [Panama's spy service, in which Noriega was chief of intelligence,] connections to arrested drug traffickers. . . . [After a suspension during the Carter administration, the] Reagan administration also put Mr. Noriega's G-2 back on the U.S. payroll. Payments averaged nearly \$200,000 a year from the

U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency and the C.I.A. Although working for U.S. intelligence, Mr. Noriega was hardly helping the U.S. exclusively. He allegedly entered into Panama's first formal business arrangement with Colombian drug bosses, according to Floyd Carlton, a pilot who once worked for Mr. Noriega and who testified before the U.S. grand jury in Miami that would ultimately indict the Panamanian on drug charges. . . . [H]e helped steal the May 1984 Panamanian elections for the ruling party. But just one month later, he also contributed \$100,000 to a Contra leader, according to documents released for Oliver North's criminal trial in Washington D.C. . . . Mr. Noriega was accused of ordering in 1985 the beheading of Hugo Spadafora, his most outspoken political opponent and the first man to publicly finger Mr. Noriega on drug trafficking charges. . . . [T]he unfolding Iran-Contra scandal took away Mr. Noriega's insurance policy [with the U.S. government]. . . . During negotiations with American officials in May 1988 over proposals to drop the U.S. [drug crime] indictments in exchange for his resignation, Mr. Noriega often asked almost plaintively how the Americans, whom he had helped for so many years, could turn against him.

John Dinges, "Two Noriegas: Trafficker, Law Enforcer," Op-Ed, *New York Times*, January 12, 1990, p. A35 (noting that all but one of the drug charges in Noriega's 1988 indictment related to activities that took place before 1984, when he was a favored U.S. client); Kevin Buckley, *Panama: The Whole Story*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991, especially pp. 18-19, 40-67; Seymour M. Hersh, "Panama Strongman Said To Trade In Drugs, Arms and Illicit Money," *New York Times*, June 12, 1986, p. A1; Seymour M. Hersh, "U.S. Aides In '72 Weighed Killing Officer Who Now Leads Panama," *New York Times*, June 13, 1986, p. A1 (according to a named U.S. official, as early as the Nixon administration in 1972 the U.S. had "hard intelligence about the extent of General Noriega's involvement in drug trafficking").

Chomsky explains the background of Noriega's quick fall from grace (*Detering Democracy*, New York: Hill and Wang, 1991, pp. 158-159):

The reasons for the invasion of Panama were not difficult to discern. . . . One black mark against Noriega was his support for the Contadora peace process for Central America, to which the U.S. was strongly opposed. His commitment to the war against Nicaragua was in question, and when the Iran-Contra affair broke, his usefulness was at an end. On New Year's Day 1990, administration of the Panama Canal was to pass largely into Panamanian hands, and a few years later the rest was to follow, according to the Canal Treaty. A major oil pipeline is 60 percent owned by Panama. Clearly, traditional U.S. clients had to be restored to power, and there was not much time to spare. With January 1 approaching, the London *Economist* noted, "the timing was vital" and a new government had to be installed. [See "Gunning for Noriega," *Economist* (London), December 23, 1989, p. 29; Martha Hamilton, "Canal Closing Underscores U.S. Concern: Waterway Shuts Down for First Time in Its 75-Year History," *Washington Post*, December 21, 1989, p. A31.]

43. For McGovern's Op-Ed, see George McGovern, "A Betrayal of American Principles," *Washington Post*, January 16, 1990, p. A23. An excerpt:

The night after U.S. forces invaded Panama seeking to spread democracy and capture Gen. Noriega I was invited to give my reaction on network television. I begged off, partly because of family obligations and partly because I regarded the invasion as a mistake that I was reluctant to criticize while American forces were still positioning themselves. . . .

Like Grenada in 1983 and a dozen other 20th century American invasions of defenseless little countries to the south of us who needed to be taught proper conduct, the invasion of Panama seems to be good for public morale. . . . Nonetheless, this invasion was illegal and mistaken on all important counts. History, I believe, will so judge it, possibly in the near future. The president acted in violation of international law, of the U.N. Charter and of the Charter of the Organization of American States -- to say nothing of our own Constitution.

44. On the scale and nature of the U.S. public relations industry's propaganda efforts, see chapter 10 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 51 and 75.

45. On the U.S. military occupation of Panama at the time of the invasion and its "dry runs" a few days beforehand, see for example, Bill Baskervill, "Former Combat Commanders Critique Panama Invasion," *A.P.*, February 25, 1990 (Westlaw database # 1990 WL 5992986). An excerpt:

The Dec. 20 assault on Panama that ousted dictator Manuel Noriega was planned and polished for months. The 13,000 U.S. troops based in Panama were at well-stocked bases and provided intelligence on the Panamanian Defense Forces and protection for the 14,000 invading troops. . . .

"It was a very, very easy operation, a very, very soft target," said [Retired Colonel David Hackworth, one of the nation's most decorated soldiers]. . . . "I feel the operation could have been done by 100 Special Forces guys who could have gotten Noriega. This big operation was a Pentagon attempt to impress Congress just when they're starting to cut back on the military. . . ." [T]he principal flaw in the invasion was the loss of surprise. Huge C-141 transport planes were landing at 10-minute intervals at Howard Air Force Base in Panama City as the invasion hour approached.

William Blum, *Killing Hope: U.S. Military and C.I.A. Interventions Since World War II*, Monroe, ME: Common Courage, 1995, ch. 50. An excerpt (pp. 310-311):

For months . . . the United States had been engaging in military posturing in Panama. U.S. troops, bristling with assault weapons, would travel in fast-moving convoys, escorted by armored vehicles, looking for all the world as if they planned to attack someone. U.S. Marines descended from helicopters by rope to practice emergency evacuation of the embassy. Panamanian military camps were surrounded and their gates rattled amid insults by U.S. servicemen. In one episode, more than 1,000 U.S. military personnel conducted an exercise that appeared to be a rehearsal of a kidnap raid, as helicopters and jet aircraft flew low over Noriega's house and American raiders splashed ashore nearby.

For some insight into the decision to use super-advanced technology during the invasion, see for example, John D. Morrocco, "F-117A Fighter Used in Combat For First Time in Panama," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, January 1, 1990, pp. 32f. An excerpt:

The U.S. Air Force employed the Lockheed F-117A stealth fighter in combat for the first time in support of an air drop of Army Rangers against a Panama Defense Forces installation at Rio Hato during the American invasion of Panama. . . . There were conflicting reports as to the rationale for employing the sophisticated aircraft, which cost nearly \$50 million apiece, to conduct what appeared to be a simple operation. . . . The Panamanian air force has no fighter aircraft, and no military aircraft are stationed permanently at Rio Hato. . . .

Franz R. Manfredi . . . an aeronautical engineering consultant and charter operator based in Panama City, said he was astonished to hear the U.S. Air Force

has employed the F-117A on the mission against Rio Hato. "They could have bombed it with any other aircraft and not been noticed," he said. Manfredi said there is no radar at the Rio Hato airport, which operates only during the daylight hours. . . . Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney, who visited Rio Hato on Dec. 25 and observed the craters left by the 2000-lb. bombs, said, "the reason we used that particular weapon is because of its great accuracy. . . ." By demonstrating the F-117A's capability to operate in low-intensity conflicts, as well as its intended mission to attack heavily defended Soviet targets, the operation can be used by the Air Force to help justify the huge investment made in stealth technology . . . to an increasingly skeptical Congress.

For a report on the Stealth fighter's actual performance, see Michael R. Gordon, "Inquiry Into Stealth's Performance In Panama Is Ordered by Cheney," *New York Times*, April 11, 1990, p. A19. An excerpt:

Senior Pentagon officials disclosed last week that the [Stealth fighter] plane's first combat mission in Panama was marked by pilot error and a failure, by hundreds of yards, to hit a critical target. The disclosure was embarrassing for the Pentagon, which has promoted the radar-eluding planes as highly precise weapons. . . .

The plane's mission in the Dec. 20 invasion of Panama was to drop bombs close enough to two barracks at the Rio Hato military base to stun Panamanian soldiers, without killing them. Mr. Cheney, based on Air Force information, initially said the two fighters had delivered their bombs with pinpoint accuracy. But senior Pentagon officials said last week that one of the planes had missed its target by more than 300 yards. . . . Defense Secretary Cheney ordered an inquiry. In the months after the invasion, the Air Force publicly rejected suggestions that the mission had not been properly executed, despite some reports to the contrary.

46. For one acknowledgment of the popular constraints on invasions by the Bush administration at the time of the Gulf War, see chapter 7 of *U.P.* and its footnote 58. For other examples, see chapter 1 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 4 and 5.

47. On the change in attitude of sectors of the Church towards the poor of Latin America, see for example, Penny Lernoux, *Cry of the People: United States Involvement in the Rise of Fascism, Torture, and Murder and the Persecution of the Catholic Church in Latin America*, New York: Doubleday, 1980; Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America*, New York: Norton, 1983 (2nd revised and expanded edition 1993), pp. 218-225. On the U.S. response, see chapter 2 of *U.P.* and its footnote 15; and footnote 48 of this chapter.

Note that it was not "Communism" that caused the U.S. onslaught, but the threat of reform. As Chomsky emphasizes (*The Washington Connection And Third World Fascism -- The Political Economy of Human Rights: Volume I*, Boston: South End, 1979, p. 260):

It cannot be overstressed that while the church increasingly calls for major social changes, the vast bulk of its efforts have been directed toward the protection of the most elemental human rights -- to vote, to have the laws enforced without favor, to be free from physical abuse, and to be able to organize, assemble, and petition for betterment.

48. For the Americas Watch study, see Americas Watch, *El Salvador's Decade of Terror: Human Rights Since the Assassination of Archbishop Romero*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991. An excerpt (pp. ix-x):

The murder of Archbishop Romero in 1980 and the massacre of six prominent Jesuit intellectuals, their housekeeper, and her daughter in 1989 bracket a tragic and violent decade in Salvadoran history. The fact that the Jesuit murders were carried out by officers and troops from the elite Atlacatl Battalion, created, trained, and armed by the United States, makes clear that U.S. assistance is not buying human rights protection for the people of El Salvador. In both cases, and in thousands of others in the intervening years, U.S. officials clung to the notion that the military was not responsible. In the Jesuit case, they discounted reports of military involvement for two months, until the weight of the evidence made the army's role impossible to ignore. It is almost certain that the murder of Father Ignacio Ellacuría and the others was engineered at the highest level of the army, and it is absolutely certain that the high command acted repeatedly to cover up its involvement, sometimes with the collusion of U.S. Embassy officials.

49. On Saudi Arabia's human rights violations, see for example, Amnesty International, *The 1996 Report on Human Rights Around the World*, New York: Hunter House, 1996. An excerpt (pp. 266, 265-266):

Amnesty International continued to express concern about the detention of people for the peaceful expression of their political or religious beliefs. . . . New information came to light about the torture and ill-treatment of detainees in 1994. The victims included political and criminal prisoners. The most common methods of torture used included *falaqa* (beatings on the soles of the feet), beatings, suspension by the wrists, and electric shocks. Among the victims was Gulam Mustafa, a Pakistani national, who was reportedly subjected to electric shocks and had a metal stick inserted into his anus while held in a detention centre for drug offenses in Jeddah in May 1994. . . . Up to 200 other political detainees arrested in 1993 and 1994 . . . continued to be held without charge or trial and without access to any legal assistance. . . .

The judicial punishments of amputation and flogging continued to be imposed for a wide range of offenses, including theft, consumption of alcohol and sexual offenses. At least nine people . . . had their right hands amputated. . . . They had been convicted on charges of theft, burglary and robbery. The punishment of flogging was widely used. . . . There was a sharp increase in the number of executions, the vast majority carried out by public beheading. . . . Defendants facing the death penalty have no right to be formally represented by defence lawyers during their trials. Confessions, even when obtained under torture, are apparently accepted in court as evidence and may be the sole evidence on which conviction is based.

50. On Hekmatyar's terror, narco-trafficking, and U.S. support, see for example, Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair, *Whiteout: The C.I.A., Drugs and the Press*, London: Verso, 1998, ch. 11. An excerpt (pp. 255-256, 263-264):

The mujahedin were scarcely fighting for freedom . . . but instead to impose one of the most repressive brands of Islamic fundamentalism known to the world, barbarous, ignorant and notably cruel to women. . . . Though the U.S. press . . . portrayed the mujahedin as a unified force of freedom fighters, the fact (unsurprising to anyone with an inkling of Afghan history) was that the mujahedin consisted of at least seven warring factions, all battling for territory and control of the opium trade.

The I.S.I. [Pakistan's secret police, a U.S. asset in the region,] gave the bulk of the arms -- at one count 60 percent -- to a particularly fanatical fundamentalist and woman-hater Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who made his public debut at the University of Kabul by killing a leftist student. In 1972 Hekmatyar fled to Pakistan, where he became an agent of the I.S.I. He urged his followers to throw acid in the faces of women not wearing the veil, kidnapped rival leaders, and built up his C.I.A.-furnished arsenal against the day the Soviets would leave and the war for the mastery of Afghanistan would truly break out. Using his weapons to get control of the opium fields, Hekmatyar and his men would urge the peasants, at gun point, to increase production. They would collect the raw opium and bring it back to Hekmatyar's six heroin factories in the town of Koh-i-Soltan. . . .

American D.E.A. agents were fully apprised of the drug running of the mujahedin in concert with Pakistani intelligence and military leaders. In 1983 the D.E.A.'s congressional liaison, David Melocik, told a congressional committee, "You can say the rebels make their money off the sale of opium. There's no doubt about it. These rebels keep their cause going through the sale of opium." But talk about "the cause" depending on drug sales was nonsense at that particular moment. The C.I.A. was paying for everything regardless.

Alfred W. McCoy, *The Politics Of Heroin: C.I.A. Complicity In The Global Drug Trade*, Brooklyn: Lawrence Hill, 1991, pp. 445-460, especially pp. 449-452; Human Rights Watch, *Human Rights Watch World Report 1993*, New York, December 1992, pp. 151-153.

51. On U.S. moves to undermine Aristide following his election, see for example, Special Delegation of the National Labor Committee Education Fund in Support of Worker and Human Rights in Central America, *Haiti After the Coup: Sweatshop or Real Development?*, New York, April 1993. An excerpt (pp. 22, 25, 27):

In the middle of the constitutional government's short reign, U.S. A.I.D. [the Agency for International Development] was declaring that "signals" from the Aristide Administration "to the business community have been mixed." U.S. A.I.D. went on the attack saying that, "decisions have been made which could be highly detrimental to economic growth, for example in the areas of labor and foreign exchange controls." U.S. A.I.D. was displeased with the fact that the democratically elected government wanted to place temporary price controls on basic foodstuffs so the people could afford to eat. . . .

Under the Aristide government . . . U.S. A.I.D., which had spent tens of millions of U.S. tax dollars since 1980 to foster offshore investment in Haiti's low wage assembly sector, stopped promoting investment. . . . After 67.5 percent of the Haitian people had voted for change, U.S. A.I.D. worked with the Haitian business elite to keep things the same. As the Aristide government came into office, U.S. A.I.D. allocated \$7.7 million to Prominex [a front group for business organizations that received 99 percent of its funding from U.S. A.I.D.] . . . \$12 million in loans to business, and \$7 million to foster democracy "from a business perspective" -- a total of \$26.7 million.

Deidre McFadyen, Pierre LaRamée and the North American Congress on Latin America, eds., *Haiti: Dangerous Crossroads*, Boston: South End, 1995, ch. 6. An excerpt (p. 190):

An April 1992 report on Haiti from the Inter-Hemispheric Education Resource Center details how "N.E.D. [the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy] and A.I.D. have tried to craft a carefully tailored electoral democracy based on conservative interest

groups. . . ." After President Aristide's victory, support for political projects in Haiti soared with the addition of a five-year, \$24-million package for "democracy enhancement." The aim of the program was to strengthen conservative forces within the legislature, the local government structures and civil society at large. And, as summed up by the Resource Center report, "to unravel the power and influence of grassroots organizations that formed the popular base of the Aristide government." The U.S. government went to special lengths to counter the demands of Haiti's labor movement. According to research conducted by the National Labor Committee, "U.S. A.I.D. used U.S. tax dollars to actively oppose a minimum-wage increase from \$0.33 to \$0.50 an hour proposed by the Aristide government."

See also, William Blum, *Killing Hope: U.S. Military and C.I.A. Interventions Since World War II*, Monroe, ME: Common Courage, 1995, ch. 55. An excerpt (pp. 373-374):

[T]he National Endowment for Democracy -- which was set up to do overtly, and thus more "respectably," some of what the C.I.A. used to do covertly -- . . . in conjunction with the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.), was busy in Haiti. It gave \$189,000 to several civic groups that included the Haitian Center for the Defense of Rights and Freedom, headed by Jean-Jacques Honorat. Shortly after Aristide's ouster, Honorat became the prime minister in the coup government. . . .

In the years prior to the coup, the N.E.D. also gave more than \$500,000 to the Haitian Institute for Research and Development (I.H.R.E.D.). This organization played a very partisan role in the 1990 elections when it was allied with U.S.-favorite Marc Bazin, former World Bank executive, and helped him create his coalition. . . . I.H.R.E.D. was led by Leopold Berlangier who, in 1993, supported the junta's sham election aimed at ratifying the prime ministership of Bazin, Honorat's successor and a political associate of Berlangier. Another recipient of N.E.D. largesse was Radio Soleil, run by the Catholic Church in a manner calculated to not displease the dictatorship of the day. During the 1991 coup -- according to the Rev. Hugo Triest, a former station director -- the station refused to air a message from Aristide. The N.E.D. has further reduced the U.S. Treasury by grants to the union association *Federation des Ouvriers Syndiques*, founded in 1984 with Duvalier's approval, so that Haiti, which previously had crushed union-organizing efforts, would qualify for the U.S. Caribbean Basin Initiative economic package. But despite its name and unceasing rhetoric, the National Endowment for Democracy did not give a dollar to any of the grassroots organizations that eventually merged to form Aristide's coalition.

52. On the successes of the Aristide regime before the coup, see for example, Special Delegation of the National Labor Committee Education Fund in Support of Worker and Human Rights in Central America, *Haiti After the Coup: Sweatshop or Real Development?*, New York, April 1993. An excerpt (pp. 35-36):

In July 1991, the Consultative Group for Haiti -- composed of 11 countries and 10 international donors -- met at the World Bank's office in Paris. . . . In what the Inter-American Development Bank (I.D.B.) referred to as a "show of support by the international community," the Consultative Group committed more than \$440 million in aid to the Aristide government. According to [the World Bank's Caribbean Director Yoshiaki] Abe, the donors strongly endorsed the new government's investment program. . . . [Q]uoting the I.D.B.: "In February 1991, when Haiti's first democratically elected government took office, the economy was in an unprecedented state of disintegration." But "the Aristide administration acted quickly to restore order to the

government's finances." In the eight months before the coup the Aristide government:

- Reduced the country's foreign debt by \$130 million.
- Increased its foreign exchange reserves from near zero to \$12 million.
- Increased government revenues "owing to the success of the tax collection measures and the government's anticorruption campaign."
- "To curb expenditures, the government streamlined the bloated public service and eliminated fictitious positions in government and government enterprise."
- Made significant inroads to curb the enormous flow of contraband trade, while lowering duties and simplifying the customs system.
- Brought "the inflation rate down dramatically from 26 percent in December 1990 to 11 percent in August 1991."
- Established a "uniform exchange rate system at the market rate."
- Signed an agreement with the International Monetary Fund.

Deidre McFadyen, Pierre LaRamée and the North American Congress on Latin America, eds., *Haiti: Dangerous Crossroads*, Boston: South End, 1995, p. 104 (reporting that there was "a 75% reduction in human rights abuses during Aristide's seven months in office"); Editorial, "For Haitians, Cruelty and Hope," *New York Times*, January 17, 1993, section 4, p. 16 ("During the seven months of [Aristide's] presidency in 1991, the flow of boat people all but dried up," but after the coup the mass exodus of refugees from Haiti resumed).

The U.S. government sought to portray Aristide's short time in power very differently. See for example, Amy Wilentz, "Haiti: The September Coup," *Reconstruction*, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1992. An excerpt (pp. 102-103):

Under Aristide's administration . . . military and paramilitary human-rights violations came to a virtual halt. . . . Since Aristide's overthrow, international discussion -- briefly enthusiastic on his behalf -- has focused on alleged flaws in his human-rights record. The United States State Department, according to the *New York Times*, circulated a thick notebook filled with alleged human rights violations. Inaccurate statistics about Aristide's human rights record were reportedly compiled and circulated by CHADEL, the human-rights organization of Jean-Jacques Honorat, now the prime minister of Haiti's illegal and unconstitutional interim government. International human-rights organizations like Amnesty International, Americas Watch, the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, and the Washington Office on Haiti have all found, however, that of the five presidents who have held power since Jean-Claude Duvalier fell in 1986, Aristide had by far the best human-rights record.

Oddly, this is the first time in the post-Duvalier era that the United States government has been so deeply concerned with human rights and the rule of law in Haiti. Under the previous four presidents (three of them Duvalieriste, two of them military men), the State Department did not circulate notebooks of violations; rather, it occasionally argued for the reinstatement of aid -- including military aid -- based on unsubstantiated human-rights improvements.

Linda Diebel, "The generals knew all along they would win," *Toronto Star*, November 14, 1993, p. E6. An excerpt:

[A] dossier on Aristide [claiming] "he's a psychotic manic depressive with homicidal and necrophiliac tendencies . . ." turned into the much-publicized Aristide report by the Central Intelligence Agency [which asserted a list of Aristide's supposed crimes while in office]. . . .

Three days after the coup that toppled Aristide, he's in exile in Venezuela. The U.S. publicly supports his return. Yet American Ambassador Alvin Adams summons

reporters from the New York Times, the Washington Post and other major U.S. outlets to private meetings and briefs them on Aristide's alleged crimes. The main line is that he's unstable, and wanted to see his enemies die with burning tires around their necks. Much of the evidence was provided by [the dossier].

53. For the *New York Times's* article on the embargo "exemption," see Barbara Crossette, "U.S. Plans to Sharpen Focus Of Its Sanctions Against Haiti," *New York Times*, February 5, 1992, p. A8. An excerpt:

The Bush Administration said today that it would modify its embargo against Haiti's military Government to punish anti-democratic forces and ease the plight of workers who lost jobs because of the ban on trade. . . . [T]he State Department announced that the Administration would be "fine tuning" its economic sanctions. . . . The Treasury Department would also grant licenses to American companies to resume assembling goods in Haiti for re-export, the State Department said. . . .

The decision to modify the United States embargo is the latest in a series of Administration moves that have been alternatively tough or concessionary as Washington tries to stem the flow of Haitian refugees while looking for more effective ways to hasten the collapse of what the Administration calls an illegal Government in Haiti.

A more straightforward account appeared in the *Times* a few days later. See Howard W. French, "Democracy Push In Haiti Blunted: Leaders of Coup Glee After U.S. Loosens Its Embargo and Returns Refugees," *New York Times*, February 7, 1992, p. A5. An excerpt:

With . . . the relaxation of a United States embargo against Haiti, the momentum of a four-month-old effort to restore democracy in this country appears to have been badly blunted. . . . On Tuesday, when Washington announced that it would begin selectively removing sanctions against industrial concerns to help revive a choking economy, the mood of optimism among many who supported the coup turned to bravado and frankly expressed glee. At ceremonies Wednesday, where officers carrying ivory-handled swords saluted the promotion of the army commander, Raoul Cedras, to the rank of lieutenant general amid the boom of a 21-gun salute, the new mood of confidence was everywhere in evidence. . . .

United States diplomats denied that the total embargo was being lifted or that Haiti's coup was being recognized. But they said the human and economic costs that a blanket embargo had caused were too high for the meager results the sanctions had produced, bringing the provisional Government to the negotiating table.

54. The fact that U.S. trade with Haiti rose dramatically under Clinton despite the "embargo" was reported in the international business press. See George Graham, "Disgruntled Washington backs away from Aristide," *Financial Times* (London), February 19, 1994, p. 3. An excerpt:

U.S. imports from Haiti rose by more than half last year [1993], to Dollars 154m, thanks in part to an exemption granted by the U.S. Treasury for imports of goods assembled in Haiti from U.S. parts. [Exports also rose to \$221 million]. . . . The Clinton administration still formally declares its support for Mr. Aristide, but scarcely disguises its wish for a leader more accommodating to the military . . . [while] European diplomats in Washington are scathing in their comments on what they see as the United States's abdication of leadership over Haiti.

55. For some of the ways in which a "message" was sent to the Haitian coup leaders by the U.S. government, see for example, Robert S. Greenberger, "Would-Be Dictators Are Watching to See If O.A.S. Can Restore Democracy in Haiti," *Wall Street Journal*, January 13, 1992, p. A11. An excerpt:

Last fall the [Bush] administration said it would consider freezing any U.S. assets of military officers who participated in the coup, and of their wealthy Haitian backers. . . [and] was considering temporarily lifting U.S. visas for these people, who travel frequently to the U.S. to shop or visit relatives. But neither step was taken. . . .

Mr. Torricelli [Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs] and others concede that one difficulty in getting support for stronger action against Haiti has been Mr. Aristide's record. He was overwhelmingly elected in Haiti's first free election and is immensely popular with the poor. But his fiery rhetoric sometimes incited class violence. . . . [T]he economic embargo . . . has been a blunt instrument, punishing mostly the urban poor and having minimal impact on the privileged.

Lee Hockstader, "Haitian Opposition Feels Betrayed," *Guardian Weekly* (U.K.), February 16, 1992, p. 17. An excerpt:

When Washington unilaterally last week eased its tough economic embargo -- which had been urged by the O.A.S. [Organization of American States] against Haiti -- after U.S. business leaders complained, it undercut its own credibility in the hemisphere both as a team player and as a democratic champion. The effect of the policy zig-zags has almost certainly been to convince Haiti's anti-democratic forces that Washington's opposition to the coup was disingenuous, according to observers here. "When you have a giant that neglects to take effective action, that neglect is interpreted as condoning" the coup, said an American with years of business experience in Haiti. "If the U.S. sincerely wanted Aristide back, they should take measures that are tailor-made to influence the people who made the coup. And they haven't gone after those people. . . ."

Aristide, the leftist priest given to militantly anti-American rhetoric, had been viewed with overt suspicion by the U.S. Embassy in Haiti for years before he entered politics. In the wake of the Sept. 30 coup, Bush voiced his reluctance to mount an invasion to restore the ousted leader. Then U.S. officials voiced their displeasure about his human rights record and commitment to the democratic process. Finally, the sweeping embargo imposed by Washington Nov. 5 was relaxed last week in what administration officials presented as a "fine-tuning." A telling moment came just 10 days after Aristide was ousted when Maj. Michel Francois, the self-appointed police chief and reputed leader of the coup, was asked in an interview how the coup leaders could withstand U.S. pressure given Washington's support for Aristide. "You really think so?" he asked with an amused smile, signaling skepticism about Washington's stated backing for Aristide.

Ian Martin [director of the U.N./O.A.S. Mission in Haiti from April through December 1993], "Haiti: mangled multilateralism," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1994, pp. 72-88. An excerpt (pp. 72-73, 77, 80, 82-83, 85):

On Monday, October 11, 1993, the U.S.S. *Harlan County* was due to dock at Port-au-Prince. The ship was to disembark U.S. and Canadian troops. . . . [A]s diplomats and journalists went to the port, they were confronted with a hostile demonstration of armed thugs. The next day, instead of waiting in the harbor while the Haitian military was pressured to ensure a safe landing, the *Harlan County* turned tail for Guantánamo Bay. Officials of the U.N. and the Organization of American States (O.A.S.) were aghast. . . . The U.N. and O.A.S. had been neither consulted

nor informed of the decision by President Bill Clinton's National Security Council to retreat. . . . The organizers of the Haitian protest could hardly believe their success. "My people kept wanting to run away," Emmanuel Constant, leader of the right-wing FRAPH [the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti, a paramilitary organization responsible for much of the terror], later told an American journalist. "But I took the gamble and urged them to stay. Then the Americans pulled out! We were astonished. That was the day FRAPH was actually born. . . ." U.S. officials, who had been in direct discussion with the [Haitian] military, concluded that the army needed further reassurance of its future. . . .

On July 3 Cédras [the coup leader] signed the Governors Island Agreement [providing that he and other military leaders would have amnesty and "early retirement" after Aristide returned to Haiti on October 30]. . . . The four-month period before Aristide's return -- a compromise from Cédras's initial proposal of six to eight months -- was presented to Aristide's negotiators as the minimum period for deploying the police and military missions. But Aristide believed the military would have ample time to frustrate his return. . . . By [August 27] it had become all too clear that the human rights situation since Governors Island had seriously deteriorated. . . . [T]he violence was carried out with an impunity implying police complicity, and the purpose seemed to be to terrorize those localities that had been the hotbeds of support for Aristide. As the weeks went on, the political character of the violence grew increasingly clear. . . . The military's declaration that public political activity would not be permitted was reinforced in a calculated message to the nation when businessman Antoine Izméry, who had defied the military in organizing peaceful but highly publicized displays of support for Aristide, was dragged from a commemorative mass on September 11 and executed in the presence of international observers. The civilian mission's investigation found that the assassination team, which included a person identified as a member of the armed forces as well as several "attachés," arrived and departed the scene escorted by police vehicles.

See also, Ronald G. Shafer, "Haiti's President stirs unease despite Clinton's backing," *Wall Street Journal*, October 1, 1993, p. A1 ("U.S. officials press Haitian lawmakers to move on amnesty [of death squad leaders] and upgrading the Haitian police force. U.S. officials say that the 600 troops being sent to Haiti starting next week won't be used to provide security for Aristide"); Steven A. Holmes, "U.N. Force to Rely on Haitians to Keep Order," *New York Times*, October 1, 1993, p. A5 (the U.S. Mission to Haiti "will have no mandate to stop Haitian soldiers and paramilitary elements from committing atrocities. 'It is not a peacekeeping role,' Secretary of Defense Aspin said. . . . 'We are doing something other than peacekeeping here'"); Pamela Constable, "As Aristide return nears, raids abound," *Boston Globe*, October 1, 1993, p. 2 (the Clinton administration announced that the U.N. Mission to Haiti, including its U.S. elements, "will rely on the Haitian military and police to maintain order").

On the devastating effects of the coup on Haitian civil society, see for example, Douglas Farah, "Grass Roots of Democracy in Haiti: All but Dead," *International Herald Tribune*, May 10, 1994, p. 3. An excerpt:

The Haitian Army and its allies have damaged democratic institutions and grass-roots organizations that had begun to grow in Haiti to such an extent that they will take years to rebuild even if Haiti's military leaders surrender power, according to diplomats and human-rights workers. . . .

Haitians and foreigners who work outside the capital said that not only the pro-Aristide movement, but even nonpolitical local or community organizations had been repressed. Thousands of community leaders have been driven into hiding, effectively decapitating virtually all local organizations. "The forced displacement of tens, if not hundreds of thousands of Haitians is part of the military's strategy to destroy all forms of organization or opposition," [a joint report by the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees and Human Rights Watch-Americas] said. . . . "Even if you send Aristide back, it will be too late," [Reverend Antoine Adrien] said. "Those returning will control nothing. All the militants are in hiding and the popular organizations are dismantled. You don't rebuild those things overnight."

Douglas Farah, "Aristide's Followers Targeted in Haiti," *Guardian Weekly* (U.K.), April 24, 1994, p. 17. An excerpt:

The army and its civilian allies in Haiti are engaged in massive terrorism aimed at dismantling the last vestiges of organized support for exiled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. . . . Human rights workers said . . . the military's willingness to engage in forms of terror . . . include[s] the systematic rape of women, usually wives or relatives of men sought because they supported Aristide; the kidnapping of small children of activists; the extensive use of clandestine prisons to hold and torture captured Aristide supporters; and the mutilation of bodies before dumping them in public places to be eaten by pigs.

Americas Watch and National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, *Silencing a People: The Destruction of Civil Society in Haiti*, New York: Human Rights Watch, February 1993 (detailing the repression of Haitian civil society, organization by organization; noting at p. 4 that "Indeed, far from a peripheral casualty of the coup, these organizations were as much the target of the army's repression as was the elected Aristide government. Violence unprecedented in Haiti was directed against popular organizations, the independent media, the *Ti Legliz* or popular church, and anyone else who brought together previously powerless people").

In the nine months following the 1991 coup -- during which these rampant massacres were taking place -- the *New York Times* devoted 54 percent of its coverage of Haiti to human rights abuses attributable to Aristide's supporters, which were less than 1 percent of the total abuses. Other U.S. newspapers, though less extreme, reflected the same extraordinary bias. See Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, "Human Rights in Haiti," *Extra!*, January/February 1993, p. 22 (reporting a survey of the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post* and the *Miami Herald* from September 30, 1991, to June 30, 1992). An excerpt:

In the three months following the coup, the three papers devoted only slightly fewer paragraphs to discussing supposed human rights abuses under Aristide as to the ongoing violence under the new military regime (43 percent vs. 57 percent). In other words, less than a dozen deaths that might be attributed to Aristide's followers were given almost as much weight as the 1,500 or more people killed in the coup or soon after. More than 80 paragraphs in the entire nine-month period surveyed were devoted to human rights abuses under the Aristide government -- 29 percent of all paragraphs dealing with human rights. This ratio was generally consistent in all three papers.

See also, Doug McCabe and Greg Geboski, "Haiti Report," *Z Magazine*, March 1993, pp. 9-11 (reporting data from the same survey).

For exceptional reporting on the links between the U.S. government and the Haitian death squad and coup leaders, see Allan Nairn, "The eagle is landing: U.S. forces

occupy Haiti," *Nation*, October 3, 1994, p. 344; Allan Nairn, "Behind Haiti's Paramilitaries: our man in FRAPH," *Nation*, October 24, 1994, p. 458; Allan Nairn, "He's our S.O.B.: Emmanuel Constant, leader of the FRAPH in Haiti," *Nation*, October 31, 1994, p. 481; Allan Nairn, "Haiti Under the Gun: How U.S.-backed Paramilitaries Rule," *Nation*, January 15, 1996, p. 11; Allan Nairn, "Our payroll, Haitian hit: 1993 slaying of the justice minister in Haiti," *Nation*, October 9, 1995, p. 369; Allan Nairn, "Haiti under cloak: reported infiltration of the Haitian National Police by the Central Intelligence Agency," *Nation*, February 26, 1996, p. 4.

The U.S. government's assistance to the perpetrators of the massacres continued long after the coup leaders stepped down. See for example, Kenneth Roth [Executive Director of Human Rights Watch], "U.S. Must Release Evidence on Haitian Abuses," Letter, *New York Times*, April 12, 1997, section 1, p. 18. An excerpt:

[The Clinton] Administration is obstructing efforts to extend the rule of law to [Haiti's new police] force by refusing to give important evidence of past abuses to Haitian prosecutors. Although Haiti's murderous army has been formally abolished, many former soldiers have been incorporated into the 5,000-strong Haitian National Police, including 130 former military officers and more than 1,000 lower-ranking soldiers. The vetting of former soldiers to exclude those with records of serious human rights abuse was often perfunctory, in part because of a lack of reliable evidence. One of the best sources of evidence are 160,000 documents, including photographs of torture victims, that the United States military seized from the Haitian Army and its paramilitary allies in 1994. The Clinton Administration refuses to return these documents without first removing the names of Americans.

The Administration's apparent motive is to avoid embarrassing revelations about the involvement of American intelligence agents with the military regime that ruled Haiti. The Haitian Government has refused to accept the documents on these terms. To deprive Haitian prosecutors of this information is to sacrifice Haiti's efforts . . . to extend the rule of law to its police.

56. For the *Platt's Oilgram* story, see Paul Sonali and Allyson LaBorde, "Texaco Says It Didn't Break Haiti Ban, U.S. Government Studying Fines," *Platt's Oilgram*, September 20, 1994, p. 3. An excerpt:

Responding to an Associated Press report that federal investigators were trying to find out why the Treasury Dept.'s Office of Foreign Assets Control (O.F.A.C.) had not fined Texaco for violations of the embargo, Texaco said that "it had acted in a totally legal and morally responsible manner in establishing a blind trust to run Texaco Caribbean's operations in Haiti" after the U.S. imposed sanctions in October 1991.

According to A.P., based on government documents, O.F.A.C. officials said in a 1993 report that Texaco should be fined \$1.6-million for 160 embargo violations. However, O.F.A.C. didn't follow through because of contacts between top Texaco officials and Bush Administration representatives.

For coverage of this story in the local U.S. press, see for example, A.P., "Ex Treasury Chief May Have Sidestepped Haiti Embargo: Aide 'Protected' Brady After Being Ordered to Drag Feet on Crackdown of Texaco, diary shows," *Rocky Mountain News* (Denver, CO), October 2, 1994, p. 83A (the Office of Foreign Assets director was told to "go slow" on Texaco by Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady). For the *Wall Street Journal's* reference, see "Bentsen Orders Probe Into Treasury's Role In Texaco Haiti Case," *Wall Street Journal*, September 21, 1994, p. A4 (mentioning the A.P. stories). In

an untitled two-paragraph "News Summaries" segment, *U.S.A. Today* also referred to Bentsen's ordering an investigation (September 21, 1994, p. 3A).

The Associated Press continued to investigate the story -- but the major U.S. media did not publish its news-wire articles. See for example, John Solomon, A.P., "Agency Head Failed to Stop Texaco Leak, Citing Bush Treasury Secretary," September 18, 1994 (Westlaw database # 1994 WL 10136202); John Solomon, A.P., "Treasury Secretary Asks for Probe in Haiti Embargo Case," September 20, 1994 (Westlaw database # 1994 WL 10129184); John Solomon, A.P., "Assets Control Director Ignored Advice to Remove Self from Texaco Case," September 29, 1994 (Westlaw database # 1994 WL 10140200); John Solomon, A.P., "Diary: OFAC Director was 'Protecting' Brady in Texaco-Haiti Case," October 1, 1994 (Westlaw database # 1994 WL 10156738).

57. For the text of Bill Clinton's speech, see "In the Words of the President: The Reasons Why the U.S. Must Invade Haiti," *New York Times*, September 16, 1994, p. A10.

58. For a Canadian article on the length of Aristide's term, see Dave Todd, Southam News, *Telegraph Journal* (New Brunswick), September 17, 1994. An excerpt: [Clinton's plan amounts to] three years of stolen democracy. . . . By deducting them from, rather than adding them to, Aristide's suspended presidency, a key political objective will be achieved . . . [namely] a partial legitimization of the 1991 coup d'état against Aristide.

59. The term "structural adjustment" refers to a series of economic "reforms" which the International Monetary Fund and World Bank demand before giving loans to Third World governments to pay off their existing international debts. These include: privatizing state enterprises, devaluing local currencies, raising food prices, lowering deficits by reducing consumer subsidies and charging for social services like health care and education, dismantling regulation of the private sector, limiting protectionist measures for foreign trade, and creating various incentives for foreign investment. See also footnote 64 of chapter 10 of *U.P.* And see footnote 41 of chapter 6 of *U.P.*

60. On the World Bank's structural adjustment package for Haiti after the coup, see Allan Nairn, "Aristide Banks on Austerity," *Multinational Monitor*, July/August 1994, pp. 7-9. The plan's paragraph 10 directs that: "the renovated state must focus on an economic strategy centered on the energy and initiative of Civil Society, especially the private sector, both national and foreign." Nairn reports that the plan commits Haiti: to eliminate the jobs of half of its civil servants, "drastic[ally]" slash tariffs and import restrictions, eschew price and foreign exchange controls, grant "emergency" aid to the export sector, enforce an "open foreign investment policy," create special corporate business courts "where the judges are more aware of the implications of their decisions for economic efficiency," rewrite its corporate laws, "limit the scope of state activity" and regulation, and diminish the power of President Aristide's executive branch in favor of the more conservative Parliament.

61. On the case of the Roosevelt administration, the Neutrality Act, and the Spanish Civil War, see for example, Dante A. Puzzo, *Spain and the Great Powers, 1936-1941*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1962, pp. 150-155, 262 n. 27. This

study notes that although technically the Neutrality Act of 1935 did not apply to Spain until it was later amended, the Roosevelt administration made it clear in the summer of 1936 that the U.S. wanted no "interference" in the Spanish war, "a policy that served, in effect, to equate the legitimate Spanish government with the insurgents [i.e. Franco's Fascists]." Companies such as Martin Aircraft that wished to maintain trade with the non-Fascist Republican government were told that supplying the Republic "would not follow the spirit of the Government's policy," in the words of Acting Secretary of State William Phillips. When an American arms exporter, Robert Cuse, insisted on his legal right to ship airplanes and aircraft engines to the Republic in December 1936, he was denounced by Roosevelt as "unpatriotic. . . . He represents the 10 percent of business that does not live up to the best standards." Compare the Cuse case with that of Thorkild Rieber, related in the text following this footnote in *U.P.* and footnote 64 of this chapter.

62. On Thorkild Rieber's Nazism, see for example, Herbert Feis, *The Spanish Story: Franco and the Nations at War*, New York: Knopf, 1948, Appendix 1, pp. 269-271. On Texaco's ships being redirected, see footnotes 63 and 64 of this chapter.

63. For contemporary left-wing press reporting of the Texaco story, see for example, "Oil for Lisbon Goes to Franco," *Industrial Worker*, Vol. XIX, May 22, 1937, p. 1. See also, "Conspiracy Against Spain," *Man! A Journal of the Anarchist ideal and Movement* (New York), Vol. V, No. 4, June 1937, pp. 1, 3 (discussing many embargo violations that aided Franco); Allen Guttman, *The Wound in the Heart: America and the Spanish Civil War*, New York: Free Press, 1962, pp. 66-67, 137-138.

64. For diplomatic histories mentioning the Texaco story, see for example, Herbert Feis, *The Spanish Story: Franco and the Nations at War*, New York: Knopf, 1948, pp. 269-271. This study reports that for falsely declaring that the oil shipments were going to France and not to Spain, Texaco was fined \$22,000 by the Treasury Department. See also, Gabriel Jackson, *The Spanish Republic and the Civil War: 1931-39*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 256 (discussing the story, but not mentioning the fact that Texaco was violating its prior agreement with the Republic).

The episode also was mentioned four years after the fact in a glowing *Life* magazine profile of Thorkild "Cap" Rieber -- "soberly regarded by his fellow workers as the greatest oil man alive." See Joseph J. Thorndike Jr., "'Cap' Rieber: He Came Off a Tanker to Build an Oil Empire and Prove that Industrial Daring is not Dead," *Life*, July 1, 1940, pp. 56-68. The reference (p. 62):

Rieber's dealings with the Franco Government in Spain were a shrewd gamble. When the Spanish civil war broke out in July, 1936, Texaco had five tankers on the high seas bound for Spain. Rieber was in Paris. He flew to Spain, took a good look around and forthwith ordered the tankers to deliver their oil to the Insurgents [Franco's Fascists]. . . . For the next two years Texaco supplied Franco with all the oil he needed, while the Loyalists never had enough.

If Franco had lost, Texaco would have been out some \$6,000,000. But the gamble won and not only did victorious Franco pay his bill but the Spanish monopoly is currently buying all its oil from Texaco. For ambitious young men Rieber is a prime example of what it takes to be a successful tycoon.

65. For studies of the post-World War II U.S. campaign to destroy anti-fascist elements internationally and to return traditional ruling groups to power, see Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945*, New York: Pantheon, 1968 (updated edition 1990); Gabriel Kolko and Joyce Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954*, New York: Harper & Row, 1972. These books were the first major scholarly efforts to document this history, and remain extremely valuable and unique in their scope and depth despite the flood of new scholarship since -- although, because they do not adhere to approved orthodoxies, it is considered a violation of scholarly ethics in the American academic community to refer to them. See also, David F. Schmitz, *Thank God They're On Our Side: The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1921-1965*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999, especially ch. 4.

On operations in Greece, see footnote 72 of this chapter. On operations in Italy, see footnotes 66, 67, 71, 75, 76, 77 and 79 of this chapter. On operations in France, see footnotes 71 and 79 of this chapter. On operations in Germany, see footnotes 69 and 71 of this chapter. On operations in Korea, see chapter 8 of *U.P.* and its footnote 67.

On operations in Japan, see for example, Joe Moore, *Japanese Workers and the Struggle for Power, 1945-1947*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983, especially ch. 7. An excerpt (pp. 188-189, 191):

S.C.A.P. [the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers, i.e. the post-war U.S. administration in Japan,] had become convinced of the necessity of putting limitations on the workers' freedom of action after coming face to face with the power and radicalism of the working-class movement in spring 1946 and having to make the decision that even the maintenance of an unpopular conservative government was greatly preferable to allowing the left-wing opposition to come to power. . . . S.C.A.P. henceforth put its emphasis upon the building of a healthy labor movement that would avoid politics and radical actions such as production control, while encouraging business and government leaders to resist such worker excesses. . . . The Yoshida cabinet was only too happy to return to the anti-labor policies of the past, and encourage union-busting tactics including use of the police to suppress disputes to a degree that would have been unimaginable even a few months before. As if to underscore S.C.A.P.'s approval, on several notable occasions even U.S. military police participated. The new policy was called, in a cynical phrase current among S.C.A.P. officials, "housebreaking" the labor movement. . . .

[The Civil Information and Education Sector of S.C.A.P.] suppressed whole issues of left-wing publications, and the censors riddled many others with their blue pencils. Henceforth, left-wing writers could no longer count upon freedom of the press to ensure that unpopular opinions got into print. On 18 May, [U.S. General Kermit] Dyke had already seen General MacArthur [the U.S. commander] and secured his consent to clamp down on the press unions. Two days after that, [the chief of the C.I.E., Major Daniel] Imboden issued a strong warning to the press, threatening to close down "irresponsible" papers as General Hodge had done in Korea. He stated that "labor unions had no right and could not dictate the editorial policy of a newspaper" for "that was the right of the owners and men who are nominated by the owners."

Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985, especially pp. 44-51; Howard B. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952*, Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1989, especially ch. 4 and pp. 62-64; Gabriel

Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945*, New York: Pantheon, 1968 (updated edition 1990), ch. 21. See also, Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, Vol. II ("The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950"), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. An excerpt (pp. 56-57):

Only Japan held [U.S. State Department planner George] Kennan's attentions in East Asia, and his new notoriety and strategic placement in 1947 made it possible for him to author the "reverse course," or what we may call the Kennan Restoration. . . . The operative document for the reverse course, developed in draft form under Kennan's aegis in September 1947 . . . envisioned a Japan that would be "friendly to the United States," amenable to American leadership in foreign affairs, "industrially revived as a producer primarily of consumer's goods and secondarily of capital goods," and active in foreign trade; militarily it would be "reliant upon the U.S. for its security from external attack." The paper reserved to the United States "a moral right to intervene" in Japan should "stooge groups" like the Japanese Communist Party threaten stability. Leaving little to the imagination, it went on: "Recognizing that the former industrial and commercial leaders of Japan are the ablest leaders in the country, that they are the most stable element, that they have the strongest natural ties with the U.S., it should be U.S. policy to remove obstacles to their finding their natural level in Japanese leadership." Thus Kennan called for an end to the purge of war criminals and business groups who supported them.

On operations in Thailand, see for example, Frank C. Darling [former C.I.A. analyst and Thailand specialist], *Thailand and the United States*, Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1965, chs. II and III, especially pp. 65, 69 (the dictator of Thailand under the Japanese, Phibun Songkham, who had in fact declared war against the United States, was reinstated in an American-supported military coup in 1948 and thereby became "the first pro-Axis dictator to regain power after the war").

On operations in Indochina, see for example, Archimedes L.A. Patti, *Why Viet Nam?: Prelude to America's Albatross*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.

On operations in French North Africa, the first area liberated by U.S. forces in World War II, see for example, Stephen E. Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*, Baltimore: Penguin, 1971, ch. 2, especially pp. 54-66. An excerpt (pp. 55-59):

The United States took the view that one could do business with Vichy [the pro-Nazi government in southern France during World War II]. Much in Pétain's [the Vichy chief of state] program appeared to Roosevelt and Hull [the British Prime Minister] to represent the best hope for France, especially those parts that stood for work, patriotism, and stability. . . . The President did everything in his power to stop de Gaulle's rise, primarily because of his fear that the French people upon liberation would, as they had in the past, run to an extreme. . . . What made [de Gaulle] even more dangerous was the way that he flirted with the forces of the left, especially the communists in the Resistance. "France faces a revolution when the Germans have been driven out," the President once said, and he feared that the man most likely to profit from it would be de Gaulle.

Roosevelt spent much time searching for an alternative to de Gaulle. He might have wanted to turn to Vichy, but Pétain was too thoroughly brushed with the tar of the collaborationist. Roosevelt's best hope was the French Army, which represented the forces of stability and conservatism without appearing to be pro-Nazi. . . . By accident, Admiral Jean Darlan was in Algiers when the [Allied] invasion hit. Darlan was bitterly anti-British, author of Vichy's anti-semitic laws, and a willing

collaborationist, but he was also the Commander-in-Chief of Vichy's armed forces and he was ready to double-cross Pétain. He agreed to a deal proposed by Clark and Murphy, which required him to order the French to lay down their arms, in return for which the Allies made him the Governor General of all French North Africa. Within a few days the French officers obeyed Darlan's order to cease fire, and a week after the invasion Eisenhower flew to Algiers and approved the deal. . . . The result was that in its first major foreign-policy venture in World War II, the United States gave its support to a man who stood for everything Roosevelt and Churchill had spoken out against in the Atlantic Charter. As much as Goering or Goebbels, Darlan was the antithesis of the principles the Allies said they were struggling to establish.

66. On U.S. fears about the 1948 Italian election and the U.S. operation to sway it, see for example, James E. Miller, "Taking Off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 7, No. 1, Winter 1983, pp. 35-55 (on U.S. use of covert funding and military supplies, sponsorship of massive propaganda efforts, and employment of the threat of cutting off aid, in order to sway the 1948 Italian election); Christopher Simpson, *Blowback: America's Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War*, New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988, pp. 89-95 (on the C.I.A.'s use of former Nazi collaborators for postwar operations to help avert an Italian Communist electoral victory); John Lamberton Harper, *America and the Reconstruction of Italy, 1945-1948*, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1986, especially ch. 9; William Blum, *Killing Hope: U.S. Military and C.I.A. Interventions Since World War II*, Monroe, ME: Common Courage, 1995, ch. 2. See also footnotes 67, 71, 75, 76, 77 and 79 of this chapter.

67. On U.S. efforts to keep the working-class parties out of power in Italy through the 1960s and the contemplation of a coup, see for example, Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, *The Rise and Fall of the Bulgarian Connection*, New York: Sheridan Square, 1986, ch. 4 (on the coup plan in the 1960s by the C.I.A.-dominated organization S.I.F.A.R., see pp. 78-81). An excerpt (pp. 73-74):

Enormous resources were poured into Italy to manipulate the postwar elections. A Marshall Plan subsidy of some \$227 million was voted by Congress just prior to the Italian elections of April 18, 1948. . . . In the mid-1970s the Pike Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives estimated that \$65 million had been invested in Italian elections in the period 1948-68. Ten million dollars was pumped into the election of 1972. Former C.I.A. officer Victor Marchetti estimated C.I.A. outlays were \$20-30 million a year in the 1950s, dropping to a mere \$10 million a year in the 1960s. These funds were also used to subsidize newspapers, anticommunist labor unions, Catholic groups, and favored political parties (mainly the Christian Democrats). . . .

Following the victory of the Right in the elections of April 1948, a new, secret antissubversive police force was established under the Ministry of Interior, with U.S. advisers. This was filled largely from the old fascist secret police of Mussolini. At the same time, the fascist party Italian Social Movement (M.S.I.) began a massive expansion program, with the assistance of U.S. intelligence officials. M.S.I. had significant backing from business interests in both Italy and the United States, and probably received financial support from the U.S. government. The honorary chairman of M.S.I. was Prince Junio Valerio Borghese, the long-time fascist leader, who had been protected by the United States at the end of the war. General Vito

Miceli, another M.S.I. leader, received an \$800,000 U.S. subsidy through U.S. Ambassador Graham Martin in 1972. M.S.I. official Luigi Turchi was a guest of honor at the Nixon White House in 1972.

"The C.I.A. in Italy: An Interview with Victor Marchetti," in Philip Agee and Louis Wolf, eds., *Dirty Work: the C.I.A. in Western Europe*, Secaucus, NJ: Lyle Stuart, 1978, pp. 168-173; John Ranelagh, *The Agency: the Rise and Decline of the C.I.A.*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986, especially pp. 115f; William Colby with Peter Forbath, *Honorable Men: My Life in the C.I.A.*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978, ch. 4; Sallie Pisani, *The C.I.A. and the Marshall Plan*, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991, pp. 106-107.

On this topic, Herman and Brodhead also cite: Giuseppe De Lutiis, *Storia dei servizi segreti in Italia*, Rome: Editori Reuniti, 1985; Gianni Flamini, *Il partito del golpe: Le strategie della tensione e del terrore dal primo centrosinistra organico al sequestro Moro*, Vol. I, Ferrara: Italo Bovolenta, 1981; Roberto Faenza and Marco Fini, *Gli Americani in Italia*, Milan: Feltrinello, 1976. See also footnotes 66, 68, 71, 75, 76 and 77 of this chapter.

68. On U.S. intervention in Italy in the 1970s, see for example, William Blum, *Killing Hope: U.S. Military and C.I.A. Interventions Since World War II*, Monroe, ME: Common Courage, 1995, ch. 18. An excerpt (p. 120):

It is not known when, if ever, the C.I.A. ended its practice of funding anti-Communist groups in Italy. Internal Agency documents of 1972 reveal contributions of some \$10 million to political parties, affiliated organizations, and 21 individual candidates in the parliamentary elections of that year. At least \$6 million was passed to political leaders for the June 1976 elections. And in the 1980s, C.I.A. Director William Casey arranged for Saudi Arabia to pay \$2 million to prevent the Communists from achieving electoral gains in Italy. Moreover, the largest oil company in the United States, Exxon Corp., admitted that between 1963 and 1972 it had made political contributions to the Christian Democrats and several other Italian political parties totaling \$46 million to \$49 million. Mobil Oil Corp. also contributed to the Italian electoral process to the tune of an average \$500,000 a year from 1970 to 1973. There is no report that these corporate payments derived from persuasion by the C.I.A. or the State Department, but it seems rather unlikely that the firms would engage so extravagantly in this unusual sideline with complete spontaneity. . . .

[An] Italian newspaper, the *Daily American* of Rome, for decades the country's leading English-language paper, was for a long period in the 1950s to the '70s partly owned and/or managed by the C.I.A. "We 'had' at least one newspaper in every foreign capital at any given time," the C.I.A. admitted in 1977, referring to papers owned outright or heavily subsidized, or infiltrated sufficiently to have stories printed which were useful to the Agency or suppress those it found detrimental.

A.P., "Italian Asks Probe Of Story On C.I.A.," *Boston Globe*, July 23, 1990, p. 10. An excerpt:

President Francesco Cossiga [of Italy] has called for an investigation into a report that the C.I.A. encouraged terrorism in Italy in the 1970s, his office said yesterday. The report on state-owned R.A.I. television alleged that the C.I.A. paid Licio Gelli, grandmaster of the secret Propaganda Due Masonic lodge, to foment terrorist activities. The P-2 has been accused of seeking to install a right-wing dictatorship in Italy during the 1970s with the help of secret service officials. . . . The R.A.I. report

was based mainly on interviews with two men who claimed to have worked for the C.I.A.

Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, *The Rise and Fall of the Bulgarian Connection*, New York: Sheridan Square, 1986, pp. 81-87 (discussing a 1984 report of the Italian Parliament on the clandestine right-wing organization P-2 and other neo-fascist groups in Italy who, working closely with elements of the Italian military and secret services, were preparing a virtual coup in the 1970s to impose an ultra-right regime and to block the rising forces of the left).

For some insight into U.S. planners' reasons for intervening in Italian politics, see for example, Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, Washington: Brookings Institution, 1985. An excerpt (pp. 487-488, 490):

The "major problem" in the Western alliance, [U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger] continued, one that was overtaking U.S.-Western European differences, was "the domestic evolution in many European countries . . ." [in the mid-1970s towards] the development of Euro-communism. . . . In April [1976] Kissinger publicly warned against the possibility of the P.C.I. [Italian Communist Party] participating in a coalition government in Italy. . . . [He stated:] "The extent to which such a party follows the Moscow line is unimportant. Even if Portugal had followed the Italian model, we would still have been opposed. . . . [T]he impact of an Italian Communist Party that seemed to be governing effectively would be devastating -- on France, and on N.A.T.O., too. . . ."

Eurocommunism was the term coined in 1975-76 to denote the new current of Western European communism that stressed independence of action for each party and embodied varying degrees of democratic and pluralistic tendencies. . . . [T]he United States perceived Eurocommunism as threatening its interests in Western Europe . . . [and] the Soviet Union also came to see Eurocommunism as threatening its interests in Eastern Europe.

69. For Kennan's statement about the West "walling off" Western Germany, see "The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State," March 6, 1946, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1946*, Vol. V ("The British Commonwealth: Western and Central Europe"), Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969, pp. 516-520. Kennan's exact words (p. 519):

It seems to me unlikely that such a country [postwar Germany] once unified under a single administration and left politically to itself and to the Russians would ever adjust itself to its western environment successfully enough to play a positive and useful role in world society as we conceive it. If this is true then we have and have had ever since our acceptance of Oder-Neisse Line [the new German/Polish border] only two alternatives: (1) to leave remainder of Germany nominally united but extensively vulnerable to Soviet political penetration and influence or (2) to carry to its logical conclusion the process of partition which was begun in the east and to endeavor to rescue western zones of Germany by walling them off against eastern penetration and integrating them into international pattern of western Europe rather than into a unified Germany. I am sure Russians themselves are confident that if rump Germany west of Oder-Neisse were to be united under single administration there would be no other single political force therein which could stand up against Left Wing bloc with Russian backing.

See also, John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 76 (in another document, Kennan stated: the "trend of our thinking means . . . that we do not really want to see Germany reunified at this time, and that there are *no* conditions on which we would really find such a solution satisfactory"); Carolyn Eisenberg, "Working-Class Politics and the Cold War: American Intervention in the German Labor Movement, 1945-49," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 7, No. 4, Fall 1983, especially pp. 297-305 (concluding that the decision to divide Germany was fueled by the fear of "a unified, centralized, politicized labor movement committed to a far-reaching program of social change"); Geoffrey Warner, "Eisenhower, Dulles and Western Europe, 1955-1957," *International Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 2, April 1993, pp. 319-329 (review of declassified documents on the subject); Melvyn Leffler, "The United States and the Strategic Dimensions of the Marshall Plan," *Diplomatic History*, Summer 1988, pp. 277-306. For a contemporary discussion of Stalin's "forgotten" 1952 proposal for reunification and neutralization of Germany, see James P. Warburg, *Germany: Key to Peace*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953, pp. 188-194.

70. On the scale of the French resistance during the Nazi occupation, see for example, Robert Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order*, New York: Knopf, 1972, pp. 294-295 (estimating that resistance participation in France at its peak, "at least as officially recognized after the war," involved about 2 percent of the French adult population while perhaps 10 percent were willing to read a resistance newspaper).

71. On the American and British operation to dismantle the anti-fascist resistance in Northern Italy and to restore the traditional industrial order, see for example, Federico Romero, *The United States and the European Trade Union Movement, 1944-1951*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989 (translation 1992), especially chs. 2 and 5. Note that this is an *approving* account of the British and American actions. An excerpt (pp. 52-59):

A few days after the liberation [of the industrial north of Italy, British Labour Party attaché W.H.] Braine left for a rapid turn through the northern cities. In Bologna, Milan, Turin, and Genoa he ran into an unexpected situation. The industrial plants were in good condition and working order. Activist optimism was to be seen everywhere. There were many serious problems, but the social fabric did not seem as torn apart as it was in the south. The first decrees of the Committee of National Liberation in Northern Italy (C.L.N.A.I.) and its rudimentary but effective administrative framework unequivocally demonstrated the existence of a new government. It was thin but widespread, and the Allies had to reckon with it. . . . Braine requested immediate decisions on three important issues. He asked for suspension of the C.L.N.A.I. decrees blocking all dismissals [of workers], paying a "liberation bonus" to the workers, and establishing worker-management councils (C.D.G.) in industrial plants. The Allies and the Italian government must prevent the "arbitrary replacement" of business leaders with commissioners appointed by the workers or by the C.L.N. The Italian government must promptly prepare regulations, under the guidance of the A.C.C. [Allied Control Commission], to govern bargaining over wages and layoffs. . . .

The resistance, useful though it was from a military point of view, had always inspired mistrust among the Allies, since it was a free political and social movement that was hard to control. It was coming out at this moment as a source of

independent power and as such had to be changed. . . . The Allies took drastic steps to prevent the worker and partisan mobilization in the enthusiasm following the liberation from leading to durable power structures, from imposing radical changes in property ownership and hierarchy in industry, and from setting up an uncontrolled anti-Fascist purge inspired by class-based criteria. . . . The A.M.G.'s attention was drawn in particular to the worker-management councils, whose legitimacy was contested, in accord with the views of the industrialists and the moderate political forces, and which, it was feared, could evolve into instruments for socializing industry. The intention was to restore all power and responsibility for the operation of industrial plants to the hands of management, leaving a purely consultative role for the worker-management councils. . . . A.M.G. power had been able to keep the working-class drive for political power in check, to rein in the most radical impulses of victorious antifascism, and to place the structure of industrial power under control, thus saving the prerogatives of the entrepreneurs. Sufficient bounds had been placed on labor mobilization to channel it into less damaging courses, laying a basis for institutionalizing and regulating the bargaining process.

Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945*, New York: Pantheon, 1968 (updated edition 1990), ch. 3, especially pp. 61-63, 436-439 (on the successes of the Italian resistance during the war and its destruction by the Allied powers); Basil Davidson, *Scenes From The Anti-Nazi War*, New York: Monthly Review, 1980, especially pp. 251-278 (memoir of a later-eminent historian of Africa who participated in the anti-Nazi underground in Italy and Yugoslavia during World War II; recounting the heroism and radical-democratic aspirations of the Italian resistance and the American and British policy to suppress the popular forces as the Nazis were defeated). See also, Gianfranco Pasquino, "The Demise of the First Fascist Regime and Italy's Transition to Democracy: 1943-1948," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986, pp. 45-70 (brief overview of Italian politics after the war). And see footnotes 66, 67, 75, 76, 77 and 79 of this chapter.

On the U.S. operations in post-World War II France, see for example, Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945*, New York: Pantheon, 1968 (updated edition 1990), ch. 4 and pp. 439-445; Alfred W. McCoy, *The Politics Of Heroin: C.I.A. Complicity In The Global Drug Trade*, Brooklyn: Lawrence Hill, 1991, chs. 1 and 2.

On the enthusiastic involvement of the mainstream U.S. labor leadership in the operations to restore the old industrial order to power in Northern Italy -- in part by reorienting the new Italian unions from their radical-democratic structure to American-style, leadership-dominated "business unionism" -- see for example, Federico Romero, *The United States and the European Trade Union Movement, 1944-1951*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989 (translation 1992), especially pp. 16-41, 149.

On the U.S. labor leadership's complicity in the overall U.S. and British post-war effort to destroy unions internationally, see also, for example, Roy Godson, *American Labor and European Politics: The A.F.L. as a Transnational Force*, New York: Crane, Russak, 1976, especially pp. 52-53, 75, 104, 117-137. This book, based on internal A.F.L. documents, explains in glowing terms and frames as a great humanitarian achievement in defense of democracy, liberty, and a free trade union movement, how the A.F.L. exploited postwar starvation in Europe to transfer power to its own associates by

keeping food from their opponents (pp. 3, 104, 116); employed gangsters as strike breakers to split the labor movement (pp. 120-125); undermined efforts of French labor to block shipments to the French forces attempting to reconquer Indochina (p. 135); split the Confédération Générale du Travail, a major French union in the key industries of coal mining, communications, and transportation, in 1947 as part of its efforts to "restore the internal balance of political power and prevent a shift to the extreme left" (pp. 117-132); and so on. However, the book skirts the Mafia connection, which is detailed in footnote 79 of this chapter.

Other studies of this topic include: Ronald Radosh, *American Labor and United States Foreign Policy*, New York: Random House, 1969 (review of U.S. labor leaders' rigid Cold War positions on foreign policy matters, and their active participation in reining in left-wing labor movements internationally); Ronald Filippelli, *American Labor and Postwar Italy, 1943-1953: A Study of Cold War Politics*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989; Sallie Pisani, *The C.I.A. and the Marshall Plan*, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991, pp. 99-100 (on U.S. labor leaders' activities in postwar France); Howard B. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952*, Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1989, ch. 4 (on U.S. labor leaders' activities in occupied Japan); Fred Hirsh and Richard Fletcher, *The C.I.A. and The Labour Movement*, Nottingham, U.K.: Spokesman, 1977. See also, Thomas Braden, "I'm glad the C.I.A. is 'immoral,'" *Saturday Evening Post*, May 20, 1967, p. 10 ("It was my idea to give the \$15,000 to Irving Brown [of the A.F.L.]. He needed it to pay off his strong-arm squads in the Mediterranean port, so that American supplies could be unloaded against the opposition of the Communist dock workers").

Similar attitudes have persisted in the U.S. union leadership until the present. See for example, Aaron Bernstein, "Is Big Labor Playing Global Vigilante?: The A.F.L.-C.I.O. Spends Millions A Year To Fight Communism Overseas -- Fueling A Bitter Internal Battle," *Business Week*, November 4, 1985, pp. 92-96. An excerpt:

Through a group of little-known institutes, the A.F.L.-C.I.O. spends \$43 million a year in 83 countries -- often for anticommunist projects that tend to merge with the [Reagan] Administration's foreign policy themes. . . . Their combined spending nearly matches the A.F.L.-C.I.O.'s \$45 million U.S. budget. Some \$5 million of the foreign affairs money comes from dues of member unions. The other \$38 million comes largely from two government sources. One is the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) . . . The other is the National Endowment for Democracy (N.E.D.), a congressionally funded foundation started with the aid of conservative Senator Orrin G. Hatch (R-Utah) to "sell the principles of democracy" abroad. . . .

[C]onservative foreign policies are nothing new for labor: The A.F.L.-C.I.O. has long been proud of the role International Affairs Dept. Director Irving J. Brown and his predecessor Jay Lovestone have played in fighting communism around the world since World War II.

72. On the destruction of the anti-Nazi resistance and restoration of Nazi collaborators in Greece by Britain and the U.S., see for example, Lawrence S. Wittner, *American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1982. This study describes the rise of the anti-fascist resistance during and after the Nazi occupation (pp. 2-3), and the British -- followed by the U.S. -- campaign of violent suppression of the Greek popular movement and reinstatement of the traditional order, once the Nazis were forced from Greece. An excerpt (pp. 31, 33-35, 80, 88, 154, 149):

Britain's defeat of E.A.M. [National Liberation Front, the main anti-fascist resistance organization] in December 1944 shattered the hegemony of the left, emboldened the right, and opened the way for a royalist takeover of the organs of state power: the police, the army, and the administration. . . . Throughout the countryside, right-wing mobs brutalized or killed leftists, republicans, and their families. National guardsmen attacked left-wing editors and smashed their printshops. . . . As usual, the Russians accepted such developments with a cynical equanimity. "This war is not as in the past," Stalin . . . [said] in the spring of 1945. "Whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. . . ." By the end of World War II, then, American policymakers were ready for the counterrevolutionary initiatives of subsequent years. . . .

Behind American policy, as behind that of Britain and Russia, lay the goal of containing the Greek left. . . . "It is necessary only to glance at a map," Truman declared [in his March 12, 1947, speech announcing the Truman Doctrine], to see that if Greece should fall to the rebels, "confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East. . . ." Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr . . . protested that "this fascist government through which we have to work is incidental. . . ."

[K]ey American officials, particularly in the U.S. embassy, agreed with the Greek authorities on the necessity of harsh measures. . . . American officials initially provided undeviating support for political executions. . . . Although "some of those persons imprisoned and sentenced to death after the December 1944 rebellion may not have been at that time hardened Communists, it is unlikely that they have been able to resist the influence of Communist indoctrination organizations existing within most prisons," [said the U.S. chargé d'affaires in Athens, Karl Rankin]. . . . In May [1947], the British ambassador reported that members of the U.S. embassy had been discussing "the necessity" of outlawing the K.K.E. [the Greek Communist Party]. . . . That December, with the rebellion in full sway, the Athens government passed a law formally dissolving the K.K.E., E.A.M., and all groups associated with them; seizing their assets; and making the expression of revolutionary ideas a crime subject to imprisonment. From the standpoint of American officials, this was a struggle to the death.

The study concludes that during the Greek civil war, "an estimated 158,000 of Greece's 7.5 million people [were] killed"; 800,000 were made refugees; and untold others were wounded or imprisoned (p. 283).

U.S. leaders' disregard for Greek self-determination and democracy continued long after the war, evidenced for example by the following incident (p. 303):

In 1964, when [Greek Prime Minister] George Papandreou met with Lyndon Johnson in Washington, the atmosphere could hardly have been chillier. To make possible the establishment of N.A.T.O. bases on Cyprus, now independent and nonaligned, the President demanded the adoption of the "Acheson plan," which entailed the partition of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey. Moreover, he threatened to withdraw N.A.T.O. aid if Greece did not accept the plan. When Papandreou responded that, "in that case, Greece might have to rethink the advisability of belonging to N.A.T.O.," Johnson retorted that "maybe Greece should rethink the value of a parliament which could not take the right decision." Later, the Greek ambassador remonstrated that "no Greek parliament could accept such a plan," only to have the American President explode: "Fuck your parliament and your constitution. America is an elephant, Cyprus is a flea. Greece is a flea. If these two fellows continue itching the elephant, they may just get whacked by the elephant's trunk, whacked good. . . . If your Prime

Minister gives me talk about democracy, parliament and constitution, he, his parliament and his constitution may not last very long."

See also, Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945*, New York: Pantheon, 1968 (updated edition 1990), ch. 8 and pp. 428-436; Gabriel Kolko and Joyce Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954*, New York: Harper & Row, 1972, chs. 8 and 15; William Blum, *Killing Hope: U.S. Military and C.I.A. Interventions Since World War II*, Monroe, ME: Common Courage, 1995, ch. 3. And see footnote 65 of this chapter.

73. On the destruction of the anti-fascist resistance in Korea, see chapter 8 of *U.P.* and its footnote 67.

74. On U.S. support for far-right elements and economic subversion in post-war Italy, see footnotes 66, 67, 68 and 79 of this chapter.

75. For N.S.C. 1 and further discussion, see National Security Council Memorandum 1/3, "Position of the United States With Respect to Italy in the Light of the Possibility of Communist Participation in the Government by Legal Means," and State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee [S.A.N.A.C.C.] Memorandum 390/1, "Provision of U.S. Equipment to the Italian Armed Forces," March 8 and January 16, 1948, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948*, Vol. III ("Western Europe"), Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974, pp. 775-779, 757-762. N.S.C. 1, not all of which is declassified, provided (p. 779):

In the event the Communists obtain domination of the Italian government by legal means, the United States should:

(a.) Immediately take steps to accomplish a limited mobilization, including any necessary compulsory measures, and announce this action as a clear indication of United States determination to oppose Communist aggression and to protect our national security.

(b.) Further strengthen its military position in the Mediterranean.

(c.) Initiate combined military staff position in the Mediterranean.

(d.) Provide the anti-Communist Italian underground with financial and military assistance.

(e.) Oppose Italian membership in the United Nations.

76. On Kennan's view that the U.S. should intervene militarily in Italy to prevent its election, see for example, George Kennan, "The Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Secretary of State," March 15, 1948, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948*, Vol. III ("Western Europe"), Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974. An excerpt (p. 849):

I question whether it would not be preferable for Italian Government to outlaw Communist Party and take strong action against it before elections. Communists would presumably reply with civil war, which would give us grounds for reoccupation [of] Foggia fields or any other facilities we might wish. That would admittedly result in much violence and probably a military division of Italy; but we are getting close to the deadline and I think it might well be preferable to a bloodless election victory, unopposed by ourselves, which would give the Communists the entire peninsula at one coup and send waves of panic to all surrounding areas.

See also, James E. Miller, "Taking Off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 7, No. 1, Winter 1983, pp. 35-55 at p. 51.

77. For the Pike Committee Report, see *C.I.A.: The Pike Report*, Nottingham, U.K.: Spokesman Books, 1977, especially pp. 193-195, 203-211; or Special Supplements, *Village Voice*, February 16 and 23, 1976 (reprinting leaked copies of the first two Parts of the Pike Committee Report, which had been suppressed by the U.S. House of Representatives on January 29, 1976). The Report notes that C.I.A. interference in Italian politics included a subsidy of more than \$65 million given to approved political parties and affiliations, from 1948 through the early 1970s. See also footnotes 67 and 68 of this chapter.

78. For some of the scholarship on post-war U.S. subversion in Italy, see footnotes 66, 67 and 71 of this chapter.

Edward Herman's and Frank Brodhead's book -- mentioned in the text -- exposes the fraudulent "Bulgarian Connection" theory, supported by the Western media and instigated by the C.I.A., which held that the right-wing Turkish terrorist Mehmet Ali Agca, who attempted to assassinate the Pope in Italy in 1981, was a Bulgarian and K.G.B. agent. See Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, *The Rise and Fall of the Bulgarian Connection*, New York: Sheridan Square, 1986.

79. On the post-war reconstruction of the Mafia by the U.S. as part of its campaign to destroy the European labor movement, see for example, Alfred W. McCoy, *The Politics Of Heroin: C.I.A. Complicity In The Global Drug Trade*, Brooklyn: Lawrence Hill, 1991, chs. 1 and 2 (updated edition of the classic work on U.S. government involvement in drug-running, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*, New York: Harper and Row, 1972). An excerpt (pp. 25, 36-38):

In Sicily the O.S.S. [the Office of Strategic Services, the forerunner of the C.I.A.], through the Office of Naval Intelligence, initially allied with the Mafia to assist the Allied forces in their 1943 invasion. Later, the alliance was maintained to check the growing strength of the Italian Communist party on the island. . . . As Allied forces crawled north through the Italian mainland, American intelligence officers became increasingly upset about the leftward drift of Italian politics. Between late 1943 and mid-1944, the Italian Communist party's membership had doubled, and in the German-occupied northern half of the country an extremely radical resistance movement was gathering strength. . . . Rather than being heartened by the underground's growing strength, the U.S. army became increasingly concerned about its radical politics and began to cut back its arms drops to the resistance in mid-1944. . . .

As Italy veered to the left in 1943-1944, the American military became alarmed about its future position in Italy, and O.S.S. felt that [Sicily's] naval bases and strategic location in the Mediterranean might provide a future counterbalance to a Communist mainland. . . . Don Calogero [an Italian mobster] rendered . . . services to the anti-Communist effort by breaking up leftist political rallies. On September 16, 1944, for example, the Communist leader Girolama Li Causi held a rally in Villalba that ended abruptly in a hail of gunfire as Don Calogero's men fired into the crowd and wounded nineteen spectators. . . . The Allied occupation and the subsequent slow restoration of democracy reinstated the Mafia with its full powers, put it once

more on the way to becoming a political force, and returned to the Onorata Societa the weapons which Fascism had snatched from it. . . ."

In 1946 American military intelligence made one final gift to the Mafia -- they released [American mobster] Lucky Luciano from prison and deported him to Italy, thereby freeing one of the criminal talents of his generation to rebuild the heroin trade. . . . Within two years after Luciano's return to Italy, the U.S. government deported more than one hundred more mafiosi as well. And with the cooperation of his old friend Don Calogero and the help of many of his former followers from New York, Luciano was able to build an awesome international narcotics syndicate soon after his arrival in Italy.

The study also describes how the U.S. government helped to reestablish the Corsican Mafia in France when the C.I.A. employed the Corsican syndicates to forcibly break Marseille's powerful Communist labor unions during dock strikes in 1947 and 1950. These actions "put the Corsicans in a powerful enough position to establish Marseille as the postwar heroin capital of the Western world" between 1948 and 1972 (pp. 44-61).

See also, Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair, *Whiteout: The C.I.A., Drugs and the Press*, London: Verso, 1998, ch. 5; Henrik Krüger, *The Great Heroin Coup: Drugs, Intelligence, & International Fascism*, Boston: South End, 1980 (on the probable involvement of the C.I.A., Mafiosi, certain Southeast Asians and elements of the Nixon White House in the sudden shift of the U.S. heroin supply route from Marseilles to Southeast Asia and Mexico in the early 1970s). On the involvement of the U.S. labor leadership in these actions, see footnote 71 of this chapter.

Chomsky explains the reason for the C.I.A.'s ongoing involvement with the drug racket since World War II (*Deterring Democracy*, New York: Hill and Wang, 1991, p. 119):

There are good reasons why the C.I.A. and drugs are so closely linked. Clandestine terror requires hidden funds, and the criminal elements to whom the intelligence agencies naturally turn expect a quid pro quo. Drugs are the obvious answer. . . . One prime target for an authentic "Drug War" would therefore be close at hand.

For other studies of U.S. government complicity in the global drug-trade (the major source is McCoy's book, cited above), see for example, Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair, *Whiteout: The C.I.A., Drugs and the Press*, London: Verso, 1998 (tracing the entire history from France and Sicily, to Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, and Latin America, with extensive references to more detailed sources); Leslie Cockburn, *Out of Control: The Story of the Reagan Administration's Secret War in Nicaragua, the Illegal Arms Pipeline, and the Contra Drug Connection*, New York: Atlantic Monthly, 1987 (on the complicity of the Reagan-Bush administrations in the drug rackets in Central America in the 1980s as part of their support for contra operations in Nicaragua); Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan Marshall, *Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies, and the C.I.A. in Central America*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991 (updated edition 1998); Gary Webb, *Dark Alliance: The C.I.A., the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion*, New York: Seven Stories, 1998; Jonathan Kwitny, *The Crimes of Patriots: A True Tale of Dope, Dirty Money, and the C.I.A.*, New York: Norton, 1987, especially chs. 3 and 26. See also, Ahmed Rashid, "Gang Warfare: mujahideen forces on verge of collapse," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 14, 1989, pp. 23-24 (on the heroin trade by the U.S.-funded *mujahedin* in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation, with 750 tons of opium produced in Afghanistan in 1989). And see footnote 50 of this chapter (on U.S.

support for the heroin trade in Afghanistan); the text of chapter 1 of *U.P.*; and the text of chapter 10 of *U.P.*

After years of denial, the C.I.A. conceded in October 1998 that it had concealed from Congress and other government agencies its knowledge that contra groups in Nicaragua in the 1980s had from the beginning decided to smuggle drugs into the U.S. to support their operations. The *New York Times* -- which for years had angrily attacked those who charged C.I.A. complicity in contra drug-smuggling -- reported this important revelation on the Saturday of a three-day holiday, on an inside page. See James Risen, "C.I.A. Said to Ignore Charges of Contra Drug Dealing in '80s," *New York Times*, October 10, 1998, p. A7. Furthermore, Risen's article omitted reference to the crucial fact that, as C.I.A. Inspector General Fred Hitz acknowledged to Congress, the C.I.A. knew of the contra-drug links and received a waiver from Reagan's Attorney General in 1982 that allowed it to keep this knowledge secret -- an omission which sustained the pretense that the C.I.A. was simply acting as a "rogue" agency, rather than the obedient executor of the will of the White House. This fact was reported elsewhere, but not in the *New York Times*. See for example, Walter Pincus, "Inspector: C.I.A. Kept Ties With Alleged Traffickers," *Washington Post*, March 17, 1998, p. A12 ("The inspector general also said that under an agreement in 1982 between then-Attorney General William French Smith and the C.I.A., agency officers were not required to report allegations of drug trafficking involving non-employees, which was defined as meaning paid and non-paid assets [i.e. agents], pilots who ferried supplies to the contras, as well as contra officials and others"). Moreover, the edition of the *New York Times* that was sold in New York City omitted six important paragraphs of Risen's article which appeared in editions of the paper that were sold elsewhere, and these paragraphs also were omitted from the version that appears on the Nexis computer database.

The C.I.A. Inspector General's report is available on the Internet at www.odci.gov/cia/publications/cocaine2 (note that the report does not try to reach definitive conclusions about whether contra-drug allegations were correct -- it deals primarily with the C.I.A.'s response to information it received that the contras were involved in drug-running).

80. On the protection and employment of Nazi war criminals by the U.S. and British governments and the Vatican, see for example, Christopher Simpson, *Blowback: America's Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War*, New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988 (on Rauff, the inventor and administrator of the gas truck execution program which murdered approximately 250,000 people in unspeakable filth and agony, see pp. 92-94; on Gehlen, Hitler's most senior intelligence officer on the brutal Eastern Front, see pp. 40-72, 248-263, 279-283; on Barbie, the Gestapo's "Butcher of Lyons," see pp. 185-195; on the Vatican's role, see pp. 175-198). An excerpt from the book's introduction (pp. xii-xiv):

In a nutshell, the Justice Department's study [in 1983] acknowledged that a U.S. intelligence agency known as the Army Counterintelligence Corps (C.I.C.) had recruited Schutzstaffel (S.S.) and Gestapo officer Klaus Barbie for espionage work in early 1947; that the C.I.C. had hidden him from French war crimes investigators; and that it had then spirited him out of Europe through a clandestine "ratline" -- escape route -- run by a priest who was himself a fugitive from war crimes charges. . . . Since the Barbie case broke open, however, there has been a chain of new discoveries of Nazis and S.S. men protected by and, in some cases, brought to the

United States by U.S. intelligence agencies. One, for example, was S.S. officer Otto von Bolschwing, who once instigated a bloody pogrom in Bucharest and served as a senior aide to Adolf Eichmann. According to von Bolschwing's own statement in a secret interview with U.S. Air Force investigators, in 1945 he volunteered his services to the Army C.I.C., which used him for interrogation and recruitment of other former Nazi intelligence officers. Later he was transferred to the C.I.A., which employed him as a contract agent inside the Gehlen Organization, a group of German intelligence officers that was being financed by the agency for covert operations and intelligence gathering inside Soviet-held territory. The C.I.A. brought the S.S. man to the United States in 1954.

Following the revelation of the von Bolschwing affair, new evidence turned up concerning U.S. recruitment of still other former S.S. men, Nazis, and collaborators. According to army records obtained through the Freedom of Information Act (F.O.I.A.), S.S. Obersturmführer Robert Verbelen admitted that he had once been sentenced to death in absentia for war crimes, including the torture of two U.S. Air Force pilots. And, he said, he had long served in Vienna as a contract spy for the U.S. Army, which was aware of his background. Other new information has been uncovered concerning Dr. Kurt Blome, who admitted in 1945 that he had been a leader of Nazi biological warfare research, a program known to have included experimentation on prisoners in concentration camps. Blome, however, was acquitted of crimes against humanity at a trial in 1947 and hired a few years later by the U.S. Army Chemical Corps to conduct a new round of biological weapons research. Then there is the business of Blome's colleague Dr. Arthur Rudolph, who was accused in sworn testimony at Nuremberg of committing atrocities at the Nazis' underground rocket works near Nordhausen but was later given U.S. citizenship and a major role in the U.S. missile program in spite of that record. Each of these instances -- and there were others as well -- casts substantial doubt on the Justice Department's assertion that what happened to Barbie was an "exception. . . ." The fact is, U.S. intelligence agencies did know -- or had good reason to suspect -- that many contract agents that they hired during the cold war had committed crimes against humanity on behalf of the Nazis.

For other studies discussing the U.S. operations to protect and employ Nazi war criminals, see for example, Mary Ellen Reese, *General Reinhard Gehlen: the C.I.A. Connection*, Fairfax, VA: George Mason University Press, 1990; Erhard Dubringhaus, *Klaus Barbie: The Shocking Story Of How The U.S. Used This Nazi War Criminal As An Intelligence Agent -- A First Hand Account*, Washington: Acropolis, 1984; John Loftus, *The Belarus Secret*, New York: Knopf, 1982, ch. 5; Tom Bower, *Klaus Barbie: The "Butcher of Lyons"*, New York: Pantheon, 1984; Magnus Linklater, Isabel Hinton and Neal Ascherson, *The Nazi Legacy: Klaus Barbie and the Rise of International Fascism*, New York: Holt, Rinehart, 1984; Kai Hermann, "A Killer's Career," *Stern* (Germany), May 10 and following, 1984 (six-part series based upon declassified U.S. government documents and interviews conducted in Bolivia); Tom Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy: The Hunt for the Nazi Scientists*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1987; Linda Hunt, *Secret Agenda: The United States Government, Nazi Scientists, and Project Paperclip, 1945-1990*, New York: St. Martin's, 1991; John Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations: Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990; E.H. Cookridge, *Gehlen: Spy of the Century*, New York: Random House, 1971; Charles Higham, *Trading With the Enemy: An Exposé of the Nazi-American Money Plot*, New York: Delacorte, 1983; Ladislav Farago, *Aftermath: Martin*

Bormann and the Fourth Reich, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974; Christopher Simpson, *The Splendid Blond Beast: Money, Law, and Genocide in the Twentieth Century*, Monroe, ME: Common Courage, 1995, pp. 236-239 (on the protection of Walter Rauff); Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair, *Whiteout: The C.I.A., Drugs and the Press*, London: Verso, 1998, chs. 6 and 7.

See also, Eugene J. Kolb [former U.S. counterintelligence corps officer and Chief of Operations in the Augsburg region of Germany], "Army Counterintelligence's Dealings With Klaus Barbie," Letter, *New York Times*, July 26, 1983, p. A20 (defending the employment of Barbie on the ground that "To our knowledge, his activities had been directed against the underground French Communist Party and Resistance, just as we in the postwar era were concerned with the German Communist Party and activities inimical to American policies in Germany"). And see Michael McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counter-insurgency and Counter-terrorism, 1940-1990*, New York: Pantheon, 1992, especially ch. 3 (important study of U.S. intelligence's absorption after World War II of Nazi methods and practitioners into U.S. special warfare doctrine).

81. On aid organizations' successes at the time of the U.S. intervention in Somalia, see for example, Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omaar, "Doing Harm by Doing Good?: The International Relief Effort in Somalia," *Current History*, May 1993, pp. 198-202. An excerpt (p. 199):

It was abundantly clear at the time [of the U.S. intervention] that the famine was almost over when the troops pushed inland from Mogadishu. One of the force's unexpected problems was counseling soldiers bewildered by the absence of masses of starving people. By the time he was forced to resign as special U.N. envoy in late October after publicly criticizing the U.N. for its slow response to the crisis, Mohamed Sahnoun was already recommending a halt to massive food imports. Excellent rainfall meant that a good harvest was expected for January. Rain and the tenacity of Somali farmers ended the famine, not foreign intervention.

Somalia Operation Restore Hope: A Preliminary Assessment, London: African Rights, May 1993, pp. 2-5 (whereas the U.S./U.N. intervention was justified by the claim that 70 to 80 percent of food aid was being lost to criminal elements, the International Committee of the Red Cross estimated aid losses at only 20 percent; other relief agencies concurred, and described this level of aid loss as "pretty good" in comparison with other relief operations).

82. On U.S. support for Siad Barre during the years before the Somalia intervention, see for example, Catherine Besteman, *Unraveling Somalia: Race, Violence, and the Legacy of Slavery*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999. An excerpt (pp. 15, 17):

In order to maintain military bases in Somalia that could monitor affairs in the [Persian] Gulf, the United States government provided \$163.5 million in military technology and four times that much in economic aid during 1980-88. By the late 1980s, Somalia was receiving 20 percent of U.S. aid to Africa. . . . The value of arms alone imported by Somalia [from the West] during the two decades of Barre's rule totaled nearly two billion dollars. . . . By the early 1980s, the Somali state was one of the most militarized in Africa. . . .

[In the late 1980s] the government killed tens of thousands of its own people; almost half a million northern Somalis fled from Barre's repression into Ethiopia, and over half a million were displaced within the north. By the final years of the 1980s when the Somali state began to wage open war against its own citizens, its international patrons could no longer ignore the fact that foreign aid supported Somalia's extreme militarization and state repression.

83. On U.S. officials' frank acknowledgments of the Somalia intervention as a Pentagon P.R. operation, see for example, John Lancaster, "For Marine Corps, Somalia Operation Offers New Esprit; Mission Could Generate 'Good News' As Service Confronts Shrinking Budgets," *Washington Post*, December 6, 1992, p. A34. An excerpt:

With a Marine amphibious strike force of 1,800 men forming the vanguard of the planned U.S.-led military relief effort in Somalia, the smallest of the nation's military services is suffused both with anxiety and a sense that a successful mission could yield a public relations bonanza at just the right time. It is a sense that is shared by all the services, as they seek to showcase their capabilities and usefulness at a time when Congress is under intense pressure to produce post-Cold War defense savings.

"I'd be lying if I said that never occurred to us," said Brig. Gen. Thomas V. Draude, chief of public affairs for the Marine Corps. "Here's what looks like a good news story. American service personnel are helping to solve an absolutely horrible situation, and these are things the American people should be aware of." Along the same lines, Army Gen. Colin L. Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during a Thursday briefing on the Somalia operation delivered what he termed a "paid political advertisement" on behalf of the administration's planned "base force" of 1.6 million uniformed personnel.

See also, Editorial, "It's More Than A Show," *Guardian Weekly* (U.K.), December 20, 1992, p. 18. An excerpt:

It is too easy to make a joke or draw too sweeping a conclusion about the antic aspect of what happened when the U.S. Navy Seals and Marines went ashore in Mogadishu last week. There they were in camouflage paint and combat gear, only to be greeted -- and, it is said, temporarily blinded, not to say confounded and embarrassed -- not by armed resistance but by the glare of T.V. lights and a swarming civilian press corps already arrived.

84. On the Catholic population of Northern Ireland initially welcoming the British forces in 1969, see for example, John O'Beirne Ranelagh, *A Short History of Ireland*, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2nd Edition, 1994, pp. 268-269.

85. On military casualties of the U.S. intervention in Somalia, see for example, Alex de Waal, "U.S. War Crimes in Somalia," *New Left Review*, No. 230, July/August 1998, pp. 131-144. An excerpt (p. 143):

There were times when [U.S. troops] shot at everything that moved, took hostages, gunned their way through crowds of men and women, finished off any wounded who were showing signs of life. Many people died in their homes, their tin roofs ripped to shreds by high-velocity bullets and rockets. Accounts of the fighting frequently contain such statements as this: "One moment there was a crowd, and the next instant it was just a bleeding heap of dead and injured." Even with a degree of

restraint on the part of the gunners, the technology deployed by the U.S. Army was such that carnage was inevitable.

One thing that the U.S. and U.N. never appreciated was that, as they escalated the level of murder and mayhem, they increased the determination of Somalis to resist and fight back. By the time of the 3 October battle, literally every inhabitant of large areas of Mogadishu considered the U.N. and U.S. as enemies, and were ready to take up arms against them. People who ten months before had welcomed the U.S. Marines with open arms were now ready to risk death to drive them out.

Eric Schmitt, "Somali War Casualties May Be 10,000," *New York Times*, December 8, 1993, p. A14 (reporting U.S. government estimates of "6,000 to 10,000 Somali casualties in four months last summer" alone -- with "two-thirds" of these being women and children -- as compared to 26 American soldiers killed); *Somalia: Human Rights Abuses By The United Nations Forces*, London: African Rights, July 1993, pp. 2-34 (reporting atrocities by U.S. and U.N. troops, including attacking a hospital, bombarding political meetings, and shooting into crowds of demonstrators).

