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
German-Bashing and the Breakup of Yugoslavia

Danlele Conversi

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The *Donald W. Treadgold Papers* publication series was created to honor a great teacher and great scholar. Donald W. Treadgold was professor of history and international studies at the University of Washington from 1949 to 1993. During that time, he wrote seven books, one of which — *Twentieth Century Russia* — went into eight editions. He was twice editor of *Slavic Review*, the organ of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, and received the AAASS Award for Distinguished Contributions to Slavic Studies, as well as the AAASS Award for Distinguished Service. Professor Treadgold molded several generations of Russian historians and contributed enormously to the field of Russian history. He was, in other ways as well, an inspiration to all who knew him.

The *Treadgold Papers* series was created in 1993 on the occasion of Professor Treadgold's retirement, on the initiative of Professor Daniel Waugh. Professor Treadgold passed away in December 1994. The series is dedicated to the memory of a great man, publishing papers in those areas which were close to his heart.

Sabrina P. Ramet
Editor

About the author of this issue

Daniele Conversi (Associate Professor) received his PhD in Sociology at the London School of Economics. He has taught at Cornell, Syracuse, and Central European University (Budapest). He has published several works on ethnic politics and nationalism, including his internationally acclaimed *The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain. Alternative Routes to National Mobilization*, London: Hurst/Reno: Nevada UP, 1997. He is currently working on a book on theories of nationalism.

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Daniele Conversi
Budapest, Hungary

Since the inception of the Yugoslav crisis, the major Western powers have been unable to provide adequate or united responses to the maelstrom of calamitous events. The EC decision to recognize the independence of Slovenia and Croatia on 16 December 1991, can be identified as the first coordinated attempt to find a way out of the *impasse*. According to its critics, this step was premature and precipitated the ensuing dramatic developments. According to its apologists, if anything, it came too late, only after the invasion of the JNA (Serbo-Croatian acronym for *Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija*, Yugoslav People's Army, also known as YPA) of nearly one third of Croatia and a ten-day war with Slovenia.

This monograph aims to consider and analyze both viewpoints. In doing so, it will try to answer the two main questions underpinning each position: Why did Germany exert particular pressure to recognize Slovenia and Croatia? Why did the notion of Germany's responsibility for these events gain widespread acceptance? The sources will be both primary, such as statements by political leaders and diplomats, and secondary, such as academic literature touching upon the topic. The latter is still at an embryonic stage and critical research discussing the topic is still relatively limited.¹

As is known, several countries had been pressing for recognition since the start of the war on 27 June 1991.² However, it was only as a result of Germany's political and economic weight that the European Union found the will to move towards that end. This step was Germany's first bold foreign policy initiative since the end of World War II. Moreover, it occurred in the wake of another dramatic development, German reunification. The latter, although not openly contested by other Western powers, created a chilly sense of threat among some European countries, reviving far-reaching memories of a renewed German expansionism. Nowhere within the EC did this fear find such fertile ground as in the British popular press and in talk shows, where 'anti-Hun' rhetoric about the purported re-emergence of a Fourth Reich sprang up in popular political culture.

This monograph argues that such a political atmosphere deeply influenced and inhibited the debate over new developments in the Balkans, and in Eastern Europe in general, in the aftermath of the Cold War. Focusing on Germany's foreign initiative (often associated with Germany's Foreign Minister at the time of the crisis, Hans D. Genscher, who led the diplomatic initiative among his Euro-

pean partners) provided a convenient all-encompassing rationale to make sense of an international event—the war in Bosnia—which defied most received wisdom and accepted explanations.

Effective analysis has also been inhibited by another factor: a split between international relations in practice on the one hand, and socio-political analysis on the other. There has been a tendency, if not a will, to play down the internal socio-political factors within Yugoslavia in favor of grandiose international explanations about a new carve-up of the Balkans. This shortcoming is particularly evident in works by international diplomats, who, rather than focusing on the internal events leading to the war, give an exaggerated importance to external factors, in which there seems to be often a desperate apology of their profession's mistakes.³ Sociological and political interpretations of the war's domestic origins are often ignored.⁴ The result is that journalistic reports and other insider accounts have often conveyed the issue more reliably than analyses by International Relations scholars or practitioners.⁵ In the last two years, however, studies by a younger generation of scholars, not from International Relations, have started to analyze in depth the internal causes of the war, while providing a balanced consideration of external factors.⁶

A brief chronological outline on recognition and its opponents will establish that the former came long after Yugoslavia had begun its slide towards disintegration, and many months after the war started. The role of Lord Carrington's initiative will be given a particular weight. The ensuing section will attempt to answer the question of why Germany apparently exerted more pressure for recognition than other European countries. Western responses to the German initiative are put in the context of a widening rift among — and within — the main European powers on how to deal with the crisis. A full section is dedicated to "German-bashing" as a resurgent Western — particularly British — *malaise*.

As used in this study, the term "German-bashing" refers exclusively to international reactions to the breakup of Yugoslavia. I will not imply that it refers to other dimensions of Germany's foreign or internal politics — even though I will mention the more general "anti-Kraut" hysteria pervading the British tabloid press and government milieu. This essay fully endorses the principle that Germany's postwar sense of guilt in the wake of the *Shoa* helped to shape and give direction to Western politics since the end of World War II. This sense of German guilt is central to the entire postwar effort of pan-European unification, and indeed, of world peace. On

the contrary, by chastening Germany for an excessive concern over human rights in the Balkans, as happened during the pre- and post-recognition debates, German-bashers have played into the hands of neo-revisionists and in general, of those who argue that Germany has been unjustly framed for past misdeeds. What characterizes contemporary attacks likening post-German unification to a new Reich is the extreme unscrupulousness of the attackers. Neo-revisionists have been only too happy to use the cynicism of German-bashers against the bountiful evidence that points to the relative success of Germany's early initiative in the Balkans — as opposed to that of other Western partners — to extrapolate more generic self-victimizing sequiturs. In other words, the attacks have risked rekindling a kind of petty wounded pride which had supposedly been laid to rest.

The most extreme form of German-bashing can be identified as the belief in a "Fourth Reich conspiracy," which in Britain was occasionally reinforced by fumbblings about a "Papist plot" to revive World War II alliances. German-bashing is *ergo* a form of anti-Europeanism. A subsequent section identifies the process of German unification as the main catalyst of this new fear of Germany, which disproportionately influenced British and French perceptions of the Yugoslav crisis. How and why German-bashing was finally utilized by the US State Department is the question which the following section attempts to answer. A particular Western weakness is then diagnosed in the lack of knowledge of internal dynamics and cleavages in the former Yugoslavia. This concerned particularly the misunderstanding of the sequel of events leading to the breakup: while most early analyses originally identified its main causes in Slovenian and Croatian nationalism, it is now increasingly clear that separatism was rather mustered up in Belgrade by duping the international community and deceiving the JNA's initial task of defending the country's unity. Finally, the marginalization of Germany's foreign politics will be identified as a critical factor impinging on the unfolding of the Bosnian war.

A brief history of recognition and its opponents

Western support for a united Yugoslavia as a single state dates back to the creation of the country in 1918.⁷ There were several reasons for this support, the best known of which was the desire to mould a military power in the Balkans which would counter-balance Germany's influence in the *vacuum* left by the collapsing

Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. Given Germany's traditional interests in, and strong ties with, the entire area from Hungary to Greece, this Anglo-French desire was understandable. In the absence of a united Yugoslavia, of all the Balkan states and potentates, Serbia would become the favorite choice because of its longest established independence, its military tradition, and its anti-German and anti-Turkish stance.⁸

In point of fact, during the last century, "plucky little Serbia" was not seen in a negative light by most Germans either, among whom a Romantic and Classic tradition of support for the independence of all Balkan peoples, chiefly Greece, had developed.⁹ Serbia's enmity with the Austro-Hungarian world began only as a 'response' to the declining Habsburg's attempt to colonize Bosnia, which was viewed basically as Serbian land.

Serbophilia has been especially robust in France, a country which bestowed all forms of military, technological and financial support on Serbia. The idea of a strong centralized state, a kind of Jacobin monarchy, proved attractive to Belgrade's elites after the creation of Yugoslavia, particularly under the dictatorship of Alexander I (1888-1934). In the 1930s, Henri Pozzi, who had been working in the French and English Intelligence Services in the Balkans and Central Europe, noted:

This military entente between France and Yugoslavia has been the corner-stone of French foreign politics in Europe ever since the first convention was signed after [World War I] between the general staffs of Paris and Belgrade. The French have not ceased to give financial aid to Belgrade since then, either directly in the form of authorized loans and advances by the Treasury, or indirectly by aiding the Yugoslav government with its purchases of military supplies; and the financing by Parisian banks of great public works, railroads, fortifications, ports, and telegraph lines, all destined to reinforce its war potentialities. This uninterrupted aid, amounting to billions of francs, the French explain and justify to themselves by the fact that by arming the Yugoslavs they are increasing their own security. The Yugoslav army has become an extension of France's might. In the event of a European war, the two would act in concert. Because of this fact the military power of Yugoslavia appears to Frenchmen as an essential factor of peace. Supporting and complementing each other, the armies of France and Yugoslavia stand at the two extremes of Europe like the jaws of a

great pair of pincers. In this strategic position they doom all trouble-makers to destruction.¹⁰

Such an alliance was manifested through massive economic loans and military supplies:

Almost 250 million francs were loaned by France to Belgrade in 1931. Of this sum little more than half was used by the Yugoslavs to buy long-range observation planes from the German Junker works. The rest went to pay for bombing planes furnished by the Dornier establishment in Italy. The 'incident' was exposed in November 1931, before the Commission of Foreign Affairs of the French Parliament.¹¹

In the concluding months of World War II, the Balkans became a center of British anti-Axis operations. Two main groups were expected to benefit from these activities: the Communist Partisans and the monarchist Chetniks. One of Churchill's traditional aims was to support monarchist regimes throughout the Balkans, believing they would serve as natural allies of the British Crown. However, there was no will to acknowledge the separate ethnic or national identities of the peoples of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia needed to remain unified. At the same time, it was recognized in Whitehall that Serbian nationalism alone could not provide a sufficient bond for uniting Yugoslavia again.¹² Moreover, the SOE (Special Operations Executive) in Cairo circulated reports that Mihailović was collaborating with the Axis.¹³ For these reasons, London decided to support the Partisans, rather than the Chetniks. This became one of the most astonishing *volte-faces* in contemporary international history and resulted in a long-lasting rift between Serbian nationalists and most Western capitals.¹⁴

This 'high treason' was particularly resented by the Chetnik diaspora converging around the figure of the exiled king in London.¹⁵ In March 1941, the British Foreign Office organized a *coup d'état* which removed Regent Paul after he had signed a pact with the Axis — although "the provisions of this pact were generous and did not obligate Yugoslavia to as much as had been expected of other Axis signatories in Europe,"¹⁶ Paul was one of those rare Serb rulers who was not a nationalist; yet his attempt to find a neutral position between the Axis and the Allies rendered him suspicious in the eyes of both. His removal was the determining factor in triggering the German invasion, which then resulted in the destruction of Yugoslavia and the creation of a Nazi-fascist puppet

state in Croatia. As is widely known, the Ustasha regime was responsible for the murder of hundreds of thousands of Jews, Gypsies, Serbs, and Croat opponents.

Practical considerations and the wish to maintain a united Yugoslavia led Winston Churchill to conclude that the Partisans could do a better job than the Chetniks.¹⁷ The West's investment in Tito was fully rewarded, as under the Marshal's iron grip Yugoslavia became an example of stability and of multiethnic coexistence. For many, the example was so successful that they could not even contemplate its breakup. A form of psychological dependence on united Yugoslavia developed among Western elites as a result of their political, economic and personal investment in the country. Thus, when Milošević rose to power in the late 1980s, they failed to see that the unitarian fabric had become irreparably damaged. Especially, they chose to ignore that Milošević was turning from a Communist bureaucrat into the main "engineer" of the country's collapse. Hence, there was resistance to see Yugoslavia's final demise as anything else but the product of "nationalism" -by which it was normally meant the non-Serb republics' aspiration to independence from an increasingly aggressive central state. At least until the beginning of the war, the policy of the European Council and Parliament was unequivocal:

The European Council considers that, in these circumstances, the Community has a duty to help to consolidate and develop the general process of reform being undertaken in [post-Communist] countries, notably by playing its part in the stabilization of their financial situation. In this context the European Council hoped that the economic reforms and democratic developments in Yugoslavia would meet with success within the framework of increased respect for human rights and *the preservation of the country's unity and territorial integrity*.¹⁸

Before the breakup of Yugoslavia, the overwhelming wish among all Western powers was that the country should be preserved as a single unit. In early 1991, the EC promised association and even the prospect of full membership to Yugoslavia, on the condition of preserving the country's unity. But history chose to follow a different path: referenda were held in Slovenia (23 December 1990) and Croatia (19 May 1991) showing an overwhelming desire for independence.¹⁹ Even after these referendums, the Berlin meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

in June 1991 recommended the unconditional preservation of Yugoslavia's "territorial integrity."²⁰

Slovenia and Croatia unilaterally declared their independence on 25 June 1991. On 27 June 1991, the JNA army set out across Slovenia to seize border posts. A blockade of JNA barracks immediately ensued, while Slovenian territorial defence units halted advancing JNA armored columns. Clashes, fights, bombings and air attacks soon spread. The war lasted ten days and cost nearly 100 dead.

On 7 July 1991, the Yugoslav army desisted from further military attacks. At the encouragement of the European Community, Slovenia accepted a *moratorium* on independence.²¹ Yet in spite of massive popular pressure for independence and despite the beginning of the carnage and more horrors announced, international bodies *continued* to treat Yugoslavia as a single entity.

On 29-30 June 1991, four days after Slovenia's and Croatia's unilateral secessions, an European summit met in Brussels. German chancellor Helmut Kohl pressed for the early recognition of the seceding republics, strongly opposed by the French President Francois Mitterand. The US, Great Britain, and France joined a common front in support of Belgrade and the preservation of a Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia — even though they also discussed a new federal arrangement.

At the European ministries meeting on 15 December 1991 all indicators seemed to point to disagreement. Then, the Italian MP Gianni De Michelis pushed for a painful compromise: that the former Yugoslav republics be recognized subject to their conforming to standards of human rights and internal reform. All decisions had to await the results of a EC commission of five jurists chaired by Robert Badinter. By 15 January 1992, the Badinter commission had to produce a full report on the situation of human rights in the former Yugoslav republics.²² Without awaiting the result of the commission, Germany's Foreign Minister Hans D. Genscher announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with Zagreb and Ljubljana on 23 December.²³ German and other European newspapers remarked that the two Republics had been given a well-deserved "Christmas present" and that Croatian children could now celebrate Christmas with hope. On 15 January 1992, due to increasing concern from neighboring countries, an international public opinion galvanized by the war, and under a firm German leadership, the EC recognized Slovenia and Croatia — anticipating their accession to the UN by several months.²⁴

Lord Carrington and the anti-recognition front

When the war was raging and recognition still seemed a distant illusion, a peace conference was opened in The Hague under the chairmanship of Lord (Peter) Carrington (b. 1919).²⁵ The president of the Council of EC Foreign Ministers, Hans Van den Broek, had appointed Carrington with the task of solving the Yugoslav conflict "within two months."²⁶ As is known, the Conference dragged from 7 September to 12 December 1991, ending in clamorous failure. It was during this period that enormous atrocities were committed for the first time and that ethnic cleansing began in earnest against Croats living in mixed areas. Krajina and Slavonia were left barren of non-Serbs.

German opposition claims that peace negotiations merely served as a cover for the Serbian offensive were therefore not totally inaccurate. After months of unsuccessful and nerve-wrecking negotiations, Germany's method seemed to gain the upper hand. Carrington vehemently opposed recognition, anticipating that any such move would render "his" own negotiations vacuous. Accordingly, recognition had represented the main incentive to both Belgrade and Zagreb. For Belgrade, recognition was used as a threat against any further derailment of the peace process. For Zagreb, recognition was to have been the final prize to be achieved only after meeting several conditions, including negotiation of its independence with Belgrade and the other republics. Hence, what was an incentive for Zagreb, was to be used at the same time as a deterrent for Belgrade. The contradiction was not lost on the participants to the conference. Finally, Carrington claimed that his conference had been "torpedoed" by Germany's "premature" recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. He contended that "It seemed to me that there was no point in continuing with the conference after [recognition]. [Once the] two countries had [obtained] their independence, they had no further interest in the proceedings, and I don't suppose the Serbs had much interest in it either. The only incentive we had to get anybody to agree to anything was the ultimate recognition of their independence. Otherwise there was no carrot. You just threw it away, just like that."²⁷ But reality contradicted Carrington's expectations: once recognition was granted, both sides lost their overriding stimulus to continue the fighting and a ceasefire was finally achieved.

With recognition as the carrot, two main "sticks" were pro-

posed: economic sanctions and the arms embargo. Both strategies were to be applied indiscriminately to all republics in former Yugoslavia. However, generalized economic sanctions and embargoes would have led to a clear advantage for Belgrade, which controlled the most powerful army in the Balkans against the ragged and embryonic armies of the other Republics. No wonder then that Serbia was the major proponent of an arms embargo against *all* the republics.²⁸ In practice, Carrington's plan offered a carrot without a stick. At the same time, with its policy of recognition Germany offered a much more palatable carrot to the non-Serbs and simultaneously a stick against further Serbian abuses. Finally, Carrington's carrot-stick metaphor assumes that recognition was really a punishment for the Serbian nationalists: We shall see that this was not certainly the case, since the Serbian nationalists had other plans, rather than acting as the West's *gendarmes* to keep Yugoslavia united.

Once Germany was marginalized and Britain took the lead in the "peace process", Carrington was again chief negotiator at the London Conference (26-27 August 1992). That month, Lord Carrington resigned as EC negotiator after persistent criticism over the failure of his efforts to secure a cessation of hostilities. He was later replaced by another former British foreign secretary, Lord (David) Owen as a representative of the European Union in the August 1993 International Peace Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) which took over from the London Conference.²⁹

There is no question about Carrington's "good intentions": his plan could have provided an ideal framework for conflict resolution, if only it had been more realistic about Serbian political aims. Initially agreed by all parties, Carrington's peace plan was well-devised, but it could not work because of Serbia's continuous opposition. Carrington's subsequent invectives against Germany, widely repeated by the Kraut-bashing tabloid press and even by top US politicians, carried with them a vindictive stamp which overshadowed any original rationale.

