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BY REV. CANON ROBERTS  
VOL. FOUR

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
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# SUMMARY

## BOOK XXVI

### THE FATE OF CAPUA

HANNIBAL encamps on the banks of the Anio within three miles of Rome and advances with 2000 cavalry up to the Colline Gate to examine the situation and defences of the City. On two successive days violent storms prevent him from engaging the Romans, pp. 13-14. Capua taken by Q. Fulvius and Appius Claudius; the chief nobles poison themselves. Q. Fulvius condemned the principal senators to death, and after they had been fastened to the stakes received despatches from Rome ordering that their lives should be spared. He would not open them until the sentence had been executed, pp. 15-20. Publius Scipio volunteers for service in Spain and is sent to take supreme command there, pp. 24-5. He captures New Carthage in one day, pp. 56-60. A belief grew up about him that he was of celestial origin, p. 25. In his eighteenth year, after assuming the toga virilis, he was frequently seen in the Capitol and it was alleged that a serpent frequently appeared in his mother's bedroom, p. 25. Successes in Sicily, pp. 51-3. Friendly relations with the Aetolians, pp. 31-2. War with the Acarnanians, pp. 33-4; with Philip of Macedon, p. 33.

## BOOK XXVII

The proconsul Cneius Fulvius and his army cut up by Hannibal at Herdonea, pp. 68-9. A more successful action was fought by the consul Claudius Marcellus against him at Numistro, pp. 69-70. Hannibal retreated from there in the night, Marcellus followed him and harassed his retreat until he turned to fight, pp. 84-5. The first battle went in favour of Hannibal, the second in favour of Marcellus, pp. 85-8. Fabius Maximus got possession of Tarentum through treachery, pp. 89-91. The two consuls, Claudius Marcellus and T. Quintius Crispinus, left the camp to reconnoitre and were ambushed by Hannibal. Marcellus was killed; Crispinus escaped, pp. 103-5. The lustrum was closed by the censors; the population according to the census numbered 137,108, which showed how many losses the Roman people had sustained in their many unsuccessful battles, p. 116. In Spain, Scipio had an engagement with Hasdrubal and was victorious, pp. 93-5. Amongst the various captures a boy of royal birth and exceptionally handsome was taken prisoner whom Scipio sent back to his uncle Masinissa with some presents, p. 96. Hasdrubal who had crossed the Alps with a fresh army to join Hannibal was utterly

defeated by the consul M. Livius with a loss of 56,000 killed and 5300 prisoners, pp. 129-32. But the consul Claudius contributed an equal share to the victory. His camp was fronting Hannibal, and he abandoned it in such a way as to escape observation. Then starting off with a picked force he took Hasdrubal in the rear, p. 131. This book also contains P. Scipio's campaign in Spain, and the praetor P. Sulpicius' operations against Philip and the Achaean, pp. 110-12.

## BOOK XXVIII

Victorious actions fought by Silanus, Scipio's second in command in Spain, pp. 135-6; by Lucius, Scipio's brother, against the Carthaginians, pp. 137-8; by the proconsul Sulpicius in conjunction with Attalus, king of Asia, against Philip of Macedonia, in defence of the Aetolians, pp. 139-42. A triumph was decreed to the consuls M. Livius and Claudius Nero. Livius who had conducted operations in his own province rode in a chariot, Nero who had gone into his colleague's province to assist him rode in the procession behind him on horseback, pp. 145-6. Even so he enjoyed more glory and admiration, for he had done more in the war than his colleague, p. 146. The fire in the temple of Vesta went out through the negligence of the virgin in charge of it; she was flogged, pp. 148. P. Scipio brought the war with the Carthaginians in Spain to a close in the fourteenth year of the Punic War, and in the fifth year of his command, pp. 150-6. He recovered the whole of Spain, and deprived the Carthaginians of their last foothold in the country, p. 156. He then crossed over to Africa from Tarraco and made a league with Syphax, king of the Massylians, pp. 156-8. Whilst there, Hasdrubal the son of Gisgo reclined by his side at supper, p. 157. Scipio exhibited at Carthago Nova a combat of swordsmen in memory of his father and his uncle, not professional gladiators, but men who entered the arena either to do their general honour or to meet challenges, p. 161. In this contest two princes who were brothers fought for the crown, p. 161. Whilst the city of Gisa was besieged by the Romans, the townsmen constructed a pyre, slew their wives and children and then flung themselves into it, p. 163. While Scipio was seriously ill he suppressed a mutiny which had broken out in a portion of the army and compelled those Spanish tribes which had again become aggressive to make their surrender, pp. 165-74. Friendly relations were established with Masinissa, king of the Numidians, who promised to assist Scipio, should he cross over into Africa, pp. 179-80. Also with the people of Gades after the departure of Mago who had received written orders from Carthage to sail to Italy, pp. 180-2. On his return to Rome he was made consul, p. 183. As Q. Fabius Maximus opposed his request for Africa as his province, he was given Sicily, and permission was granted to him to go to Africa if he thought it would be to the advantage of the commonwealth, pp. 185-95. Mago, son of Hamilcar, sailed to Italy from the Balearic islands, where he had passed the winter, p. 197.

## BOOK XXIX

C. Laelius was sent by Scipio to Africa and brought back an immense quantity of plunder and also a message from Masinissa, expressing his regret that Scipio had not yet gone to Africa, pp. 203-5. The war in Spain which had been kindled by Indibilis was brought to a close by the victory of Rome; he himself was killed in battle and Mandonius on the demand of the Romans was given up by his people, pp. 201-3. Mago was at Albingaunum in Liguria and he received from Africa strong reinforcements and a large amount of money with which to hire mercenary troops. Instructions were given him to form a junction with Hannibal, pp. 205-6. Scipio sailed across from Syracuse to Bruttium and after expelling the Carthaginian garrison and putting Hannibal to flight captured Locri, pp. 206-8. Peace was made with Philip, pp. 213-14. The Mater Idaea was brought from Phrygia to Rome in consequence of a prophecy discovered in the Sibylline books announcing that a foreign enemy could be expelled from Italy if the Mater Idaea were carried to Rome. She was handed over to the Romans by Attalus, king of Asia. It was a stone which the natives said was the Mother goddess. It was received by P. Scipio Nasica, the son of the Cnaeus Scipio who had perished in Spain. He was judged by the senate to be the best of men, though not yet old enough for a quaestorship. The oracle ordered that this deity should be received and consecrated by the man who was best of all, pp. 215-16. The Locrians sent a deputation to Rome to protest against the shameless criminality of Pleminius; he had carried off the treasure from the temple of Proserpina and had violated their wives and children, pp. 218-22. He was brought to Rome in chains and died in prison, p. 226. An idle rumour reached Rome to the effect that Scipio was living in extravagant luxury in Sicily, p. 223. The senate sent a commission of enquiry to ascertain the facts, p. 223. Scipio's innocence was proved and he received the senate's permission to sail to Africa, p. 226. Syphax married the daughter of Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, and thereupon denounced the alliance he had formed with Scipio, pp. 227-8. Whilst Masinissa was fighting for the Carthaginians in Spain he lost his father Gala, and any chance he had of succeeding to the throne, pp. 234-5. After making several attempts to recover it, he was hopelessly defeated by Syphax, p. 236. Reduced to a private status he went over with a body of two hundred horse to Scipio, p. 239. In combination with him he destroyed Hanno the son of Hamilcar and a large force of Carthaginians, at the beginning of the war, p. 240. On the approach of Hasdrubal and Syphax with nearly 100,000 men, Scipio abandoned the siege of Utica and strongly intrenched himself in a camp where he intended to pass the winter, pp. 241-2. The consul Sempronius fought with success against Hannibal in the country round Croto. There was a notable quarrel between the censors M. Livius and Claudius Nero, for Claudius struck his colleague

Livius out of the order of the equites because he had been condemned by the Assembly and driven into exile, and Livius did the same to Claudius because he said that he had given false evidence against him, and had been insincere in his reconciliation with him. Livius also left all the tribes with one exception disfranchised, because they had condemned him when innocent and afterwards made him consul and censor, p. 244. The lustrum was closed; the census giving the number of citizens as 214,000, p. 243.

## BOOK XXX

Scipio's campaign in Africa against the Carthaginians. With the assistance of Masinissa he defeated Syphax and Hasdrubal in several engagements and took both the enemies' camps, pp. 250-1. Forty thousand men were killed by fire and sword, p. 251. Through C. Laelius and Masinissa he captured Syphax, pp. 256-7. Masinissa at once fell in love with the captive Sophonisba, Syphax's wife, and married her, p. 258. Sternly rebuked by Scipio, he sent her a cup of poison, which she drank, pp. 260-2. The result of Scipio's numerous victories was that the Carthaginians were driven to despair and recalled Hannibal from Italy to save the State, p. 267. So leaving Italy after being there sixteen years he sailed for Africa, p. 268. He tried to secure peace in an interview with Scipio, pp. 276-80, but as they could not agree about the terms he was defeated in a great battle, pp. 281-5. The Carthaginians sued for peace and obtained it, pp. 285-7. Hannibal with his own hand pulled down Gisgo who was arguing against peace being made and then himself advised it, pp. 287-8. Masinissa had his kingdom restored to him, p. 264. On his return to the City, Scipio enjoyed a most brilliant and glorious triumph. Q. Terentius Culleo marched behind him wearing the freedman's cap, p. 297. Whether the cognomen Africanus was given him by his soldiers or by the citizens is uncertain, but in any case this commander is the first who ennobled his "gens" by this title, p. 297. Mago who had been fighting with the Romans in the country of the Insubres was wounded, and on his voyage back to Africa, whither he had been recalled, died of his wounds, p. 266.

## BOOK XXXI

Events which led to the renewal of the war with Philip of Macedon, pp. 298-311. During the celebration of the mysteries two young Acarnanians who had not been initiated went to Athens and with others of their countrymen entered the sanctuary of Ceres, p. 310. For this reason, as though they had been guilty of a most atrocious crime, the Athenians put them to death, p. 311. The Acarnanians, in bitter resentment at their death, sought help from Philip to avenge them, and

made an attack on Athens, p. 311. The Athenians sought help from the Romans, p. 299. This was begun in the 540th year from the foundation of the City, a few months after peace was granted to the Carthaginians, p. 310. When the envoys of the Athenians, who were being besieged by Philip, had requested assistance from the senate, and the senate agreed that it ought to be given, the plebs feeling the heavy burden of so many successive wars negatived the proposal, p. 302. The influence and authority of the senate finally induced the people to make an order "to send help to an allied State," p. 304. This war was entrusted to the consul P. Sulpicius, p. 304. He led his army into Macedonia and fought some successful cavalry actions with Philip, pp. 329-33. The people of Abydus, who were besieged by Philip, followed the example of the Saguntines and slew themselves and their families, p. 313. The praetor L. Furius defeated in battle the Insubrian Gauls who had again commenced hostilities, and Hamilcar the Carthaginian who was fomenting the war in that part of Italy, pp. 316-17. He was killed in battle and 35,000 men with him, p. 317. This book contains more-over the movements of Philip and Sulpicius and the capture of cities by each side. Sulpicius was assisted by Attalus and the Rhodians. The praetor L. Furius celebrated his triumph over the Gauls, p. 345.

## BOOK XXXII

Several portents are reported from different localities, p. 348. Amongst them a laurel tree sprang up in the stern of a warship off Macedonia, p. 349. The consul T. Quintius Flamininus fought a successful battle with Philip in the mountain district of Epirus, put him to flight and compelled him to return to his kingdom, p. 358. He ravaged the parts of Thessaly adjacent to Macedonia, pp. 361-5. The consul's brother Lucius gained possession of Euboea and the opposite coast through a naval victory with the help of Attalus and the Rhodians, pp. 362-3. Friendly relations were established with the Achaean, p. 372. The number of praetors was increased to six, p. 377. A conspiracy formed amongst the slaves for releasing the Carthaginian hostages was crushed, pp. 375-6. Two thousand of them were put to death, p. 376. The consul Cornelius Cethegus routed the Insubrian Gauls in a pitched battle, pp. 379-80. Friendly relations were established with the Lacedaemonians and Nabis their tyrant, pp. 387-8. Several cities were taken by storm in Macedonia.



## CONTENTS

BOOK	PAGE
XXVI. THE FATE OF CAPUA . . . . .	I
XXVII. SCIPIO IN SPAIN . . . . .	68
XXVIII. FINAL CONQUEST IN SPAIN . . . . .	135
XXIX. SCIPIO IN AFRICA. . . . .	199
XXX. CLOSE OF THE HANNIBALIC WAR . . . . .	246
XXXI. ROME AND MACEDON . . . . .	298
XXXII. THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR . . . . .	348
NOTES . . . . .	391





# LIVY

## BOOK XXVI

### THE FATE OF CAPUA

I. *Military Dispositions for the Year.*—The new consuls, Cn. Fulvius Centimalus and P. Sulpicius Galba, entered upon office on the 15th of March, and at once convened a meeting of the senate in the Capitol to discuss questions of State, the conduct of the war and the distribution of the provinces and the armies. The retiring consuls—Q. Fulvius and Appius Claudius—retained their commands and were instructed to prosecute the siege of Capua unremittingly until they had effected its capture. The recovery of this city was the main concern of the Romans now. What determined them was not only the bitter resentment which its defection had evoked, a feeling which was never more justified in the case of any city, but also the certainty they felt that, as in its revolt it had drawn many communities with it, owing to its greatness and strength, so its recapture would create amongst these communities a feeling of respect for the power whose sovereignty they had formerly acknowledged. The praetors of the past year, M. Junius in Etruria and P. Sempronius in Gaul, had their commands extended and were each to retain the two legions they had. M. Marcellus was to act as proconsul and finish the war in Sicily with the army which he had. If he needed reinforcements he was to take them from the troops which P. Cornelius was commanding in Sicily, but none were to be selected from those who had been forbidden by the senate to take a furlough or return home before the end of the war. The province of Sicily was assigned to C. Sulpicius, and he was to take over the two legions which were with P. Cornelius; any reinforcements he needed were to be supplied from the army of Cn. Fulvius which had been so disgracefully routed and cut up the previous year in Apulia. The soldiers who had so disgraced themselves were placed under the same conditions

with regard to length of service as the survivors of Cannae. As an additional brand of ignominy the men of both these armies were forbidden to winter in towns or to construct winter quarters for themselves within ten miles of any town. The two legions which Q. Mucius had commanded in Sardinia were given to L. Cornelius, and any additional force he might require was to be raised by the consuls. T. Otacilius and M. Valerius were ordered to cruise off the coasts of Sicily and Greece respectively with the fleets and soldiers they had previously commanded. The former had a hundred ships with two legions on board; the latter, fifty ships and one legion.

The total strength of the Roman armies engaged on land and sea this year amounted to twenty-five legions.

II. *The Command in Spain.*—At the beginning of the year a despatch from L. Marcus was laid before the senate. The senators fully appreciated the successful way in which he had conducted his operations, but a good many of them were indignant at the honorific title he had assumed. The superscription of the letter was "The propraetor to the senate," though the *imperium* had not been conferred upon him by an order of the people nor with the sanction of the senate. An evil precedent had been set, they said, when a commander was chosen by his army, and the solemn procedure at elections, after the auspices were duly taken, was transferred to camps and provinces far away from the magistrates and the laws, and left to the caprice of the soldiers. Some thought the senate ought to take the matter up, but it was thought better to adjourn the consideration of it until the horsemen who had brought the despatch had left the City. With regard to the food and clothing of the army, they ordered a reply to be sent to the effect that both these matters would be attended to by the senate.

They refused, however, to allow the despatch to be addressed "To the propraetor L. Marcus," lest it should appear that the question which was to be discussed had been prejudged.

After the messengers had been dismissed the consuls gave this question priority over everything else, and it was unanimously agreed that the tribunes should consult the plebs as soon as possible as to whom they wished to have sent to Spain with the *imperium* as commander-in-chief to take over the army which Cn. Scipio had commanded. The tribunes undertook to do so, and due notice of the question was given to the Assembly.

*The Prosecution of Cn. Fulvius.*—But the citizens were preoccupied with a controversy of a very different nature. C. Sempronius Blaesus had fixed a day for bringing Cn. Fulvius to trial for losing his army in Apulia, and made a very bitter attack upon him beforehand in the Assembly.

“Many commanders,” he said, “have through rashness and inexperience led their armies into most dangerous positions, but Cn. Fulvius is the only one who has demoralised his army by every form of vice before betraying them. They may with perfect truth be said to have been destroyed before they saw the enemy; they owed their defeat to their own commander, not to Hannibal.

“Now no man, when he is going to vote, takes sufficient trouble to find out what sort of a man it is to whom he is entrusting the supreme command of the army. Think of the difference between Tiberius Sempronius and Cn. Fulvius. Tiberius Sempronius had an army of slaves given to him, but in a short time, thanks to the discipline he maintained and the wise use he made of his authority, there was not a man amongst them who when he was in the field of battle gave a thought to his birth or his condition. Those men were a protection to our allies and a terror to our enemies. They snatched, as though from the very jaws of Hannibal, cities like Cumae and Beneventum and restored them to Rome. Cn. Fulvius, on the other hand, had an army of Roman citizens, born of respectable parents, brought up as free men, and he infected them with the vices of slaves, and made them such that they were insolent and riotous amongst our allies, weaklings and cowards in face of the enemy; they could not stand even the war-cry of the Carthaginians, let alone their charge. Good heavens! no wonder the soldiers gave ground, when their commander was the first to run away; the wonder is that any stood their ground and fell, and that all did not accompany Cn. Fulvius in his panic and flight. C. Flaminius, L. Paulus, L. Postumius, and the two Scipios, Cnaeus and Publius, all chose to fall in battle rather than desert their armies, when they were hemmed in by the foe. Cn. Fulvius came back to Rome as the all-but solitary herald of the annihilation of his army. After the army had fled from the field of Cannae it was deported to Sicily, not to return till the enemy had evacuated Italy, and a similar decree was recently passed in the case of Fulvius’ legions. But, shame to relate, the commander himself remained unpunished

after his flight from a battle brought on by his own headstrong folly; he is free to pass the rest of his life where he passed it in youth—in stews and brothels—whilst his soldiers, whose only fault is that they copied their commander, are practically sent into exile and have to undergo a service of disgrace. So unequal are the liberties enjoyed in Rome by the rich and the poor, the men of rank and the men of the people.”

III. In his defence Fulvius threw all the blame upon his men. They clamoured, he said, for battle, and he led them out, not at the moment, for it was late in the day, but on the following morning. Though they were drawn up on favourable ground, at an early hour they found either the terror of the enemy's name or the strength of his attack too much for them. When they were all flying in disorder he was swept away by the rush as Varro was at Cannae and as many other commanders have been at different times. What help would he have given to the republic by staying there alone? unless indeed his death would have warded off other national disasters. His failure was not due to lack of supplies, or to incautiously taking up a position on unfavourable ground; he had not been ambushed through insufficient reconnoitring; he had been beaten in a fair fight on an open field. Men's tempers, on whichever side they were, were beyond his control, a man's natural disposition made him either brave or cowardly.

The speeches of the prosecutor and the defendant occupied two days, on the third day the witnesses were produced. Besides all the other serious charges brought against him, a great many men stated on oath that the panic and flight begun with the praetor, and that when the soldiers found that they were left to themselves, and thought that their commander had good ground for fear, they too turned their backs and fled.

The prosecutor had in the first instance asked for a fine, but the evidence which had been given roused the anger of the people to such an extent that they insisted upon a capital charge being laid.

This led to a fresh contest. As the prosecutor during the first two days had limited the penalty to a fine and only on the third day made the charge a capital one, the defendant appealed to the other tribunes, but they refused to interfere with their colleague. It was open to him by ancient custom to proceed either by statute law or by customary precedent, whichever he preferred, until he had obtained judgment, whether the

penalty were a capital or a pecuniary one. On this Sempronius announced that he should prosecute C. Fulvius on the charge of treason and requested the City praetor to convene the Assembly for the purpose on the appointed day.<sup>1</sup> Then the accused tried another way of escape. His brother Quintus was in high favour with the people at the time, owing to his former successes and the general conviction that he would soon take Capua, and the defendant hoped that he might be present at his trial. Quintus wrote to the senate for their permission, appealing to their compassion and begging to be allowed to defend his brother's life, but they told him in reply that it would militate against the interests of the State for him to leave Capua.

Just before the day of trial Cn. Fulvius went into exile at Tarquinii. The plebs affirmed by resolution his legal status as exile and all the consequences it involved.<sup>2</sup>

IV. *The Investment of Capua.*—Meanwhile the whole stress of the war bore on Capua. The blockade was proving more effective than direct assault; the common people and the slaves could not endure the famine, nor could they send messengers to Hannibal owing to the strict watch which was kept. At last a Numidian was found who promised to get through with the despatches, and he succeeded. He escaped through the Roman lines by night, and this encouraged the Capuans to attempt sorties in all directions while they still had some strength left. Numerous cavalry encounters took place in which they generally had the advantage, but their infantry got the worst of it. The gratification which the Romans derived from their infantry successes was considerably damped by their finding themselves beaten in any arm by an enemy whom they had invested and almost conquered. At length they devised a clever plan by which they could make up for their inferiority in the mounted arm. Young men of exceptional speed and agility were selected from all the legions and supplied with bucklers somewhat shorter than those used by the cavalry. Each was furnished with seven javelins, four feet long and tipped with iron heads similar to those on the darts of the velites.<sup>3</sup> The troopers each took one of these upon his horse and trained them to ride behind and leap down briskly at a given signal.

As soon as their daily training had given them sufficient confidence, the cavalry advanced against the Capuans, who were drawn up on the level ground between the Roman camp

and the city walls. As soon as they came within range the signal was given and the velites sprang down to the ground. The line of infantry thus formed made a sudden attack on the Capuan horse; shower after shower of javelins was flung at the men and horses all along the line. A great many were wounded, and the novel and unexpected form of attack created widespread consternation. Seeing the enemy shaken the Roman cavalry charged home, and in the rout that followed they drove them with much loss right up to their gates. From that time the Romans had the superiority in their cavalry also. The velites were subsequently incorporated in the legions. This plan of combining infantry and cavalry in one force is said to have originated with one of the centurions—Q. Navius, and he received special honour from his commander in consequence.

V. Such was the position of affairs at Capua. During this time Hannibal was drawn in two directions; he was anxious to get possession of the citadel of Tarentum and he was equally anxious to retain his hold on Capua. Regard for Capua however carried the day, for he saw that it was the spot to which all eyes were turned, of friends and foes alike, and its fate would show conclusively, one way or the other, the consequences of defection from Rome. Leaving therefore his baggage and heavy-armed troops in Bruttium, he hurried into Campania with a force of horse and foot selected for their capacity for rapid marching. Swift as his advance was, however, three and thirty elephants followed him.

He took up his position in a secluded valley at the back of Mount Tifata which overlooked Capua. On his march he captured the fortified post of Calatia. He then turned his attention to the besiegers of Capua, and sent a message to the city telling them at what time he intended to attack the Roman lines, so that they might be ready to make a sortie and pour in full strength out of all their gates. The investing force was thrown into a state of great alarm, for while Hannibal was delivering his assault on one side, the whole of the forces of Capua, mounted and unmounted, supported by the Punic garrison under Bostar and Hanno were making a vigorous sortie on the other. Realising their critical position and the danger of leaving a portion of their lines unprotected by concentrating their defence in any one direction, the Romans divided their force; Appius Claudius confronted the Capuans, Fulvius was opposed to Hannibal; the proprætor C. Nero with the cavalry of the

six legions held the road to Suessula, and C. Fulvius Flaccus with the cavalry of the allies took up a position towards the Volturnus.<sup>4</sup>

There was not only the usual shouting and uproar when the battle commenced; the din of horses and men and arms was aggravated by the non-combatant population of Capua. They crowded on to the walls, and by clashing brazen vessels together, as people do in the dead of the night when there is an eclipse of the moon, they made such a dreadful noise that it even distracted the attention of the combatants.

Appius had no difficulty in driving the Capuans from his earthworks, but Fulvius had to meet a much heavier attack from Hannibal and his Carthaginians on the other side. Here the sixth legion gave way and a cohort of Spaniards with three elephants succeeded in getting up to the breastwork. They had penetrated the Roman line, and whilst they saw their chance of breaking through into the camp they saw also the danger of being cut off from their supports. When Fulvius saw the disorder of the legion and the danger which threatened the camp, he called upon Q. Navius and other centurions of the first rank to charge the enemy's cohort which was fighting just under the breastwork. "It is a most critical moment," he told them; "either you must allow the enemy to go on, in which case they will break into the camp with less difficulty than they found in breaking through the closed ranks of the legion, or you must dispose of them whilst they are still below the breastwork. It will not be a hard fight; they are a small body, cut off from their support; and the very fact of the Roman line being broken will be an advantage if both sections close on the enemy's flanks, who would then be hemmed and exposed to a double attack." On hearing this Navius took the standard of the second maniple of hastati from the bearer and advanced with it against the enemy, threatening at the same time to throw it into their midst if his men did not promptly follow him and take their share in the fighting. He was a huge man and his armour set him off, and as he lifted the standard high in the air, he attracted all eyes. But when he was close to the Spaniards they hurled their javelins at him from all sides, and almost the whole of their line turned their attention to this one man. Neither the number of the enemy, however, nor the force of their missiles were able to check the gallant fellow's onset.

VI. M. Atilius now brought up the leading maniple of the



sixth legion against the Spanish cohort; L. Porcius Licinius and T. Popilius, who were in command of the camp, were keeping up a fierce struggle in front of the breastwork, and killed some of the elephants whilst they were actually clambering over it. Their bodies rolled down into the fosse and filled it up, making a bridge for the passage of the enemy, and a terrible carnage began over the prostrate elephants.

On the other side of the camp the Capuans and their Punic garrison had by this time been repulsed, and the fighting went on right up to the city gate which leads to the Volturnus. The efforts of the Romans to break in were frustrated not so much by the arms of the defenders as by the ballistae and scorpions which were mounted over the gate and kept the assailants at a distance by the missiles they discharged. A further check was given them by a wound received by Appius Claudius; he was struck by a heavy javolin in the upper part of the chest under the left shoulder, whilst he was riding along the front encouraging his men. A great many of the enemy were however killed outside the gate; the rest were driven in hasty flight into the city.

When Hannibal saw the destruction of his Spanish cohort and the energy with which the Romans were defending their lines, he gave up the attack and recalled the standards. The retiring column of infantry was followed by the cavalry who were to protect the rear in case the enemy harassed their retreat. The legions were burning to pursue them, but Fulvius ordered the "retire" to be sounded, as he considered that he had gained quite enough in making both the Capuans and Hannibal himself realise how little he could do in their defence.

Some authors who describe this battle say that 8000 of Hannibal's men were killed that day and 3000 Capuans, and that 15 standards were taken from the Carthaginians and 18 from the Capuans. In other accounts I find that the affair was nothing like so serious, there was more excitement and confusion than actual fighting. According to these writers the Numidians and Spaniards broke unexpectedly into the Roman lines with the elephants, and these animals, trotting all over the camp, upset the tents and created terrible uproar and panic during which the baggage animals broke their tethers and bolted. To add to the confusion Hannibal sent some men got up as Italians, who could speak Latin, to tell the defenders in the name of the consul that as the camp was lost each man

must do his best to escape to the nearest mountains. The trick was, however, soon detected and frustrated with heavy loss to the enemy, and the elephants were driven out of the camp with firebrands. In any case, however it began or ended, this was the last battle fought before Capua surrendered.

The "medix tuticus," the supreme magistrate of Capua, happened for that year to be Seppius Loesius, a man of humble birth and slender fortune. The story goes that owing to a portent which had occurred in his mother's household she consulted a soothsayer on behalf of her little boy, and he told her that the highest official position in Capua would come to her son. As she was not aware of anything which would justify such expectations she replied, "You are indeed describing a desperate state of things in Capua when you say that such an honour will come to my son." Her jesting reply to what was a true prediction turned out itself to be true, for it was only when famine and sword were pressing them sorely and all hope of further resistance was disappearing that Loesius accepted the post. He was the last Capuan to hold it, and he only did so under protest; Capua, he declared, was abandoned and betrayed by all her foremost citizens.

VII. *Hannibal marches to Rome.*—Finding that his enemy could not be drawn into an engagement and that it was impossible to break through their lines and relieve Capua, Hannibal decided to abandon his attempt and march away from the place, for he was afraid of being cut off from his supplies by the new consuls. He was anxiously turning over in his mind the question of his future movements when the idea occurred to him of marching upon Rome, the head and guiding spirit of the whole war. He had always set his heart upon this, and men blamed him for letting the opportunity slip, immediately after the battle of Cannae; he himself admitted that he had made a mistake in not doing so. He was not without hope of seizing some part of the City in the confusion caused by his unexpected appearance, and if Rome were in danger, he expected that both the consuls—or at all events, one of them—would at once quit their hold on Capua. Then, as they would be weakened by their forces being divided, they would give either him or the Capuans the opportunity of fighting a successful action. One thing made him anxious, the possibility of the Capuans surrendering as soon as he had withdrawn.

Amongst his men there was a Numidian who was ready for

any desperate enterprise, and he induced this man, by the offer of a reward, to carry a despatch and enter the Roman lines in the guise of a deserter, then steal away on the opposite side and enter Capua. He wrote in a very encouraging strain, and pointed out that his departure would be the means of saving them, as it would draw off the Roman generals from their attack on Capua to defend Rome. They were not to be despondent, a few days' patience would completely break up the siege.

He then ordered the boats which were on the Volturnus to be seized and brought up to a fort which he had previously constructed to secure the passage of the river. He was informed that there was a sufficient number of them to admit of his entire army being taken across in one night. Ten days' rations were supplied to the men; they marched down to the river, and all his legions were across before day-break.

VIII. Fulvius Flaccus was informed by deserters of this project before it was put into execution, and at once sent intelligence of it to the senate. The news was received with varying feelings as men's temperaments differed. Naturally, at such a crisis, a meeting of the senate was instantly convened.

Publius Cornelius Asina was for recalling all the generals and armies from every part of Italy for the defence of the City, regardless of Capua or any other object they had in view. Fabius Maximus considered that it would be a disgrace for them to quit their hold on Capua and allow themselves to be scared by Hannibal and marched up and down at his beck and menaces. "Do you suppose," he asked the senators, "that the man who did not venture to approach the City after his victory at Cannae, really hopes to capture it now that he has been driven away from Capua? His object in coming here is not to attack Rome but to raise the siege of Capua. The army which is now in the City will be sufficient for our defence, for it will be aided by Jupiter and the other gods who have witnessed Hannibal's violation of treaty engagements." P. Valerius Flaccus advocated a middle course, which was ultimately adopted. He recommended that a despatch should be sent to the generals commanding at Capua, telling them what defensive force the City possessed. They themselves would know what troops Hannibal was bringing and how large an army was required to maintain the siege of Capua. If one of the generals commanding could be sent with a part of the army to Rome

without interfering with the effective conduct of the siege by the other general, Claudius and Fulvius might arrange which of them should continue the investment of Capua and which should go to Rome to prevent their own city from being invested.

When this decision of the senate reached Capua, the proconsul Q. Fulvius, whose colleague had been obliged to leave for Rome owing to his wound, selected a force out of the three armies and crossed the Volturnus with 15,000 infantry and 1000 cavalry. When he had definitely ascertained that Hannibal was advancing by the Latin Road, he sent men on in advance through the burghs situated on the Appian Way and also to some lying near it, to warn the inhabitants to have supplies stored in readiness in their towns and to bring them in from the outlying fields to the line of march. They were further to call in their fighting men to defend their homes, and each municipality was to provide for its own protection.

IX. After crossing the Volturnus Hannibal fixed his camp a short distance from the river, and the next day he marched past Cales into the Sidicine territory. One day was devoted to laying waste the district, and then he proceeded along the Latin Road through the lands of Suessa, Allifae, and Casinum up to the walls of the last-mentioned place. Here he remained encamped for two days and ravaged the whole of the surrounding country. From there he went on past Interamna and Aquinum into the territory of Fregellae as far as the Liris. Here he found that the bridge had been destroyed by the people of Fregellae in order to delay his advance. Fulvius too had been delayed at the Volturnus, owing to Hannibal having burnt his boats, and he had considerable difficulty in procuring rafts for the transport of his troops, owing to the lack of timber. When, however, he had once crossed, the remainder of his march was uninterrupted, as he found ample supplies of provisions waiting for him in each city he came to, and also put out by the side of the road in the country districts. His men, too, in their eagerness urged one another to march more quickly, for they were going to defend their homes.

A messenger who had travelled from Fregellae for a day and a night without stopping created great alarm in Rome, and the excitement was increased by people running about the City with wildly exaggerated accounts of the news he had brought. The wailing cry of the matrons was heard everywhere, not only in private houses but even in the temples. Here they knelt and

swept the temple-floors with their dishevelled hair and lifted up their hands to heaven in piteous entreaty to the gods that they would deliver the City of Rome out of the hands of the enemy and preserve its mothers and children from injury and outrage. The senators remained in session in the Forum so as to be at hand should the magistrates wish to consult them. Some received orders and went off to execute their commissions, others offered their services in case they could be of use anywhere. Troops were posted at the Capitol, on the walls, round about the City and even as far as the Alban Mount and the fortress of Aesula.

In the midst of all this excitement word was brought that the proconsul Q. Fulvius was on his way from Capua with an army. As proconsul he could not hold command in the City, the senate therefore passed a decree conferring upon him consular powers.

After completely destroying the territory of Fregellae in revenge for the destruction of the bridge over the Liris, Hannibal continued his march through the districts of Frusinum, Ferentinum and Anagnia into the neighbourhood of Labicum. He then crossed Algidus and marched on Tusculum, but he was refused admittance, so he turned to the right below Tusculum towards Gabii, and still descending, came into the district of Pupinia where he encamped, eight miles from Rome. The nearer his approach the greater was the slaughter of those who were fleeing to the City at the hands of the Numidians who rode in front of the main body. Many, too, of all ages and conditions were made prisoners.<sup>5</sup>

X. In the midst of this turmoil and excitement Fulvius Flaccus entered Rome with his army. He passed through the Porta Capena and marched right through the City past the Cavinae and the Esquiliae, and out again through the Colline Gate, entrenching himself on ground between the Colline and Esquiline Gates.<sup>6</sup> Here the plebeian aediles furnished him with provisions. The consuls, attended by the senate, visited him in his camp, and a council was held to consider what measures the supreme interests of the republic demanded. It was decided that the consuls should form entrenched camps in the vicinity of the Colline and Esquiline Gates, the City praetor taking command of the Citadel and the Capitol, and that the senate should remain in permanent session in the Forum in case any sudden emergency should need to be provided against.

Hannibal had now moved his camp to the Anio at a distance of three miles from the City. From this position, he advanced with a body of 2000 cavalry towards the Colline Gate as far as the temple of Hercules, and from that point he rode up and made as close an inspection as he could of the walls and the situation of the City. Flaccus was furious with indignation at this calm and leisurely proceeding and sent some cavalry with orders to clear the enemy and drive them back to their camp. There were some 1200 Numidian deserters stationed on the Aventine at the time, and the consuls sent orders to them to ride through the City to the Esquiliae, as they considered none more fitted to fight amongst the hollows and garden walls and sepulchres and enclosed paths all around that part of the City. When those on guard at the Citadel and the Capitol saw them trotting down the Publician hill they shouted out that the Aventine was taken. This caused so much confusion and panic that, had not the Carthaginian camp been outside the City, the terrified population would have poured out of the gates. As it was, they took refuge in the houses and various buildings, and seeing some of their own people walking in the streets, they took them for enemies and attacked them with stones and missiles. It was impossible to calm the excitement or to rectify the mistake, as the streets were packed with crowds of country people with their cattle, whom the sudden danger had driven into the City.

The cavalry action was successful and the enemy were driven off. It became necessary, however, to quell the disturbances which, without the slightest reason, were breaking out in many quarters, and the senate decided that all who had been Dictators, consuls or censors should be invested with the imperium until the enemy had retired from the walls. During the remainder of the day and throughout the night, many such disturbances arose and were promptly repressed.

XI. The following day Hannibal crossed the Anio and led out the whole of his force to battle; Flaccus and the consuls did not decline the challenge. When both sides were drawn up to decide an action in which Rome was the victor's prize, a tremendous hailstorm threw the two armies into such disorder that they had difficulty in holding their arms. They retired to their respective camps, fearing everything rather than their enemy. The following day, when the armies were drawn up in the same position, a similar storm separated them. On each

occasion, after they were once more in camp, the weather cleared up in an extraordinary way. The Carthaginians looked upon the occasion as preternatural, and the story runs that Hannibal was heard to say that at one time he lacked the will, at another the opportunity, of becoming master of Rome. His hopes were further damped by two incidents, one of some importance, the other less so. The more important was his receiving information that while he was actually in arms near the walls of Rome a force had marched out fully equipped, under their standards, to reinforce the army in Spain. The other incident, which he learnt from a prisoner, was the sale by auction of the spot on which he had fixed his camp, and the fact that, in spite of his occupation of it, there was no abatement in the price. That any one should have been found in Rome to buy the ground which he was holding in possession as spoil of war, seemed to Hannibal such an insulting piece of arrogance that he instantly summoned a crier and made him give notice of the sale of the silversmiths' shops round the Forum of Rome.<sup>7</sup>

These incidents led to his withdrawal from Rome, and he retired as far as the river Tutia, six miles distant from the City. From there he marched to the grove of Feronia and the temple, which was celebrated in those days for its wealth. The people of Capena and other cities round used to bring their first-fruits and other offerings, according to their ability, and they had also embellished it with a considerable quantity of gold and silver. Now the temple was despoiled of all its treasures. Great heaps of metal, where the soldiers, struck by remorse, had thrown pieces of uncoined brass, were found there after Hannibal's departure.

All writers are agreed as to the plundering of this temple. Coelius tell us that Hannibal diverted his march to it while he was going from Eretum to Rome, after marching from Amiternum by Reate and Cutiliae. According to this writer, on leaving Capua, Hannibal entered Samnium, and from there passed to the Peligni; then, marching past the town of Sulmo, he crossed the frontiers of the Marrucini and then advanced through the Alban territory to the country of the Marsi, and from there to Amiternum and the hamlet of Foruli. There can be no uncertainty as to the route he took, for the traces of that great commander and his large army could not have been lost in so short a space of time; the only point at issue is whether

that was the route he took when he marched to Rome or whether he followed it on his return to Campania.

XII. *The Fall of Capua.*—The energy with which the Romans pressed the siege of Capua was far greater than that which Hannibal exhibited in its defence, for he hurried away through Lucania to Bruttium in the hope of surprising Regium. Though the siege was in no way relaxed during Fulvius' absence, his return made a sensible difference in the conduct of operations, and it was a matter of general surprise that Hannibal had not returned at the same time. The Capuans gradually learnt through their conversations with the besiegers that they were abandoned and left to themselves, and that the Carthaginians had given up all hope of saving Capua.

In accordance with a resolution of the senate, the proconsul issued an edict which was published in the city, that any Campanian burgher<sup>a</sup> who went over to the Romans before a certain day would be amnestied. Not a single man went over; their fears prevented them from trusting the Romans, for they had in their revolt committed crimes too great for any hope of pardon. But whilst no one would provide for his own safety by going over to the enemy, there was nothing done for the public safety in the way of wise or prudent counsel. The nobility had deserted their public duties; it was impossible to get together a meeting of the senate. The supreme magistracy was held by a man who conferred no honour on his office; on the contrary, his unfitness detracted from its authority and power. None of the nobility were to be seen in the forum, or indeed anywhere in public; they shut themselves up at home waiting for their country's downfall and their own destruction. All responsibility was thrown upon the commandants of the Punic garrison, Bostar and Hanno, and they were much more concerned for their own safety than for that of their supporters in the city. A communication was drawn up for the purpose of forwarding it to Hannibal, in which he was directly charged with surrendering Capua into the enemy's hands and exposing his garrison to every kind of torture. He had gone off, so the despatch hinted, to be out of the way, lest Capua should be taken before his eyes. The Romans could not be drawn off from besieging Capua even when an attack was threatened on their city; so much more determination did the Romans show as enemies, than the Carthaginians as friends. If Hannibal would return to Capua and turn the whole tide of war in that



direction, then the garrison were prepared to make an attack on the besiegers. He had not crossed the Alps to make war with Regium or Tarentum; where the legions of Rome were, there ought the armies of Carthage to be. That was how he had conquered at Cannac, and at Thrasymentus, by meeting the enemy face to face, army to army, and trying his fortune in battle.

This was the main drift of the despatch. It was handed to some Numidians who had undertaken to carry it on promise of a reward. They had come into Fulvius' camp as deserters, intending to seize a favourable opportunity of slipping away, and the famine from which Capua had long been suffering was a very good reason why they should desert. A Campanian woman, however, the mistress of one of these deserters, suddenly appeared in the camp and informed the Roman commander that the Numidians had come in as part of a pre-arranged plot, and were really carrying a despatch to Hannibal, and that she was prepared to prove it, as one of them had disclosed the affair to her. When this man was brought forward, he at first stoutly denied all knowledge of the woman, but gradually he gave way before the truth, especially when he saw that instruments of torture were being sent for and got ready, and at last made a complete confession. The despatch was produced, and further evidence came to light, as it was found that other Numidians were at large in the Roman camp under the guise of deserters. Above seventy of them were arrested and together with the recent arrivals were all scourged, and their hands were cut off, after which they were sent back to Capua. The sight of this terrible punishment broke the spirit of the Capuans.

XIII. The people went in a body to the senate house and insisted on Loesius summoning the senate. They openly threatened the nobles who had so long absented themselves from the senate, that they would go round to their houses and drag them all by main force into the streets. These threats resulted in a full meeting of the senate. The general opinion was in favour of sending a deputation to the Roman commander, but Vibius Virrius, the prime author of the revolt from Rome, when asked his opinion, told those who were talking about a deputation and terms of peace and surrender that they were forgetting what they would have done had they had the Romans in their power, or what, as circumstances now were, they would

have to suffer. "Why!" he exclaimed, "do you imagine that our surrender now will be like the one we made in old days when, in order to get help against the Samnites, we surrendered ourselves and all that belonged to us to Rome? Have you already forgotten at what a critical moment for Rome we revolted from her? How we put to death with every torture and indignity the garrison which we could easily have sent away? What numerous and desperate sorties we have made against our besiegers, how we have assaulted their lines and called Hannibal in to crush them? Have you forgotten this last act of ours when we sent him to attack Rome?"

"Now look at the other side, consider their determined hostility to us and see if you have anything to hope for. Though there was a foreign enemy on Italian soil, and that enemy Hannibal, though the flames of war were being kindled in every quarter, they neglected everything, even Hannibal himself, and sent both the consuls, each with an army, to Capua. For two years now have they hemmed us in with their lines of circumvallation, and are wearing us down with famine. They have endured as much as we have in the extremity of peril, the utmost severity of toil; often have they been slaughtered about their entrenchments, and all but driven out of them. But I pass over these things; the labours and dangers of a siege are an old and common experience. But to show their rage and implacable hatred against us I will remind you of these incidents: Hannibal assaulted their lines with an enormous force of infantry and cavalry, and partly captured them, but they did not raise the siege; he crossed the Volturnus and desolated the district of Calenum with fire; the sufferings of their allies failed to call off the Romans; he ordered a general advance on Rome itself, they disregarded the threatening storm; he crossed the Anio and encamped within three miles of the City, and at last rode up to its walls and gates and made as though he would take their city from them if they did not lose their hold on Capua; they did not lose their hold. When wild beasts are mad with rage you can still divert their blind fury by approaching their lairs and young ones which they will hasten to defend. The Romans were not diverted from Capua by the prospect of their city being besieged, or by the terrified cries of their wives and children which could almost be heard here, or by the threatened desecration of their hearths and altars, of the shrines of their gods and the tombs of their ancestors.

So eager are they to visit us with punishment, so greedily do they thirst for our blood. And, perhaps, rightly; we should have done the same had fortune favoured us.

"Heaven, however, has ordered otherwise, and so, though I am bound to meet my death in any case, I can, whilst I am still free, escape the insults and the tortures which the enemy is preparing for me, I can dispose of myself by a death as peaceful as it is honourable. I refuse to look upon Appius Claudius and Q. Fulvius exulting in all the insolence of victory; I refuse to be dragged in chains through the streets of Rome to grace their triumph, and then in the dungeon or bound to the stake, with my back torn with the scourge, pass under the headsman's axe. I will not see my city plundered and burnt, and the matrons and maidens and noble boys of Capua ravished and outraged. Alba, the mother city of Rome, was rased by the Romans to its foundations in order that no memorial of their origin and of the stock whence they sprung might survive; much less can I believe that they will spare Capua which they hate more bitterly than they hate Carthage.

"So, for those of you who intend to meet your fate before you witness all these horrors I have prepared a banquet to-day at my house. When you have taken your fill of food and wine, the same goblet that is handed to me will be passed round to you. That draught will free our bodies from torture, our spirits from insult, our eyes and ears from seeing and hearing all the suffering and outrage which await the vanquished. Men will be in readiness to place our lifeless bodies on a vast pile which will be kindled in the court-yard of the house. This is the only path to death which is honourable and worthy of free men. Even the enemy will admire our courage, and Hannibal will know that the allies whom he has abandoned and betrayed were, after all, brave men."

XIV. This speech of Virrius was received with approbation by many who had not the courage to carry out what they approved of. The majority of the senators were not without hope that the clemency of the Roman people so often experienced in former wars would be once more extended to them, and they determined to send envoys to make a formal surrender of Capua. About seven-and-twenty accompanied Virrius home and banqueted with him. When they had as far as possible deadened their feelings with wine against the sense of impending evil, they all partook of the poisoned cup. Then

they rose from table and grasped each other's hands and took a last embrace of one another, weeping for their own and their country's doom. Some remained that they might be cremated together on the same funeral pyre, others departed for their homes. The congestion of the veins caused by the food and wine they had taken made the action of the poison somewhat slow, and most of them lingered through the whole night and part of the following day. All, however, expired before the gates were opened to the enemy.

The following day, the gate called "the Gate of Jupiter," opposite the Roman camp, was opened by the proconsul's order. One legion was admitted through it and two squadrons of allied cavalry, with C. Fulvius in command. First he took care that all the weapons of war in Capua were brought to him; then, after stationing guards at all the gates to prevent any exit or escape, he arrested the Punic garrison and ordered the senate to go to the Roman commanders. On their arrival in the camp they were manacled, and ordered to send word for all the gold and silver they possessed to be brought to the quaestors. This amounted to 2072 pounds of gold and 31,200 pounds of silver. Twenty-five senators were sent to be kept in custody at Caes, and twenty-eight who were proved to have been mainly instrumental in bringing about the revolt were sent to Teanum.

XV. As to the punishment to be meted out to the senators of Capua, Claudius and Fulvius were anything but unanimous. Claudius was prepared to grant them pardon, but Fulvius took a much sterner line. Appius Claudius wished to refer the whole question to the senate at Rome. He maintained that it was but right that the senators should have an opportunity of investigating all the circumstances and finding out whether the Capuans had made any of the allies or the Latins or the municipal burghs privy to their designs, and if so, whether any of these had given them assistance in the war. Fulvius, on the other hand, declared that the very last thing they ought to do was to harass their faithful allies by vague charges and put them at the mercy of informers who were perfectly indifferent as to what they said or what they did. Any such investigation therefore he should stifle. After this interchange of views they parted, Appius feeling no doubt that in spite of his violent language his comrade would, in such an important matter, await instructions from Rome. Fulvius, determined to forestall any such obstacle to his designs, dismissed the council and ordered

the military tribunes and the officers of the allies to select 2000 horsemen and warn them to be in readiness by the time the third watch was sounded.

Starting with this force in the night, he reached Teanum at day-break and rode straight into the forum. A crowd had collected at the first entry of the cavalry, and Fulvius ordered the chief magistrate of the district to be summoned, and on his appearance commanded him to produce the Capuans who were in his custody. They were all brought forward and then scourged and beheaded.

Then putting spurs to his horse he rode to Calcs. When he had taken his seat on the tribunal and the Capuans who had been brought out were being bound to the stake, a mounted messenger arrived post-haste from Rome and handed Fulvius a despatch from the praetor C. Calpurnius containing the decree of the senate. The spectators guessed the nature of the contents, and those standing round the tribunal expressed their belief—a belief which soon found expression throughout the Assembly—that the whole question of the treatment of the Capuan prisoners was to be left to the senate. Fulvius thought so too; he took the letter and without opening it placed it in his breast and then ordered his marshal to tell the lictor to carry out the law. Thus, those who were at Calcs were also executed. Now he read the despatch and the decree of the senate. But it was too late to prevent a deed accomplished, which had been hurried on as quickly as possible in order that it might not be prevented.

Just as Fulvius was leaving the tribunal a Capuan named Taurea Vibellius strode through the middle of the crowd and addressed him by name. Fulvius resumed his seat, wondering what the man wanted. "Order me too," he cried, "to be put to death so that you may boast of having caused the death of a braver man than yourself." Fulvius declared that the man was certainly out of his mind, and added that even if he wished to kill him he was prevented from doing so by the decree of the senate. Then Vibellius exclaimed, "Now that my native city has been taken, my friends and relations lost to me, my wife and children slain by my own hand to save them from insult and outrage, and since even the opportunity of dying as my fellow-countrymen here have died is refused me, let me seek in courage a release from the life which has become so hateful to me." With these words he drew out a sword which

he had concealed in his garment, and plunging it into his heart fell dying at the general's feet.

XVI. As the execution of the Capuans and most of the other steps taken were carried out by the instructions of Fulvius alone, some authors assert that Appius Claudius died immediately after the surrender of Capua. According to this account, Taurea did not come voluntarily to Cales, nor did he perish by his own hand; when he had been tied to the stake along with the others he shouted repeatedly, and as owing to the noise they could not hear what he was saying, Fulvius ordered silence. Then Taurea said, as I have already related, that he was being done to death by a man who was far from being his equal in courage. At these words, the marshal, on the proconsul's order, gave this direction to the lictor: "Lictor, let this brave man have more of the rod, and execute the law upon him first of all." Some authors assert that the decree of the senate was read before the men were beheaded, but there was a proviso in it to the effect that if he thought fit, he might refer the question to the senate, and Fulvius took this to mean that he was at liberty to decide as to what would be the best course in the interests of the republic.

*The Fate of the City.*—After Fulvius returned to Capua, he received the submission of Atella and Calatia. Here too the ringleaders in the revolt were punished; seventy of the leading senators were put to death, and three hundred Campanian nobles thrown into prison. Others who were distributed amongst the various Latin cities to be kept in custody perished from various causes; the rest of the population of Capua were sold as slaves.

The question now was what was to be done with the city and its territory. Some were of opinion that a city so strong, so near to Rome and so hostile to it, ought to be utterly destroyed. Utilitarian considerations however prevailed. The territory was generally allowed to be the first in Italy in point of productiveness, and the only reason why the city was spared was that there might be a place for the tillers of the soil to live in. A motley throng of peasants, freedmen, small tradesmen and artisans were told off to occupy the place; the whole of the territory with the buildings on it became the property of the Roman State. It was settled that Capua itself should be simply a lodgment and a shelter, a city merely in name; there was to be no corporate life, no senate, no council of the plebs, no magistrates; the population were without any right of public

assembly or self-government; they had no common interest and were incapable of taking any common action. The administration of justice was in the hands of a praetor who was to be sent annually from Rome.

In this way matters were arranged at Capua in pursuance of a policy which commends itself from every point of view. Sternly and swiftly was punishment meted out to those who had been most guilty, the civic population was scattered far and wide with no hope of return, the unoffending walls and houses were spared from the ravages of fire and demolition. The preservation of the city, whilst it was a material advantage to Rome, afforded to the friendly communities a striking proof of her lenity; the whole of Campania and all the surrounding nationalities would have been horror-struck at the destruction of such a famous and wealthy city.<sup>9</sup> The enemy, on the other hand, was made to realise the power of Rome to punish those who were faithless to her, and the powerlessness of Hannibal to protect those who had gone over to him.

XVII. *Affairs in Spain*.—Now that the senate was relieved from its anxiety about Capua, it was able to turn its attention to Spain. A force of 6000 infantry and 300 cavalry was placed at Nero's disposal, and he selected it from the two legions he had had with him at Capua; an equal number of infantry and 600 cavalry were to be furnished by the allies. He embarked his army at Puteoli and landed at Tarraco. Here he hauled his ships ashore and furnished the crews with arms, thus augmenting his strength. With this composite force he marched to the Ebro and took over the army there from Ti. Fonteius and L. Marcius. He then advanced against the enemy.

Hasdrubal—Hamilcar's son—was encamped at the Lapides Atri (the "Black Boulders"). This is a place in the Auretanian country between the towns of Iiturgis and Mentissa. Nero occupied the two exits of the pass. Hasdrubal, finding himself shut in, sent a herald to promise in his name that he would deport the whole of his army from Spain if he were allowed to leave his position. The Roman general was glad to accept the offer, and Hasdrubal asked for an interview the following day. At this conference they were to draw up in writing the terms upon which the various citadels were to be handed over, and the date at which the garrisons were to be withdrawn, on the understanding that they should take with them all their goods and chattels.

His request was granted, and Hasdrubal ordered the most heavily armed portion of his army to get out of the pass as best they could as soon as darkness set in. He was careful to see that not very many went out that night, as a small body would make but little noise and be more likely to escape observation. They would also find their way more easily through the narrow and difficult foot-paths.

The next day he kept the appointment, but so much time was taken up in discussing and writing down a number of things which had nothing to do with the matters they had agreed to discuss, that the whole day was lost and the business adjourned till the morrow. So another opportunity was afforded him of sending off a fresh body of troops by night. The discussion was not brought to a close the next day, and so it went on; several days were occupied in discussing terms, and the nights in despatching the Carthaginians secretly from their camp. When the greater part of the army had escaped, Hasdrubal no longer kept to the conditions which he had himself proposed, and there was less and less desire to come to terms as his sincerity diminished with his fears.

Almost the entire force of infantry had now got out of the defile when, at daybreak, a dense fog covered the valley and the whole of the surrounding country. No sooner did Hasdrubal become aware of this than he sent a message to Nero begging that the interview might be put off for that day as it was a day on which the Carthaginians were forbidden by their religion to transact any important business. Even this did not arouse any suspicion of trickery. On learning that he would be excused for that day, Hasdrubal promptly left his camp with the cavalry and elephants, and by keeping his movements secret, emerged into safety. About ten o'clock the sun dispersed the mist, and the Romans saw that the hostile camp was deserted. Then, recognising at last the trick which the Carthaginian had played upon him and how he had been befooled, Nero hurriedly prepared to follow him and force him to an engagement. The enemy, however, declined battle; only a few skirmishes took place between the Carthaginian rear and the Roman advanced guard.

XVIII. *Publius Cornelius Scipio sent to Spain.*—The Spanish tribes who had revolted after the defeat of the two Scipios showed no signs of returning to their allegiance; there were not, however, any fresh instances. After the recovery of Capua the



public interest both in senate and people centred in Spain quite as much as in Italy; and it was decided that the army serving there should be increased and a commander-in-chief appointed. There was, however, much uncertainty felt as to whom they ought to appoint. Two consummate generals had fallen within thirty days of each other, and the selection of a man to take their place demanded exceptional care. Various names were proposed, and at last it was arranged that the matter should be left to the people, and a proconsul for Spain formally elected.

The consuls fixed a day for the election. They were in hopes that those who felt themselves qualified for such an important command would become candidates. They were, however, disappointed, and the disappointment renewed the grief of the people, as they thought of the defeats they had sustained and the generals they had lost. The citizens were depressed, almost in despair, nevertheless they went out to the Campus Martius on the day fixed for the election. All turned their eyes to the magistrates and watched the expression of the leaders of the republic as they looked enquiringly at one another. Everywhere men were saying that the State was in such a hopeless condition that no one dared to accept the command in Spain.

Suddenly, Publius Cornelius Scipio, the son of the Scipio who had fallen in Spain, a young man barely twenty-four years old, took his stand upon a slight eminence where he could be seen and heard, and announced himself as a candidate. All eyes were turned towards him, and the delighted cheers with which his announcement was received were at once interpreted as an omen of his future good fortune and success. On proceeding to vote, not only the centuries but even the individual voters were unanimous to a man in favour of entrusting P. Scipio with the supreme command in Spain.

When, however, the election was decided and their enthusiasm had had time to cool down, there was a sudden silence as the people began to reflect on what they had done, and ask themselves whether their personal affection for him might not have got the better of their judgment. What gave them the greatest concern was his youth. Some, too, recalled with dread the fortune that had attended his house, and regarded as ominous of evil even the name of the man who was quitting two bereaved families in order to carry on a campaign round the tombs of his uncle and his father.

XIX. Seeing how the step which they had taken so in-

petuously now filled them with anxiety, Scipio called the voters together and spoke to them about his age and the command which they had entrusted to him, and the war which he had to conduct. He spoke in such lofty and glowing words that he evoked their enthusiasm once more, and inspired them with more hopeful confidence than is usually called out by faith in men's promises or by reasonable anticipations of success.

Scipio won people's admiration not only by the sterling qualities which he possessed, but also by his cleverness in displaying them, a cleverness which he had developed from early youth. In his public life he generally spoke and acted as though he were guided either by visions of the night or by some divine inspiration, whether it was that he was really open to superstitious influences or that he claimed oracular sanction for his commands and counsels in order to secure prompt adoption. He sought to create this impression on men's minds from the beginning, from the day when he assumed the *toga virilis*, for he never undertook any important business, either public or private, without first going to the Capitol, where he sat for some time in the temple in privacy and alone. This custom, which he kept up all through his life, gave rise to a widespread belief, whether designedly upon his part or not, that he was of divine origin, and the story was told of him which was commonly related of Alexander—a story as silly as it was fabulous—that he was begotten by an enormous serpent which had been often seen in his mother's bedroom, but on any one's approach, suddenly uncoiled itself and disappeared. The belief in these marvels was never scoffed at by him; on the contrary, it was strengthened by deliberate policy on his part in refusing to deny or to admit that anything of the kind ever occurred. There were many other traits in this young man's character, some of which were genuine, others the result of studied acting, which created a greater admiration for him than usually falls to the lot of man.<sup>10</sup>

It was the confidence with which he had in this way inspired his fellow-citizens that led them to entrust to him, young as he was, a task of enormous difficulty, and a command which involved the gravest responsibilities.

The force which he had formed out of the old army in Spain, and that which sailed from Puteoli with C. Nero, were further reinforced by 10,000 infantry and 1000 cavalry. M. Junius Silanus was appointed as his second in command. Setting sail

from the mouth of the Tiber with a fleet of thirty vessels, all quinqueremes, he coasted along the Etruscan shore, crossed the Gulf of Gaul, and after rounding the Pyrenæan Promontory brought up at Emporiae, a Greek city, founded by settlers from Phocæa. Here he disembarked his troops and proceeded overland to Tarraco, leaving orders for his fleet to follow his movements. At Tarraco he was met by deputations which had been sent from all the friendly tribes as soon as they knew of his coming. The vessels were hauled ashore, and the four Massilian triremes which had acted as convoy were sent home. The deputations informed Scipio of the unsettlement amongst their tribes due to the varying fortunes of the war. He replied in a bold and assured tone, full of self-confidence, but no expression savouring of presumption or arrogance escaped him, everything he said was marked by perfect dignity and sincerity.

XX. Tarraco was now his headquarters. From there he paid visits to the friendly tribes, and also inspected the winter quarters of the army. He praised them warmly for having maintained their hold on the province after sustaining two such terrible blows, and also for keeping the enemy to the south of the Ebro, thereby depriving them of any advantages from their victories, and also affording protection to their own friends. Marcius, whom he kept with him, he treated with so much honour that it was perfectly obvious that Scipio had not the slightest fear of his reputation being dimmed by anybody. Soon afterwards Silanus succeeded Nero and the new troops were sent into winter quarters.

After making all the necessary visits and inspections and completing the preparations for the next campaign Scipio returned to Tarraco. His reputation was quite as great among the enemy as among his own countrymen; there was amongst the former a foreboding, a vague sense of fear which was all the stronger because no reason for it could be given.

The Carthaginian armies withdrew into their respective winter-quarters: Hasdrubal, the son of Gisgo, to Gades on the coast, Mago into the interior above the forest of Castulo, Hasdrubal, the son of Hamilcar, near the Ebro in the neighbourhood of Saguntum.

This summer, marked by two important events, the recovery of Capua and the despatch of Scipio to Spain, was drawing to a close when a Carthaginian fleet was sent from Sicily to Tarentum to intercept supplies from the Roman garrison in

the citadel. It certainly succeeded in blocking all access to the citadel from the sea, but the longer it remained the greater was the scarcity amongst the townspeople as compared with that amongst the Romans in the citadel. For though the coast was clear and open access was secured to the harbour by the Carthaginian fleet, it was impossible to convey to the population of the city as much corn as was consumed by the crowd of sailors, drawn from every class, on board the fleet. The garrison in the citadel, on the other hand, being only a small body, were able to exist on what they had previously laid in, without any external supply. At length the ships were sent away, and their departure was hailed with more delight than their arrival had been. But the scarcity was not in the slightest degree lessened, for when their protection was withdrawn, corn could not be brought in at all.

XXI. *Marcellus returns from Sicily.*—Towards the end of this summer M. Marcellus left Sicily for Rome. On his arrival in the City he was granted an audience of the senate in the Temple of Bellona.<sup>11</sup> After giving a report of his campaign and gently protesting on his own behalf and on that of his soldiers against not being allowed to bring them home, though he had completely pacified the province, he requested to be allowed to enter the City in triumph. After a lengthy debate his request was refused. On the one hand, it was argued, it was most inconsistent to refuse him a triumph now that he was on the spot, after the way in which the news of his successes in Sicily had been received, and public thanksgivings and special rites ordered while he was still in his province. Against this it was alleged that as the senate had ordered him to hand over his army to his successor, it was a proof that a state of war still existed in the province, and he could not enjoy a triumph since he had not brought the war to a close, nor was his army present to testify as to whether he deserved a triumph or not. They decided upon a middle course, he was to be allowed an ovation.<sup>12</sup> The tribunes of the plebs were authorised by the senate to propose as an ordinance to the people "that for the day on which he entered the City in ovation M. Marcellus should retain his command."

The day previous to this he celebrated his triumph on the Alban Mount.<sup>13</sup> From there he marched into the City in ovation. An enormous quantity of spoil was carried before him together with a model of Syracuse at the time of its capture. Catapults and ballistae and all the engines of war taken from the city

were exhibited in the procession, as were also the works of art which had been accumulated in royal profusion during the long years of peace. These included a number of articles in silver and bronze, pieces of furniture, costly garments and many famous statues with which Syracuse, like all the principal cities of Greece, had been adorned. To signalise his victories over the Carthaginians eight elephants were led in the procession. Not the least conspicuous feature of the spectacle was the sight of Sosis the Syracusan and Moericus the Spaniard who marched in front wearing golden crowns. The former had guided the nocturnal entry into Syracuse, the latter had been the agent in the surrender of Nasos and its garrison. Each of these men received the full Roman citizenship and 500 jugera of land.<sup>14</sup> Sosis was to take his allotment in that part of the Syracusan territory which had belonged to the king or to those who had taken up arms against Rome, and he was allowed to choose any house in Syracuse which had been the property of those who had been put to death under the laws of war. A further order was made that Moericus and the Spaniards should have assigned to them a city and lands in Sicily out of the possessions of those who had revolted from Rome. M. Cornelius was commissioned to select the city and territory for them, where he thought best, and 400 jugera in the same district were also decreed as a gift to Belligenes through whose instrumentality Moericus had been induced to change sides.

After Marcellus' departure from Sicily a Carthaginian fleet landed a force of 8000 infantry and 3000 Numidian horse. The cities of Murgentia and Ergetium revolted to them, and their example was followed by Hybla and Macella and some other less important places. Mutines and his Numidians were also roaming all through the island and laying waste the fields of Rome's allies with fire. To add to these troubles the Roman army bitterly resented not being withdrawn from the province with their commander and also not being allowed to winter in the towns. Consequently they were very remiss in their military duties; in fact it was only the absence of a leader that prevented them from breaking out into open mutiny. In spite of these difficulties the praetor M. Cornelius succeeded by remonstrances and reassurances in calming the temper of his men, and then reduced all the revolted cities to submission. In pursuance of the senate's orders he selected Murgentia, one of those cities, for the settlement of Moericus and his Spaniards.

XXII. *Elections for the coming year.*—As both the consuls had Apulia for their province, and as there was less danger from Hannibal and his Carthaginians, they received instructions to ballot for Apulia and Macedonia. Macedonia fell to Sulpicius, and he superseded Laevinus. Fulvius was recalled to conduct the consular elections in Rome. The Veturian century of juniors was the first to vote, and they declared for T. Manlius Torquatus and T. Otacilius, the latter being at the time absent from Rome. The voters began to press round Manlius to congratulate him, regarding his election as a certainty, but he at once proceeded, surrounded by a large crowd, to the consul's tribunal and begged to be allowed to make a brief speech and also asked that the century which had voted might be recalled. When all were on the tiptoe of expectation to learn what he wanted, he began by excusing himself on the score of his eyesight. "A man must have little sense of shame," he continued, "whether he be pilot of a ship or commander of an army, who asks that the lives and fortunes of others should be committed to him when, in all he does, he has to depend upon other people's eyes. If, therefore, you approve, order the Veturian century of juniors to cast their vote again, and to remember, whilst they are choosing their consuls, the war in Italy and the critical position of the republic. Your ears can hardly yet have recovered from the uproar and confusion caused by the enemy a few months ago, when he brought the flames of war almost up to the very walls of Rome." The century replied with a general shout that they had not changed their minds, they should vote as before. Then Torquatus said, "I shall not be able to tolerate your manners and conduct, nor will you submit to my authority. Go back and vote again, and bear in mind that the Carthaginians are carrying war in Italy, and that their leader is Hannibal." Then the century, swayed by the speaker's personal authority and by the murmurs of admiration which they heard all around them, begged the consul to call up the Veturian century of seniors, as they wished to consult their elders and be guided by their advice in the choice of consuls. They were accordingly called up and an interval was allowed for the two bodies to consult privately in the ovile.<sup>15</sup> The seniors maintained that the choice really lay between three men, two of them already full of honours—Q. Fabius and M. Marcellus—and, if they particularly wished a new man to be appointed consul to act against the Carthaginians, M. Valerius

Laevinus, who had conducted operations against Philip both by sea and land with conspicuous success. So they discussed the claims of these three, and after the seniors had withdrawn the juniors proceeded to vote. They gave their vote in favour of M. Marcellus Claudius, resplendent with the glory of his conquest of Sicily, and, as the second consul, M. Valerius. Neither of them had put in a personal appearance. The other centuries all followed the leading century.

People nowadays may laugh at the admirers of antiquity. I for my part do not believe it possible, even if there ever existed a commonwealth of wise men such as philosophers dream of but have never really known, that there could be an aristocracy more grave or more temperate in their desire for power or a people with purer manners and a higher moral tone. That a century of juniors should have been anxious to consult their seniors as to whom they were to place in supreme authority is a thing hardly credible in these days, when we see in what contempt children hold the authority of their parents.

XXIII. Then followed the election of praetors. The successful candidates were P. Manlius Vulso, L. Manlius Acidinus, C. Laetorius and L. Cincius Alimentus. When the elections were over news came of the death of T. Otacilius in Sicily. He was the man whom the people would have given to T. Manlius as his colleague in the consulship, if the order of the proceedings had not been interrupted.

The Games of Apollo<sup>16</sup> had been exhibited the previous year, and when the question of their repetition the next year was moved by the praetor Calpurnius, the senate passed a decree that they should be observed for all time.

Some portents were observed this year and duly reported. The statue of victory which stood on the roof of the temple of Concord<sup>17</sup> was struck by lightning and thrown down on to the statues of Victory which stood above the façade in front of the pediment, and here it was caught and prevented from falling lower. At Anagnia and Fregellae the walls and gates were reported to have been struck. In the forum of Subertum streams of blood had flowed for a whole day. At Eretium there was a shower of stones and at Reate a mule had produced offspring. These portents were expiated by sacrifices of full-grown victims; a day was appointed for special intercessions and the people were ordered to join in solemn rites for nine days.

Some members of the national priesthood died this year, and

others were appointed in their stead. Manlius Aemilius Numida, one of the Keepers of the Sacred Books, was succeeded by M. Aemilius Lepidus. C. Livius was appointed pontiff in the room of M. Pomponius Matho, and M. Servilius, augur, in the place of Spurius Carvilius Maximus. The death of the pontiff T. Otacilius Crassus did not occur before the close of the year, so no one was appointed in his place. C. Claudius, one of the flamens of Jupiter, was guilty of irregularity in laying the selected parts of the victim on the altar and consequently resigned his office.

XXIV. *Treaty with the Aetolians.*—M. Valerius Laevinus had been holding private interviews with some of the leading Aetolians with the view of ascertaining their political leanings. It was arranged that a meeting of their national council should be convened to meet him, and thither he proceeded with some fast-sailing vessels.

He commenced his address to the assembly by alluding to the captures of Syracuse and Capua as instances of the success which had attended the arms of Rome in Sicily and Italy, and then proceeded: "It is the practice of the Romans, a practice handed down from their ancestors, to cultivate the friendship of other nations; some of them they have received into citizenship on the same footing as themselves; others they have allowed to remain under such favourable conditions that they preferred alliance to full citizenship. You, Aetolians, will be held in all the greater honour because you will have been the first of all the oversea nations to establish friendly relations with us. Philip and the Macedonians you find to be troublesome neighbours; I have already dealt a fatal blow to their ambitions and aggressiveness, and I shall reduce them to such a pass that they will not only evacuate those cities which they have wrested from you, but will have enough to do to defend Macedonia itself. The Acarnanians, too, whose secession from your league you feel so keenly, I shall bring back to the old terms by which your rights and suzerainty over them were guaranteed."

These assertions and promises of the Roman commander were supported by Scopas, the chief magistrate of Aetolia at the time, and by Dorimachus, a leading man amongst them, both of whom from their official position spoke with authority. They were less reserved, and adopted a more confident tone as they extolled the power and greatness of Rome. What



weighed most, however, with the Assembly was the hope of becoming masters of Acarnania.

The terms on which they were to become the friends and allies of Rome were reduced to writing and an additional clause was inserted that if it was their will and pleasure the Eleans and Lacedaemonians as well as Attalus, Pleuratus and Scerdilædus might be included in the treaty. Attalus was king of Pergamum in Asia Minor; Pleuratus, king of the Thracians; Scerdilædus, king of the Illyrians. The Aetolians were at once to commence war with Philip on land, and the Roman general would assist them with not less than twenty-five quinqueremes. The territories, buildings and walls of all the cities as far as Corcyra were to become the property of the Aetolians, all the other booty was to go to the Romans, who were also to be responsible for Acarnania passing under the dominion of the Aetolians. Should the Aetolians make peace with Philip, one of the conditions was to be that he would abstain from hostilities against Rome and her allies and dependencies. Similarly, if the Romans made a treaty with him it was to be a provision that he should not be allowed to make war upon the Aetolians and their allies.<sup>18</sup>

These were the agreed conditions, and after a lapse of two years, copies of the treaty were deposited by the Aetolians at Olympia, and by the Romans in the Capitol, in order that the sacred memorials round them might be a perpetual witness to their obligation. The reason for this delay was that the Aetolian envoys had been detained for a considerable time in Rome.

No time, however, was lost in commencing hostilities, and Laevinus attacked Zacynthus. This is a small island adjacent to Aetolia, and it contains one city of the same name as the island; this city, with the exception of its citadel, Laevinus captured. He also took two cities belonging to the Acarnanians—Oeniadae and Nasos—and handed them over to the Aetolians. After this he withdrew to Corcyra, feeling satisfied that Philip had enough on his hands with the war on his frontiers to prevent him from thinking about Italy and the Carthaginians and his compact with Hannibal.

XXV. *The War in Greece.*—Philip was wintering in Pella when the news of the defection of the Aetolians reached him. He had intended to march into Greece at the beginning of the spring, and with the view of keeping the Illyrians and the cities

adjacent to his western frontier quiet he made a sudden invasion into the territories of Oricum and Apollonia. The men of Apollonia came out to give battle, but he drove them back in great panic to their walls. After devastating the neighbouring district of Illyria, he turned swiftly into Pelagonia and captured Sintia, a city of the Dardani, which gave them easy access into Macedonia.

After these rapid incursions he turned his attention to the war which the Aetolians, in conjunction with the Romans, were commencing against him. Marching through Pelagonia, Lynceus and Bottiaea he descended into Thessaly, whose population he hoped to rouse to joint action with him against the Aetolians. Leaving Perseus with a force of 4000 men to hold the pass into Thessaly against them he returned to Macedonia, before engaging in the more serious contest, and from there marched into Thrace to attack the Maedi. This tribe were in the habit of making incursions into Macedonia whenever they found the king occupied with some distant war and his kingdom unprotected. To break their aggressiveness he devastated their country, and attacked Iamphoryna, their chief city and stronghold.

When Scopas heard that the king had gone into Thessaly, and was engaged in hostilities there, he called up all the fighting men of Aetolia and prepared to invade Acarnania. The Acarnanians were inferior to their enemy in strength; they were also aware that Oeniadae and Nasos were lost, and above all, that the arms of Rome were turned against them. Under these circumstances they entered upon the struggle more in a spirit of rage and despair than with prudence and method. Their wives and children and all men over sixty years of age were sent into the adjoining country of Epirus. All who were between fifteen and sixty bound themselves by oath not to return home unless they were victorious, and if any one left the field, defeated, no man should receive him into any city or house or admit him to his table or his hearth. They drew up a form of words, invoking a terrible curse upon any of their countrymen who should prove recreants, and a most solemn appeal to their hosts, the Epirotes, to respect their oath. They also begged them to bury those of their countrymen who fell in battle in one common grave and place over it this inscription: "Here lie the Acarnanians who met their death whilst fighting for their country against the violence and injustice of the Aetolians."

In this determined and desperate mood, they fixed their camp on the extreme limit of their borders and awaited the enemy. Messengers were despatched to Philip to announce their critical situation, and in spite of his recapture of Iamphoryna and other successes in Thrace he was compelled to abandon his northern campaign and go to their assistance.

Rumours of the oath which the Acarnanians had taken arrested the advance of the Aetolians; the news of Philip's approach compelled them to withdraw into the interior of their country. Philip had made a forced march to prevent the Acarnanians from being crushed, but he did not advance beyond Dium, and on learning that the Aetolians had retired he returned to Pella.

XXVI. At the beginning of spring Laevinus set sail from Corcyra and after rounding the promontory of Leucata reached Naupactus. He announced that he was going on to attack Anticyra, so that Scopas and the Aetolians might be ready for him there. Anticyra is situated in Locris, on the left hand as you enter the Corinthian Gulf, and is only a short distance either by sea or land from Naupactus. In three days the attack began in both directions; the naval attack was the heavier one because the ships were furnished with artillery and engines of every kind, and it was the Romans who were delivering the attack on this side. In a few days the place surrendered and was made over to the Aetolians; the booty in accordance with the treaty became the property of the Romans.

During the siege a despatch was handed to Laevinus informing him that he had been made consul, and that P. Sulpicius was coming to succeed him. Whilst he was there he was overtaken by a tedious illness, and consequently arrived in Rome much later than was expected.

*Events in Rome.*—M. Marcellus entered upon his consulship on March 15, and in order to comply with traditional usage summoned a meeting of the senate on the same day. The meeting was a purely formal one; he announced that in his colleague's absence he should not submit any proposals either in respect of the policy of the State or the assignment of provinces. "I am quite aware," he told the senators, "that there are a large body of Sicilians quartered in the country houses of my detractors round the City. I have no intention of preventing them from publishing here in Rome the charges which have been got up by my enemies; on the contrary, I was pre-

pared to give them an immediate opportunity of appearing before the senate had they not pretended to be afraid of speaking about a consul in his colleague's absence. When, however, my colleague has come I shall not allow any business to be discussed before the Sicilians have been brought into the senate house. M. Cornelius has issued what is practically a formal summons throughout the island in order that as many as possible might come to Rome to lay their complaints against me. He has filled the City with letters containing false information about a state of war existing in Sicily, solely that he may tarnish my reputation."

The consul's speech won for him the reputation of being a man of moderation and self-control. The senate adjourned, and it seemed as though there would be a total suspension of business pending the other consul's arrival.

As usual, idleness led to discontent and grumbling. The plebs were loud in their complaints about the way the war dragged on, the devastation of the land round the City wherever Hannibal and his army moved, the exhaustion of Italy by the constant levies, the almost annual destruction of their armies. And now the new consuls were both of them fond of war, far too enterprising and ambitious, quite capable, even in a time of peace and quiet, of getting up a war, and now that war was actually going on all the less likely to allow the citizens any respite or breathing space.

XXVII. All this talk was suddenly interrupted by a fire which broke out in the night in several places round the Forum on the eve of the Quinquatrus.<sup>10</sup> Seven shops which were afterwards replaced by five were burning at the same time, as well as the offices where the New Banks now stand. Soon after, private buildings—the Basilicae did not yet exist—the Lautumiae, the Fish Market and the Hall of Vesta were alight. It was with the utmost difficulty that the Temple of Vesta was saved, mainly through the exertions of thirteen slaves, who were afterwards manumitted at the public cost. The fire raged all through the next day and there was not the smallest doubt that it was the work of incendiaries, for fires started simultaneously in several different places. The senate accordingly authorised the consul to give public notice that whoever disclosed the names of those through whose agency the conflagration had been started should, if he were a freeman, receive a reward, if a slave, his liberty. Tempted by the offer of a reward,

a slave belonging to the Capuan family of the Calavii, called Manus, gave information to the effect that his masters, together with five young Capuan nobles, whose fathers had been beheaded by Q. Fulvius, had caused the fire and were prepared to commit every description of crime if they were not arrested. They and their slaves were at once apprehended. At first they endeavoured to throw suspicion upon the informer and his statement. It was asserted that after being beaten by his master, the day before he gave information, he had run away and had made out of an occurrence which was really accidental the foundation of a false charge. When, however, the accused and accuser were brought face to face and the slaves were examined under torture, they all confessed. The masters as well as the slaves who had been their accessories were all executed. The informer was rewarded with his liberty and 20,000 ases.

When Laevinus was passing Capua on his way to Rome he was surrounded by a crowd of the inhabitants who implored him with tears to allow them to go to Rome and try if they could not awaken the compassion of the senate and persuade them not to allow Q. Flaccus to ruin them utterly and efface their name. Flaccus declared that he had no personal feeling against the Capuans, it was as public enemies that he regarded them, and should continue to do so as long as he knew that they maintained their present attitude towards Rome. He had shut them up, he said, within their walls, because if they got out anywhere they would prowl about the country like wild beasts, and mangle and murder whatever came in their way. Some had deserted to Hannibal, others had gone off to burn down Rome. The consul would see in the half-burnt Forum the result of their crime. They had tried to destroy the temple of Vesta, with its perpetual fire, and the image which was concealed in the sacred shrine—that image which Fate had decreed to be the pledge and guarantee of Roman dominion. He considered that it would be anything but safe to give the Capuans a chance of entering the City.

After hearing this Laevinus made the Capuans take an oath to Flaccus that they would return within five days after receiving the reply of the senate. Then he ordered them to follow him to Rome. Surrounded by this crowd and by a number of Sicilians who had also met him, he entered the City. It seemed just as though he were bringing in a body of accusers against the

two commanders who had distinguished themselves by the destruction of two famous cities and who would now have to defend themselves against those they had vanquished.

XXVIII. The first questions, however, which the two consuls brought before the senate were those relating to foreign policy and the allocation of the various commands. Laevinus made his report on the situation in Macedonia and Greece, and the unrest amongst the Aetolians, the Acarnanians and the Locrians. He also gave details as to his own military and naval movements, and stated that he had driven Philip, who was meditating an attack on the Aetolians, back into the interior of his kingdom. The legion could now be safely withdrawn, as the fleet was sufficient to protect Italy from any attempt on the part of the king.

After this statement about himself and the province of which he had had charge, he and his colleague raised the question of the various commands. The senate made the following dispositions.

One consul was to operate in Italy against Hannibal; the other was to succeed T. Otacilius in command of the fleet and also to administer Sicily with L. Cincius as praetor. They were to take over the armies in Etruria and Gaul, each of which comprised two legions. The two City legions which the consul Sulpicius had commanded the previous year were sent to Gaul, and the consul who was to act in Italy was to appoint to the command in Gaul. C. Calpurnius had his office of propraetor extended for a year, and was sent into Etruria, Q. Fulvius also received a year's extension of his command at Capua. The composite force of citizens and allies was reduced, one strong legion being formed out of the two; this consisted of 5000 infantry and 300 cavalry, those who had served longest being sent home. The army of the allies was reduced to 7000 infantry and 300 cavalry, the same rule being observed as to the release of the veterans who had seen the longest service. In the case of the retiring consul, Cn. Fulvius, no change was made; he retained his army and his province, Apulia, for another year. His late colleague, P. Sulpicius, received orders to disband his entire army with the exception of the naval force. Similarly the army which M. Cornelius had commanded was to be sent home from Sicily. The men of Cannae, who practically represented two legions, were still to remain in the island, under the command of the praetor L. Cincius. L. Cornelius had commanded the same number of legions the previous year in

Sardinia, and these were now transferred to the praetor P. Manlius Vulso. The consuls received instructions to see that in raising the City legions, none were enrolled who had been in the army of M. Valerius, or in that of Q. Fulvius. So the total number of Roman legions in active service that year was not to exceed one-and-twenty.

XXIX. *The Case of the Sicilians.*—When the senate had finished making the appointments, the consuls were ordered to ballot for their commands. Sicily and the fleet fell to Marcellus, Italy and the campaign against Hannibal to Laevinus. This result utterly appalled the Sicilians, to whom it seemed as though all the horrors of the capture of Syracuse were to be repeated. They were standing in full view of the consuls, waiting anxiously for the result of the balloting, and when they saw how it was decided, they broke out into loud laments and cries of distress, which drew the eyes of all upon them for the moment, and became the subject of much comment afterwards. Clothing themselves in mourning garb they visited the houses of the senators and assured each of them in turn that if Marcellus went back to Sicily with the power and authority of a consul they would every one of them abandon his city and quit the island for ever. He had, they said, before shown himself vindictive and implacable towards them; what would he do now, furious as he was at the Sicilians who had come to Rome to complain of him? It would be better for the island to be buried beneath the fires of Aetna or plunged in the depths of the sea than to be given up to such an enemy to wreak his rage and vengeance on it.

These remonstrances of the Sicilians were made to individual nobles in their own homes, and gave rise to lively discussions, in which sympathy with the sufferers and hostile sentiments towards Marcellus were freely expressed. At last they reached the senate. The consuls were requested to consult that body as to the advisability of a rearrangement of the provinces. In addressing the House Marcellus said that had the Sicilians been already admitted to an audience he would have taken a different line, but as matters stood, he did not wish it to be open to any one to say that they were afraid to lay their complaints against the man in whose power they would shortly be placed. If, therefore, it made no difference to his colleague he was prepared to exchange provinces with him. He begged the senate not to make any order, for since it would have been

unfair to him for his colleague to have chosen his province without recourse to the ballot, how much more unfair and even humiliating to him would it be now to have the province which had fallen to him formally transferred to his colleague! After indicating their wish, without embodying it in a decree, the senate adjourned, and the consuls themselves arranged to exchange provinces.

Marcellus was being hurried on by his destiny to meet Hannibal, in order that, as he was the first Roman general to win the distinction of a successful action with him after so many disastrous ones, so he would be the last to contribute to the Carthaginian's reputation by his own fall, and that just at the time when the war was going most favourably for the Romans.

XXX. When the exchange of provinces had been decided, the Sicilians were introduced into the senate. After expatiating at some length upon the unbroken loyalty of Hiero to Rome, and claiming the credit of it for the people rather than for the king, they proceeded: "There were many reasons for the hatred we felt towards Hieronymus and afterwards towards Hippocrates and Epicydes, but the principal one was their abandoning Rome for Hannibal. It was this that led some of the foremost of our younger men to assassinate Hieronymus close to the senate-house, and also induced some seventy who belonged to our noblest houses to form a plot for the destruction of Epicydes and Hippocrates. As Marcellus failed to support them by bringing up his army to Syracuse at the time he promised, the plot was disclosed by an informer, and they were all put to death by the tyrants. Marcellus was really responsible for the tyranny, owing to his ruthless sacking of Leontium. From that time the Syracusan leaders never ceased to go over to Marcellus and undertake to deliver up the city to him whenever he wished. He would rather have taken it by storm, but when all his attempts by sea and land failed, and he saw that the thing was impossible, he chose as agents of the surrender an artisan called Sosis and the Spaniard Moericus, rather than let the leaders of the city, who had so often offered in vain to do so, undertake the task. No doubt he considered that he would thus have more justification for plundering and massacring the friends of Rome. Even if the revolt to Hannibal had been the act of senate and people and not simply of Hieronymus; if it had been the government of Syracuse who closed the gates against Marcellus, and not the tyrants Hippocrates



and Epicydes who had ousted the government; if we had warred against Rome in the spirit and temper of the Carthaginians, what greater severity could Marcellus have shown towards us than that which he actually practised, unless he had blotted Syracuse out from the face of the earth? At all events, nothing has been left to us beyond our walls and our houses stripped of everything, and the defaced and despoiled temples of our gods, from which even the gods themselves and their votive offerings have been carried off. Many have been deprived of their land, so that they have not even the bare soil on which to support themselves, and all who belong to them, with the remains of their wrecked fortunes. We beg and entreat you, senators, if you cannot order all that we have lost to be restored to us, at least to insist upon the restitution of what can be found and identified."

After they had stated their grievances, Lævinus ordered them to withdraw, that their position might be discussed. "Let them stop," exclaimed Marcellus, "that I may make my reply in their presence, since we who conduct war on your behalf, senators, must do so on condition of those whom we have vanquished coming forward as our accusers. Two cities have been taken this year: let Capua call Fabius to account, and Syracuse, Marcellus."

XXXI. When they had been brought back into the senate-house, Marcellus made the following speech: "I have not so far forgotten, senators, the majesty of Rome or the dignity of my office as to stoop to defend myself, as consul, against the charges of these Greeks, if they concerned me alone. The question is not so much what I have done as what they ought to have suffered. Had they not been enemies it is a matter of indifference whether I maltreated Syracuse now or in Hiero's lifetime. But if they have proved false to us, opened their gates to the enemy, threatened our envoys with drawn swords, shut their city and walls against us and called in a Carthaginian army to protect them against us, who is there who can feel any indignation at their having suffered hostile violence after having practised it? I declined the offers of their leaders to deliver up the city, and looked upon Sosis and the Spaniard Moericus as much more suitable persons to be trusted in a matter of such importance. As you make their humble station in life a reproach to others, you do not yourselves belong to the lowest class in Syracuse, and yet who amongst you promised to open

your gates and admit my armed force into your city? Those who did this are the objects of your hatred and execration; not even in this place do you shrink from insulting them, showing thereby how far you yourselves were from contemplating anything of the kind. That low social position, senators, which these men make a ground of reproach, proves most clearly that I discouraged no man who was willing to render effectual help to the commonwealth. Before commencing the siege of Syracuse, I made various attempts at a peaceful settlement, first by sending envoys and then by personal interviews with the leaders. It was only when I found that no reverence for the persons of my envoys protected them from violence and that I was unable to get any reply from the leaders with whom I conferred at their gates, that I took action and finally took the city by storm, after a vast expenditure of toil and exertion by sea and land.

“As to the incidents attending its capture, these men would be more justified in laying their complaints before Hannibal and his vanquished Carthaginians than before the senate of the people who vanquished them. If, senators, I had intended to conceal my spoliation of Syracuse I should never have adorned the City of Rome with its spoils. With regard to what I, as conqueror, took away or bestowed in individual cases, I am quite satisfied that I acted in accordance with the laws of war, according to the deserts of each individual. Whether you approve of my action or not is a question that concerns the State more than it concerns me. I only did my duty, but it will be a serious matter for the republic, if by rescinding my acts you make other generals in the future more remiss in doing their duty. And since you have heard what both the Sicilians and I have had to say in each other's presence, we will leave the House together in order that the senate may be able to discuss the matter more freely in my absence.”

The Sicilians were accordingly dismissed; Marcellus proceeded to the Capitol to enrol troops.

.XXXII. The other consul, Laevinus, then consulted the senate as to what reply was to be given to the petition of the Sicilians. There was a long debate and great divergence of opinion. Many of those present supported the view expressed by T. Manlius Torquatus. They were of opinion that hostilities ought to have been directed against the tyrants, who were the common enemies of Syracuse and of Rome. The city ought to

have been allowed to surrender, not taken by storm, and when surrendered it ought to have had its own laws and liberties guaranteed to it, instead of being ruined by war after it had been worn out by a deplorable servitude under its tyrants. The struggle between the tyrants and the Roman general in which Syracuse was the prize of victory had resulted in the utter destruction of a most famous and beautiful city, the granary and treasury of the Roman people. The commonwealth had frequently experienced its generosity, especially in the present Punic war, and the City had been embellished by its munificent gifts. If Hiero, that loyal supporter of the power of Rome, could rise from the dead, with what face would any one dare to show him either Rome or Syracuse? In the one—his own city—he would see universal spoliation and a large part of it burnt, and as he approached the other he would see just outside its walls, almost within its gates, the spoils of his country.

This was the line of argument urged by those who sought to create a feeling against the consul and evoke sympathy for the Sicilians. The majority, however, did not take such an unfavourable view of his conduct, and a decree was passed confirming the acts of Marcellus both during the war and after his victory, and declaring that the senate would for the future make the interests of the Syracusans their charge and would instruct Laevinus to safeguard the property of the citizens so far as he could without inflicting any loss on the State.

Two senators were sent to the Capitol to request the consul to come back, and after the Sicilians had again been brought in, the decree was read to them. Some kind words were addressed to the envoys and they were dismissed. Before they left the House they flung themselves on their knees before Marcellus and implored him to forgive them for what they had said in their anxiety to gain sympathy and relief in their distress. They also begged him to take them and their city under his protection, and look upon them as his clients. The consul promised that he would do so, and after a few gracious words dismissed them.

XXXIII. *The Fate of the People of Capua.*—The Capuans were then admitted to an audience. Their case was a harder one, and their appeal for mercy was all the stronger. They could not deny that they deserved punishment, and there were no tyrants on whom they could throw the blame, but they con-

sidered that they had paid an adequate penalty after so many of their senators had been carried off by poison, and so many had died under the axe. Some of their nobles, they said, were still living, who had not been driven by the consciousness of guilt into doing away with themselves, nor had the victor in his wrath condemned them to death. These men begged that they and their families might be set at liberty, and some portion of their goods restored to them. They were for the most part Roman citizens, connected with Roman families by inter-marriage.

After the envoys had withdrawn, there was some doubt as to whether they ought to summon Q. Fulvius from Capua—the consul Claudius had died soon after its capture—in order that the matter might be debated in the presence of the general whose proceedings were being called in question. This had just been done in the case of Marcellus and the Sicilians. When, however, some senators were seen sitting in the House who had been through the whole of the siege—M. Atilius Regulus and Caius the brother of Flaccus, both on his staff, and Q. Minucius and L. Veturius Philo, who had been members of Claudius' staff—they would not have Q. Fulvius recalled, nor the hearing of the Capuans adjourned. Amongst those who had been at Capua, the man whose opinion carried most weight was M. Atilius, and he was asked what course he would advise. He replied: "I believe I was present at the military council which met after the fall of Capua, when the consuls made enquiry as to which of the Capuans had assisted our republic. They discovered only two, and those were women. One was Vestia Oppia of Atella, who was living in Capua and who offered sacrifices daily for the welfare and triumph of Rome; the other was Cluvia Paucula, at one time a woman of loose character, who secretly supplied the starving prisoners with food. The rest of the Capuans were just as hostile to us as the Carthaginians themselves, and those whom Q. Fulvius executed were selected rather on account of their higher rank than of their greater guilt. I do not quite see how the senate is competent to deal with the Capuans, who are Roman citizens, without an order of the people. After the revolt of the Satricans, the course adopted by our ancestors was for a tribune of the plebs, M. Antistius, to bring the matter first before the Assembly, and a resolution was passed empowering the senate to decide what should be done to them. I therefore advise that we arrange

with the tribunes of the plebs for one or more of them to propose a resolution to that body empowering us to settle the fate of the Capuans."

L. Atilius, tribune of the plebs, was authorised by the senate to put the question in the following terms: "Whereas the inhabitants of Capua, Atella and Calatia, and also the dwellers in the valley of the Sabatus have yielded themselves to the proconsul Fulvius to be at the arbitrament and disposal of the people of Rome, and whereas they have surrendered divers persons together with themselves, as also their land and city with all things therein, sacred and profane, together with their goods and chattels and whatsoever else they had in possession, I demand of you Quirites to know what it is your will and pleasure shall be done in regard of all these persons and things?" The resolution of the Assembly ran thus: "What the senate, or the greater part of those who are present, shall, on oath, decree and determine, that we will and order shall be done."

XXXIV. The plebs having thus resolved, the senate made the following orders: First they restored their liberty and property to Oppia and Cluvia; if they wished to ask the senate for a further reward, they were to come to Rome. Separate decrees were made in the case of each of the Capuan families; it is not worth while giving a complete enumeration. Some were to have their property confiscated, they themselves with their wives and children were to be sold, with the exception of those of their daughters who had married outside the territory before they passed under the power of Rome. Others were to be thrown into chains, and their fate settled afterwards. In the case of the rest, the question whether their property should be confiscated or not depended upon the amount at which they were assessed. Where property was restored it was to include all the captured live stock except the horses, all the slaves except the adult males, and everything which was not attached to the soil.

It was further decreed that the populations of Capua, Atella, Calatia and the valley of the Sabatus should all retain their liberty, except those who themselves, or whose parents had been with the enemy, but none of them could become a Roman citizen or a member of the Latin League. None of those who had been in Capua during the siege could remain in the city or its neighbourhood beyond a certain date; a place of residence was assigned to them beyond the Tiber at some distance

from it. Those who had not been in Capua during the war, nor in any revolted Campanian city, were to be settled to the north of the Liris in the direction of Rome; those who had gone over to the side of Rome before Hannibal came to Capua were to be removed to this side of the Volturnus, and no one was to possess any land or building within fifteen miles of the sea. Those who had been deported beyond the Tiber were forbidden to acquire or to hold either for themselves or their posterity landed property anywhere except in the territories of Veii, Sutrium and Nepete, and in no case was such holding to exceed fifty jugera. The property of all the senators and of all who had held any magistracy in Capua, Atella and Calatia was ordered to be sold in Capua, and those persons whom it had been decided to sell into slavery were sent to Rome and sold there.<sup>20</sup> The disposal of the images and bronze statues which were alleged to have been taken from the enemy, and the question which of them were sacred and which profane, were referred to the Pontifical College.

After hearing these decrees, the Capuans were dismissed in a much more sorrowful state of mind than that in which they had come. It was no longer Q. Fulvius' cruelty to them, but the injustice of the gods and their accursed fate that they denounced.<sup>21</sup>

XXXV. *Difficulty of Manning the Fleet.*—After the departure of the Sicilian and Capuan envoys, the enrolment of the new legions was completed. Then came the question of providing the fleet with its proper complement of rowers. There was not a sufficient number of men available, nor was there any money at the time in the treasury with which to procure them or to pay them. In view of this state of things the consuls issued an order requiring private individuals to furnish seamen in proportion to their income and their rank, as they had done on a previous occasion, and also to supply them with thirty days' provision and pay. This order excited such a widespread feeling of indignation and resentment that if the people had had a leader they would have risen in insurrection. The consuls, they said, after ruining the Sicilians and Capuans, had seized upon the Roman plebs as their next victim to mangle and destroy. "After being drained by the war-tax," they complained, "for so many years, we have nothing left but the bare and wasted soil. Our houses have been burnt by the enemy, our slaves who tilled our fields have been

appropriated by the State, first buying them for a few coppers to make soldiers of them, and now requisitioning them for seamen. Whatever silver or gold we had has been taken to pay the rowers and furnish the annual war-tax. No resort to force, no exercise of authority can compel us to give what we do not possess. Let the consuls sell our goods, then let them glut their rage on our bodies which are all we have left; nothing remains with which we can even ransom ourselves."

