ARTICLE



Copyright © 2006 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi) 1468-7968 Vol 6(2): 203–230;063753 DOI:10.1177/1468796806063753 http://etn.saqepub.com

'Core' culture hegemony and multiculturalism

Perceptions of the privileged position of Australians with British backgrounds

JAMES FORREST

Macquarie University, Australia

KEVIN DUNN

University of New South Wales, Australia

ABSTRACT Tensions between acceptance of policies aimed at creating a multicultural society and British (Anglo or Anglo-Celtic) Australians concerned about loss of their privileged position as members of the dominant society have been an important feature of political debate in Australia in recent years. There is, however, a paucity of empirical evidence available to assess the extent of recognition of Anglo privilege in this debate. This study draws on questions about attitudes to multicultural values and Anglo privilege from a recent survey of New South Wales and Queensland respondents to address this issue. Principal components analysis of the attitudinal data shows that multiculturalism and privilege are separate, independent dimensions in respondents' thinking. Cross-tabulations show both polarization of views and ambivalence in attitudes to Anglo privilege, which are in substantial part resolved by consideration of the geography of privilege and linked multicultural values.

KEYWORDS Australia ● geography ● multiculturalism ● White (Anglo) privilege

INTRODUCTION

Tensions surrounding actual or perceived loss of hegemony of previously dominant Anglo cultures are an increasing feature of major immigrant receiving countries of the English-speaking world. Typically, these arise from concerns about and complex interrelationships among issues of national identity, citizenship, dominant society privilege and the politics of multiculturalism. Essentially, for immigrant countries, these tensions converge around issues of assimilation (or conformity to the dominant ethnoculture) versus multiculturalism (or promotion of ethnic diversity). An integral part of this 'dichotomy' is the issue of 'white privilege' or supremacy in increasingly multicultural societies. As Johnson (2000: 164) points out, hitherto dominant groups are facing dilemmas about how to maintain their own identity, and the national identity they largely shaped, when their hitherto privileged situation is increasingly under threat. Nowhere is this more true than among former settler colonies, now immigrant-receiving nations of the English-speaking world: America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Each is characterized by a mix of nationalisms reflecting the positioning of dominant, minority and, in Canada's case, regional groups (Pearson, 2001: 11). In each case, too, whitesonly immigration policies were phased out relatively recently – in America from 1965, in Canada in 1962 and 1967, in Australia in 1966 and during the early 1970s, and in New Zealand as recently as 1986. Focusing on Australia, this study examines perceptions of Anglo privilege among both Anglos – as discussed below, the terms 'white' and 'whiteness' are problematic in the Australian context – and non-Anglos, and the sociocultural context of those perceptions.

VISIONS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

In many immigrant-receiving countries, the contemporary state has to deal with contentions among several visions of nationalism and national identity which Brown (2000: 126–7) categorizes as: civic (integration into a nation of equal citizens, or difference-blindness); ethnocultural (assimilation into the dominant society or ethnoculture); and multicultural (recognition of cultural diversity and minority rights). Tension occurs when the visions of civic nation and ethnocultural nation fail to converge – the notion of a social justice nation is diminished – resulting in maintenance of dominant society privilege and the emergence of new ideas about minority rights, or multiculturalism.

However, as Brown argues:

... the emergence of multiculturalism raises major issues for the sense of national community, in that it challenges both the civic idea that the nation is a community of equal individual citizens ... and the ethnocultural [dominant society] idea that the nation is a community whose members ought to be culturally assimilating.... (2000: 126)

Equally important:

[t]he resultant politics vary markedly [among] different countries because of differences in their ethnic composition, and in the character and responses of their governments. (2000: 126, emphasis added)

Resultant variations on visions of national identity in major immigrantreceiving countries tend to range from an ethnocultural (assimilationist) view of society and national identity to recognition of diversity (multiculturalism). A brief survey of such variations among major immigrantreceiving countries of the English-speaking world provides a context within which tensions between core culture hegemony and multiculturalism in Australia can be set.

United States of America: the decline of dominant ethnicity

'Core' or dominant culture hegemony and multiculturalism in the United States take a form that is different from that in other major immigrantreceiving countries. Principally, this relates to the decline of dominant ethnicity (Kaufman, 2004), and the emergence of a process of 'segmented assimilation' (Portes and Zhou, 1993). For mainstream immigrant groups, Alba (1998: 18–24) suggests a new process of inclusion, as distinct from the older process of assimilation, into a new multicultural (see Glazer, 1997) or 'transnational America' (Bourne, 1977); that is, one where ethnic groups change – are Americanized – as a result of their encounter with the larger American society, while American society itself changes to provide a new core culture, but in a constant process of reinvention (Kivisto, 2002: 82–3). But not all are so included. Thus Rose (1997) refers to a future racial divide, not between 'whites' and 'non-whites' (the term 'white' is increasingly cultural rather than racial), but between blacks and non-blacks. Those who are excluded are 'acculturated into the adversarial culture of impoverished groups'; just where Latinos and Asians fit into this new schema is still being worked out (Kivisto, 2002: 81). Assimilation and multiculturalism, therefore, have meanings in the modern American context that are different from those pertaining in the other main immigrant-receiving nations.

In a recent study of the rise and fall of Anglo-America and the decline of dominant ethnicity in the United States, Kaufman (2004: 6–7, 9) refers to a pre-1960s, dominant ethnic phase of Americanism, marked by white, Anglo-Protestant hegemony. This was followed by a liberal-egalitarian phase that came closest to approximating the notion of a civic, but multicultural (transnational) nation. But a distinction is made between ethnic groups and racial groups:

During this second phase, which began in force during the Second World War and was consummated in the 1960s, previously marginalised ethnic groups

attained rough institutional parity with Anglo-Protestants, a development that has been accompanied by a relaxation of *all* ethnic group boundaries. Racial minorities were not as successful, but the process of change involved both white and non-white groups *simultaneously* . . . [such that] communal identities are being replaced by more privatised, post-ethnic forms of belonging. (Kaufman, 2004: 7)

In the United States, however, these changes arose as part of a broad sociopolitical process where the federal government played little active part in defining or advancing the cause of inclusion and multiculturalism (Kivisto, 2002: 83). The opposite was the case in the other major immigrant-receiving countries touched on here.

Canada: Francophone, Anglophone, indigenous and immigrant imperatives

The question of core dominance in Canada revolves around two major themes: pre-1960s cultural pluralism and ethnocentrism (assimilation), although this was always complicated by the cultural pluralism associated with the historical roles of British and French ethnicities – the two 'charter' groups (Bourque and Duchastel, 1999: 90; Dorais et al., 1992) – and the more recent multicultural approach to an increasingly diverse, post 'white Canada' ethnic mosaic since the 1960s. Unlike the United States, where multiculturalism was seen to have the potential to fragment the nation, in Canada, multiculturalism was a state-sponsored initiative aimed at preserving national unity, at creating a shared Canadian identity (Kivisto, 2002: 101). This was the result of a period of cultural introspection during the 1960s, motivated initially by the longstanding issue of Anglo–French relations. However, other European-origin groups, who had constituted a less noticed demographic for many decades, complained that the bicultural debate excluded them from full citizenship.

From an initial stance aimed at recognizing the contributions of diverse groups in Canada's national development, the focus quickly assumed political importance and demands for equal rights:

This link – between multiculturalism and equal rights – was enshrined in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms of Canada . . . in 1982, giving it constitutional status; later, the Multicultural Act of Canada was passed in 1988, formalising the Charter into the legal system. At its core, Canadian multiculturalism has three defining elements: the rights of individuals to retain their cultures; provision of services to enable both integration and cultural retention; and anti-discrimination. (Hiebert et al., 2003: 6–7)

The Anglo cultural hegemony of a British Canada established in the late 1700s, with its non-assimilationist policy stance towards Francophone Canadians came to a de facto end in the 1960s. Canada then went further

than any of the other main immigrant-receiving countries in enshrining multiculturalism legally and constitutionally in the 1980s. Canada had anchored itself to a post-Britain-as-home, post-settler, post-Anglo society and culture (Helmes-Hay and Curtis, 1998).