86. On Sahnoun's plan and his firing, see for example, Chris Giannou, "Reaping the Whirlwind: Somalia After the Cold War," in Phyllis Bennis and Michel Moushabeck, eds., *Altered States: A Reader in the New World Order*, New York: Olive Branch, 1993, pp. 350-361 at pp. 357-358. See also footnote 81 of this chapter.

87. On the requirement of international law that diplomatic means to avoid war must be pursued, see for example, United Nations Charter, Article 33, reprinted in Ramsey Clark, *The Fire This Time: U.S. War Crimes in the Gulf*, New York: Thunder's Mouth, 1992, Appendix XI, pp. 290-291.

88. Iraq's pre-war diplomatic overtures, all summarily rejected by the U.S. government and essentially ignored by the U.S. media, included the following:

(1) On August 12, 1990, Saddam Hussein proposed a settlement linking Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait to withdrawal from other illegally occupied Arab lands: Syria from Lebanon, and Israel from the territories it conquered in 1967. See for example, Editorial, "The issue is still Kuwait," *Financial Times* (London), August 13, 1990, p. 12 (Iraq's proposal "may yet serve some useful purpose" in offering "a path away from disaster . . . through negotiation"; the "immediate issue" is for "Iraq to get out of Kuwait," but however unsatisfactory Iraq's proposal may be as it stands, "The onus is now on everyone involved, including Middle Eastern and western powers, to seize the initiative and harness diplomacy to the show of political, military and economic force now on display in the Gulf"). In the United States, the Iraqi proposal was dismissed with utter derision: television news that day featured George Bush racing his power boat, jogging furiously, playing tennis and golf, and otherwise expending his formidable energies on important pursuits; the proposal merited only one dismissive sentence in a news story on the blockade of Iraq in the next day's *New York Times*, and excerpts from the proposal appeared without comment on an inside page. See Michael Gordon, "Bush Orders Navy to Halt All Shipments of Iraq's Oil and Almost All Its Imports," *New York Times*, August 13, 1990, p. A1; A.P., "Confrontation in the Gulf -- Proposals by Iraqi President: Excerpts From His Address," *New York Times*, August 13, 1990, p. A8.

(2) On August 19, 1990, Saddam Hussein proposed that the matter of Kuwait be left an "Arab issue," to be dealt with by the Arab states alone, without external interference,

in the manner of the Syrian occupation of Lebanon and Morocco's attempt to take over Western Sahara. See for example, John Kifner, "Proposal by Iraq's President Demanding U.S. Withdrawal," *New York Times*, August 20, 1990, p. A6 (with accompanying text of the Iraqi proposal). Chomsky comments (*Deterring Democracy*, New York: Hill and Wang, 1991, p. 191):

The proposal was dismissed on the reasonable grounds that, in this arena, Hussein could hope to gain his ends by the threat and use of force. One relevant fact was overlooked: the Iraqi dictator was again stealing a leaf from Washington's book. The traditional U.S. position with regard to the Western Hemisphere is that "outsiders" have no right to intrude. If the U.S. intervenes in Latin America or the Caribbean, it is a hemispheric issue, to be resolved here, without external interference [i.e. the "Monroe Doctrine"].

(3) On August 23, 1990, a former high-ranking U.S. official delivered another Iraqi proposal to National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft; this proposal, confirmed by the emissary who relayed it and by memoranda, finally was made public in an article by Knut Royce in the suburban New York newspaper *Newsday* on August 29, 1990. According to sources involved and documents, Iraq offered to withdraw from Kuwait and allow foreigners to leave in return for the lifting of sanctions, guaranteed access to the Persian Gulf, and full control of the Rumailah oilfield "that extends slightly into Kuwaiti territory from Iraq" (Royce), about two miles over a disputed border. Other terms of the proposal, according to memoranda that Royce quotes, were that Iraq and the U.S. negotiate an oil agreement "satisfactory to both nations' national security interests," "jointly work on the stability of the gulf," and develop a joint plan "to alleviate Iraq's economical and financial problems." There was no mention of U.S. withdrawal from Saudi Arabia, or other preconditions. A Bush administration official who specializes in Mideast affairs described the proposal as "serious" and "negotiable." See Knut Royce, "Secret Offer: Iraq Sent Pullout Deal to U.S.," *Newsday*, August 29, 1990, p. 3. The *New York Times* noted the *Newsday* report briefly on the continuation page of an article on another topic, citing government spokespersons who dismissed it as "baloney." However, after framing the matter properly, the *Times* conceded that the story was accurate, quoting White House sources who said the proposal "had not been taken seriously because Mr. Bush demands the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait." The *Times* also noted quietly that "a well-connected Middle Eastern diplomat told the *New York Times* a week ago [that is, on August 23rd] of a similar offer, but it, too, was dismissed by the Administration." See R.W. Apple, Jr., "Confrontation in the Gulf: Opec to Increase Oil Output to Offset Losses From Iraq; No U.S. Hostages Released," *New York Times*, August 30, 1990, p. A1. See also, Knut Royce, "U.S.: Iraqi Proposal Not Worth a Response," *Newsday*, August 30, 1990, p. 6. An excerpt:

The administration has acknowledged *Newsday* reports that possible peace feelers were received from Iraqi officials offering to withdraw from Kuwait in return for the lifting of economic sanctions and other concessions, but they were dismissed as not serious. Asked why they were not pursued to test whether they were serious, the senior official said, "I don't know."

(4) On December 4, 1990, the business pages of the *New York Times* and *Wall Street Journal* reported a "near-panic of stock buying late in the day," after a British television report of an Iraqi proposal to withdraw from Kuwait, apart from the disputed Rumailah oilfields which extend two miles into Kuwait, with no other conditions except Kuwaiti agreement to discuss a lease of the two Gulf islands after the withdrawal. See

Howard Hoffman, "Late Rumor of Iraqi Peace Offer Pulls Prices Higher in Buying Binge," *Wall Street Journal*, December 5, 1990, p. C2; A.P., "Price of Crude Oil Seesaws, Then Settles Higher at \$29.15," *New York Times*, December 4, 1990, p. D2. The news-wires carried this story, but not the news sections of the major U.S. newspapers. See for example, Lisa Genasci, "Baghdad Offers to Free Soviets, Kuwait Deal Could Be in Works," A.P., December 4, 1990 (Westlaw database # 1990 WL 6034433). News reports in the U.S. did, however, express uneasiness that proposed discussions with Iraq "might encourage some European partners to launch unhelpful peace feelers." See for example, Gerald Seib, "Baker Mission Is a Risky Move for Bush; Aides Fear Gambit May Damage Coalition," *Wall Street Journal*, December 3, 1990, p. A16.

(5) In late December 1990, Iraq made another proposal, disclosed by U.S. officials on January 2, 1991: an offer "to withdraw from Kuwait if the United States pledges not to attack as soldiers are pulled out, if foreign troops leave the region, and if there is an agreement on the Palestinian problem and on the banning of all weapons of mass destruction in the region." Officials described the offer as "interesting," because it dropped the border issues and "signals Iraqi interest in a negotiated settlement." A State Department Mideast expert described the proposal as a "serious prenegotiation position." The *Newsday* report notes that the U.S. "immediately dismissed the proposal." See Knut Royce, "Iraq Offers Deal to Quit Kuwait," *Newsday*, January 3, 1991, p. 5 (city edition, p. 4). This offer passed without mention in the national press, and was barely noted elsewhere. The *New York Times* did, however, report on the same day that P.L.O. leader Yasser Arafat, after consultations with Saddam Hussein, indicated that neither of them "insisted that the Palestinian problem be solved before Iraqi troops get out of Kuwait"; according to Arafat, "Mr. Hussein's statement Aug. 12, linking an Iraqi withdrawal to an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, was no longer operative as a negotiating demand," all that was necessary was "a strong link to be guaranteed by the five permanent members of the Security Council that we have to solve all the problems in the Gulf, in the Middle East and especially the Palestinian cause." See Patrick Tyler, "Arafat Eases Stand on Kuwait-Palestine Link," *New York Times*, January 3, 1991, p. A8. Chomsky underscores the point (*Detering Democracy*, New York: Hill and Wang, 1991, pp. 206-207):

Two weeks before the deadline for Iraqi withdrawal, then, it seemed that war might be avoided on these terms: Iraq would withdraw completely from Kuwait with a U.S. pledge not to attack withdrawing forces; foreign troops leave the region; the Security Council indicates a serious commitment to settle other major regional problems. Disputed border issues would be left for later consideration. The possibility was flatly rejected by Washington, and scarcely entered the media or public awareness. The U.S. and Britain maintained their commitment to force alone.

(6) On January 14, 1991, France also made a last-minute effort to avoid war by proposing that the U.N. Security Council call for "a rapid and massive withdrawal" from Kuwait along with a statement to Iraq that Council members would bring their "active contribution" to a settlement of other problems of the region, "in particular, of the Arab-Israeli conflict and in particular to the Palestinian problem by convening, at an appropriate moment, an international conference" to assure "the security, stability and development of this region of the world." The French proposal was supported by Belgium (at the moment one of the rotating Security Council members), and Germany, Spain, Italy, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and several non-aligned nations. The U.S. and

Britain rejected it (along with the Soviet Union, irrelevantly). American U.N. Ambassador Thomas Pickering stated that the French proposal was unacceptable, because it went beyond previous U.N. Security Council resolutions on the Iraqi invasion. See Paul Lewis, "Confrontation in the Gulf: The U.N.; France and 3 Arab States Issue an Appeal to Hussein," *New York Times*, January 15, 1991, p. A12; Michael Kranish et al., "World waits on brink of war: Late effort at diplomacy in gulf fails," *Boston Globe*, January 16, 1991, p. 1; Ellen Nimmons, A.P., "Last-ditch pitches for peace; But U.S. claims Iraqis hold key," *Houston Chronicle*, January 15, 1991, p. 1.

Citing the examples of U.S. policies towards South Africa in Namibia and Israel in Lebanon, Chomsky remarks about the United States's summary rejection of the Iraqi withdrawal proposals (*Deterring Democracy*, New York: Hill and Wang, 1991, p. 209):

It is entirely reasonable to take the position that Iraq should have withdrawn from Kuwait forthwith, unconditionally, with no "linkage" to anything, and that it should pay reparations and even be subjected to war crimes trials; that is a tenable position for people who uphold the principles that yield these conclusions. But as a point of logic, principles cannot be selectively upheld.

89. For the *New York Times* correspondent's statement, see Thomas Friedman, "Confrontation in the Gulf: Behind Bush's Hard Line," *New York Times*, August 22, 1990, p. A1. An excerpt:

The Administration's rapid rejection of the Iraqi proposal for opening a diplomatic track grows out of Washington's concern that should it become involved in negotiations about the terms of an Iraqi withdrawal, America's Arab allies might feel under pressure to give the Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, a few token gains in Kuwait to roll back his invasion and defuse the crisis.

90. For the Bush administration officials' statements that Iraqi proposals were "serious" and "negotiable," see Knut Royce, "Secret Offer: Iraq Sent Pullout Deal to U.S.," *Newsday*, August 29, 1990, p. 3; Knut Royce, "Iraq Offers Deal to Quit Kuwait," *Newsday*, January 3, 1991, p. 5 (city edition, p. 4).

91. For the *Newsday* article, see section (3) of footnote 88 of this chapter. For the *New York Times*'s dismissal, see R.W. Apple, Jr., "Confrontation in the Gulf: Opec to Increase Oil Output to Offset Losses From Iraq; No U.S. Hostages Released," *New York Times*, August 30, 1990, p. A1. The reference to the *Newsday* story came near the end of the article (note that in the second paragraph quoted here, the *Times* acknowledges that it had information about a peace offer one week earlier):

Miss Tutwiler vigorously denied, and a ranking State Department official dismissed as "baloney," a report published in *Newsday* today that a former high-ranking United States official recently delivered a secret peace offer from Iraq to Brent Scowcroft, the President's national security adviser. The offer reportedly stipulated that Iraq would release all hostages and pull out of Kuwait if United Nations sanctions were lifted, Iraq were guaranteed access to the Persian Gulf and sole control of an oilfield that straddles the Iraq-Kuwaiti border was given to Baghdad.

Two White House officials said such a message, which they described as a feeler, had in fact been delivered. But both said it had not been taken seriously because Mr. Bush demands the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait. A well-connected Middle Eastern diplomat told *The New York Times* a week ago of a similar offer, but it, too, was dismissed by the Administration. It involved a long-term Iraqi

lease on a Kuwaiti island at the mouth of the Shatt al Arab waterway and sizable payments to Iraq by other Arab countries. "We're aware of many initiatives that are being undertaken by various bodies," said Roman Popadiuk, the deputy White House press secretary.

92. On popular opposition to the war in the U.S. before the bombing began, see for example, Douglas Kellner, *The Persian Gulf T.V. War*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992, pp. 250-263; Richard Morin, "Poll: Americans Expect War But Back Peace Conference," *Washington Post*, January 11, 1991, p. A1. An excerpt:

[A]ccording to a new *Washington Post*-A.B.C. News poll . . . two-thirds of those questioned said the administration should be more flexible on the question of an international peace conference on the Middle East and support a meeting on Arab-Israeli issues if Iraqi troops are withdrawn from Kuwait. . . .

Nearly nine of 10 Americans believe war is inevitable, but large majorities also favor continued diplomatic talks up to and even beyond the Tuesday deadline the United Nations Security Council has set for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, the *Post*-A.B.C. poll found. . . . According to the poll, eight out of 10 said the United States should hold additional talks with Iraq before Jan. 15, while 53 percent say the search for a diplomatic solution should continue after the deadline expires. Nearly nine of 10 said they support a meeting between U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar and Iraqi leaders.

American Political Network Inc., "Poll Update -- A.B.C./*Post*: 66% O.K. Linking Arab-Israeli Talks For Pullout," *The Hotline*, January 11, 1991 (available on Nexis database). The highly loaded question in this A.B.C./*Washington Post* poll, which nonetheless resulted in 66 percent of the American population supporting the diplomatic option, asked:

The Bush administration opposes making any concessions to Iraq to get it to withdraw from Kuwait, including an international conference on Arab-Israeli problems. Some people say such a conference would be a concession that would reward Iraqi aggression by linking the Arab-Israeli dispute with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Other people say such an agreement would be worth it if it got Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait without a war. Do you think the U.S. should agree to an Arab-Israeli conference if Iraq agreed to withdraw from Kuwait, or not?

American Political Network Inc., "Poll Update -- C.B.S./*N.Y.T.*: Majority Would O.K. Deal On Arab-Israeli Talks," *The Hotline*, January 15, 1991 (available on Nexis database). The even more loaded question in this C.B.S./*New York Times* poll -- it only mentioned Bush's view, without suggesting any other position -- nevertheless revealed that 59 percent of Americans stated that there should be further talks between Bush and Saddam, 56 percent approved an international conference as a solution to the Gulf Crisis, and 47 versus 37 percent believed that it would be an "acceptable solution" if Kuwait offered a piece of territory to Iraq in exchange for withdrawal. Furthermore, support for a war shifted radically depending on projected numbers of U.S. casualties, with only 37 percent saying that war would be worth it if U.S. casualties climbed into the thousands.

Chomsky adds that, had the actual existence of Iraq's peace proposals and the idea that negotiated withdrawal was possible received reasonable coverage by the U.S. media, the two-to-one popular approval rating for that way of addressing the Gulf Crisis surely would have been higher.

93. On pre-war depictions of Iraq as a mighty military power, see for example, John R. MacArthur, *Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War*, New York: Hill and Wang, 1992. An excerpt (pp. 172-173):

The U.S. government claimed that by mid-September there were 250,000 Iraqi troops in Kuwait poised to invade Saudi Arabia. By early January, the number had allegedly grown to 540,000 in and around Kuwait, all formidably armed and eager to slaughter invading American troops. From Administration press releases one could imagine a sophisticated Iraqi Maginot Line [the elaborate defensive barrier set up along northeast France in the 1930s] on the southern border of Kuwait, backed by the always "elite" or "crack" Republican Guard. Although the precise strength of Iraqi troops in the war zone may never be known, the real number turned out to be far lower. . . . The focus by the government -- and the docile media -- on sheer numbers of Iraqi troops obscured the pathetic quality of the conscripted foot soldiers who made up the better part of the enemy forces. Chuck Akers of the 503 M.P. Company, Third Armored Division, told me that many of the enemy prisoners of war (E.P.W.s) taken in the first day of the ground invasion were ill-equipped, starving, and demoralized -- in short, poor specimens of fighting men. Among their number was an eleven-year-old boy, several soldiers with feet so swollen they had to have their boots cut off, and many who were carrying only blank ammunition.

As with the baby incubator story [i.e. a public relations fabrication in which a young girl, later discovered to be the Kuwaiti Ambassador's daughter, testified to Congress that she had seen the Iraqis kill Kuwaiti babies by taking them out of incubators], there was virtual unanimous acceptance by the media of the allegedly enormous manpower behind Saddam's territorial ambition. Only the *St. Petersburg Times*, a well-respected Florida daily under independent ownership, challenged the government line. In a top-of-front-page story published on Sunday, January 6, Washington bureau reporter Jean Heller reported that satellite photos of the border between southern Kuwait and Saudi Arabia taken on September 11 and 13, 1990, by a Soviet company revealed "no evidence of a massive Iraqi presence in Kuwait in September. . . ." "A number" of American news organizations had bought the same pictures and shown them to various experts, [satellite imagery expert Peter] Zimmerman said, and "all of us agreed that we couldn't see anything in the way of military activity in the pictures." But again cautiousness overcame curiosity among the media.

Reuters, "Bush: No Appeasement," *Los Angeles Times*, August 8, 1990, p. P1 (quoting President Bush's comparison of Saddam Hussein to "Nazi dictator Adolf Hitler before the onset of World War II," and his assertion that Saddam had "massed an enormous war machine on the Saudi border, capable of initiating hostilities with little or no additional preparation" including "surface-to-surface missiles").

For samples of the U.S. media's sudden demonization of Saddam Hussein, see Marjorie Williams, "Monster in the Making: Saddam Hussein -- From Unknown to Arch-Villain in a Matter of Days," *Washington Post*, August 9, 1990, p. D1.

On the long tradition of "exaggeration of American vulnerability" from the nineteenth century through World War II, see John Thompson, "The Exaggeration of American Vulnerability: The Anatomy of a Tradition," *Diplomatic History*, Winter 1992, pp. 23-43.

In reality, the Gulf War was simply a slaughter. For details on the carnage, see footnote 94 of this chapter.

94. On the Gulf Slaughter, see for example, Patrick J. Sloyan, "Buried Alive: U.S. Tanks Used Plows To Kill Thousands In Gulf War Trenches," *Newsday* (New York), September 12, 1991, p. 1. An excerpt:

The U.S. Army division that broke through Saddam Hussein's defensive frontline used plows mounted on tanks and combat earthmovers to bury thousands of Iraqi soldiers -- some still alive and firing their weapons -- in more than 70 miles of trenches, according to U.S. Army officials. . . . The unprecedented tactic has been hidden from public view. . . . Not a single American was killed during the attack that made an Iraqi body count impossible. . . .

Bradley Fighting Vehicles and Vulcan armored carriers straddled the trench lines and fired into the Iraqi soldiers as the tanks covered them with mounds of sand. "I came through right after the lead company," [Col. Anthony] Moreno said. "What you saw was a bunch of buried trenches with peoples' arms and things sticking out of them. . . ." [General Norman] Schwarzkopf's staff has privately estimated that, from air and ground attacks, between 50,000 and 75,000 Iraqis were killed in their trenches. . . . Only one Iraqi tank round was fired at the attackers, Moreno said.

Alexander Cockburn and Ken Silverstein, *Washington Babylon*, London: Verso, 1996. An excerpt (pp. 162-163):

[T]he Iraqi army enjoyed the largest mass desertions in history, with between 125,000 and 175,000 soldiers prudently departing the front before ground combat began. Saddam Hussein had stuffed the front with segregated units of Shi'ite and Kurd troops, so when it became clear that they were merely cannon fodder, most returned to their villages. Some 25,000 troops remained to confront 400,000 Allied soldiers when the ground war began. The U.S.-led force could have walked in with swords.

Ramsey Clark, *The Fire This Time: U.S. War Crimes in the Gulf*, New York: Thunder's Mouth, 1992 (an extensive and chilling review). An excerpt (pp. xvi, 31, 38, 40-42, 47-48, 51, 59, 61, 64, 70):

Before the assault was over U.S. planes flew more than 109,000 sorties, raining 88,000 tons of bombs, the equivalent of seven Hiroshimas. . . . The bulk of the Iraqi troops were draftees, ranging in age from 16 to 42, and with no deep-felt loyalty to the military. The percentage of its armed forces that were well trained and equipped was very low. . . . Iraq lost between 125,000 and 150,000 soldiers. The U.S. has said it lost 148 in combat, and of those, 37 were caused by friendly fire. . . . U.S. planes pounded troops in the Kuwaiti theater of operations and southern Iraq with carpet-bombing, fuel-air explosives, and other illegal weaponry. Iraq never mustered a single significant offensive strike or any effective defensive action. When the ground attack came, the surviving Iraqis were incapable even of self defense. In a news briefing on February 23, the eve of the ground war, General Thomas Kelly said, "There won't be many of them left." He believed most Iraqi troops were dead or had withdrawn. When U.S. tanks and armored vehicles finally did roll, the soldiers reported driving for miles without encountering live Iraqi forces. . . .

No aerial defense of the helpless country was ordered because Iraqi military officials knew that exposing its planes in the air would be suicidal. The Iraqi anti-aircraft display, shown regularly on C.N.N., created the impression that ground-to-air defenses were protecting Baghdad. However, this fire turned out to be essentially useless. . . . [T]he Pentagon reported that despite the 109,876 sorties flown during the entire war, only 38 aircraft were lost -- a rate lower than the normal accident rate in combat training. . . . The aerial assault continued until no targets remained that were worth the ordnance. Pilots reported a shortage of targets for days. . . .

Among the explosives that U.S. planes dropped on troops were napalm bombs, fuel-air explosives (F.A.E.s), and cluster bombs. . . . The *Washington Post* reported on February 18, 1991 that "wounded Iraqi soldiers were dying for lack of treatment amid conditions that recalled the American Civil War." If wounded soldiers were moved out of the lines, treatment was further impaired because U.S. planes bombed at least five Iraqi military hospitals. . . . [T]he following testimony came from Mike Erlich of the Military Counseling Network at the March-April 1991 European Parliament hearings on the Gulf War: "[H]undreds, possibly thousands, of Iraqi soldiers began walking toward the U.S. position unarmed, with their arms raised in an attempt to surrender. However, the orders for this unit were not to take any prisoners. . . . The commander of the unit began the firing by shooting an anti-tank missile through one of the Iraqi soldiers. This is a missile designed to destroy tanks, but it was used against one man. At that point, everybody in the unit began shooting. . . ." As one soldier said, it was like slaughtering animals in a pen. . . . Apache helicopters raked the Republican Guard Hammurabi Division with laser-guided Hellfire missiles. "Say hello to Allah," one American was recorded as saying moments before a Hellfire obliterated one of the 102 vehicles racked up by the Apaches. . . . "Yee-HAH," said one voice. . . .

The surgical strike myth was a cynical way to conceal the truth. The bombing was a deadly, calculated, and deeply immoral strategy to bring Iraq to its knees by destroying the essential facilities and support systems of the entire society. . . . The overall plan was described in the June 23, 1991, *Washington Post*. After interviews with several of the war's top planners and extensive research into how targets were determined, reporter Barton Gellman wrote: "Many of the targets were chosen only secondarily to contribute to the military defeat of [Iraq]. . . . Military planners hoped the bombing would amplify the economic and psychological impact of international sanctions on Iraqi society. . . . They deliberately did great harm to Iraq's ability to support itself as an industrial society. . . ." Compounded by sanctions, the damage to life-support systems in Iraq killed more after the war than direct attacks did during the war. . . .

Probably 1,500 civilians, mostly women and children, were killed when the Amariyah civilian bomb shelter was hit by two bombs in the early morning hours of February 13, 1991. . . . Neighborhood residents heard screams as people tried to get out of the shelter. They screamed for four minutes. Then the second bomb hit, killing almost everybody. The screaming ceased. The U.S. public saw sanitized, heavily edited footage of the bombed shelter. But the *Columbia Journalism Review* reported in its May/June 1991 issue that much more graphic images were shown on news reports in Jordan and Baghdad. . . . The *Review* obtained the footage via unedited C.N.N. feeds and Baghdad's W.T.N., and described it as follows: "This reporter viewed the unedited Baghdad feeds. . . . They showed scenes of incredible carnage. Nearly all the bodies were charred into blackness; in some cases the heat had been so great that entire limbs were burned off. Among the corpses were those of at least six babies and ten children, most of them so severely burned that their gender could not be determined. Rescue workers collapsed in grief."

On the U.S. attack on Iraq's civilian infrastructure, see for example, Eric Rouleau, "The View From France: America's Unyielding Policy toward Iraq," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 1, January/February 1995, pp. 59f. An excerpt (pp. 61-62):

[T]he Iraqi people, who were not consulted about the invasion, have paid the price for their government's madness. . . . Iraqis understood the legitimacy of a military action to drive their army from Kuwait, but they have had difficulty comprehending the Allied

rationale for using air power to systematically destroy or cripple Iraqi infrastructure and industry: electric power stations (92 percent of installed capacity destroyed), refineries (80 percent of production capacity), petrochemical complexes, telecommunications centers (including 135 telephone networks), bridges (more than 100), roads, highways, railroads, hundreds of locomotives and boxcars full of goods, radio and television broadcasting stations, cement plants, and factories producing aluminum, textiles, electric cables, and medical supplies. The losses were estimated by the Arab Monetary Fund to be \$190 billion.

Chomsky remarks (*Deterring Democracy*, New York: Hill and Wang, 1991, p. 410):

[The] first component [of the U.S.-led attack on Iraq on January 16, 1991] targeted the civilian infrastructure, including power, sewage, and water systems; that is, a form of biological warfare, having little relation to driving Iraq from Kuwait -- rather, designed for long-term U.S. political ends. This too is not war, but state terrorism, on a colossal scale.

For the best general account of the Gulf conflict, see Dilip Hiro, *Desert Shield to Desert Storm: the Second Gulf War*, London: HarperCollins, 1992.

95. On the rebel Iraqi generals' rejected pleas, see for example, John Simpson, "Surviving In The Ruins," *Spectator* (U.K.), August 10, 1991, pp. 8-10. An excerpt:

Our programme [*Panorama* on England's B.B.C.-1] has found evidence that several Iraqi generals made contact with the United States to sound out the likely American response if they took the highly dangerous step of planning a coup against Saddam. But now Washington faltered. It had been alarmed by the scale of the uprisings [against Saddam Hussein] in the north and south. For several years the Americans had refused to have any contact with the Iraqi opposition groups, and assumed that revolution would lead to the break-up of Iraq as a unitary state. The Americans believed that the Shi'as wanted to secede to Iran and that the Kurds would want to join up with the Kurdish people of Turkey. No direct answer was returned to the Iraqi generals; but on 5 March, only four days after President Bush had spoken of the need for the Iraqi people to get rid of Saddam Hussein, the White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said, "We don't intend to get involved . . . in Iraq's internal affairs. . . ."

An Iraqi general who escaped to Saudi Arabia in the last days of the uprising in southern Iraq told us that he and his men had repeatedly asked the American forces for weapons, ammunition and food to help them carry on the fight against Saddam's forces. The Americans refused. As they fell back on the town of Nasiriyeh, close to the allied positions, the rebels approached the Americans again and requested access to an Iraqi arms dump behind the American lines at Tel al-Allahem. At first they were told they could pass through the lines. Then the permission was rescinded and, the general told us, the Americans blew up the arms dump. American troops disarmed the rebels.

Jim Drinkard, "Senate Report Says Lack of U.S. Help Derailed Possible Iraq Coup," A.P., May 2, 1991 (Westlaw database # 1991 WL 6184412). An excerpt:

Defections by senior officials in Saddam Hussein's army -- and possibly a coup attempt against Saddam -- were shelved in March because the United States failed to support the effort, according to a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report. . . . [T]he United States "continued to see the opposition in caricature," fearing that the Kurds sought a separate state and the Shi'as wanted an Iranian-style Islamic fundamentalist regime, the report concluded. . . .

"The public snub of Kurdish and other Iraqi opposition leaders was read as a clear indication the United States did not want the popular rebellion to succeed," the document stated. . . . The refusal to meet with the Iraqi opposition was accompanied by "background statements from administration officials that they were looking for a military, not a popular, alternative to Saddam Hussein," the committee staff report said. . . . The United States resisted not only the entreaties of opposition figures, but of Syria and Saudi Arabia, which favored aiding the Iraqi dissidents militarily, the report contended.

A.P., "Senior Iraqis offered to defect, report says," *Boston Globe*, May 3, 1991, p. 8; "Report: U.S. Stymied Defections," *Newsday* (New York), May 3, 1991, p. 15; Tony Horwitz, "Forgotten Rebels: After Heeding Calls To Turn on Saddam, Shiites Feel Betrayed," *Wall Street Journal Europe*, December 31, 1991, p. 1.

For more on the immediate decision by the U.S. to allow Saddam Hussein to massacre the rebelling Shiites and Kurds -- in part using attack helicopters, as expressly permitted by U.S. commanders -- at the conclusion of the Gulf War, see for example, Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf*, Boston: Little Brown, 1995, pp. 446-456 (on Saudi Arabia's rejected plan to assist the Shiites who were trying to overthrow Saddam, see pp. 454-456).

96. For Friedman's article, see Thomas Friedman, "A Rising Sense That Iraq's Hussein Must Go," *New York Times*, July 7, 1991, section 4, p. 1. The full statement:

[T]he fact is that President Bush has been ambivalent about Mr. Hussein's fate since the day the war ended. Mr. Bush inadvertently acknowledged the source of that ambivalence last week when he was asked whether he was disappointed about the lack of democratization in Kuwait. "The war wasn't fought about democracy in Kuwait," Mr. Bush bluntly retorted.

The war was, instead, fought to restore the status quo. And, as every American policymaker knows, before Mr. Hussein invaded Kuwait he was a pillar of the gulf balance of power and status quo preferred by Washington. His iron fist simultaneously held Iraq together, much to the satisfaction of the American allies Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and it prevented Iranian Islamic fundamentalists from sweeping over the eastern Arab world. It was only when the Iraqi dictator decided to use his iron fist to dominate Kuwait and Saudi Arabia that he became a threat. But as soon as Mr. Hussein was forced back into his shell, Washington felt he had become useful again for maintaining the regional balance and preventing Iraq from disintegrating.

That was why Mr. Bush never supported the Kurdish and Shiite rebellions against Mr. Hussein, or for that matter any democracy movement in Iraq. . . . Sooner or later, Mr. Bush argued, sanctions would force Mr. Hussein's generals to bring him down, and then Washington would have the best of all worlds: an iron-fisted Iraqi junta without Saddam Hussein.

For a similar explanation of the rationale for maintaining Saddam Hussein in power, see Alan Cowell, "After The War: Kurds Assert Few Outside Iraq Wanted Them to Win," *New York Times*, April 11, 1991, p. A11. An excerpt:

It is, perhaps, one of the most savage realizations of the Persian Gulf crisis and the subsequent turmoil in both north and south Iraq that the allied campaign against President Hussein brought the United States and its Arab coalition partners to a strikingly unanimous view: whatever the sins of the Iraqi leader, he offered the West

and the region a better hope for his country's stability than did those who have suffered his repression. . . .

At the same time, the United States matched its refusal to be drawn into the civil war with a refusal to talk to those involved in fighting it. When Secretary of States James A. Baker 3d arrives here on Thursday to discuss the Middle East with President Hafez el-Assad, he will find waiting for him a letter from the opposition groups requesting a meeting. "We hope that your Government will respond positively" to the request, the letter, delivered to the United States Embassy here, says. So far, Iraqi exiles say, there has been no reply to it and the embassy's doors remain closed to them.

Chomsky remarks about this system of "stability" and "regional balance" in the Middle East based upon the Arab client-states (*Deterring Democracy*, New York: Hill and Wang, 1992, p. 417):

[W]ho are these "Arab coalition partners"? Answer: six are family dictatorships, established by the Anglo-American settlement to manage Gulf oil riches in the interests of the foreign masters, what British imperial managers called an "Arab façade" for the real rulers. The seventh is Syria's Hafez el-Assad, a minority-based tyrant indistinguishable from Saddam Hussein. That these partners should share Washington's preference for Saddam Hussein's variety of "stability" is hardly a surprise. The last of the "coalition partners," Egypt, is the only one that could be called "a country." Though a tyranny, it has a degree of internal freedom.

For the British reference to the "Arab façade" -- a state "ruled and administered under British guidance and controlled by a native Mohammedan, and, as far as possible, by an Arab staff" (the words are those of Lord Curzon) -- see William Stivers, *Supremacy and Oil: Iraq, Turkey, and the Anglo-American World Order, 1918-1930*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982, p. 28. Curzon further explained that "there should be no actual incorporation of conquered territory in the dominions of the conqueror, but that the absorption may be veiled by constitutional fictions as a protectorate, a sphere of influence, a buffer State, and so on" (p. 34). See also, William Stivers, *America's Confrontation with Revolutionary Change in the Middle East, 1948-83*, London: Macmillan, 1986 (on the U.S. policy of defending the conservative status quo in the Middle East since World War II).

97. On Iraqi children killed by the embargo, see for example, Anthony Arnove, ed., *Iraq Under Siege: The Deadly Impact of Sanctions and War*, Cambridge, MA: South End, 2000. An excerpt (pp. 60, 65):

[I]n 1995 the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization reported that the military devastation of Iraq and the Security Council embargo had been responsible for the deaths of more than 560,000 children. The World Health Organization confirmed this figure and so, inadvertently, did the U.S. Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, when she was asked on the C.B.S. program *60 Minutes* if the death of more than half a million children was a price worth paying. "[W]e think the price is worth it," she replied. . . . Former U.N. humanitarian coordinator for Iraq Denis Halliday has remarked that the death toll is "probably closer now to 600,000 and that's over the period of 1990-1998. If you include adult, it's well over 1 million Iraqi people."

Merrill Goozner, "U.S. Seems To Be Sole Supporter Of Embargo Against Iraq; Allies Cite Desire For Business, Concern For Children In Seeking Ties," *Chicago Tribune*, September 5, 1996, p. 14. An excerpt:

The embargo -- a ban on all forms of international trade, including food and medicine - is the most sweeping set of economic sanctions the U.N. has ever imposed on a nation. . . . Human rights groups, who are no fans of the brutal Iraqi regime, the U.N.'s World Food Program and UNICEF have reported the continuing impact of the embargo on Iraqi children: an estimated 500,000 deaths since 1991, primarily from intestinal disorders caused by drinking impure water in their weakened, malnourished state.

Kathryn Casa, "Embargo brings death to 500,000 children in Iraq," *National Catholic Reporter*, March 3, 1995, p. 9. An excerpt:

[If] the blockade continues, 1.5 million more children could eventually suffer malnutrition or a variety of unchecked illnesses because antibiotics and other standard medicines are scarce. . . . Among the five permanent members of the [U.N.] Security Council, only . . . the United States and Britain are opposed [to ending the embargo]. . . .

[A] two-day Athens conference featured grim photographs of Iraqi children, their bellies bloated from malnutrition, and of pitifully tiny infants, too weak to cry, their limbs as thin as sticks and their huge eyes reflecting a serenity that too often precedes death. . . . [T]here were hundreds of pages of material on the tragic effects of the embargo and on Iraq's contention that it has complied with all U.N. resolutions.

See also, Eric Hoskins, "Making the Desert Glow," Op-Ed, *New York Times*, January 21, 1993, p. A25 (a Harvard Study Team estimated that 50,000 children died in the first eight months of 1991 alone, many from the effects of radioactive artillery shells; about 40 tons of depleted uranium was dispersed in Iraq and Kuwait during the war).

On the U.S. and British insistence on maintaining the Iraq embargo, see for example, Eric Rouleau, "The View From France: America's Unyielding Policy toward Iraq," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 1, January/February 1995, pp. 59f. An excerpt (pp. 66-67):

In November 1993, two years after Resolutions 706 and 712, Saddam Hussein decided in desperation to comply fully with the conditions set by the Security Council to lift the embargo. . . . A commission headed by the Swedish diplomat Rolf Ekeus recognized that the Iraqis had cooperated fully. . . . If the Security Council were to respect the commitment it had clearly made, the oil embargo would have been lifted immediately or, at most, after a probational period set by the Security Council. Then the United States, backed by the United Kingdom, decided to "change the rules," as a *New York Times* editorial of August 2, 1994, put it. The Clinton administration decided that sanctions would remain in place as long as Iraq did not implement all the U.N. resolutions, particularly those concerning respect for human rights and recognition of Kuwait's sovereignty and borders. These new demands, however justifiable, did not appear in the sole U.N. text referring explicitly to the lifting of the oil embargo. . . .

In November 1994, under pressure from Russia and France, Iraq recognized the sovereignty and frontiers of Kuwait. As expected, the measure, conceived as a political concession to the United States, was not judged sufficient by Washington. The prevailing sense in Paris was that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to change the mind of the Clinton administration, whose determination to follow its own policy had been clear in recent months.

98. For the *Foreign Affairs* article, see Eric Rouleau, "The View From France: America's Unyielding Policy toward Iraq," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 1, January/February 1995, pp. 59f. An excerpt (p. 68):

It is widely agreed, even among the Iraqi opposition, that Saddam Hussein's regime is more secure today than it was four years ago. . . . Reliable sources in Baghdad now maintain that the Iraqi people, absorbed by the daily struggle to survive the embargo, have neither the desire nor the energy to rise up against their government, which they increasingly perceive as a victim of a superpower's agenda.

On the death toll, see footnotes 94 and 97 of this chapter.

99. On Bush's favorable attitude towards Saddam Hussein until the Kuwait invasion, see for example, Alan Friedman, *Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq*, New York: Bantam Books, 1993 (a detailed and densely documented history of U.S. support for Saddam until months before the Gulf War); Douglas Frantz and Murray Waas, "U.S. Loans Indirectly Financed Iraq Military," *Los Angeles Times*, February 25, 1992, p. A1 ("Classified documents show that Bush, first as vice president and then as President, intervened repeatedly over a period of almost a decade to obtain special assistance for Saddam Hussein -- financial aid as well as access to high-tech equipment that was critical to Iraq's quest for nuclear and chemical arms"; this relationship continued "[u]ntil the eve of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait"). See also footnote 100 of this chapter.

100. On Bush's efforts into 1990 to continue loan guarantees for Saddam Hussein, see for example, Douglas Frantz and Murray Waas, "Bush Secret Effort Helped Iraq Build Its War Machine," *Los Angeles Times*, February 23, 1992, p. A1. An excerpt:

In the fall of 1989, at a time when Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was only nine months away and Saddam Hussein was desperate for money to buy arms, President Bush signed a top-secret National Security Decision directive ordering closer ties with Baghdad and opening the way for \$1 billion in new aid, according to classified documents and interviews. . . . Getting new aid from Washington was critical for Iraq in the waning months of 1989 and the early months of 1990 because international bankers had cut off virtually all loans to Baghdad. . . .

In addition to clearing the way for new financial aid, senior Bush aides as late as the spring of 1990 overrode concern among other government officials and insisted that Hussein continue to be allowed to buy so-called "dual use" technology -- advanced equipment that could be used for both civilian and military purposes. The Iraqis were given continued access to such equipment, despite emerging evidence that they were working on nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction. "Iraq is not to be singled out," National Security Council official Richard Haas declared at a high-level meeting in April, 1990, according to participants' notes, when the Commerce Department proposed curbing Iraqi purchases of militarily sensitive technology. . . . And the pressure in 1989 and 1990 to give Hussein crucial financial assistance and maintain his access to sophisticated U.S. technology were not isolated incidents. Rather, classified documents obtained by The Times show, they reflected a long-secret pattern of personal efforts by Bush -- both as President and as vice president -- to support and placate the Iraqi dictator. . . .

[C]lassified records show that Bush's efforts on Hussein's behalf continued well beyond the end of the Iran-Iraq War and persisted in the face of increasingly widespread warnings from inside the American government that the overall policy had become misdirected. . . . [On April 19, 1990, the] White House National Security Council thwart[ed] efforts by [the] Commerce Department to stem the flow of U.S. technology to Iraq. . . . [A]s late as July 9, 1990, April Glaspie, the U.S. ambassador

to Iraq, assured Iraqi officials that the Bush Administration was still trying to get the second \$500 million [of the \$1 billion in loan guarantees] released, according to a classified cable.

Alan Friedman, "U.S. backed Dollars 1bn Iraqi loan prior to invasion of Kuwait," *Financial Times* (London), May 3, 1991, section 1, p. 1. An excerpt:

The Bush Administration pushed through a Dollars 1bn (Pounds 568m) loan guarantee to Iraq for farm exports just 10 months before the invasion of Kuwait despite being presented with reports of widespread abuse of U.S. funds by Baghdad at the time. . . . The debate over the issue came to a climax at a White House meeting on November 8, 1989 when senior officials from the Federal Reserve, U.S. Treasury and Commerce Departments all objected to the Dollars 1bn guarantee to back U.S. farm exports to Iraq. The reasons cited, according to participants at the meeting, included the view that Iraq was no longer creditworthy. . . . Mr. Robert Kimmitt, the under-secretary of state, told the White House meeting that abruptly terminating the Dollars 1bn of loan guarantees for Iraq would be "contrary to the president's intentions."

For exposures of other such links, see for example, Douglas Frantz and Murray Waas, "Bush Had Long History Of Support For Iraq Aid," *Los Angeles Times*, February 24, 1992, p. A1 (providing further detailed evidence, in particular of Bush's personal interventions to obtain Export-Import Bank loan credits for Iraq); Paul Houston, "Panel To Probe Reports On Aid To Iraq," *Los Angeles Times*, February 25, 1992, p. A10; Leslie H. Gelb, "Bush's Iraqi Blunder," Op-Ed, *New York Times*, May 4, 1992, p. A17; Gary Milhollin, "Building Saddam Hussein's Bomb," *New York Times Magazine*, March 8, 1992, section 6, p. 30; Alan Friedman, "West's guilty role in arming Saddam: Revelations this week in London and Washington imply high-level cover ups of illegal weapon deals," *Financial Times* (London), November 14, 1992, p. 1; Alan Friedman, "A paper trail of troubles: The Bush administration is coming under fire as Congress investigates alleged transfers of arms and money to Iraq," *Financial Times* (London), August 6, 1992, p. 14; Alan Friedman, Lionel Barber, Tom Flannery and Eric Reguly, "Arms For Iraq: Saddam's secret South African connection -- A steady flow of illegal missile technology was exported from the U.S. with full C.I.A. knowledge," *Financial Times* (London), May 24, 1991, p. 6; Lionel Barber and Alan Friedman, "Arms to Iraq; A fatal attraction -- Under the nose of the White House, kickbacks and illegal deals funded Saddam," *Financial Times* (London), May 3, 1991, section 1, p. 2; Bruce Ingersoll, "G.A.O. Is Critical Of Export Credits Extended To Iraq," *Wall Street Journal*, November 21, 1990, p. A16. See also, Ralph Atkins, Emma Tucker and Alan Friedman, "U.K. allowed export to Iraq of mustard gas chemicals," *Financial Times* (London), July 29, 1991, p. 1; James Adams and Nick Rufford, "Britain sold 'mustard gas' to Saddam," *Sunday Times* (London), July 28, 1991, p. 1.

101. On U.S. tolerance of Saddam after the Gulf War, see footnotes 95 and 96 of this chapter.

102. On the twenty-year U.S. and Israeli campaign to reject Palestinian rights, see footnotes 104 and 111 of this chapter; chapter 4 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 48 and 49; and chapter 8 of *U.P.* and its footnote 83.

103. The connection between the Gulf War and a change in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict was commonly drawn by officials and commentators, both during and after the war. See for example, Henry A. Kissinger, "A Postwar Agenda," *Newsweek*, January 28, 1991, p. 44. An excerpt:

[T]he United States should move to implement a number of measures in the immediate aftermath of the war. . . . [P]erhaps most importantly, a new balance of power will revive prospects for progress on the Arab-Israeli conflict. . . . [W]ith Saddam defeated, moderate Arab leaders will gain in stature, America's credibility will be enhanced and Israel will have a breathing space. This new equation should be translated into a major diplomatic effort within a few months of victory. . . . I would much prefer a diplomatic process in which the United States, the moderate Arab countries and Israel are the principal participants. . . . The aftermath of an allied victory over Iraq will offer a perhaps never-to-recur opportunity.

Andrew Rosenthal, "Bush Vows to Tackle Middle East Issues," *New York Times*, January 29, 1991, p. A13 (quoting George Bush: "When this war is over, the United States, its credibility and its reliability restored, will have a key leadership role in helping to bring peace to the rest of the Middle East").

For Chomsky's article referred to in the text, see Noam Chomsky, "Aftermath: Voices From Below," *Z Magazine*, October 1991, pp. 19-28. An excerpt (pp. 25-26):

Decoding the rhetoric of political discourse, we see a picture that looks like this. The U.S. triumph in the Gulf has enabled it to establish the rejectionist position it has maintained in international isolation (apart from Israel). The peace process that the world has sought for many years, with surprising unanimity, can now be consigned to the ash heap of history. The U.S. can at last run its own conference, completely excluding its rivals Europe and Japan, always a major goal of U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East, as Kissinger observed. With the Soviet Union gone from the scene, Syria has accepted the fact that the U.S. rules the region alone and has abandoned what is called its "rejectionist stance" in U.S. rhetoric. In this case, the term refers to Syria's support for the international consensus calling for settlement on the internationally recognized (pre-June 1967) borders and full guarantees for all states in the region, including Israel and a new Palestinian state.

For a more in-depth discussion of the subject, see Noam Chomsky, "Middle East Diplomacy," *Z Magazine*, December 1991, pp. 29-41.

See also, R.W. Apple Jr., "The Middle East Talks: How Sweet A Victory?," *New York Times*, October 31, 1991, p. A16. An excerpt:

Many months after the event, George Bush and the United States today plucked the fruits of victory in the Persian Gulf war. . . . Critics have suggested that the United States achieved far too little in the war. . . . This morning it was clear that a very great deal had changed. . . .

It was not only the energy and the diplomatic skills of Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d that created the remarkable tableau [of the Madrid Peace Conference on the Middle East], with mortal enemies arranged around the same table, that Mr. Bush saw before him in the splendid Royal Palace this morning; all of his labors would have counted for very little without the seismic shifts in the global order of things. . . . The United States is the only credible outside power in the region. The gulf war also changed the internal military balance, not only by removing Iraq from the equation, at least for the moment, but also by demonstrating that high-tech American weapons, more available to Israel than to the Arabs, again at least for the moment, were the future of warfare.

104. The General Assembly resolutions calling for recognition of Palestinian rights can be found in the annual U.N. publication *Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly*, New York: United Nations.

See also, Cheryl A. Rubenberg, "The U.S.-P.L.O. Dialogue: Continuity or Change in American Policy?," *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 11, No. 4, Fall 1989, pp. 1-58, especially pp. 18-32; Nabeel Abraham, "The Conversion of Chairman Arafat," *American-Arab Affairs*, No. 31, Winter 1989-1990, pp. 53-69.

105. For George Bush's statement, see for example, Rick Atkinson, "Bush: Iraq Won't Decide Timing of Ground War," *Washington Post*, February 2, 1991, p. A1. His exact words:

When we win, and we will, we will have taught a dangerous dictator, and any tyrant tempted to follow in his footsteps, that the U.S. has a new credibility, and that what we say goes.

106. On the likelihood of India's population overtaking China's, see for example, Barbara Crossette, "Population Policy In Asia Is Faulted," *New York Times*, September 16, 1992, p. A9. An excerpt:

India, with a population of about 882 million that is growing 2.1 percent a year, is likely to overtake China as the most populous country by 2035. . . . India's population may reach 2 billion before leveling off. China, with about 1.165 billion people, is likely to stabilize at about 1.5 billion. . . . The world's population is estimated at 5.4 billion.

107. On U.S. leaders' dislike of Nehru and Indian independence, see for example, Robert J. McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, pp. 62-64, 88-89, 222-225 (discussing high U.S. officials' dislike of Indian independence and quoting their remarks that Nehru was a "spoiled child," "vain and immature," "a hypersensitive egoist," motivated by "terrible resentment" of "domination by whites," "intellectually arrogant and of course at the same time suffering from an inferiority complex . . . schizophrenia," and that "Indians are notably prone to blame others for their problems, as the British know all too well," and Indian "ingratitude" is due to "a sense of Divine right" that is "a sort of natural attribute of Indians").

108. For declassified documents revealing U.S. planners' fear of China's developmental success, see for example, Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-67*, Draft revision of N.S.C. 5429/5, June 29, 1959, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971, Book 10. An excerpt (pp. 1198, 1213, 1226, 1208):

A fundamental source of danger we face in the Far East derives from Communist China's rate of economic growth which will probably continue to outstrip that of free Asian countries, with the possible exception of Japan. In view of both the real and the psychological impact of Communist China's growth and the major effort of the Soviet Union to gain influence in the less developed countries with aid and promises of quick progress under Communism, increased emphasis must be placed upon economic growth of the free Far East countries. . . .

The dramatic economic improvements realized by Communist China over the past ten years impress the nations of the region greatly and offer a serious challenge to the Free World. . . . [The United States should do what it can] to avoid enhancing the prestige and power of Asian Communist regimes and . . . to retard, within the limits of our capabilities, the economic progress of these regimes.

Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, Senator Gravel Edition, Boston: Beacon, 1972, Vol. III, p. 218. An excerpt: Chinese political and ideological aggressiveness . . . [are] a threat to the ability of these peoples [i.e. other Asian countries] to determine their own futures, and hence to develop along ways compatible with U.S. interests.

On the U.S. policy to support India as a counterbalance to China, see for example, National Security Council [N.S.C.] Memorandum 5701, "Statement of Policy On U.S. Policy Toward South Asia," January 10, 1957, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957*, Vol. VIII ("South Asia"), Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987, pp. 29-43. An excerpt (pp. 31, 35-36):

The outcome of the competition between Communist China and India as to which can best satisfy the aspirations of peoples for economic improvement, will have a profound effect throughout Asia and Africa. Similarly, the relative advantages to be derived from economic cooperation with the Soviet bloc or the West will be closely watched. . . . The political stake of the United States in the independence and integrity of the countries of South Asia, as well as in their stability and peaceful progress, is very large. If India or Pakistan came under Communist influence, chain reaction effects, going as far as Western Europe, would result. . . . A strong India would be a successful example of an alternative to Communism in an Asian context. . . . It is in our interest that India should substantially achieve the broad aims of the five-year [economic development] plan, in terms of increases in output and employment, and should continue to make an effective assault upon its development problems.

Dennis Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot: The United States and India's Economic Development, 1947-1963*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992, especially chs. 6 and 7, pp. 139-140 (analysis of U.S. policy during the Eisenhower and Kennedy years, remarking that by the 1950s U.S. planners feared that China seemingly "had hit upon a formula for rapid development that might prove attractive throughout Asia, the Near East, and Africa"). An excerpt (pp. 146-147):

In the United States Senate, [Senator] John F. Kennedy . . . spoke with characteristic vigor of the race between India and China for economic progress and asserted: "A successful Indian program is important at least as much for the example it can set for the economic future of other underdeveloped countries as for its own sake. . . . India, like the United States, is engaged in a struggle of coexistence -- in its case with China, which is also pursuing a planning effort being put under consideration all over the world. . . ."

In terms almost identical to [Kennedy]'s, Vice-President Nixon also supported India aid: "In my own mind what happens in India, insofar as its economic progress is concerned in the next few years, could be as important or could be even more important in the long run, than what happens in the negotiations with regard to Berlin. . . . There are two great peoples in Asia. The peoples who live under the Communist government of China, and the people of India. . . . What happens in India will have a tremendous impact on the decisions made in other countries in Asia, in the Near East, in Africa and even in the Americas."

See also, Walt Rostow with Richard W. Hatch, *An American Policy in Asia*, New York: Technology Press/M.I.T. and John Wiley, 1955, pp. 6, 37, 51.

On the "threat of a good example" as a general theme of U.S. foreign policy, see especially footnote 32 of this chapter, and also its footnotes 7, 8 and 68; chapter 1 of *U.P.* and its footnote 20; and the text of chapter 2 of *U.P.* (on Sandinista Nicaragua).

109. On the debate over sending food aid to India during its famine, see for example, Dennis Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot: The United States and India's Economic Development, 1947-1963*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992, pp. 61-74, 146-170 (reviewing the protracted discussions within the U.S. government concerning sending wheat to India during its 1950-1951 famine, ultimately carried out in June 1951 by means of a loan to India repayable in strategic materials). An excerpt (pp. 62, 65, 69-70, 73):

[W]ith hundreds of deaths due to starvation already documented, American officials generally acknowledged that India was experiencing the first stage of a very real famine. If the United States did not provide assistance, Indian officials estimated that ten to thirteen million of their countrymen would perish. The Truman administration was also aware that the United States Commodity Credit Corporation held approximately 319 million bushels of surplus wheat in reserve and that a 2-million-ton shipment to India would require only 75 million bushels. In short, India's need was well known, the crisis was extraordinarily urgent, and the United States was in a strong position to help. . . .

On the one hand, George McGhee's N.E.A. [Office of Near Eastern Affairs] eyed the political benefits to be reaped by a prompt and positive response. . . . On the other hand, the Department of the Treasury and the Bureau of the Budget voiced reservations over the cost of assisting India. . . . While Acheson [U.S. Secretary of State] and McGhee had not categorically made food aid contingent upon a reorientation of Indian policy, the linkages were obvious. . . . By early April 1951, five months had passed since the Indian government had first asked for assistance. No reliable statistics exist on how many additional, famine-related deaths occurred during this period. . . . During 1950 and 1951, as millions of Indians struggled each day to survive on as little as nine ounces of foodgrains, American policy makers sought to work India's distress to America's advantage.

110. For the *New York Times's* articles, see for example, J. Anthony Lukas, "Mrs. Gandhi and the Left: Criticism by Menon Reflects Her Drift to Pragmatism," *New York Times*, April 29, 1966, p. 6. An excerpt:

The Government [of India] has granted easy terms to private foreign investors in the fertilizer industry, is thinking about decontrolling several more industries and is ready to liberalize import policy if it gets sufficient foreign aid. . . . Much of what is happening now is a result of steady pressure from the United States and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. . . . The United States pressure, in particular, has been highly effective here because the United States provides by far the largest part of the foreign exchange needed to finance India's development and keep the wheels of industry turning.

Call them "strings," call them "conditions" or whatever one likes, India has little choice now but to agree to many of the terms that the United States, through the World Bank, is putting on its aid. For India simply has nowhere else to turn.

J. Anthony Lukas, "Mrs. Gandhi Denies She Is Shedding Socialism: Prime Minister Calls Charge of Yielding to West Absurd," *New York Times*, April 25, 1966, p. 8; J. Anthony Lukas, "India and U.S. Concern Sign Fertilizer Plant Pact," *New York Times*, May 15, 1966, section 1, p. 18.

See also, David K. Willis, "Indo-U.S. relations strained by political complexities," *Christian Science Monitor*, November 26, 1966, p. 5. An excerpt:

[T]he White House does not consider that New Delhi is doing nearly enough to attract foreign capital to build private chemical fertilizer plants -- the sine qua non of better food production. So the President is holding up approval of the two million tons of grain India says it must have by the end of the year. . . .

For their part, Indian officials here and in New Delhi do not hide their near-exasperation with Washington. "We have done everything we can to attract foreign capital for fertilizer plants," they say in effect. "But the American and other Western private companies know we are over a barrel, so they demand stringent terms. We just cannot meet them. Meanwhile, if the two million tons promised us months ago is not loaded soon, there will be a gap in the pipeline of food aid, and the consequences will be very bad indeed."

111. For Chomsky's friend's article in the Israeli press, see Tanya Reinhart, *Ha'aretz* (Israel), May 27, 1994.

On the Oslo Agreements and their background, see for example, Edward W. Said, "Arafat's Deal," *Nation*, September 20, 1993, p. 269 (immediate and perceptive interpretation); Edward W. Said, *The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After*, New York: Pantheon, 2000; Nicholas Guyatt, *The Absence of Peace: Understanding the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, London: Zed, 1998, especially chs. 2 to 6; Naseer Hasan Aruri, *The Obstruction of Peace: the United States, Israel, and the Palestinians*, Monroe, ME: Common Courage, 1995; Meron Benvenisti, *Intimate Enemies: Jews and Arabs in a Shared Land*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995; Donald Neff, *Fallen Pillars: U.S. Policy Towards Palestine and Israel Since 1945*, Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995; Sara M. Roy, *The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-Development*, Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995; Edward W. Said, *Peace and its Discontents: Gaza-Jericho 1993-1995*, London: Vintage, 1995; Graham Usher, *Palestine in Crisis: The Struggle for Peace and Political Independence After Oslo*, London: Pluto, 1995; Norman G. Finkelstein, "Securing Occupation: The Real Meaning of the Wye River Memorandum," *New Left Review*, November/December 1998, pp. 128-139; Naseer H. Aruri, "The Wye Memorandum: Netanyahu's Oslo and Unreciprocal Reciprocity," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 2, Winter 1999, pp. 17-28.

Chomsky summarizes (*World Orders Old and New*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, p. 249):

Throughout [the two decades until the Gulf War], there was general agreement (including the P.L.O. from the mid-70s) that a settlement should be based on U.N. 242 (and 338, which endorses 242). There were two basic points of contention: (1) Do we interpret the withdrawal clause of 242 in accord with the international consensus (including the United States, pre-1971), or in accord with the position of Israel and U.S. policy from 1971? (2) Is the settlement based *solely* on U.N. 242, which offers nothing to the Palestinians, or 242 *and other relevant U.N. resolutions*, as the P.L.O. had long proposed in accord with the nonrejectionist international consensus? Thus, does the settlement incorporate the Palestinian right to national self-determination repeatedly endorsed by the U.N. (though blocked by Washington),

or the right of refugees to return and compensation, as the U.N. has insisted since 1948 (with U.S. endorsement, long forgotten)? These are the crucial issues that stood in the way of a political settlement.

On both major issues under dispute, (1) and (2), the [Oslo] agreement explicitly and without equivocation adopts the U.S.-Israeli stand. Article I, outlining the "Aim of the Negotiations," specifies that "the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338"; nothing further is mentioned. Note that this refers to the *permanent* status, the long-term end to be achieved. Furthermore . . . U.N. 242 is to be understood in the terms unilaterally imposed by the United States (from 1971), entailing only partial withdrawal [from the Occupied Territories], as Washington determines. In fact, the agreement does not even preclude further Israeli settlement in the large areas of the West Bank it has taken over, or even new land takeovers. On such central matters as control of water, it refers only to "cooperation in the management of water resources in the West Bank and Gaza Strip" and "equitable utilization of joint water resources" in a manner to be determined by "experts from both sides. . . ." The outcome of cooperation between an elephant and a fly is not hard to predict.

112. On the United States blocking the Middle East Peace process for more than twenty years before the Oslo Agreement, see chapter 4 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 41, 47, 48, 49 and 56.

113. On Western European diplomatic support for Palestinian rights until the Gulf War, see footnote 104 of this chapter.

114. For Israeli commentary using the term "neocolonialism," see for example, Asher Davidi, *Davar* (Israel), February 17, 1993.

115. For blatant samples of the revival of imperialist outlook towards the Third World, see for example, Paul Johnson, "Colonialism's Back -- and Not a Moment Too Soon," *New York Times Magazine*, April 18, 1993, section 6, p. 22. An excerpt:

We are witnessing today a revival of colonialism, albeit in a new form. It is a trend that should be encouraged, it seems to me, on practical as well as moral grounds. . . . [A]t precisely the time when colonies were deriving the maximum benefit from European rule [in the 1960s], the decision was taken to liberate them forthwith. . . .

The trustees [which should be imposed to rule Third World countries] should not plan to withdraw until they are reasonably certain that the return to independence will be successful this time. So the mandate may last 50 years, or 100. . . . [S]ome states are not yet fit to govern themselves. Their continued existence, and the violence and human degradation they breed, is a threat to the stability of their neighbors as well as an affront to our consciences. There is a moral issue here: the civilized world has a mission to go out to these desperate places and govern. . . . [T]he already overburdened United States will have to take the major responsibility, though it can count on staunch support from Britain and, in this case, from France. Labor and expense will be needed, as well as brains, leadership and infinite patience. The only satisfaction will be the unspoken gratitude of millions of misgoverned or ungoverned people who will find in this altruistic revival of colonialism the only way out of their present intractable miseries.

Angelo Codevilla [Hoover Institute, Stanford University], "Counterpoint: The U.S. Leads Operation Wrong Target," *Wall Street Journal*, January 7, 1993, p. A15. An excerpt:

Our only realistic choice in Somalia and in all too many similar places is either to leave them to their misery or to re-establish something very much like colonialism. . . . Colonialism is an act of generosity and idealism of which only rising civilizations are capable. . . . [C]olonialism is about dictating political outcomes of which we can be proud.

Peregrine Worsthorne, "What kind of people?," *Sunday Telegraph* (London), September 17, 1990, p. 20. An excerpt:

Obviously we [i.e. Britain] can no longer be the world's policeman on our own as we were when we put down the slave trade. But that does not at all mean that we cannot give invaluable help to America in this role. What is more, the job would enable us to put to good use the skills and experience which history has bestowed upon us.

Critics rightly point out that we are no match for Germany and Japan when it comes to wealth creation; or even for France and Italy. But when it comes to shouldering world responsibilities we are more than a match. We are what we are. Other countries are what they are. No doubt Britain's gentlemanly high culture and its so-much-mocked and deplored anti-industrial education system have militated against our being top of the productivity league. But perhaps now that is just as well, since in the post-cold-war world there is a new job to be done that desperately needs a major European country with a rather different kind of genius. That job is to help build and sustain a new world order stable enough to allow the advanced economies of the world to function without constant interruption and threat from the Third World. Anybody who supposes that the United Nations, which is largely made up of the Third World, can be relied upon to sustain such a world order for long must be naive.

. . .

Once lost, the habit and taste for the exercise of power are not so easily regained. Britain has lost that taste less than most. Or rather a significant section of it, among all classes, has not lost that taste. For a time it looked as if this might be a liability, rendering us ill-suited to fit comfortably into a world where the wealth creators were king. But it is not quite going to be that kind of world. It is going to be the kind of world where the wealth creators will be desperate for protection. Refusing to adapt, as Britain is accused of doing, can sometimes pay off, since the wheel of fashion comes full circle. Possibly Britain was in danger of clinging too long to outmoded imperial values. Thank God she did. For the civilised world will soon need them again as never before.

R.W. Apple Jr., "Mission To Haiti: In Perspective," *New York Times*, September 20, 1994, p. A12. An excerpt:

Like the French in the 19th century, like the Marines who occupied Haiti from 1915 to 1934, the American forces who are trying to impose a new order will confront a complex and violent society with no history of democracy. . . . For two centuries, political opponents in Haiti have routinely slaughtered each other. Backers of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide [sic], followers of General Cédras and the former Tontons Macoute retain their homicidal tendencies, to say nothing of their weapons. .

..

Whether Mr. Clinton's decision to use American troops in Haiti and President Carter's peacekeeping mission have opened the way for real change, or simply inaugurated another futile effort to reshape a society that has long resisted reform, may not be known for years.

Chomsky comments about Apple's account of the lessons of history in the previous article ("Democracy Restored?," *Z Magazine*, November 1994, pp. 49-61 at p. 58):

One takes for granted that the vicious terror and racism of the Wilson administration and its successors will be transmuted to sweet charity as it reaches the educated classes, but it is a novelty to see Napoleon's invasion, one of the most hideous crimes of an era not known for its gentleness, portrayed in the same light. We might understand this as another small contribution to the broader project of revising the history of Western colonialism so as to justify the next phase.

He adds (*Rethinking Camelot: J.F.K., the Vietnam War, and U.S. Political Culture*, Boston: South End, 1993, p. 45): "States are not moral agents; those who attribute to them ideals and principles merely mislead themselves and others."

Chapter Six

Community Activists

1. On the scale of the working-class media early in the twentieth century, see for example, Jon Bekken, "The Working-Class Press at the Turn of the Century," in William S. Solomon and Robert W. McChesney, eds., *Ruthless Criticism: New Perspectives in U.S. Communication History*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993, pp. 151-175. An excerpt (pp. 158, 151, 159, 160, 162, 157):

Total circulation [of the U.S. socialist press] exceeded two million copies before World War I, with the *Appeal to Reason* -- far and away the circulation leader -- boasting a weekly circulation of 761,747. . . .

At the turn of the century, the U.S. labor movement published hundreds of newspapers in dozens of languages, ranging from local and regional dailies issued by working-class political organizations and mutual aid societies to national union weeklies and monthlies. These newspapers practiced a journalism very different from that of the capitalist newspapers. . . . Their newspapers were an integral part of working-class communities, not only reporting the news of the day or week, but offering a venue where readers could debate political, economic and cultural issues. Readers could follow the activities of working-class institutions in every field and could be mobilized to support efforts to transform economic and political conditions. . . . Labor newspapers ranged from small, irregularly issued sheets to twelve- to sixteen-page dailies that were as large, and in many ways as professional, as many of the capitalist newspapers with which they co-existed. . . . [W]orkers did not passively accept their lot. Rather, they built a rich array of ethnic, community, workplace and political organizations that helped them to survive from day to day . . . vibrant working-class cultures organized along ethnic as well as class lines. . . .

To counter what they saw as a strong antilabor bias in the mainstream press, and to secure access to unreported labor news, editors organized a cooperative news-gathering service in November 1919. With the support of labor, socialist, farm-labor, and other papers, Federated Press bureaus in Washington, Chicago, and New York dispatched daily releases, beginning in 1920. Federated Press began with 110 member papers, including 22 dailies. . . . By 1925, two years after the A.F.L. [American Federation of Labor, the most conservative segment of the U.S. labor movement] denounced Federated Press as a vehicle for communist propaganda, the Federated Press circulated its daily 5,000-word service to 150 papers and a supplemental weekly labor letter to 1,000 subscribers. In addition to breaking labor news, Federated Press provided in-depth articles on industrial and financial trends, wage levels, and corporate profits. The service survived until 1956, when it had 53 member papers and was one of four news services available to working-class newspapers (the other three were tied to the A.F.L. or C.I.O. [Congress of Industrial Organizations]). But union subscribers canceled the service after the A.F.L.-C.I.O. merger and the resulting purge of left-wing unions, and Federated was forced from the field.

J.B.S. Hardman and Maurice F. Neufeld, eds., *The House of Labor: Internal Operations of American Unions*, New York: Prentice-Hall, 1951. An excerpt (p. 188):

In 1949, Herbert Little, director of the Office of Information, U.S. Labor Department, reported that that department had a mailing list of more than 800 labor periodicals. . . . According to Mr. Little, "Their circulations have been estimated to total more than 20,000,000, possibly as high as 30,000,000. Eliminating obvious duplications, such as the machinist who gets his union's weekly newspaper, its monthly journal and the local labor papers, it is apparent that nearly all of the 16,000,000 labor unionists in this country get and probably read one or more labor papers. If their families are taken into consideration, the possible readership would be tripled.

See also chapter 4 of *U.P.* and its footnote 36.

2. Alternative Radio offers an extensive catalog of taped lectures and interviews by many speakers including Noam Chomsky, and is a resource about community radio generally (Box 551, Boulder, CO, 80306, 1-800-444-1977). Radio Free Maine also offers a catalog of taped lectures by Chomsky and others (P.O. Box 2705, Augusta, ME, 04338 (207) 622-6629). The Z Media Institute is involved in developing alternative media of various kinds (18 Millfield St., Woods Hole, MA, 02543, (508) 548-9063). The Pacifica Network of major community-controlled radio stations includes KFCF (Fresno, CA), KPFA (Berkeley, CA), KPFK (North Hollywood, CA), KPFT (Houston, TX), WBAI (New York, NY), and WPSW (Washington, DC). In addition, many other communities of all sizes have non-corporate and popularly-controlled radio.

Z Magazine -- which is discussed in the text of this chapter of *U.P.* and in chapter 9 of *U.P.* -- depends for its survival upon subscriptions (18 Millfield St., Woods Hole, MA, 02543, (508) 548-9063, www.zmag.org/znet.htm). *Dollars and Sense* is an excellent bimonthly magazine providing "left" perspectives on current economic affairs and exploring the workings of the U.S. and international economies (1 Summer Street, Somerville, MA, 02143, (617) 628-8411, www.dollarsandsense.org). *Extra!* is Fairness and Accuracy In Reporting's useful bimonthly magazine of media criticism (F.A.I.R., 130 West 25th St., New York, NY, 10001, 1-800-847-3993, www.fair.org). *The Nation* is a liberal weekly which often has interesting material (P.O. Box 37072, Boone, IA, 50037, 1-800-333-8536, www.thenation.com).

For some other popularly-oriented political organizations and publications, see the resource guides at the end of: Noam Chomsky, *The Common Good*, Tucson, AZ: Odonian, 1998; Noam Chomsky, *Secrets, Lies and Democracy*, Tucson, AZ: Odonian, 1994; and Mark Achbar, ed., *Manufacturing Consent: Noam Chomsky and the Media*, Montreal: Black Rose, 1994; and see Project Censored, *The Progressive Guide to Alternative Media and Activism*, New York: Seven Stories, 1999. See also footnote 6 of chapter 9 of *U.P.*

For extensive lists of links to the websites of progressive organizations and information sources, see for example, www.zmag.org/znet.htm (includes a "progressive internet resources directory"); www.fair.org/resources.html (includes alternative news sources, media criticism and reviews); www.commondreams.org/community.htm (lists scores of progressive and activist groups).

3. On 75 percent of the U.S. public supporting a nuclear freeze, see for example, Daniel Yankelovich and John Doble, "The Public Mood: Nuclear Weapons and the U.S.S.R.," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 63, Fall 1984, pp. 33-46 (reporting public opinion poll findings).

4. On Gorbachev's declaration of a unilateral nuclear test freeze, see for example, Serge Schmemmann, "Gorbachev Seeks To Talk To Reagan On Atom Test Ban," *New York Times*, March 30, 1986, p. 1 ("Moscow announced a halt of its testing program last July, asking Washington to join in").

5. The response of some of the most prominent disarmament activists is illustrated by a three-page funding letter sent out by the Institute for Defense & Disarmament Studies in March 1985, signed by its director, Randall Forsberg, who deserves much of the credit for the successes of the nuclear freeze campaign. Chomsky discusses and quotes from this letter as follows (*Turning the Tide: U.S. Interventionism in Central America and the Struggle for Peace*, Boston: South End, 1985, p. 188):

The Institute, which "launched the nuclear freeze movement in 1980," accomplished what it set out to do: it educated the public to support a nuclear freeze. But this popular success did not lead to "a *real* electoral choice on the issue in 1984." Why? Because of "expert opposition to the freeze," which prevented Mondale [the Democratic candidate] from taking a supportive position. The conclusion, then, is that we must devote our efforts to "building expert support": convincing the experts. This achieved, we will be able to move to a nuclear freeze.

6. Rosa Parks attended the Highlander Folk School's 1955 School Desegregation Workshop, and in December of that year began the Montgomery Bus Boycott. Tennessee officials shut down the Highlander School in 1962, after it had been attacked by white segregationists and others as a "Communist training school." A new institution, the Highlander Research and Education Center, was founded in its wake. Highlander had been a meeting place for various Socialist and Communist associations, and its founders "envisioned the rise of a radical coalition in support of an aggressive, interracial movement of industrial workers and farmers in the South," although "neither [its founder Myles] Horton nor any other faculty member ever took the final step and joined the Communist party." See John M. Glen, *Highlander: No Ordinary School*, Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1996, pp. 162-164, 54-55; Frank Adams, *Unearthing Seeds of Fire: The Idea of Highlander*, Winston-Salem, NC: John F. Blair, 1975.

For a remarkable and inspiring book about Highlander and its founder, see Myles Horton, *The Long Haul: An Autobiography*, New York: Teachers College Press, 1998.

7. On the Joint Chiefs of Staff's fear of "civil disorder" in 1968, see chapter 1 of *U.P.* and its footnote 77.

8. On the "Wise Men"'s mission, see for example, George C. Herring, *America's Longest War: 1950-1975*, New York: Knopf, 1986, pp. 202-208. The author reviews President Johnson's briefing with the "Wise Men" on March 26, 1968, and the "tremendous erosion of support" for the war among the nation's business and legal elite. The "Wise Men" were Dean Acheson, George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Douglas Dillon, Cyrus Vance, Arthur Dean, John McCloy, Omar Bradley, Matthew Ridgway, Maxwell Taylor, Robert Murphy, Henry Cabot Lodge, Abe Fortas, and Arthur Goldberg; Presidential adviser Clark Clifford also was highly influential during the period. There is additional discussion of the economic crisis of mid-March 1968 in the 1996 expanded edition of Herring's book at pp. 220-227. See also footnote 77 of chapter 1 of *U.P.*

9. On Thomas Jefferson's view of corporations, as well as his view of the effect of economic inequality on democracy, see for example, John F. Manley, "American Liberalism and the Democratic Dream: Transcending the American Dream," *Policy Studies Review*, Vol. 10, No. 1, Fall 1990, pp. 89f. An excerpt (pp. 97-99):

Jefferson did not support capitalism; he supported independent production. . . . The fundamental Jeffersonian proposition is that "widespread poverty and concentrated wealth cannot exist side by side in a democracy." This proposition is dismissed by liberals making peace with the rich and coming to terms with inequality, but Jefferson perceived the basic contradictions between democracy and capitalism. . . . In 1817 he complained that the banks' mania "is raising up a monied aristocracy in our country which has already set the government at defiance. . . ." A year earlier he said he hoped the United States would reject the British example and "crush in it's [sic] birth the aristocracy of our monied corporations which dare already to challenge our government to a trial of strength and bid defiance to the laws of our country. . . ."

Jefferson understood that Democracy was problematic. But the alternatives were rule by the rich, or a despot. "I am not among those who fear the people," he writes. "They, and not the rich, are our dependence for continued freedom. . . . [S]how me where the people have done half the mischief in these forty years, that a single despot would have done in a single year. . . ." Jefferson reminds us that democracy is impossible without a large measure of social and economic equality.

Charles Sellers, *The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. An excerpt (pp. 269-270, 106):

Jefferson's deathbed faith overcame deep misgivings. . . . Men divide naturally into two parties, "aristocrats and democrats," he wrote. On one side stood "those who fear and distrust the people, and wish to draw all powers from them into the hands of the higher classes"; on the other stood "those who identify with the people, have confidence in them, cherish and consider them as the honest & safe, altho' not the most wise depository of the public interests. . . ." He was alarmed by a Republican Congress "at a loss for objects whereon to throw away the supposed fathomless funds of the treasury." Soon he would conclude that these younger National Republicans have "nothing in them of the feelings or principles of '76." They wanted a "single and splendid government of an aristocracy, founded on banking institutions, and moneyed incorporations," he complained, through which the few would soon be "riding and ruling over the plundered ploughman and beggared yeomanry."

10. On Adam Smith's view of corporations, see for example, Patricia Werhane, *Adam Smith and His Legacy for Modern Capitalism*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. An excerpt (p. 125):

Smith [had a] genuine fear of institutions, as shown in his critique of the system of mercantilism, of monopolies, and of political or economic institutions that favor some individuals over others. Smith questions the existence of "joint-stock companies" (corporations), except in exceptional circumstances, because the institutionalization of management power separated from ownership creates institutional management power cut loose from responsibility. Smith's fear is that such institutions might become personified, so that one would regard them as real entities and hence treat them as incapable of being dismantled.

See also, Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976 (original 1776). An excerpt (Book V, ch. I, pt. iii, art. i, pp. 280-282):

To establish a joint stock company, however, for any undertaking, merely because such a company might be capable of managing it successfully; or to exempt a particular set of dealers from some of the general laws which take place with regard to all their neighbours, merely because they might be capable of thriving if they had such an exemption, would certainly not be reasonable. To render such an establishment perfectly reasonable . . . it ought to appear with the clearest evidence, that the undertaking is of greater and more general utility than the greater part of common trades. . . . The joint stock companies, which are established for the public-spirited purpose of promoting some particular manufacture, over and above managing their own affairs ill, to the diminution of the general stock of the society, can in other respects scarce ever fail to do more harm than good. Notwithstanding the most upright intentions, the unavoidable partiality of their directors to particular branches of the manufacture, of which the undertakers mislead and impose upon them, is a real discouragement to the rest, and necessarily breaks, more or less, that natural proportion which would otherwise establish itself between judicious industry and profit, and which, to the general industry of the country, is of all encouragements the greatest and the most effectual.

And see chapter 5 of *U.P.* and its footnote 1; and footnote 91 of chapter 10 of *U.P.*

11. On the development of corporate rights by lawyers and judges, without public participation, during the nineteenth century, see chapter 9 of *U.P.* and its footnote 35.

12. On industrial democracy having been a goal of the U.S. labor movement, see chapter 9 of *U.P.* and its footnote 33 (also see its footnote 15).

13. "Resist, Inc." can be contacted at: 259 Elm St., Suite 201, Somerville, MA, 02144, (617) 623-5110 (www.resistinc.org). "Funding Exchange" is a national network office for progressive funding organizations in the United States: 666 Broadway #500, New York, NY, 10012, (212) 529-5300 (www.fex.org). For lists of activist groups, see the political action resource guides cited in footnote 2 of this chapter.

14. On the violence of American labor history, see for example, Patricia Cayo Sexton, *The War on Labor and the Left: Understanding America's Unique Conservatism*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991, chs. 4, 6, and 7. An excerpt (pp. 55, 58, 65):

Labor everywhere has "war stories" to tell, but nowhere has the record been as violent as in the United States. . . . One review of some major U.S. strikes puts the figure at 700 dead and untold thousands seriously injured in labor disputes, but these figures, though impressive, include only strike casualties reported in newspapers between 1877 and 1968; and may therefore grossly underestimate the total casualties. (During the 1877-1968 period, state and federal troops intervened in labor disputes more than 160 times, almost invariably on behalf of employers.) In the seven years from 1890 to 1897, an estimated 92 people were killed in some major strikes, and from January 1, 1902, to September 1904, an estimated 198 people were killed and 1,966 injured. These casualties were overwhelmingly strikers killed or injured in some major strikes and lockouts. . . . After the adoption of some protective legislation, between 1947 and 1962, violence and militia intervention declined, but an estimated 29 people were killed in major strikes during the period, 20 of them in the South. By contrast, only 1 person in Britain has been killed in a strike since 1911. . . .

Over the years, labor espionage has been a large and profitable business. In April 1946, for example, some 230 agencies were in the business, the largest of them being William J. Burns's International Detective Agency, Inc. (operating in forty-three cities) and [Allan] Pinkerton's National Detective Agency, Inc. (operating in thirty-four cities). In just three top agencies, an estimated 135,000 men were employed at one point, operating in over 100 offices and more than 10,000 local branches, and earning some \$65 million annually for the agencies. . . . [D]uring the 1930s the agencies charged employers an estimated \$80 million a year. General Motors testified before the LaFollette [Congressional] committee that it paid about a million dollars to such agencies from January 1934 through July 1936. . . . The use of espionage agencies and *professional* strikebreakers has been almost unknown in European and other developed democracies.

John Streuben, *Strike Strategy*, New York: Gaer, 1950, pp. 300-309 (listing 143 deaths in the United States which were officially attributed to labor-management disputes between 1933 and 1949); David Montgomery, "Afterword," in David Demarest, ed., *The River Ran Red: Homestead 1892*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992, pp. 225-228; Jeremy Brecher, *Strike!*, Cambridge, MA: South End, 1997 (revised and updated edition; original 1972)(a valuable U.S. labor history). See also footnote 32 of this chapter; and footnote 81 of chapter 10 of *U.P.*

15. On the British press's reaction to the violence of U.S. labor relations in the late nineteenth century, see for example, Patricia Cayo Sexton, *The War on Labor and the Left: Understanding America's Unique Conservatism*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991, pp. 83, 100.

16. On the role of state subsidies in the U.S. economy, see chapter 3 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 10; chapter 7 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 38 to 44, 51 and 53; and chapter 10 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 22 and 23. See also chapter 2 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 4 and 5.

17. On discussion of popular democracy in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century revolutions, see for example, Christopher Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas during the English Revolution*, New York: Viking, 1972. Radical democrats in the seventeenth-century English Revolution argued (p. 48):

[I]t will never be a good world while knights and gentlemen make us laws, that are chosen for fear and do but oppress us, and do not know the people's sores. It will never be well with us till we have Parliaments of countrymen like ourselves, that know our wants.

The same sentiment was voiced in the American colonies in the eighteenth century (Gordon Wood, *The Radicalism Of The American Revolution*, New York: Vintage, 1991, pp. 244-245):

What alarmed the gentry of the 1760s and 1770s . . . were the growing ideologically backed claims by ordinary people to a share in the actual conduct of government. It was one thing for ordinary people to take part in a mob or to vote; for them to participate in the deliberations and decisions of government was quite another. . . . [T]he artisans were not content simply to be a pressure group. They wanted to make governmental decisions for themselves, and they now called for explicit representation of their interests in government. . . .

The traditional gentry no longer seemed capable of speaking for the interests of artisans or any other groups of ordinary people. "If ever therefore your rights are preserved," the mechanics told each other, "it must be through the virtue and integrity of the middling sort, as farmers, tradesmen, etc. who despise venality, and best know the sweets of liberty." Artisans, they said, could trust in government only spokesmen of their own kind.

18. Chomsky expanded on his views about specialized expertise in government planning -- and popular democracy in general -- in a 1976 interview on British television ("The Relevance of Anarcho-Syndicalism/The Jay Interview," in Noam Chomsky, *Radical Priorities*, Montreal: Black Rose, 1981, pp. 245-261 at p. 259):

I don't really believe that we need a separate bureaucracy to carry out governmental decisions. . . . [L]et's take expertise with regard to economic planning, because certainly in any complex industrial society there should be a group of technicians whose task is to produce plans, and to lay out the consequences of decisions, to explain to the people who have to make the decisions that if you decide this, you're going to likely get this consequence, because that's what your programming model shows, and so on. But the point is that those planning systems are themselves industries, and they will have their workers' councils and they will be part of the whole council system, and the distinction is that these planning systems do not make decisions, they produce plans in exactly the same way that automakers produce autos. The plans are then available for the workers' councils and council assemblies in the same way that autos are available to ride in. Now of course what this does require is an informed and educated working class, but that's precisely what we are capable of achieving in advanced industrial societies.

19. For samples of Rothbard's vision, see for example, Murray Rothbard, *For a New Liberty*, New York: Macmillan, 1973, especially chs. 10-13. An excerpt (pp. 202, 210, 214-216, 220-221, 229, 269-270):

Abolition of the public sector means, of course, that *all* pieces of land, all land areas, including streets and roads, would be owned privately, by individuals, corporations, cooperatives, or any other voluntary groupings of individuals and capital. . . . Any maverick road owner who insisted on a left-hand drive or green for "stop" instead of "go" would soon find himself with numerous accidents, and the disappearance of customers and users. . . . [W]hat about *driving* on congested urban streets? How could this be priced? There are numerous possible ways. In the first place the downtown street owners might require anyone driving on their streets to buy a license. . . . Modern technology may make feasible the requirement that all cars equip themselves with a meter. . . . Professor Vickery has also suggested . . . T.V. cameras at the intersections of the most congested streets. . . .

[I]f police services were supplied on a free, competitive market . . . consumers would pay for whatever degree of protection they wish to purchase. The consumers who just want to see a policeman once in a while would pay less than those who want continuous patrolling, and far less than those who demand twenty-four-hour bodyguard service. . . . Any police firm that suffers from gross inefficiency would soon go bankrupt and disappear. . . . Free-market police would not only be efficient, they would have a strong incentive to be courteous and to refrain from brutality against either their clients or their clients' friends or customers. A private Central Park would be guarded efficiently in order to maximize park revenue. . . . Possibly, each individual would subscribe to a court service, paying a monthly premium. . . .

If a private firm owned Lake Erie, for example, then anyone dumping garbage in the lake would be promptly sued in the courts.

20. On British capitalists' discussions of the need to "create wants" in Jamaica after the abolition of slavery in the 1830s, see for example, Thomas Holt, *The Problem of Freedom: Race, Labor, and Politics in Jamaica and Britain, 1832-1938*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992, especially 44-73. This study notes that as abolition was being prepared in Jamaica, British Member of Parliament Rigby Watson argued on June 10, 1833 (p. 54):

"To make them labour, and give them a taste for luxuries and comforts, they must be gradually taught to desire those objects which could be attained by human labour. There was a regular progress from the possession of necessaries to the desire of luxuries; and what once were luxuries, gradually came, among all classes and conditions of men, to be necessaries. This was the sort of progress the negroes had to go through, and this was the sort of education to which they ought to be subject in their period of probation [after emancipation]."

Similarly, John Daughtrey remarked (p. 71):

"Every step they take in this direction is a real improvement; artificial wants become in time real wants. The formation of such habits affords the best security for negro labour at the end of the apprenticeship."

The British leaders also addressed the problem of the fertile land that would be available to the newly freed slaves (p. 73):

Early in 1836, Lord Glenelg [the Colonial Secretary] forwarded to all the West Indian governors a dispatch addressing one of these policy problems. He began by noting that during slavery, labor could be compelled to be applied wherever the owner desired. Now, with the end of apprenticeship, the laborer would apply himself only to those tasks that promised personal benefit. Therefore, if the cultivation of sugar and coffee were to continue, "we must make it the immediate and apparent interest of the negro population to employ their labour in raising them." He was apprehensive about their ability to do this, repeating the now familiar maxim that given the demographic patterns of former slave colonies such as Jamaica -- "where there is land enough to yield an abundant subsistence to the whole population in return for slight labour" -- blacks would not work. . . . "Should things be left to their natural course, labour would not be attracted to the cultivation of exportable produce. . . ." Glenelg went on to prescribe the means by which the government would interdict these natural proclivities. It was essential that the ex-slaves be prevented from obtaining land.

21. For other examples of capitalists' conscious discussions of the necessity of "creating wants," see for example, Aviva Chomsky, *West Indian Workers and the United Fruit Company in Costa Rica, 1870-1940*, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996. An excerpt (pp. 56-59):

[The United Fruit] company claimed in its propaganda that its role was to instill consumer values among its workers. . . . In 1929, Crowther, another United Fruit biographer, explicitly explained the importance of the spread of a consumer mentality as he waxed eloquent on the virtues of capitalism and bemoaned the immoral effects of a subsistence economy: "The mozos or working people [in Central America] have laboured only when forced to and that was not often, for the land would give them what little they needed." But this could be changed, he explained, by infusing these laborers with the desire for upward mobility. "The desire for goods, it may be

remarked, is something that has to be cultivated. In the United States this desire has been cultivated. . . . American movies, radio, and especially magazines were everywhere, and "our advertising is slowly having the same effect as in the United States -- and it is reaching the *mozos*. For when a periodical is discarded, it is grabbed up, and its advertising pages turn up as wall paper in the thatched huts. I have seen the insides of huts completely covered with American magazine pages. . . . All of this is having its effect in awakening desires."

Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934*, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971. An excerpt (p. 158):

[T]he problem of introducing American pragmatism and efficiency involved confrontation with basic Haitian values and ambitions regarding work and material rewards for work. . . . Financial Adviser Arthur C. Millspaugh stated: "The peasants, living lives which to us seem indolent and shiftless, are enviably carefree and contented; but, if they are to be citizens of an independent self-governing nation, they must acquire, or at least a larger number of them must acquire, a new set of wants" [see Arthur Millspaugh (U.S. consul in Haiti), "Our Haitian Problem," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. VII, No. 4, July 1929, pp. 556-570].

Angie Debo, *And Still The Waters Run*, New York: Gordian, 1966 (original 1940), especially pp. 20-30 (classic study discussing the U.S. government's efforts to drive an awareness of their true wants into the native population during its program of "Indian removal" and annexation). An excerpt (pp. 21-23):

Senator Henry L. Dawes of Massachusetts, a distinguished Indian theorist, gave a glowing description of a visit of inspection he had recently made to the Indian Territory [in 1883]. The most partisan Indian would hardly have painted such an idealized picture of his people's happiness and prosperity and culture, but, illogically, the Senator advocated a change in this perfect society because it held the wrong principles of property ownership. Speaking apparently of the Cherokees, he said: "The head chief told us that there was not a family in that whole nation that had not a home of its own. There was not a pauper in that nation, and the nation did not owe a dollar. It built its own capitol, in which we had this examination, and it built its schools and its hospitals. Yet the defect of the system was apparent. They have gone as far as they can go, because they own their land in common. It is Henry George's system [George was a nineteenth-century American land reformer], and under that there is no enterprise to make your home any better than that of your neighbors. There is no selfishness, which is at the bottom of civilization. Till this people will consent to give up their lands, and divide them among their citizens so that each can own the land he cultivates, they will not make much more progress."

The Conference [of Eastern philanthropic "friends of the Indians"] accepted this viewpoint, and continued to advocate "reform" with all the earnestness of a moral crusade. Like Senator Dawes, the members based their opposition purely upon theoretical belief in the sanctity of private ownership rather than upon any understanding of the Indian nature or any investigation of actual conditions. With regard to Indians in general, their program in 1903 comprised . . . the division of the communal holdings among the individual Indians, to be held under the same conditions of taxation and freedom to alienate as the white man's farm. . . . In response to this faith in private ownership, Congress passed the Dawes Severalty Act in 1887. It provided that Indian reservations should be allotted in 160-acre tracts to heads of families, 80 acres to unmarried adults, and 40 acres to children; and that the remainder should be purchased by the Government and thrown open to homestead entry.

Richard Ohmann, *Selling Culture: Magazines, Markets, and Class at the Turn of the Century*, London: Verso, 1996 (on the escalating need for advertising commercial products at the turn of the century). See also chapter 10 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 74 to 80.

22. For a review of early vilification of Chomsky, see Christopher Hitchens, "The Chorus and Cassandra: What Everyone Knows About Noam Chomsky," *Grand Street*, Autumn 1985, pp. 106-131 (reprinted in Christopher Hitchens, *Prepared for the Worst: Selected Essays and Minority Reports*, New York: Hill and Wang, 1988, pp. 58-77).

23. For the *Boston Globe's* reaction to the International Days of Protest, see "The Viet Protests: From Boston to Waikiki Beach -- Cheers, Jeers, Eggs, Paint Greet Marching Thousands," *Boston Globe*, October 17, 1965, p. 1. The front page was divided in half, with coverage of the protest under the subheading "Those Who Walked . . ." and coverage of wounded Vietnam War veterans under the subheading " . . . Some Who Couldn't." Photos of four wheelchair-bound veterans accompanied the articles. This is a description of the demonstration in Boston:

The peace rally, planned as a climax to the well-organized march, came to grief as speakers tried vainly to make themselves heard. A crowd of 2000 spectators . . . were totally hostile to the marchers, greeting them with shouts of "Go into the Army," "Fight for your country," and "Go back to Russia. . . ."

