Shaping The Believer

A Comparative Study of Constitutive Religious Rhetoric

Josefine Berring

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Aalborg University
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Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to apply a rhetorical framework to analyse three cases wherein religion and religious rhetoric are prevalent, in order to gauge how religion may influence the process of creating collective subjects. The three cases selected are Kokutai no Hongi*, a schoolbook from a pre-World War II Japanese context, Pope Urban II's call for crusades, and Ayatollah Khomeini's post-revolution speech in Iran, which all three are connected to violent expressions from their audiences. The intention is that applying the comparative method of analysis to these three cases will help isolate the religious components in the rhetorical arguments, and thereby aid in assessing commonalities and discrepancies in the religious argumentations.*

These three cases are comparatively analysed taking point of departure in Maurice Charland's (1987) theory of constitutive rhetoric, as well as Compensatory Control Theory (CCT). The aim of combining these two theories is to illustrate how religion contributes to the process of rhetorically constituting subjects, as well as the potential psychological effects this may have on the constituted collective subjects. The findings of the analysis illustrate similarities and discrepancies between the three cases in how their audiences are rhetorically constituted. Here, it is made evident how the three cases to varying degrees constitute their own familial in-group in contrast with the Other, and how both of these identities are solely constructed through religious imagery. It is also illustrated how the cases invoke the collective subject through anti-individualism. Here, particularly Kokutai no Hongi erases distinctions between the individual and the group. Further, it is argued that the cases all present a so-called transreligious subject, through which the subjects are called to identify with historical subjects, solely by virtue of their religious identities. Following this, the findings of the analysis illustrate how the subjects of Kokutai no Hongi are more tightly bound in terms of following through with the narrative that is presented to them in the text, than is the case with the other two. It is shown how both Khomeini and Urban's speeches also rhetorically constrain their subjects in the sense that the religious identities they are presented with provide a more desirable identity, than the ones they are juxtaposed with.

Further, taking point of departure in CCT, the analysis illustrates how rhetorically constituting subjects in these ways to a certain degree will remove feelings of personal control, which CCT argues leads to a heightened tendency to seek external control. In presenting religion as the only viable external control factor to combat these feelings of anxiety, which the texts themselves have im-

bued onto the subjects, it is argued that following through with the telos, the inherent purpose, presented to them is the only viable option for the subjects to retain their feelings of control.

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1.0. Introduction

> Men seek for vocabularies that will be faithful reflections of reality. To this end, they must develop vocabularies that are selections of reality. And any selection of reality must in certain circumstances function as a deflection of reality. (Kenneth Burke as quoted in Jasinski 2001, 486)

Whether it is historical persuasions to join forces with an ideology, political addresses inciting a population to war, or religious encouragements to commit ritual suicide, the persuasive power of rhetoric is found again and again throughout history. Through the *logos*, rhetoric holds the power that allows whoever acquires and masters it to persuade others, to make them see things from one's own perspective and to convince them that this perspective is *right* and *correct* (Babich et al. 2012, 357-358). In Burke's words, as the quote above illustrates, rhetoric sways and argues; it selects the realities to present and deflects others. Burke describes this power that rhetoric holds in shaping reality, in selecting which realities to present and which to deflect, as a result of human intervention: rhetoric is a tangible representation of human purposes, interests and values (Jasinski 2001,487). The importance of rhetoric in persuasion has always been a subject of scholarly debate, dating back to Plato and Aristotle. Plato, reacting to the sophists, condemned persuasive rhetoric, deeming it unprincipled and deceptive (Michelstaedter et al. 2004, xii). Aristotle, on the other hand, regarded rhetoric as an art form, stressing the persuasive elements in rationality colouring the argument as well as the authority of the speaker as an ethical persona (ibid.). Undoubtedly related to people's beliefs and convictions, persuasion through rhetoric is applied by speakers and writers to highlight crucial points, and to shape one's arguments with the intention to persuade others (Adam 2017, 5).

Religious rhetoric in particular has been historically widely associated with persuasion of its subjects (Young et al. 1992, 96; Pretorius 2013, 114). In cases of religious rhetoric, it is key to persuade the audience, not only because ideology dissemination is essential, but also because of the inherent need within religion itself to legitimize one's teachings to the public (Adam 2017, 7). Increasingly, religious violence is erupting throughout the world, among right-wing Christians in the Western world, clashes between Jewish people and Muslims in the Middle East, clashing Hindus and Muslims in South Asia, and indigenous religious communities in Africa (Juergensmeyer 2003, xi). This is, of course, not a new phenomenon. Religion and violence have always been intrinsically tied together, and virtually every major religious tradition has historically served as justification for

violent acts, in some form (ibid., xii). Judith Butler, in investigating the religious zealots responsible for the terrorist acts on 9/11, argues that it is essential to examine the breeding ground that has helped shaping these perpetrators; which factors play a part in shaping religious subjects capable of violence? (Butler 2004, 11). How is it possible for people to be persuaded to commit so completely to an idea, that they are willing to commit atrocities on behalf of it, or even die for it themselves? What are the rhetorical mechanisms at play in building these notions in people's minds, and why do they take hold over people's psyches? Undoubtedly, the answer to these questions is multifaceted. Cultural and individual factors will inevitably play a role in deciding how and why people turn to religious extremism. Taking into consideration the fact that rhetoric holds the power to persuade to such a high degree, as mentioned above, that it may reflect and deflect reality suited to human purposes and desires, it is valuable to assess this specific aspect of how the violent religious subject may be constituted.

In order to assess the effect that may be unfolding in cases where religious persuasion overlaps with violence encouraged and incepted by religious rhetoric, this thesis applies Maurice Charland's notion of constitutive rhetoric as a mean to isolate the religious argumentations at play when attempting to constitute subjects. Charland's theory of constitutive rhetoric is applied as it asks the question of how subjects are rhetorically constituted and seeks to explain how this type of rhetoric demands action from its audience in order for them to reinforce the identity they are inscribed into (Charland 1987, 134-135). As a result of the fact that the cases that this thesis engages with are selected on the criteria that they are connected to violent religious expressions from their audiences, it is relevant to ask the question of how these subjects may have been rhetorically constituted. This connection between constitutive rhetoric and religion has been largely overlooked in academic scholarship (Hill 2016, 32). While many scholars acknowledge the vast power that religious language holds in constituting political and social subjects, none have examined religious discourses seeking to constitute religious subjects (ibid). As an extension of how the subjects in the cases examined in this thesis are constituted through religious rhetoric, Compensatory Control Theory (Kay et al., 2008; Kay et al., 2009; Kay et al., 2010; Kay et al., 2013) is applied in order to answer the question of how their religious rhetoric may influence the subject's psyches.

In order to answer the question of how religious people commit so fully to an idea that they are willing to go to extremes to see it through, this thesis engages with the rhetorical side of this ques-

tion in examining religious rhetoric and the psychological processes that may play a role when a group of people is subjected to this type of rhetoric. The following problem formulation is posed:

What role does religion play in constitutive rhetoric, and what are some psychological processes that potentially contribute to the interpellation process?

2.0. Scientific Considerations

In order to engage with the topic of religion and constitutive rhetoric, the ontological stance of this thesis is social constructivism. The problem formulation suggests a constructivist relationship between the rhetoric of the texts and speeches and the social world. When engaging with the social world, this relationship is assumed to be continuously constructed through meaning-making between individuals in society and constantly re-negotiated. In this sense, there can be no *one* answer to define the social world (Gibbs 2012, 7).

These notions can be expanded on through the exploration of *The Social Construction of Reality* from 1966 by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann. Here, Berger and Luckmann present the *dialectic process*, a process in which society affects humans, but where humans also affect society (Berger et al. 1991, 78.). According to Berger and Luckmann this happens through continuous reciprocal interactions between externalization, objectivation, and internalization (ibid.). The externalization process occurs when humans create their own world, which is inherently a social process. Objectivation occurs when the world we have created obtains facticity, partially independent of the people who have created it, to the degree that it is able to influence them. The third process is the internalization process in which people inevitably will internalize the parts of society that have previously been externalized (ibid., 78-80). Importantly, Berger later argues in *The Sacred Canopy* from 1967 that religion is an essential factor in the dialectic process, as it represents a societal *nomos*, or 'meaningful order', which refers to a higher perspective of meaning-making that binds the social nomos with a holy cosmos (Berger 1969, 19). The social world that this thesis studies by taking point of departure in the rhetoric of speeches, writings, and religious discourses then, is assumed to be continuously constructed through meaning-making between the speaker and the audience, who all constantly define and redefine what the social world is. Krebs et al. (2007) argue that a central recurring issue related to constructivism is the problem of "explaining how and why new norms emerge and why actors might obey norms despite contrary material pressures" (Krebs et al.,

39). In other words, there is an issue related to the *why* of the internalization process. Krebs et al., however, argue that it is precisely through the means of persuasive rhetoric that new beliefs can be sincerely internalized and how listeners are consequently able to accept new identities (ibid.).

Therefore, this thesis will work within a constructivist ontology, as it seeks to examine exactly how rhetoric, specifically religious rhetoric, can contribute to the internalization process, by assessing the specific rhetorical features applied. Further, as this thesis engages with Charland's (1987) theory of constitutive rhetoric, this dialectic process posited by Berger becomes more relevant. Charland argues, as will be elaborated upon below, that collective subjects and their ideas of how the world is constructed is created through societal discourses (Charland 1987, 139-140). Charland argues that these discourses are imposed upon the subjects who, should they identify with the discourse, essentially have no choice but to follow through with the narrative imposed onto them (ibid., 141). It could be argued then, that this rhetorical process is in many ways similar to that of Berger and Luckmann's. Here, Charland's subjects are introduced to a concept which they have no choice but to internalize, after which they will inevitably affect the existing societal discourse.

Importantly, however, this thesis will be engaging with the concept of identification, which can hopefully shed more light on how messages or ideologies are sincerely internalized and how identities are constituted within the framework of religious rhetoric. The role of identification within the topic of constitutive rhetoric will be expanded further upon below.

The epistemological nature of this thesis is social constructivism, or perspectivism. Within the perspectivist epistemology humans do not find knowledge, but construct it (Schwandt 2003, 305). In elaborating on the perspectivist epistemology, Schwandt argues that "we do not construct our theories in isolation but against a backdrop of shared understandings, practices, languages and so forth." The findings of this thesis then will inevitably be affected by choice of theory, as well as additional factors such as how the core concepts of religion and rhetoric are defined. Any knowledge acquired is therefore bound to be contextual, as it cannot be assumed that there is any *one* external world to observe, independent of factors such as culture, language, and individual meaning-making. Furthermore, in the case of this thesis, the relationship between rhetoric and reality is essential. Within the scope of perspectivism, language is a crucial part of how the lived world can be engaged with. Within perspectivism, language is not viewed as a primary tool with which we can obtain

knowledge of any sort of objectively presented world, but is instead "what allows us to have the world we have. Language makes possible the disclosure of the human world" (ibid., 307).

3.0. Methodology

3.1. Research Strategy

In comparatively analysing the three different religious texts, it is possible to apply either qualitative or quantitative methods, which will inevitably yield different outcomes. This thesis applies a qualitative approach, as it revolves around text and words, rather than numbers and statistics, as quantitative strategies do (Bryman 2012, 380). This method allows the researcher to go into depth with the complexities of a problem, in ways that cannot be obtained by quantitative research (ibid.). Therefore, a qualitative method is appropriate within the scope of this thesis, as is allows for an in-depth investigation of the rhetoric in each of the three cases. Instead of focusing on a wide array of cases and finding commonalities in frequency of word use, this thesis attempts to do an in-depth analysis of three specific cases.

Qualitative research has been criticized for not being able to generalize, as the scope of the findings will inevitably be constricted to a smaller number of cases (ibid., 406). In relation to this thesis, the findings will therefore not be applicable to all similar cases; the religious rhetoric applied in the three texts will not necessarily be comparable to those in other cases. However, drawing parallels between the religious argumentation of the texts might help illuminate some of the rhetorical devices applied in cases where religion is used as the main point of argumentation.

3.2. Quality Criterion

As mentioned above, this thesis is qualitative in nature and applies a comparative method of analysis. According to Thomann and Maggetti (2020) qualitative comparative studies "typically involve learning about facts we do not know by using the facts we do know—that is, they establish inference" (Thomann et al. 2020, 358). This entails clarifying external validity, establishing internal validity, and adopting a mode of reasoning (ibid.).

First, in terms of external validity, this relates to whether the findings of the study are generalizable to a broader context (Bryman 2012, 47; Thomann et al. 2020, 360). Here, comparative case studies may purposefully select cases by looking at criteria that is relevant to the research question in terms

of the theoretical background of the study (Thomann et al. 2020, 361). These criteria then make up the scope conditions for the results, and is called a "limited generalization", which constitute the explicitly defined empirical contexts in which the results of the study are deemed valid (ibid., 361). The scope of this thesis has been to analyze religious rhetoric in general, and not in one specific religious, temporal, or national context. Therefore, in order to ensure external validity in this sense, the cases selected were required to be able to be encompassed within these two definitions to ensure grounds for comparison. Importantly, as will be elaborated on below, all three cases, at the time of their conception, fall under the same category in terms of Robert Bellah's theory of religious evolution. This ensures that the religions found in the three cases are at similar stages in their development, which narrows the scope of the analysis further.

Secondly, internal validity in a qualitative comparative study is related to ensuring thorough qualitative knowledge of the cases as well as the concepts guiding the interpretation of them (ibid., 363; 369). In preparing for the analysis of this thesis, it has been a priority to ensure an understanding of the contexts and authorship of the three cases, as well as the religions and political environments that constitute them. Further, the core concepts as well as the theoretical framework, which are all the pillars of the analysis, have all been thoroughly studied in order to ensure a shared frame of reference when interpreting the three cases.

Lastly, qualitative comparative methods involve making a connection between the data and reasoning (ibid., 361). The approach in this thesis has been iterative in nature, as the researcher has been going back and forth between the problem formulation, the three cases, and the theory (Bryman 2012, 26). The theory section has been altered throughout the process, in order to encompass the fourth ideological effect of *negative identification* to Charland's theory of constitutive rhetoric, after having realized the heavy emphasis all three cases place on this negative identification. Therefore, the concept of constitutive rhetoric and how it takes shape in this thesis has been adjusted accordingly.

The case material itself and its relation to the theory has also been reviewed and altered, in the sense that the problem formulation called for case material, which emphasized religious rhetoric. Further, the findings of the analysis illuminated a need to further dive into the internal aspects of rhetorically constituting subjects in the discussion, which has in turn reflected back on the problem formulation.

Therefore, the research process has been iterative in nature, as a result of the weaving back and forth between possible case material, the theories applied, as well as the problem formulation.

3.3. Case Material

3.3.1. Kokutai no Hongi "The Way of the Subjects"

Kokutai no Hongi (hereafter Kokutai; see Appendix 3 for full text) is a Japanese schoolbook, originally written sometime before 1937 by Hisamatsu Senichi, a professor at Tokyo Imperial University (Kokutai no Hongi: Editor's Introduction 1949, 4). However, the writers of the final draft of Kokutai are ultimately unknown (ibid., 7). Kokutai then was written, distributed and implemented nationwide in schools during Japan's modern period (1868-1945), during a time when the principle of freedom of belief was adopted into the constitution (Baffelli et al. 2021, 185). This freedom of belief, however, was only guaranteed so far as it did not challenge the divine nature of the Japanese emperor (ibid.). Shinto was prevalent in pre-war Japan and exists still to this day as the oldest religion in Japan, having appeared before Buddhism reached Japan in 552 A.D., and even before the first states formed in the country (Borup et al. 2013, 44). Shinto, often translated as "the way of the gods", is a religion that worships the multifarious Japanese *kami* (gods) (Encyclopedia of Religion, Shinto entry). Shinto has no sacred texts as such, but the two chronicles *Kojiki* and *Nihon shoki*, both written around the year 700, are considered foundations of Shinto and depict the emperors' divine lineage as well as Japan as a "land of gods" (Borup et al. 2013, 45). Shinto was, during the modern period, in competition with the other religions in Japan and therefore, in 1890, Shinto was declared "non-religious" (ibid., 48). Instead, Shinto became what is referred to as *state Shinto*; a sort of moral discourse for the public rites of the state, through which the religious practices were incorporated into the national ideology (Baffelli et al. 2021, 188). However, despite Shinto being declared a non-religion, it has since been demonstrated by scholars of religion that Shinto at this time did in fact demonstrate religious content and practices, in terms of both ritual practices and the worship of deities (ibid.).

