

Nordic Studies in a Global Context

NORDIC EXPERIENCES IN PAN-NATIONALISMS

A REAPPRAISAL AND COMPARISON, 1840–1940

Edited by
Ruth Hemstad and Peter Stadius



NORDIC EXPERIENCES IN PAN-NATIONALISMS

This book seeks to reassess and shed new light on pan-nationalisms in general and on Scandinavianism/Nordism in particular, by seeing them as possible futures and as interconnected ideas and practices across and beyond Europe.

An actor- and practice-oriented approach is applied at the expense of more essentialist categorisations of what pan-nationalism is, or is not, to underline both the synchronic and diachronic diversity of various pan-national movements. A range of expert international scholars discuss encounters, transfers, similarities and differences among pan-movements in Norden and Europe based on a broad empirical material, focusing on Scandinavianism/Nordism, pan-Slavism, pan-Turanism, pan-Germanism and Greater Netherlandism, and the position of Britishness in Great Britain.

This book will be of key interest to scholars and students of nationalism, European history, European studies and Scandinavian studies, history, social science, political geography, civil society and literary studies.

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INTRODUCTION

Scandinavianism and Nordism in a Europe of pan-national movements

Ruth Hemstad and Peter Stadius

The significance of pan-nationalism both as a cultural and as a political mobilising force has long been neglected by a nation-state-oriented historiography.¹ The general success of the nation-state principle during the nineteenth century has led not only to a general disinterest in alternate national and spatial projects – be it of a regional, pan-national or multi-national kind – but also to a lack of understanding of pan-national, transnational and regional ideas, practices and influences.² This volume examines the promise and pitfalls of pan-nationalism to consider how these experiences have influenced nation- and region-building more generally, in both a Scandinavian and European context. The aim is to shed new light on the role of pan-national ideas and movements by a comparative and transnational approach, as well as to bridge the research gap between studies on pan-nationalism and nationalism. We argue that pan-nationalisms must be seen as interconnected phenomena, informing and influencing national developments in different ways.

Pan-nationalisms have in general been perceived as pipe dreams or historical experiments in political expansionism that have usually been aggressive, justifying warfare – and ending up as historical failures. The propaganda potential of hostile pan-national rhetoric is still current, as recent developments in Europe have violently demonstrated. The history of pan-nationalisms is, however, a complex one, calling for more comprehensive studies. Culturally and linguistically inspired pan-ideas have also encouraged peaceful and cooperative relations and promoted solidarity and reconciliation among perceived “brothers” or “sibling nations” across state boundaries, including co-nationals in foreign countries. This cultural, or low-political, dimension of pan-nationalisms seems to have a longer and relatively more successful history than the aggressive quest for statehood – not least in the Nordic region. By creating mechanisms of cooperation and a sense of mutual interests and trust, pan-national movements have

played a part in Nordic and European politics and beyond. We believe that the trigger mechanisms and underlying thought patterns for European pan-national thinking are still relevant objects of study to understand pivotal developments in international politics today. This applies both to the legitimising of expansion and conflictive revindication of geopolitical interests and to creating blocs within larger super-structures such as the EU and NATO.

Scandinavianism, and its successor Nordism, was one of several pan-movements shaping – and shaped by – national projects, region-building and transnational encounters in Europe and beyond, mainly from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, but it has not figured much in generalist and comparative studies of pan-nationalism. On the other hand, research on Scandinavianism of the nineteenth century and Nordism/Nordic cooperation of the twentieth century has mostly been studied in a (pan-)national methodological framing, seemingly autonomous from the rest of the world. This volume aims to amend both these aspects in the historiography of pan-nationalisms and the Scandinavian/Nordic case. The broader European context is necessary to understand the development within the Nordic region. The Nordic experiences may, on the other hand, help to broaden the understanding of pan-nationalism as a varied phenomenon that needs to be studied in its concrete contexts within the broader framework.

The developments towards a well-established Nordic transnational region thus call for a broader and more nuanced understanding of pan-nationalisms as not only aggressive and virulent nationalisms,³ but also as culturally oriented low-political projects of regional and transnational identification and integration. Even if, as traditionally perceived, the political project of a unified Scandinavian state perished in the trenches of Dybbøl in 1864 when Denmark received no official assistance from Sweden and Norway against the German enemy, still 150 years official later official and civil society Nordic cooperation has a remarkable track record. We suggest alternative approaches for assessing the relevance of pan-national thought and practices by highlighting the Nordic case, which has produced long-lasting institutional cooperation mechanisms and a sense of cohesion as reflected in the self-identifications as “Scandinavians” or “the Nordics,” notwithstanding political setbacks and recurrent national tensions within the region.

One of the specific features of the Nordic case is that it eventually develops from a typical nineteenth-century pan-national project to a formalised, institutionalised, practical and pragmatic political cooperation based on respect for each country’s sovereignty, evolving into an omnipresent latent factor in Nordic politics and societal action and orientation. Even what arguably may be termed ‘high-political’ gains have mainly been achieved during the 1950s and 1960s, the idea of practical Nordic official and civil cooperation as an option has prevailed. As we also wish to look upon the Scandinavian/Nordic pan-nationalism from a comparative perspective, these findings will contribute to the development of a pan-nationalism study taxonomy. As previous scholarship on Nordic cooperation and its successes and failures has mostly been analysed with

an internal chronological perspective, the focus has mostly been on the meagre results of the high-political ambitions. In contrast, looking at simultaneous developments in neighbouring pan-nationalisms will provide for a more comprehensive understanding of the taxonomy of pan-nationalisms. One important interpretation we wish to communicate is the need to understand pan-nationalisms from its more cultural and practical features and to promote this aspect as an intrinsic and equally important part of pan-nationalisms alongside the traditional realist and nation-state normative classifications of success and failure.⁴

Nordic and similar co-existent pan-ideas are thus examined through a transnational and comparative approach, by means of empirical studies of pan-national activists, transnational (*émigré*) networks, organisational endeavours, public and literary discourses and political and diplomatic reactions by neighbouring powers. The “windows of opportunity” regarding political pan-Scandinavian ambitions between 1848 and 1864 are further investigated based on international and thus far unexploited sources, thereby challenging existing research literature on this topic. Here also this volume wishes to contest methodological nationalism in history research that has too often disregarded some tangible proofs of how at times the pan-Scandinavian idea of political unity was close to being realised during the mid-nineteenth century.⁵ The emphasis on the scarcely studied connection and elements of continuity between Scandinavianism and Nordism may also open new avenues of research.

The geographical scope of this book is mainly restricted to pan-national movements in Europe, and primarily Northern Europe. It brings together well-known international scholars and a new generation of researchers, from the UK, the Netherlands, Italy, Russia and the Nordic countries in a common effort to discuss encounters, transfers, similarities and differences among pan-movements in Europe and beyond, in addition to Scandinavianism/Nordism such as pan-Slavism, pan-Turanism, pan-Germanism and Greater Netherlandism, and the position of Britishness as an overarching but also contested pan-identity in Great Britain. The contributions add an important and so far understudied international and transnational dimension to Nordic region- and nation-building. Another aspect of this is to look at competing pan-nationalisms that at times were directed towards parts of the geographical area we generally consider as Nordic.

In the following, we will first outline definitions of pan-nationalism and related concepts, before turning to Nordic pan-ideas and practices. The third part explores the intersection between pan-nationalism and civil society, while the final section will serve as a roadmap and presentation of the chapters in this book.

Pan-nationalisms: A reappraisal

The long nineteenth century has been described as the age of nationalism in Europe,⁶ and a nation-state ideology has dominated the history of Europe for at

least 150 years. Our understanding of nationalism has, however, been “shaped by its later developments rather than by its original possibilities,” Dominique Reill argues.⁷ The predominance of the one nation, one state model, was “not the result of blind faith or a narrowness of original options. It resulted from the failures of other projects and aspirations.”⁸ Nineteenth-century Europe consisted mostly not of “nation-states” but rather of different state constructions ranging from composite states and empires to confederations and multi-ethnic union states.⁹ Connected to this political landscape, and not always easily separated from the more successful “main” nationalism (as it was not necessarily a clear-cut difference), is the rise of pan-nationalisms.¹⁰ While pan-nationalisms in the early nineteenth century, such as Mazzini’s Young Europe-movement,¹¹ may be seen as less aggressive, pan-national ideas later in the century were more often coupled with the global conquest of colonies and western expansionism.

In one of the few full-length studies of pan-movements, published almost 40 years ago, Louis L. Snyder defines what he terms “macro-nationalisms” as “politico-cultural movements promoting the solidarity of peoples united by common or kindred languages, group identification, traditions, or some other characteristic such as geographical proximity.”¹² In Snyder’s approach, this supra-national version of the expanded nation-state, the “nation writ large,” always includes an element of domination. This narrow and limited scope may arise from the inclinations of some leading scholars on the subject, such as Snyder, not to see beyond the logics of major powers as actors. Consequently, the smaller state’s cooperation imperatives and logics have not fitted into a model of expansive action. In a more cultural-oriented approach, Joep Leerssen describes pan-movements as an interrelated aspect of unification nationalisms and as “projects to unite not just the fellow-members of one particular culture or language but indeed whole clusters or families of languages: the nationalism of language families.”¹³

Recently there has been a growing interdisciplinary scholarly interest in pan-nationalisms in general and specific pan-national movements in particular¹⁴ (on Scandinavianism/Nordism see below) – to focus here on the European-based pan-movements mainly connected to regional rather than continental groupings of people (such as pan-Americanism, pan-Africanism, pan-Arabism and Eurasianism). New scholarship contends that it is high time for a re-evaluation of pan-nationalism’s ideological and cultural role in European and global history, including the complex and close entanglement between pan-national movements and nation-building processes.¹⁵ Pan-nationalism may thus be analysed as a particular phenomenon, or predominantly as nationalism “written large” or potential nationalisms, not yet recognised.¹⁶ John Breuilly, by using a similar retroactive criterion, defines unification nationalism as “successful pan-nationalism” that has achieved the establishment of a national state: “until the moment of success there is no difference between the two.”¹⁷

In a recent work on pan-nationalisms, however, Alexander Maxwell recommends a broader understanding of pan-national movements, not limited to or

measured by their success or failure in forming nation-states. Although pan-nationalism implies a focus on “geographical division, and specifically the desire to promote unity between co-nationals in different states,” unity can mean different things, he underlines, and rightfully claims: “pan-nationalists do not always seek a common state.”¹⁸ Maxwell identifies two criteria in established definitions of pan-nationalism: a “multiple statehood” criterion as a necessary but not sufficient precondition, and a “success/failure” criterion dependent on achievement of “high-political” unification goals – as that of a state.¹⁹ He further refers to two related kinds of common normative usages – contemporary as well as historiographic – of the pan prefix: a “pejorative” and a “revanchist” usage, used to stigmatise the aspirations of rivals and opponents, or to underline the aggressive or unrealistic dimensions, and the viewing of pan-national movements as challenges towards existing states.²⁰

The high-political approach and the pejorative/revanchist usage often do not (or at least not always) correspond with the goals, ideas and articulations by pan-national activists themselves, Maxwell emphasises. The alternative (also a guiding principle in many of the contributions in this volume which will also discuss the multiple statehood, the success/failure criteria and the pejorative usages in different pan-national contexts) is to stay close to the primary sources, study pan-nationalism in its “individual incarnations” and apply a broader low-political cultural approach by avoiding the perception of pan-nationalism as “failed” nationalisms.²¹ By low-political we mean ideas and practices that are not primarily – at least not in a short-time perspective – aiming at statehood, or are directed at dynastic, foreign or military political aims. This does not imply, however, that low-political pan-national efforts, whether in cultural, literary, scholarly fields or elsewhere in the society, may not influence – or (be perceived as) aiming to influence – high-political developments. Here we follow Maxwell’s discussion, rejecting the traditional dichotomy between “political” and “non-political” (pan-)national aspirations as “untenable,” and instead use “low-political” to denote “any form of politics that abjures claims to statehood.”²² This approach may go a long way in explaining important features of the pan-Scandinavian and other pan-national movements, as well as the endurance and legacy of pan-national ideas and practices, as demonstrated by Tim van Gerven in his study of the enduring existence of an “ambient Scandinavianism.”²³ This does not, however, exclude the fact that promotion of pan-national ideas may also serve to bolster nationalistic projects.²⁴ In the Scandinavian context, pan-Scandinavian ideas could be connected to both Danish and Swedish pan-national aspirations, while Norwegian nationalism primarily worked against pan-national ambitions.

Pan-movements were originally a European “invention,” connected to the continent’s “meso-regional” structures – above the (nation-)state and below the continent – and the grouping of European peoples in ethnic-philological categories or ethnotypes, often perceived as “races”: the Slavic, Germanic, Latin and Celtic.²⁵ The term “pan-Slavism” was originally coined in 1826.²⁶ Later European pan-nationalisms, such as pan-Germanism/pan-Teutonism and

pan-Celticism, may be perceived, according to Leerssen, as “copycat movements” inspired by the pan-Slavic example.²⁷ By the mid-1840s, terms such as Scandinavianism (usually without the pan prefix) and pan-Germanism were frequently used.²⁸ Later European pan-movements included pan-Latinism (including mainly France, Italy, Spain as well as transterritorial areas in Latin America), pan-Celticism (Bretagne, Wales, Ireland and Scotland) and pan-Turanism (mainly Turkey, Hungary and Finland), to mention a few.

Pan-movements constituted transnational social spaces, not only including minorities in neighbouring countries but also diaspora communities of co-nationals living and working temporarily or permanently in other parts of the world. Diasporic nationalism is thus an integrated and often primarily cultural or low-political feature of pan-nationalisms. In their seminal 2002 article on methodological nationalism, Andreas Wimmer and Nina G. Schiller address the reduction of analytical focus to the boundaries of the nation-state, making transnational nation-state building invisible. Pan-movements’ organisational initiatives contributed to maintaining homeland orientation and extended homeland politics into transnational social fields.²⁹

The renewed interest in research on pan-national movements is inspired by the transnational and spatial – and related digital humanities – trends in recent scholarship, emphasising nation-states as interconnected entities,³⁰ and territorial boundaries as “created, communicated and enforced.”³¹ Transnational studies focus instead on interaction between individual groups, organisations and states that “act over national borders and form structures that go beyond the nation state.”³² In broadening the scope of historical investigation beyond the dominant nation-state narrative and framework, the last decade has provided abundant examples within global and international history, regional and local studies, comparative history and transnational history. The importance of “national indifference” – the rejection of national identification on an individual level – has also been underlined, not least in an eastern European context.³³ We want to add pan-national history to the list in uncovering the blind spots of national history and do not, by default, take the nation-state as the starting point, the explicit goal or the given result. By combining pan-national and transnational approaches, we hope to offer fresh views on alternative national affiliations and different visions of possible futures seen from a nineteenth- and early twentieth-century perspective.

Nordic pan-ideas and practices

Scandinavianism, as other pan-nationalisms, has until recently been described for the most part as a failure. The more traditional Nordic historiography has tended to declare Scandinavianism as more or less dead and buried after the Second Schleswig War in 1864, resulting in the loss of the nationally divided duchy of Schleswig, and with a final endpoint after the consolidation of the German *Kaiserreich* in 1871. This was indeed the end of what has been referred

to as political and dynastic Scandinavianism, aiming at creating a unified Scandinavian federation with a common king that could more efficiently face the geopolitical challenges in the near vicinity. International literature, such as Snyder for example, has however tended to perceive the Nordic experience more favourably, even as a success story.³⁴ By linking Scandinavianism and Nordism, Snyder claims that the “most successful of all European pan-movements has been the Nordic combination of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, and Finland.”³⁵ In his comprehensive “encyclopaedia” of macro-nationalisms, Snyder argues in his somewhat superficial and misleading description of this Nordic experience that “cultural affinity was considered sufficient as a binding element and was not extended into the political sphere.”³⁶ This was clearly not the case regarding many protagonists of mid-nineteenth-century Scandinavianism, who explicitly aimed at a Scandinavian federation. Cultural affinity did, however, play a major role in early articulations of pan-Scandinavian ideas around 1800 and throughout the century. Newer research on different aspects of the history of Scandinavianism challenges the view of the pan-Scandinavian movement as a failure, and instead highlights the low-political cultural dimension and legacy as well as the contemporary political importance and possibilities of the movement.³⁷ Recent studies furthermore underline that the pan-national aspirations must be understood in the context of similar pan-national movements, mainly pan-Germanism and pan-Slavism, but not least the Italian and German national unification projects.³⁸

Historically, and as interlinked orientations, Scandinavianism and Nordism have been of considerable significance in the Nordic region from 1840 onwards, although the relevance has varied over time. Scandinavianism, aiming at closer cultural and political ties between Denmark, Norway and Sweden – occasionally also including Finland – is intrinsically linked to the conceptualisation and construction of Scandinavia/Norden as a distinct historical transnational region.³⁹ It was based on an imagined collective of “Scandinavians” – as opposed to “Germans” and “Slavs” – and was promoted partly from ‘below,’ in addition to dynastic-political schemes, by the region-building endeavours of ideologically motivated activists mainly belonging to a societal and cultural elite.

The enthusiastic student meetings of the 1840s and visions of spiritual and cultural unity were developed during the 1850s and 1860s to include political federalist plans, mainly by Danish and Swedish national and liberal politicians and publicists, and sketched at royal courts and military chief cabinets. The quest for statehood was an important, although controversial, element in Scandinavianism, but did not play a major role after 1864/1871. This absence of high-political goals in the late nineteenth century does not, however, imply that the pan-national movement was not continuously political in a low-political sense (see discussion above). The culmination of the explicitly political and dynastic Scandinavianism was thus not the endpoint of the movement and of pan-Scandinavian ideas. In the aftermath of the defeat of 1864, the pan-Scandinavian movement was amended with several new professional groups seeking Scandinavian kinship. The “neo-Scandinavianism” arising around 1900 was

primarily culture-oriented, stimulating closer cooperation.⁴⁰ This emergence of a mostly civil society-based Scandinavianism has been lauded in more recent research as being the backbone of present-day Nordic cooperation.⁴¹ It is also worth noting that the long-term and more or less unbroken practice of Scandinavianism/Nordism has later nourished high political initiatives and cooperation in the Nordic region.

At the same time the main geopolitical concerns for this transnational region of culturally similar small states have remained. The internal factors of a sense of a shared identity and a trust in each other were in many ways tested by external factors. The limits of both Scandinavianism and Nordism were often defined as a result of external pressure, while also stimulating closer cooperation. One of the main tasks of this volume is to delve more deeply into how Scandinavian pan-nationalism was experienced from the outside. How did Russian politicians and the imperial administration look at the pan-Scandinavian movement and its influence on Finland, integrated as an autonomous grand duchy in the Russian empire since 1809? Germany, on the other side, has represented the main antagonist in the Danish-German border dispute complex, which was the central driving force behind political Scandinavianism from the beginning.

The nation's Other as seen from a Swedish perspective was Russia, while in Finland it was primarily Russia but also to some extent Sweden. In Norway, on the other hand, the nation's Other was Denmark and Sweden.⁴² Pan-Scandinavian ideas were thus seen as complementary to the national projects within Denmark, where liberal opposition to the absolutist monarchy and the increasing national conflict in the borderland were of vital importance, as well as in Sweden where a liberal-oriented elite feared political pressure from the side of its Russian neighbour. In Norway, even if there also were a number of supporters of Scandinavianism, pan-Scandinavian ideas were in general perceived quite differently, as a competing rather than a complementary national project, potentially threatening the nation's newly achieved autonomy. The Norwegian-Swedish union of 1814 was not a result of Scandinavianism but could serve as a stepping stone towards – but also a stumbling block against – a union including Denmark. In nineteenth-century Finland promoting Scandinavianism was the taking of a deliberate risk. The liberal and pro-Scandinavian movement in Finland did not succeed politically in the late nineteenth century, which saw the emergence of a national Finnish-language movement that often viewed Germany and the Baltic region as a better option for kinship and a model. However, the Swedish-Scandinavian orientation, which included a strong identification with the right of law, has been a vital part of Finnish political history. This is true even if it has not always been seen in terms of a Nordic orientation.

The actual endpoint of Scandinavianism as an imagined community of the three Scandinavian nations is the 1905 rupture of the personal union between Sweden and Norway. Even if the event at times has been highlighted as a specific Nordic way of peacefully settling international conflicts, where even a *casus belli* could have been justified, it was actually the final turning point in Scandinavian

transnational cooperation. The period 1905–1914, between the rupture and the outbreak of the First World War has rightfully been termed a Nordic winter with reference to the cold and tense relationship between the Scandinavian nations in general, and the two kingdoms on the Scandinavian peninsula in particular.⁴³ The modern twentieth-century Nordic cooperation practice emerged out of the geopolitical pressure at the outbreak of the First World War and the subsequent united declaration of neutrality in December 1914 by all three Scandinavian kingdoms. Culturally it was based on the nineteenth-century pan-Scandinavian legacy of a sense of belonging to a common cultural transnational region. However, politically it was different, since any talks of political unification soon after the war were seen as too radical, and instead the respect for each Nordic country's national sovereignty was elevated to dogmatic status in Nordic cooperation culture.⁴⁴ The Nordic region-building project, however, continued by means already developed throughout the nineteenth century, concentrating on cultural and pragmatic Scandinavian cooperation, but with a continuous ideological dimension. Meetings, associations, institutions, publications, networks and practices with a transnational scope, with Nordic participants and with the aim of strengthening Scandinavian and Nordic cooperation, became gradually more widespread after 1864, and again from around 1918, disseminating ideas of Scandinavian and Nordic unity.

Those working to redevelop Nordic cooperation during the inter-war period started gradually to refer to themselves as “Nordists,” supporters of “Nordism,” conceptually and geographically slightly different from Scandinavianism. The term itself became more widely used only after the Second World War but was introduced in the late 1920s and early 1930s, and the practice of its principles can be dated back to the early 1920s. The earlier dreams of a united Scandinavian kingdom and federation, which existed alongside cultural cooperation and efforts, were now replaced with the longing for deeper inter-governmental as well as societal cooperation between five independent nation-states in *Norden*. However, the main internal source of a legitimised sense of belonging among Nordic politicians, intellectuals, civil servants, business executives, labour union activists and others remained the same over the years. The idea of a cultural and societal affinity between the five Nordic countries has remained in its essence very similar to the cultural dimension of the pan-Scandinavian ideology of the nineteenth century, although Nordism in general may be seen as a specific combination of pan-nationalism and transnational regionalism.

The Nordic pan-idea developed during the inter-war period, which is the end of the period under study in this volume, and was firmly rooted as an ideological basis for all the concrete achievements made after the Second World War. By then any visions of a Scandinavian or Nordic union had been discarded as a political utopia, and instead a discourse of cooperation between the five nation-states was reinforced and became pivotal. Even if Nordism was based on the explicit demand of respecting the sovereignty of each nation-state, the pan-Scandinavian rhetoric remained surprisingly strong in some circles even during the period before the Second World

War.⁴⁵ Moreover, during the war, a substantial rush of pro-Nordic utopias was expressed in a state of hopeless crisis, as a reminder of the hibernating under-currents of Scandinavianism that had survived and resisted geopolitical realism.⁴⁶

The persistence of a rhetoric of unification and the ideology of cooperation have only resulted in a few shared institutions and nothing like supranational organs, a discrepancy addressed as a Nordic paradox. However, it is gravely misleading to define Scandinavianism after 1871 and Nordic cooperation as non-political in its essence. The fact that the official and institutionalised Nordic cooperation has been and is still today explicitly performed by politicians makes this obvious. Official Nordic cooperation institutions, the Nordic Council since 1952 and the Nordic Council of Ministers since 1971, are political cooperative organs equally as much as the European Union, regardless of the fact that neither seems likely to form a federation in the near future.

On a low-political level, the Nordic cooperation is – although mainly guided by a pragmatic approach – comprehensive and still ambitious. Interestingly, these official organs of Nordic cooperation have recently agreed on a common vision: that the Nordic region, based on its long historical tradition of cooperation, will become “the most sustainable and integrated region in the world by 2030.”⁴⁷ These assumptions and visions – echoing older Nordic pan-ideas and visions of alternative futures – need to be closely examined, historicised and seen in a broader international context. We may, as a preliminary attempt, underline certain aspects of the Nordic pan-idea and pan-movement, arguably representing a Scandinavian *Sonderweg*: its perceived endurance, and thus relative success as a mobilising rhetorical force; its cultural approval as an extension of national cultures; its manifestations on an organisational level as a comprehensive web of Nordic cooperation, in civil society and official levels, leading some scholars to term Norden as a regional, semi-supranational entity;⁴⁸ its constitutive connection to a historical constructed transnational region; and the lack of one clearly dominant nation-state within the movement. Scandinavianism may be nationalism written large, but it simultaneously comprised competing, and – at its best – complementary, overlapping and collaborative nationalisms, a pan-nationalism with three (later five) exceptions, to use an expression describing the later developed “Nordic model.”⁴⁹

Pan-national civil society strategies

The regional – and we may add pan-national – shape of the associational sphere has, with Hackmann, “largely been ignored.”⁵⁰ In mid-nineteenth-century Europe in general, the belief in the merits of organisation was strong, and different kinds of associations flourished connected to national as well as pan-national movements, expanding beyond nation-state territories.⁵¹ Pan-national movements helped to build and maintain a transnational imagined community by civil society initiatives, which subsequently contributed to uphold and strengthen the movement.

The institutionalisation of the pan-movements of the nineteenth century was to a high degree non- or pre-political, or at least (apparently) low-political (as several contributions to this book demonstrate), stretching from philological and scholarly conferences, learned, linguistic and literary cooperation and associations to cultural and student festivals and similar activities utilised in promoting common culture and identification. There is a certain line extending from the German Wartburg festival in 1817 and later (pan-)German congresses and organisations, to “Young” movements of the 1830s and 1840s (*Giovine Italia* 1831, Young Europe 1834), pan-Slavic Congresses (1848 and 1867) and committees (the Slavic Benevolent Committee from 1858), Dutch and Flemish philologists’ congresses (from 1849), pan-Celtic associations and conferences (from 1900/1904), Finno-Ugric Societies and congresses (from 1918/1921), and to pan-Scandinavian and Nordic associations and meetings both within and beyond the region (mainly from the 1840s onwards). This is part of a broader picture of promoting transnational culture and contacts among nationals or kindred peoples across state borders, related to pan-national political ideas, but not necessarily claims of statehood.

The connection between pan-national thought and associational endeavours is strong – and may be particularly strong – in the Nordic region. What may thus be termed the civil society-pan-nationalism nexus in the Nordic region is worthwhile discussing in a broader pan-national context. The pan-Scandinavian movement, advocating cultural unification alongside long-term political aims, contributed substantially to Nordic region-building and a sense of common belonging, not least through associational means. A unified Scandinavia therefore was not only talked and written into existence⁵² but also *organised into existence*, as a perceived region with common institutions and a sense of identity, as well as being a common homeland for Scandinavians around the world.⁵³

The high density of transnational ties at civil society level has influenced nation- and region-building processes in the region in different ways.⁵⁴ This transnational dimension, which in certain periods has included pan-national elements, has shaped the idea of a Nordic identity and model. Stenius and Haggren argue, although admitting the lack of comparative studies on transnational organisations, that “the northerners earlier and to a greater extent than citizens in other parts of the world engaged in civic activities that extend beyond their own state borders.”⁵⁵ They call for comparative studies of different pan-movements and their respective integration strategies in view of regional constructions and their viability, and believe that there are “good arguments for claiming that the Nordic countries – paradoxically in view of the failures of their striving towards unity – can be regarded as being among the particularly successful communities, while this region developed a transnational citizenship (“*medborgarskap*”) as strong as it was unique.”⁵⁶

This Nordic tradition of border-crossing cooperation merits a thorough comparative analysis, Stenius and Haggren argue. Research literature on civil societies in the Nordic region in the nineteenth century has so far mainly focused on national preconditions and experiences, to a certain extent in a comparative,

Nordic perspective.⁵⁷ Recent research has broadened the perspective and examined transnational and international dimensions, as well as different aspects of Nordic cooperation.⁵⁸ This volume seeks to further broaden these perspectives and to contribute to the examination of the Nordic transnational pan-experiences within a wider historical, pan-national European context, seeing Scandinavianism and Nordism as an integrated part of a wider development of pan-nationalisms in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.

Roadmap to the book

This volume is divided into four thematic sections that follow this introduction and the synthetic chapter on pan-nationalisms by Joep Leerssen. When asking the question of whether pan-nationalism is to be regarded as a constant quixotic failure, Leerssen sheds a much-needed revisionist light on the latent importance of pan-movements in European history. Not only does he show the pivotal importance of the territorialisation of romantic national culture during the mid-nineteenth century, but he also suggests that there is reason to reconsider many nation-state projects as rather instable. This is an important element and argument connected to the need for a reappraisal of pan-national movements proposed by this book.

A wide array of sources are examined in the following chapters, underpinning the influence of pan-national ideas in European political, as well as everyday, life. While theoretical and methodological approaches vary, all chapters apply transnational perspectives and discuss the encounters of pan-national and national ideas in different regional, cultural and societal contexts, chronologically spanning from the early nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century.

In the first section nineteenth-century Scandinavianism is studied in the context of great power politics in Northern Europe. It clearly illustrates the political ambitions and possibilities of the movement during the 1840s to the 1860s – but also its shortcomings. These contributions offer a broader international approach, underlining the contemporary possibilities and influence of the movement, based on new archival findings, some of which has never previously been used. Morten Nordhagen Ottosen's contribution discusses a very specific time period, ranging from the revolutionary year of 1848 to the aftermath of the Crimean War. He introduces the idea of a real window of opportunity for a Scandinavian unification, contradicting much previous research which, perhaps in an exaggerated act of teleological reasoning, has discarded any idea of real importance in the subject. Rasmus Glenthøj's chapter follows the same line, as it looks at the pivotal time period around the Second Schleswig War. Based on partially new archival findings and new readings, both contributions manage to reintroduce the high politics perspective to an important historical moment, questioning the previously ingrained view that there was no real pan-nationalist prospect of unification. The last contribution in this section by Evgenii Egorov also offers a new and much-needed perspective on Scandinavianism, which is the Russian view. Based on extensive use of Russian archival sources, Egorov narrates the

Scandinavian story from the eastern enemy perspective. There has been very little archival research on how Russian authorities viewed Scandinavianism, even if the hostile attitude is well known. Egorov's contribution also shows the shifting attitudes and internal debates within the Russian administration concerning Scandinavian unifying efforts.

The second section deals with the concrete networks of pan-nationalist activists. The study of agency has recently been brought to the fore in efforts to renew the theoretical underpinnings for studying pan-nationalisms. One fruitful way is to look at the persons, actions and articulations, in short "categories of practice," rather than aiming at fitting various movements into theoretical models of success/failure criteria.⁵⁹ In Niri Ragnvald Johnsen's contribution the transnational contacts and influence transfers are studied systematically, shedding new light on how concretely pan-Scandinavian actors were influenced by other pan-national and national movements and central actors, such as Mazzini, notably the Young Europe ideas, the Italian unification movement and the Polish independence movement. The seeking for inspiration and benchmarking of pan-national action is vital to the understanding of how most of these movements developed, including the Scandinavian case. Mikael Björk-Winberg and Evgenii Egorov's co-authored chapter revolves around one such case. The Finnish-born Emil von Qvanten rose to become one of the most central actors in pan-Scandinavian circles with the protection of the Swedish court. Having been expelled from the Grand Duchy of Finland for expressing pan-Scandinavian sympathies, he continued his quest and made use of extensive international networks of like-minded souls. One of them was the Russian revolutionary Michail Bakunin, whose political aims and goals to some extent coincided with that of the pan-nationalists. These chapters show how tight and important international networks were, and shed light on inner tensions between many fierce minds of the European nineteenth-century liberal-revolutionary circles.

The third section is dedicated to studies looking at the inner developments of pan-national thought in the Nordic countries. The connection between nation-building efforts and their relationship to expressions of pan-national sympathies is the object of Anna Bohlin's chapter on nineteenth-century Scandinavian literature. In a comparative study of – among others – the authors Camilla Collett, Mathilda Fibiger and Frederika Bremer, she draws a contrasting picture of their relation to pan-Scandinavian efforts, some stronger than others. Through a variety of examples, Bohlin shows how literary metaphors were used to promote – but also dismiss – pan-Scandinavian thought. Ruth Hemstad's contribution examines the rarely studied phenomenon of the practice of pan-nationalism in diaspora communities and their interaction with pan-Scandinavian associations in the homelands during the long nineteenth century. At least within the Nordic setting there are only a handful of previous studies on Scandinavianism and Scandinavian associations abroad. The practicalities of oscillating between the national and Scandinavian – and new pan-national Swedish and Norwegian projects after 1905 – are exposed through an extensive empirical study, where new findings on diaspora pan-Scandinavian practice are presented. The tension

between the nation-state and the transnational region is also one of the main points in Peter Stadius' chapter on the seldom studied Nordic pan-national transition period of the inter-war years. This was the period when the modern form of Nordic cooperation emanated from the ruins of nineteenth-century political Scandinavianism, while yet building on earlier cultural cooperation. By looking at important non-governmental organisations, Stadius exposes the principles for a new and geopolitically realist "Nordist" take on pan-nationalism, where the respect for national sovereignty is paired with a set of values, notably that of seeing the Nordic region as a fascist-free and democratic region.

The fourth section is dedicated to comparative studies of other adjacent European pan-nationalisms, with reference to Scandinavia. Tim van Gerven compares nineteenth-century memory politics within three pan-movements, that of pan-Germanism, Greater Netherlandism and Scandinavianism. In a groundbreaking study he makes comparisons between the three movements, including new suggestions for the taxonomy of pan-nationalism features. Van Gerven applies the Scandinavian experience as a benchmark for assessing the two other pan-nationalisms. In Alvin Jackson's contribution the focus is on the complex interrelationship of Scottish, Welsh and Irish national identities with the overarching pan-national Britishness within the UK. This example has some similarities with the Norwegian-Swedish case, and the chapter offers a comparison which has seldom been made. Ainur Elmgren's chapter takes an approach from another angle, as she examines the pan-Turanian movement as part of a pan-national challenge of Slavic hegemony and promoting an alternative pan-Turkish identity project. With a wide array of examples Elmgren shows how pan-Turanism also became a considerable factor in Finland and thus constituted an overlapping pan-nationalist project within the Nordic region. Pan-Slavism, one of the main pan-nationalist movements in Europe, is treated by Stefano Petrungaro. In his chapter he develops a thorough analysis of the variation of interpretations and internal projects within the larger frame of pan-Slavism, focusing on low-political features, especially in Central- and South-Eastern Europe. The study also offers new perspectives for understanding Scandinavianism. The pan-Slavic example helps to identify the comparatively uniform and concordance-oriented quality of Scandinavianism and Nordism.

Seen together, the chapters illustrate different pan-national windows of opportunity, a range of door openings – and closures – during the century after 1840, when pan-national ideas and practices flourished, playing an often underestimated role in European national and political development. Different possible transnational imagined communities, different potential frameworks of loyalties and solidarity than the nation-state-based ones could have been chosen, as pan-national ideas overlapped and closely interacted with regional and national projects and aspirations. Through discussing entangled parts of the pan-national history of the region and beyond, the aim has been to offer a reappraisal of the Nordic experiences of pan-nationalism seen in a transnational and comparative context.

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Notes

- 1 In this volume, the term “pan-nationalism” is used interchangeably with macro-nationalism.
- 2 Giladi, “Origins and Characteristics,” Maxwell, “Pan-Nationalism,” Mishkova and Trencsényi, *European Regions*, Reill, *Nationalists*.
- 3 Snyder, *Macro-nationalisms*, 4; Danielsson, “Pan-Nationalism,” 43.
- 4 Snyder, *Macro-nationalisms*; Maxwell, “Pan-Nationalism.”
- 5 See Glenthøj’s and Ottosen’s contributions to this volume.
- 6 Hobsbawm, *Nations*.
- 7 Reill, *Nationalists*, 12.
- 8 Ibid, 12–13.
- 9 See for instance Jackson’s new book *United Kingdoms: Multinational Union States in Europe and Beyond, 1800-1925* (Oxford University Press, 2023), and his contribution to this volume.
- 10 Danielsson, “Pan-Nationalism,” 42.
- 11 See also Johnsen’s contribution to this volume.
- 12 Snyder *Macro-nationalisms*, 4.
- 13 Leerssen, *National Thought*, 154. See also his contribution to this volume.
- 14 Maxwell, “Pan-Nationalism”; Danielsson, “Pan-Nationalism”; Reill, *Nationalists*; Giladi, “Origins and Characteristics”; Lomová and Hesová, *Between Hegemony*.
- 15 van Gerven, *Scandinavism*; Maxwell, “Pan-Nationalism.”
- 16 Snyder, *Macro-nationalisms*; Gellner, *Nations*, 43–50; Giladi, “Origins and Characteristics,” 254.
- 17 Breuilly, “Nationalism,” 149.
- 18 Maxwell, “Pan-Nationalism,” 5.
- 19 Ibid, 6.
- 20 Ibid, 7.
- 21 Ibid, 14–15.
- 22 Ibid, 10.
- 23 van Gerven, *Scandinavism*; see also Leerssen’s contribution to this volume.
- 24 Mishkova and Trencsényi, *European Regions*, 6.
- 25 Troebst, “European History,” 235; Leerssen, *National Thought*; Jalava and Stråth, “Scandinavia/Norden,” 39; Litvak, *Latinos*.
- 26 Maxwell, “Pan-Nationalism”; Kohn, *Pan-Slavism*, 1953.
- 27 Leerssen *National Thought*, 156.
- 28 Hemstad, “Scandinavianism”; Hemstad, “Scandinavian Sympathies.”
- 29 Wimmer and Schiller, “Methodological Nationalism,” 316; Brubaker, “The ‘diaspora’ Diaspora,” 5.
- 30 Fossat, *Transnationale historier*, 11; Putnam, “The Transnational”; see also Johnsen’s contribution to this volume.
- 31 Penros, “Nations, States and Homelands,” 7.
- 32 Jonsson and Neunsinger, “Comparison and Transfer,” 259.
- 33 Zahra, “Imagined Noncommunities,” 93–119.

- 34 See also Etzioni, *Political Unification*, 213; Stenius and Haggrén, “Det nordiska.”
- 35 Snyder, *Macro-nationalisms*, 111.
- 36 Ibid, 7.
- 37 Hemstad, “Scandinavianism”; Hemstad, “Scandinavian Sympathies”; Ekman, *Mitt hems gränser*; van Gerven, *Scandinavism*; Glenthøj, 1864; Glenthøj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*.
- 38 Glenthøj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*.
- 39 Stråth, “The Idea”; Hemstad, “Scandinavian Sympathies.”
- 40 Hemstad, *Fra Indian Summer*; see also van Gerven, *Scandinavism*.
- 41 Hemstad, *Fra Indian Summer*; Stråth, “The Idea.”
- 42 Aronson, “Nordic National Histories,” 259.
- 43 Hemstad, *Fra Indian Summer*.
- 44 Stadius, “Hundra år av nordism”; Elmersjö, “Between Nordism.”
- 45 Stadius, “Hundra år av nordism”; Hemstad, “Promoting.”
- 46 Stadius, “Kristid och väckelse.”
- 47 www.norden.org, accessed 14 October 2022.
- 48 Elmersjö, “Between Nordism,” 44.
- 49 Strang, “Introduction.”
- 50 Hackmann, “Voluntary Associations,” 11.
- 51 te Velde and Janse, *Organizing Democracy*.
- 52 Neumann, “A Region-Building.”
- 53 See Hemstad’s contribution to this volume.
- 54 Strang, “Introduction.”
- 55 Stenius and Haggren, “Det nordiska samarbetets,” 80.
- 56 Ibid.
- 57 Jansson, *Scandinavian Journal of History*.
- 58 Hemstad, *Fra Indian Summer*; Hemstad, “Promoting Norden”; Götz, Haggrén and Hilson, “Nordic Cooperation”; Alapuro and Stenius, *Nordic Associations*; Strang, *Nordic Cooperation*; Stadius, “Hundra år av nordism.”
- 59 Brubaker, “The ‘diaspora’ Diaspora”; Maxwell, “Pan-Nationalism.”

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2

QUIXOTIC? NOT QUITE

The context, agenda and legacy of macronational movements

Joep Leerssen

The territorialisation of culture and the instability of mononationalism¹

The type of nationalism that dominates cultural and political thought in the nineteenth century has a core set of clear-cut characteristic features.² One is the notion of popular sovereignty: the state derives its sovereignty and autonomy, not from the dynastic or God-given power of kings but from the unity and common purpose of its constituent people or “nation”; this tenet will over the course of the century develop into the principle of nations’ right to self-determination. The second is that this nation is not just a social contract between civic actors in the body politic but also a cultural community, transgenerationally maintaining its language, mores and historical memories; this tenet generates the civic/ethnic ambivalence which is so deeply embedded in the concept of the nation.

A third feature follows from the combination of the first two: it is the territorialisation of culture. If culture is what defines the nation, and nation is what defines the state, then the outlines of the state must ultimately be defined by the geographical footprint of its underlying cultural community. The nation-state will inherently gravitate towards an ideal-typical congruence between state and nation: to each nation its own sovereign state, in each state ideally a single constituent nation. The older, feudal model, where culturally different territories (e.g. speaking different languages) could be united under a single crown, becomes problematic. Hence the long, slow fracturing process of United Kingdoms and multi-ethnic empires towards a plurality of nation-states. Subaltern nationalities claim autonomy or self-government, and divided cultural communities demand unification.

Of course, this attempt to map politics onto an ethnolinguistic catchment area is inherently unstable. The culturally mixed borderlands of Europe face a Procrustean choice of being subsumed either under one adjoining state or under its rival on the opposite side, either one uncongenial to at least a part of the population. Competing claims and divergent identifications concerning minority populations are perpetual irritants, and different aggregational frames will be invoked to assert that a given population group, a minority within specified frontiers, forms part of a larger majority extending beyond those frontiers. In the twentieth century, Europe has been rife with conflict based on the impossibility to assign a given borderland unambiguously to one country or to its neighbour. Between Ulster and Nagorno-Karabakh, the list includes Transdnistria and Abkhazia, Epirus and Kosovo, Vojvodina, Bucovina and Transylvania, the Southern Tyrol, Burgenland, Sudetenland; Alsace-Lorraine and the East Cantons of Belgium; Schleswig-Holstein, the Åland Islands and Karelia; not to mention what is (as I am writing) an actual battlefield between Russia and Ukraine.

To take that last case: President Putin's refusal to see in Ukraine more than a Russian breakaway region is a straightforward continuation of a nineteenth-century ethnolinguistic crux as to whether Ukrainian was a standalone language, independently descended from Ancient Proto-Slavic, or a regional variant ("Little-Russian") of the Greater-Russian language.³ Subaltern dialect or independent language? Linguists will roll their eyes in despair when faced with such a question; there being no objective linguistic criterion that marks the transition from one gradation of difference to the other. Different "languages" may resemble each other so closely as to be mutually intelligible, whereas a single language may span across "dialect" variants that are mutually incomprehensible. But in the political discourse that elevates the mother tongue to the symbolical marker of national identity, the taxonomic distinction between "a language" and "a dialect" is all-important. Much as we need to understand nations emically rather than etically (i.e. as "self-defining nations," as groups that perceive themselves as being bonded by a shared nationality, whatever the factual basis for that sense of nationality may be), so too languages, when they are discursively distinguished from dialects, are emic: self-defining, as subjectively experienced by the speakers. Languages, emically, are spoken by nations, while dialects are spoken in regions. No national movement saw its drive for independence crowned with success in the Paris Peace Treaties of 1919 without having successfully asserted, in the previous century, that its language was by no means a mere rustic patois, but indeed a real, proper, independent language, with its own lexicon, grammar, line of descent, and literary potential.

And so Ukrainian will be an independent language for some and a Russian dialect for others. The taxonomic scaling of where one language stops and another, different one, begins is, in other words, an added irritant in the vexed question of demarcating nation-states on the basis of ethnolinguistic footprints ("language areas").

From mono- to pan-nationalism: Ethnolinguistic expansionism (e.g. pan-Germanism)

The earliest manifestation of ethnolinguistic nationalism in Europe, that of Romantic Germany in its resistance against Napoleonic hegemony, fully exhibits all the problematics of the territorialisation of culture, and the expansionism that results from an inability to unambiguously establish the boundaries of a language, either taxonomically or geographically. A cultural, anti-Napoleonic nationalism took hold when Bonaparte became Napoleon, took the title of Emperor and in the process forced Francis II to relinquish the millennial, ancient title of Holy Roman Emperor (Francis fell back on his less august, recently created subsidiary style of Emperor of Austria, numerically reverting from Francis II to Francis I). The assertive vindication of the German *Kulturnation*, in Fichte's *Reden an die Deutsche Nation*, and in the philological essays of men like Ernst Moritz Arndt and Jacob Grimm, coincided with, and was largely provoked by, the political disappearance of the old imperial *Reich*. In the absence of a now-broken institutional continuity harking back to Charlemagne himself, things like language and culture became the main markers manifesting such a thing as a German identity. And when Napoleon's Empire crumbled after a mere decade, Arndt vindicated the reconstitution of a reborn German state by asserting that its boundaries should coincide with the geographical footprint of the German language. A resurging German *Vaterland* should extend *so weit die deutsche Zunge klingt*. That poetic line from his propaganda song "Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland?" (1813) was taken up in his political essays from 1814 until his death in 1865. Arndt ceaselessly vindicated the unity of all Germans by virtue of their shared language and character (and hence denouncing the division of the German lands among rivalling monarchies) and formulated claims on borderlands inhabited by people who, by virtue of the language, were claimed as German. That applied in the first place to Alsace and to Schleswig-Holstein, but Arndt was quite willing to apply an expansionist linguistic idea of "German" to claim the Low Countries.⁴ The incorporation of these lands from Luxembourg to the mouths of the Rhine at Rotterdam was both necessary (strategically, to fortify the country against the French enemy) and justified (philologically, because Dutch and Flemish were German dialects, and historically, because these nations descended from German tribes who had been part of the Germanic complex as united by Charlemagne).

The combination of philological and antiquarian facts was something Arndt called *Völkergeschichte*, and it provided a rich reservoir from which he could cherry-pick arguments to justify German territorial expansionism. As the rhetoric of the Putin government vis-à-vis Ukraine shows, that type of reasoning has persisted to the present day. It was demonstrated in 1848, when Jacob Grimm asserted that Germany had a claim to annex not only Schleswig-Holstein but all of Jutland. That peninsula had anciently been inhabited by Germanic tribes (Cimbri, Teutones) and was thereby linked

to the “German” complex in its wider sense, and the present-day dialect of Jutland differed from Standard Danish by placing the definite article before, not after the noun, thus conforming to a German rather than a Scandinavian pattern.⁵ These anecdotal factoids allowed Grimm to predict that Denmark was doomed by history to be obliterated between a Greater Germany and to its north a Greater Sweden (which he generously allowed to annex the Danish islands).

The nationalism of the German Romantics is highly elastic in applying the notion of “German.” The Frankfurt Parliament of 1848 (where Grimm and Arndt were prominent delegates) is known for its vacillation between a “greater” and “narrower” vision of what the future German state would be. (The *klein-deutsch* faction wanted to exclude Austria, because of its entanglements with the other ethnicities of the Habsburg Empire and its Catholic-imperial ethos, preferring to focus on a Protestant- and Prussia-dominated complex of German lands north of the Alps.) In ethnolinguistic terms, the elasticity is no less pronounced: “German” can refer to the written language as used from Luther to Goethe, and including the dialects spoken in the lands where that language is in written use, as well as the medieval source traditions; that is how the Grimms’ *Deutsches Wörterbuch* uses the term. Alternatively, the term can be used in a wider sense, in which it includes Dutch, Flemish, Frisian and the Jutland dialects of Denmark. That is how the same Grimm uses it in the *Deutsche Grammatik* and the *Deutsche Mythologie*.

Thus, from the outset, German mononationalism shades into pan-Germanism, and the political implementation of that pan-Germanism in the Third Reich and its expansionist annexationism follows precisely the contours indicated a hundred years earlier by Romantic *Völkergeschichte* and philology.

The logic of expansionism is presented as one of unification. Much as the German *Reich* had been a feudal assemblage of lordships, with many dukedoms harking back to ancient tribes (Bavarian, Saxons, Swabians), so too the modern German nation is as it were a meta-nation consisting of various identifiable *Stämme*, each with their own tribal ancestry and present-day regional subsidiarity. The pan-German ideal is to bring together all these *Stämme*, much as the nationalist aim is to abolish the *Kleinstaaterei* and to put an end to the political dismemberment of the German *Kulturnation* among the rule of different monarchies.⁶ This, I think, is where the German case is paradigmatic for the slippage of mononationalism into macronationalism. The logic of fraternal unification is extended from a politically identifiable population in a given political context to a larger language group of which that population forms part philologically. The dialect divisions within the language family are transcended into a larger frame (this is how Grimm proceeds in his *Geschichte der deutschen Sprache*) as is the demarcation between established national languages, and the footprint of the nation is extended from the speakers of a self-defined language to the speakers of a philologically identified language family.

From self-identified language to philologically identified language family: Philologists as architects of macronationalism

It is not for nothing that philologists who more than anyone else reflect on variations within languages, and on differences and familiarities between them, are at the forefront of this logic. Linguists and philologists are, if nothing else, masters of language. They deal with them as dexterously as a magician does a deck of cards. For men like Josef Dobrovský and Rasmus Rask, the founders of Slavic and Germanic Philology, Slavic or Germanic really were a single language, with Icelandic, Old Saxon and modern Flemish being as insignificantly different for one as Church Slavonic, modern Russian and medieval Czech were for the other. They corresponded in whatever language came in handy, or (in the case of the Slovene philologist Jernej Kopitar⁷) in a macaronic welter of mashed-up Latin, German and smatterings from various other idioms that all coexisted in their word-soaked brains.

By the same token, they see through centuries of language transformation as if these were merely superficial shifts of complexion. On the family tree of language relationships, they automatically trace the present-day leaves and twigs back to the primordial branches and trunk and even to the tree's hypothetically reconstructed, prehistorical root system. They read with X-ray eyes, discerning the ancient, skeletal roots of words through their modern appearances, immediately sensing how the English *gate* relates to the Nordic *gata* or the German *Gasse*, how the Gaulish name-ending *-rix* signified royal status, as in the Latin *rex* or the Gothic *-ric*, and how Theodoric of Verona could later, in German texts, come to be called Dietrich von Bern. The resemblance between *daughter*, *Tochter*, Greek *θυγατηρ* and Sanskrit *duhitr* would be as predictable to them as the multiplication table of 3. Their expertise of deep linguistic scanning foreshortens the passage of time, as it were: for philologists the tribal Dark Ages were right next door, just a few sound-shifts away. And the tribes of yore were, for them, a recent past, still discernible in their traces. Surely any child could see that the tribe of the Catti mentioned in Tacitus map onto present-day Hessia, or Gaelic *leabhar* and Welsh *llyfr* were both derived from Latin *liber*, "book," a mere millennium and a half ago.

This, then, is how at the great aggregation level of the language family, historical and linguistic distance are both abolished, and how macronationalisms, in aggregating Frisians, Danes and Bavarians as Germanic one and all, will see modern societies as the continuation of the tribal constituents of an original common ethnicity. This is why the ancient Cimbri and Teutones of Jutland are still a present force in the geopolitical thought of Jacob Grimm, why the Galician Manuel Murguía will skip 1500 years of Romance speech and Spanish culture when he links the modern citizens of A Coruña and Santiago de Compostela back to the Celtic Iberians of pre-Christian antiquity.⁸ The fifth-century Burgundians of the Nibelungenlied, domiciled between Xanten and Worms on the Rhine,

are identified as a tribe that was mid-way in their migration from their ancestral origin Bornholm (originally *Burgundaholmr*, of course) to the Bourgogne. The Slavic Vends are tracked in the names of their settlements from Wenden (present-day Cēsis in Latvia) to Venice.

Philological thought identifies languages and language families in the phylogenetic model that dominates the nineteenth century; they, and their taxonomies, enable the logic of extending national unification towards pan-national federative agendas: from the mononationalist empowerment and unification of ethnolinguistic self-defining “nations” speaking what they experience as a “language,” towards a federative assemblage of *Stämme* (linguistically related languages within a language family) into a macro-nation.

Identifying with the enlarged language community: From philological model to poetic ideal

As such, macronationalism is by no means an anomaly; it is nothing but a logical extension of the inherent logic of nationalist thought. It does mean, however, that it is the brainchild of scholars: philologists, mythologists and archaeologists and that the macro-nation is asserted in the field of knowledge production (collections of myths and legends, ethnographic history) rather than in the Romantic artistic production which proclaimed the identity of the single nation in historical paintings, novels, music and patriotic verse.

Any national movement will be prone to irredentism where outlying populations, on the basis of their ethnolinguistic kinship, are “redeemed” from foreign bondage (as in the phraseology of *Italia irredenta*), and “brought home” into their true appurtenance (*Heim ins Reich*; or the Greek notion of *enosis*). What makes macronationalism appear as a historical oddity is that often it is a triumph of philological and literary schematisation over political reality. Macronationalism was always based on *Völkergeschichte*, mythologies, etymologies and ancient epics rather than on contemporary political reality. The notion of a unified Germany was the pipedream of Grimm and Hoffmann von Fallersleben until 1848; later on, it became a cultural propaganda tool to justify and glamorise the Bismarck-engineered power rise of Prussia. But as an ideal, we should realise that the origin coincides with an ethnogenetic articulation of a Germanic language family: that, after all, was the life work and achievement of Jacob Grimm as a philologist. His identification of Germanic mythology as a common reservoir of archetypes is fully formulated in his *Deutsche Mythologie* and is continued by his adept Mannhardt in the mid-century.

Similarly, other pan-movements are made thinkable after the initial formulation that there is, in fact, something that identifies and characterises the language family as such and that they share a common reservoir of primordial texts, notably myths. While the languages and myths themselves are very old, the taxonomy of their family relationships is part of the intellectual history of European modernity. The identification of the Celtic languages as a mutually

related cluster occurs early in the eighteenth century, and their place in the Indo-European complex (itself a paradigm that developed in the decades around 1800) was established from the 1820s onwards, with a Celtic mythology being elaborated by D'Arbois de Jubainville in the 1860s.⁹ The notion of a Slavic language family and ethnic complex was elaborated between 1770 and 1830, as folktales and myths are being philologically gathered by antiquarians like Herder and Schlözer, and later Šafařík, and by philologists like Dobrovský and Kopitar.¹⁰ The place of languages like Hungarian and Finnish was long debated (and in some circles still is), but the idea of a “Turanian” complex (which would be the basis for a Turanian pan-movement involving Hungarian nationalist and pan-Turkists, and affecting some Finnish intellectuals) only emerged in the 1850s from the work of the philologist Max Müller.¹¹

After the philologists come the poets. In German we see versifying philologists like Arndt himself, Ferdinand Maßmann (who wrote verse in bog-Gothic) or Hoffmann von Fallersleben (who wrote verse in quasi-Flemish).¹² The literature of pan-Celticism emerges from the contacts between Welsh and Breton men of letters, namely around the *eisteddfod* festivals of the 1820s and 1830s and involving authors like La Villemarqué;¹³ he, Lady Charlotte Guest and the Irish archaeologist-poet Samuel Ferguson prepare the way for the Celtic folktale- and myth-retellers of the fin de siècle. Pan-Slavism kicks off its literary trajectory with Jan Kollár's poem-cycle *Slavy Dcera* (“Slava's Daughter,” 1825); it will inspire collectors of oral literature like František Ladislav Čelakovský and even, in the twentieth century, painters like Alfons Mucha. A subsidiary, southern form of pan-Slavism manifested itself in the literary life around Zagreb as “Illyrianism” in the 1830s; it would later re-emerge as South-Slavism (“Yugoslavisism”). Turan, for late-Ottoman intellectuals like Ziya Gökalp, was a distant mirage of a paradisaical alternative reality, something that transcends the contemporary decay of the Ottoman state and sublimates contemporary discontents into the glorious but almost mystical eternity of a Greater Turkish ideal.¹⁴ This flight from real-world woes into a transcendent ideal is in fact quite close to what Kollár does in *Slavy Dcera*.

Quixotic?

All that is, then, a product of the learning and poetics of Romanticism, and as such it is idealistic, “up in the air,” and somewhat removed from (or even deliberately averse from) the mundane practicalities of political life. Contemporary historians, who study nineteenth-century nationalism above all as the political pre-history of the twentieth-century nation-state, are therefore tempted to dismiss macronationalism as the pipedreams of poets and otherworldly bookworms, without traction in political life and without measurable success in the course of history. No Greater Slavic Federation or state ever emerged; no Celtia; and Greater Germany crashed and burned in the general madness of the Third Reich.

The argument as such is incontrovertible. Macronationalism was only successful in those cases where it was embraced and instrumentalised by politically nationalist states to provide the cultural rhetoric for an agenda of hegemony and expansionism. That is how we see pan-Germanism used in the Third Reich, and indeed to some extent in some of the more ambitious war aims of Wilhelminian Germany during the First World War.¹⁵ Pan-Slavism was taken over after the 1860s for purposes of imperial Russian power politics, feeding the policies of the Russophiles or Slavophiles. Hans Kohn sees in the Comecon a Cold War extension of such pan-Slavism coerced into the service of Russian power politics, and while his view was probably skewed, it is difficult to deny the echoes of Russophile pan-Slavism in the rhetoric of Russian nationalists like Vladimir Putin. The legacy of Illyrianism was put into the service of Greater-Serbian expansionism pre-1914 and the Yugoslav Sonderweg of the Tito years, much as Turanism was invoked, first by the Three Pashas and now by Erdoğan's Turkey to bolster its sense of an ethnic Turkic identity ramifying into the Caucasus and Central Asia. In short, macronationalism provides a lofty cultural sounding-board for political irredentism but only works in that subservient capacity: to reinforce the state.

By the same token, pan-movements were never seriously successful in challenging the state. The Frankfurt Parliament of 1848 was sent packing in disarray and ignominy; the Prague Slavic Congress fared little better. Pan-Celticism as a political movement was largely the brainchild of Breton activists who, after murky episodes in occupied France in 1940–45, spent the post-war years in exile in Ireland or Wales. Turanism in Hungary belongs firmly on the fringes of the nationalist spectrum.

Not quite (1: United Kingdoms)

It would seem easy, then, to dismiss or deride such macronationalist movements. But such a dismissal might also risk being overly smug or facile.

To begin with, we should realise that no macronationalist movement ever envisaged creating a nation-state. The Austro-Slavists, modestly enough, envisaged an ethnic subsidiarity to counterbalance the authoritarianism of the central imperial court in Vienna (or the Magyar chauvinism of the Hungarian authorities). Pan-Celticism was never much more than a “what if . . .” thought experiment, and pan-Latinism was largely a cooperative movement between Catalan and Occitan activists with some support from Italy and Romania, a scale-enlarged form of regionalism rather than a form of nationalism.¹⁶

What was envisaged was always something at the higher aggregational level, much as language families relate to their individual member languages: something federative. That is the case for Turkish Turanism. Indeed, such a federative, modular structure was the political template from which, historically, these models emerge. The model for Germany was a Reich consisting of various subsidiary monarchies, and indeed that was also the type of Reich that was reconstituted

under Prussian suzerainty in 1871. Even the Third Reich, totalitarian as it was, perpetuated the memory of the diversity of Germany's various tribal *Stämme* in its structure of *Gauen*.

The example of the *Reichsidee* indicates how the "composite monarchy" dominated political thought in the century before the nation-state.¹⁷ Many kingdoms were in fact united kingdoms. This continued an *ancien régime* trend into the post-Napoleonic century: as a result of conquests or dynastic mergers, many medieval realms had clustered into personal unions with separate institutions under a composite crown. Poland-Lithuania is one example, the union of England and Scotland another (Union of the Crowns, 1603; Union of the Parliaments, 1707); in 1801, that United Kingdom also absorbed the Kingdom of Ireland.¹⁸ Sweden and Norway became such a United Kingdom in 1814. The Netherlands united the Austrian Netherlands and the United Provinces in 1815, also including a personal union with the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.¹⁹ The "composite monarchy" format continued to be considered a viable state form and was put into effect in the new imperial structures of Austro-Hungary in 1867 and Germany in 1871. In 1918, a Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs was formed which would later morph into Yugoslavia.

Many of these composite monarchies were broken up by nationalist separatism: Belgium, Norway, Finland and Ireland broke away from their unions with the Netherlands, Sweden, Russia and Great Britain, respectively. Yugoslavia is now broken, and Great Britain is balancing pan-British loyalties (largely forged in the Napoleonic period and in the framework of the Victorian/Georgian Empire) and anti-English sentiment in its non-English parts.²⁰

Even so, in studying the agenda of macronationalism, we should not overlook the presence of the "composite monarchy" model as a blueprint of political aspirations. Unlike hard-line nationalist movements, the aim may not have been to overthrow the existing state or to separate from it, but rather to adjust it to ethnic demands in a devolution model. Only this can explain the fact that (pan-)German nationalism never really fissioned into competing sub-nationalisms, despite the *incompatibilité d'esprits* of hard-line Protestants like Arndt and hard-line Catholics like Görres or Friedrich Schlegel. A confessionalisation of politics there was, even a *Kulturkampf*, and there was considerable ill-will between Bavaria and Prussia, but all of this was accommodated within the quasi-federal nature and the nationalist goodwill of the Wilhelminian Empire.

Thus, it would be unfair to impute to pan-national movements a state-breaking or state-making agenda, and then to chide them for the impracticality of it all. I would suggest that in many cases, what was suggested was federation of regions or realms, mitigating the competing centralisms of neighbouring states. Bretons and Occitans, in voicing pan-Celtic or pan-Latin sentiments, were really trying to formulate an alternative to the monocultural centralism of France; as such, they were not really different from French Basques or Flemings looking to kin-group across the Spanish or Belgian border for cultural support.

Not quite (2: Identity backup and inter-minority support networks)

Looking to kin groups across the border for cultural support: that need for “identity backup” is one of the salient, defining features of all nineteenth-century national movements. German speakers in Schleswig-Holstein were fortified by the solidarity of the fellow Germans. In nineteenth-century German choral festivals, visiting choirs from Schleswig-Holstein were always enthusiastically cheered and encouraged as beleaguered brethren;²¹ much in the way the *douze points* pattern in the Eurovision Song Contest expresses the sympathy between Turkey and Azerbaijan, or Cyprus and Greece. Czechs and Slovaks drew together in their joint resistance against rule from Vienna and Budapest. And pan-Germanism gained a firm foothold in Flanders as Flemings found themselves a disempowered language community in French-leaning Belgium post-1830: much as the *Flamands de France* looked for identity backup to Belgian Flanders, Belgian Flanders looked abroad to find larger solidarity-frameworks to back up its identity; these were found in pan-Germanism (Flanders as a Germanic bulwark against the hegemonic French) or else in a revived pan-Netherlandism.²² In Northern Ireland, both halves of the population (each considering itself to be a beleaguered minority) look across the border for identity backup: Unionist Protestants to Great Britain, Catholic nationalists to the Republic of Ireland.

Seen in this light, pan-movements can be seen as being, primarily, mutual support networks for a plurality of cultural communities which each are minoritised in their own state, and which could all profit from formulating a collective position. A co-op of identity backups, as it were. Palacký’s Slavic Congress in Prague, 1848, was nothing if not a joint manifestation of the subaltern Slavic populations of the Austrian and Ottoman empires, with Russia and Poland in a marginal position.²³ Pan-Celticism was the straightforward political consequence of marginal and marginalised populations realising that their local languages were in fact part of a philologically prestigious family and drawing support from that collective re-positioning.

What were they hoping to gain from it? I think we can disregard the idea of political independence; more foregroundedly, the obvious motivation was one of de-marginalisation. “Empowerment” or “cultural emancipation” might be the more contemporary way of phrasing it, or the interesting Northern-Irish notion of a “parity of esteem.” Rather than setting out a joint agenda to be achieved on concerted joint action, what was put forward was a self-positioning frame from which each participating community could draw moral and cultural support. Hence the fact that the activities were so very often of a cultural nature: congresses, exhibitions and festivals (foreshadowing the “Eurovision Song Contest,” indeed) where each cultural community could joyfully encounter the others and celebrate their kinship and mutual support.

In this respect, it must be observed that pan-Slavism and pan-Celticism were spectacularly successful. The inter-Slavic institution of the *matice* published books

and reading materials with a large preponderance of translations from the other Slavic languages, enriching each reading audience, always a minority in its own context, with a larger and enriched reservoir of reading material.²⁴ The Welsh *eisteddfod* format proliferated in other Celtic lands to mobilise cultural activities and self-esteem: in Scotland (Mòd), Ireland (Oireachtas), Brittany (Gorsedd) and even Cornwall; an inter-Celtic festival in Lorient is still flourishing. In the smaller Latin-language communities on both sides of the Pyrenees, “Floral games” have become a powerful cultural self-proclamation, self-replicating from Toulouse to La Coruña and Valencia and back to Arles; not to mention the enormously important *Jocs Florals* of Barcelona.²⁵ And around 1900, writers from the “Tatar” communities of Russia (in the Crimean, the Southern Caucasus and on the Volga) found sympathetic support in Turkish media.²⁶

Thus, while the pan-movements may not have broken up existing state structures to establish new polities of ethnolinguistic families, they have certainly strengthened the national movements in each of the participating cultural communities. Slovene, Slovak, Bulgarian, Czech and Ukrainian nationalism have benefited massively from the presence of a pan-Slavic support network; similarly for Irish and Breton nationalism. The best way to assess the actual impact of macronationalism is not to adjust the political history of what we may misinterpret as their state-building aims but to see how these macronational frameworks provided sounding-boards and identity backups for the nationalism that reigned in each participating member-community. Indeed, for those who, in the tradition of Eric Hobsbawm, see a “threshold principle” at work that would predict viability only to nations with a minimum size and wielding a minimum of demographic and economic clout, it may be useful to consider the possibility that certain self-defining nations, though very small in size, punched above their weight and managed to clear the threshold principle largely by virtue of the cultural and identitarian backup they derived from their association with “big brothers” in their family tree: Slovenians through the network of *matica* book clubs could establish a Slavic reading public and literary system, Estonians profited from their association with Finnish culture.

Scandinavia: The (macro-)nation as a cultural repertoire

Recently, Scandinavianism has become a prominent and fertile field of study.²⁷ Indeed, the position of the Nordic countries in the profile of macronationalism as outlined above raises a number of interesting issues.

In Denmark, Scandinavianism was clearly an identity backup in the face of the growing power and irredentism of Germany. In order to understand its emergence, we can look at a controversy between Rask and Grimm that erupted as early as 1812, ostensibly about naming the language family to which German and Danish both belong. Grimm preferred “German/Germanic,” Rask resisted this for obvious reasons and preferred “Gothic” (possibly with the Swedish *Götiska Förbundet* at the back of his mind). Even at that early stage,

Grimm denounced Danish language policies in Schleswig and Holstein as “futile attempts to block the march of history” [i.e. the advance of the cultural hegemony of the German language] and foreshadowing his above-quoted sentiments of 1848. Rask’s Nordicism – so important for the identification of Icelandic and Faroese – cannot be seen in isolation from his animus over this episode,²⁸ and the power of cultural Scandinavianism is amply demonstrated by the fact that the many German attempts to gain influence in Norway and Sweden at the expense of Denmark – in the scholarly field by Grimm, in the political field by Wilhelm II – were singularly unsuccessful and failed to break down a common Nordic cultural awareness.

Scandinavianism began in the common celebration of a shared mythology and a heroic, pre-modern past.²⁹ This philologically, culturally driven basis aligns Scandinavianism with other macronationalist movements elsewhere and means that the cultural work of the likes of Oehlenschläger, Nyerup, Grundtvig,³⁰ Tegnér and the young Ibsen should be de-marginalised in the histories of Scandinavianism (which are often centred on political activism, or student activism; I hazard the guess that students of history and philology were overrepresented in the activists’ ranks).

The Danish identity backup in looking for support against German claims by strengthening ties with the other Nordic lands is merely the political tip of this cultural iceberg, the buoyancy of which is due to a shared cultural repertoire and common roots in the tribal and early-medieval past. Political unification of the three kingdoms, even though it is now habitually seen as the core concern of the Scandinavianist agenda, was perhaps never the real point. The celebration of a common culture and a common assertion of anti-absolutism may have been more fundamental to Scandinavianism, that shift of emphasis may make the movement less quixotic in the eyes of modern readers.

The failure of support from Sweden/Norway in the 1864 war is usually seen as the death knell of Scandinavianism, but that only holds for the political portion of the agenda. The cultural persistence of a common Nordic frame of identification beyond the 1864 war should likewise be seen as an intrinsic part, rather than a tangential spin-off, of Scandinavianism.³¹

Scandinavianism can perhaps be most fruitfully compared to Greater Netherlandism – a movement that arose in the second half of the nineteenth century, well after the brief composite monarchy of 1815 had been sundered in 1830 with the Belgian Revolution.³² Greater Netherlandism drew on the lingering philological traces of a common medieval history, and a shared unease at German unification under Prussian leadership. Here as in the Nordic countries, the movement was middle class and took place in constitutional monarchies. It was carried not by irredentist or by minorities seeking to unify into strength but by cultural elites in what were individually stable states. In both cases, the pan-movements have left a strong vestigial sense of cultural commonalities – a repertoire – without political unification being a serious proposal.

Notes

- 1 I use the term macronationalism interchangeably with “pan-nationalism,” as per Snyder, *Macro-nationalism*; I heuristically oppose this to the nationalism of the single cultural community which I term “mononationalism.” As I shall argue, the distinction is fluid since the single cultural community is in practice hard to define.
- 2 Throughout this chapter I invoke the status quaestionis on nineteenth-century European nationalism resulting from the canonical works by authors such as Anderson, Gellner, Hroch, Thiesse and Smith, as summarised in my *National thought in Europe*. For individual instances I rely on the materials collected in Leerssen, *Encyclopedia of Romantic Nationalism in Europe*; individual articles are referred to by URL to the online digital edition, <http://ernie.uva.nl>.
- 3 Putin, “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” published 12 July 2021 on the official Russian government website. A response by historians of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences denounces the essay’s perpetuation of a nineteenth-century, imperial–Russocentric master–narrative; these historical antecedents are also outlined in <http://show.ernie.uva.nl/ukr-1>. Putin’s essay has been noted in dedicated Wikipedia articles in various languages.
- 4 See my “The Never–Ending Stream,” 224–61; also, my *De bronnen*.
- 5 Grimm made this remarkable assertion in the dedication (to Gervinus) of his *Geschichte der deutschen Sprache*, III–VI. The book appeared as Grimm, then a delegate in the Frankfurt Parliament, prepared his motion that Germany should declare war on Denmark until a definitive and complete cession of Schleswig–Holstein was to be achieved. The dedicatory text is online at <https://ernie.uva.nl/viewer.p/21/54/object/351-227037>, the motion at <https://ernie.uva.nl/viewer.p/21/54/object/351-225914>.
- 6 Cf. Goetz “Die ‘Deutschen Stämme’ als Forschungsproblem,” 229–53.
- 7 On Dobrovský, Rask and Kopitar: Wirtz, *Josef Dobrovský und die Literatur*; Diderichsen, *Rask og den grammatiske tradition*; Rask, *Rasmus Rask*; Pogačnik, *Bartholomäus Kopitar*; Bonazza, “Austro–Slavism,” 155–64.
- 8 See my “Gods, Heroes, and Mythologists,” 71–100.
- 9 Brown, *Celticism*.
- 10 The standard work is still (despite its Cold War bias) that of Kohn, *Die Slawen und der Westen und Pan-Slavism*.
- 11 Early sources are online at <https://ernie.uva.nl/viewer.p/21/54/object/351-282799> and <https://ernie.uva.nl/viewer.p/21/54/object/351-278596>. Also, Levent, “Common Asianist intellectual history,” 121–35; Landau, *Pan-Turkism*; Trencsényi, “Strange Bedfellows,” 243–61.
- 12 On Maßmann: Richter, *Hans Ferdinand Maßmann*; on Hoffmann’s appropriation of Flemish: Leerssen, *De bronnen*.
- 13 Constantine, *The Truth Against the World*; Fraser, “Lady Llanover and Her Circle,” 170–96.
- 14 <https://ernie.uva.nl/viewer.p/21/54/object/351-278615>
- 15 The German war aims have been a topic of controversy ever since 1961, when Fritz Fischer published his *Griff nach der Weltmacht*; for a recent independent confirmation of the Fischer thesis, see Bischoff, *Kriegsziel Belgien*.
- 16 Zantedeschi, *The Antiquarians of the Nation* and “L’invention d’un espace transnational,” 173–87; <http://show.ernie.uva.nl/rmn-1> and <http://show.ernie.uva.nl/rmn-3>.
- 17 Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies,” 48–71.
- 18 See also Jackson’s contribution to this volume.
- 19 Hemstad, “The United Kingdoms of Norway and Sweden,” 76–97.
- 20 Jackson, *The Two Unions*.
- 21 Klenke, *Der singende “deutsche Mann.”*
- 22 Generally, Schryver, *Nieuwe Encyclopedie*; Leerssen, *Bronnen*; Dunk, *Der deutsche Vormärz und Belgien*; Wils, *Vlaanderen, België, Groot-Nederland*.

- 23 The documentation is in Žáček, *Slovanský Sjezd v Praze roku 1848*. Also: Orton, *The Prague Slav Congress*.
- 24 Lajosi and Stynen, *The Matica and Beyond*.
- 25 See my “The Nation and the City,” 2–20.
- 26 Thus Ismail Gasprinskij and Hüseyinzade Ali Turan; cf. <http://show.ernie.uva.nl/Gas> and <http://show.ernie.uva.nl/HAT>.
- 27 I mention only Hemstad, Møller and Thorkildsen, *Skandinavismen*; Gerven, *Scandinavism*; Glenthoj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*; Marjanen, Strang and Hilson, *Contesting Nordicness*.
- 28 <https://ernie.uva.nl/viewer.p/21/54/object/351-225913>. Grimm’s later conversation with Scandinavian scholars has been edited and documents his ongoing attempts to isolate Danish scholarship and to forge German–Norwegian, German–Swedish and German–Icelandic links. Schmidt, *Briefwechsel der Gebrüder Grimm*. For Rask: Rask, *Rasmus Rask*; Bjerrum, *Rasmus Rasks afhandlinger*; Hjelmlev, “Commentaires,” 179–99. Also <http://show.ernie.uva.nl/swe-14> on the *Götiska Förbundet* and, for the context, Hemstad, *Historie og nasjonal identitet*.
- 29 Leerssen, “Tribal Ancestors and Moral Role Patterns”; Parker, *The Harp and the Constitution*.
- 30 Bønding, Martinsen and Stahl, *Mythology and Nation Building*.
- 31 As per Hemstad, “Scandinavian Sympathies and Nordic Unity.”
- 32 On the early period: Hemstad, “United Kingdoms.” On later developments: Leerssen, *Bronnen*; Wils, *Vlaanderen, België, Groot-Nederland*.