Lord Carrington was among the first to use this idea of Germany's role to cover up his own failure to set up any meaningful peace negotiations. In Mark Almond's words, "what Carrington's even-handed approach meant in practice was not distinguishing between victim and aggressor; to condemn as equal violations the odd Croat sniper and a Serb artillery barrage was objectively to side with the more powerful force".³⁰

There are some speculations on Carrington's personal anti-German penchant. He is reported to have said: "Germany has al-

ways been pro-Croatian, the same as France, and to a smaller extent also Britain, have been pro-Serbian."³¹ Roy Jenkins recalls a row which erupted between Carrington and Genscher, over a Foreign Affairs Council Meeting of EC Foreign Ministers in Brussels on 29 May 1980 which Genscher failed to attend: "This drove Peter Carrington, who may have felt fobbed off by the non appearance of Françoise-Poncet [then French Foreign Minister] and Genscher, into a rare state of exasperation, so much so that he nearly broke off the negotiations before they had properly started."³² Yet, even if Carrington did have some personal antipathy for Genscher and other German politicians, this cannot explain why his statements on Yugoslavia were made public and widely diffused, becoming popular within one year. Carrington was indeed dipping into an underlying tradition of German-bashing among American and British elites. Yet, as we shall see, such public statements would have been hardly conceivable before German unification.

Carrington's anti-German penchant was also reinforced by his friendship with, and trust of, important figures such as Sir Fitzroy Maclean (1911-1996).³³ Maclean, a leading advocate of German-bashing, had been Churchill's envoy in the Balkans during World War II.³⁴

The plan was also flawed by Carrington's own naivete - if not connivance with Serbia. Another element is Carrington's close links with Serbian elites. Reportedly, Carrington's friendship with the Karadjordević family, pretenders to the Yugoslav throne, played a conspicuous role in framing his line.³⁵ Moreover he was an actionist in one of the partner industries of the Yugoslav car factory *Cruena Zastava* (Red Banner), which also produces tanks, guns, and other war machinery.³⁶

Lord Carrington's strategy achieved two, perhaps unintentional, aims: 1. his pressure was crucial in postponing the recognition of Croatia, thereby prolonging the bloodbath in Krajina; 2. his blaming of Germany has provided ever since an easy "scapegoat" for the West's errors in dealing with successive phases of the war.³⁷

What can account for Carrington's and other British leaders' leaning towards Serbia? As stated before, since the beginning of the crisis, the overall Western strategy was to preserve Yugoslavia's territorial integrity at all costs -thereby ignoring Belgrade's own separatist agenda. But as the Yugoslav idea fatally collapsed, another idea gradually replaced it, following old-fashioned concepts of balance of powers: the idea that it was preferable to side with the most powerful force, staking all on its final victory, in order to speed up

the process and reestablish a form of rule the most possible alike to the *status quo ante*, that is, a clear form of Serbian hegemony in the region. For the reasons mentioned above, the two main colonial powers in the continent, Britain and France, were in a strong position to follow this strategy.

However, whereas the Parisian approach was bitterly opposed by the French intelligentsia, the same did not occur in London. In Great Britain, this policy would only work if British statesmen could count on the lethargy and idleness of British public opinion. Despite the increasing barrage of media focussing on Serbian aggression, an opposite stream of propaganda directed at specific targets—the academia, policy-makers, opinion-makers—achieved an inverse effect in critical areas such as universities, where opposition to the government policy in the Balkans was most likely to materialize. In the event, the academic environment turned apathetic. Thus, in a self-nurturing process, Serbian propagandists provided the British elite and political activists with Belgrade's versions of the facts, which were in turn disseminated via all available channels.³⁸ It was, of course, not possible to manipulate the mass-media entirely, since many journalists were reporting from the front and bore witness to the atrocities committed by Serbian nationalists under the guise of pro-Yugoslavism. Nevertheless, accusations of "reporter hysteria" and "media one-sidedness" permeated the mainstream discourse in Britain's high circles beginning in 1991. Top politicians, such as Douglas Hurd, repeatedly accused the media of 'unfair' reporting, implicitly intimating that news from Bosnia had to be censored in a way that would alleviate the government of any embarrassment.

In defense of Germany's "preemptive" move in advance of the Badinter commission, it could be said that recognition helped to stabilize and redefine the situation of non-Serb minorities. This was obviously far from re-establishing Tito's *civilizational shield*, a sort of all-pervasive form of "political correctness" with which Socialist Yugoslavia protected its minorities, as well as its majorities, from most forms of verbal and non-verbal abuses, even at the cost of restricting free speech.³⁹ For instance, "the Hungarian minority in Slovenia and Croatia fared well in terms of minority rights. In 1990 the Croatian government formed a Nationality Committee and the Slovenian government appointed a Ministry of Nationalities, both of which worked well with the Hungarian Minister after Hungary followed the EC in recognizing Slovenia and Croatia in January 1992. Cooperation treaties—including commitments to collec-

tive minority rights -were signed with both states."⁴⁰ On the other hand, tension increased with Italy over the Italian communities in Istria and Dalmatia. However, these tensions were largely a by-product of the rise of right-wing politics in Italy, including neo-fascist and irredentist claims. The relationships between the two countries had deteriorated for a while, with part of the press echoing the government's anti-Croat tirades. Neo-fascist ambitions were essentially propped up by the weakness of the Western alliance's entire management of the Yugoslav conflict. In a morally relativist world where *might* appeared to be *right* and where violence seemed to be acceptable, the Italians, as the Croats, simply tried to take advantage of the chaos.

There is by now an all-pervasive literature on Germany's "incautious" recognition of Croatia. The argument is routinely reiterated not only by the public at large, but also by academics, including Western "specialists" on Eastern Europe. Many Western intellectuals perfunctorily repeated the official version of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the US State Department.⁴¹ In this way, the very fact that the war was raging long before Germany's recognition has been deliberately overlooked.

Since then, German-bashing has periodically reappeared as a *leitmotif* for politicians, intellectuals and media professionals wishing to pin the blame on a convenient target. Germanophobia struck a sympathetic chord even among more moderate Europeans, as the collapse of the Berlin Wall reawakened in them the ominous specter of a "Fourth Reich" exceeding its European partners in size, with its 349,520 square kilometers of land area.

British apprehensions about a Great Germany have travelled far and, as we shall see, even the U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher in the Clinton administration is quoted as repeating the refrain that "the hasty recognition of Croatia and Slovenia was at the cause of the conflict."⁴² In fact, there was no hasty recognition; on the contrary, it took a long time and many dead, for Croatia and Slovenia to be recognized.⁴³

In a recurring pattern, similar declarations were uttered at a time when crucial decisions were needed. Since there was widespread lack of consensus among Western partners and no agreement could be reached, scapegoating was the easiest way out. As at other times of crisis, the blame was easily put on Germany. Western governments, the media and intellectuals seemed to ignore the aspirations of all non-Serbs partners in the so-called 'federation', and instead, most Western governments threw all their weight into

supporting Yugoslavia's territorial integrity.

German dilemmas: media democracy, public pressure and foreign policy

How was this German decision to recognize Croatia and Slovenia reached? Was it an obscure conspiracy by the country's elite? Or was it rather a publicly discussed and controversial issue? One of the leading scholars on Germany, Timothy Garton Ash, is among those who do not believe in a German conspiracy. He upholds the view that the main determinant was public pressure. He states:

One can safely say that most Germans who supported this step did so with the very best of intentions, which had nothing in common with Hitler's wartime alliance with Croatia. On the contrary, Milošević's Serbia had been presented to them as the new Nazi Germany and this time they wanted to be on the right side. . . What one could not say, however, is that this sudden turn in German policy was the result of any sober calculation of national interest. It was a hasty over-reaction, following public and especially published opinion rather than leading it. Of course, it was by no means only in Bonn that this was liable to happen. It was one of the structural problems of making foreign policy in a television democracy.⁴⁴

One may disagree with the relativist nuance about the way Serbia had been "presented" to the German public. One may also object to the use of the adjective "hasty". Yet, the point is made that there was a genuine public pressure from below, rather than a conspiracy from the top. This is confirmed by comments that "the recognition of Croatia wasn't only very popular in Germany; it was also the right step. This step didn't come too early but too late."⁴⁵

As is known, German Foreign Minister Hans D. Genscher played a substantial role in pushing for recognition.

In the immediate aftermath of German unification, the general Western hope of keeping together the so-called federal republic of Yugoslavia accorded . . . with Bonn's general wish for stability. . . . After Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence, in the face of Serbian aggression, Hans D. Genscher, then still Foreign Minister, found himself confronted with a growing barrage of moral outrage and criticism from the media and politicians of all parties in Bonn. He

then ran out ahead of his critics, and declared that Slovenia and Croatia should be recognized as independent states. It must be done; he insisted on it; how could he—for whom human rights and self-determination were sacred—ever be thought to have thought anything else?⁴⁶

Hence, Genscher was “responding” to strong popular pressures from below, rather than acting on his own. What Belgrade effectively painted as a conspiracy was in fact a very public affair.

The timing of recognition is also an argument for debate. Was it in essence a problem of bad timing? As is known, recognition was granted after most of the damage had been inflicted on Croatia. It was also the result of a laborious negotiation process in which Germany tried to avoid alienating other Western partners. In the end, agreement was reached by all the Twelve members of the European Community. Yet, for Lord Carrington, the ‘timing’ factor was crucial: “I didn’t speak against recognition as such, but against its timing. Croatia was recognized in the middle of the peace conference at which I got both Tudjman and Milošević to agree to Krajina’s autonomy in Croatia. Among other things, that autonomy was to include also separate police forces. The recognition was to follow only after that.”⁴⁷

As mentioned before, Germany shared with most other countries a vested interest in keeping Yugoslavia united. After public pressures had mounted to worrying levels, Genscher tried to rush recognition. However, he did not act alone, but had the full informal backing of several governments, including Hungary and Austria, who were worried about a possible spillover of the war into their own territories. Several spillovers across the Hungarian border had indeed occurred before recognition. Austria’s armed forces had also been placed on high alert. “Following an alleged sale of 100,000 kalashnikov rifles to Croatians in October 1990, the Serb press accused Hungary of interfering into its sovereignty. Accusation of gross interference with Yugoslav integrity mounted in Belgrade’s press.”⁴⁸ The JNA trespassed into Hungarian air spaces several times and a Hungarian village was bombed.⁴⁹ In the meantime, ethnic cleansing increased, as the notorious army of Arkan visited Vojvodina threatening the local Hungarians and other minorities with mass expulsion.⁵⁰

Genscher was also conscious that recognition was to be achieved unanimously within the EC. According to Dimitrij Rupel,

Slovenia's Foreign Minister at the time of independence, "Genscher, the Austrians, and the Hungarians told us that individual recognition by the friendly countries could not be a good solution, so they pressed for unanimity in the EC."⁵¹ Germany needed an extra-cautious approach with the other European partners, despite the rising human toll and the dramatic escalation in the war.

If bad timing was a factor at all, it may relate to the moment when Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, rather than when they were recognized as independent states. At the first evidence of Serbian onslaught, it was only reasonable to "intervene" with recognition. Yet, Britain, France, and other countries chose to follow the basic instinct of primordial alliances and historical memories, rather than seize the momentum and acknowledge the ongoing transformation in Eastern Europe.

As for Germany's role, the relevant implication of Ash's statement is that media coverage of the war accounted for the German government's reaction. However, although that may be true to some extent, why were the British and other governments' reactions much less sympathetic? Why did established interests in other countries not similarly cede to public pressure? One could argue that in Germany, a country which had undergone a genuine and heartfelt horror for its Nazi past and for which any form of connivance with a genocidal government would be unacceptable, the popular outcry for halting Serbian aggression was louder than elsewhere. Parallels between Hitler's and Milošević's genocidal campaigns could not remain unnoticed by most Germans, especially human-rights-oriented and memory-conscious citizens.

All this may have made public pressures stronger in Germany than in other countries. But the public outcry was also strong in Italy, Scandinavia, Spain, and many other countries whose governments exerted a much weaker pressure - if any- in favor of recognizing Croatia and Slovenia. Hence, public pressure can only account for a part -not the whole- of the picture.

As military confrontation escalated in Croatia during the summer of 1991, European public support for a united Yugoslavia rapidly evaporated. A Eurobarometer opinion survey in 1991 showed that for most Europeans, democracy and the recognition of the right to self-determination in the Balkans were of paramount importance.⁵² Interestingly, the average German showed less support [63 per cent] for Croatian and Slovene independence than other Europeans did. However, "managerial" —supposedly more cultured — elites were more supportive of self-determination in the Balkans

than other sectors of German society: only 15 per cent of the former supported the continuation of Yugoslavia as a single state.⁵³

The lowest support for self-determination (33 per cent and 36 per cent respectively) came from those states neighboring Yugoslavia which were plausibly more concerned about internal minority problems, namely Romania and Greece. In Bulgaria only 54 per cent favored self-determination. In all these cases the fear of a "domino effect," albeit improbable, may have arisen from their particular geographical position, so near as they are to the epicenter of the conflict. However, this fear was not shared by the other neighbors, as the most marked enthusiasm for recognition was expressed by Albania [85 per cent], which incidentally is the feeblest military power in the region. Hungary also expressed strong support for recognizing the new states [72 per cent].⁵⁴ Italy's support was the same as Germany's [63%]. But in many countries, pressure for recognition was muted for fear of Serbian reprisals. Thus, "while the Hungarian people and government were sympathetic to the independence movements in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia, support for these movements might risk incurring retaliation against the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina, or, in the worst case, military conflict with the Serb dominated Yugoslav People's Army."⁵⁵

In other words, public support for recognition was *not* more pronounced in Germany than in other countries. What distinguished Germany was the political will and capacity to adapt to shifting circumstances. In this respect, German elites (academics, business-people, politicians, etc.) showed more awareness and sense of political realism than their Anglo-French counterparts. Indeed, Germany's decision wedded political, economic and social interests with deep human rights concerns.

As already mentioned, Genscher's move was far from being isolated in Europe and was supported by a major stream of public opinion. In Italy, Scandinavia, Ireland, several East European states and many other countries, a grass-roots movement in favor of Croatian and Slovenian independence was gathering pace. Germany was therefore not alone. It can be said that Germany's policy reflected the aspirations of most Europeans, although ordinary citizens in general were not powerful enough to influence foreign policy decisions in their own countries in a reasonably short time span.

Indeed, the major world powers opposed the move, but the staunchest opponents were the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (Britain, China, France, the US, and Russia) plus Greece. In practice the entire United Nations was eminently inimi-

cal to the prospect of sovereign Slovenian and Croat states, not to speak of Bosnia and Macedonia. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali won world-wide reprobation after he snubbed the Bosnians, by referring to theirs as a "rich man's war".⁵⁶ But Boutros Boutros-Ghali should not take the brunt of accusations, as he simply followed in the footsteps of his predecessor, Javier Perez de Cuellar, who had publicly voiced his deep aversion against all secessionist movements, including the Baltic ones.⁵⁷

In line with the general trend, the Italian government also initially opposed the recognition of the two republics.⁵⁸ However, it later changed its tack, arguably both as a matter of *realpolitik* and as a reflection of its desire for good relations with its new neighbors. In contrast with the German case, public opinion mattered less in Italy, but it is hard to identify any form of direct "German pressure" short of the desire to achieve the widest possible consensus within the EC.⁵⁹ Inclinations changed again in Italy after the March 1994 elections, as a newly elected right-wing government in Rome included vociferous anti-Croat and anti-Slovene irredentists in its cabinet. Some neo-fascists were lured by Belgrade's call and even invited for informal talks to Belgrade, where they shared an anti-Croat platform. Indeed, the weakness and inner divisions of the Western alliance, and their potential tragic implications were revealed by the Italian Far Right's attempts to exploit the situation. Western inner divisions and indecision achieved what the neo-Nazis could not even dream of, namely, to wield major democratic regimes tolerating a campaign for ethnic purification.⁶⁰

But, if recognition has proved so counter-productive to Germany's tarnished image, why did Germany insist on it? A clear answer is provided by Christopher Bennett:

Before the war Germany was as committed to Yugoslavia's territorial integrity as any other country in the European Community. Two days before Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence Hans Dietrich Genscher, the veteran Foreign Minister, voted with his EC counterparts not to recognize them as independent states . . . However, the fighting changed Genscher's opinion, since he considered the recourse to violence and the manner in which the JNA prosecuted the war far graver offenses than the independence declarations. Moreover, *the lessons he drew from Germany's own past was the failure of appeasement and the importance of nipping aggression in the bud.*⁶¹

Is it possible that those who attacked German recognition were attacking anti-fascist Germany? Indeed, the focal point of the assaults was not a supposedly resuscitated Third Reich, as officially claimed by Serbian propagandists, but a Germany concerned with human rights and daunted by its own Nazi past. The ultimate effect was to reverse the postwar motto "Never Again".⁶²

Further contingent reasons inspired Genscher to press for recognition faster than his European counterparts: "Since Germany was unable to deploy troops in Yugoslavia for constitutional reasons, the most Genscher could offer Croatia was international recognition and that rapidly became the principal goal of German diplomacy."⁶³

Finally, "increasing evidence of Serb atrocities and the failure of Carrington's Peace Conference won most EC countries over to Genscher's point of view."⁶⁴ Now, this change was interpreted by the Serbophiles as a surrender to German pressures. Anti-Europeanists also took advantage of the situation. The staunchest anti-Europeanists even grumbled about a supposed "concession over the social chapter" in exchange for British recognition.⁶⁵ In a somewhat sketchy analysis of German foreign policy, John Ardagh acknowledges that "Yugoslavia would have broken up anyway, and by 1991 to keep it going artificially might have been impossible, except by force of Serb domination."⁶⁶

German-bashing in Tory Britain

As the American sociologist Randall Collins has persuasively noted, German-bashing represents a long-standing tradition among Anglo-Saxon intellectuals and ruling classes. Within the most conservative strands of British and American academic circles, it hinged on unfounded claims of "retarded modernization": that is, Germany was conventionally seen as backward and lagging behind Britain and France in terms of intellectual and cultural development.⁶⁷ Such sentiment was often asserted against all evidence of the contrary, and disregarded the fact that several German scholars had anticipated their British counterparts in their respective fields and achievements.

