Atlas of the Ethno-Political History of the Caucasus

ARTHUR TSUTSIEV
TRANSLATED BY NORA SELIGMAN FAVOROV

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To my parents, Svetlana Gabisova and Arkady Tsutsiev

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Contents

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Foreword

GEORGI DERLUGUIAN

This atlas is extraordinary. To begin with, much of the data used in creating these maps is not accessible in English sources and, indeed, is very difficult to find in sources in Russian or any other language. Further, this atlas is not a collection of satellite images of the region, however detailed such pictures might be. On the contrary, it is a series of hand-crafted maps that, along with the author's pinpoint commentary, lay before the reader snapshot images of the complex nexus of history, geography, and anthropology that shaped the region over a 250-year span. It took an extraordinary effort not simply to produce but to translate such an atlas: How does one spell the names of places and peoples for which no precedent in English exists? how make these names easier for readers to pronounce while preserving reasonable consistency in the transliteration? The Abkhaz language, for example, has more than fifty consonants and is featured in the *Guinness Book of World Records* as the most difficult to pronounce on earth. You can thus imagine the dilemmas and labors of the translator. She has succeeded splendidly. The translation is itself a pleasing piece of solid craftsmanship.

The ethnic complexity of the Caucasus is notorious, a true delight for linguistics aficionados and a potential nightmare for the cartographer. How to fit on the map of Daghestan its thirty-plus indigenous groups, some of which occupy a single valley or a few villages? How not to overwhelm the reader with the multitude of flags, including (my personal favorite) the white lotus on the saffron field of Kalmykia, the first state entity in Europe to officially proclaim itself Buddhist?

And the political complexity offers another kind of challenge. The region, with its ever-shifting borders and populations constantly on the move, migrating or being violently displaced for over two hundred years (and more), is a labyrinth of booby-traps for the cartographer. Precisely because of the enormous technical complexity, political nuance, and emotional charge of its subject matter, this atlas could only have been a work of love by a person of extraordinary decency. Arthur Tsutsiev is neither a dispassionate outsider nor a cloistered academic. To answer the inevitable (at least in the Caucasus) question: he is an ethnic Ossetian and in addition to being an academic works as a senior political analyst for the government of his native republic of North Ossetia. Does this background point to a certain bias? No less than in any of us. But Tsutsiev approaches his task as a scholar who fully realizes the terrible complexity of ethnic histories and chooses to resist the passionately nationalist biases engulfing Caucasus studies. Tsutsiev has always struck me as a quiet, sad man who probably knows more than anyone about his part of the world and what it means to live there.

What exactly is the Caucasus? A look at a good map immediately tells us more than volumes of words. The central enduring reality there is the long wall of formidable mountains tightly flanked on both sides by two large bodies of salt water. Unlike the Mediterranean, the Caspian and Black Seas are almost entirely devoid of natural harbors, promontories, and islands that could protect ancient navigators from the harsh and (especially in the Caspian) often ferocious winds blowing from the expanses of the Eurasian steppes and deserts. Thus the Caucasus is remarkably isolated by its geography, even as it has remained for centuries squeezed between the cradles of early agrarian civilizations to the south and the nomadic Great Steppe to the north, a rock between the grinding wheels of world history.

Anthropologically, the Caucasus is akin to Australia, where local species and human cultures could survive in relative isolation from the march of evolution elsewhere. Like the unique Basque language in western Europe, the majority of languages found in the Caucasus are endemic. Georgian comprises a linguistic family entirely its own, though individual words have made their way west: the Georgian word *ghwino,* according to one hypothesis, has entered English as "wine" perhaps via the ancient Armenian *gini,* Greek *oinos,* Latin *vinum,* and, ultimately, Gothic/Germanic *Wein*. Another endemic family, for simplicity called today Caucasian, is made up of the dozens of complex tongues spoken from Daghestan to Abkhazia. In between we find Ossetian, which linguists consider the sole surviving descendant of the language spoken by the ancient Indo-European horse riders: the Scythians, Sarmatians, and medieval Alans. (The latter probably left their imprint in the English personal name Alan.)

Predictably, in the Caucasus such academic hypotheses are often seen as claims to ethnic fame, if not superiority. What all this says, however, is simply that for a long time the Caucasus mountains have been effectively sheltering the human groups that at some point in their history needed shelter from the waves of various invaders. This observation might also run in another direction: ancient invaders were assimilated by the locals, who adopted their languages while largely preserving their own material cultures and physical stock. The recent invention of DNA testing supplies data, still controversial and incomplete, that seem to suggest a remarkable continuity of local populations, including historical instances in which the languages have changed, as in the cases of the Armenians (whose Indo-European language is traced to the long-extinct ancient Phrygian), the Iranian-speaking "Mountain Jews," and the Turkic Azeris, as well as to the North Caucasus Kumyks, Balkars, and Karachais. In short, in the Caucasus virtually everyone is very, very native, and yet nothing has ever been static in this living region.

The mountains protect, but they also limit. One obvious limitation is in the small size of human populations. Mountains cannot feed many mouths. Another serious limitation imposed by the landscape is in the size and depth of local state structures. The majority of highlanders before modern times rarely had to submit to the taxing powers of state officials, imperial churches, or grand lords. The inhabitants of the mountains were usually too few in number, too scattered, too poor, and too well-armed for anyone to bother taxing them. Instead, they developed flexible and strong clan cultures famed for both their generous hospitality and their vindictive ferocity: in a stateless society the only precarious guarantee of safety was a reputation for being a good friend and host and an implacable foe. This is

not too different from what we find in the old Viking societies, in the Balkans and Sicily, or among the Kurdish and Afghan peoples. In the Caucasus, warrior culture and clan segmentation achieved extraordinary levels. Much evidence suggests, however, that the persistence of clan societies is not the result of special traditionalism or geographic isolation. Just the opposite: the proliferation of nonhierarchical yet complex pastoralist-agrarian societies (to use the technical anthropological terms) seems to have been boosted by the introduction of firearms about three centuries ago. Guns allowed even the relatively poor farmers and shepherds to resist the exactions of aristocrats in splendid armor.

Into this picture enters the Russian Empire, first in the 1550s and then, in a more sustained manner, during the 1780s to 1820s. Initially the conquests seemed easy. The modern European army, tested in the wars against Napoleon himself, in a succession of battlefield triumphs rolled to the southern borders of what later became Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. The Russians' success was due to the presence of feudal social structures in these relatively more fertile lands. Once the strength of Russian arms was proven in direct confrontations, even the Muslim Turkic elites, to say nothing of the Christian Georgian and Armenian princes and priests, usually chose to submit themselves and their peasants to the new masters in the hope of being incorporated on better terms. It was only in the stateless mountains of the North Caucasus that Russia ran into the sustained guerrilla resistance coordinated by the ideological network of combative Islamic Sufis.

Arthur Tsutsiev meticulously documents in his maps the twists and turns of these protracted struggles and how their multiple legacies have been transported into our day. Let me emphasize here that his approach is far more subtle and theoretically robust than those romantic retrospective depictions that dwell on historical memories and national predestinations. This atlas is not merely an authoritative reference source. Map after map, it tells a coherent and comprehensive story of the making of the modern Caucasus.

What might be perhaps less evident to the reader is that this atlas meshes several theoretical breakthroughs in understanding the human past. Almost literally at the ground level lies the historical geography of Fernand Braudel, who first elaborated in his classical study of the Mediterranean the complex interdependencies of physical landscapes and the variety of human societies emerging from them. Braudel's work was followed by the "organizational materialism" of contemporary historical sociologists like Michael Mann, Charles Tilly, and Immanuel Wallerstein. Their approach is to examine what has been flowing over the networks of geopolitics, governance, world economies, human migrations, and cultural exchanges; what has shaped the conflicts, the dilemmas, and the solutions found or never quite found by the collective actors and organizations involved with this landscape. Ultimately, Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* became the signal work around which a broad consensus among contemporary scholars of nations and nationalism crystalized. Make no mistake, the key word *imagined* in Anderson's famous title does not mean "fake" or "frivolously concocted." Rather it directs our attention to the actual processes, personalities, resources, and ideological battles that have been involved in the construction of quintessentially modern projects aimed at political rights through nationhood.

The nationalists themselves tell a very different and much simpler story. It can be summarized in a few standard tropes: our group is ancient, we were always here, our culture is unique and great, therefore we must do whatever it takes to assert ourselves as a sovereign state. Some thinkers recently suggested that the heyday of nationalism is now past. The last great outbreak came with the ethnic rebellions following in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The future belongs to market cosmopolitanism or, in a considerably less sanguine prediction, conflict among religiously formulated civilizations. That remains to be seen. So far one must hope that this extraordinarily sobering atlas might eventually be found in every school and bookshop, and, for that matter, in the teahouses and bars where nationalist fervors still flare up easily. Such popular use of Tsutsiev's work would be a service to humanity. This does not contradict the value of his intellectual achievement. Theoretically sophisticated and remarkably clear, this atlas can also be read by students, experts, and scholars as a first-rate graphic monograph on nations and nationalism.

Introduction

The Caucasus is defined as a region by history, culture, and geography. In terms of geography, it is bordered to the west by the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, to the east by the Caspian Sea, and to the north by the lower Don River and the Kuma-Manych Depression; the southern border is political, based on longstanding Russian-Soviet borders with Turkey and Iran. But these external boundaries are far from clear-cut. The northern geographic boundary leaves the current capital of the Russian Caucasus—Rostov-on-Don (Rostov-na-Donu), the "gateway to the Caucasus" and administrative center of Russia's Southern Federal District—outside the region. (In early 2010 this district was divided in two, with the new North Caucasus Federal District centered in Pyatigorsk and comprising six of the Caucasus' seven "ethnic" republics plus Stavropol Territory.) And beyond the southern political boundary, as it has taken shape over the past two centuries, there are still significant areas that historically, culturally, and linguistically might be considered a continuation of the Caucasus region.

The heterogeneity of the Caucasus' outer borders (natural and geographical to the north and political to the south) suggests a need to investigate the processes underlying the region's historical and cultural cohesion, which developed within a single imperial state and through political engagement with that state. Historically, the Caucasus region was first seen as both an inter-imperial buffer zone and, beginning in the early nineteenth century, a special territory of Russia. Its distinct qualities have been reflected in the institutions and functions of the viceroyalty (namestnichestvo) and the military district, and in the unique ethnocultural mix that has existed on the southern frontier of the Greater Russian expanse. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the Caucasus gradually took on attributes of Russia's military, political, administrative, and ethnographic spheres, while at the same time it was being defined by its own internal cohesion and diversity.

These features of Caucasian history also give this atlas its chronological framework: it is devoted specifically to the Russian era, still ongoing, and begins with an overview of the imperial rivalry in the early eighteenth century, when Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and Persia jockeyed for control over the region. Three significant milestones mark the dawn of the Russian era: the 1722 Persian campaign by Peter the Great; the 1763 establishment of the Mozdok Fortress, which provided a base for further expansion; and the 1774 Russo-Ottoman Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji. This treaty essentially denoted the end of the neutral status given Greater and Lesser Kabarda in 1739, paving the way for their military and administrative incorporation into the Russian Empire and extending the Russian border to the Greater Caucasus Mountains and the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakhetia.

The temporal boundaries of the Caucasus' "Russian era" share some of the ambiguity of the region's physical boundaries. The decision to view 1763 or even the last quarter of the eighteenth century as starting points is not self-evident: one might begin with the conquest of Astrakhan in 1556 and the acquisition of areas along the lower southern reaches of the Terek under Ivan the Terrible along with his military and political alliance with neighboring Idarian Kabarda. Peter the Great's Persian campaign of 1722 appears to have been little more than a reconnaissance raid to the eastern Caucasus and did not lead to any long-term territorial acquisitions. But the establishment of the fortress of Mozdok by Catherine II immediately after her ascension to the throne was the prelude to successful Russian expansion into the region. The result was a new war against the Ottomans (1768–1774) and international recognition of both Kabardas as Russian territories.

In this work I shall briefly trace the more than two hundred–year evolution of the administrative and ethnic composition of the region. My goal, in particular, is to explore how the variables involved in the region's ethnopolitical conflicts came about and to study current risks associated with these conflicts. The book comprises a series of maps, each of which reflects what can be seen as a significant stage in the region's development or as an interpretation of important trends or themes in this development, accompanied by commentary in which these trends and themes are discussed.

The Caucasus has never been deprived of scholarly attention. Its abundant history, rich ethnic and cultural composition, and dynamic social and political processes have always attracted the interest of researchers throughout the social sciences. But we still lack a historical atlas of the region as a coherent social, cultural, economic, and political entity. An atlas makes it possible to visualize this coherence in its temporal and physical expression while seeing the movement of the region's collective actors—their place within the historical trajectory of Greater Russia and other powers—in the context of common perspectives and interests. By offering a series of maps illustrating certain aspects of the political and ethnic history of the region that appear significant from today's perspective, the atlas also provides the basis for a comprehensive historical atlas.

In this work I have striven to depict the historical fluidity of ethnic borders and the relativity of "indigenous" territories. While there are claims to the contrary, the historical record seems to indicate that significant portions of Caucasian territory were originally politically and administratively attributed to ethnic groups (peoples) and divided and redivided accordingly during the imperial period. The ways in which Russia and the Soviet Union drew administrative lines have affected how Caucasian groups themselves identify the boundaries of ethnic "homelands." In this atlas I examine the imperfect correlation and problematic relationship between administrative and political boundaries on one hand and the boundaries of ethnic areas on the other, aiming in particular to demonstrate that the region's political and administrative boundaries rarely (in fact, almost never) come close to matching its ethnic boundaries. Throughout history, however, each type of boundary—political, administrative, and ethnic—has influenced the others.

For two hundred years the Caucasus' political and ethnic dynamic has been shaped by the variety of modes of governance used to integrate the region into a single country. None

of the competing political strategies ignored the ethnic component. The drawing and institutionalization of boundaries did not represent an arbitrary, unfounded approach to government. On the contrary, the process was for the most part guided by a particular logic in ordering and classifying ethnic categories and identifying and exploiting ethnic solidarities. Therefore the administrative lines drawn within the empire were not arbitrary in their relationship to ethnic boundaries, nor did their creators invent ethnic distinctions where there was no preexisting collective identity on which to base them. But these identities were neither clear-cut and one-dimensional nor socially irrelevant and static.

How government was structured in the Caucasus region and the changes this structure underwent during the imperial and Soviet periods played a significant role in shaping ideas about the "historical" borders of "national territories" (ethnic homelands) and, correspondingly, the conflict over these borders and territories. But the strategies for governing and the specific applications of a nationalities policy by imperial and Soviet authorities have always been influenced by rivalries among local elites and can be viewed as a way of regulating and institutionalizing internal antagonisms and conflicts. Many conflicts that look as if they were imposed from the outside or were even artificially created are more likely to reflect an institutionalizing of endogenous processes recast in the terms and expressed through the procedures of the empire's own political and legal machinery. Therefore, final responsibility for the dynamics of these conflicts—especially for their future dynamics—lies with the Caucasian collective and individual actors themselves.

My aim is to provide a sketch of regional history capable of serving as a stepping stone toward understanding the unity but also the fragility of the contemporary Caucasus. If this book has a theme, it is that historical justice and the drawing of borders that satisfy everyone cannot be driven by the past, by treating the past as a repository of bygone national greatness. By using roughly sequential maps to trace the processes that shaped the region it is possible to demonstrate the fluidity of borders and the overall dubiousness of claims to national borders that have existed "from time immemorial." I also strive to promote (in the resolution of ethnoterritorial and status conflicts) a general reorientation of attention from the past to the present and the future. Conflicts cannot be resolved through efforts to adjust current boundaries to bring them more in line with their "original" configurations. "Original" is too relative and malleable a concept to be used as the basis of a responsible political strategy for solving today's conflicts. The future shape of the region will be determined not by historians but through the development of a civil society that transcends national boundaries and of the political institutions within them. Nevertheless, the region's common history can play an important role in this development as a reserve that can be drawn on in the critical reappraisal of current policies.

I would like to express my gratitude to everyone whose assistance or critical eye contributed to the work reflected in this atlas. First among these are my late teachers Andrey Zdravomyslov and Alan Pliev, as well as my colleagues and friends Lyudmila Gatagova, Vladimir Degoev, Georgi Derluguian, Gerard Toal (Gearóid Ó Tuathail), and Georgy Chochiev. This edition is an expansion of the 2006 Russian version, which was completed with support from the Russian Fund for Humanities, the Open Society Institute, and Central European University's Research Support Scheme. My time spent working in the Georg Eckert Institute (Braunschweig, Germany), with its extensive collection of historical atlases and cartographical studies, was invaluable. The preparation and publication of the Russian version was made possible by the support of my colleagues and friends Modest Kolerov, Lev Dzugaev, Serguei Takoev, Zita Salbieva, and Ruslan Khestanov. A special note of thanks goes to my aunt Alla Gabisova for lending her editorial expertise to the task of lightening my rather dense Russian prose. Last but not least, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to Vadim Staklo and Yale University Press for undertaking to publish my atlas in English, and to translator Nora Seligman Favorov and manuscript editor Susan Laity for helping me transform my sometimes abstruse prose into clear "Yale" English. I am extremely grateful for the second chance to reflect not only on how I express what is said in this atlas, but on what it is that needs saying.

Guide to the Maps

The maps in this atlas focus on different developments—political, ethnic, religious—that have had a greater or lesser influence on the region at different periods of its history. The focus of each map is clarified in its accompanying commentary.

Colored areas represent sovereign states, political control and administration, ethnic or linguistic categories, or religious affiliations. Shades or patterns of a single color designate internal distinctions within a category. Colored arrows indicate movements by a designated group, military or migratory, and are defined on the map or in the map key.

Solid lines enclosing a broken black line indicate the boundaries of empires: the Russian and the Soviet (red), and the Ottoman and Persian (later Turkey and Iran; violet). Approximate boundaries are designated by broken lines, which are identified in the map keys.

Dark violet lines are used to indicate boundaries of dependent political entities, satellite states, or territories. Light violet lines indicate provincial and district borders. Broken violet lines indicate boundaries that are changing, approximate, or contested within the period covered by the map. Broken violet lines may also indicate the boundaries of highlander communities, their confederations, and their polities; such cases are indicated in the map keys.

Blue lines represent rivers, lakes, and coastlines.

Colored lines not mentioned here are identified in their respective maps or keys.

Names in roman indicate states, polities, provinces, and other administrative or territorial units; those in italic are geographic areas, historical provinces, ethnic groups or ethnolinguistic categories, highlander communities and confederations of nomadic peoples, or tribes. Further distinctions are detailed in individual map keys. Where there is no clear difference between polity and ethnic community (or confederation of communities) the choice of roman or italic type was made on the basis of whether polity or ethnicity was the focus of the map. Place names in roman represent towns, fortresses, or fortified towns. Place names in italic indicate villages, including stanitsas (fortified Cossack villages). Variant names are given in parentheses or after a virgule; where these have political or other significance they are explained in the relevant map key.

Because Russian political divisions do not correspond precisely with English divisions, the Russian names of the various political and other administrative divisions are included in brackets following the English names. Brackets are also used to designate dual names, contested toponyms, outdated ethnic categories, and other distinctions; these are specified in the individual maps.

Squares and circles represent, respectively, towns and villages. Red squares indicate capital cities and provincial centers, yellow squares and circles indicate district centers unless otherwise identified in the map key. Squares with an "X" identify fortresses or fortified towns; circles with an "X" are stanitsas on a few early maps.

White triangles represent key mountain peaks, five of which appear in each map to provide a basic geographical reference. These are Mounts Elbrus, Kazbek, and Bazarduzi in the Greater Caucasus mountain range and Mounts Aragats and Ararat in the Lesser Caucasus.

Other symbols (colored squares, circles, triangles, diamonds) used in the maps are identified in the relevant map keys.

In the early maps, red dotted lines designate the Russian defensive and communication lines, with the thickness of the dotted line indicating the respective importance of the defensive line and red circles identifying important fortified points.

In later maps, red lines indicate railroads, which came to the region in the 1870s. Active railroads are represented with a solid red line, railroads under construction with a broken red line, and planned railroads with a dotted red line. Additional representations of railroads are explained in individual map keys. Green lines indicate highways; active roads are shown by a solid line, roads under construction by a broken line, and planned roads by a dotted line.

None of the boundaries, toponyms, ethnonyms, or other designations used in the atlas imply endorsement of any government office or international institution.

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Atlas of the Ethno-Political History of the Caucasus

1

Northern geographic border of the Caucasus region
Southern political border of the Caucasus region
Other political and administrative borders
Cities with more than 1 million inhabitants as of 2012
[Chernomoria] Names that are no longer used are given in brackets
△5642 Major mountain peaks with elevation in meters
0 50 100 km

Sea of Azov
Don Steppe
Sal Steppe
R.Manych
L.Manych-Gudilo
R.Volga
R.Yeya
R.Yegorlyk
Kalmykia
Kuban
[Chernomoria]
Kerch Strait
Crimea
R.Beisug
R.Kalaus
Kuma-Manych Depression
Troukhmen Steppe
R.Kuban
Taman Peninsula
[Fanagoria Island]
Russia
Adygheya
Zakubanye
[Circassia]
Stavropol Upland
R.Kuma
R.Tomuzlov
R.Urup
Gulf of Kizlyar
Kizlyar Lowland
Nogai Steppe
Mangyshlak
R.Belaya
R.Laba
[Shapsugia]
Cherkessia
Pyatigorye
Chechen I.
R.Malka
Mozdok Steppe
Greater Caucasus
Karachai
Kabarda
Mt. Elbrus 5642
Balkaria
R.Terek
Ingushetia
R.Sunzha
Chechnya
Kumyk Plain
R.Sulak
Caspian Sea
Abkhazia
Svanetia
Digoria
Aukh
Ichkeria
Salatau
Akki
Mt. Kazbek 5033
Andi
Black Sea
Racha
Khevsuretia
Avaria
Megrelia
Ossetia
Tushetia
Dagh
Akusha
Kaitag
Imeretia
Kolkhida Lowland
Dido
Ankratl
Kumukh
Tabasaran
Kakhetia
Kartlia
Georgia
Guria
Trialetia
Tbilisi
Alazani Valley
[Djary]
Kizikia
R.Samur
[Mushkur]
Lezgistan
Ajaria
Meskhetia
Javakhetia
[Doukhoboria]
Borchalo
R.Kura
Shirak Steppe
[Ilisu]
Mt.Bazarduzi 4466
Kuba
Lazistan
[Tao-Klarjeti]
Lori
Karayaz Steppe
Kazakh
Sheki
Shamshadil
Ganja
[Arran]
Shirvan
Absheron
Baku
Mt. Aragats 4090
L.Sevan
Armenia
Murovdag Mts
Gobustan
R.Arax
Yerevan
Ararat Plain
Karabakh
Azerbaijan
Mil Steppe
Mughan Steppe
R.Kura
Mt. Ararat 5165
[Daralagez]
Sharur
Turkey
Nakhichevan
Zangezur
R.Arax
Talysh
Talysh Mts
Iran
L. Van
38°
40°
42°
44°
46°
48°

The Caucasus: Historical and Geographic Areas and Contemporary Borders

Map 1

The Caucasus

Historical and Geographic Areas and Contemporary Borders

This introductory physical map is a geographic representation of the Caucasus that also shows its current political and administrative borders and main historical regions. Most of the labels refer to these historical regions (geographic and ethnographic areas) rather than to states, whose red lines they straddle in some cases.

These labels embody two dimensions: one political and administrative and the other historical and cultural. The boundaries belonging to the former seem to clearly delineate territories and sovereignties. The latter dimension is often fraught with ambiguity and fluidity: its boundaries (which this map does not aspire to convey) are relatively clear-cut in some cases but in others are indistinct, shifting, and open to interpretation, resulting in overlapping historical provinces, juxtaposed ethnographic enclaves, or wide areas of coexistence. The historical relationship between these dimensions—over the course of which polities have tried to arrange (to order, to articulate) and to change the cultural dimension—has created an ideological demand for rival cartographies of "historic lands" and "ethnic territories."

The Caucasus as a geographic and cartographic category—as a region rather than the mountain range that forms its "axis"—has a relatively short history. The famous 1723 map by the French geographer Guillaume Delisle (map 1 in the list of sources at the back of this atlas) is an early attempt at cartographically defining the Caucasus as a particular geographic and geopolitical region, although neither category was specifically identified in the title. Delisle used new Georgian and Russian sources, but basically he simply refined existing maps of the Caspian coastline and the Caspian-Azov-Black Sea interland. He referred to the region as "Pays voisins de la Mer Caspienne"—not "the Caucasus." In the first half of the eighteenth century "the Caucasus" still designated—as it had since antiquity—a mountain range, the Kavkasioni, a term used in the work of Vakhushti Bagrationi, the famous Georgian historian and geographer. The first Russian atlas of the empire, published in 1745 (map 2 in the list of sources), contained a map of the North Caucasus that was strongly influenced by Vakhushti; it depicted the "Location of Places between the Black and Caspian Seas." Thus the cartographic image of the Caucasus had already appeared, defined by geographic (seacoasts) and to some extent political (imperial borderlands or the frontier lands of the three empires) attibutes. Yet the cartographic concept of "the Caucasus" as a region emerged only gradually over the course of the century, described in terms of certain key spatial geographic markers: the coastlines and the mountain chain of the Greater Caucasus. This regional identification would eventually subsume all the basic spatial and geographic references, until "the Caucasus" began to be seen as a particular geopolitical and historical region lying on both sides of the Greater Caucasus range with boundaries that had little connection to the range itself. The Russian-German Johann Anton Gueldenstaedt, who explored the Caucasus between 1769 and 1773, may have been the first to identify and map it as a specific region (see map 8 in the list of sources), thereby creating the modern concept of "the Caucasus" and coining a term for the area that would become a geopolitical focal point in the centuries to come.

The general representation of this specific region in eighteenth-century European and Russian cartography was taking place within the context of an effort to map the indistinct limits of imperial frontiers—Ottoman, Persian, and Russian—and present the local polities, lands, and tribes situated at the junctions of these volatile peripheries. The process by which the Caucasus was mapped mirrored and anticipated the imperial rivalry that finally resulted in the clear delineation of the geopolitical limits of the modern Caucasus.

SOURCES

Maps: 1, 2, 8, 114, 115, 116, 171, 172.

A National Geographic Data Center map was used for the relief, available at http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/mgg/topo/pictures/EUROPEcolshade_sm.jpg.

Map 2
1722–1739: The Imperial Rivalry over the Caucasus Borderlands

Map 3
1763–1785: The Caucasus around the Time of the Russian Conquests

During most of the eighteenth century the Caucasus was a buffer separating three competing powers: the Ottoman Empire, Persia, and Russia. (A broader view reveals other geopolitical players as well, primarily Britain, which strove to block Russia from reaching the warm southern seas.) The powers were attempting to expand their presence in the region, transforming the Caucasus into a field of focused strategic interest. The region's political composition, the fact that its territory was divided among three powers (in terms of either influence or actual control), reflected the fluid aftermath of previous stages of imperial military and political rivalry. By the early 1770s the general contour of international borders had been determined by key treaties: the Treaties of Rasht (1732) and Ganja (1735) between Persia (Iran) and Russia, which returned the provinces along the western shores of the Caspian Sea to Persia and retracted the Russian border back to the Terek and Sulak Rivers (as can be seen in Map 2); the Treaty of Belgrade (1739) between the Porte (the government of the Ottoman Empire) and Russia, as a part of which Kabarda was established as a neutral zone (literally, "barrier lands") between the parties to the treaty and the territories south of the Kuban River were recognized as being under Turkish protection; and treaties between the Porte and Persia (including those in 1639 and 1736) delineating their territories south of the Caucasus range in the area later called Transcaucasia.

The next military phase of the Russo-Ottoman conflict (1768–1774) concluded in the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji (Küçük Kaynarca, 1774), which gave Russia "barrier lands" and shifted the border between the two empires to the lower reaches of the Kalmius River north of the Sea of Azov (not shown on the map and not to be confused with the Kalaus) and along the Yeya River to the east of this sea. Kuchuk Kainarji was followed by Russia's annexation of the Khanate of Crimea and its Kuban lands in the northwest of the Caucasus (1783). These years (illustrated in Map 3) saw a significant territorial expansion by the Russian Empire into the central Caucasus (Kabarda and the dependent highlander communities south of it). With Persia in crisis (particularly during the second half of the eighteenth century), semi-autonomous states began consolidating in the southeastern portion of the region, the largest of which were the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakhetia and the Khanate of Quba (Kuba). Russia was attempting to impede Turkey's expansion toward the Caspian Sea and to prevent the forced reintegration of Kartli-Kakhetia into Persia. Under the Treaty of Georgievsk (1783), eastern Georgia (Kartli-Kakhetia) became a Russian protectorate. This seemed to assure Russia a foothold that would later permit it to take over the remainder of the southern Caucasus.

The rivalries among the three powers in the Caucasus served as a catalyst for a network of internal conflicts and antagonisms (for example, among different factions of Greater Kabarda's princedoms and between rulers in coastal Daghestan) that gradually began to be mediated by the empires. The vagaries of geopolitics were tied to the structure of the inter-imperial field, within which a number of parameters can be identified.

POLITICAL HIERARCHY AND POLITICAL AND ETHNIC BOUNDARIES

In addition to the states of Transcaucasia and coastal Daghestan, which had well-developed urban centers, there were feudal confederations of sovereign lands in Kabarda and northern Daghestan, confederations of "free" (independent and self-governed) communities in the mountains, and powerful and politically organized tribal groups of steppe nomads. Not only did forms of authority among these groups vary widely and differ in terms of the military and political weight they carried, the groups also had unequal status within inter-imperial relations. A hierarchy is clearly reflected, in particular, in the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji. At the top were the parties to the treaty, Russia and the Porte; the Crimean Khanate (to which the Ottomans were forced to grant independence) occupied a second level; Tatar mirzas (the nobility of the Kuban Nogai Horde) a third; and the two Kabardas a fourth. The fifth level is not even mentioned in the text of the treaty—the mountain communities that depended on those higher up in the hierarchy.

The hierarchy of political entities was mirrored in a corresponding set of multilayer boundaries and a hierarchy of ways in which these were determined and legitimized. In other words, the diversity of political entities that appeared throughout Caucasian history was paralleled by a diversity of types of borders, from internationally recognized imperial borders to fluid nomadic boundaries or almost immutable naturally imposed "limits" enclosing mountain communities. Large feudal domains led by culturally defined elites (Georgian, Turkic, or, to some extent, Adyghe) usually encompassed territories with an ethnically diverse population. The political borders of these domains had little to do with ethnicity. However, the region's political makeup was also shaped by its tribal or ethnic composition, and not only because gaps in state sovereignty in highland areas or weakly defined zones of steppe left blank spots on color-coded political maps. Ethnically homogeneous free communities or tribal groups often played an active role in local politics. Ethnic dispersion inevitably impacted political dynamics and influenced the political map, as did the shifting ethnic borders of highland communities and steppe nomads. The Djar-Belokan Avar communities are an example of shifts in the dispersion of "Lezgins" (used in the Georgian-Russian political language of the time to denote any of several related ethnic groups of

2

Azak (Azov) area
(to Russia 1700-1711,
to Ottomans 1711-1739)

Azov Province, est. 1708
(renamed Voronezh Province in 1725)

Sea of Azov

R.Yeya

Don Cossacks

Don Cossack and Kalmyk military activity
against Crimean Tatars and Nogai during
Russo-Ottoman wars 1710-1713, 1735-1739

Kalmyk Khanate
(Oirat nomad polity founded within Russian borders in 1630s)

R.Volga

Kalmyk Khanate

0 50 100 km

approximate coastline of Caspian Sea
at the end of 18th century

Krasny Yar

Astrakhan

L. Bolshoy Liman

Khanate of Crimea
(Ottoman satellite state)

Former territory of Astrakhan Khanate (conquered by Russian Tsardom in 1556)

Kuban Horde
(Nogai nomadic confederation, vassal of the Crimean Khanate)

Achu

R.Yegorlyk

Russian Empire

Astrakhan Province [Astrakhanskaya Gubernia], est. 1717

Kerch

Taman (Fanagoria)
Island

Temryuk

Kopyl

R.Kuban

Nogai

Nogai

R.Kalaus

Taman

R. Adagum

Anapa

Circassian lowland communities nominally dependent
on Crimean Khanate beginning 1731

Ruins of Majar

R.Kuma

R.Tomuzlov

Crimean military activity in 1700-1730s

Sujuk-Kale

Gelenjik

Circassians

Nogai

Gulf of Kizlyar

Cherny Rynok

R.Laba

Agoi

Beslenei

Approximate and mostly nominal border
of Russian Empire by 1735-1739

Ruins of Terki or Tersky Gorodok (1588-1728)

R.Malka

Kizlyar (founded 1735)

Vardane

Principalities of
Greater Kabarda

R.Terek

Terek Cossacks

Area remained disputed between
Russia and Persia after 1735

Abaza

Karachai

Ruins of Julat

Chervlenny

Bragunt

Principalities of
Lesser Kabarda

Minor Kumyk
Principalities

Sviatoy Krest (founded 1722, abandoned 1735)

Ardkuaje (Ardiler)

Mountain Tatar Communities

R.Sunzha

R.Sulak

Principality of Abkhazia

Pitsunda

Svanetia

Chechen Communities

Shamkhalate (Principality)
of Tarki

Black Sea

Sukhum-Kale

Ossetian Communities

Galgai

Targhu (Tarki)

Caspian Sea

Peter I's Caspian Campaign 1722

Ilori

R.Ingur

Zugdidi

Principality of Megrelia

R.Rioni

Oni

Jengutai

4

Avar Khanate
and confederated communities
of Highland Daghestan

Bashly

6

Kaitag

Anaklia

Kingdom of Imeretia

Kutaisi

Mtiuls

Kbevsurs

Tushins

Akusha-Dargo

Poti

Tskhinvali

Ananuri

Shorapani

Gori

Dusheti

Telavi

5

Derbent

Principality of Guria

R.Kura

Kingdom of Kakhetia

Tabasaran

Batum

Gonio

Kingdom of Kartlia

Tiflis (Tbilisi)

Djar-Belokan Avar
Communities

Sighnaghi

Kiura

R.Samur

Mushkur

Niazabad

Akhaltsikh

Georgia

3

R.Alazani

Sultanate of Ilisu

7

Samsun

Borchalo

Shirak Steppe

Shabran

Ardahan

2

3

Karayaz Steppe

Kazakh

Shéki

Areas of Shirvan Province under Lezgin control
(Ottoman protectorate 1723-1736)

Trebizond (Trabzon)

Ottoman Empire

Shuragel

2

Persian territories annexed by Ottoman Empire 1723-1736

Ganja

Shamakhi

Agadash

Shirvan Province

Kars

Chukhur-Saad (Erivan) Province

L. Gokcha (Sevan)

Karabakh (Ganja) Province

Gulistan

Barda

Baku

Jraberd

Zardob

Echmiadzin

R.Arax

Erivan

Armenia

Khachen

R.Kura

Javad

Demarcation line
between the Russian and Ottoman Empires
as agreed under the 1724 Treaty of Constantinople
(disputes persisted south of the Kura River)

Varand

Mughan Steppe

Norashen

Persia (Safavid Empire)

Salian

Bayazit

Maku

Dizak

R.Arax

Nakhichevan

Caucasian Provinces reconquered for Persia
by Nader Shah Afshar in 1736

Kaphan

Julfa

Ordubad

Azerbaijan (Tabriz) Province
(Ottoman occupation 1723-1730)

Khoy

Lenkoran

L. Van

a b
c

Russian Empire in 1722-1739, including:
(a) territory under stable control; (b) areas under less stable control, mostly inhabited by nomadic peoples; (c) territories of Kalmyk Khanate

Cossack defensive lines on the Terek (beginning 1711) and Agrakhan (1723-1735) Rivers

Areas of disputed sovereignty between the Russian and Ottoman Empires

Ottoman Empire in 1722-1739
States and territories under Ottoman suzerainty

Persia (under the collapsing Safavid Dynasty) in 1722-1736, including:

Area ceded to Russia under the 1723 Treaty of St. Petersburg and returned to Persia
under the 1732 Treaty of Rasht (south of the Kura) and the 1735 Treaty of Ganja (north of the Kura)

Area annexed by the Ottoman Empire in 1722–1725 and retaken by Persia in 1730-1736

a b
Georgian states under
(a) Ottoman and (b) Persian suzerainty

Armenian melikdoms of Karabakh

The border of the Ottoman Empire and Persia in 1639-1722, restored under Nader Shah (1736-1747)

Numerical Key:
1. Taman district (sanjak) of the Ottoman Kaffa Province (Eyalet); 2-3. Areas of the Safavid Provinces (Beilerbeiliks) of Karabakh and Shirvan, incorporated into Kartlia and Kakhetia Kingdoms, beginning 1737; 4. Khanate of Mekhtuli; 5. Khanate of Kazi-Kumukh; 6. Kaba-Dargo and other Dargin communities of Kaitag; 7. Lezgin communities of the Samur Valley

1722-1739: The Imperial Rivalry over the Caucasus Borderlands

3

1763-1785: The Caucasus around the Time of the Russian Conquests

Sea of Azov
Black Sea
Caspian Sea
Russian Empire
Don Cossack Host
Kalmyk Khanate (abolished in 1771 after the exodus of the majority of Kalmyks to Dzungaria)
Kalmyks
Tatars
Nogai (until 1784)
Nogai
Circassians
Abaza
Ottoman Empire
Armenia
Georgia
Azerbaijan
Persia
Gulf of Kizlyar
Agrakhan Peninsula
Terek Cossacks
Ossetian Communities
Chechen Communities
Mountain Tatar Communities
Djar-Belokan Avar Communities
Daghestan
Shirvan

Khanate of Crimea
(Ottoman satellite state in 1772, nominally independent 1772-1783, annexed by Russia 1783)

Part of Azov Province in 1775-1783
Part of Yekaterinoslav Viceroyalty beginning 1783
Part of Taurida Province [Tavricheskaya Oblast] beginning 1784
Astrakhan Province [Astrakhanskaya Gubernia] became Caucasus Viceroyalty [Kavkazskoye Namestnichestvo] 1785, with division into Astrakhan and Caucasus Provinces

Azov-Kuban Communication Line 1778
Kuban Defensive Line 1778, temp. abandoned 1779
Azov-Mozdok Defensive Line 1777-1778
Kizlyar-Mozdok Defensive Line 1763
Border between Astrakhan and Caucasus Provinces in 1785

Taganrog District
Stavropol District
Aleksandrov District
Yekaterinograd District
Georgievsk District
Mozdok District
Kizlyar District

Principalities of Greater Kabarda
Principalities of Lesser Kabarda
Principality of Abkhazia
Principality of Megrelia
Principality of Guria
Kingdom of Imeretia
Kingdom of Kartli-Kakhetia (Russian protectorate beginning 1783)
Avar Khanate and confederated communities of Highland Daghestan
Khanate of Derbent
Khanate of Quba
Khanate of Sheki
Khanate of Ganja
Khanate of Erivan
Khanate of Karabakh
Khanate of Shamakhi
Khanate of Baku
Khanate of Javad
Khanate of Nakhichevan
Khanate of Maku
Khanate of Karadagh
Talysh Khanate
Shamkhalate (Principality) of Tarki
Sultanate of Salian
Sultanate of Elisu
Sultanate of Kazakh
Sultanate of Shamshadil

Yeyskoye
Achu
Kerch
Yenikale
Temryuk
Yeni-Kopyl
Taman
Blagoveshchenskaya
Aleksandrovskaya
Pavlovskaya
Mariinskaya (1778-1779)
Anapa
Sujuk-Kale
Gelenjik
Tsaritsynskaya (1778-1779)
Prochny Okop (founded 1784)
Pregradny Stan (1784)
Agoi
Vardane
Ardkuaje (Ardiler)
Pitsunda
Sukhum-Kale
Ilori
Samurzakan (disputed between Abkhazia and Megrelia)
Anaklia
Poti
Batum
Samsun
Trebizond (Trabzon)
Ardahan
Kars
Bayazit
L. Van
Akhaltsikh
Atskhur
Kutaisi
Shorapani
Tskhinvali
Gori
Ananuri
Dusheti
Telavi
Tiflis (Tbilisi)
Sighnaghi
Karaklis
Pambak
Borchalo
Shuragel
Echmiadzin
Erivan
L. Gokcha (Sevan)
Maku
Norashen
Nakhichevan
Julfa
Ordubad
Megri
Gerusy
Dizak
Khachen
Shusha
Varand
Jraberd
Gulistan
Barda
Zardob
Agdash
New Shamakhi (Aksu)
Shamakhi
Baku
Javad
Rudbar
Salian
Lenkoran
Kutkashen
Samukh
Sheki
Quba
Niazabad
Kaitag
Derbent
Tabasaran
Kiura
Bashly
Jengutai
Targhu (Tarki)
Akusha-Dargo
Ruins of Sviatoy Krest Fortress
Kostek
Aksai
Enderi
Braguny
Naur
Kizlyar
Chechen I.
Ruins of Terki or Tersky Gorodok
Cherny Rynok
Astrakhan
Krasny Yar
Ruins of Majar
Severnaya
Aleksandrovskaya
Andreevskaya
Georgievskaya
Mariinskaya
Pavlovskaya
Konstantinogorskaya(1780)
Yekaterinograd
Mozdok
Grigoripolis
Vladikavkaz founded 1784, temp. abandoned 1786
Area disputed between Russia and Kabarda 1763-1779
Donskaya
Moskovskaya
Stavropolskaya
Pregradny
Vsesviatsky
Area claimed by Djar-Belokan
Russo-Ottoman War 1768-1774

R. Manych
R. Yeya
R. Yegorlyk
R. Kalaus
R. Kuban
R. Laba
R. Malka
R. Tomuzlov
R. Kuma
R. Terek
R. Sunzha
R. Sulak
R. Volga
R. Ingur
R. Rioni
R. Alazani
R. Kura
R. Arax
R. Samur
L. Bolshoy Liman

0 50 100 km
approximate coastline of Caspian Sea at the end of 18th century

Russian Empire in 1774, including:
Territories claimed under Russian suzerainty (still mostly not under stable Russian control)
Neutral lands between the Russian and Ottoman Empires (as agreed under the Treaty of Belgrade, 1739), claimed by the Crimean Khanate until 1772, ceded to Russia under the 1772 Treaty between Russia and Crimea, and under the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji, 1774, between the Russian and Ottoman Empires
Ottoman Empire
States and territories under Ottoman suzerainty (including the Crimean Khanate until 1772)
Territories annexed by Russia in 1783
States and territories within Persia's nominal borders, including:
Khanate of Quba and dependent territories by 1785
Armenian melikdoms of Karabakh
Kingdom of Kartli-Kakhetia and dependent territories, mid- 1770s
The border of the Ottoman Empire and Safavi Persia until 1722, restored under Nader Shah (1736-1747), the limits of Persian claims of suzerainty under Agha Muhammad Khan Qajar (beginning 1779)
Yekaterinograd — Center of Russian Caucasus Viceroyalty (beginning 1785)
Provincial and district boundaries as of 1785

Numerical Key:
1. Kerch and Yenikale (Russian territory beginning 1774); 2. Yekaterininskaya fortress;
3. Novotroitskaya fortress; 4. Principality of Svanetia; 5. Free Svan communities; 6. Dadiani-ruled Svanetia;
7. Ingush (Galgai) communities; 8. Khanate of Kazi-Kumukh (Ghazi-Qumuq); 9. Khanate of Mekhtuli;
10. Lezgin communities of Samur Valley

eastern Daghestan, mostly Avar-speaking) and the expansion of territory under their political domination, where the fluid "ethnic border" overlaid the former political boundaries of Kakhetia and essentially superseded them. At the same time the Turkic sultanates and Armenian melikdoms (lands ruled by a melik, a title in the Armenian nobility) of Artsakh were politically absorbed into Kartlia and the Karabakh Khanate, respectively, but continued to pose a potential challenge for supremacy in their regions.

While ethnic and political borders may have been interdependent, they did not, as a rule, coincide. The Adyghe tribes south of the Kuban River were a far cry from Circassia as a political entity, just as Chechen and Ossetian communities were not the same as the integrated political units later called Chechnya and Ossetia. What we have on the map at this point are mere clusters of territorial groups that share a culture or language and could potentially crystallize into intrinsically connected ethnopolities ("peoples") shaped by common interests. Within these societies alternative strategies for dealing with the outside world arose and developed, along with a set of goals and unifying (ethnic, religious, and social) identities to go with them.

The longstanding effect of the interdependence between different types of borders can be seen as the eighteenth century progressed, when the hierarchical order (political dependency, vassalage, subjecthood) was challenged and emergent ethnic polities claimed a status higher up the hierarchy: these entities began to reshape the whole panorama and history of political borders.

FORMS OF ASSOCIATION WITH THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE

The various ways in which territories and populations were absorbed into the empire—ranging from symbolic patronage and episodic protection to the introduction of law-enforcement institutions and military administration—make the structure of the Caucasian region even more complex. The Russian imperial frontier gradually acquired at least two clearly distinguished layers: the Kizlyar-Mozdok and Azov-Mozdok Defensive Lines, with a clear partitioning of imperial territory into fortresses, fortifications, and Cossack settlements; and the lands of mountain peoples beyond these imperial territories that, while partially under Russian protection or internationally recognized as belonging to Russia, were far from being genuinely under Russian control. Acquiring the status of a state or community "under Russian protection" or even being granted citizenship was not the same as becoming a part of Russia. Only sustained military and administrative control over territories and populations beyond defensive lines and the extension of Russia's political borders to fully encompass such territories would make them a part of Russia proper.

From this perspective, none of the lands occupied by mountain populations (*gortsy*, literally, "highlanders") qualified as a part of the Russian Empire until its military advance in the nineteenth century. These were territories and peoples of the "outer" Russian borders (*zalineinye zemli* and *zalineinye gortsy*, "beyond-the-line lands" and "mountain populations"), and they were at this point under a degree of control that was variable, unreliable, or yet to be determined. The Treaty of Georgievsk and, somewhat later, the advancing of the empire's outer boundaries beyond the Caucasus Mountains (1801) required that a greater degree of control be established over mountain territories, first and foremost in the central portion of the region along the shortest line between the inner border that ran along the Terek River and newly acquired Georgia (which became a species of Russian exclave beyond the Greater Caucasus highlander tier). Imperial control over this area of the Caucasus became increasingly urgent as the frequency of cross-border raids on Russia by highlanders became more common.

By the middle of the eighteenth century another key feature of the Russian border running through the North Caucasus was changing. The empire was fighting to overcome broad zones of uncertainty on its southern frontier, to shrink the zones under threat of highlander raids and Cossack outlaws, and to install lines of organized control at the border and in adjacent areas. This strategic objective gave rise to a new system of relations, no longer between empires (Russia and Persia or Russia and the Porte) but between Russia and the peoples of the Caucasus.

LOCAL DETAIL

Crimea's nominal independence after 1772 came with a struggle between pro-Ottoman and pro-Russian factions within the House of Giray. Khan Shahin Giray, whom Russia had helped install, ruled over the Kuban—the eastern portion of the khanate, the southern border of which was beginning to be fortified by Russian troops (removed after 1779 in accordance with the Treaty of Aynalıkavak between Russia and the Porte, which reaffirmed Crimea's integrity and independence). The weakness of the pro-Russian party in the Crimea and the risk that the territory would return to Ottoman control prompted Catherine II (the Great) to annex the khanate. After the 1783 manifesto proclaiming the annexation, the Russian government renewed construction of the Kuban line of fortifications along what was now the Russian border. This joined Russian territory with Circassian lands in the western Caucasus south of the Kuban.

Around 1785 an Islamic religious, political, and military movement proclaiming itself a "holy war" against Russia began to spread through Chechnya under the leadership of Ushurma, a man from the village of Aldy. The spread of support for Sheikh Mansur (as he came to be known) into neighboring mountain regions compelled the Russian authorities to dismantle their fortifications along the Mozdok-Vladikavkaz-Tiflis road and essentially retract the Russian border to the Terek in the central and eastern Caucasus.

In 1785, as part of an overall program of imperial reforms, Catherine II established the Viceroyalty of the Caucasus, which quickly brought all Russia's recent Caucasian acquisitions—from the Sea of Azov to the Caspian Sea and from Astrakhan to the Terek—under one administrative umbrella.

SOURCES

Maps: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52, 53, 152.

References: *Akty, sobrannye Kavkazskoi arkheograficheskoi komissiei*, vol. 1; Degoev, "Bor'ba za gospodstvo v Zakavkaz'e"; *Dokumenty po vzaimootnosheniiam Gruzii s Severnym Kavkazom*; Dubrovin, *Istoriia voiny i vladychestva*, vol. 2; *Istoricheskii ocherk Kavkazskikh voin; Istoriia narodov Severnogo Kavkaza s drevneishikh vremen*, chap. 16; *Kabardino-russkie otnosheniia*; Mal'bakhov, *Kabarda na etapakh politicheskoi istorii*; *Russko-dagestanskie otnosheniia*; *Severnyi Kavkaz v sostave Rossiiskoi imperii*.

Map 4

1774–1783: Ethnolinguistic Map of the Greater Caucasus

Map 4 depicts the ethnolinguistic composition of the Greater Caucasus around the time the Caucasus first began to be incorporated into Russia. This is the point at which Russian researchers, scouts, and military administrators first came onto the scene. The task of determining the cultural and ethnopolitical structure of this area located directly across Russia's inner border still lay ahead, but it was important for them to investigate the territory not only for its natural features and resources but for the human landscape as well, which presented its own quagmires and impassable terrain, easily traveled lowlands, and strategic mountain crossings. And even as this landscape was being investigated, it was also, with the passage of time, increasingly being shaped by these energetic observers as they became active organizers of the regions they described. The security of the Russian border against the Caucasus looming over it and the empire's acquisition of Transcaucasian provinces would gradually demand that more comprehensive military and administrative control be exercised over the region.

By the mid-eighteenth century the Kuban Nogai Horde as well as Kabarda, coreligionist Georgia, and the Tarki Shamkhalate (a khanate ruled by a shamkhal, the title of Daghestani Tarki khans) had all become objects of Russian interest and attention. Peter the Great's campaign to Persia and the western Caspian coast (1722–1723) had begun to influence Russian thinking about the political and tribal composition of Caspian Daghestan, Shirvan, and Talysh. There was only a vague sense of Christian Armenia, somewhere deep in Turkish and Persian territory, but the Armenians who came to Kizlyar from Transcaucasia would become a familiar sight along the Russian border with the Caucasus. Moving the border forward from Kizlyar to Mozdok would bring Russian observers into closer contact with new groups of Caucasian mountain dwellers, people who seemed to be emerging from behind the former rulers of the lowlands—Kumyks and Kabardins. Different highlander communities, known to Russians since the sixteenth century as Okokis, Michiks, Shubuts, and Kachkalyks, gradually began to be perceived and categorized as one people, the Chechens, who would become the main neighbors on the other side of the Cossack defensive line along the Terek. The Iassy were rediscovered (now under the name of Ossetians) presiding over strategic mountain crossings into Georgia.

Between 1740 and 1770 the Russian administration in Astrakhan, Kizlyar, and, later, Mozdok received appeals from various mountain populations and lowland feudal rulers for Russian protection or even to become Russian subjects. These appeals were prompted by heightened internal antagonisms in the region. Rivalries among local princes in Kabarda and Daghestan were accompanied by growing tensions between lowland feudal and highland communities. Feudal overlords needed imperial support to assert their claimed suzerainty over highlanders settling the plains (where this suzerainty appeared to be in decline). As for highlander commoners, they either tried to resist these claims and their imperial backers or sought imperial support in overcoming the obstacles these overlords posed to their efforts to settle the plains.

Internal contradictions were taking shape in the region, associated in particular with social and demographic shifts in highland communities and Kabarda's post-1739 status as "independent" (in fact, it acted as a neutral buffer territory between Russia and the Porte). The Treaty of Belgrade had left Kabarda less vulnerable, for the time being, to the exigencies of the Russo-Ottoman struggle and safer from incursions by Crimeans, Kuban Tatars (Nogai) and Kalmyk nomads. This new geopolitical status freed Kabardin princes to continue their attempts to establish rule over highland communities. However, neither episodic efforts by Kabardin principalities to work together to take advantage of foreign policy opportunities nor their claims to the vassalage of the mountain communities of the Central Caucasus could qualify Kabarda as a "feudal empire" or even a confederation with allied mountain communities. By the 1750s some highland communities had already established enough offshoots in the plains to resist the princes' forces and those of their Russian patron. This was the case in the successful move onto the plains by Chechens formerly controlled by Kumyk and Kabardin princes. But where the balance of power somewhat differed, some highland communities south of Kabarda, including Ossetian and Ingush, actively sought imperial overlordship in their struggle for lowland territory.

The variety of scenarios that played out as Russia was gradually drawn into the region shows that it was not only Russia's own geopolitical rivalry with the Porte that shaped its early integration into the region but also the antagonisms and struggles between local polities situated along the Russian Terek boundary. In addition to the forces drawing Russia into the North Caucasus, local hotbeds of groups eager to push Russia out were developing that would endanger the imperial border with the Caucasus and act as a counterforce to Russian expansion. Just how complex the region was in terms of political landscape, tribal composition, and internal tensions was becoming increasingly evident. The region could be roughly broken down into three large areas:

The North Caucasian Steppe: Identified as Ciscaucasia (Fore-Caucasus) within the Russian Empire because it divided the region into the near and far side of the Caucasus mountains, it extended from the Sea of Azov to the Caspian Sea. To the north—above a line that followed the Kuban and Tomuzlov Rivers or, according to some interpretations, passed through Pyatigorye (Beshtau, in northwest Kabarda) and then extended along the Terek River—was an area controlled by various arrays of Turkic-speaking Nogai nomads and, in parts, Kalmyks. To the south of this line various Adyghe and Kumyk feudal entities dominated. Kabardin Adyghe princes laid claim to grazing lands that extended to the Tomuzlov River and Naur (as the middle reaches of the Terek were called). Along the eastern edge of Ciscaucasia the Terek flows through coastal lowlands that were populated or used by Kumyks and adjoined Daghestan's narrow lowland coast, then extending to the Derbent area, which had been settled by other Turkic groups.

4



Ethnic group (ethnolinguistic category)

Ethnonyms that are outdated, that are no longer used, or whose meanings have changed are given in brackets; variants are given in parentheses; modern generalized and/or dominant autoethnonyms are shown in red

1a | b △ — 2 — (a) Settled and (b) nomadic Nogai [Tatar] and Turkmen [Trukhmen] groups
Kalmyk (Oirat, Kalmuck) (Halmg)

Circassian or Cherkess:

3 △ — > Adyghe, including Shegak (Hegak), Zhanei (Bzhana), Natukhai (Natkuaj), Hatukai, Bzhedug, Shapsug (with Hakuch), Makhosh, Abadzekh (with Tubi), Mamkheg, Temirgoi or Chemgui (with Adamei and Yegerukai), Beslenei, Kabardei (Kabardin)

4 — > Ubykh

> Abkhaz-Abaza:

5 — Abaza (Abazin), including Tapanta [Altykesek, Baskhag]: Lou, Bibard, Dudaryqwa, Klych, Kiach, Jantemyr, and Ashqarywa (Ashkarua): Bashilbai, Bagh, Kyzylbek, Barakai, Chagrai, Tam

6 — Abkhaz (Apsua), including local groups of Bzyp, Guma, Abzhua (Abzhywa), Dal, Tsabal, Samurzakan, Sadz [Jiget] and Medovei: Tswyji, Ahchipsy, Aibga, and Pskhu

7 — Karachai and Balkar (Taulu, Malkar) [Bassian, Mountain Tatar], including local groups of Urusbi, Chegem, Holam, Bezengi, Balkar

8 — Ossetian (Ossete): Digor and Iron, including local groups of Alagir, Kurtat, Tagaur, Tual, Urs-Tual, Tyrsygom, Kudar, Dzau, Chysan, Gud, Jerakh

Chechen [Kisty, Okoki, Mychkiz]:

9 — > Ingush [Kisty], including local groups of Galgai, Galashi, Tsori, Jerakhoi, Metskhal, Fappi, Nazran

10 — > Chechen (Nokhchi) [Michik, Shubut, Kisty], including local groups of Shatoi, Maisti, Sharoi, Chaberloi, Ichkeri, Michik, Kachkalyk, Aukh

11 — > Karabulak (Orstkhoi), Akki, Nashkhoi, Myalkhi, Terloi, Aukh, Galashi
> Batsbi

12 — Russian (Russkie), Cossacks (Kazaki), including the Terek (Greben and Nizovye) Cossacks, Don (including Volga and Nekrasovite) Cossacks, and Khoper Cossacks

13 — Kumyk (Kumuk), including groups of Enderi, Kostek, Aksai, Shura, Tarki, and Kaitag

[Taulin]:

14 — > Avar (Maarulal), including local groups of Khunzakh, Salatau, Gumbet, Koisubu, Andalal, Kuyada, Karakh, Gidatl, Tleiserukh, Jurmut, Antsukh, Ankratl and Djar-Belokan or Zakatala

15 — > Andi: Andi (Qwannab), Akhvakh, Bagulal, Botlikh, Godoberi, Karata, Tindi, Chamalal

16 — > Dido: Dido (Tsez), Bezhta, Khvarshi, Hinukh, Hunzib

17 — Dargin (Dargwa), including local groups of Akusha, Tsudakhar, Sirgha, Gubden, Urakhi, Mekege, Muira, Kaitag, Kubachi, Chirag

18 — Lak [Ghazi-Qumuq or Kazi-Kumukh]

Lezgin (Lezgi) [Leki]:

19 — > Tsakhur (Tsakhby), Rutul (Mukhadar), Archi (Arshishtib)

20 — > Tabasaran

21 — > Agul

22 — > Lezgin [Leki, Kiurin], including local groups of Kiura, Akhty-Para, Dokuz-Para, Quba (Kuba)

23 — > Udin, Budug (Budad), Kryz (including Jek and Gaputli)

24 — > Khinalug (Ketsh)

25 — Tat, including Pars, Daghli, Lakhij (Lohijon)

26 ✡ ✡ — Georgian Jewish (Ebraeli) and Mountain Jewish (Juhur)

27 △ — Azerbaijani / Turkic speaking groups [Tatars] of Shirvan, Kuba (Quba), Derbent, Karabakh, and other areas in the Caucasus and northwestern Persia (Azerbaijan): Ayrum, Karapapakh (including Terekeme), Padar, Shahseven, and other groups

28 — Armenian (Hai), including Cherkeso-Hai of Circassia

Georgian (Kartveli), including:

29 | 30 — > Megrel (Mingrelian), Svan, and Laz (Chan, not shown in the map)

31 ▽ — > Georgian of Kartlia, Imeretia, Racha, Khevi, Khevsuretia, Pshavetia, Tushetia, Kakhetia, Mtiuletia, Saingilo and (not shown in the map) Guria, Ajaria, Meskhetia

32 — Territory with a mixed population or where one population has replaced another

33 — Russian Cossack and peasant colonization during construction of the Azov-Mozdok Defensive Line

→ The direction of local migration

Circassian — names in color indicate language
Kabardei — names in black indicate land, area, community, tribe

Sparsely populated or uninhabited areas

1774-1783: Ethnolinguistic Map of the Greater Caucasus

The Greater Caucasus: A massive range of forest-covered high-elevation mountains that extended from Anapa almost to the Absheron Peninsula, the Greater Caucasus was home to successive centers of compactly settled, linguistically diverse mountain groups—Adyghe, Abaza, Turkic, Ossetian, Ingush, Chechen, Daghestani and some Kartvelian groups on the northern slope and Adyghe, Abaza-Abkhaz, Kartvelian, Ossetian, and Daghestani groups on the southern slope. The boundaries of communities settled in the mountains of the Greater Caucasus were rendered much more stable and clearly defined by the topography than was the case in the nomadic North Caucasian steppe (where the concept of boundaries between populations had little relevance). In the early eighteenth century the relationship between the plains (of the North Caucasus) and highland communities was usually characterized by various forms of dependence of the latter on the former. The economic basis for this dependence was the control exercised by Kabardin and Kumyk feudal entities over winter grazing lands in the Ciscaucasian lowlands (an important resource for the mountain communities' livestock industry). But as early as the first half of the eighteenth century sociodemographic and technological factors (not least of which was the spread of firearms) were emerging that permitted mountain communities to challenge this system of domination.

Transcaucasia (Land beyond the Caucasus): A term reflecting a Russian geographical perception and the north-south progression of imperial expansion, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries "Transcaucasia" denoted all the territories added to Russia south of the Great Caucasus range, with some variations over time. (Imperial terminology placed Daghestan, for example, within Transcaucasia. Only in the Soviet period did it begin to be considered a part of the North Caucasus.) This area south of the Greater Caucasus mountains offers a more diverse medley of landscapes—low-lying plains to the west and the east joined by broad valleys and steppes that divide the Greater Caucasus from the uplands and valleys of the Lesser Caucasus. Transcaucasia could be provisionally divided into several zones in terms of its dominant ethnic components: an Abkhaz area in the northwest corner adjoining a homogenous Kartvelian population, which in the central and eastern portion came under increasing pressure from Daghestani mountain dwellers and Turkic-speaking semi-nomadic groups. The lowlands and steppes of eastern Transcaucasia were a field of Turkic semi-nomadic dominance with Iranic speaking (Tat and Talysh, the latter not shown on this map) segments. The Lesser Caucasus is itself a complex mosaic of Turkic tribes and Armenian communities.

Probably no map would be capable of reflecting the full complexity of the cultural mosaic that is the Caucasus at any given stage in its history, to say nothing of representing the range of potential criteria that could be used in classifying groups and identities. Map 4 shows the approximate geographic distribution of ethnic groups, or rather ethnolinguistic categories, across the Greater Caucasus circa 1774–1783. The colored shading is based on a contemporary classification of language families. Any approach to mapping such a complex linguistic landscape has its drawbacks and elements of arbitrariness. While color coding can convey something about the geography of linguistic categories, it does not always represent what we might expect it to represent: communities formed through common cultural identity and social networks that supersede differences of estate (*soslovie*) and cross political and tribal boundaries. In other words, a particular shading might be used to designate "groups" whose members did not share an awareness of their "unity" (the unity suggested by the color-coding system) or who lacked institutions that promote cohesion beyond estate and local interests.

Admittedly, such categories and the borders that delineate them are most useful when based on actual shared characteristics—cultural, linguistic, and religious unity, as well as uniformity of governmental administration or economic life. Such attributes are preconditions or factors that increase the probability that a particular category will crystallize into a group that sees itself as a community. Its members find or imagine themselves to be part of a unified whole and begin to conceive their political or life strategies based on the idea that their cultural unity and political cohesion are of common interest, if not objective facts.

The colored fields in this map do not yet identify ethnic groups and ethnolinguistic categories as unified historical actors or ethnopolitical entities. By 1774–1783, Circassia, or even Kabarda—to say nothing of Chechnya-Ingushetia—did not exist as integral ethnopolitical entities with the capacity to execute a coherent domestic or foreign policy. Equally, Kabarda was not a part of the Circassian political entity, as suggested by many authentic historical maps and sources, which usually mixed polities and historical provinces (J. A. Gueldenstaedt symptomatically named both Kadardas "districts of Circassia"; see under Gil'denshtedt in the List of Sources).

Areas in darker violet on this map merely indicate Adyghe languages and the dispersal of Adyghe-speaking peoples (communities), not Circassia in the sense of a Circassian state. Colors from the red spectrum indicate Indo-European languages and point to communities of speakers of this language family. Monotone peach color does not indicate, for example, the existence of a politically united Ossetia, although by this time Ossetian communities were already coordinating their efforts to gain Russian protection. Nor are these shades of red intended to suggest any particular bonds among Indo-European speakers or between these communities and the Cossack Slav wave that was already moving westward along the Terek and Russia's fortified border.

Shades of yellow on the map do not represent Azerbaijan but only a portion of the area to which Turkic languages had spread. Azerbaijan by the end of the eighteenth century was an emerging cultural entity that was still divided into states and by tribal and religious affiliations. The shared culture and language of Turkic tribal groups in eastern Transcaucasia or northwestern Persia, as well as the existence of Turkic political elites in former Persian provinces and khanates, were factors increasing the probability that an Azerbaijani people would someday emerge as a Turkic-speaking ethnopolitical community capable of overcoming tribal differences and absorbing a number of local Iranic- and Caucasian-speaking groups.

Although in the eighteenth century Georgia did not yet constitute a unified state or even a unified ethnopolitical community, there was nevertheless a well-developed institutional and cultural foundation for the construction of the Georgian nation within its greater boundaries (which encompassed first Imeretians and Gurians and, later, the Megrels, the Svans, and, during the Soviet era, the Ajarians). By the late eighteenth century, Russian sources could already categorize some provinces within these wider boundaries (excluding Abkhazia) as Georgian. However, during this period there was no integral Georgian polity beyond its Kartli-Kakhetia core, which did not include Megrelia or even Georgian-speaking Imeretia or Guria (all color-coded in shades of blue), to say nothing of Abkhazia. The Georgia of modern identity and territory would be a political project realized much later, within the confines of the Russian Empire. For its part, late-eighteenth-century Armenia remained

an indistinct line of widely scattered communities within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkic khanates of northwestern Persia, although these populations were given a good deal of cohesion by their national church.

The nascent groups and solidarities, borders and conflicts in the Caucasus wound up being historically integrated first into the rivalry between religiously defined empires and later into the processes by which imperial order was established in the region by victorious Russia. The dynamic of group solidarities and administrative and ethnic boundaries in the Caucasus was becoming functionally linked to the empire's organization of the region and to the strategies it applied in assimilating and controlling them. "Natural" as well as enforced shifts within areas settled or used by various ethnic groups would continue during the new imperial period, but now they would be accompanied by and functionally tied to the Russian state's military and administrative maneuvers and the Russian colonization of the Caucasus.

SHIFTING ETHNIC BOUNDARIES, 1750–1780s

The boundaries of the Shapsug and Abadzekh tribal areas expanded into Bzhedug and Temirgoi lowlands in the north. This tribal shift was just the outer manifestation of ongoing social dynamics—the growth of highland communities and their pressure on lowland groups, which were themselves roiled by conflict between feudal rulers and peasants. Shapsugs and Abadzekhs were not only Circassian peoples but also ethnic categories for highland communities that had been classified in Russian ethnographic tradition as "democratic tribes," as opposed to the "aristocratic tribes" of the Bzhedug and Temirgoi (both also Circassian but ruled by princes). In the near future the intervention of Cossacks on the side of Bzhedug princes at the Battle of Bziuk (1796) would ensnare Russia in what had been an internal highlander conflict, triggering a long period of highlander raids on the emergent Russian Kuban boundary.

In 1783 the Nogai were moved out of the plains on the right bank of the Kuban River. Around the same time the Nekrasovite Cossacks (who had settled the lower Kuban in the early eighteenth century) left the Caucasian Black Sea coast and moved toward the still Ottoman-controlled Balkans to remain beyond the reach of Russian tsars.

The northern districts of Inner Kartlia continued to be settled by Ossetians from the Kudar, Java (Dzau), and Dval (Tual) highland communities.

A portion of Ossetian and Ingush communities remained nominally dependent on the princes of Lesser Kabarda, but with the protection afforded by direct Russian patronage they became entirely independent of them.

Kumyk feudal areas north of the Kachkalyk ridge were gradually settled by Chechens, who also became more firmly entrenched throughout most of Lesser Kabarda between the Sunzha and Terek Rivers.

Greater Kabarda expanded to encompass a portion of territories settled by Tapanta Abazas (also known as Altykeseks—literally, "six clans") and tried to maintain influence over Mountain Tatars (Balkars) and Ossetian Digors.

LOCAL DETAIL ON TOPOGRAPHY, POLITICAL BOUNDARY, AND IDENTITY

Even today, in the early twenty-first century, there is no generally recognized identificational line between the Abkhaz and the Abazas, who speak dialects of a common language. What has served to distinguish them for more than two hundred years has been either the political border of the Principality of Abkhazia (Abkhaz-Abaza communities outside its borders were known as Abaza) or the Greater Caucasus mountain range (with Abazas to the north and Abkhaz, including groups living outside the Principality of Abkhazia, namely Sadz and Medovei, to the south).

Over time, one way in which ethnicity has been constructed in the Caucasus is through the transformation of politonyms into ethnonyms. This transformation took a variety of forms: (a) transfer, as in the case of the Abkhaz politonym described in the previous paragraph, which led to the adoption of "Abkhaz" as an ethnonym, thus creating an internal dividing line separating what had once been a single people into two—the Abkhaz and the Abazas; (b) absorption, which occurred in cases where politonyms disappeared, along with their associated polities, as when Imeretians, Gurians, and others were reintegrated into the Georgian ethnic category as "subgroups"; (c) specification, as was the case with Lezgin and Taulu, the political categories used by lowlanders living either to the south or to the north of the Daghestan mountains to describe neighboring Daghestani highlanders. Under the Russian Empire these accepted categories began gradually to be displaced by names based on ethnolinguistic criteria, and many of these politically inspired ethnonyms did not endure. Only Lezgi-speaking groups in southeast Daghestan would retain the ethnonym Lezgin. The Avar ethnonym in northwest Daghestan would gradually replace the exogenous Taulin category (literally, "highlander"), thus shifting emphasis away from place (or the differentiation of highland versus lowland) to polity and finally to language. It is also possible that the category of Circassians was regularly used in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as a politonym covering not only the Adyghe peoples but also the Abazas and sometimes all North Caucasus highlanders, to distinguish them from "Tatars," who wandered the steppe. But when "Tatar-speaking" highlanders were eventually "discovered" by Russians, along with other non-Adyghe communities, the category of Circassians began to be exclusively adhered to its ethnolinguistic Adyghe "core group."

ETHNICITY, GROUPS, AND CATEGORIES

The attribution (including self-attribution) of ethnicity is taken here both as a kind of interpretative activity, a type of shared categorization of cultural differences by social actors (often linguistic differences but sometimes also marked by religion, status, polity, and even occupation), and as the meaningful result of this activity—historically sustained identity frames. While generally omitting analysis of the former, the "ethnic maps" in the atlas will unavoidably reify the latter, at least in the form of color-coded fields suggesting groups.

Ethnicity appears through changing patterns of categorization by a variety of social actors and within a variety of practices. In the Caucasus of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries these competing interpretative activities were gradually engraved in official nomenclature (as *narodnosti* [peoples] and later *natsionalnosti* [nationalities]) by an influential subset of these actors from among the imperial authorities and local ethnicized elites. But ethnicity as a type of categorization arises long before the social practices that produce it began to be reshuffled and institutionalized along imperial lines, and well before authoritative blueprints for classification began helping

to transform local groups of highlanders into "ethnic groups." The empire may have had a hand in shaping identity in the Caucasus—dividing and uniting groups, creating and abolishing ethnic categories—but imperial efforts relied on dotted or solid lines defining ethnic identity that had been sketched or clearly drawn long before Russians arrived on the scene. The term *ethnic groups* is used here to denote the results of this multilevel interpretative activity in the form of widely accepted identity patterns. *Ethnic categories* will be used more broadly (including in cases of nominal groups lacking a shared ethnic identity where no sufficient data on their self-identification are available). *Ethnolinguistic* categorizations are based on language data. *Ethnic boundaries* are understood here in spatial terms—as territorial limits within which an ethnic group or category is perceived to be a predominating majority.

SOURCES

Maps: 6, 7, 8, 174, 176.

References: Anchabadze and Volkova, *Etnicheskaia istoriia Severnogo Kavkaza XVI–XIX veka*; Bronevskii, *Noveishie geograficheskie i istoricheskie izvestiia o Kavkaze*; Gil'denshtedt [Gueldenstaedt], *Puteshestvie po Kavkazu v 1770–1773 gg*; Velikaia, *Kazaki Vostochnogo Predkavkaz'ia*; Blaramberg, *Kavkazskaia rukopis'*; Dubrovin, *Istoriia voiny i vladychestva,* vol. 1; *Istoriia narodov Severnogo Kavkaza s drevneishikh vremen*, chap. 14; *Kabardino-russkie otnosheniia*; *Territoriia i rasselenie*; Kuz'minov, "Etnodemograficheskaia karta narodov Tereka"; *Narody Dagestana*, 2002; Volkova, *Etnicheskii sostav naseleniia*.

Map 5

1791–1801: The Caucasus Defensive Line from Kizlyar to Taman

Map 6

1801–1829: Russia's Acquisition of Transcaucasia and the War in the Greater Caucasus

I have provisionally placed the first stage of Russia's conquest of the Caucasus between the Treaties of Kuchuk Kainarji (1774) and Jassy (J; 1791) and the Treaties of Turkmenchai (T; 1828) and Adrianople (A; 1829), which granted Russia international recognition of significant territorial acquisitions in the region. By 1830 the military and political conquest of Transcaucasia by Russia was complete. During this same period an imamate (Islamic state) was established in the North Caucasus that would soon come under the leadership of Shamil, an Avar *uzden* (free commoner) from the village of Gimry in Daghestan. This marked the beginning of the era of organized military resistance to Russia by a significant portion of the mountain communities of Daghestan, Chechnya, and Circassia that came to be known as the Caucasus War.

Maps 5 and 6 reflect the process of Russia's territorial acquisition between 1791 and 1829. In the central Caucasus, the building of the Azov-Mozdok Defensive Line (1777–1778) was accompanied by an escalation in conflict with Kabarda (1765–1779) and the loss of a portion of Kabardin grazing lands along the Kuma and Malka Rivers. To the west, the extension of the empire to the Kuban River (1783) brought all of Ciscaucasia from the Caspian Sea to the Sea of Azov within Russia's borders. Caucasus Province (Kavkazskaya Oblast) was established here as an administrative region of Russia, comprising, along with Astrakhan Province (Astrakhanskaya Gubernia), the territory of the Caucasus Viceroyalty and thus administratively joining the Lower Volga with newly Russian Ciscaucasia. In 1792, almost a decade after the Nogai Horde was expelled from Kuban, the western portion of the province was turned over to the Black Sea Cossack Host, comprised of former Zaporozhian Cossacks, to be settled and administered.

In Transcaucasia the destructive campaigns of Agha Muhammad Khan Qajar, who was attempting to return the provinces to Persia, promoted a heightened interest in acquiring Russian protection and even in becoming Russian subjects among local elites. Furthermore, after the incorporation of the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakhetia as the Province of Georgia (Gruzinskaya Gubernia, 1801), a combination of armed force and diplomatic maneuvering brought the Turkic khanates of northwest Persia (1804–1813) and the kingdom and principalities of western Georgia and Abkhazia (1804–1810) under Russian control.

By 1813, when the Treaty of Gulistan (G) drew a new Russo-Persian imperial border through the cluster of Turkic khanates and along their boundaries, Russia possessed most of Transcaucasia and was achieving international recognition of its conquests. However, communication between the empire's two Caucasian territories—the areas north and south of the Greater Caucasus mountain range—remained extremely vulnerable. The Georgian Military Road (Mozdok-Tiflis) stretched through mountain territories that were only precariously controlled by Russia.

The completion of a solid defensive line (from Taman [Fanagoria] to Kizlyar) between 1791 and 1801 divided imperial territory in the North Caucasus from mountain populations that had varying degrees of dependency on or independence from Russia. Wherever mountain communities came into contact with the Russian military border, a complex network of relationships developed that included, on one hand, the germinal stages of government of local populations living beyond the line and the expansion of economic ties and, on the other, the increasingly familiar practice of exchanging armed raids. Raids on the defensive line and Russian settlements by parties of highlanders were followed by Russian reprisals, retaliatory raids that, based on the principle of collective guilt, often struck entire mountain communities.

The traditional practice of raiding existed in the Caucasus long before the Russian Empire expanded into the region. The institution of valiant horsemanship was not only a way of life for local aristocrats; it was a means of establishing the social hierarchy. Raids were also important for egalitarian free (independent and self-governed) highland communities, both in economic terms (revenue from captives and pillaged livestock was a marked feature of the economy of the Greater Caucasus) and in determining personal and clan status.

But in addition to creating new targets and thus new economic incentives for raiding, Russia's expansion and retaliatory response to raids changed the ritualistic and economic nature of this highlander social institution. It evolved from a routine, seasonal element of the highlander way of life into a political institution with completely different motivations in which economic or status considerations now played a less prominent role. The raid was increasingly seen by mountain leaders as part of the fight against an infidel who threatened not only the pasturelands in North Caucasus lowlands but the very way of life and freedom of highlanders.

Dating back to the years of Sheikh Mansur's fomenting of rebellion (in the eyes of the imperial administrators) among mountain dwellers (1785–1791), this confrontation influenced the way a significant portion of mountain populations perceived the tsarist empire, a perception that took on a corresponding religious expression (the growing strength of Islam and a belief in *ghazawat*, or holy war). Mansur's insurgency also heralded a decisive shift in the main thrust of armed opposition from the insurrection of Kabardin principalities to the free mountain communities of Chechnya, Daghestan, and western Circassia. A portion of Kabardin rulers who rejected Russian suzerainty withdrew (along with their subjects) beyond the Kuban after the insurgencies of 1804 and 1809. (Called Khazhrety, this group of

1791-1801: The Caucasus Defensive Line from Kizlyar to Taman

0 50 100 km

Russian Empire

Don Host Territory [Zemlya Voiska Donskogo]

Territory of Black Sea Cossacks [Zemlya Voiska Chernomorskogo] beginning 1792

Black Sea Cossacks settle the Kuban area, 1793

to Caucasus Viceroyalty 1790-1796
to Novorossiisk Province 1796-1802

Taurida Province 1784-1796
Novorossiisk Province 1796-1802

Black Sea (former Zaporozhian) Cossacks settle the Kuban area, 1792

Don Cossack settlement 1794

Astrakhan Province [Astrakhanskaya Gubernia]
Caucasus Viceroyalty [Kavkazskoye Namestnichestvo] 1785-1796, with division into Astrakhan and Caucasus Provinces 1785-1790, Caucasus Province abolished 1790 and later restored 1803

Stavropol District

Aleksandrov District

Georgievsk District

Mozdok District

Kizlyar District

Black Sea Defensive Line 1793

Kuban Defensive Line 1792

Azov-Mozdok Defensive Line 1777-1778

Kizlyar-Mozdok Defensive Line 1763

Russo-Ottoman War 1787-1791

Kalmyks

Tatars

Nogai

Circassia

Abaza

Pyatigorye

Kabarda

Ingush

Chechnya

Ossetia

Svanetia

Principality of Abkhazia

Principality of Megrelia

Kingdom of Imeretia

Principality of Guria

Kingdom of Kartli-Kakhetia (to Russia 1801)
Georgian Province [Gruzinskaya Gubernia] est. 1801

Akhaltsikh Province (Pashalik)

Ottoman Empire

Armenia

Kurdish tribes

Persia

Khanate of Erivan

Khanate of Karabakh

Khanate of Ganja

Khanate of Sheki

Khanate of Quba

Khanate of Shirvan

Khanate of Baku

Khanate of Derbent

Kazi-Kumukh Khanate

Avar Khanate

Shamkhalate of Tarki
(under Russian suzerainty beginning 1793)

Talysh Khanate

Agha Muhammad Khan Qajar Campaign of 1795

Zubov Campaign of 1796

Sea of Azov

Black Sea

Caspian Sea

Gulf of Kizlyar

Mughan Steppe

Shahsevens

Russian Empire in 1801, including: (a) Kingdom of Kartli-Kakhetia and Shamkhalate of Tarki; (b) Territories claimed under Russian suzerainty (still mostly not under Russian control)
Area of highlander raids (in Lower Kuban beginning 1796)

Ottoman Empire, including:
States under Ottoman suzerainty
De facto independent Kingdom of Imeretia, Principalities of Megrelia, Guria, and Svanetia
Territories under nominal Ottoman suzerainty

Persia (Qajar State), including:
States and territories under nominal Persian suzerainty (by 1801)

Russian-Ottoman nominal border along Kuban River as agreed under the Treaty of Jassy, 1791
Russian-Ottoman border in Georgia beginning 1801
Russian defensive lines (main and auxiliary) with selected key forts as of 1801
Provincial and district boundaries as of 1801
Georgian Military Road (Mozdok-Tiflis)
Cossack stanitsas (or kurens in Black Sea Host territory)

Kabardins settled along the Zelenchuk and Urup Rivers within the nominal boundaries of the Ottoman Empire.)

The conflict that had been building since at least 1763–1765 along the entire military border reached a new level in 1817–1818. The Russian authorities' application of the "Yermolov tactic," which involved the systematic takeover of mountain regions through the creation of new defensive lines, led to the first significant engagements of the Caucasus War.

- In 1817–1818, General Aleksei Yermolov, commander-in-chief of the Russian forces in the Caucasus, moved the military border from the Terek to the Sunzha. Securing the chain of Russian settlements on the Terek and the only communication line between Russia and Georgia, the shift entailed the displacement of Chechens from the lands between these two rivers. Signaling the proudly intimidating imperial order, Groznaya (Terrible) Fortress was built on the Sunzha. A new line stretching from Vladikavkaz to Groznaya was extended to the east (where Vnezapnaya [Sudden] Fortress was built) and all the way to the Caspian Sea (Burnaya [Stormy] Fortress), promising to cut the upland zone off from the Kumyk plain. In a famous address to his men, Yermolov described his strategy thus: "The Caucasus is a giant fortress defended by half a million. We have to either storm or entrench it. Storming it will be costly, and so, to siege!" (*Kavkazskaya voina*, vol. 11).
- In 1818–1820 the Kabardin were expelled from Pyatigorye (between the Kuma and Malka Rivers) and an area that was referred to as the "dry border" since it connected two river segments of the border along the Caucasus Defensive Line (the Kuban and the Malka-Terek). New fortifications were put in place here. Thus the whole independent stretch of the Greater Caucasus was divided in two—Circassia south of the Kuban and Chechnya-Daghestan.
- In 1822 a new line of fortifications was put in place north of the mountains across Kabarda, connecting Pyatigorye with Vladikavkaz Fortress, a key point in the machinery dedicated to subduing the Caucasus. Beginning in 1825 the imperial authorities strengthened the military border along the Kuban and Malka Rivers, as well as the dry border segment, relocating the stanitsas (Cossack settlements) of the Khopersky and Volgsky Regiments from the Azov-Mozdok line.

These shifts formed a broad wedge of rather solid military control in the central portion of the region and provided a link between the empire and its territories in Transcaucasia. They also afforded greater security for the Cossack settlements on the old defensive line along the Terek and former Azov-Mozdok line. Ossetians and Ingush highland communities, protected by and mostly loyal to the empire, expanded into sections of this foothill wedge.

The first stage of Russian colonization of the Caucasus was a period of military and diplomatic absorption of a local ethnopolitical agglomeration and the beginning of the empire's effort to create an administrative order capable of integrating it. The ethnic complexity of the region, the diversity of local polities and forms of their incorporation into the empire, resulted in a diversity of forms of initial imperial administration throughout the Caucasus.

In its initial drawing of administrative bodies and boundaries in Transcaucasia, the empire generally maintained continuity and retained pre-imperial borders, gradually transforming the authorities within them. The khanates, kingdoms, and sultanates of Transcaucasia were replaced with Russian units of government—gubernias, oblasts, and provintsias headed by Russian commandants. Incorporated territories were organized around local elites loyal to the empire, and some feudal domains were even allowed to continue as such for decades after they were incorporated into the empire (the Tarki Shamkhalate, the Principalities of Abkhazia and Megrelia). The degree of loyalty demonstrated by local elites and populations determined how quickly principalities, khanates, and other entities were abolished in Transcaucasia and their territories fully integrated into the empire.

Some highland communities that lacked a clear social hierarchy, and a corresponding political chain of authority, proved more troublesome. The broad gaps that still existed in the early 1830s within the field of imperial control in the Caucasus generally coincided with the boundaries of "democratic" tribal groups and the free mountain communities of Circassia, Chechnya, and Daghestan.

Russia's advance into the Caucasus, which brought it into contact with local allies and enemies, initially relied on a selective approach and the granting of protection to certain political and tribal elites and the communities they represented. Ties of protection, allegiance, and vassalage increasingly ensnared the empire in internal struggles among various Caucasian political entities, feudal associations, and tribal populations. The two main criteria used to guide imperial decision making when it came to the various actors in the overall Caucasian political process were ideological (religious affinity) and pragmatic (the military and political loyalty of these actors) considerations. How tsarist administrators approached particular areas and groups, therefore, was determined not just by the ideology of Orthodox sovereign patronage, but by pragmatism in securing imperial control over the region. These were also the considerations underlying strategies for fortifying borders and key areas and, among other goals, for altering their ethnic composition. Initially, Cossacks, loyal highlanders, groups returning to Orthodoxy (some highlanders had converted to the Orthodox church in the past but either they had abandoned it or its role in their communities had been diminished), and Georgian and Armenian migrants from Transcaucasia were brought in to settle localities within the Kizlyar-Mozdok Defensive Line. At the same time, the ground was being laid for the wholesale expulsion of some peoples (the Nogai from Kuban lands east of the Sea of Azov) or the gradual edging out of hostile tribes through the installation of a chain of fortifications and Cossack settlements (the Yermolov tactic of 1817–1826). It should be noted, however, that territorial ethnic engineering existed in the region long before Russia began to practice it there. Both the Porte and Persia had been using such political and migrational strategies for a long time. Population control as a means of territorial domination is a longstanding imperial tactic. Tribal and religious balance could be preserved or, in some cases, altered, through a variety of measures, from extermination and exile to forced Islamization, Turkicization, or organized resettlement (as in the case of Shiites being moved into southern Daghestan by Persian rulers).

In 1828–1829, as a result of further military victories over Persia and the Ottoman Empire, Russia advanced its outer boundaries to the Ararat plain and "Turkish Georgia" (Akhaltsikh Pashalik). An Armenian province (Armianskaya Oblast) was formed on the territory of the abolished Khanates of Erivan and Nakhichevan (Naxcivan), and Meskheti-Javakhetia was made Akhaltsikh Province (Akhaltsikhskaya Provintsia). Russian military victories led a portion of the Muslim population to emigrate from the region and Armenians from Persia and the Ottoman Empire to take their places. Local Georgians and Armenians actively promoted the incorporation of Transcaucasia into Russia, integrating their elite into Russia's military and economy

6

1801-1829: Russia's Acquisition of Transcaucasia and the War in the Greater Caucasus

0 50 100 km

Territorial Acquisitions by Russia in 1801-1829

Russian territory under stable control in 1801

a
b
c
d
e

Territories acquired by Russia in 1783-1813 and recognized as Russian under the treaties of Jassy (1791), Bucharest (1812), Gulistan (1813)

Succession of the actual control established is as follows:
a. by the end of 1801; b. 1803-1813; c. 1817-1822; d. and e. no certain date of establishment of control until 1825-1829

(1783) J — Year of de facto acquisition of lands given in parentheses followed by first letter of the treaty that formalized Russian suzerainty

Territories not yet under Russian control in 1829

T — Territories acquired under the Turkmenchai Treaty in 1828

A — Territories acquired under the Adrianople Treaty in 1829, including part of the Black Sea Coast (still mostly not under Russian control)

Russian-Ottoman nominal border along Kuban River until 1828

Border of the Russian Empire by late 1829

a. Yermolov's shift of the Caucasus Line forts into Kabarda and Chechnya;
b. Relocation of stanitsas from the Azov-Mozdok Line to the Kuban and Malka Rivers

Georgian Military Road (the old road from Mozdok and the new road from Yekaterinograd, 1825)

and lending important social support to the Russian state in the region. A majority of Turkic Muslims in the former khanates of northwestern Persia also proved to be loyal to the empire.

The lack of such reliable support from the "democratic tribes" of Circassia south of the Kuban Defensive Line and the free communities of Chechnya and Daghestan, as well as the crisis or disintegration of such support in some Daghestani khanates, brought the task of "subduing unruly mountain tribes" to the forefront of Russian expansion. By the end of the 1820s what existed in the region was not simply a mosaic of communities, tribal groups, and feudal lands but a developing state of mountain populations united by an ideology that was radically hostile to Russia.

IMPERIAL ADMINISTRATIVE TERMINOLOGY

The nomenclature used within the Russian Empire for the various administrative entities—namestnichestvo (viceroyalty), oblast, gubernia (both of which are translated here as "province"), and so on—generally reflects differences in the size and character of governed territories, the makeup of their population, and governmental objectives. The names of administrative entities also express essential aspects of the empire's Caucasus policy. Catherine II chose to designate the portion of Ciscaucasia under imperial control "Caucasus Province" (Kavkazskaya Gubernia), demonstrating not only her intention of advancing into Caucasus proper but her confidence that this sparsely populated territory would be fully integrated into the empire (a "gubernia" was distinguished from an "oblast" by a significant civilian population). The choice of term reflected the process by which the Caucasus was incorporated into Russia. It is also interesting to note that, starting with the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakhetia, Russia used the term "Georgia" (Gruzia) to designate all its gradually expanding Transcaucasian territory. During the first third of the nineteenth century, "Georgia" was synonymous in Russian administrative nomenclature with the later term "Transcaucasia" (Zakavkazye) and designated all Russian acquisitions from Abkhazia to the Muslim provinces. Furthermore, the Russian governor of Georgia, who was also the commander-in-chief of the Georgia Corps (renamed the Caucasus Corps in 1820), was responsible for the territory populated by North Caucasian mountain peoples as well as for the Caucasus Line that had been put into place as a barrier along the southern periphery of Caucasus Province. By the end of the 1820s the Caucasus line, or Caucasus Defensive Line (Kavkazskaya Kordonnaya Liniia), consisted of fortifications and stanitsas along the northern bank of the Kuban, Malka, and Terek Rivers, thus marking the southern boundary of the province.

SOURCES

Maps: 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57.

References: *Akty, sobrannye Kavkazskoi arkheograficheskoi komissiei*, vols. 1–6; Begeulov, *Tsentral'nyi Kavkaz v 17–pervoi chetverti 19-go veka*; Butkov, *Materialy dlia novoi istorii Kavkaza*; Dubrovin, *Istoriia voiny i vladychestva*, vols. 2–6; Esadze, *Istoricheskaia zapiska*, vol. 1; Evetskii, *Statisticheskoe opisanie Zakavkazskogo kraia*; *Istoriia narodov Severnogo Kavkaza (konets XVIII v.–1917 g.)*, chap. 1; *Kavkazskaya voina*, vol. 11; Mal'bakhov, *Kabarda na etapakh politicheskoi istorii*; Mustafaev, *Severnye khanstva Azerbaidzhana i Rossiia*; Tarkhov, "Osnovnye tendentsii izmeneniia administrativno-territorial'nogo deleniia Rossii za 300 let"; *Utverzhdenie russkogo vladychestva na Kavkaze*.

Map 7

1829–1839: Administrative Makeup of the Early Russian Caucasus

Map 8

1840–1849: Escalation of the Caucasus War and (Re-)Establishment of the Viceroyalty

Maps 7 and 8 reflect changes in the administrative composition of the Caucasus against a backdrop of continuing war and the emergence of the imamate, the Islamic state that united a significant portion of Daghestan and Chechnya in their confrontation with the Russian Empire. In 1834 the imamate was taken over by Shamil of Gimry, the fourth imam, who continued enforcing sharia among mountain populations and managed to create an effective military and political machine that hindered Russian expansion for a quarter-century. However, the imamate was never more than an enclave of mountain resistance whose potential to export murid revolution (a social and political movement led by Sufis) was blocked on all sides by the defensive lines and buffer zones of firm imperial control. Despite some major military successes and efforts to organize coordinated action among Circassians beyond the Kuban River and raids on Derbent and Temir-Khan-Shura or into Kabarda, Shamil did not manage to expand the imamate through the entire mountain region. The military operations of the imamate in the east and of the Cherkess (a Turkish ethnic designation for all Adyghe, or Circassians, a term that was used widely among Russians in the eighteenth century) south of the Kuban in the west did, nevertheless, significantly influence how Russia deployed its defensive (or rather defensive-offensive) lines. The war also forced the imperial authorities to revise the system of government overall and contributed to the restoration of the viceroyalty in the Caucasus.

In 1832 the imperial authorities reorganized the Cossack military force. All Cossack regiments from Ust-Labinskaya in the west to the mouth of the Terek River in the east were united into a single Caucasus Line Cossack Host (Kavkazskoe Lineinoe Kazachye Voisko, KLKV). The KLKV and the Black Sea Host together constituted the Caucasus Defensive Line comprising three divisions or flanks. The right flank (from the Russian perspective) confronted Circassia (in combination with a new line of fortifications along the Black Sea coastal border that Russia established in 1837–1839, a significant portion of which was destroyed by Circassians in February and March 1840). In the early 1840s the "New" Defensive Line along the Laba River (also called the Laba Defensive Line) was created—in essence, the old Kuban Defensive Line was moved forty to sixty versts (a verst is equivalent to 1.06 kilometers) deeper into Circassia. The left flank, along with the Lezgin Defensive Line, surrounded the imamate. The authority governing the center of the Caucasus line was responsible for Kabarda, which had finally been subdued in 1825, and the Vladikavkaz District (Vladikavkazsky Okrug), populated by generally loyal Ossetians and Ingush. In the center, military strategic control was strengthened by the construction of a new chain of stanitsas along the line where fortifications had stood, between Yekaterinogradskaya and Vladikavkaz (1837–1839), and later between Vladikavkaz and Groznaya (along the Sunzha Defensive Line, 1842–1847).

Expeditionary raids used against the highlanders relied increasingly on the Yermolov tactic that had been employed earlier, in 1817–1826, which involved confining the highlanders within a chain of fortifications and stanitsas. While previous chains of fortifications running through highland territories had not been continuous, forming only a broken line of military control, the establishment of stanitsas around the fortifications brought something new to the situation—a (militarized) Cossack population prepared to put down roots and support Russia's colonization of the North Caucasus.

The Yermolov approach to capturing the "Caucasus Fortress" (an approach that combined three elements—the advancement of fortified lines, the clearing of forests, and the building of roads) was revived in 1831–1838 by General Aleksei Veliaminov, Yermolov's chief of staff and later the commander of the Caucasus Line, although Veliaminov believed that the best way to subdue the Caucasus was not through forts but with Cossack stanitsas. His strategy was to gradually move into highlander territories, following up military control with colonization. Russian military successes would be consolidated by Russian settlers. Cossacks—warriors, pioneers, and peasants all rolled into one—were ideally suited to the task. Cossack settlers represented the key difference between the Yermolov-Veliaminov approach and that of General Ivan Paskevich, the commander-in-chief of the Caucasus Corps in 1827–1830, who attempted to finish the war by means of intensive short-term expeditionary raids.

As military actions were being conducted in the North Caucasus, in the late 1830s the imperial authorities were getting ready to introduce the first comprehensive, systematic reform, which brought administrative order to more stable but no less complex areas of Transcaucasia. This and subsequent reforms had one goal—to incorporate the Caucasus into the empire. However, they embraced two conflicting strategies to achieve this goal—"centralism" and "regionalism"—strategies that at times led a bizarre coexistence and at times supplanted each other, as the overall course of imperial policy in the Caucasus shifted back and forth between centralism and administrative unification on one hand and regionalism and decentralization on the other.

The primary difference between the two strategies concerned how to govern the empire's periphery, including the Caucasus. Centralism favored governing the region out of St. Petersburg through an imperial military authority put in place locally. Regionalism favored the creation of a special local administrative structure that would be directly subordinate to the emperor but would unify several territories and perform all the functions of government at the regional level. The administrative

1829-1839: Administrative Makeup of the Early Russian Caucasus

Numerical Key

1. Area of the first Russian settlements in Circassia (the Anapa stanitsas, established 1836-1844); 2. Territory under administration of the Commandant of Vladikavkaz Fortress; 3. Samurzakan; 4. Principality of Svanetia; 5. Free Svan communities; 6. Dadiani-ruled Svanetia; 7. Akhaltsikh Province; 8. Pristavstvos of Ossetia; 9. Mtiuletia [Gorskaya Distantsia]; 10. Pshavetia-Khevsuretia; 11. Tushetia; 12. Avar Khanate; 13. Khanate of Mekhtuli; 14. Akusha-Dargo; 15. Kara-Kaitag

0 50 100 km

Administrative Divisions in 1829-1839
(Territories under the administration of the commander-in-chief of the Russian military in the Caucasus)

I. Caucasus Province

- a Caucasus Province proper, including (a) lands of nomadic peoples
- b (b) territory of Caucasus Line Cossack Host [Kavkazskoe Lineinoe Kazachye Voisko, KLKV], est. 1832
- Black Sea Host Territory (incorporated into Caucasus Province beginning 1820)

II. Georgia [Gruzia], divided into 7 administrative units

- Georgian Province, including
  - Civil Administration of Georgia proper: Districts [uezds] of Tiflis, Gori (with Pristavstvos of Ossetia), Dushet (with Mtiuletia), Telav (with Tushetia and Pshavetia-Khevsuretia), and Sighnakh
  - Tatar Districts [Tatarskie Distantsii] of Kazakh, Shamshadil, Borchalo, Pambak, and Shuragel
  - Elisabethpol District [Yelisavetpolsky Okrug]
- Military District of Muslim Provinces [Musulmanskie Provintsii], including Karabakh, Sheki, Shirvan, and Talysh (beginning 1831)
- Daghestan Military District, including Derbent, Baku, and Kuba Provinces (with communities of Samur Valley); Tarki Shamkhalate; Mekhtuli, Kiura-Kazi-Kumukh and Avar Khanates; Kara-Kaitag and Tabasaran Possessions; communities of Akusha-Dargo
- Djar-Belokan Province [oblast] with former Ilisu Sultanate, communities of Dido, Kapucha, and Ankratl
- Administration of the Governor of Imeretia, including Provinces [oblasts] of Imeretia and Guria, Principalities of Megrelia (with Samurzakan) and Svanetia, Principality of Abkhazia, Pristavstvo of Tsebelda (est. 1837)
- Armenian Province [oblast]
- Akhaltsikh Province [provintsia]

Provincial centers
Border of Russian Empire
Georgian Military Road

III. Territories of Highlander Peoples

- Areas under military administration of defensive lines
- Areas not under stable control of Russian administration

Abkhazia and Tsebelda (under military administration of the Black Sea Coast Line, beginning 1838)

Province of Guria

Sea of Azov
Black Sea
Caspian Sea
Persia
Ottoman Empire
Kalmyks
Nogai
Circassia
Abadzekh
Natukhai
Shapsugh
Bzhedug
Temirgoi
Yegerukai
Ubykh
Abaza
Sadz
Pskhu
Baskhag
Beslenei
Tsebelda
Svanetia
Principality of Abkhazia
Principality of Megrelia
Imeretian Province
Province of Guria
Greater Kabarda
Lesser Kabarda
Karachai
Balkar
Urusbii
Chegem
Digoria
Ingush
Chechnya
Ossetia
Dagestan
Khanate of Kiura-Kazi-Kumukh
Avar Khanate
Mughan Steppe
Shahsevens
Caucasus Province [Kavkazskaya Oblast]
Astrakhan Province [Astrakhanskaya Gubernia]
Don Host Territory [Zemlya Voiska Donskogo]
Black Sea Host Territory [Zemlya Voiska Chernomorskogo]
Taurida Province [Tavricheskaya Gubernia]
Yekaterinoslav Province [Yekaterinoslavskaya Gubernia]
Yeysk District
Beisug District
Taman District
Yekaterinodar District
Stavropol District
Pyatigorsk District
Mozdok District
Kizlyar District
Elisabethpol District
Nakhichevan District
Erivan District
Shamshadil
Pambak
Shuragel
Kazakh
Borchalo
Karavayz Steppe
Mughan Steppe
Gulf of Kizlyar
Kumyk Possession [Vladenie Kumykskoe]
Tarki Shamkhalate [Shamkhalstvo Tarkovskoe]
Derbent Province [Derbentskaya Provintsia]
Baku Province [Bakinskaya Provintsia]
Kuba Province [Kubinskaya Provintsia]
Sheki Province [Shekinskaya Provintsia]
Shirvan Province [Shirvanskaya Provintsia]
Talysh Province [Talyshskaya Provintsia]
Karabakh Province [Karabakhskaya Provintsia]
Armenian Province [Armianskaya Oblast]
Georgian Province [Gruzinskaya Gubernia]
Daghestan Military District
Military District of Muslim Provinces
Djar-Belokan Province (est.1830)
Derbent
Baku
Tarki
Temir-Khan-Shura
Kizlyar
Astrakhan
Stavropol
Yekaterinodar
Tiflis
Batum
Kutais
Kerch
Anapa
Poti
Redut-Kale
Sukhum-Kale
Novorossiiskoe
Fort Lazarevsky
Fort Veliaminovsky
Fort Navaginsky
Sviatogo Dukha
Gagry
Bambory
Drandy
Anaklia
Zugdidi
Oni
Ozurgety
Akhaltsikh
Akhalkalaki
Ardahan
Kars
Gyumri (Alexandropol)
Bayazit
Erivan
Echmiadzin
Surmalu
Sadarak
Bash-Norashen
Nakhichevan
Ordubad
Megri
Lenkoran
Salyany
Shemakha
Sumgait
Agdash
Lagich
Nukha
Kuba
Nizovaya
Kusary
Tabasaran
Ulus Magal
Khunzakh
Gunib
Andi
Dargo
Vedeno
Gumbet
Dido
Kapucha
Ankratl
Zakataly
Signakh
Telav
Gori
Dushet
Tskhinval
Shorapan
Tsalka
Tsarskie Kolodtsy
Kakh
Jelal-Ogly
Karavan-Sarai
Shamkhor
Delijan
Elisabethpol
Yelenovka
Novy Bayazet
Basargechar
Barda
Kurdamir
Jevat
Shusha (center of the Military District of Muslim provinces)
Gerusy
Lagich
Chervlennaya
Naurskaya
Groznaya
Nalchik
Vladikavkaz
Lars
Stepantsminda
Kvesheti
Mozdok
Kislovodsk
Pyatigorsk
Georgievsk
Novo-Grigorievskoe
Aleksandrovskaya
Karabagly
Petrovskoe
Blagodarnoe
Cherny Rynok
Terekli-Mekteb
Khumarinskoe
Ust-Jeguta
Batalpashinskaya
Ersakon
Nevinnomysskaya
Armavir
Kalajinskoe
Zassovskoe
Dlinnoles
Ivano-Shebskoe
Gelenjik
Mikhailovskoe
Tenginskoe
Abin
Anapa
Taman
Kerch
Temryuk
Petrovsky
Kopyl
Timashevsky
Korenovsky
Ust-Labinskaya
Kavkazskaya
Novoaleksandrovskaya
Medvezhye
Peschanye Kopani
Yegorlykskaya
Kushchevsky
Yeysk
Umansky
Kanevsky
Pavlovsky
Akhtarsky
Kalnibolotsky
Chechen I.
Ucha I.
Laba Defensive Line (planned) 1839
Black Sea Coast Defensive Line 1837-1839
Cossack Line
Sunzha Defensive Line
Lezgin Defensive Line
Khanate of Kiura-Kazi-Kumukh
R. Kuban
R. Kuma
R. Terek
R. Kalaus
R. Yegorlyk
R. Yeya
R. Kura
R. Arax
R. Alazani
R. Samur
R. Sulak
R. Rion
R. Ingur
R. Urup
R. Malka
L. Manych
L. Gokcha (Sevan)
L. Van
Ottoman Empire
Persia

differences between the two models of government had vital and long-lasting consequences for how the empire integrated its periphery.

Centralism, as a strategy of compulsory integration, consisted of solidifying a single vertical line of authority and more forcefully assimilating objects of government (territories, groups) by, among other means, reducing and suppressing their diversity and autonomy. Imperial regionalism could at times be just as oppressive and violent as centralism, but in this strategy the diversity of territories and groups was seen as an asset; regionalists strove for a more comprehensive integration into the empire. This level of integration required those in power to possess a keen sense of local cultures and mores and to accommodate them in a way that consolidated their localism as an element of imperial governance. Centralism rested on the subordination and even elimination of local elites as representatives of autonomous interests (for example, by removing the local nobility or diminishing their influence). Regionalism, on the other hand, worked by building alliances with local leaders and focusing on interests common to both the empire and local communities.

These strategies were distinct forms of governance, but practice blurred them, and there was a certain oscillation between the two over time. Centralism and unification, inspired by an urge to incorporate the Caucasus more securely into the empire while ignoring its unique features, came with a clear undercurrent of discrimination against "native groups," a selective preference for the general (dominant, Russian) over the particular (native). This only intensified the sense of alienation Caucasians felt toward the empire and led to the development of anti-Russian attitudes and practices and, in the end, to a crisis in Russia's governance of the multi-ethnic region. Regionalism and decentralization could then be used to reduce tensions, legitimize cultural diversity, and keep Russia a country of collective possibilities (which also made it a country that allowed more freedom for collective competition), an outcome that was inconsistent with what those in power saw as the ultimate purpose of colonization—Russian political and cultural domination in peripheral ethnic regions. In the face of what they saw as a threat to the empire's unity, Russian strategists again resorted to centralism and unification as the only way to bolster the foundation on which the empire rested: autocracy and Russianness.

Territorial reorganizations were often simply the functional expression of periodic changes in overall administrative policy. The Polish uprising in 1830–1831 and its aftermath were directly linked to the shift toward a more centralist, unified approach in governing the empire's regions. The uprising demonstrated the vulnerability of Russia's position in its potentially autonomous (in terms of culture and history) peripheral provinces. Given this circumstance, it is not surprising that in the 1840s Russia initially inclined toward the centralist strategy in Transcaucasia. A series of local disturbances in the region also spurred administrative reforms there aimed at reinforcing both centralism and the unification of imperial government. In 1841 the commandant system (a system of government that was largely indirect) was abolished, the same sort of civil provincial administration that was being used in Russia proper was put in place in Transcaucasia, and Georgian and Islamic law (with a few exceptions) were no longer applied. Transcaucasia (minus Abkhazia, Megrelia, and Svanetia) was divided into two administrative units (nominally Christian and Muslim): Georgian-Imeretian Province and Caspian Province. Within the general framework of provincial government, a system of special administrative districts (okrugs) was preserved for highland peoples: the Ossetian, Mtiuletian (or Gorsky, the Russian adjectival form of "mountain," and a direct translation of the Georgian "Mtiuli"), and Tushin-Pshav-Khevsuretian (Tushetia-Pshavetia-Khevsuretia) districts. The military administration was kept in place to govern Djar-Belokan communities and the Ilisu sultanate, as well as the portion of southern Daghestan that fell within Shamil's zone of operation. Here a special Derbent Military District was established.

The administrative reforms implemented in Transcaucasia in the 1840s showed that as the empire brought order to the lands it had acquired, new factors began to emerge. The strategies that Russia had used when it was a foreign conquering power were not replaced but rather supplemented by the administrative apparatus of the central government in the routine management of its provinces. As it moved away from its former strategy of involving Russia in the region through alliances, patronage, and the military, the imperial authority began to find other administrative approaches that were familiar ways of organizing territories under firm control. Technically, this meant the formation of territorial entities commensurate in terms of area and population and with a uniform administrative structure: provinces (oblasts, gubernias) divided into districts (okrugs within oblasts and uezds within gubernias), which could then be further divided into smaller subunits (uchastoks).

Just four years later the centralist reforms of 1841 were substantially revised. The Caucasian viceroyalty was reestablished (sometimes called the Second Caucasian Viceroyalty) and became an effective compromise between centralism and regionalism. The viceroyalty functioned as the regional embodiment of a strong central authority with all its autocratic powers, but it was closer to the territories still remaining to be subjugated or already regularly administered, and therefore it needed to be more pragmatic and maneuverable. In 1846 a new administrative division of Transcaucasia was introduced. Current administrative units were broken into smaller pieces: Georgian-Imeretian Province was divided into the provinces (gubernias) of Kutais and Tiflis and then, in 1849, the latter was further subdivided, a portion of it becoming Erivan (Yerevan) Province. The disappearance of ethnonyms in the names given to new administrative units is revealing. The authorities were clearly aware of the symbolic significance involved in assigning names to areas and tried not to provoke illusions of autonomy, especially after the painful precedent in Poland. Caspian Province (Kaspiiskaya Oblast) was divided into the gubernias of Shemakha and Derbent (the latter, together with the Tarki Shamkhalate and the Khanate of Mekhtuli, was transformed into the Caspian Territory [Prikaspiisky Krai] in 1847).

It should be noted that at this point not a single provincial border in Transcaucasia corresponded to ethnic boundaries. While tribal categories (or ethnicity) were still a decisive factor in how governance was organized, clear ethnic boundaries did not really exist at the time the reforms were being implemented. Even then, interspersed ethnic enclaves of Turkic, Armenian, and to some extent Georgian populations, including within the borders of the former Kingdom of Kartli-Kakhetia, made it necessary for the empire to exercise caution in describing lands as "Armenian," "Georgian," or "Azerbaijani" (Turkic or Tatar). These adjectives represented the polity, not the ethnicity. Transcaucasia's special "Tatar distantsias" (administrative units between military commands), "highlander districts," and "Muslim provinces" were doomed to disappear from Russian imperial nomenclature. The lack of overlap between ethnic and administrative boundaries was also due in part to the fact that pre-imperial political borders (which were far from precise in di-

1840-1849: Escalation of the Caucasus War and (Re-)Establishment of the Viceroyalty

Numerical Key

Pristavstvos: 1. Kalaus-Jambulak; 2. Kuban Peoples; 3. Beslenei and Kuban Armenians; 4. Tokhtamysh; 5. Terek Chechens and Braguny 6. Khanate of Mekhtuli; 7. Akusha-Dargo; 8. Kara-Kaitag; 9. Derbent District [Derbentsky Uezd]; 10. Principality of Svanetia; 11. Racha District; 12. Ossetian District; 13. Mtiuletian District [Gorsky Okrug]; 14. District of Tushetia-Pshavetia-Khevsuretia

0 50 100 км

Administrative Divisions in 1840 and after the (Re-)Establishment of the Viceroyalty in 1844

- a / b — Caucasus Province (Stavropol Province beginning 1847), including (a) lands of nomadic peoples; (b) territory of Caucasus Line Cossack Host [Kavkazskoe Lineinoe Kazachye Voisko, KLKV]
- KLKV stanitsas found south of Caucasus Defensive Line by 1849
- Black Sea Host Territory

Military administration of defensive lines:

- Caucasus Defensive Line
- Black Sea Boundary Line (Bzhedug Land)
- Black Sea Coast Defensive Line (incliding Abkhazia)
- Central and Northern Daghestan (including Tarki Shamkhalate)
- Derbent Military District [okrug] and southern Daghestan
- Lezgin Defensive Line (including Belokan District)

- Georgian-Imeretian Province [Gruzino-Imeretinskaya Gubernia], est. 1840 and divided 1846
- Principalities of Megrelia and Svanetia
- Principality of Abkhazia, Pristavstvos of Tsebelda, Samurzakan, Jiget, and Pskhu (est. 1840)
- Caspian Province [Kaspiiskaya Oblast], est. 1840 and divided 1846

Administrative boundaries and names of provinces in the map post-date reforms of 1846-1849

- Border of Province
- Border of District
- Provincial centers as of 1849
- Tiflis — Center of the Caucasus Viceroyalty
- Military Georgian Road
- 1846 — The direction of the Imamate's and Circassian military activity
- Approximate border of Imamate
- Border of Russian Empire

viding up territory along ethnic lines) in intra-imperial administrative divisions had often been preserved. The empire had no reason to break a once "united" Georgia or would-be Azerbaijan into provinces. It just used—with its own calculations in mind, of course—a portion of the existing borders. The partitioning of relatively whole and homogeneous ethnic areas ("historical territories") into various administrative units was also nothing new. Such partitions, whether nominal or factual, already existed in many cases. However, the new imperial borders possessed a qualitatively different functional weight.