When state Rep. Irving Fishman of Newton, a Democrat, rose to address the crowd, he could get only nine words out. . . . Angry shouts drowned out anything else he had to say. . . . [I]n the middle of it all, the Common rang out with echoes of "America the Beautiful," "God Bless America," the national anthem and other patriotic music.

The reaction was even more hostile in New York City and Berkeley:

In New York, a flying wedge of spectators cracked through police barricades and beat demonstrators to the pavement during a march of 13,000 persons down Fifth Ave. A gang of 35 "Hell's Angels," a notorious gang of California motor cycle riders, swarmed through police barricades and attacked marchers at Berkeley. . . .

[A] quart container of red paint was hurled at the first rank of demonstrators. It splattered over half a dozen marchers, drenching their hair, shoulders and clothes. Eggs flying from different directions splashed others. The marchers walked on unsmiling as shouts of "Treason, Treason!" came from spectators on the sidewalk. . . . Men and women were brought to the pavement by flying tackles and punches before police could restore order.

See also, "LBJ Deplores 'Peace' March," *Boston Globe*, October 19, 1965, p. 1.

Chomsky remarked in his 1967 essay "On Resistance" (*American Power And The New Mandarins: Historical and Political Essays*, New York: Pantheon, 1969, pp. 370-371):

After the first International Days of Protest in October 1965, Senator [Mike] Mansfield criticized the "sense of utter irresponsibility" shown by the demonstrators. He had nothing to say then, nor has he since, about the "sense of utter irresponsibility" shown by Senator Mansfield and others who stand by quietly and vote appropriations as the cities and villages of North Vietnam are demolished, as millions of refugees in the South are driven from their homes by American bombardment. He has nothing to say about the moral standards or the respect for law of those who have permitted this tragedy. I speak of Senator Mansfield precisely because he is not a breast-beating

superpatriot who wants America to rule the world, but is rather an American intellectual in the best sense, a scholarly and reasonable man -- the kind of man who is the terror of our age.

24. One commentator summarized the so-called "Faurisson affair" as follows (Milan Rai, *Chomsky's Politics*, London: Verso, 1995, pp. 131-132):

[Chomsky] regards academic freedom, and the freedom of expression, as absolute values, important in themselves. For such reasons, he "supported the rights of American war criminals not only to speak and teach but also to conduct their research, on grounds of academic freedom, at a time when their work was being used to murder and destroy." He later conceded that this was a position "that I am not sure I could defend."

Chomsky's most famous defence of academic freedom was in relation to the "Faurisson affair," when Robert Faurisson, a professor of French literature at the University of Lyons, was deprived of research facilities and driven from his position for denying that gas chambers were used to kill Jews under the Nazis. A court later convicted Faurisson of the crime of failing his "responsibility" as a historian, and "de laisser prendre en charge, par autrui, son discours dans une intention d'apologie des crimes de guerre ou d'incitation à la haine raciale," among other charges [i.e. letting others use his statements as an apology for war crimes or an inducement to racial hatred]. Chomsky, in the company of hundreds of others, signed a petition in 1979 deploring this infringement of academic freedom. Subsequently he wrote a short essay on the need to defend freedom of expression, which was used without his knowledge as the preface to a book about the gas chambers by Faurisson. Chomsky's critics used these actions in defence of Faurisson's civil rights to smear Chomsky as a supporter of Holocaust denial.

For samples of the English-language defamation campaign in the "Faurisson affair," see for example, Werner Cohn, *The Hidden Alliances of Noam Chomsky*, New York: Americans for a Safe Israel, 1988. An excerpt (pp. 1-2):

[T]he fact that he also maintains important connections with the neo-Nazi movement of our time -- that he is, in a certain sense, the most important patron of that movement -- is well known only in France. . . . [D]enials have not prevented [Chomsky] from prolonged and varied political collaboration with the neo-Nazi movement. . . .

One characteristic of Chomsky's political writings that does raise immediate questions about his judgment is his obvious animus toward the United States and Israel. He occasionally says bad things about most of the governments of the world but it is Israel and the United States for which he reserves his extraordinary vitriol. Chomsky is careful not to justify Hitler explicitly but his writings create the impression that the Nazis could not have been any worse than the "war criminals" of the United States and Israel today. Moreover, and this is indeed curious, almost all references to Nazis in his books turn out to be denunciations of Nazi-like behavior on the part of Israelis.

Nadine Fresco, "The Denial of the Dead: On the Faurisson Affair," *Dissent*, Fall 1981, pp. 467f. An excerpt (p. 470):

You, Noam Chomsky, *believe* in the existence of the gas chambers: but is this mere opinion . . .? Wishing to teach the intolerant French a lesson, Chomsky incessantly refers them to their own classics, specifically to Voltaire [who wrote: "I detest what you write, but I would give my life to make it possible for you to continue to write"]. I cannot help but be annoyed (in a manner entirely irrational) by the fact that in this

Faurisson affair, which, admittedly, has a little something to do with anti-Semitism . . . Chomsky chooses as a model someone who in 1745 wrote about the Jews: "You will not find in them anything but an ignorant and barbarous people who have for a long time combined the most sordid avarice with the most detestable superstition."

Pierre Vidal-Naquet, "A Paper Eichmann?," *democracy*, April 1981, pp. 70f. An excerpt (pp. 94-95):

What is scandalous about this petition [that Chomsky signed] is that it doesn't for one moment ask whether what Faurisson says is true or false; and it even describes his findings as though they were the result of serious historical research. Of course, it can be contended that everybody has the right to lie and "bear false witness," a right that is inseparable from the liberty of the individual and recognized, in the liberal tradition, as due the accused for his defense. But the right that a "false witness" [i.e. Faurisson] may claim should not be granted him in the name of truth.

Martin Peretz, "Washington Diarist," *New Republic*, January 3, 1981, p. 38. An excerpt:

I mentioned Chomsky in this space with reference to his apologetics on behalf of the Honorable Pol Pot. . . . His latest departure from linguistics . . . [is] Chomsky's little epistle in Faurisson's defense. . . . On the question . . . as to whether or not six million Jews were murdered, Noam Chomsky apparently is an agnostic.

Peretz then further claims that Chomsky denies freedom of expression to his opponents, referring to Chomsky's comment that one degrades oneself by entering into debate over certain issues -- apparently reasoning that if one refuses to debate you, they constrain your freedom. Peretz is careful to conceal the example which Chomsky cited when making this comment: the Holocaust.

For the context of Chomsky's remark about "degrading oneself by entering into debate over certain issues," see Noam Chomsky, *American Power and the New Mandarins: Historical and Political Essays*, New York: Pantheon, 1969. An excerpt (pp. 8-9):

During these years, I have taken part in more conferences, debates, forums, teach-ins, meetings on Vietnam and American imperialism than I care to remember. Perhaps I should mention that, increasingly, I have had a certain feeling of falseness in these lectures and discussions. This feeling does not have to do with the intellectual issues. The basic facts are clear enough; the assessment of the situation is as accurate as I can make it. But the entire performance is emotionally and morally false in a disturbing way.

It is a feeling that I have occasionally been struck by before. I remember reading an excellent study of Hitler's East European policies a number of years ago in a mood of grim fascination. The author was trying hard to be cool and scholarly and objective, to stifle the only human response to a plan to enslave and destroy millions of subhuman organisms so that the inheritors of the spiritual values of Western civilization would be free to develop a higher form of society in peace. Controlling this elementary human reaction, we enter into a technical debate with the Nazi intelligentsia: Is it technically feasible to dispose of millions of bodies? What is the evidence that the Slavs are inferior beings? Must they be ground under foot or returned to their "natural" home in the East so that this great culture can flourish, to the benefit of all mankind? Is it true that the Jews are a cancer eating away at the vitality of the German people? and so on. Without awareness, I found myself drawn into this morass of insane rationality -- inventing arguments to counter and demolish the constructions of the Bormanns and the Rosenbergs.

By entering into the arena of argument and counterargument, of technical feasibility and tactics, of footnotes and citations, by accepting the presumption of

legitimacy of debate on certain issues, one has already lost one's humanity. This is the feeling I find almost impossible to repress when going through the motions of building a case against the American war in Vietnam.

For other remarks about the Holocaust in Chomsky's early writings, see Noam Chomsky, *At War With Asia: Essays on Indochina*, New York: Pantheon, 1974 (quotation from a 1970 essay). An excerpt (p. 307):

[O]ne cannot compare American policy [in the Indochina wars] to that of Nazi Germany, as of 1942. It would be more difficult to argue that American policy is not comparable to that of fascist Japan, or of Germany prior to the "final solution." There may be those who are prepared to tolerate any policy less ghastly than crematoria and death camps and to reserve their horror for the particular forms of criminal insanity perfected by the Nazi technicians. Others will not lightly disregard comparisons which, though harsh, may well be accurate. Nazi Germany was *sui generis*, of that there is no doubt. But we should have the courage and honesty to face the question whether the principles applied to Nazi Germany and fascist Japan do not, as well, apply to the American war in Vietnam.

Noam Chomsky, *Peace in the Middle East? Reflections on Justice and Nationhood*, New York: Vintage, 1974, pp. 57-58 (the Zionist case "relies on the aspirations of a people who suffered two millennia of exile and savage persecution culminating in the most fantastic outburst of collective insanity in human history").

For further discussion of the "Faurisson affair," see for example, Christopher Hitchens, "The Chorus and Cassandra: What Everyone Knows About Noam Chomsky," *Grand Street*, Autumn 1985, pp. 119-125; Brian Morton, "Chomsky Then and Now," *Nation*, May 7, 1988, pp. 646-652; Noam Chomsky, *Réponses inédites à mes détracteurs Parisiens*, Paris: Spartacus, n/d; Noam Chomsky, "The Faurisson Affair: His Right to Say It," *Nation*, February 28, 1981, pp. 231f. An excerpt (pp. 232-234):

I have taken far more controversial stands than this in support of civil liberties and academic freedom. At the height of the Vietnam war, I publicly took the stand that people I believe are authentic war criminals should not be denied the right to teach on political or ideological grounds, and I have always taken the same stand with regard to scientists who "prove" that blacks are genetically inferior, in a country where their history is hardly pleasant, and where such views will be used by racists and neo-Nazis. Whatever one thinks of Faurisson, no one has accused him of being the architect of major war crimes or claiming that Jews are genetically inferior (though it is irrelevant to the civil-liberties issue, he writes of the "heroic insurrection of the Warsaw ghetto" and praises those who "fought courageously against Nazism" in "the right cause"). I even wrote in 1969 that it would be wrong to bar counterinsurgency research in the universities, though it was being used to murder and destroy, a position that I am not sure I could defend. What is interesting is that these far more controversial stands never aroused a peep of protest, which shows that the refusal to accept the right of free expression without retaliation, and the horror when others defend this right, is rather selective. . . .

It seems to me something of a scandal that it is even necessary to debate these issues two centuries after Voltaire defended the right of free expression for views he detested. It is a poor service to the memory of the victims of the holocaust to adopt a central doctrine of their murderers.

Asked years later in an interview if, in retrospect, he would not have written the statement on freedom of speech which was included as a "preface" to Faurisson's book - without Chomsky's advance knowledge -- Chomsky responded (Noam Chomsky,

Chronicles of Dissent: Interviewed by David Barsamian, Monroe, ME: Common Courage, 1992, p. 264):

If you ask me, should I have done it, I'll answer, yes. In retrospect, would it have been better not to do it, maybe. Only in the sense that it would have given less opportunity for people of the Dershowitz variety [Harvard law professor, discussed in footnote 27 of this chapter], who are very much committed to preventing free speech on the Arab-Israeli issues, and free exchange of ideas.

I don't know. You could say on tactical grounds maybe yes, but that's not the way to proceed, in my view. You should do what you think is right and not what's going to be tactically useful.

For comparison with reactions to the exposure of Nazis in George Bush's 1988 election campaign and to the Reagan administration's opposition to a Holocaust education program, see chapter 2 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 37, 38 and 39.

25. For samples of the defamation campaign concerning Chomsky's writings on Cambodia, see for example, Stephen Morris, "Chomsky on U.S. foreign policy," *Harvard International Review*, December-January 1981, pp. 3f (and the exchange of letters in the April-May 1981 issue). An excerpt (pp. 4, 27, 30-31):

Once the evidence of Indochinese Communist behavior began to accumulate . . . [Chomsky's] response was to deny the evidence of repression. . . . The work under review, *The Political Economy of Human Rights* . . . is the most extensive rewriting of a period of contemporary history ever produced in a nontotalitarian society. . . .

[T]he moral climax of the Chomsky-Herman book [is] their apologies for Pol Pot. . . . [F]or the entire period since 1975 Chomsky has devoted an enormous amount of his time to the task of trying to discredit accounts of repression in Indochina, while promoting accounts which paint a more benign picture of the new orders. . . . [The] revelations of horror stirred Professor Chomsky to write in defense of Pol Pot. The 160 pages of *The Political Economy of Human Rights* which deal with Cambodia represent the most recent and extensive effort in this vein. . . . [Chomsky and Edward Herman] are totalitarian political ideologues, with an intense emotional commitment to the cause of anti-Americanism. Operating on the principle that "my enemy's enemy is my friend" they have wholeheartedly embraced the struggle of two of the world's most ruthlessly brutal regimes [i.e. Cambodia and Vietnam].

Fred Barnes, "My Change Of Heart: Coming around to the noble cause," *New Republic*, April 29, 1985, pp. 11-12. An excerpt (p. 12):

Who among [the leaders of the antiwar movement] has been willing to suggest that the murder of a million or more Cambodians by the Khmer Rouge might have been averted if American military force had not been removed from Indochina? If any of them spoke out that way, I missed it. But I did hear Noam Chomsky seek to prove the Cambodian genocide hadn't happened.

Geoffrey Sampson, "Censoring *20th Century Culture*: the case of Noam Chomsky," *New Criterion*, October 1984, pp. 7-16 (and see the exchange of letters in the January 1985 issue, and commentary on it in Alexander Cockburn, "Beat The Devil," *Nation*, December 22, 1984, p. 670, as well as the exchange of letters in the *Nation* on March 2, 1985, p. 226); Leopold Labedz, "Under Western Eyes: Chomsky Revisited," *Encounter*, July 1980, pp. 28f (an article which, together with many inventions and falsifications about Chomsky's stance on the Cambodian genocide, also is notable for its apologetics for the Western-backed atrocities in East Timor). Chomsky points out with regard to

Labeledz's article (*Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies*, Boston: South End, 1989, p. 383 n.31):

That the lies were conscious in this case is indicated by the fact that the journal refused to permit a response that exposed the falsifications point by point, so that the article can therefore be quoted, reprinted with acclaim, etc. It is standard for dissidents to be denied the right of response to personal attacks, and it is reasonable to suppose that in such cases the journal recognizes the need for protection of fabrications that would be all too readily exposed if response were not barred.

Chomsky and Edward Herman stated their thesis in the opening pages of their chapter "Cambodia," in Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, *After the Cataclysm: Postwar Indochina and the Reconstruction of Imperial Ideology -- The Political Economy of Human Rights: Volume II*, Boston: South End, 1979, pp. 135-136, 139-140:

[I]n the case of Cambodia, there is no difficulty in documenting major atrocities and oppression, primarily from the reports of refugees, since Cambodia has been almost entirely closed to the West since the war's end. One might imagine that in the United States, which bears a major responsibility for what Francois Ponchaud calls "the calvary [i.e. crucifixion] of a people," reporting and discussion would be tinged with guilt and regret. That has rarely been the case, however. The U.S. role and responsibility have been quickly forgotten or even explicitly denied as the mills of the propaganda machine grind away. . . . [On this "role and responsibility," see chapter 3 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 61 to 65.]

The record of atrocities in Cambodia is substantial and often gruesome, but it has by no means satisfied the requirements of Western propagandists, who must labor to shift the blame for the torment of Indochina to the victims of France and the United States. Consequently, there has been extensive fabrication of evidence, a tide that is not stemmed even by repeated exposure. Furthermore, more tempered and cautious assessments are given little notice, as is evidence that runs contrary to the chorus of denunciation that has dominated the Western media. The coverage of real and fabricated atrocities in Cambodia also stands in dramatic contrast to the silence with regard to atrocities comparable in scale within U.S. domains -- Timor, for example [on the media's coverage of East Timor, see chapter 8 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 40 and 42]. This coverage has conferred on that land of much suffering [Cambodia] the distinction of being perhaps the most extensively reported Third World country in U.S. journalism. At the same time, propagandists in the press and elsewhere, recognizing a good thing when they see it, like to pretend that their lone and courageous voice of protest can barely be heard, or alternatively, that controversy is raging about events in postwar Cambodia. . . . As in the other cases discussed, our primary concern here is not to establish the facts with regard to postwar Indochina, but rather to investigate their refraction through the prism of Western ideology, a very different task.

In the third-to-last paragraph of the chapter, the authors also stressed (p. 293):

When the facts are in, it may turn out that the more extreme condemnations were in fact correct. But even if that turns out to be the case, it will in no way alter the conclusions we have reached on the central question addressed here: how the available facts were selected, modified, or sometimes invented to create a certain image offered to the general population.

The same point also was made in the first volume of Chomsky's and Herman's study (Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism -- The Political Economy of Human Rights: Volume I*, Boston: South End, 1979, p. 130):

It is instructive to compare Western reaction to these two instances of reported bloodbaths. In the case of Cambodia reported atrocities have not only been eagerly seized upon by the Western media but also embellished by statistical fabrications -- which, interestingly, persist even after they are exposed. The case of Timor is radically different. The media have shown no interest in examining the atrocities of the Indonesian invaders, though even in absolute numbers these are on the same scale as those reported by sources of comparable credibility concerning Cambodia, and relative to the population, are many times as great.

Chomsky comments (*Deterring Democracy*, New York: Hill and Wang, 1991, pp. 380-381):

The reaction to the exposure [of the differing media treatment of the East Timor and Cambodia genocides] is also instructive: on the Timor half of the comparison, further silence, denial, and apologetics; on the Cambodia half, a great chorus of protest claiming that we were denying or downplaying Pol Pot atrocities. This was a transparent falsehood, though admittedly the distinction between advocating that one try to keep to the truth and downplaying the atrocities of the official enemy is a difficult one for the mind of the commissar, who, furthermore, is naturally infuriated by any challenge to the right to lie in the service of the state, particularly when it is accompanied by a demonstration of the services rendered to ongoing atrocities.

For a review of the defamation campaign about Chomsky's writings on Cambodia, see Christopher Hitchens, "The Chorus and Cassandra: What Everyone Knows About Noam Chomsky," *Grand Street*, Autumn 1985, pp. 107-119. On the case of Cambodia, see Chapter 3 of *U.P.*

26. For Chomsky's stance on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, see chapter 4 of *U.P.*; chapter 5 of *U.P.*; and chapter 8 of *U.P.*

27. Chomsky received his Anti-Defamation League file from an A.D.L. employee who disapproved of the practice when it was being sent to Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz, in preparation for a debate between them -- at which Dershowitz then used the defamatory material that was concocted by the A.D.L.'s surveillance system. See Noam Chomsky, *Chronicles of Dissent: Interviewed by David Barsamian*, Monroe, ME: Common Courage, 1992, pp. 29-30. Dershowitz's particular commitment to defaming Chomsky -- which presumably stems in part from Chomsky's exposure of outright lies about an Israeli court determination that Dershowitz had been advancing in the *Boston Globe*, resulting in the *Globe* ombudsman's determination that the paper would no longer publish Dershowitz's letters -- also is discussed on pp. 259-261 of *Chronicles of Dissent*.

For samples of Dershowitz's attacks on Chomsky, see for example, Alan M. Dershowitz, *Chutzpah*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1991. An excerpt (pp. 174, 177, 201):

Professor Noam Chomsky, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a well-known linguist and anti-Zionist zealot, was asked to join in protesting Faurisson's suspension. I am sure that he welcomed the opportunity, because Faurisson's writings and speeches are stridently anti-Zionist as well as anti-Semitic. Indeed, Professor Chomsky has himself made statements about Zionist exploitation of the tragedy of World War II that are not, in my view, so different from some of those of Faurisson. Chomsky immediately sprang to Faurisson's defense, not only on the issue of free speech, but on the merits of his "scholarship" and of his "character. . . ." One is left to speculate about Chomsky's motives -- political and psychological -- for

becoming so embroiled in the substantive defense of a neo-Nazi Holocaust denier. . .

Noam Chomsky continues to be a popular speaker at universities. His anti-American, anti-Israel, antiwestern, and somewhat paranoid world view will always have a kind of superficial hold on college sophomores. But the attraction rarely extends into the junior year.

Alan M. Dershowitz, "Leftist Cacophony For Human Rights Grows Silent On The Beijing Massacre," Op-Ed, *Los Angeles Times*, June 11, 1989, p. 5. An excerpt:

Chomsky, who rarely lets a day go by without some joyful condemnation of Western democracies, and who has defended Holocaust deniers against charges of anti-Semitism, has been silent about China [after the Tiananmen Square massacre], according to his secretary. . . .

The next time you read or hear condemnation of the United States, Israel or other Western democracies from the likes of [radical criminal defense lawyer William] Kunstler, Chomsky, the P.L.O. and the National Lawyers Guild, remember their selective silence in the face of one of the most inexcusable human-rights violations in recent years.

Chomsky responded to this article by Dershowitz as follows (Noam Chomsky, "Criticism of Socialist Nations For Rights Violations By The Left," Letter, *Los Angeles Times*, June 24, 1989, "Metro section," p. 9):

For 16 years, I have been correcting published lies by Dershowitz, beginning with his vicious defamation of a leading Israeli civil-libertarian. I condemned the massacre in Beijing at once in radio interviews. My first opportunity to comment in print was in the Minneapolis Star-Tribune, where I was invited to write about Gorbachev's reforms and took the occasion (June 7) to add a condemnation of the use of "deadly force" against "popular struggles for democracy and human rights," citing Tian An Men Square and Tbilisi. His reference to my secretary apparently has to do with a call from the Boston Herald asking if I had released a statement on the killings in Beijing. Of course I had not; I have never released a statement on any event, ever.

In contrast, I have (to my regret) been silent for long periods (or always) about atrocities in U.S. domains and elsewhere, among them, U.S. atrocities in Indochina, the U.S.-supported slaughter in Timor, the Sabra-Shatila massacre, etc. To cite merely one example relevant here, in June, 1980, the army of El Salvador invaded the national university, killing the rector, dozens of faculty members, and unknown numbers of students, wrecking libraries and laboratories, burning down the humanities building, etc. I mentioned nothing for 5 years. I am sorry to say that this list could go on and on. Notice that I do not, reciprocally, condemn Dershowitz for his failure to issue public statements on horrendous atrocities; that would be as idiotic as his charges, since, plainly, no human being does this.

Dershowitz's second charge is his rendition of my carefully qualified statement that denial of the existence of gas chambers is not, per se, proof of anti-Semitism; and more generally, that we cannot automatically deduce racist intent from denial or minimization of atrocities, whatever the scale, for example, denial of U.S. atrocities in Indochina, Dershowitz's apologetics for torture and repression in Israel, the denial by scholars of the Armenian genocide and the slaughter of millions of Native Americans, the serious underestimate of Pol Pot's killings by the C.I.A., etc. Racism is too important a phenomenon to be cheapened by exploitation as a political weapon.

Dershowitz is quite right, for once, in saying that we should have a single standard for compliance for human rights. It would be a welcome change if he would

begin to observe this principle instead of publishing absurd lies concerning those who do not accept his doctrinal commitments and shameful double standard.

28. On the exposure of some of the Anti-Defamation League's "intelligence" activities, see for example, Dennis King and Chip Berlet, "ADLgate," *Tikkun*, July, 1993, p. 31. An excerpt:

On April 9, newspaper readers across the nation learned that, the day before, police had raided the San Francisco and Los Angeles offices of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith. . . . It is now the focus of a mushrooming scandal which involves alleged possession of stolen police intelligence files and alleged spying on liberal social-action organizations. . . . According to newspaper reports, other indictments may be imminent in a probe of the A.D.L.'s alleged receipt of confidential data from up to twenty police law enforcement agencies in California alone. The A.D.L. may also face numerous criminal charges for allegedly concealing payments to A.D.L. operatives in violation of California unemployment laws. . . . The San Francisco D.A. has released about 700 pages of police and F.B.I. interviews and documents seized from subjects of the investigations, providing a detailed picture of an organization whose monitoring of extremists has veered out of control.

Roy Bullock has been an A.D.L. operative since 1954. He also appears to have sold information on anti-apartheid activists to the South African government while simultaneously keeping tabs on the same activists for the A.D.L. itself. There is evidence that Bullock had compiled "pinko" files on hundreds of liberal social-action organizations with no relationship to bigotry, including Greenpeace, the N.A.A.C.P., Act Up, New Jewish Agenda, and the Center for Investigative Reporting.

29. For Chomsky's article critiquing Israeli policies, see Noam Chomsky, "Letter to a Friend," *Ha'aretz* (Israel), February 4, 1994 (reprinted as "L'Accord d'Oslo, Vicié au Départ: Une Lettre de Noam Chomsky 'à un ami Israélian,'" *Courier International*, No. 174, March 3-9, 1994).

30. On Chomsky's access to national media, see for example, Milan Rai, *Chomsky's Politics*, London: Verso, 1995. An excerpt (p. 2):

[C]onsider the reaction to Chomsky's examination in the *Fateful Triangle* of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Barely mentioned in the U.S. press, the book was reviewed in every major journal in Canada, and in many minor journals, including the *Financial Post*, Canada's equivalent of the *Wall Street Journal*. The book was also reviewed in the Canadian equivalents of *Time* and *Newsweek*. Chomsky comments, "If the judgement is one of quality, then it's striking that the judgement is so different across the border."

Christopher Hitchens investigated the treatment of *The Fateful Triangle* in some depth: "Consider: One of America's best-known Jewish scholars, internationally respected, writes a lengthy, dense, highly documented book about United States policy in the Levant. The book is acidly critical of Israeli policy and of the apparently limitless American self-deception as to its true character. It quotes sources in Hebrew and French as well as in English. It is published at a time when hundreds of United States marines have been killed in Beirut and when the President is wavering in his commitment, which itself threatens to become a major election issue. It is the only book of its scope (we need make no judgement as to depth) to appear in the continental United States. The screens and the headlines are full of approximations and guesses on the subject. Yet, at this unusually fortunate juncture for publication,

the following newspapers review it: (1) the *Los Angeles Herald-Examiner*, (2) the *Boston Globe*. . . ." Note that the Canadian reviews of the *Fateful Triangle* were generally hostile. What is significant is that in Canada, Chomsky's position is regarded as part of the debate, to be taken seriously. In the United States, he is excluded from the discussion completely.

For rare coverage of Chomsky and his ideas in mainstream sources in the U.S., see for example, Anthony Flint, "Divided legacy: Noam Chomsky's theory of linguistics revolutionized the field, but his radical political analysis is what gave him a cult following; When people mention his name a century from now, which Chomsky will they mean?," *Boston Globe Magazine*, November 19, 1995, pp. 25f; "Jerry Brown Interviews Noam Chomsky," *Spin*, August 1993, pp. 68f; Charles M. Young, "Noam Chomsky: Anarchy in the U.S.A.," *Rolling Stone*, May 28, 1992, pp. 42f; Noam Chomsky on "Pozner & Donahue," April 20 & 22, 1993, C.N.B.C. T.V., 9 p.m.; John Horgan, "Free Radical: A word (or two) about linguist Noam Chomsky," *Scientific American*, May 1990, pp. 40f; Betty Sue Flowers, ed., *Bill Moyers: A World of Ideas -- Conversations with Thoughtful Men and Women about American Life Today and the Ideas Shaping our Future*, New York: Doubleday, 1989, pp. 38f (transcript of an interview on P.B.S.); Walter LaFeber, "Whose News?," *New York Times Book Review*, November 6, 1988, p. 27. See also, Jay Parini, "Noam Is An Island," *Mother Jones*, October 1988, pp. 36f; Brian Morton, "Chomsky Then and Now," *Nation*, May 7, 1988, pp. 646f.

31. On Warner Communications's suppression of Chomsky's and Herman's book and destruction of its publisher, see "A Prefatory Note by the Authors on the History of the Suppression of the First Edition of This Book," in Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism -- The Political Economy of Human Rights: Volume I*, Boston: South End, 1979, pp. xiv-xvii; Ben H. Bagdikian, *The Media Monopoly*, Boston: Beacon, 5th edition, 1997 (original 1983), pp. 32-34. The original edition had been published as *Counter-Revolutionary Violence: Bloodbaths in Fact and Propaganda*, Andover, MA: Warner Modular Publications, 1973, Module No. 57 (preface by Richard Falk); the authors then expanded it into the two-volume *The Political Economy of Human Rights*. The original book was published in France as *Bains de Sang constructifs dans les faits et la propagande*, Paris: Éditions Seghers/Laffont, 1974.

32. On the Homestead strike, see for example, Paul Krause, *The Battle for Homestead, 1880-1892: Politics, Culture, and Steel*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992, especially chs. 15 and 21. An excerpt (pp. 332, 17, 322, 326):

[E]xtraordinary solidarity and communal strength [was] exhibited by the steelworkers and their friends during the summer of 1892. . . . [S]teelworkers, for the first time in the town's history, held an outright majority on the town council; they also served as chairmen of its most important committees. Moreover, beyond personal friendships, the institutional ties that linked skilled and unskilled workers and Anglo-Americans and East Europeans were tighter than ever. . . . Homestead's elaborate defense system was under the control of the workers' Advisory Committee. . . . But in the frenzy of the Pinkertons' [armed men hired by the company] imminent landing, the committee -- at this point directed by Hugh O'Donnell, a heater in the 119-inch plate mill -- lost control, and the responsibility for Homestead's defense passed to the townspeople in general. . . .

Just as scholars have ignored the organized participation of East-European immigrants in the Homestead Lockout, so, too, have the initiatives of women been overlooked. This, in the face of overwhelming evidence that they were quick to defend the town when the Pinkertons landed, and that they worked side by side with the men. In fact, the most famous iconographic image we have of the lockout prominently features women; arms raised, mouths open, fists clenched, they stand in the front lines of the crowd as the surrendering Pinkertons are marched into town from the steelworks. . . . The Homestead women's assertion of their power and rights, of their place and stake in the workers' republic, signaled . . . that they had refused to be domesticated, interiorized, or harnessed for the purpose of lovely embroidery. Rather, they chose to break the conventions of female behavior by going into the streets, asserting themselves in word and even deed.

On the general defeats of the labor movement during the period, see for example, Jeremy Brecher, *Strike!*, Cambridge, MA: South End, 1997 (revised and updated edition; original 1972), chs. 1 to 3; Howard Zinn, *A People's History of the United States: 1492-Present*, New York: HarperCollins, 1980 (revised and updated edition 1995), chs. 10 and 11.

33. For Bailey's remark, see Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, New York: Appleton, 1969 (eighth edition). His exact words (p. 163):

The ending of the Napoleonic nightmare thus left the American people free to work out their own destiny with a minimum of foreign meddling. Responding to the robust new sense of nationalism engendered by the War of 1812, they turned their backs confidently on the Old World, and concentrated on the task of felling trees and Indians and of rounding out their national boundaries.

On scholarship about the Native American genocide, see chapter 4 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 72 and 76.

34. On Adam Smith's advocating markets because he thought that they would lead to equality, see Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976 (original 1776). An excerpt (Book I, ch. X, p. 111):

The whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the different employments of labour and stock must, in the same neighbourhood, be either perfectly equal or continually tending to equality. If in the same neighbourhood, there was any employment evidently either more or less advantageous than the rest, so many people would crowd into it in the one case, and so many would desert it in the other, that its advantages would soon return to the level of other employments. This at least would be the case in a society where things were left to follow their natural course, where there was perfect liberty, and where every man was perfectly free both to chuse what occupation he thought proper, and to change it as often as he thought proper.

Patricia Werhane, *Adam Smith and His Legacy for Modern Capitalism*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. An excerpt (p. 106):

[Smith] believes that ideally, competition should be among parties of similar advantage. A system of perfect liberty, he argues, should create a situation in which "the whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the different employments of labour and stock . . . be either perfectly equal or continually tending to equality." Smith sees perfect liberty as a necessary but not a sufficient condition for competition, but perfect competition occurs only when both parties in the exchange

are on more or less equal grounds, whether it be competition for labor, jobs, consumers, or capital.

35. George Stigler's misrepresentation of Smith's attitudes, in the University of Chicago's 1976 edition of *The Wealth of Nations*, is illustrated, for example, by a comparison of Stigler's account of Smith's views about the American colonies with Smith's actual text. Stigler claims that Smith "believed that there was, indeed, exploitation . . . but of the English by the colonists" (p. xiii of the Preface). In reality, Smith argued that there was "very grievous" exploitation of both the American colonists and of "the great body of the people" of England, by the policies of "a particular order of men in Great Britain," the "merchants and manufacturers," whose interests were "most peculiarly attended to" by the colonial system of which they were the "principal architects." For a more complete quotation from Smith on this point, see footnote 1 of chapter 5 of *U.P.*

For another example of how Stigler misrepresents Smith's text, compare the passage from *The Wealth of Nations* on what Smith says is "in every age of the world" "the vile maxim of the masters of mankind," "All for ourselves, and nothing for other people" -- to which Smith ascribes the decline of feudal barons, who "had no disposition to share" their wealth "either with tenants or retainers," but instead desired for themselves "diamond buckles" and other luxuries which "were to be all their own" (quoted in footnote 91 of chapter 10 of *U.P.*) -- with Stigler's superficial and sanitized account of the point of that passage (pp. xii-xiii of the Preface):

Quite remarkable emphasis is put upon the influence of people's earning and spending activities on the way societies evolve: the luxury of feudal lords is credited with the decline of their power as they replaced retinues of armed followers by shoes with diamond buckles. Truly they booted their power away!

36. For Adam Smith's view of division of labor, see Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976 (original 1776). An excerpt (Book V, ch. I, pt. III, art. II, pp. 302-303):

In the progress of the division of labour, the employment of the far greater part of those who live by labour, that is, of the great body of the people, comes to be confined to a few very simple operations; frequently to one or two. But the understandings of the greater part of men are necessarily formed by their ordinary employments.

The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations, of which the effects too are, perhaps, always the same, or very nearly the same, has no occasion to exert his understanding, or to exercise his invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties which never occur. He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become. The torpor of his mind renders him, not only incapable of relishing or bearing a part in any rational conversation, but of conceiving any generous, noble, or tender sentiment, and consequently of forming any just judgment concerning many even of the ordinary duties of private life. . . . His dexterity at his own particular trade seems, in this manner, to be acquired at the expence of his intellectual, social, and martial values. But in every improved and civilized society this is the state into which the labouring poor, that is, the great body of the people, must necessarily fall, unless government takes some pains to prevent it.

This passage is indeed not listed under "division of labour" in the index to the University of Chicago Press's bicentennial edition (p. 510).

37. For some of Humboldt's commentary, see J.W. Burrow, ed., Wilhelm von Humboldt, *The Limits of State Action*, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1969. An excerpt (pp. 24, 27-28):

Now man never regards what he possesses as so much his own, as what he does; and the labourer who tends a garden is perhaps in a truer sense its owner, than the listless voluptuary who enjoys its fruits. . . . An interesting man . . . is interesting in all situations and all activities, though he only attains the most matured and graceful consummation of his activity, when his way of life is harmoniously in keeping with his character. In view of this consideration, it seems as if all peasants and craftsmen might be elevated into artists; that is, men who love their labour for its own sake, improve it by their own plastic genius and inventive skill, and thereby cultivate their intellect, ennoble their character, and exalt and refine their pleasures. And so humanity would be ennobled by the very things which now, though beautiful in themselves, so often serve to degrade it. . . .

But, still, freedom is undoubtedly the indispensable condition, without which even the pursuits most congenial to individual human nature, can never succeed in producing such salutary influences. Whatever does not spring from a man's free choice, or is only the result of instruction and guidance, does not enter into his very being, but remains alien to his true nature; he does not perform it with truly human energies, but merely with mechanical exactness.

38. For Tocqueville's statement, see Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, New York: Knopf, 1948, Vol. II, Book II, ch. XX (original 1835). The exact words (pp. 158-159, 161):

When a workman is unceasingly and exclusively engaged in the fabrication of one thing, he ultimately does his work with singular dexterity; but at the same time he loses the general faculty of applying his mind to the direction of the work. He every day becomes more adroit and less industrious; so that it may be said of him that in proportion as the workman improves, the man is degraded. What can be expected of a man who has spent twenty years of his life in making heads for pins . . .? In proportion as the principle of division of labor is more extensively applied, the workman becomes more weak, more narrow-minded, and more dependent. The art advances, the artisan recedes. . . .

The territorial aristocracy of former ages was either bound by law, or thought itself bound by usage, to come to the relief of its serving-men and to relieve their distresses. But the manufacturing aristocracy of our age first impoverishes and debases the men who serve it and then abandons them to be supported by the charity of the public. . . . I am of opinion, on the whole, that the manufacturing aristocracy which is growing up under our eyes is one of the harshest that ever existed in the world. . . . [T]he friends of democracy should keep their eyes anxiously fixed in this direction.

39. In 1936 George Orwell was in Spain fighting against the Fascist army of General Francisco Franco. He described his initial impressions of Barcelona, one of the places where a popular revolution was still underway when he arrived, as follows

(George Orwell, *Homage To Catalonia*, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980 (original 1938), pp. 4-5):

[T]he aspect of Barcelona was something startling and overwhelming. It was the first time that I had ever been in a town where the working class was in the saddle. Practically every building of any size had been seized by the workers and was draped with red flags or with the red and black flag of the Anarchists; every wall was scrawled with the hammer and sickle and with the initials of the revolutionary parties; almost every church had been gutted and its images burnt. Churches here and there were being systematically demolished by gangs of workmen. Every shop and café had an inscription saying that it had been collectivized; even the bootblacks had been collectivized and their boxes painted red and black. Waiters and shop-walkers looked you in the face and treated you as an equal. Servile and even ceremonial forms of speech had temporarily disappeared. Nobody said "Señor" or "Don" or even "Usted"; everyone called everyone else "Comrade" and "Thou," and said "Salud!" instead of "Buenos dias." Tipping had been forbidden by law since the time of Primo de Rivera; almost my first experience was receiving a lecture from an hotel manager for trying to tip a lift-boy. There were no private motor cars, they had all been commandeered, and all the trams and taxis and much of the other transport were painted red and black.

The revolutionary posters were everywhere, flaming from the walls in clean reds and blues that made the few remaining advertisements look like daubs of mud. Down the Ramblas, the wide central artery of the town where crowds of people streamed constantly to and fro, the loud-speakers were bellowing revolutionary songs all day and far into the night. And it was the aspect of the crowds that was the queerest thing of all. In outward appearance it was a town in which the wealthy classes had practically ceased to exist. Except for a small number of women and foreigners there were no "well-dressed" people at all. Practically everyone wore rough working-class clothes, or blue overalls or some variant of the militia uniform.

All this was queer and moving. There was much in it that I did not understand, in some ways I did not even like it, but I recognized it immediately as a state of affairs worth fighting for.

It was similar when Orwell reached the Aragon front of the Civil War (pp. 103-104):

I had dropped more or less by chance into the only community of any size in Western Europe where political consciousness and disbelief in capitalism were more normal than their opposites. Up here in Aragon one was among tens of thousands of people, mainly though not entirely of working-class origin, all living at the same level and mingling on terms of equality. In theory it was perfect equality and even in practice it was not far from it. . . .

Many of the normal motives of civilized life -- snobbishness, money grubbing, fear of the boss, etc. -- had simply ceased to exist. The ordinary class-division of society had disappeared to an extent that is almost unthinkable in the money-tainted air of England; there was no one there except the peasants and ourselves, and no one owned anyone else as his master.

Orwell also wrote of Barcelona in 1936 (p. 6):

Yet so far as one can judge the people were contented and hopeful. There was no unemployment, and the price of living was still extremely low; you saw very few conspicuously destitute people, and no beggars except the gypsies. Above all, there was a belief in the revolution and the future, a feeling of having suddenly emerged into an era of equality and freedom. Human beings were trying to behave as human beings and not as cogs in the capitalist machine. In the barbers' shops were

Anarchist notices (the barbers were mostly Anarchists) solemnly explaining that barbers were no longer slaves. In the streets were colored posters appealing to prostitutes to stop being prostitutes.

To anyone from the hard-boiled, sneering civilization of the English-speaking races there was something rather pathetic in the literalness with which these idealistic Spaniards took the hackneyed phrases of revolution. At that time revolutionary ballads of the naïvest kind, all about proletarian brotherhood and the wickedness of Mussolini, were being sold on the streets for a few centimes each. I have often seen an illiterate militiaman buy one of these ballads, laboriously spell out the words, and then, when he had got the hang of it, begin singing it to an appropriate tune.

By April 1937, however, the situation had begun to change as the counter-revolution intensified (pp. 109-111):

Everyone who has made two visits, at intervals of months, to Barcelona during the war has remarked upon the extraordinary changes that took place in it. And curiously enough, whether they went there first in August and again in January, or, like myself, first in December and again in April, the thing they said was always the same: that the revolutionary atmosphere had vanished. No doubt to anyone who had been there in August, when the blood was scarcely dry in the streets and the militia were quartered in the small hotels, Barcelona in December would have seemed bourgeois; to me, fresh from England, it was liker to a workers' city than anything I had conceived possible. Now the tide had rolled back. Once again it was an ordinary city, a little pinched and chipped by war, but with no outward sign of working-class predominance. . . . Fat prosperous men, elegant women, and sleek cars were everywhere. . . . The officers of the new Popular Army, a type that had scarcely existed when I left Barcelona, swarmed in surprising numbers . . . [wearing] an elegant khaki uniform with a tight waist, like a British Army officer's uniform, only a little more so. I do not suppose that more than one in twenty of them had yet been to the front, but all of them had automatic pistols strapped to their belts; we, at the front, could not get pistols for love or money. . . .

A deep change had come over the town. There were two facts that were the keynote of all else. One was that the people -- the civil population -- had lost much of their interest in the war; the other was that the normal division of society into rich and poor, upper class and lower class, was reasserting itself.

See also, Franz Borkenau, *The Spanish Cockpit: An Eye-Witness Account of the Political and Social Conflicts of the Spanish Civil War*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963 (another illuminating eyewitness account of the period).

40. On the experimentation that preceded the Spanish Revolution, see for example, Murray Bookchin, *The Spanish Anarchists: The Heroic Years, 1868-1936*, New York: Harper and Row, 1977; Sam Dolgoff, ed., *The Anarchist Collectives: Workers' Self-Management in the Spanish Revolution, 1936-1939*, Montreal: Black Rose, 1990 (documentary history of the Spanish anarchist collectives); Karl Korsch, "Collectivisation in Spain," *Living Marxism*, Vol. 4, April 1939, pp. 179-182 (sympathetic summary of the book *Collectivizations: l'oeuvre constructive de la Révolution Espagnole*, Barcelona: Éditions C.N.T.-F.A.I., 1937/Toulouse: Éditions C.N.T., 1965, a collection of original documents on "the methods and results of collectivisation in the industrially most advanced province of Spain" during the revolution). See also, Burnett Bolloten, *The Grand Camouflage: The Communist Conspiracy in the Spanish Civil War*,

New York: Praeger, 1961; Burnett Bolloten, *The Spanish Revolution: The Left and the Struggle for Power during the Civil War*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979; Burnett Bolloten, *The Spanish Civil War: Revolution and Counterrevolution*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990.

41. On the British "experiment" in India, see chapter 7 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 46 and 47. On the "capitalist reforms" in Eastern Europe, see chapter 5 of *U.P.* and its footnote 10.

For other case studies of the effects of externally imposed "development" programs, see for example, Kevin Danaher, ed., *50 Years Is Enough: The Case Against the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund*, Boston: South End, 1994 (chapters reviewing the impact of World Bank and I.M.F. policies on Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, the Philippines, Jamaica, Ghana, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mexico, Hungary, Kenya, and other countries).

Some insight into so-called "development economists" general outlook towards the Third World can be gained from a confidential memo by the World Bank's Chief Economist, Harvard professor Lawrence Summers, which was leaked to the *Economist* magazine -- see "Let Them Eat Pollution," *Economist* (London), February 8, 1992, p. 66. This internal memorandum, which was sent to Summers's World Bank colleagues on December 12, 1991, made the following statements, among others:

Just between you and me, shouldn't the World Bank be encouraging *more* migration of the dirty industries to the L.D.C.s [Less Developed Countries]? . . . I think the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest-wage country is impeccable and we should face up to that. . . . I've always thought that under-populated countries in Africa are vastly under-polluted; their air quality is probably vastly inefficiently low [sic] compared to Los Angeles or Mexico City. . . .

The problem with the arguments against all of these proposals for more pollution in L.D.C.s (intrinsic rights to certain goods, moral reasons, social concerns, lack of adequate markets, etc.) could be turned around and used more or less effectively against every Bank proposal for liberalization.

The *Economist's* editors comment that "Mr. Summers is asking questions that the World Bank would rather ignore" -- but that, "on the economics, his points are hard to answer."

See also, "Pollution and the Poor," *Economist* (London), February 15, 1992, p. 18 ("The [World] Bank says that Mr. Summers, one of America's best economists, was merely trying to provoke debate"); Lawrence Summers, "Polluting the Poor," Letter, *Economist* (London), February 15, 1992, p. 6. Confronted with the memo, Summers stated:

[I]t is not my view, the World Bank's view, or that of any sane person that pollution should be encouraged anywhere, or that the dumping of untreated toxic wastes near the homes of poor people is morally or economically defensible. My memo tried to sharpen the debate on important issues by taking as narrow-minded an economic perspective as possible. As its addressees understood, its intent was not to make policy recommendations, but only to clarify what had been a rather vague internal discussion.

Elsewhere, Summers called the memorandum a "sarcastic response" to another World Bank draft -- see "Furor on Memo At World Bank," *New York Times*, February 7, 1992, p. D2.

Chapter Seven

Intellectuals and Social Change

1. On the dismantling of the incipient socialist institutions in Russia, and for Lenin's and Trotsky's writings setting forth their thinking, see footnote 3 of this chapter.

2. On Lenin's and Trotsky's assumptions about revolution in Germany being required before socialism could develop in Russia, see for example, Moshe Lewin, *Lenin's Last Struggle*, New York: Pantheon, 1968, p. 4 (quoting Lenin to indicate that, until his last days, he believed socialism could be achieved only after revolutions had occurred in the advanced capitalist countries, Germany in particular; note, however, that Lewin's interpretation of Lenin's goals and efforts is far from Chomsky's in the text). An excerpt (pp. 3-4):

In the eyes of its originators the October Revolution had neither meaning nor future independent of its international function as a catalyst and detonator: it was to be the first spark that would lead to the establishment of socialist regimes in countries which, unlike Russia, possessed an adequate economic infrastructure and cultural basis. Unless it fulfilled this function, the Soviet regime should not even have survived. Lenin often affirmed this belief, and he persisted in this interpretation even after several years had elapsed without bringing any confirmation of his hopes. In June 1921 he declared that the Socialist Republic might survive amid capitalist encirclement, "but not for very long, of course." In February 1922, he was just as categorical as ever: "We have always proclaimed and repeated this elementary truth of Marxism, that the victory of socialism requires the joint efforts of workers in a number of advanced countries. . . ."

According to the most widespread interpretation of Marxist theory, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the method of government of the first successful revolution, should be established in a country where the working class formed the majority of the population: the dictatorship of the working class would then be exercised over a negligible minority. Nothing of the kind was possible in Russia.

See also, Leon Trotsky, "War Communism, The New Economic Policy (N.E.P.) and The Course Toward the Kulak," in Irving Howe, ed., *The Basic Writings of Trotsky*, New York: Random House, 1963, pp. 160-167. After noting the disastrous effects of the Bolsheviks' initial programs, Trotsky wrote (p. 162):

The theoretical mistake of the ruling party remains inexplicable, however, only if you leave out of account the fact that all calculations at that time were based on the hope of an early victory of the revolution in the West. It was considered self-evident that the victorious German proletariat would supply Soviet Russia, on credit against future food and raw materials, not only with machines and articles of manufacture, but also with tens of thousands of highly skilled workers, engineers and organizers. And there is no doubt that if the proletarian revolution had triumphed in Germany . . . the economic development of the Soviet Union as well as of Germany would have advanced with such gigantic strides that the fate of Europe and the world today would have been incomparably more auspicious.

3. For Lenin's and Trotsky's thoughts on how Russia should be developed, see for example, Vladimir Lenin, "The Immediate Tasks of the Proletariat Government" (originally published April 28, 1918), in Vladimir Lenin, *Selected Works*, Moscow: Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the U.S.S.R., 1935, Vol. VII, pp. 313-350. An excerpt (pp. 342-344; emphasis in original):

But be that as it may, *unquestioning submission* to a single will is absolutely necessary for the success of labour processes that are based on large-scale machine industry. . . . The revolution has only just broken the oldest, most durable and heaviest fetters to which the masses were compelled to submit. That was yesterday. But today the same revolution demands, in the interests of socialism, that the masses *unquestioningly obey the single will* of the leaders of the labour process. . . . And our task, the task of the Communist Party, which is the class conscious expression of the strivings of the exploited for emancipation, is to appreciate this change, to understand that it is necessary, to take the lead of the exhausted masses who are wearily seeking a way out and lead them along the true path, along the path of labour discipline, along the path of co-ordinating the task of holding meetings and discussing the conditions of labour with the task of unquestioningly obeying the will of the Soviet leader, of the dictator, *during work time*.

For a discussion by Trotsky of the need for "militarization of labor" and "labor armies," see Leon Trotsky, *Terrorism and Communism: A Reply to Karl Kautsky*, London: New Park, 1975 (original 1920), ch. VII.

For Lenin's pronouncements on the need for "state capitalism," see for example, Vladimir Lenin, "'Left Wing' Childishness and Petty-Bourgeois Mentality" (originally published May 5, 1918), in Vladimir Lenin, *Selected Works*, Moscow: Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the U.S.S.R., 1935, Vol. VII, pp. 351-378. An excerpt (pp. 365-366; emphasis in original):

While the revolution in Germany is slow in "coming forth," our task is to study the state capitalism of the Germans, to spare *no effort* in copying it and not shrink from adopting *dictatorial* methods to hasten the copying of it. Our task is to do this even more thoroughly than Peter [the Great] hastened the copying of Western culture by barbarian Russia, and he did not hesitate to use barbarous methods in fighting against barbarism.

Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism: Its Rise, Growth, and Dissolution*, Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon, 1978, p. 484 (Lenin remarked in October 1921: "aided by the enthusiasm engendered by the great revolution, and on the basis of personal interest, personal incentive and business principles, we must first set to work in this small-peasant country to build solid gangways to socialism by way of state capitalism").

On the incipient socialist structures in Russia and the Bolsheviks' dismantling of them as they consolidated control, see for example, Maurice Brinton, *The Bolsheviks and Workers' Control, 1917 to 1921: the State and Counter-Revolution*, London: Solidarity, 1970, especially pp. 1-49. This study gives a detailed chronology of the development of popular structures in Russia after the initial February 1917 revolution, then describes the Bolsheviks' rapid steps to undermine and destroy them after they gained political power in October 1917 (citing extensively to contemporaneous Bolshevik Party sources). The detail and quantity of evidence in this short book defy quotation here; however, the author summarizes some of his findings as follows (pp. ix-x):

Between March and October the Bolsheviks supported the growth of the Factory Committees, only to turn viciously against them in the last few weeks of 1917, seeking to incorporate them into the new union structure, the better to emasculate them. This process . . . was to play an important role in preventing the rapidly growing challenge to capitalist relations of production from coming to a head. Instead the Bolsheviks canalised the energies released between March and October into a successful onslaught against the political power of the bourgeoisie (and against the property relations on which that power was based).

At this level the revolution was "successful." But the Bolsheviks were also "successful" in restoring "law and order" in industry -- a law and order that reconsolidated the authoritarian relations in production, which for a brief period had been seriously shaken.

Importantly, the author notes that (p. 35):

It is above all essential to stress that the Bolshevik policy in relation to the [Factory] Committees and to the unions which we have documented in some detail was being put forward twelve months *before* the murder of Karl Liebknecht and of Rosa Luxemburg [in January 1919] -- i.e. before the irrevocable failure of the German revolution, an event usually taken as "justifying" many of the measures taken by the Russian rulers.

Similarly, many of the Bolsheviks' measures to disempower the incipient socialist structures and avert genuine workers' control; to suppress and liquidate left-libertarian political parties and publications; and to reintroduce wages and otherwise begin the "restoration of capitalist management of industry" were implemented well before the beginning of large-scale civil war and the Western powers' intervention in Russia on May 15, 1918 (pp. 15-46). In this context, note the timing of Lenin's pronouncements, quoted above in this footnote, concerning the necessity for "unquestioning submission" to the Bolshevik Party and its "dictatorial methods." Brinton adds that the Civil War, which peaked in August 1918, then "immensely accelerated the process of economic centralisation" (p. 46).

Furthermore, it bears emphasis that the theoretical foundations which motivated the Bolsheviks' actions once they gained power also long predated these dire conditions. See for example, Vladimir Lenin, "What Is To Be Done?," in *V.I. Lenin: Collected Works*, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961 (original 1901-1902), Vol. 5. An excerpt (pp. 384-385):

Since there can be no talk of an independent ideology formulated by the working masses themselves in the process of their movement, the *only* choice is -- either bourgeois or socialist ideology. . . . There is much talk of spontaneity. But the *spontaneous* development of the working-class movement leads to its subordination to bourgeois ideology . . .; for the spontaneous working-class movement is trade-unionism . . . and trade-unionism means the ideological enslavement of the workers by the bourgeoisie. Hence, our task, the task of Social-Democracy, is *to combat spontaneity, to divert* the working-class movement from this spontaneous, trade-unionist striving to come under the wing of the bourgeoisie, and to bring it under the wing of revolutionary Social-Democracy.

Brinton adds (p. 12): "Nowhere in Lenin's writings is workers' control ever equated with fundamental decision-taking (i.e. with the *initiation* of decisions) relating to production." He also quotes Lenin's view in his most libertarian work, *State and Revolution*, that (p. 24): "We want the socialist revolution with human nature as it is now, with *human nature that cannot dispense with subordination, control and managers*" (emphasis added).

For a description of the origins and development of workers' organizations in Russia before the Bolshevik takeover, discussing the period between 1905 and October 1917, see Peter Rachleff, "Soviets and Factory Committees in the Russian Revolution," *Radical America*, Vol. 8, No. 6, November-December 1974, pp. 78-114. An excerpt (pp. 84-87, 89-90):

Beginning October 10 [1905], factories in St. Petersburg began sending delegates to meetings of what was to become the Soviet [i.e. workers' assembly]. . . . Within three days there were 226 delegates representing 96 factories and workshops. . . . The Soviet, at first performing no other task than organizing and leading the strike, changed itself over the course of several days into a general organ of the working class in the capital. . . . Similar organizations appeared amidst strikes in all the urban areas of European Russia (and in some larger villages as well). Between forty and fifty came into existence in October. Although most functioned only for a short time, their importance should not be underestimated. This was the first experience of direct representation for most of those involved. No political party dominated the soviets. . . . The soviets were created from below by workers, peasants, and soldiers, and reflected their desires. . . . [T]he Tsar turned to full-scale repression to quell all disturbances. . . . They were militarily crushed by the end of 1905, and the Russian working class suffered a defeat that would demoralize and disorganize it for almost a decade. . . .

[In 1914 there was] a real rebirth of the Russian working-class movement. . . . May Day saw half a million people demonstrating in the streets. . . . In early July of 1914 a meeting of workers from the Putilov metal works, called to support a strike in the Baku oil fields, was brutally suppressed by the police. A general strike was the immediate response made by the St. Petersburg working class, and within four days 110,000 were out on strike. Two days later, the Bolsheviks, who had experienced a rebirth in popularity since their lowest point in late 1913, called for an end to the strike. However the striking workers, exhibiting the independence that had been their tradition, paid no attention to them. Instead, they built barricades and engaged in pitched battles with the Cossacks. . . .

The beginning of 1917 saw the armed forces seething with revolt. . . . Demonstrations, which were virtually bread riots, spread throughout [Petrograd, then the capital of Russia]. The troops who had crushed similar demonstrations in 1905 refused to put down the uprising, and many joined in. By the end of the month, after three days of spontaneous demonstrations and a general strike, Petrograd was in the hands of the working class. . . . The revolution spread throughout Russia. Peasants seized the land; discipline in the army collapsed; sailors seized their ships in the Kronstadt harbor on the Baltic Coast and took over that city; the soviet form of organization reappeared, first in industrial areas, then among soldiers, sailors, and peasants. A Provisional Government came to power when the Tsar abdicated. Made up of members of the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy . . . they failed to come up with solutions to the problems experienced by the bulk of the population, both workers and peasants.

The article then describes the workers' organizations -- the soviets and factory councils (pp. 90, 92-96):

The soviets, which had sprung up across the country, were viewed as the legitimate government by the workers, peasants, and soldiers, who came to them with their problems. . . . [Power within the soviets] still remained in the hands of the Executive Committee[s]. This had been the case from the start, and it continued to be the case throughout the spring and summer of 1917. . . . [S]oon the [Petrograd]

Soviet itself became nothing but an open forum where workers and soldiers could come together, air their views, meet others like themselves, and keep their constituencies informed about what was going on. It did offer people who had been politically voiceless a chance to speak out. But it did not represent the power of the working class. . . . No more than the Provisional Government can the soviets of 1917 be considered instruments of working-class power. Moreover, the existing trade unions also confronted the workers as a power separate from them and over them, a power which hindered them rather than helped them in their attempts to solve their pressing problems. . . .

The real activity was represented by an incredible proliferation of factory committees, organs consisting of and controlled by the workers within each factory. It was through these committees that most of the workers sought to solve their problems. Whereas the soviets were primarily concerned with political issues, e.g., the structure of the government and the question of the continuation of the war [i.e. World War I], the factory committees initially dealt solely with the problems of continuing production within their factories. . . .

Such committees appeared in every industrial center throughout European Russia. The membership of a committee always consisted solely of workers who still worked in the factory. Most important decisions would be made by a general assembly of all the workers in the factory. The committees were utilized by the workers in the early months of the revolution to present series of demands, and in some instances to begin to act to realize those demands. Paul Avrich describes the functioning of some factory committees in the first months of the uprising: "From the outset, the workers' committees did not limit their demands to higher wages and shorter hours, though these were at the top of every list; what they wanted in addition to material benefits, was a voice in management. On March 4, for example, the workers of the Skorokhod Shoe Factory in Petrograd did, to be sure, call upon their superiors to grant them an eight-hour day and a wage increase, including double pay for overtime work; but they also demanded official recognition of their factory committee and its right to control the hiring and firing of labor. In the Petrograd Radiotelegraph Factory, a workers' committee was organized expressly to 'work out rules and norms for the internal life of the factory,' while other factory committees were elected chiefly to control the activities of the directors, engineers, and foremen. Overnight, incipient forms of 'workers' control' over production and distribution appeared in the large enterprises of Petrograd."

Even before the Bolsheviks took over, they began to limit the power of these popularly-based organizations (pp. 104-108):

By October . . . councils of factory committees existed in many parts of Russia. . . . Conferences of local factory committees in Petrograd and Moscow in late September and early October reaffirmed the necessity of proceeding with their role in production -- managing the entire production process -- and in developing better methods of coordination. A short time later, the first "All-Russian Conference of Factory Committees" was convened. . . . Members of the Bolshevik Party made up 62% of the delegates and were the dominant force. By now, the Party was in firm control of the recently created Central Council of Factory Committees, and used it for its own purposes. . . . The Bolsheviks at this conference succeeded in passing a resolution creating a national organizational structure for the committees. However, this structure explicitly limited the factory committees to activity within the sphere of production, and suggested a method of struggle which embodied a rigid division of activities. . . . The non-Bolshevik delegates -- and the workers they represented --

did not reject this new plan. Few realized the necessity of directly uniting the "economic" and "political" aspects of the class struggle. The Bolsheviks, now on the verge of seizing state power, began laying the foundations for the consolidation of their control over the working class. No longer did they encourage increased activity by the factory committees. Most workers and their committees accepted this about-face, believing that the new strategy was only temporary and that once the Bolshevik Party had captured "political power" they would be given free reign in the economic sphere.

Shortly thereafter, the Bolsheviks successfully seized state power, replacing the Provisional Government with their tightly-controlled soviets. The initial effect on the workers was tremendous. They believed that this new revolution gave them the green light to expand their activities, to expropriate the remaining capitalists, and to establish strong structures of coordination. . . . Out of this burst of activity came the first attempt of the factory committees to create a national organization of their own, independent of all parties and institutions. Such an organization posed an implicit threat to the new Bolshevik State. . . . The Bolsheviks, seeking to strengthen their position, realized that they had to destroy the factory committees. They now had available to them the means to do so -- something which the Provisional Government had lacked. By controlling the soviets, the Bolsheviks controlled the troops. Their domination of the regional and national councils of the factory committees gave them the power to isolate and destroy any factory committee, e.g., by denying it raw materials. Lenin wasted little time in trying to take control of the situation. On November 3, he published his "Draft Decree on Workers' Control" in Pravda, stating that "the decisions of the elected delegates of the workers and employees are legally binding upon the owners of enterprises," but that they could be "annulled by trade unions and congresses." Moreover, "in all enterprises of state importance" all delegates elected to exercise workers' control were to be "answerable to the State for the maintenance of the strictest order and discipline and for the protection of property. . . ."

[T]he power now resting in the hands of the Bolshevik State gave it the ability to go ahead with the dismantling of the power of the factory committees. Isaac Deutscher describes how the trade unions were used to emasculate the committees before the end of the year: "The Bolsheviks now called upon the trade unions to render a special service to the nascent Soviet State and to discipline the factory committees. The unions came out against the attempt of the factory committees to form a national organization of their own. They prevented the convocation of a planned all-Russian Congress of factory committees and demanded total subordination on the part of the committees. . . . The unions now became the main channels through which the government was assuming control over industry." There were to be future rebellions against the new state, for example Kronstadt in 1921 [where anti-Bolshevik sailors were massacred by Trotsky's Red Army] and Makhno's peasant movement in the Ukraine [which governed the area along anarchist principles beginning in November 1918 and defeated an invasion by the Western powers, then was crushed by the Bolsheviks' Red Army in late 1920]. However, they were labeled "counterrevolutionary" by the Government press and viciously suppressed. The total power of the Bolshevik State over all aspects of social and economic life was now consolidated and the working class were relegated to living under the same powerless situation they had experienced prior to 1917.

See also, Voline [i.e. Vsevolod Mikhailovich Eichenbaum], *The Unknown Revolution, 1917-1921*, Detroit: Black & Red, 1974 (original 1947)(classic history of the

popular revolution in Russia and the subsequent Bolshevik coup, detailing the Bolsheviks' systematic destruction of the popular institutions and their repression of the genuine revolutionary developments; written by a libertarian socialist participant in the events from October 1917); Robert V. Daniels, "The State and Revolution: A Case Study in the Genesis and Transformation of Communist Ideology," *The American Slavic and East European Review*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1953, pp. 22-43 (on Lenin's "intellectual deviation" to the left during 1917; documenting in particular how Lenin's famous polemic *State and Revolution* "is a work conforming neither to Lenin's previous thought nor to his subsequent practice").

For criticism of the Bolsheviks' actions by left-wing critics at the time, see chapter 5 of *U.P.* and its footnote 21.

4. For Bakunin's predictions, see Michael Bakunin, "Critique of the Marxist Theory of the State" (1873), "Letter to La Liberté" (1872), "Critique of Economic Determinism and Historical Materialism" (1872), and "Some Preconditions for a Social Revolution" (1873), all in Sam Dolgoff, ed., *Bakunin on Anarchy: Selected Works by the Activist-Founder of World Anarchism*, New York: Knopf, 1972, pp. 326f. Excerpts (pp. 329, 332, 284, 319, 337-338, 318-319, 275):

The differences between revolutionary dictatorship and statism are superficial. Fundamentally they both represent the same principle of minority rule over the majority in the name of the alleged "stupidity" of the latter and the alleged "intelligence" of the former. Therefore they are both equally reactionary since both directly and inevitably must preserve and perpetuate the political and economic privileges of the ruling minority and the political and economic subjugation of the masses of the people.

Now it is clear why the dictatorial revolutionists, who aim to overthrow the existing powers and social structures in order to erect upon their ruins their own dictatorships, never were or will be the enemies of government, but, to the contrary, always will be the most ardent promoters of the government idea. They are the enemies only of contemporary governments, because they wish to replace them. They are the enemies of the present governmental structure, because it excludes the possibility of their dictatorship. At the same time they are the most devoted friends of governmental power. For if the revolution destroyed this power by actually freeing the masses, it would deprive this pseudorevolutionary minority of any hope to harness the masses in order to make them the beneficiaries of their own government policy. . . .

[The Marxists] insist that only dictatorship (of course their own) can create freedom for the people. . . . [A]ccording to Mr. Marx, the people not only should not abolish the State, but, on the contrary, they must strengthen and enlarge it, and turn it over to the full disposition of their benefactors, guardians, and teachers -- the leaders of the Communist party, meaning Mr. Marx and his friends -- who will then liberate them in their own way. They will concentrate all administrative power in their own strong hands, because the ignorant people are in need of a strong guardianship. . . . There will be slavery within this state . . . which will be even more despotic than the former State, although it calls itself a People's State. . . . It will be the reign of *scientific intelligence*, the most aristocratic, despotic, arrogant and elitist of all regimes. There will be a new class, a new hierarchy of real and counterfeit scientists and scholars, and the world will be divided into a minority ruling in the name of

knowledge, and an immense ignorant majority. And then, woe unto the mass of ignorant ones . . .!

A strong State can have only one solid foundation: military and bureaucratic centralization. The fundamental difference between a monarchy and even the most democratic republic is that in the monarchy, the bureaucrats oppress and rob the people for the benefit of the privileged in the name of the King, and to fill their own coffers; while in the republic the people are robbed and oppressed in the same way for the benefit of the same classes, in the name of "the will of the people" (and to fill the coffers of the democratic bureaucrats). In the republic, the State, which is supposed to be the people, legally organized, stifles and will continue to stifle the real people. But the people will feel no better if the stick with which they are being beaten is labeled "the people's stick. . . ."

No state, however democratic -- not even the reddest republic -- can ever give the people what they really want, i.e., the free self-organization and administration of their own affairs from the bottom upward, without any interference or violence from above, because every state, even the pseudo-People's State concocted by Mr. Marx, is in essence only a machine ruling the masses from above, through a privileged minority of conceited intellectuals, who imagine that they know what the people need and want better than do the people themselves. . . .

The State has always been the patrimony of some privileged class: a priestly class, an aristocratic class, a bourgeois class. And finally, when all the other classes have exhausted themselves, the State then becomes the patrimony of the bureaucratic class and then falls -- or, if you will, rises -- to the position of a machine. But in any case it is absolutely necessary for the salvation of the State that there should be some privileged class devoted to its preservation.

But in the People's State of Marx there will be, we are told, no privileged class at all. All will be equal, not only from the juridical and political point of view but also from the economic point of view. At least this is what is promised, though I very much doubt whether that promise could ever be kept. There will therefore no longer be any privileged class, but there *will* be a government and, note this well, an extremely complex government. This government will not content itself with administering and governing the masses politically, as all governments do today. It will also administer the masses economically, concentrating in the hands of the State the production and division of wealth, the cultivation of land, the establishment and development of factories, the organization and direction of commerce, and finally, the application of capital to production by the only banker -- the State. All that will demand an immense knowledge and many heads "overflowing with brains" in this government. . . .

Can one imagine anything more burlesque and at the same time more revolting? To claim that a group of individuals, even the most intelligent and best-intentioned, would be capable of becoming the mind, the soul, the directing and unifying will of the revolutionary movement and the economic organization of the proletariat of all lands - - this is such heresy against common sense and historical experience that one wonders how a man as intelligent as Mr. Marx could have conceived it!

5. For Marx's works that are mentioned in the text, see Karl Marx, "The Civil War in France" (1871)(on the Paris Commune); "On Imperialism in India" (1853)(on the British in India); *Capital*, Vol. I (1867)(on industrial London).

6. On the lack of discussion of socialism in Marx's work, see for example, Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties*, New York: Free Press, 1960, pp. 355-392 ("Two Roads from Marx"). An excerpt (pp. 368-369):

The paucity is extraordinary. In an address to the General Council of the International Workingman's Association, published as *The Civil War in France*, Marx said, at one point in passing, that communism would be a system under which "united cooperative societies are to regulate the national production under a common plan," but nothing more. . . . In only one other place did Marx elaborate any remarks about the future society -- the testy letter which came to be known as *The Critique of the Gotha Programme*. In 1875 the rival Lassalle and Eisenacher (Liebknecht, Bebel, Bernstein) factions met in Gotha to form the German Socialist Workers Party (Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands). As a political party, the socialists were confronted, for the first time, with the task of stating a political program on transition to socialism. Taking its cue from the [1871 Paris] Commune, the Gotha program emphasized two demands: the organization of producers' co-operatives with state aid and equality.

Marx's criticism was savage. The demand for producers' co-operatives, he said, smacked of the Catholic socialism of Buchez (the president of the Constitutional Assembly of 1848), while the demand for the "equitable distribution of the proceeds of labour" was simply a bourgeois right, since in any other society than *pure* communism the granting of equal shares to individuals with unequal needs would simply lead to renewed inequality. A transitional society, Marx said, could not be completely communal. In the co-operative society, based on collective ownership, "the producers do not interchange their products." There would still be need for a state machinery, since certain social needs would have to be met. The central directing agency would make deductions from the social product: for administrative costs, schools, health services, and the like. Only under communism would the State, as a government over persons, be replaced by an "administration of things. . . ." [D]espite his theoretical criticisms of the transitional program, there is little in the *Critique* of a *concrete* nature regarding the mechanics of socialist economics either in the transitional or the pure communist society.

7. On Engels's use of the term "dialectics," see for example, Shlomo Avineri, *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx*, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1968, p. 65 ("Much of what is known as 'Marxist materialism' was not written by Marx but by Engels, in most cases after Marx's own death. Students sometimes forget that Marx himself never used the terms 'historical materialism' or 'dialectical materialism' for his systematic approach").

8. Chomsky personally observed this at the I.B.M. Research Center in the 1960s. On overt pressures on the schools more generally, see for example, William E. Simon [former U.S. Treasury Secretary], *A Time for Truth*, New York: Reader's Digest, 1978. An excerpt (pp. 231-233):

Business must cease the mindless subsidizing of colleges and universities whose departments of economics, government, politics and history are hostile to capitalism and whose faculties will not hire scholars whose views are otherwise. . . . This has nothing to do with trying to govern what any individual professor teaches, nor is it an attempt to "buy" docile professors who will teach what businessmen tell them to. That notion is as ridiculous as the idea that anti-capitalist professors are

entitled to support by capitalism. No non-professional has any right to attempt to dictate what and how a teacher teaches. He can, however (and, I argue, he must), decide whether or not that teacher -- either by virtue of his competence or lack of it, or the nature of the doctrine he espouses -- is entitled to his support. There is a world of difference between attempting to govern what is taught and simply refusing to support those whose teachings are inimical to one's own philosophy. . . .

[In addition], business money must flow away from the media which serve as megaphones for anticapitalist opinion and to media which are either pro-freedom or, if not necessarily "pro-business," at least professionally capable of a fair and accurate treatment of procapitalist ideas, values and arguments. The judgment of this fairness is to be made by businessmen alone -- it is their money that they are investing.

See also, Ann Crittenden, "Simon: Preaching the Word for Olin," *New York Times*, July 16, 1978, section 3, p. 1. An excerpt:

William E. Simon, Secretary of the Treasury under Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford [and President of the conservative Olin Foundation] . . . spends at least one-fourth of his time urging corporations to promote the free-market economy. . . .

"Why should businessmen be financing left-wing intellectuals and institutions which espouse the exact opposite of what they believe in?" he asks, referring to the fact that many corporations give grants to universities or institutions whose scholars may be critical of business. . . . "I even go so far as to discourage advertising in publications that are unfriendly to business," Mr. Simon says.

On universities' dependence on corporate money in general, see for example, Elizabeth Fones-Wolf, *Selling Free Enterprise: The Business Assault on Labor and Liberalism, 1945-1960*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992, ch. 7. An excerpt (pp. 193-194):

[B]y 1951 half of the country's nine-hundred privately endowed schools were in the red. In the late forties, private colleges and universities began soliciting corporate America to bail them out of their chronic financial predicament. A powerful segment of the business community proposed a "marriage of business and education" based on the financial rescue of independent education. In 1952, a group of leading industrialists that included Alfred P. Sloan of General Motors, Frank W. Abrams of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, Henry Ford II of Ford Motor Company, John L. McCaffrey of International Harvester Company, Irving S. Olds of United States Steel Corporation, Henning W. Prentis of Armstrong Cork Company, and Laird Bell of Weyerhaeuser Timber formed the Council for Financial Aid to Education. With the assistance of the Council, corporate contributions grew dramatically in the fifties. . . . Business gifts, independent of grants for industrial research, rose from \$24 million in 1948 to \$136 million in 1958. By 1965 corporate donations had reached \$280 million a year.

Joel H. Spring, *Education and the Rise of the Corporate State*, Boston: Beacon, 1972; David F. Noble, *America by Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism*, New York: Knopf, 1977, especially chs. 7, 8 and 9; Calvin Sims, "Business-Campus Ventures Grow," *New York Times*, December 14, 1987, p. D1. And see footnote 31 of this chapter; and footnote 75 of chapter 10 of *U.P.*

9. Allan Bloom's book is: *The Closing of the American Mind: How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today's Students*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987.

10. Bloom continually invokes Plato, stating: "Men may live more truly and fully in reading Plato and Shakespeare than at any other time" (p. 380).

11. On human rights in Mexico, see for example, Larry Rohter, "Former Mexican Soldier Describes Executions of Political Prisoners," *New York Times*, February 19, 1989, p. A1 ("In the first public acknowledgment of death squad activity in Mexico, a former Mexican Army soldier is maintaining that he was part of a secret military unit that executed at least 60 political prisoners here"); Amnesty International, *Mexico: Torture With Impunity*, New York: Amnesty International, 1991; Ellen L. Lutz, *Unceasing Abuses: Human Rights in Mexico One Year After the Introduction of Reform*, New York: Americas Watch, 1991; Dan La Botz, *Mask of Democracy: Labor Suppression in Mexico Today*, Boston: South End, 1992, pp. 30-33. See also footnote 88 of chapter 10 of *U.P.*

12. On Japan's global lead in advanced manufacturing and the myth of "Japanese economic decline" in the 1990s, see for example, Eamonn Fingleton, "The forgotten merits of manufacturing," *Challenge*, Volume 43, Issue 2, March 1, 2000, pp. 67-85.

13. On the similar allocation of research funding by M.I.T.I. and for "Star Wars," see footnote 4 of chapter 3 of *U.P.*

14. Another example of a central question systematically evaded in academic scholarship is the influence of corporations in setting foreign policy. For a rare discussion of this phenomenon, see Dennis M. Ray, "Corporations and American Foreign Relations," in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, September 1972, pp. 80-92. This article begins (pp. 80-81):

[W]e know virtually nothing about the role of corporations in American foreign relations. . . . [Scholarship has] clarified the influence of Congress, the press, scientists, and non-profit organizations, such as RAND, on the foreign policy process. The influence of corporations on the foreign policy process, however, remains clouded in mystery.

My search through the respectable literature on international relations and U.S. foreign policy shows that less than 5 percent of some two hundred books granted even passing attention to the role of corporations in American foreign relations. From this literature, one might gather that American foreign policy is formulated in a social vacuum, where national interests are protected from external threats by the elaborate machinery of governmental policymaking. There is virtually no acknowledgment in standard works within the field of international relations and foreign policy of the existence and influence of corporations.

15. On purges of dissent at U.S. universities, see for example, Ellen Schrecker, *No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986 (on the 1950s purge); Howard Zinn, "The Politics of History in the Era of the Cold War: Repression and Resistance," in Noam Chomsky et al., *The Cold War and the*

University: Toward an Intellectual History of the Postwar Years, New York: New Press, 1997, pp. 35-72.

16. Chomsky notes that for Cambodia scholars, the situation has changed somewhat in recent years.

17. On Thomas Ferguson's work, see footnote 94 of chapter 10 of *U.P.*

For an historical analog to the Ferguson story in the text, see Merle Curti, *The Social Ideas of American Educators*, Paterson, NJ: Pageant Books, 1959, p. 222 (noting that in 1895, in the midst of labor agitation, the National Education Association "recommended that the teacher of American history confine herself to the colonial and early national period"). See also, Ronald Radosh, "Annual-Set-to: The Bare-Knuckled Historians," *Nation*, February 2, 1970, p. 108 (reporting that professor Jesse Lemish was "dismissed from the University of Chicago because his 'political concerns interfered with his scholarship"); Jesse Lemisch, *On Active Service in War and Peace: Politics and Ideology in the American Historical Profession*, Chicago: New Hogtown, 1975.

18. For Peters's book, see Joan Peters, *From Time Immemorial: The Origins of the Arab-Jewish Conflict Over Palestine*, New York: Harper and Row, 1984. Scarcely eight months after its publication, the book went into its seventh printing, and Joan Peters reportedly had 250 speaking engagements scheduled for the upcoming year.

19. Some of the reviewers' blurbs reprinted in the paperback edition of the Peters book include:

- o "This book is a historical event in itself." (Barbara Tuchman)
- o "A superlative book. . . . To understand what is happening in the Middle East, one must begin with its past, which Miss Peters traces to the present with unmatched skill." (Theodore H. White)
- o "Every political issue claiming the attention of a world public has its 'experts' -- news managers, anchor men, ax grinders, and anglers. The great merit of this book is to demonstrate that, on the Palestinian issue, these experts speak from utter ignorance. Millions of people the world over, smothered by false history and propaganda, will be grateful for this clear account of the origins of the Palestinians." (Saul Bellow)
- o Joan Peters' book provides necessary demographic and historic perspectives which have been inexplicably and substantially ignored until now, but without which misconceptions and policy distortions are inevitable. The reader will be most impressed with the thoroughness and prodigious input this work entails, as I was." (Philip M. Hauser, Director Emeritus, Population Research Center, The University of Chicago; former Acting Director of U.S. Census)
- o "Joan Peters strikes a heavy blow against the broad consensus about 'the Palestinians' and the assumption that Palestinian rights are at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict. . . . *From Time Immemorial* supplies abundant justification for reversing the moral and legal presumptions that have cast Israel in the role of defendant before the court of world opinion." (William V. O'Brien, Georgetown University)
- o "The massive research Ms. Peters did . . . would have daunted Hercules. In the course of it she turned up a great deal of interesting material from Ottoman records,

the reports of Western consular officers and observant travelers and other sources."
(*New York Times Book Review*)

o "A remarkable document in itself. . . . The refugees are not the problem but the excuse." (*Washington Post Book World*)

o "Everything in this book reads like hard news. . . . One woman walks in and scoops them all. . . . The great service provided here by Mrs. Peters -- if only attention is paid -- is to lay a groundwork for peace by clearing away the farrago of lies." (*National Review*)

o "This book, if read, will change the mind of our generation. If understood, it could also affect the history of the future." (*New Republic*)

o "The reader comes away not only rethinking the Middle East refugee problem, but also the extent to which propaganda can be swallowed whole for lack of information." (*Los Angeles Times*)

o "*From Time Immemorial* is impressive, informative, absorbing. All those who are interested in the Arab-Israeli questions will benefit from Joan Peters's insight and analysis." (Elie Wiesel)

o "*From Time Immemorial* will surely change the way we think about that still fiercely contested land once called Palestine. For Joan Peters has dug beneath a half-century's accumulation of propaganda and brought into the light the historical truth about the Middle East. With a wealth of authoritative evidence, she exposes the tangle of lies and false claims by which the Arabs have tried to justify their unending violence. Everyone who hopes for peace in the Middle East between Jews and Arabs will want to read this book -- will *have* to read this book." (Lucy Dawidowicz)

20. On professor Hauser, see footnotes 19 and 25 of this chapter.

21. For Tuchman's and others' jubilation about the Peters book, see footnotes 19 and 25 of this chapter.

22. The original article by Finkelstein appeared in *In These Times*, September 11, 1984. An updated version is published as chapter 2 of Norman G. Finkelstein, *Image And Reality Of The Israel-Palestine Conflict*, London: Verso, 1995. See also, Norman G. Finkelstein, "Disinformation and the Palestine Question: The Not-So-Strange Case of Joan Peters's *From Time Immemorial*," and Edward Said, "Conspiracy of Praise," both in Edward Said and Christopher Hitchens, eds., *Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question*, London: Verso, 1988, chs. 1 and 2.

23. After several years, Finkelstein was able to obtain work teaching classes in political theory and international relations at New York University and then at City University of New York. He published four books between 1995 and 2000 -- see Norman G. Finkelstein, *Image And Reality Of The Israel-Palestine Conflict*, London: Verso, 1995; Norman G. Finkelstein, *The Rise and Fall of Palestine: A Personal Account of the Intifada Years*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996; Norman G. Finkelstein and Ruth Bettina Birn, *A Nation on Trial: The Goldhagen Thesis and Historical Truth*, New York: Metropolitan Books, 1998; Norman G. Finkelstein, *The Holocaust Industry: Reflections on the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering*, London: Verso, 2000.

24. For British reviews of the Peters book, see for example, Albert Hourani [Oxford University historian], "An ancient war," *Observer* (London), March 3, 1985, p. 27. An excerpt:

The whole book is written like this: facts are selected or misunderstood, tortuous and flimsy arguments are expressed in violent and repetitive language. This is a ludicrous and worthless book, and the only mildly interesting question it raises is why it comes with praise from two well-known American writers.

Ian Gilmour and David Gilmour, "Pseudo-Travellers," *London Review of Books*, February 7, 1985, pp. 8f. An indication of this review's sustained decimation:

Peters's censorship of Zionist sources that do not suit her case is as effective as her censorship of Arab sources. In this, at least, she is impartial. . . . Peters cites the historian Makrizi to back one of her statements about mid-19th century population movement, but, since Makrizi died in 1442, he is less than authoritative on what happened in 1860. . . . Instead of bolstering Peters's case, the Hope Simpson report destroys it. Ms. Peters's treatment of the report shows that her handling of such evidence cannot be trusted even when she seems to be quoting it. . . . Part of the author's technique is at times to give a misleading "quotation" in the text and then bury the correct quotation in one of the 1,792 footnotes at the end of the book. . . . Peters thus uses the Ottoman census when it suits her and disregards it when it does not. . . . The author prefers the words that were not used to those that were. . . . Even when the author uses a more modern piece of evidence, it is distorted out of all recognition. . . . [W]hat can one say of a historian who takes a group of 37 refugees in 1967 and translates them into "the majority of the Arab refugees in 1948"? It is disappointing that after "seven years" of research, the author has not discovered facts about the Middle East conflict which have been widely known for a long time. . . .

[T]his book is not history. As a guide to what has happened in Palestine in the last hundred years Ms. Peters is about as trustworthy as her Medieval "source" Makrizi. The prominent Zionist academics thanked in the preface for their encouragement, their "data and statistics," their "checking and re-checking," seem to have some explaining to do. In accepting the claims of this strident, pretentious and preposterous book, Miss Tuchman and Mr. Bellow among others have shown a deplorable lack of judgment.

25. For the article that refers to the unpublished Porath review, see Colin Campbell, "Dispute Flares Over Book On Claims To Palestine," *New York Times*, November 28, 1985, p. C16. An excerpt:

The whole "Palestinian" issue, Miss Peters claims, is a "big lie" that has caused "bewildering, squeamish reactions" of "doubt and guilt" among Israel's supporters. Yehoshua Porath, an Israeli historian of the Palestinian Arabs who teaches at Hebrew University, was asked in a telephone interview from Jerusalem about the book. "I think it's a sheer forgery," he replied. "In Israel, at least, the book was almost universally dismissed as sheer rubbish except maybe as a propaganda weapon," the historian said. Mr. Porath described his politics as centrist. He has written an essay on the book for *The New York Review of Books* that will be published soon.

[Barbara Tuchman], in an angry letter to Sir Ian [Gilmour, who dismissed the book as fraudulent in the British press,] that was printed last month in *The Nation*, traced part of the hostility against the book to Britain's "growing anti-Semitism." Ms. Tuchman said later that she regarded some of the book's American critics as

"committed P.L.O. supporters" who were guilty of "the worst kind" of anti-Semitism. . . . Mrs. Tuchman said she had not kept up with recent scholarship but she retained a vivid sense from research she did 30 years ago that Jewish labor had reclaimed a desolate Palestine, just as Miss Peters argued. The notion of "the Palestinians" was "a fairy tale," Mrs. Tuchman said.

Mr. Hauser, the Chicago demographer [who recommended the book's methods], recalled that Miss Peters, a family friend, had asked him to check some calculations and he had done so. He said he had "no competence" in Middle Eastern history. Saul Bellow declined to comment. Mr. Wiesel, Mr. Duke, Mr. White and several others [who all had praised the book] said they had not followed the controversy.

Norman Finkelstein notes that this article appeared in response to escalating accusations of censorship, leveled mainly by the British press. It was run by the *New York Times* in its Thanksgiving Day (non-) issue, on the Theater page, without even a listing in the index.

Several weeks later, *New York Times* columnist Anthony Lewis then devoted a column to publicizing the hoax. See Anthony Lewis, "There Were No Indians," *New York Times*, January 13, 1986, p. A15.

26. For Porath's article, see Yehoshua Porath, "Mrs. Peters's Palestine," *New York Review of Books*, January 16, 1986, p. 36. See also, Norman G. Finkelstein, *Image And Reality Of The Israel-Palestine Conflict*, London: Verso, 1995, ch. 2.

27. On the Israeli reviews of the Peters book, see for example, Norman Finkelstein, "Challenging the Thesis of a Palestine 'Uninhabited' in 1880," Op-Ed, *New York Times*, January 17, 1986, p. A30. The *Times* published this letter from Finkelstein after the *New York Review* finally ran its review of the Peters book:

Mr. Gottheil [a prior letter writer who credited Peters's thesis] asks, "Why the tumult over the Peters book?" Permit me to suggest an explanation: because the documents and statistics Miss Peters brings to bear in support of her central thesis are, in my view, and in that of serious scholars outside the United States, misrepresented.

Oxford's great Orientalist, Albert Hourani, dismissed "From Time Immemorial" in *The Observer* as "worthless and ludicrous," and the *Middle East Journal* quotes him to the effect that every citation he checked was "wrong in one way or another." Ian and David Gilmour, in *The London Review of Books*, concluded an exhaustive 8,000-word expose by calling the book "preposterous. . . ." You reported that Prof. Yehoshua Porath, Israel's outstanding scholar of Palestinian nationalism, described "From Time Immemorial" as "a sheer forgery." *Davar*, the Israeli Labor Party daily, compared the book to some of Israel's more lamentable past propaganda efforts. Avishai Margalit of Hebrew University described the author's "web of deceits" in the liberal weekly *Koteret Rashit*.

See also, Elie Shaltiel, *Davar* (Israel), March 29, 1985.

28. On Ireland's subjection to "free market" doctrine and export of food during the Irish famine, see for example, Cormac ó Gráda, *The Great Irish Famine*, Dublin: Macmillan, 1989, pp. 50-64. An excerpt (pp. 52-53, 51, 61):

[Leading Whigs and Radicals] insisted on the evils of public charity and the "inevitability" of the outcome [of the famine]. They were strongly supported in this by the *Edinburgh Review* and the fledgling *Economist*. Avoiding deaths was not the

prime Whig preoccupation: relief would shift the distribution of food "from the more meritorious to the less," because "if left to the natural law of distribution, those who deserved more would obtain it." Thus in the Commons Russell refused to commit himself to saving lives as the prime objective, and some Whig ideologues such as Nassau Senior and *The Economist's* Thomas Wilson ("it is no man's business to provide for another") countenanced large-scale mortality with equanimity. . . .

It is easy to see why populist and socialist critics saw this as Malthusian murder by the invisible hand. . . . The Whig belief in the power of free market to direct food where most needed dictated a policy of *laissez-faire* in so far as supply was concerned. Demand would be met by the purchasing power of money wages earned on the public works. . . . Whig spokesmen such as Whately and Senior believed that preventing mass mortality was simply impossible. Even attempting to do so was wrong, since it would bankrupt Irish landlords, and the ensuing demoralization would destroy "industry" and "self-dependence" and ultimately put a stop to economic activity. The Whigs, too, were consistent in their faith in the market, and their text might have been Adam Smith's dictum that "the free exercise (of trade) is not only the best palliative of the inconveniences of a dearth, but the best preventive of that calamity. . . ." If food was scarce why not balance supply and demand at a lower price by halting grain exports? Government relied instead on the self-correcting power of the price mechanism and free trade to match supply and demand, pinning their hopes on a quick supply response from overseas. They had the authority of Adam Smith and Edmund Burke on their side in rejecting any interference.

Cormac ó Gráda, *Ireland before and after the Famine: Explorations in economic history, 1800-1925*, Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 1993, especially pp. 125-133.

For a general study of Ireland's development failures, and the impact of England's colonization on a country that should have been comparable to the small wealthy advanced industrial societies of Europe, see Lars Mjøset, *The Irish Economy in a Comparative Institutional Perspective*, Dublin: Government Publications, National Economic and Social Council, December 1992. An excerpt (pp. 7, 62, 220, 225, 239):

The interaction between deindustrialisation and agricultural restructuring to provide cattle to a booming English market in the post-1814 period, led to the Great Famine. Following this disaster, population decline emerged as a most persistent factor in Irish development, first through starvation and emigration, later through emigration only. . . .

Ireland's demographic experience is unique. Its population in 1910 was only 54 per cent of the population of the 1840s. . . . The number of excess deaths due to the famine amounted at least to 1.1 million. There was no absolute shortage of food, but unemployment and lack of access to sufficient land among the rural poor, together with the vulnerability that stemmed from their specialisation in potatoes, gave rise to the catastrophe. . . . Ireland was a part of Britain, fully exposed to free trade and with no chance of choosing its own economic policies with reference to an independent constitution.

See also, L.S. Stavrianos, *Global Rift: The Third World Comes of Age*, New York: Morrow, 1981, p. 276.

29. On J. Marion Sims, a gynecologist recognized as "one of the immortals" at Harvard Medical School and memorialized with a statue in New York City's Central Park, who used black slaves and Irish immigrants as subjects for experimental surgery,

see for example, G.J. Barker-Benfield, *The Horrors of the Half-Known Life: Male Attitudes Toward Women and Sexuality in Nineteenth-Century America*, New York: Harper Colophon, 1976, especially pp. 100-102.

30. For Ware's book, see Norman Ware, *The Industrial Worker, 1840-1860: The Reaction of American Industrial Society to the Advance of the Industrial Revolution*, Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1990 (original 1924). For more on early U.S. labor history, see for example, Jeremy Brecher, *Strike!*, Boston: South End, 1972 (revised and updated edition 1997), chs. 1 to 5; Howard Zinn, *A People's History of the United States: 1492-Present*, New York: HarperCollins, 1980 (revised and updated edition 1995), chs. 10 and 11.

