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INTERLOCUTION, PERCEPTION, AND MEMORY

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David Christensen and Hilary Kornblith raise several interesting issues in their paper, "Testimony, Memory and the Limits of the *A Priori*". In response I will clarify and develop some lines in "Content Preservation".¹

I argued that in interlocution we have a general *a priori prima facie* (*pro tanto*) entitlement to rely on seeming understanding as genuine understanding. And we have a general *a priori prima facie* (*pro tanto*) entitlement to believe putative assertions that we seem to understand. These are two rational default positions. They can be overridden in particular cases if (possibly empirical) counterconsiderations arise. But if one lacks counterconsiderations, and if one has a minimal level of conceptual know-how, one is entitled to rely on one's seeming understanding of *particular* putative assertions. And one is further entitled to believe seemingly understood putative assertions – because *prima facie* they come from a rational source whose backing supports belief (assuming no counterconsiderations). If the seeming understanding is intellectual, one can, in the relevant particular cases (no counterconsiderations), be *a priori* entitled to rely on one's seeming understanding of putative assertions as genuine understanding of genuine assertions. And under the same conditions, one can be *a priori* entitled to accept particular putative assertions as true. An entitlement (whether it is *prima facie* or not) is *a priori* if neither sense experience nor perceptual belief constitute or enhance its justificational force.

What is it for understanding, seeming or actual, to be intellectual? The key idea is that it is understanding whose exercise in particular instances does not require in those instances perceptual warrant for the application of what is understood. A first approximation elaboration is that it is *conceptual* understanding that does not require, in

thinking and understanding an intentional content, perceptual warrant for the *de re* application of some aspect of the content. So one could have intellectual understanding of empirical concepts (that of a zebra) and empirical propositional contents, as well as mathematical concepts and propositions.

Intellectual understanding may require *having had* empirical experiences. They are part of learning *how* to use intellectual capacities. With empirical concepts like *red*, intellectual understanding requires being able to apply the concept with perceptual warrant to instances. But one need not perceive instances to exercise such conceptual capacities in particular cases, once one knows how to use them. So one's understanding of what is expressed by an occurrence of "Zebras are larger than red poppies" is intellectual. Thinking the intentional content with understanding does not require on particular occasions an empirically warranted *de re* application of an element in the content. By contrast, the intentional content of "That zebra is running for its life", as applied directly and non-anaphorically to a zebra, cannot be understood just intellectually.²

On my view, one's understanding assertive mode is commonly intellectual.³ One's understanding of asserted content is sometimes at the same time also intellectual. So one's seeming or presumptive understanding of putative assertions is sometimes intellectual.

A seeming understanding's being intellectual is necessary but not sufficient for one's being *a priori* entitled to rely upon that understanding. It is necessary because if perceptual warrant is implicated in the understanding, the understanding itself is partly empirically warranted. It is not sufficient because if reasonable empirical doubts arise about one's intellectual seeming-understanding, one's entitlement to rely upon it may require empirical supplement.

The two *a priori prima facie* entitlements I mentioned at the outset are rational starting points. They function for children at early stages of linguistic competence. They are salient in adults who lack information about their interlocutors, on topics they have no reason to think are problematic. To be entitled to accept what they are told, children or adults need not know that there are no counterconsiderations.⁴ Children may not conceive of counterconsiderations as possible. It is normally enough that there be no

available counter reasons. In such cases, they may be *a priori* entitled to accept what they are told.

I do not hold that we adults are in a high proportion of cases *a priori* entitled, all things considered, to particular beliefs acquired in interlocution. Perceptual elements are very frequently partly constitutive of our understanding. So understanding is often not purely intellectual. And our *a priori prima facie* entitlement to accept what we are told commonly needs empirical supplementation to override counterconsiderations. But we are sometimes so entitled. The nature of the *prima facie* entitlements is what interests me.

I

Perception enters into the acquisition of beliefs through interlocution in several ways. Christensen and Kornblith concentrate on the role of perception in understanding assertions. I acknowledged that perception is necessary for the acquisition of belief through interlocution. But I maintained that with respect to the default entitlements that we have in interlocution, and some of their applications in particular cases, perception functions only as a causal enabling condition, not as a contributor to the justificational force of our entitlement. I appealed to two analogies.

One is an analogy with the traditional rationalist view of the role of perception of symbols and diagrams in triggering understanding of (and belief in) a mathematical truth. On this view (with which I sympathize), perception is necessary to being justified in believing the theorem. But it need not contribute to the justificational force of one's justification. Even though perception is necessary to obtain such understanding, the justification flows from intellectual sources, from one's understanding and reason, not from perception.

The other analogy is with the role of memory in preserving thoughts over time in a deductive proof. One must rely on memory of earlier steps, and their assertive mode, to carry out the proof. Memory is necessary for reasoning in time. But appeals to memory are not normally part of our justification for believing the conclusion. The justification is the argument itself. *We* are justified by our having thought it through and understood it. But memory, though essential to our being justified, does not contribute to the epistemic force of our

reasoning; it simply preserves it. I claimed that in communication, perception plays a connecting and preservative role analogous to the role memory plays in deductive reasoning. Perception is necessary to understanding – even to being entitled to rely upon one’s understanding and to being entitled to one’s belief in what the interlocutor says. But it need not enhance the justificational force of one’s basic *prima facie* entitlements.⁵

Christensen and Kornblith target the first analogy. They emphasize a certain disanalogy between the case in which perception is used to trigger understanding of a mathematical truth and the case in which perception is used to understand a piece of interlocution. They point out that in the mathematical case, the understanding that the perception triggers is an understanding of propositional content. The justification flows from understanding the content alone. In interlocution, entitlement derives from understanding a putative assertion. They hold that the role of perception in understanding a putative assertion is inevitably justificatory and empirical.

The disanalogy can be sharpened. The classical account of understanding mathematical truths is not an account of one’s being justified in understanding the *presentation* of content. It is not central to the account whether the content understood is the content presented. What matters is that some appropriately understood mathematical truth is triggered and understood, regardless of its provenance. In interlocution, the understanding that perception triggers and to which the entitlement attaches is an understanding of an event, a presentation of content, not merely understanding of a content abstracted from any instantiations. We are further entitled to rely on understanding of the mode of the presentation – centrally an understanding of the event as an assertion. The second *prima facie* entitlement – to believe what one seemingly understands – derives from understanding an event as an assertion. At issue is understanding both the presentation of content and the presentation’s mode.