When Russia absorbed the Caucasus it abolished the former political borders in the region but retained most of them as internal administrative boundaries. These boundaries were subject to numerous adjustments, but none of these adjustments served to eliminate a certain ambiguity. Boundaries became sufficiently transparent to allow some divided or fragmented "ethnic lands" or feudal states to gradually integrate within Russia as "national" realms, even if they were spread across administrative boundaries. These very boundaries would continue to function as a stable but selectively applied frame of reference for competing local elites, who perceived themselves as either the heirs of absorbed states or the owners of "ethnic homelands." This ambiguity sowed the seeds for future border conflicts within the empire, which, having become the primary organizer of the Caucasus, was now the main target of frustrated local aspirations.

SOURCES

Maps: 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 36, 52, 53, 164.

References: *Akty, sobrannye Kavkazskoi arkheograficheskoi komissiei*, vols. 8–10; Bliev and Degoev, *Kavkazskaia voina*; Blieva, *Rossiiskii biurokraticheskii apparat i narody Tsentral'nogo Kavkaza; Dvizhenie gortsev Severnogo Kavkaza*; Esadze, *Istoricheskaia zapiska*, vol. 1; *Istoriia Dagestana*, sect. 4; *Istoriia narodov Severnogo Kavkaza (konets XVIII v.–1917 g.)*, chap. 4; Ivanenko, *Grazhdanskoe upravlenie Zakavkaz'em*; *Severnyi Kavkaz v sostave Rossiiskoi imperii*, chap. 5.

Map 9

1856–1859: Before the Final Storming of the "Caucasus Fortress"

Map 10

1860–1864: The End of the War and the Formation of Kuban, Terek, and Daghestan Provinces

The Crimean War of 1853–1856 against the Ottomans and their Anglo-French allies exposed the vulnerability of Russia, especially its Caucasian ports on the Black Sea coast. The allied occupation of Kerch—a major gateway to Anapa and Novorosiisk from the Russian mainland—in 1855 forced the Russian authorities to abandon these cities. They had already evacuated garrisons along the Black Sea Coast Defensive Line. Setbacks experienced during the war made it clear to Russian military strategists that the remaining gaps in imperial control in the Caucasus had to be eliminated.

The capture of Shamil, the leader of the imamate in Daghestan and Chechnya, in 1859 crowned Russia's military successes under Viceroy Aleksandr Bariatinsky and is seen as marking the end of the Caucasus War in the eastern part of the North Caucasus. However, even after the defeat of the imamate, sporadic actions against the imperial authorities continued there. Forced resettlement from the mountains to the lowlands remained one of the main methods used to control populations and territories that were not loyal to the empire. In Chechnya in 1859–1861 some auls (highland villages) were again forced to relocate, and new fortifications and Cossack settlements were put in place. In Circassia, as well, the strategy of advancing the line in this way was central during the final phases of the war and had dire consequences for highlanders there.

In fact, the strategy that Bariatinsky applied in 1856–1859 combined the approaches of earlier military leaders, Generals Aleksei Yermolov and Ivan Paskevich, by advancing lines of forts and stanitsas while conducting intensive incursions deep into highlander territories. In 1861–1864 General Nikolai Yevdokimov further refined this strategy during the final subjugation of Circassia.

Maps 9 and 10 reflect the development of Russian lines of fortification and the first postwar reform of the administrative structure of the North Caucasus. In 1860 the entire Caucasus Defensive Line was abolished, and Kuban, Terek, and Daghestan Provinces were established.

After the abolition of the Caucasus Line Cossack Host (KLKV), the territories it had occupied were divided between the newly established Kuban and Terek Cossack Hosts and their new "Host provinces" (Voiskovye oblasti; territories that were populated, governed, and defended by their respective Hosts), Kuban (which absorbed what had been Black Sea Host Province) and Terek. The creation of the Kuban Host, which also included the western portion of the former KLKV, greatly contributed to the formation of a new identity frame in the North Caucasus for vast numbers of Cossacks, some of whom had "Little Russian" (Ukrainian) roots, while others originated from "Great Russian" provinces (Velikorusskie oblasti). While certain cultural distinctions and even a degree of internal conflict between former Black Sea and "Line" Cossacks (*Chernomortsy* and *Lineitsy*) persisted, the Kuban Cossacks would become a unique instance where these distinctions gradually disappeared, and a new identity emerged among the Cossacks that evolved into a region-specific form of Russianness.

These new "military" provinces, which were established in 1860–1861, included not only Cossack territories but highlander territories that had been under the military governance of the former Caucasus Defensive Line. Kuban Province incorporated part of Circassian territories south of the Kuban (the Right Flank [*flang*] of the former Caucasus Line, which after 1856 had been called its Right Wing [*krylo*]). Terek Province encompassed the territory of the center and the Left Flank of the Caucasus Line as well as Vladikavkaz District (known as the Left Wing in 1856–1860). The third province established in 1860, Daghestan, was not made the home for some newly established Cossack Host but remained under direct military rule. This province incorporated the highlands of Daghestan and the northern portion of the Caspian Territory (the Derbent Military District, the Shamkhalate of Tarki, and the Khanate of Mekhtuli).

The border between Terek and Daghestan Provinces was originally drawn along the Sulak and Andi Koisu Rivers. A year later, in 1861, Avar and Andi-Tsez communities living along the left bank of these rivers (in Gumbet, Andi, Tekhnutsal, Chamalal, and Unkratl) were incorporated into Daghestan Province. The change was motivated by "ethnic" considerations; however, these considerations would have had little significance had they not been coupled with another factor: the historical, cultural, and economic connections between the Andi-Tsez and Avar communities in the Koisu Valley and communities in Daghestan, something the imperial administration could not ignore. It is clear that the ethnic (or "tribal," to use imperial terminology) criterion for the setting of administrative boundaries was not applied in isolation—Salatau (Avar Salatavia) was left in Terek Province along with Kumyk District, lying between the Terek and Sulak Rivers. The southern portion of what was the Caspian Territory—Kuba (Kubinsky) District—was incorporated into Shemakha (Shemakhinskaya, later Baku) Province. (The province was renamed when the administrative center was relocated to Baku after the Shemakha earthquake in 1859.) Districts with Lezgi-speaking populations thus wound up divided between two imperial administrative units. However, the 1860 border was not an invention of the empire; it corresponded to the old boundaries that once separated the Kuba Khanate from Kiura and the free communities of Samur Valley.

The borders of Terek Province were initially drawn along the borders of the former military districts of the Caucasus Defensive Line. In particular, Vladikavkaz District (formerly the

1856-1859: Before the Final Storming of the "Caucasus Fortress"

Numerical Key

[1-4] Pristavstvos: 1. Bzhedug; 2. Lower Kuban [Nizhne-Prikubanskoe]; 3. Kuban Nogai; 4. Tokhtamysh; 5-6. Argun and Ichkeri Districts (beginning 1859); 7. Mekhtuli Khanate; 8. Samurzakan Pristavstvo; 9-10. Principality of Svanetia (abolished 1859, territory combined with Free Svanetia as Pristavstvo of Svanetia); 11. Gorsky District; 12. Belokany District

0 50 100 km

Yekaterinoslav Province
Don Host Territory [Zemlya Voiska Donskogo]
Yeysk
Kushchevskaya
Starominskaya
Yegorlykskaya
Yeysk District
Umanskaya
R.Yeya
Sea of Azov
Akhtarsky
Kanevskaya
Pavlovskaya
Black Sea Host Territory (to Right Wing of the Caucasus Line 1856)
Peschanye Kopani
R.Yegorlyk
L. Manych
Greater Derbet Ulus
Kalmyks of Greater Derbet Ulus were under administration of Astrakhan Province until 1860
K a l m y k s
Astrakhan
Astrakhan Province [Astrakhanskaya Gubernia]
Taurida Province
Timashevskaya
Korenovskaya
Kerch
Temryuk
Taman District
Kopylskaya
Taman
Kavkazskaya
Novoaleksandrovskaya
Donskoe
Medvezhye
Pregradnoe
Stavropol District
Kalaus-Jambulak
Chemrek
R.Kalaus
Petrovskoe
Lesser Derbet Ulus (Turkmen Pristavstvo beginning 1858)
Ust-Labinskaya
R.Kuban
2
Yekaterinodar
R.Laba
Adagumskoe
Prochnookopskaya
Armavir
Stavropol
Stavropol Province [Stavropolskaya Gubernia]
Blagodarnoe
Anapa
Natukhai
Shapsug
Bzhedug
1
Right Wing
Temirgoi
Caucasus
Aleksandrovskaya
Karabagly
Kalaus-Sablya and Beshtau-Kuma
Pyatigorsk District
R.Kuma
Achikulak-Jambulak
Kara-Nogai - Yedishkul
Novorossiisk (abandoned in 1855 after Anglo-French naval attack, restored 1858)
Gelenjik
Maikopskoe
Labinskaya
Upornaya
Otradnaya
3
Besleney
Crimean War 1853-1856
Circassia
Abadzekh
Makhosh
Barakai
Shapsug
Ubykh
Chagraj
Boshilbai
Baskhag
Sadz
Pskhu
Peredovaya
4
Batalpashinskaya
Pyatigorsk
Georgievsk
Novo-Grigorievskoe
Cherny Rynok
Gulf of Kizlyar
Terekli-Mekteb
Kizlyar District
Kizlyar
Fort Aleksandrovsky
Black Sea Coast Defensive Line abandoned during the Crimean War in 1854
Line Cossack Host
Kislovodsk
to Left Wing 1859
R.Malka
Yekaterinogradskaya
Mozdok
R.Terek
Naurskaya
Chervlennaya
Kumyk District
Karachai
Nalchik
Kabardin District
Left Wing
Groznaya
R.Sulak
Chechen District
Shamkhalate of Tarki
Tsebelda
9
10
Ossetian Military District
Vladikavkaz
Salatau
Petrovsk
Temir-Khan-Shura
Black Sea
Caspian Sea
Sukhum-Kale
Principality of Abkhazia
Ottoman landing and offensive 1855
8
Principality of Megrelia
Racha District
Oni
to Left Wing 1859
5
6
R. Andi Koisu
Middle Daghestan incorporated into Caspian Territory 1859
7
Dargin District
Caspian Territory [Prikaspiisky Krai]
Derbent
Kutais Territory [Kutaisskoe General-Gubernatorstvo]
Zugdidi
Anaklia
Redut-Kale
R.Rioni
Kutais
Kveshety
Java
Tskhinval
11
Tionety District
Upper Daghestan
Kazi-Kumukh Khanate
District of Kaitag-Tabasaran
Poti
Shorapan
Gori District
Gori
Tionety
Dushet
Telav
Kvareli
Lagodekhi
Zakataly
Khanate of Kiura
Ozurgety
Batum
Mtskhet
Tiflis
Signakh
12
Lezgin Defensive Line
Akhaltsikh
Akhaltsikh District
Tsalka
Tiflis Province [Tiflisskaya Gubernia]
Tsarskie Kolodtsy
R.Alazani
Kakh
Samur District
R.Samur
Kuba
Samsun
Trabzon
Akhalkalaki
Bogdanovka
Shulavery
R.Kura
Akstafa
Nukha
Vartashen
Kutkashen
Divichi
Kuba District
Ardahan
Jelal-Ogly
Karaklis
Elisabethpol District
Karavan-Sarai
Delijan
Shamkhor
Elisabethpol
Lagich
Ottoman Empire
Kars
Alexandropol
Helenendorf
Agdash
Shemakha District
Shemakha
Caucasus theater of the Crimean War 1853-1856
Yelenovka
L. Gokcha (Sevan)
Barda
Kurdamir
Baku (center of province 1859)
Echmiadzin District
Novy Bayazet
Shemakha Province [Shemakhinskaya Gubernia]
R.Arax
Vagarshapat
Erivan
Basargechar
Surmalu
Erivan Province [Erivanskaya Gubernia]
Davalu
Shusha District
Agjabet
Jevat
Shusha
Bayazit
Bash-Norashen
Gerusy
Saliany
Maku
Nakhichevan District
Nakhichevan
R.Arax
Shahsevens
Ordubad District
Megri
Ordubad
Lenkoran District
Kurdish tribes
Persia
Khoy
Lenkoran
L. Van

Administrative Divisions in 1856-1859

- Stavropol Province, including (a) pristavstvos of nomadic peoples; (b) territory of the Caucasus Line Cossack Host [Kavkazskoe Lineinoe Kazachye Voisko, KLKV]
- Left Wing of the Caucasus Line [Levoe Krylo Kavkazskoi Linii], including (a) highlander territories; (b) KLKV territory; (c) part of the Left Wing beginning 1859
- Right Wing of the Caucasus Line [Pravoe Krylo Kavkazskoi Linii], including (a) highlander territories; (b) KLKV territory; (c) Black Sea Host Territory
- Circassian territory not under Russian military control (as of the end of 1857)
- Caspian Territory, including (a) territories of Derbent Province
- Tiflis Province
- Part of Daghestan temporarily administered by the command of the Lezgin Defensive Line in 1859
- Kutais Province [Kutaisskaya Gubernia]
- Principalities of Megrelia and Svanetia
- Principality of Abkhazia, Pristavstvos of Tsebelda and Samurzakan
- } Kutais Territory [Kutaisskoe General-Gubernatorstvo] established 1856
- Erivan Province
- Shemakha Province, renamed Baku Province in 1859

Ossetian Military District) encompassed not only a portion of Ossetian communities but also Lesser Kabarda and Ingush and Karabulak communities, as well as the lands of Cossack settlements in the Vladikavkaz plains and along the Sunzha. (Beginning in 1862 this "multi-tribal" district became divided along ethnic lines.) The Chechen, Ichkeri, and Shatoi districts incorporated the territory populated by Chechen communities of the former imamate.

Free highland communities of Daghestan and Chechnya were the social and territorial nucleus of the imamate, and Shamil was the first to create a unified state of these fragmented societies. To a certain extent, Russia inherited this institutional achievement. However, the internal administrative borders within Terek Province were in many ways an imperial innovation, something that was not the case in Transcaucasia and Daghestan. The occasional Russian practice of recruiting cadres that had served in the imamate's military administration and of adopting the same lines used as borders between the imamate's naibates (regions ruled over by Shamil's naibs, deputies) does not change the fact that in the final analysis, for the first time ever borders were emerging in the region that were firm enough to create a distinct territory within which the appropriate office or official could perform routine administrative procedures, apply laws, conduct censuses, and collect taxes or other forms of "tribute." Nonetheless, because of the relative newness of such borders, they remained somewhat changeable and subject to the shifting priorities of the empire's administrative policies.

It is significant that the ethnic boundaries within Terek Province in the early 1860s were also largely the result of imperial engineering. The geography of ethnic settlements there took shape as the result of military actions, forced relocation of native groups, the organized settlement of Cossacks, and, even earlier, the move of highland Ossetian and Ingush communities to former Kabardin lowlands (also largely sanctioned by the Russian authorities). Although within the clear-cut geographic boundaries surrounding Terek Province (the Malka and Terek Rivers and the Greater Caucasus mountain range) the empire found several types of borders that could have been used to bring institutional order, the ethnic boundaries provided the most plausible, socially grounded template for an administrative structure (the "ethnic/tribal principle" in the formation of administrative units was more clearly put in practice under the 1862 Statute on Governing Terek Province). In 1863–1864 the authorities implemented a plan to conduct land reform in the region, survey lands both within communities and demarcating various highland communities and ethnic groups, and formalize the legal boundaries of land use.

The concluding stage of the Caucasus War was Russia's large-scale military operations to gain control of the Black Sea coast and adjacent mountains—operations that resulted in the forced displacement of Circassians. Even earlier, in 1858–1861, significant groups of Nogai from south of the Kuban and Pyatigorye (the "dry border" area in the Kuma River basin) left for the Ottoman Empire, as did a portion of Adyghes and Abazas. But in 1862–1864 virtually all the Adyghe and Abaza communities were evicted from the highlands south of the Kuban and along the Black Sea coast. Rivalry between the Russian and Ottoman Empires played a key role in this Circassian catastrophe. Neither the memory of organized Circassian attacks along the Russian Empire's border, which in 1837–1839 had comprised a weak chain of coastal fortifications stretching from Anapa to Gagry, nor the experiences of the Crimean War were forgotten in Russia's geopolitical calculations. The expulsion of Circassians was a direct consequence of Russia's desire to strengthen its position along the imperial coastal border and, in so doing, to eliminate areas for potential foreign intervention into the Kuban-Pyatigorye area and the Russian Transcaucasian rear. The security of the imperial border was at stake in the Circassian dilemma: should the Circassians be resettled inside the empire (along the left bank of the Kuban River) or beyond its borders (beyond the Black Sea, in Turkey)? According to the best substantiated Russian estimates, 400,000–500,000 Circassians were forced to leave the Caucasus and resettle in Turkey; well-grounded Turkish official estimates give 595,000 "Circassians" in the Ottoman Empire in 1867 (Kushkhabiev, "Cherkesy v Sirii," p. 32, possibly including all North Caucasus muhajirs of different ethnic origin); some historians claim up to two million migrants, mostly Circassians, were expelled from the Caucasus over the course of the nineteenth century (Karpat, *Ottoman Population*, p. 69). A significant portion perished along the way. The remaining Circassian auls were concentrated in a narrow band along the left bank of the Kuban and Laba Rivers. In 1862–1864, even while military operations were still in progress, colonization was taking place to the south of this band, first by military Cossacks and later by civilians. At the same time, partial emigration by highlanders from other regions was beginning: for example, 23,000 Chechens and Karabulaks emigrated to Turkey in 1865, accompanied by a number of Ingush and Muslim Ossetians.

For the most part, 1864 marked the end of the century-long military phase of Russia's takeover of the Caucasus region. Starting with the Cossack footholds along the lower reaches of the Terek River and the Caspian coast, the Russian conquest consolidated the Caucasus into a unified whole, making it part of a huge empire. Russia's strategy for taking over the Caucasian inter-imperial buffer evolved to a large extent over the course of the conquests—from Peter the Great's Caspian-Persian ambitions to Catherine the Great's project of destroying the Ottoman Empire and replacing it with a Christian "Greek" Empire, centered in Constantinople but under Russian protection. The focus of geopolitical aspirations in the Caucasus—the central motive uniting the military and economic interests of the empire—shifted. Communication and the flow of goods via the Caspian (connecting the Volga and Persia) had to give way to the objective of controlling the area north of the mountains and creating a strong flank leading to the Azov "window" onto the Black Sea. The treaty making Georgia a protectorate of Russia opened up new strategic possibilities and temptations. The Russian "capital" in the Caucasus was shifted from the east to the center—from Kizlyar to Mozdok and beyond. The would-be capital Yekaterinograd (Catherineburg), as it was called in its early years, never fulfilled its mission as such, placed, in the tradition of Peter, at the outer reaches of Russia's expansion as a promise of future Russian victories. The separate bands of colonization at the beginning of the century—two successful (Ciscaucasia and Transcaucasia) and one problematic (the highlander-populated tier of the Greater Caucasus)—left the region with two capitals, each serving as the focal point for different areas and endeavors. The strategic advance guard in Russia's confrontation with the Ottomans was centered in Tiflis, the major city in Transcaucasia, while Georgievsk and later Stavropol remained the center of peasant colonization in Ciscaucasia. With the dawn of the nineteenth century, two new military and Cossack centers were consolidated, Yekaterinodar and Vladikavkaz (signifying in Russian "Catherine's gift" and "lord of the Caucasus," respectively), both at the forefront of what was by now an internal war. In the Caucasus War, Russia was trying to solve the problem of the mountain barrier, not as a barrier blocking the Russian advance toward the Muslim world, but as a barrier dividing two parts of the Russian Caucasus and posing dangers for both. In this same

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war the highlanders were trying to solve their Russia problem: the problem of statehood and order imposed from the outside. Here each tribal group or free community, sovereign clan or subservient estate encountered its own range of problems and forced solutions.

LOCAL DETAIL

By 1860 the authorities were expelling Ingush auls from the upper courses of the Kambileevka and Sunzha Rivers and the Assa Gorge, grouping them in large villages around Nazran. In 1859–1861, a number of Cossack settlements were established on the "vacated" territory: Sunzhenskaya, Feldmarshalskaya, Nesterovskaya, Kambileevskaya, Karabulakskaya, Galashevskaya, Alkunskaya, Dattykhskaya, Tarskaya, and Aki-Yurtovskaya. This is how the array of stanitsas protecting Vladikavkaz from the east came about, completing the Sunzha Defensive Line. It divided Ingushetia into two parts—highland and lowland—and separated Ossetia from Chechnya. With the passage of time it became one of the most conflict-ridden regions in the Caucasus.

Peasants rendered newly landless as a result of 1860s agrarian reforms added to the flow of migration to Caucasian lowlands, a current already being fed by the movement from mountain communities down to the lowlands. In particular, in 1863–1864 attempts were undertaken in Greater Kabarda to define land-use boundaries between Kabarda proper and neighboring Balkar and Karachai communities and to give these boundaries legal force. Enclaves of highland populations appeared on lands in the Kabardin plains that they rented or redeemed under the land reforms.

In 1864 the Principality of Abkhazia was abolished. Two years later the Sukhum Territory (Sukhumsky Otdel), including the Samurzakan and Tsebelda Pristavstvos) was formed within its borders and the territory overall was placed under the authority of the Kutais governor general.

SOURCES

Maps: 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 36, 52, 53, 132, 157.

References: *Akty, sobrannye Kavkazskoi arkheograficheskoi komissiei*, vol. 12; Bentkovskii, "Materialy dlia istorii kolonizatsii Severnogo Kavkaza"; Degoev, *Imam Shamil'; Gibel' Cherkesii*; Esadze, *Istoricheskaia zapiska*, vol. 1; *Istoriia narodov Severnogo Kavkaza (konets XVIII v.–1917g.)*, chap. 5; Ivanenko, *Grazhdanskoe upravlenie Zakavkaz'em*; Karpat, *Ottoman Population*; *Severnyi Kavkaz v sostave Rossiiskoi imperii*, chaps. 7–8; *Tragicheskie posledstviia Kavkazskoi voiny dlia adygov*; Volkova, *Etnicheskii sostav naseleniia*; *Vyselenie adygov v Turtsiiu*.

Map 11

1865–1870: Military-Native Government in Highlander Territories

Map 12

1867–1886: The Ethnolinguistic and Administrative Composition of Daghestan

When the Caucasus War was over, the conglomeration of systems that had existed in the region to govern free highlanders and other communities (including those ruled by commandants, feudal lords, and khans) was replaced with a unified system called military-native government (*voenno-narodnoe upravlenie*). The military-native system was fully implemented in Daghestan Province after the Shamkhalate of Tarki and the Mekhtuli, Kiura, and Avar Khanates were abolished in 1867. Russian army officers (often of Caucasian ethnic origin) were appointed to administer these military-native districts and were in charge of overseeing district government, the police, and, to a large extent, the judicial system. At the same time, judicial procedure was carried out with the participation of judges who were elected by communities of highlanders, and both *adat* (traditional law) and sharia (Islamic law) were applied. This allowed highlanders living under Russian military rule to enjoy a degree of judicial autonomy and preserved elements of administrative self-governance at the village or local-community level.

The authorities saw the system of military-native rule as essential to maintaining military administration in peacetime in districts where the population was "not yet ready for civilian government" and the direct application of imperial law. The military-native districts included all the territories that in 1864–1865 were populated by highlanders within Kuban and Terek Provinces, all of Daghestan Province (with the exception of the Petrovsk and Derbent municipal governments), and the Sukhum Military and Zakataly (Zakatalsky) Districts. Map 11 shows the overall composition of military-native districts in the Caucasus.

Several principles were applied in determining the territorial organization of the military-native system that governed highlanders:

- Administrative continuity: Many of the districts of Daghestan Province had borders that corresponded to the boundaries of feudal domains or alliances of free communities (jamaats) that existed in the past. Lower-level imperial administrative units in Daghestan Province (still called naibates as under the imamate) were established mostly on the basis of historical jamaats or their confederations, and thus retained the long-standing composition of these entities, including ethnically mixed communities. Map 12 illustrates the complexity of ethnic (linguistic) and historical jamaat boundaries informing the Russian administrative divisions of the province.
- Military expedience: Some districts, especially in the mountains of Chechnya, were defined based on sectors of military operation that relied on key fortified positions to control alliances of contiguous highland communities. In addition, borders of many highland districts and even in some cases their location were determined by the boundaries of areas set aside for Cossack settlements, which, in turn, were deployed based on military strategy.
- Economic and political coherence: Districts incorporated ethnically diverse but economically integrated groups (linked through seasonal migration or ties of vassalage). It should be noted that districts that brought together territories settled by a variety of ethnic groups were often broken down into smaller, mostly ethnically homogeneous subunits (uchastoks, naibates). For example, in Kabardin District, all (Balkar) highland Tatar communities were united in a single administrative subunit (an uchastok). The Nogai of the Kumyk District also had their own uchastok, as did the (Avar) Taulins and Chechens of the Nagorny District, and so on.
- Ethnic (tribal) homogeneity: Many districts (okrugs) were first given form based on the predominant distribution of certain ethnic groups (as in the case of Ossetian and Ingush Districts in Terek Province). The frequent correspondence between administrative borders and ethnic boundaries began to give new administrative expression to ethnic categories and groups, now within the empire.

None of these principles was applied in isolation. However, despite the multiplicity of criteria used to demarcate the military-native districts, a consistent administrative logic can be discerned: territorial governance tried to rely on internally coherent entities (for example, jamaats or local communities), controlling their coherence by incorporating local elites into the Russian estate system or even creating it, by grouping different local communities into administratively fixed ethnically defined units (which were increasingly perceived as politically relevant collectives). The very differences in the nature of this coherence—whether rooted in the administrative and judicial legacy of khan and Persian imperial governance (as in South Daghestan), the shared experience of forced resettlement (as in the Circassian districts south of the Kuban), or the cultural and linguistic unity of certain highland communities—occasioned differences in the shape of borders and the makeup of districts. However, contradictions between the various principles applied by Russian authorities and their choice, for reasons that were not entirely clear, to favor one of these principles over another at any given time left an impression that the design of the districts was arbitrary. For example, there were areas populated by highland Ossetian communities living in Tiflis Province and by Lezgins in Baku Province that were not placed within military-native districts.

Military-native government combined several conflicting tendencies. The military-native system brought a measure of uniformity to the governing of highland territories and peoples (khanates were completely abolished, free highland communities

1865-1870: Military-Native Government in Highlander Territories

Territories under Military-Native Government by 1870

Military-native government was a system of Russian military administration that featured elements of self-rule in highland communities, chiefdoms, or principalities. Established locally in the 1820s, it was extensively revived in territories populated by highlanders in 1865-1870.

Districts [Okrugs] of Kuban Province [Oblast]

1	Psekups
2	Laba
3	Urup
4	Zelenchuk
5	Elbrus

Districts [Okrugs] of Terek Province [Oblast]

6	Kabardin
7	Ossetian
8	Ingush
9	Chechen
10	Argun
11	Ichkeri
12	Nagorny
13	Kumyk

Districts [Okrugs] of Daghestan Province [Oblast]

14	Temir-Khan-Shura
15	Dargin
16	Gunib
17	Kazi-Kumukh
18	Andi
19	Avar
20	Kaitag-Tabasaran
21	Kiura
22	Samur

Districts [Okrugs] of Sukhum Territory [Otdel]

23	Pitsunda
24	Ochamchira
25	Zakataly District [Okrug]

Provincial boundaries as of 1869
District boundaries as of 1869
District boundaries abolished
Border of Russian Empire as of 1870
Centers of provinces and other cities
Rural settlements (villages, stanitsas, auls)

0 50 100 km

Table 11.1
Military-Native Districts in Highlander Territories

Province (Oblast)		District (Okrug) (Area in square versts)			Primary Ethnic Groups
			Area	Population (in 1867)	
Kuban		Psekups	774	16,155	Adyghe (mostly Bzhedug and Shapsug)
		Laba	1,914	20,088	Adyghe (mostly Temirgoi, Abadzekh, Hatukai, Makhosh, Mamkheg)
		Urup	3,004	12,039	Adyghe (mostly Beslenei), Nogai, Circassian Armenian (or Cherkeso-Hai)
		Zelenchuk	1,896	15,361	Adyghe (mostly Beslenei and Kabardei), Abaza, Nogai
		Elbrus	3,002	15,816	Karachai, Abaza
Terek					
		Kabardin	10,446	54,224	Adyghe (Kabardin), Mountain Tatar (Balkar)
		Ossetian	4,882	46,802	Ossetian
		Ingush	2,109	29,914	Ingush
		Chechen	3,679	67,540	Chechen
		Ichkeri	878	11,899	Chechen
		Argun	2,167	23,096	Chechen
		Kumyk	4,807	35,234	Kumyk, Chechen, Nogai
		Nagorny	1,188	17,860	Chechen, Avar
Daghestan[b]	North				
		Temir-Khan-Shura[a]	4,974	61,722	Kumyk, Avar, Dargin, Mountain Jews
		Dargin	1,536	63,951	Dargin, Avar, Lak
	Middle	Gunib	3,644	46,578	Avar, Kapuchi, Andi (Akhvakh)
		Kazi-Kumukh	1,811	34,664	Lak (Kazi-Kumukh), Avar, Dargin, Archi
	West	Andi	2,118	35,751	Andi (including Bagulal, Godoberi, Karata, Chamalal, Botlikh, Akhvakh, Tindi), Avar, Dido (including Khvarshi)
		Avar	1,549	30,545	Avar
	South	Kaitag-Tabasaran	2,756	42,080	Dargin (including Kaitag, Kubachins), Tabasaran, Kumyk, Derbent Tatars (Azerbaijani Turks), Tats, Mountain Jews
		Kiura	2,057	58,958	Lezgin (Kiurin), Tabasaran, Agul, Mountain Jews
		Samur	3,063	51,158	Lezgin (Kiurin), Rutul, Tsakhur
Sukhum Territory (Voenny *otdel*)					
		Pitsunda	6,942	25,483	Abkhaz
		Ochamchira		38,423	Abkhaz (including Samurzakan)
		Tsebelda		87	No data
Zakataly			3,965	52,215	Avar, Tsakhur, Transcaucasian Tatar (Azerbaijani Turks), Georgian (including Ingiloi)

[a]Established in 1867 out of the Tarki Shamkhalate, Khanate of Mekhtuli, and Sulak Naibate.
[b]The administrative division of Daghestan retained the the grouping of okrugs into four military districts (otdels) that had been introduced in 1860 and were referred to as North, Middle, Upper, and South Daghestan. This last otdel also included Zakataly District.
Source: For population, "Statisticheskie svedeniia"; for area, "Statisticheskaia tablitsa Kavkazskogo kraia."

1867-1886: The Ethnolinguistic and Administrative Composition of Daghestan

Borders of provinces
Borders of four military districts (otdels) of Daghestan as of 1867(otdels were abolished in 1883)
Borders of districts (okrugs) as of 1886
Akusha — Naibates (lower units of Russian military administration in Daghestan Province, established 1860-1867, renamed uchastoks 1899)
Bagulal — Lesser naibates or subdivisions (as of 1867)
Province centers and other cities
District centers and HQs of naibs (military administration deputies)
Dargwa — Language of local population
(Akusha) Dargwa / Tatar (Azerbaijani) — Contemporary classification of local language (if more specifically or differently defined)
10 km

Districts (okrugs) of Daghestan Province
1. Andi
2. Avar
3. Gunib
4. Kazi-Kumukh
5. Temir-Khan-Shura
6. Dargin
7. Kaitag-Tabasaran
8. Kiura
9. Samur

Languages or relevant ethnic groups as categories used in Russian imperial surveys, 1867-1886

Andi Languages/Peoples
3 Andi
4 Botlikh
5 Karata
6 Akhvakh
7 Godoberi
8 Bagulal
9 Chamalal
10 Tindi

Tsez Languages/Peoples
11 Dido (Tsez)
12 Kapuchi (Bezhta)
13 Hunzib
14 Khvarshi

Lezgin Languages/Peoples
19 Kiurin (Lezgin)
20 Rutul
21 Tsakhur
22 Archi
23 Agul
24 Tabasaran
25 Kryz
26 Budug

1 Kumyk
2 Avar
15 Lak
16 Dargin (Dargwa)
17 Kaitag
18 Kubachi
27 Khinalug
28 Chechen
29 Batsbi
30 Georgian
31 Georgian (Ingiloi)
32 Tat
33 Jewish-Tat (Mountain Jewish)
34 Tatar (Azerbaijani)
35 Armenian
36 Russian
mixed population

were administratively subdued) and was the first step in introducing civilian government as practiced throughout the rest of the empire. Yet the system was also a way to separate one segment of the population (highlanders) from others (Cossacks and the "nonnative" civilian population). In so doing, this model perpetuated the practice of militarily targeting ethnic (tribal) population segments and groups, although now under conditions of internal peacetime military rule.

The institution of military-native districts solidified some of the outcomes of the Caucasus War. The configuration of the districts in the western portion of the region was a direct result of the deportation of Circassians and the securing of the empire's Black Sea border from attack from the interior of Circassia. In the center, Cossack settlements along the northern perimeter of highland territories and strategic communication lines passing through these territories formed an inverted triangle, with its base along the former Caucasus Defensive Line along the Malka and Terek Rivers and its vertex at the Darial Gorge. To the east, no major ethnoterritorial shifts were occurring: the outer border of the empire had moved far to the south, and the vulnerability of land-based lines of communication in the Caspian region was diminishing now that the Caspian Sea was almost "Russian": after 1813 Russia had the exclusive right to base a navy there, and sea travel had become safe and reliable.

LOCAL DETAIL

In 1865, Lesser Kabarda was divided into two administrative halves: the western half was kept for Kabardin auls while the eastern (including Prince Bekovich's lands, which had been bought back from him by the treasury) were settled by other highland groups and non-Cossack populations.

The military-native districts south of the Kuban River contained a concentration of Adyghe, Abaza, and Nogai populations from various tribes. A new administrative framework took shape for categories of ethnic groups that would be used to govern them in the future. A portion of privately owned or imperial lands in these districts was set aside for civilian colonization.

The former Tsebelda Pristavstvo was removed from the Sukhum Territory: beginning in 1868 it was placed under the Tsebelda Superintendency of Settlement (that is, colonization). After the Abkhaz uprising of 1866, essentially the entire population of Tsebelda and Dal (Kodor Gorge) was deported or left for the Ottoman Empire. This territory was subsequently colonized by Svans (the upper portion of the Kodor Gorge) and Russians, Greeks, Megrels, and Armenians (southern portions of Tsebelda and Dal).

SOURCES

Maps: 27, 31, 32, 38, 40, 176

References: Blieva, *Rossiiskii biurokraticheskii apparat i narody Tsentral'nogo Kavkaza*; Bobrovnikov, "Voenno-narodnoe upravlenie na Severnom Kavkaze (Dagestan)"; Dzidzariia, *Makhadzhirstvo i problemy istorii Abkhazii XIX stoletiia*; Gasanov, *Dagestan v sostave Rossii*; *Naselenie Zakavkazskogo kraia; Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii o Kavkaze; Pamiatnaia knizhka Dagestanskoi oblasti; Spiski naselennykh mest Rossiiskoi imperii po Kavkazskomu kraiu*; "Statisticheskaia tablitsa Kavkazskogo kraia"; "Statisticheskie svedeniia o kavkazskikh gortsakh"; "Ukazatel' izmenenii."

Map 13

1871–1881: The Trend toward Civilian Government in the North Caucasus

During the reform period that followed the emancipation of the Russian serfs in 1861 there was a general liberalization in the Caucasus and a movement to bring the region's administrative and judicial system closer to the rest of Russia's while preserving the Caucasus' unique status as a viceroyalty. Administrative and legal regimes under which various populations lived were better aligned with the overall imperial model, in which regions were predominantly divided up into provinces (gubernias). The new policy led to the introduction in 1871 of "civil order" in Kuban and Terek Provinces (Kubanskaya and Terskaya Oblasts), whose two main population groups were the Cossack Host and highlanders. (In Daghestan Province and the Sukhum and Zakataly Districts military-native government persisted until 1917.) The military-native system for governing mountain populations and highland territories in these provinces was essentially incorporated into the system of civilian government, and there was a marked tendency to override the special administrative and legal regime for highlanders and reject military methods of government. Bringing these provinces and their populations closer to overall Russian administrative and legal standards was consistent with the objectives of the peacetime post-reform development of districts now populated by both highlanders and Cossacks. These provinces were now divided into administrative units that brought highland territories and adjacent Cossack and Russian villages into the same districts and went a long way toward eliminating the previous administrative mixture of highlander and Cossack lands by incorporating them under a unified system of government organized into units of civil administration (although boundaries were preserved on a local level through the use of the uchastok as an administrative subunit).

In 1869 changes were implemented in the administrative makeup of Terek Province that resulted in its division in 1871 into seven districts (okrugs): Georgievsk (Georgievsky), Vladikavkaz (Vladikavkazsky), Grozny (Groznensky), Kizlyar (Kizlyarsky), Khasavyurt (Khasavyurtovsky), Argun (Argunsky), and Vedeno (Vedensky). After Pyatigorsk and adjacent villages and colonies were incorporated into the province in 1874, Georgievsk District was renamed Pyatigorsk District and was later (1881) divided into Pyatigorsk and Nalchik Districts.

In Kuban Province, administrative reforms entailed the division of the territory into five districts (uezds): Yeysk (Yeysky), Temryuk (Temryuksky), Yekaterinodar (Yekaterinodarsky), Maikop (Maikopsky), and Batalpashinsk (centered in the stanitsa of Batalpashinskaya). The last three of these incorporated highland communities had previously been separate districts. In 1876 two new districts were formed: Zakubansky (Zakubanye, meaning "beyond the Kuban" in Russian) and Kavkazsky (named after the stanitsa of Kavkazskaya, though the district center was located in Armavir).

In Transcaucasia, where Russian civilian government was already firmly in place, an analogous task (in terms of overall political intent) was nearing completion: the institution of administrative order in the region following the imperial gubernia model. In 1867 the last remaining sovereign entity in the Caucasus region—the Principality of Megrelia—had lost its special status and was incorporated into Kutais Province (Kutaisskaya Gubernia). That same year, the new Elisabethpol Province (Yelisavetpolskaya Gubernia) was created out of adjacent districts of Baku and Tiflis Provinces (Bakinskaya Gubernia, Tiflisskaya Gubernia). Its border enclosed segments of territories populated by Azeri Turks (officially still called Tatars), Armenians, Kurds, and Lezgins. The 1867 borders of this administrative division thus encompassed a complex network of local ethnic entities, in accordance with the imperial (supra-ethnic) principle in creating administrative units.

The political aim of integrating the populations of the Caucasus with the empire's other subjects was to turn both the social groups in charge of implementing military rule (Cossacks) and those living under it (highlanders) into civilians and citizens of the empire with a shared set of rights. But from the beginning the policy ran into a number of obstacles, which ultimately led the imperial authority to conclude that this strategic objective was premature, owing to a combination of domestic and foreign policy factors.

The reforms of the 1860s and 1870s, which among other things dealt with the Cossack Hosts' relation to the land in the North Caucasus, were attempts to open up the closed estate of the Host and integrate both Cossacks and highland peoples into the overall population of the empire. By the middle of the 1870s, however, economic conflicts between Cossack communities and the non-Cossack Russian population (for whom Russian has a special word: *inogorodnye*) were already growing in Kuban and Terek Provinces. Post-emancipation reforms left many Russian peasants without plots to farm, and this led to the influx of a large population of non-Cossack Slavs into the North Caucasus from central Russia. Beginning in 1868 the inogorodnye were officially allowed to buy property—buildings but not land—in the Host provinces. (The property owner in this case became a permanent land user, paying an annual land rent [*posazhennaya plata*], while the land remained the Host property or, in major cities, municipal property.) This also encouraged migration. But in addition to boosting industry and trade, the population growth led to rising prices for land and stratification among the Cossacks. Gradually the imperial policy of integrating Cossacks economically with the rest of the population was limited or even replaced by a policy aimed at preserving the semi-closed nature of the Cossack community and forms of Host land ownership. Turning the Cossack community into farmers whose economic relations followed a civilian model would undermine their role as a military estate, an outcome that was perceived as a threat to their fighting spirit and communal psychology, and to the guardian role the Hosts played within the empire. The Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878 was evidence of the inopportune timing of these processes: the empire needed the Cossack Hosts to maintain their special status as shock troops and the backbone of the imperial presence in the volatile Caucasian borderlands.

1871-1881: The Trend toward Civilian Government in the North Caucasus

Yekaterinoslav Province
Don Host Province [Oblast Voiska Donskogo]
Yeysk
Kushchevskaya
Starominskaya
Yegorlykskaya
Sea of Azov
Yeysk District
Akhtarsky
Kanevskaya
Pavlovskaya
R.Yeya
Tikhoretskaya
Kavkazsky District
R.Yegorlyk
L. Manych
Elista
Greater Derbet Ulus
Medvezhensky District
Astrakhan
Krasny Yar
R.Volga
0 50 100 km
Astrakhan Province [Astrakhanskaya Gubernia]
Taurida Province [Tavricheskaya Gubernia]
Kerch
Temryuk
Temryuk District
Timashevskaya
Korenovskaya
Kavkazskaya
Medvezhye
Vinodelnoe
Divnoe
Stavropol District
Petrovskoe
Turkmen Pristavstvo
Tamanskaya
Slavianskaya
Yekaterinodar District
Ust-Labinskaya
Yekaterinodar
Nekrasovskaya
Armavir
R.Kuban
R.Kalaus
Stavropol
Blagodarnoe
Stavropol Province
Anapa
Krymskaya
Kholmskaya
Zakubansky District
Belorechenskaya
Kurgannaya
Aleksandrovskoe
Novogrigorievsky District
R.Kuma
Novorossiisk
Gelenjik
Goriachy Kliuch
Maikop
Labinskaya
Nevinnomysskaya
Aleksandrov District
Praskoveya
Kara-Nogai Pristavstvo
Gulf of Kizlyar
Transcaspian Territory [Zakaspiisky Otdel]
Apsheronskaya
Maikop District
R.Laba
R.Urup
Batalpashinsk District
Sablinskoe (to Stavropol 1880)
Novo-Grigorievskoe
Achikulak Pristavstvo
Cherny Rynok
Arkhipo-Osipovka
Dakhovskaya
Batalpashinsk
Sultanovsky
Terekli-Mekteb
Black Sea District [Chernomorsky Okrug]
Veliaminovsky Posad
Ust-Jegutinskaya
Pyatigorsk
Georgievsk
Kizlyar District
Pregradnaya
Kislovodsk
Kizlyar
Lazarevsky
Georgievsk District (Pyatigorsk District, 1874-1881)
Mozdok
Grozny District
Naurskaya
R.Terek
Dakhovsky Posad
Nalchik
Chervlennaya
Khasavyurt District
Sviatogo Dukha
Sleptsovskaya
Grozny
Khasavyurt
R.Sulak
Gagry
Sukhum District [Sukhumsky Okrug]
Vladikavkaz District
Vedeno
Petrovsk
Black Sea
Caspian Sea
Gudauty
Sukhum-Kale
Pristavstvo of Svanetia
Vladikavkaz
Shatoi
Vedeno
Temir-Khan-Shura
Argun
Botlikh
Ochamchiry
Tsageri
R.Ingur
Oni
R.Rion
Zugdidi
Kutais Province [Kutaisskaya Gubernia]
Khunzakh
Levashi
area of 1877 uprising
Gumib
Daghestan Province
Novosenaki
Kutais
Sogratl
Kumukh
Majalis
Derbent
Redut-Kale
Samtredi
Shorapan
Tskhinval
Tianety
Dushet
Kvareli
Telav
Lagodekhi
Poti
Ozurgety
Gori
Borjom
Mtskhet
Tiflis
Belokany
Kasumkent
Territories of Batum and Kars acquired by Russia under the Treaty of Berlin (1878)
Batum
Batum Province [Batumskaya Oblast], beginning 1878
Tiflis Province [Tiflisskaya Gubernia]
Signakh
R.Alazani
Zakataly
Zakataly District
R.Samur
Akhaltsikh
Katharinenfeld
Tsarskie Kolodtsy
Kakh
Akhty
Kusary
Khachmas
Samsun
Akhalkalaki
Shulavery
Kuba
Artvin
Bordanovka
Vorontsovka
Trabzon
Ardahan
Jelal-Ogly
Akstafa
R.Kura
Nukha
Divichi
Vartashen
Kutkashen
Kazakh District
Shamkhor
Siazan
Lagich
Ottoman Empire
Kars Province [Karsskaya Oblast], beginning 1878
Karaklis
Delijan
Elisabethpol
Shemakha
Sumgait
The Russian-Ottoman border under the Treaty of Berlin (July 1878)
Olti
Kars
Alexandropol
Yevlakh
Agdash
Surakhany
Yelenovka
L.Gokcha (Sevan)
Helenendorf
Geokchai
Baku Province [Bakinskaya Gubernia]
Elisabethpol Province [Yelisavetpolskaya Gubernia] est. 1867
Novy Bayazet
Barda
Kurdamir
Baku
Caucasus theater of Russo-Ottoman War 1877-1878
Kagizman
Vagarshapat
Basargechar
Zardob
Jevat
Erzurum
R.Arax
Sardarabad
Erivan
Agjabet
Hajy-Qabul (Adzhikabul)
Surmalu
Erivan Province [Erivanskaya Gubernia]
Jevat District
Alashkert (Eleskirt) Valley
Shusha
Saliany
Norashen
Jebrail District
Bayazit
Gerusy
R.Kura
Maku
R.Arax
Nakhichevan
Astrakhanka
The Russian-Ottoman border under the Preliminary Treaty of San-Stefano (Feb. 1878)
Julfa
Megri
Ordubad
Persia
Khoy
Lenkoran
L. Van
Van

Districts [Uezds] of Kuban Province and Districts [Okrugs] of Terek Province as of 1871-1881

1 Yeysk
2 Temryuk
3 Yekaterinodar
4 Maikop
5 Batalpashinsk

Numbers 1-5 indicate districts of Kuban Province before reorganization of 1876, when two new districts were established:

Zakubansky
Kavkazsky

Active railways by 1881
Railways under construction

6 Georgievsk District, renamed Pyatigorsk 1874, divided in late 1881 into Pyatigorsk (6a) and Nalchik (6b) Districts

Vladikavkaz
Grozny
Argun
Vedeno
Kizlyar
Khasavyurt

Territory incorporated into Terek Province in 1874

Centers of provinces and districts

Provincial and district boundaries as of 1881
District boundaries in 1871-1876 (where different from 1881)
Border of Russian Empire as of 1881

Ottoman landing and occupation May-Aug. 1877

Table 13.1
Terek Province, 1876

District (Okrug)	Area (in square versts)	Population (in thousands)	Primary Ethnic Groups
Pyatigorsk	2,487	136.3	Cossack (mostly Russian), German
Georgievsk (Nalchik, beginning December 1881)	16,831		Kabardin, Cossack, Mountain Tatar
Vladikavkaz	9,502	137.1	Ossetian, Cossack, Ingush
Grozny	8,405	120.6	Chechen, Cossack, and other Russian
Argun	2,472	22.7	Chechen
Vedeno	1,273	22.0	Chechen
Kizlyar	5,903	25.0	Cossack and other Russian, Nogai
Khasavyurt	4,886	55.8	Kumyk, Avar, Chechen, Nogai

Source: "Prostranstvo, naselenie i naselennost' Kavkazskogo kraia" (1877).

Table 13.2
Kuban Province, 1876

District (Uezd)	Area (in square versts)	Population (in thousands)	Primary Ethnic Groups
Yeysk	10,839	119.3	Cossack (mostly Ukrainian)
Temryuk	9,430	83.3	Cossack (mostly Ukrainian)
Yekaterinodar	10,392	178.8	Cossack (mostly Ukrainian), Adyghe (mostly Bzhedug and Shapsug)
Maikop	15,529	147.9	Cossack (mostly Russian), Adyghe (mostly Temirgoi, Abadzekh, Hatukai, Makhosh, and Mamkheg)
Batalpashinsk	15,136	132.6	Cossack (mostly Russian), Karachai, Adyghe (mostly Kabardin, Beslenei), Abaza, Nogai
Zakubanye	7,623	36.7	Cossack (mostly Ukrainian)
Kavkazsky	10,115	133.1	Cossack (mostly Russian)

Source: "Prostranstvo, naselenie i naselennost' Kavkazskogo kraia" (1877).

The degree of domestic political risk involved in the transition to civilian government and its untimeliness were also made evident by the rebellions in Chechnya and Daghestan and the Turkish naval assault on Abkhazia. In 1878–1883 imperial plans to assimilate Kars Province (Karsskaya Oblast) (under the Treaty of Berlin, Russia acquired the area on which Kars and Batum Provinces were formed) ran into problems and were fraught with inconsistencies. Approximately 100,000 Muslims left the annexed territories, and Russian colonization began. By 1883, however, the authorities had managed to move only 15,500 settlers there—Molokans, Doukhobors, retired soldiers from the Caucasus Army, and Greek immigrants. The likelihood of a sizable Armenian "colonization" of Kars Province was clearly not an appealing prospect for the imperial authorities, who began to consider promoting large-scale Cossack settlements in the newly incorporated area.

The intensification of the geopolitical rivalry among European powers and the growing role of the Caucasus in Russia's strategic goals in the south made it imperative for the authorities to strengthen the military aspect of imperial governance in the region. Furthermore, Russia's presence as a world power in the geopolitical game made it necessary to define the imperial raison d'être in the context of the developing rivalry among the nations of Europe. Rather than relying on a dynastic or religious-messianic justification for their existence, empires were beginning to seek a national justification. In this new epoch, Russia's imperial raison d'être increasingly called for an appropriate linguistic and ethnic uniformity. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Russia was beginning to define itself as a Russian national power. This identity shift was based not so much on the idea that its diverse population had pledged allegiance to the Russian throne and state, nor on a religious self-identification as an Orthodox empire, but increasingly in the cultural and linguistic sense: the empire was becoming perceived as a nation-state established by the Russian people (*Russky narod*) and belonging to this people. But another emperor would have to come to power before these processes would take the shape of a new imperial course and a new strategy for absorbing the Caucasian periphery.

SOURCES

Maps: 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 158.

References: Esadze, *Istoricheskaia zapiska*, vol. 2; *Osnovnye administrativno-territorial'nye preobrazovaniia na Kubani (1793–1985)*; "Prostranstvo, naselenie i naselennost' Kavkazskogo kraia" (1877); "Ukazatel' izmenenii"; *Sbornik svedenii o Terskoi oblasti*.

Map 14

1881–1888: The Caucasian Periphery of the Emerging Russian Nation

The assassination of Alexander II in 1881 marked the beginning of a new stage in the history of the country and its Caucasian periphery. Alexander III abolished the Caucasian viceroyalty with the aim of creating a more "homogeneous" empire. An essential component of this new policy was the consolidation of control over the non-Russian borderlands and efforts to bring these territories more firmly under a central imperial authority. This desired homogeneity was viewed as a way to strengthen political loyalty among the Caucasian outposts of the empire as it solidified its national footing. Being "Russian" was less and less equated with being a "subject of the Russian empire" and was apparently evolving into a much narrower, more ethnocentric concept. The empire's "core identity" was being nationalized at a time when the policy of Russification was becoming more pronounced throughout the ethnic borderlands. Imperial policy appeared to contain an innate contradiction: it strove to assimilate people while treating them as *inorodtsy* (literally, "of other birth," a term used to designate non-Slavic and non-Orthodox subjects of the Russian Empire), thereby weakening its ability to integrate non-Russians by functioning more as a policy of alienation. Government strategy beginning in the late 1880s was perceived as favoring "the systematic elimination of natives from local administration, a campaign targeted against schools and the native language of pupils" (*Kavkazskii zapros*, pp. 238–239).

The fact that Russian identity was not strong in the Caucasus was seen as something that could be compensated for by firm rule. The administrative dynamic in the Caucasus during this period inevitably reflected the policy of strengthening institutions of autocratic state power and ensuring the steady cultural absorption of the country's non-Russian population into the Russian national core. The way the empire governed the Caucasus shifted from a regionalist approach to a more rigid centralist policy, which paradoxically combined integrationist aims and segregationist tools (the latter, in turn, stemmed from an about-face in Cossack policy, which now favored keeping the privileged military estate intact). The civic merging of the two main North Caucasian population segments (Cossacks and highlanders) and the incorporation of both into a Russian nation was not yet on the horizon; in fact, changes in the administrative division of the region reflected the rejection of the idea of merging Cossack and highlander societies with the rest of the empire's subjects.

In Terek Province the civil districts that had existed during 1871–1883 were redivided into otdels (primarily populated by Cossacks) and okrugs (primarily populated by mountain populations). As in the period of military-native administration of highland territories (1865–1870), ethnic and administrative borders dividing not only Cossacks from highlanders but one local ethnic group from another were instituted, with a few exceptions. (One exception had to do with a portion of the lands settled by highland peoples, Ingushetia and Lesser Kabarda, which were located in the center of the province. These were incorporated into Sunzha [Sunzhensky Otdel], a Cossack district, which gave this strategic Cossack area greater territorial integrity and direct access to Transcaucasia.) Among the reasons behind the new divisions within Terek Province was the desire of the authorities to end the practice of highlanders' renting and settling Cossack lands and to avoid the "dilution" of the Host's holdings. But although they were administratively separate, both types of districts were kept under Cossack governance, which now embraced all levels of authority in the province—from the oblast (headed by a governor, or nachalnik oblasti) to the district (okrug and otdel) and uchastok.

After 1883 Kabarda and the adjoining lands of Mountain Tatar (Balkar) communities were made into the Nalchik District (Nalchiksky Okrug); North Ossetia became the Vladikavkaz District (Vladikavkazsky Okrug); Chechnya became the Grozny District (Groznensky Okrug); and the lands of the Sulak Kumyk, Aukh (Akkintsi) Chechen, and Salatau Avar communities became the Khasavyurt District (Khasavyurtovsky Okrug). The concepts "Kabarda," "Ossetia," and "Chechnya" were again given a degree of administrative expression through the organization of these units. (This administrative tendency continued in 1905, when the territory populated by the Ingush was carved out of the Sunzha Cossack District [Sunzhensky Otdel] to create Nazran District [Nazranovsky Okrug], and Lesser Kabarda was removed from Sunzha and incorporated into the Nalchik highlanders district [Greater Kabarda]. That same year, however, another administrative move led to the division of the unwieldy Grozny District, incorporating all of Chechnya, into two administrative units—the Grozny and Vedeno Districts.)

For the highland populations of Kuban and Terek Provinces, the removal of the viceroyalty from the imperial chain of command meant direct rule by Cossack provincial authorities. This new system of "military-Cossack administration" (1886) closely resembled the military-native system, which had also subordinated highland communities to the military and administrative authority of army officials. But now the military administration in highland territories was much less bound by the institutions of local self-governance and the standards of ordinary and sharia law. Furthermore, the military administration was now made up entirely of Cossacks, enhancing their privileged position and reinforcing the social distance between Cossacks and non-Cossacks (not only native populations but Russians as well). The government's effort to gain firmer control in the North Caucasus only resulted in the growing influence and power of the Cossacks.

Differences between three North Caucasus territories (in terms of ethnic composition and loyalty of the population to the empire, strategic position, and military and political stability) led to a differences in how they were governed. Total predomination by Cossack (and Russian) populations in the Kuban, almost total predomination by highland populations in Daghestan, and more or less equal population components (Cossack and highlander) in Terek Province also meant that social cleavages resonated differently in the ways different types of territories were administered.

14

1881-1888: The Caucasian Periphery of the Emerging Russian Nation

Even after the reorganization of 1886–1888, highland populations and territories situated in Kuban Province were left in districts (otdels) shared by Cossack populations, but each group was separated into its own subunit (uchastok) within those districts. Probably the sparseness of remaining highland populations and the relatively firm control exercised over their enclaves eliminated the need for new "ethnic" maneuvering here. Over the course of the administrative reorganization in 1888, only the borders of the Kuban otdels were altered.

Military-native government in Daghestan, which continued into the 1870s, also evolved into military administration on provincial and district levels: in 1883 provincial government was handed over to a military governor. However, the only significant territorial change was the elimination of the Derbent municipal district and the incorporation of its territory, except for the city of Derbent itself, into the Kiura District (Kiurinsky Okrug).

A system of provincial civil government was preserved in the provinces (gubernias) of Transcaucasia, with the exception of the Sukhum District (Sukhumsky Okrug) within Kutais Province and military governments in Kars and Batum Provinces (Karsskaya and Batumskaya Oblasts). Batum Province was downgraded to an okrug in 1883 and incorporated into Kutais Province (until 1903).

In Transcaucasia antagonisms were also being fanned by the region's unique sociopolitical dynamics. The empire-wide move toward uniform government and the promotion of greater cultural homogeneity was manifested here as well in a more heavy-handed push toward Russification in ideology, administration, and education. The evolution of the very meaning of *Russian* in the 1880s and 1890s from imperial subject to ethnic group member led to a natural narrowing of those eligible to consider themselves Russian and a growing alienation of the non-Russian segments of the population. Attempts by the imperial authorities to force Russification on the multi-ethnic population of the Caucasus were accompanied by an increase in discriminatory practices, all of which proved counterproductive, promoting non-Russian ethnic identification and the overall politicization of ethnicity. The attempt at Russification provoked an increasingly autonomist mood among local ethnic elites, especially Armenians and Georgians, two groups that in the past had contributed to Russian military and political expansion in the region. On the imperial side, the policy of Russification was shaped partly in response to the consolidation of local elites around ethnic identifications and antagonisms and these groups' resistance to Russian domination in terms of local economy and administration.

The annexation of Kars Province in 1878 and problems undermining imperial colonization gave new urgency to the question of what should be the legitimizing ideological basis for integrating the Caucasus into the empire. Put another way, who were to make up the social backbone of the Russian Caucasus? Among the conservative imperial authorities the answer that was increasingly favored was "ethnic Russians." But how could this collective status of "legitimated dominance" be supported and developed? Along with the emergence of ethno-imperial nation-state consciousness and the change in the overall frame of reference used to evaluate the national foundations of the Russian state, a clear lack of Russian dominance in Transcaucasia—economic, cultural, administrative, and in sheer numbers of Russian settlers—became evident. Beginning in the late 1880s the imperial policy of "national balance" became institutionally blatant and ethnically selective. The goal of this selectivity was to promote a stronger "Russian element" in the region.

The government policy of Russifying the region led to an overall worsening of inter-ethnic (or "inter-tribal," in the language of that time) relations in the Caucasus. In the 1880s and 1890s a complex of social antagonisms was exacerbated along ethnic lines, even as the region's economy was going through one of its most dynamic periods: Baku oil, the breadbaskets of Stavropol and Kuban, and the development of railroads all served to integrate the Caucasus into the Russian and world economies. Problems in the Caucasus and burgeoning social conflicts worked their way into the overall Russian political context, where they acquired a new symbolic meaning. These conflicts and the political strategies to overcome them would become catalysts not only for the empire's final collapse but also for the Soviet reintegration of the Caucasus through new models for the building of a nation-state.

SOURCES

Maps: 40, 41, 42, 157.

References: Gatagova and Ismail-Zade, "Kavkaz"; *Kavkazskii zapros*; Kazbek, *Voenno-statisticheskoe opisanie Terskoi oblasti*; *Osnovnye administrativno-territorial'nye preobrazovaniia na Kubani (1793–1985)*; *Sbornik svedenii o kavkazskikh gortsakh*; Silaev, "Migratsionnaia politika."

Map 15

1763–1913: 150 Years of Russian Colonization

Map 16

1913: The Terek Cossack Host

Russian settlement in the Caucasus was both a factor in and a consequence of the region's integration into the empire. Colonization was one component of the empire's military, political, socioeconomic, and, to some extent, cultural absorption of its Caucasian periphery.

The overall structure and dynamic of colonization were determined by a complex of strategies that were part of the empire's rivalry-driven foreign policy and its approach to integrating the region into the Russian state—from Cossack military settlements organized by the government, to forced relocation of Russian religious minorities to Transcaucasia, to spontaneous peasant migrations to new territories that had been added to the empire.

During the years 1711–1735 the Caucasian border of the Russian Empire first began to take shape along the lower reaches of the Terek River, formed by the outer boundaries of the Greben, Kizlyar, and Terek-Semeinoe Cossack Host lands. During this period the imperial border began to evolve from a porous area of Russians living in proximity to mountain and steppe peoples into a dividing line, with former zones of uncertainty transformed by the presence of a chain of new fortresses and stanitsas that constituted a distinct barrier. This chain first grew to the west toward Mozdok (1763) and later extended through the North Caucasian Steppe from Mozdok northwest to the Azov fortress at the mouth of the Don (1777–1778). The swath of land that had been captured by Cossack forces constituted a new border, the empire's advancing southern frontier, which put pressure on Nogai nomads and—as it approached the Malka River and Pyatigorye—Kabarda. In the rear, protected by this militarized Cossack frontier, civilian colonization was beginning. Villages populated by state serfs and the nobility's landed estates started to appear.

The annexation in 1783 of the Crimean Khanate and its Kuban lands moved the Russian border down to the middle and lower reaches of the Kuban River. After 1792, on the land bordered by the Kuban and Yeya Rivers and the Azov coast that was once the realm of Nogai nomads, Russian-Ukrainian Chernomorye (literally, the "Black Sea region," though almost none of it was on the Black Sea except a small strip of the Taman peninsula) emerged—a powerful Cossack bastion populated by resettled Zaporozhian Cossacks. By the end of the eighteenth century the Caucasian Defensive Line was taking on a distinct contour—a continuous line of Cossack settlements from Taman and the mouth of the Kuban in the west to the mouth of the Terek in the east.

By 1829–1830 the overall configuration of three zones or stages of Russia's imperial advance into the Caucasus region could be clearly seen:

The North Caucasian Steppe (Ciscaucasia). This area north of the Kuban, Malka, and Terek Rivers was a zone of vigorous colonization under the auspices of the militarized frontier, the Cossack Defensive Line along its southern perimeter. This zone was predominately inhabited by Russians, with scattered areas of Nogai, Turkmen, and Kalmyk nomads along the edges of the Stavropol Plateau and in the semi-arid steppe along the northwestern shores of the Caspian.

The Greater Caucasus. This area was populated by highlanders who were to a greater or lesser degree dependent on the empire (or entirely independent of it). Even after Russia had absorbed the region it served as a sort of internal frontier for the empire, its "internal abroad." On the North Caucasian frontier, settlers from the empire and mountain populations lived in a state of uneasy proximity—a proximity that came with economic ties, the first experience administering these new acquisitions, and armed conflict. The new Russian cordons, initially put in place to block highland raids, with time turned into outward-moving rings from which Cossack offensives were launched against highland territories.

Transcaucasia. Here a rather well-established Russian imperial administration governed a multi-ethnic native population. The displacement of a portion of sedentary and nomadic Muslim Turks to the Ottoman Empire or Persia opened up niches here for future Russian, Armenian, and Greek colonization.

The nineteenth-century Caucasus War was a struggle to solidify the empire's military and administrative control over the Greater Caucasus, which separated Cis- and Transcaucasia, by merging the three zones and making them a stable part of the empire, with a secure outer border extending to the Black Sea coast, the Kars highlands, and the Arax River. The Cossack military expansion was shaped by both the logic of the fight against the mountain communities and the desire to secure communication between the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia, which by 1813 was gaining recognition as a part of the empire. In the 1830s Russian colonization began extending to the provinces of Transcaucasia. This region, which had long since had a substantial settled population, experienced a different type of Russian colonization from that of the North Caucasus, where a continuous stretch of Russian settlement was imposed on steppe that was sparsely populated by nomads. In Transcaucasia, colonization could be described as enclave or dispersive and consisted of isolated settlements scattered among local populations. The settlements fell into several categories: villages populated by Russian religious minorities, military settlements or settlements of retired soldiers, rural settlements of recent Russian colonists (in the late nineteenth century), and urban settlements (slobodas).

Russian religious minorities (sectarians) were the pioneers of Russia's colonization of Transcaucasia. They were settled only in areas where there was no Orthodox Christian population.

1763-1913: 150 Years of Russian Colonization

Areas of Cossack and Civilian Colonization

- Russian defensive and communication lines, 1763-1862
- Main postal roads from Russia proper to the Caucasus
- 1781 — Year when settlements were established
- Territories of Cossack colonization with stanitsas (the numbers used to designate the 25 largest stanitsas correspond to the table in the commentary)
- Peasant villages that were converted to stanitsas and given to the Cossack estate
- Territories of former stanitsas that became peasant villages (as of 1913)
- abolished or resettled stanitsas
- Territories of peasant colonization in the North Caucasus with villages
- Military settlements (1838-1859)
- Russian peasant villages in Transcaucasia (predominant religion or sect: Orthodox, Molokan, Doukhobor, Subbotnik)
- Cities with more than 50% and more than 10% Russian populations (as of 1913)
- Main railways, key stations (as of 1913)
- Provincial boundaries in 1913
- Boundary of Russian Empire as of 1913
- Border between Black Sea Host (mostly Ukrainians) and Caucasus Line Cossack Host (mostly Russians) before their partial unification as Kuban Host in 1860
- Highlander territories as of 1865-1870
- Territories (pastures) of nomadic people by 1858-1859

0 50 100 km

16 1913: The Terek Cossack Host

Sotnitskoe 1833
Grushevskoe 1800
stanitsa 1836-1869
Dovsunskoe 1879
Turkmen District [Trukhmenskoe Pristavstvo]
Velichavoe 1848
Ozek-Suat
R.Kuma
Astrakhan Province
20 km
Burgon-Majary (Bolshoi Usviat)1785
Levokumskoe (Gromki) 1842
Ternovka 1791
Pokoinoe 1784
Sviatoy Krest
1799, town 1826
Severnoe 1785
stanitsa 1836-1869
Kalinovskoe 1779
stanitsa 1836-1869
R.Tomuzlov
Kitaevskoe 1839
Chernolesskoe 1782
Novoseltsy 1780
Pravokumskoe (Solontsy) 1842
Praskoveya 1764
Orlovskoe 1847
Vladimirovka 1786
Serebriakovskaya Pristan
Beriuzak 1859
Yankul 1870
Aleksandrovskoe 1777
stanitsa 1839-1869
Tomuzlovskoe 1839
Kruglolesskoe 1790
stanitsa 1836-1869
Arkhangelskoe 1839
Caspian Sea
Sultanskoe 1865
Privolnoe 1785
Achikulak District
[Achikulakskoe Pristavstvo]
Kara-Nogai District
[Karanogaiskoe Pristavstvo]
Krym-Gireevskoe 1865
Podgornoe
Niny 1784
Sablinskoe 1788
stanitsa 1839-1880
Stavropol Province [Stavropolskaya Gubernia]
Nagut 1864
Kazinka 1867
Novogrigorievskoe 1781
Vorotsovo-Aleksandrovskoe 1782
Cherny Rynok 1724
Brianskoe 1787
Kurshava 1869
Olgino
Otkaznoe 1785
Novozavedennoe 1785
Soldato-Aleksandrovskoe 1778
Stepnoe (Gashun) 1877
Obilnoe 1784
Kuban Province
[Kubanskaya Oblast]
Kangly 1865
R.Kuma
Solomenskoe
Terekli-Mekteb
State treasury land
Talovka 1877
Koktubei 1836
Shandriukovskaya Pristan
Razdolye 1749
Yurkovka 1885
Suvorovskaya 1825
Illarionovsky
Bekeshevskaya 1825
Zheleznovodskoe 1843
Nezlobnaya 1784, relocated 1861
Urukhskaya 1873
Georgievsk
1777
Georgievskaya
1825
Nezlobnaya
1861
Pyatigorsk
1812, town 1830
Karras
Tarumovka 1746
Bolshaya Areshevka 1796
Areshevka 1745
Karabagly 1790
Serebriakovka
ruins of Terki
(1588-1728)
Aleksandro-Nevskaya
1768, stanitsa 1838
Borgustanskaya
1860
Yessentukskaya 1825
Goriachevodskaya
1825
Mikhailovskoe 1874
Kislovodskaya
1825
Borgustanskaya
1825, relocated 1860
Kislovodsk
1843, town 1903
Abukovo
Mariinskaya
1829
Staropavlovskaya
1830
Novopavlovskaya
1848
Tolstaya 1849
Lysogorskaya 1848
Aleksandriskaya 1784
stanitsa 1832
(Verkhne)Podgornaya 1786
stanitsa 1832
Gosudarstvennaya
1769, stanitsa 1828
Kurskaya
Kanovo
Edissia
Kurskaya 1769
stanitsa 1828
Prokhladnaya 1784
stanitsa 1824
Soldatskaya 1782
Pavlodolskaya 1778
Novoosetinskaya 1810
Chernoyarskaya 1803
Yekaterinogradskaya
1777
Pribilshinaya
1786
Lukovskaya 1770
Mozdok
1763
6
Stoderevskaya 1780
Galiugaevskaya 1770
Ishcherskaya 1770
Naurskaya 1770
Mekenskaya 1770
Savelievskaya 1886
Kalinovskaya 1770
Nikolaevskaya 1848
Chervlennaya 1711 (1567)
Shchedrinskaya 1711 (1569)
Shelkovskaya 1718
Grebenskaya 1740
Starogladkovskaya 1711
Kurdiukovskaya 1711
Kargalinskaya
1736
Dubovskaya
1736
Borozdinskaya
1736
Kizlyar 1735
Kizlyarskaya
Romanovka
Babayurt
Aleksandriskaya 1784
Anketeri Sands
Khasaut
Karmovo
Khabaz
Babukovo
Ashabovo
R.Malka
Inalovo
Tambievo
Navruzovo
Kasaevo
Novo-Poltavskoe
Atazhukino
Gundelen
Kudenetovo
Novo-Ivanovskoe
Klishbievo
Nalchik District
[Nalchiksky Okrug]
Nalchik fort 1822,
military settlement 1838
sloboda 1859
R.Baksan
Mt.Elbrus
Urusbiev
Kholam
Chegem
R.Cherek
Bezingi
Argudan
Kaisyn-Anzorovo
Prishibskaya
1838
Kotliarevskaya
1841
Aleksandrovskaya
1838
Urukhskaya
1838, relocated 1873
to Nalchik District
beginning 1905
Nazran District
Vladikavkaz District
Zmeiskaya
1849
Nikolaevskaya
1838
R.Kambileevka
Magometanskoe
Khristianskoe
Balkar
Mestia
Donifars
Stur-Digora
Ardonskaya
1838
Arkhonskaya
1838
Ardon
Kadgaron
Gorskaya sloboda 1850
Alagir 1897
Vladikavkazskaya 1847,
relocated to Tarskaya 1860
Vladikavkaz
1784, town 1861
Tarskaya
1860
Vladikavkaz District
[Vladikavkazsky Okrug]
Kutais Province [Kutaisskaya Gubernia]
Greater Caucasus Mountain Range
Lentekhi
Arkhon
Dagom
Dargavs
Lars
Zaramag
Nar
Mt.Kazbek
Stepantsminda
R.Terek
Java
Tskhinval
Eredvi
Tirdznisi
Shindisi
Ruisi
Dushet
Tiflis Province [Tiflisskaya Gubernia]
Voznesenskaya
1847
Karabulakskaya 1859
Troitskaya
1845
Sleptsovskaya 1845
Nesterovskaya
1847
Mikhailovskaya
1846
Samashkinskaya
1847
Romanovskaya 1852
Yermolovskaya 1847
Groznenskaya
1859, stanitsa 1859
Grozny District [Groznensky Okrug]
Stary-Yurt (Tolstov-Yurt)
Bariatinskaya 1857
Petropavlovskaya 1857
Iliinskaya 1860
Kakhanovskaya 1860
Grozny
1818, town 1870
Aldy
Alkhan-Yurt
Gekhi
Goity
Urus-Martan
Achkhoi
R.Assa
R.Sunzha
Sunzhenskaya
1859
Feldmarshalskaya 1864
Galashevskaya 1860-1881
Dattykhskaya 1860-1865
Vorontsovo-Dashkovskaya 1860
Alkunskaya 1860-1865
Vozdvizhenskaya
fort 1844, sloboda 1880s
Shatoi
fort 1860, sloboda 1880s
Nazran District
[Nazranovsky Okrug]
Grozny District
[Groznensky Okrug]
Vedeno District
[Vedensky Okrug]
Vedeno
fort 1859, sloboda 1880s
Dyshne-Vedeno
Khatuni
Atagi
Shali
Germenchik
Tsentoroi
Kharachoi
Makazhoi
Dai
Itumkale
Sharoi
Shatil
Ansalta
Godoberi
Botlikh
Karata
Andi
Arguani
Tlokh
R.Argun
R.Andi Koisu
Daghestan Province
[Dagestanskaya Oblast]
Bezhta
Tionety
Matani
Napareuli
Akhmeta
Sabue
Shilda
Khasavyurt District [Khasavyurtovsky Okrug]
R.Aksai
Shelkozavodskoe (Sarafannikovo) 1718
Porobich 1735
ruins of Sviatoy Krest
(1723-1735)
Location of Terski Gorod - the first Russian fortress
in the Caucasus (founded 1567, abandoned 1571)
R.Sulak
Kostek
Chont-Aul
Temir-Aul
Shamkhal-Yangiyurt
Khasavyurt
fort 1846, sloboda 1867
Novoaleksandrovka
Tsaredarovka
Kumtorkale
Yaryksu-Aukh
Aktash-Aukh
Enderi
Dylym
Almak
Zandak
Dargo

Terek Cossack Host Territories as of 1913

- Pyatigorsk District [Pyatigorsky Otdel] with stanitsas of the Volga Regiment
- Mozdok District [Mozdoksky Otdel] with stanitsas of the Mozdoksko-Gorsky Regiment
- Kizlyar District [Kizlyarsky Otdel] with stanitsas of the Kizlyarsko-Grebenskoy Regiment
- Sunzha District [Sunzhensky Otdel] with stanitsas of the Sunzha-Vladikavkaz Regiment

- Borders of stanitsa lands
- R Reserve host lands
- F Host forest

Other Territories
- P Privately owned lands
- Lands belonging to the state treasury
- Urban lands
- Lands belonging to rural communities

Towns
Stanitsas, villages, slobodas
> 10,000 inhabitants
> 5,000
> 3,000
> 1,000
< 1,000

- Stanitsas that were originally a peasant villages
- Stanitsas that were originally a military settlements
- Abandoned or relocated stanitsas
- Slododas (Russian civilian settlements)

Years given under place names denote year of founding

Borders of provinces as of 1913
Borders of districts as of 1898
Borders of districts as of 1913 (if different)

Active railways as of 1913
Railways under construction

Renamed Stanitsas (as of 1913)

Kizlyar District [Kizlyarsky Otdel]:
Kapaiskaya → Aleksandriiskaya 1825
Sasoplinskaya → Aleksandro-Nevskaya 1861
Goriacheistochnenskaya
(aka Goriachevodskaya) → Bariatinskaya 1909
Novogladkovskaya → Grebenskaya 1910
Alkhan-Yurtovskaya → Yermolovskaya 1897
Zakan-Yurtovskaya → Romanovskaya 1913
Chertugaevskaya → Petropavlovskaya 1864
Jalkinskaya → Iliinskaya 1892
Umakhan-Yurtovskaya → Kakhanovskaya 1894

Pyatigorsk District [Pyatigorsky Otdel]:
Rimgorskaya → Borgustanskaya 1835
Belomechetskaya → (Novo) Mariinskaya 1852
Probezhnaya → Staropavlovskaya 1852
Churekovskaya → Georgievskaya 1845
Babukovskaya → Nezlobnaya 1861
Nizhnepodgornaya → Lysogorskaya 1861

Sunzha District [Sunzhensky Otdel]:
Sunzhenskaya → Sleptsovskaya 1851
Novo-Sunzhenskaya → Sunzhenskaya 1861
Aki-Yurtovskaya → Vorontsovo-Dashkovskaya 1907
Promezhutochnaya → Feldmarshalskaya 1864
Magomet-Yurtovskaya → Voznesenskaya 1897

Numerical Key:
1. Babukovskaya 1790 (stanitsa 1832, abolished 1861)
2. Mariinskaya 1777 (relocated and renamed Belomechetskaya 1828)
3. Nizhnepodgornaya 1786 (stanitsa 1832, relocated and renamed Lysogorskaya 1861)
4. Kambileevskaya 1859 (abolished 1867)
5. Feldmarshalskaya 1861 (relocated 1864)
6. Gorskaya (incorporated into Lukovskaya 1866)

In essence, a sort of pale of settlement took shape within the boundaries of Muslim areas. In the 1830s and 1840s settlements of Molokans, Doukhobors, and Sabbatarians or Subbotniks (Russians who had converted to Judaism) appeared in the vicinity of Shusha and Lenkoran and in Javakhetia and the highlands of the Elisabethpol District (Yelisavetpolsky Uezd). At first outcasts, essentially banished to the Caucasus from the internal provinces of Russia, they later became one of the decisive, even "model" forms of Russian cultural and economic assimilation of the region. The imperial authorities' attitude toward members of Russian sects varied over the different stages of the region's colonization and was determined by the contradictions inherent in the principle of "tolerance through isolation." Efforts by the authorities to isolate sectarians in the remote reaches of the empire paradoxically helped further the objectives of colonization by increasing the ethnic Russian presence. In 1858 sectarians were given the right to lease private plots belonging to the local nobility while retaining the status of state peasant and, in some cases, the right to buy their land. Nonetheless, the fact that most Russian sectarians settled in out-of-the-way corners of the Caucasus and even the social position held by a good portion of them as quitrent-paying tenants speaks to the difference between the concepts of colonist and colonizer. Russian sectarian peasant colonization in Transcaucasia did not create an ethnic status hierarchy that set imperial masters apart from a population of local subjects. Government programs aimed at settling nonsectarian Russian peasants in Transcaucasia were developed later, in the 1890s. Incentives given to settlers under these programs included loans to cover travel expenses, grants for establishing a farmstead, and the option of renting or purchasing plots on treasury land. These incentives did not, however, extend to granting Russian settlers any special status that would raise them above the native population and create mutually exclusive estates. It was not unusual for Russians to settle on plots they bought or rented from native landowners and even to be admitted to some native village communities as equal members.

The risks posed to the empire by the high proportion of sectarians among Russians in Transcaucasia was from the start (late 1830s to early 1840s) counterbalanced by the existence of another type of Russian village (and settler)—military settlements such as Jelal-Ogly, Lagodekhi, Tsarskie Kolodtsy, Manglis, Khankendy, and Gergery, strategically located throughout the region (in most cases, alongside the headquarters of troops stationed in Transcaucasia). These settlements were inhabited by retired soldiers and were almost exclusively Orthodox, as were some of military settlements founded in Terek Province.

The goals of the military settlements were stated in an 1837 statute: "By giving deserving soldiers a place to settle and thereby increasing the Russian population in the lands of mountain peoples to protect the security of our borders and transportation routes from hostile raids; to promote agriculture, trade, and industry in that region; and, through mutual needs and mutual benefits, to lay a sturdy foundation for relations with tribes that have heretofore been alien" (*Polozhenie o voennom poselenii na Kavkaze*, p. 1). Not many military settlements were established in Transcaucasia, and in 1851 they were converted to civilian settlements and their residents became ordinary villagers. This was unlike what happened in the North Caucasus, where the placement and geography of military settlements were determined by the 1837 statute, but where they were almost immediately turned into stanitsas and settled exclusively by Cossacks (beginning in 1842), with the exception of those located deep within the highlander districts of Terek Province (Nalchik, Vozdvizhenskaya, Vedeno, Shatoi, Khasavyurt). These were not settled by Cossacks and by 1880 had become Russian civilian slobodas, settled mostly by retired soldiers.

As the Caucasus War progressed, beginning in the late 1830s and particularly during its final stage in the 1860s, a new band of Russian settlements appeared in the North Caucasus, now south of the Caucasus Defensive Line and within the boundaries of areas settled by mountain populations. In 1838–1847 along the Sunzha and Terek Rivers and the upper reaches of the Kuban and Laba Rivers appeared new lines of fortifications and Cossack stanitsas. Finally, in 1862–1864, after the Circassian peoples that had populated the areas south of the Kuban River were evicted, Cossack military colonization took over a large portion of the territory between the Kuban and the Black Sea coast. Between 1867 and 1869 the Black Sea coast began to be settled by civilians as well.

The various types of colonization—military and civilian, peasant and noble, organized and spontaneous—had to do both with the dominant political and economic strategies for Russian assimilation of the region at each particular stage and with the characteristics of the territory being assimilated, such as terrain, climate, population, and military-strategic importance. By the mid-1860s differences between the zones of Russian colonization could be clearly seen not only between the North Caucasian steppe on one hand and Transcaucasia and the Greater Caucasus on the other but also between the western, central, and eastern mountain zones. The west (Circassia) extended the zone of continuous colonization and experienced an almost total replacement of the population. (The displacement of the Cherkess in 1862–1864 could be called the second systematic expulsion from a frontier area carried out by the Russian Empire for reasons of military strategy and domestic policy. The first was the expulsion of the Nogai from the Kuban in 1784.) The central North Caucasus turned into a zone where the Cossack defensive lines were interspersed with areas densely populated by highlanders. In the east, Daghestan was still officially classified as part of Transcaucasia, with no more than scattered enclaves of Russian colonization. Development of isolated Russian settlements here was hindered by a lack of available plots of land and the inherent insecurity of a system of scattered colonies. The relative decline in the geopolitical significance of this part of the region protected it to a certain extent from becoming the target of large-scale deportations. Daghestan and Chechnya were now deep inside the empire's outer border, which had been secured along the Black Sea coast and through the Armenian highlands. The risks posed to regions that were better integrated into the empire by weak imperial control over Chechen communities were being confronted through the continued build-up of Cossack defensive lines in Terek Province in 1860–1861 under Governor Nikolai Yevdokimov, build-ups that Governor Mikhail Loris-Melikov intended to continue in 1865–1866.

Overall, the center of gravity in Russia's colonization of the Caucasus shifted in the nineteenth century as Kizlyar, the first northeastern foothold, gradually found itself deep inside the empire's inner periphery. The bitter rivalry between Russia and the Ottoman Empire and the obvious economic and climactic advantages of the Kuban basin over the Caspian coast led to a marked change in military and economic priorities to colonization in the west. Beginning in the 1890s there were new attempts in Transcaucasia, if not to completely cover key areas with Russians, at least to create a more extensive network of Russian settlements. Efforts spearheaded by General

Table 15.1
Major Kuban and Terek Cossack Host Stanitsas (1913)

Kuban stanitsas are shaded yellow; Terek stanitsas are shaded blue.

	Stanitsa	Population	Number of Cossacks	Number of Allotted Plots	Total Stanitsa Allotment in Desiatinas (=1.09 hectares)
1	Labinskaya	35,519	4,028	1,251	20.876
2	Prokhladnaya	27,245	6,232	No data	26.858
3	Belorechenskaya	26,606	4,302	1,166	19.884
4	Slavianskaya	26,076	8,464	2,498	27.459
5	Starominskaya	24,834	17,314	4,419	56.760
6	Umanskaya	23,800	13,751	3,975	47.364
7	Korenovskaya	21,710	6,558	2,235	31.373
8	Petropavlovskaya	21,463	9,188	2,264	28.835
9	Pashkovskaya	21,118	13,853	2,604	21.930
10	Kanevskaya	20,179	10,601	2,932	40.295
11	Novopokrovskaya	19,600	12,125	3,632	56.602
12	Abinskaya	19,518	5,370	1,520	19.550
13	Staroshcherbinovskaya	19,323	13,951	4,196	52.624
14	Batalpashinskaya	18,794	8,019	2,357	42.024
15	Platnirovskaya	18,552	9,484	2,296	25.132
16	Urupskaya	18,470	8,252	2,201	27.183
17	Grigoripolisskaya	18,070	10,848	3,352	42.268
18	Petrovskaya	18,139	13,260	No data	29.665
19	Mikhailovskaya	17,892	7,501	2,212	26.049
20	Medvedovskaya	17,798	9,914	2,747	29.428
21	Novominskaya	17,269	10,722	2,946	39.057
22	Krymskaya	17,226	4,055	No data	16.030
23	Yekaterinovskaya	17,011	11,717	3,345	42.643
24	Poltavskaya	17,013	11,341	2,998	35.191
25	Uspenskaya	16,926	12,158	2,483	45.063
38	Yessentukskaya	14,717	9,112	No data	53.320
70	Kalinovskaya[a]	11,689	11,366	No data	71.157

[a]Kalinovskaya was the Terek stanitsa with the most Cossacks.
Source: "Alfavitnyi spisok naselennykh mest Kubanskoi oblast"; "Spisok naselennykh mest Terskoi oblasti."

Grigory Golitsyns, high commissioner of the Caucasian imperial administration that replaced the viceroyalty, to strengthen the Russian demographic presence in the Caucasus was a part of the overall imperial centralist trend and related to plans to reinforce the Russification of non-Slavic regions and more securely bind the country's ethnic periphery to its Russian core. The imperial authorities in the Caucasus received the following orders from St. Petersburg in 1912: "No matter how limited the available supply of land is in the Caucasus, it should be used to establish the Russian population. [It is essential] . . . that you pay particular attention to this and take all measures in your power to intensify and expedite the present directive" (*Obzor Dagestanskoi Oblasti*, p. 12). These efforts were partially realized through the formation of a network of rural plots for Russian settlers throughout Transcaucasia and the emergence of new urban settlements along railroad lines and on the outskirts of city centers. This is the period (1900–1913) when "Russian Mughan" appeared, a rural district densely populated by Orthodox Christians, on the former winter pastures of the Shahseven, a nomadic Turkic tribe.

LOCAL DETAIL

In the late nineteenth century, conflict between the authorities and the Doukhobors over attempts to make them subject to military conscription led many Doukhobors to leave the Caucasus for Canada (though it would be another hundred years before they left the Caucasus entirely). Villages abandoned by Doukhobors in Kars and Tiflis Provinces were then occupied by both Russian Orthodox settlers and local Armenian and Turkish populations.

By 1913–1914 the Cossacks of Kuban Province were being outnumbered by the inogorodnye (non-Cossack Slavic) population. The transformation of Kuban in the area of commercial farming, the trend toward Cossack lands being farmed by inogorodnye leaseholders, the stratification of the Cossacks as a class, and a growing rift between Cossacks and inogorodnye—all this formed the underpinnings of social antagonisms within the Russian population that would come to a head a few years later in the Civil War of 1918–1921. Table 15.1 shows total versus Cossack population and total number of plots allotted by Host

authorities within each stanitsa. Stanitsa numbers correspond to those on Map 15.

SOURCES

Maps: 18, 21, 38, 41, 50, 51, 52, 53, 58, 59, 62, 64.

References: "Alfavitnyi spisok naselennykh mest Kubanskoi oblast"; Barrett, "Linii neopredelennosti"; Breyfogle, *Heretics and Colonizers*; Gassiev, *Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe polozhenie tuzemtsev i kazakov*; Ismail-Zade, *Russkoe krest'ianstvo v Zakavkaz'e*; Iuvachev, "Zakavkazskie sektanty"; Karaulov, *Terskoe kazachestvo*; "Kratkii istoricheskii ocherk"; Kundukhov, "Memuary"; *Naselenie Zakavkazskogo kraia*; *Obzor Dagestanskoi oblasti*; *Polozhenie o voennom poselenii na Kavkaze*; Potto, *Dva veka Terskogo kazachestva*; Prozritelev, "Pervye russkie poseleniia"; *Severnyi Kavkaz v sostave Rossiiskoi imperii*, chap. 7; "Spisok naselennykh mest Kavkazskogo kraia"; "Spisok naselennykh mest Terskoi oblasti," 1915; "Spisok pereselencheskikh poselkov"; Velikaia, *Kazaki Vostochnogo Predkavkaz'ia*; Volkova, "Etnicheskie protsessy v Zakavkaz'e v XIX–XX vv."; Zasedateleva, *Terskie kazaki*.

Map 17

1763–1918: 155 Years of Non-Russian Colonization

Russian policy on colonization and resettlement was as complex and fraught with contradiction as the range of political forces and social and ethnic groups involved in its implementation. It changed both over time and in terms of its local objectives: it was selectively applied depending on the population in question and the specific reasons that drove the people to relocate. But the guiding principles of colonization policy can be seen in the government's changes of course as it applied various strategies to achieve its primary objective: building up the Russian presence in the region and securely binding the Caucasus to Russia. Shifts in administrative, cultural, or migration policy merely reflected the particular features of the empire's "national foundation" as seen by the political class, the Caucasus' senior administrators in particular.

Imperial colonization of the Caucasus was never a strictly ethnic Russian undertaking. Even Kizlyar began as a largely Armenian and Georgian colony and Mozdok as a center for Christianized Kabardins and Ossetians. Two inseparable features of the empire's national-cultural "body"—its multi-ethnicity and the presence of a dominant, core ethnic group—were manifested in Russia's absorption of the region. The Russian ethnic colonial mainstream incorporated Armenian, Greek, and German immigrants, and Ukrainians played an enormous role in the colonization of the Kuban region. The ethnic groups that assimilated the region into the empire included Estonians, Moldavians, Czechs, Bulgarians, Jews, Poles, and Latvians, among others.

The logic of colonization as a process that uses settlement to fortify the foundation of an empire that has an expressed ethnic and religious identity rests on discrimination (or, rather, an ethnopolitical order that assigns privileges) as an organizing principle in the assimilation of occupied territory. Russia's victories over the Persians and Ottomans and the empire's territorial acquisitions entailed the migration of significant groups of Turkic-speaking Muslims to the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, over the course of the nineteenth century Transcaucasia, and to a lesser extent the North Caucasus, experienced several waves of Christian (Armenian and Greek) immigration. The local Armenian population of eastern Armenia was enlarged by immigrants/repatriates from Persia and the Ottoman Empire: over the course of the Russo-Persian War (1827–1828), the Russo-Ottoman War of 1828–1829, and subsequent territorial acquisitions, approximately 130,000 "Turkish" and "Aderbaijani" (Persian) Armenians settled there. Russo-Turkish relations would later directly affect the fates of Armenians on both sides of the imperial border.

In 1817–1818 the first German colonies appeared in Transcaucasia (Neu-Tiflis, Marienfeld, Helenendorf, and Annenfeld). Unlike those of Russian religious minorities, German colonies were located in places that were more economically advantageous, close to cities or important transportation routes. It would become typical for Caucasian administrative centers to have a satellite agrarian German colony. The authorities' attitude toward German colonization could change according to the course the government was pursuing, a course that largely depended on Russia's foreign-policy situation. The view of Germans in the Caucasus, whose settlements were at first considered model agrarian communities by General Yermolov, head of the military and civil administration of the Caucasus when the first colonies were founded, would eventually be colored by "the struggle against German dominance [*nemetskoe zasilie*]," the fear during World War I that there were too many Russian Germans in positions of power. But as early as 1871 German colonists had largely lost their privileged status, which had included rights of self-government in their colonies, cultural autonomy, and exemption from military recruiting. Beginning in 1874 Germans in Russia were subject to general conscription (except for Mennonites, who were offered alternative civil service). In the early 1890s education in German colonies was gradually Russified, with Russian curricula and even Russian-language teaching, putting an end to the autonomous cultural life the Germans had previously enjoyed.

The attitude toward Armenian colonization also varied over time. While the region was being conquered militarily, Armenians were perceived primarily as an allied population that could help consolidate the empire in the Caucasus and that provided a reliable military resource. The building of Caucasian Armenia (that is, Russian as opposed to Turkish Armenia) was a joint Russian-Armenian military and political project. The influx of Armenian immigrants to Russia from the Ottoman Empire—essentially a migration taking place within the boundaries of historical Armenia—was initially supported by the authorities: Armenian communities in Javakhetia, Nakhichevan, and Zangezur became strongholds on the empire's southern frontiers. However, it became increasingly evident that Armenian immigration to Transcaucasia was overtaking Russian colonization, in terms of both demography and economics. In the 1880s and 1890s, those designing imperial policy began to see Armenian immigration as a direct "threat to the Russian cause in the Caucasus," as a Russian nationalist put it (Shavrov, *Novaia ugroza russkomu delu v Zakavkaz'e*). Armenian immigration—which strengthened the economic position of the native Armenian population in the Caucasus and expanded with the assistance of these Armenians—was beginning to encounter increasing resistance from the Russian imperial authorities. Arguments concerning the assimilation of Kars Province in 1878–1880 illustrate the obvious contradictions between the Russian and Armenian colonization projects. The wave of Armenian immigrants that entered Russia from the Ottoman Empire after the pogroms of 1894–1896 encountered a harsh response from the Russian authorities, who closed the border.

The clash of the two types of colonization being practiced in the region (by imperial design on the part of Russians and spontaneous immigration on the part of Armenians) illustrates one of the basic contradictions inherent in the Russians' colonization and empire-building in general—the contradiction between two strategies for consolidating the empire. In the first, the empire strengthens and expands the ethnic core through

Kuban and Terek Cossack Host territories
Territories under civilian administration or with predominating civilian population
Nogai, Kalmyk and Turkmen pastures as of 1917
Area of mixed population as of 1917 (highlanders, nomadic peoples, Russians, and Germans)
Highlander territories (within provinces under military administration)
Other territories under military administration as of 1917

Main areas of immigration (settlements)
German Estonian Czech Moldavian Georgian (in Kizlyar area)
Armenian Greek Assyrian Yazidi
(Armenian and Greek settlements are not shown in Kars and Batum Provinces)
Greeks 1869 Main directions of immigration with year
1781 Year when settlements were established
Russian settlements in Transcaucasia
Provincial boundaries as of 1917
Boundary of Russian Empire as of 1917
0 50 100 km

Don Host Province
Astrakhan Province
Kuban Province
Taurida Province
Stavropol Province
Terek Province
Kutais Province
Tiflis Province
Batum Province
Kars Province
Daghestan Province
Elisabethpol Province
Erivan Province
Baku Province
Sea of Azov
Black Sea
Caspian Sea
Gulf of Kizlyar
Ottoman Empire
Persia
L. Manych
L. Van

Yeysk, Olgenfeld 1866, Eigenheim 1871, Ruhental 1861, Mariental 1880, Roggenfeld, Michaelstal (Vorontsovka) 1852, Alexanderfeld (Aleksandrovka) 1852
Kronental (Nemetsko-Khaginskoe) 1878, Eesti-Haginsk (Esto-Khaginskoe) 1877
R.Yeya, R.Yegorlyk, R.Kalaus
Kerch, Temryuk, Yekaterinodar, Anapa, Novorossiisk, Gelenjik 1870, Maikop, Sochi, Tuapse, Sukhum, Poti, Batum, Samsun, Ordu, Giresun, Trabzon, Rize
Eigenfeld (Vannovskoe) 1868, Alexanderfeld (Leonovskoe) 1870, Semenovka 1863, Sonnental 1899, Gnadau (Dolinovka) 1884, Rosenfeld (Sheremetevskoe) 1872, Johannesdorf (Molochnaya) 1847, Stavropol, Armavir 1839, Marienfeld 1881, Liebental (Liwonia) 1874, Alexanderfeld (Aleksandrodar) 1864, Wohldemfuerst (Velikokniazheskoe) 1863, Fuerstendorf (Rozhdestvenskoe) 1864, Allmae 1867, Nagut 1864, Karras (Shotlandskaya) 1804, Pyatigorsk, Kislovodsk, Kanaan (Kanovo) 1841, Bethanien (Konstantinovskaya) 1837, Edissia (Kasaeva Yama) 1797
Blumenfeld (Khubiarovka) 1896, Friedrichsfeld (Zolotarevka) 1885, Martinsfeld 1867, Bethel 1878, Liebental 1908, Alexandrotal 1902, Dovsunskoe 1880, Karlsruhe, Wilhelmshoehe, Hermannsburg, Johannisheim
Major Colony 1786-91, Hoffnung (Kalantarovka) 1911, Karabagly (Sviatoy Krest, Surb Hach) 1799, Liebental (Brusilovka) 1908, Ruhental (Radkovka) 1866, Marianovka 1899, Olgenfeld 1895, Karlsfeld (Romanovka) 1897, Ebenfeld 1914, Miropol 1910, Reinfeld, Weizenfeld 1864, Peterstal 1909, Morgentau 1907, Waldheim
Karabagly 1790, Sasoplinskoe 1768, Kizlyar 1735, Mozdok 1763, Gnadenburg 1881, Sarafannikovo 1718, Strauchdorf (Yevgenievka) 1889, Romanovka 1900, Khasanai, Turshunai, Ebenfeld 1900, Schoenfeld, Freudenfeld (Ostrikovka) 1910, Eigenheim (Tatayurt) 1900, Lvovskie Khutora (Terek Mennonite settlements) 1901, Grozny, Khasavyurt, Hoffnungsfeld (Kokrek) 1910, Marienfeld (Yarokai) 1907, Novoaleksandrovka, Tsaredarovka, Petrovsk, Temir-Khan-Shura, Vladikavkaz, Nalchik, Alexanderdorf (Aleksandrovskaya) 1859, Hoffnungsfeld 1900, Eben-Ezer 1908, Emmaus, Neu-Lars 1887, Michaelsdorf (Mikhailovskaya) 1861
Derbent, Kusary, Kuba, Nukha, Shemakha, Baku, Barda, Gerusy, Shusha, Karabakh, Ivanovka, Alty-Agach, Khilmili, Petropavlovskoe, Prishib, Lenkoran
Tsagveri 1857, Georgstal 1910, Dzveli-Kanda 1882, Alexandersdorf 1818, Neu-Tiflis 1817, Petersdorf 1819, Freudental 1847, Marienfeld 1817, Tsalka, Tsintskaro 1813, Tiflis, Elisabethtal 1818, Traubenberg 1908, Tsarskie Kolodtsy, Alexanderhilf 1860, Katharinenfeld 1818, Vasilievka 1867, Gruental 1912, Waldheim 1911, Opreti, Shamlug 1787, Javakheti, Alekseyevka 1902, Yelizavetinka 1914, Gruenfeld 1906, Traubenfeld 1912, Annenfeld 1818, Georgsfeld 1885, Eigenfeld 1906, Slavianka, Elisabethpol, Helenendorf 1818, Russkie Borisy
Achkva, Dagva, Akhalsheni, Batum Province, Ardahan, Kars Province, Samavat 1879, Blagodarnoe, Petrovka, Vladikars, Novo-Selim, Sarikamish, Romanovo, Kars, Novoestonka 1886, Alexandropol, Shuragel, Pamb, Mirak, Talyn, Erivan Province, Erivan, Arzni 1830, Dvin Aisor 1830, Gel Aisor 1830, Koilasar 1830, Igdir, Surmalu, Davalu, Arazdaian 1878, Keshishkend, Sharur, Norashen, Siagut, Nakhichevan, Zangezur, L.Goktcha (Sevan), R.Kura, R.Arax, R.Alazani, R.Samur, R.Inguri, R.Rion, R.Malka, R.Terek, R.Sunzha, R.Kuma, R.Urup, R.Laba, R.Kuban, R.Psou, R.Bzyb
Armenians 1879-1880, 1894-1895
Greeks 1864-1869
Greeks 1915
Greeks 1829-1830, 1860s
Armenians 1829
Armenians, Greeks 1878-1880
Yazidis 1853-1877, 1915-1918
Assyrians 1915-1918
Armenians 1829-1830, 1894-1895, 1915-1918
Armenians 1828-1829
Assyrians 1828-1829

Krym-Gireevskoe, Grecheskoe 1864, Sablinskoe, Nagut 1864, Stavropol Province, Rosowka, Sarona, Marienbrunn 1910, Schoenfeld, Morgental, Nikolaifeld 1897, Grossfuerstental 1889, Ariwal 1913, Ulianovka, Orbelianovka, Kangly, Gartenfeld 1892, Tempelhof, Mineralnye Vody, Zmievogorskaya, Lysogorskaya, Zheleznovodsk, Karras, Mt. Beshtau, Blumenfeld, Nikolaevka, Yessentukskaya, Pyatigorsk, Bethanien, Goriachevodskaya, Terek Province, Kislovodskaya
Colonies in Pyatigorye

Settlements: Russian, Georgian, Megrelian, Svan, Greek, Armenian, German, Estonian, Moldavian
Loo, Plastunskoe 1881, Krasnaya Poliana, Estosadok, Mamaika, Medovei, Aibga, Dakhovsky Posad, Mikhelripsh, Sulewo, Nikolaevskoe, Khosta, Mekhadyr, Vysokoe, Salme, Moldovka 1870, Pilenkovo, Veseloe, Adler, Mariinskoe 1867, Gagry, Abkhaz villages, Mikhailovka 1881, Konstantinovka 1881, Andreevka, Pavlovka 1881, Baklanovka, Anukhva, Aleksandrovka 1866, Olginka 1866, Georgievka 1866, Azhara, Bambory 1835, Psyrtskha, Lata, Mtsara 1881, Besleti, Chermigovka 1885, Naa, Kelasuri 1882, Anastasievskoe 1882, Merkheuli 1879, Vladimirovka 1879, Estonskoe 1884, Gulripsh 1882, Dranda 1879, Babushery, Labra 1890, Ochamchiry, Abkhaz villages, Black Sea
Colonization in Abkhazia, 1866-1918

1763-1918: 155 Years of Non-Russian Colonization

the absorption of fragments of the non-Russian cultures at its periphery. In the second, it consolidates its Russian core by organically incorporating into its increasingly complex structure non-Russian fragments that still preserve their character. The actual effect of the Russification policy in the 1890s, modeled in accordance with the first strategy, was to reinforce not so much Russian ethnic identity as the identities of other ethnic groups. During this period there was an expansion of discriminatory practices, a hardening of ethnic identificational boundaries, and an intensification of ethnicity-based social conflicts. In the 1890s imperial policy makers began to see the relatively meager ethnic-Russian economic and demographic presence in Transcaucasia as a threat to the stability of imperial control there. In 1899 Transcaucasia was opened up to civilian Russian colonization, and in the early twentieth century an additional Russian colonization program was introduced, now against a backdrop of politicization and radicalization on the part of local ethnic elites.

These elites, given voice by political parties that were gaining in strength (some of which were regional branches of Russia-based parties whose reach extended throughout the empire), demanded an end to Russian colonization, changes favoring the representation of "Caucasian nationalities" in local civic offices and prestigious sectors of the region's economy, and the creation of "conditions guaranteeing complete freedom of self-determination for all nationalities" (*Kavkazskii zapros*). Open separatism was still a long way off, but against the backdrop of a burgeoning overall crisis in the empire, the creation of a federation began to be seen as the best design for the country. The question of the ethnic composition of territories arose, and the first drafts of plans for "national-territorial demarcation" of "autonomous ethnographic cantons" were drawn up. The overall dissatisfaction with the Russian imperial administration in the Caucasus was growing at a time when there was intensifying conflict among the local elites themselves. The fact that social boundaries might be made to correspond to ethnic ones combined with the ethnic mosaic of interspersed populations made an explosive blend that would fuel future inter-ethnic unrest. For example, in addition to the stratification between Cossacks and mountain populations there was the crisis between the economically successful and socially advanced Armenian community in Transcaucasia (the bourgeoisie and the urban proletariat) and the old Georgian aristocracy and agrarian population, which had not kept pace, to say nothing of the Turkic Muslim community and its young bourgeoisie.

LOCAL DETAIL

After the expulsion of Abkhaz from the central Sukhum District in 1866 and 1877–1878, the way was clear for multi-ethnic colonization (Russian, Greek, Armenian, Megrelian, German, Estonian). The high level of agrarian overpopulation in neighboring Megrelia led to a high rate of spontaneous colonization by Megrelian peasants. The clash between Georgian and Russian colonization projects in Abkhazia found ideological expression in debates among Georgians and Russians over the language to be used in church services for the Abkhaz population and the relative adaptive abilities of Russian and Megrelian (Georgian) migrants.

During colonization of Kars Province, the authorities created a line of Russian settlements along the new Alexandropol-Kars-Sarikamish railroad line. During this period colonization policy favored the creation of compact areas of Russian settlement in other regions of Transcaucasia and Daghestan as well.

In 1888–1892 new surges of migration by Muslim mountain populations (*muhajirun*) out of Kuban Province allowed the authorities to place new settlement colonies in what had formerly been the Laba and Urup military-native districts.

SOURCES

Maps: 22, 24, 41, 45, 48, 59, 64.

References:; *Dokumenty po vzaimootnosheniiam Gruzii s Severnym Kavkazom*; Esadze, *Istoricheskaia zapiska*, vol. 2; Felitsyn, "Chislovye dannye"; *Kavkazskii zapros*; Lakoba, *Ocherki politicheskoi istorii Abkhazii*; Lur'e, "Rossiiskaia imperiia kak etnokul'turnyi fenomen"; *Naselenie Zakavkazskogo kraia*; *Nemtsy Rossii*; "Ob utverzhdenii Polozheniia"; Plokhotniuk, *Rossiiskie nemtsy na Severnom Kavkaze*; *Programmy politicheskikh partii Rossii*; Shavrov, *Novaia ugroza russkomu delu v Zakavkaz'e*; Startsev, *Krovavye dni na Kavkaze*; Volkova, "Etnicheskie protsessy v Zakavkaz'e v XIX–XX vv."

Map 18

1886–1890: An Ethnolinguistic Map of the Caucasus

In the 1890s a range of problems associated with national identity began to dominate Caucasian political discourse. In all areas of life, social antagonisms began to take on an ethnic expression. Not only did the imperial administrators become obsessed with ethnodemographic (tribal, national) balance, but local elites increasingly cast ideas of social liberation and popular representation in specifically ethnic terms. The first vague plans for autonomy in Transcaucasia were emerging, and debates were erupting about the boundaries of "historical territories." Yet in spite of various historical and ideological approaches to determining territories, the existing network of administrative divisions continued to be used: any ideas about past or future borders inevitably became entangled with the existing administrative map and the need to "correct" it or, in some cases, ensure its permanence.

Map 18 shows how difficult it was in the Caucasus of the nineteenth century to draw territorial borders along ethnic lines without provoking rivalries among local groups throughout the region. Ethnically homogeneous areas existed side by side with interspersed or multi-ethnic enclaves. Not only provinces (oblasts and gubernias) but most of the districts of which they were constituted (okrugs and uezds)—not to mention the cities—were multi-ethnic. But at the same time, the majority of the Caucasus' individual rural settlements (as opposed to cities) maintained near-total ethnic homogeneity (the imperial statistical service generally had an easy task determining the tribal identification of communities). Thus the ethnoterritorial structure of the Caucasus countryside was characterized not by a mixed population but rather by a mosaic of local ethnic communities.

The complex ethnic structure of administrative units in which "native" inhabitants predominated was promoted by the imperial authorities and in some cases was entirely attributable to their efforts. The heterogeneous composition of the region reduced the threat that it might fragment into separate national areas. The rapid economic development of the Caucasus in 1880–1890 also heightened the ethnic mosaic effect in many parts of the region, strengthening the "imperial," heterogeneous, "not ethnically affiliated" nature of these territories. At the same time, given the backdrop of social problems, these factors—economic development and the growing complexity of the ethnic structure of key regional centers—also encouraged a growing demand for collective national rights and privileges, determined on a historical and ideological basis.

To some extent the imperial policy of ethnic selectivity that was aimed at establishing a certain tribal balance had also been carried out before the period of Russification. Underlying the openness of Russia's upper classes to members of local elites and the empire's seeming indifference to the ethnic origin of its loyal subjects was a keen awareness of tribal composition (both of administrative offices and the general population). The combining of ethnic groups in staffing and settlement policy and the attention to ethnicity as an organizing principle meant that this factor became increasingly significant in administrative policy, even among the region's ethnic, tribal elites themselves. Imperial policy was never designed to ignore ethnicity. On the contrary, it played different roles in this policy, which incorporated both blindness to tribal differences and rigid selectivity based on those differences. Such ethnic selectivity helped achieve various local objectives, such as "diluting" politically vulnerable native territories with loyal populations and maintaining a certain level of dominance and homogeneity in primarily Russian areas. In Kuban and Terek Provinces the aim was to maintain not ethnic dominance but the dominance of the Cossacks: non-Cossack Russians also encountered serious difficulties when they tried to settle in Host territories.

Imperial policy and economic growth were factors in the Caucasus' overall ethnic makeup and the development of the region's overall internal integrity. At the same time, ethnic interspersion along with agrarian overpopulation and the far from resolved contradictions in the system of land distribution posed a serious threat to the empire's designs for the region. Such a threat was present, in particular, in Terek Province, where interspersed groups were given different per-capita land allotments. In heated inter-group conflict the tsarist government strove to support, first and foremost, the status of the Cossacks, the empire's key social and military bulwark. Forced to accept a significant non-Host Russian population in Cossack districts, in the 1890s the provincial administration resorted to discriminatory measures that limited the number of highlanders allowed to migrate (for employment or settlement) to cities and Host lands. In particular, in 1893 a ban was instituted prohibiting highlanders who were not employed in government service from settling in Grozny and the Russian settlements (slobodas) of Vozdvizhenskaya, Vedeno, and Shatoi. Severe restrictions on freedom of movement for the mountain populations of this province helped preserve the relative ethnic homogeneity of Cossack districts and, to some extent, the highlanders' districts.

