

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LEVITICUS 18:22 AND 20:13: WHO IS DOING WHAT TO WHOM?

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In a 1994 article in the *Journal of the History of Sexuality*, Saul M. Olyan made major contributions to the understanding of Lev 18:22 and 20:13.[1] First, he demonstrated by a convincing philological analysis that the laws refer specifically to male–male anal intercourse, not to male–male sexual contact in general.[2] Second, he showed that the redaction history of this legislation is essential to its interpretation. Beyond this, Olyan compared Israelite attitudes toward male–male intercourse with those of other ancient Mediterranean and Near Eastern cultures. Finally, he sought to understand the laws in their final form and context in the Holiness Code, that is, as part of the complex of sexual proscriptions codified in Lev 18 and 20. The purpose of the present essay is twofold. First, since Olyan's article appeared in a journal not regularly consulted by biblical scholars, I hope to bring his insights to the attention of those who might otherwise overlook them. More importantly, I wish to build further on Olyan's philological foundations and, in so doing, to propose sociological and interpretive conclusions quite different from those he himself reached.

I

Olyan's philological contribution is to establish the meaning of the phrase מִשְׁכְּבֵי אִשָּׁה, which occurs in the Hebrew Bible only in these two verses. The key to understanding the phrase lies in the correlative phrase מִשְׁכַּב זָכָר, found in

[1] Saul M. Olyan, "'And with a Male You Shall Not Lie the Lying Down of a Woman': On the Meaning and Significance of Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13," *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 5 (1994): 179–206.

[2] As is widely recognized, the Hebrew Bible says nothing at all about female–female sexuality. For a brief survey of the limited talmudic evidence, see Daniel Boyarin, "Are There Any Jews in 'The History of Sexuality'?" *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 5 (1995): 339–40.

Num 31:17–18, 35, and Judg 21:11–12. These passages distinguish between women who are virgins and those who are not; the difference is that the latter have known משכב זכר or איש למשכב זכר and the former have not. From this Olyan rightly understands that משכב זכר, the "lying down of a male," refers specifically to vaginal penetration by a male. Therefore he infers that the correlative משכבי אשה means "the act or condition of a woman's being penetrated" or "vaginal receptivity." The legislation of Lev 18:22 and 20:13, then, which prohibits a man from "lying with a male the lying down of a woman" has in view sexual (anal) penetration of one man by another, on the analogy of sexual (vaginal) penetration of a woman by a man.[3]

Olyan argues that the Levitical laws are addressed in the first instance to the active or penetrative partner. He cites traditional interpretations in support (*m. Sanh.* 7:14; *m. Ker.* 1:1; Rashi on Lev 20:13) and dismisses the alternative as "less likely, since it appears that *miškĕbê ʾiššâ* is what a male experiences in vaginal intercourse, and the law stipulates that 'you' (m.s.) shall not experience it with a male" (p. 186). This point, which we will reexamine critically below, is foundational for many of Olyan's subsequent conclusions.

Both formulations of the Levitical law condemn the one who "lies the lying down of a woman," but, unlike 18:22, Lev 20:13 imposes punishment upon both parties to the act. Olyan points out the awkwardness of the verse's syntax and argues that 20:13 originally had in mind the same person as 18:22 (in Olyan's view, the insertive partner), and that the abrupt shift from singular ("the man who . . .") to plural ("they—the two of them") is a later redactional expansion by the compiler of the Holiness Code. Traces of similar development can be seen in several of the laws in Lev 20.

When Olyan compares Israelite legislation in the Holiness Code to what is attested in other ancient Mediterranean and Near Eastern cultures, he finds significant contrasts.[4] In Israel as elsewhere the distinction between active and receptive sexual roles was conditioned by gender. But in other cultures factors such as status and age also contributed to defining the sexual role appropriate for a particular individual, whereas this was not the case in Israel. In ancient

[3] Olyan comments that the correlation of זכר/אשה is unexpected. "Why *zākār* is paired with *ʾiššâ* instead of *nĕqēbâ* or *ʾiššâ* with *zākār* instead of *ʾîš* is not at all clear" ("And with a Male," 185).

[4] On male–male sexuality in the ancient world, Olyan cites the works of K. J. Dover, D. M. Halperin, J. J. Winkler, and A. Richlin. To these add David M. Halperin, John J. Winkler, and Froma I. Zeitlin, eds., *Before Sexuality: The Construction of Erotic Experience in the Ancient Greek World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Wayne R. Dynes and Stephen Donaldson, eds., *Homosexuality in the Ancient World* (Studies in Homosexuality 1; New York: Garland, 1992), which reprints numerous relevant articles from preceding decades; and most recently Martti Nissinen, *Homoeroticism in the Biblical World: A Historical Perspective* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1998). On the material above, see particularly Nissinen, *Homoeroticism*, 57–73.

Greece and Rome, male–male sexuality took several forms, though the range of what was acceptable differed in the two cultures. In Greece, for example, sexual relations between master and slave were considered improper, whereas they were accepted in Rome. The difference was that in Greece sexual intercourse between males was expected to involve two people of the same social class, where the opposite was the case: in Rome the active and passive roles in the relationship required that the two men be of different social rank. In Greece, sexual relationships between older men and younger free citizens were accepted; generally they were affectionate and pedagogical, and frequently lasted several years. Both men were of the same class, but the active and passive roles could be assigned to the adult and the younger man on the basis of their respective ages.[5] In Rome, such relationships were not condoned, precisely because both men were of the same social class. It was considered improper for a free male citizen of whatever age to accept a passive sexual role.

Furthermore, addressing the law to the active party rather than to the passive one differentiates the Israelite evidence sharply from Greek and Roman practice and perhaps also from Assyrian. In Greece and Rome it was primarily the passive role that was the object of social and legal opprobrium, though in Rome the active party too would have been condemned if his partner were an adult male citizen. Assyrian evidence is not entirely clear (see Middle Assyrian Law A 19–20), but seems to condemn the active party only in cases of coercion.[6] Such patterns are typical of societies where honor and shame are foundational social values: attitudes toward male–male sexual intercourse are less based on a social construction of relational sexuality (that is, that sexual activity is proper to gender-differenced partners and not to same-gender partners) than on the social construction of masculinity (that is, that status-superior males penetrate and are not penetrated). However, that is not the pattern Olyan discerns in Israel. For him, the Levitical laws "ban all male couplings involving anal penetration, seemingly those coerced and those voluntary; those with men of higher status, equal status, or lower status; those with men of one's own com-

[5] It may be significant that Greek pictorial representations of sexual contact between the ἐραστής (the older partner) and the ἐρόμενος (the younger) never suggest anal penetration of the latter. The typical form of intimate contact is intercrural intercourse. The emotional dimensions of the relationship are likewise not cast in clear dominant/submissive categories either: the *erastēs* is often portrayed as supplicatory rather than demanding. Mark Golden argues that the *erastēs/eromenos* relationship represented a transitional stage in the development of a Greek male citizen from child (*pais*) to free adult and distinguished him from the slave, who remained a *pais* all his life unless freed (see Mark Golden, "Slavery and Homosexuality at Athens," *Phoenix* 38 [1984]: 308–24; reprinted in *Homosexuality in the Ancient World*, ed. Dynes and Donaldson, 162–78).

[6] See the edition of Martha T. Roth, *Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor* (SBLWAW 6; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995).

munity or another community" (p. 195). He opines that this comprehensive prohibition predated the redaction of the Holiness Code, but sees no way to determine why this should have been so. For the Holiness Code itself, he points to a "rhetoric of inclusivity" that applies much of H's legal material univocally to all (except slaves), to native born and resident alien, to landed and landless, to freeborn and freed.