During the prelude to the Second World War, Japan prepared ideologically by applying the so-called *Kokutai*-teachings, "teachings of the national essence", through which students and adults were indoctrinated with the objective of ensuring the emperor's divinity as well as heavily criticizing the West: Kokutai no Hongi is by far the most famous example of Japanese religious indoctrination (Borup et al. 2013, 48-49). There was in Japan at this time an almost complete conflation of

politics and religion: “The deification of the emperor and of Japan itself was inextricably intertwined with the upsurge of nationalism, while the political nature of religion and the religious nature of politics ended up reinforcing each other” (Baffelli et al. 2021, 185). Interestingly, while many assumed that these teachings were merely examples of state’s imposition over an unwilling population, recent studies indicate that the people voluntarily pushed towards the divinization of the emperor and the state (ibid., 188).

Kokutai no Hongi is a 124-page official statement of national policy, and details state Shinto’s view of the order of the world. In part one of Kokutai, it is presented how the nation was founded, and listing which gods built which parts of the country. It then lists the sacred virtues, how the subjects must act with loyalty and patriotism, and how the subjects are connected to the emperor. In part two of the book, a summary of Japan’s history is detailed, heavily emphasizing the deities’ part in history as well as the character of the people, and which ceremonial rites and morality are appropriate. Lastly, political, economical, and military affairs are outlined, emphasizing the direct and divine rule of the Japanese emperor (Kokutai no Hongi 1949, vii-viii). The purpose of Kokutai was to transform the minds of young people in Japan: “In one 1939 book-length commentary, the authors ‘prayed’ for the day when the youth of Japan would become "perfect students and perfect Japanese"; when "every word and every line of The Essence of the National Polity would become your blood and become your body"” (Tansman 2014, 62-63). In 1945, after Japan lost the war, Kokutai was directly named in a directive by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces in forbidding circulation of the book and having it suppressed, in reference to the Peace Preservation Law from 1945 (Kokutai no Hongi: Editor’s Introduction 1949, 6-7). Following this, Kokutai was abolished from Japanese literature, but scholars are under the impression that vivid traces of the book still linger many years after its denunciation in Japan (Miller 1982, 94-96). Whether this is the case or not, the impact Kokutai no Hongi had on Japanese culture in pre-war Japan is undeniable, as it was “constantly referred to in public speeches and was quoted in the ceremonies of national holidays and school assemblies” (Kokutai no Hongi: Editor’s Introduction 1949, 10-11).

3.3.2. Pope Urban II’s Speech at Clermont

In 1095, Pope Urban II (c. 1088-1099) explicitly called for holy war against the Muslims who were a threat to the Byzantine Empire and who had seized Jerusalem from Christian rule (Christie et al. 2003, 139) (See Appendix 1 for entire speech). The response to this speech was overwhelming and

resulted in Christians (not only knights, but also common people) embarking on what is now commonly referred to as the first crusade (Shepkaru 2012, 94; Christie et al. 2003, 140). Pope Urban (referred to as 'Urban' in this thesis) violently declared specifically Muslims as a common enemy of the Christian people, the crusades however targeted both Muslim and Jewish people (Shepkaru 2012, 96). Scholars accredit religious idealism with the crusaders' desire to avenge both the Muslims' treatment of the Christians in Jerusalem, as well as the Jewish killing of Christ (ibid., 95-96). Following Urban's speech at Clermont, nobles rapidly came forward to sign up for the crusades, and bishops as well as wandering zealots, preached Urban's words, encouraging commoners to join as well (Paine 2012, 16). Urban's speech at Clermont was the catalyst for a long line of crusades, which would occur from 1095 until 1291, when the last remaining Frankish forces in the East fell to Islamic armies (ibid., 91-93).

Urban's exact words from the speech at Clermont have not survived. There are, however, four clerical authors who describe the council at Clermont (Fulcher of Chartres, Robert the Monk, Balderic of Dol, and Gibert de Nogent), three of which were actually present at the time (Christie et al. 2003, 139-140). None of these sources can completely replicate Urban's words at Clermont. However, the similarities between these sources outweigh their discrepancies too such a degree that it is possible through each of these sources to discern Urban's attitudes towards Christianity and holy war (ibid., 140). This thesis applies Robert of Reims', or Robert the Monk's version of Urban's speech. This is primarily because Robert the Monk's *Historia Iherosolimitana* (dated between 1106 and 1107 A.D.), in which Pope Urban's speech can be found, is attributed to Robert of Reims, who was himself present at the council. Furthermore, Robert's version of the speech was by far the twelfth century's most widely read account of the speech, and generated a considerable manuscript tradition across Europe, implying its powerful effect on its readers (Coyne 2017, 11). It should still be stated however, that the findings of this thesis, to a certain extent, can be said to be the result of the Christian scholars at this time, as much as Pope Urban II himself. However, Urban himself, in his 1095-96 tour in Gaul, explicitly addresses the same topics and follows the same line of thinking as is expressed in the versions composed by the four clerical authors (ibid., 55). Regarding Robert the Monk, very little is known, save for some autobiographical remarks made in a preface that precedes the prologue of the Historia Iherosolimitana (Kempf et al. 2013, xvii). Here, he states his name, his occupation as a 'modest writer', as well as various journeys he has made (ibid., xviii). Robert the

Monk attended the council at Clermont as abbot of St. Remi, and discusses the council's ecclesiastical business, and describes the audience's enthusiastic response (Christie et al. 2003, 140).

3.3.3. Ayatollah Khomeini's speech: "We Shall Confront the World With Our Ideology"

The third case is the speech given in 1980 in Iran by Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini (1902-1989) (See Appendix 2 for entire speech). Khomeini was a political and religious leader in Iran during the time of the revolution in 1979. Khomeini opposed the Iranian Shah, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi's "White Revolution", which included several measures feared by the '*ulama*' (religious Islamic scholars and transmitters of Islamic scripture) (Shepard 2014, 294-295). The White Revolution was announced in 1963 and, among other measures, sought to include land reform, which the *ulama* feared would affect their *awqaf*, a set of charitable donations used to finance religious institutions (ibid., 294; 390). The *ulama* also feared that the White Revolution would undermine their authority in the villages through the Shah's establishment of a literary corps, as well as the fact that the White Revolution would give women the right to vote (ibid., 294). All of this was in addition to the more general contempt that the *ulama* had for the Shah's dictatorship, his alliance with the West, and his support for Israel (ibid.). Khomeini, who was at the time the leader of the opposition, was arrested and exiled to Najaf in Iran following violent and deadly demonstrations on 'Ashura, the first month of the Muslim year and the day Shiites commemorates the death of Husayn, a martyr whom Shiites believe to be one of the twelve rightful successors of the Prophet Muhammad (ibid., 294; 371). Khomeini continued to criticize the Shah from his exile with his central argument being that Islam's rules are meant to be implemented in a society, specifically by the *ulama*, and that the West lacks the moral laws provided by Islam (ibid., 296-297). He also rejected kingship in itself, deeming it un-Islamic (ibid., 297). Iran at this time was also plagued by a still rising division between the rich and poor, as well as an increased pressure of Westernization (ibid.). Continuing unrest and anger against the Shah resulted in revolutionary momentum mounting, and Khomeini came increasingly to prominence, resulting in him returning to Iran in 1979, after the Shah permanently fled the country (ibid., 297). The emerging ruling group, *The Islamic Republican Party*, was spearheaded by Khomeini, and in June of 1979, Iran was officially turned into a clerical Republic, where rule of law was entirely based on Islamic Sharia law (ibid., 298).

Shia Islam, still to this day the official religion of Iran, is a minority within the global religion, outnumbered by far by the Sunni majority (ibid., 122). While Sunnis believe that Muhammad did not

appoint a successor when he died, Shias believe that Ali, the Prophet's nearest male relative, was appointed as his rightful successor (Betts 2013, 75). Ali was passed over by three caliphs (Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman), and following his own subsequent caliphate, his brother, Husayn, succeeded him (ibid., 74-75). In 680 A.D. the Battle at Karbala took place. Shiite retelling of the battle claims that this was an assassination attempt on Husayn, orchestrated by the Sunnis, whereas Sunni Muslims claim that his own people betrayed him. When Husayn was killed at the battle at Karbala his sacrifice was, and is still to this day, venerated as a martyr standing against oppression (Shepard 2014, 122). Shia Muslims, specifically the Imami branch which is the prevalent one in Iran, ritualize the martyrdom of Husayn still to this day through rhetorical commemorations and extremely emotional activities (ibid., 124-126). These commemorations can also be seen throughout Khomeini's speech, "We Shall Confront the World With Our Ideology", delivered on the Iranian New Year of 1980 (Khomeini 1980, 25). This speech illustrates not only Khomeini's political philosophy and view of religion, but also how the *ulama* should be the ruling strata in Iran, as well as his desire to keep Islam from foreign ideologies (ibid., 22). In this speech, delivered in post-revolution Iran, Khomeini dedicates much time to denounce the evil ways of the "satanical" West, and praises the revolutionaries for fighting against their oppressors (ibid., 22-23). He then emphasizes the importance of exporting the Iranian revolution to the world (ibid., 22) and stresses the importance of following the path of the "great Islam and its holy teachings" (ibid., 23). Khomeini also outlines thirteen issues in Iranian society, which need attention from his followers. These issues contain messages such as the fact that the people "should try to save this country from the enemies of Islam and Iran through hard work and endeavor", but also more concrete injunctions such as the fact that the Revolution Courts should implement Islam's teachings in their rulings (ibid.). Lastly, Khomeini dedicates time to compliment the youth and the martyrs of the nation (ibid., 25).

3.4. Comparative Analysis of the Three Cases

This thesis applies a comparative analysis to the three religious cases: the Japanese schoolbook *Kokutai no Hongi*, Pope Urban II's speech at Clermont, and Ayatollah Khomeini post-revolution speech in Iran. In doing a comparative analysis, two conditions need to be met: data must be gathered on two or more cases, and there must be an attempt to explain rather than describe (Pickvance 2001, 11). A comparative analysis can then be defined as "the research approach in which two or more cases are explicitly contrasted to each other regards to a specific phenomenon or along a certain dimension, in order to explore parallels and differences among the cases" (Azarian 2011, 3).

Importantly, when working with comparative analyses, it is essential to be clear "why what is being compared with what, in what respect and with what aim" (ibid., 10). This thesis applies Charland's theory of constitutive rhetoric as a frame to the three cases stated above, in order to be able to assess differences and similarities in how they rhetorically address religion. All three of these cases are highly influenced by religious connotations and appear in history as encouragements to violence: religion and religious polemic are the bases of the main arguments in all three cases. Therefore, the aim of applying a comparative analysis to these three cases is to assess the religious rhetoric in them and how this may have aided in constituting its audience, and subsequently led to violence. Comparative analysis of these three cases may help isolate the religious components in the rhetorical arguments, and thereby aid in assessing commonalities and discrepancies in the religious argumentation.

By applying three cases so distinct from each other in terms of time, place and religion, and specifically engaging with their religious statements, this may help to illustrate the specific role religion has played in shaping these religious communities. A concern with engaging with three cases so far apart from each other is related to the multifaceted and cultural dependant facets of religion; are there grounds for comparison when the religions assessed are so far apart in terms of time and place? The very nature of the discipline of science of religion is the fact of comparison; in order to understand the phenomenon of religion, oftentimes it is essential to compare it to other religions (Kripal et al. 2014, 6). Religion stands apart from other phenomena in touching upon "the realm of the sacred" (ibid., 6-7). The three cases that this thesis engages with all fall into this category; what unites them, in spite of the differences in time and place, are the unique features that the phenomenon of religion encompasses. Further, because religion is so tightly tied to nations and politics, the difference in nature of the three cases might aid in peeling back some of these worldly layers, and let religion as a phenomenon stand alone. Of course, the national and political contexts cannot be ignored, and are in fact essential in order to understand the religious nature of the cases. However, the findings of this thesis will not speak on specifically the Japanese, Medieval Catholic, or Iranian context, but more so on religious rhetoric as a phenomenon in the process of constituting subjects. While there were many other factors at play in all three cases, the object of this study is not to obtain a complete understanding of how these individuals were shaped by society, but instead to exclusively focus on the religious rhetoric, in order to find similarities and differences across the three very different cases. This thesis is an attempt to study the religious constitutive rhetoric, which his-

torically played a part in making way for violent acts. This is done through specifically engaging with the religious aspect of the three rhetorical situations. As such, the three cases are not chosen in spite of being different but precisely because they are different.

Another possible concern, related to the temporal differences in the cases, lies in fact that religion is an ever-changing phenomenon (Jensen 2013, 13). Therefore, one might assume that it would be more beneficial to at least compare three different cases, which were similar to each other in time. However, this thesis argues that while the three cases appear throughout very different times in history, at the time they appear, they all have reached the same state of religious evolution. Robert Bellah famously illustrates how all religions go through the same stages in evolving, unless they, for some reason, should be inhibited in their growth (ibid., 19). These stages include *tribal religion, archaic religion, and axial religion* (ibid., 19-29). I argue that all three of the cases fall into the category of axial religions. Axial religion is characterized by applying religion as a way to legitimize political power, having distant gods that are removed from the worldly sphere, and a renunciation of the worldly (ibid.). As will be evident below, all three of the cases exhibit these characteristics. Further, state Shinto at this time in history was not so different from Western religions in terms of the divine; scholars have argued that state Shinto emphasized the Emperor to such a high degree that it was almost monotheistic in nature (Hvithamar et al., 125). Therefore, these three religions are not randomly picked and compared; the comparative analysis is an expression of three axial religions in a context of looming violence, heavily concerned with the meeting with other religions.

If three cases were used that were similar in their religious or temporal nature, such as a revolutionary Iranian context, or even Islam in general, the findings might to a higher degree illustrate how Islam specifically may rhetorically constitute an audience. The purpose of this thesis, however, is to delve specifically into constitutive religious rhetoric as a phenomenon. Therefore a high degree of diversity within the source material is essential: this way, it is possible to isolate the phenomena that are intrinsic to religion in general. A purpose of applying comparative methods is related to the fact that comparison might "reduce the parochialism inherent in single-case studies helping to transcend their particularities and get hold of what can be generalizable" (Azarian 2011, 20). In applying a comparative method then, this thesis aims to investigate the concept of religious constitutive rhetoric by finding commonalities and discrepancies within the source material.