Beginning in the 1860s in Russia, and especially in the Caucasus, the sorts of ethnographic and statistical descriptions of governed territories typical for colonial empires in the second half of the nineteenth century became increasingly common. In the Caucasus the standardizing and sorting-out function of such descriptions continued a long-established tradition of military reconnaissance of the region's tribes and terrain. In peacetime the objective of this descriptive work was dictated by fiscal considerations and the need to collect various taxes and payments. Along with the tribal identity of groups and locales official forms of various sorts included the standard bureaucratic identification and enumeration of individual households and subjects. A picture of the population detailing social status, property, ethnicity, and religion was used in calculating specific types of payments levied on each group. The payments to which groups were subject varied greatly: Cossacks did not pay taxes but had significant military obligations, such as providing their own weapons, horses, and equipment; Muslims paid a special tax in place of the performance of military duties; peasants paid a household tax that was assessed on the basis of the property

0 50 100 km

Sea of Azov
Black Sea
Caspian Sea
Gulf of Kizlyar
L. Manych
R.Volga
R.Yeya
R.Yegorlyk
R.Kalaus
R.Kuban
R.Laba
R.Pekups
R.Urup
R.Zelenchuk
R.Malka
R.Terek
R.Sunzha
R.Kuma
R.Sulak
R.Rion
R.Alazani
R.Kura
R.Arax
L.Gokcha (Sevan)
L. Van

Astrakhan Province
Ottoman Empire
Persia

R u s s i a n s
Ukrainians
Kalmyks
Turkmen
Nogai
Nogai
Nogai
Russians
Armenians
Greeks
Germans
Germans
Germans
Russians and Greeks
Russians and Armenians
Czechs
Cherkess
Cherkess
Cherkess
Nogai
Abaza
Kabardins
Mountain Tatars
Chechens
Chechens
Chechens
Ingush
Kumyks
Ossetians
Svans
Abkhaz
Greeks
Abkhaz
Samurzakans
Megrels
Gurians
Imeretians
Georgians
Ossetians
Batsbi
Kistins
Dargins
Laks
Kaitags
Avars
Lezgins
Tats
Tatars
Tats
Udins
Armenians
Armenians
Armenians
Kurds
Kurds
Kurds
Karapapakhs
Turks
Ajarians
Greeks
Estonians
Moldavians
Dakhovsky
Gagry
Karachai
Balkars
Yezidis
Mountain Jews
Talysh
Russians
Yekaterinodar
Temryuk
Kerch
Anapa
Novorossiisk
Maikop
Armavir
Stavropol
Pyatigorsk
Georgievsk
Sviatoy Krest
Mozdok
Kizlyar
Astrakhan
Grozny
Vladikavkaz
Petrovsk
Temir-Khan-Shura
Derbent
Kuba
Zakataly
Signakh
Telav
Tiflis
Gori
Kutais
Poti
Batum
Artvin
Kars
Alexandropol
Elisabethpol
Nukha
Shemakha
Baku
Saliany
Lenkoran
Shusha
Erivan
Novy Bayazet
Nakhichevan
Sukhum
Abkhaz
Dushet
Tskhinval
Ossetians
Yekaterinodar

Ethnolinguistic groups represented on the map

1. Abkhaz
2. Abaza

Cherkess (Circassians, Adyghe), including:
3. Bzhedugs, Abadzekhs, Shapsugs
4. Beslenei
5. Kabardins

6. Ingush
7. Chechens
8. Batsbi
9. Kistins (Ingush)

10. Avars
11. Andi
12. Didoi
13. Dargins (including Kaitags, Kubachins)
14. Laks [Kazikumukhs]
15. Lezgins [Kiurins]
16. Tabasarans

17. Aguls
18. Tsakhurs
19. Rutuls
20. Archins
21. Kryz
22. Budugs
23. Udins
24. Khinalugs

25. Georgians (including Imeretians, Gurians, Pshavs, Tushins, Khevsurs, and Ingilois)
25a. Ajarians
26. Megrels (Mingrelians)
27. Svans
28. Laz (Chans)
29. Georgian Jews

30. Russians and Ukrainians
Czechs
Moldavians
31. Germans
32. Greeks

33. Ossetians
34. Kurds
35. Yezidis
36. Tats
37. Mountain Jews
38. Talysh
39. Armenians
39a. Khemshils
40. Azerbaijanis [Tatars]
40a. Turks Osmanli
40b. Karapapakhs
41. Karachais
42. Balkars [Mountain Tatars]
43. Kumyks
44. Nogai
45. Turkmen
46. Crimean and Astrakhan Tatars
47. Kalmyks
48. Estonians
49. Assyrians
50. Mordva

Ethnonyms that are no longer used are given in brackets

1886-1890: An Ethnolinguistic Map of the Caucasus

they owned, if any, and the average productivity of the lands they farmed, among other considerations.

At the end of the century Russia conducted its first national census, which enumerated the religious and linguistic characteristics of the population. Earlier still, in 1886, there had been a family-by-family accounting of the population that used a detailed, recently developed nomenclature of peoples living in the Caucasus. The explicitness of this nomenclature was to some extent facilitated by the clarity of linguistic and religious boundaries among many neighboring groups and by the fact that "dual identities" had not yet developed. The descriptions and classifications of peoples were probably designed to define local groups in terms of broader ethnotribal categories. However, with a few exceptions, such "outsider generalizations" always relied on the obvious linguistic, religious, or individual identity of the peoples in question. There was no need to invent peoples—they had already largely crystallized their self-identified boundaries within the framework of the imperial military and colonial assimilation of the region.

LOCAL DETAIL

By the 1880s the categories of "Taulins" and "Lezgins" had almost disappeared as generalized terms denoting Avars, Dargins, Laks, and other Daghestani groups except one. "Lezgins" was ultimately retained only for Kiurins and the population of Samur Valley. The only surviving local ethnonyms for denoting the Nakh-speaking population of Chechnya were "Chechens" and "Ingush." The Georgian term "Kistin" was applied more and more narrowly, and even the Kistins of Pankisi Gorge were called "Ingush" in Russian sources from the 1880s to the 1920s. Also notable was the continuing use in the late nineteenth century of several ethnic categories that would later be differently applied or discontinued: "Tatars" (or in rarer cases, "Azerbaijani Tatars") to denote Turkic-speaking Transcaucasian populations that would later be called "Azerbaijanis"; "Kiurins" for Lezgins; "Mountain Tatars" for today's Balkars (for whom the Kabardin term "Kushkha" [highlanders] was used to classify all communities between Mount Elbrus and the Darial Gorge, including Ossetians). The survival in imperial classification systems of various territorial and ethnic categories of the Kartvelian population is interesting. In particular, statistics for 1886 still separately list Georgians, Imeretians, Gurians, Pshavs, Khevsurs, and Tushins (sometimes in one category), as well as Megrels (Mingrelians), Laz, Svans, Ingilois, and Ajarians. Circassian or Adyghe peoples of Kuban Province, scattered in common villages, essentially became one people and were called by a common name (except for the Shapsugs of the Black Sea coast), or, rather, two common names: in the Soviet era, as a consequence of their division into separate administrative units, groups along the lower Kuban, Psekups, and Laba Rivers were assigned (or retained) the ethnonym "Adygheans" (Adygeitsy, related to Adygi, "Adyghe"), and those along the Zelenchuk and upper Kuban were identified as "Circassians" or Cherkess (Cherkesy). This nominal divergence makes it appear that the former were not Circassians and the latter not Adyghe, but this was clearly not the case. Given the absence of a common ethnonym, Digor and Iron Ossetians adopted the Georgian-Russian designation "Osetiny" (Ossetians) to express their unity across dialectical and religious differences and administrative boundaries. In 1893 Muslim Ossetians were allowed to serve in the military on the same footing as Christian Ossetians, and were not included in the general exemption from national conscription that existed for other groups of Caucasian Muslims. Finally, ethnic statistics at this time reveal a certain ambivalence on the part of officials concerning whether to keep the category "Malorossy" ("Little Russians," a designation used for Ukrainians). It would come and go within the "Russian" category. Linguistic criteria apparently led the two groups to be categorized separately in some censuses (those of 1886–1897, for example), but in the Caucasus, political considerations and shared membership in the Cossack estate apparently prevented the divergence of Russian and Ukrainian identity. Identity based on estate and the distinction between Cossacks and muzhiks (Russian peasants) seemed to have greater salience throughout the region.

SOURCES

Maps: 38, 41, 44, 46, 47, 50, 54, 130.

References: Anchabadze and Volkova, *Etnicheskaia istoriia Severnogo Kavkaza XVI–XIX veka*; Chavchavadze, *Armianskie uchenye i vopiiushchie kamni*; *Naselenie Zakavkazskogo kraia*; O nekotorykh izmeneniiakh"; "O vopreshchenii gortsam selit'sia v nekotorykh punktakh Terskoi oblasti"; Silaev, "Migratsionnaia politika"; "Spisok naselennykh mest Kavkazskogo kraia"; "Spisok naselennykh mest Kubanskoi oblasti"; "Spisok naselennykh mest Terskoi oblasti," 1900; "Statisticheskie tablitsy naselennykh mest Terskoi oblasti"; Volkova, "Etnicheskie protsessy v Zakavkaz'e v XIX–XX vv"; Volkova, *Etnicheskii sostav naseleniia*.

Map 19

1886–1890: A Religious Map of the Caucasus

The region's ethnic composition must be seen in terms not only of linguistic or territorial groups but also of religious groups, whose boundaries do not always coincide with linguistic or tribal boundaries. Religious identity often had greater political relevance than tribal identity, especially for elites, and a much more powerful influence on the dynamic of political processes in the region than ethnic considerations.

During the initial phases of Russia's takeover of the Caucasus, religious imperatives played a leading role in the ideology underlying imperial geopolitical objectives. For a long time religious affiliation remained predominant in the imperial perception of the various peoples that populated the region. It was viewed as a key category for understanding and regulating the conquered lands. A major factor in this perception was the geopolitical competition between the imperial states of Christian Russia and Muslim Turkey and Persia. An ideology that viewed Christians as "suffering under Muslim oppression" was occasionally invoked within this geopolitical competition. The evidence offered in support of this ideology by the historical reality of, for example, Safavid rule over the kingdoms of eastern Georgia was far from straightforward (and shows that the Georgian elite enjoyed a degree of self-rule and integration into Persian power structures and society). Nevertheless, the Orthodox empire took under its wing first coreligionist Georgia and, somewhat later, another Christian people, the Armenians, led by their Apostolic Church. Christians were identified as a group that needed to be defended and as allies of Russian empire building, while Muslims were potential enemies.

But religious solidarities and animosities served more as a force that shaped and assisted imperial expansion than as motivation for it. The way in which these solidarities and animosities were exploited can be seen in the fact that in some cases they were ignored while in others they provided the logic for decision making and the basis for either creating or destroying coalitions.

Even during the early stages of Russia's incorporation of the Caucasus, religious ideology had to be balanced against pragmatic military and political considerations. For example, the fact that a portion of the region's Muslim elite—from Daghestan to Kabarda, from Kazakh to Talysh—preferred Russian dominion to Persian or Ottoman dominion and the support the local irregular forces offered in military actions were important factors in the success of Russia's imperial expansion. On the other hand, by the late eighteenth century the expansion of Russia's Orthodox empire was already turning Islam into one of the central ideologies motivating resistance to this expansion. Islam—at least in Daghestan and Chechnya—thus served as an important identifying criterion for ethnic and social groups involved in resistance. Beginning around 1785–1790, Islamization in the northern Caucasus began to serve as a means for overcoming differences of social status and ethnicity in attempts to consolidate forces opposing Russia (whether militarily, through Sheikh Mansur's movement in Chechnya, or legally, through the sharia movement in Kabarda). In 1820–1860, this Islamization took the form of the militant state religion of the imamate, as well as Sufi branches of Islam, which were more deeply engrained in popular tradition (in particular, the Qadiriyyah tariqah, one of most influential Sufi orders, led in Chechnya by Kunta-Hajji Kishiev).

After the Caucasus War, religious preferences found expression in some discriminatory norms that endured into the period of peaceful integration of the region by Russia. For the most part discriminatory measures took the form of instances of state expropriation of *waqf* property (properties belonging to an Islamic trust or bequeathed to mosques), a prohibition on preaching in non-Muslim environments, the encouragement of conversion to Christianity by Muslims and near-prohibition of conversion to Islam by Christians, and the lack of Muslim educational institutions. In 1904–1905 there were demands for "imperial orders to reexamine regulations regarding the religious life of Muslims and reinforce the principles of religious tolerance." In 1909 a Muslim member of the State Duma again expressed the need to "do away with the privileges of the state church and the deprivation of Muhammadans' rights" (*Kavkazskii zapros*, p. 177). However, even the empire's clearly stated historical trinity of "autocracy, Orthodoxy, and nationality" (*Samoderzhavie, Pravoslavie, Narodnost*) did not stop Russia from being simultaneously an Orthodox and a Muslim country, a nation where religious tolerance varied in accordance with the dictates of pragmatism and where Muslims enjoyed significant cultural autonomy. It is illustrative that Orthodox missionary work was not imposed on unreceptive populations. Instead the Society for the Restoration of Orthodox Christianity in the Caucasus (which succeeded the Ossetian Spiritual Commission of 1771–1791 and 1814–1860) limited its activities to the Ossetian, Abkhaz, and Kalmyk population, as well as, with less success, the Kistins of Pankisi Gorge in Tiflis Province.

By the 1890s religious criteria increasingly gave way to ethnic (national) considerations in imperial political thinking. This process was most evident in Transcaucasia, where imperial authorities were being challenged on political and ethnic grounds, most vociferously by Christians. Growing demands for the restoration of the autocephaly of the Georgian Orthodox Church evolved into a movement for Georgian national autonomy. The abolition of autocephaly began to be seen by the Georgian population as a step toward the disappearance of Georgia itself, especially given the 1904 prohibition on teaching the Georgian language in parish schools. Even more pronounced was the conflict between the authorities and the Armenian Apostolic Church, which in many ways served as the infrastructure not only for the spiritual life of Armenians both in Russia and Turkey but also for political life. After the decision in 1903 to place church property under government control, a wave of Armenian terrorist acts began against top officials of the imperial administration in the Caucasus.

For the majority of Caucasian Muslims, affiliation with Islam was their dominant group identity, largely superseding ethnic (tribal) distinctions. Transcaucasian Turks and Tats,

0 50 100 km

Sea of Azov
Black Sea
Caspian Sea
Ottoman Empire
Persia
L. Manych
L. Van
Gulf of Kizlyar
R.Volga
R.Yeya
R.Yegorlyk
R.Kalaus
R.Kuban
R.Ulrup
R.Laba
R.Kuma
R.Malka
R.Terek
R.Sunzha
R.Sulak
R.Inaur
R.Rion
R.Alazani
R.Samur
R.Kura
R.Arax
L.Gokcha (Sevan)

Don Host Province
Astrakhan Province
Kuban Province
Stavropol Province
Terek Province
Kutais Province
Tiflis Province
Daghestan Province
Kars Province
Erivan Province
Elisabethpol Province
Baku Province

Yeysk
Kerch
Temryuk
Yekaterinodar
Anapa
Novorossiisk
Maikop
Armavir
Stavropol
Sviatoy Krest
Georgievsk
Pyatigorsk
Mozdok
Kizlyar
Grozny
Vladikavkaz
Petrovsk
Temir-Khan-Shura
Derbent
Dakhovsky
Gagry
Sukhum
Poti
Kutais
Batum
Akhaltsikh
Artvin
Gori
Dushet
Tiflis
Telav
Signakh
Zakataly
Nukha
Kuba
Shemakha
Baku
Saliany
Lenkoran
Kars
Alexandropol
Erivan
Novy Bayazet
Elisabethpol
Shusha
Nakhichevan

Religion

Christians
1 Orthodox
Old Believers
2 Doukhobors and Molokans
3 Armenian-Gregorian
4 Roman Catholics, including Armenian Catholics
5 Protestants (Lutherans, Evangelicals, and Mennonites)

Muslims
6 Sunnis
7 Shiites

8 Jews and Sabbatarians (Subbotniks)
9 Buddhists
10 Yazidis

1886-1890: A Religious Map of the Caucasus

Table 19.1
Population Distribution by Religion, 1886–1890 (in thousands)

	Christians					Muslims			
	Orthodox	Sectarians	Armenian-Gregorians	Lutherans/ Mennonites	Roman Catholics/ Armenian Catholics	Sunnis	Shiites	Jews	Yazidis
Kuban Province (Kubanskaya Oblast)	1,252.6	16.2	11.4	7.8 / 1.1	6.4 / —	107.5	—	5.6	—
Terek Province (Terskaya Oblast)	382.7	32.8	17.5	8.3 / —	2.2 / —	446.5	—	7.1	—
Stavropol Province (Stavrpolskaya Oblast)	620.8	7.0	4.7	5.4 /—	0.8 / —	43.8	—	1.2	—
Black Sea District (Chernomorsky Okrug)	14.3	—	1.0	0.5 / —	1.0 / —	1.4	—	—	—
Tiflis Province (Tiflisskaya Gubernia)	495.8	12.2	179.8	5.1 / —	4.8 / 16.2	68.1	19.5	7.6	—
Kutais Province (Kutaisskaya Gubernia)	797.5	—	7.6	1.0 / —	0.7 / 8.9	96.9	1.3	7.1	—
Elisabethpol Province (Yelisavetpolskaya Gubernia)	1.6	6.6	264.8	1.9 / —	— / —	183.7	264.5	1.8	—
Zakataly District (Zakatalsky Okrug)	5.4	—	0.7	—	—	93.9	—	—	—
Baku Province (Bakinskaya Gubernia)	24.2	18.2	55.1	—	1.1 / —	235.7	290.5	1.9	—
Erivan Province (Erivanskaya Gubernia)	3.1	3.0	369.6	— / —	0.3 / 5.7	30.0	246.5	—	11.3
Daghestan Province (Dagestanskaya Oblast)	5.6	—	1.1	—	0.2 / —	568.3	9.0	2.0	—
Kars Province (Karsskaya Oblast)	24.9	10.0	36.0	— / 0.8	0.5 / —	79.3	11.9	—	2.0

Source: "Raspredelenie naseleniia Zakavkaz'ia i Severnogo Kavkaza."

Kurds and Talysh, Ajarians and Meskhis at the border of the Russian and Ottoman Empires saw themselves as Muslims first and foremost. Kartvelian-speaking Ajarians and Ingilois, like Meskhis and Laz, became objects of rivalry between various "national consolidation" projects that strove to overturn one of these groups' two cultural underpinnings—Georgian or Turkic-Muslim—in favor of the other. Much later, when the political weight of religion was on the wane, being culturally Muslim offered an "alternative" to the Georgian option: unlike Ajarians and Laz within Russian imperial and later Soviet Georgian borders, who became Georgians, Turkish Ajarians and Laz became Turks. This example, in particular, points to the following processes taking shape in the Caucasus.

First, religious affiliation was used in drawing ethnic boundaries, and religion was seen as a "national" attribute, a cultural nucleus or, at the very least, a marker indicating nationality. Such was the role played by Orthodoxy for Russians and Georgians and to some extent by Islam for the young Azerbaijani nation, just as Islam would later provide a shared identity for Turkic, Tat, Kurd, and Talysh groups within Transcaucasia. The Armenian ethnic nation was largely determined by its faith-based boundaries, above and beyond imperial boundaries, and by the organizational traditions and cultural power of its church. In these and many other cases there was a strong connection between the ethnic and religion-based "collective self" that increased the distinctiveness of the groups that claimed these affiliations and the unique rigidness or, in some cases, selective openness of their delineation. Religion not only symbolized national distinctiveness; it became its focal point. To be Russian meant to be Orthodox, and many religious minorities found themselves standing outside the boundaries of Russianness, or walking a fine line between being "Russian" and, for instance, "Jewish" (as in the case of Geirim, Russian Sabbatarians).

In addition, religion-based boundaries broke up some ethnic and linguistic groups, separating a religious minority from the co-ethnic majority. These minorities became the objects of ideological and political contention between ethnic elites and the leaders of a number of nation-building projects. The various possible evolutions of such minorities included development into a "separate" people (as in the case of the Yazidi Kurds); splitting into competing identities (as did the Meskhis); or the consistent dominance of national identity over other divisions (as was the case with Sunni and Shiite Azerbaijanis, Muslim Ossetians, Orthodox Christian Kabardins, Muslim Georgian Ajarians, Roman Catholic Armenians, and Doukhobor and Molokan Russians in the Soviet Caucasus). The probability that any given scenario would play out depended strongly on the initial circumstances, particularly how long ago the group was religiously, politically, or territorially divided and whether its cultural bonds were strong enough to ultimately overcome division. The forces of religion dividing Ossetians into Muslims and Christians were easily outweighed by their shared culture and the integrating forces of politics.

These scenarios are never the inevitable consequences of initial circumstances. They depend to a large extent on what identificational trend or trajectory turns out to be politically dominant, who controls the areas inhabited by religious minorities, and what nationalities policies (the strategies of political elites) are practiced within these territories.

SOURCES

Maps: 33, 34, 38, 41, 43, 48, 49.

References: Arapov, "Imperskaia politika"; Avalov, *Prisoedinenie Gruzii k Rossii*; Gedeon, *Istoriia khristianstva*; Ismail-Zade, *Russkoe krest'ianstvo v Zakavkaz'e*; *Kavkazskii zapros*; *Naselenie Zakavkazskogo kraia*; "Raspredelenie naseleniia Zakavkaz'ia i Severnogo Kavkaza po veroispovedaniiam"; *Severnyi Kavkaz v sostave Rossiiskoi imperii*, chap. 11; "Spisok naselennykh mest Kavkazskogo kraia"; "Statisticheskie tablitsy naselennykh mest Terskoi oblasti"; *Stavropol'skaia guberniia* (1879); Volkova, "Etnicheskie protsessy v Zakavkaz'e v XIX–XX vv."

Map 20

1913: Land and Ethnicity in Terek Province

One of the enduring sources of social tension in the 1890s was relations between Cossacks and mountain populations in Terek Province (Terskaya Oblast). Agrarian overpopulation in highlander districts, especially in communities that had remained in the mountains, forced highlanders to lease surplus Cossack holdings, thus putting them in a dependent position. The most problematic situations developed in places where highlanders now had to pay rent for lands that they had used before the arrival of the Cossacks (for example, in Assa Gorge and along the Sunzha and Kambileevka Rivers east of Vladikavkaz). Furthermore, relations among some of the mountain populations themselves were far from tranquil. Significant discrepancies in how much farm and pasture lands mountain populations had access to exacerbated tensions along the borders between groups. (In the case of relations between Ossetians and Ingush, the points of contention had little or nothing to do with the allocation of lands, although neither group had much land.) Amid these tensions, lines between "ethnic territories" were often blurred by the lease or purchase of plots from private landowners or rural communities and the founding of farmsteads and villages by members of another ethnic group or a different estate, as in the case of non-Cossack Russians settling on Cossack lands.

Perhaps because of these tensions, Terek Province in the early twentieth century was a region where the formation of administrative borders was influenced by particular sensitivity to the distribution of ethnic settlements. The relatively compact and ethnically homogeneous distribution of mountain populations combined with uninterrupted stretches of Cossack settlements was reflected in the administrative division of the province into districts populated by Cossacks (otdels) and districts populated by a particular mountain people (okrugs). There were, however, exceptions to the rule: in particular, Balkar mountain communities shared Nalchik District (Nalchiksky Okrug) with Kabarda, while the Khasavyurt District (Khasavyurtovsky Okrug) incorporated Chechen Aukh communities, part of Salatau (Avar Salatavia), and the Kumyk plain, with countless farmsteads owned by members of different ethnic groups—from Chechens to German Mennonites. But these exceptions only serve to underscore a certain overall administrative logic to this model: ethnic criteria in the government's organization of the territory, while dominant, could not be exclusive. The application of such criteria was limited by considerations of agriculture and economy, terrain, military strategy, and other features of a given territory. This was clear to Russian military administrators from their first encounters with the complications inherent in land distribution in Terek Province. As one administrator noted in characterizing the connection between Kabardin and mountain (Balkar) communities, "In terms of differences of language and custom [they] can never constitute one tribe and one territory, but in terms of geographic and economic conditions they cannot be divided by clear land boundaries without detriment to one or the other" (Loris-Melikov, "Raport Nachal'nika Terskoi oblasti Glavnokomanduiushchemu Kavkazskoi Armiei").

Administrative borders, then, were neither arbitrary nor unfounded bureaucratic inventions, but instead reflected a dominant governmental model with adjustments based on a group of factors having to do with ethnic and economic ties or the accessibility of terrain for administrative control. Contemporary views concerning the "arbitrary" setting of administrative borders within the empire in which ethnic factors were not taken sufficiently into account oversimplify the historical picture. It is not entirely clear just what sort of ideal yardstick would have been needed before ethnic boundaries would have been considered "sufficiently taken into account." It is presumed, evidently, that the more painstakingly administrative borders were traced along ethnic borders, the less arbitrary they would be. But even the sort of matching of administrative borders to ethnic ones seen in Terek Province created an exceptionally complex configuration of interspersed ethnic segments. The gradual blurring of the edges of ethnic areas through the process of leasing plots and the creation of farmsteads, and the overall practice of economic migration, inevitably created a need for the borders to be periodically adjusted. The subsequent proliferation of scattered ethnic enclaves within districts that had a relative abundance of available land made the most painstaking attempts to use ethnic criteria relative at best. It is clear that attempts to bring administrative borders as close as possible to ethnic ones (taking ethnic factors "sufficiently into account") could easily reach the point of absurdity.

The relatively close match between ethnic and administrative boundaries in Terek Province had another important effect. This overlap helped compactly populated ethnic areas (territories in which throughout history one group had traditionally predominated, or "homelands") acquire enduring administrative definition. Ethnic boundaries gradually took on the formal, legal significance of proto-national boundaries—that is, boundaries enclosing territories where a collective, informal primacy was being asserted. The borders and composition of future titular Soviet autonomies could already be discerned in the contours of Terek Province's administrative divisions, although at the time of the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917 mountain populations still did not have even the rudiments of statehood. But they did have their "own" districts of Terek Province (and all of Daghestan Province), homelands that had been to some extent administratively fixed and the boundaries of which came close to ethnic boundaries. Specifically, these districts would become the territorial basis for the national political entities in the North Caucasus that would later be sanctioned by the Soviet authorities.

LOCAL DETAIL

The most heated conflicts over land developed across the entire perimeter where Cossack settlements adjoined Chechen and Ingush rural communities. In 1905 lands belonging to Ingush rural communities were taken out of the Cossack Sunzha

20 1913: Land and Ethnicity in Terek Province

20 km

Stavropol Province [Stavropolskaya Gubernia]
Kuban Province [Kubanskaya Oblast]
Kutais Province [Kutaisskaya Gubernia]
Tiflis Province [Tiflisskaya Gubernia
Daghestan Province [Daghestanskaya Oblast]
Astrakhan Province
Caspian Sea
Greater Caucasus Mountain Range
Anketeri Sands
Salatau
Achikulak District [Achikulakskoe Pristavstvo]
Turkmen District [Trukhmenskoe Pristavstvo]
Kara-Nogai District [Karanogaiskoe Pristavstvo]
Pyatigorsk District [Pyatigorsky Otdel]
Mozdok District [Mozdoksky Otdel]
Kizlyar District [Kizlyarsky Otdel]
Nalchik District [Nalchiksky Okrug]
Nalchik District
Sunzha District [Sunzhensky Otdel]
Nazran District
Vladikavkaz District [Vladikavkazsky Okrug]
Nazran District [Nazranovsky Okrug]
Grozny District
Grozny District [Groznensky Okrug]
Vedeno District [Vedensky Okrug]
Khasavyurt District [Khasavyurtovsky Okrug]
State treasury land
Mennonite Colonies

Pyatigorsk, Kislovodsk, Georgievsk, Mozdok, Kizlyar, Nalchik, Vladikavkaz, Grozny, Khasavyurt, Temir-Khan-Shura

Sviatoy Krest, Pokoinoe, Levokumskoe, Ternovka, Velichaevka, Ozek-Suat, Vladimirovka, Praskoveya, Orlovskoe, Arkhangelskoe, Privolnoe, Niny, Novogrigorievskoe, Vorotsovo-Aleksandrovskoe, Otkaznoe, Novozavedennoe, Soldato-Aleksandrovskoe, Obilnoe, Olgino, Stepnoe, Solomenskoe, Orta-Tyube, Ui-Salgan, Alikuyu, Terekli-Mekteb, Aleksandriiskaya, Illarionovsky, Urukhskaya, Nezlobnaya, Konstantinovskaya, Karras, Suvorovskaya, Bekeshevskaya, Kangly, Yessentukskaya, Borgustanskaya, Mikhailovskoe, Kislovodskaya, Abukovo, Zolskaya, Novopavlovskaya, Mariinskaya, Gosudarstvennaya, Rostovanovka, Kurskaya, Kanovo, Edissia, Prokhladnaya, Yekaterinogradskaya, Pavlodolskaya, Gnadenburg, Bekovich, Terskaya, Galiugaevskaya, Ishcherskaya, Naurskaya, Mekenskaya, Chulik-Yurt, Nogaimirza-Yurt, Naur, Katinovskaya, Nikolaevskaya, Chervlennaya, Shelkovskaya, Grebenskaya, Shchedrinskaya, Staro-Yurt (Tolstov-Yurt), Petropavlovskaya, Braguny, Engel-Yurt, Kadi-Yurt, Gudermes, Gerzel, Eliskhan-Yurt, Bilt-Aul, Tsentoroi, Bachi-Yurt, Yaryksu-Aukh, Kishen-Aukh, Zandak, Enderi (Andreevo), Aktash-Aukh, Dylym, Guni, Burtunai, Almak, Chirkei, Zubut, Miatli, Novoaleksandrovka, Tsaredarovka, Kumtorkale, Kostek, Chont-Aul, Temir-Aul, Baitam-Aul, Bata-Yurt, Kandaur-Aul, Botash-Yurt, Vladimirovka, Aksai, Stroukhdorf, Kazma-Aul, Khamza-Yurt, Kazi-Yurt, Marienfeld (Yarokai), Vanderloo, Rohrbach, Hoffnungsfeld, Shamkhal-Yangiyurt, Beriuzak, Serebriakovskaya Pristan, Shandriukovskaya Pristan, Briansk, Cherny Rynok, Talovka, Koktubei, Razdolye, Yurkovka, Tarumovka, Karabagly, Areshevka, Serebriakovka, Aleksandro-Nevskaya, Aleksandriiskaya, Borozdinskaya, Dubovskaya, Kargalinskaya, Kurdiukovskaya, Staroguladkovskaya, Romanovka, Tamaza-Tyube, Babayurt, Freudenfeld, Muzhukai, Eigenheim, Neuhoffnung, Gemé, Tatianovka, Kazma-Aul, Rohrbach, Mennonite Colonies, Kumtorkale, Temir-Khan-Shura, Kazanishchi, Jengutai, Durgeli, Kadar, Urma, Levashi, Gergebil, Khunzakh, Gunib, Salty, Chokh, Tsudakhar, Akusha, Sogratl, Kumukh, Bezhta, Botlikh, Tlokh, Ansalta, Godoberi, Karata, Andi, Arguani, Erpeli, Gimry, Untsukul, Khimoi, Sharoi, Dai, Makazhoi, Itumkale, Akki, Shatoi, Dattykh, Alkun, Targim, Metskhal, Lars, Mt. Kazbek, Stepantsminda, Zaramag, Nar, Lailashi, Tsageri, Lentekhi, Chiora, Utsera, Oni, Tsesi, Sadmeli, Khvanchkara, Mestia, R.Ingur, Balkar, Bezingi, Urusbiev, Mt.Elbrus, Kholam, Chegem, Kashkatay, Kaisyn-Anzorovo, Kogolkino, Argudan, Gundelen, Khabaz, Khasaut, Karmovo, Babukovo, Ashabovo, Atazhukino, Baksanskoe, Navruzovo, Kudenetovo, Tambievo, Shalushka, Klishbievo, Kasaevo, Novo-Poltavskoe, Novo-Ivanovskoe, Inalovo, Tambievo, Bulatovo, Barokovo, Murtazovo, Elkhotovo, Zmeiskaya, Akhlovo, Sagopsh, Psedakh, Achaluk, Kantyshevo, Surkhakhi, Bazorkino, Tulatovo, Dargkokh, Ardonskaya, Arkhonskaya, Magometanskoe, Khristianskoe, Ardon, Kadgaron, Alagir, Donifars, Fasnal, Stur-Digora, Mizur, Sadon, Arkhon, Dagom, Lats, Dargavs, Saniba, Troitskaya, Sleptsovskaya, Samashkinskaya, Yermolovskaya, Assinskaya, Feldmarshalskaya, Galashki, Achkhoi, Gekhi, Goity, Urus-Martan, Alkhan-Yurt, Chechen-Aul, Aldy, Atagi, Shali, Germenchik, Avtury, Gunoi, Benoi, Vedeno, Dyshne-Vedeno, Dargo, Khatuni, Makhkety, Kharachoi, Vozdvizhenskaya, Shalazhi, Yalkhoroi, Shatoi, Khasaut, Khabaz, Karmovo, Babukovo, Ashabovo, Atazhukino, Baksanskoe, Navruzovo, Kudenetovo, Tambievo, Shalushka, Klishbievo, Kasaevo, Novo-Poltavskoe, Novo-Ivanovskoe, Inalovo, Tambievo, Gundelen, Nalchik, Argudan, Kaisyn-Anzorovo, Kogolkino, Kashkatay, R.Cherek, R.Baksan, R.Malka, R.Tomuzlov, R.Kuma, R.Terek, R.Sunzha, R.Asso, R.Argun, R.Andi Koisu, R.Sulak, R.Aksai, Novoseltsy, Chernolesskoe, Aleksandrovskoe, Kruglolesskoe, Krym-Gireevskoe, Sablinskoe, Nagut, Kurshava

Legend

- 1 / 1a / 1bc — Terek Cossack Host lands (stanitsas), including of: 1a. Ossetians-Cossacks; 1b. Georgians-Cossacks; 1c. Armenians-Cossacks
- 2a / 2b — Russian non-Cossack villages: 2a. On private and rented lands; 2b. On state lands
- 3 — Kabardin village lands
- 3a — Kabardin communal forests
- 4 — Kabardin communal pastures (communal pastures of the villages of Nalchik District)

Mountain Communities (including settlements located on privately owned, rented, or temporarily alotted lands)

- 5 — Abazin village lands
- 6 — [Mountain Tatar] Balkar and Karachai (6a) village lands
- 7 — Ossetian village lands
- 8 — Ingush village lands
- 9 — Chechen village lands
- 10 — Kumyk village lands
- 11 — [Taulin] Avar village lands
- 12 — Nogai village and pasture lands
- 13 — Armenian village lands
- 14 — German colony lands
- 15 — Municipal lands (including slobodas)
- 2, 3, 4… — Private lands with ethnically mixed populations
- Forest and individual plots owned by the imperial treasury

- Mozdok — Cities
- Nalchik — Mestechkos, slobodas (small towns)
- *Tarskaya* — Villages, auls, stanitsas
- > 10,000 inhabitants
- > 5,000
- > 3,000
- > 1,000
- < 1,000
- Borders of provinces as of 1913
- Borders of districts as of 1913
- Active railways as of 1913
- Railways under construction

Table 20.1
Cossack and Highlander Districts of Terek Province at the Time of the Russian Revolution

	Population (in thousands)[a]	Cossack (%)	Russian (%)	Highlander (%)	Predominant Ethnic Group	Christian / Muslim (%)	Desiatina (= 1.09 hectares) of usable land per (male) capita[b]
Highlander Districts (Okrugs)							Total
Vladikavkaz	127.1	0	1.7	96.2	Ossetian	81.7 / 18.3	4.2
Vedeno	113.5	0	0.2	99.7	Chechen	0.2 / 99.8	3.2
Grozny	118.9	0	2.7	97.3	Chechen	2.7 / 97.3	4.8
Nazran	56.5	0	0.7	99.3	Ingush	0.7 / 99.3	3.9
Nalchik	150.1	0	13.0	84.1	Kabardin and Mountain Tatar (Balkar)	14.8 / 84.2	9.7
Khasavyurt	81.5	0	18.5	66.8	Kumyk, Chechen, Avar, Russian, Nogai	24.7 / 72.9	9.8
Cossack Districts (Otdels)							Total (Host Total)
Kizlyar, including Kara-Nogai Pristavstvo	112.5	48.6	70.5	0.4	Russian / Nogai	72.8 / 26.5	25.8 (15.8)
Mozdok	87.8	68.9	79.7	11.4	Russian	98.5 / 1.5	12.2 (13.6)
Pyatigorsk	109.7	59.8	92.8	0.2	Russian	99.2 / 0.8	8.3 (10.8)
Sunzha	69.4	87.0	99.6	0.1	Russian	99.9 / 0.1	6.8 (7.2)

[a]Data as of 1912.
[b]Data as of 1907.
Source: Gassiev, *Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe polozhenie*; "Statisticheskii ezhegodnik."

District and made into a separate district, the Nazran District. A proportion of Ingush and Chechen settlements were located on lands leased from Cossacks that remained in Sunzha District, a large part of which was perceived by the Ingush and Chechens as alienated historical territory. Relations between Ossetians and the Ingush, though mostly free of land rivalry, remained uneasy after 1906, when Ossetian and Cossack villages became involved in armed clashes with neighboring Ingush villages.

Lesser Kabarda, which since 1883 had been a part of the Cossack Sunzha District and was populated by a variety of ethnic groups, in 1905 was again integrated into Nalchik District. At the same time the land-use boundaries along the southern perimeter of Greater Kabarda (which was relatively rich in farmlands and pastures) and the leasing relationships associated with them continued to be fine-tuned and adjusted, as did the boundaries of land-poor mountain communities, Balkar and Karachai communities first and foremost. So-called surplus Kabardin pasture lands, as well as the Kabardin communal forest that separated the plains of Kabarda from Karachai and Balkar communities, became objects of economic land-distribution conflicts and later of ethnic territorial disputes. The pillaging of farmsteads and privately owned estates became a routine phenomenon for the province and began to be perceived by Russian Cossack and non-Cossack populations and officialdom as an engrained economic and cultural trait possessed by the greater part of mountain populations. The territorial dispersal of ethnic groups coupled with significant class, property, and cultural differences among them to some extent promoted the "ethnicization" of social conflict and the formation of ideas about intergroup antagonisms between Cossacks and highlanders. The inogorodnye population (predominantly Slavic non-Cossack and nonnative populations) remained largely ambivalent: these "outsiders" felt both dissatisfaction with the privileged position of Cossacks and fear and hostility toward highlanders.

SOURCES

Maps: 51, 59, 60, 64, 65.

References: Abramov, "Kavkazskie gortsy"; Gassiev, *Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe polozhenie tuzemtsev i kazakov*; Loris-Melikov, "Raport Nachal'nika Terskoi oblasti"; Martirosian, *Istoriia Ingushii*; "Spiski naselennykh mest Stavropol'skoi gubernii"; "Spisok naselennykh mest Kavkaza"; "Spisok naselennykh mest Terskoi oblasti," 1915; "Statisticheskii ezhegodnik"; *Territoriia i rasselenie*; *Terskii kalendar' za 1915 god*; "Vremennoe polozhenie."

Map 21

1903–1917: Administrative Divisions before the Collapse of the Empire

The growth of social conflict and the first ethnic bloodletting in Transcaucasia (called then an Armenian-Tatar [Azerbaijani] massacre) in early 1905 prompted Nicholas II to restore the institution of the viceroyalty, under which were placed all the territories of Transcaucasia and the North Caucasus except Stavropol Province (Stavropolskaya Gubernia). The administration of the viceroy (Count Illarion Vorontsov-Dashkov), helped by a flexible nationalities policy coupled with harsh police measures against the widely spread disturbances (martial law was introduced in many territories of the region, including Baku, Tiflis, Erivan, and Elisabethpol Provinces), managed to achieve a relative stabilization. In particular, the restoration of the Armenian Apostolic Church's property rights and the granting of permission for the church to open schools temporarily appeased the Armenian radicals. In Terek Province the Abramov Commission was created to study the state of land use and land ownership and devise measures to alleviate the land shortage. One of its goals was the reduction of conflict over land between Cossacks and mountain populations, and among various highland communities as well as among the privileged landowning class and landless peasants within these communities. Nevertheless, the growing polarization of political forces in the country and the region in 1905–1907 did not permit the ever-growing number of social and ethnic problems to be resolved.

Administrative changes during this period were local in nature and did not affect the overall structure of the region, which remained divided into civilian and military provinces—gubernias and oblasts, respectively. Areas with predominantly Cossack populations in Don Host, Kuban, and Terek Provinces were under direct Cossack military administration. Terek Province was divided into districts populated by Cossacks (otdels) and districts with predominantly highlander populations (okrugs). Daghestan, Kars, and the reconstituted (in 1903) Batum Province (Batumskaya Oblast) and Sukhum and Zakataly Districts were also under military administration. Vorontsov-Dashkov was skeptical of the need to preserve this distinction. In practical terms, the oblasts increasingly resembled ordinary provinces. But a number of factors affecting these administrative distinctions, both social and political, prevented reform from being realized.

The development of the wheat industry in Kuban and Terek Provinces was significantly impeded by the Host system of communal land ownership. The Hosts' military, political, and social status largely depended on this ownership arrangement, however, and the possibility that it might be abolished was seen as a threat to the Hosts themselves. Changing the system risked, among other things, creating social stratification among the Cossacks, as well as the possible transfer of land to non-Cossacks. Within the context of the overall crisis in Russian colonization of Transcaucasia such prospects did not appeal to the imperial authorities, even though the proportion of ethnic Russians among the non-Cossack population in Kuban and Terek Provinces made this group the most likely beneficiary of the economic opportunities presented by these changes. Overall, the slow pace of land reform in the North Caucasus was tied to the high level of ethnosocial conflict there. And while for non-Cossack Russians social reforms were largely associated with the abolition of Cossack privileges, for mountain populations they meant the elimination of inequalities in land distribution. Furthermore, by 1917 highlander political circles were beginning to think that this inequality could be eliminated only by relocating a number of Terek Host villages to the northern side of the Terek. Solving the land problem—first and foremost the problem of agrarian overpopulation in the highlands—was therefore closely tied to changes in ethnic boundaries.

In terms of its ethnic composition, Transcaucasia was no less complex a region than the North Caucasus. As it was more economically developed, Transcaucasia also presented the imperial authorities with a more "problematic" political landscape: there were three national entities forming there, represented by the organizationally and programmatically advanced socialist-leaning Georgian and Armenian parties and the more conservative Muslim groups. The increasing politicization and radicalization of ethnic elites that was prompted by imperial policy in the 1890s could no longer be neutralized. The cluster of social and national conflicts in Transcaucasia centered around the desire to attain regional self-rule as well as the competition for ethnic representation in municipal councils in the main economic centers.

None of the influential ethnically based political parties (to say nothing of regional or ethnic factions of "All-Russian" parties centered outside the Caucasus) proclaimed the goal of secession. Instead they developed programs for territorial autonomy within the Russian state that were couched in terms of "social liberation," which meant different things for different social groups: for workers, the "emancipation of labor"; for ethnic elites, more representation in local government; for the peasantry, more equitable access to land and an end to land-redemption payments stemming from the reforms of past decades. However, internal conflict between the three nationalizing elites inevitably placed the ethnic composition of regional self-governing entities on the agenda—raising, in other words, the prospect that the region would be administratively divided into separate ethnic components. The compositional differences between Transcaucasia and the North Caucasus were manifested, in particular, in the fact that the test for "taking national boundaries sufficiently into account" in the hypothetical case of redrawing administrative borders was even more problematic here. While it was more or less possible to trace the boundaries of Georgia (although they had long since ceased to coincide with the nation's "historic" borders), and while it was still possible to identify individual districts where the population was numerically dominated by either Turkic or Armenian populations, in many cases, instead of ethnic boundaries, Transcaucasia contained entire districts and zones dotted with interspersed mono-ethnic enclaves and multi-ethnic urban centers.

Although any boundary settlements involved in the


Numerical Key
1. Lands belonging to Don Cossack Kalmyks
Districts [uezds] of Stavropol Province: 2. Blagodarnensky;
3. Sviatokrestovsky; 4. Greater Derbet Ulus
Terek Province, Cossack districts [otdels]: 5. Sunzha; 6. Kizlyar
Higlander districts [okrugs]: 7. Vladikavkaz; 8. Nalchik; 9. Nazran; 10. Grozny
Districts [okrugs] of Daghestan Province: 11. Avar; 12. Dargin; 13. Kazi-Kumukh
Districts [uezds] of Kutais Province: 14. Senaki; 15. Racha; 16. Shorapani
Districts [uezds] of Erivan Province: 17. Echmiadzin; 18. Surmalu;
19. Sharur-Daralagez
0 50 100 km
Borders of the Caucasus Viceroyalty (reestablished February 1905)
Borders of provinces and districts as of 1917
Border of the Russian Empire as of 1917
Under Russian occupation at the end of 1916
1875
Active railways and years built
Railways under construction as of 1917
Railways planned as of 1917
Mozdok
Cities
Sochi
Mestechkos, slobodas (small towns)
Astrakhanka
Villages, auls, stanitsas
Centers of provinces and districts
Sea of Azov
Black Sea
Caspian Sea
Ottoman Empire
Persia
Don Host Province [Oblast Voiska Donskogo]
Rostov District
Sal District
to Rostov-on-Don
Astrakhan Province [Astrakhanskaya Gubernia]
Chernoyar District
Astrakhan District
Lands of Nomadic Kalmyks
Astrakhan
Elista
Ulan-Erge
Lagan
Serebriakovskaya Pristan
Taurida Province [Tavricheskaya Gubernia]
Kerch
Transcaspian Province [Zakaspiiskaya Oblast]
Fort Aleksandrovsk
Kuban Province [Kubanskaya Oblast]
Yeysk District
Taman District
Laba District
Yeysk
Starominskaya
Kushchevskaya
Umanskaya
Pavlovskaya
Kanevskaya
Primorsko-Akhtarskaya
Tikhoretskaya
Novopokrovskaya
Timashevskaya
Korenovskaya
Kavkazskaya
Temryuk
Taman
Slavianskaya
Jiginskoe
Yekaterinodar
Krymskaya
Anapa
Abinskaya
Ust-Labinskaya
Goriachy Kliuch
Belorechenskaya
Kurgannaya
Armavir
Maikop
Labinskaya
Apsheronskaya
Dakhovskaya
Akhmetovskaya
Otradnaya
Nevinnomysskaya
Batalpashinskaya
Ust-Jegutinskaya
Zelenchukskaya
Teberda
Black Sea Province [Chernomorskaya Gubernia]
Novorossiisk
Gelenjik
Arkhipo-Osipovka
Tuapse
Lazarevskoe
Romanovsk
Sochi
Adler
Pilenkovo
Gagry
to Black Sea Province 1904-191?
Stavropol Province [Stavropolskaya Gubernia]
Stavropol District
Turkmen Pristavstvo
Achikulak Pristavstvo
Kara-Nogai Pristavstvo
Torgovy
Esto-Khaginskoe
Yashalta
Bashanta
Pregradnoe
Medvezhye
Priyutnoe
Divnoe
Vinodelnoe
Novoaleksandrovskaya
Letniaya Stavka
Petrovskoe
Arzgir
Blagodarnoe
Stavropol
Aleksandrovskoe
Sviatoy Krest
Achikulak
Vorontsovo-Aleksandrovskoe
Cherny Rynok
Terekli-Mekteb
Staroterskaya Pristan
Gulf of Kizlyar
Terek Province [Terskaya Oblast]
Mineralnye Vody
Georgievsk
Pyatigorsk
Kislovodsk
Prokhladnaya
Mozdok
Kizlyar
Naurskaya
Chervlennaya
Nalchik
Sleptsovskaya
Grozny
Beslan
Nazran
Gudermes
Aksai
Khasavyurt
Vladikavkaz
Vedeno
Shatoi
Petrovsk
Temir-Khan-Shura
Sukhum District [Sukhumsky Okrug]
Gudauty
Sukhum
Ochamchiry
Kutais Province [Kutaisskaya Gubernia]
Lechkhum District
Tsageri
Oni
Zugdidi
Novosenaki
Tkibuli
Sachkheri
Kutais
Chiatury
Samtredi
Kvirily
Poti
Ozurgety
Daghestan Province [Dagestanskaya Oblast]
Andi District
Kaitag-Tabasaran District
Kiura District
Samur District
Botlikh
Khunzakh
Gubden
Gunib
Levashi
Kumukh
Majalis
Derbent
Kasumkent
Akhty
Tiflis Province [Tiflisskaya Gubernia]
Borchalo District
Zakataly District
Tskhinval
Tionety
Suram
Gori
Dushet
Telav
Kvareli
Lagodekhi
Borjom
Bakuriani
Mtskhet
Tiflis
Belokany
Tsnoris-Tskali
Zakataly
Signakh
Tsarskie Kolodtsy
Katharinenfeld
Shulavery
Vorontsovka
Jelal-Ogly
Batum Province [Batumskaya Oblast]
Batum
Artvin
Akhaltsikh
Akhalkalaki
Bogdanovka
Kars Province [Karsskaya Oblast]
Ardahan
Olti
Kars
Sarikamish
Kagizman
Erivan Province [Erivanskaya Gubernia]
Alexandropol
Karaklis
Yelenovka
L.Gokcha (Sevan)
Novy Bayazet
Basargechar
Vagarshapat
Sardarabad
Erivan
Ulukhanlu
Keshishkend
Bash-Norashen
Shakhtakhty
Nakhichevan
Julfa
Ordubad
to Tabriz
Elisabethpol Province [Yelisavetpolskaya Gubernia]
Aresh District
Jevanshir District
Zangezur District
Kazakh
Akstafa
Karavan-Sarai
Delijan
Annenfeld
Elisabethpol
Helenendorf
Yevlakh
Agdash
Barda
Terter
Agdam
Agjabedi
Khankendi
Shusha
Kariagino
Gerusy
Jebrail
Megri
Nukha
Vartashen
Kutkashen
Baku Province [Bakinskaya Gubernia]
Baku District
Baku Municipality
Jevat District
Kusary
Khachmas
Kuba
Divichi
Kyzyl-Burun
Lagich
Shemakha
Geokchai
Kurdamir
Zardob
Surakhany
Baku
Sviatoi I.
Jevat
Petropavlovskoe
Haji-Kabul
Aliat
Saatly
Saliany
Pushkinskoe
Astrakhanka
Masally
Sara I.
Lenkoran
Samsun
Giresun
Trabzon
Rize
Gumushane
Bayburt
Erzincan
Ashkale
Mamakhatun
Erzurum
Koprukoy
Eleshkirt (Alashkert)
Bayazit
Maku
Hinis (Khnus)
Arjesh
Mush
L. Van
Van
Khoy
Caucasus theater of World War I in 1914-1917
Territories occupied by the Russian Caucasus Army during World War I (taken in 1916 and held until December 1917)
Russian military narrow gauge railway
R.Volga
R.Yeya
R.Kuban
R.Laba
R.Urup
R.Kalaus
R.Kuma
R.Malka
R.Terek
R.Sulak
R.Ingur
R.Rion
R.Kura
R.Arax
R.Samur
L. Manych

1903-1917: Administrative Divisions before the Collapse of the Empire

granting of territorial autonomy in Transcaucasia were primarily conceived in terms of existing provincial and, in some cases, district borders, differences in the way the populations of the three main ethnic groups were distributed led their parties to devise fundamentally different strategies. Georgian parties clearly saw the justification for their hypothetical autonomy as the "historical borders" of the Georgian state. These borders did not always overlap existing imperial administrative borders; under them, Georgia would comprise all of Tiflis, Kutais, and Batum Provinces, Sukhum and Zakataly Districts, a portion of Elisabethpol Province, and the Olti and Ardahan Districts of Kars Province. Muslim and, in particular, Armenian political groups faced a more complex problem—preserving Transcaucasia as a politically unified entity covering all the main areas of the Muslim and Armenian populations (to a significant extent these were one and the same lands stretching from Batum to Baku).

Nothing seemed to give Transcaucasia the internal cohesion it needed—not Russian governmental authority and the army, not economic integration, which manifested itself as a regionwide network of railroads, and not even the dispersion and economic mobility of the Armenian community and Turkic (and, more broadly, Muslim) groups, which covered essentially the entire region. Whatever cohesion the region had, whatever common interests were shared by the nationalizing elites, existed only within the framework of Russian political domination. Across the entire Transcaucasian band of interspersed Armenian and Turkic (Azeri) settlements there continued to be interethnic tension, which had escalated from political conflicts to disputes involving economics and everyday life. Russia's slide toward the catastrophe of 1917 led to a violent "resolution" of the Caucasus' growing internal social conflict.

The foreign—to the region and Russia—factor became key in the overall conflict-ridden reconstruction of the Caucasus between 1917 and 1921. The crisis in Russia placed the Caucasus back into the sphere of inter-imperial rivalry and, correspondingly, intensified the differences among the vectors along which the region's ethnic elites were striving, among their "collective" interests. The region's unity collapsed in 1918 not as a result of internal strife and the series of pogroms conducted by the Armenians and Azerbaijanis against one another but as a result of the removal of the Russian power structure, which had created the illusion that the Caucasus was an integral ethnopolitical region. Turkish military expansion in 1918 essentially polarized the Caucasus' main political parties along ethnic and religious lines and shattered Transcaucasia with a series of armed conflicts.

LOCAL DETAIL

In late 1904, the territory of the newly organized Gagry Climactic Resort was taken out of the Sukhum District and incorporated into Black Sea Province (Chernomorskaya Gubernia). The goal was to promote colonization of the coast by Russian settlers with the help of certain financial incentives and government benefits within Black Sea Province. (In 1905 Viceroy Vorontsov-Dashkov in his report to Nicholas II even proposed that Sukhum District be completely incorporated into Black Sea Province, with its own system of civil administration.) Today the 1904 change is interpreted as a "shameless violation of the territorial integrity of Georgia" (Menteshashvili, *Istoricheskie predposylky sovremennogo separatizma v Gruzii*, p. 7). This presumes that such integrity already or still existed in 1904, and that the territory of Sukhum was Georgian, not imperial Russian. This presumption reflects views not of the time but of the new era that dawned in the Caucasus after the collapse of the Russian Empire—a time when social strife and ethnic conflict became entangled with political boundary making.

SOURCES

Maps: 58, 60, 61, 64, 65, 66, 67.

References: Gatagova and Ismail-Zade, "Kavkaz"; Matveev, *Rossiia i Severnyi Kavkaz*; Menteshashvili, *Istoricheskie predposylky sovremennogo separatizma v Gruzii* ; *Programmy politicheskikh partii Rossii*; "Protokol zasedaniia 30 oktiabria 1917 goda"; *Severnyi Kavkaz v sostave Rossiiskoi imperii*, chap. 10; "Spisok naselennykh mest Kavkaza"; Velikaia, "Modernizatsionnye protsessy"; Vorontsov-Dashkov, *Vsepoddanneishaia zapiska po upravleniiu Kavkazskim kraem*.

Map 22

October 1917–May 1918: The Beginning of the Civil War and Foreign Intervention

Map 23

May–November 1918: The Emergence of Independent States in Transcaucasia

Map 24

December 1918–November 1919: Denikin's Dominance in the North Caucasus

During the era of the 1917 Russian revolutions and Civil War, Russia's Caucasian periphery was embroiled in two related military and political struggles. The first was the conflict between the Red and White forces that roiled Russia proper, while the second pitted supporters of imperial power (*derzhavnik*s) against Cossack and native separatists (*samostiiniks* and *natsionals*, respectively). The deepening crisis within the central government after February 1917 spurred the growth of autonomist, centrifugal political movements in regions with populations that were culturally and historically distinct from the "Great Russian" majority. In southern Russia, including the Caucasus, there was a shift away from the federalist impulses associated with the Provisional Government toward "independence as a means of survival": a move away from what was perceived as a country sinking into Bolshevism and toward national self-determination beyond the Russian imperial state system.

THE NORTH CAUCASUS

The Southeastern Union of Cossack Hosts, Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, and Free Peoples of the Steppe was established in October 1917 as an outgrowth of a conservative reaction within the region to the crisis of central government. The Southeastern Union did not recognize the legitimacy of the October Revolution in Petrograd and the Declaration of the Russian Soviet Republic, but its amorphous structure made it incapable of preventing its own constituent parts from disintegrating and fomenting separatism. By January 1918 there were competing authorities in the Don region and in the North Caucasus. On one hand there were still regional authorities representing the deposed Provisional Government (these officials were forced to act independently given the murky future of "edinaia i nedelimaia Rossia" [the one and indivisible Russia]), but there were also pockets from which the military sovietization of the region was fanning out and constituting the republics that would become part of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic. (In July 1918, in accordance with the first Soviet constitution, the Russian Soviet Republic officially became a federation of Soviet republics—the RSFSR.) By recognizing or not recognizing the central Soviet authorities (and the legitimacy of the RSFSR's Council of People's Commissars), regional governments were responding to the key issues of peace and land. During the winter of 1917–1918 hordes of politicized peasant soldiers (including Cossack veterans) from World War I's collapsing Caucasus front refused to fight for "the bourgeoisie and the landowners" and instead hurried home to claim the land the revolution was promising them. This horde became a resource for the Soviet government's military takeover of the Caucasus and later the Bolshevization of the soviets (people's councils) that were put in power. By April 1918 pro-Bolshevik army units had overturned regional governments in Don and Kuban Provinces (the Kuban Rada), the government of Stavropol Province was in the hands of the Soviets, and a separate government of mountain peoples had been forced out of Vladikavkaz. By July 1918, with the exception of Don Province, all the regional Soviet entities that had been created in the North Caucasus out of the old administrative units were united into one North Caucasus Soviet Republic and joined with the RSFSR. In April 1918 the military sovietization of Transcaucasia began with the proclamation of the Baku Commune in the east and attempts to take over the Sukhum District in the west.

The social and ethnic diversity of the North Caucasus had a significant impact on the dynamics of the Civil War. The Soviets' military takeover of the region had the support of workers in urban centers and the non-Cossacks in Don, Kuban, and Terek Provinces whose land rights had been impinged. The majority of Cossacks, however, either wavered or opposed the prospect of the Soviets redistributing their land. The confiscation of crops and livestock by the Soviets and their increasingly brutal tactics helped transform the Cossack-dominated provinces of southern Russia into a bastion of anti-Soviet resistance. In May 1918 Soviet hotbeds were eliminated in the Don region and an "independent" republic was proclaimed by Don Cossacks—the Great Don Host. The Host established military and commercial ties with Germany, whose troops occupied the republic's western portion, including Rostov-on-Don and Taganrog. At the same time the southeastern portion of the republic was a staging ground for the Volunteer Army of Mikhail Alekseev and Anton Denikin, former generals in the Imperial Army, which aimed to overthrow the Soviets throughout Russia, expel German and Turkish interventionists, and restore a united and indivisible Russia. The opposing aims of the Don government and the Volunteer Army (the Don Cossack's separatism versus Denikin's support of a unified Russia) affected the ability of the two to achieve their common goal of defeating Soviet Russia and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.

October 1917-May 1918: The Beginning of the Civil War and Foreign Intervention

The Russian Republic
(de facto beginning March 1917, Provisional Government in Petrograd deposed in Oct. 1917)

The Russian Soviet Republic
(declared 25 Oct. 1917, renamed the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic in Jan. 1918)

Российская Социалистическая Федеративная Советская Республика

Don Host Government (January 1918)
Don Soviet Republic (March-May 1918)
Kornilov (February-April 1918)
Taurida Soviet Republic (March-April 1918)
German occupation beginning April 1918
Kuban Rada (January 1918)
Kuban Soviet Republic (April 1918)
Sovietization, March 1918
Black Sea Soviet Republic (March 1918)
Stavropol Soviet Republic (January 1918)
Terek People's Republic (February 1918)
Terek-Daghestan Government (December 1917- March 1918)
Transcaucasian Commissariat, later the Seim (November 1917-April 1918)
Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic (established 22 April 1918, dissolved 26 May 1918)
Batum Province
Kars Province
Baku Commune (established April 1918)
Sovietization of Abkhazia March and April 1918
Transcaucasian Republic Forces (May 1918)
Ottoman intervention (April 1918)
Ottoman advance (February 1918)
Germans (May 1918)
Support for sovietization of Daghestan out of Baku and Astrakhan (April 1918)
Russian Mughan self-defense
Territories occupied by the Russian Caucasus Army during World War I
(taken in 1916 and held until December 1917)
Baku-Batum Kerosene Pipeline
Kuban Cossack Host
Terek Cossack Host
Ottoman Empire
Persia
Sea of Azov
Black Sea
Caspian Sea
Kara-Nogai
Kabarda
Balkaria
Karachai
Abkhazia
Ossetia
Chechnya
Daghestan
Georgia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Kafabakh
Zangezur
Surmalu
Mughan

Boundaries of Kalmyk Steppe Province [Stepnaya Oblast Kalmytskogo Naroda], established in July 1917

0 50 100 km

The Military and Political Fragmentation of Southern Russia

- Territories of Russia under the Southeastern Union of Cossack Hosts, Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, and Free Peoples of the Steppe (established in October 1917, this alliance did not recognize the central Soviet government)
- Portions of the Union's territory under "Mountain Government" (October 1917–March 1918)
- Russian territories governed by the Transcaucasian Commissariat (beginning November 1917) and the Transcaucasian Seim (beginning February 1918), neither of which recognized the central Soviet government
- Kuban Rada (January 1918) — Regional governments formed after the actual collapse of the Southeastern Union
- Pockets of sovietization and the movement of Soviet troops in February–April 1918 — Kuban Soviet Republic (April 1918)
- Areas of anti-Soviet activity and the direction of the abortive White campaign in February-April 1918 ("The Ice March")
- Southeastern Union territory that remained under the control of the (White) Volunteer and Don armies as of May 1918 (The Great Don Host)
- Centers of Islamist movement and the direction of their military activity

- Sites of the 1915 massacre and deportation of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire

1918 Ottoman and German intervention

- The Caucasus Front: positions of the Russian Caucasus Army at the time of the Armistice of Erzincan, 5 December 1917
- The line of advance of Ottoman troops after the withdrawal of the Russian Caucasus Army in January–February 1918
- Resistance of Armenian and Georgian forces (April-May 1918)
- German intervention
- Territory going to the Ottoman Empire under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, concluded 3 March 1918 between Soviet Russia and the Central Powers
- Former border of the Russian Empire

May-November 1918: The Emergence of Independent States in Transcaucasia

Great Don Host [Vsevelikoe Voisko Donskoe] beginning May 1918

Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic

Kuban-Black Sea Soviet Republic (April-July 1918)

Stavropol Soviet Republic (January-July 1918)

North Caucasus Soviet Republic (July-December 1918)

Terek Soviet Republic

Georgian Democratic Republic (26 May 1918)

Republic of Armenia (28 May 1918)

Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (27 May 1918)

Ottoman Empire

Kuban Cossack Host

Terek Cossack Host

Taman Red Army (August 1918)

Volunteer Army offensive (July 1918)

Cossack uprising (June-November 1918)

Georgian intervention (July 1918)

Georgian offensive (June 1918)

Landings by Abkhaz Mukhajir detachments June-August 1918

German intervention beginning 25 May 1918

Germans (August 1918)

Ottoman offensive (May 1918)

Ottoman offensive (July 1918)

Caucasus Red Army (June 1918)

Ottoman-Azerbaijani offensive (July-Sept. 1918)

Bicherakhov (July 1918)

Bicherakhov's August 1918 advance against the Soviets in Daghestan and Terek Province

Area occupied by White general Bicherakhov (August-October 1918)

Ottoman intervention in support of Mountain Republic against Bicherakhov (October 1918)

British intervention in support of the Centrocaspian Dictatorship (August-September 1918)

Persian territory under Ottoman occupation as of July 1918

Baku-Batum Kerosene Pipeline

Sea of Azov

Black Sea

Caspian Sea

Sochi District

Crimean Provincial Government (German occupation zone)

Yeysk, Kushchevskaya, Yegorlykskaya, Velikokniazheskaya, Torgovy, Akhtari, Timashevskaya, Tikhoretskaya, Karenovskaya, Kavkazskaya, Petrovskoe, Remontnoe, Elista, Divnoe, Astrakhan, Kerch, Taman, Temryuk, Anapa, Krymskaya, Yekaterinodar, Armavir, Stavropol, Kurgannaya, Nevinnomysskaya, Sviatoy Krest, Cherny Rynok, Staroterskoe, Novorossiisk, Gelenjik, Maikop, Krivenkovskoe, Tuapse, Batalpashinskaya, Georgievsk, Pyatigorsk, Borgustanskaya, Kislovodsk, Lazarevskoe, Sochi, Gagry, Gudauta, Sukhum, Ochamchiry, Zugdidi, Novosenaki, Kutais, Tskhinval, Gori, Dushet, Telav, Signakh, Zakataly (de facto to Azerbaijan beginning June 1918), Kizlyar, Mozdok, Prokhladnaya, Nalchik, Grozny, Khasavyurt, Vladikavkaz, Temir-Khan-Shura, Petrovsk, Derbent, Kuba, Nukha, Poti, Ozurgety, Batum, Tiflis, Bely Kliuch, Akhaltsikh (Ahiska), Akhalkalaki, Shulavery, Borchalo, Vorontsovka, Sanahin, Kazakh, Ajaristan, Meskhetia, Javakhetia, Artvin, Ardahan, Alexandropol (Gumrù), Karaklis, Jelal-Ogly, Olti, Kars, Bash-Aparan, Sardarabad, Ulukhanlu, Igdir, Kagizman, Erzurum, Bayazit, Maku, L. Van, Nakhichevan, Julfa, Ordubad, Ganja (capital of Azerbaijan 28 May–15 September 1918), Yevlakh, Geokchai, Shemakha, Kurdamir, Shusha, Kariagino, Gerusy, Zangezur, Mountain Karabakh, Baku (became the capital of Azerbaijan on 15 September 1918), Aliat, Saliany, Prishib, Lenkoran, Samsun, Trabzon, Rize, Oni, Chiatury, Abkhazia, Ossetia, Kabarda, Balkaria, Karachai, Daghestan, Chechnya, Republic of Mountain Peoples of the North Caucasus (by November 1918), Surmalu, Daralagez, Sharur, Bash-Norashen, Meskhetia, Javakhetia, Borchalo, Ajaristan, Zakataly, Mughan Dictatorship (beginning Aug. 1918), Baku Commune (April-July 1918), Centrocaspian Dictatorship (Aug.-Sept. 1918), R. Yeya, R. Kuban, R. Laba, R. Malka, R. Terek, R. Sulak, R. Kuma, R. Alazani, R. Samur, R. Kura, R. Araks, R. Ingur, R. Rion, R. Volga, L. Manych, L. Gokcha (Sevan), 0 50 100 km

Civil War in the North Caucasus

Territories of Soviet republics (republics within the RSFSR)
a. lost to Denikin in July-October 1918; b. held as of November 1918

Front line by the end of November 1918

Yekaterinodar / Pyatigorsk — Center of the North-Caucasus Soviet Republic (in July-August and in September-December 1918)

The areas of Chechnya and Daghestan not controlled by the Soviets (Republic of Mountain Peoples of the North Caucasus)

Soviet territories occupied by Georgia in July 1918

Areas of anti-Soviet actions

Territory of the Great Don Host (as of June 1918), the primary staging ground for the (White) Volunteer and Don armies

Actions by the Volunteer Army and other White detachments

Red Army actions

Areas controlled by Islamists and the direction of their military advance

The Formation of Nation-States in Transcaucasia at a Time of German and Ottoman Intervention

Former border of the Russian Empire

The Ottoman line of advance in May–October 1918

Territory going to the Ottoman Empire under the treaties of Brest-Litovsk (March 1918) and Batum (June 1918)
Russian Caucasus territories occupied by Ottoman troops as of July 1918

Territories controlled by the Baku Commune in July 1918; by October 1918 they had been taken by Ottoman-Azerbaijani troops and incorporated into the Republic of Azerbaijan

German intervention and the deployment of German garrisons as of June 1918

States Formed after the Breakup of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic

- Georgian Democratic Republic
- Azerbaijan Democratic Republic
- Republic of Armenia
- Areas essentially controlled by Armenian armed detachments
- Zakataly — Territories contested among Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Republic of Mountain Peoples of the North Caucasus

Conflict was even more pronounced between the Kuban Rada and the Volunteer Army, which, operating out of its Don stronghold, had occupied Kuban Province in August 1918. After defeating the Red Army units of the North Caucasus Soviet Republic, Denikin had returned the Rada to power in December. However, the government in Kuban was split between those who supported independence for the province (or even its incorporation into independent Ukraine) and those who wanted to see Greater Russia restored and united. (To some extent these political differences corresponded to linguistic differences among Kuban Cossacks, who were composed of the Ukrainian-speaking successors of what had once been the Black Sea Host and of the predominantly Russian-speaking Caucasus Line Host.) Denikin tolerated this opposing political force until a number of Rada members attempted to establish a military and diplomatic alliance with the separatist Mountain Parliament (Gorsky Medzhlis [Majlis]) and took steps toward gaining Kuban's entry into the League of Nations as an independent state. In autumn 1919, with the front about to succumb to the Red Army, the Rada was dissolved, and Kuban Cossacks began to desert White Army units.

TRANSCAUCASIA

Russia's descent into civil war and the outbreak of armed conflict in the North Caucasus in 1918 left the country's Transcaucasian periphery facing two challenges: the fight for self-determination outside the Russian state and, as a consequence, the threat of Turkish intervention. Self-determination was envisioned by Transcaucasian political elites as "the immediate implementation of territorial demarcation of nationalities and the formation of cantons on ethnic territories with full internal self-government and the guarantee of ethnic minority rights" (*Zakavkazsky seim*, p. 49). For these elites, social and cultural development were no longer considered possible unless they themselves acquired full authority within a specific territory. In early 1918 there was still talk of preserving the overall governmental unity of the region in the form of a federation of "national cantons," but it was not clear how the two conflicting principles of "historical borders" and "the actual distribution of nations" would be reconciled in designing the contours of these cantons. The Bolsheviks who came to power in 1917 took Russia out of World War I, but paid a heavy price: the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which was signed by the Central Powers and Soviet Russia on 3 March 1918. In February, Ottoman Turkey, in violation of the truce then in place and taking advantage of the collapse of the Caucasus front, had advanced its troops toward the Russian imperial Transcaucasian border. According to the provisions of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Kars and Batum Provinces were to go to the Ottoman Empire. However, the treaty was not recognized by the Transcaucasian provisional administration and the Transcaucasian Parliament (Seim), which wanted to keep Kars and Batum (inhabited by large Georgian and Armenian populations) within the region. The Ottomans issued a demand: the Seim should either recognize Transcaucasia as a part of Russia and accept the provisions of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk regarding Kars and Batum Provinces or declare a republic independent of Russia, which would not be obligated to fulfill the Brest-Litovsk provisions.

The Seim chose the latter, and the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic, founded 22 April 1918 as an independent republic, tried to continue pursuing a coordinated foreign policy. The Ottoman Empire, however, now that it was dealing not with Russia but with an "independent Transcaucasia," began a new military campaign and made new territorial demands. The Ottoman threat and Germany's promise to protect Georgia forced the new Transcaucasian Republic to break up into ethnic states in late May. The three national Transcaucasian Councils (the ethnic caucuses within the Seim) became embroiled in a clash between the military and political strategies of the new ethnic states: Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. For Georgia and Armenia, Ottoman (i.e., Turkish) intervention posed an obvious threat, while for Azerbaijan, a Muslim state made up primarily of ethnic Turks, Turkey was, if not a fatherland, at least an ally.

Throughout May 1918, Armenian and Georgian detachments stood their ground against the Ottoman invasion. In the end, Georgia, supported by German guarantees, escaped Ottoman occupation and essentially extricated itself from the war. German troops entered the country (counting on a secret agreement between Germany and the Ottoman Empire to divide the region into spheres of influence). Armenia also managed to escape defeat and total Ottoman occupation, largely owing to the tenacity of its armed forces and militias in defensive operations outside Sardarabad and Bash-Aparan. The war involving Armenia, Georgia, and the Ottoman Empire was concluded by the Treaty of Batum on 4 June 1918 with the handover of not only Kars and Batum Provinces but also the Akhaltsikh and Akhalkalaki districts of what had been Tiflis Province, as well as significant portions of Erivan Province (Erivanskaya Gubernia), including Surmalu, Sharur, and Nakhichevan, to Turkey.

The division of Transcaucasia into three new states initially was largely determined by external geopolitical and military forces and the interplay among three protectorates: Germany (Georgia), the Ottoman Empire, or Turkey (Azerbaijan), and the Allied Entente, the much-less-certain support that Armenia was counting on from countries that were still embroiled in World War I. The year 1918 was a time of German and Turkish hegemony in Transcaucasia. The Ottoman Empire played a decisive role in the "interim" determination of the borders of Azerbaijan and Armenia. The territory and key governmental institutions of the Republic of Azerbaijan were under Ottoman protection and had Turkish military support. In September 1918, Turkish-Azerbaijani forces occupied Baku, which had been under the control of first the Soviet Baku Commune and then the Centrocaspian Dictatorship and the British "Dunsterforce." The Ottomans' military and political presence allowed Azerbaijan not only to incorporate areas disputed with Armenia into its borders but also to acquire direct territorial connection with a state patron (via the Arax River and, potentially, through Borchalo, an area disputed with Georgia). Independent Georgia lost districts with predominantly Muslim populations, both Georgian-speaking (Ajaristan [Ajaria]) and Turkic-speaking (Meskhetia). At the same time, however, the chaos of the Civil War in the North Caucasus permitted the government of the Republic of Georgia itself to annex the Sukhum District (Abkhazia) and introduce troops into the Kuban–Black Sea Soviet Republic, thereby staking a claim to Sochi District.

The capitulation of the Central Powers in November 1918 brought with it the withdrawal of German and Ottoman (Turkish) forces from Transcaucasia and placed the organization of the region's governments in the hands of the war's victors. A period of dominance by the Entente in Transcaucasia began, during which it played a determining role in resolving or escalating territorial conflicts among Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan and provided protection against the threat of military intervention from the north. Georgia and Azerbaijan developed complex relations with Denikin's Armed Forces of South Russia, which by

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December 1918-November 1919: Denikin's Dominance in the North Caucasus

early 1919 wound up controlling almost the entire North Caucasus. Denikin, however, was compelled to focus his attention and forces elsewhere. In January 1919, Denikin's troops reached the outskirts of Tsaritsyn (present-day Volgograd; not shown) and in August and September the Volga delta, where they formed the right flank of a general offensive against the Red Army and battled to join with the army of Aleksandr Kolchak, the supreme ruler of the White forces, in the Guryev-Astrakhan sector.

LOCAL DETAIL

In April and May 1918 Georgian forces of the Transcaucasian Seim fended off a Soviet attempt to take the Sukhum District. In June troops now fighting for an independent Georgia occupied Abkhazia, a move formally justified by an agreement between the government of the Georgian Democratic Republic and the Abkhaz People's Council. Taking this military campaign farther, in July 1918 the Georgian army occupied the Sochi District and Tuapse, claiming the right to incorporate the district into Georgia and attempting to present the Volunteer Army with a fait accompli. By the autumn and early winter of 1918 territorial conflicts between Georgia and the Armed Forces of South Russia over the Sochi and Sukhum Districts had become more heated. The government in Tiflis argued that incorporating these territories into Georgia was historically justified, pointing to the reigns of David IV (the Builder; 1073–1125) and Queen Tamar (1160–1213). Denikin demanded that the Sochi District be freed and was generally disinclined to recognize Georgia as an independent republic, viewing it as a temporary phenomenon.

While evacuating its troops from Transcaucasia in November–December 1918, Turkey attempted to organize new governments in areas with significant Muslim populations to forestall the probable transfer of these territories to Armenia and Georgia. The Transcaucasian territories that had been previously given to Turkey under the provisions of the Treaty of Batum were incorporated into the newly formed Southwestern Caucasus Republic and the Arax Republic (the Republic of Aras).

After the withdrawal of Turkish troops, disputes between Armenia and Georgia over territory became more heated. In December 1918 armed conflict broke out between the two countries over control of the Borchalo and Akhalkalaki Districts. In January 1919 the Entente helped broker a peaceful resolution to the conflict. One aspect of this resolution was the creation of the Lori Neutral Zone (initially under Anglo-French control but in August 1919, after the withdrawal of Entente troops, under joint Armenian-Georgian control). The Entente also strove to stabilize the situation in Mountain Karabakh, a region whose borders were close to the critical Baku-Batum pipeline. In August 1919 the Armenian National Council, which represented the Armenian population in Mountain Karabakh, agreed to recognize the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan over the highlands of Karabakh (where Armenians constituted an absolute majority) until such time as the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan was finalized through negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference.

The emergence of new nation-states in Transcaucasia came not only with conflict among the region's main ethnic groups but also with increased pressure on Russian and other minority groups that had settled in the region. Russian villages were subject to attacks by armed groups in the Signakh District (Signakhsky Uezd), in Mughan, and in the districts of Novy Bayazet and Elisabethpol (Novobaiazetsky and Yelisavetpolsky Uezds).

SOURCES

Maps: 111, 120, 121, 125, 127, 146, 173, 175, 186.

References: Andersen and Egge, *Armeno-Georgian War of 1918 and Armeno-Georgian Territorial Issue in the 20th Century*; Balaev, *Azerbaidzhanskoe natsional'no-demokraticheskoe dvizhenie*; Darabadi, "Geopoliticheskoe sopernichestvo"; Denikin, *Ocherki russkoi smuty*; Igolkin, "Nezavisimoe Zakavkaz'e"; Iusifzade, *Azerbaidzhano-britanskie otnosheniia*; *K voprosu o granitsakh Abkhazii s Gruziei 1917–1921 gg.*; Markhuliia, "'Krasnaia' i 'belaia'"; Menteshashvili, *Iz istorii vzaimootnoshenii Gruzinskoi Demokraticheskoi Respubliki s sovetskoi Rossiei i Antantoi*; Pipiia, *Germanskii imperializm*; *S"ezdy narodov Tereka; Zakavkazskii Seim*.

Map 25

1917–1919: The Gorskaya Republic, a Failed Attempt at Independence

As the Civil War unfolded, the founding of another country was proclaimed in the North Caucasus: the Republic of Mountain Peoples of the North Caucasus, also called the Gorskaya or Mountain Republic and the Republic of the Union of Mountain Peoples of the North Caucasus and Daghestan. These different names to some extent reflect different stages in its history, but for the most part they are indicative of the "germinal" nature of the state itself. Its brief history, part of the dynamic of the Russian Revolution, is firmly embedded in the chronology of the Civil War, foreign interventions, and the establishment of the Soviet government. A number of stages can be distinguished over the course of the Gorskaya Republic's political trajectory: first from the doctrine of self-determination to the birth of a political organization; then moving to its acquisition of power on actual territory (autonomy), to the proclamation of an independent state; and finally to the disappearance of this state as the leadership went into exile and the territory was incorporated into Soviet Russia.

The doctrine of mountain autonomism developed in 1905–1917 under the influence of reformist ideologies (primarily those of the Transcaucasian ethnic elites) and slogans supporting social and national liberation and the transformation of Russia along republican and federative lines. The February 1917 revolution made it possible to move from doctrine to the creation of a legal political organization, and by March the Union of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus and Daghestan had emerged in Vladikavkaz. This political association, which was loyal to the Russian Provisional Government in Petrograd, consolidated itself organizationally (electing an executive committee) and doctrinally (drafting a political platform and Union Constitution) by means of its first congress of mountain peoples. The charter it adopted was called a constitution and provided for a "federative design," "the safeguarding of peace and order," and "the furtherance of institutions of authority." The union of mountain peoples was not a substitute for faltering Russian governmental authority but was incorporated into it, and the leaders sent representatives to the "provisional governmental bodies"—the provincial executive committees of Terek and Daghestan Provinces—and to serve as provincial commissars for the Russian Provisional Government.

The events surrounding the Kornilov Affair and the promonarchists' efforts to topple the Provisional Government in August 1917 forced the Union of Mountain Peoples to co-found the Southeastern Union of Cossack Hosts, Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, and Free Peoples of the Steppe, a broad association loyal to the Provisional Government. The Southeastern Union had obvious designs on power and claimed to be helping to "establish a Russian democratic republic that would recognize the members of the [Southeastern] Union as its individual constituents" (*Soiuz ob"edinennykh gortsev*, p. 74).

The October Revolution in Petrograd and the collapse of the Provisional Government in Russia gave greater political weight to regional governments. The Southeastern Union, rejecting the new Bolshevik-led regime's authority, created its own coalition Government of Southern Russia, one component of which was the Union of Mountain Peoples. This body performed a number of administrative functions in the mountain districts of Terek Province and Daghestan, and by November 1917 it had already defined itself as the Mountain Government, or the Government of Mountain Autonomy. Meanwhile, in the Cossack districts of Terek Province the functions of government were concentrated in the hands of the Terek Cossack Host. Terek Province's two governments (both of which were constituents of the Southeastern Union) attempted to coordinate their actions, and in early December 1917 they formed the coalition Terek-Daghestan Provisional Government, located in Vladikavkaz.

However, the two aspiring governments proved incapable of working together effectively. By early January 1918 the failure of efforts to find a compromise between the land interests of highlanders and those of Cossacks could be seen in the growing wave of violence throughout the province. Amid political chaos, local focal points of real power took shape. In mountain districts, these were in the hands of ethnic councils, elected at national (ethnic) congresses, while in Cossack districts they were dominated by the Kazachy Krug (the Cossack Circle, a Host assembly) and military councils. At the same time Muslim movements were emerging among the mountain peoples of Daghestan and Chechnya that aimed to re-create a North Caucasus imamate.

From January through March 1918 a series of armed attacks, organized lootings, and pogroms formed a "front" of armed conflict between Cossack settlements and Chechen and Ingush villages along what had once been the Sunzha Defensive Line, as well as between neighboring Ossetian and Ingush villages. The Terek-Daghestan government ceased to exist, and its mountain component, the Mountain Government, was forced to flee from Vladikavkaz to Tiflis and Temir-Khan-Shura.

Since January 1918 the Congresses of the Peoples of the Terek, which included Cossacks and other factions, had become increasingly forceful in determining the regional political authority in Terek Province. At first the Congresses gave voice to a broad spectrum of political forces—from Cossack Circle centrists to non-Cossack Russian leftists (including members of the Socialist Revolutionary, Menshevik, and Bolshevik Parties) and highlander delegates who saw their own interests reflected in leftist slogans calling for the socialization of land. But at the first Congress in Mozdok, the forceful initiative of the Bolsheviks, whose delegation was headed by Sergey Kirov and Grigory Orjonikidze, began turning the Congresses into a vehicle for the sovietization of Terek Province's main centers.

The second Congress in Pyatigorsk created new bodies of political authority: representative (in the form of a people's council or soviet) and executive (in the form of a council of people's commissars). In March 1918, after the Mountain Government fled the chaos that had engulfed Vladikavkaz, these

institutions moved from Pyatigorsk to Vladikavkaz and established themselves as the government of the Terek People's Republic (known starting in August as the Terek Soviet Republic), which proclaimed itself an integral part of the RSFSR.

Soviet authority grew out of the ruins of previous structures that had proven incapable of managing the region's conflicting interests and groups. The first thing the forces of the left could offer the Terek region was their pacifying mediation to help control the descent into inter-ethnic war. The primary question for the first Congress of the Peoples of the Terek was military: organizing "military actions against Ingush and Chechens" as "the tribes that were rebelling against peaceful citizens and trampling human rights and laws" (*S"ezdy narodov Tereka*, pp. 27–29). This and the following five congresses were part of the region's journey from the brink of inter-ethnic war to peaceful negotiations and, later, the formation of soviets and, ultimately, the triumph of the Bolsheviks in these institutions and the final anti-Soviet revolt against them by the Terek Cossacks and a portion of Ossetians during the summer and fall of 1918. In August of that year conservative Cossack and Ossetian detachments attempted to destroy the Terek People's Council (the Council of People's Commissars) in Vladikavkaz, but the attack was repelled by local workers, pro-Bolshevik soldiers, Ingush militia members, and units of the Ossetian left-wing Kermen Party.

The sovietization of Terek Province was supported by the urban centers of Vladikavkaz and Grozny, with their large non-Cossack and nonhighlander populations, and by workers of the Grozny oil fields and the Vladikavkaz railroad—infrastructure that lent cohesion to the entire region, from Rostov (not shown) to Baku. Key to the bolshevization of the soviets themselves in the North Caucasus were the echelons of soldiers returning from the Russo-Ottoman front and becoming stranded along the entire strategic path of this railroad. Beginning with the second Congress of Peoples of the Terek and as a number of Ingush and Chechen representatives were gradually integrated into the Terek People's Council, these representatives increasingly saw the slogans of bolshevism as a way of expressing their national and political grievances (primarily having to do with land) against the Cossacks. Looking at it from another angle, these grievances were effectively exploited by the Bolsheviks: the Ingush and a portion of Chechens became important military resources for the Terek Soviet government.

On 11 May 1918, during a peace conference held in Batum, members of the ousted Mountain Government declared the creation of the Republic (Union) of Mountain Peoples of the North Caucasus, a country independent of Russia that planned to incorporate into its borders Terek and Daghestan Provinces, as well as Abkhazia (Sukhum District) and a number of other territories. These borders significantly exceeded the ones that were declared in December 1917 as "an area onto which the governmental authority of the Provisional Government [Union] of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus was extended" as an "autonomous state within a federative Russian republic" (*Soiuz ob"edinennykh gortsev*, p. 123). This proclaimed republic was recognized by the Ottoman Empire and "up to a point" by Germany. (During the Batum conference an agreement was drafted—"On the Establishment of Friendly Relations between the German Imperial Government and the Government of the Gorskaya Republic"—but it was not ratified by Germany, owing to protests by the RSFSR, among other causes.) Those behind the Mountain Government had taken a decisive step toward an independent government after they had fled Vladikavkaz in March and were under the protection of Constantinople. With the help of the Ottoman (Turkish) army, the Mountain Government, headed by Abdul "Tapa" Chermoev (Tchermoeff), returned to the North Caucasus in October 1918, but it was now centered in Temir-Khan-Shura in Daghestan rather than in Vladikavkaz (where the Terek Soviet Republic was already, or still, in place). The Ottoman (Turkish) intervention through Daghestan represented a continuation of the empire's military campaign in Transcaucasia, over the course of which Turkey took over Azerbaijan and created the Azerbaijani army and other institutions of government. The administrative center of Daghestan Province became the new capital of the Republic of Mountain Peoples and the location of its parliament (union council or Majlis) and government. The Mountain Government proclaimed control over Chechnya and Daghestan, including its foothill and coastal regions, expelling the detachments of the White general Lazar Bicherakhov. Preparations for military action against the Terek Soviet Republic were undertaken in an attempt to expand the boundaries of control over other areas that had been declared part of the Republic of Mountain Peoples.

In November 1918, World War I came to an end, and the victorious Entente, represented by Britain, replaced the Turks as the foreign supporters of a mountain republic that would be independent of Russia. The British attempted to make the mountain republic and its forces join the Volunteer Army, which was advancing from the Don and Kuban, as a part of the anti-Soviet front. However, General Anton Denikin did not recognize the Mountain Government and essentially ignored its proposal (and the request of the British) that they coordinate efforts to defeat the troops of the Terek Soviet Republic. Between February and April 1919 the Volunteer Army took possession of the entire lowlands of Terek Province and entered Daghestan. The Armed Forces of South Russia took over the territory of the defeated Terek Soviet Republic and shortly thereafter eliminated its rival, the Republic of Mountain Peoples of the North Caucasus. The task of governing mountain territories and peoples fell into the hands of so-called governors, appointed by Denikin's governor general of the Terek-Daghestan territories from among local ethnic highland members of the Russian officers' corps. Denikin's administration, however, essentially never gained control of the mountain regions of the North Caucasus.

After the White takeover of the North Caucasus, the leadership of the Mountain Government went into exile for the second—and last—time. In Tiflis, during the summer of 1919, the Union Majlis (the parliament of the Gorskaya Republic in exile) was created with the primary objective of fighting the Volunteer Army and giving the North Caucasus a country that was independent of Russia. For his part Denikin encountered two main enemies in the Terek-Daghestan territory—Red partisans and Islamic rebels, who were forced to coordinate their actions and even join in a military and political compact. In the fall of 1919 in the mountains of Chechnya and the Avar and Andi Districts of Daghestan, the Islamic insurgency gradually evolved into a North Caucasus emirate, a "sharia monarchy" headed by Sheikh Uzun Haji. A portion of the emirate's armed forces was made up of detachments from the former Terek Soviet Republic's Red Army. This Red-Islamic compact was purely temporary. Historically, Islamist efforts toward mountain self-determination have always taken a radical anti-Russian form aimed against the ongoing great-power threat—whether White or Red. The forces and institutions of the Islamist movement acted in parallel with the secular Mountain Government, often as its military



Flag of the Republic of Mountain Peoples of the North Caucasus (Gorskaya Republic) in October 1918

0 50 100 km

Declaration of independence by the Republic of Mountain Peoples of the North Caucasus (11 May 1918)

Turkish intervention in support of the Mountain Republic government of A.Chermoev (October 1918)

The Mountain Autonomy within the Southeastern Union, November 1917–March 1918

Territories covered by the declaration of "the authority of the Mountain Government" by the Union of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus and Daghestan (December 1917) including: The Sukhum (Abkhazia) and Zakataly districts, where the question of the Mountain Government's jurisdiction was supposed to be placed before the local representative councils

Areas populated by Kuban Circassians and Karachai (the status of these territories was supposed to be determined in negotiations between the Mountain and Kuban governments, both members of Southwestern Union)

Republic of Mountain Peoples of the North Caucasus (Gorskaya Republic), May 1918–May 1919

Borders declared by Chermoev's Mountain Government at the Batum Peace Conference to be "the borders of an independent Republic of Mountain Peoples of the North Caucasus" (May 1918)

The borders of territory actually controlled by the Gorskaya Republic (May 1918)

Areas actually governed by the Mountain Government as of November 1918
Areas influenced by the Mountain Government as of November 1918
} Until April–May 1919 and the essential end of the Gorskaya Republic

"Demarcation Line" claimed by the Mountain Majlis (September 1919) to be the boundaries of a "zone of mandatory deoccupation" (a) by the Volunteer Army and (b) by Georgian troops "pending a decision at the Paris Peace Conference concerning the borders of the Gorskaya Republic"

Territories claimed during the 1920s by members of the Gorskaya Republic's government in exile

Former border of the Russian Empire

Vladikavkaz (Terek-Kale) City names in parentheses were used by Mountain secessionists

Numerical Key
1. Sunzha District of the Terek Cossack Host; 2. Kabarda; 3. Ingushetia;
4. Nadterechny District of Chechnya; 5. Andi District; 6. Avar District; 7. South Ossetia

1917-1919: The Gorskaya Republic, a Failed Attempt at Independence

and spiritual foundation but sometimes as its traditionalist and theocratic alternative.

In early 1920 in the North Caucasus, after brutal fighting with Denikin's Armed Forces of South Russia, the Red Army returned, evicting both the Whites and the mountain nationalists. The Mountain Parliament in Tiflis, with the help of the Georgian authorities, supported the now anti-Soviet rebellion of Sheikh Najmuddin (Gotsinsky) of Hotso and Said-Bek (the grandson of Shamil of Gimry) in Chechnya and Daghestan. However, in February 1921 the Eleventh Red Army captured the last Transcaucasian rebel holdouts. By cutting off communication between the Andi and Avar Districts in Daghestan and Georgia, the army essentially ended the Civil War in the North Caucasus. (Some historians argue that the war did not really end until October 1925, when the Red Army conducted an operation to disarm the mountain autonomies and "eradicate the bandit element," in the lexicon of the day.)

Unlike in Transcaucasia, where national self-determination movements between 1918 and 1921 developed primarily along ethnic lines and had three organizational and political centers, the analogous movement in the North Caucasus sought the integrity of the region and presented the various highland ethnic groups as a single nation. But this political and national project turned out to be weak specifically in its organizational foundation. Mountain integrationism had neither a developed tradition of common statehood nor an effective foreign patron willing to carve a mountain state out of South Russia. The heated social conflicts within the mountain populations themselves, as well as ethnically colored intergroup tensions in key areas of the Gorskaya Republic, deprived this effort at nationhood of viability.

The integration of the mountain peoples never achieved a cohesive political form, although the attempt to create a mountain republic expressed a complex of social, political, and cultural interests common to mountain peoples. This project and its underpinnings would later be successfully used by the Soviet authorities to achieve legitimacy within the region. By the fall of 1920 the Daghestan and Gorskaya (Mountain) Soviet Republics were proclaimed, evidently as a political counterforce to the Gotsinsky rebellion. For mountain peoples the strength of the Red Army, the allure of a "just redistribution of land," and the possibility of self-determination (albeit under the Soviets) constituted the three pillars on which revolutionary Russia's legitimacy rested.

SOURCES

Maps: 73, 75.

References: Butaev, *Bor'ba gortsev za revoliutsiiu*; Dzidzoev, *Ot Soiuza ob"edinennykh gortsev*; Gamakhariia and Gogiia, *Abkhaziia–istoricheskaia oblast' Gruzii*; Kheir-Khaev, "Etapy revoliutsii v Ingushetii"; *Programmy politicheskikh partii Rossii*; *S"ezdy narodov Tereka; Soiuz ob"edinennykh gortsev*; Zhupikova, "Povstancheskoe dvizhenie."

Map 26

1920: The Azerbaijan Democratic Republic and Soviet Russia

In the 1918–1919 segmentation (or deintegration) that took place as imperial Transcaucasia fragmented into uncertain nation-state territorial units, the distribution of ethnic and religious groups was used as the main criterion legitimizing the inclusion of a given area into the new republic of Azerbaijan, with a few adjustments based on prerevolutionary administrative borders. Depending on population patterns, in some cases the units under consideration were entire provinces (gubernias, oblasts), while in others they were the districts (uezds, okrugs) these provinces comprised.

Both ethnic and religious affiliations played a role in the emergence of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. The organizational core of the new state, which took shape around the Musavat (a Muslim political party) and the Transcaucasian Seim's Muslim Council, had a pronounced religion-based orientation. In designs to draw new borders in Transcaucasia, the Musavat envisioned an Azerbaijan consisting of all the territories with a significant Muslim population. In particular, this included, in addition to areas with Turkic-speaking populations, territories with Georgian (Ajaria [Batum Province] and Meskhetia), Avar (Zakataly), and Kurdish populations, as well as a portion of Daghestan Province. In other words, the initial design for Azerbaijan was a multiethnic country uniting Transcaucasian Muslims (including "Transcaucasian Tatars," or Turkic-speaking Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Ajarians, Tats, Talysh, Ingilois, and others) with significant Christian minorities (including Georgians, Armenians, and Russians). Within the context of this project, the category "Azerbaijani" did not yet have a narrow ethnic or linguistic connotation and an Azerbaijani nation was made possible by including not only Azerbaijani Turks and, for example, Talysh but also Georgian Ingilois and—more problematic, but still feasible—even Azerbaijani Armenians (as a religious minority). The republic's 1918 declaration of independence began with a reference to the "*peoples* of Azerbaijan as the holders of sovereign rights." In this regard, the young Azerbaijani political entity had the potential to be, and to some extent was, better suited to the incorporation of ethnic minorities than were the Georgian and Armenian nations.

Such a design for an aspiring nation that had a clear religion-based core group but would also have a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional population lacked viability for a number of reasons. Although the final ethnicization (Turkicization) of the aspiring Azerbaijani nation occurred later (in the twenties and thirties, when the term "Azerbaijani" started to be equated with "Azeri Turk" and later supplanted this term), long before these Soviet transformations the tendency toward political and cultural absorption of non-Turkic groups in eastern Transcaucasia was evident. The use of a "Muslim" category within Russian Transcaucasia also affected the course of this assimilation. During the collapse of imperial Transcaucasia, Turkic domination was already providing a strong ethnic core for the young Azerbaijani proto-nation and serving as its cultural and political guidepost.

The Ottoman Empire (Turkey), as the foreign sponsor of the Azerbaijan Republic in 1918, despite being a multi-ethnic empire, also promoted a certain ethnicization of Azerbaijan's national design. It should be noted, however, that such ethnicization was also part of the European paradigm for the self-determination of peoples, one in which ethnocultural traits and communities served as defining features. In Transcaucasia such a paradigm made sense: the platforms of Georgian and Armenian political parties had already cast national self-determination in terms that were decisively ethnic, not territorial. This is how Azerbaijan wound up being first a Turkish and Muslim force affecting Georgian and Armenian self-determination in Transcaucasia and later a "nation" forming a sovereign state out of its loyal population and discovering a history for this population.

Clearly the emergent territorial extent of the Azerbaijan Republic in 1918–1920 was being shaped both by its own military and diplomatic efforts and by the strategies of the region's primary foreign players. The entire period during which the Azerbaijan Republic was coming into being can be divided into three stages based on which power's strategies were in the ascendant at the time: the Ottoman Turkish stage (April–November 1918), the British stage (December 1918–September 1919), and the Soviet stage (beginning in late April 1920). The makeup of territories controlled or contested by Azerbaijan (or other players) at different stages varied depending on which geopolitical player was dominant.

The defeat of the Central Powers and the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the region in 1918 deprived Azerbaijan of an important ally in its rivalry with Armenia over disputed territories. The British took a more neutral stance than had Turkey regarding this rivalry, opening up new real or imagined opportunities for Armenia. These opportunities were tied to the Entente's desire in late 1918 and early 1919 to create a sizable barrier between Turkey and the Azerbaijan Republic. When it came to the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Entente started with the assumption that it was desirable for the new boundaries to coincide with the old (administrative) ones—in other words, those of former Russian provinces: Elisabethpol for Azerbaijan and Erivan for Armenia.

In western Transcaucasia the granting of territories to the Ottoman Empire under the provisions of the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Batum was annulled and the Southwestern Caucasus Republic was abolished, its territory divided between Armenia and Georgia. The majority of districts densely populated by Armenians in Mountain (Nagorny) Karabakh formally remained under the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan but were actually controlled by the local Armenian National Council. (*Nagorny* means "mountainous" or "highland" in Russian. Lowland Karabakh, on the other hand, was settled mostly by Turkic-speaking [Azeri] groups. The designations of "Mountain" and "Lowland" Karabakh here reflect the political fragmentation of the territory along ethnic lines during 1918–1921.) In 1919 Azerbaijan lost control of Sharur and Daralagez and, temporarily, of Nakhichevan. Zangezur had been occupied by Armenian troops in 1918. The political standoff between Armenia and Azerbaijan

1920: The Azerbaijan Democratic Republic and Soviet Russia

Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic

Georgian Democratic Republic

Republic of Armenia

Azerbaijan Democratic Republic
(became Azerbaijan Soviet Republic on 28 April 1920)

North Caucasus Emirate
(Sept. 1919-March 1920)

Arax Republic
Jan.-May 1919

Southwestern Caucasus Republic
Dec. 1918-Apr. 1919

Batum Province
(under British Administration
Jan.1919-Apr. 1920)

Red Army offensive, March 1920

Disintegrating front of the Armed Forces of South Russia

Red Army offensive, Feb.-March 1920

Red Army offensive
27 April 1920 and
sovietization of Azerbaijan

Area of capitulation
by the Armed Forces of South Russia
in late March and April 1920

Actual border of Georgia
along the Mekhadyr River (April 1919–April 1920)

Area of secessionist
activity in Mughan and Talysh
(until August 1919)

Conclusion of the Civil War in the North Caucasus

a b c

Soviet territory: (a) as of 14 February 1920; (b) as of 2 March 1920; (c) as of late March 1920

Primary direction of Red Army actions in February–April 1920 and collapsing White fronts

Evacuation of the remnants of White armies in March 1920

0 50 100 km

Sea of Azov

Black Sea

Caspian Sea

Ottoman Empire

Persia

to Crimea

to Persia

to Baku

Yeysk
Kushchevskaya
Velikoknyazheskaya
Elista
Astrakhan
Ganushkino
Tikhoretskaya
Timashevskaya
Korenovskaya
Kavkazskaya
Bashanta
Vinodelnoe
Divnoe
Petrovskoe
Kerch
Taman
Temryuk
Yekaterinodar
Armavir
Stavropol
Anapa
Novorossiisk
Gelenjik
Maikop
Nevinnomysskaya
Aleksandrovskoe
Velichaevka
Sviatoy Krest
Fort Aleksandrovsk
Tuapse
Batalpashinskaya
Georgievsk
Pyatigorsk
Kislovodsk
Cherny Rynok
Staroterskoe
Kizlyar
Prokhladnaya
Mozdok
Naurskaya
Sochi
Nalchik
Grozny
Khasavyurt
Gagry
Gudauta
Sukhum
Vladikavkaz
Vedeno
Petrovsk
Temir-Khan-Shura
Ochamchiry
Oni
Zugdidi
Novosenaki
Kutais
Tskhinval
X Krestovy Pass
Poti
Ozurgety
Borjom
Gori
Telav
Derbent
Batum
Akhaltsikh (Ahiska)
Akhalkalaki
Tiflis
Signakh
Zakataly
Kasumkent
Akhty
Artvin
Ardahan
Shulavery
Vorontsovka
Karayaz Steppe
Kazakh
Nukha
Kuba
Khachmas
Divichi
Rize
Jelal-Ogly
Shamkhor
Ganja
Kutkashen
Olti
Kars
Alexandropol
Delijan
Yevlakh
Geokchai
Shemakha
Sarikamish
Kagizman
Vagarshapat
Sardarabad
Erivan
Basargechar
Zardob
Jevat
Aliat
Igdir
Davalu
Daralagez
Lowland Karabakh
Mountain Karabakh
Shusha
Karabulag
Saliany
Bayazit
Maku
Bash-Norashen
Gerusy
Zangezur
Jevanshir
Nakhichevan
Julfa
Ordubad
Khoy
Van
L. Van
Lenkoran
Talysh
Baku

R.Yeya
R.Yegorlyk
L. Manych
R.Volga
R.Kuban
R.Laba
R.Kuma
R.Malka
R.Terek
R.Sunzha
R.Sulak
R.Ingur
R.Rion
R. Khrami
R.Alazani
R.Samur
R.Kura
R.Arax
L.Gokcha (Sevan)
Mughan

Kabarda
Karachai
Balkaria
Abkhazia
Ossetia
Chechnya
Daghestan

1 Akhalkalaki
2
3
4 Vagarshapat
5
6
7
8
9
10 Akhty

Flag of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (beginning November 1918)

The Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (May 1918-April 1920)

Borders proposed by the Azerbaijani delegation to the Paris Peace Conference (1919–1920)

a b

Territories proposed for inclusion in Azerbaijan that were (a) entirely and (b) partially under the control of its government (summer 1919)

Arax Republic

States emerging after the withdrawal of Turkish troops in December 1918 (annexed by Georgia and Armenia in April–May 1919)

Areas contested by Azerbaijan after the liquidation of the Southwest and Arax republics

Territories actually controlled by the government of Azerbaijan on 28 April 1920 when it became sovietized

Transcaucasian territory contested and partially controlled by Georgia (as of late April 1920)

Transcaucasian territory contested and partially controlled by Armenia (as of late April 1920) including Mountain Karabakh (essentially self-governed by the Armenian National Council, which between August 1919 and March 1920 recognized Azerbaijani sovereignty under a preliminary agreement)

Numerical Key: 1. Meskhetia (Ahiska): 2. Javakhetia; 3. Borchaly (Borchalo); 4. Part of Echmiadzin District; 5. Vedibasar; 6. Sharur; 7. Kizikia (Shirak Steppe); 8. Kaitag-Tabasaran; 9. Kiura; 10. Samur

in 1918–1920 was accompanied by large-scale pogroms on both sides. During this period dozens of Armenian and Turkic-Muslim villages in the countryside of Transcaucasia as well as "ethnic" quarters in some key urban centers of the region were subjected to attacks and burned to the ground.

The most ambitious proposals advanced by the Azerbaijani delegation at the 1919–1920 Paris Peace Conference laid claim to essentially all the areas of what had been Russian Transcaucasia that had Islamic or Turkic-speaking populations. However, by 1920, when the triumphant Great Powers ceased to exercise control over Transcaucasian antagonisms, the republic's "problematic" territories fell into the following classifications:

Territories not under the authority of the Azerbaijani Republic but recognized as areas whose status was "open to compromise":

- The western portion of the Echmiadzin District (Echmiadzinsky Uezd), the southern portion of the Erivan District, and Surmalu District (Surmalinsky Uezd)—areas also claimed by Armenia (acquiring these areas would have allowed Azerbaijan to restore its territorial connection to Turkey).
- A portion of the Borchalo (Borchaly) and Signakh Districts (Borchalinsky and Signakhsky Uezds)—areas also claimed by Georgia.

Territories claimed by neighboring countries that partially controlled them and whose claims (or occupation) were viewed as encroachment on the "undisputed" national territory of Azerbaijan:

- Zakataly District (Zakatalsky Okrug), claimed by Georgia.
- Sharur-Daralagez and Zangezur Districts and the mountain portions of the Kazakh District, claimed and partially controlled by Armenia.
- Nakhichevan District and the mountain portions of Shusha and Jevanshir Districts (part of Mountain Karabakh)—also claimed by Armenia, but mostly under the military control of Azerbaijan until March 1920. There was a preliminary agreement in effect between August 1919 and March 1920 in Mountain Karabakh reached through British mediation between the government of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic and the local Armenian National Council granting Azerbaijan provisional jurisdiction until a final decision (which never came) on the status of the territory at the Paris Peace Conference.

During March and April 1920 an Armenian rebellion in Karabakh was accompanied by the introduction of Armenian Republic troops and the short-term incorporation of the area into Armenia. But on 28 April Azerbaijan came under Soviet control, and a new period began in the region's history, one in which the Transcaucasian elite's "national interests" were forced to harmonize with the geopolitical strategy of Soviet Russia, "the bridgehead of world revolution."

The fate of the Azerbaijan Republic was sealed by the RSFSR's critical dependence on supplies of oil from Baku, which gained new importance during the war between Soviet Russia and Poland. Although it was losing its independence, Azerbaijan was gaining an important ally in its territorial conflicts with Armenia, whose troops were now confronting the Red Army. By August 1920 the army had occupied Mountain Karabakh, Zangezur, and Nakhichevan. The Soviets' occupation of these areas did not predetermine any particular resolution of territorial disputes, but the boundaries of zones under military control were clearly considered probable "final" borders. Moscow again became the main force shaping the region's political map. The Bolsheviks' interest in partnership with Kemalist Turkey brought with it a growing role for Ankara in determining the borders between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In March 1921, under the Treaty of Moscow between Turkey and Soviet Russia, not only were new external borders established for Transcaucasia but a portion of its internal borders as well. This is when the autonomous Nakhichevan Territory (made up of the Sharur and Nakhichevan Districts) was proclaimed to be "under the protection" of the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic.

LOCAL DETAIL

While the contours of the Azerbaijani state were still taking shape it encountered another challenge: in August 1918 in the Lenkoran District, an area populated primarily by Russian "colonists" and Talysh, a military-political entity emerged that did not recognize the legitimacy of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. The Provisional Dictatorship of Mughan proclaimed the district to be a part of Russia and subject to the "Supreme Government" of Aleksandr Kolchak. During the spring and summer of 1919 the district wound up under the control of the Military Revolutionary Committee, which proclaimed the Mughan Soviet Republic. The brief history of the political independence of the Talysh-Mughan district, which by August 1919 had been brought to an end by the troops of the Azerbaijan Republic, has remained an important historical page for modern Talysh autonomist ideology in Azerbaijan.

SOURCES

Maps: 69, 111, 121, 125, 127, 139, 140.

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Map 27

1920: Partition of the Republic of Armenia

The logic governing the drawing of borders for an Armenian state between 1918 and 1921 developed within the context of two undermining factors: Turkish military and political pressures (coming from Ottoman Turkey in 1918 and Kemalist Turkey starting in 1920) and the interspersed enclaves of Armenian and Turkic (Azerbaijani) settlement throughout almost the entire area Armenia sought to incorporate. The "national principle"—the idea of basing borders on the dispersal of ethnic populations that Transcaucasia's Armenian and Muslim political elites had pledged to follow as they traced the borders of Armenia and Azerbaijan—was bound to trigger a series of conflicts as both sides sought to force out the "alien" population. Armenian-Azerbaijani competition developed within a significantly larger-scale geopolitical game, and its outcome depended on the balance of power among the main players: the Soviets, Turkey, and the Entente. The emergence of the Republic of Azerbaijan, first as a Turkish and later as a Soviet protectorate, diminished the effectiveness of Armenia's military and organizational advantages and foreign policy resources, and the "national principle" proved detrimental to the fate of most of the region's Armenian population.

The composition of the Armenian state in 1921 came about as a result of a series of wars, starting with World War I. The 1915 genocide of Armenians in Turkey and western (Anatolian or Turkish) Armenia was followed by local Armenians' active support of Russia's military challenge to Anatolia. Hundreds of thousands of refugees settled in Transcaucasia, in eastern Armenia, which became the center of the Armenians' struggle for national self-determination. After the collapse of the Russian Empire, while Transcaucasia was being divided into three states (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) during the spring of 1918, Armenian armed forces were themselves involved in a war with Turkey; the result, on the one hand, was the loss of a large portion of "Russian Armenia" (Kars and Ardahan, under the 1918 Batum Treaty) but, on the other, the emergence and preservation of an independent Armenian state—the "first" Republic of Armenia.