Language of this kind was used not only in private conversation, but openly in the Forum, before the very eyes of the consuls. A vast crowd had gathered round the tribunal, uttering angry cries, and the consuls were powerless to allay the agitation either by fair speeches or by threats. Ultimately they announced that they would give them three days to think the matter over, and they themselves devoted that time to seeing whether they could not find some way out of the difficulty. The next day they called the senate together to consider the matter, and many arguments were advanced to prove that the plebs were acting fairly and reasonably in their protest. At last the discussion came round to this point, that whether fair or unfair the burden must fall on the individual citizens. From what source, it was asked, could they procure seamen and sailors, when there was no money in the treasury, and how could they keep their hold on Sicily, or render the shores of Italy safe against any attempt by Philip, if they had no fleet?

XXXVI. As there seemed to be no solution of the difficulty and a kind of mental torpor appeared to beset the senate, the consul Lacvinus came to the rescue. "As the magistrates," he said, "take precedence of the senate and the senate of the people in honour and dignity; so they ought to lead the way in discharging unpleasant and difficult tasks. If, in laying any obligation on an inferior, you have first decided that it is binding on you and those connected with you, you will find that all are more ready to obey you. They do not feel an expense to be burdensome when they see each of their leaders bearing more than his due share of it. We want the Roman people to have fleets and to equip them, we want each citizen to furnish rowers and not to shirk his duty; then let us impose the burden on ourselves first of all. Let us, every one of us, bring our gold and silver and bronze money, to-morrow, to the treasury, only reserving the rings for ourselves, our wives and our children, and the *bullae*<sup>28</sup> for our boys. Those who

have wives and daughters may keep an ounce of gold for each of them. With regard to silver, those who have occupied curule chairs should keep the plating on their horse-trappings and two pounds of silver that they may have a dish and salt-cellar for the gods.<sup>29</sup> All the other senators should keep only one pound of silver. In the case of bronze coin let us retain 5000 ases for each household. All the rest of our gold and silver and money let us place in the hands of the commissioners of the treasury. No formal resolution should be passed; our contributions must be strictly voluntary; and our mutual rivalry to assist the commonwealth may stir up the equestrian order to emulate us, and after them, the plebs. This is the only course which we consuls have been able to devise after our lengthy discussion, and we beg you to adopt it with the help of the gods. As long as the commonwealth is safe, each man's property is safe under its protection, but if you desert it, it will be in vain that you try to keep what you have."

These suggestions were so favourably received that the consuls were even thanked for them. No sooner did the senate adjourn, than they each brought their gold and silver and bronze to the treasury, and they were so eager to be among the first to have their names inscribed in the public register that the commissioners were not able to take over the amounts or the clerks to enter them fast enough. The equestrian order showed quite as much zeal as the senate, and the plebs were not behind the equestrian order.

In this way, without any formal order or compulsion by the magistrates, the full complement of rowers was made up, and the State put in a position to pay them. As the preparations for war were now complete the consuls started for their respective provinces.

*XXXVII. Survey of the Military Position.*—At no period of the war were the Carthaginians and the Romans alike subjected to greater vicissitudes of fortune, or to more rapid alternations of hope and fear. In the provinces, the disasters in Spain on the one hand and the successes in Sicily on the other filled the Romans with mingled feelings of sorrow and joy. In Italy the loss of Tarentum was felt to be a grievous blow, but the unexpected stand by the garrison in the citadel made all hearts glad, and the sudden panic at the prospect of Rome being besieged and stormed gave way to universal rejoicings when Capua was taken a few days later. In the



campaign overseas a kind of balance was struck. Philip began hostilities at an inopportune moment for Rome, but in the new alliance with the Actolians and Attalus, king of Pergamum, it seemed as though Fortune were giving a pledge of Rome's dominion in the East.

The Carthaginians, again, felt that the capture of Tarentum was a set-off against the loss of Capua, and though they prided themselves on having marched unopposed up to the walls of Rome they were mortified at the futility of their enterprise, and humiliated by the contempt shown for them when a Roman army marched out on its way to Spain whilst they were actually lying under the very walls. Even in Spain itself, where the destruction of two great generals with their armies had raised their hopes of finally expelling the Romans and finishing the war, the higher their hopes had been, the greater the disgust they felt at their victory being robbed of all its importance by L. Marcius, who was not even a regular general. So whilst Fortune was holding the scales evenly and everything was in suspense, both sides felt the same hopes and fears as though the war were only just beginning.

**XXXVIII. Salapia surrendered to the Romans.**—Hannibal's principal cause of anxiety was the effect produced by the fall of Capua. It was generally felt that the Romans had shown greater determination in attacking than he had in defending the place, and this alienated many of the Italian communities from him. He could not occupy them all with garrisons unless he was prepared to weaken his army by detaching numerous small units from it; a course at that time highly inexpedient. On the other hand he did not dare to withdraw any of his garrisons and so leave the loyalty of his allies to depend upon their hopes and fears.<sup>24</sup> His temperament, prone as it was to rapacity and cruelty, led him to plunder the places which he was unable to defend, in order that they might be left to the enemy waste and barren. This evil policy had evil results for him, for it aroused horror and loathing not only amongst the actual sufferers but amongst all who heard of them.

The Roman consul was not slow in sounding the feelings of those cities where any hope of recovering them had shown itself. Amongst these was the city of Salapia. Two of its most prominent citizens were Dasius and Blattius. Dasius was friendly to Hannibal; Blattius favoured the interests of Rome as far as he safely could, and had sent secret messages to

Marcellus holding out hopes that the city might be surrendered. But the thing could not be carried through without the help of Dasius. For a long time he hesitated, but at last he addressed himself to Dasius, not so much in the hope of success as because no better plan presented itself. Dasius was opposed to the project, and by way of injuring his political rival disclosed the affair to Hannibal. Hannibal summoned them both before his tribunal. When they appeared, he was occupied with business, intending to go into their case as soon as he was at liberty, and the two men, accuser and accused, stood waiting, apart from the crowd. Whilst thus waiting Blattius approached Dasius on the subject of the surrender. At this open and barefaced conduct, Dasius called out that the surrender of the city was being mooted under the very eyes of Hannibal. Hannibal and those round him felt that the very audacity of the thing made the charge improbable, and regarded it as due to spite and jealousy, since it was easy to invent such an accusation in the absence of witnesses. They were accordingly dismissed.

Blattius, however, did not desist from his venturesome project. He was perpetually urging the matter and showing what a beneficial thing it would be for them both and for their city. At last he succeeded in effecting the surrender of the city with its garrison of 5000 Numidians. But the surrender could only be effected with a heavy loss of life. The garrison were by far the finest cavalry in the Carthaginian army, and although they were taken by surprise and could make no use of their horses in the city, they seized their arms in the confusion and attempted to cut their way out. When they found escape impossible they fought to the last man. Not more than fifty fell into the hands of the enemy alive. The loss of this troop of horse was a heavier blow to Hannibal than the loss of Salapia; never from that time was the Carthaginian superior in cavalry, hitherto by far his most efficient arm.

XXXIX. *Naval Action off Tarentum.*—During this period the privations of the Roman garrison in the citadel of Tarentum had become almost insupportable; the men and their commandant M. Livius placed all their hopes in the arrival of supplies sent from Sicily. To secure a safe passage for these along the coast of Italy, a squadron of about twenty vessels was stationed at Regium. The fleet and the transports were under the command of D. Quinctius. He was a man of humble birth, but his many deeds of gallantry had gained him a high military

reputation. He had only five ships to begin with, the largest of these—two triremes—had been assigned to him by Marcellus; subsequently, owing to the effective use he made of these, three quinqueremes were added to his command, and at last, by compelling the allied cities, Regium, Vellicia and Paestum to furnish the ships which they were bound by treaty to supply, he made up the above-mentioned squadron of twenty vessels.

As this fleet was setting out from Regium, and was opposite Sapiportis, a place about fifteen miles from Tarentum, it fell in with a Tarentine fleet, also of twenty ships, under the command of Democrates. The Roman commander, not anticipating a fight, had all sail set; he had, however, got together his full complement of rowers while he was in the neighbourhood of Croton and Sybaris, and his fleet was excellently equipped and manned, considering the size of the vessels. It so happened that the wind completely died down just as the enemy came into sight, and there was ample time to lower the sails and get the rowers and soldiers into readiness for the approaching conflict. Seldom have two regular fleets gone into action with such determination as these small flotillas, for they were fighting for larger issues than their own success. The Tarentines hoped that as they had already recovered their city from the Romans after the lapse of nearly a century, so they might now rescue their citadel, by cutting off the enemy's supplies after they had deprived them of the mastery of the sea. The Romans were eager to show, by retaining their hold on the citadel, that Tarentum had not been lost in fair fight, but by a foul and treacherous stroke. So, when the signal was given on each side, they rowed with their prows straight at each other; there was no backing or manœuvring, nor did they let go of any ship when once they had grappled and boarded. They fought at such close quarters that they not only discharged missiles, but even used their swords in hand-to-hand fighting. The prows were locked together and remained so while the hinder part of the vessel was pushed about by the oars of hostile ships. The vessels were so crowded together that hardly any missile failed to reach its aim or fell into the water. They pressed forward front to front like a line of infantry, and the combatants made their way from ship to ship. Conspicuous amongst all was the fight between the two ships which had led their respective lines and were the first to engage.

Quinctius himself was in the Roman ship, and in the Taren-

tine vessel was a man named Nico Perco, who hated the Romans for private as well as public grounds, and who was equally hated by them, for he was one of the party who betrayed Tarentum to Hannibal. Whilst Quinctius was fighting and encouraging his men, Nico took him unawares and ran him through with his spear. He fell headlong over the prow, and the victorious Tarentine springing on to the ship dislodged the enemy, who were thrown into confusion by the loss of their leader. The foreship was now in the hands of the Tarentines, and the Romans in a compact body were with difficulty defending the hinder part of the vessel, when another of the hostile triremes suddenly appeared astern. Between the two the Roman ship was captured. The sight of the admiral's ship in the enemy's hands created a panic, and the remainder of the fleet fled in all directions; some were sunk, others were hurriedly rowed to land and were seized by the people of Thurium and Metapontum. Very few of the transports which were following with supplies fell into the enemy's hands; the rest, shifting their sails to meet the changing winds, were carried out to sea.

An affair took place at Tarentum during this time which led to a very different result. A foraging force of 4000 Tarentines were dispersed through the fields, and Livius, the Roman commandant, who was always looking out for a chance of striking a blow, sent C. Persius, an able and energetic officer, with 2500 men from the citadel to attack them. He fell upon them while they were dispersed in scattered groups all through the fields, and after inflicting great and widespread slaughter, drove the few who escaped in headlong flight through their half-opened gates into the town. So matters were equalised as far as Tarentum was concerned; the Romans were victorious by land, and the Tarentines by sea. Both were alike disappointed in their hopes of obtaining the corn which had been within their view.

*XL. Close of the War in Sicily.*—Laevinus' arrival in Sicily had been looked forward to by all the friendly cities, both those who had been old allies of Rome, and those who had recently joined her. His first and most important task was the settlement of the affairs of Syracuse, which, as peace had only quite recently been established, were still in confusion. When he had accomplished this task he marched to Agrigentum, where the embers of war were still smouldering, and a Carthaginian garrison still in occupation. Fortune favoured his enterprise. Hanno was in command, but the Carthaginians placed their

chief reliance on Muttines and his Numidians. He was scouring the island from end to end and carrying off plunder from the friends of Rome; neither force nor stratagem could keep him from entering Agrigentum and leaving it on his raids whenever he chose. His reputation as a dashing officer was beginning to eclipse that of the commandant himself, and at last created so much jealousy that even the successes he gained were unwelcome to Hanno, because of the man who gained them. It ended in his giving the command of the cavalry to his own son in the hope that by depriving Muttines of his post he would also destroy his influence with the Numidians. It had just the opposite effect, for the ill-feeling created only made Muttines more popular, and he showed his resentment at the injustice done to him by at once entering into secret negotiations with Laevinus for the surrender of the city. When his emissaries had come to an understanding with the consul and arranged the plan of operations, the Numidians seized the gate leading to the sea after driving off or massacring the men on guard, and admitted a Roman force which was in readiness into the city. As they were marching in serried ranks into the forum and the heart of the city, amidst great confusion, Hanno, thinking it was only a riotous disturbance caused by the Numidians, such as had often happened before, went to allay the tumult. When, however, he saw in the distance a larger body of troops than the Numidians amounted to, and when the well-known battle shout of the Romans reached his ears, he at once took to flight before a missile could reach him. Escaping with Epicyles through a gate on the other side of the city, and attended by a small escort, he reached the shore. Here they were fortunate enough to find a small ship, in which they sailed across to Africa, abandoning Sicily, for which they had fought through so many years, to their victorious enemy. The mixed population of Sicilians and Carthaginians whom they had left behind, made no attempt at resistance, but rushed away in wild flight, and, as the exits were all closed, they were slaughtered round the gates.

When he had gained possession of the place, Laevinus ordered the men who had been at the head of affairs in Agrigentum to be scourged and beheaded; the rest of the population he sold with the plunder, and sent all the money to Rome.

When the fate of the Agrigentines became generally known throughout Sicily, all the cities at once declared for Rome. In

a short time twenty towns were clandestinely surrendered and six taken by storm, and as many as forty voluntarily surrendered on terms. The consul meted out rewards and punishments to the chief men in these cities, according to each man's deserts, and now that the Sicilians had at last laid arms aside, he obliged them to turn their attention to agriculture. That fertile island was not only capable of supporting its own population, but had on many occasions relieved the scarcity in Rome, and the consul intended that it should do so again if necessary.

Agathyrna had become the seat of a motley population, numbering some 4000 men, made up of all sorts of characters—refugees, insolvent debtors—most of them had committed capital offences at the time when they were living in their own cities and under their own laws and afterwards when similarity of fortunes arising from various causes had drawn them together at Agathyrna. Laevinus did not think it safe to leave these men behind in the island, as a material for fresh disturbances, whilst things were settling down under the newly established peace. The Regians too would find a body so experienced in brigandage as they were, very useful; accordingly Laevinus transported them all to Italy.

As far as Sicily was concerned, the state of war was put an end to this year.

XLI. *P. Scipio's Spanish Campaign.*—At the commencement of spring P. Scipio issued orders for the allied contingents to muster at Tarraco. He then launched his ships and led the fleet and transports to the mouth of the Ebro, where he had also ordered the legions to concentrate from their winter quarters. He then left Tarraco, with an allied contingent of 5000 men for the army. On his arrival he felt that he ought to address some words of encouragement to his men, especially to the veterans who had gone through such terrible disasters. He accordingly ordered a parade and addressed the troops in the following words:

“No commander before my time, who was new to his troops, has been in a position to express well-deserved thanks to his men before he made use of their services. Fortune laid me under obligations to you before I saw my province or my camp, first because of the devoted affection you showed towards my father and my uncle during their lifetime and after their death, and then again, because of the courage with which you kept your hold on the province when it was apparently lost after their

terrible defeat, and so retained it unimpaired for Rome and for me their successor. It must be our aim and object now with the help of heaven not so much to maintain our own footing in Spain as to prevent the Carthaginians from maintaining theirs. We must not remain stationary here, defending the bank of the Ebro against the enemy's passage of the river; we must cross over ourselves and shift the seat of war. To some of you at least, I fear that this plan may seem too large and bold when you remember the defeats we have lately sustained, and when you think of my youth. No man is less likely to forget those fatal battles in Spain than I am, for my father and my uncle were killed within thirty days of each other, so that my family was visited by one death upon another.

"But though I am almost heart-broken at the orphanhood and desolation of our house, the good fortune and courage of our race forbid me to despair of the State. It has been our lot and destiny to conquer in all great wars only after we have been defeated. Not to mention the earlier wars—Porsena and the Gauls and the Samnites—I will take these two Punic wars. How many fleets and generals and armies were lost in the first war! And what about this war? In all our defeats I was either present in person, or where I was not, I felt them more keenly than any one. The Trebia, Lake Thrasymenus, Cannae—what are they but records of Roman consuls and their armies cut to pieces? Add to these the defection of Italy, of the greatest part of Sicily, of Sardinia, and then the crowning terror and panic—the Carthaginian camp pitched between the Anio and the walls of Rome, and the sight of the victorious Hannibal almost within our gates. In the midst of this utter collapse one thing stood unshaken and unimpaired, the courage of the Roman people; it and it alone raised up and sustained all that lay prostrate in the dust.

"You, my soldiers, under the conduct and auspices of my father were the first to retrieve the defeat of Cannae by barring the way to Hasdrubal when he was marching to the Alps and Italy. Had he joined forces with his brother the name of Rome would have perished; this success of yours held us up under those defeats. Now, by the goodness of heaven, everything is going in our favour; the situation in Italy and Sicily is becoming better and more hopeful day by day. In Sicily, Syracuse and Agrigentum have been captured, the enemy has been everywhere expelled and the whole of the island acknowledges

the sovereignty of Rome. In Italy, Arpi has been recovered and Capua taken, Hannibal in his hurried flight has traversed the whole breadth of Italy from Rome to the furthest corners of Bruttium, and his one prayer is that he may be allowed to make a safe retreat and get away from the land of his enemies. At a time when one defeat followed close on the heels of another, and heaven itself seemed to be fighting on Hannibal's side, you, my soldiers, together with my two parents—let me honour them both with the same appellation—upheld in this country the tottering fortunes of Rome. What then can be more foolish than for you to fail in courage now when all is going on prosperously and happily there? As to recent events, I could wish that they had caused as little pain to me as to you.

“The immortal gods<sup>25</sup> who watch over the fortunes of the dominions of Rome, and who moved the electors in their centuries to insist with one voice upon the supreme command being given to me—the gods, I say, are assuring us through augurics and auspices and even through visions of the night that all will go successfully and happily with us. My own heart too, hitherto my truest prophet, presages that Spain will be ours and that ere long all who bear the name of Carthage will be driven away from this soil and will cover sea and land in their shameful flight.

“What my breast thus divines is confirmed by solid reasoning from facts. Owing to the maltreatment they have received their allies are sending envoys to us to appeal for protection. Their three generals are at variance, almost in active opposition to each other, and after breaking up their army into three separate divisions have marched away into different parts of the country. The same misfortune has overtaken them which was so disastrous to us, they are being deserted by their allies as we were by the Celtiberians, and the army which proved so fatal to my father and my uncle they have split up into separate bodies. Their domestic quarrel will not let them act in unison, and now that they are divided they will not be able to withstand us. Welcome, soldiers, the omen of the name I bear, be loyal to a Scipio who is the offspring of your late commander, the scion of a stock which has been cut down. Come on then, my veterans, and lead a new army and a new commander across the Ebro into the lands which you have so often traversed and where you have given so many proofs of your prowess and your courage. You recognise a likeness to my father and my uncle



in figure, face, and expression, I will soon show you that I am like them also in character and fidelity and courage, so that each of you may say that the Scipio who was his old commander has either come to life again or reappeared in his son."

XLII. *The Capture of New Carthage*.—After kindling the spirits of his men by this speech, he crossed the Ebro with 25,000 infantry and 2500 cavalry, leaving M. Silanus in charge of the country north of the Ebro with 3000 infantry and 300 cavalry. As the Carthaginian armies had all taken different routes, some of his staff urged him to attack the one which was nearest, but he thought that if he did that there would be a danger of their all concentrating against him, and he would be no match for the three together. He decided to begin with an attack on New Carthage, a city not only rich in its own resources, but also with the enemy's war-stores, their arms, their war-chest and hostages drawn from every part of Spain. It possessed an additional advantage in its situation, as it afforded a convenient base for the invasion of Africa, and commanded a harbour capable of holding any fleet however large, and, as far as I know, the only one of the kind on that part of the coast which abuts on our sea. No one knew of his intended march except C. Laelius, who was sent round with his fleet and instructed to regulate the pace of his vessels so that he might enter the harbour at the same time that the army showed itself. Seven days after leaving the Ebro, the land and sea forces reached New Carthage simultaneously.<sup>20</sup> The Roman camp was fixed opposite the north side of the city, and to guard against attacks from the rear was strengthened by a double rampart; the front was protected by the nature of the ground.

The following is the situation of New Carthage. There is a bay about half-way down the coast of Spain, opening to the south-west and stretching inland about two-and-a-half miles. A small island at the mouth of the harbour forms a breakwater and shelters it from all winds, except those from the south-west. From the innermost part of the bay stretches a promontory on the slopes of which the city stands, surrounded on the east and south by the sea. On the west it is enclosed by a shallow sheet of water which extends northward and varies in depth with the rise and fall of the tide. A neck of land about a quarter of a mile in length connects the city with the mainland. The Roman commander did not throw an earthwork across this isthmus, though it would have cost him very little trouble to

do so; whether it was that he wished to impress the enemy with his confidence in his strength, or because he wished to have an unimpeded retirement in his frequent advances against the city.

XLIII. When the necessary intrenchments were completed he drew up the vessels in the harbour as though he were going to blockade the place by sea. Then he was rowed round the fleet and warned the captains to be careful in keeping a look-out by night, as an enemy when first besieged makes counter-attacks in all directions. On his return to camp he explained to his soldiers his plan of operations and his reasons for beginning the campaign with an attack upon a solitary city in preference to anything else. After they were mustered on parade he made the following speech to them: "Soldiers, if any one supposes that you have been brought here for the sole purpose of attacking this city, he is making more account of the work before you than of the advantage you will reap from it. You are going, it is true, to attack the walls of a single city, but in the capture of this one city you will have secured the whole of Spain. Here are the hostages taken from all the nobles and kings and tribes, and when once these are in your power, everything which the Carthaginians now hold will be given up to you. Here is the enemy's war-chest, without which they cannot keep up the war, seeing that they have to pay their mercenaries, and the money will be of the utmost service to us in gaining over the barbarians. Here are their artillery, their armoury, the whole of their engines of war, which will at once provide you with all you want, and leave the enemy destitute of all he needs. And what is more, we shall become masters, not only of a most wealthy and beautiful city, but also of a most commodious harbour, from which all that is requisite for the purposes of war, both by sea and land, will be supplied. Great as our gains will be, the deprivations which the enemy suffers will be still greater. Here is their stronghold, their granary, their treasure, their arsenal—everything is stored here. Here is their direct route from Africa. This is their only naval base between the Pyrenees and Gades; from this Africa threatens the whole of Spain.

"But I see that you are all perfectly ready; let us pass over to the assault on New Carthage, with our full strength and a courage that knows no fear."

The men all shouted with one voice, that they would carry

out his orders, and he marched them up to the city. Then he ordered a general attack to be made by the army and the fleet.

XLIV. When Mago, the Carthaginian commander, saw that an attack was being prepared both by land and sea, he made the following disposition of his forces. Two thousand townsmen were posted in the direction of the Roman camp; the citadel was occupied by 500 soldiers; 500 more were stationed in the higher part of the city, towards the east. The rest of the townsmen were ordered to be in readiness to meet any sudden emergency and to hasten in whatever direction the shouting of the enemy might summon them. Then the gate was thrown open and those who had been drawn up in the street leading to their enemy's camp were sent forward. The Romans, at the direction of their general, retired a short distance in order to be nearer to the supports which were to be sent up. At first the lines stood confronting each other in equal strength; but as the successive reinforcements came up they not only turned the enemy to flight, but pressed upon them so closely as they fled in disorder that if the "retire" had not sounded they would in all probability have burst into the city pell-mell with the fugitives. The confusion and terror of the battlefield spread right through the city; many of the pickets fled from their stations panic-struck; the defenders of the walls leaped down the shortest way they could and deserted the fortifications. Scipio had taken his stand on an eminence which they called Mercury's Hill, and from here he became aware that the walls were in many places without defenders. He at once called out the whole force in the camp to the attack, and ordered the scaling ladders to be brought up. Covered by the shields of three powerful young men—for missiles of every description were flying from the battlements—he went up close to the walls, encouraging his men, giving the necessary orders, and, what did most to stimulate their efforts, observing with his own eyes each man's courage or cowardice. So they rushed on, regardless of missiles and wounds, and neither the walls nor the men upon them could prevent them from striving who should be the first to mount.

At the same time the ships commenced an attack upon that part of the city which faced the sea. Here, however, there was too much noise and confusion to admit of a regular assault, for what with bringing up the vessels and hauling out the scaling ladders, and clambering ashore as quickly as they

could, the men only got in one another's way through their hurry and eagerness.

XLV. Whilst this was going on the Carthaginian general had manned the walls with his regular soldiers, and they were amply supplied with missiles, great heaps of which had been stored in readiness. But neither the men, nor their missiles, nor anything else proved such a sure defence as the walls themselves. Very few of the ladders were long enough to reach to the top of the wall, and the longer the ladders the weaker they were. The consequence was that whilst each man who reached the top was unable to get on to the wall, the others who came up behind him were unable to advance and the ladder was broken by the mere weight of men. Some who were on ladders which stood the strain grew dizzy from the height and fell to the ground. As men and ladders were crashing down in all directions and the spirits and courage of the enemy were rising with their success, the signal was sounded for retiring. This led the besieged to hope that they would not only gain a respite from their hard and wearisome struggle for the time being, but would also be safe for the future, as they believed that the city could not be taken by escalade and storm, whilst the construction of siege works would be a difficult matter and would allow time for succours to be sent.

The noise and tumult of this first attempt had hardly subsided when Scipio ordered fresh troops to take the ladders from those who were exhausted and wounded and make a more determined attack upon the city. He had ascertained from the fishermen of Tarraco, who were in the habit of crossing these waters in light skiffs and when these ran aground of wading ashore through the shallows, that it was easy at low water to approach the walls on foot. It was now reported to him that the tide was on the ebb; and he at once took about 500 men with him and marched down to the water. It was about mid-day, and not only was the falling tide drawing the water seaward, but a strong northerly wind which had sprung up was driving it in the same direction, and the lagoon had become so shallow that in some places it was waist-deep and in others only reached to the knee. This state of things, which Scipio had ascertained by careful investigation and reasoning, he ascribed to the direct intervention of the gods, who he said were turning the sea into a highway for the Romans, and by withdrawing its waters were opening up a path which had never before been

trodden by mortal feet. He bade his men follow the guidance of Neptune and make their way through the middle of the lagoon up to the walls.

XLVI. Those who were making the attack on the land side were in very great difficulties. Not only were they baffled by the height of the walls, but as they approached them they were open to showers of missiles on both hands, so that their sides were more exposed than their front. In the other direction, however, the 500 found their passage through the lake and their ascent from there to the foot of the walls an easy matter. No fortifications had been constructed on this side, as it was considered to be sufficiently protected by the lake and by the nature of the ground, nor were there any outposts or pickets on guard against any attack, as all were intent on rendering assistance where danger was actually visible.

They entered the city without meeting any opposition, and at once marched full speed to the gate round which all the fighting had gathered. All had their attention absorbed in the struggle; even the eyes and ears of the combatants, as of those who were watching and cheering them on, were so riveted on the fighting that not a single man was aware that the city behind him was captured until the missiles began to fall upon them from the rear. Now that they had the enemy in front and rear they gave up the defence, the walls were seized, the gate was battered from both sides, smashed to pieces, and carried out of the way to allow a free passage to the troops. A large number surmounted the walls and inflicted heavy slaughter on the townsmen, but those who entered through the gate marched in unbroken ranks through the heart of the city into the forum.

From this point Scipio saw the enemy retreating in two directions; one body was making for a hill to the east of the city, which was being held by a detachment of 500 men; the others were going to the citadel where Mago, together with the men who had been driven from the walls, had taken refuge. Sending a force to storm the hill, he led the rest of his troops against the citadel. The hill was taken at the first charge, and Mago, seeing that the whole of the city was in occupation of the enemy, and that his own position was hopeless, surrendered the citadel and its defenders. Until the citadel was surrendered the carnage went on everywhere throughout the city, no adult male who was met with was spared, but on its surrender the

signal was given and an end put to the slaughter. The victors then turned their attention to the plunder, of which there was a vast amount of every kind.

XLVII. As many as 10,000 freemen were made prisoners. Those who were citizens were set free and Scipio gave them back their city and all the property which the war had left them. There were some 2000 artisans; these Scipio allotted to the public service, and held out to them hopes of recovering their liberty if they did their best in the tasks which the war demanded. The rest of the able-bodied population and the sturdiest of the slaves he assigned to the fleet to make up the complement of rowers. He also augmented his fleet by five vessels which he had seized. Besides all this population there were the Spanish hostages; these he treated with as much consideration as though they had been children of the allies of Rome. An enormous amount of munitions of war was also secured; 120 catapults of the largest size and 281 smaller ones, 23 of the heavier ballistae and 52 lighter ones, together with an immense number of *scorpions* of various calibre, as well as missiles and other arms. 73 military standards were also captured. A vast quantity of gold and silver was brought to the general, including 287 golden bowls, almost all of which were at least a pound in weight, 18,300 pounds of silver plate and coinage, the former comprising a large number of vessels. This was all weighed and counted and then made over to the quaestor C. Flaminius, as were also 10,000 bushels of wheat and 270 pecks of barley. In the harbour 63 transports were captured, some of them with their cargoes of corn and arms, as well as bronze, iron, sails, esparto grass, and other articles required for the fleet. Amidst such an enormous supply of military and naval stores, the actual city itself was regarded as the least important capture of all.

XLVIII. Leaving C. Laelius with the marines in charge of the city, Scipio led his legions the same day back into camp. They were well-nigh worn out; they had fought in the open field, had undergone much toil and danger in the capture of the city, and after capturing it had sustained a conflict on unfavourable ground with those who had taken refuge in the citadel. So he gave them one day's respite from all military duties and ordered them to seek refreshment and rest.

The next day he issued orders for all the soldiers and marines to appear on parade that he might address them. First he

offered up a thanksgiving to the immortal gods because they had not only made him master in a single day of the wealthiest city in all Spain, but had also brought together beforehand into the place all the resources of Africa and Spain, so that whilst nothing was left to the enemy he and his men had a superabundance of everything. Then he praised the courage of his troops, whom, he said, nothing had daunted, neither the sortie of the enemy, nor the height of the walls, nor the untried depth of the lagoon, nor the fort on the hill, nor the unusual strength of the citadel. Nothing had prevented them from surmounting every obstacle and forcing their way everywhere. Though every man amongst them deserved all the rewards he could give, the glory of the mural crown belonged especially to him who was the first to scale the wall, and the man who considered that he deserved it should claim it.

Two men came forward, Q. Tiberilius, a centurion of the fourth legion, and Sextus Digitius, one of the marines. The contention between them was not so heated as the excitement with which each body advocated the claim of its own representative. C. Laelius, the commander of the fleet, supported the marine, M. Sempronius Tuditanus took the part of his legionaries. As the dispute was almost becoming a mutiny, Scipio announced that he would allow three arbitrators to be named who should investigate the case and take evidence and give their decision as to which had been the first to scale the wall and enter the town. C. Laelius and M. Sempronius were named by their respective parties, and Scipio added the name of P. Cornelius Caudinus, who belonged to neither party, and bade the three sit at once and try the case judicially. As they proceeded, the dispute became hotter than ever, for the two men whose dignity and authority had helped to restrain the excitement were now withdrawn to the tribunal.<sup>27</sup> At last Laelius left his colleagues and stepped down in front of the tribunal to Scipio and pointed out to him that the proceedings were being carried on in defiance of all order and self-restraint, and the men were almost coming to blows. And even if there were no resort to violence the precedent that was being set was none the less detestable, since men were trying to win the reward of valour by falsehood and perjury. On the one side were the soldiers of the legion, on the other those of the fleet, all alike ready to swear by all the gods to what they wanted rather than to what they knew to be true, and prepared to

involve in the guilt of perjury not themselves only, but the military standards, the eagles and their solemn oath of allegiance. Laelius added that he was making these representations to him at the wish of P. Cornelius and M. Sempronius. Scipio approved of the step Laelius had taken and summoned the troops to assembly. He then announced that he had definitely ascertained that Q. Tiberilius and Sextius Digitius had both surmounted the wall at the same moment, and he should honour their bravery by presenting them each with a mural crown. Then he bestowed rewards upon the rest according to each man's merit. C. Laelius, the commander of the fleet, was singled out for special distinction, and in the praises which he lavished upon him he placed him on an equality with himself, finally presenting him with a golden crown and thirty oxen.

XLIX. After this he ordered the hostages from the various Spanish states to be summoned into his presence.

It is difficult to give their number, for I find in one place 300 mentioned and in another 3724. There is a similar discrepancy amongst the authorities on other points. One author asserts that the Carthaginian garrison amounted to 10,000 men, another puts it at 7000, whilst a third estimates it as not more than 2000. In one place you will find that there were 10,000 prisoners, in another the number is said to have exceeded 25,000. If I followed the Greek author Silenus I should give the number of scorpions large and small as 60; according to Valerius Antias there were 6000 large ones and 13,000 small ones; so wildly do men invent. It is even a matter of dispute who were in command. Most authorities agree that Laelius was in command of the fleet, but there are some who say that it was M. Junius Silanus. Antias tells us that Arines was the Carthaginian commandant when the garrison surrendered, other writers say it was Mago. Nor are authors agreed as to the number of ships that were captured, or the weight of gold and silver, or the amount of money that was brought into the treasury. If we are to make a choice, the numbers midway between these extremes are probably nearest the truth.

When the hostages appeared Scipio began by reassuring them and dispelling their fears. They had, he told them, passed under the power of Rome, and the Romans preferred to hold men by the bonds of kindness rather than by those of fear. They would rather have foreign nations united to them on terms of alliance



and mutual good faith than kept down in hard and hopeless servitude. He then ascertained the names of the States from which they came and made an inventory of the number belonging to each State. Messengers were then despatched to their homes, bidding their friends to come and take charge of those who belonged to them—where envoys from any of these States happened to be present he restored their own relations to them on the spot; the care of the rest he entrusted to C. Flaminius the quaestor, with injunctions to show them all kindness and protection.

Whilst he was thus engaged a high-born lady, wife of Mandonius the brother of Indibilis, chief of the Hergetes, came forward from the crowd of hostages and flinging herself in tears at the general's feet implored him to impress more strongly on their guards the duty of treating the women with tenderness and consideration. Scipio assured her that nothing would be wanting in this respect. Then she continued: "We do not set great store on those things, for what is there that is not good enough for the condition that we are in? I am too old to fear the injury to which our sex is exposed, but it is for others that I am anxious as I look at these young girls." Round her stood the daughters of Indibilis and other maidens of equal rank in the flower of their youthful beauty, and they all looked up to her as a mother. Scipio replied: "For the sake of the discipline which I in common with all Romans uphold, I should take care that nothing which is anywhere held sacred be violated amongst us; your virtue and nobility of soul, which even in misfortune is not forgetful of matronly decorum, make me now still more careful in this matter." He then delivered them into the charge of a man of tried integrity, with strict injunctions to protect their innocence and modesty as carefully as though they were the wives and mothers of his own guests.

L. Soon afterwards an adult maiden who had been captured was brought to him by the soldiers, a girl of such exceptional beauty that she attracted the eyes of all whomever she moved. On enquiring as to her country and parentage, Scipio learnt, amongst other things, that she had been betrothed to a young Celtiberian noble named Aluccius. He at once sent for her parents and also for her betrothed, who, he learnt, was pining to death through love of her. On the arrival of the latter Scipio addressed him in more studied terms than a father would use. "A young man myself," he said, "I am addressing myself to

a young man, so we may lay aside all reserve. When your betrothed had been taken by my soldiers and brought to me, I was informed that she was very dear to you, and her beauty made me believe it. Were I allowed the pleasures suitable to my age, especially those of chaste and lawful love, instead of being preoccupied with affairs of state, I should wish that I might be forgiven for loving too ardently. Now I have the power to indulge another's love, namely yours. Your betrothed has received the same respectful treatment since she has been in my power that she would have met with from her own parents. She has been reserved for you, in order that she might be given to you as a gift inviolate and worthy of us both. In return for that boon I stipulate for this one reward—that you will be a friend to Rome. If you believe me to be an upright and honourable man such as the nations here found my father and uncle to be, you may rest assured that there are many in Rome like us, and you may be perfectly certain that nowhere in the world can any people be named whom you would less wish to have as a foe to you and yours, or whom you would more desire as a friend."

The young man was overcome with bashfulness and joy. He grasped Scipio's hand, and besought all the gods to recompense him, for it was quite impossible for him to make any return adequate to his own feelings, or the kindness Scipio had shown him.

Then the girl's parents and relatives were called. They had brought a large amount of gold for her ransom, and when she was freely given back to them, they begged Scipio to accept it as a gift from them; his doing so, they declared, would evoke as much gratitude as the restoration of the maiden unhurt. As they urged their request with great importunity, Scipio said that he would accept it, and ordered it to be laid at his feet. Calling Aluций, he said to him: "In addition to the dowry which you are to receive from your future father-in-law you will now receive this from me as a wedding present." He then told him to take up the gold and keep it. Delighted with the present and the honourable treatment he had received, the young man returned home, and filled the ears of his countrymen with justly-earned praises of Scipio. A young man had come among them, he declared, in all ways like the gods, winning his way everywhere by his generosity and goodness of heart as much as by the might of his arms. He began to enlist a body

of his retainers, and in a few days returned to Scipio with a picked force of 1400 mounted men.

LI. Scipio kept Laelius with him to advise as to the disposal of the prisoners, the hostages and the booty, and when all had been arranged, he assigned him one of the captured quinqueremes, and placing on board Mago and some fifteen senators who had been made prisoners with him, he sent Laelius to Rome to report his victory. He had himself decided to spend a few days in New Carthage, and he employed this time in exercising his military and naval forces. On the first day the legions, fully equipped, went through various evolutions over a space of four miles; the second day was employed in rubbing up and sharpening their weapons in front of their tents; the third day they engaged in regular battle practice with single-sticks and darts, the points of which were muffled with balls of cork or lead; the fourth day they rested, and on the fifth they were again exercised under arms. This alternation of exercise and rest was kept up as long as they remained in Carthage. The rowers and marines put out to sea when the weather was calm and tested the speed and handiness of their ships in a sham fight.

These manœuvres going on outside the city on land and sea sharpened the men both physically and mentally for war; the city itself resounded with the din of warlike constructions carried on by the artisans of every kind who were kept together in the Government workshops. The general devoted his attention equally to everything. At one time he was present with the fleet watching a naval encounter; at another he was exercising his legions; then he would be giving some hours to an inspection of the work which was going on in the shops and in the arsenal and dockyards, where the vast number of artisans were vying with each other as to who could work the hardest.

After starting these various undertakings and seeing that the damaged portions of the walls were repaired, he started for Tarraco, leaving a detachment in the city for its protection. On his way he was met by numerous delegations; some of them he dismissed, after giving his reply while still on the march; others he put off till he reached Tarraco, where he had given notice to all the allies, old and new, to meet him. Almost all the tribes south of the Ebro obeyed the summons, as did many also from the northern province.

The Carthaginian generals did their best to suppress any

rumours of the fall of New Carthage, then when the facts came out too clearly to be either suppressed or perverted, they tried to minimise its importance. It was by a sudden ruse, almost by stealth, they said, that one city out of the whole of Spain had been filched from them in a single day; a young swaggerer elated with this trifling success had in the intoxication of his delight made believe that it was a great victory. But when he learnt that three generals and three victorious armies were bearing down upon him he would be painfully reminded of the deaths which had already visited his family.

This was what they told people generally, but they themselves were perfectly aware how much their strength was in every way weakened by the loss of New Carthage.<sup>28</sup>

## BOOK XXVII

### SCIPIO IN SPAIN

I. *The Campaign in Italy. Defeat and Death of Cn. Fulvius.*—Such was the position of affairs in Spain.

In Italy the consul Marcellus recovered Salapia, which was betrayed to him, and gained forcible possession of two places belonging to the Samnites—Marmoreae and Heles. 3000 of Hannibal's troops who had been left to garrison these towns were destroyed. The plunder, of which there was a considerable quantity, was given to the soldiers; 60,000 bushels of wheat and 28,000 of barley were also found there.

The satisfaction derived from this success was, however, more than counterbalanced by a defeat which was sustained a few days later not far from Herdonea. This city had revolted from Rome after the disaster of Cannae, and Cn. Fulvius, the proconsul, was encamped before it in the hope of recovering it. He had chosen a position for his camp which was not sufficiently protected, and the camp itself was not in a proper state of defence. Naturally a careless general, he was still less cautious now that he had reason to hope that the inhabitants were weakening in their allegiance to the Carthaginians, since the news had reached them of Hannibal's withdrawal into Bruttium after losing Salapia. This was all duly reported to Hannibal by emissaries from Herdonea, and the intelligence made him anxious to save a friendly city and at the same time hopeful of catching his enemy when off his guard. In order to forestall any rumours of his approach he proceeded to Herdonea by forced marches, and as he approached the place he formed his men in battle order with the view of intimidating the enemy. The Roman commander—his equal in courage, but far inferior to him in tactical skill and in numbers—hastily formed his line and engaged. The action was begun most vigorously by the fifth legion and the allies on the left wing. Hannibal, however, had instructed his cavalry to wait until the attention of the infantry was completely taken up with the battle and then to

ride round the lines; one division to attack the Roman camp, the other the rear of the Roman line. He told his staff that he had defeated a Cn. Fulvius, a praetor, on the same ground two years before, and as the names were the same, so the result of the fight would be the same.

His anticipations were realised, for after the lines had closed and many of the Romans had fallen in the hand-to-hand fighting, though the ranks still held their ground with the standards, the tumultuous cavalry charge in the rear threw into disorder first the sixth legion stationed in the second line, and then, as the Numidians pressed on, the fifth legion and finally the front ranks with their standards. Some were scattered in flight, others were cut down between the two bodies of assailants. It was here that Cn. Fulvius fell together with eleven military tribunes. As to the number of those killed, who could definitely state it, when I find in one author the number given as 13,000, in another not more than 7000?

The victor took possession of the camp and its spoil. As he learnt that Herdonea was prepared to go over to the Romans and would not remain faithful after his withdrawal, he transported the whole population to Metapontum and Thurii and burnt the place. Its leading citizens who were discovered to have held secret conferences with Fulvius were put to death. Those Romans who escaped from the fatal field fled by various routes, almost wholly weaponless, to Marcellus in Samnium.

II. *Marcellus engages Hannibal.*—Marcellus was not particularly disturbed by this serious disaster. He sent a despatch to the senate informing them of the loss of the general and his army at Herdonea and adding that he himself was the same Marcellus who had beaten Hannibal when flushed with his victory at Cannae, that he intended to meet him and would soon put an end to any pleasure he might feel at his recent success. In Rome itself there was great mourning for what had happened and great apprehension as to what might happen in the future.

The consul marched out of Samnium and advanced as far as Numistro in Lucania. Here he encamped on level ground in full view of Hannibal, who was occupying a hill. To show the confidence he felt, he was the first to offer battle, and when Hannibal saw the standards emerging from the gates of the camp, he did not decline the challenge.

They formed their lines so that the Carthaginian rested his

right on the hill, while the Roman left was protected by the town. The troops who were first engaged were, on the Roman side, the first legion and the right wing of the allies; those under Hannibal comprised the Spanish infantry and the Balearic slingers. When the action had commenced the elephants were driven on to the field. The contest was prolonged from the third hour of the day until nightfall, and when the front lines were worn out, the third legion relieved the first and the left wing of the allies took the place of the right. Fresh troops also came into action on the other side, with the result that instead of a spiritless and exhausted struggle a fierce fight broke out anew between men who were fresh in mind and body. Night, however, separated the combatants whilst the victory was yet undecided.<sup>1</sup>

The following day the Romans remained under arms from sunrise till well on in the day, ready to renew the contest. But as no enemy showed himself, they began to gather the spoils of the field, and after collecting the bodies of the slain into one heap, they burnt them.

Hannibal broke up his camp quietly at night and withdrew into Apulia. When daylight revealed the enemies' flight, Marcellus made up his mind to follow in his track. He left the wounded with a small guard at Numistro under the charge of L. Furius Purpurio, one of his military tribunes, and came up with Hannibal at Venusia. Here for some days there were skirmishes between the outposts and slight actions in which both cavalry and infantry took part, but no regular battle. In nearly every case the Romans had the advantage. Both armies traversed Apulia without fighting any important action, Hannibal marching by night always on the look-out for a chance of surprise or ambush, Marcellus never moving but in daylight, and then only after careful reconnoitring.

III. At Capua, in the meantime, Flaccus was occupied with the sale of the property of the principal citizens and the farming of the revenues from that part of the territory which had become Roman domain-land; the impost being paid in corn.

As though there was never to be wanting some reason or other for treating the Capuans with severity, disclosures were made of a fresh crime which had been hatched in secret. Fulvius had moved his men out of the houses in Capua, partly through fear lest his army should be demoralised by the attractions of the city, as Hannibal's had been, and partly that there

might be houses to go with the land which was being let. The troops were ordered to construct military huts just outside the walls and gates. Most of these they made of wattle or planking; some used plaited osiers and covered them with straw, as though deliberately designing them to feed a conflagration. One hundred and seventy Capuans with the brothers Blossius at their head formed a plot to set fire to all these huts simultaneously in the night.

Some slaves belonging to the Blossian household betrayed the secret. On receiving the information the proconsul at once ordered the gates to be shut and the troops to arm. All those involved in the crime were arrested, examined under torture, found guilty, and summarily executed. The informers received their freedom and 10,000 ases each.

The people of Nuceria and Acerrae having complained that they had nowhere to live, as Acerrae was partly destroyed by fire and Nuceria completely demolished, Fulvius sent them to Rome to appear before the senate. Permission was given to the Acerrans to rebuild those houses which had been burnt, and as the people of Nuceria had expressed their desire to settle at Atella, the Atellans were ordered to remove to Calatia.

In spite of the many important incidents, some favourable, some unfavourable, which were occupying the public attention, the citadel of Tarentum was not lost sight of. M. Ogulnius and P. Aquilius were appointed commissioners for the purchase of corn in Etruria, and a force of 1000 men drawn from the home army, with an equal number from the allied contingents, conveyed it to Tarentum.

IV. *Affairs in Rome.*—The summer was now drawing to a close, and the date of the consular elections was near at hand. Marcellus wrote to say that it would be against the interests of the republic to lose touch with Hannibal, as he was being pressed steadily back, and avoided anything like a battle. The senate were reluctant to recall him just when he was most effectively employed; at the same time they were anxious lest there should be no consuls for the coming year. They decided that the best course would be to recall the consul Valerius from Sicily, though he was outside the borders of Italy. The senate instructed L. Manlius the City praetor to write to him to that effect, and at the same time to send on the despatch from M. Marcellus that he might understand the reason for the senate recalling him rather than his colleague from his province.



It was about this time that envoys from King Syphax came to Rome. They enumerated the successful battles which the king had fought against the Carthaginians, and declared that there was no people to whom he was a more uncompromising foe than the people of Carthage, and none towards whom he felt more friendly than the people of Rome. He had already sent envoys to the two Scipios in Spain, now he wished to ask for the friendship of Rome from the fountain-head.

The senate not only gave the envoys a gracious reply, but they in their turn sent envoys and presents to the king—the men selected for the mission being L. Genucius, P. Poetelius, and P. Popillius. The presents they took with them were a purple toga and a purple tunic, an ivory chair and a golden bowl weighing five pounds. After their visit to Syphax they were commissioned to visit other petty kings in Africa and carry as a present to each of them a toga praetexta and a golden bowl, three pounds in weight. M. Atilius and Manlius Acilius were also despatched to Alexandria, to Ptolemy and Cleopatra, to remind them of the alliance already existing,<sup>2</sup> and to renew the friendly relations with Rome. The presents they carried to the king were a purple toga and a purple tunic and an ivory chair; to the queen they gave an embroidered palla<sup>3</sup> and a purple cloak.

During the summer in which these incidents occurred numerous portents were reported from the neighbouring cities and country districts. A lamb is said to have been yeaned at Tusculum with its udder full of milk; the summit of the temple of Jupiter was struck by lightning and nearly the whole of the roof stripped off; the ground in front of the gate of Anagnia was similarly struck almost at the same time and continued burning for a day and a night without anything to feed the fire; at Anagnia Compitum the birds had deserted their nests in the grove of Diana; at Tarracina snakes of an extraordinary size leaped out of the sea like sporting fishes close to the harbour; at Tarquinii a pig had been farrowed with the face of a man; in the district of Capena four statues near the Grove of Feronia had sweated blood for a day and a night.

The pontiffs decreed that these portents should be expiated by the sacrifice of oxen; a day was appointed for solemn intercessions to be offered up at all the shrines in Rome, and on the following day similar intercessions were to be offered in Campania, at the grove of Feronia.

V. *The Consular Elections.*—On receiving his letter of recall the consul M. Valerius handed over the army and the administration of the province to the praetor Cincius, and gave instructions to M. Valerius Messala, the commander of the fleet, to sail with a part of his force to Africa and harry the coast and at the same time find out what he could about the plans and preparations of Carthage. Then he left with ten vessels for Rome, which he reached after a good voyage. Immediately on his arrival he summoned a meeting of the senate and laid before them a report of his administration.

For nearly sixty years, he said, Sicily had been the scene of war both by land and sea, and the Romans had suffered many serious defeats there. Now he had completely reduced the province, there was not a Carthaginian in the island, nor was there a single Sicilian amongst those who had been driven away who had not now returned. They had all been repatriated, and were settled in their own cities and ploughing their own fields. Once more the desolated land was under tillage, the land which enriched its cultivators with its produce and formed an unfailling bulwark against scarcity for Rome in times of war and peace, alike.

When the consul had addressed the senate, Mutines and others who had done good service to Rome were introduced, and the promises which the consul had made were redeemed by the bestowal of honours and rewards upon them. A resolution was carried in the Assembly, with the sanction of the senate, conferring the full Roman citizenship on Mutines.

M. Valerius, meanwhile, having reached the African shore with his fifty ships before daybreak, made a sudden descent on the territory of Utica. Extending his depredations far and wide he secured plunder of every kind including a large number of prisoners. With these spoils he returned to his ships and sailed back to Sicily, entering the port of Lilybaeum, within a fortnight of his departure. The prisoners were subjected to a close examination, and the following facts were elicited and duly forwarded to Laevinus that he might understand the position in Africa: 5000 Numidians were at Carthage with Gala's son, Masinissa, a young man of great energy and enterprise; other mercenary troops were being raised throughout Africa<sup>4</sup> to be sent over to Spain to reinforce Hasdrubal, so that he might have as large a force as possible with which to cross over into Italy and join his brother, Hannibal. The Carthaginians.

believed that in adopting this plan they were sure of victory. In addition to these preparations an immense fleet was being fitted out to recover Sicily, and it was expected to appear off the island in a short time.

The consul communicated this intelligence to the senate, and they were so impressed by its importance that they thought the consul ought not to wait for the elections, but return at once to his province after naming a Dictator to preside over the elections. Matters were delayed somewhat by the debate which followed. The consul said that when he reached Sicily he would nominate M. Valerius Messalla, who was at that time commanding the fleet, as Dictator; the senators on the other hand asserted that no one who was outside Roman soil, *i.e.*, who was beyond the frontiers of Italy, could be nominated Dictator: M. Lucretius, one of the tribunes of the plebs, took the sense of the House upon the question, and the senate made a decree, requiring the consul, previously to his departure from the City, to put the question to the people, whom they wished to have nominated Dictator, and then to nominate the man whom the people had chosen. If the consul declined to do this, then the praetor was to put the question, and if he refused, then the tribunes were to bring the matter before the people.

As the consul refused to submit to the people what was within his own rights, and had inhibited the praetor from doing so either, it fell to the tribunes to put the question, and the plebs resolved that Q. Fulvius, who was then at Capua, should be nominated. But the day before the Assembly met, the consul left secretly in the night for Sicily, and the senate, thus left in the lurch, ordered a despatch to be sent to Marcellus, urging him to come to the aid of the Commonwealth which his colleague had deserted, and nominate the man whom the people had resolved to have as Dictator. Q. Fulvius was accordingly nominated Dictator by the consul M. Claudius, and under the same resolution of the plebs P. Licinius Crassus, the Pontifex Maximus, was named by Q. Fulvius as his Master of the Horse.

VI. *The Elections.*—On the Dictator's arrival in Rome he sent C. Sempronius Blaesus, who had been his second in command in Capua, to the army in Etruria, to relieve C. Calpurnius, to whom he had sent written instructions to take over the command of his own army at Capua. He fixed the earliest possible date for the elections, but they could not be closed

owing to a difference between the tribunes and the Dictator. The junior century of the Galerian tribe had obtained the first place in the order of voting, and they had declared for Q. Fulvius and Q. Fabius. The other centuries, summoned in their order, would have gone the same way, had not two of the tribunes of the plebs—Caius Arrenius and his brother Lucius—intervened. They said that it was infringing the rights of his fellow-citizens for a magistrate to extend his period of office, and it was a still greater offence for the man who was conducting the elections to allow himself to be elected. If, therefore, the Dictator accepted votes for himself, they should place their veto on the proceedings, but if the names of any others than himself were put up, they would not stop the election. The Dictator defended the procedure by alleging the authority of the senate and a resolution of the Assembly as precedents. "When Cneius Servilius," he said, "was consul and the other consul had fallen in battle at Lake Thrasymenus, this question was referred by authority of the senate to the plebs, and they passed a resolution that as long as there was war in Italy the people had the right to reappoint as consuls, any who had been consuls, as often as they pleased. I have an old precedent for my action in this instance in the case of L. Postumius Megellus, who was elected consul together with C. Junius Bubulcus at the very election over which he was presiding as interrex, and a recent one in the case of Q. Fabius Maximus, who would certainly never have allowed himself to be re-elected if it had not been in the interest of the State."

A long discussion followed, and at last an agreement was come to between the Dictator and the tribunes that they would abide by the opinion of the senate. In view of the critical position of the State, the senate saw that the conduct of affairs ought to be in the hands of old and tried men of ability and experience in war, and that there ought to be no delay in the elections. The tribunes gave way and the elections were held. Q. Fabius Maximus was returned as consul for the fifth time, and Q. Fulvius Flaccus for the fourth time. The elections of praetors followed, the successful candidates being: L. Veturius Philo, T. Quinctius Crispinus, C. Hostilius Tubulus and C. Aurunculeius. As soon as the magistrates were appointed for the year, Q. Fulvius laid down his office.

At the close of this summer a Carthaginian fleet of forty vessels under the command of Hamilcar sailed across to Sardinia

and laid waste the territory of Olbia. On the appearance of the praetor P. Manlius Volso with his army, they sailed round to the other side of the island and devastated the district of Caralita, after which they returned to Africa with every description of plunder.

Several Roman priests died this year and others were appointed in their place. C. Servilius was made pontiff in place of T. Otacilius Crassus. Tiberius Sempronius Longus, son of Tiberius, was appointed augur in place of T. Otacilius Crassus. Tiberius Sempronius Longus, son of Tiberius, was similarly appointed one of the Keepers of the Sacred Books in place of Ti. Sempronius Longus, son of Tiberius.<sup>5</sup> The deaths took place also of M. Marcius, the Rex Sacrorum, and M. Aemilius Papus, the Curio Maximus; these vacancies were not filled up during the year.

The censors appointed this year were L. Veturius Philo and P. Licinius Crassus, the Pontifex Maximus. Licinius Crassus had not been either consul or praetor before he was made censor, he went straight from the aedileship to the censorship. These censors, however, did not revise the roll of senators, nor did they transact any public business whatever; the death of L. Veturius put an end to their censorship, for Licinius at once resigned office.

The curule aediles, L. Veturius and P. Licinius Varus, celebrated the Roman Games for one day. The plebeian aediles, Q. Cadius and L. Porcius Licinius, devoted the money derived from fines to the casting of bronze statues for the temple of Ceres; they also celebrated the Plebeian Games with great splendour, considering the resources available at the time.

VII. *Assignment of the Provinces and Armies.*—At the close of the year C. Laelius arrived in Rome, thirty-four days after leaving Tarraco. His entrance into the City with his train of prisoners was watched by a great crowd of spectators. The next day he appeared before the senate and reported that Carthage, the capital city of Spain, had been captured in a single day, whilst several revolted cities had been recovered and new ones received into alliance. The information gained from the prisoners tallied with that conveyed in the despatches of M. Valerius Messalla. What produced the greatest impression on the senate was the threatened march of Hasdrubal into Italy, which could hardly hold its ground against Hannibal and his arms. When Laelius was brought before the Assembly he

repeated the statements already made in the senate. A day of solemn thanksgiving for P. Scipio's victories was decreed, and C. Laelius was ordered to return as soon as possible to Spain with the ships he had brought over.

Following many authorities, I have referred the capture of New Carthage to this year, though I am quite aware that some writers place it in the following year. This, however, appears improbable, as Scipio could hardly have spent a whole year in Spain without doing anything.

The new consuls entered office on March 15th, and on the same day the senate assigned them their province. They were both to command in Italy; Tarentum was to be the objective for Fabius; Fulvius was to operate in Lucania and Bruttium. M. Claudius Marcellus had his command extended for a year. The praetors balloted for their provinces; C. Hostilius Tubulus obtained the City jurisdiction; L. Venturius Philo the alien jurisdiction together with Gaul; Capua fell to T. Quinctius Crispinus, and Sardinia to C. Aurunculeius.

The following was the distribution of the armies. The two legions which M. Valerius Laevinus had in Sicily were assigned to Fulvius, those which C. Calpurnius had commanded in Etruria were transferred to Q. Fabius; C. Calpurnius was to remain in Etruria and the City force was to form his command; T. Quinctius was to retain the army which Quintus Fulvius had had; C. Hostilius was to take over his province and army from the propraetor C. Laetorius who was at the time at Ariminum. The legions who had been serving with the consul were assigned to M. Marcellus. M. Valerius and L. Cincius had their term in Sicily extended, and the army of Cannae was placed under their command; they were required to bring it up to full strength out of any that remained of Cn. Fulvius' legions. These were hunted up and sent by the consuls into Sicily, where they were subjected to the same humiliating conditions as the defeated of Cannae and those belonging to Cn. Fulvius' army who had already been sent to Sicily as a punishment by the senate. The legions with which P. Manlius Vulso had held Sardinia were placed under C. Aurunculeius and remained in the island. P. Sulpicius retained his command for another year with instructions to employ the same legion and fleet against Macedonia which he had previously had. Orders were issued for thirty quinqueremes to be despatched from Sicily to the consul at Tarentum, the rest of the fleet

was to sail to Africa and ravage the coast, under the command of M. Valerius Laevinus, or if he did not go himself he was to send either L. Cincius or M. Valerius Messalla.

There were no changes in Spain except that Scipio and Silanus had their commands extended, not for a year but until such time as they should be recalled by the senate.

Such were the distribution of the provinces and the military commands for the year.

VIII. *Sacerdotal Appointments.*—While the public attention was fixed on more important matters an old controversy was revived on the occasion of the election of a Curio Maximus,<sup>6</sup> in place of M. Aemilius. There was one candidate, a plebeian, C. Mamilius Atellus, and the patricians contended that no votes ought to be counted for him, as none but a patrician had ever yet held that dignity. The tribunes, on being appealed to, referred the matter to the senate, the senate left it to the decision of the people. C. Mamilius Atellus was accordingly the first plebeian to be elected Curio Maximus. P. Licinius, the Pontifex Maximus, compelled C. Valerius Flaccus to be consecrated, against his will, a Flamen of Jupiter. C. Laetorius was appointed one of the Keepers of the Sacred Books in place of Q. Mucius Scaevola, deceased. Had not the bad repute into which Valerius had fallen given place to a good and honourable character, I should have preferred to keep silence as to the cause of his forcible consecration. It was in consequence of his careless and dissolute life as a young man, which had estranged his own brother Lucius and his other relations, that the Pontifex Maximus made him a Flamen. When his thoughts became wholly occupied with the performance of his sacred duties he threw off his former character so completely that amongst all the young men in Rome, none held a higher place in the esteem and approbation of the leading patricians, whether personal friends or strangers to him. Encouraged by this general feeling he gained sufficient self-confidence to revive a custom which, owing to the low character of former Flamens, had long fallen into disuse; he took his seat in the senate. As soon as he appeared L. Licinius the praetor had him removed. He claimed it as the ancient privilege of the priesthood and pleaded that it was conferred together with the toga praetexta and curule chair as belonging to the Flamen's office. The praetor refused to rest the question upon obsolete precedents drawn from the annalists and appealed

to recent usage. No Flamen of Jupiter, he argued, had exercised that right within the memory of their fathers or their grandfathers. The tribunes, when appealed to, gave it as their opinion that as it was through the supineness and negligence of individual Flamens that the practice had fallen into abeyance, the priesthood ought not to be deprived of its rights. They led the Flamens into the senate amid the warm approval of the House and without any opposition even from the praetor, though every one felt that Flaccus had gained his seat more through the purity and integrity of his life than through any right inherent in his office.

*Preparations in Rome and Sicily.*—Before the consuls left for their provinces they raised two legions in the City to supply the necessary drafts for the armies. The old City army was made over by the consul Fulvius to his brother Caius for service in Etruria, the legions which were in Etruria being sent to Rome. The consul Fabius ordered his son Quintus to take to M. Valerius, the proconsul in Sicily, the remains, so far as they had been got together, of the army of Fulvius. They amounted to 4344 men. He was at the same time to receive from the proconsul two legions and thirty quinqueremes. The withdrawal of these legions from the island did not weaken the occupying force in either numbers or efficiency, for besides the two old legions which had now been brought up to full strength, the proconsul had a large body of Numidian deserters, mounted and unmounted, and he also enlisted those Sicilians who had served with Epicycles and the Carthaginians, and were seasoned soldiers. By strengthening each of the Roman legions with these foreign auxiliaries he gave them the appearance of two complete armies. One of these he placed under L. Cincius, for the protection of that part of the island which had constituted the kingdom of Hiero; the other he retained under his own command for the defence of the rest of Sicily. He also broke up his fleet of seventy ships so as to make it available for the defence of the entire coast-line of the island. Escorted by Muttines' cavalry he made a tour of the island in order to inspect the land and note which parts were cultivated and which were uncultivated, and commend or rebuke the owners accordingly. Owing to his care and attention there was so large a yield of corn that he was able to send some to Rome, and also accumulate a store at Catina to furnish supplies for the army which was to pass the summer at Tarentum.



IX. *Disaffection amongst the Colonies.*—The deportation of the soldiers to Sicily, most of whom belonged to the Latin and the allied nationalities, very nearly caused a great rising; so often do small occasions involve serious consequences. Meetings were held amongst the Latins and the allied communities in which they complained loudly that for ten years they had been drained by levies and war-taxes; every year they fought only to sustain a great defeat, those who were not killed in battle were carried off by sickness. A fellow-citizen who was enlisted by the Romans was more lost to them than one who had been made prisoner by the Carthaginians, for the latter was sent back to his home without ransom, the former was sent out of Italy into what was really exile rather than military service. There the men who had fought at Cannae had been for eight years wearing out their lives, and there they would die before the enemy, who had never been stronger than he was to-day, quitted Italian soil. If the old soldiers were not to return, and fresh ones were always being enlisted, there would soon be nobody left. They would be compelled therefore, before they reached the last stage of depopulation and famine, to refuse to Rome what the necessities of their situation would very soon make it impossible to grant. If the Romans saw that this was the unanimous determination of their allies, they would assuredly begin to think about making peace with Carthage. Otherwise Italy would never be free from war as long as Hannibal was alive.

Such was the general tone of the meetings. There were at the time thirty colonies belonging to Rome. Twelve of these announced to the consuls through their representatives in Rome that they had no means from which to furnish either men or money. The colonies in question were Ardea, Nepete, Sutrium, Alba, Carscoli, Sora, Suessa, Corcei, Setia, Cales, Narnia and Interamna.

The consuls, startled by this unprecedented step, wanted to frighten them out of such a detestable course, and thought that they would succeed better by uncompromising sternness than by adopting gentle methods. "You colonists," they said, "have dared to address us, the consuls, in language which we cannot bring ourselves to repeat openly in the senate, for it is not simply a refusal of military obligations, but an open revolt against Rome. You must go back to your respective colonies at once, while your treason is still confined to words, and

consult your people. You are not Capuans or Tarentines, but Romans, from Rome you sprang, from Rome you have been planted in colonies on land taken from the enemy, in order that you may augment her dominion. Whatever duties children owe to their parents, you owe to Rome, if indeed you feel a spark of affection for her or cherish any memories of your mother country. So you must begin your deliberations afresh, for what you are now so recklessly contemplating means the betrayal of the sovereignty of Rome and the surrender of victory into the hands of Hannibal."

Such were the arguments which each of the consuls advanced at considerable length, but they produced no impression. The envoys said that there was no reply for them to take home, nor was there any other policy for their senate to consider since there was not a man left for conscription nor any money for his pay.

As the consuls saw that their determination was unshaken they brought the matter before the senate. Here such general consternation and alarm were felt that most of the senators declared that the empire was doomed, other colonies would take the same course, as would also the allies; all had agreed together to betray the City of Rome to Hannibal.

X. The consuls spoke in reassuring terms to the senate. They declared that the other colonies were as loyal and dutiful as ever, and even those colonies which had forgotten their duty would learn to respect the empire if representatives of the government were sent amongst them, with words of admonishment and rebuke, not of supplication or entreaty.

The senate left it to the consuls to take such action as they deemed best in the interests of the State. After sounding the temper of the other colonies, they summoned their delegates to Rome and questioned them as to whether they had soldiers in readiness in accordance with the terms of their constitution. M. Sextilius of Fregellae, acting as spokesman for the eighteen colonies, replied that the stipulated number of soldiers were ready for service; if more were needed they would furnish more, and do their utmost to carry out the wishes and commands of the Roman people. They had no insufficiency of resources, they had more than a sufficiency of loyalty and goodwill. The consuls told them in reply that they felt they could not praise their conduct as they deserved unless the senate as a body thanked them, and with this, bade them follow them into

the House. A resolution was adopted by the senate and read to them, couched in the most complimentary and laudatory terms possible. The consuls were then charged to introduce them to the Assembly and, among the other splendid services which they had rendered to them and their ancestors, to make special mention of this fresh obligation which they had conferred on the Republic.

Though so many generations have passed away, their names ought not to be passed over in silence nor their due meed of praise withheld. Signia, Norba, Saticula, Fregellae, Lucerium, Venusia, Brundisium, Hadria, Formae and Ariminum; on the Tyrrhenian Sea, Pontia, Paestum, Cosa; and the inland colonies, Beneventum, Aesernum, Spoletum, Placentia and Cremona—these were the colonies by whose aid and succour the dominion of Rome was upheld, it was these who were publicly thanked in the senate and before the Assembly. The senate forbade all mention of the other colonies who had proved false to the empire; the consuls were to ignore their representatives, neither retaining them nor dismissing them nor addressing them, but leaving them severely alone. This silent rebuke seemed most in accordance with the dignity of the Roman people.

The other preparations for war now occupied the attention of the consuls. It was decided that the "vicesimary gold" which was kept as a reserve for extreme emergencies in the secret treasury should now be brought out.<sup>7</sup> Four thousand pounds of gold were produced. Of this 550 pounds were given to each of the consuls and to the proconsuls M. Marcellus and P. Sulpicius. A similar amount was given to the praetor L. Veturius, who had drawn in the lottery the province of Gaul, and a special grant of 100 pounds was placed in the hands of the consul Fabius, to be carried into the citadel of Tarentum. The rest was made use of in purchasing, for cash at contract prices, clothing for the army in Spain, whose successful operations were enhancing their own and their general's reputation.

XI. It was further decided that before the consul left the City certain portents should be expiated. Various places had been struck by lightning: the statue of Jupiter on the Alban Mount and a tree near his temple, a grove at Ostia, the city wall and temple of Fortune at Capua and the wall and one of the gates at Sinuessa. Some people asserted that the water at Alba had run blood and that in the sanctuary of the temple

of Fors Fortuna in Rome a statuette in the diadem of the goddess had fallen of itself on to her hand. It was confidently believed that at Privernum an ox had spoken and that a vulture had flown down on to a booth in the crowded forum. At Sinuessa it was reported that a child was born of doubtful sex, these are commonly called androgyni—a word like many others borrowed from the Greek, a language which readily admits compound words—also that it had rained milk and that a boy had been born with an elephant's head. These portents were expiated by sacrifices of full-grown victims, and a day was appointed for special intercessions at all the shrines. It was further decreed that the praetor C. Hostilius should vow and celebrate the Games of Apollo in strict accordance with the practice of recent years.

During this interval the consul Q. Fulvius convened the Assembly for the election of censors. Two men were elected, neither of whom had attained the dignity of consul—M. Cornelius Cethegus and P. Sempronius Tuditanus. A measure was adopted by the plebs, with the sanction of the senate, authorising these censors to let the territory of Capua to individual occupiers. The revision of the senatorial roll was delayed through a difference between them as to who ought to be chosen as leader of the senate. The selection had fallen to Sempronius; Cornelius, however, insisted that they ought to follow the traditional usage in accordance with which the man who had been the first of all his surviving contemporaries to be appointed censor was always chosen as leader of the senate, and in this case it was T. Manlius Torquatus. Sempronius replied that the gods who had given him by lot the right of choosing had also given him the right to make a free choice; he should therefore act on his own discretion and choose Q. Fabius Maximus, the man whom he claimed as foremost of all the Romans, a claim he would make good before Hannibal himself. After a lengthy argument his colleague gave way and Sempronius selected Q. Fabius Maximus as leader of the senate. The revision of the roll was then proceeded with, eight names being struck off, amongst them that of M. Caecilius Metellus, the author of the infamous proposal to abandon Italy after Cannae. For the same reason some were struck out of the equestrian order, but there were very few on whom the taint of that disgrace rested. All those who had belonged to the cavalry of the legions of Cannae, which were in Italy at the time—and

there was a considerable number of them—were deprived of their regulation horses. This punishment was made still heavier by an extension of their compulsory service. The years they had served with the horses furnished by the State were not to count, they were to serve their ten years from that date with their own horses. A large number of men were discovered who ought to have served, and all those who had reached the age of seventeen at the commencement of the war and had not done any military service were degraded to the *aerarii*.

The censors next signed contracts for the rebuilding of the places round the Forum which had been destroyed by fire.<sup>8</sup> These comprised seven shops, the fish market and the Hall of Vesta.

XII. After despatching their business in Rome the consuls started for the war. Fulvius was the first to leave and went on in advance to Capua. After a few days Fabius followed, and in a personal interview with his colleague strongly urged him, as he had Marcellus by letter, to do his utmost to keep Hannibal on the defensive while he himself was attacking Tarentum. He pointed out that the enemy had now been driven back on all sides, and if he were deprived of that city there would be no position where he could make a stand, no sure place for retreat, there would be no longer anything to keep him in Italy. He also sent a message to the commandant of the garrison which Laevinus had stationed in Regium as a check against the Bruttii. This was a force of 8000 men, the majority drawn, as stated above, from Agathyrna in Sicily, and all accustomed to live by rapine; their numbers had been swelled by deserters from Bruttium, who were quite their equals in recklessness and love of desperate adventures. Fabius ordered the commandant to take this force into Bruttium and lay waste the country and then attack the city of Caulonia. They carried out their orders with alacrity and zest, and after plundering and scattering the peasants, they made a furious attack on the citadel.

*Marcellus engages Hannibal.*—The consul's letter and his own belief that no Roman general was so good a match for Hannibal as himself stirred Marcellus into action. As soon as there was plenty of forage in the fields he broke up his winter quarters and confronted Hannibal at Canusium. The Carthaginian was trying to induce the Canusians to revolt, but as soon as he heard of the approach of Marcellus, he moved away. As the country

was open, affording no cover for an ambuscade, he began to withdraw into a more wooded district. Marcellus followed at his heels, fixed his camp close to Hannibal's, and the moment he had completed his entrenchments he led his legions out to battle. Hannibal saw no necessity for risking a general engagement, and sent out detached troops of cavalry and bodies of slingers to skirmish. He was, however, drawn into the battle which he had tried to avoid, for after he had been marching all night, Marcellus caught him up in level and open country, and prevented him from fortifying his camp by attacking the entrenching parties on all sides. A pitched battle ensued in which the whole strength of both armies was engaged, and at the approach of nightfall they separated on equal terms. Both the camps, separated by only a small interval, were hastily fortified before dark.

As soon as it began to grow light on the morrow Marcellus marched his men on to the field and Hannibal accepted the challenge. He said much to encourage his men, bidding them remember Thrasymenus and Cannae, and tame the insolence of their foe, who was incessantly pressing them and following on their heels, preventing them from fortifying their camp, giving them no breathing space, no time to look round. Day after day two objects met their eyes at the same time, the rising sun and the Roman battle-line on the plain. If the enemy got away with heavy loss after one battle, he would conduct his operations more quietly and deliberately.

Animated by their general's words and exasperated at the defiant way in which the enemy challenged and provoked them, they began the battle with great spirit. After more than two hours' fighting the allied contingent on the Roman right, including the special levies, began to give way. As soon as Marcellus saw this he brought the 10th legion up to the front. They were slow in coming up, and as the others were becoming unsteady and falling back, the whole line was gradually thrown into disorder and ultimately routed. Their fears got the better of them and they took to flight. 2700 Romans and allies fell in the battle and during the pursuit; amongst them were four centurions and two military tribunes, M. Licinius and M. Helvius. Four standards were lost out of the wing which began the fight, and two from the legion which came up in support.

XIII. When they were once more in camp, Marcellus addressed such an impassioned and stinging remonstrance to

his men that they suffered more from the words of their angry general than in the adverse struggle which they had kept up the livelong day. "As matters are," he said, "I am devoutly thankful to heaven that the enemy did not actually attack the camp while you in your panic were dashing into the gates and over the rampart; you would most certainly have abandoned your camp in the same wild terror in which you deserted the field. What is the meaning of this panic, this terror? What has suddenly come to you that you should forget who you are and with whom you are fighting? These surely are precisely the same enemies as those whom you spent last summer in defeating and pursuing, whom you have been closely following up these last few days, whilst they fled before you night and day, whom you have worn out in skirmishes, whom as late as yesterday you prevented from either advancing or encamping. I pass over incidents for which you may possibly take credit to yourselves and will only mention one circumstance which ought to fill you with shame and remorse. Last night, as you know, you drew off from the field after holding your own against the enemy. How has the situation changed during the night or throughout the day? Have your forces been weakened or his strengthened? But really, I do not seem to myself to be speaking to my army or to Roman soldiers, it is only your bodies and weapons that are the same. Do you imagine if you had had the spirit of Romans that the enemy would have seen your backs or captured a single standard from either maniple or cohort? So far he has prided himself upon the Roman legions he has cut up, you have been the first to confer upon him to-day the glory of having put a Roman army to flight."

Then there arose a general cry of supplication; the men begged him to pardon them for that day's work, and to make use of his soldiers' courage whenever and wherever he would. "Very well, soldiers," he said, "I will make proof of it and lead you to battle to-morrow, so that you may win the pardon you crave as victors rather as vanquished." He ordered the cohorts who had lost their standards to be put on barley rations, and the centurions of the maniples whose standards were lost were ordered to stand away from their fellows without their military cloaks and girdles and with their swords drawn. All the troops, mounted and unmounted, were ordered to assemble under arms the following day. They were then dismissed and all acknowledged that they had been justly and deservedly

censured, and that in the whole army there was not one who had that day shown himself a man except their commander. They felt bound to make satisfaction to him either by their deaths or by a brilliant victory.

The next morning they appeared equipped and armed according to orders. The general expressed his approval and announced that those who had been the first to flee and the cohorts which had lost their standards would be placed in the forefront of the battle. He went on to say that all must fight and conquer, and that they must, one and all, do their utmost to prevent the rumour of yesterday's flight from reaching Rome before the news of that day's victory. They were then ordered to strengthen themselves with food, so that if the fight was prolonged they might hold out. After all had been said and done to raise their courage, they marched to battle.

XIV. When this was reported to Hannibal, he remarked, "Evidently we have to do with an enemy who cannot endure either good fortune or bad. If he is victorious he follows up the vanquished in fierce pursuit; if he is defeated he renews the struggle with his conquerors." Then he ordered the advance to be sounded, and led his men on to the field.

The fighting was much hotter than on the previous day; the Carthaginians did their utmost to maintain the prestige they had gained, the Romans were equally determined to wipe out the disgrace of their defeat. The contingents who had formed the Roman left and the cohorts who had lost their standards were fighting in the front line, and the twentieth legion was stationed on their right. L. Cornelius Lentulus and C. Claudius Nero commanded the wings; Marcellus remained in the centre to encourage his men and mark how they bore themselves in battle. Hannibal's front line consisted of his Spanish troops, the flower of his army. After a long and undecided struggle he ordered the elephants to be brought up into the fighting line, in the hope that they would create confusion and panic among the enemy. At first they threw the front ranks into disorder, trampling some underfoot and scattering those round in wild alarm. One flank was thus exposed, and the rout would have spread much farther had not C. Decimius Flavus, one of the military tribunes, snatched the standard of the foremost maniple of hastati and called on them to follow him. He took them to where the animals trotting close to one another were creating the greatest tumult, and told his men to hurl



their javelins at them. Owing to the short distance and the huge mark presented by the beasts, crowded as they were together, every missile went home. They were not all hit, but those in whose flanks the javelins were sticking turned the uninjured ones to flight, for these animals cannot be depended upon. Not only the men who first attacked them, but every soldier within reach hurled his javelin at them as they galloped back into the Carthaginian ranks, where they caused much more destruction than they had caused amongst the enemy. They dashed about much more recklessly and did far greater damage when driven by their fears, than when directed by their drivers. Where the line was broken by their charge, the Roman standards at once advanced, and the broken and demoralised enemy was put to rout without much fighting. Marcellus sent his cavalry after the fugitives, and the pursuit did not slacken till they had been driven in wild panic to their camp. To add to their confusion and terror two of the elephants had fallen and blocked up the camp gate, and the men had to scramble into their camp over fosse and rampart. It was here that they suffered the heaviest loss; 8000 men were killed and five elephants. The victory was anything but a bloodless one for the Romans; out of the two legions some 1700 men were killed and 1300 of the allied contingents, besides a very large number of wounded in both divisions.

The following night Hannibal shifted his camp. Marcellus, though anxious to follow him, was unable to do so owing to the enormous number of wounded. Reconnoitring parties who were sent out to watch his movements reported that he had taken the direction of Bruttium.<sup>9</sup>

XV. *Recapture of Tarentum.*—About this time the Hirpini, the Lucani and the Vulcientes surrendered to the consul Q. Fulvius, and delivered up the garrisons which Hannibal had placed in their cities. He accepted their submission graciously, and only reproached them for the mistake they had made in the past. This led the Bruttians to hope that similar indulgence might be shown to them, and they sent the two men who were of highest rank amongst them, Vivius and his brother Paccius, to ask for favourable terms of surrender.

The consul Q. Fabius carried by storm the town of Manduria, in the country of the Sallentines. 3000 prisoners were secured and a considerable amount of plunder. From there he marched to Tarentum, and fixed his camp at the very mouth of the

harbour. Some of the ships which Laevinus had had for the purpose of keeping the sea open for supplies he loaded with the engines and apparatus necessary for battering the walls; others he made use of for carrying artillery and stores and projectiles of every kind. Only the transports which were propelled by oars were there made use of, so that whilst some of the troops could bring up their engines and scaling ladders close to the walls, others could beat off the defenders from the walls by attacking them at a distance from the ships. These vessels were so fitted up that they could attack the city from the open sea without any interference from the enemy, as the Carthaginian fleet had sailed across to Corcyra to assist Philip in his campaign against the Aetolians.

The force besieging Caulo, hearing of Hannibal's approach and fearing a surprise, withdrew to a position on the hills which was safe from any immediate attack.

While Fabius was besieging Tarentum an incident, of slight importance in itself, helped him to achieve a great success. The Tarentines had been furnished by Hannibal with a garrison of Bruttian troops. One of their officers was deeply in love with a young woman who had a brother in Fabius' army. She had written to tell him of the intimacy that had sprung up between her and a stranger who was rich and held a high position amongst his countrymen. The brother was led to hope that through his sister's means her lover might be led on to any lengths, and he communicated his anticipations to the consul. The idea did not seem at all an unreasonable one, and he received instructions to cross the lines and enter Tarentum as a deserter. After being introduced to the officer by his sister and getting on friendly terms with him, he cautiously sounded his disposition without betraying his real object. When he had satisfied himself as to the weakness of his character he called in his sister's aid, and through her coaxing and blandishments the man was persuaded to betray the position which he was in charge of. When the time and method of carrying out the project were arranged, a soldier was despatched from the city at night to make his way through the outposts and report to the consul what had been done and what arrangements had been made.

At the first watch Fabius gave the signal for action to the troops in the citadel and those who were guarding the harbour, and then marched right round the harbour and took up his

position without being observed on the east side of the town. Then he ordered the trumpets to sound at the same moment from the citadel, the harbour and the ships which had been brought up from the open sea. The greatest shouting and uproar was designedly raised in just those parts where there was least danger of an attack. The consul meanwhile kept his men perfectly quiet. Democrates, who had formerly commanded the fleet, happened to be in charge of that part of the defences. Finding all quiet round him whilst elsewhere there was shouting and tumult as though the city had been taken, he feared to remain where he was in case the consul should storm the place and break in somewhere else. So he led his men up to the citadel from which the most alarming noise proceeded. From the time that had elapsed and the silence which followed the excited shouts and calls to arms, Fabius judged that the garrison had withdrawn from that part of the fortifications. He at once ordered the scaling ladders to be carried to that part of the walls where he understood from the traitor that the Bruttii were mounting guard. With their aid and connivance that section of the fortifications was carried, and the Romans made their way into the town after breaking down the nearest gate to allow the main body of their comrades to march in. Raising their battle shout they went on to the forum, which they reached about sunrise without meeting a single armed enemy. All the defenders who had been engaged at the citadel and the harbour now combined to attack them.

XVI. The fighting in the forum commenced with an impetuosity which was not sustained. The Tarentine was no match for the Roman either in courage or weapons or military training or bodily strength and vigour. They hurled their javelins, and that was all; almost before they came to close quarters they turned and fled through the streets, seeking shelter in their own homes and in their friends' houses. Two of their leaders, Nico and Democrates, fell fighting bravely; Philemenus, who had been the prime agent in delivering the city up to Hannibal, rode at full speed out of the battle, but though his riderless horse was recognised soon afterwards whilst straying about the city, his body was nowhere found. It was commonly believed that he had been pitched headlong from his horse down an unprotected well. Carthalo, the commandant of the garrison, had laid down his arms and was going to the consul to remind him of the old tie of hospitality between their fathers

when he was killed by a soldier who met him. Those found with arms and those who had none were massacred indiscriminately, Carthaginians and Tarentines met the same fate. Many even of the Bruttians were killed in different parts of the town, either by mistake or to satisfy an old-standing hate, or to suppress any rumour of its capture through treachery, by making it appear as though it had been taken by storm.

After the carnage followed the sack of the city. It is said that 30,000 slaves were captured together with an enormous quantity of silver plate and bullion, 83 pounds' weight of gold and a collection of statues and pictures almost equal to that which had adorned Syracuse. Fabius, however, showed a nobler spirit than Marcellus had exhibited in Sicily; he kept his hands off that kind of spoil. When his secretary asked him what he wished to have done with some colossal statues—they were deities, each represented in his appropriate dress and in a fighting attitude—he ordered them to be left to the Tarentines who had felt their wrath. The wall which separated the city from the citadel was completely demolished.

*Hannibal's Futile Attempt to entrap Fabius.*—Hannibal had in the meanwhile received the surrender of the force which was investing Caulo. As soon as he heard that Tarentum was being attacked he hurried to its relief, marching night and day. On receiving the news of its capture, he remarked, "The Romans too have their Hannibal, we have lost Tarentum by the same practices by which we gained it." To prevent his retirement from appearing like a flight he encamped at a distance of about five miles from the city, and after staying there for a few days he fell back on Metapontum. From this place he sent two of the townsmen with a letter to Fabius at Tarentum. It was written by the civic authorities, and stated that they were prepared to surrender Metapontum and its Carthaginian garrison if the consul would pledge his word that they should not suffer for their conduct in the past. Fabius believed the letter to be genuine and handed the bearers a reply addressed to their chiefs, fixing the date of his arrival at Metapontum. This was taken to Hannibal. Naturally delighted to find that even Fabius was not proof against his stratagems, he disposed his force in ambuscade not far from Metapontum.

Before leaving Tarentum Fabius consulted the sacred chickens, and on two occasions they gave an unfavourable omen. He also consulted the gods of sacrifice, and after they had inspected

the victim the augurs warned him to be on his guard against plots and ambushes on the part of the enemy. As he did not come at the appointed time, the Metapontines were again sent to him to hasten his movements, and were promptly arrested. Terrified at the prospect of examination under torture, they disclosed the plot.

XVII. *The Position in Spain.*—P. Scipio had spent the whole winter in winning over the various Spanish tribes, either by bribes or by restoring those of their countrymen who had been taken as hostages or prisoners. At the commencement of summer Edesco, a famous Spanish chieftain, came to visit him. His wife and children were in the hands of the Romans, but that was not the only reason why he came. He was influenced by the change which Fortune apparently was bringing about over the whole of Spain in favour of Rome as against Carthage. The same motive actuated Indibilis and Mandonius, who were beyond question the most powerful chiefs in Spain. They abandoned Hasdrubal, with the whole of their contingent, and withdrew to the hills above his camp and keeping along the ridge of mountains made their way safely to the Roman headquarters. When Hasdrubal saw that the enemy were receiving such accessions of strength whilst his own forces were shrinking in equal proportion, he realised that unless he made some bold move, the wastage would continue, so he made up his mind to seize the first opportunity of fighting. Scipio was still more anxious for a battle; his confidence had grown with success, and he was unwilling to wait till the hostile armies had formed a junction, preferring to engage each separately rather than all united. In case, however, he might have to fight with their combined armies, he had augmented his strength by a somewhat ingenious method. As the whole of the Spanish coast was now clear of the enemy's ships, he had no further use for his own fleet, and after beaching the vessels at Tarraco<sup>20</sup> he brought up the crews to reinforce his land army. Of arms and armament he had more than enough, what with those taken in the capture of New Carthage, and those which the large body of artisans had fabricated for him subsequently. Laelius, in whose absence he would not undertake anything of importance, had now returned from Rome, so in the early days of spring he left Tarraco with his composite army and marched straight for the enemy.

The country through which he passed was everywhere

peaceful; each tribe as he approached gave him a friendly reception and escorted him to their frontiers. On his route he was met by Indibilis and Mandonius. The former, speaking for himself and his companion, addressed Scipio in grave and dignified language, very unlike the rough and heedless speech of barbarians. Instead of claiming credit for having seized the first opportunity of going over to the side of Rome he rather pleaded that he had no alternative. He was quite aware, he said, that the name of deserter was an object of loathing to the old friends and of suspicion to the new ones, nor did he find fault with this way of looking at it as long as the twofold odium attached not merely to the name but to the motive. Then after dwelling on the services they had both rendered to the Carthaginian generals and the rapacity and insolence which the latter had exhibited and the innumerable wrongs inflicted on them and their fellow-countrymen, he continued: "Hitherto we have been associated with them so far as our bodily presence is concerned, but our hearts and minds have long been where we believe justice and right are cherished. Now we come as suppliants to the gods who cannot permit violence and injustice, and we implore you, Scipio, not to regard our change of sides, as either a crime or a merit; put us to the test from this day forward, and as you find us, so judge and appraise our conduct."

The Roman general replied that this was just what he intended to do; he should not regard as deserters men who did not consider an alliance binding where no law, human or divine, was respected. Thereupon their wives and children were brought out and restored to them amid tears of joy. For that day they were the guests of the Romans, on the morrow a definite treaty of alliance was concluded, and they were sent off to bring up their troops. On their return they shared the Roman camp and acted as guides until they reached the enemy.

XVIII. *The Battle of Baecula.*—The first army they came to was the one commanded by Hasdrubal, which was encamped near the city of Baecula. Cavalry outposts were stationed in front of the camp. The advance guard of the Roman column, with the velites and skirmishers, at once attacked these outposts without changing their order of march or stopping to entrench themselves, and the contempt they showed for their enemy showed clearly the difference in the temper of the two armies. The cavalry were driven in hasty flight back to their

camp, and the Roman standards were carried almost to the gates. That day's skirmish only served to whet the courage of the Romans, and, impatient for battle, they formed their camp.

In the night Hasdrubal withdrew his force to a hill, the summit of which formed a broad table-land. His rear was protected by a river, in front and on either side the hill sloped down precipitously, forming a kind of steep bank, which surrounded the whole position. Below there was another level stretch of ground which also fell away abruptly, and was equally difficult of ascent.

When, on the morrow, Hasdrubal saw the Roman battle-line standing in front of their camp, he sent his Numidian cavalry and the Balearic and African light infantry on to this lower ground. Scipio rode along the ranks and pointed to the enemy standing in full view, who, he said, having given up all hope of success on level ground were clinging to the hills, trusting to the strength of their position and not to their arms or their courage. But the walls of New Carthage were higher still, and yet Roman soldiers had surmounted them; neither hills, nor citadel, nor the sea itself had stayed the advance of their arms. What use would the heights which the enemy had seized be to them except to compel them to leap down cliffs and precipices in their flight? Even that way of escape he should close to them. He then told off two cohorts, one to hold the entrance of the valley through which the river ran, the other to block the road which led from the city along the slope of the hill into the country. The attack was commenced by the light-armed troops who had repulsed the outposts the day before, and who were led by Scipio in person. At first their only difficulty was the rough ground over which they were marching, but when they came within range of the infantry stationed on the lower plateau, all kinds of missiles were showered upon them, to which they replied with showers of stones, with which the ground was strewn, and which not only the soldiers but the camp followers who were with them flung at the enemy. Difficult as the climb was, and almost buried as they were beneath stones and javelins and darts, they went steadily on, thanks to their training in escalade and their grim determination. As soon as they reached level ground and could plant their feet firmly, their superior mode of fighting told. The light and active enemy, accustomed to fighting and skirmishing at a distance, when he could evade the missiles, was quite

incapable of holding his own in a hand-to-hand fight, and he was hurled back with heavy loss on to the main body posted on the higher ground. Scipio ordered the victors to make a frontal attack on the enemy's centre, while he divided the remainder of his force between himself and Laelius. Laelius was ordered to work round the right of the hill till he could find an easier ascent; he himself, making a short detour to the left, attacked the enemy's flank. Shouts were now resounding on all sides, and the enemy tried to wheel their wings round to face the new attack; the consequence was their lines got into confusion. At this moment Laelius came up and the enemy fell back to avoid being assailed from the rear; this led to their front being broken, and an opportunity was afforded for the Roman centre to gain the plateau, which they could not have reached over such difficult ground, had the leading ranks of the Carthaginians kept their formation and the elephants remained in the fighting line. The carnage was now spreading over the field, for Scipio, who had brought his left against the enemy's right, was cutting up his exposed flank. There was no longer even a chance of flight, for the roads in both directions were blocked by the Roman detachments. Hasdrubal and his principal officers had in their flight closed the gate of their camp, and to make matters still worse, the elephants were galloping wildly about, and were dreaded by the Carthaginians as much as by the Romans. The enemies' losses amounted to 8000 men.<sup>11</sup>

XIX. Hasdrubal had secured the war-chest before the battle, and after sending on the elephants in advance and collecting all the fugitives that he could, he directed his march along the Tagus towards the Pyrenees. Scipio took possession of the enemy's camp, and gave up all the plunder, with the exception of the prisoners, to his troops. On counting the prisoners he found that they amounted to 10,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry. The Spanish prisoners were all released and sent to their homes; the Africans were ordered to be sold by the quaestor. All the Spaniards, those who had previously surrendered and those who had been made prisoners the day before, now crowded round him, and with one accord saluted him as "King." He ordered silence to be proclaimed, and then told them that the title he valued most was the one his soldiers had given him, the title of "Imperator." "The name of king," he said, "so great elsewhere, is insupportable to Roman ears. If a kingly



mind is in your eyes the noblest thing in human nature, you may attribute it to me in thought, but you must avoid the use of the word." Even the barbarians appreciated the greatness of a man who stood so high that he could look down on a title the splendour of which dazzled other men's eyes.

Presents were then distributed amongst the Spanish princes and chieftains, and Scipio invited Indibilis to choose 300 horses out of the large number captured. Whilst the quaestor was putting up the Africans to sale, he found amongst them a remarkably handsome youth, and hearing that he was of royal blood, he sent him to Scipio. Scipio questioned him as to who he was, what country he belonged to, and why at his tender age he was in camp. He told him that he was a Numidian, and his people called him Massiva. Left an orphan by his father, he had been brought up by his maternal grandfather Gala, king of the Numidians. His uncle Masinissa had come with his cavalry to assist the Carthaginians, and he had accompanied him into Spain. Masinissa had always forbidden him to take part in the fighting because he was so young, but that day he had, unknown to his uncle, secured arms and a horse and gone into action, but his horse fell and threw him, and so he had been made prisoner.

Scipio ordered the Numidian to be kept under guard, and when he had transacted all the necessary business he left the tribunal and returned to his tent. Here he sent for his prisoner and asked him whether he would like to return to Masinissa. The boy replied amid tears of joy that he should only be too glad to do so. Scipio then presented him with a gold ring, a tunic with a wide purple border, a Spanish cloak with a gold clasp, and a beautifully caparisoned horse. He then ordered an escort of cavalry to accompany him as far as he wanted to go, and dismissed him.

XX. A council of war was then held. Some of those present urged the immediate pursuit of Hasdrubal, but Scipio thought it hazardous in case Mago and the other Hasdrubal should join forces with him. He contented himself with sending a division to occupy the passes of the Pyrenees, and spent the remainder of the summer in receiving the submission of the Spanish tribes.

A few days after the battle of Baecula, when Scipio had descended from the pass of Castulo on his return to Tarraco, the two Carthaginian generals, Hasdrubal Gisgo and Mago,

came from Further Spain to join forces with Hasdrubal. They were too late to prevent his defeat, but their arrival was very timely in enabling them to concert measures for the prosecution of the war. When they came to compare notes as to the feeling in the different provinces, Hasdrubal Gisco considered that as the distant coast of Spain between Gades and the ocean still knew nothing of the Romans, it was so far faithful to Carthage. The other Hasdrubal and Mago were agreed as to the influence which Scipio's generous treatment had had upon the feelings of all states and individuals alike, and they were convinced that the desertions could not be checked until all the Spanish soldiery had either been removed to the furthest corners of Spain or transported into Gaul. They decided therefore, without waiting for the sanction of the senate, that Hasdrubal must proceed to Italy, the focus of the war where the decisive conflict would be fought. In this way he would remove all the Spanish soldiers out of Spain far beyond the spell of Scipio's name.

His army, weakened as it was by desertions and by the losses in the recent disastrous battle, had to be brought up to its full strength. Mago was to hand over his own army to Hasdrubal Gisco, and cross over to the Balearic Isles with an ample supply of money to hire mercenaries among the islanders. Hasdrubal Gisco was to make his way into the interior of Lusitania and avoid any collision with the Romans. A force of 3000 horse, selected from all their cavalry, was to be made up for Masinissa, with which he was to traverse Western Spain, ready to assist the friendly tribes and carry devastation amongst the towns and territory of those who were hostile. After drawing up this plan of operations the three generals separated to carry out their several tasks.

This was the course of events during the year in Spain.