Finally Olyan surveys several opinions about why male–male intercourse would be numbered among the sexual proscriptions of Lev 18 and 20. He rightly rejects the idea that the proscribed actions are all connected with idolatry. He is equally unconvinced that the practice is forbidden because the receptive man's behavior does not conform to the class "male"; in this case, says Olyan, one would expect the laws to address the receptive partner directly, rather than the active one. Following S. Bigger, he suggests that the purity of the land of Israel is threatened by any act that mixes two separate, potentially defiling bodily fluids in the same receptacle: human and animal semen (Lev 18:23; 20:15–16); semen and menstrual blood (Lev 18:19; 20:18); the semen of two different men (Lev 18:20; 20:10). In the case of male–male anal intercourse, the mixture of semen and excrement (defiling, according to Ezek 4:9–15) would threaten to defile the land of Israel.[7]

II

Olyan's argument that the laws refer specifically to a penetrative act, and therefore to male–male anal intercourse, is surely correct.[8] The binary opposition of משכב זכר and משכבי אשה is clear, even if the reason for the odd correlation of זכר and אשה is not.[9] On the other hand, Olyan's confidence that the laws

[7] Olyan acknowledges that this reasoning would weigh equally against male–female anal intercourse, which is nowhere prohibited in the Hebrew Bible. He speculates that "possibly it was not part of the Israelite repertoire of sexual acts." See, however, the discussion of Jer 13:22b in F. Rachel Magdalene, "Ancient Near Eastern Treaty-Curses and the Ultimate Texts of Terror," in *A Feminist Companion to the Latter Prophets* (ed. Athalya Brenner; FCB 8; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995), 328–29 n. 4. For the talmudic recognition of male–female anal intercourse, see Boyarin, "Are There Any Jews," 346–47.

[8] Boyarin reaches the same conclusion on the basis of an analysis of the talmudic understanding of the Levitical laws. "As the Talmud understood it, male-male sexual practices other than anal intercourse are not prohibited by the Torah . . ." ("Are There Any Jews," 339).

[9] Another slight anomaly, not mentioned by Olyan, is the discrepancy between singular משכב and plural משכבי. Any attempt to explain the discrepancy is conjectural, but it may have to do with one's physical position vis-à-vis the sexual partner. The penetrative partner, the זכר, will face the receptive partner; the receptive partner, on the other hand, has several possible ways of "lying down," ranging from facing toward the זכר to facing away from him. Boyarin argues that the Tal-

are addressed in the first instance to the active partner is misplaced. In examining the vocabulary used to describe sexual acts, he treats "to lie with" and "to know" as synonymous and interchangeable. For instance:

> Thus, in vaginal intercourse, a woman experiences (idiomatically "knows" or "lies") *miškab zākār* (male penetration) while presumably she offers her partner *miškĕbê ʾiššâ* (vaginal receptivity), which he experiences ("knows" or "lies"). (p. 185)

Similarly:

> Since both a man and a woman can "know" or "lie" sexually, there is probably no difference in meaning between the two idioms: both mean to experience intercourse. (p. 185 n. 16)

However, the pattern of usage is not as loose as these remarks would indicate. The passages that describe the woman's experience of מִשְׁכַּב זָכָר, that is, of penetrative intercourse by a male, consistently use the verb "to know" (Num 31:17–18, 35; Judg 21:11–12). The woman either "knows the lying down of a male" or "knows a man as to the lying down of a male." The verb here is equivalent to "experience." The Levitical laws, by contrast, both speak of a man who "lies . . . the lying down of a woman"—a cognate direct object construction to be compared with such standard Hebrew idioms as "to dream a dream," "to sin a sin," and the like. This construction regularly describes an action performed by the subject, not the subject's experience of someone else's action.[10] Compare the similar though nonsexual usage in 2 Sam 4:5b: וַיָּבֹאוּ כְחֹם הַיּוֹם אֶל־בֵּית אִישׁ בֹּשֶׁת וְהוּא שֹׁכֵב אֶת מִשְׁכַּב הַצָּהֳרָיִם ("they came to Ish-Bosheth's house in the heat of the day, while he was lying the lying down of noontime"). The man to whom the laws of Lev 18:22 and 20:13 are addressed, then, is the one who *performs* the "lying down of a woman"—that is, the one who acts as the receptive partner. This is confirmed by the specification that he lies אֶת-זָכָר, "with a male." Olyan takes "male" as a general term here (p. 196); but this is hardly likely, particularly in a context where מִשְׁכְּבֵי אִשָּׁה, sexual receptivity, is defined by its contrast to מִשְׁכַּב זָכָר, sexual penetration. The זָכָר with whom a man is forbidden to lie is the penetrator; the person addressed by the laws is the receptive partner. Thus the phrase יִשְׁכַּב אֶת-זָכָר מִשְׁכְּבֵי אִשָּׁה is best translated "to lie with a male as a woman would."

If this is correct, then several of Olyan's conclusions must be reassessed. Foremost among them is the claim that Israelite attitudes toward male–male intercourse were fundamentally different from those of other contemporary

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mud understands the plural to reflect the fact that there are two kinds of intercourse possible with a woman, vaginal and anal ("Are There Any Jews," 346–47).

[10] See the discussion of the cognate effected accusative in *IBHS* §10.2.1f.

cultures. As Olyan remarks, Israelite legislation is, by and large, addressed to the free male Israelite citizen. It was his duty to apply the law as appropriate to the various other members of his own household—women, children, slaves, foreigners. Other social classes were not addressed directly by the laws; they were spoken *about*, but they were not spoken *to*. Even H's "rhetoric of inclusivity" is expressed by explicit association rather than by expanding the second person addressee to include other social categories (e.g., "either the native or the stranger who sojourns among you," Lev 18:26). So the laws of Lev 18:22 and 20:13 are addressed to the free male citizen (the "man" of 20:13). They prohibit him from submitting to sexual penetration by a "male," whether social equal or social inferior; and 20:13 considers blameworthy both parties to an act of male–male penetrative intercourse that puts a free male Israelite into the passive role. The language of the laws, therefore, is fully consonant with what we know of other contemporary Mediterranean societies in which an honor/shame dynamic was central to social and sexual behavior. The laws need not imply any broader prohibitions than there would have been, for instance, in Rome.

If the Levitical laws are primarily addressed to the receptive partner, then Olyan's arguments about the reason for the presence of these laws in the Holiness Code must also be reexamined. There are three classes of actions called תועבה (conventionally translated "abomination") in Leviticus: violations of the dietary laws, violations of the sexual laws of Lev 18 and 20, and participation in pagan worship. Violations of the sexual laws are branded תועבה in general terms in Lev 18:26–30. The laws about male–male sexual intercourse in 18:22 and 20:13 are the only places in these two chapters where the term is applied to a specific action.[11] Mary Douglas has argued convincingly that categories of clean and unclean in the dietary laws are determined by whether a creature is a pure example of its type—animal, bird, fish, insect—or crosses boundaries—insects that fly, animals that have hands[12] instead of feet, fish that do not swim with fins, birds that dive into water, and so on.[13] The underlying motivation of these laws, then, is to respect the separation of creatures into groups according to their kinds—the typical creation theology of the Priestly tradition. In his commentary on Leviticus, Baruch Levine extends that reasoning to the other two classes of תועבות, and to the category as a whole.[14] The sexual prohibitions

[11] Olyan infers from this that the identification of male–male intercourse as תועבה formed part of the earlier formulation of this law, and was extended to all the laws of Lev 18 by later redactors who created the framing materials in 18:24–30.

[12] Leviticus 11:27 declares unclean animals that walk on *kappôt*, "hands" (NRSV "paws").

[13] Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger* (London: Routledge, 1966), esp. ch. 7, "The Abominations of Leviticus."