In December 1918, after the departure of German and Turkish troops from Transcaucasia, conflict developed between Armenia and Georgia over the disputed Akhalkalaki and Borchalo Districts. In January 1919 an agreement was reached with the sponsorship of the Entente regarding the disputed territory: Akhalkalaki (Georgian "Javakheti"/Armenian "Javakhk") and the northern portion of Borchalo (Borchaly) remained part of Georgia, while the southern portion of the Borchalo District went to Armenia and its central area (containing the copper deposits that represented the area's greatest wealth) was made into the Lori Neutral Zone, which was placed under joint English-French occupation.

During the period of the British mandate (December 1918–July 1919) in Transcaucasia a large portion of the defunct Southwestern Caucasus Republic was annexed to Armenia, specifically the territory of Kars Province, excluding a northern portion of the Ardahan (Ardagan) District, which later went to Georgia, and the western portion of the Olti District, which essentially remained in the zone controlled by Turkish militias. In the spring of 1919 Armenia was clearly disinclined to enter the pact between Georgia and Azerbaijan against White general Anton Denikin, and during the summer of 1919 and again beginning in March 1920 it waged war with the Republic of Azerbaijan over disputed areas in Nakhichevan and Mountain Karabakh. Surmalu, Sharur, and Zangezur were mostly controlled by Armenian forces but nevertheless remained in dispute. (During the summer of 1919, Surmalu and Sharur had been taken over by local Muslims demanding incorporation into Azerbaijan.) The various Transcaucasian territorial conflicts were supposed to be resolved at the Paris Peace Conference; however, by March 1920 the victory of the Red Army in the North Caucasus and the success of the Kemalists in Turkey had removed Transcaucasia from the Entente's sphere of influence.

The Soviet takeover of Azerbaijan in April 1920 and the emergence of a Soviet-Turkish strategic partnership again left the Armenian Republic essentially surrounded. Armenia's war with Azerbaijan in 1920 concluded in August with the signing of a peace agreement between Armenia and the RSFSR. By then the Red Army and Soviet Azerbaijan were occupying disputed areas in the Shusha, Zangezur, and Nakhichevan Districts (the last of which was occupied jointly with Turkish Kemalist forces).

The division of Ottoman Turkey in accordance with the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres presumed the annexation of significant territory in western (Anatolian) Armenia to the Armenian Republic, giving it access to the Black Sea. But the mass killing and forced displacement of Armenians in these areas in 1915 and the military successes of the Kemalists in the fall of 1920 made it impossible to realize these plans; two years later the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres pertaining to Armenia would be annulled by the Conference of Lausanne.

In October 1920 unilateral attempts by the Armenian government (led by the Dashnaktsutyun Party) to realize the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres and the activity of Armenian troops in the Olti District triggered a new Armenian-Turkish war. A Kemalist invasion from the west and Soviet military and political pressure from the east (on 1 December, Soviet Russia demanded that power in Armenia be passed from Dashnaks to Armenian Bolsheviks) brought an end to the independent Republic of Armenia. The Armenian-Turkish War concluded on 2 December 1920 with the Treaty of Alexandropol. The treaty was signed by the Republic of Armenia, which had already essentially been deposed by the Soviets. Although the treaty never came into force, the new borders of Armenia that it delineated served as the de facto template for what was to come. In accordance with the March 1921 Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Moscow the republic's territory was divided into Soviet and Turkish zones of control. The eastern zone, with the exception of Nakhichevan and Sharur,

1920: Partition of the Republic of Armenia

The Republic of Armenia (May 1918–December 1920)

- Borders of Transcaucasian territory proposed for Armenia by the Armenian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference (1919–1920)
- a / b — Territories proposed for inclusion in Armenia that were (a) entirely and (b) partially under the control of its government (April 1920)
- Mountain Karabakh (essentially self-governed by the Armenian National Council, which between August 1919 and March 1920 recognized Azerbaijani sovereignty under the preliminary agreement)
- Areas contested by Azerbaijan and occupied by the Red Army after the sovietization of Azerbaijan (in July–August 1920); the 10 August 1920 Preliminary Accord between the RSFSR and Armenia stated that these territories' status would be determined within the framework of a future peace treaty
- Territories contested and partially controlled by Georgia, including areas taken by Georgia during the Armenian-Turkish War in October-November 1920
- Territory of the Ottoman Empire nominally assigned in November 1920 to the Republic of Armenia by Wilson's Arbitral Award (under provisions of the August 1920 Treaty of Sevres), but still under control of Turkey (Ankara [Angora] government), which did not recognize the treaty
- T — Territory occupied by Turkish troops during the Armenian-Turkish War (September–December 1920)
- A B C — The Armenian-Turkish border under the 3 December 1920 Treaty of Alexandropol (A-B) and the border of the territories of Sharur and Nakhichevan (B-C), where under the provisions of the treaty a plebiscite was to be conducted to determine their status
- Sovietization of Armenia, 29 November–4 December 1920
- Former border of the Russian Empire

0 50 100 km

Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic

Georgian Democratic Republic

Republic of Armenia (became Armenian Soviet Republic 2 Dec. 1920)

Azerbaijan Soviet Republic (established 28 April 1920)

Ottoman Empire (Turkey)

Persia

Black Sea

Caspian Sea

Sea of Azov

General Wrangel's Government of South Russia (Apr.–Nov. 1920)

Landing by General Ulagai Aug.-Sept. 1920

Landing by Wrangel's detachments August 1920

Evacuation to Crimea April 1920

Evacuation to Crimea Oct. 1920

Area where the units of the Armed Forces of South Russia capitulated in May 1920

Gen.Fostikov Cossack uprising May-Sept. 1920

Terek Cossack uprising October 1920

Gorskaya Soviet Republic (declared November 1920)

Daghestan Soviet Republic (declared November 1920)

Area of Gotsinsky uprising beginning August 1920

Ossetian uprising May-July 1920

Soviet-Georgian border under the Moscow peace treaty between the RSFSR and Georgia, 7 May 1920

The 1920 Treaty of Sèvres stipulated that these territories' status would be determined within the framework of a future treaty between Georgia and Armenia (the area remained under stable Turkish control)

Batum Province (incorporated into Georgia June 1920)

Areas incorporated into Georgia beginning Dec. 1918

Javakhetia

Armenian advance June 1920

Turkish offensive Sept.-Oct. 1920

Sovietization, 29 Nov. 1920

Areas of anti-Soviet uprising May-June 1920

Red Army, July 1920

Turkish offensive July 1920

Nakhichevan Autonomous Territory [Nakhichevansky Avtonomny Krai] est. July 1920
de facto Soviet-Turkish protectorate

Siunik Republic, beginning Dec. 1920

De facto under Soviet control beginning May-June 1920

Mountain Karabakh

Lowland Karabakh

Daralagez

Surmalu

Karachai

Balkaria

Kabarda

Ossetia

Chechnya

Dagheстan

Trebizond

Western Armenia

Erzurum

Bitlis

Van

Sivas

Taik

Lazistan

Flag of the Republic of Armenia (1918-1920)

Numerical Key

1. Border areas of the Republic of Armenia not under control of its government; 2. Part of Ardahan District; 3. The Lori Neutral Zone, an Armenian-Georgian condominium (January 1919-November 1920); 4. Southern Lori; 5. Sharur; 6. Nakhichevan; 7. Zangezur (Siunik); 8. Zakataly District (disputed between Georgia and Soviet Azerbaijan); 9. Area of pro-Soviet uprising in Alexandropol (May 1920)

constituted the Armenian Soviet Republic. The western zone was incorporated into Turkey. This situation was certified by the November 1921 Treaty of Kars, to which Soviet Armenia was now the signatory.

A complex set of conflicting Armenian and Azerbaijani territorial claims were also resolved as part of Soviet-Turkish partnership, in particular conflicts involving Nakhichevan and Sharur: the establishment of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Territory under the protection of Soviet Azerbaijan and Turkey's annexation of the Surmalu District raised hopes that a territorial connection between Turkey and Azerbaijan would be preserved. This hope was not long-lived: the fate of Zangezur, which was claimed by both Armenia and Azerbaijan, was decided during the summer of 1921 free of Turkish influence. While all the Armenian-Azerbaijani territories under dispute were put under Soviet control by December 1920, Zangezur continued to resist and was held by Garegin Njdeh's local Armenian detachments, which proclaimed it the Siunik Republic. Renamed the Republic of Highland Armenia in April 1921, it lasted only until July, when Garegin Njdeh's Dashnak forces left for Persia, and the area was incorporated into the Armenian Soviet Republic.

The territory of Mountain (Nagorny) Karabakh was still under dispute in 1921: the Russian Communist Party's Caucasus Bureau, the Soviet party-state office in charge of deciding territorial questions in the Caucasus, could not decide how to apportion it. In the end the Bolshevik leaders made their decision guided by their strategy of "gaining allies of the October Revolution among the peoples of the East": the Kemalist regime was seen as a potential conduit for the export of anti-imperial revolution to the Muslim world. Armenia lacked any comparable geopolitical weight to equal Muslim solidarity with Soviet Russia. As a result, Mountain Karabakh remained inside Azerbaijan. But the decision featured a compromise (a result of the influence of yet another Bolshevik guiding principle—the right of peoples to self-determination): within the territory of the upland portion of Karabakh there was to be an autonomous province (oblast)—a place of Armenian self-determination within the boundaries of Soviet Azerbaijan.

The Autonomy of the Armenians of Mountain Karabakh formally lacked an ethnic titularity, as did the Autonomy of Nakhichevan (a Turkic-speaking Muslim autonomy that was placed first under the protection of Azerbaijan and later incorporated into it). However, one of the results of the Soviet approach to resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani ethnoterritorial conflicts of 1920–1923 was specifically a clear attribution of certain territories as ethnic or national entities—in the case of Mountain Karabakh, through the creation of a hierarchy ranking "people of an autonomy" below "people of a republic" (a designation that suggested an ethnonation). The invention of such an institutional hierarchy was specifically the result of compromise, an enforcement of the right to self-determination for both parties claiming the same territory: the Azerbaijani's right to Mountain Karabakh on the republic level and the Armenians' right to it on the level of a functioning autonomy.

A salient feature in the process of the sovietization of Azerbaijan and Armenia was that the Bolsheviks used ethnoterritorial statehood claims as a way to legitimize Soviet authority. This authority was established specifically in the form of a rhetorical commitment to nominal ethnoterritorial polities, but free, in the political language of the day, of the "bourgeois attributes of nationalism and interethnic strife." National self-determination could be acknowledged as long as it remained within socialist constructions. Clearly the Soviet authorities in Transcaucasia did not invent national republics and territories, but they did use these entities' institutional and symbolic resources for Soviet expansion. Nor did the Soviets invent the territorial conflicts that to a significant degree were exacerbated by the striving of young Transcaucasian states in 1918–1919 to develop rationales for their preferred borders—history, the numerical predominance of their own ethnic group, effective control—as a way of achieving international recognition. The ethnic republics themselves arose in Transcaucasia as a result of the collapse of the Russian Empire and through strategies to bring order to the emerging chaos—strategies chosen by the local political elites and appropriate to their understanding of collective interests.

It also appears that the sovietization of Azerbaijan and Armenia developed as a functional outcome of the Bolsheviks' macropolitical objectives: the defeat of Poland and General Pyotr Wrangel in 1920 (for which they needed Baku oil and a secure rear) and the acquisition of a channel (which proved illusory) for the export of world revolution into the countries of the Muslim East. Successful precedents involving the support of "internal" Soviet rebellions in Azerbaijan and Armenia would be used in the sovietization of Georgia, which also found itself in the grip of an internal crisis and in the field of action of the Soviet-Turkish strategic partnership.

SOURCES

Maps: 71, 72, 127, 151, 168, 185.

References: Barsegov, *Genotsid armian*; Hovannisian, "The Republic of Armenia"; *Istoriia Armenii*; *Istoriia Artsakha*; *Programmy politicheskikh partii Rossii*; Zograbian, "Territorial'no-razgranichitel'nye voprosy."

Map 28

1921: The End of the Georgian Democratic Republic

In the drawing of national borders in Transcaucasia and the formation of its territory, Georgia exhibited a practical preference for using contours dating back to the "Golden Age" of Georgian history (the eleventh to twelfth centuries) as the guiding principle rather than actual ethnic distribution. The problem for the government of the new Georgian Democratic Republic was that in many of the peripheral areas under dispute there was either no Georgian population whatsoever or it constituted an insignificant minority, or—despite being Georgian in terms of language or ancestry—it did not have a politically significant Georgian national identity (as in Ajaria and Meskhetia, whose populations saw themselves first and foremost as Muslims). When a new nation-state is just taking shape and lacks legitimacy, the ethnic makeup of the population and the government's policies toward minorities become important factors that can promote or hinder the internal consolidation of the country. Those in charge of Georgia's state machinery were working to solve the problem of establishing control and securing foreign and domestic legitimacy in several areas: "Muslim Georgia," Borchalo, Abkhazia, the Zakataly District, and South Ossetia.

Unlike in Armenia, the lands of historic Georgia were largely located in one state—the former Russian Empire—and therefore the drawing of the borders of an independent Georgian republic was planned and carried out almost entirely within the former borders of the empire. When it came to "foreign territory" (Lazistan and others) that remained under Turkish control and was populated almost entirely by Muslims, Georgia took a cautious approach. These areas were of peripheral importance to the Georgian national project, and attempts to incorporate them by force promised to come at great military and political cost. While laying claim to some of these districts, the Georgian government did not undertake unilateral actions to seize them. In particular, Georgia refrained from becoming embroiled in the Armenian-Turkish War in the fall of 1920.

The Entente's victory over Germany and its allies in World War I and the departure of Turkish troops from Transcaucasia made it possible for the government of Georgia to absorb the portion of "Muslim Georgia" that had been part of Russia between 1829 and 1918 and lost under the Treaty of Batum (4 June 1918): by December 1918 Javakhetia and Meskhetia had been annexed to Georgia, though it was not until August 1919 that the northern portion of Kars Province (the northern portion of the Ardahan District) was firmly incorporated into the new republic. The Batum District (Ajaria) was directly governed by the British, although both a local autonomous government and the prospect of extending Georgian jurisdiction were preserved there.

The military conflict of December 1918 between Georgia and Armenia over disputed areas in Borchalo and Javakhetia was quickly halted by the Entente: Georgia was allowed to keep Javakhetia, and Borchalo was divided into three zones: Georgian, Armenian, and neutral (Lori). During the Turkish invasion of Armenia in the fall of 1920, the Lori Neutral Zone was also held by Georgian forces (possibly by agreement with the Armenian government, to forestall another Turkish occupation).

Georgia controlled the territory of the former Sukhum District, which it had occupied since June 1918, but promised Abkhazia autonomy. Georgia also held the Sochi District but did not succeed in annexing it. When the White general Anton Denikin recaptured the district in 1919, he ignored the British proposal that it be made into a buffer zone between his forces and the Georgians and essentially placed Sochi into Russian hands. One of the little-known consequences of the "Sochi conflict" between Georgia and Denikin's Armed Forces of South Russia was to shift the western border of Abkhazia. By the time Denikin was defeated and the Red Army had occupied the Sochi District in 1920, the line of the Georgian forces' actual control passed through the Mekhadyr-Psou area, the point reached by the White offensive. In the Soviet-Georgian treaty of May 1920 the line of the state border between the two countries had been determined accordingly: it was traced along the Psou rather than the Bzyp River (which was farther south and had marked the 1904–1917 administrative border between the Sochi and Sukhum Districts).

In the spring and summer of 1920 Georgian government troops suppressed a rebellion in South Ossetia. Tiflis's problems in this territory dated back to 1918, when efforts to quash social unrest in areas populated by Ossetian peasants quickly became an ethnic conflict, specifically between the local Ossetian population and the Georgian state machinery. The resulting tangle of antagonisms became entrenched, and the declaration of Soviet rule in South Ossetia in March 1920 was perceived by many there as national self-determination outside the Georgian state: for Ossetian leaders it was a form of reintegration into the Russian, albeit sovietized, state. After the Georgian state-sponsored pogrom of 1920, "sovietization" and "self-determination" became synonymous in the minds of many South Ossetians.

Georgia's neutral stance in the feuding between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the normalization of relations with Kemalist Turkey and Soviet Russia created the illusion of a certain stability in the country's foreign relations. A treaty concluded in Moscow on 7 May 1920 defined the borders between Soviet Russia and Georgia (including the border with the newly sovietized Azerbaijan). The inclusion of the Zakataly and southern Borchalo Districts within Georgian borders prompted protests from Soviet Azerbaijan and then still independent Armenia, respectively. But as the fate of Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1920 seemed to indicate, the sovietization of Georgia was only a matter of time. Russian (and Georgian) Bolsheviks had a long list of grievances against Georgia's Menshevik government: the occupation of Soviet Sochi and Tuapse in 1918, the handover of interned officials from the Terek Soviet Republic to Denikin's forces in 1919, the suppression of a pro-Soviet revolt in South Ossetia in 1920, the support of Sheikh Najmuddin (Gotsinsky) of Hotso's uprising in 1920–1921, and repressive measures against the Georgian branch of the Bolshevik Party. But all these were just a pretext. A guiding doctrine for the Soviets was that world revolution had to cross borders in order to develop, and the

1921: The End of the Georgian Democratic Republic

Georgian Democratic Republic (May 1918–March 1921)

- Borders proposed by the Georgian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference (1919–1920)
- Territory viewed by Georgia as an inalienable part of it and under the control of its government (February 1921), including:
- Abkhazia (under Georgian control beginning June 1918)
- Territories occupied by Georgia during the Armenian-Turkish War in November 1920 (Lori Neutral Zone, Southern Lori, and part of Ardahan District)
- Zakataly District (the legitimacy of the district's inclusion into Georgia under the 7 May 1920 Moscow peace treaty between the RSFSR and Georgia was disputed by the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic; on 12 May 1920 the question of the district's disputed areas was put before a joint commission)
- Soviet-Georgian border under the 7 May 1920 Treaty between the RSFSR and Georgia
- The pro-Soviet rebellion in Lori and the February-March 1921 Soviet takeover of Georgia
- Turkish intervention in February–March 1921
- The borders between Turkey and the Georgian and Armenian Soviet Republics as well as the borders of the Nakhichevan autonomy set by the Treaty of Moscow between the RSFSR and Turkey (March 1921) and mostly confirmed by the Treaty of Kars (December 1921)
- Former border of the Russian Empire
- Administrative boundaries within the Russian SFSR as of December 1920

0 50 100 km

Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic

Don Province [Donskaya Oblast]

Kuban-Black Sea Province [Kubano-Chernomorskaya Oblast]

Stavropol Province [Stavropolskaya Gubernia]

Kalmyk Autonomous Province [Kalmytskaya Avtonomnaya Oblast]

Terek Province [Terskaya Gubernia]

Gorskaya Soviet Republic

Daghestan Soviet Republic

Chernoyar District to Tsaritsyn Province (became Krasnoarmeisky District) Mar. 1919-Nov. 1920

Georgian Democratic Republic
(became Georgian Soviet Republic on 25 February 1921)

Armenian Soviet Republic

Azerbaijan Soviet Republic

Sea of Azov

Black Sea

Caspian Sea

Turkey

Persia

Yeysk, Kushchevskaya, Yegorlykskaya, Velikokniazheskaya, Torgovy, Remontnoe, Elista, Priyutnoe, Bashanta, L. Manych, Divnoe, Vinodelnoe, R.Yeya, R.Yegorlyk

Kerch, Iaman, Temryuk, Timashevskaya, Korenovskaya, Kavkazskaya, R.Kuban, Krasnodar, Anapa, Novorossiisk, Gelenjik, Goriachy Kliuch, Maikop, Armavir, Stavropol, R.Kalaus, Aleksandrovskoe, Sviatoy Krest, R.Kuma, R.Laba, Nevinnomysskaya, R.Urup, Batalpashinskaya, Georgievsk, Kislovodsk, Pyatigorsk, Tuapse

Area restored to Russia beginning Jan. 1919

Sochi District, Sochi, R. Psou, R. Bzyp, Red Army offensive 23 Feb.–3 Mar. 1921 and sovietization of Abkhazia, Gagry, Gudauta, Abkhazia, Sukhum, Ochamchiry, R.Ingur, Zugdidi, Novosenaki, Kutais, Poti, Ozurgety, Batum, Batum Province, Samsun, Rize, Giresun, Trebizond (Trabzon), Artvin, Ardahan, Akhaltsikh, Akhalkalaki, Javakhetia, Borchalo, Lazistan (Chaneti), Tao-Clarjeti, R.Joruk, Territory occupied by Turkish forces beginning October 1920, Olti, Kars, Sarikamish, Kagizman, R.Arpachai, R.Karasu, R.Arax, Erzurum, Erzincan, Bayazit, R.Murat, L. Van, Van, Igdir, Surmalu, Davalu, Daralagez, Bash-Nbrashen, Nakhichevan Autonomous Territory (protectorate of Azerbaijan, March 1921), Nakhichevan, Julfa, Ordubad, Khoy, Tatev, Zangezur, Gerusy, Siunik Republic, Rep. of Highland Armenia (Dec. 1920–July 1921) territory incorporated into Armenian Soviet Republic beginning July 1921

Kabarda, Karachai, Balkaria, Ossetia, Chechnya, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Kazakh

R.Malka, Prokhladnaya, Mozdok, Cossack stanitsas forced out of Sunzha (a) in Mar. 1920 and (b) Oct. 1920, R.Terek, R.Sunzha, Yermolovskaya, Grozny, Vladikavkaz, Sunzhenskaya, Oni, R.Rioni, R.Kura, Borjom, Tskhinval, Telav, R.Alazani, Red Army, March 1921, Tiflis, Signakh, De facto under Soviet control beginning May 1920, Kasumkent, Zakataly District (Saingilo), Red Army offensive 16–25 Feb. 1921 and Soviet takeover of Georgia, Shulavery, Poily, Akstafa, Karayaz, R.Iori, Alaverdi, Jelal-Ogly, Delijan, Alexandropol, Armenian anti-Soviet uprising, Feb.–Apr. 1921, L.Gokcha (Sevan), Erivan, Sardarabad, Provisional border under the accord concluded 2 December 1920 between Armenia and the RSFSR (disputed by the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic), Ganja, Yevlakh, Geokchai, Shemakha, Baku, Zardob, Jevat, Aliat, Saliany, The boundary of territories still contested between Soviet Armenia and Azerbaijan as of July 1921, Shusha, Karabulag, R.Kura, R.Arax, Lenkoran

Gulf of Kizlyar, Fort Aleksandrovsk, Cherny Rynok, Terekli Mekteb, Staroterskoe, Kizlyar, Khasavyurt, R.Sulak, Petrovsk, Temir-Khan-Shura, Vedeno, Almak, Area of Gotsinsky uprising Aug. 1920–May 1921, Levashi, Derbent, Kasumkent, R.Samur, Akhty, Khachmas, Kuba, Divichi, Nukha, Kutkashen

The 1920 Treaty of Sèvres stipulated that these territories' status would be determined within the framework of a future treaty between Georgia and Armenia (the area remained under stable Turkish control)

Flag of the Georgian Democratic Republic (1918–1921)

Numerical Key

1. Dvaletia; 2. Darial Gorge; 3. The portion of former Batum Province that became autonomous Ajaria and part of the Georgian Soviet Republic under the 1921 Treaty of Moscow; 4. Meskhetia (Samtskhe); 5. Ardahan-Childir area; 6. Former Lori Neutral Zone; 7. Southern Lori; 8. Karayaz Steppe (neutral area under the preliminary agreement between Georgia and Soviet Azerbaijan, June 1920)

internal borders of a former empire, especially where there were precedents and conditions were ripe, were hardly an exception. In February 1921 a pro-Soviet rebellion broke out in the former Lori Neutral Zone. In purported support of the uprising, the Red Army invaded Georgia. On 25 February 1921 the Georgian Soviet Republic was proclaimed.

While Azerbaijan and Armenia came under Soviet control after major military defeats on external fronts and a collapsing of external borders, in February 1921 Georgia was not involved in any external wars. At the time of the Soviet takeover the composition and borders of the Georgian Republic were well defined: disputed areas were either under firm control or their status was being reviewed in accordance with internationally accepted procedure. The northern border of Soviet Georgia would clearly remain the same as it had been for the independent Georgia, having been delineated by the Soviet-Georgian treaty of 7 May 1920. However the changing status of certain Georgian provinces and alternations in other Georgian borders in 1921–1923 point to serious problems in the consolidation of Georgian territory:

- The Lori zone at first remained a part of Soviet Georgia, perpetuating historical mythology surrounding the pro-Soviet "Georgian" uprising of February 1921. In the summer of 1921 it would be incorporated into Soviet Armenia based on "ethnic criteria."
- Georgia kept the northern Borchalo area, where Georgians made up a tiny minority. But at the same time the Zakataly District was incorporated into Azerbaijan specifically based on the "ethnic criterion" (or, rather, a religion-based one, given that most of the district's Muslim population were Avars and members of other Daghestani groups).
- Under the Soviets, Abkhazia was made into a separate Soviet republic, which was later incorporated into Soviet Georgia, first economically and then legally, by means of a bilateral agreement assigning Abkhazia the newly contrived status, starting in December 1921, of Treaty-Based Socialist Soviet Republic (Dogovornaya SSR or DSSR).
- For South Ossetia, sovietization meant autonomy within Georgia. In 1921–1922 the status and borders of the autonomy were determined, but it remained a province (oblast) within Georgia.
- Soviet-Turkish treaties signed in 1921—the March Treaty of Moscow (concluded before the Red Army's entry into Batum) and the November Treaty of Kars—divided the territory of "Muslim Georgia" into two parts: North Ajaria (including Batum) and Meskhetia-Javakhetia remained part of Georgia, while Artvin, Olti, and Ardahan Districts (Artvinsky, Oltinsky, and Ardagansky Okrugs) went to Turkey. These treaties granted Ajaria autonomous status within Soviet Georgia. While the concession of Ardahan and Artvin was inspired by dreams of world revolution spreading through Turkey, the formation of an autonomous Ajaria was motivated by other Soviet calculations and ideologies: first, acquisition of the port of Batum with its oil terminals and, second, a local Muslim population that did not see itself as Georgian proper and therefore "required self-determination."

The establishment of Soviet authority in Georgia, with the occupation of its territory by the Red Army up to and including Batum and Akhaltsikh, concluded the process of bringing the countries of Transcaucasia under Soviet control. (To be precise, this process was concluded with the expulsion of the Dashnaks from Zangezur and its incorporation into Soviet Armenia in the summer of 1921.) The contours of their boundaries would still change, but the outer Soviet border was clearly defined within the framework of the short-lived Soviet-Turkish military and political partnership and was given the force of international treaties. Border adjustments and the granting of ethnic autonomies within Georgia was the Soviet solution to the problems of consolidating Georgian national territory. Had the Soviets not been able to impose this solution on Georgia, the most likely outcome would have been new border wars and internal strife. The loss of Lori was probably the price Georgia paid for keeping Javakhetia and the loss of Ardahan and Artvin for keeping Batum. The creation of the Soviet autonomies of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to a large extent allowed these territories to be kept a part of Soviet Georgia; they thus avoided punitive military operations had they been forced to submit to more intrusive intervention by the Georgian government.

SOURCES

Maps: 68, 70, 120, 121, 125, 127, 155.

References: Arutiunian, *Ob istoricheskoi rodine*; *Dokumenty, otnosiashchiesia k armiano-gruzinskoi voine*; Dzidzoev and Dzugaev, *Iuzhnaia Osetiia*; Gamakhariia and Gogiia, *Abkhaziia–istoricheskaia oblast' Gruzii*; Gamakhariia et al., *Abkhaziia s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei*; *K voprosu o granitsakh Abkhazii s Gruziei 1917–1921 gg.*; Menteshashvili, *Iz istorii vzaimootnoshenii Gruzinskoi Demokraticheskoi Respubliki s sovetskoi Rossiei i Antantoi*; Pipiia, *Germanskii imperializm*; *Programmy politicheskikh partii Rossii*; Vachnadze, Guruli, and Bakhtadze, *Istoriia Gruzii*; Zhorzholiani et al., *Istoricheskie i politiko-pravovye aspekty konflikta v Abkhazii*.

Map 29

1921: Early Administrative Divisions in the Soviet Caucasus

By autumn 1921 the entire Caucasus region (minus the territories conceded to Turkey) had been incorporated into the Soviet state. The region's new composition reflected the dynamic and inconsistent imposition of sovietization on a landscape that had taken shape over a long history and was replete with social and political problems. Clearly the Soviets' effort to structure the Caucasian territory could not be called harmonious or free of contradictions: there were too many competing interests and local problems that had to be navigated, to say nothing of the Soviets' own imperfectly developed political theories and principles of government. Furthermore, with the growth of authoritarian tendencies within the Bolshevik Party, strategic decision making was increasingly the product of behind-the-scenes battles within the small circle that was the Soviet-Bolshevik leadership and was starting to depend on the political thinking of a few influential figures.

Nevertheless, the overall logic governing the design of the new political and administrative map was clear. Taking military and economic considerations into account, the goal was to create institutions of controlled national self-determination. National (ethnic) groups, like social groups, were perceived by the Bolsheviks as collective parties to the historical process ("the oppressed," "forces of national liberation"). However, it should be noted that these groups had already become important categories in political calculations and administrative practice under the empire. During the Civil War and sovietization, the groups acquired their own political and organizational representation within various national councils and revolutionary committees. In Transcaucasia the institutionalization of ethnic categories reached, through the efforts of ethnic elites, the level of internationally recognized states. The Bolsheviks did not completely abolish this institutional form, but they harnessed its symbolic significance to their political ideology. Indeed, the new authorities exploited existing national solidarities, which had become extremely politicized during the Civil War, as support for their own socially messianic appeal: "Revolution brings liberation to the people." In places where social liberation had long been expected to come in the form of national liberation, the Bolsheviks did not want to disappoint. The Soviet authorities tried to create institutions that were in tune with preexisting mass social aspirations toward liberation and self-determination while at the same time channeling these aspirations into a specific political mold. The Soviets needed a stable social base and the necessary cadres to govern the ethnic areas. The actual characteristics of the territory and status of such self-determined entities embodied the general twofold objective pursued by the Party of Lenin (the Soviet state) in the region—the consolidation of Soviet power and the carrying out of fundamental social transformation.

In 1920–1921 the initial composition of Soviet Caucasian national republics and autonomies was just taking shape, and each was generally seen as collectively "owned" by a particular ethnic group, an institutional result of ethnic self-determination. This aspect of the autonomies was reflected in the informal names they were given, such as the Republic of Mountain Peoples and the Autonomy of the Kabardin People. The most obvious category for the new authorities, the primary collective and historical actor in the North Caucasus, was the Gortsy (the plural form of *gorets*, or "mountain person," highlander). In November 1920, at the Congress of Peoples of Terek in Vladikavkaz and the Congress of Peoples of Daghestan in Temir-Khan-Shura, two mountain Soviet republics were proclaimed as part of the RSFSR. Out of the mountain districts of the former Terek Province emerged the Autonomous Gorskaya (Mountain) Socialist Soviet Republic (the Soviet reincarnation of the Gorskaya Republic of 1917–1919), and out of Daghestan Province the Autonomous Daghestan Socialist Soviet Republic (SSR), both of which were formally or officially established through a resolution of the All-Russian Central Committee on 20 January 1921. The Autonomous Gorskaya SSR consisted of six (essentially seven, including the Cossack Sunzha District) ethnic districts and two city (municipal) districts, Vladikavkaz (the capital) and Grozny.

The borders and status of Soviet national and administrative entities were not the result of Bolshevik political whim but the effect of applying and combining a set of criteria: ideological, ethnic, and economic. Any assertion that the process used by the Soviets in designing their state and creating its national-territorial subdivisions did not take into account how ethnic groups were distributed is probably unjust. It was simply that this criterion never could be and never was taken into account in isolation.

The internal composition of the new Autonomous Gorskaya SSR almost exactly preserved the borders of Terek Province's districts. Important administrative innovations were applied to resolve the question of Terek Cossack lands within the borders of the Autonomous Gorskaya SSR. In 1920–1922, as part of the first Soviet agrarian reforms and in an effort to equalize the distribution of lands and minimize the severity of farmland shortages in a number of districts, tens of thousands of highlanders were resettled in the plains that had belonged to the Cossack Hosts. In autumn 1920 the inhabitants of several Cossack stanitsas along what had been the Sunzha Defensive Line were deported, and their lands were incorporated into the Nazran and Grozny Districts (which became the Ingush and Chechen Districts, respectively, of the Autonomous Gorskaya SSR). The remaining Cossack stanitsas south of the Terek were at first supposed to be united into a single Sunzha (Cossack) District. But later these stanitsas were divided into three territorial segments. The first two, which were wedged into the Nalchik (Kabardin) and Vladikavkaz (Ossetian) Districts of the Autonomous Gorskaya SSR, were incorporated into these districts and constituted separate administrative subdivisions within them. The third group of stanitsas, inserted into Nazran and Grozny, two districts consisting primarily of Vainakhs (a name that began to be applied informally in the 1920s as an ethnic category comprised of Ingush and Chechens), was made into a separate Sunzha District, incorporating the settlements of Karabulakskaya, Troitskaya, Assinskaya, Nesterovskaya, Sleptsovskaya,

1921: Early Administrative Divisions in the Soviet Caucasus

Numerical Key

Districts of the Autonomous Gorskaya SSR as of January 1921:
1. Karachai; 2. Balkar; 3. Nalchik (Kabardin); 4. Vladikavkaz (Ossetian), divided in February-July 1921 into (4a) Digor and (4b) Ossetian Districts; 5. Nazran (Ingush); 6. Grozny (Chechen); 7. Sunzha (Cossack), de facto est. beginning January 1921; 8. City of Vladikavkaz; 9. City of Grozny
Other territories:
10. Proposed Cherkess Autonomous Province
11. Aukh (claimed for incorporation into Gorskaya SSR in March 1921)
12. Astrakhan Province [Astrakhanskaya Gubernia]

0 50 100 km

Administrative Divisions (March-April 1921)

- Don Province (est. March 1920)
- Kalmyk Autonomous Province (est. November 1920)
- Kuban-Black Sea Province (est. March 1920)
- Stavropol Province
- Terek Province (est. April 1921)
- Autonomous Gorskaya SSR (est. January 1921), including Kabardin District (seceded from Gorskaya Republic as Kabardin Autonomous Province, September 1921)
- Autonomous Daghestan SSR (est. January 1921)

Territories of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic

- SSR of Georgia (est. February 1921), including:
  - Batum Autonomous Territory (Autonomous Ajarian SSR est. July 1921)
  - Territory claimed to be part of South Ossetian autonomy
- Abkhaz SSR (est. March 1921; became Treaty-Based SSR [Dogovornaya SSR] in December 1921)
- SSR of Armenia (est. December 1920)
- Azerbaijan SSR (est. April 1920), including:
  - territory of Mountain Karabakh (claimed by Armenia until July 1921)
- Nakhichevan Autonomous Territory (under Azerbaijani protection beginning March 1921)

Abbreviations
SSR - Socialist Soviet Republic
AP - Autonomous Province

- Administrative boundaries
- Borders of Transcaucasian Soviet republics (disputed as of March 1921)
- International border of Soviet republics

Voznesenskaya, Terskaya (in the western portion of the district) and Petropavlovskaya, Goriachevodskaya, and Ilyinskaya (in the eastern portion).

In the case of the Terek Cossacks it was obvious that, in essence, the authorities were using three approaches to resolving highlander-Cossack conflicts over land. In some cases interspersed ethnic lands were eliminated by confiscating the lands of Cossack stanitsas and expelling Cossacks in areas where there was heated highlander-Cossack conflict (Chechnya, Ingushetia). In others, where highlander-Cossack relations were not hostile, Cossack and highlander territories were merged into one administrative unit and land allotments were equalized. At this time new Ossetian lowland villages appeared side by side with Cossack stanitsas in North Ossetia (Vladikavkaz District) and on their lands. But when the impossibility of expelling Cossack stanitsas was coupled with the impossibility of putting them in the same districts as Vainakhs, they were preserved temporarily as part of a separate independent Cossack Sunzha District. Only after antagonisms between the Vainakhs and the Cossacks had subsided and Soviet authority had become stronger was the territory of this district incorporated into Chechnya.

What is seen by many contemporary historians as arbitrariness in the way the Soviets organized territories was actually a pragmatic managerial logic that took into account a variety of sociopolitical conditions and the expediency of the moment. Ideas about national self-determination as it applied to the Gorskaya SSR forced the Soviets to make a number of administrative corrections. When the republic was being constituted it was given a portion of Kuban Province populated by Karachais; this was made into the Karachai District. Two new districts were formed based on ethnicity: the Balkar (for the first time administratively taking Balkar communities out of Kabarda and uniting them into one administrative unit) and Digor Districts. This latter district did not exist for long: the Ossetian political elite favored unification, so Digoria remained a part of Ossetia and the Digors continued to be considered and to consider themselves Ossetian.

Immediately after the two mountain republics were established, the Khasavyurt District, which had been a part of Terek Province and had a Kumyk, Avar, and Aukh (Chechen) population, was incorporated into the Autonomous Daghestan SSR. Both the ethnic criteria used for Soviet territorial engineering and a desire on the part of Kumyks to be in the same republic as the majority of their fellow tribe members played a role in this. The Aukhs, who were drawn to Khasavyurt and were afraid of being left without access to winter grazing lands in the plains, were also forced—not without problems—to become a part of Daghestan. The internal structure of the Autonomous Daghestan SSR reproduced, with minor changes, the district structure of former Daghestan Province.

The initial Soviet design for Russian provinces in the North Caucasus also largely reproduced the previous administrative structure. Only Kuban Province (Kubanskaya Oblast) and the Black Sea Province (Chernomorskaya Gubernia) were combined into one province (Kubano-Chernomorskaya Oblast). Stavropol Province's Greater Derbet (Bolshederbetovsky) Ulus went to the newly formed Kalmyk Autonomous Province. Terek Province, truncated after the Autonomous Gorskaya SSR was established and incorporated Vladikavkaz and Grozny, took on an odd, elongated form stretching from Kuban to the Caspian Sea. The transfer of the provincial center to Georgievsk, and later to Pyatigorsk, shifted the province's entire system of economic and agricultural connections: the Kizlyar-Nogai steppe and winter pastures were now at the far periphery and it became possible to give them to Daghestan, while Georgievsk itself began to lay claims to areas of eastern Stavropol that had been drawn into its sphere.

But only one change in the first Soviet design of the Russian provinces of the North Caucasus was truly significant: the Kuban and Terek Cossack Hosts were abolished, changing the face of the region, which no longer featured this militarily and socially unique institution.

LOCAL DETAIL

Terek was not the only province in which land was redistributed more equitably among ethnic groups in the North Caucasus. Between 1922 and 1925 new Karachai settlements were established on former Host or privately owned lands in both Terek and Kuban Provinces—Sary-Tiuz, Uchkeken, Tereze, Eltarkach, Kumysh, Kyzyl-Oktiabr. By 1926 Karachai District was three times larger than prerevolutionary Karachai, reflecting a reconciliation of administrative boundaries with the changing boundaries of ethnic distribution.

After significant territory was transferred from Terek Province to the Autonomous Daghestan SSR in 1921–1922, the first permanent settlements of mountain Avar, Dargin, and Lak communities began to be systematically created in these lowlands. This resettlement of highlanders to the lowlands was only fully realized in the 1950s and 1960s.

Two main criteria were used in determining which ethnic group would maintain possession of Karabakh—ethnic and economic. Keeping the portions of Karabakh that were populated by Armenians as part of Azerbaijan, despite the exacerbation of tensions between Armenians and Azerbaijanis during the Civil War, was officially motivated by the need to integrate the mountain and lowland portions of the region economically. In particular, the traditional Azerbaijani highland summer pastures (*yaylaks*) located above the zonal belt of Armenian communities in Karabakh, were preserved.

SOURCES

Maps: 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 129.

References: Abdulatipov, *Natsional'nyi vopros*; Butaev, *Politicheskoe i ekonomicheskoe polozhenie*; Datiev, *Zemel'nyi vopros v GSSR*; Kazharov, "Etnoterritorial'nyi aspekt stanovleniia Kabardino-Balkarskoi avtonomii"; *K istorii obrazovaniia Nagorno-Karabakhskoi avtonomnoi oblasti*; *Narody Dagestana*, 2002; *Sbornik postanovlenii*; *Territoriia i rasselenie*; Tiutiunina, "Administrativno-territorial'noe stroitel'stvo na Severnom Kavkaze."

Map 30

1922–1928: Building a Soviet State out of a Multitude of Nations

In December 1922 the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was established. The paradigm of a Soviet edifice constituted of many "ethnoterritories" with an administrative hierarchy of socialist nations and nationalities came somewhat later, when the idea of exporting the proletarian revolution was abandoned in favor of consolidating a proletarian fatherland and when it began to appear that the creation of a multilayer quasi-federative state was unavoidable.

The administrative reorganization of the region that followed was aimed at realizing Soviet ideology as well as the military, political, and economic strategies that went with it. The territorial structure and the precise drawing of internal borders were not planned in advance. From the beginning the region's organization pitted clashing principles of economic demarcation, local group interests, and political and economic priorities against one another. There was an ongoing process of adjustment to the region's administrative composition and reconsideration of institutional decisions. Overall, however, two main strategies were implemented during this period: Soviet national autonomies were established (gradually the idea of self-determination or ethnically specific administrative units extended all the way from "Soviet republics" to "ethnic village councils" and even "ethnic collective farms") and the state's basic administrative units were reorganized (which was necessitated by the priorities involved in developing the country's economic infrastructure).

THE "NATIONAL PRINCIPLE" AND AUTONOMY

The principle of national self-determination was embodied in the use of ethnic criteria to organize authority and territory. But the very approach that gave rise to the creation in 1921 of the Gorskaya (Mountain) Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic, or ASSR (actually the Autonomous Gorskaya SSR; see the Note on Terminology at the end of this commentary) as a form of national self-determination for mountain peoples ultimately served as the ideological basis for dismantling it. The Kabardin Communist elite, headed by Betal Kalmykov and spurred by the threat of a redistribution of lands in favor of neighboring ethnic districts, strove to reach a higher level of Kabardin self-determination, above and beyond the collective self-determination Kabarda shared with other highlanders within a common Gorskaya ASSR. With the support of influential figures in Moscow, the Kabardin District (Kabardinsky Okrug) left the Gorskaya ASSR and became the Kabardin Autonomous Province (oblast). This break represented a clash between one component of ideology and another: the rhetoric of self-determination was used to argue for the economic interests of an ethnic group despite the fact that this "self-determination" meant violating the principle of equal land distribution (on which Kalmykov's opponents in neighboring districts based their arguments). The departure of Kabarda from the republic led to the gradual disintegration of the Gorskaya ASSR. In 1922 the Karachai, Balkar, and Chechen Districts left, as well as Grozny. Finally, on 7 July 1924, the republic was abolished and divided into the autonomous provinces of North Ossetia and Ingushetia, the Sunzha District, and the Vladikavkaz (City) District.

It was specifically internal conflict that led to the Gorskaya ASSR's short history, and Moscow's strategy in this case developed as the conflict developed. The absence of such conflict in the other mountain autonomy—Daghestan—resulted in a different scenario playing out there. Before the early Soviet epoch Daghestan had managed to avoid the degree of politicized ethnic rivalry that characterized Terek Province. The descent of mountain auls (villages) and their agriculture onto the Kumyk-populated plains had not yet begun, and land disputes there lacked the acrimony and resonance of an ethnic territorial conflict. Remaining in their traditional mountain pockets, the Daghestani highlanders were still an Islamic aggregate of numerous jamaats (rural communities) with their own local identities. The structure of this aggregate was politically more important and psychologically more essential than the configuration of nominal ethnic areas, which in political terms could only begin to be traced with a tentative dotted line. The borders outlining the districts of the Daghestan ASSR almost completely reproduced prerevolutionary lines (which also did not match ethnic or linguistic borders), a fact that did not simplify the mapping of Daghestani jamaats in a way that would reflect ethnic distribution. However, the national (ethnic) principle in the creation of administrative zones affected Daghestan as well: by 1928–1929 reforms were being prepared and introduced that were designed to create mono-ethnic districts within the republic.

There was no initial plan for building the Soviet state that envisioned the multiplication of new autonomies. Generally young Soviet institutions and practices inherited political schemes, borders, and rivalries that had taken shape during earlier, pre-Soviet times. The creation of autonomies, their borders and statuses, was fraught with contradiction. The central government wavered in its decision making, while local interests and groups clashed. In 1922–1923 the South Ossetian and Mountain (Nagorny) Karabakh Autonomous Provinces (APs) were established. Their creation, status, and borders were a palliative and largely behind-the-scenes approach to resolving the bitter conflicts of 1918–1920. The decision by the All-Russian Communist Party's Caucasus Bureau concerning Mountain Karabakh managed both to implement the "national principle" (providing autonomy for Karabakh Armenians) and, at the same time, to sidestep it (leaving the territory within Azerbaijan). This decision was not so much a sign of Bolshevik reverence for Kemalist Turkey as an internal conflict-mitigation compromise. The territory of Zangezur, once the forces of Garegin Njdeh were expelled during the summer of 1921, was mostly incorporated into Armenia. This brought about the strategically important "Megrin corridor" separating Azerbaijan from Turkey and Nakhichevan and connecting Armenia and Persia. Between Armenia and the Mountain Karabakh AP emerged the Kurdistan District (so-called Red Kurdistan), also a part of Azerbaijan. This turned the Mountain Karabakh autonomy into an enclave. (Probably initial plans

1922-1928: Building a Soviet State out of a Multitude of Nations

Numerical Key

1. City of Vladikavkaz (assigned district status, February 1925)
2. City of Grozny (assigned district status, February 1925)

Ethnic Subdistricts [Raions] of the North Caucasus Territory
(followed by date of establishment and raion center):

3. Shapsug Raion, Black Sea District (September 1924, Tuapse [later Soviet-Kvaje])
4. Turkmen Raion, Stavropol District (June 1925, Letniaya Stavka)
5. Armenian Raion, Maikop District (March 1925, Yelisavetpolskoe)
6. Vannovsky (German) Raion, Armavir District (February 1928, Vannovskoe [Eigenfeld])
7. Grechesky Raion, Black Sea District (December 1928, Krymskaya [located outside raion])
8. Batalpashinsky and Zelenchuksky (Russian) Raions, Karachai-Cherkess AP (Batalpashinsk)
9. Cossack Raion, Kabardin-Balkar AP (1926, Maiskoe)
10. Priterechny (Cossack) Raion, North Ossetian AP (November 1925, Ardonskaya)
11. Petropavlovsky (Cossack) Raion, given to Chechen AP (January 1923, Petropavlovskaya)
12. Kalmyk Raion, Sal District (April 1929, Kuteinikovskaya [later Zimovniki])

North Caucasus Territory also included the Armenian Miasnikovsky Raion (Don District), not shown on the map.

Other territories

13. Khasaut to Karachai-Cherkess AP, 1924
14. Melkhista and Tsekaroi to Chechen AP, 1926
15. Planned Stepnovsky (German) Raion (Solomenskoe)
16. Territory claimed by the AP of Mountain Karabakh

0 50 100 km

Flag of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(established 30 December 1922)

Administrative Divisions as of September 1928

- North Caucasus Territory (est. October 1924): a (Russian) Districts; b (National) Autonomous Provinces
- Territory of Gorskaya ASSR finally abolished in July 1924
- Territory of Karachai-Cherkess AP established in January 1922 and abolished in April 1926
- Daghestan ASSR
- Lower Volga Territory, including Kalmyk AP

Territories of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic

- SSR of Georgia, including:
  - ASSR of Ajaristan and South Ossetian AP
- Abkhaz Treaty-Based SSR [Abkhazskaya Dogovornaya SSR]
- SSR of Armenia
- Azerbaijan SSR, including:
  - Autonomous Province of Mountain Karabakh [Nagorno-Karabakh]
  - Nakhichevan SSR (incorporated into Azerbaijan beginning February 1923; Nakhichevan Autonomous Territory between February 1923 and February 1924)

The Federative Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics of Transcaucasia (Mar.-Dec. 1922)

Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic [Zakavkazskaya SFSR] (est. Dec. 1922)

Abbreviations
SSR - Socialist Soviet Republic
ASSR - Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic
AP - Autonomous Province [AO - Avtonomnaya Oblast]

Tiflis - center of Transcaucasian SFSR

- Administrative boundaries as of 1928
- Border of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

had been for Armenia and Mountain Karabakh—as well as the two parts of Kurdish Zangezur—to converge, sharing a border at one point.)

The fact that ethnic districts began to make an appearance after ethnic provinces had been put in place could be described as a top-down copying of the ethnic-autonomy model. The first Soviet examples of autonomies were clearly born out of conflicts and rivalries that predated the Soviet state. It was only later that experience provided its own model for Soviet authorities: autonomies (and the ethnic administrative attribution of authority and territory) began to be reproduced at the level of individual pockets of compact or relatively homogeneous ethnic populations. But this process was not automatic: in each case a group of factors ranging from the personal tenacity of ethnic leaders to a confluence of social, political, and economic trends affected the decision. In 1922 the Cherkess (Adyghean) Autonomous Province (Cherkesskaya [Adygeiskaya] Avtonomnaya Oblast) was created out of a number of Adyghe enclaves in the Kuban–Black Sea Province. Later, in August of the same year, the official name was changed to the Adyghean (Cherkess) Autonomous Province, and in 1928 it became the Adyghean Autonomous Province. Shapsug auls along the Black Sea coast remained outside this autonomy. However, in 1927 they were administratively brought together into a separate ethnic subdistrict. During this same period in the North Caucasus a Turkmen, a German, a Greek, and two Armenian ethnic subdistricts were created. Ethnic village councils and collective farms also started appearing. An archipelago of Greek villages and hamlets to the northeast of Novorossiisk that in 1929 united into a Greek subdistrict (Grechesky Raion) provides one example of how the administrative structure of the Caucasus might have taken shape in accordance with the "national principle."

Territorial autonomization for ethnic minorities did not just develop in predominantly Russian areas. However, analogous examples of autonomization at the raion and village level in Transcaucasia did not last. The same could be said of Russian (Cossack) districts and the village councils of other ethnic groups within highland autonomous provinces. The Russian ethnic autonomy in Mughan or areas inhabited by Doukhobors would have been absurd within the framework of the Soviet model for ethnic self-determination. The absence of a Talysh or Tat autonomy (given the existence of a Kurdish one), the fact that the Ajarians had this sort of self government (while the Megrels did not) shows that the "national principle" was never absolute and was built into a complex of other political, cultural, and economic strategies, both at the level of the Soviet Union as a whole and at the level of the governance of republics by the Soviet state and Communist Party.

ECONOMIC EXPEDIENCE AND THE MERGING OF REGIONS

Military and economic priorities had to take precedence over the "national principle" in the development of the Soviet state when it came to organizing the region and instituting associated reforms. The first reform reflecting these priorities (referred to as *ukrupnitelnaya*, or "consolidating" reform) came in 1923–1924. Reform of the way in which administrative units were made up was directly tied to the New Economic Policy (NEP) and the reorganization of the entire country's economic system. One of the main goals of the regional policy of the Soviet state was the systematic (planned) development of the economic potential of the entire system of regions with priority assigned to spurring development in lagging areas and encouraging each region to focus on a particular area of economic specialization. The North Caucasus, as an economic whole, was seen as an agricultural region, and the logic of the reorganization dictated that its integrity as an economy had to be reflected in a corresponding administrative integrity.

In February 1924 the Kuban–Black Sea and Don Provinces merged to form Southeast Province (Yugo-Vostochnaya Oblast), which later swallowed up Stavropol and Terek Provinces and became the Southeast Territory (Yugo-Vostochny Krai). In October 1924 the Southeast Territory was combined with all the mountain autonomies, with the exception of Daghestan because of its possible incorporation into the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (SFSR). This vast new entity was given the name North Caucasus Territory (Severo-Kavkazsky Krai). The territory comprised districts (okrugs) that were identified as, if not officially labeled, Russian, but it included a number of national subdistricts (raions) and six ethnic autonomous provinces (oblasts). The composition of ethnic entities and the process of granting ethnic autonomy within the RSFSR was thus built into reforms in the "Russian" territories, where such entities constituted a relatively stable periphery.

Economic factors significantly influenced the composition of the ethnic autonomies themselves. For example, Balkaria was combined into a single autonomy with Kabarda for unavoidable economic reasons (the combination was only illogical from the perspective of "pure ethnic self-determination"). At the same time the Karachai-Cherkess Autonomous Province was established, the entire subsequent history of which consisted in an attempt to reconcile ethnic and socioeconomic principles in organizing authority. In 1926 the autonomy was divided into three parts along ethnic lines: the Karachai Autonomous Province, the Cherkess District (which was also turned into an autonomous province in 1928), and the Russian Batalpashinsky Raion, which was included in the (Russian) Armavir District (okrug). Economic arguments were behind the significant expansion of the territory of Daghestan (the annexation of Kizlyar and vast stretches of Nogai steppe pasturelands). The Daghestan ASSR itself declined the plausible option of joining the Transcaucasian SFSR in 1924–1926 largely due to the risk of losing these lands. This is an example of how local economic factors could affect the overall makeup of Soviet republics and the resulting configurations of their borders.

The Transcaucasian SFSR was created in 1922 as a result of the combination of both of the principles guiding the division of territories (ethnic on the one hand and military and economic on the other). The existence of well-established ethnic entities, a pragmatic appreciation of the advantages of economic unity in Transcaucasia, and political calculations concerning the use of supra-ethnic party and military institutions to deal with internal and external threats all contributed to the emergence of a South Caucasian "sister" to the Russian SFSR.

Note on Terminology: The Soviet abbreviations "ASSR" and "SSR" for socialist soviet republics represented the official word order, which was also developing and regularizing: beginning in 1929 the term "Autonomous" was moved to follow the title name (for example, Autonomous Daghestan SSR became Daghestan ASSR), and beginning in January 1937 the terms "socialist" and "soviet" were switched in the abbreviations of ASSRs and SSRs throughout the country, as well as in the name of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (RSFSR) itself, to accord with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). For clarity, I have used "Socialist Soviet Republic" (before December 1936) and "Soviet Socialist Republic" (beginning December

1936) as the translation for "SSR" throughout the text and in the Appendixes.

SOURCES

Maps: 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 136, 166.

References: Badmaeva, *Razvitie administrativno-territorial'nogo ustroistva Kalmykii; Ekonomicheskaia geografiia Iugo-Vostoka Rossii*; *Ekonomicheskoe raionirovanie Iugo-Vostoka Rossii*; Kazharov, "Etnoterritorial'nyi aspekt stanovleniia Kabardino-Balkarskoi avtonomii"; *K istorii obrazovaniia Nagorno-Karabakhskoi avtonomnoi oblasti*; *Narody Dagestana*, 2002; Osmanov, *Agrarnye preobrazovaniia v Dagestane*; *Statisticheskii spravochnik po Severo-Kavkazskomu kraiu*; *Territoriia i rasselenie*; Tiutiunina, "Administrativno-territorial'noe stroitel'stvo na Severnom Kavkaze"; *Zakavkaz'e. Statistiko-ekonomicheskii sbornik*.

Map 31

1926: An Ethnic Map Reflecting the First Soviet Census

Map 32

1926: Using the Census to Identify Russians and Ukrainians

In addition to shifts in the distribution of populations caused by the upheavals of the Civil War and interethnic wars of 1918–1920, the ethnopolitical map of the Caucasus was being influenced by other factors: the Soviet administrative ethnicization of territories, the "indigenization" of schools and government in these territories, and changes in the nomenclature of peoples (the official instrument of ethnic identification).

Adherence to the "national principle" in the 1920s created greater conformity between the administrative division of the North Caucasus and the distribution of ethnic groups. Highly homogeneous titular national territories began to emerge or were given Soviet legitimization. The Soviets' practice of relying on the national principle in the administrative design of territory and the use of positive discrimination in favor of non-Russian minorities gave ethnicity a new instrumental and symbolic weight. Of course, the cultural notion of homeland and the symbolic connection between community and territory had already become deeply ingrained for a number of Caucasian groups before the Soviet or even the imperial era. But Soviet national design raised this connection to a new level and gave it an institutional underpinning. The Soviets sanctioned the use of ethnicity as a basis for authority and collective privilege (as well as collective responsibility), an arrangement that contrasted starkly with the estate (*soslovie*) system around which imperial Russian society had been structured. In destroying the "exploiting classes," the Bolsheviks homogenized minorities' internal social structure and thereby gave ethnic identity an entirely new significance. By the time of the revolution and Civil War the Bolsheviks were treating non-Russian minorities as akin to an exploited class—"the allies of the Russian proletariat" in the struggle against tsarism and the bourgeoisie. Postrevolutionary positive discrimination by the Soviets deployed this ideology within new educational and administrative systems. The indigenization of schools and local government was designed to create a new, Soviet cultural and political infrastructure for this ethnic field.

At the same time, the authorities now required a clear definition of nationality as a separate, distinct, and exclusive characteristic. As a result, the strategy for organizing territory based on ethnic criteria, given that it was embodied in an actual administrative network and administrative practice, itself became a factor in determining ethnic categories and borders. The government's determination of ethnic categories and boundaries depended on the outcome of rivalries between various well-established ethnopolitical goals, whether integrative or autonomizing, with a variety of institutional underpinnings (autonomous republic, oblast, raion). How the Soviet state divided up territory was fraught with contradictions—some nationalities (or nominal ethnic categories) that might have qualified as separate were combined with similar groups, while others equally similar were recognized as separate. The list of peoples in the 1926 All-Union Census generally continued to apply imperial nomenclature. The country's still-emerging ethnic and administrative composition affected how people were classified throughout the country. For example, the appearance of Ukraine as a Soviet republic created a new ethnic category that had to be added to government forms throughout the Soviet state and also required the redrawing of identificational borders within the highly integrated Slavic population of the Caucasus. These borders were apparently also designed to help Ukrainian or Russian identity supplant Cossack identity and give former Host members a new affiliation.

Official instructions issued to census takers in 1926 required them, among other things, to record "Ukrainian, Great Russian, and Belorussian nationalities" (*Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1926 goda*, vol. 5). For locales "where the word 'Russian' is used by all three of those peoples to define their nationality," those being counted were required to choose only one designation. Another set of instructions took the opposite approach: all Kartvelian-speaking peoples (Georgians, Ajarians, Megrels, Svans, Laz) were to be placed under a single designation—Georgian (ibid., vol. 14).

The existence of such administrative units as national republics, autonomous provinces (oblasts), and even ethnic districts (raions) was a factor in cultural engineering. During the early Soviet period Samurzakanians, who were primarily speakers of Abkhaz but at that time had already begun to identify themselves as Megrels, were officially designated Georgian. On the other hand the fact that "Abkhaz"—a term that had entered the Russian language from Georgian during the imperial period (the local ethnonym ["Abaza"] had entered Georgian from the Greek ["Abasgoi"])—had become entrenched in Soviet nomenclature served to strengthen official recognition of the ties between the Apsua people and Abkhazia, their native land. Considering the nature of Georgian claims to indigenous status in Abkhazia, it is clear that the Russian-Soviet canonization of the "Abkhaz" ethnonym for the Apsua greatly contributed to their standing in Abkhazia as both the indigenous and the titular group. However, in the 1940s and 1950s yet another attempt was made to subvert the ethnonymic connection between the Apsua and this territory and interpret the Abkhaz as "one of the Georgian peoples" or "ethnic Georgians."

The term "Transcaucasian Tatars" was supplanted by the term "Azerbaijani Turks" and, ultimately, "Azerbaijanis." This last would be initially applied to all the Turkic-speaking Muslims of Transcaucasia, from the Meskhetians in southwest Georgia to the Terekemes in south Daghestan and assimilated Tats and Talysh. Probably the temporary identification of the

0 50 100 km

Sea of Azov
Black Sea
Caspian Sea
Gulf of Kizlyar
L. Manych
Kalmyk Autonomous Province
Sal District
R. Volga
R. Yeya
R. Yegorlyk
R. Kalaus
R. Kuban
R. Laba
R. Urup
R. Kuma
R. Malka
R. Terek
R. Sunzha
R. Sulak
R. Rion
R. Ingur
R. Kura
R. Arax
L. Gokcha (Sevan)
L. Van
Turkey
Persia

Yeysk
Kerch
Temryuk
Anapa
Novorossiisk
Krasnodar
Armavir
Stavropol
Cherkess
Maikop
Germans
Russians and Greeks
Armenians
Kabardins and Cherkess
Nogai
Karachai
Balkars
Georgievsk
Pyatigorsk
Prikumsk
Mozdok
Kizlyar
Astrakhan
Sochi
Armenians and Russians
Gagry
Abkhaz
Greeks
Sukhum
Svans
Megrels
Kutais
Poti
Batum
Khemshils
Laz
Ajarians
Georgians
Dushet
Gori
Telav
Tiflis
Akhaltsikh
Signakh
Ossetians
Ingush
Vladikavkaz
Grozny
Chechens
Nogai
Russians
Kalmyks
Tatars
Turkmen
Ukrainians
Kumyks
Avars
Dargins
Laks
Lezgins
Tats
Derbent
Buinaksk
Makhachkala
Kuba
Nukha
Ganja
Azerbaijani Turks
Armenians
Leninakan
Erivan
Nakhichevan
Kurds
Shusha
Shemakha
Baku
Saliany
Lenkoran
Talysh

Key to the Numbers and Symbols Designating Ethnic Groups

1. Abkhaz
2. Beskek-Abaza (Abazins)
3. Cherkess (Adygheans)
4. Cherkess and Kabardins
5. △ Kabardins
6. Ingush
7. Chechens
8. Batsbi
9. Ingush (Kistins)
10. Avars
11. Andi (peoples of the Andi group)
12. Didoi (peoples of the Tsez group)
13. Dargins
13a. Kaitags and Kubachins (Dargins)
14. Laks
15. Lezgi (Lezgins)
16. Tabasarans
17. Aguls
18. Tsakhurs
19. Rutuls
20. Archins
21. Kryz
22. Budugs
23. △ Udins
24. Khinalugs
25. ▽ Georgians, Imeretians, Ajarians
26. Megrels
27. Svans
28. Laz
29. ✡ Georgian Jews
30. ○ Russians and Ukrainians
    Czechs
    Moldavians
31. Germans
32. ♦ Greeks
33. ▷ Ossetians
34. Kurds
35. Yazidis
36. ◁ Tats
37. ✡ Mountain Jews
38. Talysh
39. ▬ Armenians
39a. ▼ Khemshils
40. △ Azerbaijani Turks (Azerbaijanis)
41. ▷ Karachai
42. ◁ Balkars
43. Kumyks
44. Nogai
45. Turkmen
46. ▬ Tatars
47. Kalmyks
48. ▮ Estonians
49. ◊ Assyrians

The same ethnic designations are used here as in the 1926 census. Where contemporary designations differ they are given in parentheses.

1926: An Ethnic Map Reflecting the First Soviet Census



The map does not show the distribution of Russians and Ukrainians in Kalmykia, Astrakhan, and the Sal District north of Lake Manych.
Where districts and their centers share the same name, only one is given.
Daira, *Gavarak*, and *Temi* are the terms for administrative districts in Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, respectively

1926: Using the Census to Identify Russians and Ukrainians

Meskhetians as Azerbaijanis in the 1920s was tied to the existing administrative framework of the Transcaucasian SFSR, given Azerbaijan's role as one of its founding members. Opportunities presented by cultural and educational policies and official support for the development of ethnic schools with instruction in native languages weakened the prospect that this group of Muslims would be turned into Georgians. At the same time the extent of Turkic assimilation of Tat and Talysh populations within Azerbaijan minimized the need to worry about their aspirations for autonomy, though not to the point where they could be eliminated from the nomenclature of peoples. In 1929 came the abolition of "Red Kurdistan" (based on foreign policy considerations). Such a symptomatic deviation from the ethnic principle notwithstanding, the general practice of Soviet ethnic engineering served to counter the temptation to apply a Kemalist template in creating an Azerbaijani people by, for example, labeling the republic's entire Muslim population Azerbaijanis the same way Turkey proclaimed all members of its diverse population to be Turks. (Possible evidence that the republic's authorities felt this temptation can be seen in census data for Soviet Azerbaijan's Tat, Talysh, Kurdish, and Lezgin populations.) In the case of South Ossetia, the formation of an autonomy had the effect of hardening identifying borders within Ossetian areas of Georgia. The institution of autonomy largely inhibited the gradual historical process that was transforming South Ossetians into Georgians.

The scattered Adyghe groups were organized into four administrative units: the Kabardin-Balkar, Cherkess, and Adyghean Autonomous Provinces, and the Shapsug National District. The Adyghe autonomy in Kuban–Black Sea Province that was formed in 1922 and called the Cherkess (Adyghean) Autonomous Province (to avoid being confused with the Karachai-Cherkess AP by government agencies) changed its name to the Adyghean-Cherkess AP, and later to the Adyghean AP. Such administrative divisions became the basis for distinct official identities. The Soviet administrative map overlaid the former internal structure of the Adyghes' division into tribes, creating, in the process, four "different" peoples: the Kabardins, Adygheans, Cherkess, and Shapsugs.

The Turkic-speaking "Mountain Tatars" (or the "five mountain communities of Greater Kabarda") were designated the Balkar people, solidifying the practice of using this single name as an ethnonym for all five communities. At the same time the subset of this population that was separated from the five communities not so much by the giant Mount Elbrus as by the old administrative border of Kuban Province and the channels of economic activity, retained a different designation—Karachais.

An earlier Soviet administrative division of Chechens and Ingush perpetuated prerevolutionary tradition, reinforcing differences in identity among the Vainakhs (as the two groups together were sometimes known). But it was never assumed that this separate political and administrative division of the Vainakhs closed the door on their future administrative and ethnocultural integration—these opposing historical possibilities were represented in equal measure in the society and elites of these peoples.

The Soviets' effort to finalize a list of their peoples (a nomenclature that would "standardize" the ethnic map) was riddled with inconsistencies: the dividing lines between some groups were reinforced and made more rigid while those between others were abolished. But these inconsistencies could hardly be labeled arbitrary political and administrative juggling of existing groups and their identities, as has sometimes been claimed. Soviet ethnic engineering could only select and impel certain evolutionary tendencies that already existed within the complex of ethnic identities. What looked like arbitrary decision making was always informed by a combination of subjective and objective factors. Among the former could be included the machinations of local ethnic elites and short-term political expediency. The latter included linguistic affinities (or lack thereof), actual distribution, and economic ties. Then, in 1931, ethnicity itself was transformed into an "objective fact": it became an entry in the internal passport of every citizen of the USSR in conjunction with a mandatory census of nationalities.

SOURCES

Maps: 91, 92, 98, 113.

References: Belozerov, *Etnicheskaia karta Severnogo Kavkaza*; Kaiser, *Geography of Nationalism*, pt. 1; Martin, *Affirmative Action Empire*; Slezkine, "USSR as a Communal Apartment"; "Spisok naselennykh mest Gorskoi respubliki"; "Spisok naselennykh mest Severo-Kavkazskogo kraia"; *Statisticheskii spravochnik po Severo-Kavkazskomu kraiu*; *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1926 goda*, vols. 5 and 14.

Map 33

1929–1934: The Rise and Fall of the "National Principle" in Administrative Divisions

Map 34

1936–1938: The Constitutional Codification of a Hierarchy among Peoples and Territories

The second half of the 1920s and the early 1930s was an era of Soviet cultural ascendancy, the indigenization of schools, and the emergence of a government and Communist Party bureaucracy within ethnic autonomies. Many Caucasian peoples were becoming literate for the first time and beginning to develop a national literature. Ethnic groups were joining the ranks of Soviet national cadres involved first and foremost in the promotion of Soviet culture. The politics of indigenization helped implant Soviet ideology and practices into the practices and beliefs of indigenous groups, thereby serving as a means of inculcating Soviet political attitudes and cultural standards among national minorities. But the more effort the Soviets put into raising up the region's autonomies, the more evident the limitations of the autonomies' economies and infrastructures became. When autonomous provinces were first being established, some of their administrative centers had to be set up outside the province: in the case of the Adyghean Autonomous Province, in Krasnodar; North Ossetia and Ingushetia, in Vladikavkaz (renamed Orjonikidze in 1931); Chechnya, in Grozny; and some Karachai and Kabardin district centers, in Kislovodsk and Pyatigorsk, respectively. In the case of the united autonomy of Karachai-Cherkessia, which was split into two separate entities in 1926, the construction of two provincial centers was undertaken. And while Mikoyan-Shakhar (named for Anastas Mikoyan, then head of North Caucasus Territory [Severo-Kavkazsky Krai]) was built largely to serve as the Karachai autonomy's capital, Erken-Shakhar never moved beyond the planning stage, and the provincial center of the Cherkess AP was moved to Batalpashinsk (a former Cossack stanitsa). The impulse to eliminate ethnic criteria in the drawing of administrative boundaries, as well as a departure from the principle of indigenization, was embedded in the very strategy for building up national autonomies. If autonomies were to serve as platforms for national development, they had to have the appropriate economic infrastructure. This strategic emphasis on economics over ethnicity shaped a series of subsequent territorial expansions by autonomies at the expense of neighboring Russian districts and urban centers.

The move away from the national principle in organizing the territory's administrative subdivisions began as early as 1928, when Chechen AP was strengthened by the addition of the oil-producing city of Grozny (even earlier it had benefited from allocations funded by oil revenues). At around the same time, Chechnya acquired the territory of Sunzha District (except for Terskaya stanitsa outside Mozdok). In 1931 a large portion of the former Batalpashinsky Russian subdistrict (raion), along with the chain of Cossack stanitsas stretching along the base of the mountains between Karachai and Cherkessia, was divided between these two autonomies, a move that also greatly enhanced their economies. In 1932 a portion of the Prokhladnensky District was incorporated into the Kabardin-Balkar AP (possibly as an alternative to the incorporation of Pyatigorsk, which as far back as 1922 had been seen as a possible center for the autonomy). Rivalry between North Ossetia and Ingushetia over Orjonikidze was ostensibly settled in 1933–1934 with the incorporation of the city into the North Ossetian AP and the merging of Ingushetia and Chechnya into a single Vainakh autonomy, the Chechen-Ingush AP. In 1936 Giaginskaya District and a portion of the Maikop District (along with Maikop itself, which then became the province's administrative center) were incorporated into the Adyghean AP.

As ethnic provinces expanded, their titular populations became diluted. Furthermore, Soviet social dynamism and the emergence of new political undertakings (collectivization and campaigns against "national opportunists," the clergy, and the intelligentsia) began to weaken the perception of territories as collective ethnic property. The very institution of autonomy was transformed from a type of self-determination to the organization of minorities' collective loyalty to the Soviet state and a way to prepare them for the new horizons of the Soviet era.

A shift in the political content of the autonomy (from an institution of self-determination to an ordinary Soviet administrative unit) helped neutralize any hierarchical relationship between the titular groups and their new Russian populations. The indigenization and ethnic preferences that had been built into the old model no longer worked, and Russians saw national autonomies as little different from other administrative units—they were all part of a single country. The autonomies themselves had an interest in territorial expansion, for both economic and culturally symbolic reasons. Greater economic opportunities and the acquisition of capital cities opened up new possibilities for national elites and bureaucracies.

So by the mid-thirties, with the Soviet system firmly established in the ethnic provinces, autonomization and indigenization were abandoned as outdated political tools. In an era when the main priority was consolidating the socialist state, socioeconomic and geopolitical expediency were seen as more fitting aims than indigenization. The effort to strengthen autonomies economically led to the introduction of new administrative cadres and repressive measures designed to promote the country's cultural and ideological homogeneity.

In 1938 minority languages that had used Latin scripts (introduced in the 1920s) began using new Cyrillic-based alphabets, with the exception of Abkhaz and Ossetian within Georgia, which switched to Georgian-based scripts. Ossetian was once

Numerical Key

1-2. Upper Kuban stanitsas divided in November 1931 between Cherkess AP (Batalpashinsk and Storozhevaya) and Karachai AP (Zelenchukskaya, Ust-Jegutinskaya, Kardonikskaya, Krasnogorskaya);
3. Prokhladnensky District incorporated into Kabardin-Balkar AP in March 1932;
4. Orjonikidze incorporated into North Ossetian AP in July 1933;
5. Grozny incorporated into Chechen AP in November 1928;
6. Sunzha District incorporated into Chechen AP in April 1929 (excluding Terskaya);
7. Ingush AP and Chechen AP merged into Chechen-Ingush AP in January 1934;
8. Area given to Daghestan ASSR in 1932;
9. Boundary changes and adjustments in Transcaucasian SFSR in 1929-1934;
10. Astrakhan Province [Astrakhanskaya Gubernia], abolished in May 1928; Astrakhan District [Okrug] of Lower Volga Territory (until July 1930)

0 50 100 km

Administrative Divisions as of 1934

North Caucasus Territory divided in January 1934 into:
(a) Azov-Black Sea Territory (centered in Rostov-on-Don), including:
Adyghean AP (centered in Krasnodar)
(b) North Caucasus Territory (centered in Pyatigorsk) , including:
Cherkess AP, Karachai AP, Kabardin-Balkar AP,
North Ossetian AP and Chechen-Ingush AP
Daghestan ASSR
(incorporated into North Caucasus Territory beginning September 1931)
Lower Volga Territory (Stalingrad Territory beginning January 1934)
} Territories of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic

Georgian SSR, including:
Abkhaz ASSR, Ajarian ASSR and South Ossetian AP
Armenian SSR
Azerbaijan SSR, including:
Nakhichevan ASSR and AP of Mountain Karabakh
} Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic

Tiflis Center of Transcaucasian SFSR
Administrative boundaries as of 1934
Border of the USSR

Abbreviations:
SSR Socialist Soviet Republic
ASSR Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic
AP Autonomous Province [AO Avtonomnaya Oblast]

1929-1934: The Rise and Fall of the "National Principle" in Administrative Divisions

Table 33.1
Changes in Territories with Titular Ethnic Groups, 1929–1939

Territorial Changes	Percentage of Titular Ethnic Group[a]	
	Before Changes[b]	After Changes
Adyghean AP (incorporation of Maikop, Giaginskaya, etc.)	55.7	22.8 (1939)
Karachai AP (incorporation of a portion of Batalpashinsky District)	81.3	60.7 (1933)
Cherkess AP (incorporation of a portion of Batalpashinsky District)	70.3	38.2 (1933)
Kabardin-Balkar AP (incorporation of Prokhladnensky District)	76.3	64.1 (1935)
North Ossetian AP (incorporation of Orjonikidze [Vladikavkaz])	84.2	50.3 (1934)
Chechen AP (incorporation of the city of Grozny and Sunzha District)	94.0	64.0 (1930)

[a]The "titular ethnic group" is defined here as the group for which an administrative entity was named. In the case of Adyghea and Cherkessia, figures include populations of Adygheans, Cherkess, Kabardins, and Abazas; for Kabarda-Balkaria they include both Kabardins and Balkars.
[b]Data from 1926 census.

more written with Cyrillic letters in Russia, as it had been before the revolution.

Fascism was already on the march in Europe, and in the USSR the idea of world revolution was abandoned in favor of building up the Soviet Union as a Communist world power. However, not only were ethnic autonomies not abolished; some were given a higher status within the country. In 1936, in conjunction with the adoption of the new Soviet constitution, Kabarda-Balkaria, North Ossetia, and Chechnya-Ingushetia, which were seen as capable of economic self-sufficiency, were given the status of Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) and were made independent components of the RSFSR, while Adyghea, Cherkessia, and Karachai remained autonomous provinces incorporated into Russian administrative territories. At the same time, ethnic districts (raions) within these territories were gradually abolished and economically and administratively absorbed by neighboring Russian districts.

The administrative composition of the North Caucasus Territory also underwent significant change. In July 1930 the okrug administrative level was abolished and the territory (excluding the autonomous provinces) was broken into eighty-seven rural raions (both *okrug* and *raion* are usually translated "district") and ten cities. The administrative emphasis on the raion was associated with the challenges of collectivization. However, difficulty managing such a large number of raions, bureaucratization, and poor communication between these districts and the territorial government led to serious problems. The addition of Daghestan ASSR to the North Caucasus Territory in 1931 only hastened its inevitable breakup.

In January 1934 the North Caucasus Territory was broken into a western part—the Azov–Black Sea Territory (Azovo-Chernomorsky Krai, with Rostov-on-Don as its capital)—and an eastern part, which kept the name of the North Caucasus Territory (with its capital in Pyatigorsk and, briefly, from January to December 1936, in Orjonikidze). In 1936, after the three autonomies of Kabarda-Balkaria, North Ossetia, and Chechnya-Ingushetia were elevated to the status of autonomous republics, they—along with Daghestan ASSR—were removed from this truncated North Caucasus Territory (renamed in March 1937 Orjonikidze Territory [Ordzhonikidzevsky Krai]). The territory's capital, which in December 1936 had been left outside its boundaries, was finally moved to Stavropol (renamed Voroshilovsk from 1935 to 1943). In September 1937 the Azov–Black Sea Territory was divided into Krasnodar Territory (Krasnodarsky Krai) and Rostov Province (Rostovskaya Oblast; the difference between a krai and an oblast was that krais contained ethnic autonomous provinces). As a result, by the late 1930s Russia's Caucasian subregion had essentially returned to its prerevolutionary composition of three provinces: Kuban (now Krasnodar Territory), Don (now Rostov Province), and Stavropol (now Orjonikidze Territory).

The composition of Transcaucasia's republics proved more stable: the drawing of national boundaries here was a much more sensitive matter. Furthermore, without the resource of neighboring Russian districts, the Soviet state had to be much more cautious in how it exerted its authority over boundary changes. As the twenties and thirties came to an end, borders were shifted only slightly around villages to divide territory in keeping with economic activity and ethnic makeup. Enclaves such as the Armenian Artsvashen ("Bashkend" to the Azerbaijanis) appeared. In 1929, based on foreign policy considerations, the Kurdistan District (uezd) of Azerbaijan was abolished, taking with it the prospects for Kurdish autonomy. In 1928–1929 the Pilenkovo Subdistrict (Pilenkovskaya Volost) was reincorporated into the Abkhaz ASSR as a kind of repayment for the loss of Abkhazia's status as a treaty-based republic and its reversion to an ASSR within the Georgian SSR. Finally, with the elimination of the Transcaucasian SFSR, the three constituent republics were elevated in status and became direct constituents of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

LOCAL DETAIL

In late 1932, probably in conjunction with the trend away from indigenization and toward more repressive policies in regard to Cossack settlements in Kuban, the Soviet authorities decided to curtail the policy of Ukrainization in that region. Ukrainian-language publications and broadcasts were halted, and schools changed the language of instruction from Ukrainian to Russian. The Ukrainian population in Kuban, which had been documented in the censuses of 1897 and 1926, again became officially a part of the Russian people.

In 1938 the vast Kizlyar District (more than 75 percent Russian) was taken away from Daghestan ASSR and incorporated into Orjonikidze Territory, although by now the national principle was not the primary reason for this change. Abandoning the ethnic principle allowed administrators to give greater weight to economic considerations in decisions about how to organize the region. Eastern Ciscaucasia was viewed by the Soviets through a prism of large-scale projects to introduce irrigation

Main projects to irrigate the Stavropol Plateau and Eastern Ciscaucasia:
1. The Manych Waterway (Sea of Azov–Don River–Caspian Sea)
2. Nevinnomyssk Canal (Kuban River–Yegorlyk–Manych)
3. The Great Stavropol Canal
4. The Terek-Kuma Canal

Other irrigation projects:
5. The Samur-Absheron Canal (in Azerbaijan)

0 50 100 km

Rostov Province [Rostovskaya Oblast]
Stalingrad Province [Stalingradskaya Oblast]
Astrakhan District [Astrakhansky Okrug], restored July 1937
Kalmyk ASSR [Kalmytskaya ASSR]
Russian SFSR
Krasnodar Territory [Krasnodarsky Krai]
Orjonikidze Territory [Ordzhonikidzevsky Krai]
Kizlyar District [Kizlyarsky Okrug]
est. and incorp. into Orjonikidze Territory in Feb.1938
Adyghean AP
Maikop
given to Adyghean AP
April 1936
Cherkess AP
Karachai AP
Pregradnaya
given to Karachai AP
Jan. 1936
Kabardin-Balkar ASSR
[Kabardino-Balkarskaya ASSR]
Chechen-Ingush ASSR
[Checheno-Ingushskaya ASSR]
North Ossetian ASSR
Abkhaz ASSR
Georgian SSR
Ajarian ASSR
South Ossetian AP
Armenian SSR
Azerbaijan SSR
Nakhichevan ASSR
Mountain Karabakh AP
Daghestan ASSR
[Dagestanskaya ASSR]
Kazakh SSR
[Kazakhskaya SSR]
Black Sea
Caspian Sea
Sea of Azov
Gulf of Kizlyar
Turkey
Iran
Russian SFSR
Crimean ASSR

Administrative Divisions as of 1938

- Rostov Province
- Stalingrad Province
- Kalmyk ASSR
- Krasnodar Territory [Krai], including: Adyghean AP
- Orjonokidze Terrritory [Krai], including: Cherkess AP, Karachai AP, and Kizlyar District
- Kabardin-Balkar ASSR
- North Ossetian ASSR
- Chechen-Ingush ASSR
- Daghestan ASSR
- Georgian SSR, including: Abkhaz ASSR, Ajarian ASSR and South Ossetian AP
- Armenian SSR
- Azerbaijan SSR, including: Nakhichevan ASSR and Mountain Karabakh AP

Territories of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic*

*The word order in the name of the RSFSR was officially changed beginning December 1936

Administrative borders
Border of the USSR

Abbreviations:
SSR Soviet Socialist Republic
ASSR Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
AP Autonomous Province [AO Avtonomnaya Oblast]

1936-1938: The Constitutional Codification of a Hierarchy among Peoples and Territories

that would allow the land to be used more for grain production than cattle grazing. It was also during this period that construction began on the Manych Waterway, a shipping canal that was designed to connect the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov with the Caspian via Lake Manych and the Kizlyar District. It has yet to be completed.

SOURCES

Maps: 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 99, 100, 101, 102, 166.

References: Khmara and Golovin, "O natsional'nom raionirovanii na Severnom Kavkaze"; Kaikova, "Povorot v natsional'noi politike 1935–1937 gg"; Martin, *Affirmative Action Empire*; *Osnovnye administrativno-territorial'nye preobrazovaniia na Kubani (1793–1985)*; Slezkine, "USSR as a Communal Apartment"; *Spravochnik*; Tiutiunina, "Administrativno-territorial'noe stroitel'stvo na Severnom Kavkaze."

Map 35

1937–1949: World War II and Ethnic Deportations from the Caucasus

Map 36

1943–1956: A Selective Purge of the Ethnopolitical Map

Soviet social and foreign policies of the 1930s set in motion processes that altered the ethnic and administrative composition of the Caucasus. The most dramatic changes resulted from the forced resettlement of entire population categories. Decisions about what social or ethnic groups would be removed were determined first by the logic underlying the building of Soviet socialism and later by the social upheavals of the thirties and the great military confrontation between the Soviet Union and Germany from 1941 to 1945.

In the late 1920s one of these processes, collectivization, targeted kulaks—peasant farmers, now deemed too prosperous—as yet another category of people threatening the building of communism. Kulaks became the first collective target of large-scale repression in the 1930s. The elimination of this category from the social structure was achieved by moving tens of thousands of families to distant regions of the Urals and Siberia between 1930 and 1933 (according to some estimates, by the autumn of 1932 more than 300,000 people had been expelled from the North Caucasus Territory in the course of wholesale collectivization and the "destruction of the kulaks as a class"). In Kuban a number of stanitsas were "black boarded," literally labeled *chernodosochnye*, a term originating from the practice of hanging a black board (*chernaia doska*) in public places to cast shame on a stanitsa for not turning over its quota of requisitioned grain to the government. As punishment, the populations of these stanitsas (including Poltavskaya, Urupskaya, Umanskaya, Novorozhdestvenskaya, Medvedovskaya, Nezamaevskaya, Beisugskaya, Platnirovskaya, and Plastunovskaya) were entirely or partially deported.

Collective punishment was targeted at particular social groups, just as it had been in the case of the Cossacks during the Civil War and its aftermath. But social groups were not the only types of collective actors to be assigned such roles by the government. Indeed, even Cossacks were categorized not only in terms of their place in society (a military estate pledged to serve the empire) but as an ethnic category (Russian military colonists). Initially, ethnic groups in the Caucasus were also assigned (or assigned themselves) the same sort of collective identity. Their collective identity in the region—and their common privileges and responsibilities—was something firmly engrained in the Soviet worldview and policies.

BORDER AREA "PREVENTIVE DEPORTATIONS"

With the beginning of the collectivization experiment and the famine that ensued in many agrarian regions of the USSR, the country began to deemphasize its role as a model of socioeconomic and political development. The loss of this status and the worsening international situation in many ways changed the social function of the Soviet state's external borders. A desire to ensure the impenetrability of its borders from emigration coupled with military considerations led to the beginning of a series of border-area expulsions. Among politically unreliable elements—risk groups—were foreign and Soviet citizens who shared a common homeland with members of their ethnic group outside the borders of the Soviet Union. The first ethnic deportees were Finns from borderlands in Leningrad Province and Karelia, followed by Poles living along the country's western border and Koreans in the Far East. In the Caucasus the first to be removed were Kurds (1,325) and Iranians (approximately 6,700) from the borderlands of Soviet Azerbaijan and Armenia.

These and subsequent deportations did not involve physical expulsion from the country, however. All the collective deportations that took place after 1922 were to places of internal exile deep within the Soviet Union, far from the country's European regions and from any external borders. Although deported peoples remained residents and citizens of the USSR, within Soviet political lexicon the term "deportations" suggested that they were no longer members of the family of (true) Soviet peoples.

MILITARY "PREVENTIVE DEPORTATIONS"

At the beginning of World War II a new category was identified for collective punishment: Soviet Germans. In September–October 1941 people with German ancestry were expelled from throughout the Caucasus: 23,580 from Georgia, 22,741 from Azerbaijan, 212 from Armenia, 33,300 from Rostov Province, 5,327 from Kabarda-Balkaria, 2,929 from North Ossetia, 34,287 from Krasnodar Territory, and 95,489 from Orjonikidze Territory (of whom approximately 50,000 had been sent there from the Crimea in August 1941). Additionally, in April–August 1942 more than 7,000 Greeks were expelled from Rostov Province and Krasnodar Territory. While the motivation behind the deportation of Germans was based entirely on ethnicity—no evidence was considered necessary in order to brand two million Soviet citizens collaborators with the land of their ancestors—the fate of Greeks was tied to a different factor. As the war approached, a significant number of the Greeks who had settled the Caucasus Black Sea coast still held foreign citizenship, and a series of systematic deportations was conducted as part of the expulsion of foreign subjects from the fronts of Rostov and Krasnodar Territories. (Greeks who were deported from the Crimea later, during the summer of 1944 after the peninsula was liberated by the Red Army, were accused of "economic" collaboration with the German occupation of the Crimea, a fate that also befell

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Crimean Tatars, Bulgarians, and Armenians. As Lavrenty Beria put it, "A portion of the Greeks in occupied areas were engaged in trade and light industry"; this, in Soviet eyes, was tantamount to betrayal of the fatherland.)

DEPORTATION AS RETRIBUTION

While preventive deportation based on ethnicity was limited to groups with a "foreign fatherland," retributive deportations affected some of the Caucasus' indigenous populations. As early as the period extending from autumn 1941 through the spring of 1942 problems arose in mobilization campaigns in a number of mountain areas, and by July 1942 the Red Army conscription campaign among some ethnic groups was halted. Around the same time German troops crossed the Don near Rostov and were approaching the foothills of the Greater Caucasus Mountains. The battle for the Caucasus (over the oil of Baku and Grozny) occupied the fall and winter of 1942–1943. It was during this period that anti-Soviet insurgent activity in the North Caucasus reached its peak. In the eyes of the Soviet leadership all the blood shed by the peoples of the North Caucasus for their Soviet fatherland in the ranks of the Red Army could not begin to make up for what was imputed to be betrayal by entire peoples—though these "betrayals" in fact amounted to a few hotbeds of insurgency that had been smoldering since before the war. Probably by early 1943 decisions that appear to have been based on a presumption of collective guilt had been made about who would be the targets of Stalin's ethnic reprisals and which peoples would be subject to mass deportation.

Official accusations of collaborationism—labeled "political banditry"—were leveled against several ethnic groups in 1943–1944. The Karachais and Balkars were accused of directly aiding the enemy by providing invading German units with guides through mountain passes and helping to destroy the Soviet partisan movement in the occupied Elbrus region. In the fall of 1943, several months after the defeat of German troops outside Stalingrad and their expulsion from the Caucasus, the entire Karachai population was deported. In March 1944, Balkars were also expelled. In total, 69,739 Karachais and 37,044 Balkars were deported. The Soviets' use of deportation as a tool of retribution affected another people accused of aiding the enemy—Kalmyks. A total of 100,852 Kalmyks were deported from the Kalmyk ASSR in December 1943 and from Rostov Province in March 1944.

During the winter of 1943–1944 the NKVD prepared an operation to expel Chechens and Ingush. Unlike the Karachais and Balkars, the Vainakhs were accused of "banditry" in the Red Army's rear (with the exception of the northwestern corner around Malgobek, Chechnya-Ingushetia was never occupied by the Wehrmacht), and even of prewar banditry against neighboring Soviet territories.

The fact that the Vainakhs were not integrating well into the Soviet system had already become evident before the war, during forced collectivization and the fight against religion. The nature of their social organization had a marked effect on how these peoples adapted to Soviet experiments and upheavals. The absence or weakness of a pro-Soviet elite within certain ethnic groups created a situation of constant crisis in relations with the Soviet authorities, and the excesses of collectivization and anti-religion campaigns only made matters worse.

During repressive measures against "kulak-mullah elements" in the 1930s it became increasingly doubtful whether the Soviet authorities would be able to hold on to Chechnya-Ingushetia. Measures taken against the organic and entirely non-Soviet Vainakh social and cultural elite severely eroded loyalty toward the Soviet state. Even before the war, centers of active resistance to the authorities had formed within the autonomy, along with a developing insurgent infrastructure and ideology. The beginning of the war and the approach of the German army only served to encourage this insurgency, which in 1944 was then used as a pretext for assigning collective guilt of collaboration to the entire Chechen and Ingush populations and deporting them. On 23 February 1944 an NKVD operation titled "Chechevitsa" ("the lentil"—a phonetic play on the name of the targeted group) was launched, leading to the expulsion of 387,229 Chechens, including Akki Chechens from the Aukh District (Aukhovsky Raion) of Daghestan and 91,250 Ingush.

POSTWAR "PREVENTIVE DEPORTATIONS"

The expulsion of Meskhetian Turks took place during the war itself, in the fall of 1944, but it was probably prompted by preparations for a possible Soviet military strike against Turkey. A new "cleanup" of the Soviet-Turkish border area included deportations not only of Turkic-speaking Meskhis (approximately 79,200) but also of Kurds (8,794) and Khemshils (1,385; they were also known as Hemshins, Armenian-speaking Muslims) from Meskhetia, Javakhetia, and Ajaria. Over the course of several postwar years there was a gradual expulsion of "Dashnaks" (a politically derogatory term used to justify the selective deportation of Armenians), Turks, and the Greeks remaining along the Black Sea coast (including 8,300 from Krasnodar Territory and 16,375 from the Georgian SSR, mostly from Abkhazia).

Deportations had a profound impact on the populations of many Caucasian areas and required the redrawing of administrative boundaries. The total expulsion of ethnic groups from the administrative entities that bore their names was followed by the liquidation of the autonomies of Chechnya-Ingushetia, Karachai, and Kalmykia and the redistribution of their territories.

The territory of the Karachai Autonomous Province, which was abolished on 12 October 1943, was divided into four parts. The Uchkulan District and a portion of Mikoyan District (Uchkulansky and Mikoyanovsky Raions) went to Georgia (where they became the Klukhori District [Klukhorsky Raion]); Ust-Jeguta, Malo-Karachai, and Zelenchuk Districts (Ust-Jegutinsky, Malo-Karachaevsky, and Zelenchuksky Raions) remained within Stavropol Territory proper; the Great Laba River basin was incorporated into Krasnodar Territory; and the remainder, including the stanitsa of Pregradnaya, went to the Cherkess Autonomous Province in Stavropol Territory.

The territory of the Kalmyk ASSR, which was abolished on 27 December 1943, was divided among the newly formed Astrakhan Province, neighboring Stavropol Territory, and Stalingrad and Rostov Provinces.

The territory of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, which was abolished on 7 March 1944, was divided into four parts. The central districts were at first reconstituted within Stavropol Territory as the Grozny District (Groznensky Okrug), but on 22 March 1944, in combination with the Kizlyar District and the Naur District (Kizlyarsky Okrug and Naursky Raion), this territory became the new Grozny Province (oblast). The rest of the former autonomous republic was divided up among neighboring North Ossetian and Daghestan ASSRs, as well as the Georgian SSR.

The expulsion of Balkars brought about the transformation on 8 April 1944 of the Kabardin-Balkar ASSR into the Kabardin

The Administrative Redistribution of Territory, 1943–1956

Territories of Karachai Autonomous Province, abolished October 1943
1. to Georgian SSR (later to Stavropol Territory, March 1955)
2. to Krasnodar Territory
3. to Stavropol Territory (administered by Territory government)
4. to Cherkess Autonomous Province, Stavropol Territory

Territories of Kabardin-Balkar ASSR (in April 1944 made into the Kabardin ASSR)
5. to Georgian SSR (until May 1955)
6. to North Ossetian ASSR

Territories of Chechen-Ingush ASSR, abolished on 7 March 1944
7. to the newly established Grozny District in Stavropol Territory, later to Grozny Province (established on 22 March 1944)
8. to North Ossetian ASSR
9. to Georgian SSR
10. to Daghestan ASSR

Territories of Kalmyk ASSR, abolished December 1943
11. to Stavropol Territory
12. to Rostov Province
13. to Astrakhan Province (established December 1943)
13a. to Stavropol Territory in January 1952

Other changes to administrative divisions:
14. Aukh District [raion] of Daghestan ASSR, abolished in March 1944
15. Kizlyar District [okrug] of Stavropol Territory abolished and its territory incorporated into Grozny Province on 22 March 1944
16. Naur District [raion] of Stavropol Territory to Grozny Province in April 1944
17. Mozdok District of Stavropol Territory to North Ossetian ASSR in March 1944
18. Eastern Tagauria of North Ossetian ASSR to Georgian SSR in March 1944
19. Crimean ASSR, abolished in June 1945

Borders shown as of 1 January 1953

Boundaries of abolished autonomies

1943-1956: A Selective Purge of the Ethnopolitical Map

ASSR and the incorporation of the Balkar slopes of Mount Elbrus into the Georgian SSR.

The autonomies and localities that had been largely "cleaned up" were now populated by residents of neighboring areas and other parts of the USSR on a "compulsory volunteer" basis. (This Soviet oxymoron was a frank recognition of the fact that "voluntary" decisions by Soviet citizens were often mandatory.) Svans settled the Karachai and Balkar area around Mount Elbrus; the western districts of Chechnya-Ingushetia were settled by Ossetians (from both North Ossetia and Georgia, including the South Ossetian AP); the districts in southern Chechnya-Ingushetia were settled by Khevsurs and Tushins and in the east by Avars and Dargins. Former Chechen (Akki) villages within Daghestan (the abolished Aukh District) were settled by Laks and Avars. The Greek villages of Abkhazia and Turkic-speaking Meskhetian villages in southwestern Georgia were settled primarily by Georgians. Grozny Province was settled by people migrating from many areas of central Russia.

SOURCES

Maps: 98, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 118, 124, 126.

References: Bezugol'nyi, "Narody Kavkaza i Krasnaia Armiia"; Bugai and Gonov, *Kavkaz: narody v eshelonakh*; *Deportatsii narodov SSSR*; Kotsonis, "Deportatsiia grekov Kavkaza"; *Narody Dagestana* (1955); *Narody Kavkaza*, vols. 1–2; *Nemetskie naselennye punkty v SSSR do 1941 goda*; Panesh and Ermolov, "Meskhetinskie turki"; Polian, *Ne po svoei vole*.

Map 37

1957: The Return of the Deported Peoples and the Restoration of Their Autonomies

During the decade following the end of World War II, tens of thousands of people moved to the territories of abolished autonomies and other areas from which "punished peoples" had been expelled. In basing collective repression on ethnicity, the government drew a clear line between the punished and the rest, who were members in good standing of the "family of Soviet peoples." The punished disappeared from the daily life and history of the Caucasus. Any trace of their existence was removed from the printed and physical record, from encyclopedias and toponyms. Institutionally prescribed and ideologically inspired discrimination deepened the estrangement between peoples: for some the Soviet state was a hostile force, for others a tool for justified violence. Deportations were widely perceived as deserved retribution for crimes against or betrayal of the Soviet state. Later, during de-Stalinization, when deported groups were allowed to return home, this estrangement became one of the main sources of interethnic tension. In many cases the deportations had greatly exacerbated the already traditionally uneasy relations between the deportees and their neighbors, who had taken their lands. By involving thousands of families in the economic redevelopment of vacated territory, the Soviet state had implicated them in political crimes and made them the hostages of future conflicts.

After Stalin's death and the removal of Lavrenty Beria, the Communist Party and Soviet government began to reconsider and reverse decisions leading to the deportation of various population groups. In 1955–1956 restrictions prohibiting ethnic deportees from leaving their place of exile were lifted (the Ministry of Internal Affairs had already released them from administrative supervision) and their rights were restored. Although their rehabilitation was grounded in law and based on the innocence of the vast majority of deportees and the illegitimacy of their internal exile, it was motivated by the overall political course of the Soviet leadership toward a restoration and strengthening of "socialist legality." True rehabilitation, which depended largely on the efforts of the deported groups themselves, turned out to be limited by political expediencies and economic considerations at various levels of government.

At first rehabilitation did not even include provisions for the exiles to return home (for example, the possibility of creating an autonomy for Chechens and Ingush in Kazakhstan—their place of exile—was explored). Reluctance on the part of both the central and regional authorities to sanction a return by Germans was associated largely with the political decision that it was impossible to restore the Volga German autonomy since Germans were not a "historically indigenous people." Another factor was the authorities' probable unwillingness to lose more than one million hardworking and expert farmers in areas where virgin lands were being developed. Restrictions limiting where Germans could choose to live were lifted only in 1972. The fate of the Crimean Tatars was apparently complicated by the presence of a number of strategically important military bases in their homeland, as well as by the fact that Crimea was becoming an important Soviet resort area. The reluctance of the central government to make a decision as to whether to return deported groups to the Caucasus was also associated with another circumstance—the risk of interethnic unrest among returning exiles and those who had settled their lands, as well as the likely need to send the settlers back from whence they came. However, the fact that Chechens, Ingush, and a number of other peoples were already leaving their places of exile and returning home forced the authorities to restore the abolished autonomies. On 9 January 1957, by order of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the majority of deported ethnic groups were permitted to return. The same decrees restored the Chechen-Ingush ASSR and Kalmyk Autonomous Province (which in 1958 became an ASSR). The Kabardin ASSR was turned back into the Kabardin-Balkar ASSR, and with the reestablishment of the Karachai-Cherkess AP that had existed in the early 1920s the Cherkess were again united with the Karachais.

The government restored the "punished" ethnic groups to the status of loyal Soviet peoples and gave them land on which to rebuild (if their previous residences were not available) and financial support in reestablishing themselves. Those who had been moved into the deportees' former neighborhoods between 1944 and 1956 began to leave these areas, which were now part of reconstituted autonomies. But the reconstitution of autonomies in 1957 did not mean that their administrative design was the same as it had been in 1943–1944.

The Karachai Autonomy was restored as a combined Karachai-Cherkess AP with the reincorporation of a band of Cossack stanitsas stretching from Cherkessk (originally the stanitsa of Batalpashinskaya) to Pregradnaya. The borders of the Karachai-Cherkess AP matched what the external borders of the Cherkess AP and Karachai AP had been in 1943. The decision to reconstitute the autonomy in this form was guided by economic priorities aimed at integrating highland Karachai with foothill Cossack and Cherkess areas. (This process had already begun before the war, when a significant proportion of Karachais had moved to the lowlands, while Cherkess were allotted pasturelands in the mountains.)

In the restored Kabardin-Balkar ASSR, Balkars found themselves living within large majority-Kabardin districts. This meant that the republic's internal administrative divisions no longer adhered to the national principle and were influenced more by principles of economic demarcation. A portion of what used to be the Kurp District (Kurpsky Raion), which was ethnically mixed, remained part of the Mozdok District of the North Ossetian ASSR.

When the Chechen-Ingush ASSR was restored, a portion of the Prigorodny District (raion) that had been part of Chechnya-Ingushetia until 1944 was not returned to it. This area, which was a suburb of Orjonikidze (known as Dzaujikau from 1944 to 1954, the capital of the North Ossetian ASSR) and was economically linked to the city, remained a part of that republic. Ossetians living in other districts that had been given back to the Chechen-Ingush ASSR now moved to this part of Prigorodny District. At the same time, administrative measures were taken to

1957: The Return of the Deported Peoples and the Restoration of Their Autonomies

Restoration of Abolished Autonomies, January 1957

- 1 — Territory of the former Karachai AP within reestablished Karachai-Cherkess AP, Stavropol Territory
- 2 — Territory of the former Balkar Districts of the Kabardin-Balkar ASSR within the restored autonomy
- 3 — Territory of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR within the restored autonomy
- 4 — The portion of the former Ingush districts that remained outside of the restored autonomy: (4a) part of Prigorodny District and (4b) part of Psedakh District
- 5 — Naursky, Shelkovskoy, and Kargalinsky Districts of the former Grozny Province, incorporated in 1957 into the restored Chechen-Ingush ASSR
- 6 — Territory of the Kalmyk ASSR within the restored autonomy (from January 1957 to July 1958 the Kalmyk AP was a part of Stavropol Territory)
- 7 — The portion of Privolzhsky and Limansky (former Dolbansky) districts remaining outside the restored Kalmyk autonomy
- 8 | 9 — Territories of abolished Grozny Province, divided in 1957 between: (8) Stavropol Territory (Achikulak and Kaiasula Districts), (9) Daghestan ASSR (Kizlyarsky, Karanogaisky, Tarumovsky, and Krainovsky Districts)
- 10 — Territory of the former Aukh District [Aukhovsky Raion] of the Daghestan ASSR (the district was not restored after the return of the Aukh, and the territory continued to comprise the Novolak District and part of the Kazbekov District)

limit the return of the Ingush population to this district. North Ossetia was also allowed to retain a narrow corridor connecting the main part of its territory with Mozdok District, which had become an exclave because of the return of Malgobek and Nazran Districts to Chechnya-Ingushetia.

The predominantly Cossack Naursky (Naur), Shelkovskoy, and Kargalinsky Districts, which had been part of the abolished Grozny Province (Groznenskaya Oblast) and were economically oriented toward Grozny, the capital of the newly reconstituted Chechnya-Ingushetia, were now made a part of that autonomous republic. (It is widely believed that these three districts were incorporated into Chechnya-Ingushetia as territorial compensation for the loss of Prigorodny District; however, the available historical record offers no evidence of this.) Grozny Province's Achikulak and Kaiasula Districts (Achikulaksky and Kaiasulinsky Raions), populated by Nogais and Russians, were incorporated into Stavropol Territory, while Karanogai (Karanogaisky), Kizlyar (Kizlyarsky), and Krainovsky Districts (the latter two also predominantly Russian) went to the Daghestan ASSR. The territory of the former Kizlyar District (which covered the Nogai steppe and the Cossack settlements along the Terek) thereby wound up being administratively divided among Daghestan, Chechnya-Ingushetia, and Stavropol.

The Aukh District (Aukhovsky Raion) of the Daghestan ASSR—founded in 1943 and liquidated after its Akkin Chechen population was deported—was not reconstituted. In 1957 the authorities preferred not to get involved in a campaign to move Laks and Avars in order to make room for Chechens and instead offered the Akkins the opportunity to settle in neighboring districts of Daghestan while limiting their ability to return to what had since been renamed Novolak (Novolaksky, or New Lak) District.

In 1957 most (Turkic) Meskhis, or Meskhetians, still remained in the areas to which Caucasian peoples had been deported, along with Germans and a few other peoples. The lifting of administrative obstacles to their return to the Caucasus applied only to those who had officially designated themselves Azerbaijanis before deportation. In the fall of 1957 these self-identified Azerbaijanis were given the right to resettle in the Azerbaijan SSR. The decree issued by the Supreme Soviet on this matter cites an assertion by the Georgian SSR that it "lacked the ability to accommodate" the Meskhis in the districts from which they had been evicted.

This suggests that the policies of regional authorities played a role in determining the overall contours of the rehabilitation campaign of 1956–1957. The limited scope of this rehabilitation certainly had to do with shortcomings in the socialist legal order itself, but it had even more to do with an approach to ethnic groups that continued to categorize them in terms of how loyal they were considered to be and, correspondingly, treated them as objects of political calculation in strategies for maintaining a "preferable" ethnodemographic balance. This balance was not an overt objective of government, but the effort to maintain it led to inconsistencies in the policies of both central and regional government. The authorities wanted to reintegrate groups into dominant Soviet culture and society, whether this reintegration took place in Kazakhstan (to which most of the group had been exiled) or in the Caucasus. This explains why the former exiles were subject to both preferential treatment and certain infringements of their rights. But at the same time the authorities strove to minimize risks inherent in reintegration in specific territories, even prohibiting exiles from returning to their native villages in cases where that would have involved conflict with the new population (resulting in the creation of a local "pale of settlement").

Despite the difficulties involved in returning exiles to their homes—such as the events of 1957 in Grozny, when a portion of the Russian population demanded that the city of Grozny be allowed to secede from the Chechen-Ingush ASSR as a restored Grozny Province—the Soviet government managed to maintain overall stability and, starting in the 1960s, began to introduce a new political doctrine: the building of a "unified Soviet people."

SOURCES

Maps: 109, 115, 116, 119, 122, 123.

References: Belozerov, *Etnicheskaia karta Severnogo Kavkaza*; *Deportatsii narodov SSSR*; Kuznetsova, "Etnopoliticheskie protsessy"; Polian, *Ne po svoei vole*; Zdravomyslov, *Mezhnatsional'nye konflikty*.

Map 38

1957–1990: Stability and Conflict under "Developed Socialism"

What sets this period apart is the stability of the region's administrative borders. Beginning in 1957 and until the end of the Soviet era, the Caucasus did not undergo any politically significant redrawing of internal borders. One change that did take place was the expansion in 1962 of the Adyghean Autonomous Province to incorporate the foothill and mountain portions of the Belaya River basin (including the stanitsas of Tulskaya, Kurdzhipskaya, Kamennomostskaya, Daghestanskaya, Dakhovskaya, and Sevastopolskaya) and a portion of the Caucasus Climatological Reserve. There were also a few changes to administrative borders of the republics, territories, and provinces in keeping with various Soviet economic and political campaigns (such as Nikita Khrushchev's experiments between 1963 and 1965 in dividing territories and local governments along economic lines and sorting them into agricultural and industrial units).

As it worked to strengthen regions' socioeconomic infrastructure, including those of the country's ethnic entities, the central government was also striving to reduce the political weight of administrative (internal) borders. At the top of the Soviet Union's domestic political agenda was the emergence of a single Soviet people (*Sovetsky narod*) as a civic community (nation). This meant also that ethnically grounded administrative borders would gradually lose their significance as the territorial framework within which specific cultural and linguistic policies were conducted. However, as strategies were being developed to shape a single Soviet nation there were also processes under way that rendered this single nation an ideological illusion, a historically vulnerable political project. This civic project of nation-building, which was closely tied to the ideological kernel of "real socialism," fell victim to the untenability of the Soviet model of social and economic development.

One of the contradictions of the period of "developed socialism" was expressed in the fact that the strategy for strengthening the unity of the Soviet people, a strategy that featured unifying elements in the areas of education and culture, was developing alongside a gradual growth in the importance of ethnic affiliation and the institution of titularity—administrative entities named for a particular ethnic group. The wave of Russification associated with the "one people" view of Soviet civic nation-building had begun in the early 1960s. By 1977—when the new USSR constitution was adopted—the country's leadership had decided to omit the mention of the national languages as state or official languages in newly adopted constitutions of union republics. This decision was perceived in some republics as an effort to make Russian the country's sole official language. (One of the responses to this policy was a number of demonstrations in defense of the constitutional status of the Georgian language in Tbilisi in 1978.)

The Russification that appeared to be taking hold in the 1960s was imperiled by ideological and organizational pitfalls. The central government was trying to achieve greater integration of minorities into a common Soviet civic community built around a Russian ethnic core and to actively promote higher educational and living standards in the national republics. This strategy produced large numbers of highly educated people within the Caucasus' many nations and created "overcrowded" ethnic intelligentsias. The members of the educated class competed with one another for prestige and influence as they promoted ethnic (rather than Soviet) patriotism, defended the interests of their ethnic "nation," and discovered the "true" history of their people at a time when it was becoming possible to question the moral authority of the Soviet state. Although this new generation of ethnic elites was a product of the Soviet system, it eventually broke away from the tenets of the single-Soviet-nation paradigm, and its members became the main proponents of ethnic national sovereignty.

By and large this stage in the history of the Caucasus can be seen as a carefully controlled move toward indigenization, where the role of indigenous governing cadres was played by members of the titular ethnic group who had undergone selection within the system of party and Komsomol schools and had acquired the basic skills of the Soviet governing culture, in particular the ability to apply ethnicity as an instrument of political power. For many years the Communist Party and Soviet central authorities had worked to create an acceptable ethnic bureaucracy and intelligentsia on which they could rely in controlling and absorbing the ethnic periphery. However, this control came with increased political influence by members of the titular ethnic group and reinforced the very institution of titularity—a system that informally put the collective rights of one group above those of other groups.

As the seventies and eighties came to a close, titular ethnic groups began to develop more clearly defined ideas about themselves and their republics as protopolities—aspiring nations with a destiny that was not necessarily tied to the Soviet Union (and Russia). To mitigate the consequences of this trend the central authorities resorted to a tactic of semi-official quotas for nomenklatura (key administrative) posts as a means of supporting ethnic balance within regional governing apparatuses. But quotas only drew greater attention to ethnicity as a criterion on which positive or negative discrimination was based. Both the efforts of the central bureaucracy (which strove for ethnic balance among national cadres) and local national bureaucracies turned ethnic affiliation into an important asset or impediment in vertical mobility. Ethnic affiliation increasingly turned into a key factor in collective and individual competition for prestigious jobs in the apparatus or advantageous positions within the hierarchies of the command economy.