A further disanalogy is that the entitlements in interlocution derive from seeming understanding of the putative assertion. They do not require genuine understanding of a genuine assertion. In the classical account, the justification derives from genuine understanding of an abstract content.

As they acknowledge, I noted the disanalogy that they cite too.⁶ But I maintained that a *prima facie* entitlement to believe a putative assertion still rests on putative understanding alone. I took the disanalogy to force the epistemic warrants in interlocution to be *prima facie* entitlements rather than decisive justifications. I held that it did not prevent them from being *a priori*. I maintained that putative understanding alone yields an *a priori prima facie* connection to a rational source that is, other things equal, to be believed.⁷

In elaborating this view I want first to discuss understanding of assertive mode of a presentation event. Then I turn to understanding the content of a presentation event (cf. note 3). Why are we entitled to rely upon seeming understanding of presentations of content as *asserted*? I claimed that understanding the mode of instantiations of content is a corollary of, indeed a necessary condition for, understanding instantiations (including presentations) of content. So entitlement to rely upon seeming understanding of instantiations of content requires entitlement to rely upon seeming understanding of presentations-as-true, including assertions.

Here is a fuller explanation of this point. Assume for the sake of argument that we are *a priori prima facie* entitled to rely upon our intellectual, seeming understanding of instantiations (including presentations) of content as genuine understanding. It is necessary and *a priori* knowable that the entitlement for understanding instantiations of content gets its epistemic force partly from the presumption that we normally understand the mode of instantiations. The central sort of mode for these purposes is presentation-as-true, which includes assertion. Epistemic support for understanding presented content must normally include epistemic support for understanding presentations as assertions. So one is *a priori prima facie* entitled to rely upon one's seeming understanding of putative assertions as genuine understanding of genuine assertions.

This point then connects with the rest of the argument: there is a necessary and *a priori* knowable *prima facie* relation between a content's being asserted and its having rational backing, and between its having rational backing and being true. So assuming that one's seeming understanding is intellectual, one's seeming understanding of putative assertions provides one with an *a priori prima facie* entitlement to accept such contents as true.

The foregoing concentrated on the nature of our entitlement to rely on seeming understanding of assertive mode. It assumed for the sake of argument that we could be entitled *a priori* to rely upon seeming understanding of presentations or particular expressions of intentional content. We turn now to reflect on this assumption.

When we understand events that are expressions of content in interlocution, we must do this through perception. I think, however, that the justificational force of the relevant *prima facie* epistemic entitlement to rely upon seeming understanding of the content of presentations as genuine understanding, derives from the seeming understanding alone. Perception or perceptual belief can provide supplemental justificational force for one's presumption of understanding. But it need not contribute to the force of the epistemic warrant associated with the basic presumption. Given that one *has* the ability to understand, one is entitled to rely upon applications of seeming-understanding, including intellectual applications, *per se*. The *prima facie* entitlement is – in intellectual, undefeated applications – *a priori*.

How do Christensen and Kornblith argue that perception must contribute to the force of one's entitlement to rely upon seeming understanding of putative assertions? They give two arguments.

One continues the contrast with the mathematical case. If in understanding a mathematical truth, one were shown that one had hallucinated the symbols that called it to mind, one's justification for belief would not be undermined. But if one were given sufficient reason to believe that one had hallucinated one's interlocutor's telling one something, one's entitlement to believe what one had putatively been told would be undermined. They conclude that in the former case, perception plays (or may play) a triggering role, whereas in the latter, perception plays (or must play) a justificatory one.

The conclusion of the argument does not follow from the premises. In fact, the argument has no force at all. I grant the premises, but deny the conclusion. I maintain that one's entitlement derives from seeming understanding of a putative assertion (or more broadly, presentation-as-true). Other things equal, one has an epistemic entitlement to rely upon one's putative understanding of an asserted content, as genuine understanding. If one is given reason to believe that one has not understood any such assertive occurrence,

that reason can override one's *prima facie* entitlement to rely upon one's seeming understanding (and this in turn would override one's *prima facie* entitlement to believe the putative assertion). If one were shown that one had hallucinated, that would show that one had not understood an assertion. But it would not show that the initial entitlement gets its force from perception in addition to understanding – only that understanding depends on perception, which I already maintain.

Moreover, I emphasized in “Content Preservation” that reason or evidence that overrides one's *a priori prima facie* entitlement can be empirical. The fact that overriding considerations are empirical does not show that the entitlement to one's presumption of understanding, or to one's belief, is empirical. The nature of the initial positive justificational force is one matter. The nature of overriding considerations is another. Perception is a necessary condition for understanding an assertion. So evidence that one has not perceived anything will be evidence that one has not understood an assertion. Having such evidence can override one's default entitlements. But this fact has no tendency to show that the entitlements do not derive their justificational force purely from understanding, but must draw justificational force from perception as well. It shows only that the entitlements are empirically defeasible, which I already maintain.

Evidence that one has hallucinated is not the only evidence about perception failures that can override one's *a priori prima facie (pro tanto)* entitlement to rely upon one's seeming understanding. Suppose that one is subject to brute perceptual error that leads one seemingly to understand an assertion, when no assertion has occurred. Then one could later obtain empirical evidence that shows one had misperceived. Such evidence could override one's entitlement. Or suppose that one's understanding is veridical – that is, there is an assertion that one does understand; but suppose that one has non-veridical but excellent empirical evidence that one has misperceived. Again one's entitlement is in principle overrideable – since the *prima facie* entitlement rests on the seeming-intelligibility of a putative assertion, not on actual understanding of an actual assertion. These cases do not show that the relevant entitlements in interlocution are empirical. They show only, what I already maintain, that they are *prima facie*, and subject to empirical overrides.

We are not primarily concerned with whether or how the relevant entitlements are overrideable. We are concerned with the nature of the justificational force underlying those entitlements. I think that seeming understanding of a putative assertion can itself provide *prima facie* justificational force. One can override such force with an empirical reason to believe that one has not actually understood an assertion. But reliance on one's understanding is a rational starting point that need not be epistemologically grounded in anything about the perceptual conditions that make understanding possible.

Christensen and Kornblith's first argument does not touch this position. It begs the question by assuming that if empirical evidence can override a justification or entitlement, the justification or entitlement is itself empirical.

