

14 Some Reflections on Scepticism: Reply to Stroud

Barry Stroud's interesting paper raises fundamental issues about the relation between anti-individualism, principles of charity, and antisceptical arguments. These issues, particularly those concerning scepticism, are too large to make significant progress on here. But I can think of no honorable way to finesse Stroud's challenge to use the occasion for what it is. So I try to navigate between timorousness and saying more than can reasonably said in so short a space.

I

Stroud gives an accurate statement of the general idea of my anti-individualism about perception: Most perceptual representations represent what, in some complex sense of 'normally', they normally are caused by and are applied to. Perceptual representations of something as a physical feature are, relative to a complex standard of normality, caused by and veridically apply to such physical features. This statement can be misleading, however. For the complexity in 'normally' is important and difficult to get right. As Stroud recognizes, an individual perceiver, under special circumstances, could be mostly wrong. The individual could be lifted out of the environment that its perceptual system was fashioned to connect with. Some of its perceptual categories could be innate, but triggered by non-standard stimuli. Or they could be learned and (as a result of the displacement) triggered by abnormal but indistinguishable stimuli. Such an individual's perceptual system would still have to have been fashioned—say, in evolution or through synthetic copying—through interaction with the types of things that its perceptions represent. The perceptual system might have interacted with the relevant types of things only when it was instantiated in other previous individuals. So some veridicality is implicit in the relevant conception of normality, but not in a way that guarantees that an *individual* has any veridical perceptions at all.

Stroud quotes several times, somewhat misleadingly, my remark that we are “nearly immune from error in asserting the existence of instances of our perceptual kinds.” The remark does perhaps carry some broad epistemic reassurance. But this assurance should not be overrated. The remark is immediately followed in the same passage by an allowance of the possibility of *individuals'* being under induced massive perceptual hallucination or having no regularity in interaction between themselves and their environment—say, in certain cases of being transferred into a brain in vat situation—so that their perceptual experiences are systematically false.¹ I do think, however, that, with further qualifications that I will not discuss here, an individual could presume with near immunity from error that some individual or other has (at some time) perceived instances of some of the perceptual kinds or types that his perceptual system represents things as having.

Even laying this point about individuals aside, ‘normal’ cannot be glossed as ‘usually veridical’, at least not for each type of perceptual representation—even if one is considering a perceptual system’s representations rather than those of an individual perceiver. Some perceptual systems are fashioned in such a way as to produce a predominance of false positives for some perceptions. A rabbit’s system may misperceive objects as predators, even in its normal environment, more often than not. Or a whale’s perceptual system could in principle misperceive something as krill or as edible more often than not, although this is surely not the way whales actually operate. In being oriented to survival, the perceptual system may in certain cases scrimp on veridicality. But even in these cases, there must be a base of veridical applications interacting with some types of things being represented, if representation and error are to be possible.

There are further complexities in the account of anti-individualist principles governing perception. But it does seem impossible that no perceptual representations as of the physical world ever are or have been veridical representations. This impossibility is itself a necessary truth.

Stroud notes similarities between some of my views about perception and the principles of charity invoked by Quine and Davidson. He raises a question about what I meant when I wrote that they have sometimes used “with insufficient discrimination” the slogan that error presupposes a background of veridicality (Burge 1986, p. 131).

Quine, as Davidson has noted, sometimes writes as if the slogan applies only to observation sentences and logical truths. It seems to me that it applies in more detailed ways than that. And with respect to observation, the qualifications indicated above have not been stated by either Quine or Davidson. Davidson sometimes writes as if the slogan can be glossed as ‘most of our beliefs are (or must be) true’. Because of problems about counting beliefs he has come to prefer ‘there is a presumption in favor of the truth of a belief that coheres with a significant mass of belief’. But in his actual arguments against scepticism, he relies, I think illegitimately, on the former, stronger formulations in terms of necessary veridicality (Davidson 1986).

The problem with the first formulation—that most beliefs have to be true—is not just one about counting beliefs. As I have indicated above, the principles of anti-individualism by themselves, on any natural construal, do not allow us to know apriori that “most” of every individual’s beliefs must be true. It is possible for there to be massive systematic error on the part of an individual, even about the concurrent existence of putatively perceived objects. Further, the formulation (and Davidson’s supporting argument) in terms of coherence seems to me to gloss too generally over the specifics of how beliefs support one another. Some humanly common types of inferences are unreasonable. People are capable of wildly mistaken theories about quite a lot of things. Coherence with such bodies of belief confers no warrant. People are more likely to be right in some areas

than in others. Davidson knows this, and has emphasized it on some occasions. But sometimes the points are glossed over in ways that matter to the argumentative context.