*The Elections for the Coming Year.*—Scipio's reputation was rising day by day in Rome. Fabius too, though he had taken Tarentum by treachery rather than by valour, added to his prestige by its capture. Fulvius' laurels were fading. Marcellus was even the object of general censure, owing to the defeat which he had suffered and still more because he had quartered his army in Venusia in the height of the summer whilst Hannibal was marching where he pleased in Italy. He had an enemy in the person of C. Publicius Bibulus, a tribune of the plebs. Immediately after Marcellus met with his defeat, this man blackened his character and stirred up a bitter feeling against

him by the harangues which he was constantly delivering to the plebs, and now he was actually working to get him deprived of his command. Claudius' friends obtained permission for him to leave his second in command at Venusia, and come home to clear himself of the charges brought against him, and they also prevented any attempt to deprive him of his command in his absence. It so happened that when Marcellus reached Rome to avert the threatened disgrace, Fulvius also arrived to conduct the elections.

XXI. The question of depriving Marcellus of his command was debated in the Circus Flaminius before an enormous gathering in which all orders of the State were represented. The tribune of the plebs launched his accusations, not only against Marcellus, but against the nobility as a whole. It was due to their crooked policy and lack of energy, he said, that Hannibal had for ten years been holding Italy as his province; he had, in fact, passed more of his life there than in Carthage. The Roman people were now reaping the fruits of the extension of Marcellus' command, his army after its double defeat was now passing the summer comfortably housed in Venusia.

Marcellus made such a crushing reply to the tribune's speech by simply recounting all that he had done that not only was the proposal to deprive him of his command rejected, but the next day all the centuries with absolute unanimity elected him consul. T. Quinctius Crispinus, who was praetor at the time, was assigned to him as his colleague.

The next day came the election of praetors. Those elected were P. Licinius Crassus Dives, the Pontifex Maximus, P. Licinius Varus, Sextus Julius Caesar and Q. Claudius.

In the middle of the elections considerable anxiety was created by the intelligence that Etruria had revolted. C. Calpurnius, who was acting in that province as propractor, had written to say that the movement was started at Arretium. Marcellus, the consul elect, was hastily despatched thither to ascertain the position of affairs, and if he thought it sufficiently serious to require the presence of his army he was to transfer his operations from Apulia to Etruria. The Etruscans were sufficiently intimidated by these measures to keep quiet.

Envoys came from Tarentum to ask for terms of peace under which they might retain their liberties and their laws. The senate directed them to come again as soon as Fabius arrived in Rome.

The Roman Games and the Plebeian Games were celebrated this year, each for one day. The curule aediles were L. Cornelius Caudinus and Servius Sulpicius Galba; the plebeian aediles, C. Servilius and Q. Caecilius Metellus. It was asserted that Servilius had no legal right to be either tribune of the plebs or aedile, because there was sufficient evidence that his father, who was supposed to have been killed by the Boii near Mutina ten years previously when acting as agrarian commissioner, was really alive and a prisoner in the hands of the enemy.

XXII. *Distribution of the Civil and Military Commands.*—It was now the eleventh year of the Punic War when M. Marcellus and T. Quinctius Crispinus entered upon their duties as consuls. Reckoning the consulship to which Marcellus had been elected, but in which, owing to some flaw in his election, he did not act, this was the fifth time he had held the office. Italy was assigned to both consuls as their province, and the two armies which the previous consuls had had, and a third which Marcellus had commanded and which was at the time in Venusia, were all placed at their disposal so that they could select which of the three they chose. The remaining one would then be given to the commander to whom Tarentum and the Salentini should be allotted. The other spheres were allocated as follows: P. Licinius Varus was placed in charge of the city jurisdiction, P. Licinius Crassus the Pontifex Maximus had the jurisdiction over aliens and also wherever the senate might determine. Sicily was allotted to Sextus Julius Caesar, Tarentum to Q. Claudius the Flamen. Q. Fulvius Flaccus had his command extended for a year and was to hold the district of Capua, which T. Quinctius had previously held as praetor, with one legion. C. Hostilius Tubulus also had his command extended, he was to succeed C. Calpurnius as propraetor with two legions in Etruria. A similar extension of command was granted to L. Veturius Philo, who was to remain in Gaul as propraetor with the two legions he had previously commanded. The same order was made in the case of C. Aurunculeius, who had administered Sardinia as praetor; the fifty ships which P. Scipio was to send from Spain were assigned to him for the protection of his province. P. Scipio and M. Silanus were confirmed in their commands for another year. Out of the ships which Scipio had brought with him from Italy or captured from the Carthaginians—eighty in all—he was instructed to send fifty to Sardinia, as there were rumours of extensive naval

preparations at Carthage. It was said that they were fitting out 200 ships to menace the whole of the Italian, Sicilian and Sardinian coasts. In Sicily it was arranged that the army of Cannae should be given to Sextus Caesar whilst M. Valerius Laevinus, whose command had also been extended, was to retain the fleet of seventy ships which was stationed off Sicily, and augment it with the thirty vessels which had lain at Tarentum during the past year. This fleet of one hundred ships he was to employ, if he thought good, in harrying the African seaboard. P. Sulpicius was to continue to hold Macedonia and Greece in check with the fleet which he had. There was no change in the case of the two legions which were quartered in the City. The consuls were commissioned to raise fresh troops where it was necessary, in order to bring up the legions to their proper strength.

Thus one-and-twenty legions were under arms to defend the Roman empire.

P. Licinius Varus, the City praetor, was charged with the task of refitting the thirty old warships which were laid up at Ostia, and manning with their full complement twenty new ones, so that he might have a fleet of fifty ships for the protection of that part of the coast which was nearest to Rome. C. Calpurnius received strict orders not to move his army from Arretium before the arrival of Tubulus who was to succeed him; Tubulus was also enjoined to be especially on his guard in case any revolutionary projects were formed.

XXIII. *Portents*.—The praetors left for their provinces, but the consuls were detained by religious matters; several portents had been announced, and the omens drawn from the sacrificial victims were mostly unfavourable. News came from Campania that two temples in Capua—those of Fortune and Mars—as well as several sepulchral monuments had been struck by lightning. To such an extent does a depraved superstition see the work of the gods in the most insignificant trifles, that it was seriously reported that rats had gnawed the gold in the temple of Jupiter in Cumae. At Casinum a swarm of bees had settled in the forum; at Ostia a gate and part of the wall had been struck by lightning; at Caere a vulture had flown into the temple of Jupiter, and at Vulsinii the waters of the lake had run with blood.

In consequence of these portents a day of special intercession was ordered. For several days full-grown victims had

been sacrificed without giving any propitious indications, and it was long before the "peace of the gods" could be secured. It was on the heads of the consuls that the direful mischance prognosticated by these portents fell, the State remained unharmed.

The Games of Apollo had been celebrated for the first time in the consulship of Q. Fulvius and Appius Claudius under the superintendence of the City praetor, P. Cornelius Sulla. Subsequently all the City praetors celebrated them in turn, but they used to vow them for one year only, and there was no fixed day for their celebration. This year a serious epidemic attacked both the City and the country districts, but it resulted more frequently in protracted than in fatal illness. In consequence of this epidemic special intercessions were appointed at all the chapels throughout the City, and P. Licinius Varus, the City praetor, was instructed to propose a measure to the people providing that the Games of Apollo should always be celebrated on the same day. He was the first to celebrate them under this rule, and the day fixed for their celebration was July 5th, which was henceforth observed as the day.<sup>12</sup>

XXIV. *Unrest in Etruria.*—Day by day the reports from Arretium became more serious and caused increasing anxiety to the senate. Written instructions were sent to C. Hostilius, bidding him lose no time in taking hostages from the townspeople, and C. Terentius Varro was sent with powers to receive them from him and conduct them to Rome. As soon as he arrived, Hostilius ordered one of his legions which was encamped before the city to enter it in military order, and he then disposed the men in suitable positions. This done, he summoned the senators into the forum and ordered them to give hostages for their good behaviour. They asked for forty-eight hours for consideration, but he insisted upon their producing the hostages at once, and threatened in case of refusal to seize all their children the next day. He then issued orders to the military tribunes and prefects of allies and centurions to keep a strict watch on the gates, and to allow no one to leave the city during the night. There was too much slackness and delay in carrying out these instructions; before the guards were posted at the gates seven of the principal senators with their children slipped out before it was dark. Early on the morrow, when the senators began to assemble in the forum, the absence of these men was discovered, and their property was sold.

The rest of the senators offered their own children to the number of one hundred and twenty; the offer was accepted, and they were entrusted to C. Terentius to be conveyed to Rome. The report he gave to the senate made matters look still more serious. It seemed as though a rising throughout Etruria was imminent. C. Terentius was accordingly ordered to proceed to Arretium with one of the two City legions and occupy the place in force, C. Hostilius with the rest of the army was to traverse the entire province and see that no opening was afforded for revolutionary disturbances. When C. Terentius and his legion reached Arretium, he demanded the keys of the gates. The magistrates replied that they could not find them, but he was convinced that they had been deliberately carried off and not lost through carelessness, so he had fresh locks fitted on all the gates, and took especial precautions to have everything under his own control. He earnestly impressed upon Hostilius the need of vigilance, and warned him that all hope of Etruria remaining quiet depended upon his taking such precautions as to make any movement of disaffection impossible.

XXV. *The Question of Tarentum.*—There was an animated debate in the senate as to the treatment to be meted out to the Tarentines. Fabius was present, and stood up for those whom he had subjugated; others took the opposite line, the majority regarded their guilt as equal to that of Capua and deserving equally severe punishment. At last a resolution was adopted embodying the proposal of Manlius Acilius, viz. that the town should be garrisoned and the entire population confined within their walls until Italy was in a less disturbed state, when the whole question could be reconsidered.

An equally warm discussion arose in connection with M. Livius who had commanded the force in the citadel. Some were for passing a formal vote of censure on him for having, through his negligence, allowed the place to be betrayed to the enemy. Others considered that he ought to be rewarded for having successfully defended the citadel for five years, and having done more than any one else to effect the recapture of Tarentum. A third party, taking a middle course, urged that it was for the censors, not the senate, to take cognisance of his action. This view was supported by Fabius, who remarked that he quite admitted what Livius' friends were constantly asserting in that House, that it was owing to his efforts that

Tarentum had been retaken, for there would have been no recapture had it not previously been lost.

One of the consuls, T. Quinctius Crispinus, left with reinforcements for the army in Lucania which Q. Fulvius Flaccus had commanded. Marcellus was detained by religious difficulties which one after another presented themselves. In the war with the Gauls he had vowed during the battle of Clastidium a temple to Honos and Virtus, but he was prevented from dedicating it by the pontiffs. They said that one shrine could not be lawfully dedicated to two deities, because in case it were struck by lightning, or some other portent occurred in it, there would be a difficulty about the expiation, since it could not be known which deity was to be propitiated; one victim could not be sacrificed to two deities except in the case of certain specified deities.<sup>13</sup> A second temple was hastily built to Virtus, but this was not dedicated by Marcellus. At last he started with reinforcements for the army which he had left the previous year at Venusia.

Seeing how Tarentum had enhanced Fabius' reputation, Crispinus determined to attempt the capture of Locri in Bruttium. He had sent to Sicily for all kinds of artillery and military engines, and had also collected a number of ships to attack that part of the city which faced the sea. As, however, Hannibal had brought up his army to Lacinium, he abandoned the siege, and hearing that his colleague had moved out by Venusia, he was anxious to join forces with him. With this view he marched back into Apulia, and the two consuls encamped within three miles of each other in a place between Venusia and Bantia. As all was now quiet at Locri Hannibal moved up into their neighbourhood. But the consuls were quite sanguine of success; they drew out their armies for battle almost every day, feeling perfectly certain that if the enemy would try his chance against two consular armies, the war would be brought to a close.

XXVI. *Death of Marcellus.*—Hannibal had already fought two battles with Marcellus during the past year, in one he had been victorious, the other he lost. After this experience he felt that if he had to meet him again there was as much ground for fear as for hope, and he was therefore far from feeling himself equal to the two consuls together. He decided to employ his old tactics and looked out for a position suitable for an ambuscade. Both sides, however, confined themselves to skirmishes,



with varying success, and the consuls thought that as the summer was being spun out in this way there was no reason why the siege of Locri should not be resumed. So they sent written instructions to L. Cincius to take his fleet from Sicily to Locri, and as the walls of that city were open to a land attack also, they ordered a portion of the army which was garrisoning Tarentum to be marched there. These plans were disclosed to Hannibal by some people from Thurium, and he sent a force to block the road from Tarentum. 3000 cavalry and 2000 infantry were concealed under a hill above Petelia. The Romans, marching on without reconnoitring, fell into the trap, and 2000 were killed and 1500 taken prisoners. The rest fled through the fields and woods back to Tarentum.

Between the Carthaginian camp and that of the Romans there was a wooded hill which neither side had taken possession of, for the Romans did not know what that side of it was like which fronted the enemy, and Hannibal regarded it as better adapted for an ambushade than for a camp. He accordingly sent a force of Numidians during the night to conceal themselves in the wood, and there they remained the following day without stirring from their position, so that neither they nor their arms were visible. It was being everywhere remarked in the Roman camp that the hill ought to be seized and strengthened with defences, for if Hannibal seized it they would have the enemy, so to speak, over their heads. The idea impressed Marcellus, and he said to his colleague: "Why do we not go with a few horsemen and examine the place? When we have seen it for ourselves we shall know better what to do." Crispinus assented, and they started with 220 mounted men, 40 of whom were from Fregellae, the rest were Etruscans. They were accompanied by two military tribunes, M. Marcellus, a son of the consul, and A. Manlius, and also by two prefects of allies, L. Arrenius and Manius Aulius.

Some writers assert that whilst Marcellus was sacrificing on that day, the liver of the first victim was found to have no head; in the second all the usual parts were present, but the head appeared abnormally large. The haruspex was seriously alarmed at finding after misshaped and stunted parts such an excess of growth.<sup>14</sup>

XXVII. Marcellus, however, was seized with such a keen desire of engaging Hannibal that he never thought that their respective camps were near enough to each other. As he was

crossing the rampart on his way to the hill he signalled to the soldiers to be at their posts, ready to get the baggage together and follow him in case he decided that the hill which he was going to reconnoitre was suitable for a camp. There was a narrow stretch of level ground in front of the camp, and from there a road led up to the hill which was open and visible from all sides. The Numidians posted a vidette to keep a look out, not in the least anticipating such a serious encounter as followed, but simply in the hope of intercepting any who had strayed too far from their camp after wood or fodder. This man gave the signal for them to rise from their concealment. Those who were in front of the Romans further up the hill did not show themselves until those who were to close the road behind them had worked round their rear. Then they sprang up on all sides, and with a loud shout charged down. Though the consuls were hemmed in, unable to force their way to the hill which was occupied, and with their retreat cut off by those in their rear, still the conflict might have kept up for a longer time if the Etruscans, who were the first to flee, had not created a panic among the rest. The Fregellans, however, though abandoned by the Etruscans, maintained the conflict as long as the consuls were unwounded and able to cheer them on and take their part in the fighting. But when both the consuls were wounded, when they saw Marcellus fall dying from his horse, run through with a lance, then the little band of survivors fled in company with Crispinus, who had been hit by two darts, and young Marcellus, who was himself wounded. Aulus Manlius was killed, and Manius Aulus; the other prefect of allies, Arrenius, was taken prisoner. Five of the consuls' lictors fell into the hands of the enemy, the rest were either killed or escaped with the consul. Forty-three of the cavalry fell either in the battle or the pursuit, eighteen were made prisoners.

There was great excitement in the camp, and they were hurriedly preparing to go to the consuls' assistance when they saw one consul and the son of the other coming back wounded with the scanty remnant who had survived the disastrous expedition.

The death of Marcellus was to be deplored for many reasons, especially because, with an imprudence not to be expected at his age—he was more than sixty—and altogether out of keeping with the caution of a veteran general, he had flung into headlong danger not only himself but his colleague as well, and almost the entire commonwealth.

I should make too long a digression about one solitary fact, if I were to go through all the accounts of the death of Marcellus. I will only cite one authority, Coelius. He gives three different versions of what happened, one handed down by tradition, another copied from the funeral oration delivered by his son who was on the spot, and a third which Coelius gives as the ascertained result of his own researches. Amidst the variations of the story, however, most authorities agree that he left the camp to reconnoitre the position, and all agree that he was ambushed.

XXVIII. *Hannibal, foiled at Salapia, relieves Locri.*—Hannibal felt convinced that the enemy would be thoroughly cowed by the death of one consul and the disablement of the other, and he determined not to lose the opportunity thus afforded him. He at once transferred his camp to the hill where the action had been fought, and here he interred the body of Marcellus, which had been found. Crispinus, unnerved by the death of his colleague and his own wound, left his position in the dead of night and fixed his camp on the first mountains he came to, in a lofty position protected on every side. And now the two commanders showed great wariness, the one trying to deceive his opponent, the other taking every precaution against him. When the body of Marcellus was discovered, Hannibal took possession of his rings. Fearing that the signet might be used for purposes of forgery, Crispinus sent couriers to all the cities round, warning them that his colleague was killed and his ring in the possession of the enemy, so that they were not to trust any missives sent in the name of Marcellus. Soon after the consul's messenger had arrived at Salapia, a despatch was received from Hannibal purporting to come from Marcellus, and stating that he would come to Salapia the night after they received the letter, and the soldiers of the garrison were to hold themselves in readiness in case their services should be required. The Salapians saw through the ruse, and supposed that he was seeking an opportunity for punishing them, not only for their desertion of the Carthaginian cause, but also for the slaughter of his cavalry.<sup>16</sup> They sent back the messenger, who was a Roman deserter, that he might not be cognisant of the measures which they decided to take, and then made their dispositions. The townsmen took their places on the walls and other commanding positions, the patrols and sentries for the night were strengthened and kept a most careful look out, and the pick of the

garrison were formed up near the gate to which the enemy were expected to come.

Hannibal approached the city about the fourth watch. The head of the column was formed of Roman deserters; they carried Roman weapons, their armour was Roman, and they were all speaking Latin. When they reached the gate, they called up the sentinels and told them to open the gate as the consul was there. The sentinels, pretending to be just wakened up, bustled about in hurry and confusion and began slowly and laboriously to open the gate. It was closed by a portcullis, and by means of levers and ropes they raised it just high enough for a man to pass upright under it. The passage was hardly sufficiently clear when the deserters rushed through the gate, each trying who should be first. About 600 were inside, when suddenly the rope which held it was let go, and the portcullis fell with a great crash. The Salapians attacked the deserters, who were marching carelessly along with their shields hung from their shoulders, as though friends; others on the gate tower and the walls kept off the enemy outside with stones and long poles and javelins.

So Hannibal, finding himself caught in his own trap, drew off and proceeded to raise the siege of Locri. Cincius was making a most determined attack upon the place with siege works and artillery of every kind which he had brought from Sicily, and Mago was beginning to despair of holding the place when his hopes were suddenly revived by the news of Marcellus' death. Then came a messenger with the tidings that Hannibal had sent his Numidian cavalry on in advance, and was following as rapidly as he could with his infantry. As soon as the signal was given from the look-out of the approach of the Numidians, Mago flung the city gate open and made a vigorous sortie. Owing to the suddenness of his attack which was quite unlooked for, rather than to his fighting strength, the battle was for some time an even one, but when the Numidians came up, such a panic seized the Romans that they abandoned the siege works and the engines with which they were battering the walls, and fled in disorder to the sea and to their ships.

Thus by the arrival of Hannibal, the siege of Locri was raised.

XXIX. *Crispinus' Report to the Senate.*—As soon as Crispinus found that Hannibal had withdrawn to Bruttium he ordered M. Marcellus to take the army which his late colleague had

commanded back to Venusia. Though hardly able to bear the motion of the litter owing to his serious wounds, he started with his legions for Capua. In a despatch which he sent to the senate, after alluding to his colleague's death and the critical condition he himself was in, he explained that he could not go to Rome for the elections because he did not think he could bear the fatigue of the journey, and also because he was anxious about Tarentum in case Hannibal should leave Bruttium and direct his armies against it. He also requested that some men of wisdom and experience might be sent to him, as it was necessary for him to confer with them as to the policy of the Republic. The reading of this despatch evoked a feeling of deep regret at the death of the one consul and serious apprehensions for the life of the other. In accordance with his wish they sent young Q. Fabius to the army at Venusia, and three representatives to the consul, viz. Sextus Julius Caesar, L. Licinius Pollio and L. Cincius Alimentus who had returned from Sicily a few days previously. Their instructions were to tell the consul that if he could not come to Rome to conduct the elections, he was to nominate a Dictator in Roman territory for the purpose. If the consul had gone to Tarentum, the praetor Q. Claudius was required to withdraw the legions stationed there, and march with them into that district in which he could protect the greatest number of cities belonging to the allies of Rome.

During the summer M. Valerius sailed across to Africa with a fleet of a hundred vessels. Landing his men near the city of Clupea, he ravaged the country far and wide without meeting with any resistance. The news of the approach of a Carthaginian fleet caused the pillagers to return in haste to their ships. This fleet consisted of eighty-three ships, and the Roman commander successfully engaged it not far from Clupea. After capturing eighteen ships and putting the rest to flight, he returned to Lilybaeum with a great quantity of booty.

In the course of the summer Philip lent armed assistance to the Achaeans, who had implored his aid against Machanidas, tyrant of the Lacedaemonians, and against the Aetolians. Machanidas was harassing them with a border warfare, and the Aetolians had crossed the narrow sea between Naupactus and Patrae—the local name of the latter is Rhion<sup>16</sup>—and were making forays in Achaia. There were rumours also of an intention on the part of Attalus, king of Asia, to visit Europe,

as the Aetolians had at the last meeting of their national council made him one of their two supreme magistrates.

XXX. This being the position of affairs, Philip moved southward into Greece. The Aetolians under the command of Pyrrhias, who had been elected Attalus' colleague, met Philip at the city of Lamia. They were supported by a contingent furnished by Attalus, and also by about 1000 men whom P. Sulpicius had sent from his fleet. Philip won two battles against Pyrrhias, and in each battle the enemy lost not less than 1000 men. From that time the Aetolians were afraid to meet him in the field and remained inside the walls of Lamia. Philip accordingly marched his army to Phalara. This place lies on the Maliac Gulf,<sup>17</sup> and was formerly the seat of a considerable population, owing to its splendid harbour, the safe anchorages in the neighbourhood, and other maritime and commercial advantages.

Whilst he was here he was visited by embassies from Ptolemy, king of Egypt, and from Rhodes and Athens and Chios, with the view of bringing about a reconciliation between him and the Aetolians. Amyinandor, king of the Athamanians,<sup>18</sup> a neighbour of the Aetolians, was also acting on their behalf as peace-maker. But the general concern was not so much for the Aetolians, who were more warlike than the rest of the Greeks, as for the liberty of Greece, which would be seriously endangered if Philip and his kingdom took an active part in Greek politics. The question of peace was held over for discussion in the meeting of the Achaean League. The place and time for this meeting were settled, and in the meantime a thirty days' armistice was arranged. From Phalara the king proceeded through Thessaly and Boeotia to Chalcis in Euboea, in order to prevent Attalus, who he understood was sailing thither, from landing on the island. Leaving a force there in case Attalus should sail across in the meantime, he went on with a small body of cavalry and light infantry to Argos. Here the presidency of the Heraean and Nemean Games was conferred upon him by the popular vote, on the ground that the kings of Macedon trace their origin to Argos. As soon as the Heraean Games were over he went off to Aegium to the meeting of the League which had been fixed some time previously.

The discussion turned upon the question of putting a stop to the war with the Aetolians, so that neither the Romans nor Attalus might have any reason for entering Greece. But

everything was upset by the Aetolians almost before the armistice had expired, after they learnt that Attalus had reached Aegina and that a Roman fleet was anchored off Naupactus. They had been invited to attend the meeting of the League, and the deputations who had been trying to secure peace at Phalara were also present. They began by complaining of certain trivial infringements of the armistice, and ended by declaring that hostilities could never cease until the Achaeans restored Pylos to the Messenians, and Atintania was given back to Rome, and the Ardiaei to Scerdilaedus and Pleurutus.

Philip was naturally indignant at those whom he had defeated proposing terms of peace to him, their conqueror. He reminded the assembly that when the question of peace was referred to him and an armistice was granted, it was not with any expectation that the Aetolians would remain quiet, but solely in order that all the allies might bear him witness that whilst he was seeking a basis for peace, the other side were determined to find a pretext for war.

Since there was no chance of peace being established, he dismissed the council and returned to Argos, as the time for the Nemean Games was approaching and he wished to add to their popularity by his presence. He left a force of 4000 men to protect the Achaeans, and at the same time took over from them five ships of war. He intended to add these to the fleet recently sent from Carthage; with these vessels and the ships which Prusias was despatching from Bithynia he had made up his mind to offer battle to the Romans who were masters of the sea in that part of the world.

XXXI. While the king was preoccupied with the preparations for the Games, and was allowing himself more recreation than was possible in a time of active warfare, P. Sulpicius, setting sail from Naupactus, brought up his fleet between Sicyon and Corinth, and spread devastation far and wide over that wonderfully fertile land. This news brought Philip away from the Games. He hurried off with his cavalry, leaving the infantry to follow, and caught the Romans whilst they were dispersed through the fields in all directions, laden with plunder, and utterly unsuspecting of danger. They were driven to their ships, and the Roman fleet returned to Naupactus, far from happy at the result of their raid. Philip returned to see the close of the Games, and their splendour was enhanced by the news of his victory, for whatever its importance it was still

a victory over the Romans. What added to the universal enjoyment of the festival was the way in which he gratified the people by laying aside his diadem and purple robe and the rest of his royal state so as to be, as far as appearance went, on a level with the rest. Nothing is more grateful than this to the citizens of a free State. He would indeed have given them every reason to hope that their liberties would remain unimpaired if he had not sullied and disgraced all by his insufferable debauchery. Accompanied by one or two boon companions, he ranged as he pleased through homes and families, day and night, and by stooping to the status of a private citizen he attracted less notice and was therefore under less restraint. The liberty with which he had cheated others he turned in his own case to unbridled licence, and he did not always effect his purpose by money or blandishments but even resorted to criminal violence. It was a dangerous thing for husbands and fathers to place obstacles in the way of the king's lusts by any untimely scruples on their part. A lady called Polycratia, the wife of Aratus, one of the leading men amongst the Achaeans, was taken away from her husband and carried off to Macedon under a promise from the king to marry her.

In the midst of these debaucheries the sacred festival of the Nemean Games came to a close. A few days afterwards Philip marched to Dymae to expel the Aetolian garrison which the Eleans had invited and admitted into their city. Here the king was met by the Achaeans under Cyliadas their captain general, who were burning with resentment against the Eleans for having deserted the Achaean League, and furious against the Aetolians for having, as they believed, brought the arms of Rome against them. The combined force left Dymae and crossed the Larisus, which separates the territory of Elia from that of Dymae.

XXXII. The first day of their advance in the enemy's country was spent in plunder and destruction. The next day they marched in battle array towards the city, the cavalry having been sent forward to provoke the Aetolians to fight, which they were perfectly ready to do. The invaders were unaware that Sulpicius had sailed across from Naupactus to Cyllene with fifteen ships and landed 4000 men who had entered Elis in the night. As soon as they recognised the standards and arms of Rome amongst the Aetolians and Eleans, the unlooked-for sight filled them with great alarm. At first the king wanted to retire his men, but they were already engaged with the Aetolians



and Trallians—an Illyrian tribe—and as he saw that they were being hard pressed, he charged the Roman cohort with his cavalry. His horse was wounded by a javelin and fell, throwing the king over its head, and a fierce contest began, on both sides, the Romans making desperate efforts to reach him and his own men doing their best to protect him. Compelled as he was to fight on foot amongst mounted men, he showed conspicuous courage. The struggle became at length an unequal one, many were falling round him and many were wounded, and he was seized by his own men and placed on another horse on which he fled. That day he fixed his camp about five miles from Elis; the following day he led the whole of his force to a fortified place called Pyrgon. This was a fort belonging to the Eleans, and he had been informed that a large number of peasants with their cattle had taken refuge there through fear of being plundered. Destitute as they were of organisation and arms, the mere fact of his approach filled them with terror and they were all made prisoners. This booty was some compensation for his humiliating defeat at Elis. Whilst he was distributing the spoil and the captives—there were 4000 prisoners and 20,000 head of cattle large and small—a messenger arrived from Macedonia stating that a certain Eropus had taken Lychnidos after bribing the commandant of the garrison, that he was in possession of some villages belonging to the Dassaretii and was also making the Dardanians restless.

Philip at once abandoned hostilities with the Aetolians and prepared to return home. He left a force of 2500 of all arms under the command of Menippus and Polyphantas to protect his allies, and taking his route through Achaia and Boeotia, and across Euboea, he arrived at Demetrias in Thessaly on the tenth day after his departure from Dymae.

XXXIII. There he was met by still more alarming tidings; the Dardanians were pouring into Macedonia and were already in occupation of the Orestides district, they had even descended into the Argestaeon Plain. The report was current that Philip had been killed; the rumour was due to the fact that in the encounter with the plundering parties from the Roman fleet at Sicyon, his horse flung him against a tree and one of the horns of his helmet was broken off by a projecting branch. This was afterwards picked up by an Aetolian and taken to Scerdilaedus, who recognised it. Hence the rumour.

After the king had left Achaia Sulpicius sailed to Aegina and

joined forces with Attalus. The Achaeans in conjunction with the Aetolians and Eleans fought a successful action not far from Messene. Attalus and Sulpicius went into winter quarters in Aegina.

*The Elections for the Coming Year.*—At the close of this year the consul T. Quinctius died of his wounds, having previously nominated T. Manlius Torquatus Dictator to conduct the elections. Some say he died in Tarentum, others, in Campania. This accident of two consuls being killed in a quite unimportant action had never occurred in any previous war, and it left the republic, so to speak, in a state of orphanhood.

The Dictator named C. Servilius, who was curule aedile at the time, his Master of the Horse. On the first day of their session the senate instructed the Dictator to celebrate the Great Games. M. Aemilius, who was city praetor at the time, had celebrated them in the consulship of C. Flaminius and Cnaeus Servilius, and had made a vow that they should be celebrated in five years' time. The Dictator celebrated them accordingly, and made a vow that they should be repeated at the following lustrum. Meanwhile, as the two consular armies had no generals and were in such close proximity to the enemy, both senate and people were anxious that all other business should be postponed, and consuls elected as soon as possible. It was felt that, above all, men ought to be elected whose courage and skill would be proof against the wiles of the Carthaginian, for all through the war the hot and hasty temperament of different commanders had proved disastrous, and in that very year the consuls had been led by their eagerness to come to grips with the enemy into snares of which they did not suspect the existence.

The gods, however, out of pity for the name of Rome, spared the unoffending armies and visited the rashness of the consuls on their own heads.

XXXIV. When the patricians began to look round and see who would make the best consuls, one man stood out conspicuously—C. Claudius Nero. The question was, who was to be his colleague? He was regarded as a man of exceptional ability, but too impulsive and venturesome for such a war as the present one, or such an enemy as Hannibal, and they felt that his impetuous temperament needed to be restrained by a cool and prudent colleague. Their thoughts turned to M. Livius. He had been consul several years previously, and after laying

down his consulship had been impeached before the Assembly and found guilty.<sup>19</sup> This disgrace he felt so keenly that he removed into the country, and for many years was a stranger to the City and to all public gatherings. It was about eight years after his condemnation that the consuls M. Claudius Marcellus and M. Valerius Laevinus brought him back to the City, but his squalid garments, his neglected hair and beard, his whole appearance showed pretty clearly that he had not forgotten the humiliation. The censors L. Veturius and P. Licinius made him trim his hair and beard and lay aside his squalid garments and take his place in the senate and discharge other public duties. Even then he contented himself with a simple "aye" or "no" to the question before the House, and in the event of a division with a silent vote, until the case of his kinsman Marcus Livius Macatus came up,<sup>20</sup> when the attack upon his relative's fair fame compelled him to rise in his place and address the House. The voice which after so long an interval was once more heard was listened to with deep attention, and the senators remarked to one another that the people had wronged an innocent man to the great detriment of the commonwealth, which in the stress of a grievous war had been unable to avail itself of the help and counsel of such a man as that. Neither Q. Fabius nor M. Valerius Laevinus could be assigned to C. Nero as his colleague because it was illegal for two patricians to be elected, and the same difficulty existed in the case of T. Manlius, who had moreover already refused a consulship and would continue to refuse it.<sup>21</sup> If they gave him M. Livius as colleague, they felt that they would have a splendid pair of consuls.

This suggestion put forward by the senators was approved by the great body of the people. There was only one among all the citizens who rejected it and that was the man on whom the honour was to be conferred. He accused them of inconsistency. "When he appeared in mourning garments at his trial they felt no pity for him, now, in spite of his refusal, they would have him put on the white robe of the candidate."<sup>22</sup> They heaped penalties and honours on the same man. If they thought that he was a good citizen, why had they condemned him as a criminal? If they had found him to be a criminal, why were they entrusting him with a second consulship after he had misused the first?"

The senators severely censured him for complaining and

protesting in this way, and reminded him of M. Furius Camillus, who after being recalled from exile restored his country to its ancient seat. "We ought to treat our country," they told him, "like our parents, and disarm its severity by patience and submission." By their united efforts they succeeded in making him consul with C. Claudius Nero.

XXXV. Three days later came the election of praetors. Those elected were L. Porcius Licinius, C. Mamilius and the two Catos, C. Hostilius and A. Hostilius.

*Military Dispositions.*—When the elections were over and the Games concluded, the Dictator and the Master of the Horse resigned office. C. Terentius Varro was sent into Etruria as propraetor to relieve C. Hostilius, who was to take over the command of the army at Tarentum which the consul T. Quinctius had had. L. Manlius was to go to Greece and find out what was going on there. As the Olympian Games were to be held this summer, and as a very large gathering would be there, he was, if he could get through the enemy's forces, to be present at them and inform those Sicilians who had fled there from the war and any citizens of Tarentum who had been banished by Hannibal that they might return home and rest assured that the Roman people would restore to them all that they possessed before the war.

As the coming year seemed to be fraught with most serious dangers, and the State was for the moment without consuls, all eyes were turned to the consuls-elect, and it was universally hoped that they would lose no time in balloting for their provinces and deciding what enemy each of them would have to meet. On the initiative of Q. Fabius Maximus a resolution was carried in the senate insisting upon their becoming reconciled to each other. Their quarrel was only too notorious, and was embittered by Livius' resentment at the insulting treatment he had received, for he felt that his honour had been sullied by his prosecution.<sup>80</sup> This made him all the more implacable; he said that there was no need for any reconciliation, each would act with greater energy and alertness if he knew that failure to do so would give his enemy an advantage. However, the senate successfully exerted their authority, and they were induced to lay aside their private differences and conduct the affairs of State with one mind and one policy.

Their provinces were not contiguous as in former years, but widely separated, at the extremities of Italy. One was to act

against Hannibal in Bruttium and Lucania, the other in Gaul against Hasdrubal, who was reported to be now nearing the Alps. The consul to whose lot Gaul should fall was to choose either the army which was in Gaul or the one in Etruria, and would receive in addition the army of the City. The one to whom Bruttium fell was to raise fresh legions in the City and select one of the two consular armies of the previous year. The other one Q. Fabius was to take over as proconsul, in which capacity he was to act for the year. C. Hostilius, who had already been removed from Etruria to Tarentum, was now again to change from Tarentum to Capua. One legion was given him, the one which Fulvius had commanded.

XXXVI. *Hasdrubal's Advance*.—Hasdrubal's appearance in Italy was looked forward to with daily increasing anxiety. The first news came from the Massilians, who reported that he had passed into Gaul, and that there was widespread excitement amongst the natives owing to a rumour that he had brought a large amount of gold for the payment of auxiliary troops. The Massilian envoys were accompanied on their return by Sextus Antistius and M. Raecius, who were sent to make further investigations. These reported that they had sent emissaries, accompanied by some Massilians who had friends amongst the Gaulish chieftains, to gain information and that they had definitely ascertained that Hasdrubal intended to cross the Alps the next spring with an enormous army. The only thing that kept him from advancing at once was that the Alps were insurmountable in winter.

P. Aelius Paetus was appointed and consecrated augur in place of M. Marcellus, and Cnaeus Cornelius Dolabella was consecrated "King of Sacrifices" in place of M. Marcius, who had been dead for two years. The lustrum was closed by the censors P. Sempronius Tuditanus and M. Cornelius Cethegus. The census returns gave the number of citizens as 137,108, a considerably smaller number than the one before the beginning of the war.<sup>24</sup> For the first time since Hannibal had invaded Italy the comitium is stated to have been covered over and the Roman Games were celebrated for one day by the curule aediles Q. Metellus and C. Servilius. The Plebeian Games also were celebrated for two days by the plebeian aediles C. Mamilius and M. Caecilius Metellus. They also gave three statues to the temple of Ceres, and a banquet was held in honour of Jupiter on the occasion of the Games.

The consuls then entered upon office; C. Claudius Nero for the first time, M. Livius for the second. As they had balloted for their provinces they ordered the praetors to ballot for theirs. The urban jurisdiction fell to C. Hostilius, and the jurisdiction over aliens was also committed to him in order that three praetors might be available for foreign service. A. Hostilius was allotted to Sardinia, C. Mamilius to Sicily and L. Porcius to Gaul. The total military strength amounted to twenty-three legions and were thus distributed: each of the consuls had two; four were in Spain; each of the three praetors had two in Sardinia, Sicily and Gaul respectively; C. Terentius had two in Etruria; Quintus Fulvius had two in Bruttium; Q. Claudius had two in the neighbourhood of Tarentum and the Sallentine district; C. Hostilius Tubulus had one at Capua; and two were raised in the City for home defence. The people appointed the military tribunes for the first four legions; the consuls commissioned the rest.

XXXVII. *Portents and their Expiation.*—Prior to the departure of the consuls religious observances were kept up for nine days owing to the fall of a shower of stones at Veii. As usual, no sooner was one portent announced than reports were brought in of others. At Menturnae the temple of Jupiter and the sacred grove of Marica were struck with lightning, as were also the wall of Atella and one of the gates. The people of Menturnae reported a second and more appalling portent; a stream of blood had flowed in at their gate. At Capua a wolf had entered the gate by night and mauled one of the watch. These portents were expiated by the sacrifice of full-grown victims, and special intercessions for the whole of one day were ordered by the pontiffs. Subsequently a second nine days' observance was ordered in consequence of a shower of stones which fell in the Armilustrum.<sup>25</sup> No sooner were men's fears allayed by these expiatory rites than a fresh report came, this time from Frusino, to the effect that a child had been born there in size and appearance equal to one four years old, and what was still more startling, like the case at Sinuessa two years previously, it was impossible to say whether it was male or female. The diviners who had been summoned from Etruria said that this was a dreadful portent, and the thing must be banished from Roman soil, kept from any contact with the earth, and buried in the sea. They enclosed it alive in a box, took it out to sea, and dropped it overboard.

The pontiffs also decreed that three bands of maidens, each consisting of nine, should go through the City singing a hymn. This hymn was composed by the poet Livius, and while they were practising it in the temple of Jupiter Stator, the shrine of Queen Juno on the Aventine was struck by lightning. The diviners were consulted, and they declared that this portent concerned the matrons and that the goddess must be appeased by a gift. The curule aediles issued an edict summoning to the Capitol all the matrons whose homes were in Rome or within a distance of ten miles. When they were assembled they selected twenty-five of their number to receive their offerings; these they contributed out of their dowries. From the sum thus collected a golden basin was made and carried as an oblation to the Aventine, where the matrons offered a pure and chaste sacrifice.

Immediately afterwards the Keepers of the Sacred Books gave notice of a day for further sacrificial rites in honour of this deity. The following was the order of their observance. Two white heifers were led from the temple of Apollo through the Carmental Gate into the City; after them were borne two images of the goddess, made of cypress wood. Then twenty-seven maidens, vested in long robes, walked in procession singing a hymn in her honour, which was perhaps admired in those rude days, but which would be considered very uncouth and displeasing if it were recited now. After the train of maidens came the ten Keepers of the Sacred Books wearing the toga praetexta, and with laurel wreaths round their brows. From the Carmental Gate the procession marched along the Vicus Jugarius into the Forum, where it stopped. Here the girls, all holding a cord, commenced a solemn dance while they sang, beating time with their feet to the sound of their voices. They then resumed their course along the Vicus Tuscus and the Velabrum, through the Forum Boarium, and up the Clivus Publicius till they reached the temple of Juno. Here the two heifers were sacrificed by the Ten Keepers, and the cypress images were carried into the shrine.

XXXVIII. *Preparations for the Campaign.*—After the deities had been duly appeased, the consuls proceeded with the levy and conducted it with a rigour and exactitude such as no one could remember in former years. The appearance of a fresh enemy in Italy redoubled the apprehensions generally felt as to the issue of the war, and at the same time there was a smaller

population from which to obtain the men required. Even the maritime colonies which were declared to have been solemnly and formally exempted from military service were called upon to furnish soldiers, and on their refusal a day was fixed on which they were to appear before the senate and state, each for themselves, the grounds on which they claimed exemption.

On the appointed day representatives attended from Ostia, Alsium, Antium, Anxur, Menturnae, Sinuessa, and from Sena on the upper sea. Each community produced its title to exemption, but as the enemy was in Italy, the claim was disallowed in the case of all but two—Antium and Ostia—and in the case of these, the men of military age were compelled to take an oath that they would not sleep outside their walls for more than thirty nights as long as the enemy was in Italy.

Everybody was of opinion that the consuls ought to take the field at the earliest possible moment; for Hasdrubal must be met on his descent from the Alps, otherwise he might foment a rising amongst the Cisalpine Gauls and in Etruria, and Hannibal must be kept fully employed, so as to prevent his leaving Bruttium and meeting his brother. Still Livius delayed. He did not feel confidence in the troops assigned to him, and complained that his colleague had his choice of three splendid armies. He also suggested the recall to the standards of the volunteer slaves. The senate gave the consuls full powers to obtain reinforcements in any way they thought best, to select what men they wanted from all the armies and to exchange and transfer troops from one province to another as they thought best in the interest of the State.

The consuls acted in perfect harmony in carrying out all these measures. The volunteer slaves were incorporated in the nineteenth and twentieth legions. Some authorities assert that Publius Scipio sent M. Livius strong reinforcements from Spain including 8000 Gauls and Spaniards, 2000 legionaries, and 1000 Numidian and Spanish horse, and that this force was transported to Italy by M. Lucretius. It is further stated that C. Mamilius sent 3000 bowmen and slingers from Sicily.

XXXIX. *Hasdrubal's Arrival in Italy.*—The excitement and alarm in Rome were heightened by a despatch from L. Porcius, the propraetor commanding in Gaul. He announced that Hasdrubal had left his winter quarters and was actually crossing the Alps. He was to be joined by a force of 8000 men raised and equipped amongst the Ligurians, unless a Roman army were



sent into Liguria to occupy the attention of the Gauls. Porcius added that he would himself advance as far as he safely could with such a weak army.

The receipt of this despatch made the consuls hurry on the enlistment, and on its completion they left for their provinces at an earlier date than they had fixed. Their intention was that each of them should keep his enemy in his own province and not allow the brothers to unite or concentrate their forces. They were materially assisted by a miscalculation which Hannibal made. He quite expected his brother to cross the Alps during the summer, but remembering his own experience in the passage first of the Rhone and then of the Alps, and how for five months he had had to carry on an exhausting struggle against man and against nature, he had no idea that Hasdrubal's passage would be as easy and rapid as it really was. Owing to this mistake he was too late in moving out of his winter quarters.

Hasdrubal, however, had a more expeditious march and met with fewer difficulties than either he or any one else expected. Not only did the Arverni and the other Gallic and Alpine tribes give him a friendly reception, but they followed his standard. He was, moreover, marching mainly over roads made by his brother where before there were none, and as the Alps had now been traversed to and fro for twelve years he found the natives less savage. Previously they had never visited strange lands nor been accustomed to seeing strangers in their own country; they had held no intercourse with the rest of the world. Not knowing at first the destination of the Carthaginian general, they imagined that he wanted their rocks and strongholds and intended to carry off their men and cattle as plunder. Then when they heard about the Punic War with which Italy had been alight for twelve years, they quite understood that the Alps were only a passage from one country to another, and that the struggle lay between two mighty cities, separated by a vast stretch of sea and land, which were contending for power and dominion.

This was the reason why the Alps lay open to Hasdrubal. But whatever advantage he gained by the rapidity of his march was forfeited by the time he wasted at Placentia, where he commenced a fruitless investment instead of attempting a direct assault. Lying as it did in flat open country he thought that the town would be taken without difficulty, and that the capture of such an important colony would deter the others

from offering any resistance. Not only was his own advance hampered by this investment, but he also retarded Hannibal's movements, who, on learning of his brother's unexpectedly rapid march, had quitted his winter quarters, for Hannibal knew what a slow business sieges usually are and had not forgotten his own unsuccessful attempt on that very colony after his victory at the Trebia.

*XL. Public Feeling in Rome. Departure of the Consuls.*—The consuls left for the front, each by a separate route, and their departure was watched with feelings of painful anxiety. Men realised that the republic had two wars on its hands simultaneously; they recalled the disasters which followed upon Hannibal's appearance in Italy, and wondered what gods would be so propitious to the City and the empire as to grant victory over two enemies at once in widely distant fields. Up till now heaven had preserved it by balancing victories against defeats. When the cause of Rome had been brought to the ground in Italy at Thrasymenus and at Cannae, the successes in Spain raised it up once more; when reverse after reverse had been sustained in Spain and the State lost its two generals and the greater part of both their armies, the many successes achieved in Italy and Sicily stayed the collapse of the battered republic, whilst the distance at which that unsuccessful war was waged in the remotest corner of the world afforded in itself a breathing space. Now they had two wars on hand, both in Italy; two generals who bore illustrious names were closing round Rome; the whole weight of the peril, the whole burden of the conflict had settled down on one spot. The one who was first victorious would in a few days unite his forces with the other.

Such were the gloomy forebodings, and they were deepened by the recollections of the past year made so mournful by the death of both consuls. In this depressed and anxious mood the population escorted the consuls to the gates of the City, as they left for their respective provinces. There is an utterance recorded of M. Livius which shows his bitter feeling towards his fellow-citizens. When on his departure Q. Fabius warned him against giving battle before he knew the sort of enemy he had to meet, Livius is said to have replied that he would fight as soon as he caught sight of the enemy. When asked why he was in such a hurry he said: "Either I shall win special distinction from conquering such an enemy or a well-earned if not very honourable pleasure from the defeat of my fellow-citizens."

*Operations against Hannibal.*—Before the consul Claudius Nero arrived in his province, Hannibal, who was marching just outside the frontiers of the territory of Larinum on his way to the Sallentini, was attacked by C. Hostilius Tubulus. His light infantry created considerable disorder amongst the enemy, who were not prepared for action; 4000 of them were slain, and nine standards captured. Q. Claudius had quartered his troops in various cities in the Sallentine district, and on hearing of the enemy's approach he quitted his winter quarters and took the field against him. Not wishing to meet both armies at once, Hannibal left the neighbourhood by night, and withdrew into Bruttium. Claudius marched back into the Sallentine territory, and Hostilius while on his way to Capua met the consul Claudius Nero near Venusia. Here a *corps d'élite* was selected from both armies, consisting of 40,000 infantry and 2500 cavalry, which the consul intended to employ against Hannibal. The rest of the troops Hostilius was ordered to take to Capua and then hand them over to Q. Fulvius the proconsul.

XLJ. Hannibal assembled the whole of his force, those in winter quarters and those on garrison duty in Bruttium, and marched to Grumentum in Lucania, with the intention of recovering the towns whose inhabitants had been led by their fears to go over to Rome. The Roman consul marched to the same place from Venusia, making careful reconnaissances as he advanced, and fixed his camp about a mile and a half from the enemy. The rampart of the Carthaginian camp seemed to be almost touching the walls of Grumentum; there was really half a mile between them. Between the two hostile camps the ground was level; on the Carthaginian left and the Roman right stretched a line of bare hills which did not arouse any suspicion on either side, as they were quite devoid of vegetation and afforded no hollows where an ambuscade could be concealed. In the plain between the camps small skirmishes took place between the advanced posts, the one object of the Roman evidently being to prevent the retirement of the enemy; Hannibal, who was anxious to get away, marched on to the field with his whole force marshalled for battle. The consul, adopting his enemy's tactics with all the more chance of success since there could be no fears of an ambuscade on such open ground, told off five cohorts strengthened with five maniples of Roman troops to mount the hill by night and take their station in the dip on the other side. He placed T. Claudius

Asellus a military tribune and P. Claudius a prefect of allies in command of the party, and gave them instructions as to the moment when they were to rise from ambush and attack the enemy.

At dawn of the following day he led out the whole of his force, horse and foot, to battle. Soon after Hannibal, too, gave the signal for action, and his camp rang with the shouts of his men as they ran to arms. Scrambling through the gates of the camp, mounted and unmounted men each trying to be first, they raced over the plain in scattered groups towards the enemy. When the consul saw them in this disorder he ordered C. Aurunculeius, military tribune of the third legion, to send the cavalry attached to his legion at full gallop against the enemy, for, as he said, they were scattered over the plain like a flock of sheep and could be ridden down and trampled under foot before they could close their ranks.

XLII. Hannibal had not left his camp, when he heard the noise of the battle. He lost not a moment in leading his force against the enemy. The Roman cavalry had already created a panic amongst the foremost of their assailants, the first legion and the allied contingent on the left wing were coming into action, the enemy in no sort of formation were fighting with infantry or cavalry as they happened to meet them. As their reinforcements and supports came up the fighting became more general, and Hannibal would have succeeded in getting his men into order in spite of the confusion and panic—a task almost impossible for any but veteran troops under a veteran commander—if they had not heard in their rear the shouts of the cohorts and maniples running down the hill, and saw themselves in danger of being cut off from their camp. The panic spread and flight became general in all parts of the field. The nearness of their camp made their flight easy, and for this reason their losses were comparatively small, considering that the cavalry were pressing on their rear and the cohorts charging along an easy road down the hill were attacking their flank. Still, over 8000 men were killed and 700 made prisoners, nine standards were captured, and of the elephants which had proved useless in the confusion and hurry of the fight four were killed and two captured. About 500 Roman and allies fell.<sup>26</sup>

The next day the Carthaginians remained quiet. The Roman general marched in battle order on to the field, but when he saw that no standards were advancing from the opposing camp

he ordered his men to gather the spoils of the slain and collect the bodies of their comrades and bury them in one common grave. Then for several days in succession he marched up so close to the gates that it seemed as though he were going to attack the camp, until Hannibal made up his mind to depart. Leaving numerous fires burning and tents standing on the side of the camp facing the Romans, and a few Numidians who were to show themselves on the rampart and at the gates, he set out with the intention of marching into Apulia. As soon as it grew light, the Roman army approached the rampart and the Numidians made themselves visible on the ramparts and at the gates. After deceiving their enemy for some time they rode off at full speed to join their comrades. When the consul found that the camp was silent and that even the few who had been patrolling it at dawn were nowhere visible, he sent two troopers into the camp to reconnoitre. They brought back word that they had examined it and found it safe everywhere, on which he ordered the troops to enter. He waited while the soldiers secured the plunder, and then the signal was given to retire; long before nightfall he had his soldiers back in camp. Very early next morning he started in pursuit and, guided by the local information supplied to him and the traces of their retreat, he succeeded, by making forced marches, in coming up with the enemy not far from Venusia. There a second irregular action took place in which the Carthaginians lost 2000 men. After this Hannibal decided to give no further opportunity of fighting and, in a series of night marches over the mountains, made for Metapontum. Hanno was in command of the garrison here, and he was sent with a few troops into Bruttium to raise a fresh army there. The rest of his force Hannibal incorporated with his own, and retracing his steps reached Venusia, and from there went on to Canusium. Nero never lost touch with him, and while he was following him to Metapontum he sent Q. Fulvius into Lucania, so that that country might not be left without a defending force.

XLIII. *Nero marches to meet Hasdrubal.*—After Hasdrubal had raised the siege of Placentia, he sent off four Gaulish and two Numidian troopers with despatches to Hannibal. They had passed through the midst of the enemy, and almost traversed the length of Italy, and were following Hannibal's retreat to Metapontum when they missed the road and were brought to Tarentum. Here they were caught by a Roman foraging

party dispersed amongst the fields, and conducted to the propraetor Q. Claudius. At first they tried to mislead him by evasive answers, but the fear of torture compelled them to confess the truth, and they informed him that they were the bearers of despatches from Hasdrubal to Hannibal. They and the despatches, with seals intact, were handed over to L. Verginius, one of the military tribunes. He was furnished with an escort of two troops of Samnite cavalry, and ordered to conduct the six troopers to the consul Claudius Nero. After the despatches had been translated to him, and the prisoners had been examined, the consul saw that the regulation which confined each consul to the province and the army and the enemy which had been designated for him by the senate would not in the present instance be beneficial to the republic. He would have to venture upon a startling innovation, and though at the outset it might create as much alarm among his own countrymen as amongst the enemy, it would, when carried through, turn their great fear into great rejoicing. Hasdrubal's despatches he sent on to the senate together with one from himself explaining his project. As Hasdrubal had written to say that he would meet his brother in Umbria, he advised the senators to recall the Roman legion from Capua, raise troops in Rome, and with this City force oppose the enemy at Narnia.<sup>27</sup>

This was what he wrote to the senate. But he also sent couriers into the districts through which he intended to march—Larinum, Marrucina, Frentanum and Praetutia—to warn the inhabitants to collect all the supplies from the towns and the country districts and have them in readiness on the line of march to feed the troops. They were also to bring their horses and other draught animals so that there might be an ample supply of vehicles for the men who fell out through fatigue. Out of the whole of his army he selected a force of 6000 infantry and 1000 cavalry, the flower of the Roman and allied contingents, and gave out that he intended to seize the nearest city in Lucania with its Carthaginian garrison, so that all should be ready to march. Starting by night, he turned off in the direction of Picenum. Leaving Q. Cadius, his second in command, in charge of the camp he marched as rapidly as he could to join his colleague.

XLIV. *Alarm in Rome.*—The excitement and alarm in Rome were quite as great as they had been two years previously, when the Carthaginian camp was visible from the walls and

gates of the City. People could not make up their minds whether the consul's daring march was more to be lauded or censured, and it was evident that they would await the result before pronouncing for or against it—a most unfair way of judging. "The camp," they said, "is left, near an enemy like Hannibal, with no general, with an army from which its main strength, the flower of its soldiery, has been withdrawn. Pretending to march into Lucania, the consul has taken the road to Picenum and Gaul, leaving the safety of his camp dependent upon the ignorance of the enemy as to what direction he and his division have taken. What will happen if they find that out, if Hannibal with his whole army decides to start in pursuit of Nero with his 6000 men, or attacks the camp, left as it is to be plundered, without defence, without a general with full powers or one who can take the auspices?" The former disasters in this war, the recollection of the two consuls killed the previous year, filled them with dread. "All those things," it was said, "happened when the enemy had only one commander and one army in Italy; now there are two distinct wars going on, two immense armies, and practically two Hannibals in Italy, for Hasdrubal too is a son of Hamilcar and is quite as able and energetic a commander as his brother. He has been trained in war against Rome for many years in Spain, and distinguished himself by the double victory in which he annihilated two Roman armies and their illustrious captains. In the rapidity of his march from Spain, and the way in which he has roused the tribes of Gaul to arms, he can boast of far greater success than even Hannibal himself, for he got together an army in those very districts in which his brother lost the greater part of his force by cold and hunger, the most miserable of all deaths." Those who were acquainted with recent events in Spain went on to say that he would meet in Nero a general who was no stranger to him, for he was the general whom Hasdrubal, when intercepted in a narrow pass, had duped and baffled as though he were a child by making illusory proposals for peace. In this way they exaggerated the strength of the enemy and depreciated their own, their fears made them look on the darkest side of everything.

XLV. *Nero's March through Italy.*—When Nero had placed a sufficient distance between himself and the enemy to make it safe for him to reveal his design, he made a brief address to his men. "No commander," he said, "has ever formed a

project apparently more risky but really less so than mine. I am leading you to certain victory. My colleague did not enter upon this campaign until he had obtained from the senate such a force of infantry and cavalry as he deemed sufficient, a force indeed more numerous and better equipped than if he were advancing against Hannibal himself. However small the addition you are now making to it, it will be enough to turn the scale. When once the news spreads on the battle-field—and I will take care that it does not spread sooner—that a second consul has arrived with a second army, it will make victory no longer doubtful. Rumour decides battles; slight impulses sway men's hopes and fears; if we are successful you yourselves will reap almost all the glory of it, for it is always the last weight added that has the credit of turning the balance. You see for yourselves what admiring and enthusiastic crowds welcome you as you march along."

And indeed they did advance amidst vows and prayers and blessings from the lines of men and women who were gathered everywhere out of the fields and homesteads. They were called the defenders of the republic, the vindicators of the City and sovereignty of Rome; upon their swords and strong right hands depended all security and liberty for the people and their children. The bystanders prayed to all the gods and goddesses to grant them a safe and prosperous march, a successful battle and an early victory over their foes. As they were now following them with anxious hearts, so they prayed that they might fulfil the vows which they were making when they went forth with joy to meet them flushed with the pride of victory. Then they invited the soldiers to take what they had brought for them, each begging and entreating them to take from his hands rather than from any one else's what would be of use to them and their draught animals, and loading them with presents of all sorts. The soldiers showed the utmost moderation and refused to accept anything that was not absolutely necessary. They did not interrupt their march or leave the ranks or even halt to take food; day and night they went steadily on, hardly allowing themselves the rest which nature demanded.

The consul sent messages in advance to announce his coming to his colleague, and to enquire whether it would be better to come secretly or openly, by night or by day, and also whether they were to occupy the same camp or separate ones. It was thought better that he should come by night.



XLVI. *The Battle of the Metaurus.*—The consul Livius had issued a secret order by means of the tessera<sup>28</sup> that the tribunes should take in the tribunes who were coming; the centurions, the centurions; the cavalry, their mounted comrades; and the legionaries, the infantry. It was not desirable to extend the camp, his object was to keep the enemy in ignorance of the other consul's arrival. The crowding together of a larger number of men in the restricted space afforded by the tents was rendered all the easier because Claudius' army, in their hurried march, had brought hardly anything with them except their arms. On the march, however, their numbers had been augmented by volunteers, partly old soldiers who had served their time and partly young men who were anxious to join. Claudius enlisted those whose appearance and strength seemed to qualify them for service.

Livius' camp was in the neighbourhood of Sena, and Hasdrubal was about half a mile distant. When he found that he was nearing the place, the consul halted where he was screened by the mountains, so as not to enter the camp before night. Then the men entered in silence and were conducted to the tents, each by a man of his own rank, where they received the warmest of welcomes and most hospitable entertainment.

Next day a council of war was held, at which the praetor L. Porcius Licinus was present. His camp was now contiguous with that of the consuls; before their arrival he had adopted every possible device to baffle the Carthaginian by marching along the heights and seizing the passes, so as to check his advance, and also by harassing his columns whilst on the march. Many of those present at the council were in favour of postponing battle in order that Nero might recruit his troops worn out with the length of the march and want of sleep, and also might have a few days for getting to know his enemy. Nero tried to dissuade them from this course, and earnestly implored them not to endanger the success of his plan after he had made it perfectly safe by the rapidity of his march. Hannibal's activity, he argued, was so to speak paralysed by a mistake which he would not be long in rectifying; he had neither attacked the camp in the absence of its commander, nor had he made up his mind to follow him on his march. Before he moved, it was possible to destroy Hasdrubal's army and march back into Apulia. "To give the enemy time by putting off the engagement would be to betray their camp in Apulia to

Hannibal and give him a clear road into Gaul, so that he would be able to form a junction with Hasdrubal when and where he pleased. The signal for action must be given at once, and we must march on to the field and profit by the mistakes which both our enemies are making, the distant one and the one close at hand. That one does not know that he has to deal with a smaller army than he supposes, this one is not aware that he has to meet a larger and stronger one than he imagines."

As soon as the council broke up, the red ensign was displayed and the army at once took the field.

XLVII.—The enemy were already standing in front of their camp, in battle order. But there was a pause. Hasdrubal had ridden to the front with a handful of cavalry, when he noticed in the hostile ranks some well-worn shields which he had not seen before, and some unusually lean horses; the numbers, too, seemed greater than usual. Suspecting the truth he hastily withdrew his troops into camp and sent men down to the river from which the Romans obtained water, to catch if they could some of the watering parties and see whether they were especially sunburnt, as is generally the case after a long march. He ordered, at the same time, mounted patrols to ride round the consul's camp and observe whether the lines had been extended in any direction and to notice at the same time whether the bugle-call was sounded once or twice in the camp.<sup>20</sup> They reported that both the camps—M. Livius' camp and that of L. Porcius—were just as they had been, no addition had been made, and this misled him. But they also informed him that the bugle-call was sounded once in the praetor's camp and twice in the consul's, and this perturbed the veteran commander, familiar as he was with the habits of the Romans. He concluded that both the consuls were there and was anxiously wondering how the one consul had got away from Hannibal. Least of all could he suspect what had actually occurred, namely that Hannibal had been so completely outwitted that he did not know the whereabouts of the commander and the army whose camp had been so close to his own. As his brother had not ventured to follow the consul, he felt quite certain that he had sustained a serious defeat, and he felt the gravest apprehensions lest he should have come too late to save a desperate situation, and lest the Romans should enjoy the same good fortune in Italy which they had met with in Spain. Then again he was convinced that his letter had never reached Hannibal,

but had been intercepted by the consul who then hastened to crush him. Amidst these gloomy forebodings he ordered the camp fires to be extinguished, and gave the signal at the first watch for all the baggage to be collected in silence. The army then left the camp. In the hurry and confusion of the night march the guides, who had not been kept under very close observation, slipped away; one hid himself in a place selected beforehand, the other swam across the Metaurus at a spot well known to him. The column deprived of its guides marched on aimlessly across country, and many, worn out by sleeplessness, flung themselves down to rest, those who remained with the standards becoming fewer and fewer. Until daylight showed him his route, Hasdrubal ordered the head of the column to advance cautiously, but finding that owing to the bends and turns of the river he had made little progress, he made arrangements for crossing it as soon as daybreak should show him a convenient place. But he was unable to find one, for the further he marched from the sea, the higher were the banks which confined the stream, and by thus wasting the day he gave his enemy time to follow him.

XLVIII. Nero with the whole of the cavalry was the first to come up, then Porcius followed with the light infantry. They began to harass their wearied enemy by repeated charges on all sides, until Hasdrubal stopped a march which began to resemble a flight, and decided to form camp on a hill which commanded the river. At this juncture Livius appeared with the heavy infantry, not in order of march, but deployed and armed for immediate battle. All their forces were now massed together, and the line was formed; Claudius Nero taking command of the right wing, Livius of the left, while the centre was assigned to the praetor.

When Hasdrubal saw that he must give up all idea of entrenching himself and prepare to fight, he stationed the elephants in the front, the Gauls near them on the left to oppose Claudius, not so much because he trusted them as because he hoped they would frighten the enemy, while on the right, where he commanded in person, he posted the Spaniards in whom as veteran troops he placed most confidence. The Ligurians were stationed in the centre behind the elephants. His formation was greater in depth than length,<sup>30</sup> and the Gauls were covered by a hill which extended across their front.

That part of the line which Hasdrubal and his Spaniards

held engaged the Roman left; the whole of the Roman right was shut out from the fighting, the hill in front prevented them from making either a frontal or a flank attack. The struggle between Livius and Hasdrubal was a fierce one, and both sides lost heavily. Here were the two captains, the greater part of the Roman infantry and cavalry, the Spaniards who were veteran soldiers and used to the Roman methods of fighting, and also the Ligurians, a people hardened by warfare. To this part of the field the elephants too had been driven, and at their first onset they threw the front ranks into confusion and forced the standards to give way. Then as the fighting became hotter and the noise and shouting more furious, it became impossible to control them, they rushed about between the two armies as though they did not know to which side they belonged, just like ships drifting rudderless.

Nero made fruitless efforts to scale the hill in front of him, calling out repeatedly to his men, "Why have we made so long a march at such break-neck speed?" When he found it impossible to reach the enemy in that direction, he detached some cohorts from his right wing where he saw that they were more likely to stand on guard than to take any part in the fighting, led them past the rear of his division and to the surprise of his own men as much as of the enemy commenced an attack upon the enemy's flank. So rapidly was this manoeuvre executed, that almost as soon as they showed themselves on the flank, they were attacking the rear of the enemy. Thus attacked on every side, front, flank and rear, Spaniards and Ligurians alike were simply massacred where they stood. At last the carnage reached the Gauls. Here there was very little fighting, for a great many had fallen out during the night and were lying asleep everywhere in the fields, and those who were still with the standards were worn out by the long march and want of sleep, and being quite unable to stand fatigue could hardly sustain the weight of their armour. It was now mid-day, and the heat and thirst made them gasp for breath, until they were cut down or made prisoners without offering any resistance.

XLIX. More elephants were killed by their drivers than by the enemy. They had a carpenter's chisel and a mallet, and when the maddened beasts rushed among their own side the driver placed the chisel between the ears just where the head is joined to the neck and drove it home with all his might. This was the quickest method that had been discovered of putting

these huge animals to death when there was no hope of controlling them, and Hasdrubal was the first to introduce it. Often had this commander distinguished himself in other battles, but never more than in this one. He kept up the spirits of his men as they fought by words of encouragement and by sharing their dangers; when, weary and dispirited, they would no longer fight, he rekindled their courage by his entreaties and reproaches; he rallied those in flight and often revived the battle where it had been abandoned. At last when the fortune of the day was decisively with the enemy he refused to survive that great army which had followed him, drawn by the magic of his name, and setting spurs to his horse dashed against a Roman cohort. There he fell fighting—a death worthy of Hamilcar's son and Hannibal's brother.

Never during the whole of the war had so many of the enemy perished in a single battle. The death of the commander and the destruction of his army were regarded as an adequate repayment for the disaster of Cannae. 56,000 of the enemy were killed, 5400 taken prisoners, and a great quantity of plunder was secured, especially of gold and silver. Above 3000 Romans who had been captured by the enemy were recovered, and this was some consolation for the losses incurred in the battle. For the victory was by no means a bloodless one; about 8000 Romans and allies were killed. So satiated were the victors with bloodshed and carnage that when it was reported to Livius on the following day that the Cisalpine Gauls and Ligurians who had taken no part in the battle or had escaped from the field were marching off in a body without general or standards or any one to give the word of command, and that a single squadron of cavalry could wipe out the whole lot, the consul replied: "Let some survive to carry the news of their defeat and our victory."

*L. Reception of the News in Rome.*—The night after the battle Nero started off at a more rapid pace than he had come, and in six days reached his camp and was once more in touch with Hannibal.<sup>31</sup> His march was not watched by the same crowds as before, because no messengers preceded him, but his return was welcomed with such extravagant delight that people were almost beside themselves for joy. As to the state of feeling in Rome, it is impossible to describe it, or to picture the anxiety with which the citizens waited for the result of the battle or the enthusiasm which the report of the victory aroused. Never

from the day when the news came that Nero had commenced his march had any senator left the House, or the people the Forum from sunrise to sunset. The matrons, as they could give no active help, betook themselves to prayers and intercessions; they thronged all the shrines and assailed the gods with supplications and vows.

Whilst the citizens were in this state of anxious suspense, a vague rumour was started to the effect that two troopers belonging to Narnia had gone from the battle-field to the camp there which was holding the road to Umbria with the announcement that the enemy had been cut to pieces. People listened to the rumour, but they could not take it in, the news was too great, too joyful for them to realise or to accept as true, and the very speed at which it had travelled made it less credible, for the battle was reported as having taken place only two days previously. Then followed a despatch from L. Manlius Acidinus, reporting the arrival of the two troopers in his camp. When this despatch was carried through the Forum to the praetor's tribunal the senators left their seats, and such was the excitement of the people as they pushed and struggled round the door of the senate-house that the courier could not get near it. He was dragged away by the crowd, who demanded with loud shouts that the despatch should be read from the rostra before it was read in the senate-house. At last the magistrates succeeded in forcing back and restraining the populace, and it became possible for all to share in the joyous news they were so impatient to learn. The despatch was read first in the senate-house, and then in the Assembly. It was listened to with different feelings according to each man's temperament; some regarded the news as absolutely true, others would not believe it till they had the consul's despatch and the report of the envoys.

LI. Word was brought that the envoys were approaching. Everybody young and old alike ran out to meet them, each eager to drink in the good tidings with eyes and ears, and the crowd extended as far as the Mulvian bridge. The envoys were L. Veturius Philo, P. Licinius Varus and Q. Caecilius Metellus. They made their way to the Forum surrounded by a crowd which represented every class of the population, and besieged by questions on all sides as to what had really happened. No sooner did any one hear that the army of the enemy and its commander had been slain whilst the consuls and their army

were safe, than he hastened to make others sharers of his joy. The senate-house was reached with difficulty, and with much greater difficulty was the crowd prevented from invading the space reserved for the senators. Here the despatch was read, and then the envoys were conducted to the Assembly. After the despatch was read, L. Veturius gave fuller details and his narrative was received with bursts of applause, which finally swelled into universal cheers, the Assembly being hardly able to contain itself for joy. Some ran to the temples to give thanks to heaven, others hurried home that their wives and children might hear the good news.

The senate decreed a three days' thanksgiving "because the consuls, M. Livius and C. Claudius Nero, had preserved their own armies in safety and destroyed the army of the enemy and its commander." C. Hostilius, the praetor, issued the order for its observance. The services were attended by men and women alike, the temples were crowded all through the three days, and the matrons in their most splendid robes, accompanied by their children, offered their thanksgivings to the gods, as free from anxiety and fear as though the war were over.

This victory also relieved the financial position. People ventured to do business just as in a time of peace, buying and selling, lending and repaying loans.

After Nero had returned to camp he gave orders for Hasdrubal's head, which he had kept and brought with him, to be thrown in front of the enemies' outpost, and the African prisoners to be exhibited just as they were in chains. Two of them were released with orders to go to Hannibal and report all that had happened. Stunned by the blow which had fallen on his country and on his family, it is said that Hannibal declared that he recognised the doom which awaited Carthage. He broke up his camp, and decided to concentrate in Bruttium, the remotest corner of Italy, all his supporters whom he could no longer protect, whilst scattered in the different cities. The whole population of Metapontum had to leave their homes together with all the Lucanians who acknowledged his supremacy, and were transported into Bruttian territory.

## BOOK XXVIII

### FINAL CONQUEST OF SPAIN

I. *The Campaign in Spain.*—Though Hasdrubal's invasion had shifted the burden of war to Italy and brought corresponding relief to Spain, war was suddenly renewed in that country which was quite as formidable as the previous one. At the time of Hasdrubal's departure Spain was divided between Rome and Carthage as follows: Hasdrubal Gisgo had retreated to the ocean littoral near Gades, the Mediterranean coast-line and almost the whole of Eastern Spain was held by Scipio on behalf of Rome. A new general took Hasdrubal's place, named Hanno, who brought over a fresh army, and marched into Celtiberia, which lies between the Mediterranean and the ocean, and here he soon raised a very considerable army. Scipio sent M. Silanus against him with a force of not more than 10,000 infantry and 500 cavalry. Silanus marched with all the speed he could, but his progress was impeded by the bad state of the roads and by the narrow mountain passes, obstacles which are met with in most parts of Spain. In spite of these difficulties he outstripped not only any natives who might have carried tidings, but even any floating rumours of his advance, and with the assistance of some Celtiberian deserters who acted as guides he succeeded in finding the enemy.

When he was about ten miles distant, he was informed by his guides that there were two camps near the road on which he was marching; the one on the left was occupied by the Celtiberians, a newly raised army about 9000 strong, the one on the right by the Carthaginians. The latter was carefully guarded by outposts, pickets and all the usual precautions against surprise; the Celtiberian camp was without any discipline, and all precautions were neglected as might be expected of barbarians and raw levies who felt all the less fear because they were in their own country. Silanus decided to attack that one first, and kept his men as much to the left as possible, so as not to be seen by the Carthaginian outposts. After sending on his scouts he advanced rapidly against the enemy.



II. He was now about three miles away and none of the enemy had yet noticed his advance, the rocks and thickets which covered the whole of this hilly district concealed his movements. Before making his final advance, he ordered his men to halt in a valley where they were effectually hidden and take food. The scouting parties returned and confirmed the statements of the deserters, on which the Romans, after placing the baggage in the centre and arming themselves for the combat, advanced in order of battle. The enemy caught sight of these when they were a mile distant and hurriedly prepared to meet them. As soon as Mago heard the shouting and confusion he galloped across from his camp to take command. There were in the Celtiberian army 4000 men with shields and 200 cavalry, making up a regular legion. These were his main strength and he stationed them in the front; the rest who were lightly armed he posted in reserve. In this formation he led them out of the camp, but they had hardly crossed the rampart when the Romans hurled their javelins at them. The Spaniards stooped to avoid them, and then sprang up to discharge their own, which the Romans who were in their usual close order received on their overlapping shields; then they closed up foot to foot and fought with their swords. The Celtiberians, accustomed to rapid evolutions, found their agility useless on the broken ground, but the Romans, who were used to stationary fighting, found no inconvenience from it beyond the fact that their ranks were sometimes broken when moving through narrow places or patches of brushwood. Then they had to fight singly or in pairs, as if they were fighting duels.

These very obstacles, however, by impeding the enemy's flight, gave them up, as though bound hand and foot, to the sword. Almost all the heavy infantry of the Celtiberians had fallen when the Carthaginian light infantry, who had now come from the other camp, shared their fate. Not more than 2000 infantry escaped; the cavalry, which had hardly taken any part in the battle, together with Mago also got away. The other general, Hanno, was taken prisoner, together with those who were the last to appear in the field when the battle was already lost. Mago, with almost the whole of his cavalry and his veteran infantry, joined Hasdrubal at Gades ten days after the battle. The Celtiberian levies dispersed amongst the neighbouring forests and so reached their homes.

So far the war had not been a serious one, but there was all

the material for a much greater conflagration had it been possible to induce the other tribes to join the Celtiberians in arms; that possibility was by this most timely victory destroyed. Scipio therefore eulogised Silanus in generous terms, and felt hopeful of bringing the war to a termination if he on his part acted with sufficient promptitude. He advanced, accordingly, into the remote corner of Spain where all the remaining strength of Carthage was concentrated under Hasdrubal. He happened at the time to be encamped in the district of Baetica for the purpose of securing the fidelity of his allies, but on Scipio's advance he suddenly moved away and in a march which closely resembled a flight retreated to Gades on the coast. Feeling, however, quite certain that as long as he kept his army together he would be the object of attack, he arranged, before he crossed over to Gades, for the whole of his force to be distributed amongst the various cities, so that they could defend the walls whilst the walls protected them.

III. When Scipio became aware of this breaking up of the hostile forces, he saw that to carry his arms from city to city would involve a loss of time far greater than the results gained, and consequently marched back again. Not wishing, however, to leave that district in the enemy's hands, he sent his brother Lucius with 10,000 infantry and 1000 cavalry to attack the richest city in that part of the country; the natives call it Orongi. It is situated in the country of the Maesseses, one of the tribes of Southern Spain; the soil is fertile, and there are also silver mines. Hasdrubal had used it as his base from which to make his incursions on the inland tribes. Lucius Scipio encamped in the neighbourhood of the city, but before investing it, he sent men up to the gates to hold a parley with the townsmen and endeavour to persuade them to put the friendship rather than the strength of the Romans to the proof. As nothing in the shape of a peaceable answer was returned, he surrounded the place with a double line of circumvallation and formed his army into three divisions, so that one division at a time could be in action while the other two were resting, and thus a continuous attack might be kept up. When the first division advanced to the storm there was a desperate fight; they had the utmost difficulty in approaching the walls and bringing up the scaling-ladders owing to the rain of missiles showered down upon them. Even when they had planted the ladders against the walls and began to mount them, they were thrust down by

forks made for the purpose, iron hooks were let down upon others so that they were in danger of being dragged off the ladders and suspended in mid-air. Scipio saw that what made the struggle indecisive was simply the insufficient number of his men and that the defenders had the advantage because they were fighting from their walls. He withdrew the division which was engaged, and brought up the two others. In face of this fresh attack the defenders, worn out with meeting the former assault, retreated hastily from the walls, and the Carthaginian garrison, fearing that the city had been betrayed, left their various posts and formed into one body. This alarmed the townsmen, who dreaded lest the enemy when once inside the city should massacre every one, whether Carthaginian or Spaniard. They flung open one of the gates and burst out of the town, holding their shields in front of them in case missiles should be hurled on them from a distance, and showing their empty right hands to make it plain that they had thrown away their swords. Their action was misinterpreted either owing to the distance at which they were seen, or because treachery was suspected, and a fierce attack was made upon the flying crowd, who were cut down as though they were a hostile army. The Romans marched in through the open gate whilst other gates were demolished with axes and mallets, and as each cavalry man entered he galloped in accordance with instructions to the forum. The cavalry were supported by a detachment of triarii; the legionaries occupied the rest of the city. There was no plundering and, except in the case of armed resistance, no bloodshed. All the Carthaginians and about a thousand of the townsmen who had closed the gates were placed under guard, the town was handed over to the rest of the population and their property restored to them.

About 2000 of the enemy fell in the assault upon the city; not more than 90 of the Romans.

IV. The capture of this city was a source of great gratification to those who had effected it, as it was also to the commander-in-chief and the rest of the army. The entry of the troops was a noteworthy sight owing to the immense number of prisoners who preceded them. Scipio bestowed the highest commendation on his brother, and declared that the capture of Orongis was as great an achievement as his own capture of New Carthage.

The winter was now coming on, and as the season would not admit of his making an attempt on Gades or pursuing

Hasdrubal's army, dispersed as it was throughout the province, Scipio brought his entire force back into Hither Spain. After dismissing the legions to their winter quarters, he sent his brother to Rome with Hanno and the other prisoners of high rank, and then retired to Tarraco.

The Roman fleet under the command of the proconsul M. Valerius Laevinus sailed during the year to Africa, and committed widespread devastation round Utica and Carthage; plunder was carried off under the very walls of Utica and on the frontiers of Carthage. On their return to Sicily they fell in with a Carthaginian fleet of seventy vessels. Out of these seventeen were captured, four were sunk, the rest scattered in flight. The Roman army, victorious alike on land and sea, returned to Lilybaeum with an enormous amount of plunder of every kind. Now that the enemy's ships had been driven off and the sea rendered safe, large supplies of corn were conveyed to Rome.

V. *Events in Greece.*—It was in the beginning of this summer that the proconsul P. Sulpicius and King Attalus who, as already stated, had wintered at Aegina, sailed for Lemnos with their combined fleets, the Roman vessels numbering twenty-five and the king's ships, thirty-five. In order to be in readiness to meet his enemies by land or sea, Philip went down to Demetrias on the coast and issued orders for his army to assemble at Larissa by a given day. When they heard of the king's arrival at Demetrias, deputations from all his allies visited him there. The Aetolians, emboldened by their alliance with Rome and the arrival of Attalus, were ravaging their neighbours' lands. Great alarm was created amongst the Acarnanians, the Boeotians and the inhabitants of Euboea, and the Achaeans had further cause for apprehension, for, in addition to their war with the Aetolians, they were threatened by Machanidas the tyrant of Lacedaemon, who had encamped not far from the Argive frontiers. The deputations informed the king of the state of things, and one and all begged him to render them assistance against the dangers which were threatening by land and sea. The condition of his own kingdom was far from tranquil; reports were brought to him announcing that Scerdilaedus and Pleuratus were again active and that Thracian tribes, especially the Maedi, were prepared to invade Macedonia as soon as the king was involved in a distant war. The Boeotians and the States in the interior of Greece reported that the

Aetolians had closed the pass of Thermopylae at its narrowest part with a fosse and rampart to prevent him from carrying succour to the cities of his allies. Even a lethargic leader would have been roused to activity by all these disturbances round him. He dismissed the deputations with a definite promise that he would furnish assistance to them all as time and circumstances allowed. For the moment the most pressing care was the city of Peparethos, as King Attalus, who had sailed thither from Lemnos, was reported to be plundering and destroying all the country round. Philip sent a detachment to protect the place. He also sent Polyphantas with a small force into Boeotia, and Mnippus, one of his generals, with 1000 peltasts<sup>1</sup> to Chalcis. This force was supplemented by 500 Agrianians, in order that the whole of the island might be protected. Philip himself proceeded to Scotusa and ordered the Macedonian troops at Larissa to march there.

Information was brought to him here that the national council of the Aetolians had been summoned to meet at Heraclea and that Attalus would be present to consult with them as to the conduct of the war. Philip accordingly proceeded thither by forced marches, but did not reach the place till the council was broken up. He destroyed the crops, however, which were almost ripe, especially round the gulf of the Aenianes,<sup>2</sup> and then led his army back to Scotusa. Leaving the bulk of his forces there he returned to Demetrias with his household troops. With the view of meeting any movement on the part of the enemy, he sent men into Phocis, Euboea and Peparethos to select elevated positions on which beacon fires might be lighted, and himself fixed an observation post on Tisaeos, a peak of immense height. In this way he hoped to receive instant notice from the distant fires of any movement on the part of the enemy.

The Roman general and Attalus sailed from Peparethos to Nicaea, and from there to the city of Oreus in Euboea. This is the first city in Euboea which you pass on your left hand as you leave the Gulf of Demetrias<sup>3</sup> for Chalcis and the Euripus. It was arranged between Attalus and Sulpicius that the Romans should attack by sea and the king's troops by land.

VI. It was not till the fourth day after their arrival that they commenced the attack, the interval having been spent in secret conferences with Plator, whom Philip had made commandant of the garrison. The city has two citadels, one

overlooking the sea, the other in the heart of the city. From the latter a subterranean passage leads down to the sea, and at one time terminated in a tower five storeys high, which formed an imposing defence. Here a violent contest took place, for the tower was plentifully stored with missiles of every kind, and the engines and artillery had been brought up from the ships for use against the walls. Whilst every one's attention was engrossed by the struggle going on here, Plator admitted the Romans through the gate of the seaward citadel, and this was captured at once.

Then the defenders, finding themselves forced back into the city, tried to gain the other citadel. Men who were posted here for the purpose closed the gates against them, and thus shut out from both citadels they were killed or made prisoners. The Macedonian garrison stood in a close phalanx under the wall of the citadel, neither attempting to flee nor taking an active part in the fighting. Plator persuaded Sulpicius to let them go and they were placed on board and landed at Demetrium in Phthiotis. Plator himself joined Attalus.

Encouraged by his easy success at Oreus, Sulpicius sailed at once with his victorious fleet to Chalcis, but here the result by no means answered his expectations. The sea which is wide and open at each end of the Euripus contracts here into a narrow channel, which at first sight presents the appearance of a double harbour with two mouths opposite each other. But it would be difficult to find a more dangerous roadstead for a fleet. Sudden tempestuous winds sweep down from the lofty mountains on both sides, and the Euripus does not, as is commonly asserted, ebb and flow seven times a day at regular intervals, but its waters, driven haphazard like the wind first in one direction and then in another, rush along like a torrent down the side of a precipitous mountain, so that ships are never in quiet waters day or night.

After Sulpicius had anchored his fleet in these treacherous waters, he found that the town was protected on the one side by the sea, and on the other, the land side, by very strong fortifications, whilst the strength of its garrison and the loyalty of the officers, so different from the duplicity and treason at Oreus, made it impregnable. After surveying the difficulties of his position, the Roman commander acted wisely in desisting from his rash enterprise, and without any further loss of time sailed away to Cynos in Locris, a place situated about a

mile from the sea, which served as the emporium of the Opuntians.

VII. The beacon fires at Oreus had given Philip warning, but through the treachery of Plator they were lighted too late, and in any case Philip's inferiority in naval strength would have made it extremely difficult for him to reach the island. In consequence of this delay he made no effort for its relief, but he hastened to the relief of Chalcis as soon as he got the signal. Although this city is also situated on the island, it is separated from the mainland by such a narrow strait as to allow of its being connected by a bridge, and it is therefore more easy to approach it by land than by sea. Philip marched from Demetrias to Scotusa; he left that place at midnight, and after routing the Aetolians who were holding the pass of Thermopylae drove them in confusion to Heraclea. He finally reached Elatia in Phocis, having covered more than sixty miles in one day. Almost on the very same day the city of the Opuntians was taken and sacked by Attalus. Sulpicius had left the spoils to him, because Oreus had been sacked by the Romans a few days previously, when the king's troops were elsewhere. Whilst the Roman fleet was lying off Oreus, Attalus was busily occupied in extorting contributions from the principal citizens of Opus, utterly unaware of Philip's approach. So rapid was the Macedonian advance that had not some Cretans who had gone foraging further than usual caught sight of the hostile column in the distance, Attalus would have been completely surprised. As it was he fled, without stopping to arm, in wild disorder to his ships, and the men were actually pushing their vessels off when Philip appeared, and even from the water's edge created great alarm amongst the crews. Then he returned to Opus, storming at gods and men because the chance of a great success had been almost snatched out of his hands. He was just as furious with the Opuntians, for, though they might have held out till his arrival, no sooner did they see the enemy than they voluntarily surrendered.

After settling matters at Opus, he went on to Thronium. Attalus had sailed to Oreus, but on learning that Prusias, the king of Bithynia, had violated the frontiers of his dominions he dropped all his projects in Greece, including the Aetolian war, and sailed to Asia. Sulpicius took his fleet back to Aegina, whence he had started in the beginning of spring. Philip captured Thronium with no more difficulty than Attalus had

experienced at Opus. The population of this city consisted of refugees from Thebes in Phthiotis. When the place was captured by Philip, they escaped and put themselves under the protection of the Aetolians, who assigned for their abode a city which had been ruined and abandoned in the previous war with Philip. After his capture of Thronium he advanced to the capture of Tithronon and Drymia, small unimportant towns in Doris. Ultimately he reached Elatia, where it was arranged that the embassies from Ptolemy and the Rhodians should meet him. Here they were discussing the question of bringing the Aetolian war to a close—the ambassadors had been present at the recent council of the Romans and Aetolians at Heraclea—when news was brought that Machanidas had decided to attack the Eleans in the midst of their preparations for the Olympic Games. Philip thought it his duty to prevent this, and accordingly dismissed the ambassadors after assuring them that he was responsible for the war and would place no obstacles in the way of peace, provided its terms were fair and honourable.

He then set off with his army in light marching order, and passed through Boeotia to Megara, and from there he descended to Corinth. Here he collected supplies, and then advanced towards Phlius and Pheneos. When he had reached Heraea he heard that Machanidas, alarmed at his rapid approach, had made a hurried return to Lacedaemon. On receiving this intelligence he repaired to Aegium, in order to be present at the meeting of the Achaean League; he also expected to find there the Carthaginian fleet, which he had sent for in the hope of doing something by sea. The Carthaginians had left that place a few days previously for Oxeae and then, when they heard that Attalus and the Romans had left Oreus, they sought shelter in the harbours of Acarnania, fearing lest if they were attacked within the strait of Rhium, the neck of the Gulf of Corinth, they should be overpowered.

VIII. Philip was extremely disappointed and vexed at finding that in spite of his rapid movements he was always too late to do anything, and that Fortune mocked his energy and activity by snatching away every opportunity from before his eyes. However, he concealed his disappointment in the presence of the council, and spoke in a very confident tone. Appealing to gods and men he declared that at no time or place had he ever failed to go with all possible speed wherever the clash of hostile arms was heard. It would be difficult, he



continued, to estimate whether the enemy's anxiety to flee or his own eagerness to fight played the greater part in the war. In this way Attalus got away from Opus, and Sulpicius from Chalcis, and now Machanidas had slipped out of his hands. But flight did not always mean victory, and it was impossible to regard as serious a war in which when once you have come into touch with the enemy, you have conquered. The most important thing was the enemy's own admission that they were no match for him, and in a short time he would win a decisive victory, the enemy would find the result of the battle no better than they had anticipated.

His allies were delighted with his speech. He then made over Heraea and Triphylia to the Achaeans, and on their bringing forward satisfactory evidence that Aliphera in Megalopolis had formed part of their territory, he restored that place also to them. Subsequently with some vessels furnished by the Achaeans—three quadriremes and as many biremes—he sailed to Anticyra. He had previously sent into the Gulf of Corinth seven quinqueremes and more than twenty light vessels, intending to strengthen the Carthaginian fleet, and with these he proceeded to Eruthrae in Aetolia near Eupalium, where he disembarked. The Aetolians were aware of his landing, for all the men who were in the fields or in the neighbouring forts of Potidania or Apollonia fled to the woods and the mountains; their flocks and herds which they were unable in their haste to drive away Philip secured and placed on board. The whole of the plunder was despatched in charge of Nicias the praetor of the Achaeans to Aegium; Philip, sending his army overland through Bocotia, went himself to Corinth, and from there to Cenchrae. Here he re-embarked, and sailing past the coast of Attica, round the headland of Sunium and almost through the hostile fleets, arrived at Chalcis. In his address to the citizens he spoke in the highest terms of their loyalty and courage in refusing to be moved by either threats or promises, and he urged them, in case they were attacked, to show the same determination to be true to their ally if they thought their own position preferable to that of Opus or Oreus. From Chalcis he sailed to Oreus, where he entrusted the administration and defence of the city to those magnates who had fled on the capture of the place rather than betray it to the Romans. Then he returned to Demetrias, the place from which he had started to render assistance to his allies

He now proceeded to lay down the keels of 100 war-ships at Cassandrea, and a large number of shipwrights were assembled for their construction. As matters were now quiet in Greece, owing to the departure of Attalus and the effective assistance which Philip had given to his allies in their difficulties, he returned to Macedonia to commence operations against the Maedi.

IX. *The Consuls celebrate a Triumph.*—Just at the close of this summer Quintus Fabius, the son of Maximus, who was on the staff of the consul M. Livius, came to Rome to inform the senate that the consul considered L. Porcius and his legions sufficient for the defence of Gaul, in which case he, Livius, and his consular army might be safely withdrawn. The senate recalled not only Livius, but his colleague as well, but the instructions given to each differed. M. Livius was ordered to bring his troops back, but Nero's legions were to remain in their province, confronting Hannibal. The consuls had been in correspondence with each other and had agreed that as they had been of the same mind in their conduct of public affairs, so, though coming from opposite directions, they should approach the City at the same time. Whichever should be the first to reach Praeneste was to wait there for his colleague, and, as it happened, they both arrived there on the same day. After despatching a summons for the senate to meet at the temple of Bellona in three days' time they went on together towards the City. The whole population turned out to meet them with shouts of welcome, and each tried to grasp the consuls' hands; congratulations and thanks were showered upon them for having, by their efforts, rendered the commonwealth safe. When the senate was assembled they followed the precedent set by all victorious generals and laid before the House a report of their military operations. Then they made request that in recognition of their energetic and successful conduct of public affairs special honours should be rendered to the gods and they, the consuls, should be allowed to enter the City in triumph. The senators passed a decree that their request should be granted out of gratitude to the gods in the first place, and then, next to the gods, out of gratitude to the consuls. A solemn thanksgiving was decreed on their behalf, and each of them was allowed to enjoy a triumph.

As they had been in perfect agreement as to the management of their campaign, they decided that they would not have

separate triumphs, and the following arrangement was made: As the victory had been won in the province assigned to Livius, and as it had fallen to him to take the auspices on the day of battle, and further, as his army had been brought back to Rome, whilst Nero's army was unable to leave its province, it was decided that Livius should ride in the chariot at the head of his soldiers, and C. Claudius Nero alone on horseback. The triumph thus shared between them enhanced the glory of both, but especially of the one who allowed his comrade to surpass him in honour as much as he himself surpassed him in merit. "That horseman," men said to one another, "traversed Italy from end to end in six days, and at the very time when Hannibal believed him to be confronting him in Apulia he was fighting a pitched battle with Hasdrubal in Gaul. So one consul had checked the advance of two generals, two great captains from the opposite corners of Italy, by opposing his strategy to the one and meeting the other in person. The mere name of Nero had sufficed to keep Hannibal quiet in his camp, and as to Hasdrubal, what brought about his defeat and destruction but Nero's arrival in the-field? The one consul may ride in a chariot with as many horses as he pleases, the real triumph belongs to the other who is borne on horseback through the City; even if he went on foot Nero's renown would never die, whether through the glory he acquired in war, or the contempt he showed for it in his triumph."

These and similar remarks from the spectators followed Nero till he reached the Capitol. The money they brought into the treasury amounted to 300,000 sesterces and 80,000 of bronze coinage.<sup>4</sup> M. Livius' largesse to his soldiers amounted to fifty-six ases per man, and C. Nero promised to give the same amount to his men as soon as he rejoined his army. It is remarked that in their jests and songs the soldiers on that day celebrated the name of C. Claudius Nero more frequently than that of their own consul; and that the members of the equestrian order were full of praises for L. Veturius and Q. Caecilius, and urged the plebs to make them consuls for the coming year. The consuls added considerably to the weight of this recommendation when on the morrow they informed the Assembly with what courage and fidelity the two officers had served them.

X. *The Elections.*—The time was approaching for the elections and it was decided that they should be conducted by a Dictator. C. Claudius Nero named his colleague M. Livius as Dictator,

and he nominated Q. Caecilius as his Master of the Horse. L. Veturius and Q. Caecilius were both elected consuls. Then came the election of praetors; those appointed were C. Servilius, M. Caecilius Metellus, Tiberius Claudius Asellus and Q. Mamilius Turrinus, who was a plebeian aedile at the time. When the elections were over, the Dictator laid down his office and after disbanding his army went on a mission to Etruria. He had been commissioned by the senate to hold an enquiry as to which cantons in Etruria had entertained the design of deserting to Hasdrubal as soon as he appeared, and also which of them had assisted him with supplies, or men, or in any other way.

Such were the events of the year at home and abroad.

The Roman Games were celebrated in full on three successive days by the curule aediles, Cnaeus Servilius Caepio and Servilius Cornelius Lentulus; similarly the Plebeian Games were celebrated by the plebeian aediles, M. Pomponius Matho and Q. Mamilius Turrinus.

It was now the thirteenth year of the Punic War. Both the consuls, L. Veturius Philo and Q. Caecilius Metellus, had the same province—Bruttium—assigned to them, that they might jointly carry on operations against Hannibal. The praetors balloted for their provinces. M. Caecilius Metellus obtained the City jurisdiction; Q. Mamilius, that over aliens. Sicily fell to C. Servilius, and Sardinia to Ti. Claudius.

*The Military Dispositions for the Year.*—The armies were distributed as follows: One of the consuls took over Nero's army; the other, that which Q. Claudius had commanded; each consisted of two legions. M. Livius, who was acting as proconsul for the year, took over from C. Terentius the two legions of volunteer slaves in Etruria.<sup>5</sup> It was also decreed that Q. Mamilius, to whom the jurisdiction over aliens had been allotted, should transfer his judicial business to his colleague, and hold Gaul with the army which L. Porcius had commanded as propraetor; he was also instructed to ravage the fields of those Gauls who had gone over to the Carthaginians on the arrival of Hasdrubal. C. Servilius was to protect Sicily, as C. Mamilius had done, with the two legions of the survivors of Cannae. The old army in Sardinia, under A. Hostilius, was recalled, and the consuls enrolled a new legion which Tiberius Claudius was to take with him to the island. A year's extension of command was granted to Q. Claudius, that he might remain in charge at Tarentum, and to C. Hostilius Tubero, that he

might continue to act at Capua. M. Valerius, who had been charged with the defence of the Sicilian seaboard, was ordered to hand over thirty ships to the praetor, C. Servilius, and return to Rome with the rest of his fleet.

