

**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

**MILITARY ARMISTICE IN KOREA:
A CASE STUDY FOR STRATEGIC LEADERS**

BY

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM T. HARRISON
United States Army**

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for Public Release.
Distribution is Unlimited.**

USAWC CLASS OF 2002



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

20020806 391

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

MILITARY ARMISTICE IN KOREA: A CASE STUDY FOR STRATEGIC LEADERS

by

LTC William T. Harrison
United States Army

Colonel (R) Donald W. Boose
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: LTC William T. Harrison

TITLE: MILITARY ARMISTICE IN KOREA: A CASE STUDY FOR STRATEGIC LEADER

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 09 April 2002

PAGES: 45

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The purpose of this research project is to show that the Korean War Armistice Agreement and the negotiations involved provide tremendous insight that is critical for military strategic leaders today. The Armistice Agreement has set the framework for the last 48 years of strategic relations between North Korea and South Korea as well as the United States and other countries in the region. At the highest levels of military leadership any input to the National Military Strategy or underlying National Security Strategy regarding Korea must be built on an understanding of the Armistice Agreement. At the mid to upper levels of military leadership an understanding of the lessons learned from the negotiations will significantly help officers faced with negotiation challenges in the future. I have proposed twelve lessons learned for the military officers that will face negotiations in the future. Analyzing the background of the Korean War, the Armistice Agreement and the lessons learned from the negotiations offers a clear view of the senior military leaders' interaction with the senior political and diplomatic policy makers. It offers a tremendous opportunity to develop Strategic Leadership competencies.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
MILITARY ARMISTICE IN KOREA: A CASE STUDY FOR STRATEGIC LEADERS	1
BACKGROUND	2
THE NEGOTIATIONS	5
THE NEGOTIATIONS ENVIRONMENT.....	5
COMPROMISE AND SOLUTION.....	12
IPLEMENTATION	14
THE NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION.....	15
TEMPORARY ORGANIZATIONS.....	16
MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION.....	17
PAST DECADE	19
CURRENT SITUATION.....	22
CONCLUSIONS	23
NEGOTIATIONS LESSONS LEARNED.....	23
THE LEGACY OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT	28
ENDNOTES	31
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	37

MILITARY ARMISTICE IN KOREA: A CASE STUDY FOR STRATEGIC LEADERS

Why don't Strategic Leaders study the lessons learned from past events? It must be a combination of many factors revolving around a myopic view of world events centered on our own experiences. Somehow, we feel that the events of our time are unique and can only be understood in the present context. It is "what the philosopher John Anderson termed the 'parochialism of the present', a condition resulting from a combination of ignorance of history and an egotistical insistence on exaggerating the importance of events that more or less directly involve oneself."¹ Many times we falsely believe that what leaders experienced in previous times is not very helpful because everything is so much more complicated and different now. Another, less condemning, reason is simply a lack of time to do all that is required. Even with the proper prioritization of time and effort, leaders do not enjoy the benefit of ample time to allocate to in-depth study on so many of the areas that could be beneficial. Yet, our profession and our nation demand that we be Strategic Leaders who are quintessential students of history, comfortable with complexities, and able to build frames of reference. We must be able to give valuable input to senior military and civilian leaders for strategy formulation and must be able to execute in environments that are full of volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity.²

The purpose of this research project is to show that the Korean War Armistice Agreement and the negotiations involved provide tremendous insight that is critical for military strategic leaders today. The Armistice Agreement has set the framework for the last 48 years of strategic relations between North Korea and South Korea as well as the United States and other countries in the region. At the highest levels of military leadership any input to the National Military Strategy or underlying National Security Strategy regarding Korea must be built on an understanding of the Armistice Agreement. At the mid to upper levels of military leadership an understanding of the lessons learned from the negotiations will help significantly officers faced with negotiation challenges in the future. I have proposed twelve lessons learned for the military officers that will face negotiations in the future.

The negotiations leading to the Armistice Agreement were the most complex and longest ceasefire talks in the history of all military actions involving the United States. The complexities and the amount of time involved in reaching the Armistice Agreement have made these negotiations a resource for future negotiators.

Throughout the war, the armistice negotiations, and the Geneva Conference, the U.S. Administration was squeezed between pressures from all sides: military pressure from North Korea, opposition from the Soviet bloc at the United Nations,

and pleas for greater moderation from UN members, including those providing combat units to the Unified Command. As much time and effort was spent on the negotiations within the U.S. Administration in Washington, between Washington and the Unified Command, and between the United States and its allies and friends, as in the negotiations with North Korea and China.³

The benefit of evaluating the effects of the Armistice Agreement over the last 48 years is that it gives the United States the unique opportunity to examine how the negotiations impact the United States today and will continue to affect the United States for the foreseeable future.

At 1000 hours 27 July 1953, the senior United Nations Command (UNC) military delegate signed an Armistice Agreement with the senior delegates from North Korea. Within hours General Mark W. Clark, Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, signed it. Marshal Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander Korean People's Army and Peng Teh-Huai, Chinese People's Volunteers also signed the document for their military forces. This document that ended the fighting was "intended to be purely military in character"⁴ and designed to be temporary until a political settlement could be reached. In the document, the military delegates and commanders recommended that:

Within three months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.⁵

Both sides did meet in Geneva from the end of April to 15 June 1954. After at least 50 speeches and much posturing, the negotiations failed to produce a political settlement. The Communists insisted on the withdrawal of foreign forces before any elections took place and the Allies had pushed "for a unified, independent, and democratic Korea."⁶ Nearly fifty years later, the political settlement hoped for in the Armistice language has not yet materialized. Therefore, the Armistice Agreement, the result of the intense negotiations, has been the corner stone for the interaction on the Korean Peninsula between the warring nations since 27 July 1953.

BACKGROUND

The Armistice Agreement was the culmination of the Korean War. The Korean War started as a civil war between the Communists in the north backed by the USSR and China and the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south backed by the United Nations Command. The seeds for the conflict were sown right after World War II when the Peninsula was divided among the victors along the 38th Parallel. Almost immediately the internal Korean Nationalist and Communist movements clashed.

The Soviets brought in communist trained Koreans, to include Kim Il Sung, so they could immediately organize the northern portion of the country under the communist system. In contrast, the U.S. military did a poor job of administering the government. It also had the near impossible task of trying to establish democratic systems in a country that had never seen them. In fact, Korea had not even enjoyed any form of self-rule in nearly two generations. In addition the United States attempted to work with the Soviets to establish a unified, independent Korea. These attempts were never successful. In 1947 the United States tried to get a United Nations (U.N.) mandate to hold Korea wide elections. The Soviets did not allow elections in their area of control, because two thirds of the population lived south of the 38th Parallel, and they knew a democratic government would be elected. So the U.N. held the "national" elections only in the U.S. zone on 10 May 1948 and the Republic of Korea was born. The U.S. military turned over governmental control to President Syngman Rhee and the rest of the elected government on 20 July 1948 then started to withdraw. By June 1949 there were only 500 soldiers remaining as a Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG). The new government was recognized by the U.N. but faced an overwhelming communist threat from the north.⁷ The new Republic of Korea didn't enjoy any clearly established alliances or public assurances that it would be defended from an attack.

Despite the ROK military's obvious weakness, and Kim Il Sung's strong desire to gain control of the entire peninsula, the North Koreans could not initiate the war without the support of the USSR. In fact, they depended completely on the Soviets for all their military and economic support. This was clearly seen during Kim Il Sung's March 1949 visit to Stalin. Kim Il Sung pushed for Stalin's approval for an invasion into the south but the Soviets were not ready because they had a sophisticated understanding of the risks involved:

After their lack of success in China, the Americans probably will intervene in Korean Affairs more decisively than they did in China and, it goes without saying, apply all their strength to save Syngman Rhee...Moreover, a drawn out war in Korea could be used by the Americans for purposes of agitation against the Soviet Union and for further inflaming war hysteria. Therefore, it is inadvisable that the north begin a civil war now...the preconditions for it are not there.⁸

The USSR only later accepted the risk of the war based on a calculation that the United States would not get fully involved. That miscalculation was the result of the United States not giving clear, unambiguous warning about its willingness to provide whatever military support was necessary to defend the ROK. On 12 January 1950, Secretary of State Acheson excluded the ROK from his declared U.S. defense perimeter.⁹ Most likely this public declaration and apparent withdraw of U.S. support for the ROK is what convinced Stalin that the risks of an

attack were now acceptable and that victory could be gained rapidly. Stalin cabled, "Transmit all this to Kim Il Sung and tell him that I am ready to help him in this [invasion]."¹⁰

The Republic of Korea faced an insurgency and guerilla warfare that followed the Maoist model and culminated in the North Korean Army attack on 25 Jun 1950.¹¹ The world's two most dominant countries supported each of them. The Communists were trained and well equipped by the Soviet Union. The Soviets saw great benefit in allowing Kim Il Sung to use military force to unify the peninsula under communist rule and little risk in the attempt. Despite Secretary Acheson's public exclusion of Korea as a vital interest, the fact remained that the United States had troops in the ROK and had established itself as the protector of the fledgling democratic government. If the United States allowed the USSR- supported Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) to invade the ROK, it would be the United States first abandonment of support to a democratic nation in the face of the communists. In addition, the newly formed United Nations had also invested its prestige in the ROK by organizing the elections and certifying the ROK as the only legitimate government in Korea. The combination of U.N. and U.S. political investment in the ROK caused both to respond rapidly to the attack.

The U. S. immediately responded by sending air and naval support. The U.N. quickly passed a series of resolutions that established an allied force to defend the ROK. Within days, the United States was in the lead of a multinational force that would be committed for the next three years. The complications of this arrangement cannot be over stated. It was the first time that the United Nations responded to military aggression. The U.N. handed the United States the dominant leadership role of a large multinational force called the United Nations Command (UNC). The UNC eventually encompassed 16 nations providing combat troops plus another five providing medical support. It was also the first time the Soviets attempted to gain territory by challenging the United States through a proxy.¹²

The first year of the war saw four major shifts in momentum. First, the DPRK (or North Korea) thrust its Korean People's Army (KPA) across the 38th Parallel on 25 Jun 1950, quickly dominated the battlefields, pushed the ROK Army (ROKA) and the initial U.S. soldiers into the Pusan perimeter, and came close to claiming victory. But the KPA had pushed beyond its ability to sustain itself and had reached its culminating point. In September 1950 the UNC struck with a crippling counter offensive by an amphibious landing at Inchon east of Seoul. By October it had regained all lost territory and continued north of the 38th parallel past Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, with the intent of securing all of Korea up to the Chinese border on the Yalu River. In November 1950, the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC or Chinese Communists) entered the war and its Chinese Peoples Volunteers (CPV) Army counterattacked. They drove

the UNC back to the 38th parallel in December 1950 and then well south of Seoul in January 1951. The last great push in the first year of the war came in the spring of 1951 as the UNC again counter attacked and was able to push the combined CPV and KPA just above the 38th parallel.