German-bashing has traditionally struck a popular chord amongst the British public. As a fictional argument, it ideally stretches back to the times of the Huns and the Teutonic Hordes. This public attitude was well-known by newspaper magnates in the 1910s, who, in order to increase their sales, emphasized their

anti-German interventionist propaganda. "The demand of the *Daily Mail* on 26 October 1914 to expel from the country people with German names, or its revengeful tone since the aftermath of the war up to the 1922 Versailles Treaty are classic examples."⁶⁸ Paradoxically, 'Kraut-bashing' was not so prevalent in Britain during the Third Reich's expansion and Hitler's preparations for World War II.⁶⁹ The politics of appeasement were then reflected in a popular indifference to the fate of the Nazi victims. Several studies now exist on the history of British appeasement in the face of Nazi aggression.⁷⁰

More recently, Germanophobia has staged a massive comeback in British politics. For instance, a survey carried out in June 1996 by the communication system company Gestetner - which paradoxically runs a project to encourage British children to make friends with their European counterparts - has revealed that "when Germany is mentioned, children immediately think of war — and a dictator with black moustache."⁷¹ The tabloid press takes advantage of all occasions, from football matches to the ban on British beef, to raise the level of Germanophobia and hence anti-Brussels rhetoric. "Brick by brick, a European superstate is being created in which Germany and France wield the power and the rest of us are told what to do."⁷² This attitude leads to comic paroxysm, such as claims by the Conservative MP Christopher Gill that "it is Britain's historic destiny to champion the cause of freedom and guide our European partners away from the totalitarianism that threatens to engulf them."⁷³ Was Serbia's campaign of ethnic cleansing a suitable vehicle for such a crusading task?

A new climax of anti-German xenophobia was reached when the top figures of the Tory establishment, including Prime Minister John Major and Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind, raised the argument of the European ban on British beef to provoke "the biggest crisis in Anglo-European relations since Britain joined the European Union in 1973."⁷⁴ Interestingly, this new jingoistic posture erupted two days after the same Tory establishment was plagued by one of the greatest scandals in recent British history, the donation of at least 100,000 pounds — that is the amount so far identified — from Serbian ultra-nationalists faithful to the war criminal Radovan Karadžić.⁷⁵ The atmosphere among top Tory ranks became so vitiated that Sir Bryan Nicholson, President of the CBI (Confederation of British Industry), expressed his deep concern in the following terms: "In this pungent atmosphere of romantic nationalism and churlish xenophobia, I sometimes wonder if there are some among us who have failed to notice that the war with Ger-

many has ended."⁷⁶ Germany — and Europe— could function as a useful lightning-rod to externalize the internal tensions of the Tory regime at a moment when it was facing one of the greatest challenges in its recent history over the Serbian corruption scandal — just as in the May 1995 parliamentary debate over Bosnia, Germany served as an *explicans* for the war and a diversion for the unwillingness of the British establishment to protect Bosnia. Indeed, the British conflict with Germany seems to have continued through the *interposta persona* of Serbian ultra-nationalists. As historian Brendan Simms has pointed out, British academic and media elites seem to mirror their government's persuasion: "Among British- and not only British- intellectuals, commentators and journalists, there is a tenacious myth which runs something like this: the war in Bosnia and Croatia is the more or less direct continuation of the second world war in Yugoslavia."⁷⁷

During the Cold War — and within the framework of NATO, the EC, and other supra-national organizations— xenophobic trends had been considerably restrained. In the public arena at least, dislike for Germany emerged only under particular circumstances. A notorious case was that of former British Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Nicholas Ridley, who, in 1990, remarked that Germany was planning to "take over Europe." These remarks were widely reported, created a huge scandal, and cost Ridley his cabinet post. At a time of relatively benign polemics and timid concern for British sovereignty, Margaret Thatcher was often accused by rival Tory MPs of instigating Germanophobia. Yet without Thatcher, by the mid-1990s unbridled Euro-hysteria had become routine and no one was forced to resign.

Britain's attitudes and behavior during most of the Yugoslav war have been subjected to increasing scrutiny.⁷⁸ Accusations of British connivance with Serbia have been recurrent in Eastern Europe, as well as in Germany, Islamic countries, and several Third World countries.⁷⁹ The pro-Serbian line in British politics had remained broadly uninterrupted since at least World War I.⁸⁰ It became stronger still after World War II, and, again, after the demise of Communism. The Serbophiles were able to reabsorb lost elements of anti-fascist, Titoist, and otherwise Leftist discourse, through an anti-Croat, more precisely anti-Tudjman, rhetoric.⁸¹ The bottom line of this argument was that, rightly or wrongly, the Serbs were the traditional allies against the Germans in two world wars.

During the House of Commons' emergency debates on Bosnia in May 1995, Germany's recognition of Slovenia and Croatia was

high on the target list. The entire parliamentary discussion was diverted into rapping Germany for virtually all misdeeds in the Balkans- an argument parodied from Serbian propaganda.⁸² Even the leader of the opposition Labour Party, Tony Blair, could claim: "Undoubtedly, there have been errors of judgment. The early recognition of Croatia without thinking through its evident impact on Bosnia is one example."⁸³ Blair's more moderate approach nevertheless reflected a view which is far from being commonly accepted outside Britain. From the opposite end of the political spectrum, Ulster Unionist MP John D. Taylor echoed with sterner vigor: "If the recognition of Croatia, Bosnia and the other states of the former Yugoslavia was wrong — if we were bounced into it — why is that now the basis on which we foresee a settlement being made? Recognition was wrong then and it is still wrong today."⁸⁴ Similar analyses could be heard in the House of Lords special debate that same day.⁸⁵

The fact that both Labour and the Conservatives shared a common language in which Germany's role was heightened as a root cause of the war also points to the fact that both parties lacked competent advisors on the area. But there were more practical reasons: German-bashing was used to stave off any idea of firmer British commitment to Bosnia, particularly in the form of more decisive military intervention and lifting of the arms embargo. Hence, it assumed a crucial function in the British, and as a corollary European, management of the conflict. Indeed, most MPs who fought against further British commitment in Bosnia, found in Germany's recognition a convenient scapegoat for upholding their line.

As sponsors of the South Slav state, Western politicians overlooked Serbian repression of other ethnic groups. When EC efforts to keep the country together foundered, Genscher vigorously pushed for diplomatic recognition . . . Though Brussels and Washington eventually followed [Genscher's] lead, they were annoyed that he had forced their hand.⁸⁶

The clash between new expectations of responsibility and old fears of hegemony placed the German government in a no-win situation. If it took the lead as in the recognition of Croatia, it was criticized as overbearing. If it held back as in the Persian Gulf war, it was attacked for shirking its duties.⁸⁷

Ominously, Kraut-bashing is a more popular sport among Brit-

ish and French elites than among the populations of these countries at large, which is a probable indication that, rightly or wrongly, these elites see their dominant position challenged. For instance, French elites were so anxious about their prospective loss of leadership in Europe that political scientist Alfred Grosser protested that "the French elite lags forty years behind the mood of the population."⁸⁸ The French newspaper *Le Monde* also lamented that "some politicians have lost all sense; the German colors wave on the title pages of magazines like on military command-posts; caricatures of the fat Mr. Kohl fill newspaper pages."⁸⁹ Italian foreign policy analyst Barbara Spinelli remarked that

once national interests are defined in mere economic terms, age-old anti-capitalist ideas and gloomy fantasies about anonymous cosmopolitan machinations reappear in times of crisis. . . it is a strange disease, because France has always fought German threats with a typically German ideology ("the true substance of the nation", the "call of the soil"). It is the German *maladie* of the French thought, but it is also the disease of the Italian thought, and the American thought as well.⁹⁰

In the next section, I will analyze the most extreme form of German-bashing, namely the idea of a Fourth Reich conspiracy to carve up the Balkans and dominate the world. I will then associate the latter with kindred conspiracy theories which see a plot from the Vatican to embrace its Catholic cohorts against followers of other creeds — often in secret alliance with Bonn. Both kinds of "conspiracy" theories were often travesties of Serbian propaganda, aped and mimicked by top Western leaders and commentators as they fit their own agenda.

The Fourth Reich conspiracy

The most extreme form of anti-German xenophobia turned into the belief in a "Fourth Reich conspiracy" to dominate Europe and the world.⁹¹ Is it possible to say that a new unified Germany was "much more likely than its disunited parts to aspire to the hegemonic status it was denied in the past?"⁹² This was the view that the conflict was premeditatedly planned by German political elites prodded by the experience of unification. A typical comment argues that "Germany was *already preparing to orchestrate* full media support for Croatia if the JNA were drawn deeper into the con-

flict."⁹³ Germany was now accused of trying to "gain access to a warm Mediterranean port." Parallels between pre-unification Germany and the Weimar Republic suddenly emerged.⁹⁴

As John Agnew and Stuart Colbridge point out, "if the federal, liberal, and restrained West Germany could be cast in the role of the Weimar Republic, then reunification and its aftermath can be read as a re-play of the rise of Hitler and the Nazis. Only the new Hitler is missing so far."⁹⁵ Yet the same authors argue that "the analogy to Weimar is misleading. The political system is decentralized in many important respects and loyalties have been built to localities and regions as much as to the state as a whole."⁹⁶ Moreover, as we all know, the capitalist-democratic institutions of the *Bundesrepublik* (Federal Republic) are deeply rooted.⁹⁷ Is this Germany likely to look for a new *lebensraum*? In the existing world order the race for space is no longer paramount — although a race for space remains useful for propping up dictatorial regimes in "rogue" states such as Serbia and Iraq.⁹⁸

Rather the contrary was true in the early stages of German unification: instead of aggrandizing Germany's self-image, unification was widely regretted as soon as Bonn had to face the task of dismantling a fossilized bureaucracy in the Eastern part of the country. After the initial enthusiasm, unification has come under hefty attack among West Germans. Popular perceptions of German unity have become adverse, while negative "ethnic" stereotypes of East Germans have emerged.⁹⁹ The dichotomy between *Ossies* (East Germans) and *Wessies* (West Germans) has correspondingly increased.¹⁰⁰ The rift was evident even in Berlin, the proposed capital of united Germany. According to the City Registry, only 562 of the 16,383 marriages in Berlin occurred between West and East Berliners: 22% of all marriages were between Berliners and foreigners, and only 4% between East and West Berliners. Typically, "Berliners find more in common with Slavs, Africans, Turks. . ." ¹⁰¹ On the other side, Eastern intellectuals accused the West German establishment of cultural colonialism.¹⁰²

Germany's predicament is also linked to the peaceful nature of its foreign policy. In both the two main post-Cold War conflicts, the wars in the Gulf and in former Yugoslavia, German foreign politics — in contrast to that of the 1930s — has been shown to be "neither bellicose nor effective."¹⁰³

Many political observers claim that no independent foreign policy is feasible without military muscle. Accordingly, Germany's policy of recognition was ineffective precisely because it could not

be backed up by military support. For instance, Treverton has observed that a united Germany in the post-Cold War world tried to launch its first bold international diplomatic initiative by recognizing Croatia and Slovenia, "but it did not have the military capability to back up its decisions."¹⁰⁴ These analysts would seem to prefer a militarized Germany with its own power of committing troops in war zones, rather than a peaceful Germany where public decisions in foreign policy matters are taken openly without contemplating coercive measures. Thus, a foreign policy based on consensus is paradoxically rejected in favor of one based on coercion. Negative comments about Germany's lack of commitment during the Gulf War can also be included amongst these pro-militarist exhortations.

It is also important to consider that German relationships with the rest of Europe are crucial to its own socioeconomic development. Being so dependent on the continent's stability and security, it is unrealistic to assume that Germany would have taken an adventurist route in the Balkans. This is less the case for Britain, which has a powerful reservoir of economic incomes and surplus labour in its former colonial [or neo-colonial] Commonwealth satellites.¹⁰⁵ Thus Germany's choice reflected a considered balance between economic interests and political realism, as particularly manifested in the firm commitment to quickly reestablish democratic regimes in the region. Indeed, the defense of Germany's economic interests and the respect of human rights are certainly not contradictory options, as German-bashers often seem to assume.

Finally, the idea that the German attitude expressed a deliberate will to "dismember Yugoslavia" can be easily invalidated for the same reasons we have exposed above. First, we have seen that the German government acted in response to public pressure. Secondly, we noticed that this was shared by other European countries. Thirdly, Germany acted only after initial hesitancy and considerable distress. These three factors alone can dispel the idea of a "deliberate plan to dismember Yugoslavia."

Yet the "German conspiracy" theory has become a popular myth in a Europe beleaguered by national antagonisms. In turn, it has heavily contributed to fostering intra-European antagonisms. This idea bears a close resemblance to Samuel Huntington's cognate theory of civilizational fault lines.¹⁰⁶ Indeed, it is part and parcel of it: instead of presenting a clash between Islam, Western Civilization and Eastern Christianity, it alleges an atavistic collision between the Teutonic world and the anti-Barbarian West.¹⁰⁷ It stretches back through the centuries to long lasting rivalries between Britain

[and France], and the Austro-Hungarian empire and its predecessors. Nazi Germany is but the last reincarnation of this enmity and the most fresh and useful in terms of offending memories.

The traditional enmity with Roman Catholicism has to be added up in most Anglo-Saxon countries. This will be analyzed in the next section.

The Papist conspiracy theory

Another variety of 'conspirational' theory identifies Germany as lying decidedly within the Catholic orbit. Conjuring up civilizational fault lines between Papists and anti-Papists, this analysis speculates that, by favoring recognition, Chancellor Helmut Kohl wanted to avoid trouble with the Catholic-dominated Christian Social Union. These rumors brushed aside the fact that the most articulate proponent of the German decision was former Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher from the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), rather than Kohl and his Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Both parties, moreover, represent the Protestant vote as well - although the CDU is particularly strong in Germany's Catholic heartland, Bavaria, where most immigrants from former Yugoslavia are also concentrated.¹⁰⁸ For instance, on 13 July 1991, the Bavarian "section" of the CDU, the Christian Social Union (CSU), "issued a call to the German Federal government to recognize Croatia and Slovenia, partially out of solidarity with fellow Catholics and partially out of indignation at the 'brutal actions of the Yugoslav army which are unconstitutional and against the international law'".¹⁰⁹

The popularity in Italy of Croatian resistance also allowed for similar comparisons. In Catholic countries, the Church provided backing for a spontaneous movement of humanitarian support. This was based on a Christian 'mission' of social solidarity with the down-trodden, who in the case of Slovenia and Croatia happened to be fellow Catholics. However, the Pope's appeal to peace and condemnation of Belgrade even increased once the Muslims, rather than fellow Catholics, became the new victims.¹¹⁰ Bosnia turned into the epicenter of a new febrile humanitarian activity. This was in line with ecumenical principles that have emerged in the Church over the last thirty years — principles which showed their most remarkable visage when Pope John Paul II condemned the Allies' bombing of Iraq during the Gulf War. Paradoxically, this "neutral" attitude during the Gulf War earned the Pope accusations of a lack of

“loyalty” to the Allies’ war effort, at a moment when the need for international cohesion was paramount. These accusations were moved even more vigorously against Germany, whose apparently non-responsive and “pacifist” attitude was taken by German-bashers as a proof of Germany’s weak commitment to common Western ideals — ignoring the fact that France played a much more decisive role in supporting Saddam Hussein until the last moment and tried to re-establish contacts with Baghdad even before the UN embargo could be called off.

John Paul II proposed to Kohl that Slovenia and Croatia be recognized simultaneously by Germany and the Vatican. Eventually, the Vatican recognized them two days before the European Community. As the death toll mounted, France and the UK procrastinated over the recognition, while Germany deemed it urgent. The movement of support for Croatia and Slovenia, was particularly strong in Italy and Bavaria. This is often erroneously interpreted as a form of far-right support for Croatian nationalism and a revival of the wartime “alliance” which the Axis power had established with Croat ultranationalists.

Three major oversights can be observed in this analysis. First, this movement was often basically humanitarian and the sense of solidarity grew because thousands of Croats were being ethnically cleansed by the Serbian paramilitary and the JNA. Croatian independence was supported because it was perceived as a way of salvaging the Croats from the horrendous crimes being perpetrated in the name of Yugoslav unity, rather than because of strategic alliances between extreme nationalists.

Secondly, the far right in many countries, notably in Italy, is traditionally anti-Croat -as I have previously mentioned. Rather than respecting traditional World War II alliances, the neo-fascists have developed a strong anti-Croat rhetoric, often in the framework of an overall Germanophobia — from which their far right German comrades are often exempted.

Thirdly, the most convinced supporters of Croatia’s recognition were dispersed along the entire political spectrum, with strong representatives in the moderate and secular left. For instance, among Italy’s political groups, the militantly secular Radical Party was perhaps the strongest supporter of Croatia’s recognition.

The Pope’s appeals for peace in the Balkans and his reprobation of the Serbian treatment of minorities have been regarded with suspicion in several Protestant countries, as well as in Anglican Britain. Here, a tradition of sodality between the Anglican Com-

munion and the Serbian Orthodox Church has unexpectedly been revived.¹¹¹ For Conservative British elites, the 'Papist conspiracy' had a remarkable aspect: the perceived similarity between the cases of Ireland and Croatia. The Serbs in Krajina were seen as replicas and copycats of Ulster's Protestants, Knin was imagined as a southern version of Londonderry, while a 'solidarity' movement between extreme Unionists and Serbian paramilitary took shape. By digging up the Hansard debates, it is easy to find that in every single debate at the House of Commons the Protestant Unionist MPs were among the staunchest Serbophiles (with the possible exception of fringe Labour MP Tony Benn).¹¹² Serbophile propagandists like Richard West seized upon these perceived similarities to press the case against recognition. West defined Croatia's Ustashe regime during World War II as "similar to an IRA terrorist regime."¹¹³ Yet, as if to disprove the weakness of the idea, the pro-Croatian movement was surprisingly feeble in Ireland. Parts of the Irish intelligentsia, traditionally influenced by their British counterparts, have failed to take any serious action, or to draw salient comparisons between Croatia and Ireland.¹¹⁴

Finally, the proximity of Germany and Italy to the northern Balkans also relied on ties fostered by international organizations and economic links, such as the *Alpe-Adria* association.¹¹⁵ The latter was formed as an instrument of regional economic cooperation between Slovenia, Croatia, Austria, Hungary, parts of Northern Italy and Bavaria. Hence, strong ties had already been established between these neighboring regions long before the trouble began.

German-bashing as a form of anti-Europeanism

Germany's interests at stake in Eastern Europe — both in term of economic development and political stability — are known to be greater than Britain's.¹¹⁶ The Cold War tradition of *Ostpolitik* had simply prepared Germany for the post-1989 events.¹¹⁷ Moreover, unification has endowed Germany with a longer frontier with the Slavic world, including 646 km of land boundaries with the Czech Republic and 456 km with Poland. Let us not forget that Britain is one of the most aloof partners of the European Union and one of the countries which has demonstrated less interest in the deepening of the Union.¹¹⁸ Both the Conservatives and the opposition are historically more concerned with events occurring in Southern Africa than in the Balkans. Yet, amazingly, Britain has been allowed to play a key role in the latter area. Indeed, the Yugoslav crisis has

provided the most dramatic background for reviving Britain's antagonism against the European Union. Attacks on Germany were often meant to be attacks on Europe at a time when the latter was perceived to be economically dominated by Germany.

