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DOI: 10.4324/9781003134749-13

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10

ETHICAL ISSUES IN SCIENCE

JOURNALISM

The Benefits of Reporting about Value-laden

Judgements

Kevin C. Elliott

10.1 Introduction

Journalists have a very important role to play in communicating scientific information to

the public, but that role is difficult to fulfil in a responsible fashion. As conspiracy theories

proliferate and special-interest groups become increasingly sophisticated at “manufacturing

uncertainty” about research that conflicts with their interests, journalists are faced with

challenging ethical tensions. On one hand, it is important for them to provide information

that is relevant, interesting, and balanced with respect to different perspectives. On the

other hand, they have responsibilities to be accurate and to avoid magnifying false or mis-

leading information. This chapter argues that one of the best ways to navigate these ten-

sions is for journalists to discuss the roles that value-laden judgements play in scientific

research. Philosophers of science have recently placed a great deal of emphasis on the range

of ways that research incorporates value-laden judgements, and journalists can alleviate

many of the ethical challenges they face by drawing on this literature.

Section 10.2 introduces the ethical responsibilities of science journalists and highlights

how tensions can arise between these responsibilities. Section 10.3 introduces the philo-

sophical literature on value-laden judgements in science as a potential resource for alleviat-

ing these tensions. Building on this literature, Section 10.4 examines three specific kinds of

ethical tensions and shows how journalists can address each of these tensions by discussing

the roles of value-laden judgements in scientific research. An important strength of this

approach is that it not only has the potential to facilitate more ethical science journalism

but it is also likely to enhance the public’s understanding of scientific practice.

10.2 Ethics and Science Journalism

In order to characterize the ethical responsibilities of science journalists, it is helpful to start

by looking at the responsibilities of scientists themselves when communicating about their

work (see e.g., Elliott 2006; Franco 2017; Hardwig 1994; John 2018; Priest et al. 2018;

Kevin C. Elliott

132

Resnik 2001; Schroeder 2022). Some major ethical norms for scientists are listed in Table

10.1. Keohane et al. (2014) argue that some of these norms flow from the nature of science

itself, whereas other norms emerge from the role that science plays in society. So, for exam-

ple, norms of honesty, rigour, acknowledgement of uncertainty, and providing appropriate

credit are closely tied to the practice of science itself (Keohane et al. 2014; Shamoo and

Resnik 2015). Other norms, like communicating in a manner that is transparent and that

maintains trust, enable scientists to meet their ethical obligations to society (Elliott 2017;

Intemann 2022; Schrtoeder 2022). Nevertheless, there is probably not a sharp distinction

between these two categories; many of these norms could potentially be justified based on

both the internal practices of science and the roles that scientists play in society.

Many of the ethical norms for science journalists are similar to those for scientists them-

selves (Table 10.1). According to the code of ethics established by the Society of Professional

Journalists (2014), ethical journalists should be honest, accurate, and transparent, and they

should provide context and avoid plagiarism. Moreover, the code affirms that “The highest

and primary obligation of ethical journalism is to serve the public.” Thus, journalists argu-

ably have similar responsibilities as scientists themselves both to provide high-quality infor-

mation and to do so in ways that are relevant and helpful to the public.

Admittedly, journalism sometimes has different emphases than science; for example,

journalists tend to be more focused than scientists on attracting public attention to their

work and presenting it in an engaging and accessible manner. It is also important to remem-

ber that journalists play many different roles in society, and some of these roles have more

in common with science than others. For example, journalists sometimes act as neutral

sources of information, but they can also act as watchdogs, adversaries, or interpreters of

information, and the diversity of these roles is expanding as a result of digital media (Willnat

et al. 2013; Wahl-Jorgenson and Hanitzsch 2020; Ward 2020). Nevertheless, while the

unique features of journalism and the diversity of its roles might generate different empha-

ses, many of the same communicative norms found in science itself still apply. For example,

journalists acting as watchdogs or adversaries might place less emphasis on acknowledging

uncertainty than a scientist would, but they are still likely to acknowledge uncertainties as

part of their efforts to contextualize their reporting. It is also important to keep in mind that

science journalists are engaged in discussing the same subject matter as scientists them-

selves; thus, science journalists are even more likely than journalists working in other fields

to emphasize communicative norms that are similar to those of scientists.