THE NEGOTIATIONS

The momentum was still on the side of the UNC in July 1951 when the Soviets suggested a negotiated settlement through a radio address by Mr. Jacob Malik, USSR senior delegate to the U.N.¹³ The Chinese were in no shape to attempt any new counteroffensive and were unable to even establish a solid defensive perimeter to stop the UNC forces. The United States did not fully appreciate the poor state of the combined Chinese and North Korean forces and calculated that the UNC could only secure all of Korea by expanding the war into China and risking the direct intervention from the Soviets. President Truman publicly committed the United States not to expand the war on 11 April 1951 when he relieved General MacArthur and made a public announcement to that effect.¹⁴ Based on that thinking and an overestimation of the current capabilities of the CPV and the KPA, the U.S. leadership hastily accepted the offer to negotiate. General Ridgway, General MacArthur's replacement as Commander-in-Chief UNC (CINCUNC), sent an open radio message offering negotiations to the Communist military leaders.

THE NEGOTIATIONS ENVIRONMENT

From the outset, the negotiations were set up as a military solution to the fighting. Military officers from the United States, representing the UNC, conducted the talks with the negotiation team from the Chinese Peoples Volunteers (CPV) and Korean Peoples Army (KPA). The UNC delegation got its directives from the Truman Administration, through the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and through the UNC Commander. At each of these levels the United States was faced with extreme challenges throughout the negotiations. First, the Truman administration had to coordinate, at times, with Britain and the other 15 UNC allies. Additionally, it had to answer to the United Nations, which was strongly influenced by India and other "neutrals." Further, it had to deal with the Rhee government in the ROK. Finally, it could not deal diplomatically with the Chinese because it did not recognize the new mainland communist regime. The JCS had to deal with the other government agencies and the military arms of allies. The UNC commander, General Ridgway then General Mark W. Clark, had to deal with the commanders of the allied forces on the ground as well as the military and political leaders of the ROK. The UNC delegates were almost exclusively from the United States. Initially the team consisted of Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy; Major General Lawrence C. Craigie, USAF; Major

General Henry I. Hodes, U.S.A; Rear Admiral Arliegh A. Burke; and Major General Paik Sun Yup, ROKA.¹⁵ They had the unenviable task of negotiating with a similarly sized combination of North Koreans and Chinese as well as daily contact with reporters.

WHY THE NEGOTIATIONS TOOK SO LONG

The negotiations started with the first liaison meeting on 8 July 1951 and concluded with the Armistice on 27 July 1953. It is worth reiterating that these were the longest military negotiations in history. It took two years to set the terms that most thought would take just a few weeks. There is an interesting mix of reasons for the long duration.

First, the UNC did not think it was negotiating from a position of overwhelming strength. It came to the table because it didn't see itself as being able to dominate the battlefield and to dictate its desires. That was a miscalculation based on the perceived intentions of the Soviets and the Communist Chinese. It also over estimated the operational field strength of the CPV in Korea. By not continuing to attack, "the United Nations in large measure discarded its major bargaining weapon and eliminated from the scene the factor that had led the Communists to seek an armistice."¹⁶ So, the way the UNC came to the negotiating table was flawed. Once at the negotiations table, the UNC delegation opened with a huge mistake.¹⁷

The order of agenda items in the negotiations was disadvantageous to the UNC, whose negotiators allowed the settlement of the military demarcation line (MDL) and the demilitarized zone (DMZ) to precede the other challenging agenda items. The UNC first submitted nine agenda items, with the MDL being fifth. The communists countered with five items and placed the MDL at the top. Just the adoption of the Agenda took 16 days. In the end the agenda consisted of the Communists' proposal:

1. adoption of the agenda;
2. fixing a military demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for a cessation of hostilities in Korea;
3. concrete arrangements for the realization of a ceasefire and an armistice in Korea, including the composition, authority, and functions of a supervising organization for carrying out the terms of a cease fire and armistice;
4. arrangements relating to prisoners of war;
5. recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides.¹⁸

The UNC's critical error was allowing the Communists to place the MDL at the top. Attempting to fix the MDL before settling on the other issues gave the Communists just what

they were looking for. At first, it gave them time to regroup and establish secure reinforced defensive positions. This happened through the fall of 1951 because the UNC commanders did not see the utility of killing their men just to gain limited territory.¹⁹ As CINCUNC, General Ridgway, put it, "ground commanders of all ranks hesitated to fight for ground that an early armistice might require them to relinquish."²⁰ Once the MDL was established it gave the Communists time to adjust their objectives for the negotiations and gain great benefit from extending the negotiations as long as possible. There was a definite difference of approaches to this MDL issue between the CINCUNC, General Ridgway, and the head UNC negotiator, Admiral Joy, on the one hand and the senior leaders in Washington on the other. Washington wanted to stay flexible and give in on the MDL, while the delegates and the CINCUNC didn't want to show any signs of weakness.²¹ Admiral Joy recognized this as the turning point. He said,

This concession to the Communists was the turning point of the armistice conference. Thereafter, because the fighting slackened, we lacked the essential military pressure with which to enforce a reasonable attitude toward the negotiations. Our delegation no longer had a strong lever to use against Communist intransigence. Thereafter, we were confronted with Communist stalling and delaying tactics at every turn. It is my considered judgment that this error in offering a concession to gain nothing more than apparent (and illusory) progress in the negotiations cost the United States a full year of war in Korea and armistice terms far more disadvantageous than otherwise could have been obtained.²²

The next issue that extended the talks was the UNC miscalculation of the KPA/CPV objectives. The agreement on the MDL coupled with the earlier removal of General MacArthur as commander allowed the Communists to be fairly certain that the UNC would not attempt to recapture the northern territory and that there were minimal chances of the war expanding.²³ This gave the KPA/CPV negotiators the ability to drag the talks out for an indefinite period of time. The evidence suggests that Kim Il Sung's goal was to rebuild his military strength and try to convince the Chinese and the Soviets to support another major campaign and unify Korea. The PRC's goals were to keep the talks going so the world would have to recognize the new Chinese communist government and to build its stature in Asia. Thus, with no sense of urgency on the Communist side, it took just over four months from the start of negotiations to just reach agreement on the MDL. It took 15 more long months to complete the armistice. The agenda items three and four would take the rest of the time. First, item three was contested. Through many deliberations, the sub-delegates and delegates wrestled with how the armistice would be supervised, administered, and verified. The United States wanted to ensure that the KPA/CPV

did not use the protection of the armistice to rebuild their forces for another assault on the ROK. These issues would shape the supervision mechanisms that would be crucial to sustaining the Armistice until a permanent political settlement could be reached. As it turned out, some of these mechanisms would be effective in practice and some would not.

The Communists fiercely debated every point and didn't give any concessions. For now, they had no real pressure to complete the Negotiations and were seeing propaganda gains at the table while their soldiers were building tremendous defensive fortifications and getting resupplied and reorganized. By the first anniversary of the negotiations, 10 July 1952, the delegates still had to resolve the most contentious issue - Prisoner of War (POW) repatriation.

Agenda item 4, POW Repatriation, was the issue that extended the negotiations for another full year until 27 July 1953. The United States drove the UNC's determination not to give up the principle of voluntary repatriation. It was a hotly contested issue because of the principles represented on each side. The Communists were trying to establish the legitimacy of their way of government and could not allow many of their soldiers to refuse repatriation. That would undermine the worth of their cause and stand as a complete embarrassment. On the other hand, the United States would not allow unwilling prisoners to be forced to go back to the DPRK or China and face imprisonment, torture, or death. It was a very complicated issue with conflicting precedents in previous wars.

"At the close of the Revolutionary War the Treaty of Paris of 1783 had simply stated: 'All prisoners on both sides shall be set at Liberty...' Thousands of British and German soldiers decided to stay in the new country and to live under the new form of government rather than go back to Europe."²⁴ That could have established a precedent. However, the most current document on POWs was the 1949 Geneva Convention. Though not yet ratified by any of the combatants, other than France, it was widely accepted. It was built on previous customary rules of land warfare as outlined in The Hague Convention of 1907 and the Geneva POW Convention of 1929. The 1949 Geneva Convention called for the return of sick and wounded POWs as soon as they could be transported and all other POWs as soon as fighting ended. The strong words in Article 18 demanded quick and compulsory repatriation. They were inserted in response to the Soviet action of forcing many German and Japanese prisoners to remain in Soviet territories as forced labor long after WWII. However, in the Korean War, the UNC did not see repatriation as the simple action laid out in the Geneva Convention.

There were various levels of complexity to the prisoners held by the UNC. First, the KPA forced some ROK citizens and soldiers into its military during its initial sweep to Pusan. Many in this category were later captured a second time by the UNC during the Inchon counter

offensive. These citizens and former ROK soldiers desperately wanted to remain in the ROK. Second, after the Chinese entered the war, UNC forces captured many of those soldiers. A great number claimed to be former Chinese Nationalists, forced into communist service, and feared returning north because they faced death or torture.

Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, Army Chief of Psychological Warfare, initially identified the Chinese POW's possible fate to General J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff. He proposed the idea of paroling them to Taiwan, as opposed to sending them back to the mainland once an armistice was concluded. His proposal came in July 1951 just as the armistice negotiations started. His argument was that, besides being the humanitarian thing to do, it also would help demoralize the enemy and get more of the Chinese to surrender rather than fight so tenaciously. General Collins accepted the concept and expanded it into the idea of voluntary repatriation for all prisoners.²⁵

The voluntary repatriation stand was not the position recommended by the negotiating team. It led to 6 months of internal debate at all levels from the negotiators through General Ridgway, the Army Staff, JCS and the White House. Clearly, the post-World War II forced repatriation of Soviet POWs under Article 18 and the subsequent imprisonment and deaths of most of these unfortunates had a profound effect on President Truman and his advisors. "[Secretary of State] Acheson's argument [against involuntary repatriation] may have been designed to appeal to Truman, who regretted that unwilling Soviet soldiers had been forcibly returned after World War II."²⁶ At various times opinions and positions changed drastically on the best way to handle the complex POW issue. What seems to be constant was the primary concern for the UNC prisoners' fate. That concern was balanced with the real certainty that individuals should have the right to choose repatriation, especially since so many certainly faced death or at least horrible mistreatment back in China or North Korea.

Prior to announcing the UNC position on voluntary repatriation, the sub delegates in the negotiations sparred on the simple matter of exchanging lists of POWs. This task took considerable time and had the unfortunate consequence of giving the Communists an expectation of retrieving approximately 116,000 POWs. As early as August 1950 the UNC, in accordance with the Geneva Convention, had turned in a list of approximately 178,000 POWs to the International Red Cross. The Communists had not turned over a similar tally but had stated in a propaganda radio broadcast that they had captured over 65,000. In the fall of 1951, General Ridgway reclassified over 37,000 prisoners as detainees after they were screened and found to be civilians captured in the confusion of battle. The JCS gave him permission to

unilaterally release the detainees at his discretion. Because he feared for the safety of the UNC prisoners, he held off on this action.²⁷

On 18 Dec 51 the two sides finally exchanged lists of POWs. The UNC listed 132,474 and the Communists, 11,559. The list of UNC POWs was far lower than the list of the UNC soldiers missing in action and statistically confirmed what the UNC had seen on the battlefields-that the KPA had brutally murdered many captives. The KPA delegate denied any mistreatment and offered that they had captured over 65,000 but had released over 50,000 at the front lines to return to their homes. Though this was blatantly false, it helped the UNC argue for voluntary repatriation later. The UNC sub delegate, Vice Admiral Ruthven E. Libby, told the Communists to expect approximately 116,000 POWs in the exchange. He said besides the 37,000 detainees that would not be returned, there were approximately 16,000 identified as originally ROK soldiers who would not be handed over.

December 1951 to April 1952 saw the negotiations centered on the POW issue. As the UNC formulated and revised its negotiating position, it formally introduced the proposal for voluntary repatriation on 2 January 1952 at a sub delegate meeting. Once it was put out on the table it became part of the official UNC position and, in the words of the official Army historian, "the possibility existed that once public opinion had been marshaled in its support divorce might prove to be out of the question."²⁸

This issue, as all issues in the armistice, got the attention, decision and guidance from President Truman. He and his biggest UNC ally, British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, agreed that voluntary repatriation of prisoners was the appropriate stand. "Britain stood for the principle of no forcible repatriation...Churchill minuted on 25 March 1952, 'I presume we are agreed that so far as we have any say in the matter, no United Nations prisoner of war shall be handed back to the Communists against his will...'"²⁹ Voluntary repatriation quickly became a negotiating objective that the UNC delegation had to stick with. The Communists used the Geneva Convention as the basis for their counter argument. Vice Admiral Joy, the senior Delegate summed up the Communist position:

Basing their arguments on their interpretation of the Geneva Conventions, the Communists contended that the United Nations Command had no right to withhold repatriation of certain prisoners merely because those prisoners expressed opposition to being repatriated. The United Nations Command contended that it had the right and the duty to refuse to repatriate those prisoners who could not be returned to the side of their origin without the use of force.³⁰

The POW exchange issue seemed to be close to resolution by 2 April 1952. The UNC drafted the words to the paragraph of the armistice dealing with the POWs and issued a

supporting two-point "understanding." At the time the Communists did not challenge the two understandings; that POWs would not be forced to repatriate, and that all captives could remain in the area of their original residence. The Communists only wanted to see the adjusted lists, so the UNC made it clear that it would have to screen all POWs. "On 4 April (1952) both sides agreed to recess to determine the round number of POWs to be repatriated by each side...Hopes were high. It appeared that any figure over 100,000 POW's to be repatriated by the UNC would result in an armistice."³¹

This first screening only produced approximately 70,000 POWs willing to go back to North Korea or China out of 134,000 total captives still classified as POWs. The UNC gave that figure on 19 April 1952 and it was well below the 116,000 to 134,000 the North Koreans and Chinese had expected. The Communists accused the UNC of forcing soldiers to stay and would not agree to a recount even with their participation. Later in April 1952 the UNC offered a package proposal that included some concessions on the inspections of airfields under item 3 in return for the acceptance of the UNC position on the POW issue. Nothing worked. That caused a deadlock in negotiations for 11 months. In May 1952, a month after the original screening, Major General William K. Harrison, Jr. replaced Vice Admiral Joy as the senior UNC delegate. In June 1952 the UNC turned over the 27,000 detainees to the ROK for immediate release. General Harrison informed the North's delegates of this just as a matter for the record and he made it clear that the UNC would not negotiate about the action. In July the UNC re-screened all the remaining POWs and produced a list of 83,000 willing to be repatriated, which they presented on 13 July 52. "The Communists replied that these figures were 'clearly incapable of settling the question', and later they said they wanted 116,000 repatriates (the figure mentioned by the Unified Command [UNC] on 1 April) of whom 20,000 should be Chinese. They accused the Unified Command of trickery, and asserted their opposition to 'every form of so-called screening,' "³²

Throughout the summer, General Harrison and General Clark worked on three feasible alternatives to give to the North's Negotiators. They submitted them to the JCS for approval. In interagency coordinating meetings, the State Department and the Defense Department representatives could not agree on the alternatives. So, President Truman had to decide. He agreed with General Harrison's proposals.³³ On 28 September 1952 General Harrison offered the three POW options to the enemy negotiators. First, bring all POWs to the DMZ and allow each to go to the side of their choosing. Second, exchange all POWs willing to be repatriated then have neutral nations re-screen the rest in the DMZ and release them to the side of their choice. Third, exchange all willing POWs and bring the rest to the DMZ for release to side of

choice without further screening.³⁴ After two weeks of recess, the Communists accepted that Korean soldiers could choose to stay on the side of their birth but rejected voluntary repatriation of all POWs. General Harrison indefinitely suspended the talks until the Communists agreed to one of the three POW options or produced a solid alternative of their own. He later recalled:

It took quite a bit of convincing to get Wash [Washington] to let me recess indefinitely on Oct 8. I felt certain that when [the] Communists became convinced that they could gain nothing more by delay and would continue to suffer loss by bombing they would find some way for us to get together again. So they did some 6 mos. later.³⁵

Though liaison officers met periodically, there were no plenary negotiations again for five months. General Harrison believed that this withdrawal made the difference, "it was my break off that did finally get the armistice. After all the fooling around it took them six months to learn that we meant business."³⁶ Denying the Communists a platform from which to spew propaganda certainly was an important factor, as was the military pressure through air bombardment and limited objective ground attacks. However, there was a great deal of work being done away from the table, especially in the U.N., and changes in leadership on both sides that also strongly influenced the communists to finally offer the compromises that could continue the negotiations.

COMPROMISE AND SOLUTION

The members of the U.N. were very active in trying to resolve the POW issue so the armistice could be concluded. Several neutral nations, to include Peru and Mexico, submitted draft proposals as well as Canada, Indonesia, Iraq, Cuba and others. The U.N. finally accepted an Indian proposal for the use of neutral nations to do the screening of POWs and based on the principle that no POWs should be forced to repatriate. The Soviets represented the Chinese in the U.N. and came up with their own proposal that gutted the concept of voluntary repatriation. The U.N. voted in favor of the Indian draft as resolution 610(VII) on 3 December 1952.³⁷ Leadership in the United States and USSR changed during the 5-month break in negotiations. On 20 January 1953, General Dwight D. Eisenhower replaced Truman as U.S. President and John Foster Dulles replaced Dean Acheson as Secretary of State. "There was no basic change in the U.S. policy insofar as the Korean War was concerned."³⁸ President Eisenhower made no immediate fundamental change in the U.S. policy on the Korean War. Nevertheless, he had the NCS hold numerous policy meetings from February through May 1953 to evaluate options for ending the war to include the use of nuclear weapons. During the 20 May NSC meeting he concluded that if the Truce Talks failed, the United States would have no choice but to initiate a greatly expanded military offensive into North Korea, Manchuria and China using nuclear

weapons. President Eisenhower went so far as setting a tentative D-day for May 1954. He directed Secretary Dulles to relay that threat through the Indian Prime Minister. Presumably, that determination made itself felt to the other side. On 5 March 1953, Soviet leader Josef Stalin died and was replaced by Georgi M. Malenkov. Malenkov and his advisors were facing unrest in Eastern Europe, wanted to ease the tensions with the West, and saw the Korean War as a growing burden. They consequently relaxed Stalin's previous opposition to a negotiated truce.³⁹ The Chinese and North Koreans offered some negotiation concessions after Stalin's death.

On 28 March 1953 the Communists agreed to a 22 February proposal by the CINCUNC, General Clark, to exchange sick and wounded POWs. General Clark's idea came from an International Red Cross declaration in December 1952. Not only did the Communists agree to the exchange, they also seemed to concede on the larger POW issue. Chou En-Lai, Foreign Minister of Communist China "urged that both sides 'should undertake to repatriate immediately after the cessation of hostilities all those prisoners of war in their custody who insist upon repatriation and to hand over the remaining prisoners of war to a neutral state so as to ensure a just solution to the question of their repatriation.'⁴⁰ Action came relatively quickly after that. Between 20 April and 3 May 1953 the sick and wounded were exchanged in what the UNC called "Operation Little Switch." While this exchange was coordinated at the liaison officer level, the primary delegates met for the first time since October 1952. This happened after General Nam Il, senior KPA delegate, stated in a letter to Lieutenant General Harrison (who was promoted during the recess of negotiations) that those "POWs who are allegedly unwilling to be repatriated should be handed over to a neutral state and thorough explanations given by our side, gradually freed from apprehensions so they could return home."⁴¹

When the delegates met on 26 April 1953 a period of intense negotiations began where proposals and counter proposals were exchanged in an attempt to resolve the use of neutral nations to supervise the POWs not willing to repatriate. The time limits for the warring countries to try to convince the POWs to come home, and the final disposition of the non-repatriated POWs were also contested. On 8 June 1953 the "terms of reference" document for handling the POWs was ready for the senior delegates to sign. It was a six page detailed agreement on the handling of the remaining POWs not directly repatriated as a result of the Armistice Agreement. It established a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) consisting of Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia and led by India. The POWs not wanting to be repatriated came under the Commission's control. The nations to which the prisoners of war belonged had 90 days to try to convince them to come home. If the POWs still wanted to stay put, then their final status had to be decided within 30 more days during the political conference.