31. On early opposition to mass public education in the U.S., see for example, Joel Spring, *The American School, 1642-1985: Varieties of Historical Interpretation and the Foundations and Development of American Education*, New York: Longman, 1986, especially ch. 7 and pp. 78-81; Charles Sellers, *The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 365-369, 394-395.

For an analysis of nineteenth-century school reform and its opposition, using as a focus the case of Beverly, Massachusetts, where citizens voted to abolish the local high school in 1860, see Michael Katz, *The Irony of Early School Reform*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968, especially pp. 80-93.

On early capitalists' support for mass public education, see for example, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, *Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life*, New York: Basic Books, 1976, especially ch. 6; Elizabeth Fones-Wolf, *Selling Free Enterprise: The Business Assault on Labor and Liberalism, 1945-1960*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992, ch. 7. An excerpt (pp. 190-191):

The business community's interest in education can be traced back to the origins of the public school system in the early nineteenth century. Faced with the tensions resulting from industrialization, urbanization, and immigration, business and professional classes supported the common school movement as a means of socializing workers for the factory, and as a way of promoting social and political stability. But, by the turn of the century, inculcating the general business values of hard work, industriousness, and punctuality was not enough. Progressive-era reforms, such as at-large school elections, shifted control over education from local politicians with allegiances to their working-class constituencies to elites, almost guaranteeing "that school boards would represent the views and values of the financial, business, and professional communities." Business leaders encouraged schools to adopt a corporate model of organization and called for the education system to more explicitly prepare workers for the labor market through testing, vocational guidance, and vocational education.

Juliet B. Schor, *The Overworked American: The Unexpected Decline of Leisure*, New York: BasicBooks, 1991, pp. 60-61. An excerpt:

Employers found the first generation of industrial workers almost impossible to discipline. Attendance was irregular, and turnover high. Tolerance for the mindlessness and monotony of factory work was low. "The highlander, it was said, 'never sits at ease at a loom; it is like putting a deer in the plough.'" Employers devised various schemes to instill obedience. They posted supervisors, levied fines, and fired their workers. Beatings were common, especially among slaves and child

laborers. One early factory owner explained: "I prefer fining to beating, if it answers . . . [but] fining does not answer. It does not keep the boys at their work."

Many employers and social reformers became convinced that the adult population was irredeemably unfit for factory work. They looked to children, hoping that "the elementary school could be used to break the labouring classes into those habits of work discipline now necessary for factory production. . . . Putting little children to work at school for very long hours at very dull subjects was seen as a positive virtue, for it made them 'habituated, not to say naturalized, to labour and fatigue.'"

Merle Curti, *The Social Ideas of American Educators*, Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams, 1959. An excerpt (pp. 218-220, 228, 230, 203):

Hardly an annual meeting of the National Education Association was concluded without an appeal on the part of leading educators for the help of the teacher in quelling strikes and checking the spread of socialism and anarchism. Commissioners of education and editors of educational periodicals summoned their forces to the same end. . . . In his report for [1877] John Eaton, Commissioner of Education, insisted that the school could train the child to resist the evils of strikes and violence and declared that capital should "weigh the cost of the mob and tramp against the expense of universal and sufficient education. . . ." In his presidential address in 1881 James H. Smart, admitting that it was reasonable for the poor man, particularly after middle age, to demand a "division of property," declared that the free school did more "to suppress the latent flame of communism than all other agencies combined. . . ." Again and again educators denounced radical doctrines and offered education as the best preventive and cure. . . .

Education was considered a good investment. Among the benefactors of the public schools were Henry Frick, John D. Rockefeller, George Peabody, John F. Slater, Robert C. Ogden, Andrew Carnegie, Elbert H. Gray, and Pierre S. Dupont. . . . The Commissioner of Education in 1896 told superintendents that they would find their best support in conservative business leaders. . . . Educators accepted, in general, the business man's outlook and consciously or unconsciously molded the school system to accord with the canons of a profit-making economic system. . . . [As the social reformer Jane Addams stated in 1897:] "The business man has, of course, not said to himself: 'I will have the public school train office boys and clerks for me, so that I may have them cheap,' but he has thought, and sometimes said, 'Teach the children to write legibly, and to figure accurately and quickly; to acquire habits of punctuality and order; to be prompt to obey, and not question why; and you will fit them to make their way in the world as I have made mine!'"

See also footnote 8 of this chapter.

32. For Malthus's exact words, see Patricia James, ed., Thomas R. Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989 (based primarily on Malthus's 1803 edition), Vol. II, ch. VI. An excerpt (pp. 127-128):

A man who is born into a world already possessed if he cannot get subsistence from his parents on whom he has a just demand and if the society do not want his labour, has no claim of *right* to the smallest portion of food, and, in fact, has no business to be where he is. At nature's mighty feast there is no vacant cover for him. She tells him to be gone, and will quickly execute her own orders, if he do not work upon the compassion of some of her guests. If these guests get up and make room for him, other intruders immediately appear demanding the same favour. The report of a

provision for all that come fills the hall with numerous claimants. The order and harmony of the feast is disturbed, the plenty that before reigned is changed into scarcity; and the happiness of the guests is destroyed by the spectacle of misery and dependence in every part of the hall, and by the clamorous importunity of those who are justly enraged at not finding the provisions which they had been taught to expect. The guests learn too late their error, in counteracting those strict orders to all intruders, issued by the great mistress of the feast, who, wishing that all her guests should have plenty, and knowing that she could not provide for unlimited numbers humanely refused to admit fresh comers when her table was already full.

See also footnote 35 of this chapter.

33. For Ricardo's assertion, see David Ricardo, *The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation*, New York: E.P. Dutton, 1911 (original 1817-1821), ch. V. His exact words (p. 63):

The principle of gravitation is not more certain than the tendency of such laws [i.e. the "Poor Laws," which provided the poor with a guaranteed level of subsistence,] to change wealth and vigor into misery and weakness . . . until at last all classes should be infected with the plague of universal poverty.

34. For Kanth's book, see Rajani Kannepalli Kanth, *Political Economy and Laissez-Faire: Economics and Ideology in the Ricardan Era*, Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1986.

35. For discussion of the last manifestation of the "right to live" at the end of England's pre-capitalist period, see for example, Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, Boston: Beacon, 1957 (original 1944), pp. 77-85. An excerpt (pp. 78, 81):

[I]n 1832, the middle class had forced its way to power [in England], partly in order to remove this obstacle to the new capitalistic economy. Indeed, nothing could be more obvious than that the wage system imperatively demanded the withdrawal of the "right to live" as proclaimed in Speenhamland [where a scale for wage subsidies had been established in 1795] -- under the new regime of economic man, nobody would work for a wage if he could make a living by doing nothing. . . .

To later generations nothing could have been more patent than the mutual incompatibility of institutions like the wage system and the "right to live," or, in other words, than the impossibility of a functioning capitalistic order as long as wages were subsidized from public funds.

Eric Hobsbawm, *Industry and Empire (The Pelican Economic History of Britain, Vol. 3)*, Harmondsworth, U.K.: Pelican, 1969, pp. 101-105.

See also, Thomas R. Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, London: J. Murray, 5th ed., 1817, Vol. III, p. 154. Malthus argued against the "right to live" as follows:

Our laws indeed say that [people have] this right and bind society to furnish employment and food to those who cannot get them in the regular market; but in so doing they attempt to reverse the laws of nature; and it is in consequence to be expected, not only that they should fail in their object, but that the poor who were intended to be benefited, should suffer most cruelly from the inhuman deceit practised upon them.

36. For a penetrating inquiry into the origins of European capitalism, which reaches the conclusion about England leading the industrial revolution largely because it denied property rights to the rural population more than did France, see Robert Brenner, "Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe," in T.H. Aston and C.H.E. Philpin, eds., *The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe*, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1985, especially pp. 46-63.

37. For the article discussing the Tulsa factory, see Louis Uchitelle, "Corporate Spending Booms, but Jobs Stagnate," *New York Times*, June 6, 1994, p. D1.

38. On the "free market" myth generally, see for example, Lance Taylor [M.I.T. development economist], "Agents of Inequality: The I.M.F., the World Bank, and the global economy," *Dollars and Sense*, November 1991, p. 13. An excerpt:

In the long run, there are no laissez-faire transitions to modern economic growth. The state has always intervened to create a capitalist class, and then it has to regulate the capitalist class, and then the state has to worry about being taken over by the capitalist class, but the state has always been there. That is what the N.I.C.s [Newly Industrializing Countries] show. . . . Import substitution [through state intervention] is about the only way anybody's ever figured out to industrialize. Increasingly often, the industries that were created by import substitution turn out to be viable. . . . What the extreme deregulators will tell you is that you don't have to go through this stage, but they don't have any cases [to support their claim].

William Lazonick, *Business Organization and the Myth of the Market Economy*, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1991; Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962 (classic account of the state role in "late development" in continental Europe); Frederick Clairmonte, *Economic Liberalism and Underdevelopment: Studies in the Disintegration of an Idea*, New York: Asia Publishing House, 1960.

On the state's role in the Japanese economy, see for example, Ryutaro Komiya et al., *Industrial Policy of Japan*, Tokyo: Academic Press, 1988. This study by twenty-four leading Japanese economists concludes that it was radical defiance of prevailing economic theory that set the stage for the Japanese economic development "miracle," commenting (p. 15):

The actor that played the predominant role in the formation of industrial policy in Japan was the *genyoku*, the section of the bureaucracy within the government that had the primary responsibility for developing and supervising policies for a given industry. Then, as now, each industry had one associated *genyoku*. This system is rather similar to the organisation of the industrial bureaucracy in socialist countries and seems to have no direct counterpart in the other advanced Western countries. Overall M.I.T.I. [the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry] is the single most important *genyoku* ministry within the Japanese government.

Chalmers Johnson, "Their Behavior, Our Policy," *National Interest*, Fall 1989, pp. 17-25 at pp. 24-25 ("It may well be true that Japan is the most advanced capitalist nation today. But it may equally well prove true, as many foreign observers of the Japanese government-business relationship have concluded over the years, that 'Japan is the only communist nation that works'"). See also chapter 2 of *U.P.* and its footnote 57.

On the delusions of the economics profession, see for example, Edward S. Herman, "The Institutionalization of Bias in Economics," *Media, Culture & Society*, July 1982, pp. 275-291 (exploring the immunity of the doctrines of economic theory to empirical refutation, and how "the responses of important economic professionals and the publicity given economic findings are correlated with the increased market demand for specific conclusions and a particular ideology"); Edward S. Herman, "The Selling of Market Economics," in Marcus G. Raskin and Herbert J. Bernstein, *New Ways Of Knowing: The Sciences, Society, and Reconstructive Knowledge*, Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1987, pp. 173-199 (on the ideological influences of class and the marketplace on the field of economics); Paul Krugman, "Cycles of conventional wisdom on economic development," *International Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 4, October 1995, pp. 717-732 (pointing out the lack of empirical support for economic theories that are embraced with certainty by policy intellectuals, and the dramatic back and forth shifting in economic orthodoxy that has occurred during the past century); Doug Henwood, *Wall Street: How It Works and for Whom*, London: Verso, 1997, ch. 4 (on the "deluded" contributions of the economics profession to the field of finance over the past two centuries). See also, Herman Daly [former World Bank Senior Economist], "The Perils of Free Trade," *Scientific American*, November 1993, pp. 50-57 (commenting: "my major concern about my profession today is that our disciplinary preference for logically beautiful results over factually grounded policies has reached such fanatical proportions that we economists have become dangerous to the earth and its inhabitants").

39. For the economist's comment, see Paul Bairoch, *Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993, p. 32 ("The Mother Country and Bastion of Modern Protectionism" is one of the book's subheadings). More generally, the author concludes (pp. 53-54):

It is difficult to find another case where the facts so contradict a dominant theory than the one concerning the negative impact of protectionism; at least as far as nineteenth-century world economic history is concerned. In all cases protectionism led to, or at least was concomitant with, industrialization and economic development. . . . There is no doubt that the Third World's compulsory economic liberalism in the nineteenth century is a major element in explaining the delay in its industrialization.

40. On the results of U.S. protectionism during Europe's experiment with *laissez faire*, see for example, Paul Bairoch, *Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993, ch. 4. An excerpt (pp. 46, 53):

The important point to note here is not only that the depression [in Europe beginning around 1870] started at the peak of liberalism [i.e. the period of Europe's experimentation with *laissez faire*] but that it ended around 1892-4, just as the return to protectionism in Continental Europe had become really effective. . . . In those years the United States, which, as we have seen, was increasing its protectionism, went through a phase of very rapid growth. Indeed this period can be regarded as among the most prosperous in the whole economic history of the United States.

See also, Mark Bils, "Tariff Protection and Production in the Early U.S. Cotton Textile Industry," *Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 44, December 1984, pp. 1033-1045 (analyzing protectionism in the U.S. in the first half of the nineteenth century). An excerpt:

Cotton textiles constituted nearly two-thirds of value added in large-scale manufacturing in New England in the 1830s. The removal of the tariff, according to my results, would have reduced value added in textiles by, at a minimum, three-quarters. The implication is that about half of the industrial sector of New England would have been bankrupted.

41. On the recovery of the U.S. steel industry, see for example, "America's steel industry: Protection's stepchild," *Economist* (London), May 16, 1992, p. 97. An excerpt:

[F]or most of the 1980s America's steel industry was heavily protected from foreign competition. Starting in 1982, after a series of anti-dumping complaints against foreign suppliers [dumping is a practice in which foreign companies sell goods abroad for less than they are sold domestically or for less than they cost to produce], the government negotiated a series of "voluntary" export restraints (VERs) with the E.C. [European Community], Japan, South Korea and others. The agreements limited the foreign supplier's share of the American market; thus sheltered, the industry rebuilt itself. . . . The policy of protection -- much criticised by economists at the time -- seems to have worked. It gave the industry the time (and extra profits) it needed to adjust.

Or did it? On closer examination, the recovery of the American steel industry is a lot more complicated. At great cost, the VERs did have an effect: at least initially, they kept the price of steel in America higher than it would otherwise have been. . . . [From 1984, the VERs] limited steel imports to about 20% of the American market. . . . According to an estimate made by the Institute for International Economics in the mid-1980s, the steel VERs were then costing consumers roughly \$7 billion a year. On the assumption that the restraints would stop about 9,000 jobs from disappearing (in an industry that then employed about 170,000 people), the authors put the price for each job saved at \$750,000 a year.

David Gardner, "U.S. 'flouting the rules' in steel dispute," *Financial Times* (London), December 2, 1992, p. 4. An excerpt:

The European Commission said yesterday it was "shocked" at Monday's imposition by the U.S. of provisional countervailing duties on flat-rolled steel from six E.C. countries, accusing Washington of flouting international trade rules to protect its steel market. . . . The Commission says the U.S. is responding politically to the domestic difficulties of its steel producers by effectively closing its market to [European] Community steel exporters.

See also footnote 42 of this chapter.

On the destruction of unions in the U.S., see chapter 9 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 24, 26 and 27. See also footnote 23 of chapter 8 of *U.P.*; and footnotes 72 and 81 of chapter 10 of *U.P.*

42. On Baker's statement and Reaganite protectionism, see for example, Stuart Auerbach, "Baker Calls U.S. Late In Attacking Trade Gap," *Washington Post*, September 15, 1987, p. E1. An excerpt:

[Baker] cited as "a little known fact" that President Reagan, despite his strong adherence to free trade, "has granted more import relief to United States industry than any of his predecessors in more than half a century" and was the first president to initiate unfair trade cases. Baker said these actions "rolled back barriers in Europe, Korea, Japan and Taiwan."

See also, Paul Blustein, "Unfair Traders: Does the U.S. Have Room to Talk?," *Washington Post*, May 24, 1989, p. F1. An excerpt:

[C]hief White House economist Michael J. Boskin noted that the United States maintains restrictions on imports of steel, autos and a host of other products. Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney said the Pentagon is prohibited by law from buying supercomputers from any but U.S. manufacturers. And even Trade Representative Carla A. Hills, who favors taking a tough stand against Japan, described as disgraceful the existence of U.S. quotas on sugar imports. . . . Among the [other] products that are restricted in some manner from import into the United States . . . are cheese and other dairy products, textiles and apparel, machine tools, beef, peanuts and ceramic tiles. . . .

[D]espite the free-trade rhetoric of the Reagan administration, U.S. import restrictions have been growing rapidly during the recent past. According to [Georgetown University trade specialist Gary] Hufbauer, the proportion of imports affected by substantial U.S. barriers rose to about 23 percent in 1988 from about 12 percent in 1980. Other estimates, including one by the World Bank, show a similar increase.

Phillip Oppenheim, "Buccaneering capitalism in a not so free market," *Financial Times* (London), November 16, 1992, p. 13. An excerpt:

A World Bank survey of non-tariff barriers showed that they covered 9 per cent of all goods in Japan -- compared with 34 per cent in the U.S. -- figures reinforced by David Henderson of the O.E.C.D. [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], who stated that during the 1980s the U.S. had the worst record for devising new non-tariff barriers. . . . [T]he free-market image of the U.S. and the rhetoric of its leaders rarely match the facts, while the interventionism and protectionism of Germany and Japan are habitually exaggerated by politicians and industrialists for self-serving reasons.

43. For the British study, see Winfried Ruigrock and Rob Van Tulder, *The Logic of International Restructuring*, New York: Routledge, 1995, especially ch. 9. An excerpt (pp. 217, 221-222):

We assess that at least twenty corporations in the 1993 Fortune 100 would not have survived at all as independent companies, if they had not been saved by their respective governments. . . . Virtually all of the world's largest core firms have experienced a decisive influence from government policies and/or trade barriers on their strategy and competitive position. . . .

Government intervention has been the rule rather than the exception over the past two centuries. This intervention has taken the shape of all kinds of trade and industrial policies, and of a weak enforcement of competition or anti-trust regulations. . . . Government intervention has played a key role in the development and diffusion of many product and process innovations -- particularly in aerospace, electronics, modern agriculture, materials technologies, energy and transportation technology. . . . [G]overnment policies, in particular defence programmes, have been an overwhelming force in shaping the strategies and competitiveness of the world's largest firms.

See also, Michael Borrus [Co-Director of the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy], "Investing on the Frontier: How the U.S. Can Reclaim High-Tech Leadership," *American Prospect*, Fall 1992, pp. 79-87 at pp. 79-80 (citing a 1988 Department of Commerce study showing that "five of the top six fastest growing U.S. industries from 1972 to 1988 were sponsored or sustained, directly or indirectly, by

federal investment," the only exception being lithograph services. "The winners [in earlier years] -- computers, biotechnology, jet engines, and airframes -- were each the by-product of public spending for national defense and public health"). And see footnote 22 of chapter 10 of *U.P.*

44. On the motorization and suburbanization of the U.S., see for example, Bradford C. Snell, *American Ground Transport: A Proposal for Restructuring the Automobile, Truck, Bus, and Rail Industries*, Hearings Before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974, especially pp. 1-3, 26-47. An excerpt (pp. 1-3):

[This study] focuses on three powerful automobile companies which eliminated competition among themselves, secured control over rival bus and rail industries, and then maximized profits by substituting cars and trucks for trains, streetcars, subways and buses. In short, it describes how General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler reshaped American ground transportation to serve corporate wants instead of social needs. This is not a study of malevolent or rapacious executives. Rather, it maintains that as a result of their monopolistic structure the Big Three automakers have acted in a manner detrimental to the public interest. . . .

G.M. has both the power and the economic incentive to maximize profits by suppressing rail and bus transportation. The economics are obvious: one bus can eliminate 35 automobiles; one streetcar, subway or rail transit vehicle can supplant 50 passenger cars; one train can displace 1,000 cars or a fleet of 150 cargo-laden trucks. The result was inevitable: a drive by G.M. to sell cars and trucks by displacing rail and bus systems. This section [of the report] describes that process. It discloses, for example, G.M.'s role in the destruction of more than 100 electric surface rail systems in 45 cities including New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, St. Louis, Oakland, Salt Lake City and Los Angeles. More specifically, it describes the devastating impact of this widescale operation on the quality of life in America's cities.

. . .

General Motors' common control of auto, truck, and locomotive production may have contributed to the decline of America's railroads. Beginning in the mid-1930s, this firm used its leverage as the Nation's largest shipper of freight to coerce railroads into scrapping their equipment, including pollution-free electric locomotives, in favor of more expensive, less durable, and less efficient G.M. diesel units. As a consequence, dieselization seriously impaired the ability of railroads to compete with the cars and trucks G.M. was fundamentally interested in selling.

The study then describes actual corporate conspiracies to destroy urban streetcar systems across the United States (pp. 30-33):

After its successful experience with intercity buses, General Motors diversified into city bus and rail operations. At first, its procedure consisted of directly acquiring and scrapping local electric transit systems in favor of G.M. buses. In this fashion, it created a market for city buses. As G.M. General Counsel Henry Hogan would observe later, the corporation "decided that the only way this new market for (city) buses could be created was for it to finance the conversion from streetcars to buses in some small cities." On June 29, 1932, the G.M.-bus executive committee formally resolved that "to develop motorized transportation, our company should initiate a program of this nature and authorize the incorporation of a holding company with a capital of \$300,000." Thus was formed United Cities Motor Transit (U.C.M.T.) as a subsidiary of G.M.'s bus division. Its sole function was to acquire electric streetcar

companies, convert them to G.M. motorbus operation, and then resell the properties to local concerns which agreed to purchase G.M. bus replacements. The electric streetcar lines of Kalamazoo and Saginaw, Mich., and Springfield, Ohio, were U.C.M.T.'s first targets. . . .

In 1936 [General Motors] combined with the Omnibus Corp. in engineering the tremendous conversion of New York City's electric streetcar system to G.M. buses. . . . The massive conversion within a period of only 18 months of the New York system, then the world's largest streetcar network, has been recognized subsequently as the turning point in the electric railway industry. Meanwhile, General Motors had organized another holding company to convert the remainder of the Nation's electric transportation systems to G.M. buses. . . . During the following 14 years General Motors, together with Standard Oil of California, Firestone Tire, and two other suppliers of bus-related products, contributed more than \$9 million to this holding company [National City Lines] for the purpose of converting electric transit systems in 16 States to G.M. bus operations. . . . To preclude the return of electric vehicles to the dozens of cities it motorized, G.M. extracted from the local transit companies contracts which prohibited their purchase of " . . . any new equipment using any fuel or means of propulsion other than gas."

The National City Lines campaign had a devastating impact on the quality of urban transportation and urban living in America. Nowhere was the ruin more apparent than in the Greater Los Angeles metropolitan area. Thirty-five years ago it was a beautiful region of lush palm trees, fragrant orange groves, and clean, ocean-enriched air. It was served then by the world's largest interurban electric railway system. The Pacific Electric system branched out from Los Angeles for a radius of more than 75 miles reaching north to San Fernando, east to San Bernardino, and south to Santa Ana. Its 3,000 quiet, pollution-free, electric trains annually transported 80 million people throughout the sprawling region's 56 separately incorporated cities. Contrary to popular belief, the Pacific Electric, not the automobile, was responsible for the area's geographical development. First constructed in 1911, it established traditions of suburban living long before the automobile had arrived.

In 1938, General Motors and Standard Oil of California organized Pacific City Lines (P.C.L.) as an affiliate of N.C.L. to motorize west coast electric railways. The following year P.C.L. acquired, scrapped, and substituted bus lines for three northern California electric rail systems in Fresno, San Jose, and Stockton. . . . [In 1940] P.C.L. began to acquire and scrap portions of the \$100 million Pacific Electric system including rail lines from Los Angeles to Glendale, Burbank, Pasadena, and San Bernardino. Subsequently, in December 1944, another N.C.L. affiliate (American City Lines) was financed by G.M. and Standard Oil to motorize downtown Los Angeles. At the time, the Pacific Electric shared downtown Los Angeles trackage with a local electric streetcar company, the Los Angeles Railway. American City Lines purchased the local system, scrapped its electric transit cars, tore down its power transmission lines, ripped up the tracks, and placed G.M. diesel buses fueled by Standard Oil on Los Angeles' crowded streets. In sum, G.M. and its auto-industrial allies severed Los Angeles' regional rail links and then motorized its downtown heart.

Motorization drastically altered the quality of life in southern California. Today, Los Angeles is an ecological wasteland: The palm trees are dying from petrochemical smog; the orange groves have been paved over by 300 miles of freeways; the air is a septic tank into which 4 million cars, half of them built by General Motors, pump 13,000 tons of pollutants daily. With the destruction of the efficient Pacific Electric rail

system, Los Angeles may have lost its best hope for rapid rail transit and a smog-free metropolitan area. . . .

In April of [1949], a Chicago Federal jury convicted G.M. of having criminally conspired with Standard Oil of California, Firestone Tire and others to replace electric transportation with gas- or diesel-powered buses and to monopolize the sale of buses and related products to local transportation companies throughout the country. The court imposed a sanction of \$5,000 on G.M. . . . The court fined Grossman [the treasurer of G.M. and director of P.C.L.] the magnanimous sum of \$1. . . . Despite its criminal conviction, General Motors continued to acquire and dieselize electric transit properties through September of 1955. By then, approximately 88 percent of the nation's electric streetcar network had been eliminated. In 1936, when G.M. organized National City Lines, 40,000 streetcars were operating in the United States; at the end of 1955, only 5,000 remained.

For the decision upholding the conspirators' criminal conviction on appeal, see *United States v. National City Lines, Inc., et al.*, 186 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1951). For the decision in the civil antitrust suit which followed the conspirators' criminal conviction, see *United States v. National City Lines, Inc., et al.*, 134 F.Supp. 350 (N.D. Ill. 1955).

See also, Richard B. DuBoff, *Accumulation and Power: An Economic History of the United States*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1989. An excerpt (pp. 102-103):

As the backlog of unrealized passenger car sales from the 1930s and early 1940s was exhausted by the time of the Korean War [i.e. the early 1950s], the momentum behind [motorization] came from the cumulative impact of the Federal Highway Acts of 1944, 1956, and 1968. They opened the way to complete motorization and the crippling of surface mass transit. . . . In effect [the 1956 Act] wrote into law the 1932 National Highway Users Conference strategy of G.M. chairman Alfred P. Sloan to channel gasoline and other motor vehicle-related excise taxes exclusively into highway construction. . . . The U.S. Congress was never asked to finance this massive highway program out of general tax revenues -- that would have been extremely difficult to accomplish. Instead, the methods adopted allowed \$70 billion to be spent on the interstates without passing through the congressional appropriations process, as Congress surrendered control over the funds to the Bureau of Public Roads, while about 1 percent of that amount was allocated to rail transit.

This public "external economy" drastically lowered the risks to private investors in motels, shopping centers, sports complexes, residential housing estates, and suburban commercial and industrial zones. It is hardly conceivable that the private sector alone could have financed [motorization]. . . . One of the five authors of the House interstate highway bill in 1956, former Minnesota Congressman John Blatnik, added that the system "gave work all over the country. It put a nice solid floor across the whole economy in times of recession. . . ." In the late 1980s the effects were still evident, as nine of the top 14 *Fortune* 500 largest industrial corporations in 1987, ranked by sales, were automobile or oil companies.

David J. St. Clair, *The Motorization of American Cities*, New York: Praeger, 1986, pp. 16-17, and chs. 3 and 6.

45. On the fate of Egypt's nineteenth century industrial revolution, see for example, Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp. 169f, 238f, 258f.

46. On the fate of Bengal after the British colonial occupation, see for example, Frederick Clairmonte, *Economic Liberalism and Underdevelopment: Studies in the Disintegration of an Idea*, New York: Asia Publishing House, 1960. An excerpt (pp. 86 n.57, 98):

The famous textile centre of Dacca, which Clive described in 1757 as "extensive, populous and rich as the city of London" was to be transformed into a veritable desert. "The population of the town of Dacca," asserted Sir Charles Trevelyan before the Select Committee [of the British House of Lords] in 1840, "has fallen from 150,000 to 30,000 and the jungle and malaria are fast encroaching upon the town. . . . Dacca, the Manchester of India, has fallen off from a very flourishing town to a very poor and small town." Similarly, Sir Henry Cotton, writing at the end of the century, could declare that "the present population of the town of Dacca is only 79,000. This decadence has occurred not only in Dacca, but in all districts."

Betsy Hartmann and James Boyce, *A Quiet Violence: View from a Bangladesh Village*, London: Zed Books, 1983, ch. 1. An excerpt (pp. 11-13):

Six hundred years ago the Moroccan adventurer Ibn Battuta, whose travels took him to Persia, China, Sumatra and Timbuktu, recorded these impressions of Bengal: "This is a country of great extent, and one in which rice is extremely abundant. Indeed, I have seen no region of the earth in which provisions are so plentiful." Today Bangladesh is a land of hunger. The relics of its impoverished people are housed in a small, unpretentious museum in Dhaka. In a glass display case there is a pale turban, a specimen of the famous Dhaka muslin once prized in the imperial courts of Europe and Asia. Thirty feet long and three feet wide, the turban is so fine that it can be folded to fit inside a matchbox. The weavers of Dhaka once produced this cloth on their handlooms, using thread spun from the cotton which grew along the banks of the nearby Meghna River. Today both the cotton and the weavers have disappeared. The variety of the cotton plant adapted to the moist Bengali climate is extinct, and Bangladesh must import virtually all its cotton from abroad. . . .

The soil laid down by Bangladesh's rivers is among the most fertile in the world, and floodwaters periodically renew this fertility by depositing fresh silt and promoting the growth of beneficial soil micro-organisms. Surface waters and vast underground aquifers give Bangladesh a tremendous potential for irrigation, which is today largely untapped, while the subtropical climate allows crops to be grown 12 months a year. The rivers, ponds, and rice paddies are alive with fish; according to a report of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Bangladesh is possibly the richest country in the world as far as inland fishery resources are concerned. . . ." Today Bangladesh is famous for its poverty. . . . The land may be rich, but the people are poor. Well over half are malnourished. The average annual income is \$100 per person, the life expectancy only 46 years, and like all averages these overstate the well-being of the least fortunate. A quarter of Bangladesh's children die before reaching the age of five. . . .

The first Europeans to visit eastern Bengal, the region which is now Bangladesh, found a thriving industry and a prosperous agriculture. It was, in the optimistic words of one Englishman, "a wonderful land, whose richness and abundance neither war, pestilence, nor oppression could destroy. . . ." European traders . . . were lured to eastern Bengal above all by its legendary cotton industry, which ranked among the greatest industries of the world. After the British East India Company wrested control of Bengal from its Muslim rulers in 1757, the line between trade and outright plunder faded. . . . Ironically, the profits from the lucrative trade in Bengali textiles helped to finance Britain's industrial revolution. As their own mechanized textile industry

developed, the British eliminated competition from Bengali textiles through an elaborate network of restrictions and prohibitive duties. Not only were Indian textiles effectively shut out of the British market, but even within India, taxes discriminated against local cloth. . . . The decimation of local industry brought great hardship to the Bengali people.

See also, Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976 (original 1776), Bk. I, ch. VIII, p. 82; Book IV, ch. V, p. 33; Book IV, ch. VII, pt. III, pp. 152-153.

47. On India's industrial competitiveness and the British response, see for example, Frederick Clairmonte, *Economic Liberalism and Underdevelopment: Studies in the Disintegration of an Idea*, New York: Asia Publishing House, 1960, ch. 2. An excerpt (pp. 73, 74, 86, 87):

Digby [author of the 1902 study *Prosperous British India: A Revelation from Official Records*] argued that "before the stream of loot began to flow to England, the industries of our country were at a low level. Lancashire spinning and weaving were on a par with the corresponding industry in India so far as machinery was concerned; but the skill which had made Indian cottons a marvel of manufacture was wholly wanting in any of the Western nations. . . ." In the field of iron working -- as the iron pillars in New Delhi bear witness -- India attained a remarkable degree of skill. . . . Nor was India backward in the field of naval construction. Her ships roamed the seven seas, and even as late as 1802 British warships were built by India and England borrowed blueprints from Indian builders.

[Before a British Parliamentary Committee in 1840] Montgomery Martin stated that he . . . was convinced that an outrage had been committed "by reason of the outcry for free trade on the part of England without permitting India a free trade herself." After supplying statistical data of Indian textile exports to Great Britain, he pointed out that between 1815-1832 prohibitive duties ranging from 10 to 20, 30, 50, 100 and 1,000 per cent were levied on articles from India. . . . "Had this not been the case," wrote Horace Wilson in his 1826 *History of British India*, "the mills of Paisley and Manchester would have been stopped in their outset, and could scarcely have been again set in motion, even by the power of steam. They were created by the sacrifice of Indian manufacturers."

Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, New York: John Day Company, 1946, pp. 283-299. An excerpt (pp. 295-299):

A significant fact which stands out is that those parts of India which have been longest under British rule are the poorest today. Indeed some kind of chart might be drawn up to indicate the close connection between length of British rule and progressive growth of poverty. . . . [T]here can be no doubt that the poorest parts of India are Bengal, Bihar, Orissa and parts of the Madras presidency; the mass level and standards of living are highest in the Punjab. Bengal certainly was a very rich and prosperous province before the British came. There may be many reasons for these contrasts and differences. But it is difficult to get over the fact that Bengal, once so rich and flourishing, after 187 years of British rule, accompanied, as we are told, by strenuous attempts on the part of the British to improve its condition and to teach its people the art of self-government, is today a miserable mass of poverty-stricken, starving and dying people. . . . It is significant that one of the Hindustani words which has become part of the English language is "loot. . . ."

The Chief business of the East India Company in its early period, the very object for which it was started, was to carry Indian manufactured goods -- textiles, etc., as

well as spices and the like -- from the East to Europe, where there was a great demand for these articles. With the development in industrial techniques in England a new class of industrial capitalists rose there demanding a change in this policy. The British market was to be closed to Indian products and the Indian market opened to British manufactures. The British parliament, influenced by this new class, began to take a greater interest in India and the working of the East India Company. To begin with, Indian goods were excluded from Britain by legislation. . . . This was followed by vigorous attempts to restrict and crush Indian manufactures. . . . The Indian textile industry collapsed, affecting vast numbers of weavers and artisans. The process . . . continued throughout the nineteenth century, breaking up other old industries also, shipbuilding, metalwork, glass, paper, and many crafts. . . .

The liquidation of the artisan class led to unemployment on a prodigious scale. What were all these scores of millions, who had so far been engaged in industry and manufacture, to do now? Where were they to go? Their old profession was no longer open to them; the way to a new one was barred. They could die of course; that way of escape from an intolerable situation is always open. They did die in tens of millions. The English governor-general of India, Lord Bentinck, reported in 1834 that "the misery hardly finds a parallel in the history of commerce. The bones of the cotton-weavers are bleaching the plains of India. . . ." India became progressively ruralized. In every progressive country there has been, during the past century, a shift of population from agriculture to industry; from village to town; in India this process was reversed, as a result of British policy. . . . This, then, is the real, the fundamental cause of the appalling poverty of the Indian people, and it is of comparatively recent origin.

Paul Mantoux, *The Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth Century: An outline of the beginnings of the modern factory system in England*, New York: Macmillan, 1961, pp. 200-201. See also footnote 46 of this chapter.

48. On the pivotal importance of the French to the American Revolution, see for example, Bernard Fall, *Last Reflections on a War*, New York: Doubleday, 1967. An excerpt (p. 276):

[W]hen British general Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown to the combined French and American forces . . . his aide, General O'Hara, made a slight (and, perhaps, intentional) error in etiquette as he tried to surrender his commander's sword to French general Rochambeau rather than to one of the American generals present. . . . Count Rochambeau . . . turned down the honor, and the sword was finally handed to General Benjamin Lincoln, who had been defeated by the British at Charleston, S.C., three years earlier. . . .

Shorn of almost two centuries of 4th-of-July oratory, [the American Revolutionary War] was a military operation fought by a very small armed minority -- at almost no time did Washington's forces exceed 8000 men in a country which had at least 300,000 able-bodied males -- and backed by a force of 31,897 French ground troops and 12,660 sailors and Marines manning sixty-one major vessels. The total cost of the campaign to the French (almost \$2 billion) drove the French monarchy into bankruptcy and subsequent revolution. But politically, the French had achieved exactly what they had intended to do: they had temporarily shattered Britain's position of pre-eminence not only in America but in Europe as well.

49. For the Jacksonian Democrats' statements about the annexation of Texas, see for example, Lyon G. Tyler, ed., *The Letters and Times of the Tylers*, Richmond, VA:

Whittet & Shepperson, 1885, Vol. 2. In a letter to his son following the annexation of Texas, President Tyler wrote (p. 483):

The monopoly of the cotton plant was the great and important concern. That monopoly, now secured, places all other nations at our feet. An embargo of a single year would produce in Europe a greater amount of suffering than a fifty years' war. I doubt whether Great Britain could avoid convulsions.

Earlier, Senator Sevier of Texas made the same point. See Thomas R. Hietala, *Manifest Design: Anxious Aggrandizement in Late Jacksonian America*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985, pp. 63-70. Sevier stated (p. 66):

[Annexation of Texas would] enable us to monopolize, through the instrumentality of slave labor, the productions of cotton and sugar, not only for the supply of our own markets, but the markets of the world.

Other contemporary advocates of the annexation of Texas also urged (pp. 67-68):

[T]he chance for the emancipation of England from her dependence upon the United States for cotton . . . will have passed away forever. . . . [Annexation would] entirely preclude the attempt of England to raise up a cotton growing nation in opposition to the United States [which could be] a fatal rival. . . . [It would] tend more successfully to insure our peace and security than a standing army.

50. For a typical claim that the market inexorably has caused rising economic inequality, see John Cassidy, "Who Killed the Middle Class?," *New Yorker*, October 16, 1995, pp. 113-124. An excerpt (pp. 118, 124):

If the free market has decided, in its infinite but mysterious wisdom, that the American middle class is doomed, then the politicians will eventually have to wake up and accept the fact. . . . [The death of the middle class] is nobody's fault; it is just how capitalism has developed. Once this conclusion is accepted, maybe the political debate can move away from mutual recrimination and on to ways of governing a less homogeneous and more inequitable society.

See also chapter 10 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 66, 67, 68 and 101.

51. On the design of automation to enhance managerial control and de-skill workers, see for example, David F. Noble, *Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation*, New York: Knopf, 1984, especially chs. 5 to 9. This detailed study concludes (pp. 334, 338):

[I]nvestigation of the actual design and use of capital-intensive, labor-saving, skill-reducing technology has begun to indicate that cost reduction was not a prime motivation, nor was it achieved. Rather than any such economic stimulus, the overriding impulse behind the development of the American system of manufacture was military; the principal promoter of the new methods was not the self-adjusting market but the extra-market U.S. Army Ordnance Department. . . . The drive to automate has been from its inception the drive to reduce dependence upon skilled labor, to deskill necessary labor and reduce rather than raise wages.

See also, Merritt Roe Smith, ed., *Military Enterprise and Technological Change: Perspectives on the American Experience*, Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1985 (collection of essays examining the role of the military in technological development); Seymour Melman, *Profits Without Production*, New York: Knopf, 1983 (detailed examination of the negative effects of the military influence on commercial enterprise); Michael L. Dertouzos, Richard K. Lester et al., *Made in America: Regaining the Productive Edge*, Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1989 (this study of industrial productivity found that Germany,

Japan, and other countries that maintained the craft tradition, with more direct participation of skilled workers in production decisions, have been more successful in modern industry than the United States, with its tradition of de-skilling and marginalizing workers in the "mass-production model." It concluded that lessened hierarchy, responsibility in the hands of production workers, and training in new technologies has improved economic results where it has been tried in the U.S.).

52. On managerial selection of automation not being dependent on its profitability, see for example, David F. Noble, *Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation*, New York: Knopf, 1984, chs. 7 and 9. See also, John A. Simpson [Director of Manufacturing Engineering at the National Bureau of Standards], "The Factory of the Future," talk at Rensselaer Polytechnic, June 3, 1982 [cited in David F. Noble, *Progress Without People: In Defense of Luddism*, Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1993, pp. 89, 97 n.38]. An excerpt:

In metalworking manufacture, direct labor amounts to roughly 10 percent of total cost, as compared to materials at 55 percent and overhead another 35 percent. Yet, as of 1982, management was expending roughly 75 percent of managerial and engineering effort on labor costs reduction and 10 percent on overhead cost reduction. This is a striking disparity.

Danforth W. Austin and J. Ernest Beazley, "Struggling Industries In Nation's Heartland Speed Up Automation," *Wall Street Journal*, April 4, 1983, p. 1. An excerpt:

[According to] Thomas G. Gunn of the consulting concern of Arthur D. Little, Inc . . . : "[Companies] get the biggest, fastest, sexiest robot, when the plain truth is that in most cases a very simple piece of equipment would do the job. . . . [Companies] don't so much make mistakes as learn that it's going to take two or three times as much money and time as they thought to get the system working."

Vera Ketelboeter, "Where is Automation in Manufacturing Headed?," *Science for the People*, November/December 1981, pp. 16-18. This article reports a study of automated flexible manufacturing systems which found that:

[M]anagement is usually sold on the idea to use such systems by an engineer in the company who is enthusiastic about the technology. Cost justifications play a secondary role. The more sophisticated and fascinating a machine is, the less management is likely to quarrel over dollars.

Carol Hymowitz, "Manufacturers Press Automating to Survive, But Results Are Mixed: As Technology Soars, Users Struggle With Transition And Unsuitable Machines," *Wall Street Journal*, April 11, 1983, p. 1; "Preliminary Report on Industrial Automation," Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Center for Policy Alternatives, 1977 (academic study concluding that "after-the-fact analysis of the actual economic impact of a process of automation is rarely carried out; the result is a loss of data necessary to inform subsequent decisions about automation").

53. After teaching for nine years at M.I.T., David Noble was fired in 1984 for his ideas and his actions in support of them. He subsequently sued M.I.T. to obtain and make public the documentary record of his political firing, on the basis of which the American Historical Association condemned M.I.T. for the firing. Noble became the Curator of Industrial Automation and Labor at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, where he planned and began work on what was to be the world's first major exhibit on the human costs of automation, entitled "Automation Madness." The Smithsonian,

however, declined to present the exhibition to the public, fired Noble, and shipped the only Luddite sledgehammer in existence back to England. Noble ultimately obtained a teaching position in Canada, at York University.

For Noble's books, see among others, David F. Noble, *Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation*, New York: Knopf, 1984; and David F. Noble, *Progress Without People: In Defense of Luddism*, Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1993. See also, David F. Noble, "Command Performance: A Perspective on Military Enterprise and Technological Change," in Merritt Roe Smith, ed., *Military Enterprise and Technological Change: Perspectives on the American Experience*, Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1985 (on the development of numerical control and containerization).

54. For a summary of the state of the Central America solidarity movement in the mid-1980s, see Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, *Rules of the Game: American Politics and the Central America Movement*, Boston: South End, 1986. An excerpt (pp. 44-45):

What we will be calling the Central America Movement (C.A.M.) is not really a single movement, but a convergence of diverse efforts. It is comprised of roughly 850 different support groups and organizations, operating in all 50 states. Some are affiliated with the major "solidarity" organizations -- the Nicaragua Network, the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES), and the Network in Solidarity with the People of Guatemala (NISGUA). Others are affiliated with the Pledge of Resistance, providing legislative alerts and notice of upcoming actions to the 80,000 Americans who have committed themselves to resisting the escalation of U.S. military involvement in Central America. Many work with the Sanctuary Movement; to date more than 300 churches and synagogues have declared themselves sanctuaries for Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees, as have 21 cities and the state of New Mexico. Others have participated in the Witness for Peace program, which has led more than 80 delegations to Nicaragua in recent years, and provides an ongoing presence of U.S. observers in that country. Some have participated in the different agricultural or technical brigades that have worked in Nicaragua, or in MADRE, a "people to people" linkage of minorities and women in the U.S. and Central America. Still others are affiliated with the union-based Committee in Support of Human Rights and Democracy in El Salvador, which is trying to break the A.F.L.-C.I.O. leadership's stranglehold on foreign policy actions within the labor movement. And so on. In addition to all these groups, whose work focuses on the region, there are a number of other organizations, with broader agendas, that also work on the Central America issue.

55. For an article treating parasite sects as "the left," see for example, Laurie P. Cohen, "Not Much Left: 'The Movement' Is Pretty Still Nowadays; Despite the G.O.P. Revolution, Radical Groups Can't Win Converts to Their Brand," *Wall Street Journal*, June 16, 1995, p. A1. This article opens with a description of a May Day parade led by the Revolutionary Communist Party, which was attended by 41 people. It then focuses on such groups as the Spartacist League, the International Socialist Organization, and the Freedom Socialists to gauge the scope and strength of "the Movement."

For one of the books about French Stalinists, see Tony Judt, *Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944-1956*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992.

56. For samples of the official ideology of a war debt owed by Vietnam, see for example, Barbara Crossette, "Vietnam, Trying To Be Nicer, Still Has A Long Way To

Go," *New York Times*, November 10, 1985, section 4, p. 3; Barbara Crossette, "Hanoi Said To Vow To Give M.I.A. Data," *New York Times*, October 24, 1992, p. 1. An excerpt:

President Bush said today that Hanoi had agreed to turn over to the United States all documents, pictures and personal effects relating to American servicemen during the Vietnam War. . . . "Today, finally, I am convinced that we can begin writing the last chapter of the Vietnam War," Mr. Bush said in the White House Rose Garden. "It was a bitter conflict, but Hanoi knows today that we seek only answers without the threat of retribution for the past. . . ."

President Bush did not mention the possibility of diplomatic recognition of Vietnam or a lifting of an American-led international embargo, but there is strong speculation that he might move to normalize relations with Vietnam before his term ends in January. The President's announcement was welcomed by aid organizations, scholars and business leaders who have advocated an end to the isolation of Hanoi. . . . The United States now blocks aid to Vietnam from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

The adjacent front-page story reports Japan's failure, once again, to apologize "for its wartime aggression." See David E. Sanger, "Japan's Emperor Tells China Only of His 'Sadness' on War," *New York Times*, October 24, 1992, p. 1.

See also, "Transcript of President's News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Issues," *New York Times*, March 25, 1977, p. A10 (asked if, assuming resolution of the issue of U.S. soldiers "Missing In Action" in Vietnam, the United States has a moral obligation to help rebuild that country, President Jimmy Carter assured that we owe Vietnam no debt and have no responsibility to render it any assistance, because "the destruction was mutual"). On the U.S. invasion and destruction of Vietnam, see chapter 1 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 3, 71 and 79; chapter 2 of *U.P.* and its footnote 10; and chapter 3 of *U.P.* and its footnote 52.

Chomsky remarks that, for a decade, the official justification for the U.S. policy of "bleeding Vietnam" was alleged outrage over Vietnam's December 1978 invasion of Cambodia, which drove out the murderous Cambodian ruler Pol Pot (a Chinese client, hence indirectly a U.S. ally, after President Carter's "tilt towards China" earlier in the year) and terminated his massacres after years of vicious Cambodian attacks on the border regions of Vietnam. When the Vietnamese then withdrew all forces from Cambodia, the U.S. propaganda system smoothly switched to the earlier pretext: the fate of the missing American soldiers.

On the P.O.W.-M.I.A. (Prisoner Of War-Missing In Action) issue, see for example, H. Bruce Franklin, *M.I.A. or Mythmaking in America*, New York: Lawrence Hill, 1992; Terry Anderson [historian and Vietnam veteran], "The Light at the End of the Tunnel," *Diplomatic History*, Fall 1988, pp. 443-462; Walter F. Wouk [veteran and Chair of the New York State Senate Vietnam Veterans Advisory Council], "Exorcising a ghost of Vietnam," *Chicago Tribune*, June 2, 1992, p. 19. An excerpt:

The P.O.W./M.I.A. issue continues to fester like an open wound in the mind of many Vietnam veterans. The time has come for these veterans to accept reality and abandon the myth that the Vietnamese are still holding American P.O.W.s. This assertion is simply not supported by the facts and prolongs the anguish of the war. Recently, John Vessey, the United States' chief M.I.A. hunter since 1987, told a Senate Committee conducting an M.I.A. inquiry that there is virtually no hope of finding live M.I.A.s in Vietnam. He said in his tenure, "the only conclusive evidence that has been uncovered . . . has been to show that one American or another was dead."

Every war has its share of missing-in-action, and the American public has been led to believe that the Vietnam War produced an inordinate number of M.I.A.s. But that is not the case. At the end of World War II the U.S. had 78,751 M.I.A.s, 27 percent of the war's U.S. battle deaths. The Korean War resulted in 8,177 M.I.A.s which represented 15.2 percent of the Americans killed-in-action. Of the 2.6 million Americans who served in Vietnam, 2,505 -- less than 5.5 percent of the U.S. battle deaths -- are listed as missing in action. But even that figure is misleading. Of that number 1,113 were killed in action, but their bodies were not recovered. Another 631 were presumed dead because of the circumstances of their loss -- i.e., airmen known to have crashed into the sea -- and 33 died in captivity. The remaining 728 are missing. It should be noted that 590 of the missing Americans (81 percent) were airmen; and there were strong indications that more than 442 of these individuals (75 percent) went down with their aircraft.

On "bleeding" Vietnam and U.S. concern for Cambodia, see chapter 3 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 55, 57, 61 and 65.

57. On the American public's view of the Vietnam War, see for example, John E. Rielly, ed., *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1987*, Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1987. An excerpt (pp. 3, 33):

The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations commissioned the Gallup Organization to conduct this survey of both the general public and national leaders [including representatives of government, business, media, churches, voluntary organizations, and ethnic organizations]. . . .

American attitudes concerning the Vietnam War remained generally negative. In the 1986 survey, as before, respondents were asked how they felt about the statement that the Vietnam War "was more than a mistake; it was fundamentally wrong and immoral." In 1986, 66% of the public concurred, compared with 72% in 1978 and 1982. A total of 27% disagreed "somewhat" or "strongly" with the statement, compared with 21% in 1982 and 19% in 1978. Among leaders, only 44% agreed with the statement, compared with 45% in 1982 and 50% in 1978. A total of 57% disagreed with the statement, compared with 54% in 1982 and 47% in 1978.

This disparity of attitudes towards the war always has existed. For example, Chomsky analyzes the findings of a revealing public opinion study [see Charles Kadushin, *The American Intellectual Elite*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1974] as follows:

[Kadushin] investigated attitudes [towards the Vietnam War] of a group that he called "the American intellectual elite" in 1970, at the very peak of active opposition to the war, when colleges were closed down in opposition to the invasion of Cambodia and demonstrations swept the country. . . . The "intellectual elite" opposed the war, almost without exception. But the grounds for their opposition deserve careful attention. Kadushin identified three categories of opposition -- what he called "ideological," "moral," and "pragmatic" grounds. Under "ideological" opposition to the war he includes the belief that aggression is wrong, even when conducted by the United States. Opposition on "moral" grounds is based on deaths and atrocities: The war is too bloody. "Pragmatic" opposition to the war is grounded on the feeling that we probably can't get away with it: The war is too costly; the enterprise should be liquidated as no longer worthwhile.

There are two points of interest about this analysis. First, the terminology itself. No doubt the group surveyed would have been unanimous in deploring Russian aggression in Czechoslovakia [in 1968]. But on what grounds? Not on "pragmatic" grounds, since it was quite successful and not very costly. Not on "moral" grounds,

since casualties were few. Rather, on "ideological" grounds: that is, on grounds that aggression is wrong, even if it is relatively bloodless, costless, and successful. But would we ever refer to this as an objection on "ideological" grounds? Surely not. It is only when one challenges the divine right of the United States to intervene by force in the internal affairs of others that such sinister terms as "ideological" are invoked. More interesting, however, is the distribution of responses. Opposition [by the intellectual elite] on "ideological" grounds of opposition to aggression was very limited. More objected on "moral" grounds. But to an overwhelming degree, objections were "pragmatic." Recall that this survey was taken at the height of popular opposition to the war, when, in contrast to the "intellectual elite," substantial segments of the unwashed masses had come to oppose the war on grounds of principle and even to act on their beliefs.

(Quoted from Noam Chomsky, *Towards A New Cold War: Essays on the Current Crisis and How We Got There*, New York: Pantheon, 1982, p. 76.)

See also, Andre Modigliani, "Hawks and Doves, Isolationism and Political Distrust: An Analysis of Public Opinion on Military Policy," *American Political Science Review*, September 1972, pp. 960-978. An excerpt:

[I]n June 1966, 41 per cent of those with a grade-school education favored immediate withdrawal from Vietnam as compared to only 27 per cent of those with a college education; in February 1967, only 51 per cent of the grade-school educated favored continued bombing of North Vietnam as compared to fully 74 per cent of the college-educated; in January 1968, only 44 per cent of the grade-school educated described themselves as "hawks," while 57 per cent of the college-educated did so; and in September 1970, 61 per cent of the grade-school educated and only 47 per cent of the college-educated endorsed the Hatfield-McGovern amendment calling for an end to U.S. troop involvement in Vietnam by the end of 1971.

Noam Chomsky, "Revolt in the Academy: Some Thoughts on the Student Movement," *Modern Occasions*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1970, pp. 53-75 (discussing reactions of the U.S. intellectual establishment to the 1960s student movement).

58. For the leaked Bush administration planning document, see Maureen Dowd, "Bush Moves to Control War's Endgame," *New York Times*, February 23, 1992, section 1, p. 1. This article mainly is concerned with the final strategy for the Gulf War, and President Bush's decision "that he would rather gamble on a violent and potentially unpopular ground war than risk the alternative: an imperfect settlement hammered out by the Soviets and Iraqis that world opinion might accept as tolerable." The exact words quoted from the secret National Security Review are:

"In cases where the U.S. confronts much weaker enemies, our challenge will be not simply to defeat them, but to defeat them decisively and rapidly. . . . For small countries hostile to us, bleeding our forces in protracted or indecisive conflict or embarrassing us by inflicting damage on some conspicuous element of our forces may be victory enough, and could undercut political support for U.S. efforts against them."

59. On U.S. troops involved in clandestine warfare in Peru, see for example, Charles Lane, "The Newest War," *Newsweek*, January 6, 1992, p. 18. An excerpt:

A two-month NEWSWEEK inquiry has documented a Pentagon drug war, parts of it secret, that has quietly escalated to dimensions greater than most Americans yet realize. It involves thousands of U.S. and Latin troops, at a cost of more than a billion

dollars per year. . . . Army Green Berets train Bolivian, Peruvian and Colombian police and military in jungle warfare. Navy SEALs in Ecuador, Colombia and Bolivia have given instruction in riverine operations. Even the Army's supersecret counterterrorist unit, Delta Force, has given the Peruvian Army counterterrorism training, U.S. and Peruvian military sources say. . . .

The debate over aid to the Peruvian Army is academic for now: in September Congress withheld \$10 million of \$34.9 million in military assistance for the Peruvian Army, citing another chronic problem: human-rights abuses. Pending marked improvements in that record, and clearer answers from the administration about the scope of U.S. involvement in Peru's internal war, Congress does not want to bankroll another Vietnam or El Salvador. . . . The Army characterizes the Andean Drug War as a "low-intensity conflict," a catch-all term historically applied to wars against Marxist guerrilla armies.

On the invasions of Panama and Iraq, see chapter 5 of *U.P.*

60. For Captain John Mason's own chilling account of the Pequot Massacre in his journal, see Francis Jennings, *The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest*, New York: Norton, 1975, pp. 220-222. See also chapter 4 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 72 and 76; and chapter 6 of *U.P.* and its footnote 33.

For the textbook used in Chomsky's daughter's class, see Harold B. Clifford, *Exploring New England* (New Unified Social Studies), Chicago: Follett Publishing Co., 1961. The book's account of the extermination of the Pequot tribe by Captain Mason reads:

His little army attacked in the morning before it was light and took the Pequots by surprise. The soldiers broke down the stockade with their axes, rushed inside, and set fire to the wigwams. They killed nearly all the braves, squaws, and children, and burned their corn and other food. There were no Pequots left to make more trouble. When the other Indian tribes saw what good fighters the white men were, they kept the peace for many years.

"I wish I were a man and had been there," thought Robert.

Chapter Eight

Popular Struggle

1. For the U.S. Constitution's provision that blacks are three-fifths human, see Article I, Section 2 (emphasis added):

Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, *three fifths of all other Persons* [i.e. the slaves].

In 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment outlawed slavery; and in 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment's Section 2 implicitly removed the notion that the former slaves were "three fifths" people, stating:

Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding Indians not taxed.

2. On free speech cases in the U.S. Supreme Court, see for example, Harry Kalven, *A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America*, New York: Harper & Row, 1988. An excerpt (p. xv):

The First Amendment has been part of the Constitution and of American life since 1791. Yet it was only during World War I that the process of defining freedom of speech by means of judicial review really got started. . . . [A]s of the cutoff date of this book, 1974, more than 50 percent of all First Amendment cases had been decided since 1959 -- in other words, more than half were the work of the Warren Court.

3. The Sedition Act, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) [*The Public Statutes at Large of the United States of America, from the Organization of the Government in 1789, to March 3, 1845*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1848, Vol. I, p. 596 (published by Authority of Congress)], provided in part:

That if any person shall write, print, utter, or publish, or shall cause or procure to be written, printed, uttered or published, or shall knowingly assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering or publishing any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States, or either house of the Congress of the United States, with intent to defame the said government, or either house of the said Congress, or the said President, or to bring them, or either of them, into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against them or either or any of them, the hatred of the good people of the United States . . . then such person being thereof convicted before any court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, and by imprisonment not exceeding two years.

For commentary, see Harry Kalven, *A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America*, New York: Harper & Row, 1988. An excerpt (p. 64):

The apparent qualifications on the face of the Act as to falsity and malice were illusory, since . . . under the common law of defamation, if a statement was judged defamatory, malice and falsity were assumed, leaving the burden of proof on the defendant. . . . When Jefferson came to power in 1800 . . . he pardoned the violators still in prison.

On prosecutions under the Sedition Act, see for example, Leonard Levy, *Emergence of a Free Press*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. An excerpt (pp. 201-202, 300, 307-308):

[There was an] entire corpus of prosecutions for seditious libel under the Sedition Act of 1798. . . . President Adams willingly signed the Sedition Act and eagerly urged its enforcement, and Cushing, then an associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, presided over some of the trials and charged juries on the constitutionality of the statute. . . . [T]he Sedition Act, the capstone of the new Federalist system, expressed the easy rule of thumb offered by the party organ in the nation's capital, "He that is not for us, is against us. . . ." Incapable of distinguishing dissent from disloyalty, the Federalists easily resorted to legal coercion to control public opinion for party purposes. . . .

In a memorandum of 1801 President Jefferson . . . dismiss[ed] the prosecution, initiated under his predecessor, against William Duane, the republican editor of the Philadelphia *Aurora*, who had been indicted under the Sedition Act. . . . Yet the hard fact remains: Jefferson, Madison, Gallatin, Livingston, Nicholas, and Macon explicitly endorsed the power of the states to prosecute seditious and other criminal libels . . . [and] either endorsed the basic concept of . . . the criminal responsibility of the writer or printer for abuse of his rights, or they failed to oppose it.

David Kairys, "Freedom of Speech," in David Kairys, ed., *The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique*, New York: Pantheon, 1982 (revised and expanded edition 1990), pp. 237-272. An excerpt (p. 242):

The most prominent person prosecuted under the Sedition Act was Matthew Lyon, a member of Congress critical of the Federalists [the governing political party]. Lyon was imprisoned and his house sold to pay his fine (nevertheless he was reelected in the next election). The longest prison term, two years, was served by a laborer for erecting a sign on a post that read, in part, NO STAMP ACT, NO SEDITION . . . DOWNFALL TO THE TYRANTS OF AMERICA, PEACE AND RETIREMENT TO THE PRESIDENT.

4. The Espionage Act, 40 Stat. 219 (1917), as amended 40 Stat. 553 (1918) [*Statutes at Large of the United States of America from April, 1917, to March, 1919*, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1919, Vol. 40, pp. 217f, 553-554], provided in part:

Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of government of the United States, or the Constitution of the United States, or the flag of the United States, or bring the uniform of the Army or Navy of the United States into contempt, scorn, contumely, or disrepute, or shall willfully utter, print, write, or publish any language intended to incite, provoke, or encourage resistance to the United States, or to promote the cause of its enemies, or shall willfully display the flag of any foreign enemy, or shall willfully by utterance, writing, printing, publication, or language spoken, urge, incite, or advocate any curtailment of production in this country of any thing or things, product or products, necessary or essential to the prosecution of the war in which the United States may be engaged, with intent by such curtailment to

cripple or hinder the United States in the prosecution of the war, and whoever shall willfully advocate, teach, defend, or suggest the doing of any of the acts or things in this section enumerated, and whoever shall by word or act support or favor the cause of any country with which the United States is at war or by word or act oppose the cause of the United States therein, shall be punished by a fine of not more than \$10,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.

Eugene Debs's conviction and ten-year prison sentence for having "caused and incited and attempted to cause and incite insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny and refusal of duty in the military and naval forces of the United States and with intent so to do delivered, to an assembly of people, a public speech," was upheld by the Supreme Court. See *Debs v. United States*, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's opinion, rejecting the idea that the First Amendment protected Debs's speech, summarized the facts of the case:

The speaker began by saying that he had just returned from a visit to the workhouse in the neighborhood where three of their most loyal comrades were paying the penalty for their devotion to the working class -- these being Wagenknecht, Baker and Ruthenberg, who had been convicted of aiding and abetting another in failing to register for the draft. . . . He said that he had to be prudent and might not be able to say all that he thought, thus intimating to his hearers that they might infer that he meant more, but he did say that those persons were paying the penalty for standing erect and for seeking to pave the way to better conditions for all mankind. Later he added further eulogies and said that he was proud of them. He then expressed opposition to Prussian militarism in a way that naturally might have been thought to be intended to include the mode of proceeding in the United States. . .

The defendant spoke of other cases, and then, after dealing with Russia, said that the master class has always declared the war and the subject class has always fought the battles -- that the subject class has had nothing to gain and all to lose, including their lives; that the working class, who furnish the corpses, have never yet had a voice in declaring war and never yet had a voice in declaring peace. "You have your lives to lose; you certainly ought to have the right to declare war if you consider a war necessary. . . ." The rest of the discourse . . . [involved] the usual contrasts between capitalists and laboring men, sneers at the advice to cultivate war gardens, attribution to plutocrats of the high price of coal, &c., with the implication running through it all that the working men are not concerned in the war, and a final exhortation, "Don't worry about the charge of treason to your masters; but be concerned about the treason that involves yourselves."

For the *New York Times's* attitude towards Debs's right to free speech twenty years earlier, see Editorial, *New York Times*, July 9, 1894, p. 4. An excerpt:

[Debs] is a lawbreaker at large, an enemy of the human race. There has been quite enough talk about warrants against him and about arresting him. It is time to cease mouthings and begin. Debs should be jailed, if there are jails in his neighborhood, and the disorder his bad teaching has engendered must be squelched. Gen. Miles evidently intends to squelch it. It may be a rude business, but it is well to remember that no friends of the Government of the United States are ever killed by its soldiers -- only its enemies.

5. The Smith (or "Alien Registration") Act, 54 Stat. 671, 18 U.S.C. §2385 (1940) [*United States Statutes at Large, 1939-1941*, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941, Vol. 54, pp. 670-676], provided in part:

It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise, or teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of any such government . . . [or] to organize or help to organize any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any government in the United States by force or violence; or to be or become a member of, or affiliate with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof.

The legal scholar Harry Kalven stresses the conduct for which Smith Act criminal convictions were upheld (*A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America*, New York: Harper & Row, 1988, p. 191):

The exact charge is not advocating overthrow. Nor is it conspiring to overthrow, no doubt the Government's real grievance. Rather it is *conspiring to advocate overthrow* and *conspiring to organize a group to advocate overthrow*.

For examples of Smith Act prosecutions, see footnote 6 of this chapter.

6. For some significant Supreme Court rulings upholding sedition prosecutions under the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment, see for example, *Dennis v. United States*, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)(approving the constitutionality of the Smith Act in an appeal by eleven American Communist Party leaders convicted of "advocacy" and "organizing," because there was a "clear and present danger" that their revolutionary Marxist teachings would succeed in the United States; a dissenting opinion points out that the conduct underlying these convictions was "organiz[ing] people to teach and themselves teach[ing] the Marxist-Leninist doctrine contained chiefly in four books" which remained in full and free circulation); *Scales v. United States*, 367 U.S. 203 (1961)(upholding a Smith Act conviction for "membership" in a group whose teachings advocated violent overthrow, i.e. the Communist Party); *Frohwerk v. United States*, 249 U.S. 204 (1919)(upholding a conviction for conspiracy to obstruct military recruiting with a ten-year prison sentence, solely for publishing a newspaper that suggested that the war was wrong, that it was being fought "to protect the loans of Wall Street," and which depicted the sufferings of a drafted man in a way "made as moving as the writer was able to make it").

For an early case delineating the scope of Constitutional free speech protections, see *Davis v. Massachusetts*, 167 U.S. 43 (1897). This case accepted as consistent with the Constitution the arrest and punishment of Reverend William F. Davis, an evangelist and opponent of slavery and racism, for preaching the Gospel on the Boston Common, a public park. The decision quotes Oliver Wendell Holmes's opinion for the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, which also upheld the conviction, analogizing as follows: "For the Legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house."

For commentary on the history of sedition prosecutions in the U.S., see David Kairys, "Freedom of Speech," in David Kairys, ed., *The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique*, New York: Pantheon, 1982 (revised and expanded edition 1990). An excerpt (pp. 250-251):

[Although there were] over two thousand prosecutions . . . [n]one of the Espionage Act convictions was reversed by the Supreme Court on First Amendment grounds. . . . [As Harvard law professor Zechariah Chafee concluded after a detailed examination

of these prosecutions,] "the courts treated opinions as statements of fact and then condemned them as false because they differed from the President's speech or the resolution of Congress declaring war. . . . [I]t became criminal to advocate heavier taxation instead of bond issues, to state that conscription was unconstitutional . . . to urge that a referendum should have preceded our declaration of war, to say that war was contrary to the teachings of Christianity. Men have been punished for criticizing the Red Cross and the Y.M.C.A."

For more on the suppression of dissent in the U.S. generally, see for example, Murray B. Levin, *Political Hysteria in America: the Democratic Capacity for Repression*, New York: Basic Books, 1971, ch. 2 (on the Red Scare of 1919); Robert Murray, *Red Scare: A Study of National Hysteria, 1919-1920*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955; William Preston, *Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903-1933*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963 (second edition 1994); Robert J. Goldstein, *Political Repression in Modern America: From 1870 to the Present*, Cambridge: Schenkman, 1978 (tracing U.S. government repression of dissent from the post-Civil War labor movement through the Black Panthers and anti-Vietnam War movement); David Brion Davis, ed., *The Fear of Conspiracy: Images of Un-American Subversion From the Revolution to the Present*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971 (reviewing a vast literature of alarmism in the U.S., starting in the days of George Washington); James Aronson, *The Press and the Cold War*, New York: Monthly Review, 1970; Harold L. Nelson, ed., *Freedom of the Press from Hamilton to the Warren Court*, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967, especially "Introduction" (giving an overview and chronology of the topic) and pp. 253-263 (on repression during World War I, noting that U.S. Postmaster Burleson barred a pamphlet on the suffering under British Rule in India, and removed from a Catholic journal a statement by the Pope in which he said that "no man can be loyal to his country unless he first be loyal to his conscience and his God"); Howard Zinn, *A People's History of the United States: 1492-Present*, New York: HarperCollins, 1980 (revised and updated edition 1995) (in general, an extremely important book).

7. For the Schenck case, see *Schenck v. United States*, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Schenck was the secretary of the Socialist Party, in charge of the headquarters from which the leaflets were sent. He did not write the leaflet, he merely arranged to have fifteen thousand copies printed and mailed. Harry Kalven points out (*A Worthy Tradition*, New York: Harper & Row, 1988, p. 131):

[T]he *Schenck* leaflet is startlingly mild. One side simply presented an argument that conscription violated the involuntary servitude prohibition of the Thirteenth Amendment. It contained references to "venal capitalist newspapers," "gang politicians," and "monstrous wrongs against humanity." The action words were: ". . . join the Socialist Party in its campaign for the repeal of the Conscription Act. Write to your congressman. . . . You have a right to demand the repeal of any law. Exercise your rights of free speech, peaceful assemblage and petitioning the government for a redress of grievances . . . sign a petition to congress for a repeal of the Conscription Act. Help us wipe out this stain upon the Constitution!" [The] . . . most strongly worded sentence [of the other side of the leaflet was:] "Will you let cunning politicians and a mercenary capitalist press wrongly and untruthfully mould your thoughts? . . . Do not forget your right to elect officials who are opposed to conscription."

For another so-called "victory" for freedom of speech, see *Near v. Minnesota*, 283 U.S. 697, 713-714 (1931)(holding that the First Amendment bars *prior restraint* of speech

or publication, but not punishment afterwards if the thoughts are then held to be unacceptable).

8. For the case striking down seditious libel laws in the U.S., see *New York Times v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254, 273, 276 (1964). Justice Brennan's words:

Authoritative interpretations of the First Amendment's guarantees have consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test of truth. . . . [Injury] to official reputation affords no more warrant for repressing speech that would otherwise be free than does factual error. . . . If neither factual error nor defamatory content suffices to remove the constitutional shield from criticism of official conduct, the combination of the two elements is no less inadequate. This is the lesson to be drawn from the great controversy over the Sedition Act of 1798 . . . which first crystallized a national awareness of the central meaning of the First Amendment. . . . Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history. . . . These views [i.e. of men from Thomas Jefferson to Harvard Professor Zechariah Chafee] reflect a broad consensus that the Act, because of the restraint it imposed upon criticism of government and public officials, was inconsistent with the First Amendment.

9. For Kalven's book, see Harry Kalven, *A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America*, New York: Harper & Row, 1988. His exact words (p. 63):

In my view, the presence or absence in the law of the concept of seditious libel defines the society. A society may or may not treat obscenity or contempt by publication [i.e. commenting on or disclosing evidence from pending court cases, another category of speech that can be constrained by the government,] as legal offenses without altering its basic nature. If, however, it makes seditious libel an offense, it is not a free society, no matter what its other characteristics.

10. For the case employing the "incitement to a criminal act" standard, see *Brandenburg v. Ohio*, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Note that the "clear and present danger" test actually is not mentioned in the majority's opinion. Concurring opinions by Justices Black and Douglas called for its abandonment -- but the majority simply applied the stricter "inciting or producing imminent lawless action and . . . likely to incite or produce such action" standard.

Chomsky remarks (*Deterring Democracy*, New York: Hill and Wang, 1991, p. 400):

It is also worth recalling that victories for freedom of speech are often won in defense of the most depraved and horrendous views. Th[is] Supreme Court decision was in defense of the Ku Klux Klan from prosecution after a meeting with hooded figures, guns, and a burning cross, calling for "burying the nigger" and "sending the Jews back to Israel." With regard to freedom of expression there are basically two positions: you defend it vigorously for views you hate, or you reject it in favor of Stalinist/Fascist standards.

11. On the Zundel case and Canada's "False News" and "Anti-Hate" laws, see for example, Douglas Martin, "Canadian Wins Appeal on Anti-Jewish Book," *New York Times*, March 27, 1985, p. A14. An excerpt:

A Toronto publisher, Ernst Zundel, was convicted last month of maliciously spreading false news, specifically that the Holocaust did not happen. On Monday, he was sentenced to 15 months in prison and 3 months' probation. . . . Jewish groups in

Toronto said that they had begun compiling petitions to deport Mr. Zundel. . . . Earlier, leading members of the opposition Liberal Party had urged his deportation. . . . [The] False News Law . . . is aimed at anything printed that harms the community, not specifically hate literature.

This article also notes that Mr. James Keegstra of Alberta was prosecuted under Canada's "Anti-Hate" law, and that a Canadian appellate court ultimately decided that Keegstra would be allowed to "keep a book that had been confiscated on the ground that it was anti-Semitic."

See also, Douglas Martin, "Anti-Semite Is On Trial, But Did Ontario Blunder?," *New York Times*, February 15, 1985, p. A2. An excerpt:

A native of Germany who has lived in Canada for 28 years, Mr. Zundel [author of "The Hitler We Loved and Why"] is accused of knowingly publishing two pieces of false news detrimental to the public interest, specifically news likely to incite intolerance. . . . [T]he issue in this case is whether the views Mr. Zundel expressed about the mass killing of Jews are false under Canada's law against false news. As a result, their merits must be thoroughly discussed. . . .

Similar issues were raised in the 1981 conviction in France of Robert Faurisson, a French historian who called the mass killing [in the Holocaust] "a giant historical lie. . . ." He was convicted of libel, racial defamation and of not upholding his responsibility as a historian.

In 1992, the Canadian Supreme Court overturned Zundel's conviction by a 5-4 vote on the ground that the "false news" law conflicted with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. A few years later, however, Canadian prosecutors still were attempting to punish Zundel and others for their speech. See for example, "Anti-Semitic Site Tests Canada Law," *International Herald Tribune*, August 3, 1998, Finance section, p. 11. An excerpt:

Just days after a pro-Nazi trilogy of novels called "Lebensraum!" was published in the United States last April, Canadian customs agents confiscated a shipment of the books at the border, contending that they promote hatred against Jews and violate Canada's anti-hate laws. . . . Canadian customs agents regularly seize books, magazines and compact disks that violate standards of decency or promote hate. Now, for the first time, there is a serious attempt to address the issue of the same kind of material on the Internet. The Canadian Human Rights Commission has charged Mr. Zundel with spreading hate propaganda and is intent on shutting down [a web site run by a Californian but called] "Zundelsite." The commission contends that although the site is run from California, Mr. Zundel controls its content and thus can be prosecuted under Canadian laws.

12. For the editorial supporting the Zundel verdict, see Editorial, "The Big Lie of the Neo-Nazis," *Boston Globe*, March 2, 1985, p. 14.

13. On the British police raid on the B.B.C. and freedom of speech in England, see for example, Geoffrey Robertson, *Freedom, The Individual and The Law*, London: Penguin, Seventh Edition, 1993 (a "guide to citizens' rights" and an "up-to-the-minute account of civil liberties -- and the lack of them -- in Britain"). An excerpt (pp. 165-166, 275):

The Official Secrets Act offers remarkably extensive powers of search and seizure which sidestep some of the safeguards in P.A.C.E. [the Police And Criminal Evidence Act]. This came dramatically to public attention in 1987, when Special

Branch officers raided the B.B.C. offices in Glasgow and seized all master tapes of Duncan Campbell's *Secret Society* series, raided the homes of three *New Statesmen* journalists and spent over four days examining files in the offices of that magazine. . . . The whole episode related to Duncan Campbell's exposure of "Project Zircon," a £5-million spy satellite being planned by the MoD [Ministry of Defence] to put Britain in the business of eavesdropping from space. . . . The Government's case for suppression was undermined both by the fact that the project seemed to be common knowledge amongst defence contractors and by the impossibility of keeping the satellite a secret from the Russians once it was launched. . . .

The Home Secretary's power to ban broadcasts . . . was invoked in 1988 for the purpose of direct political censorship when the B.B.C. and the I.B.A. were ordered not to transmit any interviews with representatives of Sinn Fein, the Ulster Defence Association, or the I.R.A., or any statement which incited support for such groups. . . . The ban is a serious infringement on the right to receive and impart information: it prevents representatives of lawful political parties (Sinn Fein has an M.P. and sixty local councillors) from stating their case on matters which have no connection with terrorism, and it denies to the public the opportunity to see and hear those who support violent action being questioned and exposed. . . . The ban prevents the re-screening of such excellent programmes as Robert Kee's *Ireland: a Television History* or Thames Television's *The Troubles*, which contain interviews with I.R.A. veterans.

See also, "Bid to Prosecute Rushdie Is Rejected," *New York Times*, April 10, 1990, p. C16. An excerpt:

England's High Court today rejected a Muslim group's request to prosecute Salman Rushdie and the publishers of his novel "The Satanic Verses" on charges of blasphemy and seditious libel. . . . [The court upheld a ruling] that England's blasphemy law applied only to Christianity, not to other religions, including Islam. . . . The judges agreed . . . that for seditious libel to be proven, the evidence must show -- "and it did not" -- that an attack was made "against Her Majesty or Her Majesty's Government or some other institution of the state. . . ."

The last prosecution for blasphemy [in England] was in 1979, when the magazine *Gay News* was convicted under the law of publishing a poem that depicted Jesus as a homosexual.

14. Chomsky recounts some examples of official censorship in France and Spain (*Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies*, Boston: South End, 1989, p. 344):

In 1988 . . . the government of France, under no threat, "prohibited the sale, circulation and distribution" of a Basque book on grounds that it "threatened public order," and banned publication of the journal *El-Badil Démocratique* that supports Algerian dissidents on grounds that "this publication might harm the diplomatic relations of France with Algeria." The director of the Basque journal *Abil* was sentenced to twenty months in prison by the French courts for having published an "apology for terrorism," while the Spanish courts fined a Basque radio station for having broadcast insults to the King on a call-in radio show and the government brought three activists of a political group to trial on charges of "publication, circulation and reproduction of false information that might disturb public order," among many other cases of punishment of public statements and cancellation of peaceful demonstrations [see *El Pais* (Madrid), May 3, 1988; *Egin* (San Sebastian), June 28, August 2, June 22, July 24, 28, 1988].

15. On domestic violence after the Superbowl, see for example, Bob Hohler, "Super Bowl gaffe: Groups back off on violence claims," *Boston Globe*, February 2, 1993, p. 1 (while the claim that Superbowl Sunday is the single worst day of the year for domestic abuse cannot be substantiated, certain cities reported a notable increase of domestic violence on that day; advocates for battered women maintain that "the increase in domestic violence on Super Bowl Sunday is similar to other key days of the year, like Christmas and Thanksgiving," but the previously-voiced speculation that it increases by 40 percent on that day is not supported).

16. On the privatization of radio in the United States, see for example, Robert W. McChesney, *Telecommunications, Mass Media & Democracy: The Battle for the Control of U.S. Broadcasting, 1928-1935*, Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1993; Robert W. McChesney, *Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Politics in Dubious Times*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999, chs. 4 and 5; Robert W. McChesney, "Conflict, Not Consensus: The Debate over Broadcast Communication Policy, 1930-1935," in William Solomon and Robert McChesney, eds., *Ruthless Criticism: New Perspectives in U.S. Communication History*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993, ch. 10 (on the unsuccessful broadcast reform movement that arose in the U.S. in the 1930s).

17. On the privatization of television in the United States, see for example, Robert W. McChesney, *Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Politics in Dubious Times*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999, p. 126; Robert W. McChesney, *Telecommunications, Mass Media & Democracy: The Battle for the Control of U.S. Broadcasting, 1928-1935*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 250.

18. The N.A.F.T.A. that was enacted substantially increases the mobility of North American investors, and reduces the capacity of governments to regulate business effectively. It does this in three main ways:

(1) By improving the "security" of investments in Mexico against "loss of value" due to regulation or competition from government monopolies or enterprises. This is done in part by reducing trade barriers and extending legal protections for "investor property" and "intellectual property" rights. These protections increase the mobility of transnational corporate investment and exert new pressures on Canadian and American governments -- particularly strong at the state and local level -- to reduce regulatory standards and reduce corporate taxes so as to maintain a "competitive" environment for corporate capital investment.

(2) It imposes new legal restrictions on regulation of corporations, in part through unsustainable "compensation" burdens that must be paid by governments (i.e. the government must "compensate" companies when regulations harm corporate profits). This has an especially significant impact on labor and environmental standards enacted at all levels of government in the three countries, which like other forms of regulation under N.A.F.T.A. are subjected to the strictest degree of legal scrutiny or else held invalid. Thus, all other policy objectives are subordinated to the objective of increasing the free movement of goods, services and investment across borders.

And (3) the treaty increases the domestic political power of foreign corporations by creating new common ground between their interests and those of domestic businesses, because any effort to regulate foreign investors also applies to domestic investors under

the "National Treatment" principle. Consequently, these regulatory efforts will be resisted by the political power of both domestic and foreign businesses (which in effect includes *all* transnational corporations, since rights under the treaty apply to any company incorporated in a N.A.F.T.A. country, regardless of its country of origin). Furthermore, government regulations can be contested easily and inexpensively by individual investors, who under N.A.F.T.A. may launch their own challenges without securing the assistance of their national government, in either an international tribunal with binding arbitration powers or in the domestic courts.

The side deals on minimal labor and environmental standards, appended to the N.A.F.T.A. to secure its passage in the face of significant popular opposition, were weak and possibly even counterproductive. See for example, Ian Robinson, *North American Trade As If Democracy Mattered: What's Wrong with N.A.F.T.A. and What Are the Alternatives?*, Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives/ Washington: International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund, 1993, pp. 37-47. This careful study concludes (pp. 44, 47):

[T]he side deals actually represent a step backwards. . . . Notwithstanding the important symbolic gain that the side deals represent, they are far too weak to offset the negative impacts that the N.A.F.T.A. will have. Even considered on their own, they weaken rather than supplementing and strengthening domestic trade law provisions protecting international worker rights and labour standards, resulting in a net loss in the economic leverage that can be exercised in their defence. Consequently, the N.A.F.T.A., with or without the side deals that have just been completed, will carry North America further down the undesirable road it traveled in the 1980s, and at an accelerating pace. In effect, it will push the pedal to the floor. In the process, the N.A.F.T.A. package will further dim economic development and democratic prospects in all three countries.

For a revealing case that illustrates the effects that N.A.F.T.A. can have on environmental and other laws, see Laura Eggertson, "Ethyl sues Ottawa over M.M.T. law," *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), April 15, 1997, p. B4. An excerpt:

The U.S. manufacturer of a gasoline additive is seeking nearly \$350-million in damages from Ottawa, the first time Canadian taxpayers could feel the effect of a provision in the North American free-trade deal that gives corporations the right to sue governments for breaking promises. Ethyl Corp. based in Richmond, Va., filed a claim with the Justice Department yesterday that accuses the [Canadian] federal government of breaching its obligations under N.A.F.T.A. by passing Bill C-29. The bill, which the [Canadian] Senate passed last week, bans the importation and trade among provinces of M.M.T. The fuel additive was designed to boost octane in gasoline. But the federal government says M.M.T. could cause health ailments. . . . Two other cases have been filed against the Mexican government by the U.S. waste management industry. . . .

"It could be a major headache," Mr. Dattu [a trade lawyer with McCarthy Tetrault] said in a telephone interview from Toronto. "There is a potential for abuses of these provisions. You could certainly see an aspect to them that could verge on harassment." The harassment potential increases because companies no longer have to persuade governments to argue a case on their behalf, as they did under the Canada-U.S. free-trade deal. For instance, Ethyl Corp. does not have to convince the U.S. Trade Representative's office to challenge the import ban on M.M.T. Canada is one of the few countries that still use the additive. . . . Ethyl, the lone North

American manufacturer of M.M.T., claims the government's ban amounts to expropriation without compensation for Ethyl Canada.

John Urquhart, "Canada Removes Its Ban on Ethyl Corp.'s Additive," *Wall Street Journal*, July 21, 1998, p. A2. An excerpt:

The Canadian government, faced with the prospect of losing a costly trade fight, decided to lift its ban against a manganese-based gasoline additive produced by Ethyl Corp., Richmond, Va. . . . The auto industry, which campaigned for the M.M.T. ban, said the additive hampers electronic systems in automobiles that monitor tailpipe emissions, thereby potentially contributing to air pollution. Ethyl welcomed the government's decision to lift the restrictions against M.M.T. and said it will terminate legal actions against Canada.

See also, Joel Millman, "Metalclad Is First to Sue Mexico Under Nafta," *Wall Street Journal*, October 14, 1997, p. A2. An excerpt:

Metalclad Corp., a hazardous-waste management firm, has become the first U.S. company to sue the Mexican government under the protection of foreign-investment provisions outlined by the 1993 North American Free Trade Agreement. Metalclad, of Newport Beach, Calif., is asking for \$90 million in damages for what it says were actions taken by Mexican officials that prevented the opening of a hazardous-waste landfill site the company built in 1995 in the state of San Luis Potosi. . . . According to Metalclad's complaint, [the governor] Mr. Sanchez effectively expropriated the site when he declared it part of a 600,000-acre ecological zone.

Scott Morrison and Edward Alden, "Ottawa faces claim over P.C.B. waste ban," *Financial Times* (London), September 2, 1998, p. 4. An excerpt:

A U.S. company specializing in the clean-up of hazardous wastes is seeking C\$10m (U.S.\$6.3m) in compensation from the Canadian government over Ottawa's ban on the export of polychlorinated biphenyls (P.C.B.) waste. The claim, filed under the investor-state arbitration provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta), charges that Canada's 1995 ban amounted to an expropriation of the business of S.D. Myers, an Ohio-based company. The case is the second in as many months to raise fears that Canada's ability to uphold its environmental laws has been curtailed by Nafta's investment protection provision.

Nafta allows a foreign corporation to request compensation through binding arbitration if a government directly or indirectly expropriates that company's investment in that country. . . . S.D. Myers alleges that a 1995 ban on exports of P.C.B.s, a highly toxic coolant used in electricity transformers, prohibited it from conducting business in Canada and benefited its Canadian competitors.

In both the Metalclad and S.D. Myers cases, the N.A.F.T.A. tribunal ruled for the corporations. See "N.A.F.T.A. Panel Sides With Metalclad On Claim," *Los Angeles Times*, August 31, 2000, p. C3; "S.D. Myers wins N.A.F.T.A. Claim against Canada," *Canada NewsWire*, November 13, 2000 (available on Nexis database).

19. For the Office of Technology Assessment's report, see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *U.S.-Mexico Trade: Pulling Together or Pulling Apart?*, I.T.E.-545, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1992.

20. For denunciations of the labor movement's supposed position, see for example, Anthony Lewis, "If Nafta Loses," *New York Times*, November 5, 1993, p. A35. An excerpt:

The arguments made against Nafta by such significant opponents as the United Auto Workers seem to me to come down to fear of change and fear of foreigners. . . . Unions in this country, sad to say, are looking more and more like the British unions that have become such a millstone around the neck of the Labor Party: backward, unenlightened. . . . The crude threatening tactics used by unions to make Democratic members of the House vote against Nafta underline the point.

Bob Davis and Jackie Calmes, "Drawing Back: Nafta's Odds Improve, But U.S. May Reduce Its Trade Leadership," *Wall Street Journal*, November 17, 1993, p. A1. An excerpt:

The coalition [of N.A.F.T.A. opponents] ties together labor unions, upscale environmentalists, suburban Perot supporters and thousands of local activists nationwide, all convinced that trade is a sucker's game played for the benefit of multinational corporations. Their rhetoric is pure down-with-the-rich populism. . . .

The conspiratorial, antielitist arguments made by Nafta foes may resonate even more loudly with G.A.T.T. [the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] -- an obscure but powerful trade organization tucked away in Switzerland and run by bureaucrats unknown in the U.S. G.A.T.T. arbitration panels meet in secret, don't make their findings public and deem U.S. environmental laws improper if they block trade. And the G.A.T.T. deal now being negotiated . . . proposes to increase the G.A.T.T. bureaucracy's power, and decrease U.S. authority to use trade sanctions to protect the environment or the domestic economy.

See also, John Aloysius Farrell, "Clinton rips labor on N.A.F.T.A.; Points to 'pressure' in tactics," *Boston Globe*, November 8, 1993, p. 1. An excerpt:

President Clinton said yesterday that the "roughshod, muscle-bound tactics" of organized labor have proved to be the greatest obstacle in winning congressional approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement. . . .

Members of Congress are complaining to him that the business community is not working hard enough for N.A.F.T.A., while union representatives are "pleading . . . based on friendship, or threatening . . . based on money and work in the campaign," Clinton said. . . . But "at least for the undecided Democrats, our big problem is the raw muscle, the sort of naked pressure that the labor forces have put on," said Clinton.

Editorial, "Running Scared From N.A.F.T.A.," *New York Times*, November 16, 1993, p. A26. An excerpt:

Local Democrats fear the wrath of organized labor. And well they should. As the accompanying table shows, labor political action committees contribute handsomely to their election campaigns. Though it's impossible to say just how much the P.A.C. money explains opposition to Nafta, there's an unsettling pattern.

Note that this lead *New York Times* editorial, the day before the N.A.F.T.A. vote, was not accompanied by any table listing corporate contributions.

After much wailing about the terrifying power of labor, the day *after* the N.A.F.T.A. vote the *Times* ran a front-page story which revealed the truth: that corporate lobbying utterly overwhelmed the pathetic efforts of the labor movement. The article even spoke the usually forbidden words "class lines." See Michael Wines, "After Marathon of a Debate, A 6-Minute Dash to Settle It," *New York Times*, November 18, 1993, p. A1. An excerpt:

President Clinton and his Congressional supporters played the Oscar-quality underdog during the week leading up to tonight's vote on the North American Free

Trade Agreement. But anyone who looked inside the offices of the lobbyists for and against the accord walked away with a different view of the fight.

The lobbyists supporting the agreement -- Chamber of Commerce types, accountants, trade consultants -- occupied a stately conference room on the first floor of the Capitol, barely an elevator ride away from the action in the House chamber. Murals plastered the ceilings outside. Weighty quotations ("We Defend and We Build a Way of Life Not for America Alone, but for All Mankind") were inscribed above every door. A television was installed. Cellular telephones were everywhere -- not clunky low-rent models, but the teeny ones that fold to the size of lemons. . . .

The boiler room for the forces opposed to the pact, by contrast, was more of, well, a boiler room. Set in the spectacularly ugly Rayburn House Office Building, in a barren hearing room of the Education and Labor Committee, it was two elevators, a subway and a long walk from the House debate. The dress was union-label, inexpensive suits and nylon jackets inscribed with numbers and insignias of various locals. There was a telephone, decidedly not portable, and basic black. . . . The fight over the trade accord was a nastier and more divisive battle, a class-lines split that cleaved both parties and left everyone feeling sullen.

On the media's coverage in general before N.A.F.T.A. was passed, see for example, Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, "Happily Ever N.A.F.T.A.?", *Extra! Update*, October 1993, p. 1 (a comprehensive survey of coverage of N.A.F.T.A. in the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* from April through July 1993 found that of 201 sources quoted by name, only 6 -- 3 percent -- represented the environmental movement, and "[n]o representative of a labor union was quoted during the four-month period." "In all, 68 percent of quoted sources had pro-N.A.F.T.A. positions, with 66 percent in the *Times* and 71 percent in the *Post* in favor. Only 20 percent of the two papers' sources were opposed to N.A.F.T.A. -- 24 percent in the *Times*, 17 percent in the *Post*. In other words, almost three times as many sources were defenders of N.A.F.T.A. as critics in the *New York Times*; in the *Post*, the ratio was more than four to one").

On the U.S. public's attitude towards N.A.F.T.A., see for example, Gwen Ifill, "The Free Trade Accord: The Mood; Americans Split on Free Trade Pact," *New York Times*, November 16, 1993, p. A1 (reporting a *New York Times*/C.B.S. poll the week of the N.A.F.T.A. vote which, despite the massive media barrage in favor of the trade pact, revealed that the public still opposed it by 41 percent to 37 percent, with a 3 percent margin of sampling error).