[14] *Leviticus* (JPS Torah Commentary; Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1989), 243.

against incest prevent the confusion of two mutually exclusive groups: the group of potential sex partners and the group of kin. The prohibitions against idolatrous worship prevent the confusion of creature with Creator. Together, all three classes of תועבות protect the boundaries between Israelites, who are to be Yahweh's "holy" people (i.e., "set apart, separate"), and the various peoples surrounding them who, in Israel's view, indulged in all these prohibited dietary, sexual, and cultic practices. Thomas M. Thurston applied Douglas's categories specifically to Lev 18:22: in an act of male–male anal intercourse the boundary between "male" and "female" is being transgressed, since a man is acting in the sexually receptive role proper to a woman.[15] Similar reasoning can be extended as well to the other two instances of sexual category confusion in the immediate context: adultery, which confuses the categories of one's own sexual property and one's neighbor's, and bestiality, which transgresses the boundary between human and animal.

Daniel Boyarin's reasoning in this regard converges with Thurston's.[16] Moreover, since the separation of the categories of male (i.e., penetrator) and female (i.e., penetrated[17]) was established in creation, Boyarin infers that issues of shame and gender superiority are not relevant to the prohibition of male–male anal intercourse ("[T]he issue does not seem to have been status so much as an insistence on the absolute inviolability of gender dimorphism"),[18] and therefore that the prohibition was universal. It did not envisage only situations where a free male citizen subjected himself to penetration by another male. Boyarin thus arrives at the same conclusion Olyan reached on the basis of H's "rhetoric of inclusivity." But both scholars overlook the fact that the Levitical laws are all addressed in the first instance to the free male citizen and that these laws specifically forbid that citizen to accept the receptive role.[19] The central issue in both laws is not gender confusion in general, but precisely gender con-

[15] Thomas M. Thurston, "Leviticus 18:22 and the Prohibition of Homosexual Acts," in *Homophobia and the Judaeo-Christian Tradition* (ed. Michael L. Stemmeler and J. Michael Clark; Dallas: Monument, 1990), 7–23. Olyan considers Thurston's interpretation but rejects it because of the laws' "lack of focus on the receptive partner" (p. 199).

[16] Boyarin, "Are There Any Jews," 342. Boyarin was aware of and acknowledged Thurston's work although, at the time of writing, he had not been able to avail himself of it.

[17] Boyarin points out that the Hebrew word for female, נקבה, has reference to the female as "orifice bearer" ("Are There Any Jews," 345).

[18] Ibid., 348.

[19] There are, in addition, cases where social status clearly mitigates the categories of the created order. The murder of a human being, for instance, is to be punished by shedding the murderer's blood (Gen 9:6; cf. the Levitical formulation in Lev 24:17, 21). Yet when the victim is a "man" (that is, a free citizen), the killer is killed (Exod 21:12); when the victim is a slave, the killer is "punished" (Exod 21:20); and if the slave survives for a short time, the killer is not punished at all, "for the slave is his money" (Exod 21:21).

fusion wherein the *free* male citizen takes on the "female" role. Although the active party is equally responsible for an act of gender confusion, his behavior is not deemed blameworthy until the late redactional expansion of Lev 20:13.

Finally, this reading throws some light on the redactional process that produced the final form of the text in H. For Olyan, since the earlier form of the laws already condemned the active partner, and already exhibited a "rhetoric of inclusivity" that extended the prohibition of male–male intercourse to all males (except perhaps slaves), the only identifiable redactional development is the Holiness Code's concentration on protecting the purity of the land of Israel. However, if we recognize that the original prohibitions are addressed to the receptive partner, then the redactional addition in 20:13 *extends* the law to inculpate the active party as well. Such a development is a clear illustration of Levine's analysis of the Priestly notion of תועבה. In the original law, a free adult male citizen who took the receptive role in an act of male–male anal intercourse would have been condemned as transgressing the boundary between male and female, just as he would have been in Greece, Rome, and, apparently, Assyria. Such a law alone would not have made Israelite practice noticeably different from that of other cultures in the Mediterranean basin or the ancient Near East. But by extending the condemnation to include the active party, the redactor of H strives to differentiate between Israelite practice and that of "Egypt" and "Canaan" and "the nation that was before you" (18:3, 24–28), and thereby to protect the holiness of Israel from the תועבה of confusion with other nations.

III

The two legislative texts in Lev 18:22 and 20:13 have very narrow and very precise purview. They envisage one situation only: anal intercourse between two men, one of whom is a free adult Israelite and takes the passive sexual role of being penetrated by the other. The underlying system of social values within which such laws should be understood is the gender construction of maleness in a society where honor and shame are foundational social values. The male sexual role is to be the active penetrator; the passive role of being penetrated brings shame to a man (at least to a free adult male citizen) who engages in it and, in the later redactional stratum, also to the one who penetrates him. Apart from this situation, the Hebrew Bible is silent. Was rape practiced in war as a way of humiliating enemy soldiers, as it has been throughout history?[20] Was a

[20] The use of anal rape to humiliate conquered enemies is likely in ancient Egypt. See Vern L. Bullough, "Homosexuality as Submissive Behavior: Example from Mythology," *Journal of Sex Research* 9 (1973): 283–88; reprinted in *Homosexuality in the Ancient World*, ed. Dynes and

male slave available for sexual penetration by the master, as a female slave was? Was sexual intercourse between two male slaves the object of social or legal condemnation? Our texts say nothing that affords any insight into such questions. Moreover, other forms of male–male sexual encounter, encompassing the whole range of physical expressions of affection that do not entail penetration, are not envisaged in these laws.

Donaldson, 69–75. It is clearly reflected in Greek pictorial art. A mid-fifth-century wine jar commemorating an Athenian victory over the Persians at the Eurymedon River depicts a Persian bent over and about to be penetrated by a Greek. The inscription reads, "I am Eurymedon; I am bent over" (reproduced in Nissinen, *Homoeroticism in the Biblical World*, fig. 3). For the postbiblical tradition, Boyarin cites a passage from the *Mekhilta* of Rabbi Ishmael (Amaleq 1) that tells of a foreign conqueror punishing a captive king of Israel by subjecting him to anal rape by the conqueror's men ("Are There Any Jews," 352). In the light of these examples, one can only speculate about what to read between the lines of 2 Sam 10:4–5.

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TEXTUAL CRITICISM, ASSYRIOLOGY, AND THE HISTORY OF INTERPRETATION: DEUTERONOMY 13:7a AS A TEST CASE IN METHOD

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Nothing could be clearer than the burden of evidence calling for the emendation of the Masoretic Text (MT) of Deut 13:7. That evidence includes not simply the Septuagint, Peshiṭta, and Samaritan Pentateuch but the attestation of the Septuagint (LXX) reading in Hebrew among the biblical manuscripts of the Dead Sea Scrolls. The latter, in particular, seem decisive. They strongly suggest that the LXX translator, working in mid-third-century B.C.E. Alexandria, must have based his Greek rendering directly on a Hebrew *Vorlage.* Chronologically speaking, the argument for the originality, priority, and superiority of the LXX variant seems irrefutable. Most important, with the biblical manuscripts preserved at Wadi Qumran, there is objective evidence for the antiquity, in Hebrew, of that variant: a manuscript whose "typical Hasmonean book hand" suggests a dating of about 125 B.C.E.[1] The particular case of this reading, then, seems consistent with the more general impression that the LXX reflects an earlier stage of the biblical text than does the MT. Specifically, the earliest fragments of the LXX date as early as the mid to late second century B.C.E.: 4QLXXLev^{a}, 4QLXXNum, and two Greek papyri (*P. Fouad* 266