Table 10.1 A sample of major ethical norms of communication for scientists (left column) and jour-

nalists (right column), drawn from Elliott (2017, 2019), Intemann (2022), Keohane et al.

(2014), and Society of Professional Journalists (2014)

Honesty

Honesty

Rigour

Accuracy

Objectivity

Transparency

Trustworthiness

Contextualization

Transparency

Minimizing harm

Openness

Avoiding plagiarism

Acknowledgement of uncertainty

Maintaining a balance of perspectives

Providing appropriate credit

Serving the public

Ethical Issues in Science Journalism

133

For the purposes of this chapter, it is not particularly important to provide a comprehen-

sive analysis of all the norms that apply to scientists and science journalists; the important

ethical point is that these norms can come into conflict. These conflicts can pit one or more

norms for scientists against each other, or they can pit one or more norms for journalists

against each other, or they can pit norms for scientists against norms for journalists.

Consider three major sources of tension for science journalists, all of which involve clashes

between their norm of accuracy and one or more of their other norms. First, the norm of

being as accurate as possible can come into tension with the norm of serving the public by

providing understandable and usable information. This is a challenge not only for journal-

ists but also for scientists (McKaughan and Elliott 2018). The more they stay “close to the

data” and avoid providing their own interpretive gloss on the science, the more difficult it

is for them to present information in a way that is understandable and relevant. Second, the

norm of being as accurate as possible can come into tension with the norm of providing

information in an entertaining and engaging fashion. This source of tension is particularly

relevant to the practice of journalism, which places more emphasis on engaging audiences

than the practice of science does. Third, the norm of being accurate can also come into

tension with the norm of providing balanced information that considers all perspectives.

This issue has come into sharp relief in reporting on climate change, because special-interest

groups have taken advantage of the journalistic norm of balance in order to gain a hearing

for irresponsible and discredited scientific ideas (Boykoff and Boykoff 2007; Oreskes and

Conway 2010).

The central argument of this chapter is that the philosophical literature on the role of

value-laden judgements in science can assist journalists in navigating these tensions. By

investigating and discussing the value-laden judgements that arise in specific scientific

research projects, journalists can often find ways to lessen the tensions between norms that

are seemingly opposed. Philosophers of science have analysed these judgements extensively

in recent years (e.g., Douglas 2009; Elliott 2017; Brown 2020), and their work can assist

those who seek to communicate more responsibly about scientific research. While both

scientists and journalists can benefit from this philosophical work, the practices and skills

of journalists place them in a particularly strong position to investigate value-laden judge-

ments in science and clarify them for their audiences (Elliott 2019).

10.3 Value Judgements in Science

In recent decades, philosophers of science have developed a flourishing literature that dis-

cusses the roles that value-laden judgements play in scientific research. In the 1970s and

1980s, Thomas Kuhn (1970) and Ernan McMullin (1983) emphasized that logic and evi-

dence alone do not determine choices between opposing scientific theories; instead, scien-

tists are forced to weigh an array of desirable characteristics or “values” (i.e., factors like

explanatory power, simplicity, fruitfulness, and scope) when choosing between theories. A

rich array of feminist scholarship then highlighted a number of cases in which other sorts

of values (e.g., ethical, political, and social considerations) influenced scientific practice; in

some cases, these values hindered the objectivity of science, but in other cases they seemed

to enhance it (see e.g., Harding 1986; Longino 1990; Keller and Longino 1996). For exam-

ple, on the negative side, value-based conceptions of men as active and aggressive (versus

women as passive and receptive) have arguably impoverished scientists’ descriptions of

animal behaviour and of the range of factors contributing to human evolution (Keller and

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134

Longino 1996). However, on the positive side, women coming to these research domains

with feminist orientations have helped to alleviate these weaknesses and generate richer

hypotheses and explanations. Building on this scholarship, philosophers have attempted to

clarify the different choices or judgements in science that can be influenced by values and

the kinds of influences that are appropriate or not (Douglas 2009; Elliott and Steel 2017).

As a consequence of this work, it has become clear that scientists make a wide array of

judgements in the course of their research. These include choices about what topics to

study, what questions to ask about those topics, how to design studies to investigate those

questions, what conceptual categories and terms to use, how to operationalize variables,

how to collect and analyse data, how to interpret results, how much evidence to demand

before drawing conclusions, and how to frame findings (see e.g., Brown 2020; Elliott 2017).