The role that perception plays in enabling understanding to take place makes it hard to separate out the distinctive epistemic entitlement associated with understanding. Let us consider hallucination again, going further in raising threats to my position. Not only can *evidence* of hallucination outweigh our *prima facie* entitlement to rely upon our understanding. But – whether or not we have evidence that we have hallucinated – actual hallucination can in particular cases undermine (in the sense of prevent our having) that entitlement. For the entitlement presupposes the actual normal functioning of faculties on which it depends. If the perceptual faculty malfunctions, seeming-understanding, which relies upon perception, can fail to carry epistemic warrant. This point might seem to show that the entitlement to rely upon seeming understanding is empirical. But it does not show this. There remains the question of whether perception contributes essentially to the epistemic force of the entitlement, as opposed to merely being a necessary condition on which the entitlement depends.

We have an entitlement to rely (at least *prima facie*) upon our intuitive mathematical judgments of validity, or of self-evidence, or of plausibility (given sufficient mathematical understanding and expertise), or upon our deductive reasoning. But our intuitive judgments depend on the proper functioning of our brains; and our deductive reasoning depends as well (in a different way) on the proper functioning of preservative memory. If brain-functioning or memory-functioning were to fail, our intuitions or reasoning could

seem compelling yet fail to carry any warrant. This fact hardly shows that the epistemic entitlement to rely upon mathematical judgment or deductive justifications, gets part of its justificational force from something about our brains or memories.

Are there cases where one is entitled to rely on one's seeming understanding even where one is not entitled to rely upon the perceptions that purport to put one on to what one's interlocutor uttered? *Prima facie* entitlement to rely upon seeming understanding can certainly survive brute perceptual errors. But brute perceptual errors are those that occur despite one's being entitled to rely upon one's perception. Most failures of perceptual entitlement that are not matters of malfunctioning (as hallucination is) involve some conceptual interference or prejudice. But these failures are rational failures and would involve misuse or malfunctioning of one's rational powers. These would tend to undermine one's entitlement to seeming-understanding as well as one's entitlement to one's perception.

I think, however, that one can sometimes be entitled to rely on one's seeming-understanding of another's discourse even though one has been negligent (even negligently mistaken) in one's perception of what the other person uttered. Let us suppose that the negligence undermines the perceptual entitlement. For example, suppose that one's interlocutor misspeaks and one fails to notice the tongue slip by being perceptually careless. Suppose, that one's understanding of what the other person said is governed by considerations of intellectual plausibility (imagine it to be a simple mathematical truth); so that one's understanding of the person's meaning is warranted and veridical. Then one could be entitled to rely upon one's seeming understanding of what the other person said, even though one might lack entitlement to, and be mistaken about, one's perception of what the other person uttered. (It does not matter whether what the person means is what the person "said". Perhaps there is a sense in which it is; perhaps not. What matters is that one is *prima facie* entitled to one's seeming understanding of what the person said – even though one lacks perceptual entitlement.) This point suggests, though it does not entail, that one's reliance on one's understanding – in particular cases and in general – can be a source of epistemic warrant, independent of perceptual contribution to the warrant's force.⁸

But even if one's entitlement to rely upon one's seeming understanding always lapsed when one lacks entitlement to rely upon one's (apparent) perception of what the other person uttered, it would not follow that one's entitlement to rely upon one's seeming understanding is empirical. Take any piece of reasoning in which one relies upon preservative memory but (say, because it malfunctions) in which one is not entitled to do so. Such a piece of reasoning will fail to warrant acceptance of its conclusion. But preservative memory does not contribute to the justificational force of reasoning. It makes reasoning possible without contributing to its force. I think that the perception normally involved in understanding putative assertions plays a similar role in the epistemology of interlocution.

Perception is one source of epistemic warrant. Understanding is another. We are all familiar with epistemologies that take (implicit or explicit) inference from perception to be at the root of understanding others' speech. Such epistemologies do not seem to me plausible. They make understanding in communication a matter of interpretation or translation, when it seems, in normal cases, to be epistemically immediate, once the capacity for understanding is in place. Inference from perception in normal interlocution seems more characteristic of cases when there is some breakdown or failure of communication, or some special, non-normal use of language.

One might claim that understanding just seems to be epistemically immediate. The inference from perceptual belief is unconscious and implicit. But this appears to me to be analogous to views that build the epistemology of perception on implicit inferences from sense data or from registrations of stimulation of the retina. The position seems to confuse psychology with epistemology.

There must always be a psychological story in individual cases that explains a route from sounds and shapes through perception to understanding. Perhaps such a story will enter into some science. But in interlocution understanding seems normally to be epistemically immediate, a defeasible, epistemically warranted starting point. Our reliance on our understanding is in itself no less epistemically fundamental than our reliance on our perception. Other things equal, our seeming-understanding needs no justification by reference to perception, once perceptual and conceptual know-how are in place. It can be given supplementary support by appeal to perception, rather as

perceptual belief can be given supplementary support by appeal to beliefs about appearances or perceptual sensations. But the primary entitlement to rely upon understanding stands on its own.

Strictly speaking, we do not perceive the assertive mode, or the conceptual content, of utterances. We understand them. These are exercises of intellectual capacities. We understand events as assertions by perceiving other aspects of assertions. We understand the concepts in assertions, by perceiving expressions of them. But here perception is part of the condition for exercising the intellectual capacity, not – or not normally – part of the warrant for the individual's relying on his understanding. It is a necessary triggering mechanism, but it is not the understanding itself. In the order of epistemic warrant, seeming understanding is a rational starting point. Insofar as seeming understanding is normally an epistemic starting point with its own justificational force – not the *epistemic* product of an inference (explicit or implicit) –, and insofar as such understanding is sometimes purely intellectual, it must carry an *a priori* entitlement (cf. note 7).

Intellectual seeming-understanding is subject to empirical correction. But we can sometimes be warranted in relying upon our conceptual know-how in understanding assertions, without the warrant's being bolstered by perception or perceptual belief. It is enough that one have a capacity to understand – have some degree of reliability in understanding – and know how to use the capacity. I think that being reliable in normal circumstances can be shown to be necessary to a capacity for seeming-understanding, in something like the way that a capacity to register perceptual appearances can be shown to be necessarily reliable in normal circumstances (in order to count as a capacity for perceptual appearances). I believe, however, that I have not gotten to the bottom of this matter. I hope to have suggested some grounds for thinking my view worth exploring further.