A good example of the blending of Germanophobia and anti-Europeanism is given by staunch anti-European statements such as the following:

In 1992 Germany was to withdraw from the European Fighter Aircraft program, thereby threatening the jobs of 40,000 British workers, while in the field of foreign policy it forced Britain and the rest of the Twelve in December 1991 to recognize the independence of various former provinces [*sic*] of Yugoslavia, thereby at worst precipitating a series of bloody wars and at best undermining the peace process in the Balkans.¹⁹

First, we can note the authors' anti-chronological bent, tracing the roots of the outbreak of war (June 1991) to the EC's recognition (December 1991). Secondly, the authors reveal the widespread adoption of two typical 'diversionist' strategies in one: 1. the shifting of blame from Britain, which played a leading role in the languid peace process, to Germany, which was excluded from the peace process; 2. Germany was accused simultaneously for the loss of 40,000 British jobs, a convenient target for the workers' rage at a time of rising unemployment. These academics thus clumsily associate Germany's alleged responsibilities in the war in the Balkans with Britain's internal problems. This was accompanied by silence about London's complicity with Belgrade and connivance in ethnic cleansing, through its support for the embargo on arms to the losing side. There is no will to recognize Britain's leading role in the bankrupted "peace" process which shielded Serbia's expansion. As Adrian Hastings points out:

Britain's attitude blended a *customary British obsession with the maintenance of international borders' status quo, with an anti-European, particularly anti-German, slant. British mistrust and uneasiness over the process of European unification intervened to frame a high-handed pro-Serbian foreign politics.* The belief that a strong centralized Yugoslavia, — or Serbia in its place — could restrain Germany's strength has been the pivotal concept of this fateful inclination. The British government wished to maintain a large, Serb-dominated, Yugoslavia. When that collapsed, it fell back instead on supporting a 'Greater Serbia' because it saw a powerful

enlarged Serbia, achieved with a good deal of underhand British support, as a counterweight to German influence in the Balkans. . . The Foreign Office remains farcically preoccupied with maintaining a 'balance of power' in central Europe and 'containing' Germany.¹²⁰

This confirms that the Yugoslav tragedy was used by leading British politicians and media pundits as an arena for reviving old anti-European rivalries. Europe's fragmentation and incapacity to deal with the crisis stemmed precisely from the revival of these antagonisms and from a lack of commitment to Europe on the part of some of its partners. Author Richard West blends a typically British Croatophobia with an anti-European slant. For him, the failure of the federation in one small country whose people are ethnically and linguistically almost indistinguishable [Yugoslavia] should serve as a warning against the present mania for building a huge European federation. Already Euromania has largely contributed to the troubles of Yugoslavia and the rash, disastrous declaration of independence by Slovenia and Croatia. . . If the Irish and the British have not been able to live with each other for 800 years, why is this going to change under the rule of Brussels and Strasbourg? . . . Then we should support the unity and sovereignty of Yugoslavia in the same way as we should support the unity and sovereignty of the United Kingdom.¹²¹

Among the factors which led Germany to an "early" recognition of Croatia and Slovenia was Germany's more resolved and unequivocal pro-European commitment. The rise of nationalism in former Yugoslavia posed a real threat to the fabric of European unity. Not only did it reveal a split over the way to deal with the conflict, but it also threatened to escalate outside Yugoslavia, by drawing in Greece and Turkey. German diplomacy thus showed far greater concern for, and sensitivity to, events occurring in the Balkans than did other European diplomacies.

Normally, the pro-Europeans would have sought to minimize any tensions with Germany, both over German unification, as well as over their recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. However, the weapons provided by Serbian propaganda played very effectively into the hands of those for whom a united Europe was a gloomy and somber nightmare. In the past, this group had actively tried to promote the view that the European Community was merely a Ger-

man *palaestra*. Anti-European discourse was framed via the rationale of avoiding a German-dominated Europe.

This abnegation of responsibility has resulted in the immediate disruption of many of the efforts which the founding fathers of the European ideal made over the last 50 years. The verdict is unanimous and beyond appeal:

The war in former Yugoslavia emphasized the gulf between the EC's objectives and its capacities. At the very moment that it provided itself with pretensions to a joint defense and security policy, the EC was confronted with an intractable conflict on its doorstep. Failure to stop the killings in Bosnia did not simply lower the credibility of attempts to forge a joint defense and security policy; it weakened faith in the EC's ability to carry out any policy at all.¹²²

The performance of the Community, and now the Union, in relation to former Yugoslavia has caused widespread disillusion. The Community did provide a framework within which the divergences between member states' policies could be contained, making a repeat of the disaster of 1914 inconceivable. But it failed to form an effective common policy; and it is doubtful whether the new procedures of the CFSP are strong enough to enable the Union to do much better in such intractable situations.¹²³

There were acute differences of opinions among the member states before and during the 1991 Gulf War, and from 1992 onwards, over what to do about the consequences of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. These examples seemed to indicate that when a major crisis occurred which closely affected the European Community, it could do little but follow a minimalist collective line dictated by a mix of political expediency and an awareness of its lack of effective political and military muscle.¹²⁴

In turn, the fall in the EC's credibility translated itself into a weakened allegiance on the part of Germany.

In 1992-93 this had a far-reaching effect on the electorate in Germany, closer to the Yugoslavia fighting than any other EC member apart from Italy, more affected by flows of refugees from the war zone, and increasingly skeptical about the Maastricht blueprint for a

united Europe, particularly the plan for a monetary union. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia lowered further the German electorate's support for *Bundeswehr* peace-keeping operation outside NATO.

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In short, the contradictory stance assumed within all the major Western powers since the recognition, revealed a strong ideological conflict between the main EC actors and consequently defined the limits of European cooperation on security and foreign matters.

The long shadow of German unification

What was the main reason behind this upsurge of Germanophobia? There are two main answers which are deeply interconnected: the end of the Cold War and German unification. As has often been noted, the end of the bipolar world allowed for hitherto suppressed tensions to re-surface, while the glue provided by the common battle against Communism and Soviet expansionism was melting down. In particular, German unification re-awakened dormant ghosts. This section will be dedicated to analyzing the relationship between this historical event and the rise of German-bashing.

German-bashers also claim that German unification is the single international event which most influenced Yugoslavia's break-up. Post-1989 Germany had already applied the principle of self-determination to itself. It is claimed, often arbitrarily, that its example directly or indirectly inspired nationalists in other parts of the world, from the Baltics to Moldova and even Saddam Hussein's ill-fated invasion of Kuwait. The apologists of greater Serbia themselves often cite German reunification as a precedent, omitting to consider that it was achieved without a single shot. Yet in international relations and political science, the 'domino effect' paradigm is far from being considered a real thing.¹²⁶ The idea of Germany's 'original sin' is an important tool in the arms of the perfect German-basher. However, there are two perhaps more important sources of inspiration, and they are both related to unification. First, even though the principle of self-determination is associated by some with democracy and human rights, it does not automatically lead to secession.¹²⁷ But, if worst comes to worst, secession (state contraction) is ultimately an option preferable to unification (state expansion) from the viewpoint of other international actors — especially from the vantage point of the neighbors of the expanding coun-

try.¹²⁸ Secondly, German unification dramatically disrupted the balance of power within the European Union by at least creating the impression of an imminent German 'domination' of the continent.

Popular mutterings about Germany's secret ambitions in the Balkans were voiced particularly in Britain—as well as in other European countries—in the aftermath of German reunification. The latter took everybody by surprise. On the one hand, there was a genuine enthusiasm for the break-down of a barrier which had divided Europe's core for over 40 years. On the other hand, the very idea that Germany could be *one* revived the ghosts of the past. People suddenly realized that, at least in terms of land mass (349,520 kmq) and number of inhabitants (80,767,591),¹²⁹ Germany was now the dominant member of the EC. This added to previous fears of economic domination, expressed particularly by Britain and other North European countries. In short, a united Germany induced instinctive fears. For this reason only, the other partners wished to 'castigate' it at its weakest point, namely foreign politics.

In other words, German reunification created a sense of threat and apprehension amongst other European partners -although it was never opposed verbally. This is particularly true for Britain, where a strong anti-European lobby found new legitimacy for its anti-federalist goals. Likewise, Germany's chief neighbor, France, sensed it could be treated as a smaller partner in the EU.

It took a long time for these fears to dissipate. In the popular domain, they had been reinforced by massive media focus on neo-Nazi attacks against asylum seekers and *Gastarbeiter* in Germany.¹³⁰ Indeed, the sudden upsurge of racist attacks on foreigners by neo-Nazi gangs since 1990 contributed a great deal to spread an unprecedented sense of alarm. More distressingly, these attacks occurred in the wake of German unification and were mostly the work of East German youth socialized under Socialist internationalism and receiving the apparent benefits of the fulfillment of the long time dream of democracy and unification. Similar attacks in France and other countries before the crisis were given relatively less public attention. It is possible that foreign policy analysis has been affected by the simultaneous occurrence of German unification and the rise of xenophobia in the country. But this linkage ostensibly ignores the fact that Croatian refugees and Bosnian *Gastarbeiter* were among those murdered by skinheads and vigilante groups. Yet the democratic strength of the German fabric could be noticed in the huge candlelight demonstrations and mass mobilizations against

xenophobic attacks which have impregnated German life more than that of any other European country.¹³¹

In line with other Western powers, Britain had been advocating German unification as a matter of principle since at least 1949. Nevertheless, the speed at which unification occurred outpaced Britain's intellectual and institutional abilities to absorb and adapt to it. The major fault line of the Cold War ran through the Berlin Wall: the wall sealed the fate of the two Germanies, as well as that of the two blocs. In other words, the Cold War itself "centered upon the division of Germany. The war plans of both sides saw Germany as the first battlefield in World War III."¹³²

When Western governments encouraged German unification, they emphasized that it should take place within the framework of the European Community and NATO, and, in particular, that it should uphold existing international borders. A concern for the maintenance of the Cold War *status quo* was thus evident even before the break-up of Eastern multinational polities.

The strongest concerns were expressed by France and Britain, which felt that, confronted with a unified Germany, they risked losing their central position and seeing their influence rapidly diminished: the two "played worried spectators in the fast-moving drama," conjuring up the image of a single Germany "gradually nudging them off the center stage of European politics."¹³³ Despite their cautious approach to German reunification, neither Paris nor London appear to have "designed a long-term strategy to deal with the new challenge. . . as if they [were] counting on their status as Western Europe's only nuclear powers in order to maintain their political influence".¹³⁴

This may explain British tactical support for French nuclear tests in the Pacific in 1996: the use of the atomic bomb is seen by both London and Paris as a remaining symbol of supremacy *vis-a-vis* the economic and political power of a nuclear-free Germany, even if the ultimate price will be paid by the Polynesians and other inhabitants of the Pacific.

The Berlin Wall fell on 9 November 1989,¹³⁵ but a few months beforehand, on 17 June, Western speeches

continued to invoke the goal of eventual reunification. Allied governments had professed to go along, certain that their bluff would never be called. But in practice, almost everyone had accepted the division and tried to manage its consequences. Progressive opinion considered the existence of two German states to be the foundation for peace in Europe. Therefore the

sudden East German awakening in the fall of 1989 caught virtually all actors and commentators unprepared.¹³⁶

This is the more surprising if we consider that the division of the two Germanies was never officially accepted by either of the two German states. Hence, Paragraph 23 of GDR's Basic Law mandated for "accession," which meant in practice unification.

But how was Germany's politics of recognition related to the country's unification? And why was Germany less inhibited than other European countries in dealing with momentous changes in Eastern Europe? Not bound to any neo-colonial empire, Germany did not share the same apprehensions as other Western powers. Moreover, Germany was a relatively "homogeneous" country, which did not include territorial minorities posing a tangible threat to its own integrity - apart from the Danish speaking community in Schleswig-Holstein, a small Slavic minority of Lusatian Sorbs, and an even smaller one of North Frisians.¹³⁷ This perception of a threat to the internal borders of Britain and France will be discussed later, but it should be noted that this concern extended to virtually all non-homogeneous countries, from China, Burma and Iraq to Italy, Spain and Canada.

Finally, German unification was carried out according to much acclaimed principles of self-determination. For some, the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia was a logical extension of the same principles applied to other countries which, like former East Germany, were moving through the birth-pangs of democracy. Thus, as soon as the conflict erupted in Slovenia, Helmut Kohl declared that it was "unacceptable that suddenly the right of self-determination should no longer play a role".¹³⁸ Indeed, for many political commentators, democracy and self-determination were inseparable.

The US, Germany, and the 'realistic' option in the Balkans

In one of the most critical moments of foreign policy *impasse*, when ethnic cleansing by Serbian nationalists had reached its peak, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher suddenly accused Germany of triggering the Balkan conflict.¹³⁹ Declaring that Germany's 'early' recognition of Croatia was "not conducive to a good result," Christopher alleged that it only added coal to the fire. In a paradoxical sequel, he added that "many *serious* [sic] students of the matter think the beginnings of the problems the West faces stem from that recognition, *which enraged the Serbs*."¹⁴⁰ Several implica-

tions can be derived from this statement.¹⁴¹ First, since Christopher did not mention who such 'serious students' were, there is the suspicion that they may have been biased lobbyists or people who were interested in pressing a specific version of the facts.¹⁴² Secondly, the final part of the statement may be easily interpreted as follows: international recognition "enraged the Serbs" to such an extent that their massacres could be somehow justified. In Christopher's diplomatic *gaffe*, recognition was equated with genocide.

In the same breath, Christopher also called the UN arms embargo on Bosnia "a serious mistake."¹⁴³ This position differed from the Anglo-French one, which used the thesis of German recognition as a kind of justification for maintaining the arms embargo on Bosnia. Only a month before, Christopher manifested retreat from US calls for military action in Bosnia-Herzegovina, defining it "a quagmire" and "the problem from hell."¹⁴⁴ Faced with increasing uncertainties and with opposing pressures and counter-pressures, the US government turned to the British scheme of moral relativism: Christopher accused the Muslims of "atrocities", and for the first time he refused to describe the conflict as Serb aggression. Rather, in the British footsteps, it became a civil war, "a war between all, against all".¹⁴⁵ As in the case of Britain, targeting Germany betrayed a gnawing embarrassment for the administration's incapacity to find a solution to the Yugoslav *impasse*. However, contrary to the British and French, Christopher also stressed that "at heart, this is a European problem".¹⁴⁶ Only three weeks before, Clinton had called for military action.

This volte-face occurred after Clinton failed to convince the military and the American public that Bosnia-Herzegovina was "worth fighting for". But one more important reason was the failure of the US administration, especially Christopher, to convince the allies of the effectiveness of air strikes.¹⁴⁷ It was the allies' reluctance to take military action which forced Christopher to drop his plans. At home, White House communications chief George Stephanopoulos voiced criticism of Clinton's interventionism.

Did the Bush administration initiate the humiliating experience of Somalia with the goal of rendering further intervention in Bosnia unpopular? Before the US committed any troops to Bosnia, Boutros Boutros-Ghali had castigated the West for concentrating its attention on the war in Bosnia. The result of this and other pressures (including a real indecision about what to do in the Balkans, the fear of Russia, the persisting desire of keeping Yugoslavia united, and the efforts of the Black Caucus lobby on behalf of Somalia) was

to avoid any commitment in Bosnia. In its place, Somalia was singled out as a recipient of US 'peace-keeping' interventionism. Many months later, when popular pressure was mounting to defeat Serbian aggression in Bosnia, the experience of Somalia was adroitly, if cynically, used to warn the public about the dangers of intervention. Even as Clinton heralded the role of US troops in Somalia as "successful," the underlying meanings and lessons of this intervention were evident to the public. The media were repeatedly stressing that if the peace-keeping operation in Somalia had failed and the US had been forced demeaningly to withdraw, a real quagmire was awaiting US commitment in Bosnia. In a ceremony for troops returning from Somalia, Clinton openly addressed public misgivings about intervention.¹⁴⁸ In his speech, Clinton used the classical isolationist metaphor about the only remaining superpower refusing being branded as "the world's policeman."

In practice, at a time when Bosnia was experiencing war and genocide, Clinton uttered words of peace. He did not—and could not—set a clear goal, deliver statements of action, or "draw a line in the sand," as his predecessor George Bush had done in the Gulf War.

Again, the role of France and Britain in much of the American indecision must be taken into account. The British reporter Ed Vuillamy argues that Britain and the Foreign Office exerted a disproportionate influence over US policy, in particular during the most difficult *vacuum* at the time of installation of the new Presidency.¹⁴⁹ The Anglo-French attitude is bewildering in the light of Russia's initial will to collaborate with the West. On 5 May 1993, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev warned Bosnian Serbs that if they failed to embrace the Vance-Owen plan, they would face "hell."¹⁵⁰ On 27 April, Russian President Boris Yelstin warned Serbs they would get no protection from Russia.¹⁵¹ However, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, strongly influenced by Britain and other members of the UN Security Council, adopted a much more *laissez-faire* attitude by stating in the Senate that "US military forces would be committed only if there was strong public support, clear goals and an 'exit strategy.'"¹⁵² Hence, the initial weakness, indecision, and incapacity to act of Clinton's administration was compounded by sudden accusations against Germany.

In response to Christopher's assault, Germany's Ambassador Immo Stabreit noted: "Rather than breaking up the Yugoslav Federation, recognition of Slovenia and Croatia robbed Milošević of the 'save Yugoslavia' rhetoric that he has been using, not without

success, to disguise the true meaning of his 'Greater Serbia' strategy".¹⁵³ In support of Stabreit, Norman Stone recalls that "units were attacking towns in Slovenia six months before recognition happened. They also were laying waste to 130 kilometers of Adriatic coast around Dubrovnik in Croatia. It is pure legend to suggest — as, unfortunately, Warren Christopher did — that the Germans 'caused' this. Rather, they put an end to it."¹⁵⁴

German Foreign Ministry spokesman Michael Gerdt also dismissed Christopher's criticism: "The decision to recognize Croatia and Slovenia was a common decision made with the Twelve [i.e., the EC] . . . It was vital after Serbia blocked (peace) negotiations. . . and carried on its war of conquest against Croatia undaunted. . . Recognition was necessary to protect the small nations and republics in former Yugoslavia at least with diplomatic means...against the continued aggressive conquest policies of Serbia."¹⁵⁵

Indeed, Germany succeeded in overcoming an initial Anglo-French opposition, but strenuous criticism of recognition remained, including amongst the majority of the British political establishment. Most critics of the politics of recognition fell back on 'moral relativism', contending that Serbia was not the only aggressor, and that it reacted to the other Republics' provocations. Moral relativism over the Balkans stems from, and finds legitimacy in, this attempt to 'de-recognize recognition'.