For some of the ignored "constructive" proposals about N.A.F.T.A., see American Federation of Labor & Congress of Industrial Organizations, *International Trade: Where We Stand*, Washington: A.F.L.-C.I.O., 1992; J. Faux and W. Spriggs, *U.S. Jobs and the Mexico Trade Proposal*, Washington: Economic Policy Institute, 1992; G.C. Hufbauer and J. Schott, *North American Free Trade: Issues and Recommendations*, Washington: Institute of International Economics, 1992; Ian Robinson, *North American Trade As If Democracy Mattered: What's Wrong with N.A.F.T.A. and What Are the Alternatives?*, Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives/ Washington: International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund, 1993, pp. 29-36; Kristin Dawkins, *N.A.F.T.A.: The New Rules of Corporate Conquest*, Westfield, NJ: Open Magazine Pamphlet Series, 1993. See also footnote 22 of this chapter.

21. For the Trade Act, see 19 U.S.C.A. §2155 [original: P.L. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1974)].

22. For the Labor Advisory Committee's report, see Labor Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations and Trade Policy, *Preliminary Report of the Labor Advisory Committee For Trade Negotiations and Trade Policy on The North American Free Trade Agreement, Submitted to the President Of The United States, The United States Trade Representative, and The Congress Of The United States*, September 16, 1992. An excerpt (pp. 1-3):

Section 135 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 requires that the [Labor Advisory] Committee's report shall be provided " . . .not later than the date on which the President notifies the Congress under Section 1103(1)(1)(A) of such act of 1988 of his intention to enter into that agreement." The President's cynical rush to conclude negotiations and to then notify Congress of his intent to enter into an agreement with Mexico and Canada has rendered this requirement meaningless. While the agreement was announced on August 12, 1992, copies of a complete draft were not made available to the L.A.C. Even the chapters that were provided remained classified, contained numerous bracketed sections, were not released to the general public, and were not distributed to the full membership of the Committee. It is clear that negotiations continued for weeks after the announcement of a "completed" agreement. It was not until September 8, 1992, that all the chapters were made available to some advisors. Nevertheless, U.S.T.R. [the United States Trade Representative] informed the Committee that its report should be submitted by September 9, 1992, giving the L.A.C. insufficient time to review, analyze and prepare a report on a trade agreement that took 14 months to negotiate. Obviously, such a deadline made it impossible for the Committee to carefully examine the entire agreement. Indeed, with such short notice, the L.A.C. could not formally meet -- as directed by law -- to discuss the agreement and fulfill the requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, which mandates advance public notice of Committee meetings.

These circumstances were anticipated by the L.A.C. in a June 18, 1992, letter to Ambassador Hills [the Trade Representative], which stated: "Given the acceleration of negotiations, and the possibility of reaching an agreement in the near future, the L.A.C. is concerned that there will be insufficient time to review and analyze a completed text and submit a report to the Congress. . . . The L.A.C. takes its responsibility to advise the Executive Branch and the Congress on trade agreements seriously. In the case of N.A.F.T.A., notice of just a few weeks would not permit the Committee to effectively carry out that responsibility and would greatly diminish the value of private sector advice as required by U.S. trade law." Regrettably, the Administration chose to ignore the Committee's concerns and has, in our judgment, violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the law. . . .

[T]he Committee believes that this agreement, if entered into force, would worsen the serious economic and social problems facing the United States today by encouraging U.S. investment in Mexico and thereby reducing domestic employment and levels of compensation. . . . The issue is not whether the United States should be engaged internationally. Rather, the issue is how to structure this engagement so that the benefits of economic activity are equitably distributed. . . . Where are the protections in this agreement against further deindustrialization of the American economy? Where are the protections against the erosion of our skill base in manufacturing? Where are the counter-incentives to massive transfers of investment and production to Mexico? Where are the protections for Mexican workers to help ensure that they, and not just their employers, will reap benefits from increased

investment -- that would mean they might become consumers for the products that they and we produce? As N.A.F.T.A. is currently drafted, we know that U.S. corporations, and the owners and managers of these corporations, stand to reap enormous profits. The United States as a whole, however, stands to lose an enormous amount.

23. For an advocate's statement about N.A.F.T.A.'s likely effects on "unskilled" workers, see for example, Paul Krugman, "The Uncomfortable Truth about N.A.F.T.A.," *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 1993, pp. 13-19. An excerpt:

With N.A.F.T.A.'s opponents resorting to simplistic but politically effective rhetoric, the agreement's supporters have responded in kind if not in degree. In the glowing picture now presented by N.A.F.T.A. advocates inside and outside the administration, the agreement will create hundreds of thousands of high-paying jobs, do wonders for U.S. competitiveness, and assure the prosperity of North America as a whole. This picture is not as grossly false as that painted by N.A.F.T.A.'s opponents, but it does considerably glamorize the reality. The truth about N.A.F.T.A. . . . [includes the fact that it] will also probably lead to a slight fall in the real wages of unskilled U.S. workers. . . . [W]e should expect to see at least some adverse impact of N.A.F.T.A. on the wages of American manual workers.

On "unskilled" workers comprising 70 percent of the U.S. workforce, see for example, Ian Robinson, *North American Trade As If Democracy Mattered: What's Wrong with N.A.F.T.A. and What Are the Alternatives?*, Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives/ Washington: International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund, 1993, pp. 28, 70 n.224.

On N.A.F.T.A.'s predicted effects for Mexico, see for example, Tim Golden, "Mexican Leader a Big Winner As the Trade Pact Advances," *New York Times*, November 19, 1993, p. A1 ("economists predict that several million Mexicans will probably lose their jobs in the first five years after the [N.A.F.T.A.] accord takes effect").

On the actual effects of N.A.F.T.A., see for example, Maude Barlow and Tony Clarke, *M.A.I. (the Multilateral Agreement on Investment) and the Threat to American Freedom*, New York: Stoddart, 1998. An excerpt (pp. 25-27):

A number of respected research organizations, including the Institute for Policy Studies and the Economic Policy Institute, recently issued a study on N.A.F.T.A. called *The Failed Experiment: N.A.F.T.A. at Three Years*. The results should give Americans pause. The researchers found that, while some North Americans -- mainly large exporters and financial speculators -- have benefited from the deal, the majority of ordinary citizens and workers in all three countries have not: "Rather than produce large and growing U.S. trade surpluses with its neighbors, as proponents guaranteed, N.A.F.T.A. has plunged America's regional trade into deep and probably chronic deficit. Instead of the promised new jobs in the United States, N.A.F.T.A.-encouraged trade and investment patterns have displaced more than 400,000 American jobs on net. Most important, N.A.F.T.A. has helped to depress U.S. wages and living standards. Workers have been hurt by the availability of cheap labor in Mexico and by great reductions in the bargaining power they hold with their employers. N.A.F.T.A.'s labor side agreement has failed utterly to protect the rights of workers or the enforcement of labor standards."

In Mexico the story is worse. N.A.F.T.A.-style economics mired the country in slow growth and led directly to the peso's collapse in 1994. More than two million jobs have been lost, many thousands of small businesses were destroyed, and

human rights violations have escalated. N.A.F.T.A. has also been a failure in Canada, which experienced high job loss as manufacturing plants moved away in large numbers. Universal social programs have been slashed in order to make the country more "competitive" in the N.A.F.T.A. economy. As a result, since the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement was signed in 1989, there has been an increase in child poverty, unprecedented in the industrialized world, of 58 percent.

The Failed Experiment mirrored another study, this time by Public Citizen, that showed how N.A.F.T.A. has resulted in lower environmental and food safety standards in all three countries as well as a huge increase in pollution along the Mexican-U.S. border. *N.A.F.T.A.'s Broken Promise: The Border Betrayed* reports that N.A.F.T.A. has actually accelerated damage to border area public health and the environment: "N.A.F.T.A. has intensified severe problems of water and air pollution [and] hazardous waste dumping, and increased the incidence rates of certain diseases and birth defects in the border region." Contrary to pre-N.A.F.T.A. promises, concentration of industry along the border is steadily increasing while government funding at the local, state, and federal levels has been steadily cut. Ozone levels in border towns have decreased, U.S. environmental and public health laws have been subverted, and the quality of the U.S. food supply has been dangerously compromised. Further, N.A.F.T.A. opened U.S. borders to trucks that don't meet U.S. safety standards and weakened border inspections for illegal drugs, resulting in a sharp increase in drug trafficking in the Americas.

Leslie Crawford, "Legacy of Shock Therapy," *Financial Times* (London), February 12, 1997, p. 11. An excerpt:

[T]he country which is emerging after two years of shock therapy and a crippling recession is very different from the Mexico that joined the North American Free Trade Area in January 1994. The triumphalism which accompanied accession to Nafta, and the presumption of an equal partnership with Canada and the U.S., have vanished along with the jars of American peanut butter on supermarket shelves and the cheap flights to Miami. Trade between Mexico and the U.S. has soared to an estimated \$150bn a year. But that is because the devaluation of the peso transformed Mexico into a cheap source of manufactured goods, with industrial wages one-tenth of those in the U.S. . . .

[R]eal incomes have lost one-fifth of their purchasing power since the devaluation, while more than 50 per cent of urban families subsist on less than two minimum wages -- 52 pesos, or \$6.50, a day in total. A national health service surgeon earns little more than \$300 a month. Only the very rich, with dollar accounts in Caribbean tax havens, have been able to withstand the double blow of rapid peso depreciation and high inflation.

One of the most serious consequences of N.A.F.T.A. is its impact on union-organizing efforts in the U.S. and Canada due to the threat to transfer jobs to Mexico. On the rise of this tactic in the mid-1990s, see for example, Kate Bronfenbrenner, "We'll Close! Plant Closings, Plant-Closing Threats, Union Organizing and N.A.F.T.A.," *Multinational Monitor*, March 1997, pp. 8-13. An excerpt:

Plant-closing threats and actual plant closings are extremely pervasive and effective components of U.S. employer anti-union strategies. From 1993 to 1995, employers threatened to close the plant in 50 percent of all union certification elections and in 52 percent of all instances where the union withdrew from its organizing drive ("withdrawals"). In another 18 percent of the campaigns, the employer threatened to close the plant during the first-contract campaign after the election was won. . . . Almost 4 percent of employers closed down the plant before a

second contract was reached. The 15 percent shutdown rate within two years of the certification election victory is triple the rate found by researchers who examined post-election plant-closing rates in the late 1980s, before the North American Free Trade Agreement (N.A.F.T.A.) went into effect. . . .

In more than one in 10 cases, according to organizers, employers directly threatened to move to Mexico if the workers voted to unionize. According to the organizers, specific unambiguous threats ranged from attaching shipping labels to equipment throughout the plant with a Mexican address, to posting maps of North America with an arrow pointing from the current plant site to Mexico, to a letter directly stating the company will have to shut down if the union wins the election. In March 1995, I.T.T. Automotive in Michigan parked 13 flat-bed tractor-trailers loaded with shrink-wrapped production equipment in front of the plant for the duration of a U.A.W. organizing campaign. The company posted large hot-pink signs . . . on the side which read "Mexico Transfer Job." The equipment came from a production line the company had closed without warning. I.T.T. Automotive also flew employees from its Mexican facility to videotape Michigan workers on a production line which the supervisor claimed the company was "considering moving to Mexico. . . ." In one campaign in the Texas Rio Grande Valley, Fruit of the Loom posted yard signs in the community that said, "Keep Jobs in the Valley. Vote No." The company also hung a banner across the plant that warned, "Wear the Union Label. Unemployed."

24. For the *New York Times's* analysis of N.A.F.T.A.'s likely effects on the New York region, see Thomas J. Lueck, "The Free Trade Accord: The New York Region," *New York Times*, November 18, 1993, p. A22. An excerpt:

Though labor unions and many small manufacturers are braced for the worst, economists and business people generally predict that New York, New Jersey and Connecticut will benefit far more from the North American Free Trade Agreement than the region will be hurt by losing jobs to low-wage Mexican workers. . . . Banks and Wall Street securities firms, which will probably draw more benefit from the pact than any other businesses, say they are itching to buy Mexican businesses or invest in them.

To be sure, semi-skilled production workers across the region have reason for worry. Even if the pact does not create direct inducements for their employers to leave, the new competition from Mexico's expanding manufacturing base seems likely to worsen the financial troubles that have closed hundreds of plants. . . . The accord is expected to worsen the problems of many communities already staggered by lost factory jobs and pockmarked with abandoned plants. . . . [I]n textiles, "the people most at risk in this industry are predominantly women, blacks and Hispanics," said Herman Starobin, research director for the International Ladies Garment Workers Union in New York City, where 80,000 workers make clothing. "These are the people who need the jobs most."

25. On protests against G.A.T.T. in India and elsewhere, see for example, Sandy Tolan, "Against the Grain; Multinational Corporations Peddling Patented Seeds And Chemical Pesticides Are Poised To Revolutionize India's Ancient Agricultural System. But At What Cost?," *Los Angeles Times Magazine*, July 10, 1994, p. 18. An excerpt:

The G.A.T.T. accord makes it possible for [multinational seed and petrochemical] companies to search India's fields and then create, patent and market new, "improved" products -- which, in turn, can be sold back to farmers. . . . In the year preceding the [G.A.T.T. and other international trade] accords, millions of farmers,

environmentalists and social activists in India, Europe and east Asia took part in mass demonstrations and, in the case of Mexico, open rebellion. . . .

In South Korea, thousands of people participated in "rice riots" to denounce low-priced imports. Japanese legislators went on hunger strikes, and rice farmers vehemently protested increased imports. More than 10,000 farmers across France joined in anti-G.A.T.T. demonstrations, blocking highways and rail lines and bringing their tractors into the heart of Paris. And in India, crowds reaching half a million rallied against G.A.T.T. for more than a year. These opponents of the trade agreement believe it will force millions of farmers off their land and place much of the world's basic food supply in ecological jeopardy.

Michael Pollan, "The Seed Conspiracy," *New York Times*, March 20, 1994, section 6, p. 49. An excerpt:

[U]nder the new G.A.T.T. accords, which will be phased in over the next five years, the world will take a giant step toward the privatization of seeds. That's because the G.A.T.T. provisions on "intellectual property rights" require all signatories -- many for the first time -- to set up a system for the patenting of plant varieties. This development has already ignited powerful protests in the third world. Many farmers worry that by promoting F-1 hybrids and patenting local plant varieties that were previously saved and exchanged freely, multinational corporations will ruin traditional agriculture.

Last July a group of Indian farmers destroyed a Cargill seed-processing plant under construction in southern India, the second attack on the American seed giant's facilities there. (During the first, in December 1992, 300 protesters broke into Cargill's office in Bangalore and made a bonfire of corporate documents.) And in October, in what may be the largest protest ever against G.A.T.T., more than 500,000 farmers in India rallied in defense of their "sovereignty over seeds."

See also, "Indian Man Commits Suicide In G.A.T.T. Protest," Reuters, February 5, 1994 (available on Nexis database)("A suicide note [left by 34-year-old A.N. Basavaraju] said he killed himself to protest the Indian government's decision to sign the international General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade deal reached in December").

For more detail on the protesters' immediate grievance, see for example, Walter Schwarz, "Seeds of Discontent," *Guardian* (U.K.), March 11, 1994, p. 16. An excerpt:

When the Uruguay Round of the Gatt is finally signed next month, the companies will be able to enforce copyright on scientifically improved seeds. In theory, this means farmers will no longer be allowed to gather seeds from these crops, but will have to buy them each year from seed companies. Many of these seeds depend on chemicals for growth. All this, Najundaswami [leader of the ten-million member Karnataka Farmers Union in India] says, will lead to a monopoly for agribusiness, requiring farmers to spend heavily on chemical fertilisers and pesticides (usually sold by the same companies). It could, he says, threaten the livelihoods of all but rich farmers. . . .

[The protesters'] central target is the "intellectual property rights" awarded to companies by the new Gatt rules, which threaten to stop them trading seeds among themselves. . . . Hybrid seeds sold by companies are sterile, cannot be resown after the first harvest and must therefore be repurchased every year. . . . But non-hybrids can be replanted and farmers say their time-honored methods of trading such seeds after each harvest are now under threat. Under the new Gatt rules, companies can sue farmers for selling seeds from their own fields when these are claimed as derivatives of protected seeds. Astonishingly, the rules place the onus of proof in case of dispute on the farmers, a provision going against normal rules of justice

which has caused particular anger. Such seeds are not primitive, the farmers insist. They represent centuries of improvement and adaptation to local conditions and have been developed for mixed, sustainable agriculture.

Multinational Western corporations reap billions in profits by exploiting seeds and plants developed and discovered by Third World peoples over centuries. See for example, Darrell Posey, "Intellectual Property Rights (and just compensation for indigenous knowledge)," *Anthropology Today* (U.K.), August 1990, pp. 13-16. An excerpt:

The annual world market value for medicines derived from medicinal plants discovered from indigenous peoples is U.S.\$43 billion. Estimated sales for 1989 from three major natural products in the U.S. alone was: digitalis, U.S.\$85 million; Resperine, U.S.\$42 million; Pilocarpine, U.S.\$28 million. . . . Unfortunately, less than 0.001 percent of the profits from drugs that originated from traditional medicine have ever gone to the indigenous people who led researchers to them.

This article also notes that profits of at least the same scale could derive from natural insecticides, insect repellents, and plant genetic materials. Moreover, the international seed industry alone makes some \$15 billion per year, based in large part on genetic materials from crop varieties "selected, nurtured, improved and developed by innovative Third World farmers for hundreds, even thousands of years."

26. On the harmful impact of France's product patents, see for example, William Brock, *The Norton History of Chemistry*, New York: Norton, 1992, p. 308.

27. On "Intellectual Property" rights and pharmaceutical prices, see for example, "Intellectual property . . . is theft," *Economist* (London), January 22, 1994, p. 72. An excerpt:

"Process" patents are still the rule in many developing countries -- particularly when they relate to life-saving medicines in the developing world. In Brazil and Argentina drugs which are deemed life-sustaining cannot be patented at all. . . . If drug firms enjoy monopoly rights through the patent system, pharmaceutical prices are likely to go up -- so much so, say opponents, that local people will be denied the treatment they need. Critics in India, which imposes strict controls on the price of drugs, point to the experience of Pakistan, where products are granted patents and prices are up to ten times higher.

See also, Linda Diebel, "How U.S. drug lobby put new patent law atop Canada's agenda," *Toronto Star*, December 6, 1992, p. A1.

28. On intra-firm "trade," see for example, Vincent Cable, "The diminished nation-state: a study in the loss of economic power," *Daedalus*, March 22, 1995, p. 23 (according to the United Nations's 1993 *World Investment Report*, intrafirm trade is "estimated at over 50 percent of the international trade of both the United States and Japan and 80 percent of British manufactured exports").

29. In fact, Chomsky's book *Necessary Illusions* -- which was on the non-fiction bestseller list in Canada -- could not even be reviewed on "public" broadcasting in the United States. See Alexander Cockburn and Ken Silverstein, *Washington Babylon*, London: Verso, 1996. An excerpt (p. 34):

Back in 1990, pressed to devote its five-minute book section to Noam Chomsky's *Necessary Illusions*, [National Public Radio's] "All Things Considered" pre-recorded

Chomsky in its Boston studio, then announced at 5 p.m. that the interview would be aired at 5:25. Came 5:25 and the eager listeners heard nothing but solemn music. In the interim a senior N.P.R. executive, hearing the 5:00 announcement, had axed the segment over the protests of the producer. Five years later the show's host Robert Siegel stated publicly, "We wouldn't be interested in airing the views of such media and political critics as Chomsky."

A footnote on public radio north of the border: *Necessary Illusions* was delivered as lectures, mostly about U.S. media, over C.B.C. [the nationally-owned Canadian Broadcasting Company].

Audio tapes of Chomsky's Massey Lectures are available from Alternative Radio, 2129 Mapleton, Boulder, CO, 80304, as: "Media, Propaganda and Democracy: Massey Lectures/CBC" (five tapes).

30. Chomsky also discussed former Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson in a transcribed lecture in Canada. See Noam Chomsky, "The Drift towards Global War," *Studies in Political Economy* (Ottawa), Summer 1985, pp. 5f at pp. 24-26. For documentation about Pearson's allowing Canada to use its status as an allegedly "impartial" international mediator to assist the U.S. in its Indochina policies before and during the Vietnam War, see for example, James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada -- Indochina: Roots of Complicity*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983, especially pp. 186-188, 223, 242-249; Victor Levant, *Quiet Complicity: Canadian Involvement in the Vietnam War*, Toronto: Between the Lines, 1986, especially pp. 177-181 and chs. 9 and 13. See also, George C. Herring, ed., *The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers*, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983.

31. On Canada's role as a military exporter during the Vietnam War, see for example, Victor Levant, *Quiet Complicity: Canadian Involvement in the Vietnam War*, Toronto: Between the Lines, 1986, ch. 6; Claire Culhane, *Why Is Canada In Vietnam? The Truth about our Foreign Aid*, Toronto: N.C. Press, 1972.

32. On factory fires in China, see for example, Sheila Tefft, "Growing Labor Unrest Roils Foreign Businesses in China," *Christian Science Monitor*, December 22, 1993, p. 1. An excerpt:

In November, at a toy factory run by a Hong Kong businessman in the southern special economic zone of Shenzhen, more than 80 women died when fire raged through the plant, trapping them behind barred windows and blocked doorways. Less than a month later, 60 workers died when fire swept through a Taiwanese-owned textile mill in Fuzhou, capital of Fujian province. Chinese officials and analysts say the accidents stem from abysmal working conditions, which, combined with long hours, inadequate pay, and even physical beatings, are stirring unprecedented labor unrest among China's booming foreign joint ventures.

In recent months, newspapers have carried numerous reports of abuses against Chinese workers, who were beaten for producing poor quality goods, fired for dozing on the job during long work hours, fined for chewing gum, locked up in a doghouse for stealing, and who went on strike to protest low pay. . . . More than 11,000 workers were killed in [the first eight months of 1993 alone]. . . . [T]he problems are particularly troubling in Guandong and Fujian provinces, engines in China's booming economy.

Richard Smith, "Creative Destruction: Capitalist Development and China's Environment," *New Left Review*, No. 222, March/April 1997, pp. 3-41 at p. 7 n.8 (the Chinese government "reported that industrial accidents killed 18,160 workers in China's factories and mines in 1995," and "the Labor Ministry said that it expects industrial accidents 'to soar'").

These circumstances are routine in other Third World countries as well. See for example, P.R. Newswire Association, Inc., Distribution To Business, Foreign and Labor Editors, "A.F.L.-C.I.O. President [Lane Kirkland] Comments On Tragic Fire In Thai Toy Factory," May 13, 1993 (available on Nexis database). An excerpt:

We share in the world's horror at the deaths of some 240 young Thai workers -- and the injuries to 500 more -- in the fire that swept a Thai toy factory Monday night. Such massive loss of life in a factory fire should not happen anywhere in this day and age. But it is not surprising. The Kader factory near Bangkok, like so many others in that region of the world, was a death trap. It had no fire escapes, no fire alarms, and no sprinkler or other safety systems. Despite three earlier fires, Kader made no attempt to improve protections for the workers there, who were mostly young women toiling at rock-bottom wages. Worse yet, witnesses have reported that the fire exits had been locked to prevent the workers from stealing toys as they fled for their lives.

The Kader factory was a direct supplier to more than a dozen U.S. companies, including Tyco, Fisher Price, Hasbro, Gund and J.C. Penney. More than 20 other U.S. companies, including Toys "R" Us and Wal-Mart, purchase goods made in other Kader factories in Thailand. These American companies cannot deny knowledge or responsibility for the abysmal working conditions in the factories that produce their goods. Indeed, those conditions are the reason they located production in Thailand in the first place. They can literally work people to death. American business executives call this "staying competitive in the world economy." They will say that they cannot be held responsible for the actions of their subcontractors in other parts of the world. We disagree and wonder how many more must die before those who ultimately profit from this misery are held accountable.

This report -- distributed to business and foreign desk editors across the United States on the news-wire -- was not published in the U.S. media.

See also, Merrill Gozner, "Asian Labor: Wages of Shame, Western Firms Help to Exploit Brutal Conditions," *Chicago Tribune*, November 6, 1994, p. 1. An excerpt:

In the world of Asian laborers, which makes the goods that line the shelves of American, European and Japanese stores, workers get fired for leaving their machines to go to the bathroom. Bosses punish tardy workers by making them stand in the sun for hours. It's a world in which factory owners build dormitories that house 100 women in a room, all too often stacked above warehouses and locked at night. The inevitable fires have taken a horrendous toll in human life. Employers regularly flout government regulations on minimum wages and maximum hours, where health and safety regulations are either non-existent or not enforced, and where governments forbid workers from forming unions -- or even meeting to discuss the issue.

Hundreds of thousands of children on the Indian subcontinent labor to produce the intricate hand-knotted carpets considered a sign of taste in the First World markets. And thousands more Indonesian children work in fishtraps, harvesting seafood delicacies for Japanese sushi shops and U.S. seafood counters. . . . [B]usinessmen, forever chasing the lowest-cost sites for their textile, shoe, toy and other labor-intensive factories, want . . . nothing to stand in the way of their freedom

to take advantage of the low wages and abysmal working conditions in many parts of the region.

33. For a sinologist's discussion of China fragmenting, see for example, Henry Rosemont, *A Chinese Mirror: Moral Reflections on Political Economy and Society*, LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1991, ch. 3, especially p. 86. For more on China and its prospects, see Timothy B. Weston and Lionel M. Jensen, eds., *China beyond the Headlines*, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000.

34. On China's cooperatives, see for example, "Down off the farm: A new form of corporate organisation has transformed China," *Economist* (London), November 28, 1992, p. 11. An excerpt:

Rural China has been remade. When the reforms began, farming accounted for 70% of rural output, industry for 20%; now farming accounts for 45% and industry for only a point or two less than that. . . . The lay of the land would seem more familiar if "non-state" in China meant "privately owned." It does not, or not necessarily. For the most part, China's rural industries are, in the words of Ronald McKinnon, a Stanford economist, "a form of corporate organisation that hasn't been created before."

Most of the rural industries, technically known as "township and village enterprises" (T.V.E.s), are controlled by units of local government: counties, townships or villages. Managers are answerable to local officials and to the householders who have started the business or invested in it (plenty of overlap, usually). Some of the T.V.E.s' profits go into local infrastructure like roads and schools, some are retained for investment, some are paid out to individual households as dividends.

David R. Francis, "China's Economy Advances Briskly," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 14, 1992, p. 2. An excerpt:

By now, T.V.E.s produce nearly 80 percent of all bricks in China. They account for almost 20 percent of total cement production, three-eighths of silk textile output, nearly a quarter of paper and cardboard, around 30 percent of phosphate fertilizer, and 26 percent of coal, notes Vogl. T.V.E.s are increasingly active in electronics. . . . [They] now account for close to 20 percent of China's G.N.P., employing more than 100 million people.

Ronald I. McKinnon, "China's Economy: China's Tentative Freedoms," *Asian Wall Street Journal*, February 23, 1994, p. 6. An excerpt:

Although small private enterprises are important in trade and commerce, the most amazing growth in manufacturing has been in consumer-oriented light-industry enterprises owned by townships and villages -- the so-called T.V.E.s. . . . The profit and tax flows from the T.V.E.s serve to make many local governments financially independent of Beijing. One consequence is that local officials in thriving areas have become more responsive to the needs of residents for schools, hospitals, roads, recreational facilities and so forth.

35. On imprisonment in China, see for example, Human Rights Watch, *The Human Rights Watch Global Report On Prisons*, New York: Human Rights Watch, June 1993, pp. 137-150; Marc Mauer and The Sentencing Project, *Race to Incarcerate*, New York: New Press, 1999, Table 2-1, pp. 21-22 (listing 1995 incarceration figures of 1,236,534 in China, and 1,585,401 in the U.S.). On imprisonment in the United States, see chapter 10 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 31 and 32.

36. On export of U.S. prison labor products, see for example, Reese Erlich, "U.S., as Well as China, Exports Prison Goods," *Christian Science Monitor*, February 9, 1994, p. 8. An excerpt:

While the Clinton administration continues to criticize China for exporting prison-made products to the United States, California and Oregon are stepping up efforts to export their prison-made clothing to Asia. . . . Oregon will export an estimated \$3 million worth of inmate-manufactured jeans and shirts this year to Japan, Italy, and other countries, according to Brad Haga, marketing director for Oregon Prison Industries, the state agency that oversees the manufacture of prison goods. Oregon prisons sell a line of work clothes called Riggers, as well as specialty jeans, shirts, and shorts dubbed "Prison Blues." California prisons export less prison-made clothing than Oregon, having so far sent test orders to Japan and Malaysia. The garments are manufactured by inmates whose net pay falls well below minimum wage. California inmates earn 35 cents an hour for sewing shirts. Oregon prisons pay inmates \$6 to \$8 an hour, but take back 80 percent for room, board, and in some cases restitution to victims. . . .

To prevent unfair competition, California prison-made goods cannot be sold to the private sector. License plates, office furniture, clothing, and other items are sold to government agencies or exported. . . . If prisoners refuse work assignments, they are usually transferred from dormitories to cells and denied some canteen privileges.

37. On Ford's and Kissinger's authorization for the 1975 East Timor invasion, see for example, Jack Anderson, "East Timor Shouldn't Be Ignored," *Washington Post*, November 9, 1979, p. B13 (note the late date of this article reporting the story). An excerpt:

By Dec. 3, 1975, an intelligence dispatch to Washington reported that . . . "Ranking Indonesian civilian government leaders have decided that the only solution in the Portuguese Timor situation is for Indonesia to launch an open offensive against Fretilin [the newly independent East Timorese government]. . . ." As it happened, President Gerald Ford was on his way to Indonesia for a state visit. An intelligence report forewarned that Suharto would bring up the Timor issue and would "try and elicit a sympathetic attitude" from Ford. That Suharto succeeded is confirmed by Ford himself. . . . Ford also received the impression, he told us, that Suharto planned not to stage an invasion but to put down a rebellion. The U.S. national interest, Ford concluded, "had to be on the side of Indonesia. . . ." Ford gave his tacit approval on Dec. 6, 1975. The Indonesians struck the following day.

Hamish MacDonald [former *Washington Post* Jakarta correspondent], *Suharto's Indonesia*, Blackburn, Australia: Fontana/Collins, 1980. An excerpt (p. 211):

An attack on Dili was to have been made on 5 December [1975], the day U.S. President Gerald Ford and his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, were due to arrive in Jakarta from China. American intelligence learnt of this highly compromising timetable, and successfully demanded that the operation be postponed until after Ford left on 6 December. In Jakarta Kissinger raised no objection to the intervention, stipulating only that the Indonesians did it "quickly, efficiently and don't use our equipment." (He was to be disappointed on all three counts.)

See also, A.P., "Indonesian Drive Into Timor Told," *Los Angeles Times*, December 7, 1975, p. 1. An excerpt:

Fretilin [the political party supporting Timorese independence] has said it wants to establish a nonaligned, democratic nation. It appealed to President Ford during his

visit to Jakarta Saturday to plead the Fretilin case with Indonesian President Suharto. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, who is traveling with Ford, told newsmen in Jakarta that the United States would not recognize the Fretilin-declared republic and "the United States understands Indonesia's position on the question."

House of Representatives, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations (Rep. Donald M. Fraser, Chairman), *Human Rights in East Timor and the Question of the Use of U.S. Equipment by the Indonesian Armed Forces*, June 28 and July 19, 1977, 95th Congress, 1st Session, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977, pp. 72-73. Congressman Fraser, whose record was consistently honorable (in marked contrast to most of his colleagues), summarized his final impressions at the conclusion of the Congressional hearings on East Timor as follows:

[T]he United States was apprised, at least in general, perhaps specifically, because I think Secretary Kissinger was in Djakarta the day before the invasion, we were apprised of the intention of the Indonesian government but we made no serious objection to what they proposed to do; that as soon as the military operations, which were by the testimony of other members of the State Department at least initially quite violent, within a matter of months after the major military operations came to an end and what I would regard as a facade of self-determination was expressed, the United States immediately indicated it was satisfied with what had transpired and resumed shipments of military assistance which it never told Indonesia it was suspending. U.S. arms were used in all that and continue to be used today, there is a degree of complicity here by the United States that I really find to be quite disturbing. Even if one sets that aside, to write off the rights of 600,000 people because we are friends with the country that forcibly annexed them does real violence to any profession of adherence to principle or to human rights. I am deeply disappointed that this administration [i.e. Carter's] has continued that posture. It seems to me that on this score they have come out with a very bad rating.

The response by the State Department representative, George H. Aldrich, is an incoherent evasion which defies summary and is pointless to quote. And see footnote 39 of this chapter.

38. On U.S. weaponry in the East Timor invasion and Kissinger's leaked order to increase its supply, see footnotes 39 and 41 of this chapter.

39. On British, Australian, and U.S. awareness and approval of the East Timor invasion plans and their progress, see for example, John Pilger, "Land of the dead; journey to East Timor," *Nation*, April 25, 1994, p. 550. An excerpt:

Western governments knew in advance the details of almost every move made by Indonesia. The C.I.A. and other American agencies intercepted Indonesia's military and intelligence communications at a top-secret base run by the Australian Defense Signals Directorate near Darwin [Australia]. Moreover, leaked diplomatic cables from Jakarta, notably those sent in 1975 by the Australian Ambassador Richard Woolcott, showed the extent of Western complicity in the Suharto regime's plans to take over the Portuguese colony. Four months before the invasion Ambassador Woolcott cabled his government that Gen. Benny Murdani, who led the invasion, had "assured" him that when Indonesia decided to launch a full-scale invasion, Australia would be told in advance. Woolcott reported that the British ambassador to Indonesia had advised London that it was in Britain's interests that

Indonesia "absorb the territory as soon as and as unobtrusively as possible"; and that the U.S. ambassador had expressed the hope that the Indonesians would be "effective, quick and not use our equipment. . . ."

Kissinger sought to justify continuing to supply the Indonesian dictatorship by making the victim the aggressor. At a meeting with senior State Department officials, he asked, "And we can't construe [prevention of] a communist government in the middle of Indonesia as self-defense?" Told that this would not work, Kissinger gave orders that he wanted "to stop arms shipments quietly," but that they were secretly to "start again" the following month. In fact, as the genocide unfolded, U.S. arms shipments doubled. In 1975 C. Philip Liechty was a C.I.A. operations officer in the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta. We met in Washington last November. "Suharto was given the green light [by the U.S.] to do what he did," Liechty told me. "There was discussion in the embassy and in traffic with the State Department about the problems that would be created for us if the public and Congress became aware of the level and type of military assistance that was going to Indonesia at the time."

"Kissinger's personal instructions," *New Statesman* (U.K.), November 21, 1980, pp. 6-7 (quoting numerous secret cables that confirm the British, Australian and U.S. leaders' knowing complicity); John Taylor, *Indonesia's Forgotten War: The Hidden History of East Timor*, London: Zed Books, 1991, chs. 4 and 5. See also footnotes 37, 43 and 45 of this chapter.

Even the Western media had predicted that an invasion of East Timor was about to occur. See for example, "A tempting target," *Economist* (London), March 15, 1975, p. 61 ("General Suharto and his advisers are reported to be seriously considering a military takeover of Portuguese Timor"); "Indonesia eyes Portuguese colony," *Christian Science Monitor*, April 24, 1975, p. 30 ("there is an almost universal feeling in Jakarta within the government and the military that Indonesia is going to have East Timor -- by peaceful means preferably, but by sending in troops if necessary"); John Saar, "Jakarta Set to Use Force to Overturn Timor Independence," *Washington Post*, November 30, 1975, p. A18 ("[Indonesia's] top leaders have told foreign diplomats that they will not tolerate . . . a non-viable, highly unstable independent East Timor which might start an infection of secessionism among the 3,000 Indonesian islands").

The U.S. press also pointed out America's leverage with Indonesia when it reported the impending invasion of East Timor two days before it occurred (David Andelman, "President Ford's Stop Today: Indonesia, One of Asia's Richest Yet Poorest Countries," *New York Times*, December 5, 1975, p. 19):

[The Indonesian] Government seeks ever-increasing military and economic assistance from the United States . . . [and is] anxious to win assurances of United States support for their "archipelago concept," in which they have claimed as territorial waters all the sea area in the archipelago. . . . The United States is also likely now to ask the Indonesians to explain their intentions regarding Portuguese Timor -- intentions that they have been describing as peaceful since last August but that may have shifted last weekend. Foreign Minister Malik . . . [declared last Friday] that the situation [in East Timor] had gone beyond diplomacy and could be resolved only on the battlefield. . . . [T]he Malik statement . . . puzzled American officials because it came in all its stridency four days before the arrival of President Ford.

40. The *New York Times* index gives a good indication of how the U.S. press covered the unfolding East Timor invasion and occupation. In 1975, when the fate of the Portuguese colonies was a matter of much concern in the West, Timor received six full

columns in the annual index (i.e. the finely-printed reference listing of articles published on a subject). In 1976, when the Indonesian army was beginning the "annihilation of simple mountain people" -- as the Congressional testimony of anthropologist Shephard Forman, who worked in Timor, described Indonesia's occupation -- coverage dropped to half a column. In 1977, when the massacre was reaching truly awesome proportions, coverage dropped to five lines. Furthermore, these five lines refer to a story about refugees in Portugal; actual coverage of East Timor in the *New York Times* when the killings reached an arguably genocidal level was flat zero.

Indeed, only one journal in North America published a serious article on East Timor during the entire worst phase of the killings, through 1978. See Arnold Kohen, "The Cruel Case of Indonesia," *Nation*, November 26, 1977, pp. 553-557.

On Canada as a prime supporter of the East Timor invasion since the beginning, see for example, Sharon Scharfe, *Complicity: Human Rights and Canadian Foreign Policy, the Case of East Timor*, Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1996.

41. On the scale of the East Timor killings, see for example, John Pilger, "Inside the ministry of propaganda," *New Statesman & Society* (U.K.), April 29, 1994, p. 16. An excerpt:

Two weeks ago, the puppet governor of East Timor, Abilio Soares, a high official installed by the regime who takes his orders from Jakarta, was asked by an Australian reporter if it was true that a third of the population had died under Indonesian rule. He replied, "I think it is true. Maybe around 200,000 have died in East Timor since 1975."

See also, John Taylor, *Indonesia's Forgotten War: The Hidden History of East Timor*, London: Zed Books, 1991, p. 83 (already by mid-1977, Indonesia's own Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, acknowledged that "Fifty thousand people or perhaps 80,000 might have been killed during the war in East Timor" -- an admission which still represents the killing of about ten percent of the population). And see footnote 57 of this chapter.

On Carter's replenishment of Indonesia's arms supply at the height of the East Timor killings, see for example, Ann Crittenden, "U.S. Aid Restrictions Called Incomplete," *New York Times*, July 17, 1977, p. 7 ("the Administration has proposed to extend \$40 million in military sales credits to Indonesia in the 1978 fiscal year. This represents a 73 percent increase over the 1977 fiscal year"); Arnold Kohen, "The Cruel Case of Indonesia," *Nation*, November 26, 1977, pp. 553-557 ("the [Carter] administration was requesting a record \$58.1 million in military aid for Indonesia in fiscal 1978, a 28 percent increase over the \$46 million granted in fiscal 1977 -- which, in turn, was double the amount given in fiscal 1976").

See also, Terence Smith, "Mondale Is a Nonexpert Who Matters," *New York Times*, May 14, 1978, section 4, p. 1. An excerpt:

[Carter's] Vice President Walter Mondale spent two days in Jakarta discussing Indonesia's requests for additional military and economic assistance. As the talks concluded, an Indonesian minister drew aside an American official. "These sessions have been really useful for us," he said. "Now we have someone at the Friday breakfasts who understands Indonesia's problems." The breakfast the Minister was referring to is the foreign policy review that President Carter conducts over coffee and Danish every Friday. . . .

[Jakarta's request to purchase a squadron of A-4 ground-attack bombers had been] flatly opposed by human rights advocates in the State Department [who] felt Jakarta should be compelled to release some of Indonesia's 20,000 political prisoners. . . . [However, once in Jakarta], the Vice President found that the planes were indeed important to the Indonesians. . . . Some hurried phone calls back to Washington and a few hours later, the Vice President was given the discretionary authority to grant the plane request if he felt adequate progress could be obtained on human rights. More talks with the Indonesians persuaded him that this was the case. Shortly before he left, he announced the plane sale.

No mention of East Timor appears in this article. A letter of June 22, 1978, to Carter's Secretary of State Cyrus Vance from Congressional Representatives Donald Fraser and Helen Meyner, protesting the proposed transaction, informed the administration that the A-4 aircraft were likely to be used in East Timor -- perhaps good for a few laughs over coffee and Danish at the Friday breakfast.

On the figure of 90 percent of Indonesia's armaments being supplied by the U.S., see for example, Scott Sidell, "The United States and Genocide in East Timor," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. II, No. 1, 1981, pp. 44-61 at pp. 47-48 (reporting the State Department's acknowledgment of this figure, and listing portions of the military equipment that the U.S. provided and its uses).

42. East Timor received extensive coverage in the U.S. press after its August 1999 referendum on independence and the ensuing bloodbath -- but the media's whitewash of the U.S. role in supporting Indonesia's 24-year occupation continued. See for example, Elizabeth Becker and Philip Shenon, "With Other Goals in Indonesia, U.S. Moves Gently on East Timor," *New York Times*, September 9, 1999, p. A1 (summarizing the Indonesian occupation and the "human rights abuses attributed to the military," but including no mention whatsoever of the U.S. role and responsibility for it, through decades of diplomatic, economic and armaments support); Editorial, "Another Messy Apartment," *Washington Post*, September 10, 1999, p. A36 ("At one time, you could have made an argument that East Timor was one of those places, no matter how unfortunate, that didn't merit U.S. involvement").

The tone and perspective of the coverage also was strikingly different from that used to describe the victims of enemy states, and the criminality of those states' leaders. See for example, Seth Mydans, "With More Broken Promises of Peace, East Timor Votes," *New York Times*, August 30, 1999, p. A3 ("pro-independence forces, with 24 years of experience in both war and propaganda, have seized the role of well-intentioned victims," after "at least 200,000 people died as the Indonesian military struggled to suppress a separatist insurgency in this former Portuguese colony" -- in fact, struggled to suppress the population's refusal to submit to Indonesia's illegal annexation of their country, and the regime of terror imposed by the corrupt Indonesian dictatorship to massacre them).

For earlier samples of how the U.S. press covered Indonesia's occupation of East Timor when it infrequently reported on the topic over the decades, see for example, Henry Kamm, "War-Ravaged Timor Struggles Back from Abyss," *New York Times*, January 28, 1980, p. A1 (relating the history of the Indonesian occupation, with no discussion of the U.S. diplomatic role in allowing it to take place and ensuring that it could continue; no discussion of the true character of Indonesia's continuing military attack and its accelerated supply of U.S. weaponry; and written as if the "pacification"

was virtually complete and essentially ended, with the general population of East Timor no longer supporting the resistance any more than the occupying force. The U.S. humanitarian role in easing starvation in East Timor is, however, prominently highlighted); Bernard Nossiter, "World Watches Waldheim," *New York Times*, November 23, 1981, p. A8 (reporting that there was a vote in the U.N. General Assembly supporting "the right to self-determination by the people of East Timor," and that Indonesia had invaded the country in 1975 "with soldiers, planes, napalm and tanks" -- but making no mention of the U.S. role, the U.S. vote against the U.N. resolution, or earlier U.S. efforts to provide diplomatic cover for the Indonesian aggression and massacre); James Fallows, "Indonesia: An Effort to Hold Together," *Atlantic*, June 1982, pp. 8-22 at p. 18 ("American influence on [Indonesia's decision to invade] may easily be exaggerated," though the U.S. "could have done far more than it did to distance itself from the carnage"); James Fallows, "Double Moral Standards," *Atlantic*, February 1982, pp. 82f (reviewing a book of Chomsky's, and paraphrasing his critique of the U.S. role in East Timor as: "The American government . . . averted its eyes from East Timor").

After Indonesia committed the error of carrying out a massacre in front of T.V. cameras in 1991 -- and brutally beat two independent U.S. journalists who were in East Timor -- the *Washington Post* to its credit called for a change in U.S. policy towards the occupation, which it explained as follows (Editorial, "Dead in East Timor," *Washington Post*, November 20, 1991, p. A22):

Back in the '70s, most of the world had other things on its mind than a remote colonial backwater named East Timor. The American government was in the throes of its Vietnam agony, unprepared to exert itself for a cause -- one with no domestic constituency -- that could only end up complicating relations with its sturdy anti-Communist ally in Jakarta. But that was then. Today, with the East-West conflict gone, almost everyone is readier to consider legitimate calls for self-determination. It is time to dust off the question of East Timor and to give it the priority that justice and, now, international sentiment require. The United States has supported the Indonesians over the years and should be able to bring its influence to bear on this issue.

Chomsky comments about this editorial's account of longstanding U.S. policies (*Rethinking Camelot: J.F.K., the Vietnam War, and U.S. Political Culture*, Boston: South End, 1993, p. 16):

The relation of Indonesia's invasion to the East-West conflict was a flat zero. Unexplained is why, in the throes of its Vietnam agony, the U.S. found it necessary to increase the flow of weapons to its Indonesian client at the time of the 1975 invasion, and to render the U.N. "utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook" to counter the aggression, as U.N. Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan proudly described his success in following State Department orders. Or why the Carter administration felt obliged to sharply accelerate the arms flow in 1978 when Indonesian supplies were becoming depleted and the slaughter was reaching truly genocidal proportions. Or why the Free Press felt that duty required that it reduce its coverage of these events as the slaughter mounted, reaching zero as it peaked in 1978, completely ignoring easily accessible refugees, respected Church sources, human rights groups, and specialists on the topic, in favor of Indonesian Generals and State Department prevaricators. Or why today it refuses to tell us about the rush of Western oil companies to join Indonesia in the plunder of Timorese oil. All is explained by the Cold War, now behind us, so that we may dismiss past errors to the memory hole and return to the path of righteousness.

Following President Suharto's abdication in the face of mass popular uprisings in 1998, Indonesia announced its "autonomy plan" for East Timor. The *New York Times's* report contained not a single reference to the United States, or even to the fact that near-genocidal killings had been occurring for more than twenty years in East Timor since Indonesia's invasion. The article's *sole* description of the East Timor conflict -- except for its repetition of the Indonesian Foreign Minister's charge that East Timorese guerrillas have "burned villages . . . [and] killed innocent villagers" -- states (Barbara Crossette, "Indonesia Agrees to an Autonomy Plan for East Timor," *New York Times*, August 6, 1998, p. A3):

The territory has benefited from Indonesian aid programs, even if they were intended only to mitigate military rule, and some Timorese may be swayed by that. . . . The likelihood that Indonesia's Army will interfere with a change in Timor's political status may be receding as cases of past human rights violations by the military are uncovered in increasing numbers.

Yet another revealing example occurred when the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to East Timorese Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo and diplomat José Ramos-Horta. The *New York Times* devoted three-quarters of a page to their selection and to the issue of East Timor, with only one paragraph in each of the two articles mentioning the United States -- each time obscuring its role in the massacre completely. The first reference (Philip Shenon, "Timorese Bishop and Exile Given Nobel Peace Prize," *New York Times*, October 12, 1996, p. A6):

The State Department congratulated the two Nobel laureates today. "We hope that the action of conferring the award on them will lead to a resolution of the problems of East Timor, in which the United States does have an interest," said Nicholas Burns, the department spokesman. "We have spoken out publicly about human rights abuses in East Timor and will continue to do so."

The second reference (Steven Lee Myers, "East Timor Has Chafed for Centuries Under Foreign Rule," *New York Times*, October 12, 1996, p. A6):

The United States has not contested Indonesia's annexation, although it maintains that there was never an act of self-determination by the Timorese and has repeatedly criticized Indonesia.

Similarly, the article in Canada's main newspaper contained no reference at all to the U.S. or Canadian role in the massacre. See John Stackhouse, "East Timor defenders awarded peace prize," *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), October 12, 1996, p. A1.

Chomsky discusses an illustrative case that occurred just prior to Indonesia's invasion (*The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism -- The Political Economy of Human Rights: Volume I*, Boston: South End, 1979, pp. 135-137):

The handling of the reports by the first foreign visitors after the brief civil war gives a revealing insight into the nature of the news management that has since then prevailed in the United States. The *New York Times* published an account written by Gerald Stone, "an Australian television journalist, who is believed to be the first reporter allowed there since the fighting began" (4 September 1975). In fact, the *Times* story is revised and excerpted from a longer report by the *London Times* (2 September 1975). The *New York Times* revisions are instructive.

A major topic of Stone's *London Times* story is his effort to verify reports of large-scale destruction and atrocities, attributed primarily to FRETILIN [the victorious Timorese political party] by Indonesian propaganda and news coverage based on [this propaganda], then and since. The reports, he writes, "had been filtered through the eyes of frightened and exhausted evacuees or, worse, had come dribbling down

from Portuguese, Indonesian, and Australian officials, all of whom had reason to distrust FRETILIN." Here are his major conclusions: "Our drive through Dili quickly revealed how much distortion and exaggeration surrounds this war. The city has been taking heavy punishment, with many buildings scarred by bullet holes, but all the main ones are standing. A hotel that was reported to have been burnt to the ground was there with its windows shattered, but otherwise intact. . . . Undoubtedly there have been some large-scale atrocities on both sides. Whether they were calculated atrocities, authorized by Fretilin or U.D.T. [the pro-Indonesian party] commanders, is another question. Time after time, when I tried to trace a story to its source, I found only someone who had heard it from someone else. Strangely, it is in the interest of all three governments -- Portuguese, Indonesian and Australian, to make the situation appear as chaotic and hopeless as possible. . . . *In that light, I am convinced that many of the stories fed to the public in the past two weeks were not simply exaggerations; they were the product of a purposeful campaign to plant lies [emphasis added].*" Stone implicates all three governments in this propaganda campaign.

Of the material just quoted, here is what survives editing in the *New York Times*: "A drive through Dili showed that the city had taken heavy punishment from the fighting. All the main buildings were standing but many were scarred with bullet holes." Stone's conclusions about the purposeful lies of Indonesian and Western propaganda are totally eliminated, and careful editing has modified his conclusion about the scale of the destruction. What the *New York Times* editors did retain was Stone's description of prisoners on burial detail, the terrible conditions in FRETILIN hospitals (the Portuguese had withdrawn the sole military doctor; there were no other doctors . . .), "evidence of beating" (this is the sole subheading in the article), and other maltreatment of prisoners by FRETILIN.

The process of creating the required history advances yet another step in the *Newsweek* account of Stone's *New York Times* article (International Edition, 15 September 1975). *Newsweek* writes that "the devastation caused by rival groups fighting for control of Timor is clearly a matter of concern," a comment that is interesting in itself, in view of the lack of concern shown by *Newsweek* for the real bloodbath since the Indonesian invasion. *Newsweek* then turns to "an account of the bloodbath written by Gerald Stone" in the *New York Times*. After quoting the two sentences cited above on the "drive through Dili," *Newsweek* continues: "Stone went on to report seeing bodies lying on the street and many badly injured civilians who had gone without any medical treatment at all. He also revealed that the Marxist Fretilin party had driven the moderate Timorese Democratic Union (U.D.T.) out of the capital and in the process had captured and systematically mistreated many U.D.T. prisoners. . . . Stone's dispatch supported the stories of many of the 4,000 refugees who have already fled Timor."

From this episode we gain some understanding of the machinations of the Free Press. A journalist visits the scene of reported devastation and atrocities by "the Marxist Fretilin party . . ." and concludes that the reports are largely false, in fact, in large measure propaganda fabrications. After a skillful re-editing job by the *New York Times* that eliminates his major conclusion and modifies others, *Newsweek* concludes that he found that the reports were true. Thus the required beliefs are reinforced: "Marxist" terrorists are bent on atrocities, and liberation movements are to be viewed with horror. And the stage is set for general acquiescence when U.S.-backed Indonesian military forces invade to "restore order."

43. For Ambassador Moynihan's exact words, see Daniel Patrick Moynihan (written with Suzanne Weaver), *A Dangerous Place*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1978. An excerpt (pp. 245-247):

In both instances [the Moroccan invasion of Spanish Sahara and the Indonesian invasion of East Timor], the United States wished things to turn out as they did, and worked to bring this about. The Department of State desired that the United Nations prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook. This task was given to me, and I carried it forward with no inconsiderable success. . . .

In February, the deputy chairman of the provisional government [of East Timor] forecast that the Indonesian forces would complete their takeover in three to four weeks, and estimated that some sixty thousand persons had been killed since the outbreak of civil war. This would have been 10 percent of the population, almost the proportion of casualties experienced by the Soviet Union during the Second World War. The three-to-four week estimate must have been correct, as the subject disappeared from the press and from the United Nations after that time.

See also, Leslie H. Gelb, "Moynihan Says State Department Fails To Back Policy Against U.S. Foes in U.N.," *New York Times*, January 28, 1976, p. 1.

On Moynihan's reputation as a defender of international law, see for example, Roger Rosenblatt, "Give Law a Chance," *New York Times Book Review*, August 26, 1990, section 7, p. 1 (lauding Moynihan's "espousal of the principles of international law" and his "sardonic, righteous anger," which recalls "the impassioned professor who suspects no one's listening" while he "is clearly fuming that an idea as morally impeccable as international law is routinely regarded as disposable and naive").

44. On the 1965 slaughter in Indonesia, see chapter 2 of *U.P.* and its footnote 23. On this slaughter being supported by the U.S. and welcomed in the West, see chapter 1 of *U.P.* and its footnote 18; and chapter 2 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 23, 24 and 25. On East Timor's oil, see footnotes 45 and 57 of this chapter.

45. The leaked Australian diplomatic records were published in a book that was immediately censored by the Australian government (as were newspapers that published excerpts from it). The reason for the injunction against publication, as told to the Australian High Court by Australia's Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Peter Henderson, was that the extracts named several important Indonesian leaders and their dissemination would damage Australian relations with Indonesia. The banned book was: J.R. Walsh and G.J. Munster, eds., *Documents on Australian Defence and Foreign Policy, 1968-1975*, Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1980. At pages 197-200, the book reprinted a secret cable from August 1975 by Australian Ambassador to Indonesia Richard Woolcott, which stated in part:

We are all aware of the Australian defense interest in the Portuguese Timor situation but I wonder whether the Department has ascertained the interest of the Minister of the Department of Minerals and Energy in the Timor situation. . . . The present gap in the agreed sea border . . . could be much more readily negotiated with Indonesia . . . than with Portugal or an independent Portuguese Timor. I know I am recommending a pragmatic rather than a principled stand but that is what national interest and foreign policy is all about.

46. Chomsky comments on the original East Timor activists (*Towards A New Cold War: Essays on the Current Crisis and How We Got There*, New York: Pantheon, 1982, p. 366):

In the United States the numbers were so few that it would not have been difficult to list the names: Arnold Kohen, Richard Franke, Sue Nichterlein, Roberta Quance, Michael Chamberlin, Jeremy Mark, and a handful of others, several of them at Cornell University, where they had the support of Professor Benedict Anderson. This tiny group deserves full credit for the fact that there is any awareness at all of the Timor tragedy and the U.S. role in it in the United States, for the fact that the story did finally break through and reached the press and Congress and large parts of the loosely structured "peace movement." They also deserve credit for the fact that some international relief did finally reach the silently suffering people of East Timor, saving tens of thousands of lives.

47. For the very thin trickle of reporting in the U.S. on the East Timor occupation by 1979-80 -- well after the major atrocities had taken place -- see Morton Kondracke, "Another Cambodia, With Uncle Sam in a supporting role," *New Republic*, November 3, 1979, pp. 13-16 (a generally accurate article signed by the magazine's editor); Editorial, "An Unjust War in East Timor," *New York Times*, December 24, 1979, p. A14 (a strong editorial, the *Times's* first condemnation of the war since 1975; noting that "Although most of the weapons of suppression are American-made, Washington has muted its concern for the familiar pragmatic reasons. . . . American silence about East Timor contrasts oddly with the indignation over Cambodia; the suffering is great in both places"); Robert Levey, "Power play cripples E. Timor," *Boston Globe*, January 20, 1980, p. 39 (to that date, the most accurate and comprehensive account by a professional U.S. journalist).

48. On Clinton's circumvention of the Congressional military training ban, see for example, Reuters, "Indonesia Military Allowed To Obtain Training in U.S.," *New York Times*, December 8, 1993, p. A14. This three-paragraph article, at the bottom of an inside page, reports:

The Administration acknowledged today [i.e. the dateline is December 7] that it is letting Indonesians obtain military training in the United States despite objections from Congress. . . . The State Department said today, "Congress's action did not ban Indonesia's purchase of training with its own funds, but rather cut off United States funding for possible training."

Irene Wu, "Clinton clashes with Congress on Indonesian policy," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 30, 1994, p. 18. An excerpt:

The administration has been skirting the aid ban by letting Indonesia pay for I.M.E.T. [International Military Education and Training], a programme usually supplied free to developing countries. . . . [T]he House Appropriations Committee said it was "outraged" that the new administration, despite its vocal embrace of human rights, decided to provide training to the Indonesian military for a fee. "It was and is the intent of Congress to prohibit U.S. military training for Indonesia," the committee declared.

49. The two American journalists who were attacked in the Dili Massacre were Amy Goodman of W.B.A.I. (New York) community radio and Allan Nairn. Nairn testified

about the massacre before the U.N. Special Committee on Decolonization on July 27, 1992, as follows:

As the mass broke up people assembled on the street. By the time it reached the cemetery the crowd had grown quite large. There were perhaps three thousand to five thousand people. Some filed in toward Sebastiao's grave, and many others remained outside, hemmed in on the street by cemetery walls. Then, looking to our right, we saw, coming down the road, a long, slowly marching column of uniformed troops. They were dressed in dark brown, moving in disciplined formation, and they held M-16s before them as they marched. As the column kept advancing, seemingly without end, people gasped and began to shuffle back. I went with Amy Goodman of W.B.A.I./Pacifica radio and stood on the corner between the soldiers and the Timorese. We thought that if the Indonesian force saw that foreigners were there, they would hold back and not attack the crowd. But as we stood there watching as the soldiers marched into our face, the inconceivable thing began to happen. The soldiers rounded the corner, never breaking stride, raised their rifles and fired in unison into the crowd.

People fell, stunned and shivering, bleeding in the road, and the Indonesian soldiers kept on shooting. I saw the soldiers aiming and shooting people in the back, leaping bodies to hunt down those who were still standing. They executed school-girls, young men, old Timorese, the street was wet with blood and the bodies were everywhere. As the soldiers were doing this they were beating me and Amy; they took our cameras and our tape recorders and grabbed Amy by the hair and punched and kicked her in the face and in the stomach. When I put my body over her, they focused on my head. They fractured my skull with the butts of their M-16s. This was, purely and simply, a deliberate mass murder, a massacre of unarmed, defenseless people. There was no provocation, no stones were thrown, the crowd was quiet and shrinking back as the shooting began. There was no confrontation, no hot-head who got out of hand. This was not an ambiguous situation that somehow spiraled out of control. It was quite evident from the way the soldiers behaved that they marched up with orders to commit a massacre.

50. On Indonesia's public relations cover-up and propaganda, see for example, John Pilger, "Inside the ministry of propaganda," *New Statesman & Society* (U.K.), April 29, 1994, p. 16. An excerpt:

[According to the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, the] American public relations giant Burson Marsteller, which the [Indonesian] regime hired following the massacre in the Santa Cruz cemetery on 12 November 1991 . . . [received a contract] "worth \$5 million and [its addition to the Indonesian team] signals a change from a passive posture to a more forceful, sophisticated approach."

John Pilger, "Torture under a mountain of propaganda," Letter, *Guardian* (U.K.), April 19, 1994, p. 25. Pilger recounts some of Indonesia's other P.R. tactics:

Helped by the world's biggest public relations firm in Washington, and, among others, the British Foreign Office, the [Indonesian] regime has distributed a mountain of propaganda material. . . . One of Jakarta's tactics has been to run highly restricted press tours to Dili, the East Timorese capital. . . . [C]urrently the regime's big lie (as featured in the News from Indonesia pack received by every member of the British and Australian parliaments, as well as the U.N. General Assembly) . . . [is its boast] of the material "development" that Jakarta claims to have brought to East Timor. . . . When my colleagues and I traveled secretly and extensively in East Timor, the evidence of our eyes was that the "development" was strategic and aimed at

controlling the population in military zones. As the recent research of the Indonesian academic, Dr. George Aditjondro, makes clear, the infrastructure in the territory, "particularly roads, bridges and harbours," is concentrated in areas where the military feels threatened by the East Timorese resistance, while in relatively peaceful regions, like Maliana and Ermara, the roads are deplorable and there are hardly any bridges. . . . As we found, community facilities, such as clinics, are primitive, if they exist at all, and the health of people away from foreign eyes is often shocking.

51. For the *Boston Globe's* article, see Brian McGrory, "Indonesian general, facing suit, flees Boston," *Boston Globe*, November 12, 1992, p. 52. An excerpt:

An Indonesian general accused of contributing to the deaths of as many as 200,000 people has fled the Boston area after being sued by family members of a victim. . . . Although the Indonesian press and others in Indonesia have said [General Sintong] Panjaitan came to Boston to take business classes at Harvard, officials at Harvard say they have no record that he attended school there.

52. Appellate courts have held that under the Alien Tort Claims Act, enacted by the First U.S. Congress, "whenever an alleged torturer is found and served with process by an alien within [U.S.] borders" there is federal jurisdiction, since "deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official authority violates universally accepted norms of the international law of human rights." In addition, the Torture Victims Protection Act and a Federal anti-torture criminal law also can be used to punish torturers present in the United States. On these matters, see for example, *Filartiga v. Pena-Irala*, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980); *Kadic v. Karadzic*, 70 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 1995); 28 U.S.C. §1350; 18 U.S.C. §2340.

53. For the decision against the Indonesian General, see *Todd v. Panjaitan*, 1994 W.L. 827111 (D. Mass., October 26, 1994; unreported decision available on the Westlaw database)("the court having considered plaintiff's submissions regarding damages, as well as the impressive and painful testimony of Allan Nairn, Constancio Pinto and Helen Todd," awarded plaintiff \$4 million in compensatory and \$10 million in punitive damages).

See also, Lewa Pardomuan, "Indonesian general says court verdict a 'joke'," *Reuters World Service*, October 28, 1994 (available on Nexis database)(defendant Sintong Panjaitan told Reuters: "Just assume it is a joke").

54. For the decision against the Guatemalan General, see *Xuncax v. Gramajo*, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995)("defendant violated international law by summary execution or 'disappearance' of plaintiffs' relatives and by torture, arbitrary detention, and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment"; finding that, at a minimum, defendant was aware of and supported widespread acts of brutality committed by personnel under his command, and there was evidence that he devised and directed the implementation of an indiscriminate campaign of terror against civilians such as plaintiffs and their relatives).

See also, Judy Rakowsky, "Ex-Guatemala general, tied to abuses, loses a \$47m U.S. suit," *Boston Globe*, April 13, 1995, p. 2. An excerpt:

A federal judge in Boston yesterday ordered the retired defense minister of Guatemala to pay \$47 million in damages to nine Guatemalans and an American nun

for atrocities they suffered at the hands of army soldiers, including torture and rape. Gen. Hector Gramajo . . . was served with two lawsuits at his commencement at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government in 1991. . . .

[I]n a telephone interview from Guatemala, Gramajo said that he believes he was "framed" and that the court decision is timed to damage his bid for the presidency of his country. . . . Among the plaintiffs was Dianna Ortiz, an American Ursuline nun who was kidnapped from a village where she worked with children and repeatedly interrogated and raped by Guatemalan soldiers. After Ortiz escaped to the United States, Gramajo publicly dismissed the 100 cigarette burns on her body as a fabrication and the rapes as the acts of a spurned lover.

"Guatemala: U.S. court issues default judgment against Gramajo," *Central America Report* (Guatemala City, Guatemala: Inforpress Centroamericana), Vol. XVIII, No. 45, November 22, 1991, p. 347. An excerpt:

According to the Washington-based human rights group AMERICAS WATCH, a prestigious degree from Harvard's Public Policy and Management Program seems to be the State Department's way of grooming Gramajo for the 1995 presidential elections in Guatemala. "He's definitely their boy down there," said a U.S. Senate staffer who asked not to be identified.

[U.S. journalist Allan] Nairn insists that Harvard must have known about Gramajo's record before they offered him a scholarship: "Harvard as an institution would have to know exactly who he is. . . . If they can read, they will know that they awarded their Mason Fellowship to one of the most significant mass-murderers in the Western Hemisphere. . . ." [M]embers of the armed forces who served under Gramajo's command admitted that his orders to them were to "identify and assassinate" civilians, and to give the message that "If you're with us, we'll feed you. If you're not, we'll kill you."

For more on Gramajo, see for example, Kenneth Freed, "U.S. Is Taking a New Tack in Guatemala Diplomacy: American officials are turning to the military to help achieve stability and to gain help in the war," *Los Angeles Times*, May 7, 1990, p. 7. An excerpt:

Gen. Hector Alejandro Gramajo was a senior commander in the early 1980s, when the Guatemalan military was blamed for the deaths of tens of thousands of people, largely civilians, in a campaign against leftist guerrillas and their suspected supporters. But he is seen as a moderate by the U.S. embassy. . . . Washington's tolerance of Gramajo, or its need for him, evidently outweighs its repugnance at Latin America's highest level of human rights violations by government security forces or their allies. So-called death squads are blamed for the killings or disappearances of more than 50 people a month.

"I don't think Gramajo is promoting all these killings," a Western diplomat said, "but whenever he senses that the left is trying to organize, he permits, if not orders, hard action against them. He certainly doesn't root out any offenders. . . ." Gramajo will leave office in June, and he has said he intends to attend Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government in the fall.

Before the Harvard grooming took effect, Gramajo described his role ("Let The Trials Begin," *Economist* (London), July 20, 1991, p. 44):

As defense minister, [Gramajo] put down two coups before going last year to the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, where he explained his doctrinal innovations to the *Harvard International Review*: "We have created a more humanitarian, less costly strategy, to be more compatible with the democratic

system. We instituted civil affairs [in 1982] which provides development for 70% of the population, while we kill 30%. Before, the strategy was to kill 100%."

The killing, indeed, continues. Last year there were 304 political murders of civilians and 233 disappearances, according to the official ombudsman for human rights. This year the figure is likely to be higher. The killings are selective, designed to spread fear. The victims are human-rights activists, trade unionists in Guatemala City, politicians who are vaguely left of centre, or Indian farmers who refuse, as is their constitutional right, to join the civil patrols.

Later, Gramajo offered a sanitized version of this interview (Shelly Emling, "Guatemala's Possible Future President," *Washington Post*, January 6, 1992, p. A13):

[Gramajo's] house is decorated with ceramic Santas, pictures of his family, and piles of worn Graham Greene books. In Gramajo's study, a pile of books autographed by his influential friends in Washington illustrates his close ties to the United States. . . . Gramajo, a recent graduate of Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, likes to play tennis, help his wife in the kitchen, and preach the benefits of democracy. But Gramajo is also the man denounced by human rights groups, having been in charge of all military operations in the western highlands during the mid-1980s, one of the darkest and most violent periods of the country's 31-year-old civil war. . . .

"What I said [to the Harvard *International Review*] was that we never renounced or have never given up the cohesive force of the military. Use of force is the military's nature," Gramajo said in a recent interview. "If we were chocolate makers, we'd be making chocolate." He added, "The effort of the government was to be 70 percent in development and 30 percent in the war effort. I was not referring to the people, just the effort."

See also footnote 13 of chapter 1 of *U.P.*

55. For the Indonesian Foreign Minister's phrase, see for example, Editorial, "Indonesia's Pebble," *Wall Street Journal*, November 17, 1994, p. A24. For illustrations of how popular activism in the West turned East Timor into "a piece of gravel" in the Indonesian rulers' shoe, see for example, John Pilger, "The rising of Indonesia," *New Statesman & Society* (U.K.), June 16, 1995, pp. 14-15. An excerpt:

Suharto's recent, disastrous trip to Germany has left him virtually friendless in Europe, with of course the exception of Britain. Governments do business with him, but they don't want his presence, a remarkable situation for the head of the Non-Aligned Movement [at the U.N.].

In Weimar, the city council voted to call off his visit; in Hanover, the Lord Mayor attacked him in a speech given in his presence; in Dresden, angry crowds virtually held him hostage, encircling his bus and plastering it with "Free East Timor! Suharto Murderer!" signs. During this siege, Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas became apoplectic and entertained the crowd with obscene gestures. A photograph of Alatas giving the finger, reproduced on the next page, says much about the regime's deepening frustration and humiliation. In the past, Alatas has cultivated an image of urbanity and reasonableness, even turning up at the World Conference on Human Rights at Vienna in 1993 with his very own "collected speeches on human rights" in a glossy folder. Then, no delegate raised the question of his regime's well-documented genocide in East Timor. Today, he would not get away with it.

56. On Britain and Australia picking up any slack in arms sales to Indonesia, see for example, Michael Durham and Hugh O'Shaughnessy, "Exclusive: U.K. In Secret

Pounds 2Bn Arms Bid," *Observer* (London), November 13, 1994, p. 1 (on British plans for a "huge arms deal" with Indonesia); Editorial, "Rifles to Indonesia makes sense," *Australian* (Sydney), January 17, 1995 (on Australia's decision to sell military rifles to Indonesia); Dr. Peter Carey [Oxford University historian], "Arms and the Businessmen," Letter, *Guardian Weekly* (U.K.), July 12, 1992, p. 18 (on a British Aerospace/Rolls Royce deal to supply Indonesia with 40 Hawk fighter-trainers).

57. On the Aditjondro story, see for example, John Pilger, "A voice that shames those silent on Timor," *New Statesman & Society* (U.K.), April 8, 1994, p. 16. An excerpt:

George Aditjondro, an Indonesian academic, risked his livelihood, and possibly his life, to speak out about East Timor, to "take off the veil of secrecy," as he later told me. . . . Within days, Aditjondro's house was attacked by stone-throwing thugs, and his university has come under pressure to sack him. It is not difficult to understand why. On 16 March, Aditjondro released two academic papers, written after more than 20 years of research. Entitled "In the Shadow of Mount Ramelau" and "From Memo to Tutuaka," they represent one of the most comprehensive analyses of the effects of Indonesia's attempts to "integrate" East Timor. . . .

The Aditjondro papers support the estimate of human-rights organizations that at least 200,000 people, or a third of the East Timorese population, have died under the Indonesian occupation. In a telephone interview from his home in Java, he told me that 200,000 was a "moderate estimate." In his research, he quotes a figure of 60,000 East Timorese killed in the first two months of the occupation -- 10 per cent of the population. "The death toll," he writes, "quickly escalated during the succeeding years. During the first three years of the war, the population in the territory fell from 688,771 in 1974 to 329,271 in October 1978. What happened to the shortfall of 359,500 people? About 4,000 went into exile. . . . A large number were forced to flee or went voluntarily into the forests But anecdotal accounts point to an exceedingly high death toll. . . . Aditjondro's source for the figure of 271 [killed in the Dili Massacre in 1991] . . . comes from Timorese research rigorously cross-checked by the Lisbon-based human rights organisation Peace Is Possible in East Timor. The research lists the names and addresses of each one of the murder victims. . . .

Within two months of the Dili massacre . . . the Australian government oversaw the awarding of 11 contracts [to exploit Timorese oil] under the Timor Gap treaty. Signed in 1989 by [Australian Foreign Minister Gareth] Evans and his Indonesian counterpart, Ali Alatas, flying over the mass graves of East Timor and toasting each other in champagne, the treaty allows Australians and other foreign companies to exploit the gas and oil reserves off East Timor which, says Evans, could bring in "zillions" of dollars.

See also, George Aditjondro, *In the Shadow of Mount Ramelau: The Impact of the Occupation of East Timor*, Leiden, the Netherlands: Indonesian Documentation and Information Centre, 1994. The research actually was reported in Perth by the *West Australian*.

58. Aditjondro finally sought refuge in Australia. See Adam Schwarz, "Running for Cover: Dissident seeks asylum in Australia," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 29, 1995, p. 29. An excerpt:

Indonesia's current political climate has proved too hot for prominent dissident George Aditjondro. A former lecturer at Satya Wacana Christian University in

Salatiga, Central Java, he says he intends to seek permanent residence status in Australia, where he's currently on a six-month university fellowship.

Aditjondro, who faces probable prosecution in Indonesia for allegedly insulting a government body, says he can't expect a fair trial at home. . . . Aditjondro says he "has tried for many years to work within the system. That's why I know it doesn't work. I've become more aware of how people have been co-opted by the government and I think I can better continue the struggle from abroad."

59. On labor unrest in Indonesia before the popular rebellions of 1998 which led to Suharto's abdication, see for example, Jeremy Seabrook, "Indonesian workers risk freedom for rights," *Guardian Weekly* (U.K.), October 14, 1994, p. 15; John Pilger, "The rising of Indonesia," *New Statesman & Society* (U.K.), June 16, 1995, pp. 14-15. See also, Dan LaBotz, *Made In Indonesia: Indonesian Workers Since Suharto*, Cambridge, MA: South End, 2001.

60. By May 1998, dissent among students in Indonesia had developed to the point that students led weeks of demonstrations and protests which ultimately forced the dictator Suharto to abdicate. See for example, Seth Mydans, "Suharto, Besieged, Steps Down After 32-Year Rule In Indonesia," *New York Times*, May 21, 1998, p. A1. On increasing awareness among Indonesian students about the East Timor issue in the preceding years, see for example, George J. Aditjondro, *In the Shadow of Mount Ramelau: The Impact of the Occupation of East Timor*, Leiden, the Netherlands: Indonesian Documentation and Information Centre, 1994, p. 83.

61. On Indonesia's withdrawal of the U.N. resolution under Western pressure, see for example, John Pilger, "True Brits, true to mass murderers," *New Statesman & Society* (U.K.), June 3, 1994, p. 14.

On the World Court's subsequent ruling, see for example, Reuters, "World Court Condemns Use of Nuclear Weapons," *New York Times*, July 9, 1996, p. A8. An excerpt: By a narrow margin, the International Court of Justice advised today that the use or threat of nuclear weapons, "the ultimate evil," should be outlawed. But it could not decide whether they should be banned in self-defense. The World Health Organization and the United Nations General Assembly had asked the court for an advisory opinion on whether international law permits the threat or use of nuclear weapons. . . . Among the nuclear powers, the United States, France and Russia urged the court to reject the request, saying nuclear weapons were vital for global security.

62. On U.S. nuclear threats against North Korea as late as the 1960s, see for example, Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, *Korea: The Unknown War*, New York: Viking, 1988. An excerpt (pp. 216, 215, 217):

In 1969, within a few months of Nixon's taking office as President, the North Koreans shot down a U.S. plane, killing all thirty-one people on board. Nixon and Kissinger at first recommended dropping a nuclear bomb on the North but later backed off. . . .

There are currently approximately 41,000 U.S. military personnel in South Korea, with nuclear weapons. South Korea is the only place in the world where nuclear weapons are used to deter a non-nuclear force. . . . Each year U.S. and South Korean forces carry out joint military manoeuvres known as "Operation Team Spirit,"

which last over two months. They have grown from fewer than 50,000 troops to well over 200,000 and are the second largest military manoeuvres anywhere in the world, involving planning for nuclear war and amphibious landings. The North says that they are an obstacle to negotiations.

The U.S. government also actively and publicly considered using nuclear weapons against North Korea during the Korean War (pp. 88-89, 121, 123). See also, Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History*, New York: Norton, 1997, pp. 477-482, 289-293.

On U.S. development of biological weapons, as well as its possible use of them in North Korea and China, see Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagerman, *The United States and Biological Warfare: Secrets from the Early Cold War and Korea*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998, especially chs. 3, 8 to 12 (documenting how the U.S. took over the hideous biological warfare operations of the Japanese Fascists after World War II -- including the personnel, who were protected from war crimes prosecution -- then integrated their work into U.S. war plans by 1949).

63. On bombing of dikes being a war crime, see for example, Gabriel Kolko, "Report on the Destruction of Dikes: Holland, 1944-45 and Korea, 1953," in John Duffett, ed., *Against the Crime of Silence: Proceedings of the Russell International War Crimes Tribunal*, New York: O'Hare Books, 1968, pp. 224-226. Before describing U.S. bombing of dikes in Korea, the author notes the Western powers' own classification of that act as a war crime:

During the final months of the Second World War the Nazis exposed the Dutch civilian population to a form of war crime the United States and English Governments especially designated as crimes against humanity. To prevent the advance of Anglo-American troops, the German High Commissioner in Holland, Seyss-Inquart, opened the dikes and by the end of 1944 flooded approximately 500,000 acres of land. The result was a major disorganization of the Dutch economy and the most precipitous decline in food consumption any West European country suffered during the war. . . . Of the 185 Nazis indicted at Nuremberg only 24 were sentenced to death. Seyss-Inquart was one of the 24. His crime was considered to be one of the most monstrous of the Second World War, and prominent among the charges against him at Nuremberg.

See also, Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, *Korea: The Unknown War*, New York: Viking, 1988, pp. 195-196 ("The U.S.A. initially chose five dams near Pyongyang that supplied water for the irrigation system of the area that produced three-quarters of the country's rice. . . . The last time an act of this kind had been carried out, which was by the Nazis in Holland in 1944, it had been deemed a war crime at Nuremberg").

64. For official Air Force accounts of dike-bombings in the Korean War, see Robert Frank Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-53* (Revised Edition), Washington: United States Air Force, Office of Air Force History, 1983. An excerpt (pp. 666-669):

In order to test the feasibility of the endeavor and develop attack techniques, General Weyland directed the Fifth Air Force to breach the Toksan dam. . . . On 13 May [1953] four waves of 59 Thunderjets of the 58th Wing attacked the 2,300-foot earth-and-stone dam. At last light the dam seemed to have withstood the 1,000 pound bombs directed against it. Sometime that night, however, impounded waters broke through the weakened dam, and fighter-bombers found the reservoir empty the

next morning. "The damage done by the deluge," reported the Fifth Air Force, "far exceeded the hopes of everyone." The swirling floodwaters washed out or damaged approximately six miles of embankment and five bridges on the important "George" railway and also destroyed two miles of the main north-south highway which paralleled the railroad. Down the river valley the floodwaters destroyed 700 buildings and inundated Sunan Airfield. The floodwaters also scoured five square miles of prime rice crops. "The breaching of the Toksam dam," General Clark jubilantly informed the Joint Chiefs, "has been as effective as weeks of rail interdiction."

With one of the two main railway lines into Pyongyang unserviceable, General Weyland immediately scheduled two more dams for destruction in order to interdict the "Fox" rail line. He assigned the Chasan dam to the Fifth Air Force and the Kuwonga dam to Bomber Command. The Fifth Air Force commenced work promptly. . . . The last wave of the fighter-bombers scored a cluster of five direct hits and the hydraulic pressure of other bombs bursting in the water broke the weakened dam. Impounded waters surged southward to wash away 2,050 feet of embankment and three bridges on the "Fox" rail line. The parallel highway suffered slight damage, but secondary roads were washed out. The onrushing waters surged over field after field of young rice. . . .

At the end of the Korean fighting General Weyland remarked that two particular fighter-bomber strikes stood out "as spectacular on their own merit." One was the hydroelectric attack of June 1952, and the other -- "perhaps the most spectacular of the war" -- was the destruction on the Toksan and Chasan irrigation dams in May 1953. Although they displayed their usual fantastic rapidity in restoring rail lines, the Communists did not get the "Fox" and "George" lines back into service until 26 May. To the average Oriental, moreover, an empty rice bowl symbolizes starvation, and vitriolic Red propaganda broadcasts which followed the destruction of the irrigation dams showed that the enemy was deeply impressed.

Quarterly Review Staff Study, "The Attack on the Irrigation Dams in North Korea," *Air University Quarterly Review* (Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama), Vol. 6, No. 4, Winter 1953-54, pp. 40-61. An excerpt:

On 13 May 1953 twenty USAF F-84 fighter-bombers swooped down in three successive waves over Toksan irrigation dam in North Korea. From an altitude of 300 feet they skip-bombed their loads of high explosives into the hard-packed earthen walls of the dam. The subsequent flash flood scooped clean 27 miles of valley below, and the plunging flood waters wiped out large segments of a main north-south communication and supply route to the front lines. The Toksan strike and similar attacks on the Chasan, Kuwonga, Kusong, and Toksang dams accounted for five of the more than twenty irrigation dams targeted for possible attack -- dams upstream from all the important enemy supply routes and furnishing 75 percent of the controlled water supply for North Korea's rice production.

The study then remarks about these dike-bombing atrocities:

These strikes . . . sent the Communist military leaders and political commissars scurrying to their press and radio centers to blare to the world the most severe, hate-filled harangues to come from the Communist propaganda mill in the three years of warfare. . . . To the U.N. Command the breaking of the irrigation dams meant disruption of the enemy's lines of communication and supply. But to the Communists the smashing of the dams meant primarily the destruction of their chief sustenance -- rice. The Westerner can little conceive the awesome meaning which the loss of this stable food commodity has for the Asian -- starvation and slow death. "Rice famine," for centuries the chronic scourge of the Orient, is more feared than the deadliest

plague. Hence the show of rage, the flare of violent tempers, and the avowed threats of reprisals when bombs fell on five irrigation dams. . . .

Attacks on the precious water supply had struck where it hurts the most. The enemy could sustain steady attrition of war materials inflicted by the USAF day-and-night interdiction program, so long as at least a minimum quantity arrived at the static battle front. He could stand the loss of industry, so long as the loss was offset by procurement from Manchuria and Soviet Russia. He could sustain great loss of human life, for life is plentiful and apparently cheap in the Orient. But the extensive destruction and flood damage to his two main rail lines into Pyongyang was a critical blow to his transport capabilities . . . [and] the impact was further compounded by the coincidental flood damage to large areas of agricultural lands, which seriously threatened his basic source of military food supply.

For more on Korea's utter devastation by the U.S., see for example, Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History*, New York: Norton, 1997, ch. 5, especially pp. 289-298; Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, *Korea: The Unknown War*, New York: Viking, 1988. An excerpt (pp. 115, 118, 144, 172):

From early November 1950 onwards [U.S. General] MacArthur ordered that a wasteland be created between the front and the Chinese border, destroying from the air every "installation, factory, city, and village" over thousands of square miles of North Korean territory. On 8 November seventy B-29s dropped 550 tons of incendiary bombs on Sinuiju, "removing [it] from off the map"; a week later Hoeryong was hit with napalm "to burn out the place"; by 25 November "a large part of [the] North West area between Yalu river and southwards to enemy lines . . . [was] more or less burning." Soon the area would be a "wilderness of scorched earth. . . ."

We may leave as an epitaph for this genocidal air war the views of its architect, General Curtis LeMay. After the war started, he said: "We slipped a note kind of under the door into the Pentagon and said, 'Look, let us go up there . . . and burn down five of the biggest towns in North Korea -- and they're not very big -- and that ought to stop it.' Well, the answer to that was four or five screams -- 'You'll kill a lot of non-combatants,' and 'It's too horrible.' Yet over a period of three years or so . . . we burned down every (sic) town in North Korea and South Korea, too. . . ." The U.S.A. had complete control of the air: everyone and everything that moved was subjected to constant bombing and strafing. People could move only at night, which was also the only time when repairs could be carried out to bridges, railways and roads -- all made far more dangerous by delayed-action bombs. . . . By 1952 just about everything in North and central Korea was completely levelled.

65. On treatment of enemy prisoners in the Korean War, see for example, Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, *Korea: The Unknown War*, New York: Viking, 1988. An excerpt (pp. 176-179, 92):

[Commander of U.N. Forces Matthew] Ridgway's headquarters revealed that by the end of 1951 6,600 P.O.W.s had died in U.N. custody. The announcement stated that the 6,600 deaths resulted *primarily* (authors' emphasis) from the poor physical condition of the prisoners when they arrived at U.N. camps. Many deaths were from starvation; others were due to lack of medical treatment; many were the result of violence. . . . The way in which the camps were administered played a significant role. The U.S.A. assigned most of the guard duty to South Koreans, while encouraging anti-communist prisoners and agents to hold positions of power. . . . According to Western sources, the guards often just killed prisoners. Many P.O.W.s died even before they got to the camps. . . .

U.S. documents of the time show that there was what one State Department official called a "reign of terror" in the camps -- and that senior U.S. officials knew this. U.S. Ambassador Muccio later called the guards "Gestapos." According to the U.S.A.'s first chief negotiator at the peace talks, Admiral Joy, anyone who expressed a wish to return home was "either beaten black and blue *or killed* (authors' emphasis) . . . the majority of the P.O.W.s were too terrified to frankly express their choice." Joy wrote this in his diary. In public he gave quite a different impression. Violence was not the exclusive prerogative of the Koreans and Chinese. When the pro-communist P.O.W.s revolted during 1952 the U.S.A. instituted a "shoot-to-kill" policy. . . . U.N. troops later went in with tanks and flame-throwers and killed hundreds of P.O.W.s in different incidents. . . .

James Cameron of London's *Picture Post* wrote about what he termed "South Korean concentration camps" in Pusan in the late summer of 1950: "I had seen Belsen, but this was worse. This terrible mob of men -- convicted of nothing, un-tried, South Koreans in South Korea, suspected of being 'unreliable.' There were hundreds of them; they were skeletal, puppets of string, faces translucent grey, manacled to each other with chains, cringing in the classic Oriental attitude of subjection, the squatting foetal position, in piles of garbage. . . . Around this mediievally gruesome market-place were gathered a few knots of American soldiers photographing the scene with casual industry. . . . I took my indignation to the [U.N.] Commission, who said very civilly: 'Most disturbing, yes; but remember these are Asian people, with different standards of behaviour . . . all very difficult.' It was supine and indefensible compromise. I boiled, and I do not boil easily. We recorded the situation meticulously, in words and photographs. Within the year it nearly cost me my job, and my magazine its existence." *Picture Post* never published Cameron's story, causing a "mini-mutiny" on the magazine; shortly thereafter *Picture Post* "withered away, as it deserved."

Grotesque treatment of enemy prisoners also occurred in the Vietnam War. See for example, Citizens Commission of Inquiry, eds., *The Dellums Committee Hearing on War Crimes in Vietnam: An Inquiry into Command Responsibility in Southeast Asia*, New York: Vintage, 1972; Vietnam Veterans Against the War, eds., *The Winter Soldier Investigation: An Inquiry into American War Crimes*, Boston: Beacon, 1972; James Simon Kunen, *Standard Operating Procedure: Notes of A Draft-age American*, New York: Avon, 1971; David Thorne and George Butler, eds., *The New Soldier*, New York: Macmillan, 1971; James Duffett, ed., *Against the Crime of Silence, Proceedings of the Russell International War Crimes Tribunal*, New York: O'Hare Books (Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation), 1968, pp. 392-513 (testimony about torture of Vietnamese prisoners, Vietnamese prisoners being thrown out of helicopters, summary executions, rape of civilians, etc.).

66. For serious scholarship on the Korean War, see for example, Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2 volumes, 1981 and 1990. See also, Allen S. Whiting [former head of U.S. State Department Research Department], *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision To Enter the Korean War*, New York: Macmillan, 1960 (study conducted under the auspices of the RAND Corporation and commissioned and paid for by the U.S. Air Force; documenting that, until the invasion of North Korea by U.S. troops, there had been no sign or suggestion that China might enter the war).

67. On the U.S. destruction of the indigenous nationalist movement in Korea in the 1940s, see for example, Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History*, New York: Norton, 1997, ch. 4, especially pp. 185-224; Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, *Korea: The Unknown War*, New York: Viking, 1988, especially pp. 10-48. An excerpt (pp. 10, 16, 19-20):

Because it came at the height of the Cold War, and because of near-complete ignorance of the internal forces playing upon Korean society, an entire literature treats the war as a bolt out of the blue in June 1950, with unknown or irrelevant antecedents. . . . Many Americans express surprise when they learn that U.S. involvement with Korea came well before 1950, in a three-year occupation (1945-8) in which Americans operated a full military government. . . .

An ostensible Korean government did exist within a few weeks of Japan's demise; its headquarters was in Seoul, and it was anchored in widespread "people's committees" in the countryside. But this Korean People's Republic (formed on 6 September 1945) was shunned by the Americans. . . . The American preference was for a group of conservative politicians who formed the Korean Democratic Party (K.D.P.) in September 1945, and so the occupation spent much of its first year dismantling the committees in the South, which culminated in a major rebellion in October 1946 that spread over several provinces. . . . Under American auspices Koreans captured the [Japanese] colonial government and used its extensive and penetrative apparatus to preserve the power and privilege of a traditional land-owning elite, long the ruling class of Korea but now tainted by its associations with the Japanese. The one reliable and effective agency of this restoration and reaction was the Korean National Police (K.N.P.). The effective opposition to this system was very broad and almost wholly on the left; a mass popular resistance from 1945 to 1950 mingled raw peasant protest with organized union activity and, finally, armed guerrilla resistance in the period 1948-50.

The authors then discuss the U.S.-organized suppression of the indigenous nationalist movement (pp. 38-40):

[A] rebellion at the port city of Yosu . . . soon spread to other counties in the southwest and south-east and . . . for a time, seemed to threaten the foundations of the fledgling republic. The cause of the uprising was refusal, on 19 October 1948, of elements of the 14th and 6th Regiments of the republic's Army to embark for a mission against the Cheju guerrillas [who were carrying out a popular uprising, which ultimately was suppressed with from 15,000 to 30,000 killed]. . . . Rhee and his American backers immediately charged that North Korea had fomented the rebellion, but it was, in fact, an outburst dating back to the frustrated goals of local leftists over the previous three years.

The authors note that the counter-revolution was directed by Americans through "secret protocols" which "placed operational control . . . in American hands." One of the American organizers of the suppression reported that police in one area were: "out for revenge and are executing prisoners and civilians . . . loyal civilians already killed and people beginning to think we (*sic*) are as bad as the enemy" (p. 40). Additionally, Halliday and Cummings point out (pp. 47-48):

There was little evidence of Soviet or North Korean support for the Southern guerrillas. . . . No Soviet weapons had ever been authenticated in South Korea except near the parallel; most guerrillas had Japanese and American arms. Another [U.S.] report found that the guerrillas "apparently receive little more than moral support from North Korea." The principal source of external involvement in the guerrilla war was, in fact, American.

See also, Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, Vol. I ("Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947"), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981. An excerpt (pp. xxi, xxiv):

[I]mmediately after liberation [from Japan in 1945], within a three-month period . . . open fighting [began which] eventually claimed more than one hundred thousand lives in peasant rebellion, labor strife, guerrilla warfare, and open fighting along the thirty-eighth parallel -- all this before the ostensible Korean War began. In other words, the conflict was civil and revolutionary in character, beginning just after 1945 and proceeding through a dialectic of revolution and reaction. The opening of conventional battles in June 1950 only continued this war by other means. . . . From September through December 1945, the American Occupation made a series of critical decisions: it revived the Government-General bureaucracy and its Korean personnel; it revived the Japanese national police system and its Korean element; it inaugurated national defense forces for south Korea alone; and it moved toward a separate southern administration.