New Zealand: Divergent nationalisms?

The ending of the 'white New Zealand' policy from 1986, and the subsequent arrival of significant numbers of Asian immigrants, resulted in growing levels of public concern and opposition throughout the 1990s. Until that time, the overwhelming majority of immigrants to New Zealand were from Britain and other 'British' sources, such as Australia. The only important exceptions were, from the 1960s, inflows of immigrants from northern Europe, especially the Netherlands, and from English-speaking island groups of the South Pacific. But overwhelmingly, according to McKinnon (1996: 7):

... while each post-1840 generation of New Zealanders felt itself less 'British' than its predecessors, an outside observer is still, in the mid-1990s, struck by the extent to which 'New Zealandness' is shot through with 'Britishness' (and not least because it is rarely commented on or analysed). (1996: 7, emphasis added)

Instead, the most obvious feature of 'whiteness' and a dominant ethnicity in New Zealand is the centrality of a biculturalism debate involving Maori (the indigenous people) and Pakeha (broadly speaking, people of the non-Maori settler society, complicated, however, by intermarriage; Callister, 2004, 2005); there is also uncertainty whether 'Pakeha' refers only to 'white' New Zealanders - see Spoonley, 1991). Rather, the focus, according to Hiebert et al. has been on:

... settling historical grievances and attempts to reduce social and economic 'gaps' between Maori and other New Zealanders. Multiculturalism . . . has yet to find a space in national debates and policy, although the growing cultural diversity of New Zealanders, especially in Auckland [cf. Johnston et al., 2002] has increased the pressure to develop policies that address such diversity. (2003: 32)

Almost by default, then, immigrants are expected to assimilate into New Zealand society – hence problems with the influx of Asian immigrants resulting in the emergence of the ultra-nationalist New Zealand First Party - while issues of biculturalism have dominated approaches to an undifferentiated citizenship and any sense of a single nationalistic narrative (Fleras and Spoonley, 1999), although this view is by no means uncontested (Pearson, 2001).

Australia: Anglo conformity versus multiculturalism

Contemporary Australian society and polity is often characterized as increasingly multicultural, but still struggling to disengage from a legacy of Anglo privilege and cultural dominance. So a Labor government's (1991–96) emphasis, under Prime Minister Paul Keating, on the need for a new Australian identity reflecting the multicultural nature of modern Australian society (Keating, 1995; Johnson, 2000) had 'huge implications' for the positioning of Anglo identity within broader conceptions of a new national identity. It began to confront Anglo privilege by attaching an ethnicity to Anglo culture. In the previous era, ethnicity was constructed only in terms of the 'other', i.e., non-Anglo. Anglos had never thought of themselves as an ethnic group. Now, Australians of Anglo backgrounds were also being asked to accept a new, cosmopolitan form of national identity, to embrace ethnic diversity and to give up their privileged position in a post-assimilationist society (Johnson, 2002: 175). One result was a conservative backlash that was highly critical of any attempt to encourage 'a more cosmopolitan and inclusive identity' (Johnson, 2002: 177) that was seen to neglect 'mainstream' Australia in favour of special (multicultural, non-Anglo) interest groups (Howard, 1995a, 1995b). In a remarkable twist of rhetoric, the dominant group in society was now the oppressed, and the disadvantaged and marginalized had become the oppressors (Johnson, 2001: 5). Thus Hage asked:

Does multiculturalism signal the end to ... Anglo-Celtic [privilege] within [Australia]? This is certainly ... the view of a significant number of Anglo-Celtic Australians opposed to multiculturalism. Since the early 1980s state support for issues such as ethnic diversity [and] Asian immigration has generated ... a 'discourse of decline' [among] a wide cross section of the Anglo-Celtic population. This discourse either passively mourns or actively calls for resistance against what it perceives as a state-sanctioned assault [through the development of multicultural policies] on Australo-Britishness as a natural cultural formation. (1995: 41)

The backlash took two main forms. One was the emergence of a new, One Nation party (on which see Leach et al., 2000; Goot and Watson, 2001) whose leader, Pauline Hanson, a conservative-populist politician, gained a seat in federal parliament at the 1996 election. One Nation closely linked Asian immigration following the ending of the White Australia policy with multiculturalism as a harbinger of social conflict and division such that 'Immigration . . . socially, if continued as is, will lead to an ethnically divided Australia . . .' (1998 One Nation policy statement quoted in McDonald and Kippen, 1999). The other was a consequence of the election of a Liberal-National government under Prime Minister John Howard in 1996. This brought with it a marked decline in the importance of multiculturalism as a driving force for change in Australian society and a resurgence of Anglo privilege, values and identity.

Prime Minister Howard moved quickly to remove funding from various ethnic community organizations. Multiculturalism itself was not a term favoured by Howard (Johnson, 2002: 177), although his government eventually came to terms with it once it was redefined as a general means for retaining 'common values' (Howard, 1999). A National Multicultural Advisory Council appointed by the Howard Government developed what they called 'Australian multiculturalism', branded as remarkable by placing Anglo-Australians centrally within the multicultural identity. The effect was to accord a privileged status to Anglo-Australians within multicultural history and identity. The Council's Chair commented that:

The British and Irish heritage, which includes our democratic system and institutions, our law, the English language, much of our humour and our oft-quoted distinctive values of the fair go, egalitarianism and mateship, together provide the foundation on which Australian multiculturalism has been built. (NMAC, 1999: 4)

The new focus on 'mainstream' Australians acted, according to Hage (2003: 1) to produce an absence of concern for non-Anglo Australians, and a return to the old Anglo values with their assimilationist disregard for the precepts of multiculturalism.

Effectively, therefore, an ethnocultural or assimilationist perspective has returned to the forefront of at least government concern in Australia, replacing the civic nation approach of the previous Labor administrations. This is not greatly different from the New Zealand situation in terms of public backlash, but the difference is in the degree of government support, indeed government drive, to reverse previous multicultural policies. It is quite different from what is happening in Canada, where all political parties support present immigration and multicultural policies. And it is quite different from the United States, where multiculturalism is driven from below rather than from government levels.

Uniquely perhaps among the major immigrant-receiving countries commented on in this brief overview, the question of Anglo privilege and Anglo decline is seen among many of the conservative political elite in Australia as a matter of great concern, not least to the electorate Prime Minister Howard was trying to win over in the mid-1990s. In this context, Hage's (1998) broadening of Anglo privilege into 'white supremacy in a multicultural society' is a little confusing. Confusing, because the concept of white – non-white sidelines tensions between Anglo and other (white) European identities (Johnson, 2002: 179) and the protracted struggles by such groups – in particular Greek and Italian immigrant groups – in support of multicultural policies and against previous policies of assimilation into Anglo values (Collins, 1999). A distinction between Anglo and 'white' privilege must therefore be maintained. Examination of Anglo hegemony best facilitates an assessment of the full panoply of viewpoints about the

existence and importance of privilege in contemporary Australian society, which is the object of this study.

But just how important is the issue of Anglo privilege among contemporary Australians, either among those of Anglo background, or among those from non-Anglo backgrounds? How do different ethnic groups perceive the privileged position of Australians of Anglo background? This study addresses these questions.