[1] Sidnie Ann White, *A Critical Edition of Seven Manuscripts of Deuteronomy: 4QDt^{a}, 4QDt^{c}, 4QDt^{d}, 4QDt^{f}, 4QDt^{g}, 4QDt^{i}, and 4QDt^{n}* (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International, 1988), 20. The reconstruction of the text (based upon the join of frgs. 22–23) and the text-critical issue are discussed on pp. 62–63. See also eadem, "Special Features of Four Biblical Manuscripts from Cave IV, Qumran: 4QDt^{a}, 4QDt^{c}, 4QDt^{d}, and 4QDt^{g}," *RevQ* 57–58 (1991): 157–67, esp. 160–62. For the official edition, see eadem (as Sidnie White Crawford), "4QDeut^{c}," in *Qumran Cave 4* (ed. Eugene Ulrich et al.; DJD 14; Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 23. I am grateful to Prof. Crawford for her courteous response via e-mail to several questions concerning the restoration of the reading.

and *P. Rylands Gk.* 458).[2] More or less complete LXX manuscripts are extant from the fourth (Vaticanus, Sinaiticus) and fifth (Alexandrinus) centuries C.E. By contrast, the MT seems to represent a late witness. Its earliest manuscripts date nearly a millennium and a half after the composition of Deuteronomy: the Aleppo Codex (first half of the tenth century C.E.) and Leningrad Codex $B19^A$ (1009 C.E.). Even its earliest indirect attestations are relatively late: the Greek translations, Theodotion, Aquila, and Symmachus, which "correct" the LXX toward the MT and date to the second century C.E.[3]

The purpose of this article is to argue that, despite the apparently overwhelming support for the LXX variant, it is the "late" witness of the MT that, uniquely, preserves the chronologically prior reading. The way scholars have sought to interpret the evidence of the versions in this example raises a series of larger questions about the theoretical and methodological assumptions of biblical textual criticism. On that basis, Deut 13:7 provides a valuable test case to reflect on the discipline itself. The separation of textual criticism from exegesis—as if the former were an ancillary "lower criticism" in relation to a purportedly "higher criticism"—is untenable. Equally indefensible is the separation of the full spectrum of biblical studies from Assyriology, whether in matters of textual criticism or exegesis. The understanding of Deut 13:7—both the text-critical crux and the meaning of the passage—requires recourse to Akkadian on the one hand and to the history of Second Temple biblical interpretation on the other.

I. The Literary Context of the Crux: The Apostasy Series of Deuteronomy 13

Deuteronomy 13 presents an ordered series of three laws, carefully arranged to present challenging test cases that vividly depict a fundamental conflict of loyalty for the addressee. The laws deal consistently with apostasy. The first two laws involve an incitement to worship other gods that originates

[2] Emanuel Tov, *Textual Criticism of the Hebrew Bible* (Minneapolis: Fortress; Assen/Maastricht: Van Gorcum, 1992), 136–39.

[3] More accurately, "Theodotion" goes back to the mid-first century B.C.E., since fragments of this revision have been found at Naḥal Ḥever, and the revision is quoted in sources of the first centuries B.C.E. and C.E.—two centuries before the historical Theodotion, who lived in the late second century C.E.! Theodotion must have compiled or revised the revision, and so his name was attached to it anachronistically. Aquila, the most literal of the Greek versions, dates to about 125 C.E. Symmachus, which uses more idiomatic Greek rather than slavishly following Hebrew syntax, dates to the end of the second or the beginning of the third century C.E. For a valuable analysis, see Tov, *Textual Criticism,* 145–46, 170.

with a prophet or oneiromancer (Deut 13:2–6) or with a family member, spouse, or close friend (13:7–12). In each case, the addressee must express unconditional commitment to Yahweh by ensuring that the inciter is executed, even taking the law into his own hands by summarily executing the family member or friend (13:9–10). The demand for loyalty is equally stringent in the third case, which depicts the successful conversion to apostasy of an entire city. The law requires that the entire population of the city, together with its cattle and property, be placed under the Deuteronomic ban and destroyed (13:13–18), just as if its population were Canaanite rather than Israelite (see Deut 7:1–6, 24–26; 20:16–18).

The particular challenge is that each law is set up to present an extreme case whereby the incitement comes from sources that, under normal circumstances, would command the addressee's trust. The prophet or oneiromancer would, by definition, possess public credibility and religious authority. In the private sphere, the affective ties of love to a close family member, beloved wife, or intimate friend make the addressee vulnerable to their incitement, while also making it unlikely that one would take stringent action against them for sedition or heresy. And in the sphere of clan life, little could be more horrifying than to "enter into battle against our kin" (Judg 20:23, 28).

The focus of this study is the second case, whose protasis reads:

Deut 13:7a

כי יסיתך אחיך בן אמך או בנך או בתך או אשת חיקך או רעך
אשר כנפשך בסתר לאמר . . .

If your brother, the son of your mother, or your son or your daughter or the wife of your bosom or the friend who is as your own self should secretly incite you, saying . . .

The apodosis requires that the addressee take the law into his own hands. He must systematically extinguish all ties of affection, trust, and mercy toward the inciter and immediately implement the extreme penalty of summary execution (vv. 9–10).[4] The protasis, with its detailed list, thus rhetorically underscores the severity of the test case by identifying five of the closest possible affective ties: brother, son or daughter, wife, friend. The very intimacy of the relation in question is, of course, precisely the difficulty: commitment to Yahweh requires that the addressee execute his own flesh and blood, beloved wife, or trusted friend.

That protasis contains the text-critical crux at issue. The MT identifies only one male sibling relation: אחיך בן אמך, "your brother, the son of your

[4] See further Bernard M. Levinson, "'But You Shall Surely Kill Him!': The Text-Critical and Neo-Assyrian Evidence for MT Deut 13:10," in *Bundesdokument und Gesetz: Studien zum Deuteronomium* (ed. Georg Braulik; Herders Biblische Studien 4; Freiburg: Herder, 1995), 37–63.

mother." Surprisingly, it omits the expected symmetrical continuation: "or the son of your father." Whereas here there is only a single relational term, which is appositionally defined, the continuation provides two balanced male/female pairs: בן/בת (son/daughter) and אשה/רע (wife/friend). In contrast to the imbalance of the MT, the LXX preserves a variant that provides the expected symmetry: ὁ ἀδελφός σου ἐκ πατρός σου ἢ ἐκ μητρός σου, "your brother from *your father or* from your mother."[5] The Samaritan Pentateuch reflects the same plus: אחיך בן אביך או בן אמך, "your brother, *the son of your father or* the son of your mother."[6] Two later witnesses are of less direct bearing on the text-critical analysis. The Syriac Peshiṭta, which often depends on the LXX tradition, does so here as well and represents the variant; the Vulgate, conversely, aligns with the MT, again because of the shared tradition.[7]

II. The History of the Discussion

The text-critical adoption of this plus has long been urged. Johannes Hempel recommended its restoration in his widely influential editions of the Hebrew text of Deuteronomy, first as probable in *BHK*[3] and then without reservation in *BHS*.[8] This approach has consequently found widespread acceptance in standard Bible translations and has nearly won the status of a scholarly consensus. *La Sainte Bible* incorporates the variant into its translation—"Si ton frère, fils de ton père ou fils de ta mère . . ."—while also providing a note to indicate "avec sam. et grec."[9] Ironically, the *Jerusalem Bible*, which is based on that work and retains the variant in the text—"If your brother, the son of your father or of your mother . . ."—deletes the note concerning its origin.[10] The *New English Bible* similarly embeds the plus without noting the departure

[5] John William Wevers, ed., *Deuteronomium* (Septuaginta 3.2; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1977), 187. In the Hexapla, this reading was placed "under the obelus to indicate its omission from the MT"; see John William Wevers, *Notes on the Greek Text of Deuteronomy* (SBLSCS 39; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995), 231.

[6] See August Freiherrn von Gall, ed., *Der Hebräische Pentateuch der Samaritaner* (Giessen: Töpelmann, 1918), 393.