This misunderstanding of the causes of the conflict also stems from Cold War thinking. Cold War inertia culminated with James Baker's visit to Belgrade. The Bush administration's Secretary of State arrived in Belgrade on 21 June 1991, where he held nine consecutive meetings in one day with all six republican leaders, as well as with Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Marković, Foreign Minister Budimir Lončar, and Albanian leaders from Kosovo.¹⁵⁶ The US administration's priorities for post-Communist Yugoslavia were shallowly defined by Baker as "order and stability" in his Belgrade speech.¹⁵⁷

It has often been noticed that the effect of Baker's words was to encourage Belgrade's further expansion and assert the Serbian viewpoint more strongly *vis-a-vis* world public opinion. Some observers, such as former US Ambassador to Yugoslavia (1989 to 1992) Warren Zimmermann, strongly deny this perspective. In a fascinating piece of self-scrutiny, Zimmermann claims that "Baker's failure was due not to his message but to the fact that the different parts of Yugoslavia were on a collision course" and that "never was a green light given or implied to Milošević or the army to invade

the seceding republics, as has since been alleged in some press accounts. But, was there a red light? Not as such, because the United States had given no consideration to using force to stop a Serbian/JNA attack on Slovenia or Croatia."¹⁵⁸

Yet we have to judge by the results. The complexity of the situation is brilliantly described in Laura Silber's and Alan Little's well-known investigation.¹⁵⁹ At the beginning, Belgrade was uncertain about the West's intentions. Before launching a massive attack against the secessionist Republics, the regime needed to know from reliable sources what the West's reactions to a massive attack by the JNA would be. The only way they could obtain this information was through Moscow, given both Russia's perceived sympathy for Serbian aspirations and the privileged channel of communication between Moscow and Washington—and other Western capitals. Borislav Jović, president of Yugoslavia until the outbreak of the conflict in 1991 and vice president of Milošević's Serbian Socialist Party, consulted the Yugoslav Defense Minister General Veljko Kadijević, and together they decided that the latter should travel to Moscow.¹⁶⁰

In Moscow the generals met secretly with the hard line Communists who run the Soviet Ministry of Defense. Jović testified: "We agreed he should ask: 'If we seize the arms from Croatia by force, and if the West intervenes, will you Russians defend us?'" The Soviet Defense Ministry gave General Kadijević details of their intelligence report. This showed that the Yugoslav army was safe to ignore Western warnings. Jovic continues: "None else from the State Council knew he went. It was a private matter, though perfectly legal. We just needed the information". Confidential [that] they could act in safety, Milošević and Jović went to the Yugoslav army headquarters for the launch of the military action they had planned together.¹⁶¹

Baker's visit probably gave a further impetus to the fragmentation of Yugoslavia in two noticeable ways. First, by upholding state integrity as a supreme value, it encouraged repression and internal war. Secondly, it also exposed previously unaffected republics to the destabilizing influence of pan-Serbianism.

The collapse of Yugoslavia shows that actions designed to prevent violence may trigger it. In June 1991, when Yugoslavia's national crisis was coming to a head, Secretary of State James Baker said that the

United States preferred a unified Yugoslavia, which many in Belgrade interpreted as tacit approval for the Yugoslav army to use violence to stop regional secession.¹⁶²

Christopher Bennett's analysis concords with this view:

When the JNA High Command decided to intervene in Slovenia, it did so in the belief that the United States was prepared to turn a blind eye to intervention, provided the operation was rapid and efficient, in the interest of holding Yugoslavia together. . . [James Baker] had certainly opted for bullying Slovenia and Croatia out of their independence declarations rather than exerting comparable pressure on Serbia and the JNA to moderate their respective stances.¹⁶³

As on previous occasions during this century, the Serbian nationalists would hardly have begun their campaign for a Greater Serbia without some form of international assurance or support. In the past, the support of Russia and France had been crucial in proping up an extreme form of nationalism which had transformed Ottoman Belgrade into a military fortress without equivalent in Europe. In the post Cold-War era, Serbia could count on new allies. Among the sympathizers, Serbian nationalists could enlist the support of Greek anti-Turkish nationalists, the Russian far right, the Cyprus establishment, and Hellenic lobbies throughout the Western world. But undercover support was more crucial by far as Milošević could count on the 'neutrality' of Britain, France, and, in the first critical phase of the war, the United States. As Roy Gutman cogently points out, "Paramilitary forces organized in Serbia began the offensive by launching military attacks on cities in eastern Slavonia, but *after it was clear that no outside power would intervene*, the army took the offensive in August."¹⁶⁴ This 'neutrality' was exemplified by the decision to impose an embargo on all 'contending parts'. "In September, at American and British behest, the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia and all its component parts. The Serbs, who enjoyed an enormous advantage in weapons, were supportive."¹⁶⁵ The JNA is one of the largest armies in Europe. Against its heavy artillery, tanks, and jet aircraft the Croatian police and civilian volunteers had mostly light weapons. Sabrina Ramet concurs that "Britain and France obstinately insisted on keeping that embargo in place, leading State Department officials in Washington to speculate that despite their protes-

tations to the contrary the British and the French actually hoped for a Serb victory."¹⁶⁶ While France and Britain expected a massive victory against the Muslims, Germany was the country which exerted the greater pressure to lift the embargo. However, there was not much Germany could do: German foreign policy had become marginalized since 1991 and the recognition was blown out of all proportions in order to provide a '*casus belli*' for the Anglo-French takeover and monopolization of the 'peace initiative'.

Rumors persisted that the US clash with Germany over the issue of recognition was about the realignment of Western relations. The major fault line would then be not in the Balkans but within the West, between an older colonial order, pursued by France and Britain, and a post-colonial order where the right of self-determination, democracy and human rights are the key words. America's belated shifting from the first to the second position occurred under dramatic circumstances. America was particularly influenced by Anglo-French pressures, as well as by pro-Serbian lobbyists within the US.¹⁶⁷ Evidence of its faulty approach accumulated every day, until it was possible neither to maintain the older opinion nor to adopt any new prescription. Yet, despite this apparent shift, mainstream America has conveniently preserved the useful legend that German premature recognition caused the war.

Lack of Western knowledge on Yugoslavia and the role of the diasporas

The break-up of Yugoslavia had been anticipated at least since the mid-1980s, when the dire straits of the country's economy and the lack of a central leadership had awoken international apprehensions. In the early 1980s, the political historian A. Ross Johnson had warned, "Yugoslav political rhetoric sustains [the notion] that 'all nationalisms are dangerous at the same level.' In reality, Serbian nationalism is by far the most dangerous. Being the only instrument of centralism, it is the only nationalism that can solicit disintegrative reactions in the whole country."¹⁶⁸ In 1985, George Schöpflin anticipated the difficulties of holding the Republics together.¹⁶⁹ By June 1988, Branka Magaš envisaged that a major explosion might be brewing.¹⁷⁰ In 1989, the same author had warned about the dangers of 'Balkanization'.¹⁷¹ Thus, a few international analysts did foresee forthcoming events at a very early stage. Yet, the media started to worry belatedly, and, when it did, it could not avoid trivializing the entire issue with Eurocentric notions such as "tribalism."¹⁷²

In particular, there was widespread knowledge of the anti-Albanian repression in the early 1980s. A few words of condemnation were then uttered by isolated politicians and human rights observers. Yet, beside human rights rhetoric, a clear signal was sent to Belgrade — as well as to its victims. In the Yugoslav mindset of the time, this signal was interpreted as one of due and appropriate non-interference in the country's internal affairs. Such idea of non-interference was a central hinge of the non-aligned ideology of Titoism. In this way, the West decided to uphold Tito's postulates about Yugoslavia's inviolable sovereignty — but this time, without Tito. Western elites chose to overlook the most powerful and all-pervasive form of nationalism, that is, state nationalism. In the eyes of many onlookers it simply did not exist. Nationalism was purely a disease of recalcitrant minorities, not a problem of the Yugoslav state.

If the break-up of Yugoslavia was a predictable event, why did some Western countries try to prevent it as long as they could? Why was not the goal of Greater Serbia, within or without Yugoslavia, promptly diagnosed? In this section, I will explore a crucial international facet of the Yugoslav war, namely the peculiar condition of acquaintance, but at the same time unfamiliarity, with Yugoslavia as determined by the Cold War.

The main argument of this section is that every major event within Yugoslavia reached Western diplomacies after being screened and sifted either by Belgrade's propaganda machine or by pro-Yugoslav elements abroad. In Britain, the latter included pro-Chetnik lobbies as well as Marxist intellectuals.¹⁷³ In short, events in Yugoslavia were long perceived through a Serbian lens. Equally, in academic circles the only reality which was often adumbrated was that of their Serbian colleagues. The role of the Serbian intelligentsia in shaping current ideals of ethnic cleansing and suppressing dissent has been widely noted.¹⁷⁴

In such an astonishing vacuum of information, the media played a critical role by disseminating images of the tragedy which Serbian propaganda had tried to minimize or demolish altogether. Significant attempts to silence the media by claiming that they offered a one-sided or distorted view of the conflict took place at the most crucial moments of the war, just when the West most needed to get its act together. The philosophy opposed to media reporting was that of "moral relativism."¹⁷⁵

However, this trend has spared a few countries. In Germany, an academic tradition less oriented towards Serbia already prevailed

— even though a pro-Serbian heritage also existed.¹⁷⁶ Germany had less pronounced ties with Serbia at least since World War I.

Contrary to the case of the former Soviet Union, there has been little useful Western scholarship on Yugoslavia.¹⁷⁷ From US government agencies enormous funds were channeled during the Cold War toward the development of Soviet Studies in America, and an entire area discipline emerged under the name of *Sovietology* or *Kremlinology*. Unfortunately, no “Yugoslavology” was ever instituted. Why this disinterest? The main reason was that Yugoslavia was not a key protagonist of the Cold War, it was not an enemy or a threat to Western interests, and it was on the contrary accorded several strategic advantages.¹⁷⁸

Yugoslavia was often perceived in the West as a potential ally in the Cold War. Tito's regime received enormous benefits by playing the role of bridge between East and West. With its enlightened politics of non-alignment, Belgrade provided no serious reason for concern for the Western bloc and, as we have already observed, postwar British politics were staunchly pro-Titoist beyond ideological cleavages. As with Enver Hoxa's Albania, Yugoslavia remained at the margin of NATO's and the West's strategic interests.

For this reason, no serious funding was invested into studying the fabric and history of Yugoslav societies in English-speaking countries: most of the West's ‘expertise’ on the area revolved around a few Belgrade-centered diplomats and lobbyists. Given this deficiency in Western expertise, it is not surprising that, when the crisis erupted in the late 1980s, Western governments were unable to interpret it, even though - as we have seen- the demise of Yugoslavia had been anticipated by some lone scholars.

Another factor which put Germany in a strong position for anticipating developments in Yugoslavia was its large numbers of Albanian, Croatian, Serbian, and other *Gastarbeiter* from the poorest areas of Yugoslavia.¹⁷⁹ Their presence made it more difficult than elsewhere to hide the truth. It also made the Germans more receptive to their plight and dreams: “Hosting 600,000 Slovenian and Croatian workers, Germany sympathized with their aspiration to self-determination. But the bloody legacy of Nazi abuse in World War II tied FRG hands.”¹⁸⁰ John Ardagh claims that, of all immigrant groups, “the Yugoslavs tend to be the best liked, and are much appreciated by their employers for their intelligence, politeness, and hard work”.¹⁸¹ Yet, the role of the Croatian diaspora in shaping German foreign policy has not been properly documented. Some authors have hinted at an unidentified “Croatian lobby” in Ger-

many generating a black veil of deceit and propaganda.¹⁸² No evidence is normally provided to sustain such hypotheses. Moreover, the same authors barely mention the crucial impact of the much better organized Serbian diaspora in other Western countries, particularly in Britain, France and the US, where it acted in concert with the even more powerful Greek lobby. By contrast with the hypothetical "Croatian lobby," the role of the Serbian lobby in the Yugoslav war has been thoroughly documented.¹⁸³ The role of the lobbies is an indispensable angle from which to analyze the conflict. By analyzing the data which the lobbies disseminated to government agencies and academic institutions, it may be possible to clarify the international dimension of the war and the basis of its legitimacy and support. Yet in Britain most of the lobbying was carried out by British citizens of "pure English" stock who had no ethnic relationship with the Balkans whatsoever.¹⁸⁴

Germany's proximity to Yugoslavia was also reflected in a particularly favorable disposition towards refugees from the area. During the Cold War, as well as during the war in Bosnia, Germany adopted an open-door policy towards refugees in general, which was in sharp contrast with Britain's tight border controls. In Britain, these controls prevented the consolidation of a significant Yugoslav presence, apart from the influential Serbian nationalist diaspora which I have already mentioned. Border controls have consistently discriminated against Bosnian refugees, and there are cases of British citizens imprisoned for facilitating the entry and providing humanitarian help to Bosnian Muslims.¹⁸⁵

After 1989, Germany became Europe's prime country for immigration. In 1992 over 600,000 refugees arrived. Of the 425,000 refugees who by 1992 managed to leave the borders of Yugoslavia, Germany accepted more than 200,000, a percentage which is much larger than that of any other West European country.¹⁸⁶ Moreover, Germany had the most liberal policy in terms of supplying haven for asylum seekers: Article 162.2.2 of the Federal Republic of Germany's Basic Law states: "[all] persons persecuted on political grounds shall enjoy the right of asylum."¹⁸⁷

The marginalization of German foreign policy: blessing or curse?

As is known, since World War II, autonomous German foreign policy initiatives have been extremely restrained. The prospect of an independent German foreign policy still generates alarm in Europe today. After World War II, France and Britain, with the

US, held total control over international diplomacy by firmly resisting any German initiative. Mark Almond soundly observes that "for decades, Whitehall and the Quai d'Orsay had been used to the German poodle doing as it was instructed in foreign policy matters at the risk of being reminded of its Nazi past if it stepped out of line."¹⁸⁸

This attitude can be seen in connection both with Germany's pro-recognition policy and with its pressure to lift the arms embargo which was strangling Bosnia: Norman Cigar points out that "among the European allies, Germany was the most forceful proponent for lifting the embargo, while the British government seems to have played a central role in opposing it."¹⁸⁹

Returning again and again to an assertion that the conflict was a "civil war" caused by "centuries of ethnic hatred," UK Prime Minister John Major's government sought to shape Western policy on the embargo with a view to obstructing any change in the international position. Great Britain's support of a continued embargo took various forms, including at the UN, where Britain had already worked to block the General Assembly's recommendation to lift the embargo in December 1992. Great Britain again exerted considerable effort, along with France and Russia, to derail a similar motion at the Security Council in June 1993.

In the end, in the interests of a united European position, Germany's Chancellor Kohl retreated reluctantly from his position, and, as a result, "the initiative languished and was shelved, much to the chagrin of not only many in the West, but also of public opinion in most Muslim countries."¹⁹⁰

The result of Germany's marginalization in the peace process has been the slow deferral of most peace initiatives to Britain, with the resulting tragedy for millions of Bosnians. One of the strongest accusations comes from Sabrina Ramet:

In June 1994 British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd emphatically took the Serb side in the Serb-Albanian dispute, declaring that Britain was opposed both to Kosovo's secession from Serbia and to any changes in Serbia's southern borders. Since the United States, Germany and France were increasingly deferring to Britain in matters related to the Yugoslav crisis, Hurd was probably speaking for the West as a whole.¹⁹¹

Indeed, it is now clear that, once Germany had been excluded from any direct initiative, ostensibly as a "punishment" for its policy

of recognition, Britain, and to a lesser extent France, took the absolute lead, which coincided with the campaign of mass murder against the Muslims.

On one account German policy was perhaps flawed: if instead of pushing for recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, Germany had instead pushed its partners towards the preventive deployment of peacekeeping troops in Bosnia, then the Bosnians might have been spared the fate of their northern neighbours. Yet the preventive deployment of troops in Bosnia was opposed by Cyrus Vance and most other peace "negotiators."

What matters is that the *vacuum* resulting from America's withdrawal and Germany's marginalization has been filled by Britain and France. Both of those countries (particularly Britain) have traditionally maintained a skeptical and recalcitrant stance towards European union — perhaps more so than any other countries within the EC. Yet Britain and France did collaborate in the most crucial post-1989 event, the dismemberment of Bosnia.¹⁹²

Internal collapse: from Yugoslavia to Yugoserbia

The more we distance ourselves in time and space from the conflict, the more clearly we can see the picture and the sequence of events which led to Yugoslavia's disintegration. The most recent research no longer blames the secession of Slovenia and Croatia for instigating the war.¹⁹³ Some accounts go as far as suggesting that the primal form of separatism was Serbia's own brand, rather than Slovenia's and Croatia's. For instance, Laura Silber and Allan Little contend that "under Milošević's stewardship, the Serbs were. . . the key secessionists."¹⁹⁴ The rhetoric of Yugoslav unity, purposely defended by Belgrade, was hence mere fiction. It served two main purposes: one external, namely to convince the international community that Belgrade's option was the most stable in the sense that it would preserve the existing status quo; the other internal, namely to convince the Yugoslav army that they were fighting for the unity of the country.

In December 1991, Yugoslav premier Ante Marković was ousted after accusations of pro-Croatian sympathies, which stemmed mostly from the fact that he was an ethnic Croat. Once Marković had allegedly resigned and had been replaced by an ethnic Serb, there remained few doubts about Serbia's dominance over rump Yugoslavia. Even the most naive foreign observers should have noticed that Yugoslavia became no more than a rhetorical fig-

ment, and that 'Yugoserbia' had taken its place. Hence, when in January 1992 Croatia was officially recognized by the EC, recognition came well after Yugoslavia had *de facto* ceased to exist — despite the rhetorical devices of Belgrade's elites.¹⁹⁵

The JNA was easily lured into this trap: the army and the Party were one, and the army's foundation was totally derived from Communist ideology and practice.¹⁹⁶ One could hardly be conceived without the other. With the demise of Communism, a vital source of legitimacy disappeared. The Army reacted to post-1989 events by deceiving itself that Yugoslavia could be exempted from the fall of Communism. Indeed, the exceptional success of Tito's Yugoslavia and its relative progress in terms of opening to free-market reforms and democratic pluralism, led the army to conceive that Belgrade could be spared the fate of other East European regimes. As most armies in the world, the JNA also upheld the unity of the country as a supreme task and sacred duty. Along with Communism, the ideology of international 'non-alignment', with its stress on equidistance from the two blocs, was what held the country together. Once the antagonism between the two blocs disappeared, the non-aligned ideology which went with it also vanished.

