1. You and I may intend that we jointly carry this heavy table upstairs. In this case we both
can be said to have the group-intention to carry the table upstairs, for the content of the …

The article discusses joint intention and we-intention in the performance of a particular
action. I-mode account of joint intention pertains to the individuals' intention to perform or …

ollective intentions are those intentions associated with joint actions. The paradigm cases
include two people singing a V^>* duet, painting a house, pushing a car, and taking a walk …

This paper gives an up-to-date account of we-intentions and responds to some critics of the
author's earlier work on the topic in question. While the main lines of the new account are …

1. Philosophers have been curiously unpuzzled by the existence of human in-stitutions, and
by what John Searle calls the'metaphysics of ordinary social relations'. Searle induces in his …

This paper begins with an intuition, a notation, and a presupposition. The intuition is:
Collective intentional behavior is a primitive phenomenon that cannot: be analyzed as just …

Paradigmatically, a we-intention is a participatory intention of a group member to do her part
of a joint action, together with the other members, while believing that there is a mutual belief …

Existing accounts of shared intention (by Bratman, Searle, and others) do not claim that a
single token of intention can be jointly framed and executed by multiple agents; rather, they …

Many attempts to understand collective intentionality have tried to steer between two
extremes. We want to understand how the members of a group are bound together, what …

When I first read Intention as a student it seemed misnamed, since, I thought, it gave an
account of intentional action all right, but left me still wondering what an intention was. It was …