3.4.1. Rhetorical Situations

The three cases vary from each other not only in terms of time and place, but also in respect to the rhetorical situation; two of the cases are speeches directed to a people, where the third is the Japanese schoolbook, Kokutai no Hongi. As specified above, the main concern of this thesis is with the religious rhetoric occurring in the three cases. Below, it will be specified what the concepts of "religion" and "religious rhetoric" entail in this thesis. As all three of the cases are encompassed by these definitions, it allows for analyzing all three cases on the same terms. The rhetorical situations and target audiences are, however, still important to note and assess. In terms of target audiences, Khomeini and Urban can both be argued to have more or less similar target audiences: adults and young people the speakers aimed to persuade to follow through on the posed religious missions. Kokutai somewhat follows the same logic in the sense that the aim is to sway people to follow through with religious missions. Though Kokutai is officially a schoolbook made for youths, its target audiences encompassed the entire Japanese population (Tansman 2014, 61). While there exist discrepancies between the intended audiences of the three cases, the aim of all of then was to reach the nation in general with the explicit intent of persuasion, which will be elaborated upon below. Furthermore, these differences in the rhetorical situations make way for illuminating some key differences; seeing as Kokutai is an entirely different format than the other two, the inclusion of this text may make way for accessing and isolating which components of the cases are repeated across the rhetorical situations.

In terms of the written versus the spoken rhetorical situation, there are inevitably certain discrepancies between these two that will affect the way audiences are influenced by what is presented to them. In particular, emotional states are much easier conveyed through the spoken word, through aids such as pitch, timing, and word frequency per minute (Johar 2016, 10). The exact way these emotional states are conveyed and received by a listener are, however, difficult to pin down and test for: "Inconsistent data regarding voice cues to specific emotions, individual differences among speakers, weak emotional effects and interplay of spontaneous and strategic expressions are some sources of variability that pose practical problems to deduce emotion portrayals" (ibid., 12). There is, however, within the rhetorical tradition, the main concern of whether the differences within the mode of presentation lie in *planned* speech or not; whether or not the rhetorical situation is deliberately prepared (Fahnestock 2011, 90). This means that prepared speech "belongs towards the written end of the speech/writing continuum" (ibid.). The speeches within this thesis then can be said to be incorporated into the same category as Kokutai, in terms of speech/writing style. Although Ko-

kutai is still considerably longer than the speeches, the analysis will dedicate an even amount of effort in the analysis of the three cases.

3.5. Data Analysis

This thesis will apply Maurice Charland's theory of constitutive rhetoric as it is presented in the journal article "Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case of the Peuple Québécois" from 1987 as the main framework for the analysis. Within Charland's framework, three ideological effects of constitutive rhetoric are posited: collective identification, positioning a transhistorical subject in the narrative, and lastly, the illusion of freedom. These will be explained in depth in the theory section of this thesis. In order to obtain a more comprehensive view of the three cases, a fourth ideological effect will be added in the form of the ideological manufacture of the Other, introduced by Jerry Won Lee (2014). Within this thesis however, this fourth ideological effect will be included as a part of the first ideological effect, 'creating a collective subject', as whichever traits a subject is called to identify with is heavily influenced by the traits juxtaposing them (Lee 2014, 3-4). These ideological effects will be analysed with the explicit focus on how religious rhetoric in all three cases is present and may constitute its subjects. Furthermore, in order to assess potential psychological processes that contribute to the interpellation process, Compensatory Control Theory (CCT hereafter) is applied. Furthermore, additional theories and scholars will be incorporated continuously throughout the analysis, in order to obtain in-depth explanations of religious imagery, rhetoric and context. The structure of the analysis then will follow these three ideological effects of constitutive rhetoric in comparatively analysing the three cases, while simultaneously analysing how these findings might play into the theory of CCT. Again, the scope of the analysis will specifically be oriented towards religious rhetoric and how this may relate to CCT.

3.6. Core Concepts

3.6.1. Religion Defined

In order to engage with the multiple facets of religion, as well as encompass three religions placed far from each other in terms of both time and space, this thesis will apply Clifford Geertz' definition of religion from 1973, which is as follows:

> [Religion is] a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem

uniquely realistic (Geertz 1973, 90).

Geertz' definition of religion is a broad one, which is unfolded in his book *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*, first published in 1973, over the coarse of more than 40 pages. Here, Geertz refers to religion as a "system of symbols" and explains that religion is what symbolically connects systems (or models) *of* and *for* the world. Models *of* the world are descriptive; they are a way for humans to attempt to understand the world as it is. Models *for* the world are prescriptive and are, in a sense, models for how the world should be. Religious symbols connect these two in depicting a representation of the way things are (models *of*) and directing human actions (models *for*) (ibid., 93). The "powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations" Geertz includes, refer to how religion essentially makes humans feel certain emotions and in turn act on them. According to Geertz, there are two distinct types of dispositions in terms of acting in a certain way; moods and motivations. Moods refer to emotions, such as feelings of joy an inner peace obtained when having completed a ritual. Motivations on the other hand, are directed toward a specific goal, there is a directional quality, such as salvation (ibid., 96-97). Geertz expands on the notion of "formulating conceptions of a general order of existence" in stating that religion works as a way to order existence and that there are three potential threats to this order: 1) the limits of our understanding, 2) the limits of our capacity to endure difficulty, and 3) the problem of evil in the sense that if God is good, why do evil things happen, also referred to as the issue of teodicé (ibid., 100-108). In terms of "clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality", Geertz explains how religion fuses together *world view* (a people's central ideas and beliefs about the world) and *ethos* (the inclination to act in accordance with these ideas and beliefs) (ibid., 112-114). Lastly, Geertz' definition includes the fact that "the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic". This, Geertz posits, means that what humans experience through religion and religious rituals will inevitably influence our common sense because religion is the 'really real'; common sense becomes *part* of a larger reality (ibid., 119). In this project, this definition of religion is appropriate as persuasion and identification play a large part in presumably convincing people that certain religious narratives bear more weight and are more realistic than others. The powerful and pervasive moods that Geertz assumes can be instilled in people through religious means are essential in the interpellation process, which will be expanded upon later. Also, the ability Geertz assumes that religion has in terms of formulating conceptions of a general order of existence is highly relevant in terms of Compensatory Control Theory and the effect the need for a controlled and ordered universe has on people.

Geertz' definition of religion is a *functional* definition. When engaging with definitions of religion, there are generally assumed to be two distinct types of definitions: *substantive* and *functional* (Berger 1974, 126). A substantive definition of religion means "defining religion 'in terms of its believed contents" (ibid., 125). Within a substantive definition of religion, it is the content of people's beliefs that are essential to defining it, such as the belief in supernatural beings (ibid.). A functional definition on the other hand is centered on what religion *does*, or its function, in the sense that its focus is on the instrumental role of religion in terms of its psychological and social functions (ibid.). Working with a functional definition allows for the inclusion of multiple religions, as the specific boundaries for the content of each religion is less important than the effect it may have on its followers (ibid.). This fact is important in relation to this thesis, as the three religions analysed vary widely from each other in terms of their content, belief systems, and historical contexts. Furthermore, this thesis primarily focuses on the concrete functions a religion may have in different contexts; both social and psychological perspectives are analysed and discussed.

Importantly, a commonly mentioned drawback of applying a functional definition of religion is the fact that they oftentimes appear broad enough to encompass societal phenomena that are not in fact religious in nature, such as an intense faith in capitalism or nationalism (Roberts 2020, 8). However, Geertz' definition of religion, while remaining focused on the functions of religion, posits that religion distinguishes itself from other phenomena by including a "symbol system that acts to reinforce both a worldview and an ethos and that has a built-in system of believability or plausibility" (ibid., 11). To summarize, a functional definition of religion is applied in this thesis, as the focus will primarily be placed on how religion and religious rhetoric affects humans psychologically and socially.

3.6.2. Rhetoric Defined

It is important to delimit what is meant by the word 'rhetoric', as this concept plays a role throughout the entirety of the thesis. Whether it is constitutive rhetoric, speeches to crowds, or spreading messages through books, it is essential to define the meaning of the phrase. In order to be able to apply a definition of rhetoric that is able to contain both text and the spoken word, Kenneth Burke's definition is applied throughout this thesis:

> Rhetoric is "the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols." Inducing such cooperation involves "the use of words by human

> agents to form attitudes or to induce actions in other human agents" (Burke as quoted in Smit 1997, 42).

This definition is applied, as it is able to contain rhetorical acts in terms of both the spoken and the written word, which is essential when engaging with a comparative analysis of both types of rhetoric. Furthermore, Burke includes the importance of rhetoric's role in "of inducing cooperation in beings" by using word to "form attitudes or to induce actions in other human agents", which Burke emphasizes as a result of *identification* as an alternative to the act of persuasion (Burke 1955, 55). Identification occurs when a speaker (or a text according to Burke's own definition of rhetoric) applies rhetoric to make themselves or itself consubstantial (identified with as opposed to set apart from) with another (ibid., 20-21). Burke posits that while we as humans are essentially divided, we are individuals and inherently different from one another, identification through rhetoric means that we are able to belong to a group, essentially to be the same as someone else (ibid., 22, 28). Therefore, throughout this thesis identification will be applied instead of persuasion, which is also contributed to the fact that Charland also uses this concept of identification.

3.6.3. Religious Rhetoric Defined

Religious rhetoric, while necessarily closely related to both Geertz' definition of religion as well as Burke's definition of rhetoric then, needs its own definition in order to be able to explore the potential contents of such a type of rhetoric as well as, importantly, potential effects on its audiences. Religious rhetoric needs to be delimited in order to be able to separate it from rhetoric in general. Here, it is also useful to turn to Burke and his book *The Rhetoric of Religion* from 1961. In this, Burke explains how *ultimate terms* or "god-terms" are, within certain religious symbol systems, the ultimate value, and how everything else that is rhetorically stated must inevitably be understood in terms of "the Spirit" (Henderson 1989, 23). Burke further states:

> Since "God" by definition transcends all symbol-systems […] language is intrinsically unfitted to discuss the "supernatural" literally. […]Hence, all the words for "God" must be used analogically—as were we to speak of God's "powerful arm" (a physical analogy), or of God as a "lord" or "father" (a socio-political analogy) or of God as the "Word" (a linguistic analogy) (Burke 1970, 15).

In this sense, religious rhetoric is speaking of the unspeakable; it is a way of applying natural terms to the supernatural. According to Burke, the effect of this is tied to religious "law" or prescriptions. Invoking God through rhetoric means applying an "ultimate term" in terms of hierarchy, and puts

everything else into contrast with the ultimate good (Burke 1955, 175). In this sense, religious rhetoric means applying the ultimate hierarchal argument to the rhetoric applied; everything else stated will inevitably be measured in relation to this (ibid.). Religious rhetoric is manifold and can take shape in a wide variety of forms. Implicit in religious rhetoric however are the moral directives embedded in it, urging its listeners away from "moral evil", and pointing out what this moral evil contains (ibid., 89-90). The continuous implication of this moral evil is "intrinsic to dominion, owing to the role of the negative in the forming of laws" (ibid.), implying the effects religious rhetoric has in prescribing morally founded real-world effects.

3.7. Limitations

This thesis engages with translated sources from three different languages, all translated into English. With translation of primary sources, especially translations done by people other than the researcher, certain issues will inevitably arise. Here, it is necessary to address the issues arising in interpretation and analysis when a researcher is working in what is to them a foreign language. Can the subjects ever be in any way be accurately represented when their words have gone through the process of translation? Smith (1996) addresses this issue of foreign language research, in particular when the researcher is interpreting "wordplay, associating meanings, multiple and shifting references" (Smith 1996, 160). In representing the issue of interpreting sources, Smith points to the fact that language is never transparent, even in one's own native language; even when researching our native language "we cannot be sure we understand even the same language. All interpretative research involves the representation and appropriation of Others' experiences as well as the researcher's. It requires interpretation across cultures of socially constructed meanings" (ibid., 162). Interpreting sources in foreign languages and native languages then, both require a level of interpretation from the researcher. The meanings of certain words will always be up for interpretation, even when engaging with one's own language:

> If the research is in a foreign language or a foreign culture it becomes a more complex but perhaps more overt operation to involve oneself in the perilous task of representing other people's worlds in one's own reconstructions or texts, no matter what the efforts at empowering research methodologies. In this reading, then, the problematisation of language and meaning applies to research in 'home ' and ' foreign' languages since both involve interpretation and appropriation. (ibid., 163)

Of course, it should be noted that when engaging with sources in foreign languages, there is an additional layer for the researcher to penetrate. Also, this thesis is dependant on outside sources' translating abilities.

Further, Smith proposes that researchers instead embrace so-called "hybrid spaces" in engaging with foreign language sources (ibid.). Accepting that "true meaning" cannot be found neither in the researcher's native language nor in a foreign language, Smith argues that "what is possible […] is not that the 'truth' of the 'other' is 'revealed' in the home language, but that between the two languages, two cultures, researcher and researched an in-between space, a space of hybrids is created" (ibid.). In exploring the space between the text and the interpretation then lies a gap of translation which may not necessarily need to have such highly negative connotations in terms of research; here new spaces of insight might be opened in which the researcher is made aware of their own linguistic biases and is thereby able to be more reflected on rhetorical conclusions drawn: "Looking for meaning 'out there' which has to be 'brought home' […] is disrupted as the 'home' language becomes denaturalised" (ibid., 164-165). The three cases of this thesis then, will require a layer of interpretation, based on the translators' individual interpretations of the words. While this might indicate that the findings are further removed from the original source material of the three cases, it can also open up the possibility of a heightened awareness of one's own linguistic and cultural biases.

4.0. Theory

4.1. Constitutive Rhetoric

This thesis will apply Maurice Charland's concept of constitutive rhetoric in order to examine the phenomenon of how subjects may be rhetorically constituted through the use of religious imagery. Charland's model of constitutive rhetoric is particularly applicable in this case, as the model is a method of assessing how identities are constructed rhetorically. In the journal article "Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case of the Peuple Québécois" from 1987 Charland unfolds the notion of constitutive rhetoric and the concept of interpellation by taking point of departure in the Quebec case of emancipation from Canada in 1967. Here, Charland examines how rhetoric played a part in shaping the identity the people Québécois, a group of citizens from Quebec who desired independence from Canada (Charland 1987, 134-135).

The history of constitutive rhetoric reaches back further than Charland however, to the Greek philosophers, where Aristotle suggested that legitimacy when attempting to engage an audience is key, emphasizing the importance of the character of the speaker, and logical structures in the speech as well as clear and understandable speaking patterns (Ihlen 2018, 271). In his *Rhetoric* dating from the fourth century, Aristotle highlighted the importance of one-way, strategic communication with underlying messages for a specific type of audience in creating measurable effects within the listeners (ibid., 455).

More recent contributions to the field of constitutive rhetoric notably includes Louis Althusser, whom Charland himself draws inspiration from (Charland 1987, 133). Charland posits that interpellation, a notion he borrows from Althusser, is a way for subjects to identify with whatever arguments they are receiving. In 1971, Althusser presented the concept of interpellation, which he argued explained the way ideologies and ideas are internalized within subjects, so that when people are interpellated, or "hailed", they are offered an illusory choice as to whether or not to adhere to the identity they have been called to identify with (Althusser 2001, 174).

As illustrated above, Charland then takes point of departure in Kenneth Burke's notion that it is identification instead of persuasion that is essential in the rhetorical process (Charland 1987, 133). Burke states in his *Rhetoric of Motives* that "the audience feels as though it were not merely receiving, but were itself creatively participating in the poet or speaker's assertion" (Burke 1955, 58). In this sense, although the audience members are essentially the ones receiving information, the relationship between the speaker and the listener is effectively a discursive one, where the audience is called upon to define and redefine their identity whilst doing so within the boundaries set by the speaker's message.