ABOUT ANGLO PRIVILEGE

Australian society has been described as 'exceptionally homogeneous' until the mid-20th-century (Freeman and Jupp, 1992). At its highest point in 1947, 'the British component of the population was over 90 percent, of whom the vast majority had been born in Australia' (Jupp, 1988: 62). A culturally formative ethnic dynamic, of English (predominantly), Scottish and Irish, had defined Australia's core culture from 1788. The assimilation of the Celtic (Irish) component into a dominant Anglo-Australian society and culture came much later. Thus Dixson (1999: 9) described how 'eminent writers' have consistently described Australia, in a matter-of-fact way, as an 'Anglo-Saxon' society or country. By the end of World War I, Anglo-Saxon had already been shortened to Anglo. The contemporary incorporation of the word 'Celtic', as in 'Anglo-Celtic', into the lexicon used to describe Australia's dominant social and cultural fragment is a recent response to intensive lobbying by those of Irish birth or ancestry in particular to be recognized as a distinctive element of the Anglo-Australian or British-Australian identity. As a consequence, the terms 'Anglo' and 'Anglo-Celtic' are often used interchangeably. This Anglo ethnicity has underpinned Australian culture, its institutions and the nation itself since the beginning of European settlement (Dixson, 1999: 9), and still largely does so. Even allowing for the impact of non-British immigration since 1945, their proportion had only reduced to 75 percent in 1991 (Jupp, 1988: 9). For the year ending mid-2002, the UK was still the largest source of permanent arrivals (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2002: 32).

In spite of the demographics, Cochran (1995: 10) argues that, somewhere between the 1950s and the 1980s, the hitherto 'Anglo-Saxon' culturally dominant majority surrendered, or lost, its social and cultural hegemony. The post World War II inflow of non-British immigrants – from central and southern Europe in the 1950s and 1960s, and from the eastern Mediterranean in the 1960s and 1970s, then a major widening of source areas with the ending of the White Australia policy in favour of skills-based criteria from the early 1970s – posed a challenge to the established sense of ethnic homogeneity, as did the newly developed policy of

multiculturalism as a basis for accepting and absorbing the 'new ethnicity'. It was the Whitlam Labor government, bringing in new immigration policies and citizenship rules to treat all immigrants equally – hitherto immigrants from 'old' (British) Commonwealth countries had free entry – that effectively ended the White Australia policy in 1973, launching Australia into a new, multicultural era of the later 1970s through to the mid-1990s. Labor Prime Minister Keating (1995: 31) was moved to state that: 'Today, Australians derive from more than 150 ethnic backgrounds ... multiculturalism is not a threat to Australian identity and ethos - it is inseparable from it.'

Keating's basic argument was that contemporary Australian society was being fundamentally reshaped by ethnic diversity. But such an argument had major and negative implications for the former hegemonic status of Anglo identity. Anglo-Celtic Australians were being asked to abandon the previous privileging of their identity, implicit in pre-multicultural, assimilationist policies (Johnson, 2002: 175). The then Liberal (conservative) Opposition leader, Howard was very critical of the Keating Labor position, arguing that it benefited special (including ethnically based) interest groups. and neglected 'mainstream' Australians (Howard, 1995a, 1995b). In fact, and while emphasizing his opposition to racism, he and the populist, racist politician, Pauline Hanson were both speaking to sections of a largely common electoral base, the Anglos (Johnson, 2002: 178). Hanson specifically targeted Anglos, arguing that among other things, Labor government support for 'special interest' groups such as immigrants and Australian Aboriginal peoples had made Anglo (males) 'the most disadvantaged group in Australian society' (Leser, 1996: 27).

Changes in attitudes towards immigrant groups that have occurred over the past several decades are, however, rather more complex than simply multiculturalism versus assimilation into the dominant Anglo culture (Hage, 1995). At the core of this complexity is an important class consideration. Dixson (1999: 33) argues that Anglo society in European Australia, from its late 18th-century beginnings until the mid-20th-century or so, was dominated by the lower-middle (working) and middle classes. But with the onset of global economic restructuring from the mid-1970s and the decline of the manufacturing sector, there has been a shift away from the lowermiddle and middle-class basis of Anglo dominance in favour of a new managerial-professional class based on the new knowledge economy. These constitute part of what Hage (1995: 44) refers to as 'cosmo-multiculturalists': people like Keating, who acted to undermine the traditional class base of the Anglo privilege position, only, perhaps without realizing it in Keating's case, to replace it with another. Thus Hage (1995: 63) argues that the cosmomulticulturalism of the new class replaces, but continues, the Eurocentric form of the earlier Australo-British working and middle class, except that it has been changed by migration in a post-White Australia society, and increasingly turns to Asia as the UK moves ever deeper into the European Community.

As Betts argues, a deep divide has emerged:

between professionally-educated internationalists and cosmopolitans (people who are attracted to the wider world of 'overseas' . . .) and the much larger numbers of lower-class parochials who value the [pre-existing] character of their national home . . . (1999: 3)

So, while the 'parochials' among the working- and middle-class Anglos have experienced 'decline of control', there has been a shift to a new privileged Anglo group (Hage, 1995: 62). This was accompanied by a change from an assimilationist perspective to that of the newly dominant cosmomulticulturalists, where Anglo privilege is no longer central, does not aim to control the immigrant presence, yet creates an opening within the dominant imaginary in which non-Anglo Australians can be included. Nevertheless, the new cosmo-multiculturalist class is in practice more cosmopolitan than multicultural, having little involvement with, or concern for, dominantly working-class immigrant groups and remaining culturally inclined to Australo-British hegemony.

DATA

Much of the literature reviewed in the previous section focuses on Anglo reactions to erosion of their previously privileged position in a 'post-assimilationist' society, the 'discourses of decline' mentioned earlier. To date, very little, if any, attention has been paid to the reverse situation – how do immigrant groups view that privileged position? What is more, there has been little empirical assessment of how Anglos themselves see their situation. In the latter case, the attitudes and perceptions analysed in most commentaries rely heavily upon statements by the (conservative) political and cultural elite, including those from both major and minor parties. In an attempt to fill part of this gap in the literature on the perceptions of a wide range of immigrant groups, plus a cross section of British- and Australianborn, this study draws on a question from a University of NSW/Macquarie University (UNSW/MQU) survey of people's attitudes and opinions about aspects of racism in Australia.

The UNSW/MQU Racism Project survey was undertaken as a telephone questionnaire conducted among residents of the states of Queensland (QLD) and New South Wales (NSW) during October and December 2001. Respondents were drawn randomly from within every second postal code district in the two states. The sample covers half of Australia's total population. Returns from NSW accounted for 64 percent, and from Queensland

36 percent of the total, which closely approximates respective state population shares. A sample total of 5056 valid responses was generated. The project required a sufficiently large representation of respondents by geographic area, so the sample was randomly drawn from within every second postal code, but included at least one postal code from every Statistical Local Area (SLA) in each state, and for that reason was restricted to the two states. Responses to a question that 'Australians from a British background enjoy a privileged position in our society' were sought on a fivepoint range between 'strongly disagree' through 'disagree', 'neither disagree nor agree', 'agree' to 'strongly agree'. The question was one of 14 asked as part of the telephone survey. An overview of results is contained in Dunn et al. (2004).

PERCEPTIONS OF ANGLO PRIVILEGE

Johnson (2001) notes that, because Anglos are not regarded as an ethnic group, they are, in a sense, invisible, and there is no Anglo identity separate from the assertion of racial and ethnic privilege that is one of its defining features. As the founding (settler) group, however, British ancestry or birthplace has long been associated with the 'core' or 'dominant' culture that provided the nation's language, law and institutions to which those from different backgrounds have long been asked to conform. This group holds the reigns of cultural and economic power and to that extent may be seen by themselves and others from different cultural backgrounds, as 'privileged' (i.e. the dominant culture). Such perceptions are what our question - that 'Australians from a British background enjoy a privileged position in our society' - was designed to bring out. There are a number of key characteristics that are likely to generate variations in contemporary social perceptions of Anglo privilege. Four of these - birthplace, class, age and multicultural values – are singled out for discussion here.