[7] For the Syriac, see D. J. Lane et al., eds., *The Old Testament in Syriac,* Part I, fascicle 2; Part II, fascicle 1b (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 40. The Vulgate reading is "frater tuus filius matris tuae"; see Bonifatius Fischer et al., eds., *Biblia Sacra Iuxta Vulgatam Versionem* (Stuttgart: Württembergische Bibelanstalt, 1969), 254.

[8] See R. Kittel, ed., *Biblia Hebraica* (3d ed.; Stuttgart: Württembergische Bibelanstalt, 1937), 285; and K. Elliger and W. Rudolph, eds., *Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1987), 310.

[9] H. Cazelles, ed., "Deutéronome," in *La Sainte Bible traduite en français sous la direction de L'École Biblique de Jérusalem* (Paris: Cerf, 1956), 190.

[10] *The Jerusalem Bible: Reader's Edition* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1968), 203.

from the Hebrew.[11] Although the variant is not represented in the *Revised Standard Version* (1952), it is accepted into the *New Revised Standard Version* (1989), which does provide a note to acknowledge the dependence on the LXX: "If anyone secretly entices you—even if it is your brother, *your father's son* or your mother's son . . . ."[12] The Jewish Publication Society's *Tanakh* hedges on the matter. A footnote acknowledges the Samaritan plus but neither evaluates its significance nor mentions its attestation in the LXX.[13] Conversely, in a surprising omission, the valuable *La Bible d'Alexandrie* here overlooks the LXX's divergence from the MT.[14]

All of the conceivable positions have been proposed within the literature. Many scholars have defended the originality of the MT and regarded the variant as a secondary expansion of it.[15] Several scholars have partially sidestepped

[11] *The New English Bible with the Apocrypha* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 211.

[12] See Wayne A. Meeks, ed., *The HarperCollins Study Bible: New Revised Standard Version* (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 290 (my emphasis). It is unclear why, in opting for the LXX against the MT, the NRSV editors overlooked or rejected the preference for the MT (explicitly against the NEB and JB) specified by Dominique Barthélemy et al., eds., *Preliminary and Interim Report on the Hebrew Old Testament Text Project* (5 vols.; 2d rev. ed.; New York: United Bible Societies, 1979–80), 1:283.

[13] See *Tanakh: A New Translation of the Holy Scriptures according to the Traditional Hebrew Text* (Philadelphia: JPS, 1988), 300. There is no discussion of this case in H. M. Orlinsky, *Notes on the New Translation of the Torah* (Philadelphia: JPS, 1970), 250.

[14] Cécile Dogniez and Marguerite Harl, eds., *La Bible d'Alexandrie: Le Deutéronome* (Paris: Cerf, 1992), 201.

[15] These include Zacharias Frankel, *Ueber den Einfluss der palästinischen Exegese auf die alexandrinische Hermeneutik* (Leipzig: Joh. Ambr. Barth, 1851; republished, Westmead, England: Gregg International, 1972), 223; August Dillmann, *Die Bücher Numeri, Deuteronomium und Josua* (Kurzgefasstes exegetisches Handbuch zum Alten Testament; 2d ed.; Leipzig: Hirzel, 1886), 301; Eduard König, *Das Deuteronomium* (Kommentar zum Alten Testament; Leipzig: A. Deichert/Werner Scholl, 1917), 123, who provides the most detailed analysis; Karl Marti, "Das fünfte Buch Mose oder Deuteronomium," in *Die Heilige Schrift des Alten Testaments* (trans. Emil Kautzsch and ed. Alfred Bertholet; 4th ed.; Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1922–23), 1:258–327, at 284; Max Löhr, *Das Deuteronomium (Untersuchungen zum Hexateuchproblem, II)* (Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft, Geisteswissenschaftliche Klasse 1.6; Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1925), 163–209, at 174; Friedrich Horst, "Das Privilegrecht Jahwes: Rechtsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zum Deuteronomium" (1930), repr. in idem, *Gottes Recht: Gesammelte Studien zum Recht im Alten Testament: Aus Anlaß der Vollendung seines 65. Lebenjahres* (ed. H. W. Wolff; TB 12; Munich: Kaiser, 1961), 17–154, at 35 n. 1; Moshe Weinfeld, *Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972), 98 n. 5; Paul E. Dion, "Deuteronomy 13: The Suppression of Alien Religious Propaganda in Israel during the Late Monarchical Era," in *Law and Ideology in Monarchic Israel* (ed. Baruch Halpern and Deborah W. Hobson; JSOTSup 124; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1991), 147–216, at 153; Eduard Nielsen, *Deuteronomium* (HAT 1.6; Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1995), 144; Jeffrey H. Tigay, *The JPS Torah Commentary: Deuteronomy* (Philadelphia/Jerusalem: JPS, 1996), 132, 367 n. 26; and Juha Pakkala, *Intolerant*

the text-critical question by reconstructing an original Hebrew text that, they maintain, is reflected by neither the MT nor the LXX.[16] For more than a century, however, important arguments have been made on behalf of the LXX.[17] That position achieved near normative status through its incorporation, as already noted, into the standard scholarly Bibles: *Biblia Hebraica* and *Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia*.[18] Particularly significant is that the two major scholars of the LXX of Deuteronomy independently agree that the Greek translator here followed a Hebrew *Vorlage* different from that preserved by the MT. As editor of the Göttingen Septuagint, John William Wevers is avowedly circumspect in his approach to textual variants; he is reluctant to assume the translator's reliance on a parent text that differs from that reflected by the MT.[19] That conservative methodology makes his acceptance of the variant here all the more noteworthy.[20] Anneli Aejmelaeus represents a different methodological orientation and is more inclined to accept the variants as pointing to actual Hebrew readings that diverge from the textual tradition of the MT.[21] In a rich

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Monolatry in the Deuteronomistic History (Publications of the Finnish Exegetical Society 76; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), 21.

[16] See Gottfried Seitz, *Redaktionsgeschichtliche Studien zum Deuteronomium* (BWANT 93; Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1971), 144–45 (n. 160), 150–51. His position is followed by A. D. H. Mayes, *Deuteronomy* (NCB; London: Marshall, Morgan & Scott, 1979), 234. For a detailed analysis of this position, please see "The Evidence of Comparative Semitics and Historical Linguistics" below.

[17] Carl Steuernagel, *Das Deuteronomium übersetzt und erklärt* (Göttinger Handkommentar zum Alten Testament; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1899), 50; similarly, but without the justification, in the second edition of 1923 (p. 103). See also Alfred Bertholet, *Deuteronomium* (KHC 5; Leipzig/Tübingen: Mohr, 1899), 43; Antti Filemon Puukko, *Das Deuteronomium: Eine literarkritische Untersuchung* (BWAT 5; Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1910), 253; and Lothar Perlitt, "'Ein einzig Volk von Brüdern': Zur deuteronomischen Herkunft der biblischen Bezeichnung 'Bruder,'" in idem, *Deuteronomium-Studien* (FAT 8; Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1994), 50–73, at 53–54.

[18] *Biblia Hebraica Quinta* will, however, mark an important change. It regards the plus of the LXX, 4QDeut^{c}, and the Samaritan as secondarily derived from the MT and thus rejects the textual emendation. The fascicle's editor, Prof. Carmel McCarthy, University College, Dublin, courteously shared her analysis of the verse in advance of publication (e-mail communication, June 6, 2000).

[19] See Wevers, *Notes on the Greek Text of Deuteronomy*, xi–xii; and idem, "Apologia pro Vita Mea: Reflections on a Career in Septuagint Studies," *BIOSCS* 32 (1999): 65–96, at 93. The latter publication was kindly brought to my attention by Mr. Albert Friedberg.

[20] Wevers, *Greek Text of Deuteronomy*, 231: "following Sam rather than MT."