XI. *Portents*.—In the anxiety caused by the strain of such a serious war when men referred every occurrence, fortunate or the reverse, to the direct action of the gods, numerous portents were announced. At Tarracina the temple of Jupiter, at Satricum that of Mater Matuta were struck by lightning. At the latter place quite as much alarm was created by the appearance of two snakes which glided straight through the doors into the temple of Jupiter. From Antium it was reported that the ears of corn seemed to those who were reaping them to be covered with blood. At Caere a pig had been farrowed with two heads, and a lamb yeaned which was both male and female. Two suns were said to have been seen at Alba, and at Fregellae it had become light during the night. In the precinct of Rome an ox was said to have spoken; the altar of Neptune in the Circus Flaminius was asserted to have been bathed in perspiration, and the temples of Ceres, Salus and Quirinus were all struck by lightning.

The consuls received orders to expiate the portents by sacrificing full-grown victims and to appoint a day of solemn intercession. These measures were carried out in accordance with the senatorial resolution. What was a much more terrifying experience than all the portents reported from the country or seen in the City, was the extinction of the fire in the temple of Vesta. The vestal who was in charge of the fire that night was severely flogged by order of P. Licinius, the Pontifex Maximus. Though this was no portent sent by the gods, but merely the result of human carelessness, it was decided to sacrifice full-grown victims and hold a service of solemn supplication in the temple of Vesta.

Before the consuls left for the seat of war, they were advised by the senate "to see to it that the plebeians were reinstated on their holdings. Through the goodness of the gods the burden of war had now been shifted from the City of Rome and from Latium, and men could dwell in the country parts without fear, it was by no means fitting that they should be more concerned for the cultivation of Sicily than for that of Italy." The people found it, however, anything but an easy matter. The small holders had been carried off by the war, there was

hardly any servile labour available, the cattle had been driven off as plunder, and the homesteads had been either stripped or burnt. Still, at the authoritative behest of the consuls a considerable number did return to their farms. What led to the senate taking up this question was the presence of deputations from Placentia and Cremona, who came to complain of the invasion and wasting of their country by their neighbours, the Gauls. A large proportion of their settlers, they said, had disappeared, their cities were almost without inhabitants, and the countryside was a deserted wilderness. The praetor Mamilius was charged with the defence of these colonies; the consuls, acting on a resolution of the senate, published an edict requiring all those who were citizens of Cremona and Placentia to return to their homes before a certain day.

At last, towards the beginning of spring, they left for the seat of war. The consul Q. Caecilius took over the army from C. Nero, and L. Veturius, the one which Q. Claudius had commanded, and this he brought up to its full strength with the fresh levies which he had raised. They led their armies into the district of Consentia, and ravaged it in all directions. As they were returning laden with plunder they were attacked in a narrow pass by a force of Bruttians and Numidian javelin-men, and not only the plunder but the troops themselves were in danger. There was, however, more alarm and confusion than real fighting. The plunder was sent forward and the legions succeeded in getting into a position free from danger. They advanced into Lucania, and the whole of the district returned to its allegiance to Rome without offering any resistance.

XII. *Hannibal's Position*.—No action was fought with Hannibal this year, for after the blow which had fallen upon him and upon his country, he made no forward movement, nor did the Romans care to disturb him, such was their impression of the powers which that single general possessed, even while his cause was everywhere round him crumbling into ruin. I am inclined to think that he deserves our admiration more in adversity than in the time of his greatest successes. For thirteen years he had been carrying on war with varying fortune in an enemy's country far from home. His army was not made up of his own fellow-countrymen, it was a mixed assemblage of various nationalities who had nothing in common, neither laws nor customs, nor language, who differed in appearance, dress and arms, who were strangers to one another in their religious

observances, who hardly recognised the same gods. And yet he had united them so closely together that no disturbance ever broke out, either amongst the soldiers themselves or against their commander, though very often money and supplies were lacking and it was through want of these that numerous incidents of a disgraceful character had occurred between the generals and their soldiers in the First Punic War. He had rested all his hopes of victory on Hasdrubal and his army, and after that army had been wiped out he withdrew into Bruttium and abandoned the rest of Italy to the Romans. Is it not a matter of surprise that no mutiny broke out in his camp? For in addition to all his other difficulties, there was no prospect of feeding his army except from the resources of Bruttium, and even if the whole of that country had been in cultivation it would have afforded but meagre support for so large an army. But as it was, a large part of the population had been diverted from the tillage of the soil by the war and by their traditional and innate love of brigandage. He received no assistance from home, for the government were mainly concerned about keeping their hold on Spain, just as though everything in Italy was going on successfully.

*The Carthaginians expelled from Spain.*—The situation in Spain was in some respects similar, in others completely dissimilar to the state of affairs in Italy. It was similar in so far as the Carthaginians after their defeat and the loss of their general had been driven into the most distant parts of Spain to the shores of the ocean. It was dissimilar because the natural features of the country and the character of the inhabitants made Spain more fitted than Italy, more fitted, in fact, than any country in the world for the constant renewal of hostilities. Though it was the first province, at all events on the continent, into which the Romans made their way, it was, owing to this cause, the very last to be completely subjugated, and this only in our own days under the conduct and auspices of Augustus Caesar.

Hasdrubal Gisgo, who, next to the Barcine family, was the greatest and most brilliant general that held command in this war, was encouraged by Mago to renew hostilities. He left Gades, and traversing Further Spain, raised a force of 50,000 infantry and 4500 cavalry. As to the strength of his cavalry the authorities are generally agreed, but some writers assert that the infantry force which he led to Silpia<sup>6</sup> amounted to

70,000 men. Near this city the two Carthaginian commanders encamped on a wide and open plain, determined to accept battle if offered.

XIII. When intelligence was brought to Scipio of the muster of this large army, he did not consider that he could meet it with his Roman legions unless he employed his native auxiliaries to give at all events the appearance of greater strength. At the same time he felt that he ought not to depend too much upon them, for if they changed sides it might lead to the same disaster as that which had overtaken his father and his uncle. Culchas, whose authority extended over twenty-eight towns, had promised to raise a force of infantry and cavalry during the winter, and Silanus was sent to bring them up. Then breaking up his quarters at Tarraco, Scipio marched down to Castulo, picking up small contingents furnished by the friendly tribes which lay on his line of march. There Silanus joined him with 3000 infantry and 500 cavalry. His entire army, Romans and allied contingents, infantry and cavalry, amounted now to 55,000 men. With this force he advanced to meet the enemy and took up his position near Baecula.

Whilst his men were entrenching their camp they were attacked by Mago and Masinissa with the whole of their cavalry, and would have been thrown into great disorder had not Scipio made a charge with a body of horse which he had placed in concealment behind a hill. These speedily routed those of the assailants who had ridden close up to the lines and were actually attacking the intrenching parties; with the others, however, who kept their ranks and were advancing in steady order the conflict was more sustained, and for a considerable time remained undecided. But when the cohorts of light infantry came in from the outposts, and the men at work on the intrenchments had seized their arms and, fresh for action, were in ever increasing numbers relieving their wearied comrades until a considerable body of armed men were hastening from the camp to do battle, the Carthaginians and Numidians retreated. At first they retired in order though hurriedly and kept their ranks, but when the Romans pressed their attacks home and resistance was no longer possible, they broke and fled as best they could. Though this action did much to raise the spirits of the Romans and depress those of the enemy, there were for several days incessant skirmishes between the cavalry and light infantry on both sides.



XIV. *The Battle of Baecula.*—After the strength of each side had been sufficiently tested in these encounters Hasdrubal led out his army to battle, on which the Romans did the same. Each army remained standing in front of its camp, neither caring to begin the fight. Towards sunset the two armies, first the Carthaginian and then the Roman, marched back to camp. This went on for some days; the Carthaginians were always the first to get into line and the first to receive the order to retire when they were tired out with standing. No forward movement took place on either side, no missile was discharged, no battle-shout raised. The Romans were posted in the centre on the one side, the Carthaginians in the centre of the other; the flanks on both armies were composed of Spanish troops. In front of the Carthaginian line were the elephants which looked in the distance like towers.

It was generally supposed in both camps that they would fight in the order in which they had been standing, and that the main battle would be between the Romans and Carthaginians in the centre, the principals in the war and fairly matched in courage and in arms. When Scipio found that this was assumed as a matter of course, he carefully altered his dispositions for the day on which he intended to fight. The previous evening he sent a tessera through the camp ordering the men to take their breakfast and see that their horses were fed before day-break, the cavalry were at the same time to be fully armed with their horses ready, hitted and saddled. Day had scarcely broken when he sent the whole of his cavalry with the light infantry against the Carthaginian outposts, and at once followed them up with the heavy infantry of the legions under his personal command. Contrary to universal expectation he had made his wings the strongest part of his army by posting the Roman troops there, the auxiliaries occupied the centre.

The shouts of the cavalry roused Hasdrubal and he rushed out of his tent. When he saw the mêlée in front of the rampart and the disordered state of his men, and in the distance the glittering standards of the legions and the whole plain covered with the enemy, he at once sent the whole of his mounted force against the hostile cavalry. He then led his infantry out of the camp, and formed his battle line without any change in the existing order.

The cavalry fight had now been going on for some time without either side gaining the advantage. Nor could any decision

be arrived at, for as each side was in turn driven back they retreated into safety amongst their infantry. But when the main bodies were within half a mile of each other, Scipio recalled his cavalry and ordered them to pass to the rear of the infantry, whose ranks opened out to give them passage; he then formed them into two divisions, and posted one as a support behind each of the wings. Then when the moment for executing his manœuvre arrived he ordered the Spaniards in the centre to make a slow advance, and sent word to Silanus and Marcius that they were to extend to the left as they had seen him extend to the right, and engage the enemy with their light cavalry and infantry before the centres had time to close. Each wing was thus lengthened by three infantry cohorts and three troops of horse, besides velites, and in this formation they advanced against the enemy at a run, the others following *en échelon*. The line curved inwards towards the centre because of the slower advance of the Spaniards. The wings were already engaged whilst the Carthaginians and African veterans, the main strength of their army, had not yet had the chance of discharging a single missile. They did not dare to leave their place in the line and help their comrades for fear of leaving the centre open to the advance of the enemy. The wings were being pressed by a double attack, the cavalry and light infantry had wheeled round and were making a flank charge, whilst the cohorts were pressing their front in order to sever them from their centre.

XV. The struggle had now become a very one-sided one in all parts of the field. Not only were untrained Balearics and raw Spanish levies face to face with the Roman and Latin legionaries, but as the day went on, the physical strength of Hasdrubal's army began to give way. Surprised by the sudden attack in the early morning they had been compelled to go into battle before they could strengthen themselves with food. It was with this view that Scipio had deliberately delayed the fight till late in the day, for it was not until the seventh hour that the attack began on the wings, and it was some time after that before the battle reached the centre, so that, what with the heat of the day, the fatigue of standing under arms, and the hunger and thirst from which they were suffering, they were worn out before they closed with the enemy. Thus exhausted, they leaned on their shields as they stood. To complete their discomfiture the elephants, scared by the sudden onsets of

the cavalry and the rapid movements of the light infantry, rushed from the wings into the centre of the line. Wearied and depressed, the enemy began to retreat, keeping their ranks however, just as if they had been ordered to retire. But when the victors saw that matters were going in their favour they made still more furious attacks in all parts of the field, which the enemy were almost powerless to withstand, though Hasdrubal tried to rally them and keep them from giving way by calling out that the hill in their rear would afford them a safe retreat if they would retire in good order. Their fears, however, got the better of their sense of shame, and when those nearest to the enemy gave way, their example was suddenly followed by all and there was a universal flight. Their first halt was on the lower slope of the hill, and as the Romans hesitated about mounting the hill, they began to re-form their ranks, but when they saw them steadily advancing they again fled and were driven back in disorder to their camp. The Romans were not far from the rampart and would have carried the camp in their onset had not the brilliant sunshine which often glows between heavy showers been succeeded by such a storm that the victors could hardly get back to their camp, and some were even deterred by superstitious fears from attempting anything further for the day.

Although the night and the storm invited the Carthaginians, exhausted as they were by their toil and many of them by their wounds, to take the rest they so sorely needed, yet their fears and the danger they were in allowed them no respite. Fully expecting an attack on their camp as soon as it was light they strengthened their rampart with large stones collected from all the valleys round, hoping to find in their intrenchments the defence which their arms had failed to afford them. The desertion of their allies, however, decided them to seek safety in flight rather than risk another battle. The first to abandon them was Attenes, chief of the Turdetani; he went over with a considerable body of his countrymen, and this was followed by the surrender of two fortified towns with their garrisons to the Romans. For fear of the evil spreading and the spirit of disaffection becoming general, Hasdrubal shifted his camp the following night.

XVI. *The Carthaginians finally evacuate Spain.*—When the outposts brought intelligence of the enemy's departure Scipio sent on his cavalry and followed with his entire army. Such

was the rapidity of the pursuit that had they followed in Hasdrubal's direct track they must have caught him up. But, acting on the advice of their guides, they took a shorter route to the river Baetis, so that they might be able to attack him if he attempted its passage. Finding the river closed to him, Hasdrubal turned his course towards the ocean, and his hurried march, which in its haste and confusion looked like a flight, gave him a considerable start on the Roman legions. Their cavalry and light infantry harassed and retarded him by attacking him in flank and rear, and whilst he was continually forced to halt to repel first the cavalry and then infantry skirmishers, the legions came up. Now it was no longer a battle but sheer butchery, until the general himself set the example of flight and escaped to the nearest hills with some 6000 men, many of them without arms. The rest were killed or made prisoners.

The Carthaginians hastily improvised an intrenched camp on the highest point of the hills, and as the Romans found it useless to attempt the precipitous ascent, they had no difficulty in making themselves safe. But a bare and sterile height was hardly a place in which to stand even a few days' siege, and there were numerous desertions. At last Hasdrubal sent for ships—he was not far from the sea—and fled in the night, leaving his army to its fate.

As soon as Scipio heard of his flight he left Silanus to keep up the investment of the Carthaginian camp with 10,000 infantry and 1000 cavalry, whilst he himself with the rest of his force returned to Tarraco. During his seventy days' march to this place, he took steps to ascertain the attitude of the various chiefs and tribes towards Rome, so that they might be recompensed as they deserved.

After his departure Masinissa came to a secret understanding with Silanus, and crossed over with a small following to Africa, to induce his people to support him in his new policy. The reasons which determined him on this sudden change were not evident at the time, but the loyalty which he subsequently displayed throughout his long life to its close proved beyond question that his motives at the beginning were carefully weighed.

After Mago had sailed to Gades in the ships which Hasdrubal had sent back for him, the rest of the army abandoned by their generals broke up, some deserting to the Romans, others

dispersing amongst the neighbouring tribes. No body of troops remained worth consideration either for numbers or fighting strength.

Such, in the main, was the way in which under the conduct and auspices of Publius Scipio the Carthaginians were expelled from Spain, fourteen years from the commencement of the war, and five years after Scipio assumed supreme command. Not long after Mago's departure Silanus joined Scipio at Tarraco, and reported that the war was at an end.

XVII. *Alliance with Syphax*.—Lucius Scipio was sent to Rome in charge of numerous prisoners of high rank to announce the subjugation of Spain. Everybody else welcomed this brilliant success with feelings of delight and exultation, but the one man who had achieved it and whose thirst for solid and lasting renown was insatiable looked upon his conquest of Spain as only a small instalment of what his lofty ambition led him to hope for. Already he was looking to Africa and the great city of Carthage as destined to crown his glory and immortalise his name. This was the goal before him and he thought it best to prepare the way to it by gaining over the kings and tribes in Africa.

He began by approaching Syphax, king of the Masaesulians, a tribe of Moorish nationality. They lived opposite that part of the Spanish coast where New Carthage lies. At that time there existed a treaty of alliance between their king and Carthage, but Scipio did not imagine that Syphax would regard the sanctity of treaties more scrupulously than they are generally regarded by barbarians whose fidelity depends upon the caprices of fortune. Accordingly he sent C. Laelius to him with presents to win him over. The barbarian was delighted with the presents, and, as he saw that the cause of Rome was everywhere successful, whilst the Carthaginians had failed in Italy and entirely disappeared from Spain, he consented to become friendly to Rome, but insisted that the mutual ratification of the treaty should take place in the presence of the Roman general. All that Laelius could obtain from the king was a safe-conduct, and with that he returned to Scipio. In furtherance of his designs on Africa it was of supreme importance for him to secure Syphax; he was the most powerful of the native princes, and had even attempted hostilities against Carthage; moreover, his frontiers were only separated from Spain by a narrow strait.

Scipio thought it worth while running considerable risk in

order to accomplish his end, and as it could not be effected in any other way, he made arrangements for visiting Syphax. Leaving the defence of Spain in the hands of L. Marcius at Tarraco and M. Silanus at New Carthage, to which latter place he had proceeded by forced marches from Tarraco, he sailed across to Africa accompanied by C. Laelius. He only took two quinqueremes, and as the sea was calm most of the passage was made by rowing, though a light breeze occasionally assisted them.

It so happened that Hasdrubal after his expulsion from Spain entered the harbour at the same time. He had brought his seven triremes to anchor and was preparing to land when the two quinqueremes were sighted. No one entertained the smallest doubt that they belonged to the enemy and could easily be overpowered by superior numbers before they gained the harbour. The efforts of the soldiers and sailors, however, to get their arms ready and the ships into trim amidst much noise and confusion were rendered futile by a freshening breeze from the sea, which filled the sails of the quinqueremes and carried them into port before the Carthaginians could get up their anchors. As they were now in the king's harbour, no one ventured to make any further attempt to molest them. So Hasdrubal, who was the first to land, and Scipio and Laelius, who disembarked soon afterwards, all made their way to the king.

XVIII. Syphax regarded it as an exceptional honour—as indeed it was—for the captains of the two most powerful nations of their time to come to him seeking his friendship and alliance. He invited them both to be his guests, and as Fortune had willed that they should be under the same roof and at the same hearth he tried to induce them to confer together with the view of removing all causes of quarrel. Scipio declined on the ground that he had no personal quarrel with the Carthaginian and he was powerless to discuss affairs of State without the orders of the senate. The king was anxious that it should not seem as if one of his guests was excluded from his table, and he did his utmost to persuade Scipio to be present. He raised no objection, and they both dined with the king, and at his particular request occupied the same couch. Such was Scipio's charm of manner and innate tact in dealing with everybody that he completely won over not only Syphax, who as a barbarian was unaccustomed to Roman manners, but even his deadly enemy. Hasdrubal openly avowed that "he admired

Scipio more now that he had made his personal acquaintance than after his military successes, and he had no doubt that Syphax and his kingdom were already at the disposal of Rome, such skill did the Roman possess in winning men. The question for the Carthaginians was not how Spain had been lost, but how Africa was to be retained. It was not from a love of travel or a passion for sailing along pleasant shores that a great Roman commander had quitted his newly subjugated province and his armies and crossed over with two vessels to Africa, the land of his enemies, and trusted himself to the untried honour of a king. His real motive was the hope of becoming master of Africa; this project he had long been pondering over; he openly complained that 'Scipio was not conducting war in Africa as Hannibal was in Italy.' "

After the treaty with Syphax was concluded Scipio set sail from Africa and, after a four days' passage in which he was buffeted by changeable and mostly stormy winds, reached the harbour of New Carthage.

XIX. *Iliturgi and Castulo punished for their Defection.*—Spain was now quiet as far as war with Carthage was concerned, but it was quite evident that some communities conscious of wrong-doing were kept quiet more by their fears than by any feeling of loyalty to Rome. Amongst these Iliturgi and Castulo were foremost in importance and foremost in guilt. As long as Roman arms were successful Castulo remained true to her alliance; after the Scipios and their armies were destroyed they revolted to Carthage. Iliturgi had gone further, for the inhabitants had betrayed and put to death those who had sought refuge with them after those disasters, thus aggravating their treason by crime. To take action against these cities immediately on his arrival in Spain, whilst the issue was still undecided, might have been justifiable but hardly wise. Now, however, that matters were settled, it was felt that the hour of punishment had arrived. Scipio sent orders to L. Marcius to take a third part of his force to Castulo and at once invest the place, and with the remainder he himself marched to Iliturgi where he arrived after a five days' march.

The gates were closed and every preparation had been made to repel an assault; the townsmen were quite conscious of the punishment they deserved, and any formal declaration of war was, therefore, unnecessary. Scipio made this the subject of his address to his soldiers. "The Spaniards," he said, "by

closing their gates have shown how well they deserve the punishment which they fear. We must treat them with much greater severity than we treated the Carthaginians; with the latter we contend for glory and dominion, with hardly any feeling of anger, but from the former we have to exact the penalty for cruelty, treachery and murder. The time has come for you to avenge the atrocious massacre of your fellow-soldiers and the treachery meditated against yourselves had you been carried there in your flight. You will make it clear for all time by this awful example that no one must ever consider a Roman citizen or a Roman soldier a fit subject for ill-treatment, whatever his condition may be."

Roused by their general's words the men began to prepare for the assault, storming parties were picked out of all the maniples and supplied with ladders, and the army was formed into two divisions, one being placed under the command of Laelius, so that the town might be attacked from opposite sides and a twofold terror created. The defenders were stimulated to a determined and prolonged resistance not by their general or their chiefs but by the fear which came from a consciousness of guilt. With their past crime in mind they warned each other that the enemy was seeking not victory so much as vengeance. The question was not how to escape from death but where to meet it, whether, sword in hand, on the battlefield where the fortune of war often raises up the vanquished and flings the victor to the ground, or amidst the ashes of their city before the eyes of their captive wives and children after being torn with the lash and subjected to shameful and horrible tortures. With this prospect before them every man who could carry arms took his part in the fighting, and even the women and children working beyond their strength supplied missiles to the combatants, and carried stones up to the walls for those who were strengthening the defences. Not only was their liberty at stake—that motive only inspires the brave—but they had before their eyes the very extremity of torture and a shameful death. As they looked at each other and saw that each was trying to outdo all the rest in toil and danger, their courage was fired, and they offered such a furious resistance that the army which had conquered Spain was again and again repulsed from the walls of one solitary city, and fell back in confusion after a contest which brought it no honour. Scipio was afraid that the futile efforts of his troops might



raise the enemies' courage and depress his own men, and he decided to take his part in the fighting and his share of the danger. Reproaching his soldiers for their cowardice he ordered the ladders to be brought up and threatened to mount himself if the rest hung back. He had already reached the foot of the wall and was in imminent danger when shouts arose on all sides from the soldiers who were anxious for their commander's safety, and the ladders were at once planted against the wall.

Laelius now delivered his attack from the other side of the town. This broke the back of the resistance; the walls were cleared of their defenders and seized by the Romans, and in the tumult the citadel also was captured on that side where it was considered impregnable.

XX. Its capture was effected by some African deserters who were serving with the Romans. Whilst the attention of the townsmen was directed to defending the positions which appeared to be in danger and the assailants were mounting their ladders wherever they could approach the walls, these men noticed that the highest part of the city, which was protected by precipitous cliffs, was left unfortified and undefended. These Africans, men of light make and through constant training extremely agile, were furnished with iron hooks, and where the projections of the cliff gave them a footing they climbed it, when they came to a place where it was too steep or too smooth they fixed the hooks in at moderate intervals and used them as steps, those in front pulling up those behind, and those below pushing up those above them. In this way, they managed to reach the top, and no sooner had they done so than they ran down with loud shouts into the city which the Romans had already captured. And now the hatred and resentment which had prompted the attack on the city showed itself. No one thought of making prisoners or securing plunder though everything was at the mercy of the spoilers; the scene was one of indiscriminate butchery, non-combatants together with those in arms, women equally with men were all alike massacred; the ruthless savagery extended even to the slaughter of infants. Then they flung lighted brands on the houses and what the fire could not consume was completely demolished. So bent were they upon obliterating every vestige of the city, and blotting out all record of their foes.

From there Scipio marched to Castulo. This place was being defended by natives from the surrounding towns and also by

the remains of the Carthaginian army who had gathered there after their flight.<sup>7</sup> But Scipio's approach had been preceded by the news of the fall of Ilturgi, and this spread dismay and despair everywhere. The interests of the Carthaginians and of the Spaniards were quite distinct, each party consulted for its own safety without regard to the other, and what was at first mutual suspicion soon led to an open rupture between them. Cerdubelus openly advised the Spaniards to surrender, Himilco, the Carthaginian commander, counselled resistance. Cerdubelus came to a secret understanding with the Roman general, and betrayed the city and the Carthaginians into his hands. More clemency was shown in this victory; the town was not so deeply involved in guilt, and the voluntary surrender went far to soften any feelings of resentment.

XXI. After this Marcus was sent to reduce to submission any tribes that had not yet been subjugated. Scipio returned to New Carthage to discharge his vows and to exhibit the gladiatorial spectacle which he had prepared in honour of the memory of his father and his uncle.

The gladiators on this occasion were not drawn from the class from which the trainers usually take them—slaves and men who sell their blood—but were all volunteers and gave their services gratuitously. Some had been sent by their chiefs to give an exhibition of the instinctive courage of their race, others professed their willingness to fight out of compliment to their general, others again were drawn by a spirit of rivalry to challenge one another to single combat. There were several who had outstanding quarrels with one another and who agreed to seize this opportunity of deciding them by the sword on the agreed condition that the vanquished was to be at the disposal of the victor. It was not only obscure individuals who were doing this. Two distinguished members of the native nobility, Corbis and Orsua, first cousins to each other, who were disputing the primacy of a city called Ibes gave out that they intended to settle their dispute with the sword. Corbis was the elder of the two, but Orsua's father had been the last to hold that dignity, having succeeded his brother. Scipio wanted them to discuss the question calmly and peaceably, but as they had refused to do so at the request of their own relations, they told him that they would not accept the arbitrament of any one, whether god or man except Mars, and to him alone would they appeal. The elder relied upon his strength, the younger

on his youth; they both preferred to fight to the death rather than that one should be subject to the commands of the other. They presented a striking spectacle to the army and an equally striking proof of the mischief which the passion for power works amongst men. The elder cousin by his familiarity with arms and his dexterity easily prevailed over the rough untrained strength of the younger.

The gladiatorial contests were followed by funeral games with all the pomp which the resources of the province and the camp could furnish.

XXII. *The Fall of Astapa*.—Meantime Scipio's lieutenants were by no means inactive. Marcius crossed the Baetis, called by the natives the Certis, and received the surrender of two cities without striking a blow.

Astapa was a city which had always been on the side of Carthage. But it was not this that created a strong feeling of resentment so much as its extraordinary hatred against the Romans, far more than was justified by the necessities of war. Neither the situation nor the fortifications of the city were such as to inspire its inhabitants with confidence, but their love of brigandage induced them to make raids on the territories of their neighbours who were allies of Rome. In these excursions they made a practice of capturing any Roman soldiers or camp sutlers or traders whom they came across. As it was dangerous to travel in small parties, large companies used to travel together and one of these whilst crossing the frontier was surprised by the brigands who were lying in ambush, and all were killed.

When the Roman army advanced to attack the place, the inhabitants, fully aware of the chastisement which their crime merited, felt quite certain that the enemy were too much incensed to allow of any hope of safety in surrender. Despairing of protection either in their walls or their arms, they resolved upon a deed equally cruel and horrible to themselves and to those who belonged to them. Collecting the more valuable of their possessions they piled them up into a heap in a selected place in their forum. On this pile they ordered their wives and children to take their seats and then heaped round them a quantity of wood, on the top of which they threw dead brushwood. Fifty armed men were told off to guard their possessions and the persons of those who were dearer than their possessions, and the following instructions were given them: "Remain on

guard as long as the battle is doubtful, but if you see that it is going against us, and the city is on the point of being captured, you know that those whom you see going into action will never return alive, and we implore you by all the gods celestial and infernal in the name of liberty, liberty which will end in either an honourable death or a dishonourable servitude, that you leave nothing on which a savage enemy can vent his rage. Fire and sword are in your hands. Better that faithful and loving hands should make away with what is doomed to die than that the enemy should add mockery and scorn to murder." These admonitions were followed by a dire curse on any one who was turned from his purpose by hope of life or by soft-heartedness.

Then they flung open the gates and burst out in a tumultuous charge. There was no advanced post strong enough to check them, for the last thing to be feared was that the besieged would venture outside their walls. One or two troops of horse and some light infantry were sent against them from the camp, and a fierce irregular fight ensued in which the troopers who had been first to come into collision with the enemy were routed, and this created a panic amongst the light infantry. The attack would have been pushed even to the foot of the rampart if the pick of the legions had not made the most of the few minutes allowed them for getting into line. As it was, there was at first some wavering amongst the front ranks, for the enemy, blinded by rage, rushed with mad recklessness upon wounds and death. Then the veterans who came up in support, unshaken by the frantic onset, cut down the front ranks and stayed the advance of those behind. When in their turn they tried to force the enemy back they found that not a man would give ground, they were all resolved to die where they stood. On this the Romans extended their lines, which their superiority in numbers enabled them to do easily, until they outflanked the enemy, who fighting in a compact body were killed to a man.

XXIII. The wholesale slaughter was at any rate the work of an exasperated soldiery who met their armed foes in the shock of open battle. But a much more horrible butchery took place in the city, where a weak and defenceless crowd of women and children were massacred by their own people, and their still writhing bodies flung on to the lighted pile which was again almost extinguished by the streams of blood. And last of all the

men themselves, exhausted by the pitiful slaughter of those dear to them, flung themselves arms and all into the midst of the flames. All had perished by the time the Romans came on the scene. At first they stood horror-struck at such a fearful sight, then, seeing the melted gold and silver flowing<sup>8</sup> amongst the other articles which made up the heap, the greediness common to human nature impelled them to try and snatch what they could out of the fire. Some were caught by the flames, others were scorched by the heated air, for those in front could not retreat owing to the crowd pressing on behind.

Thus Astapa was destroyed without yielding any plunder to the soldiers. After accepting the surrender of the remaining cities in that district Marcius led his victorious army back to Scipio at New Carthage.

Just at this time some deserters came from Gades and promised to deliver up the city with its Carthaginian garrison and the commandant and also the ships in the harbour. After his flight Mago had taken up his quarters in that city, and with the help of the ships which he had assembled he had got together a considerable force, partly from the opposite coast of Africa and partly through the agency of Hanno from the Spanish tribes round. After guarantees of good faith had been given on both sides, Scipio sent Marcius with the cohorts of light infantry and Laelius with seven triremes and one quinquereme to conduct joint operations against the place by sea and land.

XXIV. *Scipio's Illness and the Mutiny amongst his Troops.*—Scipio was overtaken by a serious illness, which rumour, however, made still more serious, as each man from the innate love of exaggeration added some fresh detail to what he had already heard. The whole of Spain, especially the remoter parts, was much agitated at the news, and it was easy to judge what an amount of trouble would have been caused by his actual death from seeing what storms arose from the groundless rumour of it. Friendly states did not preserve their fidelity, the army did not remain loyal.

Mandonius and Indibilis had made up their minds, that after the expulsion of the Carthaginians the sovereignty of Spain would pass to them. When they found that their hopes were frustrated they called out their countrymen, the Lacetani, and raised a force amongst the Celtiberians with which they ravaged the country of the Suessitanians and the Sedetanians, who were allies of Rome.

A disturbance of a different kind, an act of madness on the part of the Romans themselves, occurred in the camp at Sucro. It was held by a force of 8000 men who were stationed there to protect the tribes on this side the Ebro. The vague rumours about their commander's life were not however the primary cause of their movement. A long period of inactivity had, as usual, demoralised them, and they chafed against the restraints of peace after being accustomed to live on the plunder captured from the enemy. At first their discontent was confined to murmurs amongst themselves. "If there is war going on in the province," they said, "what are we doing here amongst a peaceable population? If the war is at an end why are we not taken back to Rome?" Then they demanded their arrears of pay with an insolence quite inconsistent with military discipline or the respect which soldiers should show towards their officers. The men at the outposts insulted the tribunes as they went their rounds of inspection, and some went off during the night to plunder the peaceable inhabitants in the neighbourhood, till at last they used to quit their standards in broad daylight without leave. They did everything just as their caprice and fancy dictated, no attention was paid to rules or discipline or to the orders of their officers. One thing alone helped to keep up the outward aspect of a Roman camp and that was the hope which the men entertained that the tribunes would become infected with their madness and take part in their mutiny. In this hope they allowed them to administer justice from their tribunals, they went to them for the watchword and the orders of the day, and relieved guard at the proper intervals. Thus after depriving them of any real authority they kept up the appearance of obedience, whilst they were actually their own commanders. When they found that the tribunes censured and reprobated their proceedings and endeavoured to repress them, and openly declared that they would have nothing to do with their insensate folly, they broke out into open mutiny. They drove the tribunes from their official seats, and then out of the camp, and amidst universal acclamation placed the supreme command in the hands of the chief ring-leaders of the mutiny, two common soldiers whose names were C. Albius of Cales and C. Atrius, an Umbrian.<sup>9</sup> These men were by no means content to wear the insignia of the military tribunes, they had the audacity to affect those of the chief magistrates, the fasces and the axes. It never occurred to them that those

symbols which they had carried before them to strike fear into others were impending over their own backs and necks. The false belief that Scipio was dead blinded them; they felt certain that the spread of this report would kindle the flames of war throughout the whole of Spain. In the general turmoil they imagined that they would be able to levy contributions on the allies of Rome and plunder the cities round them, and when crime and outrage were being committed everywhere, what they had done would not be noticed in the universal confusion.

XXV. They were every hour expecting fresh details of Scipio's death, and even news of his funeral. None came however, and the idle rumours by degrees died away. Then they began to look for those who started the report, but each in turn kept out of the way, preferring to be thought credulous rather than suspected of inventing such a story. Abandoned by their followers, the ringleaders looked with dread upon the insignia they had assumed, and fully expected that in return for this idle show of power they would draw down upon themselves the weight of the true and legitimate authority.

While the mutiny was thus at a standstill, definite information was brought that Scipio was alive and this was soon followed by the further intelligence that his health was restored. This intelligence was brought by a party of seven military tribunes, whom Scipio had sent to Sucro. At first their presence was strongly resented, but the quiet talks they had with those they happened to know had a calming effect; they visited the soldiers in their tents, and chatted with the groups which gathered round the tribunals or in front of the headquarters tent. They made no reference to the treason the soldiers had been guilty of, but only questioned them as to the causes of the sudden outbreak. They were told in reply that the men did not get their pay punctually, nor their due share of credit for the part they had played in the campaign. It was by their courage, they asserted, that the Roman name was preserved and the province saved for the republic after the destruction of the two armies and their commanders, at the time when the Iliturgans committed their foul crime. And though they had received the just recompense for their treason, no one had been found to reward the Roman soldiers for their meritorious services.

In reply to these and similar complaints the tribunes told

the men that their requests were reasonable and they would lay them before the general. They were glad that these were nothing worse or harder to set right, and the men might rest assured that P. Scipio, after the favour the gods had shown him, and, indeed, the whole State, would show their gratitude.

Scipio was experienced in war, but unfamiliar with the storms of internal disturbances. Two things made him anxious, the possibility of the army exceeding all measure in its insubordination, or of his inflicting punishments which would be excessive. For the present he decided to go on as he had begun, and handle the matter gently. Collectors were sent among the tributary states so that the soldiers might hope to receive their pay soon. An order was shortly after issued for them to assemble at New Carthage for that purpose; they might go in a body or successively in single detachments as they preferred.

The unrest was already dying down when the sudden cessation of hostilities on the part of the revolted Spaniards completely stopped it. When Mandonius and Indibilis heard that Scipio was still alive, they gave up their enterprise and retired within their frontiers, and the mutineers could no longer find any one either amongst their own countrymen or amongst the natives who would associate himself with their mad scheme. After carefully considering every possible plan they saw that the only way of escaping the consequences of their evil counsels, and that not a very hopeful way, was to submit themselves either to the just displeasure of their general or to his clemency, which they were not without hopes of experiencing. They argued that he had ever pardoned the enemies of his country after armed conflict, whereas during their mutiny not a wound had been received or a drop of blood shed, it had been free from all cruelty and did not deserve a cruel punishment. So ready are men with reasons when they wish to palliate their own misconduct. There was considerable hesitation as to whether they should go to receive their pay separately cohort by cohort, or all together. The latter course seemed the safer and they decided upon it.

XXVI. Whilst they were discussing these points, a council of war was being held over them in New Carthage. The members were divided; some thought it sufficient to proceed only against the ringleaders, who did not number more than five-and-thirty; others regarded it as an act of high treason rather than a mutiny and held that such a bad example could only be dealt with by



the punishment of the many who were implicated. The more merciful view, that punishment should only fall on those with whom the mischief originated, finally prevailed; for the troops generally a severe reprimand was considered sufficient.

On the breaking up of the council the army stationed in Carthage was informed that an expedition was to be made against Mandonius and Indibilis, and that rations were to be prepared for several days in advance. The object was to make it appear that this was the business for which the council had been held. The seven tribunes who had been sent to Sucro to quell the mutiny now returned in advance of the troops, and each handed in the names of five ringleaders. Suitable men had been told off to meet the culprits with smiles and pleasant words, and invite them to their houses, and when they had drunk themselves into a state of stupor place them in fetters. When the men were now not far from New Carthage they were informed by people who met them that the whole of the army at Carthage were starting on the morrow with M. Silanus against the Lacetanians. This news did not completely dispel the secret fears which haunted their minds, still they were greatly rejoiced to hear it, as they imagined that now that their commander would be alone, they would have him in their power, instead of their being in his.

The sun was setting when they entered the city, and they found the other army making all preparations for their march. It had been arranged beforehand how they were to be received, they were told that their commander was glad that they had arrived when they did, just before the other army left. They then dispersed for food and rest, and the ringleaders were conducted by the men selected for the purpose to their houses, where they were entertained, and where the tribunes arrested and manacled them without any disturbance.

At the fourth watch the baggage train of the army began to move for its pretended march; at daybreak the standards went forward, but the whole army was halted as soon as it reached the gate, and guards were posted round all the gates to prevent any one from leaving the city. The newly arrived troops were then summoned to an assembly, and they ran into the forum and crowded threateningly round their general's tribunal, expecting to intimidate him by their shouts. At the moment when he ascended his tribunal the troops who had marched back from the gate and were fully armed surrounded the un-

armed crowd. Now their rebellious spirit was completely cowed, and, as they afterwards admitted, the thing that they were most afraid of was the colour and vigour of their chief whom they expected to see looking weak and ill, and the expression in his face such as they had never witnessed before, not even in the heat of battle. For some time he sat in silence, until he received information that the ringleaders had been brought down to the forum and everything was in readiness.

XXVII. After the usher had obtained silence he made the following speech: "I never supposed that I should want words in which to address my army, not that I ever trained myself to speak rather than to act, but that having lived a camp life from boyhood I have learnt to understand the soldier's character. As to what I am to say to you now, words and ideas alike fail me; I do not even know by what title I am to address you. Am I to call you Roman citizens—you who have revolted against your country? Can I call you soldiers when you have renounced the authority and auspices of your general, and broken the solemn obligations of your military oath? Your appearance, your features, your dress, your demeanour I recognise as those of my fellow-countrymen, but I see that your actions, your language, your designs, your spirit and temper are those of your country's foes. What difference is there between your hopes and aims and those of the Hergetes and the Lacedaemonians? And yet they chose men of kingly rank, Mandonius and Indibilis, to lead them in their madness, whilst you delegated the auspices and the supreme command to Atrius, an Umbrian, and Albius, a man from Cales. Do tell me, soldiers, that you did not all join in that or approve of its being done. I will gladly believe that only a few were guilty of such insensate folly, if you assure me that this is so. For the crime is of such a nature that had it involved the whole army it could only have been expiated by a frightful sacrifice.

"It is painful for me to speak thus, opening up, as it were, wounds, but unless they are handled and probed they cannot be healed. After the expulsion of the Carthaginians from Spain I did not believe that there were anywhere people who wished me dead, such had been my conduct towards friends and enemies alike. And yet, alas, so greatly was I mistaken that even in my own army the report of my death was not only credited but eagerly looked for. I would not for a moment wish to lay this to the charge of you all, for if I thought that the whole of

my army wished for my death, I would die here before your eyes. My life would have no attraction for me if it were hateful to my fellow-countrymen and my soldiers. But every multitude is like the sea which left to itself is naturally motionless, till winds and gales excite it. So it is with calm and storms amongst you, the cause and origin of your madness is to be found in your ringleaders, who infected you with their frenzy. For you do not seem even now to be aware to what lengths of folly you have gone or what criminal recklessness you have been guilty of towards me, towards your country, your parents and your children, towards the gods who were witnesses of your military oath, towards the auspices under which you served, towards the traditions of the army and the discipline of our ancestors, towards the majesty inherent in supreme authority. About myself I prefer to be silent; you may have lent a thoughtless rather than a willing ear to the report of my death; I may be a man whose rule might be naturally expected to prove irksome to his army. But your country—what has it deserved of you that you should make common cause with Mandonius and Indibilis for its betrayal? What have the Roman people done that you should deprive the tribunes whom they elected of their authority, and bestow it on private individuals? And not content with having such men for tribunes you, a Roman army, have transferred the fasces of your commander to men who never possessed a single slave to be at their command! The headquarters tent was occupied by an Albius and an Atrius; at their doors the trumpet sounded; to them you went for orders; they were seated on P. Scipio's tribunal; the lictor was in attendance and cleared the way before them; in front of them the axes and fasces were borne! When there is a shower of stones, or buildings are struck by lightning, or animals produce monstrous offspring, you consider these things as portents. We have here a portent which no victims, no intercessions can expiate but the blood of those who have dared such an awful crime.

XXVIII. "Though no crime is dictated by rational motives, I should still like to know what was in your mind, what was your intention, so far as such wickedness admitted of any. Years ago a legion which was sent to garrison Regium murdered the principal men of the place and kept possession of that wealthy city for ten years. For this crime the entire legion of 4000 men were beheaded at Rome in the Forum. But they did

not choose for their leader an Umbrian who was little more than a camp-follower, an Atrius whose very name is an evil omen. They followed D. Vibellius, a military tribune. Nor did they join hands with Pyrrhus, or with the Samnites and Lucanians, the enemies of Rome, but you communicated your plans to Mandonius and Indibilis and prepared to join them in arms. They were content to do as the Campanians did when they wrested Capua from the Tuscans, its old inhabitants, or as the Mamertines did when they seized Messina in Sicily; they intended to make Regium their future home without any idea of attacking Rome or the allies of Rome. Did you intend to make Sucro your permanent abode? If, after subjugating Spain, I had gone away and left you here you would have rightly complained to gods and men that you had not returned to your wives and children. But you may have banished from your minds all thought of them, as you have in the case of your country and in my own case.

"I want to trace the course which your criminal project would have taken, though stopping short of the extreme of madness. As long as I was alive and retained intact the army with which in one day I captured New Carthage and defeated and routed four Carthaginian armies, would you really have wrested the province of Spain from the hands of Rome, you, a force of some 8000 men, every one of you of less account at all events than the Albius and Atrius whom you made your masters?

"I put aside and ignore my own honour and reputation, and assume that I was in no way injured by your too easily crediting the story of my death. But what then? Supposing I had died, would the commonwealth have died with me, would the sovereignty of Rome have shared my fate? No, Jupiter Optimus Maximus would never have allowed a City built for eternity, built under the auspices and sanction of the gods, to be as short-lived as this fragile mortal body of mine. C. Flaminius, Aemilius Paulus, Sempronius Gracchus, Postumius Albinus, M. Marcellus, T. Quinctius Crispinus, Cnaeus Fulvius, and my own relations, the two Scipios, all of them distinguished generals, have been carried off in this single war, and yet Rome lives on and will live on though a thousand more should perish through sickness or the sword. Would then the republic have been interred in my solitary grave? Why even you yourselves, after the defeat and death of my father and my uncle, chose Septimus Marcius

to lead you against the Carthaginians, flushed as they were with their recent victory. I am speaking as though Spain would have been left without a general; but would not the sovereignty of the empire have been amply vindicated by M. Silanus, who came into the province invested with the same power and authority as I myself with my brother Lucius and C. Laelius as his lieutenants? Can any comparison be made between their army and you, between their rank and experience and those of the men you have chosen, between the cause for which they are fighting and the one which you have taken up? And if you were superior to them all would you bear arms in company with the Carthaginians against your country, against your fellow-citizens? What injury have they done to you?

XXIX. "Coriolanus was once driven to make war on his country by an iniquitous sentence which condemned him to dishonoured and forlorn exile, but his affection as a son recalled him from the crime which he was meditating as a citizen. What have you suffered to call out this bitter hostility? Did you proclaim war against your country, did you desert the people of Rome in favour of the Iltergetes, did you trample underfoot all law, human and divine, simply because your pay was a few days in arrear owing to your general's illness? There is no doubt about it, soldiers, you were seized with madness; the bodily illness from which I suffered was not one whit more severe than the mental malady which overtook you. I shrink with horror from dwelling upon the credit men gave to rumours, the hopes they entertained, the ambitious schemes they formed. Let all be forgotten, if possible, or if not that, let silence at least draw a veil over all.

"I admit that my words have appeared stern and unfeeling to you, but how much more unfeeling, think you, has your conduct been than anything I have said? You imagine that it is right and proper for me to tolerate your actions, and yet you have not patience to hear them mentioned.<sup>10</sup> Bad as they are, however, I will not reproach you with them any longer; I only wish you may forget them as easily as I shall. As for the army as a body, if you sincerely repent of your wrongdoing you give me satisfaction enough and more than enough. Albius of Cales and Atrius of Umbria with the other ringleaders in this detestable mutiny will expiate their crime with their blood. The sight of their punishment ought to give you satisfaction rather than pain, if indeed you have recovered your sanity,

for their designs would have proved more mischievous and destructive to you than to any one else."

He had hardly finished speaking when, at a preconcerted signal, the eyes and ears of his audience were assailed by everything which could terrify and appal. The army which was on guard all round the assembly clashed their swords against their shields, and the voice of the usher was heard calling over the names of those who had been sentenced in the council or war. These were stripped to the waist and conducted into the middle of the assembly; all the apparatus of punishment was at once brought out; they were tied to the stake, scourged and finally beheaded.

The spectators were so benumbed by terror that no voice was raised against the severity of the punishment, not even a groan was heard. Then the bodies were all dragged away, and after the place was cleansed, the soldiers were summoned each by name to take the oath of obedience to P. Scipio before the military tribunes. Then they each received the pay due to them.

Such was the end and issue of the mutiny which started amongst the soldiers at Sucro.

XXX. *Close of the Spanish War.*—Hanno, Mago's lieutenant, had been despatched during this time, with a small body of Africans to hire troops among the Spanish tribes, and succeeded in raising 4000 men. Soon afterwards, his camp was captured by L. Marcius, most of his men were killed in the assault, some during their flight by the pursuing cavalry; Hanno himself escaped with a handful of his men.

Whilst this was going on at the Baetis Laelius sailed westward and brought up at Carteia, a city situated on that part of the coast where the Straits begin to widen into the ocean.

Some men had come into the Roman camp with a voluntary offer to surrender the city of Gades, but the plot was discovered before it was ripe. All the conspirators were arrested and Mago handed them over to the custody of Adherbal for conveyance to Carthage. Adherbal placed them on board a quinquereme which was sent on in advance as it was a slower vessel than the eight triremes with which he followed shortly after. The quinquereme was just entering the Straits when Laelius sailed out of the harbour of Carteia in another quinquereme followed by seven triremes. He bore straight down upon Adherbal, feeling quite sure that the quinquereme could not be brought round, as it was caught by the current sweeping through the channel.

Surprised by this unsuspected attack, the Carthaginian general hesitated for a few moments whether to follow his quinquereme or turn his prows against the enemy. This hesitation put it out of his power to decline the contest, for they were now within range of one another's missiles, and the enemy were pressing on him on all sides. The strength of the tide prevented them from steering their ships as they wished. There was no semblance of a naval battle, no freedom of action, no room for tactics or manœuvres. The tidal currents completely dominated the action and carried the ships against their own side and against the enemy indiscriminately, in spite of all the efforts of the rowers. You might see a ship which was endeavouring to escape carried stern foremost against the victors, whilst the one pursuing it, if it got into an opposing current, was swept back as though it were the one in flight. And when they were actually engaged and one ship was making for another in order to ram it, it would swerve from its course and receive a side-blow from the other's beak, whilst the one which was coming broadside on would suddenly be swung round and present its prow. So the varying struggle of the triremes went on, directed and controlled by Chance. The Roman quinquereme answered the helm better, either because its weight made it steadier, or because it had more banks of oars to cut through the waves. It sank two triremes, and sweeping rapidly past a third sheared off all the oars on one side, and it would have disabled the rest if Adherbal had not got clear away with the remaining five, and crowding all sail reached Africa.

XXXI. After his victory Laelius returned to Carteia where he learnt what had been going on at Gades, how the plot had been discovered and the conspirators sent to Carthage. As the purpose for which he had come was thus frustrated he sent word to L. Marcius, saying that if they did not wish to waste their time by sitting before Gades, they ought both to rejoin their commander-in-chief. Marcius quite agreed, and they both returned in a few days to New Carthage.

On their departure Mago breathed more freely after having been threatened by the double danger from land and sea, and on receiving intelligence of the renewal of hostilities by the Ibergetes, he once more entertained hopes of reconquering Spain. Messengers were despatched to Carthage, to lay before the senate a highly coloured account of the mutiny in the

Roman camp and the defection of the allies of Rome, and at the same time strongly urge that assistance should be sent to him in order that he might win back the heritage left him by his ancestors, the sovereignty of Spain.<sup>11</sup>

Mandonius and Indibilis had retired for some time within their borders and were quietly waiting till they knew what was decided with regard to the mutiny. They felt no doubt that if Scipio pardoned the offence of his own fellow-countrymen, he would exercise clemency towards them also. But when the severity of the punishment became generally known they were convinced that equal measure would be meted out to them, and so they decided to resume hostilities. They summoned their tribesmen once more to arms, and called out the auxiliaries who had joined them before, and with a force of 20,000 infantry and 2500 cavalry they crossed their frontiers and marched to their old camping ground in Sedetania.

XXXII. By his punctual payment of arrears to all alike, the guilty as well as the innocent, and by his affable tone and bearing towards every one, Scipio soon regained the affection of his soldiers. Before he broke up his quarters at New Carthage, he called his troops together and after denouncing at some length the treachery of the two chiefs in recommencing war went on to say that the temper in which he was going to avenge that crime was very different from the spirit in which he had recently healed the fault of his misled fellow-citizens. Then he felt as if he were tearing his own vitals, when with groans and tears he expiated either the thoughtlessness or the guilt of 8000 men at the cost of thirty lives. Now it was in a cheerful and confident spirit that he was marching to the destruction of the Ilergetes. They were not natives of the same soil with him, nor was there any treaty bond between them; the only bond was that of honour and friendship, and that they had themselves broken by their crime. When he looked at his own army he saw that they were all either Roman citizens or Latin allies, but what affected him most was the fact that there was hardly a single soldier amongst them who had not been brought from Italy, either by his uncle Cnaeus Scipio, who was the first Roman general to come into that province, or by his father or else by himself. They were all of them accustomed to the name and auspices of the Scipios, and he wanted to take them back with him to their country to enjoy a well-earned triumph. Should he become a candidate for the



consulship he hoped that they would support him, as the honour conferred on him would belong to them all.

As to the expedition in front of them the man who regarded it as a war must have forgotten all that he had hitherto done. Mago, who had fled with a few ships to an island surrounded by an ocean, beyond the limits of the world of men, was, he assured them, more of a concern to him than the Ilergetes were, for a Carthaginian general and a Carthaginian garrison, however small, were still there, but here there were only brigands and brigand chiefs. They may be strong enough to plunder their neighbours' fields and burn their houses and carry off their flocks and herds but they have no courage for a pitched battle and an open field; when they have to fight they will trust more to their swiftness for flight than to their weapons. It was not, therefore, because he saw that there was any danger from them, or any prospect of serious war that he was marching to crush the Ilergetes before his departure from the province, but because such a criminal revolt must not go unpunished, and also because it must not be said that a single enemy has been left behind in a province which by such courage and good fortune has been reduced to submission. "Follow me then," he said, in conclusion, "with the kind help of heaven, not to make war—for you have to do with an enemy who is no match for you—but to inflict punishment upon men steeped in crime."

XXXIII. The men were then dismissed with orders to make their preparations for the next day's departure. Ten days after leaving New Carthage he reached the Ebro, and within four days of his passage of the river he came within view of the enemy.

In front of his camp there was a level stretch of ground shut in on either side by mountains. Scipio ordered some cattle taken mostly from the enemy's fields to be driven towards the hostile camp in order to rouse the savagery of the barbarians. Laelius was instructed to remain with his cavalry in concealment behind a projecting mountain spur, and when the light infantry who went to guard the cattle had drawn the enemy into a skirmish he was to charge from his hiding-place. The battle soon began, the Spaniards on catching sight of the cattle rushed out to secure them, and the skirmishers attacked them while occupied with their plunder. At first the two sides harassed one another with missiles, then they discharged light darts, which are more likely to provoke than to decide a battle,

and at last they drew their swords. It would have been a steady hand-to-hand fight if the cavalry had not come up. They not only made a frontal attack, riding down all in their way, but some galloped round the foot of the mountain so as to cut off the retreat of the enemy. There was more slaughter than usually occurs in skirmishes of this kind, and the barbarians were infuriated rather than disheartened at their want of success.

In order, therefore, to show that they were not defeated, they marched out to battle the next morning at daybreak. There was not room for them all in the narrow valley, described above; two divisions of their infantry and the whole of their cavalry occupied the plain and the rest of their infantry were posted on the slope of a hill.

Scipio saw that the confined space would give him an advantage. Fighting on a narrow front was more adapted to Roman than to Spanish tactics, and as the enemy had brought his line into a position where he could not employ all his strength, Scipio adopted a novel stratagem. As there was no room for him to outflank the enemy with his own cavalry, and as the enemy's cavalry which was massed with the infantry would be useless where it was, he gave Laelius orders to make a detour along the hills, escaping observation as far as possible, and keep the cavalry action distinct from the infantry battle. Scipio led the whole of his infantry against the enemy with a front of four cohorts, as it was impossible to extend further.

He did not lose a moment in beginning the fight, for he hoped that in the heat of battle his cavalry might execute their manœuvre unnoticed. Nor were the enemy aware of their movements till they heard the sounds of battle in their rear. So two separate contests were going on through the whole length of the valley, one between the infantry and the other between the cavalry, and the narrow width of the valley prevented the two armies from assisting each other or acting in concert. The Spanish infantry, who had gone into action trusting to the support of their cavalry, were cut to pieces and the cavalry, unable to stand the attack of the Roman infantry after their own had all fallen, and taken in rear by Laelius and his cavalry, closed up and for a time stood their ground and kept up their resistance, but at last all were killed to a man. Not a single combatant out of the cavalry and infantry which fought in the valley remained alive. The third division which had been

standing on the mountain side, looking on in safety instead of participating in the fight, had room and time enough to make good their retreat. Amongst them were the two chieftains, who escaped in the confusion before the entire army was surrounded.

XXXIV. The Spanish camp was captured the same day and in addition to the rest of the booty 3000 prisoners were secured. As many as 2000 Romans and allies fell in the battle; the wounded amounted to more than 3000. The victory would not have been so costly had the battle been fought in a wider plain where flight would have been easier.

Indibilis laid aside all idea of continuing the war, and thought that the safest course, considering his hopeless position, would be to throw himself on Scipio's well-known clemency and honour. He sent his brother Mandonius to him. Throwing himself on his knees before the victor he put everything down to the fatal frenzy of the time, which like some pestilential contagion had infected not only the Ibergetes and Lacetanians but even a Roman army with madness. He declared that he and his brother and the rest of their countrymen were in such a condition that they would, if he thought it right, give back their lives to the same P. Scipio from whom they had received them, or, if they were spared a second time, they would devote the whole of their lives to the one man to whom they owed them. Previously they had trusted to the strength of their cause and had not made trial of his clemency, now that their cause was hopeless they put all their trust in their conqueror's mercy.

It was the traditional practice of the Romans, in the case of a conquered nation with whom no friendly relations had previously existed either through treaty or community of rights and laws, not to accept their submission or allow any terms of peace until all their possessions sacred and profane had been surrendered, hostages given, their arms taken away and garrisons placed in their cities. In the present instance however, Scipio, after sternly reprimanding Mandonius and the absent Indibilis at considerable length, said that their lives were justly forfeited by their crime, but that through his own kindness and that of the Roman people, they would be spared. He would not, however, demand hostages, since these were only a security for those who feared a fresh outbreak of hostilities, nor would he take away their arms, he would leave their minds at rest. But if they revolted it was not unoffending hostages but they themselves who would feel the weight of his arm; he

would inflict punishment not upon a defenceless but upon an armed foe. He would leave it to them whether they preferred the favour or the wrath of Rome; they had experience of both.

So Mandonius was dismissed, the only condition imposed upon him being a pecuniary indemnity sufficient to furnish the pay which was owing to the troops.

After sending Marcius on in advance into Southern Spain, Scipio stayed where he was for a few days until the Ibergetes paid over the indemnity and then, setting out with a light-armed force, overtook Marcius who was already nearing the ocean.

XXXV. *Scipio makes a League with Masinissa.*—The negotiations which had been begun with Masinissa were delayed for various reasons. He wanted in any case to meet Scipio personally and to grasp his hand in confirmation of the league between them, and this was the reason why Scipio undertook at that time such a long and out-of-the-way journey. Masinissa was at Gades, and on being informed by Marcius that Scipio was coming, he represented to Mago that his horses were getting out of condition through being confined in so small an island, and were causing a general scarcity from which all alike suffered, whilst his cavalry were becoming enervated through inaction. He persuaded the Carthaginian commander to allow him to cross to the mainland for the purpose of plundering the adjacent country. When he had landed he sent three Numidian chieftains to Scipio to fix the time and place of the interview. Two were to be detained by Scipio as hostages, the third was to be sent back to conduct Masinissa to the place that had been decided upon.

They came to the conference, each with a small escort. From what he had heard of his achievements the Numidian had already conceived a great admiration for the Roman commander and had pictured him in imagination as a man of grand and imposing presence. But when he saw him he felt a deeper veneration for him. The majesty, natural to Scipio, was heightened by his flowing hair<sup>12</sup> and the simplicity of his general appearance, which was devoid of all adornment and decoration, and in the highest degree manly and soldierly. He was at the most vigorous time of life, and his recovery from his recent illness had given him a freshness and clearness of complexion which renewed the bloom of youth.

Almost speechless with astonishment at this his first meeting

with him, the Numidian began by thanking him for having sent his nephew home. From that moment, he declared, he had looked for such an opportunity as this of expressing his gratitude, and now that one was offered him by the kindness of heaven he would not let it slip. He was desirous of rendering such service to Scipio and to Rome that no one of foreign birth might ever be found to have afforded more zealous assistance. This had long been his wish, but Spain was a strange and unknown land to him, and he had been unable to carry out his purpose there; it would, however, be easy to do it in the land of his birth, where he had been brought up in the expectation of succeeding to his father's throne. If the Romans sent Scipio as their general into Africa, he felt pretty certain that the time of Carthage would be very short.

Scipio watched him and listened to him with great pleasure. He knew that Masinissa was the master-spirit in all the enemy's cavalry, and the youth's whole bearing showed high courage. After they had pledged their faith to each other, Scipio returned to Tarraco. Masinissa was allowed by the Romans to carry off plunder from the adjacent fields, in order that he might not be thought to have sailed across to the mainland without sufficient cause. After this he returned to Gades.

XXXVI. *Mago's Last Attempts in Spain.*—Mago's hopes had been raised by the mutiny in the Roman camp and the revolt of Indibilis. Now he despaired of effecting anything in Spain and made preparations for his departure. Whilst he was so employed a despatch came from the Carthaginian senate ordering him to take the fleet which he had at Gades over to Italy, and after raising as large a force as possible of Gauls and Ligurians in that country to form a junction with Hannibal and not allow the war which had been begun with so much energy and even more success to drag on lifelessly. Money was brought to him from Carthage for the purpose, and he also requisitioned as much as he could from the people in Gades. Not only their public treasury but even their temples were plundered, and they were all compelled to contribute their private stores of gold and silver. Sailing along the Spanish coast, he landed a force not far from New Carthage, and plundered the nearest fields, after which he brought up his fleet at the city. During the day he kept his men on board, and did not disembark them till night. He then took them to that part of the city wall where the Romans had effected the capture of the place;

thinking that the city was held by a weak garrison and that there would be a movement amongst some of the townsmen who hoped for a change of masters.

The country people, however, who were fleeing from their fields had brought news of the depredations and approach of the enemy. His fleet had also been seen during the day, and it was obvious that they would not have taken their station before the city without some special reason. An armed force was accordingly drawn up outside the gate which faced the sea. The enemy approached the walls in disorder, soldiers and seamen were mixed together, and there was much more noise and tumult than fighting strength. Suddenly the gate was thrown open and the Romans burst out with a cheer; the enemy were thrown into confusion, turned their backs at the very first discharge of missiles and were pursued with heavy loss down to the shore. If the ships had not been brought up close to the beach and so afforded a means of escape, not a single fugitive would have survived. On the ships, too, there was hurry and confusion; the crews drew up the ladders, lest the enemy should clamber on board with their comrades, and cut the cables and hawsers so as not to lose time in weighing anchor. Many who tried to swim to the ships could not see in the darkness what direction to take or what dangers to avoid, and perished miserably. The next day, after the fleet had regained the ocean, it was discovered that 800 men had been killed between the wall and the shore and as many as 2000 arms of different kinds picked up.

XXXVII. On his return to Gades, Mago found the gates closed against him, so he anchored off Cimbii, a place not far from Gades, and sent envoys to lodge a complaint against the gates being closed to him, an ally and a friend. They excused themselves by saying that it was done by a gathering of the townsmen who were incensed at some acts of pillage committed by the soldiers during the embarkation. He invited their *sufetes*<sup>13</sup>—the title of their supreme magistrate—together with the city treasurer to a conference, and when they were come he ordered them to be scourged and crucified.

From there he sailed to Pityusa, an island about a hundred miles distant from the mainland, which had at the time a Phoenician population. Here the fleet naturally met with a friendly reception, and not only were supplies furnished on a generous scale but he received reinforcements for his fleet in

the shape of arms and men. Thus encouraged, the Carthaginian sailed on to the Balearic Isles, a voyage of about fifty miles. There are two islands so called; the larger one was better supplied with arms and contained a more numerous population; it also possessed a harbour where Mago thought he could conveniently shelter his fleet for the winter, as the autumn was now closing. But his fleet met with quite as hostile a reception as if the island had been inhabited by Romans. The sling which the Balearics make most use of to-day was at that time their sole weapon, and no nation comes near them in the skill with which they handle it. When the Carthaginians tried to approach the land such a shower of stones fell upon them like a violent hailstorm that they did not venture inside the harbour. Putting out once more to sea they approached the smaller island, which possessed a fertile soil, but fewer resources in men and arms. Here they landed and encamped in a strong position commanding the harbour, from which they became masters of the island without meeting any resistance. They raised a force of 2000 auxiliaries which they sent to Carthage and then beached their ships for the winter.

After Mago's departure Gades surrendered to the Romans.

XXXVIII. *Scipio's Return to Rome. The Elections.*—Such is the record of Scipio's command in Spain. After handing over the charge of the province to the proconsuls L. Lentulus and L. Manlius Acidinus, he set sail with ten ships for Rome. On his arrival a meeting of the senate was held at the temple of Bellona, at which he gave a report of all he had done in Spain, how many pitched battles he had fought, how many towns he had captured, and what tribes he had brought under the dominion of Rome. He asserted that when he arrived in Spain he found four Carthaginian armies opposed to him; when he left, there was not a single Carthaginian in the country.

He was not without hope that a triumph might be accorded to him for his services; he did not, however, press his demand for one, as it was quite understood that no one had up to that time enjoyed a triumph who was not invested with a magistracy.<sup>14</sup> After the senate had been dismissed, he made his entry into the City and had borne before him 14,342 pounds of silver and a great quantity of silver coins, all of which he deposited in the treasury.

L. Veturius Philo now proceeded to hold the consular elections, and all the centuries voted amidst much enthusiasm for Scipio.

Publius Licinius Crassus, the Pontifex Maximus, was elected as his colleague. It is recorded that a larger number of voters took part in that election than at any other time during the war. They had come from all parts, not only to give their votes, but also to get sight of Scipio; they flocked in crowds round his house, and at the Capitol when he sacrificed the hecatomb which he had vowed to Jupiter in Spain. They assured themselves that as C. Lutatius had brought the First Punic War to a close, so Scipio would terminate this one, and as he had driven the Carthaginians out of Spain, so he would drive them out of Italy. They were marking out Africa as his province, just as though the war in Italy was at an end.

Then followed the election of praetors. Two of those elected—Spurius Lucretius and Cnaeus Octavius—were plebeian aediles at the time; the others—Cnaeus Servilius Caepio and L. Aemilius Papus—were not holding any office.

It was in the fourteenth year of the Second Punic War (B.C. 205) that P. Cornelius Scipio and P. Licinius Crassus entered on their consulship. In the assignment of the consular provinces Scipio with his colleague's consent took Sicily without recourse to the ballot, because Crassus, as Pontifex Maximus, was prevented by his sacred duties from leaving Italy; he therefore took Bruttium. The praetors then balloted for their provinces. The City jurisdiction fell to Cnaeus Servilius; Spurius Lucretius received Ariminum, as the province of Gaul was then called; Sicily fell to L. Aemilius and Sardinia to Cnaeus Octavius.

XXXIX. *Envoys from Saguntum appear before the Senate.*—The senate held a session in the Capitol. A resolution was passed on the motion of P. Scipio that he should celebrate the Games which he had vowed during the mutiny and defray the cost out of the money which he had brought into the treasury.

Then he introduced a deputation from Saguntum, the senior member of which addressed the House in the following terms: "Although there is no form of suffering, senators, which we have not endured in order to keep our faith with you to the last, still the kindness which you and your generals have shown to us has made us forget our misery. For us you have undertaken war and for fourteen years have carried it on with such determination that often you have brought yourselves and often reduced the Carthaginians to the last extremities. Though you had in the heart of Italy such a terrible war and such an



enemy as Hannibal, you nevertheless sent a consul with his army to Spain to collect, as it were, the remains of our wreckage. From the day that the two Scipios, Publius and C. Cornelius, came into the province they never at any moment failed to do good to us and injury to our enemies. First of all, they restored our city to us, and sent men all over Spain to find out those of us who had been sold into slavery and set them free. When our fortunes, from being utterly miserable, had become almost enviable, your two generals Publius and C. Cornelius met with their deaths, a loss which we felt even more bitterly than you. It seemed at the time as though we had been brought back from distant exile to our old home only to see for the second time our own ruin and our country's destruction. It did not require a Carthaginian general or army to effect our annihilation, the Turduli, our inveterate enemies who had been the cause of our former collapse, would have been quite able to extinguish us. And just when we had lost all hope, you suddenly sent P. Scipio, whom we are more fortunate than all our fellow-citizens in seeing here to-day. We shall carry back to our people the news that we have seen, as your consul-elect, the one man in whom we placed all our hopes of safety. City after city has been taken by him from your enemies throughout Spain, and in every instance he picked out the Saguntines from the mass of prisoners and sent them home. And lastly the Turdetani, such deadly enemies to us that had their strength remained unimpaired Saguntum must have fallen, even they have been brought so low by his arms that they are no longer to be feared by us, nor, if I may dare to say so, by our posterity. The tribe in whose favour Hannibal destroyed Saguntum have had their own city destroyed before our eyes. We take tribute from their land, but it is not the profit, but the revenge that we enjoy most.

"For these blessings, the greatest that we could hope for or ask heaven to grant, the senate and people of Saguntum have sent this deputation to convey their grateful thanks. We are at the same time to convey their congratulations to you on having been so successful these last years in Spain and Italy that you have subjugated the one country by the might of your arms, not only as far as the Ebro, but even to its most distant shores which the ocean bounds, whilst in the other you have left the Carthaginian nothing outside the rampart of his camp.

"To the great Guardian of your stronghold in the Capitol, Jupiter Optimus Maximus, we are bidden not only to render thanks for these boons, but also, if you allow us, to offer and carry to him in the Capitol this gift of a golden crown, as a memorial of your victories. We pray that you will sanction this and further, if it seem good to you, that you will ratify and confirm for all time the advantages which your generals have conferred upon us."

The senate replied to the effect that the destruction and restoration of Saguntum would both alike be a proof to all the world of the faith which each side had kept to the other. Their generals had acted wisely and properly and in accordance with the wishes of the senate in restoring Saguntum and rescuing its citizens from slavery, and all other acts of kindness which they had performed were such as the senate wished to have done. They accorded permission to the envoys to place their gift in the Capitol.

Free quarters and hospitality were provided for them at the cost of the State, and orders were given for each to be presented with a sum of not less than 10,000 ases.

The other deputations were then admitted to an audience of the senate.

The Saguntines also asked to be allowed to make a tour through Italy as far as they could with safety, and guides were furnished them and letters sent to the different towns requesting them to give the Spaniards a hospitable reception.

*XL. Discussion in the Senate respecting the Allotment of Provinces.*—The next question before the senate concerned the raising of troops and the distribution of the various commands.<sup>15</sup> There was a rumour that Africa was to form a new province and be allotted to Scipio without having recourse to the ballot. Scipio himself, no longer contented with a moderate share of glory, was telling people that he had been returned as consul not simply to carry on the war but to bring it to an end, and the only way of doing that was for him to take an army over to Africa. In the event of the senate's opposition he asserted openly that he would carry his proposal by the authority of the people. The project was most distasteful to the leaders of the senate, and as the rest of the senators, afraid of becoming unpopular, refused to speak out, Q. Fabius Maximus was asked for his opinion. This he gave in the following speech:

"I am quite aware, senators, that many of you regard the

question before us to-day as already decided, and consider that any one who discusses the destination of Africa as though it were still an open question is wasting words. I do not quite understand, however, how Africa can have been definitely assigned as the province of our gallant and energetic consul, when neither the senate nor the people have decided that it shall be included amongst the provinces for the year. If it has been so assigned then I think the consul is quite wrong in inviting a sham discussion upon a measure that has been decided upon; he is not only stultifying the senate as a body, but each individual senator who is called upon in turn for his opinion.

“In expressing my dissent from those who think that we ought at once to invade Africa, I am quite conscious that I expose myself to two imputations. For one thing my action will be set down to my cautious nature. Young men may call it timidity and indolence if they please, as long as we have no cause to regret that though the counsels of others have seemed at first sight more attractive, experience shows that mine are better.<sup>16</sup> The other charge against me will be that I am actuated by motives of malevolence and envy against the ever-growing glory of our most gallant consul. If my past life, my character, my dictatorship and five consulships, the glory I have acquired as a citizen and as a soldier, a glory so great as to produce surfeit rather than a desire for more—if these do not shield me from this imputation at least let my age free me from it. What rivalry can exist between myself and a man who is not even as old as my son? When I was Dictator, in the full maturity of my powers and engaged in most important operations, my authority was by an unheard-of innovation divided with the Master of the Horse. Yet no one ever heard a word of protest from me either in the senate or in the Assembly, even when he was pursuing me with abuse. It was through my actions rather than my words that I wished the man whom others considered my equal to be compelled to admit his inferiority to me. And am I, who have received all the honours that the State can confer, to enter into competition with one who is in the full flower of his youth? And simply that if Africa is refused to him, it may be granted to me, tired as I am not only of public business but of life itself? No, I must live and die with the glory that I have won. I have prevented Hannibal from conquering in order that he might be conquered by those of you who are in the full vigour of your powers.

XLI. "It is but fair, Publius Cornelius, that whilst in my own case I have never preferred my own reputation to the interests of the State, you should pardon me for not regarding even your glory as more important than the welfare of the commonwealth. I admit that if there were no war in Italy or only an enemy from whose defeat no glory was to be gained, then the man who would keep you in Italy though acting in the public interest might appear to be depriving you of the chance of winning glory in a foreign war. But as our enemy Hannibal has been holding Italy for fourteen years with an undefeated army, you will surely not despise the glory of expelling from Italy during your consulship the enemy who has been the cause of so many defeats, so many deaths, and of leaving it on record that it is you who have terminated this war, as C. Lutatius has the lasting glory of bringing the First Punic War to a close? Unless, indeed, Hasdrubal was a finer general than Hannibal, or the last war a more serious one than this one, or the victory which closed it a greater and more brilliant one than this will be, should it fall to our lot to conquer whilst you are consul. Would you rather have drawn Hamilcar away from Drepana and Eryx, than expel Hannibal and his Carthaginians from Italy? Even though you should cling to the glory you have acquired more than to what you hope for, you will not pride yourself upon having delivered Spain from war rather than Italy. Hannibal is not yet such an enemy that the man who prefers to fight against another foe would not be thought to fear rather than to despise him. Why do you not gird yourself to this task? Why do you not march straight from here to where Hannibal is and carry the war thither instead of taking a roundabout course in the hope that when you have crossed over into Africa he will follow you? You are anxious to win the crowning glory of bringing the Punic War to an end; your natural course will be to defend your own country before you go to attack the enemy's. Let there be peace in Italy before there is war in Africa; let our own fears be banished before we make others tremble. If both objects can be achieved under your generalship and auspices, then when you have conquered Hannibal here, go on and capture Carthage. If one of the two victories must be left for your successors, the former is the greater and more glorious one and will necessarily lead to the latter. As matters now are, the public exchequer is unable to support two armies in Italy and also in Africa, we have nothing left

from which to equip a fleet and furnish it with supplies, and over and above all this who can fail to see what great dangers would be incurred? P. Licinius, let us suppose, is conducting the campaign in Italy and P. Scipio one in Africa. Well, supposing—may all the gods avert the omen which I shudder at the mention of! but what has happened may happen again—supposing, I say, that Hannibal wins a victory and marches on Rome, are we to wait till then before recalling you from Africa, as we recalled Q. Fulvius from Capua? What, if even in Africa the fortunes of war prove equally favourable for both sides? Take warning from the fate of your own house, your father and uncle destroyed with their armies within a month of each other in the country where they had raised the name of Rome and the glory of your family high among the nations through their successful operations by land and sea. The daylight would fail me if I attempted to enumerate the kings and captains who by their rash invasion of their enemy's territory have brought the most crushing defeat on themselves and their armies. Athens, a city most sensible and wise, listened to the advice of a young man of high birth and equally high ability,<sup>17</sup> and sent a great fleet to Sicily before it had disposed of the war at home, and in one naval battle the flourishing republic was for ever ruined.

XLII. "I will not take instances from distant lands and remote times. This very Africa we are speaking about and the fate of Atilius Regulus<sup>18</sup> form a conspicuous example of the fickleness of fortune.

"When you, Scipio, have a view of Africa from the sea will not your conquest of Spain seem mere child's play? What resemblance is there between them? You began by coasting along the shores of Italy and Gaul over a sea free from any hostile fleet, and you brought up at Emporiae, a friendly city. After disembarking your troops you led them through a perfectly safe country to Tarraco, to the friends and allies of Rome, and from Tarraco your route led through the midst of Roman garrisons. Round the Ebro lay the armies of your father and your uncle, whose courage had been raised by defeat and who were burning to avenge the loss of their commanders. Their leader was, it is true, irregularly chosen by the vote of the soldiery to meet the emergency, but had he belonged to an ennobled family and been duly appointed he would have rivalled distinguished generals in his mastery of the art of

war. Then you were able to attack New Carthage without the slightest interruption; not one out of the three Carthaginian armies attempted to defend their allies. The rest of your operations, though I am far from depreciating them, are not to be compared with a war in Africa. There no harbour is open to our fleet, no district which will receive us peaceably, no city in alliance with us, no king friendly to us, no spot which we can use as a base of operations. Wherever you turn your eyes, you see hostility and menace.

“Do you put your trust in Syphax and his Numidians? Be satisfied with having trusted them once. Rashness does not always succeed and duplicity prepares the way for confidence through trifles, so that when the occasion calls for it, it may succeed in securing some great advantage. Your father and your uncle were not defeated until the treachery of their Celtiberian auxiliaries left them victims to the enemy. You yourself were not exposed to anything like the danger from the Carthaginian commanders, Mago and Hasdrubal, that you were from Indibilis and Mandonius after you had accepted their alliance. Can you trust the Numidians after the experience you have had of the disloyalty of your own troops? Syphax and Masinissa would both prefer that they rather than the Carthaginians should be the leading powers in Africa, but failing that, they would rather have the Carthaginians than any one else. At this moment mutual rivalry and numberless grounds of complaint are embittering them against one another, because external dangers are far distant; but once let them see the arms of Rome and a foreign army, and they will hasten side by side to extinguish, as it were, a conflagration which threatens them both. Those Carthaginians defended Spain in a very different way from that in which they would defend their country's walls, the temples of their gods, their hearths and homes, when their trembling wives will follow them and their little children cling to them as they march out to battle. What, moreover, if, feeling quite assured of the united support of Africa, the fidelity of their royal allies and the strength of their walls, and seeing that you and your army are no longer here to protect Italy, the Carthaginians should send over a fresh army from Africa, or order Mago, who, we understand, has left the Balearic Isles and is sailing along the Ligurian coast, to form a junction with Hannibal? Surely we should be in the same state of alarm as we were at the appearance

in Italy of Hasdrubal, after you had allowed him to slip through your hands—you, who are going to blockade not Carthage only but the whole of Africa with your army! You will say that you defeated him. Then I regret all the more, both on your account and on behalf of the republic, that you allowed him after his defeat to invade Italy.

“Allow us to ascribe all that has gone happily for you and for the dominion of Rome to your wise counsels, and all misfortunes to the uncertain chances of war—the more talent and courage you claim for yourself the more will your native country and all Italy desire to keep such a doughty defender at home. Even you cannot disguise the fact that where Hannibal is, there is the centre and mainstay of the war, for you are giving out that the one reason for your going to Africa is to draw Hannibal there. Whether there then or here, you still have Hannibal to deal with. And will you, I should like to know, be in a stronger position in Africa, single-handed, than here with your own army and your colleague’s acting together? What a difference that makes is shown by the recent instance of the consuls Claudius and Livius. Where, pray, is Hannibal more likely to be supplied with men and arms? In the most remote corner of Bruttium where he has so long been vainly asking for reinforcements from home, or in the country round Carthage and on the soil of Africa which is entirely occupied by his allies? What an extraordinary idea that is of yours to fight where your forces are reduced by one-half and those of the enemy largely augmented, rather than in a country where with two armies you would engage only one, and that, too, exhausted by so many battles, and such long and burdensome service. Just think how different your plan is from your father’s. On his election as consul he proceeded to Spain, then left his province and returned to Italy in order to meet Hannibal on his descent from the Alps; you are preparing to leave Italy while Hannibal is actually here, not in the interest of the republic but because you think it a grand and glorious thing to do. Just in the same way you, a general of the Roman people, left your province and your army without any legal authority, without any instructions from the senate, and entrusted to a couple of ships the fortunes of the State and the majesty of the empire which were for the time bound up with your own safety.

“I hold the view that P. Cornelius Scipio was elected consul

not for his own private ends, but for us and the commonwealth, and that armies are raised to guard this city and the soil of Italy, and not for consuls to transport to any part of the world they please in the arrogant style of kings and despots."

XLIII. This speech of Fabius, so appropriate to the circumstances under which it was delivered, and backed up by the weight of his character and his long-established reputation for prudence, produced a great effect upon most of those present, especially upon the seniors. Seeing that the majority approved of the sage counsels of age in preference to the impetuous temper of youth, Scipio is reported to have made the following reply:

"Senators, at the beginning of his speech, Q. Fabius admitted that what he had to say might lay him under a suspicion of jealousy. Personally, I should not dare to accuse so great a man of that weakness, but either through the inadequacy of his defence or the impossibility of making a successful one, he has utterly failed to clear himself of the charge. For in his anxiety to dispel the suspicion, he spoke about his distinctions and his reputation in such exaggerated terms as to give the impression that I was in danger of finding a rival in the lowest of the Romans, not in him who, because he stands above all others—a position which I frankly confess I am striving to attain, denies the possibility of any rivalry between us. He has represented himself as an old man full of honours, and me as a youth not even as old as his son, as if the passion for glory did not extend beyond the span of human life and find its chief satisfaction in the memory of future generations. I am quite certain that it is the lot of all great men to compare themselves not with their contemporaries alone, but also with the illustrious of all ages. I admit, Quintus Fabius, that I am desirous not only of equalling your renown but—forgive my saying so—of surpassing it, if I can. Let not your feeling towards me, or mine towards my juniors, be such that we would prevent any of our fellow-citizens from reaching our level. That would not only injure the victims of our envy, it would be a loss to the State, and almost to the human race.

"The speaker dwelt upon the danger to which I should be exposed if I landed in Africa, showing apparently solicitude not only for the commonwealth and its army but even for me. What has led to this sudden anxiety on my account? When my



father and my uncle were killed and their armies all but annihilated; when Spain was lost; when four Carthaginian armies and their generals were holding the whole country down by the terror of their arms; when you were looking for a man to take the supreme command in that war and no one appeared, no one came forward to offer himself but me; when the Roman people conferred the supreme command on me before I had reached my twenty-fifth year—why did no one then say anything about my age, the strength of the enemy, the difficulties of the campaign or the recent disaster which had overtaken my father and my uncle? Has some calamity occurred recently in Africa greater than the one which happened then in Spain? Are there larger armies and better and more numerous commanders in Africa now than there were then in Spain? Was I then at a riper age for undertaking a great war than I am today? Is Spain a more convenient field for operations against the Carthaginians than Africa? Now that I have scattered four Carthaginian armies in flight, reduced so many cities by force or fear, and subjugated every part down to the shores of the ocean, petty kings and savage tribes alike; now that I have reconquered the whole of Spain so completely that no vestige of war anywhere remains, it is an easy task to make light of my services, as easy, in fact, as it will be, when I have returned victorious from Africa, to make light of those very difficulties which are now painted in such dark colours in order to keep me here.

“Fabius says that no part of Africa is accessible, that there are no harbours open to us. He tells us that M. Atilius Regulus was made prisoner in Africa, as though he had met with misfortune as soon as he landed. He forgets that that very commander, unfortunate as he was afterwards, did find some harbours in Africa open to him, and for the first twelve months won some brilliant victories, and as far as the Carthaginian generals were concerned, remained undefeated to the last. You will not, therefore, deter me by quoting that instance. Even if that disaster had occurred in this war instead of in the last one, quite recently and not forty years ago—even then why should I be prevented from invading Africa because Regulus was made prisoner any more than I was prevented from going to Spain after the two Scipios were killed? I should be sorry to believe that Xanthippus, the Lacedaemonian, was born to be a greater blessing to Carthage than I am to be to my country,

and my confidence is strengthened by seeing what tremendous issues depend upon one man's courage.

" We have had to listen even to stories about the Athenians, how they neglected the war at their doors in order to go to Sicily. Well, since you are at leisure to tell us tales about Greece why do you not mention Agathocles, king of Syracuse, who after Sicily had long been wasted by the flames of the Punic War sailed across to this same Africa and turned the tide of war back to the country from which it had started?

XLIV. " But what need is there of instances drawn from other lands and other times to remind us how much depends upon taking the aggressive and removing danger from ourselves by making it recoil upon others? <sup>19</sup> It makes all the difference in the world whether you are devastating the territory of another nation or seeing your own destroyed by fire and sword. It shows more courage to attack than to repel attacks. Then again, the unknown always inspires terror, but when you have entered your enemy's country you have a nearer view of his strength and weakness. Hannibal never hoped that so many communities would go over to him after Cannae; how much less could the Carthaginians, faithless allies, harsh and tyrannical masters as they are, count upon the firmness and stability of their African empire!

" So far, even when deserted by our allies, we stood in our own strength, the soldiery of Rome. The Carthaginians have no citizen army, their soldiers are all mercenaries, ready to change sides on the smallest provocation. If only nothing stops me, you will hear that I have landed, that Africa is wrapped in the flames of war, that Hannibal is tearing himself away from Italy, that Carthage is besieged—all at one stroke. You may look for more cheerful and more frequent news from Africa than you received from Spain. Everything inspires me with hope—the Fortune which waits on Rome, the gods who witnessed the treaty which the enemy has broken, the two princes Syphax and Masinissa, whose fidelity I shall so far trust as to protect myself from any perfidy they may attempt. Many advantages which at this distance are not apparent will be disclosed as the war goes on. A man proves his capacity for leadership by seizing every opportunity that presents itself, and making every contingency subserve his plans. I shall have the adversary whom you, Q. Fabius, assign to me—Hannibal—but I would rather draw him away than that he should keep

me here; I would compel him to fight in his own country, and Carthage shall be the prize of victory rather than the half-ruined strongholds of Bruttium.

"And now as to any injury that may befall the republic during my voyage or whilst I am disembarking my men on the shores of Africa or during my advance on Carthage. As the consul, P. Licinius, is also Pontifex Maximus, and cannot be absent from his sacred duties, it is impossible for him to ballot for so distant a province. Would it not be almost an insult to say that he cannot accomplish the task, after Hannibal's power has been shaken and almost shattered, which you, Q. Fabius, were able to accomplish when Hannibal in the hour of victory was flying about in every part of Italy? And even if the war should not be brought to a more speedy termination by the plan which I suggest, the dignity of Rome and her prestige amongst foreign kings and nations would surely require us to show that we possess sufficient courage not only to defend Italy but to carry our arms even as far as Africa. We must not let the idea get abroad that no Roman general durst do what Hannibal has done, or that whilst in the First Punic War, when the struggle was for Sicily, Africa was frequently attacked by our fleets and armies, in this war, when the struggle is for Italy, Africa is left in peace. Let Italy, which has been so long harassed, have some rest at last; let Africa take its turn of fire and ruin; let a Roman camp threaten the gates of Carthage rather than that we should see the enemy's lines from our walls. Let Africa be the seat of war henceforth; let us roll back there all the terror and the flight, all the wasting of our lands and the defection of our allies, all the other miseries of war which have been assailing us for the last fourteen years.

"Enough has been said as to the republic and the present war and the allocation of provinces. It would be a long and uninteresting discussion if I were to follow the example of Q. Fabius, and as he has depreciated my services in Spain, so I were to pour ridicule on his glory and extol my own. I will do neither the one nor the other, senators, and if, young as I am, I cannot have the advantage over an old man in anything else, I will at least prove his superior in moderation and restraint of language. My life and my conduct of affairs have been such that I am quite content to accept in silence the judgment which you have spontaneously formed."

XLV. Scipio was listened to with impatience, for it was

generally believed that if he did not succeed in inducing the senate to decree that Africa should be his province, he would at once bring the question before the Assembly. So Q. Fabius, who had held four consulships, challenged Scipio to say openly before the senate whether he left the decision as to the provinces in their hands, and was prepared to abide by it, or whether he was going to refer it to the people. Scipio replied that he should act as he thought best in the interests of the State. On this Fabius observed: "It was not because I did not know what you would say or how you would act that I made my request, for you openly avow that you are sounding the House rather than consulting it, and that if we do not at once assign you the province which you want, you have a resolution ready to put to the Assembly." (Then, turning to the tribunes) "I demand of you, tribunes of the plebs, that you support me in my refusal to vote, for even if the decision is in my favour the consul is not going to recognise it." Then a discussion arose between the consul and the tribunes, he asserting that there was no just ground for their intervening and supporting a senator in his refusal to vote, when called upon to do so. The tribunes gave their decision in the following terms: "If the consul submits to the senate the allocation of the provinces their decision shall be binding and final, and we will not allow any reference to the people. If he does not so submit it, we shall support any senator in his refusal to vote when called upon to do so."

The consul asked for a day's grace in order to consult his colleague. The following day he submitted the matter to the decision of the senate.

The decree made respecting the provinces was that one consul should take Sicily and the thirty warships which C. Servilius had had the previous year, permission being granted him to sail to Africa, if he thought such a course would be in the interests of the State; the other consul was to take Bruttium and the operations against Hannibal, with either the army which had served under L. Veturius, or the one which Q. Caecilius had commanded. These two were to ballot and arrange which of them was to act in Bruttium with the two legions which the consul would not require, and the one to whom that field should fall was to have his command extended for a year. With the exception of the consuls and praetors all who were to take charge of armies and provinces had their commands

extended for a year. It fell to Q. Caecilius to act with the consul against Hannibal in Bruttium.

Scipio exhibited the Games amidst the applause of a large and enthusiastic crowd of spectators.

M. Pomponius Matho and Q. Cadius were sent on a mission to Delphi to carry thither the offering made from the plunder of Hasdrubal's camp. It was a golden crown of 200 pounds' weight, and there were facsimiles of the pieces of spoil made in silver weighing in the aggregate 1000 pounds.

Scipio did not succeed in obtaining permission to levy troops and indeed he did not press the point, but he was allowed to enlist volunteers. As he had stated that his fleet would not be a charge on the State he was given liberty to accept any materials contributed by the allies for the construction of his ships. The cantons of Etruria were the first to promise assistance, each according to its means. Caere contributed corn and provisions of all kinds for the crews; Populonia, iron; Tarquinii, cloth for the sails; Volaterrae, timber for the hulls<sup>20</sup> and corn; Arretium, 3000 shields and as many helmets, whilst they were ready to supply as many as 50,000 darts, javelins and long spears. They also offered to furnish all the axes, spades, sickles, gabions and hand-mills<sup>21</sup> required for forty warships as well as 120,000 pecks of wheat and provision for the sailing-masters and the rowers on the voyage. Perugia, Clusium and Russellae sent pine-wood for the timbers of the ships and a large quantity of corn. The Umbrian communities as well as the inhabitants of Nursia, Reate and Amiternum and the whole of the Sabine country promised to furnish men. Numerous contingents from the Marsi, the Paeligni and the Marrucini volunteered to serve on board the fleet. Camerinum, a city leagued on a basis of equal rights with Rome, sent a cohort of six hundred men-at-arms. The keels of thirty ships—twenty quinqueremes and ten quadriremes—were laid down, and Scipio pressed on the work so rapidly that forty-five days after the timber had been brought from the forests, the ships were launched with their tackle and armament complete.

*XLVI. Departure of the Magistrates for their Provinces. Landing of Mago in Liguria.*—Scipio sailed to Sicily with 7000 volunteers on board his thirty warships, and P. Licinius proceeded to Bruttium. Of the two consular armies stationed there he selected the one which the former consul L. Veturius had commanded. He allowed Metellus to keep the legions he was in command of,

as he thought he would do better with men accustomed to his leadership. The praetors also departed for their several provinces.

As money was needed for the war the quaestors received instructions to sell that part of the Capuan territory which extends from the Fossa Graeca to the coast, and evidence was asked for of any cases where land had been appropriated by a citizen of Capua, that it might be included in the Roman state-land. The informer was to receive a gratuity of ten per cent. of the value of the land. The City praetor, Cnaeus Servilius, was also to see that the citizens of Capua were residing where the senate had given them permission to reside, and any who were living elsewhere were to be punished.

During the summer Mago who had been wintering in Minorca embarked with a force of 12,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry, and set sail for Italy with about thirty warships and a large number of transports. The coast was quite unguarded and he surprised and captured Genua. From there he went on to the Ligurian coast on the chance of rousing the Gauls. One of their tribes—the Ingauni—were at the time engaged in a war with the Epanterii, an Alpine tribe. After storing his plunder in Savo and leaving ten vessels as guardships, Mago sent the remainder of his ships to Carthage to protect the coast, as it was rumoured that Scipio intended to invade Africa, and then he formed an alliance with the Ingauni, from whom he expected more support than from the mountaineers, and commenced to attack the latter. His army grew in numbers every day; the Gauls, drawn by the spell of his name, flocked to him from all parts.

The movement became known in Rome through a despatch from Spurius Lucretius, and the senate were filled with the gravest apprehensions. It seemed as though the joy with which they heard of the destruction of Hasdrubal and his army two years before would be completely stultified by the outbreak of a fresh war in the same quarter, quite as serious as the former one, the only difference being in the commander. They sent orders to the proconsul M. Livius to move the army of Etruria up to Ariminum, and the City praetor, Cnaeus Servilius, was empowered, in case he thought it advisable, to order the City legions to be employed elsewhere and give the command to the man whom he thought most capable. M. Valerius Laevinus led these legions to Arretium.

About this time Cnaeus Octavius who was commanding in Sardinia captured as many as eighty Carthaginian transports in the neighbourhood. According to Coelius' account they were loaded with corn and supplies for Hannibal; Valerius, however, says that they were carrying the plunder from Etruria and the Ligurian and Epanterian prisoners to Carthage.

Hardly anything worth recording took place in Bruttium this year. A pestilence attacked the Romans and the Carthaginians and was equally fatal to both, but in addition to the epidemic, the Carthaginians were suffering from scarcity of food. Hannibal spent the summer near the temple of Juno Lacinia, where he built and dedicated an altar with a long inscription recording his exploits in Phoenician and also in Greek.

## BOOK XXIX

### SCIPIO IN AFRICA

I. *Scipio in Sicily*.—On his arrival in Sicily Scipio organised the volunteers into maniples and centuries, and selected three hundred of the most robust and active whom he kept about his person. They did not carry arms, and did not know why they were unarmed, and why they were not included in the centuries. Then he picked out of the whole military population of Sicily three hundred of the noblest and wealthiest and formed them into a cavalry corps to take with him into Africa. He fixed a day on which they were to present themselves fully equipped with horses and arms. The prospect of a campaign far from home with its many toils and great dangers both by land and sea appalled the young fellows as well as their parents and relations. When the appointed day arrived they all appeared fully armed and accoutred. Scipio then told them that it had come to his knowledge that some of the Sicilian cavalry were looking forward with dread to their expedition as one full of difficulties and hardships. If any of them felt like that he would rather that they owned it at once than that the republic should have reluctant and inefficient soldiers who were always grumbling. They should speak out their mind, he would listen to them without any feeling of resentment. One of them ventured to say that if he were free to choose he would rather not go, whereupon Scipio replied: "Since, young man, you have not concealed your real sentiments I will provide a substitute for you; you will give up to him your horse and your arms and other military outfit and take him with you at once to train him and instruct him in the management of a horse and the use of arms." The man was delighted to get off on these terms and Scipio handed over to him one of the three hundred whom he was keeping unarmed. When the others saw the trooper exempted in this way with the commander's approval they, every one of them, excused themselves and accepted a substitute. By this means the Romans replaced the three hundred Sicilian cavalry without any expense to the State.



The Sicilians had all the care of their training, for the general's orders were that any one who did not carry this out would have to go on active service himself. It is said that this turned out a splendid squadron of cavalry and did good work for the republic in many battles.

Then he inspected the legions and picked out the men who had seen most service, particularly those who had been under Marcellus, as he considered that these had been trained in the best school, and after their protracted investment of Syracuse were thoroughly familiar with the methods of attacking fortified places. In fact Scipio was not contemplating any small operations, he had already fixed his mind on the capture and destruction of Carthage. He then distributed his army amongst the fortified towns and ordered the Sicilians to supply corn, thus husbanding what had been brought from Italy. The old ships were refitted and C. Laelius was sent with them to plunder the African coast; the new ones he beached at Panormus, as owing to their hasty construction they had been built of unseasoned wood and he wished them to be on dry land through the winter.

When his preparations for war were completed, Scipio visited Syracuse. This city had not yet recovered its tranquillity after the violent convulsions of the war. Certain men of Italian nationality had seized the property of some Syracusans at the time of the capture, and though the senate had ordered its restitution they still retained it. After making fruitless efforts to recover it, the Greeks came to Scipio for redress. He felt that confidence in the honesty of the government was of the very first importance, and by issuing a proclamation and pronouncing judgment against those who persisted in keeping possession he succeeded in restoring their property to the Syracusans. This action on his part was gratefully appreciated not only by the owners themselves but by all the cities of Sicily, and they exerted themselves more than ever to assist him.