II

Christensen and Kornblith's second argument consists in a challenge to distinguish the entitlement involved in interlocution, which I claim to be *a priori*, from entitlements involved in certain clear cases of empirical justifications or entitlements. They compare inter-

locution to our acquiring beliefs about the time from looking at a clock. The clock example is representative of a range of examples of belief acquisition from observing scientific instruments, especially instruments with conventionally established, linguistic ways of reading their indications. Beliefs acquired from these instruments are normally empirically justified, or carry empirical entitlements. The challenge is to say what differentiates entitlements to the relevant beliefs derived from interlocution.

Here I think that Christensen and Kornblith raise an interesting issue. I had deleted a section of a draft of “Content Preservation” which sought to say something about it – postponing the attempt. I hope to make some progress here.

I agree, of course, that the conventional mode of expression on a clock’s dial, which introduces a rational element into the causal chain relating our beliefs to the time, does not by itself give one a non-empirical entitlement to beliefs acquired from looking at the clock. I also agree that whether one makes sub-conscious inferences from a perceptual belief about the clock’s face, or simply forms a non-inferential perceptual belief about the time from looking at the clock’s face, is not an issue that is crucial to whether one’s justification or entitlement is empirical.

The issue has to do with the nature of the understanding in the two cases (interlocutor and clock) and with the nature of the connection between understanding and subject matter. I did not deal with the closely related matter of the relation between perceptual entitlement and interlocutional entitlement in a satisfactory way in “Content Preservation”. But I think that I was nevertheless on to an important difference in the passage my critics quote:

The relation between words and their subject matter and content [in interlocution] is not an *ordinary*, natural, lawlike causal-explanatory relation. Crudely speaking, it involves a mind.⁹

Their discussion of this passage gets off track. I do not hold that minds are “set apart from the same causal order that encompasses clocks”. My emphasis on “ordinary” was meant to indicate that mind-involving relations may be special cases of lawlike, causal-explanatory relations. I took no position on this. Moreover, this challenge is fruitless: “If minds are part of the causal order, we have been given no reason for thinking that a mind-mediated connection

cannot be ordinary lawlike or causal-explanatory.” I took it that in involving a mind, the connection is *ipso facto* not “ordinary”. My concern was not to suggest that the connections are not lawlike or causal-explanatory, but to suggest that they are sometimes not empirical connections, from the point of view of understanding epistemic warrant, because of the role of mind in the connection.

I thought that the role of mind in the relation between words, their subject matter, and their intentional content is relevant this way: it makes possible an *a priori*, conceptual, connection between seeming understanding of a putative assertion and being rationally entitled to form beliefs. A seemingly understood putative assertion is a *prima facie* sign of rational backing for the assertion and rational commitment to truth; and rational backing together with rational commitment constitute a *prima facie* sign of truth. Even if this epistemic connection must be associated with a law-like, causal explanatory relation (one that relates one’s understanding through perception to utterances and to a subject matter), the epistemic account of interlocution will be different from that of the epistemic connection between belief, clock-dial, and subject matter – which is of course itself associated with a law-like, causal explanatory relation. In the latter case, the reliability of the causal relation carries most of the epistemology, without reference to reason.

It is true that minds figured in the relation between one’s beliefs about the time and the subject matter of the clock dial. Minds gave the clock dial meaning – and played a role in making the clock. In the case of more sophisticated scientific instruments, understanding the empirical theory behind them is needed to understand their outputs. But these roles are different in epistemically relevant ways from the role of minds in interlocution. Let me develop these metaphorical suggestions in a more concrete way.

Reading a clock or other instrument differs from understanding interlocution in two ways. What one understands is different. And the relation between what one understands and the way the instrument or interlocutor relate to the subject matter is different.

In reading a clock, one does not understand what one reads as an assertion or presentation-as-true. There is no intentional intellectual act on the part of the instrument. More fundamentally, we do not rely on rationality in the instrument. The instrument is not understood as

carrying through reasoning about a subject matter. (An appropriately complex talking robot might be different.)

Although the presence of linguistically intelligible signs on the instrument would bespeak the presence of rationality in the chain linking one with the subject matter, we understand that the clock has been set up to provide merely a natural sign of, or natural meaning in Grice's sense about, the subject matter. More precisely, we do not – and are not entitled to – understand its outputs as intelligible acts of assertion, or as any other expression of reason.

The entitlement in interlocution rests on a *prima facie* conceptual relation between assertions, reason, and truth about a subject matter. One does not understand clocks as asserting anything or as otherwise expressing rational processes. And the chain relating clocks' outputs to their subject matter does not support a conceptual relation featuring only understanding and reason. The relation is not guided by reason. Thus putative understanding of the clock's output does not entitle us to rely upon a *a priori prima facie* conceptual connections between understanding, reason, and truth (connections which we need not have mastered to have the entitlement, but which can be understood *a priori*). Our understanding of a clock's output does not entitle us to rely *prima facie* on the source's being rational, as our understanding of an interlocutor does.

In learning to understand scientific instruments, we understand these matters – or at least lack an understanding of instruments that would allow us to rely on them as expressions of reasoning. Simple instruments are mere amplifications of our perceptual powers. More sophisticated empirical instruments may incorporate checking devices. But even in these cases, with possible exceptions like the one already noted, we do not rely on their carrying out rational processes and being committed to truth. We rely on them as non-rational reliable indicators. Our warrant for relying on them is empirical.¹⁰

Of course, we can often infer from the fact that the instrument is an artifact that reason went into its construction. We can infer that reason was involved in setting up the non-rational mechanism for providing reliable indications about the subject matter. But this is an inference from empirically justified belief about the artifact as object. One's warrant does not derive purely from seeming understanding

of putative expressions of reason. What is operating in one's justification is a substantive thesis *about* the thing's being an artifact, not a preservation of instances of reasoning. The instrument itself does no such reasoning, nor does it express any. The meta-reasoning about the artifact introduces empirical elements that simple preservation through understanding does not.

In understanding others we are in a position to rely on the fact that seemingly understood putative assertions are a *prima facie* sign of rationality or reasoning. Insofar as we are relying alone on the rationality of our source, our entitlement is *a priori*.

Our not understanding empirical instruments as we would rational beings is probably the most central reason why our warrant for relying upon them is not *a priori*. But there are other considerations. I am not in a position to develop these in detail because there is much I do not understand. But I want to broach one of them.