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PART I

Scandinavianism and great power politics



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3

WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY AND THE POLITICAL ANATOMY OF SCANDINAVIANISM, 1848–1858

Morten Nordhagen Ottosen

Speaking to the burghers in Sweden’s diet of the estates (*Riksdag*) on 10 May 1848, the lawyer Gustaf Ferdinand Ekholm lamented that the idea of “the nationality of related tribes” had “cropped up at a most unfortunate moment,” as it appeared to introduce a new age of conflict rather than a new political and social order. To Ekholm, the revolutions sweeping across Europe as he was speaking signalled that “different nationalities are on their way to rising against each other, and in a very despotic manner at that, to compete for supremacy.” “Germanism,” he warned, “has come into conflict with Italianism, and is also well on the way to clashing with Panslavism and Scandinavianism.”¹

Like many of his contemporaries Ekholm framed the national currents of the time in pan-national terms. But in lamenting the “springtime of peoples” in 1848, he was a rather lone voice among European liberals and radicals, several of whom were inspired by the Italian nationalist Giuseppe Mazzini.² To them, nationalism was the harbinger of a new Europe, where nation-states would serve as fundamentals for stability, democracy and peace in a United States of Europe. The Mazzinian concept of nationalism was also based on the principle of size. For them to be viable as nations and polities, Europe’s nation-states had to exceed what the historian Eric Hobsbawm has labelled a “threshold” in terms of geography, demography, culture, resources and military capacity. In calling for the union of ethnic groups or nations with similarities in culture, traditions and vernacular, the threshold principle was concerned above all with size and viability. In Mazzini’s own map of future Europe, he contented himself with a bare dozen states and federations, meaning that the polities were, as a rule, to be pan-national in kind.³

It was no coincidence that Mazzini drew up his future map in 1857. Although the revolutions of 1848 failed to impact the map of Europe, they nevertheless introduced a new era. Over the next two and a half decades Europe’s ideological

landscape was transformed, the international political system was in transition, and the map was indeed redrawn. The years 1848–71, regarded by Richard Evans as “a single period of revolutionary change,” were marked by conflict, war and *Realpolitik*, in which notions of nationalism served as ambition, threat, means and ends to ideologues, statesmen, monarchs and emerging mass movements.⁴ Nationalism became an integral part of high politics, although the political aspirations of individual national and pan-national movements varied in kind and scope. Yet, even if pan-Slavists did not express the level of political ambition evoked for example by German nationalists, the very existence of a pan-Slavic movement left those advocating German and Scandinavian unification with a sense of urgency, as it reinforced their fears of pan-Slavism as a vehicle for Russian expansion.⁵ Thus, even in the absence of “high-political goals” of its own, pan-Slavism strongly influenced high politics, making Alexander Maxwell’s suggestion to somehow detach pan-Slavism from high politics seem slightly awkward.⁶

The present chapter is concerned with political efforts to unite Scandinavia from the European revolutions in 1848 through the immediate aftermath of the Crimean War. These efforts were very much matters of high politics and must be approached as such, albeit in a broader manner than conventional diplomatic history. Ideological designs mattered but seldom served as blueprints in the practical political application of nationalism, as the cases of Italian and German unification remind us. Set against a backdrop of domestic and international politics this chapter argues that the period 1848–58 witnessed at least two significant windows of opportunity for a dynastic union of Scandinavia, intended to pave the way for a closer political pan-national union, whatever its concrete constitutional, territorial and cultural terms. These windows were essentially crossroads, and although the efforts to exploit the windows failed, unification was no less viable than other outcomes. Rather, this chapter argues that the efforts of Scandinavianists from 1848 onwards reflect a movement very much in touch with the political and national currents of its time – insofar as becoming ideologically flexible and ready to exploit opportunities offered by shifting constellations in a time of international political transition and instability. As such the present chapter rejects assertions by some scholars that Scandinavianism peaked before 1848.⁷

Although the political aspirations of Scandinavianism faced notable challenges, the decades after 1848 brought a political climate where individuals, circumstance, timing and chance arguably mattered more than at any point since the Napoleonic Wars. In a time of blood and iron – as the era’s embodiment, Otto von Bismarck, put it in 1862 – political opportunism and flexibility was the very essence of the *Realpolitik* practised by such statesmen as Bismarck himself and Camillo di Cavour. History is not determined by “great men” or “great women,” but nor is it determined solely by structural conditions. As Margaret Macmillan argues, individuals making decisions and acting on them, sometimes at great risk, have had crucial influence on the course of history.⁸ Individual decision-makers were indeed presented with opportunities to overcome or bypass

some of the challenges to Scandinavianism, but individual decisions were also a major cause of its eventual failure in political terms. Even when stars appeared to align for Scandinavianism, key individuals oscillated, balked at risk, or failed to act altogether, thereby perpetuating impressions that Scandinavian unification was structurally inhibited, as if no windows were ever open to it at all.⁹

Scandinavian historians have traditionally tended to regard attempts to unite Scandinavia in 1848–64 as little more than cases of royal whim and recklessness, until such “Scandinavian dreams” were finally confronted by “political realities.”¹⁰ The historian Bo Stråth regards the “foreign policy activism” of Scandinavianists in the 1850s and 1860s as “dangerous escapism,”¹¹ while the label “dynastic Scandinavianism,” often applied to Scandinavianist efforts in the 1850s and 1860s, may leave an impression of these as being little more than the sport of kings.¹² As Scandinavianism became increasingly bound up with dynastic ambition, elitist politics, military alliances and war, historians have contrasted it with democratisation and peace as embodiments of the “proper” course of Scandinavian history, to say nothing of the advent of the individual Scandinavian nation-states.¹³ The resulting narrative does not quite do justice to the windows of opportunity that were open to Scandinavian unification, even if these were determined by unpleasant circumstances such as war, revolution or constitutional plans stopping well short of modern democracy.¹⁴

During the period under investigation here, Scandinavianism was transformed from a liberal and philological pan-national ideology supported mainly by academics, students and publicists into a more ideologically heterogeneous and overtly political movement, with adherents from such varied quarters and different political colour as aristocrats, royalty, academics, military officers and businessmen. Yet, the political flexibility offered by this wide range of adherents was tempered by their inherent tensions, particularly as to the concrete terms of Scandinavian union. Still, active support from court and government circles made Scandinavianism an integral part of the high politics of the time not only in terms of domestic politics, dynastic ambition and security concerns but also in terms of international politics, as the major powers contemplated if and how Scandinavian unification could serve their interests. Pan-nationalism featured prominently in various plans and proposals for a general European reshuffle, in which Scandinavian unification played part and faced odds no worse than those confronted by contemporaries striving for German and Italian unification.

The hour of Scandinavia

A low ebb in early 1848 and fears that Scandinavianism “was about to become extinct” turned out to be the calm before the storm.¹⁵ The unexpected death of King Christian VIII of Denmark on 20 January 1848 opened the lid on the thorny questions of succession and constitution in the Danish state, bedevilled by conflicts over the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. The spearhead of the Scandinavianist movement, the Danish editor and politician Carl Ploug, feared

that the deceased king's successor, Frederick VII, was most inclined to continue absolutism and preserve the Danish unitary state. There is evidence to suggest that Ploug and his fellow travellers planned a revolution to bring the Swedish and Norwegian house of Bernadotte onto the Danish throne.¹⁶ The new king opted for a constitutional path trodden by conservative unitary statist, but it did not appease the liberals. In mid-March the revolutionary wave emanating from Paris brought Copenhagen to the cusp of revolt and caused unrest in Stockholm and Christiania. Both Frederick VII and King Oscar I of Sweden and Norway made concessions, but the abolition of absolutism in Denmark and secret negotiations between Schleswig-Holstein separatists and the new Danish government (including three national liberal Scandinavianists) could not prevent the outbreak of civil war. The conflict spiralled into national war when the German Confederation intervened with Prussian bayonets, defeated the Danish army at Schleswig on 23 April and thence marched into Jutland. This was a nightmare coming true for many Danes, Denmark having been referred to by German national ideologues as the "admiral state" of a united Germany. Fear of national annihilation certainly contributed to Danish national liberals embracing Scandinavianism as a means of survival.¹⁷

Following the defeat at Schleswig, the desperate Danish government pleaded the United Kingdoms of Sweden and Norway for help, with Frederick VII citing personal pledges Oscar I had allegedly made to him previously. Having recently disavowed meddling in the First Schleswig War as "donquixotism," Oscar I made an about-turn. Although he was keen to stress that it was not for the sake of Scandinavian unionism, there was no avoiding this question when the *Riksdag* debated and approved funding for Swedish intervention in the war on 10–11 May. The Norwegian government and parliament followed suit, albeit with reservations. By the end of May Swedish and Norwegian troops prepared to embark for Denmark and on 8 June 4 000 Swedish troops arrived at Funen.¹⁸

In the meantime, Scandinavianists had worked themselves into a frenzy.¹⁹ In late March Ploug put a challenge to the Swedish editor and leading Scandinavianist O.P. Sturzen-Becker: "What does Sweden say, especially its youth, to a Russian attack on Copenhagen? This is the time for an offensive and defensive alliance. Troops from Scania lunging into the backs of our attackers [the Germans] and an invasion of Finland! What do you say, boys?"²⁰ Ploug was later accused of invoking Russophobia as a cloak for winning Swedish support for Denmark against Germany, but like most Scandinavianists he genuinely feared Russia and Germany as parallel threats – and saw the upheaval of 1848 as an occasion to do away with both.

Scandinavianist fears were closely linked to perceptions of Scandinavian unification as paramount to check alleged pan-Slav and German expansionism. Like many European nationalists at the time, leading Scandinavianists believed in the threshold principle, which turned notions of unite or perish into a forceful argument for unification.²¹ This was given added impetus by the German invasion of Denmark proper in 1848. But it also offered opportunities. As German

troops made headway, and Swedish and Norwegian volunteers made their way to Denmark backed by vociferous public support, Ploug argued that the “hour of Scandinavia has come” and advocated immediate action by the Bernadotte dynasty: “If it does not seize this opportunity, it might never return.”²² A rally in Christiania on 1 May yielded 1 600 signatures on a petition to King Oscar. The organiser of the rally, the historian P.A. Munch, explained the purpose of the petition when he remarked that “it is entirely about, and not supposed to mean anything other than War! War!”.²³ This coincided with the king’s about-turn and his decision to intervene in the war on Denmark’s side.

The tipping point

A wave of public support – and the likely intervention of Sweden-Norway when a military convention was agreed with Denmark on 11 May and Swedish troops landed at Funen in early June – were manifestations of Scandinavian pan-national solidarity. The sociologist Randall Collins has demonstrated how national mobilisation is not constant but occurs in “time bubbles” of fairly short duration, during which national solidarity can become a permanent staple if it is institutionalised.²⁴ A time bubble of pan-nationalism did emerge in Scandinavia in the spring of 1848, as evidenced by the public support for Denmark’s cause and its Scandinavian implications, and a joint war effort would promote institutionalisation.

Swedish-Norwegian intervention in the war would not in itself unite Scandinavia, but it would provide the Scandinavians with some of the key components in the forging and institutionalisation of national identity: shared experiences, a common foe and formalised military and political cooperation. Equally important, it would heavily influence the course of events and the great powers. A negotiated territorial and dynastic settlement, guaranteed by the great powers, was a likely outcome of such a major conflagration in Northern Europe. In Norway, the parliament majority was sufficiently aware of this to furnish its grant of troops and funding with reservations against “a more permanent approach to Denmark.”²⁵ Yet, once events were set in motion this would not be left solely at the discretion of the Norwegian parliament. The Danish author and politician Hans Egede Schack spelled out the Scandinavianist plan when he wrote that the war was intended to solve the conflict over Schleswig and Holstein, pave the way for dynastic union through Frederick’s adoption of Crown Prince Charles of Sweden and Norway and “above all, to bring about a united Scandinavia.”²⁶ A likely solution was a partition of Schleswig, which some national liberals in the Danish government were open to, whereas Sweden-Norway already offered a precedent for dynastic union and prospects – however contested – for institutional integration.

Whatever the much-debated considerations of the coy Oscar I, he was well aware of the prospect of the Danish throne for his dynasty, as much as he did not want to see Germany extended to the Danish straits. Moreover, unrest elsewhere

in Europe and Russian inaction provided him with diplomatic leverage. It was only on 22 May that Russia called for Prussian troops to leave Jutland, to which the Prussians obliged. This was the first case of Russian diplomatic meddling, but it marked a tipping point.²⁷ There is much to suggest that St. Petersburg also let it be understood that Scandinavian unification and German expansion were equally undesirable. Oscar opted not to cross Russia, still untouched by revolution and regarded as Europe's gendarme. In mid-June he offered mediation to the belligerents, arguing to disappointed Danes that the military convention of 11 May was only valid for Zealand and Funen, where the Swedish troops thus remained.

Leading Scandinavianists such as Ploug and Sturzen-Becker could not believe what happened, having anticipated a war of unification. The time bubble burst, and several historians have asserted that Scandinavianists thus woke up to a reality with which they had lost touch in their exaltation, as it should have been obvious to all that Russia would not sanction Scandinavian unification.²⁸ Yet, such verdicts lean on hindsight, as did admittedly later Scandinavianist lamentations that a nod from King Oscar would have sufficed for him to be crowned king of Denmark.²⁹ Their point, however, was that Scandinavian union had been within grasp, depending on Oscar's course of action. They certainly worried about Russia, but the summer of 1848 marked only the beginning of a more active Russian policy of reactionary intervention in Europe. Yet only in 1850 did Russian vessels appear in Danish waters.³⁰

The Scandinavianists were thus not deluded in sensing that a window of opportunity was open in the spring of 1848.³¹ Moreover, they had reason to expect France and Britain to be sympathetic, and possibly even check Russian military action in Scandinavia. In Paris, President Alphonse Lamartine had declared that France would support all nations in their quest for liberty. Obviously, the problem in Schleswig was that two nations were making such claims, and, in any event, the June Days in Paris put a lid on hopes for French support for national movements elsewhere.³² In London, Lord Palmerston, the foreign minister, was keen to prevent the war from tilting the balance of power in the Baltic area. In May, he was told by his envoy to Copenhagen that "the idea of a union grew stronger day by day" and was based "on more sound principles" than German unification, but been advised that this matter must be "reserved for those who come after us."³³ Palmerston agreed and in June his diplomatic intervention led to peace negotiations on grounds of a division of Schleswig, yielding a Danish-Prussian truce meddled by Oscar I in July.³⁴

Although direct Swedish-Norwegian intervention in the war was no longer an option, conspicuous attempts were made to revive the time bubble of Scandinavianism when Danish-Prussian hostilities were resumed in April 1849. These efforts amounted to press campaigns, to which King Oscar likely contributed, as well as overtures between the Scandinavian courts.³⁵ Still, Swedish-Norwegian military involvement was limited to 4 000 troops serving as a peace-keeping force in North Schleswig during a renewed truce in 1849–50,

amidst vain Scandinavianist hopes that a chance confrontation with German troops would trigger the common war effort they had so desired in 1848. Peace was concluded in London in 1851 on grounds of *status quo ante bellum*, but the conflict over the duchies continued, fuelled by nationalist sentiments. Moreover, even though Prince Christian of Glücksburg had been selected as Danish heir presumptive through the Treaty of London in 1852, neither the Scandinavianists, Frederick VII nor the court in Stockholm regarded the question of Danish succession as settled indefinitely.

The turning point

The events of 1848–51 transformed the Scandinavianist movement and broadened its ideological grounds. Liberal Scandinavianists entered into a marriage of convenience with kings Oscar and Frederick, inspired by the question of Danish succession but also the preference of many European liberals for constitutional monarchy and limited suffrage, reinforced by antagonism towards an emerging extreme political left.³⁶ Thwarted attempts at parliamentary reform in Sweden and the conflict-ridden repercussions of the free constitution introduced in Denmark in 1849 ensured that constitutional questions very much remained on the Scandinavianist agenda, but the movement was no longer one of overt political opposition. Nor was it solely liberal, as Scandinavianism increasingly attracted Swedish conservatives. Scandinavianism's monarchic embrace and apparent political right turn came at the price of many of its radically inclined adherents, such as the Swede Emil Key, who later lamented that Scandinavianism erred in its elitism and lack of progressive political thrust, which in his view deprived it of the popular appeal he saw as necessary for its political fulfilment.³⁷

Still, neither German nor Italian unification was accomplished on particularly progressive political grounds, partly because the national appeal was such that liberals were ultimately prepared to sacrifice constitutional demands in return for unification.³⁸ Even though Scandinavianism may have lacked appeal to a similar extent, some were prepared to compromise. For example, one of the Scandinavianist movement's most prominent liberals, the Swedish editor August Sohlman, was ready to discard parliamentary reform in Sweden in return for immediate Scandinavian unification.³⁹ In a similar vein, the prominent Danish national liberal politician and Scandinavianist Orla Lehmann remarked that he would rather "be Swedish than German," meaning that he ultimately preferred Denmark as a Swedish province, as some conservative Swedes wished, to falling into Germany's orbit.⁴⁰

Sohlman and Lehmann's remarks reflected the changing face and political composition of the Scandinavianist movement after 1851. In Sweden, they were joined and arguably even surpassed in their Scandinavianist efforts by a new cohort of "neo-conservative" landed aristocrats close to Crown Prince Charles. Where liberals saw Scandinavian unification in federal and progressive constitutional terms, the aristocratic "junkers" were little disposed towards extended

suffrage and bicameral representation, also tending to regard Scandinavian unification as a means of Swedish expansionism.⁴¹

In Denmark national liberals continued to front Scandinavianism after 1848 but were joined by a faction of agrarian nationalists, several of whom were noble estate-owners but in political terms situated to the left of the national liberals. For all their vehement differences of opinion with regard to suffrage and representation, the national liberals and agrarian nationalists found common ground in wanting to rid Denmark of her German territories and the “protocol prince” Christian, as well as in their opposition to conservative unitary statist, who looked to Russia for the preservation of the unitary state and dynastic succession. This eventually made national liberals and agrarian nationalists unite behind the banner of Scandinavianism, even to the point of co-planning revolution to install the Bernadotte dynasty on the Danish throne and accept a Swedish army on Danish soil.⁴²

Others were less inclined to compromise for the sake of Scandinavian unification. In Norway Scandinavianism remained the domain of educated officials, publicists and intellectuals, who were generally regarded as conservative by the parliamentary opposition (of which the majority were peasants), but liberal by any other European standard. Still, the experience of Norway’s union with Sweden since 1814 left most Norwegian Scandinavianists unwilling to accept unification on any other terms than full national equality, let alone a progressive constitutional arrangement.⁴³ Indeed, the complicated history of the Swedish-Norwegian union and perpetual suspicion of alleged Swedish aims to “amalgamate” the two nations ultimately made Scandinavianists in Norway turn against each other.⁴⁴ Still, there were some who accepted that the Norwegians would not have the final say in the question of Scandinavian unification. The editor Ludvig Kristensen Daa acknowledged in 1857 that it was “on Denmark and Sweden the question mostly depends,” at a time when Scandinavian unification was seriously considered in Stockholm, Copenhagen, Paris, London and Berlin.⁴⁵

The Crimean War

The international order established at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 was designed to prevent war between the major powers and succeeded in doing so until Britain and France went to war against Russia in 1854. The subsequent allied operations on the Crimea were in part a consequence of the reluctance of Sweden-Norway and Denmark to engage in an assault on Russia from the Baltic Sea. It was not for lack of French and British efforts to induce the Scandinavian governments to join them, but King Oscar, though interested, was reluctant to commit in lieu of firm guarantees for manpower and subsidies. The Danish government was paralysed by domestic strife, the pressure of allied courting and Russia’s virtual superintendence of the monarchy and unitary state, as well as uncertainty as to Prussia’s and Austria’s course of action.⁴⁶

Scandinavian historiography, centred on Sweden–Norway and Denmark respectively, has largely ignored the Scandinavian and, hence, Scandinavianist dimension to the political options available to Sweden–Norway and Denmark during the Crimean War.⁴⁷ The efforts to bring the Scandinavian countries into the war for the purpose of unification involved several key Scandinavianists with close relations to the courts at Stockholm and Copenhagen, suggesting a greater level of continuity between their efforts in 1848 and the era of “dynastic Scandinavianism” from 1856 than what has hitherto been acknowledged.⁴⁸

Most liberal Europeans and Scandinavians welcomed war against Russia as an ideological showdown. In taking discrete steps towards war King Oscar reconnected with liberal Scandinavianists in Sweden in an attempt to influence public opinion through media propaganda similar to 1848–49.⁴⁹ Media campaigns were extended into France and Britain in a bid to sway public opinion and make their cabinets receptive to Scandinavian interests. Whereas the Norwegians were, on the whole, not inclined to go to war, the Danish national liberal opposition saw the Crimean War as an opportunity to strike a blow against both the unitary state and Russia and, hence, the heir presumptive, widely perceived as a Russian dependent. In Sweden, many saw the Crimean War as a means to regain Finland, lost to Russia in 1809. Some Scandinavianists made a case for a Scandinavian union comprising Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland.⁵⁰ This idea was most expressively voiced by the exiled Finnish writer Emil von Qvanten, who later became a central figure in the Scandinavianist movement and the court in Stockholm.⁵¹

Despite the secrecy surrounding their efforts, there is plenty of circumstantial evidence to suggest that there were connections and coordination between the court in Stockholm and influential Scandinavianists, who had secret connections of their own. The Danish merchant magnate and Scandinavianist Alfred Hage used his contacts within the British cabinet to seek an avenue to Scandinavian unification in return for Danish commitment to the allied war effort. Secret envoys were also working on behalf of the Scandinavian courts to convince emperor Napoleon III of the same. Both the Danish and Swedish–Norwegian governments were left in the dark as the Scandinavianist movement worked in tandem with the courts to plunge Scandinavia into war with Russia in return for allied support for Scandinavian union.⁵²

By the summer of 1855 the efforts of the royal envoys and Scandinavianist propaganda appeared to make dividends, as the British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston, alarmed by alleged Russian designs in Finnmark, prepared to offer Sweden–Norway a treaty of integrity as a first step towards an offensive alliance.⁵³ British diplomats reported that the Danish king had assured France that he would follow Sweden–Norway into war.⁵⁴ Frederick VII detested his presumptive successor and seemed prepared to join Sweden–Norway and the allies in war against Russia.⁵⁵

This tied perfectly in not only with Scandinavianist designs but also King Oscar’s ongoing negotiations with London and Paris as regards the treaty of

integrity. In September 1855 he privately raised the question of King Frederick's ill-health and pondered whether, in the event of Frederick's death, the Danish throne would pass to himself.⁵⁶ Sweden-Norway's treaty of integrity was agreed with Britain and France in November and presented by Oscar to his government as a *fait accompli* intended as a launching pad for Sweden-Norway's entry into the war. Notably, negotiations for Sweden-Norway's military contribution always included a 16 000 strong Danish contingent, as did internal allied discussions.⁵⁷ Oscar obviously knew – as did the Scandinavianists – that Sweden-Norway's entry into the war could force Denmark to follow suit and eject the unitary statist government from office in favour of the Scandinavianist national liberals.⁵⁸

In early January 1856 Sweden-Norway looked poised to join the allies. On 6 January the prominent Danish national liberal politician, D.G. Monrad, declared that “now is the time when one, in the event of war, could and should bring the Scandinavian realm into existence.”⁵⁹ Even though the British government was non-committal, the British envoy to Copenhagen, Andrew Buchanan, remarked privately that Britain would have no qualms about Scandinavian unification.⁶⁰ Nor would Napoleon III, but the emperor was also interested in ending the Crimean War to restore and exploit benevolent relations with St. Petersburg rather than antagonising Russia further. This, as well as the prospect of an expanded allied coalition, contributed to Tsar Alexander II accepting peace negotiations. The news, delivered in Stockholm on 17 January, stunned Oscar, who had placed his bets on the war to continue.⁶¹ With only a treaty of integrity of questionable value to show for his hostile intent towards Russia, Oscar had to reconsider his foreign policy. Denmark, meanwhile, had antagonised none of the great powers, but not befriended any of them either, which left the country in increasing international isolation.

A new foundation for Scandinavia

“Russia is not sulking, she is gathering her strength,” foreign secretary elect Alexander Gorchakov quipped after the Congress of Paris in the spring of 1856.⁶² Aware of having incurred Russian wrath King Oscar concluded that a “new foundation must be laid for the political future of the United Kingdoms [Sweden and Norway]” and that a “*political* union is the only salvation for the Nordic countries!”⁶³ This was borne out of wider geopolitical considerations. Denmark's conflict with Prussia and Austria over Schleswig and Holstein was escalating, and the prospect of having the German border run in the Great Belt or the Sound was considered a vital threat to Sweden-Norway. What was more, the Russophile inclinations of the unitary statist Danish government and Prince Christian could possibly lead to the re-emergence of the Danish-Russian alliance that had bedevilled Sweden for almost half a century up until the later stages of the Napoleonic Wars.⁶⁴

Consequently, King Oscar advanced his relations with the Scandinavianist movement, whose hopes and efforts were redoubled, to say nothing of their faith

in a dynastic union as the key to unification. In June 1856 Oscar hosted some 1 300 participants in a Scandinavian student gathering as a symbol of official embrace. At the same time, he strengthened his personal relations with Frederick VII, who was by now openly looking to Stockholm for his successor.⁶⁵ However, caught between traditional dynastic thinking and modern nationalism, Frederick was reluctant to shed the German parts of his realm even for the sake of an altered succession, let alone Scandinavianism.⁶⁶

While the Bernadotte family courted Frederick and made overtures to Napoleon III in 1856, the Scandinavianist movement launched yet another propaganda campaign to convince the Western public and governments of the benefits of a united Scandinavia. The campaign raised sufficient awareness to be brought up in diplomatic exchanges between Paris and London. Napoleon III was still highly interested, but not prepared to push the matter and further upset his relations with the more reluctant British government, still reeling from the abrupt end to the Crimean War and France's reconciliation with Russia.⁶⁷ Yet, he did press the matter in discussions with the Prussian diplomat Otto von Bismarck, who shared interest in a Scandinavian union as a possible solution to the conflict over the duchies. It appears that the two were thinking in terms of the annexation of the duchies to Prussia and of Denmark proper to Sweden.⁶⁸ This is also what Lord Clarendon, the British foreign minister, appears to have suggested to Napoleon.⁶⁹ As always, the precise territorial, constitutional and dynastic terms of a Scandinavian union were contested, but the crux of the matter was that France, Britain and Prussia were principally open to the idea, whereas Austria was indifferent and Russia opposed to it, but seriously weakened. Having conferred with the Prussian king and foreign minister, Bismarck travelled to Copenhagen and Southern Sweden in the summer of 1857 to sound out the Scandinavianists as to their plans. He returned unimpressed, but still saw Scandinavianism as potentially beneficial to Prussian interests.⁷⁰

While visiting Frederick VII in September 1856, Crown Prince Charles met Carl Ploug, still spearhead of the Scandinavianist movement, and invited him to submit a plan for unification.⁷¹ In December both Ploug and Sturzen-Becker submitted memoranda to King Oscar outlining "an offensive and defensive alliance as *means* to arrive at the union as the *goal*."⁷² As usual Oscar weighed his options carefully and vacillated, keeping his ministers out of the loop. But a health scare on the part of Frederick VII and the sensational publication in January 1857 of a pamphlet by C.F. Blixen-Finecke, an eager Danish-Swedish aristocrat and Scandinavianist and, notably, Prince Christian's brother-in-law, made Oscar act from fear that the premature death of the fragile Frederick would allow Christian to close the lid on Scandinavian unification.⁷³ The Danish foreign minister L.N. Scheele, a staunch defender of the unitary state, was quick to dismiss Scandinavianism and all its works, adding diplomatic insult by noting that surely King Oscar shared his sentiments. However, Oscar thought otherwise. In March he offered Denmark an alliance through which he would firmly commit Sweden-Norway to the defence of Schleswig, which had been out of the

question in 1848. This offer was entirely in line with Ploug and Sturzen-Becker's plan for unification. Oscar even confided to his envoy to Copenhagen that he regarded himself as "too honest to completely disregard my dynastic interest" and alluded to the alliance as the fundament of a dynastic union to be followed by further integration.⁷⁴ This was a close to an admission of overt Scandinavianist plans that the otherwise highly secretive Oscar ever came.

Frederick was about to accept the offer, and even had a draft of his welcoming reply at hand, when it struck him that it would be wise to consult his Holstein-born foreign minister Scheele, who also happened to be a close friend. Scheele struck a chord with his king when he pointed out that Holstein was not included in the terms of the alliance. Scheele was thus left to pen Frederick's official reply and enquire about Holstein, prompting a negative reply from Stockholm, where Holstein was considered as much of an anathema as it was by the Scandinavianists, who advocated a German-Scandinavian border along the river Eider separating Schleswig and Holstein. Oscar's offer stood as it was, but as Frederick reconsidered it, long-standing tensions with Scheele at their heart caused his government to collapse. In its vacuum, while national liberals and conservatives competed for power during a politically tense few weeks, Frederick opted to consult the newly resigned Scheele. Neither Scheele nor Frederick's other confidants were inclined to sacrifice any part of the realm. Nor was Frederick himself. King Oscar's offer was thus rejected.⁷⁵ Only a little more than three weeks later, on 13 May, Carl Christian Hall formed a national liberal cabinet which would happily have accepted the Swedish-Norwegian offer even if it had required bending the king's ear. In the time leading up to Hall's appointment, Oscar's heirs even spoke of joining a revolution in Denmark in the event of the formation of a conservative unitary statist government, knowing that the future of Scandinavianism hinged on the outcome of the crisis of government.⁷⁶

With Hall having entered the government it did not take long for the question of the alliance to be revived through Alfred Hage's Swedish connections, only for chance and circumstance to play their part yet again. In June, King Oscar was left incapacitated by a brain tumour. Although the Crown Prince regent Charles was an avid Scandinavianist, he was preoccupied with the ongoing session of the *Riksdag* and the formation of a new Swedish government, as well as concerns over Franco-Russian rapprochement. The conservative aristocrat Henning Hamilton, Charles' confidant and largely the architect behind the reshuffled Swedish government, went very far in assuring Hage that a Danish proposal would be welcomed, prompting Hall to make one such in November 1857. However, in consulting his envoy to Paris and foreign minister-elect, Ludvig Manderström, Charles was advised to leave the Danish proposal be.⁷⁷ The irony is thus that a Danish proposal in the autumn of 1857 for an alliance with a view to a future union was rejected by a foreign minister yet to be appointed, whereas a similar Swedish-Norwegian offer in the spring had essentially been rejected by a foreign minister having just resigned. Chance and circumstance certainly did play part in determining the course of political Scandinavianism.

Perspective

Editing his diary, the Danish professor of law and minister of the interior as of 1857, Andreas Frederik Krieger, added a retrospective remark to his entry for 12 April 1848:

The Swedish policy in 1848 is a riddle. Long after, in 1856, they turn Scandinavian; whether one wanted to be that in 1848 and could not, or if one could have after all, is a point of contention. [D.G] Monrad has always asserted that one could not in 1848, but if the war in 1856 had not ended, the time would have come.⁷⁸

It may seem like a chance remark tinged by hindsight, but it was a profound observation. Even contemporaries regarded the time of the Crimean War as a crucial window of opportunity. Speaking to the Scandinavian student gathering in Copenhagen in 1862, Carl Ploug described the rejection of the treaty offered by Sweden-Norway in 1857 as “the greatest stupidity and greatest sin the Danish government ever committed.”⁷⁹ By then the question of a Scandinavian alliance and union had been revived, but Ploug had little faith in the ability of Charles, now king, to see it through.

Still, a number of circumstances had made Scandinavianism come closer to political fruition in 1856–57 than later, and even in 1848. In the first place, France, Britain and Prussia were principally open to the idea of Scandinavian union in 1856–57, even to the point of active support, whereas Russia had been defeated and was hardly in a position to oppose it, at least as compared to 1848. Indeed, in the event of Scandinavian participation in the Crimean War it is highly likely that the pressure for Scandinavian unification would have mounted and been subject to negotiations among the great powers. Secondly, Oscar I was a stronger and more authoritarian monarch than Charles, who by 1863 was virtually being held hostage by his government, with several vehement anti-Scandinavianists within its ranks. The level of personal control over foreign and even domestic policy exerted by Oscar was beyond the means and capacity of his successor. Thirdly, despite his reluctance to cede part of his realm, Frederick was much more inclined to accept Scandinavian unification than his successor, who ascended to the Danish throne in November 1863 as Christian IX.

The historian A.J.P. Taylor asserted in his autobiography that “most things in history happen by accident.”⁸⁰ Although the outcome of the question of Scandinavian unification was not decided by mere accident, circumstance, individuals and timing did matter in determining the outcome of the political efforts to unite Scandinavia. This is not to belittle the structural challenges facing Scandinavianism, let alone its cultural dimension. Even if unification could have been presented as a political *fait accompli* concluded by monarchs and ministers with backing from most of the great powers, it is difficult to see how unification – even in the era of *Realpolitik* – could have been accomplished without unequivocal support from governments and consent from the respective parliaments in

Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Even then a union may well have suffered the same fate as the Swedish–Norwegian union and Czechoslovakia. But these are at best arguments against the longer-term viability of a Scandinavian union, not its creation in the first place.

Support for Scandinavianism appears to have been most widespread and influential in Denmark, owing much to the prospect for help in the struggle with Prussia and Austria and acute fear of national annihilation. The Norwegian government was reported in 1862 as essentially being split in half in its attitude to Scandinavianism, whereas a narrow majority in the Norwegian parliament expressed its misgivings in both 1848 and 1864. In any event, botched attempts to reform the union with Sweden in the 1850s reveal the extent of Norwegian reservations. In Sweden, Scandinavianism was arguably at its peak in 1848 and during the Crimean War. Scandinavian unification was supported by highly influential politicians, even if their views on the terms and nature of Scandinavian union differed. With Oscar I in firmer control of his government than his successor Charles XV, the question of Danish succession was still very much a matter of contention. With interest from France, Britain and Prussia in a changing international political climate, the conclusion of a Scandinavian alliance in 1856–57, to say nothing of a common war effort in 1848, would at the very least have confronted the Scandinavian countries with options and circumstances different to those that contributed to the demise of political Scandinavianism in the 1860s. It would also have influenced the greater powers. Yet even in the 1860s crossroads appeared, where the course of political Scandinavianism hinged on the decisions and influence of individuals. As such the windows of opportunity for Scandinavian unification were not predetermined failures of the kind long maintained by several Scandinavian historians. Nor was unification a historical necessity thwarted merely by chance and misfortune. Above all Scandinavian unification was a future past envisaged and pursued by several leading political decision-makers of the day and must be taken seriously as such.

Notes

- 1 *Protocoll åren 1847 och 1848*, 76.
- 2 See also the Johnsen's contribution to this volume.
- 3 Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 31; Salvemini, *Mazzini*, 176.
- 4 Evans, *The Pursuit of Power*, 266.
- 5 Kohn, *Pan-Slavism*; Orton, *The Prague Slav Congress*; Vick, *Defining Germany*, 59–60, 64, 76, 175, 192–99; Glenthoj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*, 45, 137, 141 ff.
- 6 Maxwell, "Pan-Nationalism," 10 ff. On pan-Slavism, see also Petrungraro's contribution to this volume.
- 7 Sanness, *Patrioter*; Becker-Christensen, *Skandinaviske drømme*; Danstrup, "Den politiske Skandinavisme."
- 8 Macmillan, *History's People*, especially chapters 1 and 3.
- 9 For several examples: Glenthoj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*, 29.

- 10 Becker-Christensen, *Skandinaviske drømme*; Clausen, *Skandinavismen*, 36, 38, 69–70; Hallendorff, *Illusioner*, 30–31, 65, 131–32, 137–38; Berg, *Profesjon – Union – Nasjon*, 170; Vammen, *Den tomme stat*, 173 ff, 183.
- 11 Stråth, *Sveriges Historia*, 115.
- 12 Typologies: Clausen, *Skandinavismen*; Thorkildsen, “Skandinavismen,” 202–203; Seip, *Ole Jacob Broch*, 288.
- 13 Stråth, *Union og demokrati*, 172 ff, 192 ff, 202–222; Seip, *Utsikt*, 39; Clausen, *Skandinavismen*, 72–73, 116–18, 138; Hallendorff, *Illusioner*, 127, 129; Rerup, “Fra litterær til politisk nationalisme,” 331; Møller, *Skandinavisk stræben*, 182.
- 14 Glenthøj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*, 25 ff, 30–32, 528–40.
- 15 Sanness, *Patrioter*, 74–75, 326 f, 563, 565; Danstrup, “Den politiske Skandinavisme,” 255 (quote), 282; Becker-Christensen, *Skandinaviske drømme*, 181–85; Norberg, *Den svenska liberalismen*, 126–27; Borell, *De Svenska liberalerna*, 232.
- 16 Swedish National Archives. E5680. Vol. 6. Ploug to Sturzen-Becker 18 and 19 January 1848; Larsen, “Et par mindeblade,” 377.
- 17 Fink, *Admiralstatsplanen*; Glenthøj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*, 139 ff, 197 ff.
- 18 Holmberg, *Skandinavismen*, 133–44; Glenthøj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*, 221–35.
- 19 Swedish National Archives. E5680. Vol. 4. Munck to Sturzen-Becker 11 May 1848.
- 20 Sturzen-Becker, *Oskar Patrick Sturzen-Becker*, 144–46.
- 21 Glenthøj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*, 36 ff, 127 f, 133, 199
- 22 Swedish National Archives. E5680. Vol. 6. Ploug to Sturzen-Becker 20 April 1848.
- 23 Johnsen, “P.A. Munchs forhold,” 122.
- 24 Collins, “Time-Bubbles.”
- 25 *Storthings-Forhandlinger 1848*, 50.
- 26 Clausen, *Skandinavismen*, 114.
- 27 Danstrup, “Den politiske Skandinavisme,” 266–67; Trap, *Erindringer*, 64–65; Löfgren, *Danska frågan*, 51–54, 64–69; Becker-Christensen, *Skandinaviske drømme*, 203, 218–23; Holmberg, *Skandinavismen*, 131, 140, 173–76. See also Egorov’s contribution to this volume.
- 28 Clausen, *Skandinavismen*, 114; Lundh, “Skandinavism och liberalism,” 287–88; Danstrup, “Den politiske skandinavisme,” 266–68, 275, 277–78; Holmberg, *Skandinavismen*, 188–90; Becker-Christensen, *Skandinaviske drømme*, 211–18, 251, 255; Friisberg, *Lehmann*, 180–81.
- 29 Stråth, *Sveriges Historia*, 111.
- 30 Fejtö, “Conclusion,” 423; Sperber, *European Revolutions*, 225 ff, 229; Schroeder, *Transformation*, 799–800.
- 31 Krohg, *Kjærlighed og krig*, 146; Sturzen-Becker, *Oskar Patrick Sturzen-Becker*, 161–62.
- 32 Kumar, “Nationalism and revolution,” 210 ff.
- 33 Hjelholt, *British Mediation*, 123.
- 34 Lundqvist, *Slesvig-holsteinska frågan*, 14 ff.
- 35 Holmberg, *Skandinavismen*, 224–26; Eriksson, *Carl XV*, 239–40; Hallendorff, *Illusioner*, 23; Trap, *Erindringer*, 212; Danish National Archives. Kongehuset. Frederik 7. Vol. 9:2. Frederick VII to Charles, undated draft, attached to Charles to Frederick 15 December 1852.
- 36 Gasslander, *Gripenstedt*, 60–61; Murray-Miller, *Revolutionary Europe*, 175–76, 84; Rapport, “1848 Revolutions,” 274.
- 37 Key (ed.), *Minnen*, 242–43; Eriksson, *Carl XV*, 411; Gellermann, *S.A. Hedlund*, 25 ff.
- 38 Lyttelton, *National Question*, 98 ff; Grew, *Sterner Plan*, 36–37; Schulze, *German Nationalism*, 94 ff.
- 39 Danish National Archives. PA-6138. A.I. 1. Sohlman to Ploug 15 December 1863; Royal Library, Stockholm. Sohlmans samling. L10:3. Sohlman to Rosenmüller 23 February 1864.
- 40 Danish National Archives. PA-05424, 76. Lehmann to Hage 13 March 1861.

- 41 Royal Library, Stockholm. Sohlmans samling. L10:2. Ploug to Sohlman 3 March 1863.
- 42 Glenthøj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*, 488–99.
- 43 Royal Library, Stockholm. Sohlmans samling. L10:2. Krohg to Sohlman 31 January 1862.
- 44 Glenthøj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*, 512 ff.
- 45 Royal Library, Stockholm. Sohlmans samling. L10:2. Daa to Sohlman 15 October 1857.
- 46 Overview: Rath, *Crimean War*. Sweden-Norway: Eriksson, *Svensk diplomati*. Denmark: Halicz, *Danish Neutrality*. Synthesis: Glenthøj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*, 275–92.
- 47 Kaartvedt, *Unionen med Sverige*, 246, 271 ff, 281–87; Stråth, *Sveriges Historia*, 94, 112 ff; Stråth, *Union och demokrati*, 198, 210 ff; Halicz, *Danish Neutrality*, 9–11.
- 48 1856 is often regarded as a watershed for so-called dynastic Scandinavianism, cf. Thorkildsen, “Skandinavismen,” 202; Seip, *Ole Jacob Broch*, 288, 342 ff.
- 49 Eriksson, *Svensk diplomati*, cf. Holmberg, *Skandinavismen*, 140 ff.
- 50 Glenthøj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*, 93, 526.
- 51 Särkilax, *Fennomani och Skandinavism*; Bååth-Holmberg, *Skaldedrommar*, 43 ff. See also Björk-Winberg and Egorov’s contribution to this volume.
- 52 Glenthøj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*, 284–92.
- 53 Berg, “Russofobiens rotter,” 53 ff; Berg, *Profesjon – Union – Nasjon*, 158 ff; Eriksson, *Svensk diplomati*, 7, 148 ff, 154 ff.
- 54 Schoubye, *Neutralitets- og forfatningspolitik*, 224–27; Halicz, *Danish Neutrality*, 155–57.
- 55 Glenthøj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*, 289 ff.
- 56 Eriksson, *Svensk diplomati*, 283–84.
- 57 Anderson, “Scandinavian Area,” 271; Halicz, *Danish Neutrality*, 164–71.
- 58 Halicz, *Danish Neutrality*, 172 ff; Eriksson, *Svensk diplomati*, 285 ff.
- 59 Krieger, *Dagbøger*, 177.
- 60 Møller, “Skandinaviske Planer,” 44–46.
- 61 Swedish Royal Archives. Oscar I:s och Drottning Josefinas arkiv. No. 36. Entry for 17 January 1856; Rath, *Crimean War*, 196 f; Holmberg, *Skandinavismen*, 257 f; Eriksson, *Svensk diplomati*, 284–85, 353–56, 368–71; Halicz, *Danish Neutrality*, 180–81; Stråth, *Sveriges Historia*, 114.
- 62 Lyons, *Post-Revolutionary Europe*, 243.
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- 64 Møller, *Skandinavisk stræben*, 27–29; Anderson, “Scandinavian Area,” 274–75; Eriksson, *Svensk diplomati*, 374–75, 379; Holmberg, *Skandinavismen*, 255–60; Eriksson, “Sista propaganda,” 668.
- 65 Glenthøj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*, 298–307.
- 66 Swedish Royal Archives. Oscar I:s och Drottning Josefinas arkiv. No. 37. Frederick VII to Oscar I 3 December 1856.
- 67 Møller, “Skandinaviske Planer,” 42–51.
- 68 Frahm, “Die Bismarcksche Lösung,” 347–53.
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- 70 Hedin, *Skandinaviska alliansfrågan*, 20–21; Frahm, “Die Bismarcksche Lösung,” 353–54; Møller, “Skandinaviske Planer,” 64–65; Møller, *Skandinavisk stræben*, 88 ff; Bismarck, *Reflections and reminiscences*, 214–16; Friis, “Blixen Finecke og Bismarck,” 366 f.
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- 78 Krieger, *Dagbøger*, 115.
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- 80 Taylor, *Personal History*, 104.

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4

HIGHWATER FOR POLITICAL SCANDINAVIANISM, 1863–1865

Rasmus Glenthøj

According to the master narrative about Scandinavianism and the writing of national histories in the Scandinavian countries,¹ political Scandinavianists have been seen as romantic “dreamers” and the idea of a Scandinavian union as a utopia. According to the historiography, their politics was built on a combination of illusion and idealism that Europe’s great powers would never be able to support. Such arguments and that rhetoric can be traced directly back to their political opponents, the so-called anti-Scandinavianists. The master narrative was not plucked out of thin air. When we look at the celebratory after-dinner speeches at the Scandinavian student gatherings in the 1840s, we can see how elements of the Scandinavianists’ philosophy of history were clearly inspired by German romanticism.

The fact that Scandinavian historians have been able to find sources that confirm a pre-existing perception and are apparently able to explain the history that came to pass (i.e. the downfall of Scandinavianism) may explain why they have overlooked all those sources that contradict their arguments and conclusions. They have overlooked the fact that political Scandinavianism was formed to a far greater extent by a fear of annihilation that gave rise to what political scientists call realism.

An age of iron

The origin of the state was, as a Norwegian Scandinavianist wrote, fear,² and their aim was to survive in an anarchic world in which it was the strongest who survived. The problem was that, individually, the Scandinavian states were too small and too weak. For that reason, they had to unify their resources to secure that survival. This was the perception that reflects the core of a “realistic” view of international politics.³

Scandinavianism has traditionally been associated with liberalism, and seen from today's perspective it can be difficult, therefore, to understand how a liberal movement embraced a "realistic" view of international politics. The explanation is twofold. In the first place, the movement also consisted of conservative and radical elements, but it is true that it was dominated by liberals.⁴ Secondly, nineteenth-century liberalism, as a political ideology, was crucially different from that of today. For European liberals of the time, political freedom was reserved for individuals with capacity (i.e. resources), in other words, people who could think and act independently.⁵

Precisely the same thought runs again in the Scandinavianist view of European politics that found expression particularly in the 1850s and 1860s. As the Scandinavianists saw it, no state was completely independent, but small states in particular had extremely limited independence. This meant that, by giving up some part of their sovereignty to a federation or a union, small states could in truth achieve greater independence than they had individually.⁶

If Scandinavianist rhetoric changed its tune, becoming both darker and more pragmatic, it was because the inability to unite Scandinavia during the First Schleswig War and the failure of European revolutions set alongside the Crimean War and the unification of Italy had altered the scope of their expectations. Of these factors, the last three influenced other policies right across Europe. Liberals and conservatives became more closely aligned. Belief in an international order and in treaties faded, while realism became the order of the day in international politics paving the way for the unification of Italy and Germany.

In this light it is not remarkable how the optimism to be found in Scandinavianism in the 1840s is replaced by a rhetoric clad in armour and a realism that increasingly becomes dystopian. A good example of the latter is the exchange of letters between the former Danish interior minister, Hans Rasmussen Carlsen, and the Swedish and Norwegian heir apparent, Prince Oscar (II).⁷ They regarded the unification of Scandinavia as a precondition for the survival of the Scandinavian peoples, while an alliance between a unified Scandinavia and Germany was necessary if the Germanic peoples were to survive the battle against the Slav peoples led by Russia.

Political Scandinavianism as a realistic theory was, however, most clearly expounded by the Norwegian historian and politician Michael Birkeland who, on Norway's national day, 17 May 1864, spoke in support both of the united kingdoms of Sweden and Norway going to war for Denmark and of a Scandinavian union. He built his argument on "the idea of Nationality." The striving of nations for independence constituted the strongest political principle of the time, but for Birkeland the nationality principle meant something else than it does for us today. After the peoples had been given their freedom and autonomy, "a craving for political amalgamation between closely related" nationalities had made itself felt. Just as the principle of national unification had proved to be a lever to promote economic development, the link between closely related peoples was a source of military and political strength, spiritual unity and material prosperity.⁸

Birkeland's thinking captures what the British historian Eric Hobsbawm has called the "threshold principle." For Hobsbawm, nationalism and the creation of nation-states were two sides of the same coin. But, unlike other students of nationalism, he recognised that in the mid-nineteenth century the nationalist principle was restricted to those nations that either had created or could create large states. According to their way of thinking, small states did not have the necessary political, military, economic or cultural resources to survive or to contribute positively to the development of history. The essence of the threshold principle was that a nation had to have sufficient size to be capable of surviving and developing. If it fell beneath the threshold, the nation had no legitimacy. For that reason, national self-determination should be restricted to large states. Consequently, to avoid annihilation smaller and related nations had to unite to survive.⁹

Along the same lines, the German historian Dieter Langewiesche has argued that nations should be seen as a community of resources and defence. This can clearly be seen in Birkeland, who believed that he was living in "an age of iron." Industrial developments had led to military innovation that left the small states proportionately weaker. Norway did not have the resources to defend itself, so their Danish brother nation was their natural ally. If Denmark lost its independence, Norway's existence would be threatened. This was not simply due to the indissoluble bonds that existed between the cultures of the two peoples but also because, if Denmark became German, that would constitute a political and military threat to the rest of the Nordic countries. An annihilation of Denmark risked becoming the national annihilation of the Nordic people.¹⁰

If particular emphasis is placed here on Birkeland's words, it is not because they mark themselves out as being different but because they do not. The Norwegian's views are echoed by Swedish and Danish Scandinavianists, whose view of the world was imbued with the threshold principle, realism and fear of annihilation. It is, however, no accident that it was Norwegian academics like Birkeland, Daa and men like the Swedish-speaking Finn Emil von Qvanten who were in the service of the monarch in Stockholm who provided the best description of the ideological basis of political Scandinavianism. While the threat to Denmark's existence was real enough, that to Norway's was abstract. This made it necessary to provide the comprehensive argumentation that was to be found by historians like Birkeland. And when men like von Qvanten wrote actual dissertations about the ideological basis of Scandinavianism, they had the backing of the monarchy to direct their writing towards a European public.

Political Scandinavianism was not only ideologically but also politically a child of its time. It is simply wrong, therefore, when the master narrative within Scandinavian historiography claims that a Scandinavian union was made impossible by the opposition of the great powers. Quite the contrary, several of them were actively working to promote it.

The idea of sharing the unitary state (the Kingdom of Denmark and the duchies of Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg) with Sweden had been recurrent

in Prussian foreign policy since the Napoleonic Wars, and, as mentioned in Ottosen's contribution, Bismarck began to show interest in Scandinavianism no later than 1857. In the years that followed, there were countless occasions on which Prussia proposed a solution to the Schleswig question to France, Great Britain and Sweden-Norway by having Denmark become part of a unified Scandinavia while the duchies would devolve to Prussia. The degree to which Schleswig should be partitioned was an open question. A solution along these lines had already been discussed between Paris and London. Napoleon III consistently supported the idea. The liberal British government was open to it, at least until 1860, after which the foreign minister Lord Russell increasingly distanced himself from it. On the other hand, Queen Victoria suggested in January 1864 that the Schleswig question should be resolved through a dynastic union between the Danish, Swedish and Norwegian monarchies. Austria and Russia were opposed to a unified Scandinavia. For them, the continued existence of the unitary state was a European necessity.¹¹

The alliance

According to the Danish council president C.C. Hall, Denmark stood "at a crossroads" in 1863. If they retained the unitary state, the country would become a German puppet state and risk the re-introduction of absolutism. The alternative was a national and "Scandinavian policy." According to Hall, failure to act would lead to the dissolution of the state.¹² On 30 March 1863, the Danish government crossed the Rubicon. Holstein and Lauenburg were partially separated from the unitary state by being given autonomy in almost all their internal affairs. On 9 July, the German Confederation declared that in taking this action Denmark had contravened the rights of the German duchies and was preparing to incorporate Schleswig into the kingdom. They demanded that the March declaration be withdrawn. If this did not happen, Holstein and Lauenburg would be occupied while all appropriate measures would be taken in Schleswig.

Formally, these threats were issued because, according to the German interpretation, Denmark had broken the agreements that had been entered into after the First Schleswig War. How far this was formally correct has been disputed. On the other hand, the year before Prussia and Austria had demanded a solution that infringed the agreements entered into by insisting that Schleswig and Holstein should be united and Schleswig become a member of the German Confederation. There were four reasons for the Danish government not withdrawing the declaration as demanded.¹³

- 1) The rising in Poland in January 1863 meant that the focus of the great powers and the confederation temporarily shifted away from the duchies. This reduced for the time being the risk of a new Schleswig war.
- 2) The Danish government was prepared, if necessary, to make use of a *short* war to induce European conciliation. The government knew that the war

- could not be won and that it would lead to loss of territory. But it was prepared to give up the German duchies and probably also parts of Schleswig.
- 3) To satisfy Germany without partitioning Schleswig was extremely difficult, but neither the Danish king nor the population as a whole would accept such a partition in peacetime. This meant that partitioning Schleswig required either a war or a diktat issued by the European great powers, and this required that European involvement of this kind to be provoked.
 - 4) If it was felt, as several of the government's ministers did, that a unified Scandinavia was a precondition for Denmark's lasting security, this would in all likelihood require a war, as in the case of Italy, or a new European order following a European Congress.

Sweden-Norway's foreign minister Ludvig Manderström had prevented a Scandinavian alliance on several occasions, but he had never in principle ruled it out. On the contrary, he had pledged Swedish-Norwegian support in the event of a war. Manderström and Charles XV agreed that a precondition for support was that Denmark should separate off Holstein. While the king regarded this separation as a step on the way towards a Scandinavian war of unification in which Holstein was ceded to Prussia, his minister believed that it might lead to a diplomatic solution. Independent of these various motives, it was the Swedish-Norwegian press that caused Hall in March 1863 to partially separate off Holstein. This was presumably followed by assurances from the council president in June, which weakened Manderström's opposition to an alliance and strengthened Charles's determination to enter into it.

On 22 June, the two Scandinavian kings met north of Copenhagen, where Charles XV promised Frederick VII and Hall an alliance on condition that Holstein would not be defended. According to the king, this took place with the agreement of Manderström. How far this is correct is a matter of conjecture, but, in contrast to his former position, the foreign minister chose to accept the agreement. A draft treaty was negotiated and concluded by Hall and Hamilton, after which Manderström himself negotiated the final details in Copenhagen. While the Norwegian government was kept in ignorance, several Swedish ministers, including the Minister of Justice Louis De Geer (*de facto* prime minister), were informed. Even though they did not necessarily support it, they accepted the king's policy for the time being.¹⁴

Scandinavianist policy was given further backing when Denmark, with the support of Sweden-Norway, rejected the German Confederation's ultimatum. Instead of withdrawing the March declaration, the Hall government was preparing to make a liberal revision of the constitution of the unitary state. The constitution had been created in 1855 but applied only to Denmark and Schleswig, since, at the insistence of the confederation, it had been revoked for Holstein and Lauenburg in 1858. The revision altered nothing in constitutional law. The German duchies could choose to subscribe to it and Schleswig was not incorporated into Denmark. If the latter was nevertheless claimed by the German side,

it was because the reform cemented a *de facto* Denmark to the Eider and made a compromise with the conservative German duchies difficult. The constitution, which was approved with a narrow majority on Friday 13 November, has often been singled out as the cause of the outbreak of war the following year. The truth, however, is that on 1 October the German Confederation had already passed a resolution to occupy Holstein and was threatening to do the same to Schleswig.¹⁵

Prince Oscar (II), however, was conducting negotiations with German middle states about a solution that involved a unified Scandinavia. At the same time, secret negotiations left Denmark, Great Britain and Sweden-Norway with the impression that Prussia was prepared to go along with European conciliation and accept a *de facto* unification of Denmark and Schleswig. Posterity has emphasised, rightly, that Bismarck was pulling the wool over his adversary's eyes but overestimated the significance of his trap.¹⁶

The Danes knew that they were risking war, but they hoped that the threat of it looming on the horizon could force friendly conciliation from the Western powers. This was dependent on there being unity between London and Paris. Prospects for this faded during the autumn of 1863, since the British and the French found themselves disagreeing on the Polish question. Without the threat of French intervention, Lord Russell's diplomacy was not taken seriously in Germany, and it was further undermined by the emperor's attempts to reach an understanding with Berlin or Vienna about a new map of Europe without reference to the British.¹⁷

When this failed, Napoleon III proposed a European Congress that was to create a Europe of nations by resolving the continent's four major issues: Poland, Italy, the duchies on the Danube and the Danish-German conflict. British opposition, however, sabotaged this project. It ruined relations between the Western powers. Franco-British collaboration became impossible as long as Lord Russell was foreign minister, the risk of a European war increased, and Napoleon III discussed once again with Berlin the possibility of partitioning the unitary state between Prussia and a united Scandinavia.¹⁸

At this point, both the entire Swedish and the Norwegian governments had been made acquainted with the Scandinavian alliance.¹⁹ While the latter were equally divided on the question, a majority in the former were opposed. Opposition culminated for the time being on 8 September at Ulriksdal, where, according to the traditional narrative, the Minister of Finance Johan August Gripenstedt and Louis De Geer ensured that the alliance was dead and buried. However, if we look at the contemporary sources, it is clear that the alliance did not die at Ulriksdal. A compromise was agreed whereby the decision was postponed until the Western powers had made their views clear. When their responses signalled procrastination, attempts were made on the Swedish-Norwegian side to force Hall either to relinquish the alliance or to water it down. The Danish council president rejected the former but accepted the latter since the aim of the alliance was to a lesser degree military. It was about

sending a message to the outside world that there was a common Scandinavian front. Despite the widespread opposition, the view in both the Swedish and the Norwegian governments at the beginning of November was that the alliance would be ratified. However, events took an unexpected turn.

The death of Frederick VII and the downfall of Hall

On 15 November 1863, Frederick VII died. This was the last of the Oldenburgs, whose right of succession to all parts of the unitary state was indisputable. With the London Protocol of 1852, the great powers and Sweden–Norway had recognised Prince Christian (IX) as the rightful heir. The German Confederation had not done so. The following day, Frederick (VIII) of Augustenborg was proclaimed Duke of Schleswig–Holstein and was speedily recognised by the German middle states and the confederation.

Formally, Prussia and Austria upheld the London Protocol, but they now claimed that the new Danish constitution was a breach of agreements on which it was based. The German great powers demanded, therefore, that it should be withdrawn. The following month, Bismarck added that an understanding between Germany and Denmark would be impossible as long as the latter remained democratic. The unitary state could be saved by acceding to the German demands. This would in all likelihood lead to the organisation of the unitary state being dictated by Germany and probably some form of absolutism. The alternative was a Danish–Scandinavian policy which would either provoke European conciliation or a brief war that would lead to realistic negotiations. The government supported the latter policy, the new regent the former. The new constitution was approved, but it lacked the royal signature. Christian IX dragged his feet in an attempt to get Russia and Great Britain to force the government to withdraw the constitution or step down, leaving a conservative government to save the unitary state.²⁰

When the king refused to sign the constitution, the mood in Copenhagen turned revolutionary. There were revolutionary plans, and offers to take the Danish crown were sent to Stockholm. Charles XV was not averse to exploiting a revolution, but he was firm in his intention not to trigger it. His plan had been to make use of the alliance and the war to prepare the way for a change in the Danish succession to his advantage. This was prevented by the death of Frederick, which briefly caused the interest of the Swedish and Norwegian king in a Scandinavian alliance to fade. This was exploited by Manderström and opponents of the alliance in the government. The dispute about the succession in the duchies, they claimed, activated the London Protocol. That prevented Sweden–Norway from committing themselves to an alliance, and so at the beginning of December it was postponed indefinitely.

The Swedish and Danish Scandinavianists, however, did not give up.²¹ They put pressure on Charles XV, who in mid-December promised orally and in writing with or without an alliance to place himself at the head of an army of 22

000 men. The news was immediately telegraphed back to Copenhagen, where the Scandinavianist editor, Carl Ploug, printed it without considering the consequences. Traditionally, this has been seen as yet another instance of a royal policy that had no backing in the government. This is wrong. Charles spoke the truth when he emphasised that he had two ministers backing him. Moral scruples and the hope that Western powers could be forced to intervene had made Manderström stake his position on getting the alliance resurrected, while Louis De Geer was afraid that the king might change his government. The leak to the Danish press, however, made De Geer retract, and instead, he helped to persuade the foreign minister to remain in the government.

Stockholm was beset by a permanent crisis of government, and Charles XV was in regular contact with Napoleon III. According to British sources, the Swedish envoy, Henning Hamilton, presented Hall with the prospect of a French-Swedish-Norwegian intervention in the coming war for the spring of 1864.²² It is against this background that we need to understand Bismarck's offer to Charles XV in December 1863 to divide the unitary state. The king telegraphed his reply: "Get thee behind me, Satan!" However, according to his secretary, it was Manderström who had dissuaded him from accepting the offer.²³ Manderström himself continued to try to convince the Western powers to intervene, but Charles assured both Hall and the Scandinavianists in Copenhagen that he would with the assistance of Napoleon III save the Nordic countries.²⁴

Russia and Great Britain were also interfering in Danish internal affairs. The aim was, formally, to ensure the peace by forcing Denmark to withdraw the November constitution. In reality, their policy involved a change of government. Initially, Hall resisted pressure from the special British and Russian envoys. The council president insisted that as long as the great powers would not commit themselves to mediate in the conflict and ensure a final solution to the Danish-German dispute, Danish compliance served no purpose. The British diplomat, Lord Woodhouse, subsequently telegraphed London suggesting that Denmark should be promised a conference. Lord Russell agreed, but as the response was sent by letter – and only telegraphed later – it did not reach Copenhagen before the government had fallen.²⁵

Hall's position had been seriously undermined since the Scandinavian alliance had not been ratified, and he predicted that the king, with Russian help, would displace him. Opinion is divided on the degree to which he wished to relinquish power and pass on the responsibility to the unitary statist. At all events, the government did its best to sabotage a unitary state policy, since it forced the king to prorogue parliament. This meant that the November constitution could not legally be retracted. When the king demanded parliament be recalled, the ministers refused and handed in their notice. Denmark now had only a caretaker government.

The king's attempt to create a conservative unitary statist government quickly fell apart. The situation changed with the British offer of a conference. Supported by a number of prominent politicians, Hall was prompted to create a

new government, in which he was probably prepared to make concessions to the king by excluding the most controversial ministers. But most of the resigning ministers were, however, only prepared to re-assume their positions as a united whole. The king and his circle exploited this division, when – presumably to avoid the king's abdication – D.G. Monrad took up the reins of power. No leading politicians were willing to form part of his government.²⁶

The Dannevirke days

Monrad's policy has always been debated. This is due not only to his complex character but also to the fact that, like other politicians, he destroyed many of the sources that might shed light on it. On the face of it, in January 1864 Monrad appears to have followed a unitary statist policy where, with British support, he attempted to prevent the war. But he also discussed a possible partition of Schleswig with the British and French envoys, while trying to win the king over to a unification of the Glücksburgs and the Bernadottes in a marriage between Crown Prince Frederick (VIII) and Charles XV's daughter, princess Lovisa.²⁷

By the end of 1863, *The Economist* was predicting that the new year would lead to a general European war.²⁸ Even though the continent was not set alight, the prediction was well founded. And in the case of Denmark and Germany war did come, since the peace policy was doomed to failure for various reasons. Russia wished to save the unitary state and feared a united Scandinavia, but it was politically and militarily weakened, and the uprising in Poland prevented any direct intervention from the Russian side. On the other hand, the Polish question and Napoleon III's plans for a congress divided the Western powers. The British wanted peace, but they hesitated to threaten the German states with armed mediation without French support. If the emperor could not have his congress, then he wanted to realise his policy by exploiting a war either in Scandinavia or in Italy. A favourable outcome for France could be ensured through advance negotiations with Prussia and Sweden–Norway. Sweden–Norway was preparing for war, but in Norway the government was divided, while the crisis in government continued to rage in Sweden. In the wings was the threat of a government run by aristocrats of a Greater Sweden who were keen to pursue a policy of war but who opposed the planned parliamentary reforms.²⁹

Bismarck also wanted to exploit a war so that Prussia could take possession of the duchies. Officially, like Austria, he supported a unification of Schleswig and Holstein whose only link to Denmark would be a personal union. This policy was acceptable to Christian IX but not for the segment of the population that was politically aware. Bismarck ensured in reality that war was inevitable, since, with Austria's backing, he issued Denmark with an ultimatum on 14 January. The country was given 48 hours to withdraw the November constitution. The German great powers knew that this was legally impossible; they therefore urged the Danish government to undertake a coup d'état and reintroduce absolutism.

Monrad refused, since he suspected – with good reason – that this would trigger a Scandinavian revolution in Copenhagen.³⁰

On 1 February 1864, war was a reality, as 60 000 Prussian and Austrian soldiers crossed the Eider. The Danish army numbering 42 000 men were stationed behind Dannevirke in southern Schleswig. The season made it possible, however, for the German troops to avoid the 14-kilometre fortification either by crossing the Slien fjord to the east or the marshy area to the west, both of which were frozen over. On 5 February, the Danish army withdrew from Dannevirke to take up flanking positions at Dybbøl and Fredericia. The decision was taken by General De Mezas and his staff, but the king and Monrad, who were in Schleswig, were informed and the king sanctioned the decision. This retreat, which saved the army from being surrounded, provoked violent unrest in Copenhagen.

More recent historiography, in particular, has regarded the street battles as a manifestation of hysterical nationalism and a national romantic belief in the strength of Dannevirke.³¹ Even though this should not be ignored as a contributory factor, the Dannevirke days should be seen primarily as an expression of fear for a conservative coup d'état. When Dannevirke was abandoned without a fight and without the knowledge of the minister of war, and when telegraph poles cut down to prevent counterorders, it was seen in Copenhagen as proof that the rumours that king would give in to the German demands and reintroduce absolutism were true. Once again, Danish Scandinavianists started planning a revolution and offered the throne to Charles XV. Charles's response was ambivalent. He was not prepared to trigger a revolution, but if the revolution broke out, then he would do everything to support it. In the meantime, the situation stabilised in Copenhagen, and the Scandinavianists requested instead that Charles should send his agent, Emil von Qvanten, to negotiate a union instead of an alliance.³²

Monrad had returned to the Danish capital. He was able to calm the people, parliament and his own government. However, he only succeeded by lying. The king had both been informed about and had approved the army's withdrawal. If this became known, it could cause an explosion in the barrel of dynamite that Copenhagen had become.³³

Wasted opportunities

The abandonment of Dannevirke weakened Denmark politically, since the majority of Schleswig was now occupied. However, nothing was yet decided. France and Prussia were in regular contact, exchanging plans for how the unitary state could be divided and discussing a Scandinavian union. King William of Prussia wrote to the Belgian King Leopold that he was in favour of a unified Scandinavia but that this would depend on Great Britain and Russia having been led off into a diplomatic sideroad so they could not block a Scandinavian union.³⁴ Meanwhile, in the spring of 1864 the whole of Europe was anticipating that Italy and France would fling themselves into the war. From Monrad's conversations

we know that this was the reason why, until mid-March, Denmark was reluctant to receive British mediation.³⁵

On 23 February, a telegram arrived in Stockholm. Napoleon III did not wish to go to war at the moment but he urged Charles XV in the strongest terms to do so. The emperor wanted to prevent Russian involvement and an understanding could be reached with Germany. The message from France was clear: if Sweden-Norway acted now, Scandinavia could be unified.³⁶ Charles wanted the war. But he found himself in a dilemma. A majority in the government continued to be opposed to the war unless there was support from a major power. If the king changed his government, the Swedish parliamentary reform, which had been worked on for decades, would fall by the wayside – with domestic political consequences. Nevertheless, Charles explored the possibilities for a new government. The keys of power were offered, for example, to the Swedish-Norwegian envoy in London, Carl Wachtmeister, but he was only prepared to lead a Scandinavian government and required the capital to be moved immediately to Copenhagen. If Charles XV ultimately did not change his government, this is probably because he had not given up hope of winning De Geer over to his policy. The king's hope was that he would achieve both the union and the parliamentary reform.³⁷

Disturbances broke out in Stockholm, while the action moved to Christiania, where the Norwegian *Storting* was assembled. It approved funds to put the army on a war footing and place it at the disposal of the king, but the *Storting* made it a requirement that there was support from a great power before they could go to war, while a slim majority expressed opposition to a union with Denmark. This has overshadowed significant political and public support in Norway. Half of the government were Scandinavianists, and the celebrations on the Norwegian national day on 17 May 1864 showed a signification supported for the war and Scandinavianism in parts of the population. It is just as relevant that there are serious doubts whether a slim majority in the *Storting* would have been able to block a union, if Denmark, Sweden, Prussia and France had agreed to a solution.³⁸

However that might be, the outcome was that time passed without Sweden and Norway intervening in the war. A number of French diplomats subsequently made it clear that Charles XV had wasted a unique opportunity. The lack of support was the reason why, according to British sources, Monrad was prepared to accept a peace conference in London with the participation of the five great powers, the German Confederation, Denmark and Sweden-Norway. This took place, however, without a ceasefire. This can be explained through continuing hopes of a European military intervention and the wish to retain Dybbøl, which the Prussians were demanding should be vacated if they were to accept a ceasefire.³⁹

Prior to the conference opening, regular negotiations took place both in London and in between the European capitals. From the diplomatic correspondence, it becomes evident that there was a clear difference between the official demands and the real wishes of the various powers. Austria wanted to see a personal union, but if this was not possible, the duchies should be separated

off and given a German prince. A personal union was in principle compatible with Russia's wish to retain the unitary state, only in a different and more conservative form, under Christian IX. The British, the French and the Prussians all felt, however, that Schleswig should be partitioned. The same was true of Sweden–Norway, even though it officially supported a Denmark to the Eider. The questions that remained were, simply, where Schleswig should be divided, who should have the separated part, and whether the state's Danish part should form part of a Scandinavian union. The answer to these questions meant that a wider European war remained a possibility, including a Franco–British intervention in favour of Denmark. The price for this demanded by Paris, however, was a border at the Rhine.

The instructions to the Danish negotiators bore testament to divisions between the government and the regent. Officially, the country stood by the London Protocol and with it the unitary state that the king wanted. If, or rather when, this proved to be impossible, they were to propose a hiving off of Holstein. On the other hand, a personal union with a united Schleswig–Holstein was to be rejected. If and when these possibilities had been excluded, Schleswig could be divided at Dannevirke. Instructions were at one and the same time a compromise between the king and the council president and a strategy which, by excluding all other possibilities, would lead to a solution by partition. The court, however, was not averse to a personal union between Denmark and a unified Schleswig–Holstein. In the eyes of the nationalists and Scandinavianists, this would lead sooner or later to incorporation into Germany and the annihilation of the nation. Monrad warned the king that a personal union would cost him his crown. The opposition discussed a national unity government, and the national liberals sent their own agent, Jens Julius Hansen, to France. C.C. Hall wanted to see a division at Flensborg and a Scandinavian union.⁴⁰

The London conference and the union treaty

A German pretext ensured the conference was postponed, and on 18 April Dybbøl fell and the Danish army had to retreat to the island of Als. Soon afterwards, troops also withdrew from Fredericia. This altered the dynamic but did not prevent progress at the negotiating table. In the first place, the majority ruled out a re-creation of the unitary state, a hiving off of Holstein and a personal union between Denmark and the duchies. This left only a partitioning of Schleswig. The question was, where? Monrad succeeded in pressing Christian IX to accept a border at Dannevirke. This the king immediately regretted and, with Russian support, he tried to reach an understanding with the Schleswig–Holstein landed aristocracy about a personal union.⁴¹

Monrad was also betting on more than one horse, and he opposed any border north of Dannevirke, since that would leave Denmark too weakened politically, militarily and economically, which demonstrates how his thinking was shaped by the threshold principle. In contrast to Hall, Monrad was prepared to break up

the conference to trigger a wider European war. The liberal British government was on a weak footing, and, if the negotiations failed, they would either have to enter the war or expect a stormy reception in parliament that risked bringing it down. If this plan failed, the circle around Monrad discussed whether they could either request French mediation or negotiate directly with Prussia. These were all solutions that, in Monrad's view, could pave the way for a Scandinavian union. For the same reason, it might seem strange that Monrad was not better at grasping the opportunity for the union when it arose in the spring of 1864. Emil von Qvanten had been in Copenhagen in March, where he had completed negotiations for a draught for a federation with leading Danish politicians. Charles approved it in a revised form, which introduced the requirement to partition Schleswig. The plan was presumably accepted by Sweden's *de facto* Prime Minister, Louis De Geer.⁴²

Qvanten again travelled to Copenhagen in April shortly after the fall of Dybbøl. He presented the draught for a federation to Monrad and Christian IX, along with the proposal for a family pact that would determine the succession in Scandinavia. They were urged to start direct negotiations with De Geer himself. Formally, the king and the council president replied positively, but they wanted the overture to come from Sweden. Before the negotiations got underway in earnest, the story exploded in the press, whereupon the Swedish finance minister put De Geer firmly in his place and forced Charles to choose between his policy and his government. The king's choice was made easy when Christian IX demanded that Holstein should be included in a unified Scandinavia, a demand that put the business beyond the pale in Stockholm. Meanwhile, negotiations were continuing in London. Great Britain and France had originally supported a border at Dannevirke, but after pressure from the Germans the British proposed that the Belgian king as arbitrator should draw a border somewhere between Dannevirke and Aabenraa. Leading national liberals wanted this offer to be accepted. The king and the council president did not agree but for widely different reasons.⁴³

Monrad wanted to have the conference break down in order to win and unify Scandinavia *either* through war, French mediation *or* negotiations with Prussia. He also tried to negotiate in secret with Sweden about a union. Christian IX, for his part, wanted along with Russia to get the personal union back on the negotiating table. The plan was devised by the Russian foreign minister. Russia was actively working for it in London, while the Danish envoy in St. Petersburg, the Holsteiner Otto von Plessen, travelled to Copenhagen, where he supported the king's attempt to create a unitary state government that would make the plan a reality in Denmark. This triggered a government crisis. Christian's attempt to create a new government, however, failed spectacularly. The Danish unitary statistes feared a Scandinavist revolution, while support in Holstein was too weak. The king was forced to reinstate Monrad.⁴⁴

According to the king's brother, Prince John, Scandinavianism was in the air. The day before the decisive meeting in the unitary parliament, the king,

according to John, was prepared to abdicate so that the Crown Prince could enter into an understanding with Sweden (e.g. a Scandinavian union). The king, however, changed his mind the following day. In the state council, the king insisted on a border at Dannevirke and thereby rejected arbitration. This was in all likelihood the choice that Monrad wanted the king to make, but their motivation was quite different. While Monrad wanted to break up the conference, the king apparently believed that if the arbitration was removed from the table, it would open up once again the possibility of a personal union at the conference. Christian appears to have believed that this was possible without the war being resumed. But even if war did finally happen, a Danish defeat – as the unitary statist saw it – would discredit a nationalist and Scandinavianist policy and pave the way for a government that would pursue the king's policy. The conference was broken up. War was resumed.⁴⁵

Bismarck and Scandinavianist plans for revolution

A European and Scandinavian intervention was possible but only on condition that Denmark could repel a Prussian attack on Als. This did not happen. Denmark suffered yet another humiliating defeat on 29 June. Denmark's existence was seriously threatened, and the desire for opposition among the public was, at least for the time being, broken. Monrad vainly attempted to ensure French mediation. But they were rejected. On the basis of the strategy that Monrad heads sketched out earlier, the next step – and the only logical one – would have been direct negotiations in Berlin. Such negotiations had taken place repeatedly during the First Schleswig War, and the idea resurfaces repeatedly in Danish diplomatic correspondence. Monrad's idea was that Prussia's acceptance of a Scandinavian union should be bought by ceding Holstein, Lauenburg and a part of Schleswig directly to Prussia. This did not happen, since Monrad was dismissed on 8 July. Documents from the Prussian archives show, however, that Monrad's tactics could perhaps have worked. Shortly after Als, Prussia's King William proposed to King Leopold of Belgium the establishment of "a Scandinavian federation." Christian IX also wrote to Leopold, but his aim was to establish a personal union, Denmark's entry into the German Confederation and direct negotiations with Prussia *and* Austria.⁴⁶

The new conservative government succeeded in introducing a ceasefire, but in contrast to Monrad's policy, the king's was incompatible with Prussian interests, and by involving Austria, he made it impossible to reach an understanding with Berlin, since Vienna would never accept a trade-off that clearly only benefited Prussia. This prevented a partition of Schleswig, and instead all three duchies had to be relinquished. The peace was agreed in October and ratified in November, but disagreements between Prussia, Austria and the rest of Germany about the future of the duchies meant that the issue was not yet resolved. This only happened after Prussia's victory in the war with Austria in 1866, whereupon all three duchies fell to Prussia.