As mentioned above, in Charland's demonstration of the effects of constitutive rhetoric he takes point of departure in the Canadian case where a group of Quebec residents desired independence from Canada (Charland 1987, 134-135). Charland here highlights how the MSA (*Mouvement Souveraineté-Association*, in English: Movement for Sovereignty-Association) issued a white paper, in which they called for Quebec's independence from Canada and applied the slogan "We Are Québésois" (ibid., 134). According to Charland, this white paper applied rhetoric in order to present a historical narrative in which the people of Quebec had always been repressed, and outlined a pro-

posed new political order in which Canada and Quebec would be separated in all matters except economical (ibid., 135). In doing this, Charland argues that the white paper shapes a narrative in which 'Québésois' becomes a sort of antithesis to 'Canadian' (ibid.). In explaining how these identities are created, Charland turns to the notion of interpellation, as mentioned above. Charland draws on Althusser's concept of interpellation and expands on it in stating that:

> The ideological 'trick' of such a rhetoric is that it presents that which is most rhetorical, the existence of a *peuple*, or of a subject, as extrarhetorical. These members of the *peuple* whose supposed essence demands action do not exist in nature, but only within a discursively constituted history. Thus, this rhetoric paradoxically must constitute the identity 'Québécois' as it simultaneously presumes it to be pregiven and natural, existing outside of rhetoric and forming the basis for a rhetorical address (ibid., 137).

In this sense, the act of interpellation becomes something beyond what is merely rhetorical, something that is able to transcend a text or a speech and take root in the lived experience. Althusser himself explains the concept of interpellation in his book *Lenin and Philosophy and other* essays from 1971, which Charland heavily draws from. Althusser unfold his theory of interpellation and writes that interpellation can be explained through the notion of hailing; "Hey, you there!" (Althusser 2001, 118). According to Althusser, when a subject is hailed, they become a subject when they realize that "the hail was really addressed to him, and that it was *really him* who was hailed and not someone else" (ibid.). Interpellation, which Althusser argues explains the way ideologies and ideas are internalized within subjects, means that when people are interpellated, or "hailed", they are offered an illusory choice as to whether or not to adhere to the identity they have been called to identify with (ibid., 119).

Importantly, Charland adds to this that the "rhetoric of identification is ongoing, not restricted to one hailing, but usually a part of a rhetoric of socialization. Thus, one must already be an interpellated subject and exist as a discursive position in order to be part of the audience of a rhetorical situation in which persuasion could occur" (Charland 1987, 138). This is also a notion Charland borrows from Althusser's explanation of the interpellation process. Althusser states that when a subject is interpellated, or 'hailed', it is important to note that he or she is *always already* a subject as a reflection of the various roles people are cast in. Althusser draws on Freud and gives the example of the family in which even before the child is born it is certain that it is born into a specific relation,

that it will have its father's name, and through this have an identity and be irreplaceable (Althusser 2001, 119). Charland adds to this the fact that the rhetorical act cannot and does not exist in a vacuum, but must instead draw on pre-existing narratives when addressing the listeners in order to recreate the identities of the listeners. Constitutive rhetoric here is then presented as something that can both construct and reconstruct the audience (Charland 1987, 138). In this sense, when listeners are sought to be defined by an outside influence, they can be hailed or interpellated to identify with whatever values they are presented with, and are therefore forced to internalize it and let themselves be subconsciously defined by it.

Charland quotes Michael Calvin McGee in highlighting the importance of the fact that a "people" is a fiction, which can only exist when a group of individuals accept the fact that they are living in a political myth (ibid., 138). However, this "people", when presented through constitutive rhetoric is engaged with as something natural and essential to the audience: "Rhetorical claims for a sovereign Quebec are predicated upon the existence of an ideological subject, the 'Québécois,' so constituted that sovereignty is a natural and necessary way of life." (ibid., 137).

4.2. The Three Ideological Effects of Constitutive Rhetoric

Charland believes that there are three essential ideological effects of constitutive rhetoric, which are all appealed to in the identification process, and are important to note when engaging with constitutive rhetoric (ibid., 141). Again, Charland here takes point of departure in the case in Québec, where he finds that the first ideological effect of constitutive rhetoric is collective identification. Collective identification indicates that constitutive rhetoric creates a collective subject, which envelopes and surpasses individual identity (ibid., 139). According to Charland, the identity created through a specific narrative "transcends the limitations of individual body and will" and "offers an 'ultimate' identification permitting an overcoming or going beyond of divisive individual or class interests and concerns" (ibid.). Constitutive rhetoric then must appeal to a sense of identity that is rooted deeper than the individual one, it must call upon the values placed in being part of a collective and transcend otherwise divisive characteristics of class and self.

The second ideological effect of constitutive rhetoric is concerned with narrative identification. When constitutive rhetoric is applied, a *transhistorical subject* is positioned in the narrative, meaning that the listener is compelled to identify with the subject of the past with feeling compelled to

manifest a certain *telos*, an inherent purpose, in the future (ibid., 140). Charland argues that constitutive rhetoric, by applying the image of the transhistorical subject, draws a parallel between the people of the past and the people of the future. 'Québécois' then becomes an actual subject of history, but, importantly, not a *free* subject. Because the parallel has been drawn between the people of the past, the people are now compelled to follow through with the narrative imposed on them (ibid.). They are, in a sense, locked into the narrative when successful interpellation has occurred, because they have been positioned by the direct comparison between the people of the past and the people of the present. This notion of being locked into the narrative is further delved into in the third effect.

The third and final ideological effect of constitutive rhetoric is an illusion of freedom. Charland states: "Freedom is illusory because the narrative is already spoken or written. Furthermore, because the narrative is a structure of understanding that produces totalizing interpretations, the subject is constrained to follow through, to act so as to maintain the narrative's consistency" (ibid., 141). The Québécois are subjects within a narrative, but they, as a people, only exist *because* of this narrative and are therefore forced to follow the narrative presented to them, which presents them with a clear telos in the white paper issued. They are free actors, but solely inside the boundaries set for them by the narrative, because the narrative itself has constituted the collective subject. Accordingly, the subject has no other choice than to act in ways consistent with the narrative.

4.3. Negative Identification: the Fourth Ideological Effect

However, Charland's three ideological effects are in need of clarification in terms of so-called *negative identification*, according to Robert Elliot Mills (2014). Mills argues that there are "two analytically distinct, although functionally coextensive, effects: positive and negative identification" (Mills 2014, 114). While Charland elaborates fully on the positive identification aspects of constitutive rhetoric, the positively depicted set of characteristics that the interpellated subject identifies with, there is a lack of focus of negative identification (ibid.). Where the positive identification aspects of a rhetorical address bring the subjects' identity in line with the subject position established by the narrative, negative identification sets that identity against another in a relationship of antagonism (ibid., 115). Expanding on this need for negative identification, Jerry Won Lee (2014) proposes a fourth ideological effect of constitutive rhetoric, in addition to Charland's three. Lee suggests that the ideological manufacture of the Other be added to Charland's theory (Lee 2014, 3).

> The logic of the Quebecois movement was this: Canada is the sovereign state for Canadians; Quebec would be the sovereign state, not merely the province within the state, for the Quebecois. And through this logic, the Canadians become the Other who occupy a state other than Quebec. If a people are to be constituted as a nation, an implicit Other must exist, for a people could not maintain a belief in their uniqueness without an Other whose collective subjectivity is believed to be different (ibid.).

Here, Lee underlines the importance of having an Other presented through constitutive rhetoric as a point of comparison. In this sense, it is a way to declare 'who we are' through the declaration of 'who we are not'. In fact, Burke further emphasizes this point in his analysis of Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, where he argues that materialising a collective enemy is always the primary unifying step (ibid., 3). This need for an outside force opposing the in-group is also expanded upon by Heidegger:

> The enemy is one who poses an essential threat to the existence of the people and its members. The enemy is not necessarily the outside enemy, and the outside enemy is not necessarily the most dangerous. It may even appear that there is no enemy at all. The root requirement is then to find the enemy, to bring him to light or even to create him, in order that there may be that standing up to the enemy, and that existence not become apathetic. The enemy may have grafted himself onto the innermost root of the existence of a people, and oppose the latter's ownmost essence, acting contrary to it. All the keener and harsher and more difficult is then the struggle, for only a very small part of the struggle consists in mutual blows; it is often much harder and more exhausting to seek out the enemy as such, and to lead him to reveal himself, to avoid nurturing illusions about him, to remain ready to attack, to cultivate and increase constant preparedness and to initiate the attack on a long-term basis, with the goal of total extermination (Heidegger as quoted in Desilet et al. 2011, 341).

This quote illustrates in regards to negative identification the importance of the depiction of the enemy. Here, Heidegger argues when a people is threatened by an outside force, the end result is inevitably "total extermination". Desilet et al. 2011 (2011) equates this with Burke's (1955) notion of Order, the Secret, and the Kill (ibid., 340). Here, it is argued that Heidegger "connects dots between non-apathetic, purposeful living (Order), knowledge of a hidden "enemy" (the Secret), and the struggle ending ultimately in extermination (the Kill)" (ibid., 341). In this sense, it is argued that this struggle lies at the junction between rhetoric, human relations and conflict (ibid.). Importantly,

rhetorical devices pose the possibility of shaping these narratives (Burke 1955, 265). The quote by Heidegger illustrates the fact that the enemy presented through the rhetorical situation is not always an outside enemy, but may instead take shape as something inherent in the community itself; something that must be killed in order for Order to persevere.

Furthermore, the importance of a speaker bringing attention to the Other when aiming to persuade his audience lies in the fact that demonizing members of the out-group and indicating them to be "parasites", "vermin" etc., is an efficient rhetoric device to activate someone's disgust, which will encourage them to think of these members of the out-group as threats to one's own community, threats which need to be removed (Clarke 2014, 12-13). Assessing how these members of the out-group are rhetorically constructed will then benefit in analysing the audience itself, in terms of which values within the group are to be protected.

Within this thesis, these three above-mentioned ideological effects will be applied to the case material, in order to gauge how the subjects in the texts may have been rhetorically constituted in these heavily religious contexts. In order to answer the problem formulation, it is mainly the notion of religious rhetoric that will be analysed, as has been elaborated on above. In addition to Charland's three ideological effects, the fourth effect regarding negative identification proposed by Lee is incorporated. The notion of negative identification will not be included as a separate fourth ideological effect, however, but will instead exist as a subcategory of the first effect in this thesis. This is because negative identification works as a point of contrast in creating the collective subject (Mills 2014, 108). It is therefore useful as a point of departure in establishing the collective subject that is being established throughout the three cases. Including the notion of negative identification in analysing the three cases is imperative, as all three of them dedicate much time to focus on the importance of the Other and how inherently different from themselves they are, as will be elaborated upon in the analysis.

4.4. Compensatory Control Theory

Taking point of departure in the notion of rhetorically constituting collective subjects, it is relevant to engage more fully with the topic of science of religion in determining the special standing religion has when constituting a community of people. Particularly, it is important to attempt to under-

stand how religious rhetoric specifically might have a unique part to play in terms of constituting religiously adhering subjects.

Here, Kay et al. (2009) might help illuminate these questions with their study "Compensatory control: Achieving order through the mind, our institutions, and the heavens". In this study Kay et al. examine the role religion plays in providing people with a sense of control, when they feel that their sense of personal control is threatened (Kay et al. 2009, 264). Kay et al. in their study pose the question of why individuals so strongly hold the desire for control and argue that "the motivation to perceive personal control is not an end in itself but may be one means for meeting the more fundamental need to view the world as orderly and nonrandom." (ibid.). Compensatory control theory (CCT), they claim, is a variety of psychological and perceptual systems humans have developed in order to preserve a sense of order and ensure nonrandomness in times of crises of personal control (ibid.). Kay et al. posits that compensatory control springs from a fundamental human motivation to possess a sense of control of the world, to feel tethered in a sense, and point to a program of research which suggests two sociocultural form of compensatory control; "support for a controlling government and belief in an interventionist God" (ibid.). Kay et al., found after subjecting test subjects to a series of threats to their sense of personal control, that "participants rated themselves as more determined to live and act in accordance with their religious beliefs, more willing to derogate others' religious institutions, more willing to argue for their religious opinions, and even more willing to support religious warfare" (Kay et al. 2010, 42-43). Further, Kay et al. argue that the capacity for religion to encompass and provide both external control and personal control could likely account for some of its long-lasting appeal (ibid., 43). All of this indicates that when people lose their sense of personal control, they are more likely to turn to forces of external control, however these may be presented to them. These forces of external control may appear in a variety of forms, among other things in the shape of religious authority or controlling ideologies (Kay et al. 2013, 572). Therefore in defending oneself against the complete loss of control, people will experience a tendency to endorse and commit to socio-political or religious ideologies:

> CCT proposes that the need to defend oneself against anxieties regarding randomness in life is the engine that drives people to endorse these ideologies of control. If this is the case, then individual and situational variables that heighten the salience of concerns about randomness should predict more extreme endorsement of these ideologies. And, indeed, as described earlier, con-

> siderable research has demonstrated that when one control source is undermined people increase their reliance on other sources (ibid., 578).

Importantly, CCT explains how people throughout their lives draw on multiple sources of control, in order to ensure and consolidate their feelings of non-randomness. This typically will consist of a mix between secular, supernatural, political and personal control ideologies. However, in certain cases a lack of personal control may lead to "the totality of people's control needs [being] funnelled into only one of these control-affirming ideologies. In such cases, CCT would suggest, we should see especially vigorous attachment to and defence of the relevant ideology—that is, extremism" (ibid., 578).

Furthermore, Kay et al. confirms in a previous study that this belief in supernatural beings as a form of compensatory control is more prevalent when emphasis is put on the controlling features of the God (Kay et al. 2008, 23), and how the model of compensatory control is based on supportive evidence gathered from both Western and non-Western countries (Kay et al. 2010, 37).

Compensatory control, or CCT, then, acts as a way for people to look for meaning and control, when their feeling of personal control has been threatened in some way. In terms of constitutive rhetoric it is important to further delve into the concrete effects this may have on the audience of the three cases. What might this removal of personal control look like rhetorically? In assessing constitutive rhetoric, it is relevant to engage with CCT in order to be able to gauge and speculate what the concrete effects might be for individuals, specifically when the rhetoric imposed on people is religious in nature. Kay et al. (2010) argues that religion may have a unique standing when it comes to the psychological power of conviction: since religious conviction, they posit, promotes both internal and external control, in the sense that religion shields both the individual as well as the community, which is an effective safeguard against anxiety caused by randomness, confusion or uncertainty (Kay et al. 2010, 37).

In order to assess how constitutive rhetoric may interplay with CCT, it is relevant to follow the structure of Charland's argument in terms of the three ideological effects of constitutive rhetoric: creating a collective subject, the transhistorical subject, and the telos, in order to be able to assess the potential psychological impact on the audience members.

5.0. Analysis

5.1. First Ideological Effect of Constitutive Rhetoric: Creating a Collective Subject

According to Charland, constitutive rhetoric relies on the subjects being interpellated, or hailed, as the identity being constituted through the speech (Charland 1987, 138). This section of the analysis will therefore assess which identities the three texts are attempting to constitute, whilst simultaneously addressing the first ideological effect of constitutive rhetoric, which is creating a collective subject.

When considering the identities that the texts are, or are attempting to, constitute, it is relevant to assess how they are presenting the antithesis to the question of 'who are we?' (Mills 2014, 108). "The effect of constitutive rhetoric is visible in the rearticulation of explicit negative identifications, the latter of which require the ongoing presence of an antagonist to maintain structural coherence" (ibid.). In order to bind a collective closer together, oftentimes maintaining a focus on enmity will result in a "solidarity of fear, a community of spite, a kinship in arms, and a brotherhood of hatred" (ibid., 114). Here then, negative identification will be addressed first, and following this, focus will be on how the collective subject is constructed through the following points of departure: familial relationship, martyrdom and anti-individualism.

5.1.1. Negative Identification

All three of the texts heavily emphasize the importance of being part of the collective, and all have a strong current of anti-individualism in them, which will be expanded upon later. In contrast to the identity created for the audience stands *the Other*, so that the question of "who are we?" can be, in part at least, be answered by the question "who are we not?".