Even in understanding human interlocutors, our entitlement to accept what they tell us often fails to be *a priori* because our understanding is not purely intellectual. Often understanding what another person says involves seeing what the person is pointing to. In such cases, our warrant for believing what the interlocutor asserts depends partly on warrants backing our perception.

It is not clear to me how far this empirical *de re* element in understanding extends. But one sort of extension is to a case like this: The interlocutor provides a context-dependent indicator of a particular object, where the indicator is a component in what he tells us. Suppose that the indicator is understood to indicate and track some individual or event that the interlocutor can see, but we cannot. In at least some cases of this sort, we seem to be engaging in deferred ostension: we see the indicator and take it as our means of "demonstrating" an individual or event that we cannot perceive. We seem to use the indicator as an amplification of our perceptual powers, since we understand it to be connected to the referent that it indicates through deferred perceptual means.

The indicator is not an expression of a general descriptive concept of the individual. It tracks the presence, absence, or changes of the indicated individual or event. Perhaps it changes in some conventionally understood way in accord with how the object changes. The indicator contributes a perceptually backed *de re* element to our

understanding of what the interlocutor tells us about the individual. And our epistemic warrant for understanding the *de re* element is empirical. Our understanding is not purely intellectual; and our entitlement to accept what we are told is not *a priori*.

Now some such *de re* empirical element seems to be part of much understanding of scientific instruments. Normally we understand the instruments' readings as tracking, in a context-dependent manner, particular state or property instantiations, or aspects of particular events or individuals. The relation of the instruments' indicators to the particulars that they indicate often seems broadly analogous to a deferred demonstrative perceptual relation.¹¹ The instruments are amplifications of our perceptual powers in relating us *de re* to particulars. I do not claim that all instruments for yielding information about the empirical world provide us with an empirically backed *de re* relation to particulars. But I think that most do. The instruments' role is normally to help track individual events or property instantiations by means that are not purely conceptual. In most cases understanding contents that include such tracking seem to require empirical warrant through a kind of deferred empirically backed ostension.¹² But interlocutors can provide us with non-empirical information; and they can provide empirical information in purely conceptual form. So our understanding of content in interlocution can be intellectual in a way that allows our entitlement to the understanding – and beliefs based upon it – to be *a priori*.

How deep a role empirically backed *de re* understanding plays in the empiricity of our warrants for relying on scientific instruments is a matter that I leave open. I hope that I have broached the subject in a way that will prove fruitful.

III

The last part of Christensen and Kornblith's paper deals with purely preservative memory, which was the key to the second analogy I offered – the analogy between perception in interlocution and preservative memory in deductive argument. They raise objections to my discussion of preservative memory. They begin my misdescribing my views about it. Perhaps my exposition was at fault. But I do not invoke "the distinction between explicit invocation of memory as

a premise and implicit reliance on memory to divide the empirical from the *a priori*” (p. 12). Preservative and substantive memory are distinguished by their function, not their degree of explicitness; and they do not mark the divide between the *a priori* and the empirical.

Substantive memory frequently functions even if it is not invoked explicitly. And preservative memory can be conscious as well as unconscious. Moreover, substantive memory can participate in an *a priori* justification, if its object is a past intellectual event (say if one remembers thinking the *cogito*). And preservative memory can, frequently does, preserve empirical thoughts and warrants.

The difference has to do with the function of the two sorts of memory. Preservative memory preserves thoughts and their assertive mode, and does not contribute new elements in a justification, or add to justificational force. Substantive memory refers to events or objects and provides elements in a justification, whether or not the justification is explicit (or conscious).

I have shown, I think, that preservation memory – memory that preserves beliefs with their justifications, but contributes no independent source of justification – is epistemically necessary if we are to understand any argument as justifying beliefs through the steps of the argument. I think it unquestionable that preservative memory *normally* preserves not only beliefs but warrants (at least as entitlements, often as justifications) for the beliefs it preserves. This can be argued on *a priori* grounds, assuming only that we reason in time and are sometimes entitled to beliefs that we argue for.

Christensen and Kornblith provide two reasons “for doubting that the distinction between substantive and purely preservative memory can mark the border of the *a priori*” (p. 13). Since I do not mark the border this way, we will have to consider these reasons carefully.

The first reason rests on the example of someone’s remembering a theorem, but not remembering how he or she acquired the belief. Christensen and Kornblith appear to assume that on my view, as long as she does not invoke memory explicitly, her justification is *a priori*. They cite against this the possibility that she learned the theorem in an *a posteriori* way. But the objection rests on a mistake about my view. If she relies upon preservative memory (consciously or not) and that memory preserves in an appropriate way an acquisition that rests on an *a priori* entitlement or justification, then her current belief

(or its warrant) is *a priori*.¹³ If preservative memory appropriately preserves an empirically entitled belief, then her current belief is empirical. It does not matter whether she remembers how she learned the theorem. What matters is how she in fact learned it and whether her memory preserves those beliefs from those acquisitions in an appropriate way. So their first objection is irrelevant.

They produce a supplementary objection to a position that is closer to mine. They consider the view that whether a justification of a memory-based belief is *a priori* or not depends on historical factors, such as how the person acquired the belief in the first place. They object to this view because they think

it entails that two people could remember the same fact – indeed, they could share all the same present beliefs, reasons, cognitive abilities, and memories – and one of them be justified *a priori* and the other justified *a posteriori*, because one of them had done the proof 20 years ago, while the other had taken a student's word for it after self-consciously considering the possibility that he was lying [where each has forgotten the original grounds for the belief].

If a person remembers the theorem she has proved, but has no access to the proof, then the person is not *justified* (has no justification, in my sense of justification) for believing the theorem. In the case described, neither person has a *justification* for belief in the theorem. But what are we to say about their *entitlements*? Insofar as they are entitled to believe the theorem, their entitlements are surely different.

Although nothing in “Content Preservation” commits me on this matter, I believe that a person clearly *can be* entitled to believe a theorem she believes because of preservative memory even if she cannot remember the proof she gave long ago, and even if she cannot remember that she gave a proof. Most of what one is entitled to believe from past reading, past interlocution, past reasoning, or past empirical learning, derives from sources and warrants that one has forgotten.