*War in Spain.*—During this summer an extensive war broke out in Spain at the instigation of Indibilis, whose sole motive was his intense admiration for Scipio which made him think lightly of other commanders. The people looked upon him as the only general the Romans had left to them, all the others having been killed by Hannibal. Indibilis told the Spaniards that it was owing to this there was no one else who could be sent to Spain after the two Scipios were killed, and when the

war began to press more heavily on Italy he was recalled home as the only man who could oppose Hannibal. The Roman generals in Spain were nothing but names and the veteran army had been withdrawn; now there was confusion everywhere, and an untrained mob of raw recruits. Never again would Spain have such a chance of recovering its liberty. Up to that time it had been in bondage to either the Romans or the Carthaginians, nor always to one alone, occasionally to both at the same time. The Carthaginians had been expelled by the Romans, the Romans could be expelled by the Spaniards if they were unanimous, and then with their country freed for ever from foreign domination they could return to the traditions and rites of their forefathers.

By arguments of this kind he succeeded in rousing his own people and their neighbours, the Ausetani. Other tribes round joined them and in a few days 30,000 infantry and about 4000 cavalry mustered in the Sedetanian territory, the appointed rendezvous.

II. The Roman commanders, L. Lentulus and L. Manlius Acidinus, were determined not to let the war spread through any remissness on their part. They united their forces and marched with their combined strength through the Ausetanian territory, inflicting no injury on either the hostile or the peaceable districts, until they came to where the enemy was encamped. They fixed their own camp at a distance of three miles from that of the enemy, and sent envoys to persuade him to lay down his arms. When, however, the Spanish horse attacked a party of foragers, cavalry supports were at once hurried up from the Roman outposts, and a skirmish took place without any special advantage to either side.

On the morrow the whole of the Spanish army marched under arms and in battle formation to within a mile of the Roman camp. The Ausetani formed the centre, the Ibergetes were on the right and the left was made up of various nameless tribes. Between the wings and the centre open spaces were left, wide enough to allow of the cavalry charging through when the right moment arrived. The Roman line was formed in the usual way, except that they so far copied the enemy as to leave spaces between the legions for their cavalry also to pass through. Lentulus, however, saw that this disposition would be of advantage to that side only who were the first to send their cavalry through the wide gaps in the opposing line. Accordingly

he gave the military tribune, Servius Cornelius, orders to send his cavalry at full speed through the openings. He himself, finding that his infantry were making no progress, and that the twelfth legion, who were on the left, opposed to the Ilergetes, were beginning to give ground, brought up the thirteenth legion who were in reserve to their support. As soon as the battle was restored in this quarter he rode up to L. Manlius, who was at the front encouraging his men and bringing up assistance wherever it was required, and pointed out to him that all was safe on his left and that S. Cornelius, acting under his orders, would soon envelop the enemy with a whirlwind of cavalry. He had hardly said this when the Roman cavalry charging into the middle of the enemy threw his infantry into confusion, and at the same time barred the passage for the Spanish horse. These, finding themselves unable to act as cavalry, dismounted and fought on foot. When the Roman commanders saw the enemy's ranks in disorder, confusion and panic spreading and the standards swaying to and fro, they appealed to their men to break up the enemy while thus shaken and not let them re-form their line. The barbarians would not have withstood the furious attack which followed had not Indibilis and his dismounted cavalry placed themselves in front to screen the infantry. There was very violent fighting for some time, neither side giving way. The king though half dead kept his ground till he was pinned to the earth by a javelin, and then those who were fighting round him were at last overwhelmed beneath showers of missiles. A general flight began and the carnage was all the greater because the troopers had no time to recover their horses, and the Romans never relaxed the pursuit until they had stripped the enemy of his camp. 13,000 Spaniards were killed on that day and about 1800 prisoners taken. Of the Romans and allies a little more than 200 fell, mainly on the left wing. The Spaniards who had been routed on the field or driven out of their camp, dispersed amongst the fields, and finally returned to their respective communities.

III. After this Mandonius summoned a meeting of the national council, at which loud complaints were uttered about the disasters they had incurred, and the authors of the war were strongly denounced. It was resolved to send envoys to make a formal surrender and offer to give up their arms. They threw all the blame on Indibilis for starting the war, and on the other chieftains also, most of whom had fallen in the battle.

The reply they received was that their surrender would only be accepted on condition of their giving up Mandonius alive and the other instigators of the war; failing this, the Roman army would march into the country of the Iltergetes and Ausetani, and into the territories of other nations one after another. When this reply was reported to the council, Mandonius and the other chiefs were at once arrested and handed over for punishment. Peace was re-established amongst the Spanish tribes. They were required to furnish double pay for the troops that year, a six months' supply of corn, and cloaks and togas for the army. Hostages were also demanded from about thirty tribes.

*Landing of Laelius in Africa.*—In this way the revolt in Spain was crushed without any serious disturbance, and all the terror of our arms was turned towards Africa. C. Laelius reached Hippo Regius in the night, and at daybreak his soldiers and the crews of the vessels were sent ashore for the purpose of ravaging the surrounding country. As the inhabitants were all peacefully pursuing their avocations and suspecting no danger, considerable mischief was done amongst them. Wild alarm was spread through Carthage by the breathless fugitives, who declared that a Roman fleet had arrived under the command of Scipio; the report of his having crossed over to Sicily had already got abroad. As no one was quite clear as to how many ships had been sighted, or what was the strength of the force that was landed, they were led by their fears to exaggerate everything. When they had recovered from the first shock of alarm they were filled with consternation and grief. "Has Fortune," they asked, "so completely changed that the nation which in the pride of victory had an army before the walls of Rome, and after making so many of the enemy's armies bite the dust, forced or persuaded into submission all the peoples of Italy, should now in the recoil of war have to witness the desolation of Africa and the siege of Carthage without having anything like the resources which the Romans have wherewith to meet these troubles? In the Roman plebs and in Latium they are supplied with a soldiery which is always growing more efficient and more numerous to replace all the armies they have lost, whilst our common people are utterly unwarlike whether in town or country. We have to hire mercenaries from amongst the Africans, upon whom no dependence can be placed, who are as fickle as the wind. The native sovereigns are hostile now; Syphax has quite turned against us since his interview with

Scipio; Masinissa has openly declared himself our bitterest enemy. Nowhere does there appear the slightest prospect of help. Mago has not created any outbreak in Gaul nor has he effected a junction with Hannibal; Hannibal himself is weakening, both in prestige and in strength."

IV. The Carthaginians were recalled from the gloomy reflections into which the dire news had plunged them by the pressure of immediate danger and the necessity of devising means to meet it. They decided to raise a hasty levy from the town and country population alike, to send officers to enlist African mercenaries, to strengthen the defences of the city, to accumulate stores of corn, to prepare a supply of weapons and armour, to fit out ships and despatch them against the Roman fleet at Hippo.

In the midst of these preparations news came that it was Laelius, not Scipio, who was in command, that the force he had brought was only sufficient to make a raid and that the main strength of the war was still in Sicily.

So they breathed freely once more, and began to send deputations to Syphax and the other princes with the view of consolidating their alliance. They even sent envoys to Philip with the promise of two hundred talents of silver to induce him to invade either Sicily or Italy. Instructions were also sent to their generals in Italy to keep Scipio fully employed at home and so prevent him from leaving the country. To Mago they sent not only instructions but also 25 warships, a force of 6000 infantry, 800 cavalry and 7 elephants. A large amount of money was also forwarded to him to enable him to raise a body of mercenaries, with which he might be able to move nearer Rome and form a junction with Hannibal.

Such were the preparations and plans of Carthage.

While Laelius was carrying off the enormous quantity of booty which he had taken from the defenceless and unprotected peasantry, Masinissa, who had heard of the arrival of the Roman fleet, came with a small escort to visit him. He complained of the want of energy shown by Scipio. Why, he asked, had he not brought his army to Africa just at a time when the Carthaginians were in a state of dismay and consternation, and Syphax was preoccupied with war with his neighbours? He was quite certain <sup>1</sup> that if time were allowed him for arranging matters as he wished, Syphax would be anything but a true friend to the Romans. Laelius must urge Scipio to push on without

delay and he, Masinissa, though driven from his kingdom would assist him with a force of horse and foot, which would be by no means contemptible. Laelius himself, too, must not stay in Africa, there was reason to believe that a fleet had sailed from Carthage with which in Scipio's absence it would not be safe to engage.

After this conversation Masinissa took his departure, and the following day Laelius left Hippo with his ships laden with plunder and returned to Sicily where he laid Masinissa's instructions before Scipio.

*V. Mago active in Northern Italy.*—It was about this time that the ships which had been despatched from Carthage to Mago appeared off the coast at a place situated between the Ingauni and Genua. Mago's fleet happened to be anchored there at the time, and as soon as he learnt the nature of the instructions brought to him and that he was to gather together as large a force as possible, he at once summoned a council of the Gallic and Ligurian chieftains, the two nationalities of which the large population of that country was composed.

When they were assembled he told them that his mission was to restore them to liberty, and as they could see for themselves reinforcements were being sent to him from home. But it depended upon them what numbers and strength would be available for the war. There were two Roman armies in the field, one in Gaul, the other in Etruria, and he knew as a matter of fact that Spurius Lucretius would unite his forces with M. Livius. A good many thousands of men must be armed if they were to offer an effectual resistance to two Roman generals and two armies.

The Gauls assured him that they were perfectly willing to do their part, but as one Roman camp was on their territory and the other just within the frontier of Etruria, almost within sight of them, any attempt to assist the Carthaginians openly would subject their country to an invasion from both sides. Mago must ask from the Gauls only such assistance as they could furnish secretly. As for the Ligurians, the Roman camp was a long way from their cities, they were therefore free to act as they chose, it was right that they should arm their men and take their fair share in the war. The Ligurians raised no objection, they only asked for an interval of two months in which to raise their force.

Mago in the meantime after sending the Gauls home began

to hire mercenary troops secretly throughout their country, and clandestine supplies were sent to him from the different communities. M. Livius marched his army of volunteer slaves from Etruria into Gaul and after joining hands with Lucretius made preparations for opposing any movement which Mago might make in the direction of Rome. If on the other hand the Carthaginians remained quiet in that corner of the Alps he would also stay where he was, near Ariminum, to defend Italy.

VI. *Recapture of Locri*.—Scipio's eagerness to carry out his project was quickened by the report which C. Laelius brought back of his conversation with Masinissa, and the troops, too, were very keen to make the voyage when they saw the whole of Laelius' fleet loaded with plunder taken from the enemy. His larger purpose, however, was crossed by a smaller undertaking, namely the conquest of Locri, one of the cities which in the general defection of Italy had gone over to the Carthaginians. The hope of achieving this object had arisen from a very trivial incident. The struggle in Bruttium had assumed the character of brigandage much more than that of regular warfare. The Numidians had commenced the practice, and the Bruttians followed their example, not so much because of their alliance with the Carthaginians as because it was their traditional and natural method of carrying on war. At last even the Romans were infected by the passion for plunder and, as far as their generals allowed them, used to make predatory incursions on the enemy's fields. A party of Locrians who had left the shelter of their city were caught by them in one of these raids and carried off to Regium, and amongst them were some artisans who had been working for the Carthaginians in the citadel of Locri. Many of the Locrian nobles who had been expelled by their opponents when the city was surrendered to Hannibal had retired to Regium and were living there at the time. They recognised these artisans and naturally after their long absence wanted to know what was going on at home. After replying to all their questions the prisoners said that if they were ransomed and sent back they believed that they could betray the citadel to them, as they lived there and were implicitly trusted by the Carthaginians. The nobles, filled as they were with a yearning for home and burning to take vengeance on their opponents, came to an understanding with them as to how the project was to be executed and what signals those in the citadel were to look out for. They then promptly ransomed

them and sent them back. Their next step was to proceed to Syracuse, where some of the refugees were staying, and interview Scipio. They told him what the prisoners had promised to do, and he felt that there was a reasonable prospect of success. Two military tribunes, M. Sergius and P. Maticus, accompanied them back to Regium with orders to take 3000 men from the garrison there and march to Locri. Written instructions were also sent to the propraetor Q. Pleminius to take command of the expedition.

The troops started from Regium carrying with them ladders specially constructed to reach the lofty elevation of the citadel, and about midnight they arrived at the place from which they were to give the signal agreed upon. The conspirators were on the look out, and when they observed the signal they lowered ladders which they had made for the purpose, and in this way the assailants were able to mount at several different points simultaneously. Before any shouting arose they attacked the men on guard who, suspecting no danger, were asleep. Their dying groans were the first sounds that were heard, then there was the consternation of men suddenly awakened and not knowing the cause of the tumult, and at last when they discovered it they roused the rest and every man shouted his loudest, "To arms! the enemy is in the citadel and the sentinels are being killed!" The Romans, who were far outnumbered, would have been overpowered had not the shouts of those outside bewildered the garrison, whilst everything seemed more terrible in the confusion and panic of a nocturnal assault.

The Carthaginians in their alarm imagined that the citadel was filled by the enemy, and abandoning all further resistance fled to the other citadel which was situated not far from the first. The city itself, which lay between the two as the prize of victory, was held by the townsmen. Sorties were made from each citadel and skirmishes went on day by day. Q. Pleminius commanded the Roman garrison and Hamilcar the Carthaginian. The numbers on each side were augmented by reinforcements from neighbouring positions. At last Hannibal himself moved up and the Romans would not have held out had not the population, embittered by the tyranny and rapacity of the Carthaginians, taken their side.

VII. When information reached Scipio as to the serious state of affairs at Locri and Hannibal's approach, he feared for the garrison, which would be in great danger owing to the difficulty



of withdrawal. Leaving his brother Lucius in command of a detachment at Messana, he set sail as soon as the tide turned and allowed a favourable voyage. Hannibal had reached the river Bulotus, at a point not far from Locri, and had sent instructions from there to Hamilcar, ordering him to commence a violent attack on the Romans and Locrians, whilst he himself would deliver an assault on the opposite side of the city, which would be left unguarded as everyone's attention would be devoted to the attack which Hamilcar was making. He arrived before the city at daybreak and found the fighting already begun, but he would not confine himself in the citadel where his men, crowded together, would hamper one another's movements, and he had not brought scaling ladders for an attempt on the walls. After giving orders for the baggage to be piled, he displayed his army in battle formation with the view of intimidating the enemy. Whilst ladders were being got ready and preparations made for an assault he rode round the walls with his Numidians to see where an approach could best be made. As he was advancing towards the wall, one of those who happened to be close to him was struck by a missile from a scorpion,<sup>2</sup> and, alarmed at the danger to which his men were exposed, he ordered the retreat to be sounded and entrenched himself in a position far beyond the range of any missiles.

The Roman fleet arrived from Messana sufficiently early in the day to allow of the whole force disembarking and entering the city before sunset. The next day the Carthaginians began the fighting from the citadel, whilst Hannibal advanced to the walls with the scaling ladders and all other apparatus in readiness for the assault. Suddenly a gate was flung open, and the Romans sallied out against him—the last thing he was expecting. In their sudden charge they killed as many as 200, and Hannibal, finding that the consul was commanding in person, retired the rest of his force to his camp. He sent word to those in the citadel that they must provide for their own safety. During the night he broke up his camp and departed, and the men in the citadel, after setting their quarters on fire in order to delay any pursuit by the confusion thus created, followed and overtook their main body with a speed which looked very much like flight.<sup>3</sup>

VIII. When Scipio discovered that the citadel had been evacuated and the camp abandoned, he summoned the Locrians to an assembly and bitterly reproached them for their defection.

The authors of the revolt were executed and their property assigned to the leaders of the other party as a reward for their exceptional loyalty to Rome. As regarded the political status of Locri he said that he would make no change, they were to send representatives to Rome, and what the senate thought right, that would be their fate. He added that he was quite sure that although they had behaved so badly to Rome, they would be better off under the Romans, incensed as they were against them, than under their friends, the Carthaginians. Leaving the detachment which had captured the citadel, with Pleminius in command, to protect the city, he returned with the troops he had brought to Messana.

After their secession from Rome the Locrians had met with such tyrannical and brutal treatment from the Carthaginians, that they could have submitted to ordinary ill-usage not only with patience but almost with cheerfulness. But, as a matter of fact, Pleminius so far surpassed Hamilcar, his soldiers so far surpassed the Carthaginians in criminality and greed that they seemed to be rivalling one another in vice, not in courage. Nothing that can make the power of the strong hateful to the weak and defenceless was left undone by the general and his men in their conduct towards the townsmen. Unspeakable outrages were inflicted on their persons, their wives and their children. Their rapacity did not shrink even from sacrilege; not content with plundering the other temples it is recorded that they laid hands on the treasury of Proserpine, which had always been undisturbed, except by Pyrrhus, and even he restored the plunder and made a costly offering to expiate his sacrilegious deed. As on that occasion the king's ships, tempest-tossed and shattered, brought to land nothing that was uninjured, except the sacred money of the goddess, so now by a disaster of a different kind the same money drove all who were contaminated by the violation of her temple to such a pitch of frenzy that general was turned against general, and soldier against soldier in all the madness of mortal strife.

IX. Pleminius was in supreme command, and he had with him the troops he had brought from Regium, the rest were under the military tribunes. One of his men was running off with a silver cup which he had stolen from a house, and the owners were running after him. He happened to meet Sergius and Matienus, the military tribunes, who ordered the cup to be taken from him. A dispute arose, angry shouts were raised,

and at last a regular fight began between the soldiers of Pleminius and those of the military tribunes. As first one and then another ran up and joined his own side, the number and noise of the combatants went on increasing. Pleminius' party were worsted and ran to their commander with loud and angry shouts, showing him their wounds and blood-stained armour, and repeating the insulting language which had been used about him in the quarrel. He was furious, and rushing out of his house summoned the tribunes before him, and ordered them to be stripped and the rods got ready. This took some time, for they struggled and appealed for help to their men, who, excited by their recent victory, ran up from all parts as though they had been summoned to arms to repel an attack. When they saw the persons of their tribunes actually outraged by the rods they were kindled into ungovernable fury, and without the slightest respect for the majesty of office or even for humanity, they grossly maltreated the lictors, and then having separated Pleminius from his men and hemmed him in, they slit his nose and ears and left him half dead.

All this was reported to Scipio at Messana, and a few days later he came in a six-banked galley<sup>4</sup> to Locri, where he held a formal enquiry into the causes of the disturbance. Pleminius was acquitted and retained his post; the tribunes were declared to be guilty and thrown into chains with a view to their being sent to Rome. Scipio then returned to Messana, and from there proceeded to Syracuse.

Pleminius was beside himself with rage. He considered that Scipio had treated his wrongs far too lightly, and that the only man who could assess the penalty was the man who had suffered the outrage. The tribunes were dragged before him, and after undergoing every torture which the human body can endure, were put to death. Even then his cruelty was not satiated and he ordered the bodies to be cast forth unburied. He exercised the same savage cruelty upon the leading citizens of Locri, who he learnt had gone to Scipio to complain of his misconduct. The shocking proofs he had already given of his lust and greed amongst the allies of Rome were now multiplied in his fury, and the shame and odium they created recoiled not only on him but on his commander-in-chief as well.

X. *The Elections. The Mater Idaea brought to Rome.*—The date of the elections was approaching, when a despatch was received from the consul P. Licinius. In it he stated that both

he and his army were suffering from serious illness, and they could not have held their position if the enemy had not been visited with equal or even greater severity. As, therefore, he could not himself come, he would, if the senate approved, nominate Quintus Caecilius Metellus as Dictator to conduct the elections. He suggested that it would be advisable in the public interest for Q. Caecilius' army to be disbanded, as there was no immediate use for them now that Hannibal had gone into winter quarters and the epidemic had attacked their camp with such violence that unless they were soon disbanded, not a single man, judging from appearances, would survive.

The senate left it to the consul to take such steps as he thought most consistent with his duty to the commonwealth.

About this time the citizens were much exercised by a religious question which had lately come up. Owing to the unusual number of showers of stones which had fallen during the year, an inspection had been made of the Sibylline Books, and some oracular verses had been discovered which announced that whenever a foreign foe should carry war into Italy he could be driven out and conquered if the Mater Idaea<sup>6</sup> were brought from Pessinus to Rome. The discovery of this prediction produced all the greater impression on the senators because the *deputation who had taken the gift to Delphi*<sup>6</sup> reported on their return that when they sacrificed to the Pythian Apollo the indications presented by the victims were entirely favourable, and further, that the response of the oracle was to the effect that a far grander victory was awaiting Rome than the one from whose spoils they had brought the gift to Delphi. They regarded the hopes thus raised as confirmed by the action of Scipio in demanding Africa as his province as though he had a presentiment that this would bring the war to an end. In order, therefore, to secure all the sooner the victory which the Fates, the omens and the oracles alike foreshadowed, they began to think out the best way of transporting the goddess to Rome.

XI. Up to that time the Roman people had no allies amongst the communities in Asia. They had not forgotten, however, that when they were suffering from a serious epidemic they had sent to fetch Aesculapius from Greece<sup>7</sup> though they had no treaty with that country, and now that King Attalus had formed a friendly league with them against their common enemy, Philip, they hoped that he would do what he could in the interest of Rome. Accordingly, they decided to send a

mission to him; those selected for the purpose being M. Valerius Laevinus who had been twice consul and had also been in charge of the operations in Greece, M. Caecilius Metellus an ex-praetor, S. Sulpicius Galba, formerly aedile, and two who had been quaestors, Cnaeus Tremellius Flaccus and M. Valerius Falto. It was arranged that they should sail with five quinqueremes in order that they might present an appearance worthy of the people of Rome when they visited those states which were to be favourably impressed with the greatness of the Roman name.

On their way to Asia the commissioners landed at Delphi, and at once went to consult the oracle and ascertain what hopes it held out to them and their country of accomplishing their task. The response which they are said to have received was that they would attain their object through King Attalus and when they had conveyed the goddess to Rome they were to take care that the best and noblest men in Rome should accord her a fitting reception. They went on to the royal residence in Pergamum, and here the king gave them a friendly welcome and conducted them to Pessinus in Phrygia. He then handed over to them the sacred stone which the natives declared to be "the Mother of the Gods," and bade them carry it to Rome. M. Valerius Falto was sent on in advance to announce that the goddess was on her way, and that the best and noblest man in Rome must be sought out to receive her with all due honour.

The consul commanding in Bruttium nominated Q. Caecilius Metellus as Dictator to conduct the elections and his army was disbanded; L. Veturius Philo was Master of the Horse. The new consuls were M. Cornelius Cethegus and P. Sempronius Tuditanus; the latter was elected in his absence as he was commanding in Greece. Then followed the election of praetors, those elected being Tiberius Claudius Nero, M. Marcius Ralla, L. Scribonius Libo and M. Pomponius Matho. When the elections were over, the Dictator resigned his office.

The Roman Games were celebrated three times, the Plebeian Games, seven times. The curule aediles were the two Cornelii, Cnaeus and Lucius. Lucius was in charge of the province of Spain; he was elected in his absence, and though absent, discharged the duties of his office.<sup>8</sup> Tiberius Claudius Asellus and M. Junius Pennus were the plebeian aediles.

The temple of Virtus near the Porta Capena was dedicated

by M. Marcellus this year; it had been vowed by his father at Clastidium in Gaul seventeen years previously.

M. Aemilius Regillus, flamen of Mars, died this year.

XII. *Affairs in Greece*.—Little attention had been paid to affairs in Greece for the last two years. As a result, Philip, finding that the Aetolians had been abandoned by the Romans to whom alone they looked for help, compelled them to sue for peace and accept whatever terms he chose. Had he not devoted all his strength to secure this result as soon as possible, his operations against them would have been interrupted by the proconsul P. Sempronius who had succeeded Sulpicius and commanded a force of 10,000 infantry, 1000 cavalry and 35 ships of war, a considerable force to bring to the assistance of our allies.

Hardly had the peace been concluded when news reached the king that the Romans were at Dyrrachium and that the Parthini and neighbouring tribes had risen and were besieging Dimallum. The Romans had diverted their force to this place, for as the Aetolians had concluded the treaty with the king without their consent, they showed their resentment by refusing the help which they were sent to give them. On receiving this intelligence Philip, anxious to prevent the movement from spreading, hastened to Apollonia, Sempronius had withdrawn to this place after sending Laetorius with a portion of his force and fifteen ships to Aetolia to see how matters stood there and, if possible, upset the peace. Philip ravaged the country round Apollonia, and brought his forces up to the city in order to give the Romans an opportunity of fighting. As, however, he saw that they kept within their walls, and feeling doubtful as to his ability to attack the place, he withdrew into his kingdom. An additional motive for his retirement was his desire to establish peace with them as he had with the Aetolians, or if not peace at all events a truce, and consequently he avoided irritating them by further hostilities.

The Epirotes were by this time tired of the long-continued war and after sounding the Romans sent envoys to Philip with proposals for a general settlement and assuring him that there was no doubt as to its being arranged if he would confer with Sempronius. The king was by no means averse from the proposal, and readily consented to visit Epirus. Phoenice, an important city in Epirus, was chosen as the place of meeting, and there the king, after a preliminary interview with Aeropus,

Dardas and Philip, the chief magistrates of the Epirotes, met Sempronius. There were present at the conference Amynder, king of the Athamanians, as well as the chief magistrates of the Epirotes and Acarnanians.

The Epirote magistrate, Philip, opened the discussion by appealing to the king and the Roman general to put a stop to the war out of consideration for the Epirotes. The conditions of peace as stated by Sempronius were that the Parthini together with the towns of Dimallum, Bargullum and Eugenium should belong to Rome, and Atintania should be annexed by Macedon, if Philip obtained the sanction of the senate to the arrangement. When the terms were settled the king included Prusias, king of Bithynia, and also the Achaeus, the Boeotians, the Thessalians, the Acarnanians and the Epirotes as parties to the agreement. The Romans on their side extended its provisions to the Ilienses, King Attalus, Pleuratus, Nabis, tyrant of the Lacedaemonians, the Eleans, the Messenians and the Athenians.

The clauses were then reduced to writing and duly sealed. A two months' armistice was agreed upon to allow of envoys being sent to Rome to obtain from the Assembly the ratification of the treaty. All the tribes voted for it; they were glad to be relieved for the time from the pressure of other wars now that their efforts were directed towards Africa. After the conclusion of peace, P. Sempronius left for Rome to take up the duties of his consulship.

XIII. *Distribution of the Commands.*—P. Sempronius and M. Cornelius entered upon their consulship in the fifteenth year of the Punic War. To the latter was decreed the province of Etruria with the standing army there; Sempronius received Bruttium and had to enrol fresh troops. Of the praetors, M. Marcus took over the City jurisdiction, L. Scribonius Libo was charged with the jurisdiction over aliens and also the administration of Gaul, Sicily fell to M. Pomponius Matho, and Sardinia to Tiberius Claudius Nero. P. Scipio had his command extended for twelve months with the army and fleet which he already had. P. Licinius was to remain in Bruttium with two legions as long as the consul thought it advisable for him to retain his command there. M. Livius and Sp. Lucretius were also to retain the legions with which they had been protecting Gaul against Mago. Cnaeus Octavius was to hand over his legion and the command in Sardinia to Nero and take

charge of a fleet of forty ships for the protection of the coast within the limits fixed by the senate. The remains of the army of Cannae, amounting to two legions, were assigned to M. Pomponius, the praetor commanding in Sicily. T. Quinctius was to hold Tarentum and C. Hostilius Tubulus Capua with the existing garrisons—both with the rank of propraetor. With regard to the command in Spain it was left to the people to decide upon the two proconsuls who were to be sent into that province and they were unanimous in retaining L. Cornelius Lentulus and L. Manlius Acidinus in command there.

The consuls proceeded with the enlistment, as ordered by the senate, for the purpose of raising fresh legions for Bruttium and bringing the other armies up to full strength.

XIV. *The Reception of the Mater Idaea.*—Although Africa had not been officially placed among the provinces—the senators, I think, kept it secret to prevent the Carthaginians from getting information beforehand—the citizens fully expected that Africa would be the scene of hostilities this year, and that the end of the Punic War was not far off. In this state of excitement men's minds were filled with superstition and the ready credence given to announcement of portents increased their number. Two suns were said to have been seen; there were intervals of daylight during the night; a meteor was seen to shoot from east to west; a gate at Tarracina and at Anagnia a gate and several portions of the wall were struck by lightning; in the temple of Juno Sospita at Lanuvium a crash followed by a dreadful roar was heard. To expiate these portents special intercessions were offered for a whole day, and in consequence of a shower of stones a nine days' solemnity of prayer and sacrifice was observed.

The reception of Mater Idaea was also being anxiously discussed. M. Valerius, the member of the deputation who had come in advance, had reported that she would be in Italy almost immediately and a fresh messenger had brought word that she was already at Tarracina.

The attention of the senate was engrossed by a very difficult question; they had to decide who was the best and noblest man in the State. Every one felt that to gain this distinction would be for him a real victory, far outweighing any official position or honourable distinction which either patricians or plebeians could confer. Of all the great and good men in the State they adjudged the best and noblest to be P. Scipio, the



son of the Cnaeus Scipio who had fallen in Spain; a young man not yet old enough to be quaestor.<sup>9</sup> What special merits of his induced the senate to come to this conclusion I should have been glad to record for posterity had the writers who lived nearest to those days handed them down. As it is I will not obtrude my conjectures upon a matter hidden in the mists of antiquity.

P. Scipio was ordered to go to Ostia, accompanied by all the matrons, to meet the goddess. He was to receive her as she left the vessel, and when brought to land he was to place her in the hands of the matrons who were to bear her to her destination. As soon as the ship appeared off the mouth of the Tiber he put out to sea in accordance with his instructions, received the goddess from the hands of her priestesses, and brought her to land. Here she was received by the foremost matrons of the City, amongst whom the name of Claudia Quinta stands out pre-eminently. According to the traditional account her reputation had previously been doubtful, but this sacred function surrounded her with a halo of chastity in the eyes of posterity. The matrons, each taking their turn in bearing the sacred image, carried the goddess into the temple of Victory on the Palatine. All the citizens flocked out to meet them, censers in which incense was burning were placed before the doors in the streets through which she was borne, and from all lips arose the prayer that she would of her own free will and favour be pleased to enter Rome. The day on which this event took place was 12th April, and was observed as a festival; the people came in crowds to make their offerings to the deity; a lectisternium was held and Games were constituted which were known afterwards as the Megalesian.

XV. *Penalties inflicted on the recalcitrant Colonies.*—Whilst steps were being taken to complete the drafts for the legions in the provinces, some of the senators suggested that the time had come to deal with a state of things, which, however they might have put up with it at a time of critical emergency, was intolerable now that the goodness of the gods had removed their fears. Amid the close attention of the House they stated that "the twelve Latin colonies which refused to furnish soldiers when Q. Fabius and Q. Fulvius were our consuls have now for almost six years been enjoying an exemption from military service, as though an honourable distinction had been conferred upon them. In the meanwhile our good and faithful allies have,

as a reward for their fidelity and devotion, been completely exhausted by the levies which they have raised year after year." These words not only recalled to the memory of the senate a fact which they had almost forgotten, but they called forth a strong feeling of resentment.

Accordingly, they insisted on taking this as the first business before the House, and made the following decree: "The consuls shall summon to Rome the chief magistrates and the ten leading councillors<sup>10</sup> of each of the offending colonies, namely, Nepete, Sutrium, Ardea, Cales, Alba, Carseoli, Sora, Suessa, Setia, Cerceii, Narnia, and Interamna. They shall order each colony to supply a contingent of infantry twice as numerous as the largest they have raised since the Carthaginians appeared in Italy, and 120 cavalry in addition. In case any colony cannot make up the required number of mounted men they shall be allowed to substitute three foot-soldiers for each horseman deficient. Both the cavalry and infantry are to be selected from the wealthiest citizens, and sent wherever reinforcements are required outside the limits of Italy. If any of them refuse to comply with this demand, we order that the magistrates and representatives of that colony be detained, and no audience of the senate shall be granted until they have done what is required of them. In addition to these requirements a property tax of one tenth per cent. shall be imposed on those colonies, to be paid annually, and the assessment shall be made similarly to the one in force in Rome. The Roman censors are to supply the censors of the colonies with the necessary schedule of instructions, and the latter must bring their lists to Rome and verify their accuracy on oath before going out of office."

In pursuance of this resolution of the senate the magistrates and chief councillors of those colonies were summoned to Rome. When the consuls ordered them to furnish the necessary supplies of men and money they broke out into loud and angry remonstrances. It was impossible, they said, for so many soldiers to be raised, they would have the utmost difficulty in getting as many as they were bound to supply under the old conditions. They entreated that they might be allowed to appear and plead their cause before the senate, and protested that they had done nothing to justify this ruinous treatment. Even if it meant death to them, no fault which they might have committed, no angry threats on the part of Rome could make them raise more men than they possessed. The consuls were inflexible and

ordered the representatives to remain in Rome whilst the magistrates returned home to levy the men. They were told that unless the required number of men was brought to Rome the senate would grant them no audience. As there was no hope of approaching the senate and begging for more favourable treatment, they proceeded with the enlistment throughout the twelve colonies, and it presented no difficulty owing to the increase in the number of men of military age through the long exemption.

XVI. *Repayment of Sums advanced to the State.*—Another matter which had been lost sight of for a similar length of time was brought up by M. Valerius Laevinus. It was only just and right, he said, that the sums which were contributed by private individuals in the year when he and M. Claudius were the consuls should at last be repaid. No one ought to be surprised that he was particularly anxious for the State to meet its obligations honourably, for, apart from the fact that it specially concerned the consul for that year, it was he himself who advocated these contributions at a time when the treasury was exhausted, and the plebeians were unable to pay their war-tax.

The senators were glad to be reminded of the incident, and the consuls were instructed to submit a resolution to the House. They made a decree that the loans should be repaid in three instalments, the first, immediately by the consuls then in office, the second and third by the consuls who should be in office in two and four years' time, respectively.

*The Appeal of the Locrians.*—A subject was afterwards brought up which absorbed all other interests, namely the terrible state of things at Locri. Up to that time nothing had been heard of it, but since the arrival of the delegates it had become generally known. Deep resentment was felt at the criminal conduct of Pleminius, but still more at the partiality or the indifference shown by Scipio. The delegates from Locri, presenting a picture of grief and misery, approached the consuls, who were on their tribunals in the comitium, and holding out in Greek fashion olive-branches as tokens of suppliants prostrated themselves on the ground with tears and groans. In reply to the consuls' enquiry as to who they were, they stated that they were Locrians, and that they had experienced at the hands of Pleminius and his Roman soldiers such treatment as the Roman people would not wish even the Carthaginians

to undergo. They craved permission to appear before the senate and unfold their tale of woe.

XVII. An audience was granted them, and the senior delegate addressed the senate in the following terms: "Whatever importance, senators, you attach to our complaints must, I am well aware, depend very largely upon your knowing accurately the circumstances under which Locri was betrayed to Hannibal, and after the expulsion of his garrison was again brought under your suzerainty. For if our senate and people were in no way responsible for the defection, and it can be shown that our return to your obedience was brought about not only with our full consent, but even by our own efforts and courage, then you will feel all the more indignation at such shameful outrages having been inflicted by your officer and soldiers upon good and faithful allies. I think, however, that we ought to put off for another time any explanation of our double change of sides, for two reasons. One is that the matter ought to be discussed when P. Scipio is present, as he recaptured Locri and was an eyewitness of all our acts, both good and bad, and another reason is that, however bad we may be, we ought not to have suffered as we have done. We do not deny, senators, that when we had the Carthaginian garrison in our citadel we had to submit to many acts of insolence and cruelty at the hands of Hamilcar and his Numidians and Africans, but what were they compared with what we are going through to-day?

"I pray, senators, that you will not take offence at what I am most reluctantly compelled to say. The whole world is waiting in feverish expectation to see whether you or the Carthaginians are to be the lords of the earth. If the choice between Roman and Punic supremacy depended upon the way in which the Carthaginians have treated us Locrians as compared with what we are suffering to-day from your soldiers, there is not one of us who would not prefer their rule to yours. And yet in spite of all this, see what our feeling towards you has been. When we were suffering comparatively slight injuries from the Carthaginians we betook ourselves to your commander; now that we are suffering from your troops injuries worse than any enemy would inflict it is before you and no one else that we lay our complaint. If you, senators, do not show any regard for our misery, there is nothing left which we can pray for, even to the immortal gods themselves.

"Q. Pleminius was sent with a body of troops to recover Locri

from the Carthaginians and was left with his troops in the city. In this officer of yours—the extremity of misery gives me courage to speak freely—there is nothing human except his face and appearance, there is no trace of the Roman save in his garb and speech; he is a wild beast, a monster such as were fabled to haunt the waters which divide us from Sicily, to the destruction of navigators. If he were content with wreaking his own villainy and lust and rapacity upon your allies, we might fill up this one gulf, deep as it is, by patient endurance, but as it is, he has been so eager to spread licentiousness and wickedness indiscriminately that he has made every centurion and every private soldier into a Pleminius. They all alike rob, plunder, beat, wound, kill, outrage matrons, maidens and boys torn from their parent's arms. Each day witnesses a fresh storm, a fresh sack of our city; everywhere, day and night, it is echoing with the shrieks of women who are being seized and carried off. Any one who knows what is going on might wonder how we are able to endure it all, or why they have not become weary of their crimes.

"I cannot go into details, nor is it worth your while to hear what each of us has suffered; I will give you a general description. There is not a single house in Locri, I venture to assert, *not a single individual who has escaped ill-treatment*; there is no form of villainy or lust or rapacity which has not been practised upon everyone who was a suitable victim. It is difficult to decide which is the worst misfortune for a city, to be captured by an enemy in war, or to be crushed by force and violence by a sanguinary tyrant. All the horrors which attend the capture of a city we have suffered and are suffering to the utmost; all the tortures which ruthless and cruel tyrants inflict on their down-trodden subjects Pleminius has inflicted on us, our children and our wives.

XVIII. "There is one matter about which our religious instincts compel us to make a special complaint, and we should be glad if you would hear what has happened, and if you so decide, take steps to clear your State from the taint of sacrilege. We have seen with what pious care you not only worship your own gods, but even recognise those of other nations.<sup>11</sup> Now there is in our city a shrine sacred to Proserpine, and I believe some rumours of the sanctity of that temple reached your ears during your war with Pyrrhus. On his return voyage from Sicily he touched at Locri and added to the atrocities

which he had committed against us for our loyalty to you by plundering the treasury of Proserpine, which up to that day had never been disturbed. He placed the money on board his fleet, and continued his journey overland. What happened, senators? The very next day his fleet was shattered by a terrible storm and the ships which were carrying the sacred gold were all cast ashore on our coast. Taught by this great disaster that there are gods after all, the arrogant monarch gave orders for all the money to be collected and carried back to Proserpine's treasury. In spite of this nothing ever prospered with him afterwards, he was driven out of Italy and in a fool-hardy attempt to enter Argos by night he met with an ignoble and dishonourable death. Your commander and the military tribunes had heard of this incident and of countless others which were related to them not so much to increase the feeling of dread as to give proofs of the direct and manifest power of the goddess, a power which we and our ancestors had often experienced. Notwithstanding this, they dared to lay sacrilegious hands on that inviolate treasure and to attain themselves and their houses and your soldiers with the guilt of their unhallowed plunder. We implore you therefore, senators, by all you hold sacred, not to employ these men in any military service till you have expiated their crime, lest their sacrilege should be atoned for, not by their blood alone but also by disaster to the commonwealth.

“Even now the wrath of the goddess is not slow to visit your officers and soldiers. Frequently have they already engaged in pitched battles; Pleminius leading the one side, the military tribunes the other. They have fought quite as furiously with one another as they ever fought with the Carthaginians, and in their frenzy would have given Hannibal an opportunity of recapturing Locri if we had not sent for Scipio. Do not suppose that whilst the guilt of sacrilege drove the soldiers mad, the goddess did not manifest her wrath by punishing the leaders. It is just here where she manifested it most clearly. The tribunes were beaten with rods by their superior officer, afterwards he was caught unawares by them and, in addition to being hacked all over, his nose and ears were sliced off and he was left for dead. At length, recovering from his wounds, he placed the tribunes in irons and then, after flogging them and subjecting them to all the tortures that are inflicted on slaves, he put them to death and after they were dead forbade

them to be buried. In this way is the goddess inflicting retribution upon the despoilers of her temple, nor will she cease to vex them with every kind of madness until the sacred hoard has once more been deposited in the shrine. Once when our ancestors were hard pressed in the war with Croto, they decided, as the temple was outside the city walls, to carry the treasure into the city. A voice was heard at night proceeding from the shrine and uttering a warning: 'Lay no hand upon it! The goddess will protect her temple.' Deterred by religious fears from moving the treasure, they wanted to build a wall round the temple. After it had been carried up some distance it suddenly collapsed. Often in the past has the goddess protected her temple and the seat of her presence, or else as at the present time she has exacted a heavy atonement from those who have violated it. But our wrongs she cannot avenge, nor can any one but you, senators; it is your honour that we invoke and your protection beneath which we seek shelter. To allow Locri to remain under that commander and those troops is, as far as we are concerned, the same as handing us over for punishment to all the rage of Hannibal and his Carthaginians.

"We do not ask you to accept what we say at once, in the absence of the accused or without hearing his defence. Let him appear, let him hear the charges against him, and let him rebut them. If there be any single crime that one man can be guilty of towards another, which that man has failed to commit against us, then we are willing to go through all our sufferings, if it is in our power to do so, once more, and ready to pronounce him void of all offence towards gods and men."

XIX. At the close of the delegate's speech, Q. Fabius enquired whether they had laid their complaints before Scipio. They stated in reply that they had sent a deputation to him, but he was fully occupied with his preparations for war and had either sailed or was going to sail in a very few days for Africa. They had had proof of the high favour in which Pleminius stood with his commander-in-chief, for after investigating the circumstances which led to the dispute between him and the military tribunes Scipio had thrown the tribunes into chains and allowed his subordinate to retain his command though he was equally or even more guilty.

They were then ordered to withdraw, and in the discussion which followed both Pleminius and Scipio were very severely handled by the leaders of the House, especially by Quintus

Fabius. He declared that Scipio was born to destroy all military discipline. It was the same in Spain; more men had been lost there in mutiny than in battle. His conduct was that of some foreign tyrant, first indulging the licence of the soldiers and then punishing them. Fabius closed his attack with the following drastic resolution: "I move that Pleminius be brought to Rome to plead his cause in chains, and if the charges which the Locrians have brought against him are substantiated, that he be put to death in prison and his property confiscated. With regard to Publius Scipio, as he has left his province without orders, I move that he be recalled, and that it be referred to the tribunes of the plebs to bring in a bill before the Assembly to relieve him of his command. As to the Locrians, I move that they be brought back into the House, and that we assure them in reply to their complaint that the senate and the people alike disapprove of what has been done, and that we recognise them as good and trusty allies and friends. And, further, that their wives and children and all that has been taken away from them be restored, and that all the money abstracted from Proserpine's treasury be collected, and double the amount put back. The question of expiation must be referred to the pontifical college, who must decide what expiatory rites are to be observed, what deities are to be propitiated and what victims are to be sacrificed in cases where sacred treasures have been violated. The soldiers at Locri must be transferred to Sicily and four Latin cohorts sent to garrison the place."

Owing to the heated debate between Scipio's supporters and opponents the votes could not be collected that day.<sup>12</sup> Not only had he to bear the odium of Pleminius' criminal brutality towards the Locrians, but the Roman commander was even taunted with his style of dress as being un-Roman and even unsoldierly. It was asserted that he walked about the gymnasium in a Greek mantle and Greek slippers and spent his time amongst rhetoricians and athletes and that the whole of his staff were enjoying the attractions of Syracuse and living a life of similar self-indulgence and effeminacy. They had completely lost sight of Hannibal and the Carthaginians; the entire army was demoralised and out of hand; like the one formerly at Sucro or the one now at Locri, they were more dreaded by their allies than by the enemy.

XX. *The Decision of the Senate.*—Though there was sufficient truth in these charges to give them an air of probability,



Q. Metellus carried the majority with him. Whilst agreeing with the rest of Fabius' speech, he dissented from what he said about Scipio. Scipio, he said, had only the other day been chosen by his fellow-citizens, young as he was, to command the expedition which was to recover Spain, and after he had recovered it, was elected consul to bring the Punic War to a close. All hopes were now centred in him as the man who was destined to subjugate Africa and rid Italy of Hannibal. How, he asked, could they with any propriety order him to be peremptorily recalled, like another Q. Pleminius, without being heard in his defence, especially when the Locrians admitted that the cruelties of which they complained took place at a time when Scipio was not even on the spot, and when nothing could be definitely brought against him, beyond undue leniency or shrinking from cruelty in sparing his subordinate officers? He moved a resolution that M. Pomponius, the praetor to whom Sicily had been allotted, should depart for his province in three days' time; that the consuls should select at their discretion ten members of the senate who would accompany the praetor, as well as two tribunes of the plebs and one of the aediles. With these as his assessors he should conduct an investigation, and if the acts of which the Locrians complained should prove to have been done under the orders or with the consent of Scipio, they should order him to quit his province. If he had already landed in Africa, the tribunes and the aedile with two of the ten senators whom the praetor considered fittest for the task should proceed thither, the tribunes and the aedile to bring Scipio back and the two senators to take command of the army until a fresh general arrived. If on the other hand M. Pomponius and his ten assessors ascertained that what had been done was neither by the orders nor with the concurrence of Scipio, he was to retain his command and carry on the war as he proposed.

This resolution proposed by Metellus was adopted by the senate, and the tribunes of the plebs were asked to arrange which of them should accompany the praetor. The pontifical college was consulted as to the necessary expiations for the desecration and robbery of Proserpine's temple. The plebeian tribunes who accompanied the praetor were M. Claudius Marcellus and M. Cincius Alimentus. A plebeian aedile was assigned to them so that in case Scipio refused to obey the praetor or had already landed in Africa, the tribunes might, by virtue of

their sacrosanct authority, order the aedile to arrest him and bring him back with them. They decided to go to Locri first and then on to Messana.

XXI. As to Pleminius two stories are current. One is to the effect that when he heard of the decision arrived at in Rome he started to go into exile at Naples, and on his way was met by Q. Metellus, one of the ten senators, who arrested him and brought him back to Regium. According to the other account Scipio himself sent an officer with thirty men of highest rank amongst his cavalry and threw Pleminius and the prime movers of the outbreak into chains. They were all handed over by Scipio's orders or those of the officer to the people of Regium for safe keeping.

The praetor and the rest of the commission, on their arrival at Locri, made the religious question their first care, in accordance with their instructions. All the sacred money in the possession of Pleminius and his soldiers was collected together, and together with what they had brought with them was placed in the temple, and then expiatory sacrifices were offered. After this the praetor summoned the troops to assembly, and issued an order of the day threatening severe punishment to any soldier who stayed behind in the city or carried away anything that did not belong to him. He then ordered the standards to be borne outside the city, and fixed his camp in the open country. The Locrians were given full liberty to take whatever they recognised as their own property, and make a claim for whatever could not be found. Above all he insisted upon the immediate restoration of all free persons to their homes, any one who neglected to restore them would be very severely punished.

The praetor's next business was to convene an assembly of the Locrians, and here he announced that the senate and people of Rome gave them back their constitution and their laws. Whoever wished to prosecute Pleminius or any one else was to follow the praetor to Regium. If their government wished to charge Scipio with either ordering or approving of the crimes against gods and men which had been perpetrated in Locri they were to send representatives to Messana, where, with the aid of his assessors, he should hold an enquiry.

The Locrians expressed their gratitude to the praetor and the other members of the commission, and to the senate and people of Rome. They announced their intention of prosecuting

Pleminius, but as to Scipio, " though he had not been much troubled about the injuries inflicted on their city, they would rather have him their friend than their enemy. They were quite convinced that it was neither by the orders nor with the approval of P. Scipio that such infamous crimes were committed; his fault was that he either reposed too much confidence in Pleminius or felt too much distrust in the Locrians. Some men are so constituted that whilst they would not have crimes committed they lack the resolution to inflict punishment when they have been committed."

The praetor and his council were greatly relieved at not having to call Scipio to account; Pleminius and thirty-two others they found guilty and sent them in chains to Rome. The commission then went to Scipio to find out by personal observation whether there was any truth in the common rumours about Scipio's style of dress and love of pleasure, in order to be able to report to Rome.

XXII. Whilst they were on their way to Syracuse Scipio prepared to justify himself, not by words but by acts. He gave orders for the whole of the army to muster at Syracuse and the fleet to be prepared for action as though he had to engage the Carthaginians that day both by land and sea. When the commission had landed he received them courteously, and the following day he invited them to watch the manoeuvres of his land and sea forces, the troops performing their evolutions as in battle, whilst the ships in the harbour engaged in a sham sea-fight. Then the praetor and the commissioners were taken for a tour of inspection round the arsenals and magazines and the other preparations for war, and the impression made by the whole and by each separate detail was such as to convince them that if that general and that army could not conquer Carthage, no one ever could. They bade him sail for Africa with the blessing of heaven, and fulfil as speedily as possible the hopes and expectations in which the centuries had unanimously chosen him as their consul. They left in such joyous spirits that they seemed to be taking back the announcement of a victory, and not simply reporting the magnificent preparations for war.

Pleminius and his fellow criminals were thrown into prison as soon as they reached Rome. When they were first brought before the people by the tribunes the minds of all were too full of the sufferings of the Locrians to leave any room for pity.

But after they had been brought forward several times the feeling against them became gradually less embittered, the mutilation which Pleminius had suffered and the thought of the absent Scipio who had befriended him disposed the populace in his favour. However, before the trial was over he died in prison. Clodius Licinius in the Third Book of his Roman History says that Pleminius bribed some men to set fire to various parts of the City during the Games which Scipio Africanus was celebrating, in fulfilment of a vow, during his second consulship, to give him an opportunity of breaking out of gaol and making his escape. The plot was discovered, and he was by order of the senate consigned to the Tullianum.

No proceedings took place with regard to Scipio except in the senate, where all the commissioners and the tribunes spoke in such glowing terms of the general and his fleet and army that the senate resolved that an expedition should start for Africa as soon as possible. They gave Scipio permission to select from the armies in Sicily what troops he would like to take with him, and what he would leave in occupation of the island.

XXIII. *Syphax and Scipio*.—During these occurrences in Rome, the Carthaginians had established look-out stations on all the headlands and waited anxiously for the news which each successive courier brought; the whole winter was passed in a state of alarm. They formed an alliance with King Syphax, a step which they considered would materially aid in protecting Africa against invasion, for it was in reliance upon his co-operation that the Roman general would attempt a landing. Hasdrubal Gisgo had, as we have already mentioned,<sup>13</sup> formed ties of hospitality with the king when on his departure from Spain he met Scipio at his court. There was some talk of a closer connexion through the king's marriage with Hasdrubal's daughter, and with a view to realising this project and fixing a day for the nuptials—for the girl was of a marriageable age—Hasdrubal paid Syphax a visit. When he saw that the prince was passionately desirous of the match—the Numidians are of all barbarians the most ardent lovers—he sent for the maiden from Carthage and hastened on the wedding. The gratification felt at the match was heightened by the action of the king in strengthening his domestic tie with Carthage by a political alliance. A treaty was drawn up and ratified on oath between Carthage and the king, in which the contracting parties bound themselves to have the same friends and the same enemies.

Hasdrubal, however, had not forgotten the treaty which Scipio had formed with Syphax, nor the capricious and fickle character of the barbarians with whom he had to deal, and his great fear was that if once Scipio landed in Africa this marriage would prove a very slight restraint upon the king. So whilst the king was in the first transports of passion and obedient to the persuasive endearments of his bride, he seized the opportunity of inducing Syphax to send envoys to Scipio advising Scipio not to sail to Africa on the faith of his former promises, as he was now connected with a Carthaginian family through his marriage with Hasdrubal's daughter; Scipio would remember meeting her father at his court. They were to inform Scipio that he had also made a formal alliance with Carthage, and it was his wish that the Romans should conduct their operations against Carthage at a distance from Africa as they had hitherto done. Otherwise he might be involved in the dispute and compelled to support one side and abandon his alliance with the other. If Scipio refused to keep clear of Africa, and led his army against Carthage, Syphax would feel himself under the necessity of fighting in defence of the land of his birth, and in defence of his wife's native city and her father and her home.

XXIV. *Scipio invades Africa.*—Furnished with these instructions the king's envoys repaired to Syracuse to interview Scipio. He recognised that he was deprived of the valuable support which he had hoped for in his African campaign, but he decided to send the envoys back at once before their mission became generally known. He gave them a letter for the king in which he reminded him of the personal ties between them, and the alliance he had formed with Rome, and solemnly warned him against breaking those ties or violating the solemn engagements he had undertaken, and so offending the gods who had witnessed and would avenge them.

The visit of the Numidians could not, however, be kept secret, for they strolled about the city and were seen at headquarters, and there was a danger of the real object of their visit becoming all the more widely known through the efforts made to conceal it, and of the army being discouraged at the prospect of having to fight the king and the Carthaginians at the same time. To prevent this Scipio determined to keep them from the truth by preoccupying their minds with falsehood.

The troops were summoned to assembly and Scipio told them that there must be no further delay. The friendly princes were

urging him to start for Africa as soon as possible; Masinissa himself had already gone to Laelius to complain of the way in which time was being wasted, and now Syphax had sent envoys to express his surprise at the delay and to demand that the army should be sent to Africa or, if there was a change of plan, that he should be informed of it in order that he might take measures to safeguard himself and his kingdom. As therefore all the preparations were completed and circumstances did not admit of any further delay, it was his intention to order the fleet to Lilybaeum, to muster the whole of his infantry and cavalry there and on the very first day which promised a favourable voyage set sail, with the blessing of heaven, for Africa. He then wrote to M. Pomponius requesting him, if he thought it advisable, to come to Lilybaeum that they might consult together as to what legions should be selected and what ought to be the total strength of the invading force. Orders were also sent all round the coast for every transport vessel to be requisitioned and brought to Lilybaeum.

When the whole of the military and naval forces in Sicily were assembled there, the town could not afford accommodation for all the men, nor could the harbour hold all the ships, and such enthusiasm prevailed in all ranks that it seemed as though instead of marching to war they were to reap the fruits of a victory already won. This was particularly the case with the survivors of Cannae, who felt quite certain that under no other leader would they be able to do such service for the commonwealth as would put an end to their ignominious condition. Scipio was far from despising these men, he was quite aware that the defeat at Cannae was not brought about by any cowardice on their part, and he knew, too, that there were no soldiers in the Roman army who had had such a long experience in every kind of fighting, and in the conduct of sieges. They formed the fifth and sixth legions. After announcing to them that he would take them with him to Africa, he inspected them man by man, and those whom he did not consider suitable he left behind, replacing them from the men whom he had brought from Italy. In this way he brought up the strength of each legion to 6200 men and 300 cavalry. He selected the Latin contingent also, both horse and foot, out of the army of Cannae.

XXV. As to the number of troops put on board there is considerable divergence among the authorities. I find that some state it to have amounted to 10,000 infantry and 2200 cavalry;

others give 16,000 infantry and 1600 cavalry; others again double this estimate and put the total of infantry and cavalry at 35,000 men. Some writers give no definite number, and in a matter so uncertain I prefer to include myself amongst them. Coelius declines, it is true, to give any definite number, but he exaggerates to such an extent as to give the impression of a countless multitude; the very birds, he says, fell to the ground stunned by the shouting of the soldiers, and such a mighty host embarked that it seemed as though there was not a single man left in either Italy or Sicily.

To avoid confusion Scipio personally superintended the embarkation. C. Laelius who was in command of the fleet had previously sent all the seamen to their posts and kept them there while the soldiers went on board. The praetor, M. Pomponius, was responsible for the shipping of the stores; forty-five days' provisions, including fifteen days' supply of cooked food, were put on board. When all were now on board, boats were sent round to take off the pilots and captains and two men from each ship who were to assemble in the forum<sup>14</sup> and receive their orders. When all were present, his first enquiry was as to the supply of water for the men and horses, whether they had put on board sufficient to last as long as the corn. They assured him that there was water in the ships sufficient to last for forty-five days. He then impressed upon the soldiers the necessity of keeping quiet and maintaining discipline and not interfering with the sailors in the discharge of their duties. He further informed them that he and Lucius Scipio would command the right division of twenty ships of war, whilst C. Laelius, prefect of the fleet, in conjunction with M. Porcius Cato, who was quaestor at the time, would be in charge of the left line containing the same number, and would protect the transports. The warships would show single lights at night, the transports would have two, while the commander's ship would be distinguished by three lights.

He gave the pilots instructions to make for Emporia.<sup>15</sup> This was an extremely fertile district, and supplies of all kinds were to be found there in abundance. The natives, as usually happens in a fruitful country, were unwarlike, and would probably be overpowered before assistance could reach them from Carthage. After issuing these orders he dismissed them to their ships, and on the morrow at the given signal they were, with the blessing of heaven, to set sail.

XXVI. Many Roman fleets had put out from Sicily and from that very port, but not even during the First Punic War—in the present war the majority were simply raiding expeditions—had any afforded a more striking picture at its departure. And yet, if you only take into account the number of vessels, it must be remembered that two consuls with their respective armies had left that port on a previous occasion and the war-ships in their fleets were almost as numerous as the transports with which Scipio was now making his passage, for in addition to the forty ships of war he was carrying his army in four hundred transports.

Several causes conspired to invest the occasion with unique interest. The Romans regarded the present war as a more serious one than the former because it was going on in Italy, and had involved the destruction of so many armies with their generals. Scipio, again, had become the most popular general of his time for his gallant deeds of arms, and his unvarying good fortune had immensely raised his reputation as a soldier. His design of invading Africa had never before been attempted by any commander, and it was generally believed that he would succeed in drawing Hannibal away from Italy and finish the war on African soil.

A vast crowd of spectators had gathered in the harbour; besides the population of Lilybaeum, all the deputations from the different cities in the island who had come to pay their respects to Scipio as well as those who had accompanied M. Pomponius, the governor of the province, were present. The legions which were to remain in Sicily also marched down to bid their comrades God-speed, and the throng which crowded the harbour was as grand a spectacle to those afloat as the fleet itself was to those ashore.

XXVII. When the moment for departure came, Scipio ordered the herald to proclaim silence throughout the fleet and put up the following prayer: "Ye gods and goddesses of sea and land, I pray and beseech you to vouchsafe a favourable issue to all that has been done or is being done now or will be done hereafter under my command. May all turn out happily for the burghers and plebs of Rome, for our allies of the Latin name, for all who have the cause of Rome at heart, and for all who are marching beneath my standard, under my auspices and command, by land or sea or stream. Grant us your gracious help in all our doings, crown our efforts with success. Bring



these my soldiers and myself safe home again, victorious over our conquered foes, adorned with their spoils, loaded with booty and exulting in triumph. Enable us to avenge ourselves on our enemies and grant to the people of Rome and to me the power to inflict exemplary chastisement on the city of Carthage, and to retaliate upon her all the injury that her people have sought to do to us."

As he finished he threw the raw entrails of the victim into the sea with the accustomed ritual.<sup>16</sup> Then he ordered the trumpeter to sound the signal for departure, and as the wind which was favourable to them freshened they were quickly carried out of sight.

In the afternoon they were enveloped in so thick a fog that they had difficulty in keeping their ships from fouling one another, and as they got out to sea the wind dropped. During the night a similar fog prevailed, which dispersed after sunrise, and at the same time the wind freshened. At last they descried land, and a few minutes later the pilot informed Scipio that they were not more than five miles from the coast of Africa, and that the headland of Mercurius was plainly visible.<sup>17</sup> If he would give orders for him to steer for it, the man assured him, the whole of the fleet would soon be in port. When he caught sight of land Scipio offered a prayer that this first view of Africa might bring good to himself and to the republic.

He then gave orders for the fleet to make for an anchorage further south. They went before the wind which was still in the same quarter, but a fog which came up about the same time as on the day before blotted out the view of the land and made the wind fall. As night came on everything became obscure, and to avoid all risk of the ships coming into collision or being driven ashore it was decided to cast anchor. When it grew light, the wind again freshened from the same quarter, and the dispersal of the fog revealed the entire coastline of Africa. Scipio enquired the name of the nearest headland, and on learning that that was called Pulchrum ("Cape Beautiful") he remarked, "I accept the omen, steer for it." The fleet brought up there and the whole of the force was landed.

This description of the voyage as favourable and unaccompanied by any confusion or alarms rests upon the statements of numerous Greek and Latin authorities. According to Coelius, though the fleet was not actually submerged by the waves, it was exposed to every possible danger from sea and sky, and

was at last driven from the African coast to the island of Aegimurus, and from here with great difficulty succeeded in getting on the right course. He adds that as the ships were leaking badly and all but sinking, the soldiers took to the boats without orders just as though they were shipwrecked and escaped to land without arms and in the utmost disorder.

XXVIII. *The Situation in Carthage.*—When the disembarkation was completed, the Romans measured out a site for their camp on some rising ground close by. The sight of a hostile fleet, followed by the bustle and excitement of the landing, created consternation and alarm, not only in the fields and farms on the coast, but in the cities as well. Not only were the roads filled everywhere by crowds of men and troops of women and children, but the peasantry were driving their live stock inland, so that you would say that Africa was being suddenly depopulated. The terror which these fugitives created in the cities was greater even than what they themselves felt, especially in Carthage, where the confusion was almost as great as if it had been actually captured. Since the days of the consuls M. Atilius Regulus and L. Manlius, almost fifty years ago, they had never seen a Roman army other than those employed on raiding expeditions, who picked up what they could in the fields and always got back to their ships before the countrymen could assemble together to meet them. This made the excitement and alarm in the city all the greater.

And no wonder, for there was neither an effective army nor a general whom they could oppose to Scipio. Hasdrubal, the son of Gisco, was by far the most prominent man in the State, distinguished alike by his birth, his military reputation and his wealth, and now by his connexion with royalty. But the Carthaginians had not forgotten that he had been defeated and routed in several battles by this very Scipio, and that as a general he was no more a match for him than the irregular levies which made up his force were a match for the army of Rome. There was a general call to arms, as though they were anticipating an immediate assault; the gates were hastily closed, troops stationed on the walls, outposts and sentinels posted, and the night was passed under arms.

The next day, a body of cavalry, 1000 strong, who had been sent down to the sea to reconnoitre and harass the Romans during the disembarkation, came upon the Roman outposts. Scipio, meanwhile, after sending the fleet to Utica, had advanced

a short distance from the shore and seized the nearest heights, where he stationed some of his cavalry as outposts; the rest he sent to plunder the fields.

XXIX. In the skirmish which ensued, the Romans killed some of the enemy in the actual fighting, but the greater number were slain in the pursuit, amongst them the young Hanno, who was in command. Scipio ravaged the surrounding fields and captured a fairly opulent city in the immediate neighbourhood. In addition to the plunder which was at once put on board the transports and sent to Sicily, he made prisoners of some 8000 men, freemen and slaves.

What cheered the whole army most of all at the outset of their campaign was the arrival of Masinissa, who, according to some writers, was accompanied by a mounted force of 200 men; most authorities, however, assert that it numbered 2000.

*Masinissa*.—As this monarch was by far the greatest of his contemporaries and rendered most important service to Rome, it may be worth while to digress from the order of our narrative and give a brief account of the various fortunes he experienced in the loss and subsequent recovery of the throne of his ancestors.

Whilst he was fighting for the Carthaginians in Spain, his father Gala died. In accordance with the Numidian custom the crown passed to the late king's brother Oezalces, a man advanced in years. He died not long afterwards and the elder of his two sons, Capussa—the other was quite a boy—succeeded to the throne. But as he wore the crown by right of descent rather than through any influence or authority he possessed with his subjects, a certain Mazaetullus prepared to dispute his claim. This man was also of royal blood and belonged to a family which had always been foes to the reigning house, and had kept up a constant struggle with varying fortunes against the occupants of the throne. He succeeded in rousing his countrymen, over whom, owing to the king's unpopularity, he had considerable influence, and taking the field against him, compelled him to fight for his crown. Capussa fell in the action, together with many of his principal supporters; the whole of the Maesulian tribe submitted to Mazaetullus. He would not, however, accept the title of king, this he bestowed on the boy Lacumazes, the sole survivor of the royal house, and contented himself with the modest title of Protector. With a view to an alliance with Carthage he married a Carthaginian lady of noble birth, a niece of Hannibal's, and widow of Oezalces. He also

sent envoys to Syphax and renewed the old ties of hospitality with him, thus securing on all sides support for the coming struggle with Masinissa.

XXX. On hearing of his uncle's death, followed by that of his cousin, Masinissa left Spain for Mauretania. Baga was king at the time, and Masinissa, by his earnest and humble entreaties, obtained from him a force of 4000 Moors to serve as an escort as he could not induce him to supply enough for warlike operations. With this escort he reached the frontiers of Numidia, having sent messengers in advance to his father's friends and his own. Here about 500 Numidians joined him, and, as had been arranged, his escort of Moors returned to their king. His adherents were fewer than he expected, too few, in fact, with which to venture on so great an enterprise. Thinking, however, that by active personal effort he might collect a force which would enable him to achieve something, he advanced to Thapsus, where he met Lacumazes, who was on his way to Syphax. The king's escort retreated hurriedly into the town, and Masinissa captured the place at the first assault. Some of the royal troops surrendered, others who offered resistance were killed, but the great majority escaped with their boy-king in the confusion and continued their journey to Syphax. The news of this initial success, slight though it was, brought the Numidians over to Masinissa, and from the fields and hamlets on all sides the old soldiers of Gala flocked to his standard and urged the young leader to win back his ancestral throne. Mazaetullus had considerably the advantage in point of numbers; he had the army with which he had defeated Capussa as well as some of the troops who had gone over to him after the king's death, and Lacumazes had brought very large reinforcements from Syphax. His total force amounted to 15,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry, but, though so inferior in both arms, Masinissa engaged him. The courage of the veterans and the skill of their commander, trained as he had been in the wars in Spain, carried the day; the king and the Protector with a mere handful of Masaesulians<sup>18</sup> escaped into Carthaginian territory.

Thus Masinissa won back the throne of his ancestors. As he saw, however, that a much more serious contest awaited him with Syphax, he thought it best to effect a reconciliation with his cousin, and sent to the boy to assure him that if he would place himself in Masinissa's hands he would experience the same honourable treatment that Oenacles received from

Gala. He also pledged his word to Mazaetullus that he should not suffer for what he had done, and, more than that, that all his property should be restored to him. Both Lacumazes and Mazaetullus preferred a moderate share of fortune at home to a life of exile, and in spite of all the efforts of the Carthaginians went over to Masinissa.

XXXI. Hasdrubal happened to be on a visit to Syphax at the time. The Numidian did not consider it a matter of much importance to him whether the Maesulian throne was occupied by Lacumazes or Masinissa, but Hasdrubal warned him that he was making a very great mistake if he supposed that Masinissa would be content with the same frontiers as his father Gala. "That man," he said, "possessed much more ability and much more force of character than any one of that nation had hitherto shown. In Spain he had often exhibited to friends and foes alike proofs of a courage rare amongst men. Unless Syphax and the Carthaginians stifled that rising flame, they would soon be involved in a conflagration which nothing could check. As yet his power was weak and insecure, he was nursing a realm whose wounds had not yet closed."

By continually urging these considerations, Hasdrubal persuaded him to move his army up to the frontiers of Maesulia and fix his camp on territory which he claimed as beyond question forming part of his dominions, a claim which Gala had contested not only by argument, but by force of arms. He advised him in case any one offered opposition—and he only wished they would—to be prepared to fight; if they for fear of him retired, he must advance into the heart of the kingdom. The Maesulii would either submit to him without a struggle or they would find themselves hopelessly outmatched in arms.

Encouraged by these representations Syphax commenced war with Masinissa, and in the very first battle defeated and routed the Maesulians. Masinissa with a few horsemen escaped from the field and fled to a mountain range called by the natives Bellum. Several households with their tent-wagons and cattle—their sole wealth—followed the king; the bulk of the population submitted to Syphax.

The mountain district which the fugitives had taken possession of was grassy and well watered, and as it afforded excellent pasturage for cattle it provided ample sustenance for men who lived on flesh and milk. From these heights they harried the whole country round, at first in stealthy nocturnal incursions,

and afterwards in open brigandage. They ravaged the Carthaginian territory mainly, because it offered more plunder and depredation was a safer work there than amongst the Numidians. At last they reached such a pitch of audacity that they carried their plunder down to the sea and sold it to traders who brought their ships up for the purpose. More Carthaginians fell or were made prisoners in these forays than often happens in regular warfare. The authorities at Carthage complained loudly of all this to Syphax and pressed him to follow up these remnants of the war. Angry as he was, however, he hardly thought it part of his duties as a king to hunt down a robber at large on the mountains.

XXXII. Boncar,<sup>19</sup> one of the king's officers, a keen and energetic soldier, was selected for the task. He was supplied with 4000 infantry and 200 horsemen and he had a good prospect of gaining rewards if he brought back Masinissa's head, or—what would afford measureless gratification—captured him alive. Making a surprise attack on the plunderers when they were suspecting no danger, he cut off an enormous number of men and cattle from their armed escort and drove Masinissa himself with a few followers up to the summit of the mountain. He now regarded serious hostilities as at an end, and after despatching his capture of men and cattle to the king, sent back also the bulk of his troops whom he considered unnecessary for what remained of the fighting, retaining only 500 infantry and 200 mounted men. With these he hastened in pursuit of Masinissa who had left the heights and, catching him in a narrow valley, he blocked both entrances and inflicted a very severe loss on the Maesulii. Masinissa with not more than fifty troopers got away through steep mountain tracks unknown to his pursuers. Boncar, however, kept on his track and overtook him in the open country near Clupea where he surrounded him so completely that the whole party were killed with the exception of four who with Masinissa, himself wounded, slipped out of his hands during the fray. Their flight was observed and the cavalry were sent in pursuit. They spread over the plain, some making a short cut to head off the five fugitives, whose flight brought them to a large river. Dreading the enemy more than the river, they spurred their horses without a moment's hesitation into the water, and the rapid current carried them down stream. Two were drowned before their pursuers' eyes, and it was believed that Masinissa had

perished. He, however, with the two survivors, landed amongst the bush on the other side.

This was the end of Boncar's pursuit, as he would not venture into the river and did not believe that there was any one now left for him to follow. He returned to the king with the baseless story of Masinissa's death, and messengers were sent to carry the good news to Carthage. The report soon spread throughout Africa, and affected men's minds in very different ways.

Masinissa was resting in a secret cave and treating his wound with herbs, and for some days kept himself alive on what his two troopers brought in from their forays. As soon as his wound was sufficiently healed to allow him to bear the movements of the horse he started with extraordinary boldness on a fresh attempt to recover his kingdom. During his journey he did not collect more than forty horsemen, but when he reached the Maesulii and made his identity known, his appearance created intense excitement. His former popularity and the unhopèd-for delight of seeing him safe and sound, after they had believed him dead, had such an effect that in a few days 6000 infantry and 4000 cavalry had gathered round his standard. He was now in possession of his kingdom, and began to devastate the tribes who were friendly to Carthage, and the territory of the Masaesulii, which formed part of the dominions of Syphax. Having thus provoked Syphax into hostilities, Masinissa took up a position on some mountain heights between Cirto and Hippo, a situation which was every way advantageous.

XXXIII. Syphax looked upon the struggle as too serious a one to be entrusted to his lieutenants. He placed one division of his army under his son Vermina with instructions to march round the back of the mountain and attack the enemy in the rear while he himself occupied his attention in front. Vermina started in the night as he was to fall on the enemy unawares; Syphax broke camp and marched out in broad daylight with the obvious intention of giving regular battle. When sufficient time had elapsed for Vermina to reach his objective, Syphax led his men over a part of the mountain which afforded a gentle slope and made straight for the enemy, trusting to his superiority in numbers and the success of the attack in the rear. Masinissa prepared to meet the attack with confidence owing to his vastly superior position. The battle was fiercely and for a long time evenly contested; Masinissa had the advantage of the ground

and finer soldiers, Syphax, that of great superiority in numbers. His masses of men, which had been formed into two divisions, one pressing the enemy in front, the other surrounding his rear, gave Syphax a decisive victory. Flight was impossible as they were hemmed in on both sides, and almost the whole force of infantry and cavalry were killed or made prisoners. Some two hundred horsemen had gathered as a bodyguard round Masinissa, and he divided them into three troops with orders to cut their way through at different points and after they had got clear away to rejoin him at a spot he named. He himself charged through the enemy and escaped in the direction he intended, but two of the troops found escape impossible, one surrendered, the other after an obstinate resistance was buried beneath the enemy's missiles. Masinissa found Vermina almost at his heels, but by continually doubling first to one side and then to the other he eluded his pursuit until at last he forced him to abandon the exhausting and hopeless chase.

Accompanied by sixty troopers he reached the Lesser Syrtis. Here, in the proud consciousness of his many heroic efforts to recover his father's throne, he passed his time between the Carthaginian Emporia and the tribe of the Garamantes until the appearance of Scipio and the Roman fleet in Africa. This leads me to believe that when Masinissa came to Scipio it was with a small rather than with a large body of troops; the former would be much more suitable to the fortunes of an exile, the latter to those of a reigning prince.

XXXIV. *Scipio's Movements.*—After the loss of their cavalry corps and its commander,<sup>20</sup> the Carthaginians raised a fresh force which they placed under Hamilcar's son Hanno. They had sent repeated messages to both Hasdrubal and Syphax and at last sent a special embassy to each of them, appealing to Hasdrubal to succour his native city which was all but invested, and imploring Syphax to come to the aid of Carthage and indeed of the whole of Africa.

Scipio at the time was encamped about a mile from Utica, having moved up from the coast where for a few days he had occupied an intrenched position close to his fleet.

The mounted troops which had been supplied to Hanno were by no means strong enough to harass the enemy or even to protect the country from his depredations, and his first and most pressing task was to increase its strength. Though he did not reject recruits from other tribes, his levy consisted mainly



of Numidians, by far the finest cavalry in Africa. When he had brought his corps up to about 4000 men, he took possession of a town called Salaeca, about fifteen miles from the Roman camp. This was reported to Scipio, and he exclaimed, "What? Cavalry in houses in the summer! Let there be more of them as long as they have such a leader!" Realising that the less energy the enemy showed, the less hesitation ought he himself to show, he instructed Masinissa and his cavalry to ride up to the enemy's quarters and draw them into action; when their whole force was engaged and he was being outnumbered he was to retire slowly, and when the moment arrived Scipio would come to his support. The Roman general waited until Masinissa had had sufficient time to draw the enemy, and then followed with his cavalry, his approach being concealed by some low hills which fortunately flanked his route.

Masinissa, in accordance with his instructions, rode right up to the gates and, when the enemy appeared, retired as though afraid to meet him; this simulated fear made the enemy all the more confident, until he was tempted into a rash pursuit. The Carthaginians had not yet all emerged from the city, and their general had more than enough to do in forcing some who were heavy with wine and sleep to seize their weapons and bridle their horses and preventing others from rushing out of the gates in scattered disorder, with no attempt at formation and even without their standards. The first who incautiously galloped out fell into Masinissa's hands, but they soon poured out in a compact body and in greater numbers, and the fighting became more equal. At last, when the whole of the Carthaginian cavalry were in the field, Masinissa could no longer bear the weight of their attack. His men did not, however, take to flight but retired slowly before the enemy's charges until their commander had brought them as far as the rising ground which concealed the Roman cavalry. Then these latter charged from behind the hill, horses and men alike fresh, and threw themselves, in front and flank and rear, upon Hanno and his Africans, who were tired out with the fight and the pursuit. Masinissa at the same time wheeled round and recommenced fighting. About 1000 who were in the front ranks, unable to effect a retreat, were surrounded and killed, amongst them Hanno himself; the rest, appalled at their leader's death, fled precipitately, and were pursued by the victors for more than thirty miles.<sup>21</sup> As many as 2000 were either killed or made

prisoners, and it is pretty certain that amongst them there were not less than 200 Carthaginians, including some of their wealthiest and noblest families.

XXXV. On the very day on which this action was fought, it happened that the ships which had carried the plunder to Sicily returned with supplies, as though they had divined that they would have to carry back a second cargo of spoils of war. Not all the authorities state that two Carthaginian generals of the same name were killed in two separate actions, they were afraid, I think, of being misled into repeating the same incident twice over. Coelius, at all events, and Valerius tell us that Hanno was taken prisoner.

Scipio distributed amongst the cavalry and their officers rewards proportioned to the service each had rendered; Masinissa was distinguished above the rest by some splendid presents. After placing a strong garrison in Salaeca he continued his advance with the rest of his army, and not only stripped the fields along his line of march, but captured various towns and villages as well, spreading terror far and wide. After a week's marching he returned to camp with a long train of men and cattle and all sorts of booty, and the ships were sent off for the second time heavily loaded with the spoils of war.

He now abandoned his plundering expeditions and devoted all his strength to an attack on Utica, intending if he took it to make that the base of his future operations. His naval contingent was employed against the side of the city which faced the sea, while his land army operated from some rising ground which commanded the walls. Some artillery and siege engines he had brought with him, and some had been sent with the supplies from Sicily, new ones were also being constructed in an arsenal where a large number of artisans trained in this work were assembled. Under the pressure of such a vigorous investment all the hopes of the people of Utica rested on Carthage, and all the hopes of the Carthaginians rested on Hasdrubal and on whatever assistance he could obtain from Syphax. In their anxiety for relief everything seemed to be moving too slowly. Hasdrubal had been doing his utmost to obtain troops, and had actually assembled a force of 30,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry, but he did not venture to move nearer the enemy till Syphax joined him. He came with 50,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry, and with their united forces they at once advanced from Carthage and took up a position not

far from Utica and the Roman lines. Their approach led to one important result at least: after prosecuting the siege of Utica with all the resources at his command Scipio abandoned any further attempts on the place, and as winter was coming on he constructed an intrenched camp on a tongue of land which projected into the sea and was connected by a narrow isthmus with the mainland.<sup>22</sup> He enclosed the military and naval camps within the same lines. The legions were stationed in the middle of the headland; the ships, which had been beached, and their crews occupied the northern side; the low ground on the south side was allotted to the cavalry.

Such were the incidents in the African campaign down to the end of the autumn.

XXXVI. In addition to the corn which had been accumulated from the plunder of all the country round, and the supplies which had been conveyed from Sicily and Italy, a large quantity was sent by the propraetor Cnaeus Octavius which he had obtained from Ti. Claudius, the governor of Sardinia. The existing granaries being all full, new ones were built. The army was in need of clothing and Octavius received instructions to confer with the governor as to whether any could be made and despatched from that island. The matter was promptly attended to and in a short time 1200 togas and 12,000 tunics were sent off.

*Events in Italy.*—During this summer the consul P. Sempronius, who was commanding in Bruttium, was marching near Croto when he fell in with Hannibal. An irregular battle ensued, as both armies were in column of march and did not deploy into line. The Romans were repulsed, and though it was more of a mêlée than a battle no fewer than 1200 of the consul's army were killed. They retreated in confusion to their camp, but the enemy did not venture to attack it. The consul, however, marched away in the silence of the night after despatching a message to the proconsul P. Licinius to bring up his legions. With their united forces the two commanders marched back to meet Hannibal. There was no hesitation on either side, the consul's confidence was restored by the doubling of his strength, and the enemy's courage was raised by his recent victory.

P. Sempronius stationed his own legions in front, those of P. Licinius were placed in reserve. At the commencement of the battle the consul vowed a temple to Fortuna Primigenia

in case he routed the enemy, and his prayer was granted. The Carthaginians were routed and put to flight, above 4000 were killed, nearly 300 were made prisoners and 40 horses and 11 standards were captured. Daunted by his failure, Hannibal withdrew to Croto.

Etruria, at the other end of Italy, was almost wholly in sympathy with Mago, hoping to effect a revolution with his help. The consul M. Cornelius kept his hold on the province more by the terror created by his judicial proceedings than by force of arms. He conducted the investigations which the senate had commissioned him to make without any respect of persons, and many Etrurian nobles who had personally interviewed Mago or been in correspondence with him about the defection of their cantons were brought up and condemned to death; others knowing themselves to be equally guilty went into exile and were sentenced in their absence. As their persons were beyond arrest, their property only could be confiscated as an earnest of their future punishment.

XXXVII. While the consuls were thus occupied in their widely separated spheres of action, the censors, M. Livius and C. Claudius, were busy in Rome. They revised the roll of senators, and Q. Fabius Maximus was again chosen as Leader of the House. Seven names were struck off the roll, but none of them had ever filled a curule chair. The censors insisted upon the exact fulfilment of the contracts which had been made for the repair of public buildings, and they made additional contracts for the construction of a road from the Forum Boarium to the temple of Venus with public seats on each side of it and also for the building of a temple to Mater Magna on the Palatine. They also imposed a new tax in the shape of a duty on salt. In Rome and throughout Italy it had been sold at a sextans, and the contractors were bound to sell it at the old price in Rome but allowed to charge a higher price in the country towns and markets. It was commonly believed that one of the censors had devised this tax to spite the people because he had once been unjustly condemned by them, and it was said that the rise in the price of salt pressed most heavily on those tribes who had been instrumental in procuring his condemnation. It was owing to this that Livius got the name of Salinator.

The lustrum was closed later than usual because the censors had sent commissioners into the provinces to ascertain the number of Roman citizens who were serving in the armies.

Including these, the total number as shown in the census amounted to 214,000. The lustrum was closed by C. Claudius Nero.

This year, for the first time, a return was furnished of the population of the twelve colonies, the censors of the colonies themselves furnishing the lists so that the military strength and financial position of each might be permanently recorded in the archives of the State.

Then followed the revision of the equites. It so happened that both the censors had government horses.<sup>23</sup> When they came to the Pollian tribe, which contained the name of M. Livius, the usher hesitated about citing the censor himself. "Cite M. Livius," exclaimed Nero, and then, whether it was that the old enmity still survived or that he was pluming himself upon an ill-timed strictness, he turned to Livius and ordered him to sell his horse as he had been condemned by the verdict of the people. When they were going through the Arniensian tribe and came to his colleague's name, Livius ordered C. Claudius Nero to sell his horse for two reasons, first because he had borne false witness against him, and secondly because he had not been sincere in his reconciliation with him. Thus at the close of their censorship a dispute arose equally discreditable to both, each besmirching the other's good name at the cost of his own.

After C. C. Nero had made the usual affidavit that he had acted in accordance with the laws, he went up to the treasury and amongst the names of those whom he left disfranchised he placed that of his colleague. He was followed by M. Livius who took still more dramatic action. With the exception of the Maecian tribe, who had neither condemned him nor afterwards, in spite of his condemnation, made him either consul or censor, Livius reduced to the status of *aerarii* the whole of the remaining tribes of the Roman people on the ground that they had condemned an innocent man, and afterwards had made him consul and censor. He argued that they must admit that either they were acting wrongfully as judges in the first instance, or afterwards as electors. Amongst the thirty-four tribes, C. C. Nero, he said, would be disfranchised, and if there were any precedent for disfranchising the same man twice he would have inserted his name specially. This rivalry between the censors in affixing a stigma on each other was deplorable, but the sharp lesson administered to the people for their

inconstancy was just what a censor ought to have given and befitted the seriousness of the times.

As the censors had fallen into disfavour one of the tribunes of the plebs, Cnaeus Baebius, thought it a good opportunity for advancing himself at their expense, and appointed a day for their impeachment. The project was defeated by the unanimous vote of the senate, who were determined that the censorship should not for the future be at the mercy of popular caprice.

XXXVIII. During the summer Clamptia in Bruttium was taken by storm by the consul; Consentia, Pandosia and some other unimportant places surrendered voluntarily.

As the time for the elections was approaching it was thought best to summon Cornelius from Etruria as there were no active hostilities there, and he conducted the elections. The new consuls were Cnaeus Servilius Caepio and Caius Servilius Geminus. At the election of praetors which followed, those returned were P. Cornelius Lentulus, P. Quintilius Varus, P. Aelius Paetus and P. Villius Tappulus; the last two were plebeian aediles at the time. When the elections were over the consul returned to Etruria.

Some deaths took place among the priests this year, and appointments were made to fill the vacancies. Tiberius Veturius Philo was appointed Flamen of Mars in place of M. Aemilius Regillus who died in the preceding year. M. Pomponius Matho, who had been both augur and keeper of the Sacred Books, was succeeded by M. Aurelius Cotta in the latter office and as augur by Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, a very young man, a very unusual thing at that time in appointments to the priesthood.

Golden chariots were placed in the Capitol by the curule aediles, C. Livius and M. Servilius Geminus. The Roman Games were celebrated for two days by the aediles P. Aelius and P. Villius. There was also a feast in honour of Jupiter on the occasion of the Games.

## BOOK XXX

### CLOSE OF THE HANNIBALIC WAR

1. *Distribution of the Commands. Expiation of Portents.*—It was now the sixteenth year of the Punic War. The new consuls, Cnaeus Servilius and Caius Servilius, laid before the senate the questions of the general policy of the republic, the conduct of the war and the assignment of the provinces. It was resolved that the consuls should come to an arrangement, or failing that decide by ballot, which of them should oppose Hannibal in Bruttium whilst the other should have Etruria and the Ligurians as his province. The one to whom Bruttium fell was to take over the army from P. Sempronius, and Sempronius, whose command was extended for a year as proconsul, was to relieve P. Licinius; the latter was to return to Rome. Licinius was not only a fine soldier but he was in every respect one of the most accomplished citizens of the time; he combined in himself all the advantages which nature or fortune could bestow; he was an exceptionally handsome man and possessed remarkable physical strength; he was considered a most eloquent speaker, whether he was pleading a cause or defending or attacking a measure in the senate or before the Assembly, and he was thoroughly conversant with pontifical law. And his recent consulship had established his reputation as a military leader.

Arrangements similar to those in Bruttium were also made in Etruria and Liguria; M. Cornelius was to hand over his army to the new consul and hold the province of Gaul with the legions which L. Scribonius had commanded the previous year.

Then the consuls balloted for their provinces; Bruttium fell to Caepio, Etruria to Servilius Geminus. The balloting for the praetors' provinces followed; Aelius Pactus obtained the City jurisdiction, P. Lentulus drew Sardinia, P. Villius Sicily, and Quintilius Varus Ariminum with the two legions which had formed Lucretius Spurius' command. Lucretius had his command extended for a year to allow of his rebuilding Genua, which had been destroyed by Mago. Scipio's command was

extended until the war in Africa was brought to a close. A decree was also made that, as he had entered upon his province of Africa, solemn intercessions should be offered up that the expedition might be to the advantage of the Roman people, of the general himself and of his army.

II. 3000 men were raised for service in Sicily, as all the troops in that province had been taken to Africa and it had been decided that Sicily should be protected by forty ships until the fleet returned from Africa.<sup>1</sup> Villius took with him thirteen new ships, the rest were the old ones in Sicily which were refitted. M. Pomponius, who had been praetor the year before, was appointed to take charge of this fleet, and placed on board the new levies he had brought from Italy. A fleet of equal strength was assigned to Cnaeus Octavius, who also had been praetor the previous year and was now invested with similar powers for the protection of the Sardinian coast. The praetor Lentulus was ordered to furnish 2000 men for service with the fleet. In view of the uncertainty as to where the Carthaginian fleet would land, though they would be sure to seek some unguarded spot, M. Marcius was furnished with forty ships to watch the coast of Italy. The consuls were authorised by the senate to raise 3000 men for this fleet and also two legions to defend the City against all contingencies. The province of Spain was left in the hands of the former commanders, L. Lentulus and L. Manlius Acidinus, who retained their old legions.

Altogether there were 20 legions and 160 ships of war on active service this year.

The praetors were ordered to go to their respective provinces. Before the consuls left the City they received the commands of the senate to celebrate the Great Games which the vow of the Dictator T. Manlius Torquatus required to be celebrated every five years,<sup>2</sup> if the condition of the republic remained unaltered.

Numerous stories of portents filled men's minds with superstitious terrors. It was said that crows picked with their beaks some of the gold on the Capitol and actually ate it, and rats gnawed a golden crown at Antium. The whole of the country round Capua was covered by an immense flight of locusts, and no one knew whence they had come. At Reate a foal was born with five feet; at Anagnia fiery meteors were seen in different parts of the sky and these were followed by a huge



blazing torch; at Frusino a thin bow encircled the sun, which afterwards grew to such a size that it extended beyond the bow; at Arpinum there was a subsidence of the ground and a vast chasm was formed. Whilst one of the consuls was sacrificing, the liver of the first victim was found to be without a head.<sup>3</sup>

These portents were expiated by sacrifices of full-grown animals, the college of pontiffs intimated the deities to whom they were to be offered.

III. *Progress of Scipio's African Campaign.*—When this business was completed the consuls and praetors departed to their various provinces. They were all, however, interested in Africa, as much so indeed as if the ballot had assigned it to them, whether it was that they saw that the issue of the war and their country's fate would be decided there, or that they wished to do a service to Scipio as the man to whom all eyes were turned. So it was that not only from Sardinia, as above stated, but from Sicily itself and from Spain, clothing, corn, even arms as well as supplies of all kinds were forwarded to him from the Sicilian harbours.

Throughout the winter there had been no pause in the numerous operations which Scipio was conducting on all sides. He maintained the investment of Utica; his camp was in full view of Hasdrubal; the Carthaginians had launched their ships, their fleet was fully equipped and ready to intercept his supplies. Nevertheless he had not lost sight of his purpose to win Syphax, in case his passion for his bride should have cooled through unstinted enjoyment. Syphax was anxious for peace and proposed as conditions that the Romans should evacuate Africa, and the Carthaginians Italy, but he gave Scipio to understand that if the war continued he should not desert his allies. I believe that the negotiations were conducted through intermediaries—and most of the authorities take this view—rather than that Syphax, as Antias Valerius asserts, came to the Roman camp to confer personally with Scipio. At first the Roman commander would hardly allow these terms to be mentioned; afterwards, however, in order that his men might have a plausible reason for visiting the enemies' camp he did not reject them so decidedly, and held out hopes that after frequent discussions they might come to an agreement.

The winter quarters of the Carthaginians, constructed as they were of materials collected haphazard from the country round, were almost wholly built of wood. The Numidians in

particular lived in huts made of wattled reeds and roofed with grass matting; they were dispersed all over the camp in no order or arrangement, and some even lay outside the lines. When this was reported to Scipio, he was hopeful of burning the camp down if an opportunity presented itself.

IV. The envoys who were sent to Syphax were accompanied by some first-rank centurions, men of tried courage and sagacity, who were disguised as camp-servants. Whilst the envoys were in conference these men strolled about the camp noting all the adits and exits, the general arrangement of the camp, the positions of the Carthaginians and Numidians, respectively, and the distance between Hasdrubal's camp and that of Syphax. They also watched the methods adopted in posting the watches and guards, to see whether a surprise attack would be better made by night or by day. The conferences were pretty frequent, and different men were purposely sent each time in order that these details might become known to a larger number.

As the discussions went on with increasing frequency, Syphax, and through him the Carthaginians, fully expected that peace would be attained with a few days. Suddenly the Roman envoys announced that they had been forbidden to return to headquarters unless a definite reply were given. Syphax must either say what he had made up his mind to do or, if it was necessary for him to consult Hasdrubal and the Carthaginians, he should do so; the time had come for either a peace settlement or an energetic resumption of hostilities. Whilst Syphax was consulting Hasdrubal and the Carthaginians, the Roman spies had time to visit every part of the camp, and Scipio was able to make all his arrangements. The prospect of peace had, as usually happens, made Syphax and the Carthaginians less on the alert to guard against any hostile attempt which might be made in the meantime. At last a reply came, but as the Romans were supposed to be anxious for peace, the opportunity was taken of adding some unacceptable conditions. This was just what Scipio wanted to justify him in breaking off the armistice. He told the king's messenger that he would refer the matter to his council, and the next day he gave his reply to the effect that not a single member of the council beside himself was in favour of peace. The messenger was to take word that the only hope of peace for Syphax lay in his abandoning the cause of the Carthaginians.

Thus Scipio put an end to the truce in order that he might

be free to carry out his plans without any breach of faith. He launched his ships—it was now the commencement of spring—and placed his engines and artillery on board as though he were going to attack Útica from the sea. He also sent 2000 men to hold the hill commanding the city which he had previously occupied, partly with a view of diverting the enemy's attention from his real design, and partly to prevent his camp from being attacked from the city, as it would be left with only a weak guard while he was marching against Syphax and Hasdrubal.

V. *Destruction of Hasdrubal's and Syphax's Camps.*—After making these arrangements he summoned a council of war and ordered the spies to report what they had discovered, and at the same time requested Masinissa who knew all about the enemy to give the council any information he could. He then laid before them his own plan of operations for the coming night and directed the tribunes to lead the troops out of camp as soon as the trumpets sounded on the break-up of the council. In obedience to his order the march out began at sunset. About the first watch the column of march was deployed into line of battle. After advancing in this order at an easy pace for seven miles they reached the hostile camp about midnight.

Scipio assigned a portion of his force, including Masinissa and his Numidians, to Laelius with instructions to attack Syphax and fire his camp. Then he took Laelius and Masinissa apart and appealed to them each separately to make up by extra care and diligence for the confusion inseparable from a night attack. He told them that he should attack Hasdrubal and the Carthaginian camp, but would wait until he saw the king's camp on fire. He had not to wait long, for when the fire was cast on the nearest huts it very soon caught the next ones and then running along in all directions spread over the whole camp. Such an extensive fire breaking out at night naturally produced alarm and confusion, but Syphax's men thinking it was due to accident and not to the enemy rushed out without arms to try and extinguish it. They found themselves at once confronted by an armed foe, mainly Numidians whom Masinissa, thoroughly acquainted with the arrangement of the camp, had posted in places where they could block all the avenues. Some were caught by the flames, whilst half asleep in their beds, numbers who had fled precipitately, scrambling over one another were trampled to death in the camp gates.

VI. In the Carthaginian camp the first to see the glowing

flames were the watch, then others wakened by the tumult observed them, and all fell into the same mistake of supposing that it was an accidental outbreak. They took the cries proceeding from wounded combatants as due to the nocturnal alarm, and so were unable to realise what had actually happened.<sup>4</sup> Not in the least suspecting the presence of an enemy, they rushed out, each through the gate nearest to him, without any weapons carrying out what might help to extinguish the flames, and so came right on the Roman army. They were all cut down, for the enemy gave no quarter, that none might escape and give the alarm. In the confusion the gates were left unguarded, and Scipio at once seized them and fire was flung upon the nearest huts. The flames broke out at first in different places but, creeping from hut to hut, in a very few moments wrapped the whole camp in one vast conflagration. Men and animals alike scorched with the heat blocked the passages to the gates and fell crushed by each other. Those whom the fire did not overtake perished by the sword and the two camps were involved in one common destruction. Both the generals, however, saved themselves, and out of all those thousands only 2000 infantry and 500 cavalry made good their escape, the majority being wounded or suffering from the fire. Forty thousand men perished either from the fire or the enemy, over 5000 were taken alive, including many Carthaginian nobles of whom eleven were senators; 174 standards were captured, 2700 horses and 6 elephants, 8 others having been killed or burnt to death. An enormous quantity of arms was secured, these the general devoted to Vulcan, and they were all burnt.

VII. *Fresh Efforts on the part of Carthage. Battle in Magni Campi.*—Hasdrubal, who was accompanied in his flight by a small body of horse, made for the nearest city, where he was subsequently joined by all who survived, but fearing that it might be surrendered to Scipio, he left it in the night. Soon after his departure the gates were opened to admit the Romans, and as the surrender was a voluntary one the place suffered no hostile treatment. Two cities were taken and sacked soon afterwards, and the loot found there with what had been rescued from the burning camp was all given to the soldiers. Syphax established himself in a fortified position about eight miles distant; Hasdrubal hastened to Carthage, fearing lest the recent disaster should frighten the senate into a more yielding mood. So great in fact was the alarm that people expected

Scipio to leave Utica alone and instantly commence the siege of Carthage. The *sufetes*—a magistrate corresponding to our consul—convened a meeting of the senate.