More fundamentally, Davidson's emphasis on coherence and his basic claim that warrant can derive *only* from beliefs seem to me to overlook that we are *entitled* to certain beliefs not because they are justified by other beliefs, or because they are self-justifying, but because of our competence with a representational (e.g., perceptual) system that bears certain types of connection to the world. The most salient type of entitlements are those attaching to perceptual beliefs.² Neither sensations nor perceptions provide a justification, though they play a role in the account of the warrant—the entitlement. And coherence with other beliefs does not provide all the warrant, or even the primary warrant, for perceptual beliefs. In fact, I think that coherence plays very little role in the warrant for our more primitive perceptual beliefs. Rather, perceptual beliefs are often warranted through entitlements that do not involve justifications available to the individual at all. Not all warrant is justification. Not all warrant is inferential, or evidential, or derivative from within the individual's system of belief. Most perceptual warrant is not.

I do believe, however, that there is a *prima facie*, general warrant in favor of the veridicality of belief as well as perception. This warrant derives from the connections, first, between belief and rationality—or more broadly epistemic warrant—and, second, between rationality and truth. Certain extremely abstract and restricted elements from antiindividualism can play a role in the latter of these two connections. I further believe that, properly qualified to allow for such points as those about individuals, systems, and survival that I have just made, the contents of many of our empirical beliefs must apply to sorts of things that normally cause them.

So, I think that individuals can be systematically mistaken in their perceptions and perceptual beliefs. But the perceptual representations of a perceptual system, as opposed to an individual's actual perceptions, must have a core of veridical perceptions. I believe with Quine and common sense that beliefs causally and epistemically less directly tied to perception—more theoretical beliefs—are susceptible to error in more ways than beliefs more directly tied to perception. (We can understand 'directly tied' in terms of causal distance from sensation, in the learning and normal application of the beliefs.) I think with Davidson that there is a general *prima facie* presumption in favor of the truth of all beliefs. But I am not sure that I motivate my view in quite the way that he does his.

Stroud is right that I do not envisage a distinction between perceptual and theoretical belief that makes the sceptical scenarios impossible for the former but not for the latter. Dramatic error is possible in both cases. And I think that a generalized *prima facie* warrant backs theoretical as well as perceptual belief because anti-individualist principles cover both, and because a presumption of rationality applies to any system of belief. Stroud's Kantian (*Critique of Pure Reason* A226/B273) suggestion that perception is in principle

extendable ever further into empirical reality is a salutary reminder. But I do not think that it is the fundamental point. It seems likely, and certainly possible, that some empirically knowable entities are in principle (say, by physical law) imperceptible. The fundamental point is that principles about content formation and about rationality carry the argument that there is necessarily a base of veridicality in any intentional system. Principles about perception are important special cases.

I believe that the general presumptive warrant in favor of one's beliefs and perceptions is qualified, and overridden, in numerous ways that bear on the particularities of an individual's forms of reasoning. And I believe with Stroud that this warrant is in principle ("metaphysically" or "logically") compatible with any individual's being massively mistaken about what the world around him is like. There are important differences between my, Quine's, Davidson's, and Stroud's conceptions of the *basis* for the idea that error presupposes a core of veridicality that I shall return to.

II

Stroud raises some profound questions about the relation between anti-individualism and scepticism. I have supported a qualified version of the idea that error presupposes a background of veridicality. I have also endorsed a version of the idea that our perceptual systems' representations must bear certain relations to types of entities causing veridical perceptions in at least some individuals. Implicit in these ideas is some seeming reassurance against scepticism about the physical world. Stroud asks whether these ideas provide an adequate reassurance against traditional scepticism about perception, and more generally about belief regarding the physical world. Of course, as Stroud is well aware, there are different types of scepticism. So the question is a schema for a number of different questions.

But I give a schematic negative answer to all of them. There is a simple and uninteresting reason for this answer: Scepticism is about knowledge or justification. Neither anti-individualism nor the slogan that error presupposes veridicality says a word about knowledge or justification. So something more needs to be said even to speak to scepticism, much less answer it. Stroud anticipates this point, and later I will say more about what he does with it. But there is a further point in favor of a schematic negative answer.