Why is the person entitled to believe the theorem when she has forgotten the proof? By hypothesis, the person has a properly functioning preservative memory of the belief; and the belief derives from the acquisition or reinforcement of the belief through proof. Preservative memory does not contribute to the force of the justification or entitlement. The force of the entitlement derives from the nature of the warrant for the acquisition of the belief, a warrant that, via

preservative memory, entitles the person still to believe the theorem. The entitlement to believe the theorem is *a priori* because the entitlement derives from the original *a priori* justification. Similarly, the person who originally acquired the belief empirically, would retain an empirical entitlement. Given the plausible view that we are entitled (at least normally) to beliefs preserved in memory even if we do not remember the grounds for these beliefs, I find these results unexceptionable.

The objection was that it is unintuitive that two people “could share all the same present beliefs, reasons, cognitive abilities, and memories – and one of them be justified *a priori* and the other justified *a posteriori*”. The view just stated does not entail this result. As I have noted, it makes a claim about entitlement, not justification. Further, although the two relevant people remember the same belief, it seems to me very doubtful that their memories are properly individuated as the same, given that they preserve a belief that in the two cases was associated with very different types of warrant. It is doubtful that a preservative memory can be individuated independently of the warrant that it preserves. In either case, I find the idea that the two people have different warrants (here, entitlements) for their belief fairly obvious.

In special cases (say, when memory is reasonably called into question), one’s entitlement to maintain a belief when one has lost access to one’s original grounds may come to depend on meta-reasoning about the reliability of one’s memory. Such warrant might be empirical. But a generalization of this view would be preposterously hyper-intellectualized. An individual’s warrant for relying on memory-preserved beliefs when he forgets his grounds is not normally an empirically justified meta-belief in the reliability of his memory. The entitlement to rely, without justification, on beliefs retained by preservative memory greatly outruns the ability to call up the warrants for the beliefs that are preserved. If it did not, very little of what we count as knowledge would be knowledge.

The entitlement to the remembered belief seems to derive from the warrant for the original belief. For we would not be entitled to the belief if it were preserved from *unwarranted* acquisitions that we had forgotten: we cannot, I think, become warranted by forgetting

the poor grounds originally had, and then relying on the remembered belief.

The second objection to my conception of preservative memory centers on observations about how memory works. Christensen and Kornblith emphasize the degree to which background beliefs affect memory. I accept this emphasis. But I do not think that my proposals about epistemic warrant are affected. We may rely on background empirical beliefs in maintaining a view. These beliefs may mix with and reinforce our *a priori* grounds for the view. We may have empirical and *a priori* warrants for the same conclusion. The question in judging whether a warrant is *a priori* is always whether there is a line of justification or entitlement to whose justificational force sense experience makes no contribution. Arguing that empirical background beliefs affect the epistemic status of beliefs based on memory does not show that those beliefs do not have *a priori* warrant. It shows only that they have empirical warrant. One can have both.

Christensen and Kornblith discuss a case in which someone acquired the belief that the Vikings preceded Columbus “for good reasons”, remembers that the Vikings preceded Columbus, but does not remember how she acquired the belief. They think mistakenly that the fact that she does not explicitly think about the fact that she is relying on her memory makes it the case that her belief hinges on purely preservative memory. But let us suppose that the belief does hinge on purely preservative memory, in my sense, going back to the original acquisition. They further suppose that she is able to retrieve the belief from memory only because it is “inferentially connected” with other beliefs about the Vikings. They maintain that whether the belief is justified depends on whether these other beliefs are justified. So if the belief were inferentially integrated with irrational beliefs, the belief would not be justified.

They consider an objection that the initial warrant “provided by . . . purely preservative memory is present, but is *undermined* by the belief’s inferential connections with other beliefs” (p. 17). They reject the view that there is any initial *prima facie* warrant because irrational beliefs with which the Viking belief is integrated call into question neither the Viking belief nor the workings of preservative memory. They maintain that the problem lies with the memory. They claim that the justificatory power of a memory cannot be divorced

from the justificatory status of beliefs whose inferential connections sustain it.

They appear to see this example as refuting the view that preservative and substantive uses of memory correspond, respectively, to *a priori* and empirical justifications. But this, as I have noted, is not my view. A belief that the Vikings preceded Columbus adopted for good reasons will be *empirically* justified, and the belief retained by preservative memory would remain empirically warranted.¹⁴

Let us imagine that the individual acquired the belief without reasons but with an *a priori prima facie* entitlement to accept what she is told. Suppose that the belief is retained from this acquisition by preservative memory. Suppose that memory is sustained by the belief's being inferentially integrated with empirical beliefs. Suppose that apart from this causal sustenance, the memory would have lapsed.

Here again we face issues about how justifications or entitlements (as distinguished from beliefs) are retained by preservative memory. In "Content Preservation" I held only that in normal argumentation, one's justification was retained over time through argument. What I said about the analogy between perception in interlocution and preservative memory in argument is independent of how one glosses cases in which one's initial grounds are not only forgotten but inaccessible to reflective memory.

Still, what are we to say? One must distinguish between the causal role of the inferential background beliefs and their role in justification. Lots of beliefs and experiences might function mnemonically to help sustain preservative memory. Some might have no justificatory connection to the preserved belief. The fact that a psychological condition keeps preservative memory going does not show that the condition bears on the epistemic status of the preserved belief. It seems clear that we are commonly entitled to beliefs retained by preservative memory even though we have forgotten the circumstances of their acquisition and our warrant for them.

For the sake of argument I will adopt the possibly over-simple view (cf. note 13) that as long as preservative memory works to preserve a warranted belief from its initial acquisition, one has at least a *prima facie* entitlement to the belief, which derives from entitlements or justifications originally associated with the belief.

Suppose one's initial warrant is *a priori*. Then, of course, one could acquire additional empirical grounds, good or bad, for the same belief. And it might happen (though I think this by itself is epistemically irrelevant) that these additional beliefs causally sustain the memory that goes back to the acquisition. Without them, the memory would have lapsed. Then one has different sources of possible warrant – those preserved by the original memory and those associated with the subsequently acquired empirical beliefs whose inferential connections to the belief help support it epistemically.

Christensen and Kornblith believe that these suppositions are mistaken. They think that there is not even a *prima facie* entitlement to the belief that derives from the belief's being preserved from its initially warranted acquisition, in cases where the belief is "inferentially integrated" with other beliefs. I disagree, *at least if (as they seem to stipulate) there remains a preservative memory connection to the times the belief was held with the original good warrant*. The individual need not remember the acquisition of the belief as an event, of course. It is enough that the belief is preserved in memory from that acquisition. If the inferentially connected background beliefs were given up; and if the relevant preservative memory were still sustained by some other (say, epistemically irrelevant) means; and if the individual still remembered that the Vikings preceded Columbus; then the individual would surely be entitled to that belief, even if the individual could not justify it or remember how or when she acquired it.

