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=== Debate over the Eight-eight fleet ===
{{main|Eight-eight fleet}}
[[File:IJN battleship design of Project-13 class.jpg|thumb|right|320px|Design concept of the [[Kii-class battleship]]s, part of the [[eight-eight fleet]]]]
The First World War gave the Japanese navy a cause for increasing the size of its budgetary requests.{{Sfn|Schencking|1998|p=324}} The Japanese seizure of strategically valuable territories in the Central Pacific, administrated by the [[South Seas Mandate]], changed the strategic calculus of the navy in the event of a war with a major naval power. The IJN also undertook the construction of secret military installations in Micronesia, in violation of demilitarization laws concerning the administration of the region.{{Sfn|Schencking|1998|p=324-325}} The strategic calculus of the Navy was the creation of "[[unsinkable aircraft carrier]]s", attempting to nullify the US Navy's advantage in tonnage via the fortification of Japan's interior lines in the Western Pacific.{{Sfn|Hirama|1991|p=75}} Following Woodrow Wilson's renewal of a shipbuilding program increasing the strength of the US Navy, the [[National Diet|Imperial Diet]], pressured by the IJN, approved a motion calling for the expansion of Japan's fleet to include eight [[Battleship|battleships]] and eight [[battlecruiser]]s.{{Sfn|Hirama|1991|p=66}} Immediately, issues with the fleet expansion plan surfaced because of the cost of procurement of such expensive vessels. Kato Tomosaburō, the architect of the 8-8 fleet plan, stated that competing with the industrial and budgetary hegemony that the United States was constituted a feat that Japan could not achieve.{{Sfn|Asada|1993|p=86}} Tomosaburo concluded that the cost of constructing such a large fleet would amount to financial ruin for Japan, which was under the strain of a post war economic recession.{{Sfn|Asada|1993|p=86}} The navy ministry, trying to avoid an arms race while under adverse financial and budgetary restrictions, accepted an invitation to the Washington Naval Conference.{{Sfn|Asada|1993|p=86}} The [[Japanese diet]] concurrently passed a resolution calling for a reduction in arms spending, which had grown to 48% of Japan's budgetary expenses.{{Sfn|Johnson|1972|p=70}}
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