Here three proposals were made. One was to send envoys to Scipio to negotiate a peace; another, to recall Hannibal to protect his country from the ruin which threatened it; the third, which showed a firmness worthy of Romans in adversity, urged the reinforcement of the army to its proper strength and an appeal to Syphax not to abandon hostilities. The last proposal, which was supported by Hasdrubal and the whole of the Barcine party, was adopted.

Recruiting began at once in the city and the country districts, and a deputation was sent to Syphax, who was already doing his utmost to repair his losses and renew hostilities. He was urged on by his wife, who did not now trust to the endearments and caresses with which she had formerly swayed her lover, but with prayers and piteous appeals and eyes bathed in tears she conjured him not to betray her father and her country, or allow Carthage to be devastated by the flames which had consumed his camp. The deputation gave him encouragement and hope by informing him that they had met near a city called Obba a body of 4000 Celtiberian mercenaries who had been raised in Spain, a splendid force, and that Hasdrubal would appear ere long with a formidable army. He answered them in friendly terms, and then took them to see a large number of Numidian peasants to whom he had just given arms and horses, and assured them that he would call out all the fighting men in his kingdom. He was well aware, he said, that he owed his defeat to fire, and not to the chances of battle; it was only the man who was vanquished by arms that was inferior in war.

Such was the tenor of his reply to the deputation. A few days later, Hasdrubal and Syphax joined forces; their united strength amounted to about 30,000 men.

VIII. Just as though the war were at end, so far as Syphax and the Carthaginians were concerned, Scipio pressed on the siege of Utica and was already bringing his engines up to the walls when he received intelligence of the enemy's activity. Leaving a small force to keep up the appearance of an investment by land and sea, he marched with the main body of his army to meet his foes. His first position was on a hill some four miles distant from the king's camp. The next day he

marched his cavalry down into what are called the Magni Campi, a stretch of level country extending from the foot of the hill, and spent the day in riding up to the enemies' outposts and harassing them with skirmishes. For the next two days both sides kept up this desultory fighting without any result worth mentioning; on the fourth day both sides came down to battle.

The Roman commander drew up his principes behind the leading maniples of the hastati, and the triarii as reserves; the Italian cavalry were stationed on the right wing, Masinissa and the Numidians on the left. Syphax and Hasdrubal placed the Numidian cavalry opposite the Italian, and the Carthaginian horse fronted Masinissa, whilst the Celtiberians formed the centre to meet the charge of the legions. In this formation they closed. The Numidians and Carthaginians on the two wings were routed at the first charge; the former consisting mostly of peasants could not withstand the Roman horse, nor could the Carthaginians, also raw levies, hold their own against Masinissa, whose recent victory had made him more formidable than ever. Though exposed on both flanks the Celtiberians stood their ground, for as they did not know the country, flight offered no chance of safety, nor could they hope for any quarter from Scipio after carrying their mercenary arms into Africa to attack the man who had done so much for them and their countrymen. Completely enveloped by their foes they died fighting to the last, and fell one after another on the ground where they stood. Whilst the attention of all was turned to them, Syphax and Hasdrubal gained time to make their escape. The victors, wearied with slaughter more than with fighting, were at last overtaken by the night.

IX. *Attack on the Roman Fleet.*—On the morrow Scipio sent Laelius with the whole of the Roman and Numidian cavalry and some light-armed infantry in pursuit of Syphax and Hasdrubal. The cities in the neighbourhood, all of which were subject to Carthage, he attacked successively with his main body; some he won by appealing to their hopes and fears, some he took by storm.

Carthage was in a state of terrible panic, they felt quite sure that when he had subjugated all their neighbours in the rapid progress of his arms, he would make a sudden attack on Carthage. The walls were repaired and protected by outworks, and each man carried off from the fields, on his own account,

what would enable him to endure a long siege. Few ventured to mention the word "peace" in the senate, many were in favour of recalling Hannibal, the majority were of opinion that the fleet which was intended to intercept supplies should be sent to destroy the ships anchored off Utica, possibly the naval camp as well, which was insufficiently guarded. This proposal found most favour, at the same time they decided to send to Hannibal, "for even," it was argued, "supposing that the naval operations were completely successful, the siege of Utica would be only partly raised, and then there was the defence of Carthage—they had no general but Hannibal, no army but his that could undertake that task." The next day the ships were launched, and at the same time a party of delegates set sail for Italy. The critical state of affairs acted as strong stimulus, everything was done with feverish energy, any one who showed hesitation or slackness was regarded as a traitor to the safety of all.

As Scipio was making slow progress, his army being encumbered with the spoils of many cities, he sent the prisoners and the rest of the booty to his old camp at Utica. As Carthage was now his objective, he seized Tyneta,<sup>5</sup> from which the garrison had fled, a place about fifteen miles from Carthage, protected by its natural situation as well as by defensive works. It is visible from Carthage and its walls afford a view of the sea which surrounds that city.

X. Whilst the Romans were busily engaged in intrenching they saw the hostile fleet sailing from Carthage to Utica. They at once ceased work, orders were given to march, and the army made a rapid advance, fearing lest the ships should be caught with their prows turned shorewards for siege operations, in utter unreadiness for a naval battle. "How," they asked themselves, "can a mobile and fully armed fleet in perfect sailing order be successfully resisted by ships loaded with artillery and war machines, or converted into transports, or brought up so close to the walls as to allow of scaling parties using them instead of an *agger* and gangways?"<sup>6</sup> Under the circumstances Scipio abandoned the usual tactics. Bringing the warships which could have protected the others into the rearmost position close inshore, he lined up the transports in front of them four deep to serve as a wall against the enemy's attack. To prevent the lines from being broken by violent charges he laid masts and yard-arms from ship to ship and secured them by stout

ropes which bound them together like one continuous chain. He then fastened planks upon the top of these, so making a free passage along the whole line, and under these bridges the despatch-boats had room to run out against the enemy and retire into safety. After making these hurried arrangements as complete as time would allow, he placed about 1000 picked men on board the transports and an immense quantity of missile weapons, so that however long the fighting went on there might be enough. Thus ready and eager, they waited for the enemy.

If the Carthaginians had moved more rapidly they would have found hurry and confusion everywhere, and they might have destroyed the fleet in the first onset. They were, however, disheartened by the defeat of their land forces, and now they did not feel confidence even on the sea, the element where they were strongest. After sailing slowly all through the day they brought up towards sunset at a harbour called by the natives Rusocmon. The following day, they put out to sea in line of battle, expecting the Romans to come out and attack them. After they had been stationary for a long time and no movement on the part of the enemy was visible, they at last commenced an attack on the transports. There was nothing in the least resembling a naval action, it looked almost exactly as if ships were attacking walls. The transports were considerably higher than their opponents, and consequently the missiles from the Carthaginian vessels, which had to be hurled from below, were mostly ineffective; those from the transports thrown from above fell with more force, their weight adding to the blow. The despatch-boats and light vessels which ran out through the intervals under the plank gangways were many of them run down by the momentum and bulk of the warships, and in time they became a hindrance to those fighting on the transports, who were often obliged to desist for fear of hitting them while they were mixed up with the enemy's ships. At last the Carthaginians began to throw poles with grappling-hooks at the end—the soldiers call them *harpagones*—on to the Roman ships, and it was impossible to cut away either the poles or the chains by which they were suspended. When a warship had hooked one of the transports it was rowed astern, and you would see the ropes which fastened the transports one to another give way, and sometimes a whole line of transports would be dragged off together. In this way all the gangways connecting the first line of transports were broken up, and there



was hardly any place left where the defenders could spring back into the second line. Six transports were towed off to Carthage. Here the rejoicing was greater than the circumstances of the case warranted, but what made it all the more welcome was the fact that the Roman fleet had narrowly escaped destruction, an escape due to the Carthaginian commander's slackness and the timely arrival of Scipio. Amid such continual disasters and mourning this was an unhopcd-for cause of congratulation.

XI. *Syphax defeated and made prisoner.*—Meantime Laelius and Masinissa, after a fifteen days' march, entered Numidia, and the Maesulians, delighted to see their king whose absence they had so long regretted, placed him once more on his ancestral throne. All the garrisons with which Syphax had held the country were expelled and he was confined within the limits of his former dominions. He had no intention, however, of remaining quiet; he was goaded on by his wife, whom he passionately loved, and by her father, and he had such an abundance of men and horses that the mere sight of the resources afforded by a realm which had enjoyed many years of prosperity would have stimulated the ambition of even a less barbarous and impulsive nature than Syphax possessed. He assembled all who were fit for war, and after distributing horses, armour and weapons amongst them he formed the mounted men into squadrons and the infantry into cohorts, a plan which he had learnt in the old days from the centurions.<sup>7</sup>

With this army, quite as numerous as the one he had had before but consisting almost entirely of raw and untrained levies, he marched off to meet his enemies, and fixed his camp in their vicinity. At first he sent small bodies of cavalry from the outposts to make a cautious reconnoissance; compelled to retire by showers of darts they galloped back to their comrades. Sorties were made on both sides alternately, and indignant at being repulsed, larger bodies came up. This acts as an incentive in cavalry skirmishes when the winning side find their comrades flocking to them in hopes of victory and rage at the prospect of defeat brings supports to those who are losing. So it was then, the fighting had been begun by a few, but the love of battle at last brought the whole of the cavalry on both sides into the field. As long as the cavalry only were engaged the Romans had great difficulty in withstanding the immense numbers of Maesulians whom Syphax

was sending forward. Suddenly, however, the Roman light infantry ran out between the cavalry who made way for them, and this gave steadiness to the line and checked the rush of the enemy. The latter slackened speed and then came to a halt, and were soon thrown into confusion by this unaccustomed mode of fighting. At last they gave ground not only before the infantry but before the cavalry also, to whom the support of their infantry had given fresh courage. By this time the legions were coming up, but the Maesulians did not wait for their attack, the mere sight of the standards and arms was enough, such was the effect either of the recollection of their past defeats or of the fear which the enemy now inspired.

XII. Syphax was riding up to the hostile squadrons in the hope that either a sense of honour or his own personal danger might check the flight of his men, when his horse was severely wounded and he was thrown, overpowered and made prisoner, and carried off to Laelius. Masinissa was especially delighted to see him as a captive.

Cirta was Syphax's capital, and a considerable number escaped to that city. The losses sustained were insignificant compared with the importance of the victory, for the fighting had been confined to the cavalry. There were not more than 5000 killed, and in the storming of the camp, whither the mass of troops had fled after losing their king, less than half that number were made prisoners.

Masinissa told Laelius that nothing would delight him more for the moment than to visit as conqueror his ancestral dominions which had after so many years been recovered, but prompt action was as necessary in success as in defeat. He suggested that he should be allowed to go on with the cavalry and the vanquished Syphax to Cirta, which he would be able to surprise amidst the general confusion and alarm; Laelius might follow with the infantry by easy stages. Laelius gave his consent and Masinissa advanced to Cirta and ordered the leading citizens to be invited to a conference. They were ignorant of what had happened to the king, and though Masinissa told them all that had occurred he found threats and persuasion equally unavailing until the king was brought before them in chains. At this painful and humiliating spectacle there was an outburst of grief, the defences were abandoned, and there was a unanimous resolve to seek the victor's favour by opening the gates to him. After placing guards round all the

gates and at suitable places in the fortifications he galloped up to the palace to take possession of it.

As he was entering the vestibule, on the very threshold in fact, he was met by Sophonisba, the wife of Syphax and daughter of the Carthaginian Hasdrubal. When she saw him surrounded by an armed escort, and conspicuous by his arms and general appearance, she rightly guessed that he was the king, and throwing herself at his feet, exclaimed: "Your courage and good fortune aided by the gods have given you absolute power over us. But if a captive may utter words of supplication before one who is master of her fate, if she may touch his victorious right hand, then I pray and beseech you by the kingly greatness in which we too not long ago were clothed, by the name of Numidian which you and Syphax alike bear, by the tutelary deities of this royal abode who, I pray, may receive you with fairer omens than those with which they sent him hence, grant this favour at least to your suppliant that you yourself decide your captive's fate whatever it may be, and do not leave me to fall under the cruel tyranny of a Roman. Had I been simply the wife of Syphax I would still choose to trust to the honour of a Numidian, born under the same African sky as myself, rather than that of an alien and a foreigner. But I am a Carthaginian, the daughter of Hasdrubal, and you see what I have to fear. If no other way is possible then I implore you to save me by death from falling into Roman hands."

Sophonisba was in the bloom of youth and in all the splendour of her beauty, and as she held Masinissa's hand and begged him to give his word that she should not be surrendered to the Romans, her tone became one of blandishment rather than entreaty. A slave to passion like all his countrymen, the victor at once fell in love with his captive. He gave her his solemn assurance that he would do what she wished him to do and then retired into the palace. Here he considered in what way he could redeem his promise, and as he saw no practical way of doing so he allowed his passion to dictate to him as a method equally reckless and indecent. Without a moment's delay he made preparations for celebrating his nuptials on that very day, so that neither Laelius nor Scipio might be free to treat as a prisoner one who was now Masinissa's wife.

When the marriage ceremony was over Laelius appeared on the scene, and, far from concealing his disapproval of what had

been done, he actually attempted to drag her from her bridegroom's arms and send her with Syphax and the other prisoners to Scipio. However, Masinissa's remonstrances so far prevailed that it was left to Scipio to decide which of the two kings should be the happy possessor of Sophonisba. After Laelius had sent Syphax and the other prisoners away, he recovered, with Masinissa's aid, the remaining cities in Numidia which were still held by the king's garrisons.

XIII. When the news arrived that Syphax was being brought into camp, the whole army turned out as though to watch a triumphal procession. The king himself, in chains, was the first to appear, he was followed by a crowd of Numidian nobles. As they passed the soldiers each in turn sought to magnify their victory by exaggerating the greatness of Syphax and the military reputation of his nation. "This is the king," they said, "whose greatness has been so far acknowledged by the most powerful States in the world—Rome and Carthage—that Scipio left his army in Spain and sailed with two triremes to Africa to secure his alliance, whilst the Carthaginian Hasdrubal not only visited him in his kingdom, but even gave him his daughter in marriage. He has had the Roman and the Carthaginian commanders both in his power at the same time. As each side has sought peace and friendship from the immortal gods by sacrifices duly offered, so each side alike has sought peace and friendships from him. He was powerful enough to expel Masinissa from his kingdom, and he reduced him to such a condition that he owed his life to the report of his death and to his concealment in the forest, where he lived on what he could catch there like a wild beast."

Amidst these remarks of the bystanders, the king was conducted to the headquarters tent. As Scipio compared the earlier fortunes of the man with his present condition and recalled to mind his own hospitable relations with him, the mutually pledged right hands, the political and personal bonds between them, he was greatly moved. Syphax, too, thought of these things, but they gave him courage in addressing his conqueror.

Scipio questioned him as to his object in first denouncing his alliance with Rome and then starting an unprovoked war against her. He admitted that he had done wrong and behaved like a madman, but his taking up arms against Rome was not the beginning of his madness, it was the last act. He first exhibited his folly, his utter disregard of all private ties and

public obligations, when he admitted a Carthaginian bride into his house. The torches which illuminated these nuptials had set his palace in a blaze. That fury of a woman, that scourge, had used every endearment to alienate and warp his feelings, and would not rest till she had with her own impious hands armed him against his host and friend. However, broken and ruined as he was, he had this to console him in his misery—that pestilential fury had entered the household of his bitterest foe. Masinissa was not wiser or more consistent than he had been, his youth made him even less cautious: at all events that marriage proved him to be more foolish and headstrong.

XIV. *Sophonisba's Death*.—This was the language of a man animated, not only by hatred towards an enemy, but also by the sting of hopeless love, knowing as he did that the woman he loved was in the house of his rival. Scipio was deeply distressed at what he heard. Proof of the charges was found in the hurrying on of the nuptials almost amid the clash of arms without consulting or even waiting for Laelius. Masinissa had acted with such precipitancy that the very first day he saw his prisoner he married her, and the rites were actually performed before the tutelary deities of his enemy's house. This conduct appeared all the more shocking to Scipio because when he himself was in Spain, young as he was, no captive girl had ever moved him by her beauty.

Whilst he was thinking all this over, Laelius and Masinissa appeared. He extended the same gracious and friendly welcome to both, and in the presence of a large number of his officers addressed them in most laudatory terms. Then he took Masinissa quietly aside and spoke to him as follows: "I think, Masinissa, that you must have seen some good qualities in me when you went to Spain to establish friendly relations with me, and also when, afterwards, you trusted yourself and all your fortunes to me in Africa. Now, among all the virtues which attracted you there is none upon which I pride myself so much as upon my continence and the control of my passions. I wish, Masinissa, that you would add these to the other noble features of your own character. At our time of life we are not, believe me, so much in danger from armed foes as from the seductive pleasures which tempt us on every side. The man who has curbed and subjugated these by his self-control has won for himself greater glory and a greater victory than we

have won over Syphax. The courage and energy you have displayed in my absence I have gladly dwelt upon and gratefully remember; the rest of your conduct I prefer that you should reflect upon when alone, rather than that I should make you blush by alluding to it. Syphax has been defeated and made prisoner under the auspices of the people of Rome, and this being so, his wife, his kingdom, his territory, his towns with all their inhabitants, whatever in short Syphax possessed, belong now to Rome as the spoils of war. Even if his wife were not a Carthaginian, if we did not know that her father is in command of the enemy's forces, it would still be our duty to send her with her husband to Rome, and leave it to the senate and people to decide the fate of one who is alleged to have estranged our ally and precipitated him in arms against us. Conquer your feelings and be on your guard against letting one vice mar the many good qualities you possess and sully the grace of all your services by a fault which is out of all proportion to its cause."

XV. On hearing this Masinissa blushed furiously and even shed tears. He said that he would comply with the general's wishes, and begged him to take into consideration, as far as he could, the pledge he had rashly given, for he had promised that he would not let her pass into any one's power. Then he left the headquarters tent and retired to his own in a state of distraction. Dismissing all his attendants he remained there some time, giving vent to continual sighs and groans which were quite audible to those outside. At last with a deep groan he called one of his slaves in whom he placed complete confidence and who had in his keeping the poison which kings usually have in reserve against the vicissitudes of Fortune. After mixing it in a cup he told him to take it to Sophonisba, and at the same time tell her that Masinissa would have gladly fulfilled the first promise that he made to his wife, but as those who have the power were depriving him of the right to do so, he was fulfilling the second—that she should not fall into the hands of the Romans alive. The thought of her father, her country, and the two kings who had wedded her would decide her how to act. When the servant came with the poison and the message to Sophonisba, she said, "I accept this wedding gift, no unwelcome one if my husband can do nothing more for his wife. But tell him that I should have died more happily had not my marriage bed stood so near my grave."<sup>8</sup> The high spirit of these words

was sustained by the fearless way in which, without the slightest sign of trepidation, she drank the potion.

When the news reached Scipio he was afraid that the young man, wild with grief, would take some still more desperate step, so he at once sent for him, and tried to console him, at the same time gently censuring him for having atoned for one act of madness by committing another and making the affair more tragic than it need have been.

The next day, with the view of diverting his thoughts, Scipio mounted the tribunal and ordered the assembly to be sounded. Addressing Masinissa as king and eulogising him in the highest possible terms, he presented him with a golden crown, curule chair, an ivory sceptre and also with a purple-bordered toga and a tunic embroidered with palms. He enhanced the value of these gifts by informing him that the Romans considered no honour more splendid than that of a triumph, and that no more magnificent insignia were borne by triumphing generals than those which the Roman people deemed Masinissa, alone of all foreigners, worthy to possess. Laelius was the next to be commended, he was presented with a golden crown. Other soldiers received rewards according to their services. The honours which had had been conferred on the king went far to assuage his grief, and he was encouraged to hope for the speedy possession of the whole of Numidia now that Syphax was out of the way.

XVI. *Overtures for Peace.*—Laelius was sent in charge of Syphax and the other prisoners to Rome, and envoys from Masinissa accompanied him. Scipio returned to his camp at Tyneta and completed the fortifications which he had commenced. The rejoicing of the Carthaginians over the temporary success of their naval attack was short-lived and evanescent, for when they heard of the capture of Syphax, on whom they had rested their hopes almost more than on Hasdrubal and his army, they completely lost heart. The war party could no longer gain a hearing and the senate sent the "Thirty Seniors"<sup>9</sup> to Scipio to sue for peace. This body was the most august council in their state and controlled to a very large extent even the senate itself.

When they reached the headquarters tent in the Roman camp, they made a profound obeisance and prostrated themselves—a practice, I believe, which they brought with them from their original home. Their language corresponded to their

abject posture. They made no excuse for themselves, but threw the responsibility for the war on Hannibal and his supporters. They craved pardon for a city which had been twice ruined by the recklessness of its citizens and could only be preserved in safety by the good-will of its enemy. What Rome sought, they pleaded, was the homage and submission of the vanquished, not their annihilation. They professed themselves ready to execute any commands which he chose to give.

Scipio replied that he had come to Africa in the hope—a hope which his successes had confirmed—of taking back to Rome a complete victory, and not merely proposals for peace. Still, though victory was almost within his grasp, he would not refuse to grant terms of peace, that all nations might know that Rome was actuated by the spirit of justice, whether she was undertaking a war or putting an end to one.

He stated the terms of peace, which were the surrender of all prisoners, deserters and refugees; the withdrawal of the armies from Italy and Gaul; the abandonment of all action in Spain; the evacuation of all the islands lying between Italy and Africa and the surrender of their entire navy with the exception of twenty vessels. They were also to provide 500,000 pecks of wheat and 300,000 of barley, but the actual amount of the money indemnity is doubtful. In some authors I find 5000 talents, in others 5000 pounds of silver mentioned; some only say that double pay for the troops was demanded. "You will be allowed," he added, "three days to consider whether you will agree to peace on these terms. If you decide to do so, arrange an armistice with me, and send envoys to the senate in Rome." The Carthaginians were then dismissed. As their object was to gain time to allow of Hannibal's sailing across to Africa they resolved that no conditions of peace should be rejected, and accordingly they sent delegates to conclude an armistice with Scipio, and a deputation was also sent to Rome to sue for peace, the latter taking with them a few prisoners and deserters for the sake of appearance, in order that peace might more be readily granted.

XVII. *The Senate and Masinissa*.—Several days previously Laelius arrived in Rome with Syphax and the Numidian prisoners. He made a report to the senate of all that had been done in Africa and there were great rejoicings at the present position of affairs and sanguine hopes for the future. After discussing the matter the senate decided that Syphax should



be interned at Alba and that Laelius should stay in Rome until the Carthaginian delegates arrived. A four days' thanksgiving was ordered.

On the adjournment of the House, P. Aelius, the praetor, forthwith convened a meeting of the Assembly, and mounted the rostrum, accompanied by C. Laelius. When the people heard that the armies of Carthage had been routed, a far-famed king defeated and made prisoner, and a victorious progress made throughout Numidia, they could no longer restrain their feelings and expressed their unbounded joy in shouts and other demonstrations of delight. Seeing the people in this mood the praetor at once gave orders for the sacristans to throw open the holy places throughout the City in order that the people might have the whole day for going round the shrines to offer up their adoration and thanksgivings to the gods.

The next day he introduced Masinissa's envoys to the senate. They first of all congratulated the senate upon Scipio's successes in Africa and then expressed thanks on behalf of Masinissa for Scipio's action in not only conferring upon him the title of king, but also in giving practical effect to it by restoring to him his ancestral dominion where now that Syphax was disposed of he would, if the senate so decided, reign free from all fear of opposition. He was grateful for the way in which Scipio had spoken of him before his officers and for the splendid insignia with which he had been honoured and which he had done his best to prove himself worthy of and would continue to do so. They petitioned the senate to confirm by a formal decree the royal title and the other favours and dignities which Scipio had conferred upon him. And as an additional boon, Masinissa begged, if he was not asking too much, that they would release the Numidian prisoners who were under guard in Rome; that, he considered, would increase his prestige with his subjects.

The reply given to the envoys was to the effect that the senate congratulated the king as much as themselves upon the successes in Africa; Scipio had acted rightly and in perfect order in recognising Masinissa as king, and the senators warmly approved of all he had done to meet Masinissa's wishes. They passed a decree that the presents which the envoys were to take to the king should comprise two purple cloaks with a golden clasp on each and two tunics embroidered with the laticlave<sup>10</sup>; two richly caparisoned horses and a set of equestrian

armour with cuirasses for each; two tents and military furniture such as the consuls are usually provided with. The praetor received instructions to see that these things were sent to the king. The envoys each received presents to the value of 5000 ases, and each member of their suite to the value of 1000 ases. Besides these, two suits of apparel were given to each of the envoys, and one to each of their suite and also to each of the Numidian prisoners who were to be restored to the king. During their stay in Rome a house was placed at their disposal and they were treated as guests of the State.

XVIII. *The Campaign in Gaul. Mago wounded.*—During this summer P. Quintilius Varus the praetor and M. Cornelius the proconsul fought a regular engagement with Mago. The praetor's legions formed the fighting line; Cornelius kept his in reserve, but rode to the front and took command of one wing, the praetor leading the other, and both of them exhorted the soldiers to make a furious charge on the enemy. When they failed to make any impression upon them, Quintilius said to Cornelius, "As you see, the battle is progressing too slowly; the enemy finding themselves offering an unhoped-for resistance have steeled themselves against fear, there is danger of this fear passing into audacity. We must let loose a hurricane of cavalry against them if we want to shake them and make them give ground. Either, then, you must keep up the fighting at the front and I will bring the cavalry into action, or I will remain here and direct the operations of the first line while you launch the cavalry of the four legions against the enemy." The proconsul left it to the praetor to decide what he would do. Quintilius, accordingly, accompanied by his son Marcus, an enterprising and energetic youth, rode off to the cavalry, ordered them to mount and sent them at once against the enemy. The effect of their charge was heightened by the battle-shout of the legions, and the hostile lines would not have stood their ground, had not Mago, at the first movement of the cavalry, promptly brought his elephants into action. The appearance of these animals, their trumpeting and smell so terrified the horses as to render the assistance of the cavalry futile. When engaged at close quarters and able to use sword and lance the Roman cavalryman was the better fighter, but when carried away by a frightened horse, he was a better target for the Numidian darts. As for the infantry, the twelfth legion had lost a large proportion of their men and were holding their

ground more to avoid the disgrace of retreat than from any hope of offering effectual resistance. Nor would they have held it any longer if the thirteenth legion which was in reserve had not been brought up and taken part in the doubtful conflict. To oppose this fresh legion Mago brought up his reserves also. These were Gauls, and the hastati of the eleventh legion had not much trouble in putting them to rout. They then closed up and attacked the elephants who were creating confusion in the Roman infantry ranks. Showering their darts upon them as they crowded together, and hardly ever failing to hit, they drove them all back upon the Carthaginian lines, after four had fallen, severely wounded.

At last the enemy began to give ground, and the whole of the Roman infantry, when they saw the elephants turning against their own side, rushed forward to increase the confusion and panic. As long as Mago kept his station in front, his men retreated slowly and in good order, but when they saw him fall, seriously wounded and carried almost fainting from the field, there was a general flight.

The losses of the enemy amounted to 5000 men, and 22 standards were taken. The victory was a far from bloodless one for the Romans, they lost 2300 men in the praetor's army, mostly from the twelfth legion, and amongst them two military tribunes, M. Cosconius and M. Maeuius. The thirteenth legion, the last to take part in the action, also had its losses; C. Helvius, a military tribune, fell whilst restoring the battle, and twenty-two members of the cavalry corps, belonging to distinguished families, together with some of the centurions were trampled to death by the elephants. The battle would have lasted longer had not Mago's wound given the Romans the victory.

XIX. *Mago's Death.*—Mago withdrew during the night and marching as rapidly as his wound would allow reached that part of the Ligurian coast which is inhabited by the Ingauni. Here he was met by the deputation from Carthage which had landed a few days previously at Genua. They informed him that he must sail for Africa at the earliest possible moment; his brother Hannibal, to whom similar instructions had been given, was on the point of doing so. Carthage was not in a position to retain her hold upon Gaul and Italy. The commands of the senate and the dangers threatening his country decided Mago's course, and moreover there was the risk of an attack from the victorious enemy if he delayed, and also of the desertion

of the Ligurians who, seeing Italy abandoned by the Carthaginians, would go over to those in whose power they would ultimately be. He hoped too that a sea voyage would be less trying to his wound than the jolting of the march had been, and that everything would contribute to his recovery. He embarked his men and set sail, but he had not cleared Sardinia when he died of his wound. Some of his ships which had parted company with the rest when out at sea were captured by the Roman fleet which was lying off Sardinia.

Such was the course of events in the Alpine districts of Italy.

The consul C. Servilius had done nothing worth recording in Etruria, nor after his departure for Gaul. In the latter country he had rescued his father C. Servilius and also C. Lutatius after sixteen years of servitude, the result of their capture by the Boii at Tannetum.<sup>11</sup> With his father on one side of him and Lutatius on the other he returned to Rome honoured more on personal than public grounds. A measure was proposed to the people relieving him from penalties for having illegally acted as tribune of the plebs and plebeian aedile while his father who had filled a curule chair was, unknown to him, still alive. When the bill of indemnity was passed he returned to his province.

The consul Cnaeus Servilius in Bruttium received the surrender of several places, now that they saw that the Punic War was drawing to a close. Amongst these were Consentia, Aufugium, Bergae, Besidiae, Oriculum, Lymphaeum, Argentanum, and Clamptia. He also fought a battle with Hannibal in the neighbourhood of Croto, of which no clear account exists. According to Valerius Antias, 5000 of the enemy were killed, but either this is an unblushing fiction, or its omission in the annalists shows great carelessness. At all events nothing further was done by Hannibal in Italy, for the delegation summoning him to Africa happened to arrive from Carthage about the same time as the one to Mago.

XX. *Hannibal evacuates Italy.*—It is said that he gnashed his teeth, groaned, and almost shed tears when he heard what the delegates had to say. After they had delivered their instructions, he exclaimed, "The men who tried to drag me back by cutting off my supplies of men and money are now recalling me not by crooked means but plainly and openly. So you see, it is not the Roman people who have been so often routed and cut to pieces that have vanquished Hannibal, but the

Carthaginian senate by their detraction and envy. It is not Scipio who will pride himself and exult over the disgrace of my return so much as Hanno who has crushed my house, since he could do it in no other way, beneath the ruins for Carthage."

He had divined what would happen, and had got his ships ready in anticipation. The unserviceable portion of his troops he got rid of by distributing them ostensibly as garrisons amongst the few towns which, more out of fear than loyalty, still adhered to him. The main strength of his army he transported to Africa. Many who were natives of Italy refused to follow him, and withdrew into the temple of Juno Lacinia, a shrine which up to that day had remained inviolate. There, actually within the sacred precinct, they were foully murdered.<sup>12</sup>

Seldom, according to the accounts, has any one left his native country to go into exile in such gloomy sorrow as Hannibal manifested when quitting the country of his foes. It is stated that he often looked back to the shores of Italy, accusing gods and men and even cursing himself for not having led his soldiers reeking with blood from the victorious field of Cannae straight to Rome. Scipio, he said, who whilst consul had never seen a Carthaginian in Italy, had dared to go to Africa, whereas *he* who had slain 100,000 men at Thrasymenus and at Cannae had wasted his strength round Casilinum and Cumae and Nola. Amid these accusations and regrets he was borne away from his long occupation of Italy.

XXI. *The Carthaginian Ambassadors in Rome.*—The news of Mago's departure reached Rome at the same time as that of Hannibal. The joy with which the intelligence of this twofold relief was received was, however, chastened by the fact that their generals had, through lack of either courage or strength, failed to detain them, though they had received express instructions from the senate to that effect. There was also a feeling of anxiety as to what the issue would be now that the whole brunt of the war fell upon one army and one commander.

Just at this time, a commission arrived from Saguntum bringing some Carthaginians who had landed in Spain for the purpose of hiring auxiliaries, and whom they had captured together with the money they had brought. 250 pounds of silver and 800 pounds of gold were deposited in the vestibule of the senate-house. After the men had been handed over and thrown into prison, the gold and silver was returned to the Saguntines. A vote of thanks was accorded to them, they were presented

with gifts and also provided with ships in which to return to Spain.

Following upon this incident some of the senior senators reminded the House of a great omission. "Men," they said, "are much more alive to their misfortunes than to the good things that come to them. We remember what panic and terror we felt when Hannibal descended upon Italy. What defeats and mourning followed! The enemy's camp was visible from the City—what prayers we one and all put up! How often in our councils have we heard the plaint of men lifting up their hands to heaven and asking whether the day would ever come when they would see Italy freed from an enemy's presence and flourishing in peace and prosperity! At last, after sixteen years of war, the gods have granted us this boon, and yet there are none who ask that thanks should be offered to them. Men do not receive even a present blessing with grateful hearts, much less are they likely to remember past benefits." A general shout arose from all parts of the House calling upon the praetor P. Aelius to submit a motion. It was decreed that a five days' thanksgiving should be offered at all the shrines and a hundred and twenty full-grown victims sacrificed.

Laelius had by this time left Rome with Masinissa's envoys. On tidings being received that the Carthaginian peace deputation had been seen at Puteoli and would come on from there by land it was decided to recall Laelius in order that he might be present at the interview. Q. Fulvius Gillo, one of Scipio's staff-officers, conducted the Carthaginians to Rome. As they were forbidden to enter the City they were domiciled in a country house belonging to the State, and an audience of the senate was granted them in the temple of Bellona.

XXII. Their speech to the senate was much the same as the one they had made to Scipio; they disclaimed any responsibility for the war on the part of the government and threw the entire blame on Hannibal. "He had no orders from their senate to cross the Ebro, much less the Alps. It was on his own authority that he had made war not only on Rome but even on Saguntum; any one who took a just view would recognise that the treaty with Rome remained unbroken to that day. Their instructions accordingly were simply that they should ask to be allowed to continue on the same terms of peace as those which had been settled on the last occasion with C. Lutatius."

In accordance with the traditional usage the praetor gave

any one who wished permission to interrogate the envoys, and the senior members who had taken part in arranging the former treaties put various questions. The envoys, who were almost all young men, said that they had no recollection of what happened. Then loud protests broke out from all parts of the House; the senators declared that it was an instance of Punic treachery, men were selected to ask for a renewal of the old treaty who did not even remember its terms.

XXIII. The envoys were then ordered to withdraw and the senators were asked for their opinions. M. Livius advised that as the consul C. Servilius was the nearest he should be summoned to Rome in order that he might be present during the debate. No more important subject could be discussed than the one before them, and it did not seem to him compatible with the dignity of the Roman people that the discussion should take place in the absence of both the consuls. Q. Metellus, who had been consul three years previously and had also been Dictator, gave it as his opinion that as P. Scipio, after destroying their armies and devastating their land, had driven the enemy to the necessity of suing for peace, there was no one in the world who could form a truer judgment as to their real intention in opening negotiations than the man who was at that moment carrying the war up to the gates of Carthage. In his opinion they ought to take Scipio's advice and no other as to whether the offer of peace ought to be accepted or rejected. M. Valerius Laevinus, who had filled two consulships, declared that they had come as spies and not as envoys, and he urged that they should be ordered to leave Italy and escorted by a guard to their ships, and that written instructions should be sent to Scipio not to relax hostilities. Laelius and Fulvius supported this proposal and stated that Scipio thought that the only hope of peace lay in Mago and Hannibal not being recalled, but the Carthaginians would adopt every subterfuge whilst waiting for their generals and their armies, and would then continue the war, ignoring treaties however recent, and in defiance of all the gods.<sup>18</sup> These statements led the senate to adopt Laevinus' proposal. The envoys were dismissed with no prospect of peace and the curtest of replies.

XXIV. *Incidents in Italy.*—The consul Cnaeus Servilius, fully persuaded that the credit of restoring peace in Italy was due to him, and that it was he who had driven Hannibal out of the country, followed the Carthaginian commander to Sicily,

intending to sail from there to Africa. When this became known in Rome the senate decided that the praetor should write to him and inform him that the senate thought it right that he should remain in Italy. The praetor said that Servilius would pay no attention to a letter from him, and on this it was resolved to appoint P. Sulpicius Dictator, and he by virtue of his superior authority recalled the consul to Italy. The Dictator spent the remainder of the year in visiting, accompanied by M. Servilius, his Master of the Horse, the different cities of Italy which had fallen away from Rome during the war, and holding an enquiry in each case.

*The Carthaginians break the Truce.*—During the armistice a hundred transports carrying supplies and escorted by twenty warships were despatched from Sardinia by Lentulus the praetor and reached Africa without any damage either from the enemy or from storms. Cnaeus Octavius sailed from Sicily with two hundred transports and thirty warships, but was not equally fortunate. He had a favourable voyage until he was almost within sight of Africa, when he was becalmed; then a south-westerly wind sprang up which scattered his ships in all directions. Thanks to the extraordinary efforts of the rowers against the adverse waves, Octavius succeeded in making the Promontory of Apollo. The greater part of the transports were driven to Aegimurus, an island which forms a break-water to the bay on which Carthage is situated and about thirty miles distant from the city. Other were carried up to the city itself as far as the *Aquae Calidae* ("hot-springs").

All this was visible from Carthage, and a crowd gathered from all parts of the city in the forum. The magistrates convened the senate; the people who were in the vestibule of the senate-house protested against so much booty being allowed to slip out of their hands and out of their sight. Some objected that this would be a breach of faith whilst peace negotiations were going on, others were for respecting the truce which had not yet expired. The popular assembly was so mixed up with the senate that they almost formed one body, and they unanimously decided that Hasdrubal should proceed to Aegimurum with fifty ships of war and pick up the Roman ships which were scattered along the coast or in the harbours. Those transports which had been abandoned by their crews at Aegimurum were towed to Carthage, and subsequently others were brought in from *Aquae Calidae*.



XXV. The envoys had not yet come back from Rome, and it was not known whether the senate had decided for peace or for war. What did most to arouse Scipio's indignation was the fact that all hopes of peace were destroyed and all respect for the truce flouted by the very men who had asked for a truce and were suing for peace. He at once sent L. Baebius, M. Servilius and L. Fabius to Carthage to protest. As they were in danger of ill-treatment from the mob and saw that they might be prevented from returning, they requested the magistrates who had protected them from violence to send ships to escort them. Two triremes were supplied to them, and when they reached the mouth of the Bagradas, from which the Roman camp was visible, the ships returned to Carthage. The Carthaginian fleet was lying off Utica, and whether it was in consequence of a secret message from Carthage, or whether Hanno, who was in command, acted on his own responsibility without the connivance of his government, in any case, three quadriremes from the fleet made a sudden attack upon the Roman quinquereme as it was rounding the promontory. They were, however, unable to ram it owing to its superior speed, and its greater height prevented any attempt to board it. As long as the missiles lasted, the quinquereme made a brilliant defence, but when these failed nothing could have saved it but the nearness of the land and the numbers of men who had come down from the camp to the shore to watch. The rowers drove the ships on to the beach with their utmost strength; the vessel was wrecked, but the passengers escaped uninjured.

Thus, by one misdeed after another, all doubt was removed as to the truce having been broken when Laelius and the Carthaginians arrived on their return from Rome. Scipio informed them that in spite of the fact that the Carthaginians had broken not only the truce which they had pledged themselves to observe, but even the law of nations in their treatment of the envoys, he should himself take no action in their case which would be inconsistent with the traditional maxims of Rome or contrary to his own principles. He then dismissed them and prepared to resume operations.

Hannibal was now nearing the land and he ordered a sailor to climb the mast and find out what part of the country they were making for. The man reported that they were heading for a ruined sepulchre.<sup>14</sup> Hannibal regarding it as an evil omen

ordered the pilot to sail past the place and brought up the fleet at Leptis, where he disembarked his force.

XXVI. *Summary of Events during the Year.*—The above-described events all happened during this year, the subsequent ones belong to the year following when M. Servilius the Master of the Horse and Tiberius Claudius Nero were the consuls.

Towards the close of the year a deputation came from the Greek cities in alliance with us to complain that their country had been devastated and the envoys who had been sent to demand redress were not allowed to approach Philip. They also brought information that 4000 men under Sopater had sailed for Africa to assist the Carthaginians, taking a considerable sum of money with them. The senate decided to send to Philip and inform him that they regarded these proceedings as a violation of the treaty. C. Terentius Varro, C. Mamilius and M. Aurelius were entrusted with this mission, and they were furnished with three quinqueremes.

The year was rendered memorable by an enormous fire, in which the houses on the Clivus Publicius were burnt to the ground, and also by a great flood. Food, however, was extremely cheap, for not only was the whole of Italy open, now that it was left in peace, but a great quantity of corn had been sent from Spain, which the curule aediles, M. Valerius Falto and M. Fabius Buteo, distributed to the people, ward by ward, at four ases the peck.

The death occurred this year of Quintus Fabius Maximus at a very advanced age, if it be true, as some authorities assert, that he had been augur for sixty-two years. He was a man who deserved the great surname he bore, even if he had been the first to bear it. He surpassed his father in his distinctions, and equalled his grandfather Rullus. Rullus had won more victories and fought greater battles, but his grandson had Hannibal for an opponent and that made up for everything. He was held to be cautious rather than energetic, and though it may be a question whether he was naturally slow in action or whether he adopted these tactics as especially suitable to the character of the war, nothing is more certain than that, as Ennius says, "one man by his slowness restored the State."

He had been both augur and pontifex; his son Q. Fabius Maximus succeeded him as augur, Ser. Sulpicius Galba as pontifex. The Roman and the Plebeian Games were celebrated by the aediles M. Sextius Sabinus and Cnaeus Tremellius

Flaccus, the former for one day, the latter were repeated for three days. These two aediles were elected praetors together with C. Livius Salinator and C. Aurelius Cotta. Authorities are divided as to who presided over the elections, whether the consul C. Servilius did so or whether, owing to his being detained in Etruria by the conspiracy trials which the senate had ordered him to conduct, he named a Dictator to preside.

XXVII. *Distribution of the Commands.*—In the beginning of the following year the consuls M. Servilius and Tiberius Claudius convened the senate in the Capitol to decide the allocation of the provinces. As they both wanted Africa they were anxious to ballot for that province and for Italy. Mainly, however, owing to the efforts of Q. Metellus, nothing was decided about Africa; the consuls were instructed to arrange with the tribunes of the plebs for a vote of the people to be taken as to whom they wished to conduct the war in Africa. The tribes were unanimously in favour of P. Scipio. In spite of this the senate decreed that the two consuls should ballot, and Africa was drawn by Ti. Claudius, who was to take across a fleet of fifty vessels—all quinqueremes—and exercise the same powers as Scipio. Etruria fell to M. Servilius. C. Servilius who had held that province had his command extended in case the senate should require his presence in Rome. The praetors were distributed as follows: M. Sextius received Gaul and P. Quintilius Varus was to hand over two legions which he had there; C. Livius was to hold Bruttium with the two legions which P. Sempronius had commanded there the year before; Cnaeus Tremellius was sent to Sicily and took over the two legions from P. Villius Tappulus, the praetor of the previous year; Villius in the capacity of propraetor was furnished with twenty warships and 1000 men for the protection of the Sicilian coast; M. Pomponius was to send 1500 men to Rome in the twenty remaining ships. The City jurisdiction passed into the hands of C. Aurelius Cotta. The other commands were unchanged.

Sixteen legions were considered sufficient this year for the defence of the dominion of Rome.

In order that all things might be undertaken and carried out with the favour of the gods, it was decided that before the consuls took the field they should celebrate the Games and offer the sacrifices which T. Manlius the Dictator had vowed during the consulship of M. Claudius Marcellus and T. Quinctius, if the republic should maintain its position unimpaired for five years.

The Games were celebrated in the Circus, the celebration lasting four days, and the victims vowed to the several deities were duly sacrificed.

XXVIII. *State of Feeling in Rome and Carthage.*—All through this time there was a growing tension of feeling, hopes and fears alike were becoming stronger. Men could not make up their minds whether they had more to rejoice over in the fact that at the end of sixteen years Hannibal had finally evacuated Italy and left the unchallenged possession of it to Rome, or more to fear from his having landed in Africa with his military strength unimpaired. "The seat of danger," they said, "is changed, but not the danger itself. Quintus Fabius, who has just died, foretold how great the struggle would be when he declared in oracular tones that Hannibal would be a more formidable foe in his own country than he had been on alien soil. Scipio has not to do with Syphax, whose subjects are undisciplined barbarians and whose army was generally led by Statorius, who was little more than a camp manial, nor with Syphax's elusive father-in-law, Hasdrubal, nor with a half-armed mob of peasants hastily collected from the fields. It is Hannibal whom he has to meet, who was all but born in the headquarters of his father, that bravest of generals; reared and brought up in the midst of arms; a soldier whilst still a boy, and when hardly out of his teens in high command.<sup>15</sup> He has passed the prime of his manhood in victory after victory and has filled Spain and Gaul and Italy from the Alps to the southern sea with memorials of mighty deeds. The men he is leading are his contemporaries in arms, steeled by innumerable hardships such as it is hardly credible that men can have gone through, bespattered, times without number, with Roman blood, laden with spoils stripped from the bodies, not of common soldiers only, but even of commanders-in-chief. Scipio will meet many on the field of battle who with their own hands have slain the praetors, the commanders, the consuls of Rome, and who are now decorated with mural and vallarian wreaths<sup>16</sup> after roaming at will through the camps and cities of Rome which they captured. All the fasces borne before Roman magistrates to-day are not so many in number as those which Hannibal might have had borne before him; taken on the field of battle when the commander-in-chief was slain."

By dwelling on such gloomy prognostications they increased their fears and anxieties. And there was another ground for

apprehension. They had been accustomed to seeing war going on first in one part of Italy and then in another without much hope of its being soon brought to a close. Now, however, all thoughts were turned on Scipio and Hannibal, they seemed as though purposely pitted against each other for a final and decisive struggle. Even those who felt the greatest confidence in Scipio and entertained the strongest hopes that he would be victorious became more nervous and anxious as they realised that the fateful hour was approaching.

The Carthaginians were in a very similar mood. When they thought of Hannibal and the greatness of the deeds he had done they regretted that they had sued for peace, but when they reflected that they had been twice worsted in the open field, that Syphax was a prisoner, that they had been driven out of Spain and then out of Italy, and that all this was the result of one man's resolute courage, and that man Scipio, they dreaded him as though he had been destined from his birth to be their ruin.

*XXIX. Hannibal in Africa. His Interview with Scipio.*—Hannibal had reached Hadrumetum where he remained a few days for his men to recover from the effects of the voyage, when breathless couriers announced that all the country round Carthage was occupied by Roman arms. He at once hurried by forced marches to Zama. Zama is a five days' march from Carthage. The scouts whom he had sent forward to reconnoitre were captured by the Roman outposts and conducted to Scipio. Scipio placed them in charge of the military tribunes and gave orders for them to be taken round the camp where they were to look at everything they wished to see without fear. After asking them whether they had examined all to their satisfaction, he sent them back with an escort to Hannibal. The report they gave was anything but pleasant hearing for him, for as it happened Masinissa had on that very day come in with a force of 6000 infantry and 4000 cavalry. What gave him most uneasiness was the confidence of the enemy which he saw too clearly was not without good grounds. So, although he had been the cause of the war, though his arrival had upset the truce and diminished the hope of any peace being arranged, he still thought that he would be in a better position to obtain terms if he were to ask for peace while his strength was still unbroken than after a defeat. Accordingly he sent a request to Scipio to grant him an interview. Whether he did this on his own initiative or

in obedience to the orders of his government I am unable to say definitely. Valerius Antius says that he was defeated by Scipio in the first battle with a loss of 12,000 killed and 1700 taken prisoners, and that after this he went in company with ten delegates to Scipio's camp. However this may be, Scipio did not refuse the proposed interview, and by common agreement the two commanders advanced their camps towards each other that they might meet more easily. Scipio took up his position not far from the city of Naragarra on ground which, in addition to other advantages, afforded a supply of water within range of missiles from the Roman lines. Hannibal selected some rising ground about four miles away, a safe and advantageous position, except that water had to be obtained from a distance. A spot was selected midway between the camps, which, to prevent any possibility of treachery, afforded a view on all sides.

XXX. When their respective escorts had withdrawn to an equal distance, the two leaders advanced to meet each other, each accompanied by an interpreter—the greatest commanders not only of their own age but of all who are recorded in history before their day, the peers of the most famous kings and commanders that the world had seen.

For a few moments they gazed upon one another in silent admiration. Hannibal was the first to speak. "If," he said, "Destiny has so willed it that I, who was the first to make war on Rome and who have so often had the final victory almost within my grasp, should now be the first to come to ask for peace, I congratulate myself that Fate has appointed you, above all others, as the one from whom I am to ask it. Amongst your many brilliant distinctions this will not be your smallest title to fame, that Hannibal, to whom the gods have given the victory over so many Roman generals, has yielded to you, that it has fallen to your lot to put an end to a war which has been more memorable for your defeats than for ours. This is indeed the irony of fortune, that after taking up arms when your father was consul, and having him for my opponent in my first battle, it should be his son to whom I come unarmed to ask for peace. It would have been far better had the gods endowed our fathers with such a disposition that you would have been contented with the sovereignty of Italy, whilst we were contented with Africa. As it is, even for you, Sicily and Sardinia are no adequate compensation for the loss of so many

fleets, so many armies, and so many splendid generals. But it is easier to regret the past than to repair it. We coveted what belonged to others, consequently we had to fight for our own possessions; not only has war assailed you in Italy and us in Africa, but you have seen the arms and standards of an enemy almost within your gates and on your walls while we hear in Carthage the murmur of the Roman camp. So the thing which we detest most of all, which you would have wished for before everything, has actually come about, the question of peace is raised when your fortunes are in the ascendant. We who are most concerned in securing peace are the ones to propose it, and we have full powers to treat, whatever we do here our governments will ratify. All we need is a temper to discuss things calmly. As far as I am concerned, coming back to a country which I left as a boy, years and a chequered experience of good and evil fortune have so disillusioned me that I prefer to take reason rather than Fortune as my guide. As for you, your youth and unbroken success will make you, I fear, impatient of peaceful counsels. It is not easy for the man whom Fortune never deceives to reflect on the uncertainties and accidents of life. What I was at Thrasymenus and at Cannae, that you are to-day. You were hardly old enough to bear arms when you were placed in high command, and in all your enterprises, even the most daring, Fortune has never played you false. You avenged the deaths of your father and your uncle, and that disaster to your house became the occasion of your winning a glorious reputation for courage and filial piety. You recovered the lost provinces of Spain after driving four Carthaginian armies out of the country. Then you were elected consul, and whilst your predecessors had hardly spirit enough to protect Italy, you crossed over to Africa, and after destroying two armies and capturing and burning two camps within an hour, taking the powerful monarch Syphax prisoner, and robbing his dominions and ours of numerous cities you have at last dragged me away from Italy after I had kept my hold upon it for sixteen years. It is quite possible that in your present mood you should prefer victory to an equitable peace; I, too, know the ambition which aims at what is great rather than at what is expedient; on me, too, a fortune such as yours once shone. But if in the midst of success the gods should also give us wisdom, we ought to reflect not only on what has happened in the past but also upon what may happen in the future. To take only one instance,

I myself am a sufficient example of the fickleness of fortune. Only the other day I had placed my camp between your city and the Anio and was advancing my standards against the walls of Rome—here you see me, bereaved of my two brothers, brave soldiers and brilliant generals as they were, in front of the walls of my native place which is all but invested, and begging on behalf of my city that it may be spared the fate with which I have threatened yours. The greater a man's good fortune the less ought he to count upon it. Success attends you and has deserted us, and this will make peace all the more splendid to you who grant it; to us who ask for it it is a stern necessity rather than an honourable surrender. Peace once established is a better and safer thing than hoping for victory; *that* is in your hands, *this* in the hands of the gods. Do not expose so many years' good fortune to the hazard of a single hour. You think of your own strength, but think too of the part which fortune plays and the even chances of battle. On both sides there will be swords and men to use them, nowhere does the event less answer expectation than in war. Victory will not add so much to the glory which you can now win by granting peace, as defeat will take away from it. The chances of a single hour can annihilate all the honours you have gained and all you can hope for. If you cement a peace, P. Cornelius, you are master of all, otherwise you will have to accept whatever fortune the gods send you. M. Atilius Regulus on this very soil would have afforded an almost unique instance of the success which waits on merit, had he in the hour of victory granted peace to our fathers when they asked for it. But as he would set no bounds to his prosperity, nor curb his elation at his good fortune, the height to which he aspired only made his fall the more terrible.

"It is for him who grants peace, not for him who seeks it, to name the terms, but perhaps it may not be presumptuous in us to assess our own penalty. We consent to everything remaining yours for which we went to war—Sicily, Sardinia, Spain and all the islands that lie between Africa and Italy. We Carthaginians, confined within the shores of Africa, are content, since such is the will of the gods, to see you ruling all outside our frontiers by sea and land as your dominions. I am bound to admit that the lack of sincerity lately shown in the request for peace and in the non-observance of the truce justified your suspicions as to the good faith of Carthage. But, Scipio, the loyal observance of peace depends largely upon



the character of those through whom it is sought. I hear that your senate have sometimes even refused to grant it because the ambassadors were not of sufficient rank. Now it is Hannibal who seeks it, and I should not ask for it if I did not believe it to be advantageous to us, and because I believe it to be so I shall keep it inviolate. As I was responsible for beginning the war and as I conducted it in a way which no one found fault with until the gods were jealous of my success, so I shall do my utmost to prevent any one from being discontented with the peace which I shall have been the means of procuring."

XXXI. To these arguments the Roman commander made the following reply: "I was quite aware, Hannibal, that it was the hope of your arrival that led the Carthaginians to break the truce and cloud all prospect of peace. In fact, you yourself admit as much, since you are eliminating from the terms formerly proposed all that has not already been long in our power. However, as you are anxious that your countrymen should realise what a great relief you are bringing them, I must make it my care that they shall not have the conditions they formerly agreed to struck out to-day as a reward for their perfidy. You do not deserve to have the old proposals still open and yet you are seeking to profit by dishonesty! Our fathers were not the aggressors in the war for Sicily, nor were we the aggressors in Spain, but the dangers which threatened our Mamertine allies in the one case and the destruction of Saguntum in the other made our case a righteous one and justified our arms. That you provoked the war in each case you yourself admit, and the gods bear witness to the fact; they guided the former war to a just and righteous issue, and they are doing and will do the same with this one. As for myself, I do not forget what weak creatures we men are; I do not ignore the influence which Fortune exercises and the countless accidents to which all our doings are liable. Had you of your own free will evacuated Italy and embarked your army before I sailed for Africa and then come with proposals for peace, I admit that I should have acted in a high-handed and arbitrary spirit if I had rejected them. But now that I have dragged you to Africa like a reluctant and tricky defendant<sup>17</sup> I am not bound to show you the slightest consideration. So then, if in addition to the terms on which peace might have been concluded previously, there is the further condition of an indemnity for the attack on our transports and the ill-treatment of our

envoys during the armistice, I shall have something to lay before the councils. If you consider this unacceptable, then prepare for war as you have been unable to endure peace."

Thus, no understanding was arrived at and the commanders rejoined their armies. They reported that the discussion had been fruitless, that the matter must be decided by arms, and the result left to the gods.

XXXII. *The Battle of Zama.*—On their return to their camps, the commanders-in-chief each issued an order of the day to their troops. "They were to get their arms ready and brace up their courage for a final and decisive struggle; if success attended them they would be victors not for a day only but for all time; they would know before the next day closed whether Rome or Carthage was to give laws to the nations. For not Africa and Italy only—the whole world will be the prize of victory. Great as is the prize, the peril in case of defeat will be as great." For no escape lay open to the Romans in a strange and unknown land; and Carthage was making her last effort, if that failed, her destruction was imminent.

On the morrow they went out to battle—the two most brilliant generals and the two strongest armies that the two most powerful nations possessed—to crown on that day the many honours they had won, or for ever lose them. The soldiers were filled with alternate hopes and fears as they gazed at their own and then at the opposing lines and measured their comparative strength with the eye rather than the mind, cheerful and despondent in turn. The encouragement which they could not give to themselves their generals gave them in their exhortations. The Carthaginian reminded his men of their sixteen years' successes on Italian soil, of all the Roman generals who had fallen and all the armies that had been destroyed, and as he came to each soldier who had distinguished himself in any battle, he recounted his gallant deeds. Scipio recalled the conquest of Spain and the recent battles in Africa and showed up the enemies' confession of weakness, since their fears compelled them to sue for peace and their innate faithlessness prevented them from abiding by it. He turned to his own purpose the conference with Hannibal, which being private allowed free scope for invention. He drew an omen and declared that the gods had vouchsafed the same auspices to them as those under which their fathers fought at the Aegates. The end of the war and of their labours, he assured them, had come;

the spoils of Carthage were in their hands, and the return home to their wives and children and household gods. He spoke with uplifted head and a face so radiant that you might suppose he had already won the victory.

XXXIII. Then he drew up his men, the hastati in front, behind them the principes, the triarii closing the rear. He did not form the cohorts in line before their respective standards, but placed a considerable interval between the maniples in order that there might be space for the enemy elephants to be driven through without breaking the ranks.<sup>18</sup> Laelius, who had been one of his staff-officers and was now by special appointment of the senate acting as quaestor, was in command of the Italian cavalry on the left wing, Masinissa and his Numidians being posted on the right. The velites, the light infantry of those days, were stationed at the head of the lanes between the columns of maniples with instructions to retire when the elephants charged and shelter themselves behind the lines of maniples, or else run to the right and left behind the standards and so allow the monsters to rush on to meet the darts from both sides.

To make his line look more menacing Hannibal posted his elephants in front. He had eighty altogether, a larger number than he had ever brought into action before. Behind them were the auxiliaries, Ligurians and Gauls, with an admixture of Balearics and Moors. The second line was made up of Carthaginians and Africans together with a legion of Macedonians. A short distance behind these were posted his Italian troops in reserve. These were mainly Bruttians who had followed him from Italy more from the compulsion of necessity than of their own free will. Like Scipio, Hannibal covered his flanks with his cavalry, the Carthaginians on the right, the Numidians on the left.

Different words of encouragement were required in an army composed of such diverse elements, where the soldiers had nothing in common, neither language nor custom nor laws nor arms nor dress, nor even the motive which brought them into the ranks. To the auxiliaries he held out the attraction of the pay which they would receive, and the far greater inducement of the booty they would secure. In the case of the Gauls he appealed to their instinctive and peculiar hatred of the Romans. The Ligurians, drawn from wild mountain fastnesses, were told to look upon the fruitful plains of Italy as the rewards

of victory. The Moors and Numidians were threatened by the prospect of being under the unbridled tyranny of Masinissa. Each nationality was swayed by its hopes or fears. The Carthaginians had placed before their eyes, their city walls, their homes, their fathers' sepulchres, their wives and children, the alternative of either slavery and destruction or the empire of the world. There was no middle course, they had either everything to hope for or everything to fear.

Whilst the commander-in-chief was thus addressing the Carthaginians, and the officers of the various nationalities were conveying his words to their own people and to the aliens mingled with them mostly through interpreters, the trumpets and horns of the Romans were sounded and such a clangor arose that the elephants, mostly those in front of the left wing, turned upon the Moors and Numidians behind them. Masinissa had no difficulty in turning this disorder into flight and so clearing the Carthaginian left of its cavalry. A few of the animals, however, showed no fear and were urged forward upon the ranks of velites, amongst whom, in spite of the many wounds they received, they did considerable execution. The velites, to avoid being trampled to death, sprang back to the maniples and thus allowed a path for the elephants, from both sides of which they rained their darts on the beasts. The leading maniples also kept up a fusillade of missiles until these animals too were driven out of the Roman lines on to their own side and put the Carthaginian cavalry, who were covering the right flank, to flight. When Laelius saw the enemy's horse in confusion he at once took advantage of it.

XXXIV. When the infantry lines closed, the Carthaginians were exposed on both flanks, owing to the flight of the cavalry, and were losing both confidence and strength. Other circumstances, too, seemingly trivial in themselves but of considerable importance in battle, gave the Romans an advantage. Their cheers formed one united shout and were therefore fuller and more intimidating; those of the enemy, uttered in many languages, were only dissonant cries. The Romans kept their foothold as they fought and pressed the enemy by the sheer weight of their arms and bodies; on the other side there was much more agility and nimbleness of foot than actual fighting strength. As a consequence, the Romans made the enemy give ground in their very first charge, then pushing them back with their shields and elbows and moving forward on to the

ground from which they had dislodged them, they made a considerable advance as though meeting with no resistance. When those in the rear became aware of the forward movement they too pressed on those in front, thereby considerably increasing the weight of the thrust.

This retirement on the part of the enemy's auxiliaries was not checked by the Africans and Carthaginians who formed the second line. In fact, so far were they from supporting them that they too fell back, fearing lest the enemy, after overcoming the obstinate resistance of the first line, should reach them. On this the auxiliaries suddenly broke and turned tail; some took refuge within the second line, others, not allowed to do so, began to cut down those who refused to admit them after refusing to support them. There were now two battles going on, the Carthaginians had to fight with the enemy, and at the same time with their own troops. Still, they would not admit these maddened fugitives within their ranks, they closed up and drove them to the wings and out beyond the fighting ground, fearing lest their fresh and unweakened lines should be demoralised by the intrusion of panic-struck and wounded men.

The ground where the auxiliaries had been stationed had become blocked with such heaps of bodies and arms that it was almost more difficult to cross it than it had been to make way through the masses of the enemy. The hastati who formed the first line followed up the enemy, each man advancing as best he could over the heaps of bodies and arms and the slippery bloodstained ground until the standards and maniples were all in confusion. Even the standards of the principes began to sway to and fro when they saw how irregular the line in front had become. As soon as Scipio observed this he ordered the call to be sounded for the hastati to retire, and after withdrawing the wounded to the rear he brought up the principes and triarii to the wings, in order that the hastati in the centre might be supported and protected on both flanks.

Thus the battle began entirely afresh, as the Romans had at last got to their real enemies, who were a match for them in their arms, their experience and their military reputation, and who had as much to hope for and to fear as themselves. The Romans, however, had the superiority in numbers and in confidence, since their cavalry had already routed the elephants and they were fighting with the enemy's second line after defeating his first.

XXXV. Laelius and Masinissa, who had followed up the defeated cavalry a considerable distance, now returned from the pursuit at the right moment and attacked the enemy in the rear. This at last decided the action. The enemy were routed, many were surrounded and killed in action, those who dispersed in flight over the open country were killed by the cavalry who were in possession of every part. Above 20,000 of the Carthaginians and their allies perished on that day and almost as many were made prisoners. 132 standards were secured and 11 elephants. The victors lost 1500 men.

Hannibal escaped in the mêlée with a few horsemen and fled to Hadrumetum.<sup>10</sup> Before quitting the field he had done everything possible in the battle itself and in the preparation for it. Scipio himself acknowledged and all experienced soldiers agreed that Hannibal had shown singular skill in the disposition of his troops. He placed his elephants in front so that their irregular charge and irresistible force might make it impossible for the Romans to keep their ranks and maintain the order of their formation, in which their strength and confidence mainly lay. Then he posted the mercenaries in front of his Carthaginians, in order that this motley force drawn from all nations, held together not by a spirit of loyalty but by their pay, might not find it easy to run away. Having to sustain the first onset they might wear down the impetuosity of the enemy, and if they did nothing else they might blunt his sword by their wounds. Then came the Carthaginian and African troops, the mainstay of his hopes. They were equal in all respects to their adversaries and even had the advantage inasmuch as they would come fresh into action against a foe weakened by wounds and fatigue. As to the Italian troops, he had his doubts as to whether they would turn out friends or foes and withdrew them consequently into the rearmost line.

After giving this final proof of his great abilities, Hannibal fled, as has been stated, to Hadrumetum. From here he was summoned to Carthage, to which city he returned thirty-six years after he had left it as a boy. He told the senate frankly that he had lost not a battle merely but the whole war, and that their only chance of safety lay in obtaining peace.

XXXVI. *Peace Negotiations.*—From the battlefield Scipio proceeded at once to storm the enemies' camp, where an immense quantity of plunder was secured. He then returned to his ships, having received intelligence that P. Lentulus

had arrived off Utica with 50 warships and 100 transports loaded with supplies of every kind. Laelius was sent to carry the news of the victory to Scipio, who, thinking that the panic in Carthage ought to be increased by threatening the city on all sides, ordered Octavius to march the legions thither overland while he himself sailed from Utica with his old fleet strengthened by the division which Lentulus had brought, and steered for the harbour of Carthage. As he was approaching it he was met by a vessel hung with bands of white wool and branches of olive. In it there were the ten foremost men of the State, who, on Hannibal's advice, had been sent as an embassy to sue for peace. As soon as they were near the stern of the general's vessel they held up the suppliant emblems, and made imploring appeals to Scipio for his pity and protection. The only answer vouchsafed them was that they were to go to Tunis, as Scipio was about to move his army to that place. Keeping on his course he entered the harbour of Carthage in order to survey the situation of the city, not so much for the purpose of acquiring information as of discouraging the enemy. He then sailed back to Utica and recalled Octavius thither also. As the latter was on his way to Tunis he was informed that Vermina, the son of Syphax, was coming to the aid of the Carthaginians with a force consisting mainly of cavalry. Octavius attacked the Numidians whilst on the march with a portion of his infantry and the whole of his cavalry. The action took place on December 17, and soon ended in the utter rout of the Numidians. As they were completely surrounded by the Roman cavalry all avenues of escape were closed; 15,000 were killed and 1200 taken prisoners, 1500 horses were also secured and 72 standards. The prince himself escaped with a few horsemen.

The Romans then reoccupied their old position at Tunis, and here an embassy consisting of thirty delegates had an interview with Scipio. Though they adopted a much humbler tone than on the previous occasion, as indeed their desperate condition demanded, they were listened to with much less sympathy on account of their recent breach of faith. At first the council of war, moved by a righteous indignation, were in favour of the complete destruction of Carthage. When, however, they reflected on the greatness of the task and the length of time which the investment of so strong and well-fortified a city would occupy, they felt considerable hesitation. Scipio himself

too was afraid that his successor might come and claim the glory of terminating the war, after the way had been prepared for it by another man's toils and dangers. So there was a unanimous verdict in favour of peace being made.

XXXVII. The next day the envoys were again summoned before the council and severely taken to task for their want of truth and honesty, and they were admonished to lay to heart the lesson taught by their numerous defeats and to believe in the power of the gods and the sanctity of oaths. The conditions of peace were then stated to them. They were to be a free State, living under their own laws; all the cities, all the territory and all the frontiers that they had held before the war they were to continue to hold, and the Romans would on that day cease from all further depredations. They were to restore to the Romans all the deserters, refugees and prisoners, to deliver up their warships, retaining only ten triremes and all their trained elephants, at the same time undertaking not to train any more. They were not to make war either within or beyond the frontiers of Africa without the permission of Rome. They were to restore all his possessions to Masinissa and make a treaty with him. Pending the return of the envoys from Rome they were to supply corn and pay to the auxiliaries in the Roman army. They were also to pay a war indemnity of 10,000 talents of silver,<sup>20</sup> the payment to be in equal annual instalments, extending over fifty years. One hundred hostages were to be handed over, to be selected by Scipio between the ages of fourteen and thirty years. Finally, he undertook to grant them an armistice if the transports which had been seized during the previous truce were restored with all that they contained. Otherwise there would be no armistice, nor any hopes of peace.

When the envoys brought these terms back and laid them before the Assembly, Gisgo came forward and protested against any proposals for peace. The populace, alike opposed to peace and incapable of war, were giving him a favourable hearing when Hannibal, indignant at such arguments being urged at such a crisis, seized him and dragged him by main force off the platform. This was an unusual sight in a free community, and the people were loud in their disapproval. The soldier, taken aback by the free expression of opinion on the part of his fellow-citizens, said, "I left you when I was nine years old, and now after thirty-six years' absence I have returned. The



art of war which I have been taught from my boyhood, first as a private soldier and then in high command, I think I am fairly well acquainted with. The rules and laws and customs of civic life and of the forum I must learn from you." After this apology for his inexperience, he discussed the terms of peace and showed that they were not unreasonable and that their acceptance was a necessity. The greatest difficulty of all concerned the transports seized during the armistice, for nothing was to be found but the ships themselves, and any investigation would be difficult, as those who would be charged were the opponents of peace.<sup>21</sup> It was decided that the ships should be restored and that in any case search should be made for the crews. It was left to Scipio to put a value on whatever else was missing and the Carthaginians were to pay the amount in cash.

According to some writers, Hannibal went down to the coast straight from the battlefield, and going on board a ship which was in readiness, set sail immediately for the court of King Antiochus, and when Scipio insisted before all else upon his surrender, he was told that Hannibal was not in Africa.

XXXVIII. After the return of the envoys to Scipio the quaestors received instructions to make an inventory from the public registers of all the government property in the transports, and all the private property was to be notified by the owners. Twenty-five thousand pounds of silver were required to be paid down as an equivalent for the pecuniary value,<sup>22</sup> and a three months' armistice granted to the Carthaginians. A further stipulation was made that as long as the armistice was in force, they should not send envoys to any place but Rome, and if any envoys came to Carthage they were not to allow them to leave until the Roman commander had been informed of the object of their visit.

The Carthaginians envoys were accompanied to Rome by L. Veturius Philo, M. Marcius Ralla and L. Scipio the commander-in-chief's brother.

During this time the supplies which arrived from Sicily and Sardinia made provisions so cheap that the traders left the corn for the sailors in return for its freight.

*Events in Rome and Italy.*—The first news of the resumption of hostilities by Carthage created considerable uneasiness in Rome. Tiberius Claudius was ordered to take a fleet without loss of time to Sicily and from there to Africa; the other consul

was ordered to remain in the City until the position of affairs in Africa was definitely known. Tib. Claudius was extremely slow in getting his fleet ready and putting out to sea, for the senate had decided that Scipio rather than he, though consul, should be empowered to fix the terms on which peace should be granted.

The general alarm at the tidings from Africa was increased by rumours of various portents. At Cumae the sun's disk was seen to diminish in size and there was a shower of stones; in the district of Veliternum the ground subsided and immense caverns were formed in which trees were swallowed up; at Aricia the forum and the shops round it were struck by lightning, as were also portions of the walls of Frusino and one of the gates; there was also a shower of stones on the Palatine. The latter portent was expiated, according to the traditional usage, by continuous prayer and sacrifice for nine days, the others by sacrifice of full-grown victims. In the middle of all these troubles there was an extraordinarily heavy rainfall which was also regarded as supernatural. The Tiber rose so high that the Circus was flooded and arrangements were made to celebrate the Games of Apollo outside the Colline Gate at the temple of Venus Erucina. On the actual day, however, the sky suddenly cleared and the procession which had started for the Colline Gate was recalled and conducted to the Circus, as it was announced that the water had subsided. The return of the solemn spectacle to its proper place added to the public joy and also to the number of spectators.

XXXIX. At last the consul took his departure from the City. He was, however, caught in a violent storm between the ports of Cosa and Loretum,<sup>23</sup> and was in the greatest danger, but he succeeded in making the harbour of Populonia, where he remained at anchor till the tempest wore itself out. From there he sailed to Elba, then on to Corsica and from there to Sardinia. Here, whilst rounding the Montes Insani, he was caught in a much more violent storm and off a much more dangerous coast. His fleet was scattered, many of his vessels were dismantled and sprang leaks, some were totally wrecked. With his fleet thus tempest-tossed and shattered he found shelter at Caralis.<sup>24</sup> Whilst he was repairing his ships here winter overtook him. His year of office expired, and as he received no extension of command he brought his fleet back to Rome in a private capacity.

Before leaving for his province M. Servilius named C. Servilius Dictator in order to avoid being recalled to conduct the elections. The Dictator appointed P. Aelius Pactus Master of the Horse. In spite of various dates being fixed for the elections the weather prevented them from being held. Consequently, when the magistrates went out of office on March 14 no new ones had been appointed and the republic was without any curule magistrates.

The pontifex T. Manlius Torquatus died this year and his place was filled by C. Sulpicius Galba. The Roman Games were celebrated three times by the curule aediles L. Licinius Lucullus and Q. Fulvius. Some of the secretaries and messengers of the aediles were found guilty on the evidence of witnesses of abstracting money from the aediles' chest and Lucullus was seriously compromised in the matter. The plebeian aediles, P. Aelius Tubero and L. Laetorius, were found to have been irregularly appointed and resigned office. Before this happened, however, they had celebrated the Plebeian Games and the festival of Jupiter and had also placed in the Capitol three statues made out of the silver paid in fines. The Dictator and the Master of the Horse were authorised by the senate to celebrate the Games in honour of Ceres.<sup>25</sup>

*XL. The Elections and Assignment of the Commands.*—On the arrival of the Roman commissioners from Africa, simultaneously with that of the Carthaginians, the senate met at the temple of Bellona. L. Veturius Philo reported that Carthage had made her last effort, a battle had been fought with Hannibal and an end had at last been put to this disastrous war. This announcement was received by the senators with huge delight, and Veturius reported a further success though comparatively an unimportant one, namely the defeat of Vermina, the son of Syphax.

He was ordered to go to the Assembly and make the people sharers in the good news. Amidst universal congratulations all the temples in the City were thrown open and public thanksgivings were ordered for three days.

The envoys from Carthage and those from Philip who had also arrived, requested an audience of the senate. The Dictator, at the instance of the senate, informed them that the new consuls would grant them one.

The elections were then held and Cnaeus Cornelius Lentulus and P. Aelius Paetus were made consuls. The praetors elected were M. Junius Pennus, to whom the City jurisdiction was

allotted; M. Valerius Falto, to whom Bruttium fell; M. Fabius Buteo, who received Sardinia, and P. Aelius Tubero, to whom the ballot gave Sicily. As to the consuls' provinces it was agreed that nothing should be done until Philip's envoys and those from Carthage had obtained an audience. No sooner was one war at an end than there was the prospect of another commencing. The consul Cnaeus Lentulus was keenly desirous of obtaining Africa as his province; if the war should continue, he looked forward to an easy victory; if it were coming to an end he was anxious to have the glory of terminating so great a struggle. He gave out that he would not allow any business to be transacted until Africa had been decreed to him as his province. His colleague being a moderate and sensible man gave way, he saw that to attempt to wrest Scipio's glory from him would be not only unjust but hopeless. Two of the tribunes of the plebs—Q. Minucius Thermus and Manlius Acilius Glabrio—declared that Cnaeus Cornelius was attempting to do what Tiberius Claudius had failed to do,<sup>26</sup> and that after the senate had authorised the question of the supreme command in Africa to be referred to the Assembly, the thirty-five tribes had unanimously decreed it to Scipio. After numerous debates both in the senate and in the assembly it was finally settled to leave the matter to the senate. It was arranged that the senators should vote on oath, and their decision was that the consuls should come to a mutual understanding, or failing that, should resort to the ballot, as to which of them should have Italy and which should take command of the fleet of fifty vessels. The one to whom the fleet was assigned was to sail to Sicily, and if it proved impossible to make peace with Carthage, he was to proceed to Africa. The consul was to act by sea; Scipio, retaining his full powers, was to conduct the campaign on land. If the terms of peace were agreed upon the tribunes of the plebs were to ask the people whether it was their will that peace should be granted by the consul or by Scipio. And also if the victorious army was to be brought away from Africa, they were to decide who should bring it. Should the people resolve that peace was to be concluded through Scipio and that he was also to bring the army back, then the consul was not to sail for Africa.

The other consul, who had Italy for his province, was to take over two legions from the praetor M. Sextius.

XLI. *The Military Arrangements for the Year.*—Scipio received

an extension of his command and retained the armies he had in Africa. The two legions in Bruttium which had been under C. Livius were transferred to the praetor M. Valerius Falto and the two legions in Sicily under Cnaeus Tremellius were to be taken over by the praetor P. Aelius. The legion in Sardinia, commanded by the propraetor P. Lentulus, was assigned to M. Fabius. M. Servilius, the consul of the previous year, was continued in command of his two legions in Etruria.

With regard to Spain, L. Cornelius Lentulus and L. Manlius Acidinus had been there for some years and the consuls were to arrange with the tribunes to ask the Assembly to decide who should command in Spain. The general appointed was to form one legion of Romans out of the two armies and fifteen cohorts of Latin allies, with which to hold the province, and L. Cornelius and L. Manlius were to bring the old soldiers home.

Whichever consul received Africa as his province was to select fifty ships out of the two fleets, *i.e.*, the one which Cnaeus Octavius was commanding in African waters and the one with which P. Villius was guarding the Sicilian seaboard. P. Scipio was to keep the forty warships which he had. Should the consul wish Cn. Octavius to continue in command of his fleet, he would take rank as propraetor; if he gave the command to Laelius, then Octavius was to leave for Rome and bring back the ships which the consul did not want. Ten warships were also assigned to M. Fabius for Sardinia.

In addition to the above-mentioned troops the consuls were ordered to raise two City legions so that there might be fourteen legions and one hundred ships of war at the disposal of the republic for the year.

*XLII. Reception of the Embassies by the Senate.*—Then the admission of the embassies from Philip and the Carthaginians was discussed. It was decided that the Macedonians should be introduced first. Their address dealt with various points. They began by disclaiming all responsibility for the depredations on the friendly countries of which the Roman envoys had complained to the king. Then they themselves brought charges against the allies of Rome and a much more serious one against M. Aurelius, one of the three envoys, who they said had stayed behind and after raising a body of troops commenced hostilities against them in violation of treaty rights, and fought several engagements with their commanders. They ended with a demand that the Macedonians with their general

Sopater who had served as mercenaries under Hannibal and were then prisoners in chains should be restored to them.

In reply, M. Furius, who had been sent from Macedonia by Aurelius to represent him, pointed out that Aurelius had certainly been left behind, but it was for the purpose of preventing the allies of Rome from being driven to secede to the king in consequence of the injuries and depredations from which they were suffering. He had not overstepped their frontiers; he had made it his business to see that no hordes of plunderers crossed those frontiers with impunity. Sopater, who was one of the purple-clad nobles who stood near the throne and was related to the monarch, had recently been sent to Africa to assist Hannibal and Carthage with money and also with a force of 4000 Macedonians.

On being questioned as to these matters the Macedonians gave unsatisfactory and evasive replies, and consequently the answer they received from the senate was anything but favourable. They were told that their king was looking for war, and if he went on as he was doing, he would very soon find it. He had been guilty of a twofold breach of treaty, for he had committed wanton aggression on the allies of Rome by hostile arms and he had also aided the enemies of Rome with men and money. Scipio was acting rightly and legitimately in treating those taken in arms against Rome as enemies and keeping them in chains. M. Aurelius also was acting in the interests of the State—and the senate thanked him for it—when he afforded armed protection to the allies of Rome since treaty rights were powerless for their defence.

With this stern reply the Macedonian envoys were dismissed. Then the Carthaginians were called in. As soon as their age and rank were recognised, for they were quite the foremost men in the State, the senators remarked that now it was really a question of peace. Conspicuous amongst them all was Hasdrubal, on whom his countrymen had bestowed the sobriquet of "Hædus." He had always been an advocate of peace and an opponent of the Barcine party. This gave his words additional weight when he disavowed all responsibility for the war on behalf of his government and fastened it on a few ambitious and grasping individuals.

His speech was discursive and eloquent. He repudiated some of the charges, others he admitted lest unabashed denials of established facts might lead to less consideration being shown.

He warned the senators to use their good fortune in a spirit of moderation and self-restraint. "If," he continued, "the Carthaginians had listened to Hanno and myself and had been willing to take advantage of their opportunity, they would have dictated the terms of peace which now they are seeking from you. Seldom are good fortune and good sense granted to men at the same time. What makes Rome invincible is the fact that her people do not lose their sound judgment in the hour of prosperity. And indeed it would be a matter for surprise were it otherwise, for those to whom good fortune is a novelty go mad with unrestrained delight because they are unused to it, but to you Romans the joy of victory is a usual, I might almost say a commonplace experience. It is by clemency towards the conquered more than by conquest itself that you have extended your dominion."

The others spoke in language more calculated to evoke compassion. They reminded their audience of the powerful and influential position from which Carthage had fallen. Those, they said, who lately held almost the whole world subject to their arms had nothing now left to them but their city walls. Confined within these they saw nothing on land or sea which owned their sway. Even their city and their hearths and homes they would only keep if the Roman people were willing to spare them; if not, they lost everything.

As it became evident that the senators were moved with compassion, one of them, exasperated by the perfidy of the Carthaginians, is said to have called out, "By what gods will you swear to observe the treaty, since you have been false to those by whom you swore before?" "By the same as before," Hasdrubal replied, "since they visit their wrath on those who violate treaties."

*XLIII. Peace concluded.*—Whilst all were in favour of peace the consul Cnaeus Lentulus, who was in command of the fleet, prevented the House from passing any resolution. Thereupon, two tribunes of the plebs, Manius Acilius and Q. Minucius, at once brought the questions before the people: Was it their will and pleasure that the senate should pass a decree for the conclusion of peace with Carthage? Who was to grant the peace? and Who was to bring away the army from Africa? On the question of peace all the tribes voted in the affirmative; they also made an order that Scipio should grant the peace and bring the army home.

In pursuance of this decision the senate decreed that P. Scipio should, in agreement with the ten commissioners, make peace with the people of Carthage on such terms as he thought right.

On this the Carthaginians expressed their thanks to the senators, and begged that they might be allowed to enter the City and converse with their fellow-countrymen who were detained as State-prisoners.<sup>37</sup> These were members of the nobility, some of them their own friends and relations, and others there were for whom they had messages from their friends at home. When this was arranged they made a further request that they might be allowed to ransom any of the prisoners whom they wished. They were told to furnish the names, and they gave in about two hundred. The senate then passed a resolution that a commission should be appointed to take back to P. Scipio in Africa two hundred of the prisoners whom the Carthaginians had selected and to inform him that if peace were established he was to restore them to the Carthaginians without ransom.

When the fetials received orders to proceed to Africa for the purpose of striking the treaty they requested the senate to define the procedure. The senate accordingly decided upon this formula: "The fetials shall take with them their own flints and their own herbs; when a Roman praetor orders them to strike the treaty they shall demand the sacred herbs from him." The herbs given to the fetials are usually taken from the Citadel.<sup>38</sup>

The Carthaginian envoys were at length dismissed and returned to Scipio. They concluded peace with him on the terms mentioned above, and delivered up their warships, their elephants, the deserters and refugees and 4000 prisoners including Q. Terentius Calleo, a senator. Scipio ordered the ships to be taken out to sea and burnt. Some authorities state that there were 500 vessels, comprising every class propelled by oars. The sight of all those vessels suddenly bursting into flames caused as much grief to the people as if Carthage itself were burning. The deserters were dealt with much more severely than the fugitives; those belonging to the Latin contingents were beheaded, the Romans were crucified.<sup>39</sup>

XLIV. The last time peace was concluded with Carthage was in the consulship of Q. Lutatius and A. Manlius, forty years previously. Twenty-three years afterwards the war began in the



consulship of P. Cornelius and Tiberius Sempronius. It ended in the consulship of Cnaeus Cornelius and P. Aelius Paetus, seventeen years later.

Tradition tells of a remark which Scipio is said to have frequently made to the effect that it was owing to the jealous ambition of Tiberius Claudius and afterwards to that of Cnaeus Cornelius that the war did not end with the destruction of Carthage.<sup>30</sup>

*Hannibal's Rebuke to the Carthaginian Senate.*—Carthage found a difficulty in meeting the first instalment of the war indemnity as her treasury was exhausted. There was lamentation and weeping in the senate and in the middle of it all Hannibal is said to have been seen smiling. Hasdrubal Haedus rebuked him for his mirth amid the nation's tears. "If," Hannibal replied, "you could discern my inmost thoughts as plainly as you can tell the expression of my countenance you would easily discover that this laughter which you find fault with does not proceed from a merry heart but from one almost demented with misery. All the same, it is very far from being so ill-timed as those foolish and misplaced tears of yours. The proper time to weep was when we were deprived of our arms, when our ships were burnt, when we were interdicted from all war beyond our frontiers. That is the wound that will prove fatal. There is not the slightest reason for supposing that the Romans are consulting your peace and quietness.<sup>31</sup> No great State can remain quiet; if it has no enemy abroad it finds one at home, just as excessively strong men, whilst seemingly safe from outside mischief, fall victims to the burden of their own strength. Of course we only feel public calamities so far as they affect us personally, and nothing in them gives us a sharper pang than the loss of money. When the spoils of victory were being dragged away from Carthage, when you saw yourselves left naked and defenceless amidst an Africa in arms, nobody uttered a groan; now because you have to contribute to the indemnity from your private fortunes you lament as loudly as though you were present at your country's funeral. I greatly fear that you will very soon find that it is the least of your misfortunes which you are shedding tears over to-day." Such was the way in which Hannibal spoke to the Carthaginians.

*Scipio's Departure from Africa.*—Scipio summoned his troops to assembly, and in the presence of the whole army rewarded

Masinissa by adding to his ancestral realm the town of Cirta and the other cities and districts which had belonged to the dominion of Syphax and had passed under the rule of Rome. Cnaeus Octavius received instructions to take the fleet to Sicily and hand it over to the consul Cnaeus Cornelius. Scipio told the Carthaginian envoys to start for Rome in order that the arrangements he had made in consultation with the ten commissioners might receive the sanction of the senate and the formal order of the people.

XLV. As peace was now established on land and sea Scipio embarked his army and sailed to Lilybaeum. From there he sent the greater part of his army on in the ships, whilst he himself travelled through Italy. The country was rejoicing quite as much over the restoration of peace as over the victory he had won, and he made his way to Rome through multitudes who poured out from the cities to do him honour, and crowds of peasants who blocked the roads in the country districts. The triumphal procession in which he rode into the City was the most brilliant that had ever been seen. The weight of silver which he brought into the treasury amounted to 123,000 pounds. Out of the booty he distributed forty ases to each soldier. Syphax had died shortly before at Tibur whither he had been transferred from Alba, but his removal, if it detracted from the interest of the spectacle, in no way dimmed the glory of the triumphing general. His death, however, provided another spectacle, for he received a public funeral. Polybius, an authority of considerable weight, says that this king was led in the procession. Q. Terentius Culleo marched behind Scipio wearing the cap of liberty,<sup>32</sup> and in all his after-life honoured as was meet the author of his freedom.

As to the sobriquet of Africanus, whether it was conferred upon him by the devotion of his soldiers or by the popular breath, or whether as in the recent instances of Sylla the Fortunate and Pompey the Great it originated in the flattery of his friends, I cannot say for certain. At all events, he was the first commander-in-chief who was ennobled by the name of the people he had conquered. Since his time men who have won far smaller victories have in imitation of him left splendid inscriptions on their busts and illustrious names to their families.

## BOOK XXXI

### ROME AND MACEDON

I. I, too, feel as much relief in having reached the end of the Punic War as if I had taken a personal part in its toils and dangers. It ill befits one who has had the courage to promise a complete history of Rome to find the separate sections of such an extensive work fatiguing. But when I consider that the sixty-three years from the beginning of the First Punic War to the end of the Second take up as many books as the four hundred and eighty-seven years from the foundation of the City to the consulship of Appius Claudius under whom the First Punic War commenced, I see that I am like people who are tempted by the shallow water along the beach to wade out to sea; the further I progress, the greater the depth, as though it were a bottomless sea, into which I am carried. I imagined that as I completed one part after another the task before me would diminish; as it is, it almost becomes greater.

*Renewal of Hostilities with Macedonia.*—The peace with Carthage was very soon followed by war with Macedonia. There is no comparison between them as regards the critical nature of the contest, or the personality of the commander or the fighting quality of the troops. But the Macedonian war was, if anything, more noteworthy owing to the brilliant reputation of the former kings, the ancient fame of the nation and the vast extent of its dominion when it held sway over a large part of Europe and a still larger part of Asia.

The war with Philip which had commenced some ten years previously had been suspended for the last three years, and both the war and its cessation were due to the action of the Aetolians. The peace with Carthage now left the Romans free. They were angry with Philip for his attacking the Aetolians and the other friendly States in Greece while he was nominally at peace with Rome, and also for his having given assistance in both men and money to Hannibal and Carthage. He had ravaged the Athenian territory and driven the inhabitants into the

city, and it was their request for help which decided the Romans to recommence the war.

II. Just about the same time envoys arrived from King Attalus and also from Rhodes with the information that Philip was trying to gain the States of Asia Minor. The reply made to both deputations was that the situation in Asia was engaging the attention of the senate. The question of war with Macedonia was referred to the consuls, who were at the time in their respective provinces.

In the meanwhile, C. Claudius Nero, M. Aemilius Lepidus and P. Sempronius Tuditanus were sent on a mission to Ptolemy, king of Egypt, to announce the final defeat of Hannibal and the Carthaginians and to thank the king for having remained a staunch friend to Rome at a critical time, when even her nearest allies deserted her. They were further to request him, in case Philip's aggressions compelled them to declare war against him, that he would maintain his old friendly attitude towards the Romans.

*Roman Defeat in Cis-Alpine Gaul.*—During this period P. Aelius, the consul who was commanding in Gaul, learnt that the Boii, prior to his arrival, had been raiding the territories of friendly tribes. He hastily raised a force of two legions in view of this disturbance and strengthened it with four cohorts from his own army. This force, thus hurriedly collected, he entrusted to C. Ampius, a prefect of allies, and ordered him to march through the canton of Umbria called Sapinia and invade the country of the Boii. He himself marched over the mountains by an open road. Ampius crossed the enemy's frontier, and after devastating his country without meeting any resistance, he selected a position at the fortified post of Mutilum as a suitable place for cutting the corn which was now ripe. He commenced the task without previously examining the neighbourhood or posting armed parties in sufficient strength to protect the foragers, who had laid aside their weapons and were intent on their work. Suddenly he and his foragers were surprised by the Gauls who appeared on all sides. The panic and disorder extended to the men on guard; 7000 men who were dispersed through the cornfields were killed, amongst them C. Ampius himself, the rest fled to the camp. The following night the soldiers, as they had no regular commander, decided to act for themselves, and leaving most of their possessions behind made their way through almost impassable forests to the consul.

Beyond ravaging the Boian country and making a league with the Ligurian Ingauni the consul did nothing worth mentioning in his province before his return to Rome.

III. *Preparations for the War with Philip.*—At the first meeting of the senate after his return there was a general demand that the action of Philip and the grievances of the friendly States should take precedence of all other business. The question was at once put in a crowded House and a decree was made that the consul P. Aelius should send the man whom he thought best, with full command to take over the fleet which Cn. Octavius was bringing back from Africa and proceed to Macedonia. He selected M. Valerius Laevinus, who was sent with the rank of *propraetor*. Laevinus took thirty-eight of Octavius' ships which were lying at anchor off Vibo and with these he sailed for Macedonia. He was met by M. Aurelius, who gave him details about the strength of the land and sea forces which the king had got together and the extent to which he was securing armed assistance not only from the cities on the mainland, but also from the islands in the Aegean, partly by his own personal influence, partly through his agents. Aurelius pointed out that the Romans would have to display far greater energy in the prosecution of this war, or else Philip, encouraged by their slackness, would venture on the same enterprise which Pyrrhus, whose kingdom was considerably smaller, had ventured on before.

It was decided that Aurelius should send this information in a despatch to the consuls and the senate.

IV. *Allotment of Land for time-expired Soldiers.*—Towards the close of the year the question was brought up as to the holdings which were to be assigned to the veteran soldiers who had served with Scipio in Africa. The senator decreed that M. Junius, the City praetor, should at his discretion appoint ten commissioners for the purpose of measuring and allotting that portion of the Samnite and Apulian territory which had become State domain. The commissioners were P. Servilius, Q. Caecilius Marcellus, the two Servilii, Caius and Marcus—who were known as "The Twins"—the two Hostilii Catones, Lucius and Aulus, P. Villius Tappulus, M. Fulvius Flaccus, P. Aelius Pactus and T. Quinctius Flaminius.

*The Elections for the Year.*—The elections were conducted by the consul P. Aelius. The consuls-elect were P. Sulpicius Galba and C. Aurelius Cotta. The new praetors were Q. Minucius

Rufus, L. Furius Purpureo, Q. Fulvius Gillo and C. Sergius Plancus.

The Roman Scenic Games were celebrated this year with unusual splendour by the curule aediles, L. Valerius Flaccus and T. Quinctius Flamininus, and were repeated for a second day. They also distributed to the people with strict impartiality and to the general satisfaction a vast quantity of corn which Scipio had sent from Africa. It was sold at four ases the modius.<sup>1</sup>

The Plebeian Games were also exhibited on three separate occasions by the aediles L. Apustius Fullo and Q. Minucius Rufus; the latter after serving his aedileship was one of the newly-elected praetors. The Festival of Jupiter was also celebrated.

V. In the 551st year from the foundation of the City, during the consulship of P. Sulpicius Galba and C. Aurelius and within a few months of the conclusion of peace with Carthage, the war with King Philip began.

On March 15, the day on which the consuls entered office, P. Sulpicius made this the first business before the senate. A decree was made that the consuls should sacrifice full-grown victims to those deities whom they might decide upon, and should offer up the following prayer: "May the will and purpose of the senate and people of Rome as regards the commonwealth and the entrance upon a new war have a prosperous and happy issue both for the Roman people and for the Latin allies!" After the sacrifice and prayer the consuls were to consult the senate as to the policy to be pursued and the allocation of provinces.

Just at this time the war-spirit was stimulated by the receipt of the despatches from M. Aurelius and M. Valerius Laevinus as well as by a fresh embassy from Athens which announced that the king was nearing their frontiers and would soon be master of their territory and of their city as well if Rome did not come to the rescue.

The consuls reported the due performance of the sacrifices and the declaration of the augurs that the gods had listened to their prayer, for the victims had given favourable omens and portended victory, triumph, and an enlargement of the dominion of Rome. Then the despatches from Valerius and Aurelius were read and an audience given to the Athenian envoys. A resolution was passed by the senate that thanks be given to their allies for remaining loyal in spite of continual attempts

to seduce them and even when threatened with a siege. With regard to giving active assistance the senate deferred a definite answer until the consuls had balloted for their provinces, and the one to whom the Macedonian province fell had submitted to the people the question of declaring war against Philip of Macedon.

VI. This province fell to P. Sulpicius, and he gave notice that he should propose to the Assembly that "owing to the lawless actions and armed attacks committed against the allies of Rome, it is the will and order of the Roman people that war be proclaimed against Philip, King of Macedonia, and against his people, the Macedonians."

The other consul, Aurelius, received Italy for his province. Then the praetors balloted for their respective commands. C. Sergius Plancus drew the City; Q. Fulvius Gillo, Sicily; Q. Minucius Rufus, Bruttium, and L. Furius, Gaul.

The proposed declaration of war against Macedonia was almost unanimously rejected at the first meeting of the Assembly.<sup>2</sup> The length and exhausting demands of the late war had made men weary of fighting and they shrank from incurring further toils and dangers. One of the tribunes of the plebs, Q. Baebius, too, had adopted the old plan of abusing the patricians for perpetually sowing the seeds of fresh wars to prevent the plebeians from ever enjoying any rest. The patricians were extremely angry and the tribune was bitterly attacked in the senate, each of the senators in turn urging the consul to call another meeting of the Assembly to consider the proposal afresh and at the same time to rebuke the people for their want of spirit and show them what loss and disgrace would be entailed by the postponement of that war.

VII. The Assembly was duly convened in the Campus Martius, and before the question was put to the vote, the consul addressed the centuries in the following terms: "You seem to be unaware, Quirites, that what you have to decide is not whether you will have peace or war; Philip will not leave you any option as to that, he is preparing war on an enormous scale both by land and sea. The only question is whether you will transport the legions into Macedonia or wait for the enemy in Italy. You have learnt by experience, if not before, at all events in the late Punic War, what a difference it makes which you decide upon. When Saguntum was besieged and our allies were imploring us for help, who doubts that if we had sent

prompt assistance, as our fathers did to the Mamertines, we should have confined within the borders of Spain that war which, most disastrously for ourselves, we allowed through procrastination to enter Italy. Why, this very Philip had entered into an agreement with Hannibal through his agents and in his despatches that he would invade Italy, and there is not the smallest doubt that we kept him in Macedonia by sending Laevinus with a fleet to take the offensive against him. Are we hesitating to do now what we did then, when we had Hannibal for our enemy in Italy—now that Hannibal has been driven out of Italy and out of Carthage, and Carthage itself is completely vanquished? If we allow the king to make proof of our slackness by storming Athens as we allowed Hannibal to do by storming Saguntum, it will not be in five months—the time Hannibal took from Saguntum—but in five days after he sails from Corinth that he will set foot in Italy.