Much of the difficulty in answering scepticism lies in avoiding begging the question, or in deciding what legitimate questions the sceptic raises that should not be begged. Anti-individualism is a metaphysical view about the nature of certain mental states—what having such states necessarily presupposes. Merely asserting it, even with justification, does no more to answer scepticism than Moore's asserting 'Here is a hand'. Moore's assertion is warranted and true. But his mere assertion hardly provides a non-question-begging

answer to the worries that the sceptic is developing. Anti-individualism may be a component in, or a clue to, an answer to scepticism. But simply asserting it may beg the question. How is the assertion justified? Do we know it on any less question-begging grounds than we know 'Of course there are physical objects. I'm looking at this hand full on in a good light'?

Such claims might be made with full assurance. In fact, I think that it is a deep point, which Moore rightly played on, that they *should be* made with full assurance, even in the light of the sceptic's challenge. But the interest in answering scepticism lies not in displaying or bolstering our assurance—which is surely sufficiently high even after hearing the sceptic out. It lies in explaining the nature of reason and epistemic warrant.

The fact that anti-individualism is supposed to be asserting necessary truths may seem to differentiate it from Moore's answer. But there remains the task of explaining the epistemic status of anti-individualism and showing that that status is not such as to beg some important and legitimate question that the sceptic is asking. Asserting anti-individualism may give clues, components, assurance. But it does not constitute an answer.

What justification for our beliefs can be associated with the putative fact that our having attitudes with the relevant contents about the world necessarily derives from some interaction between individuals with attitudes and the world? Do we know this account of content-possession, and whatever claims we make about warrant for it, in a way that derives from assumptions whose justification is not brought as much into question by the sceptic as that of the straight-out claims about the physical world that we began with?

The antisceptical interest of anti-individualism stems partly from the view that it might be known through apriori reflection. Traditionally the sceptic is supposed to concede that invocation of principles known from apriori reflection is legitimate in providing an answer. For it was assumed, at least on some traditional conceptions, that knowledge from reflection was knowledge backed by reason alone. And the scepticisms that I regard as interesting purport to be reasonable.

But the precise epistemic status of anti-individualism—or of various aspects of it—is not obvious. It seems to begin by reflecting on the relation between mental states and a physical or social environment that is simply assumed to exist. Moreover, certain features of anti-individualism—such as our reflections on the role of evolution or the differences between individuals' perceptions and perceptual systems—seem to owe something to empirical background knowledge. Emphatically, I do not assume that these points decisively undermine all antisceptical strategies that make use of anti-individualism. But the dangers of begging the sceptic's question are too evident to glide over quickly and without comment.

Both Davidson and Putnam provide stimulating responses to scepticism that are grounded in anti-individualist considerations. But neither so much as considers the

question of how the premises of his antisceptical argument are justified, much less whether the premises might beg the question.³ As an example of how Davidson's argument threatens to beg the question in ways that he does not address, consider this remark: "Belief can be seen to be veridical by considering what determines the existence and contents of a belief. Belief . . . is supervenient on facts of various sorts, behavioral, neuro-physiological, biological and physical" (Davidson 1986, p. 314). The sceptic can reasonably ask what justifies this invocation of behavioral, neurophysiological, biological, and physical facts, and why it does not beg the question. I also think that the relations between reliable connection to the world and rational coherence of a belief system are not sufficiently distinguished in Davidson's argument, opening it to Stroud's charge that mere appeal to coherence can make the position look covertly idealist.

An adequate response must, I think, consider those issues in some depth. I believe that anti-individualism can be a component in antisceptical initiatives. There are positive as well as negative things to be learned from the initiatives already proposed. But just invoking anti-individualism to show that our having beliefs about the physical world presupposes interaction with the physical world—even if it is on the right track—is too quick a response to provide lasting illumination on the issues raised by scepticism. The key issue with scepticism is to understand what are legitimate starting points for reason.

III

Transcendental arguments, understood as arguments from the conditions necessary for aspects of our cognitive or mental lives, can provide at most general responses to the most general scepticisms. The general response might be at the level of "we know that there (tenseless) are and have been physical objects." I think that non-question-begging responses of this sort are imminently worth having and, for all their elusiveness, not beyond getting. But the fact, noted above, that anti-individualism about perception allows that an individual could be massively mistaken about his immediate environment raises obvious difficulties with expecting too much of anti-individualism in dealing with all the traditional scepticisms. I think that anti-individualism can contribute to general antisceptical responses, and in more limited ways, to more specific responses. But I agree with Stroud that no argument from anti-individualistic premises alone can provide a worthwhile response to the sceptic.