Gregory Henderson [U.S. diplomat who served in Korea during the 1940s and '50s], *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968, p. 167 (estimating that "tens of thousands -- probably over 100,000 -- were killed without any trial whatsoever" by U.S.-backed Republic of Korea soldiers and the Counter-Intelligence Corps when these forces recaptured areas of leftist repute in the South). And see, Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945*, New York: Pantheon, 1968 (updated edition 1990), chs. 21 and 24.

68. For Hersh's book, see Seymour Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*, New York: Random House, 1991.

69. Judges 16:23-31.

70. On Israel's development of nuclear weapons, see for example, Avner Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998; Seymour Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*, New York: Random House, 1991; Andrew and Leslie Cockburn, *Dangerous Liaison: The Inside Story of the U.S.-Israeli Covert Relationship*, New York: HarperCollins, 1991, especially ch. 4; Mark Gaffney, *Dimona: the Third Temple?; The Story Behind the Vanunu Revelation*, Brattleboro, VT: Amana, 1989; Insight Team, "Revealed: the secrets of Israel's nuclear arsenal," *Sunday Times* (London), October 5, 1986, p. 1 (across-the-front-page banner headline, with two-page spread including photographs and diagrams, reporting the testimony of the Israeli nuclear technician Mordechai Vanunu, who disclosed the details of Israel's nuclear weapons program).

For examples of the way the U.S. press, particularly the *New York Times*, handled reports of Israel's nuclear capabilities over the years, compare the following: "Israel may have 20 nuclear arms, report says," *Boston Globe*, October 31, 1984, p. 5 (reporting a 1984 study by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's specialist on nuclear proliferation, Leonard Spector, identifying Israel as "by far the most advanced of eight 'emerging' nuclear powers, surpassing the nuclear capabilities of earlier contenders such as India and South Africa"); with Richard Halloran, "2 Nuclear Arms Races in Third World Feared," *New York Times*, October 31, 1984, p. A11 (the *New York Times*'s story

covering the Spector report: it mentions Israel once -- namely, as having helped to *reduce* the danger of nuclear proliferation by bombing an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981).

Similarly, compare A.P., "Report says Israel could 'level' cities," *Boston Globe*, February 25, 1987, p. 67 (reporting Spector's 1987 study on nuclear proliferation in the paper's Amusements section; quoting him as saying that Israel may have acquired enough nuclear weaponry "to level every urban center in the Middle East with a population of more than 100,000"); with Michael Gordon, "Libya's A-Bomb Effort Cited," *New York Times*, February 25, 1987, p. D23 (reporting Spector's study the same day as the previous *Boston Globe* article, but making no mention of Israel; the article instead opens by warning of Libyan efforts to acquire a nuclear capacity, then turns to suspicions about Pakistan, Iran, and India).

71. For discussions of the "Samson Complex" idea in Israel, see for example, Aryeh (Lova) Eliav, "Emil and the murderers," *Davar* (Israel), November 3, 1982; Yaakov Sharett, "A Great Danger is Coming," *Davar* (Israel), November 3, 1982 (mentioning the Samson Complex, and citing entries from Prime Minister Moshe Sharett's diaries in which Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon is quoted as saying "we will go crazy" -- "nishtagea" -- if crossed, and Labor Party official David Hacoheh is quoted after the attack on Egypt in 1956 as telling Sharett, "we have nothing to lose so it is better that we go crazy; the world will know to what a level we have reached")(quotations are Chomsky's own translations).

Israeli Prime Minister Moshe Sharett also referred to an early expression of the "Samson Complex" in his personal diary on January 10, 1955. See Livia Rokach, *Israel's Sacred Terrorism: A Study Based on Moshe Sharett's Personal Diary and Other Documents*, Belmont, MA: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1986. Sharett's words (p. 36):

[Labor Party Defense Minister Pinhas] Lavon . . . has constantly preached for acts of madness and taught the army leadership the diabolic lesson of how to set the Middle East on fire, how to cause friction, cause bloody confrontations, sabotage targets and property of the Powers [and perform] acts of despair and suicide.

See also, David Hirst, *The Gun and the Olive Branch: The Roots of Violence in the Middle East*, London: Faber and Faber, 1977, pp. 454-456.

72. For the Israeli Labor Party press's report of Israel's warning, see Daniel Bloch, *Davar* (Israel), November 13, 1981. The August 1981 Saudi peace plan had called for a two-state settlement according to the 1967 borders, with recognition of the right of all states in the region to exist in peace.

73. For the Israeli strategic analysts' statement -- in English -- about Israel's nuclear capabilities, see Amos Perlmutter, Michael Handel and Uri Bar-Joseph, *Two Minutes Over Baghdad*, London: Vallentine, Mitchell and Co., 1982. An excerpt (p. 51):

Western intelligence sources estimated that the explosion in September 1979 [over the Indian Ocean at a height of 26,000 feet] was a joint experiment by the R.S.A. [Republic of South Africa] and Israel in one of the most advanced tactical nuclear systems known to be used anywhere in the world. . . . [T]here are indications that a common effort [of Israel, South Africa and Taiwan] is being made to develop a cruise missile with a 1,500 mile range. Such a missile launched from Israel could hit any target within the Arab world, while also covering many targets in southern U.S.S.R.

See also, Insight Team, "France admits it gave Israel A-bomb," *Sunday Times* (London), October 12, 1986, p. 1. The High Commissioner of the French Atomic Energy Agency from 1951 to 1970 (the period when France helped Israel to build its nuclear weapons plant at Dimona) observed:

We thought the Israeli bomb was aimed against the Americans, not to launch it against America but to say "if you don't want to help us in a critical situation we will require you to help us, otherwise we will use our nuclear bombs."

74. For the post-Cold War glossy document, see *National Security Strategy of the United States: 1990-1991*, The White House [George Bush credited as the author], March 1990 (also published as a book by Brassey's/Macmillan). The planners' exact words (pp. 47-48, 104, 55-56 of the Brassey's/Macmillan edition):

The Middle East is a vivid example, however, of a region in which, even as East-West tensions diminish, American strategic concerns remain. Threats to our interests -- including the security of Israel and moderate Arab states as well as the free flow of oil -- come from a variety of sources. In the 1980s, our military engagements -- in Lebanon in 1983-84, Libya in 1986, and the Persian Gulf in 1987-88 -- were in response to threats that could not be laid at the Kremlin's door. The necessity to defend our interests will continue. . . .

The growing technical sophistication of Third World conflicts will place serious demands on our forces. They must be able to respond quickly, and appropriately, as the application of even small amounts of power early in a crisis usually pays significant dividends. . . . In a new era, we foresee that our military power will remain an essential underpinning of the global balance, but less prominently and in different ways. We see that the more likely demands for the use of our military forces may not involve the Soviet Union and may be in the Third World, where new capabilities and approaches may be required. We see that we must look to our economic well-being as the foundation of our long-term strength.

For similar commentary, see Christopher Layne [senior fellow of the Cato Institute] and Benjamin Schwarz [international policy analyst at the RAND Corporation], "American Hegemony -- Without An Enemy," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1993, pp. 5-23. An excerpt:

The U.S.S.R.'s demise has also forced the American foreign policy elite to be more candid in articulating the assumptions of American strategy. . . . [U]nderpinning U.S. world order strategy is the belief that America must maintain what is in essence a military protectorate in economically critical regions to ensure that America's vital trade and financial relations will not be disrupted by political upheaval. This kind of economically determined strategy articulated by the foreign policy elite ironically (perhaps unwittingly) embraces a quasi-Marxist or, more correctly, a Leninist interpretation of American foreign relations. Such views surprisingly echo the radical "open door school" view of American foreign policy advanced by William Appleman Williams and other left-wing historians. . . .

Rather than being the stimulus to peace that it is touted to be, economic interdependence -- and the need to protect America's stakes in it -- is invoked to justify a post-Cold War U.S. military presence in Europe and East Asia and military intervention in the Balkan conflict. . . . In effect, the foreign policy establishment has embraced the proposition that wars (or at least continuous preparations for war) are necessary for the American economy to prosper.

On the reasons why the U.S. military budget could not be dramatically reduced after the collapse of the Soviet Union, see chapter 2 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 4 and 5; and chapter 3 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 10.

75. On the U.S. being the biggest arms dealer to the Third World after the Cold War, see for example, Barry Schweid, "\$6b in arms sent to Mideast since May; Arms control group cites Pentagon data," *Boston Globe*, February 15, 1992, p. 3 ("Since 1989, U.S. arms exports to developing countries have increased by 138 percent," making the U.S. "the world's largest exporter of weapons to the developing world"); Robert Pear, "U.S. Sales of Arms to the Third World Declined by 22% Last Year," *New York Times*, July 21, 1992, p. A16 (quoting a Congressional Research Service report: "The United States, which surpassed the Soviet Union as the biggest supplier in 1990, accounted for 57% of all sales in 1991").

On total U.S. arms sales after the Cold War, see for example, Larry Korb [former Assistant Secretary of Defense], "U.S. Arms Industry Keeps on Rollin'," Op-Ed, *Christian Science Monitor*, January 30, 1992, p. 18 ("In 1989 American firms sold \$12 billion a year worth of defense goods around the world. The following year, foreign military sales jumped to \$18 billion. For 1991, they will come close to \$40 billion").

See also, Lawrence J. Korb, "The Readiness Gap. What Gap?," *New York Times Magazine*, February 26, 1995, p. 40. An excerpt:

Today, the United States spends more than six times as much on defense as its closest rival, and almost as much on national security as the rest of the world combined. In 1995, Bill Clinton will actually spend \$30 billion more on defense, in constant dollars, than Richard Nixon did 20 years ago and substantially more than his own Secretary of Defense argued was necessary in 1992. . . . [D]efense spending is at about 85 percent of its average cold war level.

Marc Breslow, "Budget-balancing nonsense: the GOP's contract with the devil," *Dollars and Sense*, March 1, 1995, p. 8. An excerpt:

As of 1993, the U.S. military budget was greater than that of the next ten highest spenders combined, all of whom are U.S. allies (if one includes Russia, whose budget is now only one-tenth of ours). Cutting the military in half would come close to eliminating the deficit, while still leaving us with more than three times the defense budget of Japan, our closest competitor.

Aaron Zitner, "Arms Across the Sea," *Boston Globe*, August 1, 1993, p. 77 (an aerospace industry analyst commented approvingly that, for the first time, the Secretary of Commerce was sent to the Paris Air Show and to potential Third World buyers such as Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, "hawking American fighter planes"). And see chapter 10 of *U.P.* and its footnote 23.

Chomsky adds that foreign arms sales also help to alleviate the balance-of-payments crisis: oil-exporter Saudi Arabia alone had \$30 billion in outstanding contracts with U.S. arms suppliers in mid-1993, part of a huge arms build-up that has undermined the economy of this super-rich country, recycling oil wealth to the West (primarily the United States) and not to the people of the region. On Saudi Arabia's purchases, see for example, Jeff Gerth et al., "Saudi Stability Hit by Heavy Spending Over Last Decade," *New York Times*, August 22, 1993, p. 1 (noting Saudi Arabia's "fundamental decision" to "put purchases of weapons first, and cut Saudi citizens' subsidies where necessary").

76. On the Lockheed-Martin propaganda, see Eyal Press, "G.O.P. 'Responsibility' On U.S. Arms Sales," Op-Ed, *Christian Science Monitor*, February 23, 1995, p. 19. An excerpt:

While Lockheed hawks the F-16 with one hand, it uses the other to lobby Congress to fund the F-22 advanced fighter, which the company claims is needed to keep America ahead of its competitors -- at a \$72 billion cost to taxpayers. The F-22 is not necessary for U.S. defense. A 1994 General Accounting Office report showed that current-generation planes could meet any foreseeable threat to U.S. forces. Still, last year Lockheed distributed a brochure on Capital Hill touting the need for the F-22 by highlighting the looming danger posed by the spread of advanced fighter-planes like the F-16 to foreign countries. As an official who helped produce the brochure says, "We've sold the F-16 all over the world; what if [a friend or ally] turns against us?"

See also, William D. Hartung, "The Speaker From Lockheed?," *Nation*, January 30, 1995, p. 124.

77. On prevention of development in the Occupied Territories, see for example, "Defence minister: Areas won't compete with our economy," *Jerusalem Post*, February 15, 1985, p. 1 (reporting Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin's statement that "there will be no development [in the Territories] initiated by the government, and no permits will be given for expanding agriculture or industry [there], which may compete with the State of Israel"); David Richardson, "De facto dual society," *Jerusalem Post*, September 10, 1982, p. 7. An excerpt:

"The economy of the West Bank may be characterized as undeveloped, non-viable, stagnant and dependent. It is an auxiliary sector of both the Israeli and Jordanian economies," Benvenisti [the Former Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem] concludes. Twenty-five per cent of Israeli exports are sold via the West Bank, which is something of a captive market and the largest single market for Israeli manufactured goods. The industrial base of the area is undeveloped since there is no capital investment, no governmental investment in industrial infrastructure, no credit facilities or capital market, no protection from the import of Israeli goods, there are restrictions on exports to Jordan, and restrictions on the import of equipment and raw materials.

David Shipler, "Israel Changing Face of West Bank," *New York Times*, September 12, 1982, p. 1 (providing further details of Meron Benvenisti's research and conclusions about the lack of development in the West Bank); Julian Ozanne, "Gaza-Jericho Autonomy: Decades of neglect leave unemployment as the norm," *Financial Times* (London), May 5, 1994, p. 6. An excerpt:

The Palestinians will also need to reverse decades of Egyptian and Israeli neglect which have left Gaza's sewerage, water, roads, power, communications and housing in disrepair and chaos. The World Bank says the Israeli-run civil administration of the occupied territories for 27 years had an unusually low rate of investment, only 3 percent of gross domestic product. . . . Many of Gaza's problems are repeated in Jericho and the West Bank.

On the abysmal economic level of the Occupied Territories, see for example, Julian Ozanne, "The Middle East: Close links likely to remain in economic reconstruction -- Reversing the decline in occupied territories," *Financial Times* (London), September 1, 1993, p. 4. An excerpt:

The economy in the territories, however, is underdeveloped and depressed. Combined gross national product per capita of the 1.7m residents of the West Bank and Gaza in 1991 was Dollars 1,800 -- 16 per cent of Israel's Dollars 10,878. . . .

[The Occupied Territories] contribute less than 3 per cent of Israel's gross national product -- a figure that is declining with the substitution of immigrant labourers in the place of Palestinians. The Gaza economy -- which will be the initial focus of an expanded Palestinian authority -- is much the worst hit with income per head of less than Dollars 850. Gaza, a 360 sq. k.m. strip of land, is home to 780,000 Palestinians, many living in sprawling shanty refugee camps. . . . Unemployment is estimated at 40-50 per cent.

Anthony Coon, *Town Planning Under Military Occupation: An examination of the law and practice of town planning in the occupied West Bank*, Ramallah: Al-Haq, 1992, especially pp. 29-30. See also chapter 4 of *U.P.* and its footnote 59; and footnote 78 of this chapter.

78. On the development level of Jordan compared to that of the Occupied Territories, see for example, Danny Rubinstein, "Two Banks of the Jordan," *Ha'aretz* (Israel), February 13, 1995 (translated in Israel Shahak, *Translations from the Hebrew Press*, April 1995).

79. On the lawsuit about stolen wage deductions, see for example, Kav La'Oved, *Newsletter*, October 1995 (Justice Y. Bazak of the Jerusalem District Court issued his ruling dismissing the suit in May 1995); Rubik Rosenthal, *Ha'aretz* (Israel), February 25, 1994; Haim Gvirtzman, *Ha'aretz* (Israel), May 16, 1993; Interview, *Al Hamishmar* (Israel), March 12, 1993.

80. On the importance of the Occupied Territories' water to Israel, see chapter 4 of *U.P.* and its footnote 59.

81. For the *New York Times's* story saying that the peace process was "dead" following the 1996 Israeli election of Benjamin Netanyahu, see Steven Erlanger, "In Israel, Fears Decide Which Road Not to Travel," *New York Times*, June 2, 1996, section 4 (*Week in Review*), p. 1 ("With the narrow election of Benjamin Netanyahu as Israel's Prime Minister last week, the Arab-Israeli peace process that the Clinton Administration worked so hard to guide and manage is effectively dead").

82. For the article about Clinton in the Israeli press, see Nahum Barnea, "Clinton, the last Zionist," *Yediot Ahronot* (Israel), March 14, 1996 ("Bill Clinton is the first U.S. President who liberated himself from the attitude of the former Presidents, who at least pretended that their attitude toward Israel and the Arabs is 'balanced'")(title and quotation are Chomsky's own translations). See also, Donald Neff, "Clinton places U.S. policy at Israel's bidding," *Middle East International*, March 31, 1995, p. 16.

83. On the Clinton administration's new stance at the U.N. towards the Palestinian refugees and control of Jerusalem, see for example, Jules Kagian, "Rewriting resolutions," *Middle East International*, December 17, 1993, p. 10. An excerpt:

For the first time in 45 years, the United States has abandoned its support for the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland as enshrined in Resolution 194, adopted by the General Assembly on 11 December 1949. The resolution was reaffirmed by the General Assembly on 8 December [1993] with 127 votes in favour, but Israel and the U.S. voted against it. . . .

From the outset of the current 48th session [of the U.N.], the U.S. delegation sought to eliminate, revise or defer many resolutions on the Middle East, claiming that the Declaration of Principles signed by Israel and the P.L.O. in Washington on 13 September 1993 required a change in "obsolete and anachronistic" resolutions. The U.S. delegation opposed references to "occupied territory, including Jerusalem," claiming they could be considered to prejudge the outcome of negotiations. The U.S. also refused to condemn Israel's settlement activity because it was "unproductive to debate the legalities of the issue. . . ." In the four resolutions on Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people, the Assembly deplored Israel. The U.S. is conducting a campaign to abolish the special committee [on Palestinian rights], which was described by the U.S. representative as "biased, superfluous and unnecessary."

Graham Usher, "Burying the Palestinians," *Middle East International*, January 6, 1995, pp. 4-5 (in both 1993 and 1994, the U.S. -- for the first time -- voted against all U.N. General Assembly resolutions pertaining to Palestinian refugees) .

On Clinton's position on control of Jerusalem, see also, Jules Kagian, "The U.N. abdicates its role," *Middle East International*, April 1, 1994, p. 4. Although previously the United States had always joined the world in referring to -- in the words of Resolution 694 of 1991, the most recent reiteration -- "all the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem," the Clinton administration reversed course at the U.N.:

U.S. Ambassador Albright said the U.S. could not support the description of the territories occupied during the 1967 war as "occupied Palestinian territory." [The Clinton administration] also opposed specific reference to Jerusalem [as part of the occupied territories], the status of which [Albright] said was to be addressed at a later stage of the peace process. . . . [T]he Palestinian observer at the U.N. . . . said that every single Council resolution on the Palestinian issue had contained language referring to Jerusalem as part of the occupied territories.

Paul Lewis, "U.N. Security Council Condemns the Hebron Slayings," *New York Times*, March 19, 1994, p. 6. An excerpt:

After three weeks of tortuous negotiations, the [U.N.] Security Council condemned the Hebron massacre [of a mosque full of Palestinians by an American-Jewish settler on February 25, 1994] today. But the United States strongly disavowed a suggestion in the Council's resolution [number 280] that Jerusalem was part of the Israeli-occupied territories. . . . [The U.S. abstained] on a paragraph that implies that Jerusalem is part of the occupied territories . . . [and a paragraph saying the massacre] underlines the need to provide protection and security for the Palestinian people. . . . The 14 other Council members voted in favor of every paragraph.

84. On the traditional "option" of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories working in Israel, see for example, Yigal Sarna, "Uncle Ahmed's Cabin," *Yediot Ahronot* (Israel), July 3, 1987 (discussing the "story of slavery" of the tens of thousands of unorganized Palestinian workers who come to Israel each day: "slaves, sub-citizens suspected of everything, who dwell under the floor tiles of Tel Aviv, locked up overnight in a hut in the citrus grove of a farm, near sewage dumps, in shelters that . . . serve rats only," or in underground parking stations or grocery stands in the market -- illegally, since they are not permitted to spend the night in Israel)(title and quotations are Chomsky's own translations); Ian Black, "Peace or no peace, Israel will still need cheap Arab labor," *New Statesman* (U.K.), September 29, 1978, pp. 403-404 (reporting on the

bands of Palestinian children, of whom "some are no more than six or seven years old," who work on Israeli settlements in and around the Occupied Territories). See also, Moshe Semyonov and Noah Lewin-Epstein, *Hewers of Wood and Drawers of Water: Noncitizen Arabs in the Israeli Labor Market*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.

On the encouraged "option" of Palestinians "going somewhere else," see for example, Francis Offner, "Sketching Rabin's Plan for Peace," *Christian Science Monitor*, June 3, 1974, pp. 1, 6. Former Israeli Labor Party Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin candidly explained:

"I would like to create in the course of the next 10 to 20 years conditions which would attract natural and voluntary migration of the [Palestinian] refugees from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank to East Jordan. To achieve this we have to come to agreement with King Hussein [of Jordan] and not with Yasser Arafat [P.L.O. leader]."

See also footnote 58 of chapter 4 of *U.P.*

85. On Israel's foreign workers, see for example, Yosef Elgazi, *Ha'aretz* (Israel), March 22, 1996; Hagar Enosh, *Yediot Ahronot* (Israel), April 2, 1996; Hanoch Marmari, *Ha'aretz* (Israel), March 9, 1995 [translated in Israel Shahak, *Translations from the Israeli Press*, April 1995]; Shlomo Abramovitch, "The Land of Opportunities," *Sheva Yamim* (Israel), March 3, 1995 [translated in Israel Shahak, *Translations from the Israeli Press*, April 1995]; Gay Ben Proat, *Ma'ariv* (Israel), February 9, 1996.

86. The principle about the Jewish vote in Israel being the only part that counts was stated succinctly by A. M. Rosenthal of the *New York Times* ("The Warp From Israel," *New York Times*, June 4, 1996, p. A15):

Arab Israelis, 12 percent of the electorate, voted for Mr. Peres [the incumbent Labor Party leader] virtually unanimously, narrowing the Netanyahu lead to 1 percent. Arab votes count legally as much as do Jewish votes, and should. Labor was able to put together its coalition in 1992 with Arab support. Israeli Jews did not contest that. But Israel was created to be not only democratic but a Jewish state whose fate and security were to be in Jewish hands, a truth that seems to embarrass the politically correct these days. Israeli Jews gave Mr. Netanyahu 60 percent of their ballots. In that critical political sense the election was not a squeaker but a landslide for Mr. Netanyahu.

87. Chomsky's stance on the P.L.O. and the Arab states of the Middle East -- despite common misrepresentations -- is long a matter of record. See for example, Noam Chomsky, *Peace in the Middle East? Reflections on Justice and Nationhood*, New York: Pantheon, 1974 (essay written in 1970-1972), pp. 99f, 108; Noam Chomsky, *Towards A New Cold War: Essays on the Current Crisis and How We Got There*, New York: Pantheon, 1982 (essay written in 1974), pp. 262, 430 n.2; Noam Chomsky, *Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians*, Boston: South End, 1983 (updated edition 1999), pp. 79, 164; Noam Chomsky, *Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies*, Boston: South End, 1989, p. 404 n.85; and elsewhere.

88. For Yermiya's book, see Dov Yermiya, *My War Diary: Lebanon June 5 -- July 1, 1982*, Boston: South End, 1984 (first published in Hebrew as *Yoman Hamilchama Sheli*, Jerusalem: Mifras Publishing House, 1983).

89. On popular opposition to Arafat among Palestinians before the Oslo Accords, see for example, Lamis Andoni, "Arafat and the P.L.O. in crisis," *Middle East International*, August 20, 1993, p. 3. An excerpt:

The P.L.O. is facing the worst crisis since its inception, as lack of funds and divisions over the peace process threaten to break apart the Organisation and the Palestinian negotiating team. Palestinian groups -- except for Fatah -- and independents are distancing themselves from the P.L.O. as they feel alienated from the decision-making process that is now confined to a shrinking clique around Yasir Arafat. . . . As the situation stands now, ten groups are functioning outside the P.L.O.

. . . .
A call by the leader of Fatah in Lebanon for Arafat to resign, even though the former carries little political weight, reflects the rapid disintegration of the mainstream group and Arafat's loss of support inside his own movement. The financial crisis of the P.L.O., which is mainly caused by the Gulf states cutting aid to the Palestinians, is fueling discontent among the Palestinians in the territories and the refugee camps in Jordan and Lebanon who are angered by reports of corruption and mismanagement. . . .

[M]any fear that the P.L.O. is rapidly collapsing. . . . At no point in the P.L.O.'s history has opposition to the leadership, and to Arafat himself, been as strong, while for the first time there is a growing feeling that safeguarding Palestinian national rights no longer hinges on defending the P.L.O.'s role. Many believe that it is the leadership's policies that are destroying Palestinian institutions and jeopardising Palestinian national rights. The speedy disintegration of the P.L.O.'s institutions and the steady erosion of the Organisation's constituency could render any breakthrough at the peace talks meaningless.

Shmuel Toledano [former Israeli Labor Party adviser on Arab affairs], "Talking to the P.L.O.," *Middle East International*, August 28, 1993, pp. 20-21 [reprinted from *Ha'aretz* (Israel), August 13, 1993]. An excerpt:

It is worth remembering here that members of the Palestinian delegation went to Tunis in order to submit their resignation for one reason: because they were not prepared to accept the P.L.O.'s orders to respond positively to the U.S. proposal. They were demanding a more extremist, negative line. Is this not another good reason to prefer direct talks with the Tunis P.L.O.?

. . . .In real terms, the P.L.O. and the Palestinians have long abandoned their dream of returning to Jaffa, Haifa, Lydda and Ramle. Now they are saying: "We are willing to refrain from exercising this right, although nobody can possibly disagree with the right itself." In a letter sent on 19 January 1991 by Nabil Sha'th, the chair of the P.L.O.'s political department, to Harold Saunders, then the U.S. Secretary of State's aide in Middle East Affairs, [Sha'th] said: "I have received a copy of the framework agreement. I am pleased to say that I have been authorised by the P.L.O. to adopt this document and support it as a valuable basis for future negotiations towards peace. . . ." Among other things, the document contains a chapter dealing with the right of return and with the refugees. It says on this subject: "The procedure towards the Palestinians who will wish to return to their homes or to receive compensation will be discussed during the peace process. A collective return of Palestinians to their homes is not envisaged."

Nadav Ha'etzni, *Ma'ariv* (Israel), August 29, 1993; Danny Rubinstein, *Ha'aretz* (Israel), August 24, 25, 27, 1993; Chris Hedges, "Palestinians' Reactions: Anger, Doubt and Hope," *New York Times*, September 10, 1993, p. A13 ("In a two-hour walk through the [Becca Palestinian refugee] camp there was not one photo or portrait of the P.L.O.

chairman visible"); James Whittington, "The Middle East: Anger in refugee camps at meagre offer of land; Opposition to Arafat is mounting," *Financial Times* (London), September 1, 1993, p. 4 ("there is open hostility or murderous undertones at the mention of Mr. Arafat's name"). See also, Shimon Peres, *Moked* (Israeli T.V.), September 1, 1993 [quoted in *News from Within* (Jerusalem), September 5, 1993] (the day the accords were announced, former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres described: "there has been a change in *them*, not *us*. We are not negotiating with the P.L.O., but only with a shadow of its former self").

90. On the Palestinian Authority's police force, see for example, Amnesty International, *Palestinian Authority: Prolonged political detention, torture and unfair trials*, December 1996 (A.I. Index: MDE 15/68/96). An excerpt (p. 8):

The Palestinian police force was recruited partly from Palestinians from the diaspora, including members of the Palestinian Liberation Army, the armed force of the P.L.O., and partly from local people from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Originally composed of 12,000 police, by July 1995 its number had risen to 20,000 and by September 1996 there were believed to be more than 40,000 police in different branches of the security forces. In the Gaza Strip, with about 20,000 police, there is one law enforcement officer for every 50 people, possibly the highest ratio of police to civil population in the world.

Human Rights Watch, *World Report 1997*, New York, 1996, pp. 293-294 (condemning abuses and repression by the P.L.O. security forces); B'Tselem [human rights organization], *Neither Law Nor Justice*, Jerusalem, August 1995 (also condemning abuses).

91. On the return of Russia to the standard Third World pattern in the 1990s, see chapter 5 of *U.P.* and its footnote 10.

92. On the savagery of European colonial expansion, see chapter 4 of *U.P.* and its footnote 72. On the general cultural level of Western Europe at the outset of the colonial period, see for example, Francis Jennings, *The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest*, New York: Norton, 1975. An excerpt (p. 3):

The Atlantic coast countries [of Europe] destined for overseas empire had little of Italy's artistic splendor or intellectual boldness. Spain and Portugal were deeply steeped in feudal institutions and customs. France's kings had only just won their long, debilitating contests with the kings of England and the dukes of Burgundy, and in England the Tudors had just begun to salvage what remained from the Wars of the Roses. However much may now be seen of germs and origins of modern times, the peoples of the springboard societies of western Europe knew only what they had grown up with, and that was still feudal in conception, in conduct, and in expectation.

When the Europeans began their astounding voyages to dazzling "new" worlds, they could carry only the freight they possessed; the ideas and institutions with which they conquered and colonized were the same they knew at home. On a thousand frontiers Europeans used the technology of superior ships and guns to gain beachheads; then they imposed on top of indigenous societies the devices best understood by the conquerors.

93. On the approximate populations of Europe and Africa at the start of colonization and centuries later, see for example, Fernand Braudel, *The Structures of*

Everyday Life: The Limits of the Possible -- Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century, Vol. I, New York: Harper and Row, 1979 (translation from the French 1981), p. 42 (citing population estimates for 1650 of 100 million in Africa and 100-103 million in Europe; for 1750 of 100 million in Africa and 140-144 million in Europe; for 1800 of 100 million in Africa and 187 million in Europe; for 1850 of 100 million in Africa and 266-274 million in Europe; and for 1900 of 120 million in Africa and 401-423 million in Europe. Note that Braudel himself questions the early estimates of 100 million for Africa).

94. On U.S. dismissal of the World Court's condemnation, see chapter 3 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 43, 44 and 45.

95. On John Jay's maxim, see the biography by Frank Monaghan, *John Jay: Defender of Liberty*, New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1935, p. 323.

96. For James Madison's statements, see Jonathan Elliot, ed., *The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, 1787* ("Yates's Minutes"), Philadelphia: Lippincott, 2nd edition, 1836 (reprinted in facsimile 1937). Madison argued (p. 450):

In England, at this day, if elections were open to all classes of people, the property of landed proprietors would be insecure. An agrarian law would soon take place. If these observations be just, our government ought to secure the permanent interests of the country against innovation. Landholders ought to have a share in the government, to support these invaluable interests and to balance and check the other. They ought to be so constituted as to protect the minority of the opulent against the majority. The Senate, therefore, ought to be this body.

Similarly, Madison declared ("James Madison: Note to his Speech on the Right of Suffrage," in Max Farrand, ed., *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966, Vol. III, p. 452):

An obvious and permanent division of every people is into owners of the Soil, and the other inhabitants. In a certain sense, the Country may be said to belong to the former. . . . Whatever may be the rights of others derived from their birth in the Country, from their interest in the high ways & other parcels left open for common use as well, as in the national Edifices and monuments; from their share in the public defence, and from their concurrent support of the Govt., it would seem unreasonable to extend the right so far as to give them when become the majority, a power of Legislation over the landed property without the consent of the proprietors.

In a June 1787 speech, perhaps influenced by Shays's rebellion -- a 1786-87 armed rebellion by debt-ridden Massachusetts farmers that was suppressed by force -- Madison gave the following warning (Richard Matthews, *If Men Were Angels: James Madison and the Heartless Empire of Reason*, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995, p. 80):

In framing a system which we wish to last for ages, we shd. not lose sight of the changes which ages will produce. An increase of population will of necessity increase the proportion of those who will labor under all the hardships of life, & secretly sigh for a more equal distribution of its blessings. These may in time outnumber those who are placed above the feelings of indigence. According to the laws of equal suffrage, the power will slide into the hands of the former. No agrarian attempts have yet been made in this Country, but symptoms of a levelling spirit, as

we have understood, have sufficiently appeared in a certain quarters [sic] to give warning of the future danger.

Madison elaborated further on this fear in 1829, commenting (p. 210):

That proportion being without property, or the hope of acquiring it, cannot be expected to sympathize sufficiently with its rights, to be safe depositories of power over them.

The most careful scholarly analysis concludes (Jennifer Nedelsky, *Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism: The Madisonian Framework and its Legacy*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990, p. 66):

In 1787 the importance of the rights of persons and the right to participate in the making of the laws were assumptions in the back of Madison's mind. The protection of property was the object he held steadily before him as he worked on the Constitution. This focus cast "the people," the future majority, in the role of a problem to be contained, and tipped the balance among the competing values he sought to implement.

The author notes that the same conception was accepted as a matter of course by almost all of the Framers, James Wilson being "the only one who declared that property was not the object of government" and "gave priority to what was seen by his colleagues as the major threat to property: the political liberty of the people" (p. 96). Chomsky adds that Thomas Jefferson took a similar position, but he had no direct role in these deliberations.

See also, Gordon Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic: 1776-1787*, New York: Norton, 1969, pp. 513-514 ("The Constitution was intrinsically an aristocratic document designed to check the democratic tendencies of the period," delivering power to a "better sort" of people and excluding "those who were not rich, well born, or prominent from exercising political power"); Lance Banning, *The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison and the Founding of the Federal Republic*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995, p. 245 (the author, who strongly affirms Madison's dedication to popular rule, nevertheless concurs with Gordon Wood's assessment of the Constitutional design, quoted above).

97. On Madison's original assumptions and his subsequent recognition of their delusional nature, see for example, Jennifer Nedelsky, *Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism: The Madisonian Framework and its Legacy*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990, pp. 42-51; Lance Banning, *The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison and the Founding of the Federal Republic*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995, p. 203; Richard Matthews, *If Men Were Angels: James Madison and the Heartless Empire of Reason*, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995, pp. 184, 189 n.32; Robert A. Rutland et al., eds., *The Papers of James Madison*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977, Vol. 10, p. 213 (Madison's language about the "enlightened Statesman, or the benevolent philosopher," was from a 1787 letter to Thomas Jefferson).

These scholars recount Madison's hope that it would be the "enlightened Statesman" and "benevolent philosopher" who would share in the exercise of power in the political system he designed. Ideally "pure and noble," these "men of intelligence, patriotism, property and independent circumstances" would be a "chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interests of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial

considerations." They would thus "refine" and "enlarge" the "public views," guarding the public interest against the "mischiefs" of democratic majorities.

Madison soon learned differently, and by 1792 he warned that the Hamiltonian developmental capitalist state would be a government "substituting the motive of private interest in place of public duty," leading to "a real domination of the few under an apparent liberty of the many." As Madison put it in a letter to Jefferson (Nedelsky, pp. 44-45):

[M]y imagination will not attempt to set bounds to the daring depravity of the times. The stock-jobbers will become the pretorian band of the Government, at once its tool and its tyrant; bribed by its largesses and overawing it by its clamours and combinations.

98. For Madison's recommendation that the population should always remain fragmented, see his famous *Federalist* Paper No. 10, first published in 1788. An excerpt:

The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. . . . To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of [a majoritarian] faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed. . . . By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. . . . Extend the sphere [of the society] and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength and to act in unison with each other. . . .

The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it.

99. On scientists' warnings about the greenhouse effect in the early 1970s, see for example footnote 46 of chapter 2 of *U.P.*

Chapter Nine

Movement Organizing

1. For the companion book to the documentary, see Mark Achbar, ed., *Manufacturing Consent: Noam Chomsky and the Media*, Montreal: Black Rose, 1994 (includes videotape ordering information). Chomsky also explained why he has not seen the film in an interview with *Movie Guide* (p. 11):

I haven't seen it and I don't intend to. There are several reasons, some of them are merely personal. I mean I just don't like to hear or see myself because I think about how I should have done it differently. There's also a more general reason. I'm very uneasy about the whole project. For one thing, no matter how much they try, and I'm sure they did try, the impression it gives, and I can tell that from the reviews, is the personalization of the issues. That's the wrong question for a number of reasons.

I can begin with the very title of the film. The title of the film is *Manufacturing Consent*. The title is taken from a book, a book written by Edward Herman and me. And if you look at the book, you'll find his name comes first. Well, his name came first at my insistence . . . for the simple reason that he did most of the book. And in fact, most of the things people write about in the reviews of the film are his work. Here we already begin to see what's wrong. These are all cooperative activities and they shouldn't be personalized and associated with one individual. . . . And if the impression is given that there's some leader or spokesman or something like that organizing, galvanizing things, that's absolutely the wrong lesson. The lesson there is follow your leader. The lesson ought to be: take your life into your own hands.

2. For some of Bertrand Russell's political writings, see among other titles, *Principles of Social Reconstruction* (1916); *Political Ideals* (1917); *Proposed Roads to Freedom: Socialism, Anarchism and Syndicalism* (1918); *The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism* (1920); and *The Prospects of Industrial Civilization* (1923). See also, Noam Chomsky, *Problems of Knowledge and Freedom: The Russell Lectures*, New York: Pantheon, 1971; Barry Feinberg and Ronald Kasrils, *Bertrand Russell's America: A Documented Account*, Boston: South End, 1983.

3. Chomsky appeared on the cable television talk show *Pozner & Donahue* on April 20 and 22, 1993, from 9 to 10 p.m. Phil Donahue was quite sympathetic, except regarding sports:

DONAHUE: There's a part of the documentary which has you on the podium, reliving the experience of going to a high school football game when you were in high school. And you sat there and you said, "Why do I care about this team? I don't even know anybody on the team." Here, Professor Chomsky, you go too far. You are cranky, you're anti-fun. We wonder if you ever knew the experience of a hot dog with mustard and a cold beer. And it is much easier, then, to dismiss you as the Ebenezer Scrooge of social commentary. Go away. You're not a happy man. You're scolding us for rooting for the high school football team.

CHOMSKY: I should say, I continued to go root for the high school football team -- the reason I bring it up is, it's a case of how we can somehow live with this strange dissonance. I mean, you conform to the society around you, and you're part of it, and you have the hot dog and you cheer for the football team. And in another corner of your mind you notice, "This is insane. What do I care whether this . . ."

DONAHUE: *What* is insane?

CHOMSKY: What do I care whether this group of professional athletes wins or that group of professional athletes wins? None of them have anything to do with me.

DONAHUE: I don't know. I grew up with the Indians [baseball team], I was a kid in Cleveland . . . it was a social experience, it was the smell, this huge Cleveland stadium. . . . Those are memories. What's wrong with this? Why wouldn't you want to celebrate this?

CHOMSKY: I did the same thing. I can remember the first baseball game I saw when I was 10 years old, I can tell you what happened at it -- fine. But that's not my point. See, if you want to enjoy a football game, that's great. You want to enjoy a baseball game, that's great. Why do you care who wins? Why do you care who wins? Why do you have to associate yourself with a particular group of professionals, who you are told are your representatives, and they better win or else you're going to commit suicide, when they're perfectly interchangeable with the other group of professionals. . . .

DONAHUE: You had a relative in New York City who had a kiosk which wasn't quite on the main street, it was behind the train station. And God knows what kind of radical literature he was selling. And you're there, this little kid listening in -- no wonder you grew up to be such a radical who doesn't like high school football.

CHOMSKY: Unfortunately, I did like it. I'm sorry for that.

On Chomsky's views about the role of spectator sports in society, see chapter 3 of *U.P.*

4. For the *New York Times's* review, see Vincent Canby, "Superimposing Frills On a Provocative Career," *New York Times*, March 17, 1993, p. C17 (a subheading listed the film's title as "*Manufacturing Consent and the Media*"). The exact words of the paragraph in question:

Whether or not you agree with Mr. Chomsky's conclusions, his reading of the American scene is persuasive: that the government is most responsive to the wishes expressed by the minority of citizens who vote, which is also one of the principal points made by John Kenneth Galbraith in his recent book *The Culture of Contentment*. As Mr. Chomsky sees it, his mission is to wake up and activate the electorate.

5. On the "Propaganda Model," see chapter 1 of *U.P.* and especially its footnotes 35, 44 and 67. On the case of East Timor, see chapter 8 of *U.P.*

6. Chomsky considers the London *Financial Times* perhaps the best newspaper in the world for these purposes. He cautions, however, that while there are "occasional flashes of honesty in the business press, I would not want to imply that businessmen are free from the cant of much academic scholarship" (*Towards A New Cold War: Essays On The Current Crisis And How We Got There*, New York: Pantheon, 1982, p. 107).

A summary of useful business publications in the U.S. is in Nancy Folbre and The Center for Popular Economics, *The New Field Guide to the U.S. Economy*, New York: New Press, 1995, section T.1:

The major publications of the business press, including *The Wall Street Journal*, *Fortune*, *Forbes*, and *Barron's*, are all useful, but *Business Week* usually offers the most systematic analysis of economic trends. For a distinctly anticorporate approach, see *The Left Business Observer* (250 West 85th Street, New York, NY, 10024, 212-874-4020, www.panix.com/~dhenwood/LBO-home.html). . . . Short, interesting, and very useful articles about current economic events are published monthly in *Dollars and Sense*, by the Economic Affairs Bureau, Inc., 1 Summer Street, Somerville, MA, 02143 (617-628-8411, www.dollarsandsense.org). More academic yet accessible articles are published bi-monthly in *Challenge: The Magazine of Economic Affairs* (80 Business Park Drive, Armonk, NY, 10504, www.mesharpe.com/cha_main.htm). . . . The two best sources of general economic data are the *Statistical Abstract of the U.S.*, published by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, and *The Economic Report of the President*, published by the President's Council of Economic Advisors . . . Catalogs of [these and other] Government Printing Office publications are available from the Superintendent of Documents, Stop S.M., Washington, DC, 20402. . . . The Center for Popular Economics provides workshops on economic literacy, international economics, and urban economic issues [P.O. Box 785, Amherst, MA, 01004, (413) 545-0743, www.populareconomics.org].

For an informative discussion of various concrete strategies of media activism, see "A Call to Media Activism: Interview with Jeff Cohen [founder of Fairness and Accuracy In Reporting]," in Martin A. Lee and Norman Solomon, *Unreliable Sources: A Guide to Detecting Bias in News Media*, New York: Lyle Stuart, 1990, pp. 340-358.

7. The movie includes the following interchange on "concision" from an interview with the producer of the current-affairs T.V. program *Nightline*, Jeff Greenfield, conducted by Jeff Hanson of W.O.R.T. Community Radio in Madison, WI:

HANSON: What about just in the selection of guests to analyze things. Why is Noam Chomsky never on *Nightline*?

GREENFIELD: I couldn't begin to tell you.

HANSON: He's one of the leading intellectuals in the entire world.

GREENFIELD: I have no idea. I mean, I can make some guesses. He may be one of the leading intellectuals who can't talk on television. You know, that's a standard that's very important to us. If you've got a 22 minute show, and a guy takes five minutes to warm up -- now I don't know whether Chomsky does or not -- he's out. One of the reasons why *Nightline* has the "usual suspects" [a reference to the media-monitoring group Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting's study of the program's guest-list, "All the Usual Suspects: McNeil-Lehrer and *Nightline*"] is that one of the things you have to do when you book a show is know that the person can make the point within the framework of television. And if people don't like that, they should understand that it's about as sensible to book somebody who will take eight minutes to give an answer as it is to book somebody who doesn't speak English. But in the normal give and flow, that's another culture-bound thing: we've got to have English-speaking people. We also need concision.

[The film then cuts to Chomsky speaking at Georgetown University, commenting:]

CHOMSKY: So Greenfield or whatever his name is hit the nail on the head. The U.S. media are alone in that you must meet the condition of "concision" -- you've got to say things between two commercials or in 600 words. And that's a very important fact, because the beauty of concision -- you know, saying a couple of sentences between 2 commercials -- the beauty of that is you can only repeat conventional thoughts. . . .

Suppose I get up on *Nightline*, I'm given whatever it is, two minutes, and I say Qaddafi is a terrorist and Khomeini is a murderer, the Russians invaded Afghanistan, all this sort of stuff -- I don't need any evidence, everybody just nods. On the other hand, suppose you say something that just isn't repeating conventional pieties. Suppose you say something that's the least bit unexpected or controversial. Suppose you say, "The biggest international terror operations that are known are the ones that are run out of Washington." [The film then cuts to a series of such statements, spoken at different locations.] Suppose you say, "What happened in the 1980s is the U.S. government was driven underground." Suppose I say, "The United States is invading South Vietnam" -- as it was. "The best political leaders are the ones who are lazy and corrupt." "If the Nuremberg laws were applied, then every post-war American President would have been hanged." "The Bible is probably the most genocidal book in our total canon." "Education is a system of imposed ignorance." "There's no more morality in world affairs, fundamentally, than there was at the time of Ghengis Kahn, there are just different factors to be concerned with."

You know, people will quite reasonably expect to know what you mean. Why did you say that? I never heard that before. If you said that you better have a reason, you better have some evidence, and in fact you better have a lot of evidence, because that's a pretty startling comment. You can't give evidence if you're stuck with concision. That's the genius of this structural constraint.

For Fairness and Accuracy In Reporting's studies of *Nightline*, see William Hoynes and David Croteau, *A Special F.A.I.R. Report: Are You on the Nightline Guest List? An Analysis of 40 Months of Nightline Programming*, Boston: Boston College, 1989; F.A.I.R., *All the Usual Suspects: MacNeil-Lehrer and Nightline*, New York, 1990 (finding that, in most respects, the guest-list of the so-called "public" television program *MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour* included an even narrower segment of the political spectrum than did *Nightline's*).

8. On public opposition in the U.S. to war in the Persian Gulf before the bombing started, see chapter 5 of *U.P.* and its footnote 92.

9. On Iraq's rejected peace proposals before the Gulf War, see chapter 5 of *U.P.* and its footnote 88.

10. On 83 percent of the American public believing that the economic system is inherently unfair, see for example, John Dillin, "Voters Angry As Delegates Convene," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 14, 1992, p. 1. An excerpt:

Each year since 1966, [pollster Louis] Harris has measured the number of Americans who feel alienated from the nation's economic, political, and social institutions. In his most recent survey, taken in late 1991, Harris's index hit an all-time high -- 66 percent. . . .

Humphrey Taylor, president of Louis Harris and Associates, says 83 percent of Americans agree with the statement that "the rich are getting richer and the poor are

getting poorer." People are saying, "The economic system is inherently unfair," Mr. Taylor says.

For similar polls, see for example, Everett Carl Ladd, "The 1994 Congressional Elections: The Postindustrial Realignment Continues," *Political Science Quarterly*, Spring 1995, pp. 1-24 at p. 13 (82 percent of the U.S. population believes that "[t]he government is run for benefit of the few and the special interests, not the people"; this article also includes a chart that tracks declining public trust in government from 1958 to 1994, peaking at 78 percent in the early 1960s and decreasing below 22 percent after 1994); "America, Land Of The Shaken," *Business Week*, March 11, 1996, pp. 64-65 (reporting a *Business Week*/Harris Poll which found that by "a stunning 95%-to-5% majority" Americans believe that corporations "should sometimes sacrifice some profit for the sake of making things better for their workers and communities"; 71 percent feel that "Business has gained too much power over too many aspects of American life," with 72 percent believing that "business has benefited more than consumers from government deregulation"; and "Fully 67% say the American dream is getting further out of reach"); Richard Morin, Dan Balz, Steven Pearlstein, Thomas B. Edsall, Paul Taylor, and David S. Broder, Various Titles, *Washington Post*, January 28 to February 4, 1996, p. A1 (six-part series on Americans' declining faith in institutions and government). See also chapter 1 of *U.P.* and its footnote 42; chapter 2 of *U.P.* and its footnote 59; and footnotes 44 and 45 of this chapter.

11. For the poll on Marx's dictum, see Laurence H. Tribe, "To Praise the Constitution or to Bury It?," in "A More Perfect Union," *Boston Globe Magazine Special Supplement*, September 13, 1987, pp. 8-9.

See also, Vicente Navarro, "The 1984 Election and the New Deal: An Alternative Interpretation (2 parts)," *Social Policy*, Spring and Summer 1985, pp. 3-10, 7-17, at Spring issue p. 9 (reporting that Presidential candidate Gary Hart's pollsters found in 1975 that "the overwhelming majority" of the American population believes that "workers, employees, and community residents should control the [business] enterprises located in their communities," though "socialism" is advocated by virtually no one).

12. On the poll about Dan Quayle and Murphy Brown, see for example, Mark Lundgren, "Quayle Loses In All Categories," *San Francisco Chronicle*, June 1, 1992, p. D3 (the Gallup Poll was conducted for the magazine *Entertainment Weekly*, and found that Americans would prefer Brown as President by 40 to 38 percent).

13. On rising public disillusionment and alienation from institutions, see chapter 2 of *U.P.* and its footnote 59; and footnotes 10, 44 and 45 of this chapter. See also chapter 1 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 7 and 42; and chapter 10 of *U.P.* and its footnote 18.

14. The book referred to is Lancelot Hogben, *Mathematics for the Million*, New York: Norton, 1968 (original 1937).

15. For Muste's political writings, including those concerning his work at the Brookwood Labor College north of New York City beginning in 1921, see for example, Nat Hentoff, ed., *The Essays of A.J. Muste*, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967, pp. 84-154, especially pp. 179-185. See also, Noam Chomsky, "The Revolutionary Pacifism of

A.J. Muste: On the Backgrounds of the Pacific War," in *American Power And The New Mandarins: Historical and Political Essays*, New York: Pantheon, 1967, pp. 159-220.

16. For a sample of Dewey's statements about industrial democracy, see for example, Robert Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991. An excerpt (pp. 442, 440, 453):

Democratization remained at bottom a question of power for Dewey, and the redistribution of power was the first priority of the social-democratic proposals he advanced: "Power today resides in control of the means of production, exchange, publicity, transportation and communication. Whoever owns them rules the life of the country, not necessarily by intention, not necessarily by deliberate corruption of the nominal government, but by necessity. Power is power and must act, and it must act according to the nature of the machinery through which it operates. In this case, the machinery is business for private profit through private control of banking, land, industry, reinforced by command of the press, press agents and other means of publicity and propaganda. In order to restore democracy, one thing and one thing only is essential. The people will rule when they have power, and they will have power in the degree they own and control the land, the banks, the producing and distributing agencies of the nation. Ravings about Bolshevism, Communism, Socialism are irrelevant to the axiomatic truth of this statement. They come either from complaisant ignorance or from the deliberate desire of those in possession, power and rule to perpetuate their privilege. . . ."

"As long as politics is the shadow cast on society by big business, the attenuation of the shadow will not change the substance. . . ." "The ultimate problem of production," he commented, "is the production of human beings. To this end, the production of goods is intermediate and auxiliary. It is by this standard that the present system stands condemned. 'Security' is a means, and although an indispensable social means, is not the end. . . . The means have to be implemented for the production of free human beings associating with one another on terms of equality."

17. For the "Wagner" or National Labor Relations Act, see 29 U.S.C. §§151-169. The Act promoted collective bargaining through independent unions, establishing a code of fair practices and creating a new National Labor Relations Board to determine bargaining rights and hear charges of unfair labor practices. Other legislation also outlawed such traditional employer weapons as the blacklist, the yellow-dog contract (by which workers agree as a condition of employment not to be in a union), and company unions.

18. On President Franklin Roosevelt being a conservative rather than a crusader for labor, see for example, Walter Karp, *Indispensable Enemies: The Politics of Misrule in America*, New York: Saturday Review, 1973, pp. 109-128 (describing how Roosevelt was concerned primarily with helping bankers and businessmen, rather than the "ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished" sectors of the population); Robert Collins, *The Business Response to Keynes, 1929-1964*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1981, especially pp. 27-30; Thomas Ferguson, *Golden Rule: The Investment Theory of Party Competition and the Logic of Money-Driven Political Systems*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995, chs. 2 and 4. See also chapter 10 of *U.P.* and its footnote 94.

19. A more detailed explanation of "proportional representation" is in Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, *On Democracy: Toward a Transformation of American Society*, New York: Penguin, 1983, pp. 157-158:

A system of proportional representation is a system in which the votes of participating citizens are directly reflected in the composition of legislative bodies. Such a system can be clarified by its contrast with the "winner take all" balloting and representation procedure in the United States. In the United States, for example, if 50 percent of the participating electorate vote for a Democratic candidate for the House of Representatives, 40 percent vote for a Republican, and the remaining 10 percent divide their votes among a variety of lesser parties, then the Democratic candidate wins the seat. The winner takes all. If the results above were consistent across districts, a Democrat would win in each district, and the composition of the House would be 100 percent Democratic. If the same pattern of voting obtained within a pure proportional representation system, on the other hand, then the composition of the legislative body would be 50 percent Democratic and 40 percent Republican, with 10 percent of the seats divided among the lesser parties. The overall pattern of voting would thus actually be reflected in the composition of the legislature.

It is common for states to impose minimal barriers to representation within proportional representation schemes. The Federal Republic of Germany, for example, has a "5 percent rule," meaning that to have any representation within the Bundestag a party must garner at least 5 percent of the national vote. Even on such modified plans, however, what distinguishes proportional systems of representation from "winner take all" systems is the way in which the votes of participating citizens are aggregated to social decisions. Within the "winner take all" systems like that featured in the United States, the final distribution of representation (Democrats versus Republicans versus other parties) may not and usually does not reflect the aggregate levels of support for different representing parties. Within a proportional representation system, the procedure for allocating seats comes closer to providing the basis for a distribution of representation that does reflect these aggregate levels of support. By providing representation for political parties that do not win majorities in any single district, a proportional representation system removes a formidable obstacle to the formation of "third parties," and thus helps to ensure representation of minority views.

20. For Madison's use of the term "parchment barrier," see for example, Richard Matthews, *If Men Were Angels: James Madison and the Heartless Empire of Reason*, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995, pp. 128, 135.

21. Chomsky remarks about Clinton's 1993 health care reform initiatives (*World Orders Old and New*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, p. 90):

The Clinton administration sought health reforms, but keeping strictly to two essential conditions: (1) the outcome must be radically regressive [i.e. with a disproportionately negative impact on poorer people], unlike tax- or even wage-based programs; and (2) large insurance companies must remain in control, adding substantially to the costs of health care with their huge advertising expenditures, high executive salaries, and profits, along with the costs of their intricate bureaucratic mechanisms. . . . The code phrase used to disguise these obstacles to a far more equitable and efficient government-run plan is that the latter is "politically impossible." The considerable popular support for some variety of national health care is therefore irrelevant.

See also, Vicente Navarro, ed., *Why the United States Does Not Have a National Health Program*, Amityville, NY: Baywood, 1992; Nancy Watzman, "Labor's Misdiagnosis: U.S. Labor and the Fight for National Health Care," *Multinational Monitor*, Vol. 13, No. 5, May 1992, pp. 9-12. An excerpt:

More than \$756 billion -- over 13 percent of the G.N.P. -- is being paid out yearly in health care, and 37 million U.S. citizens are uninsured. . . . The single-payer system, in place in Canada since the late 1960s, severs the link between employment and health care by setting up a national plan that provides health services to all citizens. It makes the federal government the only provider of health insurance, and eliminates all private health insurance. It is the most radical waste-reducing type of plan, eliminating the bloated administrative costs from which the United States currently suffers. In Canada, there is no need for legions of actuaries furiously laboring to calculate whether or not to deny coverage to someone with diabetes: every citizen is covered by the national health insurance program. Canadians pay only 11 cents on the dollar for administrative costs associated with health-care provision; U.S. citizens pay up to 24 cents. Another measure of the single-payer system's cost-slashing success: Blue Cross of Massachusetts covers 2.7 million subscribers and employs 6,680 people, more than are employed in all of Canada's provincial health programs, which insure 26 million Canadians. . . .

[T]he issue of health-care reform is the hottest it has been since the 1960s, when the American Medical Association (A.M.A.) beat back a movement for national health care and the nation got Medicaid and Medicare instead.

Robin Toner, "Poll Says Public Favors Changes in Health Policy," *New York Times*, April 6, 1993, p. A1 ("Fifty-nine percent of the respondents [in the U.S.] said they favored a different model, one that Mr. Clinton has rejected: a Canadian-style system of national health insurance paid for with tax money"). Chomsky underscores about this poll that the figure of 59 percent "is remarkably high, given near-unanimous government-media dismissal of this option, which is off the agenda."

22. Questioned in an interview with David Barsamian, Chomsky made an additional important point about boycotts and activism directed at corporate practices (*The Common Good*, Tucson, AZ: Odonian, 1998, p. 60):

BARSAMIAN: There's quite a bit of activism against sweatshops that profit transnationals like The Gap, Disney, Nike, Reebok, etc. Do you think these campaigns are getting to systemic issues?

CHOMSKY: I think they're really good campaigns. To ask whether they're getting to systemic issues is, I think, misleading -- the kind of question that undermined a lot of traditional Marxist politics. Systemic questions grow out of people learning more and more about how the world works, step-by-step. If you become aware that people in Haiti are being paid a couple of cents an hour to make money for rich people here, that ultimately -- and maybe a lot sooner than ultimately -- leads to questions about the structure of power in general.

23. For the estimate that 30 percent of the world's population is unemployed, see for example, G. Pascal Zachary, "Study Predicts Rising Global Joblessness," *Wall Street Journal*, February 22, 1995, p. A2 ("the World Employment 1995 report, issued by the International Labor Organization, a United Nations affiliate that advocates worker rights . . . estimates that 30% of the world's labor force of about 2.5 billion people is either unemployed or underemployed"). See also, World Bank, *World Development Report*

1990, Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 1 ("more than one billion people in the developing world are living in poverty," which is defined as "struggling to survive on less than \$370 a year").

On the unemployment rate in the U.S. during the Great Depression, see footnote 7 of chapter 3 of *U.P.*

24. For *Business Week's* article, see Aaron Bernstein, "Why America Needs Unions But Not the Kind It Has Now," *Business Week*, May 23, 1994, p. 70. An excerpt:

Few American managers have ever accepted the right of unions to exist, even though that's guaranteed by the 1935 Wagner Act. Over the past dozen years, in fact, U.S. industry has conducted one of the most successful antiunion wars ever, illegally firing thousands of workers for exercising their rights to organize. The chilling effect: Elections to form a union are running at half the 7,000-a-year pace of the 1970s. And major strikes -- involving 1,000 or more workers -- have fallen from 200-plus a year to 35 in 1993. . . .

[E]mployers illegally fired 1 of every 36 union supporters during organization drives in the late 1980s, vs. 1 in 110 in the late '70s and 1 in 209 in the late '60s. . . . Unlawful firings occurred in one-third of all representation elections in the late '80s, vs. 8% in the late '60s. . . . "Even more than the numbers is the perception of risk among workers, who think they'll be fired in an organizing campaign," says Harvard law professor Paul C. Weiler. Indeed, when managements obey the law, they don't defeat unions nearly as often. Union membership in the public sector, where federal, state, and local officials don't try so desperately to break or avoid unions, has risen by 23% since 1983, to 7 million last year. The excuse on which industry based its assault -- that U.S. labor costs were out of line internationally -- was largely a bogus issue: Such comparisons sprang mostly from the ultrastrong dollar. Now that it's lower again, U.S. wages are below Europe's and Japan's.

Business Week concludes:

[U]nions will need to adopt a "we're-in-this-together" mentality instead of the "us-vs.-them" one that has characterized both sides of the industrial divide for decades.

For further discussion of the U.S. government's refusal to protect worker-safety and union rights, see Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, *Right Turn: The Decline of the Democrats and the Future of American Politics*, New York: Hill and Wang, 1986, ch. 4. An excerpt (pp. 134-135, 253-254 n.47, 135, 131):

[At the Occupational Safety and Health Administration,] enforcement of existing law dropped precipitously, while the development of new workplace standards came to a virtual halt. Over the F.Y. 1980-1985 period, O.S.H.A. complaint inspections declined 58 percent, while follow-up inspections declined 87 percent. Citations for violations of the act also fell, dropping 50 percent for serious violations, 91 percent for willful violations, and 65 percent for repeat violations. At the bottom line, total penalties (including both state and federal programs) dropped 78 percent, while failure-to-abate penalties fell 91 percent. . . .

Policy changes at the [National Labor Relations Board] were even more dramatic. Especially after consolidating a solid majority of Reagan appointees in 1983, the Board began making major changes in basic labor-law doctrine -- all in the direction of favoring management over unions. During the first five months of 1984 alone, it altered long-standing policy in a slew of lead cases. . . . [For example, in] *Bekker Industries Corp.*, 268 N.L.R.B. No. 147 (February 16, 1984), it upheld the discharge of an employee who refused to work in a plant half a mile from the site of a chemical explosion, although local authorities had evacuated all residents living within a five-

mile radius of the accident. In *L.E. Meyers Company*, 270 N.L.R.B. No. 146 (May 31, 1984), it upheld the discharge of two employees who had refused to climb a forty-foot ladder to an I-beam on a day when snow had fallen, even though a fellow worker had already slipped on the ladder. In *Asplundh Tree Expert Co.*, 269 N.L.R.B. No. 63 (March 22, 1984), the Board ruled that a worker's protest of his supervisor's failure to get medical attention for a co-worker who had been injured by a downed power line constituted quitting. The protest consisted of the worker's throwing his hard hat to the ground and refusing the employer's instruction to pick it up. This, the Board ruled, indicated that he had "opted to forsake employment."

Similarly, the Board has helped further erode the law governing employer conduct during [unionization] election campaigns by interpreting standing doctrine on threats and reprisals in interesting new ways. In *Bardcor Corp.*, 270 N.L.R.B. No. 157 (June 7, 1984), for example, it found that an employer who went through his plant taking pictures of employees shortly after learning that an organizing drive had begun, and whose supervisor told workers that the employer did this because he wanted to have a picture to "remember" them by, was engaged in harmless activity, while in *Benchmark Industries, Inc.*, 270 N.L.R.B. No. 8 (April 30, 1984) it held that an employer who told an employee that "a little birdie told me" the employee was handing out union authorization cards (normally 30 percent of the members of a unit have to sign such cards before a representation election will be conducted by the N.L.R.B.) was not engaged in intimidation.

A favorite Board tactic in finding anti-union activity legal was to find that activity motivated by purely economic concerns or part of the reserved managerial prerogatives of business. In *Garrett Flexible Products, Inc.*, 270 N.L.R.B. No. 173 (June 13, 1984), for example, it held that an employer's firing of laid-off union supporters was legal, because it was covered by a company policy of terminating all workers laid off for more than 120 days. The Board concluded this despite the fact that this "policy" had never been previously announced to workers, and the Administrative Law Judge had found the company representative who testified on it "vague and unsure" about its origins and unable to name with certainty the other firms where he claimed it was standard practice. In *Royal Coal Sprinklers, Inc.*, 268 N.L.R.B. No. 156 (February 21, 1984), it found layoffs of employees who had voted a week before to bring in a union justified on economic grounds, even though the employer had granted wage increases the week before that. The list could go on and on. . . .

In addition to being the most anti-union Board in history, the Reagan N.L.R.B. soon became the least efficient. The case backlog, or number of contested cases awaiting decision by the Board, grew dramatically. . . .

Over Reagan's first term, [the Environmental Protection Agency's] overall budget was reduced by 35 percent (a cut of 50 percent was proposed), enforcement against strip-mine violations declined by 62 percent, prosecution of hazardous-waste violations declined 50 percent, and [Food and Drug Administration] regulation enforcement declined 88 percent. Exposure limits on hazardous chemicals were raised above previous E.P.A. levels, sometimes on the order of 10 to 100 times. The number of "emergency exemptions" for business for restrictions on pesticide use more than tripled (in 1982, better than 97 percent of business requests for such exemptions were approved by E.P.A.).

See also, House Committee on Education and Labor, Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations, *The Failure of Labor Law -- A Betrayal of American Workers*,

98th Congress, 2nd Session, 1984, Rept. 98, pp. 17-22. And see footnotes 72, 81 and 101 of chapter 10 of *U.P.*

25. For the Federal law prohibiting discrimination against employees on the basis of union activities, see 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(3).

26. On the I.L.O.'s censure of the United States concerning the Caterpillar strike, see for example, John Hoerr, "Is the Strike Dead?," *American Prospect*, Summer 1992, pp. 106-118. An excerpt (p. 113):

[O]ther countries are questioning America's commitment to this basic worker right [i.e. to strike]. Legal experts at the International Labor Organization did so in 1991 in a ruling on a complaint filed by the A.F.L.-C.I.O. Although the United States has ratified only a few I.L.O. conventions on workplace standards, as a member-country it is obligated to uphold two principles that are written into the I.L.O. constitution. These are freedom of association and the right to organize and bargain collectively; the right to strike is considered crucial to these two principles. The A.F.L.-C.I.O.'s complaint charged that the United States is violating these principles by allowing the use of permanent replacements. The Bush administration and an employer group disputed the charge. The I.L.O.'s Committee on Freedom of Association reviewed the evidence submitted by both sides and issued a ruling in 1991. Even in the mushy language typically used by I.L.O. bodies to avoid angering member-countries, the committee's decision clearly supported the A.F.L.-C.I.O. complaint. The right to strike is "not really guaranteed when a worker who exercises it legally runs the risk of seeing his or her job taken up permanently by another worker, just as legally," the committee said. It recommended that the United States consider whether the striker replacement policy is eroding the right to strike. . . . The only other major industrial nation that allows the use of permanent replacements is South Africa.

See also, Stephen Franklin, Peter Kendall, and Colin McMahon, "Downshifting: Blue collar blues," *Chicago Tribune*, September 10, 1992, p. 1, zone C (part five of a series focusing on the Caterpillar strike in the context of the changing world economy). An excerpt:

[Caterpillar's] threat to use replacement workers was only one of many by U.S. companies. According to the General Accounting Office, an arm of Congress, U.S. companies were much more likely to threaten strikers with replacement workers in the 1980s and 1990s than ever before in this century. . . . Partly due to the fear of replacement workers, many other union leaders have avoided strikes in recent years. Only 40 major strikes occurred in 1991, matching the post-World War II low set three years earlier. . . .

In 1985 and 1989, according to the General Accounting Office, employers threatened to use replacement workers in one-third of all strikes. According to the Bureau of National Affairs, U.S. companies used replacement workers in 17 percent of the 407 strikes it studied in 1990, replacing a total of 11,500 union members. A year later, according to the private research firm, businesses used replacements in 14 percent of the 322 strikes studied, putting 2,000 union members out of their jobs. . . . These companies were able to bring in replacement workers in part because pro-union sentiment fell off dramatically after the 1970s.

And see footnotes 72 and 81 of chapter 10 of *U.P.*

American courts sometimes have been frank about their contributions to the campaign to roll back labor rights. For example, denying an appeal by workers who had

lost their jobs when Ohio plants were moved to states with cheaper labor, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated in *Allen et al. v. Diebold, Inc.*, 33 F.3d 674, 677, 679 (6th Cir. 1994):

Unlike law and social policy in many European countries, the laws of the United States do not prohibit or seriously discourage these plant closing and relocation activities and the attendant dislocation, unemployment and new employment. States and counties in the United States compete with each other for companies contemplating relocation. Labor laws like the National Labor Relations Act do not discourage such relocations or prohibit the closing of a unionized plant in one part of the country and the opening of a nonunion plant in another part of the country or in a foreign country. The North American Free Trade Agreement contemplates such relocations. . . .

The basic problem with plaintiffs' case is that the Congress and the courts in interpreting our labor laws and our law of contract have made the social judgment, rightly or wrongly, that our capitalistic system, Darwinian though it may be, will not discourage companies from locating on the basis of their own calculations of factors relating to efficiency and competitiveness. The rules of the marketplace govern. By so reflecting commercial interests, the institutions of government serve -- according to current legal and economic theory -- the long-term best interests of society as a whole. That is the basic social policy the country has opted to follow.

Chomsky comments ("Rollback: IV," *Z Magazine*, May 1995, pp. 18-24 at p. 22):

The candor is unusual, though the deception is typical. "The country" has "opted" for no such course, and it is radically false that "the rules of the marketplace govern" or that the system is "Darwinian" (in the intended sense of "social Darwinism," which has little to do with biology) -- except, of course, for the poor and the weak, who are indeed subjected to these rules by those who cast their usual shadow by means of Congress and the courts.

On the realities of the marketplace and social-Darwinian illusions about them, see chapter 7 of *U.P.*

On the U.S. media's coverage and portrayal of unions, see William J. Puette, *Through Jaundiced Eyes: How the Media View Organized Labor*, Ithaca: I.L.R. Press of Cornell University, 1992.

27. On Clinton's fruitless promise to stop the hiring of permanent replacement workers, see for example, Jack Germond and Jules Witcover, "Labor dealt blow again in defeat of striker bill," *Baltimore Sun*, July 15, 1994, p. 2A.

For the existing law prohibiting the practice, see 29 U.S.C. §157 (note that while striking to protest "unfair labor practices" is a protected act, striking for "economic" reasons is not).

28. For an article in the British press comparing the new "renewal" requirement for union check-offs to one for banks, see Seumas Milne, "Unions Count Cost of Legal Challenge," *Guardian* (U.K.), May 24, 1994, p. 18.

29. Between 1900 and 1920, Washington had the nation's largest African-American community and its "Uptown" neighborhood (now called "Shaw") boasted the best black educational institutions in America: Howard University and top high schools. Dunbar High School was the first and most prestigious high school for African-Americans in the country. Accomplished scholars took jobs at Dunbar, because there

were so few other employment opportunities in any field. Moreover, the federal government paid black teachers in Washington the same as white teachers, making Dunbar's faculty among the highest-paid African-Americans in the nation. Most of the students that finished Dunbar High School went to college, many at Ivy League schools. Around 1900, Dunbar's students scored higher on standardized tests than students at D.C.'s two white high schools. (Discussed in the 1999 documentary film "Duke Ellington's Washington," by Hedrick Smith et al.)

30. On the vast size of pension funds and the ways that they are invested by financial managers, see for example, Nancy Folbre and The Center for Popular Economics, *The New Field Guide to the U.S. Economy*, New York: New Press, 1995. An excerpt (section 1.14):

According to one recent estimate, about 40% of all corporate stocks and 50% of bonds were held by private and public pension funds. Currently, funds are strictly prohibited from using any but "prudent financial" criteria in investing, which means that workers may find themselves providing capital for firms that are busting unions or harming the environment. Also, most pension fund capital (70%) is in the hands of employers who invest it as they see fit. During the 1980s, many corporations tapped into pension funds as a cheap source of financing. As a result, about half of all single-employer plans are suspected to be in trouble.

See also, Archon Fung, Tessa Hebb and Joel Rogers, *Working Capital: The Power of Labor's Pensions*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001.

For critical discussion of various strategies of so-called "soulful capitalism" as ways to reform the economic system -- including the "progressive" use of pension funds -- see Doug Henwood, *Wall Street: How It Works and for Whom*, London: Verso, 1997, ch. 7. On the limits of corporate reform, see also for example, Edward S. Herman, *Corporate Control, Corporate Power*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 250f.

31. In 1886, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that a corporation is a "person," entitled to the protection of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thereafter, the Court held that a corporation's property is protected under the Due Process Clause of the same Amendment. See *Santa Clara County v. South Pacific Railroad Company*, 118 U.S. 394 (1886)(corporations have rights under the Equal Protection Clause); and, for example, *Smyth v. Ames*, 169 U.S. 466 (1898)(corporations have rights under the Due Process Clause). See also, *Dartmouth College v. Woodward*, 17 U.S. 518 (1819)(the seminal case on the topic).

32. On corporate charters being contingent on service of public interests in the nineteenth century, see for example, Gary D. Rowe, "Lochner Revisionism Revisited," *Law and Social Inquiry*, Vol. 24, Winter 1999, pp. 221-252. An excerpt (p. 248):

In the second half of the nineteenth century, states . . . regulated their corporate franchises heavily to insure that these companies served the public interest in exchange for the privileges they received. Thus *quo warranto* proceedings to revoke the charters of corporations that engaged in mergers and formed "trusts" contrary to the public interest became increasingly common in the 1880s. In 1889, however, New Jersey offered interstate corporations a way of evading this problem when it enacted a new general incorporation law that permitted state corporations, in exchange for franchise taxes, to form pools and trusts to their hearts' content.

Corporations forced to dissolve in other states quickly reorganized as new corporations in New Jersey. The race to the bottom had begun. See also footnote 35 of this chapter.

33. On the early A.F.L. and advocacy of workers' control, see for example, David Montgomery, *Citizen Worker: The Experience of Workers in the United States with Democracy and the Free Market during the Nineteenth Century*, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 162; Henry Demarest Lloyd, *Men, the Workers*, New York: Arno, 1969. The "clarion call to the 1893 A.F.L. convention" proclaimed (pp. 90-91):

The pioneers who saw a generation ago the thread that would lead us through this labyrinth and into the free air have now become a multitude. That thread is the thread of democracy, whose principles must and will rule wherever men co-exist, in industry not less surely than in politics. It is by the people who do the work that the hours of labour, the conditions of employment, the division of the produce is to be determined. It is by them the captains of industry are to be chosen, and chosen to be servants, not masters. It is for the welfare of all that the coördinated labour of all must be directed. Industry, like government, exists only for the coöperation of all, and like government, it must guarantee equal protection to all. This is democracy, and democracy is not true only where men carry letters or build forts, but wherever they meet in common efforts. The declaration of independence yesterday meant self-government, to-day it means self-employment, which is but another kind of self-government.

See also, Paul Buhle, *Taking Care of Business: Samuel Gompers, George Meany, Lane Kirkland, and the Tragedy of American Labor*, New York: Monthly Review, 1999, p. 70 (noting that "[m]any local A.F.L. members and even leaders unmoved by socialism mulled the idea" of "workers' control of production" even as late as 1909-1913).

34. For Adam Smith's and Thomas Jefferson's warnings against corporations, see chapter 6 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 9 and 10.

35. On the expansion of corporate rights being the work of lawyers and judges removed from democratic processes -- and for some background on the history of corporations -- see for example, Charles Sellers, *The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, especially pp. 44-55. An excerpt (pp. 44-48):

Only seven private business corporations were chartered under the colonial regime, whereas the number climbed to forty in the first decade after the Revolution and passed three hundred during the commercial boom of the 1790s. The first corporations were chartered to enlist private capital for such public facilities as bridges, turnpikes, and urban water systems, with investors deriving their profits from tolls and user fees. Their public purpose also justified legislatures in granting them monopoly privileges as to route and location, as well as the right to seize private property under the state's power of eminent domain. Yet the line between public purpose and private purpose proved elastic. . . .

[B]y the end of the War of 1812 . . . corporations were only beginning to win two of their cardinal privileges, limited liability of stockholders for corporate debts and corporate freedom from interference by the state. These privileges were won not in legislative halls but in the courts. Behind the facade of democratic decision-making in

legislative bodies -- as few contemporaries realized and as historians have only lately begun to discover -- the decisive reshaping of the law to the demands of the market was being accomplished by lawyers and judges, both Federalist and Republican, in the state courts.

Lawyers were the shock troops of capitalism. The bar mushroomed as the market proliferated contractual relationships. . . . [L]awyers' decisive contribution to the expanding market was accomplished outside the limelight of electoral politics and legislation. . . . With impressive creativity and speed, the legal profession supplied a new law. Not even the wiliest lawyer/politicians could have extracted the law required by expansive capital from legislatures vulnerable to a broad electorate still imbued with premarket values. But in the courts the lawyers' technical expertise could not be democratically challenged. By taking control of the state courts and asserting through them their right to shape the law to entrepreneurial ends, lawyer/judges during the first half of the nineteenth century fashioned a legal revolution.

Lawrence Friedman, *A History of American Law*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973, especially pp. 166-176, 446-456; J. Willard Hurst, *The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of the United States, 1780-1970*, Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1970, pp. 13-57. See also, Howard Zinn, *A People's History of the United States: 1492-Present*, New York: HarperCollins, 1980 (revised and updated edition 1995), at p. 255 (the Fourteenth Amendment "had been passed to protect Negro rights, but of the Fourteenth Amendment cases brought before the Supreme Court between 1890 and 1910, nineteen dealt with the Negro, 288 dealt with corporations"). And see footnote 32 of this chapter.

36. For Horwitz's and Sellers's books, see Morton Horwitz, *The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy*, Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1992 (2 volumes); Charles Sellers, *The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, especially pp. 44f.

37. On the concept of "plausible denial," see for example, U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, Interim Report, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975, pp. 11-12. An excerpt:

"Plausible denial" has shaped the processes for approving and evaluating covert actions. For example, the 40 Committee and its predecessor, the Special Group, have served as "circuit breakers" for Presidents, thus avoiding consideration of covert action by the Oval Office. "Plausible denial" can also lead to the use of euphemism and circumlocution, which are designed to allow the President and other senior officials to deny knowledge of an operation should it be disclosed. The converse may also occur; a President could communicate his desire for a sensitive operation in an indirect, circumlocutious manner.

On the C.I.A.'s operations, see for example, William Blum, *Killing Hope: U.S. Military and C.I.A. Interventions Since World War II*, Monroe, ME: Common Courage, 1995; Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, *The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence*, New York: Knopf, 1974; John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies: A C.I.A. Story*, New York: Norton, 1978; Ralph W. McGehee, *Deadly Deceits: My 25 Years in the C.I.A.*, New York: Sheridan Square, 1983; Frank Snepp, *Decent Interval: An Insider's Account of Saigon's Indecent End*, New York: Random House, 1977; Philip Agee, *Inside the Company: A*

C.I.A. Diary, Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1975; Howard Frazier, ed., *Uncloaking the C.I.A.*, New York: Free Press, 1978.

38. By "high-level" conspiracy theory, Chomsky means one according to which the Kennedy assassination was ordered and planned by some sector of the government or a major policy-making interest group, such as the C.I.A. or representatives of the military-industrial complex -- the thesis of Oliver Stone's 1992 film *JFK*. Typically, these theories take as their starting point that Kennedy was opposed to American military policy, determined to end the Cold War and to lead the world to a state of peace. For an extended and documented debunking of the "high-level" conspiracy theory -- implying nothing about the thesis that J.F.K. was killed by the Mafia, or by right-wing Cubans, or other such theories -- see Chomsky's *Rethinking Camelot: J.F.K., the Vietnam War, and U.S. Political Culture*, Boston: South End, 1993.

For a sample of the widely-held belief in the United States that J.F.K. was assassinated by a high-level conspiracy of awesome scale -- often presented as established truth, and the starting point for further discussion -- see for example, Peter Dale Scott, "The Quest for the Grail," and Michael Parenti, "Morte D'Arthur," *Letters*, *Nation*, March 9, 1992, pp. 290, 317-318 (letters responding angrily to journalist Alexander Cockburn's questioning of these beliefs in Alexander Cockburn, "Beat the Devil," *Nation*, January 6, 1992, p. 6); Michael Lerner, "J.F.K. and the Possibility of Possibility," Peter Dale Scott, "The Assassination and the Cover-up: What Really Happened?," Peter Gabel, "The Spiritual Truth of J.F.K.," and Todd Gitlin, "The Stoning of Oliver and the Fascination of J.F.K.," *Tikkun*, March/April 1992, pp. 37-55. There is also much discussion of the issue on community-based radio, in movement journals, and in other channels out of the mainstream. For some early criticism of these tendencies, see I.F. Stone, "The Left and the Warren Commission Report," *I.F. Stone's Weekly*, October 5, 1964, pp. 1-3.

39. Before his assassination, Martin Luther King had been a major target of F.B.I. subversion, including COINTELPRO activities [on the F.B.I.'s COINTELPRO program, see chapter 4 of *U.P.* and its footnote 33]. Indeed, F.B.I. memoranda show that orders were given to "neutralize" King as late as one month before his death. For a lengthy discussion of some of the illegal activities against King, see Final Report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, *Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans*, Report No. 94-755, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, Books II and III, especially Book III, pp. 79-184. This report points out (Book II, p. 223):

[T]he "neutralization" program continued until Dr. King's death. As late as March 1968, F.B.I. agents were being instructed to neutralize Dr. King because he might become a "messiah" who could "unify, and electrify, the militant black nationalist movement," if he were to "abandon his supposed 'obedience' to 'white liberal doctrines' (nonviolence) and embrace black nationalism." Steps were taken to subvert the "Poor People's Campaign" which Dr. King was planning to lead in the spring of 1968. Even after King's death, agents in the field were proposing methods for harassing his widow, and Bureau officials were trying to prevent his birthday from becoming a national holiday.

See also, Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Wall, *The COINTELPRO Papers: Documents from the F.B.I.'s Secret Wars Against Dissent in the United States*, Boston: South End, 1990. An excerpt (pp. 97, 100):

By 1964, King was not only firmly established as a preeminent civil rights leader, but was beginning to show signs of pursuing a more fundamental structural agenda of social change. Correspondingly . . . the [F.B.I.]'s intent had crystallized into an unvarnished intervention into the domestic political process, with the goal of bringing about King's replacement with someone "acceptable" to the F.B.I. . . . Two days after announcement of the impending [Nobel Peace Prize for King, COINTELPRO head William C. Sullivan] caused a composite audio tape to be produced, supposedly consisting of "highlights" taken from the taps of King's phones and bugs placed in his various hotel rooms over the preceding two years. The result, prepared by F.B.I. audio technician John Matter, purported to demonstrate the civil rights leader had engaged in a series of "orgiastic" trysts with prostitutes and, thus, "the depths of his sexual perversion and depravity." The finished tape was packaged, along with the accompanying anonymous letter (prepared on unwatermarked paper by Bureau Internal Security Supervisor Seymore E. Phillips on Sullivan's instruction), informing King that the audio material would be released to the media unless he committed suicide prior to bestowal of the Nobel Prize. . . . Still, the Bureau's counterintelligence operations against King continued apace, right up to the moment of the target's death by sniper fire on a Memphis hotel balcony on April 14, 1968.

David J. Garrow, *The F.B.I. and Martin Luther King, Jr.*, New York: Norton, 1981; Taylor Branch, *Pillar of Fire: America in the King Years, 1963-65*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997; Philip Melanson, *Who Killed Martin Luther King?*, Berkeley, CA: Odonian, 1993; Harold Weisberg, *Frame-Up: The Martin Luther King/James Earl Ray Case*, New York: Outerbridge and Diensfrey, 1971.

40. For a contemporaneous assessment of the Kennedy administration's role in the Civil Rights Movement, see Howard Zinn, *S.N.C.C.: The New Abolitionists*, Boston: Beacon, 1964. An excerpt (pp. 203-206):

There is an additional problem which the civil rights movement in the South faces. Any action for injunctions or any move in the federal courts to restore constitutional rights to citizens can be swiftly blocked as long as judges with strongly-entrenched segregationist beliefs sit on federal courts. Here is one area where the President has great power to change the status quo, since he is authorized by the Constitution to appoint federal judges. Unfortunately, the appointments made by President Kennedy, in precisely those years when the civil rights struggle reached its height and court decisions were so crucial, were a great disservice to the cause of racial equality. As the Southern Regional Council suggested, if the President could not secure Senate approval for his appointments, he could leave the seats vacant to dramatize the issue. Kennedy was just not bold enough to break the tradition of getting the approval of Southern segregationist Senators in the appointment of federal judges; thus, again and again, he appointed racists to sit on federal courts in the South.

In Georgia, he appointed J. Robert Elliott, an old member of the Talmadge machine. Elliott once said, before he became a judge (as reported in the *New York Times*): "I don't want these pinks, radicals and black voters to outvote those who are trying to preserve our segregationist laws and other traditions." But more important, as soon as he came to the bench, he acted to deprive the Albany Movement of its rights of peaceful protest, and to deny repeatedly its requests to enjoin interference with peaceful constitutional activities.

In Mississippi, Kennedy appointed William Cox to the federal bench. . . . Cox consistently refused to rule that discrimination was being used against Negroes in Mississippi. In one case, in March, 1963, he said (the *New York Times* reported): ". . . I am not interested in whether the registrar is going to give a registration test to a bunch of niggers on a voter drive."

In Alabama, Kennedy appointed Clarence W. Allgood, who ruled that it was legal for the Birmingham school board to expel 1100 Negro children from schools because they joined desegregation demonstrations.

In Louisiana, he appointed E. Gordon West . . . [who] wrote (as reported in the *Boston Globe*): "I personally regard the 1954 holding of the United States Supreme Court in the now famous Brown case [prohibiting segregated schools] as one of the truly regrettable decisions of all times." Another Kennedy appointee in Louisiana, Frank Ellis, joined West in holding constitutional a Louisiana law requiring that the race of candidates be put on the ballot in elections. . . .

Furthermore, Attorney General Robert Kennedy publicly defended, in the spring of 1963, the Administration's appointment of Southern segregationists to federal judgeships. He said: "I'm very proud of the judges that have been appointed. We looked into all of them for questions of integrity and whether they would uphold the law of the land. . . ."

Early in his administration, President Kennedy denied the need for a civil rights bill, saying that executive orders could do effectively what had to be done. He proved to be slow and cautious however, in this field, as his moderate and much-delayed order on housing showed. Kennedy delayed almost two years in signing this order, and then did not extend its coverage to all federally connected housing, as the Civil Rights Commission had asked. He also refrained from making comments on the moral issues involved in racial inequality. It took the severe violence in Birmingham in the spring of 1963 to arouse the President to an excellent, forthright statement on racism as a moral blight on the nation. Then, curiously, instead of being roused to sweeping executive action, he flung the responsibility at Congress, by putting a new Civil Rights Act into the works. . . .

What remained hidden from the American people was the fact that the *already existing civil rights legislation was not being effectively enforced*, that important Supreme Court decisions were not being followed by strong presidential action. The Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960, for instance, were specifically designed to end discrimination against Negroes in voting. They did not succeed, because the President and the Justice Department confined their enforcement actions to slow, cautious lawsuits. In that one area where the Attorney General *did* have specific statutory authorization, in voting, he did not act vigorously to enforce the law. Vivid evidence of that was given on Freedom Day in Selma, October 7, 1963, when a corps of F.B.I. men and Justice Department lawyers watched local policemen pull S.N.C.C. [Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee] workers down the steps of a federal building and jab others with electric prod poles because they were bringing food to Negroes waiting in line to register.

See also, Howard Zinn, *A People's History of the United States: 1492-Present*, New York: HarperCollins, 1980 (revised and updated edition 1995), pp. 444-450.

41. On the decline of real wages in the United States after 1973, see footnote 101 of chapter 10 of *U.P.* See also footnote 14 of chapter 10 of *U.P.*

42. On the decline of entry-level wages, see for example, Lawrence Mishel and Jared Bernstein, *The State of Working America: 1994-95*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994. An excerpt (p. 109):

The most severe wage reductions . . . have been for entry-level jobs for young, high school graduates, a group comprising two-thirds to three-fourths of all young workers. In 1993, the wages paid to young male and female high school graduates were, respectively, 30% and 18% less than the wages their counterparts received in 1979. Similarly, the wages of entry-level college graduates fell 8% among men (but rose 4% among women). Starting in 1987 and continuing through the current recovery . . . wages began falling for groups such as white-collar and college-educated men that had previously escaped the downward pressure on wages.

See also footnote 44 of this chapter; and chapter 10 of *U.P.* and its footnote 68.

Notably, some wage-earners have fared much better in recent decades (Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein and John Schmitt, *The State of Working America, 1998-1999*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999, p. 6):

[C]orporate chief executive officers (C.E.O.s) have seen their pay skyrocket. In 1965, the typical C.E.O. made about 20 times more than the average production worker; in 1989, the ratio had almost tripled to 56; by 1997, relative C.E.O. pay had more than doubled again to 116 times the pay of the average worker. A separate estimate of C.E.O. pay shows that the salary, bonus, and returns from stock plans of the average C.E.O. grew 100% between 1989 and 1997. Extraordinarily high C.E.O. pay appears to be a uniquely American phenomenon, with U.S. C.E.O.s earning, on average, more than twice as much as C.E.O.s in other advanced economies.

43. On the moral reasoning of nineteenth-century slave owners and trade unionists, see for example, Drew Gilpin Faust, "A Southern Stewardship: The Intellectual and the Proslavery Argument," *American Quarterly*, Spring 1979, pp. 63-80; Paul Krause, *The Battle for Homestead, 1880-1892: Politics, Culture, and Steel*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992, pp. 82-83.

44. For the poll on three-quarters of the U.S. population believing that their children will be worse off than they are themselves, see Richard Benedetto, "Americans Increasingly Upset With Direction Of The Nation," Gannett News Service, June 17, 1992 (available on Nexis database). An excerpt:

A new U.S.A. Today/C.N.N./Gallup poll taken June 12-14 shows 84 percent dissatisfied with the way things are going in the country -- the highest level of disgruntlement in 13 years -- and 74 percent are pessimistic about the chances of their children being able to live better than they do.

45. On half of the U.S. population believing that the two major political parties are hopeless, see for example, Adam Pertman, "A public keen on politics fuels outsider groups," *Boston Globe*, March 5, 1993, p. 1. An excerpt:

A national survey [by pollster Gordon Black] . . . showed that 56 percent of Americans were angry at both major parties; 69 percent agreed incumbents could never reform the process; and 50 percent said they favored a new party because neither the Democrats nor Republicans could get things back on the track.

46. On rising alienation and disaffection from institutions, see chapter 1 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 7 and 42; chapter 2 of *U.P.* and its footnote 59; and footnotes 10, 44 and 45 of this chapter.

Chapter Ten

Turning Point

1. On work time in Western Europe, see for example, Sylvia Ann Hewlett, *Child neglect in rich nations*, New York: United Nations Children's Fund, 1993. An excerpt (p. 8):

Relaxed European attitudes towards the work week have been greatly facilitated by a powerful trade union movement that has kept the issue of shorter hours at the top of the agenda throughout the postwar period. In bad economic times, unions have resisted the inevitable pressure for longer hours, arguing that a shorter work week actually combats unemployment by spreading the work around. Even during the severe downturn of the early and mid-1980s, weekly hours for most European workers continued to fall. Only recently, the large German union IG Metall won a 35-hour work week for its members, a gain that is expected to spread through the German labour force. And vacation time continues to rise throughout Europe. Recent collective-bargaining agreements have set annual paid leave at five to six weeks in France and six weeks in Germany. Contrast this to the American scene, where in 1989, workers had an average of 16 days off, down from 20 days in 1981.

For comparisons with work time in the United States, see for example, Juliet B. Schor, *The Overworked American: The Unexpected Decline of Leisure*, New York: BasicBooks, 1991. An excerpt (pp. 2, 29):

U.S. manufacturing employees currently work 320 more hours [per year] -- the equivalent of over two months -- than their counterparts in West Germany or France. . . . [Compared to 1969 in the U.S.,] the average employed person [in 1989 was] on the job an additional 163 hours, or the equivalent of an extra month a year.

Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein and John Schmitt, *The State of Working America, 1998-1999*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999, especially chs. 4 and 8. An excerpt (pp. 12, 2):

Between 1990 and 1995, a rise in the average hours worked per year in the United States and an even larger decline in the average hours worked per year in Japan have given the United States the dubious distinction of being the advanced economy with the longest work year. An important contributor to the much longer work schedule in the United States is the lack of legally mandated, employer-paid vacation time, which is typically three to five weeks per year for all workers in most European economies. . . . [T]he typical married-couple family with children worked 247 more hours (about six more full-time weeks) per year in 1996 than in 1989. . . . American families are working harder to stay in the same place and are seeing little of the gains in the overall economy.