Already dominated by Serbian cadres, the army was easily laid open to the influence of Serbian nationalism, becoming severely infiltrated by Greater Serbia apologists. For the army as a whole, there was no option other than believing that Milošević's regime was truly defending the country's unity. But the metamorphosis of the Yugoslav state into an ethnic Serbian state could only be achieved through radicalization and by increasing conflict at home and abroad. Instead of taking a 'neutral' course as guarantor of Yugoslavia's unity, the army espoused Milošević's line. This was made easier by the preponderance of ethnic Serbs in the Army, especially in the top ranks, where they made up 60 per cent of the officer corps.¹⁹⁷ All of Tito's efforts to decentralize the country "were futile because Tito was not able to federalize the armed forces, [which] remained under Serbian domination."¹⁹⁸ Once the road was undertaken, there was no way back. A spiral of tensions ensued. So, it has been argued that ethnic cleansing really began in the army before it could be acted out in the streets of Croatia and Bosnia.¹⁹⁹

While trying to ignore internal tensions ignited by Milošević's re-centralization, the army and the regime began to look for imaginary foreign scapegoats in order to externalize Yugoslavia's intestine tensions. A pre-existing anti-imperialist 'Third Worldist' rhetoric inherited by Yugoslavia's non-aligned past was revived and

adapted to the new circumstances. The blame was shifted on an assorted variety of 'imperialists' and their scramble for the Balkans. Since internal minorities could hardly be blamed for acting themselves as imperialist *vis-a-vis* Belgrade, they could be more effectively portrayed as stooges acting on behalf of shadowy outside powers. In this vein, Albanians and Muslims became "Turks", whereas Croats, Slovenes and Hungarians were seen as puppets of Germany and harbingers of an unlikely Austro-Hungarian revival.

The non-aligned ideology was transformed into a raving paranoia musing about the role of international conspiracies in the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Accusations of Fourth Reich expansionism were crucial. Yet, they were not the only ones: Serbia became the eternal victim of a universal plot headed by US imperialism, Austro-Hungarian nostalgics, Islamic fundamentalists, Albanian expansionism, rampant neo-Naziism, neo-Ottoman revivalism, and the Vatican. The enemies at home were identified as pro-Croat Titoism and his bureaucratic legacy — which mostly meant the remains of Yugoslavia's 'federalist' skeleton. All these imaginary targets were crucial in welding the army onto Milošević's regime and providing an *alibi* for the successive loss of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia.

Even before conspiracy theories hit the Western media, Belgrade had gained praise among Western elites for its purported defense of Yugoslav unity. A crucial paradox was taking shape behind the scenes: while the discourse of Yugoslav unity served to increase sympathy abroad, it served the opposite function within the country. That is, while it successfully propped up international support for Belgrade, it also inflamed the army against non-Serbs. Blaming international actors provided an easy external decoy for both the army and the regime, instead of confronting the issue of the regime's failure to defend the country's unity. This elementary paradox was ignored by the international 'community' with tragic consequences and must account for one of the greatest obstacles in the understanding of the origins of the war. Beyond the unitary rhetoric, there loomed the reality of the creation of a Greater Serbia, an ethnically pure state for the Serbs, a goal changing in shape according to Milošević's wishes and needs.

As James Gow points out, since the end of 1990 the JNA tried to find legitimacy by allying itself with a particular group, the Serbs. In doing so it alienated all other groups and helped to destroy the 'federation', hence losing its very *raison d'être*. "Relegitimation for the YPA had to mean dangling carrots, not brandishing big sticks. .

. Chances of survival reduced every time the Generals made attempts to assert authority which could only be counterproductive. The more the Generals tried to take initiative, the worse they made the situation. . . If the Generals were to end up without a country to defend, it would have been largely their own doing."²⁰⁰ That situation is familiar to many military regimes: it was the case with the Spanish army in the mid-1970s with respect to the Basque insurgents, and the Turkish army in the 1990s with respect to Kurdish guerrillas.²⁰¹ Yet, the aim of these two countries was unquestionably unitarian.²⁰²

At the same time, the JNA lent itself to a process of internal purification which soon led to the elimination or flight of non-Serbs. In the words of a Bosnian rape victim, ethnic cleansing had begun *within* the army much before 'recognition' and even before the breakup of Yugoslavia: "By 1992 the Yugoslav Army had already systematically 'ethnically cleansed' itself of non-Serbs, even by sending young draftees home from boot camps in coffins. This had been going on for years. Nonetheless, when the army took up positions in the hills around Sarajevo, we Sarajevans still thought of it as the Yugoslav *National Army*. . ." ²⁰³ Moreover, shortly before Bosnia proclaimed its independence, Milošević and Jović secretly began to transfer all Bosnian Serbs in the JNA to units in Bosnia. In this way, "they handed over to Karadžić an army of 80,000 soldiers fully equipped with sophisticated weapons which they used to target civilians with. Milošević contrived to pay and supply this army by stealth so that he could deny having any connection with it."²⁰⁴

Conclusion

Within the EC, there has been unanimous support for the preservation of a united Yugoslavia. As we have seen, even Germany was initially opposed to the disintegration of the country

In the foregoing investigation, I have shown that the idea that Germany caused the breakup of Yugoslavia, and even that it caused the war, is entirely false. Like all myths, it had its functions. For Western leaders, particularly in Britain, it served to justify their *impasse* and belated awareness of the causes of the conflict. For Belgrade's elites, it represented a conscious attempts to divert attention from their crucial responsibility in the war. The punctuality and timeliness of attacks against Germany reflected a typical diversion strategy. The idea of a German responsibility was disseminated in order to find a whipping boy for the West's incapacity

to coordinate a common policy on the war. At the same time, Germany has been made accountable for breaking a *taboo* by recognizing new states and acknowledging new international border changes.

In analytical terms, the German-centered explanation is also flawed, as it builds on another misguided interpretation, the idea that the conflict is basically a tug-of-war between Serbia and Croatia. This has turned out to be a major distracting "decoy."²⁰⁵ As the ensuing war in Bosnia has shown, it was folly to try and solve the Croatian conflict in isolation from Bosnia and from all other preys of the Serbian offensive.

The recent dramatic cooling of relations between Croatia and Germany further disproves the simplistic and chimeric story of a revival of World War II's alliances. Since at least 1992, Germany has developed and improved its ties with all former Yugoslav Republics except Croatia, and German intellectuals have been highly vocal in condemning human right abuses in Croatia, particularly, the role of Croatian extremists in Bosnia. Metaphorically, it can be said that the destruction of the bridge of Mostar represented the severing of all preferential ties between Germany and Croatia. Likewise, Croatia has tried to eschew Germany's embrace, by diversifying its economic and political partners and expanding relations with other Western countries, particularly the USA, Italy, and its northern neighbors.

It was originally the attempt to re-centralize the Yugoslav state, and in particular the abolition of the provincial autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina in 1989 (the former overwhelmingly inhabited by Albanians, the latter inhabited by Hungarians, Slovaks, Croats, and other minorities) that, by revealing the regime's intentions, induced most Slovenes, hitherto staunch supporters of Yugoslav unity, to discuss openly the possibility of secession.²⁰⁶ Croatian nationalists simply adjusted to the evolving *Zeitgeist*, seeing the unfolding of Belgrade's authority as an historic and unrepeatable opportunity.²⁰⁷ Branka Magaš notes how "little attention has been paid to the political and constitutional changes that took place in Yugoslavia before 1989" and that these changes "predate the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe."²⁰⁸ The attack on Tito's 1974 Constitution was conducted under the banner of radical centralism: the abolition of provincial autonomies within Serbia preluded to an era were non-Serbs would be treated as second-class citizens. It also "destroyed the ideological and constitutional settlement forged in World War II."²⁰⁹ Nobody in the West dared to forecast that radical centraliza-

tion would lead to ethnic cleansing. Indeed, the most ominous sign of the time was the West's indifference to the fate of Kosovo, and ever since, Serbian politics consisted in "testing the will of the other to resist, be they other Yugoslav nations or the West."²¹⁰

Yet, the conflict was commonly painted as Serbo-Croat at the core. Such a view has been repeated *ad infinitum* in several derivative interpretations of the conflict, but especially by British and American mainstream politicians.²¹¹ Until well after the siege of Sarajevo began, this *cliché* was the daily staple of the US government's official interpretive efforts in regard to the war. Since Belgrade's elites had abounding connections with the West, both in mainstream political and in academic circles, it was not easy to attack them. Instead, against all evidence, the Croats—and the other minorities as a corollary—were presented as 'the problem'.

After being censured and marginalized for recognizing Croatia and Slovenia, Germany's pressure was more muted in respect of the need to recognize Bosnia. It was the United States which, after refusing for a long time to recognize Croatia and Slovenia, took the lead in recognizing Bosnia. But the original indecision of the US was a forewarning of the coming tragedy.

As soon as Lord Carrington pointed the finger at Germany's initiative for seriously wrecking the leverage power of his plan, a kind of fever spread across Europe, with its center in Britain.²¹² Accusations of Germany "maneuvering behind the scenes" and images of an EC "prodded by Germany" promptly circulated from Anglo-French chancelleries to the world media, feeding ancient prejudices and contributing to what has been cogently defined as the "Balkanization of the West."²¹³

Among all countries, non-interventionism and German-bashing peaked in Britain and the US. Relying on popular memories dating back from the time of Bismarck's competing colonialism till the Nazis, Anglo-Saxon elites constructed a convenient framework in which all otherwise unaccountable events in former Yugoslavia could be conveniently placed. Germany's unification prompted a first muted reaction which emerged in the open once the new German state took an unprecedented initiative in foreign policy.

Another fact that emerges is the historical depth of distrust of Germany. Hence, events in Yugoslavia were more likely to be read in the light of World War I developments, than World War II's anti-Fascist struggle. By blaming Germany, the US and Britain were indeed blaming Europe. Accordingly, Germany has been "allowed" to "steamroll" its European partners with an "overhasty" recogni-

tion of Croatia and Slovenia. For years, the adjective "hasty" has bounced around in the media like an uncontrollable squash-ball whose momentum was unexpected even by its launcher. It was in turn reflected in popular perceptions, particularly in Britain. When international responsibilities risked being identified, Germany provided an ideal target to divert all potential criticism away from the West's mismanagement of the conflict.

The main argument of this paper is that the policy of apportioning blame on Germany for the Balkan crisis has been a fallout from German re-unification. The latter not only came as a surprise, but many Westerners reacted to it with alarm. Criticism was held back for a while, only to explode once Germany ventured into the taboo area of foreign policy, anticipating a move which most Western states frowned upon: the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. It is known that autonomous initiatives in foreign policy matters are seen with suspicion. Obviously, Germany did not act without the official support of other governments, but several leaders who accepted recognition did then claim *post-facto* that they had not intended to do so, and that they had acted under German pressure.

As we said, among the most powerful legitimizing principles of the Serbophile line was the conviction that the Serbs were acting on behalf of the entire Yugoslavia. Milošević and JNA army commanders used to validate their behavior in front of the international arena by adducing the imperative to protect Yugoslavia's sovereignty. In practical terms, that meant that the responsibility totally fell back on the shoulders of "seceding" republics: the Serbs were seen as upholders of the principle of national sovereignty against anarchic secessionist trends. They were also desecrated as upholders of civilized unitary principles versus the new 'tribal anarchism' of their antagonists.

Moreover, the secession of Croatia and Slovenia was misconceived as a purely egotistic move in defiance of allegedly solidaristic principles of 'national' unity. The Croatian and Slovene far-right also supported secession. But egotistic and anti-solidarian elements are in-built in all nationalist movements. Yet, it is impossible to underestimate that all non-Serbian minorities were facing a sense of impending menace. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear now from what sort of extreme atrocities non-Serbian minorities were trying to escape. The threats were far from imaginary.

Another major mistake was to confuse secession with instability. Events have shown that instability was rather spurred by persistent counter-efforts to uphold state integrity and the untouch-

ability of frontiers inherited by the Cold War. Such a principle can only work with the agreement of both governments involved and their subjects, but we have seen how Belgrade itself had a separatist agenda which had nothing to do with the international community's wishful thinking.

Finally, there was the persistent mistake of conceiving the current war as derived from secession and "Balkanization" —an old Western nightmare. Far from it, the tragic evolution of the events was most likely dictated by the major international powers' relentless attempts to keep Yugoslavia together.

In their futile attempt to maintain the unity of the country against powerful centrifugal trends, most Western governments *de facto* wedded themselves unto a pro-Serbian line. Moreover, implying that the conflict was basically a Serbian-Croatian one meant that one was forced to play down the harassment and persecution suffered by the other minorities.

The Croat and Slovene move did put Western governments under unprecedented pressure, a pressure which they were unprepared to tackle. This may be the only *alibi* for the West's politicians vacillations and shilly-shallies. All their subsequent moves do not absolve them.

In brief, I wish to conclude by stressing that German recognition had no discernible negative impact on the crisis. By recognizing Slovenia and Croatia as international partners, Germany did indeed dissuade further Serbian aggression. The EC decision of 16 December 1991 to recognize Croatia and Slovenia was in fact followed by a Serb decision to stop the war in Croatia. If the same did not occur in Bosnia, that was mostly due to the contrasting signals sent by the West to Belgrade and the *de facto* non-recognition of Bosnia as a single entity. Again, the tragedy of Bosnia had often been attributed to Germany's politics of recognition. The "German conspiracy thesis" hence represented one of the cardinal myths supporting Western abnegation of responsibility. It also represented an easily available interpretation for those Western elites which, particularly in Britain, lacked substantial information on the background of the conflict, or decided to rely on information filtered by Belgrade-centered sources — even to the point of ignoring events as reported by the media.

Notes

¹ See Heinz-Jürgen Axt, "Did Genscher Disunite Yugoslavia? Myths and Facts about the Foreign Policy of United Germany", in Gunay Göksü Özdoğan and Kemâli Saybasili (eds.), *Balkans: A Mirror of the New International Order* (Istanbul: EREN, 1995). For a comprehensive legal analysis, see the Proceedings of the Symposium on "Recent Developments in the Practice of State Recognition", in *European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 36—91 and 142—143.

² Belgium, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Austria, and some other Scandinavian and East European countries were voicing their approval for recognition before Germany and other countries could even act.

³ This is the approach adopted, for instance, by the former Yugoslav Ambassador to the European community, Mihailo Crnobrnja in his book, *The Yugoslav Drama* (London: Taurus, 1994); by U. S. Ambassador in Belgrade Warren Zimmermann in his article, "Origins of a Catastrophe: Memoirs of the Last American Ambassador to Yugoslavia", in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 2 (March/April 1995), pp. 2—20; by the European Union's representative to the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, David Lord Owen, in his book, *Balkan Odyssey* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1996); and by Susan Woodward, senior adviser to U.N. special representative in the former Yugoslavia Yasushi Akashi, in her book, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995). Perhaps the best example of German-bashing with accompanying scholarly baggage is Beverly Crawford's "Explaining Defection from International Cooperation: Germany's Unilateral Recognition of Croatia", in *World Politics*, Vol. 48, No. 4 (July 1996), pp. 482—521. Crawford's article starts from the assumption that there was something like a tacit international agreement not to recognize Slovenia and the other republics as long as the war was in progress, and that Germany hence betrayed this "agreement". The author's attitude is visible in the use of terms such as "defection" and "unilateral" in the very title. Pressures from other governments on Germany to act on their behalf (for example, from Italy, Austria, and Hungary) were not taken into account.

⁴ See Christopher Bennett, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course, and Consequences* (New York: New York University Press, 1994). Bennett provides one of the clearest balances between internal and external factors in Yugoslavia's dissolution.

⁵ For an excellent example of investigative journalism into the origins of the war, see Laura Silber and Allan Little, *Death of Yugoslavia* (London: Penguin Books/BBC Books, 1995).

⁶ Mark Almond, *Europe's Backyard War: The War in the Balkans* (London: Heinemann, 1994); Bennett, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse*; Norman L. Cigar, *Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of "Ethnic Cleansing"* (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1995); Branka Magaš, *The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up 1980—92* (London: Verso, 1993); Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History* (New York: New York University Press, 1994); Sabrina P. Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996); and Valerie P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia", in *International Security*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Winter 1994), pp. 130—166.

⁷ Paradoxically, the creation of Yugoslavia is now viewed by many South Slavs, chiefly Serbs, as a Western conspiracy.

⁸ Serbia became officially independent in 1878 but had already achieved virtual independence from the Ottoman Empire by 1833.

⁹ One of the most incisive and penetrating critiques of European Philhellenism can be found in Stathis Gourgouris, *Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, and the Institution of Modern Greece* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp. 122-74. On a more general level, see Evangelos Konstantinou (ed.), *Europäischer Philhellenismus: Die europäische philhellenische Presse bis zur 1. Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Frankfurt-am-Main and New York: Peter Lang, 1994). [Conference proceedings, Wasserschloß Mitwitz, Germany, 19-22 July 1990].

¹⁰ Henri Pozzi, *Black Hand over Europe* (London: The Francis Mott Co., 1935), pp. 64—65.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

¹² For instance, R. W. Seton-Watson argued that, "It is not a service to the Yugoslav cause to exaggerate [Mihailović's] role or to treat him as one who can unite all Yugoslavs behind him." — R. W. Seton-Watson, letter to *Time and Tide* (24 July 1943), cited in Carl Rollyson,

Rebecca West: A Saga of the Century (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1995), p. 188. Seton-Watson was disturbed about reports of Croatian villages burned by Serb irregulars, as well as by the extent of state centralization and repression.

¹³ On Serbian-Nazi collaboration, see Philip J. Cohen, *Serbia's Secret War: Propaganda and the Deceit of History* (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1996), pp. 30—31, 40—41, 43, 60—62, 104—106; and Walter R. Roberts, *Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 1941—1945* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1987).

¹⁴ Churchill's "change of horses" on Yugoslavia in January 1944 provoked consternation among British elites and, for the Serbophile author Rebecca West, the aftershocks "lasted almost to the day she died." — Rollyson, *Rebecca West*, p. 186.

¹⁵ The loyalists, often referred to as Chetniks, were the supporters of King Peter and the government-in-exile.

¹⁶ Sabrina P. Ramet, personal correspondence to the author. On Regent Paul, see Neil Balfour and Sally Mackay, *Paul of Yugoslavia: Britain's Maligned Friend* (London: H. Hamilton, 1980).