All three of the texts contrast themselves with the notion of the Other that is imbedded with highly negative traits, and something that is alien to the listeners. Khomeini's portrayal of the Other, which continues throughout the speech, is evident in his depiction of the Western world as 'world-devourers':

> The will of almighty God, may He be praised, decreed the release of this oppressed nation from the yoke of the tyranny and crimes of the satanical regime and from the yoke of the domination

> of oppressive powers, especially the government of the world-devouring America, and to unfurl the banner of Islamic justice over our beloved country (Khomeini 1980, 22).

Here, Khomeini distances the listeners from two distinct identities: the monarchy and the Shah, as well as the Western world. Khomeini uses words such as 'tyranny', 'crimes' and 'oppressive powers' to describe these two entities, in order to emphasize the brutality and illegality of the powers that oppress them. Importantly, Khomeini also casts the Other as 'satanical' (the monarchy) and 'world devourers' (America). The use of 'satanical' in reference to the opposition pits the audience against an ultimate evil, against something inherently insidious and through this demonstrates how the audience is on the right side of the revolution. The use of 'satanical regime' and 'world-devouring America' further serves to bring forth a mix between populism and religious connotations. Khomeini frames the listeners, the Iranian people, as someone who are fundamentally against the dominating evil forces and argues that power needs to be given back to the people in order to overcome this ultimate evil. Khomeini also continuously depicts the revolutionaries as filthy: "The Foundation of the Oppressed should clearly publish the list of movable and real property of the satanical people, especially the Shah, his family and his filthy lackeys throughout Iran (ibid., 24)." 'Filthy lackeys' refers to the people supporting the Shah and equates them once again with something inherently evil through the religious imagery of Satan. This imagery contrasts the listeners with something unclean, and within the context of Islam this is particularly significant. Within the context of Islam, being impure means not being able to participate in religious rituals in terms of being unclean in front of God, which is a sign of disrespect (Shepard 2014, 100). Being contrasted with this impure, satanical Other thereby paints the audience in a favorable light in the eyes of the Ayatollah; being a counterpart to these people essentially means being a good Muslim.

Urban in his speech is, perhaps to an even higher degree, adamant in representing the Other as an evil entity:

> From the confines of Jerusalem and the city of Constantinople a horrible tale has gone forth and very frequently has been brought to our ears, namely, that a race from the kingdom of the Persians, an accursed race, a race utterly alienated from God, a generation forsooth which has not directed its heart and has not entrusted its spirit to God, has invaded the lands of those Christians and has depopulated them by the sword, pillage and fire […]They destroy the altars, after having defiled them with their uncleanness. (Munro 1895, 5).

Here, Urban describes the Other, the Persians, as 'accursed' and how they are 'alienated from God' and equates this to being 'unclean'. This effectively aids in constructing the narrative that the listeners are *not* these things. And if they are not unclean, this means that they are not alienated from God, consolidating their identity as Christians and framing their faith as the thing, which distances them from the Persians, essentially what makes them not unclean. In relation to this, Urban also depicts how the Persians have 'invaded the lands' and are destroying the churches. This effectively paints the Other as a sort of trespasser, encroaching on the Christian religion, and through this evokes a sense of righteousness in the listener in terms of taking back what is rightfully theirs.

Urban also repeatedly emphasizes the fact that the Christians of the region are being forcibly circumcised by the Muslims: "They circumcise the Christians, and the blood of the circumcision they either spread upon the altars or pour into the vases of the baptismal font." (ibid.). When Urban claims that the Christians are subjected to forced circumcision, it underlines his stance that the Other is an enemy of the Christian belief system in itself. Circumcision is mentioned in the Bible, but Christians believe (and did at the time of Urban as well) that this ritual has been replaced by baptism (Raveenthiran 2018, 1442). In describing the Muslims' forced circumcision of the Christians then, Urban calls on the audience to defend Christianity itself, and essentially argues that while the Muslims are torturing the Christians and killing them purposelessly, there is an essential difference in the type of warfare he is encouraging the Christians to lead; for the Christians, their entire faith is what is at stake.

Kokutai no Hongi is decidedly less graphic in its depiction of the Other, than is the case in Urban's speech. However, there is still a decidedly strong undercurrent of polemic throughout the book. Quoting the tenth emperor of Japan, Emperor Sujin (97 BC – 30 BC), Kokutai states the following regarding the Other:

> The key to leading the people doth lie in teaching and transforming them. Now already the deities of heaven and earth have been reverenced, so that all ill and harm have died out throughout the Land. Howbeit, barbarians in far-off places have not yet received the law; and is it not because these have not even until now known the Sovereign's teachings? Hence, choose ye courtiers, dispatch them everywhere, and cause them to know Our laws (Kokutai no Hongi 1949, 74).

Kokutai often makes use of binary oppositions in representing the Other, primarily the Western world, as barbarians and outsiders, who have not been blessed by being the chosen people. The Japanese are the chosen people and are exceptional because of it, as "the Imperial Line and its dignity [has] no parallel in foreign countries" (ibid., 67).

Kokutai states continuously and repeatedly throughout the book that Japan is superior to the West. It is also stated how this superiority is primarily a result of the moral decay of the Western world, combined with the Japanese being blessed by the sacred status of their emperor:

> The Emperor is not merely a so-called sovereign, monarch, ruler, or administrator, such as is seen among foreign nations, but reigns over this country as a deity incarnate in keeping with the great principle that has come down to us since the founding of the Empire; and the wording of Article III which reads, "The Emperor is sacred and inviolable," clearly sets forth this truth. Similar provisions which one sees among foreign nations are certainly not founded on such deep truths, and are merely things that serve to ensure the position of a sovereign by means of legislation (ibid., 165).

The Japanese emperor is not merely a politician, as is made evident by Kokutai is the case in the Western world. Juxtaposing the 'administrators' of the foreign nations with the 'deity incarnate' that is the emperor, Kokutai here makes evident the fact that the Japanese system of power is based on something that is raised above profane politics; it is something more than that. This is further stressed by contrasting the 'deep truths' of the imperial line with how the sovereign of the foreign nations are merely ensured through legislation. Here, it is also made clear the differences in the temporal weight the different institutions carry. According to Kokutai, the emperor is legitimized by "the great principle that has come down to us since the founding of the Empire", whereas the sovereigns, monarchs, rulers and administrators hold no such legitimizations. They are temporary institutions, where the emperor is an eternal one. Kokutai then constitutes its intended audience as being something more than the profane subjects of the Western world, the audience are made out to be special solely because of their religion.

Particularly Kokutai focuses on the fact that the emperor is "inviolable" and how "the key to leading the people doth lie in teaching and transforming them". Relating to the notion from Heidegger, that the enemy in a society is not necessarily represented by an outside force (Desilet et al. 2011,

341), this is made evident in Kokutai's representation of supposed dangers to the community. While Kokutai also focuses on outside Western forces, more attention is paid to the importance of inner identification with the emperor's doctrines within the Japanese people. This can be viewed as a kind of pre-emptive strategy in eradicating any notions of non-collective thinking within the Japanese audience. This is much more pronounced in Kokutai than in the other two cases; Kokutai, to a much higher degree, focuses on the inner transformation of its subjects. However, this inner struggle is also evident in both Khomeini and Urban's speech, albeit in slightly different fashions. Urban calls for the renouncement of worldly attachments in stating that "what the Lord says in the Gospel, "He that loveth father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me" (Munro 1895, 6). It can be argued that this, in a sense, equates to demanding expulsion of impure non-religious thought and, through this, of an enemy not represented by any outside force. Khomeini also focuses on the inner transformations of his audience in stating that "you should set aside dissension and schism and should think of the people and you should free yourselves from the evil of the "isms" and "ists" of the East or the West" (Khomeini 1980, 25). Here, while the enemy of the people is ultimately still referred to as outside forces, there is still an implicit expectation from the audience in not giving in to these forces. In all three of the cases then, the Other is not merely represented through outside influences imposing on the religious purity of their own turf, but it is also demanded of the audience that they purify themselves of anti-religious notions. Kokutai emphasizes these aspects of inner transformations repeatedly. This could potentially be attributed to the contexts of the three texts; where Urban is an a state of urging people to partake in the crusade, and Khomeini speaks directly after the Iranian revolution, Kokutai is written in a pre-war context, where the *possibility* of war is imminent. Focusing on this "inner antagonist" is a way of cultivating constant preparedness (Desilet et al. 2011, 341). In this context then, it is a necessity for the Japanese to focus on the inner aspects to a higher degree than the outside enemies; whoever the outside enemy turns out to be, it is essential to prepare the audience. It can be argued that in presenting the audience with a concrete enemy to unite them through, Kokutai's project is the more difficult one: there has not been not any immediately imminent bloodshed, nor has the people gone through a unifying revolution. There is only the *potential* outside enemy, which means that preparedness is crucial.

In all three of the cases, the Other is painted in a highly polemic light, which is primarily a result of the fact that the Other holds the wrong religious view, they are not the 'chosen people'. Urban stands out in his depiction of the other as he, potentially in an attempt to evoke a sense of revulsion

from the audience, paints an image of the Other as someone near and imposing. In his graphic depictions of the brutal acts of the Other, it makes them appear as almost tangible and threatening in a way that draws them nearer to the audience. The threat of the Other becomes something urgent and something that poses an immediate danger to the life and religion of the audience. Kokutai on the other hand in its depiction of the Other removes them from the immediate context of the audience and instead turn them into a distant danger which threatens the harmony of the lives of the Japanese. Where Urban makes this threat an actual threat to the lives of the listeners, Kokutai makes the threat into a more abstract threat to their way of life. Khomeini, in a sense, stands between these two positions. In describing America as being 'world-devouring', the threat is not merely a far-off danger, but something looming nearer instead.

Furthermore, in all three texts the listeners' collective identity is accentuated by contrasting it with something terrible and foreign. This is primarily done through the use of religious imagery, by alienating the Other and depicting them as something diametrically foreign from themselves because they do not share the religion, morals, and status as chosen as the listeners. The Other is portrayed in all three cases as a faceless, insidious mass, who are not differentiated from one another, but solely differentiated form the audience on the grounds that they are not as inherently good or special as the themselves. When religion is applied in all three of the texts it distances the audience to an even higher degree from the Other, because it becomes something that surrounds the entire lives of the audience; religion is presented as something that influences family, nationality, moral and politics and is therefore all-encompassing. In all three texts religion is what drives the polemic presentations of the Other, and is what constitutes the listeners as good religious subjects, as good people, *because* they are not filthy Satan worshippers, in Khomeini's words, accursed and unclean, in Urban's words, or barbarians whose nations are not based on deep truths, in Kokutai's words. The audience is what is presented as the contrasts to these characteristics, and religion is the community that constitutes them as special and superior to the Other.

5.1.2. Familial Relationship

A recurrent theme in all three of the texts is the fact that the collective identity being constructed throughout them is to a high degree based on the repeated descriptions of a familial relationship between the listeners by virtue of their religious community. It is relevant to assess how the three texts uses familial relations as constitutive imagery, as "the uses of relational images entangle the

speaker and the listener in relationships that have a *priori* behavioral expectations built into them" (Adams 1983, 57). Further, seeing as all three of the texts repeat this imagery several times, it is important to delve into the importance of this exact rhetorical device.

All three of the texts repeatedly make use of familial metaphors in comparing the audience to children, sisters and brothers. This is important as continual repetition and reassertion of the same ideas in a text has immense rhetorical force in the sense that it puts certain ideas in the foreground of its listeners' minds (Fahnestock 2011, 135). This is perhaps most evident in Urban's speech, in which he continually emphasizes the importance of the religious community as a family:

> Oh, most valiant soldiers and descendants of invincible ancestors, be not degenerate, but recall the valour of your progenitors. But if you are hindered by love of children, parents and wives, remember what the Lord says in the Gospel, "He that loveth father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me." "Every one that hath forsaken houses, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or lands for my name's sake shall receive an hundredfold and shall inherit everlasting life." (Munro 1895, 6-7).

Both of these Biblical references are to the Gospel of Matthew, which Urban applies to emphasize the importance of the religious family as being greater than worldly families. Urban first calls on the listeners to remember that they are 'descendants of invisible ancestors' in reminding them that they are first and foremost members of a religious family, and that this religious family is essentially important enough to trump their own worldly family. This is a common image in medieval Christianity, where some Christians oftentimes wished to remain homeless in the sense of worldly deprivations, because they believed that their true home was transcendent (Woodhead 2004, 51). Urban's words can then essentially be seen as a call for extreme asceticism in that this fundamentally constitutes a religious community that is more important than family. Urban's repeated emphasis on the importance of family is further underlined in naming the listeners "children of Israel" and "beloved Brethren" (Munro 1895, 6-7). This constructs a narrative in which the listeners become a family not solely through their religion, but also brings them closer to God in the sense that it brings them in direct relation to the Pope, the successor to Saint Peter (Woodhead 2004, 37) and through him, in direct relation to the divine. Furthermore, Urban's use of "children of Israel" consolidates the narrative that the listeners are only a part of this familial relation through religion and faith.

Khomeini's use of family as a rhetorical device is also recurring throughout his speech, although he does not go as far as to demand the renouncement of worldly relationships: "My dear sisters and brothers, you should know that those people who regard the clergy as reactionary are, ultimately, following the path of the Shah and America" (Khomeini 1980, 25). Here, Khomeini refers to the audience as sisters and brothers and through this establishes a familial relationship between them and the Ayatollah himself. This sibling-relation however is not the only way Khomeini insinuates a familial relationship between the audience and himself:

> Now, the agents of the Shah have again put the word reaction into the mouths of my children who are unaware of the depth of the issues, in order to crush the clergy, who are the foundation of independence and freedom of this country. My beloved and revolutionary children: today the insulting and the weakening of the role of the clergy is a blow against independence, freedom and Islam (ibid.).

Here, the Iranians are being described by the Ayatollah as his own children. Using the phrase 'unaware' about them paints them in an innocent light, making them dependent on Khomeini, who here is casting himself as the role of the father figure to the nation and the listeners. Furthermore, 'beloved and revolutionary children' draws a parallel between the words 'beloved' and 'revolutionary', indicating that the audience is beloved in the eyes of the Ayatollah *because* they have served in the revolution.

Kokutai frequently and explicitly makes use of the familial imagery in presenting the relationship between the Japanese emperor and his subjects:

> The Imperial Ancestor and the Emperor are in the relationship of parent and child, and the relationship between the Emperor and his subjects is, in its righteousness, that of sovereign and subject and, in its sympathies, that of father and child (Kokutai no Hongi 1949, 81).

This exact image of the emperor as the father of the nation and the people as his children is recurring throughout Kokutai. 'Imperial ancestor' refers here to the Sun Goddess, Amaterasu-Ōmikami, and not the first Emperor Jimmu, who was founder of the empire (ibid., 17). In the passage it is described how the emperor is in direct familial relationship with the Japanese gods, and 'in its sympathies' in a father-child relation to his subjects. This relationship is further emphasized throughout

the text: “Thus, founded on this great principle, all the people, united as one great family nation in heart and obeying the Imperial Will, enhance indeed the beautiful virtues of loyalty and filial piety” (ibid., 59). Again, here it is not a literal familial relationship, but one ‘in heart’, based on religious truths and devotions.

Importantly, the point made above about how the familial relationship puts the listeners closer to Urban and through him to God also applies in the two other texts; the families in all three texts are ones based on the religious identity of the audience. Specifically the imagery of the family unit is important in the context of creating a collective identity:

> These archetypal relationships seem to tap into essential and fixed patterns of human caring. As such, they stand as bases of moral consciousness. Moreover, they provide powerful means of motivation that act to "familialize" audiences and sensitize them to the value of their collective potential to meet political exigencies (Adams 1983, 60).