Philosophers have also identified many different values that can influence these judgements.

Sometimes these values are distinguished into those that are “epistemic” (i.e., necessary for

truth or promoting truth) as opposed to those that are “non-epistemic,” but this distinction

has been contested (see e.g., Douglas 2013; Rooney 2017; Steel 2010). There are also dif-

ferent ways in which scientific judgements can end up being “value-laden”; values can

operate as conscious reasons for making judgements in particular ways, or they can cause

particular judgements, or they can be “served” or “promoted” by making judgements in

one way rather than another (Ward 2021).

Science journalists do not need to get bogged down in the details of this literature in

order to benefit significantly from it. They can often provide a significant benefit to the

public just by seeking to identify and clarify the most important value-laden judgements in

cutting-edge areas of research (Elliott 2019). For example, this might involve highlighting

crucial strengths or weaknesses in the way a study was designed, or it might involve identi-

fying fundamental assumptions that make some scientists sympathetic to a new study while

others are more sceptical. In some cases, journalists could also identify important values

that might have influenced how scientists made these judgements. For example, when stud-

ies are funded by a private company or performed in association with a non-governmental

organization, or when a research group has a strong intellectual stake in the outcome of a

study, these values could affect the design or interpretation of the resulting research. This

would not necessarily mean that the resulting studies were inappropriately biased, but the

readers of science journalism could benefit by understanding how research projects might

have been shaped by the perspectives of those who funded and performed them (see e.g.,

Suryanarayanan and Kleinman 2016).

This effort to clarify value-laden judgements in science might seem to be somewhat eso-

teric and complicated, but it actually coheres very well with recommendations that are

already being made by some science journalists. For example, in a recent introduction to the

field, Martin Angler (2017) pointed out that there are both more entertainment-focused

and more critical forms of science journalism. He argued that the critical form is important

to promote, in part because it helps contribute to a healthy democracy (see also Murcott

and Williams 2013). He claimed, “If done properly, science journalism questions the meth-

ods scientists employ as well as their results and how the media and the public interpret

them; it also investigates and unfolds possible conflicts of interest researchers may have”

(Angler 2017: 3). In this quotation, his recommendations for science journalists are virtu-

ally identical to what philosophers of science would recommend in an effort to highlight

value-laden judgements in research. Journalists are sometimes in an even better position to

clarify these value-laden judgements than scientists themselves, because journalists can

Ethical Issues in Science Journalism

135

interview multiple scientists to gain an understanding of their points of disagreement and

the reasons why they come to differing conclusions. Journalists also have the opportunity

to take the perspective of an outsider rather than being committed to a particular scientific

viewpoint, and their skills at investigative reporting can enable them to uncover financial

conflicts of interest and ideological commitments that can influence scientists’ judgements.

For the purposes of this chapter, it is especially noteworthy that the clarification of

value-laden judgements can help to alleviate the ethical tensions discussed in Section 10.2.

As the next section explains, journalists can alleviate the risks of importing their own idio-

syncratic values into their reporting by striving to acknowledge the important value-laden

judgements in the areas of research that they are discussing. In addition, they can navigate

the tension between being engaging and being accurate by discussing the role of values in

science, which can sometimes interest people who do not care as much about the details of

scientific facts. Third, attention to important value-laden judgements (and the evidential

support for making judgements in particular ways) can help journalists to pursue balance

in ways that do not sacrifice accuracy. Section 10.4 considers each of these recommenda-

tions in greater detail.

10.4 Discussing Value-laden Judgements to Address Ethical Tensions

10.4.1 Public Good vs. Accuracy

Let us consider first the tension that can arise between, on one hand, providing information

that is relevant and useful for one’s audiences and, on the other hand, trying to be as accu-

rate as possible (see e.g., Elliott 2017; McKaughan and Elliott 2018). The fundamental

difficulty is that the public often benefits when scientists or journalists provide “commen-

tary” or interpret scientific information to make it as meaningful as possible for those

receiving the information (Cranor 1990; Shrader-Frechette 1996). However, the more one

interprets scientific information for an audience, the greater the danger that the audience’s

understanding will be coloured by the interpreter’s idiosyncratic perspectives or values

rather than by the evidence itself (Resnik 2001). This tension was captured in a debate that

played out in the journal Science over the pros and cons of deliberately framing scientific

information. Matthew Nisbet and Chris Mooney (2007) argued that frames help people to

grasp important features of scientific information, so they recommended that scientists

deliberately frame information about evolution, climate change, and stem cell research in

ways that would make people sympathetic to the research. Critics argued that this kind of

behaviour is inappropriate in science, which should remain free from the public relations

and propaganda stunts that are so prevalent in other domains (see e.g., Holland et al.