¹⁷ Marshal Josip Broz Tito and Edvard Kardelj, the Partisans' chief commander and main theoretician, were respectively of Croat-Slovene and Slovene parentage. Churchill's main objective was to defeat Germany. For this reason, Churchill recommended to the Yugoslav leaders that "they should combine their resources so as to wield the Yugoslav People into one instrument in the struggle against the Germans. Our aim was to promote the establishment of a stable and independent Yugoslavia and the creation of a United Yugoslav Government was a step towards this end." — Letter to U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt from British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, written from Caserta, Italy, and reprinted in Sir Winston Churchill, *Churchill & Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, 3 vols. edited by Warren F. Kimball (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), Vol. 3, p. 275.

¹⁸ Statement by Enrique Baron Crespo, President of the European Parliament in the Conclusions of the European Council at its Rome meeting (27—28 October 1990), in Political Union — Economic and Monetary Union — Relations with USSR, etc. (Brussels: European Council, 28 October 1990), p. 9, *my emphasis*.

¹⁹ More than 88 per cent of registered voters in Slovenia voted for independence, but, more ominously, the Serbian minority in Croatia boycotted Croatia's referendum on independence.

²⁰ The first meeting of the Council of Ministers was convened in order to consider the situation in Yugoslavia under the heading "Mechanism for Consultation and Cooperation with Regard to Emergency Situations", adopted in Berlin.

²¹ Three months later, Ljubljana took over control of its own borders and introduced a new currency, the *tolar*. The Yugoslav army withdrew its last soldier from Slovenian soil on 25 October 1991.

²² It has been argued that Macedonia was the only republic (aside from Slovenia) that fulfilled all of the conditions required by the Badinter Commission. Yet it remained unrecognized longer than any other Yugoslav successor state, because of the European community's fixation on winning Greece's approval for the recognition of Macedonia. See Sabrina Petra Ramet, "The Macedonian Enigma", in Sabrina Petra Ramet and Ljubiša S. Adamovich (eds.), *Beyond Yugoslavia: Politics, Economics, and Culture in a Shattered Community* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), p. 215.

²³ For Hans-Dietrich Genscher's own version of events, see his memoirs: Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Rebuilding a House Divided: A Memoir by the Architect of Germany's Reunification* (New York: Broadway Books, 1997).

²⁴ Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina were accepted as members of the United Nations on 22 May 1992.

²⁵ As a prominent Tory member, Peter Lord Carrington had been appointed First Lord of the Admiralty and Privy Counselor in 1959. In 1962, he became Assistant Deputy Leader of the House of Lords, and in the 1970 Conservative Government, Lord Carrington was appointed first Secretary of State for Defense, and subsequently Secretary of State for Energy. Between 1972 and 1974, he served as Chair of the Conservative Party. He later became Chair of the General Electric Company (1983—84) and Secretary-General of NATO (1984—88).

²⁶ It is significant that Hans van den Broek himself was one of the staunchest opponents of recognition within the European commu-

nity. Lord Carrington recalls that "At the meeting in January 1992, Britain's representative Douglas Hogg voted against recognition, but he was outvoted. The only other person who was against [recognition] was Hans van den Broek, while all others kept silent in response to Genscher's insistence. Actually, van den Broek was the only objecting minister, since Hogg wasn't actually a minister." — Peter Lord Carrington, interviewed by Dragan Čičić, in *NIN*, no. 2338 (20 October 1995), pp. 12–13. The Belgrade weekly sported a photo of Lord Carrington on the front cover.

²⁷ Cited in Silber and Little, *Death of Yugoslavia*, p. 220.

²⁸ The dramatic consequences of the arms embargo have been exposed by Norman Cigar in his *The Right to Defence: Thoughts on the Bosnian Arms Embargo* (London: Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 63, 1995).

²⁹ The ICFY's two co-chairs were Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance — the latter a former U.S. Secretary of State and then serving as U.N. chief negotiator. In May 1993, Norway's Thorvald Stoltenberg replaced Vance as co-chair of the peace conference and as U.N. chief negotiator.

³⁰ Mark Almond, *Europe's Backyard War*, p. 243.

³¹ Carrington, interviewed by Čičić, in *NIN*, no. 2338 (20 October 1995), pp. 13.

³² Roy Jenkins, *A Life at the Centre* (London: Papermac, 1991), p. 506.

³³ The adventurer, bon vivant, maverick Conservative MP (1941–74) Sir Fitzroy Maclean often raised his voice in defense of Yugoslav unity, despite the fact that he was positively disposed toward the notion of dismantling the Soviet Union and "restoring" the monarchy in Georgia. Maclean defined Yugoslavia's Albanians as "a problem so intractable that not even Pavelic or the Nazis with their gas ovens would be able to solve it." — Cited in Frank J. McLynn, *Fitzroy Maclean* (London: John Murray Publ., 1992), p. 366. See also Maclean's obituary, written by McLynn, in *The Independent* (London), 19 June 1996, p. 14. It is interesting to note that another partisan of monarchist restoration in Georgia was the CSU deputy in the European parliament and a former heir to Austria's throne, Otto von Habsburg (b. 1912), who, rather more consistently, resolutely endorsed Slovenian, and to a lesser extent, Croatian independence.

³⁴ Almond, *Europe's Backyard War*, p. 247.

³⁵ Sandro e Alessandro Damiani, *Jugoslavia: Genesi di una mattanza annunciata* (Pistoia: Sette Giorni, 1993), p. 77.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ The term "scapegoat" is used here in the classical sense of an individual or group who is "accused of causing misfortune. This serves to relieve others, the scapegoaters, of their own responsibilities, and to strengthen the scapegoaters' sense of power and righteousness." — Sylvia Brinton Perera, *The Scapegoat Complex: Toward a Mythology of Shadow and Guilt* (Toronto: Inner City Books, 1986). My use of the term "scapegoating" refers *exclusively* to the West's post-recognition policy in the Balkans. In no way am I implying that the same expediency was recently applied toward Germany in other circumstances. That is, although I argue that Britain and France scapegoated Germany in connection with the Yugoslav Wars in order to wash their hands of any culpability for inaction in the face of Serbian aggression and hegemonism, I make no argument that they necessarily scapegoated Germany in any other context.

³⁸ *The Guardian* (London), 3 May 1993, Section 2, pp. 15—16.

³⁹ See Tibor Várady, "Collective Minority Rights and Problems in their Legal Protection: The Example of Yugoslavia", in *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Autumn 1992), p. 265. It is important to note that this "civilizational shield" was one of the main targets of Serbian nationalists who then concealed their long-term strategy of a Serb-only state behind an ad hoc defense of "Yugoslav unity".

⁴⁰ Andrew Cottey, *East-Central Europe after the Cold War: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary in Search of Security* (London: Macmillan, 1995), p. 113.

⁴¹ On the disproportionate influence of the British Foreign Office on the dithering American administration, see *The Guardian* (20 May 1996), pp. 1, 7—8.

⁴² *USA Today* (17 June 1993), p. 1A.

⁴³ The terms “premature” and “hasty” were first applied to Germany’s recognition of Croatia and Slovenia by Lord Carrington. They have been repeated like mantras by politicians, academics, and the wider public in most European countries as well as in the United States, usually with no thought concerning the “evidence” for this characterization. Lord Carrington was not so much opposed to the republics’ independence per se as to an uncoordinated process achieved without the consensus of all republics. The German government’s argument, on the other hand, was that the peace talks were being used by Serbian President Slobodan Milošević to further his own aims of military conquest and mass murder.

⁴⁴ Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent* (New York: Random House, 1993), p. 396.

⁴⁵ *Christian Science Monitor* (8 September 1993), p. 20.

⁴⁶ Ash, *Europe’s Name*, p. 96.

⁴⁷ Carrington, interviewed by Čičić, in *NIN*, no. 2338 (20 October 1995), pp. 12—13.

⁴⁸ Cottey, *East-Central Europe*, pp. 110—111.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 112. Nevertheless, given Western passivity, Budapest had no other option but to seek a rapprochement with Belgrade, in order to avoid the extension of the war into Vojvodina, perhaps involving Hungary itself. Serbia still had the strongest army in the Balkans and could easily have crushed its Hungarian counterpart.

⁵¹ Dimitrij Rupel, “Slovenia’s Shift from the Balkans to Central Europe”, in Jill Benderly and Evan Kraft (eds.), *Independent Slovenia: Origins, Movements, Prospects* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), p. 194.

⁵² *Eurobarometer*, no. 36 (December 1991), pp. 39—42 and table 33 on p. A-41.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, table 33 on page A-41.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* Firm support was also expressed by Lithuania (78 per cent), Ireland (74 per cent), Great Britain (73 per cent), Portugal (76 per

cent), France (73 per cent), Latvia (72 per cent), Poland (71 per cent), Spain (71 per cent), Denmark (70 per cent), Luxemburg (69 per cent), the Netherlands (65 per cent), and Czechoslovakia (63 per cent). Support was weaker in European Russia (45 per cent).

⁵⁵ Cottey, *East-Central Europe*, p. 110.

⁵⁶ This claim served to pave the way for another disaster: following Boutros Boutros-Ghali's recommendation, the United States sent troops to Somalia and sent no troops to Bosnia. A hidden agenda behind Operation "Restore Hope" in Somalia was palpably to distract public opinion from the war in Bosnia and Croatia. Finally, the operation's failure served to reinforce the isolationist mood in the United States and to convince American public opinion that American armed forces were incapable of playing any effective role in "civil wars".

⁵⁷ On 8 October 1991, Perez de Cuellar appointed Cyrus Vance, former U.S. Secretary of State, to serve as his personal envoy to Yugoslavia. The tragic sequel of failed political negotiations and flagged peace settlements inaugurated by his team, with Lord Carrington, created the basis for the Serbian offensive in Bosnia and the politics of ethnic cleansing. The policy of consulting and appealing "all sides" was also coordinated with the Presidency of the European Community and the Chair of the CSCE-participating states. Cyrus Vance also opposed the preventive deployment of troops in Bosnia once Serbian nationalists initiated ethnic cleansing in Croatia. The resulting peace-keeping "effort" was supposed to create the necessary conditions for the pursuit of negotiations. Instead, it served to disguise the carving up of Bosnia by the far more powerful Serbian army.

⁵⁸ *Reuter* (8 August 1991).

⁵⁹ *Reuter* (20 November 1991); and *Reuters — Money Report* (28 November 1991).

⁶⁰ On Italy's changing attitudes, see the excellent appendix, "L'Italia e la guerra balcanica", in Zlatko Dizdarević and Gigi Riva, *L'ONU é morta a Sarajevo: Dal genocidio alla spartizione* (Milano: Il Saggiatore, 1996).

⁶¹ See Bennett, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse*, p. 178, my emphasis.

⁶² So far, the connection between pro-Serbian and neo-Nazi revisionism has not drawn systematic scholarly attention. Yet recent studies have highlighted one of the most radical forms of historical revisionism, viz., the Serbian nationalist exploitation of the Holocaust. On this point, see Cohen, *Serbia's Secret War*; and Brendan Simms, "Bosnia: The Lessons of History?", in Thomas Cushman and Stjepan G. Meštrović (eds.), *This Time We Knew: Western Responses to the War in Bosnia* (New York: New York University Press, 1996), pp. 65—78.

⁶³ Bennett, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse*, pp. 178—179.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 179.

⁶⁵ See *House of Commons. Official Report. Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)* (London: HMSO, 1995), Vol. 260, no. 112 (31 May 1995), col. 1019.

⁶⁶ John Ardagh, *Germany and the Germans: The United Germany in the mid-1990s*, 3rd ed. (London: Penguin Books, 1995), p. 582.

⁶⁷ Randal Collins, "German-bashing and the theory of democratic modernization", (in English), in *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (February 1995), pp. 3—21.

⁶⁸ On Britain's "jingoistic" and "war-mongering" press, see Jean-Karim Chalaby, "Nationalism as a Discursive Strategy", in *The ASEN Bulletin*, No. 6 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 19—25. On present-day Kraut-bashing tabloid hysteria, see Nick Cohen, "And you thought the war was over", in *Independent on Sunday* (London), 5 May 1996, p. 16.

⁶⁹ The British press was much more nationalist before World War One than before World War Two, ferociously anti-German in 1914 but forgiving in 1939. See Chalaby, "Nationalism as a Discursive", p. 21.

⁷⁰ See Keith Robbins, *Appeasement* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988); M. Gilbert, "The roots of appeasement" and J. Wheeler-Bennett, "The road to appeasement" — both in W. Laird Kleine-Ahlbrandt (ed.), *Appeasement of the Dictators: Crisis Diplomacy?* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1970).

⁷¹ *Evening News* (12 June 1996), p. 23. When British children were

asked what they most associated with other European countries, most replied “frog legs and snails” for France, “pizza and spaghetti” for Italy, “sun and beaches” for Spain, “kilts” for Scotland, “dragons” for Wales, “the Queen” for England, “chocolate” for Belgium, and “IRA violence” for Ireland. — *The Guardian* (10 June 1996), p. 2.

⁷² *The Sun* (London), 23 April 1996, as cited by Cohen, “And you thought”, p. 16.

⁷³ Quoted in Cohen, “And you thought”, p. 16.

⁷⁴ *The Guardian* (22 May 1996), pp. 1, 4, 8, and 9.

⁷⁵ On the financial scandal involving top British Conservative leaders, see *The Sunday Times* (London), 19 May 1996, pp. 1 and 24; *The Independent* (20 May 1996), pp. 1 and 13; and *The Guardian* (20 May 1996), pp. 1—2 and 8.

⁷⁶ *The Guardian* (22 May 1996), p. 1.

⁷⁷ *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (4 October 1996), p. 25.

⁷⁸ See Simms, “Bosnia: The Lessons of History?”, Daniele Conversi, “Moral relativism and Equidistance: British attitudes to the war in former Yugoslavia”, in Cushman and Meštrović (eds.), *This Time We Knew*, pp. 75—76 and 255—262; and Almond, *Europe’s Backyard War*, pp. xv—xvii, 31—57, 91—103, 143—47, 240—262, and 289—326.

⁷⁹ In the Islamic world, officialdom’s muted reactions contrasted with widespread solidarity felt among ordinary Muslims, who “tend to identify the fate of Bosnia with their own, and to see this war as a symbol of their destiny.” — Tetsuya Sahara, “The Islamic World and the Bosnian Crisis”, in *Current History*, Vol. 93, No. 586 (November 1994), pp. 386—389.

⁸⁰ On Dame Rebecca West (1892—1983), the most famous English Germanophobe and Serbophile, see Brian Hall, “Rebecca West’s War”, in *The New Yorker* (15 April 1996), pp. 74—83. Her selective xenophobia targeted Germans and Turks as chiefly responsible for all ills and evils in the Balkans.

⁸¹ Milošević’s able use and abuse of past memories, including the Holocaust, has proven to be highly effective both in Serbia and abroad.

⁸² It is customary that any mention of Germany in England evokes the ghosts of the past. This anti-German prejudice, found among the English, (though less among the Scots, Welsh, or Irish Catholics of Northern Ireland), lent itself to translation into anti-Croatian prejudice.

⁸³ *House of Commons. Official Report. Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)* (London: HMSO, 1995), Vol. 260, No. 112 (31 May 1995), cols. 999—1102, especially col. 1008.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, col. 1043.

⁸⁵ *House of Lords. Official Report. Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)* (London: HMSO, 1995), Vol. 564, No. 96 (31 May 1995), cols. 1117—1172.

⁸⁶ Konrad H. Jarausch, *The Rush to German Unity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 206.

⁸⁷ Konrad H. Jarausch and Volker Gansow, "The New Germany: Myths and Realities", in Konrad H. Jarausch and Volker Gansow (eds.), *Uniting Germany: Documents and Debates, 1944—1993* (Providence, R.I.: Berghahn Books, 1994), p. xxix.

⁸⁸ *Bonner Rundschau* (28 March 1990), as reprinted in Jarausch and Gansow (eds.), *Uniting Germany*, pp. 131—132.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ For an excellent critique of France's anti-German xenophobia, see *La Stampa* (Torino), 9 August 1993, p. 1.

⁹¹ For a typical example of radical Germanophobia mixed with anti-Islamic prejudice, adding even a pinch of anti-Americanism, see Carl J. Jacobsen, "Washington's Balkan Strategy: Aberration or Herald?", in *The South Slav Journal*, Vol. 17, No. 1/2 (Spring/Summer 1996), pp. 67—70. Other pro-Serbian propaganda by the same author has been published by *European Security and Mediterranean Quarterly*.

⁹² For a critique of this view, see John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, *Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory, and International Political Economy* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 152ff.

⁹³ Crnobrnja, *Yugoslav Drama*, pp. 167—168, my emphasis.

⁹⁴ Western foreign policy commentators, their gaze fixed firmly on the past, failed to look at what was happening in the real world around them. They often disregarded the fact that Russia in the early and mid-1990s could much more appropriately have been cast in the role of the weak Weimar Republic, and that Russia's emerging xenophobic elites were much more tempted to assume the Nazi uniform (this time with thousands of atomic warheads at their disposal).

⁹⁵ Agnew and Corbridge, *Mastering Space*, p. 152.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 152—153.

⁹⁷ William E. Paterson and David Southern, *Governing Germany* (London: W. W. Norton, 1991).

⁹⁸ Agnew and Corbridge, *Mastering Space*, p. 152.

⁹⁹ See Hanna Behrend (ed.), *German Unification: The Destruction of an Economy* (London: Pluto Press, 1995), in particular, the chapters by Hanna Behrend ("Inglorious German Unification"), Christel Panzig ("Changing the East German Countryside"), and Manfred Behrend ("Right-wing extremism in East Germany before and after the *Anschluss* to the Federal Republic").

¹⁰⁰ Allen Buchanan points out that German unification can only succeed if West Germans perceive the enormous transfer of wealth to the eastern part as redistribution among one people, rather than as redistribution to another people. "The greater the identification of the benefactors with the recipients, the less likely the benefactors are to see themselves as suffering the injustice of discriminatory redistribution." — Allen Buchanan, *Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce From Fort Sumter to Lithuanian and Quebec* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), p. 51.

¹⁰¹ *The Guardian* (22 July 1996), p. 7.

¹⁰² Erhard Blankenburg, "The colonisation of East Germany: Imposition of law and cultural identity", in Keebet von Benda-Beckman and Maykel Verkuyten (eds.), *Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Cultural Identity in Europe* (Utrecht: University of Utrecht series on Comparative Studies in Migration and Ethnic Relations, 1995, no. 1).