The effect of the three texts all relying so heavily on the family metaphor is that distinctions within the group are collapsed in favor of the family relation that binds them together. The family-in-religion relation transcends cultural and worldly differences and binds the audience together in a collective identity, tied to their religious lineage. Family is the most primary units of social cohesion (ibid., 56) and replacing a ‘people’ with a ‘family-through-religion’ serves as an ultimate unifier. This is especially true when considering the above-mentioned Other as something threatening the family unit. Because the Other is described as something that imposes on the archetypical relationships of the family, this only serves to further highlight the precariousness of their situation and works as an incentive to protect the family unit.

5.1.3. Martyrdom and Anti-Individualism

In relation to the collective subject created in the three texts, it is important to emphasize the roles of martyrdom and anti-individualism and how these two phenomena appear and interact in all three texts. A martyr can be defined, in its broadest sense, as “a person who undergoes death or great suffering for a faith, belief, or cause,” and martyrdom as “the act of becoming or the condition of being a martyr” (Olivola 2013, 92). Combined, these indicate that martyrdom means suffering for a cause (ibid.). Martyrdom and how the shape it takes inevitably varies from religion to religion, but a

common feature is how the act is through to be a way to sacrifice individual life in favor of the group: “The act of martyrdom, a self-sacrifice, is thus a powerful means of identity formation, for both the martyr and the martyr's community” (Juergensmeyer et al. 2012, 750). Martyrdom is considered to be the ultimate sacrifice, and a way to sacrifice yourself for the good of the community; it is a way to strengthen social and religious order (Woodhead 2004, 39).

Khomeini’s speech to the revolutionaries is heavily oriented towards the historic importance of martyrdom within Islam. While the subjects of self-sacrifice and anti-individualism are recurrent throughout the entirety of his speech, Khomeini does not directly mention martyrs until the last part of his speech:

> Committed and responsible intellectuals, you should set aside dissension and schism and should think of the people and you should free yourselves from the evil of the "isms" and "ists" of the East or the West, for the sake of the salvation of the people, who have given martyrs (Khomeini 1980, 25).

Shiite Islam, as mentioned above in section 3.3.3., is historically heavily occupied with the importance of self-sacrifice. When Husayn, the nephew of Ali, who was, according to Shiites, the one the Prophet appointed as his successor, rose up to his oppressors, he died sacrificing himself for his people (Shepard 2014, 122). “This event, which took place in 680, has echoed down the centuries for Shi’is” (ibid.). Within the context of Shiism, Husayn is venerated as the rightful Imam and an opposition to oppression. So when Khomeini venerates the people who have died as martyrs for the cause, it is essentially likening them to Husayn and his sacrifices. This is a rhetorical trick applied often and throughout many of Ayatollah Khomeini’s speeches (ibid., 294-295). Within Shiism then, there is great honour in self-sacrifice, and Khomeini mentions this self-sacrifice as being for the ‘salvation of the people’. Here, it is evident that Khomeini sets the religious community above the individual in emphasizing the importance of the people and those who should be honoured by doing so as well. This is also evident when Khomeini ends his speech by highlighting the debt that the religious community owes to the martyrs:

> Finally, after praying for forgiveness for the martyrs of the Islamic Revolution and expressing gratitude for their self-sacrifice, it is necessary on this new year to express my congratulations to their relatives, to their mothers and fathers and congratulate them on their being able to train

> such lions and lionesses. Also, I wish to congratulate the injured and the crippled of the revolution, who were pioneers in the advancement of the movement of the nation and the establishment of the Islamic Republic. Verily, our Islamic revolution is indebted to the self-sacrifice of these two beloved groups. I and the nation will not forget their brave deeds and will honour their memory (Khomeini 1980, 25).

Khomeini ends the speech with this quote, further emphasizing the importance that he places on the martyrs and their sacrifices, on anti-individualism. Here, Khomeini asks for forgiveness from the martyrs, which could be argued imbues them with a power over not only the people, but also the Ayatollah himself. He also congratulates the relatives of the martyrs, which essentially places the religious family above the worldly family; there is honour in placing religion above one's own family. Both in this as well as in the 'crippled' of the revolution being congratulated, the religious overtones of Shiism are evident: there is honour in individuals sacrificing themselves for their religious community.

Perhaps even more radically in favour of martyrdom is Pope Urban, whose entire call for the crusades can be argued to be a call for martyrdom. Firstly, as mentioned previously, Urban, like Khomeini, also directly calls for his audience to place the religious family above the worldly family when he quotes the Gospel of Matthew in stating: "Every one that hath forsaken houses, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or lands for my name's sake shall receive an hundredfold and shall inherit everlasting life" (Munro 1895, 6-7). Here, many of the same themes are present as in Khomeini's congratulatory words to the families that have lost children for the revolution. In both cases there is no higher honour than giving up individual attachments and instead sacrificing yourself for the religious community. Urban further accentuates this towards the end of his speech:

> Whoever, therefore, shall determine upon this holy pilgrimage and shall make his vow to God to that effect and shall offer himself to Him as a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, shall wear the sign of the cross of the Lord on his forehead or on his breast. […] As He commands in the Gospel, "He that taketh not his cross and followeth after me, is not worthy of me." (Munro 1895, 8)

This section of the speech does not mention a return journey, as it is expected that those who undertake the mission will perish either in battle, on the road, or as potential settlers (Coyne 2017, 85).

This mission is similar in nature to penitential journeys at the time where believers travelled to Jerusalem to be buried there (ibid.). This, combined with the imagery of the "living sacrifice", indicates that to undertake this journey is essentially equated with the denunciation of all individual attachments in one's own country. Anti-individualism here is at the forefront of Urban's argumentation. Urban also notes that these living sacrifices should be venerated as holy, and essentially, what makes one worthy of God. In fact, Christians who undertook the journey of the crusades were promised that they would be venerated as martyrs in the event of death (Woodhead 2004, 117). This of course further illustrates the status related to martyrdom at the time.

Both Khomeini and Urban are insisting in their tone in appraisal of the martyrs of their respective religions, but differ in terms of whom the martyr is referencing. Khomeini's speech was held after there has already been bloodshed on behalf of Islam, as he is consistently referring to the martyrs of the Iranian revolution. In a sense, he is consolidating the religion in referring back to people who have *recently* died for it. Urban differs in this sense, seeing as his speech is an appeal for future sacrifices. Although Urban refers to "the deeds of your ancestors" (Munro 1895, 6), there exist no current martyrs who have already died for his specific cause. In terms of the constituted collective subject then, it can be argued that because Khomeini has the advantage of *recent* history, he does not to as high a degree as Urban need to refer back to abstract historical happenings; the gap that needs to be filled between the previous martyrs and the potential martyrs is not as great as is the case with Urban. The collective subject that is formed in Khomeini's speech then, can be argued to be more historically tightly bound to the martyrs than Urban's. This could also indicate that this gives Khomeini the rhetorical advantage of righteousness; people have already deemed this exact cause worthy of dying for.

Lastly, Kokutai also places importance of martyrdom and anti-individualism, although in somewhat different ways than both Khomeini and Urban. Kokutai dedicates several pages to describing the importance of Bushido. Bushido ("The Way of the Warrior") literally translates to "Military-Knight-Ways" and are precepts for how warriors should act (Inazō 1905, 20-21). In relaying the importance of Bushido, Kokutai describes the importance of self-effacement:

> Though a sense of indebtedness binds master and servant, this has developed into a spirit of self-effacement and of meeting death with a perfect calmness. In this, it was not that death was made light of so much as that man tempered himself to death and in a true sense regarded it with

> esteem. In effect, man tried to fulfill true life by way of death. This means that rather than lose the whole by being taken up with and setting up oneself, one puts self to death in order to give full play to the whole by fulfilling the whole. Life and death are one, and the monistic truth is found where life and death are transcended. Through this is life, and through this is death. However, to treat life and death as two opposites and to hate death and to seek life is to be taken up with one's own interests, and is a thing of which warriors are ashamed. To fulfill the Way of loyalty, counting life and death as one, is Bushido (Kokutai no Hongi 1949, 81)**.**

This quote highlights a recurrent theme throughout the entirety of the descriptions of Bushido. There is, as will be expanded upon below, a recurrent theme of 'oneness' throughout Kokutai. In this example, it is evident that this oneness also influences Bushido, in the sense that anti-individualism is promoted as a natural state for the people. This is evident in the quote as it illustrates how a person should put the self to death in order to fulfil the whole. This self-effacement and encouragement to count 'life and death as one' both express anti-individualism to the point that one should become almost indifferent to dying. The oneness in Kokutai is highlighted to such a degree, that death is inconsequential: the individual *is* the group and is therefore not important enough to choose its own life over the life of the group; they are, in fact, the very same. The notion of dying for the group or 'the greater good' is also evident throughout Kokutai's other chapters. An example of this is a poem 'of old' which states: "O that I could die Beneath the Emperor's banner, Though deserveless of a name!" (ibid., 85)**,** after which the audience are directly implored to sacrifice themselves for the state (ibid.).

In this sense, as a result of these extreme kinds of anti-individualism, martyrdom in Kokutai is not presented as a sacrifice at all. Where both Khomeini and Urban presents martyrdom as an honour in terms of service to the religious community, it is however still acknowledged that it is in fact a sacrifice for the individual. This is not the case in Kokutai, where the individual *is* the group as much as life *is* death; there can essentially be no sacrifice of the individual that bears any weight. As long as the collective remains, the individual remains as well. Below, it will also be illustrated how time also exists only as 'one', in the sense that past, present and future all are conflated, meaning that a martyr now does not die in the temporal sense that is traditionally the case. As opposed to Khomeini and Urban then, who venerate the martyrs of their religions, it can be argued that in Kokutai there is no distinction between the martyrs and the ones who remain alive. The collective subject in Kokutai is so completely bound together with the collective by the fact that nothing in the worldly

sphere can essentially impact the integrity of the community; all subjects are always already martyrs while simultaneously all of them are not. It can be argued that where Khomeini and Urban's subjects are being interpellated as parts of the collective because of their *potential* martyrdom, Kokutai's subjects are being interpellated as *already-martyrs*.

In summation, the subjects of the three cases are in this sense being interpellated, or "hailed", as members of the religious family, as part of the collective, and as something clean and good, contrasted with the insidious outsider. And it is only through accepting and committing to this interpellation, to being hailed as a religious subject, that they can set themselves apart from the Other and enter into the role being cast as inherently *good*.

5.1.4. CCT: Creating a Collective Subject

As illustrated above, Urban, Khomeini and Kokutai no Hongi all heavily emphasize the negative identification aspects, meaning that they all, albeit in different ways, accentuate the otherness and insidious nature of the Other. When Khomeini describes the Other as filthy satans and world-devourers, when Urban deems them accursed and unclean, and when Kokutai describes the Other as barbarians in far-off places, these fear-based tactics, what can essentially be deemed fear-mongering, are written as a contrast to the safe structures created by their own respective religions. It can be argued, that this fear-mongering serves as a way for the speaker to destabilize a sense of control in the audience. As demonstrated in the analysis, this is done through the depiction of the Other as someone insidious and diametrically foreign from the speaker and their in-group. Kay et al. (2010) writes:

> Thus, when protective sources of personal control are lowered and the world seems perilously random and uncertain, beliefs in the existence of a controlling God may be a particularly attractive mode of coping. This argument implies that threats to personal control should increase religious conviction and belief in the existence of a controlling God, which should, in turn, relieve the anxious uncertainty. (Kay et al. 2010, 38)

Depicting the Other as a looming threat and as something dangerous that is fast approaching, can be argued to be a world-destabilizing message to the audience, which makes their world appear "random and uncertain", in Kay's words. According to CCT then, this will indicate that the audience members are now more susceptible to external control. As the quote above states, the belief in a controlling God will then be a particularly attractive mode of coping. In terms of constitutive rheto-

ric and its relationship with CCT, it can be argued that in the three cases analysed, the religious subjects are constituted, at least in part, through fear-based tactics. The texts all emphasize the danger posed by the Other, and should the audience buys in to these narratives, they will essentially have no other choice than to inscribe themselves as part of the 'right side', that is, the side presented by the speaker or author.

Importantly, in terms of this 'right side' opposing the Other, as illustrated above, all three texts repeatedly highlight the importance of the 'family-through-religion' narrative, as something that inherently contrasts the 'satanical' and 'unclean' nature of whoever is not a part of this religious family. It can be argued that this establishes their own respective religion as the unity that brings cohesion and has the potential to stabilize the world, or the 'nomos', in Berger's terms. After having destabilized the worldview of the audience through presenting the Other as something imposing and inherently evil, the familial imagery is brought in as a contrast to these narratives. Essentially, religion is what constitutes the safe haven as a contrast to the world-destabilizing enemies presented in the texts, and, according to CCT, the audience will inevitably be more receptive to, and more likely to be interpellated by, these messages, having just been presented with the uncertainty of the outside world. According to CCT then, it can be argued that the texts all three make the collective subject receptive to religious control as well as receptive to religious interpellation, as identification with the 'right side' is presented as the ordered and safe counterpart to the lack of control.

In terms of which of the three texts could be argued installs the audience with most uncertainty, Urban is the most graphic in his descriptions of the Other. Kay et al. describes how the more anxiety is experienced, the more likely a turn towards religion is: "[…] in contexts of low, but not high, personal control, the more anxiety participants experienced, the more they reported believing in the existence of a controlling God" (Kay et al. 2010, 39). In his graphic descriptions of the gory rituals committed by the Persians against the Christians, it can be argued that this is a way of removing feelings of personal control, when he installs fear in the audience in the face of this brutality. According to CCT, this would indicate openness to external control, in Urban's case, religious authority. As demonstrated above, Urban also calls for the renunciation of worldly familial relationship in order to serve the ultimate familial relation; the Pope and Christianity. This paints religion as the only safeguard against the uncertainty brought on by the brutality of the Other.

Furthermore, as the religious community throughout all three texts is painted as the safeguard against outside uncertainty, anti-individualism is highlighted as a virtue in connection to the martyrdom described above. In terms of CCT, it can be argued that the imagery of the religious martyrs is also an indicator of the respective religion's external control features. Traditionally, martyrs represent the ultimate image of courage and fearlessness (Wallace 2011, 217-219). When the three texts applies the image of the martyrs, people fearlessly sacrificing themselves for the community, it can be argued that this ties the religion together with the notion of courage and fearlessness. Specifically within Kokutai, fear almost becomes inconsequential, as long as the subjects dedicate themselves fully to the religion. In the context of Kokutai, external control in a sense *becomes* internal control, but only after having accepted the premise that religion is the ultimate means to gain control.

5.2. Second Ideological Effect of Constitutive Rhetoric: the Transhistorical Subject

Constitutive rhetoric positions a "transhistorical subject" and describes the past "as an extension of the present," with the effect that "time is collapsed as narrative identification occurs" (Charland 1987, 140). An example of this is Charland's own explanation of how the term 'Québécois' denotes both eighteenth century settlers as well as people who live in Quebec today (ibid.). The purpose of the positioning of the transhistorical subject is to provide a tangible bond between the current members of the in-group and their ancestors. Also, the connection between the subjects of today and the subjects of the past is established by the two groups occupying the same land (ibid., 140). In the speeches of Khomeini and Urban as well as in Kokutai no Hongi, this transhistorical subject is to a high degree present throughout all three of the texts. However, there is also a different yet similar occurrence in the texts, which is that of the trans*religious* subject. This will be explained and expanded upon below.