“Perhaps you do not put Philip on a par with Hannibal or consider the Macedonians equal to the Carthaginians. At all events you will consider him the equal of Pyrrhus. Equal, do I say? How greatly the one man surpasses the other, how superior is the one nation to the other! Epirus always has been and is to-day a very small accession to the kingdom of Macedonia. The whole of the Peloponnese is under the sway of Philip, not excepting even Argos, famous for the death of Pyrrhus, quite as much as for its ancient glory.

“Now compare our position. Consider the flourishing state of Italy when all those generals and armies were safe and sound which have been since swept away by the Punic War. And yet when Pyrrhus attacked it, he shook it to its foundations and all but reached Rome itself in his victorious career! Not only did the Tarentines revolt from us and the whole of that coastal district of Italy called Magna Graecia, which you would naturally suppose would follow a leader of the same language and nationality as themselves, but the Lucanians, the Bruttians and the Samnites did the same. Do you suppose that if Philip landed in Italy, these nations would remain quiet and true to us? They showed their loyalty, I suppose, in the Punic War.<sup>3</sup> No, those nations will never fail to revolt from us, unless there is no longer any one to whom they can revolt.

“If you had thought it too much to go to Africa you would have had Hannibal and his Carthaginians in Italy to-day. Let Macedonia rather than Italy be the seat of war, let it be the



enemy's cities and fields that are devastated with fire and sword. We have learnt by this time that our arms are more potent and more successful abroad than they are at home. Go to the poll with the help of the gods, and confirm the decision of the senate. It is not your consul only who urges you to take this course, the immortal gods also bid you do it, for when I was offering up the sacrifices and praying that this war might end happily for the senate, for myself, for you, for our allies and Latin confederates, for our fleets and armies, the gods vouchsafed every cheering and happy omen."

VIII. After this speech they separated for the voting. The result was in favour of the consul's proposal, they resolved on war. Thereupon, the consuls, acting on a resolution of the senate, ordered special prayers and supplications for three days, and at all the shrines intercessions were offered up that the war which the Roman people had ordered against Philip might have a happy and prosperous issue. The fetials were consulted by the consul as to whether it was necessary for the declaration of war to be conveyed personally to King Philip, or whether it would be sufficient if it were published in one of his frontier garrison towns. They declared that either mode of procedure would be correct. The senate left it to the consul to select at his discretion one of them, not being a member of the senate, to make the declaration of war.<sup>4</sup>

The next business was the formation of the armies for the consuls and praetors. The consuls were ordered to disband the old armies and, each of them, to raise two fresh legions. As the conduct of the new war, which was felt to be a very serious one, was entrusted to Sulpicius, he was allowed to enlist as volunteers as many as he could out of the army which P. Scipio had brought back from Africa, but on no account to compel any of the veterans to join against his will. The consuls were to give to each of the praetors, L. Furius Purpurio and Q. Minucius Rufus, 5000 men from the Latin contingents as an army of occupation for their provinces, the one in Gaul, the other in Bruttium. Q. Fulvius Gallo also was ordered to select men belonging to the Latin and allied contingents from the army which the consul P. Aelius had commanded, beginning with those who had seen the shortest service until he had made up a force of 5000 men. This army was for the defence of Sicily. M. Valerius Falto, who had had Campania for his province during the previous year, was to make a similar selection

from the army in Sardinia, which province he was to take charge of as *propraetor*.<sup>5</sup> The consuls received instructions to raise two legions in the City as a reserve to be sent wherever there was need for their services, as many of the Italian nationalities had taken the side of Carthage in the late war, and were seething with anger.<sup>6</sup>

IX. In the midst of these preparations for war a deputation came from King Ptolemy to bring information that the Athenians had sought his aid against Philip. Although both States were allies of Rome, the king would not—so the deputies stated—send either fleet or army to Greece to protect or attack any one without the consent of Rome. If the Romans were at liberty to defend their allies he should remain quietly in his kingdom; if on the other hand the Romans preferred to remain inactive he would himself send such assistance as would easily protect the Athenians against Philip. The senate passed a vote of thanks to the king and assured the deputation that it was the intention of the Roman people to protect their allies; if the need arose they would point it out to the king, and they were fully aware that the resources of his kingdom would prove a steady and loyal support for their commonwealth. To each of the deputies the senate presented 5000 ases.

While the consuls were raising troops and preparing for war, the citizens were occupied with religious observances, especially those which were usual when a fresh war began. The special intercessions and prayers at all the shrines had been duly offered, but that nothing might be omitted the consul to whom Macedonia was allotted was authorised to vow Games in honour of Jupiter and an offering to his temple. This matter was delayed through the action of the Pontifex Maximus, Licinius, who laid it down that no vow ought to be made unless the sum required to discharge it was paid, because the money so appropriated could not be used in connexion with the war, and ought to be at once set apart and not mixed up with other money. Unless this were done, the vow could not be duly discharged.

Although the pontiff's authority and the reasons he gave had great weight, the consul was instructed to refer the question to the whole pontifical college as to whether a vow could be properly undertaken when the expense incurred was left uncertain. The pontiffs declared that it could, and would be made with even greater propriety under these conditions. The consul recited the words of the vow after the Pontifex Maximus in

the same form in which vows to be discharged after an interval of five years were usually recited, the exception being that the senate was to determine the cost of its fulfilment at the time when it was discharged. Up to this time when the Games and offerings were vowed a definite sum had always been named; this was the first instance where the cost was not fixed at the time.

X. *A Gaulish Outbreak.*—Whilst all men's minds were turned to the Macedonian war, rumours suddenly arose of an outbreak of the Gauls, the last thing that was apprehended. The Insubres and Cenomani in conjunction with the Boii, who had induced the Celines and Ilvates and the other Ligurian tribes to join them, had taken up arms under Hamilcar, a Carthaginian general, who had held a command in Hasdrubal's army and had remained in the country. They had stormed and sacked Placentia and in their blind rage had destroyed most of the city by fire, hardly 2000 men being left amid the smoking ruins. Thence, crossing the Po, they advanced with the intention of sacking Cremona. Hearing of the disaster which had overtaken their neighbours, the townsmen had time to close their gates and man their walls so that they might, at all events, be able to stand a siege and send a message to the Roman praetor before the final assault. L. Furius Purpureo was in charge of that province at the time, and acting under the resolution of the senate had disbanded his army, retaining only 5000 from the Latin and allied contingents. With this force he was encamped in the neighbourhood of Ariminum. In a despatch to the senate he described the serious condition of his province; of the two military colonies which had weathered the terrible storm of the Punic War one was taken and destroyed by the enemy and the other was being attacked. His own army could not render assistance to the colonists in their distress unless he was willing to expose his 5000 allied troops to be massacred by the 40,000 of the enemy—that number was under arms—and by incurring such a fatal disaster himself raise the courage of the enemy who were exulting over the destruction of a Roman colony.

XI. After the despatch had been read the senate decreed that the consul C. Aurelius should order his army to muster at Ariminum on the day which he had previously fixed for their muster in Etruria. If the state of public affairs allowed, he was to go in person to suppress the disturbance, otherwise, he was to send instructions to L. Furius requesting him, as

soon as the legions reached him, to send his 5000 of the allied contingent to replace them in Etruria, and then raise the siege of Cremona.

*Commissioners sent to Africa.*—The senate also decided to send a mission to Carthage and to Masinissa in Numidia. Their instructions for Carthage were to inform the government that Hamilcar, one of their citizens who had come with either Hasdrubal's or Mago's army, had been left behind and in defiance of the treaty had persuaded the Gauls and Ligurians to take up arms against Rome. If they wished to remain at peace they must recall him and surrender him to the Romans. The commissioners were also to announce that the deserters had not all been given up, a great many of them were stated to be openly walking about in Carthage; it was the duty of the authorities to find them out and arrest them in order that they might be handed over in accordance with the treaty.

These were their instructions for Carthage. To Masinissa they were to convey the senate's congratulations on his having recovered his ancestral kingdom and still more upon his having extended it by the annexation of the richest portion of Syphax's dominions. They were also to inform him that a war had been undertaken against Philip in consequence of his having lent the Carthaginians active assistance, and when Italy was wrapped in the flames of war he had inflicted injuries on the allies of Rome. She was thus compelled to send ships and armies to Greece, and by thus dividing her forces Philip was primarily the cause of the delay in sending an expedition to Africa. The commissioners were further to request Masinissa to assist in that war by sending a contingent of Numidian horse. Some splendid presents were placed in their charge for the king—gold and silver vases, a purple robe, a *tunica palmata* together with an ivory sceptre, also a *toga praetexta* together with a curule chair.<sup>7</sup> They were instructed to assure him that if he required anything for the security and extension of his kingdom and would intimate what he wanted, the Roman people would do their utmost to meet his wishes in return for the services he had rendered.

A deputation from Syphax's son, Vermina, also appeared before the senate. They made excuses for his mistakes on the ground of his youth and threw all the blame on the faithlessness of the Carthaginians. Masinissa had once been the enemy and had now become the friend of Rome; Vermina, too, they said,

would make every effort not to be outdone in friendly offices to Rome either by Masinissa or by any one else. They ended by petitioning the senate to confer on him the title of "king, ally and friend."

The reply which the deputation received was to the effect that "Syphax, his father, had suddenly without any reason become an enemy to the people of Rome after being their ally and friend, and that Vermina himself had commenced his military education by an attack on the Romans. He must therefore sue for peace before he could have any title to be styled 'king, ally and friend.' The Roman people were accustomed to confer that honourable distinction in return for great services which kings have rendered to them. The Roman envoys would shortly be in Africa and the senate would empower them to grant peace to Vermina on certain conditions, providing that he left the fixing of those conditions absolutely to the Roman people. If he wanted anything added or cancelled or altered in the terms he must make a fresh appeal to the senate."

The men who were sent to conduct these negotiations were C. Terentius Varro, Sp. Lucretius and Cn. Octavius; and they had each a *quinquereme* placed at their disposal.

XII. *Questions touching Religion.*—A despatch was read in the House from Q. Minucius, the praetor commanding in Bruttium, in which he stated that money had been stolen by night from the treasury of Proserpine at Locri and there was no clue to the perpetrators of the crime. The senate were extremely angry at finding that acts of sacrilege were still going on and that not even the example of Pleminius, notorious alike for the guilt and the punishment which so swiftly followed, acted in any way as a deterrent. C. Aurelius was instructed to write to the praetor and tell him that the senate wished an enquiry to be made into the circumstances of the robbery on the same lines as the one which the praetor M. Pomponius had conducted three years previously.<sup>3</sup> Whatever money was discovered was to be replaced, and the deficit made up; and should it be thought necessary expiatory sacrifices were to be offered in accordance with the instructions of the pontiffs on the previous occasions.

Their anxiety to atone for the violation of the temple was made all the keener by the simultaneous announcements of portents from numerous localities. In Lucania it was alleged that the heavens had been on fire; at Privernum the sun had

been glowing red through the whole of a cloudless day; at the temple of Juno Sospita in Lanuvium a terrible noise was heard in the night. Numerous monstrous births were also reported: amongst the Sabines a child was born of doubtful sex; another similar case was discovered where the child was already sixteen years old; at Frusino a lamb was yeaned with a head like a pig; at Sinuessa a pig was littered with a human head, and on the public domain-land in Lucania a foal appeared with five feet. These were all regarded as horrid and monstrous products of a nature which had gone astray to produce strange and hybrid growths; the hermaphrodites were looked upon as of especially evil omen and were ordered to be at once carried out to sea just as quite recently in the consulships of C. Claudius and M. Nero similar ill-omened births had been disposed of. At the same time the senate ordered the decemvirs to consult the Sacred Books about this portent. Following the instructions found there, they ordered the same ceremonies to be observed as on the occasion of its last appearance.<sup>9</sup> A hymn was to be sung through the City by three choirs, each consisting of nine maidens, and a gift was to be carried to Queen Juno. The consul C. Aurelius saw that the instructions of the Keepers of the Sacred Books were carried out. The hymn in our fathers' days was composed by Livius, on this occasion by P. Licinius Tegula.

XIII. *The Public Finances.* When all the acts of expiation had been duly performed, and the sacrilege at Locri had been investigated by Q. Minucius, and the money, recovered from the sale of the goods of the guilty persons, had been replaced in the treasury, the consuls were now anxious to start for their provinces, but a delay arose. A number of persons had lent money to the State during the consulship of M. Valerius and M. Claudius, and the repayment of the third instalment was due this year. The consuls informed them that the money in the treasury would hardly meet the cost of the new war, which would have to be carried on with a large fleet and large armies and that there was no means of paying them for the present. They appealed to the senate and pleaded that if the State chose to use the money which was lent for the Punic War to defray the cost of the Macedonian War also, and one war arose out of another, it would simply mean that their money would be confiscated in return for the service they had rendered as though it had really been an injury.

The senate acknowledged that they had a grievance. The creditors' demands were just, but the State was unable to meet its liabilities and the senate decided upon a course which was fair to both sides and of practical utility. Many of the applicants had stated that there was land everywhere for sale and they wanted to become purchasers; the senate accordingly made a decree that they should have the option of taking any part of the public domain-land within fifty miles of the City. The consuls would value the land and impose a nominal tax of one as per jugerum as acknowledgment of its being public land, and when the State could pay its debts any of them who wished to have his money rather than the land could have it and restore the land to the people. They gladly accepted these terms, and the land thus occupied was called *trientabulus* because it was given in lieu of a third part of their loan.<sup>10</sup>

XIV. *Philip's Activity in Greece. Commencement of the War.*—After the recital of the customary prayers in the Capitol P. Sulpicius was invested by his lictors with the paludamentum<sup>11</sup> and left the City for Brundisium. Here he incorporated into his legions the veterans who had volunteered out of the African army, and also selected the vessels out of the fleet under Cn. Cornelius. Then he set sail, and the next day he landed in Greece.

Here he was met by an embassy from Athens who begged him to raise the siege which that city was undergoing. C. Claudius Cento was at once despatched thither with 20 warships and 1000 men. The king was not personally directing the siege, he was just then attacking Abydos, after trying his strength in naval encounters with the Rhodians and with Attalus, and in neither battle had he been successful. But his was not a nature to accept defeat quietly, and now that he had leagued himself with Antiochus, king of Syria, he was more determined on war than ever. They had agreed to divide the rich kingdom of Egypt between them, and on hearing of the death of Ptolemy they both prepared to attack it.

The Athenians, who retain nothing of their ancient greatness but their pride, had become involved in hostilities with Philip through a quite unimportant incident. During the celebration of the Eleusinian Mysteries two young Acarnanians who had not been initiated entered the temple of Ceres with the rest of the crowd, quite unaware of the sacrilegious nature of their action. They were betrayed by the silly questions which they

asked, and were brought before the temple authorities. Though it was quite evident that they had sinned in ignorance, they were put to death as though guilty of a horrible crime. The Acarnanians reported this hostile and barbarous act to Philip and obtained his consent to their making war on Athens supported by a Macedonian contingent.

Their army began by laying the land of Attica waste with fire and sword, after which they returned to Acarnania with plunder of every description. So far there was only anger and exasperation on both sides, subsequently, by a decree of the citizens, Athens made a formal declaration of war. For when King Attalus and the Rhodians who were following up Philip in his retreat to Macedonia had reached Aegina, the king sailed across to the Piraeus for the purpose of renewing and confirming his alliance with the Athenians. The whole body of the citizens came out to meet him with their wives and children; the priests in their sacred robes received him as he entered the city; even the gods themselves were almost summoned from their shrines to welcome him.

XV. The people were at once summoned to an assembly, in order that the king might lay his wishes before them. It was, however, thought to be more in accordance with his dignity that he should put what he wanted into writing, rather than let his blushes be called up by having to recount his services to the city or his modesty be shocked by the fulsome flattery of the applauding crowd. Accordingly he drew up a written statement which was read in the assembly, in which he enumerated the benefits he had conferred on their city and described his contest with Philip, and urged them in conclusion to take their part in the war while they had him and the Rhodians and, now especially, the Romans to support them. If they hung back now they would never have such an opportunity again.

Then the envoys from Rhodes were heard; they had quite lately done a good turn for the Athenians, for they had recaptured and sent back to Athens four Athenian warships which the Macedonians had taken.

War against Philip was unanimously decided upon. Extraordinary honours were paid to King Attalus and also to the Rhodians. A proposal was carried to add to the old ten tribes a new one to be called the Attalis tribe. The people of Rhodes were presented with a golden crown in recognition of their



bravery, and the full citizenship was granted to them just as they had previously granted it to the Athenians.

After this Attalus rejoined his fleet at Aegina and the Rhodians sailed to Cia, and from there made their way home through the Cyclades. All the islands joined them with the exception of Andros, Paros and Cythnos which were held by Macedonian garrisons. Attalus had sent messengers to Aetolia and was waiting for the envoys who were coming from there; their non-arrival kept him inactive for some time. He could not induce the Aetolians to take up arms, they were only too glad to remain at peace with Philip on any terms. But had he in conjunction with the Rhodians vigorously opposed Philip, they might have won the glorious title of Liberators of Greece. Instead of this, they allowed him to cross the Hellespont a second time and seize an excellent position in Thrace where he could concentrate his forces, and thus they gave fresh life to the war and surrendered the glory of bringing it to a close to the Romans.

XVI. *Philip's Successes in Thrace and on the Hellespont.*—Philip showed a more kingly spirit. Though he had not held his own against Attalus and the Rhodians he was not alarmed even at the prospect of a war with Rome. Philocles, one of his generals, was sent with a force of 2000 infantry and 200 cavalry to ravage the lands of the Athenians, and Heraclides was placed in charge of the fleet, with instructions to sail for Maronea. Philip himself marched thither overland with 2000 men in light marching order, and took the place at the first assault. Aenos gave him a good deal of trouble, but he finally effected its capture through the treachery of Callimedes, who was holding the place for Ptolemy. Cypsela, Doriscos and Serrheum were taken in rapid succession and he then advanced to the Chersonese where Elacus and Alopeconnesus voluntarily surrendered. Callipolis and Madytos fell through treachery together with some other unimportant fortified places. The people of Abydos would not even admit his envoys and closed their gates against the king. The siege of this place detained Philip for a considerable time, and if Attalus and the Rhodians had shown the smallest energy they might have saved the place. Attalus sent only 300 men to assist in the defence and the Rhodians despatched one quadrireme out of their fleet which was lying at anchor off Tenedos. Later on, when they could hardly hold out any longer, Attalus himself sailed to Tenedos,

and after raising their hopes by his approach did not afford his allies any assistance either by land or sea.

XVII. The Abydenes in the first instance placed engines all along their walls and in this way not only prevented any approach by land, but also made the anchorage of the hostile ships unsafe. When, however, a portion of the wall was battered into ruins and the enemies' mines had been carried up to an inner wall which the defenders had hastily constructed, they sent envoys to the king to arrange terms for the surrender of the city. They proposed that the Rhodian quadrireme with its crew and the contingent which Attalus had sent should be allowed to depart and that the inhabitants should be permitted to leave the city with simply the clothes they were wearing. Philip replied that there was not the slightest hope of peace unless they surrendered unconditionally. When this reply was brought back it created such an outburst of indignation and rage that the citizens formed the same frenzied resolution as the Saguntines had done in former years.<sup>12</sup> They gave orders for all the matrons to be shut up in the temple of Diana, the freeborn boys and girls, even infants with their nurses to be collected in the gymnasium, all gold and silver to be taken to the forum, all costly apparel to be placed on board the vessels from Rhodes and Cyzicus which were lying in the harbour, and altars set up in the middle of the city, round which the priests were to be assembled with victims for sacrifice. Here a body of men, selected for the purpose, took an oath dictated to them by the priests, to carry out the desperate measure which had been decided upon. As soon as they saw that their comrades who were fighting in front of the levelled wall were all killed, they were to put the wives and children to death, throw the gold and silver and the apparel on board the ships into the sea and set fire wherever they possibly could to all the public buildings and private houses, and the most horrible curses were invoked on them if they broke their oath. Following them, all the men of military age solemnly swore that none should leave the battle alive, except as victor. So faithful were they to their oath and with such desperation did they fight, that before night could put an end to the battle, Philip withdrew from the conflict appalled by their frenzied courage.

The leading citizens, to whom the more cruel part had been assigned, finding that there were only a few survivors, and they

wounded and exhausted, sent the priests, wearing supplicatory fillets, as soon as it was light to Philip to make a surrender of the city.

XVIII. Before the surrender actually took place, the Roman envoys who had been sent to Alexandria heard of the siege of Abydos, and the youngest of the three, M. Aemilius, went at the suggestion of his colleagues to Philip. He remonstrated against the war that had been made on Attalus and the Rhodians, and especially against the attack on Abydos. On the king replying that Attalus and the Rhodians had been the aggressors he asked, "Were the people of Abydos also the first to take up arms?" To one who seldom heard the truth this language seemed too bold to address to a king. "Your youth, your good looks and, above all, the fact of your being a Roman make you too venturesome. It is my wish that you should remember treaty obligations and keep the peace with me, but if you begin the attack, I too am quite ready to fight, and you will find the kingdom and name of Macedon no less renowned in war than those of Rome."<sup>13</sup>

After dismissing thus the envoy Philip took possession of the gold and silver which had been collected, but he lost all chance of making prisoners. For such a madness fell on the people that they believed that all who had met their death in battle had been suddenly betrayed, and they accused one another of perjury, especially the priests, for they were surrendering to the enemy those whom they had devoted to death. Seized by one sudden impulse they all rushed off to kill their wives and children, and then they inflicted death upon themselves in every possible form. The king was utterly astounded at this outburst of madness and called off his men from the assault, telling them that he would allow the people of Abydos three days in which to die. During this interval the vanquished wrought more horrors upon themselves than the victors would have done, however infuriated they might have been. Not a single man fell into the hands of the enemy alive, save those for whom chains or some other cause beyond their control made death impossible.

After leaving a force in occupation of Abydos, Philip returned to his kingdom. As the destruction of Saguntum strengthened Hannibal's resolve to war against Rome, so the fall of Abydos encouraged Philip to do the same. On his way he was met by couriers who announced that the consul was now in Epirus

and was wintering his troops in Apollonia and his naval force at Corcyra.

XIX. *The Legation to Africa*.—The envoys who had been sent to Africa to report the action of Hamilcar in assuming the leadership of the Gauls were informed by the Carthaginian government that they could do nothing more than sentence him to banishment and confiscate his property; all the refugees and deserters whom after careful search they had been able to discover had been given up, and they intended to send envoys to Rome to give satisfactory assurances on this point. They sent 200,000 *modii* of wheat to Rome and a similar amount to the army in Macedonia.

From Carthage the legates proceeded to Numidia to visit the two kings. The presents destined for Masinissa were given to him and the message delivered from the senate. He offered to furnish 2000 horse, but only 1000 were accepted, and he personally superintended their embarkation. With them he sent to Macedonia 2,000,000 *modii* of wheat and the same quantity of barley.

The third mission was to Vermina. He came to meet them at the frontier of his kingdom and left it to them to put in writing what conditions of peace they wanted, assuring them that any peace with Rome he should look upon as fair and advantageous. The terms were handed to him, and he was instructed to send commissioners to Rome to obtain their ratification.

XX. *L. Cornelius Lentulus*.—About this time L. Cornelius Lentulus returned from Spain where he had been acting as proconsul. After giving a report of the successful operations which he had conducted there for several years, he asked to be allowed to enter the City in triumph. The senate were of opinion that his services quite deserved a triumph, but they reminded him that there was no precedent for a general who had not been Dictator or consul or praetor enjoying a triumph, and he had held his command in Spain as proconsul, not as consul or praetor. However, they went so far as to allow him to enter the City in ovation,<sup>14</sup> in spite of the opposition of Tiberius Sempronius Longus, one of the tribunes of the plebs, who said that there was no precedent or customary authority for that any more than for the other. In the end he gave way before the unanimous feeling of the senate, and after they had passed their resolution, Lentulus enjoyed his ovation. 43,000

pounds of silver and 2450 pounds of gold, captured from the enemy, were carried in the procession. Out of the spoil he distributed 120 ases to each of his men.

XXI. *Defeat of the Gauls.*—By this time the consular army in Gaul had been transferred from Arretium to Ariminum, and the 5000 men of the Latin contingent had moved from Gaul into Etruria. L. Furius accordingly left Ariminum and hastened by forced marches to Cremona which the Gauls were at the time besieging. He fixed his camp a mile and a half distant from the enemy and would have had a chance of winning a brilliant victory if he had led his men straight from their march against the Gaulish camp. The Gauls were scattered over the fields in all directions and the camp had been left insufficiently guarded. But he was afraid that his men would be too much fatigued after their rapid march, and the shouts of the Gauls recalled their comrades, who, leaving the plunder which they had gathered behind, ran back to their camp.

The next day they marched out to battle. The Romans were not slow in accepting the challenge, but they had hardly time to complete their formation, so rapidly did the enemy come on. Furius had formed the allied troops into two divisions, and the right division was stationed in the first line, the two Roman legions forming the reserve.<sup>15</sup> M. Furius was in command of this division, M. Caecilius commanded the legions and L. Valerius Flaccus the cavalry. These were all staff-officers. The praetor kept two of his staff with him—C. Laetorius and P. Titinius—to assist him in surveying the field and meeting any sudden attempt of the enemy.

At first the Gauls brought their whole strength to bear in one direction, hoping to be able to overwhelm the right wing and smash it up. Failing in this, they endeavoured to work round the flanks and envelop the enemy's line, which, considering their numbers and the fewness of their opponents, seemed an easy task. When the praetor saw this manœuvre he extended his front by bringing up the two legions in reserve to the right and left of the allied troops, and he also vowed a temple to *Diovis*,<sup>16</sup> in case he routed the enemy that day. He then ordered L. Valerius to launch the Roman cavalry against one wing of the Gauls and the allied cavalry against the other to check the enveloping movement. As soon as he saw that the Gauls had weakened their centre by diverting troops to the wings, he ordered his infantry to advance in close order

at the charge and break through the opposing ranks. This was decisive; the wings were repulsed by the cavalry and the centre by the infantry. As they were being cut down in all parts of the field, the Gauls turned, and in wild flight sought shelter in their camp. The cavalry followed in hot pursuit and the infantry soon came up and attacked the camp. Not 6000 men succeeded in making their escape; more than 35,000 were killed or made prisoners; 70 standards were taken together with 200 Gaulish carts loaded with spoil.

The Carthaginian general Hamilcar fell in that battle as well as three Gaulish nobles who were in command. 2000 men whom the Gauls had taken at Placentia were set at liberty and restored to their homes.

XXII. It was a great victory and caused great joy in Rome. When the despatch arrived a three days' thanksgiving was decreed. The Romans and allies lost 2000 men, mostly belonging to the right division against which the enormous mass of the enemy made their first attack.

Although the praetor had practically brought the war to a close, the consul C. Aurelius after finishing the necessary business in Rome proceeded to Gaul and took over the victorious army from the praetor.

*Events in Greece.*—The other consul reached his province quite late in the autumn and wintered in the neighbourhood of Apollonia. As stated above, C. Claudius was sent to Athens with twenty triremes out of the fleet which was laid up at Corcyra. When they entered the Piraeus they brought great comfort and hope to their allies who were now in a state of great despondency. The depredations committed on their fields by the troops at Corinth, who came through Megara, now ceased, and the pirates from Chalcis who had infested the sea and harried the maritime districts of Athens no longer ventured beyond Sunium and in fact would not trust themselves outside the Euripus. In addition to the Roman ships there were three quadriremes from Rhodes and three Athenian undecked vessels which had been fitted out to protect their coast. As a chance of an important success offered itself to C. Claudius he thought that it would be sufficient for the present if this fleet protected the city and territory of Athens.

XXIII. Some refugees from Chalcis who had been expelled by the king's adherents reported that the place could be seized without any serious resistance, for as there was no enemy to be

feared in the neighbourhood the Macedonians were strolling about everywhere, and the townsmen, trusting to the Macedonians for protection, made no attempt to guard the city. On this information C. Claudius proceeded to Chalcis, and although he reached Sunium early enough to allow of his entering the strait of Euboea the same day, he kept his fleet at anchor till nightfall that his approach might not be observed.

As soon as it was dark he sailed on over a calm sea and reached Chalcis a little before dawn. He selected the least populous part of the city for his attempt, and finding the guards at some points asleep and other places without any guard at all, he directed a small body of soldiers to place their scaling-ladders against the nearest tower, which was taken with the wall on either side of it. Then they advanced along the wall to where the buildings were numerous, killing the guards on their way, till they reached the gate which they broke down and so admitted the main body of troops. Dispersing in all directions they filled the city with tumult, and, to add to the confusion, the buildings round the forum were set on fire. They burnt the king's granaries and the arsenal with an immense number of military engines and artillery. This was followed by an indiscriminate slaughter of those who offered resistance and those who tried to escape, and at last every man capable of bearing arms was either killed or put to flight. Amongst the former was Sopater, an Acarnanian, the commandant of the garrison. All the plunder was collected in the forum and then placed on board the ships. The gaol too was broken open by the Rhodians, and the prisoners of war whom Philip had immured there as being the safest place of custody were released. After the statues of the king had been thrown down and mutilated the signal for embarkation was given, and they sailed back to the Piræus.

Had there been a sufficient force of Roman soldiery to allow of Chalcis being occupied without interfering with the protection of Athens, Chalcis and the Euripus would have been wrested from the king; a most important success at the very outset of the war. For the Euripus is the key to Greece by sea as the pass of Thermopylae is by land.

XXIV. Philip was in Demetrias at the time. When the disaster that had overtaken a friendly city was announced to him, he determined, as he was too late to save it, to do the next best thing and avenge it. With a force of 5000 infantry in light

marching order and 300 cavalry he went almost at a run to Chalcis, not for a moment doubting that he would be able to take the Romans by surprise. Finding that there was nothing to see but the uninviting spectacle of a smoking and ruined city in which hardly enough men were left to bury the victims of the war, he hurried away at the same speed and crossing the Euripus by the bridge marched through Boeotia to Athens, thinking that as he had shown as much enterprise as the Romans he would have the same success. And he would have had, if a scout had not observed the king's army on the march from a watch-tower. This man was what the Greeks call a *hemero-dromos*, because these men cover enormous distances in a single day, and running on in advance he reached Athens at midnight. Here there was the same somnolence and negligence which had brought about the loss of Chalcis a few days before. Roused by the breathless messenger, the Athenian commander-in-chief and Dioxippus the prefect of the cohort of mercenaries mustered their soldiers in the forum and ordered the trumpets to sound the alarm from the citadel so that all might know that the enemy was at hand. There was a general rush to the gates and the walls.

Some hours later, though considerably before daybreak, Philip approached the city. When he saw the numerous lights and heard the noise of men hurrying to and fro in the inevitable confusion, he halted his force and ordered them to lie down and rest. As his attempt at a surprise had failed he prepared for an open assault and made his advance on the side of the Dipylon.<sup>17</sup> This gate, placed as a mouth to the city, is considerably larger and wider than the rest, and the road on both sides of it is broad, so that the townsmen were able to form their line right up to it from the forum, whilst the road beyond it stretching for about a mile as far as the Academy allowed plenty of room for the infantry and cavalry of the enemy. After forming their line inside the gate, the Athenians, together with the detachment which Attalus had left and Dioxippus' cohort, sallied forth. As soon as he saw them Philip thought he had them in his power and would be able to satisfy his long-cherished desire for their destruction, for there was not one of the Greek States that he was more furious against than he was against Athens.

After exhorting his men to keep their eyes on him as they fought and to remember that where the king was, there the



standards and the fighting line ought to be, he put spurs to his horse, animated not only by raging anger but also by a love of ostentation. He thought it a splendid thing to be seen fighting by the immense crowd who thronged the walls to view the spectacle. Galloping forward in front of his lines with a few horsemen he charged into the middle of the enemy and created as much alarm amongst them as he inspired his own men with enthusiasm. Many he wounded at close quarters, others by the missiles he flung, and he drove them back to their gate where he inflicted greater losses as they crowded through the confined space. Recklessly as he pursued them, he was still able to draw off in safety because those who were on the turrets of the gate forbore to throw their javelins for fear of hitting their own comrades who were mixed up with the enemy.

After this the Athenians kept within their walls, and Philip after giving the signal for retirement fixed his camp at Cynosarges where there was a temple of Hercules and a gymnasium with a grove round it. But Cynosarges and the Lyceum and every sacred and delightful place round the city was burnt. Not only were buildings destroyed but even the tombs, nothing belonging to either gods or men was spared in his uncontrollable fury.

XXV. The following day the closed gates were suddenly thrown open to admit a body of troops sent by Attalus and the Romans from the Piraeus. The king now removed his camp to a distance of about three miles from the city. From there he marched to Eleusis in the hope of securing by a *coup-de-main* the temple of the fort which surrounded it and protected it on all sides. When, however, he found that the defenders were quite on the alert, and that the fleet was on its way from the Piraeus to render assistance, he abandoned his project and marched to Megara, and then straight to Corinth. On learning that the Council of the Achaeans was sitting at Argos he made his appearance in the assembly quite unexpectedly. They were at the time discussing the question of war with Nabis, tyrant of the Lacedaemonians. When the supreme command was transferred from Philopoemen to Cyliades, who was by no means his equal as a general, Nabis, finding that the Achaeans had dismissed their mercenaries, resumed hostilities, and after devastating his neighbours' fields was now threatening their cities. To oppose this enemy the council were deliberating as to what proportion of troops should be furnished by each State.

Philip promised to relieve them from all anxiety so far as Nabis and the Lacedaemonians were concerned; he would not only protect the soil of his allies from their ravages, but he would at once roll back all the terror of war upon Laconia itself by marching his army thither. When these words were greeted with loud applause he went on to say, "If, however, your interests are to be protected by my arms it is only fair that my own should not be left undefended. Furnish me then, if you approve, with such a force as shall suffice to garrison Oreus, Chalcis and Corinth, so that with all safe in my rear I may make war upon Nabis and the Lacedaemonians free from misgivings."

The Achaeans were not slow to detect his motive in making such a generous promise and offering aid against the Lacedaemonians. They saw that his real aim was to draw the fighting strength of the Achaeans out of the Peloponnese as hostages and so bind the nation to a war with Rome. Cycliades, seeing that further argument would be irrelevant, simply observed that the laws of the Achaeans did not allow discussion on any matters other than those which the council had been convened to consider. After a decree had been passed for raising an army to act against Nabis, he dismissed the council over which he had presided with courage and independence. Before that day he had been looked upon as a strong supporter of the king. Philip, whose high hopes were thus suddenly dashed, succeeded in enlisting a few volunteers, after which he returned to Corinth and from there to Attica.

XXVI. During the time that Philip was in Achaia, Philocles, one of his generals, started from Euboea with 2000 Thracians and Macedonians for the purpose of ravaging the Athenian territory. He crossed the forest of Cithaeron in the neighbourhood of Eleusis, and there he divided his forces. Half were sent forward to harry and plunder the fields in all directions, the other half he concealed in a position suitable for an ambuscade so that if an attack were made from the fort at Eleusis upon his plunderers he might take the assailants by surprise. His ruse, however, was detected, so he recalled the scattered pillagers and made a regular attack upon the fort. After a fruitless attempt in which many of his men were wounded he retired and joined forces with Philip who was on his way from Achaia. The king himself made an attempt on the same fort, but the arrival of the Roman ships from the Piraeus and

the presence of a reinforcement which had been thrown into the place compelled him to abandon the undertaking. He then sent Philocles with a part of his army to Athens, and with the rest he proceeded to the Piraeus in order that while Philocles kept the Athenians within their city by approaching the walls and threatening an assault, he might seize the opportunity of storming the Piraeus whilst it was left with a feeble guard. But the assault on the Piraeus proved to be quite as difficult as the one on Eleusis, as practically the same troops defended both. Leaving the Piraeus he hurried up to Athens. Here a force of infantry and cavalry from the city attacked him within the dilapidated Long Walls which connect the Piraeus with Athens<sup>18</sup> and he was repulsed. Seeing that any attempt on the city was hopeless he divided his army with Philocles and set himself to complete the devastation of the country. His former work of destruction had been confined mainly to the sepulchres round the city; now he determined to leave nothing free from profanation and gave orders for the temples which the people had consecrated in every deme to be destroyed and set on fire. The land of Attica was famous for that class of building as well as for the abundance of native marble and the genius of its architects, and therefore it afforded abundant material for this destructive fury. He was not satisfied with overthrowing the temples with their statues, he even ordered the blocks of stone to be broken in pieces lest if they retained their shape they might form imposing ruins. When there was nothing left on which his rage, still insatiate, could wreak itself he left the enemy's territories for Boeotia and did nothing more worth mentioning in Greece.

XXVII. *The Consul's successful Campaign.*—The consul Sulpicius was at the time encamped by the river Apsus in a position lying between Apollonia and Dyrrhachium. He recalled L. Apustius and sent him with a portion of his force to ravage the enemy's frontiers. After devastating the borders of Macedon and capturing at the first assault the fortified posts of Corrhagum, Gerrunium and Orgessus, Apustius came to Antipatrea, a place situated in a gorge between two mountain ranges. He first invited the chief men of the city to a conference, and tried to persuade them to trust themselves to the Romans. Confident in the size of their city, its fortifications, and its strong position, they treated his overtures with contempt. He then resorted to force and carried the place by

assault. After putting the adult males to death and allowing the soldiers to appropriate all the plunder he levelled the walls and burnt the city. Fear of similar treatment brought about the surrender of Codrion—a fairly strong and fortified town—without offering any resistance. A detachment was left there to garrison the place, and Cnidus—a name better known as that of a city in Asia—was taken by storm. As Apustius was on his way back to the consul with a considerable amount of plunder he was attacked during his passage of the river by Athenagoras, one of the king's prefects, and his rear was thrown into confusion. On hearing the shouting and tumult he galloped back, made his men face about and throw their kits into the centre of the column, and formed his line. The king's soldiers did not stand the charge of the Romans, many were killed and more taken prisoners. Apustius brought back his army safely to the consul, and was at once sent off to rejoin the fleet.

XXVIII. As the commencement of the war was marked by this successful expedition, various princes and leading men from the countries bordering on Macedonia visited the Roman camp; amongst them Pleuratus, the son of Scerdilaedus, Amynder, king of the Athamanians, and Bato, the son of Longarus, who represented the Dardanians. Longarus had been warring on his own account with Demetrius, Philip's father. In reply to their offers of help the consul said that he would avail himself of the services of the Dardanians and of Pleuratus when he led his army into Macedonia. With Amynder he arranged that he should induce the Aetolians to take part in the war. Envoys from Attalus had also come, and he instructed them to ask the king to meet the Roman fleet at Aegina where it was wintering and in conjunction with it to harass Philip, as he had previously done, by naval operations. Emissaries were also sent to the Rhodians urging them to take their share in the war.

Philip, who had now arrived in Macedonia, showed no less energy in making preparations for the war. His son Perseus, a mere boy, to whom he had assigned some members of his council to direct and advise him, was sent to hold the pass which leads to Pelagonia. Sciathos and Peparthos, cities of some importance, were destroyed that they might not enrich the hostile fleet with plunder. He sent envoys to the Aetolians to prevent that people, excited at the arrival of the Romans, from breaking faith with him.

XXIX. *Discussion in the Aetolian Council.*—The meeting of the Aetolian League which they call the Pan-Aetolium was to be held on a certain day. The king's envoys hastened their journey in order to be in time for it, and Lucius Furius Purpurio was also present as representing the consul, as was also a deputation from Athens.

The Macedonians were allowed to speak first, as the treaty with them was the latest that had been made. They said that as no new circumstances had arisen they had nothing new to urge in support of the existing treaty. The Aetolians, having learnt by experience how little they had to gain by alliance with the Romans, had made peace with Philip, and they were bound to keep it now that it was made. "Would you prefer," asked one of the envoys, "to copy the unscrupulousness—or shall I call it the levity?—of the Romans? When your ambassadors were in Rome, the reply they received was 'Why do you come to us, Aetolians, after you have made peace with Philip without our consent?' And now the very same men insist upon your joining them in war against Philip. Formerly they pretended that they had taken up arms against him on your account and for your protection, now they forbid you to be at peace with Philip. In the first Punic war they went to Sicily, ostensibly to help Messana; in the second, to deliver Syracuse from Carthaginian tyranny and restore her freedom. Now Messana and Syracuse and in fact the whole of Sicily are tributary to them; they have reduced the island to a province in which they exercise absolute power of life and death. You imagine, I suppose, that the Sicilians enjoy the same rights as you, and that as you hold your council at Naupactus under your own laws, presided over by magistrates of your own choice, and with full power of forming alliances or declaring war as you please, so it is with the councils which meet in the cities of Sicily, in Syracuse or Messana or Lilybaeum. No: a Roman governor manages their meetings; it is at his summons that they have to assemble; they see him issuing his edicts from his lofty tribunal like a despot, and surrounded by his lictors; his backs are threatened with the rod, their necks with the axe, and every year they have a different master allotted them. Nor ought they, nor can they wonder at this when they see the cities of Italy, such as Regium, Tarentum and Capua, lying prostrate beneath the same tyranny, to say nothing of those close to Rome out of whose ruin she has grown to greatness.

Capua does indeed survive as the sepulchre and memorial of the Campanian nation, the people themselves are either dead and buried, or else cast forth as exiles. It is a headless and limbless city without a senate, without a plebs, without magistrates, an unnatural portent in the land. To leave it as a habitation for men was an act of greater cruelty than its utter destruction would have been. If men of an alien race, separated from you more widely by language, customs and laws than by intervening sea and land, obtain a hold here, it is folly and madness to hope that anything will remain as it is now.

"You think that Philip's sovereignty is a danger to your liberty. It was your own doing that he took up arms against you, and his sole aim was to have a settled peace with you. All that he asks to-day is that you will keep that peace unbroken. Once make foreign legions familiar with these shores and bow your necks to the yoke, then you will seek in vain and too late for Philip's support as your ally; you will have the Romans for your masters. Aetolians, Acarnanians, Macedonians are united and disunited by slight and purely temporary causes; with foreigners and barbarians, all Greeks ever have been and ever will be at war. For they are our enemies by nature, and nature is unchanging; their hostility is not due to causes which vary from day to day.

"But I will end where I began. Three years ago you decided on this very spot to make peace with Philip. You are the same men that you were then, he is the same that he was, the Romans who were opposed to it then are just those who want to upset it now. Fortune has altered nothing, I do not see why you should alter your minds."

XXX. The Macedonians were followed, at the instance of the Romans, by the Athenians, who after the shocking way they had been treated, had every justification for protesting against Philip's barbarous cruelty. They mourned over the piteous devastation and pillaging of their fields, but it was not because they had suffered hostile treatment from an enemy that they complained. There were certain rights of war which could be justly exercised and therefore must be justly submitted to; the burning of crops, the destruction of dwellings, the carrying off of men and cattle as plunder, cause suffering to those who endure them, but are not felt to be an indignity. What they did complain of was that the man who called the Romans foreigners and barbarians had so completely outraged all law,

human and divine, that in his first ravages he made impious war upon the infernal deities, and in his subsequent ones he defied the powers above. All the sepulchres and monuments within their borders were destroyed, the dead in all their graves laid bare, their bones no longer covered by the earth. There were shrines which their ancestors in the day when they dwelt in separate demes had consecrated in their little fortified posts and villages, and which even when they had been enrolled as citizens of one city they did not abandon or neglect. All these temples Philip had enveloped in sacrilegious flames, the images of their gods, blackened, burnt, mutilated, were lying among the prostrate pillars of their temples. What he had made the land of Attica, once so fair in its beauty and its wealth, such, if he were allowed, would he make Aetolia and the whole of Greece. Even Athens itself would have been similarly disfigured if the Romans had not come to the rescue, for the same impious rage was driving him to attack the gods who dwell in the city, Minerva the protectress of the citadel, the Ceres of Eleusis and the Jupiter and Minerva of the Piraeus. But he had been repulsed by force of arms, not only from their temples, but even from the walls of the city, and had turned his savage fury against those shrines whose sanctity was their only protection. They closed with an earnest appeal to the Aetolians that they would out of compassion to the Athenians take part in the war, under the leadership of the immortal gods and of the Romans who next to the gods possessed the greatest power and might.

XXXI. Then the Roman legate spoke as follows: "The Macedonians and then the Athenians have compelled me to alter entirely the address I was going to make. I came to protest against Philip's wrongful action against all those cities of our allies, but the Macedonians by the charges they have brought against Rome have made me a defendant rather than an accuser. The Athenians, again, by their recital of his impious and inhuman crimes against the gods above and those below, have left nothing more for me or for any one else to bring up against him. Consider that the same things have been said by the inhabitants of Chios and Abydos, by the Aeneans, the Maronites, the Thasians, by the natives of Paros and Samos, of Larissa and Messene, and by the people over there in Achaia, and that those upon whom he was able to inflict most injury have made the gravest and most serious charges.

“As to those actions which he has brought up against us as crimes, I frankly admit that if they do not deserve praise they cannot be defended. He mentioned, as instances, Regium, Capua and Syracuse. In the case of Regium, the inhabitants themselves begged us during the war with Pyrrhus to send a legion for their protection, and the soldiers, forming a criminal conspiracy, took forcible possession of the town which they were sent to defend. Did we therefore approve their action? Did we not on the contrary take military measures against the criminals, and when we had them within our power did we not compel them to make satisfaction to our allies by scourgings and executions, and then did we not restore to the Regians their city, their lands and all their possessions, together with their liberty and their laws? As to Syracuse, when it was oppressed by foreign tyrants—a still greater indignity—we came to its help and spent three weary years in making attacks by sea and land upon its almost impregnable fortifications. And though the Syracusans themselves would rather have remained under that servile tyranny than let their city be taken by us, we captured it, and the same arms which effected its capture won and secured its freedom. At the same time we do not deny that Sicily is one of our provinces, and the communities which took the side of the Carthaginians and in full sympathy with them urged war against us are now tributary, and pay us the tenth of all their produce. We do not deny this; on the contrary we with you and the whole world know that each has been treated in accordance with its deserts. It was the same with Capua. Do you suppose that we regret the punishment meted out to the Capuans, a punishment which they themselves cannot make a ground of complaint? It was on their behalf that we remained at war with the Samnites for nearly seventy years, during which time we suffered severe defeats; we were united with them by treaty, then by intermarriage, and at last by common citizenship. And yet these men were the first of all the Italian nationalities to take advantage of our difficulties and revolt to Hannibal after massacring our garrison, and then in revenge for our besieging them sent him to attack Rome. If neither their city nor a single inhabitant had survived, who could feel any indignation at their fate or charge us with having adopted harsher measures than they deserved? Those whom a consciousness of guilt drove to suicide were more numerous than those who were punished by us,



and though we deprived the survivors of their city and territory we gave them land and a place to dwell in. The city itself had not injured us, and we left it standing uninjured, so much so that any one who sees it to-day would find no trace of its having been stormed and captured.

“But why do I speak of Capua when even to conquered Carthage we have given peace and liberty? The danger is rather that by showing too much leniency to the conquered we should incite them all the more to try the fortune of war against us.

“So much in defence of our conduct. With respect to the charges against Philip—the bloodshed in his own family, the murders of his kinsmen and friends, his lust almost more inhuman than his cruelty—you who live nearest to Macedonia know most about them. As regards you Aetolians, it was on your behalf that we undertook war against him; you made peace with him without any reference to us. Perhaps you will say that as we were fully occupied with the Punic War, you were compelled to accept terms of peace from the man whose power was at that time in the ascendant, to which we should reply that it was only after you had laid aside hostilities that we too abandoned them, as greater matters claimed our attention. Now, however, that through the favour of the gods the Punic War is over, we have thrown our whole strength on Macedonia and the opportunity offers itself for you to regain our friendship and support, unless indeed you prefer to perish with Philip rather than conquer with the Romans.”

XXXII. At the conclusion of this speech the unanimous feeling was in favour of the Romans. Damocritus, the chief magistrate of the Aetolians, who was currently reported to have been bribed by the king, refused to support either side. “In a matter of such serious consequence,” he said, “nothing is so fatal to wise counsels as doing things in a hurry. This is followed by quick repentance which, however, is too late, and quite unavailing; decisions hastily and precipitately formed cannot be recalled, nor can the mischief be undone.” He thought that an interval ought to be allowed for mature deliberation, and the time could be fixed there and then. As they were forbidden by law to discuss questions of peace and war anywhere but in the Pan-Aetolian Council, they ought at once to pass a decree exempting the chief magistrate from all penalties, if he summoned a council when he thought the time had come to submit the question of peace and war, and the decrees of that

council should have the same force and validity as though they had been passed in a regular Pan-Aetolian Council. After the matter was adjourned the envoys were dismissed, and Damocritus said that the decision come to was in the highest degree favourable to the nation, for whichever side had the better fortune in the war, that side they would be able to join. Such were the proceedings in the Pan-Aetolian Council.

XXXIII. *Sulpicius' Operations against Philip.*—Philip was making vigorous preparations both by land and sea. He concentrated his naval strength at Demetrias in Thessaly, as he expected that Attalus and the Roman fleet would move from Aegina at the beginning of the spring. Heraclides was continued in command of the fleet and coast-line. The gathering of his land forces he conducted in person, encouraged by the belief that he had deprived the Romans of two important auxiliaries, the Aetolians on the one side and the Dardanians on the other, as the pass at Pelagonia was closed by his son Perseus.

By this time the consul was not preparing for war but actually engaged in it. He led his army through the country of the Dessaretii, and the corn which they had brought from their winter quarters they were carrying with them untouched, as the fields through which they marched supplied all that they wanted. Some of the towns and villages on his route surrendered voluntarily, others through fear, some were taken by storm, others were found to be abandoned, the inhabitants having fled to the neighbouring mountains. He formed a standing camp at Lyncus near the river Bevus, and from there he sent parties to collect corn from the granaries of the Dessaretii.

Philip saw that there was consternation everywhere and that the population were in a state of panic, but he did not know what part the consul was making for, and accordingly he sent a cavalry detachment to reconnoitre and find out in what direction the enemy were marching. The consul was equally in the dark, he knew that the king had moved out of his winter quarters, but was ignorant of his whereabouts, so he too sent out cavalry to reconnoitre. After each party had wandered for a considerable time along unknown roads amongst the Dessaretii, they at last took the same road. When the noise of men and horses was heard in the distance, they both became aware that an enemy was approaching. So before they came in sight of one another they put their horses and weapons in readiness, and as soon as they saw their enemy they charged.

They were not unfairly matched in numbers and courage, for each corps consisted of picked men, and for some hours they kept up an even fight, until the exhaustion of men and horses put a stop to the battle without either side gaining the victory. Forty of the Macedonians fell and thirty-five of the Romans. Neither side gained any information as to the whereabouts of their opponents' camp, which they could carry back either to the consul or to the king. This information was ultimately conveyed by deserters, a class of persons whom want of principle renders useful in all wars for finding out things about the enemy.

XXXIV. With the view of doing more to win the affections of his men and make them more ready to meet danger on his behalf, Philip paid special attention to the burial of the men who had fallen in the cavalry action and ordered the bodies to be brought into camp that all might see the honour paid to the dead. But nothing is so uncertain or so difficult to gauge as the temper of a mass of people. The very thing which was expected to make them keener to face any conflict only inspired them with hesitancy and fear. Philip's men had been accustomed to fighting with Greeks and Illyrians and had only seen wounds inflicted by javelins and arrows and in rare instances by lances. But when they saw bodies dismembered with the Spanish sword, arms cut off from the shoulder, heads struck off from the trunk, bowels exposed and other horrible wounds, they recognised the style of weapon and the kind of man against whom they had to fight, and a shudder of horror ran through the ranks. Even the king himself felt apprehensive, though he had not yet met the Romans in a pitched battle, and in order to augment his forces he recalled his son and the troops who were stationed in the Pelagonian pass, thus leaving the road open to Pleuratus and the Dardanians for the invasion of Macedonia.

He now advanced against the enemy with an army of 20,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry, and came to a hill near Athacus where he strongly entrenched himself about a mile from the Roman camp. It is said that as he looked down on it and gazed with admiration on the appearance of the camp as a whole and its various sections marked off by the rows of tents and the roads crossing each other, he exclaimed, "No one can possibly take that for a camp of barbarians."

For two whole days the king and the consul kept their

respective armies in camp, each waiting for the other to attack. On the third day the Roman general led out his whole force to battle.

XXXV. The king, however, was afraid of hazarding a general engagement so soon, and contented himself with sending forward a detachment of 400 Trallians—an Illyrian tribe, as we have explained above—and 300 Cretan infantry with an equal number of cavalry under Athenagoras, one of the nobles of his court, to challenge the enemies' cavalry. The Romans, whose main line was about half a mile distant, sent forward their velites and about two squadrons of cavalry, so that the number of their mounted and unmounted men was equal to that of the enemy.

The king's troops expected the style of fighting to be that with which they were familiar; the cavalry would make alternate charges and retirements, at one moment using their missiles, then galloping to the rear; the swift-footed Illyrians would be employed in sudden onsets and rushes; the Cretans would discharge their arrows on the enemy as he dashed forward to attack. But this order of combat was completely upset by the method of the Roman attack, which was as sustained as it was fierce. They fought as steadily as though it had been a regular engagement; the velites after discharging their javelins came to close quarters with their swords; the cavalry, when once they had reached the enemy, halted their horses and fought, some on horseback whilst others dismounted and took their places amongst the infantry. Under these conditions Philip's cavalry, unaccustomed to a stationary combat, were no match for the Roman horse, and his infantry, trained to skirmish in loose order and unprotected by armour, were at the mercy of the velites who with their swords and shields were equally prepared for defence and attack. Incapable of sustaining the conflict and trusting solely to their mobility they fled back to their camp.

XXXVI. After one day's interval the king decided to bring the whole of his cavalry and light-armed troops into action. During the night he concealed a body of caetrati,<sup>19</sup> whom they call peltasts, in a position between the two camps well adapted for an ambush, and instructed Athenagoras and his cavalry in case the main battle went favourably to push their advantage, but if not, to give ground slowly and draw the enemy to the place where the ambush was set. The cavalry did retire, but the officers of the corps of caetrati did not wait long enough

for the signal, and by sending their men forward before the right moment lost their chance of success. The Romans, victorious in the open battle and safe from the danger of ambuscade, returned to camp.

The next day the consul went out to battle with his whole force. In front of his line were posted some elephants which the Romans were using for the first time, having captured some in the Punic War. When he saw that the enemy were keeping quiet within their lines, he mounted some rising ground close to their rampart and taunted them with their timidity. Even then no chance of fighting was offered him, and as foraging was by no means safe while the camps were in such close proximity since Philip's cavalry would attack his men when they were dispersed amongst the fields, he shifted his camp to a place called Ottolobum, about eight miles off, to allow of his foraging more safely owing to the greater distance. As long as the Romans were cutting corn in the neighbourhood of their camp the king kept his men within their lines in order that the enemy might grow more venturesome and careless. When he saw them scattered far afield he set off with the whole of his cavalry and the Cretan auxiliaries at such a rapid pace that only the fleetest of the infantrymen could keep up with the troopers. On reaching a position between the foragers and their camp he divided his force. One division was sent in pursuit of the scattered foragers, with orders not to leave a single man alive; with the other he beset the various roads by which the enemy would have to return to their camp. Now men were fleeing and being cut down in all directions, and no one had yet reached the Roman camp with tidings of the disaster because those who fled thither fell into the hands of the king's troops who were waiting for them; more were killed by those who were blocking the roads than by those who had been sent in pursuit. At last some who had managed to elude the enemy brought, in their excitement, more confusion into the camp than definite information.

XXXVII. The consul ordered his cavalry to go wherever they could to the rescue of their comrades and at the same time led the legions out of the camp and marched in close order against the enemy.<sup>20</sup> Some of the cavalry lost their way in the fields owing to the various cries that were raised in different places, others came face to face with the enemy and fighting began at many points simultaneously. It was hottest where

the king's stationary troops were posted, for owing to their numbers, both horse and foot, they almost formed a regular army, and as they held the road most of the Romans encountered them. The Macedonians, too, had the advantage of the king's presence to encourage them, whilst the Cretan auxiliaries, in close order and prepared for fighting, made sudden onsets and wounded many of their opponents, who were dispersed without any order or formation. If they had kept their pursuit within bounds they would not only have come off with flying colours in the actual contest, but they would have gone far to influence the course of the war. As it was, they were carried away by thirst for blood and fell in with the advancing Roman cohorts and their military tribunes; the cavalry, too, as soon as they saw the standards of their comrades, turned their horses against the foe who was now in disorder, and in a moment the fortune of the day was reversed, those who had been the pursuers now turned and fled. Many were killed in hand-to-hand fighting, many whilst fleeing; they did not all perish by the sword, some were driven into bogs and were sucked down together with their horses in the bottomless mud. Even the king was in danger, for he was flung to earth by his wounded and maddened horse and all but overpowered as he lay. He owed his safety to a trooper who instantly leaped down and put the king on his own horse, but as he could not keep up on foot with the cavalry in their flight he was speared by the enemy, who had ridden up to where the king fell. Philip galloped round the swamp and made his way in headlong flight through paths and pathless places until he reached his camp in safety, where most of the men had given him up for lost.

Two hundred Macedonians perished in that battle, about a hundred prisoners were taken and eighty well-equipped horses were secured together with the spoils of their fallen riders.

XXXVIII. There have been some who blamed the king's rashness and the consul's want of energy on that day. They said that Philip ought to have remained quiet, for he knew that the enemy would in a few days have cleared all the country round of corn and would have come to the extremity of want. The consul, on the other hand, after routing the enemy's cavalry and light infantry and almost capturing the king himself, ought to have marched at once to the enemy's camp; the enemy were too much demoralised to make any stand and the war could have been finished in a moment. As in most cases, this was

easier to say than to do. Had the king engaged with the whole of his infantry it is possible that he might have lost his camp after they had been completely defeated and fled from the field to their camp, and then continued their flight as the enemy broke through their intrenchments. But as the infantry force in camp remained intact and the outposts and guards were all at their stations, what would the consul have gained beyond imitating the rashness of the king in his wild pursuit of the routed horses? Nor could any fault be found with the king in his plan of attacking the foragers whilst dispersed through the fields, had he been contented with that success. That he should have tempted fortune as he did is the less surprising since a report was current that Pleuratus and the Dardanians had already invaded Macedonia with an immense force. With this force assailing him in the rear he might well believe that the Romans would finish the war without striking a blow.

After the two unsuccessful cavalry actions Philip thought that he would be running considerable risk in remaining any longer in his standing camp. As he wanted to conceal his departure from the enemy he sent a flag of truce just after sunset to ask for an armistice for the purpose of burying the dead. Having thus deceived the enemy he marched out at the second watch in perfect silence, leaving numerous fires alight all through the camp.

XXXIX. The consul was resting when the news was brought to him of the arrival of the herald and the reason of his coming. All his reply was that an interview would be granted on the following morning. This was just what Philip wanted, as it gave him the night and a part of the following day in which to get the start of his opponent. He took the road over the mountains, which he knew that the Roman general would not attempt with his heavy column. At daybreak the consul granted the armistice and dismissed the herald and not long afterwards became aware that the enemy had disappeared. Not knowing in what direction to follow him he spent some days in camp, collecting corn. Then he marched to Stuberra and gathered out of Pelagonia the corn which was in the fields. From there he advanced to Pluinna without, so far, discovering the route which the enemy had taken.

Philip at first fixed his camp at Bryanum and then advancing by cross-roads created a sudden alarm amongst the enemy. The Romans in consequence left Pluinna and encamped by the

river Oshpagus. The king pitched his camp not far away by a river which the natives call Erigonus, and carried his intrenchment along the bank. Then, having definitely ascertained that the Romans intended to march to Eordaea, he determined to anticipate them and occupied a narrow pass with the object of making it impossible for the enemy to pass through it. He barricaded it in various ways, in some parts with rampart, in others with fosse, in other places with piled-up stones to serve as a wall, and elsewhere with tree-trunks as the nature of the ground or the materials allowed, until, as he believed, he had made a road which was naturally difficult, absolutely impassable by the obstacles which he had placed across every exit.

The country was mostly forest, difficult for troops to work in, especially for the Macedonian phalanx, for unless they can make a kind of *chevaux de frise* with the extraordinarily long spears which they hold in front of their shields—and this requires a free and open space—they are of no use whatever. The Thracians with their pikes, which were also of an enormous length, were hampered and obstructed by the branches on all sides. The Cretan cohort was the only one that was of any service, and this only to a very limited extent, for though when attacked by an unprotected horse and rider they could discharge their arrows with effect, there was not sufficient force in their missiles to penetrate the Roman shields nor was there any exposed part of the body at which they could take aim. Finding therefore that mode of attack useless, they pelted the enemy with the stones which were lying all over the ravine. This caused more noise than injury, but the drumming on their shields checked the advance of the Romans for a few minutes. They soon ceased to pay any attention to them, and some of them forming a shield-roof over their heads forced their way through the enemy in front, while others by making a short circuit gained the crest of the hill and drove the Macedonians from their posts of observation. Escape was almost impossible on such difficult ground, and the greater number were slain.

XL. Thus the pass was surmounted with less trouble than they had anticipated, and they entered the district of Eordaea. After ravaging the fields in all directions, the consul moved into Elimia. Here he made an attack on Orestis and approached the town of Celetrum. This was situated on a peninsula, the walls were surrounded by a lake and there was only one road to the



adjacent country over a narrow neck of land. At first the townsmen, relying upon their position, closed their gates and rejected the summons to surrender. When, however, they saw the standards advancing and the legions marching under their shield-roof up to the gate and the narrow neck of land covered by the hostile column, their hearts failed them and they surrendered without risking a battle. From Celctrum he advanced into Dassaretia and took the city of Pelion by assault. The slaves and the rest of the booty he carried off, but the free citizens he set at liberty without ransom, and he restored their town to them after placing a strong garrison in it. It was well adapted from its position to serve as a base for his operations against Macedonia.

After thus scouring the enemy's country, the consul returned to friendly territories and led his force back to Apollonia, which had been his starting-point for the campaign.

*Philip's Operations against the Aetolians and other Nationalities.*—Philip had been called away by the Aetolians, the Athamanians, the Dardanians and the numerous wars which had broken out in various quarters. The Dardanians were already retiring from Macedonia when he sent Athenagoras with the light infantry and the greater part of the cavalry to attack them from the rear as they retreated, and by harassing their rear make them less eager to send their armies away from home. As to the Aetolians, Damocritus their supreme magistrate, who had advised them at Naupactus to delay resolving upon war, had at their next meeting urged them strongly to take up arms after all that had happened—the cavalry action at Ottolabrum, the invasion of Macedonia by the Dardanians and Pleuratus in conjunction with the Illyrians, and especially the arrival of the Roman fleet at Oream and the certainty of Macedonia, beset by all those States, being blockaded at sea.

XLI. These considerations brought Damocritus and the Aetolians back to the side of the Romans, and in conjunction with Amynder king of the Athamanians they proceeded to invest Cercinium. The townsmen had closed their gates, whether spontaneously or under compulsion is not clear, as Philip's troops were holding the place. However, in a few days Cercinium was taken and burnt, and those who survived the wholesale slaughter, slaves and citizens alike, were carried off with the rest of the booty. Dread of a similar fate drove the inhabitants of all the cities round the Boeotia to abandon their homes

and take to the mountains. There being no further chance of plunder, the Aetolians left that part of the country and proceeded to go into Perrhaebia. Here they took Cyretiae by storm and ruthlessly sacked it. The population of Maloea surrendered voluntarily and were admitted into the Aetolian League.

Leaving Perrhaebia, Amynander advised them to attack Gomphi, as it was close to Athamania and there was every probability of its being carried without much fighting. The Aetolians, however, wanted plunder and made for the fertile plains of Thessaly. Amynander accompanied them, though he did not approve of the disorderly way in which they carried on their depredations nor of their careless method of pitching their camp on any chance ground without taking the trouble to select a good position or throw up proper intrenchments. He was afraid that their recklessness and carelessness might bring disaster to him and his men, and when he saw them fixing their camp on flat open ground below the hill on which the city of Phaeca stood, he took possession of some rising ground little more than a mile away which needed very slight fortifying to make it safe. Except that they continued their depredations the Aetolians seemed to have almost forgotten that they were in an enemy's country; some were roaming about unarmed, others were turning day into night with wine and sleep, leaving the camp altogether unguarded.

Suddenly, when no one expected him, Philip came on the scene. Some who rushed back from the fields announced his appearance, and Damocritus and the other generals were in dire consternation. It happened to be midday, when most of the soldiers were asleep after their heavy meal. Their officers roused them, ordered some to arm themselves and sent off others to recall the plundering parties dispersed over the fields. So great was the hurry and confusion that some of the cavalry went off without their swords and most of them had not put on their body-armour. Sent out thus hurriedly, barely amounting to 600 horse and foot, they met the king's cavalry, who were superior to them in numbers, equipment and *moral*. They were naturally routed at the first shock, and after showing hardly any fight, broke into a cowardly flight and made for their camp. Many whom the cavalry cut off from the main body of the fugitives were either killed or captured.

XLII. His men were already coming up to the enemy's

rampart when Philip ordered the retreat to be sounded, for horses and men alike were tired, not so much by fighting as by the length and extraordinary celerity of their march. Orders were given to the cavalry to get water and take their dinner, a troop at a time, and the light infantry to do the same, a maniple at a time; the others he kept in position under arms waiting for the main body of infantry, who owing to the weight of their armour had marched more slowly. When these arrived they were ordered to plant their standards and put their arms down in front of them and then take a hasty meal, while two or three at the most were sent from each company to fetch water. The cavalry and light infantry were in the meantime standing ready for instant action in case of any movement on the part of the enemy. By this time the crowds of Aetolians who had been dispersed in the fields had regained their camp, and troops were posted about the gates and rampart as though they were prepared to defend their lines. As long as they saw that the enemy were quiet and they felt safe, they were quite courageous, but as soon as the Macedonians got into motion and began to advance towards their camp fully prepared for battle, they all promptly deserted their posts and made their escape through the gate in the rear of the camp to the eminence on which the Athamanian camp stood. Philip felt quite certain that he could have deprived the Athamanians also of their camp, had sufficient light remained, but the day had been consumed, first in the battle and then in plundering the Aetolian camp. So he took up his position on the level ground near the hill, prepared to attack at dawn. But the Aetolians, who had not recovered from the panic in which they had abandoned their camp, fled in various directions during the night. Amynander proved of the greatest assistance to them; under his leading the Athamanians who were familiar with the paths over the mountain summits conducted them into Aetolia by ways unknown to the enemy who was following in pursuit. A few who had lost their way in the scattered flight fell into the hands of the cavalry whom Philip on finding that the camp was abandoned had sent to harass their retreat.

XLIII. Athenagoras, Philip's lieutenant, in the meanwhile caught up the Dardanians as they were retiring within their frontiers and created considerable confusion in the rear of their column. They faced about and formed in line of battle, and a regular engagement ensued in which neither side gained the

advantage. When the Dardanians began again to go forward the king's cavalry continued to harass them, as they had no troops of the same kind to protect them, and their equipment rendered them immobile. The ground, too, was in favour of the assailants. Very few were actually killed, but there were many wounded; no prisoners were taken because they were cautious about leaving their ranks and kept up the retreating fight in close order.

Thus Philip through his bold initiative as much as by its successful results kept the two nations in check by his well-timed movements and so made good the losses he had sustained in the war with Rome. An incident which occurred subsequently gave him a further advantage by diminishing the number of his Aetolian enemies. Scopas, one of their principal men, who had been sent by King Ptolemy from Alexandria with a considerable amount of gold, conveyed to Egypt a mercenary army consisting of 6000 infantry and 500 cavalry. He would not have left a single man of military age in Aetolia if Damocritus had not kept some of them at home by sternly reminding them of the war which was imminent and the defenceless condition of a country deprived of its manhood. It is uncertain whether his action was dictated by patriotism or by personal enmity to Scopas who had not bribed him.

Such were the various undertakings in which the Romans and Philip were engaged during this summer.

XLIV. *Operations of the Combined Fleets.*—It was in the early part of this summer that the fleet under L. Apustius left Corcyra and after rounding the Cape of Malea was joined by Attalus off Scyllaeum, a place situated in the district of Hermione. On this the Athenians, who had for a long time been afraid to show their hostility to Philip too openly, now at the prospect of immediate assistance gave full vent to their rage against him. There is never any lack of tongues there to stir up the populace. People of this sort thrive on the applause of the mob, and are found in all free States, particularly in Athens where oratory had so much influence.

A proposal was introduced and at once adopted by the people that all the statues and busts of Philip and of all his ancestors, male and female alike, with the inscriptions on them should be removed and destroyed; the festivals, sacrifices and priests which had been instituted in honour of him or of his predecessors should be abolished; even the localities in which anything had

been set up, or where there was any inscription to perpetuate his name, were to be placed under a curse, and nothing which it was right to erect or consecrate on undesecrated ground could be erected or consecrated in these places. On every occasion on which the official priests offered up prayers for the people of Athens and the armies and fleets of their allies, they were always to invoke solemn curses on Philip, his children and his realm, all his forces, military and naval, and on the whole nation of the Macedonians. It was further decreed that if any one should in future introduce any measure calculated to brand Philip with ignominy the Athenians should at once adopt it, and if any one by word or deed tried to vindicate him or do him honour the man who slew him would be justified in doing so. Finally it was enacted that all the decrees which had been formerly made against Pisistratus should be in force against Philip. As far as words went the Athenians made war on Philip, but it was only in these that their strength lay.

XLV. When Attalus and the Romans arrived at the Piraeus they stayed there a few days and then left for Andros with a heavy cargo of decrees quite as extravagant in their praises of their friends as in their expressions of wrath against their enemy. They brought up in the harbour of Gaurelum, and a party was sent ashore to test the feelings of the citizens and find out whether they preferred to surrender voluntarily or to await an assault. They replied that they were not their own masters, as the place was held by Philip's troops. Thereupon the forces were landed and all the usual preparations for an assault were made, Attalus approached the city on one side and the Roman commander on the other. The novel sight of the Roman arms and standards and the spirit with which the soldiers without the slightest hesitation mounted the walls utterly appalled the Greeks, who promptly fled to the citadel, leaving the enemy in possession of the city. There they held out for two days, trusting more to the strength of the place than to their own arms; on the third they, together with the garrison, surrendered the town and citadel on condition of being allowed to retire with one garment apiece to Delium in Boeotia. The city itself was made over by the Romans to Attalus; they themselves carried off the plunder and all that adorned the city. Anxious not to have the island a solitude, Attalus persuaded nearly all the Macedonians, as well as some of the Andrians,

to remain there. Subsequently those who had, in accordance with the terms of surrender, migrated to Delium were induced by the king's promises to return, for the love of country made them more ready to trust his word.

From Andros the fleets sailed to Cythnos. Here they spent some days in a fruitless attack on the city, and as it seemed hardly worth while to continue their efforts, they sailed away. At Prasias, a place on the mainland of Attica, the Issaeans joined the Roman fleet with twenty fast sailing-vessels. They were sent off to ravage the Carystian country; pending their return the rest of the fleet lay at Geraestus, a well-known port in Euboea. Then they all set sail for the open sea, and leaving Scyros on their right, reached Icus. Here a violent gale from the north detained them for a few days, and as soon as the weather moderated they sailed across to Sciathos, a city which had been devastated and plundered by Philip. The soldiers dispersed through the fields and brought back to the ships a supply of corn and whatever other food they could find. There was no plunder, nor had the Greeks done anything to deserve being plundered. From there they directed their course to Cassandrea, and touched at Mendae, a village on the coast. Rounding the cape they were purposing to bring their ships right up to the walls when they were caught and scattered by a violent storm in which the vessels almost foundered. It was with difficulty that they gained the land after losing most of their tackle. This storm was also a presage of their land operations, for after they had collected their vessels and landed their troops they were repulsed in their attack on the city with heavy loss, owing to the strength of the garrison which held the place for Philip. After this failure they withdrew to Canaestrum in Pallene, and from there sailing round the promontory of Torone they headed for Acanthus. After ravaging the territory they took the city by assault and sacked it. As their ships were by this time heavily laden with booty they did not go any further, and retracing their course they reached Sciathus, and from Sciathus they sailed to Euboea.

XLVI. Leaving the rest of the fleet there they entered the Maliac Gulf with ten swift vessels to discuss the conduct of the war with the Aetolians. Pyrrhias the Aetolian was the head of the deputation which came to Heraclea to share their views with Attalus and the Roman commander. Attalus was requested to furnish a thousand soldiers, as under the terms

of the treaty he was bound to supply that number if they made war on Philip. The demand was refused on the ground that the Aetolians had declined to march out and ravage the Macedonian country at the time that Philip was burning everything round Pergamum, sacred and profane, and so draw him off to look after his own interests. So the Aetolians were dismissed with expectations rather than with actual assistance, as the Romans confined themselves to promises. Apustus returned with Attalus to the fleet.

Plans were now discussed for attacking Oreus. This was a strongly fortified city and, after the former attempt upon it, had been held by a strong garrison.<sup>21</sup> After the capture of Andros twenty Rhodian vessels commanded by Agesimbrotos, all decked ships, joined the Roman fleet. This squadron was sent to take its station off Zelasium, a promontory in Phthia beyond Demetrias, where it would be admirably placed for meeting any movement on the part of the Macedonian ships. Heraclides, the king's admiral, was anchored at Demetrias, waiting for any chance which the enemy's negligence might offer him rather than venturing on open battle.

The Romans and Attalus attacked Oreus on different sides; the former directed their assault against the citadel which faced the sea, whilst Attalus directed his towards the hollow between the two citadels where a wall separates one portion of the city from the other. And as they attacked at different points, so they employed different methods. The Romans brought their vineae and battering rams close up to the wall, protecting themselves with their shield-roof; the king's troops poured in a hail of missiles from their ballistae and catapults of every description. They hurled huge pieces of rock, and constructed mines and made use of every expedient which they had found useful in the former siege. The Macedonians, however, who were defending city and citadel were not only in greater force but they not forgotten Philip's censures for their former misconduct nor his threatenings and promises in the respect of the future, and so they exhibited more courage and resolution. The Roman general found that more time was being spent there than he expected and that there was a better prospect of success in a regular investment than in a sudden assault. Other operations might be conducted during the siege, so, leaving a sufficient force to complete the investment, he sailed to the nearest point on the mainland, and suddenly

appearing before Larissa—not the well-known city in Thessaly, but another, called Cremaste—he captured all the city but the citadel. Attalus, too, surprised Aegeleon, where the inhabitants were not in the least apprehending an attack from an enemy who was engaged in the siege of another city.

By this time the siege-works round Oreus had begun to tell upon the place and the garrison were weakened by their losses and exhausted by the incessant labour of watches and guards by night and day alike. A part of the wall had been loosened by the blows of the battering-rams and had fallen down in several places. The Romans broke through the breach during the night and forced their way into the citadel commanding the harbour. On receiving a signal from the Romans in the citadel Attalus entered the city at daybreak where a large portion of the wall lay in ruins. The garrison and townsmen fled to the other citadel and in two days' time surrendered. The city fell to Attalus, the prisoners to the Romans.

XLVII. The autumnal equinox was now at hand, and the straits of Euboea, which are called Coela,<sup>22</sup> are considered dangerous to navigation. As they were anxious to get away before the winter storms began, the fleets sailed back to the Piraeus, their starting-point for the war. Leaving thirty ships there Apustius sailed with the remainder past Malea to Corcyra. Atticus was detained by the celebration of the Eleusinian Mysteries at which he wished to be present, and when they were over he withdrew into Asia after sending Agesimbrotus and the Rhodians home.

Such were the operations against Philip and his allies conducted by the Roman consul and his lieutenant with the assistance of King Attalus and the Rhodians.

*The Praetor L. Furius enjoys a Triumph.*<sup>23</sup> — When the other consul, C. Aurelius, came into his province he found the war brought to a close, and he did not conceal his chagrin at the praetor's activity in his absence. He sent him into Etruria and then took his legions into the enemy's country to plunder it: an expedition from which he returned with more booty than glory.

L. Furius, finding no scope for his activity in Etruria, and bent upon obtaining a triumph for his victories in Gaul, which he thought he might more easily do while the angry and jealous consul was out of the way, suddenly returned to Rome and convened a meeting of the senate in the temple of Bellona.



After giving a report of what he had done, he asked to be allowed to enter the City in triumph.

XLVIII. A considerable number of the senators supported him in view of the great services he had rendered, and also on personal grounds. The older members were for refusing him a triumph, partly because the army which he had employed had been assigned to another commander, and partly because in his eagerness to snatch the chance of a triumph he had quitted his province, an act contrary to all precedent. The consulars, in particular, insisted that he ought to have waited for the consul, for he could then have fixed his camp near the city and so have afforded sufficient protection to the colony to hold the enemy in hand without fighting until the consul came. What he failed to do, the senate ought to do, namely, wait for the consul; after hearing what the consul and the praetor had to say, they would form a truer judgment about the case.

Many of those present urged that the senate ought not to consider anything beyond the praetor's success and the question whether he had achieved it as a magistrate with full powers and under his own auspices. "Two colonies," it was argued, "had been planted as barriers to check risings amongst the Gauls. One had been plundered and burnt, and the conflagration was threatening the other colony which was so near it, like a fire running from house to house. What was the praetor to do? If no action ought to have been taken in the consul's absence, either the senate was at fault in furnishing the praetor with an army—for as it had decided that the campaign should be fought by the consul's army and not by the praetor's which was far away,<sup>34</sup> so it could have passed a special resolution to the effect that it should be fought under the consul and not under the praetor—or else the consul was in the wrong in not joining his army at Ariminum, after he had ordered it to move from Etruria into Gaul, so that he might take his part in the war, which you say ought not to have been undertaken without him. The critical moments in war do not wait upon the procrastination and delays of commanders, and you sometimes have to fight, not because you wish to do so, but because the enemy compels you. We ought to keep in view the battle itself and its consequences. The enemy were routed and cut to pieces; their camp taken and plundered; one colony relieved from siege; those of the other colony who had been made

prisoners recovered and restored to their homes and friends; the war was finished in a single battle. Not to men only was that victory a cause of rejoicing; thanksgivings for three days ought to be offered to the immortal gods because L. Furius had upheld the cause of the republic well and happily, not because he had acted ill and rashly. War with the Gauls was the destined prerogative of the house of the Furii." <sup>25</sup>

XLIX. Through speeches of this kind delivered by him and his friends, the personal influence of the praetor, who was on the spot, outweighed the dignity and authority of the absent consul, and by an overwhelming majority a triumph was decreed to L. Furius.

So L. Furius as praetor celebrated a triumph over the Gauls during his magistracy. He brought into the treasury 320,000 ases and 100,500 pounds of silver. No prisoners were led in procession before his chariot, nor were any spoils exhibited, nor was he followed by his soldiers. It was obvious that everything except the actual victory was at the disposal of the consul.

*Events in Rome.*—The Games which Scipio had vowed when he was proconsul in Africa were celebrated with great splendour. A decree was made for the allotment of land to his soldiers; each man was to receive two jugera for every year he had served in Spain or in Africa, and the decemviri managed the allotment. Commissioners were also appointed to fill up the number of colonists at Venusia, as the strength of that colony had been diminished in the war with Hannibal. C. Terentius Varro, T. Quinctius Flamininus and P. Cornelius, the son of Cnaeus Scipio, were the commissioners who undertook the task.

During this year C. Cornelius Cethegus who was holding Spain as propraetor routed a large army of the enemy in the Sedetan district. 15,000 Spaniards are said to have been killed in that battle and seventy-eight standards taken.

On his return to Rome to conduct the elections, C. Aurelius did not, as was anticipated, make it a ground of complaint that the senate had not awaited his return or given him the opportunity of discussing the matter with the praetor. What he did complain of was the way in which the senate had passed the decree granting the triumph without hearing any of those who had taken part in the war or indeed any one at all except the man who was to enjoy the triumph. "Our ancestors," he said, "laid it down that the lieutenants-general, the military tribunes, the centurions and the soldiers should be present

in order that the people of Rome might have visible proof of the victory won by the man for whom such an honour was decreed. Was there a single soldier out of the army which fought with the Gauls, or even a single camp-follower from whom the senate might have enquired as to the truth or falsehood of the praetor's report? "

After making this protest he fixed the day for the elections. The new consuls were L. Cornelius Lentulus and P. Villius Tappulus. Then followed the election of praetors. Those returned were L. Quinctius Flamininus, L. Valerius Flaccus, L. Villius Tappulus and Cn. Baebius Tamphilus.

Provisions were remarkably cheap that year. A great quantity of corn had been brought from Africa and the curule aediles, M. Claudius Marcellus and Sex. Aelius Paetus, distributed it to the people at two ases the modius. They also celebrated the Roman Games on a splendid scale and repeated them a second day. Five bronze statues from the proceeds of fines were placed by them in the treasury.

The Plebeian Games were celebrated three times by the aediles, L. Terentius Massiliota and Cn. Baebius Tamphilus, the latter being praetor-designate. Funeral Games were also exhibited in the Forum for four days on the occasion of the death of M. Valerius Laevinus by his sons, Publius and Marcus; they also gave a gladiatorial spectacle in which five-and-twenty pairs fought together. One of the Keepers of the Sacred Books, M. Aurelius Cotta, died and Manlius Acilius Glabrio was appointed to succeed him.

It so happened that the curule aediles who were elected were both unable to take up their duties at once; Gaius Cornelius Cethegus was elected while absent in Spain where he held command; C. Valerius Flaccus was in Rome when he was elected, but as he was a Flamen of Jupiter he could not take the oaths, and it was not permitted to hold any magistracy for more than five days without doing so. Flaccus asked that this condition might be waived in his case and the senate decreed that if an aedile should provide some one, with the approval of the consuls, to take the oaths for him, the consuls might if they thought good arrange with the tribunes for the matter to be referred to the plebs. L. Valerius Flaccus, praetor-designate, was brought forward to take the oaths for his brother. The tribunes brought the matter before the plebs, and the plebs decided that it should be just as though the aedile himself

had taken them. In the case of the other aedile, the tribunes requested the plebs to appoint two men to command the armies in Spain, and the plebs resolved that the curule aedile C. Cornelius should come home to take up his duties and that L. Manlius Acidinus should retire from his province after having held it for many years. They then made an order that Cn. Cornelius Lentulus and L. Stertinius should have the full powers of proconsuls in Spain.

## BOOK XXXII

### THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR

*I. Military Appointments for the Year.*—The consuls and praetors went into office on March 15 and at once balloted for their commands. Italy fell to L. Lentulus and Macedonia to P. Villius. The praetors were distributed as follows: L. Quinctius received the City jurisdiction; Cn. Baebius, Ariminum; L. Valerius, Sicily; L. Villius, Sardinia. The consul Lentulus received instructions to raise fresh legions; Villius took over the army from P. Sulpicius and it was left to him to bring it up to whatever strength he thought necessary. The legions which C. Aurelius had commanded as consul were assigned to Baebius on the understanding that he was to retain them until the consul relieved him with his new army, and on his arrival all the time-expired soldiers were to be sent home. Out of the allied contingent only 5000 men were kept on active service, a sufficient number, it was thought, to hold the country round Ariminum. Two of the former praetors had their commands extended—C. Sergius, for the purpose of allotting the land to the soldiers who had been serving for many years in Spain, and Q. Minucius in order that he might complete the investigation of the conspiracies in Bruttium which he had been hitherto conducting so carefully and impartially. Those who had been convicted of the sacrilege and sent in chains to Rome he was to send to Locri for execution, and he was also to see that what had been abstracted from Proserpine's shrine was replaced with the due expiatory rites.

In consequence of complaints made by representatives from Ardea that the customary portions of the victims sacrificed on the Alban Mount had not been given to that city, the pontiffs decreed that the Latin Festival should be held afresh.<sup>1</sup>

*Portents.*—Reports came from Suessa that two of the city gates and the wall between them had been struck by lightning. Messengers from Formiae announced that the same thing had happened to the temple of Jupiter there, others from Ostia

reported that the temple of Jupiter there also had been struck, others again from Velitrae brought word that the temples of Apollo and Sancus had been struck, and that hair had appeared on the statue in the temple of Hercules. Q. Minucius, the praetor in Bruttium, wrote to say that a foal had been born with five feet, and three chickens with three feet each. A despatch was received from P. Sulpicius, the proconsul in Macedonia, in which among other things he stated that laurel leaves had shot forth on the stern of a warship.

In the case of the other portents the senate decided that the consuls should sacrifice full-grown victims to those deities who they thought ought to receive them, but with regard to the last-mentioned portent the haruspices were called into the senate to advise. In accordance with their directions a day of special intercessions was ordered and prayers and sacrifices were offered at all the shrines.

II. This year the Carthaginians conveyed to Rome the first instalment of the war indemnity. It was paid in silver and the quaestors reported that it was not up to standard value, and on assaying it found that one-fourth was alloy. The Carthaginians made up the deficiency by borrowing money in Rome. They petitioned the senate to allow their hostages to be restored, and a hundred were given back to them. Hopes were held out of the restoration of the remainder if Carthage was true to her obligations. A further request which they put forward was that the hostages who were still detained might be moved from Norba where they were very uncomfortable, and placed elsewhere. It was agreed that they should be removed to Signia and Ferentinum.

A deputation from Gades came with a request that no praefect might be sent there,<sup>2</sup> as this would be in contravention of the agreement made with L. Marcius Septimus when they placed themselves under the protection of Rome. Their request was granted.

Delegates also came from Narnia who stated that their colony was short of its proper number and that some of inferior status had found their way amongst them, and were giving themselves out to be colonists. The consul L. Cornelius was instructed to appoint three commissioners to deal with the case. Those appointed were the two Aelii—Publius and Sextus, both of whom had the cognomen of Paetus—and Cn. Cornelius Lentulus.

The colonists at Cosa also requested an augmentation of their number, but their request was refused.

III. *P. Villius in Macedonia*.—After despatching the necessary business in Rome the consuls left for their respective provinces.

On his arrival in Macedonia, P. Villius was confronted by a serious mutiny amongst the troops, which had not been checked at the beginning, though they had for some time been seething with irritation. These were the 2000 who, after Hannibal's final defeat, had been transferred from Africa to Sicily and then in less than a year to Macedonia. They were regarded as volunteers, but they maintained that they had been taken there without their consent, they had been placed on board by the tribunes in spite of their protests. But in any case, whether their service was compulsory or voluntary they claimed that they had served their time and that it was only right that they should be discharged. They had not seen Italy for many years, they had spent the best years of their life under arms in Sicily and Africa and Macedonia, and now they were worn out with their toils and hardships, their many wounds had drained their blood.

The consul told them that if they asked for their release in a proper way there was reasonable ground for granting it, but that did not justify them nor would anything else justify them in breaking out into mutiny. If therefore they were willing to remain with the standards and obey orders he would write to the senate about disbanding them. They would be much more likely to attain their object by moderation than by contumacy.

IV. *Philip's Activity*.—At this time Philip was pressing the siege of Thaumaci with the utmost energy. His mounds were completed and his vineae in full working order and he was on the point of bringing his battering-rams up to the walls when the sudden arrival of a body of Aetolians compelled him to desist. Under the leadership of Archidamus they made their way through the Macedonian guard and entered the town. Day and night they made constant sorties, at one time attacking the outposts, at another, the siege-works of the Macedonians. The nature of the country helped them. To one approaching Thaumaci from the south by Thermopylae and round the Malian Gulf and through the country of Lamia, the place stands out on a height overlooking what they call Thessalia Coele.<sup>9</sup>

When you have made your way by winding paths over the broken ground and come up to the city itself, the whole plain of Thessaly suddenly stretches out before you like a vast sea beyond the limits of vision. From the wonderful view which it affords comes its name of Thaumaci. The city was protected not only by its elevated position but also by the precipitous sides of the height on which it stood. In the face of these difficulties Philip did not think its capture worth all the toil and danger involved and accordingly gave up the task. The winter had already begun when he withdrew from the place and returned to his winter quarters.

V. Everybody else made the most of the short rest allowed in seeking relaxation for mind and body, but the respite which Philip gained from the ceaseless strain of marches and battles only left him the more free for anxious thought as he contemplated the issues of the war as a whole. He viewed with alarm the enemy who was pressing on him by land and sea, and he felt grave misgivings as to the intentions of his allies and even of his own subjects, lest the former should prove false to him in the hope of gaining the friendship of Rome and the latter break out in insurrection against his rule. To make sure of the Achaeans he sent envoys to require them to renew the oath of fidelity which they had undertaken to renew annually, and also to announce his intention of restoring to the Achaeans the cities of Orchomenos and Heraea and the district of Triphylia and to the Megalopolitans the city of Aliphera, as they maintained that it had never belonged to Triphylia, but was one of the places from which by direction of the council of the Arcadians the population had been drawn to found Megalopolis, and therefore it ought to be restored to them.

By adopting this course he sought to consolidate his alliance with the Achaeans. His hold upon his own subjects was strengthened by the action he took in the case of Heraclides. He had made a friend of this man, but when he saw that he was making himself intensely disliked, and that many charges had been brought against him, he threw him into prison to the great joy of the Macedonians.

His preparations for war were as carefully and thoroughly made as any he had ever made before. He constantly exercised the Macedonians and mercenary troops and at the commencement of the spring he sent Athenagoras with all the foreign auxiliaries and light infantry through Epirus into Chaonia



to seize the pass at Antigonea, which the Greeks call Stena. A few days later he followed with the heavy troops, and after surveying all the positions in the country he considered that the most suitable place for an entrenched camp was one before the river Aous. This runs through a narrow ravine between two mountains which bear the local names of Meropus and Asnaus, and affords a very narrow path along its bank. He gave orders to Athenagoras to occupy Asnaus with his light infantry and intrench himself; and he himself fixed his camp on Meropus. Where there were precipitous cliffs, small outposts mounted guard, the more accessible parts he fortified with fosse or rampart or towers. A large quantity of artillery was disposed in suitable places to keep the enemy at a distance by missiles. The king's tent was pitched on a most conspicuous height in front of the lines to overawe the enemy and to give his own men confidence.

VI. The consul had wintered in Corcyra, and on receiving intelligence through Charops, an Epirote, as to the pass which the king and his army had occupied, he sailed across to the mainland at the opening of the spring and at once marched towards the enemy. When he was about five miles from the king's camp he left the legions in an entrenched position and went forward with some light troops to reconnoitre. The following day he held a council of war to decide whether he should attempt to force the pass in spite of the immense difficulty and danger to be faced, or whether he should lead his force round by the same route which Sulpicius had taken the year before, when he invaded Macedonia. This question had been debated for several days when a messenger came to report the election of T. Quinctius to the consulship and the assignment to him of Macedonia as his province, and the fact that he was hastening to take possession of his province and had already reached Corcyra.

According to Valerius Antias, Villius, finding a frontal attack impossible as every approach was blocked by the king's troops, entered the ravine and marched along the river. Hastily throwing a bridge across to the other side where the king's troops lay, he crossed over and attacked; the king's army were routed and put to flight and despoiled of their camp. 12,000 of the enemy were killed in the battle, 2200 prisoners taken, 132 standards and 230 horses captured.

All the Greek and Latin writers, so far as I have consulted

them, say that nothing noteworthy was done by Villius and that the consul who succeeded him took over the whole war from the outset.

VII. *Affairs in Rome*.—During these occurrences in Macedonia the other consul, L. Lentulus, who had remained in Rome, conducted the election of censors. Amidst several candidates of distinction the choice of the electors fell upon P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus and P. Aelius Paetus. They worked together in perfect harmony, and revised the roll of the senate without disqualifying a single member. They also leased out to contractors the customs dues at Capua and Puteoli and the harbour dues at the Castra Hannibalis, where a town now stands. Here they sent 300 colonists—the number fixed by the senate—and also sold the land belonging to Capua which lay at the foot of Mount Tifata.

L. Manlius Acidinus, who left Spain about this time, was prevented by P. Porcius, a tribune of the plebs, from enjoying an ovation on his return, though the senate had granted it to him. He entered the City in an unofficial capacity, and brought into the treasury 1200 pounds' weight of silver and 30 pounds of gold.

During the year Cn. Baebius Tamphilus, who had succeeded C. Aurelius in the command in Gaul, invaded the country of the Insubrian Gauls, but owing to his want of caution he was surprised, and very nearly lost the whole of his army. His actual losses amounted to 6700 men, and this great defeat occurred in a quarter which was no longer a cause of apprehension. This incident called L. Lentulus out of the City. As soon as he reached the province, which was filled with disturbance, he took over the command of the demoralised army and after severely censuring the praetor ordered him to quit the province and go back to Rome. The consul himself, however, did nothing of any importance, as he was recalled to Rome to conduct the elections. These were delayed by two of the tribunes of the plebs, M. Fulvius and Manius Curius, who would not allow T. Quinctius Flaminius to be a candidate for the consulship as he was only quaestor at the time. They alleged that the offices of aedile and praetor were now looked down upon, the nobility did not rise through the successive posts of honour before trying for the consulship and so give proof of their efficiency, but passing over the intermediate steps made the highest immediately follow the lowest. The question

passed from the Campus Martius to the senate, who passed a resolution to the effect that when any one was a candidate for an office of dignity which he might lawfully hold, it was right in such a case that the people should have the power to elect whom they would. The tribunes deferred to the authority of the senate. The consuls elected were Sex. Aelius Pactus and T. Quinctius Flaminius. At the subsequent election of praetors the following were returned: L. Cornelius Merula, M. Claudius Marcellus, M. Porcius Cato and C. Helvius. These had been plebeian aediles, and exhibited the Plebeian Games and celebrated the festival of Jupiter. The curule aediles—C. Valerius Flaccus, one of the flamens of Jupiter, and C. Cornelius Cethegus—celebrated the Roman Games with great splendour.

Two pontiffs—both members of the house of the Sulpicii, Servius and Caius—died this year. Their places were filled up by M. Aemilius Lepidus and Cnaeus Cornelius Scipio.

VIII. On assuming office the new consuls convened the senate in the Capitol, and it was decreed that the consuls might either arrange between themselves about the two provinces of Macedonia and Italy, or they might ballot for them. The one to whom Macedonia fell was to raise 3000 Roman infantry and 300 cavalry in order to bring the legions up to their proper strength, and also 5000 men from the Latins and the allies and 500 cavalry. The army for the other consul was to be an entirely new one. L. Lentulus, the consul of the previous year, had his command extended and he received orders not to leave his province or bring away his veteran army until the consul arrived with the new legions.

The result of the balloting was that Italy fell to Aelius and Macedonia to Quinctius. Amongst the praetors, L. Cornelius Merula received the jurisdiction in the City; M. Claudius, Sicily; M. Porcius, Sardinia, and C. Helvius, Gaul. The enrolment of troops followed, for in addition to the consular armies the praetors were required to levy forces. Marcellus enlisted 4000 Latin and allied infantry and 300 cavalry for service in Sicily, Cato raised 2000 foot and 200 horse of the same class for Sardinia, so that both these praetors on reaching their provinces might disband the old cavalry and infantry.