At the end of a total of 120 days the POWs had the final choice to remain in the capturing country, go to India, or return home.⁴² The "terms of reference" was the first document signed by the two senior delegates, General Nam Il and General Harrison, and set the stage for the resolution of the final Armistice Agreement.

Still, it was nearly two months before the Armistice was signed. The biggest issue left on the table was the MDL. The UNC wanted the MDL that the negotiators agreed to back in December 1952. However, the Communists wanted it adjusted to the current frontline battle positions. Not wanting to drag out the talks further, the UNC agreed. While the sides were adjusting the MDL, ROK President Rhee took action on his threats to sabotage the Armistice. He had been absolutely opposed to any military settlement short of full reunification since the outset of hostilities. In a desperate attempt to derail the fast concluding negotiations, he engineered releasing almost all the 25,000 North Korean POWs that his ROK police forces were holding. These guard forces did not fall under the UNC but were among the very few that fell directly under the ROK.⁴³ The move caused the Communists to question the ability of the UNC to ensure ROK compliance with the Armistice and interrupted the negotiations for several weeks, but it failed to stop the Armistice. Nevertheless, President Rhee's strong protests did win the ROK a Mutual Defense Treaty promise from President Eisenhower and ensured the long-term relationship that has developed between the United States and the ROK over the past 50 years.

The Armistice Agreement was finally signed on 27 July 1953. It used the framework that was crafted over a year earlier by Vice Admiral Joy's delegation team and was based on the original agenda agreed to in August 1951. There were Four Articles subdivided into 63 paragraphs.

IMPLEMENTATION

Imbedded in the document were the descriptions of organizations and procedures for implementing and supervising the Armistice Agreement. These were primarily found in Article II, Concrete Arrangements For Ceasefire And Armistice. The two major bodies established were the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC). The MAC was charged with representing the two side's warring commanders and implementing and monitoring the Armistice. It specifically had responsibility for all actions within the 4 Kilometer-wide DMZ. To support the MAC, a Joint Secretariat was established, as well as 10 Joint Observer Teams. The Secretariat was to provide administrative support, while the role of the Observer teams was to monitor all activities within the DMZ and report findings back to

the MAC. Joint Duty Officers were set up to establish 24-telephone contact between the two sides and to receive or transmit messages and reports between the commanders.

THE NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION

The NNSC was charged with ensuring the two sides complied with the agreement to cease the introduction of reinforcing military forces and reinforcing aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition. The Armistice Agreement provided for 20 Neutral Nation Inspection Teams (NNIT) to monitor and investigate. The Agreement identified the 5 ports of entry in the north and south that the teams had to cover. It also called for the remaining 10 NNIT teams to be in reserve, collocated with the NNSC headquarters. The NNSC was, in turn, to be located in vicinity of the MAC and was given its own Secretariat.⁴⁴

This set up had a near fatal flaw. Neither the MAC nor the NNSC had final authorities imbedded in them for any disputes. Every issue that came up in the MAC had to be negotiated. Worse yet, in the independent NNSC there was no way of breaking the inevitable tie during votes on issues. These ties always would fall between the two neutrals selected by the Communists and the two selected by the UNC. Since the Communists considered the U.N. as a combatant, the organization was unable to assert its now familiar role as mediator or arbitrator. The impact on the NNSC was almost immediate.

The NNITs, over-watching the five North Korean ports, were not given access to the facilities they needed to observe and the North Koreans reported miniscule movements of troops and no introduction of any aircraft. The teams covering the ROK ports were given full access and the UNC gave detailed reports of troop and equipment movements. The UNC accused the Communists of obstructing the inspections in the north and using the southern inspections to spy. In addition the UNC accused the North Korea of falsifying all data it submitted on movements of troops and equipment. As an example, by the end of the first year, the UNC reported 287,343 soldier arrivals and 362,122 departures while the Communists reported only 12,748 and 31,201. Because of these glaring problems, both the Swiss and the Swedes recommended complete abolition of the NNSC within the first year.⁴⁵ After the Armistice Agreement, General Harrison, now General Clark's Far East Command Chief of Staff, wrote a position paper stating the NNSC would not work and recommended terminating it.⁴⁶ On 29 August 1954 the MAC agreed to reduce the NNITs from 5 to 3 in each country. In May 1956 the UNC notified the Communists through the MAC that it was no longer going to support the inspection teams in the south because the Communists did not support the teams in the north. As a result the NNSC withdrew all teams to within the DMZ.⁴⁷ "Four years after the signature of

the Armistice Agreement, the supervisory system had virtually collapsed. The NNSC, denuded of its Inspection Teams, was confined to the DMZ.⁴⁸ The UNC goal of keeping the Communists from building up forces in the north throughout the negotiations and afterwards through the NNSC was a complete failure. The months spent during the Armistice negotiations working on compromises for the inspection elements of agenda item 3 proved in the end fruitless. The Communists intentionally violated all aspects of the NNSC inspection process.

The NNSC still exists today, even though it never did revive its primary mission of inspection and monitoring. However, it has served as a communications outlet for the two sides and the NNSC members have helped to defuse several crises. The organization has been reduced to a minimum. The UNC's nominated neutrals, Sweden and Switzerland are still involved. However, the DPRK started to withdraw its support for the Czechs and Poles at the end of the Cold War, when those countries renounced communism and became independent in 1991. When Czechoslovakia broke up into Slovakia and the Czech Republic, the DPRK refused to recognize the Czech Republic as the legitimate successor and forced the Czech delegation to withdraw from the NNSC in April 1993. In 1995 the DPRK expelled the Poles from North Korea and broke off all contact with the NNSC. Today, the Poles still are members of the NNSC without the recognition of the DPRK or PRC. The Swedes and Swiss still remain in the ROK and the Polish NNSC representatives meet with them several times each year.⁴⁹ In fact, 14 August 2001 marked the 2,700th Plenary NNSC meeting.⁵⁰ The vast majority of its work however is simply symbolic.

TEMPORARY ORGANIZATIONS

In contrast, the temporary Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission structure for the POW non-repatriation resolution was somewhat more successful. The intent of setting it up was partially met and the organization performed well. One of the major reasons that the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission succeeded while the NNSC failed is because it had an authority in charge. The same four neutral nations supported both organizations. However, the Repatriation Commission had a fifth country, India, and it was in charge. The Indian Military ran the POW camps holding the Non-repatriates and ensured the POWs' safety. Overall it can be judged a success, but it had its own problems. Because of the strong internal POW organizations the Indians were unable to enforce the individual POW conferences with their home countries. So the warring countries were not given the planned opportunity to convince all the POWs to return home. Of the 22,604 non-repatriated POWs held by the UNC, only 628 changed their minds and returned to Communist control while 86 went to India and 21,839

returned to UNC control. Of the 359 held by the Communists, 347 remained in North Korea or went to China, only two went to India and ten returned to the UNC. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission finished its work on 19 February 1954.⁵¹ The MAC had a Committee for Repatriation and a Committee for Assisting the Return of Dislocated Civilians. After the successful conclusion of Operation Big Switch, the exchange of POWs, the Repatriation committee disbanded.

MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION

The most important element of the Armistice was the Military Armistice Commission (MAC). It has succeeded as the only consistent place of communication between the two sides. Though not envisioned as having a long-term mission, it has served this important function for the past 50 years. The Armistice Agreement and the MAC were very critical during the first forty years following the war. The Commission stood as the only real contact venue between the sides. There were almost no diplomatic channels for interaction with the Chinese during that time. The Chinese were not admitted to the U.N. until 1972 and formal diplomatic ties with the United States didn't start until the end of 1978. Even more importantly, the DPRK has been completely isolated from most other countries so the MAC has had to function as its only communication port. There were no diplomatic ties between the sides at all. There were almost no political negotiations "...for most of the forty or so years between the end of the Korean War and the end of the Cold War, simply because, with Kim Il Sung adamantly opposed to rapprochement with South Korea, there was little basis for negotiations with North Korea on other than a crisis management basis."⁵² After the futile attempt at a political settlement in the Geneva Talks of 1954, the Armistice remained the only agreement between the sides, so the MAC played a central role and was used for political purposes. However, its primary function remained unchanged. "Regular low-level technical contact between the militaries has been consistently maintained through the Military Armistice Commission (MAC), the vehicle through which military violations of the Armistice Agreement itself have been discussed and resolved."⁵³

Ironically, the initial intent of the MAC was never fully realized. The critical function of observing and monitoring violations within the DMZ never took hold. The MAC controlled the Joint Observation Teams (JOT), but they were rarely used to observe, monitor or inspect violations within the DMZ as it was intended in the Armistice Agreement. Each side could vote against any JOT employment. As a result, the MAC only used its JOT effectively once in 1976 to adjust the MDL within the Joint Security Area (JSA) around Panmunjom after the "Ax-Murder

Incident." This clash between the guard forces, provoked by the North Koreans, led to the deaths of two American Officers and numerous injuries on both sides.

Nevertheless, over the years the MAC has performed an important function of establishing procedures for returning personnel who cross over the MDL. These incidents started in 1954 and continue today. "The precedent for the return of military personnel under the armistice was first established at a MAC meeting on October 6, 1954, when the North Koreans repatriated U.S. Marine Lieutenant Colonel Herbert A. Peters with his light aircraft."⁵⁴ Since then dozens of minor and major crossing incidences have been handled through the MAC. Most recently, on 7 August 2001, the United Nations Component of the Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) returned a KPA soldier who had been captured along the south boundary fence of the DMZ to the KPA through Panmunjom. The UNC's NNSC members investigated and determined that the soldier had fallen into a river and was washed south before becoming disoriented. Before he was released, he had to confirm that he was volunteering to be repatriated.⁵⁵ This is a direct holdover from the bitterly contested repatriation issue from the Armistice negotiations. There have been numerous incidents where Communist soldiers were not forced to return and ended up defecting to the ROK.