For a long time the central Soviet authorities managed to gloss over the contradictions inherent in the two forms of nation-building they were engaged in as they strove on one hand to create a melting pot, a single supranational state, while on the other they perpetuated ethnic autonomy (cast in Soviet terminology as "the maturing of socialist nations"). The maturity of the Soviet Union's ethnic nations remained a merely potential threat for the integrity of the country—for now, there was still doctrinal energy behind Communist ideol-

Russian SFSR

Azerbaijan SSR

Armenian SSR

Georgian SSR

Flags of the Soviet Republics (adopted beginning in 1951–1952)

1957-1990: Stability and Conflict under "Developed Socialism"

ogy and relatively effective central institutions of state power. The well-developed ideology of "friendship among peoples" and long-standing practice of "attention to ethnicity" that manifested this friendship both inhibited and fed the politicization of ethnicity. The crisis of Soviet ideology and its legitimizing function was followed by the accelerating disintegration of central institutions, finally destroying the identificational framework of shared Soviet nationhood.

By the late 1980s conflict began to heat up in several zones of ethnopolitical competition. These zones were distinguished primarily by the pretensions of two or more ethnic groups to the exclusive status of the titular people within a territory. Titularity meant possession of an administrative entity that had the institutional backing of the Soviet system but also control of the institutions of power that was not overtly or formally sanctioned and having a controlling share of government stock in a given territory, so to speak. The titular tug-of-war was exacerbated by the fact that competing groups fostered conflicting versions of national history and mutually exclusive ideas about "historical native territories" and "right of first possession." Being an "indigenous people" was presented as the historical grounds for the status of "titular people." Another collective resource in the competition over status was numerical predominance. Majority status allowed those who possessed it to view the democratic procedures growing out of Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika as an important mechanism in the defense of collective ethnic rights.

In the Caucasus region, which had clearly been shaped by successive strategies for governing ethnic minorities belonging to different eras, there existed a whole network of potential status conflicts. Administrative territories named for one group (autonomies and republics with only one titular group) experienced challenges to their legitimacy in the form of disputes over boundaries or the status of separate districts by groups that considered themselves indigenous but unjustly deprived of titular status (for example, the Ingush in the Prigorodny District of North Ossetia) or access to power (the Ingush of Chechnya-Ingushetia), or by groups constituting a majority but nevertheless deprived of both titular status and meaningful access to power (Russians in Adyghea).

In cases of "shared autonomies"—territories with two "united" titular groups—conflicts arose between the two groups over how power would be divided. Demographic differences between groups led to asymmetry in the balance of power. Crises surrounding problems of parity presented the prospect of dividing these autonomies along ethnic lines, raising questions about how to draw new borders (Karachai-Cherkessia, Kabarda-Balkaria, Chechnya-Ingushetia).

Superethnic titular territories named not for a specific ethnic group but for a cluster of groups and for the territories' historical, cultural, or geographic uniqueness experienced conflicts over the distribution of power among ethnic groups belonging to a collective autonomy (for example, in Daghestan).

Hierarchies of titular territories, where one ethnic administrative entity was subordinate to another, were a source of conflict associated with the strivings of the elites of both groups to achieve exclusive priority within their given territory (Abkhazia in Georgia, South Ossetia in Georgia, Mountain Karabakh in Azerbaijan).

These zones of dispute over status formed a matrix of potential conflict. When conflicts did escalate into violence it was largely spurred by the actions of ethnic entrepreneurs tied to their own political strategies and specific trajectories toward power under the conditions of crisis and destruction sweeping away the institutions of the Soviet state in the late 1980s.

LOCAL DETAIL

In November 1972 a letter ("On the Fate of the Ingush People") was submitted to the Communist Party Central Committee by representatives of the Ingush intelligentsia that described the inequitable position of the Ingush in North Ossetia and Chechnya-Ingushetia and argued for the creation of a separate Ingush autonomy that would include the Prigorodny District, which was currently part of North Ossetia. One month later a mass demonstration took place in Grozny over similar demands (it was dispersed by police). Tensions sporadically spilled over from the political sphere into everyday interactions between Ingush and Ossetians in the Prigorodny District.

In 1977 the Armenian Helsinki Watch group publicly demanded the "reunification of Mountain Karabakh and Nakhichevan Autonomous Provinces, which had been incorporated into the Azerbaijan SSR, with the Armenian SSR."

In December 1977 more than a hundred members of the Abkhaz intelligentsia issued a letter to top party and government officials that was critical of the policy toward the Abkhaz language and culture in Georgia and demanded that Abkhazia be given the right to secede from the Georgian SSR. During the spring and summer of 1978 there were mass demonstrations in Abkhazia in support of these demands.

SOURCES

Maps: 110, 114, 115, 116, 117, 122, 128, 131, 170.

References: Alekseeva, *Istoriia inakomysliia v SSSR*; Denisova and Ulanov, *Russkie na Severnom Kavkaze*; Derluguian, *Bourdieu's Secret Admirer in the Caucasus*; Kaiser, *Geography of Nationalism*, pt. 2; Karklins, *Ethnic Relations in the USSR*; Khoperskaia, *Sovremennye etnopoliticheskie protsessy*; Lakoba, *Ocherki politicheskoi istorii Abkhazii*; Lapidus, "Ethnonationalism and Political Stability"; Savva, *Etnicheskii status*; Silver, "Population Redistribution and the Ethnic Balance in Transcaucasia"; Zhorzholiani et al., *Istoricheskie i politiko-pravovye aspekty konflikta v Abkhazii*.

Map 39

1989–1991: Overview of the Ethnopolitical Rivalries at the Conclusion of the Soviet Era

Map 40

1991–2003: The Dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Escalation of Armed Conflict in the Caucasus

The crisis that swept over the Soviet state in the late 1980s brought with it a series of competing plans to redraw the map of the Caucasus. The country's deteriorating economy made changes in the name of "ethnic sovereignty" or "the redress of historical wrongs" more appealing. The collapse of Soviet institutions and solidarities opened up a great ideological void that was immediately filled by the historical and political agendas of competing ethnic groups as agents of consolidated action. The goal of these collective agents was envisioned solely in terms of the defense of their own interests—their own "ethnoses" or "nations." It was believed that to accommodate these interests (the interests of "ethnic awakening," "parity," "survival," "territorial rehabilitation," and so on) it would be necessary to redraw administrative and political lines, both political borders and those delineating the legitimate privilege of the collective owners.

In an overview of the numerous ethnic territorial and status conflicts that were developing in the early 1990s it is possible to pinpoint a number of specific disputes.

THE SHAPSUG QUESTION

This issue arose out of the desire of Adyghe political groups united within the Adyghe Khase movement (a union or council of Adyghe NGOs) to restore the Shapsug national district that had existed from 1924 to 1945, or even to establish a national republic, centered in the Krasnodar Territory coastal town of Lazarevskoe. Shapsugia as it was conceived in 1990 encompassed territory on which the Adyghe Shapsug population made up an insignificant minority. This was one of the main impediments to realizing a Shapsug national autonomy, but there were others. Shapsugia was within a federally designated resort area, Greater Sochi. Furthermore, concern over setting a precedent by restoring a former national entity made the territorial authorities reluctant to work with the Shapsugs to find a compromise.

ADYGHEA

Conflict over the status of Adyghea, an autonomous province (oblast) in Krasnodar Territory, stemmed from the efforts of the Adyghe political elite to secede from Krasnodar and the fact that in 1990 Adyghea was given the status of a national republic. Russians in primarily Russian districts of Adyghea demanded that their districts remain a part of Krasnodar Territory. The political structure of Adyghea was a source of tension stemming from the fact that it was the national republic of the Adyghe people (a circumstance that came with certain privileges for ethnic Adyghes and assured them majorities within institutions of local government), even though the Adyghes constituted a minority of the population.

KARACHAI-CHERKESSIA

The fact that Karachai-Cherkessia was the titular autonomy for two groups—leading to a complex of mutually exclusive claims—and also was home to three additional numerically significant ethnic groups that wanted representation in government inevitably led to conflict. In the early 1990s the Jamagat social and political movement demanded the restoration of the separate Karachai autonomy that had existed in 1943, which included a number of Cossack villages. Cossack organizations were pursuing their own "territorial self-determination" aimed at the creation of a Russian autonomy (the republics of Batalpashinsk and Zelenchuk-Urup) or the integration of districts with stanitsas into Krasnodar or Stavropol Territory proper (the Karachai-Cherkess AP was part of Stavropol Territory until 1991, when it seceded and became the Karachai-Cherkess Republic, a constituent of the Russian Federation). Cherkess political groups (and Adyghe groups in general) were working to raise the political status of the Cherkess and restore or create a titular autonomy separate from the Karachais, and in so doing to avoid the prospect of Karachai political domination in a united Karachai-Cherkessia. For their part, local Abazas and Nogais, lacking any titular status within the autonomy, demanded the creation of their own national entities. The growing impulse toward ethnic self-determination within Karachai-Cherkessia and the conflicts associated with it were somewhat quelled by the republic-wide referendum in 1992, in which 76 percent voted to preserve a single Karachai-Cherkess Republic. Nevertheless, political problems related to ethnic territorial claims continued into the twenty-first century.

KABARDA-BALKARIA

In 1990–1992, in anticipation of a probable breakup of Kabarda-Balkaria along ethnic lines, territorial conflict began to crystallize between its two titular groups. The broad and amorphous border area between the mountainous Balkaria and the foothills and lowlands of Kabarda became the target of historical-ideological competition by popular political organizations (the Congress of the Kabardin People versus the National Council of the Balkar People and the Tyore ["supreme council"]). The threat that the republic would be divided also provoked the

1989-1991: Overview of the Ethnopolitical Rivalries at the Conclusion of the Soviet Era

Projects to Redraw the Map of the North Caucasus

- 1a — Creation of a Shapsug autonomy (the restoration of a Shapsug national district)
- 1b — Elevation of the status of the Adyghe autonomy to a national republic and its secession from Krasnodar Territory
- 1c — Secession of the predominantly Cossack Giaginsky and Maikop Districts from Adyghea and their incorporation into Krasnodar Territory proper
- 2 — Elevation of the status of Karachai-Cherkessia to a republic and its secession from Stavropol Territory
- 2a 2b — Division of Karachai-Cherkessia and the restoration of the republics of Karachai (2a) and Cherkessia (2b)
- 2c — Secession of the predominatly Cossack Districts from Karachai-Cherkessia and the formation of Cossack republics (of Zelenchuk-Urup and Batalpashinsky) to be incorporated into Stavropol or Krasnodar Territory
- 2d 2e — Creation of an Abaza autonomy within Karachai-Cherkessia and Nogai autonomies within Karachai-Cherkessia and Stavropol Territory
- 3a 3b — Division of the Kabardin-Balkar autonomy and the formation of Kabardin (3a) and Balkar (3b) republics
- 3c — Secession of Prokhladnensky District from Kabarda-Balkaria and its incorporation into Stavropol Territory
- 4a — Incorporation of a portion of North Ossetia's Prigorodny District and “Mozdok Corridor” into Chechnya-Ingushetia or Ingushetia
- 4b — Incorporation of the southern half of North Ossetia's Mozdok District into Kabarda-Balkaria (within the boundaries of the former Kurp District)
- 4c — Secession of Mozdok District from North Ossetia and its incorporation into Stavropol Territory
- 5 a/b — Division of Chechnya-Ingushetia, the formation of Chechen (5a) and Ingush (5b) republics, and Chechnya's secession from Russia
- 5c — Division of Sunzha District, contested by Chechnya and Ingushetia, or the restoration of the Sunzha Cossack District
- 5d — Secession of the Naursky and Shelkovskoy Districts from Chechnya and the formation of a Cossack-Nogai autonomy and/or incorporation into Stavropol Territory
- 6 a b — Division of Daghestan into ethnic autonomies, including the formation of Kumyk (6a) and Lezgin (6b) republics
- 6c — Secession of the Kizlyar, Nogai, and Tarumovka Districts from Daghestan or the restoration of a Kizlyar District within Stavropol Territory
- 6d — Restoration of an Aukh Chechen district and/or the incorporation of this territory into Chechnya
- 6e — Creation of the new Novolak District for the resettlement of Laks from the proposed Aukh District
- 6f — Secession of the Derbent District from Daghestan and its incorporation into Azerbaijan
- 7 — Incorporation of a portion of Astrakhan Province (parts of Liman [formerly Dolban], and Narimanov [within the boundaries of the former Privolzhsky]) Districts into Kalmykia
- 8 — Incorporation of parts of Kalmykia's "Black Lands" [Chernye Zemli] into Astrakhan Province (which had been administering them since 1954 under an indefinite lease)

Projects to Redraw the Map of the South Caucasus

- 9 — Secession of Georgia from the USSR and abolition of its autonomies
- 9a — Elevation of the Abkhaz republic to a constituent unit of the Federation of Georgia and Abkhazia or seccession from Georgia
- 9b — Elevation of South Ossetia from an autonomy to a republic within Georgia or its secession from Georgia and possible incorporation into Russia
- 9c — Secession of Leningori/ Akhalgori District from South Ossetia and incorporation into Georgia proper
- 9d — Creation of an Armenian autonomy in Javakhetia
- 9e — Creation of an Azerbaijani autonomy in Borchalo
- 10 — Secession of Azerbaijan from the USSR and the abolition of its autonomies
- 10a — Secession of Mountain Karabakh from Azerbaijan and/or its incorporation into Armenia
- 10b — Incorporation of the Shahumyan District into Mountain Karabakh
- 10c — Creation of a Talysh autonomy in Azerbaijan
- 10d — Secession of South Lezgistan from Azerbaijan and its incorporation into Daghestan and Russia
- 11 — Secession of Armenia from the USSR

Other revisionist projects

Unification of “Adyghe (Cherkess) autonomies” into a Cherkess republic (Shapsugia, Adyghea, Cherkessia, and Kabarda) within Russia
Unification of Karachai and Balkaria into a Karachai-Balkar republic within Russia
Unification of North and South Ossetia within Russia
Unification of Chechnya and Daghestan into an Islamic Republic of Daghestan outside Russia
Unification of North and South Lezgistan within Russia
Unification of mountain autonomies into a North Caucasus Confederation (Gorskaya Republic)

Border of the USSR as of 1991

0 50 100 km

Cossacks of the Prokhladnensky and to some extent the Maisky Districts (raions) to demand that all territory with stanitsas be made a part of Stavropol Territory. In 1991 Kabarda-Balkaria laid claim to a part of North Ossetia's Mozdok District (Mozdoksky Raion), which until 1944 had been part of the Kabardin-Balkar ASSR's Kurp District (Kurpsky Raion). However, this dispute was just an episode in otherwise stable relations between Kabarda-Balkaria and North Ossetia.

Illustrative of the sorts of schemes to redraw the ethnopolitical map of the Caucasus in the early 1990s were plans to recombine two "Adyghe-Turkic" republics based on ethnolinguistic criteria: the plans to establish "Turkic" republics of Karachai-Balkar and Adyghea (the latter of which would have included Kabarda, Cherkessia, and Adyghea, as well as the Shapsug Raion).

INGUSHETIA AND NORTH OSSETIA'S PRIGORODNY DISTRICT

By the early 1990s an Ingush popular political movement aimed at restoring a separate Ingush republic had taken shape. Demands were made to include portions of North Ossetia's Prigorodny and Mozdok Districts in this autonomy (the portions that from 1924 to 1944 had been part of the Ingush Autonomous Province or the Chechen-Ingush ASSR), as well as the eastern side of Orjonikidze/Vladikavkaz on the right bank of the Terek (although no part of the city proper had ever been incorporated into the autonomies of Ingushetia or Chechnya-Ingushetia). The ethnoterritorial dispute between North Ossetia and the Ingush Republic culminated in armed conflict during the autumn of 1992. (The Ingush Republic was carved by Russian Federation law in June 1992 out of the Chechen-Ingush Republic without a determination of its boundaries—the law provided for a transitional period during which border issues would be resolved.) An attempt by the Ingush to establish armed control (and thus achieve a fait accompli) over areas of the Prigorodny District they claimed led to clashes with North Ossetian police, the Ossetian population, and groups from South Ossetia. It concluded with the intervention of the Russian federal army. The "One-Week War" left more than six hundred dead and forty thousand refugees, the majority of whom were Ingush from North Ossetia.

CHECHNYA AND THE SUNZHA COSSACK DISTRICT

In the autumn of 1991 the crisis within the USSR created an opening for the Chechen "ethnic revolution," which was being led by the United Congress of the Chechen People under the banner of national sovereignty and secession from Russia, and, later, the building of an Islamic state. The new political regime in Chechnya under General Jokhar Dudaev led to a breakdown of social infrastructure, an upsurge in criminality, and the flight of non-Chechens from the republic. In December 1994 a lengthy armed standoff began, with Russian central government forces and Chechen forces that wanted to remain part of the federation on one side and Chechen (Ichkerian) separatist groups on the other. By 2002–2003 the latter groups had been forced to become guerrillas relying on the support of a portion of the local population and organizational and financial help from foreign Islamic public institutions and political groups. The first Chechen war was the worst post-Soviet ethnopolitical conflict in terms of its humanitarian toll: approximately 35,000 dead and more than 350,000 refugees. The second Chechen war cost between 15,000 and 24,000 lives. The military, political, and humanitarian catastrophe that engulfed the Chechen Republic between 1991 and 2003 encompassed a number of schemes to redraw the borders of this republic. The almost total exodus of Russians from Chechnya, including the Naursky and Shelkovskoy Districts north of the Terek River, deprived demands for the return of these districts to Stavropol Territory of their social and ethnic basis. Even earlier, in 1991–1992, the ethnic basis for the political attempt to restore the Sunzha Cossack District (Sunzhensky Kazachy Okrug) had evaporated. The territory that had once been part of this district was formally disputed between Chechnya and Ingushetia, but the principle of ethnic majority rule essentially rendered it part of the Republic of Ingushetia (with the exception of the Assinskaya stanitsa and Sernovodsk).

THE NOGAI AUTONOMY AND KIZLYAR DISTRICT

In the early 1990s the question of creating a Nogai autonomy appeared on the political agenda. This entity was to include the entire Nogai steppe, which had been divided since 1957 among Stravropol Territory, Daghestan, and Chechnya-Ingushetia. A more modest plan envisioned creating a national autonomy out of Daghestan's Nogai District (Nogaisky Raion) and an adjacent portion of Stavropol Territory (the former Kaiasula District [Kaiasulinsky Raion]). The question of Nogai autonomy was raised in large part by migration within Daghestan and fundamental changes to the ethnic structure of districts north of the Terek River (the north bank). Once predominated by Cossacks (along the Terek) and Nogais, the steppe districts of what was now North Daghestan became a zone of increasingly impressive economic activity and settlement by peoples (mostly Dargins and Avars) leaving Daghestan's highland communities. As a political response to these processes, in the late 1980s schemes emerged to form a Nogai autonomy and restore the Kizlyar District (Kizlyarsky Okrug) as an autonomy for the Cossacks of the lower Terek and Nogai, as well as a more radical plan that would have returned the territory of the former Kizlyar District to Stavropol Territory.

THE KUMYK AUTONOMY

Not unrelated to plans for Cossack and Nogai autonomy from Daghestan were a number of schemes in the late 1980s and early 1990s to redefine the Republic of Daghestan. In 1990 the Tenglik Kumyk national movement proclaimed as its objective the "national self-determination of the Kumyk people within the boundaries of their historic territories," which was to involve the creation of an autonomy or even an independent republic within Russia. These territories encompassed what are now the Babayurt, Buinaksk, Karabudakhkent, Kayakent, Kizilyurt, and Khasavyurt Districts (Babayurtovsky, Buinaksky, Karabudakhkentsky, Kayakentsky, Kizilyurtovksy, Khasavyurtovsky Raions) and Makhachkala (more than a quarter of Daghestan's territory). The 1950s through the 1980s were a period of economic development and settlement of a significant segment of the Kumyk lowlands by settlers from highland Avar, Dargin, and Lak communities. Today the territory of a hypothetical Kumyk autonomy is an extended mosaic consisting of Kumyk, Avar, Dargin, Chechen, Nogai, and Lak villages and winter pasture settlements. While highland Daghestan, with its historically well-established system of jamaats (rural communities), could still be thought of in terms of administrative subdivisions and ethnic cantonization, the situation in the lowlands and

0 50 100 km

Areas of Escalating Conflict

Armed conflicts or military operations
1 Karabakh War (Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict), 1990-1994
2 War in South Ossetia (Georgian-Ossetian conflict), 1991-1992
3 Armed clashes and a military coup in Tbilisi, 1992
4 War in Abkhazia (Georgian-Abkhaz conflict), 1992-1994
5 Conflict in Prigorodny District of North Ossetia (Ossetian-Ingush conflict), 1992
6 Wars in Chechnya (Russian-Ichkerian conflict), 1994-1996 and 1999-2003
7 Wahhabi insurgency in Daghestan and intervention from Chechnya, 1999

Other areas of tension

Areas of anti-government protest sparked by ethnic and regional conflict

The main areas from which refugees fled conflict (arrow) and the areas where they took refuge (triangle), including:
- Armenians fleeing Azerbaijan, 1988-1992
- Azerbaijanis fleeing Armenia, Mountain Karabakh, and adjacent areas occupied by Karabakh Armenian forces, 1988-1994
- Kurds fleeing areas occupied by Karabakh Armenian forces, 1993
- Ossetians fleeing Georgia and parts of South Ossetia under Tbilisi's control, 1990–1992
- Georgians fleeing South Ossetia, 1991, and Abkhazia, 1992-1993
- Ingush fleeing North Ossetia, 1992
- Russians and other groups fleeing Chechnya and Ingushetia, beginning 1991
- Chechens fleeing Chechnya, 1995-1996 and 1999-2001
- Laks fleeing Novolak District of Daghestan, 1999
- Meskhis (Meskhetian Turks) fleeing Central Asia, 1988

Terrorist attacks

When alterative place names are given the first is the official late Soviet-era name and the second is a name assigned by one of the parties to the conflict after 1990 (e.g. Lachin/ Berdzor)

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coastal areas called out for a new model for the republic's development. The fragmentation of this ethnically mixed zone into homogeneous and compact enclaves proved to be an extremely risky endeavor. An important factor holding Daghestan together was the interspersed distribution of the main ethnic groups in the lowlands and coastal portions of the republic and the mixed population of all its larger cities.

THE AUKH DISTRICT

A troublesome ethnopolitical problem for Daghestan throughout the 1990s was the "Aukh question," or the potential conflict pitting Laks and Avars against Chechens in the Novolak (New Lak) District (raion) and adjacent portions of Kazbekov District (Kazbekovsky Raion). Akkin Chechens (Aukhs) demanded the restoration of the Aukh District (Aukhovsky Raion) with the borders it had had before it was abolished in 1944 after its Chechen population was deported. A more radical plan called for the expansion of the district and its handover to the Republic of Chechnya. In 1992 the Daghestan government decided to restore the Chechen district in stages as part of Daghestan and to resettle Laks in other plain territories (which would be specially designated under a new resettlement campaign). However, financial problems and the Kumyks' anger at the new plans for their land under this campaign delayed its implementation. Finally, the events of August and September 1999 (the Wahhabi/Salafi insurgency in the Tsumada and Botlikh Districts [Tsumadinsky and Botlikhsky Raions] and the subsequent intervention in Novolak District launched from Chechen territory) hindered the government campaign to resettle Laks.

THE LEZGIN AUTONOMY

Sadval was a transborder Lezgin autonomist and irredentist movement that was attempting to challenge the way the region's political map was taking shape in the early 1990s. Its expressed goal was the creation of a Lezgin national autonomy within Daghestan (or directly within Russia) incorporating Lezgin districts of southern Daghestan and northeast Azerbaijan. The Lezgins considered themselves a divided people and felt that the preservation of their historical and cultural unity and the political stability of the districts where they lived in many ways depended not only on the domestic nationalities policies of Russia and Azerbaijan but also on relations between these two states (including the openness of their borders). The Lezgin question is one of several ethnopolitical problems in the Caucasus that extend beyond the boundaries of individual states and bind these states in a common field of conflict and potential solutions.

SOUTH OSSETIA

Another situation that was becoming increasingly acute in 1988–1990 and escalated into armed conflict beginning in January 1991 revolved around the political status of South Ossetia. Georgia's impending secession from the USSR and Russia and the trend among Georgian political elites toward ideological and practical support for the creation of a unitary nation within the borders of the Georgian SSR provoked the republic's ethnic minorities to come up with political designs to protect their local autonomy and, ultimately, remove it from the republic. At first the representative assembly (the Provincial [Oblast] Council) of South Ossetia proclaimed the formation of a "republic within the Georgian SSR" (November 1989). Then, on 20 June 1990, the Georgian parliament declared all laws passed after the 1921 sovietization of Georgia void and in so doing rescinded South Ossetia's status as an autonomous province or oblast. This was followed by the passage in September 1990 in Tskhinvali of the Declaration of South Ossetian National Sovereignty within the USSR, as well as a provision that the Soviet constitution would be valid on its territory. In December 1990 the Georgian parliament decreed the abolition of the South Ossetian Autonomous Province, and on 6 January 1991 Georgian police and paramilitary groups associated with various Georgian political parties occupied Tskhinvali, the autonomy's capital. This action transformed the conflict from a political to a military one. For more than a year there were armed clashes between Georgian units and detachments of Ossetian forces over practically all parts of the autonomy where Georgian and Ossetian border villages came into close proximity, especially around Tskhinvali (Georgian forces were expelled from the city in March 1991, but the city itself was blockaded by Georgian detachments from the north, south, and east). Armed actions on the territory of the autonomy accelerated the departure of more than 60,000 Ossetians from Georgia, between 8,000 and 10,000 from South Ossetia into North Ossetia, and 10,000 Georgians from South Ossetia to Georgia proper. In June 1992 four-party talks (in which Russia and North Ossetia acted as intermediaries) achieved a ceasefire agreement, the introduction of combined peacekeeping forces into the zone of conflict, and the beginning of a potential resolution process.

ABKHAZIA

Conflict in Abkhazia developed even earlier than in South Ossetia, although it did not enter its military phase until August 1992. While the two conflicts did not share a common genesis, their paths toward escalation followed a similar course: the crisis and collapse of the Soviet Union; Georgia's move to become a unitary nation-state and the formation of a Georgian political regime with an ideology of ethnic nation-building; and, as a parallel process, the shift of national movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia toward favoring union with the USSR or Russia and, correspondingly, toward separation from Georgia. The political conflict in Abkhazia turned violent on 14 August 1992 when the Georgian government (Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze's State Council) adopted a decision to introduce troops into the territory of Abkhazia. Over the course of several days Georgian armed forces occupied Gali, Ochamchira, and Sukhumi and established a significant foothold in western Abkhazia (from Gagra to Psou). This military action (and attendant war crimes) came with great humanitarian costs, typically exacted by criminal militias with nominal national legitimacy. The Abkhaz resistance managed to hold on to the Gudauta District (Gudautsky Raion), the Bzyb River valley, and enclaves around Tkvarcheli. After two months of entrenched battle, the Abkhaz managed to restore control over Gagra, and in September 1993, with the active support of volunteers from Russia—primarily from the North Caucasus—they entered Sukhumi. Within several days the Abkhaz forces reached the Inguri River and took control of the rest of Abkhazia. Georgia managed to hold on only to the upper Kodor Gorge, populated by Svans. More than 230,000 local Georgians fled with the retreating Georgian army. A ceasefire agreement and the introduction of a Russian peacekeeping contingent (nominally a contingent of the Commonwealth of Independent States) permitted a "freeze"

of the military phase, thus reestablishing the military outcome of the 1992–1993 conflict and at the same time opening the door to the negotiation process.

BORCHALO AND JAVAKHETIA

Georgia's move toward independence gave new urgency to the question of how the republic's two most numerous minorities—Azerbaijanis in what they called Borchaly (Borchalo) but Georgians referred to as Kvemo Kartli and Armenians in Javakhetia—would be integrated into it. Clashes in Borchalo in June 1989 were successfully kept local in terms of scale and consequences, and after January 1992 the area's Azerbaijani population was reliably free of separatist impulses. In the 1990s virtual self-rule developed in Armenian Javakhetia, although administratively the district was made a part of the Meskhetia-Javakhetia region, where Georgians constituted a numerical majority. Overall, the careful, pragmatic positions taken by Tbilisi and especially Yerevan in the "Javakhetia question" kept self-rule on the local level from escalating into demands to turn the area into a formal, constitutional Armenian autonomy. In an analogous situation, such demands for Talysh autonomy in Azerbaijan in the 1990s lacked large-scale support or organization and were quickly neutralized by the authorities in Baku.

MOUNTAIN KARABAKH

As early as 1986–1987 Soviet liberalization brought about increasing rivalry between Armenians and Azerbaijanis over the status of the Mountain (Nagorny) Karabakh Autonomous Province (MKAP) and other areas of Azerbaijan with Armenian populations. One outcome of this rivalry was the emergence of the Krunk movement, which advocated incorporating the autonomy into the Armenian SSR. (*Krunk* is Armenian for "crane" and symbolizes longing for the Armenian motherland. The flag of the Republic of Mountain Karabakh features a stylized formation of cranes suggestive of westward flight toward their Armenian homeland.) On 20 February 1988, MKAP's Provincial Council adopted a decision to ask the authorities of the two republics, Armenia and Azerbaijan, to consider this matter. Subsequent clashes and a pogrom against Armenians in Sumgait started a chain of incidents of ethnic violence on both sides, including mass expulsions. In 1988–1990 more than 260,000 Armenians left Azerbaijan and approximately 200,000 Azerbaijanis left Armenia and Stepanakert (in Mountain Karabakh). The Soviet central authorities gradually lost any ability to influence the two sides. Neither political measures (introducing a Special Government in the MKAP between January and November 1989) nor military actions were able to ease the growing violence or the polarization of the Armenian and Azerbaijani populations over their mutually exclusive goals. On 1 December 1989, against a backdrop of sporadic clashes in Mountain Karabakh and its virtual blockade, a joint session of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR and the Provincial Council of the MKAP adopted a resolution incorporating the MKAP into Armenia, a decision deemed invalid by the USSR Supreme Soviet. Events in Baku in January 1990 (a new pogrom and meager efforts—the late and inadequate use of the Soviet army—to stop it) deprived the Soviet authorities of whatever political or moral legitimacy they had in the eyes of either party to the conflict. This removed the last common institution shared by both sides that might have prevented an escalation of civil conflict into a full-scale war. After deportations of Armenians from the Shahumyan District (Shaumianovsky Raion) and against a backdrop of escalating armed conflict in Karabakh and the declaration of Azerbaijan's independence (31 August 1991) after the putsch in Moscow, Mountain Karabakh declared itself a sovereign state. On 2 September the Provincial Council proclaimed the establishment of the Mountain Karabakh Republic (within the boundaries of the MKAP but also including Azerbaijan's Shahumyan District). On 26 November 1991 the parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan formally abolished the autonomy. The MKAP's defense forces—as the near future would show—were getting increasing support from Armenia and were building experience and resources that would effectively allow Mountain Karabakh to remain independent of Baku.

SOURCES

Maps: 134, 135, 137.

References: Babich, "Etnopoliticheskaia situatsiia v Kabardino-Balkarii"; *Biulleten' Seti etnologicheskogo monitoringa*; Cherkasov, "Demografiia"; *Dagestan: etnopoliticheskii portret*; De Waal, *Black Garden*; Derluguian, *Bourdieu's Secret Admirer in the Caucasus*; Drobizheva, et al., *Demokratizatsiia i obrazy natsionalizma*; "Etnicheskie i regional'nye konflikty v Evrazii"; Ibragimov and Matsuzato, "Alien but Loyal"; Kazenin, *"Tikhie" konflikty*; Khoperskaia, *Sovremennye etnopoliticheskie protsessy*; Kisriev, "Etnopoliticheskaia situatsiia v Respublike Dagestan"; *Konflikty v Abkhazii i Iuzhnoi Osetii*; Kul'chik, "Chechenskii krizis"; Kul'chik and Adilsultanov, "Chechentsy-akkintsy (aukhovtsy) i ikh grazhdanskie formirovaniia"; Pchelintseva and Samarina, "Sovremennaia etnopoliticheskaia situatsiia v Respublike Adygeia"; Pietzonka, *Ethnisch-territoriale Konflikte in Kaukasien*; Siver, "Shapsugi i problema vosstanovleniia Shapsugskogo natsional'nogo raiona"; Smirnova, "Karachaevo-Cherkesiia"; *Sotsial'nye konflikty*; *Spornye granitsy na Kavkaze*;; Tishkov, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict*; "Zaiavlenie Press-tsentra"; Zdravomyslov, *Mezhnatsional'nye konflikty*.

Map 41

1988–1994: Mountain (Nagorny) Karabakh

The Karabakh conflict of 1988–1994 was ethnopolitical, and in it ethnic solidarity became not only a reliable predictor of any hypothetical referendum in disputed territories but an important military resource and objective. The geographical distribution of the Azerbaijani and Armenian population became part of the framework of the political and military confrontation in which "our people" was an operational asset giving significant advantages over "the enemy," and zones of firm military or administrative control tended to coincide with areas of ethnic predominance. Ethnic makeup thus became an objective of military or police action aimed at either protecting a population or deporting it, always with tragic human consequences, as the "ethnic cleansings" of Bashkend/Artsvashen, Chaykend/Getashen (to give the Azerbaijani/Armenian names), Khojali, and Maraga (Leninavan) illustrate. The deportations of 1988–1990 and the war of 1990–1994 led ultimately to the segregation of the Armenian and Azerbaijani populations in the subregion, thus concluding the process of establishing two ethnic states and, correspondingly, political and civic nations with rigidly ethnic—and therefore mutually exclusive—foundations, with Armenia and the Mountain Karabakh (Nagorno-Karabakhskaya) Republic (MKR) essentially ending up as a unified whole.

By 12 May 1994, when the opposing sides concluded a ceasefire agreement, the Karabakh army was occupying significant Azerbaijani territory beyond the borders of the Mountain Karabakh Republic, holding the districts (raions) of Kelbajar, Lachin, Zangilan, Jabrail, and Qubadli in their entirety, as well as most of Agdam, and some of Fizuli (including the administrative centers of these last two). These districts, from which approximately 350,000 Azerbaijanis fled, formed what the Mountain Karabakh Republic's defenders described as the MKR's "defensible borders" and "outer security zone." The easternmost territories of the Martakert and Martuni Districts of the former Mountain Karabakh Autonomous Province remained under Azerbaijani control, along with the Shahumyan District (claimed by the MKR as an integral part of the republic). The Karabakh ceasefire line, as well as positions dividing the two sides along the northern and Nakhichevan sector of the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, have since the ceasefire remained a hostile zone through which all communication has been completely blocked. Armenia and the Mountain Karabakh Republic (including the security zone) are cut off by Azerbaijan and Turkey, which have closed all the connecting roads. For its part, Azerbaijan has been deprived of a direct land route to the Republic of Nakhichevan and Turkey.

Since 1992 various attempts have been made to mediate the conflict, involving both joint and competing efforts by the members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), particularly the co-chairs of the "Minsk Group"—Russia, the United States, and France. (The Bishkek Protocol, which established the 1994 ceasefire, was achieved through Russian mediation.) The positions of the parties to the conflict and the prospects for settling it involve several interconnected problems. The most important issues are the status of Mountain Karabakh, guaranteeing its security, withdrawal of Armenia and MKR forces from occupied Azerbaijani territories, unsealing borders, the return of refugees, and the socioeconomic rehabilitation of the conflict zone. However, neither a wholesale nor a piecemeal approach to addressing these problems has been successful. Indeed, the only achievement since the signing of the ceasefire protocol has been that it has more or less been observed: the OSCE monitors the ceasefire and has noted regular, but local, violations. The stalled Minsk process—episodic meetings between high-level representatives from both sides and diplomats—has not brought the two sides any closer. As of 2012, mediators were still preparing to work with the sides to agree to "the basic principles of a settlement," including the recognition of legal procedures for Mountain Karabakh's self-determination. However, the inability of the two sides to agree on the specific terms and timing of any new referendum—a key component of these legal procedures—is a serious impediment.

The sides have not even been able to agree on who the parties to the conflict are or how to design a step-by-step approach that resolves the issues of security guarantees and the procedure for legitimizing the status of Mountain Karabakh. Azerbaijan believes that the other party to the conflict is Armenia, not the Armenian population of Karabakh and the successor MKAP proclaimed in 1991. As far as Azerbaijan is concerned, the conflict has become a territorial dispute between two sovereign states, with Armenia an aggressor occupying Azerbaijani territory. Another version of the Azerbaijani position constitutes Karabakh as a secessionist region challenging the territorial integrity of a sovereign state. The Azerbaijani formula for a settlement demands the condemnation and restraint of the aggressor (including its withdrawal from occupied territory), which would be followed by normalized relations between the Azerbaijani government and its ethnic minority (a range of possible forms of autonomy, including territorial, would serve as the mechanism for ensuring the rights of the Armenian population in Karabakh).

From the perspective of international law, it is unlikely that the Mountain Karabakh Republic will be recognized as a sovereign state or that Azerbaijan's 1991 borders will be changed without the agreement of Azerbaijan itself. In keeping with the principle of *uti possidetis*, which holds that the borders of former administrative entities continue to be protected by international law even if the laws that once defined these borders are no longer in force, the borders of post-Soviet states clearly "succeed" those of Soviet republics. (Although Mountain Karabakh Autonomous Province cited Soviet law when it seceded from the Azerbaijani SSR in 1991, this secession was never recognized by either the central Soviet authorities or the republican authorities in Baku.) The borders of Soviet republics acquired international status in December 1991 when the USSR was abolished and the Declaration of Alma Ata was signed (stipulating, among other things, "recognition and respect [by former Soviet republics] of one another's territorial integrity and the inviolability

41 1988-1994: Mountain (Nagorny) Karabakh

International boundaries as of December 1991
Boundary of the former Mountain Karabakh Autonomous Province (MKAP)
Boundary of Shahumyan District [Shaumianovsky Raion]
MKAP territory held or temporarily occupied by Azerbaijani forces during the 1991–1994 war
Territory retaken or occupied by Armenian forces during the 1991–1994 war
Ceasefire line (border of the territory under de facto control by the armed forces of the Mountain Karabakh Republic as of May 1994
Main roads (active and planned)
Population centers predominated by Armenians (orange dots) and Azerbaijanis (yellow dots) as of 1989 (estimates)

The ethnic makeup of population centers is shown only within the MKAP, the Shahumyan District, and the Chaykend/Getashen subdistrict.

Lachin/Berdzor — When alternative place names are given the first is the official late Soviet-era name and the second is a name assigned by one of the parties to the conflict after 1990

Major military clashes, 1991–1994
Airport
10 km

Districts of the unrecognized Mountain Karabakh Republic under the control of its government in 2012 (colored areas)

Shahumyan District
Martakert District
Shahumyan District
Askeran District
Stepanakert
Martuni District
Shusha District
Kashatag District
Hadrut District

Khankendi (Stepanakert)
Dozular
Hajikend
Kushchu-Armavir
Shahumyan District (under Azerbaijani control by July 1992)
Mikhailovka
Azat/Suluk
Gyurzalar
Todan
Kamo
Erkej
Chaykend/Getashen
Hai Paris
Martunashen/Karabulakh
Mnashid
Zeyva
Sarisu
Russkie Borisy
Karachinar
Toganali
Kharkhaput
Tap-Karakoyunlu
Buzluq
Shahumyan/Ashagi Agjakend
Goygol Lake
Yukhari Agjakend/Verinshen
Bashkishlak
Area retaken by Armenian forces in May 1994
Talish
Gulistan
Chayli
Terter
Leninavan (Margushevan)
Madagiz
Tonashen
Levonarkh
Maraga
Karmiravan
Omar Pass
Mt.Mrov 3340
Jraberd
Seysulan
Magavuz/Chardagli
Mingrelskoe
Mt. Gyamish/Gomshasar 3724
Mokhratag
Mets Shen/Ulu Garabei
Martakert/Agdere
Sarsang Reservoir
Agdaban
Kusapot
Gulluja
Nadirkhanli/Nor Getashen
Umudlu/Aknaberd
Mekhmana
Haterk/Hasanriz
Nerkin Horratag/Ashagi Oratag
R. Khachenchai
Imaret Qervend
Drmbon/Heyvali
R. Terter
Gulyatag/Vanadzor
Chapar
Kochogot
Javahirli
Charektar
Childiran
Janyatag
Kelbajar/Karvachar
Area occupied by Azerbaijani forces in June-November 1992 and retaken by Armenians in February-June 1993 counteroffensive
Vaguas/Qozlu
Harutyunagomer/Qizilkaya
Malikli
Area occupied by Karabakh Armenian forces beginning April 1993
Tsmakahog
Sirkhavend/ Kichan
Azerbaijan
Vank
Farukh
Area occupied by Karabakh Armenian forces beginning July 1993
Nareshtar/Narinjlar
Gandzasar Monastery
Dovshanli/Arajadzor
Khramort
Kurdlar
Kolatag
Khanabad
Arazbari
Seyidshen/Khachen
Askeran
Agdam/Akna
Khndziristan
Marzili
Noragyukh
Nakhijevanik
Dashbulak/Astgashen
Khojali
Vardadzor
Badara
Agbulak
Kiatuk
Norshen
Dahrav
Malibeyli
Karakend
Kuropatkino/Kakavadzor
Ballica/Aygestan
Kushchular
Khnatzakh
Avdur
Spitakashen
Mughanli
Bashkend
Harav
Kosalar
Stepanakert/Khankendi
Kerkijan
Amiranlar
Choykend
Qeybali
Karadagli/Varanda
Martuni/Khojavend
Shushikend
Nngi/Jemiyat
Khanlikpaya
Khalfali
Yukhari Veysalli
Shusha/Shushi
Zarislu
Sarushen
Dashalti/Karin Tak
Güneikaler
Sos
Yegtsahog
Turshsu
Karabulak
Machkalashen
Mt. Big Kirs
Konachtala
Avetaranots
Kaladaresi /Mets Shen
Tagavard
Karmir-Shuka
Sheker
Kirov
Allijan
Mets-Taglar
Azokh
Fizuli/Varanda
Qarakhanbeyli
Lachin/Berdzor
Togh
Tumi/Bina
Jrakus
Edilli/Ukhtadazor
Zabukh/Aghavno
Seiydmahmudlu
Lachin Corridor occupied by Armenian forces beginning May 1992
Arpageduk/Karing
Khtsabert
Shagakh/Sarinshen
Hadrut
Zamzur/Tsamdzor
to Yerevan
Khintaglar
Aygestan
Goris
Tsor
Shukurbeyli
Dolanlar/Arevshat
Banazur/Banadzor
R. Vorotan
R. Akera
Arakel
Horadiz
Shurnukh
Jabrail/Jrakan
Area occupied by Azerbaijani forces between May and November 1991
Qubadli/Sanasar
Armenia
Area occupied by Karabakh Armenian forces beginning August 1993
Qazakhlar
R. Barqushat
Area occupied by Karabakh Armenian forces beginning November 1993
R.Arax
Iran
Kapan
Yegvard
Agarak
Zangilan/Kovsakan
Railway Baku-Nakhichevan-Yerevan

of existing borders"). Since 1991, however, Armenia has not officially demanded any change in its borders with Azerbaijan—it is the Mountain Karabakh Republic that makes such claims.

The Karabakh side disputes the very idea that Mountain Karabakh is a part of independent Azerbaijan, arguing that the Soviet borders of Azerbaijan that incorporated Mountain Karabakh were abolished in October 1991 with the enactment of Azerbaijani independence, when Baku dismantled the Soviet legal framework for the 1921 incorporation of Mountain Karabakh into the Azerbaijani SSR. However in 1990–1991, the Mountain Karabakh Autonomous Province attempted to base its secession from the Azerbaijani SSR on the Soviet law of 3 April 1990, "On Procedures for Resolving Questions Concerning the Secession of Soviet Republics from the USSR." Article 5 of this law states, "In a Soviet republic containing autonomous republics, autonomous provinces, and autonomous districts, referenda [on secession of the Soviet republic from the USSR] will be conducted separately in each autonomy. The peoples of autonomous republics and autonomous entities retain the right to independently decide whether to remain within the USSR or in the seceding Soviet republic and to address the question of the national and legal status [of their autonomous entity]." The competence of such laws was disputed by Soviet republics, which were already enacting declarations of sovereignty. After the Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991, Soviet law ceased to be a major factor in conflicts over secession. Nevertheless, from the Karabakh perspective, this was a dispute between two sovereign states—Azerbaijan and the Mountain Karabakh Republic—both of which should be allowed to negotiate as equals. (While on a political and diplomatic level Armenia formally removed itself as a party to the conflict, in practical terms Armenia's position in the conflict has always been integrally linked to Karabakh's.)

Defining the parties to the conflict will ultimately impact any final determination of the political and legal relationship between Azerbaijan and the MKR. The list of possible resolutions to the status of the MKR discussed in 1994 included the following: "broad autonomy" within Azerbaijan (Azerbaijan's position); an MKR associated with the Azerbaijani state or the formation of a confederation with Azerbaijan; the hazy notion of a "common state" of Azerbaijan and the MKR; an Azerbaijani-Armenian condominium. All these models for shared sovereignty run up against the incompatibility of both sides' positions. The negotiators cannot find a constructive way to overcome the basic contradiction between nominal "territorial integrity" and actual self-determination.

Since 2008, given precedents for recognizing newly independent states against the will of their former parent state and no change in the balance of power between the two sides, the MKR's prospects for gaining recognition of its independence may have improved. Baku's position has not changed, since its options for conciliation are clearly limited not only by the importance Azerbaijan assigned to the principle of the "inviolability of borders" but also by the MKR's de facto long-term independence. A conciliatory path to settling the Karabakh conflict that left open the possibility of preserving the nominal integrity of Azerbaijan within its 1991 borders seems increasingly likely to include recognition of the MKR as a party to international law and international relations with a number of military and other foreign policy guarantees (a special relationship with Armenia at minimum). At the same time any attempt by Azerbaijan to pursue a military path toward "settlement"—should the balance of power between the two sides change and should such an approach became attractive to Baku—would activate mechanisms already tested in Serbia and Georgia for recognition of the MKR by at least one state. As the case of Kosovo in 1999 demonstrates, armed action as a means of subduing secession can fatally damage the sovereign right of a parent state to put a stop to the fracturing of what it perceives as its territorial integrity.

The problem of the MKR's status is linked to prevalent perceptions of its security needs, which in turn are tied to the configuration of zones of control and transit routes. The MKR has refused demands to withdraw from seven Azerbaijani districts outside its borders until sufficient security guarantees are agreed on (in essence, until the MKR's independence is recognized). Of special concern is the "Lachin corridor," which provides the MKR direct access to Armenia (it is seen by the Armenian-Karabakh side as a strategic sector, a lifeline that must remain outside Azerbaijani control). At one time informal proposals (the so-called Goble plans) were made to exchange territory such as Megri (not shown)—which would give Azerbaijan direct access to Nakhichevan—for the Lachin corridor, or, in another version, Megri in exchange for the Lachin corridor plus a sector in Sadarak District (not shown), giving Armenia direct access to Iran. Alternative proposals called for the parallel creation of a special open border under international protection in the Lachin corridor and the Megri "crossroads." Clearly the reciprocal opening of blocked transit routes would create new opportunities for an overall settlement and begin to pave the way for the return of refugees. However, the stagnation of the settlement process has only made the MKR more unbending in its position regarding not only Lachin but the entire "security zone" (which in the past was overwhelmingly populated by Azerbaijanis): decisions made in 2001–2005 to incorporate the occupied Azerbaijani districts into the administrative structure of the republic and integrate them into the economy are being implemented.

SOURCES

Maps: 133, 148, 151.

References: Arasly, *Armiano-azerbaidzhanskii konflikt*; De Waal, *Black Garden*; Iamskov, "Traditsionnoe zemlepol'zovanie kochevnikov"; International Crisis Group, "Nagornyi Karabakh"; Iunusov, "Armiano-azerbaidzhanskii konflikt"; "Iuzhnyi Kavkaz"; "Predely vozmozhnostei liderov elity i obshchestva"; Zolian, *Nagornyi Karabakh*.

Map 42
1991–1992: South and North Ossetia

Map 43
1992–1993: Abkhazia

On 17 March 1991 a referendum was held throughout the Soviet Union on whether to preserve the country as a federation of sovereign republics. At the time the referendum took place, armed conflict was already under way between Georgian troops and South Ossetian militias seeking independence from Georgia. Georgia did not participate in the Soviet referendum, instead holding its own on 26 May. The Georgian referendum was used as the basis for proclaiming Georgia's independence (secession from the Soviet Union). South Ossetia, meanwhile, did participate in the Soviet referendum, and based on the result of the referendum and on Soviet law announced that it would remain an autonomy (now a republic) within the USSR. After the Soviet Union fell in December, Tskhinvali issued a declaration of South Ossetian independence and the creation of the Republic of South Ossetia, at which Georgia stepped up its military pressure.

The armed confrontation between South Ossetia and Georgia ended in 1992 with the Sochi Agreement of 24 June, which established a Joint Peacekeeping Force (JPKF) comprised of Russian, Ossetian, and Georgian battalions. The agreement created a zone of JPKF responsibility that included about a third of the territory of South Ossetia and a contiguous portion of Georgia proper (consisting primarily of the Gori District), all of which was subject to demilitarization. The battalions, which were under joint command, were given sectors of responsibility that largely corresponded to the zones under either Ossetian or Georgian control at the time the Sochi Agreement was signed. These zones were largely defined by their pre-outbreak ethnic composition, with Ossetians holding areas that were predominately inhabited by Ossetians, and Georgians holding South Ossetian areas that had majority Georgian populations. Population patterns created interspersed stripes of Georgian and Ossetian control. The Ossetians (the Republic of South Ossetia, or RSO, though no other government recognized their sovereignty at the time) governed the sectors of responsibility under the control of Russian and Ossetian JPKF battalions, while Georgian authorities governed the Georgian battalion's sector of responsibility.

Between 1993 and 2003 a system developed whereby the functions of government were carried out both in direct coordination between the parties to the conflict (Georgia and South Ossetia) and through a Joint Control Commission (JCC) created under the Sochi Agreement that included not only Georgia and South Ossetia but also Russia and North Ossetia. The JCC coordinated efforts by Georgian and South Ossetian law enforcement agencies and facilitated the socioeconomic rehabilitation of the conflict zone and the return of refugees. An important function of the JCC was to serve as a platform for the negotiation process whereby the parties to the conflict, through the mediation of Russia and with participation by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Commission, could coordinate steps toward settlement and reconstruction.

During this period the framework set in place by the Sochi Agreement (the JCC and JPKF) and the actual practices of peacekeeping prevented an escalation of violence in South Ossetia. Interethnic tensions in the zone of conflict were significantly eased, and until March 2004 the population was able to move freely and without fear between zones controlled by both sides. The local economy of South Ossetia and adjacent districts of Georgia took shape around the Transcaucasus Highway, which connected Russia and Transcaucasia and permitted South Ossetia to integrate its economy into those of South Russia and central Georgia. The economy of the unrecognized Republic of South Ossetia was to a large extent dependent on this road, as well as on financial support from the Russian Federation. The informal economic and financial integration of South Ossetia into Russia was accompanied by a measure of civic integration: by 2004 most of the Ossetian population of the RSO had received Russian citizenship, having refused to take Georgian citizenship after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the 1991–1992 war. Anyone living in South Ossetia, including people in Georgian-controlled areas, was allowed to cross the Russian border without a visa (this was also true for residents of Georgia's Kazbegi District), despite the fact that since January 2001 the Russian authorities had required Georgian citizens to have visas to enter the country. So by April 2004, South Ossetia was essentially a Russian protectorate and a "free trade" zone within the internationally recognized borders of Georgia. Tens of thousands of Ossetians and Georgians participated in duty-free commerce across the Georgian-Russian border. The quality of personal interactions between Ossetians and Georgians (despite the absence of a political settlement) gained the South Ossetian peacekeeping effort international recognition as relatively successful.

As of 2004 the two sides were far from finding a solution to the question of the political and legal status of South Ossetia, endangering the informal, grass-roots reconciliation of the Ossetian and Georgian peoples. The official Georgian position under President Eduard Shevardnadze was that any Ossetian autonomy within Georgia was illegitimate and that any institutions of this autonomy had to be dismantled and its territory incorporated into Georgia (primarily, into Shida Kartli Province), as it had been in 1991 when Georgia seceded from the Soviet Union. The very term "South Ossetia" was proclaimed invalid.

The official South Ossetian position was grounded in the idea of the historical validity and actual institutional and legal existence of a South Ossetian autonomy. Furthermore, the Ossetians saw the endangerment of their autonomy as the main factor necessitating independence from Georgia and driving

42 1991-1992: South and North Ossetia

International borders as of December 1991
Borders of autonomies
De facto border between Ingushetia and Chechnya after 1991
Contested territories in North Ossetia ("Prigorodny District") within the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict
Territories of North Ossetia under the control of Ingush armed units between 30 October and 3 November 1992
a b a — (a) The zone of JPKF responsibility and (b) the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone (both identified by Sochi Agreements in June 1992)
Territories of South Ossetia under Georgian governmental control after the halt of military operations in June 1992
Predominant ethnic group of population centers in both Ossetias (1989 census) and Ingushetia (estimate for 1989)
Ossetians Russians Ingush Georgians Kumyks Chechens Kabardins Turks
Major railways and highways
Airport
Leningori/Akhalgori
When alterative place names are given the first is the official late Soviet-era name and the second is a name assigned by one of the parties to the conflict after 1990
Major military clashes in South Ossetia in 1990–1992 and North Ossetia in 1992
10 km

Stavropol Territory
Chechnya
Ingushetia
North Ossetia
South Ossetia
Kabarda-Balkaria
Russia
Georgia
Mozdok
Troitskoe
Veseloe
Lukovskaya
Terskaya
Vinogradnoe
Kizlyar
Galiugaevskaya
R.Terek
Znamenskoe
Nogaimirza-Yurt
to Kizlyar
Malgobek
"Mozdok Corridor"
Vozhesenskaya
Aki-Yurt
Goragorsk
Ziazikov-Yurt
Sagopshi
Psedakh
Western border of the former Sunzha Cossack District
Achaluki
Karabulak
Orjonikidzevskaya
Sernovodskoe
R.Sunzha
to Grozny
Nazran
Yandare
Troitskaya
Assinskaya
Nesterovskaya
Ekazhevo
Surkhakhi
Magas (founded 1995)
Alkhaste
Achkhoi-Martan
Bamut
Ali-Yurt
Galashki
Muzhichi
Alkun
Sunzha
Oktiabrskoe
Tarskoe
Chermen
Kurtat
Kartsa
Vladikavkaz
Beslan
Arkhonskaya
Gizel
Chernorechenskoe
Terk
Balta
Mt. Stolovaya 2993
Chmi
Lars
Jeirakh
Khamkhi
Targim
Tsori
R.Assa
Daryal Gorge
Mt. Shan 4451
Mt. Kazbek 5033
Kazbegi (Stepantsminda)
Shatili
Turso Gorge
R.Terek
Krestovy Pass
Mt. Jimara 4780
Roki Tunnel
Roki/Ruk
Sba
Edis
Erman
R. Sgvr Liakhva
Wanel
Cheselt
Kvaisa
Tson
Java/Dzau
Trancaucasus Highway
Sinagur
Karzmani
Gudis
Jer
Ortev
Zonkar
Gufta
Kekhvi
Kurta
Vanati
Beloti
Dmenis
Khelchua
Tbet
Tsunar
Eredvi
Ergneti
Nuli
Avnevi
Tkviavi
Tskhinvali/Tskhinval
Znaur/Kornisi
Zar bypass road
Dzari/Zar
Tigwa
Atsriskhevi
Vilda
Bikar
Ivret
Grom
Artsevi
Zakkor
Ardisi
Koloti
Doretkari
Balaani
Tsgoita
Largvisi
Sadzeguri
Gdu
Korinta
Ikoti
Leningori/Akhalgori
Tsinagar
Orchosan
R.Ksani
R.Aragvi
Georgian Military Highway
Ali
Variani
Karaleti
Kareli
R. Didi Liakhvi
Zone of JPKF responsibility
R. Kura
Gori
to Tbilisi
to Tbilisi
Stary Batako
Zamankul
Dargkokh
Zilga
Khumalag
Nikolaevskaya
Elkhotovo
Stavd-Dort
Zmeiskaya
Iran
Karjin
Lesken
Chikola
Digora
Ardon
Kadgaron
Kora-Ursdon
Lezgor
Zadalesk
Donifars
Alagir
Akhsau
Vakats
Galiat
Dunta
Dzinaga
Stur-Digora
Biz
Mizur
Tsamad
Unal
Zgid
Sadon
Bad
Arkhon
Buron
Tsei
Mt.Wilpata 4649
Zaramag
Mamison Pass
Tib
Kalak
Nar
Abaitykau
Dzivgis
Fiagdon
Lats
Koban
Dargavs
Karmadon
Malgobek
Sagopshi
Psedakh
Achaluki
Stary Batako
Zamankul
Dargkokh
Zilga
Khumalag
Nikolaevskaya
Elkhotovo
Stavd-Dort
Zmeiskaya
Iran
Karjin
Lesken
Chikola
Digora
Ardon
Kadgaron
Kora-Ursdon
Lezgor
Zadalesk
Donifars
Alagir
Akhsau
Vakats
Galiat
Dunta
Dzinaga
Stur-Digora
Biz
Mizur
Tsamad
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Zaramag
Mamison Pass
Tib
Kalak
Nar
Abaitykau
Dzivgis
Fiagdon
Lats
Koban
Dargavs
Karmadon
Arkhonskaya
Gizel
Vladikavkaz
Trancaucasus Highway (Transkam)
Beslan
Nazran
Ekazhevo
Yandare
Troitskaya
Assinskaya
Nesterovskaya
Surkhakhi
Magas (founded 1995)
Alkhaste
Achkhoi-Martan
Bamut
Ali-Yurt
Galashki
Muzhichi
Alkun
Sunzha
Oktiabrskoe
Tarskoe
Chermen
Kurtat
Kartsa
Chernorechenskoe
Terk
Balta
Mt. Stolovaya 2993
Chmi
Lars
Jeirakh
Khamkhi
Targim
Tsori
R.Assa
Daryal Gorge
Mt. Shan 4451
Mt. Kazbek 5033
Kazbegi (Stepantsminda)
Shatili
Turso Gorge
R.Terek
Krestovy Pass
Mt. Jimara 4780
Roki Tunnel
Roki/Ruk
Sba
Edis
Erman
R. Sgvr Liakhva
Wanel
Cheselt
Kvaisa
Tson
Java/Dzau
Trancaucasus Highway
Sinagur
Karzmani
Gudis
Jer
Ortev
Zonkar
Gufta
Kekhvi
Kurta
Vanati
Beloti
Dmenis
Khelchua
Tbet
Tsunar
Eredvi
Ergneti
Nuli
Avnevi
Tkviavi
Tskhinvali/Tskhinval
Znaur/Kornisi
Zar bypass road
Dzari/Zar
Tigwa
Atsriskhevi
Vilda
Bikar
Ivret
Grom
Artsevi
Zakkor
Ardisi
Koloti
Doretkari
Balaani
Tsgoita
Largvisi
Sadzeguri
Gdu
Korinta
Ikoti
Leningori/Akhalgori
Tsinagar
Orchosan
R.Ksani
R.Aragvi
Georgian Military Highway
Ali
Variani
Karaleti
Kareli
R. Didi Liakhvi
Zone of JPKF responsibility
R. Kura
Gori
to Tbilisi
to Tbilisi
Malgobek
Sagopshi
Psedakh
Achaluki
Karabulak
Orjonikidzevskaya
Sernovodskoe
R.Sunzha
to Grozny
Nazran
Yandare
Troitskaya
Assinskaya
Nesterovskaya
Ekazhevo
Surkhakhi
Magas (founded 1995)
Alkhaste
Achkhoi-Martan
Bamut
Ali-Yurt
Galashki
Muzhichi
Alkun
Sunzha
Oktiabrskoe
Tarskoe
Chermen
Kurtat
Kartsa
Vladikavkaz
Beslan
Arkhonskaya
Gizel
Chernorechenskoe
Terk
Balta
Mt. Stolovaya 2993
Chmi
Lars
Jeirakh
Khamkhi
Targim
Tsori
R.Assa
Daryal Gorge
Mt. Shan 4451
Mt. Kazbek 5033
Kazbegi (Stepantsminda)
Shatili
Turso Gorge
R.Terek
Krestovy Pass
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Roki Tunnel
Roki/Ruk
Sba
Edis
Erman
R. Sgvr Liakhva
Wanel
Cheselt
Kvaisa
Tson
Java/Dzau
Trancaucasus Highway
Sinagur
Karzmani
Gudis
Jer
Ortev
Zonkar
Gufta
Kekhvi
Kurta
Vanati
Beloti
Dmenis
Khelchua
Tbet
Tsunar
Eredvi
Ergneti
Nuli
Avnevi
Tkviavi
Tskhinvali/Tskhinval
Znaur/Kornisi
Zar bypass road
Dzari/Zar
Tigwa
Atsriskhevi
Vilda
Bikar
Ivret
Grom
Artsevi
Zakkor
Ardisi
Koloti
Doretkari
Balaani
Tsgoita
Largvisi
Sadzeguri
Gdu
Korinta
Ikoti
Leningori/Akhalgori
Tsinagar
Orchosan
R.Ksani
R.Aragvi
Georgian Military Highway
Ali
Variani
Karaleti
Kareli
R. Didi Liakhvi
Zone of JPKF responsibility
R. Kura
Gori
to Tbilisi
to Tbilisi

Administrative division of the Republic of South Ossetia as of 2012 (South Ossetia's status is a matter of international dispute)
Java District
Tskhinval District
Tskhinval/Tskhinvali
Znaur District
Leningori District

43 1992-1993: Abkhazia

South Ossetia toward becoming part of the Russian Federation and uniting with North Ossetia.

In 2004 the prospects for gaining international recognition of South Ossetia's secession from Georgia appeared dim. Russia, as the military and political guarantor in the settlement process and the actual guarantor of South Ossetia's existence, refused to recognize South Ossetia's independence and supported Georgia's "territorial integrity," as well as the right of Tbilisi to restore its jurisdiction over South Ossetia. However, Russia held that this reestablishment had to be achieved peacefully and through conciliation: essentially Russia was trying to create conditions under which the sides could work out a constitutional status for South Ossetia within Georgia that would have been backed by international legal guarantees, including a binding agreement to abstain from the use of force. It was presumed that South Ossetia would remain within the borders of Georgia and that the variables in any settlement would concern only the extent of international guarantees for a Republic of South Ossetia within those borders and its relationship to the Georgian central authorities.

The 1990–1992 armed conflict in South Ossetia turned out to be the prelude to a troubled history that began with a ten-year period of unsettled calm (1993–2003), then led to the breakdown of the settlement process, ultimately followed by a new outbreak of hostilities in August 2008. In 1999–2000 Russian-Georgian relations took a turn for the worse, directly provoked by the problem of Pankisi Gorge in Kakhetia (but exacerbated by Moscow's concern about being left in isolation by a string of unfriendly former Soviet republics stretching from the Baltic to the Caspian, including Georgia). This Georgian valley drew a concentration of Chechen refugees during the second Chechen War of 1999–2003. The Georgian authorities were unable to prevent Pankisi from being used as a safe haven for Chechen guerrillas. Tbilisi denied the existence of the problem and refused to work with the Russian Federation to destroy the bases, fearing the spread of the Chechen conflict to Georgia.

Mikheil Saakashvili's election as president of Georgia in January 2004 further deteriorated Russian-Georgian relations. His position ("Moscow must either help Georgia restore control over the former autonomies or get out") ignored the link between the conflicts in South Ossetia (and in Abkhazia) and the Russian federal authorities' domestic policy considerations in the North Caucasus. The new president of Georgia greatly changed the dynamic in South Ossetia, taking the conflict out of its "frozen" state (which had allowed well-functioning Ossetian-Georgian social networks to develop) and moving it toward a military option.

One echo emanating from the 1990–1992 conflict in and around South Ossetia was an escalation in the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in Russian North Ossetia during the fall of 1992. The flood of Ossetian refugees from Georgia into North Ossetia, especially the villages of the Prigorodny District, began to greatly alter the ethnodemographic character of this district and enflamed feelings in the Ossetian-Ingush conflict over status and territory.

By late October 1992 a series of laws, including federal (Russian) laws, coupled with a chain of criminal and public incidents, engulfed the Prigorodny District and Vladikavkaz in large-scale disturbances and ethnically focused violence. Armed clashes were put down with force—the introduction of federal troops, who were nevertheless unable to prevent the expulsion of the majority of the Ingush population of North Ossetia: between 30,000 and 32,000 people (Ingush sources claim more). Seven thousand Ossetians and Russians were also forced to leave their homes in villages occupied by Ingush armed groups during 1–3 November. The clashes of 1992 left in their wake the extreme segregation of Ossetian and Ingush settlements. Even at the level of individual villages still shared by both communities there were ethnically homogeneous sectors (Chermen, Tarskoe). Between 1993 and 1998 an almost total breakdown in relations between North Ossetia and Ingushetia took place, and the border area between the two republics, despite the deployment of Russian federal troops, remained a zone of ethnically targeted terror.

During the suppression of this conflict in November 1992 the Russian federal authorities created military and administrative structures designed to restore relations between the two peoples and their republics and to settle the conflict. A federal Provisional Administration was established to deal with the Ossetian-Ingush conflict. Collaborative efforts by the Russian central government, the authorities of North Ossetia and Ingushetia, and civic organizations in these republics gradually managed to ameliorate the situation within the conflict zone. Direct federal funding made it possible to begin restoring the social infrastructure and damaged housing and to build new housing for those left homeless. By 2003 between 60 and 70 percent of displaced Ingush had returned to North Ossetia. Direct contact between the two republics through government agencies, local and rural administrations, and civic organizations was expanded. A halt was put to the long-standing practice of police escorts to protect convoys of cars and trucks belonging to the "other side." (Despite this practice, starting in 1992 road traffic between the North Ossetian cities of Vladikavkaz and Mozdok followed a circuitous route through Kabarda-Balkaria to avoid passing through Ingushetia.)

In the fall of 2002 a Friendship and Cooperation Agreement was signed between North Ossetia and Ingushetia. Progress was made in settling the conflict despite strong mutual feelings of fear and hostility. Political elites began to reappraise the key problem in Ossetian-Ingush relations. What had been regarded as a territorial problem was no longer seen as such; rather, the two societies worked out a strategy for constructive coexistence despite the administrative divisions that had taken shape between the republics. But the territorial problem remained a factor in the conflict that had the potential to undermine Ossetian-Ingush relations and trigger large-scale violence on both sides. The article providing for the "return of indigenous territories" remained in the constitution of the Republic of Ingushetia, just as the article concerning "territorial rehabilitation" remained in the Russian Federation law "On the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples," thereby establishing "legal" grounds for traditional conceptions of territory as ethnic property and provoking new conflicts. (This law was adopted by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet on 4 April 1991 and essentially provided for the changing of borders of the administrative units of the Russian Federation without their consent, something that violated the constitution in force at the time. In December 2005 the Russian Federation Constitutional Court upheld the law, arguing that its provisions "could not be interpreted as allowing territorial questions to be decided or borders changed between the administrative units of the Russian Federation on a unilateral basis.")

There was an obvious setback in resolving the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in 2003 when the Republic of Ichkeria (Chechnya), which had been defeated by Russian federal forces, turned the fight over to anti-Russian jihadist guerrillas, some of whom were based in neighboring regions. Ingushetia, as Chechnya's ethnic "little sister," was transformed into not only one of the most active fronts for terrorism against federal and local authorities but a staging ground for increased strikes against the

civilian population—now in neighboring Ossetia. Under the leadership of the Chechen Islamist Shamil Basayev, strikes by Chechen and Ingush mujahideen against local police in Ingushetia on 22 June 2004 were followed by attacks on a school in Beslan in North Ossetia on 1 September. The murder of policemen in Ingushetia essentially led to an outbreak of intraethnic civil war in this republic. Ingush involvement in Basayev's raid on Beslan was probably also aimed at inciting civil war, now between Ossetians and Ingush, a conflict that would have jeopardized the efforts of federal authorities to stabilize militarily and politically not only the Republic of Chechnya but the entire North Caucasus. In the fall of 2004, however, through the efforts of the federal and local authorities and the will of most of the population, this explosive scenario was averted, although hundreds had already died at Beslan.

THE "FIVE DAY WAR" OF AUGUST 2008 IN SOUTH OSSETIA AND GEORGIA

The Rose Revolution of November 2003 brought a young political elite to power in Georgia that promised to "democratically transform the country and quickly restore its territorial integrity," based on the 1991 borders of the Georgian SSR. With Russian help, Tbilisi reestablished full control over the restive Ajarian autonomy and set its sights on South Ossetia and Abkhazia. However, unlike Ajaria, which had an almost exclusively Georgian population, South Ossetia and Abkhazia had been essentially independent of Georgia for a decade and had well-established political institutions built around a markedly non-Georgian identity in local communities and a corresponding attitude on the part of elites. Most important, many in these regions looked to Russia, which was providing key military and political guarantees of stability in the conflict zones and, in effect, of the very existence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as political entities.

The main parties to the conflicts had differing perceptions of the settlement process and the institutions involved in it. For Abkhazia and South Ossetia the settlement process was the "normalization of bilateral relations" with Georgia, a neighboring state. Tbilisi, on the other hand, felt that settlement mechanisms (such as the Joint Control Commission in South Ossetia) should serve as instruments for restoring Georgian sovereignty. In Moscow, settlement was perceived as a process that would eventually result in a mutual delegation of authority that would make a "common state" of Georgia possible, with constitutional niches and legally binding guarantees for Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moscow saw the settlement process as dependent on bilateral agreements between parties, combined with a Russian guarantee that would eliminate military risks in the region and the possibility of a subsequent "echo" in the Russian North Caucasus.

The prospect of its former autonomies becoming institutionalized as parties to agreements with some kind of international (in fact, Russian) guarantees apparently did not suit Georgia. Allowing a settlement to be structured in this way seemed to Tbilisi tantamount to formal recognition of Abkhazia's and Ossetia's secessions. However, letting the conflict remain in its frozen state meant running the serious risk that the former autonomies' independence would become further consolidated (under Russian military and political protection) and ultimately lead to a point of no return. Tbilisi chose a third option: in the spring of 2004 the new Georgian leadership began taking steps to unfreeze both conflicts by destroying the existing negotiating frameworks (forcing the JCC to cease its work, making the Georgian faction of the JPKF subordinate to the Georgian military, periodically closing the administrative boundaries of South Ossetia by Georgian military police, creating an "alternative government" of South Ossetia and installing it in South Ossetia, and building a military base in Gori), building up military readiness, and intensifying political and diplomatic pressure on South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Between 2004 and 2008 the situation in both conflict zones underwent a slow and relentless deterioration that culminated in war in August 2008.

Throughout this period Russia took a series of measures—some diplomatic, some military—that demonstrated its involvement in the situation. Moscow straightforwardly declared that if Georgia attempted to restore control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia through military means, Russia would not remain on the sidelines. Either these warnings were not taken seriously or it was believed that they promised nothing more than "symbolic assistance to the separatists" (both Abkhazia and South Ossetia reject the term *separatists*, arguing that it was Georgia that unilaterally separated from the Union in May 1991). A key factor in these mistaken calculations was Georgia's confidence that the ties it had already established with NATO (the republic was under consideration for entry into the Membership Action Plan stage of admission to the alliance) protected it from Russian military intervention—even in the case of a sudden military operation against de facto seceded regions that had not been approved by its allies.

In June and July 2008 tensions rose sharply in South Ossetia. Finally, in early August, the Georgian authorities decided on a military operation. From 7 to 8 August, Georgian troops attacked and partially occupied Ossetian positions and population centers across the entire perimeter of the administrative border along the Sinagur-Znaur-Tskhinvali-Tsinagar line. Russian and Ossetian JPKF positions in Tskhinvali were also directly attacked.

As promised, Russia did not remain on the sidelines. After two days of fighting, Georgian forces in South Ossetia had been crushed and Russian Federation forces entered Georgia proper. The Georgian army, which had been prepared to battle South Ossetia and was now encountering a qualitatively different enemy, quickly collapsed and withdrew to Tbilisi without a fight. In Abkhazia, Georgian forces, also without a fight, left the upper Kodor Gorge, which Abkhaz troops had entered after an artillery attack.

By 12 August, Russian armed forces had ceased advancing into Georgian territory. A ceasefire agreement was reached with the active mediation of France, which stipulated that Russian forces would leave occupied areas of Georgia by 10 October. However, Russia's calls to conclude a legally binding non-use-of-force agreement between Georgia and Abkhazia and Georgia and South Ossetia have again been confounded by Georgia's precondition that Abkhazia and South Ossetia recognize Georgian sovereignty. Within a month after the war Moscow finally decided to recognize the independence of these republics and decouple the question of their security from the issue of Georgia's territorial integrity. It remains to be seen, however, whether the independence and militarily imposed security of South Ossetia and Abkhazia will bring the Caucasus any closer to a stable peace.

ABKHAZIA

The conflict in Abkhazia has a distinctly ethnic dimension that reflects a long-standing rivalry between the republic's Georgian and Abkhaz elites. During the Soviet period, ethnicity

had been a familiar component of arguments over how to organize authority in the autonomy, who should hold prestigious positions, and what should be given priority in culture and education. When crisis struck with the collapse of Soviet institutions, ethnicity became a basis for mobilizing action.

During the imperial and Soviet eras Abkhazia became a multiethnic mosaic in which the Abkhaz were a minority and Georgians constituted almost half the republic's population. The final Soviet crisis found the autonomy being pulled in two opposing national and political directions: the Abkhaz national movement was motivated by a desire to prevent Abkhazia from fading away altogether, while Georgians wanted to reshape the autonomy in accordance with their actual demographic and economic dominance. Designing Abkhazia's parliament based on the principle of ethnic parity (specifically, by creating a quota system that assured a political balance between the two communities), a formula that emerged in September 1991, provided a temporary compromise between Tbilisi and Sukhum, the capital of the Abkhaz ASSR. But it proved insufficient to neutralize growing polarization between Georgian and Abkhaz elites.

The introduction of Georgian government troops into the autonomous republic in August 1992 while a civil war was going on in Georgia added armed conflict to this polarization. The brutal nature of the Georgian occupation of Abkhaz towns took everyday Georgian-Abkhaz relations to a new level of estrangement and radically changed the political agenda for Abkhazia. The human costs of the Georgian occupation and the pogroms and arbitrary reprisals used against the civilian population rallied Armenian and other minority communities in Abkhazia to the Abkhaz side. The moral and military defeat of the Georgian army in 1993 prompted a mass exodus of Abkhazia's Georgian population, which had served as a social base for the occupation forces. In the end, this population bore the brunt of Georgia's 1992 military gamble.

When military actions were halted on 30 September 1993, Abkhaz forces (supported by volunteers from the North Caucasus) occupied the entire autonomy from the Psou to the Inguri Rivers (with the exception of "Abkhaz Svanetia" or the upper Kodor Gorge north of Lata). In accordance with a ceasefire agreement signed in Moscow in April 1994, a Collective Peacekeeping Force (CPKF), under the aegis of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) but made up exclusively of a Russian Federation contingent, was deployed along the line separating the two sides. The CPKF created a buffer zone, which was also monitored by the United Nations. This zone of CPKF responsibility was demilitarized on both sides of the Georgia-Abkhazia border and in the upper Kodor Gorge.

Unlike in South Ossetia between 1993 and 2003, a tense atmosphere of smoldering military and political confrontation persisted within the zone of Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. There was no progress toward a settlement either on the political level or to any notable extent on the level of ordinary human relations or economic cooperation. (One exception has been the Inguri Hydroelectric Station, which has units on both sides of the border, leaving Georgia and Abkhazia no option but to cooperate technically.) The Megrelian (or, more widely, Georgian population) of the Gali District (Galsky Raion) wound up caught between both sides. The Abkhaz strategy was aimed at instilling loyalty to Abkhazia in the Gali District's Samurzakan population (and ensuring this loyalty through firm armed control over the area). The Georgian strategy, meanwhile, was aimed at the reintegration of Abkhazia into Georgia. The areas of Abkhazia along the line of separation remained a zone in which Georgian commando groups operated, targeting not only Abkhaz militia but the forces of the CPKF. Twice the Georgians escalated the guerrilla warfare with Abkhazia: in the spring of 1998 in the Gali District and the autumn of 2001 from their foothold in the upper Kodor Gorge. The latter case was a joint operation between Georgian forces and a detachment of Chechen field commander Ruslan Gelaev (the detachment deployed from its base in the Pankisi Gorge in eastern Georgia). These attacks were not successful and only exacerbated hostilities between the sides. The 2001 attacks led to a sharp deterioration in relations between Russia and what was still President Eduard Shevardnadze's Georgia. (At first Georgia denied that the country's special forces had been involved in transporting the Chechen detachment to Abkhazia from Pankisi.) In August 2002, before the start of Georgia's "anti-criminal operation" to demilitarize Pankisi (a result of the focus of the United States on terrorism after the attacks of 11 September 2001), Gelaev's forces peacefully left the gorge for Ingushetia, where they were quickly blocked and partially destroyed by Russian federal forces.

The 1993–2003 negotiation process was spread over various international forums and involved shuttle diplomacy by individual intermediary countries. The parties to the conflict held diametrically opposed positions concerning both the political future of Abkhazia and the priorities in the settlement process itself. Inherent in the ethnopolitical nature of the conflict were three key interrelated problems that had to be resolved in any settlement: defining the status of the territory, launching a process to return refugees, and guaranteeing security. The Abkhaz position was predicated on the idea that the republic must be internationally recognized as an independent state before the process of allowing Georgian refugees to return could begin, to guard against the possibility that their numerical superiority might undermine the idea of an Abkhaz nation-state in future democratic elections. (The hope that there might also be a large-scale repatriation of Abkhaz Muslim refugees from Turkey was never realized.)

The Georgians preferred to address questions concerning the return of refugees separately from or before dealing with the problem of resolving Abkhazia's status. Georgia was critical of the peacekeeping regime in Abkhazia between 1994 and 2003 because it did nothing to facilitate the return of refugees or provide guarantees for those who were able to return (as in the Gali District). When Shevardnadze was still in power Tbilisi began to demand that the CPKF mission be revised and the configuration of the zone of responsibility be changed. Instead of a buffer model Georgia proposed expanding the peacekeeping force's zone of responsibility to the entire territory of Abkhazia and having it guarantee and police the return and reestablishment of refugees.

The two sides were also far from agreement when it came to the issue of status. Before the 1992–1993 war the Abkhaz consented to reintegrate their republic with Georgia along federative lines, but after the war they insisted that the conflict could only be resolved between the two independent states of Abkhazia and Georgia. Tbilisi offered Abkhazia "the broadest autonomy within the Georgian state," the borders of which would correspond to the internationally recognized borders of the Georgian SSR as of 21 December 1991. There were also vague promises of Georgian constitutional reform that would turn the country into a federation, although no institutional steps were taken in that direction.

After Abkhazia refused to accept the restoration of autonomy status (generally construed as implying a subordinate relationship to Georgia), Russia proposed that the sides try to reach agreement using a less hierarchical model, a "common state" or confederation that maintained Georgia's territorial integrity. In

June 1997 the draft of a Georgian-Abkhaz settlement protocol was largely agreed upon; it provided for the creation of a single united state within which Abkhazia and Georgia would have equal status.

From 1998 to 2001 international intermediaries (the U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Friends, convened to resolve the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict under the aegis of the United Nations) attempted through the Boden Plan to outline the framework of a status settlement, among other things. A key feature of these initiatives was the recognition of Abkhazia as a "sovereign entity" within Georgia with a special status that would be based on a federative constitutional law. But none of these plans or negotiations was successful since the parties to the conflict viewed each proposed model only in terms of how it affected the future prospects for either a fully independent Abkhazia or the restoration of Georgian jurisdiction. Until 2001 the Abkhaz side was willing to consider a constitutional arrangement providing for two equal members of a common state of Abkhazia and Georgia, but the military venture in Kodor Gorge cast doubt on this means of settling the question of Abkhazia's status.

In January 2004, Georgia's president Mikheil Saakashvili made sovereignty over Abkhazia (and South Ossetia) the main objective of the state and promised voters he would achieve this objective during his first term in office. Georgia believed that the departure of Russian peacekeeping troops from the conflict zone was key to such success. The insistence with which Tbilisi demanded their removal and the reluctance of the Georgians to sign any agreement committing them to abstain from using force led Sukhum to conclude that assurance of the republic's security had to be its highest priority and essentially the only real issue for negotiations with Georgia. The 2006 Abkhaz settlement plan ("Key to the Future") left the issue of Abkhazia's status off the agenda, while Georgian refugees were offered the prospect of returning to Abkhazia only if they were willing to become Abkhaz citizens.

In the summer of 2006, Georgian troops entered the upper Kodor Gorge, which had been demilitarized under the 1994 Moscow Agreement. A pro-Georgian Abkhaz autonomous government was installed here. Tbilisi was building an "alternative Abkhazia," a strategy analogous to the one it had used in South Ossetia. Georgia's actions in Kodor brought political dialogue between Georgia and Abkhazia to a complete halt. (The Abkhaz side saw the removal of Georgian troops from the CPKF zone of responsibility—which included the Kodor Gorge—as a precondition for the renewal of the negotiating process.)

The stalemate was largely grounded in a foreign policy context that featured a variety of geopolitical vectors along which Abkhazia and Georgia were being pulled. In order to achieve a certain distance from Georgia and in the absence of clear international guarantees of its security, Abkhazia tried to integrate itself economically and politically into Russia, which increasingly appeared to be the only military and political guarantor of Abkhazia's statehood. The economic blockade of Abkhazia that Georgia had managed to organize within the framework of the CIS ceased to function, more for humanitarian than political reasons. Furthermore, after 2002 Russia maintained a policy that allowed residents of Abkhazia, a significant portion of whom had become citizens of the Russian Federation, to enter Russia without a visa. For its part, Georgia strove for rapid integration into NATO and calculated that the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers would ensure the restoration of the country's territorial integrity by compelling Abkhazia toward "peace" and acceptance of the return of refugees under armed protection, finally eliminating the ethnodemographic basis for Abkhaz separatism within Georgia.

In 2007–2008 tensions increased in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone. Georgia began conducting reconnaissance flights over Abkhazia and increased its military budget. A new military base (Senaki) close to the Abkhaz border was nearing completion. Abkhazia, with Russian military technical assistance, also raised military preparedness to a new level and added an active air defense capability. The legacy of distrust ran deep in the region, and it was becoming exceedingly unlikely that the parties would be willing to demilitarize their mutual border and pursue a peaceful political settlement of the conflict. Finally, Georgia's attack on South Ossetia in August 2008 and Russian military involvement and recognition of South Ossetian and Abkhaz independence appear to have doomed Georgia's hope of including Abkhazia within its borders anytime soon, if ever.

SOURCES

Maps: 145, 149.

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Map 44

1994–2003: Chechnya and Daghestan

The more than ten-year military and political conflict that took place in Chechnya can be divided into several stages—a brief flare of hostilities followed by relative peace from 1991 to 1994, the first Russian campaign from 1994 to 1997, peace from 1997 to 1999, and the second Russian campaign from 1999 to 2003—that varied in terms of the intensity and geography of clashes, the structure of the opposing forces, and the fluctuating allegiances of the Chechen population. The conflict can be described as ethnopolitical in nature, since both participants and observers consistently identified the parties in ethnic terms, both formally (politically) and informally (within the realm of public opinion). However, the limitations of viewing the conflict purely through the prism of ethnicity became increasingly evident as it developed, the parties to it reconfigured, and large groups of Chechens became increasingly inclined to remain part of Russia.

The conflict began to take shape in the fall of 1991 when the United Congress of the Chechen People forcibly ousted the government of the Chechen-Ingush Republic, declared the independence of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, and took possession of a significant portion of the Soviet army's weapons and equipment within the republic's borders. The political regime that took shape between 1991 and 1994 under President Jokhar Dudaev essentially seceded from Russia, creating what Moscow considered a dangerous precedent for the integrity of the Russian Federation throughout the rest of the North Caucasus. In December 1994 federal forces launched an ill-conceived military campaign, which resulted in a wide range of Chechen society rallying around Dudaev and turned the political conflict between Moscow and Grozny into a full-scale war. The broad civilian participation and massive casualties alienated the population (both the local Chechen population and Russian society overall) from what was seen as an occupying federal army, and led eventually to the "Khasavyurt defeat" in August 1997—a derogatory term for an accord signed in Khasavyurt ("On the Principles for Determining the Bases of Bilateral Relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic") that in essence provided for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of federal troops from the territory of Chechnya, and de facto recognition of Chechnya as a sovereign state: the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

During the 1997–1999 interbellum the de facto independence of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria only served to compound the contradictions in Grozny's (Jokhar's) domestic and foreign policy and thus deepened the rift with Moscow without bringing the republic any closer to becoming a viable nation-state. (In 1998 the Chechen parliament renamed Grozny Jokhar-Kala [Djovkhar Ghaala] in honor of Dudaev, who had been slain in 1995. This new name was not recognized either by the Russian authorities or by the pro-Russian Chechen authorities, who returned to power in 2000 when the republic again became part of the Russian Federation.) The government of Aslan Maskhadov, who took power in 1997, could not combat the extreme decentralization that had characterized the structure of Chechen resistance during the first military campaign. The Chechen elite appeared to be unready to come up with internal resources needed to rein in the criminal violence that was sweeping the republic itself and adjacent regions of Russia after the 1994–1997 war. The organizational structure of the national movement and ethos of the past war became the basis not so much for statehood as for the legitimization of private, often criminal, business conducted by various clan networks and field commanders. The widespread practice of hostage-taking undermined the viability of the separatist movement from the perspective of both Chechens themselves and the other peoples of the North Caucasus. An attempt to spread the movement to neighboring regions of Russia began to be associated in the minds of these regions' local populations with violent criminal activity.

Lacking the internal resources to centralize authority and quell criminal violence, a few leaders of the Chechen political elite turned to radical politicized Islam as one way of overcoming the internal crisis. However, the republic's move toward Islamic statehood, and especially attempts to overcome or cover up the crisis through the spread of "pure" (Salafi or Wahhabi) Islam, only served to further fracture Chechen society. Salafism came into conflict with Chechnya's "national" (Tariqah or Sufi) Islamic traditions and came to be perceived by some of the Chechen political elite as an even greater threat to Chechnya's cultural heritage than being within the orbit of the developing Russian state.

This conflict between Tariqah traditionalism and Salafism became apparent when important and influential Tariqah Chechen clans broke with Maskhadov and abandoned the separatist movement. These clans began increasingly to view a return to Russia as the lesser of two evils and to perceive Russia as the only force capable of helping Chechnya out of its crisis and postwar destruction. They viewed Salafism as a negative influence that neither promoted the formation of Chechen statehood nor served to enhance the republic's standing among its neighbors. This attitude became politically decisive during the next Russian military campaign, when the conflict underwent what was known as "Chechenization," a term used to describe the changing focus from Russian-Chechen "antagonisms" to an internal struggle among Chechen factions, some of whom were starting to favor the republic's reintegration into Russia. In 1998–1999 the tensions brought about by the internal crisis and functional failures of the republic's government institutions as well as the country's regional isolation led Chechen leaders to determine that salvation could be found only through the export of Islamic revolution to neighboring highland regions of the Russian Caucasus, Daghestan first and foremost. The ideology and organizational infrastructure for such an endeavor had been taking shape in Chechnya since 1996, primarily in military training camps, where a significant number of trainees were from Daghestan and trainers were from a number of Arabic countries.

By the mid-nineties relations between Chechnya and Daghestan, both official and local, were strained. Daghestan's territory

44 1994-2003: Chechnya and Daghestan



adjacent to Chechnya—primarily the Novolak, Khasavyurt, and Kazbekov Districts (Novolaksky, Khasavyurtovsky, and Kazbekovsky Raions)—was plagued by tensions between Akkin or Aukh Chechens on the one hand and Avars and Laks on the other. This source of internal tension for Daghestan and the deadlock in resolving the Aukh problem undermined trust and fanned an atmosphere of suspicion between the political elites of the two republics. Public opinion in Daghestan grew increasingly anti-Chechen, especially among Avars and Laks. Grozny's radicalism heightened suspicions that Chechnya's secession from Russia would spur separatist aspirations on the part of Akkin Chechens and exacerbate ethnoterritorial problems within Daghestan. It was significant that the growing internal crisis in Chechnya between 1997 and 1999 came at a time when political elites in neighboring republics had already adapted to new post-Soviet conditions and by and large supported the efforts of the federal authorities to consolidate a unified Russian state. In particular, the 1999 attacks by Salafis in the Botlikh and Tsumada Districts (Botlikhsky and Tsumadinsky Raions) took place soon after elections in Daghestan, enabling the Daghestani political elite to strengthen its position and establish and test new, post-Soviet methods of resolving internal conflict. The tensions raised during the social crisis in Daghestan were to some extent successfully channeled into the fight against the common enemy: the "Wahhabi threat."

Between 1991 and 1999 a Salafi or Wahhabi religious political movement had emerged in Daghestan within the context of a post-Soviet Islamic revival and as a radical expression of widespread popular disgust with corrupt machinations at the upper echelon of power that were essentially disenfranchising ordinary people. By 1998 Salafi jamaats had emerged within a number of the republic's districts, and a zone covering the villages of Kadar, Karamakhi, and Chabanmakhi was proclaimed a "sharia territory." Russian law essentially ceased to be observed there, and the local Salafi jamaat, backed by its armed detachments, took over control.

In August 1999 clashes began between Salafi groups and local police in Daghestan's Tsumada District, expanding into the Botlikh District with the active involvement of Chechen forces on the side of the Salafis. Immediately following the defeat of the Salafi jamaats and their Chechen allies in Daghestan in September 1999 (around the villages of Kadar, Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi, and the Novolak District) by federal forces and Daghestani police, the second Chechen military campaign began.

In 1999–2000 a series of operations conducted by the federal army and its Chechen allies in the republic brought the Ichkerian regime to an end. After 2001 the Chechen radical movement continued to operate but switched to terrorist tactics and gradually lost its political influence. At the same time in Chechnya there was a strengthening of pro-Russian (or, rather, anti-Wahhabi/anti-Salafi) structures and forces that actively opposed the radical separatist movement within the Chechen Republic. The "mujahideen" attack on a school in Beslan in 2004 was seen as a signal of the radical Islamists' new moral and political trajectory. As a result, Chechen and, more broadly, North Caucasian separatism cultivated on an Islamic basis seemed to be losing not only any prospect of political dialogue with the federal center but what little popular support it enjoyed, even in Chechnya itself. (The organizers of the Beslan terrorist attack, Shamil Basayev and Abu Dzeit [Zaid], were killed by federal forces in 2005 in their guerrilla hideouts in Ingushetia. The same year Aslan Maskhadov was killed in his hideout in Tolstoy-Yurt, Chechnya.)

By 2004 the problem of Chechnya's status was no longer on the political agenda: the republic had resumed its place as an administrative unit of the Russian Federation, with an elected government and a republican constitution that had been approved by the Chechen people in a national referendum. Doubts as to whether these procedures expressed the will of the Chechen people and were in strict accordance with the law are unlikely to change their outcome, which rests largely on the ability of the federal and republican authorities to ensure Chechnya's irreversible transition into a country focused on the problems and cares of peacetime. Two major threats endanger this transition: indiscriminate violence by federal forces, which may again turn the sympathies of the Chechen population toward cells of terrorist resistance, which in turn will intensify the "occupation effect," pitting Russia and Chechnya against each other; and the emergence in the republic of a closed, authoritarian regime legitimized and protected by the federal government and alienated from broad segments and territorial or *teip* (clan) groups of the Chechen population. These two threats could pave the way for a return to the goals and actions associated with the republic's separation from Russia.

SOURCES

References: *Chechnia i Rossiia: obshchestva i gosudarstva*; Cherkasov, "Demografiia"; Gakaev, *Chechenskii krizis*; Kisriev, "Otkrytie 'vtorogo fronta' boevikov"; Malashenko and Trenin, *Vremia Iuga*; Tishkov, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict*; Tishkov, *Obshchestvo v vooruzhennom konflikte*.

Map 45

1989–2010: An Ethnic Map of the Caucasus

The 1989 Soviet census provides an ethnoterritorial snapshot of the Caucasus as the Soviet era was coming to a close. It shows two opposite trends that first began to develop in the stable sixties and seventies. The first is the shrinking share of the "nontitular" population (those not belonging to an ethnic group for which a given autonomy was named) within the boundaries of most of the ethnic entities and an associated increase in ethnic homogeneity in these territories. This trend does not stem simply from differences in birth rates between titular groups on the one hand and Russians on the other (Russians make up the largest share of the nontitular population of autonomies). It also stems from clearly evident migration trends.

The development of an informal system of ethnic preferences within "national" territories spurred migration among nontitular groups, especially the young and well-educated. The social structure of these groups began to replicate itself in truncated form, and upward social mobility became harder to achieve without migrating beyond the boundaries of the "titular" ("alien" for these groups) territories.

The second trend concerned nontitular territories, mostly Russian Krasnodar and Stavropol, which were becoming increasingly complex in their ethnic makeup, primarily due to influxes of ethnic minorities as economic migrants. Some regions of ethnic entities—for example, the lowlands of Daghestan—were also part of this trend.

The rapidly diminishing motivational force of Soviet ideology, with its unifying myths and appeal to supra-ethnic values, brought ethnic issues to the forefront of popular political discourse in the Caucasus in the 1980s. The "national idea" (or ethnic revivalism) became a dominant principle there in constructing a picture of the future and defining social threats, along with the collectives seen as standing behind these threats. Between 1987 and 1989 the first public campaigns and national congresses appeared, at which these threats were often attributed not only to "the regime" but to some collective ethnic other. Ethnicity became the organizing principle around which new influential social and political associations were created. Ethnicity also appeared to be the basis for claiming the exclusive right to control the levers of power in the approaching redistribution of state property. A complex of historical myths, "traumas," and mutual grievances was revived. Within the context of the intensifying crisis of the Soviet state and its economy, ethnopolitical debate aroused ethnophobia and the growth of violence toward ethnic others—violence that initially was symbolic and random but later, in several hotbeds of social and political tension, was organized on a large scale to serve specific objectives.

The channeling of social conflict through interethnic rivalry in the late eighties and early nineties led to a catastrophic acceleration of a number of migration trends that had emerged during the Soviet period and the dwindling of others, and to a fundamental restructuring of the ethnic composition of many Caucasian territories. The collapse of the unified Soviet state and the escalation of a chain of violent conflicts (in Mountain Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, North Ossetia and Ingushetia, and Chechnya) became factors prompting large-scale forced migration.

LOCAL DETAIL

After ethnic violence against Meskhetian Turks in Uzbekistan's Fergana Valley in 1989 and their subsequent departure from Uzbekistan, a major Meskhetian diaspora emerged in the North Caucasus. A portion of the group wanted to repatriate to Georgia, from which they had been deported in 1944. As prospects for this repatriation faded, many Meskhis became permanent residents of the Russian North Caucasus, and a number of problems developed in conjunction with their social adaptation in the region, leading to constant eruptions of tension between the local populations of the Kuban and the Meskhetian community. In 2004 a program was launched to settle 20,000 Meskhi Turks from Krasnodar Territory in the United States.

When the Chechen population returned from exile in the late fifties and early sixties, instead of coming back to the villages they had left in the highland zone of Chechnya-Ingushetia, a significant portion of them settled in the Russian Cossack Naur (Naursky), Kargalinsky, and Shelkovskoy Districts (raions), while the Ingush moved into the stanitsas of the Sunzha District (Sunzhensky Raion). Most of the stanitsas and villages of these districts were left with a mixed Russian-Vainakh population (i.e., Russian-Chechen and Russian-Ingush). In the seventies and eighties Russians started to leave Chechnya-Ingushetia. The pogrom against Russians (Cossacks) in the stanitsa of Troitskaya (in Ingushetia) in 1991 prompted the departure of Russians from mixed Russian-Ingush villages and stanitsas, and when law and order broke down after Jokhar Dudaev's ascent to power in Chechnya, Russians fled en masse from the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. The exodus continued through Russia's 1994–1997 military campaign against the separatists, by the end of which virtually all the Slavic population had departed. Ingushetia's attempt from 2002 to 2008 to conduct a special program for the return of Russian-speaking residents to the republic was not successful.

During the sixties, seventies, and eighties a dramatic change took place in the ethnic profile of the lowland (Kumyk, Russian/Cossack, and Nogai) districts of Daghestan and neighboring districts of Stavropol to which Avars, Dargins, and other highland groups were migrating. The emerging ethnic mosaic of the Kumyk lowlands, Nogai steppe, and cities of Daghestan became a new unifying space for the republic's peoples, both serving as a factor in the development of a supra-ethnic Daghestani community and presenting new risks for intergroup rivalries within it. In the eighties there was an upsurge in Russian migration out of the republic, including from the Kizlyar and Tarumovka Districts (Kizlyarsky and Tarumovsky Raions).

1989-2010: An Ethnic Map of the Caucasus

Key to the Numbers and Symbols Designating Ethnic Groups

- 1. Abkhaz
- 2. Abazins
- 3. Adygheans
- 3a. Shapsugs
- 4. Cherkess
- 5. Kabardins

(Adyghe)

- 6. Ingush
- 7. Chechens
- 8. Batsbi
- 9. Kistins
- 10. Avars
- 11. Andi (peoples of the Andi group)
- 12. Tsez (peoples of the Tsez group)
- 13. Dargins
- 14. Laks
- 15. Lezgins
- 16. Tabasarans
- 17. Aguls
- 18. Tsakhurs
- 19. Rutuls
- 20. Archins
- 21. Kryz
- 22. Budugs
- 23. Udins
- 24. Khinalugs
- 25. Georgians
- 25a. Georgian Jews
- 30. Russians and Ukrainians
- Moldavians
- 31. Germans
- 32. Greeks
- 33. Ossetians
- 34. Kurds
- 35. Yazidi
- 36. Tats
- 37. Mountain Jews
- 38. Talysh
- 39. Armenians
- 39a. Khemshils
- 40. Azerbaijanis
- 41. Karachai
- 42. Balkars
- 43. Kumyks
- 44. Nogai
- 45. Turkmen
- 46. Tatars
- 46a. Turks
- 47. Kalmyks
- 48. Estonians
- 49. Assyrians

Megrels, Svans, Laz (nos. 26–28 in map 31) were subsumed under the category "Georgians" in the 1989 and later censuses, as were "Georgian Jews" (no. 29 in map 31).

Table 45.1
Relative Percentages of Primary (Titular) Ethnic Groups and Most Numerous Secondary Groups

		Census					
Territory	Primary or Titular Group(s)	1959	1970	1979	1989	1999–2003	2009–2011
Krasnodar Territory	Russians	94/4 Ukr [a,b]	90/4 Ukr[b]	89/4 Ukr[b]	87/2 Ukr[b]	82/5 Arm (2002)	88/6 Arm (2010 census) 82/8 Arm (estimate)
Stavropol Territory	Russians	91/2 Ukr[b]	90/2 Ukr[b]	88/2 Ukr[b]	84/3 Arm[b]	82/6 Arm (2002)	81/6 Arm (2010 Census) 80/8 Arm (estimate)
Adyghea	Adygheans	23/70 Rus	21/72 Rus	21/71 Rus	22/68 Rus	24/65 Rus (2002)	25/64 Rus (2010)
Karachai-Cherkessia	Karachais, Cherkess, Abazas, Nogais	43/51 Rus	47/47 Rus	49/45 Rus	54/42 Rus	61/34 Rus (2002)	64/32 Rus (2010)
Kabarda-Balkaria	Kabardins, Balkars	53/39 Rus	54/37 Rus	55/35 Rus	58/32 Rus	67/25 Rus (2002)	70/23 Rus (2010)
North Ossetia	Ossetians	48/40 Rus	49/37 Rus	51/34 Rus	53/30 Rus	63/23 Rus (2002)	65/21 Rus (2010)
Chechnya-Ingushetia	Chechens, Ingush	41/49 Rus	59/35 Rus	65/30 Rus	71/23 Rus	94/4 Rus (2002)	96/2 Rus (2010)
						77/20 Ch[c] (2002)	94/5 Ch (2010)
Daghestan	Avars (including Andi and Tsez peoples), Aguls, Dargins, Kumyks, Lak, Lezgin, Nogai, Rutuls, Tabasarans, Tats, Tsakhurs	69/20 Rus	74/15 Rus	78/12 Rus	80/9 Rus	87/5 Rus (2002)	88/5 Az (2010)
Georgia	Georgians	64/11 Arm	67/10 Arm	69/9 Arm	70/8 Arm	84/7 Az[d] (2002)	85/7 Az (estimate)
Abkhazia	Abkhaz	15/39 Grg	16/41 Grg	17/44 Grg	18/46 Grg	44/21 Grg (2003)	51/19 Grg (2011 Census) 44/23 Arm (estimate)
Ajaria	Georgians	73/14 Rus	77/12 Rus	80/10 Rus	83/10 Rus	93/2 Rus (2002)	95/1 Rus (estimate)
South Ossetia	Ossetians	66/28 Grg	66/28 Grg	66/29 Grg	66/29 Grg	64/35 Grg (estimate)	85/10 Grg (estimate)
Armenia	Armenians	88/6 Az	89/6 Az	90/5 Az	93/3 Az	98/1 Kurds (2001)	98/1 Kurds (estimate)
Azerbaijan	Azerbaijanis	68/14 Rus	74/10 Rus	78/8 Rus	83/6 Rus	95/2 Lez[d] (1999)	93/2 Lez (2009 census) 95/2 Lez (estimate)
Nakhichevan	Azerbaijanis	90/7 Arm	94/3 Arm	96/2 Rus	96/1 Kurds	99/1 Kurds (estimate)	99/1 Kurds (estimate)
Mountain Karabakh	Armenians	84/14 Az	81/18 Az	76/23 Az	77/21 Az	99/1 Az (estimate)	99/1 Az (estimate)

[a]Abbreviations: Arm—Armenians; Az—Azerbaijanis; Ch—Chechens; Grg—Georgians; Lez—Lezgins; Rus—Russians; Ukr—Ukrainians.
[b]1959–1989 data for Krasnodar and Stavropol Territories exclude the populations of autonomies within these territories.
[c]Data from the 2002 census for Ingushetia include Chechen refugees.
[d]Data for Georgia and Azerbaijan do not include Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Mountain Karabakh.

Analogous migration trends developed with varying degrees of intensity and following various patterns in other North Caucasian autonomies. The anxiety this generated in predominantly Russian territories was evident, for example, in concern about the "Daghestanization" of eastern Stavropol Province.

The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Mountain (Nagorny) Karabakh (1988–1994) was accompanied by large-scale violent shifts of population between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Pogroms in Azerbaijani cities also led their Armenian populations to flee to Russia. Occupation of several Azerbaijani districts by Armenian-Karabakh forces provoked the departure of their entire Azerbaijani (and Kurdish) populations.

The violent conflict in South Ossetia in 1991–1992 led to an exodus by Ossetians from Georgia proper to North Ossetia. The Ossetian population of Trialetia essentially disappeared. The

area populated by Ossetians in Kakhetia, including the Pankisi Gorge, shrank considerably. Clashes in the autonomy beginning in January 1991 prompted local Georgians to flee Tskhinvali and other areas remaining under Ossetian control.

In North Ossetia heated ethnopolitical conflict beginning in 1992 over the status of the Prigorodny District (claimed by Ingushetia), involving armed clashes within the district, was accompanied by the departure of approximately 32,000 Ingush from North Ossetia to Ingushetia. By 2003, under the terms of a settlement, most of the Ingush forced out of the district were able to return to their villages.

The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict in 1992–1993 greatly altered the ethnic makeup of Abkhazia. The vast majority of Georgians were forced to leave the republic along with the retreating Georgian army. The Georgian Svan population remained in Abkhazia's Kodor Gorge (which was not controlled by Abkhazia until 2008) and Megrels remained in the Gali District, to which approximately 45,000 refugees who had fled the republic in 1993 returned.

Conflicts during the 1990s in the Caucasus spurred the local Greek population to emigrate for Greece, including almost all the Greeks living in Abkhazia and a large portion of those living in Tsalka and other districts of South Georgia. A majority of Mountain Jews left Daghestan for Israel. For the most part, the Jewish population also left Georgia and virtually none remained in Tskhinvali, whose Jewish quarter greatly suffered when the city was shelled in 1991. In 1995 Russian sectarians (Christian religious minorities) moved from Javakhetia to Russia, bringing the 150-year history of Russian Doukhobors in the Caucasus to an end.

The first decade of the twenty-first century has seen large-scale economic migration into Stavropol and Krasnodar Territories and Rostov Province from the republics of the North Caucasus by a variety of Caucasian ethnic groups—not just ethnic Russians. An analogous migration trend has been seen out of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Russian North Caucasus began to separate into two subregions distinguished by economic conditions and demographic trends. One zone attracted migration from throughout Russia and the states of the southern Caucasus while the other saw an outflow of migrants. Russian regions and their local governments found themselves faced with the need for new integrative practices, both political and on the level of culture and education policy.

One common demographic and cultural trend in the South (and, to some extent, the North) Caucasus starting in the late Soviet period was a decrease in the absolute and proportional number of Russians and, beginning in 1991, a reduced role for the Russian language as a cultural resource for many members of the Caucasian elite. Attitudes toward Soviet history overall impelled some toward de-sovietization and de-Russification not only of their recent history but of the toponyms that reflected it. Ethnopolitical conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, Georgians and Abkhaz, and Georgians and Ossetians has been accompanied by the politicized renaming of cities and villages.

Over the course of the 2008 Five-Day War in South Ossetia and Georgia, approximately 35,000 Ossetians and 22,000 Georgians fled the South Ossetian conflict zone and approximately 180,000 Georgians fled adjacent Georgian districts (Gori, Kaspi, and Kareli). While the Ossetian population returned to South Ossetia after the armed conflict had come to an end, Georgians only returned to districts in Georgia proper and, to a lesser extent, to the Leningor (Georgian "Akhalgori") District of South Ossetia. Georgian villages in the Tskhinval and Znaur districts of South Ossetia were essentially burned to the ground, leaving close to 19,000 people without any clear prospect for returning—victims of a new wave of military adventurism by political elites.

SOURCES

Maps: 143, 161, 176, 179, 182, 184.

References: Anikanov, Stepanov, and Susokolov, *Titul'nye etnosy Rossiiskoi Federatsii*; Belozerov, *Etnicheskaia karta Severnogo Kavkaza*; Dzadziev, "Russkoe naselenie respublik Severnogo Kavkaza"; Ediev, "Migration in the Caucasus Region"; Eldarov et al., "Resettlement and Migration"; *Itogi Vserossiiskoi perepisi naseleniia 2002 goda*; Mukomel', "Demograficheskie posledstviia"; Riazantsev, *Sovremennyi demograficheskii i migratsionnyi portret*; Savva, *Novye diaspory Krasnodarskogo kraia*; *Stabil'nost' i konflikt v rossiiskom prigranich'e*.

Map 46

2012: Major Roads and Transportation Corridors

Map 47

2012: Primary Petroleum Transportation Routes

The geopolitical contraction of Russia into the borders of the Russian Federation in 1991 again transformed the Caucasus region, especially its southern portion, into a field of rivalry and cooperation for world and regional powers. What makes the Caucasus particularly attractive from the perspective of today's Great Game is that it is intersected by routes transporting crude oil and natural gas from the Caspian Basin, with the prospect of turning Transcaucasia into a corridor connecting Europe and the Americas to Central Asia while bypassing Russia, Iran, and China (and thereby guaranteeing Europe and North America autonomous access to the underbelly of one of the "poles" of a multipolar world).

Transcaucasia's promise as a corridor is being fulfilled through several large-scale projects. One of them, TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia), uses Black Sea and Caspian ports and overland communication through Georgia and Azerbaijan to connect Europe with Central Asia and China. Transcaucasia's potential to provide access to a non-OPEC oil and gas reservoir of international import, as well as channels along which to move it that do not depend on Russia, found material expression with the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline. The BTC pipeline began operation during the summer of 2006 and moves petroleum resources out of the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian shelf (the site of the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshi oil field, among others). In the future the BTC pipeline may be fed by the huge Kazakh Tengiz field on the northeast coast of the Caspian Sea and by the Kashagan field as well as by fields in Turkmenistan. The prospect of abundant oil from these sources is particularly important given the possibility that estimates of the volume of oil in the Azerbaijani sector may be exaggerated, which would make Kazakhstan supplies vital to the profitability of the BTC.

However, there is another prospective vehicle for bringing Tengiz oil to market: the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC)'s pipeline, which passes over Russian territory. This route could reverse the trend toward diminution of Russia's role in the international maneuvering for supremacy over Caspian oil and its transport. However, the problem with the CPC pipeline is that it carries Tengiz oil to a terminal close to Novorossiisk. This means that the route is dependent on Turkey to get to the West, and Ankara is increasingly inclined to set more stringent limits on tankers passing through the Bosporus straits. For Russia, options for overcoming this dependence include construction of bypass pipelines such as the Burgas-Alexandroupoli pipeline, which has been designed to pass through Bulgaria and Greece and carry oil to the Aegean Mediterranean coast. Another option is to transport the oil via tanker to Odessa, from which it can move to Ukraine's pipeline system. From the perspective of 2012 this version appears highly problematic because of the risks underscored by the recent history of conflict between Russia and Ukraine over the shipment of natural gas. A new alternative project was proposed for bypassing the Bosporus that includes tanker shipping from Novorossiisk to a planned terminal at Unye (east of Samsun), which will become the starting point of a new Trans-Anatolian pipeline to Ceyhan.

