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ON THE POSSIBILITY OF RATIONAL FREE ACTION 39 leading to a free action when the agent's reasons are'fully d tive'of what she does. Strawson maintains that some'ind input'will have to be located among the antecedents of the action. And he argues that the only way in which an indete input prior to the choice or action can play a role consistent with the reasons' being fully determinative of the action is for that input to affect the reasons themselves; the indeterministic input" can play a part only by playing a part in shaping or determining what the agent's reasons for actions are"(p. 43). Now, reasons have been supposed to consist of desires and beliefs. We are content, Strawson argues, to have our beliefs determined by the way the world is. Hence, the indeterministic input would have to play a role in affecting what a rational free agent desires. But it will not help at all if desires are merely undetermined; what is …