[21] Contrast Wevers's careful analysis of the crux at MT Deut 13:10 = LXX Deut 13:9, where he derives the LXX variant from the MT (*Greek Text of Deuteronomy*, 232–33), with the sharp rejection of that model by Aejmelaeus, who instead understands the LXX translator faithfully to reproduce a Hebrew *Vorlage* (Anneli Aejmelaeus, "Die Septuaginta des Deuteronomiums," in *Das Deuteronomium und seine Querbeziehungen* [ed. Timo Veijola; Schriften der Finnischen Exegetischen Gesellschaft 62; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996], 1–22, at 19–20 and 21 nn. 68–69). On the variant in question, see Levinson, "But You Shall Surely Kill Him!" 37–63 (against which Aejmelaeus argues).

article on the *Denkarbeit* that underlies the LXX, she affirms the translator's fidelity to his Hebrew parent text, which Alexandrian Judaism regarded as Torah.[22] This perspective, which builds on the pioneering contributions of Zacharias Frankel and nineteenth-century *Wissenschaft des Judentums*, provides welcome recognition of the extent to which the LXX also represents a prodigious hermeneutical accomplishment.[23] Given the scrupulous attention paid to the Torah by the translator and his community, textual variants may often be regarded as deriving "aus einer sehr frühen, vormasoretischen Phase der Textgeschichte."[24] The case of Deut 13:7a serves as but one of a series of parade examples, culled from the apparatus of *BHS*, where, she argues, the translator preserves such a non-Masoretic variant text, one also reflected in the Samaritan or at Qumran.[25]

With the discovery and publication of the Dead Sea Scrolls, the arguments in favor of the textual variant have won renewed strength. The evidence provided by 4QDeut^{c} 13:7 and the indirect witness of 11QTemple 54:19 attests a Hebrew textual tradition that is consistent with the LXX plus and that arguably provides its *Vorlage*. On that basis, the restoration of the plus to the MT has been urged as incontrovertible, given the allegedly decisive evidence provided

[22] Aejmelaeus, "Septuaginta," 1, 3.

[23] Ibid., 1 n. 3, citing Frankel, *Einfluss der palästinischen Exegese* (see n. 15 above). With his command of rabbinic exegesis controlled by historical-critical methodology, Frankel helped open a new chapter in the study of the LXX, one signaled by the book's opening discussion: "Liegt hier nur eine Uebersetzung oder auch zugleich ein Religionswerk vor?" (pp. 1–2). This approach to the LXX as a translation that also, in places, embeds Second Temple exegesis, is carried further in the overlooked work of Leo Prijs: "So darf die LXX in ihrer Beziehung zum hebräischen Text oft nur von innen her, aus ihrem eigenen Geist heraus, nicht durch mechanische, rein äusserliche Vergleichung mit dem hebräischen Text verstanden werden" (*Jüdische Tradition in der Septuaginta* [Leiden: Brill, 1948; repr., Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1987], xvi).

Given the emphasis by Aejmelaeus on how Alexandrian Jewish hermeneutics mediated the biblical text to its Alexandrian translators, it becomes unclear whether her analysis fully takes this model's significance into account. The text-critical alternatives that are considered—whether "der Übersetzer seiner Vorlage treu gewesen ist . . . [oder] den Text frei gestaltet hat" (Aejmelaeus, "Septuaginta," 16)—impose a false dichotomy upon the evidence. Conceivably, the committed translator is true to the text only when he or she renders it meaningfully: as it is taught, interpreted, and understood within that religious community. What constitutes a "true" rendering of a text for the Second Temple reader, interpreter, or translator of scripture must surely be judged by criteria different from those employed by the modern philologist.

[24] Aejmelaeus, "Septuaginta," 6. The same author elsewhere similarly stresses the importance of the LXX for its having been "translated well before the fixing of the Masoretic tradition." See Anneli Aejmelaeus, "What can we know about the Hebrew *Vorlage* of the Septuagint?" *ZAW* 99 (1987): 58–89; republished in and cited according to eadem, *On the Trail of* [the] *Septuagint Translators: Collected Essays* [correcting typo of title page] (Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1993), 77–115, at 114–15).

[25] Aejmelaeus, "Septuaginta," 17–18. Given the use of *BHS* as source, the attestation of the variant by 4QDeut^{c} is not noted.

by the Qumran manuscripts in question.[26] The acceptance of the variant has become so second nature that several scholars have confused it with the MT, citing the latter as if it included the reference to the half brother, but without a text-critical note to indicate whether the emendation was intentional.[27]

The purpose of this article is systematically to assess the evidence for the originality of the textual variant represented by the LXX, the SP, and 4QDeut^{c}. Here it is important methodologically to distinguish between two kinds of questions. The normal focus of textual critics is specifically to analyze whether a LXX reading, where it diverges from the MT, is based on an actual Hebrew parent text: whether the Septuagint translator remained "treu" to a Hebrew *Vorlage* or was "frei" in his rendering.[28] Only so—only if it witnesses a Hebrew *Vorlage*—does the reading preserve a true textual variant: a Hebrew reading that diverges from the MT. Otherwise the reading represents nothing more than the free invention or exegetical activity of the translator. When both Wevers and Aejmelaeus agree that the LXX plus Deut 13:7(6)a derives from such a parent text, and is independent of the MT, that is their common focus. The reflections of that plus in Samaritan and in Hebrew at Qumran would seem conclusive.

At the same time, another question has to be asked that seems to have been overlooked. Even granting the existence of a non-Masoretic Hebrew *Vorlage* of the LXX variant, does that *Vorlage* offer access to the understand-

[26] Timo Veijola, "Wahrheit und Intoleranz nach Deuteronomium 13," *ZTK* 92 (1995): 287–314, at 303.

[27] In a meticulous analysis of the literary history of Deut 13, Eckart Otto translates MT Deut 13:7 according to the LXX and SP ("Wenn . . . dein Bruder, der Sohn deines Vaters, oder der Sohn deiner Mutter, . . ."), without noting or discussing this deviation from the MT. See his "Treueid und Gesetz: Die Ursprünge des Deuteronomiums im Horizont neuassyrischen Vertragsrechts," *Zeitschrift für Altorientalische und Biblische Rechtsgeschichte* 2 (1996): 1–52, at 15, 25, 33 (as translation of MT, given on facing page), and 43. Identically, idem, "Die Ursprünge der Bundestheologie im Alten Testament und im Alten Orient," *Zeitschrift für Altorientalische und Biblische Rechtsgeschichte* 4 (1998): 1–84, at 38; and idem, *Das Deuteronomium: Politische Theologie und Rechtsreform in Juda und Assyrien* (BZAW 284; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1999), 41, 57, and 67. Similarly confusing the MT and the LXX is Martti Nissinen, "Falsche Prophetie in neuassyrischer und deuteronomistischer Darstellung," in *Das Deuteronomium und seine Querbeziehungen,* ed. Veijola, 172–95, at 175. While recognizing importantly that both the treaty literature and Deut 13:7 stress the most intimate relationships, Nissinen here overlooks the distinction between the two textual versions. The MT (which he unintentionally conflates with the LXX variant) properly supports his larger thesis and is consistent with the Neo-Assyrian material; the LXX (which he actually cites) compromises his thesis and dissolves the focus on the intimate sibling relation. Independently demonstrating the focus of Deut 13:7 on intimacy and the connection to the Neo-Assyrian treaties, see Bernard M. Levinson, "Recovering the Lost Original Meaning of ולא תכסה עליו (Deuteronomy 13:9)," *JBL* 115 (1996): 601–20, esp. 614–17.