Birthplace group perceptions

There is an underlying complexity among birthplace group attitudes to the existence of Anglo privilege. This is highlighted by the amount of inter- and intra-group variation in perceptions among the Australian born, and among immigrants from both English-speaking background (ESB) and non-English speaking background (NESB) source areas in Table 1. The general impression is one of a polarization of views both for and against the existence of Anglo cultural hegemony. Higher proportions of NESB immigrants than others agree that people of Anglo backgrounds enjoy a privileged

Table 1 Birthplace and response to the idea of Anglo privilege (percent values)

Born in	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	N			
Australian born – Language other than English (LOTE) spoken at home or not									
Non-LOTE	9.7	33.9	18.5	30.7	7.3	3643			
LOTE at home	11.9	29.6	22.1	27.9	8.4	226			
Aborigines	8.0	28.4	19.3	33.0	11.4	104			
English-speaking origi	n areas (ESB))							
Total ESB	14.3	32.9	14.8	29.0	9.0	575			
UK/Eire	16.2	33.8	12.8	26.4	9.4	352			
New Zealand	12.7	31.7	16.2	29.6	6.3	142			
USA/Canada	12.5	37.5	20.8	16.7	12.5	24			
Sn Africa	6.3	18.8	18.7	40.1	12.5	32			
Pacific Islds	5.0	25.0	15.0	40.0	7.5	40			
Non-English speaking	origin areas								
Total NESB	5.4	29.2	16.5	39.8	9.1	538			
(a) European									
Total European	5.5	28.3	13.4	40.9	7.5	254			
Western Europe	6.2	27.9	10.8	44.2	6.2	129			
Eastern Europe	6.1	36.4	15.1	33.3	6.2	33			
Southern Europe	4.3	26.1	16.3	39.1	9.8	92			
(b) Elsewhere									
Total non-European	4.9	27.7	17.9	35.8	9.8	307			
Middle East	3.0	37.9	15.2	31.8	12.1	66			
NE Asia	4.6	26.8	18.5	39.8	4.6	108			
SE Asia	8.1	25.1	16.1	37.1	4.8	62			
S Asia	4.2	18.7	20.8	37.5	16.7	48			
Latin America	4.3	26.1	21.7	21.7	26.1	23			

Source: UNSW/MQU Racism Survey, 2001 (see Dunn et al., 2004).

position, but there are important inter-group differences. There is little indication here of any general in-group, out-group consistency.

Although the telephone survey did not ask about ancestry of the Australian born, an indication of this was obtained by separation of the Australian born into English-speaking only, and where a language other than English (LOTE) was spoken at home. In fact, the latter's views about Anglo privilege are very close to those among the Australian born speaking only English at home, except for a higher proportion who have no opinion either way. Among Indigenous Australians, however, a noticeably higher proportion agreed there was Anglo privilege than did not. It is suggested that differences between the Australian-born-LOTE-spoken-at-home from all NESB immigrants in Table 1 can be accounted for by the greater initial segregation of NESB immigrants compared with those of NESB ancestry. Here are the concentrations of those experiencing greatest (initial) recognition of barriers to fitting into their new social environment (Forrest and Poulsen, 2003).

ESB immigrants have much the same views as the Australian born, except that a greater proportion either agree or disagree, rather than holding a middle position. This is not altogether surprising where 'ethnics' are 'other', where non-ethnicized English speaking immigrants are assumed to merge into the English speaking background Anglo-Celtic dominant culture with 'the ideologically naturalized status of the members of this group as non-immigrant Australians' (Stratton 2000: 43–4). A clear majority of those from the UK/Eire and New Zealand deny the concept of Anglo privilege. Similar views are held among Americans and Canadian immigrants, except that the notion of Anglo privilege is more clearly rejected and a higher proportion have no formed view. Among immigrants from South Africa and the Pacific Islands, on the other hand, a significant majority, as high as most non-English speaking background (NESB) groups, agree that there is Anglo privilege. Arguably, this is another case where 'memories of Empire' attune these groups to the existence of Anglo privilege; for example, a significant minority of South Africans, especially in Sydney, are of Indian and Afrikaans descent.

NESB immigrants have been categorized into those from Europe, many of whom came to Australia before the White Australia policy was effectively abandoned in the early 1970s, and those from other parts of the world admitted after that time. Even so, slightly more European immigrants agree that there is Anglo privilege than do those from other parts of the world (mainly from Asia). Immigrants from both western and southern Europe agree most of all, and those from eastern Europe to a lesser degree. While NESB immigrants from non-European origin areas are generally less concerned or aware of Anglo privilege, there are again important differences in perceptions. Of those from the Middle East, north-east and south-east Asia, around 42-44 percent recognize the

existence of Anglo privilege, while close to half or more of immigrants from south Asia and Latin America hold this view, and with a higher proportion uncommitted. Interestingly, nearly all of the south Asian origins comprise the former British-ruled territories of Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Burma. Here, too, an experience and knowledge of British colonial authority may lie behind these Australians' keener sense of Anglo privilege.

Class perceptions

The survey assessed class in terms of level of educational attainment. This was preferred to occupation or income because of the large number of women who otherwise tend to be marginalized in assessment of socioeconomic status (class) when the other two measures are used. The outcome of this cross-tabulation (Table 2) among the Australian born is generally consistent with Hage's (1995: 63) upper-middle-class, cosmomulticulturalist explanation of a new form of Anglo privilege, discussed previously, as shown by the high proportion (52%) of those who agree with the question among the tertiary educated. There is also an element of Dixson's (1999) argument about the lower- to middle-class origins of many Anglo-Australians (Dixson, 1999) in the 32–40 percent, rising among those with lesser or no qualifications, who accept that Anglo Australians are privileged. But this is offset by the higher proportion – some 42–48 percent with a trade or School Certificate – who disagree, which may, of course, be taken to mean that whatever privilege they may have had has been lost to multiculturalism.

Overall, perceptions of Anglo privilege vary noticeably across birthplace and class groups. Among the overseas born, those from English-speaking countries are generally less concerned about Anglo privilege, but most so among the less well educated. Acceptance of the existence of Anglo privilege is higher among European immigrants, and higher still among those from 'non-white' NESB countries, especially among those with trade or no qualifications. This is a problem with immigrant groups in all receiving countries, where NESB immigrants, in particular, find themselves disadvantaged in terms of entry into the labour force, or face social discrimination (Forrest and Johnston, 2000). Morrissey et al. summarize the problem in Australia as one where:

... groups of [NESB] workers arrived who could find work only in unskilled manufacturing jobs and then found ... they did not have the occupational or sectoral mobility available to [ESB] workers [because of] lack of English language proficiency ... lack of transferable work skills due to the unskilled nature of the employment gained; lack of education qualifications, and under-evaluation (in an Australian context) of such skills, education or qualifications as they [had]. (1992: 15)

Table 2 Education attainment (class), major ethnic groupings and response to 'Australians of a British background enjoy a privileged position'

	Tertiary	Higher School Certificate	School Certificate	Trade qualifications	No formal qualifications
Australian born:					
Disagree ¹	23.1	45.6	46.8	47.8	41.6
Neutral	24.6	18.1	17.5	20.0	18.6
Agree ²	52.3	36.3	35.8	32.2	39.8
Overseas born – Ei	nglish speak	king backgro	und:		
Disagree	41.3	50.0	53.3	47.0	51.2
Neutral	18.3	14.8	17.5	18.2	9.3
Agree	40.4	35.2	29.2	34.8	39.5
Overseas born – E	uropean noi	n-English spe	aking backg	round:	
Disagree	37.0	40.0	40.7	57.9	38.1
Neutral	19.6	12.7	14.8	10.5	21.4
Agree	43.4	47.3	44.4	31.6	40.5
Overseas – non-Eu	ıropean non	ı-English spe	aking backgr	ound:	
Disagree	35.7	43.2	17.3	29.0	11.1
Neutral	21.0	22.7	23.1	19.4	11.1
Agree	43.3	34.1	59.6	51.6	77.8

Source: UNSW/MQU Racism Survey, 2001 (see Dunn et al., 2004).