Christian IX, however, clung to his policy and – supported by Russia – continued working for a personal union. This was regarded as a betrayal of the nation by leading politicians and provided new momentum for Scandinavianist plans for revolution. There is much we do not know, since sources have been systematically destroyed, but we do know that in the late summer Monrad negotiated with Prince Oscar in Scania. According to Oscar, the former council president offered the prince the Danish crown after a revolution.⁴⁷

The nationalist opposition conducted its own foreign policy, not least through the agent Jens Julius Hansen. He was in close contact with the French government and with Bismarck. The Prussian minister president was not unsympathetic to reaching an understanding. Bismarck allegedly had his own agent in Denmark, who in July 1864 discussed a Scandinavian union with national liberal politicians. According to the minutes written by the Danish agent, Jens Julius Hansen, of his negotiations with Bismarck, in mid-December the Prussian declared himself to be “very strongly Scandinavian.” The minister president wished to see an alliance between Prussia and a unified Scandinavia to confront Russia. For that, he was willing to hand back northern Schleswig. This was a message that Hansen passed on to his national liberal backers – including C.C. Hall – in Copenhagen over Christmas 1864.⁴⁸

Three weeks before, Charles XV had been presented with a new revolutionary plan that can be traced back to the circle around the former minister of the interior, Hans Rasmussen Carlsen. They wanted to kidnap the royal family from Bernstorff Castle and imprisoned them in Malmö Castle in Sweden. In Copenhagen, a revolutionary government would be formed, Charles would be proclaimed lord protector, while the Swedish army would take control of Jutland, whose loyalty was more in doubt. France would keep Russia at Bay, while Prussia’s goodwill would be ensured by allowing it to annexe Holstein and southern Schleswig. Northern Schleswig would be returned, and a Scandinavian union created through a referendum. The plan emphasised that it had the backing of Napoleon III and Bismarck.⁴⁹

If Charles rejected the plan, it was not for its aim but for its means. To kidnap the Danish royal family would have created an international scandal, a domestic crisis and the fall of the Swedish government. In Charles’s eyes, the reform of the Swedish parliamentary system was bound up with the unification of Scandinavia, and he was of the impression that he had an understanding with Louis De Geer. The king would support De Geer’s reform in return for the Minister of Justice helping Charles with the unification of Scandinavia. According to the Scandinavianists, the Minister of Justice failed to honour this deal, when the reform was finally carried out in 1866. In other words, the Danish defeat had done nothing to persuade Charles to give up on Scandinavianism. On the contrary, he continued to spread Scandinavianist propaganda out across Europe, while he retained contact with Scandinavianists in Copenhagen through the Swedish diplomatic post.⁵⁰

On 29 January 1865, a new plan was sent from Copenhagen to Stockholm. It was, in essence, the same. Northern Schleswig should be returned to Denmark

and Scandinavia should be unified. France would support the plan, and the same went for Prussia if they were allowed to annex the remaining parts of the duchies. The plan explicitly emphasised that Bismarck had declared himself as a Scandinavian and that Prussia's support could be won through a Prussian-Scandinavian alliance against Russia. In order to realise the plan, a Swedish agent was to be sent to Copenhagen, who could negotiate with C.C. Hall and Hans Rasmussen Carlsen. With the backing of Sweden-Norway, Christian IX would be forced by a referendum to accept a Scandinavian union. Christian IX had yet to give up the idea of a personal union or of Denmark's entry into the German Confederation. For Hall, Carlsen and those of like mind, this would be tantamount to Denmark's annihilation. At the same time, Bismarck had ruled out neither Scandinavianism nor the return of northern Schleswig.⁵¹

It can, of course, be debated whether Bismarck actually meant what he said, but Scandinavianism had been a recurrent feature of his policy for a decade. That being so, it does not seem unreasonable that Bismarck should see Scandinavianism as one among a number of possible futures. As Bismarck put it, the Scandinavians were natural allies of Germans and Protestants whom Prussia would always be able to control by occupying the peninsula of Jutland if Scandinavia stepped out of line.

Why, then, did these plans never become a reality? It is difficult to give a definitive answer, not least because so many sources have been burned. But Russian suspicions about Scandinavianist conspiracies clearly made Bismarck cautious. Things were not improved by the witch hunt of Scandinavianists conducted by the Danish Minister of Justice in Copenhagen. When the case exploded in the press, it caused a scandal. The Minister of Justice could prove nothing and had to resign in disgrace, but the commotion clearly caused Bismarck to tread more warily. Over the following six months, Hansen's approaches were rejected, and when their contact was resumed in November 1865, Prussia seemed more concerned to resolve the conflict about the duchies through a conflict with Austria. This duly took place the following year, after which the window for Scandinavianism had in any real sense closed.⁵²

Notes

- 1 Master narrative, cf. Glenthøj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*, 25–32.
- 2 Daa, *Danmark: russisk eller skandinavisk*, 7–8. Cf. Glenthøj and Ottosen, 116–45.
- 3 Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 29 ff.
- 4 Cf. Glenthøj and Ottosen, 83 ff.
- 5 Cf. Kahan, *Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century Europe* and Broers, *Europe after Napoleon*.
- 6 Glenthøj and Ottosen, 119ff.
- 7 Køge Archives. Gl. Kjøgegaard Archive: Chamberlain Hans von Carlsen's Private Archive. Box 29/3 (*Fyrstebreve*).
- 8 Birkeland, *Skandinavismen fra et norsk Synspunkt*, 25–28.
- 9 Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, 33, 42.
- 10 Langewiesche, "The Nation as a Developing Resource Community"; Birkeland, 28–31.

- 11 Cf. Glenthøj and Ottosen, 172–75, 438 ff.; Hedin, *Sverig-Norge och Preussen 1860–1863*.
- 12 Hedin, *Den skandinaviska alliansfrågan*, 87–88.
- 13 Rigsarkivet, Copenhagen. Private Archive: Vedel, Peter August Frederik Stoud. XI. *Vedels beretning om Danmarks Udenrigspolitik i Aaret (Vedel's Account of Denmark's Foreign Policy in the Year) 1863 1/1 to 31/12*, 281, 293; Glenthøj and Ottosen, 387 ff.
- 14 Glenthøj and Ottosen, 390 ff.; Hedin, 113 ff.
- 15 Glenthøj and Ottosen, 395–405.
- 16 *Diplomatiske Aktstykker*; Glenthøj and Ottosen, 406–409.
- 17 Nielsen, *1864 – Da Europa gik af lave*; Møller, *Helstatens Fald*, vol. 1, 537, 543, 549, 550, 558–60; Carr, *The Origins of the Wars of German Unification*, 80.
- 18 Nielsen, 44–45; Mosse, *The European Powers*, 140; Glenthøj and Ottosen, 421.
- 19 Cf. Glenthøj and Ottosen, 395–413.
- 20 Glenthøj and Ottosen, 417 ff.
- 21 Cf. Glenthøj and Ottosen, 423 ff.
- 22 Steefel, *The Schleswig-Holstein Question*, 148.
- 23 Kaartvedt, *Frederik Stang og Georg Sibbern*, vol. 2, 113.
- 24 Rigsarkivet, Copenhagen. Private Archive: Hall, Carl Christian og hustru Augusta Marie Frederikke. Box 3. *Karl XV to M. Hall 26.12.1863* (quote).
- 25 Glenthøj and Ottosen, 429 ff.
- 26 For a detailed discussion, see Glenthøj and Ottosen, 429–35.
- 27 Glenthøj and Ottosen, 441–43.
- 28 *The Economist*, December 26, 1863.
- 29 Glenthøj and Ottosen, 438 ff.
- 30 British Library, London. Western Manuscripts. Paget Papers. 51217. *Paget to Russell 13.01.1864, 14.01.1864. No. 23 (c.15.01.1864), 19.01.1864*; Rigsarkivet, Copenhagen. Private Archive: Vedel, Peter August Frederik Stoud. XI. 28. *Vedels Beretning om Danmarks Udenrigspolitik i Aaret (Vedel's Account of Denmark's Foreign Policy in the Year) 1864 1/1 til ca. 20/4*, 387–88, 398 ff.
- 31 The best example is Buk-Swienty, *Slagtebænk Dybbøl*, 2nd ed., 160 ff., 207 ff.
- 32 Glenthøj and Ottosen, 443–49. See also Björk-Winberg and Egorov's contribution to this volume.
- 33 Glenthøj and Ottosen, 445.
- 34 Hähnsen, *Ursprung und Geschichte*, vol. 1, 22 ff., 30 ff., 37, 50–56; Ibbeken, *Die Auswärtige Politik Preußens*, vol. 4, 704, 748 ff.; Ibbeken, *Die Auswärtige Politik Preußens*, vol. 5, 33–37; Steefel, 206 ff.
- 35 Glenthøj and Ottosen, 454.
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5

THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE AND SCANDINAVIANISM

Grasping a moving target, 1840–1864

Evgenii Egorov

In 1809 Finland was annexed from Sweden to the Russian empire and established as the Grand Duchy of Finland. The duchy preserved its laws, local administrative system and social hierarchies inherited from Sweden. Finland became an exception – in line with other administrative and legal exceptional zones – within the structure of the Russian empire, for the degree of autonomy it possessed until the late nineteenth century was unmatched by any other constituent part of the state. This position was a result of collaboration between the imperial administration and the elites of the newly established political entity.¹ By putting Finland under the emperor's sceptre, Russia became an even more notable participant in the political life of Northern Europe. This prompted it to follow attentively the developments in the region, Scandinavianism being one of them.

Scandinavianism, conceived in the 1840s as a vision of cultural and political consolidation of the Scandinavian nations, was viewed by the Russian authorities as a conspiracy undermining the security of Europe and the integrity of the empire since it rendered Finland a part of the imaginative polity. But the empire also perceived Scandinavianism in its distinct way, translated it into understandable categories and supplied its image with own fears. The Russian empire was not a “stable” object itself, for the mid-nineteenth century brought a wave of sweeping reforms that aspired to change its nature.² While these reforms primarily targeted central regions of the realm, the borderlands and their administrations were also modernised, facing new practices of sociality and politics that accordingly altered the perception of Scandinavianism.

This chapter mostly fathoms into power relations and knowledge-production concerned with Scandinavianism in the imperial institutions. Its focal point gravitates between the Finnish administration and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to argue that internal and external perception of Scandinavianism coalesced with each other.

Finnish administration and governor-general A.S. Menshikov

Although Finland preserved its “ancient” legal order, imperial infrastructures were also deployed in the duchy. While the head of the duchy was the Grand Duke (the emperor), the governor-general supervised executive power.³ After the suppression of the Decembrists revolt in 1825 that sought to assault the imperial regime, Finland was also equipped with the headquarters of the political police, known as the Third Section of His Imperial Majesty’s Own Chancellery.⁴ Since 1831, the post of governor-general was occupied by Prince Alexander Menshikov, a descendant of Peter I’s famous associate, who simultaneously commanded the Russian navy.

Brought up in Dresden, Menshikov shared the outlook of the enlightened cosmopolitical elite of Alexander I’s reign.⁵ While nationalising tendencies reached the empire in the 1840s, as some officials demanded the russification of the administration and limitation of the privileges of non-Russian nobility, Menshikov eschewed these visions of Russian sovereignty that undermined estate privileges.⁶ Notorious for his defence of the noble estate (*dvorianstvo*), Menshikov simultaneously supported the autonomous position of Finland and the degree of power exercised there by the local, mostly Swedish-speaking nobility.⁷ The vision of aristocratic empire held together by the bonds of estate solidarity was his ideal.

While Finland was considered a loyal borderland, its ongoing relations with Sweden, that could not be immediately halted after 1809, drew constant attention of the administration. Considering the radicalisation of the Swedish public sphere in the 1830s, the Finnish government sought to break preserved institutional and cultural bonds. The tendencies of the public debate in Sweden to embrace radical agenda were regarded as a precursor of revolutionary transformations that could spread into Finland.⁸ Since the autonomy of the duchy in the eyes of its administration often depended on its “quietness,” the bond was dangerous.

Scandinavianist tendencies reached their radars during the process of this institutional separation. While the term “Scandinavianism” was coined only in 1843, the tendencies of the Scandinavian rapprochement were spotted earlier.⁹ In 1837, post-director of the duchy Alexander Wulffert informed the governor-general about a Swedish notice of a call by a marginal Danish newspaper, *Nordisk Ugeskrift*, to revive “the ancient unity of the Scandinavian nations.” This information was forwarded to the minister of foreign affairs, Karl von Nesselrode, with an introductory note by Menshikov: “The emperor has paid attention to the contents of the Swedish journal [...]. It is a call printed in another journal which came out in Copenhagen with the goal to prepare the minds to the revival of the union of Calmar.”¹⁰

Hyperbolised imperial sensitivity towards this negligible publication could be attested to inflamed attentiveness of Finnish post-director due to strained imperial foreign relations in the late 1830s.¹¹ Since this article framed the union as set

against Russia, “a carnivorous eagle,” Nesselrode addressed Charles XIV John for clarifications. This led to the promulgation of a royal note that confirmed conservative trajectory of Swedish foreign policy.¹² What interests me here is not the emperor’s predictable will to preserve the “equilibrium” in post-Napoleonic Europe but rather the line of communication that went through Finland. It was a special position of the duchy that set it in the juncture between internal and foreign policy.

Next encounter of the Finnish administration with Scandinavianism happened in the summer of 1843 when the convention of the Nordic students took place in Uppsala. In June, as the students from Helsinki were invited to the festival, the post-director informed Menshikov that five of them embarked on a trip but promised to leave if political tendencies ensued.¹³ Unfortunately for the administration, they did ensue rapidly. Wulffert, together with the Russian diplomat in Stockholm Dmitrii Glinka, and minister state-secretary for Finnish affairs Alexander Armfelt informed the governor-general on its unfavourable development.¹⁴ Glinka argued that the convention emanated revolutionary impulses while the post-director highlighted the students’ manifestations that rendered Finland a part of the future Scandinavia. The presence of Finnish students there became the main problem: Menshikov was informed that four of them took part in the convention.¹⁵

In the correspondence between Menshikov and Armfelt the position of the governor-general towards pan-Scandinavian ideas became clear: “The attempts to exhume the Union of Calmar does not concern us.” Either institutionally unrelated to the duchy or unappealing to the Finnish population, this idea should not have bothered local administration. He, however, could not tolerate political proclamations ostensibly expressed by the subjects of the emperor, while also condemning the rector’s lack of discernment in allowing the trip. Menshikov insisted that the students had to be excluded from the lists of the university members.¹⁶ Initially expelled, the students, however, were allowed to return to their studies soon, after addressing Armfelt with their justification of the voyage. The students surprisingly framed the convention as a source of inspiration for their Fennomaniac-leaning endeavours: they ostensibly did not partake in the building of a united Scandinavia but rather enthusiastically witnessed it.¹⁷ The administration also regarded Scandinavianism and Fennomania as related aspirations, propelled by kindred revolutionary intuitions.

In 1845, when a larger meeting of the Scandinavian students took place in Copenhagen, Finnish administration did not pay any attention to it due to the absence of Finnish participants.¹⁸ Scandinavianism, however, came to be known for the population of the province through censored domestic coverage of the idea and imported materials, many of them banned due to the critical utterances against the empire.¹⁹ Some materials, however, passed this filter, legally or not. Scandinavian integration manifested itself by building the network of communication, bringing Finnish learned inhabitants into new transnational discursive exchanges.²⁰ Since 1846, the Danish oppositional and pro-Scandinavian

newspaper *Fædrelandet* and Norwegian *Den Constitutionelle* were introduced for subscription in Finland and were reviewed on par with the Swedish ones.²¹

Until the Crimean War, Finnish imperial administration regarded Scandinavianism as an external problem unappealing to the audience of the duchy. However, this acquaintance shed light on the institutional framework of dealing with external hazards. The porous nature of the Swedish-Finnish border made materials and meanings trespass it almost unchallenged while the bond of language and similarity of political organisation prepared fertile soil for their blooming. Permeable frontiers of the empire rendered Finland an object of management that found itself in the juncture between internal and external.²²

The work of translation: Envoys meet Scandinavianism

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs watched political tendencies that manifested in the Scandinavian kingdoms.²³ Russian diplomats up to 1848 mostly updated the minister on the tendencies that exhibited themselves during the student meetings, reckoning with the revolutionary power student mobilisation gained since the 1810s across Europe.²⁴ Their dispatches, however, were more than reproduced pieces of information. They were translations into the language of the European security culture that made sense of these tendencies for Saint-Petersburg. While researchers tend to highlight geopolitical fears of the empire related to the reification of pan-Scandinavian projects,²⁵ I argue that the rhetoric of diplomacy also recast it into a threat against the Vienna order:²⁶ Scandinavianism was primarily perceived as a revolutionary threat until 1848.

By 1843, the situation in Sweden was politically strained, as the dispatches demonstrated. Financial crisis coupled with the growing demand for the reform of representation. In May 1843, Glinka informed Nesselrode on the project of Danish and Swedish-Norwegian fleet collaboration against piracy around African shores, the proposal that “give a new impulse to the idea of the Scandinavian union.” “As the imperial government does not favor the projects of this genre,” he recommended the question to be resolved with the help of Great Powers rather than by Denmark and Sweden alone, following closely the principles of Vienna arrangements and collective securitisation.²⁷ However, new instances of the Scandinavian consolidation in a more dangerous form loomed large soon.

In his next dispatch he informed the ministry on the Scandinavian student meeting that bore pronounced political significance. “150 students from Copenhagen accompanied by the students of Lund” were pronouncing political claims and insults against the empire during their voyage. If previously Glinka considered these trends not worth combatting because any request would have provoked the Swedish public, the fact that the demonstrators fixed their attention on Finland untied the hands of the Russian mission. Glinka suggested to elicit the attention of the Swedish cabinet to the events and demand explanations. His next report highlighted the revolutionary impulse that animated the convention and its anti-Russian rhetoric. It appeared extraordinary to the envoy because

Sweden and Russia formally were allies, but the cabinet did not impose any measures upon these provocations.²⁸

The status of a Great Power did not, however, make the empire into an omnipotent agency. Glinka's requests followed the seesaw dynamics: provocations on the students' side could have been counterbalanced by imperial interventions. During ensuing demonstrations, reinforced by numerous publications and speeches charged against Russia, often presented as an Eastern barbarous "monster,"²⁹ Glinka requested strict measures to be implemented: "in the view of events of such gravity, analogous steps must be taken." He suggested to announce to the Swedish cabinet that the reiteration of provocative student trips could cause rupture between Russia and Sweden. Glinka insisted that "it is only serious fear of jeopardizing relations with us" – meaning the aggravation of diplomatic affairs – "that could make it [the cabinet] overcome another fear inspired by the Scandinavian Jacobins."³⁰

Particular attention was paid to the appearance of the Scandinavian demonstrators who themselves perfectly understood its provocative nature.³¹ Flowers and ribbons, salutes and cheerings featured as clues to their motivations for the diplomatic agents. The fact that the students wore the same *cocarde* in the form of "red-blue ribbon with the word Scandinavia" on the chest proved the unwanted tendencies, "the move which political significance is hard to deny."³² The question whether Finnish students wore this cockade was essential, as the positive answer would have justified imperial "opposition to the Scandinavian movement in the eyes of Europe."³³ Since students in Finland were supposed to follow strict guidelines in their dress, the breach of clothing could be legitimately punished, especially given the obvious references to French revolutionary symbols.³⁴

In Denmark, as the diplomats Gustav Stackelberg and Pavel Nicolay informed the minister that year, Scandinavianist ideas were advocated by the oppositional "Danish party" that sought to polarise the Danish and German population of the kingdom and delimitate state borders according to ethno-legal principles. In their dispatches, proclaimed cultural goals of the Scandinavian idea featured as a disguise for revolutionary ambitions while the rebellious spirit imported from France and Italy provided a pattern for propagandists' activities.³⁵ The movement thus featured as a part of the larger European mosaic of revolutionary complots. Nesselrode's reply to Stackelberg further recast students into revolutionaries' prey who was manipulated to participate in the manifestations, while the Scandinavian idea was just a bait to allure them.³⁶

Carl Ploug, the Scandinavian ideologist, who held the most radical speech in 1843 on the necessity of the Scandinavian unification, provoked the attention of the Russian mission. Stackelberg referenced his animosity against the empire but also pointed to deeper conflict that motivated it, "the eternal war of those who have nothing against those who possess."³⁷ The vision of hyperbolised class conflict that backed up potential revolution – shared by conservative politicians in the Scandinavian kingdoms – haunted the diplomatic language around the Scandinavian issue.³⁸

While destabilising the social order of the kingdom, the pan-Scandinavian idea in their views also undermined the foundations of the Danish kingdom, as it alienated the German-speaking population. Imperial envoys did their best to make the government prohibit the dissemination of provocative materials and warned Saint-Petersburg on activities of the Scandinavian Society (*Skandinavisk Samfund*) – quickly banned thereafter – that ostensibly had political goals. However, a new organisation under almost the same name (*Skandinavisk Selskab*) was soon established this time “not by proletarians and men without respect” – again a class-centred category – with hidden political motivations.³⁹

In 1845, Russian representatives in Denmark followed the development of “the Scandinavian festivals,” that time in Copenhagen. They drew the attention of the minister to the diversity of political groups and classes that provided their resources for the event.⁴⁰ Again, some “inappropriate” speeches reflected revolutionary tendencies. Orla Lehmann’s call-to-arms for the freedom of the North and his “ridicule” parallel between the Scandinavian students and French revolutionaries appeared most provocative. To the satisfaction of the Russian mission, he and two other politicians were prosecuted.⁴¹ However, minister Rewentlow-Criminil in a dialogue with the secretary of the Russian mission Ewers appreciated the guests’ behaviour when compared with the provocative nature of the earlier Danish visit to Sweden. While some indeed considered this convention went smoother,⁴² the Russian mission was cautious: “the agitation of minds did not cease when the events ended.”⁴³

The scope of attention of the Russian mission revealed trajectories of their conceptual translation. While for its advocates, Scandinavianism was a design of the future that outlined territorial and political expectations, the envoys paid attention rather to the disruptive nature of their current actions.⁴⁴ The diplomats focused on radicalising tendencies and disgrace expressed towards the empire while geopolitical imaginaries were rather read as provocations and hardly as a real threat to account for. For them, the spirit of revolution, the primary hazard of post-Napoleonic security culture, was the most dangerous outcome of the student meetings: alarming student mobilisation across Europe planted its seeds in Scandinavia. The revolutionary trope made essential the question of the cocarde that for the first time appeared on students’ chests and allegedly imitated the cockade of the revolutionary France. This suspicion solidified with the envoy’s analysis of class struggle and underground propaganda deployed in the kingdoms.

Russia, Denmark and Scandinavianism in 1848

During the tumultuous months of 1848, the relations between Finland and Sweden created problems for the imperial administration. While no demonstration took place in Finland, March “proletarian” riots in Stockholm elicited the attention of the authorities.⁴⁵ Given the European context, Menshikov foresaw unfavourable outcomes: “if the troubles in Stockholm took such a disastrous

turn that the legitimate government would be forced to surrender to the violent force, then all Swedish subjects [...] should be decisively banned from entering Finland.”⁴⁶ He also paid attention to the students and their specific relations with Sweden, noting that the spirits in Uppsala always found reflection in the Alexander University in Helsinki.⁴⁷ The cure implied a quarantine, a breach of relations with an ex-metropole, in which revolutionary ideas could not spread.

The situation in Sweden, according to the envoy’s dispatches, indeed developed in a regrettable way. Everywhere in Stockholm bourgeoisie and workers saluted to the French revolution and then took upon riots.⁴⁸ The atmosphere of change gave birth to new reform projects and societies composed of “extremely” radical thinkers who incited disorder. In the deteriorating political atmosphere along with the demands for the “ultra-democratic” political reform, another political project previously “abandoned for years” was revived, the idea of the Scandinavian union.⁴⁹

The aspirations of Oscar I’s government and the sentiments of the public sphere aligned, as the king pronounced his support for the Danish case in the Schleswig-Holstein question that came to the forefront that year.⁵⁰ The will to assist their neighbours in the unjust struggle was universally shared by all classes and estates, as Russian envoy Alexander Krüdener dispatched: the king could not put himself in opposition to the voice of the Swedish nation. If not explicitly pan-Scandinavian,⁵¹ these measures were partially perceived so by the Russian mission, as it considered the public to push the campaign forward. Oscar I dislocated the troops to Scania to be ready to join the Danish forces in case the Prussian army crossed the border of Jutland.⁵²

The imperial administration, in its turn, took an ambiguous stance towards Scandinavianism in 1848. Earlier that year, Russian envoy in Berlin, Peter von Meyendorff, noted in his letters to Nesselrode the regrettable influence of revived pan-Scandinavian ideas in Denmark. The short-sightedness of the *parti danoise* was expressed in their ignorance of the fact that Denmark would become a mere province of Sweden in the case of “national alliance” while antagonising Germany. The “liberal, constitutional and Scandinavian movement,” according to his views, was a breach in the monarchical establishment in the North, aggressive towards the empire without any reason.⁵³ This attitude, however, did not stop Russia from active assistance to Denmark in 1848–50 in its war against Prussia.

There appeared greater evils than Scandinavianism on the map of Europe, namely the revolution in Prussia and the German states. Seeking to ensure that revolutionary governments would not change territorial status quo in Europe, Nicholas I was ready to interfere in the Danish-German conflict over Schleswig and Holstein. In March, Nicholas I ordered Menshikov to have the fleet ready to be sent to the Danish waters for a naval demonstration. Later in April–May, after the promulgation of the anti-revolutionary manifesto in Russia, the emperor sided with the Swedish king’s declaration on assistance to Denmark and opted to send his son and Menshikov to Stockholm to offer the Russian fleet to transport

Swedish battalion.⁵⁴ This measure might have been prompted by a dispatch from Copenhagen that rendered exclusive Swedish assistance logistically futile and even dangerous due to its Scandinavianist intentions, while only Russian intervention could make this arrangement work for the future of Danish integrity.⁵⁵ King Oscar himself, as Krüdener wrote, wanted to perform under the aegis of the Vienna order rather than driven by popular sympathies.⁵⁶

On May 20, Menshikov together with Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich boarded ships that reached Stockholm in two days to convene with the king. While Oscar I mildly refused to accept the Russian fleet for landing purposes, Menshikov consulted him on tactics and strategy of assistance to Denmark. Menshikov noted that the public was previously hostile towards Russia, but the arrival of the Grand Duke significantly affected this trajectory in a positive way.⁵⁷

In five days, the Russian-Swedish delegation also reached Copenhagen, greeted by cheering crowds. During the pompous dinner, a big audience gathered at the Frederiksberg palace in ceremonial uniforms, but the appearance of several persons fell out of the audience. New ministers who entered the government “under the principle of nationality,” as Menshikov put it, were wearing tailcoats. He even listed them to further express his attitude: “Monrad, Lehmann and Hvidt, abominable figures.”⁵⁸ Menshikov, like the emperor and Nesselrode, despised the leading role that nationality and liberalism were taking in the European politics: nationalism aimed to undermine the sophisticated balance of rule in the mosaic of composite states.

While preferring the conservation of the political order in Scandinavia, the empire could even apprehensively collaborate with the forces of Scandinavianism. Thus, Meyendorff, who at the beginning of the year was alarmed about Scandinavianist danger, reported to Nesselrode that Orla Lehmann during his European diplomatic voyage appreciated the attitude of the Russian government, “and concerning Scandinavianism this can benefit us. It would better turn against Germany than against Russia.”⁵⁹ Lehmann, in his turn, highlighted in his memoirs that in 1848, Meyendorff was much friendlier towards him than the Swedish envoy in Berlin.⁶⁰ The imperial authorities at one point were even ready to abandon their traditional insistence on the “integrity” of the Danish Kingdom and agree to divide Schleswig along the language line.⁶¹ Press in Finland – both in Finnish and Swedish – sided explicitly with Danish and broader Scandinavian case, and even in Saint-Petersburg some enthusiasm for Scandinavianism was allowed to surface.⁶² Moreover, while Nicholas consistently urged belligerent sides to negotiate, his young son envisioned the prospects of war during his stay in Stockholm. Whereas he noted that spirit was good among the Swedish forces ready to assist their brothers the Danes, “the Scandinavian spirit has dimmed, and nothing is heard about it.” He must have distinguished between the public will to assist the “brothers” and the idea of dynastic political unification.⁶³

As the power of the public opinion in the Nordic countries could not be ignored, a tactical engagement with Scandinavianism was justified, even though Nicholas I scorned the national-liberal ministry in Denmark. Moreover, while

previously Scandinavianism featured as an oppositional force challenging the power of the cabinets, the readiness of the Swedish cabinet to assist the neighbouring kingdom and the establishment of the ministry in Denmark that included its advocates altered this situation and made Russian government perceive the movement as a geopolitical project with potential for reification given the example of similar projects across Europe. One also should not overstress the eagerness of this collaboration. Later that year, acknowledging unacceptable behaviour of Prussia, Nesselrode, however, dispatched the envoy in Denmark to “pour some water” on the “Scandinavian fire,” meaning the belligerent spirits in the capital: the empire desired status quo at all costs and was ready to tramp its rivals.⁶⁴

In the case of the Prussian assault, those who opposed the principle of Danish unitary “wholeness” (*helstat*) and those who defended it briefly appeared on the same side of the barricades. Nicholas I up to 1850 was ready to aid Denmark and then took part in the pacification of the conflict, proclaiming the integrity of the Kingdom of Denmark with Holstein “a European necessity” to the irritation of the national-liberal forces there.⁶⁵ This brief collaboration is often obscured both in the historiography of the imperial foreign policy that focuses completely on its repressive side in 1848–49 and that of Scandinavianism,⁶⁶ but it assists in the relativisation of the self-projected imaginaries of anti-liberal empire and the anti-Russian Scandinavian visions. Even though the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs later sought to rhetorically distance itself from any associations with Scandinavianism and frame its measures as strictly Viennesque in its report of the foreign policy for the given year, in reality many agents apprehensively sought to reconcile its actions with the public sympathies in the region.⁶⁷ This coincident highlights the flexibility of action of both agents and the space for possible negotiations in a security threat situation.

The Crimean War and its aftermath: New matrixes of loyalty

As the situation in Europe stabilised after the revolutions, Emperor Nicholas I embarked on the issues concerning “the Eastern question” characterised by the rise of tensions between the Great Powers over the destiny of the Ottoman empire. The conflict between Nicholas I and Napoleon III found its reflections in the battle for the influence in the East. The issue of the control over the holy places in Bethlehem became a precursor for the Crimean War. Menshikov left for a diplomatic mission to the Ottoman empire in 1853, and the position of governor-general of Finland was substituted by Platon Rokassovsky and then occupied by Friedrich Wilhelm (Fedor Fedorovich) Berg until 1861.

While Menshikov did not question the bonds of estate solidarity as the foundation of imperial resilience, new representatives of imperial authority came to instrumentalise ethnic categories on par with estate logics of social division. As the Swedish element in Finland – a new category of surveillance and control – allegedly compromised itself during and after the Crimean War by siding with pro-Swedish and then pan-Scandinavian sentiments, the governor-general

chose to support alternative cultural projects to counterbalance the Swedish influence.⁶⁸ This was the moment when in some areas of imperial rule, modern notions of social engineering outweighed conservative fears of peasant and socialist unrest.⁶⁹

Berg represented the new generation of the Russian bureaucracy. His modernising projects in technical and social spheres reflected readiness to change the imperial order. The manifestation of the governor-general's power also transformed, as he was constantly present in the duchy, changing the modality of rule. Berg occupied the position for seven years that were pivotal in the political life of the duchy. The epoch of Alexander II, usually associated with the Great Reforms in central Russia, altered the political life in the duchy as well. The softening of censorship, growing power of the public sphere and ensuing reintroduction of the *Lantdag* contributed to the politisation of the society.⁷⁰ Berg, previously an army commander, in his turn, never ceased to operate in a paramilitary fashion, suspecting Swedish/Scandinavian conspiracy.

While until late 1855 Sweden was true to the principles of neutrality, its government was pressed by England and France to join their alliance and even reconquer Finland. Under the advocacy of a Scandinavian union, some journals already in 1854 argued for the Swedish revanchist agenda regarding Finland, while Oscar I backed up these sentiments.⁷¹ The imperial administration quickly recognised a potential threat, deteriorated by the expectations of insurgency on part of the Swedish-speaking population inside the duchy. Already in 1854, some alleged Swedish spies were caught, and it was established that one of them advised the coastal population to flee, as Franco-Swedish landing was awaited. The interrogation revealed that he examined the attitude of the Swedish-speaking population towards the neighbouring kingdom.⁷²

Berg simultaneously complained about the unfavourable spirit and provocative materials about Finland printed in Swedish journals during and after the war. He even presented these dangers as a reason to establish secret police, but his plans were curbed by the then head of the Third Section.⁷³ The degree of suspicion that Berg entertained provoked the educated society in the duchy, especially at the university. While he might not have stood behind every espionage scandal, the "atmosphere of surveillance" made the liberal-minded population put blame on him. One of such scandals, the Tamelander affair, when post-director's nephew travelled to Stockholm in 1855 to sonder the ground around the Finnish émigré and publicist Emil von Qvanten, was revealed by the students and put on the governor-general's shoulders.⁷⁴

Qvanten's activities came early on the radar of Berg's attention. The publication of his *Fennomani och Skandinavism* was quickly spotted by the administration. The text called for softening of a Fennoman extreme stance, Swedish intervention in the war for the emancipation of Finland under pan-Scandinavian aegis, and Finland's eventual union with Sweden.⁷⁵ As Qvanten legally was the subject of the Russian emperor, Berg requested his repatriation "under a plausible reason" during the summer of 1855, describing him as a dangerous agitator. This

communication was made through the envoy in Sweden, Jakov Dashkov.⁷⁶ The latter, however, found that even though Qvanten was unsympathetic towards Russia, there was no legal condition for his deportation while forceful operations could only agonise the public in Sweden.⁷⁷ Since this did not work, Qvanten was banned from entering the duchy. Berg's suspicion went further, and the November agreement between Sweden and the maritime powers made him suspect the Swedish-speaking coastal population of potential collaboration in case of war.⁷⁸

When the war was over, he kept on complaining about the clandestine correspondence network established at the University of Helsinki that agitated Finland to consolidate with Sweden and secede from the empire. While at first his dispatches pointed exclusively to the Finnish-Swedish line of communication, the larger picture of Scandinavian propaganda gradually shaped its presence in his reports. To weaken the "Swedish element" in the duchy, Berg opted to back up the domestic Fennoman movement though being sceptical about the potential of the "Finnish race" to become equal with civilised European counterparts.⁷⁹ This was not enough, and by summer 1860, Berg declared his suspicion over the existence of a "secret freemasonic society" in Finland to elicit Saint-Petersburg's attention.

Berg stated that while in Russia freemasonry societies vanished, in Sweden the king supported them, which was not a misconception.⁸⁰ In Finland, he continued, there was a party of liberal-minded youngsters who constantly sent their negative reports to be printed in Swedish journals. It was especially the pool of students who took part in the Tamelander affair that fell under his inspection. One of the most influential freemasons in Berg's opinion was Carl Dahlfelt, Swedish consul in Helsinki and the king's advisor. August Tobisen, the officer of the Third Section in Finland, shared Berg's suspicion, but the surveillance that the governor-general proposed he considered unfruitful.⁸¹ The central headquarters of the Third Section took Berg's request seriously.⁸²

Deploying its activities independently and with almost one year delay, the Third Section dispatched agent A.K. Hederstern to Scandinavia to sonder the ground there and to establish secret surveillance in Finland. While there was no mention of Scandinavianism in Berg's initial report, the surveillance gradually focused on the project as its central subject, "for at least the intrigues in Finland revolve around it."⁸³ Travelling through Sweden and Denmark, the agent reported on pronounced pan-Scandinavian sentiments there and, as he had a chance to travel to Christiania with Sven Gustaf Lallerstedt, a liberal Swedish politician, he was assured of the deep roots that this idea took in the region.⁸⁴ In Christiania, Hederstern contacted the Russian consul, Henrik Adolf Mechelin, who agreed to assist in the operation in the duchy.⁸⁵

One of Hederstern's correspondents in Helsinki noted that while he did not discover any organised propaganda, the spirit of "Scandinavianism was in the air, and in some cases in the blood of the old families of Scandinavian origin." Strained financial and political situation made the opinions of the Finnish inhabitants

vulnerable, and Scandinavian advocates could “breathe on sparks that were many.”⁸⁶ Mechelin also spotted the development of the idea of nationality in the duchy that was simultaneously, albeit in diverging ways, pursued by Fennomans and the “so-called Swedish party” which exhibited Scandinavian tendencies. The demands of this party aligned with the ambitions of Scandinavianism that “espoused the ideas of liberal institutions and independence.”⁸⁷ While no society has been uncovered, Scandinavianism as grasped by the agents appeared now conditioned by intra-duchy issues rather than by international agenda.⁸⁸

Berg’s request for surveillance on the part of the Third Section surprisingly turned against him. The governor-general’s extravagant policy in the duchy irritated a part of the administration and the public sphere.⁸⁹ The chancellery of minister state-secretary and the Third Section were used to provide feedback on him. From 1856 to 1861, Berg was accused of the breach of traditional rule, disrespect of the law and usurpation of power. These reports charged Berg both from liberal and conservative standpoints since he was also blamed for allying with Fennoman democrats.⁹⁰ In 1858, Stepan Baranovsky, professor of Russian at the University of Helsinki, compiled a report in which he accused Berg of deceit and egoism. Juggling with the fears of the imperial regime, he pointed to the fact that while before Berg’s appointment pan-Scandinavian sentiments almost disappeared, his restrictive measures revived the idea of Finland joining a Scandinavian union.⁹¹

In 1861, Hederstern, sent by the Third Section to sonder opinions, discovered the reason for disorder in Berg’s policy rather than in secret societies. He argued that the figure of the governor-general was unpopular while his policy went in disagreement with the laws of the duchy. The cure he saw was the replacement of the governor-general, which followed, though on Berg’s initiative, later the same year.⁹² The independence of the Third Section made it into an alternative source of knowledge and power in the duchy. During and after the war, it was being operated by officer August Tobisen in Finland. He reported monthly to the head of the gendarmerie about events and states of mind in the duchy. While there were many tendencies that elicited his attention, Scandinavianism was one of the largest among them towards the 1860s.⁹³

In the post-war atmosphere of change, both imperial administration and local bureaucrats witnessed and to a degree contributed to the birth of political groups that pushed forward their cultural and political agendas. To differentiate between them, those in power often intermixed traditional estate criteria with ethnic and ideological ones. The methods to deal with the Scandinavian issue also ranged from Berg’s scrupulous surveillance to claims that “powerful government should not be scared” of such nuisances.⁹⁴ Scandinavianism became a continuously present category defined not only by trans-Nordic public sphere but also by the conditions of local political contestation in Finland. In the debates on the direction of the railroads, financial situation and the governor-general’s policy, Scandinavianism simultaneously featured as a certain spatial, economically profitable and liberal argument, while its gradual withering in the administrative

documentation later referred to the growth of Fennomania rather than to the defeat of Denmark in 1864.⁹⁵

Imperial cabinets recognised the rhetorical power of performative Scandinavianist utterances and utilised them to prompt the establishment of secret surveillance, to request an allocation of resources or to challenge institutions of power that let it spread or scare them. The diversification of knowledge-production in the borderlands and recognition of the public sphere in the modernising empire made it possible to approach the problem of Scandinavianism in Finland from new standpoints. Instead of a secret society – probably the main internal fear of the Russian administration since the Decembrist uprising of 1825 – the administration discovered a challenge of another nature there, namely the power of the public opinion that widened and solidified throughout the era of the Great Reforms.⁹⁶

Conclusion: Imperial challenges

The expanded public sphere became a new phenomenon in the reformed imperial space that the authorities simultaneously could use but also should have reckoned with. After the defeat in the Crimean War, the intellectual debate pushed forward the idea of reforms that were designed to make the empire stronger.⁹⁷ The demand for modernisation and for the most radical in its scope, the emancipation of peasants, created a new category for describing the population of the central region of the empire – the Russian nation. This conceptual change created tension with rhetorically outdated signifiers of the traditional rule.⁹⁸

The changes that took place in Russian proper echoed in other composite parts, and Finland was no exception. The learned society there called for the reforms, primarily targeting the reestablishment of the representative body that convened in 1863. But the concepts of rule also migrated, and imperial cabinets instrumentalised ethnic distinction as a new category of control that ambiguously related to more flexible categories of estate and class. Although the category of estate remained central in legal terms, social engineering drew on new circuits of nationality and loyalty.⁹⁹ Thus in 1863 the head of the Third Section received a completely ethnographic analysis of the situation in the duchy:

The population of the country consists of two sharply distinct ethnicities: native Finns and Finlanders of Swedish descent. [...] These tribes (*plemena*) represent different characters with regard to education and morality.

While local Finns appeared “a serious, simple-minded, ascetic nation (*narod*),” Finlanders of Swedish descent were *built* different. The analysis described them as “energetic and dominating in all spheres”, though these differences were smoothing among middle and upper estates. Swedish Finlanders opposed to every Russian intervention into the affairs of the duchy, while their emancipation programme included “the establishment of a constitutional state [...], and one party even

dreams about an inclusion of Finland as a federal part of the future Scandinavian state.”¹⁰⁰ This ethnicisation reversed the analysis of present complications: while status positions could have been mediated to improve loyalty, the bond between ethnic Swedishness and opposition against the empire put more weight on nature than on nurture.

During the January Uprising in Poland in 1863, the empire found in Finland a structurally similar situation to that of Poland: a foreign-minded aristocracy ruled over a loyal peasant majority while Sweden represented a military hazard.¹⁰¹ Minister of war Dmitrii Milyutin, a nationalist moderniser, commented that the endeavour of the Swedish public sphere to use the situation to intervene into the Polish affair came to naught, while the minds of the Finnish population did not correspond to the hopes of Swedish radicals. He asserted that while Swedish aristocracy tended to share pan-Scandinavian aspirations, the conservative majority of the Finns was hostile towards these trends.¹⁰² The later expression of solidarity with Denmark during the war in Finland, and military volunteering as its epitome, also figured as a signal of disloyalty.¹⁰³

The unreliability of Swedishness was associated with the fear of Scandinavianism that arose in the aftermath of the Polish uprising. This “internal” Scandinavianism attracted as much attention as pronounced attempts to build a union between Denmark and Sweden-Norway in 1863–64. As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took an ambiguous stance during the Second Schleswig War, avoiding direct intervention, imperial public sphere voiced variegated opinions, from sympathising with Denmark and paralleling rebellious duchies to Poland to tolerating Prussian invasion, blaming the excesses of Danish democracy, and envisioning Schleswig-Holstein as a separate state.¹⁰⁴ Scandinavianism as a political project, however, was unanimously repudiated in the press and in the cabinets as incompatible with Russian interests. The defeat of Denmark in 1864 did not put an end to the persisting reproduction of the idea in the cabinets and public spheres of the Russian empire. In political, economic and military enterprises in Finland and in the “Russian North,” Scandinavianism kept on figuring as a dangerous tendency of the public opinion or conspirative trajectory of the foreign policy.¹⁰⁵

From small demonstrations of youngsters to the revolutionary complots of the crude politicians, from the streets of the Nordic capitals to the high cabinets of respective governments, from an idea ostensibly formulated by secret societies to a tendency of the public opinion, the vision of Scandinavianism migrated not only with its interior developments and foreign policy arrangements but also together with self-rationalising schemes of the empire, its categories of rule and matrixes of loyalty. While in the case of bourgeoisie demonstrations of the 1840s, the empire tended to use surveillance, prosecution and other disciplinary measures, the “import” of pan-Scandinavian ideas made it rethink its repertoire, reinforcing familiar instruments with a more sensible inquiry of the public opinion and social engineering that reprogrammed the pillars of imperial resilience.

Notes

- 1 Tommila, *Suomen autonomian*.
- 2 Gerasimov, Kusber and Semyonov, *Empire Speaks Out*.
- 3 LeDonne, "Frontier Governors General," 56–88.
- 4 Zagora, "Gendarme Control," 40–43; More on the institution: Abakumov, *Bezopasnost' prestola*, 1–63.
- 5 Schönle, Zorin and Evstratov, *The Europeanized Elite*, 155–96.
- 6 Mironenko, *Stranicy tajnoj istorii*, 107–96.
- 7 Kristiina Kalleinen, "The Nature of Russian Imperialism."
- 8 Krusius-Ahrenberg, "Finland och den svensk-ryska allianspolitiken."
- 9 Hemstad, "Scandinavianism: Mapping the Rise," 1–21.
- 10 Wulfert's report and consecutive documentation. GARF (Gosudarstvennij Arkhiv Rossijskoy Federacii, Moscow). F.8091. Op. 1. D. 2105. L. 1–10.
- 11 Ajrapetov, *Vneshnaja politika*, 142–61.
- 12 Hemstad, "I 'Tidens Fylde,'" 377–404.
- 13 Wulfert-Menshikov. 30 May/11 June 1843. RGAVMF (Rossiskij Gosudarstvennij Arkhiv Voenno-Morskogo Flota, Saint-Petersburg). F. 19. Op. 2. D. 54. L. 42.
- 14 Wulfert-Menshikov. 13/25 June 1843. RGAVMF. F. 19. Op. 2. D. 54. L. 40; 30 May/11 June 1843. L. 42; 4/16 June 1843. L. 47.
- 15 Glinka-Menshikov. 27 May/9 June 1843. RGAVMF. F. 19. Op. 3. D. 82. L. 4–5; Pipping, "Finlands ställning," 134–40.
- 16 Menshikov-Armfelt. 8/20 June 1843. RGAVMF. F. 19. Op. 3. D. 18. L. 84.
- 17 Student's letters. KA (Kansallisarkisto, Helsinki). Alexander Armfeltin arkisto. IIb 8a. 20 June/2 July 1843; Wendelen-Armfelt. 21 October 1843. Löfström-Armfelt. 3 November 1843; Aspelund's speech on the voyage read in 1844. KK (Kansalliskirjasto, Helsinki). Coll. 16.2. *Några ord [...]*.
- 18 Wulfert-Menshikov. 28 June/10 July 1845. RGAVMF. F. 19. Op. 2. D. 54. L. 112–13.
- 19 Minutes of the censorship committee. KA. Sensuurikomitea. Ca: 11. Pöytäkirjat 1844–48.
- 20 E.g. *Borgå Tidning*, no. 64, 14.08.1844; Harvard and Stadius, *Communicating the North*, 1–24; Kurunmäki and Marjanen, "Catching up through Comparison."
- 21 Secret letters to and from governor-general Menshikov. KA. KKK. Dd: 2.
- 22 Rieber, *Persistent Factors*, 315–59.
- 23 Becker-Christensen, *Skandinaviske dromme*; Holmberg, *Skandinavismen i Sverige*.
- 24 Wirtschafter, *From Victory to Peace*, 79–85.
- 25 Holmberg, *Skandinavismen i Sverige*; Glenthøj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*.
- 26 De Graaf, Vick, and de Haan, eds., *Securing Europe after Napoleon*; Wirtschafter, *From Victory to Peace*.
- 27 Glinka-Nesselrode. 13/25 May 1843. AVPRI (Arkhiv Vneshney Politiki Rossijskoy Imperii, Moscow). F. 133. Op. 496. G. 1843. D. 162. L. 77–88. Schulz, "The Construction of a Culture of Peace," 464–74.
- 28 Glinka-Nesselrode. 27 May/8 June 1843. L. 91–95; 31 May/12 June 1843. L. 96–103.
- 29 Neumann, "Russia as Europe's Other."
- 30 Glinka-Nesselrode. 31 May/12 June 1843. L. 101–103.
- 31 Nilsson, *I rörelse*, 124–31.
- 32 See also Hemstad's contribution to this volume.
- 33 Glinka-Nesselrode. 10/22 June 1843. L. 117.
- 34 *Disciplins-reglemente*, 8–11.
- 35 Stackelberg-Nesselrode. 22 June/4 July 1843. RA (Rigsarkivet, Copenhagen). DUA. P. 2477. S. 80–81.
- 36 Nesselrode-Stackelberg. 22 June/4 July 1843. S. 17–20.
- 37 Stackelberg-Nesselrode. 18/30 June 1843. S. 76–78.
- 38 Glenthøj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*, 231–32.

- 39 Becker-Christensen, *Skandinaviske drømme*, 110–17; Stackelberg-Nesselrode. 1/13 August 1843. S. 95–96; 4/16 September 1843. 104–106. See also Hemstad's contribution to this volume.
- 40 Nicolay-Nesselrode, 11/23 June 1845. RA. DUA. P. 2478. S. 297–98.
- 41 Ewers-Nesselrode. 23 June/5 July 1845. S. 303–304.
- 42 Holmberg, *Skandinavismen i Sverige*, 95–98.
- 43 Ewers-Nesselrode. 19 June/1 July 1845. RA. DUA. P. 2478. S. 300–302.
- 44 Koselleck, *Futures Past*, 80.
- 45 Björkman, "Må de herrskande klasserna darra," 119–29.
- 46 Menshikov-Nordenstam. 20 March/1 April 1848. KA. KKK. Dd: 2. n. 659–62.
- 47 Menshikov-Rokassovsky. 19/31 March 1848. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIB 34c. 230–237.
- 48 Krüdener-Nesselrode. 7/19 March 1848. AVPRI. F. 133. Op. 496. G. 1848. D. 167. L. 33–35.
- 49 Krüdener-Nesselrode. 5/17 April 1848. L. 84.
- 50 Hjalmar Haralds, *Sveriges utrikespolitik 1848*.
- 51 Møller, *Skandinavisk stræben*, 15–24.
- 52 Holmberg, *Skandinavismen i Sverige*, 140–41.
- 53 Hoetzsch, *Peter von Meyendorff*, II, 24–31.
- 54 For the manifesto see: Syn Otechestva n. 4. April 1848, 1–2. RGAVMF. F. 19. Op. 7 D. 134. L. 448. See also Ottosen's contribution to this volume.
- 55 Sternberg-Nesselrode. 28 April/10 May 1848. AVPRI. F. 133. Op. 496. G. 1848. D. 193. L. 407–10.
- 56 Krüdener-Nesselrode. 17/29 April 1848. AVPRI. F. 133. Op. 496. G. 1848. D. 167. L. 105.
- 57 Menshikov-Nesselrode. 12/24 May 1848. RGADA (Rossijskij Gosudarstvennij Arkhiv Drevnikh Aktov, Moscow). F. 11. Op. 1. D. 1201. L. 1–11.
- 58 Menshikov's diary. RGAVMF. F. 19. Op. 7 D. 134. L. 449ob.
- 59 Hoetzsch, *Peter von Meyendorff*, II, 84–85.
- 60 Lehmann, *Efterladte Skrifter*, 138–42.
- 61 Nesselrode, *Lettres et papiers*, 118–22.
- 62 *Helsingfors tidningar* 07.06.1848 no. 44; *Suometar* 30.06.1848 no 26; *Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti*, 1848.04.17.
- 63 Konstantin-Nicholas. Not dated. GARF. F. 622. Op. 1. D. 671. L. 39.
- 64 Nesselrode, *Lettres et papiers*, 106–109.
- 65 Hjelholt, *British Mediation*; Matthias Schulz, *Normen und Praxis*, 201–52.
- 66 See, for example: Saunders, "A Pyrrhic Victory."
- 67 Report of the ministry for year 1848. AVPRI. F. 137. Op. 475. G. 1848. D. 22.
- 68 Paasivirta, *Finland and Europe*, 106–16.
- 69 Berger and Miller, *Nationalizing Empires*, 23; Darius Staliūnas, *Making Russians*, 42–56.
- 70 Kurunmäki and Liikanen, "The Formation," 399–416.
- 71 Eriksson, *Svensk diplomati*, 294–338.
- 72 Interrogation report. KA. KKK. Fc 25. N. 336.
- 73 Berg-Armfelt. 11/23 May 1855. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIA 15. S. 37–49.
- 74 Klinge, *Studenter och idéer*, II, 31–48.
- 75 Qvanten, *Fennomani och Skandinavism*, I–II. See also Björk-Winberg and Egorov's contribution to this volume.
- 76 Berg-Nesselrode. 1 June 1855. AVPRI. F. Departament vnutrennikh shosheniy. Otd. 4. St. 4 t-4. Sekretniy arkhiv. Op. 306. D. 39. L. 1–10.
- 77 Dashkov-Senyavin. 23 June/5 July 1855. L. 11.
- 78 Berg's plan of the defence of Finland. RGAVMF. F. 410. Op. 2. D. 1214. L. 1–20.
- 79 Berg-Armfelt. 14/26 April 1856. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIA 15. S. 282–96.
- 80 Berg-Dolgorukow. 10/22 August 1860. GARF. F. 109. 1-eks. Op. 35. D. 206. L. 1. Glenthøj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang* and Ottosen, 399.

- 81 Dolgorukow-Berg. 26 October 1860. GARF. F. 109. 1-eks. Op. 35. D. 206. L. 16, 32–33.
- 82 Timashev-Tolstoy. 16 September 1860. L. 7.
- 83 Hederstern-Dolgorukow. 24 July/5 August 1861. L. 39.
- 84 Hederstern-Dolgorukow. 8/20 August 1861. L. 43–47.
- 85 Hederstern's plan. 8 May 1861. L. 33. H.A. Mechelin was Leo Mechelin's uncle.
- 86 Anonymous report. L. 54–56.
- 87 Mechelin-Dolgorukow. 24 September/6 October 1861. L. 57–59.
- 88 Sidorova and Scherbakova, *Rossia pod nadzorom*, 531–66.
- 89 Schweitzer, *The Rise and Fall*, 40–48.
- 90 GARF. F. 109. Op. 3a. Sekretniy arkhiv. D. 1351. L. 4–6. March 1857; GARF. F. 109. Op. 3a. Sekretniy arkhiv. D. 1352. 17 February 1858. L. 1–2.
- 91 Baranovsky-Alexander II. 14 May 1858. GARF. F. 109. Op. 3a. Sekretniy arkhiv. D. 1353. L. 1–2.
- 92 Hederstern's report. GARF. F. 109. 1-eks. Op. 35. D. 206. L. 35–36.
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- 98 Dolbilov, "Russification and the Bureaucratic Mind," 245–71.
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- 105 Agapov, "'Zagovor' protiv," 73–96.

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PART II

Pan-movements,
international influences
and networks



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6

PAN-NATIONALISMS ACROSS BORDERS

Scandinavianism in the community of nations, 1830–1870

Niri Ragnvald Johnsen

In scholarly literature, it has frequently been suggested that the pan-Scandinavian movement, most popular in the years 1830–70, was both similar to and influenced by contemporary pan-nationalisms, such as the German and Italian unification movements and pan-Slavism.¹ Yet, little effort has been made to elucidate *how* pan-Scandinavian activists viewed other, pan- and mono-national movements, and in what ways they were influenced by these. As a result, it remains unclear what role Scandinavianists assigned their prospective nation within the larger “community of nations” of mid-nineteenth-century Europe. Furthermore, it also remains unclear how and under which influences pan-nationalism as a *historical* category of thought – as opposed to an *analytical* one – came about and was cultivated in Scandinavia during the same period.

Building on the constructivist tradition of Benedict Anderson, historian Alexander Maxwell has recently warned students of pan-nationalism not to conflate the two categories. While analytical categories can be helpful – indeed they are often indispensable – he argues that the study of pan-nationalisms or “pan-nationhood” as a “category of political practice” must be a study of how historical actors themselves perceived the phenomenon.² Analytical definitions are, as a matter of course, based on studies of historically contingent variants of these phenomena. But whereas historical phenomena fluctuate and change, analytical concepts remain fixed, encompassing numerous variations across large swaths of time. As a result, some of the defining analytical criteria of pan-nationalisms, namely that they are inherently “chauvinistic,” seem to have been more apt to describe their incarnations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, than the earlier variants around the middle of the nineteenth century.³

In this chapter, then, I inquire how Scandinavianists themselves situated their movement in relation to other national movements in Europe around the middle of the nineteenth century, and to what extent contact with such movements

influenced their thinking and shaped their rhetoric. I study these questions using two separate, but complementary approaches. First, by studying interactions and correspondence between pan-Scandinavian activists and members of political émigré-communities from the 1830s and onwards. And second, by studying how other pan- and mono-national movements were invoked in pan-Scandinavian agitational material such as newspaper articles, pamphlets and public speeches made during the heydays of political Scandinavianism, roughly 1830–70.

Here, particular attention is given to national movements which the Scandinavianists themselves viewed as pan-movements, parallel to their own. Accordingly, no distinction is made between “pan-movements” and “unification movements,” as no such distinction appears in the sources – a fact mirroring John Breuilly’s assertion that the latter are merely a variant of pan-movements that were eventually successful in attaining statehood, such as the case was with Italy and Germany.⁴ Following Joep Leerssen’s discussion in this volume, I do however use the heuristic term “mono-nationalism” as a contrast to “macro-” or “pan-nationalism,” primarily when discussing the Polish national movement. Although even the Polish national movement could possibly be construed as a “unification nationalism,” as pointed out by Breuilly, it was seemingly never portrayed as such or as a pan-nationalism in contemporary, pan-Scandinavian rhetoric. Because it nonetheless played a crucial role in the European émigré-communities, as well as in the construction of the Scandinavianists’ self-understanding alongside contemporary pan-movements, it has been included in the present study.

The two approaches combine traditional close readings of print media and archival material with “distant readings” of an array of digitised newspapers from Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Great Britain, conducted with the help of proximity searches.⁵ Proximity searches make it possible to narrow the search down to instances where two or more keywords occur within a certain number of words of each other, thus making it easier to identify different discourses based on their most used terms – the basic assumption being that literal proximity on the page equals greater discursive proximity as well.⁶ In order to avoid typical pitfalls of distant reading such as random data-selection and the text-recognition software misreading the source material, the research has been complemented by systematic studies of archival sources and print material.⁷

The chapter is divided into two main parts. The first part of the chapter offers a discussion on how the relationship between (pan-)nations was generally understood in early-nineteenth-century thought. Focusing on the cosmopolitan pan-nationalism of Giuseppe Mazzini, I argue that this relationship was in fact generally not understood as a chauvinistic battle of all against all, but rather as a state of peace and fraternal co-operation. As a case study I then explore how the ideas and organisational networks of Mazzini were extended to Scandinavia via the political émigré Harro Harring. Harring was not only a close accomplice of Mazzini but also among the first to profess his support for a Scandinavian pan-nation within a wider system of pan-nations. The second

part of the chapter builds on the previous and investigates how pan-Scandinavian intellectuals and activists visualised other, contemporary pan- and mono-national movements. How the “pan-Scandinavian Others” studied here – that is the German and Italian unification movements, pan-Slavism and the Russian Empire and the Polish national liberation movement – were conceptualised is here explained by using metaphors of warfare: they could be construed as allies or rivals – but also, in conjunction with both the abovementioned, as inspirational models.

States of war and perpetual peace

When looking into how Scandinavianists perceived and situated themselves in relation to other nationalities, it is necessary to discern how the relationship between different pan- and mono-national movements was conceptualised in general. A useful entry point in this regard could be what some have seen as one of the defining ideological features of political pan-nationalism, namely the *threshold principle*. Originally coined by Eric Hobsbawm in his seminal study on the rise and nature of nationalism in nineteenth-century Europe, the term was used to denote the idea that small nation-states “had to be of a sufficient size to form a viable unit of development,” i.e., that they had to come together in larger states to survive in a world of aggression and expansionism.⁸ In recent years, Rasmus Glenthøj has argued that the threshold principle should be viewed as an integral part of political pan-nationalisms in general, as well as in the specific case of Scandinavianism.⁹

As Glenthøj points out, the tenet that small states ought to be bigger permeates the writings and speeches of the pan-Scandinavian movement. A newspaper article from 1847 by Norwegian Scandinavianist Georg Anton Krohg provides a typical example:

The dawning era portends the creation of colossal unions of related tribes, each on their own counting several million, and these will strive to exercise their influence on the overall human community. [...] Is therefore a Pan-Slavism, a Pan-Hellenism, a Pan-Latinism and a Pan-Germanism one of the European civilisation’s and culture’s great demands, then a Pan-Scandinavianism is it no less.¹⁰

For Krohg, a process of related tribes banding together was going on all over Europe. He presented it both as a process specific to modern times, while simultaneously assigning it a legitimacy of timelessness and universality by including reference to the amphictyony of Greek tribes in ancient times, here dubbed “Pan-Hellenism.”¹¹ His main point, however, was that this process was something all tribes or nations must give in to, in order to “exercise their influence on the overall human community.” For Scandinavia to claim its rightful place in the European community of nations, it needed to follow suit.

One thing that is often overlooked, or at least not sufficiently emphasised when dealing with the threshold principle, is that it appears to be founded upon a notion of perpetual war between nations, reminiscent of the Hobbesian *bellum omnium contra omnes*.¹² The phrase was famously used by seventeenth-century philosopher Thomas Hobbes to describe the uncertain prospect of individuals living in a theoretical state of nature, but could also, in his conception, be applied to the relationship between states in what has later been called an “international state of nature.”¹³ Glenthoj and Morten Nordhagen Ottosen have recently suggested that this notion of warfare or competition between nations could also be tied to the Social-Darwinist idea of the “survival of the fittest,” which was formulated by Herbert Spencer in the 1860s.¹⁴ Perhaps because of this perceived competitiveness, pan-nationalisms have often been regarded by scholars as inherently expansionistic and chauvinistic.¹⁵

However, even though the relationship between nations was indeed frequently conceptualised as one of antagonism and rivalry, around the middle of the nineteenth century it would more often be conceptualised as one of peace and brotherly co-operation.¹⁶ The Hobbesian notion of perpetual warfare between states had already in the late eighteenth century found its counterpart in the Kantian idea that perpetual peace could be ensured through a federation of states. For Immanuel Kant, the “inevitable *antagonism*” between states would eventually lead to the formation of a “state among states,” ensuring a state of peace and security.¹⁷ Later, this cosmopolitan idea was developed in Giuseppe Mazzini’s theory of nationality and the Young Europe-movement, founded in 1834.¹⁸ As I will argue in the following, Mazzini’s ideas and organisational networks would later become a major influence on the pan-Scandinavian movement and its activists.

A particularly important influence from Mazzini’s cosmopolitan nationalism was his multi-level analysis of nationality. As scholars on Mazzini have highlighted, he ascribed the nation a crucial role as “the medium between the individual and humanity.”¹⁹ In similar fashion, many pan-Scandinavian activists tied their goals of a united Scandinavia together with a future, cosmopolitan union of all peoples. Swedish pamphleteer Emil Key, writing during the First Schleswig War of 1848–51, argued that “all peoples who have hitherto remained divided and underdeveloped must strive towards attaining as much freedom [...] as their neighbours possess.” If true equality was achieved in this regard, he continued, “[t]he Earth will become a single federation.”²⁰

Cosmopolitanism and nationalism, or in Key’s parlance, “universality and nationality,” were thus regarded as complementary. It should be noted that by “nationality” Key here specifically meant pan-nationalism, that is a nationalism based on the concept of “fragmented tribes” banding together, which can be recognised from Krohg’s quotation above. The moniker “tribe” would generally be ascribed to what was perceived to be regions within the pan-nation. As Swedish university teacher Per Adam Siljeström stated during the Second Scandinavian student meeting in 1845: just as Prussians and Saxons were both Germans, Norwegians, Danes and Swedes were all Scandinavians. Moreover,

Germans, Scandinavians, Slavs and so on should in his view consider themselves “Europeans, or as world citizens.”²¹ Key similarly prophesied that the ongoing merger of nations would ultimately result in the establishment of a “world republic.”²²

In this multi-level conception of nationality, peace and co-operation between nations become more important than expansionism and competition. Siljeström showcased this peaceful sentiment explicitly in his speech, describing the idea of Nordic unity as follows: “Marvellous phenomenon! – Millions united, not to *fight* – for there is no need for fighting – but to *live* for one idea!”²³ Following from this peaceful, non-chauvinist conception of nationality and the relationship between nations, different nations could be construed as natural allies. This line of thinking allowed for co-operation between national movements and led to the establishment of what Joep Leerssen has called “an international network of nationalist movements,” and Gavin Murray-Miller has termed “broader revolutionary communities beyond the nation.”²⁴

International networks and ideological transfer: Giuseppe Mazzini and Harro Harring

During the first part of the nineteenth century, a series of networks were established between pan- and mono-national movements of Europe. These networks were generally established and cultivated in communities of political exiles working to liberate their nations from the arbitrary rule of empires that characterised post-Napoleonic Europe.²⁵ For instance, when Giuseppe Mazzini established his Young Italy in 1831, it was as a political exile in Marseille. Three years later he would go on to establish the pan-European organisation Young Europe together with German, Polish and other Italian exiles in Bern.

In August 1833, shortly before Mazzini established his Young Europe, he met the painter, poet and freedom fighter Harro Harring in Geneva. He soon became one of Mazzini’s most ardent supporters and close allies, even joining him, Giuseppe Garibaldi and a band of German and Polish exiles in a failed attempt to invade the Kingdom of Savoy in 1834.²⁶ Having been born in Schleswig in 1798, Harring embodied the multi-ethnic composition of the Danish empire during the first part of the nineteenth century: Frisian was his mother tongue, but he learned Danish and German early on.²⁷ As an adult he would however repeatedly identify as a Scandinavian, dreaming of “a free, united fatherland, from North cape to the Eider Strand [i.e., the banks of the river Eider]”.²⁸

Even though Harring himself was somewhat of an outsider to the pan-Scandinavian movement – he spent most of his adult life outside Scandinavia – he remained one of the first and most ardent international advocates of pan-Scandinavian unity.²⁹ In this regard he was also deeply influenced by Mazzini, who supported the idea of Scandinavian unity. According to Harring’s somewhat boastful foreword to the third edition of his popular novel *Dolores* (wherein

Harring dedicated the novel to Mazzini), the two men shared the same ideas even prior to meeting each other in the early 1830s:

In conformity with my consciousness of nationality [...], I conceived the idea of a *Scandinavian National Union*, founded on the principles of *Democracy*; the *Scandinavian Republic*, connected with the [...] necessity of a moral, spiritual, and practical *Alliance* of the European nations. The same thought of an Alliance of Nations was contemplated by you, also, *Mazzini*, at the same time, without our personal acquaintance, nor correspondence.³⁰

Upon meeting Mazzini, Harring immediately joined his organisational efforts. According to Harring himself, he became an affiliated member of *Junges Deutschland* and *La Giovine Italia*. More importantly, however, he took on the mantle as representative of a Scandinavian sub-branch of Young Europe, “Young Scandinavia” – seemingly as its sole member.³¹ He also became among the first people to use the term “Young Scandinavia.” In a poem allegedly written in 1834 he hailed its imminent advent, predicting that a union of Norwegians, Swedes and Danes – “peoples of the same blood” – would soon emerge, along with “European unity” and a “league of nations” (*Völker-Bund*). The latter term had, incidentally, originally been coined by Kant some 40 years prior.³²

The poem shows that Harring shared Mazzini’s cosmopolitan pan-nationalism, and the ideal of fraternal co-existence among nations. A case in point being that Harring dubbed Germany as “Scandinavia’s sister.”³³ For many Scandinavianists, particularly in Harring’s native Denmark, pan-Germanism and the prospect of a German state were seen as an existential threat to Scandinavia. Harring, on the other hand, was an avid supporter of both German and Scandinavian unification, often criticising the current dismemberment (*Zerstücklung*) and pettiness (*Kleinlichkeit*) of German states.³⁴ Several years later, shortly after the seize-fire of the First Schleswig War of 1848–51, he would urge Scandinavians and Germans to set aside their differences and shake hands at the river Eider “in brotherly love.”³⁵

Like Mazzini, Harring viewed bigger, pan-national units and fraternal cooperation between peoples as a prerequisite for freedom and peace on the entire European continent. And just as Mazzini saw the nation as a medium between the individual and humanity, Harring also professed a multi-level, cosmopolitan idea of nationality, springing from mono-national “tribes” via pan-national “nations,” to Europe and finally to all of Humanity. Writing in 1851, he expressed this idea succinctly: “Nations consist of tribes; Humanity of Nations.”³⁶ Strikingly, his vision of a Scandinavia from North Cape to the banks of the Eider hence simultaneously entailed freedom and co-existence among large nation units from “Cape Otranto to North Cape.”³⁷

The goal for Harring, as well as the means to attain it, was “The liberation of humanity on *the basis of nationality*,” as he wrote to the Swedish Scandinavianist Oscar Patric Sturzen-Becker in the summer of 1851. In the letter, which also

contained direct references to Mazzini, he elaborated: “Humanity neither can nor will ever be free, without the nations [of the world] condensing into a united state (*Stats-Eenhed*) based on democratic principles, I mean in related tribes as one Nation.”³⁸

This letter to Sturzen-Becker, one of the main agitators within the pan-Scandinavian movement, brings us to the question of whether Harring managed to transfer his – and by proxy Mazzini’s – ideas to members of the movement. In addition to the letter to Sturzen-Becker, he also sent letters to the pan-Scandinavian newspaper editors August Sohlman and Johan Sandwall in Sweden, and he claimed to have Scandinavian “compatriots” and “friends” in Gothenburg and Stockholm as well as in Norway and Denmark – although whilst complaining that his pen pals in the latter countries would not reply to his letters.³⁹

Interestingly, it appears that Harring did in fact not primarily direct his pan-national efforts at the members of the Scandinavianists movement, but rather at representatives of the contemporary democratic labour movements in Norway and Sweden. For about six months during 1849–50 he stayed in the Norwegian capital of Christiania, where he became affiliated with the Norwegian labour agitator Marcus Thrane. During his stay he kept in touch with Mazzini, receiving letters from him in London.⁴⁰ Shortly after Harring’s arrival in the Norwegian capital, Thrane sent a letter to one of his peers in the Swedish labour movement, writing that he dreamed of a union of all civilised peoples in a federative republic. This “fraternal society” of nations would together “end all war.”⁴¹ A few months later Harring was evicted from Norway following his anti-monarchical play *Testamentet fra America*, in which he made repeated references to “Young Europe.”⁴²

After his exile, both Thrane and the above-mentioned Sandwall, who was also the leader of the Gothenburg labour association, received a “Scandinavian declaration” from Harring, written by him in the capacity as representative of “Young Scandinavia,” clearly referring to the sub-branch of Young Europe which he had established in the early 1830s.⁴³ In the declaration he proposed the gathering of a Scandinavian parliament in Gothenburg.⁴⁴ Simultaneously he offered to represent the Scandinavian labour associations at a global conference to be held in London during the summer of 1851. This conference was again organised by the “Central European Democratic Comittée,” a London-based umbrella-organisation headed by Mazzini as an offspring of his Young Europe organisation.⁴⁵

Allies, rivals and models: Conceptualising Scandinavianism’s constitutive Others

The act of articulating a Scandinavian “self,” that is a Scandinavian national identity, required Scandinavianists to situate themselves in relation to similar movements. National identities, like all forms of identities and modes of self-awareness

– be they individual, national, regional – are formed by the dialectical interplay between the self and a constitutive Other. This philosophical point can be traced back to the phenomenology of G.W.F. Hegel and his theory of the genesis of self-awareness in the individual.⁴⁶ Edward Said, one of the many researchers who have since adopted the concept, has shown how it is also applicable to the construction of supra-individual cultural units such as “the Occident” and “the Orient.” He writes: “The construction of identity [...] involves the construction of the opposite ‘others’ whose actuality is always subject to the continuous interpretation and reinterpretation of their differences from ‘us.’”⁴⁷

Said’s assertion is also applicable to the relationship between states and national movements. In particular, the German and Italian unification movements, the Polish emancipation struggle and the pan-Slavic struggle figured prominently in pan-Scandinavian rhetoric. They all functioned as constitutive Others with whom the Scandinavianists could compare themselves, sometimes as antagonistic rivals, sometimes as allies. Correspondingly the relationship between nations could be conceptualised either as a state of war or a state of peace and fraternal co-existence. Additionally, other movements could be viewed as exemplary models, often in conjunction with the role of ally, or even that of rival.

As discussed above, in the Mazzinian conception of the relationship between different pan- and mono-nations, all nations were seen as natural allies. Their common enemy were authoritarian, multi-ethnic empires, which were opposed to Mazzini’s core tenets: national sovereignty, republicanism and democracy. This is showcased in a letter Mazzini wrote to a Polish émigré after the outbreak of Polish January uprising of 1863, wherein Polish liberation and unification was the goal. Here he suggested that the Italians should have supported the insurrection by attacking Austria, which “would have given the signal for a crusade of nationalities” against empires.⁴⁸ Meanwhile, Mazzini’s protégé Harring would later argue that the only way to defeat imperial despotism was if the nations of Europe supported each other, stating that the “Russian despots can only be crushed by a united Scandinavia and a united Italy, connected with a Greek confederation, all based upon the same principles of freedom.”⁴⁹

Within the pan-Scandinavian movement, some nations were more readily invoked as allies than others. Alongside the Italian unification movement, this was particularly the case with the Polish movement, which early on was referenced in pan-Scandinavian rhetoric.⁵⁰ Having famously been partitioned three times and split between the Russian and Austrian Empires and Prussia during the eighteenth century, the Polish case constituted proof to the Scandinavianists of their deepest fear: that old and venerable nations could indeed be annihilated and cease to be, especially if they were of an insufficient size and lacking in military power. As has recently been argued, the Polish partitions “may be regarded as a foundational trope for territorial loss in nineteenth-century nationalisms in the Baltic Sea region.”⁵¹ As such, the Polish example and prospect of future “Scandinavian” partitions could be invoked as a cautionary doomsday-tale in the face of foreign threats.⁵²

During the 1850s, following the Crimean war and the increased geo-political tensions between the East and the West, Poland gradually transformed from cautionary doomsday-tale to close-knit ally in a shared battle for freedom in pan-Scandinavian rhetoric. One Swedish Scandinavianist, writing in 1862, exemplifies this turn:

The Danish-German and Polish questions are both well suited to accelerate and promote the development of the *idea of unity*, upon which rests not only the future happiness and well-being of Norden, but also that of Europe in its entirety. A strong and united Scandinavia would exercise a mighty influence on European politics, which would be so much more crucial seeing as the three Scandinavian realms together form civilisation's last outpost against the barbarity, which Russia, the evil spirit of Europe, so wickedly continues to keep alive. [...] Against one such *mutual* enemy must therefore be formed a *mutual* defence.⁵³

As this quotation typifies, the argument was frequently made that Scandinavia and Poland were natural allies in a common struggle against The Russian Empire, "The evil spirit of Europe," and to a lesser extent against Prussia. Both Scandinavia and Poland, it was argued, were caught in a middle position between East and West, understood at the same time as the line between freedom and democracy on the one side, and arbitrary tyranny on the other. In accordance with Hegelian notions of all nations having their own historical mission, Scandinavia and Poland were both portrayed as the nations that were to withstand and break the shackles of eastern tyranny, thereby ending imperial rule in Europe and ushering in a new era of freedom and fraternal co-operation between nations. Both were thus ascribed the role of "bulwark nations."