As I indicated, I think that general antisceptical arguments are worth striving for. Providing a powerful general antisceptical transcendental argument would be a major philosophical achievement. But Stroud is right in conjecturing that I would not be satisfied (although I would be thrilled) by an adequate *general* antisceptical response—a guaran-

tee of the reliability of perceptual systems in their representations of physical objects, or of the mere existence of physical objects. I do not go so far as to hope that we could *prove* reliability of perception or the existence of physical objects. But I do think it philosophically worthwhile and possible to *show* with some rational force, against the most interesting forms of scepticism, that we have such knowledge. I also think that we can show that we know some *particular* specified propositions about our own environment. For example, I think that it is possible to provide an antisceptical argument in defense of the claim that there is a hand here (looking at one in a good light). I think it is worthwhile and possible to argue rationally that no demon is systematically fooling us and that we are not brains in vats.

Such arguments would have to allow that individual claims to knowledge, even reasonable claims, are fallible, for ordinary, nonsceptical reasons. That is one reason I am leery of the language of proof. I think that we can infer the negative propositions about demons and vats from our ordinary perceptual knowledge claims. Stroud correctly attributes this view to me. I do not purport to have provided philosophical arguments for the view; I only assert optimism that it can be done. The chief difficulties are supporting the inferential principles and supporting those ordinary claims themselves in a way that would be illuminating in the light of the standard sceptical challenges. There is no easy argument, either here or in the more general case. I hope to pursue these matters, despite Stroud's evident belief, certainly backed by considerable apparent inductive support, that such pursuit is quixotic.⁴

There are important differences in the ways Stroud and I see the prospects of dealing with scepticism. Some of these differences seem to derive from differences in the ways we view the relation between anti-individualism and the charity principles that Quine and Davidson have brought to prominence. Stroud states: "Davidson holds on anti-individualist grounds that most of our beliefs are true, or that they are by and large or for the most part true. The anti-individualist grounds he relies on are to be found in the conditions of what he calls 'interpretation'—one person's understanding and communicating with another. . . ." He continues, "Burge's anti-individualism . . . is also a theory of our practices of attributing psychological states and attitudes with determinate contents to people in a world we inhabit. The thought experiments he appeals to to support his anti-individualism turn on and exploit our capacities of belief- and attitude-attribution as they actually are."

These remarks may reveal a large difference between my view and Stroud's. I do not accept the idea that anti-individualism has its grounds in interpretation, or that anti-individualism is itself a theory about our practices of attitude attribution. Rather, I think that our practices of attribution have their ground (partly) in anti-individualism. Anti-individualism is not about those practices—though it can be loosely seen as implying or

requiring conditions on a theory about them. Anti-individualism is about the nature of certain types of belief and other propositional attitudes, and about the nature of concept possession. Of course, our views about belief are partly informed by our practices of attribution of belief to others. There is no way to avoid being in some respects influenced by the ways we attribute beliefs (our own or others') that we actually have. But anti-individualism is not a second-level theory about our views about belief or about our ways of detecting belief—much less about the language of belief-attribution (as some, not Stroud, have claimed). It is a theory about belief and about possession of intentional or representational content. I see anti-individualism as no more about our ways of attributing or detecting belief than mathematics is about the ways we think about or find out about the numbers and quantities.

The view that we detect beliefs about the physical world by considering their physical causes does *not* by itself entail anti-individualism. It lacks the needed premise that our modes of detection are correct. And it lacks the modality associated with anti-individualism: Relevant beliefs about the environment are by their nature necessarily related to the environment.

These differences entail a difference in the way I approach the problem of scepticism. For someone who starts with a theory about our practices of attitude attribution, one must defend some non-question-begging principle that our practices are correct and rational. It is usually not noticed that one must also show that we know what our practices are in a way that itself does not beg the question against the sceptic. As Stroud has explained in his wonderful classic work on transcendental arguments, such defenses frequently fall into verificationism or idealism (Stroud 1968).