2007).

Daniel McKaughan and I have argued that the discussion of value-laden judgements in

science can help to alleviate this tension (McKaughan and Elliott 2013; McKaughan and

Elliott 2018). We introduced the concept of “backtracking” as a way to describe the activ-

ity of clarifying value-laden judgements. To backtrack is to retrace a path. In the context of

science communication, the path is a metaphor for the interpretive choices or frames that

influence how one communicates information. Thus, backtracking in science communica-

tion involves acknowledging significant value-laden judgements that one has made in the

course of communicating information. This could involve clarifying important assump-

tions, gaps in evidence, interpretive frames, or controversial aspects of one’s message.

Kevin C. Elliott

136

Ideally, backtracking can allow one to have one’s cake and eat it too, in the sense that

communicators can go ahead and interpret information in ways that help their audiences as

long as they acknowledge the major interpretive moves they have made.

Admittedly, this strategy still has limitations. One problem is that those communicating

information are typically not aware of all the judgements they have made. Another problem

is that their audiences may be primarily influenced by the main message they receive, and

they may pay little attention to the nuanced backtracking that accompanies it (see e.g.,

Larson 2011: 210). One might also worry that backtracking is too much work and that it

clashes with journalists’ goals of producing snappy, interesting stories. Perhaps the deepest

worry is that different scientists and journalists could disagree about the most responsible

ways to backtrack. For example, one person might think that it is crucial to acknowledge

specific uncertainties associated with a body of scientific information, whereas someone else

might think that those uncertainties are so speculative that they are not worth discussing

(see e.g., Elliott 2021). These are all legitimate concerns, but steps can be taken to alleviate

them. For example, in response to the worry that scientists and journalists could disagree

about how to backtrack in a responsible manner, one could insist that they should at least

be able to justify their decisions based on reasons that others in their communities would

accept as reasonable grounds for making those decisions. Thus, even if backtracking is not

a perfect solution, it has promise as one avenue for helping journalists to navigate the ten-

sion between serving the public good and maintaining accuracy.

10.4.2 Engagement vs. Accuracy

Another form of tension is between the norm of writing in an interesting and engaging style

versus the norm of being as accurate as possible. For example, Kristen Intemann (2022)

points out that hype is a pervasive problem in science communication. She argues that hype

is more difficult to define than it might appear, but at a first pass it involves exaggeration

about the significance of findings or the evidence for them or their potential ramifications.

Journalists face particular pressures to hype scientific findings because of economic incen-

tives to attract larger audiences for their work (Almomani et al. 2015; Caulfield 2004;

Partridge et al. 2011). Although the temptation to hype scientific findings goes beyond

legitimate efforts to follow the norm of making scientific results interesting and engaging, it

illustrates the pressures that journalists can face to sacrifice accuracy for the sake of provid-

ing more compelling messages. Moreover, evidence suggests that these pressures to hype

results are pervasive among all those communicating science, including scientists them-

selves (Caulfield and Condit 2012; Intemann 2022).

How can journalists address potential conflicts between the desire to increase the engage-

ment of their readers while maintaining their commitment to providing accurate information?

One potential strategy for addressing this problem is to discuss the role of value-laden judge-

ments in science. At first glance, this might seem like exactly the wrong strategy to pursue.

One might think that journalists would be almost guaranteed to bore their readers by going

into a discussion of all the research choices that contributed to a study’s findings. Nevertheless,

there are often ways of discussing value-laden judgements in science that not only increase the

interest level of a story but also enhance people’s understanding of the practice of science.