Among none of the class groups, however, is perception of Anglo privilege held by a majority of respondents.

Age group perceptions

Two points stand out from examination of relationships between age and birthplace (Table 3). First, with increasing age, the level of ambivalence (a neutral view) declines. Second, older non-Anglos are more likely to recognize privilege, while Anglos are increasingly likely both to agree with and to deny it. Such an age-privilege relationship may be seen to involve three main time periods:

¹ Combines 'strongly disagree' and 'disagree'.

² Combines 'strongly agree' and 'agree'.

- prior to the major change away from Anglo-Celtic origins, which occurred in the late 1940s and early 1950s with the relative decline of immigrant numbers from the UK and Ireland;
- the greater dominance, until the early 1970s, of NESB European immigrants;
- from the early 1970s, following the end of the White Australia policy, and the last three decades of immigration from any part of the world, dependent only on skills, family union and refugee quotas.

These three periods generally correspond to those today aged in their late 60s and older; those in their mid-40s to mid-60s; and those aged up to their early- to mid-40s.

Table 3 Age group, major ethnic groupings and response to 'Australians of a British background enjoy a privileged position'

	18–24	25-34	35–44	45–54	55–64	65+	
Australian born:							
Disagree ¹	35.5	43.1	44.6	45.7	42.9	44.4	
Neutral	26.5	22.0	22.1	15.5	15.2	13.5	
Agree ²	38.0	34.9	33.3	38.9	41.9	42.0	
Overseas born – English speaking background:							
Disagree	43.8	36.4	44.9	47.8	57.7	51.3	
Neutral	18.8	29.1	18.4	16.5	10.8	14.8	
Agree	37.5	34.5	36.7	35.6	31.5	33.9	
Overseas born – European non-English speaking background:							
Disagree	40.0	31.3	28.6	35.6	43.9	29.2	
Neutral	33.3	25.0	28.6	16.9	17.5	40.0	
Agree	26.7	43.8	42.8	47.5	38.6	62.5	
Overseas born – non-European non-English speaking background:							
Disagree	32.6	44.0	28.9	28.1	30.4	30.4	
Neutral	28.3	20.0	25.3	14.0	17.4	12.0	
Agree	39.1	36.0	45.8	57.9	52.2	60.9	

Source: UNSW/MQU Racism Survey, 2001 (see Dunn et al., 2004).

¹ Combines 'strongly disagree' and 'disagree'.

² Combines 'strongly agree' and 'agree'.

Among the Australian-born aged 18–44, the proportion who agree that Anglo privilege exists is in the mid- to higher-30s percent, rising to the low 40s percent among those aged 45–64, and slightly higher among those aged in their mid-60s and older.

In many ways, patterns of age differentiation as to the perception of privilege among immigrants from English-speaking countries is the reverse of that among the Australian born. Those who agree that there is privilege tend to be the younger respondents and the proportion of those with neutral views is highest among younger respondents. Conversely, disagreement rises with age. This may well relate to a process of self-ethnicization of recent streams of British immigrants identified by Stratton (2000), and commensurate with the Hawke/Keating Labor government's policy moves during the 1980s and 1990s away from acceptance that British immigrants should have a privileged place in Australian society. Perceptions of Anglo privilege among NESB groups generally are positively correlated with age and the proportions with that perception are higher among 'non-white' NESB groups. As with all other birthplace groups, a neutral response falls with age. On the other hand, there is no particular pattern with regard to disagreement, and results for all NESB groups are very similar to those for the Australian born.

ANGLO PRIVILEGE, MULTICULTURALISM AND RACISM IN **AUSTRALIA**

The advent of multiculturalism effectively asked Australians of British or Anglo backgrounds to abandon the previous privileging of that identity and attendant assimilationist policies in favour of the new, multicultural perspective. Thus Hage (1995: 41) characterized the protagonists of multiculturalism and of Anglo privilege as mutually opposed to each other, in that the decline of one is seen by many to mirror the ascendancy of the other. All this served to focus attention on issues of cultural hegemony and national identity. This was a focus reinforced by then Liberal (conservative) opposition leader John Howard's (1995a, 1995b) support for 'mainstream' Australians as opposed to the Labor government's supposed support for special interest (specifically non-Anglo) groups, aggravated by the rightwing populist Pauline Hanson's positioning of Anglo-Australian males as a disadvantaged group, and her introduction of racist themes. In that Howard and Hanson were both talking to a largely common electoral base (Johnson, 2002: 17), issues of multiculturalism and national identity, but also racism, became conflated in the ensuing debate. But is this the way in which these issues are popularly perceived? Results from the University of New South

Wales/Macquarie University (UNSW/MQU) Racism Survey provides some answers.

Nine survey questions explored attitudes to aspects of Anglo privilege. multiculturalism and racism. Principal components analysis accounted for 49 percent of variation among the 5056 respondents across the nine attitude variables, producing three varimax rotated (uncorrelated) dimensions (components) with eigenvalues above unity; tests with oblimin and promax rotations showed minimal correlations among the components. Each component or dimension describes an underlying composite variable that is associated with several questions (Table 4), where significant variable loadings have been highlighted in bold. Component 1 (column 1 of Table 4) brings out a group of questions that may be characterized as 'multiculturalists versus assimilationists and a homogeneous society'. This is a bipolar dimension, with significant (> 0.5) positive loadings on those who value a society made up of different cultures, who feel secure among different ethnicities, and for whom all races are equal, that is, multicultural liberals; significant negative loadings are associated with assimilationist/ cultural homogeneity, indeed racist attitudes: 'Australia is weakened by . . .', 'people of different races should not intermarry' and 'I am prejudiced against other cultures'. Component 2 links Anglo privilege: 'Australians from a British background . . .' with 'there is racial prejudice in Australia', thus highlighting perceptions of cultural dominance associated with general racist ('others are but I am not') attitudes. Component 3 is mainly associated with one question, that 'humankind is made up of different races', weakly linked with an assimilationist attitude ('Australia is weakened by . . .').

The fact that Anglo privilege and multicultural values are statistically independent (i.e. they load on different, uncorrelated components), and each associated with aspects of racist attitudes – racism is the common denominator – adds a new and previously unremarked element to Hage's (1995) less complex view of mutual opposition between assimilationists who support Anglo privilege, and multiculturalists. Thus, results from the principal components analysis show the following:

- The juxtaposition of multicultural attitudes (the high positive loadings) between opposition to aspects of both 'old' (sociobiological) and 'new' (issues of social acculturation) racisms (on which, in an Australian context, see Dunn et al., 2004) and overt racism ('I am prejudiced . . .') on component 1. This is the main dimension to emerge from the analysis, accounting for some 25 percent of variation among respondents.
- Rather, recognition of Anglo privilege is correlated with recognition of racial prejudice generally (others are prejudiced) on component 2, where it accounts for a smaller 13 percent of variation. In the

Table 4 Principal components analysis of attitudes to indicators of Anglo privilege, multiculturalism and racism in Australia

Variables ¹		Rotated component matrix			
	1	2	3		
It is good for society to be made up of different cultures	0.70	0.20	0.03		
I feel secure with people of different ethnicities	0.60	-0.01	0.08		
Australia is weakened by people of different ethnic origins sticking to their old ways	-0.49	-0.08	0.39		
There is racial prejudice in Australia	0.07	0.74	0.16		
Australians from a British background enjoy a privileged position in our society	-0.01	0.74	-0.16		
It is not good for people of different races to intermarry	-0.53	-0.06	0.19		
All races of people are equal	0.63	-0.01	0.12		
Humankind is made up of different races	0.06	0.03	0.90		
l am prejudiced against other cultures	-0.63	0.13	0.06		
Per cent variance accounted for	24.65	12.65	11.59		

Source: UNSW/MQU Racism Survey, 2001 (see Dunn et al., 2004).

