The article discusses joint intention and we-intention in the performance of a particular
action. I-mode account of joint intention pertains to the individuals' intention to perform or …

1. You and I may intend that we jointly carry this heavy table upstairs. In this case we both
can be said to have the group-intention to carry the table upstairs, for the content of the …

This paper gives an up-to-date account of we-intentions and responds to some critics of the
author's earlier work on the topic in question. While the main lines of the new account are …

ollective intentions are those intentions associated with joint actions. The paradigm cases
include two people singing a V^>* duet, painting a house, pushing a car, and taking a walk …

The paper discussed and analyzes collective and joint intentions of various strength. Thus
there are subjectively shared collective intentions and intersubjectively shared collective …

We do things intentionally, and we intend to do things. Our commonsense psychology uses
the notion of intention to characterize both our actions and our mental states: I might …

Existing accounts of shared intention (by Bratman, Searle, and others) do not claim that a
single token of intention can be jointly framed and executed by multiple agents; rather, they …

When I first read Intention as a student it seemed misnamed, since, I thought, it gave an
account of intentional action all right, but left me still wondering what an intention was. It was …

This article explores the question: what is it for two or more people to intend to do something
in the future? In a technical phrase, what is it for people to share an intention? Extending …

My concern here is to motivate some theses in the philosophy of mind concerning the
interpersonal character of intentions. I will do so by investigating aspects of shared agency …