Consider, for example, books like Merchants of Doubt (Oreskes and Conway 2010),

Doubt is their Product (Michaels 2008), and Deceit and Denial (Markowitz and Rosner

2002). They discuss how powerful interest groups sought to challenge scientific evidence

Ethical Issues in Science Journalism

137

about the hazards of lead, tobacco, acid rain, the ozone hole, climate change, and a wide

array of industrial chemicals. For example, they describe how companies strategically

designed studies in ways that were likely to generate their preferred results and how they

hired external scientific consultants to reanalyse studies that reflected unfavourably on their

products. They also discuss efforts by these companies (and the think tanks and front

groups that support their interests) to strategically frame scientific debates in an effort to

slow down regulations on their products. Thus, these books describe many of the value-laden

judgements that philosophers of science emphasize, and one can see how these discussions

actually make these books far more engaging than they would be if they focused solely on

presenting scientific facts about these issues. Journalists obviously have less space to work

with than the authors of these books, but it is often feasible for them to write short pieces

that focus on the conflicts of interest and/or differing perspectives that are often present in

complex scientific cases. Moreover, they can acknowledge the presence of differing perspec-

tives without giving the misleading impression that they are all regarded as equally legiti-

mate within the scientific community.

An important benefit of this strategy is that it helps to promote critical science literacy,

which consists in an understanding of how science works and the social forces that shape it

(Elliott 2016). Scholars in the field of science studies have argued that it is at least as impor-

tant for members of the public to have this kind of broader understanding about how sci-

ence works as to have an understanding of basic scientific facts and concepts (Priest 2013).

Ideally, critical science literacy can give people a realistic sense of the messiness of scientific

practice and the necessity of making thoughtful decisions under scientific uncertainty. It can

also prevent people from being misled by interest groups that cherry-pick scientific informa-

tion to serve their interests; people with critical science literacy recognize the importance of

looking to the recommendations of respected scientific organizations. Critical science liter-

acy can also prevent people from relying too much on new, flashy scientific studies that may

not ultimately be reproduced.

Unfortunately, there can still be dangers associated with the strategy of attracting public

interest by emphasizing the role of value-laden judgements in scientific research. In addition

to the worry that it could bog audiences down with too many details, there is also the

danger that it could make people overly sceptical about high-quality science. People might

start dismissing any science they dislike based on the assumption that it probably rests on

value-laden judgements that could be challenged. This is a legitimate concern, but it is not

an insuperable problem. An important part of achieving critical science literacy is recogniz-

ing that some scientific conclusions rest on much more solid evidence than others and that

it can be misleading to create a false sense of balance that treats both sides of a scientific

controversy as having equal evidential support. This is the issue addressed in the next

sub-section.

10.4.3 Balance vs Accuracy

Perhaps the most widely discussed ethical tension in science journalism is the tension

between providing balance and being accurate. One of the most fundamental norms of

journalistic practice is to strive for balanced reporting. For many years, this practice was

even established by law in the United States under the Federal Communications Commission’s

Fairness Doctrine, which required broadcast journalists to present diverse viewpoints on

public issues (Arbuckle 2016). However, a number of scholars have recently emphasized

Kevin C. Elliott

138

that this norm can be misused and manipulated by special interest groups who aim to

manufacture uncertainty about scientific information that runs counter to their interests

(Boykoff and Boykoff 2007; Oreskes and Conway 2010). For example, right-wing think

tanks and fossil-fuel companies have manipulated journalistic standards of balance by call-

ing for television shows and media articles to discuss “both sides” of the climate change

controversy. Unfortunately, this approach can easily give the misleading impression that

there are two legitimate and opposing perspectives on this issue, whereas there are actually

almost no reputable climate scientists who question the fact that human activities are con-

tributing to climate change.

In response to this danger of reporting inaccurate information, one might think that

science journalists should focus solely on reporting the “mainstream” views of the scientific

community and avoid presenting minority positions. Nevertheless, there are serious dan-

gers associated with this approach. In most areas of policy-relevant science, there is signifi-

cant room for reasonable disagreement, and there is not such an overwhelming consensus

in favour of one particular position. Even in the case of climate change, most detailed

claims (e.g., about what effects are likely in particular areas over particular time periods)

are subject to disagreement. Thus, journalists are likely to do the public a serious disservice

if they give the impression that science is typically simple and straightforward, with consen-

sus views that everyone agrees on. As the preceding discussion of critical science literacy

emphasized, members of the public are likely to be much better served by recognizing that

science is complicated and that they should not just accept the latest study they see in the

news as a definitive source of information they can rely on.