Note: Figures in bold denote loadings >0.4, which, by convention, contribute significantly to interpretation of each component.

popular perception, denial of privilege is linked with assimilationist views that are seen as generally racist, rather than with multiculturalism, but is much less important as a source of attitude differentiation.

- A further aspect of the assimilationist perspective is brought out on component 3, representing variation among 12 percent of respondents. This highlights the view that people are different (a sociobiological fact that humankind is made up of different races), which is somewhat correlated with anti-multicultural values ('Australia is weakened by . . .')
- That just 49 percent of overall variations among respondents is accounted for by the three components or dimensions itself reflects the range of views apparent in Tables 1–3.

¹ All variables were coded: strongly disagree (= 1); disagree; neither disagree nor agree; agree; strongly agree (= 5); significant loadings are highlighted.

The absence of a direct association between pro-multiculturalism and recognition of Anglo privilege, and instead the emergence of aspects of racism as the common link, may well be a result of Prime Minister Howard's ambivalence towards the more overtly racist views of the Pauline Hanson One Nation Party from 1996 and his refusal to condemn these views (cf. Johnson, 2000). It is worth stressing here that recognition of Anglo privilege is not a common derivative, or consequence, of mainstream multiculturalism. Rather, privilege is much more clearly associated with the recognition of racism. Clearly, the rise of multicultural rhetoric has not had a dramatic impact on perceptions of Anglo privilege. This affirms suggestions of a range of critical scholars who have argued that multiculturalism in Australia has been of a weaker form than elsewhere, certainly stopping short of the unsettling and disruptive challenge to Anglo privilege that national conservatives (e.g. the One Nation Party and Prime Minister Howard) claim it represents.

Is there a geography of Anglo privilege?

Despite Hage's (1995: 41) view that protagonists of multiculturalism and of Anglo privilege are mutually opposed to each other, the range of views about Anglo privilege, even among people of similar social and demographic backgrounds as brought out in Tables 1–3, and the results of the principal components analysis, indicate that the relationship is more complex. One possibility is that the group category memberships brought out in Tables 1–3 are composites of the total population. Yet people with the same social or demographic backgrounds in different spatial contexts can and do behave differently, which raises the possibility of a spatial dimension.

A test for such a geography may be achieved by investigating for any grouping of statistical sub divisions (SSDs) in Sydney and Brisbane, and the larger statistical divisions (SDs) elsewhere in NSW and QLD in terms of commonality of their agreement/disagreement profiles. An entropy grouping procedure was used; its ability to characterize and group observation areas with a minimum of information loss is reviewed by Johnston and Semple (1983; see also Forrest and Johnston, 1981). In summary, it groups SSDs and SDs with similar response profiles; that is, proportions of respondents in each of the 'strongly disagree/disagree' through 'agree/strongly agree' responses on the Anglo privilege and anti-multicultural ('Australia is weakened by ...') questions. Unlike other classification procedures, the entropy procedure minimizes the amount of within-group variance for $(1 \dots n)$ groups at each iteration by retesting all possible groupings of observations, and it is not constrained by any requirements of normal distribution common to many other classification procedures. The number of groups selected is determined subjectively by a decreasing amount of variation accounted for by increasing the number of groups.

Eight groups of areas across the two states accounted for 70 percent of variation among the SDs and SSDs (Table 5). Interpretation of the results suggests three broad sets of responses associated with different geographic combinations of SDs and SSDs. Limited support for Hage's (1995) argument is indicated by one cluster (groups 1, 2 and perhaps 3) and above average agreement with the existence of Anglo privilege and assimilationist (anti-multicultural) views. However, group 2 is much more ambivalent on multiculturalism; groups 1 and 2 differ on their attitude to multiculturalism vet share a disposition towards privilege. Most of these are in NSW and include many of the rural regions in the western and southern parts of the state. They also include all the higher social status areas in northern and southern Sydney, but also the major industrial cities of Newcastle and Wollongong and their regions, north and south of Sydney respectively. They further embrace mixed working- and middle-class regions of northern Brisbane and of Ipswich City in south-west Brisbane (and home of the One Nation Party's leader, Pauline Hanson). Here is evidence of the Eurocentric (and more specifically Anglo or Anglo-Celtic) attitudes of both the 'old

Table 5 Entropy analysis of Anglo privilege versus multiculturalism

	Views o	Views on Anglo privilege ¹			anti-multi	ınti-multiculturalism²		
	Strongly disagree/ disagree	Neutral	Agree/ strongly agree	Strongly disagree/ disagree	Neutral	Strongly agree/agree		
Mean:	42.40	19.26	38.34	37.13	17.58	45.29		
1	-13.68	4.39	9.29	-1.12	-2.16	3.28		
2	-10.07	5.92	4.16	-7.59	7.07	0.52		
3	-1.99	-0.74	2.73	-0.67	1.36	-0.68		
4	6.22	-5.56	-0.65	-9.92	-6.24	16.16		
5	6.46	-1.90	-4.57	-1.86	-2.36	4.23		
6	4.06	7.02	-11.07	-9.57	5.99	3.58		
7	-2.23	4.78	-2.55	5.81	-0.98	-4.83		
8	1.24	-7.87	6.63	8.20	0.89	-9.08		

Source: UNSW/MQU Racism Survey, 2004 (see Dunn et al., 2004).

Note: Figures in **bold** denote >0.5 SD, deviation from the mean; positive values indicate an above average in that category, while negative values indicate a below average response.

¹ The question was: 'Australians from a British background enjoy a privileged position in our society'.

² The question was: 'Australia is weakened by people of difference ethnic origins sticking to their old ways'.

identity' Australo-British working class and the new, professional-managerial cosmo-multiculturalists identified by Hage (1995), plus of course traditionally more conservative, rural areas; but not uniquely so.

A second cluster (groups 4, 5 and 6) emphasizes disagreement with the existence of Anglo privilege and yet these groups are strongly assimilationalist in their views. These include the strongly working-class areas of western/south-western and outer northern Sydney and southern Brisbane (Logan City). Also included are several important regional cities in Oueensland – Gold Coast, Bundaberg and Gladstone – all strongly supportive of the One Nation Party (Davis and Stimson, 1998), along with southwestern and northern coastal regions of New South Wales. Finally, a third cluster (groups 7 and 8) generally agree with, or are ambivalent about, the existence of Anglo privilege, but also have strongly multicultural views. In the state capitals, these include Sydney's inner city and the old high status eastern suburbs as well as parts of the city's north-west, and also Brisbane's inner city. In QLD, the whole of the coastal region from the Sunshine Coast, just north of Brisbane, to the far north, including the major regional cities of Mackay, Townsville and Cairns, embrace these views. Hence, on balance, the overall independence of multiculturalist and Anglo privilege views, brought out in the principal components analysis, reflects a distinctively spatial component to any understanding of the interaction of the two attitudes.

CONCLUSION

While the impact of liberal globalization and multiculturalism puts pressure on all immigrant nations to transform their national identities from an ethnic to a civic mode (Kaufman, 2004), ways in which such transformations are worked through can best be characterized as 'everywhere different'. Thus of the United States, Kaufman (2004) refers to a current liberalegalitarian stage since the mid-1960s, when previously marginalized ethnic groups, both marginalized 'white' ethnics and racial minorities, gained a measure of institutional parity with Anglo-Americans such that 'we are all multiculturalists now' (Glazer, 1997: 119). Except, of course, that the previous distinction between 'white' and 'non-white' has, according to some commentators, been replaced by a 'black'/'non-black' dichotomy; today's multicultural (or transnational) America does not extend its inclusiveness to black Americans nor yet, perhaps, to Latino and Asian immigrants. This might suggest that the liberal cosmopolitan vision of the United States since the late 1960s and as a civic nation (Kaufman, 2000: 147) may still be open to question.