[28] Aejmelaeus, "Septuaginta," 16.

ably hoped-for "vormasoretische Phase der Textgeschichte?"[29] Does "non-Masoretic" so directly translate into "pre-Masoretic"? After all, "just because they are old readings does not mean that they are automatically better readings. . . ."[30] The argument here is that the attestation of a Hebrew text corresponding to a LXX variant does not and should not suffice to determine the originality of that variant. The issue is rather how to understand and interpret the quality, meaningfulness, and originality of the variant readings relative to one another. Although the LXX, SP, and 4QDeut^{c} point clearly to an ancient non-Masoretic Hebrew *Vorlage,* I believe that tradition to be secondary: it is "post-Masoretic" rather than pre-Masoretic. It derives from and depends on the textual tradition witnessed by the MT.

III. The Evidence of Qumran

Despite being invoked as providing all but objective support for the originality of the LXX plus, the Qumran evidence is much more problematic than has previously been recognized. There are two witnesses in question, the direct one of the biblical manuscript (4QDeut^{c}) and the indirect one of the *Temple Scroll*.

4QDeut^{c}

From the time of its initial publication, first as a dissertation and then in the official edition, the correspondence of the restored fragments to the LXX variant has been recognized.[31] On that basis, the emendation of the MT has been urged, a position that has been taken up more broadly by textual critics and biblical scholars. The evidence is as follows, based on the join of the top lines of frgs. 22 and 23:

4QDeut^{c} 13:7
[בן]אביך[או בן אמך] אוֹ בנך או אש[ת]

[29] Ibid., 6.

[30] Wevers, "Apologia pro Vita Mea," 93.

[31] See Crawford, "4QDeut^{c}," 23 and plate IV (cited in n. 1 above). Note that the reproduction of frgs. 22 and 23 in DJD 14 is not of high quality. The photographs here are used by permission of the Israel Antiquities Authority.



Frg. 23
Courtesy Israel Antiquities Authority

Frg. 22
Courtesy Israel Antiquities Authority

On its own grounds, however, 4QDeut^{c} proves an unreliable witness. On the one hand, frg. 22 is taken as providing evidence in support of the LXX plus because it seems to attest the reading אביך (note the very incomplete preservation of the final two consonants and the only partial preservation of the first two).[32] On the other hand, the very same line (following the join) continues with . . . או בנך או אשת, "or your son or the wife of . . ." (frg. 23). It thus omits the essential alternative או בתך, "or your daughter," attested by all of the other versions:

Deut 13:7

4QDeut^{c}	או בנך או אשת
MT, LXX, SP, Syriac, Targum, Vulgate	או בנך או בתך או אשת

Correctly noting the omission of the reference to the daughter, the editor of the official edition requires its restoration and thus here accepts the superiority of the witness provided by the MT.[33] The reliability of 4QDeut^{c} as a textual witness is, as a result, extremely problematic. Within the space of a couple words, the witness of Qumran both corrects the MT and must be corrected by

[32] At my request, the editor of the official edition checked the photographs to confirm the reading אביך against the possibility of MT אמך. There were two considerations. (1) The consonant ב is almost certain. Although its head is missing, the letter in frg. 22 shows the squatter vertical and longer base stroke that characterize ב rather than medial מ in 4QDeut^{c}. (2) Spacing considerations suggest that the first line would be shorter than average for 4QDeut^{c} if it followed the MT; conversely, there is room for the longer reading of the LXX and the SP. I am grateful to Professor Sidnie White Crawford for this generous assistance (e-mail communication, November 8, 1999).

[33] White, *Critical Edition*, 63 (see n. 1 above): "4Q has suffered haplography owing to homoioteleuton (בנך – בתך)."

it, both permits the restoration of a haplography and itself requires restoration, both preserves a reliable Hebrew *Vorlage* and deviates from it. Elijah's challenge to Israel, assembled at Mount Carmel, could not be more apt: "How long will you go limping with two different opinions? If Yahweh is God, follow him; but if Baal, then follow him" (1 Kgs 18:21). Sound method is compromised by citing the plus in isolation from its immediate literary context.[34] The ostensibly objective evidence is hardly that.

11QTemple 54:19

Here again the evidence is at best ambiguous. On the one hand, this reuse of the biblical text provides clear Hebrew attestation of the LXX plus:[35]

ואם ישיתכה אחיכה בן אביכה או בן אמכה או
בנכה או בתכה

[34] Overlooking the minus is Veijola, "Deuteronomium 13," 303. Contrast the valuable citation of both plus and minus in Martin Abegg, Jr., Peter Flint, and Eugene Ulrich, eds., *The Dead Sea Scrolls Bible* (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1999), 167.

[35] See Yigael Yadin, *The Temple Scroll* (3 vols.; Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 1977–83), 2:245; and Elisha Qimron, *The Temple Scroll: A Critical Edition with Extensive Reconstructions* (Beer Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press; Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 1996), 78. 11QTemple[b], frg. 20, may also attest a miniscule portion of this plus: כה או-, thus, the second person pronominal suffix of "your father" with the following "or"; so Qimron, *Temple Scroll*, 78; and Florentino García Martínez et al., eds., *Qumran Cave 11* (DJD 23; Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), 401–2.

The judgment that the pronominal suffix belongs to אב, "father"—thus attesting the plus of the variant—rather than to MT אם, "mother," is based in each case on the editors' reconstruction of how the fragment fits within the line. That such reconstructions are by no means definitive is demonstrated by the degree of divergence between them. Whereas Qimron locates the fragment in question toward the right edge of the column, the editors of DJD situate it on the left. Given such variation, it is unclear that the attestation of the plus in 11QTemple[b] can be so directly mandated by the tentative reconstruction of the text's original form and line length. The indication is rather that the reconstruction may be based from the outset on the assumption that 11QTemple[b], as an expansive text, conforms to 11QTemple[a] in attesting the plus. Yet other expansive texts, like 4QDeut[c], may include striking omissions, as already demonstrated. On this basis, it would be methodologically more defensible to conclude that at Qumran only 11QTemple[a] and 4QDeut[c], but not 11QTemple[b], witness the plus. Conversely, however, the Qumran manuscripts provide no clear attestation of the shorter reading reflected by the MT.

For the correct identification and publication of 11QTemple[b], frg. 20, see A. S. van der Woude, "Ein bisher unveröffentliches Fragment der Tempelrolle," *Mémorial Jean Carmignac*, *RevQ* 13 (1988): 89–92; and Florentino García Martínez, "11QTemple[b]: A Preliminary Publication," in *The Madrid Qumran Congress: Proceedings of the International Congress on the Dead Sea Scrolls* (ed. Julio Trebolle Barrera and Luis Vegas Montaner; 2 vols.; STDJ 11; Leiden: Brill; Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 1992), 2:363–91, esp. 388–89. This information permits a correction to the valuable index prepared by Eugene Ulrich, "An Index of the Passages in the Biblical

On the other hand, the larger context points to linguistic updating and redactional revision as central to the reuse of the biblical material. The author has not retained the older casuistic protasis marker כי ("if") employed by Deuteronomy. That marker is ancient; it corresponds to Ugaritic *k,* Akkadian *šumma,* and Sumerian *tukumbi*.[36] But the same Hebrew conjunction also bears a wide range of unrelated meanings ("because" or "for"; asseverative marker).[37] Indeed, the conjunction is second only to paratactic -ו as the most frequent clause connector in Hebrew, with over four thousand occurrences.[38] Given the ambiguity that inevitably arises, the strong tendency of Second Temple Hebrew is to restrict כי to the "because" function and to assign the "if" function to אם.[39] In fact, the nonretention of conditional כי constitutes one of the distinguishing characteristics of rabbinic Hebrew.[40] That process of linguistic updat-

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Manuscripts from the Judean Desert (Genesis–Kings)," *Dead Sea Discoveries* 1 (1994): 113–29, at 124, which cites "11QDeut?" as an additional attestation of Deut 13:7–11. That reference is actually a misidentification of 11QTemple[b] (as graciously confirmed by Prof. Ulrich via e-mail, November 10, 1999) that derives from J. P. M. van der Ploeg's preliminary description of the fragment from 11QTemple[b] as biblical ("Les manuscrits de la Grotte XI de Qumrân," *RevQ* 12 [1985]: 10). The misidentification recurs in Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *The Dead Sea Scrolls: Major Publications and Tools for Study* (rev. ed.; SBLRBS 20; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990), 68 and 215; and, most recently, Eugene Ulrich, "Index of Passages in the Biblical Scrolls," in *The Dead Sea Scrolls after Fifty Years: A Comprehensive Assessment* (ed. Peter W. Flint and James C. VanderKam; 2 vols.; Leiden: Brill, 1999), 2:649–65, at 654. The correction is also noted by García Martínez, "11QTemple[b]," 389. I am grateful to Molly Zahn for her careful analysis of the reconstruction of 11QTemple[b], frg. 20.