All geopolitically significant routes come with their own particular risks. The BTC pipeline brings Caspian oil right to the Mediterranean but comes dangerously close to areas of smoldering armed conflict in the South Caucasus and eastern Anatolia (a territory populated by Kurds). Analogous risks confront the planned Nabucco natural gas pipeline, which originates in Erzurum, Turkey, and has been designed to deliver gas to Europe from Central Asia. Gas can be transported to Erzurum via the South Caucasus Pipeline (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum, BTE), which began operating in 2007 and carries gas from the Caspian Shah Deniz gas field, running parallel to the BTC pipeline.

The geopolitical rivalry reflected in competing pipelines makes it necessary to view their economic and ecological aspects, their strengths and weaknesses, within the context of other factors. The BTC and, in the future, the Nabucco pipelines contribute toward Azerbaijan's and Georgia's independence from Russia and weaken Russia's influence over the two republics. The military risks and ecological costs associated with the construction of the BTC (which passes through the upper Borjomi Gorge) have to be balanced against external guarantees, which in turn are tied to the strategic advantages of the BTC for the United States as a route that does not depend on Russia and Iran.

The potential offered by the South Caucasus corridor is fraught with complications and contradictions. The fragmentation of the once-unified Soviet Caucasus that began in the early 1990s, the appearance of new states, and the escalation of internal tensions have created fertile ground for the renewal of geopolitical rivalries throughout the region. At the same time political instability deprives the region of the sorts of nonmilitary guarantees that are needed before large-scale economic projects can be confidently undertaken. Such projects require a stable balance of power on the international level and stable political regimes on the local level. The foundations on which the future stability of the Caucasus region will rest are only beginning to appear through the dramatic process by which local polities determine their place in the new world order. In particular, the ties between Azerbaijan and Georgia developed not only out of pipeline geography and the West's desire to squeeze Russia out of the Transcaucasian corridor but also out of a commonality of interests in acquiring control over their own breakaway autonomies. Deprived of Russia's support in any effort to forcefully reintegrate Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia has a strong interest in strengthening the Western presence in the region, as does Azerbaijan, which sees the latitudinal corridor

2012: Major Roads and Transportation Corridors

through Georgia as the main channel for the export of its oil and the acquisition of transit connections with Ankara. In 2001 work began to design a railway line from Akhalkalaki to Kars that would connect the Baku-Tbilisi and Erzurum-Ankara lines. Construction began in 2008 (as a part of the project, the railway line from Marabda to Akhalkalaki in Georgia is currently undergoing improvements). For Georgia this branch has great domestic significance: it promises to better economically integrate predominantly Armenian Javakhetia, which is located at the country's periphery and is economically oriented toward Gyumri and Yerevan in Armenia. Armenia, in turn, in an effort to reduce its regional isolation, is advancing proposals to rebuild the old Tbilisi-Gyumri-Kars railway line. Armenia sees the planned train ferry between Port Kavkaz (located in Krasnodar Territory) and Poti in Georgia, as well as a future highway connecting Batumi, Akhaltsikhe, Akhalkalaki and Gyumri, as a way to open up westward routes. Yerevan is also promoting the restoration of a railroad connection through Abkhazia. However the failure of Abkhazia and Georgia to reach a settlement of their sovereignty dispute is an obstacle to resuming service along the line from Abkhazia to Georgia.

Travel along the Black Sea highway was interrupted in 1992 when it was partially destroyed east of Sukhum. Abkhazia has not exhibited an interest in restoring transit through its territory, but it worked steadfastly to restore the highway segment to Russian Adler (which was completed in 2004). Abkhazia's economy has been focusing its development on transforming the Abkhaz coast into a continuation of the Sochi recreational complex and, beginning in 2007, becoming part of the construction boom associated with the 2014 Sochi Olympics. Reintegration of Abkhazia into the "Russian Riviera" does not require a throughway. However, the stalemate in resolving the Abkhaz conflict of 1994–2008 has inhibited Russian investment in the republic. Since August 2008 and Russia's recognition of Abkhazia the situation has become even more complicated. On one hand, in October of that year Georgia passed the "Law Concerning Occupied Territories" proclaiming any foreign economic activity in Abkhazia illegal, but on the other, Russian companies were now able to work in Abkhazia without worrying about Tbilisi's position, although Russian economic activity in Abkhazia continues to provoke diplomatic tiffs between Tbilisi and Moscow.

Even before it was clear how the events of 2008 would turn out, Georgia was apprehensive about reopening the highway through Abkhazia, since the functioning of the road (customs duties, the creation of jobs) would boost the economy of the breakaway autonomy. This was Tbilisi's reasoning as early as 1994, when Georgia decided on an economic blockade of Abkhazia under the (false) assumption that this would make Abkhazia more tractable on the issue of the returning Georgian refugees. The blockade proved ineffective due first to Abkhazia's informal integration into the tourism economy of southern Russia and later to Russia's reluctance to go along with Tbilisi's confrontational logic in relations with Sukhum.

Once Abkhazia no longer offered a thoroughfare, two trans-Caucasian highways that passed through Ossetia gained importance: the Georgian Military Highway (which traverses Krestovy Pass) and the Transcaucasus Highway, or Transkam (which passes through the Roki Tunnel). The relative stabilization of the situation within the zone of Georgian-Ossetian conflict between 1993 and 2003 made it possible for both highways to be in regular use. These two roads complement each other and at the same time are competing routes. Georgia had a greater interest in the Georgian Military Highway's being used, since the Transkam essentially served (until 2004) to bolster South Ossetia's independence, taking traffic away from Georgia's customs border. However, instead of pursuing a legal and mutually beneficial institutionalization of the economic ties that had developed for South Ossetia through the Transkam, between 2004 and 2007 the authorities in Georgia targeted the road's economic functionality by instituting a blockade to force Tskhinval into submission. Transit routes via South Ossetia were again used as a weapon of division rather than a means of promoting mutually beneficial connectivities and potential reconciliation. Travel along the Georgian Military Highway was halted by the Russians in September 2004, purportedly for technical reasons but actually as part of anti-terrorism measures in the North Caucasus. From 2006 to 2009 the road was completely closed in Verkhny (upper) Lars (Darial Gorge), where Russia has built a new border transportation terminal, a symbol of the crisis in Russia's relations with Georgia but also of the potential for a brighter future.

The escalation of the South Ossetian conflict into a war between Georgia and Russia in 2008 and the resulting break in diplomatic ties also interrupted air travel between the two countries. Nevertheless, the Russian Federation continued to honor its contracts for natural gas deliveries to Georgia and through Georgia to Armenia and South Ossetia via a gas pipeline traversing the Darial Gorge and the Krestovy Pass. In 2009 Russia began operating the high-elevation gas pipeline from North to South Ossetia, and in so doing freed South Ossetia from relying on energy delivered via Georgia. Armenia is also striving to secure its Russian energy supply from the risks inherent in delivery through Georgia and in collaboration with Iran, and with Russian support is building the Tabriz-Megri-Kajaran natural gas pipeline (the first leg was put into operation in 2007). The diplomatic rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia that began during the fall of 2009 and the possible opening of the Turkish-Armenian border could also expand Armenia's energy options.

All this demonstrates that north-south transportation lines through the Caucasus have been badly weakened by the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the deterioration of Georgian-Russian relations. Russia is working to build other reliable routes to compensate, at least partially, for losses in this strategic area and, specifically, is promoting the revival of old Volga-Caspian supply lines. Olya, a new commercial seaport in the Volga delta, promises to serve as a conduit for a significant portion of Russian-Indian and Russian-Iranian trade. The rebuilding of the railway line between Russia and Iran through Azerbaijani Astara (or via train ferry between Makhachkala and Iranian Caspian ports) may also bolster north-south shipping.

But Russia's primary interest in the Caucasus is not economic gain but territorial integrity and state security. This interest has less to do with shipping and transit than it does with the overall political situation and its effect on regional stability and the neutralization of threats to the Russian North Caucasus. These threats continue to be determined by the dynamics of North Caucasian separatism (which, in turn, depend on the dynamics of the Russian political system itself), the quality of local governance by North Caucasian elites, and the relevant disadvantages (in terms of economic perspectives) faced by the region due to its peripheral position vis-à-vis Russia proper.

The more Russia disengages from the South Caucasus and the more the North Caucasus becomes a marginal field, an "internal abroad"—a process perceived as a continuation of the political and economic eviction of Russia from Transcaucasia—the more viable the paradigm of a "Russia-free" Caucasus begins to appear. Transcaucasian risks are perceived by the Russian



2012: Primary Petroleum Transportation Routes

political elite in terms of two undesirable scenarios, in one of which the region would be transformed into a gray zone of political instability, while in the other strong anti-Russian regimes would be established. The first scenario would involve the emergence of weak states, unable to prevent the infiltration of extremist factions into their territories and possibly even serving as refuges for these factions. The Shevardnadze presidency in Georgia showed that even a country's membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States does not necessarily insure against such a prospect. The second scenario is foreshadowed in the strategies pursued by some of the new ruling elites that have emerged in Transcaucasia aimed at strengthening their own positions through risky confrontations with Russia. These strategies exploit the "imperial threat" to secure domestic political positions and, to an even greater extent, as a bargaining chip in setting the terms of integration into Europe as a corridor, a barrier, an outpost whose function is to further Russia's geopolitical isolation. The polarity of these two scenarios is relative for conservative Russian geopolitical thinking because both embody the apprehension that the southern Caucasus could turn into one of "NATO's forward lines"—either through weak territories that serve as a base for the "inevitable provocation of instability" in the North Caucasus or directly, as full member states in NATO. NATO's expansion into the Caucasus and beyond, toward Russia's "soft underbelly," is seen as providing potential military cover for future "pastel" revolutions on the regional level or even in Russia (which in the North Caucasus means another wave of "national-liberation movements" with their lists of grievances against Russia's historical role in the Caucasus and its presence there).

The formation of a political buffer preventing the development of a "crisis of loyalty" in the North Caucasus and the most dangerous manifestations of such a crisis (such as the emergence of hotbeds of Islamic extremism within North Caucasus republics) is a top priority shaping Russian policy in Transcaucasia, one that, however contradictorily, is compatible with an increased Western presence in the region. For Russia, the most desirable features of any Transcaucasian state would be stability and the empowerment of elites that take Russian interests into account and refrain from resorting to anti-Russian rhetoric for political advantage. In order for Russia to exert influence in Transcaucasia at least two things have to happen. First it must play an effective role in settling regional conflicts and be extensively involved in the most fundamental sectors of the regional economy. The dramatic turn of events in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008 represented a choice for Russia between bad and worse. Using armed force to compel Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili to stand down was preferable to losing standing (particularly domestically) as a state capable of fulfilling its military and political commitments within the region. It remains to be seen how much more stable the new political map of the Caucasus will prove to be compared with the old one, and whether it will serve as a better foundation for long-term stabilization.

Second, Russia must show that it is capable of influencing how the Transcaucasian energy corridor takes shape, both as a participant and as an agent of alternative solutions. The positive version of such influence presumes an active integration of the east-west and north-south routes to create an overall regional infrastructure in the Caucasus that would diminish the role of bloc politics. However, the dynamic of conflicts in the South Caucasus leaves rifts along the region's military and political borders and the prospects for a productive, well-integrated Caucasus rather distant.

SOURCES

Maps: 147, 153, 156, 180, 183, 185

References: Ezhiev, *Geopolitika Kaspiiskogo regiona*; Gadzhiev, *Geopolitika Kavkaza*; U.S. Energy Information Administration; Zhil'tsov, Zonn, and Ushkov, *Geopolitika Kaspiiskogo regiona*.

Maps 48–56

Conflicting Historical Visions of Homelands and Borders

The ethnopolitical conflicts that flared up in the late 1980s created a great demand for historical arguments in support of collective rights to ethnic homelands, arguments that were needed to support a new wave of claims to these lands, or at least assertions of priority. These arguments, which continue to fuel ethnopolitical conflicts throughout the Caucasus, are powered by geographies that depict "indigenous ethnic lands" as regions that have been occupied from time immemorial or during some glorious past. Ethnically centered visions of the past are often informed by contemporary anxieties and reflect actual rivalries for political power in ethnically structured societies. Under such conditions, national ideological narratives confirm or challenge the hierarchy—imagined or real—of ethnically grounded social networks and clarify for whom the land is "home" and who is there as a "guest" (or "invader"). In other words, such narratives are used to translate "history" (accounts supporting collective grievances and visions of past glory) into actual political agendas driving territorial or collective status conflicts. The contours of historical borders and ethnic areas are meant to show where a certain ethnic group (or, rather, ethnically grounded elite) is supposed to be dominant, even if this dominance is purely symbolic.

This call for the symbolic or practical restoration of historical borders often flows naturally out of an assumption of direct succession between contemporary ethnic or national communities (peoples, nations) and various ethnic, tribal, or state entities that existed in the distant past. The historical past that resides in written sources, in ancient art, architecture, and artifacts, or in language itself is given the weight almost of legal evidence. Historical narratives offer three categories of argument that feed popular constructions of the territorial rights of an ethnic group or people among its potential rivals:

- Precedence, or the Myth of Primary Acquisition: Evidence that one's own ethnic group settled a given territory before the rival group did establishes the "proper relationship" between the indigenous group and the "latecomers." Ancientness of settlement, or autochthony, endows the right to primary possession of a territory, thus neutralizing rival claims.
- Succession, or the Myth of Inheritance: There must be a determination of continuity (linguistic, cultural, political) between a contemporary ethnic or national group and illustrious forebears who ruled over the territory in question. Continuity of dominance and settlement endow "the right of inheritance."
- Justice/Injustice, or the Myth of the Legitimacy/Illegitimacy of Changes: It is important to portray undesirable alterations of historical borders or ethnic areas (the contraction of "indigenous" territories) as a violation of natural rights and a historical injustice. Positive changes (expansion of territory) are viewed as "natural" and "historically justified."

Maps 48–56 summarize certain dominant narratives found in ideological historical texts concerning the Caucasus and can be usefully studied in conjunction with maps 39 and 40. It should be noted that national narratives unfailingly vary in terms of the reliability of their sources and the level—ranging from popular to scholarly—at which they are used. Some national histories are presented in reputable works by professional historians and have been integrated into international scholarly discourse. Another type of narrative directly emerges from political conflict and is shaped by and for conflict, unconstrained by the rigors of scholarship. This type of narrative plays a role once played by departments of national propaganda and often fuels groupist obsession with the nation's glorious past or with lost opportunities for current greatness.

The graphic depictions of popular historical-territorial constructs presented here generally sidestep the task of evaluating their merits or addressing levels of historical accuracy and the degree of scholarly recognition one or another version might have attained. Their primary purpose is to reflect dominant historical-territorial narratives of ethnic representations as they appear in official interpretations, textbooks, and popular publications. These narratives also inhabit the realm of the "ethnic Internet," which has developed in recent years to provide a forum for interaction and the exchange of pertinent stories. Generally I shall avoid focusing on the mechanisms and institutions that promote these visions. What is of interest here is the content of the constructs associated with the Caucasus' current ethnopolitical conflicts. The purpose of depicting these conflicting narratives cartographically (bringing them together in a single "package") is to show the commonalities between, and relative nature of, national "historical truths" and the inevitable limitations of mutual pretensions to aboriginal territories, to say nothing of the practice of turning to history as a reservoir of legal arguments for the resolution of contemporary ethnoterritorial (in fact, political) problems.

Map 48
Azerbaijan and Azerbaijanis

Azerbaijani historical and ideological narratives are heavily influenced by the range of problems surrounding the conflict in Mountain (Nagorny) Karabakh and carry the imprint of old Armenian-Azerbaijani rivalry over a number of other Transcaucasian territories (including Zangezur, Nakhichevan, Sharur-Daralagez, and Erivan). Contemporary Azerbaijani narratives emphasize (a) the autochthony of Azerbaijanis throughout these territories; (b) the nineteenth-century Armenian immigration as confirmation of the Armenians' "outsider" status (see for example, Safarov, *Izmenenie etnicheskogo sostava*); and (c) the idea that these territories were part of an Azerbaijani state or states until they were conquered by Russia between 1803 and 1828 (see map 142 in the list of sources at the end of this volume). Linguistic features tying the ethnogenesis of modern Azerbaijanis to Turkic migrations within Transcaucasia in the eleventh through fourteenth centuries do not pose an insurmountable problem for the conceptual substantiation of Azerbaijani autochthony in the Caucasus. This evidence is

neutralized by the "Albanian theory" (Mamedova, *Kavkazskaia Albaniia i Albany*), which describes a process of cultural and demographic absorption of the local Albanian population (seen as proto-Azerbaijani and therefore representing a stage or element in the formation of the Azerbaijani people) by Turkic tribal groups during the fourth and fifth centuries. The Azerbaijani ethnic community thus arose through the assimilation of Albanians and other non-Turkic groups by Turkic groups and the incorporation of their cultural heritage and area of settlement into a system that comprises the historical cultural uniqueness and corresponding aboriginal territories of Azerbaijan (Aliev, *O nekotorykh voprosakh*; Dzhafarov, "O formirovanii azerbaidzhanskogo naroda"). A more radical "Turkic theory" rejects the thesis that Caucasian and Iranian-speaking groups were assimilated and envisions Turkic groups in Azerbaijan dating back to the first centuries C.E. (Geibullaev, *K etnogenezu azerbaidzhantsev*).

An important part of Azerbaijani historical self-conception is how Azerbaijanis define the national character of former Persian provinces (beilerbeiliks) and later of the Turkic khanates of eastern Transcaucasia, which were conquered by Russia between 1803 and 1828 (including the khanates of Kuba, Shirvan, Baku, Sheki, Erivan, Nakhichevan, Karabakh, Talysh, and Ganja). These khanates, as well as the sultanates within the borders or zone of influence of Kartli-Kakhetia (Kazakh [Qazakh], Shamshadil), were defined specifically as Azerbaijani states or portions of an Azerbaijani state (Aliev, "Azerbaidzhan v 18 veke"; see also map 141 in the list of sources). Their incorporation into Russia was viewed as the division of Azerbaijan between Russia and Persia, transforming the Azerbaijanis into a divided people (Ismailov, "Azerbaidzhan v pervoi polovine 19 veka"). At the same time, northern Azerbaijan, after it became a part of Russia, was subject to an imperial policy that strove to push out the Turkic Muslim population and encourage an influx of Armenian migrants. In particular the melikdoms of Karabakh (Qarabagh) were seen as making up fragments of Albanian state entities that had been Armenianized with help from Russia only in the nineteenth century (*Garabag: Kurekchai-200*). Historical artifacts of local Armenian culture (predating the nineteenth-century Armenian migration) across a broad swath of mixed Armenian-Turkic settlement in Transcaucasia are either denied or explained away as Albanian, linking them to the proto-Azerbaijani Caucasian-speaking population (an issue addressed by Shnirel'man, *Voiny pamiati*).

Map 49
Armenia and Armenians

The Armenian historical vision of the Caucasus (which focuses primarily on the Caucasian rim of the Armenian highlands rather than on Armenia itself) centers on the overall threat associated with the expansion of Turkic-speaking tribal groups into ancient Armenian territories, including Artsakh (Karabakh). Since the time of the Artaxiad state (the second century B.C.E.) and even earlier, the Armenian ethnic population has occupied an area that is bounded to the northeast by the Kura (Kur) River ("K osveshcheniiu problem istorii i kul'tury"; Saarian, "Granitsy Velikoi Armenii"). The Kura was also the border between Greater Armenia and historical Caucasian Albania (Armenian "Aghuank") in the time of Tigranes I (the first century B.C.E.). Beginning in the eleventh century the indigenous population of Caucasian Albania was overwhelmed by Turkic migrations, and by the nineteenth century had disappeared from the historical stage. The Udins represented the last fragments of Albania in Transcaucasia, and their disappearance shows how thoroughly the Caucasus-speaking and Christian Arran (Albania) was transformed into Turkic and Muslim Azerbaijan. The invasion of Turkic nomads beginning with the Seljuks in the eleventh century and lasting until the settlement of the Kara Koyunlu (Qara Qoyunlu) and Ak Koyunlu (Aq Qoyunlu) in the fourteenth was accompanied by the displacement of the Armenians themselves, including from their mountain districts in the Lesser Caucasus, and the destruction of many monuments of Armenian culture (Grigorian, *Ocherki istorii Siunika IX–XV vv.*). The climax of Turkic violence against Armenia in modern times was the genocide of 1915, which led to the organized destruction of Anatolian (western) Armenia and the expansion of new Turkic states on lands they occupied or controlled, including those in eastern Armenia.

The Armenians consider the 1918–1920 Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, which was created as a result of Turkish intervention, one such new political entity. The Armenian narrative emphasizes the Turkic population's ethnonymic appropriation of the name "Azerbaijan" and "Azerbaijanis" and the fact that no Azerbaijani state existed in Transcaucasia until the twentieth century (Babaian, "Nagorno-karabakhskii konflikt"). Earlier historical narratives even deny that the states of eastern Transcaucasia that were incorporated into Russia between 1803 and 1828 were Turkic (in terms of the language of the political and cultural elite). These states are portrayed as Persian provinces with a settled (native) Armenian population and a Turkic-Kurdish nomadic population that arrived later.

By and large, the incorporation of the Caucasus into Russia is viewed positively in Armenian narratives. However, the delineation of the political borders of Armenia (the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic) that took place under the Soviets in 1920–1921 (without Mountain Karabakh, Nakhichevan, Surmalu, Kars, and Ardahan) is treated as an outcome of the Soviet-Turkish division of historically Armenian territory (Barsegov, *Genotsid armian*). Armenian-Georgian rivalry over "historical rights" to Javakhetia and to a lesser extent Borchalo, as well as Ardahan and the Chorokhi (Chorukh) River basin, is also a constant theme in Armenian historical-territorial narratives and since the 1890s has been accompanied by debate over the character and locus of the Armenian people's ethnogenesis and their status as successors of the ancient states and autochthonies of Asia Minor and the Armenian highlands (Ishkhanian, *Voprosy proiskhozhdeniia*).

Map 50
Georgia and Georgians

Underlying Georgian historical narratives is a conflation of the borders of the Georgian state, as far back as the fourth through the third centuries B.C.E. and prior to the time of Queen Tamar (twelfth century C.E), with those of Georgia's ethnic frontiers. Even today a "formula predating the reign of David IV" (1073–1125) and proclaiming that "the state territory of Georgia extends 'from Nikopsia to Daruband and from Ovseti to Aregats'" is called upon in ideologically defining "the historical borders of Georgia" (Markhuliia, "'Krasnaia' i 'belaia'"). A few components of this spatial construct have enduring relevance to contemporary ethnopolitical conflict. A view of Russia as a promoter of separatism in Abkhazia and South Ossetia remains a dominant theme. The Georgian historical perspective takes a negative view of the annexation of Georgian states and territories by the Russian Empire between 1801 and 1829, an event that brought them together within the borders of a single state (Vachnadze, Guruli, and Bakhtadze, *Istoriia Gruzii*). The "bringing together" is left in the shadows, while attention is focused on Russia's role in the overall reduction of Georgian national territory. The


48 Azerbaijan and Azerbaijanis
Black Sea
Caspian Sea
Imeretia
Daghestan
Kartlia-Kakhetia
R. Ganja
Derbent Khanate
Tabasaran
Kiura
Djar-Belokan
Tlisu Sultanate
Kuba (Quba) Khanate
R. Kur
Kazakh (Qazakh) Sultanate
Shamshadil Sultanate
Sheki (Shaki) Khanate
Ganja (Gence) Khanate
Mt. Alagez
L. Gokcha
Erivan (Irevan) Khanate
Shemakha (Shamakhi) Khanate
Baku (Baki) Khanate
R. Aras
Ottoman Empire
Karabakh (Qarabagh) Khanate
Jayad Khanate
Salian Sultanate
Mt. Agridag (Ararat)
Shirvan
Nakhichevan (Nakhchivan) Khanate
Zangezur
R. Aras
Talysh Khanate
Maku Khanate
Karadag (Qaradagh) Khanate
Khoy Khanate
Tabriz Khanate
Ardabil Khanate
L. Van
Territories of (Azerbaijani) states in the second half of the 18th century
Border of the Azerbaijan Republic as of 1991
Territories of the Azerbaijan Republic not under control of its government


49 Armenia and Armenians
Greater Armenia in the 1st century C.E.
The Republic of Armenia in 1919–1920 (including parts not under its control)
Territory under the de facto control of Armenia and the Mountain Karabakh Republic as of 2012
Borders of the Republic of Armenia and Mountain Karabakh Republic as of 1991
Sarmatia
Iberia
Black Sea
Caspian Sea
Gugark
R. Kur
Albania
Roman Empire
R. Chorukh
Taik
Mt. Aragats
Utik
Airarat
L. Sevan
Artsakh
R. Eraskh
Bardzr Haik
R. Euphrates
Siunik
Paytakaran
Mt. Masis (Ararat)
R. Arax
Turuberan
Tsopk
Vaspourakan
L. Van
Aldznik
Parthian Empire

50 Georgia and Georgians



51 Abkhazia and the Abkhaz



borders of Georgia within the Russian Empire or Soviet Union were not drawn to match the "historical borders" of bygone Georgian states but enclosed a much smaller territory, leaving beyond the borders of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, for example, Saingilo, which went to Azerbaijan; Lori, which went to Armenia; and Jiketi and Dvaleti, which went to Russia itself (see map 15 of Shekiladze, *Sakartvelos Istoriuli Atlasi*, map 155 in the list of sources at the back of this volume). Moscow is also blamed for giving up Ardahan (Artaani) and Artvin to Turkey in 1921 and for creating the administrative subdivisions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Within Georgian nationalist historiography, two versions of Abkhaz history have developed. One of them portrays the Abkhaz (Apsua) as an ethnic group that emerged as a result of broad immigration by Adyghe-Cherkess peoples in the late sixteenth century into the territory of present-day Abkhazia, displacing the "autochthonous Kartvelian population" (history's "true Abkhaz"; Gamakhariia and Gogiia, *Abkhaziia—istoricheskaia oblast' Gruzii*). It has been asserted that "before the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Abkhaz, whatever their ancestry might have been, were culturally and historically Georgians" (Lordkipanidze, *Abkhazy i Abkhaziia*). Another version allowed for a "dual aboriginality" for the population of Abkhazia (Zhorzholiani et al., *Istoricheskie i politiko-pravovye aspekty konflikta v Abkhazii*), recognizing the Abasgoi and Apsilae as forebears of the Abkhaz who created their own principality in the mountains of northwestern Colchis during the first and second centuries. Some Abasgoi and Apsilae assimilated, while others crowded out the native Kartvelian population, whose ancestors, the ancient Colchians, created the first western Georgian state as early as the sixth century B.C.E., a polity that incorporated the territory of Abkhazia. Both Georgian narratives agree that, at least since this period, "the entire territory of Abkhazia has continuously been a part of a unified Georgian state or of separate Georgian political entities" (Sanadze, Beradze, and Topuriia, *Sakartvelos Istoriuli Atlasi*, map 163 in the list of sources; see also *Abkhaziia: kratkaia istoricheskaia spravka*). Beginning in the fourth century, the territory of Abkhazia was a part of Lazica (Egrisi), a "Georgian" kingdom, and, beginning in the tenth century, it became a part of a unified Georgia, affirming that the Abkhaz state has historically, culturally, and politically belonged specifically to Georgia (Lomouri, *Abkhaziia v antichnuiu i rannesrednevekovuiu epokhi*). Abkhaz autochthony legitimizes the Abkhaz claims to autonomy, but only within a Georgian state.

The case of South Ossetia is approached somewhat differently. It is presumed that the Ossetians were late arrivals into modern-day South Ossetia from the North Caucasus (the chronology ranges from the fourteenth to the nineteenth century; see (Topchishvili, *Gruzino-osetinskie etnoistoricheskie ocherki*) and therefore have no right to national autonomy within Georgia (*Osetinskii vopros*).

Map 51
Abkhazia and the Abkhaz

The Abkhaz narrative emphasizes the history of Abkhaz independent statehood and the lengthy processes by which Abkhazia was dynastically absorbed by Georgia and politically absorbed by Russia between 1810 and 1864, as well as subsequent shifts in the ethnic makeup of the population of the former Abkhaz principality resulting from military interventions and colonization (Bgazhba and Lakoba, *Istoriia Abkhazii*). The deportation of the Abkhaz in 1866–1867 and 1877–1878 paved the way for massive Kartvelian (mostly Megrelian and Svan) colonization within Abkhazia and the gradual transformation of Georgians (Kartvelians) into the dominant ethnic group there (Lakoba, "Kak zaseliali Abkhaziiu"). One aspect of this process was the Megrelization of the Abkhaz population of the southeasternmost province of Samurzakan (*Etnicheskaia revoliutsiia v Abkhazii*). The concurrent numerical increase of other ethnic groups within the territory was seen not as a threat but rather as an ethnodemographic and political counterweight to Georgian (Kartvelian) dominance. The incorporation of Abkhazia into Georgia in 1931 as an autonomous republic was followed by an organized influx of Georgians (Kartvelians) and, as a result, the emergence of the doctrine of "Georgian" autochthony in Abkhazia that was used to dispute the titular status of the Abkhaz and to claim this status for "Georgians" as the/an indigenous population.

Abkhaz historical narratives dismiss both Georgian approaches: the "extreme" theory that the Abkhaz (Apsua) arrived in Abkhazia relatively late, and the "dual aboriginality" theory that sees Abkhazia as "the ancient site of a jointly created material and spiritual culture shared by the Georgian and Abkhaz peoples" (Gunba, "Ob avtokhtonnosti abkhazov v Abkhazii"). The Georgian narrative about Colchian and Kartvelian autochthony in Colchis and Abkhazia is countered with the thesis that "Kartvelian tribes intruded into the Khatt-Abkhaz-Adyghe ethnic area" after the third and fourth millennia B.C.E. on the territory of what is now western Georgia (Lakoba, *Ocherki politicheskoi istorii Abkhazii*). It is asserted that ancient and medieval Abkhazia was a specifically Abkhaz state, the kings of which, through dynastic marriages with royal houses of Georgia, at one specific point in history united Abkhazia and Georgia into a single state (Marykhuba, *Ob abkhazakh i Abkhazii*). Georgia's long-term cultural, religious, and dynastic influence over Abkhazia allegedly paved the way for unjustified Georgian historical claims to the right to incorporate Abkhazia into the boundaries of newly formed Georgian states. This happened first in 1918–1920, again between 1921 and 1931, and finally in 1991, when newly independent Georgia was established on the territory and within the borders of the former Georgian SSR.

Map 52
Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Vainakhs

Vainakh (Chechen and Ingush) historical ideologies address various ethnic partners from among the neighbors of the Chechens and Ingush. Chechen visions of the past are predominated by the theme of eternal resistance to Russia's military and colonial expansion. The most radical accounts develop the motif of a "450-year Chechen-Russian confrontation" punctuated by periodic officially sanctioned genocides (Abumuslimov, "Rossiia i Chechnia"). All versions of the Chechen historical narrative emphasize the nineteenth-century Caucasus War and the 1944 deportation. Territorial ideologies reach back much farther in time. Vainakh narratives presume the autochthony of Nakh-speaking tribes within the area of Koban culture (twelfth to third century B.C.E.) and designates the bearers of this culture "Nakho-Koban" or "proto-Nakh." One interpretation posits the migration of Iranian-speaking nomads and the formation of a mixed Nakho-Sarmatian, Nakho-Alanian population in the Central Caucasus lowlands and the Iranization of the language of some Nakhs (beginning sometime between the fifth and seventh centuries C.E.) in the mountains (with the Kartvelization of another subset of Nakhs, the Tsanars, beginning around the same time). From this Vainakh perspective, Ossetians are Iranianized Vainakhs, Georgian mountain groups (Svans, Rachins, Mokhevs,

Khevsurs, Mtiuls, Tushins) are Kartvelianized Vainakhs, and Karachai-Balkars are Turkicized Vainakhs (Suleimanov, *My—edinyi narod*).

Between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries the area covered by the emerging Chechen people again began to include the piedmont plains. Post-Soviet Chechen narratives lay claim to the area between the Terek and Sulak Rivers extending all the way to the Caspian (Adilsultanov, *Akki i akintsy v 16–18 vekakh*), a claim "supported" in part by the existence of Chechen Island off the coast of Daghestan (Suleimanov, *Toponimiia Chechni*). (Toponyms are often both the weapons and victims of historical mythology. In this particular case, the name of Chechen Island—which, unlike the ethnic group, ends with a soft *n*—probably originates from the Turkic term *chechen* used by Russian and Tatar Volga-Caspian fishermen to denote a round enclosure for live fish woven out of sedge and willow. The island probably had nothing to do with the mountain communities that came later to bear almost the same name. Yet this "ethnic connection" was first formulated in 1772 by the German explorer Samuel Gmelin. The presumed origin of the Kabardin and Russian exonym for the Chechen people—the Turkic [Kumyk] name for one of the large villages on the banks of the Terek that was well known beginning in the eighteenth century, Chechen-aul or Reed (wattle-fenced) village [Byzov, "Toponimika Chechni"]—is also disputed in Chechen literature [Arsanukaev, *Vainakhi i alany*].)

A new account has also emerged about an "ancient Chechen presence" on the left bank of the middle and lower reaches of the Terek ("Istoriia Chechenskoi respubliki") that serves to substantiate claims to areas of the Chechen Republic and Daghestan north of the Terek, areas whose "historical ownership" is contested by Terek Cossacks. A more extreme interpretation sees "ancient Nakh settlement extending from the Kuban to the Volga" (Il'iasov, "Chechenskii teip"), and the story lines of some Chechen and Ingush historical narratives seek Nakh ethnic and cultural genealogy in ancient Hurro-Urartian (El'murzaev, "Stranitsy istorii chechenskogo gosudarstva") and Etruscan (Pliev, *Nakhskie iazyki*) civilizations.

Ingush versions of history focus on the topic of North Ossetia's Prigorodny District, which they claim as a cradle of the Ingush people. The Ingush village of Angusht (Tarskaya stanitsa from 1860 to 1920 and the village of Tarskoe since 1944), which has served as the basis for the Russian ethnonym "Ingushi" since the eighteenth century, is located within the district. Narratives supporting Ingush historical rights to the Prigorodny District, which was handed over to Ossetia when the Ingush were deported in 1944, feature an Ingush Caucasian autochthony and the relatively late arrival of an Iranian-speaking Ossetian population in the region. Within the framework of this historical opposition it is maintained that the pre-Alanian population of the Central Caucasus (the bearers of Koban culture) spoke Nakh (Akhmadov, *Istoriia Chechni*). Evidence of ancient Alanian settlements on disputed territories has forced Ingush historians to deal with the subject of Alania. The notion of Iranian-speaking Alans is denied or sublated by the idea that an Ingush ethnic element once played a dominant role in the Alanian multi-tribe union or state that predated the Mongol invasions (and extended over a territory stretching from the Laba to the Argun Rivers). The currency of this theory is reflected in the official naming of the new capital of the Republic of Ingushetia in 1998 Magas (Maghas), a semi-mythical Alanian city. An extreme version of this theory that has been deployed in Ingush and Chechen histories comes close to identifying Alania as a Vainakh state: the Alans themselves are depicted as a Nakh-speaking group (Arsanukaev, *Vainakhi i alany*; Kodzoev, *Istoriia ingushskogo naroda*). At the same time the need to explain the existence of Iranian-speaking Ossetians has prompted radical Vainakh narratives to offer a newly invented myth about the appearance of Ossetians in the Caucasus as a group of "Iranian-speaking Mazdaki Jews" that was resettled from Iran in the sixth and seventh centuries C.E. (Baksan [Bakaev], *Sled satany*).

Map 53
Ossetia and Ossetians

Ossetian historical ideologies primarily center on the idea of a direct cultural, linguistic, and, to a lesser extent, political line shared by Indo-European Iranian-speaking inhabitants of the Caucasus, extending from the Scythians, Sarmatians, and Alans to modern-day Ossetians (see map 159 in the list of sources at the back of this volume). The Iranian linguistic marker linking Ossetians and Alans is used to justify exclusive rights to the Alanian cultural and historical legacy in the face of claims by other contenders—the Turkic-speaking Karachai-Balkars and Caucasian-speaking Ingush. The addition in 1993 of the word "Alania" to the official name of the Republic of North Ossetia reflects the concern that Ossetians' cultural and historical lineage from the medieval Alans and Alania may not be enough to legitimize historical rights to the entire territory currently encompassed by the republic. The assertion of Alanian-Ossetian succession (or even equivalence) offers a way around Ingush pretensions to primacy within the Prigorodny District as well as counterarguments concerning significantly more extensive Alanian-Ossetian territories (from the Laba to the Argun Rivers).

Historical narratives equating Alania and Ossetia are used to counter theories that there was a Vainakh or Adyghe presence within what is now North Ossetia during a "pre-Ossetian" period. However, the Ossetians' claim of Alanian heritage and identification of Ossetians as Alans makes the question of whether Ossetians are autochthonic to the Caucasus even more contentious: in academic treatments Alans are described as nomads who migrated to the Caucasus no earlier than the first century C.E. There are two approaches to this issue. In the first, the classical "substratum theory" is applied (see Kuznetsov, "Iranizatsiia i tiurkizatsiia"), relying on the thesis that Ossetian ethnogenesis took place in the central Caucasus, where an Ossetian people emerged out of the assimilation of a local Caucasian-speaking (Koban) population (*Istoriia Severo-Osetinskoi ASSR*) by Iranian-speaking Scythians (beginning in the seventh century B.C.E.) and Sarmatian Alans (from the third century B.C.E. through the first century C.E. and from the fourth to sixth centuries C.E. in the mountains). The second theory—the "theory of continuity"—holds that the autochthonic ethnic substrate was Iranian-speaking and formed in the process of settlement of Scythian tribal groups within the area settled by the bearers of Koban culture during the seventh through fifth centuries B.C.E., who were also seen as Indo-Europeans (Medoiti and Chochiev, "Eshche raz o 'kavkazskom' substrate"; Isaenko and Kuchiev, "Nekotorye problemy drevnei istorii osetin"). There is also a compromise theory according to which the process of ethnic assimilation of local (Caucasian-speaking) tribes by Iranians was "largely completed" by the time the last Iranian nomadic (Alanian) wave arrived in the North Caucasus, near the beginning of the Common Era (Gagloiti, *Alany i voprosy etnogeneza osetin*).

Competing accounts of Ossetian ethnogenesis can also be seen in treatments of the "Dval problem"—determining the ethnic affiliation of the Dvals (Ossetian "Tuals"), an aboriginal


52 Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Vainakhs
Extent of Koban culture (Koban tribes) in 12th–4th centuries B.C.E.
Area settled by Nakh tribes, 1st century C.E.
Extent of the Alanian tribal union or the Alanian state, 6th–13th centuries C.E.
Nakh tribes (Kists, Durdzuks), 13th–17th centuries
Contemporary borders of Chechnya and Ingushetia
Sea of Azov
Kypchaks (11th–13th centuries)
R. Kuban
R. Laba
Kasogs
R. Kuma
R. Malka
Alans
R. Terkhi (Terek)
R. Sulak
Chechen I.
Caspian Sea
Abkhaz
Black Sea
Mt. Bashlam
Galgai
Akki
Nokhchi
Dvals
Tsanars
Batsbi
Didoi
Kartlia
Kakhetia
R. Kura
Lezgins


53 Ossetia and Ossetians
Extent of Koban culture (Koban tribes) in 12th–4th centuries B.C.E.
Area settled by Iranian-speaking nomads during the 7th–6th centuries B.C.E.
Extent of the Alanian tribal union or the Alanian state in the 6th–13th centuries C.E.
Area settled by Alans (Ossetians) after the 13th-century Mongol conquest of Alania
Area settled by Ossetians in the 17th–18th centuries
Contemporary borders of North and South Ossetia
Sea of Azov
Scythians (7th century B.C.E.)
Sarmatians (3rd century B.C.E.)
R. Kuma
R. Laba
R. Warpa
R. Wardan
Kasogs
Alans (1st century C.E.)
R. Malka
Alon
As-Digor
R. Terk
Abkhaz
Mt. Catyberzond (Walbars)
Digor
Iron
Durdzuks
R. Argun
Mt. Sanaikhokh
Caspian Sea
Black Sea
R. Kura
Kartlia

population in South Ossetia. Any given solution to this "problem" is potential fodder for substantiating or refuting the autochthony of Ossetian (Indo-European), Georgian (Ibero-Colchian), or Nakh (Caucasian) groups on a particular territory. The predominating theory in contemporary Ossetian historical ideology is that the Dvals were Iranian-speaking (based on a key thesis that an Indo-European element appeared in the southern Caucasus before an Ibero-Colchian one; see Bliev, *Iuzhnaia Osetiia*). The obvious Ossetian identity of contemporary Dvals does not resolve the problem that the boundaries of historical Dvaleti and contemporary South Ossetia do not correspond, and the etymology of Tskhinvali (which possibly comes from the Georgian *krcxilnari*, "an abundance of hornbeams") has led to a quest for alternative readings (Chochiev, *Narty-arii i ariiskaia ideologiia*).

The incorporation of Ossetia into the Russian Empire in the late eighteenth century is widely seen as a positive development, as is Ossetia's history as a part of Russia overall. Ossetians emphasize Ossetia's time within Russia as a united entity undivided by an international border, in contrast with Ossetia's current state as a divided people (Bliev and Bzarov, *Istoriia Osetii*).

Map 54

Circassia and the Adyghe

Adyghe historical narratives, while claiming a Sindi-Maeotae past and discovering a Khatt antiquity (Betrozov, *Adygi*), are built around other dominant narratives. These are associated with the direct and indirect consequences of the nineteenth-century Caucasus War: the expulsion to Turkey of 90 percent of the Adyghe population, a portion of which died in the process (Kasumov and Kasumov, *Genotsid adygov*), between 1861 and 1866, and the military (Cossack) and civilian colonization of vast territories south of the Kuban and along the Black Sea coast (*Gibel' Cherkesii*). At the same time the Cherkess see the Caucasus War as beginning specifically with the Russian conquest of Kabarda between 1763 and 1774 ("O date nachala"). Recognition of the historical fact that Cherkess suffered a national catastrophe in the 1860s is viewed as an important legal, historical, and even humanitarian resource in seeking repatriation and strengthening claims to titularity for Adyghe groups within territories where they today constitute a minority (Adyghea, Karachai-Cherkessia, Shapsugia), territories that represent only a fragment of the once vast Cherkessia that stretched from Taman to the lower reaches of the Terek (Terch) River.

Aggression by Crimean Tatars inspired a military and political union between (part of) Kabarda and the Muscovite state in the mid-sixteenth century (Dzamikhov, "Ot voenno-politicheskogo soiuza"). Some treatments of this relationship emphasize the nature of vassalage and even the voluntary entry of Kabarda into Russia (see the "classical" Soviet approach exhibited in the introduction to *Kabardino-russkie otnosheniia*). However, accounts describing the entry as voluntary probably reflect not the Adyghes' own view but accommodation to the doctrine of absorbing Caucasian peoples that prevailed during the Soviet era.

The complicated relationship that existed between Russia and Circassia during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was made more so by Russo-Turkish geopolitical rivalry. The Caucasus War and incorporation of Adyghe lands into Russia led either to their being completely taken away from the aboriginals (as was the case south of the Kuban between 1862 and 1864) or to the gradual, organized state handover of Adyghe territory to neighboring peoples. Lands to the north of the Malka (Balk) and Terek Rivers were given to Cossacks when Mozdok (1763) and the Azov-Mozdok Defensive Line (1777–1778) were still being built; significant portions of Lesser Kabarda were handed over to the Ingush and Ossetians in the nineteenth century; Pyatigorye went to Russians (Cossacks) and the upper reaches of the Kuma (Gume) to the Karachais; and the highland forest belt and pastures of Greater Kabarda went to the Balkars (*Territoriia i rasselenie*).

The fact that the Adyghe people have been divided—both politically and in terms of their ethnic identity—into Kabardins, Cherkess, Adygheans, and Shapsugs is also seen as an outcome of the nineteenth-century war that was later reinforced through the way the Soviet government divided them into the separate administrative units of Kabarda-Balkaria, Karachai-Cherkessia, Adyghea, and the Shapsug District (the latter lasting only until 1945). One feature of the Soviet approach was the creation of dual autonomies, each named for two groups, which forced Adyghe groups (Kabardins and Cherkess) to share administrative units with Turkic groups (Karachais and Balkars). Current Adyghe-Turkic rivalries over status within the two autonomies lend urgency to questions surrounding the historical demarcation of ethnic territories for each group's national ideology. Adyghe narratives tie Karachai-Balkars to Turkic migrations into Adyghe territories (either in the seventh or the twelfth–thirteenth centuries). Mountain communities formed during the process of these migrations were later "locked" in ravines by Kabardin reconquests of the plains and piedmont of the central Caucasus (fifteenth–sixteenth centuries). These mountain communities (Karachai and Balkar, as well as Ossetian and Ingush), which were vassals of Kabardin principalities in the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries, wound up incorporated into Kabarda, and the polity of the Kabardin principality took on features of a "feudal empire" (Kazharov, "K voprosu o territorii feodal'noi Kabardy"). Evidently the notion that there was an Adyghe "reconquest" of the central North Caucasian steppe between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries is an ideological reaction to a "migration theory" of the genesis of Kabarda positing that the Kabardins settled the central Caucasus relatively late (see Kuznetsov and Chechenov, *Istoriia i natsional'noe samosoznanie* on this subject).

Map 55

Karachai, Balkaria, and the Karachai-Balkars

The main themes of the Karachai-Balkar historical narrative primarily address the Adyghes and Ossetians. The need to demonstrate precedence over the Adyghes, who arrived in the "disputed territories" (essentially all of Kabarda-Balkaria and Karachai-Cherkessia) in the fifteenth century, requires the Karachai-Balkars to demonstrate their autochthony within the boundaries of their contemporary dispersal (Miziev, "Iz istorii pozemel'nykh sporov"). There are two approaches to this problem. One relies on scholarly sources (such as Gadlo, "Osnovnye etapy," and Kuznetsov, "Iranizatsiia i tiurkizatsiia") and the thesis that the ethnogenesis of the Turkic-speaking Karachai-Balkars as such took place over the course of Turkic invasions into Alania and the subsequent linguistic assimilation of the Alanian Iranian-speaking or aboriginal Caucasian-speaking population. The period during which various Turkic groups appeared in western Alania extends from the sixth to the eighth centuries (Bulgars) and to the twelfth–thirteenth centuries (Kypchaks). This is a variation of the "substratum theory" that posits that Iranian-speaking Alans served as the substrate in the ethnogenesis of the Karachai-Balkars, while the Turk-Bulgars (eighth


54 Circassia and the Adyghe
Circassia as of the early 16th century C.E.
Kabardin principalities (ca. the late 16th century) and extent of highlander communities over which they claimed suzerainty
Area populated by Circassians (Adyghe and Abaza) in the 17th–18th centuries
Abaza populated area (ca. the late 18th century)
Area currently populated by Circassians (Adyghe and Abaza)
Contemporary borders of Adyghea, Kabarda-Balkaria, and Karachai-Cherkessia
Sea of Azov
Nogai (16th century)
Taman
R. Psyzh (Kuban)
Natukhai
Bzhedug
Shapsug
Temirgoi
R. Laba
R. Urup
Abadzekh
Beslenei
Abaza
Ubykh
Sadz
R. Bzyp
Abkhaz
Black Sea
Mt. Oshkhamakho
Karachai
Lesser Abaza
R. Balk
Kaityquei (Kazi)
Kabardei
Balkars
Ossetians
Ingush
Mt. Kazbech
Imeretia
Kartlia
R. Kura
R. Tomuzlov
R. Gume
R. Terch
Talostanei
Idarei
R. Sunzha
Gylakhstanei
Chechens
Kumyks
Caspian Sea
Daghestan


55 Karachai, Balkaria, and the Karachai-Balkars
Sea of Azov
Great Bulgaria
(6th–7th centuries)
Khazar Kaganate
(7th–10th centuries)
R. Volga
R. Kuban
Circassians
Kypchaks (Cumans)
(11th–13th centuries)
R. Kuma
Caspian Sea
R. Malka
R. Terek
Karachai
Urusbi
Holam
Chegem
Bezingi
Balkar
Mt. Mingitau
Abkhaz
Svans
Ossetians
Chechens
Kumyks
Kartlia
Daghestan
R. Kura
Black Sea
Area populated by Turkic-speaking nomads and ruled by their states in the 5th–6th centuries C.E.
Areas of Alania settled by Bulgars beginning in the 7th century
Extent of the Alanian tribal union and Alanian state in the 6th–13th centuries
A
B
Areas settled by Kypchaks (Cumans) as of the 12th–13th centuries and of Karachai-Balkar (A) and Kumyk (B) ethnogenesis
Karachai and Balkar mountain communities by the 17th century
Contemporary borders of Karachai-Cherkessia and Kabarda-Balkaria

century) and later Turk-Kypchaks (twelfth century) served as the superstrate (Batchaev, "Predkavkazskie polovtsy").

However, allowing that the Alans were Iranian-speaking is an obvious shortcoming of this theory: the Ossetians could use the fact that they were Iranian-speaking as a weapon in "usurping" Alanian cultural and territorial heritage. (Contemporary Karachai has well-known monuments to the Christian culture of medieval Alania of the tenth–thirteenth centuries.) Using language to prove Karachai-Balkar autochthony comes with a migrational "flaw" and therefore is insistently replaced in Karachai-Balkar ideological narratives by a more radical theory—that the Alanian forebears of the Karachai-Balkars were in fact Turkic-speaking (Miziev, "Iz istorii pozemel'nykh sporov"). The ethnogenesis of the Karachai-Balkars is described as the process of consolidation of various waves of Turkic nomads within the boundaries of their state formations in the North Caucasus (including Great Bulgaria and Alania) and on the local proto-Turkic ethnic substrate (they are depicted as the bearers of Maikop and Koban culture). The participation of Kypchaks in this process (beginning in the twelfth century) is, on the other hand, ideologically muted as it occurred too late to support claims of autochthony. The ideological "backdating" of a Turkic presence in the central Caucasus is achieved by assigning Turkic linguistic characteristics to the entire Scythian-Sarmatian world (Laipanov and Miziev, *O proiskhozhdenii tiurkskikh narodov*), despite the fact that scholars continue to posit that Iranian was spoken in these cultures.



Map 56
Cossacks and Russians in the North Caucasus

One notable feature of historical ideological narratives in the Caucasus region is a grievance toward Russia as the historical force bearing primary responsibility for the unjust determination of borders and attribution of territories, as well as for the indelible marks left on the region by "expansionism, colonialism, Russification, Christianization, genocide, deportation" (see criticisms contained in *Rossiia i Kavkaz skvoz' dva stoletiia*). In any given group's account it is often the group's opponents in territorial conflicts who have benefited from Russian imperial actions and policies in the Caucasus. Despite the fact that Cossacks and the Russian population are generally not at the forefront of contemporary conflicts in the Caucasus, Cossacks as a group play a prominent role in the overall ideological narratives and the various explanations or criticisms of Russia's historical role in the Caucasus.

Russian and Cossack historical narratives reflect a broad spectrum of theories about the connections between these two categories and identities (Sopov, *Problemy proiskhozhdeniia*). Two opposing interpretations endure. On one side there is the "autochthonic" view of Cossacks as a separate people (distinct from Russians), while on the other there are "Great Russian" versions that present Cossacks as a special subset of a single Russian people (a subset that originally comprised runaway serfs who fled Russia, later became one of the estates into which Russian society was divided, and gradually evolved into a subethnic group). Given the contemporary situation in the Caucasus, which has pitted both Cossacks and non-Cossack Russians against the same collective opponent, it is increasingly common to see a shift toward perceiving Cossackdom as the quintessence of Russianhood and to discover a special connection between Cossacks and Russian statehood—to attribute, that is, Russia's very ability to become an empire to Cossacks, with all the current Russian connotations of this concept, from the exclusive ethnic sense to the inclusive civic and even geopolitical sense, and a vision of Cossacks as the force that created Russia from Europe and the Black Sea to the Pacific.

Ideologies that strive to defend Cossack Russian autochthony in the Caucasus, or at least the idea that the Cossacks' and Russians' history there is sufficiently long to earn them native status, are clearly a reaction to depictions of Russia in local nationalistic narratives as a colonial empire (and Slavic Cossacks as colonizers of the region). The motifs found in Cossack and Russian narratives are to some extent linked to these ethnic or territorial stories. The Terek Cossacks in particular see themselves as direct successors of the Greben and Nizovye (Lower Terek) Cossacks, who by the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were living on both sides of the lower Terek River, in the lowlands of today's Chechnya, the Grozny area, and a significant portion of what is now northern Daghestan. Emphasis is placed on the fact that Cossacks settled the piedmont plains before the Chechens arrived there in the seventeenth and eighteenth

centuries (Abakumov, "Vainakhskie gory i ariiskaia step'"; Tiuliakov, "O titul'nykh i netitul'nykh narodakh"). The departure of Cossacks from the right (south) bank of the Terek is dated to 1711, while the left bank is established as age-old Cossack lands that were taken away and given to Chechnya and Daghestan under the Soviets. The incorporation of these and a number of other areas that were or are Cossack (in terms of numerical dominance) into the ethnic republics of the North Caucasus is treated as a negative development and a factor contributing to the outcome that Cossacks were not given the status they deserved during the Soviet period and were gradually displaced from their native lands.

The ideological task of establishing overall Cossack (and Slavic) roots in the Caucasus, a task that is complicated by the problem of finding "direct proof" of autochthony, is pursued along a number of lines. It is considered important to pinpoint a few pieces of historical evidence of an ancient Russian presence in the region. One resource in this quest for evidence is the tenth–twelfth century Tmutarakan Principality, with borders, according to some accounts, that extended from Taman to the Stavropol Plateau (Tiuliakov, "O titul'nykh i netitul'nykh narodakh"), thus expanding the Russian indigenous presence beyond "the shores of the Azov and Black Seas" (Savel'ev, *Istoriia kazachestva*). Succession is established by pointing to cases of "stable inhabitation by East Slavic groups" in a number of key areas of the North Caucasus (Vinogradov, *Sredniaia Kuban'*), making them, if not autochthonic, then at least a long-established population, and turning the North Caucasus into a "territory where Cossacks originated and a place where Russian people have lived from time immemorial" (as stated in the former Charter of Krasnodar Territory in regard to Kuban). Some contemporary Cossack historiography bases its case for indigenization on the idea that Cossacks originated out of an intermingling of Slavic and Cherkess or Slavic and Turkic peoples (proponents of such theories cite the works of historians including the Russian eighteenth-century historian and statesman Vasily Tatishchev and the twentieth-century historian Lev Gumilev). This approach makes it possible to connect these theories to Caucasian narratives (Shambarov, *Kazachestvo*).

Another argument deployed to support Russian-Cossack indigenization is the large number of various peoples that, over time, have replaced one another across the vast expanse of Ciscaucasia (the North Caucasian steppe) and Kuban—an argument that indirectly works to deflect claims to sole autochthonic rights by any one of these peoples. There is an assertion of autochthony implied in efforts to substantiate that Cossacks or other Slavic groups were the first to settle and continuously inhabit an uninterrupted stretch of the "vast steppe wilderness" of the North Caucasus (see "Kratkii istoricheskii ocherk" for an example of such clichés in early sources) at a time when prestate steppe nomads, "freely wandering hordes," roamed the area. The conceit of "empty space," of an "undeveloped and uninhabited territory," is important and offers an alternative to visions of the Caucasus being "conquered" or "subjugated." The anniversaries of the founding of Russian cities and Cossack stanitsas or villages, even in the mountain and Black Sea areas of Krasnodar Territory, are often celebrated as the "beginning of history," with elements of ethnic narratives or stories from prehistory relegated to the margins (a phenomenon commented on by Achmiz, "K voprosu o date osnovaniia"). However, the key role in Cossack and Russian narratives is played by the idea that Cossacks and Russians were the foundation of state order that brought the Caucasus together into a single political entity and protected its peoples from the historical threats posed by Turkey and Persia. Cossacks and Russians enjoy a certain "political autochthony" as the historical bearers and roots of the Russian statehood that brought the peoples of the North Caucasus together, as the kernel of Russia—not as representatives of a colonial empire and "prison of peoples" but of a unified fatherland of Russians and Caucasians (Vinogradov, "'Rossiiskost'"; Matveev, *Rossiia i Severnyi Kavkaz*).

Ethnic historical ideologies, especially the subtle ideological implications that can be inferred from popular historical narratives, compel us to analyze the political values and goals being voiced by such narratives. What is the purpose of "history"? It can be used to prove the legitimacy of many peoples sharing citizenship in a common nation, one in which the categories of autochthonic and more recently arrived peoples are not a means of granting or withholding rights and privileges and serve only to shape meaningful agendas for developing culture, to devise an astute nationalities policy, and to make "intersecting" identities possible. However, what we see is often something else: newly rediscovered "history" serves as a means for revising the existing political map, justifying a status hierarchy among ethnic groups, and feeding the dangerous illusion that such a hierarchy should determine which sets of rights and life strategies people have at their disposal.

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Azerbaijan

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Armenia

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Georgia

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Abkhazia

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Chechnya and Ingushetia

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Ossetia

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Circassia

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Cossacks and Russians in the North Caucasus

Maps: 63.

References: Abakumov, "Vainakhskie gory i ariiskaia step'"; Achmiz, "K voprosu o date osnovaniia"; *Istoriia Kubani. Atlas*; Kraisvetnyi, "O roli narodov"; "Kratkii istoricheskii ocherk"; Matveev, *Rossiia i Severnyi Kavkaz*; Naidenko, "Tsentral'noe Predkavkaz'e"; *Rossiia i Kavkaz skvoz' dva stoletiia*; Savel'ev, *Istoriia kazachestva*; Shambarov, *Kazachestvo*; Sopov, *Problemy proiskhozhdeniia*; Tiuliakov, "O titul'nykh i netitul'nykh narodakh"; Vinogradov, "'Rossiiskost'"; Vinogradov, *Srednniaia Kuban'*.

Map 57

2014: The Political and Administrative Map of the Caucasus

With the dawn of a new millennium, the Caucasus region appeared to be overcoming the violent conflicts of the 1990s and entering a relatively stable period. In Russia the restoration of effective institutions of central government, economic growth, and the success of efforts to strengthen the federation seemed to have reversed the tide of secessionism that had existed during the 1990s in its North Caucasian periphery. By 2002 the military threat posed by an expanding violent secessionist movement and its potential nucleus within the Chechen Republic had been eliminated. The Chechen (or, more broadly, North Caucasian) separatists were defeated by Russian federal forces and compelled to abandon their pretensions to independent statehood and become a purely terrorist underground. Throughout the federation, mechanisms for the effective exercise of control over regional governments were coupled with successful efforts to win the loyalty of local elites and bring their political and cultural strategies into the system.

However, by the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century it had become apparent that fundamental problems in the North Caucasus persisted. The enhanced top-down governmental power structure that came with the abolition of regional gubernatorial elections (after the attack on Beslan by terrorists in 2004) and the elimination of militant separatism from the public policy agenda were not accompanied by needed political modernization or the development of institutions of civil society. Depressed economies in the republics and the vulnerability of regional regimes, which appeared increasingly alienated from the population, contributed to a growing apathy and created conditions ripe for the possible resurgence of radical political and religious groups and ideologies favoring renewal outside Russia. Such ideologies fed on social stratification and widespread grievances toward government incompetence and the corruption of regional elites, who now enjoyed a measure of security within the Russian Federation's restored hierarchy of power.

Certain cultural dimensions of local communities, which tend to be pervaded by dense webs of clan allegiances, play a part in the crises still afflicting the North Caucasus. Rather than promoting positive social dynamics and economic growth, social networks increasingly impede them, leaving channels for upward mobility critically dependent on ethnic and clan nepotism. These channels are further corrupted by the intertwining of government and economic opportunity. Many sectors of local economies remain factually monopolized or "closed": only businesses informally affiliated with the government are able to survive. Broad social networks that had once served as valuable resources increasingly take the form of patron-client pyramids, inevitably leading to mass frustration throughout the very societies that shaped these changes, and spurring both critical civic reflection and new waves of political radicalism in the region.

Although this problem is largely home-grown, the federal authorities are increasingly seen as protecting the system by essentially depriving the populace of crucial means of electorally influencing who holds the reins of local power. Electoral mechanisms were evidently perceived by the federal authorities as fraught with risk: they offered a potential vehicle for undesirable ethnic and interclan conflict and they might be vulnerable to manipulation by criminal groups wishing to attain power. But instead of taking political and legal measures to neutralize these risks, the federal authorities simply weakened the electoral system, thereby removing a vital political catalyst in the development of civic institutions capable of offering an alternative to the region's long-familiar ethnocentrism or to the more recent scourge of religious radicalism.

It is noteworthy that secessionist and Islamist ideologies in the North Caucasus have taken on the rhetoric of class and begun to target niches of social dissatisfaction. In Muslim republics the growing estrangement between wide strata of the population and the regional authorities (as well as the narrow groups of "insiders" that control property and resources) is beginning to take on an aura of religious antagonism and be perceived as a confrontation between Muslims and government cliques serving the "infidels." Islamism has not displaced the previous ethnic focus in separatist ideologies; rather it has appropriated the old repertoire of "historic grievances" toward Russia and recast them in more radical and doctrinaire terms.

These threats in the region are developing within an inauspicious context. Among the ethnic majority of Russia proper a mood of fear and anxiety with regard to the Caucasus is developing. The combination of acute stratification and the collapse of social expectations over the course of the past decade has coincided with the emergence of a visible migrant minority presence and certain societal stresses, including terrorism. All of this has spurred ethnophobia and alienation, the main targets of which have been specifically Caucasian minorities—both citizens of the Russian Federation from the northern Caucasus and others from the countries of the southern Caucasus. This focusing of fear and anxiety on a specific region is accelerating a tendency that has been long present in the Russian political consciousness: for almost twenty years now an ideology of isolationism in regard to the non-Russian ethnic periphery has taken the place of both the old Russian great-power philosophy, in which non-Russian neighbors were seen as potential wards, and the Soviet policy of integrating ethnic minorities into a common socialist nation led by the Russian people. What was once seen as a prized frontier is now beginning to look to many Russians like a burden on the country and the source of unnecessary problems.

For the time being the Russian public's isolationist mood in regard to the North Caucasus is not being widely reflected in the doctrines and programs promulgated by Russia's political elite. Yet such doctrinaire perspectives are already becoming evident. Today, the "Caucasus question" has again brought the issues of the country's identificational foundations and the "boundaries of Russianness" to the forefront. A standoff is looming between etatist tradition (in which Russia was a multinational empire) and its contemporary liberal rival (in which Russia is a political

2014: The Political and Administrative Map of the Caucasus

Numerical Key

1. Republic of Adyghea
2. Republic of North Ossetia-Alania
3. Republic of Ingushetia
4. Mountain Karabakh (Artsakh) Republic (MKR), including de facto:
   4a. Territory of the former Mountain Karabakh Autonomous Province (MKAP)
   4b. Territory of Azerbaijan under MKR control since the end of the 1991-1994 war
5. Territory of the former MKAP that has remained under the control of the government of Azerbaijan
6. Shahumyan District and Getashen Subdistrict claimed by MKR and controlled by Azerbaijan
7. Territory of Azerbaijan annexed by Armenia
8. Territory of Armenia annexed by Azerbaijan

* The republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia de facto seceded from Georgia (in 1991-1992) and have limited international recognition as independent countries (beginning 2008)
** The Mountain Karabakh Republic de facto seceded from Azerbaijan (in 1991) and remains an unrecognized state (as of 2014)

0 50 100 km

International boundaries
Boundaries of territories with contested international status
Administrative boundaries
De facto boundary between the Republic of Ingushetia and Chechen Republic (still not officially determined as of December 2013)

Russian Federation

Azerbaijan Republic

Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic

Republic of Armenia

Georgia

Autonomous Republic of Ajaria

Republic of Abkhazia

Republic of South Ossetia

Mountain Karabakh Republic

Flags of the regions of the Russian Federation (shown on the map)

Administrative Units of the Southern Federal District*

Republic of Adyghea
Krasnodar Territory
Republic of Kalmykia
Rostov Province

Administrative Units of the North Caucasus Federal District (est. Jan. 2010)

Republic of Ingushetia
Republic of North Ossetia-Alania
Kabardin-Balkar Republic
Stavropol Territory
Republic of Daghestan
Chechen Republic
Karachai-Cherkess Republic

*The Southern Federal District also includes Astrakhan and Volgograd Provinces

multi-ethnic nation of co-citizens) on the one hand and, on the other, Russian ethnocentrism, whose proponents feel that insufficient priority is given to the culture and goals of ethnic Russians. This rejectionist ethnocentrism represents no less a threat to the country's unity than do the North Caucasus' political or quasi-religious radicals who have long provoked it.

Today the ethnic minorities of the North Caucasus see the choice to remain part of Russia as having more to do with political and economic pragmatism than with civic solidarity and national identity. Yet this pragmatism could be effectively converted into a Russian civic identity if such an identity were cultivated through the implementation of a consistent strategy by political parties, civic associations, and educational and informational programs. Such an approach could halt the country's identificational fragmentation. But without civil society, a strong, hierarchical authority is not enough to achieve this goal. The failure of this hierarchy of authority to fully stabilize the North Caucasus after 2004 prompted some organizational changes, whose consequences are far from clear. In January 2010 the North Caucasus Federal District was created. This move delineated the area as being of particular federal concern (and the target of special programs) but also drew an administrative dividing line between two parts of the Russian North Caucasus—the more prosperous, predominantly ethnically Russian, and less troubled northern portion and the less stable ethnic republics to the south. In the North Caucasus the contours of the inner border of bygone days again seem to be delineating an "internal abroad" within the Russian Federation. There is a danger that this inner border could severely undermine the country's common cultural and identificational foundations, its informational and educational institutions, and, in the final analysis, its institutions of statehood.

The southern Caucasus also began the new millennium with a phase of relative yet imperfect stability. The political culture of each country is reflected in the approach to the rotation of authority it adopted, from an almost dynastic system of political succession (Azerbaijan) to the practices of illiberal if not failed democracies (Georgia and Armenia). It is clear that the sociocultural fabric of the nations of the southern Caucasus is woven from the same patron-client hierarchies as in the North Caucasus (with all the attendant challenges for political and economic reforms). Nevertheless, the three countries of post-Soviet Transcaucasia have by and large successfully overcome the risks inherent in the vulnerable period of post-Soviet administrative and economic transformation. Their journey toward administrative and procedural stability is not yet over; their elites are still plagued by conflict that hinders the adoption of constructive foreign policy strategies capable of addressing regional ethnopolitical conflicts.

The nations of the Caucasus were achieving statehood at a time when the doctrine and practice of nation-building was in a state of flux. The ethnocentric mood that swept the region after the Soviet Union's collapse proved fatal to Georgia's and Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. And today it seems that ethnopolitical secessionist conflicts within their nominal borders, particularly those that had gone through a stage of military estrangement and ethnic expulsions, cannot be settled even under circumstances of the "broadest possible autonomy" granted by former parent states. These states themselves are perceived by alienated minorities as the institution of "rival" ethnic groups. The prospects that a breakaway territory will be peacefully reintegrated into the former parent state are greatly improved if both are entering—on a parallel, nonsubordinate basis—into a political association of a higher order, not a nation-state (which is predominantly interpreted within the Caucasus as an "ethnic" polity). This is why scholars, diplomats, and think tanks have been actively developing the ideas of a "common state" (*obshchee gosudarstvo*), "associated states," and the like in an attempt to find a conceptual compromise between principles of "territorial integrity" and "the right to self-determination," or, more to the point, between the principle of integrity and de facto self-determination.

It is indicative that Georgia's movement in the second half of the 1990s toward a federative state (implicit in the new administrative division of the country) did nothing to improve the chances that its former autonomies would become members of this federation. In their eyes, the lip service Georgia paid to federalism was just that. Apprehensions that Georgian authorities were indeed pursuing the goal of unitary statehood appeared to be supported when Ajaria was essentially deprived of its autonomy after Georgian sovereignty was fully restored there in 2004. Finally, in an effort to reverse the situation that existed between 1994 and 2003, when Abkhazia and South Ossetia became essentially Russian protectorates, Georgia resorted to force in reintegrating its former autonomies and lost.

It is unclear how long the new (post- 2008) "cool down" phase will last or what changes may be in store for the political map of a divided Caucasus. Whatever scenarios unfold will be shaped by the interplay between local rivalries (and cooperation), both on the level of ethnic elites and nation-states, and rivalries (and cooperation) among leading world powers. These scenarios depend on what the various geopolitical perspectives and forces have to offer local political communities, what niches will look most appealing in the search for Caucasian identities, what political, economic, and life strategies best fit these niches. But whatever scenarios do play out will directly derive from these local strategies, which will either calm or exacerbate confrontations among world powers. The South Ossetian–Georgian war of 2008 has shown the decisive role local political actors can play in plunging the Caucasus into a new phase of instability.

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Maps: 150, 154, 162, 171, 172, 181, 185.

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Appendix 1

The Area and Population of Administrative Units and States of the Caucasus Region[1]

1763–1801 (MAPS 3 AND 5) Area in Square Versts/Population	**1801–1829 (MAP 6)** Area in Square Versts/Population
Caucasus Viceroyalty Established 1785, centered in Yekaterinograd, comprised of two provinces, Astrakhan and Caucasus. Population, 381,000.[2] **Caucasus Province** (1789) > 56,000 males[3] (of which 10,118 were Cossacks).[4] Male population by district (uezd):[5] Yekaterinograd 8,366; Aleksandrov 7,235; Georgievsk 5,735; Mozdok 4,113; Stavropol 7,401; Kizlyar 23,155 (of which there were 20,112 Nogai and Turkmen males). Caucasus Province was abolished in 1790 and the center of the viceroyalty was moved to Astrakhan. **Caucasus Viceroyalty** (1794) no data/496,000; (1796) 297,000/694,460.[6] In 1796 the Caucasus Viceroyalty was abolished and its territory became Astrakhan Province.	**Caucasus Province** Reestablished 1802 out of five districts of Astrakhan Province, centered in Georgievsk, and put under the dual administration of the central imperial authorities in St. Petersburg and the commander-in-chief of Russian forces headquartered in Tiflis.[7] (1803) 85,000/122,400–126,712[8] Population in districts (uezds): Aleksandrov 14,262; Georgievsk 20,925; Mozdok 7,754; Stavropol 32,405; Kizlyar 19,464. Provincial population subtotals: Cossacks of the Caucasus Line 31,902 (in 1803);[9] Civilians 94,810 (including approximately 48,350 Nogai and Turkmen nomads). The province's nomadic Kalmyks were counted as part of Astrakhan Province until 1860.
Kuban Horde (part of Khanate of Crimea; territory annexed 1783) (1783) Nogai more than 56,000[10] Territory successively part of: (a) Taurida Province (Fanagoria Uezd) 1784–1790;(b) Caucasus Viceroyalty 1790–1796;(c) Novorossiisk Province (part of Rostov Uezd) 1796–1802; (d) Taurida Province (Tmutarakan Uezd) 1802–1820. **Black Sea Host Territory** beginning in 1792[11] (1793) 27,807–30,691[12]/25,000[13] (1801) 28,000/32,634[14] Households by district:[15] Yekaterinodar District 991 in 17 villages; Yeysk 285 in 6 villages; Beisug 427 in 10 villages; Taman (Fanagoria) District 155 in 3 villages plus the town of Taman; Grigorievsky 295 in 6 villages; town of Yekaterinodar 600 households.	**Black Sea Host Territory** (1814) 28,000/61,593[16] (1821) 28,000/72,361[17]; District (okrug) totals:[18] Yekaterinodar 26,259; Yeysk 19,462; Beisug 20,105; Taman 6,535. (1825) 28,000–33,044/105,639[19]

<table>
<tr><td>Kingdom of Kartli-Kakhetia, annexed 1801
Georgian Province, beginning 1801
(1801) no data/300,000[20]
(a) Districts (uezds) in Kartlia: Gori,[21] Dushet, Somkhetia (or Lori),[22] 4 Tatar subdistricts (distantsias): Borchalo, Kazakh, Shamshadil, Pambak;
(b) Districts (uezds) in Kakhetia: Telav, Signakh</td><td rowspan="2">Georgian Province
(1804) no data/300,000[23]
(1806) 82,430/153,572–516,400?;[24] District (uezd) totals: Tiflis (with former Lori) 8,781; Gori 33,371; Ananur (former Dushet) 12,677;[25] Telav 30,406;[26] Signakh 31,998. Tatar subdistricts (distantsias): Borchalo 8,559; Kazakh 16,579; Shamshadil 6,040; Pambak 5,161; Elisabethpol District (est.1806) 7,000 households.
Georgian Province (1823) population 250,000[27]
Imeretia (1823) 9,200?/35,000 households
Megrelia (1823) 5,600?/20,000 households</td></tr>
<tr><td>Territories under Ottoman Suzerainty
Including nominally as of 1801: Kingdom of Imeretia, Principalities of Guria, Megrelia, Abkhazia. Circassian and Abazin lands/communities south and west of Kuban River were also under nominal Ottoman suzerainty.</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Territories under Persian Suzerainty
Including nominally as of 1801: Khanates of Quba (Kuba), Derbent, Baku, Shirvan (with the Salian Sultanate), Sheki, Karabakh, Ganja,Talysh, Erivan and Nakhichevan (with Ordubad).</td><td>Between 1805 and 1813 the following khanates in former Persian territories (Muslim Provinces)[28] were incorporated into Russia: Karabakh (5,000 households);[29] Sheki, or Nukha (20,000 households); Shirvan, or Shamakhi (25,000 households) ; Salian Sultanate (2,000 households); Baku (1,000 households); Kuba (7,964 households). In 1806–1826 khanates were abolished and transformed into provinces (provintsias).
(1829) Derbent Province 5,541 households; Kaitag Province 10,455 households;[30] Tabasaran 1,252 households.[31]</td></tr>
<tr><td>Persian territories until 1828
Erivan Khanate (1823) 18,000 households; Nakhichevan Khanate (1823) 12,000 households</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Independent Highlander Territories (Circassia, significant parts of Chechnya and Daghestan).
No data.</td></tr>
</table>

Dependent Highlander Territories As of 1801 claimed by Russia but not under its stable control, including Kabarda (Kabardin Pristavstvo established 1769),[32] Shamkhalate of Tarki, principalities of Aksai, Kostek, Enderi, Braguny. In 1770, some Ingush and, in 1774, some Ossetian communities adopted Russian suzerainty.[33]	**Dependent Highlander Territories** As of late 1829 claimed by Russia but not always under its stable control, including Kabarda, Balkaria;[34] Karachai;[35] Digoria;[36] three Ossetian communities (Alagir, Kurtat, and Tagaur);[37] Ingush communities between the Terek and Sunzha;[38] Terek Chechens[39] and Braguny; the Shamkhalate of Tarki; Aksai, Kostek and Enderi;[40] the Avar Khanate;[41] the Kazi-Kumukh Khanate.[42]

1829–1839 (MAP 7)[43] Area in Square Versts/Population	**1840–1845 (MAP 8)**[44] Area in Square Versts/Population
Caucasus Province (1831) approximately 97,630/122,500–140,902 Including Nogai lands, 27,177 square versts. In 1832, the Caucasus Line Cossack Host (Kavkazskoe Lineinoe Kazachye Voisko, KLKV) was established out of "Cossacks settled along the Caucasus Line":[45] 32,800 males (as of 1832), 53,035 males (as of 1833), and 67,645 males (as of 1836).[46] **Caucasus Province** (1839) approximately 97,630/365,000, of which KLKV Cossacks of both sexes numbered approximately 147,700.	Caucasus Viceroyalty restored in 1844 and centered in Tiflis **Caucasus Province** (1842) approximately 97,630/population between 194,693 (males) and 403,813 (both sexes).[47] Male population by district (okrug):[48] Stavropol 97,936; Kizlyar 31,850; Mozdok 20,559; Pyatigorsk 44,348. **Caucasus Province** (1845) 94,707/402,300,[49] including the Caucasus Line Cossack Host 34,830/172,895.[50]
Black Sea Host (1829) 28,000–33,944[51]/approximately 110,000?	**Black Sea Host** (1842) 28,000/120,585[52] Population by district (okrug): Yekaterinodar 48,230; Yeysk 24,716; Beisug 37,712;[53] Taman 9,906 **Black Sea Host** (1845) 33,522/124,100[54]
Highlander Territories (as of 1833) and the **Military Administration of the Caucasus Defensive Line**[55] (a) Population of unsubdued Circassia approximately 610,000; Chechen communities 205,000;[56] communities of Daghestan[57] 216,500; (b) Population of lands under the control of the Russian military administration: Nogai south of Kuban 16,000; Greater Kabarda[58] and Lesser Kabarda 36,000; Karachai 8,800; Ossetian Communities 22,500;[59] Chechen (Ingush) communities of Nazran and Galashi 13,000;[60] Kumyks of Aksai, Kostek, and Enderi 38,000;[61] other Daghestani territories under Military Administration beginning 1824 (see below).	

Georgian Province (1835) 40,000–46,600/311,000–387,500 (216,295)[62] By district: (a) Georgia under civilian administration, 6 districts (uezds): Tiflis 800–1,375/42,000[63] (19,246); Dushet 1,780–2,300/20,000 (14,862); Gori 4,000–5,280/48,000 (31,225) with Ossetian pristavstvos 1,900/15,500 (9,100);[64] Telav 2,000–4,000/47,000 (31,817); Signakh 4,000–5,600[65]/45,000 (31,217); Elisabethpol 3,000–5,000/41,000 (12,541); (b) Highlander districts (distantsias): Gorskaya (Mtiuletian) 1,600–2,000/8,000 (7,156); Pshaveti-Khevsuretian 2,600/10,780 (3,526); Tushetian 1,120/5,720 (2,401); (c) Tatar districts (distantsias): Kazakh 2,800–3,200/35,500 (17,632); Shamshadil 3,200–4,200/22,000 (10,888); Borchalo 3,000–8,000/25,000 (13,549); Pambak-Shuragel 2,800–8,440/22,000 (16,628).[66]	In 1840 Georgian and Imeretian Provinces (gubernias), and Armenian and Akhaltsikh Provinces (oblasts) merged into Georgian-Imeretian Province (gubernia). **Georgian-Imeretian Province** (1843) >84,300/762,177–979,021,[67] including 11 districts (uezds): Tiflis (which absorbed Borchalo District); Gori (including Ossetian pristavstvos,[68] which became a separate district in 1842); Telav (with pristavstvo of Tushetia and Pshav-Khevsuretia, which was made into a separate district in 1842); Kutais (comprising the abolished Imeretian Province); Guria (comprising the abolished Gurian Province); Elisabethpol (absorbed Kazakh and Shamshadil Districts); Alexandropol (comprising Pambak-Shuragel District); Erivan; Nakhichevan; Belokan (comprising the abolished Djar-Belokan Province), Akhaltsikh (comprising the abolished Akhaltsikh Province).
Imeretian Province (1835) 9,200/64,000–128,750 (71,014) [69]	
Guria Province 1,736–2,500/24,000–36,700 (31,067)	
Principality of Megrelia 5,320–8,000[70]/68,600–125,000 (61,600)[71]	**Principality of Megrelia** 5,550/108,000 **Pristavstvo of Samurzakan** 1,290/16,000–18,000
Svanetia 2,380–3,500[72]/15,000–30,000[73]	**Principality of Svanetia** 2,380/8,000–12,000
Principality of Abkhazia (1835) 5,000–6,000/52,300 (45,100)[74]	**Principality of Abkhazia** 6,000/65,000–68,000
Akhaltsikh Province (1835) 4,800–7,800/38,000–70,000[75] (17,463)	
Armenian Province (1835) 23,100–24,000/132,000–164,631[76] Armenian Province (oblast) consisted of 2 provinces (provintsias): Erivan 13,114–14,600/113,000–115,155 (65,298); Nakhichevan 5,300–8,500/30,507 (16,095), and Ordubad District 1,200/10,975 (3,160)	

Military District of Muslim Provinces (Voenny Okrug Musulmanskikh Provintsii) (1835) 34,500/250,000–359,000, including: Karabakh Province 15,925–18,300/104,520 (54,581); Sheki Province 5,700–9,000/98,500 (55,723); Shirvan Province 10,500–14,500/124,600 (69,627); Talysh Province 5,000–10,000/8,900–30,000 (22,750)[77]	In 1840, the Military District of Muslim Provinces and parts of Daghestan (Derbent, Kuba, and Baku) comprised Caspian Province (Kaspiiskaya Oblast), centered in Shemakha. **Caspian Province (Kaspiiskaya Oblast)** (1843) 69,700/504,370–573,197,[78] including 7 districts (uezds): Shirvan (former Shirvan Province), renamed Shemakha District in 1846; Sheki (former Sheki Province), renamed Nukha District; Karabakh (former Karabakh Province), renamed Shusha District in 1841; Talysh (former Talysh Province), renamed Lenkoran District in 1841; Baku (former Baku Province); Derbent (former Derbent District, Kara-Kaitag, and Tabasaran); Kuba (former Kuba Province and Samur District).[79] In 1844, nominally established Dargin Pristavstvo was added to the province.[80] In 1846, Caspian Province (oblast) was divided into Derbent Province (gubernia) and Shemakha Province (gubernia). Beginning in 1847, Derbent Province, the Tarki Shamkhalate, and the Khanate of Mekhtuli were combined into Caspian Territory (Prikaspiisky Krai), centered in Derbent.
Daghestan Military District (Voenny Okrug Dagestanskikh Provintsii)[81] (1835) 28,000/252,000, including: Tarki Shamkhalate 4,700/35,000–50,000;[82] Mekhtuli Khanate 2,000/9,000; Khanate of Kiura and Kazi-Kumukh 2,500/11,000–30,000?; Derbent Province 680–3,600/11,100 (6,599)–60,400;[83] Kaitag Province 3,000/(36,200);[84] Tabasaran Province 2,000/10,000 (7,000);[85]Kuba Province 10,000–10,500/95,200–104,000 (46,094);[86] Baku Province 2,200–3,500/17,600–31,328 (15,428); Avar Khanate 6,000/31,600[87]	
Djar-Belokan Province (1835) 5,500–6,100/58,000–67,680 (46,680), including: Djar-Belokan communities 4,000/40,000; Ilisu Sultanate 1,500–2,100/18,000	

1846–1856 (MAP 8)[88] Area in Square Versts/Population	**1856–1859 (MAP 9)** [89] Area in Square Versts/Population
Stavropol Province (1851) 97,630/535,447,[90] including the Caucasus Line Cossack Host 37,646/213,866[91] (the population of the KLKV, including stanitsas outside the province, totaled 254,415 in 1851).[92] Civilian population in districts (uezds): Stavropol 126,737 (nomads 7,565); Kizlyar 62,471 (nomads 27,524); Pyatigorsk 91,824 (nomads 10,704).[93] Pristavstvos of nomadic peoples: Kalaus-Jambulak 1,835/14,538; Kalaus-Sablia and Beshtau-Kuma 3,610/12,245; Achikulak-Jambulak 2,410/8,950; Karanogai-Yedishkul and Turkmen (Trukhmen) 7,200/38,450; Kalmyk lands 21,440[94]/4,700.	**Stavropol Province** (1858) 91,047/604,125. Districts (uezds): Stavropol 31,198/325,695; Kizlyar 26,268/83,155; Pyatigorsk 33,582/153,467. According to data for 1858, 231,311 KLKV Cossacks resided within Stavropol Province while 98,845 lived in highlander territories outside the province.[95] Nomads within the province totaled 90,958.[96]

Black Sea Host (1851) 27,807–33,522/156,745 District (okrug) totals: Yekaterinodar 8,797/51,164; Yeysk 10,924/52,728; Taman 8,086/52,853	**Black Sea Host** (1858) 27,354/202,493 (to Right Wing of the Caucasus Defensive Line, 1856) District (okrug) totals: Yekaterinodar 8,797/63,617; Yeysk 10,744/78,657; Taman 7,813/60,219
Black Sea Coast Defensive Line (1851) 9,376[97]	Black Sea Coast Defensive Line abolished in 1854.
Highlander Territories and **Military Administration of the Caucasus Defensive Line** (1858):[98] 89,955/ > 800,000 (a) Right Wing, including: Land of Kuban Nogai (Zemlia zakubanskikh nogaitsev) 12,261; Land of Kuban Highlanders (Zemlia zakubanskikh gortsev), 34,043;[99] Karachai, 3,220.[100] (b) Left Wing: Greater Kabarda 9,978 (Kabardin District, beginning 1857);[101] Vladikavkaz District 7,162 (became Ossetian Military District in 1857 and included Lesser Kabarda, 1,145);[102] Chechnya 4,892 (became Chechen District in1857); Land of Kumyks (became Kumyk District in 1857) 7,169.[103] (c) Daghestan territories 9,787 (incorporated into Caspian Territory after the war ended in 1859).[104]	
Tiflis Province (1852) 41,673/560,455[105] City of Tiflis 48,221. District (uezd) totals: Tiflis 95,330; Gori 59,712; Telav 49,526; Signakh 70,124; Elisabethpol 108,275. Highlander district (okrug) totals: Gorsky 23,147; Ossetian 21,259; Tusheti-Pshaveti-Khevsuretian 15,719; Belokan 69,142.[106]	**Tiflis Province** (1858) 46,880/647,125 District (uezd) totals: Tiflis 8,605/166,395; Telav 2,668/39,801; Signakh 4,075/77,797; Gori District 4,704/81,853; Elisabethpol 12,739/119,895. Highlander district (okrug) totals: Ossetian 1,860/23,560;[107] Mtiuletian (Gorsky) 3,713/23,819; Tusheti-Pshaveti-Khevsuretian (renamed Tionety District in 1858) 3,932/21,095; Belokan District 4,584/92,910.[108]
Kutais Province (1853) 10,827?/324,320 District (uezd) totals: Kutais 93,545; Akhaltsikh 57,954; Ozurgety (former Guria) 52,293; Racha 42,412; Shorapan 78,116.	**Kutais Territory (Kutaisskoe General-Governorate [Gubernatorstvo])** (1858) 32,642/641,791,[109] including: (a) Kutais Province 16,134/354,846 By district (uezd): Kutais 3,775/97,630; Akhaltsikh 4,879/79,563; Ozurgety 1,935/54,257; Racha 2,652/43,992; Shorapan 2,894/79,404. (b) Other territories: Principality of Megrelia 5,899/183,960; Pristavstvo of Svanetia 2,209/6,044; Pristavsto of Samurzakan 1,373/20,666; Principality of Abkhazia 3,220/66,275; Pristavstvo of Tsebelda 2,348/9,200; Pskhu Community 1,458/800.
Principality of Megrelia 5,550/155,000[110] **Principality of Svanetia** 2,380/12,000 **Samurzakan Pristavstvo** 1,290/16,000 **Principality of Abkhazia** 6,000/70,000 (including Tsebelda 8,000).	

Shemakha Province (1851) 47,300–49,790/603,006[111] District (uezd) totals : Shemakha 156,019; Nukha 123,990; Baku 42,075; Shusha 198,160; Lenkoran 81,212.	**Shemakha Province** (1858) 49,860/633,886 District (uezd) totals: Shemakha 10,817/161,496; Shusha 19,866/195,299; Nukha (Sheki) 6,486/143,420; Baku 1,447/45,491; Lenkoran 11,244/88,180.
Erivan Province[112] (1853) 26,450/238,257–294,322[113] District (uezd) totals: Erivan 9,460/114,100; Alexandropol 4,120/51,000; Nakhichevan 4,680/25,000; Novy Bayazet 5,300/32,000; Ordubat 2,890/16,157.	**Erivan Province** (1858) 26,563/257,106[114] District (uezd) totals: Erivan and Echmiadzin 10,017/94,705; Alexandropol 4,401/54,596; Nakhichevan 4,982/36,130; Novy Bayazet 5,441/44,457; Ordubat 2,874/27,218.
Caspian Territory (Prikaspiisky Krai) (1853) >24,900/469,221–487,809, including: (a) **Derbent Province** 19,923/424,531–453,284, including: Derbent City no data/12,213; Derbent District 1,226/51,484; Kuba City no data/8,430; Kuba District 7,859/104,587; Samur District 3,063/30,386–57,168; Dargin District no data/136,381; Kiura Khanate 2,112/15,000–25,427; Kazi-Kumukh Khanate 1,794/15,000–39,493; Sirgha community no data/16,130. (b) Tarki Shamkhalate 4,555/27,155;[115] Mekhtuli Khanate 419/11,825;[116] seven separate settlements no data/5,710.[117]	**Caspian Territory (Prikaspiisky Krai) (1858)** (a) **Derbent Province** 23,754/513,925, including: Derbent District 1,226/67,142; Dargin District and Tabasaran 3,455/161,020; Samur District 2,150/60,970; Kazi-Kumukh Khanate 1,794/32,319; Kiura Khanate 2,112/27,169; Kuba District 7,906. (b) Tarki Shamkhalate 4,681/30,885; Mekhtuli Khanate 431/15,066. (c) Daghestan territories south and east of Andi Koisu and Sulak Rivers 9,787.

1860–1864 (MAP 10)[118] Area in Square Versts/Population	**1865–1870 (MAP 11)**[119] Area in Square Versts/Population
Stavropol Province (1860) 65,600/359,172[120] District (uezd) totals: Stavropol 18,192/148,452; Pyatigorsk 29,785/136,586; Kizlyar 17,622/74,134. Lands of nomadic peoples (1865):[121] Greater Derbet and Turkmen 13,185 sq. versts; Karanogai-Edishkul and Achikulak-Jambulak 13,880 sq. versts (total for nomadic *inorodtsy* 78,571).	**Stavropol Province** (1871) 62,299/437,118 District (uezd) totals: Stavropol 13,231/180,346; Pyatigorsk 10,357/89,708; Novogrigorievsky 11,647/82,732; nomadic lands: 27,065/84,322. Population in pristavstvos: Greater Derbet Ulus 6,827; Karanogai 34,426; Achikulak 22,572;[122] Turkmen 14,671.

Kuban Province (1860) 89,258/1,089,089,[123] including: (a) Former Black Sea Host territories by district (okrug): Yekaterinodar 8,797/65,267; Yeysk 10,924/78,635; Taman 8,086/61,368. (b) Four brigades of the former KLKV north and east of the Kuban River 14,932/129,214.[124] (c) Two brigades of the former KLKV south of the Kuban River (in Zakubanye [beyond the Kuban]) 20,856/65,012.[125] (d) Highlander lands under Russian administration (1860) 13,634/239,593. Population of territory by pristavstvo: (former) Lower Kuban (Nizhne-Prikubanskoe) 979;[126] Kuban Nogai 1,938;[127] Tokhtamysh 1,983;[128] Karachai 2,979;[129] Natukhai 2,667;[130] Bzhedug 3,085.[131] **Highlander lands and population not under Russian administration** (1860) 12,024/about 450,000. Highlander lands under Russian administration (1863) 10,943/91,136[132]–132,766,[133] including Lower Kuban (Nizhne-Kubanskoe) Pristavstvo 2,963/2,594; Upper Kuban Pristavstvo 3,584/22,564; Shapsug District 1,082/4,000;[134] Abadzekh District 1,904/41,978;[135] Bzhedug District 959/20,000.	**Kuban Province** (1865) 86,949/556,619 (Cossack) district (okrug) totals: Yekaterinodar 8,797/59,156; Yeysk 10,924/84,109; Taman 8,086/63,807. Four brigades of the Kuban Host north and east of Kuban River 14,932/132,591. Two brigades and new Cossack regiments of the Kuban Host settled in former Circassian territories south of Kuban River 29,891/145,561. Highlander district (otdel) totals: Psekups 774/14,215; Laba 1,914/20,848; Urup 3,004/7,652; Zelenchuk 1,896/13,158; Elbrus (Elborus) 3,002/15,992. By dominant population category: Kuban Cossack Host areas 72,629/430,040; highlander districts 10,590/73,871; *inogorodnye* (non-Cossack Russians) 5,243. **Kuban Province** (1870) 82,105/606,700 District (uezd) totals: Yekaterinodar 9,785/118,005; Yeysk 15,839/116,438; Temryuk 13,753/94,446; Batalpashinsky 24,033/153,120; Maikop 18,696/124,691.
Black Sea coastal area (depopulated by the end of 1864)	**Black Sea District** (est. 1866) 3,729/unsettled (1871) 4,467/15,703
Terek Province (1860) 45,895/402,211, including: Terek Host lands 14,054/83,533; highlander districts 31,841/317,678.[136] District (okrug) totals: Kabardin 8,616/46,785;[137] Military Ossetian (Vladikavkaz) 9,108/89,477;[138] Chechen 3,690/75,860;[139] Argun 2,725/41,200; Ichkeri 1,906/31,312; Kumyk 5,797/33,044. In 1862–1864 the province's districts were grouped in three military administrative units (otdels): (a) West (made up of Kabardin District 10,446/41,501; Ossetian District 4,882/49,864, and Ingush District 2,109/31,237); (b) Middle (made up of Chechen District 3,679/89,895; Argun District 2,167/18,430; Ichkeri District 878/13,185); and (c) East (made up of Kumyk District 4,609/23,540; Nagorny District 1,188/21,876).	**Terek Province** (1865) 44,011/469,278, including: Terek Host lands 14,054/115,220 (inogorodnye population 1,915); highlander districts 29,958/286,534. District (okrug) totals: Kabardin 10,446/58,319; Ossetian 4,882/55,367; Ingush 2,109/26,053; Chechen 3,679/115,801; Argun 2,167/18,693; Ichkeri 878/12,773; Kumyk 4,609/49,052; Nagorny 1,188/18,000. **Terek Province** (1870) 51,729/477,612[140] District (okrug) totals: Vladikavkaz 9,502/134,023; Georgievsk 19,288/119,139; Grozny 7,639/107,218; Argun 2,471/21,907; Kizlyar 6,648/29,740; Khasavyurt 4,791/46,434; Vedeno 1,390/19,151.

Daghestan Province (1860) 26,491/566,594, including: Tarki Shamkhalate 3,329/30,885; Mekhtuli Khanate 419/15,742; Sulak Naibate 1,226/7,710; Dargin District 1,536/58,069; Gunib District 2,152/46,900;[141] Avar Khanate 1,549/47,756; Kazi-Kumukh District 1,911/22,463; Kaitag-Tabasaran District 2,756/51,641; Kiura Khanate 2,057/26,327; Samur District 3,063/40,902; Bezhta District 2,413/31,500; Derbent Municipality 216/15,157; Zakataly District 3,965/53,329.[142]	**Daghestan Province** (1871) 25,123/448,299 District (okrug) totals: Temir-Khan Shura 5,359/66,834; Gunib 3,259/46,578; Kazi-Kumukh 1,821/34,664; Andi 3,053/35,781; Avar 1,355/30,545; Kaitag-Tabasaran 2,569/42,080; Dargin 1,447/63,951; Kiura 2,814/58,958; Samur 3,224/51,178. Derbent Municipality 242/17,730
	Zakataly District (1871) 3,497/56,802
Tiflis Province (1864) 42,881/599,526 District (uezd) totals: Tiflis 9,813/169,194; Elisabethpol 12,739/131,853; Signakh 4,076/72,132; Telav 2,668/44,162; Gori 5,940/102,486. District (okrug) totals: Gorsky 3,713/27,632;[143] Tionety 3,932/29,808.	**Tiflis Province** (1871) 35,376/606,584 District (uezd) totals: Tiflis 9,323/176,926;[144] Signakh 4,545/83,714; Telav 7,043/85,288;[145] Gori 5,990/123,665; Dushet 3,777/54,803; Akhaltsikh 4,783/82,188.[146]
Kutais Territory (1864) 33,595/644,344, including: (a) Kutais Province 16,134/362,725. District (uezd) totals: Kutais 3,775/104,597; Shorapan 2,894/92,330; Ozurgety 1,935/57,353; Racha 2,652/46,131; Akhaltsikh 4,793/62,314. (b) Principality of Megrelia (1860) 5,899/183,575; Pristavstvo of Svanetia 2,209/6,500; Samurzakan 1,373/23,000; Principality of Abkhazia 3,220/approx. 70,000;[147] Pristavstvo of Tsebelda 2,348/approx. 9,000; former lands of Jigets, Aibga, and Pskhu 2,411/uninhabited as of late 1864.	**Kutais Province** (1867) 24,157/621,693 District (uezd) totals: Kutais 3,775/131,556; Ozurgety 1,935/59,502; Shorapan 2,894/109,450; Racha 2,652/49,810; Akhaltsikh 4,793/76,761. Also included in total: Pristavstvo of Svanetia 2,209/6,906; Principality of Megrelia 5,899/187,708 (abolished in 1867 with its territory divided into 3 districts: Zugdidi 2,476; Senaki 1,478; Lechkhum 1,947 sq. versts). **Kutais Province** (1870): 18,295/600,607 District (uezd) totals: Kutais 2,963/135,384; Ozurgety 1,929/59,080; Shorapan 2,683/116,235; Racha 5,635/50,087; Zugdidi 2,576/92,256; Senaki 1,478/ 96,724; Lechkhum 2,033/47,718; Poti town no data/3,023.
	Sukhum Military District (Sukhumsky Voenny Otdel) (1870) 6,428/66,498, including 4 districts (okrugs): Pitsunda, Tsebelda, Dranda, Okum.

Baku Province (1864) 57,749/781,307 District (uezd) totals: Baku 1,447/51,340; Shusha 19,866/195,833; Nukha (Sheki) 6,486/137,583; Shemakha 10,817/174,832; Lenkoran 11,274/102,084; Kuba (to Baku Province in 1860) 7,859/119,635.	**Baku Province** (1871) 34,286/513,460 District (uezd) totals: Baku 3,457/58,748; Shemakha 5,768/112,563; Kuba 6,300/152,869; Lenkoran 4,731/85,401; Jevat 9,838/37,454; Geokchai 4,157/56,856.
Erivan Province (1864) 25,608/437,719 District (uezd) totals: Erivan 2,565/91,202; Alexandropol 3,193/75,909; Nakhichevan 4,982/51,963; Novy Bayazet 5,441/70,184; Echmiadzin 6,553/98,962; Ordubat 2,874/33,108.	**Elisabethpol Province** (1871) 38,450/529,412 District (uezd) totals: Elisabethpol 11,097/95,288;[148] Nukha 6,191/138,955;[149] Shusha 6,617/117,960;[150] Zangezur 7,371/87,151; Kazakh 7,134/90,058.
	Erivan Province (1871) 24,072/452,001 District (uezd) totals: Erivan 2,865/80,701; Nakhichevan 5,715/88,205;[151] Alexandropol 3,405/94,370; Novy Bayazet 5,372/65,424; Echmiadzin 6,715/119,131;[152] Ordubat city no data/4,170.

1871–1881 (MAP 13)[153] Area in Square Versts/Population	**1881–1897 (MAP 14)**[154] Area in Square Versts/Population
Stavropol Province (1878) 60,307/473,975 District (uezd) totals: Stavropol 6,789/92,619; Aleksandrov 10,283/83,383; Novogrigorievsky 10,873/99,301; Medvezhensky 6,326/106,433. Administrative units populated by nomads:[155] Greater Derbet Ulus 4,649/10,564; Nogai (Achikulak and Kara-Nogai) and Turkmen (Trukhmen) Districts 21,386/11,629.	Caucasus Viceroyalty abolished in 1883. **Stavropol Province** (1897) 49,728/876,298 District (uezd) totals: Stavropol 6,461/124,584; Aleksandrov 9,905/180,904; Medvezhensky 6,803/233,760; Novogrigorievsky 12,146/241,953.[156] Stavropol city no data/41,621. Administrative units populated by nomads: Greater Derbet Ulus 2,780/11,392; Turkmen (Trukhmen) Pristavstvo 7,913/16,800; Achikulak Pristavstvo 3,720/16,777.
Kuban Province (1876) 82,963/1,836,694 District (uezd) totals: Yekaterinodar 10,392/178,800; Yeysk 10,838/119,333; Temryuk 9,430/83,360; Zakubanye 7,623/36,692; Batalpashinsky 15,136/132,606; Maikop 15,529/147,906; Kavkazsky 14,014/133,103.	**Kuban Province** (1897) 82,795/1,922,773[157] District (otdel) totals: Yekaterinodar 7,350/178,230; Yeysk 12,049/241,190; Kavkazsky 9,049/249,947; Labinsky 10,587/307,837; Temryuk 14,736/321,527; Batalpashinsky 14,877/218,225; Maikop 14,102/249,301.

Black Sea District (1876) 4,645/15,795	**Black Sea Province** (1897) 5,995/54,228 District (okrug) totals: Novorossiisk 1,023/16,847;[158] Tuapse 1,597/8,020; Sochi 3,375/13,153.
Terek Province (1876) 52,036/530,980[159] District (okrug) totals: Pyatigorsk 19,595/136,280;[160] Vladikavkaz 9,502/137,027; Grozny 9,569/120,595; Argun 2,812/22,620; Kizlyar 6,718/24,297; Khasavyurt 4,886/55,760; Vedeno 1,274/22,002. Terek Cossack Host lands/population totals for all districts (1881) 18,650/151,905 (including inogorodnye 12,611).[161]	**Terek Province** (1894) 64,080[162]/837,292.[163] including: (a) City of Vladikavkaz no data/43,843. (b) Cossack districts (otdels): Sunzha 6,170/109,707[164] (including Terek Cossack Host lands/population 3,224/40,317); Pyatigorsk 11,107/337,603 (Host 9,243/162,868), divided in 1894 into Pyatigorsk and Mozdok Districts; Kizlyar 20,019/86,838 (Host 6,896/38,613 and Pristavstvo of Karanogai 6,277/31,453). (c) Highlander districts (okrugs), 26,869/439,672, including: Nalchik 9,851/92,087; Vladikavkaz 4,965/87,576; Grozny 7,309/197,892; Khasavyurt 4,796/62,126.
Daghestan Province (1876) 25,123/481,524 District (okrug) totals: Temir-Khan-Shura 5,359/68,110; Gunib 3,259/47,916; Kazi-Kumukh 1,821/36,056; Andi 3,053/41,468; Avar 1,376/38,910; Kaitag-Tabasaran 2,570/42,868; Dargin 1,447/65,450; Kiura 2,814/60,582; Samur 3,224/59,819; Derbent city 13,775; Petrovsk 3,893.	**Daghestan Province** (1897) 26,815/586,636 District (okrug) totals:[165] Temir-Khan-Shura 5,456/74,829; Gunib 3,974/58,594; Kazi-Kumukh 1,885/53,665; Andi 3,107/46,993; Avar 1,376/30,545; Kaitag-Tabasaran 2,691/76,549; Dargin 1,521/82,463; Kiura 3,153/58,958; Samur 3,654/47,693; Derbent city 14,821; Petrovsk/9,086.
Tiflis Province (1880) 35,517/660,800 District (uezd) totals: Tiflis 4,159/158,355; Borchaly 5,417/60,828; Signakh 5,464/81,823; Telav 2,101/52,412; Tionety 4,281/34,404; Gori 5,812/124,829; Dushet 3,455/57,588; Akhaltsikh 2,366/43,377; Akhalkalaki 2,462/49,909.	**Tiflis Province** (1897) 36,627/1,051,032 District (uezd) totals: Tiflis 4,084/227,780; Borchaly 6,116/125,224; Signakh 5,397/100,097; Telav 2,207/65,149; Tionety 4,336/36,438; Gori 6,134/191,650; Dushet 3,481/69,925; Akhaltsikh 2,378/69,144; Akhalkalaki 2,454/73,362; Zakataly 3,544/82,168.
Zakataly District (1880) 3,497/68,839	

Kutais Province (1880) 18,296/570,691 District (uezd) totals: Kutais 2,963/142,083; Ozurgety 1,929/52,416; Shorapan 2,683/107,790; Racha 2,635/49,372; Zugdidi 2,575/87,666; Senaki 1,478/86,413; Lechkhum 2,033/28,105. Pristavstvo of Svanetia 2,209/7,055. City of Poti no data/3,026.	**Kutais Province** (1897) 32,583/1,075,861 District (uezd) totals: Kutais 3,113/223,327; Ozurgety 1,945/92,212; Shorapan 2,678/157,726; Racha 2,531/72,742; Zugdidi 2,398/117,623; Senaki 1,916/119,184; Lechkhum 4,360/50,517. District (okrug) under military government totals: Batum 3,321/85,576; Artvin 2,934/56,456; Sukhum 7,387/100,498. In 1883, the Sukhum Military District [otdel] became Sukhum Okrug and was incorporated into Kutais Province.
Sukhum District (Sukhumsky Otdel) (1874) 6,428/74,442 District (okrug) population totals: Ochamchiry 40,147; Pitsunda 32,529; Sukhum-Kale 1,161; Tsebelda 605. (1878) 6,428/43,734.[166]	
Russian territories beginning 1878: **Batum Province** (Batumskaya Oblast) 6,030/80,987 District (okrug) population totals: Batum 20,824; Artvin 38,443; Ajaria 12,241; Batum town 3,479; Artvin town 6,000. **Kars Province** (Karsskaya Oblast) 16,299/95,086 District (okrug) population totals: Ardahan and Poskhov 16,485; Olty 10,161; Kagizman 7,307; Shuragel 28,642; Zarushad and Childir 14,350; Takhta and Khorosan 14,476; Kars town 3,665.	**Kars Province** (1897) 16,869/292,498 District (okrug) totals: Kars 3,519/135,884; Kars city no data/20,891; Kagizman 3,938/59,726; Ardahan 5,031/65,667; Olty 2,681/31,721.
Baku Province (1878) 34,286/540,773 District (uezd) totals: Baku 3,457/59,389; Shemakha 6,841/97,800; Kuba 6,301/145,778; Lenkoran 4,731/95,382; Jevat 9,838/70,568; Geokchai 3,085/60,299.	**Baku Province** (1897) 35,016/789,659 District (uezd) totals: Baku 3,606/177,606; Shemakha 5,859/123,610; Kuba 6,425/181,515; Lenkoran 4,820/112,200; Jevat 10,753/85,065; Geokchai 3,559/109,663.
Elisabethpol Province (1878) 38,341/593,784 District (uezd) totals: Elisabethpol 8,398/98,587; Nukha 3,284/94,336; Aresh 2,823/38,776; Jebrail 2,749/41,329; Jevanshir 3,904/49,000; Shusha 4,446/105,465; Zangezur 6,644/88,685; Kazakh 6,092/77,601.	**Elisabethpol Province** (1897) 38,949/871,557 District (uezd) totals: Elisabethpol 8,624/162,178; Nukha 3,746/117,062; Aresh 2,361/62,917; Jebrail 2,873/67,123; Jevanshir 4,745/67,005; Shusha 4,480/140,740; Zangezur 6,936/142,064; Kazakh 5,185/112,468.
Erivan Province (1878) 24,448/547,693 District (uezd) totals: Erivan 2,339/96,112; Nakhichevan 3,908/65,635; Sharur-Daralagez 2,636/51,791; Alexandropol 3,382/107,015; Novy Bayazet 5,411/73,162; Echmiadzin 3,222/83,039; Surmalu 3,151/58,487; Ordubat city 3,489.	**Erivan Province** (1897) 25,012/804,757 District (uezd) totals: Erivan 2,784/127,072; Nakhichevan 4,098/100,942; Sharur-Daralagez 2,699/75,982; Alexandropol 3,462/163,435; Novy Bayazet 5,439/123,839; Echmiadzin 3,308/124,643; Surmalu 3,220/88,844.

1903–1917 (MAPS 20, 21) [167] Area in Square Versts/Population	1920–1925 (MAPS 26–29)[168] Area in Square Kilometers/Population
Stavropol Province (1914) 48,742/1,258,525–1,329,000[169] District (uezd) totals: Stavropol 6,468/240,100; Aleksandrovsky 6,763/201,600; Medvezhensky 6,803/315,600; Blagodarnensky 8,543/270,100; Sviatokrestovsky 6,746 /211,500.[170] Greater Derbet Ulus 2,780/7,924–14,600.[171] Turkmen Pristavstvo 7,901/16,664–35,200. Achikulak Pristavstvo 2,871/12,814–23,400.	**Stavropol Province** (1922) 30,983/965,988 In June 1924 the province was abolished and its territory was incorporated into the newly formed **Southeast Territory (Iugo-Vostochny Krai)**, which was renamed North Caucasus Territory (Severo-Kavkazsky Krai) in November 1924.
Kuban Province (1914) 83,284/2,984,500–3,059,459[172] District (otdel) totals: Yekaterinodar 7,358/441,309; Yeysk 12,128/443,756; Kavkazsky 13,941/447,789; Labinsky 5,920/499,327; Taman 14,174/495,460;[173] Batalpashinsky 15,328/286,028; Maikop 14,436/445,790.	**Kuban–Black Sea Province**[174] (1921) 78,381/2,772,532, including: Kuban Province, population 2,458,283; former Black Sea Province, population 114,249. In June 1924 Kuban–Black Sea Province (Kubano-Chernomorskaya Oblast) was abolished and its territory was incorporated into the newly formed Southeast Territory, renamed North Caucasus Territory 1924.
Black Sea Province (1914) 7,327/152,700–194,463 District (okrug) totals: Novorossiisk 999/9,241; Tuapse 1,562/38,496; Sochi 4,766/63,556.	
Terek Province (1914) 63,656–64,070/ 1,261,200–1,272,354,[175] including: (a) Vladikavkaz city no data/79,343. (b) Cossack districts (otdels): Sunzha 3,137–3,702/71,955 (Host 3,136/62,416); Pyatigorsk 4,981–5,088/112,701 (Host 3,880/66,791); Mozdok 5,732–5,880/90,616 (Host 5,002/62,186); Kizlyar 12,124–19,941/ 113,793 (Host 6,837/55,940 and Karanogai Pristavstvo 7,898/6,277?). (c) Highlander districts (okrugs) 29,432/666,223 District (okrug) totals: Nalchik 9,851–10,458/154,481; Vladikavkaz 5,023/129,948; Nazran 1,641–2,468/57,320; Grozny 3,936–4,369/120,512; Vedeno 3,342–3,372/120,021; Khasavyurt 4,699–4,796/83,941.	**Terek Province** (1922) 25,877/588,816[176] **Gorskaya (Mountain) ASSR** (1921) 29,105 sq. versts /686,500[177] National district (okrug) totals: Kabardin 7,325 and Balkar 3,365 sq. miles (both okrugs seceded from Gorskaya ASSR and merged into a united Kabardin-Balkar AP 10,690 sq. versts/ 181,900); Karachai (in 1921 seceded from Gorskaya ASSR and merged into a united Karachai-Cherkess AP 9,364 sq. versts/161,300); Grozny (Chechen) 8,786 sq. versts (seceded from Gorskaya ASSR as Chechen AP, 1922); Vladikavkaz (Ossetian) 5,586 sq. versts/150,500;[178] Nazran (Ingush) 2,590 sq. versts /69,700; Sunzha (Cossack) 1,454 sq. versts /35,000.[179] In 1924, all national districts and two autonomous cities of the dismantled Gorskaya (Mountain) ASSR were integrated into North Caucasus Territory as autonomous provinces (oblasts); predominantly Russian Vladikavkaz, Grozny and Sunzha became autonomous districts (okrugs).