When these dispositions were completed, the consuls introduced a mission from Attalus to the senate. They announced that the king was assisting Rome with the whole of his military and naval strength and had up to that day done his utmost

to carry out faithfully the behests of the Roman consuls, but he feared that he would not be at liberty to do this any longer; Antiochus had invaded his kingdom while it was left defenceless both by sea and land. He therefore requested the senate, if they wished to avail themselves of his fleet and his services in the Macedonian war, that either they themselves would send a force to protect his kingdom, or if they did not wish to do so, that they would allow him to return home and defend his dominions with his fleet and the rest of his forces. The senate instructed the consuls to convey the following reply to the delegates: "The assistance which King Attalus has given the Roman commanders with his fleet and other forces has been very gratifying to the senate. They will not themselves send assistance to Attalus against Antiochus since he is on terms of alliance and friendship with Rome, nor will they detain the auxiliaries which Attalus is furnishing longer than suits the king's convenience. When the Romans have made use of the resources of others they have always left liberty of action to others. If any wish to render active assistance to the Romans, it rests with them to take the first step as it does to take the last. The senate will send envoys to Antiochus to inform him that the Roman people are making use of Attalus' ships and men against their common enemy, Philip, and Antiochus will give gratification to the senate if he desists from hostilities and leaves Attalus' dominions alone. It is only just and right that monarchs who are allies and friends of Rome should also keep the peace towards each other."

IX. The consul T. Quinctius, in raising troops, took care to choose mainly those who had done good service in Spain or in Africa and who were men of tried courage. Anxious as he was to go to his province, he was delayed in Rome by the announcement of portents and the necessity of expiating them. Several places had been struck by lightning—the high road at Veii, the forum and the temple of Jupiter at Lanuvium, the temple of Hercules at Ardea, and at Capua walls and towers and the temple called Alba. At Arretium the sky appeared to be on fire. At Velitrae the earth subsided over a space of three jugera, leaving a huge chasm. At Suessa it was reported that a lamb had been born with two heads, and at Sinuessa a pig with a human head. In consequence of these portents a day of special intercessions was proclaimed and the consuls arranged for the prayers and sacrifices.

After thus placating the gods the consuls left for their respective provinces. Aelius took the praetor Helvius with him into Gaul and handed over to him the army which he had received from L. Lentulus, to be disbanded, whilst he himself prepared to continue the war with the legions he brought with him. He did not however do anything worth recording.

*The Roman Army in Thessaly.*—The other consul, T. Quinctius, left Brundisium earlier than his predecessors had been in the habit of doing and sailed for Corcyra with an army of 8000 infantry and 800 cavalry. From there he crossed over in a quinquereme to the nearest part of the coast of Epirus, and proceeded by forced marches to the Roman camp. He sent Villius home and then waited a few days until his troops which were following him from Corcyra joined him. Meanwhile he held a council of war on the question whether he should march straight to the enemy's lines and force them, or whether, without attempting a task of such difficulty and danger, it would not be better to make a safe circuit through the Dessaretii and the country of Lyncus and enter Macedonia from that side. The latter proposal would have been adopted had not Quinctius feared that if he moved further from the sea his enemy might slip out of his hands, and seek safety as he had done before in forests and deserts, in which case the summer would be gone without any decisive result being arrived at. It was decided, therefore, in any case to attack the enemy where he was, in spite of the unfavourable ground over which the attack had to be made. But it was easier to decide that an attack should be made than to form a clear idea of how it should be made. For forty days they remained inactive in full view of the enemy.

X. This led Philip to hope that he might arrange a peace through the mediation of the Epirotes. A national council was held at which Pausanias, their captain-general, and Alexander, the commander of their cavalry, were chosen to undertake the task, and they arranged a conference between the king and the consul at a point where the Aous contracts to its narrowest width. The sum and substance of the consul's demands were that the king should withdraw his garrisons from the various States, that he should restore to those of them whose cities and fields he had plundered all that they could recover, and make compensation for the rest upon a fair valuation.

In reply Philip asserted that the cities were differently

circumstanced. Those which he had himself taken he would liberate, but as to those which had been bequeathed to him by his predecessors he would not give up what he had inherited as his lawful possession. If any of the States with whom he had been at war made complaint of the losses they had sustained he would submit the question to arbitration before any neutral nation whom they chose. To this the consul replied that in this matter at all events there was no need whatever for any arbitration, for who could fail to see that the responsibility for all wrongs lay with the aggressor, and in every case Philip had been the aggressor without having received any provocation?

The discussion then turned upon the question, which communities were to be liberated. The consul mentioned the Thessalians to begin with.<sup>4</sup> Philip was so furious at this suggestion that he exclaimed, "What heavier condition, T. Quinctus, could you impose upon a defeated foe?" and with these words hastily left the conference. It was with difficulty that the two armies were prevented from fighting with missiles, separated as they were by the breadth of the river.

The next day the patrols on either side engaged in numerous skirmishes over the broad plain between the camps. Then the king's troops retired and the Romans in their eagerness for battle followed them on to confined and broken ground. They had the advantage in their order and discipline and in the nature of their armour which afforded protection to the whole person; the Macedonians were helped by the strength of their position, which enabled catapults and ballistae to be posted on almost every rock as though on a city wall. After many on both sides had been wounded and some had even fallen as in a regular battle, night put an end to the fighting.

XI. At this juncture a shepherd was brought to the consul who had been sent by Charopus, the leading man in Epirus. He said that he had been in the habit of pasturing his flock in the defile which was then occupied by the king's camp, and knew every track and turn on the mountains. If the consul cared to send a party with him he would lead them by a route which was not difficult or dangerous to a place where they would be over the enemy's head. On hearing this the consul sent to Charopus to find out whether he thought that the rustic was to be trusted in a matter of such importance. Charopus sent back word that he might trust him so far as to keep everything in his own hands, and not be at the mercy of his guide.

Whilst wishing rather than daring to trust the man, and with mingled feelings of joy and fear, he was so far swayed by the authority of Charopus as to try the chance which offered. In order to dispel all suspicion of his intended movement, he kept up continuously, for two days, attacks upon every part of the enemy's position, bringing up fresh forces to relieve those who were worn out with fighting. In the meantime he selected 4000 infantry and 300 cavalry and placed this picked force in charge of a military tribune with orders to take the cavalry as far as the ground allowed, and when it became impassable for mounted men he was to post them somewhere on level ground; the infantry were to follow the path indicated by the guide. When, as he promised, they reached a position above the enemy they were to give a signal by smoke and not raise the battle-shout until the consul had received the signal and could judge that the battle had begun. The consul ordered them to march by night—it happened to be moonlight all night—and to take their food and rest in the daytime. The guide was promised a very large reward if he proved faithful, he was, however, bound before being handed over to the tribune. After despatching this force the Roman commander subjected the Macedonian outposts to more vigorous pressure on all sides.

XII. The detached force reached the height which was their objective on the third day, and signalled by a column of smoke that they had seized and were holding it. Thereupon the consul, having formed his army into three divisions, advanced up the bottom of the ravine with his main strength and sent his right and left wings against the camp.

The enemy showed no less alertness in meeting the attack. Eager to come to blows they moved out of their lines, and as long as they fought in the open, the Romans were vastly superior in courage and training and arms. But after losing many men in killed and wounded the king's troops retired upon positions strongly fortified or naturally secure, and then it was the turn of the Romans to be in difficulties, as they were advancing over dangerous ground where the narrow space made retreat almost impossible. Nor would they have been able to retire without paying heavily for their rashness had not the Macedonians heard shouts and found that a battle had begun in their rear. This unforeseen danger drove them frantic with terror, some fled in disorder, others who stood their ground, not so much because they had the courage to fight, as because there

was no place for escape, were surrounded by the enemy who were pressing on in front and rear. The whole army might have been annihilated had the victors been able to keep up the pursuit, but the cavalry were hampered by the rough and confined ground and the infantry by the weight of their armour.

The king galloped off the field without looking behind him. After he had ridden some five miles, and rightly suspected from the nature of the country that the enemy would find it impossible to follow him, he came to a halt on some rising ground and sent his escort in all directions over hill and dale to rally his scattered troops. Out of the whole force his losses did not amount to more than 2000, and all the rest, as if in obedience to a signal, collected together and marched off in a strong column for Thessaly.

After continuing the pursuit as far as they could with safety, cutting down the fugitives and despoiling the dead, they plundered the king's camp which even in the absence of defenders was difficult to approach. During the night they remained in camp, and the next day the consul followed the enemy through the gorge at the bottom of which the river wound its way.

XIII. On the first day of his retreat the king reached a place called Pyrrhus' Camp in Molossian Triphylia. The next day he gained the Lyncon range, a tremendous march for his army, but their fears urged them on. This range is in Epirus and divides it from Macedonia on the north and Thessaly on the east. The mountain sides are clothed with dense forests and the summits form a wide table-land with perennial streams.

Here the king remained encamped for several days, unable to make up his mind whether to go straight back to his kingdom or whether it would be possible for him first to make an incursion into Thessaly. He decided to march his army down into Thessaly and proceeded by the nearest route to Tricca, from which place he visited the surrounding cities in rapid succession. The men who were able to follow him were compelled to quit their homes and the towns were burnt. All the property they could carry with them they were allowed to take away, the rest became the booty of the soldiers. There was no cruelty that they could have suffered from an enemy greater than that which they experienced from their allies. These measures were extremely distasteful to Philip, but as the country would soon be in



possession of the enemy he was determined to keep the persons, at all events, of his allies out of their hands. The towns which were thus devastated were Phacium, Iresiae, Euhydrium, Eretria and Palaepharsalus. At Pherae the gates were closed against him, and as a siege would have caused considerable delay and he had no time to lose, he gave up the attempt and marched into Macedonia.

His retreat was hastened by the news of the approach of the Aetolians. When they heard of the battle which had taken place near the Aous, the Aetolians ravaged the country nearest to them round Sperchiaë, and Macra Come, as it is called, and then crossing the frontiers of Thessaly they gained possession of Cymene and Angea at the first assault. Whilst they were devastating the fields round Metropolis the townsmen who had mustered in force to defend their walls inflicted a repulse upon them. In an attack upon Callithera they met with similar resistance, but after an obstinate struggle they drove the defenders back within their walls. As there was no hope whatever of their effecting the capture of the place, they had to content themselves with this success. They next attacked the villages of Theuma and Celathara, which they plundered. Acharrae they gained by surrender; at Xyniae the terrified peasants fled and after thus abandoning their homes fell in with a detachment of Aetolians who were marching to Thaumaci to protect their foragers. The unarmed and helpless crowd were slaughtered by the armed soldiery and the abandoned Xyniae was sacked. Then the Aetolians took Cyphaera, a stronghold commanding Dolopia.

These successful operations were rapidly carried out in a few days.

XIV. Amynander and the Athamanians, on hearing of the Roman victory, did not remain inactive. As he felt little confidence in his soldiers Amynander begged the consul to lend him a small detachment with which to attack Gomphi. He began by seizing Phaeca, a place lying between Gomphi and the pass over Pindus which divides Athamania from Thessaly. Then he marched to the attack on Gomphi. For several days the inhabitants defended their city most vigorously, but when the scaling-ladders were at last placed against the walls their fears drove them to surrender. The fall of Gomphi created the liveliest alarm throughout Thessaly. The garrisons of Argenta, Pherinium, Timarum, Ligynae, Stimo and Lampsus surrendered

## The Second Macedonian War 361

in rapid succession together with other unimportant fortified posts in the neighbourhood.

Whilst the Athamanians and the Aetolians, delivered from the Macedonian peril, were thus making their gain out of the victory which others had won, and Thessaly, doubtful whom to count as friend or foe, was being devastated by three armies at once, the consul marched through the defile which the flight of the enemy had left open to him and entered the country of Epirus. He knew perfectly well which side the Epirotes, with the exception of Charopas, had favoured, but as he saw that they were anxious to repair their past mistakes by doing their utmost to carry out his commands, he measured them by their present rather than their former attitude, and through his clemency and readiness to forgive he secured their attachment for the future.

After despatching instructions to Corcyra for the transports to come into the Ambracian Gulf he advanced by easy stages for four days and fixed his camp at the foot of the Cercetian range of mountains. Amynder was requested to bring up his troops to the same place, not so much because his assistance was required as because the consul wished to have them as his guides into Thessaly. Most of the Epirotes were allowed to volunteer for service also.

XV. The first Thessalian city to be attacked was Phalorium. It was garrisoned by 2000 Macedonians, and as far as arms and fortifications could protect them they offered a most determined resistance. The consul believed that failure to withstand the Roman arms in this first instance would decide the attitude of the Thessalians generally, and he pressed the attack day and night without intermission. At last the resolution of the Macedonians was overcome and Phalorium was taken. On this envoys came from Metropolis and Cierium to surrender their cities and to ask that their offence might be condoned. Their request was granted, but Phalorium was sacked and burnt.

He then advanced against Aeginium, but when he saw that the place was practically impregnable even with a small force to defend it, he contented himself with discharging a few missiles on the nearest outpost and diverted his march towards Gomphi. As he had spared the fields of the Epirotes his army was now without the necessaries of life, and on his descent into the plain of Thessaly he sent to find out whether the

transports had reached Leucas or the Ambracian Gulf, and then despatched bodies of troops one after another in turn to Ambracia to procure corn. Though the route from Gomphi to Ambracia is a difficult and awkward one, it is very short, and in a few days the camp was replenished with stores of all kinds which had been brought up from the coast.

His next objective was Atrax. This city lies on the Peneus about ten miles from Larissa and was founded by emigrants from Perrhaebia. The Thessalians felt no alarm at the appearance of the Romans, and Philip himself did not venture to advance into Thessaly but remained encamped in Tempe, so that he could send help as occasion required to any place attempted by the Romans.

XVI. *Naval Operations.*—Just about the time when the consul began his campaign against Philip by fixing his camp in the pass leading from Epirus, his brother L. Quinctius, to whom the senate had entrusted the charge of the fleet and the command of the coast-line, sailed to Corcyra with two quinqueremes. When he heard that the fleet had left, he decided to lose no time and followed it up to the island of Zama. Here he sent back Lucius Apustius, whom he had succeeded, and went on to Malea. The voyage was a slow one, the vessels which were accompanying him, laden with provisions, having mostly to be taken in tow. From Malea he proceeded with three swift quinqueremes to the Piraeus, leaving orders for the rest of the fleet to follow him as quickly as they could, and here he took over the ships which had been left by L. Apustius for the protection of Athens.

At the same time two fleets sailed from Asia, one of twenty-three quinqueremes with Attalus, the other a Rhodian fleet of twenty decked ships, under Agesimbrotus. These fleets united off Andros and from there sailed to Euboea, which is only separated by a narrow strait. They began by laying waste the fields of the Carystians, but when Carystus was strengthened by reinforcements which were hurried up they sailed away to Eretria. On hearing that Attalus had arrived there, L. Quinctius proceeded thither with the squadron in the Piraeus after leaving orders for the rest of his fleet as they arrived to sail for Euboea.

A very fierce attack on Eretria now commenced. The vessels in the three fleets carried all kinds of siege engines and artillery, and the country around afforded an abundant supply of timber

for the construction of fresh works. At first the townsmen defended themselves with considerable energy, but they gradually became worn out and many were wounded, and when they saw a portion of the walls levelled by the enemy's machines, they began to think about surrendering. But the garrison consisted of Macedonians and the townsmen were as much afraid of these as they were of the Romans. Philocles, Philip's lieutenant, also sent word that he would come to their assistance in time if they would hold out. Thus their hopes and fears constrained them to lengthen out the time beyond either their wishes or their strength. At last they heard that Philocles had been defeated and was in hasty flight to Chalcis, and they at once sent spokesmen to Attalus to ask for mercy and protection. Hoping for peace they slackened their defence and contented themselves with guarding that part where the wall had been levelled. Quinctius, however, delivered an assault by night in the quarter where they least expected it and captured the city. The whole of the townsmen with their wives and children took refuge in the citadel and finally surrendered. There was not much gold and silver, but the statues and pictures by old-time artists and similar objects were discovered in greater quantities than might have been expected from the size and wealth of the city.<sup>8</sup>

XVII. Carystus was the next place to be attacked. Here before the troops were landed the entire population abandoned the city and took refuge in the citadel. Then they sent envoys to make terms with the Roman general. The townsmen were at once granted life and liberty; the Macedonians were allowed to depart after giving up their arms and paying a sum equivalent to 300 drachmæ per man. After ransoming themselves at this sum they departed for Boeotia.

After thus, within a few days, capturing two important cities in Euboea, the fleets rounded Sunium, a promontory in Attica, and brought up at Cenchreea, the commercial port of Corinth.

*Roman Successes in Thessaly and Phocis.*—Meanwhile the consul had on his hands a siege which proved to be more tedious and costly than any one anticipated, and the defence was conducted in a way he was quite unprepared for. He took it for granted that all his efforts would be devoted to the demolition of the walls and when once he had opened the way into the city the flight and slaughter of the enemy would

follow as they usually do when cities are taken by assault. But after a portion of the wall had been battered down by the rams and the soldiers began to march over the debris into the city they found themselves at the beginning of a fresh task. The Macedonian garrison, a large body of picked men, considered it a special distinction to defend the city by their arms and courage rather than by walls, and they formed in close order, their front resting on a column of unusual depth. As soon as they saw the Romans clambering over the ruins of the wall they drove them back over ground covered with obstacles and ill-adapted for retirement.

The consul was intensely mortified, for he looked upon this humiliating repulse as not only helping to prolong the siege of one solitary city, but also as likely to influence the future course of the war which, in his opinion, depended to a great extent upon unimportant incidents. After clearing the ground where the shattered wall lay in heaps he brought up a movable tower of immense height carrying a large number of men on its numerous stages, and sent on cohort after cohort to break through, if possible, the massed body of Macedonians, which they call the phalanx. But in the narrow space—for the breach in the wall was by no means a wide one—the kind of weapon he used and his style of fighting gave the enemy an advantage. When the serried Macedonian ranks presented their enormously long spears it was like a shield-wall, and when the Romans after fruitlessly hurling their javelins, drew their swords they could not get to close quarters, nor could they hack off the spear-heads; if they did succeed in cutting or breaking any off, the splintered shafts kept their places amongst the points of the uninjured ones and the palisade remained unbroken. Another thing which helped the enemy was the protection of their flanks by that part of the wall which was sound; they had not to attack or retire over a wide stretch of ground, which generally disorders the ranks. An accident which happened to the tower gave them still greater confidence. As it was being moved over ground not thoroughly beaten down, one of the wheels sank in and gave the tower such a list that it seemed to the enemy to be falling over.

XVIII. Though he was making no progress, what vexed the consul most was that he was allowing a comparison to be made between the tactics and weapons of the contending armies; he recognised that there was no near prospect of a successful

assault, and no means of wintering so far from the sea in a country utterly wasted by the ravages of war, and under these circumstances he raised the siege.

There was no harbour on the whole of the Acarnanian and Aetolian coast-line which would admit all the transports employed in provisioning the troops and at the same time furnish covered winter-quarters for the legionaries. Anticyra in Phocis, facing the Corinthian Gulf, seemed the most suitable place, as it was not far from Thessaly and the positions held by the enemy, and only separated from the Peloponnese by a narrow strip of sea. There he would have Aetolia and Acarnania behind him, and Locris and Boeotia on either side of him.

Phanotea in Phocis was taken without any fighting; Anticyra only made a brief resistance; the captures of Ambrysus and Hyampolis speedily followed. Owing to the position of Daulis on a lofty hill, its capture could not be effected by escalade or direct assault. By harassing the defending garrison with missiles and, when they made sorties, skirmishing against them, alternately advancing and retiring without attempting anything decisive, he brought them to such a pitch of carelessness and contempt for their opponents that when they retired within their gates the Romans rushed in with them and took the place by storm. Other unimportant strongholds fell into Roman hands more through fear than through force of arms. Elatea closed its gates against him and there seemed little probability of its admitting either a Roman general or a Roman army unless it were compelled to do so by force.

XIX. *Meeting of the Achaean League.*—While the consul was engaged in the siege of Elatea, the hope of achieving a greater success brightened before him, namely, of inducing the Achaeans to abandon their alliance with Philip and enter into friendly relations with Rome. Cyliadas, the leader of the Macedonian party, had been expelled, and Aristacnus, a favourer of the Roman alliance, was chief magistrate.

The Roman fleet in conjunction with those of Attalus and Rhodes were anchored at Cenchreae, preparing to make a joint attack on Corinth. The consul thought that, before commencing operations, it would be better to send an embassy to the Achaeans and give an undertaking that if they would abandon the king and go over to the Romans, Corinth should be incorporated in the Achaean league. At the consul's suggestion, envoys were accordingly sent by his brother Lucius, and by Attalus,

the Rhodians and the Athenians. A meeting of the council was convened at Sicyon.

The Achaeans, however, were far from clear as to what course they ought to pursue. They were in fear of Nabis the Lacedaemonian, their dangerous and relentless enemy, they dreaded the arms of Rome, and they were under many obligations to the Macedonians for their kind services both in bygone years and recently. But the king himself they viewed with suspicion on account of his faithlessness and cruelty; his action at the time they attached no importance to,<sup>6</sup> and saw clearly that after the war he would be more of a tyrant than ever. They were quite at a loss what view to express, either in the senates of their respective States or in the general council of the League; even when thinking the matter over by themselves, they could not make up their minds as to what it was they really wanted or what was best for them.

Whilst the councillors were in this state of indecision the envoys were introduced and requested to state their case. The Roman envoy, L. Calpurnius, was the first to speak. He was followed by the representatives of King Attalus, and then came the delegates from Rhodes. The emissaries of Philip were the next to speak, and the Athenians came last of all, that they might reply to the Macedonians. These last attacked the king with almost greater bitterness than any of the others, for none had suffered more or undergone such harsh treatment. The whole day was taken up with the continuous speeches of all these deputations, and at sunset the council broke up.

XX. The next day they were called together again. When, in accordance with Greek usage, the usher announced that the magistrates gave permission to speak to any one who wished to lay his views before the council, there was a long silence, each looking for some one else to speak. Nor was this surprising, when men who had been turning over in their minds proposals flatly opposed to each other until their brains had come to a standstill, were still further bewildered by speeches lasting the whole day through, in which the difficulties on both sides were set forth in tones of warning.

At last, Aristaenus, the president, determined not to adjourn the council without discussion, said: "Where, Achaeans, are those lively disputes which go on at your dinner-tables and at the street corners, in which whenever Philip or the Romans are mentioned you can scarcely keep your hands off each other? Now, in

a council convened for this special purpose, when you have heard the representatives of both sides, when the magistrates submit the question to discussion, when the usher invites you to express your views, you have become dumb. If care for the common safety fails to do so, cannot the party spirit which makes you take one side or the other, extort a word from any one? especially as no one is so dense as not to see that this is the moment, before any decree is passed, for speaking and advocating the course which commends itself to any one as the best. When a decree has once been made, every one will have to uphold it as a good and salutary measure, even those who previously opposed it." This appeal from the president not only failed to induce a single speaker to come forward, it did not even call forth a single cheer or murmur in that great assembly, where so many States were represented.

XXI. Then Aristaenus resumed: "Leaders of the Achaeans, you are not lacking in counsel any more than you are in the power of speech, but each of you is unwilling to endanger his own safety in consulting for the safety of all. Possibly I, too, should keep silence, were I only a private citizen, but as it is, I see that either the president ought not to have introduced the envoys into the council, or after he had introduced them they ought not to be dismissed without some reply being made to them. But how can I give them any reply except in accordance with the decree which you make? And since none of you who have been summoned to this council is willing or has the courage to express his opinion, let us examine the speeches which the envoys delivered yesterday as though they were made by members of this council, let us regard them not as making selfish demands in their own interest, but as recommending a policy which they believe to be advantageous to us.

"The Romans, the Rhodians and Attalus all ask for our alliance and friendship and consider that it is only just and right that we should give them assistance in the war they are waging against Philip. Philip, on the other hand, reminds us of the fact that we are his allies and have pledged our oath to him. At one time he demands our active support, at another he assures us that he is content for us to remain neutral. Has it not occurred to any one why those who are not yet our allies ask more from us than those who are our allies? This is not due to excess of modesty in Philip or to the lack of it in the Romans. It is the fortune of war which imparts confidence



to the demands of one side and takes it away from those of the other. As far as Philip is concerned we see nothing belonging to him except his envoy. As for the Romans, their fleet lies at Cenchrea, laden with the spoils of the cities of Euboea, and we see the consul with his legions overrunning Phocis and Locris which are only separated from us by a narrow strip of sea. Do you wonder why Philip's envoy, Cleomedon, spoke in so diffident a tone when he urged us to take up arms against the Romans on behalf of his king? He impressed upon us the sanctity of the same treaty and oath, but if we were to ask of him, by virtue of the same treaty and oath, that Philip should defend us from Nabis and the Lacedaemonians, he would not be able to find a force adequate for our protection or even an answer to our request, any more than Philip himself could have done last year. For when he attempted to draw our fighting-men away into Euboea by promising that he would make war on Nabis, and saw that we would not sanction such an employment of our soldiers or allow ourselves to be involved in a war with Rome, he forgot all about the treaty which he is now making so much of, and left us to be despoiled and wasted by Nabis and the Lacedaemonians.

"To me, indeed, the arguments that Cleomedon used appeared inconsistent with each other. He made light of a war with Rome and said that the issue would be the same as that of the former war. If so, then why does Philip keep away and ask for our assistance instead of coming in person and protecting us from Nabis and the Romans? 'Us,' do I say? Why, if this be so, did he allow Eretria and Carystus to be taken? why, all those cities in Thessaly? why, Locris and Phocis? Why is he allowing Elatea to be attacked now? Why did he evacuate the passes leading into Epirus and the unsurmountable barriers commanding the river Aous? And when he had abandoned them, why did he march off into the heart of his kingdom? If he deliberately left his allies to the mercies of their enemies how can he object to these allies taking measures for their own safety? If his action was dictated by fear he must pardon us for our fears. If he retreated because he was worsted shall we Achaeans, Cleomedon, withstand the arms of Rome when you Macedonians could not withstand them? You tell us that the Romans are not in greater strength or employing greater forces in this war than in the last one; are we to take your word for it, rather than look at the actual facts? On

## The Second Macedonian War 369

that occasion they only sent their fleet to help the Aetolians; they did not put a consul in command nor did they employ a consular army. The maritime cities belonging to Philip's allies were in a state of consternation and alarm, but the inland districts were so safe from the arms of Rome that Philip laid waste the land of the Aetolians while they were vainly imploring the Romans for help. Now, however, the Romans have brought the war with Carthage to a close, that war which for sixteen years they have had to endure, whilst it preyed, so to speak, on the vitals of Italy, and they have not simply sent a detachment to aid the Aetolians, they have themselves assumed command of the war and are attacking Macedonia by land and sea. Their third consul is now conducting operations with the utmost energy. Sulpicius met the king in Macedonia itself, routed him, put him to flight, and ravaged the richest part of his realm, and now, when he was holding the passes which form the key of Epirus, secured as he thought by his positions, his fortified lines and his army, Quinctius has deprived him of his camp, pursued him as he fled into Thessaly, stormed the cities of his allies and driven out his garrisons almost within sight of Philip himself.

"Suppose there is no truth in what the Athenian delegate has said about the king's brutality and greed and lust, suppose that the crimes committed in Attica against all the gods, supernal and infernal, do not concern us, still less the sufferings of Chios and Abydos, which are a long way off; let us forget our own wounds, the robberies and murders at Messene in the heart of the Peloponnesus, the king's assassination of his host almost at the banquet-table, the deaths of the two Arati of Sicyon, father and son—the king was in the habit of speaking of the hapless old man as though he were his father—the abduction of the son's wife into Macedonia as a victim to Philip's lusts, and all the other outrages on matrons and maids—let all these be consigned to oblivion. Let us even imagine that we have not to do with Philip whose cruelty has struck you dumb (for what other reason can there be for you who have been summoned to the council keeping silence?), but with Antigonus, a gentle and just-minded monarch who has been the greatest benefactor to us all. Do you suppose that he would demand of us that we should do what cannot possibly be done?"

"The Peloponnesus, remember, is a peninsula connected with the mainland by the narrow strip of land called the Isthmus,

open and exposed above all to a naval attack. If a fleet of 100 decked ships and 50 undecked ships with lighter draught, and 30 Isaeon cutters should begin to ravage our coast and attack the cities which stand exposed almost on the shore, we should, I suppose, withdraw into the inland cities just as if we were not caught by the flames of a war within our frontiers which is fastening upon our vitals. When Nabis and the Lacedaemonians are pressing us by land and the Roman fleet by sea, from what quarter am I to appeal to our alliance with the king and implore the Macedonians to help us? Shall we protect with our own arms the threatened cities against the Romans? How splendidly we protected Dymae in the last war! The disasters of others afford ample warning to us, let us not seek how we may become a warning to others.

"Because the Romans are asking for your friendship voluntarily, take care that you do not disdain what you ought to have desired and done your best to obtain. Do you imagine that they are entrapped in a strange land and driven by their fears into wishing to lurk under the shadow of your assistance and seek the refuge of an alliance with you in order that they may have the entry of your harbours and make use of your supplies? The sea is under their control, whatever shores they visit they at once bring under their dominion, what they deign to ask for they can obtain by force. It is because they wish to spare you that they do not allow you to take a step which would destroy you.

"As to the middle course which Cleomedon pointed out as the safest, namely, that you should keep quiet and abstain from hostilities, that is not a middle course, it is no course at all. We have either to accept or reject the proffered alliance with Rome; otherwise we shall win the gratitude of neither side, but like men who wait upon the event, leave our policy at the mercy of Fortune, and what is this but to become a prey of the conqueror? What you ought to have sought with the utmost solicitude is now spontaneously offered; beware lest you scorn the offer. Either alternative is open to you to-day, it will not be open always. The opportunity will not long remain, nor will it often recur. For a long time you have wished rather than ventured to free yourselves from Philip. The men who would win your liberty for you without any risk or effort on your part have crossed the seas with mighty fleets and armies. If you reject their alliance you are hardly in your right senses,

but you will be compelled to have them as either friends or enemies."

XXII. At the close of the president's speech a hum of voices ran through the assembly, some approving, others fiercely attacking those who approved. Soon not only individual members but the collective representatives of each State were engaged in mutual altercations, and at last the chief magistrates of the League, the *damiurgi*<sup>7</sup> as they are called, ten in number, were disputing with quite as much heat as the rest of the assembly. Five of them declared that they would submit a proposal for alliance with Rome and take the votes on it; the other five protested that it was forbidden by law for the magistrates to propose or for the council to adopt any resolution adverse to the existing alliance with Philip. So the second day was wasted in wrangling.

Only one day now remained for the legal session of the council, for the law required its decree to be made on the third day. As the time approached, party feeling ran so high that fathers could hardly keep their hands off their children. Risias, a delegate from Pallene, had a son called Memnon who was one of the *damiurgi* who were opposed to the resolution being moved and voted upon. For a long time he appealed to his son to permit the Achaeans to take measures for their common safety and not by his obstinacy bring ruin on the whole nation. When he found that his appeal had no effect he swore that he would count him not as a son but as an enemy and would put him to death with his own hand. The threat proved effectual and the next day Memnon joined those who were in favour of the resolution. As they were now in a majority they put the resolution amidst the unmistakable approval of almost all the States, a clear indication of what the final decision would be. Before it was actually carried, the representatives of Dymae and Megalopolis and some of those from Argos rose and left the council. This did not occasion surprise or disapproval considering the position in which they were placed. The Megalopolitans after being expelled by the Lacedaemonians in the days of their grandfathers had been reinstated by Antigonus. Dymae had been taken and sacked by the Romans and the inhabitants sold into slavery, and Philip had issued orders for them to be ransomed wherever they could be found, and had restored them to liberty and to their city. The Argives, who believed that the kings of Macedonia had sprung from

them, had, most of them, been long attached to Philip by ties of personal friendship. For these reasons they withdrew from the council when it showed itself in favour of making an alliance with Rome, and their secession was considered excusable in view of the great obligations they were under for the kindness recently shown to them.

XXIII. On being called upon to vote, the remaining Achaean States desired the immediate conclusion of an alliance with Attalus and the Rhodians. As an alliance with Rome could not be made without a resolution of the Roman people the question was adjourned until envoys could be sent there. Meantime it was decided that three representatives should be sent to L. Quinctius and that the whole of the Achaean army should be brought up to Corinth as Quinctius had already begun to attack the city, now that he had taken Cenchreae.

*Failure of Attack on Corinth. Capture of Elatea.*—The Achaeans fixed their camp in the direction of the gate which leads to Sicyon, the Romans on the other side of the city which looks towards Cenetreae, Attalus brought his army through the Isthmus and attacked the city on the side of Lechaemum, the port on the Gulf of Corinth.<sup>8</sup> At first the attack did not show much spirit, as hopes were entertained of internal discord between the townsmen and Philip's garrison. When however it was seen that all were at one in meeting the assault, the Macedonians as energetic as though they were defending their native soil, the Corinthians obeying the orders of Androsthenes, the commandant, as loyally as though he were a fellow-citizen, placed in command by themselves, then the assailants placed all their hopes in their arms and their siege-works. In spite of the difficulties of approach, mounds were built up against the walls on all side. On the side where the Romans were working, the battering-rams had destroyed some part of the wall and the Macedonians came up in force to defend the breach. A furious conflict began and the Romans were easily driven out by the overwhelming numbers of the defenders. Then the Achaeans and Attalus came up in support and made the contest a more equal one, and it seemed pretty certain that they would not have much difficulty in forcing the Macedonians and the Greeks to give way. There was a large body of Italian deserters, consisting partly of those from Hannibal's army who had entered Philip's service to escape punishment at the hands of the Romans and partly of seamen who had left the fleet for the prospect of

the more respectable military life. These men, despairing of their lives in case the Romans conquered, were inflamed with madness more than with courage.

Opposite Sicyon lies the promontory of Acraean Juno, as she is called, which juts out into the sea; the distance across from Corinth is about seven miles. To this point Philocles, one of the king's generals, brought a force of 1500 men through Boeotia. Vessels from Corinth were in readiness to carry this detachment to Lechaëum. Attalus advised that the siege should be raised at once and the siege-works burnt, but the Roman commander showed great resolution and was for persisting in the attempt. When however he saw Philip's troops strongly posted in front of all the gates and realised that it would be difficult to withstand their attacks in case they made sorties, he fell in with Attalus' view. The operation was accordingly abandoned and the Achæans were sent home. The rest of the troops re-embarked, Attalus sailed for the Piræus and the Romans for Corcyra.

XXIV. While the naval forces were thus engaged, the consul encamped before Elatea in Phocis. He began by inviting the leading citizens to a conference and tried to induce them to surrender, but they told him that matters were not in their hands, the king's troops were stronger and more numerous than the townsmen. On this he proceeded to attack the city on all sides with arms and siege artillery. After the battering-rams had been brought up, a length of wall between two towers was thrown down with a terrific crash and roar, leaving the city exposed. A Roman cohort at once advanced through the opening thus made, and the defenders leaving their different posts rushed from all parts of the city to the threatened spot. Whilst the Romans were clambering over the ruins of the wall others were fixing their scaling-ladders against the walls which were still standing, and the attention of the enemy being diverted in one direction, walls in other parts were successfully scaled and the assailants descended into the city. The noise of the tumult so terrified the enemy that they left the place which they had been so vigorously defending and fled every one to the citadel, followed by crowds of non-combatants. Having thus gained possession of the city, the consul gave it up to plunder. He then sent a message to those in the citadel promising to spare the lives of Philip's troops if they gave up their arms, and also to restore to the Elateans their freedom.

When the necessary guarantees had been given, he secured the citadel after a few days.

XXV. *Philip gains Argos.*—The appearance of Philocles in Achaia not only raised the siege of Corinth but brought about the loss of Argos, which was betrayed by the leaders of the city acting with the full concurrence of the population. It was customary with them on the day of the elections for the presiding magistrates, as an omen of good fortunes, to commence the proceedings by uttering the names of Jupiter, Apollo and Hercules, and a law had been made ordering Philip's name to be added. After the alliance with Rome had been made the usher did not add his name and the people broke out into angry murmurs, and soon shouts were heard demanding the restoration of Philip's name and the honours which were his by law, till at last the name was uttered amidst tremendous cheers.

Replying upon this proof of his popularity, Philip's partisans invited Philocles, and during the night he seized a hill which commanded the city; the stronghold was called Larissa.<sup>9</sup> Posting a detachment there, he marched down in order of battle to the forum which lay at the foot of the hill. Here he found a body of troops drawn up to dispute his progress. It was an Achaean force which had recently been thrown into the city, consisting of 500 men selected from all the cities under the command of Aenesidemus of Dymae. Philocles sent a spokesman to them, bidding them evacuate the place, since they were no match even for the Macedonian supporters in the town, still less so now that they had the Macedonians with them, those Macedonians against whom even the Romans could not make a stand at Corinth. At first his warning made no impression on either the commander or his men, but soon afterwards when they saw a large body of Argives in arms marching against them from another side, they saw that their fate was sealed, though had their commander persisted in his defence of the place they were evidently prepared to fight to the death. Aenesidemus, however, was unwilling that the flower of the Achaean soldiery should be lost together with the city, and he came to an understanding with Philocles that they should be allowed to depart. He himself, however, remained standing under arms together with a few of his personal followers. Philocles sent to ask him what his intention was, and without moving a step and holding his shield in front of him he replied that he

would die fighting in defence of the city entrusted to him. The general then ordered the Thracians to shower their darts upon them, and the whole party were killed.

Thus, even after the alliance between the Achaeans and the Romans had been cemented two of the most important cities, Argos and Corinth, were in the king's hands.

Such were the operations of the naval and military forces of Rome, during this summer, in Greece.

XXVI. *A Conspiracy amongst the Slaves.*—In Gaul nothing of any importance was accomplished by the consul Sex. Aelius, though he had two armies in the province. He retained the one which L. Cornelius had commanded and which ought to have been disbanded, and placed C. Helvius in command of it, the other army he brought with him into the province. Almost the whole of his year of office was spent in compelling the former inhabitants of Cremona and Placentia to return to the homes from which they had been dispersed by the accidents of war.

While things were unexpectedly quiet in Gaul this year, the districts round the City very nearly became the scene of a rising among the slaves.

The Carthaginian hostages were under guard at Setia. As children of the nobility they were attended by a large body of slaves whose numbers had been swelled by many whom the Setians themselves had purchased from among the prisoners taken in the recent war in Africa. When they had set their conspiracy on foot they sent some of their number to gain over the slaves in the country round Setia and then in the districts of Norba and Cerceii. Their preparations being now sufficiently advanced they arranged to seize the opportunity of the Games which were shortly to take place at Setia and attack the people while their attention was absorbed in the spectacle. Then in the midst of the excitement and bloodshed the slaves were to seize Setia and then secure Norba and Cerceii.

Information of this monstrous affair was brought to Rome and laid before L. Cornelius, the City praetor. Two slaves came to him before daybreak and gave him a full account of what had been done and what was contemplated. After issuing instructions for them to be detained in his house he convened the senate and communicated the intelligence which the informers had brought. He received instructions to start off at once to investigate and crush the conspiracy. Accompanied by five assessors he compelled all whom he found in the fields



to take the military oath, arm themselves and follow him. In this informal levy he collected an armed force of about 2000 men with which he reached Setia, all of them being perfectly ignorant of his destination. Here he promptly seized the ring-leaders, and this led to a general flight of slaves from the town. Parties were sent through the fields to hunt them down. . . .<sup>10</sup> The service rendered by the two slaves who gave the information and by one who was a freeman was of the utmost value. To the latter the senate ordered a gratuity of 100,000 ases, to each of the slaves 5000 ases and their liberty, the owners being compensated out of the public treasury.

Not long afterwards news arrived that some slaves, the remains of that conspiracy, were intending to seize Praeneste. L. Cornelius proceeded thither and inflicted punishment on nearly 2000 who had been involved in the plot.

Fears were entertained by the citizens lest the Carthaginian hostages and prisoners of war should have been prime movers in the affair. Strict watch was accordingly kept in Rome in all the different wards, the subordinate magistrates were required to visit the posts and the superintendents of gaols were to see that the public prison at the quarries was more strictly guarded. Instructions were also sent by the praetor to the Latin communities for the hostages to be kept in privacy and not allowed to appear in public; the prisoners were to be manacled with fetters not less than ten pounds in weight, and not to be confined in custody anywhere but in the State prisons.

XXVII. *The Elections*.—During the year a delegation from King Attalus deposited in the Capitol a golden crown weighing 246 pounds. They also tendered his thanks to the senate for the intervention of the Roman envoys, as owing to their representations Antiochus had withdrawn his army from Attalus' territories.

In the course of the summer 200 mounted men, 10 elephants and 200,000 modii of wheat were sent by Masinissa to the army in Greece. From Sicily and Sardinia also a large quantity of provisions and clothing were despatched for the army. M. Marcellus was administering Sicily; M. Porcius Cato, Sardinia. The latter was a man of integrity and blameless life, but was considered somewhat too severe in his repression of usury. The moneylenders were banished from the island, and the sums which the inhabitants had contributed towards keeping

up the state and dignity of the praetors were either cut down or totally abolished.

The consul Sex. Aelius came back from Gaul to conduct the elections; C. Cornelius Cethegus and Q. Minucius Rufus were the new consuls. Two days later followed the election of praetors. In consequence of the increase in the provinces and the extension of the dominion of Rome, six praetors were elected this year for the first time, viz., L. Manlius Volso, C. Sempronius Tuditanus, M. Sergius Silus, M. Helvius, M. Minucius Rufus and L. Atilius. Amongst these Sempronius and Helvius were the plebeian aediles; the curule aediles were Q. Minucius Thermus and Tiberius Sempronius Longus. The Roman Games were celebrated four times during the year.

XXVIII. *The Allocation of the Provinces.*—The first business before the new consuls was the settlement of the provinces both praetorian and consular. As the praetors' spheres of administration could be determined by ballot they were the first to be dealt with. The City jurisdiction fell to Sergius, the alien jurisdiction to Minucius; Atilius drew Sardinia; Manlius, Sicily; Sempronius, Hither Spain; and Helvius, Further Spain.

Whilst the consuls were arranging to ballot for Italy and Macedonia, two of the tribunes of the plebs, L. Oppius and Q. Fulvius, objected to their doing so. Macedonia, they alleged, was a distant province, and nothing up to that time had stood in the way of a successful war more than the fact that when operations had hardly commenced the former consul was always recalled just as he was opening his campaign. This was the fourth year since war had been declared against Macedonia. Sempronius had spent most of the year in trying to find the king and his army. Villius had actually come into touch with the enemy but was recalled before any decisive action had been fought. Quinctius had been detained in Rome for the greater part of the year by matters connected with religion, but had he reached his province earlier or had the winter begun later his conduct of affairs showed that he could have brought the war to a close. He had now almost gone into winter quarters, but it was asserted that he had given such a complexion to the war that if his successor did not interfere with him he would finish it in the summer.

By using language of this kind they so far succeeded that the consuls promised to accept the decision of the senate if

the tribunes would do the same. As both parties left the senate free to act, a decree was made that Italy should be administered by both consuls and T. Quinctius confirmed in his command until such time as the senate should appoint his successor. Each of the consuls had two legions assigned to him, and with these they were to carry on the war against the Cis-Alpine Gauls who had revolted from Rome. Reinforcements were also voted for Quinctius to be employed against Macedonia, comprising 6000 foot and 300 horse and also 3000 seamen. L. Q. Flaminius retained his place as commander of the fleet. Each of the praetors who were to act in Spain received 8000 infantry furnished by the Latins and allies and 400 cavalry; these were to take the place of the old army which was to be sent home. They were also to determine the boundaries of the two provinces of Hither and Further Spain. P. Sulpicius and P. Villius who had formerly been in Macedonia as consuls were appointed to Quinctius' staff.

XXIX. *Portents*.—Before the consuls and praetors left for their respective provinces steps were taken to expiate various portents which had been announced. The temples of Vulcan and Summanus in Rome and one of the gates with a portion of the wall at Fregellae were struck by lightning; at Frusino the sky became lit up during the night; at Aesula a two-headed lamb with five feet was born; at Formiae two wolves entered the town and mauled several people who fell in their way; at Rome a wolf entered the City and even made his way into the Capitol.

C. Atinius, one of the tribunes of the plebs, carried a proposal for founding five colonies on the coast, two at the mouths of the Volturnus and Lirernus, one at Puteoli, one at the Castrum Salerni, and finally Buxentum. It was decided that each colony should consist of 300 households, and three commissioners were appointed to supervise the settlement. They were to hold office for three years. The commissioners were M. Servilius Geminus, Q. Minucius Thermus and Tiberius Sempronius Longus.

*Expedition into Gaul and Liguria*.—When they had raised the required force and completed all the necessary business, both sacred and secular, both the consuls left for Gaul. Cornelius took the direct road to the Insubres, who in conjunction with the Cenomani were in arms; Q. Minucius bent his course to the left side of Italy towards the Adriatic, and marching his

army to Genua began operations in the direction of Liguria. Two fortified towns, Clastidium and Litubium, both belonging to the Ligurians, and two of their communities, the Celeiates and the Cerdiciates, surrendered. All the tribes on this side the Po were now reduced except the Boii in Gaul and the Ilvates in Liguria. It was stated that 15 fortified towns and 20,000 men surrendered.

XXX. From there he led his legions into the country of the Boii, whose army had not long before crossed the Po. They had heard that the consuls intended to attack with their united legions, and in order that they too might consolidate their strength by union they had formed a junction with the Insubres and Cenomani. When a report reached them that one of the consuls was firing the fields of the Boii, a sharp difference of opinion arose; the Boii demanded that all should render assistance to those who were hard pressed, the Insubres declared that they would not leave their own country defenceless. Their forces were accordingly divided; the Boii went off to protect their country, the Insubres and Cenomani took up a position on the bank of the Mincius. On the same river, two miles lower down, Cornelius fixed his camp. From there he sent to make enquiries in Brixia, their capital, and in their villages, and from what he learnt he was quite satisfied that it was not with the sanction of their elders that the younger men had taken up arms, nor had the national council authorised any assistance being given to the revolted Insubrians. On learning this he invited their chiefs to a conference and tried to induce them to break with the Insubres and either return home or go over to the Romans. He was unable to gain their consent to the latter proposal, but they gave him assurances that they would take no part in the fighting, unless occasion should arise, in which case they would assist the Romans. The Insubres were kept in ignorance of this compact, but they felt somewhat suspicious as to the intentions of their allies, and in forming their line they did not venture to entrust them with a position on either wing lest they should abandon their ground through treachery and involve the whole army in disaster. They were accordingly stationed in the rear as a reserve.

At the outset of the battle the consul vowed a temple to Juno Sospita in case the enemy were routed that day, and the shouts of the soldiers assured their commander that they would enable him to fulfil his vow. Then they charged, and

the Insubres did not stand against the first shock. Some authors say that the Cenomani attacked them from behind while the battle was going on and that the twofold attack threw them into complete disorder, 35,000 men being killed and 5200 made prisoners, including the Carthaginian general Hamilcar, the prime instigator of the war. 130 standards were taken and numerous wagons. Those of the Gauls who had followed the Insubres in their revolt surrendered to the Romans.

XXXI. The consul Minucius had carried his plundering expeditions throughout the country of the Boii, but when he heard that they had deserted the Insubres and returned to defend their country, he kept within his camp, intending to meet them in a general engagement. The Boii would not have declined battle if the news of the defeat of the Insubrians had not broken their spirit. They abandoned their leader and their camp and dispersed to their villages, each man prepared to defend his own property. This made their antagonist change his plans, for as there was no longer any hope of forcing a decision in a single action he resumed the plundering of their fields, and burnt their villages and farms. It was at this time that Clastidium was burnt. The Ilvates were now the only Ligurian tribe which had not submitted, and he led the legions against them. They too, however, surrendered when they had learnt the defeat of the Insubrians and also that the Boii were so discouraged that they would not venture to hazard an engagement.

The despatches from the two consuls announcing their successes reached Rome about the same time. The City praetor, M. Sergius, read them in the senate and was authorised by that body to read them in the Assembly.

A four days' thanksgiving was ordered.

XXXII. *Abortive Negotiations with Philip.*—Winter had now set in and T. Quinctius, after the capture of Elatea, had quartered his troops in Phocis and Locris. Political dissensions broke out in Opus, the one party summoned the Aetolians, who were the nearer, to their aid, the other party called in the Romans. The Aetolians were the first to arrive on the scene, but the other party, the wealthier and more influential one, refused them admittance and after despatching a message to the Roman general held the city pending his arrival. The citadel was garrisoned by Philip's troops and neither the threats of the Opuntians nor the authoritative tone of the Roman com-

mander availed to turn them out. The place would have been attacked at once had not a herald arrived from the king asking for a place and time to be appointed for an interview. After considerable hesitation the request was granted. Quinctius' reluctance was not due to his not wishing to have the credit of bringing the war to a close by arms and by negotiations, for he did not yet know whether one of the new consuls might not be sent out as his successor or whether he would be continued in his command, a decision which he had charged his friends and relations to do their utmost to secure.<sup>11</sup> He thought, however, that a conference would suit his purpose and leave him at liberty to turn it in favour of war if he remained in command, or of peace if he had to leave.

They selected a spot on the shore of the Maliac Gulf near Nicaea. The king proceeded thither from Demetrias in a war-vessel escorted by five swift barques. He was accompanied by some of the Macedonian magnates and also by a distinguished Aetolian refugee, named Cycliadas. With the Roman commander were King Amynder, Dionysodorus, one of Attalus' staff, Agesimbrotus, commandant of the Rhodian fleet, Phaeneas, the chief magistrate of the Aetolians, and two Achaeans, Aristaenus and Xenophon.

Surrounded by this group of notables the Roman general advanced to the edge of the beach, and on the king coming forward to the head of his ship, which was lying at anchor, he called out to him, "If you would step ashore we should both address and hear one another more comfortably." The king refused to do this, on which Quinctius asked, "What on earth are you afraid of?" In a proud and kingly tone Philip replied, "I fear no one but the immortal gods; but I do not trust all those I see about, and least of all the Aetolians." "That," answered Quinctius, "is a danger to which all who go into conference with an enemy are equally exposed, if, that is, no faith is kept." "Yes, T. Quinctius," was Philip's rejoinder, "but the rewards of treachery, should any be meditated, are not the same for both sides; Philip and Phaeneas are not equal in value. The Aetolians would not find it so difficult to substitute another magistrate, as the Macedonians would to replace their king." After this no more was said.

XXXIII. The Roman commander thought it only right that the one who had asked for the conference should begin the conversation, the king considered that the discussion should

be opened by the men who proposed terms of peace, not by the one who was to accept them. Thereupon the Roman observed that what he had to say would be quite simple and straightforward; he should merely state those conditions, without which peace would be impossible. "The king must withdraw his garrisons from all the cities in Greece; the prisoners and deserters must be handed back to the allies of Rome; those places in Illyria which he had seized after the conclusion of peace in Epirus must be restored to Rome; the cities which he had taken forcible possession of after the death of Ptolemy Philopator must be given back to Ptolemy, the king of Egypt. These," he said, "are my conditions and those of the people of Rome, but it is right and proper that the demands of our allies should also be heard." The representative of King Attalus demanded the restoration of the ships and prisoners that had been taken in the sea-fight off Chius, and also that the Nicophorium and the temple of Venus which the king had plundered and desolated should be restored to their former condition. The Rhodians demanded the cession of Peraca, a district on the mainland opposite their island and formerly under their sway, and insisted upon the withdrawal of Philip's garrisons from Iasos, Bargyliae and Euromus, as well as from Sestos and Abydos on the Hellespont, the restoration of Perinthus to the Byzantines with the re-establishment of their old political relations and the freedom of all the markets and ports in Asia. Phaeneas, as representing the Aetolians, demanded, almost in the same terms as the Romans, the evacuation of Greece and the restoration of the cities which had formerly been under the rule of the Aetolians.

He was followed by a leading Aetolian, named Alexander, who was, for an Aetolian, an eloquent speaker. He had long remained silent, he said, not because he thought that the conference would lead to any result, but simply because he did not want to interrupt any of the speakers who represented his allies. "Philip," he continued, "is not straightforward in discussing terms of peace nor has he shown true courage in the way he has conducted war. In negotiation he is deceitful and tricky, in war he does not encounter his enemy on fair ground or fight a set battle. He keeps out of his adversary's way, plunders and burns his cities, and when vanquished destroys what should be the prizes of the victors. The former kings of Macedonia did not behave in this way; they trusted to their battle-line, and

spared the cities as far as possible that their dominions might be all the richer. What sort of policy is that of destroying the very things which a man is fighting to secure, and leaving nothing for himself but the mere war? Last year Philip laid waste more cities in Thessaly, though they belonged to his allies, than any enemy that Thessaly ever had. Even from us Aetolians he has taken more cities since he became our ally than he did while he was our enemy. He seized Lysimachia after expelling the Aetolian garrison and its commandant; in the same way he completely destroyed Cius, a member of our league. By similar treachery he is now master of Thebes, Phthiae, Echinus, Larisa and Pharsalus."

XXXIV. Stung by Alexander's speech, Philip moved his ship nearer to the land in order that he might be better heard, and commenced a speech mainly directed against the Aetolians. He was, however, hotly interrupted at the outset by Phaeneas, who exclaimed: "Matters are not to be settled by words. Either you must conquer in war or you must obey those who are better than you." "That," replied Philip, "is obvious, even to a blind man"—a mocking allusion to Phaeneas' defective vision. He was by nature more given to jesting than a king ought to be, and even in the midst of serious business did not sufficiently restrain his laughter. He went on to express his indignation at the Aetolians ordering him, just as if they were Romans, to evacuate Greece, when they could not tell within what boundaries Greece lies. Even in Aetolia itself the Agraci, the Apodoti and the Amphiloichi, who form a considerable part of its population, are not included in Greece. "Have they," he continued, "any right to complain of my not leaving their allies alone, when they themselves keep up the ancient custom, as though it were a legal obligation, of allowing their younger men to bear arms against their own allies, the sanction of their government alone wanting? Thus it very frequently happens that opposing armies have contingents drawn from Aetolia on both sides. As to Cius, I did not actually storm it, but I lent assistance to Prusias, my ally and friend, in his attack on the place. Lysimachia I claimed from the Thracians, but as I had to give my whole attention to this war and was unable to guard it, the Thracians still hold it.

"So much for the Aetolians. With regard to Attalus and the Rhodians, in strict justice I owe them nothing, for the war was started not by me but by them.<sup>12</sup> Still, to show my esteem



for the Romans, I will restore Peræa to the Rhodians and the ships to Attalus with all the prisoners that can be found. Touching the restoration of the Nicephorium and the temple of Venus, what reply can I give to this demand further than to say that I will undertake the care and expense of replanting—the only way in which woods and groves that have been cut down can be restored—since such demands it is the pleasure of kings to make and grant to each other? ”

The close of his speech was a reply to the Achæans. After enumerating the services rendered to that nation, first by Antigonus and then by himself, he ordered the decrees to be read, which they had passed in his favour, showering upon him all honours human and divine, and then confronted them with the one they had lately passed in which they resolved to break with him. Whilst bitterly reproaching them for their faithlessness, he nevertheless promised to restore Argos to them. The position of Corinth he should discuss with the Roman general, and he should at the same time ask him whether he thought it fair that he should renounce all claim to the cities which he had himself captured and held by the rights of war, and even to those which he had inherited from his ancestors.

XXXV. The Achæans and the Aetolians were preparing to reply, but as it was almost sunset the conference was adjourned to the morrow. Philip returned to his anchorage and the Romans and allies to their camps. Nicaea had been fixed upon for the next meeting and Quinctius arrived there punctually on the following day, but there was no Philip anywhere, nor did any message arrive from him for several hours. At last, when they had given up all hope of his coming, his ships suddenly appeared. He explained that as such heavy and humiliating demands were made upon him and he was at a loss how to act, he had spent the day in deliberation. It was generally believed that he had purposely delayed the proceedings till late in the day in order that no time might be left for the Achæans and Aetolians to make their reply. This suspicion was confirmed when he requested that, in order to avoid waste of time in recriminations and bring the matter to a final issue, the others might be allowed to withdraw, and he and the Roman general left to confer together. At first this was demurred to, as it would look as if the allies were shut out from the conference, but as he persisted in his demand, it was agreed to by all that the others should withdraw and the

Roman commander accompanied by a military tribune, Appius Claudius, should go forward to the edge of the beach whilst the king attended by two of his suite came ashore. There they conversed for some time in private. It is not known what report of the interview Philip gave to his people, but the statement which Quinctius made to the allies was to the effect that Philip was prepared to cede to the Romans the whole of the Illyrian coast and deliver up the refugees and any prisoners there might be; to return to Attalus his ships and their captured crews; to restore to the Rhodians the district they call Peraea, but he would not evacuate Iasos and Bargyliae; to the Aetolians he would restore Pharsalus and Larisa but not Thebes; to the Achaeans he would cede not only Argos but Corinth as well.

Not one of the parties concerned was satisfied with these proposals, for they said that they were losing more than they were gaining, and unless Philip withdrew his garrisons from the whole of Greece, grounds of quarrel would never be wanting.

XXXVI. All the members of the council were loud in their protests and remonstrances, and the noise reached Philip who was standing at some distance. He asked Quinctius to postpone the whole business till the next day; he was quite certain that either he would bring them over to his view, or fall in with theirs. The sea-shore at Thronium was fixed upon for the conference and they assembled there at an early hour.

Philip began by urging Quinctius and all who were present not to insist upon destroying all hopes of peace. He then asked for time to enable him to send ambassadors to the Roman senate, he would either obtain peace on the terms he proposed or accept whatever conditions the senate offered. This suggestion met with no acceptance whatever, they said that his only object was to gain time to collect his forces. Quinctius observed that this might have been true if it had been summer, and the season suitable for a campaign, but as winter was now closing in nothing would be lost by allowing him sufficient time to send his ambassadors. No agreement that he might have made with the king would be valid without the ratification of the senate, and whilst the winter necessarily put a stop to military operations, it would be possible to find what conditions of peace the senate would sanction.

The rest of the negotiators fell in with this view and a two months' armistice was arranged. The different States decided to send each one envoy to lay the facts before the senate so that

they might not be misled by Philip's false statements. It was further agreed that before the armistice could come into force, the king's garrisons must be withdrawn from Phocis and Locris. To give greater importance to the mission Quinctius sent in company with them Amynder, king of the Athamanians, Q. Fabius, his sister-in-law's son, Q. Fulvius and Appius Claudius.

XXXVII. On their arrival in Rome the delegates of the allies were received in audience before those from Philip. Their address to the senate was mainly taken up with personal attacks on the king, but what weighed most with the senate was their description of that part of the world and the distribution of sea and land. From this they showed clearly that as long as Philip held Demetrias in Thessaly, Chalcis in Euboea, and Corinth in Achaia Greece could not be free; Philip himself with as much truth as insolence called these the fetters of Greece.

The king's envoys were then introduced and had commenced a somewhat lengthy address when they were interrupted by the pointed question: "Is he prepared to evacuate those three cities?" They replied that they were not mentioned in their instructions. On this they were dismissed and the negotiations broken off, the question of peace or war being left entirely to Quinctius. As it was quite evident that the senate were not averse from war, and as Quinctius himself was more anxious for victory than for peace, he refused any further interview with Philip, and said that he would not admit any envoys from him unless they came to announce that he was withdrawing entirely from Greece.

XXXVIII. *Philip and Nabis*.—When Philip saw that matters must be decided on the battlefield, he called in his forces from all quarters. His main anxiety was about the cities in Achaia, which were so far away, and he was more uneasy about Argos than about Corinth. He thought the best course would be to place it in the hands of Nabis, the tyrant of Lacedaemon, as a deposit to be restored to him should he be victorious, or should he meet with reverses to remain under the tyrant's rule. He wrote to Philocles, who was governor of Corinth and Argos, bidding him discuss the matter with Nabis. Philocles took a present with him, and as a further pledge of future friendship between the king and the tyrant he informed Nabis that Philip wished to form a matrimonial alliance between his daughters and Nabis' sons. At first the tyrant refused to accept the city

unless the Argives themselves, by a formal decree, summoned him to their assistance. When, however, he heard that at a crowded meeting of their Assembly the Argives were pouring contempt and even execration on his name, he considered that he had got a sufficient justification for plundering them and he told Philocles that he might deliver up the city whenever he chose. The tyrant was admitted into the place in the night without arousing any suspicion; at daybreak all the commanding positions were occupied and the gates closed. A few of the principal citizens had escaped at the beginning of the tumult and their property was seized; those who still remained had all their gold and silver taken away and very heavy fines were imposed upon them. Those who paid up promptly were dismissed without insult or injury, those who were suspected of concealing or withholding anything were flogged and tortured like slaves. A meeting of their Assembly was then summoned in which he promulgated two measures, one for the cancelling of debts and another for the division of land—two firebrands with which the revolutionaries were to inflame the lower classes against the aristocracy.<sup>13</sup>

XXXIX. When the city of the Argives was once in his power, the tyrant no longer troubled himself about the man who had made it over to him or the conditions on which he had accepted it. He despatched emissaries to Quinctius in Elatea and to Attalus who was wintering in Aegina, to inform them that he was master of Argos. They were also to intimate to Quinctius that if he would come to Argos, Nabis felt confident that a complete understanding would be arrived at. Quinctius' policy was to deprive Philip of all support, and he consented to visit Nabis, and at the same time sent word to Attalus to meet him in Sicyon. Just at this time his brother Lucius happened to bring up ten triremes from his winter quarters at Corcyra, and with these Quinctius sailed from Anticyra to Sicyon. Attalus was already there, and when they met he remarked that the tyrant ought to go to the Roman commander and not the Roman commander to the tyrant. Quinctius agreed with him, and declined to enter Argos. Not far from that city is a place called Mycenica, and this was decided upon as the scene of the conference.

Quinctius went with his brother and a few military tribunes, Attalus was attended by his suite, Nicostratus the chief magistrate of the Achaeans was also present with representatives

of the allied States. They found Nabis waiting for them with the whole of his force. He marched almost to the middle of the space separating the two camps, fully armed and escorted by an armed bodyguard; Quinctius unarmed, and the king also unarmed and accompanied by Nicostratus and one of his suite, came forward to meet him.

Nabis began by apologising for having come to the conference in arms and with an armed escort, though he saw that the king and the Roman commander were unarmed. He was not afraid, he said, of them, but of the refugees from Argos. Then they began to discuss the terms on which friendly relations might be established.

The Romans made two demands: first, that Nabis should put a stop to hostilities against the Achaeans and, secondly, that he should furnish assistance against Philip. This he promised to furnish; instead of a definite peace, an armistice was arranged with the Achaeans, to remain in force until the war with Philip was over.

XI. Attalus then opened a discussion on the question of Argos, which he contended had been treacherously betrayed by Philocles and was now forcibly retained by Nabis. Nabis replied that he had been invited by the Argives to go to their defence. Attalus insisted upon a meeting of the Argive Assembly being summoned in order that the truth might be ascertained. The tyrant raised no objection to this, but when the king declared that the troops ought to be withdrawn from the city and the Assembly left at liberty, without any Lacedaemonian being present, to state what the Argives really wanted, Nabis refused to withdraw his men. The discussion led to no result. A force of 600 Cretans was furnished by the tyrant to the Romans, and an armistice for four months arranged between Nicostratus the Achaean president and the tyrant of the Lacedaemonians, after which the conference broke up.

From there Quinctius proceeded to Corinth and marched up to the gate with the Cretan cohort in order that Philocles, the commandant, might see that Nabis had broken with Philip. Philocles had an interview with the Roman general who pressed him to change sides at once and surrender the city, and in his reply he gave the impression of postponing rather than refusing compliance. From Corinth Quinctius went on to Anticyra and sent his brother to learn the attitude of the Acarnanians.

From Argos Attalus proceeded to Sicyon, and this city paid

him still greater honour than they had done before, whilst he on his part determined not to pass by his allies and friends without some token of his generosity. He had previously secured for them at considerable cost some land which was consecrated to Apollo, and now he made them a gift of ten talents of silver and a thousand *medimni* of corn. He then returned to his ships at Cenchreae.

Nabis, too, went back to Lacedaemon, after leaving a strong garrison at Argos. He had despoiled the men and now he sent his wife there to despoil the women. She invited the ladies of rank to her house, sometimes alone, sometimes in family parties, and in this way succeeded by blandishments and threats in getting from them not only their gold but even their wardrobes and all their finery.



## NOTES

### BOOK XXVI

1 (p. 5). The Assembly alone could take cognisance of charges of treason.

2 (p. 5). *E.g.*, loss of all civil rights and confiscation of property.

3 (p. 5). They wore for defence only a light casque covered with leather and carried a round buckler and a bundle of darts. They skirmished in front of the line, ran forward to discharge their darts, and then fell back through the intervals in the front line—the *hastati*—who then made their main charge. Livy's language here is, however, somewhat odd, as the light troops he is speaking of were the first *velites*. His meaning seems to be that they were armed then as the *velites* were in his time.

4 (p. 7). The road to Suessula ran S.E. of Capua, whilst "towards the Voltturnus" would be N. of the city. Map No. VIII. in Everyman's *Classical Atlas* will make these positions clear.

5 (p. 12). "Before the sweeping pursuit of his Numidians crowds of fugitives were seen flying towards the City, while the smoke of burning houses arose far and wide into the sky. Within the walls the confusion and terror were at their height: he was come at last, this Hannibal whom they had so long dreaded; he had at length dared what even the slaughter of Cannae had not emboldened him to venture; some victory greater even than Cannae must have given him this confidence; the three armies before Capua must be utterly destroyed; last year he had destroyed or dispersed three other armies, and had gained possession of the entire south of Italy; and now he had stormed the lines before Capua, had cut to pieces the whole remaining force of the Roman people, and was come to Rome to finish his work. So the wives and mothers of Rome lamented, as they hurried to the temples, and there prostrate before the gods and sweeping the sacred pavement with their unbound hair in the agony of their fear, they remained pouring forth their prayers for deliverance. Their sons and husbands hastened to man the walls and the citadel and to secure the most important points without the City; whilst the senate, as calm as their fathers of old whom the Gauls massacred when sitting at their own doors, but with the energy of manly resolution rather than the resignation of despair, met in the Forum and there remained assembled, to direct every magistrate on the instant, how he might best fulfil his duty" (Arnold, III. pp. 243-4).

6 (p. 12). A reference to the plan of Rome (Map XXIII.)—where the inner boundary must be taken—will show that Fulvius marched through the lower ground west of the Caelian and the Esquiline and then turning to the east emerged through the Porta Esquiline. A position between the Esquiline and Colline Gates would be in the direction of Hannibal's advance from his camp at the Anio.

7 (p. 14). It is impossible to take this story seriously. Such childish petulance is hardly consistent with one of the strongest and most self-controlled characters in history.



8 (p. 15). "Campanian burgher," as distinct from the Capuans who, possessing the full Roman franchise, were guilty of treason and therefore excluded from the amnesty.

9 (p. 22). "The flourishing city of Capua, once the rival of Rome, was blotted out from among the list of Italian towns, and was henceforth let out by the Roman people 'like a tenement or pelling farm.' . . . Its 'motley population' was destitute of all those hallowed associations and feelings of attachment to the soil, which to the people of antiquity were the basis of patriotism and of all civic virtues. . . . We cannot of course expect to find amongst the men that fought against Hannibal that chivalrous spirit and generosity which in general characterise modern warfare. To what extent they acted in the spirit of their contemporaries we can judge most clearly from the manner in which the tender-hearted humane Livy, two centuries later, spoke of their proceedings. . . . There is perhaps no greater contrast anywhere between antiquity and modern times than in the range of human sympathies and love. As every nation, and even every city, had formerly its own god and its own religion, there existed no moral and no religious obligation with regard to the members of other communities. It was only when mankind gradually rose to the conception of one God of the universe, and when Christianity taught us to love our enemies as ourselves, that men ceased to look with pleasure or indifference at the sufferings of men differing from them in race, language, or even geographical locality alone" (*Ihnc*, II. pp. 342-3).

10 (p. 25). "At the same age, and nearly under the same circumstances, in which Napoleon was appointed in 1796 to take the command of the French army in Italy, was P. Scipio chosen by the unanimous voice of the Roman people to take the command of their army in Spain. And great as were the consequences of the appointment of Napoleon, those which followed the appointment of Scipio were greater and far more lasting" (*Arnold*, III. p. 390).

"A mind like Scipio's, working its way under the peculiar influence of his time and country, cannot but move irregularly; it cannot but be full of contradictions. . . . His mind rose above the state of things round him; his spirit was solitary and kingly; he was cramped by living amongst those as his equals whom he felt fitted to guide as from some higher sphere; and he retired at last to Linternum to breathe freely, to enjoy the simplicity of childhood, since he could not fulfil his natural calling to be a hero king. So far he stood apart from his countrymen, admired, revered, but not loved. But he could not shake off all the influence of his time; the virtue, public and private, which still existed at Rome, the reverence paid by the wisest and best men to the religion of their fathers, were elements too congenial to his nature, not to retain their hold on it: they cherished that nobleness of soul in him, and that faith in the invisible and the divine which two centuries of growing unbelief rendered almost impossible in the days of Caesar" (*Ibid.* p. 384).

11 (p. 27). We frequently read of the senate meeting in the Temple of Bellona, when a victorious general returning from a campaign claimed a triumph, as here, or when foreign states sent plenipotentiaries to discuss terms of peace. Neither the former nor the latter could enter the City before the senate authorised them to do so; the Temple of Bellona was situated on the northern edge of the Campus Martius, outside the City limits.

12 (p. 27). See note 8 in p. 356 of Vol. I.

13 (p. 27). The temple of Jupiter Latiaris on the Alban Mount was in all probability the shrine at which the generals of Latium used to

offer sacrifice after their triumph, as subsequently the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus on the Capitol was similarly used by the Romans.

14 (p. 28). This was the maximum allowed under the Licinian Law, and by virtue of this grant they became citizens of the First Class.

15 (p. 29). The enclosures within which the voters were penned whilst voting were called *ovolia* ("sheepfolds"). See Vol. I. note 9, p. 356.

16 (p. 30). For the institution of these Games, see Vol. III. p. 253.

17 (p. 30). A good illustration of a statue surmounting the roof of a temple is seen in fig. 17 in the *Classical Dictionary*.

18 (p. 32). "The league which the Aetolians now concluded with the Romans was distinguished by peculiar turpitude. It was an engagement by which the whole Aetolian people became Roman mercenaries and stipulated that their hire should be the plunder of the neighbouring Greek cities. . . . The Romans were to furnish ships, the Aetolians troops; the conquered countries and towns were to become the spoil of the Aetolians, the movable booty that of the Romans. If we recollect that this 'movable booty' included the inhabitants who might fall into the hands of the conquerors, and would consequently be sold into slavery, we shall duly appreciate the sense of national dignity that could animate the Aetolians and induce them to conclude so disgraceful an alliance with foreign barbarians for the enslaving of their countrymen" (Ihne, II. p. 411. See also Mommsen, II. pp. 141-2).

19 (p. 35). Quinquatrus, a festival in honour of Minerva, celebrated on March 19. The name is that of the day of its observance, the fifth of the Ides, as other days were similarly named in Old Latin, e.g., Triatrus, Sexatrus, etc. In time this derivation was forgotten, and to justify the name the celebration was extended over five days. As the goddess of art and science Minerva's festival had a special interest for the schools. The children had a holiday during its celebration, and then began a fresh year's work; the masters received their honorarium as a present from the scholars; this was called a "Minerval."

20 (p. 45). As Weissenborn remarks, this was a particularly cruel decree, as many Romans would actually witness the sale of their own relations by marriage.

21 (p. 45). "It was a consequence of the municipal constitution of the republic that Rome could not brook another great town beside herself. This was the reason why even in the legendary period Alba Longa was crushed and at a subsequent period Veii was doomed to destruction. . . . Wherever the republican armies planted their iron foot, they stamped out the life of all towns which might enter into competition with Rome. It was not before Rome herself had bowed her proud head under an imperial master that municipal prosperity returned to the great centres of art, learning and commerce in the subjected countries" (Ihne, II. p. 345).

22 (p. 46). A gold locket worn by patrician boys round the neck, containing generally an amulet or charm against evils.

23 (p. 47). The Lares and Penates, the friendly household gods, who presided over the daily food, were in some ways analogous to the "Brownies" of northern mythology. They were invited to share the daily meal, and bread and salt were placed before their images. A little silver salt-cellar and dish were kept for this purpose in almost all houses.

24 (p. 48). This is a good instance of Livy's compactness of expression. He means that Hannibal could not leave those allies who were doubtful

free to join that side from which they hoped to gain most advantage, nor would he expose those who remained true to him to the fear of subjugation and the fate of Capua.

25 (p. 55). This passage down to the opening words of chap. xliii, is wanting in the oldest MSS.

26 (p. 56). Polybius, who agrees with Livy as to the time taken on the march, gives the distance as 2600 stadia, equal roughly to 325 English miles. This would give an average of 46 miles a day. This seems a tremendous distance, but it is not incredible from what we know elsewhere of the marching powers of a Roman army. Towards the end of the following book the consul Claudius Nero is described as executing a still more rapid march—if Livy's account be accurate—of 55 miles on the average per day for six days. Where a forced march was not necessary the usual rate of marching was from 18 to 20 Roman miles a day. The Roman mile=4850 feet, or, roughly,  $1\frac{1}{3}$  of an English mile.

27 (p. 62). This is an obscure sentence. Livy's meaning appears to be that though each had championed his own man they had exerted their authority in keeping the display of party feeling within bounds. Their selection as arbitrators prevented them from doing so any longer.

28 (p. 67). New Carthage was the key of Spain, the base of the Carthaginian operations in that country, and its fall was the first step towards their final expulsion. Spain was the recruiting ground from which Hannibal hoped to keep up his strength in Italy and, when that was lost, there could only be one issue for him.

## BOOK XXVII

1 (p. 70). The text of the MSS. is here evidently at fault.

"It is much to be regretted that the account of these events by Polybius is lost. Yet we are not altogether deprived of the means of rectifying the palpable boastings of the annalists whom Livy followed. Frontinus, a military writer of the first century after Christ, has by chance preserved an account of the battle of Numistro from which we learn that it ended, not with a victory, but with a defeat of Marcellus" (Ince, II. p. 361).

2 (p. 72). Namely, the one concluded with Ptolemy Philadelphus, mentioned in the summary of Book XIV.

3 (p. 72). The *palla* was a wide loose wrap, thrown over the shoulders and fastened by brooches. It was worn out of doors.

4 (p. 73). That is of course Northern Africa, the only part of the continent the Romans were acquainted with. These troops would be Moors and Libyo-Phœnicians.

5 (p. 76). The text here is doubtful.

6 (p. 78). See Vol. I. p. 356, note 7.

7 (p. 82). This gold was the produce of the tax of five per cent. on the value of every slave who was emancipated. Its institution is mentioned in Book VII. chap. xvi (Vol. II. p. 72). There would thus be an accumulation of 150 years. As gold coinage was not yet introduced it would probably be in bars.

The "secret treasury" was in the temple of Saturn on the Capitoline, distinct from the treasury of the exchequer which was probably kept in a building behind that temple, unless, as Preller supposes, it was in the temple of Saturn and Ops in the Vicus Lugiarius.

- 8 (p. 84). The fire described in the previous Book, chap. xxvii.
- 9 (p. 88). It is unfortunately impossible to look upon the account of these battles as historical. "A victory on the day after a defeat—surely the most difficult and the most glorious feat of arms, especially in a war with Hannibal—would have been an event in the military annals of Rome which would have secured for Marcellus not only the grateful acknowledgement of his countrymen but immortal fame. But instead of this we find in chap. xx. that Marcellus was forthwith accused in Rome by the tribune C. Publicius Bibulus of incompetency in the management of the war and that he found it necessary to hasten from Venusia to Rome in order to justify himself and to prevent the passing of a vote of censure" (Ihne, II. p. 367, note). We have here an instance of the mischief done by family annals in falsifying history. One or two families are conspicuous for this hero-worship, the greater offenders probably being the Claudii and the Marcelli. Livy's remark at the end of Book XXX. has a wide application.
- 10 (p. 92). On the tongue of land to the west of the harbour opposite the isthmus on which the city stood.
- 11 (p. 95). "It is evident that Scipio's pretended victory at Baecula was of little importance. Hasdrubal carried off all his elephants, all his treasure, and a large proportion of his infantry; he was not pursued; he retreated in the direction which best suited his future movements, and these movements he effected without the slightest interruption from the enemy" (Arnold, III. p. 412. See also Mommsen, II. p. 152).
- 12 (p. 101). This seems the most probable reading, though there is something to be said for Merkel's conjecture of *idus* for *nonus* which would give 13th July as the date. As a matter of fact the Games were in Livy's day celebrated through the interval between these limits, though probably in the earlier time they were confined to one or, at the most, two days.
- 13 (p. 103). It is not without considerable hesitation that I have given this rendering. Livy used the word *certi*. The traditional classification of the gods was (a) *certi*, (b) *incerti*, (c) *selecti*. The *certi* were the deities who had been universally recognised from the beginning. The *incerti* had become such by consecration, i.e. raised to the rank of gods; e.g. Castor and Pollux, Hercules, Liber, etc. The *selecti* seem to have been mainly personifications of abstract qualities, e.g. Pudor, Spes, Pietas, etc. But it is doubtful whether Livy uses the word in this sense and did not rather mean the deities definitely mentioned in the pontifical books as those to whom offerings might be made in common. If he used the word in the first signification it is clear that as Honos and Virtus were not *certi* but *selecti* the pontiff's objection was well grounded.
- 14 (p. 104). The protuberance on the right lobe of the liver—the "head"—was most anxiously scrutinised; its absence or malformation was always regarded as a most important sign.
- 15 (p. 106). The incident is mentioned in chap. xxxviii. of the preceding Book.
- 16 (p. 108). At the neck of the Gulf of Corinth, which in its narrowest part is only five furlongs wide.
- 17 (p. 109). Now the Gulf of Zeitoun.
- 18 (p. 109). Athamania lies under the Pindus range to the west of it. See *Classical Atlas*, Map XI.

- 19 (p. 114). His companion in misfortune was L. Aemilius Paulus, who fell at Cannae (Book XXII. chap. xxxv.).
- 20 (p. 114). The incident mentioned in chap. xxv.
- 21 (p. 114). See Book XXVI. chap. xxii.
- 22 (p. 114). See note 14 in Vol. I. p. 358.
- 23 (p. 115). Nero had given evidence against him at his trial.
- 24 (p. 116). Ten years before the population numbered 270,713.
- 25 (p. 117). A place on the Aventine, so called from its being used for the purification (*lustratio*) by arms.
- 26 (p. 123). It is difficult to reconcile the account of this battle with what we know of the extraordinary discipline which Hannibal maintained.
- 27 (p. 125). Narnia, as will be seen from Map VIII., was on the Flaminian Road and formed the key to Umbria. In case Hasdrubal was successful in Umbria a force here would cover the road to Rome.
- 28 (p. 128). For the use of the *lessera*, see note 17 in Vol. II. p. 285.
- 29 (p. 129). The two consuls being of equal rank, each had the bugle-call—probably when the guard was relieved—for the men in his command.
- 30 (p. 130). There can, I think, be no doubt that this is the true rendering, though many editors reverse it. It is supported by the direct statement of Polybius and is in harmony with Livy's description of the battle.
- 31 (p. 132). This would amount to an average of fifty-five miles in the twenty-four hours. See note 26 to chap. xlii. in the last Book (p. 394).

## BOOK XXVIII

- 1 (p. 140). The *pelta* was a small light shield not unlike the *celva* or ox-hide buckler mentioned in Book XXI. chap. xii. (Vol. III. p. 20) as forming part of the equipment of the Spanish infantry. It was similarly covered with hide and was circular and convex in shape. A good idea of it may be obtained from the illustration of "Memnon and Achilles" on p. 604 of the *Classical Dictionary*.
- 2 (p. 140). The tribe dwelt to the west of the Maliac Gulf which is here named after them.
- 3 (p. 140). Otherwise, the Pegasean Gulf in the south-east of Thessaly.
- 4 (p. 146). Mainly the proceeds of Hasdrubal's captured war-chest.
- 5 (p. 147). Their enrolment into two legions—the nineteenth and twentieth—is mentioned in chap. xxxviii. of the preceding Book.
- 6 (p. 150). Otherwise, *Ilipa* by which it is designated in the *Classical Atlas* (Map III.). It lay some sixty miles west of Corduba.
- 7 (p. 161). Marcius (see last chapter) had evidently failed to effect its capture, probably because his force was too small. Livy tells us nothing about the operations before this city.
- 8 (p. 164). Reading *interfluens*, which agrees with the account Livy gives of this business. Neither he, however, nor Polybius explains how the soldiers managed to secure the molten metal.
- 9 (p. 165). Atrius and Albius (*ater* means "black" and *albus* means "white") seem hardly historical, though Scipio is represented in his subsequent address as making play on the former name, which carried

an evil omen. It suggested the infernal deities. There may also be a play in the association of Atrius with Umbria (*umbra* means "shade"). If the names are historical the contrast forms a curious coincidence.

10 (p. 172). Scipio evidently detects signs of impatience and irritation in his audience.

11 (p. 175). The Carthaginian supremacy in Spain was the work of the Barcine family. See previous Vol. chap. ii.

12 (p. 179). Contrary to the fashion of the Romans, who wore their hair short, as Scipio himself did in later years. See the numismatic profiles on p. 588 of the *Classical Dictionary*.

13 (p. 181). The Phoenician form is *Shophet*, a word common to all the Semitic languages. It is translated in our authorised version by "judge."

14 (p. 182). The magistracy carried the *imperium* and *potestas* in the republic as a whole. Scipio's commission was a local one. See Book XXVI. chap. xviii.

15 (p. 185). According to chap. xxxviii. this had already been done in the case of the consular provinces. It appears as though Scipio wanted to upset the arrangement and have Africa assigned to him instead of Sicily.

16 (p. 186). This sentence has been variously interpreted. I take it to mean that he fears lest the adoption of the more specious proposals of others may bring disaster and so prove his own to have been wiser.

17 (p. 188). Alcibiades.

18 (p. 188). For the fate of Regulus, see the Summary of the Eighteenth Book in Vol. II.

19 (p. 193). There is an interesting reading in the later MSS., which insert after this sentence: "Can there be a greater or closer instance than Hannibal?"

20 (p. 196). Reading *interamenta*, which has the best authority. Another reading which some editors adopt—*incramenta*—would appear to denote wax and pitch for caulking the vessels. The word only occurs in this passage.

21 (p. 196). These are apparently part of the regular military equipment; axes for cutting the timber for the stockade of the camp, spades for intrenchment, sickles for cutting grass, etc. for forage, gablons for carrying earth in throwing up the *vallum*, and hand-mills, as the soldiers generally ground their own corn.

#### BOOK XXIX.

1 (p. 204). Reading *certum* for the *incertum* of the MSS., which confuses the sense.

2 (p. 208). See Book XXIV. chap. xxxiv. (Vol. III. p. 220) for this particular engine.

3 (p. 208). The citadel evidently had its own gates, as the Romans were holding the city gates.

4 (p. 210). Probably, as Weissenborn suggests, a Sicilian vessel.

5 (p. 211). See the note on Ida in the *Classical Dictionary*. Her worship became predominant in Phrygia and there was at Pessinus, where she

was honoured under the name of Agdistis, a famous temple dedicated to her.

6 (p. 211). The one mentioned in Book XXVIII. chap. xlv.

7 (p. 211). This incident is described at the end of Book X.

8 (p. 212). He was proconsul in Spain and at the same time aedile in Rome; a probably unique instance of the kind.

9 (p. 216). Probably at that time the minimum age was twenty-seven.

10 (p. 217). These were the *decuriones*. The city council in the Latin colonies consisted of one hundred members who were divided into ten committees or *decuries*. The president of each committee was the *decurio*.

11 (p. 220). As instances of the hospitality which Rome extended to foreign deities we have in addition to the instance recently mentioned of Mater Idaea, that of the Juno of Veii in Book V. chap. xxi., and of the Aesculapius of Epidaurus in the Summary of Book XI.

12 (p. 223). Each senator was asked for his opinion individually by the president, and in the present case the process could not be completed owing to the number and length of the speeches.

13 (p. 227). See Book XXVIII. chap. xvii.

14 (p. 230). This is Livy's word. Probably some large shed on one of the wharves is meant.

15 (p. 230). Emporia (to be distinguished from the Spanish Emporiae), the name of a district lying round the Syrtis Minor, containing numerous populous Phœnician colonies.

16 (p. 232). This was an offering to the sea-gods. When an offering was made to terrestrial deities, the sacrificial parts of the victim were roasted and then burnt on the altar.

17 (p. 232). On the eastern side of the Gulf of Carthage. It is more commonly described by the Greek form of the name ("Hermaeum" Prom.). See *Classical Atlas*, Map XXI.

18 (p. 235). Livy introduces the Masaesulians to us in chap. xvii. of the preceding Book.

19 (p. 237). This name is often given as Bocchar, but it appears on an inscription as Boncar, which is probably the correct form.

20 (p. 239). This is recorded in chap. xxix.

21 (p. 240). So the MSS. But there must be some mistake as the Carthaginian horses were already tired out.

22 (p. 242). This place was known afterwards as the Castra Cornellana. Caesar mentions it in his *Memoirs of the Civil War*, where he speaks of it as "a steep ridge running out into the sea, precipitous and rocky on both sides, but somewhat less so on the side towards Utica. The distance from Utica in a straight line is a little over a mile" (II. xxiv.).

23 (p. 244). For these horses furnished by the State, see Vol. I. p. 50.

### BOOK XXX

1 (p. 247). The 3000 were required to man the 40 ships.

2 (p. 247). The last celebration was in 208 B.C.

3 (p. 248). For the significance of this portent see note 14 in Book XXVII.

4 (p. 251). As it stands in the text this sentence is undoubtedly corrupt and no safe emendation has been proposed.

5 (p. 254). The modern Tunis.

6 (p. 254). The "gangways" were wooden bridges thrown across from the movable towers on to the enemy walls, which were then at once rushed.

7 (p. 256). Referring to Q. Statorius and his colleagues. The account is given in Book XXIV. chap. xlviil.

8 (p. 261). I owe this happy paraphrase to old Philemon Holland.

9 (p. 262). Who formed the Supreme Council of Carthage. See Mommsen, Vol. II. p. 15.

10 (p. 264). A purple band round the edge which distinguished the senators.

11 (p. 267). The incident is recorded in Book XXI. chap. xxv.

12 (p. 268). It is to be regretted that Livy should have accepted this story, which no doubt was widely current. "The act cannot be reconciled with Hannibal's character. He was not capable of gratuitous cruelty. . . . If Italian soldiers met their death in the sanctuary of Juno it is much more likely that they were men who, like the noble Capuans before the taking of the town, preferred to die a voluntary death rather than allow themselves to be tortured by the Romans in punishment for their rebellion" (Ihne, II. 444). Mommsen, who looks at things more from a Roman standpoint, regards it as historical. See Vol. II. p. 172. He takes a fairer view of Hannibal's character.

13 (p. 270). The text of this passage is very uncertain.

14 (p. 272). This may probably be the name of a locality.

15 (p. 273). By the voice of the soldiery.

16 (p. 275). See Vol. II. note 18, p. 285.

17 (p. 280). The translators appear to have missed the point here. The Latin phrase is borrowed from the law-courts and corresponds somewhat to our "haling before a judge."

18 (p. 282). Livy's description leaves much to be desired here. It would appear from Polybius' account that the maniples were drawn up in column behind one another instead of the usual chess-board formation. This would allow of fairly wide "lanes" extending from front to rear between each column. It was, however, a risky manœuvre and shows Scipio's confidence in his men.

19 (p. 285). A somewhat long fight, continued for two days and two nights. Hadrumetum was apparently about 270 miles from the field of Zama.

20 (p. 287). About £2,550,000.

21 (p. 288). The difficulty was that to demand restitution from these would considerably diminish any chance of the acceptance of Scipio's terms; it was highly important that they should be brought over.

22 (p. 288). The returns of the quaestors and private owners would be made in terms of Roman coinage.

23 (p. 289). As Cosa—or Cossa—was considerably north of Rome the consul must have been deliberately marking time. There was no port of "Loretum"; the reading is doubtless corrupt.



24 (p. 289). Carnis is on the extreme south of Sardinia. See Map IX. in *Classical Atlas*.

25 (p. 290). These Games appear to be distinct from the Festival of Ceres mentioned in Book XXI. chap. lvi. (vol. III. p. 117), and lasted from the 12th to the 19th of April when the green fields were full of promise and the kindly goddess of the harvest was specially invoked. The Games were an occasion of rejoicing and revelry, and those who took part in them, especially the priestesses and ministers of Ceres, were clad in white.

26 (p. 291). Referring to the incident in chap. xxvii.

27 (p. 295). Probably in the "Hall of Liberty" mentioned in Vol. III. p. 246. There is a touch of irony in this designation of a place of confinement.

28 (p. 295). This formula should be compared with the one mentioned in Vol. I. p. 28. It is not quite clear whether the "praetor" here is the commander-in-chief, or whether it is simply the designation of a curule magistrate, or whether the use of the "sacred herb" was ordered outside the limits of Italy.

29 (p. 295). A solitary instance, apparently, of this form of death inflicted on the Romans, and probably borrowed from the Carthaginians. According to the *Digest* the ordinary punishment in later times was that of being burnt alive.

30 (p. 296). Livy does not endorse this story, which is highly improbable. See Mommsen, Vol. II. p. 175.

31 (p. 296). Reading *otio* with the MSS. The peace-at-any-price party of Hasdrubal Haedus might look upon this prohibition as a positive benefit to Carthage, because it removed the temptation to exhaust her strength in foreign wars. Hannibal goes on to show that the real design of the Romans was to encourage domestic dissensions as the surest way of effecting her ruin. This policy was carried out in the next few years amongst the States of Greece with fatal results to their liberty.

32 (p. 297). See note 7 on page 299 of Vol. III.

#### BOOK XXXI

1 (p. 301). On the prices of corn at this epoch, see Mommsen, II. p. 350.

2 (p. 302). See Mommsen, II. p. 218.

3 (p. 303). The defection of these nationalities was one of the results of Cannae. See Vol. III. p. 125.

4 (p. 304). Livy's words might be taken to mean that any Roman who was not a senator could act, but in view of the technicalities to be observed and the punctiliousness of the Romans in such matters it is most probable that the consuls' choice would be limited to the fetials. The procedure is described in Vol. I. p. 39.

5 (p. 305). The unpopularity of the war made the senate anxious to draw upon as few citizens as possible for their military requirements. The employment of auxiliaries without any stiffening of Roman legionaries was a new departure. See Mommsen, II. 218.

6 (p. 305). Owing, doubtless, to the severity with which Rome was treating the disaffected communities.

7 (p. 307). These were the insignia of royalty and the special dress worn by Roman generals in their triumphal procession. See Vol. II. p. 229, with the note on the passage.

8 (p. 308). The procedure is described in Book XXIX. chap. xxi.

- 9 (p. 309). Of which an account is given in Book XXVII, chap. xxxvii, 10 (p. 310). The etymology of this word is explained thus: the land was entered as *triens*—"a third part"—in the *tabulae* or State registers—probably the exchequer rolls.
- 11 (p. 310). See Vol. I. p. 355, note 23.
- 12 (p. 313). See Vol. III. p. 12.
- 13 (p. 314). For a fuller account of this interview, see Mommsen, II. p. 217.
- 14 (p. 315). See Vol. I. p. 356, note 8.
- 15 (p. 316). Livy evidently assumes that both divisions took part in the fighting, but only mentions one. Something has probably fallen out of the text.
- 16 (p. 316). A synonym of Jupiter as the beneficent god of heaven and the light of heaven. See article "Jupiter" in *Classical Dictionary*.
- 17 (p. 319). This gate is marked on the plan of Athens at the end of the *Classical Dictionary*. It lies on the north-west and opened on to the main road to Western Attica and the Peloponnesus. As its name shows, it consisted of two gates one behind the other, an arrangement similar to that of the Hexapylon of Syracuse. For a description of the latter, see Vol. III. p. 300, note 10.
- 18 (p. 322). These famous walls were built under the administration of Pericles in 457-6 B.C. They extended from the Piraeus to Athens, a distance of four-and-a-half miles, and were parallel to each other, separated by a breadth of 550 feet. They appear to have been some twelve feet thick and sixty feet or thereabouts in height.
- 19 (p. 331). So called from their carrying the *caetra*, a buckler covered with ox-hide. The Africans and Spaniards adopted it also; see Vol. III. p. 20. In respect of their equipment the *caetrati* held an intermediate place between the light-armed and heavy infantry.
- 20 (p. 332). Practically, a square formation which allowed of a front being formed in any direction in case of a sudden attack.
- 21 (p. 342). Livy is probably thinking of the attack on the place mentioned in Book XXVIII, chap. vi., but at that time the city was actually taken; Philip's recovery of it is mentioned in chap. viii.
- 22 (p. 343). "The Hollows." According to Strabo this was the designation of the narrows between Aulis and Calchis, where the coast-line on either side is hollowed out. See *Classical Atlas*, Map XI.
- 23 (p. 343). Livy resumes the narrative from chap. xxii.
- 24 (p. 344). There is no doubt, I think, that the reading of the best MSS.—*sicut non*—is the right one. The army of L. Furius had been disbanded as we read in chap. x., and the consular army from Etruria had been placed under his orders till the consul C. Aurelius, who had been detained in Rome, could take up his command.
- 25 (p. 345). For M. Furius Camillus, see Vol. I. p. 345, Vol. II. p. 53; and for his son L. Furius Camillus, Vol. II. p. 83.

## BOOK XXXII

- 1 (p. 348). The Latin Festival was a religious gathering on the Alban Mount at which the Roman consuls and other magistrates, including the plebeian tribunes and aediles and the magistrates of the cities comprised in the Latin League, took part. The victim for sacrifice was a young white steer, and after the sacrifice and the appointed prayers were ended those

present joined in a sacrificial meal in which the parts of the victim were distributed amongst them. It would appear that when the representatives of a particular town were not present, their portion was sent to them. Ardea had not received its portion and we read of a similar omission in the case of Laurentia (Book XXXVII. chap. iii.). Where a mistake of this kind occurred, or where the prayers had not been duly recited as in the case of the magistrate of Lanuvium (Book XLI. chap. xvi.), the whole solemnity was rehearsed anew.

2 (p. 349). Their reason may be gathered from Mommsen's remarks, I. pp. 418-19.

3 (p. 350). *I.e.* "Hollow Thessaly." See the same designation applied to the narrowest part of the Euripus in chap. xlvii. of the preceding Book.

4 (p. 357). Thessaly had been a part of the Macedonian empire since 340 B.C.

5 (p. 363). This remark throws an interesting side-light upon the wide diffusion of works amongst private owners in Greece and also upon the eagerness of the Romans to possess them. Livy makes a similar remark with regard to Syracuse, Vol. III. chap. xl.

6 (p. 366). Referring to his offers in chap. v.

7 (p. 371). These were the permanent council of the League, who dealt with current business, convened the general council of the League and decided upon the subjects for discussion.

8 (p. 372). The position round Corinth: The Achaeans were on the north-west, the Romans on the south-east, and Attalus on the north.

9 (p. 374). Or a Larissa. The word is apparently an old Pelagic designation for a strongly fortified height, and is frequently met with. The one described here was "a hill nine hundred feet high, with precipitous sides, forming one of the strongest acropolises in Greece."

10 (p. 376). There is a lacuna here in the principal MSS. of three lines, which is indicated in the translation. Probably, as Weissenborn conjectures, it contained an account of the capture and punishment of the conspirators.

11 (p. 381). This is an awkwardly worded sentence. I have adopted the current interpretation, but, in spite of Weissenhorn's lengthy defence of it, I am far from satisfied with it. Gronovius' conjectural emendations simplify the sentence and, had they anything to support them, would probably have been adopted.

12 (p. 383). The Rhodians and Attalus began the war. See Mommsen, II. 207.

13 (p. 387). Nabis pursued the same policy in Argos as that by which he made himself master of Sparta. See Mommsen, II. 207.