See also footnote 65 of this chapter.

2. On Western European poverty rates among the elderly and children, see for example, Sylvia Ann Hewlett, *Child neglect in rich nations*, New York: United Nations Children's Fund, 1993. An excerpt (pp. 15-16):

The situation in Europe is quite different from that in the United States and Canada. In France, for example, in recent years, tax policy and income transfers have reduced poverty among the elderly by a decisive 75 per cent, taking the rate from 76 to 0.7 per cent; but poverty among children has also been reduced significantly, falling from 21 to 5 per cent. Similarly, in the Netherlands, public policies have reduced poverty among the elderly by an impressive 56 per cent, taking the rate from 56 per cent to zero, while these same policies have lowered the child poverty rate from 14 to 4 per cent.

3. On Western European provisions for child-rearing, see for example, Sylvia Ann Hewlett, *Child neglect in rich nations*, New York: United Nations Children's Fund, 1993. An excerpt (pp. 19, 21):

The United States is unique in its lack of provision for childbirth. In all other rich nations, pregnant women and newborn children are treated with much more generosity and humanity -- which is a large part of the reason why infant mortality rates are so much lower in France, Japan, the Netherlands and Sweden than they are in the United States. . . .

In sharp contrast to the restricted maternity benefits typical of the Anglo-American world, a large number of Western European governments provide a generous package of rights and benefits to all working parents when a child is born. For example, Sweden provides a parenting leave of 15 months at the birth of a child, to be taken by either parent, and replaces 90 per cent of earnings up to a specified maximum. In Italy, a pregnant woman is entitled to five months of paid leave at 80 per cent of her wage, followed by a further six months at 30 per cent of her wage. Her job is guaranteed for both periods. Perhaps the most remarkable fact about the Italian system is that a woman is entitled to two years of credit towards seniority each time she gives birth to a child. Not only does an Italian woman not get fired for having a child -- she is actually rewarded.

4. For Hewlett's book, see Sylvia Ann Hewlett, *Child neglect in rich nations*, New York: United Nations Children's Fund, 1993. An excerpt (pp. 1-2, 15, 18, 26):

The United States has by far the highest percentage of children living in poverty: 20 per cent, which represents a 21 per cent increase since 1970. . . . Three other "Anglo-American" countries -- Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom -- are at or near the 9 per cent mark. Yet, in most other rich countries, child poverty rates are a fraction of the United States rate. In Western Europe and Japan, for example, child poverty rates typically hover around 2 to 5 per cent. . . . Child poverty rates, school drop-out rates and teenage suicide rates [in the U.S.] are all on the rise. . . . Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores for college-bound students are 70 points lower than they were 20 years ago. . . . The overall drift [in the "Anglo-American" countries is] . . . towards blighting youngsters and stunting their potential. An anti-child spirit is loose in these lands. . . .

In the United States, 60 per cent of American working women still have no benefits or job protection when they give birth to a child. In the United Kingdom, only 2 per cent of child care available for children under age three is publicly funded. In Canada, 5 billion Canadian dollars (one Canadian dollar = U.S.\$0.76, 1 September 1993) have been removed from social programmes that benefited poor children. . . . In 1990, the [U.S.] Medicaid system financed health care for only 40 per cent of those below the poverty line. . . . A recent study estimated that in the United States the costs to the taxpayer of one "throwaway child . . ." is about U.S.\$300,000. That is the

cost of one unproductive life, spent in and out of the welfare system, in and out of the penal system. The pain in [such a] life does not even come cheaply. See also, Sylvia Ann Hewlett, *When the Bough Breaks: The Cost of Neglecting Our Children*, New York: BasicBooks, 1991 (expanded discussion of child neglect in the U.S.). And see chapter 2 of *U.P.* and its footnote 48; and footnotes 5, 12 and 13 of this chapter.

5. For the statistic of 40 percent of children in New York City living in poverty, see for example, Shlomo Maital and Kim I. Morgan, "Hungry Children Are A Bad Business," *Challenge*, Vol. 35, No. 4, July 1992, p. 54. The statistic is from a study by the New York City Federation of Protestant Welfare Agencies, which found that approximately 40 percent of New York City's children live below the poverty line for a family of three (i.e. \$9,120 in 1986).

On child poverty in the U.S. generally, see for example, Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein and John Schmitt, *The State of Working America, 1998-1999*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999, especially chs. 3 and 6. An excerpt (p. 9):

Since the mid-1980s, poverty rates in the United States have failed to respond to economic growth. The most recent poverty rate -- 13.3% in 1997 -- is 0.5 percentage points above the 1989 rate of 12.8%. Even with an economy that grew between 1979 and 1997, poverty rates in those 18 years were high by historical standards, averaging 13.6% for the period 1979-89 and 14.0% for the period 1989-97.

Poverty rates for minorities and children are well above the national average. . . . About one in five (19.9%) children were poor in 1997, up slightly from 19.6% in 1989 and 16.4% in 1979. For minority children, poverty rates are especially high: 37.2% of black children and 36.8% of Hispanic children under 18 were poor in 1997. The poor also appear to be poorer now than at any time in the last 20 years: in 1997, the share of people in poverty whose incomes were below 50% of the poverty line was 41.0%. Some argue that these rates are artificially high due to erroneous measurement. But a study by a nonpartisan panel of poverty experts shows that an updated measure of poverty would actually increase the number of poor by about 9 million persons (with most of the increase among the working poor).

David Holmstrom, "As Child Poverty Grows, Report Warns of Crisis," *Christian Science Monitor*, January 27, 1994, p. 2. An excerpt:

A recent study by Tufts University in Medford, Mass., indicates that poverty among white, black, and Hispanic children under 18 in the U.S. increased by a staggering 47 percent between 1973 and 1992. The result, says the Urban Institute in Washington, is that 1 out of 5 American children -- more than 14 million -- are in poverty today. That is twice the poverty rate of any other industrialized nation. . . . The government defines poverty as an annual income of \$11,186 for a family of three.

Steven R. Donziger, ed., *The Real War on Crime: The Report of the National Criminal Justice Commission*, New York: HarperCollins, 1996, pp. 27-29 ("up to twelve million children are malnourished"). This study lists international child poverty rates as follows (p. 29): U.S. Total 21% [African-Americans 44%, Latinos 37.9%, Whites 16.2%] (1993); Australia 14% (1990); Canada 13.5% (1991); United Kingdom 9.9% (1986); Germany 6.8% (1989); France 6.5% (1984); Netherlands 6.2% (1991); Sweden 2.7% (1992).

On hunger among U.S. children, see for example, Shlomo Maital and Kim I. Morgan, "Hungry Children Are A Bad Business," *Challenge*, Vol. 35, No. 4, July 1992, p. 54. An excerpt:

Hungry children and adults comprise one of every eleven Americans. . . . Today, one of every eight children in the United States under the age of twelve suffers from hunger, and one child in every four is either hungry or lives in a household that experienced hunger during the year. That adds up to 5.5 million hungry children and another 6 million at risk of hunger. . . .

According to Dr. J. Larry Brown, Director of the Center on Hunger, Poverty, and Nutritional Policy at Tufts University, the history of child hunger is a relatively brief and recent one. "Three decades ago . . . extensive hunger was identified and the Government's responses in the 1960s and 1970s virtually eliminated the problem. The food stamp program served twenty million people. School lunch and breakfast programs were increased, so poor children would have the nutritional basis for doing well in school. Supplemental feeding programs were set up to supply food to poor pregnant women, to mothers, and to their infants. Then, in 1981 the Reagan administration began reducing and modifying those programs. By 1982 signs of hunger were widespread. . . .

One commonly-believed cause of hunger among children has no basis in fact -- the myth that children go hungry because poor people spend money on food wastefully or buy food that is not nutritious. According to Dr. Brown, "poor people actually buy more nutritious food than the rest of the population. They think more about how to make wise choices because they have to stretch their food dollar as far as possible. . . ." Today, less is spent on the school breakfast and lunch program than on the space program.

See also footnote 27 of this chapter.

On the low levels of child health care in the U.S., see for example, Derrick Z. Jackson, "The richest country has a poor record in child health care," Op-Ed, *Boston Globe*, September 29, 1993, p. 17. An excerpt:

The United States, the richest country in the world, has only the 19th-lowest rate of death for children under 5. For infants, the mortality rate of white children would rank with Switzerland, Japan and Canada. The death rate for African-American infants is worse than the rate in Cuba, Poland and Bulgaria. . . . Only 77 percent of children under 2 are immunized in the United States against measles. This ranks 60th among the nations listed by U.N.I.C.E.F. The U.S. measles immunization rate is worse than that for Iran, India, Botswana, Rwanda, both Koreas, China, Cuba, Vietnam, Mongolia, Honduras, Chile, Colombia, Hungary, Romania, Egypt, Syria, Panama, Mexico and the former Czechoslovakia. . . . [C]hild poverty rose from 15 percent in 1970 to the current 20 percent. The rate is twice that of any other developed nation. . . . Put together, the report [U.N.I.C.E.F.'s *The Progress of Nations*] reminded us that the United States is one of only two major industrial nations -- the other being the United Kingdom -- that allowed the state of children to deteriorate over the last two decades.

See also, Sylvia Ann Hewlett, *Child neglect in rich nations*, New York: United Nations Children's Fund, 1993. An excerpt (p. 17):

Estimates vary, but in the early 1990s, somewhere between 600,000 and 3 million people are homeless. Approximately 30 per cent of them are families, most often a parent with two or three children. The average child is 6 years old; the average parent, 27. The loss of a home often leads to the dissolution of a family: two older children in foster care, the wife and baby in a public shelter, the husband sleeping on a park bench or under a bridge. . . .

In 1989, 10 million Americans were living near the edge of homelessness, doubled up with friends or family. . . . Local officials report that there is no public

housing available for hundreds of thousands of poor families who, under existing government regulations, qualify for help. There are today about 44,000 persons on the waiting list in Chicago, 60,000 in Miami and 200,000 in New York City. While approximately 330,000 children are homeless in the United States, 12 million are uninsured and have little or no access to health care.

And see chapter 2 of *U.P.* and its footnote 48; and footnotes 4, 12 and 13 of this chapter.

6. For the *New York Times*'s review, see Malcolm W. Browne, "What Is Intelligence, and Who Has It?," *New York Times Book Review*, October 16, 1994, p. 3. The three books under review were: Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray, *The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life*, New York: Free Press, 1994; J. Philippe Rushton, *Race, Evolution, and Behavior: A Life History Perspective*, New Brunswick, NJ: Transition, 1994; and Seymour W. Itzkoff, *The Decline of Intelligence in America: A Strategy for National Renewal*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994.

An excerpt from the *Times* review:

Indicators of national intelligence in the United States have declined compared with similar measurements of intelligence in other countries. The demographer Daniel R. Vining Jr. has calculated that America's I.Q. scores have fallen about five points since intelligence tests first came into use at the beginning of this century, and the College Entrance Examination Board says that scores for the Scholastic Aptitude Test fell from 1962 to 1990 by 11 percent in the verbal section and 5 percent in the mathematics part. . . . Worst of all, say the authors [of the books under review], the lowest intellectual levels of the population are strongly outbreeding the brightest, and if (as most psychologists believe) intelligence is partly inherited, America is losing the cognitive base essential to coping with national problems. . . .

Among Mr. Rushton's [one of the authors] conclusions are that whites, on average, emphasize nurture rather than numbers of offspring, while blacks, on average, are shaped by evolutionary selection pressures [of the warmer environment of Africa] to produce more children but to nurture each one less. . . . This is the kind of proposition that makes Mr. Rushton a constant target of furious protests. . . . Mr. Rushton is nevertheless regarded by many of his colleagues as a scholar and not a bigot. . . . Mr. Murray and Mr. Herrnstein [the authors of another of the books] write that "for the last 30 years, the concept of intelligence has been a pariah in the world of ideas," and that the time has come to rehabilitate rational discourse on the subject. It is hard to imagine a democratic society doing otherwise.

7. The opening sentence of the review is: "One may loathe or share the opinions expressed in the three books under review, but one thing seems clear: The government or society that persists in sweeping their subject matter under the rug will do so at its peril."

8. On the number of people in the United States suffering hunger, see for example, Theo Francis, "Hunger Found Surging In U.S., Easing Globally," *Chicago Tribune*, October 14, 1994, zone N, p. 26. An excerpt:

In 1990, 12 percent of the U.S. population was determined to be hungry, or ate too little "to provide them with the energy and nutrients for fully productive, active, and healthy lives," according to a study on the causes of hunger by the Bread for the World Institute. Between 1985 and 1990, the U.S. experienced an increase of 50 percent in the number of hungry people, according to the study. Twelve million of the

30 million deemed hungry in the U.S. are under 18 while 3 million to 5 million are senior citizens.

"Worldwide, hunger is going down," said institute director David Beckmann. "In Africa and, ironically, in America, it's going up. . . ." Increasing federal food assistance by less than one percent of the federal budget, or about \$10 billion, would eliminate the country's hunger problem, according to the institute. . . . [Executive Director of the Congressional Hunger Caucus John] Morrill argued that enough money could be raised by cutting about 3 percent of the defense budget, or a third of the C.I.A.'s annual funds.

Judy Rakowsky, "Tufts study finds 12 million children in U.S. go hungry," *Boston Globe*, June 16, 1993, p. 80 (reporting similar statistics from a Tufts University study conducted based upon the nutrition standard set by the National Academy of Sciences, i.e. having enough money to buy adequately nutritious food to nourish the body and maintain growth and development in children). See also footnotes 5, 11 and 12 of this chapter.

9. On increasing hunger in the U.S. and Africa, see footnote 8 of this chapter.

10. On the permanent impact of malnutrition on children's neural development, see for example, John W. Frank and Fraser Mustard, "The Determinants of Health from a Historical Perspective," *Daedalus (Health and Wealth)*, Vol. 123, No. 4, Fall 1994, pp. 1-19. An excerpt (p. 10):

Emerging evidence from fields such as psychology and the neurosciences points to how nurturing or stimulation influence brain development, particularly when it is most plastic. The modifications and connections that are formed among the billions of cells in the cerebral cortex occur very rapidly during the first few months of life and continue throughout childhood. The development of the brain is strongly influenced by the quality of the nourishment and nurturance given to infants and children. The stimuli affect not only the number of brain cells in the cortex and the number of connections among them, but also the way the nerve cells are "wired." The stages in the development of the brain appear to be linked so that events early in life affect the development and function of the brain at later stages. In addition, in adverse environments activated stress hormones can have a negative effect on brain development and can damage neurons, leading to permanent defects in memory and learning.

11. For the *Wall Street Journal's* article on increasing hunger among the elderly, see Michael J. McCarthy, "Frayed Lifeline: Hunger Among Elderly Surges," *Wall Street Journal*, November 8, 1994, p. A1. An excerpt:

[S]everal million older Americans are going hungry -- and their numbers are growing steadily. . . . [A]s many as 4.9 million elderly people -- about 16% of the population aged 60 and older -- are either hungry or malnourished to some degree, often because they are poor or too infirm to shop or cook. . . . [A]t least two-thirds of needy older people aren't being reached by federal food-assistance projects, including food stamps. . . . Meanwhile, funds for federal nutrition programs haven't kept pace with either the rising cost of food or the surging tide of older people. Increases in funding trailed the inflation rate throughout the 1980s, and in the 1990s program budgets have risen only marginally. In contrast, the elderly population swelled by more than 20% in the 1980s alone. . . .

Some nine million people 65 or older live alone, putting them at increased risk for poor nutrition, and their numbers are expected to grow to 11 million within a decade. . . . Says Ed Kramer, an aging-department official for the state [of New York]: "There are a lot of hidden elderly, particularly in urban areas and high-rises, who are literally starving to death."

12. On the Boston City Hospital malnutrition clinic, see for example, Diego Ribadeneira and Cheong Chow, "BCH [Boston City Hospital] Study Illustrates Poor's Painful Choice," *Boston Globe*, September 8, 1992, p. 1; Diego Ribadeneira, "BCH Reports Rise in Child Malnutrition," *Boston Globe*, September 25, 1992, Metro section, p. 1. An excerpt:

The demand for the services of the failure-to-thrive clinic is so great that staff members resort to triage -- a system of assigning on the basis of urgency or chance for survival -- to determine which children are in need of immediate care and which children can afford to be placed on a waiting list. . . . Some of the children suffer from Third World levels of malnutrition and require hospitalization. Their immune systems are so weakened by lack of nutrients that infections could be fatal. Doctors say the children, mostly infants and toddlers, are the victims of the social and financial calamities that have befallen families in Boston's inner-city neighborhoods. . . .

[The Director of the clinic] points out that the maximum allowance for food stamps is 80 cents per meal per person. . . . "I challenge you to be able to properly care for a child on 80 cents, given the food costs in this city," [she] said.

On infant mortality in the U.S., see for example, Derrick Z. Jackson, "America's shameful little secret," *Boston Globe*, December 24, 1989, p. A20. An excerpt:

The United States is the second-richest nation in U.N.I.C.E.F.'s State of the Children report. Its per-capita gross national product is \$18,530, just behind first-place Switzerland's \$21,330. But the United States has only the 22d lowest rate of infant mortality. In 1960, the United States had the 10th lowest. The United States is now behind Ireland and Spain, where the per-capita G.N.P. is about \$6,000.

The numbers for African-American children are tragic. The U.S. infant-mortality rate is 10 per 1,000 live births. The African-American rate is 18 per 1,000. In Roxbury [a section of Boston], the rate is 27.2. That rate would rank Roxbury, supposedly part of the world's second-richest nation, 42d in infant mortality. Though Boston is perhaps the most hospitalized city in America, Roxbury's rate would be behind both Koreas, the United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, the Soviet Union, Uruguay, Mauritius, Yugoslavia, Romania, Chile, Trinidad and Tobago, Kuwait, Jamaica, Costa Rica, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Cuba, Greece, Portugal, Czechoslovakia and Israel. It is barely ahead of Panama, Argentina, China and Sri Lanka. . . .

Paul Wise, a Harvard Medical School expert on infant mortality, said: "The only place where you see social disparities like you see in the U.S. infant-mortality rate is South Africa." The United States and South Africa hold the distinction of being the only two industrialized nations without guaranteed health care.

See also footnote 5 of this chapter.

13. On declining contact time between parents and children, see for example, Sylvia Ann Hewlett, *Child neglect in rich nations*, New York: United Nations Children's Fund, 1993. An excerpt (pp. 2, 7, 10):

Over the last two decades there has been a sharp decline in the amount of time parents spend caring for their children, a trend that has been particularly pronounced in the United Kingdom and the United States. According to Stanford University

economist Victor Fuchs, American children have lost 10 to 12 hours of parental time per week. . . . The data show that the amount of "total contact time" (defined as "all time parents spend with children, including time spent doing other things") has dropped 40 per cent during the last quarter century. . . .

It is a telling comment on the state of affairs that Hallmark, the greeting card company, now markets cards for overcommitted professional parents who find it difficult to actually see their children. "Have a super day at school," chirps one card meant to be left under the cereal box in the morning. "I wish I were there to tuck you in," says another, designed to peek out from behind the pillow at night.

William R. Mattox, Jr., "The Family Time Famine," *Family Policy*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1990, p. 2.

14. On the rise of two-income families, see for example, Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein and John Schmitt, *The State of Working America, 1998-1999*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999, especially ch. 1. An excerpt (pp. 17-18, 38):

Were it not for the extra hours of work provided by working wives, the average income of middle-income, married families would have fallen in the 1990s. Between 1989 and 1996, middle-class husbands and wives increased their annual hours of work outside the home from 3,550 to 3,685, or more than three weeks of extra work per year. And, because of falling wages, this 3.8% increase in hours translated into just 1.1% more family income over seven years. Most of the added hours came from wives, and, without their added work effort, these middle-class families would have lost 1.1% of their income. These middle-income families were not alone: the bottom 80% of families increased their annual hours of work but still managed only to stay even. . . .

Unlike the prior decade, wives' contributions were no longer sufficient [in the 1990s] to offset the lower earnings of husbands, whose wages continued to fall (only husbands in the top fifth experienced wage increases). By 1996, the bottom 80% of married-couple families would have experienced flat or declining incomes in the absence of wives' work; even with wives' contributions, families in the bottom 40% lost economic ground in the 1990s.

See also footnote 101 of this chapter.

On the steep increase in the number of working poor in the U.S. since the 1970s, see for example, Robert A. Rosenblatt, "Survey Finds Sharp Rise In Working Poor Salaries: The Number of Full-Time Workers Who Earn Less Than A Living Wage Rose From 12% To 18% In 13 Years," *Los Angeles Times*, March 31, 1994, p. D1. An excerpt:

The percentage of gainfully employed Americans receiving poverty-level wages rose sharply over the last decade, with nearly one in five full-time employees now counted among the working poor, according to a study released Wednesday by the Commerce Department. The study, titled "The Earnings Ladder," shows that 18% of Americans with year-round full-time jobs had earnings of less than \$13,091 in 1992. In 1979, only 12% of all full-time workers earned comparably low wages. A worker trying to support a family on this wage would be living in poverty; the official definition of poverty in 1992 was a family of four earning \$14,428 a year.

Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein and John Schmitt, *The State of Working America, 1998-1999*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999, chs. 3 and 6. An excerpt (pp. 307, 313, 309, 137):

Despite the popular notion that the poor work very little . . . in 1996, 72.6% of the employable, prime-age [age 25-54] poor either worked (67.1%) or sought work (5.5%). . . . [T]he wage and employment conditions shown in [numerous

accompanying statistical tables] make it difficult to see how low-wage workers can realistically be expected to work their way out of poverty. . . . Low-wage workers . . . are defined as those whose hourly wage [is less than that which] would lift a family of four just up to the poverty line in 1997: \$7.89 per hour. This group's average wage in 1997 was \$5.92, 25% below the poverty-level wage. . . .

[There has been] a significant expansion of workers earning far less than poverty-level wages since 1979, primarily in the 1980s. In 1979, only 4.2% of the workforce were "very low earners," with wages at least 25% below the poverty-level wage. By 1989, 13.4% of the workforce earned such wages, a shift of 9.2% of the workforce into this low-wage group. This group declined by 1.3% between 1989 and 1997, however. Looking at the total group earning poverty-level wages . . . in 1997, 28.6% of the workforce earned poverty-level wages, a rise from 23.7% in 1979. There was no change over the 1989-97 period.

On the systematic undercounting in official unemployment statistics, see for example, Marc Breslow, "The real un(der) employment rate," *Dollars and Sense*, May 1, 1995, p. 35.

15. For some of *Fortune's* celebrations of the rise of profits in the mid-1990s without a corresponding increase in payroll expenditures, see for example, Louis S. Richman, "Why Profits Will Keep Booming," *Fortune*, May 1, 1995, p. 33. An excerpt: Champagne, anyone? Though the final figures for 1994 are still trickling in, it isn't too early to start celebrating the best profit party corporate America has thrown in decades. Net earnings of the S&P [Standard and Poor's, a stock-price index] 500 companies rose a splendid 40% last year -- the fourth successive year of double-digits gains -- and the festivities ain't over yet. . . . You have to look back to the golden years of the mid-1960s to find the last time U.S. companies experienced a six-year run in earnings growth. . . . [Workers] have been off the profit-party guest list so far.

Richard S. Teitelbaum, "Introduction to the Fortune 500; Largest U.S. Corporations A Boom In Profits," *Fortune*, May 15, 1995, p. 226. An excerpt:

Even an anxious Broadway producer couldn't wish for a stronger opening. The premiere of the new Fortune 500, combining industrial and service companies, offers performance numbers that would bedazzle any critic. For the group, profits rose a stunning 54% on a sales gain of 8.2%. That powerful showing came with only modest growth in the cast: employee rolls of Fortune 500 companies gained just 2.6% last year.

Richard S. Teitelbaum, "The Largest U.S. Industrial Corporations; Hats Off! It was a Heck of a Year," *Fortune*, April 18, 1994, p. 210. An excerpt:

[A] dazzling \$62.6 billion in profits. . . . What makes that 15% gain even more impressive is that sales growth in 1993 was virtually stagnant. . . . Employees, though, might well voice a few loud gripes.

"Getting Stronger," *Fortune*, November 14, 1994, p. 14 ("The percentage of corporate income devoted to payrolls is hovering near a record low").

See also, John Liscio, "Is Inflation Tamed? Don't Believe It," *Barron's*, April 15, 1996, "Market Week" section, p. 10 ("The big reason why the bond and stock markets have enjoyed such a heady run for the past 15 years has been capital's clear subjugation of labor"). And see footnotes 14 and 101 of this chapter.

16. Chomsky incisively elaborated on an important aspect of this problem in a 1976 interview broadcast on British television. For the transcript of this discussion, see "The Relevance of Anarcho-Syndicalism/The Jay Interview," in Noam Chomsky, *Radical Priorities*, Montreal: Black Rose, 1981, pp. 245-261. The passage (pp. 254-257):

CHOMSKY: [T]here's a certain amount of work that just has to be done if we're to maintain [something like our current] standard of living. It's an open question how onerous that work has to be. Let's recall that science and technology and intellect have not been devoted to examining that question or to overcoming the onerous and self-destructive character of the necessary work of society. The reason is that it has always been assumed that there is a substantial body of wage-slaves who will do it simply because otherwise they'll starve. However, if human intelligence is turned to the question of how to make the necessary work of society itself meaningful, we don't know what the answer will be. My guess is that a fair amount of it can be made entirely tolerable.

It's a mistake to think that even back-breaking physical labor is necessarily onerous. Many people -- myself included -- do it for relaxation. Well recently, for example, I got it into my head to plant thirty-four trees in a meadow behind the house, on the State Conservation Commission [land], which means I had to dig thirty-four holes in the sand. You know, for me, and what I do with my time mostly, that's pretty hard work, but I have to admit I enjoyed it. I wouldn't have enjoyed it if I'd had work norms, if I'd had an overseer, and if I'd been ordered to do it at a certain moment, and so on. On the other hand, if it's a task taken on just out of interest, fine, that can be done. And that's without any technology, without any thought given to how to design the work, and so on. . . .

But let's assume there is some extent to which it remains onerous. Well, in that case, the answer's quite simple: that work has to be equally shared among people capable of doing it.

PETER JAY: And everyone spends a certain number of months a year working on an automobile production line and a certain number of months collecting the garbage, and . . .

CHOMSKY: If it turns out that these are really tasks which people will find no self-fulfillment in. Incidentally, I don't quite believe that. As I watch people work, craftsmen, let's say, automobile mechanics for example, I think one often finds a good deal of pride in work well done, complicated work well done, because it takes thought and intelligence to do it, especially when one is also involved in management of the enterprise, determination of how the work will be organized, what it is for, what the purposes of the work are, what'll happen to it and so on -- I think all of this can be satisfying and rewarding activity which in fact requires skills, the kind of skills people will enjoy exercising. However, I'm thinking hypothetically now. Suppose it turns out that there is some residue of work which really no one wants to do, whatever that may be -- okay, then I say that the residue of work must be equally shared, and beyond that people will be free to exercise their talents as they see fit. . . .

[N]otice that we have two alternatives: one alternative is to have it equally shared, the other is to design social institutions so that some group of people will be simply compelled to do the work, on pain of starvation. Those are the two alternatives. . . . And I think that the chances for [the former] are enormously enhanced by industrialization. Why? Precisely because much of the most meaningless drudgery can be taken over by machines, which means that the scope for really creative human work is substantially enlarged. . . .

[Y]ou pose a dilemma which many people pose, between desire for satisfaction in work and a desire to create things of value to the community. But it's not so obvious that there is any dilemma, any contradiction. So it's by no means clear -- in fact, I think it's false -- that contributing to the enhancement of pleasure and satisfaction in work is inversely proportional to contributing to the value of the output.

PETER JAY: Not inversely proportional, but it might be unrelated. I mean, take some very simple thing, like selling ice cream cones on the beach on a public holiday. It's a service to society; undoubtedly people want ice creams, they feel hot. On the other hand, it's hard to see in what sense there is either a craftsman's joy or a great sense of social virtue or nobility in performing that task. Why would anyone perform that task if they were not rewarded for it?

CHOMSKY: I must say I've seen some very cheery-looking ice cream vendors . . . who happen to like the idea that they're giving children ice creams, which seems to me a perfectly reasonable way to spend one's time, as compared with thousands of other occupations that I can imagine. . . .

[W]hat I'm saying is that our characteristic assumption that pleasure in work, pride in work, is either unrelated to or negatively related to the value of the output is related to a particular stage of social history, namely capitalism, in which human beings are tools of production. It is by no means necessarily true.

17. On the lack of scientific legitimacy of claims about I.Q., see for example, Richard C. Lewontin, Steven Rose, and Leon J. Kamin, *Not In Our Genes: Biology, Ideology, and Human Nature*, New York: Pantheon, 1984; Stephen Jay Gould, *The Mismeasure of Man*, New York: Norton, 1981; Russell Jacoby and Naomi Glauberman, eds., *The Bell Curve Debate: History, Documents, Opinions*, New York: Times Books, 1995. See also, Noam Chomsky, "Equality: Language Development, Human Intelligence, and Social Organization" (1976), in James Peck, ed., *The Chomsky Reader*, New York: Pantheon, 1987, pp. 183-202; Noam Chomsky, "Psychology and Ideology" (1972), in Noam Chomsky, *For Reasons of State*, New York: Pantheon, 1973, pp. 318-369 at pp. 347-363 (note that the relevant passage of this essay was not included in the version of it that is reprinted in *The Chomsky Reader*).

18. On public knowledge of and attitudes towards the "Contract With America" -- the policy program advanced in 1994 when the Republicans gained control of Congress -- see for example, Maureen Dowd, "Americans Like G.O.P. Agenda But Split on How to Reach Goals," *New York Times*, December 15, 1994, p. A1 ("Although Mr. Gingrich has been waving around his copy of the Contract with America, which was printed in TV Guide, 72 percent of those polled [by the *New York Times* and C.B.S. News] said they had not read or heard anything about it"); Marc Breslow, "The G.O.P.'s 17% mandate," *Dollars and Sense*, March 1, 1995, p. 43; John Brennan [Director of the *Los Angeles Times* Poll], "Voters Don't Buy Expert Wisdom That Economy's Perking Along," *Los Angeles Times*, November 20, 1994, p. D2. An excerpt:

This October, as the Republican blowout was brewing, 61% still told *The Times* Poll that spending for domestic programs should be increased. Most, including GOP-leaning voters, had never heard of the now-legendary Republican Contract with America. When told it was a mix of tax cuts, more defense spending and a balanced budget amendment, a majority called it "unrealistic."

Richard Morin [Director of the *Washington Post* Poll], "Myths and Messages in the Election Tea Leaves," *Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, November 21-27, 1994, p. 37. An excerpt:

[P]ublic opinion polls and an analysis of [1994 Congressional] election returns suggest that the vote was something less than what Newt Gingrich and his fellow travelers appear to have in store for the country. According to a Time magazine-CNN post-election survey, six out of 10 persons interviewed said the election was a repudiation of the Democrats, while just one out of six said it was an affirmation of the Republican agenda. . . . Republicans claimed about 52 percent of all votes cast for candidates in contested House seats, slightly better than a two-point improvement from 1992.

Richard Berke, "Poll Finds Public Doubts Key Parts Of G.O.P.'s Agenda," *New York Times*, February 28, 1995, p. A1. An excerpt:

Eight weeks after Republicans assumed control of Congress and vowed to make the Government more responsive, Americans are dubious about central elements of the party's legislative agenda. . . . More than half of Americans said they knew nothing about the Contract With America, the House Republicans' political manifesto. But the number of people who had some familiarity with the contract has risen to 45 percent, from 27 percent in December. Even so, Americans -- Democrats and Republicans alike -- disagreed with or were divided over many particulars in the contract. . . .

Despite the contract's call to increase military spending, 63 percent preferred to keep such spending at the current level. Sixty-nine percent of Americans said it was a poor idea for the House to approve, as it did recently, a bill that would allow the police to make searches without having a warrant.

For one of the most fascinating stories about the so-called "Contract," see Knight-Ridder, "G.O.P. Pollster Never Measured Popularity Of 'Contract,' Only Slogans," *Chicago Tribune*, November 12, 1995, p. 7, zone C. An excerpt:

After recent polls suggested that the "Contract With America's" popularity had fallen, House Speaker Newt Gingrich blamed pollsters for asking "totally dishonest" questions. There may be another explanation.

Republican pollster Frank Luntz, a Gingrich protege, never really measured the contract's popularity in the first place, before assuring reporters last September that at least six out of 10 Americans supported each of its 10 main proposals. Instead, in a survey he won't disclose for publication, Luntz merely measured the popularity of the strongest slogans that the contract's drafters could come up with. Luntz now concedes that his methods were flawed, and even some Republicans suspect that public support for the contract was overstated. . . . This month's Wall Street Journal/N.B.C. News survey, for example, finds that by a 45 percent to 35 percent margin, the public disagrees with most of what the House G.O.P. is proposing to do.

On public attitudes remaining stubbornly social-democratic in important respects since the New Deal years of the 1930s, see chapter 1 of *U.P.* and its footnote 7; and footnote 50 of this chapter.

19. For excerpts from the Contract With America, including "The Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act," see David E. Rosenbaum, "The 1994 Campaign: The Republicans," *New York Times*, November 1, 1994, p. A20. The exact words of that paragraph of the Contract:

The Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act. Small business incentives, capital gains cut and indexation, neutral cost recovery, risk assessment/cost-benefit analysis, strengthening the Regulatory Flexibility Act and unfunded mandate reform to create jobs and raise worker wages.

20. On U.S. military spending, see chapter 8 of *U.P.* and its footnote 75.

21. Note that the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941 was not an attack on the United States itself, because Pearl Harbor was a military base on a U.S. colony -- stolen by force and guile from its inhabitants half a century before (as the sources cited below make clear) -- and Hawaii became a State only in 1959.

On the U.S. conquest of Hawaii, see for example, Thomas Hietala, *Manifest Design: Anxious Aggrandizement in Late Jacksonian America*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985; Noel J. Kent, *Hawaii, Islands Under the Influence*, New York: Monthly Review, 1983; Gavan Daws, *Shoal of Time: A History of the Hawaiian Islands*, New York: Macmillan, 1968.

Chomsky notes that the hijacked airplanes that hit the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001, were "something quite new in world affairs, not in their scale and character, but in the target. For the U.S., this is the first time since the War of 1812 that its national territory has been under attack, even threat."

22. On the real purpose of the Pentagon, see chapter 3 of *U.P.*, "Teach-In: Evening."

On tourism, Boeing, and the Pentagon system, see for example, Leslie Albrecht Popiel, "Aircraft Producers Expect to Make \$5.5 Billion Profit," *Christian Science Monitor*, January 20, 1994, p. 8 (quoting Secretary of Transportation Federico Pena: "The aviation industry is critical to our country. . . . It contributes \$80 billion a year to our economy. It plays a significant role in perhaps the world's largest industry . . . the \$3 trillion global travel and tourism industry"); Mark Trumbull, "Boeing's Defense Division Accelerates Out of the Red," *Christian Science Monitor*, December 16, 1993, p. 9 (on the continuing importance of Pentagon contracts to the Boeing Company); Frank Kofsky, *Harry Truman and the War Scare of 1948: A Successful Campaign to Deceive the Nation*, New York: St. Martin's, 1993, especially pp. 13-15, 36-38 (on the publicly-funded development of the aircraft industry generally); Laura D'Andrea Tyson, *Who's Bashing Whom?: Trade Conflict in High-Technology Industries*, Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1992. An excerpt (pp. 157, 169-170):

Both Boeing's monopoly of the wide-body, long-range market and its consequent position in the global industry have their roots in engine technologies and design competitions funded by the U.S. military. . . . During the first twenty years of its existence . . . Boeing ran losses on its commercial operations. . . . Boeing was able to sustain these losses only because of its military operations. At least through the 1960s, endemic market volatility and subcompetitive returns in the commercial aircraft market were offset by market security and often supercompetitive returns in the military market. Operations in the latter market provided an implicit subsidy for operations in the former.

At critical moments, government contracts provided the safety net to catch a plummeting commercial airframe company. . . . Even as late as the early 1980s, for example, the U.S. Air Force bought 60 K.C.-10s, an airplane that was virtually

identical to the D.C.-10 (except for the addition of in-flight refueling equipment). Without this purchase, McDonnell-Douglas would not have been able to keep its D.C.-10 production line open. . . . The N.A.S.A. R & D budget paled in comparison with the explosion of federal funds for defense R & D in aerospace during the postwar period, but N.A.S.A. continued to play an important role through its research installations and its participation in several collaborative R.&D. projects.

See also footnotes 3, 4 and 10 of chapter 3 of *U.P.*

23. On Pentagon spending in the post-Cold War era, see for example, Center for Defense Information, *Defense Monitor*, July 1993, XXI.3, XXII.4 (noting that Clinton's military budget remained above the Cold War average in real dollars); John Aloysius Farrell, "Clinton seen returning to 'New Democrat' stance," *Boston Globe*, December 3, 1994, p. 7 ("The president scored a preemptive political strike on a Republican Congress -- and shored up his status as commander in chief -- by proposing Thursday a \$25 billion hike in defense spending"). See also chapter 3 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 3 and 10; and chapter 8 of *U.P.* and its footnote 75.

24. On tax deductions for home mortgages and other regressive fiscal measures, see for example, Christopher Howard, "The Hidden Side of the American Welfare State," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 108, No. 3, Fall 1993, pp. 403-436 at pp. 416-417 ("Over 80 percent of the tax benefits for home mortgage interest, charitable contributions, and real estate taxes go to those earning more than \$50,000"); Michael Wines, "Taxpayers Are Angry. They're Expensive, Too," *New York Times*, November 20, 1994, section 4, p. 5. An excerpt:

[P]ayments to the poor add up to less than the three largest tax breaks that benefit the middle class and wealthy: deductions for retirement plans, the deduction for home mortgage interest and the exemption of health-insurance premiums that companies pay for their employees. Perhaps more important, most tax breaks and payments to the well-situated are practically exempt from the debate over controlling expenditures.

See also, Nancy Folbre and The Center for Popular Economics, *The New Field Guide to the U.S. Economy*, New York: New Press, 1995, sections 6.7 and 1.2 (adding together the value of direct benefits and tax breaks, an average household with income under \$10,000 received roughly 60 percent of the welfare provided to households with income over \$100,000 in 1991: \$5,700 to \$9,300. Moreover, "The top tax rate on income fell from 90% during the Kennedy years to 31% during the Reagan years").

For a useful discussion of dozens of the primary welfare programs in the U.S. -- from the Pentagon system, to Savings and Loan bailouts, to insurance loopholes, to the "horse write-off," and many others -- see Mark Zepezauer and Arthur Naiman, *Take The Rich Off Welfare*, Tucson, AZ: Odonian, 1996. An excerpt (pp. 6-7, 10, 35-36, 52-53, 70-71, 96):

Welfare for the rich costs us about 3 1/2 times as much as the \$130 billion we spend each year on welfare for the poor -- an amount the 1996 welfare "reform" bill will reduce significantly. . . . \$448 billion greatly understates the amount of money American taxpayers spend each year on welfare for the rich. . . .

Back in the 1950s, U.S. corporations paid 31% of the federal government's general revenues. Today, they pay just 11%. . . . A series of tax "reforms" that began in 1977 have cut the rate paid by the richest Americans nearly in half, while Social Security taxes -- which are paid overwhelmingly by ordinary wage earners (and not paid at all on income over \$62,700) -- have steadily risen. . . . Social

Security tax is a major technique for transferring the tax burden away from the rich. One reason is that it only applies to "earned" income; income from investments is exempt. Another reason is that there's a ceiling -- currently \$62,700 -- on how much earned income is taxed. Anyone who earns \$62,700 or more pays the same Social Security tax Bill Gates does -- needless to say, it amounts to a slightly higher percentage of their income. This makes Social Security one of our most regressive taxes. A family that made the (1993) median income of \$37,800 paid 7.65% of its income in Social Security tax, while one that made ten times as much paid 1.46% and one that made a hundred times as much paid 0.1% (one-tenth of 1%). . . .

Homeowners get five different federal tax breaks that the 40 million American families who rent their homes don't. . . . [T]wo-thirds of the benefits go to families with incomes of \$75,000 or higher. . . . Although about 63 million U.S. families own their homes, only 27 million -- fewer than half -- claimed the mortgage interest deduction in 1994. That's probably because it isn't worth it for most nonwealthy taxpayers to itemize their deductions. What's more, the lower your tax bracket, the less the deduction is worth to you. . . . The National Housing Institute calculates that this deduction cost the Treasury slightly more than \$58 billion in fiscal 1995, and that half that total -- \$29 billion -- went to people with incomes over \$100,000. . . .

Of the U.S.-based transnationals with assets over \$100 million, 37% paid no U.S. federal taxes at all in 1991, and the average tax rate for those that did pay was just 1% of gross receipts! (We'd tell you what it was as a percentage of profits, but nobody knows. That's just the point -- they avoid paying tax by concealing how much profit they make.) Foreign-based transnationals did even better. 71% of them paid no U.S. income tax on their operations in this country, and the average rate for those that did pay was just 0.6% -- *six-tenths of one percent* -- of gross receipts! . . . The [business] meals and entertainment deduction amounts to an annual subsidy of \$5.5 billion for fancy restaurants, golf courses, skyboxes at sports arenas and the like. And it's applied unequally. Factory workers can't deduct meals or sporting events at which they discuss their jobs with colleagues -- nor can any taxpayer who doesn't itemize deductions.

On the regressive changes in the U.S. tax system during the 1980s, see for example, Edward S. Herman, *Beyond Hypocrisy: Decoding the News in an Age of Propaganda*, Montreal: Black Rose, 1992. An excerpt (p. 89):

Between 1980 and 1990, the bottom 20 percent of income recipients had a federal tax rate increase of 16.2 percent; the top 20 percent had a federal tax reduction of 5.5 percent; and the rate for the top 5 percent fell 9.5 percent. The 59 percent of the population in the lower and middle income ranges had a larger federal tax obligation in 1990 than in 1980, despite the Reagan tax cuts, mainly because of the regressive Social Security tax increases. Going back to a 1977 base, 90 percent of U.S. families paid more federal taxes in 1990; federal tax changes since 1977 cost this 90 percent \$25.6 billion, while the richest 10 percent saved \$93.1 billion. According to the Congressional Budget Office, the bottom 20 percent, with an average family income of \$7,725 before taxes, saw their incomes drop 3.2 percent between 1980 and 1990, while the top 20 percent, with an average family income of \$105,209, enjoyed an increase of 31.7 percent, the top 5 percent rising by 46.1 percent.

On the extraordinary efforts of government and right-wing analysts to conceal and distort the economic facts regarding income redistribution in the 1980s, see Paul Krugman, "The Right, the Rich, and the Facts," *American Prospect*, Fall 1992, pp. 19-31.

For more on the regressive nature of the U.S. tax system, see for example, Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein and John Schmitt, *The State of Working America*,

1998-1999, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999, ch. 2; Donald L. Barlett and James B. Steele, *America: Who Really Pays the Taxes?*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994; John F. Witte, *The Politics and Development of the Federal Income Tax*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985, especially section IV. On the Canadian tax system, see for example, Linda McQuaig, *Behind Closed Doors: How the Rich Won Control of Canada's Tax System*, Toronto: Penguin, 1987.

25. For McQuaig's book, see Linda McQuaig, *The Wealthy Banker's Wife: The Assault on Equality in Canada*, Toronto: Penguin, 1993, at p. 121 (estimating that it would cost \$1.5 billion in capital spending to create daycare spaces for the 750,000 Canadian children who currently need them, and comparing this figure to the \$1 billion cost to the federal treasury of business "entertainment" deductions alone).

26. On corporate resistance to eliminating Food Stamps, see for example, Hilary Stout, "GOP Drafting Bill to Reform Welfare Plans," *Wall Street Journal*, January 9, 1995, p. A3.

27. On falling A.F.D.C. benefits from 1970 until the time of the "Welfare Reform Act," see for example, Marc Breslow, "Budget-balancing nonsense: the GOP's contract with the devil," *Dollars and Sense*, March 1, 1995, p. 8 ("the average monthly [A.F.D.C.] benefit level dropped dramatically, from \$714 in 1970 to \$510 in 1980 and \$394 in 1993 (all in 1995 dollars)"); Nancy Folbre and The Center for Popular Economics, *The New Field Guide to the U.S. Economy*, New York: New Press, 1995, section 6.9 (in 1970, welfare benefits averaged about \$622 per family per month, or about 71 percent of the poverty line for a family of three; by 1992, they had fallen to \$374, or about 40 percent of the poverty line (all in 1992 dollars)); Nancy Folbre, "Welfare State of Mind," *Village Voice Literary Supplement*, November 1992, p. 31. An excerpt:

[F]ailure to adjust [welfare] benefits for inflation, combined with recent cuts, have resulted in drastic reductions in Aid to Families With Dependent Children (A.F.D.C.). Between 1970 and 1991, the maximum benefit for a family of three with no other income fell 42 per cent in the typical state, after adjusting for inflation. Today the national average value of A.F.D.C. benefits and food stamps combined is down to the same level (adjusted for inflation) as A.F.D.C. benefits alone in 1960, before the food-stamp program was created. . . .

In 1991, this country spent \$26.2 billion on building and operating prisons and supervising individuals on probation and parole. In the same year, it spent \$22.9 billion on A.F.D.C. There were more than 10 times as many people on A.F.D.C. That's \$1696 a year for A.F.D.C. per person, compared to \$23,818 per prisoner. The point of this comparison is not that prisoners are living high off the hog. It's that experts seem to worry more about the possibility that a welfare recipient might lie in bed watching a soap opera than about the possibility that joblessness and urban degradation might contribute to high crime rates.

For a sense of what these welfare-benefit cuts mean for people living in poverty, see for example, Shlomo Maital and Kim I. Morgan, "Hungry Children Are A Bad Business," *Challenge*, Vol. 35, No. 4, July 1992, p. 54. An excerpt:

The average food stamp benefit per meal is sixty-eight cents. . . . In 1970, New York State considered \$279 [per month] minimally essential for a family of three. The benefit level of A.F.D.C. was set at that level. In 1989, A.F.D.C. paid \$539. This is \$325 short of what it would have been, had the 1970 level been fully adjusted for

inflation. That \$325 shortfall can mean the difference between two meals a day, and one or none, for millions of children. . . .

Once, welfare lifted a family above the poverty line. In 1970 New York State's grant for a family of three was 10 percent more than the poverty line. In 1985, the grant was a third less. . . . Two-thirds of all poor children in New York City are on the A.F.D.C. program. Their cash benefits are only two-thirds of the poverty level. To a welfare family in New York, \$1.96 per person per day is allocated to cover the costs of some food and medical needs (food stamps and Medicaid cover a bit of the rest), clothing, furniture, transportation, school supplies, utensils, and so forth. The original food allocation for a four-person family was \$121 in 1970. In 1974 it was raised to \$137. It has never been increased since. Today, it would cost \$357 to buy the same food originally intended to buy the 1970 "standard of need."

See also footnote 5 of this chapter.

28. Because in Europe many social and family support programs are not income-targeted (i.e., as with Social Security in the U.S., there are not income-based restrictions on recipients), it is difficult to make exact comparisons of international spending levels "for the poor." However, comparison of the impact of social spending on poverty rates reveals a vast difference between the U.S. and other industrialized nations. See for example, Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein and John Schmitt, *The State of Working America, 1998-1999*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999, pp. 375-379 (the U.S. tax and transfer system creates a 28.5 percent reduction in the poverty rate, whereas the tax and transfer systems in all other industrialized countries decrease poverty rates by between 60 and 80 percent, the only exceptions being Britain, Australia and Canada, whose tax and transfer programs still reduce poverty rates by approximately 50 percent). See also footnote 2 of this chapter.

As with domestic poverty-relief programs, U.S. foreign aid also is miserly by international standards. See for example, David Gergen, "America's Missed Opportunities," *Foreign Affairs, America and the World*, 1991-92, pp. 1-19 at p. 4 (in 1989, half of the U.S. public believed that foreign aid was the largest element in the federal budget; in reality, U.S. foreign aid had by then sunk to last place among the industrial countries, barely detectable in the federal budget and a miserly 0.21 percent of Gross National Product); Robin Wright, "Foreign Aid Hits Lowest Level In Two Decades; Other Rich Nations Follow U.S. In Cutting Back While Poverty Spreads, World Surveys Show," *Los Angeles Times*, June 13, 1995, p. 1. An excerpt:

[T]he number of poor around the world has soared to 1.3 billion, about one out of every five, according to the U.N. Development Program. The total is expected to increase to 1.5 billion within the next five years. . . . In 1989, 20% of needs went unmet. In 1994, over half the needs were unmet, [the Agency for International Development] reports. . . . As a percentage of its gross national product, the measure of its economy, the United States is now the lowest aid contributor of the top 21 industrialized nations. The U.N.I.C.E.F. target is for donor states to provide less than 1% -- just 0.70% -- of G.N.P.. The United States gives 0.15%, in contrast with the 0.30% average among the other 20 top donors. . . .

Perhaps ironically, the new reports [documenting these figures] coincide with a new study that finds "a strong majority" of Americans favor either maintaining or increasing U.S. foreign aid. And a strong majority would also be willing to pay more taxes if they believed that more aid would get to the people who need it. . . . The study, conducted by the Center for the Study of Policy Attitudes at the University of

Maryland, concluded that "an overwhelming majority rejects the idea that the United States should only give when it promotes the U.S. national interest."

29. On the plan to remove five million children from the A.F.D.C. program, see for example, Robert Pear, "White House Says Young Will Suffer Under G.O.P. Plan," *New York Times*, December 30, 1994, p. A1. An excerpt:

The Clinton Administration said today that five million children would be dropped from the welfare rolls under House Republican proposals. Republicans who helped write the legislation acknowledged that was a possible result, but asserted that the children would not be harmed.

About 9.7 million children are beneficiaries of the nation's main cash welfare program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children. Donna E. Shalala, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, said her department estimated that more than half of these children -- 5.3 million -- would eventually become ineligible under the bill that House Republicans plan to introduce. . . . An aide to the House Republican leaders acknowledged that . . . "The number 'five million' is approximately correct, but that's at the end of five years."

30. On massive public funding of Gingrich's district, see footnotes 52 and 56 of this chapter.

31. The U.S. prison population quadrupled between 1985 and 1999. See for example, William J. Chambliss, *Power, Politics, and Crime*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999, p. 2. See also, "More than any other democracy," *Economist* (London), March 20, 1999, p. 30. An excerpt:

This week the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that the nation's prison and jail population has increased yet again, by 4.4% to 1.8m in the year to June 1998. This represents slower growth than the annual average of 6.2% since 1990, or the 5.9% growth in 1997. But it is not much of a slowdown. More remarkable is the fact that America's prison population continues to grow at such a steady pace in the teeth of two other facts: rates of reported crime have fallen for each of the past six years, and America has already locked up more people than any country in the world. . . .

Last year one in every 150 American residents (children included) was behind bars. The rate of incarceration, at 668 inmates per 100,000 residents, is five to ten times the rates of countries in Western Europe, six times the rate in Canada and nearly 20 times that in Japan. The number of Americans in prison has nearly quadrupled since 1980 and more than doubled since 1985. Only Russia imprisons a larger proportion of its people but, at the current rate of increase, America should win the top spot in a year or two. Because of its larger population, America already has more people behind bars. . . .

The prison and jail populations have soared not because the police are catching more violent criminals, but because sentences have been lengthened and probation severely curtailed. In addition, there is one type of crime where mass imprisonment seems to have failed abysmally -- illegal drug use. Since America panicked over the crack epidemic ten years ago, toughening drug laws at both the federal and state level, the number of people imprisoned for illegal drug use or trafficking has quadrupled. . . . Despite such large-scale imprisonment, the number of people abusing drugs has not changed since 1988. . . . Blacks comprise 12% of the American population, but represent nearly half of those in prison or jail.

Kathleen Maguire and Ann L. Pastore, eds., *Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1997*, U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998, p. 464, Table 6.1 (in 1997, 1,185,800 adults were in prison and 557,974 in jail, together with 3,261,888 on probation and 685,033 on parole, a total increase of adults under correctional supervision in the U.S. of 88.9 percent since 1985 and 209 percent since 1980).

And see Tom Wicker, "The Iron Medal," *New York Times*, January 9, 1991, p. A21. An excerpt:

[T]he National Council on Crime and Delinquency . . . discloses that in 1987, when about 340,000 Americans were sent to the slam, 65 percent of them went in not for murder, rape or assault but for property, drug and public disorder crimes. An additional 15 percent, making 80 percent of the total, had only violated parole conditions -- "e.g. curfew violations, failure to participate in a program, evidence of drug use, etc."

U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, *Prisoners in 1993*, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1994, p. 13, Table 18 (84 percent of the increase in state and federal prison admissions since 1980 is attributable to nonviolent offenders).

32. For specific figures on imprisonment in the U.S., see footnote 31 of this chapter. For a comparison of international prison populations, see for example, Marc Mauer, "Americans Behind Bars -- A Comparison of International Rates of Incarceration," in Ward Churchill and J.J. Vander Wall, eds., *Cages of Steel: The Politics of Imprisonment in the United States*, Washington: Mazonneuve, 1992, pp. 22-37. An excerpt (p. 26):

The United States now has the world's highest known rate of incarceration, with 426 prisoners per 100,000 population. South Africa is second in the world with a rate of 333 per 100,000, and the Soviet Union third with 268 per 100,000 population. . . . Black males in the United States are incarcerated at a rate four times that of black males in South Africa, 3,109 per 100,000, compared to 729 per 100,000. . . . The total cost of incarcerating the more than one million Americans in prisons and jails is now \$16 billion a year. . . . [N]o other nation for which incarceration rates are known even approaches these levels. Rates of incarceration for western Europe are generally in the range of 35-120 per 100,000, and for most countries in Asia, in the range of 21-140 per 100,000.

See also, Marc Mauer and The Sentencing Project, *Race to Incarcerate*, New York: New Press, 1999, Table 2-1 and Figures 2-3 and 2-4 (listing international rates of incarceration and of victimization).

33. On U.S. prisons being condemned for torture by human rights groups, see for example, <http://www.amnesty-usa.org>; Amnesty International, *United States of America: Rights For All*, New York: Amnesty International Publications, 1998, ch. 4 ("Violations In Prisons and Jails: Needless Brutality"); Amnesty International, *Betraying the Young: Human Rights Violations Against Children in the U.S. Justice System*, New York: Amnesty International U.S.A., 1998; Amnesty International, *The High Security Unit, Lexington Federal Prison, Kentucky* (A.I. Index: AMR 51/34/88), New York, 1988; Amnesty International, *Allegations of Inmate Treatment in Marion Prison, Illinois, U.S.A.* (A.I. Index: AMR 51/261/87), New York, May 1987; "The United States of America," in Amnesty International, *The 1996 Report on Human Rights Around the World*, New York: Hunter House, 1996. An excerpt (pp. 314-315):

In January a federal court ordered the authorities to discontinue what it described as a pattern of brutality and neglect at Pelican Bay State Prison, California, including repeated assaults on prisoners by guards; the punitive shackling of inmates to toilets or other cell fixtures; and grossly inadequate medical and mental health care. The court also stated that conditions in the prison's Special Housing Unit (S.H.U.), where inmates were isolated in sealed, windowless cells with no work, educational or recreational programs, "may press the outer bounds of what most humans can physically tolerate. . . ." Chain-gangs, last used in the U.S.A. 30 years ago, were reintroduced into the prison systems of Alabama, Arizona and Florida and legislation permitting the use of chain-gangs was passed in Utah. The practice -- in which prisoners are shackled together with leg-irons and forced to do hard labour such as rock-breaking for hours at a time -- constitutes cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.

See also, Ward Churchill and J.J. Vander Wall, eds., *Cages of Steel: The Politics of Imprisonment in the United States*, Washington: Maisonneuve, 1992.

34. On imprisonment for drug crimes, see for example, William J. Chambliss, *Power, Politics, and Crime*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999, ch. 4; William J. Chambliss, "Don't Confuse Me With Facts: Clinton 'Just Says No,'" *New Left Review*, March/April 1994, pp. 113-126. An excerpt (pp. 114-115):

Drug arrests were the third most frequent category of arrests [in 1992], behind larceny (1,504,500) and driving under the influence (1,624,500). Over two-thirds (68 per cent) of the drug arrests in 1992 were for possession and less than one-third (32 per cent) for the sale or manufacture of drugs. Marijuana arrests accounted for 32 per cent of the total, heroin and cocaine for 53 per cent; the remainder of the drug arrests were for synthetic or "other dangerous drugs."

In 1992, 58 per cent of the inmates in federal prisons and over 30 per cent of state prisoners were sentenced for drug offenses. Approximately one-third of these are sentenced for marijuana and other drugs, two-thirds for heroin and cocaine: official reports make no distinction between these two but it is certain that the vast bulk of these arrests are for cocaine. Over 21 per cent of all federal prisoners are "low-level drug offenders" with no current or prior violent offenses on their records, no involvement in sophisticated criminal activity and no previous prison time. Austin and Irwin [in *Who Goes to Prison?*, San Francisco: National Council on Crime and Delinquency, 1989] estimate that over 50 per cent of the prisoners in state and federal prisons are in for offenses which opinion surveys show the general public think are "not very serious crimes."

U.S. Department of Justice, *An Analysis of Nonviolent Drug Offenders with Minimal Criminal Histories*, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 4, 1994 (in the federal system, 89 percent of inmates are convicted of nonviolent offenses; in 1992, federal prisons held about 1,800 people convicted of murder for an average time served of 4.5 years, and 12,727 nonviolent first-time drug offenders for an average time served of 6.5 years). See also, Michael Tonry, *Malign Neglect -- Race, Crime, and Punishment in America*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, chs. 1 and 3; Marc Mauer and The Sentencing Project, *Race to Incarcerate*, New York: New Press, 1999, p. 81 ("Over half of all state and federal prison inmates are currently serving time for a non-violent drug or property offense").

Chomsky remarks on how public attitudes were developed for the so-called "Drug War" (*Deterring Democracy*, New York: Hill and Wang, 1991, p. 120):

Shortly after the November 1988 elections, 34 percent of the U.S. public had selected the budget deficit as "George Bush's No. 1 priority once he takes office." Three percent had selected drugs as top priority, down from previous months. After the ["War on Drugs"] media blitz of September 1989, "a remarkable 43% say that drugs are the nation's single most important issue," the *Wall Street Journal* reports, with the budget deficit a distant second at 6 percent. In a June 1987 poll of registered voters in New York, taxes were selected as the number 1 issue facing the state (15 percent), with drugs far down the list (5 percent). A repeat in September 1989 gave dramatically different results: taxes were selected by 8 percent while the drug problem ranked far above any other, at a phenomenal 46 percent. The real world had hardly changed; its image had, as transmitted through the ideological institutions, reflecting the current needs of power.

35. On the federal sentencing ratio for crack and powder cocaine, see for example, Steven R. Donziger, ed., *The Real War on Crime: The Report of the National Criminal Justice Commission*, New York: HarperCollins, 1996, pp. 99-129. An excerpt (pp. 118-119).

[After passage of the federal law imposing strict mandatory sentences for possessing or selling crack,] penalties for the use of "crack" cocaine became up to 100 times harsher than the penalties for powder cocaine. Under federal law, possession of five grams of crack cocaine became a felony that carried a *mandatory minimum* sentence of five years, while possession of the same amount of powder cocaine remained a misdemeanor punishable by a *maximum* of one year. Both before and after the law was passed, about 90 percent of "crack" arrests were of African-Americans while 75 percent of arrests for powder cocaine were of whites.

[The media has] trumpeted crack cocaine as a highly addictive drug that ha[s] the potential to destroy communities and wreak wanton violence, but careful research now tells us that this was largely myth. Although some claim that smoking crack cocaine produces a quicker and higher high, the evidence of meaningful pharmacological difference between crack and powder cocaine is exceedingly thin. The violence associated with crack stems more from turf battles between police and crack dealers, and among crack dealers battling to control lucrative markets, than from the narcotic effect of crack itself.

United States v. Armstrong, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 1492-1493 (1996)(Stevens, J., dissenting).

An excerpt:

[T]he Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 and subsequent legislation established a regime of extremely high penalties for the possession and distribution of so-called "crack" cocaine. Those provisions treat one gram of crack as the equivalent of 100 grams of powder cocaine. . . . These penalties result in sentences for crack offenders that average three to eight times longer than sentences for comparable powder offenders. . . . [I]t is undisputed that the brunt of the elevated federal penalties falls heavily on blacks. While 65% of the persons who have used crack are white, in 1993 they represented only 4% of the federal offenders convicted of trafficking in crack. Eighty-eight percent of such defendants were black.

On myths about crack, see for example, Craig Reinerman and Harry G. Levine, eds., *Crack In America: Demon Drugs and Social Justice*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997 (on the myth about crack and violence, see ch. 6; on crack's pharmacology, see ch. 7).

36. On the origins of U.S. marijuana prohibitions, see for example, Charles H. Whitebread and Richard J. Bonnie, *The Marihuana Conviction: A History of the Marihuana Prohibition in the United States*, Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1974, ch. 2. An excerpt (pp. 38-39):

Mexican immigration during the first third of the twentieth century increased enormously; the Bureau of Immigration records the entry of 590,765 Mexicans from 1915 to 1930. Two-thirds of these people remained in Texas. The others settled in states in the Rocky Mountain area, most of them as farm laborers. During this period practically every state west of the Mississippi River passed antimarihuana legislation. . . . Whether motivated by outright ethnic prejudice or by simple discriminatory lack of interest, the proceedings before each legislature [involved] . . . little if any public attention and no debate. Pointed references were made to the drug's Mexican origins, and sometimes to the criminal conduct which inevitably followed when Mexicans used the "killer weed."

Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair, *Whiteout: The C.I.A., Drugs and the Press*, London: Verso, 1998, pp. 70f. An excerpt (pp. 71-72):

In 1930 a new department of the federal government, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, was formed under the leadership of Harry Anslinger to carry on the war against drug users. Anslinger, another racist, was an adroit publicist and became the prime shaper of American attitudes to drug addiction, hammering home his view that this was not a treatable addiction but one that could only be suppressed by harsh criminal sanctions. Anslinger's first major campaign was to criminalize the drug commonly known at the time as hemp. But Anslinger renamed it "marijuana" to associate it with Mexican laborers who, like the Chinese before them, were unwelcome competitors for scarce jobs in the Depression. Anslinger claimed that marijuana "can arouse in blacks and Hispanics a state of menacing fury or homicidal attack. During this period, addicts have perpetrated some of the most bizarre and fantastic offenses and sex crimes known to police annals." Anslinger linked marijuana with jazz and persecuted many black musicians, including Thelonius Monk, Dizzy Gillespie and Duke Ellington. Louis Armstrong was also arrested on drug charges, and Anslinger made sure his name was smeared in the press. In Congress he testified that "[c]olors with big lips lure white women with jazz and marijuana. . . ." In 1951 Anslinger worked with Democrat Hale Boggs to marshal through Congress the first minimum mandatory sentences for drug possession.

Craig Reinerman and Harry G. Levine, "Crack in Context: politics and media in the making of a drug scare," *Contemporary Drug Problems*, Winter 1989, pp. 535-577. An excerpt:

[I]n 1937, Congress passed the Marijuana Tax Act. This first federal law against marijuana was the result of a marijuana scare orchestrated by yet another moral entrepreneur -- Harry Anslinger, the chief of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. Before the scare began, there was no evidence of widespread marijuana use, almost no coverage of marijuana in the press, and little, if any, agitation for a clampdown. However, in the midst of the Great Depression, the bureau had endured four straight years of budget cuts, and with opiates and cocaine already outlawed, Anslinger felt he needed a new villain to justify the bureau's existence. Anslinger circulated to newspapers across the nation an unsubstantiated tale of a Florida youth who had murdered his entire family, allegedly under the influence of the "killer weed." After the story had been reprinted in many newspapers, Anslinger held up the clippings before Congress as evidence of the need for a new federal law. This scare too tapped racial fears: the "killer weed," it was said, made Mexicans, in particular, violent.

Kathleen Auerhahn, "The Split Labor Market and the Origins of Antidrug Legislation in the United States," *Law and Social Inquiry* (Journal of the American Bar Foundation), Vol. 24, No. 2, Spring 1999, pp. 411-440 (excellent survey of the history of U.S. opium, cocaine, alcohol and marijuana prohibitions, with numerous references to contemporary sources); Laura M. Rojas, "California's Compassionate Use Act and the Federal Government's Medical Marijuana Policy," *McGeorge Law Review* (University of the Pacific), Vol. 30, No. 4, Summer 1999, pp. 1373-1459 at pp. 1376-1381 (discussing the history of marijuana prohibitions); Craig Reinerman and Harry G. Levine, eds., *Crack In America: Demon Drugs and Social Justice*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997, ch. 1; John Kaplan, *Marijuana -- the new prohibition*, New York: World Publishing, 1970.

37. On the class and racial aspect of Prohibition and early drug laws in the U.S., see for example, Kathleen Auerhahn, "The Split Labor Market and the Origins of Antidrug Legislation in the United States," *Law and Social Inquiry* (Journal of the American Bar Foundation), Vol. 24, No. 2, Spring 1999, pp. 411-440. An excerpt (pp. 430-431):

The saloons were not targeted simply out of convenience. In addition to being retail outlets for alcoholic beverages, saloons performed an important function for the immigrant working class in the northern cities. There were intimate connections between saloon owners and political machines, and saloons offered a place where the community could gather and make business deals, plan political strategies, and generally develop as a *community*. . . . The combination of economic threat, political threat, and the potential to organize (to a greater extent than they already had) practically *begged* a social control response from native-born Americans.

Craig Reinerman and Harry G. Levine, "Crack in Context: politics and media in the making of a drug scare," *Contemporary Drug Problems*, Winter 1989, pp. 535-577. An excerpt:

In the first two decades of the 20th century . . . [m]any corporate supporters of prohibition argued that traditional working-class drinking interfered with the rhythms of the modern factory and thus with productivity and profits. To earlier fears of the barroom as a breeding ground of immorality was added the idea of the saloon as alien and subversive. Prohibitionists argued that saloons were where unions organized, where socialists and anarchists found new recruits. For the corporate and political elite, and for much of the old business middle class and the new professional middle class, clamping down on drinking and saloons was part of a much broader strategy of social control, a quest for "order. . . ."

The first law against opium smoking in the U.S. was much more the result of anti-Chinese agitation in California in the 1870s than it was of troublesome opium smoking. Chinese immigrants had been brought in as "coolies" to help build the railroad and work the mines. Many brought the practice of opium smoking with them. But when the railroad was completed and the gold ran out, recession set in. White workers found themselves competing with lower-paid Chinese workers for scarce jobs and viewed the Chinese as an economic threat. The campaign against smoking opium (but not against other, non-Chinese uses of opiates) included lurid newspaper accusations of Chinese men drugging white women into sexual slavery. . . . Broader political and racial issues were also factors in the earliest cocaine scare, which led to the first federal drug law, the Harrison Act of 1914. Just as the current scare blossomed only after the practice of cocaine smoking spread to lower-class, inner-

city blacks and Hispanics, so did class and racial fears fuel the first cocaine scare. . . . As medical historian David Musto has shown, this first cocaine scare was not primarily a response to cocaine use or opiate addiction, or to any drug-related crime wave; rather, says Musto, it was animated by "white alarm" about "black rebellion" against segregation and oppression.

For an early example of a sensationalist report of cocaine use by blacks, see Edward Huntington Williams, M.D., "Negro Cocaine 'Fiends' Are A New Southern Menace," *New York Times*, February 8, 1914, p. 12. An excerpt:

[T]here is no escaping the conviction that drug taking has become a race menace in certain regions south of the line. . . . [T]he negro drug "fiend" uses cocaine almost exclusively. . . . [He is] likely to have peculiar delusions, and develop hallucinations of an unpleasant character. He imagines that he hears people taunting or abusing him, and this often incites homicidal attacks upon innocent and unsuspecting victims. But the drug produces several other conditions that make the "fiend" a peculiarly dangerous criminal. One of these conditions is a temporary immunity to shock -- a resistance to the "knock down" effects of fatal wounds. Bullets fired into vital parts, that would drop a sane man in his tracks, fail to check the "fiend" -- fail to stop his rush or weaken his attack. . . .

A recent experience of Chief of Police Lyerly of Asheville, N.C., illustrates this particular phase of cocainism. The Chief was informed that a hitherto inoffensive negro, with whom he was well acquainted, was "running amuck" in a cocaine frenzy, had attempted to stab a storekeeper, and was at the moment engaged in "beating up" the various members of his own household. Being fully aware of the respect that the negro has for brass buttons, (and, incidentally, having a record for courage), the officer went single-handed to the negro's house for the purpose of arresting him. But when he arrived there the negro had completed the beatings and left the place. A few moments later, however, the man returned, and entered the room where the Chief was waiting for him, concealed behind a door. When the unsuspecting negro reached the middle of the room, the officer closed the door to prevent his escape, and informed him quietly that he was under arrest, and asked him to come to the station. In reply the crazed negro drew a long knife, grappled with the officer, and slashed him viciously across the shoulder. Knowing that he must kill the man or be killed himself, the Chief drew his revolver, placed the muzzle over the negro's heart, and fired -- "intending to kill him right quick," as the officer tells it. But the shot did not even stagger the man. And a second shot that pierced the arm and entered the chest had just as little effect in stopping the negro or checking his attack. Meanwhile, the Chief, out of the corner of his eye, saw infuriated negroes rushing toward the cabin from all directions. He had only three cartridges remaining in his gun, and he might need those in a minute to stop the mob. So he saved his ammunition and "finished the man with his club."

38. On racial disparities in the criminal justice system, see for example, *Harvard Law Review*, "Developments in the Law -- Race and the Criminal Process," Vol. 101, No. 7, May 1988, pp. 1473-1641 (comprehensive dissection of racial discrimination in the criminal justice system, determining that there is evidence that discrimination exists against African-Americans at almost every stage of the criminal justice process); Steven R. Donziger, ed., *The Real War on Crime: The Report of the National Criminal Justice Commission*, New York: HarperCollins, 1996, especially ch. 4. This book analyzes the discrepancy between African American or Hispanic and White crime and incarceration

rates, and examines the influence of race at each stage of the criminal justice system. An excerpt (pp. 102-103, 115-116; emphasis in original):

African-American males make up less than 7 percent of the U.S. population, yet they comprise almost half of the prison and jail population. In 1992, 56 percent of all African-American men aged 18 to 35 in Baltimore were under some form of criminal justice supervision on any given day. In the District of Columbia, the figure was 42 percent. One out of every three African-American men between the ages of 20 and 29 in the entire country -- including suburban and rural areas -- was under some form of criminal justice supervision in 1994. . . . In 1992, 29 percent of prison admissions were white, while 51 percent were African-American and 20 percent were Hispanic. Almost three out of four prison admissions today are either African-American or Hispanic. Ninety percent of the prison admissions for drug offenses are African-American or Hispanic. . . .

African-American arrest rates for drugs during the height of the "drug war" in 1989 were five times higher than arrest rates for whites *even though whites and African-Americans were using drugs at the same rate*. African-Americans make up 12 percent of the U.S. population and constitute 13 percent of all monthly drug users, but represent 35 percent of those arrested for drug possession, 55 percent of those convicted of drug possession, and 74 percent of those sentenced to prison for drug possession. . . . Between 1985 and 1989, the number of African-American arrests for drug offenses nationwide more than doubled from 210,000 to 452,000, while the number of white arrests grew by only 27 percent. . . . In New York City, 92 percent of drug arrests were of African-Americans or Hispanics. In St. Paul, African-Americans were 26 times as likely to be arrested on a drug charge as whites.

Craig Reinerman and Harry G. Levine, eds., *Crack In America: Demon Drugs and Social Justice*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997, ch. 13. An excerpt (pp. 262-264):

If we turn the clock back just about fifty years, whites constituted approximately 77% of all prisoners in America, while blacks were only 22%. . . . Notice that in the last half century, the incarceration rate of African-Americans in relation to whites has gone up dramatically. In 1933, blacks were incarcerated at a rate almost three times that of whites. In 1950, the ratio had increased to approximately four times; in 1960, it was almost five times; in 1970, it was six times; and in 1989, it was seven times that of whites. During the last two decades, we have seen the greatest shift in the racial composition of the inmates of our prisons in all of U.S. history. According to our most recent figures, 45% of those in our state and federal prisons are African-American. . .

There is now a near complete consensus among criminologists that drug control strategies account for most of the increase of the U.S. prison population of the last decade. As late as 1980, only 25% of the federal prison population was incarcerated for drug charges. By January 1992, this figure had more than doubled to 58%. . . . According to the government's own best statistics, blacks constitute only 15-20% of the nation's drug users, but in most urban areas, they constitute half to two-thirds of those arrested for drug offenses.

Michael Tonry, *Malign Neglect -- Race, Crime, and Punishment in America*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, ch. 2.

Other prominent studies of the criminalization of minorities, arriving at similar conclusions, include those conducted by the following organizations: The Sentencing Project, 1995; Federal Court Special Master in Duval County, Florida, 1993; National Council on Crime and Delinquency, 1992; National Center on Institutions and

Alternatives, 1992; Rand Corporation, 1990; The Sentencing Project, 1989; California Attorney General's Office, 1987; Blumstein and Graddy/Carnegie-Mellon, 1983.

39. On the O.E.C.D. study, see for example, Apolinar Biaz-Callejas [of the Andean Commission of Jurists and Latin American Association for Human Rights], "Violence in Colombia, its History," *Latin America News Update* (Chicago, IL), Vol. 10, No. 12, December 1994, pp. 19-20 (from *Excelsior* of Mexico City, October 14, 1994). An excerpt:

According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the money produced by drug trafficking throughout the world reached \$460 billion in 1993, of which the U.S. received \$260 billion, which is circulated through its financial system, as contraband, and through other ways. Colombia, as a producer-exporter, gets only \$5 to \$7 billion, or 2 to 3% of what remains in the U.S. The big business is, therefore, in that country.

See also, Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair, *Whiteout: The C.I.A., Drugs and the Press*, London: Verso, 1998, pp. 365-371.

40. On the elimination of Operation Greenback, see for example, Jefferson Morley, "Contradictions Of Cocaine Capitalism," *Nation*, October 2, 1989, pp. 341-347. See also, Craig Reinerman and Harry G. Levine, eds., *Crack In America: Demon Drugs and Social Justice*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997, pp. 282-283.

41. On the C.I.A.'s study, see for example, Nicholas C. McBride, "Bill would regulate chemical exports," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 27, 1988, p. 3. An excerpt:

A report obtained from the Central Intelligence Agency says that since 1983, there has been a sharp increase in Latin American imports of chemicals used to manufacture illegal drugs, among other purposes. It concludes that the imports far exceed those necessary for legitimate uses. Most of the chemicals are produced in the U.S. . . . "Ninety-five percent of the chemicals necessary to manufacture cocaine in Latin America originate in the United States," says Gene R. Haislip, a deputy assistant administrator for the federal Drug Enforcement Administration.

Douglas Jehl, "Cocaine Has A Made In U.S.A. Label; American Firms Make Most Of The Solvents That Routinely Wind Up In Colombian Cocaine Labs -- That Chemical Trail Is Surprisingly Easy To Follow," *Los Angeles Times*, December 5, 1989, p. A1; Brook Larmer, "U.S., Mexico Try to Halt Chemical Flow to Cartels: Latin drug lords rely almost wholly on U.S-made products to turn coca into cocaine," *Christian Science Monitor*, October 23, 1989, p. 1.

42. For Chambliss's studies, see William J. Chambliss, *Power, Politics, and Crime*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999, ch. 3; William J. Chambliss, "Policing the Ghetto Underclass: The Politics of Law and Law Enforcement," *Social Problems*, Vol. 41, No. 2, May 1994, pp. 177-194. An excerpt (pp. 177-180):

For the past several years my students and I have been riding with the Rapid Deployment Unit (R.D.U.) of the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police. . . . They patrol what Wilson calls the urban ghetto: that is, the area of the city where 40 percent of the black population lives below the poverty level. The R.D.U. organizes its efforts at crime control around three distinct activities: the "rip," vehicular stops, and serving warrants. The "rip" involves the use of undercover agents to buy drugs

and to identify the person who sold the drugs. . . . The following field notes illustrate how this is done . . .:

"It is 10:25 at night when an undercover agent purchases \$50 of crack cocaine from a young black male. The agent calls us and tells us that the suspect has just entered a building and gone into an apartment. We go immediately to the apartment; the police enter without warning with their guns drawn. Small children begin to scream and cry. The adults in the apartment are thrown to the floor, the police are shouting, the three women in the apartment are swearing and shouting 'You can't just barge in here like this . . . where is your goddam warrant?' The suspect is caught and brought outside. The identification is made and the suspect is arrested. The suspect is sixteen years old. While the suspect is being questioned one policeman says: 'I should kick your little black ass right here for dealing this shit. You are a worthless little scumbag, do you realize that?' Another officer asks: 'What is your mother's name, son? My mistake . . . she is probably a whore and you are just a ghetto bastard. Am I right?' The suspect is cooperative and soft spoken. He does not appear to be menacing or a threat. He offers no resistance. The suspect's demeanor seems to cause the police officers to become more abusive verbally. The suspect is handled very roughly. Handcuffs are cinched tightly and he is shoved against the patrol car. His head hits the door frame of the car as he is pushed into the back seat of the patrol car. One of the officers comments that it is nice to make 'a clean arrest.'" When asked whether it is legal to enter a home without a warrant, the arresting officer replies: "This is Southeast [Washington] and the Supreme Court has little regard for little shit like busting in on someone who just committed a crime involving drugs. . . . Who will argue for the juvenile in this case? No one can and no one will."

Chambliss's and his students' field notes also recount "commonplace" stops of "any car with young black men in it," suspicionless searches conducted upon coerced "consent," and similar conduct in poor African-American neighborhoods. In contrast, they report that policing in the predominantly white sections of Washington takes "an entirely different approach."

See also, Charles J. Ogletree et al., *Beyond the Rodney King Story: An Investigation of Police Conduct in Minority Communities*, Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1995; Craig Reinerman and Harry G. Levine, eds., *Crack In America: Demon Drugs and Social Justice*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997, ch. 11.

43. On the elimination of Pell Grants to prisoners, see for example, Sheryl Stolberg, "School's Out For Convicts," *Los Angeles Times*, September 14, 1995, p. A1. An excerpt:

Last year, Congress cut off the federal grant money . . . [which] 27,000 inmates across America . . . had used to go to college. The ban on prisoners' use of Pell grants -- which are intended to help indigent students -- was adopted quietly, as an amendment to 1994's anti-crime legislation. . . . [R]esearch has repeatedly shown that education -- and in particular, higher education -- helps keep former inmates out of trouble. While national recidivism rates hover around 60%, a Texas study found that only 13.7% of inmates who earned an associate of arts degree returned to prison; the figure was 5.6% for those who earned a bachelor's degree. In New York, 45% of offenders without college degrees returned, compared to 26% of those who got diplomas in prison. . . .

The prisoners' share of the [Pell Grants] program was small. The 27,000 who received Pell funds in the 1993-94 academic year comprised fewer than 1% of

recipients. The government spent \$35 million on them, as compared to \$6 billion for the entire program. [Congressional Republicans] argued that criminals were taking away grant money from "the honest and hard-working." That is not true, says [Assistant Secretary for Post-Secondary Education of the Department of Education David] Longanecker. Pell grants are an entitlement program. That means that anyone who is eligible is approved. If applicants exceed budget estimates, the government has traditionally allocated more money.

44. On "crime control" spending approaching the scale of Pentagon spending, compare U.S. Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for F. Y. 1995*, Washington: Office of the Comptroller of the Department of Defense, March 1994, p. 147, Table 7-1 (\$100 billion of public money is spent on law enforcement every year, and an additional \$65 billion is spent on private security); with Anthony Lewis, "The Defense Anomaly," *New York Times*, January 22, 1996, p. A15 (the U.S. defense budget is approximately \$265 billion). See also, Paulette Thomas, "Making Crime Pay: Triangle of Interests Creates Infrastructure to Fight Lawlessness," *Wall Street Journal*, May 12, 1994, p. A1.

45. On the Fresno S.W.A.T. patrols, see for example, B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., "Fresno Puts SWAT Teams On The Streets Full Time," *Portland Oregonian*, December 18, 1994, p. A29 ("the SWAT squads . . . were ordered onto the streets full time, their booted, masked, heavily armed presence bringing a war-zone feel to this Central California community of 400,000").

46. On the poor being disproportionately victimized by violent and other crime, see for example, Bureau of Justice Statistics, *Criminal Victimization in the United States, 1994*, Washington: U.S. Department of Justice, May 1997. An excerpt (pp. viii-ix, 19):

Males, blacks, Hispanics, the young, the poor, and inner city dwellers were the most vulnerable to crime. . . . Blacks were more likely than whites or persons of other races -- Asians or Native Americans -- to be victims of robbery or aggravated assault. . . . Hispanics had higher violent crime [victimization] rates than Non-Hispanics. . . . Persons from households with lower incomes were more vulnerable to violent crime than those from higher income households. Persons with household incomes of less than \$15,000 per year had significantly higher violent crime [victimization] rates for all categories of violent crime when compared with those who had household incomes of \$15,000 or more per year. . . .

Minorities, urban dwellers, and those who rent their homes experienced the highest rates of property crime. The impact of income varied, depending on the type of property crime. Black households suffered higher rates of property victimization for all property crime than did white households (341 versus 302 per 1,000 households, respectively). Hispanic households had a significantly higher rate of property crime victimization than non-Hispanics (426 incidents per 1,000 households versus 298, respectively). Households earning \$50,000 or more annually had a theft rate 50% higher than those households earning less than \$7,500 annually. Households earning under \$7,500 a year suffered almost twice the rate of household burglary compared to those with the highest annual earnings.

For some context regarding the economic costs of "street" crimes, see for example, Russel Mokhiber, "Underworld U.S.A.," *In These Times*, April 1, 1996, pp. 14-16. An excerpt:

[L]ess than one half of 1 percent (250) of the criminal indictments (51,253) brought by the Department [of Justice] in 1994 involved environmental crimes, occupational safety and health crimes, and crimes involving product and consumer safety issues. . . .

The F.B.I. reports burglary and robbery combined cost the nation about \$4 billion in 1995. In contrast, white-collar fraud, generally committed by intelligent people of means -- such as doctors, lawyers, accountants and businessmen -- alone costs an estimated 50 times as much -- \$200 billion a year, according to W. Steve Albrecht, a professor of accountancy at Brigham Young University. . . . The F.B.I. puts the street homicide rate at about 24,000 a year. But the Labor Department reports that more than twice that number -- 56,000 Americans -- die every year on the job or from occupational diseases such as black lung, brown lung, asbestosis and various occupationally induced cancers. Even these figures, which scarcely meet with any serious public attention or debate, don't get at the full scale of the problem. Most corporate wrongdoing and violence gets unreported.

Nancy Folbre and The Center for Popular Economics, *The New Field Guide to the U.S. Economy*, New York: New Press, 1995. An excerpt (section 6.10):

In 1992, *Business Week* estimated that poverty-related crime in the U.S. cost the country \$50 billion and that productive employment for the poor could generate \$60 billion. In that year, additional public transfers of \$45.8 billion could have brought the incomes of all families over the poverty line. That \$45.8 billion represented: less than 1% of gross domestic product [or] about 15% of military spending. Poverty among children could have been eliminated by transfers of little more than half that amount -- \$28 billion. According to the Congressional Budget Office, the U.S. could easily have raised that amount of money simply by taxing the richest 1% of Americans at the same rates in effect in 1977 [see Christopher Farrell et al., "The Economic Crisis of Urban America," *Business Week*, May 18, 1992, pp. 38f at p. 40].

47. On declining violent crime rates, see for example, Steven R. Donziger, ed., *The Real War on Crime: The Report of the National Criminal Justice Commission*, New York: HarperCollins, 1996. An excerpt (p. 3):

[S]ince the early 1970s, crime rates have remained remarkably stable [in the U.S.] even though they sometimes go up or down from year to year. The murder rate in this country dropped 9 percent from 1980 to 1992 and now is almost exactly the same as it was in the 1970s. The serious violent crime rate for the United States stands 16 percent below its peak level of the mid-1970s.

Keith Bradsher, "Serious Crime Is Still Declining, But Fears Remain, F.B.I. Reports," *New York Times*, December 5, 1994, p. A14.

See also, Robert S. Lichter and Linda S. Lichter, eds., *Media Monitor: 1993 -- The Year in Review*, Washington: Center for Media and Public Affairs, Vol. VIII, No. 1, January/February 1994 (coverage of crime on the three major U.S. television news shows tripled from 571 stories in 1991 to 1,632 stories in 1993, despite the fact that crime declined slightly over that period); William J. Chambliss, "Policing the Ghetto Underclass: The Politics of Law and Law Enforcement," *Social Problems*, Vol. 41, No. 2, May 1994, pp. 177-194 at p. 191 ("the media ha[ve] become so dependent on crime news in recent years that in 1993 crime was the most frequently reported subject on television news"); Marc Mauer and The Sentencing Project, *Race to Incarcerate*, New York: New Press, 1999, p. 93 ("despite significant declines in crime in the 1990s . . . [a 1997 Harris poll] found that 67 percent of U.S. citizens thought that violent crime was

increasing, while a Time/C.N.N. poll the same year showed that half the public believed crime would be worse in their communities by the year 2000").

48. On international crime rates, see for example, Steven R. Donziger, ed., *The Real War on Crime: The Report of the National Criminal Justice Commission*, New York: HarperCollins, 1996. An excerpt (pp. 10-11):

Although it is often assumed that the United States has a high rate of incarceration because of a high crime rate, in reality the overall rate of crime in this country is not extraordinary. The one exception is murder. Largely because of the prevalence of firearms, we have about 22,000 homicides per year, about 10 times the per capita murder rate of most European countries. . . . [However,] it is not our higher violent crime rates that lead to our high incarceration rates -- the 22,000 homicides per year cannot account for the 1.5 million people behind bars. Rather, American rates of incarceration are higher because of our exceedingly harsh treatment of people convicted of lesser crimes. . . . Criminologists in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom recently compared crime across industrialized countries. With the exception of homicide, the United States had the highest crime rate in only one of the fourteen offenses measured -- attempted burglary.

49. On declining welfare rates, see footnotes 27, 28 and 5 of this chapter.

50. On "welfare" versus "assistance to the poor," see for example, Nancy Folbre, "Welfare State of Mind," *Village Voice Literary Supplement*, November 1992, p. 31. An excerpt:

Even many fair-minded, kindhearted ordinary people have become persuaded that welfare is a cause of poverty, not a means of coping with it. The best evidence of this comes from a poll recently published in *The New York Times*. When asked whether we are spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on "welfare," 44 per cent of all respondents said "too much" and 23 per cent said "too little." When the phrase "assistance to the poor" was substituted for "welfare," the percentage who said "too much" dropped to 13. The percentage who said "too little" increased to 64.

Jason DeParle, "The 1994 Election: Issues; Momentum Builds for Cutting Back Welfare System," *New York Times*, November 13, 1994, p. 1 ("the same voters who clamor in opinion polls for a crackdown on 'welfare spending' show much less support when the issue is defined as 'reducing aid to the poor,' especially poor children").

For a study of how the British press and politicians led a successful campaign to dismantle the welfare consensus in England, see Peter Golding and Sue Middleton, *Images of Welfare: Press and Public Attitudes to Poverty*, Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982.

51. For an estimate of the public relations industry's spending, see John C. Stauber and Sheldon Rampton, *Toxic Sludge Is Good For You!: Lies, Damn Lies and the Public Relations Industry*, Monroe, ME: Common Courage, 1995, p. 13 (citing \$10 billion as a "conservative estimate" of the annual amount of public relations spending in the United States); Sharon Beder, *Global Spin: The Corporate Assault On Environmentalism*, White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green, 1998. An excerpt (p. 107):

Today public relations is a multi-billion dollar industry. In 1991 the top fifty U.S.-based public relations companies charged over \$1,700,000,000 in fees. The industry employs almost 200,000 people in the U.S.; there are more public relations personnel

than news reporters. More than 5,400 companies and 500 trade associations have public relations departments, and there are over 5,000 P.R. agencies in the U.S. alone. The government also employs thousands of people in Public Affairs. P.R. has gradually replaced advertising in the corporate marketing budget: advertising now makes up less than a third of the money spent on marketing in the U.S., compared with two-thirds in 1980.

See also, Michael Dawson, *The Consumer Trap: Big Business Marketing and the Frustration of Personal Life in the United States Since 1945*, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Oregon, August 1995 (discussing the huge expenditures on marketing [i.e. advertising and promotion] by American business: approximately \$1 trillion per year, one-sixth of Gross Domestic Product, much of it tax-deductible, so that people pay for the privilege of being subjected to manipulation of their attitudes and behavior).

52. On Cobb County, see for example, Peter Applebome, "A Suburban Eden Where the Right Rules," *New York Times*, August 1, 1994, p. A1. An excerpt:

A 1993 study in Common Cause Magazine found that Cobb took in \$3.4 billion in Federal money in 1992. Only two suburban counties in the nation, Arlington, Va., outside Washington, and Brevard County, Fla., home of the Kennedy Space Center, took in more. . . .

Beneath the suburban idyll [of Cobb] is a more troubling history. . . . With [racial] integration that began in the 1960's, Cobb became the favored destination for whites fleeing Atlanta. Linked by Interstate 75, Cobb was an easily accessible suburb about 20 miles from downtown Atlanta and a place with a history of inhospitability towards blacks. "They love that river down there," Joe Mack Wilson, a State Representative who later became the Mayor of Marietta, said in 1975 of the Chattahoochee River, which separates Cobb County from Atlanta, now 70 percent black. "They want to keep it as a moat. They wish they could build forts across there to keep people from coming up here. . . ." A former Cobb Commissioner, Emmett Burton, said he "would stock the Chattahoochee with piranha" to keep rapid transit out. . . . Blacks make up a slim fraction of Cobb's population, and those who have been attracted to the area, Mr. Gingrich said, "don't want to be black in the unity convention, N.A.A.C.P. sense."

53. On deaths from tobacco versus hard drugs, see footnote 32 of chapter 2 of *U.P.*

54. On the faked passive smoking studies, see for example, Philip Hilts, "Data on Secondhand Smoke Were Faked, Workers Say," *New York Times*, December 21, 1994, p. D23 (the House Health and Environmental Subcommittee report showed that the data were "faked" and that they had been a "significant element" in industry campaigns to bar regulation; the conclusion was supported by the Committee's research staff and an independent review by a chemist at the Naval Research Laboratory). In 1995, pro-tobacco Republican Representative Thomas Bliley of Virginia became the head of the panel's parent committee.

On the leaked tobacco company documents which proved massive fraud across the industry for decades concerning its knowledge of the harmful effects of smoking, see Stanton A. Glantz et al., *The Cigarette Papers*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.