Perhaps most importantly, the MAC has sustained a critical role of defusing tense situations that could have led to war again. The most serious time period was from 1966-1970. It was a time when the United States was focused on Southeast Asia and the Vietnam War. During this time, the KPA killed 75 U.S. and 299 ROK soldiers.⁵⁶ The North Koreans committed numerous commando assaults into the ROK, including a 21 January 1968 attempt to assassinate President Park Chung Hee. In a tremendous diversionary move, the North Korean Navy captured the USS Pueblo two days later. The MAC played the central role in negotiating the release of the 82-man Pueblo crew.⁵⁷ The movement of the USS Eisenhower into Korean waters to pose a direct strike capability against North Korea initially put pressure on the KPA, but soon the North Koreans realized that the United States would not use force. That meant the KPA had the latitude to draw out the Pueblo negotiations just as they had the Armistice Negotiations.

Finally, on 23 December 1968, after more than 11 months, the negotiations ended with the senior UNCMAC delegate signing a confession of wrong doing on the document of receipt for the Pueblo crew. North Korea got the propaganda it wanted out of the incident.⁵⁸

There were two other serious incidents that the MAC had to respond to and help divert the threat of war. The first one was the Ax-Murder Incident of 18 August 1976. The second was the bombing assassination attempt on President Chun Doo Hwan in Rangoon Burma 9 October

1983. The MAC held critical meetings after each of these. After the Ax-Murder Incident, UNCMAC showed photo proof that the KPA security guards attacked the UNC security force while they were pruning a tree in the Joint Security Area. The United States responded by sending a large force, supported by forces on full alert and B-52s in the air, into the DMZ to cut the tree down. Kim Il Sung actually wrote a partial apology to protect North Korea from a retaliatory strike. It came through the MAC an hour after U.S./ROK forces cut the tree down. The bomb in Rangoon killed 17 and wounded 48, but missed the ROK president. Again the MAC was center stage for the dialog between the two sides and the containment of the subsequent rising military tensions.⁵⁹ This dialogue defused the incident, preventing an escalation to war.

PAST DECADE

In the past decade the MAC has undergone large changes. Just as during the Korean War Armistice negotiations, many of the critically important developments in the 1990s took place away from Panmunjom's negotiating table. The DPRK's long time allies finally granted diplomatic recognition to the ROK. The USSR did so in January 1991 and the PRC in 1992. Both the DPRK and ROK gained seats in the U.N. in September of 1991.⁶⁰ Those represented the most significant external changes affecting the MAC.

The major internal changes started when the United States decided to back away from its leading role in the MAC and assume a supporting role to the ROKA. In 1991 the United States and the Republic of Korea agreed that a ROKA general officer should be the senior UNCMAC delegate. The KPA protested that the UNC did not have the authority to make that move because the ROK did not sign the 1953 Armistice. This was a specious argument since CINCUNC had signed on behalf of all the UNC military forces, including those of the Republic of Korea. Nevertheless, after CINCUNC appointed a South Korean general, Major General Hwang Won Tak, to be the UNCMAC Senior Member, the North Koreans refused to accept his appointment and refused to attend Military Armistice Commission plenary meetings. They did, however, send representatives to lower level meetings. In April 1994, the North Koreans announced that they were withdrawing from the Military Armistice Commission. While they refused subsequently to attend most of the meetings provided for in the formal MAC protocols, they kept their delegation in place, re-designating it the "KPA Mission to Panmunjom."⁶¹ The North Koreans also convinced the Chinese to pull their CPV representatives from the MAC that same year.⁶² The North Koreans might have felt it didn't need the Armistice or the MAC because away from the MAC tables the belligerents were expanding their diplomatic ties. Still,

the KPA used the lower level meetings allowed within the MAC when they found it convenient. In December 1994, they called for General Officer meetings over the shoot down of an U.S. Army OH-58 helicopter in North Korea. They negotiated with the UNCMAC counterparts but the real negotiations were taking place in the North Korean Capital of Pyongyang. First, New Mexico's Representative, Bill Richardson went. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, Thomas Hubbard, followed him. This was the first time that negotiations away from the MAC took precedence on a military Armistice infraction and it showed that the belligerent sides had bypassed the MAC by the opening of new venues of dialog and negotiation.

Less than two months before the OH-58 helicopter incident the DPRK and the United States negotiated directly a very controversial quasi-treaty called the Agreed Framework, which they signed on 21 October 1994 in Geneva. This agreement stated that the United States would organize an International Consortium to build Light-water Reactors (LWRs) with an output of 2,000 Megawatts for North Korea and supply them 500,00 tons of heavy fuel oil until the LWRs were complete, with a target date of 2003. The DPRK would allow inspections of its current nuclear facilities and dismantle them when the LWRs were on line. Both sides would open up diplomatic liaison offices and lift some existing barriers to trade and investment. The DPRK would implement the 1991 North-South joint declaration on the demilitarization of the Korean peninsula and reengage in N-S dialogue.⁶³ This agreement had brought the United States and DPRK back from the brink of war and culminated a torturous process that had started over two years earlier.

On 25 February 1992, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had accused the North Koreans of making weapons grade plutonium. The North Koreans threatened to withdraw from the international Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) because they were unwilling to submit to the demanded inspections. Negotiations were held directly between the DPRK and the United States for the first time in an attempt to negotiate an agreement over the nuclear facilities and keep North Korea in the NPT. After two unsuccessful plenary meetings, new evidence surfaced that the North Koreans had removed some of the rods in 1989 and could have extracted plutonium from them. This seemed to confirm an IAEA/U.S. fear that the North Koreans were close to gaining Nuclear Weapons. Then on 19 April, North Korea announced that it was defueling more of the rods. By 2 June the IAEA sent a letter to the UN Security Council calling for international action against North Korea and that led to the threat of sanctions. The North Koreans withdrew from the NPT on 12 June 1992. The United States strongly supported using the sanctions and Kim Il Sung said that sanctions would be treated as an act of war. At the

same time the U.S. military was meeting to update its plans to be ready for a major war in Korea. The Clinton Administration attempted to get direct contact with Kim Il Sung by sending two Senators to Pyongyang, but the North Koreans refused to accept them. A few days later, former President Carter did get to see Kim Il Sung. After two days of talks, on 16 June 1994, President Carter defused the situation by establishing the basis for the resumption of talks. Those talks eventually resulted in the "Agreed Framework."⁶⁴

Perhaps the biggest diplomatic initiative during the 1990s was the 16 April 1996 U.S.-ROK proposal for Four Party talks. The two allies challenged the PRC and DPRK to join them in open talks. This dialogue was just gaining momentum when the KPA committed another serious military violation. On 18 September 1996, a mini-submarine with North Korean commandos on board ran aground near Kangnung on the east coast of South Korea. This incident threatened the Agreed Framework and temporarily halted the Four Party talks. The ROK reaction also marked a return, long dormant, to threats of unilateral military action against the DPRK.⁶⁵ This incident also again demonstrated that severe Armistice violations were being dealt with in important ways outside the Armistice machinery. This time, the State Department's Korean country director and the DPRK's Director General for American Affairs met nine times to work out the solution. Some results came from these non-MAC negotiations. The North Koreans issued an apology, committed to resuming the Four Party talks, and restarted preserving spent fuel rods. The United States resumed shipping heavy oil to North Korea and relaxed a few economic sanctions. The ROK agreed to resume the LWR project and returned the commandos' remains.⁶⁶

By March 1998 the Four-Party talks were a failure. The DPRK withdrew after nothing more than preliminary agenda meetings. On 8 May the DPRK foreign ministry threatened to stop complying with the Agreed Framework.⁶⁷ All the while the UNC continued to man the MAC and attempted to hold regular meeting with the KPA. In recent years the MAC has continued to function for low level contacts between the KPA and the UNC. The Commission continues to perform a valuable function as a communication port for the sides, but it is not doing much more. The frequency of the meetings has gone down in recent years. Members of the UNC Component of the Military Armistice Commission met with their KPA counterparts 21 times in 2000 and only 11 times in 2001. The UNC called for 40 various meetings in 2001 but only got six meetings from this method and during those six meetings another five were agreed to for the total of 11. In the past two years only one of these meeting were "General Officer" meetings, in which the UNC delegation was led by the second ranking UNCMAC officer (an American). All

the others were Secretariat or other lower level meetings to discuss such administrative matters as the return of Korean War era UNC remains from the north.⁶⁸

Joint Recovery of Remains is an ongoing operation that allows U.S. personnel to travel into North Korea to search for and return U.S./UNC force remains through Panmunjom for identification and burial. The negotiations for this program started after President Carter's request to Kim Il Sung during his nuclear crisis visit in 1994. The United States and DPRK signed a bilateral agreement in 1996. It is an arrangement that allows the United States to bring closure to Korean War families in exchange for giving the North Koreans hard currency. This program was updated through negotiations at Kuala Lumpur in December 2000. The MAC is only involved in the exchange of the money and the remains. The last money exchange netted the North Koreans \$1,876,556.40 on 12 October 2001 as the second installment of 2001 payments.⁶⁹

CURRENT SITUATION

The Armistice is still the binding agreement that separates two "warring" sides. The DMZ successfully splits two of the worlds' largest armies and minimizes intentional or unintentional violent contacts. There has not been any successful attempt to replace the Armistice Agreement with a permanent political settlement. The current war on Terrorism makes a political settlement as remote as ever. President Bush referred to North Korea as "a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens...states like these... constitute an axis of evil."⁷⁰ It seems to indicate reluctance on the part of the United States to fully endorse diplomatic attempts by to establish a political settlement that keeps the "Kim Family Regime"⁷¹ in power in the DPRK. The United States current overarching concern is North Korea's exportation of long-range missiles and its ability to produce biological, chemical and nuclear weapons of mass destruction. President Bush in his February 2002 visit to the ROK stated that he is willing to talk to the North Koreans but that the DPRK must drastically alter their approach to the ROK and the international community. As of today, there are no negotiations pending. The Agreed Framework only addressed the nuclear weapon issue. Indications are now that the North Koreans are limiting the inspectors. The Light Water Reactors will not be finished on the original 2003 timeline and the North Koreans might not fulfill their promise to hand over the spent fuel rods. So, it is questionable if the Agreed Framework will have the desired outcome of minimizing the DPRK nuclear weapons capability in the long term.