Daghestan Province (1914) 26,106/702,237–724,200 District (okrug) totals: Temir-Khan-Shura 5,464/132,664; Gunib 4,322/75,589; Kazi-Kumukh 1,271/50,831; Andi 3,152/56,832; Avar 1,148/34,895; Kaitag-Tabasaran 2,897/113,918; Dargin 1,526/82,163; Kiura 3,067/84,751; Samur 3,259 /70,694.	**Daghestan ASSR** (1922) 50,095/744,200 Comprised 11 districts (with Khasavyurt District added in 1921 and Kizlyar District in 1922).
Tiflis Province (1914) 35,904/1,359,600–1,410,056 District (uezd) totals: Tiflis 4,005/456,386; Borchaly 6,037/175,388; Signakh 5,292/141,356; Telav 2,163/74,829; Tionety 4,250/44,820; Gori 6,008/235,614; Dushet 3,412/81,742; Akhaltsikh 2,332/95,975; Akhalkalaki 2,407/104,946.	**Georgian Democratic Republic** (1920) 71,645 km^2 **SSR of Georgia** (1925) 59,108 km^2, including: Ajarian ASSR 2,008 km^2; AP of South Ossetia 3,270 km^2
Zakataly District (1914) 3,502/84,657–100,400[180]	
Kutais Province (1914) 18,535/1,037,934–1,067,700 District (uezd) totals: Kutais 3,043/284,511; Ozurgety 1,899/111,436; Shorapan 2,619/205,992; Racha 2,477/88,663; Zugdidi 2,346/131,887; Senaki 1,869/154,558; Lechkhum 4,282/60,787.	
Batum Province (1914) 6,129/191,138 District (okrug) totals: Batum 3,254/120,948; Artvin 2,875/70,190.	
Sukhum District (1914) 5,792/146,400–189,907[181]	**Abkhaz SSR** (1925) 8,275/174,100[182]
Kars Province (1914) 16,466/391,213–396,200 District (okrug) totals: Kars 8,084/176,288; Kagizman 3,843/80,818; Ardahan 4,918/94,016; Olty 2,621/40,091.	
Baku Province (1914) 33,345/802,021–1,100,400 District (uezd) totals: Baku 2,610/177,606; Kuba 6,309/184,164; Shemakha 6,626/158,622; Lenkoran 4,727/167,144; Jevat 8,397/132,008; Geokchai 4,677/132,224; Baku Municipality 931/379,886.	**Azerbaijan Democratic Republic** (1920) Claimed 85,349 sq. versts as being under control of its government.[183] **Azerbaijan SSR** (1925) 81,275 km^2, including Nakhichevan ASSR 7,733 km^2

Elisabethpol Province (1914) 38,922/1,098,000–1,165,836 District (uezd) totals: Elisabethpol 8,726/248,015; Nukha 3,685/167,358; Aresh 2,318/85,864; Kariagino 3,276/91,845; Jevanshir 4,654/67,005; Shusha 4,423/178,081; Zangezur 6,743/209,951; Kazakh 5,097/134,546.	**Republic of Armenia** (1918) Approx. 9,000–11,000 km^2 (1920) Claimed 61,992 km^2 as being under control of its government.[184] **SSR of Armenia** (1925) 27,153 km^2
Erivan Province (1914) 23,195/1,018,300–1,044,097 District (uezd) totals: Erivan 2,724/176,592; Nakhichevan 3,939/136,174; Sharur-Daralagez 2,638/85,080; Alexandropol 3,387/223,344; Novy Bayazet 4,123/174,823; Echmiadzin 3,237/149,067; Surmalu 3,147/99,017.	

1922–1934 (MAPS 29–33)[185] Area in Square Kilometers/Population	**1936–1939 (MAP 34)**[186] Area in Square Kilometers/Population
North Caucasus Territory (Severo-Kavkazsky Krai), est. November 1924 (1928) 293,616/8,363,491, including: (a) District (okrug) totals:[187]Armavir 21,524/927,392; Kuban 35,860/1,489,088;[188] Maikop 14,712/330,135; Stavropol 30,620/727,585; Terek 28,542/643,369; Black Sea 9,415/291,437;[189] Vladikavkaz (autonomous urban district) 86/75,275;[190] Sunzha 1,187/34,875; Grozny (autonomous urban district) 294/96,226. (b) Autonomous Province (oblast) totals: Adyghean (Cherkess) AP (1928) 3,093/113,509; (1932) 2,941/127,600; Cherkess AP (1928) 1,430/37,000; (1932) 3,044/76,600; Karachai AP (1928) 8,300/64,623; (1932) 9,862/96,300; Kabardin-Balkar AP (1928) 12,205/204,000; (1932) 12,833/257,400; North Ossetian AP (1928) 6,045/152,400; (1932) 6,191/169,500; Ingush AP (1928) 3,193/75,200; (1932) 3,244/82,000; Chechen AP (1928) 9,371/309,860; (1932) 12,277/530,600. (c) National district (raion) totals (1932): Armenian 1,692/11,400;[191] Miasnikov 674/25,800;[192] Vannovsky (German) 362/20,000;[193] Greek 213/16,500; [194] Kalmyk 3,555/15,400;[195] Shapsug 582/6,500;[196] Turkmen 2,734/11,700. In 1930, the districts (okrugs) of North Caucasus Territory were abolished and the territory was divided into 75 raions (7 of which were national), 7 autonomous (national) provinces, and 8 municipal units directly under the Territory (Krai) administration.	**Krasnodar Territory (Krasnodarsky Krai)** (1939) 83,600/3,172,674, including Adyghean AP 4,400/241,799 **Orjonikidze Territory (Ordzhonikidzevsky Krai)** (1939) 101,500/1,950,887, including: Cherkess AP 4,000/92,898; Karachai AP 9,900/150,303; Kizlyar District 22,300/123,824.[197] **Kabardin-Balkar ASSR** (1939) 12,800/359,219 **North Ossetian ASSR** (1939) 6,306/329,205 **Chechen-Ingush ASSR** (1939) 15,400/697,009

Daghestan ASSR (1928) 54,212/788,100 (1929) 58,151/812,000 Between 1931 and 1936 Daghestan was part of the North Caucasus Territory.[198]	**Daghestan ASSR** (1939) 38,200/930,416
Georgian SSR (1926) 68,865/2,660,900, including: Ajarian ASSR 2,577/131,300; South Ossetian AP 3,673/87,300; Abkhaz SSR (Treaty-Based SSR 1927–1931, ASSR within Georgian SSR beginning 1931) 8,172/199,175.	**Georgian SSR** (1939) 69,700/3,540,023, including: Abkhaz ASSR 8,660/311,885; Ajarian ASSR 2,577/200,106; South Ossetian AP 3,700/106,118.
Azerbaijan SSR (1926) 84,679/2,313,200, including: Nakhichevan ASSR 5,355/105,100; AP of Mountain Karabakh 4,161/125,200	**Azerbaijan SSR** (1939) 86,600/3,205,150, including: Nakhichevan ASSR 5,088/126,696; Mountain Karabakh AP 4,200/150,837
Armenian SSR (1926) 30,948/876,600	**Armenian SSR** (1939) 29,800/1,282,338

1944–1956 (MAP 36)[199] Area in Square Kilometers	**1957–1991 (MAP 38)** Area in Square Kilometers/ Population	**2002–2012 (MAP 57)**[200] Area in Square Kilometers/ Population 2002 and 2010
Krasnodar Territory 85,000 Including Adyghean AP 4,400	**Krasnodar Territory** (1989) 83,600/5,052,922 Including Adyghean AP 7,600/432,588.	**Krasnodar Territory** 74,485/5,125,221 (2002); 5,226,647 (2010)
		Republic of Adyghea 7,792/447,109 (2002); 439,996 (2010)
Stavropol Territory Including Cherkess AP 4,000	**Stavropol Territory** 80,600/2,825,349 Including Karachai-Cherkess AP 14,200/417,560.	**Stavropol Territory** 66,160/2,735,139 (2002); 2,786,281 (2010)
		Karachai-Cherkess Republic 14,277/439,470 (2002); 477,859 (2010) Including Abazin District 182/13,280 (2010);[201] Nogai District 187/13,671 (2010).[202]

Kabardin ASSR 11,800	**Kabardin-Balkar ASSR** 12,500/753,531	**Kabardin-Balkar Republic** 12,470/901,494 (2002); 859,939 (2010)
North Ossetian ASSR 9,200	**North Ossetian ASSR** 8,000/632,428	**Republic of North Ossetia-Alania** 7,987/710,275 (2002); 712,980 (2010)
Grozny Province 33,000 Abolished in 1957, territory divided among Chechen-Ingush ASSR, Daghestan ASSR, and Stavropol Territory.	**Chechen-Ingush ASSR** 19,300/1,270,429 The Chechen-Ingush ASSR was divided into two republics in 1991: Chechnya and Ingushetia.	**Republic of Ingushetia**[203] Approx. 3,600/467,294 (2002);[204] 412,529 (2010)
		Chechen Republic Approx. 15,700/1,103,686 (2002);[205] 1,268,989 (2010)
Daghestan ASSR 38,200 The following okrugs were established in 1952: Buinaksk, Derbent, Izberbash, Makhachkala. They were abolished in 1953.	**Daghestan ASSR** 50,300/1,802,188	**Republic of Daghestan** 50,270/2,576,531 (2002); 2,910,249 (2010)
Georgian SSR 76,400 Including: Ajarian ASSR 2,900; Abkhaz ASSR 8,660; South Ossetian AP 3,900. In 1951 Tbilisi and Kutaisi Provinces (oblasts) were established (abolished in 1953).	**Georgian SSR** 69,700/5,400,841 Including: Ajarian ASSR 3,000/392,707; Abkhaz ASSR 8,660/525,061; South Ossetian AP 3,900/98,537.	**Georgia** De facto territory 57,140 De facto population (2002) 4,369,579 Including Ajarian AR 3,000/376,016[206] De facto population (2012) 4,497,600 Including AR of Ajaria 3,000/393,700[207]
		Republic of Abkhazia[208] 8,660/215,972 (2003); 240,705 (2011)
		Republic of South Ossetia 3,900/(2011 estimate)/42,000–45,000

Azerbaijan SSR 85,700 Including: Nakhichevan ASSR 5,500; Mountain Karabakh AP 4,200. In 1951 Baku and Ganja Provinces (oblasts) were established (abolished in 1953).	**Azerbaijan SSR** 86,600/7,021,178 Including: Nakhichevan ASSR 5,500/295,091; Mountain Karabakh AP 4,400/187,769.	**Azerbaijan Republic** De facto territory approx. 75,100–76,500 Population (2009) 8,922,400[209] (2012) 9,235,100[210] Including Nakhichevan AR 5,560/410,100[211] (2012)
		Mountain Karabakh Republic[212] De facto territory (2007) 10,100–11,500 De facto population (2010, estimate) 143,600
Armenian SSR 29,800	**Armenian SSR** 29,800/3,304,776	**Republic of Armenia** (2012) 29,800/3,277,000[213]

Notes

1. The term "Caucasus Region" refers to the Russian Empire's Caucasus Viceroyalty as of 1914 (plus Stavropol Province) and corresponding Soviet and post-Soviet territory. Since Russian-Soviet borders with Turkey have traditionally delineated the region's southwestern border, Kars Province and a portion of Batum Province ceased to be part of the region after 1921; however, pre-1921 data for these areas have been included in this table. In some cases the table shows a population range based on multiple nineteenth-century sources. Where a range of figures is offered for area, this may have to do with refinements to the data themselves rather than changes to borders or the composition of territories.

2. *Statisticheskie tablitsy Vserossiiskoi imperii*, Table 20. Shtukenberg, *Opisanie Stavropol'skoi gubernii*, p. 8, gives the number of inhabitants in the Caucasus Viceroyalty in 1785 (excluding Kalmyks and other nomadic groups) as 48,350. Fadeev, *Rossiia i Kavkaz*, p. 14, gives the male population in Caucasus Province for that same year as 22,158. Despite the name, a large area of the Caucasus Viceroyalty (Astrakhan Province) was not within the geographic boundaries of the Caucasus Region and is not henceforth covered in this table.

3. Total male population plus male Cossacks counted by district, excluding Yekaterinograd District. Figures based on Kabuzan, *Naselenie Severnogo Kavkaza v XIX–XX veke*, pp. 139, 141–142.

4. Ibid. By 1785 a variety of Cossack hosts and detachments were living in newly established Caucasus Province: the Greben Host, the oldest of the Terek Cossack entities (dating to the 1570s), began settling in five stanitsas on the left bank of the lower Terek River in 1712; the Terek-Semeinoe Host, the successor of the abolished Agrakhan Host (Don Cossacks by origin), relocated in 1735 from Agrakhan-Sulak to the Terek River and settled in three stanitsas between the Greben Host and Kizlyar (the term "Semeinoe" derived from Peter I's decision, while forming the new Agrakhan Host in 1722, to take one household [*semya*] from each Don Cossack stanitsa); the Terek-Kizlyar Host, part of the former Agrakhan Host, was made up of highlander units serving the Russian state and settled between Kizlyar and the Caspian Sea in 1735; the Volga Host, which had come from the Don region to help secure Russian expansion into the Volga region, relocated from the Volga to the Terek and settled in 1770 in five stanitsas on the Kizlyar-Mozdok Defensive Line and in 1777 in five stanitsas on the Azov-Mozdok Defensive Line; the Mozdok Gorsky Detachment, made up of baptized Kabardins and Kalmyks, and later Ossetians, settled around Mozdok beginning in 1763; the Khoper Regiment comprised Cossacks who moved from the Khoper River in Voronezh Province to the Caucasus and settled in four stanitsas along the Azov-Mozdok Defensive Line (including Stavropolskaya, today's Stavropol) in 1777–1778. Together, these Cossack entities formed a chain of stanitsas from the Caspian in the east to the Don in the northwest and, beginning in 1786, were given the common designation "Cossacks Settled along the Caucasus Line" (Poselennye Kavkazskoi Linii Kazaki, a formal title that later spawned the common informal term *Lineitsy*) and placed under the commander of the Caucasus Corps. The Terek-Kizlyar and Terek-Semeinoe Hosts were informally called Nizovye Cossacks, since they originated in the *nizovye*, or lower reaches of the Terek. With the Greben Cossacks they formed the Terek line.

5. 1786 figures from the 4th Revision (fiscal census) (Kabuzan, *Naselenie Severnogo Kavkaza v XIX–XX veke*, p. 124, citing the Russian State Military-Historical Archive [RGVIA], f. 52, op. 194, d. 567, l. 25–35). In 1790, the number of Nogai and other "Tatars" within the six districts of Caucasus Province totaled approximately 19,370 male "souls" (see as well 1782 figures from the 4th Revision).

6. *Statisticheskie tablitsy Vserossiiskoi imperii*, Table 22. Estimate for both sexes. The unit of measure—"census-counted soul" (*Revizskaia dusha*)—refers to males of the taxpaying estates. The overall population was estimated by calculating the correlation between males and females.

In 1796, the Caucasus Viceroyalty included territory of Astrakhan and former Caucasus Province (a total of 381,000 inhabitants; see as well ibid., Table 20) and lands of the Don (population approximately 200,000) and Black Sea Cossacks (also estimated by sources at 200,000). However, it is likely that the number of Black Sea Cossacks actually totaled no more than 30,000, while the Don Cossacks were significantly more numerous—more than 300,000.

7. The bodies exercising unified imperial military command in the Caucasus went through a succession of incarnations: Astrakhan Corps (1777–1782), Caucasus Corps (1782–1796), Tenth Caucasus Division (1797), Caucasus Inspection (1797–1811), Georgian Corps (1811–1815), Separate Georgian Corps (1815–1820), Separate Caucasus Corps (1820–1857), Caucasus Army (1857–1865), and Caucasus Military District (1865–1917). Beginning in 1785, the commander-in-chief of Russian forces in the Caucasus was usually also the senior official in the region and held military and civil authority: governor general of Astrakhan Province (until 1785 and in 1796–1802); governor general of the Caucasus Viceroyalty (1785–1796); commander-in-chief in Georgia, governor general of Astrakhan and Caucasus Provinces (1802–1816); administrator-in-chief of civil affairs (Glavnoupravliaiushchy grazhdanskoi chastyu) in Georgia, Astrakhan, and Caucasus Provinces (1816–1832); administrator-in-chief in the Caucasus (1832–1844); Caucasus viceroy (Namestnik) (1844–1881); administrator-in-chief of civil affairs (Glavnonachalstvuyushchy grazhdanskoi chastyu) in the Caucasus (1881–1904); Caucasus viceroy (1905–1917).

8. *Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii o Rossii*, p. 23.

9. The terms "Caucasus Line" and "Caucasus Defensive Line" (Kavkazskaya Kordonnaya Liniia) are used as synonyms throughout the atlas, as they were interchangeable in official nineteenth-century Russian terminology. By the mid-1820s, the Lineitsy ("Cossacks settled along the Caucasus Line") remained grouped in different Hosts and separate detachments: the Greben Host, 6,209 of both sexes; the Terek-Semeinoe Host, 2,405; the Terek-Kizlyar Host, 517 (these three hosts were located along the Kizlyar-Mozdok Line, which was also called the Terek Line); the Mozdok Regiment (or Gorsky Regiment, comprised of Volga Cossacks located along the Kizlyar-Mozdok Line in 1770 and of the Mozdok Gorsky Detachment), 10,241; the Volga [Volgsky] Regiment, comprised of Volga Cossacks located along the Azov-Mozdok Line since 1777, 6,167; the Khoper Regiment, which settled along the Azov-Mozdok Line in 1777 and partially resettled in 1825 to form six new stanitsas on the Kuban Line, 7,946; the Kuban Regiment, comprised of Don Cossacks who settled in four stanitsas on the Kuban River and/or to the east of the Kuban in 1794, 7,756 of both sexes; the Caucasus Regiment, comprised of the former Yekaterinoslav Host from Ukraine, settled in five stanitsas along the Kuban River in 1802–1804, 7,418. The total number of Lineitsy was 48,662 as of 1826 (Debu, *O Kavkazskoi linii*, table between pp. 80 and 81).

10. The estimate for the Nogai population is based on F. Lashkov, "K voprosu o kolichestve naseleniia Tavricheskoi gubernii v nachale XIX veka [On the number of inhabitants of Taurida Province in the early 19th century]," *Izvestiia Tavricheskoi Uchenoi Arkhivnoi komissii* [Reports by the Taurida Scholarly Archival Commission], 53 (1916), cited by Kabuzan, *Naselenie Severnogo Kavkaza*, p. 32. Bentkovskii ("Zaselenie Chernomorii s 1792 po 1825 god") estimates the number of Nogai at the end of 1781 to be significantly greater—62,000 *kibitki* (families). The latter figure may reflect the situation before the Nogai were expelled from the territory of the former Crimean Khanate's Kuban Horde in 1784 (some Nogai were resettled in Astrakhan Province). It also probably includes Nogai who were roaming Astrakhan Province.

11. Beginning in 1792, Kuban (an approximate triangle formed by the Kuban River in the south, the Sea of Azov in the west, and the Yeya River in the northeast) was settled by Cossacks of the Black Sea Host and was originally put under the administration of the Caucasus Viceroyalty (until 1796). In 1796–1801, as part of Paul I's "anti-Catherine" administrative reforms and abolition of viceroyalties, this area was nominally made part of Novorossiisk Province (Rostov Uezd). In 1802, Alexander I restored Taurida Province, and the Black Sea Host territory became Tmutarakan Uezd within that province. The unofficial but widely used name of the Black Sea Host Territory between 1793 and 1860 was Chernomoria (Black Sea land), and the Black Sea Cossacks were called Chernomortsy. Here the name of a group helped determine the new name of a territory: the Black Sea Host was given this name when first established in 1787, primarily out of former Zaporozhian Cossacks of "Little Russian" (Ukrainian) origin on the territory adjoining the Black Sea between the Dnestr and Bug Rivers. Under Catherine II the Chernomortsy were resettled to Kuban and lent their own name to that of the homeland they had been granted (despite retaining very little Black Sea shore, they played an important geopolitical role in the defense of the Black Sea region).

12. The lower figure is consistent with more recent estimates for this territory (see "Statisticheskie tablitsy Rossiiskoi imperii," 1863, p. 50). The higher figure is cited from Bentkovskii, "Zaselenie Chernomorii s 1792 po 1825 god," p. 8. A possible explanation for the differences in the area of the Land of the Black Sea Host is the erroneous or possibly temporary inclusion of territory between the Yeysk River and the lower Don-Manych (see map 10 in the list of sources at the end of this volume). To a lesser extent this discrepancy may be associated with the inclusion or noninclusion of the Limans of the Sea of Azov and Kuban River.

13. Including 17,021 men and approximately 8,000 women (Shcherbina, *Istoriia Kubanskogo kazach'ego voiska*, 1913). Kabuzan offers different figures for the Black Sea Host in Kuban: 5,910 males as of early 1793 and 12,645 males as of early 1794 (Kabuzan, *Naselenie Severnogo Kavkaza v XIX–XX veke*, p. 41).

14. Felitsyn, *Materialy dlia istorii Kubanskogo voiska*; see as well Bentkovskii, *Zaselenie Chernomorii*, and Kabuzan, *Naselenie Severnogo Kavkaza v XIX–XX veke*, p. 142. The figure breaks down into 23,534 males and 9,100 females. In 1801–1809 the size of the Black Sea Host decreased to 20,675 males.

15. Bentkovskii, *Zaselenie Chernomorii*, p. 55.

16. Not included in these figures were 41,634 people (22,296 men and 19,328 women) from Malorossiiskaya Province (the approximate area of contemporary Ukraine's Poltava and Chernigov Provinces) who were resettled to Chernomoria during 1809–1811 (Debu, *O Kavkazskoi Linii*, p. 397).

17. In 1820, with the acceleration of war in the Caucasus, Alexander I put General Aleksei Yermolov, commander of the Separate Georgian Corps and administrator-in chief in Georgia (the senior Russian official in the Caucasus) in charge of this territory. The Georgian Corps was renamed the Caucasus Corps in August 1820, reflecting the changed scale of Russian military activity in the Caucasus and its shifting focus in 1817–1820 from conquering Georgia (Transcaucasia) to the war in the Greater (highland) Caucasus.

18. Calculated based on the table Placement of the Black Sea Host in 1821–1842, Kabuzan, *Naselenie Severnogo Kavkaza v XIX-XX*, pp. 171–172.

19. In 1821–1825, the second government program to resettle Ukrainian ("Malorossian" in the sources) Cossacks to the Black Sea region was realized: 48,382 people (25,627 men and 22,755 women) were moved to Host territory from Poltava and Chernigov provinces (Bentkovskii, *Zaselenie Chernomorii*, p. 104). The higher figure on the territory is from Debu (*O Kavkazskoi Linii*, p. 402).

20. Statisticheskie tablitsy Vserossiiskoi imperii, Table 21.

21. Partially populated by Ossetian communities under the nominal suzerainty of the abolished Kingdom of Kartli-Kakhetia.

22. Beginning in 1802, the center of the Lori District was moved from Somkhetia to Tiflis "due to the fact that the city of Lori has no population," probably a reference to the destruction of Loriberd Fortress (*Akty, sobrannye Kavkazskoi arkheograficheskoi komissiei*, vol. 1, p. 439). There was an actual Tiflis District (north of the Khrami River), incorporating four Tatar subdistricts (distantsias): Borchalo (south of the Khrami), Kazakh, Shuragel, and Pambak ("Vedomost' o razdelenii Gruzii na piat' uezdov ot 1802 goda," pp. 461–575). In incorporating Georgia into the empire, the Russian authorities based their approach toward newly acquired territories in part on the principle that different ethnic groups should be governed separately. The source states that "those from other [i.e., non-Georgian] tribes must be governed based on exclusive privilege," i.e., in a manner suited to the specific group and involving specially appointed police officials (*mouravs*) or with the participation of local rulers. Special guidelines were also drafted for the governing of Georgian highlanders and Ossetians in 1826–1859 (within the framework of distantsias, pristavstvos, and later districts [okrugs]).

23. *Statisticheskie tablitsy Vserossiiskoi imperii*, Table 21.

24. The higher figure is based on *Statisticheskie tablitsy Vserossiiskoi imperii*, Table 22. (Probably the source included an estimate of the area and population of the territories of Imeretia, Megrelia, Guria, Shuragel, and Ganja that were incorporated into the empire in 1803–1806 into figures for Georgian Province.) At the time, Russian sources treated the term "Georgia" as synonymous with "all territories under Russian control south of the Greater Caucasus." The lower figure is given by *Akty, sobrannye Kavkazskoi arkheographicheskoi komissii* (vol. 3, p. 714) and is apparently based on the 1804 Cameral Description (Kameral'noe Opisanie), a survey made for fiscal purposes and thus likely to significantly underestimate population. Figures per districts (including towns) are also from the same source and clearly lack data on highlander areas of Georgian Province.

25. In 1803, Dushet District was renamed Ananur District. This figure apparently does not include the population of mountain areas, which in 1817 were grouped in a particular subdistrict labeled "the Administration of Highlanders *[Gortsy]* Living along the Georgian Military Road." The category of Gortsy here includes Georgian-speaking Mokhevs and Mtiuls and Ossetians living along the upper reaches of the Terek and Aragva Rivers. In 1826, this subdistrict was renamed the Gorskaya Distantsia.

26. In 1826, the Tushetia-Pshavetia-Khevsuretia subdistrict (distantsia) was formed on the territory of Georgian highlander communities of the Telav District. Bronevskii (*Noveishie geograficheskie i istoricheskie izvestiia*) estimates the population of the subdistrict for 1823 at 2,300 families.

27. Based on estimates from Bronevskii (ibid.), "Georgia proper"—i.e., the parts of Georgia Province under civilian government—had a population of approximately 250,000 inhabitants comprising approximately 40,000 households.

28. Russian authorities used the generic category "Muslim possessions beyond the Caucasus" and later "Transcaucasian Muslim possessions" for such entities as the Kazakh, Borchalo, Shuragel, Pambak, and Shamshadil Sultanates, the Khanates of Ganja, Erivan, Nakhichevan, Sheki/Nukha, Shirvan/Shemakha, Karabakh, Baku, Talysh, and the Sultanates of Salian, Ilisu, and sometimes also Djary-Belokany (communities). The Avar-controlled ("Lezgin-controlled" in the terminology of the time) territories of Djary-Belokany were alternately designated "Transcaucasian Muslim possessions" and "Daghestan and Lezgins," another generic geopolitical category. Symptomatically, the term "Zakavkazye" (Transcaucasia) appeared only in the list of "Contents" of the first six volumes of the most comprehensive collection of historical documents on the Caucasus, the *Akty, sobrannye Kavkazskoi arkheographicheskoi komissii*, collected and printed between 1868 and 1873—not in any documents predating 1827. Only in 1827–1828, when newly acquired and apparently non-Georgian lands beyond the Caucasus had to be administered did the term "Georgia" begin to give way to the terms "Zakavkazsky krai" or "Zakavkazskie provintsii" (vol. 7).

29. By 1817, after the return of a portion of the Armenian population, a total of 7,872 families populated the Karabakh Khanate (*Akty, sobrannye Kavkazskoi arkheograficheskoi komissiei*, vol. 6, pt. 1, p. 836).

30. In 1820, the Kaitag Utsmiate was abolished by Russian authorities and Kaitag Province was formed on its territory. In 1823, Bronevskii (*Noveishie geograficheskie i istoricheskie izvestiia*) gave the Kaitag population at 25,000 households (*dyms*), an inflated estimate. In 1833 this province was divided and the part of its territory populated by Terekeme (in the Raiat or lower Kaitag) was incorporated into Derbent Province. The raiats were an estate of dependent peasants in Daghestan distinct from the uzden, free peasant commoners.

31. "Vedomost' o chislennosti narodonaseleniia Derbentskoi provintsii." In 1823, Bronevskii (*Noveishie geograficheskie i istoricheskie izvestiia*) estimated the number of Tabasaran at 10,000 households (dyms) and the population of Derbent Province at 2,000 households (9,300 "souls").

32. The post "pristav of the Kabardin people" was officially introduced in 1769 after the beginning of the 1768–1774 Russo-Ottoman War and the demise of the 1739 Treaty of Belgrade, which had made Kabarda "a neutral barrier between Empires." Pristavstvos were not originally on a par with the empire's other administrative-territorial units. They were an element of the Russian administrative structure established to govern particular highland communities, nomadic peoples, or feudal lands that were already under imperial military control or semi-control. The pristav was the official representative of the imperial authorities "attached" (*pristavlenny*) to local communities to perform a variety of political functions. Where there was no preexisting internal centralized authority over a community or people, the pristav acted as a supervisor and was sometimes given the official designation "head of the people" (*nachalnik naroda*). In fact, the role of the pristav was originally closer to that of a mediator facilitating cooperation between the Russian military and native self-rule bodies. Gradually the role of the pristavsto evolved in keeping with the system of "military-native government." The offices of the pristavstvo were not necessarily located within the territory of the people being governed. In 1800, the "Main Pristavstvo for Kabardins, Nogai, Turkmens, Abazins, and other Asiatic peoples roaming Astrakhan Province and its environs" was established. Between 1801 and 1864, many pristavstvos were established to deal with particular populations and their respective territories and offered a framework for the creation of more conventional units of imperial government: districts (okrugs).

33. In international terms both, territories indirectly came under Russian suzerainty in 1774 due to their mostly nominal allegiance to Kabarda (which itself was formally acquired by Russia under the 1774 Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji).

34. The term "Balkaria" was not used around 1827, when five Turkic-speaking highlander communities neighboring Greater Kabarda (Balkar, Chegem, Holam, Bezengi, and Urusbii) adopted Russian suzerainty. In the 1840s, the original Russian categories for these communities (Mountain Tatars, Kabardin Highlanders) were being used in parallel and as equivalents of the general term "Malkars" (later "Balkars"), the most numerous of these communities. Balkar lands formally came under Russian suzerainty in 1774 as a nominal part or dependent polity of Kabarda.

35. Disputed by the Ottoman and Russian Empires between 1791 and 1828, Karachai adopted Ottoman suzerainty in 1826 and was conquered by Russians in 1828. In 1829, the Karachai Pristavstvo was established to administer the territory and community.

36. Ossetian-speaking Digoria adopted Russian suzerainty in 1827 along with Turkic-speaking Balkaria.

37. Each community was under a particular pristav subordinate to the commandant of Vladikavkaz Fortress.

38. These were also under pristavs, subordinate to the commandant of Vladikavkaz Fortress.

39. Beginning in 1818, the position of Chechen pristav was established by the Russian authorities to deal with so-called "peaceful [*mirnye*] Chechens," meaning mostly Chechens living on land along the right bank of the Terek across from the Terek Line and along the right bank of the Sunzha across from the developing Sunzha Line.

40. In addition to being placed under the authority of the Main Kumyk Pristavstvo (beginning in 1827), each of these three entities was assigned its own pristav.

41. Nominally adopted Russian suzerainty beginning 1803.

42. Under nominal Russian suzerainty beginning 1820.

43. Primary sources: Evetskii, *Statisticheskoe opisanie Zakavkazskogo kraia, Obozrenie Rossiiskikh vladenii*, Shtukenberg, *Opisanie Zakavkazskogo kraia*, and *Akty, sobrannye Kavkazskoi arkheograficheskoi komissiei*, vol. 8.

44. Primary source: *Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii o Rossii*.

45. Beginning in 1827–1830, there was a reorganization of highlander territories under Russian control and along the Caucasus Defensive Line. By that time the Line itself was populated by several Cossack Hosts and separate detachments under a single command that were officially seen as a single unit. The reorganization brought Cossack territories (the Line itself) and highlander lands (under the control of this Line) together into a common administrative entity, a step toward greater administrative integration. The Caucasus Defensive Line, stretching from Taman to the Caspian Sea, was divided into five military-administrative units: (1) Chernomoria, consisting of Black Sea Host lands bordered to the south by the "Black Sea Boundary Line," i.e., the Kuban River, plus some adjacent subdued parts of Circassia; (2) the Right Flank, comprising the lands of Kuban and Caucasus Cossack Regiments located along the Kuban Line and some adjacent Zakubanye/Circassia territories; (3) the Center, comprising Greater and Lesser Kabarda, Karachai, Balkaria, Digoria, the Volga Regiment located between the Kuban River and Mozdok, and the forts along the Georgian Military Road in Kabarda; (4) Vladikavkaz Commandantship (the territory administered by the commandant of Vladikavkaz Fortress), comprising some Ossetian and Ingush communities, the forts along the Georgian Military Road in Ossetia, and the forts along the upper half of the Sunzha Defensive Line; and (5) the Left Flank, comprising territories of so-called "peaceful Chechen communities," Kumyk lands between the Terek and Sulak, the Greben and Kizlyar Cossack Hosts, and the forts along the lower half of the Sunzha Defensive Line.

Highlander segments within the reorganized area became pristavstvos and all the Cossack forces in the Caucasus were organized into regiments (including formerly separate Hosts). In 1832, the Cossack Hosts and regiments belonging to the Right Flank, Left Flank, Center, and Vladikavkaz Commandantship were institutionally integrated in a united "Caucasus Line Cossack Host" (Kavkazskoe Lineinoe Kazachye Voisko, KLKV). The Black Sea Host (Chernomoria) retained its separate status until 1860.

46. Kabuzan, *Naselenie Severnogo Kavkaza v XIX–XX veke*, pp. 160 and 181. Another source gives 7,722 Cossack households in about 1832 (Zubov, *Kartina Kavkazskogo kraia*, p. 43). In 1832–1839, the KLKV was significantly reinforced: 37 of the province's peasant villages comprising 9,221 square versts/36,575 people of both sexes entered into the Cossack estate and became part of the KLKV. Military (Cossack stanitsas) and civil settlements (mostly Russian and Malorossian/Ukrainian peasant villages) in the province itself were sometimes interstratified over significant areas but remained under separate administrations: the Caucasus Line Host Administration (Voiskovoe Pravlenie) and Caucasus provincial government, respectively. Both governments were located in Stavropol.

47. Figures on male population are from the 8th Revision (fiscal census) for 1842 (see Kabuzan, *Naselenie Severnogo Kavkaza v XIX-XX veke*, p. 163). Certain categories represented by this number were not subject to taxation, specifically the Cossacks (74,698 males) and the Nogai (43,096 males). The estimate for both sexes breaks down into 147,689 "settlers subject to civil authority," 100,900 nomads, and 155,224 members of the "military, Cossack population" (Shtukenberg, *Opisanie Stavropol'skoi gubernii*, p. 34).

48. From 1827 to 1847 the term *okrug* was used for districts of Caucasus Province.

49. *Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii o Rossii*, p. 9.

50. Ibid., p. 22. Here the figure for Cossacks of the KLKV may include only the population of stanitsas located within Stavropol Province. Other sources offer a range of 155,224–163,678 for both sexes within the KLKV for 1842 (see Shtukenberg, *Opisanie Stavropol'skoi gubernii*, and *Voenno-statisticheskoe obozrenie Rossiiskoi imperii* for Stavropol Province). Beginning in 1838, the Malorossian Cossack Regiment (formed and deployed in the Caucasus in 1832) was settled in new stanitsas established outside Caucasus Province on the sites of former forts along the Georgian Military Road between Vladikavkaz and the Caucasus Line itself. These Cossacks of Ukrainian origin, along with the inhabitants of a few military settlements along the road, became the Vladikavkaz Regiment (incorporated into the KLKV in 1842). In 1845 the Sunzha Regiment was formed comprising new (mostly Don Cossack) stanitsas established on the sites of forts along the upper half of the Sunzha Line, the so-called Upper Sunzha Line (also incorporated into the KLKV in 1845). These moves began to form two chains of Cossack stanitsas crossing lands populated by Kabardins and Ossetians (Vladikavkaz Regiment) and by Ingush, Karabulaks, and Chechens (Sunzha Regiment).

51. The higher estimate is from Debu, *O Kavkazskoi Linii*, p. 402.

52. Based on Kabuzan, *Naselenie Severnogo Kavkaza v XIX-XX veke*.

53. In 1842, Beisug District was abolished. The territory of the Black Sea Host was divided into three districts: Yekaterinodar, Taman, and Yeysk.

54. In 1848, the ranks of the Black Sea Host were augmented by the 3rd Government Recruitment: an additional 14,227 people (7,767 men and 6,460 women) were brought in from Ukrainian provinces.

55. Outside Caucasus Province. Estimate by the Russian military authority: "Vedomost' o chislennosti narodonaseleniia Kavkaza."

56. The figure includes some Ingush and Karabulaks, which, under the designation Nazranovtsy and Galashevtsy, were under the control of the Russian military administration (pristavs subordinate to the commandant of Vladikavkaz Fortress, which became Vladikavkaz District in 1846). Some Chechen communities under the semi-control of Russian authorities ("peaceful Chechens") came under the purview of the Main Chechen Pristavstvo, established in 1839 and headquartered at Groznaya Fortress. This administration included the "Pristavstvo of Terek Chechens [Nadterechnye, settled above the Terek] and Braguny people." The term "Braguny people" reflects polity, not ethnicity (the Braguny were an ethnically mixed community of Kumyks, Chechens, and Kabardins). In 1852, the Chechen Pristavstvo was reorganized into the Main Administration of Chechen People and in 1857 into Chechen District.

57. Salatau, Gumbet, Koisubu, Andi, Avaristan, Baktlukh, Dido, Ankratl, Unkratl, Karakh, Andalal, Tleiserukh, and others (see "Vedomost' o chislennosti narodonaseleniia Kavkaza").

58. Including "Mountain Tatar" communities of Balkar, Urusbii, Chegem, Holam, and Bezingi.

59. "Vedomost' o chislennosti narodonaseleniia Kavkaza." This estimate relates to the four "northern" Ossetian communities under the Russian military government of the Caucasus Line, in particular Digoria (which until 1857 had been administered as part of Greater Kabarda), Alagir, Kurtat, and Tagaur (under the commandant of

Vladikavkaz Fortress or Vladikavkaz District after 1846). The Russian administration kept the remaining Ossetian communities in Georgian Province from the time of its establishment in 1801, while the Kudar community was kept as part of Imeretian Province.

60. Administered by pristavs subordinate to the commandant of Vladikavkaz Fortress/District.

61. Under the Main Kumyk Pristavstvo. The Nogai nomads, who roamed the Kumyk plain, were also "attached" to the Main Kumyk Administration under a separate pristav.

62. In the figures for 1829–1839, the numbers in parenthesis are for male population from *Obozrenie Rossiiskikh vladenii*, vol. 1, pp. 18–22 (based on the Cameral Description of 1829–1832).

63. Does not include the population of Tiflis (25,290).

64. Beginning in 1830, four pristavstvos were formed to administer the Ossetian communities of Georgian Province: Java-Keshelta, Koska-Rok, Magran-Dvaletia (administered out of Gori District) and Ksani-Jamur (administered out of the Gorskaya Subdistrict [distantsia]). These figures relate to the first three units.

65. The higher figure includes an area of the Karayaz Steppe that was claimed by the Tatar population of Elisabethpol and Kazakh-Shamshadil and had been partially incorporated into these units by 1840.

66. The reason such a large range is given for the area of Borchalo and Pambak-Shuragel may be that Lori Pristavstvo was sometimes included in one and sometimes in the other. Other sources estimate the area of the Pambak-Shuragel subdistrict at 4,120 square versts (including Pambak, 2,360, and Shuragel, 1,760 square versts—see Erivan Province in *Voenno-statisticheskoe obozrenie Rossiiskoi imperii*, 1853) and 8,840 square versts (including Pambak 2,150, Shuragel 1,290, and Lori 5,000[?]—see *Obozrenie Rossiiskikh vladenii*, vol. 2, p. 294).

67. The lower figure is from *Akty, sobrannye Kavkazskoi arkheograficheskoi komissiei*, vol. 10, p. 834. The higher figure is from vol. 9, p. 604 (the discrepancy may have to do with whether the populations of Djary-Belokany, Akhaltsikh, and Kutais Districts [uezds] were counted). The area of the province is calculated based on the total territories it comprised. I calculated district populations for 1842 based on district data for the male population and the overall population ("Cameral Description"—see Keppen [Koeppen], *Deviataia reviziia*, p. 139), specifically for districts (uezds): Tiflis, 106,353; Gori, 66,824; Elisabethpol, 89,727; Signakh, 72,804; Telav, 44,344, and districts (okrugs): Gorsky, 12,176; Ossetian, 18,453; Tusheti-Pshaveti-Khevsuretian, 11,963; Djar-Belokan, 68,835. Another source gives the following population figures for Georgian Province before its reorganization into Georgian-Imeretian Province in 1840: Tiflis District 123,057; Gori 75,416; Signakh 86,996; Telav 81,035; and three Tatar distantsias 92,014 ("Putevoditel'," p. 82).

68. In 1840 Ossetian District (okrug) was established with its center in Kveshety. The district comprised territories of the former Ossetian Pristavstvos of Gori District and Gorskaya Subdistrict (distantsia). In 1842, Ossetian District was again divided into two districts: Ossetian (center in Java) and Gorsky (center in Kveshety).

69. Another source estimates the 1833 population of Imeretia at 152,200 (see map 17 in the list of sources at the end of this volume and Kabuzan, *Naselenie Severnogo Kavkaza v XIX–XX veke*, p. 176).

70. A possible reason for the existence of different figures for the area of the Megrelian Principality is the controversy over whether Samurzakan should be included in it or in Abkhazia.

71. The higher figure is based on Bronevskii, *Noveishie geograficheskie i istoricheskie izvestiia*, and the assumption of 20,000 households averaging 6.25 people each. Map 17 in the list of sources estimates the population of Megrelia at 64,600 (a figure that does not include Samurzakan, 9,000; Dadian Svanetia, 5,000, and, probably, Lechkhum, which had previously been contested by Imeretia).

72. The lower figure is only for the Principality of Svanetia; the higher one includes "Free Svanetia."

73. The lower figure is based on Bronevskii, *Noveishie geograficheskie i istoricheskie izvestiia* (3,000 families averaging 5 people each). The higher figure is from Evetskii, *Statisticheskoe opisanie Zakavkazskogo kraia*. Map 17 in the list of sources estimates the overall population of Svanetia at 25,000.

74. *Obozrenie Rossiiskikh vladenii* may include Samurzakan and Tsebelda in figures for Abkhazia (vol. 1, p. 24).

75. The higher figure reflects the fact that the source (Evetskii, *Statisticheskoe opisanie Zakavkazskogo kraia*) inflates the area and, probably, the population of Akhaltsikh Province by erroneously including a portion of the former Akhaltsikh Pashalik, which, under an 1829 treaty, did not fall within the borders of Russia (in particular the sanjaks [Ottoman administrative divisions] of Childir and Poskhov).

76. The higher estimate is from map 17 in the list of sources. Evetskii, *Statisticheskoe opisanie Zakavkazskogo kraia*, estimates the population of Armenian Province in 1835 at 158,400. The 1829–1832 Cameral Description (fiscal census) of Armenian Province puts the figure at 164,450 (see Shopen, *Istoricheskii pamiatnik*, p. 642).

77. Talysh Province in 1831 was placed under the administration of Muslim Provinces. The lower estimate is based on Kabuzan, *Naselenie Severnogo Kavkaza v XIX–XX veke*, p. 176.

78. The lower figure is based on *Akty, Sobrannye Kavkazskoi Arkheograficheskoi Komissiei*, vol. 9, p. 604; the higher one is based onvol. 10, p. 834. The province's area was calculated based on the total of territories it comprised.

79. Samur District was formed in 1839 out of the Lezgin free communities of Akhty-Para, Alty-Para, and Dokuz-Para. In 1844, the Rutul community was also incorporated into the district (after being removed from the Ilisu Sultanate).

80. The pristavstvo existed in 1844–1845 on the lands of the Akusha-Dargo confederation of highlander communities (sometimes called the Dargin Union). After an 1845 uprising, the Akusha-Dargo confederation joined the Imamate. Russian administration was restored in 1854, and the Dargin District was established.

81. Where there is a range of population figures for the units of the Daghestan Military district, the higher one is based on "Vedomost' o chislennosti narodonaseleniia Kavkaza" and the lower one is based on Evetskii, *Statisticheskoe opisanie Zakavkazskogo kraia*.

82. Another source gives 12,000 households (*Obozrenie Rossiiskikh vladenii*, vol. 3, p. 188).

83. The area and higher estimate for the population of Derbent Province are based on Evetskii, *Statisticheskoe opisanie Zakavkazskogo kraia*, p. 223, which includes the "raiat" portion of Kara-Kaitag and all of Lower Kaitag (referred to as Bashly District [okrug]). The "uzden," or free, part of Kara-Kaitag was outside the control of the Russian administration.

84. The figure may reflect the situation before Kaitag Province was divided.

85. The figure in parentheses (from Evetskii, *Statisticheskoe opisanie Zakavkazskogo kraia*, p. 226) is for Tabasaran as a whole, although the source refers to it as "Tabasaran Qadiate." By the time it was conquered by Russia, Tabasaran was divided into two parts—North Tabasaran (ruled by a qadi, an elected ruler comprising both judicial and spiritual authority, including among members of free peasant communities) and South Tabasaran (the feudal domain of a maisum—a hereditary ruler). Accordingly, North Tabasaran was referred to as a qadiate and South Tabasaran as a maisumate. Both parts of Tabasaran were further divided into an "uzden" part (populated by free peasant commoners) and a "raiat" part (populated by peasant vassals). The overall population of Tabasaran is inflated by some sources, which estimate it at 50,000 (see Bronevskii, *Noveishie geograficheskie i istoricheskie izvestiia*; "Vedomost' o chislennosti narodonaseleniia Kavkaza"). Shtukenberg (1859) gives 500 square miles for Lower (Raiat) Tabasaran.

86. Probably these figures are inflated and include the population of Samur District. Bronevskii (*Noveishie geograficheskie i istoricheskie izvestiia*) offers the figure of 23,147 for the population of the Kuba feudal domain (obviously not including the district).

87. The source (Evetskii, *Statisticheskoe opisanie Zakavkazskogo kraia*, p. 232) probably includes allied communities of highland Daghestan in the total area of the Avar Khanate, but the population figure is obviously just for the Avar Khanate itself.

88. Primary sources: Keppen [Koeppen], *Deviataia reviziia*; "Statisticheskie tablitsy Rossiiskoi imperii," 1858 (data as of 1856).

89. "Statisticheskie tablitsy Rossiiskoi imperii," 1863 (data as of 1858).

90. See Keppen [Koeppen], *Deviataia reviziia*. According to data from *Voenno-statisticheskoe obozrenie Rossiiskoi imperii* for Stavropol Province, the province had a total of 332,624 "civilian" inhabitants (including 109,596 *inovertsy*, adherents of other faiths—i.e., non-Orthodox Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, and Jews), 256,140 members of the Caucasus Line Cossack Host, and 45,000 regular troops and Don Cossacks deployed along the Caucasus Line.

91. Does not include territory of the Caucasus Line Cossack Host located beyond the boundaries of Stavropol Province (along the "New" and Sunzha Lines).

92. In 1845, the "Regulations of the Caucasus Line Cossack Host" were adopted by the imperial authorities. Henceforth, the KLKV comprised five brigades, with two or three former regiments and their respective territory (polkovoi okrug) going to each brigade: 1st Brigade, headquartered in Ust-Labinskaya, comprised two Caucasus regiments and two Laba regiments; 2nd Brigade, headquartered in Prochnookopskaya, comprised two Kuban regiments and two Stavropol regiments (formed in 1833 mostly of former peasant villages, including those located along the former Azov-Mozdok Line); 3rd Brigade, headquartered in Suvorovskaya, comprised two Khoper regiments and two Volga regiments; 4th Brigade, headquartered in Yekaterinogradskaya, comprised the Gorsky, Mozdok, and Vladikavkaz regiments; 5th Brigade, headquartered in Chervlennaya, comprised members of the Greben and Kizlyar Hosts and Sunzha Regiment (the Kizlyar Host resulted from the 1838 merger of the Terek-Kizlyar and Terek-Semeinoe Hosts). Later the brigades of the KLKV would change their numeration and makeup. The total population (both sexes) of the Caucasus Line Host (KLKV) in 1846 was 172,895 (see *Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii o Rossii*, p. 22). The institutional common identity of the Lineitsy, or Cossacks of the Line, gradually supplemented and overshadowed the past identities of the different Hosts.

93. A total of 45,793 nomads were attributed to the districts. According to *Voenno-statisticheskoe obozrenie Rossiiskoi imperii* for Stavropol Province, the overall nomad population was significantly higher—78,833.

94. The figure represents the area of the nomadic lands of Greater Derbet Ulus and Lesser Derbet Ulus within Stavropol Province (including part of the seasonal pastures also used and claimed by the Turkmen and Nogai).

Beginning in 1858–1860, Kalmyk nomads of the Lesser Derbet Ulus were limited to territories of Astrakhan Province, while some of the lands they had traditionally roamed within Stavropol Province were, with the formation of the Turkmen Pristavstvo, recognized mostly as belonging to the Turkmen.

95. In 1859, two new Cossack regiments were formed; the 2nd Vladikavkaz Regiment (out of seven stanitsas established in 1859–1864 east of Vladikavkaz, connecting the fortress with the upper Sunzha Line) and the 2nd Sunzha Regiment (out of eight stanitsas established on the sites of forts of the lower Sunzha Line). By 1860, when the KLKV was abolished, the Host's overall population, including stanitsas located outside Stavropol Province, totaled 318,156 ("Statisticheskie tablitsy Rossiiskoi imperii," 1863, p. 176, note).

96. The figure reflects the situation before approximately 30,000 Nogai emigrated to the Ottoman Empire and the 1860 abolition of two out of four Nogai pristavstvos—Kalaus-Sablia and Beshtau-Kuma, and Kalaus-Jambulak.

97. The figure represents individuals of both sexes "not subject to military authority," based on data of the 9th Revision (see Keppen [Koeppen], *Deviataia reviziia*). By 1852, the five stanitsas that made up this defensive line (settled in 1838 around Anapa) had a population of 5,412 (both sexes) (Shtukenberg, *Opisanie Zakavkazskogo kraia*, p. 57). They were abandoned in 1855, and their inhabitants were evacuated to the Caucasus Line.

98. In 1856, territories of the Caucasus Defensive Line were reorganized into two military-administrative units: the Right Wing (including Black Sea Host territory and the former Right Flank of the Line) and the Left Wing (composed of the former Center and Left Flank of the Line). Where only one number is given, it is for population.

99. Several pristavstvos were established in the 1840s in the territories south and west of the Kuban River, which came under Russian semi-control: (a) the Main Pristavstvo of Kuban Peoples (Zakubanskikh narodov, literally "peoples living beyond Kuban," meaning mostly Mansur Nogai, Kypchak Nogai, and Dudaryqwa Abazins; in 1852 this pristavstvo was divided into the Lower Kuban [Nizhne-Prikubanskoe] Pristavstvo and the Pristavstvo of Karamurzin and Kypchak Nogai); (b) Pristavstvo of Beslenei Peoples and Kuban Armenians (including also Nauruz Nogai and some Abazin settlements); (c) the Pristavstvo of Laba Peoples (Zalabinskikh narodov, literally "peoples living beyond the Laba," later renamed the Pristavstvo of the Temirgoi, Yegerukai, Hatukai, and Bzhedug Peoples; this unit was abolished in 1852 and partially reestablished in 1857); (d) the Pristavstvo of Tokhtamysh Nogai, including also some Abazin settlements.

Beginning in 1857, the Karamurzin-Kypchak and Beslenei-Kuban Armenian Pristavstvos were merged into the Pristavstvo of Kuban Nogai (Zakubanskikh Nogaitsev). An 1858 source ("Statisticheskie tablitsy Rossiiskoi Imperii," 1863) possibly counted the last entity along with the Toktamysh Nogai Pristavstvo as "Land of Kuban Nogai," while the other territories beyond the Kuban River were counted as "Land of Kuban Highlanders."

In 1859, there were five Kuban pristavstvos: Bzhedug, Lower Kuban (Nizhne-Prikubanskoe), Kuban Nogai, Tokhtamysh, and Karachai-Abazin.

100. After the 1848 addition of several neighboring Abazin settlements to the Karachai Pristavstvo, it was officially renamed the Pristavstvo of Karachai and Abazin Peoples.

101. Kabardin District encompassed (in addition to Greater Kabarda proper) a pristavstvo covering five "Mountain Tatar" communities and included the Gorsky (Mountain) uchastok, which was increasingly informally referred to as Balkaria. Kabardin District also originally included the pristavstvos of Digoria and Lesser Kabarda. Later, in 1859, both entities became part of the Ossetian Military District.

102. The term *military* was added to the name of this new district in the Left Wing of the Caucasus Line to distinguish it from the Ossetian District that already existed under the civilian administration of Tiflis Province (*Akty, sobrannye Kavkazskoi arkheograficheskoi komissiei*, vol. 12, p. 646). Part of the former would eventually become North Ossetia, and the latter formed the main territory of South Ossetia.

The Ossetian Military District of the Left Wing was not an ethnic entity, and as a successor of the "multi-tribal" Vladikavkaz District (1846–1856) originally included three Ossetian-speaking communities/pristavstvos (Alagir, Kurtat, and Tagaur) and four Ingush- and Orstkhoi-speaking communities/pristavstvos (Nazran, Nagornoe [Galgai and other Ingush mountain lands], Galashi, and Karabulak). This discrepancy between the name of the district and its ethnically mixed composition led the authorities to restore the name "Vladikavkaz District" in 1860.

103. In 1852, the Main Kumyk Pristavstvo was upgraded to the Administration of the Kumyk Domain (Kumykskoe Vladenie), which incorporated lands of Aksai, Kostek, and Enderi.

104. Probably what the source refers to as "Daghestan" in this case is the territory between the Sulak/Andi Koisu and the border of Caspian Territory (Prikaspiisky Krai) as of 1858 (the Avar Khanate, Anktratl, Unkratl, Dido, Gumbet, and "some of the Kists" are specifically mentioned). See "Statisticheskie tablitsy Rossiiskoi imperii," 1863, p. 52.

105. The population figure is calculated based on 1852 data for the number of households in Tiflis Province ("Statisticheskie svedeniia po Tiflisskoi i Erivanskoi gubeniiam") and an assumed average 7.7 people per family (see Keppen [Koeppen], *Deviataia reviziia*, p. 140). Population figures for Tiflis Province from "Statisticheskie tablitsy Rossiiskoi imperii" for 1856 differ significantly: the population of Tiflis Province (1856) is listed as 560,455, including (a) in districts (uezds): Tiflis 111,504; Telav 46,395; Signakh 59,707; Gori 63,253; Elisabethpol 104,932; (b) in districts (okrugs): Ossetian 50,340; Gorsky 21,550; Tusheti-Pshav-Khevsuretian 33,943; Djar-Belokan 68,836.

106. Belokan District was under the military administration of the Lezgin Defensive Line. Some Daghestani highlander communities located on the northern slopes of the Greater Caucasus mountain range were also nominally placed under the Lezgin Defensive Line as pristavstvos: Jurmut (part of Ankratl), Dido, and Antsukh-Kapucha.

107. In 1859 the district was abolished and its territory was divided between the Gori District of Tiflis Province and the Ossetian Military District of the Left Wing of the Caucasus Defensive Line.

108. In 1860 Belokany District was renamed Zakataly District and placed under the administration of Daghestan Province. The so-called Gornye magaly (Mountain Quarters) along the headwaters of the Samur (Tsakhur villages) were removed from the district.

109. Figures based on data from "Statisticheskaia tablitsa Kavkazskogo kraia," 1862. The Kutais Governorate General (Kutais Territory on the map) was established in April 1856 and abolished in 1867.

110. Keppen [Koeppen] (*Deviataia reviziia*) offers various population estimates as to the Principality of Megrelia, ranging from 61,000 to 108,780 (as of 1850).

111. Keppen [Koeppen], *Deviataia reviziia*.

112. *Voenno-statisticheskoe obozrenie Rossiiskoi imperii*, 1853, Erivan Province.

113. Keppen offers 1848–1851 data from the Cameral Descriptions (fiscal censuses that included only the male population) and presumes that this higher estimate is inflated since it does not take into account the fact that "in the southern provinces the number of women is usually lower than the number of men" (see Keppen [Koeppen], *Deviataia reviziia*, Table 63, Erivan Province, as well as pp. 10–11). The 9th Revision showed the following distribution of the province's male population by district: Erivan 58,931, Alexandropol 22,931, Nakhichevan 20,675, Novy Bayazet 18,762, Ordubat 16,157.

114. The area of Erivan Province including the surface of Lake Gokcha totaled 27,749 square versts.

115. Berzhe offers an estimate (probably inflated) of the population of the Tarki Shamkhalate for 1846–1852: 60,000 (Berzhe, "Kratkii ocherk gorskikh plemen na Kavkaze," p. 271).

116. According to Berzhe, ibid., 20,000.

117. The seven settlements in 1851 made up separate communities located on the outskirts of the Russian military's administrative control: Ishkarty, Erpeli, Karanai, Chirkey, Chiriyurt, Sultan-Yangiyurt, and Chontaul. Between 1860 and 1867 they were united into the Sulak Naibate.

118. Primary sources: "Prostranstvo, chislo zhitelei i plotnost' naseleniia Kavkazskogo kraia," "Statisticheskaia tablitsa Kavkazskogo kraia," 1862.

119. "Prostranstvo, chislo zhitelei i plotnost naseleniia Kavkazskogo kraia," *Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii o Kavkaze*, "Statisticheskaia tablitsa Kavkazskogo kraia," 1862, "Prostranstvo, naselenie i naselennost' Kavkazskogo kraia v 1871 godu."

120. "Statisticheskaia tablitsa Kavkazskogo kraia," 1862. The number of inhabitants of each district includes nomadic *inorodtsy* (literally, people of other ethnicities). The total number of nomadic Kalmyks, Nogai, and Turkmen in the province in 1862 was 84,377.

121. All three of the province's districts had lands roamed by nomadic peoples.

122. The official name of this pristavstvo was Achikulak-Jambulak-Yedisan-Yedishkul.

123. The source ("Statisticheskaia tablitsa Kavkazskogo kraia," 1862) includes in these figures territory and population both of the newly formed Kuban Province and of highlanders south of the Kuban, who at this time were not under the control of the Russian authorities. In 1860, when the Kuban Cossack Host (Kubanskoe Kazachye Voisko) was established, it totaled 213,624 people (Malukalo, *Kubanskoe kazach'e voisko)*. This is apparently the number of Chernomortsy (former members of the Black Sea Cossack Host) at the time of the Kuban Host's creation. In 1860, another six brigades of Lineitsy were incorporated into the Kuban Host (the Caucasus, Kuban, Khoper, Stavropol, Laba and Urup Brigades, each consisting of two regiments). The remaining four abolished KLKV brigades formed the new Terek Cossack Host (the Volga, Sunzha-Vladikavkaz, Gorsko-Mozdok, and Kizlyar-Greben Brigades, each consisting of two regiments).

With the establishment of Kuban and Terek Provinces in 1860 came the introduction of the Russian official term "the North Caucasus," which comprised Kuban, Terek, and Stavropol Provinces (*Akty, sobrannye Kavkazskoi arkheograficheskoi komissiei*, vol. 12, p. 58).

124. Territory of the so-called "Old Line" (or the Kuban Line, which extended along the right bank of the Kuban) and the "Quiet Line" (a segment of the former Azov-Mozkok Line that cut through Stavropol Province and wound up behind the line of Cossack military colonization).

125. Beginning in 1841, territory of the "New Line" (or Laba Line, running along the right bank of the Laba River) was taken over by stanitsas of two regiments of the former KLKV's Laba Brigade. Beginning in 1857 it was expanded to encompass stanitsas of the Urup Brigade.

126. Abolished in 1861; territory was merged into the Lower Kuban (Nizhne-Kubanskoe) Pristavstvo.

127. Renamed Lower Kuban (Nizhne-Kubanskoe) Pristavstvo in 1861.

128. Abolished in 1861; territory incorporated into the Upper Kuban (Verkhne-Kubanskoe) Pristavstvo.

129. Abolished in 1861; territory incorporated into the Upper Kuban (Verkhne-Kubanskoe) Pristavstvo.

130. Established in 1860 and abolished in 1864, when all local Circassians (Natukhai) either emigrated to the Ottoman Empire or were resettled in 1862–1864 east of the Adagum Line to Bzhedug District. In 1863, the highlander population of Natukhai District was 26,684.

131. Established in 1859 and upgraded to Bzhedug District in 1861.

132. "Statisticheskie tablitsy Zakavkazkogo kraia," 1864 (data for 1863).

133. General Rostislav Fadeev mentioned in his report of 1863 two sources of population data, Caucasus Army Headquarters and the pristavs, which gave the following numbers, respectively: Upper Kuban Pristavstvo 26,348 and 43,932; Lower Kuban Pristavstvo 4,540 and 8,252; Abadzekh District 38,434 (both sources); Bzhedug District 37,436 and 37,648; Shapsug District 4,500 (both sources). In total, the 1863 native population of Kuban Province under Russian military administration was between 106,798 (Headquarters data) and 132,766 (pristav data). See Fadeev, *Gosudarstvennyi poriadok*, p.395.

134. Established in 1864 and abolished in 1865 after local Circassians (Shapsug) either emigrated to the Ottoman Empire or were resettled to Bzhedug District (renamed Psekups in 1865). Here the first territorial core of the "Adygeitsy" (Adyghean) ethnic category of Soviet censuses (one of four "different" Adyghe/Circassian subethnic groups) was formed within Russian imperial boundaries.

135. In 1861, former Temirgoi territory between the Laba and Belaya Rivers came under the authority of the Laba Pristavstvo, upgraded in 1862 into a district that was divided into the Pristavstvos of Lower Laba and Upper Laba. In 1863–1864, some Abadzekhs who had escaped the forced emigration to Turkey were resettled to Temirgoi lowlands, leading to the establishment of Abadzekh District. In 1865, Abadzekh District was renamed Laba District, now inhabited by mix of Abadzekh, Temirgoi (with Yegerukai and Adamii), Hatukai, Makhosh, and Mamkheg Circassians. The district went on to form another geographic core for the contrived "Adygeitsy" category.

136. In 1860, the Terek Cossack Host was formed out of the former KLKV and in 1861 consisted of five brigades with two regiments in each: 1st Brigade, comprised of two Volga Regiments; 2nd Brigade, comprised of the Mozdok and Gorsky Regiments; 3rd Brigade, comprised of the Greben and Kizlyar Regiments; 4th Brigade, comprised of two Vladikavkaz Regiments; and 5th Brigade, comprised of two Sunzha Regiments.

137. In 1862, the Lesser Kabarda Subdistrict (uchastok) was returned to Kabardin District. The district's overall area and population totaled 10,446 square versts and 41,501 people.

138. The Ossetian Military District (which became Vladikavkaz District in 1860) was divided in 1862 along ethnic lines into the Ossetian and Ingush Districts, Lesser Kabarda (see previous note), and Cossack stanitsas located along the Georgian Military Road and along the Upper Sunzha Line (in 1861 the Line comprised two Vladikavkaz Regiments of the Terek Cossack Host).

139. A comparison with 1863 data for districts settled by Chechens suggests a significant population shift during 1861–1863 from Chechnya's mountain districts (Argun and Ichkeri) to lowland districts. In 1863, Ichkeri District was divided into the districts of Ichkeri (878 sq. versts/13,185) and Nagorny (1,188 sq. versts /16,568), which also absorbed part of Kumyk District, including the Avar-speaking communities of Salatau. Chechen District consisted of two parts, as Chechnya had been divided by the forts of the Sunzha Line since Yermolov's time (1817–1818) and hence by Cossack stanitsas since 1845.

140. "Prostranstvo, naselenie i naselennost' Kavkazskogo kraia v 1871 godu."

141. The district comprised the naibates of Chokh, Sogratl, Tilitl, Karakh, Gidatl, Kuyada, Arakan, and Untsukul.

142. Zakataly District was temporarily placed under the military administration of Daghestan Province in 1860, when that province was first being formed. In 1881 independent administration was introduced. Between 1893 and 1905 the district was incorporated into "civilian" Tiflis Province.

143. In 1867, Tiflis Province's Gorsky District was abolished and its territory was incorporated into the newly formed Dushet District.

144. In 1880, Tiflis District was divided into Tiflis and Borchalo Districts.

145. In 1873, a part of Telav District was used to restore Tionety District (now as a uezd).

146. In 1873 the district was divided into two uezds: Akhaltsikh and Akhalkalaki.

147. In 1864, when the Principality of Abkhazia was abolished, its territory, along with Tsebelda, Samurzakan, and the former Pskhu community, became the Sukhum Military District (Sukhumsky Voenny Otdel), with a total area of 6,942 square versts and a population of 79,195. Between 1864 and the uprising of 1866, Sukhum Military District was administratively divided into three okrugs (Abkhaz, Bzyb, and Abzhua) and two pristavstvos (Tsebelda and Samurzakan).

148. In 1873 the district was divided into two districts: Elisabethpol and Jevanshir.

149. In 1873 the district was divided into two districts: Nukha and Aresh.

150. In 1873 the district was divided into two districts: Shusha and Jebrail.

151. In 1873 the district was divided into two districts: Nakhichevan and Sharur-Daralagez.

152. In 1873 the district was divided into two districts: Echmiadzin and Surmalu.

153. "Prostranstvo, naselenie i naselennost' Kavkazskogo kraia v 1871 godu," "Prostranstvo, naselenie i naselennost' Kavkazskogo kraia (po ofitsial'nym dannym na 1873–1876 gody)."

154. Primary sources: "Kavkazskii krai," "Obzor Terskoi oblasti," *Pervaia Vseobshchaia perepis' naseleniia*, "Dannye o prostranstve i naselenii Kavkazskogo kraia."

155. As of 1878 there were 85,274 "nomadic natives" in Stavropol Province, of which only 18,653 were counted for the appropriate pristavstvo ("Statisticheskaia tablitsa o narodonaselenii Kavkazskogo kraia"). The larger number can be broken down as follows: Greater Derbet Ulus 10,597; Turkmen 6,569; Achikulak 4,167, Kara-Nogai 516 (*Spiski naselennykh mest Kavkazskogo kraia*, p. 404). This discrepancy might result from the seasonal migration of nomads from one pristavstvo to another, leading some nomads to evade official count altogether.

156. In 1900, Novogrigorievsky District was divided into two districts: Blagodarnensky and Praskoveisky.

157. In 1899 the Host lands of Kuban Province totaled 65,330 square versts. Total population by category: Cossack 833,022, highlander 104,247, inogorodnye (mostly non-Cossack Slavic) 788,353.

158. The figure does not include the population of the town of Novorossiisk (14,586).

159. The population figure includes the population of the towns of Mozdok and Georgievsk, which as of 1876 were not incorporated into any district.

160. The Pyatigorsk District of Terek Province was formed in 1874 out of Georgievsk District plus a part of Stavropol Province (along with the city of Pyatigorsk itself). Beginning in January 1882, it was divided into the districts of Pyatigorsk (2,487 sq. versts/30,650) and Nalchik (16,831 sq. versts/132,474) ("Prostranstvo, naselenie i naselennost' Kavkazskogo kraia i Zakaspiiskoi Oblasti," 1886).

161. In 1870 the five brigades that by then made up the Terek Cossack Host were renamed regiments: Volga, Gorsky-Mozdok, Kizlyar-Greben, Vladikavkaz, and Sunzha (the last two joined in 1881 to form the Sunzha-Vladikavkaz Regiment).

162. Before the incorporation of Karanogai Pristavstvo in 1888, Terek Province's area totaled 60,869 square versts.

163. Figures for 1894 broken down by population category: Terek Host, 19,357 square versts/162,868; inogorodnye, 87,470; highlander, 476,083. After 1894 the administrative and military composition of the Terek Cossack Host became more integrated. Each Cossack district (otdel) corresponded to the territory of a specific regiment: Pyatigorsk District (occupied by stanitsas of the Volgsky Regiment), Mozdok District (Gorsko-Mozdoksky Regiment), Kizlyar District (Kizlyarsko-Grebenskoi Regiment), Sunzha District (Sunzhensko-Vladikavkazsky Regiment). Each Cossack regiment was broken into three numbered regiments under the same name (the 3rd Volga [Volgsky] Regiment, etc.).

164. The figures include the population of rural communities of Lesser Kabarda and Ingushetia and their territory.

165. Significant differences in official population counts by district (cf. 1881, 1897, and 1914) may be associated with seasonal factors and the highlanders' common practice of leaving for mountain pastures in the summer or lowlands in the winter, sometimes in a different district. Those who departed for summer or winter quarters may have been counted as residing permanently in a district other than that of their native village.

166. "Prostranstvo, naselenie i naselennost' Kavkazskogo kraia," 1878.

167. Primary sources: "Prostranstvo i naselenie Kavkazskogo kraia," 1914, and *Statisticheskii ezhegodnik Rossii*, 1915. Upper-range estimates for Stavropol Province for 1914 (rounded to the nearest hundred) are taken from *Statisticheskii ezhegodnik Rossii*. The lower population figure is based on data from uezd government records as of 1 January 1914 ("Prostranstvo i naselenie Kavkazskogo kraia," 1914).

168. Primary sources: "Nalichnoe naselenie Iugo-Vostoka Rossii," *Statisticheskii spravochnik Iugo-Vostoka Rossii*, *Ekonomicheskaia geografiia Iugo-Vostoka Rossii*, *Zakavkaz'e. Statistiko-ekonomicheskii sbornik*.

169. *Statisticheskii ezhegodnik Rossii za 1913 god*, *Pamiatnaia knizhka Stavropol'skoi gubernii na 1915 god*. The discrepancy in the population figures has to do with the difference between those currently living in the province and those registered there but temporarily absent.

170. Between 1900 and 1911 the uezd was called Praskoveisky (centered in the village of Praskoveya).

171. The marked discrepancy in population figures for the territories within the province roamed by nomads has to do with the way in which nonnomadic and nomadic peoples were recorded. A significant proportion of nomads were not counted as belonging to pristavstvos.

172. In 1914: Kuban Host, 65,100 square versts/1,331,149; highlanders, 133,278, inogorodnye, 1,514,944 ("Otchet o sostoianii Kubanskoi oblasti za 1914 god").

173. Temryuk District was renamed Taman District in 1910.

174. The territories of what had been Kuban and Black Sea Provinces were essentially united in March 1920 under the government of the Kuban Revolutionary Committee (the Soviet provincial government) immediately after the Red Army occupied it at the end of the Civil War.

175. Ranges for the uezds and okrugs of Terek Province in 1913 reflect two sources: *Statisticheskii ezhegodnik Rossii za 1913 god* and "Statisticheskii ezhegodnik Terskoi oblasti za 1913 god." Figures for 1914: Terek Host Lands 18,858 square kilometers; Cossack population 247,333, inogorodnye population 393,979, highlander population 631,042.

176. Terek Province (Terskaya Gubernia) was established as part of the RSFSR in February-April 1921 after the territory of the newly formed Gorskaya ASSR was removed from the former Terek Province. Figures include Sviatoi Krest District (uezd) and the former Achikulak Pristavstvo, which were joined to the province in August 1921. Terek Province was abolished in June 1924, and its territory was incorporated into the Southeast Territory (which became North Caucasus Territory in November 1924).

177. The population figure does not include Karachai and Sunzha Districts (okrugs) but does include estimates for Chechnya (Vedeno and Grozny Districts [okrugs]).

178. Vladikavkaz (Ossetian) District (okrug) of the Gorskaya ASSR was divided into Digor and Ossetian Districts (okrugs) between February and July 1922.

179. These last three districts remained parts of the Gorskaya ASSR between 1922 and its abolition in July 1924. Their combined area totaled 9,629 square versts and combined population totaled 329,000.

180. In 1905, Zakataly District (okrug) was removed from Tiflis Province and placed directly under the Viceroy of the Caucasus.

181. In 1905, Sukhum District (okrug) was removed from Kutais Province and placed directly under the Viceroy of the Caucasus.

182. Beginning in 1922, a bilateral treaty gave Abkhazia the political status of an SSR institutionally tied to (federated with) Georgia, also an SSR. In 1927, Abkhazia's treaty-based status was spelled out in a provision of the Georgian constitution: "The SSR Abkhazia is part of the SSR Georgia under a special treaty between them."

183. See "Adres-kalendar' Azerbaidzhanskoi respubliki na 1920 god."

184. See "Doklad," in Barsegov, *Genotsid armian*, vol. 1.

185. Primary sources: *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1926 goda*, *Spravochnik po avtonomnym oblastiam*, and map 89 in the List of Sources.

186. Primary sources: *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1937 goda*, *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1939 goda* (Table 15A, The National Makeup of the Population for the USSR, Republics, Oblasts, and Raions).

187. In addition to those territories shown in the map, the North Caucasus Territory included okrugs located within the former Don Host Province (not shown): Donetsk, Don, Taganrog, Salsk, Shakhty-Donetsk. Under the policy of *korenizatsia* beginning 1924–1925, okrugs and raions with predominantly Ukrainian populations began a program to "Ukrainize" education and local government (the same policy of "nativization" of education and local government as was implemented in national administrative units across the country). Beginning in 1932–1933, Soviet nationalities policies shifted, and Ukrainization in the North Caucasus was abandoned.

188. There were also 16,540 foreign citizens in permanent residence (presumably subjects of Greece).

189. There were also 14,174 foreign citizens in permanent residence.

190. There were also 3,071 foreign citizens in permanent residence.

191. The district was abolished in 1953 and its territory divided between neighboring rural districts.

192. Miasnikovskii Armenian District (not shown in this atlas) was located northwest of Rostov-on-Don. The district was established in May 1926 and currently exists as an ordinary (nonnational) rural district within Rostov Province. The majority population is still Armenian.

193. Vannovsky (German) District was abolished in May 1941.

194. In August 1935, the Greek District was expanded to encompass the territory of neighboring and predominantly Slavic Krymsk District, thus eliminating it as a "national administrative-territorial unit." In 1938, the Greek District was renamed Krymsk District, eliminating the last vestige of Greek territorial autonomy in the Caucasus.

195. Formed in 1928 on part of the territory of Kalmyk Cossack stanitsas in what had been Don Host Province. Abolished in March 1944.

196. In 1934, Shapsug District was expanded to encompass the predominantly Slavic part of Tuapse District. The center of Shapsug District moved from Soviet-Kvaje to the Lazarevskoe settlement. In May 1945, Shapsug District was renamed Lazarevsky District and formally ceased to be a "national administrative-territorial unit."

197. Established in February 1938 out of five former districts of the Daghestan ASSR north of the Terek (Kizlyar, Achikulak, Kara-Nogai, Kaiasula, and Shelkovskoi).

198. The administrative-territorial composition of Daghestan underwent continuous reforms in the 1920s to 1930s, when 10 former districts (okrugs) were reorganized into 26 kantons, which were later renamed raions. The ethnic principle in administrative policy was realized through the establishment of "national raions" (ethnic territorial units), where possible. By the mid-1930s, when ethnicity ceased to be the guiding principle in administrative-territorial policy in the USSR, 26 out of the Daghestan ASSR's 34 rural raions were mono-ethnic (with a single group representing at least 75 percent of the population). Eight raions remained ethnically mixed. The Akhvakh, Botlikh, Gumbet, Gunib, Kazbekov, Kakhib, Tlyarata, Untsukul, Khunzakh, Tsumada, Tsunta, and Charoda raions were predominated by Avar-speaking and Andi-Tsez peoples; Akusha, Urkarakh, Kaitag, Levashi, and Sergo-Kala were Dargin raions; Akhty, Dokuzpara, Kasumkent, and Kurakh were Lezgin raions; and Lak and Kuli were Lak raions. Tabasarans, Aguls, Rutuls, and Azerbaijanis predominated in one rural raion each (Tabasaran, Agul, Rutul, and Derbent rural raions, respectively). Kumyks had a majority in raions with a significant minority of other ethnic groups (Karabudakhkent, Kayakent, Kumtorkale, Buinaksk). Nogai predominated in Karanogai, Kaiasula, and Achikulak raions (all became part of Stavropol/Orjonikidze Territory in 1938 as part of newly established Kizlyar District [okrug]). The only raions lacking an ethnic majority were Babayurt, Khasavyurt, and Khiv. Beginning in the mid-1930s, the administrative trend toward the conglomeration of "national raions" in Daghestan gave way to economic and other political forces. Mono-ethnic raions were not abolished but functioned increasingly as ordinary rural districts with the their own ethnic/linguistic "flavor" and cultural and educational policies.

199. Primary source: "SSSR."

200. The results of the All-Russian Censuses of 2002 (*Vserossiiskaia perepis' naseleniia 2002 goda*) and 2010 (*Vserossiiskaia perepis' naseleniia 2010 goda*) are shown by region.

201. Established in June 2006 on the territories of Abazin settlements within Karachai-Cherkessia.

202. Established in October 2007 on the territories of Nogai settlements in Karachai-Cherkessia. Another Nogai District long existed in the Daghestan ASSR, the successor of the former Kara-Nogai Pristavstvo (which existed until 1920) and Kara-Nogai District (renamed Nogai District in 1966). As of 2010, Nogai District in Daghestan covered an area of 9,000 square kilometers and had a population of 22,539.

203. The republic of Ingushetia was established in accordance with a June 1992 Russian Federation law as part of the division of what was once the Chechen-Ingush Republic into two separate republics. The exact borders of the Ingush republic were to be finalized during a "transitional period." As of 2014 the republic's borders had still not been legally finalized. Currently (as of 2014) the borders of Ingushetia have been given a measure of formality by official documents enumerating and describing the municipalities that fall within its territories (in accordance with the 23 February 2009 Law of the Republic of Ingushetia "Concerning the Determination of Borders of Municipalities of the Republic of Ingushetia"; however this law does not "regulate the determination of borders between the Republic of Ingushetia and other administrative entities of the RF").

204. This figure probably includes refugees from the Chechen Republic residing in Ingushetia while the 2002 census was being conducted (estimated at approximately 100,000).

205. The expert community has cast doubt on the reliability of the figures generated by the 2002 All-Russian Census for the Chechen Republic. It has been argued that a more realistic figure for the number of people living in the Chechen Republic in 2002 would be between 800,000 and 813,000 (see Cherkasov, "Demografiia," with references to the calculations made by the Russian State Committee for Statistics).

206. Census data, 2003. Source: National Statistics Office of Georgia (available at http://www.geostat.ge/cms/site_images/_files/english/census/2002/03%20Ethnic%20Composition.pdf, accessed 11/26/2013), including data on those parts of de facto independent Abkhazia and South Ossetia where Georgian control allowed Georgian authorities to conduct the count (upper Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia and several Georgian enclaves in South Ossetia: Leningor/Akhalgori District, Avnevi-Nuli, Kekhvi-Kurta-Tamarasheni, and Eredvi-Vanati).

207. *Demographic Situation in Georgia*.

208. Census data for 2003 and 2011. Source: *Etnodemografia Kavkaza*.

209. Data as of 2009 by the State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan (http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/demoqraphic/az/AP_/1_5.xls) on population within the internationally recognized boundaries of

Azerbaijan (including 120,300 of Armenians, presumably primarily the population of the de facto independent Mountain Karabakh Republic).

210. Data as of 2012 by the State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan (http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/demoqraphic/en/AP_/AP_1.shtml) within the internationally recognized boundaries of Azerbaijan (i.e., including population of the de facto independent Mountain Karabakh Republic).

211. Data as of 2012 by the State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan (http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/demoqraphic/en/AP_/2_4.xls)

212. See the map "Republic of Armenia and the Mountain Karabakh Republic" in *Perepis' naseleniia NKR 2005 goda* and *Statistical Yearbook of the NKR*, 2010.

213. Population of the Republic of Armenia as of 1 July, 2012. National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia (http://www.armstat.am/file/article/bnakch_01.07.2012.pdf).

Appendix 2

Major Cities in the Caucasus

The following table gives population figures for historically significant urban entities. Light-green background is used for cities, dark green for the region's five largest cities, yellow for places that have not been granted city status. Post-1991 names (as seen on Map 57) are given, with past or alternate versions in parentheses.

	1856[1]	1876[2]	1897[3]	1914[4]	1926[5]	1959[6]	1989[7]	1999–2005[8]	2009–2012[9]
Akhaltsikhe	13,298	13,265	15,357	23,924	12,310	16,868	24,570	18,483	19,700
Anapa	2,144[10]	5,019	6,944	17,238	13,264	19,602	54,976	53,493	58,990
Armavir	753	4,634	18,113	57,480	74,377	110,994	160,983	193,964	188,832
Baku (Baki)	5,413	14,577	111,904	248,812	453,333	642,507	1,150,055	1,788,854	2,122,300
Batumi	?	3,479[11]	28,508	38,615	48,474	82,328	136,609	121,806	125,800
Budennovsk (Sviatoy Krest, Prikumsk)	3,839	3,783	6,583	14,852	15,780	27,895	55,350	65,687	64,624
Buinaksk (Temir-Khan-Shura)	1,069	5,094	9,214	16,922	9,504	32,956	56,783	61,437	62,623
Cherkessk (Batalpashinskaya)[12]	2,874	5,320	11,473	19,193	19,355	41,709	113,060	116,244	129,069
Derbent	11,506	13,775	14,649	33,536	23,111	47,318	78,371	101,031	119,200
Dusheti	1,925	2,041	2,566	2,213	2,100	5,444	8,439	7,315	7,600
Ganja (Elisabethpol, Kirovabad, Gence)	10,938	18,505	33,625	59,586	57,393	116,122	278,006	299,342	320,700
Gelenjik		?	?	4,483	4,500	14,131	47,417	50,012	54,980
Georgievsk	3,471	3,315	12,115	25,591	22,163	35,135	62,926	70,575	72,153
Gori	3,378	5,015	10,269	18,211	10,547	35,061	68,924	49,516	54,600
Grozny	1,996	8,452	15,564	36,201	68,677	172,448	399,688	210,720	271,573
Gyumri (Alexandropol, Leninakan)	11,358	20,477	31,616	51,316	42,313	108,446	122,587	150,917	145,700
Kars	?	3,665[13]	20,805	30,086	No data	No data	78,455	77,525	76,729
Kislovodsk	936	1,373	1,872	15,178	31,345	77,998	114,414	129,788	128,553
Kizlyar	9,305	9,178	7,282	12,130	9,514	25,573	39,748	48,457	48,984
Krasnodar (Yekaterinodar)	9,929	32,530	65,606	108,420	161,172	313,110	620,516	723,404	744,995
Kutaisi	3,808	8,717	32,476	57,917	48,196	128,203	234,870	185,965	196,800
Lankaran (Lenkoran)	1,999	4,779	8,733	13,967	12,078	25,209	45,020	48,600	50,800
Maikop		22,537	34,327	54,442	52,320	82,135	148,608	156,931	144,249
Makhachkala (Petrovsk)	4,263[14]	3,893	9,753	22,464	31,702	119,334	317,475	462,413	572,076
Mozdok	10,970	8,379	9,330	15,152	14,008	25,611	38,037	42,865	38,768
Nakhchivan (Nakhichevan)	5,157	6,875	8,790	10,246	8,946	25,340	59,754	64,300	74,100
Nalchik	1,478[15]	1,651[16]	4,809	7,350	11,451	87,617	234,547	274,974	240,203
Nazran	?	?	274	258	1,282	5,703	18,246	125,066[17]	93,335
Novorossiisk	1,776[18]	2,988	16,897	66,130	66,118	93,461	185,938	232,079	241,952
Ordubad	1,040	3,525	4,611	5,472	3,739	6,699	9,395	9,500	10,300
Ozurgeti (Makharadze)	306	700	4,710	8,050	5,874	19,131	23,399	18,705	18,700
Poti	1,309	3,026	7,346	19,667	13,137	42,068	50,922	47,149	47,900
Pyatigorsk	4,743	13,665	18,440	35,307	53,487	69,617	129,499	140,559	142,511
Quba (Kuba)	7,907	11,313	15,363	13,459	13,613	15,947	20,791	22,100	23,900
Salian (Saliany)	3,405	9,038	11,787	17,465	8,335	17,197	30,396	35,900	36,800
Shamakhi (Shemakha)	20,433	24,183	20,007	27,527	3,665	13,066	24,681	28,500	36,800

	1856[1]	1876[2]	1897[3]	1914[4]	1926[5]	1959[6]	1989[7]	1999–2005[8]	2009–2012[9]
Shaki (Sheki, Nukha)	8,484	20,917	24,734	54,678	22,944	34,348	56,223	61,800	63,700
Shusha	13,469	24,552	25,881	42,586	5,104	6,117	15,039	3,191	3,599
Sighnaghi (Signakh)	4,520	9,265	8,994	17,690	4,853	3,752	3,489	2,146	2,400
Sochi	?	?	1,352	17,611	10,376	81,912	336,514	328,809	343,334
Stavropol	14,368	29,617	41,590	54,228[19]	57,488	141,023	318,298	354,867	398,539
Stepanakert (Khankendi)	95	?	?	1,550	3,189	20,333	56,705	49,986	50,400
Sukhum (Sukhum-Kale, Sukhumi)	245	1,161	7,998	46,530	21,568	64,730	121,406	43,716	62,914[20]
Tbilisi (Tiflis)	47,304	101,750	159,590	344,629	294,044	694,664	1,259,692	1,081,679	1,142,100
Telavi	4,403	7,022	13,929	9,478	9,697	15,328	28,325	21,805	20,100
Temryuk	6,613	11,157	14,734	20,515	15,863	22,182	33,163	36,118	38,046
Tskhinval (Tskhinvali)	?	2,456	3,823	4,618	5,818	21,641	42,934	Est. 22,000	Est. 12,000–15,000
Tuapse	?	?	1,392	16,158	12,142	36,650	63,081	64,238	63,292
Vagarshapat (Echmiadzin)	467	2,910	5,267	5,755	8,436	19,699	60,640	56,388	57,800
Vanadzor (Karaklis, Kirovakan)	?	2,306	2,686	6,671	8,301	49,423	75,616	107,394	104,800
Vladikavkaz (Orjonikidze, Dzaujikau)	3,635	20,057	43,740	79,523	73,603	164,420	300,198	315,608	311,693
Yerevan (Erivan)	9,718	12,505	29,006	29,766	67,121	509,340	1,201,539	1,103,488	1,129,300
Yeysk	17,539	28,507	35,414	53,992	37,653	55,324	78,150	86,349	87,769
Zugdidi	800	5,170	3,407	5,125	5,577	31,081	50,022	68,894	74,900

Notes

Data are from the following sources: 1. "Rospis' gorodam," 1856; 2. "Administrativnye punkty"; 3. Pervaia Vseobshchaia perepis'; 4. "Spisok naselennykh mest Kavkaza," 1914; 5. Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1926 goda (vols. 5 and 14); 6. Itogi Vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1959 goda; 7. "Chislennost' gorodskogo naseleniia"; "Gorodskie poseleniia RSFSR"; 8. Natsional'naia perepis' naseleniia Armenii 2001 goda; Natsional'naia perepis' 1999 v Azerbaidzhane; Natsional'naia perepis' naseleniia Gruzii 2002 goda; Perepis' naseleniia Abkhazii 2003 goda; Perepis' naseleniia NKR 2005 goda; Vserossiiskaia perepis' naseleniia 2002 goda; 9. Demographic Situation in Georgia; Federal State Statistics Service of Russia; National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia (http://www.armstat.am/file/article/bnakch_01.07.2012.pdf); State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan (http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/demoqraphic/en/AP_/2_4.xls).

10. As of 1854 ("Rospis' gorodam," 1854).

11. As of 1880 ("Tablitsa administrativnogo razdeleniia Kavkazskogo kraia," 1882).

12. Batalpashinskaya, though technically a stanitsa, was nominally a city from 1870 to 1893, but the organizational and legal measures that usually go with municipal status were never implemented. In 1931 it was officially designated the city of Batalpashinsk; it was renamed Sulimov in 1934–1937, Yezhovo-Cherkessk in 1937–1939, and Cherkessk in 1939, which is its current name.

13. As of 1880 ("Tablitsa administrativnogo razdeleniia Kavkazskogo kraia," 1882).

14. As of 1865. Petrovsk was given city status in 1857.

15. As of 1866 ("Svedenie o narodonaselenii Terskoi oblasti," 1866).

16. As of 1869 (*Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii o Kavkaze,* 1869).

17. In 1995 five neighboring settlements were merged into Nazran as municipal districts of this city.

18. As of 1854 ("Rospis' gorodam," 1854).

19. As of 1909 ("Spiski naselennykh mest Stavropol'skoi gubernii").

20. As of 2011 (*Etnodemografiia Kavkaza* [http://www.ethno-kavkaz.narod.ru/rnabkhazia.html]).

Appendix 3

Ethnic Composition of the Caucasus: Historical Population Statistics

	1833–1846[1]	1865–1867[2]	1876–1878[3]	1886–1892[4]	1897[5]	1926[6]	(1937)[7], 1939[8]	1959[9]	1970[10]	1979[11]	1989[12]	1999–2002[13]	2009–2011[14]
	Estimates by the Russian Military Authority	Multiple Sources: Cameral Description (Fiscal Census),[15] Police Records, Estimates		Per Household Census[16]	General Census								
1. Russians, including	(as of 1835) 405,500[17]	925,210–938,299[20]	1,353,449	2,481,547–2,917,379	3,154,898	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Caucasus Province 20,264 households[18]		Kuban 733,007										
1a. Russians (Velikorossy)	(as of 1858) 785,400[19]	Kuban 478,976 Stavropol 255,669 Terek 123,036 Tiflis 35,739 Baku 14,388	Stavropol 367,881 Terek 167,811 Tiflis 36,390 Baku 18,201	Kuban 1,432,000 Stavropol 628,600 Terek 298,690 Tiflis 35,740 Baku 42,432 Kars 10,695	1,829,793 Kuban 816,734 Stavropol 482,495 Terek 271,185 Tiflis 79,082 Baku 73,632 Kars 22,327	[2,861,371] North Caucasus ASSRs and APs 165,343 Armavir District 552,176 Kuban District 498,102 Stavropol District 454,551 Terek District 375,538; Maikop District 212,549 Azerbaijan 220,545 Georgia 96,085 Armenia 19,548	[5,835,130] North Caucasus ASSRs and APs 876,388 Krasnodar 2,754,027 Orjonikidze 1,606,994 Azerbaijan 528,318 Georgia 308,684 Armenia 51,464	[6,839,889] North Caucasus ASSRs and APs 1,245,672 Krasnodar 3,363,711 Stavropol 1,607,196 Azerbaijan 501,282 Georgia 407,886 Armenia 56,477	[7,874,434] North Caucasus ASSRs and APs 1,436,470 Krasnodar 3,981,970 Stavropol 1,922,193 Azerbaijan 510,059 Georgia 396,694 Armenia 66,108	[8,069,329] North Caucasus ASSRs and APs 1,411,454 Krasnodar 4,159,089 Stavropol 2,032,664 Azerbaijan 475,255 Georgia 371,608 Armenia 70,336	[8,175,101] North Caucasus ASSRs and APs 1,359,191 Krasnodar 4,300,451 Stavropol 2,199,999 Azerbaijan 392,304 Georgia 341,172 Armenia 51,555	[(2002) 7,910,073] North Caucasus republics of Russia (2002) 994,591 Krasnodar (2002) 4,436,270 Stavropol (2002) 2,231,759 Azerbaijan (1999) 141,700 Georgia 67,671 Abkhazia (2003) 23,420 Armenia 14,660	North Caucasus republics of Russia (2010) 892,601 Krasnodar (2010) 4,522,962 Stavropol (2010) 2,232,153 Azerbaijan (2009) 140,800[21] Abkhazia (2011) 22,064
1b. Ukrainians (Malorossy)					1,305,463 Kuban 908,818 Stavropol 319,817 Terek 42,036	[1,974,463] North Caucasus ASSRs and APs 63,562 Kuban District 915,450 Armavir District 305,126 Stavropol District 245,755 Azerbaijan 18,241 Georgia 14,356	[1,869,762] North Caucasus ASSRs and APs 48,394 Krasnodar 149,874 Orjonikidze 46,541 Georgia 45,595 Azerbaijan 23,643	[314,005] North Caucasus ASSRs and APs 53,727 Krasnodar 145,592 Stavropol 43,078 Georgia 52,236 Azerbaijan 25,778	[351,639] North Caucasus ASSRs and APs 57,317 Krasnodar 169,711 Stavropol 53,472 Georgia 49,622 Azerbaijan 29,160	[347,132] North Caucasus ASSRs and APs 58,236 Krasnodar 168,578 Stavropol 56,613 Georgia 45,036 Azerbaijan 26,402	[401,831] North Caucasus ASSRs and APs 63,693 Krasnodar 195,883 Stavropol 69,189 Georgia 52,443 Azerbaijan 32,345	[(2002) 246,234] North Caucasus republics of Russia (2002) 29,162 Krasnodar (2002) 131,774 Stavropol (2002) 45,892 Azerbaijan 29,000 Georgia 7,039 Armenia 1,633 Abkhazia 1,797	North Caucasus republics of Russia (2010) 13,907 Krasnodar (2010) 83,746 Stavropol (2010) 30,373 Abkhazia 1,743
1c. Belarusians (Belorussians)					19,642	36,113	21,123	45,464	63,989	64,681	78,646	Russian North Caucasus (2002) 43,258	Russian North Caucasus (2010) 12,159

	1833–1846[1]	1865–1867[2]	1876–1878[3]	1886–1892[4]	1897[5]	1926[6]	(1937)[7], 1939[8]	1959[9]	1970[10]	1979[11]	1989[12]	1999–2002[13]	2009–2011[14]
2. Poles	—	800 (as of 1858)	5,722 Kuban 2,522 Stavropol 1,216 Tiflis 1,872	11,180–14,338	25,117 Tiflis 6,167 Terek 4,173 Kars 3,243 Kuban 2,719 Daghestan 1,630 Baku 1,439 Erivan 1,385	19,070 Georgia 3,159 Azerbaijan 2,460 Kuban 2,611 Black Sea 2,020 Terek 1,948 Armavir 1,632 Maikop 1,131	14,040 Georgia 3,167 Azerbaijan 2,270 Krasnodar 3,841 Stavropol 2,233	10,216 Georgia 2,702 Azerbaijan 1,483 Krasnodar 2,861 Stavropol 1,590	11,017 Georgia 2,565 Azerbaijan 1,264 Krasnodar 3,563 Stavropol 1,726	10,135 Georgia 2,200 Azerbaijan 1,073 Krasnodar 3,316 Stavropol 1,590	9,362 Georgia 2,200 Azerbaijan 712 Krasnodar 3,655 Stavropol 1,604	Russian North Caucasus (2002) 5,101, including Krasnodar 2,958; Stavropol 1,262	Russian North Caucasus (2010) 3,261, including Krasnodar 1,969; Stavropol 810-
3. Czechs	—	—	900 Black Sea District 868	920 Black Sea District 908	3,360 Black Sea 1,290 Kuban 1,213	3,638 Black Sea 2,728	3,156 Krasnodar 2,648	2,283 Krasnodar 2,001	2,104 Krasnodar 1,737	1,792 Krasnodar 1,500-	1,485 Krasnodar 1,247	Russian North Caucasus (2002) 919	Krasnodar (2010) 416
4. Germans	3,353[22] Georgian/Tiflis Province 2,317 Caucasus Province 1,036	9,649 Tiflis 6,114 Stavropol 1,927 Kuban 1,187	15,357 Kuban 4,682 Tiflis 4,896 Terek 2,974 Stavropol 1,353 Elisabethpol 1,326	21,613–34,623 Kuban 7,000 Tiflis 5,066 Terek 4,500 Stavropol 2,000 Elisabethpol 1,902	56,729 Kuban 20,778 Terek 9,672 Stavropol 8,807 Tiflis 8,340 Elisabethpol 3,194	92,564 Armavir 21,856 Terek 18,043 Stavropol 8,157 Kuban 7,255 Azerbaijan 13,149 Georgia 12,074	(90,145) 138,231 Orjonikidze 45,689 Krasnodar 34,287 Kabarda-Balkaria 5,327 Daghestan 5,048 Azerbaijan 23,133 Georgia 20,527	13,740 Stavropol 1,921 Krasnodar 4,754 Azerbaijan 1,492 Georgia 1,921	37,193 Stavropol 6,393 Krasnodar 17,326 Kabarda-Balkaria 5,262 North Ossetia 2,099 Azerbaijan 1,361 Georgia 2,317	51,027 Stavropol 9,235 Krasnodar 24,237 Kabarda-Balkaria 9,905 North Ossetia 2,527 Azerbaijan 1,048 Georgia 2,053	60,414 Stavropol 13,245 Krasnodar 31,751 Kabarda-Balkaria 8,569 North Ossetia 3,099 Azerbaijan 748 Georgia 1,546	Russian North Caucasus (2002) 32,236, including Krasnodar 18,469 Stavropol 8,047 Kabarda-Balkaria 2,525 Adyghea 1,204 North Ossetia 964	Krasnodar (2010) 12,171
5. Estonians	—	—	1,031	1,387–2,382 Kutais 646 Black Sea Province 309	4,281 Stavropol 1,279 Kuban 880 Black Sea 791	3,800 Stavropol 1,165 Armavir 1,185 Black Sea 1,797	6,864 Stavropol 1,483 Krasnodar 2,508 Abkhazia 2,282	5,544 Krasnodar 2,168 Stavropol 1,027 Abkhazia 1,882	5,888 Krasnodar 2,032 Stavropol 1,019 Abkhazia 1,834	4,892 Krasnodar 1,912 Stavropol 870 Abkhazia 1,445	5,509 Krasnodar 1,678 Stavropol 848 Abkhazia about 1,400	Russian North Caucasus (2002) 1,780, including Krasnodar 1,138 Abkhazia 446	Krasnodar (2010) 688
6. Greeks	6,350 Georgian/Tiflis Province 2,857 males	>7,000 Stavropol 2,226 Tiflis 1,896? Erivan 887	20,298 Tiflis 15,161 Black Sea 1,941 Stavropol 1,540 Erivan 1,090	46,562–57,707 Kars 23,525–27,567 Tiflis 22,171 Kutais 6,603 Stavropol 1,600 Erivan 1,026	105,169 Kars 32,593 Tiflis 27,118 Kuban 20,118 Stavropol 1,715 Erivan 1,323	88,223 Georgia 54,051 Black Sea 15,134 Kuban 5,747 Stavropol 3,031 Armenia 2,980	145,481 Georgia 84,636 Stavropol 9,507 Krasnodar 42,568 Armenia 4,181	107,916 Georgia 72,938 Stavropol 13,433 Krasnodar 12,436 Armenia 4,976	134,750 Georgia 89,246 Stavropol 16,752 Krasnodar 17,913 Armenia 5,690	150,182 Georgia 95,105 Stavropol 21,848 Krasnodar 22,671 Armenia 5,653	168,057 Georgia 100,324 Stavropol 28,458 Krasnodar 29,898 Armenia 4,650	Russia (2002) 97,827, including Stavropol 34,078; Krasnodar 26,540 Georgia 15,166 Abkhazia 1,486 Armenia 1,176	Russia (2010) 85,640, including Stavropol 33,573; Krasnodar 22,595 Abkhazia (2011) 1,382

	1833–1846[1]	1865–1867[2]	1876–1878[3]	1886–1892[4]	1897[5]	1926[6]	(1937)[7], 1939[8]	1959[9]	1970[10]	1979[11]	1989[12]	1999–2002[13]	2009–2011[14]
7. Armenians	>370,000 Georgian/Tiflis Province 144,000[23] Armenian/Erivan Province 82,377[24] Karabakh Province 19,000–30,000[25] Caucasus Province 6,110–13,000[26]	[568,959] Erivan 239,681 Baku 144,000 Tiflis 113,000 Kutais 42,600 Stavropol 16,731[27] Terek [10,082][28] Kuban >2,865[29]	721,241 Erivan 292,978 Elisabethpol 193,742 Tiflis 162,201 Baku 21,127 Terek 14,100 Stavropol 5,254	954,612–970,656 Erivan 366,700 Elisabethpol 258,324 Tiflis 193,610 Baku 55,459 Kars 37,094–44,280 Kutais 16,390 Terek 13,000 Kuban 6,150 Stavropol 5,340	1,173,096 Erivan 441,000 Elisabethpol 292,188 Tiflis 196,189 Kars 73,406 Baku 52,233 Kutais 24,043 Kuban 13,926 Terek 11,803 Stavropol 5,385	1,567,568 Armenia 743,571 Georgia 307,008 Azerbaijan 282,004 Black Sea 27,729 Terek 21,423 Kuban 21,023 Armavir 19,198	(1,968,721) 2,152,860 Armenia 1,061,997 Georgia 415,013 Azerbaijan 388,025 Krasnodar 60,501 Orjonikidze 29,633 North Ossetia 8,932	2,786,912 Armenia 1,551,610 Georgia 442,916 Azerbaijan 442,089 Krasnodar 78,176 Stavropol 25,618 North Ossetia 12,012 Uzbekistan 27,370	3,559,151 Armenia 2,208,327 Georgia 452,309 Azerbaijan 483,520 Krasnodar 98,589 Stavropol 31,096 North Ossetia 13,355 Uzbekistan 34,470	4,151,241 Armenia 2,724,975 Georgia 448,000 Azerbaijan 475,468 Krasnodar 120,797 Stavropol 40,504 North Ossetia 12,912	4,623,232 Armenia 3,083,616 Georgia 437,211 Azerbaijan 390,505 Krasnodar 182,217 Stavropol 72,530 North Ossetia 13,619	Russia (2002) 1,130,491, including Krasnodar 274,566; Stavropol 149,249; North Ossetia 17,147 Georgia 248,929 Mountain Karabakh 137,380 Abkhazia 44,870 Armenia 3,145,354 Ukraine 99,894	Russia (2010) 1,182,388, including Krasnodar 281,680; Stavropol 161,324; North Ossetia 16,235 Georgia about 224,800 Mountain Karabakh about 140,000 Abkhazia 41,907 Armenia about 3,202,000
8. Talysh	<30,000[30]	36,000[31]	42,900	50,510	55,291	77,323[32]	(99,244) 88,026	162	Not listed	Not listed	21,602 Azerbaijan 21,169	Azerbaijan (1999) 76,800[33] Russia (2002) 2,548	Azerbaijan (2009) 112,000 Russia (2010) 2,529
9. Tats	No data	No data Daghestan 1,722	81,490 Baku 79,112 Daghestan 2,378	111,000–124,683 Baku 118,165 Daghestan 3,609	95,056 Baku 89,519 Daghestan 2,998	28,705[34] Azerbaijan 28,443 Daghestan 1,237	(56,975) (Azerbaijan 56,933) Not listed in 1939 census	11,463 Azerbaijan 5,887 Daghestan 2,954	17,109 Azerbaijan 7,769 Daghestan 6,440	22,441 Azerbaijan 8,848 Daghestan 7,437	30,669 Azerbaijan 10,239 Daghestan 12,939	Azerbaijan (1999) 10,900 Russia (2002) 2,303	Azerbaijan (2009) 25,200 Russia (2010) 1,585
10. Persians	14,000[35] Armenian/Erivan Province 10,737	No data [36]	7,779	12,687–13,068	16,745	43,971	(15,116)[37] 39,370	20,766	27,501	Not listed	Not listed	Russia (2002) 3,821 Armenia 1,200	Russia (2010) 3,696
11. Kurds		No data Erivan 18,182	44,485 Primarily in Erivan 27,779 Elisabethpol 15,366	82,215–100,043 Erivan 36,478 Elisabethpol 34,162 Kars 26,434–30,259	99,836[38] Erivan 49,389 Elisabethpol 3,042 Kars 42,968	54,661 Azerbaijan 41,193 Georgia 7,955 Armenia 3,025	(48,399) 45,877[39] Azerbaijan 6,005 Georgia 12,915 Armenia 20,481	58,799 Azerbaijan 1,487 Georgia 16,212 Armenia 26,627	88,930 Azerbaijan 5,488 Georgia 20,690 Armenia 37,486	115,858 Azerbaijan 5,676 Georgia 25,688 Armenia 50,822 Kazakhstan 17,692	152,717 Armenia 56,127 Georgia 33,331 Azerbaijan 12,226 Kazakhstan 25,425	Russia (2002) 19,607 Azerbaijan (1999) 13,100 Georgia 2,514 Armenia 1,519 Kazakhstan 32,764 (1999) Ukraine 2,088	Russia (2010) 23,232 Azerbaijan (2009) 6,100 Kazakhstan (2009) 38,325
12. Yazidi	Armenian/Erivan Province 324	4,390	7,772	14,498[40] Erivan 11,374		14,523						Armenia 40,620[41] Russia (2002) 31,273 Georgia 18,329	Russia (2010) 40,586

	1833–1846[1]	1865–1867[2]	1876–1878[3]	1886–1892[4]	1897[5]	1926[6]	(1937)[7], 1939[8]	1959[9]	1970[10]	1979[11]	1989[12]	1999–2002[13]	2009–2011[14]
13. Ossetians	34,450–51,429 Vladikavkaz District 16,950–27,339[42] Georgian/Tiflis Province 16,500–23,090[43] Imeretian Province 1,000[44]	66,126–76,802 Terek 46,802 Tiflis and Kutais Provinces 19,324[45]–30,000[46]	110,914 Terek 58,926 Tiflis 49,278 Kutais 2,710	166,345–168,345 Terek 88,000–90,000 Tiflis 72,420 Kutais 3,595 Kars 2,330	171,716 Terek 96,621 Tiflis 67,268[47] Kutais 4,240	272,272 North Ossetia 128,321 Georgia 113,298 (South Ossetia 60,351)	(319,350) 354,818 North Ossetia 165,616 Georgia 147,677 (South Ossetia 72,266)	412,592 North Ossetia 215,463 Georgia 141,178 (South Ossetia 63,698)	488,039 North Ossetia 269,326 Georgia 150,185 (South Ossetia 66,073) Turkey >8,943[48]	541,893 North Ossetia 299,022 Georgia 160,497 (South Ossetia 65,077)	597,998 North Ossetia 334,876 Georgia 164,055 (South Ossetia 65,233)	Russia (2002) 514,875, Including North Ossetia 445,310 South Ossetia (2002) about 45,000–50,000 Georgia 38,028 Ukraine 4,834 Kazakhstan 2,039	Russia (2010) 528,515, including North Ossetia 459,688 South Ossetia (2012) about 37,000–40,000
14. Abkhaz-Abaza groups,[49] Including	[77,290–162,023][50] Abkhaz-Abaza groups, including	[>87,195] (as of 1865)	[>85,163]	[70,192]	72,103[55]	[70,782]	[74,297]	[85,021]	USSR [108,688] Turkey >30,500[56]	[120,412]	[138,921]	[Territories of the former Soviet Union 150,000]	—
14a. Abkhaz	[Ashkarua 6,037–37,000][53]; [Tapanta 9,230–31,000][54]; and groups in the Abkhaz Principality 45,100–94,023[51] Samurzakan 9,896 Tsebelda 9,327 Sadz 16,923–20,000[52]	>79,195[57] (in 1865) 64,933 (in 1867)	>75,698[58] (in 1876) >43,734[59] (in 1878)	60,445 Abkhaz 9,805 Samurzakans 30,640	59,554 Sukhum District 58,697	56,957 Abkhazia 55,918	(55,561) 59,003 Abkhazia 56,197	65,430 Abkhazia 61,193	83,240 Abkhazia 77,276	90,915 Abkhazia 83,097	105,308 Abkhazia 93,267	[Territories of the former Soviet Union 112,000] Abkhazia (2003) 94,597[60] Russia (2002) 11,366 Georgia 3,527 Ukraine 1,458	Abkhazia (2011) 122,175 Russia (2010) 11,249
14b. Abaza		8,000[61]	9,465	9,747	12,549 Batalpashinsk District 10,370	13,825[62] Cherkessia 10,993	(13,802) 15,294 Cherkessia 10,245	19,591 Karachai-Cherkessia 18,159	25,448 Karachai-Cherkessia 22,896	29,497 Karachai-Cherkessia 24,245	33,613 Karachai-Cherkessia 27,475	Russia (2002) 37,942, including Karachai-Cherkessia 32,346	Russia (2010) 43,341, including Karachai-Cherkessia 36,919
15. Adyghe (Circassians), including	435,000- 750,000[63] Adyghe (Circassians), including Kabardins 29,700–45,000[64] Bzhedug[65] 4,000–38,000 Shapsug 80,000–200,000 Natukhai (Natkhoquazh) 20,000–60,000 Hatukai 3,000–6,520 Abadzekh 40,000–160,000 Temirgoi[66] 6,600–15,000 Makhosh 1,300–5,000 Mamkheg 2,000–5,000 Beslenei 4,000–25,000	Russia 82,238[67]–145,460[68] Adyghe (Circassians), including Kabardins >53,000; Bzhedug >12,310; Shapsug[69] >1,043; Natukhai ?; Hatukai >400; Abadzekh >5,648;	Russia >115,449[71] Adyghe (Circassians), including Kabardins >64,978 Bzhedug 15,263 Shapsug 4,983 Natukhai 175 Hatukai 606 Abadzekh 14,660 Temirgoi[72] 6,818	127,744–161,953[73]	[144,847]	[205,195]	[252,300]	[313,705]	[419,568] Turkey 587,000–1,000,000[74]	[476,900]	[568,003]	Russia (2002) [712,234] Estimates of Adyghes in Turkey and countries of Middle East exceed 3,000,000[75]	Russia (2010) 718,827]
15a. Kabardins				Kabardins 71,700–83,161[76]	98,561[77] Terek 84,093 Kuban 14,340	139,925 Kabarda-Balkaria 122,402 Cherkessia 12,314	(150, 690) 164,185 Kabarda-Balkaria 152,327	203,620 Kabarda-Balkaria 190,284	279,928 Kabarda-Balkaria 264,675 Turkey >32,879[78]	321,719 Kabarda-Balkaria 303,604	390,814 Kabarda-Balkaria 363,494 Stavropol 6,481	Russia (2002) 519,958, including Kabarda-Balkaria 498,802 Stavropol 6,619	Russia (2010) 516,826, including Kabarda-Balkaria 490,453 Stavropol 7,993