- ¹⁰³ David Marsh, *Germany and Europe: The Crisis of Unity* (London: Mandarin, 1994), p. 170.
- ¹⁰⁴ Gregory F. Treverton, "The New Europe", in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 1 ("America and the World", 1991/92), pp. 94—112.
- ¹⁰⁵ The same may apply to a lesser extent to France.
- ¹⁰⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 21—49.
- ¹⁰⁷ This attitude has become widespread in the U.S., but even more so in the U.K., where it has been championed by both Ulster unionists and the far left. See Conversi, "Moral relativism", pp. 255—262.
- ¹⁰⁸ Protestants represent 45 per cent of Germany's population and it is inaccurate and deceptive to claim that the Catholics (37 per cent) could influence Genscher's decisions more than the former.
- ¹⁰⁹ *Deutsche Presse Agentur* (12 July 1991), trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report* (Western Europe), 13 July 1991, p. 15.
- ¹¹⁰ *La Stampa* (30 June 1993), p. 1.
- ¹¹¹ Conversi, "Moral relativism", especially pp. 250—251.
- ¹¹² *House of Commons* [note 65], cols. 1117—1172.
- ¹¹³ *The Sunday Telegraph* (London), 30 June 1991, p. 20.
- ¹¹⁴ This, notwithstanding the fact that historians like R. W. Seton-Watson had traced parallels between Croatia and Ireland as early as 1912. See R. W. Seton-Watson, *Absolutism in Croatia* (London: Constable & Co., 1912).
- ¹¹⁵ On Alpe-Adria, see Liviana Poropat, *Alpe-Adria e Iniziativa Centro-Europea: Cooperazione nell'Alpe-Adria e nell'area danubiana* (Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1993).
- ¹¹⁶ On the triangular relationship between Yugoslavia and both East and West Germany, see Sabrina Petra Ramet, "Yugoslavia and the Two Germanys", in Dirk Verheyen and Christian Soe (eds.), *The Germans and Their Neighbors* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993).

¹¹⁷ See, for instance, William E. Griffith, *The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978).

¹¹⁸ Opinion polls consistently put Britain at the bottom in the list of EC countries in terms of support for European unity.

¹¹⁹ Alan Sked and Chris Cook, *Post-War Britain: A Political History, 1945—1992* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1993), p. 561.

¹²⁰ Adrian Hastings, *SOS Bosnia* (London: United Kingdom Citizens' Committee for Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1993), pamphlet, p. 8, my emphasis.

¹²¹ *The Sunday Telegraph* (30 June 1991), p. 20.

¹²² Marsh, *Germany and Europe*, p. 98.

¹²³ John Pinder, *European Community: The Building of a Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 220.

¹²⁴ Derek W. Urwin, *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945*, 2nd ed. (London: Longman Publ., 1995), p. 261.

¹²⁵ Marsh, *Germany and Europe*, p. 101.

¹²⁶ For a critical assessment of the "domino effect" as applied to nationalist movements, see Daniele Conversi, "Domino effect or internal developments? The influences of international events and political ideologies on Catalan and Basque nationalism", in *West European Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (July 1993), pp. 245—270.

¹²⁷ For a discussion of this issue, see Alexis Heraclides, *The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics* (London: Frank Cass, 1991).

¹²⁸ On secession, see Buchanan, *Secession*, passim.

¹²⁹ July 1993 census estimate.

¹³⁰ On the rise of neo-Nazism in unified Germany, see Sabrina Petra Ramet, "The Radical Right in Germany", in *In Depth*, Vol. 4, No. 1

(Winter 1994), pp. 43—68.

¹³¹ On the candlelight demonstrations against xenophobic violence which gradually changed the public mood, see *New York Times* (13 January 1993), reprinted in Jarausach and Gransow (eds.), *Uniting Germany*, pp. 267—269. On foreign reactions to German xenophobia, see *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), 14 December 1992, pp. 28—30, reprinted in Jarausach and Gransow (eds.), *Uniting Germany*, pp. 263—265.

¹³² Agnew and Corbridge, *Mastering Space*, p. 152.

¹³³ *New York Times* (15 February 1990), reprinted in Jarausach and Gransow (eds.), *Uniting Germany*, pp. 115—116.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 115—116.

¹³⁵ The unification between the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, and the City of Berlin was formally declared on 3 October 1990.

¹³⁶ Jarausach and Gransow, "New Germany", p. xvii.

¹³⁷ On the Lusatian Sorbs, see Martin Kasper (ed.), *Language and Culture of the Lusatian Sorbs throughout their History* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1987).

¹³⁸ Quoted in *Washington Post* (30 June 1991), p. A20.

¹³⁹ "Christopher raps German role on Bosnia," *USA Today*, 17 June 1993, p. 1A.

¹⁴⁰ *The Times* (London), 18 June 1993, p. 12.

¹⁴¹ U. S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher's blaming Germany may have reflected his personal disagreement with President Bill Clinton. Indeed, once Clinton was elected on a platform which included sterner action on Bosnia and Haiti, Christopher said of Clinton's pronouncements, "I don't suppose you'd want anybody to keep a campaign promise if it was a very unsound policy." — Quoted in William W. Finan, Jr., "America and The World: Drift and...?", in *Current History*, Vol. 94, No. 590 (March 1995), pp. 136—139. The Secretary of State also earned notoriety for having reiterated, time and again, that "at heart, [Bosnia] is a European problem." Like his British counterpart, Douglas Hurd, Christopher blamed the

media for having put undue pressure on the U.S. government, in a clear sign of moral embarrassment that was covered up by German-bashing and other operations of moral relativism. "Christopher has directly cautioned against overemphasizing TV images in policy-making, sounding a strong note of resistance — a note increasingly heard in policy circles — against being swayed by image[s]." — Quoted in Nik Gowing, "The one-eyed king of real-time news coverage", in *New Perspectives Quarterly*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Fall 1994), pp. 45-54.

¹⁴² On the Serbian lobby in the U.S., see Brad K. Blitz, "Serbia's War Lobby: Diaspora Groups and Western Elites", in Cushman and Meštrović (eds.), *This Time We Knew*, pp. 187—243.

¹⁴³ *USA Today* (17 June 1993), p. 1A.

¹⁴⁴ *USA Today* (19 May 1993), p. 1A.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ *USA Today* (7 May 1993), p. 8A.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 8A.

¹⁴⁹ *The Guardian* (20 May 1996), pp. 1, 7—8.

¹⁵⁰ *USA Today* (6 May 1993), p. 4A.

¹⁵¹ *USA Today* (28 April 1993), p. 1A.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

¹⁵³ *The Washington Post* (29 June 1993), p. A-19. See also letter to the editor from Immo Stabreit in *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), 1 July 1993, p. 14.

¹⁵⁴ Letter to the editor from Norman Stone, in *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), 27 July 1993.

¹⁵⁵ *Reuter* (18 June 1993).

¹⁵⁶ James A. Baker III's two main advisers on Yugoslavia, Lawrence

Eagleburger and Brent Scowcroft, were notoriously linked to Belgrade's elites and Serbian interests. See Almond, *Europe's Backyard War*, p. 39. For Baker's self-defense, see James Baker, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace 1989—1992* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1995).

¹⁵⁷ See Baker, *Politics of Diplomacy*, pp. 470-486.

¹⁵⁸ See Zimmermann, "Origins of a Catastrophe", pp. 11—12. In this article, Zimmermann describes the major architect of American appeasement of Belgrade, Lawrence Eagleburger, for reasons unclear, as "one of the foremost American experts on the Balkans." For a critique of Zimmermann's apology, see Slaven Leticica, "The 'West Side Story' of the Collapse of Yugoslavia, and of the Wars in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina", in Cushman and Meštrović (eds.), *This Time We Knew*, pp. 163—186. See also *The Guardian* (20 May 1996), pp. 1 and 7—8.

¹⁵⁹ Silber and Little, *Death of Yugoslavia*, pp. 169—208.

¹⁶⁰ Milošević's former confidante Borislav Jović was, at that time, the second most influential person in the regime and a framer of the Serbian constitution. His diaries, covering the years from 1980 to 1992, have revealed, in part, Belgrade's responsibilities in the break-up of Yugoslavia. See Borislav Jović, *Poslednji dani SFRJ: Izvodi iz dnevnika* (Belgrade: Politika, 1995).

¹⁶¹ From the BBC television series, *The Death of Yugoslavia*. *Death of a Nation*, produced by Brian Lapping Associates and shown on BBC Television (U.K.) and on the Discovery Channel (U.S.), program 4, scripts 1—20.

¹⁶² Stephen John Stedman, "Alchemy for a New World Order: Over-selling Preventive Diplomacy", in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 3 (May/June 1995), pp. 14—20. However, Stedman's *laissez-faire* argument and skeptical view of conflict prevention were not sympathetic to German recognition either. See p. 19.

¹⁶³ Bennett, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse*, p. 14.

¹⁶⁴ Roy Gutman, *A Witness to Genocide* (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1993), p. xxvi, my emphasis.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. xxvi.

¹⁶⁶ Sabrina Petra Ramet, "The Bosnian War and the Diplomacy of Accommodation", in *Current History*, Vol. 93, No. 586 (November 1994), p. 383, Ramet's emphasis has been removed.

¹⁶⁷ On the powerful influence of the Greek and Serbian lobbies in the U.S., see Blitz, "Serbia's War Lobby", pp. 194, 200—214, 217—229.

¹⁶⁸ A. Ross Johnson, *Impressions of Post-Tito Yugoslavia: A Trip Report* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, Note N-1813, January 1982), p. 10.

¹⁶⁹ George Schöpflin, "Political Decay in One-Party Systems in Eastern Europe: Yugoslav Patterns", in Pedro Ramet (ed.), *Yugoslavia in the 1980s* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 307—324.

¹⁷⁰ Magaš, *Destruction of Yugoslavia*, pp. 122—136.

¹⁷¹ Branka Magaš, "Yugoslavia: The spectre of Balkanization", in *New Left Review*, No. 173 (March 1989), pp. 3—31.

¹⁷² *New York Times* (25 June 1989), Section IV, p. 26.

¹⁷³ On pro-Serbian groups in Britain, see Conversi, "Moral relativism", pp. 255—256.

¹⁷⁴ The blueprint for ethnic cleansing had indeed been drawn up by Belgrade intellectuals at least four years before recognition. See Cigar, *Genocide in Bosnia*, pp. 22-37; and Magaš, *The Destruction of Yugoslavia*, pp. 49-73. Beverly Allen argues that ethnic cleansing started even earlier, viz., in 1986, when non-Serb cadets and recruits in the JNA were systematically murdered under obscure circumstances. See Beverly Allen, *Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia* (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1996), pp. 50—53. She identifies this practice as the pre-1990 "genocidal murders in the armed forces and the elimination of non-Serbs from positions of authority in that and other institutions. Now that it is too late, it is easy to see how the spittle-coated moniker 'ethnic cleansing' was taking on meaning long before it was to hit the international media and give the 'international community' something to shake its collective head over at news time." — Allen, *Rape Warfare*, p. 53.

¹⁷⁵ See Conversi, "Moral relativism", pp. 244—246. See also Thomas Cushman, *Critical Theory and the War in Croatia and Bosnia* (Seattle: The HMJ School of International Studies of the University of Washington, The Donald W. Treadgold Papers in Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies, No. 13, August 1997).

¹⁷⁶ A Romantic tradition exemplified by the Brothers Grimm and the historian Leopold von Ranke (1795—1886) exalted the deeds of the Serbs in pursuit of their freedom from the Ottomans. See Leopold von Ranke, *Die Serbische Revolution. Aus Serbischen Papieren und Mitteilungen*, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt, 1844); and Leopold von Ranke, *Serbien und die Türkei im neunzehnten Jahrhundert* (Leipzig: Duncker & Humboldt, 1879).

¹⁷⁷ Christopher Cvičić would disagree with my statement. "Of all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that had come under Communist rule in 1944—45, Yugoslavia was the most diligently and closely studied right up to its bloody demise in 1991." — Christopher Cvičić, "Perceptions of former Yugoslavia: an interpretative reflection", in *International Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 4 (October 1995), pp. 819—826. The salience of the national question was, for example, underestimated by Steven L. Burg, *Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia since 1966* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983); and Bruce McFarlane, *Yugoslavia: Politics, Economics, and Society* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1988).

¹⁷⁸ On wartime alliances and the West's privileged relations with Tito's self-declared government, see Roberts, *Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies*, chapters 7—12 (pp. 129—295).

¹⁷⁹ See Institut für Zukunftsforschung (ed.), *Ausländer oder Deutsche. Integrationsprobleme griechischer, jugoslawischer und türkischer Bevölkerungsgruppen* (Cologne: Bund Verlag, 1981); Donata Elschenboich and Otto Schweitzer (eds.), *Die Heimat des Nachbarn. Herkunftsländer, Italien, Jugoslawien, Griechenland, Türkei* (Gelnhausen: Burkhardt Verlag, 1982); and *Das Gastarbeiterproblem. Rotation? Integration? Arbeitsplatzverlagerung? Jugoslawien, Griechenland, Türkei: Ergebnisse einer Fachtagung* (Munich: Eigenverlag der Südosteuropa Gesellschaft, 1975).

¹⁸⁰ Jaraus, *Rush to German Unity*, p. 206.

¹⁸¹ Ardagh, *Germany and the Germans*, p. 278.

¹⁸² Lenard J. Cohen, *Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 238ff.

¹⁸³ See Blitz, "Serbia's War Lobby", pp. 196—228.

¹⁸⁴ The diaspora fulfilled its role of giving a semblance of legitimacy to the plan for a Greater Serbia. It conferred on the frightful slaughter an aspect of dignified presentability and thus helped to cloud its genocidal nature.

¹⁸⁵ *The Independent* (London), 20 May 1996.

¹⁸⁶ *New York Times* (29 July 1992), p. A4.

¹⁸⁷ The Basic Law was adopted, as a provisional constitution, on 23 May 1949.

¹⁸⁸ Almond, *Europe's Backyard War*, p. 246.

¹⁸⁹ Cigar, *Genocide in Bosnia*, p. 168. It is crucial to note that Britain and France, which had committed the greatest number of troops on the ground, were not in a neutral position. The roots of British Serbophilia and predilection for a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia have been analyzed in depth in my recent study, "Moral relativism", in Cushman and Meštrović (eds.), *This Time We Knew*, pp. 244—281. France's position has traditionally been even more pro-Serbian. However, whereas the French intelligentsia has protested against their government's policies, the British intelligentsia has remained largely passive.

¹⁹⁰ Cigar, *Genocide in Bosnia*, p. 168.

¹⁹¹ Sabrina P. Ramet, *Social Currents in Eastern Europe: The Sources and Consequences of the Great Transformation*, 2nd ed. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1995), p. 424.

¹⁹² *La Stampa* (17 October 1994), p. 1. See also *La Stampa* (14 June 1995), p. 15.

¹⁹³ Bennett, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse*, pp. 11-ff; Magaš, *Destruction of Yugoslavia*, especially pp. 301-ff; and Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History*, pp. 213—252 (especially p. 217.) On the opposite side, the

most forceful Slovene-bashing argument is to be found in Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, where the JNA is paradoxically portrayed as a victim of Slovenian aggression (see, for instance, pp. 167-ff.)

¹⁹⁴ Silber and Little, *Death of Yugoslavia*, p. xxiv.

¹⁹⁵ See Janusz Bugajski, *Nations in Turmoil: Conflict and Cooperation in Eastern Europe*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 110ff.

¹⁹⁶ On the JNA, see Anton Bebler, *The Yugoslav Crisis and the "Yugoslav People's Army"* (Zürich: Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktanalyse, Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule, 1992).

¹⁹⁷ James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992), pp. 139—152.

¹⁹⁸ Branimir Anzulović, *The Triumph of the War God: Violence in Serbian Life and Culture*, Unpublished manuscript, 1996, p. 68.

¹⁹⁹ Allen, *Rape Warfare*, pp. 53, 55.

²⁰⁰ Gow, *Legitimacy*, pp. 146—147.

²⁰¹ The Madrid-Basque conflict began to be resolved as soon as the army left the political scene, but bequeathed a legacy of violence and distrust which may take more than a generation to overcome. Yet a thriving civil society in a non-ethnic state framework has emerged in post-Francoist Spain, turning it into an international model for conflict resolution and settlement of ethnic disputes. See Daniele Conversi, *The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilization* (Reno: The University of Nevada Press, 1997). The preponderant role of the army in Turkey has also meant that the Ankara-Kurdish conflict has resulted in the irreparable alienation of the majority of Kurds from the Ankara government.

²⁰² Certainly, their politics was nearly as "ethnic" as Serbia's, since Franco's Spain aspired to achieve homogeneity under Castilian dominance while Turkey prohibited most forms of non-Turkish cultural expression. In other words, their goal was an ethnically exclusive state for the Castilians and the Turks respectively.

²⁰³ Cited in Allen, *Rape Warfare*, p. 13. On rape as an act of conquest

and subjugation of entire societies, see Kanan Makiya, *Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising, and the Arab World* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993), pp. 287—294.

²⁰⁴ *The Death of Yugoslavia*, program 4, scripts 1—20; and Silber and Little, *Death of Yugoslavia*, pp. 245—250.

²⁰⁵ Among the staunchest proponents of this view is Misha Glenny. See his *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War*, revised and updated ed. (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1994). Glenny's book, which probably inspired Lord Owen's mission, was one of the first to focus on Germany's alleged responsibility. For a more condensed example of Glenny's attitudes, see Misha Glenny, "Germany Fans the Flames of War", in *New Statesman and Society* (27 December 1991), pp. 145ff.

²⁰⁶ On this, there is now a general accord among most scholars of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav successor states. In particular, Magaš, *Destruction of Yugoslavia*, pp. 6-13, argues that Milošević's "wrong turn in Kosovo" ignited the fires of war. See also Bennett, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse*, p. 11; Cigar, *Genocide in Bosnia*, pp. 33ff; and Paul Garde, *Vie et mort de la Yougoslavie* (Paris: Fayard, 1992), *passim*.

²⁰⁷ On the concept of "opportunism" as applied to Croatian nationalism, see Ivo Banac, "Croatianism: Franjo Tudjman's brutal opportunism", in *The New Republic* (25 October 1993), pp. 20ff.

²⁰⁸ Branka Magaš, personal correspondence.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹¹ For instance, the entire British political spectrum as well as influential quarters within the U.S. policy-making establishment.

²¹² John Newhouse, "The diplomatic round: Dodging the problem", in *The New Yorker* (24 August 1992), p. 66. For Germany's "crucial" influence, see Nenad Ivanković, *Bonn: Druga Hrvatska fronta* (Zagreb: Mladost, 1993). See also open letter to President Franjo Tudjman from Josip Manolić, in *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), 17 April 1994, p. 4, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 26 April 1994, p. 44.

²¹³ Stjepan G. Meštrović, *The Balkanization of the West: The Confluence of Postmodernism and Postcommunism* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994).

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