Khomeini, in addressing his audience, places much emphasis on the Shia branch of Islam that the majority of Iranians, as well as Khomeini himself, practice. This effectively constructs a link between the religious origins of this particular branch of Islam and the audience: "In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful, let me congratulate all oppressed people and the noble Iranian nation on the occasion of the new year, whose present is the consolidation of the foundation of the Islamic Republic" (Khomeini 1980, 22). This is one example of many in which Khomeini refers to

the audience as oppressed. Here, Khomeini likens being oppressed with being noble. This is a recurring theme in Shiism, where much of the religious identity is constructed around being a historically oppressed people (Shepard 2014, 122). This constructs a transhistorical subject, where the audience is closely tied to the people of the past, based on their religious identity. This identity that is constructed through being oppressed is further emphasized through the continuous use of the image of an all-powerful Other as an opposing force to the oppressed Shiites:

> On the other hand, all the superpowers and all the powers have risen to destroy us. If we remain in an enclosed environment we shall definitely face defeat. We should clearly settle our accounts with the powers and superpowers and should demonstrate to them that, despite all the grave difficulties that we have, we shall confront the world with our ideology (Khomeini 1980, 22).

This emphasis on the Other as something powerful that has 'risen to destroy' the Shiites further consolidates the identity shared across the Shiite community; an oppressed people that have historically fallen victim to the powerful elite. Khomeini here constitutes a collective identity within the audience as a people who will, time and time again, rise above the difficulties they are being subjected to, 'despite all the grave difficulties'. The transhistorical subject being constituted by Khomeini then is one that gains its identity through being part of the Shiite religion. Shiism is what binds the audience to the people of the past.

Urban also relies on the transhistorical subject in engaging his listeners: "Oh, race of Franks, race from across the mountains, race chosen and beloved by God as shines forth in very many of your works set apart from all nations by the situation of your country as well as by your catholic faith and the honour of the holy church!" (Munro 1895, 5). Here, Urban presents a direct appeal to the Franks in encouraging them to join the crusades. 'Race of Franks' at this time could signify any potential warrior from Western Europe, or could even refer to a member of the Christian population bound by the ideal of a Frankish empire (Coyne 2017, 72). In the section of his speech above, Urban likens the Franks that he calls upon to a 'race chosen and beloved by God'. Speaking from a religious standpoint, it could be argued that the Pope here draws a parallel between the Franks and the earliest Christians.

> Let the deeds of your ancestors move you and incite your minds to manly achievements; the glory and greatness of king Charles the Great, and of his son Louis, and of your other kings, who have destroyed the kingdoms of the pagans, and have extended in these lands the territory of the holy church. Let the holy sepulchre of the Lord our Saviour, which is possessed by unclean nations, especially incite you, and the holy places which are now treated with ignominy and irreverently polluted with their filthiness. Oh, most valiant soldiers and descendants of invincible ancestors, be not degenerate, but recall the valour of your progenitors (Munro 1895, 6).

Urban here encourages the audience to "let the deeds of your ancestors move you" and recalls Charlemagne, who was king of the Franks and founded the Holy Roman Empire, as well as his son and "your other kings". Following this, he explains how these former kings destroyed the pagans on behalf of the church. The pagans and the Christians are essentially mirroring each other here; Charlemagne and the earlier kings "destroyed the kingdom of the pagans" just as the "unclean nations" now have "possessed" the Christian lands. The difference between the pagans and the kings that Urban encourages the audience to revere is Christianity as the overarching root that sets them apart, and it is ultimately what justifies the Pope's mission. Urban then applies the imperative "recall the valour of your progenitors" to the audience, whom he describes as "valiant soldiers and descendants of invincible ancestors". This effectively equates what the Franks are tasked to do with the earlier deeds of the kings who extended the territory of the church. Urban contrasts the holy with the filthy and places Charlemagne and the kings and the audience on the same side; a side which is upheld by their Christian beliefs. The transhistorical subject in this case is one equated with kings and their holy deeds, which they performed exclusively on behalf of the Christian faith.

Kokutai no Hongi, perhaps most of all the three texts, applies the transhistorical subject in the attempt to create unity among all Japanese people:

> That our Imperial Throne is coeval with heaven and earth means indeed that the past and the future are united in one in the "now," that our nation possesses everlasting life, and that it flourishes endlessly. Our history is an evolution of the eternal "now," and at the root of our history there always runs a stream of eternal "now." […] Thus, sovereign and subject, united in one, take shape and develop eternally, and the Imperial Throne goes on prospering (Kokutai no Hongi 1949, 65).

The Japanese throne is eternal and is what unites the people of Japan. These descriptors essentially bind the people to the everlasting throne and to their emperor's eternal lineage. Describing the past and the future as united in the *now* collapses the temporal distinctions between the ancestors and the current Japanese people. In this sense then, the transhistorical subject in Kokutai no Hongi is in a way more tangible than is the case in both Khomeini's and Urban's speech. While both the speeches emphasize the religious heritage and the bond that unites the audience with their ancestors, in Kokutai this bond between the subjects is not merely something that exists despite temporal gaps; the gap does not exist at all. This natural state of oneness is further illustrated:

> The Emperor does not look upon his subjects as just his own, but as descendants of the subjects of the Imperial Ancestors. […] That is, we by nature serve the Emperor and walk the Way of the Empire, and it is perfectly natural that we subjects should possess this essential quality (Kokutai no Hongi 1949, 77-79).

Japanese subjects possess a 'quality' which encourages them 'by nature' to serve the Emperor. In this sense, to be Japanese means to be part of something unchanging and untouched by history. In a way, this creates a more tangible bond, the Japanese people of the past, present and future are bound together through their emperors, and this is only possible through his sacred nature. In terms of the transhistorical subject then, the religious connotations that make way for this profound bond indicate a subject that transcends the transhistorical. In a sense, this unity is all encompassing to such a degree that the people of today are not only descendants of previous subjects; they are the very same subject. Religion is also what unifies the audience in Khomeini and Urban's speeches, but to a less extreme degree than is the case in Kokutai; while parallels are also drawn to the historical subjects, they are still divided by time, which is not the case in Kokutai. It could be argued however, that the end goal of all three texts remains the same; in all three cases the subjects are unified with other subjects by merit of their religion alone. It can therefore be argued that a trans*religious* subject is created in all three cases, the subjects are being interpellated through their religious affiliation falling in line with previous subjects'. However, where Khomeini and Urban urge their audience to look to the past in constituting their subjects, Kokutai draws the subjects of the past into the present and collapses any temporal divisions.

5.2.1. CCT: The Transhistorical Subject

In terms of CCT, it can be argued that by referring to past historical subjects, who have all overcome obstacles similar to the ones faced now by the audience, the narrative has already been played out; it has, in a sense, been tested. When the three texts emphasize to such a high degree the transreligious subject and how current events are merely extensions of historical incidents, there are, in a sense, no consequences for the audience should they choose to complete the narrative, or the telos presented to them, since it has been completed successfully before. When one is informed of how the narrative will play out, and is being led to understand that this is essentially something that has happened before, it can be argued that feelings of control might settle within the audience. Kokutai here distinguishes itself from the other two cases in the sense that temporal distinctions matter less; the transhistorical subject is almost one and the same as the audience and therefore a more direct comparison is made between the subjects of past, present and future. In terms of CCT then, the religious connotations implicit in the collective subject accepting this premise mean that control is exclusively found in accepting that the collective subject is, in a sense, eternal and through this immortal.

Furthermore, as a result of the fact that religion is so heavily prevalent in all three of the texts, it can be argued that religion is what is being presented to the audience as the only external control factor, contrasting the lack of control that have been imposed onto them, as evidenced above. Because the transhistorical subject in all three of the texts is to a much higher degree a trans*religious* subject, it is being presented to the subjects that religion is the main cause of the narratives ending the way that they did. Religion is, in a sense, being introduced to the audience as the ultimate external control factor.

5.3. Third Ideological Effect of Constitutive Rhetoric: The Illusion of Freedom

Regarding the third and final ideological effect, Charland posits: "Freedom is illusory because the narrative is already spoken or written. Furthermore, because the narrative is a structure of understanding that produces totalizing interpretations, the subject is constrained to follow through, to act so as to maintain the narrative's consistency" (Charland 1987, 141). The audience is being hailed or interpellated as subjects within a narrative, but solely exist *because* of that narrative and therefore, Charland argues, they essentially have no choice but to follow through with it (ibid.). They are bound in a sense by the *telos* being presented to them.

5.3.1. The Telos Presented to the Audience

All three of the texts present a more or less explicit telos to their audience, albeit using different methods. Khomeini, in his post-revolution context, is very adamant about spreading the message of revolution throughout the world:

> We should try hard to export our revolution to the world, and should set aside the thought that we do not export our revolution, because Islam does not regard various Islamic countries differently and is the supporter of all the oppressed people of the world. On the other hand, all the superpowers and all the powers have risen to destroy us. If we remain in an enclosed environment we shall definitely face defeat. We should clearly settle our accounts with the powers and superpowers and should demonstrate to them that, despite all the grave difficulties that we have, we shall confront the world with our ideology (Khomeini 1980, 22).

Here, Khomeini makes it evident that his intent is for the audience to further the spread of the revolution by exporting it to the rest of the world. He also makes it clear how the religious community does not solely consist of the present audience members. When he refers to "our revolution", it is clear that this group consists only of the revolutionaries, but is expanded when he claims that Islam "is the supporter of all the oppressed people of the world". This effectively expands the community to include all Shiites and includes them in the "we" and "us". Khomeini here explicitly states the telos of what he intends to promote in his speech: to spread the ideology of the Iranian revolution on behalf of all Shiites, to "confront the world with our ideology". This ties the telos to the Shiite identity and makes it clear to the audience that the mission is a religiously founded one. Claiming that the ideology is "our" ideology, and not simply something presented to the people through Khomeini, also inscribes the audience as an already active part of the revolutionary way of thinking; they are not merely following another person's plans, but are constituted as active in creating these plans. Furthermore, in the section of the speech highlighted above, Khomeini, once again, claims the importance of supporting the oppressed. Here, a telos is presented to the audience again, as they are encouraged to also support the oppressed on behalf of their Shiite identity. Supporting the oppressed also speaks directly to the Shiite part of Islam, where being oppressed is considered a virtue. This is also made evident in Khomeini's continued juxtaposing of the oppressed people with the 'superpowers' threatening them:

> The will of almighty God, may He be praised, decreed the release of this oppressed nation from the yoke of the tyranny and crimes of the satanical regime and from the yoke of the domination of oppressive powers, especially the government of the world-devouring America, and to unfurl the banner of Islamic justice over our beloved country. lt is our duty to stand up to the super-powers and we have the ability to stand up against them, provided that our intellectuals give up their fascination with Westernization or Easternization and follow the straight path of Islam and nationalism (Khomeini 1980, 22).

Khomeini here frames the telos as a direct duty that the audience has in stating that it is their duty to stand up to the superpowers. This is not a direct order but more so a duty in the moral sense of the word, a duty imposed upon the listeners by virtue of their faith; Islamic *justice* must be spread across the world. Islamic justice is contrasted with "satanical", "oppressive powers", and "world-devouring", among other things. In this sense, it is not so much a revolution they are spreading but almost a rescue operation on behalf of their Islamic heritage.

Urban, to perhaps an even higher degree than Khomeini, is very explicit in framing the telos of the people, as the speech in itself is a presentation of a telos:

> This royal city, therefore, situated at the centre of the world, is now held captive by His enemies, and is in subjection to those who do not know God, to the worship of the heathens. She seeks therefore and desires to be liberated, and does not cease to implore you to come to her aid. From you especially she asks succor, because, as we have already said, God has conferred upon you above all nations great glory in arms. Accordingly undertake this journey for the remission of your sins, with the assurance of the imperishable glory of the kingdom of heaven (Munro 1895, 7).

Urban here presents the crusade as a journey similar to a pilgrimage, where remission for one's sins can be obtained. He appeals to the audience in claiming that she (Jerusalem) asks succor of the Christians to be liberated from 'those who do not know God'. The telos is explicitly presented when Urban urges the audience to 'undertake this journey'. Urban presents the Franks as the only people who are able to liberate Jerusalem in stating that 'God has conferred upon you above all nations great glory in arms'. This effectively grants the audience a status as being already chosen to com-

plete the telos, they have been divinely selected to do so. The importance of this mission and its divine character is further illustrated by Urban:

> Whoever, therefore, shall determine upon this holy pilgrimage and shall make his vow to God to that effect and shall offer himself to Him as a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, shall wear the sign of the cross of the Lord on his forehead or on his breast. When truly having fulfilled his vow he wishes to return, let him place the cross on his back between his shoulders. Such, indeed, by the twofold action will fulfill the precept of the Lord, as He commands in the Gospel, "He that taketh not his cross and followeth after me, is not worthy of me." (ibid., 8)

The telos here is even more explicitly stated and is directly tied to worthiness. In quoting the Gospel, Urban claims that should the telos not be completed, then the audience is unworthy in the eyes of God. In quoting scripture, and through it directly quoting the Lord, Urban asserts that Christ himself believes that putting something, even your own life, before Him makes someone unworthy, a lesser Christian. Put differently, completing the telos would make one a worthier Christian in the eyes of both the Pope and Christ. Furthermore, the imagery of the cross is important here. Where the cross had previously been associated with suffering and death, the crusades made way for the cross to become a Christian symbol of power (Woodhead 2004, 117). This further consolidates the telos presented to the audience as making them worthy; bearing the Christian symbol of power ensures their status as worthy through their religion.

Kokutai is less explicit than the other two texts in the telos is presents. The book presents a wide array of teloses, ranging from the more abstract demands that the subjects give up their individuality to directly encouraging them to go to war. The former of these two is most prevalent throughout the book and is expressed primarily by referencing the corruption of the Spirit:

> We must sweep aside the corruption of the spirit and the clouding of knowledge that arises from setting up one's self and from being taken up with one's self and return to a pure and clear state of mind that belongs intrinsically to us as subjects, and thereby fathom the great principle of loyalty (Kokutai no Hongi 1949, 77-79).

Kokutai here presents an extreme form of anti-individualism as being the ultimate goal for the Japanese to obtain. Loyalty is here tied to this anti-individualism in essentially stating that “corruption of the spirit” can be avoided by casting aside the self. In other words, Kokutai here constitutes an

identity where internalizing the telos of casting the self aside is expected of the audience, in order to avoid the corruption of the spirit and remain part of the religious community. This emphasis on the importance of internalization is highlighted again, when Kokutai describes Bushido (”the way of the warriors”). Bushido is described as what is expected of every man capable of fighting, where he must appreciate being indebted to the Emperor: “[…] though a sense of indebtedness binds master and servant, this has developed into a spirit of self-effacement and of meeting death with a perfect calmness” (ibid., 145).

This casting aside of the self is further illustrated multiple times throughout Kokutai:

> A pure, cloudless heart is a heart which, dying to one's ego and one's own ends, finds life in fundamentals and the true Way. That means, it is a heart that lives in the Way of unity between the Sovereign and his subjects, a Way that has come down to us ever since the founding of the Empire. It is herein that there springs up a frame of mind, unclouded and right, that bids farewell to unwholesome self-interest. The spirit that sacrifices self and seeks life at the very fountainhead of things manifests itself eventually as patriotism and as a heart that casts self aside in order to serve the State (Kokutai no Hongi 1949, 132).

Here, the religious connotations of this casting aside of the self are further highlighted; casting aside the self (or ‘dying to one’s ego’) lives in unity with the Way, which, according to Kokutai, came down to the Japanese when the gods founded the Empire. Following this, Kokutai draws a comparison between sacrificing one’s own spirit and patriotism, directly linking religion and politics. This link between the felt and internal aspect of the country and politics becomes more and more evident later in the book:

> Whether We shall be able or unable to respond to the grace of the heavenly deities and repay the goodness of Our Imperial Ancestors by guarding the nation shall depend on whether ye men of the military forces fulfill your duties or not. If at any time the prosperity of Our national glory should be endangered, ye shall indeed share the burden with Us. If our national chivalry is stirred to the surface and its glory is made known, We shall share the honor with you men. If ye shall all devote yourselves to your tasks and bend your powers to guard the nation, the people of our nation shall enjoy the blessings of peace for many years to come and make her national prestige greatly felt throughout the world (Kokutai no Hongi 1949, 171).