By contrast, my problem is to justify in a non-question-begging way my claim to know something about the nature and individuating conditions of certain beliefs. The problem is still difficult. But it does not involve a step from putative knowledge about our practices of attribution—or about beliefs about belief, or about detecting belief—to knowledge about belief itself.⁵

I believe that the theory of interpretation is grounded partly in anti-individualism and partly in a (broader) theory of reason, rationality, and epistemic warrant. We can get clues to both of these latter, more basic theories from reflecting on our practices of linguistic and psychological interpretation. But this is an order of discovery, not an order of justification. I think that the more metalevel theory of interpretation, insofar as it has any claims to be apriori or necessary—as opposed to a sociological theory of our actual practices—is grounded in prior principles about attitudes, epistemic warrant, and reason.

Anti-individualism and principles about reason and epistemic warrant can contribute in different ways to addressing the antisceptical problem. I think that one can defend a rational presumption that belief generally can be rationally presumed to be *prima facie* veridi-

cal. On this matter, I side with Davidson against Stroud. But I would motivate such a presumption not merely from very abstract features of anti-individualism. (If I understand Davidson correctly he motivates the view from an account of our practices of interpretation.) I would motivate it also from a theory of epistemic warrant and reason. The bearing of such an argument on particular beliefs—say, about the existence of physical objects—would require supplementation.

Anti-individualism can be used to create some rational presumption that certain particular types of beliefs could not be held if the individual who had them bore no appropriate (perhaps indirect) relation to some relevant physical environment. And from this one can derive some limited conclusions about veridicality. In this domain, Stroud seems to me right in insisting that the argument for veridicality derive from what a person believes, not from the nature of belief in general. Anti-individualism has primarily to do with how having particular types of intentional contents depends on relations to an environment beyond the mind or skin of the individual. A full antisceptical theory must separate the different strands—considerations about reason and epistemic warrant from anti-individualist considerations.

IV

I would like to make some brief remarks about Stroud's own approach to scepticism. He claims that we do not have to "prove" scepticism to be false in order to oppose it on anti-individualistic grounds. I have indicated some unease about this conception of proof. Perhaps Stroud and I share the unease. But I think that traditional positive responses to scepticism need not be construed in terms of proof. I think that one might refute scepticism by showing in a non-question-begging way that it is, all things considered, unreasonable to doubt or suspend belief about (say) the existence of the physical world. Such a refutation need not portray its reasons, much less those associated with ordinary beliefs, as infallible or incontrovertible. It is sufficient that they be, and show themselves to be, substantially more reasonable than the sceptic's putative reasons to doubt. Or it is sufficient to show that there is something unreasonable about the sceptic's putative reasons to doubt in light of the nature of certain reasons for believing.

I agree with Stroud that we should reject the "stronger thesis" that it is "logically" necessary that most beliefs and perceptions are veridical—or that any "large and reasonably comprehensive set of beliefs" is for the most part veridical. But I think that what he calls the "weaker thesis" also deserves scrutiny. The weaker thesis is that anyone who thinks that people have determinate beliefs, and thinks so on anti-individualist grounds, will regard those beliefs as for the most part true; for the interpreter will not see the people he

interprets as holding the beliefs he attributes unless he sees them as sharing his beliefs to a large extent, hence as having mostly true beliefs.

I doubt this weaker thesis, as stated. An interpreter can, I think, find another person wildly mistaken, for example, if the other person has been transferred from a normal environment into a new abnormal environment (for example, a controlled vat). So anti-individualism does not block one from finding another person to be in at least some of the sceptic's scenarios for at least some periods of time. Sharing a single world and using that world to interpret others does not block one from attributing wildly mistaken beliefs, because the environment by reference to which the preponderance of the belief-contents were fixed can change or be destroyed. So even if the weaker thesis could be shown to rest on non-question-begging grounds, I do not believe that it can be relied on to deal with all sceptical scenarios.

There remains a yet weaker thesis that might be proposed from Stroud's point of view: Our considering the particular set of perceptions and beliefs that we and others have guarantees that we find, in accordance with anti-individualism, that some of them are grounded in relations to an environment—even if that environment is no longer the one in which we are situated. This may yield the result that we must find veridical a limited set of beliefs about the (tenseless or past tense) existence of kinds indicated by some of our intentional contents. This thesis is the meta-analogue of the “general” response against scepticism that we considered before. It is not the same, for it centers not on the necessary veridicality of some of our beliefs but on our necessarily *finding* some of our beliefs veridical. I am not hostile to this weaker thesis, *modulo* certain questions about ‘must find’. But I think that it too needs further argument to engage the sceptic. Wherein is anti-individualism justified? Wherein are we warranted in determining what perceptions and beliefs we have? Do such justification and warrant not beg the question against the sceptic? If these questions are answered satisfactorily, then one has shown that our practices are reasonable, and one has answered the sceptic. If they are not addressed, then it seems to me that the yet weaker thesis remains under the suspicion that it begs the sceptic's question.