While the trope of "bulwark nation" had been an integral part of Polish national mythology long before the nineteenth century, it did not have the same historical resonance in Scandinavia. Swedish Scandinavianists did portray Scandinavia as a "dam" and "bulwark" against the "barbarity" in the East as early as in 1845, but it was during the Crimean War that the trope came into common use. Drawing inspiration from Poland, the use of the trope would often include reference to Poland as a compatriot bulwark nation.⁵⁴ "Who is first and foremost Poland's natural ally and brother in arms, if not the young Scandinavia, surrounded as it is by the same overconfident neighbours?" asked one Swede at a public meeting in 1863. At the same meeting, another Scandinavianist underscored that "lasting peace in Europe cannot be won before the angel of liberty everywhere has defeated the dark spirits of despotism" and that "a free, autonomous and mighty Poland south of the Baltic Sea for the future balance in Europa is of as great importance as a concordant Scandinavia to the North!"⁵⁵

Among Danish Scandinavianists, there reigned a certain disdain for the Swedes' infatuation with Poland, as they feared it could overshadow their own, military needs.⁵⁶ Here, the main antagonist and largest existential threat

was Prussia and the encroaching Germanism. Taking a sort of middle ground between the two positions, the Norwegian pan-Scandinavian newspaper editor Georg Anton Krohg was enthusiastic about the Polish struggle, but instead argued that Slavic and Scandinavian peoples were allies in a mutual war against German unification.⁵⁷

Even though Prussia and pan-Germanism was often portrayed as Scandinavia's main rival, multiple pan-Scandinavian intellectuals would also portray the German pan-movement as a model. For example: In May 1848, during an inaugural banquet for the newly founded Scandinavian association (*Skandinaviska Föreningen*) in Gothenburg, a speaker expressed the admiration and sympathy felt for "the grand liberation movements in Italy and Germany" and their "just struggle for *unity*" by the citizens of the "Scandinavian Norden."⁵⁸ Here, Germany was included as a model alongside Italy, even though the most widely discussed news case at the time was the newly started First Schleswig War.

Another example of this seemingly ambivalent relationship towards Germany and Germanism can be found in the writings of the most prominent pan-Scandinavian intellectual in Norway during the period, Ludvig Kristensen Daa. In 1843, he too referenced both *Giovine Italia* and *Junges Deutschland* as inspirational models for the idea of "Nordic Unity" in his periodical *Granskeren*.⁵⁹ In 1849, after the outbreak of the First Schleswig War, he would repeat the sentiment, stating that it was in Germany that the "idea of unity" had been discussed most thoroughly. Formulating a pan-Scandinavian political programme was therefore a matter of finding the German insights' "application to our Scandinavian conditions."⁶⁰ Even though Daa frequently warned against a chauvinistic and expansionistic pan-Germanism, he would keep on supporting the *idea* of German unification as such – that is, a unification restricted to what he deemed to be the proper, Germanic areas. Even after the Danish defeat in the Second Schleswig War of 1864, he and the Norwegian Scandinavian association (*Skandinavisk Selskab*) would still uphold both the Italian and German examples as inspirational models for a Scandinavian union. During the association's meetings Germany could be invoked as a model, stating that "what has succeeded between 37 German states must certainly succeed between three Nordic states."⁶¹

The above-mentioned pamphleteer Emil Key also acknowledged, even commended, the German pan-movement. In an agitational piece written shortly after the outbreak of the First Schleswig War, he wrote that the pan-German movement "is grand, is noble, just as every such struggle, wherever it may appear." He too therefore supported the *idea* of a German nation, but, like Daa, rejected the current movement as chauvinistic, illiberal and needlessly self-aggrandising. For Key, Scandinavia's historical and geo-political mission was defined in opposition to this variant of pan-Germanism, with Scandinavia taking on the role of a bulwark nation. Scandinavia's mission, then, was to unite as one and form a "living dam" against the pan-German "flood" or "lavine." Seeing Scandinavia as a bulwark nation, Key would also state that Scandinavia

was to play an important role in the battles to come between the East and the West, and therefore had to “concentrate, amalgamate [...] just like every other nation in our era.”⁶²

Meanwhile, whereas the pan-German movement was conceived of both as a rival and a model, the Italian movement was generally seen as both an ally and a model. During the fifth Scandinavian student meeting in Copenhagen in 1862, the Danish pastor B. Birkedal would utter the sentiment with an exclamation mark: “Look to Italy!”⁶³ The wording is indicative of how the Italian unification movement was treated in pan-Scandinavian rhetoric, particularly after the advent of the Second Italian Independence War in 1859 accelerated the process of Italian unification. As the news of progress in the Italian unification movement reached Scandinavia and was coupled with what was perceived as a sharpened threat from The Russian Empire and Prussia, Italy was taken as a model for Nordic unity. The Swedish King Carl XV was proclaimed the “Scandinavian Victor Emmanuel,” while the question was raised as to who would be the Scandinavians’ Garibaldi and Camillo Cavour.⁶⁴

The search for Scandinavian equivalents would, however, not be restricted to finding heroes, but also to drawing geographical parallels. Finland, which was ceded by Sweden to The Russian Empire during the Napoleonic wars, was for instance likened to Lombardy-Venice under Austrian rule. Meanwhile, Sweden was to be to Scandinavia what Piedmont-Sardinia had been to Italy: a driving force in the unification process.⁶⁵ Or as pan-Scandinavian propagandist and admirer of Cavour, Gustaf Lallerstedt, stated in the Swedish parliament in 1857: “What Sardinia is to Italy Sweden should be to Scandinavia. Sweden has its nemesis in Russia, Sardinia has its own [nemesis] in Austria; Italy has Lombardy, Scandinavia Finland.”⁶⁶ The driving idea behind these parallels was succinctly formulated in a two-part article in the Swedish newspaper *Fäderneslandet*, fittingly entitled “Italy and Scandinavia,” where it was argued that “what is true in the South must also be true in the North.”⁶⁷

Conclusion

It is often said that nothing is more international than nationalism; even though national movements would view themselves as unique, during the long nineteenth century nationalist ideology was transferred between proponents of different movements as part of “the internationalisation of nationalism.”⁶⁸ This “identity trade between nations,” as Anne-Marie Thiesse has called it,⁶⁹ would often be carried out through print media, as nationalists in one area related their movements to others. However, it could also result from contact between individuals, either through face-to-face contact or through correspondence.

Scandinavianism did not evolve in a vacuum. In conceptualising their project, pan-Scandinavians frequently referred to other contemporary pan- and mono-national movements, treating them as models, allies or rivals. For pan-Scandinavian activists, the German, Italian, pan-Slavic and Polish movements – to only

mention the ones treated here – all in different ways functioned as constitutive Others in the construction of a pan-Scandinavian self.

The role of exemplary model could in theory be ascribed to all other nations, but in practice it was predominantly applied to the Italian and Polish unification movements. In establishing Scandinavia's role within the broader European community of nations, Scandinavianists imported and re-purposed several rhetorical figures from these movements. Scandinavia's mission as a "bulwark nation" against the Russian threat to the East – and sometimes also against the encroachment of Germanism in the South – was heavily inspired by contemporary images of Poland. Moreover, Scandinavia was often conceptualised as a "new Italy," particularly by Swedish Scandinavianists. Multiple parallels were drawn between the two projects, such as Scandinavia needing a "Victor Emmanuel of the North," Finland being the "Lombardy" or "Venice of the North" and Sweden being the "Piedmont-Sardinia of the North."⁷⁰

The roles of allies and rivals, which could both be combined with the role of exemplary model, were drawn from a general theory of the relationship between nations, which was conceptualised as a duality of war and peace. During the infancy and subsequent heydays of Scandinavianism during the first to middle part of the nineteenth century, Giuseppe Mazzini, following in the philosophical footsteps of Immanuel Kant, developed a theory of nationalism in which it was perceived that the inherent state of war between nations would gradually become a state of perpetual peace. This process was imagined as a multi-step process starting with the coming together of related "tribes" in larger "nations," and eventually in a cosmopolitan union of all of humanity.

Mazzini was also one of the driving ideological agents behind this era's "internationalisation of nationalism," that is, the dispersion of universal nationalist theories among different national movements. Through networks of political émigrés scattered across the continent, his ideas were spread far and wide. Their application to Scandinavia was first and most clearly formulated by the Frisian painter, poet and freedom fighter Harro Harring. For Harring, like Mazzini, Scandinavianism was merely a step towards pan-European and cosmopolitan unity for all humanity and the end of all empires.

Harring never found himself at the centre of the pan-Scandinavian movement. Although he followed it intently and tried to establish contact with some of its leading figures, his republican ideas were seemingly at odds with the dynastic machinations of his Scandinavian peers. Whereas they dreamed of a "Victor Emmanuel of the North," he would dream of a "*Washington of the North*."⁷¹ Consequently, he would instead direct his main agitational efforts at establishing a Scandinavian state at the popular, radical labour movements in Norway and Sweden, which at the time was inclined towards internationalism and republicanism. However, as one of the first people to place Scandinavia within a wider framework of cosmopolitan pan-nationalism, he contributed to establishing a language of Scandinavianism which can be recognised among later adherents of the movement.

Notes

- 1 Clausen, *Skandinavismen*, ix; Sanness, *Patrioter*, 1; Eimer, *Cavour*; Thorkildsen, "Skandinavismen," 191; Andersson, *Making Politics*, 9; Hemstad, Møller and Thorkildsen, "Skandinavismen som visjon," 10. A laudable exception that goes beyond merely suggesting is the recent Glenthøj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*.
- 2 Anderson, "Imagined Communities"; Maxwell, "Pan-Nationalism," 4.
- 3 Arendt, "Imperialism"; Snyder, *Macro-Nationalisms*, 5–7.
- 4 Breuille, "Nationalism and National Unification"; Maxwell, "Pan-Nationalism."
- 5 See Moretti, *Distant Reading*. All these newspapers are accessible online through the webpages <https://www.nb.no/>, <https://tidningar.kb.se/>, <https://www2.statsbiblioteket.dk/mediestream/> and <https://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/>, the latter for a fee.
- 6 For example, when searching for instances where the Scandinavian, German and Italian unification projects were compared, the proximity search command "Scandinavia Italy Germany"~25 has proven useful.
- 7 For pitfalls connected to the fact that now "historians can find without knowing where to look"; see Putnam, "The Transnational," 377.
- 8 Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 30f.
- 9 Glenthøj, "The Threshold Principle and the Existential Fear of Being too Small"; Glenthøj, "Skandinavismen som politisk nødvendighed," 230.
- 10 *Den Constitutionelle* 13.1.1847. All translations are my own unless otherwise indicated.
- 11 A similar reference to the amphictyony of ancient Greece is made in Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," 10.
- 12 "The war of all against all."
- 13 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 104; Malnes, *The Hobbesian Theory of International Conflict*, 49–50.
- 14 Glenthøj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*, 42.
- 15 Arendt, "Imperialism"; Snyder, *Macro-Nationalisms*, 5–7.
- 16 Cf. Glenthøj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*, 133, who claim the opposite.
- 17 Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," 10. Translations to English by David L. Colclasure. See also, Kant, "Towards Perpetual Peace."
- 18 Urbinati, "Mazzini's Democracy"; Sarti, "Giuseppe Mazzini and Young Europe." See also Ottosen's contribution to this volume.
- 19 Bayly and Biagini, "Introduction," 15.
- 20 Key, *Om Skandinaviens framtid*, 16.
- 21 *Berättelse*, 198–199.
- 22 Key, *Politiska funderingar*, 5–11.
- 23 *Berättelse*, 197.
- 24 Leerssen, *National Thought*, 160; Murray-Miller, *Revolutionary Europe*, 111.
- 25 See Evgenii Egorov and Mikael Björk-Winberg's contribution(s) to this volume.
- 26 Harring would also become an ally to Garibaldi, even modelling the title character of his novel *Dolores* after Garibaldi's wife. *Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning* 11.6.1850.
- 27 Ladewig, *Harro Harring*, 3.
- 28 Harring, *Poesie eines Scandinavens*, 28; *Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning* 7.3.1851. For more instances see Ladewig, *Harro Harring*, 10, 15, 18.
- 29 Harring's position as outsider to the pan-Scandinavian movement has also been noted by Becker-Christensen, *Skandinaviske drømme*, 85; Ladewig, *Harro Harring*, 8.
- 30 Harring, *Dolores*, iv.
- 31 Harring, *Historisches Fragment*, 6–7; Saager, *Giuseppe Mazzini*, 111. On the existence of this branch, see Schraepfer, "Geheimsbündelei," 65; Volkmer, *Kriegsverhütung*, 134.
- 32 According to Koselleck, "The Temporalisation of Concepts," 22.
- 33 See reprint version in Harring, *Die Möwe*, 53–54; Harring, *Poesie eines Scandinavens*, 104–105.

- 34 Indeed, he portrayed dismemberment of states as a specifically “German curse” in his 1848-poem “Mehr umschlungen!” Quoted in Thode, “Lebenslauf,” 226. As Hobsbawm points out, derogatory terms such as these were in common use in German at the time. After 1848 most of them condensed into the derogatory concept “Partikularismus.” Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 31; Veit-Brause, “Partikularismus.”
- 35 *Drammens Tidende* 14.3.1851: 1.
- 36 *Drammens Tidende* 16.3.1851.
- 37 Cape Otranto being the south-easternmost tip of Italy. *Correspondenten* 1.7.1864: 2.
- 38 Harro Haring to Oscar Patric Sturzen-Becker 9.5.1851, Oscar Patrik Sturzen-Beckers arkiv. Brev till Sturzen-Becker, National Archives of Sweden: RA/720688: E5679. A few months later, Haring would repeat this paragraph almost verbatim, but translated to German in Haring, *Entstehung*, 12.
- 39 Harro Haring to August Sohlman [undated, 1850], August Sohlmans politiska korrespondens, National Library of Sweden: KB1/Ep. S 42. Here he might refer to the Danish Scandinavianist Orla Lehmann, whom he had written a fervorous letter in May 1848, without response. Before this, Haring had also dedicated a poem to Lehmann, dubbing him “Scandinavia’s Son.” Degn, “Harro Haring,” 156–57; Haring, *Poesie eines Scandineve*, 157–59.
- 40 A fragment of one letter was published in Haring’s Norwegian newspaper *Folkets Røst*, as well as reprinted in *Morgenbladet* 7.5.1850.
- 41 Marcus Thrane to Fredrik Theodor Borg 8.1.1850, quoted in Koht, *Marcus Thrane*, 62.
- 42 Haring, *Testamentet*, 62, 66, 68, 71, 77, 119 etc.
- 43 See the final part of his declaration in *Arbeider-Foreningernes Blad* 31.5.1851 and Haring, *Historisches Fragment*, 6–7.
- 44 A copy of the letter to Thrane (in Danish) is kept in the National Archives of Norway, Lovenskiolds stattholderrapporter, RA/EA-4022/H/L0215-L0216. It was also later published in multiple contemporary newspapers in Norway and Sweden, e.g., *Christiania-Posten* 31.7.1851; *Post- och Inrikes Tidningar* 5.8.1851. An earlier, abridged letter to Sandwall was published in the latter’s newspaper *Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning* 7.3.1851. Gothenburg was a popular pick as prospective capital of Scandinavia, see Glenthøj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*, 160, 453, 467–68; Sanness, *Patrioter*, 9.
- 45 Hanschmidt, *Republikanisch-demokratischer*, 69–82.
- 46 Berenson, “Hegel on Others and the Self.”
- 47 Said, *Orientalism*, 332.
- 48 Mazzini, *A Cosmopolitanism of Nations*, 143. For Mazzini’s influence on Polish political émigrés, see Procyk, *Mazzini’s Young Europe*.
- 49 *Jersey Independent* 14.5.1859.
- 50 For more on how the Polish national movement was viewed in Scandinavia, see Postén, *De polska emigranternas*; Halicz, *Russia and Denmark*, 219–94.
- 51 Bohlin, Grönstrand and Kinnunen, “Introduction,” 5.
- 52 The loss of Schleswig was generally construed as the first partition of Scandinavia, see *Dagligt Allehanda*, 29.4.1848; Johnsen, *Skandinavismen og pressen*, 43. Alternatively, Sweden’s cession of Finland to Russia in 1809 would by some, especially by Swedish Scandinavianists, be seen as the first partition. For Finland and Scandinavianism in general see Barton, “Scandinavianism, Fennomania,” but also Egorov and Björk-Winberg’s joint contribution to this volume.
- 53 *Politisk Tidskrift för Sveriges Allmoge* 4 (1862): 254.
- 54 *Berättelse*, 191–92. For the concept of Bulwark nations in general and its place in Polish national mythology especially, see Berezhnaya and Hein-Kircher, *Rampart Nations*; Srodecki, *Antemurale Christianitatis*; Pekacz, “‘Antemurale’ of Europe.”
- 55 *Nya Wermlandsposten* 10.4.1863.
- 56 Glenthøj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*, 388–90.

- 57 Sanness, *Patrioter*, 494.
- 58 *Göteborg Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning* 24.5.1848. See also Hemstad's contribution to this volume.
- 59 *Granskeren* 15.6.1843. I am grateful to Ruth Hemstad for bringing this article to my attention.
- 60 Daa, *Danmark – russisk eller skandinavisk?* 36.
- 61 Hansen, *Skandinavisk selskab*, 126–28.
- 62 Key, *Om Skandinaviens framtid*, 20, 54, 51–52.
- 63 *Fædrelandet* 17.6.1862: 565.
- 64 See for instance *Aftonbladet* 12.9.1863; Glenthøj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*, 84, 165, 320.
- 65 E.g., *Aftonbladet* 10.6.1857; 14.2.1860: 2; *Nye Dagligt Allehanda* 28.10.1861: 2.
- 66 *Aftonbladet* 10.6.1857. Notably, the parallel between Piedmont–Sardinia and Sweden had already been drawn by Cavour some years prior, Eimer, *Cavour and Swedish Politics*, 133. For Lallerstedt, Cavour and the *Risorgimenti* as a model for Scandinavian unity, see also Quiricio, “Garibaldi and Sweden,” 19; Furlani, “Italiens enande.”
- 67 *Fäderneslandet* 28.11.1860: 2; 1.12.1860: 1.
- 68 Bayly and Biagini, “Introduction,” 5.
- 69 Thiesse, “National Identities,” 125; Bohlin, Grönstrand and Kinnunen, “Introduction,” 6.
- 70 For Scandinavia as a “New Italy,” see *Aftonbladet* 7.7.1864.
- 71 Everett, “Harro Harring,” 578.

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7

EMIL VON QVANTEN, MIKHAIL BAKUNIN AND PAN-NATIONAL ACTIVIST NETWORKS

Mikael Björk-Winberg and Evgenii Egorov

Emil von Qvanten (1827–1903) and Mikhail Bakunin (1814–76), a Finnish and a Russian émigré in exile, offer an interesting case for studying Scandinavianism and pan-nationalism in a transnational perspective. Since historical research has often focused on studies within national borders, transnational networks and their links with each other have not been in focus. As Rasmus Glenthøj and Morten Nordhagen Ottosen have stated, many sources on Scandinavianism have been found elsewhere than in Scandinavia itself.¹ This chapter focuses on two non-Scandinavian protagonists with links to different pan-national movements in Northern Europe. As authors and political activists, von Qvanten was engaged in Scandinavian and Finnish national activities, whereas Bakunin was more focused on a regime change in the Russian sphere. Both met each other in Sweden and had hopes for larger cooperation, but the whole transnational project as such ended in mistrust and failure. Although the outcome of their contacts did not lead to eventual Finnish-Russian-Polish cooperation at the time, the considerable correspondence they have left demonstrates initial willingness from both von Qvanten and Bakunin to engage in revolutionary activities with pan-national elements. As a result of the feelings arisen in connection to the Polish January uprising, which around the early 1860s stirred unrest and hopes among Finnish, Russian and Polish dissidents abroad, a genuine belief in a future revolution in one area that could spark further liberal prospects emerged.

In the history of Scandinavianism in Finland, Emil von Qvanten undoubtedly plays a prominent role. Von Qvanten's activities have tended to be neglected, however, because he has not been considered as one of the "Founding Fathers" in the nation-building project. In general, historical studies on Finland and Scandinavianism have not received major attention, with the exceptions of Runar Johansson's study in 1930, Hugo Pipping's in 1921 and Mikko Juva's article in 1957.² In Finland, the topic has fitted neither in a nation-building

project nor in a historical teleological narrative of a Finland in the making. Researchers of Scandinavianism have in general not paid much attention to the Finnish or Russian scenes, partly because research on Scandinavianism has often been conducted in Sweden, Norway and Denmark within their national fields of research. The American historian H. Arnold Barton has however stated that von Qvanten's activities were more widespread and influential than what previous research has pointed out. Barton has also argued that although Scandinavianism was partly unsuccessful in Finland, it affected the liberal spheres in Finland and the liberal element lingered and influenced the country later.³ Recent research on Scandinavianism has also pointed out how cultural and associational Scandinavianism played a part during the late nineteenth century through earlier traditions, networks and practices.⁴ When the Russification period started in the 1890s and the Russian empire legislated more strict laws in the Grand Duchy and reduced its autonomy, a liberal tradition had already been built, which had close ties to the other Nordic countries. The imperialisation process was opposed by a cadre of liberals that operated from an axis between Helsinki and Stockholm, as had been done by the Finnish liberals and Scandinavianists already during the Crimean War, not least through the activities of von Qvanten.

Von Qvanten was a promising young poet in Finland during the 1840s and his *Suomis säng* (Song of Suomi), which Fredrik Pacius later composed into a popular choir piece, has received an iconic status. The poem was first published in Fabian Collan's Fennophilic newspaper *Helsingfors Morgonblad*.⁵ Later von Qvanten moved to Sweden, where he published the political pamphlet *Fennomani och skandinavism* during the Crimean War.⁶ He did so under the pseudonym Peder Särkilax, a direct reference to the first person known to have preached Lutheranism in the Finnish part of Sweden, but his real identity was revealed. Because of these activities, von Qvanten became a *persona non grata* in the Grand Duchy of Finland and had to stay in exile in Sweden, where he rose to a position as the Swedish-Norwegian, pro-Scandinavian King Karl XV's librarian and agent.

As trusted by Karl XV, von Qvanten played a pivotal role in making a draft for a Scandinavian union in 1864.⁷ He was monitored closely by Finnish and Russian authorities as a potentially dangerous revolutionary figure, who from his exiled position in Stockholm had European networks and contacts with liberal radicals, such as Mikhail Bakunin, Aleksandr Herzen, Polish emigrants and other Scandinavianists. Transnational revolutionary movements and networks in mid-nineteenth-century Northern Europe also had pan-national elements, as the Finnish-Russian-Polish network demonstrates. Through von Qvanten's correspondence a transnational network can be traced, which encompasses Polish and Russian revolutionaries. The hope among these was that the Russian imperial regime would fall apart and that Poland and Finland would become independent. For the Russian revolutionaries Mikhail Bakunin and Alexandr Herzen a regime change was the goal, although they had different viewpoints on how to reach these aims.

Bearing these actions and aspirations in mind, this chapter examines the activities and transnational networks of Emil von Qvanten and Mikhail Bakunin and how they were functioning. This time period encompasses three armed conflicts: the Crimean War, the January uprising in Poland of 1863 and the Second Schleswig War in 1864. This chapter argues that von Qvanten's and Bakunin's activities were pan-national in character and that the Russian empire and the authorities in the Grand Duchy of Finland took them seriously as a potential threat, which can be seen as a sort of "opposition from abroad."⁸

A transnational cosmopolitan: Fennomania and Scandinavianism and the exile in Sweden

Emil von Qvanten's ardent and utopian work for a Nordic federal state and a Scandinavian union depicts how an exiled aristocrat of *la noblesse pauvre* seriously believed in the possibilities of such scenarios. Von Qvanten negotiated with King Karl XV, the Danish Council President D.G. Monrad, Mikhail Bakunin, Aleksandr Herzen and Polish exile leader Konstantin Czaratoryski directly or indirectly. Von Qvanten's ideas evolved while being outside Finland in different parts of the world, and most of his writings were published in Sweden. Both Emil von Qvanten's and Mikhail Bakunin's lifestyles were cosmopolitan, which is manifested in their engagement in international networks.

During the 1840s, von Qvanten studied at the Imperial Alexander University and wrote poetry, but he was suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis. In 1850, von Qvanten's friend Fredrik Cygnaeus, who was an influential figure in Finnish cultural life, urged him to travel to Java, to recover from the disease. Neither von Qvanten nor his family could afford this, but the journey was made possible by a grant. The night before the trip he stayed at Johan Vilhelm Snellman's place.⁹ Later Snellman became von Qvanten's nemesis. Snellman condemned the activities of von Qvanten and other émigrés in Sweden in *Litteraturblad för allmän medborgerlig bildning*.¹⁰ Von Qvanten was acquainted with central Finnish nation-builders such as Snellman, Cygnaeus and Johan Ludvig Runeberg, but at the same time he was too radical to establish himself in his home country. Like Bakunin, who also engaged in political activities while being outside Russia, von Qvanten thrived in a more cosmopolitan environment, in which he developed international contacts and networks.

Von Qvanten seems to have been too ill in Cape Town to continue his journey to Java and thus he stayed in South Africa for a while. Eventually, a Finnish sea captain lent him money and enabled von Qvanten to sail with a Swedish ship to Akyas in India. From India he embarked on a Finnish ship, which took him to Falmouth in England. From there von Qvanten went to Antwerp, where he stayed for a year. From Antwerp a Norwegian captain took him on board and in 1853 he arrived in Sweden.¹¹ These years abroad gave von Qvanten experience in global citizenship, cosmopolitan life and how to survive through Nordic networks. Von Qvanten also saw Finland and the Nordic countries from other

parts of the world, a possibility not many of his countrymen, although educated, had at that time. His future antagonist Snellman had for instance travelled a lot in Germany and Sweden but had not been further away than Central Europe. Von Qvanten's travels had taken him from his hometown Pori (Björneborg in Swedish) to Cape Town, and later in his life he spent much time in Italy, which became his second home.

Von Qvanten might have developed his ideas for the pamphlet *Fennomani och skandinavism*, published 1855, during his long journey back from South Africa and India to Europe, on the island of Saint Helena, where a North American sea captain informed him that Great Britain and France were preparing a war against Russia – the upcoming Crimean War.¹² In *Fennomani och skandinavism* von Qvanten suggested that the Nordic countries – including Finland – could be merged into a Nordic federal state.¹³ This was seen as a possible outcome if Great Britain and France would win the Crimean War. In this scenario Finland would have been merged into a Nordic federal state in a similar status as Norway had in the Swedish-Norwegian union.¹⁴ According to Bååth-Holmberg, who remains a central source of knowledge on von Qvanten through her somewhat hagiographic biography, the publication of *Fennomani och skandinavism* immediately created a liberal Scandinavianist party in Finland. The same point is made by Johansson in his studies of Scandinavianism in Finland.¹⁵ A small liberal fraction emerged among young university students. They are known from an infamous Tölö dinner in Helsinki in 1855, but its Scandinavianist orientation is debatable. A group of people who gathered around Karl Wetterhoff and included future polar explorer A.E. Nordenskiöld in their ranks were surely liberal, but whether they supported Scandinavianism or not is not apparent. However, officials such as the governor general, count Friedrich Wilhelm Berg did not consider the liberal group politically sound, and thus its activities were repressed by the authorities in the Grand Duchy of Finland. Moreover, the spy Gustaf Oskar Tamelander was sent to Sweden to find out who had written *Fennomani och skandinavism*. Tamelander found out that von Qvanten was the author behind the pseudonym “Peder Särkilax.” Governor Berg stated in September 1856 that the Finnish student and the Swedish subject von Qvanten could “never and under any circumstances” return to Finland.¹⁶ Von Qvanten was thus permanently prevented access to his former home country.

Emil von Qvanten may have been a “Scandinavian” already in the 1840s, but this stance was strengthened in 1856 when he participated in the fourth Scandinavian student meeting in Uppsala. Von Qvanten contributed to the publication of several anonymous letters from Finland in the leading Swedish liberal daily *Aftonbladet*, written by Frans af Björksten, Nestor Tallgren, Ernst Linder, Johannes Chydenius and H. Borgström, who had all stayed behind in Finland. Their names could not be revealed in the Swedish press since the content was critical towards the political system in Finland. The letters, published under the heading “Finska förhållanden” (Finnish conditions), could be read but not published in Finland.¹⁷ One example is the article “Bref från Finland” (Letter from

Finland) signed by “Agricola” and published in *Aftonbladet* in November 1857. Here the writer criticised a speech by Cygnaeus to the students of Uppsala as being too neutral, Snellman’s writings in *Litteraturbladet* in June and governor general Berg’s policies in general.¹⁸ The critique against Berg was shared by Bakunin and other of von Qvanten’s compatriots. In 1860, these letters from Finland were published in *Nya Dagligt Allehanda* instead of in *Aftonbladet*. The reason for the switch was that the editor August Sohlman had decided that the letters should not be published in *Aftonbladet*. Earlier Sohlman had paid interest to the Finnish question and written about it himself, but he eventually found the opinions exaggerated. *Aftonbladet* had also supported Norway and its liberal development and had therefore lost subscribers. A person who worked for *Aftonbladet* with contacts to Finland had also travelled to Saint-Petersburg and was promised there by governor general Berg that *Aftonbladet* could be published in Finland if these correspondences or letters would not figure in the newspaper.¹⁹ Accordingly, von Qvanten started to work for *Nya Dagligt Allehanda*. In an article in 1871 in *Nya Dagligt Allehanda*, presumably written by von Qvanten, Snellman’s policies in Finland are criticised. The main critique considered Snellman to be loyal to the emperor of Russia. Moreover the writer stated that Snellman would accept the emperor’s autocracy, in case he would revise the “constitution,” as it had been formed in the Diet of Borgå in 1809 and afterwards. The writer also pointed out Snellman’s critique against the Finnish “Constitutional Party,” which did not get access to the public sphere because of censorship restrictions. In the public debate in Sweden there also existed a “Constitutional Party” in exile, which saw Snellman and the Russian Emperor as political antagonists.²⁰ This perspective was also shared by Bakunin. Snellman had criticised von Qvanten in 1858 in an article on the Finnish émigrés in Sweden.²¹ Zacharias Topelius, another central figure in the Finnish nation-building efforts, was not quite as aggressive as Snellman but called the émigrés “cowardly snipers.”²²

Von Qvanten’s knowledge about the state of his former country relied on information that he received by corresponding with old friends and countrymen. In Finland there was a small group of people that supported von Qvanten, mainly old friends, such as the architect Nestor Tallgren, who called von Qvanten the leader of the Finnish liberal movement.²³ In his many letters, Tallgren wrote from Helsinki to von Qvanten in Stockholm and reported about the situation in the Grand Duchy, on the sentiments towards liberalism in Helsinki and on what was going on in his former home country.²⁴ The correspondence between Tallgren and von Qvanten continued in the 1850s and 1860s. References to the Italian *Risorgimento* were continuous in the correspondence, and Tallgren expressed that he was supporting a “rigenerazione della patria” but that he could achieve very little from his position in Finland.²⁵ Tallgren expressed in his letters that he was a liberal but did not mention explicitly any Scandinavianist sympathies.²⁶

In 1863, Snellman criticised von Qvanten, Wetterhoff, Bakunin, Poles in Sweden and others, who had stirred unrest in Finland by trying to agitate its population against the Emperor. Snellman’s political message was to stay calm

and to be loyal towards the Emperor.²⁷ In his journal article, Snellman also discussed Finnish newspapers that had commented the difficulties of a possible re-unification with Sweden. In that case Finland would have had to be divided, since “Russia would never accept a Scandinavian border a couple of miles from Saint Petersburg,”²⁸ he emphasised.²⁹ The concept “Scandinavian border” in this context underlines the anti-Scandinavianist rhetoric directed against the joint activities by von Qvanten and other Finnish émigrés, Poles in exile and Russian dissidents in Sweden. At this time, von Qvanten and Bakunin had already met in Stockholm and discussed possibilities for joint actions. 1863 was also marked by the Polish January uprising, which stirred political unrest in the Baltic region.

Revolutionary possibilities: The Russian emigration

While Scandinavianism was backed up by the national visions of the Northern Romanticism, its imaginaries should not obscure its cosmopolitanism in action. Italian *Risorgimento* was as important for Scandinavian intellectuals, as we have seen in the correspondence between Tallgren and von Qvanten, as the visions of Scandinavian ancient past, and struggle on the Peninsula was followed attentively.³⁰ But Italy was not the only practical ally. Russian revolutionary émigrés who since the late 1840s called upon the destruction of the oppressive imperial regime also established relations with Scandinavian counterparts, as their struggles aligned. Emil von Qvanten would become the centre of transnational networks.

Russian intellectuals towards the 1840s felt the need to communicate with those in power to convey their vision of the imperial future. The powers that be, however, were not going to reciprocate them, especially after the Decembrist revolt of 1825. Nicholas I's conservative policy put an end to any attempts of the wider public sphere to express their views on politics of the imperial regime. Many young intellectuals who usually had a good education and were descendants of well-off aristocratic families, Alexander Herzen among them, were uncovered as members of secret societies and sent into prison or exile far from the capitals. Having realised the impossibility to reify their ideas, some of them preferred to leave the empire for Europe.³¹

Herzen, a famous Russian émigré who left an immense literary heritage, left for Europe in 1847 on the eve of the revolutions. Initially inspired by the wave of uprisings in 1848, their violent suppression alienated Herzen from the intellectual development of the region.³² European historical power, as Herzen would later condemn, withered when the authorities trampled the revolutions, supported in this action by bourgeois centralists. The image of “rotting Europe” was shared by Herzen and, surprisingly, by his main antagonist, Nicholas I. While the first deemed it so due to its inability to revolutionise, the latter considered its revolutionary potential deteriorating.³³ Well-versed in European languages, vivid and talented Herzen moved to London to establish himself as a

bean of the Russian emigrant community. Since 1853, Herzen and his friend Nikolai Ogarev stood behind the Free Russian Press with the journal *Kolokol* (the Bell) as its flagship.³⁴

After 1848, when the wave of national revolutions suffocated, Herzen opted for another type of revolutionary scenario, for the socialist revolution instead of the national-liberal one. A revolutionary figure was no more a liberal intellectual, but a worker and peasant guided by Herzen's idealised aristocracy.³⁵ With this change of agency behind revolution, geopolitically its centre also migrated to the East. The time came for the "young" Slavic peoples with their historically communal way of life to provoke new changes. These expectations for the Slavic world – free from the bonds of the empire – became a new hope for conservative Europe.³⁶ The empire itself was seen as an artificial body, governed by Germans and "Tatar" aristocracy. The fall of the empire would have led to the establishment of the federation of the Slavic tribes.³⁷

However, after the death of Nicholas I in 1855, Herzen took an ambiguous political stance. As the Russian empire embarked on social and political reforms, the central of them being the emancipation of peasants, his views became less anti-governmental. He could envision a drastic social change under imperial rule while repudiating the dogmatism of democracy and republicanism. Thus, the question of "whether Finland and Georgia would separate" was secondary to the emancipation that captured Herzen's whole attention.³⁸ Although he always protected the rights of nations to freely choose their political fate – being one of the most radical émigré intellectuals of his time – for the moment peaceful reform obscured other problems.

Herzen's earlier associate, Mikhail Bakunin, arrived in London in 1862. Bakunin, who stood at the barricades in Paris, Prague and Dresden in 1848–49, was prosecuted by the governments of Saxony and Austria to be then delivered to the hands of the Russian police.³⁹ Sentenced to the lifelong exile in Siberia, Bakunin managed to flee to the USA to reach his old friends in London. Herzen, Ogarev and Bakunin first met each other in 1840 in one of the reading clubs that mushroomed in Russia. While antagonised during their acquaintance, as Bakunin at that time shared a conservative worldview, they came much closer later.⁴⁰

Mikhail Bakunin also contributed to the Slavic struggle for independence: in 1847 he was expelled from Paris for his speech in support of the Polish insurgency. In 1848, Bakunin travelled to Prague and took part in the first Pan-Slav Congress. The participants prepared their manifest of pan-Slavism that proclaimed national freedom of the Slavic peoples.⁴¹ The same year and further on, the antagonism of the Slavic and German tribes, where "German" was often associated with conservative bourgeois, was more and more palpable both in Herzen's and in Bakunin's works.⁴² Later it epitomised in an almost nationalist hatred against all things "Teutonic" and must have affected their favourable attitude towards the Danish nationalist struggle for Schleswig and Scandinavianism in general.⁴³

At the very beginning of contacts between Herzen and Bakunin there, however, appeared a disagreement concerning the tools appropriate for the revolutionary change that became especially sensible after 1861. While Herzen bet on the distribution of printed materials and the long process of the preparation of minds, Bakunin preferred establishing conspiracy groups in his hopes for momentous revolutionary outbursts.⁴⁴ Herzen on several occasions pronounced his disdain for conspiracy measures, regarding them futile. When in 1862 Bakunin reached Herzen and Ogarev, the two “greeted him with embrace,” but in fact feared that Bakunin would bring disorder in the working processes of their enterprise. The discrepancy in their revolutionary methods, according to Herzen, could cause difficulties.

Bakunin goes north: Contacts, networks and (mis)understandings

When the January Uprising of 1863 in Poland shut the western border of Russia for smuggling the journals, the situation prompted the editors to look for other ways of delivering *Kolokol*. The northern border figured as a convenient place for this enterprise, while Finland resembled Poland in its general characteristics: its non-Russian population and ostensible alienation from the imperial centre made it into a potential revolutionary zone. During the winter of 1863, Bakunin travelled to Stockholm to sounder the ground there. Prior to the trip, his main acquaintances there were Polish émigrés whose presence in Stockholm established grounds for conspirations. Zygmunt Jordan was the main figure who provided recommendations for Bakunin in Stockholm, where he was introduced to Finnish and Swedish activists to establish the lines of journal distribution.⁴⁵

In several weeks upon his arrival to Sweden, Bakunin joined the Polish conspiracy voyage on the ship *Ward Jackson* that planned to reach Poland with weaponry, while Bakunin cherished his dreams about a “Russian legion” that would join insurgent forces. Prior to the trip he managed to establish contacts with Finnish emigrants in Stockholm. On 28 March, during the trip Bakunin sent a letter to Emil von Qvanten, asking him to meet Herzen’s son Alexander Alexandrovich (Herzen-junior) and to introduce him to other conspirators, including, among others, “prince Oscar.” Bakunin attested his deep friendship with von Qvanten and attached a note for Herzen to the letter. The note introduced von Qvanten and Nordenskiöld as Finnish patriots and fighters for the united Scandinavia. Bakunin assured Herzen that with their help he hoped to establish a secret organisation in Finland to propagate the population against the Russian empire. Bakunin wanted Herzen-junior to connect Stockholm to Saint-Petersburg and London, as “Sweden is a real treasury for our business.”⁴⁶ At the beginning, the dialogue between the representatives of revolutionary Slavism and Scandinavianism was profitable.

The voyage of *Ward Jackson* quickly came to naught due to the involvement of the Russian diplomatic mission.⁴⁷ Instead of Gotland, their captain delivered the group of insurgents to Copenhagen, motivating this measure by the lack

of water. The expedition then decided to return to Sweden. Since Bakunin found himself in Sweden, he deployed his revolutionary activities there again. In the end of April, Bakunin authored a lengthy letter to “Finnish patriots,” Finnish émigrés in Stockholm, in which he called upon the destruction of the “German” Russian empire founded on repression. Despite the plausible appearance of measures taken towards emancipation, as he wrote, even Alexander II could not change the nature of this system. The Russian population, however, never ceased fighting against this artificial oppression. Regardless of the attempts of Peter the Great to impose the Prussian system upon the Russian spirit, he and his successors failed. The primary power of this resistance was the underground organisation *Zemlia i Volia* (Land and Liberty), “which embraces all classes from the highest nobility to peasants.” With regard to the territorial organisation of the post-imperial space, Bakunin asserted that “in opposition to imperial centralization, we are federalists, not out of whim or theoretical enthusiasm, but out of the very necessity of our position.” Bakunin insisted that *Zemlia i Volia* strove to give freedom to all nationalities, including Finnish.⁴⁸

On 8 May, Ogarev promised Bakunin to send Herzen-junior to Finland towards the end of the month but asked that the latter should have focused exclusively on the *Kolokol* affair. Although we do not have Bakunin’s letters to Herzen of the beginning of April, from Herzen’s replies it was clear that Bakunin expressed his admiration towards his pan-Scandinavian associates, royal family members among them.⁴⁹ Herzen-junior also took with him Ogarev’s letter to Qvanten in which the Russian revolutionary expressed his admiration for the Finnish and pan-Scandinavian struggle. He assured von Qvanten that the future Slavic federation would become a reliable ally of Scandinavia while their predominantly agricultural character pushed them to unite against “feudal, urban, and bourgeois Europe.”⁵⁰ The shared expectation of the future establishment of larger political bodies – Scandinavian, Slavic and German – created a common ground for mutual understanding.⁵¹

Towards the end of May, as Herzen-junior reached Sweden, the tone of Herzen and Ogarev changed. The affair with the transportation of the journal failed, but the reasons remained unknown. Bakunin’s propaganda, though attacked by the conservative press, continued, and on 28 May he read a speech for an audience in Stockholm on the resistance in Russia and its flagship, the secret organisation *Zemlia i Volia*. Bakunin’s address was extensively covered in Danish and Swedish newspapers. The speech highlighted the ideals of the Slavic commune and federation as the basis of the future organisation of Russia while also proclaiming the emancipation of all non-Russian territories and nationalities “that we held prisoners by violence and repression.” He ended his speech hoping that the future Scandinavian federation would become an ally of revolutionary Russia.⁵²

During summer the contact between Bakunin and von Qvanten gradually deteriorated. On 1 August, Bakunin reported to Herzen that he blamed his son for making his interaction with Finnish representatives difficult: “tell Alexander

that ‘his friend’ Qvanten, lacking anyone to patronize, began patronizing the Polish (Raphael) Tugenhold.” Tugenhold, a Polish insurgent, ostensibly presented a brochure to prince Oscar that accused Bakunin in the failure of the voyage of Ward Jackson, and this charge was the reason for Qvanten’s patronage. Moreover, Bakunin’s relations with the representatives of the Polish insurgency also worsened, as he confessed: “the best Polish man for us as Russians is an enemy.” During summer, the Russian revolutionaries shared their hopes for the European war against the empire, but Bakunin claimed that he would abstain from joining the forces of “England, France and *Sweden*.” The war, however, could be a trigger for underground operations in Russia.⁵³

Von Qvanten did not remain silent on the matter of worsening communication with Bakunin. As he confessed in the letter to Oscar Patrik Sturzen-Becker in June 1863, while he appreciated the attempts to promote Finnish independence and collaborate with the Poles, he was doubtful about any cooperation with Bakunin. Whereas “Swedes, Finns and Poles had a goal that the Russian Empire would fall apart,” the Russian revolutionary had something different on his mind. Von Qvanten added that at that point the Finns did not want to do anything with Russians, regardless of what political doctrines they professed.⁵⁴ On the grounds either of Bakunin’s visions of the Slavic future or of his radical revolutionary views, the alliance with him was perceived as threatening.

The rupture between Bakunin and von Qvanten resulted in alienation with Finnish emigrants in Stockholm. However, “thanks to my Swedish associates” it was possible for Bakunin to communicate with one of the leaders of the Fennomans party. He even sent letters from this person to Herzen and Ogarev. He refrained from naming him, because this information could be delivered “to my current arch enemy von Qvanten.” Bakunin considered essential to instruct his new Finnish associates against von Qvanten, and he was glad to know that they did not want to obey the colony of Finnish émigrés there.⁵⁵ The turn towards Fennomania and hence against Swedish-centrism was not only accidental but also ideologically more consistent than the collaboration with the Swedish aristocracy. Herzen, Ogarev and Bakunin repeatedly complained that the Polish aristocracy was too alienated from the peasantry. This criticism could have been projected onto the Finnish situation where the Fennomans movement demanded political and cultural emancipation of the Finnish lower classes.

After Bakunin left Sweden in October, in a status much less favourable compared to his arrival, as the Russian envoy in Stockholm noted,⁵⁶ a Danish take on his ideas was published in the journal *Dansk Maanedsskrift*. The article was authored by Carl Rosenberg, a liberal politician, and an advocate of the Scandinavian union. As Rosenberg was Qvanten’s close associate, the animosity between the Russian revolutionary and the Finnish emigrant affected the tone and trajectory of Rosenberg’s argumentation. While Rosenberg appreciated Bakunin’s charisma and passion for the destabilisation of the empire, the outcomes of the expected Russian revolution did not come as calming. First, he regarded Bakunin as an extremely radical thinker whose ideas hardly found any adherents

in Sweden. He added that Bakunin did not find any recognition from the Finnish side, probably referring to his conflict with Qvanten. Second, Bakunin's views of the post-imperial order that espoused the Slavic federation, atheism and communal ownership of the land might have cost more for Scandinavia than the existing imperial regime. Rosenberg rather envisioned that the Scandinavian nations should have united to counterbalance this future political body.⁵⁷

Draft for a unified Scandinavia

Rasmus Glenthoj and Morten Nordhagen Ottosen have concluded that Emil von Qvanten had a central role in the making of the draft that envisioned a unified Scandinavia in 1864.⁵⁸ The Second Schleswig War in 1864 gave hope to von Qvanten that Scandinavia could be unified, and that Finland would be pulled into that state formation.⁵⁹ Von Qvanten later saw a link from *Fennomani och skandinavism* to his activities concerning the Danish question in 1864. His motives were that Finland would be liberated within a Scandinavian context.⁶⁰ In 1862, von Qvanten visited the fifth Scandinavian student meeting in Copenhagen and established contacts with others who had a Scandinavianist political orientation, such as Carl Rosenberg.

Because of the Polish expedition to Copenhagen, Malmö and Klintehamn, von Qvanten had corresponded with Rosenberg. His letters to von Qvanten were perceived by von Qvanten as directed to the king himself and that they represented a larger political Danish-Scandinavian party. Thus, von Qvanten asked permission from Karl XV to travel to Copenhagen and to “study the Scandinavian circumstances and parties there.”⁶¹ In 1864 von Qvanten also stayed in contact with the Danish *Konsæilspræsident* (prime minister) D.G. Monrad. A draft for a union between Denmark and Sweden-Norway was written in the middle of the Second Schleswig War,⁶² by von Qvanten and Danish Scandinavianists, during his visit in Copenhagen.⁶³ These plans were not put into practice, even though Karl XV was not totally against them. There were even plans for a *coup d'état* in the summer and autumn of 1864, but some of the sources have been lost and probably burnt because of the risky plan, which would have been classified as high treason in case of a failure.⁶⁴

The draft of a union included an agreement of forming a federation between Sweden, Norway and Denmark with a parliament for the federation with an upper and a lower house. Each country would have had an equal number of members in the upper house, but the members of the lower house would have been elected by the people, and the number of seats would have been in proportion to each country's number of inhabitants. The duchies Schleswig and Holstein did not have to be a part of this, but Sweden and Norway would have been obliged to defend the Danish part of Schleswig. Finally, a dynastic union was to be made under one crown.⁶⁵

During the time period from the Crimean War through the times of the Polish January uprising and ending in the Second Schleswig War in 1864 Emil

von Qvanten had an agenda to unite the Scandinavian countries. Moreover, he had hopes that the Russian empire would have lost control of Finland and Poland and that Finland in this context would have gained its independence or at least autonomy in the context of a Scandinavian union. Thus, the collaboration with Mikhail Bakunin was an opportunity in the early 1860s, although it eventually stranded in mistrust, since von Qvanten suspected that Bakunin had other aims than the Finnish and Polish separatists in exile.

Bakunin's second encounter

In late summer 1864 when Bakunin returned to Sweden, it was clear that the conflict between Denmark and Germany crushed hopes for the military alliance between Denmark and Sweden-Norway.⁶⁶ The soil, however, was fertile for conspiracies and underground societies that pushed forward ideas about possible unification of Scandinavian kingdoms under dynastic and federal principles.⁶⁷

Bakunin, in a way synchronised with the situation on the ground, proposed another path, underground cooperation between pan-Scandinavian activists under the auspices of the International Revolutionary Brotherhood. This time he exclusively contacted Swedish radical politicians August Sohlman, August Blanche, Adolf Hedin and their associates. Even if Scandinavianism lost broad public support after 1864, Scandinavia as a political region remained vital for Bakunin. Thus, a section of the secret society was designed not on national but rather on a pan-national basis in the region, unlike in other contexts. Bakunin sent his proposal for the international revolutionary organisation and the regional organisation under the name of the “Scandinavian family” to Adolf Hedin, acknowledging, however, that nothing existed at the time.⁶⁸

A large part of the text on the international organisation was Bakunin's take on Napoleon III's policy. Bakunin warned his Scandinavian associates against any alliance with him and, broadly speaking, with any monarchs and governments – a standpoint he explicitly formulated in opposition to von Qvanten.⁶⁹ From now on, members of his revolutionary group, “brothers” of the “family,” had to swear to detest European institutions based on injustice while their goal was the destruction of the existing order. Men of all nationalities and descents were welcome to the society, but these statuses subdued to the supreme “motherland of humanity” and struggle for justice: “[A brother] must belong to the family and to revolutionary work even more than he belongs to his homeland.” Acknowledging the differences each country made along their way towards universal justice, all national brotherhoods should have worked for the same goal under the auspices of the Central Government: “The Brothers, therefore, united or dispersed in the world, form a true family, the invisible revolutionary international family, recognizing no other purpose in the world than its own, no other laws and other justice than its own.”⁷⁰

While the international brotherhood should have been established by no more than 100–200 members, the goal of the revolution was unreachable without

millions of followers. For this purpose Bakunin suggested establishing regional and national cells of the international organisation placed lower in the hierarchy. The guiding document of each national and regional cell should have followed the main catechism but also be adapted for the conditions at place. The main principles, in short, were the following: the separation of church and state, federalism, abolition of estate privileges and introduction of universal suffrage, protection of working conditions and public education, abolition of army, fair external policy, solidarity of the interests of all nations in their pursuit of liberty and the establishment of the material base of the organisation.⁷¹ In addition to this, he also sent his proposal for the “Secret international society for the emancipation of humanity” – a text more related to the issues of labour, control of the means of production and personal freedom – to August Sohlman, but ultimately, he considered both Hedin and Sohlman members of one and the same society.⁷²

When Bakunin expanded on the “Scandinavian family,” he recommended adapting to the present conditions, the most essential being the indispensability of monarchy in Sweden. On the other hand, the government in Sweden often pushed forward liberal and democratic values, unlike in the rest of Europe. In Denmark, according to Bakunin, the dynasty was unpopular, so the unification of Denmark and Sweden–Norway under one sceptre was desirable by the “most advanced party, of which many members love republics platonically, but cannot or do not want to publicly state this.” Bakunin proposed two questions as the focus of the “Scandinavian family” society: the issue of representative constitution and Scandinavianism. And while the reform of representation was covered briefly, most of his text concerned the Scandinavian union: “The Scandinavian question [...] correspond, if not as a well-understood idea, then as a very deep sentiment to the general instinct of the whole Swedish nation.” Conditioned by traditional fear of Russia, characteristic for all Swedes and – currently – of Germany, the idea should have become essential for the society. While it grew out of dynastic union, “the king should not be an absolutely necessary condition for the union,” as it had to be transformed into a federation with a Scandinavian parliament.⁷³

Whereas some members of the planned society – meaning the milieu Bakunin contacted – did not regard Finland as a part of Scandinavia, Bakunin asserted that the inclusion of the duchy as an independent member of the federation, given also support for its own national project, would make it clear for its inhabitants that the intentions were those of liberty and justice. Bakunin warned his associates that they would face many setbacks in their own country: “Nowhere is the establishment of secret associations as difficult as in Sweden. But nowhere is it that necessary for the preparation of public opinion.” The challenges were not of legal but rather of social nature: general indifference towards politics in Sweden, fear, excesses of rationality and individualism.⁷⁴

Bakunin followed on with his vision of the regional organisation of the association in detail, scripting the schemes for international brotherhood, Scandinavian brotherhood, and inferior cells such as “Scandinavian cousins” and “friends”

with each lower cell restricted in the information on the true scale of the international cooperation. As it surfaced in text, his Swedish associates were reluctant to give a “Scandinavian” name to this society opting rather for “Nordic,” as the primary “lost its credit in Sweden at the moment.” Bakunin insisted that the federation of the Scandinavian nations was a desirable outcome, and the word Scandinavian was famous for its liberal connotations in Europe, while Nordic, “le Nord,” was territorially and ideologically a vague term.⁷⁵

The word Nordic, indeed, kept capturing the rhetoric of the Scandinavian union supporters. Upon Bakunin’s arrival in August, another society was simultaneously being established there – Nordiska Nationalföreningen (the Nordic national association) – primarily by August Sohlman and Adolf Hedin.⁷⁶ Its goals were much less radical, compared to Bakunin’s vision, and it focused on the political consolidation of the Scandinavian kingdoms into a political union under a common government and a parliament by “legal means.” Some of its leading members, whom Sohlman listed in a letter to Carl Ploug,⁷⁷ were the same persons whom Bakunin contacted in Sweden or mentioned in his letters. It is not clear how these societies were supposed to function in parallel to each other, as Sohlman in his correspondence was silent on the matter of Bakunin’s arrival – on the grounds of either conspiracy or indifference. However, as materials witness, Bakunin counted Sohlman and Hedin as members of his revolutionary society in-the-making.

Not all indoctrinated members – we know only three persons that the society comprised after Bakunin’s departure⁷⁸ – agreed with all the radicalism that Bakunin demanded. Since Bakunin introduced Sohlman to the society personally, the ‘voice’ of the latter resonated in the corrections to the oath he demanded. While he shared the idea of the socialist revolution in Europe, he was not ready to “abjure the fatherland” though he acknowledged its unfavourable political development. Sohlman agreed that the “Scandinavian movement should be developed into the European revolution” with the help of the establishment of the headquarters, but he defended the autonomy of the Scandinavian revolutionary cell against any abuses of the central government.⁷⁹ After Bakunin’s departure, Sohlman, however, seemingly lost any interest in the activities of the society as he ceased to reply to the Russian revolutionary while other indicted members remained in contact with their “moving center.”⁸⁰

Bakunin’s doctrine upon his second arrival to Sweden became more radical, distancing itself from the fleur of the Slavic revolution. From that moment on, it was international cooperation “regardless of nationality and class” that could make the socialist revolution possible. As did mostly the conservative opposition, Bakunin appreciated the revolutionary potential of the pan-Scandinavian movement. Immediately upon his arrival to Sweden through Copenhagen, he established contacts with liberal and radical intellectuals, and for him the combination of liberal mass politics and Scandinavianism became unbreakable, if not synonymous. While Russian authorities and diplomatic mission could not find appropriate language other than revolutionary allusions to describe the social

impulse behind pan-Scandinavian ideas, Bakunin consciously coded it in these terms projecting his expectations. However, as Scandinavianism still rested on the “national” imagination, Bakunin’s anarchism that he brought to Sweden in 1864 did not find firm common grounds with it.

Conclusions

The international networks of pan-nationalist activists brought a cosmopolitan dimension also to Scandinavianism, which materialised in various forms of political collaboration. Besides imagining the future of the Scandinavian region, these partnerships clarified the visions of the rest of the world, from the united Italy to the free revolutionary Russia, that would have potentially made a united Scandinavia possible and compatible with its coevals. But apart from horizontal cooperation between variegated projects, from Italian *Risorgimento* to Russian revolutionary groups, these networks prompted hierarchical relations between intellectuals and politicians. The windows of opportunity of the project were thus not only geopolitical conditions for reification but also smaller intrapersonal configurations that put together those who provided designs of the future with those who had power.

Scandinavianism featured as an umbrella term, uniting diverse and often contradicting endeavours that strived to imagine and organise the future of the region. There was a constant negotiation of its conditions of existence and final goals between groups that claimed their loyalty to the project. The fact that Scandinavianism did not have any coordinating centre but rather variegated arenas and networks of communications, decentralised its activities and opened up ways for its local interpretations. Finnish émigrés, Russian revolutionaries and Polish insurgents could thus legitimately be included into the decision-making processes with regard to further trajectories of the project, but it did not exclude a chance of the incompatibility of their visions. In their pursuits to “tame” the project that ranged from Monrad’s/von Qvanten’s scripted designs of the political union or Bakunin’s attempts to impose strict organisational structure upon the activists, all, however, came to naught. “Fluid” Scandinavianism resisted any attempts of hegemonic readings, antagonising groups that disagreed on new terms.

The configuration of networks also presupposed a certain level of trust between its members as well as distribution of roles they played in it for its proper functioning. Expertise on certain processes and regions nested within particular circuits of the network. Russian revolutionaries correspondingly were believed to have an expertise on the Russian empire, while von Qvanten was entrusted with accumulation of knowledge regarding Finland. This exchange of information, on the one hand, could maintain the network promptly updated on the situation around the world. On the other hand, however, the roles sometimes took over the authenticity, and both Bakunin and von Qvanten started to abuse their claimed expertise, providing overly positive information on their zones of

interest – the fact that Herzen and Ogarev were quick to notice – while being physically detached from “their” areas for prolonged periods of time. These celebrated émigrés who were awarded with the roles for their past experiences rather had expertise on the imagined future than on the present situation.

Notes

- 1 Glenthøj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*, 12–18.
- 2 Johansson, “Skandinavismen i Finland”; Pipping, “Finlands ställning till skandinavismen”; Juva, “Skandinavismens påverkan på Finland.”
- 3 Barton, “Scandinavism, Fennomania,” 182.
- 4 E.g. Haarder Ekman, *Mitt hems gränser vidgades*; Hemstad, *Indian Summer*.
- 5 von Qvanten, *Helsingfors Morgonblad*.
- 6 von Qvanten, *Fennomani och skandinavism* I–II.
- 7 Glenthøj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*, 17.
- 8 Björk-Winberg, “Opposition from Abroad.”
- 9 Bååth-Holmberg, “Emil von Qvanten,” 218.
- 10 Snellman, “Finska emigrationen i Sverige.”
- 11 Bååth-Holmberg, “Emil von Qvanten,” 220–23.
- 12 Bååth-Holmberg, “Emil von Qvanten,” 223.
- 13 von Qvanten, *Fennomani och skandinavism* I, 47.
- 14 von Qvanten, *Fennomani och skandinavism* I, 47.
- 15 Johansson, “Skandinavismen i Finland,” 256–68.
- 16 Letter from F.W. Berg, 21 September 1856. Biographica-kokoelma I, Qvanten, Emil von, C6 46, Kansallisarkisto (KA). See also Egorov’s contribution to this volume.
- 17 von Qvanten, *Finska förhållanden*.
- 18 “Agricola,” *Aftonbladet*, 11 November 1857, 2.
- 19 Bååth-Holmberg, “Emil von Qvanten,” 229–30.
- 20 *Nya Dagligt Allehanda*, 27 June 1861, 2.
- 21 Snellman, “Finska emigrationen i Sverige,” 49–58.
- 22 Bååth-Holmberg, “Emil von Qvanten,” 233.
- 23 Bååth-Holmberg, “Emil von Qvanten,” 234.
- 24 Björk-Winberg, “Opposition from Abroad.”
- 25 Tallgren to von Qvanten, 1859. Emil von Qvantens arkiv, Kungliga Biblioteket (KB), KB1/ Ep. Q1.
- 26 Tallgren to von Qvanten. The years 1854–64. Emil von Qvantens arkiv.
- 27 Snellman, “Krig eller fred,” 193–202.
- 28 Snellman, “Krig eller fred,” 197.
- 29 Snellman, “Krig eller fred,” 197, see also 199.
- 30 See also Johnsen’s contribution to this volume.
- 31 Kelly, *The Discovery of Chance*; Miller, *The Russian Revolutionary Emigres*.
- 32 Herzen, “Du développement des idées,” 9–132.
- 33 Herzen, “Staryj mir.”
- 34 Malia, *Alexander Herzen*, 394–95.
- 35 Malia, *Alexander Herzen*, 369–88.
- 36 Herzen, “Staryj mir.”
- 37 Herzen, “Pis’mo k Dzhuzeppe Maccini”; Herzen–Proudhon, 23 March 1860.
- 38 Herzen, “Rossija i Polsha,” 32–33.
- 39 Steklov, *Mihail Aleksandrovich Bakunin* I.
- 40 Dragomanov, *Pisma Bakunina*, I–CVII.
- 41 Odlozilik, “The Slavic Congress,” 3–15.

- 42 Bakunin, “*Vozzvanie k Slovyanam.*”
- 43 Herzen, “Russkie nemcy,” 148–89.
- 44 Herzen, *Mihail Bakunin.*
- 45 Rudnickaya, “Herzen, Ogarev.”
- 46 Rudnickaya, “Herzen, Ogarev,” 380.
- 47 Steklov, *Mihail Aleksandrovich Bakunin I*, 230–43.
- 48 Emil von Qvantens arkiv, 1863, KB
- 49 Herzen, *Alexander Ivanovich Herzen* 27.
- 50 Makashin, “N.P. Ogarev-Emil von Qvanten,” 145–50.
- 51 Glenthøj, “Skandinavismen.”
- 52 Dragomanov, *Pisma Bakunina*, 134–39.
- 53 Dragomanov, *Pisma Bakunina*, 122–25.
- 54 von Qvanten to Sturzen-Becker, 22 June 1863, Emil von Qvanten, 1863, Riksarkivet (RA).
- 55 Dragomanov, *Pisma Bakunina*, 126–31.
- 56 Steklov, *Mihail Aleksandrovich Bakunin I*, 247.
- 57 Rosenberg, “Et par Erindringer,” 292–308.
- 58 Glenthøj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*, 467–69.
- 59 Bååth-Holmberg, “Emil von Qvanten,” 279.
- 60 Bååth-Holmberg, “Emil von Qvanten,” 531.
- 61 Bååth-Holmberg, “Emil von Qvanten,” 280.
- 62 Emil von Qvanten, “A draft for a Scandinavian union.” “Brev och skrivelser rörande Carl XV:s politik,” 1864, Emil von Qvantens arkiv, KB, KB1/Ep. Q 1; Glenthøj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*, 467, 492. In addition to the draft for a union, the manuscripts include an undated paper written in Danish, which suggests that the Danish royal court would be placed in Malmö and that a revolutionary cabinet would take over Denmark. It also speaks of a *coup d'état* and that the countries would be unified. A writing with pencil on the paper states that it was immediately refused by Karl XV. It's unclear who were behind this plan, but according to Glenthøj and Nordhagen Ottosen (2021) the following persons are mentioned: J.J. Hansen, Rosenmüller, Rosenberg, Carlsen, Juel and Høgsbro. The letters were sent to von Qvanten, who presented the plan to Karl XV.
- 63 Glenthøj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*, 467–69.
- 64 Glenthøj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*, 492–93.
- 65 Emil von Qvanten, “A draft for a Scandinavian union” (KB)
- 66 Friis, “Skandinavismens Kulmination.”
- 67 Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*.
- 68 “Projet d'organisation de la famille des frères scandinaves”; “Projet d'une organisation secrète internationale.” Sven Hedins arkiv, KB, KB1/Ep. H. 7:1.
- 69 “Projet d'une organisation secrète,” 14; “Projet d'organisation de la famille,” 7.
- 70 “Projet d'une organisation secrète,” 17–19.
- 71 “Projet d'une organisation secrète,” 22–23.
- 72 Mervaud, “La ‘Societe internationale secrete,’” 107–240.
- 73 “Projet d'organisation de la famille,” 4–6.
- 74 “Projet d'organisation de la famille,” 9–10.
- 75 “Projet d'organisation de la famille,” 5–6.
- 76 Lundh, *Från Skandinavism till neutralitet*, 23–29.
- 77 Sohlman to Ploug, 8 August 1864. Sohlmans arkiv, KB, KB1/L 10.
- 78 Furlani, “Bakunins svenska förbindelser,” 4–25.
- 79 “Procès-verbal de réception d'August Sohlman comme membre de la Fraternité Internationale. 12 October 1864.” Oeuvres Complètes de Bakounine. CD-ROM. IISG Bakunin collection, International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam.
- 80 Bakunin to Sohlman. October 1864–January 1865. Sohlmans arkiv. KB, KB1/L 10.

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PART III

Nation-building and region-building: From Scandinavianism to Nordism



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8

LITERATURE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SCANDINAVIAN PEOPLES IN RELATION TO SCANDINAVIANISM

Anna Bohlin

Literature was of pivotal importance in the construction of national characteristics in the nineteenth century; criteria for inclusion in a nationally defined people were negotiated in fiction. Expanding literary markets and reading circuits allowed literature to reach different strata of the population and to have a real impact on identity formation.¹ Likewise, literature and cultural journals were essential to the spread of pan-national ideas – in Scandinavia as well as elsewhere in Europe.² In fact, the modern literary markets, slowly establishing in the Nordic countries, were too small and often had to rely on transnational co-operations to reach a sufficiently large audience to gain a profit. This economic incentive for transnational enterprises was used for ideological reasons, and books specifically targeting a transnational readership were issued with the aim to create a common Scandinavian identity.³

Contrary to the pan-Latinism of the 1870s and onwards, the Scandinavian pan-national movement did not follow nation-state nationalism as a second stage but was a product of the earlier period of liberal nationalism.⁴ Scandinavianism appeared as an alternative scale of national identity.⁵ In fact, all Scandinavian nationalist movements at the beginning of the nineteenth century acknowledged Old Norse literature as a source of a national identity and as a common “national” heritage. In that sense, pan-nationalism was the very foundation for the different Scandinavian nationalisms, although the term “Scandinavianism” for the political movement was not used until 1843.⁶ The imagining of a Scandinavian cultural community and the movement to strengthen that sense of belonging, not necessarily aiming at statehood, fuelled the nineteenth-century nation-building processes.⁷ Thus, the Scandinavian nationalisms bore an intrinsic, although tense and shifting, relation to pan-nationalism.

This chapter will distinguish between three different ways in which the construction of the nationally defined people in nineteenth-century literature related

to ideas of a Scandinavian cultural community. As the examples will show, the relation to Scandinavianist ideas of different kinds could be explicit, dismissed or unacknowledged. By “dismissed” in this context I do not mean what Alexander Maxwell has called a “pejorative usage” of pan-nationalism.⁸ Pejorative usages of “Scandinavianism” were indeed abundant in public debate during the mid-nineteenth century, especially in Norway.⁹ However, my aim is to highlight how the defining criteria for “the people” might invoke other kinds of transnational comparisons. Given the strong impetus to relate to a Scandinavian community, neglecting to do so stands out as a dismissal. In the following, I will discuss literature of the mid-nineteenth century, in different ways keys to the formation of national identities, by the Finnish J.L. Runeberg (1804–77); the Danish Mathilde Fibiger (1830–72); the Norwegians Camilla Collett (1813–95), Henrik Wergeland (1808–45), and J.S. Welhaven (1807–73); and the Swedes Fredrika Bremer (1801–65) and C.J.L. Almqvist (1793–1866). Three themes will be focused on: women’s emancipation, the re-use of Old Norse myth and poverty as a national characteristic.

The three major emancipation novels of Swedish, Norwegian and Danish literature respectively were all issued in the 1850s within a period of five years: Mathilde Fibiger’s *Clara Raphael. Tolv Breve* (1851, *Clara Raphael: Twelve Letters*), Camilla Collett’s *Amtmandens Døtre* (1854–55, *The District Governor’s Daughters*) and Fredrika Bremer’s *Hertha, eller En själs historia* (1856, *Hertha*). In order to articulate women’s contribution to the nation as citizens, they all consciously created a nationally defined people, though in strikingly different ways in terms of the relation to wider pan-Scandinavian ideas.¹⁰ These novels are all considered to be the forerunners of the women’s movements in Sweden, Norway and Denmark respectively, and as such, they had a profound impact on national identity formation for politically active women in the late nineteenth century. Fibiger’s novel started the very first – and a very fierce – public debate on women’s emancipation in Denmark, and Collett’s novel was certainly the talk of the day in Norway, although not met with such vehement reactions.¹¹

The analysis will start out with Bremer’s authorship since she most explicitly related to Scandinavianist ideas, especially in a novel that predated *Hertha* in exploring female citizenship, aptly named *Syskonlif* (1848, *Brothers and Sisters*). At the time, Bremer was the most famous of the three, widely read across three continents. *Hertha* was published the same year (1856) in Sweden, Britain, the USA, France and Germany, whereas the translations into Dutch and Danish would follow the next year, and into Spanish in 1865–66.¹² Collett’s *The District Governor’s Daughters* makes for a different take on Scandinavian fellowship, whereas pan-nationalism is conspicuously absent from Fibiger’s novel. Fibiger’s tacit dismissal of Scandinavianism in her construction of the Danish people will then be compared to the Norwegian J.S. Welhaven’s prose sketch “Billeder fra Bergenskysten” (1842, “Sketches from Norway”), before finally moving on to the three examples of what I call an “unacknowledged” relation to pan-national identity. Poverty was promoted as a characteristic of the

Finnish people in J.L. Runeberg's "Julqvällen" (1841, "Christmas Eve"), of the Swedish people in C.J.L. Almqvist's "Svenska Fattigdomens betydelse" (1838, "The Importance of Swedish Poverty") and of the Norwegian people in numerous publications by Henrik Wergeland. I will discuss the unacknowledged transnational links behind the representation of poverty as a national virtue.

Several of these authors – Almqvist, Bremer, Welhaven – were keen advocates of the Scandinavianist movement; the Scandinavianist student meetings were an important meeting-ground for Welhaven.¹³ However, their main goal was to strengthen the cultural integration between the Scandinavian nations rather than to form one state, that is, they embraced to varying degrees Scandinavianism as a "low-political" rather than a "high-political" project.¹⁴ As many of their contemporaries, Bremer and Almqvist used the concept of the nation to refer to a province, a realm or the entire Scandinavia interchangeably.¹⁵ All of them (except possibly Mathilde Fibiger) belonged to Scandinavian networks, providing support, help to promote their works, new contacts – and pan-nationalist ideas. Camilla Collett, J.S. Welhaven, C.J.L. Almqvist and Fredrika Bremer all stayed in Copenhagen for long periods of time, and Bremer lived mainly in Norway for several years in the late 1830s. She also laid claim to a Finnish identity because she was born in Turku (Swe. Åbo). During her stay in Norway, she corresponded with Wergeland, who dedicated one of his main literary works, *Jan van Huysums Blomsterstykke* (1840, *Jan van Huysum's Floral Painting*), to her. The Finnish national author Zacharias Topelius (1818–98) was likewise among her many correspondents, whereas Runeberg had an intense correspondence with Almqvist, who sent Runeberg several of his manuscripts before publishing.¹⁶ Runeberg's and Topelius' works were issued by both Finnish and Swedish publishing houses and were as popular in Sweden as they were in Finland – as Finnish scholars have pointed out, largely due to a blatant misreading. The Finnish authors did indeed celebrate Finland's common history with Sweden in their historical poems, short stories and novels, but they did so in order to distinguish an exclusively Finnish history and to create a Finnish people. Swedish readers generally missed that last point.¹⁷ The intentions were thus decidedly *not* transnational, but the readings were. Runeberg's and Topelius' works unintentionally contributed to the creation of two nationally defined peoples on different sides of the Baltic Sea.

Explicit relation to pan-nationalism

Among the three Scandinavian emancipation novels, Fredrika Bremer's *Hertha* (1856) stands out as most outspoken in the commitment to Scandinavianist ideas. Her novel *Brothers and Sisters*, issued in the year of revolutions 1848 and concerned with the discussion on citizenship, even more conspicuously created a Swedish people on an explicit pan-national foundation. Actually, Scandinavianist motifs and ideas structure the novel in several ways. Criteria for citizenship are clearly at stake: minority groups, such as Sámi people and Jews, appear in side-stories

with no other narrative function than to attest to their fitness for citizenship and inclusion into the Swedish people on account of a God-fearing moral. The same criteria apply to the poor and to ex-criminals.¹⁸ The Scandinavian fellowship is explicitly targeted on at least three levels of the narrative. Firstly: the depiction of the characters.

The chief characters are nine siblings, who together with their uncle, the General, will end up building a model society. An Icelandic-Danish sculptor, Lagertha Knutson, is invited to be a part of the family; the title *Brothers and Sisters* refers not only to the main characters but also to the Scandinavian nations.¹⁹ Mats Wickström has shown that the idea of kinship between the Nordic peoples still guides the legislation on privileges for citizens of other Nordic countries in naturalisation policies, albeit with some variations.²⁰ The representation of nations as personifications was indeed established early on in the nineteenth century, but that idea was elaborated and literally fleshed out in the nineteenth-century novel.²¹ In Bremer's *Brothers and Sisters*, several Nordic countries are actually combined in one single person, as Lagertha turns out to be raised in Iceland as the daughter of a Danish father and a Swedish mother, and trained to become an artist in Copenhagen.²² This transnational heritage will also prove to be an inspiration to the siblings, particularly to the development of ideas on female citizenship.

Secondly, a commitment to the Scandinavianist movement is explicitly pointed out. The political disagreement between one of the siblings with Communist ideas on the one hand and the General's old fashion patriotic and paternalistic ideals on the other is soothed by the common celebration of Scandinavianism. The General exclaims:

Children, we must drink to the health of our fair guest and her native land, – the brother land of a thousand bullets! We are Scandinavians, and we will drink to all Scandinavians and Scandinavianism. I am heart and soul with it; it is a thought which God the Father first conceived, and afterwards we.²³

The General is here also referring to eschatological pan-nationalism that united many mid-nineteenth-century nationalist thinkers such as Bremer and Almqvist: the nation was considered to be a step in God's plan to ultimately unite humankind.²⁴ Giladi suggests that pan-nationalism "proposed a different final step, in which nation-states would merge into larger units, macro-nations."²⁵ However, to these mid-nineteenth-century Scandinavianists, pan-nationalism was not the final step, only yet another step to move closer to God's Kingdom on Earth.

Thirdly, Old Norse literature as the common Scandinavian "national" heritage is presented as a key source of inspiration for the future society. Lagertha is commissioned to create a decoration for a fountain with a motif from Old Norse mythology for the ideal society, New Birka. She chooses the Norns by the Urda fountain, or more specifically, the Norns as interpreted by the Danish N.F.S.

Grundtvig in his ground-breaking work *Nordens Mythologi* (*Northern Mythology* 1808, 2nd ed. 1832). Lagertha states that she reads Eddic poetry, Snorre's *Heimskringla* (*Sagas of the Kings*) and Grundtvig's work every day for inspiration from "the genius of the north."²⁶ Grundtvig holds that the Old Norse myths must be interpreted in a historical-poetical manner; they provided an imagery for representing "the truth about the great Struggle for Eternity."²⁷ The three Norns should properly be understood as a poetic representation of a Nordic idea of "Destiny and Providence": Prophecy, Combat and Harmony.²⁸ This idea is enthusiastically paraphrased in Bremer's novel and executed in Lagertha's sculpture.²⁹ The sculpture has a profound impact on one of the novel's sisters, Gerda. She recognises herself in the Norns, an experience that generates a recognition of her need for freedom: "I know that there is a life beyond that of housekeeping, even for women, a life, an activity for thought, as noble, as beneficial as the other."³⁰ The Norns have brought forth Gerda's sense of citizenship.