The liberal-egalitarian view of a civic nation (difference blindness) is

arguably most fully realized in Canada. Multiculturalism was developed first to mute the Anglo dominance of British Canada in an attempt to put an end to longstanding issues of Anglo-French tensions through a policy of cultural pluralism, expanded subsequently to embrace equal rights for all Canadians, Indigenous and non-charter group immigrants. This link was, contrary to the situation in the United States, enshrined in law. New Zealand, on the other hand, is still at the stage of defining and resolving issues of biculturalism. 'Britishness' - Anglo cultural hegemony - remains an essential part of New Zealand's national culture and identity. Multiculturalism is not yet a focus of national debate, although, as in Canada two decades earlier, a growing cultural diversity (Johnston et al., 2003), especially in the largest city, Auckland, is increasing pressure to address the emerging situation.

In Australia, liberal-egalitarianism and multiculturalism - the civic nation – reached their greatest development during the years of the Keating Labor government in the early to mid-1990s. At that time, Prime Minister Keating's public stance reflected a form of civic nationalism in its attempt to bind all citizens together in a single national identity standing above ethnic difference and aimed at creating a new Australia and a new Australian identity (Johnson, 2002: 175-6). Much of this was discarded in the conservative backlash of the mid-1990s with the return of the conservative John Howard to power as Prime Minister in 1996. Multiculturalism became, essentially, 'assimilation in slow motion' or delayed assimilation (Jamrozik et al., 1995: 110), as Anglo privilege was effectively re-established in the terms asserted by the Howard government's National Multicultural Advisory Council in 1999 (see also Marden and Mercer, 1998).

Yet results from this study indicate that the concept of Anglo privilege (or dominant culture) is not one about which there is any real consensus. Among different birthplace groupings, NESB immigrants from Europe include a higher proportion who agree with the existence of Anglo privilege, having experienced 30 to 40 years of disadvantage in accessing the labour market for lack, or lack of recognition, of skills or educational qualifications, or difficulties with English. Many Asian immigrants share this view, significantly including many from former British ruled territories; it could be argued that Asian immigrants from former French colonies may well feel the same way in the Australian context. Among class groups, a majority of the new managerial-professional (cosmo-multiculturalist) class agree there is Anglo privilege, but whether they are mainly cosmopolitans, or multiculturalists only to the extent that they see multiculturalism as 'assimilation in slow motion' requires further investigation. With age, too, relationships with recognition of Anglo privilege are not consistent. There is a general correlation, but among some groups, such as ESB immigrants, who are only now becoming 'ethnicized', there is a negative correlation. The need for further work among different birthplace groups is indicated.

Findings from this study indicate that the notion of Anglo privilege and its links to multiculturalism are both independent of each other and varied geographically. Fundamental to the way in which social difference bears on perceptions of Anglo privilege among those who would be considered part of the Anglo (or Anglo-Celtic) social hegemonic group, is the differentiation between the 'old' working and middle class and the 'new' managerialprofessional class built on the new knowledge economy (Dixson, 1999). Hage (1995) argues that the Anglo-orientated thinking of the former is scarcely different from that of the latter, except, however, that the generally less-skilled immigrants can be readily accepted by the latter because they pose no cultural challenge to the cosmo-multiculturalists. Thus is the new 'Australian multiculturalism' readily accepted by the new class elite, implicitly conferring privilege, but leaving the old urban working and middle class largely abandoned and left to face the chill winds of cultural challenge and social change on their own. As Hage (2003: 1) notes, the effect is to create an 'absence of concern' about non-Anglo Australians, which acts to enshrine Anglo privilege by default, as recognized in Table 2, where the less educated NESB more strongly recognize privilege. The One Nation Party, which was seen to represent the views of the 'most disadvantaged Anglo (male) group', has long since seen its views absorbed into the policies and thinking of the ruling Howard government. But not, of course, the One Nation Party's overtly racist views. Rather, the way in which racism provides a link between privilege and multiculturalism acts through the 'new' racisms and their emphasis on cultural compatibility as a basis for nation and national identity (Dunn et al., 2004).

In terms of the politics of anti-racism, and for electoral politics generally, there are several important implications arising from the findings of this study. For the cosmo-multiculturalists, there is no substantial problem of marginalization, nor the sense of it. For the 'left behind Anglos' (and some other longer established European groups), there is both an economic and a cultural alienation, where current politics exacerbate, feed into and off, this alienation. Among these 'left behind Anglos', economic restructuring and rising unemployment worsens their plight. The politics of these grievances and alienation are both fraught and worrisome and deserving of further study in the light of findings presented here.

In its present form, 'Australian multiculturalism' presents an adversarial stance that is at odds with the 'difference blindness' of a civic nation. Any idea of integration into a nation of equal citizens requires a move back to a more centrist notion of nation and this is especially true of major immigrant-receiving nations like Australia. In a sense, the very notion of Australian multiculturalism implies such a move to a new, cultural centre, an Australian ethnicity. But in its present form it is, in practice, far from that objective. The privileged position of the dominant society remains, through its culture, language, institutions and laws. Yet results from this study

demonstrate just how ambivalent most sections of Australian society are about Anglo privilege, but equally so about multiculturalism. If, as indicated by the principal components analysis presented here, privilege and multiculturalism are perceived as two separate issues, but linked by recognition of racism, the focus of building a new nation must necessarily shift to dispel the present 'insurmountability of cultural differences' (Markus, 2001) and any threat of this to social cohesion and national unity in an increasingly diverse immigrant society. It requires an end to any belief, explicit or implicit, in the superiority of one (presently dominant) culture over all others, whether 'white' or Anglo. For that, as Kaufman (2004) argues, there is a need to develop some new, post-ethnic forms of living together.

References

- Alba, R.D. (1998) 'Assimilation, Exclusion or Neither? Models of the Incorporation of Immigrants in the United States', in P.H. Schuck and R. Munz (eds) Paths to Inclusion, pp. 1–31. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Australian Bureau of Statistics (2002) Australian Demographic Statistics. June Ouarter, ABS No. 3101.0. Canberra: ABS.
- Betts, K. (1999) The Great Divide: Immigration Politics in Australia. Sydney: Duffy & Snellgrove.
- Bourne, R. (1977) The Radical Will: Selected Writing, 191-1918s. New York: Urizen
- Bourque, G. and J. Duchastel (1999) 'Erosion of the Nation-state and the Transformation of National Identities in Canada', in J.L. Abu-Lughod (ed.) Sociology for the Twenty-first Century: Continuities and Cutting Edges, pp. 183-98. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Brown, D. (2000) Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Ethnocultural and Multicultural Politics. London: Routledge.
- Callister, P. (2004) 'Maori/non-Maori Ethnic Intermarriage', New Zealand Population Review 29(2): 89-105.
- Callister, P. (2005) 'Seeking an Ethnic Identity: Is "New Zealander" a Valid Ethnic Category?', New Zealand Population Review 30(1&2): 5-22.
- Cochran, P. (1995) 'Anglo-Saxonness: Ancestors and identity', in G. Hage, J. Lloyd and L. Johnson (eds) An Inquiry into the State of Anglo-Saxonness Within the Nation, pp. 1–16. Kingswood: University of Western Sydney, Nepean.
- Collins, J. (1999) 'Review Article, Ghassan Hage, White Nation: Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Society', Australian Journal of Social Issues 34(4): 387-94.
- Davis, R. and R. Stimson (1998) 'Disillusionment and Disenchantment at the Fringe: Explaining the Geography of the One Nation Party vote at the Queensland Election', People and Place 6(3): 69-82.
- Dixson, M. (1999) The Imaginary Australian: Anglo-Celts and Identity 1788 to the Present. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.
- Dorais, L-J., L. Foster and D. Stockley (1992) 'Multiculturalism and Integration', in