Due to the nature of the North Korean Regime, a political resolution seems unlikely in the foreseeable future, and may prove to be impossible. Reunification might only come about

through the collapse of the Kim Regime. Until that happens, a strong alliance must remain between the ROK and the United States to deter North Korean attack. The Armistice Agreement still serves a vital role of establishing a tool to defuse border incidents and provide venues for talks to keep tensions manageable. Because of the repeated failures to reach any kind of political settlement, the MAC continues to play an important but limited role. The NNSC role remains insignificant.

CONCLUSIONS

NEGOTIATIONS LESSONS LEARNED

U.S. Military Strategic Leaders can take many lessons from the Armistice Negotiations and the follow on interactions of the MAC. These are both useful in a general sense and in the eventuality of negotiating with North Koreans again.

1. Values of the United States must be maintained during the negotiations The cost of demanding voluntary repatriation was extremely high but it gave the United States moral authority to espouse freedom as one of our enduring "national values."⁷² In retrospect, it is one of the most courageous decisions in U.S. history, although it is much easier to say that sitting in a comfortable 72-degree room and not facing the hardships that the soldiers in 1952-1953 faced. The Korean War dragged on for a full year while this principle was defended. It is possible that by May 1952 the delegates could have signed the Armistice if the UNC had just agreed to exchange all POWs. The cost of extending out the negotiations another year was painfully high. The UNC lost many thousands Killed in Action and the POWs suffered in the hands of the Communists for another long year. Those supreme sacrifices in the end saved 7,604 Koreans who got to stay in the ROK and 14,235 Chinese who got to go to Taiwan.⁷³ They avoided the horrible fate awaiting the Chinese prisoners and many of the captured Koreans. The internal debate over demanding voluntary repatriation was vigorous. Professional soldiers serving at the negotiations table, UNC staff, Army staff, JCS, and leaders in the interagency joined it. I think it was the proper decision. It just was not done within the framework of a clear overall strategy.

2. The NCA, military leaders and the negotiators all must have a clearly defined set of goals. We should not accept negotiations unless the negotiation plan has been worked out. The leadership spent a great deal of time wrestling with the negotiations. Many brilliant men committed themselves to the task. However, the goals were not set out clearly at the beginning of the negotiations. General Ridgway was forced into offering negotiations before the United States leaders could come up with their goals and supporting strategy. This haste caused the

U.S./UNC to make the critical error of allowing the Communists to set the agenda and, by default, the goals. The goals or objectives drive the strategy. Though beyond the scope of this paper, it can be argued that the United States stumbled into the truce tent in Iraq without setting the proper goals as well.

3. Strategic and operational COAs, branches and sequels must be established should negotiations fail or stall. Initially, the United States failed to work through this process and it hurt the negotiating position. However, as the war went on, the U.S. policy community and the UNC negotiators got better at this process. The best example of the thorough application of the Strategic Model is found in the course of action (COA) analysis done by the National Security Council (NSC) in 1953. They looked at the negotiations for the Armistice and the Korean War in terms of eight COAs and tied each of them into the overall U.S. military strategy and the regional goals within the Grand Strategy.⁷⁴

4. The enemy will send their very best negotiators. The Communist Chinese and the North Koreans sent some of their top leaders into the negotiating tent. They clearly saw the truce talks as vitally important to the two countries. It was the most important event for them. They were extremely well skilled at the art of vicious negotiations and clearly understood why they were at the table. "They were fighting a delaying action. Fighting it with words and not with guns."⁷⁵ U.S. negotiators must not underestimate the training, skills and preparation of the opposing side. The Communists were able to translate military weakness into negotiating strength based on the skills of the negotiators and the strategy they employed. General Nam Il, Chief of Staff, KPA, was their senior delegate. He stayed in that position for the entire two years of talks. He was supported and perhaps led the entire time by Major General Hsieh Fang, Chief of Staff, CPVA.⁷⁶ Though these officers were extremely capable, they did not have the authority to make many, if any, decisions. They always had to call recesses to get approval from higher leaders:

- Key KPA/CPV policy decisions were coordinated among the Chinese, North Koreans, and Soviet leaders with China providing direction and guidance to the KPA/CPV delegation. Instructions were transmitted through a team headed by Li Kenong, Chinese vice foreign minister and deputy chief of staff of the Chinese army, who directed negotiations from behind the scenes.⁷⁷

The frustration level for UNC negotiators was always very high. The Communists would twist everything said to fit their propaganda goals. Even the simplest things had to be argued and they would never acknowledge the truth of any situation. All their words were measured and spoken for maximum effectiveness at disrupting the UNC position and flustering the delegates.

5. Hand pick the Negotiations Team and trust them The United States must select its negotiators carefully. All conflicts include military members in negotiations. During the long

Korean War the United States and the UNC entrusted the entire negotiating effort to senior and mid grade U.S. military officers. Even as the negotiations extended out far beyond anyone's initial worst thinking, the United States and the U.N. kept their faith in the military negotiators at the table. In the middle of the most difficult period of the negotiations the British government sent a diplomatic team over to Korea to challenge the way the talks were progressing. They came away with praise for the team and reported that support back to a very skeptical Parliament and society. For political reasons the United States offered one observer position to the British. Nineteen flag officers rotated through as UNC delegation members.⁷⁸ At all times both sides had an equal number of five delegates at the plenary sessions. General Ridgway selected Vice Admiral Joy to lead the initial negotiations team. He had met Admiral Joy on 26 December 1950 in Japan when General MacArthur, CINCUNC and Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. FAR EAST Command (CINCFE) in-briefed him, as incoming Eighth Army Commander.⁷⁹ They started their relationship as coequal component commanders under General MacArthur. Admiral Joy was the Naval Commander of the Far East Forces and had been in theater since the beginning of the war. By the time the negotiations started, President Truman had relieved General MacArthur and replaced him with General Ridgway. During the negotiations Admiral Joy never relinquished his Naval Forces Command. General Ridgway also appointed Major General Harrison to the negotiating team when Harrison arrived in theater as the Deputy Eighth Army Commander in March 1952. In May 1952, Vice Admiral Joy asked to be replaced as the senior delegate. He returned to the United States to be the Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy.⁸⁰ General Ridgway was also leaving the UNC to replace General Eisenhower in Europe. General Clark replaced Ridgway as CINCUNC and Major General Harrison replaced Vice Admiral Joy as the senior delegate. Major General Harrison had been West Point Classmates with Ridgway, Clark and General Collins, the Army Chief of Staff. He had the respect and confidence of all of them.⁸¹

6. Prepare daily from the enemy point of view. Every night, the UNC delegates had to review the positions presented by the north in preparation for the next session. This preparation was very difficult because of the unique way the north negotiated. They did not establish any position that reflected the real circumstances. The UNC had to ask themselves what gain would the north try to make based on perceived propaganda advantages. As an example, the North accused the UNC of "mass murder...experiments on prisoners of war with poison gas, germ weapons, and atomic bombs."⁸² The North Koreans appeared to be irrational in their logic and had no interest in working from a basis of commonly accepted facts. That made normally accepted methods of reaching compromise totally worthless. Interestingly, the same illogical

haranguing was evident 42 years later during the 1994 Agreed Framework talks. For three months the DPRK delegates opened every session with deliberately insulting and completely baseless posturing statements against the "capitalist warmongers and their American puppets to the south [ROK]."83

7. Lower ranking officers increase the level of work that gets done negotiating while lowering the level of posturing. One of the best negotiating ideas early in the armistice talks was the idea of establishing sub-delegate groups that could work out the difficult details of all the agenda points. The Communists were much less interested in posturing or wasting incredible amounts of time in longwinded, worthless speeches when the senior delegates were not in session. This model applied to the sub delegates who were always flag officers as well as the field grade staff officers who worked on the details such as drawing the MDL and the exchange of sick and wounded POWs. When at all possible, the negotiations should be kept away from the "plenary" level. In other words, work hard on getting issues resolved "away from the table."84

8. Military negotiators must get clear guidance and faithfully articulate it None of the UNC negotiators had any specific training on negotiations. It was incumbent on them to continually report back to the CINUNC and the JCS with updates and ask for guidance. This flow worked extremely well throughout the negotiations, although there were times that the guidance didn't match what the senior delegates wanted to do. Unfortunately, during the war some of the toughest negotiating happened away from Panmunjom and demonstrated what happens when this lesson is not followed. In May 1952, during riots at a POW camp on Koje Island, Communist POWs captured the camp commander, Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd, through Dodd's negligence. Brigadier General Charles F. Colson, Chief of Staff of U.S. I Corps, was sent to resolve the situation, using military force if necessary. "Colson had no knowledge of conditions on Koje-do until he was chosen and only sketchy acquaintance with the issues being discussed at Panmunjom."85 General Colson was given orders from Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet, Eighth Army Commander. These orders were passed through Brigadier General Yount, 2nd Logistical Command, who had responsibility for the POW camps. The guidance was to demand the release of General Dodd, set a deadline and execute a crushing military assault if needed. Either BG Colson did not understand the guidance he was given or he chose to ignore it.

Negotiations reached a disgraceful climax on May 10 when General Dodd, prisoner spokesmen sitting beside him, telephoned Colson. Passing on the prisoners' demands and suggesting changes in Colson's reply as the prisoners demanded. This resulted in a written statement from Colson assuring the

prisoners that 'in the future POW's can expect humane treatment in this camp,' that there would be 'no more forced rescreening,' and that a representative group or commission of prisoners of war would be established 'according to the details agreed to by Gen. Dodd and approved by me.' Dodd was finally released at 9:30 PM on May 10 after the prisoners' leaders decided that they had wrung from the UN Command the last possible drop of damaging propaganda.⁸⁶

All this led to the weakening of the UNC negotiations position, a huge propaganda victory for the Communists and the reduction in rank of two U.S. Brigadier Generals; Dodd and Colson.