The Norns by the Urda fountain also have a central function in the emancipation novel *Hertha* (1856). In a dream at the beginning of the novel, the title character experiences the oppression of women worldwide. The Norns in the dream acquaint her with the curse on womankind, present the challenge to fight it and foretell her victory; in that respect, the Norns are the personifications of women's emancipation.³¹ Grundtvig's *Northern Mythology* is indeed part of the reading-list for the girl school that Hertha organises in the end of the novel.³² Hertha herself is repeatedly compared to the Norse goddess Iduna and Swedish conditions are in the novel often referred to in a Nordic frame.³³ Nevertheless, Old Norse mythology is not the only ancient myth engendering female citizenship in Bremer's work.

Bremer's brand of pan-nationalism certainly included Finland, and *Kalevala* (1835) is portrayed as the main source of internal strength for the head character Sofia in Bremer's first novel specifically targeting female citizenship: *En dagbok* (1843, *A Diary*, Engl. transl. 1844). Sofia has been raised in a Finnish landscape, or in Bremer's words: in "the home of the magic arts, Finland."³⁴ She knows "PRIMEVAL WORDS" ("*ursprungords*") from *Kalevala*, and has an inner heathen troll, which accounts for her crave for freedom and ultimately makes her fit for citizenship.³⁵ Finland is also explicitly included in the Scandinavian family of *Brothers and Sisters*. The most important side-story is an account of the separation of Finland from Sweden in 1809, recounted by the Finnish-born General, who has been separated from his beloved half-brother in a conflict over how to conceive of the nation. The half-brother perceives the Fatherland in terms of the territory and stays on to cultivate the land and the people of his father's estate. The General, on the other hand, cannot forgive what he considers to be a treachery to the Fatherland in terms of the state and government. The novel thus, once again, treats a political conflict as a family business. The reconciliation of the two brothers may be read as an emotional manual on how to re-forged bonds of fellowship in acknowledging, what initially is represented as a split identity, as two different national identities.³⁶

Bremer's emancipation novel *Hertha* was preceded by what is considered to be the first emancipation novels of Norwegian and Danish literature respectively: Camilla Collett's *The District Governor's Daughters* in 1854–55 and Mathilde Fibiger's *Clara Raphael* in 1851. At least Collett's novel does refer to pan-nationalism, though in a different manner. The Norns are indeed mentioned, but only in passing and as the dark forces of destiny denying human happiness and keeping the lovers apart.³⁷ In this case, Old Norse myth is certainly not the foundation for a pan-national identity, nor for women's emancipation. Collett was quite literally placed at the core of the famous Norwegian battle over the construction of the nation in the 1830s and 1840s towards Danish cultural (and Swedish political) domination. She was the sister of one of the chief opponents, Henrik Wergeland, and had an unfulfilled love relationship with the other, J.S. Welhaven. Although the political content of the battle has been exaggerated, most of all by the opponents themselves, there was indeed a conflict over how to relate to the common history with Denmark (until 1814) in constructing a Norwegian nation. Historian Anne-Lise Seip emphasises that different concepts of freedom lay at the bottom of that conflict.³⁸ Whereas Wergeland believed that political freedom should come first and engender cultural progress, Welhaven followed Friedrich Schiller's *Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen* (1795) in arguing that true political freedom must be the result of *Bildung*. Inner freedom cultivated by aesthetic taste, harmony and beauty was a prerequisite for successful political reforms. In that respect Collett sided with Welhaven.

Collett's novel has received a lot of scholarly attention, but only recently has a critical examination of the construction of the Norwegian people in this proto-feminist novel been carried out.³⁹ The construction of the nationally defined people in *The District Governor's Daughters* does indeed take the Norwegian landscape, the peasantry and folklore as its point of departure, but canalised through the bourgeois female main character, Sophie, the Governor's daughter. Through her, the landscape and the peasant culture will contribute to nation-building and future societal developments.⁴⁰ However, for Collett the immediate response to the national nature was not enough to create a nation. She relied on the old bonds with Danish cosmopolitan culture for the, in her view, necessary aesthetic education of her ideal national woman in several ways.

Firstly, the relation between Denmark and Norway is explicitly discussed by the main characters. Secondly, Sophie is sent to Copenhagen to educate her singing voice and her sense of aesthetic judgement, making her fit to exercise societal power. The years of training in the Danish capital, however, are not directly represented in the novel, only related retrospectively and by means of letters. The novel stays in Norway. Still, the last part of the novel, where an ideal society is built, is set in a transnationally defined place: in the reverend Rein's parsonage, originally a manor house built in a "Danish" style. The novel is quite explicit on this matter and offers a thorough overview of the interior and of architectural details: "The arched, rigidly ornamented stucco ceilings and door mantels still survived as reminders of former aristocratic days."⁴¹ Nevertheless, the building

marked by the aristocracy is filled with a new meaning; Collett emphasises that the library, formerly used only by the master of the house, was available to anyone. The description ends:

Everything the visitors saw bore the mark of solid, unostentatious prosperity, combined with a sense of beauty and comfort. Where it is still possible to find such homes in our country, they represent either the last, dwindling remains of a foreign, imported culture, or the happy beginnings of an emerging native one.⁴²

Two temporalities meet in this conception of the national home, signifying two different cultures: the remains of an old, “foreign,” aristocratic culture and the new, happy beginnings of a “native one.” The final decision on how to interpret the manor house, harbouring the ideal society, is left open, which allows for the different temporalities to mingle. The old, beautiful, comfortable Danish culture is indeed the frame for the growth of the Norwegian, national culture.

The construction of the Norwegian nation in Collett’s novel is thus an example of explicit pan-nationalism in the sense that the relation to Denmark is targeted, firstly in terms of a discussion of the implications of the shared history for the sense of national belonging; secondly as inspiration for the aesthetic cultivation necessary to develop true political freedom; and thirdly as the symbolic, transnational location for the ideal national society. The transnational relation required for Norwegian nation-building, according to Collett, was a new way to make sense of the old Danish–Norwegian relation.

Dismissed relation to pan-nationalism

Before publishing *The District Governor’s Daughters*, Collett reached out to the Danish author and leading literary critic, Johan Ludvig Heiberg (1791–1860), to ask for his advice. Collett knew him from her years in Copenhagen, but she was presumably also guided by the fact that he had protected the publication of the first Danish emancipation novel a few years earlier: Mathilde Fibiger’s epistolary novel *Clara Raphael*. Heiberg wrote a peculiar preface, recommending the novel and simultaneously making excuses for the young author’s ideas on women’s calling and the institution of marriage, quoting from their correspondence regarding the manuscript. Grundtvig was among Fibiger’s friends who welcomed the nationalism of the novel, but for a twenty-first-century reader, the explicit connection between women’s emancipation and militant nationalism is hard to digest.⁴³

Clara Raphael in Mathilde Fibiger’s eponymous novel formulates her simultaneous religious and nationalist awakening in terms of family relations:

God is my Father, Denmark my Mother; all human beings my siblings. This is the great family life, wherein I am rooted. I am not alone!⁴⁴

Fibiger echoes Grundtvig, who according to Jes Fabricius Møller had three fatherlands, “Denmark, Norden and the Heavenly Fatherland,” only Fibiger leaves Norden out.⁴⁵ That is worth noting, given that Grundtvig not only defended Fibiger’s cause in public debate but also together with his wife opened their home as a refuge for Fibiger, when she was under attack after the publication of *Clara Raphael* for being too radical – or not radical enough.⁴⁶ Although she expressed a continuum in the quotation above, from the nation to humankind, and included all people in her family, the reader quickly loses sight of any other except Danes; or rather, the reference to humankind is submerged in her overlayering of Christian faith with nationalism and feminism. Just like in Bremer’s authorship, female citizenship is to Fibiger an example of vocational nationalism: she understands her commitment to nationalism to be God-willed.⁴⁷ However, nationalism in Fibiger’s case lacks the pan-nationalist element. It is restricted to Denmark, more specifically in connection to the First Schleswig War (1848–51).

The construction of the nationally defined people in *Clara Raphael* is framed by the war in more than one sense. The temporal frame of the narrative coincided roughly with the duration of the war, and the war is awarded a pivotal importance in Clara’s development of her feminist calling together with her nationalist sense of belonging. Even though the novel does contain references to Old Norse literature, Fibiger presents it as stories about Danish heroes and Danish history. Raised on historical tales of the Danish people, the breakout of the war allows her for the first time to perceive the contemporary Danish people. Meeting soldiers going to war and watching the national colours initiate a new life for Clara:

On the 21st of March, a new life arose for me. I saw the Danish people, whom I only knew from legends and songs, I heard words spoken, that reverberated deep in my soul.⁴⁸

The event in Fibiger’s account that renders the Danish people visible, that “makes the nation real,” is the war on Germany.⁴⁹ It is Denmark’s “significant Other” that makes the nation appear in Clara’s mind; she suddenly “sees” the Danish people. The transnational relation required to construct the Danish people in *Clara Raphael* is thus the defining external difference to the enemy, the German people.

Nevertheless, Fibiger attributes a special significance to the German Friedrich Schiller’s drama *Die Jungfrau von Orléans* (1801). More importantly with reference to Scandinavianism, there is a quotation from the Swedish poet Esaias Tegnér’s poem “Till en yngling” (“To a Young Man”).⁵⁰ The Tegnér quote is placed next to a quote from Adam Oehlenschläger, whom Tegnér had awarded a laurel in 1829 – usually considered to be the start of Scandinavianist thought. Still, Fibiger fails to make that connection explicit. That failure may be read as a statement. The relation to Scandinavianism is dismissed in Fibiger’s emancipation novel, and interestingly, the same is true of the construction of the national people in Welhaven’s prose sketch “Sketches from Norway.” However, in Welhaven’s

case, the transnational relation replacing Scandinavianism is very different from Fibiger's use of the significant Other.

Welhaven joined enthusiastically in the Scandinavianist student meetings, had extensive contacts in Denmark, where he also stayed for long periods of time for research purposes, and most importantly, loudly promoted the benefits from the old connection with Denmark in the debate over the construction of the Norwegian people.⁵¹ He also had powerful friends in the literary public sphere in Sweden, although "Sketches from Norway" remained one of the few literary works by Welhaven that were translated into Swedish (in 1860).⁵² In fact, this prose sketch was the only text by Welhaven that was published in Britain and America during his lifetime, with a significant change of the title from the literal "Pictures from the Bergen coast" to "Sketches from Norway."⁵³ Initially a poet, a literary critic and a literary historian, Welhaven turned in "Sketches from Norway" to a more realistic representation of the Norwegian landscape and the peasantry. He was also an important promoter of Norwegian art, and his poetry, in return, inspired the artists – one example is Adolph Tidemand (1814–76) and Hans Fredrik Gude's (1825–1903) famous painting *Bridal Procession on the Hardangerfjord* (1848), which is more or less a depiction of a scene from "Sketches from Norway."⁵⁴ As such, this prose sketch would contribute to the visual culture of Norwegian nationalism.

The sketch was originally published in 1842 as a series of articles in the newspaper *Den Constitutionelle* (subsequently published in *Reisebilleder og Digter*, 1851). The aim was clearly to celebrate the Norwegian people and to display the present-day peasantry of the islands off the Bergen coast as a channel to the past glory of the Norwegian Golden Age: the Medieval, independent kingdom of Norway. To claim the position as part of European cultural history, Welhaven repeatedly compares Norwegian landscape, folklore and traditions to that of other nations. Apparently, Scandinavianism is of no help to Welhaven in this quest. The relation to other Scandinavian nations is practically obliterated and replaced with transnational comparisons. The islands off the Bergen coast represent a "Norway on a small scale," Welhaven writes, and the people who live there, "a race called the Striles," has kept the old ways as nobody else among the Norwegian peasantry.⁵⁵ A "strange nation," Welhaven calls them.⁵⁶ This is prototype Norway, lost to modernity, which now should not only be incorporated into the nation but guide the conception of the nationally defined people.

The very size of the islands, "Sartor [nowadays Sotra], the Ask Isle, the Holsen Isle and the Rad Isle" is specified by comparisons – in the original with the Isle of Wight, Malta, Ithaca and the Danish island Langeland, although the English translation settles for the first two.⁵⁷ After having zoomed in on Sotra, Welhaven describes the bottomless lake in the middle of the island and presents the magic creature that resides in the water as superior to other legendary beasts:

The tale is stranger than what is told of the sea-serpent and the Krake; for those have the wide ocean for their playground, whereas the leviathan of

the Sartor Isle is confined within a prison, where the rocks stand around as sentinels.⁵⁸

Sea-serpents are present in various mythologies; the Kraken in Nordic folklore is indeed one of them, but Welhaven quickly exchanges the Nordic beast for the Biblical leviathan. The picturesque close-up of the Strile himself reminds the narrator of Rembrandt: “yonder old sea-Strile, you will say, seated under the vent-hole, with the daylight streaming down upon his uncouth dress, and his long grey beard, is a figure unmatched in all the paintings of Rembrandt.”⁵⁹ The bridal procession, that supposedly has kept traditions and costumes more or less intact since the Viking Age, ends with a dance that “has all the marked action and passionate fling of the Tarantella,” while funerals are attended by professional weeping-women who, in Welhaven’s words, “form a Christian choir of Choephoraë, that gives the burial scene a wild dramatic effect.”⁶⁰ “Sketches from Norway” is no more than ten pages long, but to construe the people of the miniature Norway on equal terms with the ancient cultures of southern Europe, Welhaven manages to gather references from the Bible, Classical Antiquity as well as from more modern-day European cultural history. The Scandinavian nations are only hinted at as part of a broader European community. In “Sketches from Norway” as well as in *Clara Raphael*, Scandinavianist ideas are dismissed and replaced either by transnational comparisons with a wider European community or, conversely, by a “significant Other.”

Unacknowledged relation to pan-nationalism

The representation of poverty as a national characteristic in Norwegian, Finnish and Swedish mid-nineteenth-century literature points to a third possibility of articulating the relation to pan-national ideas. Poverty certainly was hard to ignore in Scandinavia during the nineteenth century with recurring years of bad crops and famine.⁶¹ Starvation was indeed the immediate impetus for Almqvist’s “The Importance of Swedish Poverty” (1838) and for Runeberg’s poem, “Bonden Pavo” (1830, “Paavo the Peasant”); Runeberg was famously inspired by his first-hand experience in Saarijärvi of the people’s patience in their suffering. Paavo’s wife thinks that bad crops year after year means that they have been forsaken by God, but Paavo maintains like the Biblical Job: “God but tries us, he does not forsake us.”⁶² Obviously, scarcity had to be taken into account in Scandinavian nationalist ideology, but there is no self-evident way of how that should be done. Runeberg, Wergeland and Almqvist all celebrated poverty as a national virtue, or more to the point: the ability to cope in hard circumstances as a moral asset granting freedom. That definition of poverty as morality is a clear example of the trade in national identity.⁶³

Admittedly, the idea that the harsh climate of northern countries fosters liberty is ancient; Joep Leerssen traces it back to Hippocrates and Aristotle, and follows the north–south-opposition to the present day via Tacitus, Montesquieu’s

climate theory and Romantic nationalism.⁶⁴ Swedish patriotism had indeed made ample use of that thought already in the seventeenth century, when poverty and freedom (in terms of political sovereignty and the Protestant faith) were claimed as a characteristic of the Swedish people.⁶⁵ Romantic nationalism would rephrase this set of ideas to a national culture of inner feeling and identity.⁶⁶

Henrik Wergeland's appropriation of poverty as a Norwegian national characteristic was framed in opposition to the riches of Denmark: to value freedom over the comforts of life. The moral attitude to poverty – “poverty with honour” – was elaborated in his many efforts to educate the nation.⁶⁷ He edited, or more or less single-handedly wrote, two subsequent journals that specifically targeted the common people: *For Almuen* (*For the Common People*, 8 volumes 1830–34) and *For Arbeidsklassen* (*For the Working Class*, 2 volumes every month from December 1839–44). Actually, *For the Working Class* was initially called *For Fattigmand* (*For the Poor Man*), but that name was quickly changed. This second publication in particular was issued in impressively large numbers and had an impact on the Poor Laws issued in 1845.⁶⁸ Wergeland actually translated Runeberg's “Paavo the Peasant” for publication in *For the Working Class* in 1844, though that remains the only evidence of contact.⁶⁹ Historian Odd Arvid Storsveen stresses that Wergeland's main objective with *For the Common People* was to spread the ideas of national liberty and virtues among the peasantry, in a vein reminiscent of Enlightenment patriotic citizenship ideals, although Romantic nationalism informed his conception of the Norwegian people as intrinsically sovereign even in times of subjection.⁷⁰ The later publication, *For the Working Class*, still kept that thought, but distinguished between different elements of the common people; the poor had not fulfilled Wergeland's high hopes and he now concentrated on more practical advice.⁷¹ Wergeland was indeed known for wearing “vadmél,” that is rough, homespun woollen cloth, typically used by the peasantry, manifesting in his own appearance that poverty was a virtue to be adopted also by the educated classes.⁷² Still, his attitude in the publications aimed at the poor people was more paternalistic than celebratory. The idealist conception of poverty featuring the poor people as role models for the upper classes was even more pronounced in Runeberg's and Almqvist's works.

In Runeberg's authorship, poverty as a national virtue is most explicitly celebrated in the epic poem “Christmas Eve”, which is often recognised as a turning-point in his authorship.⁷³ The literary historian Johan Wrede points out that the depiction of poverty as a national virtue was influenced by Runeberg's favourite author, Almqvist, and especially the representation of poverty in “The Importance of Swedish Poverty.” Wrede stresses that the idea of poverty as beneficial for moral education was indeed widespread, and admittedly the Finnish people was described in similar terms in Runeberg's earlier works. Still, there is evidence to suggest that Runeberg had access to an unpublished version of “The Importance of Swedish Poverty” when he started to work on “Christmas Eve” in 1838, and the depiction of poverty as a factor for nationalist identification and solidarity, cutting across social classes, is strikingly similar, Wrede contends.⁷⁴

The pivotal section, in Wrede's words "the Evangelical foundational text of national Finnish patriotism," constructing the Finnish people as poor, patient and honourable is induced by a meeting between two old soldiers.⁷⁵ The Major is proud to hear his old brother-in-arms, Pistol, reject the idea of being supported by his wealthier friend. As long as he can take his livelihood from the forest and the lake, Pistol will not be dependent. The Major gazes "transfigured and manly" at the soldier with a heart growing larger in his swelling bosom and responds with a tacit celebration of the Finnish nation:

Finland stood for his soul, that bleak, hidden and poverty-stricken, sacrosanct native land, and the gray cohort from Lake Saimaa's shores, the delight of his life, the pride of his lifetime, once more appeared to him [...].⁷⁶

The poor soldier Pistol reminds the Major not only of the army but of the "sacrosanct native land" itself, characterised by poverty. The poor, independent man represents Finland in Runeberg's poem, "humble, curt, and calm, with an iron-fast pride deep inside him."⁷⁷ The verse in the original is hexameter, which was far from an innocent or politically neutral matter at the time.⁷⁸ The Finnish historian Matti Klinge has stressed that Runeberg's background as a scholar of Classical Antiquity is shown not only in his expertise of the antique verse but also in the national virtues he ascribed to the Finnish people. The virtues of Runeberg's nationally defined people are in fact the cardinal virtues of stoicism: bravery, privation, silence, calm and above all *constantia*.⁷⁹ Still, the virtuous endurance of poverty is indeed a common Scandinavian trait.

Almqvist's essay "The Importance of Swedish Poverty," that inspired Runeberg in "Christmas Eve," appropriates poverty as a specifically Swedish characteristic. It is possibly the most re-issued text in Almqvist's authorship and had an impact on the construction of the Swedish people that extended well into the twentieth century.⁸⁰ In fact, poverty in Almqvist's account is the God-given purpose of the Swedish nation: "However, one thing – and a great thing – distinguishes the Swede from all others in Europe: the Swede is destined for *poverty*."⁸¹ He elaborates on this thought, claiming that poverty is a virtue in the sense "to *be able* to be poor. To be able do it right, with perfect freedom, soundness and independence."⁸² Whereas the rich become dependent on wealth, the poor are autonomous. To be sure, this characteristic chimes with older kinds of ethnotypes as well as with earlier climatological theories.⁸³ The difference is that these moral characteristics in Almqvist's work, in accordance with nineteenth-century Romantic nationalism, was understood as an inner feeling of national belonging that the upper classes must learn to appreciate from the poor people.⁸⁴

The construction of nationally defined peoples in Wergeland's, Runeberg's and Almqvist's authorships foregrounded poverty as a national virtue specific to each nation even though they clearly are defined by common Nordic circumstances. First of all, it's unlikely that anyone would claim poverty as a national

characteristic unaware of the transnational conditions, especially given the long tradition of poverty defining the idea of the north. Secondly, there are links connecting these representations other than harsh climate and years of bad crops. Although Wergeland was probably not aware of Almqvist's work, Runeberg and Almqvist were indeed friends and inspired one another's construction of their respective people.⁸⁵ Wergeland's, Runeberg's and Almqvist's works are all seeking to carve out a national identity, to establish criteria for the Norwegian, Finnish and Swedish peoples respectively, and these texts were all pivotal in that nation-building process. The relation to common pan-national ideas in these cases is clearly a defining feature of the construction of different Scandinavian peoples, though it remains unacknowledged. They knowingly built on earlier ethnotypes of the north and freely traded characteristics between each other, but still claimed these very same characteristics to be uniquely Norwegian, Finnish or Swedish.

Conclusions

Scandinavian nationalisms bore an intrinsic relation to pan-nationalism, and yet the most important result of this investigation is the sheer variety in constructions of nationally defined Scandinavian people in relation to ideas of a Scandinavian cultural community. The three major emancipation novels of Swedish, Norwegian and Danish literature respectively – Mathilde Fibiger's *Clara Raphael*, Camilla Collett's *The District Governor's Daughters* and Fredrika Bremer's *Hertha* – all consciously created a nationally defined people, though in strikingly different ways in terms of the relation to wider pan-Scandinavian ideas. Bremer's commitment to pan-Scandinavian ideas is explicit throughout her authorship, and women's sense of citizenship is nourished by Old Norse literature, understood as a common Scandinavian heritage. The transnational relation required for nation-building in Norway, according to Collett on the other hand, was a new way to make sense of the old Danish-Norwegian relation. Old Norse myth for her only represented a gloomy, by-gone history with no potential for women's emancipation. Fibiger's novel points to a third use of Old Norse literature: she presents it as stories about Danish heroes and Danish history. In *Clara Raphael* as well as in Welhaven's "Sketches from Norway," Scandinavianist ideas are dismissed and replaced by other kinds of transnational connections. In Fibiger's account Denmark's "significant Other," Germany, makes the Danish people appear by means of the First Schleswig War. Welhaven's "Sketches from Norway" construe the people of the miniature Norway on equal terms with the ancient cultures of southern Europe by replacing Scandinavia in transnational comparisons with a wider European community.

The representation of poverty as a national characteristic in Norwegian, Finnish and Swedish mid-nineteenth-century literature points to a third possibility of articulating the relation to pan-national ideas. The construction of nationally defined peoples in Wergeland's, Runeberg's and Almqvist's authorships

foregrounded poverty as a national virtue specific to each nation even though they were defined by common Nordic circumstances. They knowingly built on earlier ethnotypes of the north and freely traded characteristics between each other, but still claimed these very same characteristics to be uniquely Norwegian, Finnish or Swedish. The relation to common pan-national ideas in these cases is clearly a defining feature of the construction of different Scandinavian peoples, though it remains unacknowledged.

Notes

- 1 Furuland, *Romanen som vardagsvara*; cf. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.
- 2 Haarder Ekman, "Mitt hems gränser vidgades"; Giladi, "Origins and Characteristics of Macro-Nationalism"; Maxwell, "Pan-Nationalism," 8–12.
- 3 Hemstad, "I 'Tidens Fylde'"; Hansen, "Bøker og skandinavisk forbrødring"; Forssell, *Författaren, förläggarna och forskarna*.
- 4 Cf. Giladi, "Origins and Characteristics of Macro-Nationalism."
- 5 See e.g. van Gerven, *Scandinavism*, 386.
- 6 Hemstad, "'Skandinavismens' tilkomst."
- 7 See the Introduction to this volume.
- 8 Maxwell, "Pan-Nationalism," 6; see also the Introduction to this volume.
- 9 Hemstad "'Skandinavismens' tilkomst."
- 10 The criteria for citizenship were codified rather late in the nineteenth century, in Sweden, for example, as late as 1858. Debates over the meaning of the concept of citizenship and the criteria for inclusion took place not only in the Parliaments and in the press but also in literature. Active citizenship was considered to be reserved for men, but liberal authors – female and male – at the time disagreed: they promoted women's contributions to the nation and included women as citizens. Bohlin, "Female Citizenship." For a discussion of the moral conception of citizenship in nineteenth-century Norway, see Ulvund, *Religious Otherness and National Identity in Scandinavia*.
- 11 Wulfsberg, "Kvinnefrigjøring og offentlighet"; Aslaksen, "Romanens virkningskraft."
- 12 Arping and Furuland, "Inledning," XXVIII–XXIX.
- 13 Seip, *Demringstid*; Haarder Ekman, *Mitt hems gränser vidgades*; Hemstad, *Fra Indian summer til nordisk vinter*.
- 14 See the Introduction to this volume; Maxwell, "Pan-Nationalism."
- 15 Bohlin, "Den svenska 1840-talsromanen som nationell kartografi."
- 16 Wrede, *Världen enligt Runeberg*, 242.
- 17 Wrede, *Världen enligt Runeberg*, 19, 337; Klinge, *Idyll och hot*, 15; Forssell, *Författaren, förläggarna och forskarna*; Bohlin, "Neglect, Grief, Revenge."
- 18 Bohlin, "Neglect, Grief, Revenge"; Bohlin, "Fattigdom som svensk kvalitet"; cf. Ulvund, *Religious Otherness and National Identity in Scandinavia*.
- 19 Cf. Haarder Ekman, "Mitt hems gränser vidgades," 154–58.
- 20 Wickström, "Nordic brothers before strange others."
- 21 See e.g. Bohlin, "Neglect, Grief, Revenge."
- 22 Bremer, *Brothers and Sisters* II, 67.
- 23 Bremer, *Brothers and Sisters* I, 32.
- 24 See e.g. Bohlin, "Geography of the Soul – History of Humankind."
- 25 Giladi, "Origins and Characteristics of Macro-Nationalism," 258.
- 26 Bremer, *Brothers and Sisters* II, 51, 55.
- 27 Grundtvig, *Nordens Mythologi*, 212.
- 28 Grundtvig, *Nordens Mythologi*, III, XX, 1, 7, 212.
- 29 Bremer, *Brothers and Sisters* II, 53–54.

- 30 Bremer, *Brothers and Sisters* II, 59. See also Bohlin, "Female Citizenship."
- 31 Bremer, *Hertha*, 59.
- 32 Bremer, *Hertha*, 232.
- 33 See e.g. Bremer, *Hertha*, 109. See also Arping and Furuland, "Inledning"; von Schnurbein, "Norn, Vampire, Female Christ."
- 34 Bremer, *A Diary*, 32.
- 35 Bremer, *A Diary*, 89. See also Bohlin, "Magi och nation," 61.
- 36 See Bohlin, "Neglect, Grief, Revenge," 100; cf. Edgren, "Traumakonstruktionen"; Engman, *Ett långt farväl*; Sandström, "Sveriges 1809."
- 37 Collett, *The District Governor's Daughters*, 191.
- 38 Seip, *Demringstid*, 80–91.
- 39 Skår, "Den danske herregård."
- 40 Skår, "Den danske herregård."
- 41 Collett, *The District Governor's Daughters*, 224. See also Skår, "Den danske herregård," 74–77.
- 42 Collett, *The District Governor's Daughters*, 224.
- 43 Nun, *Women of the Danish Golden Age*, 99; Kølle Martinsen, "A Shieldmaiden Born to Fight and Love," 213–16.
- 44 Fibiger, *Clara Raphael*, 50. There is to my knowledge no English translation of Fibiger's novel; the translations of the quotations are therefore my own.
- 45 On Grundtvig's three "fatherlands," see Møller, "Grundtvig, Danmark og Norden," 105.
- 46 Kølle Martinsen, "A Shieldmaiden Born to Fight and Love," 214; on the debate, see Wulfsberg, "Kvinnefrigjøring og offentlighet."
- 47 On vocational nationalism, see e.g. Smith, *Chosen Peoples*; Thorkildsen, "For Norge, kjempers fødeland"; Bohlin, "Geography of the Soul – History of Humankind."
- 48 Fibiger, *Clara Raphael*, 6–7.
- 49 Cf. Smith, *The Nation Made Real*.
- 50 Fibiger, *Clara Raphael*, 74.
- 51 Seip, *Demringstid*.
- 52 Seip, *Demringstid*, 455; Lindberger, *Wergeland och Sverige*.
- 53 "Sketches from Norway" was translated by H. Ward and Augusta Plesner, and first published in *Temple Bar: A London Magazine for Town and Country Readers* vol. 22 (1868): 387–96, and subsequently in New York in *The Eclectic Magazine* vol. 70 (1868): 472–76. Halvorsen, *Norsk forfatter-lexikon*, 371; see also Seip, *Demringstid*, 455.
- 54 Seip, *Demringstid*, 263.
- 55 Welhaven, "Sketches from Norway," 387, 390.
- 56 The English translation has "this strange race" (Welhaven, "Sketches from Norway," 390), but the original has "nation": "denne mærkelige Nation." Welhaven, *Samlede verker*. IV, 12.
- 57 Welhaven, "Sketches from Norway," 387.
- 58 Welhaven, "Sketches from Norway," 389.
- 59 Welhaven, "Sketches from Norway," 393.
- 60 Welhaven, "Sketches from Norway," 395–96.
- 61 See Kjellen, *Sociala idéer och motiv*.
- 62 Runeberg, "from Idylls and Epigrams 1830," 53. Nordberg, "Kommentar." Rainer Knapas has drawn attention to that "Paavo the Peasant" was published in *Finland: An English Journal devoted to the Cause of the Finnish People* (1899) as part of a campaign to counteract the ongoing Russification in Finland. Knapas comments: "Runeberg's 'Paavo the Peasant' in English translation was a satisfactory literary expression for the unyielding, strenuous Finnish people." Knapas, *Idyll och hjältemod*, 68, my transl.
- 63 Thiesse, "National Identities."
- 64 Leerssen, "The North," 15–18.
- 65 Nordin, *Ett fattigt men fritt folk*, 179, 235–66.
- 66 Bohlin, "Fattigdom som svensk kvalitet."

- 67 Uthaug, *Et Verdensdyp av Frihet*, 255; Storsveen, *Mig selv*, 109.
- 68 Storsveen, *Mig selv*, 357–66.
- 69 Lindberger, *Wergeland och Sverige*, 39, 62–68.
- 70 Storsveen, *Mig selv*, 357–66.
- 71 Storsveen, *Mig selv*, 116–118, 360.
- 72 Uthaug, *Et Verdensdyp av Frihet*, 255; Stengrundet, “Vadmelsideologi.”
- 73 Wrede, *Världen enligt Runeberg*, 250.
- 74 Wrede, *Världen enligt Runeberg*, 218, 237–43, 246–53.
- 75 Wrede, *Världen enligt Runeberg*, 252, my transl.
- 76 Prose translation by Tore Wretö and Zelek S. Herman in Wretö, *J.L. Runeberg*, 60.
- 77 Prose translation by Tore Wretö and Zelek S. Herman in Wretö, *J.L. Runeberg*, 60.
- 78 In accordance with Schiller’s idea of naïve literature, Runeberg perceived hexameter as a more genuine metre, connected to nature and folk poetry. He slandered the Swedish poet Esaias Tegnér for using alexandrines in his nationalist poem “Svea” (1811). Klinge, *Den politiska Runeberg*, 154–55, 195; Wrede, *Världen enligt Runeberg*, 105–06. Every nineteenth-century nation required, in Anne-Marie Thiesse’s words, “un Homère à soi.” Thiesse, *La fabrique de l’écrivain national*, 33–59.
- 79 Klinge, *Den politiska Runeberg*, 385–87.
- 80 Bohlin, “Fattigdom som svensk kvalitet.”
- 81 Almqvist, “Svenska Fattigdomens betydelse,” 290. There is no English translation of Almqvist’s essay; the translations of the quotations are therefore my own.
- 82 Almqvist, “Svenska Fattigdomens betydelse,” 290.
- 83 Cf. Leerssen, “The North.”
- 84 Bohlin, “Fattigdom som svensk kvalitet.”
- 85 Lindberger, *Wergeland och Sverige*.

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9

ORGANISED INTO EXISTENCE

Scandinavianism and pan-Scandinavian associations within and beyond the region

Ruth Hemstad

Pan-Scandinavian ideas inspired a range of civil society initiatives, not only across the Scandinavian region but also beyond, among Scandinavians travelling to or settled in other parts of the world. During the nineteenth century, mainly between 1842 and 1905, a transnational associational life thrived, attracting pan-Scandinavian-oriented members at home and Scandinavian diaspora and expatriate communities abroad. This diverse associational practice contributed to the imagining of a Scandinavian community transcending both the nation-state borders and the borders of the region. The pan-Scandinavian associations mainly concentrated on cultural and literary tasks, as well as offering sociability and financial support in foreign countries, but could also serve pan-national political purposes, and they were at times certainly perceived as a means to promote Scandinavianism, by both the protagonists and antagonists of the movement.

It will be argued in this chapter that the scarcely explored pan-Scandinavian associational life abroad is essentially a history of a rise and fall – although also of new beginnings. I will focus particularly on the initiating and culminating phases of this process, when, it seems, these associations – and their interaction with the homelands – were particularly tight and tense. Between 1842 and 1905 associations with Scandinavian purposes, measures and members – and usually terming themselves simply “Scandinavian association” (in a particular city) – were founded in around 100 different cities, most of them beyond the region, in Europe, the Americas, Australia and Africa.¹ In many cities in Europe and North America there were several, often short-lived Scandinavian associations, sometimes at the same time. The total number of this kind of pan-national association therefore probably amounts to at least 125. They constituted an imagined “remote Scandinavia” – until its culmination in 1905, followed by a restructuring of the pan-national landscape abroad. By studying the rise and fall of pan-Scandinavian associations abroad, their bonds to Scandinavia as an

imagined homeland and the role of this associational life in a broader pan-Scandinavian discourse during the long nineteenth century, fresh light may be cast on Scandinavianism in general and the reciprocal relationship between pan-national ideas and diaspora nationalism in a Scandinavian context in particular.

Scandinavia?

“Where is the famous country Scandinavia?” The mocking question put forward by the Norwegian author Henrik Wergeland (1808–45) was published in a pamphlet in 1845, a few months before 1400 students from Norway, Sweden and Denmark paraded through the streets of Copenhagen at the second Scandinavian student meeting, demonstrating that they were “Scandinavians,” as stated on the silk ribbons they were wearing, and toasting “Scandinavia” as an affirmation of sympathy.² The answer Wergeland himself offered was that, if anywhere, Scandinavia was “on the moon.” This dismissal of Scandinavia as a meaningful transnational space was apt enough to circulate for years, not only within a Norwegian public sphere but also abroad, to Scandinavians who had formed “Scandinavian associations” in Europe and North America. One of these, the Scandinavian Association in Rome, declared shortly after its founding in 1860 (addressing Wergeland’s question) that the Scandinavian community is “not on the moon – but in Rome.”³ Some years later, in 1869, while visiting Scandinavians in Minneapolis, the famous Norwegian musician Ole Bull (1810–80) reiterated Wergeland’s question, asking if the country “Scandinavia” – not mentioned in his textbook in geography – was rather to be found on the moon.⁴ Bull’s satirical comment must be seen as a reaction to local pan-Scandinavian associational initiatives – a Scandinavian association was indeed formed in Minneapolis just before his arrival – as well as general visions of a “New Scandinavia” overseas.⁵

The pan-Scandinavian movement envisaged “Scandinavia” as a transnational cultural community based on a shared ancient past, similar culture and kindred languages – and with a prosperous joint future, if standing together. The region consisted of three separate nation-states in the making, of which two of them, Sweden and Norway, were united in a loose personal union in 1814. For many, particularly Danish and Swedish Scandinavianists, a political unification securing the region against German and Russian threats was more or less openly declared as the final goal, mainly between 1848 and 1864/70.⁶ From the perspectives of the associations abroad – and many of the associations at home as well – Scandinavianism was, however, rarely a question of statehood, but rather of a Scandinavian cultural unity, complementing national identities and cultures. Among the means available for cultivating Scandinavian identities was the emerging public sphere and rising associational life of the mid-nineteenth-century Western world.⁷ A main vehicle in developing and disseminating Scandinavianism, alongside talking and writing the region into existence – as Iver B. Neumann suggests – was thus to form associations with pan-Scandinavian purposes and measures.⁸ Through associations, Scandinavia was, one may

argue, *organised into existence* as a transnational cultural community with common institutions and a sense of identity.

Although Scandinavianism was not primarily concerned with ethnic minorities beyond the state borders, as in many other pan-nationalisms, the Scandinavian transnational community in the making did have an extraterritorial dimension – it was imagined as a common homeland among the rising number of Scandinavians around the world. The Scandinavian communities abroad may arguably be termed a Scandinavian diaspora which, according to Roger Brubaker, may be broadly understood as a population dispersed across state borders and consciously maintaining a common cultural identity and a homeland orientation and inter-connection.⁹ Albeit not always reflected in nationalism studies, emigration and nation-building processes are closely intertwined through diaspora or expatriate communities, sometimes including political exiles.¹⁰ This is particularly important in pan-nationalisms that, according to Snyder, “writ the nation large” by expanding their influence, identity and culture beyond established borders, promoting unity between co-nationals in different states.¹¹ This unity may expand beyond neighbouring states, and it may be perceived as primarily cultural, or, with Maxwell, low-political, and not necessarily aiming at statehood.¹²

Unification through associations

One of the earliest examples of postulating “Scandinavia” as a political entity is known from an associational context beyond the region, a speech given at the Nordic Society in London in 1792. The London association for Norwegians, Danes and Swedes visiting or staying in London, is (alongside *Societas Scandinaviensis*, founded in Philadelphia in 1769, probably by Herrnhuter emigrants from Sweden, Denmark and Norway),¹³ the oldest known Scandinavian association of all. In his remarkable speech on the unification of “the three Nordic realms,” the Danish historian Frederik Sneedorff (1760–92) emphasised the important role of associations in uniting Scandinavia. He prescribed a transnational network of associations across “Scandinavia” – understood as a political entity consisting of the Danish–Norwegian dual monarchy and its arch-enemy Sweden, including Finland – thereby revealing an early belief in the merits of associations.

It is through associations, that all plans, being too comprehensive [to accomplish] for the individual person, begin and are carried out [...]. Through associations, established in the three Nordic realms and primarily in the capitals, could this deference, this friendship, this mutual confidence at best be disseminated [...] we united Swedes, Norwegians and Danes consider us as solely part of one fatherland – Scandinavia.¹⁴

Sneedorff’s speech travelled from London to Copenhagen and later to Stockholm and was published several times in different Scandinavian associational contexts,

in 1798 by the Scandinavian Literary Society (founded in Copenhagen in 1796), and in 1810, 1846 and 1869, in the latter introduced as “if it was written yesterday.”¹⁵ The literary society in Copenhagen was a closed society, typical of its time, open only to a maximum of 40 subscribing fellows, some of whom were also members of the Nordic Association in London. It was probably the first association in the Scandinavian region terming itself “Scandinavian” and one of the first examples of a transnational, although Danish-dominated, association in the area. It aimed at promoting “literary connections between the Scandinavian realms,” not least through its journal *Skandinavisk Museum* – where Sneedorff’s speech was published – and later a book series issued until the 1820s.¹⁶

Throughout the nineteenth century, a range of pan-national associations were formed within and beyond the region, usually terming themselves “Scandinavian,” rarely “Nordic,” with a gradual shift during the last part of the century.¹⁷ While the concepts could be used interchangeably, Scandinavia and Scandinavian had stronger political connotations. Scandinavian cooperation within different fields, developing since the late 1830s, tended to be interpreted as expressions of pan-Scandinavian tendencies – both among Scandinavian activists and in parts of the Scandinavian and foreign press. The first scholarly association regularly organising Scandinavian meetings, the Scandinavian Association of Natural Scientists, was for instance understood, although overstated, as a first step towards a “Scandinavian League,” in *The Foreign Quarterly Review* in 1842:

an idea seldom openly expressed, but not the less deeply cherished by very many thinking men in the north, who see in this society the first step gained towards attaining that great Scandinavian League which they are so eager to bring about.¹⁸

Scandinavianists participating in these early meetings, inspired by German, British and Swiss models, indeed declared them to be the first sign of a Scandinavian scholarly unification. The meeting series, starting in 1839 and continuing until 1936, was at least a first step towards closer Nordic cooperation among scholars and different professions, leading to what was to become an established Nordic tradition of regularly organised transnational meetings.¹⁹

Pan-Scandinavian ideas had been in the air since the late 1830s, and associations and journals reflecting these developments appeared, both within and beyond the region, along with transnational meetings – with the student meetings from 1843 onwards in a prominent position. From 1843 “pan-Scandinavianism” – or far more frequently “Scandinavianism” – was used as a common concept, resembling the established term “pan-Slavism,” in use since 1826.²⁰ From its founding years until the late 1840s, Scandinavianism was an oppositional movement, led by an emerging liberal-oriented intelligentsia and bourgeoisie, not least working through interconnected associations, transnational events and common literary initiatives. Danish and Swedish authorities were until the late 1840s cautious regarding almost all kinds of transnational associational activities,

both within and beyond their borders. Not without reason they feared Russian diplomatic reactions against what could be seen as veiled political pan-national projects.²¹ The general fear of political tendencies is also visible in the discussion of the naming of the first Scandinavian association abroad in the nineteenth century – founded 15 December 1842 in the hanseatic free city of Hamburg, close to the border of the Danish Realm at a time with rising national tensions in the borderland. The cultural association in Hamburg, led by Danish tradesmen, had chosen the “Scandinavian Association in Hamburg” as its name. The Danish envoy protested, however, fearing (as was soon reported in the Scandinavian press) the political connotations attached to this name, causing the association to rename itself “The Nordic Reading Society” after a discussion at the general meeting.²² At the next general meeting, in March 1843, the original name was nonetheless reintroduced.

It seems, then, that Scandinavian associations were formed abroad before similar associations were founded within the region, both in the late eighteenth and in the mid-nineteenth century. After the first Scandinavian student meeting in Uppsala in 1843, the returning students, spearheaded by the controversial editor and political activist Carl Ploug (1813–94), decided to form a pan-Scandinavian association in Copenhagen. Associational models referred to at the constituting meeting were the existing “Scandinavian clubs or reading societies” within Scandinavian communities in many cities abroad, “as in Hamburg and Munich; just as in Paris and Rome a close exchange takes place between the Scandinavians living there.”²³ Although the new Scandinavian association in Copenhagen was defined as a literary society, the Danish absolutist authorities, fearing Russian reactions, banned it. Stirred by this sanction, the Copenhagen elite mobilised, and soon formed another Scandinavian association in September 1843, formally as a closed club.²⁴ It got political sanction on the precondition of not discussing political matters. In Uppsala, inspired by the initiative in Copenhagen, a similar Scandinavian association, closely connected to the university, was founded in October 1843, and some years later, in 1848, another one in Gothenburg. In Stockholm, an association terming itself “Scandinavian society” was formed in 1847. The society was, however, connected to the early radical labour movement, and the naming probably reflected the experiences of the travelling journeymen, who stayed abroad temporarily as part of their vocational training and were accustomed to being regarded as “Scandinavians” in different associational contexts in foreign countries.²⁵ Later, this segment of Scandinavian associational life abroad, with Zurich as a main node, developed a comprehensive network of associations across Europe and Scandinavia which came to have an enduring legacy (see below). While the associational response to Scandinavianism in Norway was in general more hesitant in the 1840s, a Scandinavian book committee connected to the national student association in Christiania (Oslo) was formed in late 1843, focusing on literary exchange.

The associations in Denmark and Sweden stayed in close (although not formalised) contact with each other and with Scandinavian associations and

communities abroad. Closer Scandinavian cooperation was stated as their main purpose, and they confined themselves to cultural and literary activities, although aiming at, at least in a long-term perspective, a closer union of some kind. The importance ascribed to these associations is illustrated by the encyclopaedic entry they earned in 1848. The clearly pro-Scandinavian entry is interesting, while it also reveals the perceived interconnection between the associations within and beyond the region as belonging to the same phenomenon, although having different backgrounds, characters and purposes.

Scandinavian association is the name of the associations, which in recent years have been established within as well as outside Scandinavia, in order to contribute to the development of the common Swedish, Norwegian and Danish nationality. The purpose of these associations is to stimulate the feeling of one nationality, not Swedish, Norwegian or Danish, but Scandinavian. Their main principle is that these three Nordic states consist of one and the same people, and therefore the closest union should be promoted.²⁶

The activities of the associations were described in this entry as primarily literary, such as book exchange and building book collections. Regarding Scandinavian associations in foreign countries – America is mentioned as an example, probably referring to the Scandinavian association in New York, founded in 1844 – it is underlined that these also functioned as social and supporting associations for Scandinavians far from home.

The associations within the region were interconnected to Scandinavian associations abroad through correspondence and visits and by sending literature, journals and newspapers. Associations in Paris, Bordeaux, Rome, Zurich, London and New York wrote to the “mother” associations at home to get associational advice and asking for help in purchasing literature, journals and newspapers. The letters were usually read aloud at semi-public associational meetings in Copenhagen and Uppsala and subsequently reported in pro-Scandinavian newspapers and journals. These associational networks were important, although never formally organised, as in later pan-national organisations in the Scandinavian countries.

The early associations in Denmark and Sweden closed down in the 1850s, probably due to reduced interest.²⁷ Similar associations within the region were, however, established in two additional rounds during the century, in the mid-1860s and again around 1900. The first pan-Scandinavian association in Norway was formed in 1864 during the ongoing Second Schleswig War. After the defeat and the painful loss of Schleswig – without the anticipated help from Norway and Sweden – new associations were formed in Sweden around 1865 and in Copenhagen in 1866.²⁸ These associations were clearly more political in orientation, contradicting the general claim that Scandinavianism was “dead and buried” after the war.²⁹ In their common journal, the message of political unification

was explicit, Scandinavian literature and culture in general is of interest, but no attention is paid to Scandinavian associations abroad.³⁰ The associations were dissolved in 1871–72, reflecting limited interest in political Scandinavianism after the German unification.

In 1899, as a response to renewed German and Russian threats against the southern and eastern border of the Nordic region, a range of new networked Nordic associations with explicitly cultural-literary purposes was founded in all three countries, as part of a renewed interest in what was termed “Neo-Scandinavianism.”³¹ This included renewed interest in, and contact with, Scandinavian associations abroad. A loose network, a “Connection between Nordic associations within and beyond the Nordic countries,” was established, aiming at exchange of information and potential mutual support.³² In general, there was increased attention in the Scandinavian press, and the label “Scandinavian associations abroad” was used in newspapers and magazines.

A remote Scandinavia

In general, it was said that Scandinavians were known for their eagerness to travel, and were sometimes termed “migratory birds” – arriving regularly in Southern territories every winter.³³ The travelling Scandinavians tended to form associations together wherever they arrived. A range of Scandinavian cultural associations were thus formed during the nineteenth century by and for Scandinavians working in or travelling to other parts of the world. They reflected both the pan-Scandinavian movement at home and the increasing number of Scandinavians leaving the region – temporarily or permanently. The associations could build on mutual understanding and common culture, and they contributed to preserving and promoting Scandinavian identity and language abroad. They represented an important infrastructure for newcomers abroad and for needy members of the Scandinavian communities in foreign countries. Sickness funds and mutual aid/benevolent societies were often established as parallel, interconnected associations. Similar associational initiatives like the one in Hamburg, including semi-organised reading societies, were made by Scandinavians in Paris, Zurich, Munich, Hannover, Bordeaux, London, Rome and New York in the mid-1840s. From the beginning they were perceived, as we have seen, as expressions of Scandinavian solidarity and unity and were part of the broader movement, confirming the idea of a Scandinavian transnational community. During the nineteenth century, similar associations mushroomed in a number of European and North American cities, as well as some in Latin America, several in Australia and a couple in Africa and Asia.

Between 1842 and 1905 around 70 Scandinavian associations were founded in at least 50 different European cities. Some were in German-speaking areas, in cities like Hamburg (1842), Zurich (1845, 1880) and Hannover (1840s), later Berlin (1856, 1897, 1904), Basel (1886), Leipzig (1867), Vienna (1870), Munich (1874, 1889, 1903), Frankfurt am Main (1878), St. Gallen (1890) and around

1900 Darmstadt and Karlsruhe. Around 1902, about 25 associations for artisans and travelling journeymen, in Switzerland and Germany, were connected to the Central relief funds for Scandinavians abroad (C.U.K.) in Arbon, Berlin, Bern, Bremen, Cologne, Davos, Dresden, Düsseldorf, Hamburg, Hannover, Harburg, Kreuzlingen, Leipzig, Luzern, Mainz, Mannheim, Nuremberg, Schaffhausen, Stettin, Stuttgart, Veogesack and Wiesbaden, in addition to the older associations in Zurich and St. Gallen. In France, there were several just in Paris (1845, 1866, 1880, 1891), others in Bordeaux (1846), and later in Cognac and Marseille (1890s). In Great Britain, similar associations were founded in London (1845), and later in Manchester (1856), Newcastle on Tyne (1861), Hull, Glasgow and Liverpool (1880s to 1900). In Italy, the Scandinavians gathered in Rome, as we have seen, from the 1830s. In Russia, benevolent societies were formed in St. Petersburg (1878) and Moscow (1890). Scandinavians also gathered in Budapest (1886), Danzig (1891), Antwerp (around 1900) and probably several other cities.

In a European context, members of these associations could include visitors staying for a longer or shorter period of time, notably artists, scholars, artisans, travelling journeymen and merchants, as well as established Scandinavians in a particular city, frequently involving diplomats or consuls, who often played a central role in the associational life. The social profile of the European associations could vary; from artists and scholars in Rome or merchants in Hamburg to artisans and travelling journeyman working temporarily abroad – from one to three years – in Zurich and its interconnected network of associations.

Scandinavians not only travelled – they emigrated *in masses* during the century. Between 1825 and 1930 around three million Scandinavians, mostly Swedes and Norwegians, emigrated, mainly to North America.³⁴ Norway was the country, next to Ireland, with the highest rate of its population emigrating during this period. Sweden ranks third. A range of Scandinavian associations were thus founded in American cities from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. As in Europe, this tendency to create common Scandinavian institutions, as Barton maintains, reflected “not only the relatively small size of all the Scandinavian groups in America in the pioneer period, but also the idealistic Pan-Scandinavianism that flourished among the educated classes in their homelands during the middle decades of the century.”³⁵ Many of these associations continued, however, long after the pioneer period and after the heydays of Scandinavianism, even if they were supplemented by national and local societies.


Starting with the Scandinavian association in New York, founded in 1844, a range of similar ventures were created in at least 22 different cities in North America during the century. Between 1856 and 1883 there were Scandinavian associations in cities like Washington, New Orleans, Brooklyn, Boston, San Francisco, Chicago, Minneapolis, Philadelphia, St. Paul, Moline in Illinois, Bristol in Connecticut, Galesburg, Austin, Portland and La Crosse in Wisconsin. In Canada, similar associations were founded in Montreal in the 1890s. Scandinavians also emigrated to other continents and formed small Scandinavian communities. In Latin America we know of associations since

the 1890s in Campinas and Sao Paulo in Brazil, in Mexico City in Mexico, in Tandil in Argentina and in Valparaiso in Chile. In Australia and New Zealand Scandinavian associations were active from the first one in Ballarat, and later in Sydney, Brisbane, Maryborough and Melbourne in Australia and in Christchurch and Auckland in New Zealand. In southern Africa, associations were established around 1900, in the provinces of Natal and Transvaal.³⁶

The Scandinavian associational life abroad was to a varying degree influenced by Scandinavianism. The trans-associational contact between associations at home and abroad illuminates how pan-Scandinavian ideas also travelled worldwide. Several letters from Scandinavians abroad to the Scandinavian associations in Copenhagen and Uppsala refer to Scandinavianism and Scandinavian ideas as a source of associational inspiration. An illustrating example is a letter from Paris in 1844, where 60 Swedish, Danish and Norwegians, mostly artisans, had gathered. They wrote to the associations in Uppsala and Copenhagen, asking for advice on how to form a Scandinavian reading society that would allow them to “unite as brethren,” to keep in contact with the “fatherland” and to be enlightened and educated as citizens through the reading of useful publications.³⁷ The Scandinavian association in Zurich, founded in 1845, equally explicitly referred to the pan-Scandinavian movement as an encouragement for reconciliation among Scandinavians abroad as well, in a letter to the association in Uppsala in 1847.³⁸

The Scandinavian associations, both in Scandinavia and Europe, also served as inspiration for Scandinavians in New York, forming the association “Skandinavia” in 1844, thereby mirroring similar associations already established among Germans, Irish and other people in the city.³⁹ This tendency was the same in European cities, “where people from all European countries gather together,” and the shared experiences and closeness among Scandinavians abroad were striking, as was underlined in a letter from Paris to the Scandinavian association in Rome in March 1873. The spirit of association, the letter emphasised, was particularly mature among “us northerners [...] spiritually connected as we are, considering each other as sons of one and the same people.”⁴⁰ Staying abroad they feel, the letter further argues, a strong urge to seek the company of their fellow citizens, thereby maintaining the connection with their homeland.

Staying in contact with citizens and associations abroad was also among the tasks of the Danish and – until 1905 – common Swedish-Norwegian diplomatic representatives in foreign countries. Still, the associational life abroad was usually common Scandinavian – and not national, or Swedish-Norwegian – although these kinds of associations also existed. A particular example of official diplomatic Scandinavian cooperation abroad and the close interaction between the legations and Scandinavian associations was the all-Scandinavian consul – probably the only one of its kind – in Rome. Consul Johan Bravo played an important role in supporting and managing the Scandinavian Association there, formally established in 1860, but based on older Danish-Norwegian and Swedish book collections (merged in 1856). It was probably the only one being financially supported



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FIGURE 9.1 Map with pan-Scandinavian associations around the world between 1842 and 1905. Produced with QGIS by Jon Carlsted Tønnessen, National Library of Norway's DH-lab. Documentation at https://github.com/joncto/map-ScandAssoc-1842_1905

by the three Scandinavian governments. Scandinavians in Rome had socialised on a regular basis since the 1830s and a common relief fund was formed in 1843. The association in Rome became the most famous of the Scandinavian associations abroad, and newspapers at home reported regularly on the “Scandinavians in Rome.”⁴¹ This phrase was used during most of the twentieth century as well, when most of the other associations abroad had been dissolved.

Pan-Scandinavian sympathies were articulated in various ways in these associational contexts, in speeches, songs, publications and letters, and in ceremonial brotherly drinking and enthusiastic toasting to the common Scandinavian homeland.⁴² This self-perception was reported in the Scandinavian press, frequently publishing annual accounts circulated by the associations, and written reports by corresponding journalists or other visitors. The Scandinavian association in Munich, toasting the homeland from the “remote Scandinavia” at its constituting meeting in 1874 (reported in the Scandinavian press), published a report in 1890 underlining that the activity in the association “continuously animates the feeling among the members, that we, Norwegians, Swedes and Danes, constitute one nationality.”⁴³

The statutes of the Scandinavian associations abroad, generally offering membership for “every Scandinavian” in a particular city, usually underlined the social and literary dimensions of the associations. They were normally explicitly non-political, partly due to national restrictions in the country of residence and partly to avoid national conflicts among the members. Most of these associations offered a library with Scandinavian literature, journals and newspapers from the home countries, and several of the statutes typically list as a major task the securing of the accessibility of Scandinavian publications, understood as an important means for promoting Scandinavian unity abroad.⁴⁴ Typically, the purpose of the Scandinavian Association in Hamburg, one of the best organised and wealthiest of the many similar associations, was stated as: “to make Scandinavian literature available to them, to provide visitors with the convenience and usefulness of being introduced to a circle of fellow citizens, to guide members and newly arrived Scandinavians [...].”⁴⁵ Similarly, social events, with regular meetings and celebrations, were often included in the defined purposes as well. In Paris, where several Scandinavian associations were formed – at times even in the same periods, but directed at different social segments – the first clause of the Scandinavian association founded in 1866, stated its purpose as “through frequent conviviality provide heartfelt and lively interaction between the Scandinavians in Paris.”⁴⁶ Women participated primarily at some of these social and cultural events, as membership was usually restricted to male fellows. This gradually changed during the century. Supporting Scandinavians in need was naturally, as mentioned above, an important function of most of these associations.

Although the statutes usually concentrated on local purposes, the transnational practice contributed to a common cause. Gradually, a range of networks and contacts developed between Scandinavian associations in foreign countries, most prominently in Europe, and the associations – or other relevant institutions

and individuals – at home, promoting Scandinavian culture, language and a sense of commonality. New contacts emerged among Scandinavians meeting each other in the “remote” Scandinavia, laying the foundations for enduring friendships and cooperating networks. Different networks of associations also developed between several of the associations in Europe. Initiated by the association in Hamburg, including this task in their statutes, several Scandinavian associations stayed in contact with each other as corresponding members, through the exchange of printed material and by reduction in entry fees and access to support. A separate network emerged among associations for artisans and travelling journeymen, mainly in Switzerland and Germany, through the Danish-dominated umbrella organisation the Central relief funds for Scandinavians abroad (C.U.K.) from 1900, originally based in Zurich.⁴⁷ It had around 25 branches in several European cities and also among returning members in the Scandinavian countries, as well as publishing its own journal.⁴⁸

The Scandinavian associations abroad were also spaces that attracted short-term visitors, such as artists, authors and journalists from the home countries, thereby strengthening the contacts across land and sea. Visitors reported on their travels and experiences abroad, in newspapers, journals and books, and these published accounts could play an important role in debates at home, not least regarding emigration as such.⁴⁹ Barton points out the influence by authors travelling to America, such as Per Adam Siljeström and Fredrika Bremer, both clearly inspired by pan-Scandinavian ideas.⁵⁰ After her journey in the early 1850s, Bremer published *Homes of the New World* in London and in Stockholm, where she envisaged the areas around Minnesota as a “new Scandinavia.”⁵¹ In the same vein, in a printed speech in the journal *Norden*, published by the newly founded Nordic associations in the Nordic countries in 1900, it was underlined that the “American ‘Scandinavianism’” and the “New Scandinavia” emerging among Scandinavians overseas, perceived “Norden” and “Scandinavia” as the fatherland and common homeland.⁵² The Scandinavian associations abroad were often described, by both members and visitors, as a “Scandinavian home” in foreign countries, a minor “remote Scandinavia,” a “Scandinavian community.” Seen from a distance, and among strangers, the similarities between the Scandinavians – their mutual culture and kindred languages – became clearer. Norwegians, Danes and Swedes abroad often regarded each other as, if not being of one Scandinavian nationality, at least as “fellow citizens” – understood as of the common homeland “Scandinavia.”

During the nineteenth century, Scandinavian associations at home and abroad had thus become an established practice, spanning the globe, although only loosely interconnected. As shown, there were, within the region, at least 15 different and relatively short-lived associations with a general pan-Scandinavian programme, mainly in the 1840s and 1850s, the late 1860s and around 1900. Beyond the region, probably around 125 Scandinavian associations, mainly in Europe and North America, had gathered no small number of Scandinavians in diaspora and expatriate communities. All this associational activity across the

globe must have helped to reinforce ideas of Scandinavian identity and promote “Scandinavianess.”

From pan-Scandinavian to pan-Swedish and Greater Norway

Scandinavianism around 1900 was, with Tim van Gerven’s expression, arguably “ambient,”⁵³ functioning as an overlapping identity compatible with the national ones in important segments of the population – and probably not least among Scandinavians abroad. The Scandinavian dimension may have been more or less taken for granted – but it was still ambiguous. This ambiguity, one may say, was confirmed by the reactions after 1905 and the dissolution of the Norwegian-Swedish union, adding new dimensions and meanings to what suddenly became a contested Scandinavian associational practice, seemingly regarding associations abroad in particular. The heated political conflict in the homelands, leading to strong anti-Scandinavian sentiments in parts of the Swedish population, soon reached the associations abroad. This led to a sharp confrontation between Swedes on the one side, and Norwegians and Danes on the other. In Hamburg, the Swedish members declared in early 1906 that “Scandinavianism is dead – *completely and irrecoverably dead*,”⁵⁴ literally walking out of the association and establishing their own national one. The conflict after 1905 ultimately led to the reorganisation and renaming of the association as solely Danish in 1912.⁵⁵ The Swedish conservative press monitored the conflict abroad closely, strongly criticising the Scandinavian associations abroad for being the last and detested remnants of “Scandinavianism.” The idea of a Scandinavian cultural community had in practice promoted Norwegian and Danish interests at the cost of the less nationalistic Swedes, it was claimed. The national consolidation in Sweden, following the dissolution of the union, inspired – and was inspired by – national consolidation among Swedish co-nationals abroad. Continued Scandinavian cooperation was deemed highly problematic in a Swedish conservative press calling for a national reawakening. From being perceived as a common homeland – although this perspective, as we have seen, was controversial at least in certain Norwegian quarters – “Scandinavia” was rejected as constraining Swedishness abroad as seen from a conservative Swedish post-1905 perspective.

While Swedish conservative newspapers denounced “Scandinavianism” and all kinds of Scandinavian cooperation at home and abroad, declaring that “a political Scandinavia does not exist anymore,”⁵⁶ the labour movement took another approach. The Swedish social democratic movement supported their Norwegian brothers in 1905 and embraced Scandinavian cooperation, reinterpreting Scandinavianism as “labour Scandinavianism” which was the way forward for the “new Scandinavia.”⁵⁷ This approach is also visible in the labour-oriented segment of Scandinavian associations abroad. In 1905, the Scandinavian association in Zurich invoked their old maxim: “Let us always keep together and stand by each other, remembering that the well-known phrase also applies to Scandinavians abroad: Unity is strength!”⁵⁸ The C.U.K. network abroad was

among the few, alongside the Scandinavian association in Rome, to survive the “storm of 1905,” terminating most of the associational life abroad, at least temporarily, and managing to uphold their existence in reorganised forms until the present day.⁵⁹

The heated dispute around 1905 concerning the associations abroad led to an organisational reconfiguration along national – or rather new pan-national – lines in Sweden and Norway. In general, the Scandinavian diaspora and expatriate communities, especially in Europe and to a certain extent in the United States,⁶⁰ separated into three different national segments, each forming their own national associations. These associations, superseding the common Scandinavian ones, were soon to be supported by new-established pan-national umbrella organisations based in their respective home countries of Norway, Sweden and eventually Denmark. These pan-national organisational changes mirrored, and were inspired by, already existing European models.

Supporting co-nationals and promoting diaspora nationalism and national culture and interests abroad through pan-national organisations became widespread during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and represents early examples of what later has been termed political, cultural or language diplomacy.⁶¹ These kind of activities started from below, from civil society organisations, reflecting a global competition among (great) nations where culture became one of the stakes of power.⁶² The first one seems to be the German School Association for the Preservation of German Language Abroad (*Deutscher Schulverein*), founded in 1881, renamed as *Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland* (1908) and later closely connected to the Pan-Germanic League (*Alldeutscher Verband*).⁶³ Its purpose was to promote Germanness, German language and schooling in foreign and neighbouring countries. The national association for propagating French language in colonies and abroad (*Alliance Française*), founded in 1883 and dedicated to the spread and maintenance of French culture and language outside the borders of France proper, may, according to Leerssen, “be seen as an echo” of pan-Latinism.⁶⁴ *Società Dante Alighieri*, similarly a pan-Italian organisation sustaining Italian identity and language abroad, was founded in 1889. Germany and Italy were, like Norway, both latecomers as nation-states with large diaspora groups, and among those countries and governments, as Andreas Wimmer and Nina G. Schiller remind us, that were “active in monitoring their nationals abroad and nurturing their loyalties to their homeland.”⁶⁵

Similar pan-national umbrella organisations were founded in Norway and Sweden in the aftermath of the dissolution of the union in 1905. The urgent background for the necessity to “preserve Swedishness abroad” (the aim of the pan-Swedish organisation) was not only the rising emigration, as scholarly literature has maintained,⁶⁶ but not least the collapse of the Scandinavian associational landscape that had evolved during the last half of the nineteenth century. The National Association for the Preservation of Swedishness Abroad (*Riksföreningen för svenskhetens bevarande i utlandet*) was founded in 1908, directed at the old Swedish-speaking communities in Finland and Estonia, and the newer ones in

North America, Europe and elsewhere. The organisation was explicitly anti-Scandinavian, being a national and conservative reaction after the dissolution of the union in 1905.⁶⁷ In Norway, the Norse Federation (*Nordmands-Forbundet*), founded in 1907, was not particularly anti-Scandinavian, although avoiding formal cooperation with its Scandinavian sister organisations.⁶⁸ In Denmark, a short-lived organisation was founded in 1912, the Danish World Society (*Dansk Verdenssamfund*), reorganised in 1919 as Danish Cooperation (*Dansk Samvirke*), more recently renamed as Danes Worldwide. These new pan-national organisations were, contrary to the rather unacknowledged and more loosely organised nineteenth-century experiences, actively involved in cultural diplomacy and the promotion of national culture abroad.

The new pan-national organisations argued, as part of their promotion strategy, that half of the Norwegian population lived outside Norway, and one-third of the Swedish-speaking “race” (one of the expressions frequently used) lived outside Sweden – including the Swedish-speaking population in Finland and Estonia.⁶⁹ It was therefore a main national task to bring these divided parts of the national community together, thereby constituting (as it was said, resembling contemporary pan-national rhetoric) a “Greater Norway” or a “Greater Sweden.” From the early twentieth century, then, if not before, the country of origin took a “central place in the process of maintaining a collective memory and solidarity,” an aspect included in some definitions of diaspora.⁷⁰

The prominent leader of the Swedish organisation, Vilhelm Lundström (1869–1940), professor of classics in Gothenburg and conservative politician, was explicitly inspired by the Italian and German pan-national organisations – as can also be seen in the terminology employed. The first initiatives came from abroad, as we have already seen regarding Scandinavian associations. Swedes in Germany, who had left the Scandinavian associations in Hamburg, Berlin and elsewhere, founded the Association for the Preservation of Swedishness among Swedes in Germany in 1906.⁷¹ From late 1906 onwards, Lundström and others raged against the tradition of Scandinavian associations abroad in a range of polemical articles in the Swedish conservative press. In a revealing statement, published as late as 1927, Lundström stated that “Where Scandinavianism goes in, Swedishness goes out” and warned against Scandinavianism and “Nordism,” especially regarding national associations and cultural promotion abroad.⁷² This is also an early example of the use of the new – but equally ambiguous – concept of “Nordism” that had gradually since the mid-1930s replaced “Scandinavianism” to denote endeavours promoting Nordic cooperation and cohesion, both on an official level and within the re-emerging civil society cooperation.⁷³ One of the first instances of a positive use of “Nordism” was in fact connected to travel – within, beyond and to the region.⁷⁴

Conclusion

The “famous country Scandinavia” emerged during the long nineteenth century as an important space on Earth – even if it was dismissed as being “on the moon,”

as Wergeland suggested in 1845, or rejected as a failed pan-national dream after 1864 (or at least after 1905), as many Swedes and others proclaimed. As an imagined transnational cultural community, stretching across the Scandinavian region and beyond, to Scandinavians around the world, Scandinavia was inscribed, one may argue, in the hearts and minds of many Northerners. Although loosely interconnected, the web of Scandinavian associations at home and abroad – more or less dedicated to Scandinavian ideas and connected to the broader movement – contributed to articulating and promoting a transnational regional identity and to organising Scandinavia into existence.

The Scandinavian associations abroad were an important and comprehensive part of Scandinavian associational life, not quite paralleled within the region. Its substantially unknown history offers an extra-Scandinavian, diasporic perspective, a point of view from outside and from a distance, on Scandinavia as a transnational region. The potential of politicising this transnational practice became clear in 1905. Swedish anger over the dissolution of the union demonstrates that associational Scandinavianism abroad was closely entangled with the political-cultural developments at home. The event changed the Scandinavian associational life abroad permanently, at least in Europe. The dominant pattern shifted from common Scandinavian associations to national ones, connected to new pan-national organisations in the home countries promoting a narrower diaspora nationalism, less compatible with pan-Scandinavian ideas. Some associations survived as a minor “Scandinavian community” abroad, as the association in Rome and the artisan/labour network C.U.K. New ones were also established in the interwar period and beyond, both in Europe and elsewhere, reflecting the re-emergence of Nordic cooperation within the region in the interwar period. The changes in the associational landscape were, however, marked enough to change the contemporary language as codified in encyclopaedias at the time. “Scandinavian association,” including associations abroad, had been introduced as a headword in 1848. In 1917, the headword “Scandinavian associations abroad” was still included in the second edition of the Swedish-Nordic encyclopaedia *Nordisk Familjebok*. The entry was, however, without any definition of its own, only a reference to another more relevant entry based on a recent concept: “see Swedes living abroad” (*Utlandssvenskar*).⁷⁵ The minor but not insignificant encyclopaedic and rhetoric transformation illustrates the rise and fall of pan-Scandinavian associational life abroad.

In spite of all setbacks and failed efforts of political unification, pan-Scandinavian ideas and practices came to have an enduring influence on Nordic region-building. After the “Nordic winter” with reduced cooperation following 1905 – with “labour Scandinavianism” as an important exception – new associations and cooperation re-emerged in the interwar period.⁷⁶ The new Norden Associations established in the Scandinavian countries in 1919, in Iceland in 1922 and in Finland in 1924, build on – if not always acknowledged as such – a comprehensive associational legacy.⁷⁷ Beyond the region, Scandinavian civil society and state-endorsed cooperation has been important in a range of international contexts.

The Nordic region was eventually formally organised into existence after the Second World War, through the formation of the Nordic Council (1952) and the Nordic Council of Ministers (1971), formalising an already comprehensive state-based cooperation, firmly grounded on the recognition of national sovereignty and complementing and cooperating with the entangled Nordic civil societies.

Notes

- 1 This number is based on an ongoing inventory of Scandinavian associations abroad. The main empirical basis is written and printed material produced by these associations, mainly archived in ephemeral collections at the Scandinavian National Libraries, their journals and national and transatlantic digitised newspapers: www.nb.no/aviser,tidningar.kb.se, <http://www2.statsbiblioteket.dk/mediestream/avis>. The study is connected to the UiO:Nordic research project Nordic Civil Societies: Global, Transnational and Regional Encounters since 1800. Some related aspects are examined in Hemstad, "Organizational Scandinavianism" and "Literature as auxiliary forces."
- 2 Wergeland, *Nordmandens Katechisme* (2nd ed.); Hemstad, "Toasting Scandinavia."
- 3 "Af et Brev fra Rom," *Aftenbladet*, 10 April 1861. The association's full name is the Scandinavian Association for Artists and Scientists in Rome (*Circolo Scandinavico per Artisti e Scienziati a Roma*).
- 4 *Fædrelandet og Emigranten*, 12 May 1870, quoted in Babcock, *The Scandinavian Element*, 15–16.
- 5 Mauk, "Syttende mai," 34; see also Bremer, *The Homes*.
- 6 See Glenthøj and Ottosen's contributions to this volume.
- 7 te Welde, *Organizing Democracy*.
- 8 Neumann, "A Region-Building Approach," 58–59.
- 9 Brubaker, "The Diaspora," 5.
- 10 Olson, *Vikings*, 215. See however the contributions by Björk-Winberg and Egorov and Johnsen to this volume.
- 11 Snyder, *Macro-Nationalisms*.
- 12 Maxwell, "Pan-Nationalism."
- 13 Flom, *A History of Norwegian*, 42–43. It ceased to exist in the early 1800 but was invoked by later Scandinavian associations in the city.
- 14 Sneedorf, "Vigtigheden," 134.
- 15 Bajer, "Det Skandinaviske Litteraturselskab."
- 16 *Vedtægter*.
- 17 Hemstad, *Fra Indian summer*.
- 18 "The Travelling Philosophers," 258.
- 19 Between 1839 and 1905 around 100 different regularly held meetings took place, see appendix in Hemstad, *Fra Indian summer*.
- 20 See e.g. "De unga danskarnes [...]," *Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning*, 3 July 1843, Kohn, *Pan-Slavism*.
- 21 See Egorov's contribution to this volume.
- 22 *Aalborg Stiftstidende og Adresse-Avis*, 27 January 1843, *Love*.
- 23 *Beretning*.
- 24 The first association was termed *Skandinavisk Samfund*, the second *Skandinavisk Selskab*.
- 25 Bäckström, *Götrek och manifestet*, 21.
- 26 *Svenskt konversationslexikon*, 547–48.
- 27 The association in Copenhagen was dissolved in 1856. The one in Uppsala merged with the new general student association in 1852.

- 28 *Skandinavisk Selskab* in Christiania, *Nordiska Nationalföreningen* in Stockholm, Lund and Gothenburg, *Nordisk Samfund* in Copenhagen.
- 29 See also Glenthoj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*.
- 30 *Nordisk tidskrift för politik, ekonomi och litteratur*, vol. 1–5, 1866–70.
- 31 They were termed *Nordisk Forening*. Hemstad, *Fra Indian summer*.
- 32 “Forbindelse mellem nordiske foreninger,” *Norden*, no. 3 (Dec. 1901): 29–30.
- 33 “Den skandinaviske Koloni i Berlin,” *Morgenbladet*, 25 January 1895; “Fra Italien. III,” *Morgenbladet*, 4 December 1877.
- 34 Kuldkepp, “Emigration,” 181–94.
- 35 Barton, *A Folk Divided*, 34.
- 36 See also Eidsvik, “Expressions of Pan-Scandinavian.”
- 37 Letter from *Den skandinaviske Forening i Paris* to Professor Atterblom, 14 November 1844, Bref till Skandinaviska Sällskapet åren 1843–1849, U 1751 d, Uppsala University Library.
- 38 Letter from *Det Skandinaviska Sällskapet* in Zurich to *Skandinaviska Sällskapet* in Uppsala, dated 18 April 1847. Bref till Skandinaviska Sällskapet åren 1843–1849.
- 39 Hansen, “Langt fra Danmark,” 56–57.
- 40 Letter from *Den skandinaviske Forening i Paris* to *Den skandinaviske Forening i Rom*, dated 14 March 1873, Diverse korrespondanse, L1a.3, The Scandinavian Association in Rome.
- 41 To mention just one, “Skandinaver i Rom,” *Morgenavisen* 28 February 1925, written by the former leader of the association Niels Hoffmeyer, who misleadingly stated that the “Scandinavians in Rome” was the last one of its kind in the whole world.
- 42 On toasting, see Powell, “Political Toasting.”
- 43 “Skandinaviskt sällskap i Wien,” *Post- och Inrikes Tidningar*, 15 January 1870, *Skandinaviske Forening i München*.
- 44 Hemstad, “Organizational Scandinavianism.”
- 45 *Love ... Hamburg*, § 1. Italic is used in the original.
- 46 *Love ... Paris*, §1.
- 47 *Central-Understøttelseskasse for Skandinaver i Udlandet*.
- 48 *Den færende Svend*, published since 1902. The journal is still published by the organisation “Naverne-CUK” (*Forening for Berejste Skandinaver*) (Association for Travelling Scandinavians), dating their history back to Zurich in 1899 but now mostly represented in Denmark (<http://www.naverne-cuk.dk/>, accessed 1 November 2022).
- 49 Barton, *A Folk Divided*, see also Mathiesen, “The Epistolary Practices.”
- 50 Barton, *A Folk Divided*, 25.
- 51 Bremer, *The Homes*.
- 52 “Norden–Amerika,” *Norden*, no. 8–9 (July–August 1900): 123–24. See also Brøndal and Blanck, “The Concept.”
- 53 van Gerven, *Scandinavism*.
- 54 “Skandinavismen är död,” *Norrköpings Tidningar*, 9 March 1906.
- 55 Henningsen, *Det danske Selskab*.
- 56 “Utlandets okunnighet om svenska förhållanden och Sveriges ställning i Norden,” *Göteborgs Aftonblad*, 28 January 1908.
- 57 Hemstad, “Promoting Norden.”
- 58 *Skandinavisk Forening Zürich*.
- 59 See <http://www.naverne-cuk.dk/> and <https://www.circoloscandinavo.it/>, accessed 1 November 2022.
- 60 Jenswold, “The Rise and Fall.” See, however, Eidsvik on the Scandinavian community in Durban continuing in the twentieth century, Eidsvik, “Expressions of Pan-Scandinavian.”
- 61 Åkerlund, “The Nationalisation”; Chaubet, “The French Alliance.”
- 62 Chaubet, Åkerlund, “The French Alliance.”
- 63 *The Pan-Germanic League*.
- 64 Leerssen, *National Thought*, 158, see also Chaubet, “The French Alliance.”