So, how can science journalists acknowledge different perspectives without falling prey

to the merchants of doubt and magnifying poorly supported ideas? Once again, thought-

fully discussing value-laden judgements is one of the best ways to navigate this tension. In

order to avoid giving a false sense of balance, one of the most important tasks for journal-

ists is not only to discuss the major judgements that go into a particular body of research

but also to clarify when and why some judgements are better supported than others. That

way the audience can be made aware of differing views without getting the impression that

“anything goes” and that everyone’s views are equally well supported. In some cases, like

climate change, journalists can clarify that the evidence for one side of a controversy is

overwhelming. Rather than reporting on both sides of the controversy in cases like that, it

is more appropriate to report about the strategies that special-interest groups can use to

“manufacture doubt” about well-supported claims. In most cases, however, it is probably

better to acknowledge that there are multiple views within the scientific community, while

showing that some scientists are making judgements that are more questionable than

others.

One might think it is unrealistic to expect journalists to achieve this level of nuance, but

there are excellent examples of journalists who do this well. Consider the example of Julia

Belluz (2018), who wrote an impressive piece in Vox in collaboration with epidemiologist

Dylan Collins about the potential health effects of cellphone radiation. What is especially

noteworthy about the piece is that she clarified that the existing evidence fits best with the

conclusion that cellphone radiation is not a cancer threat, but she highlighted the limita-

tions of the available evidence and the existence of some threads of evidence that could pose

cause for concern (Elliott 2019). She did a masterful job of clarifying why some studies are

more reliable than others and showing how scientists can draw differing conclusions when

looking at the same overall body of evidence. Thus, she gave her readers a nuanced sense of

Ethical Issues in Science Journalism

139

the complexity of this area of research (fulfilling the norm of balance) while also making it

clear where the current weight of evidence lies (fulfilling the norm of accuracy). Although

journalists might have more difficulty achieving this level of nuance when they have to write

short pieces under tight time constraints, it is still often possible for them to provide brief

caveats or links to additional information in an effort to inform their readers of the poten-

tial for differing views and interpretations (McKaughan and Elliott 2018).

Admittedly, this approach still poses challenges. Psychologists emphasize that humans

do not process information in completely rational ways (e.g., Kahneman 2011). Thus, even

just mentioning a minority opinion (along with caveats about its weaknesses) could poten-

tially backfire if people remember it but forget or disregard the accompanying caveats. The

best strategies for navigating this challenge are likely to vary depending on a journalist’s

specific context. Nevertheless, except for rare cases where the risks to individual or social

well-being are particularly severe, it generally seems better to assume that audiences can

operate rationally and to provide them with at least some information about minority

views. In the complicated areas of science that are of significant interest to the public (e.g.,

medical, nutritional, and environmental research), there is typically a good deal of uncer-

tainty, and the experts are often wrong. For example, as Moises Velasquez-Manoff (2021)

discusses in a wonderfully nuanced piece of reporting for the New York Times Magazine,

the mainstream medical field has been highly dismissive of people with chronic medical

problems for decades, often assuming that illnesses like chronic fatigue syndrome were

largely psychosomatic. New evidence is beginning to suggest that this dismissive attitude

was unwarranted. In contexts like this, it would be a serious loss for journalists and patients

to abandon the reporting of minority views. By probing the amounts and kinds of evidence

in favour of specific conclusions, journalists can keep acknowledging minority views while

also clarifying cases where the evidence for the majority view is overwhelming.

10.5 Conclusion

Journalists have important roles to play in communicating scientific information, but they

face tensions between potentially conflicting ethical norms. On one hand, they aim to pro-

vide information that is useful, engaging, and balanced with respect to different perspec-

tives. On the other hand, it is important for them to be accurate and to avoid spreading

false or misleading information. This chapter has shown how journalists can potentially

navigate these tensions by drawing on recent literature from the philosophy of science and

thoughtfully discussing the roles that value-laden judgements play in scientific research. By

doing so, they can engage in more ethically responsible reporting while simultaneously

promoting the critical science literacy of the public.

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