55. On the Oxford study of tobacco deaths in China, see for example, Rajiv Chandra, "China: Trying to Stop Nation's Future From Going Up In Smoke," Inter Press Service, July 28, 1993 (available on Nexis database). An excerpt:

Western cigarette companies are now becoming more aggressive in their bid to make more smokers out of China's 1.2 billion people. The country already has 300 million people hooked to cigarettes -- more than the entire U.S. population. . . . Health experts say children are the most affected by the national addiction. Some reports even talk of some provinces where crying babies and toddlers are pacified by a puff on lighted cigarettes. . . . "Of all the children alive today in China under the age of 20 years, 50 million of them will eventually die of tobacco," says Oxford epidemiologist Richard Peto. . . .

The likes of [Dr. Judith] Mackay argue the situation will only worsen if the powerful Western tobacco cartel succeeds in pressuring Beijing to open its market to foreign cigarette firms by threatening the imposition of trade sanctions. Foreign tobacco industries, especially those from Western Europe and the United States, have earlier been successful in prying open markets in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Two years ago, U.S. cigarette companies broke into the Thai market when Thailand, fearing trade retaliation from the United States and a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (G.A.T.T.) ruling lifted the ban on U.S. cigarettes.

On deaths from tobacco globally, see for example, Thomas H. Maugh II, "Worldwide Study Finds Big Shift In Causes Of Death," *Los Angeles Times*, September 16, 1996, p. A1 (prediction by an international team headquartered at the Harvard University School of Public Health that within 25 years smoking will become the single largest cause of death and disability in the world, nearly tripling from 3 million deaths in 1990 to 8.4 million deaths in 2020); Jonathan Kaufman, "Smoky market: Cigarette makers flock to E. Europe," *Boston Globe*, May 26, 1992, p. 1. An excerpt:

According to a British study released last week, more than one-fifth of the people alive in the developing world today will die of smoking-related causes. . . . While many American companies have been criticized for not being aggressive in investing in Eastern Europe, American cigarette companies have been trail-blazers. Within days of the Berlin Wall's coming down, Marlboro placed billboards in the area around the old border crossings to entice eastern Germans. Prague sometimes seems a city of rolling cigarette cartons, as both Camel and Marlboro have paid to repaint several Prague tram cars to look like boxes of cigarettes. . . .

"There is little awareness of health and environmental problems in Hungary," one Western tobacco executive said here. "We have about 10 years of an open playing field."

See also, Ron Scherer, "Former Surgeon General Criticizes Tobacco Exports," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 23, 1990, p. 8. An excerpt:

U.S. tobacco companies have petitioned U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills to impose sanctions on Thailand unless the Asian country opens its markets to U.S. brands. Indeed, the overseas sales of cigarettes -- always significant to the leading U.S. and British companies -- have become even more important as the market shrinks in the U.S. . . .

[P]ublic-health experts from around the world predicted a global epidemic from smoking-related deaths as a result of this surge in overseas sales. . . . [Former U.S. Surgeon General C. Everett Koop testified at a Congressional Health and Environment Subcommittee meeting:] "I am appalled at our own government's support of such behavior -- it is the export of death and disease. . . ." When he was surgeon general, Koop testified before Congress against trying to force countries to

accept U.S. cigarettes. "It is the height of hypocrisy for the United States, in our war against drugs, to demand that foreign nations take steps to stop the export of cocaine to our country while at the same time we export nicotine, a drug just as addictive as cocaine to the rest of the world," Koop said.

56. On Cobb County's white-collar jobs and Lockheed, see for example, Peter Applebome, "A Suburban Eden Where the Right Rules," *New York Times*, August 1, 1994, p. A1 ("More than 72 percent of the workforce [of Cobb County] is in white-collar jobs, most of them in expanding areas of the economy like insurance, electronics and computers, and trade. The largest employer is Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Company"); William D. Hartung, "Lockheed Martin: from warfare to welfare," *Nation*, March 2, 1998, p. 11 ("Today the average household pays a 'Lockheed Martin' tax of approximately \$200 per year to cover an array of military and civilian government contracts"). See also chapter 3 of *U.P.* and its footnote 3; footnote 43 of chapter 7 of *U.P.*; and footnotes 22 and 52 of this chapter.

57. On U.S.-based corporations' total production compared to their production in the U.S., see for example, Bob Davis, "The Outlook: World-Trade Statistics Tell Conflicting Stories," *Wall Street Journal*, March 28, 1994, p. A1. An excerpt:

If you want to figure out how the U.S. is faring in its trade battles around the world, don't look to those much-publicized monthly trade numbers everyone rails about. They may not be getting the picture even half right. . . . To try to fix some of the broader problems in the trade numbers, the National Academy of Sciences suggested totting up companies' total sales, no matter where their factories are. That calculation better reflects the competitiveness of companies world-wide -- and shows the U.S. a lot stronger than commonly recognized. Using that method, Commerce Department economists calculated that the U.S. would have posted an overall trade surplus in goods and services of \$164 billion in 1991, rather than a \$28 billion deficit.

58. On the expansion and effects of international finance capital, see for example, John Eatwell [Cambridge University finance specialist], "The Global Money Trap," *American Prospect*, Winter 1993, p. 118. An excerpt:

Financial markets are today dominated by short-term flows that seek to profit from changes in asset prices and currency shifts -- in other words, from speculation. The growth in the scale of pure speculation, relative to other transactions, has been particularly marked in the foreign exchange markets over the past twenty years. In 1971, just before the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system, about 90 percent of all foreign exchange transactions were for the finance of trade and longterm investment, and only about 10 percent were speculative. Today those percentages are reversed, with well over 90 percent of all transactions being speculative. Daily speculative flows now regularly exceed the combined foreign exchange reserves of all the G-7 governments. . . . Today the sheer scale of speculative flows can easily overwhelm any government's foreign-exchange reserves.

Philip Coggan, "Survey of I.M.F. World Economy and Finance," *Financial Times* (London), September 24, 1993, p. IV. An excerpt:

The amount of money sloshing around the world's financial system is so vast that governments seem almost powerless to resist it -- they might as well attempt to repeal the laws of gravity. To give a few examples: Net daily foreign exchange

turnover last year was about Dollars 1,000bn, compared with central bank reserves which were estimated at Dollars 555.6bn in April 1992. . . .

The World Bank has estimated that global institutional investment funds are worth Dollars 14,000bn. . . . These funds are controlled by professional managers who are well aware of the need to produce good performance to retain their management contracts. They will thus be quick to exploit any profitable opportunities -- such as an expected currency devaluation -- or to desert a stock market if they feel government policy has moved in an uncongenial direction. Conversely, domestic markets can surge if international fund managers decide to increase their country allocation by a couple of percentage points or so. . . . The ability of international capital markets to embarrass governments was demonstrated in September 1992 and August 1993, when speculative attacks twice caused turmoil in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. . . .

A classic example of a country's economic policy being set with financial markets in mind is that of France in the early 1990s, where interest rates have been kept high to support the franc, in the face of the belief of many economic commentators that substantial interest rate cuts were needed to prevent a drastic recession. . . . Once such countries have become dependent on foreign capital, they may find their economic policies constrained by the need to keep international investors sweet.

The power of international investment institutions will have increased once more.

Doug Henwood, *Wall Street: How It Works and for Whom*, London: Verso, 1997. An excerpt (pp. 10, 9 n.2, 25):

In May 1996, \$1.25 trillion a day crossed the wire connecting the world's major banks. That figure -- which captures most of the world's financial action with the U.S. dollar on at least one side of the trade -- was a mere \$600 billion around the time of the 1987 stock market crash. After that inconsequential cataclysm, daily volume resumed its mighty rise, passing \$800 billion in 1989, and \$1 trillion in 1993. . . . Despite the prominence of the stock market, daily trading volume in U.S. Treasury securities is about ten times that of the N.Y.S.E. [New York Stock Exchange] -- about \$180 billion in federal paper in early 1996, compared with \$18 billion in stocks. . . . At the end of 1992, according to a New York Fed survey, total daily trading volume averaged \$400-550 billion, or over \$100 trillion a year.

See also, Susan Strange, *Casino Capitalism*, Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell, 1986; Howard M. Wachtel, *The Money Mandarins: The Making of a New Supranational Economic Order*, New York: Pantheon, 1986.

For an exceptional overview of the world economy from 1950 to 1998, see Robert Brenner, "The Economics of Global Turbulence," *New Left Review*, No. 229, May/June 1998 (entire issue).

59. On daily speculative capital flows, see footnote 58 of this chapter.

60. On low economic growth and job creation rates in the 1990s, see for example, Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein and John Schmitt, *The State of Working America, 1998-1999*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999, especially ch. 8. An excerpt (pp. 355, 385):

[T]he 1990s have been a period of slow growth in national income and productivity in all of the O.E.C.D. [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries, including the United States. Income and productivity growth over the last decade have generally trailed the rates obtained in the 1970s and 1980s and are far

below those of the "Golden Age" from the end of World War II through the first oil shock in 1973. . . . The employment growth data . . . suggest that the current U.S. job creation rate is not particularly high either by its own historical terms or when compared with several other economies with very different labor market institutions. On declining wages and huge profits in the 1990s, see footnotes 15, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70 and 101 of this chapter.

61. On financial speculators' opposition to economic growth, see for example, Louis Uchitelle, "Who Rules? It's the Bond Market, Stupid," *International Herald Tribune*, June 13, 1994, Finance Section. An excerpt:

Favor a weak economy? Who would do that? Enter that mysterious and slightly sinister entity, The Bond Market, the pre-eminent force in the economy today. More than any other group, the bond market determines how many Americans will have jobs, whether the jobholders will earn enough to afford a house or a car, or whether a factory might have to lay off workers. In sum, the American economy is governed by the bond market -- a loose confederation of wealthy Americans, bankers, financiers, money managers, rich foreigners, executives of life insurance companies, presidents of universities and nonprofit foundations, retirees and people who once kept their money in passbook savings accounts (or under a bed) and now buy shares in mutual funds.

While some would recoil at being called enemies of economic growth, the fact is that the confederation has ruled in recent months that the economy should lose strength, not gain it. "The bond market's members speak in a monologue, and their message is contract the economy," a U.S. official said. . . . Mr. Clinton's administration does not aggressively challenge the bond market's preference for subdued economic growth.

Keith Bradsher, "U.S. Shifts Stance In Effort To Slow Economic Growth," May 8, 1994, *New York Times*, p. A1 ("After a year and a half of seeking faster economic growth, the Clinton Administration has now reluctantly changed course, putting the stability of financial markets ahead of rapid economic expansion. . . . [The shift] is in keeping with Mr. Clinton's political goal of positioning himself as a Democrat who is not feared on Wall Street"); Antonia Sharpe and Peter John, "Sharp Decline in U.S. Jobless Rate Unsettles Bonds," *Financial Times* (London), June 4, 1994, p. 1; James C. Cooper and Kathleen Madigan, "Just What the Doctor Ordered: Slower Growth," *Business Week*, June 13, 1994, p. 27; Mark Memmott, "Jobless Rate Increase Seen As Good News," *U.S.A. Today*, May 8, 1989, "Money" section, p. 1B. See also footnote 62 of this chapter.

62. For the *Wall Street Journal's* article, see Douglas R. Sease and Constance Mitchell, "The Vigilantes: World's Bond Buyers Gain Huge Influence Over U.S. Fiscal Plans," *Wall Street Journal*, November 6, 1992, p. A1. An excerpt:

They aren't elected, and you may not know any of them. Many are citizens of other countries. But big bond investors around the world may now hold unprecedented power -- perhaps even a veto -- over U.S. economic policy. Bill Clinton got a taste of that power in the past four weeks. Bondholders, increasingly anticipating the Arkansas Democrat's victory in the presidential race, pushed down prices of U.S. Treasury bonds and thus pushed up long-term interest rates to about 7.7% from 7.3% a month ago. It was the bond market's way of warning Mr. Clinton that as the new president he will long be on probation, with his every move

instantaneously scrutinized. Since the election, bond prices have slipped only slightly. . . .

[If Clinton] proposes big spending programs or policies that accelerate inflation -- bondholders' deepest fear -- the reaction could be swift and painful. . . . If thousands of investors world-wide dump U.S. Treasury bonds, they could drive up long-term interest rates, which move inversely to bond prices, hobble America's economic growth and even plunge the nation back into recession. . . . With the U.S. government's seemingly relentless borrowing, both Wall Street and Washington increasingly view the bond market as a potent force that U.S. officials have to take into account. . . . Even modest stimulatory proposals could prove self-destructive. Based on campaign promises and economists' projections, Mr. Clinton seems to be proposing changes in government spending and taxation that would result in a net \$20 billion increase in the fiscal 1994 budget deficit -- though the president-elect himself says there won't be any net increase in the deficit. If bond investors react with even a modest dose of anxiety that sends longterm rates up just one percentage point, the deficit would increase another \$20 billion, effectively doubling to \$40 billion the program's cost as estimated by outside economists.

See also footnote 58 of this chapter.

On the Reagan/Bush debt and its effects, see for example, Richard B. DuBoff, *Accumulation and Power: An Economic History of the United States*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1989, p. 163 (Reaganite policies turned the United States into the world's largest debtor nation by 1987, after seventy years as a creditor nation); Daniel Patrick Moynihan [Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee], "Reagan's Inflate-the-Deficit Game," Op-Ed, *New York Times*, July 21, 1985, section 4, p. 21. An excerpt:

[The Reagan administration made a] deliberate decision to create deficits for strategic, political purposes. . . . The Reagan Administration came to office with, at most, a marginal interest in balancing the budget -- contrary to rhetoric, there was no great budget problem at the time -- but with a very real interest in dismantling a fair amount of the social legislation of the preceding 50 years. The strategy was to induce a deficit and use that as grounds for the dismantling.

It was a strategy devised by young intellectuals of a capacity that Washington had not seen for years. They were never understood, and as they depart they leave behind an alarming incomprehension of the coup they almost pulled off. The key concept was that individual Government programs are relatively invulnerable to direct assault. The Congress, the staff, the constituency can usually beat you and always outwait you. On the other hand, the Budget Act of 1974 contained little understood powers of huge potential. The budget committees, assuming agreement by the full Congress, could require other committees to cut back programs. The power -- technically a "reconciliation" instruction -- had never been used to the fullest, but it was there. Thus, the plan: Reduce revenues. Create a deficit. Use the budget process to eliminate programs.

A hidden strategy? Not really. On Feb. 5, 1981, 16 days in office, the President in his first television address to the nation said: "There were always those who told us that taxes couldn't be cut until spending was reduced. Well, you know, we can lecture our children about extravagance until we run out of voice and breath. Or we can cure their extravagance by simply reducing their allowance. . . ." The deficit was policy, a curious legacy of the young radicals who came to power in 1981, but not a symptom of a failed system of Government.

See also, David Felix, "Financial globalization and the Tobin tax," *Challenge*, May 1, 1995, pp. 56f. An excerpt:

[Financial and productive] sectors are now bonded by a common objective -- made more politically feasible by the Cold War victory of capitalism. That objective is to shrink, perhaps even to liquidate, the welfare state. The ability of financial capital, with its instant international mobility, to terrorize governments, makes it a valued ally in any effort. Its disruptive behavior raises capital costs and instability for the productive sectors, but coordinated crisis management by the governments of the major capitalist economies will suffice, they hope, to contain the instability without undermining their broader objective.

Felix's article also describes a proposal, first suggested in 1978 by Nobel Laureate James Tobin, for curbing the trend towards expansion of unregulated finance capital and short-term speculative flows. The so-called "Tobin Tax" on foreign-exchange transactions would cut their yield, and thereby eliminate some of the incentive for them. While such a mechanism would enhance economic stability and is technically feasible, the author concludes that the chief barriers to its adoption are "ideological and political."

63. For the *Economist's* article, see "Politics Versus Policy: Polish Economic Reform Progresses Despite Political Disfavor," *Economist* (London), April 16, 1994, p. 9. An excerpt:

The elections of September 1993 [in Poland] sounded like a death-knell for reform. Voters turned out parties that sprang from the Solidarity movement and chose instead the Democratic Left Alliance (S.L.D.) and the Polish Peasant Party (P.S.L.). These two parties won in September by promising higher wages, fatter pensions and more aid to farmers -- pledges that, if kept, would have wrecked reform. The coalition quickly set about breaking its promises. The 1994 budget passed on March 5th by the Sejm, the more-important lower house of parliament, offered little relief from earlier austerity.

Clearly, policy works better than democracy. Coalitions rise and fall but the main outlines of policy have been remarkably consistent since the semi-free elections of June 1989 that thrust Solidarity into power. The first Solidarity government, led by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, was as unprepared for power as the communists were to relinquish it. Its shock therapy was as alien to most Solidarity members as it was to central planners. Governments have stuck to it in part because the strongest Polish institutions stand outside politics. . . .

Does that matter? It is sometimes necessary to insulate policy from the chaos of politics, as Russia has signally failed to do. And in some ways Poland has the best of both worlds: a vigorous press and free elections, coupled with apolitical sanity in the making of policy.

64. For the term "New Imperial Age," see James Morgan, "Rip van Winkle's new world order: The fall of the Soviet bloc has left the I.M.F. and G7 to rule the world and create a new imperial age," *Financial Times* (London), April 25, 1992, p. 1. An excerpt:

Quite unnoticed, imperialism is back in fashion. Nobody calls it that, except for those who believed it never went away and, therefore, fail to recognise its present character. It is in the know-how funds and systems for technology transfer operating in eastern Europe and, above all, in a vast framework under construction in the developing world; bringing in experts from Washington, Paris and Frankfurt to tell others how to run their affairs. Englishmen draw up plans for privatisation in Prague. In India last October, the Frenchman who runs the International Monetary Fund, Michel Camdessus, went to New Delhi to nod approvingly at plans drawn up there for economic and social reform to the standard I.M.F. template. The construction of a

new global system is orchestrated by the Group of Seven, the I.M.F., the World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Gatt). But it works through a system of indirect rule that has involved the integration of leaders of developing countries into the network of the new ruling class. . . .

The vehicle by which the free-market gospel has been transmitted has received scant attention in the rich countries but is omnipresent in the media of the poor: the Structural Adjustment Programme [S.A.P.] . . . [The I.M.F. and World Bank] run large parts of the developing world and eastern Europe while insisting that the governments concerned are merely implementing their own plans. "We are there to help," as the British used to say. The essence of the S.A.P. is to encourage governments to follow the right kind of reform policy. A developing country can receive large, cheap loans if it adopts the programmes embodied in the orthodoxy of (more or less) balanced budgets, devaluation, privatisation, and a hearty welcome for foreign investment. . . . Calling this phenomenon the New Imperialism will be resented. But imperialism was not always a pejorative term. It described the integration -- admittedly by force rather than choice -- of the world economy. The British, 100 years ago, saw it as a civilizing power. The Americans, too.

See also footnote 59 of chapter 5 of *U.P.* And see Michael Prowse, "World Bank/I.M.F. Meeting: Theorising on an Eastern Promise: An Attempt to Explain East Asia's Dynamic Growth," *Financial Times* (U.K.), September 27, 1993, p. 3 (term "technocratic insulation" in chart).

65. On increased worktime and stagnating incomes in the U.S. in the 1990s economy, see Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein and John Schmitt, *The State of Working America, 1998-1999*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999, especially chs. 1, 3 and 8. An excerpt (pp. 83, 381-382):

[A]mong married-couple families with children in the middle fifth [of income distribution], hours of work grew 6.9%, or 247 hours since 1989. Since 1979, these middle-class families added 615 hours, more than 15 weeks of full-time work to their schedules. While these added hours have surely helped to raise middle-class income, they also leave significantly less time for nonmarket activities. . . . Workers in the United States worked, on average, more hours per year (1,952) than workers in any of the other countries, even more than the historic leader in hours worked, Japan (1,898). . . . The U.S. average [of vacations], about 16 days per year, is below the statutory minimum in all but two of the [European] countries in the [accompanying] figure.

See also footnotes 1, 13, 14, 15, 67, 68, 69, 70 and 101 of this chapter.

66. On stock income and stock ownership in the U.S. in the 1990s, see for example, Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein and John Schmitt, *The State of Working America, 1998-1999*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999, ch. 5 at pp. 209-212 (on C.E.O.s), and p. 260 (top 1 percent own more than 50 percent of stocks and top 10 percent own most of the rest) and p. 271 (85 percent of stock gains went to the top 10 percent). An excerpt (pp. 256-258, 9):

[A]ll of the growth in wealth during the 1990s has been a consequence of the increase in financial assets . . . (primarily the long-term rise in the value of stocks), a form of wealth that is concentrated in a small portion of the population. Wealth held in tangible assets, which is much more widely held, actually declined over the 1989-97 period. . . .

The stock market boom of the 1980s and 1990s has had little or no impact on the vast majority of Americans for the simple reason that most working families do not own much stock. While the share of households owning stock has risen in the 1990s, by 1995 almost 60% of households still owned no stock in any form, including mutual funds or defined-contribution pension plans. Moreover, many of those new to the stock market have only small investments there. In 1995, for example, fewer than one-third of all households had stock holdings greater than \$5,000. In the same year, almost 90% of the value of all stock was in the hands of the best-off 10% of households. Not surprisingly, then, projections through 1997 suggest that 85.8% of the benefits of the increase in the stock market between 1989 and 1997 went to the richest 10% of households.

On the distribution of wealth gains in the U.S. in the previous decade, see for example, Peter G. Gosselin, "Study: U.S. workers laboring for less," *Boston Globe*, September 7, 1992, p. 47 ("The top 1 percent of families captured more than half all income gains between 1980 and 1989 while the bottom 60 percent experienced income declines"); Mark Zepezauer and Arthur Naiman, *Take The Rich Off Welfare*, Tucson, AZ: Odonian, 1996. An excerpt (pp. 10-11):

Between 1983 and 1989, 99% of the increase in Americans' wealth went to the top 20% of the population, and 62% of it went to the top 1% of the population (currently made up of families whose net worth is \$2.35 million or more). . . . The total net worth of that top 1% is now equal to the total net worth of the bottom 90% of the population! In other words, the 2.7 million Americans who are worth \$2.35 million or more have as much money as the 240 million Americans who are worth \$346,000 or less.

67. On net worth loss by the second decile of the U.S. population in the 1990s, see for example, Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein and John Schmitt, *The State of Working America, 1998-1999*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999, pp. 262-264.

68. On declining entry-level wages in the U.S. in the 1990s, see for example, Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein and John Schmitt, *The State of Working America, 1998-1999*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999, ch. 3. An excerpt (pp. 120, 119):

[T]he wages earned by new high school graduates has continued to decline, although more slowly in 1989-97 as in the 1979-89 period. The result is that the entry-level wages of high school graduates in 1997 were 27.6% less for young men and 18.3% less for young women than in 1979. . . . Many high-wage workers, particularly men, failed to see real wage improvements in the 1989-97 period. Male white-collar wages, including those for managers and technical workers, have been stagnant or have declined, and the wages of male college graduates have stagnated and remain below their level of the mid-1980s or early 1970s. The wages of new college graduates have declined by 7% among both men and women over the 1989-97 period despite a recent upturn, indicating that each year's graduates are accepting more poorly paying jobs than their counterparts did at the end of the 1980s.

See also footnote 42 of chapter 9 of *U.P.*

69. On median real income again reaching its 1989 level only in 1997, see Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein and John Schmitt, *The State of Working America, 1998-1999*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999, ch. 1. An excerpt (p. 90):

Since 1989, median family income growth has been stagnant for most family types, and the 1997 median is just \$285 (in 1997 dollars) above its 1989 level. In prior

recoveries, the income of the median family had far surpassed its prerecession level by this point in the business cycle.

70. On public perceptions of the 1990s economy, see for example, Celinda Lake and Robert Borosage, "Money Talks," *Nation*, August 21/28, 2000, pp. 29-31 (reporting a poll which found that, of Americans who vote, 54 percent believe the economic boom has not "reached people like me"; 72 percent of voters believe that despite the alleged wave of prosperity, most Americans "are just holding their own"; and 64 percent of voters believe "the wealthy and big corporations" have "benefited most from the upturn in the economy").

71. On Canadian job loss in the first years of the original Free Trade Agreement, see for example, Virginia Galt, "226,000 jobs lost since pact, C.L.C. says," *Globe & Mail* (Toronto), December 15, 1990, p. A1 (the Canadian Labour Congress reported the loss of over 225,000 Canadian jobs in the first two years of the 1989 Free Trade Agreement, many to the Southeast U.S., along with a wave of takeovers of Canadian-based companies); Bruce Campbell, *"Free Trade": Destroyer of Jobs -- An Examination of Canadian Job Loss Under the F.T.A. and N.A.F.T.A.*, Ottawa: Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives, 1993. An excerpt (pp. 1-2):

The facts themselves are not seriously disputed. Statistics Canada provides a neutral data base. Differences arise over their interpretation -- what caused the crisis and how to solve it. The Statistics Canada labour force survey gives us the broadest picture of the crisis. During the four years from December 1984 to December 1988, the last month before the trade deal was implemented, 1.3 million jobs were created and the unemployment rate stood at 7.5%, hardly a record of which to be proud. In the next four and a half years, that is to August 1993, the economy added zero jobs. During 1984-88, 1.1 million full-time jobs were created. In the next 4 1/2 years there was a net destruction of 291,000 full-time jobs.

On N.A.F.T.A., see chapter 8 of *U.P.*, "Popular Struggle."

72. On Caterpillar's developing overseas production capacity to break strikes, see for example, James Tyson, "As Unions Fight Irrelevance, Caterpillar Racks Up Profits," *Christian Science Monitor*, January 24, 1995, p. 1. An excerpt:

[T]he world's biggest manufacturer of earth-moving equipment, based in Peoria, Ill., logged record fourth-quarter sales and earnings in 1994, despite the United Auto Workers (U.A.W.) seven-month-long walkout. . . .

Like many U.S. companies, Caterpillar has pursued a business strategy that has nudged American workers away from defiance toward compliance. It has responded to rising global competition by manufacturing at cheaper facilities abroad. . . . [B]y relying on imports from factories in Brazil, Japan, and Europe, Caterpillar is better able to meet demand and smooth out disruptions from a strike. And it has hired 1,100 new employees and 4,730 contract and temporary laborers at lower pay than the roughly \$17 hourly wage U.A.W. workers earn. The union walked out after compiling 101 complaints of intimidation, harassment, unjustified dismissal, and other unfair labor practices.

On other corporations also using this same technique, see for example, Louis Uchitelle, "U.S. Corporations Expanding Abroad at a Quicker Pace," *New York Times*, July 25, 1994, p. A1. An excerpt:

[There are] situations in which a company can export its product inexpensively enough, particularly when the dollar is weak, but chooses instead to manufacture abroad, mainly for "insurance," as [Harvard Economist Raymond] Vernon puts it. . . . The Gillette Company embraces the strategy of manufacturing abroad rather than exporting, generating jobs overseas rather than in the United States. That has happened most recently in the case of Gillette's new Sensor XL razor blade cartridge. . . .

The new Sensor model is to be sold in the United States starting this year. But rather than expand the Boston operation [at Gillette's main plant] to handle the additional production -- and add jobs, perhaps -- Gillette is adding the extra capacity to its Berlin plant, a high-technology factory that will take over the European market. Cost is not the issue; blades are small and not difficult to ship, and the weak dollar gives the United States an advantage -- but one that [Gillette senior vice president Thomas] Skelly, and other corporate executives, dismiss as insignificant. "In the long run, these currency fluctuations, up and down, don't mean a whit in the decision where to manufacture," he said. . . .

Being close to a market is a priority, promising better returns than exporting from the United States, Mr. Skelly says. "We are also concerned about having only one place where a product is made," he said. "There could be an explosion, or labor problems." If the Boston workers struck, for example, Gillette would supply the Sensor XL to Europe and the United States from the Berlin plant, and vice versa. The upshot of this approach is that Gillette employs 2,300 people in the manufacture of razors and blades in the United States and 7,700 -- more than three times as many -- abroad. Some of those workers are making blades at Gillette plants in Poland, Russia and China, where production costs are less than in the United States. But that is not the case in Germany. "You could ship the blades from here, but you set up there for insurance," Mr. Vernon said.

On the Caterpillar strike, see for example, Stephen Franklin, Peter Kendall, and Colin McMahon, "Downshifting: Blue collar blues" [five part series on the Caterpillar strike in the context of the changing world economy], *Chicago Tribune*, September 6 to 10, 1992, zone C, p. 1 (describing how, when Caterpillar recruited scabs to break the strike, the union was "stunned" to find that unemployed workers crossed the picket line with no remorse, while Caterpillar workers found little "moral support" in their community; the union, which had "lifted the standard of living for entire communities in which its members lived," had "failed to realize how public sympathy had deserted organized labor"). See also, David Gordon, "Real Wages Are on a Steady Decline," *Los Angeles Times*, July 16, 1989, part 4, p. 2. An excerpt:

In 1978, Douglas Fraser, then president of the United Auto Workers, resigned in protest from a private and informal discussion group of leading corporate executives and labor leaders called the Labor-Management Group. He explained his resignation in a widely circulated letter: "The leaders of industry, commerce and finance in the United States have broken and discarded the fragile, unwritten compact previously existing during a past period of growth and progress. . . . I am convinced there has been a shift on the part of the business community toward confrontation, rather than cooperation. . . . I believe leaders of the business community, with few exceptions, have chosen to wage a one-sided class war in this country -- a war against working people, the unemployed, the poor, the minorities, the very young and the very old, and even many in the middle class of our society."

On other aspects of the business campaign against labor and unionism, see footnote 23 of chapter 8 of *U.P.*; footnotes 24 and 26 of chapter 9 of *U.P.*; and footnote 81 of this chapter.

73. On the global destruction of unions after World War II and the role of the American labor leaders, see chapter 5 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 65, 71 and 79.

74. On post-World War II business fears about popular attitudes, see for example, Elizabeth Fones-Wolf, *Selling Free Enterprise: the Business Assault on Labor and Liberalism, 1945-1960*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992. An excerpt (pp. 37, 71, 36):

One public relations firm . . . warned in 1947 that "our present economic system, and the men who run it, have three years -- maybe five at the outside -- to resell our so-far preferred way of life as against competing systems. . . ." In 1946, the Psychological Corporation found that 43 percent of surveyed workers believed they would do as well or better if American manufacturing firms were run entirely by the government. A 1950 Opinion Research Corporation sample of industrial workers found that over 30 percent believed that the government should control prices and limit profits, 26 percent wanted to see the government limit salaries of top executives and 21 percent would vote for government ownership of four key industries. . . .

[A 1946 survey in] the business journal *Factory* . . . found that 47 percent of factory workers thought that the government would do most in providing new peacetime jobs. Similarly, the Opinion Research Corporation discovered that over 70 percent of workers believed that the government should guarantee jobs. For some corporate leaders the most startling revelation in terms of the outlook for business growth and survival was a *Fortune* poll that showed less than half of those interviewed believed hard work would pay off.

Alex Carey, *Taking the Risk Out of Democracy: Corporate Propaganda versus Freedom and Liberty*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997. An excerpt (p. 147):

[A] review in November 1945 of a dozen [popular opinion] surveys carried out in the previous five years concluded that: "[People] have two serious reservations about industry; that great industrial corporations lack warmth and friendliness in their human relationships; and that the owners of industry, the stockholders, realise too great a return on their contribution to industry. [Thus] two counts on which industry is most vulnerable are (1) its human relationships and (2) the widespread public misunderstanding about corporate profits."

The corporate fears that intensified after World War II resumed a trend that had been evident in the 1930s (p. 24):

By 1934 American business, led by the N.A.M. [National Association of Manufacturers] had oriented itself for a massive campaign to recapture public opinion. "Public policies in our democracy are eventually a reflection of public opinion," the N.A.M. warned its members, so public opinion must be reshaped "if we are to avoid disaster. . . ." [In] 1938 the N.A.M.'s Board of Directors . . . found the "hazard facing industrialists" to be "the newly realized political power of the masses." It warned that unless their thinking was directed, "we are headed for adversity."

For some reports in the press of this post-war "crisis," see for example, Russell Porter, "Research in Human Relationship Seen Needed for Reconversion," *New York Times*, April 21, 1946, p. 1. An excerpt:

No reasonable observer could deny that the country is facing a crisis within the next few years, in view of the way reconversion [from wartime production] has been stalled by one major strike after another. . . . Although the tremendous demand for goods from all over the world and the unprecedented productive capacity of the American industrial machine as expanded during the war no doubt insure the nation of prosperity during the next few years, both economists and business men are worried over the longer future. . . . [T]hey believe efforts must be begun right now to solve critical problems in the social and economic fields through management-labor cooperation. . . .

In the broader perspective, many also realize that the future of the free enterprise system is at stake, in view of its world-wide competition from Socialism and Communism, as we succeed or fail in the coming years to provide greater economic democracy and social justice to match our political democracy. . . . If the free enterprise system, including free labor as well as free industry, is to be saved, something . . . will have to be done.

Russell Porter, "Hunt Is Sharpened For Labor Peace," *New York Times*, May 20, 1946, p. 2. An excerpt:

Just as research in the biological sciences has accomplished wonders in preventive medicine, the social sciences hope to prevent disease in and indefinitely prolong the life of the American system of free enterprise or democratic capitalism. This would be done by getting at the roots of the trouble instead of waiting for specific complaints to develop, any one of which under certain circumstances might prove fatal. . . . The current wave of major strikes has stimulated new interest in industrial, labor and scientific circles in encouraging and expanding such activities. Hundreds of thousands of dollars have been contributed as grants and endowments to universities and other institutions for the pursuit of such work.

Editorial, "Business Is Still In Trouble," *Fortune*, May 1949, pp. 67f. An excerpt:

Sixteen turbulent years have rolled by since the New Deal began to rescue the People from the Capitalists, and no one can say that business has retrieved the authority and respect it ought to have if the drift to socialism is to be arrested. Every U.S. businessman, consciously or unconsciously, is on the defensive. . . . A majority of the people . . . [according to public opinion polls] believe that very few businessmen have the good of the nation in mind when they make their important decisions. They think business is too greedy and that it has played a large part in keeping prices too high. They think, therefore, that government should keep a sharp eye on business. And they have been thinking just about that way for fifteen years.

This *Fortune* editorial then describes the business community's response to the "crisis," providing a revealing articulation of the theme of "manufacture of consent" which is discussed in chapter 1 of *U.P.* and its footnote 41. The relevant passage:

The immense expansion of the art of public relations in the past ten years was financed mainly by industry. . . . It is as impossible to imagine a genuine democracy without the science of persuasion [i.e. propaganda] as it is to think of a totalitarian state without coercion.

The daily tonnage output of propaganda and publicity . . . has become an important force in American life. Nearly half of the contents of the best newspapers is derived from publicity releases; nearly all the contents of the lesser papers and the hundreds of specialized periodicals are directly or indirectly the work of P.R. departments. . . . The day is surely coming when American business, so long run by its production men and supersalesmen, must be run by men who put public relations ahead of everything else. . . . [Public relations] is a corporate way of life.

75. On the business community's post-World War II propaganda program, see footnotes 77 to 81 of this chapter.

In general, corporate propaganda and its pervasive role in the world -- particularly in the United States -- is a vastly understudied topic. Yet it is perhaps the most important one that there is. For some careful studies that merit much wider circulation, see for example, John C. Stauber and Sheldon Rampton, *Toxic Sludge Is Good For You!: Lies, Damn Lies and the Public Relations Industry*, Monroe, ME: Common Courage, 1995 (extremely important and eye-opening examination of the scope, impact, and tactics of corporate propaganda today); Alex Carey, *Taking the Risk Out of Democracy: Corporate Propaganda versus Freedom and Liberty*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997 (the seminal study; with an introduction by Chomsky). An excerpt (pp. 18, 21, 129, 24):

The twentieth century has been characterized by three developments of great political importance: the growth of democracy, the growth of corporate power, and the growth of corporate propaganda as a means of protecting corporate power against democracy.

There have been two principal aspects to the growth of democracy in this century: the extension of popular franchise (i.e. the right to vote) and the growth of the union movement. These developments have presented corporations with potential threats to their power from the people at large (i.e. from public opinion) and from organized labour. American corporations have met this threat by learning to use propaganda, both inside and outside the corporation, as an effective weapon for managing governments and public opinion. They have thereby been able to subordinate the expression of democratic aspirations and the interests of larger public purposes to their own narrow corporate purposes. . . . It is arguable that the success of business propaganda in persuading us, for so long, that we are free of propaganda is one of the most significant propaganda achievements of the twentieth century. . . . The disastrous consequences for critical thought and American democracy resulting from corporate propaganda could not have happened but for an almost unbelievable neglect by liberal scholars and researchers to give critical attention and exposure to the extent, character and consequences of this development. . . .

[In 1939] the La Follette Committee, a committee of the U.S. Senate which had been established to investigate violations of the rights of labour, incidentally exposed the extraordinary scale of business's assault on public opinion. Of the N.A.M. [National Association of Manufacturers] in particular, the committee reported that it "blanketed the country with a propaganda which in technique has relied upon indirection of meaning, and in presentation of secrecy and deception. Radio speeches, public meetings, news, cartoons, editorials, advertising, motion pictures and many other artifices of propaganda have not, in most instances, disclosed to the public their origin within the Association."

Elizabeth Fones-Wolf, *Selling Free Enterprise: the Business Assault on Labor and Liberalism, 1945-1960*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992 (another extremely important and carefully documented study).

See also, Stuart Ewen, *PR!: A Social History of Spin*, New York: Basic Books, 1996 (survey of the intellectual background and development of public relations); Joshua Karliner, *The Corporate Planet: Ecology and Politics in the Age of Globalization*, San Francisco: Sierra Club, 1997, ch. 6; Richard S. Tedlow, *Keeping the Corporate Image: Public Relations and Business, 1900-1950*, Greenwich, CT: J.A.I., 1979, pp. 59-73;

Howell John Harris, *The Right to Manage: Industrial Relations Policies of American Business in the 1940s*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982, pp. 184-198; Curtis D. MacDougall, *Understanding Public Opinion: A Guide for Newspapermen and Newspaper Readers*, New York: Macmillan, 1952, pp. 566-570; Vladimir Orlando Key, *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*, New York: Crowell, 1958, pp. 103f; Robert A. Brady, *Business as a System of Power*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. 274-293; Herbert I. Schiller, *Culture, Inc.: The Corporate Takeover of Public Expression*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

On the degree to which "news" material is provided by public relations press releases, see for example, Martin A. Lee and Norman Solomon, *Unreliable Sources: A Guide to Detecting Bias in News Media*, New York: Lyle Stuart, 1990. An excerpt (p. 66):

Newspapers are . . . inundated by corporate P.R. A study by Scott M. Culip, ex-dean of the School of Journalism and Mass Communications at the University of Georgia, found that 40 percent of the news content in a typical U.S. newspaper originated with public relations press releases, story memos, or suggestions. . . . Charles Staebler, former assistant managing editor of the *Wall Street Journal*, estimated that up to 50 percent of the *Journal's* stories are generated by press release. . . . The *Columbia Journalism Review*, which scrutinized a typical issue of America's leading business paper, found that more than half the *Journal's* news stories "were based solely on press releases." Oftentimes the releases were reprinted "almost verbatim or in paraphrase," with little additional reporting, and many articles carried the slug, "By a *Wall Street Journal* Staff Reporter."

Sharon Beder, *Global Spin: The Corporate Assault On Environmentalism*, White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green, 1998. An excerpt (pp. 114-116):

News releases do not necessarily go directly to newspapers. Often a P.R. service will place it with a wire service first. (Some large agencies have their own wire services.) By 1985, P.R. Newswire was transmitting 150 stories a day from a pool of 10,000 companies directly into 600 newsrooms belonging to newspapers, radio and television stations. Such stories may be picked up by newsrooms or rewritten by wire services such as A.P., Reuters and Dow Jones. In this way the news release becomes a "legitimate" news story and will be more likely to be taken up by journalists on the newspapers. . . .

During the 1980s P.R. firms began sending out video news releases (V.N.R.s) -- fully edited news segments for broadcast as part of television news. Hill and Knowlton established its own fully staffed television production facilities (as did Burson-Marsteller) and by 1985 was already sending video news releases via satellite all over the U.S.A., rather than relying solely on the old-fashioned press release. It is popular nowadays to accompany the fully edited piece ready to be broadcast (A-roll) with unedited footage (B-roll) and a script so the television station crew can put together and edit the story as if they had shot it themselves, inserting their own journalist's voice over, or adding their own material.

It might be noted that the corporate propaganda counteroffensive that was initiated in the 1970s -- in response to the popular movements of the 1960s -- was marked by an important new development. For important further discussion, see Carey, *Taking the Risk Out of Democracy*, cited above in this footnote, pp. 88-98:

The kind of propaganda that was employed on such a large scale in the United States in the period around World War II is known as "grassroots" propaganda. Its purpose is to reach as vast a number of people as possible in order to change public

opinion so that it is sympathetic to business interests. . . . The 1970s propaganda campaign in the United States largely replicated the grassroots program of 1945-50. To this extent it contains little that is novel except for its scale and its impact on U.S. politics. But the 1970s campaign also involved a great expansion of a more sophisticated form of propaganda which one might call, for purposes of distinction, "treetops" propaganda, aimed at the leaders of society. . . .

[T]he sole novelty of the neo-conservative movement lies in its demonstrated capacity to recruit intellectuals who will convert, in an elite version of the factory system, millions of corporate dollars into up-market propaganda for corporate interests. . . . "Treetops" propaganda is not directed at the person on the street. It is directed at influencing a select group of influential people: policy-makers in parliament and the civil service, newspaper editors and reporters, economics commentators on T.V. and radio. Its immediate purpose is to set the terms of debate, to determine the kinds of questions that will dominate public discussion -- in a word to set the political agenda in ways that are favourable to corporate interests. . . .

The 1970s saw the emergence of an aggressive new breed among [the private think-tank organizations that carry out "policy research" on a range of national issues], which were lavishly funded by corporations and produced an endless flow of market-oriented studies. . . . [For example,] the American Economic Institute for Public Policy Research[']s (A.E.I.) . . . board of trustees is comprised "almost entirely of representatives of major corporations." Its budget grew from less than \$1 million in 1970 to over \$7 million in 1978, its staff from 24 to 125, and in addition it has 100 adjunct scholars working on A.E.I.-sponsored studies. In 1977 its "vast outpouring of material and activities," the *New York Times* reported, "included 54 studies, 22 forums and conferences, 15 analyses of important legislative proposals, 7 journals and newsletters, a ready-made set of editorials sent regularly to 105 newspapers, public affairs programs carried by more than 300 television stations and centers for display of A.E.I. material in some 300 college libraries. . . ." The Heritage Foundation [another neo-conservative think-tank] . . . provides newspaper columns, published as local editorials, to "several thousand newspapers" throughout the United States. . . .

[T]he Business Roundtable . . . comprises the Chief Executive Officers of 194 of America's largest corporations . . . [and] represents approximately half the G.N.P. of the United States . . . [and its share of] G.N.P. is greater than the G.N.P. of any country in the world apart from the United States. It is a prototypical treetops propaganda and lobbying organization. In the same year it was founded, Justice Lewis Powell (shortly afterwards elevated to the Supreme Court by the Nixon administration) wrote a famous memorandum for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce which was a virtual manifesto for the neo-conservative movement. In it Powell urges business "to buy the top academic reputations in the country to add credibility to corporate studies and give business a stronger voice on the campuses."

In the following decade business founded and funded more than forty chairs of Free Enterprise, with appropriately selected incumbents. . . . From early in the 1960s American corporations began to fund chairs of free enterprise with the explicit purpose of promoting and defending the free-enterprise system. Examples of these "chairs for propaganda" are the Goodyear Chairs of Free Enterprise at Kent State University and the University of Akron, the W.H. David Chair of the American Free Enterprise System at Ohio State University and the Irwin Maier Chair of American Enterprise at the University of Wisconsin. The first such chair was established at Georgia State University in 1963; the next was not established till 1974. By 1978 there were twenty; by 1981 there were more than forty.

See also, William E. Simon [former U.S. Treasury Secretary], *A Time for Truth*, New York: Reader's Digest, 1978. An excerpt (pp. 230-231):

Funds generated by business (by which I mean profits, funds in business foundations and contributions from individual businessmen) must rush by multimillions to the aid of liberty, in the many places where it is beleaguered. Foundations imbued with the philosophy of freedom (rather than encharged with experimental dabbling in socialist utopian ideas or the funding of outright revolution) must take pains to funnel desperately needed funds to scholars, social scientists, writers and journalists who understand the relationship between political and economic liberty. . . .

One does not work from "within" the egalitarian world to change it; one can only work from without -- and this absurd financing of one's philosophical enemies must not be tolerated in the new foundations. On the contrary, they must serve explicitly as intellectual refuges for the non-egalitarian scholars and writers in our society who today work largely alone in the face of overwhelming indifference or hostility. They must be given grants and more grants in exchange for books, books and more books. This philosophical restriction placed on the beneficiaries of the new foundations will not result in a uniformity of intellectual product. There is an enormous diversity of viewpoints within the center-to-right intellectual world which endorses capitalism. The point is simply to make sure that the thinkers on that broad band of the American spectrum are given the means to compete in the free market of ideas. Today they constitute an impoverished underground.

Alexander Cockburn and Ken Silverstein, *Washington Babylon*, London: Verso, 1996. An excerpt (pp. 12-13):

The Heritage Foundation publishes hundreds of books, monographs and studies annually, with complimentary copies mailed to journalists across the country. Heritage's 1995-1996 *Guide to Public Policy Experts* lists some 1,800 policy wonks and 250 policy groups which "share our commitment to public policies based on free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defense." The cross-referenced guide provides deadline-weary journalists with cooperative specialists in dozens of areas, ranging from "intelligence and counter-terrorism" to "wildlife management" and "bilingual education."

Think-tank scholars make money on the side by renting themselves out to public relations firms and lobbyists looking for "independent" supporters of their clients' viewpoints. One P.R. industry rep describes his technique in the following way: "I call up an 'expert,' feign interest in his or her work, confirm that it's consistent with the industry viewpoint and then seek to strike a deal," normally for either a study or an appearance at a press event. "We don't say that we want an industry mouthpiece, but that's what it amounts to -- and they know it. There are many people in this town who are willing to prostitute themselves and their work."

76. The quotations noted in the text are discussed in Elizabeth Fones-Wolf, *Selling Free Enterprise: the Business Assault on Labor and Liberalism, 1945-1960*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992 (citing *N.A.M. News*, December 16, 1950, and February 17, 1951; and S.C. Allyn, "Industry as a Good Neighbor," Address before the 53rd Annual Congress of American Industries, December 1, 1948, in the archives of the N.A.M. Museum and Library, Wilmington, Delaware). An excerpt (pp. 52, 177):

J. Warren Kinsmann, chairman of the N.A.M.'s [National Association of Manufacturers] Public Relations Advisory Committee and vice president of Du Pont, reminded businessmen that "in the everlasting battle for the minds of men" the tools

of public relations were the only weapons "powerful enough to arouse public opinion sufficiently to check the steady, insidious and current drift toward Socialism. . . ." S.C. Allyn of National Cash Register . . . [summarized] corporate objectives. The goal was to "indoctrinate citizens with the capitalist story."

77. On the Advertising Council's campaign, see for example, Curtis D. MacDougall, *Understanding Public Opinion: A Guide for Newspapermen and Newspaper Readers*, New York: Macmillan, 1952, pp. 568-570; Alex Carey, *Taking the Risk Out of Democracy: Corporate Propaganda versus Freedom and Liberty*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997. An excerpt (pp. 30-31):

In April 1947 the council announced a \$100 million advertising program which, over the next twelve months, would use all media "to 'sell' the American economic system" to the American people. The program was officially described as a "major project of educating the American people about the economic facts of life. . . ."

Daniel Bell, then an editor of *Fortune* . . . [reported:] "The Advertising Council alone, in 1950, inspired 7 million lines of newspaper advertising stressing free enterprise, 400,000 car cards, 2,500,000,000 radio impressions. . . . By all odds it adds up to the most intensive 'sales' campaign in the history of industry."

Carey notes that the Advertising Council also promulgated a similar campaign in the 1970s (p. 89):

To counter [the] critical public sentiment [of the 1960s] the Advertising Council in 1975 once again initiated a national program of conservative "economic education" on a scale similar to the postwar program. In 1977 *Fortune* described the continuing Ad Council campaign as "a study in gigantism, saturating the media and reaching practically everyone." By 1978, according to an expert witness before a Congressional inquiry, American business was spending \$1 billion per annum on grassroots propaganda. This expenditure was aimed at persuading the American public that their interests were the same as business's interests.

78. On the N.A.M.'s [National Association of Manufacturers] public relations budget, see for example, Elizabeth Fones-Wolf, *Selling Free Enterprise: The Business Assault on Labor and Liberalism, 1945-1960*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992. An excerpt (pp. 25, 52-53):

In the last part of the 1930s, the N.A.M., other employer associations, and individual firms launched a campaign to convert the American public to the economic goals, ideals, and program of business. The N.A.M.'s budget for public relations shot up from \$36,000 in 1934 to \$793,043 in 1937 representing 55 percent of the organization's total income. The N.A.M. utilized numerous communications media, including weekly radio programs, film strips, educational films, paid advertisements, direct mail, displays for schools and plants, a speakers bureau, and an industrial press service, providing editorials and news stories to seventy-five hundred small papers.

By 1940, the N.A.M. was beginning to experiment with methods to more systematically influence the institutions of education and religion and to reach more directly into the community with the story of free enterprise. General Electric and other firms supplemented the N.A.M.'s efforts with films, traveling industrial exhibits, merchandise displays, and pamphlets and programs for school children. . . . [In the late 1940s, the N.A.M.] also began new initiatives, including a new \$1.5 million radio program featuring singers and interviews with business leaders. In 1950, the N.A.M. turned to television, launching a weekly program, "Industry on Parade," which

showcased companies, explained how products were made, and demonstrated what industry gave to individuals, communities, and the nation. . . . By late 1951, business-sponsored movies reached an audience of 20 million people every week, more than one-third of the nation's weekly attendance at commercial movies. That represented a 30 percent larger audience than in 1950 and a 500 percent increase since 1946.

Alex Carey, *Taking the Risk Out of Democracy: Corporate Propaganda versus Freedom and Liberty*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997. An excerpt (pp. 28, 111, 21):

In the four years from 1946 to 1950 the N.A.M. distributed 18,640,270 pamphlets. Of this number 41 percent went to employees, 53 percent to high school and college students and 6 percent (i.e. still more than one million) to community leaders, including ministers of religion and women's club leaders throughout the entire nation. The N.A.M. reported that the most popular propaganda weapon "to reach masses of people in both the employee and student market with broad messages" was the full-colour "comic type" booklet. Dramatizing the scale of its activities, the N.A.M. reported: "If all N.A.M.-produced pamphlets ordered for distribution to employees, students and community leaders in 1950 had been stacked one on top of the other they would have reached nearly four miles into the sky -- the height of sixteen Empire State Buildings . . . a record . . . distribution [of] 7,839,039 copies. . . ."

In 1955 the secretary of [Australia's Institute of Public Affairs, a business lobbying and popular-proselytizing organization,] was sent to the United States to study business's economic education programs. His report attempted to convey some idea of the "vast sums" spent on the American operation and its enormous scale. He was able to inform us that General Motors produced more booklets as part of its "economic education" program for employees than it produced automobiles; that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce produced a "colour cartoon film" which had been seen by more than sixty million people and conducted a "Business-Education Day" annually on which 300,000 teachers had been given in-plant acquaintance with the free-enterprise viewpoint; that Sears Roebuck spent \$1 million on a film about "the economic facts of life" which was shown, in work time, to its 200,000 employees; that U.S. Steel produced an economic education program for its 250,000 employees which was also used widely in schools and elsewhere; and that the N.A.M. produced a weekly series of films for T.V. which was shown nationwide. . . .

[Even much earlier, in] 1913, a committee of the U.S. Congress had been established to investigate the mass dissemination of propaganda by the National Association of Manufacturers (N.A.M.), the leading business organization of the time, for the purpose of influencing legislation by influencing public opinion. The committee . . . reported that the "aspirations" of the N.A.M. were "so vast and far-reaching as to excite at once admiration and fear -- admiration for the genius that conceived them and fear for the effects which the . . . accomplishment of all these ambitions might have in a government such as ours."

79. On business-supplied material in schools, see for example, Elizabeth Fones-Wolf, *Selling Free Enterprise: The Business Assault on Labor and Liberalism, 1945-1960*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992. An excerpt (pp. 204, 202):

In 1950, the N.A.M. alone distributed almost four and a half million pamphlets to students, representing a 600 percent increase over 1947. It also doubled school usage of its films between 1947 and 1949; by 1954 over 3.5 million students watched about sixty thousand showings of N.A.M. films. That year, school superintendents estimated the investment in free material at \$50 million, about half the amount public

schools spent annually on regular textbooks. At the end of the decade, one in five corporations reported supplying teaching aids. . . . In 1953, over 2 million school children read B.F. Goodrich Company's cartoon-type booklet "Johnson Makes the Team," in which Tommy Johnson, a son of a Goodrich tire dealer, learns about the American free enterprise system through teamwork in football. Hundreds of thousands of others watched the N.A.M.'s film, "The Price of Freedom," which explored the hidden danger of security achieved through the growth of the government.

80. On corporate propaganda films during worktime, see for example, Alex Carey, *Taking the Risk Out of Democracy: Corporate Propaganda versus Freedom and Liberty*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997. An excerpt (pp. 29-30):

Corporations realized they could use captive audiences of employees for proselytizing purposes. "Many of the countr[y's] largest firms," *Fortune* magazine observed in 1950, "have started extensive programs to indoctrinate employees." These programs consisted of so-called "Courses in Economic Education." They were given to employees during working hours, in groups of ten or twenty, with tests to measure increase in commitment to the free-enterprise system. Sears Roebuck, for example, took three years to produce its own economic education program, which included a series of films and the training of 2600 "meeting leaders." In 1952 these leaders conducted 71,000 meetings to put Sears's 200,000 employees through the course at a total cost of \$6 million. The two leading economic education programs, both "evangelistic" in temper, were produced by Dupont and Inland Steel. By 1953 they had been used with about nine million employees.

Elizabeth Fones-Wolf, *Selling Free Enterprise: The Business Assault on Labor and Liberalism, 1945-1960*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992, ch. 3. An excerpt (pp. 53, 83):

By late 1951, business-sponsored movies reached an audience of 20 million people every week, more than one-third of the nation's weekly attendance at commercial movies. That represented a 30 percent larger audience than in 1950 and a 500 percent increase since 1946. . . .

A dozen educational and business organizations and over thirty large firms, ranging from progressives like Johnson & Johnson to such staunch antiunion conservatives as I.B.M. and Du Pont, developed economic education programs, many of which were distributed nationwide to other firms. These entailed taking workers or supervisors off the shop floor for one or more days for a period of three to fifteen hours to participate in discussion classes. Approximately 105,000 Westinghouse, 180,000 U.S. Steel and 20,000 Swift Company employees were among the first to be exposed to this new technique. G.E. demonstrated its commitment to promoting "a better understanding of our American way of life" by assigning an executive full time as "Manager of Economic Training." In early 1951, a leading management consultant observed in the *Harvard Business Review* that "practically every prominent leader of business in the United States today is talking about teaching economics to employees. Many of the largest corporations have launched economic-education programs."

Wallace F. Bennett [President of the N.A.M.], "Preface" to *Employee Communications for Better Understanding*, New York: National Association of Manufacturers, June 1949. An excerpt:

Think of it! About fifteen million American men and women spend eight or more hours a day, five or six days a week, in the mills, factories, or plants of America --

figuratively at the very elbows of the managers of manufacturing industry. . . . Armed with the economic facts, these millions with their families could be a mighty force, probably a determining factor, in the growing struggle between American individualism and foreign-bred collectivism. So in our plants we're not only manufacturing goods. We're manufacturing reactions to our way of life.

81. On business's use of "scientific" methods of strike-breaking, see for example, Keith Sward, "The Johnstown Strike of 1937: A Case Study of Large-Scale Conflict," in George W. Hartmann and Theodore Newcomb, eds., *Industrial Conflict: A Psychological Interpretation*, New York: Cordon, 1940, pp. 74-102. An excerpt (pp. 86-87):

The strikebreaking measures employed at Johnstown conform to the so-called "Mohawk Valley Formula," a systematic back-to-work tactic perfected by the Remington Rand Company. The National Association of Manufacturers publicized the plan in a special release sent to its members in July, 1936. . . .

It stated, "If there ever was a strike that was BROKEN BY PUBLIC OPINION and determination of employees to work, it was the one called June 11, 1937, at 11 P.M. at the Cambria Plant of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation." In essence, the "Formula" consists in employer mobilization of the public or "The Third Party" in a labor dispute. "A citizens' committee is formed under the slogan of 'law and order.' Mass police powers are invoked against the strikers by dramatizing real, imaginary, or provoked instances of 'violence.' Back-to-work sentiment is stimulated by the presence of massed vigilantes, a pretense of normal plant operations, mass meetings, press and radio publicity, dissemination of demoralizing propaganda, the circulation of back-to-work petitions, and a well-timed dramatic opening of the plant so prearranged that a substantial body of non-strikers or outside recruits marches into the plant *en masse*. The employer manipulates pressure groups to discredit the strike as the 'lost cause' of a 'radical minority.' With public support, he can, if necessary, employ extra-legal means of thwarting unionization."

Alex Carey, *Taking the Risk Out of Democracy: Corporate Propaganda versus Freedom and Liberty*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997. An excerpt (pp. 25-27; emphasis in original):

Until the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935, which required management to bargain with representatives of labour, unions had few rights, and attempts to organize workers were commonly met with violence and intimidation. After the Wagner Act the industrialists sought, in the words of the [Congressional] La Follette Committee, "a new alignment of forces." That is, they sought, through propaganda and other means, to arouse and organize the public at large "to do to labour on industry's behalf what the individual employer himself could no longer do legally." This tactic, it was reported at the time, "envisages a public opinion aroused to the point where it will tolerate the often outrageous use of force by police or vigilantes to break a strike. . . ." [I]ts use foreshadow[ed] the general *subordination of industrial relations to public relations* that developed in the decades after World War II.

Fourteen years [after the Johnstown steel strike], in 1950, John Streuben wrote: "Since then these 'scientific' methods of strike-breaking have been applied in every major strike in the country. . . ." "As one executive explained to the La Follette Committee, 'strike breakers and violence and things of that kind [are] things of the past. The way to win or combat a strike was to organize community sentiment.'"

On the Wagner Act of 1935, see chapter 9 of *U.P.* and its footnote 17. On the continued use of "strikebreakers and violence" after the Wagner Act, see chapter 6 of *U.P.* and its footnote 14; and chapter 9 of *U.P.* and its footnotes 26 and 27.

82. On the business community's and liberals' instigation of so-called "McCarthyism," see for example, Alex Carey, *Taking the Risk Out of Democracy: Corporate Propaganda versus Freedom and Liberty*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997, ch. 4 and pp. 27f; Peter H. Irons, "American Business and the Origins of McCarthyism: The Cold War Crusade of the United States Chamber of Commerce," in Robert Griffith and Athan Theoharis, eds., *The Specter: Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of McCarthyism*, New York: New Viewpoints, 1974, pp. 72-88; Ann Fagan Ginger and David Christiano, eds., *The Cold War Against Labor: An Anthology*, Berkeley, CA: Meiklejohn Civil Liberties Institute, 1987 (2 volumes); Mary Sperling McAuliffe, *Crisis on the Left: Cold War Politics and American Liberals, 1947-1954*, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1978; Richard M. Freedland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946-1948*, New York: New York University Press, 1985; Michael Paul Rogin, *The Intellectuals and McCarthy: the Radical Specter*, Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967; Patricia Cayo Sexton, *The War on Labor and the Left: Understanding America's Unique Conservatism*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991, ch. 9. See also chapter 8 of *U.P.* and its footnote 6.

83. On the American labor leaders' records, see chapter 5 of *U.P.* and its footnote 71.

84. On U.S. assistance to the Haitian coup, see chapter 5 of *U.P.*

85. For one of the scientific reports that was released at the end of 1994, see Malcolm Browne, "Most Precise Gauge Yet Points to Global Warming," *New York Times*, December 20, 1994, p. C4. An excerpt:

During the first two years of its operation, the most accurate system ever devised for measuring changes in global sea level has discerned a steady rise of more than three millimeters, or about one-tenth of an inch, a year. It may not sound like much, but if this trend continues for another few years, scientists say, it will be solid evidence that the earth is undergoing a long-term warming trend, probably related to increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide.

See also footnote 46 of chapter 2 of *U.P.*

86. For the Georges Bank report, see Scott Allen, "Georges Bank: Comeback Is No Sure Thing," *Boston Globe*, December 19, 1994, p. 29. An excerpt:

Two years ago, the Canadian government bit the bullet and closed its vast northern cod fishery off the Newfoundland coast, throwing scores of remote fishing villages into turmoil in an attempt to save the fast-shrinking fish population from annihilation. . . . New England started down this same sorry road last week with the unprecedented closure of parts of Georges Bank, once the world's richest fisheries. . . . If anything, scientists say, Georges Bank is in worse shape than the Canadian fisheries: Because U.S. officials rejected warnings for nearly a decade, fishermen [spurred by federal tax credits] depleted Georges Bank to all-time lows, taking more than 70 percent of the groundfish swimming on the bank each year. . . . Even a 12-year comeback is no sure thing. . . .

[T]he collapse has been more than offset by increasing cod imports from Norway, whose government took strong measures to stop overfishing years ago. "We have a

tradition that the government can tell individual economic actors, 'This is allowed, and this is not allowed.' This is a philosophical difference from North America," explained Kare Bryn, director of the resources department in Norway's fisheries ministry. Norway faced a plummeting cod population due to overfishing in the mid-1980s, prompting the federal government to cut fishing quotas up to 50 percent.

87. On the G.E. and Honeywell firings and the American unions' response, see for example, Geri Smith and John Pearson, "Which Side (Of the Border) Are You On?," *Business Week*, April 4, 1994, p. 50. An excerpt:

Honeywell says most of the dismissals were the result of work transfers. But the employees and the U.S. unions that back them charge they were punished for trying to organize a union at the *maquiladora*, where 493 workers earn an average of \$1 an hour making thermostats and other products. . . . Ironically, U.S. unions, militantly anti-N.A.F.T.A., now are using the law to help their cross-border campaigns. The Teamsters have filed a complaint against Honeywell with the National Administrative Office, set up by the U.S. Labor Dept. to help implement the labor pact. And the U.E. [United Electrical Workers] has filed one against General Electric Co. . . . In any case, there's only so much U.S. unions can do for Mexican workers under the N.A.F.T.A. labor pact. . . . [Its provisions] will have only limited powers to influence labor conditions in the three countries.

See also, Dan La Botz, *Mask of Democracy: Labor Suppression in Mexico Today*, Boston: South End, 1992. An excerpt (pp. 148-149, 151, 158):

In 1986, as a result of years of struggle by local union members, the Ford Cuautitlán plant had one of the best labor union contracts in the Mexican auto industry, with higher wages and better working conditions than in many other auto plants. Then, in 1987, the Ford Motor Company closed its Cuautitlán plant, and paid final severance pay to all 3,400 union employees, eliminating the union contract. A few months later, Ford reopened the plant, and rehired many of the workers, but with a new contract which drastically reduced salaries and benefits, and which compacted job titles, eliminating whole categories. The "official" C.T.M. Ford auto workers union, run at the time by General Secretary Lorenzo Vera Osorno, accepted the new arrangement, to the detriment of the workers. The workers, who had no say in accepting the contract, were understandably angry about the loss of labor standards. . . .

When Ford announced that the legally mandated annual Christmas bonus would be reduced in late December -- many workers who would have received 600,000 pesos (200 dollars) would only receive about 10,000 pesos (three dollars) -- . . . the workers engaged in a work stoppage. The next day, they demanded not only that they receive their full annual bonus and profit sharing payments required by law and their union contract, but also that their fired union leaders be reinstated, and that they be allowed to elect their own union leaders. . . . [A] group of 30 thugs, most of them reported to be officers of the Judicial Police of the state of Mexico, and reputed to have been hired by the C.T.M. and Ford, attacked and beat several leaders. Six workers . . . were either kidnapped or arrested. . . . One worker, Cleto Nigno, died a few days [after another confrontation with armed men presumably hired by Ford and the company "union"]. He had been shot in the back. . . . For years, workers were consistently terrorized by C.T.M. and Ford hired gunmen and thugs who attacked their meetings, demonstrations, and picket lines.

And see footnote 11 of chapter 7 of *U.P.*

88. On the Labor Department's decision, see for example, Allen R. Myerson, "U.S. Backs Mexico Law, Vexing Labor," *New York Times*, October 13, 1994, p. D1. An excerpt:

The United States refused today to pursue complaints that Mexico had failed to enforce union organizing rights at two plants owned by American corporations. The rulings, by Secretary of Labor Robert B. Reich, were the first test of how far the Clinton Administration would go, under a labor side accord to the North American Free Trade Agreement, in taking up the cause of Mexican workers against their Government and employers. Although his department heard the two cases over protests by the corporations and Mexican officials, whose reading of the labor accord is narrow, he in time sided with them. American and Mexican unions accuse Honeywell and General Electric of dismissing dozens of workers and using illegal tactics, condoned by the Mexican Government, to foil organizers. In a report issued tonight, the Labor Department found that the Mexican Government had not failed to protect worker rights and that Mr. Reich had no grounds for bringing the cases to his Mexican and Canadian counterparts. . . .

The available information, [Secretary of the Labor Department's National Administrative Office Irasema T. Garza] said, "does not establish that the Government of Mexico failed to promote compliance with, or enforce the specific laws involved." But as she also noted, "The timing of the dismissals appears to coincide with organizing drives at the two plants."

For commentary on Mexican labor law, see for example, Ian Robinson, *North American Trade As If Democracy Mattered: What's Wrong with N.A.F.T.A. and What Are the Alternatives?*, Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives/ Washington: International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund, 1993. An excerpt (p. 71 n.245):

[T]he principal problem with Mexican labour standards is poor enforcement, rather than low standards. . . . [W]hile Mexican labour standards are generally high, Mexican federal labour law -- in spite of the language of the Mexican constitution -- greatly restricts workers' rights to organize their own unions and to democratically elect their own leaders.

For some indications of how the rule of "law" operates in Mexico generally, see Christopher Whalen [Director of The Whalen Company and Editor of *The Mexico Report*], "Reality Check: Doing Business in the Real Mexico," *World Trade*, November 1992, p. 41. An excerpt (emphasis in original):

Mexico is an authoritarian country where men rather than written laws govern both civil and commercial life. Government-run elections are a charade maintained to blunt foreign criticism. Information flows about economic and business conditions, and government finances are limited and frequently unreliable. In order to do business in Mexico successfully, companies must identify the business leaders and their political patrons that rule over a given industry sector or market. In other words: Make sure you're paying the right person. Bribes are part of doing business in Mexico. A payoff is often required at each level of the government, right up to the highest levels. It is impossible to do business in Mexico on a long-term basis without paying "gratuities" to administrative and political officials who hold sway over a given industry. *Indeed, contrary to government propaganda about "reforms," the situation with respect to corruption in the highest levels of government has actually worsened under the Salinas government.*

Geri Smith, "A Tear in Mexico's Curtain of Democracy," *Business Week*, March 22, 1993, p. 47. An excerpt:

At a dinner held in [Mexican President Salinas's] honor on Feb. 23 [1993], nearly 30 of Mexico's most powerful executives were presented with a proposal that most of them would find hard to refuse. Each was asked to contribute a cool \$25 million to a proposed \$1 billion trust fund aimed at providing Salinas' Institutional Revolutionary Party (P.R.I.) with a permanent source of financing to help make it invincible in upcoming 1994 elections. The executives didn't blanch. Most have benefited tremendously from Salinas' policies, such as his huge sell-off of state-owned assets.

In attendance, for example, was Carlos Slim, a Salinas intimate and majority owner of Telefonos de Mexico (Telmex), the nation's only telephone company. Its market value has zoomed from \$200 million to \$26 billion since its privatization three years ago. . . . [A]t least one dinner guest was inclined to fatten the kitty. T.V. tycoon Emilio Azcarraga Milmo, whose Televisa network enjoys a near monopoly in Mexico, offered \$30 million. . . . When the dinner-party news leaked [to the American press], Salinas quickly dropped the \$25 million plan and proposed new limits on political contributions.

89. On public subsidies to DuPont and other chemicals corporations to replace fluorocarbons, see for example, Joshua Karliner, *The Corporate Planet: Ecology and Politics in the Age of Globalization*, San Francisco: Sierra Club, 1997, pp. 51-52; Mark Zepezauer and Arthur Naiman, *Take The Rich Off Welfare*, Tucson, AZ: Odonian, 1996, pp. 111-113. See generally, Joshua Karliner, "The Environment Industry: Profiting from Pollution," *Ecologist*, Vol. 24, No. 2, March/April 1994, pp. 59-63.

90. For the *Wall Street Journal* editors' concern about the ozone layer, see for example, Editorial, "Press-Release Ozone Hole," *Wall Street Journal*, February 28, 1992, p. A14. An excerpt:

The frightening news story [that N.A.S.A. predicted the opening of an "ozone hole"] raises the possibility of "exposing people and plant life to higher levels of harmful ultraviolet radiation from the sun. . . ." We ourselves are not prepared to dismiss the theory of ozone depletion. But the problem hasn't been ignored. . . . If federal policy makers are going to ask the American people for a crash project at huge expense, as they did with the Clean Air Act, they'd better have their science nailed down.

See also, G. Pascal Zachary, "The Outlook: Greenhouse Emissions Pose Tricky Problems," *Wall Street Journal*, March 10, 1997, p. A1.

91. For Adam Smith's remarks, see Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976 (original 1776). An excerpt (Book I, ch. VIII, p. 75; Book I, ch. IX, p. 110):

We rarely hear, it has been said, of the combinations of masters, though frequently of those of workmen. But whoever imagines, upon this account, that masters rarely combine, is as ignorant of the world as of the subject. Masters are always and every where in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform combination, not to raise the wages of labour above their actual rate. To violate this combination is every where a most unpopular action, and a sort of reproach to a master among his neighbours and equals. We seldom, indeed, hear of this combination, because it is the usual, and one may say, the natural state of things which nobody ever hears of. Masters too sometimes enter into particular combinations to sink the wages of labour even below this rate. These are always conducted with the utmost silence and secrecy, till the moment of execution, and when the workmen yield, as they sometimes do, without

resistance, though severely felt by them, they are never heard of by other people. . . . Our merchants and master-manufacturers complain much of the bad effects of high wages in raising the price, and thereby lessening the sale of their goods both at home and abroad. They say nothing concerning the bad effects of high profits. They are silent with regard to the pernicious effects of their own gains. They complain only of those of other people.

Smith's statement about the "vile maxim of the masters of mankind" is in the following passage (Book III, ch. IV, p. 437):

[W]hat all the violence of the feudal institutions could never have effected, the silent and insensible operation of foreign commerce and manufactures gradually brought about. These gradually furnished the great proprietors with something for which they could exchange the whole surplus of produce of their lands, and which they could consume themselves without sharing it either with tenants or retainers. All for ourselves, and nothing for other people, seems, in every age of the world, to have been the vile maxim of the masters of mankind. As soon, therefore, as they could find a method of consuming the whole value of their rents themselves, they had no disposition to share them with any other persons. For a pair of diamond buckles perhaps, or for something as frivolous and useless, they exchanged the maintenance, or what is the same thing, the price of the maintenance of a thousand men for a year, and with it the whole weight and authority which it could give them. The buckles, however, were to be all their own, and no other human creature was to have any share of them; whereas in the more ancient method of expence they must have shared with at least a thousand people. With the judges that were to determine the preference, this difference was perfectly decisive; and thus, for the gratification of the most childish, the meanest and the most sordid of all vanities, they gradually bartered their whole power and authority.

See also chapter 5 of *U.P.* and its footnote 1.

On corporate planning groups and meetings, see for example, Edward S. Herman, *Corporate Control, Corporate Power*, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 194-230; "Babel's Tongues," in Alexander Cockburn and Ken Silverstein, *Washington Babylon*, London: Verso, 1996; John C. Stauber and Sheldon Rampton, *Toxic Sludge Is Good For You!: Lies, Damn Lies and the Public Relations Industry*, Monroe, ME: Common Courage, 1995, pp. 33-34. See also footnotes 75, 77 and 78 of this chapter.

92. The cover title of *Z*'s June 1996 issue advertised: "Chomsky On Corporate Greed."

On the alternative political monthly *Z Magazine*, see chapter 6 of *U.P.* and its footnote 2.

93. It is a fundamental tenet of corporate law that corporate directors have a "Duty of Care" and "Duty of Loyalty" to the corporation and its shareholders. There is statutory liability for their "misconduct," and removal "for cause" -- or, if the certificate of incorporation or corporate bylaws allow it, "without cause." In some circumstances, shareholders can bring "derivative actions" (i.e. on behalf of "the corporation") to compel official actions, such as the payment of stock dividends, based upon possible "mismanagement" by the directors in breach of their duties to "the corporation." One such cause of action is for "waste" -- in other words, for improvident disposition of corporate assets in neglect or violation of the director's legal duties. See generally,

Edward S. Herman, *Corporate Control, Corporate Power*, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981, chs. 2 and 3.

94. On corporate support for the New Deal in the 1930s, see for example, Thomas Ferguson, *Golden Rule: The Investment Theory of Party Competition and the Logic of Money-Driven Political Systems*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995, especially the appendix and chs. 1, 2 and 4. Ferguson's book marshals a compelling case that at the center of the new type of political coalition that Roosevelt built were not the workers, blacks and poor that have preoccupied liberal commentators, but rather a new block of high-technology industries, international oil companies, investment banks, and internationally-oriented commercial banks. In general, Ferguson argues that from the early nineteenth century the history of American politics is the history of groups of investors banding together to invest to control the state. When several groups of powerful investors happen to have conflicting interests there are what appear to be political conflicts, and when they have shared interests there are periods of political quiescence -- but to an overwhelming degree, it is these groups of investors who put together the political party programs, select and fund the candidates, impose the external constraints within which political decisions are made, and so on. See also, Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, *Right Turn: The Decline of the Democrats and the Future of American Politics*, New York: Hill and Wang, 1986 (discussing similar themes and focusing on the Carter and Reagan years).

For routine acknowledgment by a mainstream source of the uncontroversial fact that the New Deal was supported by business, see for example, Leonard W. Levy, ed.-in-chief, *Encyclopedia of the American Constitution*, New York: Macmillan, 1986. An excerpt (pp. 447-448):

While encouraging the growth of big labor and ministering to the needs of the elderly and the poor, the New Deal also provided substantial benefits to American capitalists. Business opposition to Roosevelt was intense, but it was narrowly based in labor-intensive corporations in textiles, automobiles, and steel, which had the most to lose from collective bargaining. The New Deal found many business allies among firms in the growing service industries of banking, insurance, and stock brokerage where government regulations promised to reduce cutthroat competition and to weed out marginal operators. Because of its aggressive policies to expand American exports and investment opportunities abroad, the New Deal also drew support from high-technology firms and from the large oil companies who were eager to penetrate the British monopoly in the Middle East.

Sophisticated businessmen discovered that they could live comfortably in a world of government regulation. The "socialistic" Tennessee Valley Authority [a government corporation founded in 1933 to develop the Tennessee river basin in a seven-state area through projects like building hydroelectric power stations] lowered the profits of a few utility companies, but cheap electric power for the rural South translated into larger consumer markets for the manufacturers of generators, refrigerators, and other appliances. In addition to restoring public confidence in the stock exchanges and the securities industry, the Securities and Exchange Commission promoted self-regulation among over-the-counter dealers. Motor trucking firms received a helping hand from the Interstate Commerce Commission in reducing rate wars, and the major airlines looked to the Civil Aeronautics Board to protect them from the competitive rigors of the marketplace.

See also chapter 2 of *U.P.* and its footnote 51; and chapter 9 of *U.P.* and its footnote 18.

95. For the *Wall Street Journal's* article about the corporations that funded the Gingrich movement, see Jill Abramson and David Rogers, "Shifting Fortunes: As G.O.P. Tries to Shrink Government, Coffers Swell With New Money," *Wall Street Journal*, February, 9, 1995, p. A1.

On the tobacco company executives as mass murderers, see footnote 32 of chapter 2 of *U.P.*; and footnotes 54 and 55 of this chapter.

96. For the *Fortune* article, see Richard I. Kirkland, Jr., "Today's G.O.P.: The Party's Over for Big Business," *Fortune*, February 6, 1995, p. 50. An excerpt:

[T]he links between the corporate community and the G.O.P. are weaker and more strained than at any time in memory. . . . [I]f the Republican National Committee published a tabloid newspaper, the headline heralding the dawn of the Newt Gingrich era might well blare: G.O.P. TO BIG BUSINESS: DROP DEAD. "A lot of the newer Republicans in Congress simply don't like big business," says Richard Rahn, former chief economist of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Indeed, party chairman Haley Barbour went out of his way to deliver that message, albeit more politely, in the wake of the G.O.P.'s November 8 triumph, observing "ours is the party of small business, not big business; of Main Street, not Wall Street." In particular, the new G.O.P. draws its strength from the neighborhoods on Main Street populated by religious conservatives (mainly born-again Christians as opposed to, say, mainline Protestants and Catholics with a small-government bent) and by conservative-cause groups, such as the National Rifle Association. Their common ideological ground: an intense dislike, even hatred, for meddlesome big government and all its minions. . . .

Most of the current G.O.P. partisans don't actively hate, much less fear, big business. They just feel contempt for it. . . . "There's a real cultural disconnect between the FORTUNE 500 and social conservatives," says Gary Bauer, 48, who runs the Family Research Council, a lobbying outfit with strong ties to Christian fundamentalist groups and the new Republicans. . . . [In] the "culture war . . ." big business has so far been either missing in action -- or on the wrong side. Oft-cited in point: a study by the Capital Research Center, a conservative policy group, which found that in 1992 major corporations gave \$3.42 in donations to "left" or "liberal" charities -- Planned Parenthood, the National Organization for Women (N.O.W.), the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and the like -- for every dollar given to nonprofits on the right side of the war. . . .

[A] poll conducted exclusively for FORTUNE by the opinion research firm of Clark Martire & Bartolomeo . . . [found that] just 4% of executives rated passing a constitutional amendment to allow voluntary school prayer as highly important. . . . By contrast, a whopping 98% said Congress should make cutting or slowing the growth of federal spending a top priority. In addition, 82% gave a high score to reducing government regulation, and 78% thought it critical to pass a tort reform bill. . . . [O]n the litmus-test issue of abortion -- the last four Republican party platforms and a majority of G.O.P. primary voters favor imposing stringent restrictions -- 59% of C.E.O.s were adamantly pro-choice, agreeing with the statement that "a woman should be able to get an abortion if she wants one, no matter what the reason."

97. For the *New York Times's* editorial, see Editorial, "In Praise of the Counterculture," *New York Times*, December 11, 1994, section 4, p. 14.

98. Chomsky is actually referring to a lengthy and sympathetic profile of him and his work in the *Boston Globe*. See Anthony Flint, "Divided legacy: Noam Chomsky's theory of linguistics revolutionized the field, but his radical political analysis is what gave him a cult following," *Boston Globe Magazine*, November 19, 1995, p. 25.

99. For the discussions of "class war," see for example, Jason DeParle, "Class is No Longer a Four-Letter Word," *New York Times Magazine*, March 17, 1996, p. 40; Meg Greenfield, "Back to the Class War," *Newsweek*, February 12, 1996, p. 84; Dennis Farney, "Great Divides: Scenes From the Politics of American Culture," *Wall Street Journal*, December 14, 1994, p. A1.

See also, Editorial, "The Backlash Building Against Business," *Business Week*, February 19, 1996, p. 102. An excerpt:

[S]omething very serious is afoot in the land. So far, most Americans have tended to blame Big Government for their economic woes. But now their anger may be shifting in some measure toward Big Business. The role of the corporation in society is being challenged. Only the foolish would ignore the signs. . . . Voices from a reviving left are . . . calling for changes in the ways corporations operate. . . . C.E.O.s would be wise to ponder these tectonic changes. One thing is certain: U.S. corporations may have to strike a new balance between the need to cut costs to be globally competitive and the need to be more responsible corporate citizens.

100. The U.S. Constitution's Second Amendment provides: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." On the constitutional meaning of this "militias" clause, see for example, *United States v. Miller*, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).

101. On falling real wages after 1973, see for example, Maude Barlow and Tony Clarke, *M.A.I. (the Multilateral Agreement on Investment) and the Threat to American Freedom*, New York: Stoddart, 1998. An excerpt (p. 50):

Despite robust economic growth, the [Council on International and Public Affairs]'s study reveals that the real wages of U.S. workers have declined by 19.5 percent from their level of twenty-five years ago. Indeed, virtually all of the income gains during the past decade have reportedly gone to the top 5 percent of American families, thereby dramatically increasing inequality and poverty in the country.

Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein and John Schmitt, *The State of Working America, 1998-1999*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999, especially chs. 3 and 6. An excerpt (pp. 5, 2, 1-2):

After adjusting for inflation, hourly wages stagnated or fell between 1989 and 1997 for the bottom 60% of all workers (wages over the 1990s did increase 1.4% for workers at the 10th percentile). In real terms, earnings of the median worker in 1997 were about 3.1% lower than they were in 1989. . . . In the most recent period for which we have data, 1989-97, median family income rose by only \$285, or 0.6%. Income stagnation of this magnitude is unprecedented in the postwar era. In every other postwar expansion, the income of the typical family had, at this point, already far surpassed the level reached in the preceding peak. . . .

The significant improvements in 1997 and 1998 in wages for most workers have still left wage trends in the 1990s no better than they were for most workers in the 1980s. Wage declines have also pulled down new groups of workers in the 1990s, including many white-collar workers and recent college graduates. Women workers

in the middle and upper-middle part of the wage distribution, who saw real wages rise significantly in the 1980s, have experienced a sharp deceleration in the 1990s. At the same time, jobs have become less secure and less likely to offer health and pension benefits. Middle-class wealth (the value of tangible assets such as houses and cars, plus financial assets, minus debts) has also fallen. These same factors have kept economically less-advantaged families in poverty despite an extended economic recovery. . . . [T]he typical American family is probably worse off near the end of the 1990s than it was at the end of the 1980s or the end of the 1970s, despite an increase in the productive capacity of the overall economy. To the extent that the typical American family has been able to hold its ground, the most important factor has been the large increase in the hours worked by family members.

See also, Juliet B. Schor, *The Overworked American: The Unexpected Decline of Leisure*, New York: BasicBooks, 1991, p. 81 ("just to reach their 1973 standard of living, [workers in 1990] must work 245 more hours, or 6-plus extra weeks a year").

For a celebration in the business press of this downward trend in wages, see Alfred Malabre, "The Outlook: Economy's Slow Pace Masks Competitiveness," *Wall Street Journal*, September 13, 1993, p. A1. An excerpt:

Concern about the economy's sluggish pace obscures a welcome development of transcendent importance: a remarkable improvement in America's ability to compete in world markets. Behind this improvement is the increasingly competitive cost of U.S. labor. . . . In the U.S., labor costs per unit of output fell 1.5% last year. These costs, expressed in terms of the dollar's international value, rose sharply in most of the other countries studied. Among the sharpest increases: 18.3% in Japan, 12% in Germany, 11.3% in the Netherlands and 7.2% in France. . . . Data for such emerging industrial nations as South Korea and Taiwan are less complete, but they also point to the improving U.S. competitiveness. While labor costs in the U.S. were falling last year, such costs, expressed in dollar terms, rose 12.4% in Taiwan and 0.5% in South Korea. . . . In 1985, hourly pay in South Korea, Taiwan and Mexico all averaged about 10% of the U.S. level. Last year, the South Korean rate reached 30% of the comparable U.S. pay figure, the Taiwanese rate reached 35% and the Mexican rate rose to about 15%.

In 1985, hourly pay in the U.S. was also a good deal higher than in the other members of the so-called Group of Seven, the seven major trading nations. In Canada, the pay level was about 85% of the U.S. rate. The German pay rate was 75% of the U.S. level. Lower still were the comparable rates in Italy (60%), France (58%), Japan (50%) and Britain (45%). Last year, by comparison, hourly pay in the U.S. was lower than in most other G-7 nations. In Germany, the hourly rate was some 60% higher than in the U.S. In Italy, the rate was about 20% above the U.S. figure. Only in Britain was hourly pay still below the U.S. level, but the once-huge gap was nearly gone.

See also footnote 14 of this chapter.

102. On Chinese factory fires, see chapter 8 of *U.P.* and its footnote 32.

103. On the disappearance of water supplies in Nicaragua and Haiti, see for example, "Nicaragua: Very Briefs," *envío: The Monthly Magazine of Analysis on Central America* (Universidad Centralamericano, Managua, Nicaragua), Vol. 12, No. 142, May 1993, p. 21. An excerpt:

In March, Managua's Nejapa lagoon dried up completely -- perhaps irreversibly. It left only a round bed of mud in which dozens of turtles burrowed for survival. This

environmental tragedy is only one indicator of the ecological disaster toward which Nicaragua could be heading. It was attributed to the widespread drought that has affected a large part of the Pacific coast for several years, due largely to massive and indiscriminate deforestation. More than 100 rivers in the Pacific region have been reduced to dry and dusty ditches in the past 5 years. Ecologists say that if Nicaragua continues with its current level of generalized poverty, without plans for sustainable development, the Pacific coast will be a total and irreversible desert in 50 years.

Patrick Bellegarde-Smith, *Haiti: the Breached Citadel*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990. An excerpt (pp. 115-116):

Haiti suffers from what is described as an irreversible ecological disaster. First, a large population for the amount of land, of which only a part is arable, results in a density of 565 persons per arable square kilometer (1,462 per arable square mile), and overcultivation of the land is one consequence of this density. Second, charcoal is the only source of energy for home energy needs, and in the late 1980s, about 80 percent of Haiti's energy came from that source. As a result, according to the experts, the equivalent of 11 hectares (27 acres) of wood are used every day to meet that need. In the mid-1950s, Haiti's forests -- which up to the time of Spanish colonization had covered the whole island -- were already estimated to cover only a low 7 percent of the land, and the decline continues at the rate of 5 percent of reserves yearly. A direct result of the search for both cultivable land and fuel is erosion, which is taking its toll. In the mid-1980s, an estimated 6,000 hectares (14,800 acres) of good soil was lost each year. . . . [I]n twenty-five years the whole country will be a desert according to some scientific estimates.

104. For a study early in the twentieth century describing Haiti as a rich resource center, see for example, William A. MacCorkle, *The Monroe Doctrine in Its Relation to the Republic of Haiti*, New York: Neale, 1915. An excerpt (pp. 25-26):

This island has within its shores more natural wealth than any other territory of similar size in the world. By reason of its rich valleys and splendid mountains it has every temperature known to man. All tropical plants and trees, as well as the vegetable and fruits of the temperate climes, grow there in perfection. The best coffee known to commerce grows wild, without planting or cultivation. Sugar cane, indigo, bread fruit, melons, mangoes, oranges, apples, grapes, mulberries, and figs all grow with little labor or care. Mahogany, manchineel, satinwood, rosewood, cinnamon-wood, logwood, the pine, the oak, the cypress, and the palmetto grow in rich profusion in its splendid soil. Here are the best dyestuffs known to commerce, and in the earth are silver, gold, copper, lead, iron, gypsum, and sulphur.

We hazard the statement that this island is more capable of supporting life in all its phases, more able to create wealth and diffuse happiness to its people, than any other land of its size on the face of the earth. Its harbors are incomparable, and will float the navies of the world. Its atmosphere is salubrious and its climate healthy. It is a natural paradise, and the description of its beauty and resources by Columbus is as true to-day as it was more than four hundred years ago.

The study then quotes Columbus's impressions of Haiti (pp. 26-27):

"In it there are many havens on the seacoast, incomparable with any others I know in Christendom, and plenty of rivers, so good and great that it is a marvel. The lands there are high, and in it are very many ranges of hills and most lofty mountains incomparably beyond the island of Centrefei (or Teneriffe); all most beautiful in a thousand shapes and all accessible, and full of trees of a thousand kinds, so lofty

that they seem to reach the sky. And I am assured that they never lose their foliage, as may be imagined, since I saw them, as green and as beautiful as they are in Spain in May and some of them were in flower, some in fruit, some in another stage, according to their kind. And the nightingale was singing, and other birds of a thousand sorts, in the month of November, round about the way I was going. There are palm trees of six or eight species, wondrous to see for their beautiful variety; but so are the other trees and fruits and plants therein. There are wonderful pine groves and very large plants of verdure, and there are honey and many kinds of birds, and many mines in the earth; and there is a population of incalculable number. Espanola [i.e. the island of Haiti and the Dominican Republic] is a marvel; its mountains and hills, and plains, and fields, and the soil, so beautiful and rich for planting and sowing, for breeding and cattle of all sorts, for building of towns and villages."

Haiti's richness made it a prize for colonial robbery and exploitation. See for example, Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934*, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971. An excerpt (pp. 19-20):

At the time of the French Revolution, Saint Domingue [Haiti] was the wealthiest European colonial possession in the Americas. As early as 1742 the sugar production of Saint Domingue exceeded that of all the British West Indies, and on the eve of the revolution the colony accounted for more than one-third of the foreign commerce of France. In 1789 French trade with Saint Domingue amounted to £11 million, while the whole of England's colonial trade totaled only £5 million. In the same year the ports of Saint Domingue received 1,587 ships, a greater number than Marseilles, and France employed 750 ships exclusively for the Saint Domingue trade. The chief exports of the colony were sugar, coffee, cotton, indigo, molasses, and dyewoods. The French built an elaborate network of roads, irrigation systems, and magnificent plantations.

Paul Farmer, *The Uses of Haiti*, Monroe, ME: Common Courage, 1994. An excerpt (p. 63):

At one time or another, the colony was first in world production of coffee, rum, cotton, and indigo. On the eve of the American Revolution, Saint-Domingue [Haiti] -- roughly the size of the modern state of Maryland -- generated more revenue than all thirteen North American colonies combined. By 1789, the colony supplied three-fourths of the world's sugar. Saint Domingue was, in fact, the world's richest colony and the busiest trade center in the New World.

Patrick Bellegarde-Smith, *Haiti: the Breached Citadel*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990. An excerpt (pp. xviii, 109):

In the second half of the eighteenth century . . . [Haiti] created more wealth than any other colony in the world. At that time, 50 percent of France's transatlantic commerce involved Haiti, and nearly 20 percent of the French population depended on trade with Haiti for its livelihood. . . . Overall investments in the Haitian economic infrastructure were meager compared to the enormous profits and trade advantage gained by France. Economically, Saint-Domingue [Haiti] was the world's most profitable colony. It soon became known as "the pearl of the Antilles" and was the standard by which the profitability of other colonies was judged. Socially, however, Saint-Domingue may have been the most repressive colony in the eighteenth century because of its disproportionate slave-to-master ratio and the exceedingly exploitative economic structure the French had devised. Terror and coercion were used to keep the Africans in line, and the French systematically exported the resources and profits of Saint-Domingue to France itself. . . .

Food imports, expensive by definition, now account for about half of all Haitian imports. . . . This economic situation is a far cry from that of the first decade of the nineteenth century when Haiti was self-sufficient in food production and when the country was evolving a manufacturing base. The Haitian peasantry at that time had the highest standard of living of any peasantry in the Western Hemisphere after the United States.