- 65 Wimmer and Schiller, “Methodological Nationalism,” 316.
- 66 Åkerlund, “The Nationalisation,” 25; Kummel, *Svenskar i all världen*.
- 67 See for instance their journal *Allsvensk Samling* published from 1914.
- 68 Cooperation was suggested in the proposed statutes but not included in the final version. Småttrykksamlingen, 325 Nordmannsforbundet, National Library of Norway.
- 69 See also Kummel, *Svenskar i all världen*.
- 70 Astrid Wonneberger, quoted in Olson, *Vikings*, 219.
- 71 “Svenskheten i Tyskland,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, 20 December 1906.
- 72 “Huru svenskheten går framåt i vårt gamla Stralsund,” *Trelleborgstidningen*, 15 December 1927.
- 73 See also Stadius’ contribution to this volume.
- 74 The Finn Börje Sandberg “launched” the word “Nordism” at the second Nordic tourism meeting in Aalborg in 1937 to denote Nordic cooperation within the travel-business field, including promoting Norden abroad as a tourist destination, “Nordisme bør være Turistlivets Motto,” *Nationaltidende*, 17 September 1937.
- 75 *Nordisk Familjebok*, 876.
- 76 Hemstad, “Promoting Norden”; Stadius, *Meningen*.
- 77 *Foreningene Norden*. See also Stadius’ contribution to this volume.

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10

NORDISM AS A REMAKE OF THE NORDIC-SCANDINAVIAN PAN-NATIONALISM

Peter Stadius

The transformation from Scandinavianism to Nordism, and the replacement of the varying nineteenth-century interpretations of what the pan-Scandinavian idea stood for, has its established chronology. The final point of Scandinavianism is usually dated to the Danish defeat in 1864, and finally to the dissolution of the union between Sweden and Norway in 1905. The final “Indian summer” around 1900 was replaced by a “Nordic winter,” a state of affairs that would last one decade.¹ The first sign of a re-emerging pan-Scandinavian or pan-Nordic initiative is in this chronology occupied by what was to be called the Three Kings Meeting in Malmö in December 1914. What actually was a meeting between three foreign ministers was also the first time the kings of Sweden and Norway met in an official event, giving this political meeting an added symbolical value.²

The result of the meeting was a joint declaration of neutrality in the Great War that had started some months earlier. The foreign ministers would meet again in 1917 when deciding upon mutual assistance in exchange of goods to relieve home market shortages. By the end of the war, the idea of keeping up with this cooperation found supporters among several leading politicians and industrialists. Even if the most far-fetched visions of a tariff-free inner market were not made reality, the seeds for Nordic cooperation and for what would be labelled as “Nordist” ideas had been sown. Only after the Second World War did the official Nordic cooperation become reality with the establishment of the parliamentary cooperation body, the Nordic Council, in 1952.

The concepts “Nordism” and “Nordist” first appear in the 1920s,³ but it took a while before that term rooted itself in common speech, and it was only after the Second World War that these terms apparently became widely used, a practice that has persisted until this day. However, in the early 1920s the idea of Scandinavianism was gradually replaced by the practice of pan-Nordic cooperation, and the principles guiding Nordic cooperation and a pan-Nordic idea were

formed during these decades. If we look at the various expressions and actions in favour of Nordic cooperation, it is evident that concepts and discourses vary during these years. We find both seemingly tradition-bound reuse of Scandinavianist rhetoric, as well as a very cautious Nordic cooperation discourse in accepting only a cooperation culture where all “neo-Scandinavianist” tendencies would be declined in favour of a total respect for each nation’s independence.⁴

The interplay between internal and external factors, as defined by Iver B. Neumann, both changed in context. When Neumann refers to inside-out and outside-in dynamics of pan-regional movements, he sees the former as the culture-based identity formation process, working out of the premises of a common cultural heritage. The latter refers in his typology to the fact that regional cooperation often stems from a detected need to find viable geopolitical solutions when facing outside threats.⁵ Here lies the core and the essence of Nordism, i.e. a combination of the nineteenth-century Scandinavianist idea of belonging to a common transnational region on the one hand, and the logics of small state cooperation in order to muster strength when facing outside threats. Eventually this latter would also develop into a mutual self-identification of the Nordics as a humanitarian power of considerable size and importance in the international community.⁶ Also, the internally felt sense of belonging, or the benchmarking of national identity with a Nordic element,⁷ one of the backbones in Nordic pan-nationalism, underwent a process of modernisation. It would gradually embrace the idea of Nordic people and societies as an avant-garde in modern social engineering, as well as it developed a sharper ideological positioning as an anti-fascist pan-nationalism.

In this chapter the emerging Nordic cooperation practice and culture will be studied mainly through one central civil society organisation, the Norden Association (*Foreningen Norden*), which was funded as three distinctive national branches in 1919 and consolidated as an all-Nordic network of national associations with the addition of an Icelandic and Finnish branch in 1922 and 1924 respectively. As recent scholarship has concluded, one fruitful way of studying pan-nationalisms is to rather look at the persons, actions and articulations, in short “categories of practice,” rather than aiming at fitting various movements into theoretical models of success/failure criterion.⁸ The dominating feature in the re-emerged Nordic cooperation in the inter-war years was the emergence of NGOs that have proven long-lasting. Their role in the period under study is crucial, albeit also the political turn of events go hand in hand with this development. Consequently, the actors of Nordic cooperation and the promoters of a Nordist idea need to be studied.

From Scandinavianism to Nordic cooperation

When the concept of “Norden” replaced “Skandinavien” as the mainly used name for the region and the practice of pan-national building efforts, it also signified a redefinition of the nature of the region’s pan-nationalist self-articulations.

There were several reasons for this conceptual shift. Both concepts as geographical and political concepts have a longer history, although Norden is more used than Scandinavia in the early modern period, and a rough assessment is that while Scandinavia transformed from a geographical concept into a political concept during the nineteenth century and the Scandinavianist movement, Norden remained a vague but still culturally value-laden geographical concept during that century.⁹ Norden was a pan-national symbol in many patriotic songs, and “Norden” and “nord,” literary “the north” in Scandinavian (and German) languages, both appear in the later canonised Swedish (Richard Dybäck 1844) and Finnish (J.L. Runeberg 1848) national anthems which are still sung today.

However, it remains clear that there was never a completely fixed norm for using Scandinavia and Norden, and nor is there any such still today if we look at it from a broader international perspective. Both terms are still used interchangeably in the public sphere. The diversity of content and definitions is typical of any nationalist or pan-nationalist movement, but the Scandinavian-Nordic case stands out with its self-naming confusion. Most other European pan-nationalisms do not have this ambiguity. To some extent the inter-changeability of pan-Turanism and pan-Turkism has a matching character.¹⁰ But perhaps the only real point of comparison would be the development of the pan-Illyrian movement as a southern section of pan-Slavism. Also, the overlapping but distinct conceptual pair Latin/Mediterranean could be included in such a category.¹¹ However, in neither case there is such a persisting confusion of naming that partially has lasted until this day.

If we still wish to create order in the self-naming confusion, some particular developments can be found. When Scandinavia gradually ceded as the geographical denomination for the pan-national efforts, it was partly because of the failure of its political programme. Since no Scandinavian United Kingdom or union would see the light of the day, political Scandinavianism had failed in the light of the most ambitious plans, and thus also Scandinavia as a political concept became contaminated and burdened with negative associations from the recent past. In addition, the break-up of the union between Sweden and Norway added further shadows on the notion since the union geographically had covered the Scandinavian Peninsula. A further aspect that motivated the replacement of Scandinavia with Norden was the emergence of Finland and Iceland as sovereign states. The two Scandinavian realms had become five Nordic nation-states, as Finland retook a Nordic orientation after a century as an autonomous Grand Duchy (1809–1917) in the Russian Empire, and Iceland had become a sovereign state in 1918 in a personal union with the Danish king.

The rebirth of the Nordic/Scandinavian pan-national idea and project was not just a matter of changing one name with another. Even if many of the established forums for cooperation persisted, such as the Nordic Lawyers' Meetings (running since 1872), the main principles for cooperation would change. The new Nordic cooperation that replaced Scandinavianism was built upon a restrictive attitude towards deeper integration efforts, which had been an explicit demand

from the Norwegian side in the 1920s.¹² In the aftermath of the union break-up, and with Finland's independence in 1917 and Iceland practically becoming independent in 1918 (formally in 1944), there was a common understanding for and respect towards the sovereignty of each Nordic partner.

The primacy of the nation-state also was a sign of the times in the inter-war period, and these two factors solidified the subordination of Nordic pan-nationalism in relation to the nation-state nationalisms.¹³ What later would be referred to as Nordism built upon the "Olympic principle" of each participant representing his or her nation under its flag, and thus firmly framed in a national identity.¹⁴ Nordism in the 1920s and 1930s was never a serious threat and competitor to nation-states, and as such there is no element of what has been referred to as othering, i.e. the phenomenon of a competing pan-nationalism in outright conflict with the nation-state.¹⁵

The inter-war period is also a specific period in the development of pan-nationalisms. The shift from a *Völker* idea of cultural-linguistic pairing with liberal ideas towards a Darwinist struggle and geopolitics context emerged already in the late nineteenth century. What has been referred to as a biologisation of nationalism and pan-nationalism was obviously a factor also in the Nordic case.¹⁶ Therefore, it was also logical that the age of Nordism developed a different relation to the concept of race. In comparison to other pan-national movements, Nordism did not make race a main point, but rather a more implicitly present dimension in the framing of Nordic essence.¹⁷ Pan-Germanism and pan-Latinism had different developments, where the entanglements with scientific racism as part of fascist ideology are more present.

In the German case this meant that the challenge to the Pan-German League presented after the Great War by the German Worker's Party (1919–20), and its successor NSDAP (1920–45) became a hegemonic overtaking culminating in the 1933 electoral victory and the following political path chosen. As Roger Chickering has noted:

The turmoil of war, revolution, and civil war expanded and altered radically the character of the German-national public realm. The older patriotic societies (or their successors) and other "national organizations" of the imperial period found themselves in the early 1920s amidst a network of new groups – paramilitary formations, political parties, and radical antisemitic societies – all of which claimed to speak or act in the name of the nation.¹⁸

Even if the Pan-German League developed strategies to maintain its influence, it soon became clear that German nationalism under an Austrian-born dictator had adopted an aggressive, biologised and expansive pan-German doctrine with a clear aim to convert it into political action. In many ways this example is illustrative of the longer development of pan-nationalisms, from cultural to power politics.

Even if Nordism in theory had many common historical, cultural and mythological components to share, the interpretation of modernity, politics and social order was to be very different. There was never a serious far right wing and fascist challenge to the central actors and discourses on Nordic cooperation. The reason for this is manifold. In Germany the combination of a very firmly rooted scholarly and political doctrine of German border-colonial expansion in combination with a sense of humiliation connected to the Versailles Peace 1918 created a very tense atmosphere that can be compared to the state of a cold war. The idea of expanding and clashing civilisational spheres seems to have created some kind of basic necessity for expansion essential to pan-Germanism in the inter-war years. Already in 1913, the German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg had in a speech anticipated a violent and apocalyptic clash between Germans and Slavs.¹⁹

The Nordic situation was very different, with no immediate war experience nor trauma, except for the Finnish Civil War of 1918, where Swedish volunteers had fought on the white side as an act of anti-Bolshevism. Otherwise, having stayed neutral during the war was a logical outcome of realist small state policy, where securing status quo and peace was the major aim. After the war Denmark regained a considerable part of southern Jutland, as a consequence of Germany's war loss. The regaining in 1920 of the sites for the Dybbøl battle of 1864 gave Denmark the chance to re-nationalise the battlefield as a Danish memory site.²⁰ As part of this plan a memorial for the Nordic volunteers was erected in 1936. The central obelisk is surrounded by four cornerstones for each Nordic neighbour country. On the obelisk's plinth an inscription reads:

Finnish, Icelandic, Norwegian and Swedish men fought as volunteers in the battles 1848–50 and 1864 for the Danishness of Southern Jutland. Danes erected this memorial.²¹

A poem accompanies the text, reading: "The hand you gave/ the blood that was shed/ the sacrifice you made/ tied us together." The text represents standard nationalistic war memorial rhetoric but is also a symbol of how Nordic cooperation and togetherness became part of the Danish anti-German memory culture. The fact that only very few Icelandic, Finnish and Norwegian volunteers actually fought in these wars on the Danish side is over-shadowed by the need to portray Nordic unity in the latter half of the 1930s, when Germany again posed an aggressive and expansionist attitude. By this time Nordic cooperation, as a consequence of the changed geopolitical situation, had become more instrumental, and plans for a permanent parliamentary cooperative body as well as for security cooperation were already sketched.²²

Simultaneously a shared vision of how to approach the challenges posed by "mass society" was in the making connecting the emerging social democratic-driven welfare state policies to both practical Nordic cooperation and to the forging of a new element in the Nordic self-narrative.

The Norden Associations

The main conducting forces of Nordic cooperation in the inter-war years were civil society organisations. Among the various NGOs funded just after the Great War in order to promote the retaken Nordic pan-nationalist initiatives, the most important was the Norden Association. The Norden Association actually consisted of five separate national organisations, which perfectly embodies the principle of nation-state primacy. The original idea presented in 1919 to fund *one* Norden association was altered, in order to meet Norwegian expectations.²³ Fear of being redrawn into an asymmetrical power relation with its two former dominant Scandinavian counterparts was the leading idea among Norwegians. The cooperation during the world war had broken the ice-cold relationship between Norway and Sweden, but still utter caution was employed.

During the entire inter-war period the Norwegian partners in this form of Nordic cooperation maintained a stand which clearly wanted to limit the cooperation to low key enlightenment activities promoting knowledge about each other among the Nordic countries. “Knowledge gives friendship” was the slogan proposed by the Norwegian board member Johan Ludwig Mowinkel, illustrating the Norwegian stand.²⁴ Any proposals hinting at a deeper integration were rejected as “amalgamism,” a term that had been coined during the Swedish-Norwegian union, or as “neo-Scandinavianism,” which was understood as an anachronistic strategy to revive an already failed political Scandinavianist project.²⁵ The newly established principles of Nordic cooperation, against any kind of excessive Danish and/or Swedish supremacy, were further consolidated by the founding of the Norden Associations in Iceland in 1922 and in Finland in 1924. The Icelandic association came to see the light after a heavy campaign by the three founding partners since there was a strong feeling that the Nordic family would not be completed without an Icelandic participation.²⁶ The activities within the Icelandic branch remained very modest during the first decade; by 1930 the association had 90 members, but eventually the Icelandic Norden association would become an active and integrated part of this NGO group.²⁷

The Finnish case was a bit different since it took until 1924 before a Norden Association was established. Earlier attempts and initiatives around 1919–20 had failed due to two main reasons. Firstly, the Swedish Norden Associations’ leading members were hesitant about the status of the newly independent Finland, which had been part of the Russian Empire for over hundred years, and just gone through a brutal civil war in 1918. The dispute over the Åland Islands, ruled in Finland’s favour by the League of Nations in 1921, also affected Swedish sentiments towards Finland at that very moment. Secondly, there was a concern that the Finnish branch would become dominated by Swedish speakers of Finland. Some circles within this group had presented a plan that the Finnish branch would only be for Swedish speakers, and that other Scandinavians living in Finland could become members.²⁸ Here, there was a concern for the influence of the Greater Sweden ideology through the National Association for the

Preservation of Swedishness Abroad (*Riksföreningen för svenskhetens bevarande i utlandet*), who had actively established contacts and branches in Finland.²⁹ Since this organisation was openly hostile towards Nordic cooperation, it had to be assured that the Finnish Norden Association would have a wider national base. On the Finnish nationalist side, the agrarian party and organisations like the Academic Karelia Society were also strongly opposed to a Nordic orientation. The former had been the political backbone for the Fennoman movement, and the latter was an activist society founded on the bases of a Greater Finland ideology. Finally, in 1924 a consensus among Finnish- and Swedish-speaking political forces, both in favour of what was seen as a Scandinavian political culture based on the rule of law, managed to give birth to a bilingual association officially named “Norden, an association in Finland for Nordic cooperation,” in concordance with the official name of the other chapters.³⁰

One of the leading proponents of the Norden Association was the Danish industrialist Aleksander Foss, chairman of the Danish Industrial Council (*Industrirådet*) and parliamentarian, who personally was driven both by commercial interests and by security concerns. The first board of all three national associations was occupied by the representatives of the highest circles in society, including politicians, civil servants and university professors. The Norwegian board was chaired by Edvard Hagerup-Bull, leader of the right-wing party *Høyre*'s parliamentary group in the Norwegian parliament *Stortinget*, experienced through various stints as cabinet member as well as judge of the Supreme Court. Besides Anders Buen, the speaker of *Stortinget* and leader of the social democratic parliament group, and the university professors Halfdan Koht and Fredrik Stang, the board also counted with some heavyweight representation from corporate business. Johan Throne Holst was the owner and CEO of Norway's leading chocolate factory Freia, and in 1916 he had started a similar company Marabou in Sweden. He was a lifelong Nordist, who saw a connection between business and culture.³¹ Johan Ludwig Mowinckel was a prominent figure in the shipping business, but also politically active within the liberal party *Venstre*. He had served as member of parliament and later during the inter-war period he was appointed cabinet member several times, including three different periods as Prime Minister. Mowinckel was an active proponent of free trade, and his involvement in the Norden Association was motivated by the lobbying for developing the wartime exchange of goods into a Nordic free trade agreement.

The fact that the Norden Association boards were stacked with the utmost political, academic and business elite needs further consideration. In the Norwegian case there was certainly a strategic national interest to monitor the development of the association, thus the broad parliamentary base, but that is just a side story. One may also notice the consensual representation of all main right-centre-left parties on the Norwegian Norden Association board, a phenomenon that was matched in the Swedish and Danish boards as well. However, no radical parties, be it communists or fascist parties, were part of the association's recruitment base. What is striking is that while similar associations in the nineteenth

century had been short-lived and not seldom met with distrust for political and reliability reasons, the new Nordic associations would both become long-lived and form an accepted part of the interplay between official authorities and civil society actors.³² Not seldom did important persons sit on many chairs, and the Nordic associations became forums for testing ideas that were still too bold to be implemented politically. Thus, an NGO like the Norden Association would at times serve a lobbying platform for Nordic cooperation in high politics. In the beginning the results were not that prominent, but eventually these organisations pushed forward Nordic cooperation making a clear impact towards the official parliamentary cooperation established in 1952.

The commitment and engagement of the elite had many reasons and further implications. Firstly, the commercial interests for lowered trade barriers were a political question connected to the active promotion of Nordic cooperation. Secondly, the recent war, albeit the three Nordic kingdoms had remained neutral, still was a crude reminder of the still prevailing geopolitical threats in the south and in the east. The rapprochement labelled Nordic made by the governments 1914–18 came from the highest political level, and the initiative to create lobbying NGOs was in tight connection to certain sectors of that elite. The executive circles of the associations were part of the establishment. Their political competition came mainly from stricter nationalism and to some extent from communism and fascism.

The elite in search of a demos

The Norden Associations were essentially top-down elitist organisations in the beginning, whose main goal was to foster pro-Nordic policies and eventually to create a popular base for these. This early elitism has often been brought up as a revelation and honest observation of the fact that these organisations originally were not popular movements, implicitly indicating this as a negative feature.³³ This criticism goes back to the 1930s and 1940s as part of an internal self-criticism within the movement. Nils Herlitz, who had been part of the Swedish board since the beginning reflected over this in 1944 stating, “that those who were part of the Nordic movement from the beginning cannot escape the question if the association would have done more and according to other principles.”³⁴ This was opportunistic hindsight and fitted an anti-elitist and egalitarian Nordic self-image that has been part of a teleological narrative on the evolution of Nordic cooperation in the twentieth century.

This is to a high degree tied to the inter-connection between the rising power position of the Nordic social democratic parties and the intensified Nordic cooperation in the 1930s. It also ties back to an egalitarian self-narrative of nineteenth-century nation-building in the Nordic region. However, it is also worth pointing out that the transnational “elitist” position must be understood in the context of competing nationalism, and also in the context of which groups in society had the capacity to think and act in transnational terms. A transnationally

competent and orientated sector of society has generally been a precondition in a successful pan-nationalist agency in comparison with nationalisms.³⁵ The dominating critical narrative of 1920s Nordism as elitist has seldom been contested through this argument, with perhaps the only exception of Danish historian Lorenz Rerup, who has pointed out that the Norden Associations and other similar organisations probably would never have seen the light of day without the transnational perspectives provided by certain key actors familiar to international surroundings. He sees no capacity within the emerging middle class at this point to be able to concretely bridge national borders in order to shape a Nordic community.³⁶

This being said, there was a constant concern among the board members to reach a more popular member base. The challenge posed by an emerging mass society was urgently sensed and many strategies articulated from a patronising but enthusiastic perspective. Valfrid Palmgren Munch-Petersen, one of the more active board member contributors in the annual Norden yearbook, expressed this need to create a popular base, “so that the peoples of Norden eventually would learn to think and feel not only in national but in in Nordic terms.” She also added that the association, representing “the smartest among our people,” should work for awakening, “the free will to follow the call of nature who invites the Nordic peoples to live together as brothers of the same tribe.”³⁷ These ideas were already very close to neo-Scandinavianist ideas and the earlier Swedish Royal Library clerk Palmgren Munch-Petersen working as Swedish language lecturer at the University of Copenhagen had constant clashes about the association’s strategy with her Norwegian antagonist Edvard Hagerup-Bull. The Swedish board member and historian Eli Hekscher supported a deeper integration vision. He asked for more ambitious action in the form of ambulating university courses, and generally deploring how the World War had “numbed the senses for both righteousness and common sense” among “the civilized mankind.”³⁸ A similar patronising discourse was presented by the bishop and professor of theology Edvard Rodhe, when speaking to the participants of a Danish-Swedish summer meeting in Kullen on the Swedish west coast in 1924. He thanked the Norden Associations for arranging “meetings like these which make a difference in the education of the people,” and he added that “we want a united Norden” since he felt that the unity between Nordic peoples was something unique. Finally, he asked God, “who steers the faith of nations, to protect Norden.”³⁹

This top-down constellation did not bring great results for membership numbers until the late 1930s, but already during the first decade a myriad of activities made the association an important actor. The number of various professional group summer courses and meetings is to be counted in hundreds. School teachers, journalists, merchants, farmers, dairy producers, gardeners and school children count among some of the groups that were specifically targeted for all-Nordic activities.⁴⁰ All in all, the Norden associations were estimated to have arranged 99 courses and meetings for a total of 13 171 participants during the first 20 years, 1919–39.⁴¹ The meetings were often facilitated by efforts to

conceive lower fares from the respective national railroad companies, and often chartered trains would bring the participants to the meeting venue.

The strategy to battle what was seen as harmful animosity between the Nordic nations also resulted in a school history book committee that undertook various initiatives to harmonise the content concerning how past history was presented with regard to past wars and animosities between the Scandinavian kingdoms. The subject had been constantly on the agenda since the start of 1919, and many were the lobbying efforts of the national school authorities. Finally, in 1933 the Norden Associations decided on a major revision of school history books in all Nordic countries.⁴² The aim was to erase what was referred to as chauvinism, and to make place for a more sensible patriotism that also acknowledged the close kinship between all Nordic nations. These activities were conducted by a quite small group of people, all active in the Norden Associations. The success of their activity is difficult to measure, and there were various forms of national contesting of the committee's proposals. The most visible result of the committee, which officially functioned until 1972, was a report published in 1937 with the title "Nordic school books in history: a mutual review conducted by the expert councils of the Norden Associations."⁴³

It was not, however, until the labour movement organisations joined the Nordic cause during the 1930s that the true broadening of the member base took place. During the heydays of Scandinavianism, the university students as representing the future of the nation had performed the role of an active member base for the cause. In the inter-war era of democratisation and modernisation, the popular support would be mobilised from a combination of civic citizenship of the educated bourgeoisie and the active support of workers, in what was to be labelled as "Workers Scandinavianism."⁴⁴ The Nordic social democratic labour unions had in 1932 intensified its cooperation dating back to 1886, and as a result a cooperation committee SAMAK was founded. The obvious converging interest in the aspirations for worker's rights was coupled with the advancements of what was later to be known as a Nordic welfare state model.⁴⁵

This made Nordic cooperation a relevant forum for the revisionist Nordic political left. The pressure to reform the Norden Associations grew stronger, and the criticism towards the elitist and patronising elements was voiced. One expression used to criticise earlier practices was "banquet Nordism," a critical reference to what was seen as a cooperation practice where fancy gala banquets and bombastic speeches dominated over grassroots popular mobilisation.⁴⁶ As a marking point for the new direction Sweden's social democratic Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson published an article in the Norden Associations common Yearbook in 1937 under the title "Workers Scandinavianism."⁴⁷ Besides the obvious conceptual lingering between nineteenth- and twentieth-century pan-nationalistic language, within the labour movement the use of Scandinavianism was explicit, as it might have seemed more in line with the internationalism so central. The political leader of Sweden explicitly stated that the Nordic social democratic parties were now ready to take a major role in the Nordic cooperation movement: "The

labour Scandinavianism in its enlarged Nordic form is now completely merging into the general aspirations for a Nordic concord.”⁴⁸ Further the Swedish leader pointed to SAMAK as a vital organisation for Nordic cooperation, and he also reminded the readers of the importance of unity, “when it concerns the acting of the Nordic states towards the exterior in international politics.”⁴⁹

The chairman of the Swedish chapter of the Norden Association, the social democrat Torsten Nothin, was also in line with the interest shown by P.M. Hansson. He urged for making special efforts to attract new members to the association in order to make it into a proper popular movement. By early 1929 the total number of members in all five chapters had risen to 5000 persons, indicating a steady increase during the first ten years of existence.⁵⁰ In Denmark the membership count amounted to 3000 persons by 1939. Despite all efforts it would take an external shock to alter the picture drastically. It was the outbreak of the Second World War that made the membership numbers reach until then unimaginable heights. The outbreak of the Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union was the spark that made all previous efforts and preparations become reality. Between 1939 and 1945 the membership total rose drastically, and by the end of the war the Norden associations had almost 70 000 members.⁵¹ The main reason was the general public outcry in support for Finland, which made people join the Norden Association as an act of solidarity. The labour unions effectively promoted membership and also employer’s organisations did the same in Sweden. The most striking case was Denmark where basically all union members joined a massive support for Nordic solidarity during the war. By 1945 the Danish Norden Association had over 50 000 members. This phenomenon has been called the Nordic awakening or the Nordic revival,⁵² and as such it constituted a popular support and mandate for government-driven Nordic cooperation after the war.

Nordic self-constructing discourses in the inter-war period

A value-based Nordic self-image as defenders of rule of law, democracy and egalitarianism both internationally and in their own societies grew into a self-understanding where the Nordic countries perceived themselves as defending something precious and morally higher against the evils imposed by two powerful neighbours. The geopolitical David and Goliath constellation was conceptualised as a fight for a common set of Nordic values that were seen as universal. The higher quest for the Nordic pan-nationalism was to secure the survival and freedom of this region, and as such the idea of forming a democratic and progressive ante-murale against totalitarianism and aggressive expansionism set the tone for Nordist self-understanding. The idea of a specific form of “Nordic democracy” became the intellectual basis for Nordic cooperation.⁵³ The idea of a specific form of Nordic democracy was launched in 1930 mainly from the left, partly as an act of contesting domestic conservative politics. This compares to the liberal political agenda of the mid-nineteenth Scandinavianism.

As the reformist left made a quest for occupying a leadership role in Nordic cooperation, one emblematic moment was the celebration of the “Day of Nordic Democracy,” in Malmö, in August 1935. A strong sense of democracy being in crisis on the European continent was made into a counter-image of what was conceptualised as Nordic democracy. The event was arranged by the Swedish Social Democratic Youth organisation, and strategically it coincided with the Socialist Youth International congress held in Copenhagen. In total some 20 000 people had gathered for the two events, and in Malmö four Nordic social democratic leaders, Per Albin Hansson, Väinö Tanner (Finland), H.P. Hansen (Denmark) and Johan Nygaardsvold (Norway), all gave speeches.⁵⁴ They all stressed how their movement was future oriented and represented a new form of modernity. The Norwegian Nygaardsvold also added that, “if we want to achieve a strong and secure bulwark against the European dictatorship infection, it has to be created by and with the working class.”⁵⁵ This conceptual border-drawing practice included “a duty towards all mankind” to take up the battle for democracy.

The Norden Associations were attentive to follow up the public mass manifestations by the labour movement, and the very next year “Norden’s Day” was arranged on 27 October 1936 in all five Nordic capitals. The explicit aim was to reach all citizens and promote a broader popular support for the associations and for the Nordic cause in general. The event was broadcasted over national radio, as all four heads of state gave a speech on the occasion. The event is also known for presenting for the first time the allegory of five swans symbolising Nordic cooperation. Based on a poem by Dane Hans Hartvig Seedorff Pedersen this motive was recurring in the extensive advertisement in mass media and also on the cover of a song book printed in a 200 000 copies edition.⁵⁶ That symbol has later established itself as the flag of official Nordic cooperation.

The political development towards increased totalitarian regimes in the vicinity made the Nordic discourse easier to grasp as a pan-regionalist self-identification. And as seen, it was not only the Social Democratic party that conceived a pan-Nordic value-based vision. The explicit statement against totalitarianism in all its forms, born in a world of tensions and geopolitical threats, was widely embraced. In domestic politics, it was also connected to a specific political consensual bargaining between the left and the agrarians and between employer’s organisations and labour unions. The form of Nordism practised and endorsed by the generally more conservative and paternalistic Norden Association inner circles thus far did not stand that far from the ideas social democratic leadership was articulating. Much of this tradition was tied to older structures such as the Nordic Lawyers’ Meetings, started in 1872 and retaking its practice of regular meetings every third or fourth year. When the 13th meeting was held in Helsinki 1925, the chair of the Finnish organising committee Julius Grotenfelt welcomed his 400 Nordic fellow lawyers with the following words:

Therefore, we the Finnish lawyers who have endured past decades of ardent fight for the preservation of lawful order and principles in our

country against heavy attacks, now with outmost satisfaction greet this day, when the guardians of western law and legal culture in Norden have gathered here in large numbers for this general assembly in our independent country.⁵⁷

This forum representing the establishment cultivated a strong discourse of the Nordic countries standing as beacons for a western legal tradition. In the Finnish case this had been part of the national constitutional struggle during the last 20 years as part of the Russian Empire. This in combination with the emerging totalitarian tendencies and increased geopolitical threats provided a context for a Nordist self-celebratory discourse. Unlike pan-Germanism, the Nordist discourse was not expansive in geographical terms, since that was not a feasible future outlook, but rather defensive. An era that saw a logic of expansion and evolution towards bigger units as a sign of civilisational strength also saw pan-nationalist movements adhere to claims for so-called life space.⁵⁸ The “biologisation” of nationalism, the steady shift from a *Völker* ideology towards a more social-Darwinist view meant that international law constantly was under pressure from a major power imposed expansionism.⁵⁹ The bulwark idea sprung from a figure of thought where the Nordic people had to protect the lawful and democratic values essential to their societies. It also contained an intrinsic reference to possessing reason in a world of turmoil, thus hinting at a moral supremacy of the northernmost nations of Europe.

A brief look at developments within the pan-Latinist sphere during the same decades also offers an interesting contrast to the Nordic case. From the Franco-Prussian War 1870–71 up until the First World War pan-Latinist thinking and practice had evolved much around a counter-narrative to Anglo-Saxon and other northern hegemony imposed by the process of biologisation of nationalism. A sense of being marginalised and meridionalised was acute among the Latin nations.⁶⁰ When the British prime minister Lord Salisbury in a speech in 1898 referred to how there were only two categories of nations, the living and the dying, he referred to Europe’s Latin nations concerning the latter category. Otto von Bismarck at one point referred to Latin nations as the feminine race of Europe.⁶¹ In this sense pan-Latinism was also much evolved around the idea of a defensive battle that had to capitalise on immaterial capital in its self-empowering discourse.⁶² In the Latin case it would be the superiority of culture and civilisation that became the cornerstone for a common struggle, while the Nordic self-image evolved around the idea of representing true democracy and standing as morally superior common sense representatives and defenders of law and order in international relations.

During the First World War, however, a new strategic constellation emerged as a Franco-Italian approach became one way of countering the German threat in France. Italy as a member of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary did not participate in the war, and in 1915 the alliance expired. After the

war a considerable number of public intellectuals saw this scenario in a positive light alluding to a common Latin identity. This also in many cases included an approval to Mussolini's fascist ideology.⁶³ Even if the diversity of ideological stands was considerable, still the fact that fascism figured as one of the important forums for pan-nationalist Latin action during the inter-war years makes it different from the Nordic case.⁶⁴ Another slight difference was the centrality of "race" in the Latin case in comparison with a more implicit, but nonetheless relevant, discourse in the Nordic region. Especially the Italian debate paid attention to the race question, since it was also seen as part of a national north-south question, the *questione meridionale*.⁶⁵ A division appeared between those who disqualified scientific racism and the theories of Aryan supremacy, and those who contemplated over the future of the Latin nations from a perspective that accepted the idea of Latin backwardness and lagging behind in modern progress. This was very much also the situation in Spain, while the French saw themselves (as did others in the Latin world) as the leaders of a trans-Atlantic pan-region. The term "raza" also always contained a less racist connotation in the Hispanic world, as it in many Latin American countries also alludes to the mestizaje of European and indigenous elements in the nation, but in a more cultural sense than in an anthropological sense.

In the Nordic case there is no such understanding of mixing Nordic with indigenous elements, and the classic German-based *Volk/folk* definition of each Nordic nation persisted through the first half of the twentieth century. The Nordic-Aryan racist discourse was, however, generally much stronger in Germany and in the USA, even if it was not absent in the Nordic region.⁶⁶ Internally the Sámi and Inuit communities in Norden served as contrasting population groups where racism discourse was the order of the day, and mainstream racist discourse was not uncommon even within the labour movements at least until 1933 and the change of power in Germany.

Conclusion

The re-emergence of a pan-nationalist idea in the Nordic countries under the label of Nordism and Nordic cooperation was both a continuation and a break from nineteenth-century Scandinavianism. Utter caution was employed just after the First World War to point out the novelty and changed principles of this idea. If we compare Nordism and its content and practices, the high level of institutionalisation, continuity and especially the evident support Nordism had in the highest political and social spheres stand out. Nordic cooperation of the inter-war period has more in common with top-down state-driven integration projects, such as the European integration process after the Second World War, than it has with nineteenth-century pan-nationalist practices. Instead of striving for uniting a pan-nation as one based on a national-romantic ideology, Nordic cooperation strove towards a governmental cooperation as an act of rationality and sensible politics.

A vital part of Nordism was a culture of cooperation practices that in many ways had survived from the nineteenth century and which was reinforced vigorously during the inter-war period. The cooperation became in many ways the achieved goal of Nordic cooperation, and during the inter-war periods no serious proposals for a federal Nordic state were presented. During the dramatic years of the Second World War this would change for a short moment when some pamphlets urging for a future federal state saw the light of day. However, after the war it was precisely the base of civil society cooperation practice in combination with a common will to institutionalise official Nordic cooperation that paved the way for a comparatively highly institutionalised, both unofficial and official, Nordic cooperation. By then also to identify oneself as a Nordist slowly became a self-imposed identity. The bases for a high popular acceptance of Nordic cooperation became a fact during the Cold War due both to external pressures and to internally edified sense of Nordic solidarity which had broad popular support.

In Norden pan-nationalism did not emerge as a response to multi-ethnicity since the nation-state primacy in combination with the incapacity to recognise linguistic and ethnic minorities meant that Nordism was firstly an idea of protecting the region against outside threats. Rather the emerging Nordism was based on what Tim van Gerven in his typology refers to as brothering, by which is meant a state when national and pan-national identities are subsidiary. Also, the concept of benchmarking applies to the Nordic case, alluding to a situation where an Old Norse legacy but also a set of moral attributes create the substance of how to define the “we.”⁶⁷ Since the inclusion of Finland after 1918 in Nordic cooperation, the Old Norse legacy ceased to be all-embracing, and the moral values connected to shared legal, Lutheran and social democratic-driven modernisation processes became more and more important. This shift happened exactly during the inter-war period, when the remake of nineteenth-century Scandinavianism into Nordism and Nordic cooperation took shape.

Notes

- 1 Hemstad, *Fra Indian Summer til nordisk vinter*, 358; Sejerstedt, *Socialdemokratins tidsålder*, 176–77.
- 2 Stadius, *Trekungamötet i Malmö*, 370–71.
- 3 See Hemstad’s contribution to this volume.
- 4 See Hemstad, *Fra Indian Summer til nordisk vinter*, 99–102.
- 5 Neumann, *A Region-Building Approach*, 53.
- 6 Götz & Haggrén, *Introduction*, 9–11.
- 7 Gerven, *Scandinavism*, 387.
- 8 Brubaker and Cooper, *Beyond “Identity,”* 4; Maxwell, *Pan-Nationalism as a Category*, 3.
- 9 See Hemstad, *Scandinavian Sympathies and Nordic Unity*, 35–38.
- 10 See Elmgren’s contribution to this volume.
- 11 Guedj and Meazzi, *Pour une lecture latine*,
- 12 Hansen, *Drømmen om Norden*, 82.
- 13 Janfelt, *Att leva i det bästa av världar*, 97.

- 14 Haggrén and Stenius, *Det nordiska samarbetets vardagspraktiker*, 81.
- 15 van Gerven, *Scandinavism*, 387.
- 16 Danielsson, "Pan-Nationalism Reframed," 50.
- 17 See WeBel, *The Nordic in the Scientific Racial Discourses*, 59–62.
- 18 Chickering, *We Men Who Feel*, 229.
- 19 Kohn, *Pan-Slavism*, 198.
- 20 Sørensen and Adriansen, *Dybbøl: The Construction and Reconstruction*, 18.
- 21 <https://smvu.se/registreringskort-nr-dk07/>
- 22 Wendt, *Cooperation in the Nordic Countries*, 25.
- 23 Andersson, *Idé och verklighet*, 19.
- 24 Hansen, *Drømmen om Norden*, 81.
- 25 Hemstad, *Scandinavianism, Nordic Co-operation*, 183.
- 26 Janfelt, *Att leva i det bästa av världar*, 132.
- 27 Andersson, *Idé och verklighet*, 24.
- 28 Stadius, *Hundra år av nordism*, 20.
- 29 See Hemstad's contribution to this volume.
- 30 Swe. Norden, en förening i Finland för nordiskt samarbete; Fin. Norden, Suomessa toimiva yhdistys pohjoismaista yhteistyötä varten.
- 31 Sejerstedt, *Socialdemokratins tidsålder*, 190.
- 32 See Hemstad's contribution to this volume.
- 33 Wilén, *Föreningarna Norden*, 279.
- 34 Andersson, *Idé och verklighet*, 55.
- 35 Maxwell, *Pan-nationalism as a Category*, 4.
- 36 Rerup, *Nationalisme og skandinavisme*, 79–87.
- 37 Palmgren Munch-Petersen, *Tankar i nordiska frågor*, 109.
- 38 Hekscher, *Det nordiska samarbetets innebörd*, 52.
- 39 Rodhe, *Ett enigt Norden*, 115.
- 40 Wendt, *Cooperation in the Nordic Countries*, 89.
- 41 Hansen, *Drømmen om Norden*, 86.
- 42 Åström Elmersjö, *Norden, nationen och historien*, 92.
- 43 Åström Elmersjö, *Norden, nationen och historien*, 115.
- 44 Hemstad, *Scandinavianism, Nordic co-operation*, 187.
- 45 Kurunmäki and Strang, *Rhetorics of Nordic Democracy*, 10.
- 46 Stadius, *Hundra år av Nordism*, 28.
- 47 See also Hemstad, *Scandinavianism, Nordic co-operation*, 189.
- 48 Hansson, *Drømmen om Norden*, 92.
- 49 Ibid.
- 50 Wilén, *Föreningarna Norden*, 279.
- 51 Andersson, *Idé och verklighet*, 111.
- 52 Andersson, *Idé och verklighet*, 43–44; Stadius, *Kristid och väckelse*, 212.
- 53 Kurunmäki and Strang, *Rhetorics of Nordic Democracy*, 10.
- 54 Kurunmäki, "'Nordic Democracy' in 1935," 37–38.
- 55 *Fyra tal om nordisk demokrati*, 33.
- 56 Hemstad, *Promoting Norden*, 43.
- 57 Tamm, *De nordiske juristmøder*, 74–75.
- 58 Kohn, *Pan-Slavism*, 198.
- 59 Danielsson, *Pan-Nationalism Reframed*, 42, 50.
- 60 Giladi, *Origins and Characteristics of Macro-nationalism*, 255.
- 61 Stadius, *Resan till norr*, 91–92.
- 62 Litvak, *Latinos y anglosajones*, 13.
- 63 Shor, *Identité fasciste, identité latine*, 4.
- 64 Gudej and Meazzi, *Introduction. Pour une lecture latine*, 2.
- 65 Moe, *The View from Vesuvius*, 224–30.
- 66 See WeBel, *The Nordic in the Scientific Racial Discourses*.
- 67 Gerven, *Scandinavism*, 387.

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PART IV

European pan-movements: Comparative perspectives



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11

CONSTRUCTIVE FORGETTING AND RECONCILIATORY MEMORY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY HISTORICAL FICTION

A comparative perspective on Scandinavianism,
pan-Germanism and Greater Netherlandism

Tim van Gerven

Research on Scandinavianism has shown that the making of a pan-Scandinavian identity relied greatly on the cultivation of a shared past in scholarship, education, literature, the fine arts and public proclamation.¹ Norse Antiquity and the Viking Age provided myths of common origins and historicised egalitarian values, while more problematic memories of inter-Scandinavian warfare in the late Middle Ages and Early Modernity were creatively reimagined to fit the unifying ideals of the present. Only in times of political crisis did negative images of the Scandinavian neighbours reappear in cultural productions, such as in the backlash of 1864 or in the years leading up to the dissolution of the Swedish-Norwegian union. However, such heat-of-the-moment antagonisms did little to upset the general trend towards reconciliatory remembrance within Scandinavian culture. This defusing, as I have proposed to call it, of potentially divisive memories is one of the ways in which Scandinavianism, understood as the cultivation of a Scandinavian identity, reconfigured the nation-building processes in its constitutive parts: national-historical memories were shaped and reshaped with at least one eye on the Scandinavian context.

This chapter examines whether these conclusions drawn from the Scandinavian case are applicable to two other pan-national movements as well. The two pan-movements in question are pan-Germanism and Greater Netherlandism, which were both, to varying degrees of intensity, intertwined with the pan-Scandinavian project. Despite these obvious and important overlaps – on which I will elaborate further down – their selection for analysis is primarily based on the language skills of the author and does not wish to disregard the importance of other pan-movements for Scandinavianism.² The main question is thus not whether there was any cultural transfer between the three selected movements

with respect to their respective memory cultures, but whether each of these pan-movements “ticks” in the same way: is the defusing of unwanted memories a core characteristic of pan-nationalism *tout court* or is it to some degree particular to Scandinavianism? And in how far can the application of reconciliatory memory be considered indicative for the success of a pan-national vision in creating cross-border cohesion? These questions will be addressed by, first, elaborating on the intricacies of reconciliatory memory in nineteenth-century Scandinavian literature and, second, by analysing how these insights apply to the pan-Germanic and Netherlandic cases. The literary evocation of the Austrian-Prussian War of 1866 and the Belgian Revolution of 1830 will serve as the most important case studies.

Scandinavianism: Reconciliatory memory and strategies for defusion

The three centuries after the fall of the Kalmar Union in 1523 were marked by repeated military conflict between Sweden and Denmark-Norway. The Swedish poet and bishop Esaias Tegnér (1782–1846) retrospectively designated this historical era the “Age of Severance” (*söndringens tid*). He used this phrase while symbolically crowning the Danish poet Adam Oehlenschläger (1779–1850) “King of Nordic Poets” during a graduation ceremony in Lund Cathedral in 1829, an act that to his mind for ever closed the lid on the era of inter-Scandinavian discord. Indeed, the next two decades saw the emergence of Scandinavianism as both an influential cultural movement (which, it has to be noted, built on pan-Scandinavian traditions running back to the late eighteenth century) and a political ideal that in its most ambitious formulation sought to establish a Scandinavian federation or constitutional monarchy.³ Next to realpolitikal considerations that saw a united Scandinavia as an indispensable bulwark against potential German and/or Russian aggression, the ideological foundations of Scandinavianism were provided by a Romantic historicism that exalted the shared linguistic, cultural and historical roots of the Danes, Swedes and Norwegians.

Whereas the political ideology went into decline after the Second Schleswig War (1864) – following Norwegian-Swedish non-interference in the matter – as a cultural affect Scandinavianism continued to inspire literary and artistic practices throughout the remainder of the century and after.⁴ This not only included the continuation of inter-Scandinavian cooperation and cultural exchange but also a persistent willingness to cultivate a shared Scandinavian identity through works of art and literature. Inspiration for this was not exclusively found in Norse mythology and Viking culture, which were seen as representing Scandinavia’s common origins and heritage, but also, notably – and perhaps paradoxically – in subjects from Tegnér’s Age of Severance, such as the siege and storming of Copenhagen (1659) or the Great Northern War (1700–21).

On a first look, such memories of war might be seen as offering fuel for stories of national self-aggrandisement at the expense of the Scandinavian

neighbour, but on closer inspection it becomes apparent that memories of inter-Scandinavian conflict are in fact predominantly used to convey a message of reconciliation and togetherness. Ever since the start of the century, writers of historical fiction creatively reframed potentially divisive memories in such a way that the sting could be taken out, so as not to upset the harmonious relations in the present. The work of Walter Scott (1771–1832) offered a “model of remembrance” that was keenly followed by Scandinavian authors.⁵ This model centres around a conflict between two different ethnic groups – such as the Normans and Saxons in *Ivanhoe* (1819) – who ultimately decide to lay their differences aside, recognising that each of them has to give up part of their identity in order to make a unified future possible.⁶ Scott’s model can as such be perceived as a form of reconciliatory memory that is not simply aimed at forgetting unwanted episodes from the past, but that instead acknowledged the trauma experienced, and the wrongdoings committed by all sides in the conflict, leading to the realisation that such discord should never reoccur in the future.⁷ Indeed, recalling inconvenient memories in this manner, and burying the symbolic hatchet in the process, was a necessary precondition for reconciliation and the imagination of a multinational identity in the present. Concurrently, favouring remembering over forgetting made it possible to still celebrate national heroes and achievements related to such conflict-ridden memories, without vilifying the Scandinavian neighbours.

This Scott-inspired conflict-reconciliation narrative was dominant in portraying troublesome memories from the shared Scandinavian past throughout the nineteenth century. We find it in both popular light reading, such as in the works of highly popular and well-read authors like Carit Etlar (1816–1900), Carl Georg Starbäck (1828–85) and Rudolf Muus (1862–1935), and the historical fiction of canonical names like August Strindberg (1849–1912) and Johannes V. Jensen (1873–1950). These and many other authors employed one or more of three narrative ploys that helped *defuse* the potential divisive impact of problematic memories.⁸

The first is the representation of war as an aberration from the natural state of harmony and brotherhood between the Scandinavian peoples. This is closely connected to the idea of common roots. In ancient times, the Scandinavians had been a single people, so it was believed, and this common mainspring was seen as legitimation for continued harmonious relations even after this *Ur-Volk* had developed into the three modern nations. This idea was most commonly expressed through family metaphors: the Scandinavians are portrayed as brothers or siblings, whose historic quarrels thus offered the “reassurance of fratricide”: the wars could be presented as conflicts within the family, which made it impossible to clearly distinguish between victims and perpetrators.⁹ In fact, the rediscovery of family-bonds, or the regained knowledge of common roots, towards the end of the plot often exposes the war situation as an anomaly. All this is most neatly encapsulated by one of the characters from Rolf Olsen’s (1818–64) Norwegian national-history play *Anna Kolbjørnsdatter* (1852), who, after a

battle between Swedish and Norwegian forces during the Great Northern War, exclaims: “O, why can’t we all be friends? Norwegian, Swedish or Danish, aren’t we all children of the same mother, sons of the noble Nordic tribe?”¹⁰

A second strategy concerns the introduction of an alternative enemy. In Swedish literature this was often the Russians; in Denmark, the Germans regularly featured as the bad guys – and unsurprisingly so given the strained situation in Schleswig and Holstein, meaning that historical accuracy was often sacrificed in order to reflect political antagonisms in the present. Usually, these non-Scandinavian foes are presented as the evil masterminds behind inter-Scandinavian discord. For instance, in their respective works on the medieval knight Engelbrekt Engelbrektsson, both Starbäck and Strindberg ascribed the failure of the Kalmar Union to German intermingling. The most extreme example hails from Denmark and concerns the play *Gøngehøvdingen* (1865), which, although set during the almost complete occupation of Denmark by Swedish forces in 1658–60, does not feature a single Swedish character; their place has instead been taken by scheming German mercenaries.

Finally, many authors introduced a social opposition between the righteous common people and the abusive aristocracy that took precedence over the historic military conflict between Scandinavian nations. Aristocrats represent an internal alternative enemy of sorts, as they behave contrary to the national interest and thwart the egalitarianism deemed indigenous to the Scandinavian countries (also this idea is traced back to Norse Antiquity and the Viking Age), a general plotline that is congruent with the dominant master narrative in all three national historiographies in the nineteenth century.¹¹ The aristocracy is in that sense “foreign” to Scandinavia in terms of its cultural and political identity. Several authors thus use their historical fiction as a vehicle for their social criticism, usually pushing an agenda for greater popular representation. Such is for instance the case in the aforementioned works by Starbäck and Strindberg, who both saw power abuse by the nobility as an equally decisive cause for the collapse of the Kalmar Union as the German interference, while Carit Etlar’s novel *Gøngehøvdingen* (1853) can be read as a critique of the gross inequality experienced in contemporary Danish society. As is the case with the “alternative enemy” trope, the realisation that the aristocracy represents the “real” enemy is cause for characters from diverse Scandinavian backgrounds to team up and face the new challenge together.

The question now is whether – and if so, to which level of intensity – these three tropes of reconciliation and defusion appear in historical fiction in other pan-national contexts, such as in the present chapter, pan-Germanism and Greater Netherlandism. Concerning the Netherlandic case, the Belgian Revolution of 1830 has been selected as a case study; for pan-Germanism, the choice fell on the Austro-German War of 1866, which pitted Prussia against Austria in their claims for hegemony in the German-speaking world. To be sure, both these historic events concern instances of living memory – with the authors often being personally involved and pursuing a particular political

agenda – which marks a significant difference with the Scandinavian sites of memory discussed above, which are of a considerably older date. More recent memories of Scandinavian conflict, however, only played a minor role in the common imagination – the short Swedish–Norwegian war of 1814, for instance, created two wholly different commemoration traditions on either side of the border¹² – whereas the cultivation of older memories formed part and parcel of the Scandinavianist project and could potentially still be contentious (as can be exemplified by the Danish–Swedish skirmishes over the interpretation of the Stockholm Bloodbath of 1520), as contentious at times as the memorialisation of the Belgian Revolution and the Austro–Prussian War. Both revolution and war, moreover, represent the only straightforward instances of internal discord within the “pan–nation” in the Netherlandic and pan–German cases – and their cultivation in fiction, as we shall see, had much in common with the strategies found in Scandinavian literature.

Greater Netherlandism: From Dutch retaliation to constructive forgetting

In 1815, the Netherlands and Belgium were united in the United Kingdom of the Netherlands (*Het Verenigd Koninkrijk der Nederlanden*). This political union was however short-lived and came to an end with the Belgian Revolution of 1830 (although the Belgian secession was ratified only in 1839). The causes for the Revolution are manifold and complex, but resistance of the French-speaking south against the rigid language policies of King Willem I, who wanted to enforce Dutch as the official language throughout the realm, features prominently among them. Deep-rooted linguistic as well as religious differences thus proved detrimental for the sustainability of the political union. Nevertheless, the Flemish-speaking north of Belgium – save for a particularistic faction in Catholic West-Flanders – continued to aspire close ties with the Netherlands, not in the least to ward off French influences.¹³

However, this Dutch–Flemish solidarity had to go through a notable slum in the 1830s. On the one hand, this owed to the collapse of Flemish literary and linguistic infrastructure – Dutch faculties were closed, literary societies and publishing houses were forced to dissolve – and the return of “Northerners” to their home country. On the other hand, many in the Netherlands were greatly dissatisfied because of the events of 1830. The first years after the Revolution saw the rise of a new popular genre, “Citadel Poetry,” so called to honour the “last stand” of Dutch garrisons in citadel cities like Antwerp, Namur and Liège. These poems indeed served to glorify Dutch heroism during the Revolution. An especially popular subject was naval lieutenant Jan van Speijk (1802–31), who had preferred blowing himself and his gunboat up in the sky rather than surrendering to the Belgian army. The Belgians, by contrast, were depicted as dumb-witted, immoral, unhinged and, first and foremost, unthankful towards their “good father” King Willem I.¹⁴ Main objective of this form of poetry was to seek

recompense for the wronged Dutch nation and their monarch. In all this, there seems to be no mourning for the loss of the south, as the Belgians are considered to have proven to be unworthy of Dutch solidarity.

Dutch historical novels that deal with the Belgian Revolution follow the recipe provided by Citadel Poetry to a tee. Between 1831 and 1841 five of these novels were published, in addition to two originally German novels that, unsurprisingly, corroborated the Dutch version of events (Table 11.1). Furthermore, A.R. Sloos (1805–69) wrote his *Dutchman and Belgian* already in 1838, but this novel was for unknown reasons not published before 1860.¹⁵ In all these novels, Dutch heroes like Van Speijk are celebrated for their cunning patriotism, even if the plotline must make a sharp detour to include them in the story (in Cramer's *The Sutler of the Dutch Army*, for instance, the titular heroine somewhat forcedly winds up in Antwerp, just in time to witness the gunboat exploding). The Belgian "rebels" are almost without exception portrayed as amoral crooks who do not act out of sincere national feeling, but out of an impudent lust to plunder, steal, rape, vandalise and murder. Their ungratefulness towards Willem's benevolent rule is likewise repeatedly underlined. Despite this obvious national bias, all authors purported in a preface that theirs was "a truthful and objective account of the events." Such remarks might not surprise us, as Toos Streng observes, given that the historical novel at this time also fulfilled the journalistic purpose of informing the public of relatively recent events, in that way supplementing newspaper reports that were generally short and wanting in detail.¹⁶

C.H. Clemens' (1808–41) *Lambert Broussard* from 1833 can serve as a representative example of the general themes and tropes applied in these novels on the Revolution.¹⁷ Clemens is also the one author who most empathically applied a family motif in his novel. The Belgians are here once more portrayed as unthankful children who show nothing but disrespect to their good father, Willem I. But Clemens also draws a sharp distinction between Wallonia and Flanders, a nomenclature that would otherwise only become widely used in the

TABLE 11.1 The Belgian Revolution in Dutch novels, 1831–1899.

Year	Author	Title
1831	Johannes Immerzeel Jr	<i>Hollands Leeuw Ontwaakt</i>
1831	Anonymous	<i>Oordeel niet voor het tijd is; dus weet of wacht</i>
1831	Anton Cramer	<i>De Marketenster van het Hollandse Leger</i>
1833	C.H. Clemens	<i>Lambert Broussard</i>
1834	Friedrich Bartels	<i>De Luikenaar*</i>
1841	K.L. Hencke	<i>De Citadel van Antwerpen*</i>
1841	G.L.H. Mispelblom van de Schelde	<i>Luik in 1830</i>
1860	A.R. Sloos	<i>Hollander en Belg</i>
1897	L. Zegers Veeckens Hzn.	<i>Het oproer ontweken</i>
1899	R. Boon	<i>De Citadel van Antwerpen</i>

* Originally published in German.

1840s,¹⁸ and he ascribes the wrongdoings first and foremost to the Francophone Walloons (one of the riot leaders is even called “François Le Franc!”), who are depicted as immoral plebeian murderers and rapists, who, moreover, always have a bottle of wine close at hand. In this way, the Walloons might be perceived as an alternative enemy, who drive a wedge between the “stepbrothers” Holland and Flanders. Clemens worked this family metaphor tightly into his plot. The eponymous hero – a Walloon revolutionary – accidentally kills his Flemish father-in-law (a double agent working for the Dutch), which leads to the death of both his fiancée and his mother-in-law, and, in the longer run, his own death as well. This might be interpreted as to mean that a marriage between Flemish and Walloon will bring nothing but trouble. Similarly, the use of the term “stepbrothers” – applied by several of the authors in question – might suggest that the relation between the Netherlands and Flanders should be understood as historical rather than biological; a relation, in other words, that might not require nation-building, let alone state formation.

In its use of the alternative enemy trope, *Lambert Broussard* thus resembles Scandinavian historical fiction. The application of the family metaphor is more ambiguous; on the one hand, it indicates that the cultural and linguistic ties are indeed acknowledged, but the use of the term stepbrothers betrays less commitment to the pan-national ideas than in the Scandinavian case; it is also telling that there never is any reconciliation between Dutch and Flemish in this corpus. However, the greatest deviation from Scandinavian literary practice – in Clemens’ work as well as in that of others – concerns the depiction of social relations. The Revolution is presented as emanating from the “rabble” (*het grauw*) – captained by a small group of ill-minded nobles and bourgeois agitators – who are made into caricatures of poverty, immorality and drunkenness. In this respect the novels even seem to support a strict preservation of class divisions. This stands in sharp contrast to the social criticism expressed by among others Etlar, Strindberg and Starbäck.

By 1840, Dutch irritation over the events of 1830 had waned and both Citadel Poetry and its prose equivalent went out of fashion. When Sloos’ novel was finally marketed in 1860, the author did not refrain from remarking in the media that “about much of what I deemed to be good and true back then, I would have judged differently now.”¹⁹ The Belgian Revolution only reappeared in two literary memoirs of veterans in the closing years of the century, which according to the newspapers were of such poor quality that one could wonder why they had been published in the first place.²⁰

Remarkable is the relative neglect of the Belgian Revolution in Flemish literature. The only relevant novel that I could find is *The Revolution of 1830* (1858) by Hendrik Conscience (1812–83), Belgium’s foremost historical novelist and Scott acolyte. The novel recounts the author’s first years in the newly established Belgian army, which he joined in the immediate aftermath of the Belgian Revolution. Only 17 years of age at the time, it becomes clear that Conscience’s primary motivation for joining the army was not so much the fight

for the freedom of the fatherland – he acknowledges to have been unaware of the causes of the Revolution – but rather the realisation of his own personal freedom, and the wish to overcome his perceived childishness and femininity (of which he is repeatedly accused throughout the book) and mature into manhood. The novel accordingly ends when his hard-liner superior acknowledges Conscience's value as a soldier. In this personal memoir, the Dutch "enemy" is described in neutral, and sometimes even positive terms, most notably when the ill protagonist is given care and lodgings by a poor Dutch family, who show nothing but affection for "our Belgian."²¹ Besides this intimate scene, however, there is no further reflection on the relation between Dutch and Flemish, and the realisation of Belgian independence is defined as just and desirable.

By the time of the publication of Conscience's book, the political relations between Belgium and the Netherlands had significantly improved. The 1840s had witnessed the recovery of linguistic and cultural cooperation between Flanders and the Netherlands, helped by a renewed orientation within the Flemish Movement on the North, following its dissatisfaction with French hegemony in the Belgian state, and a reaction against pan-Germanism, which after the Germanist Congress of 1846 with all its anti-Danish rhetoric was increasingly seen as a threat.²² According to Leerssen, the "starting shot" for Greater Netherlandism was given with the first joint congress of Dutch and Flemish philologists and medievalists, organised in 1849.²³ The congresses had as its objective "the preservation of the Netherlandic tribe [...] the promotion of unity between North and South [...] and the reinforcement of the common *Volksgeist*."²⁴ These events were organised on a regular basis, alternately north and south of the shared border, and inspired the joint standardisation of orthographies and a project for a comprehensive Dictionary of the Netherlandic Language.²⁵ In this context of mutual rapprochement, the disappearance of the Revolution from the literary imagination might signal a commitment to a form of "forgetting that is constitutive in the formation of a new identity,"²⁶ which thus stands in contrast to the reconciliatory remembrance characteristic of Scandinavianism.

The fact of the matter is that Belgium and the Netherlands would develop divergent memory canons after the break-up of 1830.²⁷ In the Netherlands, the corpus skewed towards the Middle Ages, the Reformation and the Eighty Years War.²⁸ In comparison, historical fiction in Flanders mainly served to convey that nation's continuous struggle for freedom against foreign oppression, a centuries-long battle that only recently had been put to an end.²⁹ The Northern Dutch had only been the last in a long list of oppressors after the Romans, the French, the Spanish, the Austrians and, again, the French. Indeed, vilification of the French is a characteristic and oft-returning theme, feeding into a clear predilection for medieval topics, such as in Conscience's highly influential *The Lion of Flanders* (1838), and a tendency to reflect on the contemporary tensions between Flemish and Walloon in Belgian society.³⁰ Thus, one might say that, when taking a bird's-eye view of the entire corpus, there is an "alternative" enemy – the French – but this enemy never shows in narratives of Dutch-Flemish conflict and

reconciliation, as these do not exist, not in Flemish literature, nor in the Dutch, where religious discord and internal discord – as during the late-medieval Hook and Cod Wars – were prevalent themes.

Dutch and Flemish literature thus formed “closed circuits” that from the pre-determined national framework reinforced its national profile by retroactively selecting subjects from the national past that appealed first and foremost to a national audience and that worked into the articulation of a national identity that left little room for reconnection across the border.³¹ To be sure, similar observations can be made for Danish, Norwegian and Swedish literature;³² yet, here memories of mutual conflict – and the reconciliatory way in dealing with them – provided notable overlap between the respective national literatures. According to Lode Wils this lack of a truly shared history between Flanders and the Netherlands forestalled the emergence of a cross-border national consciousness; linguistic unity alone proved not to be enough for pan-Netherlandism to gain wide popular appeal or a cultural *éclat* comparable to the Scandinavian case.³³ The ideal of the political unification of Holland and Flanders would only gain a relatively small following in the circles of radical Flemish activists, and in the Netherlands among members of the *Algemeen Nederlands Verbond* (ANV, “Pan-Netherlandic Union,” founded in 1895).

Pan-Germanism: War between brothers

Pan-Germanism was considerably vaguer in its geographical formulation than the other two macronationalisms under discussion.³⁴ Grosso modo a distinction can be made between a pan-national ambition to unify the German-speaking world into a single nation state, a project that was thus largely congruent with the push for the unification of Germany, and a more ambitious vision to politically unite all Germanic-speaking peoples, which was rooted in the comparative philology of Jacob Grimm (1785–1863) and Ernst Moritz Arndt (1769–1860), and which envisioned a German-led superstate that included Flanders, the Netherlands, Alsace-Lorraine, Luxemburg, Scandinavia (or at the very least Jutland), parts of Poland and the Baltic region, as well as the German-speaking parts of Switzerland and Austria, including Süd-Tyrol.³⁵ Although this Germanic vision was only put on the political agenda by the Nazis and never truly formed part of the unification effort in the nineteenth century, pan-Germanism was nevertheless often seen as a threat from the Netherlandic and Scandinavian perspective.³⁶ German aggression directed towards Denmark, in word and deed, not only harnessed Scandinavianist sentiments in Danish nationalism as well as, albeit to a lesser degree, in the other Scandinavian countries, but it also inspired renewed Dutch-Flemish solidarity as a bulwark against possible future German expansionism.³⁷ The reactions to pan-Germanism were however not one-sidedly antithetical. There were those in Scandinavia that saw Scandinavian unification as a first step towards integration in a larger pan-Germanic constellation, while others preferred pan-Germanism over pan-Scandinavianism as a more powerful

alliance against the “real” Slavic threat.³⁸ Pan-Netherlandism would from the 1930s lean increasingly towards National Socialism; the fact that many of its most fervent supporters collaborated with the Nazis during the war would lead to the movement’s marginalisation after 1945.³⁹

When restricting pan-Germanism to the German language and the unification process (which comes with the important sidenote that the Germany that became a nation state in 1871 counted significant numbers of non-German speakers within its borders), it quickly becomes clear that the position of Austria is a problematic one. The convincing Prussian victory in the war of 1866 secured the exclusion of Austria from the future united Germany; a Greater Germany solution (*Großdeutschland*) was thus abandoned in favour of a Lesser Germany (*Kleindeutschland*). Although Prussian-Austrian relations logically soured for some years – the defeat was mourned in Austria especially because it was framed as a victory of the Protestant North over the Catholic South – a strong sense of cultural and ethnolinguistic communality persisted and was even actively promoted by Austrian literati.⁴⁰ The fact that, in Prussia, the war had been termed the Brothers War (*Bruderkrieg*) from the outset exposes the tension that was felt between culture and politics at the time, as the war was by many perceived as a civil war of sorts. Indeed, as Tobias Hirschmüller has pointed out, the term *Brüder* was explicitly used to exclude the non-German-speaking peoples of the Austrian Empire from the narrative and to envision continuing pan-German solidarity even after this military bump in the road.⁴¹

The family motif already apparent in the very name *Bruderkrieg* itself is also generally interwoven in the modest wave of historical novels thematising the war in the immediate post-war years (see Table 11.2).⁴² These first works were

TABLE 11.2 The Austro-Prussian War in German and Austrian novels, 1867–1918.

Year	Author	Title
1867	Stanislaus Graf Grabowski	<i>Unter Preußens Fahnen</i>
1867	Julie Burow	<i>Die Preußen in Prag</i>
1867	Julius Conrad	<i>Der siebentägige Krieg oder: Die Todsünden des Feindes</i>
1867	H. Liebach	<i>Der Spion im preussischen Hauptquartier, oder die Rache der Wienerin</i>
1867	J. Retcliffe	<i>Von Berlin nach Königgrätz</i>
1869	Edmund Hahn	<i>Hohenzollern und Welfen</i>
1874	Gregor Samarow	<i>Der Todesgruß der Legionen</i>
1898	Moritz von Berg-Nesselröden	<i>Graf Hasso Felsberg. Ein Leutnant von der Garde du Corps</i>
1900	A. Meymund	<i>Vergangene Tage</i>
1905	Karl Crome-Schwiening	<i>Unter dem springenden Pferd</i>
1906	Edith Gräfin von Salburg	<i>Königsglaube</i>
1914	Robert Hohlbäum	<i>Österreicher</i>
1914	Karl Christian Rückert	<i>Der tote Preuße</i>
1918	Robert Hohlbäum	<i>Das Vorspiel</i>

without exception written from the Prussian perspective and consequently brim with triumphalism over Prussia's overwhelming success. However, they in general strike a reconciliatory tone when describing the Austrian opponent. The paradox ingrained in the word Brothers War is solved by highlighting that such a war may indeed be unnatural, but it is nonetheless a necessary evil on the road to the unification of Germany. This united Germany, it is made clear, should be made in the image of Prussia, which naturally should take the lead in shaping Germany's future.

This emphasis on Prussia as the single viable model for a united Germany in itself harbours the evocation of an alternative enemy as well as, in a more subtle way, the incorporation of a social critique. These tropes are most comprehensively employed in the 1867 novel *The Prussians in Prague* by Julie Burow (pseudonym of Julie Pfannenschmidt, 1806–68). In her book, Prussia is represented as an ideal state of meritocratic cultivation and religious tolerance, which is set in contrast to the Catholic orthodoxy that would take over were Austria to become the leading power. It is in other words not so much Catholicism *per se* that is targeted, but specifically an intolerant and aggressive Catholicism that is not in the first place represented by Austria, but by ultramontanism and the Papacy in Rome, which aspired to exert political power beyond the walls of the Vatican, and that as such formed a common enemy for the open-minded and freedom-loving Germans. Prussia, to the contrary, is portrayed by Burow as a haven of religious freedom, where religion is a matter of personal choice instead of dogma, and that offers a good home not only for Christians of different confessions but also for Jews. All this is captured in the main plotline, which centres on a tug of war over the custody of the toddler Polly, who is the son of an impoverished Catholic Austrian nobleman and a half-Jewish, half-Protestant Prussian actress, but who is at first snatched from his grandmaternal care by a particularly dogmatic monk. In addition to this, Burow repeatedly stresses the high level of education, or *Bildung*, in Prussia, where even the common soldier can engage into meaningful intellectual discussions with his superiors and can rapidly climb the ranks based on both his military and his intellectual capabilities. This focus on meritocracy, in Burow's account, offers further support for Prussia's claim to hegemony in the unification process.

In most of the other novels, the North/South divide between Protestantism and Catholicism, as well as the emphasis on meritocracy, is less well-developed than in Pfannenschmidt's story, where it is a major point of discussion between the various characters. Instead, the most common way to strike a reconciliatory tone is through praising the valour and courage in battle of both sides, while death is often literally portrayed as the great equaliser: Prussians and Austrians brotherly lie side by side on the battlefield and in the field hospitals, where the fallen and wounded, be they friend or foe, are treated with equal respect.

Reconciliatory memory of this kind, it must be stressed, was employed to not only mend the divisions between Prussia and Austria but also those between Prussia and Hanover, Austria's most powerful ally in the north during the war. Such is for instance the case in novels by A. Maymund (years unknown) and Karl

Crome-Schwiening (1858–1906). Edmund Hahn's (years unknown) *Hohenzollern and Guelfs* (3 vols., 1867–69) sheds light on the events from the perspective of Hanover's royal family, whose familial ties connect them to the royal houses across the continent, including that of Prussia. The application of Scott's model of remembrance is made very explicit, when Scott himself makes a brief appearance in the second volume; the queen of Hanover praises his work, assuring her son, Crown Prince Georg, that "never has a troubled mind read a book by Walter Scott without being soothed by it."⁴³ The road to reconciliation being presented here is for King Georg V – who went into exile in Vienna after his defeat against Prussia – to relinquish his claims to the throne in order to make a united Germany possible, something which he in the end does not do, neither in the novel nor in real life. Despite that reconciliation does not truly come in his novel, Hahn makes it clear that this would have been the right way for the king to have acted. Interestingly, the example to follow introduced in the story is the Swedish Prince of Vasa, who tells the king that he does not wish to reclaim his father's throne – which had been lost after the coup of 1809 – as that would not be in the interest of his people; it would only cause harm. By his example, he encourages Georg to likewise put the common good above his personal interests – the king, however, laughs at the possibility and brushes the suggestion aside.

The reconciliatory frame might have been dominant in dealing with the Austro-Prussian War, but it had no monopoly. This is most apparent in the 4-volume *The Spy in the Prussian Headquarters, or the Revenge of the Viennese Girl* by H. Liebach (pen name of Hermann Baeblich, 1832–unknown). Although the story has its "good" Austrians that engage in friendly relations with the Prussians, and Liebach does not fail to express the customary praise for the valour of the Austrian troops, he also explicitly takes a stance in a controversy that divided Austrian and Prussian public opinion in the months immediately after the war. This controversy centred on Hiëronymus Roth (1826–97), mayor of Trautenau (Trutnov), Bohemia, site of the only Austrian victory in the war. Roth had published a pamphlet after the war in which he complained about the "inhumane treatment" he and his fellow inmates had received during their 80-day imprisonment in a Prussian cell. This elicited a counter-pamphlet from the Prussian side, which accused him of all sorts of crime and wished for his execution. From his novel it becomes clear that Liebach sided with the anonymous author of the latter pamphlet. In his rendition of the events, Roth is the leader of a band of outlaws who, with the approval of Austrian high command, employ cowardly guerrilla tactics against the Prussian forces, while engaging in the robbing of corpses – be they Prussian or Austrian – and the harassment of the local populace.

Through taking a firm stance in this controversy, Liebach forecloses a simple reconciliatory reading of his text. At the same time, however, he leaves the imagination of a pan-German continuum intact, as he lets his characters realise that most men in Roth's company are Czechs or Hungarians "whose speech, demeanour, and, above all, whose rapacious deeds stand in sharp contrast to their uniform."⁴⁴ This points at another common trope in this corpus: the

exclusion of the Hungarians, Slavs and Italians from the grand narrative of the *Bruderkrieg*, which is to remain an exclusively German-speaking affair: the other ethnic groups might pose as Austrians, they will never be able to mask their true identity – that is the point Liebach wants to make. In his novel, the Czechs and Hungarians might be perceived as alternative enemies, but in most of the other novels in Table 11.2 exclusion is not achieved through the vilification of minority groups, but rather through silence: these citizens of the Empire feature solely as the nameless extras filling up the ranks of the Austrian army or populating the areas surrounding the main sites of war; they have no agency in the plot. Here, Julie Burow – who herself was born in present-day Lithuania – represents somewhat of an exception, as she writes in positive terms about multilingual Prague, while she praises the Slavic peoples for being a stalwart bulwark against the “Crescent Moon” (her appeal to religious tolerance, notably, does not extend towards the Islam), thus employing the familiar stereotypes of the “bulwark” and the “crossroads” that have a longstanding history in describing Eastern Europe.⁴⁵

After 1871, historical novels put the events of 1866 into the perspective of the subsequent war with France and the establishment of the German Empire. This does not mean, however, that France is now introduced in fictional plots as an alternative enemy that can inspire Prussian–Austrian reconciliation. Gregor Samarow’s *The Legion’s Final Salute* (1874), for instance, is a surprisingly neutral account that sheds light on the run-up and unfolding of the Franco–Prussian War from both the Prussian, French and Austrian perspectives, minutely describing the deliberations of the politicians, monarchs, generals and diplomats involved in the matter, in the act demonstrating that realpolitik and practical considerations often took precedence over ethnocultural arguments.⁴⁶ In general, however, the *Bruderkrieg* narrative developed in the late 1860s remains leading up to the Second World War, while any negative portrayals of Austria akin to Liebach’s approach do not reappear. This was no doubt helped by the improving relations with Austria after 1870, which were cemented through the signing of the Dual Alliance in 1879 and the shared experience of the First World War.