Kokutai is here quoting Emperor Meiji (1852–1912) in stating that military men guarding the nation are equated to repaying the imperial ancestors for their goodness. The worldly and the religious are here almost completely conflated. The Emperor, who is holy by virtue of being directly descendent from the gods, shares the burden and honor with the people. This sharing of the burden further emphasizes the importance of casting one's self aside as a result of the oneness highlighted by the text; the holy demands that both burden and glory is shared amongst the people.

All three of the texts explicitly state what is expected of the collective subject. While the telos is arguably most explicit in Urban's call for crusading, both Khomeini and Kokutai outline clear expectations of their subjects. This can be attributed to the contexts of the three texts; where Khomeini speaks in a post-revolution context, and Kokutai merely presents a potential telos, Urban is much more precise in his demands. Khomeini's speech and Kokutai, by virtue of them not being authored directly before a call to arms, are much more general in stating their respective teloses. Urban on the other hand has the benefit of presenting one specific telos, directly encouraging his audience to follow through with very specific orders.

5.3.2. The Illusion of Freedom

According to Charland, a telos, like the ones presented above, has a binding effect on the audience; through the process of interpellation, if this has been done efficiently, the subject will not only be compelled to complete the narrative, they will have no other choice but to do so (Charland 1987, 141). To this end, it is relevant to ask the question of whether or not the three texts present a narrative in which the subjects are free to make their own choices, or, to which degree the narrative is a binding one, as well as what role religion plays a part in constraining the subject.

There are definite differences in the ways the narrative binds the subjects constituted by the texts as well as to which degree they are bound. In all three of texts action is expected of the audience and a more or less clear telos is presented to them, as illustrated above. In terms of the question of whether or not the subject is free, Kokutai in many ways displays characteristics of presenting the more constrained audience, despite not having the most explicitly stated telos. As illustrated above, Kokutai completely conflates the religious and the worldly sphere in demanding that the subjects cast aside the self, a claim to complete internalization and anti-individualism. In both Urban and Khomeini's speech, religion is what constitutes the subject as special and as something *more* than the people outside of the religion, whereas in Kokutai religion is what constitutes the very premise of being. Where in Urban and Khomeini's speeches the audience would become a lesser being without

religion, in Kokutai there can be no subject at all without it. The subject Kokutai presents is therefore completely constrained by the narrative; in presenting the subject through an extreme notion of "oneness", there are no individuals and therefore no individual choice. This binds the subject in Kokutai because it is assumed in the text that the audience does not even have the option of making a choice free of the collective. As a result of the religious identity that they have been interpellated into, being one with the collective is a cornerstone of their entire being.

This is not the case in Khomeini and Urban's speeches; while the subject is being compelled to make the "right" decision, it is not assumed that the choice has already been made. When Khomeini urges his audience to "confront the world with our ideology", and when Urban quotes the Bible in stating that "He that taketh not his cross and followeth after me, is not worthy of me", these are both encouragements for the subject to make the "right" decision by seeing through the religious telos. The choice is not assumed to have already been made solely by virtue of their religion, as is the case in Kokutai. In spite of this however, the subjects that make up both Urban's and Khomeini's audience are still constrained by the narrative. The consequences of not following through with the telos are still far-reaching for the individual. Both speeches have made clear the importance of adhering to their respective religions and have juxtaposed the worthiness of being a "chosen people" with the "satans" and the "uncleanliness" of the "accursed races". This is why the audiences of these two speeches are still bound by the telos presented to them; it is a result of the fact that the two speeches place such a large amount of emphatic attention on how religion essentially shapes them as individuals through their religious community as well as how it constitutes them as *worthy* people as opposed to the unclean Other, they must follow the religious telos imposed onto them. The consequence of not following through with this telos is not being able to remain a part of the religious community, which is essentially what makes them *good*.

What is shared across the narratives of all three of the texts is, as demonstrated above, that the community constituted through rhetoric is one that exists partially through distancing itself from the Other; something terrible and foreign, someone who is *not* chosen. Religion has been painted as the overarching authority that ensures the status of the audiences; it is what constitutes the identity created in the three texts. In this sense, the audience is being granted the *illusion* of freedom, rhetorically at least; there are no direct orders in the texts. However, if the subject wants to remain part of the religious community, a community which is being unfolded as the very thing that constitutes their chosen status as well as their inherently *good* qualities, they have no narrative choice but to

complete the telos being presented to them. All three texts bind their audience to complete a narrative, but they bind them differently; where Kokutai emphasizes the oneness of the people and thereby removes the ability to even choose an individual narrative, Khomeini and Urban both paint the consequences of not following through with the narrative in such an undesirable light, that the audience essentially remains without a choice.

5.3.3. CCT: The Illusion of Freedom

According to Kay, having a sense of order is essential to humans because of their need to view the world as ordered and non-random (Kay et al. 2009, 264). In all three of the texts, following through with the telos is presented as a necessity for the audience, if they expect to remain part of their respective religions. And, as illustrated above, religion is throughout all three of the texts presented as the only thing available to protect the audience against forces from the outside. Presenting religion as the only available external control factor then, the only thing able to grant the audience a sense of control over the circumstances, essentially takes away freedom of choice. The illusion of freedom lies in the human need for control; if the subject wants to regain a sense of control after having had it removed by the speaker, they essentially have no other choice than to adhere to the religious community.

5.4. Summarized Findings

While there are a great deal of discrepancies between the three cases, likely as a result of their historical, cultural, and geographical differences, similar religious rhetoric appear throughout the three. In terms of Charland's theory of constitutive rhetoric, the findings of the analysis have illustrated a greater need for emphasizing how the Other is constituted in rhetorical situations, as well as how the collective subjects constituted are presented in relation to this Other. This type of presentation of the Other bears more weight within the scope of this study, than is the case with Charland. As illustrated, there is a lack of focus of negative identification in Charland's own work (Mills 2014, 114). The findings of the analysis, particularly in relation to the theory of CCT, has shown that when engaging with religious rhetoric, there is a greater need for engaging with the role the Other plays, in order to adequately understand the points of contrast that the collective subject is painted in when being interpellated. Furthermore, throughout the three cases this role of negative identification in the interpellation process has been shown to be important in terms of the anxiety it potentially installs in people. Having instilled feelings of anxiety and randomness in people, essentially taking

away personal control, it has been shown how religion is the force presented as the sole available safeguard. This notion of negative identification has also helped illuminate and possibly explain some of the key differences found in the three cases. Whereas for Khomeini and Urban, a religious community across national borders is expressed and established, in Kokutai the historical context demands a reinforced nationalism based on religious identity. Therefore, in the Japanese case there is a more pronounced emphasis on positive identification than is the case in both Urban and Khomeini's speeches, where aspects of negative identification are to a higher degree stressed.

This fact is also expressed through the representation of martyrdom and anti-individualism in the three cases. The cases all three represent martyrdom as what gives meaning to death; dying for one's religious community is considered honourable. In terms of CCT, seeing as disorder and lack of control are considered the most anguishing aspects of life, it can be argued that martyrdom is considered the less disordered option. Through martyrdom, a subject in embraced into the religious order, or the only available external control, and is arguably therefore more open to interpellation; religion is posed as the only available means of control. In terms of how constrained the collective subject is by the narrative, it has been argued that the audience is interpellated as a transreligious subject, in the sense that external control is granted to them by means of being urged to live out a *safe* narrative. The narrative then binds its subjects through interpellating the audience as people who are in a position to be saved solely by the forces able to grant them feelings of control by virtue of their religiosity.

It has been illustrated how religious rhetoric contributes to the interpellation process in constituting subjects in the sense that religion has the ability to deprive subjects of personal control. Religion then, through religious familial imagery and depictions of martyrdom, is able to imbue these subjects with the ultimate sense of both internal and external control. According to CCT, religion has a unique standing in this sense because of its capacity to encompass all aspects of a person's life, instead of merely holding political or social sway (Kay et al. 2010, 37). Religious rhetoric then can be argued to present a more complete interpellation of its subjects in being able to encompass all aspects of their lives, and through this being able to provide more comprehensive features of control; following through with the narrative grants internal, external and transcendent control.

6.0. Discussion

In comparing three cases so different from each other in terms of not only temporal and special dimensions, but also in content of their religions, it is relevant to ask what affect this fact may have when analysing the three religions from the same theoretical point of departure. Within the scope of comparative religion, aspects of a religion, or sometimes the entirety of it, are compared to those aspects of another religion with the purpose of bringing forth similarities and differences in order to draw parallels between them (Carpenter 2013, 19-20; 25). In terms of the grounds of comparison between these three cases then, it is specifically religious rhetoric that has been brought to the forefront of the analysis. However, this does not mean that there are not aspects of the specific temporal and cultural contexts of each religion, which are important to take note of in order to properly gauge the meaning behind the differences and similarities within each of the compared cases. Here, context is highly relevant to discuss. Japan during the time Kokutai was authored and distributed throughout the nation was a nation centered around *ethnic nationalism* (Doak 1996, 81). Ethnic nationalism, or *ethnonationalism*, exists when nationalism is defined on the grounds of the ethnicity of its people (ibid., 80). Seeing as the religion in Japan at this time was state Shinto, the binding of religion and state (Baffelli et al. 2021, 188), this inevitably ties religion to this ethnonationalism occurring in Japan at the time. In this sense, Shinto is a religion solely for the Japanese people.

Contrasting this fact that state Shinto is exclusory in the sense that it is specifically tied to Japanese ethnicity, are Christianity and Islam, represented in the two other cases. Both Christianity and Islam are intrinsically tied to the notion of *mission* (Woodhead 2004, 95; Shepard 2014, 48). Where both peaceful and violent expansion and conversion has been a foundation of the Islamic faith in the beginning of the religion as well as several hundred years after (Shepard 2014, 48-50). The same can be said for Christianity, which has expanded throughout the world, oftentimes using violent methods (Woodhead 2004, 96-97). It can therefore be said that these two religions are comparable with each other in the sense that their foundational purposes are more universalistic in their expression. They can be said to be universalistic in the sense that it is a foundational belief of each of the religions that conversion to their respective religions is an option across nations and ethnicities. As the analysis illustrated, this is evident in the telos the cases each presented. Where Khomeini's speech states the need to export the Iranian revolution to the world, and Urban is focused on expanding the Christian faith in reconquering Jerusalem, Kokutai no Hongi is almost exclusively preoccupied with

consolidating what is presented as quintessential Japanese; the Emperor and the state, which are both completely tied in with their Japanese ancestry and ethnicity.

This of course will certainly play a role in terms of the interpellation process and the notion of constitutive rhetoric. In the Japanese case, nationalism will then inevitably play a different role as a result of the ethnonationalism in the country at the time. This means that closer ties are bound between state, religion and ethnicity, which might affect the way religion is presented throughout the text. This is because the ethnocentrism present in Japan at this time could potentially indicate a further strengthening of the special and chosen the people of the nation are presented, because of their homogenous nature: "The membership of the nation [of Japan] as specified by the Nationality Law is predominantly determined according to "blood and soil" criteria, which are often held to be hallmarks of ethnic nationalism such as birth (Hvithamar 2009, 123). This "ethnic homogeneity" in addition to the extreme state-oriented focus of Japan at this time (ibid., 124), makes it a difficult task to isolate the religious phenomena as a product of this culture. Of course, religion is not an isolated concept in the other two cases, but the case of pre-war Japan and its state Shinto arguably binds ethnonationalism and religion closer than is the case in Urban and Khomeini's respective contexts. It can be argued then, that Kokutai's repeated and explicit focus on servitude to the emperor as well as on the unity of the Japanese people are as much products of ethnonationalism as they are of religion. In terms of constitutive rhetoric then, it can be argued that the Japanese subjects are constituted by way of an ethnonationalistic perception of religion, whereas Khomeini and Urban's subjects are products of religions founded in a more universalistic way of thinking.

Kokutai no Hongi is not the only one of the cases set apart from the others in certain aspects; all three cases differ vastly from each other. This thesis has assessed and analysed three different cases occurring across three different time periods and cultures. There are benefits to comparing and contrasting highly different cases, which is an intrinsic part of the nature of religious comparative analysis (Kripal et al. 2014, 6). This thesis has argued that one of the main benefits to comparing these very different cases such as these is in avoiding the particularistic and being able to make broader generalization about the nature of religious constitutive rhetoric. However, seeing as religion is widely accepted to be a product of society, as well as the fact that these societies are so vastly different, it can be challenging to separate the societal and temporal discourses in the respective societies at the time, in order to gauge which parts of the case materials are "purely religious". Seeing as

these cases vary too such a high degree in terms of the cultures they are produced by, can they in any way be removed from their cultural contexts in order to isolate the religious components of them? How many of Urban's words are solely a product of his place in history, and how much can be contributed to religion? And if their words are, in part at least, merely products of their time, are there even grounds for comparison between them?

Asking the question of whether it is possible to separate the religious from the societal however, misses the point of religious comparison. It is precisely because there are inherent differences in the societies that produce them that there are even grounds at all for conducting religious comparison (Carpenter 2013, 23-24). Therefore, it cannot be the intent when conducting comparative religious studies to remove the religions from their contexts, which has therefore not been the focus of this thesis. More so, the intention of comparing three vastly different religions across different historical and cultural contexts has been to illustrate some intrinsic qualities particular to the topic of rhetoric, which echoes across the case material, and as such across time and cultures.

In order to further delve into these cultural and temporal particularities in seeking to illustrate the specific function of religion in constitutive rhetoric, more cases might be applied, from different cultures across different time periods. Even narrowing down the scope to have the religions investigated all encompassed at the same, or similar, stages in their religious evolution, such as Bellah's Axial stage as mentioned in section 3.4., many more religions could be included in the analysis in order to form a fuller picture of religious rhetoric and its role in constitutive rhetoric.

7.0. Conclusion

The rhetorical analysis of the three cases of Kokutai no Hongi, Pope Urban II's speech at Clermont, and Khomeini's post-revolution speech has revealed that in terms of the theory of constitutive rhetoric, religious rhetoric contributes in the sense that is works as a means of placing the subjects in extremely contrasting states. This has been explained through the application of Compensatory Control Theory, through which it is argued that religion contributes to constitutive rhetoric in depriving the subjects of feelings of personal control, making way for presenting religion as the primary and sole means of regaining not only external, but internal control as well. In this sense, religious rhetoric contributes to the interpellation process a presentation of these extreme states; religion does not merely install fear in the subjects, it is also a way of regaining feelings of safety.

Through interacting with every aspect of people's lives, not only internal and social, but also ideological, political and transcendent, religious rhetoric poses a more comprehensive identification between interpellated subjects and the narratives they are subjected to. While this was a common denominator in terms of the concrete effects religious rhetoric has on the theory of constitutive rhetoric, the analysis also revealed how this was achieved differently across the three cases. The three cases emphasize different aspects of their religious community as well as where they intent for the audience to place their focus. Urban's speech revealed a high level of focus on the negative identification of the Other, whereas Khomeini's speech is more invested in binding the religious community through their religious past, and Kokutai no Hongi is devoted to extreme depictions of unity and anti-individuality. As argued in the discussion, these discrepancies are potentially a result of the three cases' place in history as well as the religion they each represent. Following Charland's theory of constitutive rhetoric has revealed these discrepancies but has also illustrated the above-mentioned points of comparison; each case heavily applies religious rhetoric, resulting in an interpellation process heavily oriented towards the contrast of control and loss of control.

8.0. Bibliography

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