	1833–1846[1]	1865–1867[2]	1876–1878[3]	1886–1892[4]	1897[5]	1926[6]	(1937)[7], 1939[8]	1959[9]	1970[10]	1979[11]	1989[12]	1999–2002[13]	2009–2011[14]
15b. Cherkess		Temirgoi >5,231; Makhosh >1,121; Beslenei >3,485 Ottoman Empire 470,703–595,000[70]	Makhosh 1,438 Mamkheg 887 Beslenei 5,875	44,583[79]–45,791[80] Cherkess, including Bzhedug 11,819–16,771 Shapsug 3,381–4,318 Natukhai 219 Hatukai 649 Abadzekh 13,961–15,768 Temirgoi 4,818–5,127 Makhosh 1,637 Mamkheg 1,210 Beslenei 6,063–6,551	46,286[81] Kuban 38,488 Terek 2,565 Black Sea 1,939	65,270[82] Adyghea 50,821 Cherkessia 2,655	(78,733)[83] 88,115[84] Adyghea 55,085 Cherkessia[85] 16,010	30,453 Karachai-Cherkessia 24,145	39,785 Karachai-Cherkessia 31,190	46,470 Karachai-Cherkessia 34,430	52,363 Karachai-Cherkessia 40,241	Russia (2002) 60,517, including Karachai-Cherkessia 49,591	Russia (2010) 73,184, including Karachai-Cherkessia 56,466
15c. Adygheans								79,631 Adyghea 55,048 Krasnodar (outside Adyghea) 9,129	99,855 Adyghea 81,478 Turkey >133,626[87]	108,711 Adyghea 86,388 Krasnodar (outside Adyghea) 16,584	124,826 Adyghea 95,439 Krasnodar (outside Adyghea) 20,795	Russia (2002) 131,759, including Adyghea 108,115; Krasnodar 15,821, including those identifying themselves as Shapsug 3,231	Russia (2010) 124,835,[86] including Adyghea 107,048; Krasnodar 17,673, including those identifying themselves as Shapsug 3,839
16. Ubykh	7,000–25,000[88]	No data	No data	80	No data	No data	No data	No data	Turkey >9,069	No data	No data	No data	No data
17. Vainakhs[89] (Chechens)	117,080–218,550[90] Chechens, including Chechens proper 86,100 Aukh and Kachkalyk 7,600–14,000 Ichkeri 15,000 Chaberloi 6,000–7,000 Akki 6,000 Pshekhoi 4,000 Sharoi 7,000 Shatoi 5,000–15,000 Chantii Kistins (of upper Argun Gorge) 18,000–27,000 Tsori 1,200 Galgai 1,534–4,800 Nazran 9,500–11,000 Galashi 2,000 Karabulaks 6,200–15,000[91]	142,500–218,000?[92]	[197,946]	[224,131]	[276,408]	[394,639]	[502,736] (460,076)[93]	[525,736]	[770,279]	[941,980]	[1,194,317]	[Territories of the former Soviet Union in 2002 about 1,832,000]	Russia (2010) 1,876,193
17a. Chechens		[119,500–190,000]	164,615	195,917–283,421?[94]	226,496 Terek 223,347	318,522 Chechnya 291,259 Daghestan 21,851	407,968 Chechnya-Ingushetia 368,446 Daghestan 26,419	418,756 Chechnya-Ingushetia 243,974 Daghestan 12,798 Kazakhstan 130,232 Kirgizia 25,208	612,674 Chechnya-Ingushetia 508,898 Daghestan 39,965 Kazakhstan 34,492 Turkey >8,998[95]	755,782 Chechnya-Ingushetia 611,405 Daghestan 49,227 Kazakhstan 38,256	956,879 Chechnya-Ingushetia 734,501 Daghestan 57,877 Stavropol 14,988 Kazakhstan 49,507	Russia (2002) 1,360,253, including Chechnya 1,031,647; Daghestan 87,867; Rostov 15,469; Stavropol 13,208; Kabarda-Balkaria 4,241 Kazakhstan 31,799 Ukraine 2,877	Russia (2010) 1,431,360, including Chechnya 120,6551 Daghestan 93,658 Ingushetia 18,765 Stavropol 11,980 Rostov 11,449 Volgograd 9,649 Astrakhan 7,229
17b. Kistins[96]				2,150–6,150	2,503[97]	[2,020]	[2,648]	Not listed as a separate category[98]	Not listed as a separate category	Not listed as a separate category	Not listed as a separate category	Georgia 7,110	No data
17c. Ingush[99]		23,000–28,000[100]	33,331	[>34,000][101]	47,409 Terek 47,184	74,097 Ingushetia 69,930	92,120 Chechnya-Ingushetia 83,798	105,980 Chechnya-Ingushetia 48,273 North Ossetia 6,071 Kazakhstan 47,867	157,605 Chechnya-Ingushetia 113,675 North Ossetia 18,387 Kazakhstan 18,356	186,198 Chechnya-Ingushetia 134,744 North Ossetia 23,663 Kazakhstan 18,337	237,438 Chechnya-Ingushetia 163,762 North Ossetia 32,783 Kazakhstan 19,914	Russia (2002) 413,016, including Ingushetia 361,057; North Ossetia 21,442 Kazakhstan 16,893	Russia (2010) 444,833, including Ingushetia 385,537 North Ossetia 28,336

	1833–1846[1]	1865–1867[2]	1876–1878[3]	1886–1892[4]	1897[5]	1926[6]	(1937)[7], 1939[8]	1959[9]	1970[10]	1979[11]	1989[12]	1999–2002[13]	2009–2011[14]
18. Daghestani Highlanders, [Lezgi-speakers],[102] Including	320,000–397,760[103] Daghestani Highlanders, including Salatau 6,090–10,500 Gumbet 5,960–15,000 Andi 15,000–16,000 Koisubu 23,000–35,000 Avarian (Khunzakh) 25,500 Andalal 12,000–23,000 Karakh 15,200 Mukratl 5,020 Tleiserukh 5,000–8,860 Ankratl 23,790–26,000[104] Antsukh 3,600 Kapucha 8,400[105] Bagulal 4,600 Chamalal 3,500 Tindi 3,500 Unkratl 7,700 Tekhnutsal 5,600–10,000 Didoi (Tsunta) 4,000 Karata 8,200–11,000 Tsunta Akhvakh 4,400 Ratlu Akhvakh 2,500 Gidatl 5,400 Kuyada 5,600 Baktlukh 10,000 Tsatanikh 6,000 Mekhtuli 14,000–20,000 Akusha-Dargo 37,000 Kaitag 15,412–85,000[106] Tabasaran 10,279–55,000[107] Kiura-Kazikumukh 30,000 Rutul 3,000 Akhty-Para, Dokuz-Para, and Alty-Para 7,000	[>402,369][108]	—	596,829	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
18a. Avars, with Andi and Didoi Including		[163,956–219,170][109]	[>184,717]	194,918[110]	212,692[111] Daghestan 158,550 Zakataly 31,670 Terek 15,721	[202,403][112]	(232,299) 252,818 Daghestan 230,488 Azerbaijan 15,740 Georgia 4,595	270,394 Daghestan 239,373 Azerbaijan 17,254 Georgia 4,615[113]	396,297 Daghestan 349,304 Azerbaijan 30,735 Georgia 4,100[114] Turkey >1,966	482,844 Daghestan 418,634 Azerbaijan 35,991 Georgia 3,680	600,989 Daghestan 496,077 Azerbaijan 44,072 Georgia 4,230	Russia (2002) 814,473, including Daghestan 758,438; Stavropol 7,167; Astrakhan 4,217; Chechnya 4,133 Avars, including those who identify themselves as Andi 21,808; as Didoi 15,256 Azerbaijan 50,900 Georgia 1,996 Ukraine 1,496	Russia (2010) 912,090, including Daghestan 850,011; Stavropol 9,009; Chechnya 4,864; Astrakhan 4,719 Avars, including those who identify themselves as Andi 11,448; as Botlikhs 3,508; as Akhvakh 7,923; as Godoberi 426; as Karata 4,761; as Chamalal 16; as Tindi 634; as Didoi 11,623; as Bezhta 5,956; as Khvarshi 526; as Hunzib 918 Azerbaijan 49,800
18a1. Avars		[about 138,900] Daghestan 96,320 Zakataly [37,000] Terek >5,517	155,194 Daghestan 98,305 Zakataly 40,408 Terek 16,480	152,270–175,000 Daghestan 119,711 Zakataly 40,425 Terek about 17,000		162,957[115] Daghestan 138,749 Azerbaijan 19,104							
18a2. Andi peoples		[17,114] Andi peoples, including Andi 3,693 Botlikh 1,102 Karata 4,952 Akhvakh 2,172 Bagulal 1,989 Chamalal 2,418 Tindi 2,515	>19,857 Andi peoples, including Andi 5,693 Botlikh [1,200] Karata [5,500] Akhvakh 2,464 Bagulal [2,200] Tindi [2,800]	35,511 Andi peoples, including Andi 7,575 Botlikh 1,383 Karata 7,217 Godoberi 1,172 Akhvakh 3,585 Bagulal 2,474 Chamalal 3,889 Tindi 3,262		[31,871] Andi 7,800 Botlikh 3,354 Godoberi 1,425 Karata 5,305 Akhvakh 3,683 Bagulal 3,054 Chamalal 3,438 Tindi 3,812						
18a3. Dido (Tsez) peoples		[7,380] Didoi 4,010 Khvarshi 1,094 Kapuchi (Bezhta) 1,708 Hunzib 568	9,074	[9,006] Didoi 4,844 Khvarshi 1,406 Kapuchi (Bezhta) 2,330 Hunzib 426		[5,743] Didoi 3,276 Khvarshi 1,019 Kapuchi (Bezhta) 1,448 Hunzib 106						
18b. Archins		562	592	804		863							
18c. Dargins, Kaitags, and Kubachins[116]		Dargins 80,854 Kaitags 5,431 Kubachins 3,757	Dargins 88,045 Kaitags 7,050 Kubachins 1,839	123,756–133,756[117] Dargins 117,168 Kaitags 14,356 Kubachins 2,232	130,209?[118] Daghestan 121,375	125,754[119] Daghestan 125,707	(144,665) 153,837 Daghestan 150,421	158,149 Daghestan 148,194	230,932 Daghestan 207,776 Stavropol 6,752	287,282 Daghestan 246,854 Stavropol 15,939	365,038 Daghestan 280,431 Stavropol 32,740	Russia (2002) 510,156, including Daghestan 425,526; Stavropol 40,218 Ukraine 1,610	Russia (2010) 589,386, including (Daghestan 490,384 Stavropol 49,302 Rostov 8,304 Kalmykia 7,590 Astrakhan 4,241

	1833–1846[1]	1865–1867[2]	1876–1878[3]	1886–1892[4]	1897[5]	1926[6]	(1937)[7], 1939[8]	1959[9]	1970[10]	1979[11]	1989[12]	1999–2002[13]	2009–2011[14]
19. Lezgins (Kiurins)		Daghestan Province >77,017	170,968? Daghestan 130,873 Baku 38,122	173,328?[120] Daghestan 127,268 Baku 41,849	159,213?[121] Daghestan 94,596 Baku 48,192	134,529? [122] Daghestan 90,509 Azerbaijan 40,709	(206,487) 220,969 Daghestan 100,417 Azerbaijan 111,666	223,129 Daghestan 108,615 Azerbaijan 98,211	323,829 Daghestan 162,721 Azerbaijan 137,250 Turkey >3,257	382,611 Daghestan 188,804 Azerbaijan 158,057	466,006 Daghestan 204,370 Azerbaijan 171,395	Russia (2002) 411,535, including Daghestan 336,698 Azerbaijan (1999) 178,000[123] Kazakhstan 4,616 Ukraine 4,349	Russia (2010) 473,722, including Daghestan 38,5240; Stavropol 7,900; Astrakhan 4,246 Azerbaijan (2009) 180,300
19a. Laks (Kazikumukhs)		33,982	35,139	48,316	90,880[124]	40,380 Daghestan 39,878	(50,135) 56,054	63,529 Daghestan 53,451	85,822 Daghestan 72,240	100,148 Daghestan 83,457	118,074 Daghestan 91,682	Russia (2002) 156,545, including Daghestan 139,732 Ukraine 1,019	Russia (2010) 178,630, including Daghestan 161,276
19b. Tabasarans		14,667	16,350	27,667		31,983 Daghestan 31,915	(32,938) 33,607	34,700 Daghestan 33,548	55,188 Daghestan 53,253	75,239 Daghestan 71,722	97,531 Daghestan 78,196	Russia (2002) 131,785, including Daghestan 110,152	Russia (2010) 146,360, including Daghestan 118,848 Stavropol 6,951
19c. Aguls		5,022	5,357	6,830		7,653, all in Daghestan	27,610[125]	6,709 Daghestan 6,368	8,831 Daghestan 8,644	12,078 Daghestan 11,459	18,740 Daghestan 13,791	Russia 28,297, including Daghestan 23,314	Russia (2010) 34,160, including Daghestan 28,054
19d. Rutuls		10,007	11,803	11,985		10,495 Daghestan 10,333		6,732 Daghestan 6,566	12,071 Daghestan 11,799	15,032 Daghestan 14,288	20,388 Daghestan 14,955	Russia (2002) 29,929, including Daghestan 24,298	Russia (2010) 35,240, including Daghestan 27,849
19e. Tsakhurs		Daghestan Province 3,428	Daghestan Province 4,561	Daghestan Province 5,165		19,085 Daghestan 3,531 Azerbaijan 15,552		7,321 Daghestan 4,278 Azerbaijan 2,876	11,103 Daghestan 4,309 Azerbaijan 6,208	13,478 Daghestan 4,560 Azerbaijan 8,546	19,972 Daghestan 5,194 Azerbaijan 13,318	Russia (2002) 10,366, including Daghestan 8,168 Azerbaijan 15,900	Russia (2010) 12,769, including Daghestan 9,771 Azerbaijan 12,300
19f. Budugs		No data	No data	2,625		1,993	Not listed	Not listed	Not listed	Not listed	Not listed	Budugs, Kryz, Jeks and Gaputlins, and Khinalugs are not listed in censuses; the estimated population was 10,000 as of 1999, all in Azerbaijan.[126]	Not listed
19g. Kryz, Jeks and Gaputlins		No data	12,718[127]	10,508[128]		880[129]	Not listed	273	Not listed	Not listed	Not listed		Azerbaijan 4,400
19h. Khinalugs		No data	2,196	2,167		105[130]	Not listed	Not listed	Not listed	Not listed	Not listed		Azerbaijan 2,200

	1833–1846[1]	1865–1867[2]	1876–1878[3]	1886–1892[4]	1897[5]	1926[6]	(1937)[7], 1939[8]	1959[9]	1970[10]	1979[11]	1989[12]	1999–2002[13]	2009–2011[14]
19i. Udins		No data	9,688	7,300	7,100	2,455	(20) Not listed	3,678 Azerbaijan 3,202	5,919 Azerbaijan 5,492	6,863 Azerbaijan 5,841	7,971 Azerbaijan 6,125	Russia (2002) 3,721 Azerbaijan 4,300 Georgia 203	Russia (2010) 4,267 Azerbaijan 3,800
20. Georgians, including	>432,000[131] Caucasus Province 1,225 males[132] Georgian/Tiflis Province 109,246 males;[133] Imeretian Province 79,203 males	852,319–900,000 Kutais 557,600 Tiflis 290,000 Zakataly 4,674[134]	910,025 Kutais 558,078 Tiflis 312,866 Zakataly 11,679[135]	1,155,000 Kutais 791,383 Tiflis 396,673 Zakataly 12,430[136]	1,352,535[137] Kutais 868,766 Tiflis 467,581 (Zakataly 12,389) Black Sea Province 1,429	1,821,0184 Georgia 1,788,186 (Abkhazia 67,494) RSFSR 20,952 (Vladikavkaz 5,038) Azerbaijan 9,500 Georgians, including Ajarians 71,426 Svans 13,218 Megrels 242,990 Laz 643	(2,008,839) 2,249,636 Georgia 2,173,922 (Abkhazia 91,967) RSFSR 44,094 (North Ossetia 6,312; Stavropol 4,608; Krasnodar 4,310) Azerbaijan 10,196 Georgians, including Ajarians 88,230[138]	2,691,950 Georgia 2,600,588 (Abkhazia 158,221) RSFSR 57,594 (North Ossetia 8,160; Stavropol 2,926; Krasnodar 5,304) Azerbaijan 9,526	3,245,300 Georgia 3,130,741 (Abkhazia 199,595) RSFSR 68,971 (North Ossetia 10,323; Stavropol 4,093; Krasnodar 7,112) Azerbaijan 13,595 Turkey 83,306[139]	3,570,504 Georgia 3,433,011 (Abkhazia 213,322) RSFSR 89,407 (North Ossetia 11,247; Stavropol 5,287; Krasnodar 8,507) Azerbaijan 11,412	3,981,045 Georgia 3,787,393 (Abkhazia 239,872) RSFSR 130,688 (Krasnodar 12,748; North Ossetia 12,284; Stavropol 5,998) Azerbaijan 14,197	Russia (2002) 197,934, including Krasnodar 20,500; North Ossetia 10,803; Stavropol 8,764 Georgia[140] 3,661,173 Abkhazia 34,953[141] Azerbaijan (1999) 12,500 Kazakhstan 5,356 Ukraine 34,199	Russia (2010) 157,803, including North Ossetia 9,095; Stavropol 7,526 Georgia about 3,733,000 Abkhazia (2011) 46,456[142] Azerbaijan (2009) 9,900
20a. Georgians[143]	Georgians, including Georgians proper [Kartlians and Kakhetians] 115,000–250,000[144]; Georgian highlanders, including Khevsurs 2,500–6,200; Pshavs 4,232–5,180; Tushetians 4,719–6,120	Georgians, including Georgians proper 290,000 Georgian highlanders 20,000 Imeretians 285,000 Gurians 60,000	Georgians, including Georgians proper 301,537 Georgian highlanders, including Khevsurs 6,900; Pshavs 8,144; Tushetians 5,033 Imeretians and Gurians 379,112	Georgians, including Georgians proper 383,582–385,681 Georgian highlanders, Including Khevsurs 6,560; Pshavs 9,155; Tushetians 5,624 Imeretians 423,201–499,296 Gurians 76,095 Ajarians 46,000–59,516	Georgians, including Georgians proper 823,968; Imeretians and Gurians 273,186,[145] including Ajarians about 62,000[146]								
20b. Svans)	30,000?[147]	7,000	12,069	14,035	15,756								
20c. Megrels (Mingrelians)	No data	188,000	197,228	213,030	239,625								
20d. Laz	No data	No data	No data	1,781	No data			No data	No data Turkey 85,108[148]	No data Turkey about 115,000[149]	No data	No data	No data

	1833–1846[1]	1865–1867[2]	1876–1878[3]	1886–1892[4]	1897[5]	1926[6]	(1937)[7], 1939[8]	1959[9]	1970[10]	1979[11]	1989[12]	1999–2002[13]	2009–2011[14]
21. Azerbaijanis (Azerbaijani Tatars, Azerbaijani Turks)[150]	[>319,230 males][151] Military District of Muslim Provinces >304,500?[152] Armenian Province 81,749[153] Georgian Province 77,500[154]	927,000–977,191[155] Baku 644,667 Erivan 166,138 Tiflis 90,000 Daghestan 19,282 Zakataly [11,000]	1,001,387 Elisabethpol 357,917 Baku 304,049 Erivan 211,263 Tiflis 63,699 Daghestan 19,786 Zakataly 15,673	1,100,000–1,139,659[156] Elisabethpol 407,949 Baku 377,521 Erivan 251,057 Tiflis 68,342 Zalataly 21,090 Daghestan 13,697	1,509,785[157] Elisabethpol 534,086 Baku 485,146 Erivan 313,176 Tiflis 107,383 Daghestan 32,143	1,706,605[158] Azerbaijan 1,437,977 Georgia 137,921 Armenia 76,870 Daghestan 23,428	(2,134,250)[159] 2,275,678 Azerbaijan 1,870,471 Georgia 188,058 Armenia 130,896 Daghestan 31,141	2,939,728 Azerbaijan 2,494,381 Georgia 153,600 Armenia 107,748 Daghestan 38,224 Uzbekistan 40,511 Kazakhstan 38,362	4,379,937 Azerbaijan 3,776,778 Georgia 217,758 Armenia 148,189 Daghestan 54,403 Krasnodar 2,099 Stavropol 1,993 Uzbekistan 40,431 Kazakhstan 56,166	5,477,330 Azerbaijan 4,708,832 Georgia 255,678 Armenia 160,841 Daghestan 64,514 Krasnodar 3,080 Stavropol 3,691 Kazakhstan 73,375 Uzbekistan 59,779	6,770,403 Azerbaijan 5,804,980 Georgia 307,556 Armenia 84,860 Daghestan 75,463 Kazakhstan 90,083 Krasnodar 11,383 Stavropol 9,450 Uzbekistan 44,410	Russia (2002) 621,840, including Daghestan 111,656; Stavropol 15,069; Krasnodar 11,944 Georgia 284,761 Azerbaijan 7,205,500 Kazakhstan 78,295 (1999), 85,292 (2009) Ukraine 45,176	Russia (2010) 603,070, including Daghestan 130,919; Rostov 17,961; Stavropol 17,800; Volgograd 14,398; Krasnodar 10,165; Astrakhan 7,828 Azerbaijan (2009) 8,172,800
21a. Karapapakhs[160] (Azerbaijani Turks, Terekeme)			About 29,000 in Kars and Ardahan[161]	Kars 24,134–27,247 Daghestan 8,893[162]	Kars 29,739	6,316, all in Armenia							
22. Turmen	12,611	14,761	17,872,[163] all in Stavropol	18,893–29,580 Stavropol 19,000 Kars 10,174	24,522 Stavropol 14,896 Kars 8,442	5,963 Stavropol 4,065	6,681 Orjonikidze 6,651	5,907 Stavropol 5,907	8,351 Stavropol 8,313	9,554 Stavropol 9,443	11,522 Stavropol 11,337	14,097 Stavropol (2002) 13,937	Stavropol (2010) 15,048
23. Karachai[164]	7,380–24,000[165]	15,816[166]	19,832–24,000	20,000–25,000 Kuban 25,000	27,223[167] [>30,941] Kuban 26,877	55,123 Karachai 52,503	75,763 (108,545)[168] Karachai 70,301	81,403 Karachai-Cherkessia 67,830 Kazakhstan 5,574 Kirgizia 4,575	112,741 Karachai-Cherkessia 97,104 Turkey >3,917[169]	131,074 Karachai-Cherkessia 109,196	155,936 Karachai-Cherkessia 129,449	Russia (2002) 192,182, including Karachai-Cherkessia 169,198; Stavropol 15,146 Kazakhstan 1,400	Russia (2010) 218,403, including Karachai-Cherkessia 194,324 Stavropol 15,598
24. Balkars[170]	4,950–5,200[171]	10,155[172]	13,605[173]	About 16,000, all in Terek	[27,310] Terek 27,310[174]	33,307 Kabarda-Balkaria 33,197	42,685 (108,545)[168] Kabarda-Balkaria 40,747	42,408 Kabarda-Balkaria 34,088 Kazakhstan 4,174	59,501 Kabarda-Balkaria 51,356	66,334 Kabarda-Balkaria 59,710	85,126 Kabarda-Balkaria 70,793	Russia (2002) 108,426, including Kabarda-Balkaria 104,951 Kazakhstan 2,079	Russia (2010) 112,924, including Kabarda-Balkaria 10,8577
25. Kumyks	60,900–85,800 Tarki Shamkhalate and Mekhtuli [about 35,000?] Kumyk domain[175] 10,900–60,000	78,011 Daghestan 50,511 Terek 27,500	77,445–85,655 Daghestan 52,527–64,500 Terek 24,819	80,000–92,357 Daghestan 60,838 Terek 31,519	83,408 Daghestan 51,209[176] Terek 31,826	94,549 Daghestan 87,960 Kabarda-Balkaria 3,505 Chechnya 2,130	(134,100) 112,604 Daghestan 100,053 Chechnya-Ingushetia 3,713 Kabarda-Balkaria 3,520	134,967 Daghestan 120,859 Chechnya-Ingushetia 5,556 North Ossetia 3,921	188,792 Daghestan 169,019 Chechnya-Ingushetia 7,218 North Ossetia 6,363	228,418 Daghestan 202,297 Chechnya-Ingushetia 8,087 North Ossetia 7,610	281,933 Daghestan 231,805 Chechnya-Ingushetia 9,853 North Ossetia 9,478	Russia (2002) 422,409, including Daghestan 365,804 North Ossetia 12,659 Chechnya 8,883	Russia (2010) 503,060, including Daghestan 431,736 North Ossetia 16,092 Chechnya 12,221

	1833–1846[1]	1865–1867[2]	1876–1878[3]	1886–1892[4]	1897[5]	1926[6]	(1937)[7], 1939[8]	1959[9]	1970[10]	1979[11]	1989[12]	1999–2002[13]	2009–2011[14]
26. Nogai	119,200[177] Caucasus Province 74,183–88,402[178] Highlander territories 17,000–21,248,[179] including Circassia 11,600–16,000; the Kumyk domain 5,400–6,000	72,893[180] Stavropol 56,998 Terek 8,500 Kuban 5,429 Daghestan 1,966	64,017[181]	61,560 Terek 35,000 Stavropol 17,000 Kuban 7,000 Daghestan 2,560	64,080 Terek 36,577 Stavropol 19,651 Kuban 5,880 Daghestan 1,909	36,274 Daghestan 26,086 Cherkessia 6,206 Terek 2,654	(33,085) 36,615 Orjonikidze 24,273[182] Daghestan 4,677 Cherkessia 6,156	38,583 Daghestan 14,939 Stavropol 8,692 Karachai-Cherkessia 8,903 Chechnya-Ingushetia 4,123	51,784 Daghestan 21,750 Stavropol 11,340 Karachai-Cherkessia 11,062 Chechnya-Ingushetia 5,534	59,546 Daghestan 24,977 Stavropol 12,940 Karachai-Cherkessia 11,872 Chechnya-Ingushetia 6,093	75,181 Daghestan 28,294 Stavropol 15,533 Karachai-Cherkessia 12,993 Chechnya-Ingushetia 6,884	Russia (2002) 90,666, including Daghestan 38,168 Stavropol 20,680 Karachai-Cherkessia 14,873 Chechnya 3,572	Russia (2010) 103,660, including Daghestan 40,407 Stavropol 22,006 Karachai-Cherkessia 15,654 Chechnya 3,444
27. Turks (Osmanli Turks)	No data	20,000[183]	No data	70,226–82,350 Kars 41,823–46,954 Kutais 28,368	208,822 Kars 63,547 Kutais 46,645 Tiflis 24,722	8,570[184] Georgia 3,810 Armenia 1,516	(10,285) 10,592 Georgia (9,387) Georgia 4,950	35,306[185] Georgia 1,411 Uzbekistan 21,269 Kazakhstan 9,916	79,489 Azerbaijan 8,491 Uzbekistan 46,398 Kazakhstan 18,397	92,689 Azerbaijan 7,926 Uzbekistan 48,726 Kazakhstan 25,820	207,512[186] Azerbaijan 17,705 Georgia 1,375 Uzbekistan 106,302 Kazakhstan 49,567 Kirgizstan 21,294	Russia (2002) 92,415,[187] including Krasnodar 13,496; Kabarda-Balkaria 8,770; Stavropol 7,484 Azerbaijan 43,400[18] Kazakhstan 75,900 (1999),[189] 97,015 (2009) Ukraine 9,280	Russia (2010) 105,05, including Rostov 35,902; Stavropol 10,419; Krasnodar 8,685; Kabarda-Balkaria 13,965; Kalmykia 3,675; North Ossetia 3,383 Azerbaijan (2009) 38,000
28. Jews (European/ Ashkenazim, Mountain/ Juhuro, and Georgian/ Ebraeli)	No data	>21,676 Daghestan 5,445 Baku 7,112 Tiflis ? Kutais 4,702	28,697 Daghestan 6,251 Baku 6,323 Tiflis 5,295 Kutais 3,516	42,198–45,666 Daghestan 9,210 Baku 8,603 Tiflis 7,632 Kutais 7,082	40,498[190]–56,783[191] Daghestan 7,361 Baku 8,172 Tiflis 5,188 Kutais 7,006	45,288 Azerbaijan 20,578 Georgia 9,262 Black Sea 2,358	119,633[192] Georgia 42,300 (Georgia 29,721)[193] Azerbaijan 41,245 (Mountain Jews 10,899; in Daghestan 10,932)	72,467 Azerbaijan 29,350 Georgia 15,716 Daghestan 5,226	108,681 Georgia 44,757 Azerbaijan 29,392 Daghestan 10,204	87,136 Azerbaijan 33,248 Georgia 20,107 Daghestan 14,033[194]	60,635 Azerbaijan 25,190 Georgia 10,312 Daghestan 9,390 Krasnodar 5,183 Stavropol 4,390	Russian North Caucasus (2002) 9,255	No data
28a. Jews (Juhuro)	5,400–7,650 (2,509 males in Daghestan and Miltary District of Muslim Provinces)					25,974 Daghestan 11,592 Azerbaijan 10,270		30,028 Daghestan 16,201 Azerbaijan 10,324	27,389 Daghestan 11,937 Azerbaijan 11,653	9,389[195] Daghestan 4,688 Azerbaijan 2,123	18,513 Azerbaijan 5,484 Daghestan 3,649 Kabarda-Balkaria 3,178	Russia (2002) 3,394, including Daghestan 1,066 Azerbaijan 8,900[196]	Russia (2010) 762 Azerbaijan (2009) 9,100
28b. Jews (Ebraeli)	11,772[197]					21,471 Georgia 20,897		36,105 Georgia 35,656	10,935[198] Georgia 10,475	8,455[199] Georgia 7,974	16,054 Georgia 14,314	Georgia 3,772[200]	No data

	1833–1846[1]	1865–1867[2]	1876–1878[3]	1886–1892[4]	1897[5]	1926[6]	(1937)[7], 1939[8]	1959[9]	1970[10]	1979[11]	1989[12]	1999–2002[13]	2009–2011[14]
29. Kalmyks	[>107,851][201] Don Host 20,195 Astrakhan 87,656, including nomads roaming Caucasus Province in Greater Derbet 3,100; Lesser Derbet 1,600	Astrakhan 114,911–119,866[202] Don Host 21,069[203] Stavropol 6,827[204] Terek 3,118	Astrakhan 128,160 Don Host 26,136[205] Stavropol 10,707 Terek >3,000	Astrakhan 131,160 Don Host 28,659 Stavropol 11,837–12,314 Terek >3,000	190,648 Astrakhan 138,582 Don Host 32,283 Stavropol 10,814 Terek 3,595	129,321 Kalmykia 107,026 Salsky District 8,400 Stalingrad 5,173 Astrakhan 4,357	(127,336) 134,402 Kalmykia 107,315 Rostov 9,047 Stalingrad 8,502	106,066 Kalmykia 64,882 Astrakhan 12,687 Stalingrad 4,474 Krasnoyarsk 3,595 Kirgizia 2,443	137,194 Kalmykia 110,264 Astrakhan 11,419 Kirgizia 3,887 Volgograd 3,037	146,631 Kalmykia 122,167 Astrakhan 8,691 Kirgizia 4,437	173,821 Kalmykia 146,316 Astrakhan 8,191 Kirgizia 5,050	Russia (2002) 173,996, including Kalmykia 155,938 Astrakhan 7,162	Russia (2010) 183,372, including Kalmykia 162,740 Astrakhan 6,624
30. Assyrians	No data	No data	1,478	2,372 Erivan 1,682	5,353 Erivan 2,865 Tiflis 1,570	9,808 Georgia 2,904 Armenia 2,215	20,256 Georgia 4,707 Armenia 3,280 Krasnodar 1,238	21,803 Georgia 5,005 Armenia 4,326 Krasnodar 1,030	24,294 Georgia 5,617 Armenia 5,544 Krasnodar1,227	25,170 Armenia 6,183 Georgia 5,286 Krasnodar 1,511	26,160 Georgia 6,206 Armenia 5,963 Krasnodar 1,853	Russia (2002) 13,649, including Krasnodar 3,764 Armenia 3,409[206] Georgia 3,299 Ukraine 3,150	Russia (2010) 11,084

Notes

1. If the total of a given population is set at the top of a column, any additional figures indicate breakdowns of that total by people or place.

In determining the ethnic categories to which each population belonged, both the imperial and Soviet authorities assumed that individuals could have only one national (ethnic) identity. In cases of mixed ethnicity, a choice had to be made in favor of a single category, either by the census taker or the individuals.

The table shows figures for Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Germans, Greeks, Poles, Jews, Estonians, and Turkmen only within the Caucasus region of the Russian Empire (within the borders of the viceroyalty as of 1914 plus Stavropol Province), the corresponding territory of the USSR (excluding portions of Rostov Province and Kalmykia), and the new independent states. The remaining ethnic categories and groups are shown for the Russian Empire and the USSR overall and for newly independent states overall. What is referred to in the table as the "Russian North Caucasus" includes today's Krasnodar and Stavropol Territories, Adyghea, Karachai-Cherkessia, Kabarda-Balkaria, North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Chechnya, and Daghestan.

Population figures in brackets represent my estimates or a numerical summary of the relevant categories.

Where sources offer conflicting data concerning nineteenth-century figures, the table shows a population range.

Data are from the following sources: "Vedomost' o chislennosti narodonaseleniia Kavkaza"; Blaramberg, *Kavkazskaia rukopis'*; Evetskii, *Statisticheskoe opisanie Zakavkazskogo kraia*; "Obzor politicheskogo sostoianiia"; Dubrovin, *Istoriia voiny i vladychestva* (data as of 1842); Berzhe, "Kratkii ocherk gorskikh plemen na Kavkaze" (data as of 1846–1851).

2. *Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii o Kavkaze* (Part B: "Svedeniia o naselenii Kavkazskogo namestnichestva po narodnistiam [Data on the ethnic composition of the population of the Caucasus Viceroyalty]," and Appendix: "Statisticheskie svedeniia o gortsakh Kavkaza i Zakavkaziia [Statistical data on highlanders of the Caucasus and Transcaucasia]").

3. "Kavkazskii krai" (1876); "Statisticheskaia tablitsa o narodonaselenii."

4. "Raspredelenie naseleniia Kavkaza po narodnostiam" (data as of 1886–1891); "Kavkazskii krai" (1894).

5. *Pervaia Vseobshchaia perepis' naseleniia Rossiiskoi Imperii*. This census did not designate "nationality," therefore ethnic categories in this column represent an estimate based on the distribution of native languages. Results for the 1897 imperial census and All-Soviet censuses (1926, 1937, 1939, 1959, 1970, 1979, 1989) are available on the "Demoscope Weekly" Web site (the electronic version of the newsletter "Naselenie i obshchestvo" [Population and Society] of the Higher School of Economics National Research University's Institute of Demography (http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/pril.php) and on the "Ethno-Kavkaz" Web site ("Ethnic Caucasus: The Ethnodemography of the Caucasus, Detailed Information about Censuses and Ethnographic Maps") compiled by N. Bagapsh: (http://www.ethno-kavkaz.narod.ru/).

6. *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1926 goda*, vols. 5, 14. This column contains data for the TSFSR, the Daghestan ASSR, and parts of the North Caucasus Territory (the Kuban, Armavir, Maikop, Terek, Stavropol, Sunzha, and Black Sea Districts; the autonomous cities of Vladikavkaz and Grozny; and the Territory's autonomous provinces: Adyghe-Cherkessia, Karachai, Cherkessia, Kabarda-Balkaria, North Ossetia, Ingushetia, and Chechnya).

7. Data from the 1937 census (*Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1937 goda*) have been placed in parentheses. In 1938 the census was officially denounced as having been "falsified" and its organizers were arrested.

8. *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1939 goda* (table from fond 15A: Ethnic Composition of the USSR by Republic, Province, and District).

9. *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1959 goda* (Table 3: Population Distribution by Nationality and Native Language).

10. *Itogi Vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 goda*; *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1970 goda* (Table 7s: Population Distribution by Nationality, Native, and Second Language).

11. *O predvaritel'nykh itogakh vsesoiuznoi perepisi 1979 goda*; *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1979 goda* (Table 9s: Population Distribution by Nationality and Native Language [http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_89.php]).

12. Working archive of the Russian State Committee for Statistics, Table 9s: Population Distribution by Nationality and Native Language; *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR*.

13. *Vserossiiskaia perepis' naseleniia 2002 goda* (www.perepis2002.ru/index.html?id=17); *Vseukrainskaia perepis' naseleniia 2002 goda* (http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/rus/results/nationality_population/nationality_popul1/); *Natsional'naia perepis' naseleniia Armenii 2001 goda; Natsional'naia perepis' naseleniia Gruzii 2002 goda; Perepis' naseleniia Nagorno-Karabakhskoi Respubliki 2005 goda*; *Natsional'naia perepis' 1999 v Azerbaidzhane; Perepis' naseleniia Respubliki Kazakhstan*; Population data for the states and regions of the Caucasus are available on the Ethno-Kavkaz Web site (http://www.ethno-kavkaz.narod.ru/russkiy.html). It should be noted that experts have expressed doubts as to the reliability of 2002 census figures for some ethnic groups in a number of republics of the North Caucasus. In particular, Stepanov and Tishkov believe that census data for Avars, Dargins, Kabardins, Chechens, Ingush, and Balkars were inflated (see Stepanov and Tishkov, "Rossiia v etnicheskom izmerenii").

14. Vserossiiskaia perepis' naseleniia 2010 goda (www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/perepis_itogi1612.htm).

15. The Cameral Description (census) was a survey used to record the *podatnoe* (tax-paying) population that was conducted for fiscal purposes—for the collection of *podymnaia podat'* (a per household tax), the *zemskii sbor* (rural community tax), and other taxes and payments. Until the mid-nineteenth century the Cameral Description was often the only basis for calculating the entire population of territories. Only the male popula-

tion was counted. The overall population was calculated by estimating the ratio of men and women. The unit of measurement was the *dym* (an archaic term for hearth, household, extended family or group of families sharing a single household). The overall population of the Caucasus until the late nineteenth century was calculated primarily based on estimates of the average number of people per dym. This led to significantly different numbers because of differences in estimates of the sizes of households, which often consisted of several families and could include several dwellings.

16. The per household census (*dannye posemeinykh spiskov* or data from per family lists) was the instrument used to calculate the population of the Caucasus in the 1880s for conscription and taxes. It included information about social status (estate), native language, religion, education (literacy), and per household (per family) information on "property ownership, occupation and industry, trade, and place of permanent residence."

17. Based on data from the 8th Revision (the fiscal census of 1835). Source: Kabuzan, *Naselenie Severnogo Kavkaza*, p. 173. In his table, Kabuzan uses the categories "Russians" (279,200) and "Ukrainians" (126,300), clearly basing these estimates on the specific Russian provinces and territories from which the government had organized Slavic migrations to particular areas of the Caucasus (the so-called *mesta vykhoda*, "places of exit"). It is doubtful that the fiscal census itself used these "ethnicized" categories, which had nothing to do with taxpaying status. The empire's entire Orthodox Slavic population in the Caucasus was treated as Russian.

18. Of which 7,722 households are Cossack (Zubov, *Kartina Kavkazskogo kraia*, v. 2, p. 43).

19. Kabuzan, *Naselenie Severnogo Kavkaza*, p. 190 (the source breaks this number down into three categories: Russians (372,400), Ukrainians (408,000), and Belarusians (5,000). (See note 17.)

20. Does not include regular troops stationed in the North Caucasus, a figure that in 1865 totaled 110,000 (*Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii o Kavkaze*). Another source shows the total Russian population of the North Caucasus in 1867 as 1,085,800 (Rittikh, *Plemennoi sostav*, pp. 330–339. Kabuzan, *Naselenie Severnogo Kavkaza*, pp. 198–199, breaks this figure into Russians [614,900] and Ukrainians [470,900]). The guesswork involved in the total for the "Russian" category can be seen in notes accompanying a table showing the population of the Caucasus Viceroyalty broken down by peoples [narodnosti] (*Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii o Kavkaze*), which indicates that "to determine the number of *Russians* we took (a) the number of Orthodox residents in the provinces of Stavropol, Terek, and Kuban, excluding the small number of Greeks settled in the North Caucasus, (b) the number of schismatics throughout the entire Caucasus Viceroyalty, (c) the number of troops and all individuals categorized as belonging to the 'military estate.' . . . The number of Russian officials . . . we were forced not to take into account, but we presume it is equal to the number of non-Russians in the military estate." The "ethnic" composition of the population is thus arrived at by combining information about religious, military, and fiscal attributes.

21. Russians and Ukrainians.

22. P. Koeppen, *Russlands Gesamt-Bevoelkerung im Jahre 1838* (St. Petersburg, 1843), cited by Dizendorf [Diesendorf], *Istoricheskaia demografiia* . See also *Akty, sobrannye Kavkazskoi arkheograficheskoi komissiei*, vol. 8, p. 970.

23. *Obozreniie Rossiiskikh vladenii za Kavkazom* (vol. 4, Table A) gives 56,354 males (?) of Armenian origin in the province in 1832 (including 9,447 in Tiflis).

24. The total Armenian population of Erivan Province (65,280), Nakhichevan Province (13,369), and Ordubad District (3,728), which together in 1829–1840 made up Armenia Province (see Shopen, *Istoricheskii pamiatnik*). The greater part of the Armenian population of the province consisted of those who had left the Ottoman (21,666) and Persian (35,560) Empires in 1827–1828. *Obozrenie Rossiiskikh vladenii za Kavkazom* (vol. 4, General Table of the Population in Russian Possessions beyond the Caucasus) gives the figure as 54,665 males of Armenian origin in Armenian and Akhaltsikh Provinces as of 1832.

25. *Obozrenie Rossiiskikh vladenii za Kavkazom* (vol. 4, General Table of the Population in Russian Possessions beyond the Caucasus) gives 35,286 males of Armenian origin in the military district of Muslim provinces (i.e., Shemakha, Nukha, Karabakh, and Talysh) as of 1832.

26. The lower estimate represents figures for 1846 (see Keppen [Koeppen], *Deviataia reviziia*, especially Table 49, Stavropol Province). The higher estimate is for the same period based on the *Voenno-statisticheskoe obozrenie Rossiiskoi imperii* (vol. 16, Stavropol Province). Data for 1832 give 4,390 males of Armenian origin in Caucasus Province (Zubov, *Kartina Kavkazskogo kraia*, p. 43).

27. These figures probably include the Armenian population of Kizlyar and Mozdok, which by 1865 had become part of Terek Province.

28. Figures for Terek Province derived by adding "individuals of the Armenian-Gregorian and Armenian Catholic faiths" (*Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii o Kavkaze*).

29. Cherkeso-Hai living in Laba District (settlement of Armavir).

30. Listed in the source as "Persians" (Evetskii, *Statisticheskoe opisanie Zakavkazskogo kraia*, p. 211).

31. "Persians and Lezgins" of Baku Province.

32. Within the Azerbaijan SSR the census gave 4,735 "Turks whose native language is Talysh."

33. The growth of the Talysh population measured by the census is probably tied to the liberalization of identity politics when it came to the official nomenclature for peoples, as well as the differentiation of ethnicity and native language. There are estimates that 200,000–250,000 Talysh live in Azerbaijan (see Iunusov, "Etnicheskii sostav Azerbaidzhana").

34. A significant proportion of Tats in 1926 was listed under the categories "Persians" and "Azerbaijani Turks." In particular, within the Azerbaijani SSR the 1926 census identified 38,327 "Turks whose native language is Tat."

35. This is an estimate in Evetskii (*Statisticheskoe opisanie Zakavkazskogo kraia*) of the total population of "Persians" and "Kurtins" (Kurds) within the Muslim provinces and Armenian Province.

36. Sources do not distinguish Persians from Tats and Talysh.

37. Most Persians identified by the 1937 census were in the Turkmen SSR (13,006). The 1939 census was the first to use the category "Iranians."

38. The number indicates speakers of Kurdish dialects.

39. The censuses of 1939, 1959, 1979, and 1989 do not give population figures for Yazidi, who are included among Kurds based on language.

40. "Raspredelenie naseleniia Kavkaza po veroispovedaniiam."

41. Experts estimate the number of Yazidi in Armenia as approximately 45,000 (see Asatrian and Arakelova, *Etnicheskie menshinstva Armenii*).

42. Berzhe ("Kratkii ocherk gorskikh plemen na Kavkaze") estimates the population of Ossetian communities (as of 1846) within the Vladikavkaz District of the Caucasus Line at 27,338: Digor, 8,000; Alagir, 5,880; Kurtat, 3,818; Tagaur, 9,640. In 1823 Bronevskii (*Noveishie geograficheskie i istoricheskie izvestiia*) estimated the population of "Georgian Ossetia [within Russia's Georgian Province] and independent [what is now North] Ossetia" at 30,000 households. This estimate is significantly inflated and renders Bronevskii's own "scale" (which assumed a five-member average family) invalid.

43. *Obozrenie Rossiiskikh vladenii za Kavkazom* (vol. 4, Table A) gives 15,447 males (?) of Ossetian origin in Georgian Province as of 1832, of which Ossetian pristavstvos (under Gori District administration) had 9,100; Gori District proper had 1,525; Dushet District had 3,060; and Gorskaya Subdistrict (Distantsia) had 1,743.

44. There were 614 males (*Obozrenie Rossiiskikh vladenii za Kavkazom* [vol. 4, Table A]).

45. Dubrovin, *Istoriia voiny i vladychestva russkikh*, vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 283.

46. *Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii o Kavkaze*, pt. B, p. 40.

47. The reduction in the number of Ossetians in the census in Tiflis Province (as compared with the early 1880s) reflects the process of linguistic assimilation: 7,000–8,000 "ethnic Ossetians" indicated Georgian as their native language.

48. These are descendents of the *muhajirun* (Muslim migrants). This number represents an estimate of the number of Ossetians living in rural areas of 39 out of 67 provinces of the Republic of Turkey (from Aydemir, "Türkiye Çerkesleri"). Here and below the numbers for Caucasian groups living in the Republic of Turkey are based on Andrews, *Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey*.

49. Dating back to at least 1770, Russian sources treat the "Abaza" and "Abkhaz" categories as synonymous (see Gil'denshtedt, *Puteshestvie po Kavkazu*). After the 1864 expulsion of the western Abkhaz (Sadz) and mountain Abkhaz (Medovei) communities and the territorial separation of the two Abkhaz-Abaza populations, a nominal distinction between Abkhaz and Abaza began to take shape, tied to the fact that they were in different administrative units: those in the Principality of Abkhazia (and its successor, Sukhum District) were Abkhaz, while those in Kuban Province (i.e., north of the main Caucasus Mountain range) were Abaza, including the Tapanta (Abaza for "people of the plains") and Ashkarua (Abaza for "highlanders"). This nominal distinction between Abkhaz and Abaza persisted during the Soviet period. It should be noted that the dialect spoken by the Ashkarua Abaza is closer to the Abkhaz (Apsua) language proper than to Tapanta Abaza. In other words, the way the Abkhaz and Abaza were divided into two ethnic categories did not match the linguistic dividing line between speakers of the two Abkhaz-Abaza dialects.

50. The range of estimates of Abkhaz-Abaza populations is found in three sources: "Vedomost' o chislennosti narodonaseleniia Kavkaza," "Obzor politicheskogo sostoianiia," and Berzhe, "Kratkii ocherk gorskikh plemen na Kavkaze" (data as of 1846–1851). In 1823 Bronevskii (*Noveishie geograficheskie i istoricheskie izvestiia*) estimated the population of Greater Abkhazia at 50,000 families. For Bronevskii (and Gil'denshtedt in the 1770s), "Greater Abkhazia" comprised the entire coastal territory from Gelenjik Bay to the Ingur River. Here we see the influence of Georgian sources on early Russian imperial political geography of the Caucasus (particularly in determining the western boundary of Jiketi).

51. The higher estimate, which is probably inflated, belongs to Berzhe ("Kratkii ocherk gorskikh plemen na Kavkaze") and relates to 1846–1851 (this source does not treat Tsebelda and Samurzakan as part of the

Principality of Abkhazia). The lower estimate for the principality's population (based on "Vedomost' o chislennosti narodonaseleniia Kavkaza") includes 5,000 in Tsebelda and 9,000 in Samurzakan. Evetskii (*Statisticheskoe opisanie Zakavkazskogo kraia*) provides an estimate of 52,300 for the overall population of the Principality of Abkhazia for 1835. The gap between population estimates for the principality itself (not counting Tsebelda and Samurzakan) for 1834–1855 reaches 40,000–60,000, reflecting not so much changes in the principality's population before the Crimean War as the shortcomings of the estimates themselves.

52. In this case, the category of Sadz includes (a) mountain societies grouped together under the name "Medovei" (specifically the Pskhu, the Ahchipsy, the Aibga, and the Tswiji groups, totaling approximately 8,000 people), (b) coastal communities grouped together under the names "Jigets" or "Sadz proper" (including the Tsandba, Gechba, and Aredba [Ardler] groups, totaling approximately 12,000 people). Some Russian sources listed the Sadz as belonging to the Circassian (Adyghe) category (see map 17 in the list of sources at the end of this volume).

53. Zubov (*Kartina Kavkazskogo kraia*) estimated the number of Abaza in Caucasus Province, who were mostly Tapanta, as 9,770 (in about 1832). Yet sources do not use such general categories for highland and lowland Abaza communities as Tapanta and Ashkarua. Berzhe ("Kratkii ocherk gorskikh plemen na Kavkaze"), who is the source of the lower estimate (for 1846–1851), distinguishes further categories: Bashilbai, 2,677; Bagh, 480; Kyzylbek, 600; Barakai, 960; Chagrai, 630; and Tam, 690. The higher estimate of the overall population of Abkhaz-Abaza was derived based on "Vedomost' o chislennosti narodonaseleniia Kavkaza," which subdivides the population into the categories Bashilbai, 8,000; Bagh, 5,000; Kyzylbek, 6,000; Barakai, 7,000; Chagrai, 5,000; and Tam, 6,000. The significant difference between estimates of Abaza populations in 1833 compared to 1840 may relate to the war along the Laba, Urup, and Kuban Rivers, which led to a reduction in the number of Abaza subject to Russian military control and inclusion in the survey.

54. According to Berzhe, "Kratkii ocherk gorskikh plemen na Kavkaze," there were 2,500 Abazas living along the Kuma River, and 3,900 along the Kuban River. He also identifies the following Abaza subgroups: Lou, 1,000; Dudaryqwa, 890; Bibard, 890. In his reports, Tornau ("Doklady") offers figures for males in 1835: Bashilbai, 860; Tam, 270; Chagrai, 330; Bagh, 300; Barakai, 620; Kyzylbeg, 220; and Tapanta (Lou and Kiach, 980; Dudaryqwa, 870). The upper estimate is based on "Vedomost' o chislennosti narodonaseleniia Kavkaza" and includes specifically Lou and Kiach, 4,000; Dudaryqwa, 7,000; Bibard, 10,000, and Baskhag (Abaza living along the Kuma and Kuban Rivers), 10,000. The compilers of the *Voenno-statisticheskoe obozrenie Rossiiskoi imperii* for 1851 estimated the number of Abaza at 22,000, including Tapantas (Baskhag), 3,648; Bashilbai, 4,873, and an approximation of Chagrai, 3,000; Bagh, 3,500; and Barakai, 3,500.

55. The census of 1897, due to its reliance on linguistic criteria, does not distinguish between Abaza and Abkhaz and only offers the category "those who select Abkhaz as their native language." Within this column, all residents of Kuban and Terek Provinces who indicated Abkhaz as their native language were counted as Abaza (in accordance with the "administrative principle" of dividing what is essentially a single ethnolinguistic whole into two parts). The rest were categorized here as Abkhaz, including Samurzakanians who selected Abkhaz as their native language.

56. Estimate of the number of Abkhaz-Abaza in rural areas of 39 out of 67 provinces of the Republic of Turkey as of the early 1970s (from Aydemir, "Türkiye Çerkesleri"). According to the Turkish census of 1965, the number of people who indicated the Abkhaz language as their native tongue or a second language totaled 12,399 (see Andrews, *Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey*, p. 167). Estimates of the number of Abkhaz and Abaza in Turkey by the mid-1990s range from 100,000 to 150,000 (see Chirikba, "Distribution of Abkhaz dialects in Turkey").

57. Of these 16,000 were Samurzakanians. This estimate is for the population within the Sukhum Military District (otdel) (the territory of the former Principality of Abkhazia, Tsebelda, and Samurzakan) during the period preceding the uprising of 1866. In 1867, 19,342 people were expelled from Abkhazia to Turkey, including 14,740 from Tsebelda and Dal and 4,602 from the Pitsunda and Dranda districts (see Dzidzariia, *Makhadzhirstvo*, p. 389). The per household census of 1868 shows 68,390 Abkhaz (see "Statisticheskie svedeniia o kavkazskikh gortsakh"). According to an estimate for 1871, the number of Abkhaz totaled 66,800, including the population of Samurzakan (see "Ekonomicheskoe polozhenie tuzemnogo naseleniia").

58. Estimate of the population of Sukhum District before the war of 1877–1878 ("Prostranstvo, naselenie i naselennost' Kavkazskogo kraia," 1877). Out of this number, 26,915 people were in Samurzakan.

59. Data for 1878 ("Prostranstvo, naselenie i naselennost' Kavkazskogo kraia,"1878). Another source shows 22,576 Abkhaz-Abaza ("Statisticheskaia tablitsa o narodonaselenii Kavkazskogo kraia"). This figure obviously does not include Samurzakanians (26,475).

60. Expert estimates show 70,000–75,000 Abkhaz in Abkhazia (Iamskov, "Problemy opredeleniia").

61. Based on data from Berzhe, "Vyselenie gortsev s Kavkaza," for 1858–1865, the following groups were expelled to Turkey: coastal Sadz and Medovei, 19,515; Abaza (probably Tapanta and Ashkarua), 30,000.

62. The source uses the term "Beskheg-Abaza."

63. The range of estimates of the Adyghe population is significantly greater. The disparities are evidently associated not only with the problematic nature of population counts by outside observers but also with differing assumptions about the size of the dym (household) and the definition of the "family" as a unit of count, with some using the dym as a large extended family (in which case the unit of count might actually be several households) and others using nuclear families, which usually constituted only part of the dym. Early Russian estimates of the number of Adyghe (Cherkess, Circassians) probably belong to Bronevskii (*Noveishie geograficheskie i istoricheskie izvestiia o Kavkaze*)—approximately 35,000 "families of *zakubanskie* [living beyond the Kuban River] Cherkess." Bronevskii evidently did not include the greater or coastal Shapsug (approximately 10,000–12,000 additional families). After adding 13,000 families of Kabardins, Bronevskii came up with an overall population of 58,000–60,000 Cherkess (Circassian) households in the early 1820s (p. 58). Bronevskii assumed 5 people as an approximate average household size in the Caucasus. This is obviously too low: see the documented cases showing that the average size of an Adyghe uzden household was 10–12 persons (e.g., the table Svedeniia o chisle pereselivshikhsia v Turtsiiu kabardinskikh semeistv i dush [Information on the number of Kabardin families and individuals that emigrated to Turkey] in Mamkhegov, *Vysshie sosloviia Kabardy*, pp. 60–61), which would mean that the Adyghe population in the early 1820s was at least 600,000 (including coastal Shapsugs). In 1834 Blaramberg (*Kavkazskaia rukopis'*) had at his disposal some of the sound intelligence collected in 1829 and 1830 by the Russian scout Novitsky and estimated the overall Circassian population at 600,000. Novitsky himself accepted the number of Circassian households as 54,110, but assumed the dym size to be between 8 and 20 people, estimating that the Circassian population could be as high as 1,082,200, a figure disputed by Gardanov ("O rasselenii i chislennosti adygskikh narodov v pervoi polovine 19-go veka," pp. 247–248). The well-known estimates of Lapinskii (*Gortsy Kavkaza*) are noteworthy in this regard. In the late 1850s, he estimated the average size of the Adyghe dym to be 17 people. Lapinskii and Novitsky apparently equated the Adyghe household with an extended family, thereby inflating their estimates. The Soviet historian Pokrovskii ("Adygeiskie plemena") estimated the number of Adyghe by the mid-nineteenth century at 700,000–750,000. He arrived at this range using a number close to the upper end of estimates of the total Circassian population before the war and exodus of 1858–1864. Average estimates of the Adyghe population in the 1850s are between 624,000 (the Tenth Revision gave the number of Circassians as 573,000 and Kabardins as 51,000 [Kabuzan, *Naselenie Severnogo Kavkaza*, p. 90], although the source might have treated the Ubykh and some of the Abaza as Circassians/Adyghe) and 700,000, a more plausible figure.

64. Berzhe put this figure at 41,745, including people of Greater Kabarda (24,282), Lesser Kabarda (12,756), and Khazhrety or Hijrets (Kabardins who had resettled in Zakubanye; 4,707).

65. General Yevdokimov estimated the number of Bzhedugs around 1862 at 38,000 and Natukhai at 40,000 (see Skibitskaia, "K voprosu o sootnoshenii sil").

66. Including Adamei, Yegerukai and Zhanei (Bzhana).

67. Lower figures are from 1867, higher ones are from 1864, possibly reflecting a population shift in the final phase of the war in 1863–1864. According to Russian military estimates, the overall Circassian population in 1858 was 624,000, of which 51,000 were Kabardins (see Kabuzan, *Naselenie Severnogo Kavkaza*, p. 190). It is possible that some Abaza were included in this number. According to Berzhe ("Vyselenie gortsev s Kavkaza," p. 168), between 1858 and 1865, 493,194 Caucasian highlanders and Kuban Nogai emigrated for the Ottoman Empire. This number includes 390,781 Adyghe (Circassians), of whom 49,080 were Natukhai; 27,337 were Abadzekh; 165,626 were Shapsug; 74,567 were Ubykh; 10,500 were Bzhedug; approximately 15,000 were Temirgoi, Makhosh, and Yegerukai; approximately 4,000 were Beslenei; and approximately 17,000 were Kabardins. An additional 27,671 Shapsug, Natukhai, and Bzhedugs were combined into a single category. It seems probable that these numbers significantly underestimate the number of Abadzekhs and overestimate the number of Ubykhs. It is possible that the figure for Ubykhs includes Abadzekhs who left their homeland for Turkey via the Ubykh and Shapsug coast (Jubga, Tuapse, Psezuapse, Makopse, Sochi), as it is unlikely that all Abadzekhs passed through Taman and Novorossiisk, as represented in the source. Overall, Berzhe's data take into account only those who left via the coast and were registered with the authorities.

68. The 1864 source gives the total Circassian (Adyghe) population in Kuban Province at the end of the war as 92,460 ("Statisticheskie tablitsy Zakavkazskogo kraia," p. 131). To estimate the entire Adyghe population within the Russian Empire in about 1864 I added to this number that of the Kabardins of Terek Province.

69. This figure applies only to the highlanders living in districts under military-native government in Kuban and Terek Provinces. Some of the Shapsugs who remained after 1864 lived outside these districts, in the Black Sea District.

70. The estimates of the total number of muhajirs who emigrated for the Ottoman Empire vary significantly. Here the lower number represents the official Russian estimate of Circassians who left the Caucasus in 1858–1864; the higher number is based on the official Ottoman source of 1867 (cited in Kushkhabiev, "Cherkesy

v Sirii," p. 32, in which the group is categorized as Circassian). The Ottoman source may include Abaza and Ubykhs within the general Circassian/Adyghe category.

71. The source uses the category "Kabardins and other Cherkess peoples." According to other sources, there were at least 132,000 Adyghe within the Russian Empire in 1876–1878, of whom 81,584 were Kabardins (see *Sbornik svedenii o Terskoi oblasti* [1878]).

72. This number includes the Yegerukai.

73. Another estimate gives the number of Adyghe living in the Caucasus in 1886 as 187,487 ("Raspredelenie naseleniia Kavkaza po narodnostiam" [1900]). This appears to be an overestimate since the source obviously categorized all highlanders living in Kuban Province, including Abaza and Ossetians of the Georgievskoe settlement, as "Kabardins and other Cherkess peoples."

74. Estimates of the number of Adyghe. The first figure is for Adyghe in rural areas of 40 (out of 67) provinces of the Republic of Turkey as of the early 1970s. The second figure is for Adyghe throughout the Republic of Turkey. According to the 1965 census, a total of 113,369 people indicated the Cherkess (Adyghe) language as their native or second language (Aydemir, "Türkiye Çerkesleri," pp. 39–40, based on Andrews, *Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey*, pp. 167, 201–202).

75. *Adygskaya i karachaevo-balkarskaya zarubezhnaya diaspora*, p. 7.

76. The lower estimate includes 11,461 Kabardins in Kuban Province (see Felitsyn, "Chislovye dannye o gorskom i prochem musul'manskom naselenii," data as of 1883). A higher estimate of Kabardins in Kuban Province around this time (1882) is 15,440 (Polovinkina, *Cherkesia—bol' moia*, p. 173).

77. The number represents respondents who gave Kabardian as their native language.

78. This figure probably includes Beslenei.

79. Felitsyn, "Chislovye dannye o gorskom i prochem musul'manskom naselenii," (data as of 1883). Between 1871 and 1884, 13,586 Adyghe and Abaza emigrated from Kuban Province to the Ottoman Empire (ibid.).

80. This number does not include Kabardins (Polovinkina, *Cherkesia—bol' moia*, p. 173).

81. The number represents respondents who gave Cherkess as their native language.

82. The census used the category "Cherkess and Adygheans."

83. The 1937 census did not distinguish Cherkess and "Adygheans," including both under the category "Cherkess."

84. The census used the category "Cherkess and Adygheans."

85. The marked increase in the census category "Cherkess and Adygheans" in the Cherkess Autonomous Province (as compared to the 1926 census) is obviously associated with the inclusion of local Kabardins (who, now that they had "become" Cherkess, were no longer Kabardin, according to the exclusionary logic of the census).

86. Some Adygheans and Kabardins may have identified themselves in the 2010 census as Cherkess as a result of a public campaign by Adyghe/Cherkess associations for readopting this exoethnonym as a common category for Kabardins, Adygheans, and the Cherkess in the All-Russian census. Another possibility is that the 2002 census in Kabarda-Balkaria and Adyghea was falsified.

87. Including: Abadzekh, > 72,975; Shapsug, > 49,035; Bzhedug, > 6,082; Hatukai, > 5,244; Makhosh, > 290.

88. The lower estimate is from "Vedomost' o chislennosti narodonaseleniia Kavkaza" and the higher one is from Berzhe, "Kratkii ocherk gorskikh plemen na Kavkaze" (data as of 1846–1851). Berzhe's estimate includes figures for the "Ubykh proper" together with a group of Wardane communities (7,000 people) that spoke Adyghe and Ubykh, as well as Sashe or Sochi Ubykh-Abaza communities (5,000 people). Russian sources from 1830–1840 include Ubykh communities in the overall category of Cherkess (Adyghe), although they report that the Adyghe exoethnonym for Ubykhs was Kushkhazyr Abaza (literally, Abaza living beyond the highlands; see Blaramberg, *Kavkazskaia rukopis'*). Berzhe is unequivocal in labeling the Ubykhs a "separate tribe."

89. Historical sources do not use this category. Only in the twentieth century did it begin to be used to denote the corresponding linguistic (and ethnic) community in ethnographic literature. This is also when the practice was firmly established of grouping the entire Vainakh population into three categories based on language—Chechen, Ingush, and Karabulak (with the occasional addition of a fourth group, the Tsova-Tushins, or Batsbi). However, even early Russian sources, before any firm categorization of the Chechen population based on linguistic features had been introduced (back then, groups were usually listed by territory and territorially based communities; see "Vedomost' o chislennosti narodonaseleniia Kavkaza"), were beginning to see Chechens and Ingush as "separate tribes" ("Obzor politicheskogo sostoianiia"; *Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii*). The most frequently used analogue to the category "Vainakh" in Russian sources of the 1830s to the 1850s was the "Chechen" category, which replaced the category of "Mychkiz" that had been used earlier. In Russian usage, the exoethnonym of Kumyk origin "Michigish" (those who live along the Michik River) was replaced in the eighteenth century with an exoethnonym of Kabardin origin, "Chechen" (those who live in Chechen-Aul).

90. The lower estimate, which is probably too low, is from Berzhe, "Kratkii ocherk gorskikh plemen na Kavkaze" (data as of 1845–1846). The higher estimate is from "Vedomost' o chislennosti narodonaseleniia Kavkaza." "Obzor politicheskogo sostoianiia" shows 176,350 Chechens (including groups referred to as Ingush). An earlier estimate of the number of Vainakh groups can be found in Bronevskii (*Noveishie geograficheskie i istoricheskie izvestiia*): 35,000 families of Chechens, Ingush, and Karabulaks, or (based on his own estimate that the average family consisted of five people), 175,000 people, which might be a significant underestimation.

91. A majority of Karabulaks (Orstkhoi) were expelled to the Ottoman Empire in 1865. The remainder are included among Chechens and Ingush in the censuses.

92. The lower number—apparently an underestimate—is from *Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii o Kavkaze*. The higher number is a heedlessly "recycled" number from "Vedomost' o chislennosti narodonaseleniia Kavkaza" of 1833 (see Kabuzan, *Naselenie Severnogo Kavkaza*, p. 190) Between 1858 and 1865, a total of 23,193 Chechens were expelled to Turkey (see Berzhe, "Vyselenie gortsev s Kavkaza"). Berzhe obviously includes expelled Karabulaks and Ingush in this number.

93. Counted as one people ("Chechen-Ingush") in the 1937 census.

94. The lower number is from "Kavkazskii krai" (1894). The higher one is from "Raspredelenie naseleniia Kavkaza po narodnostiam" (data as of 1886–1891). This estimate appears inflated, as it is higher than the estimates in the same source for the population of Grozny and Khasavyurt Districts combined.

95. These represent descendants of Chechen muhajirs of 1865, who are listed together with Ingush.

96. The term "Kistins" is an exoethnonym of Georgian origin for Vainakhs. However in Russian sources and censuses, this Georgian term was adapted uncritically to denote Vainakhs living in districts along the border with Georgia or within Georgia itself (in Pankisi, for example). Today, the "Kistin" category has become an established term only for the Vainakh population of Pankisi.

97. The number represents those living in the Tioneti District of Tiflis Province who gave "Chechen or Kist" as their native language.

98. In the census of 1926 Kistins were included under the "Ingush" category and in subsequent censuses probably counted as Georgians or Chechens.

99. The ethnic category "Ingush" was initially used by Russian sources for a single local Nakh-speaking group living in the Tarskaya Valley (Angusht-Aul). By the 1850s the category was being applied to all "western Chechen communities" who distinguished themselves from Nokhchi (i.e., Chechens). Into this category were placed communities calling themselves Galgai and some Orstkhoi (Akki). After the vast majority of Karabulaks (Orstkhoi) left for Turkey in 1865 and this central link in the continuum of Nakh dialects weakened, the distinction between Chechens and Ingush became more expressed and was subsequently firmly established in administrative divisions and census and linguistic distinctions.

100. The lower number is from *Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii o Kavkaze*; the higher one is from the table Ethnic Composition of the North Caucasus Population in the 1850s Based on Data from the 10th Revision (1858) and Local Calculations in Kabuzan, *Naselenie Severnogo Kavkaza*, pp. 189–190. It is obvious that in this case data from 1840 (see "Obzor politicheskogo sostoianiia Kavkaza") were used in these "local calculations."

101. Listed in the source as "Ingush and Kistins of Terek Province."

102. The tribal structure of the highlander population of Daghestan is described in Russian sources of the 1830s to the 1850s only in terms of territory and territorially based communities and their confederations. Furthermore, the category of "Lezgi" ("Leki") is used for all of Daghestan's non-Turkic-speaking and non-Persian-speaking groups.

103. The lower number is from Evetskii, *Statisticheskoe opisanie Zakavkazskogo kraia*. The higher one is based on 1830 data from "Vedomost' o chislennosti narodonaseleniia Kavkaza." The latter number is identical to Berzhe's estimates of the population of Daghestan (not counting the Derbent and Samur Districts) as of 1846. The range of population numbers for separate communities of Daghestan in this column is based on three sources: "Vedomost' o chislennosti narodonaseleniia Kavkaza," "Obzor politicheskogo sostoianiia," and Berzhe, "Kratkii ocherk gorskikh plemen na Kavkaze" (data as of 1846–1851).

104. In Avar, *Antl-Ratl* literally means "seven lands," but by the 1830s nine or more communities were part of the Ankratl union: Antsukh, Kapucha (Quannal), Jurmut, Tash, Ants-Rosso, Bokhnada, Unkhada, Khenada, and Tkhebel (see "Vedomost' o chislennosti narodonaseleniia Kavkaza"). Berzhe ("Kratkii ocherk gorskikh plemen na Kavkaze") provides numbers for the first two communities separately.

105. Estimates offered by Berzhe ("Kratkii ocherk gorskikh plemen na Kavkaze") for a number of communities appear inflated. Other figures for communities of Upper Daghestan (Dido, Antsukh, Kapucha, Jurmut, Tleiserukh) show a total of 10,000 people ("Obzor politicheskogo sostoianiia").

106. The lower number is from "Obzor politicheskogo sostoianiia" and the higher one (probably significantly inflated) is from "Vedomost' o chislennosti narodonaseleniia Kavkaza."

107. The lower number is from "Obzor politicheskogo sostoianiia" and the higher one (probably significantly inflated) is based on "Vedomost' o chislennosti narodonaseleniia Kavkaza" and Berzhe, "Kratkii ocherk gorskikh plemen" (data as of 1846).

108. This figure includes the overall number of highlanders in Daghestan (359,852) plus the number of Avars in Terek Province (the Salatau Naibate) and in Zakatala District. Calculated based on *Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii o Kavkaze* and "Statisticheskie svedeniia o kavkazskikh gortsakh."

109. The sources from the 1830s to the 1850s apply the category "Avars" only to the population of the Avar Khanate. Here the lower estimate is the sum of the Avar-speaking population and Andi-Tsez communities according to data from *Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii o Kavkaze*; the higher figure is based on Berzhe, "Kratkii ocherk gorskikh plemen" (data as of 1846–1851).

110. The source—"Dannye o prostranstve i naselenii"—uses the category "Avaro-Andi group."

111. This number represents speakers of Avaro-Andi dialects.

112. This number probably declined because the census categorized a portion of the Avar-speaking population of Zakataly as "Azerbaijani Turks."

113. Of this total, 4,030 are categorized as Lezgin.

114. Of this total, 3,650 are categorized as Lezgin.

115. This figure includes 4,188 who identify themselves as "Taulins" (Tavlintsy).

116. Sources from the 1830s to the 1840s do not group Dargins, Kaitags (Kaitaks), and Kubachins into a single category. The "tribal" structure of the population is described only through an estimate of the number of territorial communities—jamaats. Ethnolinguistic criteria suggesting that the populations of Akusha-Dargo, Sirgha (Siurga), a portion of the Kaitag (Kaba-Dargo), and other communities were a single people began to be used to construct a corresponding census designation only in the late 1860s through the creation of a category of "speakers of several Dargin dialects," which included Kara-Kaitags (i.e., the Dargin-speaking population of Kaitag). Kaitags and Kubachins began to be consistently placed under the census category "Dargins" much later, in the 1930s.

117. Sources use the category "the Dargin group."

118. Probably this number includes the Tsakhurs of Zakataly District, who were erroneously labeled "speakers of Dargin" in the 1897 census (7,441 people).

119. This number includes Kaitags (14,430) and Kubachins (2,371).

120. Sources use the category "Kiurin group," which probably included the entire population of the Tabasaran and Samur districts.

121. This number represents speakers of the Kiurin dialect. Possibly some Lezgin were recategorized as speakers of "Kazi-Kumukh [Ghazi-Qumuq] and other Lezgi dialects" in 1897.

122. This number does not include the 31,721 "Turks whose native language is Lezgi" identified within the Azerbaijani SSR.

123. Some experts estimate the number of Lezgins in Azerbaijan as 250,000–260,000 (see Iunusov, "Etnicheskii sostav Azerbaidzhana").

124. The source uses the category "Kazi-Kumukh [Ghazi-Qumuq] and other Lezgi dialects."

125. The source uses the category "other peoples of Daghestan."

126. See Iunusov, "Etnicheskii sostav Azerbaidzhana."

127. This figure includes those recorded as Kryz (4,795) and Jeks and Gaputlins (7,923).

128. This figure can be broken down as 2,027 Kryz; 7,403 Jeks; and 1,078 Gaputlins.

129. The census recorded 3,738 "Turks whose native language was Kryz (Jek)."

130. The census recorded 1,372 "Turks whose native language was Khinalug."

131. The source—Evetskii, *Statisticheskoe opisanie Zakavkazskogo kraia*—obviously underestimates this population.

132. Zubov, *Kartina Kavkazskogo kraia*, p. 43.

133. *Obozrenie Rossiiskikh vladenii za Kavkazom*, vol. 4, General Table of the Population in Russian Provinces beyond the Caucasus.

134. Only Orthodox Christian Georgians were counted here.

135. This figure represents the Georgian population of Zakataly District (Ingiloi), of whom 3,550 were Orthodox Christian and 8,129 were Muslim.

136. This figure represents the Georgian population of Zakataly District, of whom 3,703 were Orthodox Christian (listed in the source as Georgians) and 8,727 were Muslim (listed in the source as Ingiloi).

137. This figure represents the overall number of speakers of Kartvelian languages (the 1897 census lists four "Kartvelian languages": Georgian, Imeretian, "Mingrelian" [Megrelian], and Svan).

138. The 1937 census places this ethnic group in a separate category.

139. This figure represents speakers of Georgian as a native or second language in the 1965 Turkish census (see Andrews, *Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey*, p. 173).

140. Including part of the territory of Abkhazia and South Ossetia controlled by Georgia at the time the 2002 census was being conducted.

141. Expert estimates show 65,000–70,000 Georgians living in Abkhazia (Iamskov, "Problemy opredeleniia").

142. Georgians (43,249) and Megrels (3,207): the Abkhaz census of 2011 uses two categories.

143. The category "Georgians proper" was used in pre-1850 Russian sources to designate the Georgian-speaking population of Kartli and Kakhetia (excluding members of highland communities, for whom the local ethnonyms Khevsur, Pshav, and Tushin were used; sometimes the highland group of Mokhevs were specified using the name Mtiuli). In Russian sources, the "Georgian" category comprised "Georgians proper" (i.e., Kartlians, Kakhetians) plus Georgian highlanders and the Georgian-speaking population of Imeretia and Guria.

144. The lower figure is from Evetskii, *Statisticheskoe opisanie Zakavkazskogo kraia*; the higher one is from Bronevskii, *Noveishie geograficheskie i istoricheskie izvestiia o Kavkaze*. *Obozreniie Rossiiskikh vladenii za Kavkazom* (1836, vol 4, Table A) gives the following figures for the Georgian male population in Georgian Province: Georgians (proper), 101,866 (including 1,947 in Tiflis); Tushetians, 2,401; Pshavs, 2,054; Khevsurs, 1,560.

145. These figures attest to the fact that by the 1897 census most Imeretians and Georgians identified themselves as Georgians, specifying Georgian as their native language (from among the four "Kartvelian languages" listed by the census: Georgian, Imeretian, "Mingrelian" [Megrelian], and Svan).

146. The 1897 census does not use Ajarian as a category. The Kartvelian-speaking Muslim population of Batum District is divided into four linguistic categories, depending on the choice of native language: Georgian (56,498), Imeretian (341), Megrelian (635), and Svan (17).

147. The source (Evetskii, *Statisticheskoe opisanie Zakavkazskogo kraia*) probably inflates this number. Berzhe, "Kratkii ocherk gorskikh plemen," provides figures for the number of dyms (households) in Svanetia: a total of 1,639, broken down as follows: Dadiani Svanetia (part of Megrelian Principality), 440 households; Principality of Svanetia, 516; and Free Svan communities, 683. It is unlikely that the average household of a Svan family consisted of 18 people.

148. This figure represents the total number of people who indicated Laz as their native or second language according to the 1965 census (see Andrews, *Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey*, p. 176).

149. Estimate (see Andrews, *Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey*, p. 176).

150. During the period when the Caucasus was first being incorporated into Russia the category "Tatar" was used in Russian sources to denote all natives, but it was gradually narrowed to Turkic-speaking groups. The category "Turkic-speaking groups" was usually qualified by the area these groups inhabited: Kuban and Beshtau Tatar (for Nogai tribal groups roaming the Kuban and Pyatigorye), Mountain Tatars (for today's Balkars), Derbent Tatars (for Terekeme in the Derbent region), Kazakh and Borchali Tatars (for the southern and southeast periphery of Kartli-Kakhetia), etc. Other qualifiers were applied at the same time, in particular the actual tribal "criterion": Kumyk, Nogai (further subdivided into Yedisan, Mansur, Jambulak, Navruz, etc.); Karapapakh, Terekeme, Airumlu, Shahseven, etc. In the Russian imperial lexicon, the category of Tatar made it possible to distinguish on one hand all these tribal (ethnic) entities and their political associations and on the other subjects of the Ottoman Empire. In other words, the term "Tatarsky" served to distinguish certain groups from "Turetsky" (Turkish), which was used only as a politonym equivalent to "Ottoman." However, even early Russian sources were clearly aware of the linguistic unity of all Tatars specifically as Turkic-speaking and, simultaneously, their dialectic diversity ("they speak a Tatar language called Turku," "they speak various Tatar dialects"). By the late 1860s, it was specifically internal linguistic differences that were being increasingly clearly transformed into a primary (but not exclusive) criterion for the ethnic categorization of various Turkic-speaking groups into "peoples" and a final division of "Turkic (Tatar) tribes" into different "nationalities."

In the 1770s, Turkic tribal groups from Kartli to Derbent were identified by, in particular, Gil'denshtedt (*Puteshestvie po Kavkazu*) using the overall category of Terekeme Tatars (as distinct from Kumyk Tatars). After the appearance of the term "Transcaucasia" in the 1830s the category "Transcaucasian Tatars" came gradually into use, generally for speakers of "Turkic-Azerbaijani languages" who populated the Russian provinces "beyond the Caucasus." By the 1860s the qualification of the language of the Transcaucasian Tatars as a Turkic-Azerbaijani language, distinct from Kumyk, Nogai, or Crimean, was clearly being used as the basis for ethnic categorization. By the late nineteenth century "Transcaucasian Tatars" (sometimes called Azerbaijani Tatars as a designation for speakers of Tatar languages, i.e., Azerbaijanli-Turk) were still being distinguished from "Turks" (as a designation of speakers of Turkish or Osmanli-Turk). During the period of Azerbaijani independence (1918–1920), the first category evolved into simply "Turks," which had been inherited by the early Soviet ethnic nomenclature (having in the process subsumed Osmanli Turks remaining within Soviet borders). Later, in 1921–1930, this category was slightly refined as "Azerbaijani Turks" (which also encompassed the Meskhetian Turkic-speaking population in Georgia) to match political realities. Finally, in 1939, it was transformed simply into "Azerbaijani," a result that underscores not so much the linguistic distinction between the Anatolian (Osmanli) Turk and the Azeri Turk as the deterioration of Soviet-Turkish relations.

151. *Obozreniie Rossiiskikh vladenii za Kavkazom* (vol. 4, General Table of the Population in Russian Provinces beyond the Caucasus). This excessively conservative figure possibly misses significant numbers of Turkic-speaking nomads in Transcaucasia and includes the Turkic-speaking population of the Daghestan Military District (part of which would later be categorized as Kumyk).

152. This figure probably represents a significant underestimation by the source (Evetskii, *Statisticheskoe opisanie Zakavkazskogo kraia*). *Obozrenie Rossiiskikh vladenii za Kavkazom* (vol. 4) gives the figure of 166,518 males of Tatar origin in the Military District of Muslim Provinces as of 1832.

153. This figure represents the Muslim population of Armenian Province (Shopen, *Istoricheskii pamiatnik*, p. 640), including nomadic groups (7,489). *Obozrenie Rossiiskikh vladenii za Kavkazom* (vol. 4) gives 45,588 males of Tatar origin in Armenian and Akhaltsikh Provinces as of 1832.

154. *Obozrenie Rossiiskikh vladenii za Kavkazom* (vol. 4) gives 41,253 males of Tatar origin in Georgian Province as of 1832.

155. This figure represents the population of speakers of Azerbaijani (called the "Turko-Azerbaijani language" by the source). It is obviously too low. (The source itself acknowledges that this number, in particular, does not include the Turks of Zakataly District, the so-called "Muglintsy." See *Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii o Kavkaze*, note to the table showing the population of the Caucasus Viceroyalty broken down by people.)

156. The source uses the category "Tatars."

157. The source uses the category "Tatars."

158. The source uses the category "Turks."

159. The source uses the category "Turks (Azerbaijanis)."

160. The term "Karapapakhs" was used as a separate census category only in Kars and Batum Provinces, while "Terekeme" was the corresponding term in Daghestan. During the Soviet period, "Karapapakhs" was used as a census category only in 1926 for a portion of the Turkic-speaking population of Armenia.

161. These populations are found within the Ottoman Empire's Kars and Ardahan pashalyks that went to Russia under the 1878 Treaty of Berlin (see Andrews, *Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey*, p. 77).

162. The source uses the category "Terekeme."

163. As of 1873 (*Stavropol'skaia guberniia* [1874]).

164. In Russian sources from the 1830s to the 1840s this group of highlanders was moved out of the "Abaza peoples" category (see "Vedomost' o chislennosti narodonaseleniia Kavkaza") and placed under the general category of "Tatar peoples" (which, based on linguistic features, was also used for Balkars, Nogai, and Kumyks; see "Obzor politicheskogo sostoianiia").

165. The lower estimate is from Berzhe, "Kratkii ocherk gorskikh plemen" (data as of 1846–1851). The higher one is from "Vedomost' o chislennosti narodonaseleniia Kavkaza" and "Obzor politicheskogo sostoianiia." Possibly Balkars summering their herds along the northern spurs of Mt. Elbrus have been listed here along with the Karachai.

166. This figure represents the population of the Elbrus District of Kuban Province (and apparently includes a small number of Abaza).

167. These figures are somewhat low. Probably some Karachai are included in the census category "Tatar native language."

168. The Karachai and Balkars were listed as a single people—"Karachai-Balkars"—in the 1937 census.

169. This figure represents both Karachai and Balkars.

170. The ethnic category "Balkars" ("Malkars") began to be used by Russian sources for all five Turkic-speaking highland communities to the south of Greater Kabarda only after the 1850s. At the same time, this category gradually ceased being used as a designation within the general Kabarda category, although for a long time "highland communities of Kabarda" and "Kabardan highlanders" remained in use (although the "Kabardan highlanders" in question, were not, in fact, Kabardins, but Turkic-speaking highlanders of Kabardin District). In some early Russian sources the population of these communities was erroneously identified as "Ossetians" because of a careless translation of the Kabardin term "Kushkha" (highlander), which Kabardins used for all their highland neighbors.

171. In the source, "Malkars were divided into the communities of Balkar, Kholam, Chegem, Bezingi," as well as the community of Urusbi. The lower estimate belongs to Berzhe, "Kratkii ocherk gorskikh plemen," the higher, to "Obzor politicheskogo sostoianiia."

172. This figure represents the population of the Gorsky uchastok of Kabarda District (*Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii o Kavkaze*). The source listed it as "highland communities of Turkic tribes."

173. This figure represents Kabardin highlanders (specifically the highlanders of Nalchik District, i.e., the Turkic-speaking communities of Urusbi, Kholam, Chegem, Bezengi, and Balkar).

174. The census uses the category "selecting Tatar as native language." The Turkic language spoken by the highland communities of Nalchik District is listed in the 1897 census as "Tatar."

175. In this column, "Kumyk domain" refers to the territory of Aksai, Enderi, and Kostek. The lower estimate is from Berzhe, "Kratkii ocherk gorskikh plemen," the higher from "Vedomost' o chislennosti narodonaseleniia Kavkaza." In 1823 Bronevskii (*Noveishie geograficheskie i istoricheskie izvestiia*) estimated the Kumyk population in three domains (Aksai, Kostek, and Enderi) at 12,000 families, or at least 60,000 people. Blaramberg gives the following population figures: Aksai, 8,000; Enderi, 28,000; and Kostek, 2,800 (*Kavkazskaia rukopis'*, p. 371).

176. Probably a portion of the Kumyks of Daghestan Province (living in the Kaitago-Tabasaran District) were categorized as native speakers of "Tatar."

177. This figure is from Kabuzan, who uses data from the 1858 10th Revision (*Naselenie Severnogo Kavkaza*, p. 190).

178. The lower number is from *Voenno-statisticheskoe obozrenie Rossiiskoi imperii* for Stavropol Province; the higher one is from *Administrativno-territorialnoe ustroistvo Stavropol'ia*, p. 253. Zubov in 1835 gives 7,199 *kibitki* (nomadic households) of Nogai and Kara-Nogai in Caucasus Province (*Kartina Kavkazskogo kraia*, p. 43). The Nogai of Caucasus Province were administratively grouped into four pristavstvos whose names reflected the geography of the areas roamed by the groups, and, in some cases, the name of Nogai tribal associations: (a) Kalaus-Jambulak (the area roamed by the Jambulak tribe between the Kalaus and Kugulta rivers), (b) Kalaus-Sablia and Beshtau-Kuma (roamed by the Yedisan and Yedishkul tribes), (c) Achikulak-Jambulak (roamed by the Yedisan and Jambulak, later also by the Yedishkul tribes), (d) Karanogai-Yedishkul (roamed by Karanogai, Yedishkul, Jambulak, and Yedisan tribes). See the numbers for nomadic populations broken down by pristavstvos in Appendix 1: The Area and Population of Administrative Units and States of the Caucasus Region.

179. Berzhe, "Kratkii ocherk gorskikh plemen," offers figures for groups of Nogai in the areas south of the Kuban and between the Terek and Sulak Rivers (in the Kumyk domain): Tokhtamysh, 4,021; Mansur, 2,314; Karamurzin, 1,425; Kypchak, 2,650; Navruz, 5,419; and in Aksai and Kostek, 5,419. The total number given by Berzhe for the Nogai tribes south of the Kuban (15,829) generally corresponds to the 1833 estimate in "Vedomost' o chislennosti narodonaseleniia Kavkaza," which distinguishes only two groups of Nogai roaming the left bank of the Kuban—the Mansur and Navruz.

180. The number of Nogai who relocated to Turkey between 1859 and 1865 totaled approximately 30,650 (Berzhe, "Vyselenie gortsev s Kavkaza").

181. Dubrovin gives 86,853 of Nogai at the end of the 1860s, including: "Kumyk Nogai," 7,000; Zakubanye Nogai, 10,000; Achikulak-Karanogai, 34,120; others, 35,733 (*Istoriia voiny i vladychestva russkikh na Kavkaze*, vol. 1, pt. 1, pp. 261–262).

182. This figure does not take into account the Nogai population of the Cherkess Autonomous Province.

183. This figure represents the Muslim and, probably, Turkic-speaking population of Akhaltsikh Province.

184. The source uses the category "Osman Turks." Evidently a significant portion of the Turkic-speaking population listed under the category "Turkish speaking" (as distinguished from "Tatar speaking" Azerbaijanis) in 1897 was put into the same category as "Azerbaijani Turks" (i.e., Azerbaijanis) by the 1926 census.

185. It is probable that members of the Turkic-speaking population who were expelled from Georgia in 1944 (Meskhetian Turks) were listed as "Turks" by the census.

186. Clearly, the Turkic-speaking Muslims expelled from Georgia in 1944 now identify themselves as Turks.

187. Out of this number, 3,257 were identified as Meskhetian Turks. It is believed that these numbers are greatly underestimated. (See Stepanov and Tishkov, "Rossiia v etnicheskom izmerenii.")

188. According to some estimates, there may have been as many as 100,000 Turks in Azerbaijan (see Iunusov, "Etnicheskii sostav Azerbaidzhana").

189. Of this number, 2,761 people identified themselves as Meskhetian Turks.

190. This figure represents native speakers of "Jewish" (which Jewish language is not specified). The census also lists 6,047 Jews who gave Georgian as their native language.

191. This figure represents the number of practicing Jews within the former Caucasus Viceroyalty.

192. The 1939 census did not contain separate categories for Georgian and Mountain (Gorsky) Jews. The 1937 census gives a total of only 101 Georgian Jews and 14,410 Mountain Jews throughout the entire USSR.

193. Probably a significant proportion of these are Mountain Jews.

194. Approximately 22,000 Mountain Jews identified themselves as Tats in the 1979 census ("Gorskie evrei").

195. No differentiation was made between Mountain and European Jews.

196. This figure represents the Jewish population of Georgia-Imeretia Province as of 1843 (*Akty, sobrannye Kavkazskoi arkheograficheskoi komissiei*, vol. 9).

197. Some experts/sources estimate that the figure was actually higher—approximately 43,000 ("Gruzinskie evrei"). Probably a large proportion identified themselves as "Jews" in the 1970 census.

198. There are estimates of a larger actual number of Georgian and Mountain Jews (who were underestimated in Soviet censuses). See Konstantinov, *Evreiskoe naselenie* (part 1.4: The Makeup of the Jewish Population by

Sub-Ethnic Groups in 1926–1989). It is probable that in the 1979 census a significant number of Georgian Jews identified themselves as "Jews" or "Georgians."

199. No differentiation was made between Georgian and European Jews.

200. Based on data from the 9th Revision (1851): Keppen [Koeppen], *Deviataia reviziia*. The Kalmyks listed for Astrakhan Province include nomads roaming Stavropol Province. The total number of Kalmyk kibitki around 1832 was estimated as 28,162 (Zubov, *Kartina Kavkazskogo kraia*, p. 43).

201. *Ocherki istorii Kalmytskoi ASSR*, vol. 1, Table 2; *Kalmytskaia Step' Astrakhanskoi Gubernii*, p. 108.

202. Data as of 1859 (Mitirov, *Oiraty-kalmyki*).

203. This figure does not include Christianized Kalmyks, who were counted as part of the Terek Cossack Host (3,128 people).

204. Data as of 1871 (Ochirov, "K voprosu o chislennosti kalmytskikh ethnicheskikh grupp").

205. According to expert assessments the number of Assyrians in Armenia in 2002–2003 was approximately 8,000 (Asatrian and Arakelova, *Etnicheskie menshinstva Armenii*).

Appendix 4

Administrative Units of the Russian Empire and the USSR

Unit	Examples	Hierarchy of Administrative Units
THE SYSTEM(S) OF ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS WITHIN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE		
Namestnichestvo (Viceroyalty) An administrative unit incorporating several gubernias or oblasts (provinces) within one territory under the administration of a viceroy (namestnik), who represented the emperor and reported to him directly.	• The Caucasus Viceroyalty of 1785–1796 incorporated Astrakhan and Caucasus Provinces. • The Caucasus Viceroyalty of 1844–1883 incorporated the entire Russian Caucasus (until 1859–1864 large areas of Circassia, Daghestan, and Chechnya were beyond the control of Russian administration). • The Caucasus Viceroyalty of 1905–1917 incorporated the entire Caucasus region except for Stavropol Province.	• Namestnichestvo • Gubernia, Oblast (province) • Uezd, Okrug, Otdel (district) • Volost, Uchastok (subdistrict), • Selskoe Obshchestvo (rural community), comprised of one or several settlements: Aul, Selenie, Stanitsa (highlander or native village, rural village [mostly Russian], Cossack settlement)
Highest-Level Administrative Units		
Gubernia (Province) An administrative unit governed by civilians.	Stavropol (Stavropolskaya), Tiflis (Tiflisskaya), Kutais (Kutaisskaya), Erivan (Erivanskaya), Elisabethpol (Yelizavetpolskaya), Baku (Bakinskaya), Black Sea (Chernomorskaya) Provinces (Gubernias)	• Gubernia • Uezd (district)/Okrug (district governed usually by a military commandant) • Uchastok, Volost (subdistrict, beginning in 1861), Selskoe Obshchestvo (rural community)
Oblast (Province) Equivalent to a gubernia but governed by the military. Oblasts could transition into gubernias if the governing authority were put into civilian hands.	Caucasus (Kavkazskaya), Caspian (Kaspiiskaya), Daghestan (Dagestanskaya), Armenian (Armianskaya) Oblasts	• Oblast • Okrug, Vladenie (until 1867) (district) • Uchastok (subdistrict); Naibate (in Daghestan Province: a subdistrict ruled by a naib or local leader, who was a military deputy appointed by higher authorities, analogous to a pristav, or military commandant); Selskoe Obshchestvo

Oblast (Province) Provinces with significant Cossack population were also oblasts.	Don Host Province (Oblast Voiska Donskogo), Black Sea Host Province (Oblast Voiska Chernomorskogo), Kuban Province (Kubanskaya Oblast), Terek Province (Terksaya Oblast)	• Oblast • Otdel, Okrug, Uezd • Uchastok • Stanitsa, or Stanichnoe Obshchestvo
Zemlya (Territory, Land) A transitional unit that existed before self-governed Cossack Hosts were turned into Cossack Host Provinces (i.e., before lands settled by Cossacks were integrated into the overall system of imperial administrative units as oblasts).	Territory of the Don Host (Zemlya Voiska Donskogo), Territory of the Black Sea Host (Zemlya Voiska Chernomorskogo)	• Zemlya • Otdel, Okrug, Uezd • Uchastok • Stanitsa, or Stanichnoe Obshchestvo
Linia (Defensive Line) An administrative and military entity that incorporated districts where military operations were ongoing and/or that was under direct military (komendantsky, pristavsky) administration.	Caucasus Defensive Line (Kavkazskaya Kordonnaya Linia). By 1860 this administrative unit included areas that became part of Kuban, Terek, and Daghestan Provinces (Oblasts).	• Linia • Flang (flank), until 1856, when Krylo (wing) was adopted • Okrug, Otdel, Pristavstvo (district) • Uchastok • Selskoe Obshchestvo
"Vestigial" or Transitional Administrative Units		
Vladenie (Domain, Possession) Political formations incorporated into the overall imperial administrative system but still preserving their former governmental structure and rights of dominion.	Principality of Megrelia (Megrelskoe Kniazhestvo), Principality of Abkhazia (Abkhazskoe Kniazhestvo), the Avar, Kiura, and Talysh Khanates (Avarskoe, Kiurinskoe, Talyshskoe Khanstvos), the Shamkhalate of Tarki (Shamkhalstvo Tarkovskoe), the Utsmiate (Principality) of Kara-Kaitag (Utsmiistvo Kara-Kaitagskoe), the Elisu Sultanate (Sultanstvo Ilisuiskoe), the Tabasaran Maisumate (Tabasaranskoe Maisumstvo)	• Vladenie • Obshchestvo (community/society), Uchastok, Magal (in Muslim districts) Between 1801 and 1867 vladenies were gradually incorporated into the unified administrative system as uezds, okrugs, provintsias, distantsias, etc.

Provintsia (Province) A transitional imperial administrative unit used to govern the territory of khanates and principalities that were annexed between 1803 and 1813 and in 1829 after these forms of government were abolished.	Quba (Kubinskaya), Derbent (Derbentskaya), Baku (Bakinskaya), Sheki (Shekinskaya), Shirvan (Shirvanskaya), Karabakh (Karabakhskaya), Imeretian (Imeretinskaya), Akhaltsikh (Akhaltsikhskaya) Provinces (Provintsias)	• Provintsia • Magal (Uchastok) in former khanates, Uezd in former principalities In 1841 the provintsias were either restructured as uezds or divided into uezds and incorporated into the newly established Caspian Province (Kaspiiskaya Oblast) and Georgian-Imeretian Province (Gruzino-Imeretinskaya Gubernia).
Tatarskaya Distantsia (Tatar Subdistricts) A transitional administrative unit within the Georgian Province (Gruzinskaya Gubernia, 1801–1840), which had a primarily Muslim Turkic population. It "inherited" the territory of the sultanates of Kartlia-Kakhetia before 1801.	Shamshadil (Shamshadilskaya), Kazakh (Kazakhskaya), Borchalo (Borchalinskaya), Pambak (Pambakskaya), and Shuragel (Shuragelskaya) Tatar areas (Distantsias)	• Distantsia • Magal (Uchastok) In 1841 distantsias were either restructured as uezds or incorporated into uezds within Georgian-Imeretian Province.
General-Gubernatorstvo (Governorate-General) An administrative unit equivalent to a gubernia or oblast but incorporating heterogeneous (vestigial and transitional) units: principalities, uezds and okrugs, and pristavstvos. In the overall administrative structure of Russia beginning in 1775 the term was more commonly used as an equivalent of namestnichestvo.	The Kutais Governorate-General (Kutaisskoe General-Gubernatorstvo) of 1856–1867 incorporated the territory of the Principalities of Megrelia and Abkhazia (Megrelskoe and Abkhazskoe Kniazhestvos), as well as a number of uezds (in the territory of the former Imeretian Kingdom and pristavstvos in Svanetia and Samurzakan.	• General-Gubernatorstvo • Uezd, Vladenie, Pristavstvo The Kutais Governorate-General was reorganized as a gubernia when the administrative system was unified and principalities were abolished in 1867.

Krai (Territory) An administrative unit equivalent to a gubernia or oblast but incorporating heterogeneous (including vestigial and transition) units: khanates, uezds, okrugs.	The Caspian Territory (Prikaspiisky Krai) of 1847–1860 included the annexed khanates of Daghestan and Quba/Kuba, as well as Derbent Province, which comprised Kuba and Derbent Districts (Kubinsky, Derbentsky Uezds), and the Derbent Municipal District (Derbentskoe Gradonachalstvo). In 1860 most of Caspian Territory became Daghestan Province (Dagestanskaya Oblast) and the rest was incorporated into Baku Province (Bakinskaya Gubernia).	• Krai • Khanate, Uezd, Okrug • Magal, Uchastok, Selskoe Obshchestvo
Second-Level Administrative Unit		
Uezd (District) An administrative unit within gubernias and sometimes oblasts.	Stavropol, Tiflis, Elisabethpol (Stavropolsky, Tiflissky, Yelizavetpolsky) Districts (Uezds)	• Uezd • Volost • Selskoe Obshchestvo
Okrug (District) An administrative unit within gubernias, oblasts, and defensive lines.	Vladikavkaz, Nalchik, Batalpashinsky.	• Okrug • Uchastok • Selskoe Obshchectvo
Otdel (Division, District) A) An administrative division within an oblast with significant Cossack population. B) A military division or district that has been removed from the overall administrative system and placed under the viceroy or the Ministry of Defense.	A) Yekaterinodar (Yekaterinodarsky) Batalpashinsky, Kizlyar (Kizliarsky), Sunzha (Sunzhensky) B) Sukhum Military District (Sukhumsky Voenny Otdel) and Zakataly (Jar-Belokan) (Zakatalsky [Dzharo-Belokansky]) District	A) • Otdel • Uchastok • Stanitsa, or Stanichnoe Obshchestvo B) • Otdel/Okrug • Uchastok • Selskoe Obshchestvo
Pristavstvo A governance institution or unit within which a military commandant is put in charge of a given territory and population (such as highlanders or nomads).	Pristavstvo of Kabardin People, Achikulak (Achikulakskoe), Kara-Nogai (Karanogaiskoe), Labinskoe, Bzhedug (Bzhedugskoe), Upper Kuban (Verkhne-Kubanskoe), Samurzakan (Samurzakanskoe), Tsebelda (Tsebeldinskoe) Pristavstvos	• Pristavstvo • Selskoe Obshchestvo • Stan (camp)

Ulus (District or Subdistrict) A special district within a gubernia or oblast for governing nomadic Kalmyks.	Greater Derbet (Bolshederbetovsky) Ulus	• Ulus • Aimak (Volost)
Gradonachalstvo (Municipal District) A civilian administrative unit to govern a major city or urban territory within a gubernia or oblast.	Derbent municipal district (Derbentskoe Gradonachalstvo), 1859–1883; Baku municipal district (Bakinskoe Gradonachalstvo), 1906–1917	
Third- and Fourth-Level Administrative Units		
Uchastoks, Volosts, and Naibates (Naibstvos) Naibates were used in Daghestan Oblast and a part of Terek Oblast. Between 1899–1900 and 1921 only uchastoks remained in use. **Selskie Obshchestvos, Selskie Upravlenies** Rural communities/governments (selskie obshchestva/upravleniia) and stanitsa communities/governments (stanichnye obshchestva/upravleniia) could be comprised of one or several rural settlements of the following types: • Aul (also selenie): highlander village, settlement (mostly situated in the mountains) • Stanitsa (Ukrainian "kuren"): Cossack settlement • Selo: peasant, non-Cossack settlement (mostly Russian, but often used for highlander and other native villages in the plains) • Kolonia (colony): rural community settled by foreigners (mostly Germans). In 1893 kolonias were renamed "selos" (villages) after most of the villages with German names were given Russian ones.		
THE SOVIET SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS, 1918–1922		
The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (Rossiiskaya Sovetskaya Federativnaya Sotsialistichestkaya Respublika, RSFSR) was formed in 1918 as the "federation of Soviet republics" built on the administrative foundation of former provinces (gubernias and oblasts) of the Russian Empire.		• RSFSR • Soviet Republics (territorially most conformed to former provinces)
Sovetskaya Respublika (Soviet Republic) In 1918–1921 this was the general term used for the political administrative entities created during the sovietization of Russian provinces and the independent states that arose in the empire's territory in 1918.	• The Kuban, Terek, and Stavropol Soviet Republics (Kubanskaya, Terksaya, Stavropolskaya Sovrespublikas) in July 1918 were united into a single North Caucasus Soviet Republic [Severo-Kavkazskaya Sovrespublika])	

The sovietization of the states of Transcaucasia in 1920–1921 led to the emergence of a new administrative scheme: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soiuz Sovetskikh Sotsialistichestkikh Respublik), which encompassed Soviet Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia (Belarus), and Transcaucasia. These four republics were informally called "union" (soiuznaya) republics (as distinguished from "autonomous republics," which were formed within union republics on a part of their territory). The term "union" was used to designate the constituent parts of the USSR under their 1922 agreement to form a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or to enter into this union.	• The Azerbaijan, Armenian, and Georgian Soviet Republics (Azerbaidzhanskaya, Armianskaya, Gruzinskaya Sovetskaya Respublikas) were created in 1920–1921.	
Gubernia, Oblast (Province) Transitional administrative units of the RSFSR based on prerevolutionary units as of 1921.	Terek Province (Terksaya Gubernia), Kuban-Black Sea Province (Kubano-Chernomorskaya Oblast), Don Province (Donskaya Oblast), Stavropol Province (Stavropolskaya Gubernia). Abolished in 1921.	• Gubernia, Oblast • Uezd • Volost
(Avtonomnaya) Sovetskaya Respublika, Avtonomnaya Oblast, Avtonomny Krai ([Autonomous] Soviet Republic, Autonomous Province, Autonomous Territory) Political-administrative entities created after 1921 based on ethnicity on a portion of another Soviet republic or under its protection.	The Mountain (Gorskaya) Soviet Republic (part of the RSFSR), the Ajarian Autonomous Republic (part of the Georgian Soviet Republic), the Nakhichevan Autonomous Territory (Nakhichevansky Krai, under the protection of the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic), the Autonomous Kalmyk Province (Kalmytskaya Oblast, part of the RSFSR)	• Autonomous Republic, Oblast, Krai • Okrug • Volost (Raion)

Kommuna (Commune) A political-administrative entity that arose as a form of local "revolutionary self-government" when Soviet authority was first being established.	The Baku Commune of 1918. A number of ethnic communes that arose in 1918–1921 became Soviet autonomies (republics or oblasts).	
THE SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS WITHIN THE USSR 1922–1991		
• Sovetskaya Federativnaya Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika (SFSR) (Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) **• Sovetskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika (SSR) (Soviet Socialist Republic)** These entities were referred to as "union" (soiuznaya) republics.	Russian SFSR, Transcaucasian SFSR (Transcaucasian SFSR comprised three SSRs—the Azerbaijan, Armenian, and Georgian Soviet Socialist Republics, which became direct "union" republics after the Transcaucasian SFSR was abolished in 1936), Ukrainian SSR, Belorussian SSR	Overall hierarchy (after 1922): • SSSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) • SFSR and SSR • SSR (in the case of the Transcaucasian SFSR) • Krai, Oblast, Autonomous Republic (ASSR) • Okrug, Autonomous Oblast • Volost (Raion after 1929) • Selsky Sovet (village soviet [council])
First Level of Administrative Units in the RSFSR/USSR		
Krai (Territory) Beginning in 1924, an administrative unit in the RSFSR that included an autonomous province (avtonomnaya oblast) or an autonomous district (avtonomny okrug) within its territory. After 1991, when a number of autonomous oblasts were taken out of their krais, these units continued to be called krais. After 1991 the distinction between krais and oblasts was eliminated.	(At various times) North Caucasus (Severo-Kavkazsky), Azov-Black Sea (Azovo-Chernomorsky), Lower Volga (Nizhne-Volzhsky), Orjonikidze (Ordzhonikidzevsky), Stavropol (Stavropolsky), Krasnodar (Krasnodarsky) Territories (Krais)	Within the RSFSR • Krai, Oblast, ASSR • Okrug, Autonomous Oblast • Volost (Raion after 1929) • Selsky Sovet

Oblast (Province) Beginning in 1924, an administrative unit in the RSFSR that did not include an autonomous oblast or autonomous okrug.	• Rostov (Rostovskaya) Oblast (beginning in 1934), Grozny (Groznenskaya) Oblast (1944–1956). • For a brief period in 1951–1954 the Georgian and Azerbaijani SSRs were divided into oblasts (two in each republic).	• Okrug, Autonomous Oblast • Volost (Raion after 1929) • Selsky Sovet
Avtonomnaya Sovetskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika (ASSR) (Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic) A) A unit formed on the basis of ethnicity but not incorporated into one of the krais of the RSFSR (except in the case of the Daghestan ASSR, which was part of the North Caucasus Territory [Krai] in 1931–1936). B) An administrative unit formed on the basis of ethnicity and incorporated into another ("union") Soviet republic.	A) Daghestan (Dagestanskaya, 1921–1991), Mountain (Gorskaya, 1921–1924), Kabardin-Balkar (Kabardino-Balkarskaya), North Ossetian (Severo-Osetinskaya), Chechen-Ingush (Checheno-Ingushskaya), Kalmyk (Kalmytskaya) (all 1936–1991) ASSRs. B) Abkhaz (Abkhazskaya, beginning 1931), Nakhichevan (Nakhichevanskaya) ASSRs.	• Autonomous Republic • Okrug • Volost (beginning in 1929 Raion or, in the case of the Daghestan ASSR in 1929–1932, Canton)
Second-Level Administrative Units for the RSFSR and Soviet Union		
Okrug (District) A) An administrative unit (1923–1930) within a krai or oblast. B) An administrative unit organized along ethnic lines within an ASSR.	A) Armavir (Armavirsky), Labinsky, Stavropol (Stavropolsky), Pyatigorsk (Piatigorsky) Districts (Okrugs). B) Gorskaya ASSR was comprised of Karachai (Karachaevsky), Kabardin (Kabardinsky), Balkar (Balkarsky), Vladikavkaz (Vladikavkazsky), Nazran (Nazranovsky), Chechen (Chechensky), and Sunzha (Sunzhensky) Districts (Okrugs).	• Okrug • Volost (Raion beginning in 1929) • Selsky Sovet In 1922–1924 okrugs in the Gorskaya ASSR were reorganized as autonomous provinces (oblasts), except for Sunzha District. During the reorganization of administrative units in 1930 the okrug level was abolished, though it persisted in the Caucasus in the case of Kizlyar District (Okrug) from 1938 to 1944.

Avtonomnaya Oblast (Autonomous Province, AP) A unit organized along ethnic lines within a krai of the RSFSR, an ASSR, or a "union" Soviet republic.	The Kabardin-Balkar, North Ossetian, Chechen Ingush, Adyghean, Karachai, Kalmyk, South Ossetian APs, the AP of Mountain Karabakh (Nagorno-Karabakh). The Cherkess (Cherkesskaya) AP was called the Cherkess [Cherkessky] National District (Okrug) between 1926 and 1928.	• Autonomous Oblast • Volost (Raion beginning in 1929, Ulus in the Kalmyk AP/ASSR) The distinction between ASSRs and APs has to do with both economic factors (regions with large, productive economies were more likely to be made republics) and political factors (as was the case in the creation of the Ajarian ASSR in 1921).
Third- and Fourth-Level Administrative Units of the RSFSR		
Raion (Volost before 1929) Selsky Sovet (village soviets or councils)		
ADDITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS		
Dogovornaya Sovetskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika (DSSR) (Treaty-Based Soviet Socialist Republic) This term was used to describe the special constitutional status of the Abkhaz Soviet Republic from 1922 to 1931 whereby a special treaty defined the limits of authority of the Georgian SSR and Transcaucasian SFSR over Abkhazia. In essence, this was an interim step between an SSR and an autonomous republic (ASSR) within an SSR.		
Gavarak, Temi, Daira, Kanton The terms used for rural districts in the 1920s in Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Daghestan, respectively.		

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Sources

MAPS

The term *reconstruction* is used for maps created with the specific purpose of reflecting (or, rather, reconstructing) the geographical and political situation of a particular period in the past. These maps are distinguished from original historical maps that relate to the period they depict and represent a certain authoritative or thematic view of their authors' contemporary reality.

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