The Dual Alliance also marked a watershed in the Austrian remembrance of the war of 1866, which, in contrast to Prussia, was only rarely called *Bruderkrieg* or Austro–Prussian War and was instead commonly referred to with a variety of other names, including German War, Austro–Prussian–Italian War, “the Bohemian battlefields” or simply “the war of 1866.”⁴⁷ Pain and irritation over the defeat had largely waned and the 1880s witnessed a rising popularity of pan-German thought in the German-speaking parts of the Austrian public sphere, which among other things expressed itself through the erection of monuments honouring Bismarck along the German–Austrian border.⁴⁸ Despite these developments, however, it was not until the start of the twentieth century that Austrian novelists started to take an interest in the war of 1866. The novels that now appeared on the market were without exception vehicles for the evocation of pan-German ideas. Edith von Salburg (1886–1942), one of the most productive authors of her generation, gave literary expression to such sentiments in her two-volume novel

Königsglaube from 1906, but in a later novel, from 1933, she really hammered the point home with its title alone: *German to German. Germany and Austria, Two People – One Blood!*

Robert Hohlbaum's (1886–1955) *Austrians*, published only a couple of months before the outbreak of the First World War, offers a more complex reflection on Austrian national identity in relation to the wider *Alldeutsch* solidarity. The plot centres on a father and son who hold opposing views on the matter. The father is a devoted Austrian patriot who has to retract his negative views of the Prussians when the war brings him into contact with Prussian officers; similar to many a Scandinavian novel, the war not only brings conflict, it also brings contact, and this contact in turn leads to the invalidation of age-old stereotypes, which turn out to have no basis in reality. The son, on the other hand, is a keen supporter of a potential Austrian *Anschluss* and on that account refuses to join the student corps and “fight in a Brother War against my brothers.” He holds a derogative view of Austria, which he sees as “something half-Papist, half-Czech.”⁴⁹ The Prussians, however, teach him how to love his own country, his *Heimat*, and thus win him over to his father's side. To further underscore the point, the father desists a profitable position in Prussia in order to remain living on his home soil. In *Austrians*, Hohlbaum thus makes the case for a heartfelt Austrian patriotism within the confines of a larger pan-German cultural community, which means that he does not support the realisation of a Greater Germany.

Hohlbaum would disapprove of his own message even before the war had ended. Disgruntled with the collapse of the Empire, he would ultimately join the *Großdeutsche Volkspartei* (The Greater German People's Party, established in 1920), which championed the unification of Austria and Germany as its main objective. His second novel on the Austro-Prussian War, appearing in 1918, consequently communicated something entirely different. Here, the seven years between the mass celebration of the Schiller centenary in 1859 and the start of the war in 1866 are portrayed as a “prologue, the prelude to the great event, the outcome of which will bring closer the shared struggle that we will fight alongside our brothers with every day.”⁵⁰ Hohlbaum's turnaround foreshadows the ideological course the remembrance of the Austro-Prussian War would take in historical fiction in the interwar period. Like Hohlbaum himself, who would become a member of the NSDAP in 1934 and even adopt German citizenship in 1937, the memory of the Austro-Prussian War would become ingrained in Nazi propaganda and form a building block in Hitler's *Heim ins Reich* policies.

Conclusion

It would be unfair and unacademic to judge pan-Germanism solely from the perspective of its ultimate absorption into Nazi ideology.⁵¹ Pan-German thought, it is true, remained tightly interlaced with dreams of a Greater Germany, making it susceptible to irredentism, xenophobia, racism and anti-Semitism, but the historical novels spent on the war of 1866 include both tropes that foreshadow this

troublesome future – as in Liebach’s and Hohlbaum’s anti-Slavism – and insertions of a more progressive nature – as in Burow’s plea for religious tolerance (also towards Judaism) and individual choice. Indeed, in its cultural guise, pan-Germanism had in the nineteenth century much in common with the Scandinavian recipe for reconciliatory memory, first and foremost in its use of family motifs. The representation of the war as one between brothers made it possible to write about the conflict not only as a tragic and counterintuitive event but also as a wholesome experience that prepared the ground for future rapprochement. Ultimately, however, this future in the pan-German case is of a very concrete political nature and concerns the full realisation of the once-abandoned Greater Germany solution, while Scandinavia’s future concerns the continuation of the present, characterised by harmonious cooperation, and is thus considerably more modest in its aspirations.

The use of family motifs also most clearly corroborates the assumption that Greater Netherlandism had a much weaker cultural and historicist profile than the other two movements. The Dutch and the Flemish are at best seen as stepbrothers, while the “alternative enemy” and “social criticism” tropes are only minimally applied. Occasionally, the Walloons or the French appear as stand-in bad guys, but in general Dutch novels present a rather black-and-white opposition between “good” Dutchmen and “bad” Belgians. If there ever is any social criticism, it is one of a conservative nature that speaks in debasing terms of the lowest classes in society. More importantly, reconciliation was ultimately achieved through silence and forgetting in the Netherlandic case: memories of mutual conflict never played a part in the identity-making process. Scott’s lesson that remembering such negative experiences is a much more powerful tool in forging multinational identities than simply forgetting them was never taken to heart.

It must be said that reconciliatory memory is most comprehensively interwoven in Scandinavian historical fiction. The general narrative that reappears throughout the corpus is one of the common people seeking to affirm its rights in opposition to a corrupt aristocracy, whose worldview is often crafted on the authoritarianism of either the Germans or the Russians. Such an alternative enemy is not always present in the Prussian and Austrian novels. Most commonly this role is assigned, in the Prussian case, to Catholicism, either personified by scheming clergymen or encapsulated by a more abstract concept of religious bigotry, while also the non-German inhabitants of the Austrian Empire repeatedly give *acte de présence* as the story’s main villain. A social critique is at best only implied in the elevation of religious freedom, personal choice and public education (see Table 11.3 for an overview of conclusions). Very cautiously, then, it can be concluded that at least part of Scandinavianism’s success in preparing the ground for today’s Nordism can be attributed to its intricate development of a reconciliatory narrative that suffused Scandinavian culture from the middle of the nineteenth century onward. In addition to this, it should be remarked that Scandinavianism was never tainted by the Second World War, as is the case with pan-Germanism and Greater Netherlandism.

TABLE 11.3 Reconciliatory memory in Scandinavian, Netherlandic and pan-German historical fiction according to its three main tropes.

	<i>Scandinavianism</i>	<i>Greater Netherlandism</i>	<i>Pan-Germanism</i>
Family motif	Brothers	Stepbrothers	Brothers
Alternative enemy	Germans Russians Aristocracy	Walloons The “rabble”	The Papacy Orthodox Catholicism Czechs, Hungarians, Italians, etc.
Social criticism	Egalitarian	Conservative	Individualistic Meritocratic (<i>Bildung</i>)

Notes

- 1 van Gerven, *Scandinavism*.
- 2 On for instance pan-Slavism, and the Risorgimento, see Björk-Winberg and Egorov’s, and Johnsen’s contributions to this volume.
- 3 Glenthøj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*; Haarder Ekman, *Mit hems gränser vidgades*; Hemstad, *Fra Indian Summer til nordisk vinter*.
- 4 Haarder Ekman, *Mit hems gränser vidgades*; Grandien, *Röndruvans glöd*.
- 5 Nielsen, “His pirates had foray’d on Scottish hill”; Rigney, *The Afterlives of Walter Scott*.
- 6 Rigney, *The Afterlives of Walter Scott*.
- 7 On reconciliation, forgetting and remembrance, see Knutsen, “Strategic Silence.”
- 8 van Gerven, *Scandinavism*.
- 9 Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 199–203.
- 10 Olsen, *Anna Kolbjørnsdatter*, 94.
- 11 Berger, “Nordic National Histories”; Linde-Laursen, *Bordering*. See also Bohlin’s contribution to this volume.
- 12 Hemstad, “United Kingdoms.”
- 13 Couttenier, “Literatuur en Vlaamse Beweging”; De Wever, “Groot-Nedeland.”
- 14 Weijermars, *Stepbrothers*, 237–49.
- 15 I am grateful to Toos Streng, who compiled a comprehensive database of all works of historical fiction, both originally Dutch and translated, published in the Netherlands between 1790 and 1899. Using this database made my selection of relevant novels an easy task. The database is accessible at https://www.academia.edu/20284910/Historische_romans_in_Database_Streng. My own database of Scandinavian historical fiction can be consulted at <https://scandinavism.com/literature/>
- 16 Streng, “De historishe roman.”
- 17 Clemens had witnessed its backlash from close by as he had had a teaching position in Liège at the time; the outcome of the Revolution forced him to return to the Netherlands.
- 18 Wils, “De Belgische Revolutie.”
- 19 Anonymous, “Hollander en Belg,” 207.
- 20 See for instance the review in *Rotterdamsche Courant*, May 15, 1897.
- 21 Conscience, *Volledige werken* 13, 57.
- 22 Couttenier, “Literatuur en Vlaamse Beweging”; Leerssen, “Landsnamen, taalnamen.”
- 23 Leerssen, “Landsnamen, taalnamen,” 484.
- 24 Cited in Leerssen, “Landsnamen, taalnamen,” 484.
- 25 Leerssen, “Greater Netherlandism.”

- 26 Connerton, "Seven Types of Forgetting," 62–64.
- 27 Leerssen, "Novels and Their Readers."
- 28 Mathijsen, *Historiezucht*; Streng, "De historishe roman."
- 29 Couttenier, "Nationale beelden"; Verschaffel, "Leren sterven."
- 30 Verschaffel, "Spiegelpaleis."
- 31 Leerssen, "Novels and Their Readers."
- 32 van Gerven, *Scandinavism*, 167–72.
- 33 Wils, "De Belgische Revolutie."
- 34 This does not mean that the territorial demarcations of Scandinavianism and Greater Netherlandism were set in stone. Scandinavianism had significance for Finland and Iceland, while the Boer Wars of 1880–81 and 1899–1902 elicited ethnolinguistically inspired solidarity in Flanders and the Netherlands with their "beleaguered brethren" in South Africa.
- 35 Leerssen, "Pan-Germanism."
- 36 Boysen, "Mit oder gegen den 'Pangermanismus'."
- 37 Couttenier, "Literatuur en Vlaamse Beweging"; Glenthøj and Ottosen, *Union eller undergang*; Leerssen, "Landsnamen, taalnamen."
- 38 Sørensen, *Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson*; Seip, "Nasjonsbygger og kosmopolitt."
- 39 De Wever, "Groot-Nedeland"; Leerssen, "Greater Netherlandism."
- 40 Fiedler, *Konstruktion und Fiktion der Nation*; Hirschmüller, "Vom Bruderkrieg."
- 41 Hirschmüller, "Vom Bruderkrieg."
- 42 This overview could easily be retrieved from the database compiled by the "Projekt Historischer Roman" of the University of Innsbruck. This database contains ca. 6300 historical novels written in the German language between 1780 and 1945, as well as around 400 novels written in the DDR. See, <https://webapp.uibk.ac.at/germanistik/histrom/datenbank.html>
- 43 Hahn, *Hohenzollern und Welfen*, 72.
- 44 Liebach, *Der Spion*, 226.
- 45 Ugrešić, *Nobody's Home*; Wolff, *Inventing Eatsern Europe*. See also Johnsen's contribution to this volume.
- 46 The name on the cover is a pseudonym of Oskar Meding (1828–1902), a Hanoverian diplomat who changed sides to Prussia in 1870 and who had first-hand knowledge of most of the events that he describes.
- 47 Hirschmüller, "Vom Bruderkrieg."
- 48 Winkler, *Die deutschnationalen Bestrebungen*.
- 49 Hohlbaum, *Österreicher*.
- 50 Hohlbaum, *Das Vorspiel*, cover text.
- 51 Chickering, *We Men Who Feel Most German*.

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12

IRELAND, SCOTLAND, WALES, BRITISHNESS AND THE UK, 1800–1925

Alvin Jackson

Britishness was a pan-national identity, in so far as its proponents actively sought to subsume Englishness, Scottishness and Welshness and Irishness within one shared outlook.¹ But it was arguably both national and dynastic; and it was also both fluid and malleable. Moreover, Britishness speedily grew from an identity designed to bind Englishness, Scottish and Welshness inside a complex multiple kingdom towards a wider, imperial, framework where the identities of the Atlantic archipelago were brought together within an overseas mission and purpose.² Britishness was an identity associated first with the creation of the union of the crowns of England and Scotland created in 1603; and it underpinned the parliamentary union of England and Scotland formulated in 1706–07. Britishness was the wholly inadequate identity associated with the United Kingdom, and the parliamentary union of Great Britain and Ireland (1801). Intellectual attempts in the late nineteenth century to imagine a “greater” imperial Britishness offered some fleeting possibilities of an identity and institutions embracing both the United Kingdom and its empire; but in practice these were never fully realised.³

What were the components of an overarching Britishness? To some extent the idea of Britishness was first effectively elaborated and imagined in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries by a range of in particular Scottish philosophers and polemicists, including John Mair, James Henrisoun and David Hume of Godscroft: these often emphasised the shared acceptance of the Protestant reformation which characterised both the English and the Scots in the second quarter of the sixteenth century; and they also often underlined the desirability and possibilities of dynastic union.⁴ Influential research by Linda Colley and others into the Britishness of a later era, the eighteenth century, has similarly emphasised religion, a shared Protestantism, as well as a unifying monarchy; and it has also underlined the unifying impact of overseas warfare.⁵

At the same time, and despite some of the Scottish origins of its early ideologies, Britishness often became effectively an extension of English patriotic identity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is true that on occasion, most recently in the aftermath of Tony Blair's devolution project (1997–99), and the creation of assemblies or parliaments in Belfast, Cardiff and Edinburgh, a distinctive assertion of Englishness has clearly re-emerged.⁶ But it is also worth underlining that pan-nationalisms, like Britishness, have frequently and lastingly reflected the concerns and interests of a dominant constituent national identity.

Historians have long added empire to the embrace of Britishness – stressing the interrelationship between Britishness, in particular British imperial identities, and the acquisition, recalibration and consolidation of an overseas British empire. And there can be little doubt that, if the intellectual theorists of a “Greater Britain” in the late nineteenth century achieved relatively little traction, then a popular imperialism was in fact much more widely pervasive throughout Britain and parts of Ireland – even if its meaning and significance have sometimes been questioned.⁷

Scholars of the mid and late twentieth century have also agreed on the interconnectedness of external warfare and Britishness; and they have included the idea of the welfare state amongst the mix of binding agents. Indeed, for the sociologist David McCrone, “war and welfarism” have underpinned Britishness and union – certainly in Scotland.⁸ These different binding agents within a pan-national Britishness – religion, monarchy, warfare and empire – form the organisational schema of this chapter (the post-1945 welfare state lies beyond its chronological parameters).

At the same time different other pan-nationalisms co-existed, or looked as if they might emerge, within the United Kingdom of the nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries. The idea of a Greater Britain has already been mentioned. But one of the central difficulties with this “Greater Britishness,” which flourished between c.1860 and 1880, was that its proponents often focused upon an envisioned or aspirational relationship between in particular England and its settler colonies and looked away from the reality of the complex relationships within the United Kingdom itself – and not least the standing of Ireland and the Irish. In practice, therefore, Greater Britishness was often determinedly Anglo-centric, and in any case its overall coherence and popular impact were questionable.⁹

There were other pan-national impulses within the United Kingdom which co-existed alongside the construction of Britishness: these included efforts to imagine and construct a pan-Celticism. Pan-Celticism effectively originated in the early nineteenth century and aspired to promote cultural and even, sometimes, political linkages between the Scots, Irish, Welsh, Cornish and Breton peoples – and indeed beyond. But while the pan-Celtic movement invoked much more successful cognate enterprises such as pan-Slavism or pan-Germanism, in reality it was small-scale and fissiparous: it achieved some limited cultural traction but at best an ‘uneven’ success. Irish nationalism, as by far the most

extensive of the Celtic nationalisms of the early twentieth century, had (through its successive leaders) only the most constricted investment in pan-Celticism: Irish energies tended instead to be directed by its interrelationship with its muscular neighbour, Britain, by the relationship between Irishness and Britishness, and – often – by a sense of the apparent overall superiority of the Irish in terms of other Celtic nationalisms.¹⁰

So, while acknowledging these alternative, or putative, pan-national movements across the Atlantic archipelago, the focus here, with this chapter, is on an exploration of the interrelationship of Welsh, Scottish and Irish national identities with each of these constituents of a macro-national or pan-national Britishness: some comparison, necessarily brief (given the constraints of space), is also offered with other pan-national identities in nineteenth-century continental Europe. Through this comparative approach it is hoped that a more nuanced reading of the structure of the multinational British union state and its survival will emerge.

Church and faith

Turning first to issues of faith – and in particular to the interrelationship between religious faith and national identity across the nineteenth-century United Kingdom: the Habsburg historian, Robert Evans, has asked, acutely, whether in the late nineteenth century age of empire, emergent Celtic national ideas were “sublimated into religious ones, as [in particular Welsh] social and political goals were incorporated into the British Liberal and then Labour movements?” And he has further enquired “whether chapel-based religion, for the Welsh of that day, constituted an end in itself, or should be read primarily as a statement of something else.”¹¹

The nineteenth century certainly brought a remarkable Welsh movement away from the established church of the British union state, Anglicanism, towards an embrace of Protestant non-conformity, and especially Calvinistic Methodism. This emerging non-conformist dominance may be loosely identified with the marked consolidation of Irish Catholicism in the nineteenth century and indeed with the idea of a “devotional revolution” in post-Famine Ireland – and with non-conformist ministers coming to play the same kind of influential independent social and political leadership role in nineteenth-century Welsh society as did Catholic priests in Irish society.

Irish Catholicism, together with Welsh non-conformity and Scottish Presbyterianism supplied the basis for a limited national or patriotic differentiation from England. The non-conformist chapels of Wales provided a form of popular structure which, like the parochial organisation and hierarchy of the Catholic Church in Ireland, and also the complex administrative architecture of the Church of Scotland, was largely beyond the institutional grasp of the British state. At the same time, however, it has been rightly observed that Welsh protestant non-conformism “allowed for an alliance between Welsh and English liberals within the larger British system that undermined other forms of identity,

especially conservative linguistic Welsh nationalism, that could have been used to articulate Welsh cultural and political distinctiveness.”¹² Irish Catholicism, as represented within the home rule movement, lacked any similar binding interrelationship within the structures of British politics; and thus there was no equivalent alliance which effectively subverted other, Irish, identities. Parnellite nationalists certainly forged a pragmatic alliance with Gladstonian liberalism after 1886; but this collapsed in 1890, and, though subsequent nationalists under John Redmond worked with British Liberals, the political “union of hearts” of the late 1880s was never again reconstituted – and Irish Catholic home rulers were never fully enfolded within British liberalism.

While Ireland at the end of the union remained very largely Catholic at just under 74 per cent of the island’s population, and while Catholicism provided a clear basis for a national identity distinct from a supranational Britishness, none of these factors was entirely relevant for Scottish and Welsh religion. In both polities, Wales and Scotland, it is true that Presbyterianism, whether within the Kirk (the Church of Scotland) or Free Church or Calvinistic Methodism, was – like Catholicism in Ireland – in some ways a shared badge of difference; but this was mitigated in various ways – not least in Scotland because, while the Kirk was clearly not the Church of England, it was nonetheless effectively an established church and thus culturally and politically entangled within the British union state. Moreover, as has been said, in general terms Protestantism and Britishness were historically co-related; and thus, while Welsh non-conformism and the Scots Kirk might not have been part of the union church, the United Church of England and Ireland, established in 1801, they were certainly embraced within a broader supranational British identity.

However, there were also additional complications. In both Scotland and Wales, the highly fissiparous nature of the Protestant churches meant that, while they could and did provide a basis for Scots or Welsh difference, they were (unlike Irish Catholicism) a relatively ineffective organisational foundation for national mobilisation. It is true that both Scots and Welsh Presbyterianism had its key institutions, citadels and nodes – Edinburgh and its university, for example, in the case of the Kirk, and Bala and its college in Merioneth (Gwynedd) in the case of Calvinistic Methodism. It is true, too, that a degree of non-conformist unity of purpose was provided by the shared call for the disestablishment of the Anglican church, originating with the Church of Ireland, which was disestablished in 1869, and spreading then to the Church in Wales, which was finally disestablished only in 1920. On the other hand in Scotland the Great Disruption of 1843, which saw the schism between the Free Church and the mainstream Church of Scotland, precipitated nearly 90 years of internal Presbyterian competition and wrangling; while in Wales, though there were indeed vital shared non-conformist cultures and sensibilities, in reality those who were not members of the Established Church were (as recorded in the census of 1851) spread across four other churches – the Calvinistic Methodists, Congregationalists, Baptists and Wesleyans.

It was also the case that different types of non-conformity appealed to different parts of Wales with the Welsh-speaking rural areas, for example, leaning markedly towards Calvinistic Methodism.¹³ A wider point of spatial comparison has been suggested by Robert Evans, who (in making a plea for the wider contextualisation of the nineteenth-century Welsh non-conformist experience) has pointed to some parallels not just between the Welsh flight from Anglicanism into a fissiparous non-conformity and the Scots Great Disruption (1843) but also between the Welsh experience and the Dutch Reformed Church *Afscheiding*, or “split,” of 1834 and the later split or *Doleantie* (grieving) of 1886, which was associated with Abraham Kuyper.¹⁴ In any event, just as land and national questions might be associated in Wales (as over church disestablishment and the associated tithes question in the 1880s and beyond) but were never formally bound as they were in Ireland, so religion and national identity might be linked but could never be wholly mobilised. As Reginald Coupland crisply commented in 1954, unlike Irish nationalists, “the [Welsh] nonconformists were seeking freedom from a predominantly English Church, not from a predominantly English parliament.”¹⁵

Some final observations in terms of religion might be proffered. Edwin Muir, the Orkney poet, indicted Scots Calvinism “with the destruction of the Scottish sense of community and humane belief.”¹⁶ Welsh Calvinism and indeed Welsh non-conformity, more generally, have faced a related, though slightly different accusation. Here the long-standing suggestion has been that the protestant non-conformist chapels simultaneously commanded formidable loyalty while helping to shape a political and electoral agenda which emphasised their own spiritual, sectional and – sometimes – sectarian preoccupations. In other words, through the influence of the chapel, the evolution of a civic Welsh identity was impeded, while the fight against Anglicanism – and, indeed, the fight to demonstrate a distinctive moral purity to England and beyond – was given pre-eminence in public life. Welsh non-conformity (like Scots Presbyterianism) may have sought “a virtuous nation” – but the emphasis was emphatically on the “virtuous” rather than the “national.”¹⁷ In similar vein, the former Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams has referred to the “cultural Puritan national identity” of the Welsh and the associated claim that “Welsh Dissenters were wholly loyal citizens of Queen Victoria’s realm, distinguished only by exceptional piety, honesty, thrift, and sobriety, non-conformists perhaps, and political liberals, but very much a *loyal* opposition.”¹⁸

More generally, it might be said that the Presbyterian and non-conformist cultures of economic as well as spiritual individualism in Scotland and Wales militated against a sense of national cohesiveness.¹⁹ And, it may be worth hypothesising that Irish Catholic nationalism was founded upon a relatively strong sense of community, where the evangelical and liberal cultures of Wales and Scotland, which of course also had strong communitarian aspects, in the end emphasised an intensely individual relationship with both God and Mammon at the expense of the national. If this hypothesis is correct, then perhaps the secularisation of both Scotland and Wales (with, for example, the rapid retreat of the Kirk in the

late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries) has not so much weakened a pan-national Britishness – as removed some of the brakes which have hitherto been applied to Scottish and Welsh national sentiment.

Monarchy

Turning to a second key institutional constituent of a pan-national Britishness, monarchy – the Scots, like the Welsh, but on the whole unlike the Irish, had shared ownership of the overarching British monarchy and its associated institutions. There are parallels here between on the one hand monarchy, protestant religious faith and Britishness, and on the other hand the Habsburg monarchy, Catholicism and dynastic loyalties within the Austrian empire and Austria-Hungary – between British loyalism and *Habsburgtreue*.

Scotland and Wales were long associated with a pan-British loyalism, which in the Welsh case was linked to the Welsh origins of the royal Tudor dynasty in the fifteenth century. Llewellyn Williams, who wrote extensively at the beginning of the twentieth century on the history of Tudor Wales, emphasised the Welshness of King Henry VII; and the Welshness of the Tudors provided a theme and, in a sense, a constraint for radical patriots and advocates of Welsh home rule like T.E. Ellis.²⁰ William Rees, no unionist partisan, argued that only the English monarchy, paradoxically, supplied the basis for the consolidation of any Welsh state: there was, he observed, “little tradition of political unity in the country, and indeed little had survived which could serve as a nucleus for the building up of a united state, except perhaps the English king, himself the greatest holder of land in Wales and a member of a Welsh royal line.”²¹

In a similar manner, the Scots had a share of the British monarchy – through the union of the Scottish and English crowns, achieved under King James VI and I in 1603, and through the rule of the Scottish royal house of Stuart over Great Britain between then and 1714. The succeeding dynasty, the House of Hanover, was ultimately able to annex some of these ancient Stuart legacies, including Jacobitism, by the early nineteenth century; and both George IV and Victoria were famously influential in binding the formerly dissident cultures of the Scottish Highlands to the British throne. There were also significant interlinkages between the royal house and the Scottish aristocracy in the later nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

For the Irish, however, there was no visceral sense of ownership to counterbalance these Welsh and Scottish claims; and indeed, those Irish connections which the monarchy actually possessed were uniformly with senior members of the Irish protestant ascendancy interest, such as the dukes of Abercorn. Institutions which in the other polities of the United Kingdom have served to create bonds with a pan-British identity have, in the Irish case, functioned only in the interests of the narrow ascendancy class.

On the other hand, it would be wrong to suggest that an uncomplicatedly positive set of relationships prevailed between the Welsh and Scots and monarchy,

and an uncomplicatedly bleak set of relationships between it and the Irish. Judged purely from the perspective of Victoria's reign, the Irish were not as badly treated by the crown as the Welsh. Victoria famously embraced Scotland and the Stuarts, while barely doing her duty in Ireland, and scarcely setting foot at all in Wales: the calculation is that, through her long reign, she spent a total of seven years in Scotland, spent very much less than seven weeks in Ireland, but managed seven days only in Wales.²² The Balmoral estate in Aberdeenshire and Holyrood House in Edinburgh each became, famously, a key locus of the British monarchy, which steadfastly resisted any Irish or Welsh equivalents. Victoria, Supreme Governor of the Church of England, enthusiastically embraced Presbyterianism while in Scotland, and took communion at Crathie Kirk; but she regarded both the protestant non-conformity of her Welsh subjects and the Catholicism of the Irish with much less comprehension or sympathy. By contrast her son, Edward VII, generally played well in Ireland: he visited three times, was fond of horseracing and was rumoured to be sympathetic to home rule. But his otherwise louche reputation had very little appeal for Welsh religious dissent or for the Scottish Kirk.²³

In terms of the Welsh, however, there was a critical counterweight: the Welsh had ownership of monarchy, not simply through dynastic antiquity, but also through the princes of Wales. The designation of the heir apparent to the monarch as "prince of Wales" from the time of Edward I ultimately created a direct association between Wales and the crown; and this of course was augmented by the invention of the tradition of investiture at Caernarfon Castle in 1911, and its renewal for Prince Charles, promised in 1958 at the Empire Games at Cardiff, and eventually fulfilled in 1969. The ceremony at Caernarfon in 1911 has been seen as cementing an alliance between middle class Welsh non-conformity and the British political establishment.²⁴ Indeed, as in Scotland, so in Wales, contentious and divisive national histories were reframed in more ecumenical terms by successive monarchs: just as the House of Hanover annexed and detoxified its Stuart heritage, so its successors performed a similar function in Wales, turning an appropriated historical title into an agency of national unity.

In short, if Scotland and Wales were effectively bound within Britishness, then they were also effectively bound within, and possessed part ownership of, key institutions of Britishness such as the monarchy. This was less true for Ireland. The problem was not simply that the British monarchy was wholly neglectful of Ireland; for this was not the case. In the end the challenge which the British monarchy faced in Ireland, in contrast to Wales and Scotland, reflected less on the performance of individual monarchs (though this certainly could be woeful) than on the constraints of "Britishness" itself.

As it was, the monarchy was still capable of generating some dynastic loyalty, even in Ireland; and just as a pan-national attachment to the Habsburg monarchy, or *Habsburgtreue*, constituted a key unifying bond within Austria-Hungary, so there was always a similar potential with the British royal house throughout all of the nations of the Atlantic archipelago, including Ireland.²⁵ But only in Wales

and Scotland, and with sections of unionism in Ireland, was this potential fully realised.

Army and war

Both the Scots and the Welsh and to a certain extent the Irish had part-ownership not just of the monarchy but also of some of its associated institutions such as the army: the army and its wars have long been seen as connected with the construction of a pan-national Britishness.²⁶ Unlike the Irish, however, there were few ambiguities in this Scottish and Welsh possession. As in Ireland and Scotland, the strongly territorial and regional nature of the late Victorian army appealed both to local and to more general patriotic identities in Wales.²⁷ The extent of the Welshness of Welsh regiments and the Scottishness of Scots regiments certainly varied markedly; but, unlike in Ireland, where there were deep and ongoing tensions between private and public attitudes towards the army, and between private and public attitudes towards the empire, there was little evidence of widespread political ambivalence in Scotland or in Wales. The engagement of these regiments in some of the most conspicuous or controversial military episodes of the nineteenth-century British empire was generally a source of Scots and Welsh patriotic engagement – as with the Sutherland Highlanders’ “Thin Red Line” at Balaclava, during the Crimean War in 1854, or the South Wales Borderers’ disastrous engagement at Isandlwana and at Rorke’s Drift in 1879, during the Anglo-Zulu war. The Welsh Regiment were deployed in South Africa at Driefontein (1900) and on the Tujela during the Anglo-Boer war: the actions of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers at Paardeberg in South Africa were equally acclaimed.²⁸ It is true, of course, that there was some sympathy for the Boers in Wales – stronger, it has been observed, than in any other part of the United Kingdom except for Ireland.²⁹ However, those sympathisers were still a minority of the Welsh, concentrated in non-conformist and Welsh-speaking areas, and unlike in Ireland they were motivated at least as much by religious as by any secular sympathies.³⁰

Unlike in Ireland, too, domestic encounters with the army in Scotland and Wales did little to dent this patriotic pride. Since the most significant episodes of Scots and Welsh protest in the nineteenth century were not primarily driven by nationality, then any subsequent military action has not generally been interpreted through a nationalist lens. Naval (the Royal Marines’) intervention in the Crofters’ War in the western highlands of Scotland in 1883 was not seen in national terms: nor was the military suppression of the workers’ insurgency in Glasgow in January 1919, known as “Red Clydeside.” In Wales the Newport rising of 1839, which resulted in the death of 22 Chartist protestors at the hands of the 45th (Nottinghamshire) regiment, has not been seen as an example of “English” military oppression.³¹ The Tonypandy riots of November 1910 and those at Llanelli in August 1911 brought bloody confrontations between British and Irish soldiers and local striking miners and railwaymen respectively; and, though there were casualties, once again the episodes were generally not

interpreted as acts of English military oppression.³² Comparisons between events of these kinds and near-contemporary Irish affrays are never likely to be exact, but the clear nationalist freighting of the Mitchelstown Massacre (1887) or the Bachelor's Walk Massacre (1914) (when, on each occasion, crown forces opened fire on civilians) strongly suggests the existence of two quite different levels of nationalist consciousness and engagement in Ireland and Wales.

By extension, the outbreak of war in August 1914 had different resonances in Wales and Scotland, as compared with Ireland. Scotland and Wales wholeheartedly embraced the British war effort in 1914, even though – like Ireland – the Welsh initially faced official scepticism and resistance to their claims upon a national army unit (eventually formed as the 38th Welsh Division).³³ Indeed in this particular respect, and in some others, the Welsh had nearly as much cause to complain at the actions of the union state as the Irish. Where Scotland and Ireland each possessed an elite national regiment of guards (created in 1642 and 1900 respectively), the Welsh Guards were only formed in 1915. Moreover, conscription was applied in Wales, as in the rest of Britain, but not Ireland, from 1916; so there was at least a theoretical opportunity for a patriotic resistance to enforced involvement in England's war.

But the opportunity was largely untouched, not least because one of those ultimately responsible for its enforcement was David Lloyd George, Secretary of State for War (July to December 1916) and, from December 1916, Prime Minister. In a sense Lloyd George's ministerial ascent not only signalled Welsh ownership of the war effort; the emphatically Welsh character of his premiership, flanked in office by scores of his fellow-countrymen, indicated the extent and effectiveness of the principality's conquest of the inner circles of the United Kingdom itself.³⁴ For a time Wales effectively owned the union and its pan-national British identity. In the same way Scottish influence over British government was immense throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with six of the eleven British prime ministers (1868–1935) being Scots. But this was never the case for Ireland. British ministers (secretaries, later secretaries of state) for Scotland were almost always Scottish in this period: British ministers (chief secretaries) for Ireland were almost always English.

In short, the Army and warfare presented a set of challenges and opportunities to the Welsh which chimed in some narrow respects with those supplied to the Irish: both Welsh disestablishment and Irish home rule had been placed on the statute books in September 1914, and Redmondite nationalists in Ireland and Welsh patriots now each felt the need to demonstrate that Irish Catholics and Welsh non-conformists could support the British empire no less than Protestant unionists and English and Welsh Anglicans.³⁵

But, beyond this shared narrow ground, there were several fundamental distinctions. First, though both Irish nationalists and Welsh patriots like John Redmond and Rev John Williams of Brynsiencyn (1854–1921) energetically endorsed recruitment to the British war effort after 1914, the Irish (until 1916) remained deeply conflicted in their approach to England's armies, while the

corresponding Welsh divisions were relatively slight.³⁶ Second, Irish divisions over the war, such as those between the Irish and National Volunteers, were precipitated by different readings of nationality, while those of the Welsh (where they existed) tended to arise from religious scruples – from the deep pacifist strains within Welsh non-conformity and within the growing socialist cause. And third and finally, the war focused and clarified the problems of union government for the Irish, and in doing so consolidated Irish nationality – both amongst those fighting in the ranks of the British army and with those who stayed behind. By contrast, in 1914–18, and again in 1939–45, the experience of war certainly underpinned both Welsh and Scots distinctiveness – but generally within a clear set of unifying British or pan-national contexts.

Empire

Despite the forefronting of anti-imperial traditions, in fact the Welsh, like the Scots, and – in a more limited way – the Irish, all bought into empire, which was linked with the later nineteenth-century expression of a “greater” or pan-national British identity. Historians still routinely bemoan the underdeveloped literature on especially Wales and empire.³⁷ However, there is now arguably a sufficient body of research to venture some provisional reflections on the comparative interaction of union and empire in Scots, Irish and Welsh history.³⁸ Unsophisticated ideas of empire producing a homogeneous pan-national Britishness out of Welsh, Scots and Irish engagement have certainly now been superseded; and on the whole it seems clear that the growth of empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and concomitant Welsh and Scottish participation, encouraged not simply a one-size-fits-all Britishness, but rather different forms of Welsh and Scottish distinctiveness within a complex set of British and imperial contexts.³⁹

Wider practical engagement with the empire should be distinguished, however, from the preoccupation of some late Victorian intellectuals with ideas of “Greater” Britishness. Others have persuasively explored the complex contexts against which these ideas arose in the second half of the nineteenth century – a sense of threatened decline, the central exemplars of the empires of antiquity and their fate, the stimulus offered by American and German and other federalism, and also a recognition that technology was strengthening the possibilities of global, specifically imperial, interconnectedness. But these imperial visionaries were in general English writers and thinkers like John Seeley, or Goldwin Smith, or J.A. Froude – for whom the constituent peoples and polities of the United Kingdom were either secondary considerations or (in the case of Froude) objects of antipathy and suspicion. This was also often a global and imperial Britishness which was associated with an overt and racialised Anglo-Saxonism and which created difficulties in much of Ireland, Scotland and Wales. In keeping with these Anglo-centric emphases, it has also been observed that – where ideas of greater imperial union took on a more specific constitutional shape as with federalism

– these were often quite separate from the parallel debates on Irish, Scots and Welsh home rule.

However, all three nations otherwise engaged thoroughly with empire in the nineteenth century – the Scots perhaps most completely and unequivocally. In the case of Irish nationalism, while there was a strong tradition of anti-imperialism, clearly evident in the 1870s and beyond, there was also a subdued history of nationalist engagement or accommodation with empire, most obviously with John Redmond – but perceptible also even with Parnell who accepted financial support from Cecil Rhodes, the controversial arch-imperialist. If there was a spectrum of imperial engagement across Ireland, Scotland and Wales, then the Welsh fell short of the Scots enthusiasm (for reasons which are explored below), while not buying into the ultimately dominant anti-imperial strains within Irish nationalism.⁴⁰

As in both Scotland and Ireland, so in Wales the intensity of imperial engagement possessed a regional inflection. The development in the nineteenth century of an industrial economy in South Wales mirrored that of the relatively industrialised northeast of Ireland. Thus, Scotland had its industrial “central belt,” with Glasgow as the “second city of the empire,” while Ulster unionists boasted of Ulster as “the Imperial Province”; and the Welsh, for their part, possessed their “imperial Rhondda” and an “imperial South Wales” – imperial both in formation and engagement.⁴¹ In each case there developed regional export-driven economies, exponential – migrant-led – demographic growth – and related social, economic and cultural links within union and empire.

As in both Scotland and Ireland, so empire supplied Wales, too, with not just economic but also spiritual opportunities. For both non-conformist Wales and Catholic Ireland the empire provided a set of evangelising opportunities within a global mission-field.⁴² The shift to evangelical non-conformity in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Wales was intrinsically linked with a widening and deepening sense of an international Christian community and concomitant spiritual opportunities.⁴³ It should be said as well that evangelical religion, especially evangelical non-conformity, possessed not only a global empire but also archipelagic networks: evangelical spirituality provided some shared ground (in terms of experience, practice and theology) for the many and fissiparous Protestant churches across Britain and Ireland, and to that extent supplied an implicit, and sometimes overt, bolster for union. In these contexts, religious revivalism spanned both the Atlantic Ocean – and also the Irish Sea, binding Welsh and Irish evangelicals both in 1859 and again to a lesser extent in 1904–45.

If *Cymru Fydd*, the Young Wales movement, was the fullest expression of late nineteenth-century Welsh national feeling, then its protagonists – T.E. Ellis, David Lloyd George – ultimately each came to embrace their own particular reading of imperial Britishness though each also flirted briefly, but indecisively, with pan-Celticism.⁴⁴ It has for long been recognised that Welsh patriotic radicals were disarmed by the growing popular imperialism in the 1890s, not so

much because they surrendered to an assimilationist pan-national Britishness, but rather because – like John Redmond, the Irish leader – they saw the British empire, not necessarily as an agent of oppression, but rather as a vehicle for Celtic nationality. Most Welsh people – Lloyd George, famously, was an exception – supported the British struggle in South Africa (1899–1902); but, as in Ireland, there were divisions on the issue. However, a telling overall distinction between the Irish stand and the Welsh was that, while the former emphasised nationality and opposition to empire, the latter emphasised religious principle – and in particular that the empire was engaged in the suppression of good Calvinists in the shape of the Boers.⁴⁵ Recent research into the growth of St David’s Day celebrations within Welsh schools after the Boer War has emphasised the extent to which patriotic and imperial themes now became closely interwoven, and especially of course during the struggle of 1914–18.⁴⁶

In the same manner, however, empire worked for Redmondite nationalists, not because it imposed or demanded a pan-national Britishness, but rather because it provided openings for the Irish. In the end, empire bound Wales to union because it facilitated the exercise of a distinctive Welshness on a global stage: empire worked for Wales because it identified, defined and liberated Welshness. Indeed, on the eve of the First World War Welsh patriots like Gwilym Griffith echoed, and elaborated, John Redmond’s attempt to locate home rule within a wider imperial framework.⁴⁷ Griffith argued that on the whole Britain had recognised that “loyalty is fostered by liberty”; and he developed his theme by suggesting that, since this recognition had been accorded to South Africa and was in the process of being extended to Ireland through self-government in each case, Wales had great claims to be next on the list. Welsh home rule was required, not because the Welsh hated Britain and Britishness and empire, but rather because the Welsh had contributed so extensively to the empire, and because her national ideals were “consonant with the highest ideals of British statesmanship.” In this sense, “the development of Welsh nationality means the enrichment, not the impoverishment, of the collective life of the Imperial Union.”⁴⁸ And in Ireland John Redmond saw nationality in broadly the same relationship to an imperial Britishness.

Comparisons

It will by now be clear that the approach of this chapter has been to consider Britishness and the British union state in terms of comparisons between its constituent “subordinate” nationalities in the nineteenth century, looking at the nuances of distinction and similarity binding and separating Irishness, Scottishness and Welshness within the British union framework.

But before moving to a conclusion, one final set of comparisons may be briefly broached – glancing at Britishness and the British union in the light of other contemporary pan-national identities across continental Europe – and especially those which were expressed within the common structures of a union state.

British and Irish contemporaries, particularly liberal and nationalist contemporaries, frequently looked to Austria-Hungary for comparisons and exemplars; and indeed, there are substantial areas of overlap between the binding pan-national Habsburg identity of the Dual Monarchy and Britishness. *Habsburgtreue*, like Britishness, focused on loyalty to the monarchy: it also focused upon, and was anchored in, those institutions associated with the monarchy, such as the armed forces. *Habsburgtreue*, like Britishness for much of the period covered by this chapter, was associated with particular forms of religious expression, and Catholicism in particular.

But British and Irish contemporaries also gazed intently at the United Kingdoms of Sweden and Norway for most of its 90-year life. And, while Irish unionists looked admiringly to patriarchs of the union such as Charles XIV John, liberals and nationalists reflected on the utility and desirability of a looser Scandinavian form of union which would better preserve individual national identities and distinctiveness. Irish and British unionists and proponents of a pan-national British identity had a form of investment in the United Kingdoms of Sweden and Norway in the shape of Viscount Castlereagh, the architect of the Irish union who was subsequently an active supporter of the United Kingdoms in 1814–15. On the other hand, Irish opponents of the British-Irish union, those who sought the “repeal” of union, saw in the United Kingdoms a specific model of reform for Britain and Ireland. In 1844 an essay competition was launched by Daniel O’Connell’s Loyal National Repeal Association; and the terms of the competition, signed off by John O’Connell, Thomas Davis and William Smith O’Brien, specifically requested any budding literary repealers to “examine how far the constitution of Norway, and its connexion with Sweden, may serve as a model for the [putative] new constitution of Ireland.”⁴⁹ For the leading essayist, Michael Barry, Norway provided a model of nationality for Ireland, in terms of its resistance to any closer union with Sweden, as well as its struggles against the irksome aspects of its existing union (such as the lack of separate diplomatic representation, the lack of commercial autonomy and the “inferior” place accorded to their national symbols): in short, Norway’s condition underlined “the necessity of giving Ireland, in all particulars, as distinct a nationality as possible.”⁵⁰ Late nineteenth-century British Liberals, pre-eminently Gladstone, and Irish nationalists like Redmond would of course continue to look to Sweden-Norway for inspiration.

However, there is also evidence to suggest that in the early years of the United Kingdoms, some Norwegians and Swedes reciprocated this attention – and looked to the possibilities of closer union identities on the British model. For example, Count Magnus Björnsterna, Swedish minister in London under Carl XIV Johan, argued in 1840 – in sharp contradistinction to Gladstone’s later embrace of the Scandinavian model – that Britain in fact offered an exemplar for Sweden-Norway rather than vice versa: “England and Scotland were under the same king during a century before the union took place. It is not more than a quarter of a century since Norway and Sweden made the first step, and

we hope that it will also be conducive to a future closer union between the two nations for the prosperity and the benefit of both.”⁵¹ There was some evidence of similar sentiments even amongst Norwegian proponents of a stronger Scandinavian identity: for example, the scholar and journalist Ludvig Kristensen Daa produced a Swedish–Norwegian dictionary in 1841 in which he argued that the time of the small state had now passed, and that the possibility of a union of Great Scandinavia embracing Norway, Sweden *and* Denmark, like that of Great Britain, offered small nations the necessary conditions and tools for further national development.⁵²

On the other hand, there were clearly challenges with pan-national identities which were related to asymmetrical state formations like the unions of Britain and Ireland and Sweden–Norway. Swedish Scandinavianists, like many nineteenth-century English proponents of Britishness, sometimes linked their pan-national movement with fundamentally national concerns. Swedish Scandinavianism tended to equate the notion of greater regional unity with the idea of a “Greater Sweden” and with Swedish pre-eminence – as well as with the maintenance of the United Kingdoms. Similarly, the rifle clubs movement, supportive of greater union, was also, at the same time, an expression of Swedish national feeling: while it looked to greater Scandinavian unity and to unionism, it was simultaneously associated with nationalistic memorialisation. The rifles club movement, which sought military and parliamentary reform, faded after the attainment of the latter in 1865–66; but the paradoxical brand of dominant nation nationalism together with unionism or pan-nationalism and militarism which it embodied lived on as a strain within the politics of the United Kingdoms until their ultimate demise.⁵³

In short, Habsburg dynastic loyalties and identities approximated to the reality of the ties of Britishness within the United Kingdom. Scandinavianism, on the other hand, approximated either to what the Scots and Welsh fondly believed that they had achieved with Britishness and the union state or to what the Irish aspired to create through a radical recalibration of Britishness and union. Of course, Scandinavianism also contained the potential, like Britishness, to serve as a vehicle for more narrowly national interests in asymmetrical union states. And it not only looked towards, but often beyond, the parameters of the United Kingdoms of Sweden–Norway.

Summation

Why then, finally, did Scotland and Wales stay connected with a pan-national Britishness, and remain within the union (thus far, at any rate) – while Ireland largely broke these connections, where they had ever existed, and left in 1921–22? One relatively straightforward answer to this question lies in taxonomy – namely the varying types of union which have constituted the ostensibly unitary state of Great Britain and then of the United Kingdom. Different types of union were associated with different histories and different relationships with England,

Britain and Britishness: the Scottish union was the closest to being a coequal partnership, the union *aeque principaliter* defined by John Elliott and others, the Irish closest to a form of colonial relationship, and the Welsh was a distinctively assimilationist or “accessory” union.⁵⁴ Wales, for example, stayed within “the” union – partly because its union was different to that of the Irish.⁵⁵

Scotland and Wales’s relationship with a pan-national Britishness has been correspondingly close, though at the same time not without ambiguity and difficulty. The Welsh and the Scots to some extent were partners in the construction of Britishness in the eighteenth century, in ways which were not applicable to the Irish. Accordingly, the Welsh and Scots have had a purchase over some of the central historic institutions of Britishness, including the Protestant monarchy, its army and empire. Much more than in Ireland, the limited interest in home rule in Wales and Scotland before the First World War was defined very firmly in the context of Britishness and empire: home rule could and should be granted, because Welsh and Scots loyalty were unquestioned, because home rule would therefore bolster empire – and because (it was implied) the Scots and Welsh deserved it more than the Irish who at the time were apparently well on the way to securing a similar concession.⁵⁶

So, in short, the relationship between a pan-national Britishness and its “sub-ordinate” nationalities bears some comparison to wider European exemplars – and contemporaries, not least in Norway and Sweden, sometimes made the connection. Scottish and Welsh patriotic identities were often compatible with a pan-national and an imperial Britishness – because, though the Scots and Welsh were minority partners in union and Britishness, they had purchase over the shared monarchy, shared British institutions and a shared Protestantism. By contrast the Irish had less investment in the monarchy, and they had deeply ambiguous relationships with other key components of the British state. Britishness had been defined by others and for other purposes – and in the end it did not, and could not, permanently bind the Irish to the United Kingdom.⁵⁷

Notes

- 1 Some cognate arguments are explored in Jackson, *Two unions*. This chapter also builds upon, Jackson “Why did Wales stay in the union?” 248–80.
- 2 For the fuller case linking Britain, Britishness and empire from the early seventeenth century onwards, see Armitage, *Ideological origins*.
- 3 For the proponents of “Greater Britain”; see Bell, *The idea of Greater Britain*.
- 4 Kidd, *Union and unionisms*, 44; Mason (ed.), *Scots and Britons*, 161–86.
- 5 Linda Colley, *Britons*.
- 6 See e.g. Ailsa Henderson and Richard Wyn Jones, *Englishness: The Force Transforming Britain*.
- 7 The work of Antoinette Burton, Catherine Hall and John MacKenzie has made the case for the depth of the popular imperial influence, while Porter’s *Absent-Minded Imperialists* has suggested a range of counter-arguments.
- 8 See e.g. David McCrone, *Understanding Scotland*.
- 9 Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain*, 15, 21, 26. See also, for example, the review by Miles Taylor, online “Reviews in history,” <https://reviews.history.ac.uk/review/709>.

- 10 Stover, "Celtic Nationalism," 286; de Barra, "Celtic Nationalism, Identity and Ethnicity."
- 11 R.J.W. Evans, "Nonconformity and Nation," 233, 238.
- 12 Haesly, review of *Why Wales Never Was* in *Nations and Nationalism*, 1215–17.
- 13 Davies, *History of Wales*, 423.
- 14 Evans, "Nonconformity and Nation: The Welsh Case," 237.
- 15 Coupland, *Welsh and Scottish Nationalism*, 221; see also e.g. Morgan, *Rebirth of a Nation*, 40–41.
- 16 Harvie, *A Floating Commonwealth*, 129.
- 17 Cf. Davies, *A History of Wales*, 392.
- 18 Williams, "How the Welsh fought back": my italics.
- 19 Brooks, *Why Wales Never Was*.
- 20 Williams, *The Union of England and Wales*, 70–72; see also Nicholson and Lloyd Williams (eds.), *Wales: Its Part in the War*, 234; Ellis and Ellis, *Speeches and Addresses*, 103.
- 21 Rees, *The union of England and Wales*; Rees is discussed in Morgan, *Rebirth of a Nation*, 102, 248.
- 22 Loughlin, "Royal Agency and State Integration," 1–26; Loughlin, *The British Monarchy and Ireland*.
- 23 Jackson, *The Two Unions*, 157.
- 24 Ellis, *Investiture*.
- 25 Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*.
- 26 See again e.g. Colley, *Britons*.
- 27 See e.g. Nicholson and Williams (eds.), *Wales: Its Part in the War*, 34–35.
- 28 Morgan *Wales in British Politics*, 179.
- 29 Davies, *A History of Wales*, 478.
- 30 Morgan, *Wales in British Politics*, 178–80; Morgan, *Rebirth of a Nation*, 30.
- 31 Coupland, *Welsh and Scottish Nationalism*, 178–79.
- 32 See e.g. Morgan, *Rebirth of a Nation*, 147.
- 33 Cf. Ward, *Unionism in the United Kingdom*, 79.
- 34 Morgan, *Rebirth of a Nation*, 167.
- 35 See e.g. Matthews, "For Freedom and Justice."
- 36 O'Leary, "Wales and the First World War," 601.
- 37 Discussed in Bowen (ed.), *Wales and the British Overseas Empire*, 1–13; Ward, *Unionism in the United Kingdom, 1918–74*, 79–80.
- 38 See Jackson, *The Two Unions*, 132–36, 211–12; Bowen (ed.), *Wales and the British Overseas Empire*; Jones and Jones, "The Welsh World and the British Empire."
- 39 Bowen (ed.), *Wales and the British Overseas Empire*, 11–12.
- 40 Townend, *The Road to Home Rule*.
- 41 Edwards, *The Good Patch*, chapter xii; Williams, *The Welsh in Their History*, 183–84.
- 42 Evans, "Nonconformity and Nation: The Welsh Case."
- 43 Bowen (ed.), *Wales and the British Overseas Empire*, 108.
- 44 Ellis and Ellis, *Speeches and Addresses*, 85–118; Morgan, *Rebirth of a Nation*, 33–34; Stover, "Celtic Nationalism," 189.
- 45 Morgan, *Wales in British Politics*, 180.
- 46 Grigg, "You Should Love Your Country," 115.
- 47 Griffith, *The New Wales*, 32.
- 48 Griffith, *The New Wales*, 32–33.
- 49 Anon., *Essays on the Repeal of the Union*, iv.
- 50 Anon., *Essays on the Repeal of the Union*, 109.
- 51 Anon. [Björnstjerna], *On the Moral State and Political Union*, 19; Barton, *Sweden and Visions of Norway*, 51–53.
- 52 Jorgenson, *Norway's Relations*, 151.
- 53 Petterson, "Sweden: The Emergence of the Nation State," 989; Jorgenson, *Norway's Relations*.
- 54 Elliott, "A Europe of Composite Monarchies," 48–71.

- 55 Edwards, *Wales*; Edwards, *A Short History of Wales*; Williams, *The Union of England and Wales*.
- 56 Griffith, *The New Wales*, 32–33.
- 57 I am grateful to the Leverhulme Trust for their support of my wider project on multi-national union states.

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PAN-TURANISM AND ALTERNATIVE PAN-NATIONALISMS IN FINLAND 1917–1923

Ainur Elmgren

The study of pan-Turanism as a macronationalist ideology is complicated by the fact that pan-Turanism consists of different national strains.¹ The Hungarian and Turkish variants of (pan-)Turanism have been studied extensively. Finnish contributions to the topic have mainly focused on the connections between Hungary and Finland. In addition, colonial and imperial powers have utilised the label “pan-Turanism” propagandistically to denigrate movements and endeavours without pan-nationalist ambitions, or to manipulate target groups.² My aim here has been to trace those few historical moments when (pan-)Turanist ideas have been presented in a positive way in the public discourse in independent Finland, and to explain which historical circumstances made it possible.

This chapter explores a narrow window of opportunity opening in the revolutionary year of 1917 and shutting in 1923, when the public discourse in Finland briefly seemed to change in favour of the practical implementation of pan-Turanism. During these years, the pan-Turanism advocated by Finnish, Hungarian and Tatar actors in the Finnish public sphere – in the press, in public speeches, within learned societies and sometimes narrower circles of the scholarly and political elite – appeared both as a form of macronationalism with hegemonic ambitions and as a movement of mutual minority support. The different power positions of the actors must also be considered. The Finnish and Hungarian enthusiasts of pan-Turanism could imagine vast geopolitical alliances and tumultuous uprisings from the relative safety of their own independent states, although both countries experienced bloody civil wars during this era. The most pressing needs of the small Tatar diaspora in Finland after 1917 were matters of pure survival as a community.

Conjunctural and opportunistic use of pan-ideologies is therefore an important part of this study. The Tatars in Finland needed to appeal judiciously to pan-Turanism if they wanted to acquire influential allies in a country where

emigrants and refugees from the former Russian Empire were viewed with suspicion. The Finns, on the other hand, tended to passively accept pan-Turanism as a feature of soft diplomacy, or, in contrast, to utilise it in the internal language strife against the Scandinavianism of Swedish-speakers. Neither of these uses was motivated by solidarity with oppressed Turanian brothers – that solidarity was strictly reserved for the nearest Finno-Ugric nations, the objects of Finnish hegemonic macronationalism. Another reason for Finnish intellectuals and politicians to shy away from pan-Turanism, which I have explored elsewhere, was the fear of being associated with Asian nations, which were stigmatised as culturally and racially inferior to their colonial overlords.³ This civilisational hierarchy was taken seriously in Finland during its struggle for international recognition as an independent state, and it was reflected in the arguments used in the linguistic conflict between Finnish- and Swedish-speakers.

However, a key agent in this study did not see pan-Turanism or other alternative macro-nationalisms as naturally antagonistic to a Scandinavian orientation. This was Rudolf Holsti, a liberal nationalist and enthusiast of Finno-Ugric “tribal” solidarity, who served as Finland’s minister of foreign affairs from 1919 to 1922 and from 1936 to 1938. The Anglophile, Western-oriented Holsti envisioned a defensive bloc uniting the Baltic and the Nordic countries against the threat of the greater powers in the region: Russia and Germany. As a politician of the liberal and republican National Progress Party, Holsti often opposed monarchist pro-German conservatives of the National Coalition Party. The Agrarian Union, a centrist and republican party representing the interests of the rural peasantry, supported Holsti’s ideas as they aligned with the party’s Finno-Ugric pan-nationalism. Holsti’s views had some significance for the small Tatar community in Finland, and there are indications that Holsti had positive influence on the protection of Tatar refugees in Finland during the Russian Civil War.

Pan-Turanism’s window of opportunity in 1917–23 not only shows the latent significance of various pan-nationalisms in the past and maybe in the future, but it is also a telling example of the diversity of competing pan-nationalisms present in the Nordic region.

Historical context of the pan-Turanian idea

As a pan-ideology, pan-Turanism can be described as a relatively recent phenomenon built on ancient foundations. The Hungarian strain of pan-Turanism was inspired by a mediaeval tradition that traced back the Hungarian monarchy’s founder Árpád’s ancestry to Attila of the Huns.⁴ Although Turkish Turanism is usually seen as a historically modern phenomenon, competing with and superseding Ottomanism and Islam, Central Asian chronicles connected the genealogies of the non-Islamic Mongols and the Muslim Turks already in the late Middle Ages and the Early Modern era. Only the Finns and Estonians, and their fellow Finno-Ugric minorities in the east, lacked comparable aristocratic genealogies

that could be utilised to bolster macro-nationalisms crossing religious, linguistic and geographic borders with compelling historical-mythological imagery.

The birth of modern pan-Turanism is usually traced to early nineteenth-century scholarship in languages, inspired by national romanticism. Similarities between Finno-Ugric, Turkic (including Tatar) and Mongolian languages had compelled philologists to theorise about their interrelations since the eighteenth century.⁵ The most generous definitions of pan-Turanism embraced Korea, Japan, the Tungusic languages and even China. In 1921, Hungarian pan-Turanists reported the foundation of a Turanian Society in Japan with hundreds of new members and the spread of the idea in China.⁶ A restrictive definition of pan-Turanism or a pan-nationalism of more limited scope was more attractive to Finnish intellectuals who envisioned a leading role for their own nation in it.

In 1844, young Zacharias Topelius – future novelist, poet and historian of national significance – projected a future development of the Finnish language into a culture-bearing idiom. In an essay published in the year after the first Scandinavian student meeting in Uppsala, he declared: “Today people speak of Pan-Slavism; one day they may talk of Pan-Fennicism, or Pan-Suomism. Within such a Pan-Finnic community, the Finnish nation should hold a hegemonic position of sorts, because of its cultural seniority.”⁷ Perhaps the pan-Finnish nation, “by no means smaller than the Slavs [!]”, would one day play a greater part on the world stage. The Asian origin of the Finns, which Topelius accepted, was not an obstacle. After all, also the Hindus had a great and ancient culture. The tone of Topelius’ essay, written for a Swedish-speaking audience, was apologetic. The loyalist Fennomans wished to focus national efforts on the long-term development of Finnish culture within the borders of the autonomous Grand Duchy in the Russian Empire and avoid politically risky Scandinavianism.

The difference between the loyalists and the radicals did not always follow clear-cut linguistic lines. In October 1844, a few months after the publication of Topelius’ essay, the linguist Mattias Alexander Castrén wrote to the leading Fennomann philosopher Johan Vilhelm Snellman: “I am determined to show the Finnish nation that we are not a solitary people from the bog, living in isolation from the world and from universal history, but that we are in fact related to at least one-sixth of mankind.”⁸ There was strength in numbers. Castrén rejected cautious loyalism in favour of a macronationalist geopolitical scheme that would open the path to national independence for Finland and end Russian imperialist domination of its subject nations. His own fieldwork in Siberia among the Nenets and the Komi – albeit financed by the St Petersburg Academy of Science – ultimately served this cause, Castrén argued.

A few years later, Castrén’s work bore fruit. He had studied a wide variety of Finno-Ugric, Turkic and Mongolic languages and published numerous grammars, research papers and a dissertation. In an 1849 public lecture, he confidently declared that the cradle of the Finnish nation – together with the other Finno-Ugric, “Samoyedic,”⁹ Turkic and Mongolic peoples – could be found in the Altai mountains.¹⁰ In linguistics, this theory would be entitled “the Ural-Altai

hypothesis,” often used interchangeably with “Turanian.” It would also plant the seed of a new pan-ideology: the pan-Turanian idea. Castrén has been attributed its spiritual fatherhood, although many consider that the Hungarian Ármín Vámbéry coined the term. For example, the current online edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* claims that Castrén championed “the belief in the racial unity and future greatness of the Ural-Altai peoples.”¹¹

After Castrén, the terms Turanian and pan-Turanian were popularised internationally by linguists like the German-British Max Müller. Finnish nationalist historian Yrjö Koskinen explored the Turanian ancestry of the Finns in his 1862 doctoral dissertation.¹² Clergyman and populariser of science, Johan Calamnius, praised the Turanian civilisation as the first and oldest in the history of humanity.¹³ Turanian, applied to the Finns, was thus an accepted term. Finnish scholars were initially driving forces behind its popularisation. However, in the late nineteenth century Finns began to gradually abandon the idea, just as the term gained popularity among Hungarian authors.

The term *Turan* initially reached Hungarian readers through second-hand translations of Persian and Turkish works. In the mediaeval Persian epic *Shahnameh* by the poet Ferdowsi, the nomadic steppe warriors of Turan (often interpreted as Turks) battle the heroes of Iran. The fascination for the Orient triggered a kind of proto-Turanism among Hungarian literati, conscious of the steppe nomad heritage of the ancient Magyars. In the early nineteenth century, the Finno-Ugric language family was still only a fringe theory in comparative linguistics.¹⁴ The Hungarian uprising of 1848–49 infused this early cultural macronationalism with political urgency, as Russia subdued the rebellion while Turkey welcomed Hungarian political refugees. A new generation of scholars, almost all of them disciples of the intrepid Vámbéry, founded Hungarian Turkology and promoted Turanism in the late nineteenth century. Between 1913 and 1944, almost every Hungarian prime minister was a member of the Turanian Society.¹⁵

The place of Finnish and Finno-Ugric languages in Hungarian Turanism had been hotly contested since Vámbéry’s times. The Paris World Fair of 1900 was a turning point. For the first time, Finland presented its own pavilion, and Akseli Gallen-Kallela’s visualisations of the *Kalevala* won the hearts and minds of the Hungarian art world. Meanwhile, in the Russian Empire, Muslim intellectuals began to adopt a pan-Turkic identity partly inspired by pan-Slavism in the 1870s and 1880s.¹⁶ The modernisation of Japan, the increased visibility of Finland and the birth of pan-Turkism inspired the hope “that a ‘Turanian awakening’ was about to take place in the world and that Hungary could play a role in it.”¹⁷

However, the goals of Turkism in Russia were chiefly defensive. The Empire’s assimilation policies targeted primarily the urban and literate Tatars in the Middle Volga region. For historical reasons, Islam had been a cohesive force of the Turkic-speaking nationalities in the Russian Empire. Catherine the Great had institutionalised Islam in the Empire through the establishment of muftiates, semi-state institutions that functioned as middlemen between the believers and the Empire’s administration.¹⁸ At the price of becoming integrated in the

Empire's power structure, the Kazan Tatars achieved a relatively privileged position among the subject nationalities as religious teachers and experts.¹⁹ Among them, the exonym "Tatar" was gradually accepted. The historian and theologian Shihabuddin Märjani utilised the term as a macronationalist concept. "Tatar" could be defined as any Turkic-speaking Muslim subject of the Russian Empire.²⁰

Many Muslims from Russia moved to Turkey, where they introduced their own ideas about pan-Islam and pan-Turkism as complementary, rather than opposite, ideologies. These emigrant intellectuals, representing a variety of Eurasian populations, tended to argue on behalf of an Asian-oriented definition of Turkishness. Yusuf Akçura, founder of the Pan-Turkist journal *Türk Yurdu* in the 1910s, described the "Turko-Tatars" as a nation within the larger "Ural-Altai" unit.²¹ Struggling to include the Finno-Ugric nations within a Turkocentric definition of Turanism, Akçura introduced the concepts Lesser Turan and Greater Turan, the latter including the Finno-Ugric peoples and other non-Muslim nations.²²

James H. Meyer has called the emigrants that provided the driving forces in these networks "trans-imperial Muslims" referring to their pan-nationalist activism that encompassed Turkish, Muslim and occasionally broader "Asian" identities.²³ Their relationship with Finland was often closer than their political views betrayed. Another emigrant intellectual of Tatar origin, writer and politician Ğayaz Ishaki, maintained close connections to the emerging Tatar community in Finland throughout the first half of the twentieth century.²⁴ Many of these emigrants used their positive impressions of Finland to emphasise the affinity between Turks and Finns. The educator Abdullah Battal, who had spent the early 1920s in Finland and spoke fluent Finnish, promoted Finland as a model nation in Akçura's journal *Türk Yurdu*.²⁵ Hamit Zübeyr, a native of Ufa in today's Bashkortostan, studied in Hungary in the early 1920s and called for cooperation between Finno-Ugric and Turko-Tatar nations in the Finnish press.²⁶ Although their voices did not go unheard within the small Tatar community in Finland, these intellectuals and activists could only hope for a response from their cautious Finnish colleagues if the geopolitical stars were right.

A window of opportunity: 1918–1924

The case of the Finno-Ugric Society in 1918 illustrates the quandary of a learned society that claimed to stand outside of all politics, but whose members did not hesitate to take political action when opportunity arose. In the beginning of the twentieth century, the Society balanced between its scientific mission and contemporary political demands. It had sponsored several competent and internationally renowned scholars in the Altaic (Turkic and Mongolian) languages, but these cultural spheres were no longer considered a priority after the abandonment of the Ural-Altai theory.²⁷ Dominated by the nationalist and conservative politician E.N. Setälä, the Society had turned toward a narrower definition of its objectives by 1910: "the Society is first and foremost a Finno-Ugric society,"

Setälä had declared. The Society ought to produce research results that would ensure the Finnish nation a place among the civilised nations and the right to “demand respect” for her national independence.²⁸

However, when the window of opportunity for national independence appeared at the end of the First World War, the pan-Turanian idea became surprisingly useful. In May 1918, the Finno-Ugric Society elected as its honorary members count Rüdiger von der Goltz, commander of the Baltic Sea Division of the German Army; Mehmet Talât Pasha, Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire; and Ferdinand I, King of Bulgaria. These nominations were hardly motivated by scientific merits, although Ferdinand I was a “native Hungarian” with “scientific hobbies.” The German commander’s membership was justified with his “swift and skilled action” in the Finnish Civil War of 1918 that had helped to preserve untouched the scientific collections and resources of the Finnish capital and had “restored necessary peaceful working conditions” by the end of the civil war. Talât Pasha, in turn, had earned the nomination with his “leading position in the Turanian movement.”²⁹

In fact, just before the Finnish Civil War, representatives of the government had travelled around the capitals of the Central Powers to gather support for Finnish independence, which had been declared on 6 December 1917. Many of these early diplomats had been recruited among Finnish linguists and philologists. Slavicist J.J. Mikkola and Finno-Ugricist Jalo Kalima travelled to Germany, Bulgaria and Turkey to establish diplomatic contacts. Kalima and his colleagues were aware of the fame of Turkish hospitality, but reality exceeded their wildest expectations: “We imagined Finland to be unknown in Turkey and beyond the Turkish sphere of interest, and that our independence would pass without much fanfare. We were mistaken.”³⁰

Turkish Fennophilia presented a bittersweet dilemma to Finnish philologists: It was based on a theory of interrelation that they considered scientifically unproven, misguided and even stigmatising, yet it had turned out to be provisionally advantageous. Kalima stated: “We Finns are thus a brother nation of the Turks. And when Finland [...] begins its life as a free nation, then the Turk understands it as a benefit for his tribe: there goes one of *us*.” Kalima emphasised that the Turanian movement was politically meaningful regardless of the scientific status of Turanism. A “Turanian chain” was surrounding Russia, with Finland as its last link.³¹

The metaphor of an iron chain or ring tightening its stranglehold of Russia multiplied in Finnish newspapers for the duration of the Russian Civil War.³² A similar turn of phrase had been used in November 1917 by Finnish diplomats who were negotiating German support for an independence that would ensure bourgeois hegemony in the face of threatening revolutionary tendencies in Finland.³³ The delegates promised General Ludendorff that Finland would become the northernmost link in a series of nations that would form a protective wall for Europe. For the pro-German Finnish monarchists, an alliance with Germany, including a monarch of Hohenzollern stock, would ensure not only

the independence of Finland from Russia but the creation of a Greater Finland with a leading role in Northern Europe.³⁴

Although the German defeat in November 1918 came as a shock to Finnish monarchists, the restless years immediately after the First World War were a time when hitherto impossible geopolitical dreams seemed to materialise. Small but determined bands of zealots took on demoralised forces of crumbling empires and created utopian states that lasted for weeks or months before others, more powerful utopian (or dystopian, depending on one's perspective) forces overran them. Gabriele D'Annunzio in Fiume, Enver Pasha in Turkestan and Roman von Ungern-Sternberg in Mongolia became models for this kind of daring action. Finland and its nearest neighbourhood in north-eastern Europe also became a stage for such bands of irregular fighters fired by irredentist ideologies blended with pan-nationalisms.

Pan-Turanism and the vanguard nations 1919–1922

In 1919, Turkologist and Mongologist G.J. Ramstedt informed the Finnish public about a unit of Muslim Tatar soldiers formed in Finland in early 1918, just before the ephemeral Tatar-led Republic of Idel-Ural fell to the Bolsheviks.³⁵ Ramstedt was a supporter of the Volga Tatar independence movement and hosted prominent Idel-Ural refugees in Finland, among them Sadri Maksudi, a former member of the State Duma who became a statesman and scholar in the Republic of Turkey. For Maksudi, the revival of the Finnish language provided an important model for the revitalisation of Turkish language and culture, and he praised *Kalevala*, the “Finnish national epic” composed by Elias Lönnrot in the early nineteenth century, as an achievement of the entire Ural-Altai race.³⁶ The works of Maksudi and other Tatar emigrants presented Finland as a Nordic model for the new Turkish nation. The Muslim Tatar community in Finland played an important role in the maintenance of these connections with Finnish scholars and learned societies. Pan-nationalist societies founded in the interwar years, such as the Club of Vanguard Nations (*Etuvaltiokansojen Klubi*) and the Prometheus Society, had Tatars among their founding members.³⁷

Until the passing of the law on freedom of religion in Finland in 1923, the Tatar community in Finland had acute needs that required the support of influential allies. Firstly, many of the Tatars residing in Finland at the outbreak of the Russian Civil War wished to reunite with their families that remained in Russia. Secondly, emigrants and refugees needed help to find the necessary contacts and resources to apply for residence permits and Finnish citizenship, a right that was accorded to non-Christian residents in 1919. Thirdly, while the Tatars had been organised in Islamic charitable associations even before the passing of the 1923 law, they needed to legalise their organisations according to the association law of independent Finland.³⁸

In all these endeavours, the support of liberal-nationalist Finnish allies such as G.J. Ramstedt and professor of economy, Yrjö Jahnssoon, was crucial. Ramstedt

attempted to influence public opinion in favour of the Tatars, knowing well that the Finnish public had cultivated prejudices against ethnic minorities associated with the Russian Empire.³⁹ Jahnsson aided political refugees, providing them with legal advice and appealing to Finnish officials and politicians in their favour. He was driven not only by humanitarian interest. From 1917 to 1923, Jahnsson composed extensive plans for a geopolitical rearrangement of Northern Eurasia. Although Jahnsson's plans never materialised, he was not alone in daring to imagine new transnational alliances reaching beyond the Baltic region. His friend, the liberal politician Rudolf Holsti, was a "chief architect" of the vanguard nations policy, meaning that he promoted the establishment of a protective belt (a *cordon sanitaire*) of states along the Soviet Russian borders, but for different reasons than the western great powers that promoted such solutions to the crisis in Europe.⁴⁰

Holsti subscribed to the idea that Finno-Ugric nations ought to unite their forces, and that the most advanced among them had an obligation to support their disadvantaged tribal brethren.⁴¹ For Holsti, the contradictions between a Finno-Ugric pan-nationalism and a Scandinavian orientation could be overcome, since the purpose of both alliances was to safeguard the interests of small nations against great powers. In addition, Finland's purpose within the Scandinavian block was to balance the dominance of Sweden in the North.⁴²

Although the cause of the "tribal brothers" was close to Holsti's heart, he pragmatically included others than Finno-Ugric nations in these projects. In 1913, Holsti had predicted a coming world war as a window of opportunity for Finnish independence, and he identified the ensuing turmoil in Russia as a chance for all small nationalities in the empire.⁴³ Holsti served as the minister of foreign affairs after the failure of the pro-German monarchists to create a Greater Finland with the support of the Central Powers. Holsti feared above all a closer relationship between Germany and Russia, which he predicted would be the perdition of small states in the region.⁴⁴

However, just as many members of the Finnish political elite, Holsti did not believe that all minority nationalities had equal capabilities to become independent states – unlike Finland, a politically mature and geographically distinct unit with a constitution and a parliament.⁴⁵ These ideas partly explain why Finnish conservative and liberal nationalists alike were hesitant to formally recognise Estonian independence in 1918–19, although they supported the Estonian war of liberation against the Bolsheviks. However, they do not fully explain why Holsti chose to support Tatar independence activists whose situation was even less hopeful. Archival evidence of Holsti's activities in favour of the Tatars is scarce, but reveals that the local Tatar community approached him as a potential ally. In 1921, the Finnish Tatar community sent him an invitation to a gala dinner on the occasion of Sadri Maksudi's, the former leader of the Tatar independence movement, visit.⁴⁶

With Rudolf Holsti, Jahnsson had a friend in a high place, and he did not hesitate to make use of this connection. Within the Tatar community, Jahnsson's

main partner was the businessman and activist Hasan Kanykoff, who rallied to the cause of an independent Tatar republic. Perhaps Kanykoff was the anonymous Tatar informant interviewed in the nationalist and irredentist journal *Suunta* on “Tatar strivings for independence” in 1919.⁴⁷ According to this informant, the Volga Tatar realm covered a territory rich in natural resources. The almost 20 million Tatar people, whose culture, “albeit underdeveloped,” was fully vital, ought to profit from this wealth, rather than their oppressors – including the unreliable leaders of the White movement in Russia.