9. Military leaders must adjust to the negotiation role while still being responsible for other military duties. The military cannot afford to keep a group of highly trained negotiators standing by. All the Armistice negotiators were in the theater of operations performing important functions when they were called to the truce tent. Many of these officers still had to perform the "primary" functions within their component commands. For instance, Admiral Joy reviewed naval plans in support of several different counterattack proposals after the talks started. After Harrison was promoted to Lieutenant General he was assigned as the Far East Command Chief of Staff and flew to Japan on many occasions to work in that capacity while having to also concentrate on the difficult negotiations.

10. There will be a never-ending series of negotiations within the negotiations. The UNC delegates did not have ratification authority at the Armistice Negotiations. They had to get their positions from the United States and in many cases they originated from the President. "Often, the internal negotiations are more contentious than the negotiations that occur across the table."⁸⁷ During the Truce Talks, the web of influencers and decision makers was incredibly complex. All the same players that strategic leaders will face today were present during the Armistice talks. The military delegates had a theater commander, service commanders and the JCS. The U.S. players included the Defense Department, State Department, the NSC and other interagency players. The congress also had influence. Beyond the United States there was the U.N. and its incredibly complex relationships. On the one hand the U.N. was a belligerent in the War as it formed the UNC, involving 16 nations. On the other hand, the U.N. was a forum for debate. It gave voice to the USSR, a de facto enemy, as well as many neutral countries. Then, as now, there were key Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) such as the International Red Cross. Communications between all parties must be clear and straightforward. Military negotiators must clearly state their opinions to their superiors and recommendations and have the situational awareness of the complexities of the negotiations going on above them.

11. Military negotiators must have political support. Throughout the negotiations the UNC delegates enjoyed tremendous political support from within the U.S. leadership. Their judgments

and decisions were not second-guessed and they were publicly supported even as the war dragged out and became more and more unpopular. The U.S. political leaders also defended the UNC delegation team from the pressures of the other major political players from within the UNC and U.N. There was a unity of effort between the military and the political leaders. The United States consistently leveraged its diplomatic element of power in support of the delegates and the negotiations process.

12. The enemy must fear the results of failed negotiations. The single most important lesson learned from the Armistice negotiations is that an enemy facing U.S. negotiators must be convinced that coming to a rapid settlement is in their best interests. In the words of current negotiating parlance, they must not believe that they have a good BATNA (Best alternative to a Negotiated Agreement). As long as they think they can do better not reaching an agreement they will not make any serious attempts. They will not be interested in finding a ZOPA (Zone of Possible Agreement).⁸⁸ In a military conflict, the United States must continue to apply devastating military pressure while the negotiations are ongoing. Or at the least, the United States must demonstrate that it is willing to reapply military pressure if it determines that the other side is stalling or failing to negotiate in earnest. Again, this is an easy recommendation to make but hard to execute when "military pressure" means sending U.S. soldiers to their death. Nevertheless, the cost of not doing it can be equally tragic as the Korean War demonstrated.

THE LEGACY OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

Although intended as a temporary mechanism for maintaining the cease-fire the Armistice has survived for nearly 50 years. It has held two warring sides apart while endless efforts at political settlement have so far failed to establish a lasting peace in Korea. The longevity and relevance of the Armistice Agreement is a testimony to the dedicated efforts of the military professionals the UNC put at the negotiating table. The outstanding professional soldiers called to serve on the UNCMAC over the years have been able to rely on the Armistice Agreement as their foundation for difficult negotiations with the North Koreans over the past 50 years. The POW issue was finished in the months following the Armistice after the exchange, interviews, and release of the non-repatriates. However, the "no forced repatriation principle" will remain a foundation for future conflicts involving the United States. The difficult inspection language in the Armistice was doomed from the start because of the equal number of inspectors and the veto power each belligerent had. That portion of the Armistice cannot be seen as a success. However, it is hard to imagine an alternative that would have worked any better

The study of the Armistice Agreement offers U.S. military leaders the opportunity to understand the complexities of negotiating in the most difficult circumstances. It underscores the important role negotiations have in all the wars we have ever fought or will fight. Analyzing the background of the Korean War, the Armistice Agreement and the lessons learned from the negotiations offers a clear view of the senior military leaders' interaction with the senior political and diplomatic policy makers. It offers a tremendous opportunity to develop Strategic Leadership competencies and all military senior leaders can benefit from this study.

Word Count = 13,372.

ENDNOTES

¹ Owen Harries, "An End to Nonsense," The National Interest, no. 65 (2001): 117.

² Roderick R. Magee, Strategic Leadership Primer (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1998). He provides a thorough explanation of the Strategic-Leadership Competencies.

³ Sydney D. Bailey, The Korean Armistice (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 202.

⁴ Spencer C. Tucker, ed., Encyclopedia of the Korean War, Vol. III- Documents: Armistice Agreement Preamble (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2000), 1026.

⁵ Ibid., 1035.

⁶ Bailey, 170.

⁷ Chuck Downs, Over The Line (Washington, D.C.: AIE Press, 1999), 17.

⁸ Kathryn Weathersby, "To Attack, or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Prelude to War," Cold War International History Project Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995): 7. This publication includes the declassified Soviet documents.

⁹ William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 5. This book gives an expansive history of the international influences leading up to the Korean War.

¹⁰ Weathersby, 9.

¹¹ The ideas in this paragraph are based in part on remarks made by a guest lecturer in the Unconventional Warfare elective and the insurgency model presented in that course. It also ties in the background information cited in the publications noted thus far. In particular the declassified documents refer to partisan movement and the need for the political situation in the south to be set.

¹² All the U.N. resolutions are found in Sidney Bailey's The Korean Armistice. It also gives a thorough account of the complications involved in the allied efforts. The Security Council resolutions in quick succession condemned the attack, called on U.N. members to assist the ROK and requested the U.S. provide the unified commander.

¹³ A complete copy of the speech is found in Spencer C. Tucker's Encyclopedia of the Korean War, Vol III, 997-998.

¹⁴ See President Truman's complete order relieving General MacArthur and his Address to the Nation in Spencer C. Tucker's Encyclopedia of the Korean War, Vol III, 961-962.

¹⁵ William H. Vatcher, Panmunjom: The Story of the Korean Military Armistice Negotiations (New York: Preager, 1958), 30.

¹⁶ Herbert Goldhamer, The 1951 Armistice Conference: A Personal Memoir (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994) 188. He wrote this memoir in February 1952. His observations have stood

up to nearly 50 years of analysis and are all the more powerful because they were given before the negotiations were even half completed.

¹⁷ All sources seem to concur that the decisions and positions represented by the Delegation at Panmujom were directed or at least approved by the JCS, interagency coordinating groups and most times at the presidential level. For brevity I'll usually just state them all as the delegates or the UNC.

¹⁸ Bailey, 76.

¹⁹ John Toland, In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Morrow, 1991), 474.

²⁰ Matthew Ridgway, The Korean War (New York: Da Capo, 1967), 187.

²¹ Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1992), 130.

²² Turner C. Joy, How Communists Negotiate (Santa Monica, CA: Fidelis, 1952), 129.

²³ Joy, 165.

²⁴ Hermes, 135. The discussions in the following paragraphs on the POW complications are taken mainly from his thorough research. The conclusions are mine.

²⁵ J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime (Boston MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1969) 340.

²⁶ Barton J. Bernstein, "The Struggle over the Korean Armistice: Prisoners of Repatriation," in Child of Conflict: The Korean-American relationship, 1943-1953, ed. Bruce Cumings (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1983), 280.

²⁷ Vatcher, 115-170. Mr. Vatcher provides a very detailed discussion of the verbal exchanges at the negotiating table over the POW issue. The following paragraphs rely on Mr. Vatcher's notes as well as the research of Mr. Bailey.

²⁸ Hermes, 144.

²⁹ Bailey, 88. He does a fine job explaining the sequence of positions and directives sent to the negotiating team as well as the influence of the allies and UN members on this issue and the rest of the armistice.

³⁰ Joy, 146-147.

³¹ Vatcher, 142.

³² Bailey, 110. He also provides a thorough examination of the intense negotiations happening "away from the table" between U.S. and Britain to keep a united front on the Armistice with regard to the POW screening. The British House of Commons challenged the U.S. handling of the negotiations. Britain sent the Minister of Defense and the Minister of State

to ROK and they found that the UNC was doing both the screening and the negotiations fairly and thoroughly.

³³ Collins, 350. Provides the background on the events leading up to the POW alternatives presented to the Communists.

³⁴ Bailey, 111.

³⁵ William K. Harrison's marginal notes in his copy of Vatcher's Panmunjom page 166. He wrote these sometime shortly after 25 Dec 1958 when the book was given to him as a gift from his oldest son. My oldest sister gave me the book in January 2002.

³⁶ William K. Harrison, Jr., Senior Officers Oral History Program: Project 81-B. Interviewed by Robert N. Mathis (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1981), 469.

³⁷ All the U.N. resolutions on the Korean War are laid out in the appendices of Bailey's, The Korean Armistice and many of the documents pertaining to the Korean War are in Spencer C. Tucker's Encyclopedia of the Korean War, Vol. III

³⁸ Hermes, 408.

³⁹ Jack Snyder, "Case 359: Atomic Diplomacy in the Korean War," in Pew Case Studies in International Affairs (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 1993), 7-9.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 413.

⁴¹ Ibid, 419.

⁴² Spencer C. Tucker, "Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission" Encyclopedia of the Korean War, VOL. III, 1036-1039.

⁴³ Hermes, 451.

⁴⁴ All data on the Armistice Agreement comes from the copies I reviewed from numerous sources identified in these notes. Most of the books have copies of the Agreement. The signed copy is in Bailey's, The Korean Armistice.

⁴⁵ Bailey, 175-176.

⁴⁶ Harrison, 449.

⁴⁷ Bailey, 177.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 178

⁴⁹ Donald W. Boose Jr., "Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission," in Encyclopedia of the Korean War, VOL. II, 484.

⁵⁰ United Nations, United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) Quarterly Report, July-September 2001.

⁵¹ Sunghun Cho, "Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission," in Encyclopedia of the Korean War, VOL. II, 482-482.

⁵² Scott Snyder, Negotiating On the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior (Washington, D.C: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1999), x.

⁵³ Ibid, 10.

⁵⁴ Downs, 110.

⁵⁵ Notes from the UNC-KPA Staff Officer Meeting, 6 August 2001, provided by Donald W. Boose.