I can imagine positions that would accept this point but hold that while the individual had the irrational beliefs supporting the same conclusion, the individual would lack even *prima facie* entitlement to the belief. But I find such positions implausible. The *prima facie* entitlement seems to be present all the way through because of the individual's memory connection to an epistemically warranted acquisition of the belief. Of course, if there remains no causal memory-connection to the period of the original warrant, and the only preservative memory relations are to times when the belief was supported by irrational grounds, then one has no entitlement preserved from one's original warrant.

Where one has a *prima facie* entitlement deriving from a warrant preserved by preservative memory and one also has inferential

empirical justifications (good or bad), one has two sources of warrant. These should be epistemically distinguished, regardless of how complex and overgrown the psychological situation is. One source might be *a priori* and the other empirical. I see no difficulty here.

What are we to say about whether the individual is entitled to the belief *all things considered*, in the case where his background empirical inferential support is irrational, but his memory derives from a belief acquisition that was rational? We continue to suppose that the individual cannot remember the initial rational warrant, but he has a good *prima facie* entitlement for the belief. As Christensen and Kornblith in effect point out, the bad reasons do not impugn the good entitlement. It is not obvious to me that they *must* undermine the entitlement. In many cases they can be seen as purporting to reinforce a warrant that the individual already has: it is just that the reinforcement that they purport to add is worthless.

Again, if the irrational beliefs were given up and some other element causally sustained the preservative memory deriving from the initial acquisition, the individual would still believe (apparently with entitlement) the proposition. Perhaps there are cases where the entitlement is overridden by the bad reasons for the same belief. Since the individual cannot cite the *prima facie* entitlements, perhaps the bad reasons she can cite sometimes dominate. But if she is not so entitled, it is because she relies on bad reasons, even though she *has* a source of rational entitlement. What I think mistaken is the view that the defect lies in the warrant (entitlement) preserved by the memory that the Vikings preceded Columbus. Preservative memory tracing back to the time of the original acquisition carries, I think, a *prima facie* entitlement to maintain the belief.

Obviously in such a case, there will be various memory routes which the individual cannot sort out: those tracing to the original acquisition, and those tracing to instances of inferential empirical support (good or bad) for the same belief that came along later. All routes preserve the same belief but do so in epistemically different ways. Epistemic warrants stem from these routes in ways that are largely independent of whether the individual can sort out the routes or warrants. The route to the original acquisition is, we are assuming, causally and epistemically traceable. There is no defect there.

Normally where the memory route is intact, some warrant, at least *prima facie* entitlement, would seem to be preserved.

It would be a mistake to underrate the normative strength of preservative memory mechanisms that tie present to past practice, or the independence of warrant preserving mechanisms from the individual's ability to call them up. Like intentional content, much epistemic warrant depends on normatively loaded causal chains which need not be fully available to the individual.

NOTES

¹ David Christensen and Hilary Kornblith, "Testimony, Memory and the Limits of the *A Priori*," *Philosophical Studies* 86 (1997), pp. 1–20 (this issue). Their paper responds to my "Content Preservation" *The Philosophical Review* 102 (1993), pp. 457–488.

² Thus, given the views I outlined three paragraphs back, I maintain that in interlocution one can on occasion be *a priori* entitled to rely upon one's intellectual, seeming understanding of (and even *a priori* entitled to believe) propositions which can only be *known* empirically. The default entitlement to believe propositions one receives in interlocution presumes a more primary epistemic warrant somewhere in the chain of interlocutors. An *a priori* entitlement carried by the recipient of communication frequently relies upon necessarily empirical primary warrants that others have. I presume that a primary epistemic warrant for belief in the general proposition about zebras can only be empirical. Inasmuch as knowledge gained through interlocution depends on there being primary epistemic warrants that others have, the recipient's knowledge will be empirical even though his own individual entitlement to belief may be *a priori* – in the sense of "*a priori*" defined in "Content Preservation", *op. cit.* Some of the matters just glossed are discussed in more detail in that article.

³ One of the ways in which the elaborated characterization of intellectual understanding is a first approximation is that it does not elaborate what it means to understand assertive mode intellectually. Getting this right is complex, and not something I will attempt here. The initial explication of "intellectual understanding" will have to suffice in that case, for the present. The assertive mode of an assertion is not part of its content, so the approximate characterization in terms of application of elements of the content is not directly relevant. But the main difficulty is that understanding assertive mode, though commonly what I want to count "intellectual" in the rough intuitive sense I began with, is not entirely conceptual. (Cf. note 12 for an analogous source of complexification in the account of intellectual understanding, even of understanding of intentional content.) So my account of intellectual understanding in terms of conceptual understanding is an oversimplification from the beginning. The claim that understanding assertive mode is commonly intellectual thus invites further elaboration. The situation may appear to be even worse for me in that the claim is surely one that Christensen and Kornblith would dispute, on any elaboration of it that would serve my purposes. So clarification is needed at this central point. (The approximation that I have

given in the text will suffice for the content of empirical generalizations, such as *zebras are larger than poppies*. My claim that understanding in those cases can be intellectual, in the sense given in the text, should be uncontroversial. The controversy in that case centers on whether we can be *a priori* entitled to rely upon seeming understanding of what an utterance's content is, granted that the understanding is intellectual.) I believe, however, that most of what I will say in favor of the *a priori* of our entitlement to rely upon our seeming understanding of particular putative assertions is independent of exactly how I characterize intellectual understanding of assertive mode. For I think that the most salient epistemic issues arise about understanding *expressive events*, or uttered presentations of content as opposed to abstract content, regardless of whether the mode or the content of the uttered expressions is at issue. I will, however, have more to say about understanding assertive mode.