The *Suunta* interview claimed that committees in support of the Tatar cause had sprung up everywhere in Europe’s capitals. Indeed, Kanykoff was a founding member of the short-lived Society of Vanguard Nations.⁴⁸ This was not an overtly pan-nationalist organisation, although the membership included individuals with pan-ideological affiliations. Nevertheless, the *Suunta* interview emphasised the militancy of the organisations, claiming that they were ready to fight both the Bolsheviks and the Russian Nationalists. The struggle would make a far-reaching impact on the Eurasian continent, for the long-term “national and political dream” of the Tatars was “to create a united Tatar realm extending beyond the lands of Tatars proper, the Bashkirs, the Turkmens and other Tatar tribes, from the area of Kazan to the borders of Afghanistan and beyond the borders of Mongolia.” An editorial comment expressed interest in the plan in conjunction with the struggle of other minority nations of the former Russian empire. If there was unity, “these nationalities would represent a force that world politics, not to mention Russians, would have to take into account”:

Tatars, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Ingrians, Karelians – and why not Finns and Poles, too – form an important cordon around Russia proper. Their coordination of planning and action might even by its own weight resolve the Russian question. One thing is sure: the creation of a new Russia cannot take place without the favourable aid of these nationalities.⁴⁹

The emphasis on numbers recalls Eric Hobsbawm’s threshold principle.⁵⁰ Calculations about the relative power of the Russian Empire’s subject nations had been already done in Germany during the First World War, and Jahnsson’s papers contain many such tables and additions.⁵¹ Elsewhere, I have called this tendency to seek strength in numbers “arithmetic pragmatism.”⁵² I refer to the calculation, explored in fiction and political commentary throughout the inter-war era, that the minority nationalities of the Russian Empire or Soviet Russia, added together, would outnumber the Russians. From this calculation followed the conclusion that the united minorities could successfully defeat Russia and divide it into national republics. This idea remained popular in pan-nationalist circles until the 1930s.⁵³

Although this plan never materialised, Jahnsson appealed to it as general knowledge in his letter of recommendation for the Tatar merchant Sarif Daher’s

citizenship application in 1921. Daher's first application had been refused because he had not resided permanently in Finland over the previous five years, as required by law. Jahnsson wrote a testimonial to the authorities to explain that Daher had travelled abroad in order to establish contacts with Tatar independence activists on the recommendation of the minister of foreign affairs, Rudolf Holsti. According to Jahnsson, the Tatar uprising had distracted the Bolsheviks from intervening in the Civil War in Finland. Jahnsson wanted to prove that Finland was indebted to the Tatars, who had been a decisive factor in support of the Finnish independence struggle. Consequently, Sarif Daher's second citizenship application was successful.⁵⁴

Pan-Finnism or pan-Turanism?

As we have seen, scholars, learned societies and educators were prominently represented among enthusiasts of pan-nationalisms. A congress by the title *Yhteissuomalainen koulukokous*, best translated as "Pan-Finnish School Conference," was organised by and for educators in Helsinki in 1921. Five Hungarian delegates attended the event. The pedagogical journal *Alkuopetus* later referred to these Hungarian delegates as proof of the pan-Finnish (*yhteissuomalainen*) nature of the conference. In contrast, a comment in the conservative newspaper *Uusi Suomi* was bewildered at the sudden expansion of the definition of "pan-Finnishness."⁵⁵ The commentator called the Pan-Finnish School Conference's title "completely misleading"; a few years ago, the plans had only included Estonians and Finns, but now, also Hungarians and Komi people had been invited.⁵⁶ Even some "Turko-Tatars" had sent fraternal greetings, although their hypothetical relationship to the Finns could only be found in "the dizzying darkness of the most distant past." The commentator admitted that the conference had been a strong "forge of tribal spirit," thanks to the passionate Hungarians. The hard-working Estonians had also organised numerous cultural and educational exhibitions and concerts. Their delegation was almost as large as the number of Finnish participants. Indeed, the author wondered where the host nationality was hiding. Apparently, this enlarged "pan-Finnishness" was an alienating concept.⁵⁷

The Finnish audience's lukewarm attitude to pan-nationalist events was remarkable because teachers reputedly used to flock to educational conferences. The teachers' journal *Opettajain Lehti* also complained about a lack of interest among Finnish teachers toward the Twelfth Nordic School Meeting in Helsinki in 1925.⁵⁸ The reason for the low number of preliminary registrants from Finland was thought to be the ambivalent status of the Finnish language and "Eastern Swedish tactlessness" (some conference leaflets had used the term *finländsk*, "Finlandish," which Finnish-speakers found separatist and insulting).⁵⁹ Tensions about unequal power relations and competition for leadership roles shaped the media representation of both events.

Whereas "Nordic," at least, was treated as a neutral term, school inspector and conference secretary Alfred Jotuni had to explain the "pan-Finnish

idea” as the aim to revive cultural activities with kindred nations, comparable with “those foreign movements that are known as Latinism, Germanism and Turanism.” Judging by the speeches by the Hungarian delegates, the distinction between the pan-Finnish and the Turanian idea was unnecessary. The teacher József Fekete presented macronationalist movements as “a new problem of world politics,” listing Scandinavianism, the “Yellow Peril,” and Turanism in a litany of pan-ideologies. For Fekete, the World War had awakened the Turanian idea among the Ural-Altai peoples. The Finno-Ugric movement was a modest offshoot of this macro-national idea. Due to the small size of the scattered Finno-Ugric nations, their ambitions had to be limited to the cultural, educational and economic fields. The Finns, the Estonians and the Hungarians were to serve as the leaders of this movement, due to their higher level of civilisation.⁶⁰

After prolonged applause, school inspector Matti Pesonen thanked Fekete for opening far-reaching visions of grand tasks awaiting “our race.”⁶¹ In the print version of Fekete’s speech, published in Finnish, he used the term “golden race” for the Turanians, a term resembling the Mongolian “Golden lineage” (*altan urug*) of Genghis Khan’s descendants.⁶² The poet and folklorist Aladár Bán dug even deeper into kinship metaphors. According to Bán, the arrival of the Hungarian delegates in Finland showed how the Turanian racial connection could overcome geographical and temporal distances. Hungarians and Finns had mixed with strangers over the course of millennia, but “pure drops of Turanian blood” remained in their veins. This unique fraternal relationship had finally melted “the ice walls of the North.” Northern coldness and ice symbolised hatred and indifference that had kept the brothers apart, while warm, fraternal love originated from the “bright southern landscape.” The Hungarians inversed the hierarchy of the cardinal directions and presented themselves as the active initiators of this relationship, offering the Finns their “hearts’ blood” and “souls’ fire,” hoping that “fraternal love” would let “spring bloom” between the “blood storms” of war.⁶³

Although the Hungarian journal *Túrán* cited favourable Finnish newspaper reports on the pan-Finnish conference,⁶⁴ it did not mention the reputedly weak Finnish participation numbers. Finnish pan-Turanism enthusiasts knew that the idea faced an uphill battle. It was difficult enough to convince fellow Finns of the importance of alliances in the near neighbourhood. As Holsti discovered, many Finnish conservatives often resisted initiatives that encroached German interests. In 1921, pro-German elements in the Finnish political elite, the armed forces and the paramilitary White guards that had become institutionalised after the Civil War put up energetic resistance to any attempts at an actual defence alliance between Finland, the Baltic countries and Poland.⁶⁵ However, these elements did favour Finnish irredentist adventures in East Karelia. In late 1921, activists supported the East Karelian popular revolt against the Bolsheviks by smuggling arms and men over the Finnish-Soviet border, until the centre-liberal government put a stop to the traffic. Henceforth, the hostile conservative press incited a

defamation campaign against the minister of the interior, Holsti's party comrade Heikki Ritavuori, who was assassinated on 14 February 1922.

Tatars in Finland were likely aware of ambivalent Finnish attitudes toward pan-Turanism via their learned supporters. Hence, their appeals to Finnish solidarity with pan-Turkic or pan-Turanian projects generally avoided claims of racial kinship. Rather, Tatars referred to a spiritual kinship based on similar values and historical experiences. These included the common enemy, Russia; common historical experiences with nations in kinship relationship (e.g. the Finno-Ugric minorities in the Middle Volga region), and common ethics.

Pan-Turanism resurrected? The debacle of 1923

In 1923, many Finnish-language newspapers suddenly rallied against the perceived tendency of Finland's Swedish-speakers to hold on to their privileged positions under the guise of Scandinavian cooperation. Already in February, an editorial in the conservative *Aamulehti* attacked racial views attributed to the Swedish People's Party.⁶⁶ The editorial refuted any conceited Swedish beliefs in a pure "Germanic" race of their own. No matter what race the Finns or Swedes were thought to be, biological inheritance followed no linguistic lines, and vice versa. The editorial reminded that the Finns should not be dismissed as alien or inferior, but that the fates of both population groups were intertwined.

The cessation of irredentist activism after the foundation of the Soviet Union on 30 December 1922 had put a damper on pan-Finnish sentiments. This explained the hostile Conservative reactions in August 1923 when some Agrarian Union's newspapers presented the Turanian idea as a serious alternative to a Scandinavian orientation. On 27 August 1923, an editorial in the Agrarian newspaper *Ilkka* introduced the aim of the Turanian Society in Budapest as the unification of and mutual support for all Turanian nations, including the Finno-Ugric peoples. According to the editorial, the "awakening of the Turanian race" was already taking shape in countries such as Japan, Turkey and Hungary, proving "the movement's impact to be more powerful in the psychology of nations than usual."⁶⁷

Another Agrarian paper, *Keski-Pohjanmaa*, agreed that the Turanian idea was worthy of attention because it aimed to unite the Finno-Ugric peoples with powerful nations. Both *Ilkka* and *Keski-Pohjanmaa* emphasised that the right time had come for such projects of extended "racial" or "tribal" consciousness in the years after the World War. Coolly and sensibly – using the attributes of Nordic rationality – Finns ought to consider this window of opportunity, instead of maintaining dated illusions about other options. With a thinly veiled reference to Sweden and the contested Åland islands, the editorial mused that "distant friends" were perhaps not worse than "our close strangers, who sometimes feel tempted to chop off a piece to themselves at our expense." The Turanian nations had common interests, which the editorial presented as a

more welcoming and symmetrical relationship “than the circles that we have attempted to enter this far.”⁶⁸

The editorial comments in favour of Turanism compared and conflated Swedes with Germans to emphasise the parallels between Finns and Hungarians. *Ilkka* predicted that “Finland’s Swedes” would immediately rush to mock Turanism, just like the Germans had done in Hungary. According to *Ilkka*, “the Swedes” tried to kill the Turanian idea in Finland, because the Hungarian national awakening frightened them. The rise of Turanism would end the expansionism of the “Germanic race” in the Baltic Sea region by toppling the Finland-Swedes from their positions of power. Embracing Turanism was the only viable answer to Swedish race-consciousness, since any attempt to prove the Germanic origin of the Finns would only result in being treated like a minor and subservient part of the Germanic race.⁶⁹

The National Coalition Party became concerned about this anti-Germanic rhetoric in the rival party’s newspapers. The party had been founded by advocates for Imperial German intervention in the Finnish Civil War and a German monarch in 1918. For many supporters of this party, a rejection of “German(ic)” orientation was tantamount to treason. Pan-Germanism made even Sweden appear tolerable in the eyes of the party’s Finnish-speaking members. Although the National Coalition Party had to accept the republican form of government, it remained nostalgic of monarchy and loyal to Germany, which had been “forced” (in the eyes of many conservatives) to undergo the same development. The fiercely republican Agrarian Union was its main opponent in this political struggle.

This explains why the Turanist editorials triggered an almost immediate reaction. Hugo Suolahti, professor in German Philology, first chairman of the National Coalition Party, and newly appointed rector of the University of Helsinki condemned the Agrarian newspapers as advocates of “national isolationism,” a “most dangerous instinct” in the Finnish national character. Such a defensive position was justified during the peril of Russification, Suolahti conceded, but not in independent Finland, where the Finnish people had achieved masterhood. The interaction between Finnish and Germanic cultures had produced a unique, yet firmly Western civilisation: “We have [...] even somewhat prided ourselves in being the vanguard of this West European culture in the east.” It would be dangerous to lose this orientation. Although the brotherhood between Finland and Estonia was symbolically important, Suolahti maintained, it was not enough. The cultural connection to the “physically and linguistically” distant Hungary was even less satisfying:

And the least believable connection is to Turkey and Japan, for the only argument presented in favour of it, some sort of a tribal connection, is completely hypothetical and does not stand a scientific investigation.⁷⁰

For Suolahti, Turanism as “an actually existent Finno-Ugric cultural form” was baseless rhetoric. National Coalition Party newspapers supported his views. An

editorial in *Länsi-Suomi*, a newspaper in southwestern Finland, explained the Turanian idea as a logical consequence of the post-war upheavals, but derided the pretension of a “Turanian world power” supported by the numbers of the Chinese (300 million), the Japanese (70 million) and the Turko-Tatar nations (tens of millions). These “castles in the air” had enchanted the Agrarian regional newspapers, but *Länsi-Suomi* appealed to “cool reason” to diffuse the fever-dreams of the Turanian idea. Finns and their kin had to quit dreaming about Asian allies. There was no need to taint the friendship between the Western, independent Finno-Ugrian nations with “Turanian megalomania.”⁷¹

The Turanian idea was rebuffed – not by Swedish-speaking newspapers only, although they took part in the debate, but chiefly by the leadership of the National Coalition Party, which acted as a gatekeeper of nationalist rhetoric. Most importantly, the choice was not framed as a choice between Turanism and Scandinavianism. As mentioned before, the National Coalition Party held a low profile in the Scandinavian question but nourished a sense of gratitude to Germany. According to the party line, Finland had to choose between Eastern barbarism and Western civilisation.

The window closes: Turanism in the continued interwar era

The fault lines in the Turanism question in Finland did not always run cleanly between different factions: liberals versus conservatives, pro-British versus pro-Germans, Turanists and Scandinavianists, Finnish-speakers and Swedish-speakers. There was considerable overlap between many of these categories. The window of opportunity would soon be closed by the Bolshevik victory in the Russian Civil War in late 1922, but until then it seemed that several pan-nationalisms could be united for a common cause – including Jahnsson’s practical Turanism and Holsti’s Balto-Scandinavian orientation.

For a few years after the pan-Turanism debacle, the idea of an “iron chain” of nations around Russia still captured the imagination of some Finnish educators, such as school inspector Matti Pesonen.⁷² In Pesonen’s visions, a pan-ideology was not necessary to unite Russia’s opponents – the imminent downfall of the common enemy was an adequate programme. Still, traces of pan-ideologies can be found in his rhetoric. For Pesonen, cultural contacts presented a geopolitical opportunity. Through cultural exchange, the Finno-Ugric peoples would unite “to forge that horseshoe which must squeeze our ancient enemy if our tribe intends to survive.” Pesonen believed that the cultural connections between Turanian nations would prepare the way to political cooperation, but he, too, had to concede that the “Turanian question was still alien to us in the Northern lands, probably also premature.”⁷³ Finnish educators, otherwise ready to support “Pan-Finnish” cooperation, agreed: “Probably the Turanian idea is not ripe yet on the shores of the Gulf of Finland.”⁷⁴ The Scandinavian connection, on the other hand, was becoming entrenched by the foundation of a Finland branch of the Norden Association in 1924.⁷⁵

Although Turanism was dismissed as a pipedream, Finland became an important node in the pan-Turkic, diaspora nationalist network due to location, elite allies (especially Turkologists and Finnougrists) and shared geopolitical interests. The Azeri independence activist Ali Mardan Topchibashi had played a central role in Yrjö Jahnsson's plans for a "Liberty League" (*Vapausliitto*) that would fight for the liberation of the oppressed nations of Russia.⁷⁶ Another Azeri politician, Mehmed Emin Resülzade, fled to Finland in 1922 with the help of the cross-border contacts of the Tatar community, particularly the scholars and Fennophiles Musa Bigi and Abdullah Battal.⁷⁷ A third Azeri independence activist, Mehmed Sadik, published the journal *Yeni Turan*, funded by Finnish Tatars Zinnetullah Ahsen Böre and Ibrahim Arifulla.⁷⁸ Topchibashi wrote to Sadik in 1933 to thank him and the Finnish Tatars:

This is an unforgettable virtue: to struggle for the freedom of Turkic nations while living in the far north of Europe. [...] Once I had my friends among the Finns. I met them in St. Petersburg (in the First Duma). Is any one of them alive? Who are your associates in such a good country? Are they our brothers from the eternally dear [Idel-Ural]?⁷⁹

The Muslim community in Finland contributed far beyond its numbers (around 600–700 in the 1930s) to a transnational activist network bringing together Turks, Finns and other nationalities in a common struggle for recognition. Not everyone in the community supported pan-Turkism or pan-Turanism, especially when its objectives abandoned the Tatar independence movement in favour of Turkish nationalism. Hamzä Kayenuk, son of Hasan Kanykoff, later lamented that "pan-Turanism, born out of passionate love, has swallowed many of our capable men and women, too."⁸⁰ The practical and symbolic importance of Finland in Pan-Turkic and Pan-Turanian rhetoric was greater than expected of a small, Nordic, Lutheran country. Yet it can be argued that these attributes made Finland particularly desirable as an ally and a model for pan-Turanist causes.

After the establishment of the Soviet Union ended the "iron chain" era and closed the window of opportunity for a decolonisation of the former Russian empire, there was a brief resurgence of pan-Turanian rhetoric in the early 1930s – before the breakthrough of the Scandinavian orientation under Rudolf Holsti's second period as minister of foreign affairs 1936–38.⁸¹ Gayaz Ishaki visited Finland in 1928 and 1930 and promoted the activities of the Prometheus League, an association of independence movements of minority nationalities of the Soviet Union. Soon, a Finnish Prometheus Society was founded by younger Tatar activists and Finnish intellectuals who had already been involved with the Club of Vanguard Nations in the early 1920s.⁸²

Pan-Turanist ideas were sometimes mentioned by Tatars reaching out to the Finnish public in the interest of their local communities. Campaigning for a Muslim school in Tampere, a Mr B. Shamaletdin explained that his people belonged to the Turanian race. He mentioned that Finns and Tatars had fought

for a common cause during the Russian Revolution. Finland would have much to gain from good relations with other Turanian nations, such as Turkey and Idel-Ural.⁸³ This Tatar activist spoke of the Idel-Ural republic as an existing state, although it had been replaced by the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1920. In the Tatar emigrant imagination, the short-lived republic was priceless evidence of the nation's past and future capabilities.

It is understandable that Tatars in Finland generally avoided the sensitive topic of a "tribal" relationship between Turks and Finno-Ugrics. Although Tatars and Finns seemed to share a common enemy in Russia, the imperial experience did not self-evidently translate to solidarity. Finnish interest in Turanism often baulked at the prospect of uniting with nations that were imagined to be racially, culturally and geographically alien and even inferior. Hence, some Finns proposed an alternative pan-ideology with Finland as the hegemonic leader: Pan-Fennicism or "pan-Suomism." Such a hegemonic position would have been impossible to enforce in a pan-Scandinavian movement or in a pan-Turanist movement led by Hungary or Turkey. However, some, such as Rudolf Holsti, envisioned an active and dominant role for Finland in a Scando-Baltic context to keep Sweden in check and to resist the might of Russia and Germany. The adoption of the vanguard nations idea by Holsti and others was motivated by small states' desire to gain agency and resist the dictates of the great powers within the window of opportunity provided by the breakup of multi-national empires after the First World War.

Whenever pan-Turanism was presented as a positive option by Finns to the Finnish public, it was motivated by political expediency. On occasion, it was mobilised as a counterargument or attack against other macronationalist ideologies. Those actors that identified the Finnish people as a member of the Turanian macro-nation did not usually identify themselves as "Eastern." Finnish Turanists continued to see their nation as belonging to the North first – and the West second. The East was better kept at a safe distance, both metaphorically and in practice.

Notes

- 1 See Snyder, *Macro-nationalisms*.
- 2 Paksoy, "Nationality or Religion," 17–18, 22.
- 3 See Elmgren, "Imperial Complicity."
- 4 Ablonczy, *Go East!* 7.
- 5 Kemiläinen, *Finns in the Shadow*, 65–66.
- 6 Dessewffy, "A Magyarországi Túrán," 74–76.
- 7 Topelius, Zacharias. 1844. "Den Finska Literaturen och dess Framtid." *Helsingfors Tidningar*, May 22, 1844, 1–3. Translations are mine unless otherwise mentioned.
- 8 Sommer, "Historical Linguistics Applied," 394.
- 9 Translation by Sommer, "Historical Linguistics Applied," 398.
- 10 Obsolete term for the Enets-Nenets, the Nganasan, and the Selkup peoples.
- 11 Castrén, "Hvar låg Finska folkets vagga?"
- 11 "Matthias Alexander Castrén," Encyclopaedia Britannica, last modified May 3, 2021, accessed October 4, 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Matthias-Alexander-Castren>.

- 12 See Ahrari, "Eurasia Calling."
- 13 Calamnius, "Kuvaelmia," 20.
- 14 Ablonczy, *Go East!* 18–19.
- 15 Ablonczy, 10, 20–22.
- 16 Landau, "The Fortunes and Misfortunes," 8.
- 17 Ablonczy, 31–32.
- 18 See Bekkin, "People of Reliable Loyalty."
- 19 Ross, *Tatar Empire*, 6.
- 20 Schamiloglu, "The Formation," 39–49.
- 21 Arai, "Turkish Nationalism," 67.
- 22 Ablonczy, *Go East!* 23.
- 23 Meyer, "Turks Across Empires," 9–11.
- 24 Baibulat, *Tampereen Islamilainen Seurakunta*, 100–01, 190.
- 25 Räsänen, *Puolikuun nousu*, 93–94.
- 26 "Hirek," 61–62; Zubeir, Hamid [Hamit Zübeyr]. "Venäjän turkkilaiset heimot," *Iltalehti*, August 29, 1923.
- 27 Salminen, *Aatteen tiede*, 73.
- 28 Salminen, 95.
- 29 Salminen, 101.
- 30 Kalima, Jalo. 1918. "Suomen itsenäisyys ja Turkki." *Valkoinen Suomi*, March 31, 1918, 2.
- 31 Kalima, Jalo. 1918. "Suomen itsenäisyys ja Turkki." *Valkoinen Suomi*, April 4, 1918, 2. Emphasis in the original.
- 32 "Venäjän tulevaisuus. Kansain itsemääräämisoikeuden valossa. VII." *Uuden Suomen Iltalehti*, August 7, 1919; "Taistelu bolshevikeja vastaan." *Liitto*, September 9, 1919; Jaakkola, Eemeli. "Unkari ja Suomi." *Iltalehti*, June 15, 1920.
- 33 Volanen, *Nuori Suomi*, 21.
- 34 Roiko-Jokela, *Ihanteita ja reaalipolitiikkaa*, 72; Volanen, *Nuori Suomi*, 156.
- 35 Ramstedt, "Tatarien waiheet," 83–85.
- 36 Maksudi, "Milletlerin intibahında tarih," 685–92; Raevuori, "Turkkilainen lakimies," 164.
- 37 Leitzinger, *Suomen tataarit*, 184.
- 38 See the case of Abdrahim, Ymär et. al. 1922. "Kosk. moskean rakentamista ja johtosäännön vahvistamista." AD 1011/206, Eb:240 Anomusaktit (1922–1922), Valtioneuvoston kirjaajankonttorin arkisto (Archive of the Government Registrar's Office), National Archives of Finland.
- 39 For examples of such prejudices, see Wassholm, "Threatening Livelihoods."
- 40 Zetterberg, *Yrjö ja Hilma Jahnsson*, 271–79, 287–313; Roiko-Jokela, *Ihanteita ja reaalipolitiikkaa*, 14.
- 41 Volanen, *Nuori Suomi*, 329.
- 42 Roiko-Jokela, *Ihanteita ja reaalipolitiikkaa*, 131–33.
- 43 Roiko-Jokela, 31, 40.
- 44 Roiko-Jokela, 21.
- 45 Roiko-Jokela, 48.
- 46 Holsti, Rudolf. "Muhameetilainen siirtola, Helsinki 24.11.1921." Kirjeenvaihto. Saapuneet kirjeet, K-M 1898–1922. Rudolf Holstin arkisto (Archive of Rudolf Holsti), National Archives of Finland.
- 47 "Tatarilaisten itsenäisyyspyrkimykset," 103–104.
- 48 Leitzinger, *Suomen tataarit*, 180–88.
- 49 "Tatarilaisten itsenäisyyspyrkimykset," 104.
- 50 Glenthøj, "When Size Mattered," 245–56.
- 51 Jahnsson, Yrjö. Undated. "Etuvartiokansojen klubi. – Yrjö Jahnssonin Itämeren valtioiden puolustusliittoa, Klubia, Suomen itärajapolitiikkaa ja ei-venäläisiä kansoja käsitteleviä konsepteja," 72. 4. Etuvartiokansojen klubi (1899–1928), Yrjö Jahnssonin

- arkisto, 41, Yrjö ja Hilma Jahnssonin kokoelma (Yrjö and Hilma Jahnsson papers), National Archives of Finland.
- 52 Elmgren, "Imperial Complicity," 327.
- 53 Elmgren, 333.
- 54 Daher, Sarif Fethullen. 1922. AD 2772/422, Anomusaktit Eb:224, Valtioneuvoston kirjaajankonttorin arkisto (Archive of the Government Registrar's Office), National Archives of Finland.
- 55 *Alkuopetus*, "Kutsu toiseen Suomalais-Ugrilaiseen kulttuurikokoukseen," 74; Markku, "Yhteissuomalainen." *Uusi Suomi*, June 22, 1921.
- 56 The Komi were represented by the teacher and activist Igon Mösseg, a friend of Yrjö Jahnsson, who received little attention in the Finnish press but was featured in the Hungarian Pan-Turanist journal *Túrán* (B. A., "A zürjének," 49–50).
- 57 Markku, "Yhteissuomalainen." *Uusi Suomi*, June 22, 1921.
- 58 On the Nordic School Conferences in the context of pan-Scandinavianism and Nordism, see Hemstad, *Fra Indian summer*.
- 59 "Pohjoismainen koulukokous," 3.
- 60 "Yhteissuomalainen koulukokous," *Helsingin Sanomat*, June 21, 1921.
- 61 "Suomalais-ugrilaisten sivistyspyrkimysten yhteiset päämäärät," *Iltalehti*, June 22, 1921.
- 62 Fekete, "Suomalais-ugrilaisten kansain," 304–10; Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente*, 142.
- 63 Fennofil, "Az első Finn-ugor Tanügyi," 38–39. I thank Orsolya Sild for the translation.
- 64 Fennofil, 40.
- 65 Volanen, *Nuori Suomi*, 387–94.
- 66 "Rotu ja kieli," *Aamulehti*, February 7, 1923.
- 67 "Sivistyksellinen ja valtiollinen suuntautumisemme." *Ilkka*, August 27, 1923.
- 68 "Missä ovat ystävämme?" *Keski-Pohjanmaa*, August 2, 1923.
- 69 "Sivistyksellinen ja valtiollinen suuntautumisemme." *Ilkka*, August 27, 1923.
- 70 "Rehtorin puhe," *Iltalehti*, September 14, 1923.
- 71 "Turaanilaisuus." *Länsi-Suomi*, September 20, 1923.
- 72 "Tallinnan kulttuurikokous," 89–92; "Suomalais-ugrilaisten kansojen kulttuuriyhteys," *Uusi Suomi*, June 24, 1924. Pesonen's latter speech was also published in full Hungarian translation and with a summary in Estonian and Finnish in Pesonen, "A finn-ugor népek," 15–25.
- 73 "Kulttuuriyhteys Suomen sukukansojen kesken," *Uusi Suomi*, February 14, 1924.
- 74 "Kutsu toiseen Suomalais-Ugrilaiseen kulttuurikokoukseen," 74.
- 75 See Stadius' contribution to this volume.
- 76 Jahnsson, Yrjö. Undated manuscript. "Etuvartiokansojen klubi. Esitelmiä, selostuksia, artikkeleita ja muistioita." 4. Etuvartiokansojen klubi (1899–1928), Yrjö Jahnssonin arkisto, 41, Yrjö ja Hilma Jahnssonin kokoelma (Yrjö and Hilma Jahnsson papers), National Archives of Finland.
- 77 Soltanbekov, "Mehmed Emin Resulzade," 119–29; Hasanli, *Leadership and Nationalism*, 201.
- 78 Suikkanen, "Yksityinen susi," 89; Hasanli, 212.
- 79 Translation by Hasanli, 212.
- 80 Hamzä Kayenuk to Harry Halén, attachment to letter dated November 21, 1981. Materials of Hamzä Kayenuk, Box 21, Coll. 732 Tatarica, National Library of Finland.
- 81 Roiko-Jokela, *Ihanteita ja realipolitiikkaa*, 13; see also Peter Stadius' contribution to this volume.
- 82 C-a., "Panturkiska strävanden," *Hufvudstadsbladet*, July 23, 1928; *Uusi Suomi*, "Venäjän vierasheimoisten kansojen vapauspyrkimykset," *Uusi Suomi*, October 5, 1930; "Prometheus-kerhon alkutaipaleelta," 2; "Helsingin Prometheus-Kerho," 4–5.
- 83 Shamaletdin, B. "Omauskoista kansakouluopetusta," *Aamulehti*, July 29, 1933.

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14

PAN-SLAVISM, ITS INTERPRETATIVE AMBIGUITIES AND CONFLICTING PRACTICES

Stefano Petrunaro

Among the beneficiaries of charity aid in the first post-First World War years in Yugoslavia, it is not unusual to find “Russian immigrants.”¹ Even though the country was facing not only the economic difficulties shared by all the other European countries in the aftermath of the war but also specific internal tensions of different nature derived by the establishment of a new State, one of the priorities of philanthropic societies was to offer help to members of a foreign country, to Russians. The South-Slav state was not short of paupers, even not of its own refugees, like those “from Istria and Rijeka” (also mentioned in the quoted document), territories recently passed, or close to pass to the Kingdom of Italy. That means that although private charity associations had to take care of a very high number of people, a part of the energies and the resources was devoted to the Russian émigrés. Why did it happen? How to interpret it? And which implications could it have had? Was it an expression of pan-Slavism, i.e. of pan-Slavist solidarity? In other words, is this a good example of the reciprocal help and support which Slav societies have historically offered each other, as promoted by pan-Slavist principles? I think that the answer must be much more nuanced.

In the framework of a book which deals with Scandinavianism and Nordism in a comparative perspective, it can be useful to provide an analysis of another pan-movement like pan-Slavism. As it is shown by a growing body of scholarly research,² macro- and supra-nationalist movements in modern Europe were closely interconnected. Beyond their differences, all these supra-national ideologies and practices like pan-Scandinavianism, pan-Germanism, pan-Turanism, pan-Slavism and the other examined in this volume emerged in entangled ways, as reaction one to the other, reciprocally serving as inspiring models or fearsome competitors, in any case sharing words and ideas and making the here examined phenomena inherently relational and mutually conditioned.³ Transnational transfers, alliances and also contrasts, like in the case of Scandinavianism and

pan-Slavism,⁴ gave shape to a variegated international landscape. The potentials of transnational history thus become evident by investigating historical phenomena like those this chapter, and this book, deals with, i.e. European pan-movements.⁵

This chapter aims at contributing to the comparative study of European pan-movements, focusing on the case of pan-Slavism. For the purposes of this work, we need to partly revise an established view of pan-Slavism, which has often been reduced to its political dimension and the state-building process in Central- and South-Eastern Europe. This attitude produced both celebrations and denigrations of pan-Slavism. This traditional approach also prejudiced the later public memories, as well as many historiographical interpretations of the various cultural and political phenomena linked to pan-Slavism, which could even lead, as we will see, to its negation. In other words, many scholars, influenced by a research agenda inspired by nation-state contexts and nationalist goals, revised the activities and works by famous pan-Slavists, interpreting them in national terms. Furthermore, the focus on the political dimension led to precise chronologies of the investigated phenomenon, which recognised, e.g. in First World War a radical turning point (and defeat) in the European history of pan-Slavism.

This contribution therefore has two main goals. The first one is to give back to pan-Slavism all its multidimensionality and integral ambiguities, and the second is to examine expressions of pan-Slavic ideas also including a grass root perspective. Concerning the multidimensionality, the aim is to counter the aforementioned anachronistic interpretations, framed exclusively in modern national terms, as well as those which uncritically celebrated it as a forerunner of later Slavic political unifying projects. Instead, the analysis will highlight the many, variegated and sometimes even conflicting interpretations elaborated by the historical actors during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In line with recent suggestions,⁶ it is useful to look not only at the interpretations of pan-Slavism provided by contemporaries and by later scholars but also at what was said and written by the pan-Slavists themselves, looking for points of contact and divergences.

As brilliantly showed by some comparative historians, there have been several attempts at defining taxonomies of nationalism/pan-nationalism, identifying cultural pan-movements, political ones, secessionist, unifying, nationalist and supra-national ones, without neglecting their variegated historiographical interpretations.⁷ Therefore, the question about pan-Slavism would be to which sub-category to ascribe it. Yet, as this chapter hopefully will show, pan-Slavism is a cultural and political tree with a lot of branches, and the fruits produced have been deeply different, depending on the place and on the time where/when they appeared. It is not possible to give one simple answer to that question, which requires to be qualified and adapted to each case study. As we will see, a first, relevant distinction was made between the pan-Slavist variants adopted by the Slav intellectuals of Central- and South-Eastern Europe in the nineteenth century, and those elaborated later in the Tsarist circles. At the same

time, it could happen that a pan-regional/–national rhetoric was embraced fostering at the same time a national agenda,⁸ what was often the case when pan-Slavism is concerned. Furthermore, there were cultural projects which imagined communities alternative to the national ones, thus not necessarily claiming statehood. To further diversify the picture, the chapter will deal with the re-emergence of some pan-Slavist *topoi* in the twentieth century and precisely between the two world wars, like in the cases of the intricate forms and practices of pan-Slavist solidarity expressed by non-Russian Slav societies towards Russia and Russians, what implies the role of the Russian diaspora. The history of pan-Slavist motives and their political instrumentalisation can trace further episodes along the twentieth century, like in the case of Soviet pan-Slavism, or up to the fragile and tense relationships between Russia and Ukraine nowadays. All this makes the pan-Slav landscape deeply entangled and multi-layered, and an extremely contingent historical phenomenon.

Secondly, the chapter will examine some cases of concrete implications of the pan-Slavist rhetoric observing it not only from the classical point of view of the political and diplomatic history but also from a perspective “from below,” which considers the *practices* of pan-Slavism, and the everyday life of common people. The chapter will offer some insights in terms of welfare policies, as well as public memories of First World War, including examples taken from Yugoslav school textbooks. The aim is to offer the possibility to the reader to have an insight into concrete cases of alliances as well as rivalries, which the idea of Slavic solidarity and reciprocity could provoke.

The chapter contributes to the research about pan-Slavism beyond nation-state teleological bias, as well as other kinds of simplistic interpretations. The contribution will illustrate the manifold meanings and concrete implications of some pan-Slavism-inspired initiatives, showing their potential in terms of both promoting supra-national cultures, as well as imperialist projects. Finally, the chapter will contribute to rewriting the chronology of the inter- and transnational developments of pan-Slavism in Europe, what certainly include breaks, but also less expected continuities.

Beyond the nation-states: Pan-Slavist variations of the theme

Inspired by German Romanticism and the texts on the Slavs written by Johan Gottfried Herder, and in general by the linguistic pan-Germanism represented by Arndt and Fichte, pan-Slavism “proclaimed the affinity of various people, in spite of differences of political citizenship and historical background, of civilization and religion, solely on the strength of an affinity of [Slavic] language.”⁹ These were the times when the *Volksgeist* was better to be detected in the language, the mother tongue, which should give voice to the motherland, the Nation. But in this case, like in other pan-movements in Europe, the attempt was to overcome cultural and even national differences, in order to reach a supra-national

dimension, testified by the alleged existence of a common (linguistic) Slavic community.

There had actually been a pre-modern chapter of this history, embodied by Juraj Križanić (c. 1618–83), a Catholic priest from today Croatia, whose life mission was to promote the union of the Catholic Church and the Christian Orthodox world, beginning with the Russian Orthodox Church. Apart from these confessional goals, Križanić deeply believed in the ethnic and cultural unity of the Slavic people as it is stated: “It is difficult to tell, when he writes ‘our people,’ whether he is referring to the Russians, to the Croats, or to some other Slavs.”¹⁰ His religious Ecumenism developed thus in a sort of pan-Slavist worldview, which he considered “a family of free peoples under Russian protection.”¹¹ This is the reason why it has often been regarded as the precursor of the later, modern pan-Slavism.

Many Slav scholars produced impressive works based on oral poetry and philological research during the nineteenth century. Intellectuals like the Slovaks Ján Kollár (1793–1852), Pavel Josef Šafárik (1795–1861) and Ľudovít Štúr (1815–56), the Czechs Joseph Dobrovský (1753–1829) and Josef Jungmann (1773–1847), the Slovene Jernej Kopitar (1780–1844) and the Serb Vuk Stefanović Karadžić (1787–1864) are only the most known actors of that vivid inter- and transnational cultural landscape. They laid the foundations for standardising their respective national languages, histories and cultures, but at the same time they also shaped the awareness of belonging to a broader Slavic consciousness and a common Slavic culture. The so-called Slavic idea arose, i.e. the idea that there was a commonality in cultural and spiritual terms, which called for mutual solidarity (termed as “reciprocity”), and which led the poets and scholars of those circles to theorise a broader “Slavicity,” even though its interpretations, as we will better see in the next lines, could deeply differ.¹²

Among the most known historical episodes inspired by that cultural and political tradition in the first half of the nineteenth century is the Illyrian Movement, nurtured by a group of intellectuals from the Habsburg Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia, but with some adherents from the neighbouring regions, which promoted a common, multi-religious cultural identity among the South Slavs of the Monarchy.¹³ The premise was the canonisation of a modern Croatian language and alphabet, an endeavour realised by Ljudevit Gaj, who published the first “Croatian-Slavic orthography” in 1830. The ideology of this intellectual movement, also called Illyrism, evolved in the second half of the nineteenth century into Yugoslavism, the idea of unifying the South Slavs in a common state. Needless to say, also this cultural and political aspiration, as well as pan-Slavism, was subject to numerous divergent interpretations up to 1918, when the first South-Slav state, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, was established.¹⁴

An illustrious event which embodied – carrying it even in the name – a pan-Slavist inspiration was the first pan-Slav Congress held in Prague in 1848, where mainly Habsburg Slav intellectuals gathered to discuss a possible reform of the Empire, which should take more into consideration the political interests of its

Slav subjects. In the revolutionary context of that year, the Congress gathered illustrious literary scholars like the Slavophile Pavel Josef Šafárik, or renowned political activists like the anarchist Mikhail Bakunin (1814–76). Among the distinguished personalities of that assembly, the famous Czech historian and politician František Palacký (1798–1876) led the movement which aimed at applying to the Habsburg Empire a federalist approach, the so-called Austro-Slavism.¹⁵ The fundamental idea of that cultural-political orientation was to promote the collaboration among the members of the Habsburg Slavic communities, in order to counterbalance the German-Austrian and Hungarian hegemonic tendencies.

As evident by these short considerations, and as acknowledged by the research, pan-Slavism originated in Central and South-Eastern Europe and did not emerge in Russia as a public movement before the late 1850s, i.e. until the defeat in the Crimean War.¹⁶ Nonetheless, during the 1860s, the idea that Slavic people should politically act together, under the lead of Russia, became popular in the Tsarist intellectual circles, combining Slavophile inclinations with imperialist, i.e. anti-Ottoman, anti-Habsburg and anti-German aspirations of the Russian Empire. This is the reason why the second Slavic Congress took place in Moscow, in 1867, and became an arena for the articulation of a Russo-centric vision of the future of the Slavs, prescribing the necessity to unify into one state, clearly led by Russia.

As shown in detail by recent works, it is precisely in the period between the Crimean War (1853–56) and the Russo-Turkish War (1877–78) that the Russian foreign policy towards the Ottoman Balkans acquired a distinct pan-Slavic tone. Such new attitudes were not only elaborated – as stressed by early studies – in the “centre” of the empire, thanks to the contributions by pan-Slavic Russian philosophers and writers such as Nikolay Yakovlevich Danilevsky, Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky, Ivan Sergeyevich Aksakov and Rostislav Andreyevich Fadeyev, but also by institutional representatives of the Russian Empire in Istanbul, like the Ambassador Nikolay Pavlovich Ignatyev, and by institutions like the Slavic Benevolent Committee, an organisation with branches in Moscow (1858), St. Petersburg (1868), Kiev (1869) and Odessa (1870), which helped in spreading a Russian-centred pan-Slav atmosphere, in Russia as well as in the Ottoman Balkans.¹⁷ Thanks to their increasing activities, this Committee promoted the education, both in their countries and in Russia, of Balkan Orthodox students. Furthermore, the Committees collected donations and supported the publishing of a Russian pan-Slavist press.

The activism of Russian, as well as some Central and South-Eastern intellectuals and politicians, gave an important contribution in shaping a new, pan-Slavist Russian imperial ideology in the Ottoman Balkans, which became clear through the military intervention of the Russian Empire on the occasion of the anti-Ottoman Bulgarian insurgence in 1875–78.¹⁸

Military and political alliance should not be confused with innocent fraternity. Very deep discrepancies characterised the view of the various pan-Slavists, especially Russians and non-Russians. Generally speaking, while Russia's

actions aimed at ending Ottoman rule and expanding the influence, if not the territory of the Tsarist Empire, some Central- and South-Eastern intellectuals regarded the pan-Slav reciprocity as a tool for granting each nation-building goals, thus causing internal frictions.¹⁹ Furthermore, Russian pan-Slavism has always been associated with a clear sense of cultural superiority of the Russian culture. Balkan Orthodox Slavs were thus depicted by late nineteenth-century Russian pan-Slav activists both as the same and as different from the Russians.

This is particularly true for the multi-layered Ukrainian case. It was traditionally considered by Russian intellectuals and common opinion as an integral part of the Russian space, as a local, southern and bucolic variant of the Russian culture, the so-called common-Russian nationality (*obshcherusskiy narod*), which also included the White Russians. This is the reason why late-Tsarist authorities began to decidedly oppose the Ukrainian elite, when its members developed the idea of a different identity in Ukrainian, modern national terms.²⁰

Yet, in this case, too, the national tensions, which represent the cultural long-term roots of present-day conflicts, should not hide the fact that even in this context, it is possible to detect pan-Slavist occurrences not only in form of an aggressive pan-Russism but also as genuine Ukrainian interpretations. The first and most authoritative representative of this approach was Nikolay Ivanovich Kostomorov (1817–85), an important Ukrainian-Russian historian and intellectual, who was particularly inspired by Polish Slavophilism, and who elaborated his own interpretation of the relationship between Ukrainians, Russians and the other Slavic people: Ukrainian identity and culture should be recognised as different, nonetheless as part of a broader, Slavic family. The future of the country should thus be envisioned in close, reciprocal and fraternal dialogue with the other Slavic brothers.²¹

A gender dimension can be added to the picture, e.g. considering the relations between Russians and the South-East European Orthodox Slavs. While the Russian self-perception was built on the idea of a powerful crusader, who fought for (and partly instead of) the Balkan Slavs, the latter were depicted as emasculated and feminised.²² The Southern Slavs were thus subordinated to the Russian brothers not only because they were lacking political independence but also in deeper terms, being considered fragile and passive subjects, to be saved from a cruel foreign domination.

One first conclusion is that there has not been “one” nineteenth-century pan-Slavism, but rather several variations of it. Czech-Panslavism, Illyrian-Panslavism, Austro-slavism, Russian-Panslavism, etc.: the general idea of a Slavic cultural unity, and maybe the prospective to also foster a political union, has been interpreted in very different terms, depending on the geopolitical context, the historical moment and the main actors involved.²³

Revising, condemning, celebrating

What is important to underline is that the standard works – written in the second half of the twentieth century by Western-based scholars – of this manifold

historical phenomenon are constantly occupied in emphasising its limited political impact, due to internal frictions. In the typical judgements about the topic, the intellectual tradition of several pan-Slavists' generations is reconstructed in detail, but stressing that "they had no impact whatsoever," and whereas the programme of the first ones was further elaborated by others, "it remained unreal too." The prism through which to read that manifold historical phenomenon is clearly that "it has failed to create a political or economic union," with strong analogies, it is said, with pan-Africanism and pan-Scandinavianism.²⁴ An established historical approach regarding this intellectual tradition, thus, consists in reducing it to the concrete political dimension, closely linking it with state-building processes. Having not been able to realise a pan-Slav State, pan-Slavism is sentenced, with some disdain, as a failed idea.

On the other hand, more recent research has stressed the necessity to look beyond the state-centred historiographical approach, because it is often misleading. The search for a Slavic unity must not necessarily be equated with the battle for a common Slavic state, and "in fact, nineteenth-century panslavs rarely had such political ambitions."²⁵ The problematic point of departure of many historical investigations for more than a century has been a nation-state point of view, which assumed that each intellectual spoke his/her "national" language, and strove for defending his/her national interests, embracing the Pan Slavist cause only in an opportunistic way, in order to promoting in truth national goals. In the public memories and in the scholarly traditions, it is possible to notice a tendency to anachronistically impose modern national interpretative standards onto historical actors and ideas, whose aim actually was to go beyond the single nations. There have been Slavic intellectuals who really posited a single Slavic nation speaking a single Slavic language. There have been in the long nineteenth-century history in Europe, even in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, people who imagined communities different from the national ones. An excellent example are those North-Adriatic intellectuals, who elaborated an "Adriatic Multi-Nationalism"²⁶ and other, regional forms of collective identification, also as alternatives to the national ones.²⁷ Similarly, pan-Slavists intellectuals in the nineteenth century were able to conceive the principle of the Slavic "literary reciprocity," i.e. the idea that the Slavs formed "ein grosses Volk" (one great people), who spoke "eine Sprache" (one language) with various "Mundarten" (dialects). They went beyond the dimension of the single Slav nations, and they did it without necessarily aiming at statehood.²⁸

Many scholars, not to mention official memories, seem to be decisively reluctant to acknowledge the historical importance of pan-Slavism as a cultural and political phenomenon. Many interpretations are more inclined to read in national terms the cultural activism of those historical actors, even leading to selective omissions, mistranslations "and specious 'clarifications' that conceal or alter the meaning of key passages."²⁹

An echo of this approach can be detected in school textbooks. The analysis of the representation of the Illyrian Movement in the post-socialist Croatian

history textbooks, for instance, revealed a process of increasing marginalisation towards a personality like Ljudevit Gaj, now accused of political short-sightedness and naivety. The Illyrian Movement, blamed to be “anational,” underwent an interpretative process of strong Croatisation, mitigating, or even neglecting its South- and pan-Slav traits and reducing it to a national, Croatian movement.³⁰ These first post-socialist interpretations, which have been partly revised in some later textbooks, were not the first nationalist revisions of this kind, when one has in mind the history textbooks produced during the early 1940s, i.e. during the pro-Fascist and pro-Nazi regime of the Ustasha.³¹ Therefore, there were not only many variants of pan-Slavism, but there have been also many variants of its nation/nationalist interpretations.

This is not to say that the instrumentalisation of pan-Slavism has known only the nationalist variant. A historical look at the whole twentieth century can detect also opposite interpretations of the same phenomenon. During the two Yugoslavias, for instance – i.e. during the first Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, later renamed Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918–41), and during the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1945–92) – history textbooks stressed everything what had a “Yugoslavist” flavour and could contribute to give historical substance to the Yugoslav state. Every historical episode which could be presented as evidence of South-Slav solidarity got attention, like the cultural, political and even military collaborations between Slovenes, Croats and Serbs during the revolutions of 1848.³² Personalities like the Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer (1815–95), Illyrist activist and founder, among other institutions, of the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts (1866), were presented in a positive light as the enlightened forerunners of the twentieth-century Yugoslav experiment. In general, the “Yugoslav idea (*jugoslovenska misao* or *ideja*)” was illustrated as the natural historical path which finally flew into the Yugoslav state(s), “where brothers of the same blood, after centuries, gathered together,”³³ thanks to a “spiritual union” which existed already before.³⁴

In other parts of Eastern Europe, as well, during the twentieth century there have been new modern interpretations of pan-Slavism, sometimes trying to update and adapt it to the new geopolitical circumstances. The years after First World War were, in some regards, not ideal for the flourishing of such ideas, and “Pan-Slavism seemed even more dead than Pan-Germanism,”³⁵ with the (re) establishment of several Slav nation-states, partly in competition, what became evident through the reciprocal military aggressions between 1939 and 1941. Nonetheless, some attempts of political alliance were made, e.g. between the Polish and the Czech governments in exile, but they were overridden by the Soviet Union foreign policy, which resumed a quite traditional Great Russian imperialism, increasingly dressed with pan-Slav traits.

Rejecting the previous Marxist and Lenin’s contempt towards a phenomenon which was interpreted as the manifestation of the reactionary late-Tsarist and bourgeois imperialism, Stalin himself increasingly appealed to Slav solidarity, already for legitimising the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939, described as an

act of solidarity towards Belarusians and Ukrainians, to be emancipated from the Polish yoke. Especially after the German attack on the USSR in June 1941, the Soviet government made widely use of a pan-Slavist rhetoric, in order to mobilise Soviet citizens and other Slav people for the anti-fascist fight, what was also called by the old Bolshevik Yemelyan Mikhajlovich Yaroslavsky the “fight of Slavic nations against German fascism” (*borba slavyanskih narodov protiv german-skogo fashizma*).³⁶

Under the coordination of Georgi Dimitrov, the Bulgarian General Secretary of the Comintern, several committees and conferences were organised, and the periodical *Slavyane* was established, in order to spread the Soviet pan-Slavist war propaganda. It drew upon classical pan-Slavist ideologemes, like the shared history, language, culture and the common spiritual nature, and even utilised in biologist terms, as when referring to the “blood kinship” (*krvnoe rodstvo*). This discourse recognised a historical continuation between Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union, stressing the long-term Russian/Soviet historical “mission,” i.e. to help all the Slav brothers, even beyond the border of Russia/the USSR.³⁷

This leads us to the post-1945 version of this new pan-Slavism under Russian/Soviet leadership, which included now a new ideological aspect, i.e. the Communist inspiration. Not only all the Slavs but especially all the Slav workers should unite. The centre of this new chapter in the history of pan-Slavism was initially Belgrade, and not Prague anymore. Yet, this was also destined to last not long: after the Tito–Stalin break in 1948 and the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform, the pan-Slav Communist rhetoric suffered of a relevant defection. The “all-Slav” rhetoric was abandoned and replaced partly by pan-Russism, and partly by the reference to the ethnically undetermined “socialist camp.”³⁸ The “friendship of people,” introduced in 1935, was the Soviet ideological principle regarding the nationalities issue. Even though not framed in pan-Slav terms, in some cases, e.g. the Russian-Ukrainian one, it could evoke known *topoi* of pan-Slavist tones, like that of the brotherhood and the “fraternal relations” between the Russian and the Ukrainian people, with all the ambiguities which characterise the modern history of Russian-Ukrainian relations, including the second half of the twentieth century.³⁹

While this section has considered the issue of pan-Slavism through the perspective of governments and the members of the elite, it is also useful to have a look at examples of concrete effects of those discourses and theories in the everyday life of common people, as I try to do in the following section.

Pan-Slavism from below

The tormented Count Vronsky, in the epilogue of Tolstoy’s *Anna Karenina*, decides to join the Russian volunteer movement, which sought to liberate the Southern Slavs from the “Ottoman yoke,” as it was called. This should not surprise the reader of this chapter, as anyone familiar with pan-Slavism in all its

declinations. Pan-Slavism is not only a matter of theory: it also induced people to concretely act, even to fight and to die.

In order to deal not only with narrow groups of members of the elite, like Count Vronsky, this section will change the perspective, trying to have an insight into pan-Slavism “from below.” As recalled by the incipit of this text, investigating the assistance to the poor in the first Yugoslav state it is possible to notice some cases of concrete implications of the pan-Slavist rhetoric in terms of welfare policies. Considering for instance “Prehrana” (Nourishment), one of the most relevant philanthropic associations in Zagreb and in Croatia,⁴⁰ then belonging to the newly established Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, it is interesting to carefully read the list – shortly mentioned at the beginning of the chapter – of the target groups of the association with regard to the first post-war years of activity, namely: “war widows and orphans, invalids and their families, poor school pupils and students, unemployed workers, refugees from Istria and Rijeka, Russian immigrants (school pupils, teachers and officers)” and others.⁴¹ That means that a private association like Prehrana, whose main activity was to provide hot meals for the needy in urban areas, adopted a supra-confessional, supra-ethnic and supra-national approach (at least for some nationalities), including among its recipients not only the masses of poor people living in Zagreb and arriving from its countryside but also people coming from a farther place, a foreign country, the post-revolutionary Russia. The reasons are not explicitly illustrated in the documents of that charity association, but they are known, anchored in the Russophile pan-Slavism which has a long historical tradition in the Serbian culture.⁴²

The Slavic brotherhood praised by so many authors and politicians had thus in Yugoslavia interesting and manifold repercussions: it not only helped the establishment of a South-Slav state, supporting the political collaboration between South Slavs, but it also nourished the relations between the Yugoslav governments and the Russian émigrés, even affecting the activities promoted by the civil society. This can be interpreted as an example of the mixed economy of welfare, when governmental and private actors closely collaborate to provide public services.⁴³ And even though Prehrana’s spokespersons repeatedly maintained that the association’s mission was not only to aid the association’s members, or the members of a specific confessional community, rather *anyone* who was in need, it is not surprising that its activities were actually influenced by moral, gender and political considerations.⁴⁴

The decisions taken in the first post-First World War years regarding the recipients of the philanthropic aid were not irrelevant ones: the people “in need” were in those times, to a different extent, the main part of the population. To share the limited resources among a vast audience meant inevitably to foster rivalries among the targeted groups. The hot food distributed in the soup kitchens was not unlimited, and the queues of waiting people were long. This led the association to a revision of its admission criteria during the interwar times. If we compare the already quoted list of target social groups, with the same list from the mid-1930s,

we can notice that the variegated folk of poor and unemployed (Yugoslav) people are now – in the mid of the effects of the Great Depression – the focus of the intervention. The Russian immigrants are not mentioned anymore, apart from four school pupils (on a total of 171).⁴⁵

Slavic solidarity and reciprocity, as we already know from the previous sections, also produced rivalries. What we can add from the here adopted perspective is that also pan-Slavic *charity*, as every form of social assistance, produced competitions among its beneficiaries. Furthermore, the pan-Slavic “grass root” activism, similarly to the precarious relations in the realm of the high politics, could also change over time, revising its priorities. The dramatic social and economic crisis which affected Yugoslavia after 1929, as other European countries, pushed on the background war- and Russian civil war-related issues, giving more relevance to urgent internal socio-economic problems.

Yet, pan-Slavist liaisons could be further observed in Yugoslav society during the interwar period. When we take into consideration women voluntary associations, for instance, we can be faced with the gendered declination of pan-Slavism, claiming for a pan-Slavic sisterhood between all the different confessional and tribal segments of the Yugoslav population. The most active association in this field was the *Kolo srpskih sestara* (The Circle of Serbian Sisters), a clearly pro-Serbian and pro-Yugoslav voluntary women association, whose initiatives acquired in the 1930s also a pan-Slavic flavour.⁴⁶ The activism of this women organisation is another good example of the flexibility of the pan-Slavist concept. The patriotic *Kolo srpskih sestara* organised many pan-Slavic balls throughout the entire Yugoslavia, including the periphery along contested territories like that in the North-Eastern Adriatic, showing the possibility to intertwine Yugoslav patriotism, pan-Slavist internationalism and local irredentism.⁴⁷ The gender and precisely female dimension of some interwar pan-Slavist movement can be easily observed considering the Association Unity of Slavic Women, established in 1929 thanks to the commitment of women from Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia and Russian émigré women. The association organised several international congresses, like those in Prague (1930, 1938), Warsaw (1931) and Belgrade (1933). The association was intended as the female counterpart and continuation of the pan-Slavist tradition inspired by Ján Kollár.⁴⁸

In some cases, like the just mentioned *Kolo srpskih sestara*, the political orientations of the associations were clearly in dialogue with, if not an expression of, the governmental ones. Yet, looking from below at the manifold and widespread pan-Slavist attitudes in Yugoslavia, as well as in the rest of Central-East Europe, one of the reasons is that after the Russian civil war, many Russian communities emerged in these regions. These Russian refugees often got integrated in the local society, especially when – as it mostly was the case – the immigrant had a higher education, like the Russian and Ukrainian criminologists employed at the Criminological Institute of the Faculty of Law in Belgrade,⁴⁹ or the renown architects,⁵⁰ and many, many other Russian scholars, military officers and members of the clergy.⁵¹

Furthermore, the Russian presence in interwar Central-, South-East and Western Europe gave a contribution also to the commemorative culture of First World War. Actually, a high number of memorials for Russian victims were built not in the Soviet Union, which rather celebrated the Great Patriotic War, but in the rest of Europe, in the USA and in the European overseas territories.⁵² In Czechoslovakia and in Yugoslavia such projects acquired distinctive pan-Slavist tones, used by all the involved parts. In both countries pan-/philo-Slavism played a relevant role in the discussions and later realisations of those war memorials, and in general terms “appeals to Slavic solidarity helped emigres argue for acceptance, assistance and sympathy.”⁵³

Even though this pattern of relationship cannot be generalised to all the Slavic countries – e.g. not including Poland because of the deep-rooted Polish-Russian animosity – the story of émigrés’ communities in Central- and South-Eastern Europe allow to partly revise, again, historical judgements about the alleged completely political inefficacy of pan-Slavism during those interwar years. 1918 does not represent such a radical break, if observed through the prism of the post-revolution life of many Russian émigrés in several Slavic countries. Pan-Slavism, as we have seen from the previous two sections, was able to revive through many and variegated embodiments between the two world wars, during Second World War, and even afterwards.

Conclusions

The history of pan-Slavism does not end with the conclusion of the “short twentieth century.” We could encounter Count Vronsky again in the South-Slav literature of the 1990s and later, this time transferring the Tolstoy’s story in the context of the Yugoslav civil wars, in some cases celebrating Count Vronsky as a national hero, who fights against Croats (not the Turks anymore) and for the interests of Serbia.⁵⁴ Furthermore, post-Soviet Russia turned to a renewed pan-Slavist rhetoric in imagining and practising its diplomatic role in the Balkans, especially during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁵⁵ Apart from political support expressed by a long series of journalists, intellectuals and members of the nationalist right wing of the *Duma*, several hundreds of volunteers came to fight in Bosnia for the Serbian side, also in the name of pan-Slavist values.⁵⁶ And also later, in 1999, in the context of the NATO bombing of Serbia, the speaker of the Russian parliament (*Duma*), Gennadiy Seleznyov, foresaw a “Russian-Serbian armed brotherhood,” while appeals to a military help for the “Orthodox Slavic brothers” in Serbia were launched by high representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church,⁵⁷ to mention only a few examples. This pan-Orthodox Russian patronage is clearly welcomed by the ruling elite not only in Serbia but also in the Serbian Republic of Bosnia, where declarations of cultural proximity and spiritual brotherhood are frequent in the public discourses.

Similarly, it is opportune to mention the role of revived pan-Slavist ideas in the post-Soviet space, considering first of all the tense relationship between Russia

and Ukraine. Intertwined with Slavophile and anti-Western intellectual schools, as well as with the tradition of Russian Eurasianism,⁵⁸ the idea of a deep cultural and historical unity between Russians and Ukrainians has resurged. That kind of brotherhood was often interpreted by emphasising the belonging to the same kinship to the extent of denying the identity, at least in national terms, of the Ukrainian brother. This interpretative framework has been exploited to legitimise first the support of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republic, then the military aggression against Ukraine.⁵⁹ Evidently, this somehow elusive idea is still able, like it was in the past, to find new, heterogeneous incarnations.

This sounds like a further confirmation of what this contribution has tried to show: the impossibility to reduce the historical phenomenon of pan-Slavism to an easily definable concept. It is a history, which shares many traits with the other pan-movements analysed in this volume. Pan-Slavism, too, is an intriguing cultural and political tradition exactly because of all its multidimensionality and integral ambiguities. As this analysis has tried to show, there are several reasons to avoid both nationalistic and celebrative interpretations considering the many, variegated and sometimes conflicting interpretations elaborated by the involved historical actors during the long nineteenth and the twentieth century.

Pan-Slavism, as well as other pan-movements in Europe, proved to be an inspiring and powerful cultural tool for generations of intellectuals, who were able to imagine transnational communities beyond the emerging borders of the nation-states. On the other hand, the history of pan-Slavism cannot be naively celebrated and idealised. Every cultural, political and social initiatives inspired by the idea of a Slavic solidarity immediately produced frictions and rivalries, and the pan-Slavist rhetoric has also been utilised to legitimate aggressive pan-nationalist claims, to the extent that it aimed at subjugating the (natural or elected) brother.

What is important, thus, is not to oversimplify this multi-coloured narrative and historical experience. Rather, it is necessary to get a dynamic and nuanced historical picture of the phenomenon, which has been, is being and certainly will be shaped and reshaped in the future, in many variegated forms.

Notes

- 1 E.g. Croatian State Archives (Državni Arhiv Zagreb-DAZ), fond 1092, Dobrotvorno društvo "Prehrana," box 4, *Glavna godišnja skupština (20th Annual meeting)*, 1935, Secretary's Report, p. 3, with reference to 1919.
- 2 See Hemstad and Stadius' introduction to this volume.
- 3 Mishkova, Trencsényi, *European Regions and Boundaries*.
- 4 See Lerssen's and Egorov's contributions to this volume.
- 5 Haupt, Kocka, *Comparison and Transnational History*; Kaelble, "Comparative and Transnational History"; Körner, "Transnational History."
- 6 Maxwell, "Pan-Nationalism as a Category."
- 7 Leerssen, "Pan-Slavism"; Maxwell, "Pan-Nationalism as a Category," 5–11; see also Leerssen, and Hemstad and Stadius in this volume.
- 8 Mishkova, Trencsényi, "Introduction," 6.
- 9 Kohn, *Pan-Slavism*, ix.

- 10 Petrovich, "Juraj Križanić: A Precursor of Pan-Slavism," 86.
- 11 Petrovich, "Juraj Križanić: A Precursor of Pan-Slavism," 89.
- 12 Tamborra, *Panslavismo e solidarietà slava*; Troebst, "Slavizität"; Leerssen, "Pan-Slavism"; Karl, Skordos, "Pan-Slavism."
- 13 Kirchner Reill, *Nationalists Who Feared the Nation*, 63–78.
- 14 Ivetic, *Jugoslavia sognata*.
- 15 Moritsch, *Der Austroslavismus*.
- 16 Petrovich, *The Emergence of Russian Panslavism*; Karl, Skordos, "Pan-Slavism."
- 17 Gülseven, "Rethinking Russian Pan-Slavism in the Ottoman Balkans."
- 18 Heraclides-Dialla, "The Balkan crisis of 1875–78 and Russia."
- 19 Kohn, *Pan-Slavism*; Gülseven, "Rethinking Russian Pan-Slavism," 340.
- 20 Plokhly, *The Gates of Europe. A History of Ukraine*, 155–160.
- 21 Franco, "Ukraine as a 'Pan-Slavic Keystone'"; Plokhly, *The Gates of Europe. A History of Ukraine*, 158.
- 22 Vovchenko, "Gendering irredentism?."
- 23 Makowski, Hadler, *Approaches to Slavic Unity*.
- 24 Kohn, "The Impact of Pan-Slavism on Central Europe," 323–24.
- 25 Maxwell, "Effacing Panslavism," 634; Maxwell, "Pan-Nationalism as a Category."
- 26 Kirchner Reill, *Nationalists Who Feared the Nation*.
- 27 Clewing, *Staatlichkeit und nationale Identitätsbildung*.
- 28 Kollár, quoted in Maxwell, "Effacing Panslavism," 637.
- 29 Maxwell, "Effacing Panslavism," 633.
- 30 Petrunaro, *Riscrivere la storia*, 161–64.
- 31 Petrunaro, *Riscrivere la storia*, 159–60.
- 32 Petrunaro, *Riscrivere la storia*, 165–210, also for the next examples.
- 33 Srkulj, *Povijest novoga vijeka*, 414.
- 34 Jakić, *Povijest Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, 146.
- 35 Kohn, "The Impact of Pan-Slavism on Central Europe," 330.
- 36 Behrends, "Die 'sowjetische Rus' und ihre Brüder"; von Rauch, "Eine taktische Waffe: Der sowjetische Panslawismus."
- 37 Behrends, "Die 'sowjetische Rus' und ihre Brüder," 104–105; Fertacz, "Von Brüdern und Schwestern. Das *Allslawische Komitee* in Moskau."
- 38 Troebst, "Slavizität," 9.
- 39 Yekelchik, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, ch. 9.
- 40 Petrunaro, "Soup Kitchens and Yugoslav Poor Relief."
- 41 DAZ, fond 1092, box 4, *Glavna godišnja skupština (20th Annual meeting)*, 1935, Secretary's Report, p. 3 (with reference to 1919).
- 42 E.g. Mac Kenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism*.
- 43 Katz-Sachße, *The Mixed Economy of Social Welfare*; Giomi-Petrunaro, *Voluntary Associations in Yugoslavia*; Giomi-Keren-Labbé, *Public and Private Welfare in Modern Europe*.
- 44 Petrunaro, "Soup Kitchens and Yugoslav Poor Relief."
- 45 DAZ, 1029, box 4, 22. *Annual meeting*, 1937, p. 5 (with reference to 1936).
- 46 Giomi, *Making Muslim Women European*, 137–38.
- 47 Rolandi, "Women's Organizing in a Contested Borderland," 61.
- 48 Daskalova, "The Little Entente of Women," 23–24.
- 49 Janković, "Kriminalistički Institut Pravnog Fakulteta u Beogradu."
- 50 Stanojević, "Rad arhitekta Viktora Lukomskog."
- 51 Sibinović, *Ruska emigracija u srpskoj kulturi*; Putyatin, "Adaptatsiya rossijskoj emigratsii v Korolevstve SHS."
- 52 Cohen, "'Our Russian Passport': First World War Monuments."
- 53 Cohen, "'Our Russian Passport': First World War Monuments," 642.
- 54 Kuzmic, "Tolstoi's Count Vronsky in the Post-Yugoslav Imagination."
- 55 For an earlier reflection on this: Cohen, "Russia and the Balkans."
- 56 Levin, "Neopanslavism"; Cozzi, *Wolves of Belgrade*.

- 57 Troebst, "Slavizität," 7–8.
- 58 Shlapentokh, *Russia between East and West*; Bassin, Glebov, Laruelle, *Between Europe and Asia*.
- 59 Machitidze, "Popular Imagery, Competing Narratives and Pan-Slavism"; Suslov "Geographical Metanarratives in Russia"; more in general: "Forum: The Ukrainian Crisis"; Plokhly, *The Gates of Europe. A History of Ukraine*, 347–53.

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15

EPILOGUE

Peter Stadius

The Nordic cooperation tradition has a history of around 200 years to fall back on. The evolution from a typical nineteenth-century pan-nationalist movement, with its moments of possible political unification, to a mainly low-key but highly institutionalised cooperation is well documented. Rarely, however, has this pan-movement been systematically compared to, and seen in the transnational context of, other similar movements. There are some seminal works on pan-nationalism, and valuable recent studies referred to in the introduction of this volume, that have served as inspiration for a both more theoretical and comparative approach on Scandinavianism and later Nordic cooperation. The comparative approach allows for a development of pan-nationalist taxonomy, which is indeed helpful when trying to understand the historical legacy, present meanings and future options for any pan-nationalism. It offers a different approach from a diachronic history writing, where the developments with its ups and downs are detected, described and analysed. The diachronic approach has for most parts also been conducted in what could be described as a methodological pan-nationalism.

One of the aspects in comparing is that present-day Nordic cooperation implicitly assumes comparison. The Nordic region's present narrative is not so much about being an alternative and providing a specific model, like was the case during the Cold War era, when the Nordic welfare model was an integral part of how Nordic countries were seen from the outside. The European integration and globalisation have made the Nordics converge to a certain degree. Now it is rather by scoring in the top sport in various nation rankings that the Nordic region stands out. As Johan Strang has pointed out, the Nordics differ by being better, not by being different.¹ The comparison is present through rankings such as the World Happiness Index, Corruption Perception Index, Democracy Index and others of similar kind. This self-narrative of being an example by excellence has rooted itself in a pan-Nordic narrative. A tangible proof of this is the official

goal recently set up by the Nordic Council of Ministers that by 2030, the Nordic region shall be the most sustainable and integrated region in the world.² The connection to the UN 2030 sustainability goal is obvious, but how cutting the cultural budget of Nordic cooperation in favour of sustainability and green shift will help to achieve the second goal is a bit questionable. Notwithstanding, it is interesting to observe that the goals set to become world leaders are based on the idea of comparing transnational regions.

As the EU always has had its centre and periphery, its powerful members and its smaller partners, the possibility of an emerging bloc phenomenon presents interesting questions. Are they desired or not? The 1992 Maastricht Treaty and its following deeper integration elevated the slogan “Europe of the regions” as a main principle to guide a development towards lesser nation-state power.³ There are signs that the core nations of the EU are looking with a changed and more positive view on the Nordic countries acting as a block, and one might ask why a stronger Nordic voice might be desired by the leading core nations France and Germany? The recent development in some of the Union’s central-eastern member states, where current leadership has proclaimed a doctrine of illiberal democracy, most certainly is a factor explaining a possible shift in the core states’ view on a more unified Nordic bloc. Also, Brexit has altered the balance of the Union, perhaps constituting an additional factor for a more coordinated effort from the Nordics.

This book does not take an explicit stand on these contemporaneous political questions but sees an added value in studying past pan-national and meso-regional developments as part of understanding current trends. The regional latent undercurrents have their particular histories, and they tend to surface from time to time. At the present the Nordics view two potential conflicts within the EU, firstly a north-south conflict concerning fiscal policy in the Eurozone, and secondly a value politics conflict on the east-west axis. What has been referred to as the return of the nation-state has to a certain extent also meant the potential return of the historical meso-regions, or the blocs within the EU. The Nordic bloc is, as we know, not complete, with Norway and Iceland (and Greenland and the Faroe Islands) being outside the EU. The Visegrad regional block was established in 1991 by then three countries that have now become four: Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland.⁴ All four countries are members of the EU, and the potential bloc cooperation and Central European identity building have at least three decades to fall back on. The EU Med Group was established in 2013, as a coordination body for nine Mediterranean and Southern European member states. The explicit aim is to better defend common interests of this region within the EU. Also, the Benelux, which perhaps is not a block in the same sense today as the other given examples, as it is part of the geographical core of the union, has served in recent history as an example for meso-regional cooperation and identity building.

The internal dynamics of European politics and EU politics explicitly is guided partially by senses of solidarity and mutual understanding between some

countries. The underlying cultural and historical reasons are manifold, and it is by no means obvious that all the above-mentioned groups are the result of nineteenth-century pan-nationalism. However, the Mediterranean club has obvious ties to a pan-Latin self-narrative, let be that this kind of self-essentialising rhetoric is largely absent in the fairly modest cooperation practice. The Visegrad countries can only in a very limited form claim to represent a continuation of pan-Slavic heritage, since Hungary is one of the members, and Poland for various historical reasons has not been an active part in pan-Slavic nation building. However, the Nordic case presents a long and established cooperation culture, which in comparison stands out as resilient and highly institutionalised.

As many of the contributions in this book show, the high state level and official support for various pan-nationalist initiatives were generally weak in the nineteenth century. There were windows of opportunity for ambitious political projects actually materialising, and from a European perspective the German unification presents one such success story. But mainly the actions taken, dreams and ambitions articulated, and practices created are often both marginal and culture driven, seen from a high politics point of view. The legacy for later international politics is then rather the cultural capital latent for revival, and the historical knowledge of past pan-nationalist projects, both failures and successes, as potential future visions. If we look at how the hopes and dreams for a Nordic federal union have been articulated after the heydays of Scandinavianism, it has always been presented as a vision with a future projection, not necessarily a concrete project to be executed at that very moment.

The Second World War presents such a short period when several plans for a Nordic state union were presented.⁵ These pamphlets part from a rational claim that cooperation and a deep political integration is the only rational choice in order to meet the military security threats presented by the Soviet Union and Germany. Since they are written during a time of deep concern and feelings of disbelief, they project a future vision where the Nordic people and governments have learnt their lesson and voluntarily must understand a Nordic federal state as the only future option. These voices raised for a Nordic union were written during the early 1940s, and thus not part of the time span for this book. They point to the development that followed in Nordic cooperation with the introduction of an official cooperation within the Nordic Council (1952) and eventually the Nordic Council of Ministers (1971). Some of the most ambitious political visions presented during the war were tested but without success. The Swedish proposal for a defence union in 1948 failed as did the attempts to form a customs union (1961) and a Nordic free trade zone (Nordek 1969). Nordic cooperation became institutionalised according to the principles of Nordism, where close friendship and mutual trust paved the way for successful cooperation in the 1950s (passport union, social security convention). But this cooperation always built on the unconditional recognition of each country's sovereignty, and the visions of a Nordic union were not actively articulated during the Cold War. Instead, the image of a specific block was facilitated by the political profiling of the Nordic

countries as mixed economies, the “Middle way” countries without a colonialist past burden. This is very visible in the proportionally big role the Nordic countries would play in the United Nations, and it is fair to say that the Nordic block was to a considerable extent created as a projection from the outside by the rest of the world. Karl Deutsch famously called the Nordic countries a security community in 1957.⁶

During this period the culture of informal communication and exchange of information developed. However, it is well known that the various security policy arrangements, with Sweden and Finland (with some constraints) as neutral countries and Denmark, Norway and Iceland in NATO, did not affect the informal exchange of key intelligence information.⁷ The seemingly low-key cooperation had much more high politics substance, but this was never recorded for the minutes. The intangibles of informal networking as a tradition present methodological challenges on how to study its history in order to understand its relevance. To study networks is one way of tracing facts in this dimension of transnational cooperation. Also giving more significance to low-key politics and cultural cooperation can serve to drive research in this direction. This has been done, but still there is a tendency to rule out certain pan-national cooperation forums as irrelevant, or even as failures, since it is low in hard politics results.⁸

Pan-nationalism has an inherent logic of upholding expansion and the striving towards bigger units as a desirable goal *per se*. The Nordic cooperation culture has as stated earlier not accepted any serious attempts to work for a Nordic political union. However, later years have seen a debate and new narrative entering the corridors and circles of official Nordic cooperation. In 2010 the Swedish historian, diplomat and civil servant Gunnar Wetterberg presented a vision of a future Nordic federal state that according to him could be a reality by 2030.⁹ This provocative pamphlet, published by the Nordic Council of Ministers, was an intention to reintroduce a union narrative as a serious future option. The pamphlet came timely, as the Eurocrisis had made many in the Nordic region sense a renaissance for Nordic cooperation. However, little has happened on the high political scale since. At least not until February 2022, when the Russian-Ukrainian War made Sweden and Finland to suddenly change their long-standing security arrangements and opt for applying for NATO membership at fast forward speed. Both examples are illustrative of Nordic cooperation, as they show the importance of external factors as conducting forces for dramatic changes. The Eurocrisis, which only affected Finland, and the slowing down of the European integration, was not enough to spark a new Nordic cooperation renaissance in practice. Russia’s war actions are obviously a different case. In this situation Nordic cooperation has become a high priority for the leading politicians, and the latent internal narrative of trust and friendship can thus be easily activated. The instinct to turn to the Nordic neighbours and the Nordic cooperation tradition is a turn of events that has been seen earlier in history. How it will turn out this time remains to be seen.

Notes

- 1 Strang, *The Rhetoric of Nordic Cooperation*.
- 2 <https://www.norden.org/en/our-vision-2030>
- 3 Guérot, *Europe of the Regions*, 234–35.
- 4 Gyárfášová and Mesežnikov, *Visegrad Four*, 10.
- 5 Stadius, *Kristid och väckelse*.
- 6 Wiberg, *The Nordic Security Community*, 121.
- 7 Archer & Joenniemi, *Nordic Security and Defence Cooperation*, 167.
- 8 Strang, *Introduction*, 4.
- 9 Wetterberg, *The United Nordic Federation*, 61.

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