⁵⁶ James M.H. Lee, "The Korean Armistice and North-South Dialogue," The Korea Society Quarterly (Summer 2001): 12. Numbers are extracted from his charts and the description of the numerous incidents is also taken from this work.

⁵⁷ Downs, 127.

⁵⁸ Ibid, 144.

⁵⁹ Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), 80. He provides outstanding dramatic accounts of these incidents and the reactions by all belligerents.

⁶⁰ Ibid, 210.

⁶¹ Stephen Tharp <TharpS@usfk.korea.army.mil>, "RE:Clarification on Meetings After ROK SM Was Appointed," electronic mail message to COL (R) Donald Boose <boosed@pa.net>. 18 March 2002.

⁶² Oberdorfer, 364.

⁶³ Ibid, 357. The "North-South Agreement" of 1991 was an "Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North." It was supposed to recognize the government of each side and commit to no use of force. Further explanation is found in the same source on page 262.

⁶⁴ Ibid, 249-364. Mr. Oberdorfer provides detailed analysis of the brinksmanship of North Koreans and the complex attempts to work through a diplomatic solution to the nuclear weapons fears.

⁶⁵ Ibid, 390.

⁶⁶ Ibid, 392.

⁶⁷ Downs, 276.

⁶⁸ The UNCMAC Quarterly Report, October-December 2001 gives the composition, level and total number of meetings. The one General Officer (GO) talk in 2000 is found in Stephen Tharp <TharpS@usfk.korea.army.mil>, "RE:Clarification on Meetings After ROK SM Was Appointed," electronic mail message to COL (R) Donald Boose <boosed@pa.net>. 18 March 2002. He describes all the GO talks from 1998 through 2001.

⁶⁹ UNCMAC notes of the UNC Secretary meeting with KPA representatives on 12 October 2001. Mr. Oberdorfer provides the details on the Carter request.

⁷⁰ George W. Bush, "Address Before a Joint session of the Congress on the state of the Union, January 29, 2002," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 38, no. 5 (2002): 135.

⁷¹ Stephen Bradner, North Korea's Strategy. Paper presented at the workshop on Competitive Strategies, 14 June 2000, in Arlington VA, 2. He explains his three reasons for using this "KFR" term in his footnotes: "first many of the regime's elite are related by blood or marriage. Second...the regime operates much like a crime family. Third, because we have witnesses one 'dynastic succession,' and there are reports that another is contemplated."

⁷² Robert H. Dorff, "A Primer In Strategy Development," in U.S. Army War College Guide To Strategy, ed. Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2001), 15.

⁷³ Bailey, 149.

⁷⁴ NSC-147: Analysis of Possible Courses of Action in Korea and NSC-148: United States Policy in the Far East, Encyclopedia of the Korean War, VOL. III, 994-1004.

⁷⁵ Harrison, 455.

⁷⁶ Vatcher, 31.

⁷⁷ Donald W. Boose Jr., "Truce Talks," in Encyclopedia of the Korean War, VOL. II, 653.

⁷⁸ Vatcher, 228. He supplies the complete list of delegates and the length of their tours at the talks. He does not list all the staff officers but mentions their critical work throughout his book.

⁷⁹ Ridgway, 83,182.

⁸⁰ Joy, 161. Admiral Joy only states that he left for the USNA assignment. General Ridgway states that he asked to be relieved, page 216-217 of The Korean War.

⁸¹ Collins, 348. General Collins describes his confidence in MG Harrison.

⁸² Joy, 55.

⁸³ Colonel Lloyd Miles, interview by author 21 February 2002, U.S. Army War College. COL Miles was the JCS representative on the U.S. seven-man team led by Ambassador Gallucci.

⁸⁴ This concept is one of the major teaching points from the U.S. Army War College elective entitled "Negotiations." It is also, a lesson learned from COL Miles Agreed Framework experience. The Armistice sub-delegates and staff officers were able to hammer out all the 63 paragraphs "away from the table" (plenary sessions).

⁸⁵ Hermes, 246.

⁸⁶ Collins, 345-346.

⁸⁷ Thomas R Colosi, On and Off the Record: Colosi on Negotiation (Dubuque, IA.: Kendall/Hunt, 1993), 26.

⁸⁸ Concepts taken from the "Negotiations" Elective at the U.S. Army War College.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abramowitz, Morton I., and James T. Laney. Testing North Korea: The Next Stage in U.S. and ROK Policy. N.p. Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2001.
- Armitage, Richard L. "A Comprehensive Approach to North Korea." Strategic Forum 159 (March 1999)
- Arms Control Association. "Bush's Deferral of Missile Negotiations with North Korea: A Missed Opportunity." Arms Control Today 31 (April 2001): 13-17.
- Bailey, Sydney D. The Korean Armistice. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992.
- Bernstein, Barton J. "The Struggle over the Korean Armistice: Prisoners of Repatriation." In Child of Conflict: The Korean-American relationship, 1943-1953, ed. Bruce Cumings. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1983.
- Boose, Donald W. "Portentous Sideshow: The Korean Occupation Decision." Parameters 25 (Winter 1996): 12-29.
- Boose, Donald W. "Articles for The Encyclopedia of the Korean War, Vols I,II,III. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2000." 1-59.
- Bradner, Stephen. North Korea's Strategy. Paper presented at the workshop on Competitive Strategies, 14 June 2000, in Arlington VA.
- Bush, George W. "Address Before a Joint session of the Congress on the state of the Union, January 29, 2002." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 38, no. 5 (2002): 133-139.
- Carbaugh, John E. Korea Report: An Exclusive Report from Washington, D.C. on the Political, Trade and Defense Issues Affecting Korea. Rosslyn, VA.: John E. Carbaugh, 13 December 2001.
- Carbaugh, John E. Korea Report: An Exclusive Report from Washington, D.C. on the Political, Trade and Defense Issues Affecting Korea. Rosslyn, VA: John E. Carbaugh, 15 January 2002.
- Collins, P. Lawton. War in Peacetime. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969.
- Colosi, Thomas R. On and Off the Record: Colosi on Negotiation Dubuque, IA.: Kendall/Hunt, 1993.
- Cossa, Ralph A., and Alan Oxley. "The U.S.- Korea Alliance." In America's Asian Alliances, ed. Robert D. Blackwill and Paul Dibb. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000.
- Dorff, Robert H. "A Primer In Strategy Development." In U.S. Army War College Guide To Strategy, ed. Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr., 11-18. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2001.

- Downs, Chuck. Over the Line: North Korea's Negotiating Strategy. Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1999.
- Flounnoy, Michele A., ed. QDR 2001: Strategy-Driven Choices For America's Security. Washington, D.C.: National Defense Press, 2001.
- Foot, Rosemary. The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985.
- Goldhamer, Herbert. The 1951 Korean Armistice Conference: A Personal Memoir. Santa Monica, CA.: Rand, 1994.
- Greenfield, Kent Roberts. American Strategy In World War II: A Reconsideration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963.
- Harries, Owen. "An End to Nonsense." The National Interest 65 (2001): 117-120.
- Harrison, Thomas D., and Bill Stapleton. "Why Did Some GIs Turn Communist?" Colliers. (27 November 1953).
- Harrison, William K., Jr. Senior Officers Oral History Program: Project 81-B. Interviewed by Robert N. Mathis. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1981.
- Hermes, Walter G. Truce Tent and Fighting Front Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1992.
- Howle, Roy C. "An Evitable War: Engaged Containment and the U.S.-China Balance." Parameters 31 (Autumn 2001): 92-104.
- Joy, Turner C. How Communists Negotiate. Santa Monica, CA: Fidelis, 1952.
- Lee, James M. H. "The Korean Armistice and North-South Dialogue." The Korea Society Quarterly (Summer 2001): 9-12,57.
- Lockerbie, Bruce D. A Man Under Orders: LTG William K. Harrison. New York: Harper & Row, 1979.
- Magee, Roderick R. Strategic Leadership Primer. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1998.
- Miles, Lloyd, Colonel U.S. Army and the JCS representative on the 7 man Agreed Framework negotiations team led by Ambassador Gallucci. Interview by author 21 February 2002, Army War College.
- Montaperto, Ronald N. "Asia-Pacific Region: Murky Future?" In Strategic Assessment 1999: Priorities for a Turbulent World, ed. Hans Binnendijk, 121-138. Fort McNair, Washington, D.D.: National Defense University, June 1999.
- Oberdorfer, Don. The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997.

- Ostermann, Christian F., eds. "New Evidence on the Korean War." Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11 (Spring 1998) 176-199.
- Ridgway, Matthew B. The Korean War. New York: Doubleday, 1967.
- Rumsfeld, Donald H. Quadrennial Defense Review. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, September 2001.
- Russell, Richard L. "What if...China Attacks Taiwan!" Parameters 31 (Autumn 2001): 76-91.
- Scobell, Andrew. The U.S. Army and the Asia-Pacific. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, April 2001
- Shelton, Henry H., and others. "Forum on the Korean War." 9 articles. Joint Force Quarterly 28 (Spring/Summer 2001). 23-87.
- Sigal, Leon V. "Negotiating an End to North Korea's Missile-Making." Arms Control Today 30 (June 2000): 3-7.
- Snyder Jack, "Case 359:Atomic Diplomacy in the Korean War." In Pew Case Studies in International Affairs. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 1993.
- Snyder, Scott. Negotiating On the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1999.
- Sokolski, Henry D., ed. Planning for a Peaceful Korea. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, February 2001.
- Stueck, William Whitney, Jr. The Korean War: An International History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.
- Tharp, Stephen <TharpS@usfk.korea.army.mil>. "RE:Clarification on Meetings After ROK SM Was Appointed," electronic mail message to COL (R) Donald Boose <boosed@pa.net>. 18 March 2002.
- Toland, John. In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1953. New York: Morrow, 1991.
- Tucker, Spencer C., ed. Encyclopedia of the Korean War, Vols I,II,III. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2000.
- United Nations. United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) Quarterly Reports, October-December 1999, January-March 2001, April-June 2001, July-September 2001, October-December 2001.
- Vatcher, William H. Panmunjom: The Story of the Korean Military Armistice Negotiations. New York: Preager, 1958.
- Wit, Joel S. "North Korea: The Leader of the Pack." Washington Quarterly 24 (Winter 2001): 77-92.
- Weathersby, Kathryn. "To Attack, or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Prelude to War." Cold War International History Project Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995): 1-11.