- H. Adelman (ed.) *Immigration and Refugee Policy*, Vol. 11, pp. 372–402 Toronto: University of Toronto Press..
- Dunn, K.M., J. Forrest, I. Burnley and A. McDonald (2004) 'Constructing Racism in Australia', *Australian Journal of Social Issues* 39(4): 409–30.
- Fleras, A. and P. Spoonley (1999) *Recalling Aotearoa: Indigenous Politics and Ethnic Relations in New Zealand.* Greenlane: Oxford University Press.
- Forrest, J. and R.J. Johnston (1981): 'On the Characterization of Urban Sub-areas According to Age Structure', *Urban Geography* 2: 31–40.
- Forrest, J. and R.J. Johnston (2000) 'The Occupational Attainment of Immigrant Groups in Australia', *International Migration* 38(2): 269–96.
- Forrest, J. and M.F. Poulsen (2003) 'Multiculturalism and the Spatial Assimilation of Migrant Groups: The Melbourne and Sydney Experience', paper presented to the Cities Conference, 3–6 December, Parramatta.
- Freeman, G.P. and J. Jupp (1992) 'Comparing Immigration Policy in Australia and the United States', in G.P. Freeman and J. Jupp (eds) *Nations of Immigrants: Australia, The United States and International Migration*, pp. 1–20. Melbourne: Oxford University Press.
- Glazer, N. (1997) We are All Multiculturalists Now. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Goot, M. and I. Watson (2001) 'One Nation's Electoral Support: Where Does it Come From, What Makes it Different and How Does it Fit?', *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 47(2): 159–91.
- Hage, G. (1995) 'Anglo-Celtics Today: Cosmo-Multiculturalism and the Phase of the Fading Phallus', in G. Hage, J. Lloyd and L. Johnson (eds) An Inquiry into the State of Anglo-Saxonness Within the Nation, pp. 41–78. Nepean: University of Western Sydney.
- Hage, G. (1998) White Nation: Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Society. Annandale, MN: Pluto Press.
- Hage, G. (2003) Against Paranoid Nationalism: Searching for Hope in a Shrinking Society. Sydney: Pluto Press.
- Helmes-Hay, R. and J. Curtis, eds (1998) *The Vertical Mosaic Revisited*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Hiebert, D., J. Collins and P. Spoonley (2003) *Uneven Globalization: Neoliberal Regimes, Immigration and Multiculturalism in Australia, Canada and New Zealand*. Vancouver Centre of Excellence for Research on Immigration and Integration in the Metropolis (RIIM), Working Paper No. 03–05.
- Howard, J.W. (1995a) 'The Role of Government: A Modern Liberal Approach', Parliament House, Canberra (June).
- Howard (1995b) 'Politics and Patriotism: A Reflection on the National Identity Debate', Grand Hyatt Hotel, Melbourne (13 December). Quoted in Johnson (2000) Governing Change: From Keating to Howard. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press.
- Howard, J.W. (1999) Address at the Launch of the National Multicultural Advisory Council Report, Australian Multiculturalism for a New Century: Towards Inclusiveness (5 May). Available from www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/1999/ MulticulturalAdvisoryCouncil.htm
- Jamrozik, A., C. Boland and R. Urquhart (1995) *Social Change and Cultural Transformation in Australia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Johnson, C. (2000) Governing Change: From Keating to Howard. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press.
- Johnson, C. (2001) 'The Treaty and Dilemmas of Anglo-Celtic Identity: From Backlash to Signatory' Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies [www.aiatsis.gov.au/rsrch/smnrs/papers/johnson.htm].
- Johnson, C. (2002) 'The Dilemmas of Ethnic Privilege: A Comparison of Constructions of "British", "English" and "Anglo-Celtic" Identity in Contemporary British and Australian Political Discourse', Ethnicities 2(2): 163–88.
- Johnston, R.J. and R.K. Semple (1983) Classification using Information Statistics, Catmog No. 39. Norwich: Geobooks.
- Johnston, R.J., M.P. Poulsen and J. Forrest (2002) 'Fragmented Urban Spaces? New Zealand's Ethnic Residential Areas', New Zealand Geographer 58(2): 30–44.
- Johnston, R.J., M.P. Poulsen and J. Forrest (2003) 'The Ethnic Geography of New Zealand: A Decade of Growth and Change, 1991–2001', Asia Pacific Viewpoint 44(2): 109-30.
- Jupp, J. (1988) 'The Making of the Anglo-Australian', in J. Jupp (ed.) The Australian People, pp. 56–63. Sydney: Angus & Robertson.
- Kaufman, E. (2000) 'Ethnic or Civic Nation? Theorising the American Case', Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 27: 133-54.
- Kaufman, E. (2004) The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America: The Decline of Dominant Ethnicity in the US. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Keating, P. (1995) 'Common Values: The Cement that Preserves Our Diversity', Weekend Australian 8-9 April: 31.
- Kivisto, P. (2002) Multiculturalism in a Global Society. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Leach, M., G. Stokes and I. Ward, eds (2000) The Rise and Fall of One Nation. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press.
- Leser, D. (1996) 'Pauline Hanson's bitter harvest', The Sydney Morning Herald 'Good Weelend', 30 November: 18-28.
- Marden, P. and D. Mercer (1998) 'Locating Strangers: Multiculturalism, Citizenship and Nationhood in Australia', Political Geography 17(18): 939-58.
- Markus, A. (2001) Race: John Howard and the Remaking of Australia. Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin.
- McDonald, P. and R. Kippen (1999) 'Population Futures for Australia: The Policy Alternatives', Research paper No. 5, Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/index.htm].
- McKinnon, M. (1996) Immigrants and Citizens: New Zealanders and Asian Immigration in Historical Context. Wellington: Institute of Policy Studies, Victoria University of Wellington.
- Morrissey, M., M. Dibden and C. Mitchell (1992) 'Immigration and Industry Restructuring in the Illawarra'. Bureau of Immigration Research, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
- NMAC (National Multicultural Advisory Council) (1999) Multiculturalism: The Way Forward. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.
- Pearson, D. (2001) 'Divergent Nationalisms: Some Comparative Thoughts on Australia, Canada and New Zealand', Political Science 53(1): 3-16.
- Portes, A. and M. Zhou (1993) 'The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and its Variants', Annals, American Academy of Political and Social Science, November, 530: 74-96.

- Rose, P. (1997) *Tempest-Tost: Race, Immigration and the Dilemmas of Diversity*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Spoonley, P. (1991) 'Pakeha Ethnicity: A Response to Maori Sovereignty', in P. Spooner, D. Pearson and C. Macpherson (eds) *Nga Taka: Ethni Relations and Racism in Aoteroa/New Zealand*, pp. 154–70. Palmerston North: Massey University.
- Stratton, J. (2000) 'Not Just a Multicultural Story: English Migrants and the Ideology of "Fitting in" to Australia', *Journal of Australian Studies* September: 23–49.

JAMES FORREST is an Associate Professor in the Department of Human Geography at Macquarie University, Sydney. *Address*: Department of Human Geography, Macquarie University, NSW 2109, Australia. [email: jim.forrest@els.mq.edu.au]

KEVIN DUNN is a Senior Lecturer in Geography in the School of Biological, Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of New South Wales. *Address*: School of Biological, Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia. [email: k.dunn@unsw.edu.au]