These points do not touch the first-person version of the weaker thesis, and the analogy to Moore's paradox. No one of us can consistently believe that the beliefs he or she now has are false. But this point applies to irrational as well as rational beliefs, and to revisable beliefs (such as that it is raining) as well as intractable ones. And we can certainly find later that beliefs we once had are wildly false or thoroughly irrational. So this analogy alone might offer us no reassurance in response to the sceptic. Stroud seems, however, to envisage that the anti-sceptical theses that he favors are not only beyond consistent rejection, in the Moore sense, but are things that we necessarily believe, once we have concepts of belief at all. I think that this is an interesting strategy. It links up with the ideas that I discussed in the previous paragraph.

I suspect, however, that the strategy is unstable.⁶ If we can get that far, we will have to go further. I do not think that we should restrict ourselves to responses to scepticism that maintain that necessarily *we* find it incredible. I think that it is possible and worthwhile to show in non-question-begging ways that it is reasonable to believe what the sceptic doubts—reasonable to believe that there is a physical world, for example.

As noted, my basic starting point, as well as my aimed-for conclusion, differs from Stroud's. I start not with a theory of attribution of belief, but with a theory of belief—particularly certain types of belief. And I aim for the conclusion that it is unreasonable (not only locally incredible) to suspend belief about the physical world. But both strategies must answer the questions asked two paragraphs back. The issue about begging the question is, I think, the central one in discussions of scepticism. For it goes to the issue of the legitimate starting points for reason and epistemic warrant.

One *can* beg the sceptic's question or ignore it. Those are perhaps reasonable procedures, though they do not seem to me to be *philosophically illuminating* procedures. How much philosophical, rational reassurance should this last yet weaker thesis yield, apart from the epistemic investigations that I have recommended? I think that this is an interesting and subtle question. One can perhaps with perfectly reasonable assurance ignore the sceptic's question. But in light of the sceptic's question, does the yet weaker thesis provide philosophically illuminating rational *reassurance*? The claim that we cannot do otherwise than to find some of our beliefs true, or some carefully hedged existential commitments veridical, may seem not to count for much reassurance. The sceptic can heartily agree with the claim and say that that just brings out our pitiful, irrational plight. It seems to me that reassurance may require some account of wherein there is *reason* in the necessity of finding the world to answer to at least some of our, and others', beliefs. And if we give such an account, it seems that we must once again confront whether we are begging some legitimate question that the sceptic is asking. I would like to know what Stroud thinks about this.

In any case, my own strategy in dealing with the sceptic through reflections on anti-individualism does not go through the route of a claim about the necessity of our following our practices of belief-attribution. I concentrate directly on the implications of having certain beliefs. Moreover, I hope for something more nearly like what Stroud calls a direct refutation of the sceptic. I do not think that it has been shown that we cannot explain, in light of the sceptic's question, reasonably and in a non-question-begging way, wherein we have knowledge and even wherein we can know we have knowledge. This route may not be any easier than the traditional routes that Stroud has convincingly criticized. But I believe that it is different.

Notes

1. See my (1986), p. 131.
2. For discussions of entitlement, see Burge (1993), (1995), (1997), (1999), and Perceptual Entitlement, forthcoming in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*.
3. See Davidson (1986); and Putnam (1991), chapter 1.
4. My Locke Lectures 1993 at Oxford were devoted to this topic. Since the issues are so difficult, I have published some of those lectures only with the antiskeptical objectives deleted. I hope eventually to provide a fuller treatment of the subject.
5. As I note in my reply to Loar, I did use one argument for anti-individualism from our practices of belief-attribution. But it was never my primary or only argument. The primary argument is from judgments, based on cases, about conditions under which it is metaphysically possible or impossible to have certain beliefs. The conclusion of the arguments was never primarily about our practices but always about the nature of belief. This point is quite explicit even in Burge (1979). See also Hahn's contribution to this volume, and my reply.
6. See Brueckner (1996).

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