⁴ John Biro, in "Testimony and Apriori Knowledge" *Philosophical Issues* 6 (1995), argues that particular applications of the general entitlement to rely upon one's understanding cannot be *a priori* because one cannot know *a priori* that there are no (possibly empirical) counterconsiderations to one's general entitlement. This argument rests on a misunderstanding of my Acceptance Principle in "Content Preservation" op. cit. The Acceptance Principle is: *A person is [a priori] entitled to accept a proposition that is [taken to be] presented as true and that is [seemingly] intelligible to him, unless there are stronger reasons not to do so.* (I have entered the bracketed clarifications. All are explicit in my original explanations of the principle, though I failed to make them explicit in the statement of the principle itself. None of them is relevant to Biro's argument.) The force of "unless there are stronger reasons not to do so" is to indicate that the person's entitlement is *prima facie*. The principle says that the entitlement holds unless there are stronger reasons (available to the person) that override it. It does not say that the person must know there are no stronger reasons; the individual may lack the concept of a stronger reason, and in any case need not rule out the existence of defeaters in advance. It is enough for the individual's being warranted that there *are* no defeaters; defeaters of the entitlement must be available to him. As Glenn Branch pointed out to me, an individual with the right conceptual abilities *might* know through non-empirical self-knowledge that there are no relevant counterconsiderations. On the other hand, it might be that some candidate counterconsiderations could be known not to be stronger only through empirical considerations. But the main point is that the individual does not have to *know* that there are no stronger reasons counting against the *a priori* entitlement in order for the *a priori prima facie* entitlement to entitle him to belief. It is enough that there *be* none that are available to him.

⁵ Although Christensen and Kornblith acknowledge this distinction between genetic and epistemic roles for a cognitive capacity, they often state the dispute in ways that ignore it. For example, they write, "The root intuition we are trying to capture [in deciding whether something is *a priori*] involves a distinction between learning about the world through our senses and learning about the world through thought" (p. 9). On my view, and most rationalist views, one's learning about the world through the senses, as a genetic matter, need not compromise the *a priori* of a justification, as long as the senses play a merely enabling role rather than a justificatory one. Similarly, they write, apparently in criticism of my view, "Propositional content does not pass directly from one mind to another; rather the

passage is mediated by perception of an utterance . . .” (p. 12). As a description of the causal process there is of course no disagreement here. My metaphor of passage of propositional content from one mind to another concerned the account of justification, and explicitly acknowledged the essential role of perception in mediating communication.

⁶ Cf. “Content Preservation”, op. cit. p. 480, note 19. There are also, of course, differences in what is required for knowledge. Although one has a *prima facie* entitlement in interlocution to belief based on seeming understanding of a putative assertion (presuming that one’s seeming understanding involves a genuine content that one is thinking), one has knowledge only if one does understand a genuine assertion. In the mathematical case, one can have knowledge as well as justification regardless of whether one has understood an assertion, or indeed any communication, as long as one genuinely understands a relevantly simple logical or mathematical truth.

⁷ The argument for the *a priori* connections between seeming understanding of putative assertion and *prima facie* rationality of the source, and between such rationality and the truth of the putative assertion, is given in “Content Preservation”, op. cit. There is much to be said about this argument. But Christensen and Kornblith do not discuss it. They concentrate on my claim that we have *a priori prima facie* entitlement to rely upon seeming understanding of an assertion. So I will not defend the larger argument here.

⁸ It does not entail it, of course, because one might claim that the entitlement to rely on the understanding derives from other previous perceptual entitlements. I do not think that this is so. I do not think that any reasonable inductive or perceptual inference can explain our entitlement to rely upon our seeming understanding of strangers in unusual contexts. And I do not think that perceptual experience that precedes acquiring understanding plays an indispensable role in justifying applications of our intellectual faculties. But the point in the text is not meant to settle the issue about the nature of our entitlement to rely upon understanding. It is just to explore the relation between understanding and perception, showing that our entitlement to rely upon understanding can be independent of particular perceptual entitlements in the context of that understanding.

⁹ “Content Preservation”, op. cit. p. 479.

¹⁰ As empirical scientific instruments approach the sophistication of androids in the way they express and process information, they become more nearly like interlocutors. Whether there is a *sharp* line between a rational source and a sophisticated empirical instrument (with lots of the functions or reason) is a deep question in the philosophy of mind.

¹¹ This is, I think, one important difference between computers that we rely on to solve mathematical problems and most scientific instruments. I argue elsewhere – in “Computer Proof, Apriori Knowledge, and Other Minds”, forthcoming – that we can obtain *a priori* mathematical knowledge through computer aided proofs. It is not just that the computers rely on rational processes, and that we can be entitled to understand this by understanding their output. It is that the computers do not put us into *de re* empirical relations to a subject matter. Our understanding of their output is purely intellectual.

¹² I think that all *de re* relations to times or particulars in time involve non-conceptual elements in the mode of reference. Cf. my “Belief *De Re*” *The Journal of Philosophy* 74 (1977), pp. 338–363. But I do not think that *understanding*

contents that involve such *de re* elements always involves *empirical* warrants, or perceptual application. I believe that certain *de re* contents (for example, those involving *I* and certain uses of *now* and perhaps *here*) can be understood without being backed by a warrant whose epistemic force derives (even partly) from sense experience. One can understand such *de re* contents through mastering a conceptual rule, and applying the rule with such understanding in a context, where the application is not guided by the senses, only by thought. In effect, one allows the context to provide a *re* given the intellectual application of the rule. The application need not be guided by perception. Such understanding seems to me to be intellectual in a way that would not preclude an *a priori* justification or entitlement. So it appears that applicational elements in thought can be intellectual, without themselves being wholly conceptual. I think that understanding instances of the *cogito* is intellectual but not purely conceptual. The intentional content of such instances involves *de re* non-conceptual elements of application, but the understanding of the instances is not normally guided by sense experience. There are analogs in understanding *de re* elements (e.g. tensed elements) in thoughts about physical objects. These matters obviously complicate the relation between *de re* contents and the nature of one's epistemic entitlement to rely on one's understanding of such contents.

¹³ I will return to "appropriate way". Preservative memory does not add to one's justification or entitlement. But there may be conditions on preservation of justification or entitlement that go beyond merely preservation of the belief. I am sceptical about such conditions' looming large, but I leave room for their possibility.

¹⁴ There is perhaps an even more serious mistake in the discussion. It was part of my characterization of preservative memory that it does *not* confer or enhance warrant (neither *a priori* nor empirical warrant). It preserves beliefs and, normally, their warrant. We are entitled to rely on it. But it is not itself an element in an individual's justification: it provides no justification, and adds nothing to the force of justification or entitlement. They appear to be asking whether the warrant provided by preservative memory is genuine, overridden, or dependent on other matters. This would be a misunderstanding, unless "provided" simply means "preserved". Later (p. 18) they speak of the "justificatory power of memory", again suggesting this basic misunderstanding, insofar as preservative memory is at issue.

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