[36] For *k* as introducing conditional clauses in Ugaritic, see Josef Tropper *Ugaritische Grammatik* (AOAT 273; Münster: Ugarit-Verlag, 2000), 801–2 (§83.24b), 909 (§97.91). On the Akkadian and Sumerian conjunctions, see Roderick A. F. Mackenzie, "The Formal Aspect of Ancient Near Eastern Law," in *The Seed of Wisdom: Essays in Honor of T. J. Meek* (ed. W. S. McCullough; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), 31–44.

[37] Ugaritic *k* is similarly polyvalent. Its causal, conditional, temporal, and affirmation functions are often difficult to distinguish; see Tropper, *Ugaritische Grammatik*, 795 (§83.151), 800–803 (§83.24).

[38] See Anneli Aejmelaeus, "The Function and Interpretation of כי in Biblical Hebrew," *JBL* 105 (1986): 193–209; republished in and cited according to eadem, *On the Trail,* 166–85. The frequency of attestation is noted on p. 166.

[39] In the Covenant Code, the latter conjunction carried that meaning, but marked subconditions rather than the main protasis. Thus contrast the use of כי to mark the main protasis of the manumission law (Exod 21:2) with the designation of the subconditions by אם (vv. 3, 4, 5). Analogously, contrast Exod 22:7 with vv. 8, 9, 10, 11.

[40] See Abba Bendavid, *Biblical Hebrew and Mishnaic Hebrew* (2 vols.; Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1967, 1971), 1:261 and esp. 2:614 (Hebrew). A similar significance is attached by Miguel Pérez Fernández to the loss of the particle as a dependent clause marker (*An Introductory Grammar of Rabbinic Hebrew* [Leiden: Brill, 1997], 214). The inconsistency of the replacement in biblical citations at Qumran suggests a stage that is transitional from the classical to the rabbinic use; see Takamitsu

ing and lexical specification provides the context for the replacement of the older conjunction here.[41]

This section of the *Temple Scroll* also presupposes extensive redactional reordering of the biblical text. Consistent with his proclivity to regroup biblical laws, the redactor of the *Temple Scroll* employs Deut 16:18–20 to introduce a section on the judicial system (11QTemple 51:11–16). He follows that unit with a broad collection of cult laws culled from the Tetrateuch (11QTemple 51:16–54:7). Then, anticipating the topically similar law that will follow, he departs from the biblical textual order to insert the incitement laws of Deut 13:1–18 (11QTemple 54:8–55:14). Following this regrouping of laws based on the shared topic of apostasy, the peripatetic redactor returns to the original legal sequence.[42] He resumes with the law granting local courts the right of capital punishment in cases of apostasy (Deut 17:2–7 = 11QTemple 55:15–56:?),[43] the law on the central court at the Temple (Deut 17:8–13 = 11QTemple 56:?-11), and the law of the king (Deut 17:14–20 = 11QTemple 56:12–21). On the basis of such updating, both linguistic and redactional, the attestation of the textual plus by the *Temple Scroll* cannot be separated from its literary context: the reception of and reflection upon the biblical text by the Judaisms of the Second Temple period.

Muraoka, "An Approach to the Morphosyntax and Syntax of Qumran Hebrew," in *Diggers at the Well: Proceedings of a Third International Symposium on the Hebrew of the Dead Sea Scrolls and Ben Sira* (ed. T. Muraoka and J. F. Elwolde; STDJ 36; Leiden: Brill, 2000), 212–13.

[41] The precise reason for the substitution in the *Temple Scroll* has been debated, since it does not occur consistently. For the contrasting interpretations, see Yadin, *Temple Scroll*, 2:247; and Gershon Brin, "The Bible as Reflected in the *Temple Scroll*," in *Shnaton: An Annual for Biblical and Ancient Near Eastern Studies 4* (ed. Moshe Weinfeld; Jerusalem: Israel Bible Society, 1980), 182–224 (Hebrew, English abstract), esp. 214–17. For an attempt to provide a systematic explanation, see Bernard M. Levinson and Molly M. Zahn, "The Hermeneutics of כי and אם in the *Temple Scroll*" (in preparation).

[42] On the reorganization of the biblical material, see Yadin, *Temple Scroll*, 2:246. Accordingly, when Alexander Rofé "restores" Deut 17:2–7 to Deut 13, regarding it as a missing textual fragment that had somehow broken off from its original context, partially on the basis of the common grouping attested by the *Temple Scroll*, he does not pursue the implications of his astute insight that the *Temple Scroll* groups the laws together based on the common theme ("The Arrangement of the Laws in Deuteronomy," *ETL* 64 [1988]: 265–87). At issue is a secondary regrouping—an *ordo facilior*—rather than an original legal order. For a fuller analysis of the problematic textual sequence involved, see Bernard M. Levinson, *Deuteronomy and the Hermeneutics of Legal Innovation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 100–109.

[43] Although there are several lines missing from the top of col. 56, the first extant line cites Deut 17:9b. According to the reconstruction of the number of lines originally in the column, the missing section (Deut 17:6–9a) would neatly fill the space available (see Yadin, *Temple Scroll*, 2:249–51).

IV. The Evidence of Comparative Semitics and Historical Linguistics

One approach to the text-critical variation between the MT and the LXX/SP maintains that neither preserves the original text. This approach attempts to make the grammatical number of the verse's protasis consistent with the singular form of the pronominal suffixes in the apodosis (vv. 9–11).[44] The original Hebrew text is thus reconstructed to refer to אחיך, "your brother," alone. The entire continuation is excised as secondary: not only the reference to the full brother or to the half-brother but also the complete list of additional family members and intimates. This drastic surgery is unnecessary. The rules of congruence in classical Hebrew syntax are flexible and do not demand such wooden consistency.[45] Moreover, comparative evidence from the ancient Near East that might have controlled and contextualized the argument, some of which was valuably cited, was arbitrarily deemed irrelevant.[46] In fact, the appositional formula employed by the MT, אח בן אם, "brother, son of mother," is well

[44] On the basis of the seeming grammatical inconsistency, Seitz maintained that the law originally knew only a singular subject: the biological אח, "brother"; see *Redaktionsgeschichtliche Studien*, 144–45 (n. 160) and 150–51. He reasoned that when the Deuteronomic authors subsequently employed the same word metaphorically to refer to the "fellow-Israelite" (see Deut 15:2–3), the appositional definition in relation to the mother became necessary to specify the actual sibling. This secondary addition to the text triggered in turn the catena of other biological relations (son/daughter) and intimate relations (wife/friend) now present. The LXX/SP further amplified the catena with the plus. From this viewpoint, the LXX/SP represents a tertiary expansion of an already secondarily expanded Hebrew text (MT).

[45] Seitz imposes a modern notion of grammatical agreement upon the text. Like many languages, however, classical Hebrew syntax has various ways to construe the grammatical number of coordinated subjects. For example, plural subjects may sometimes take predicates that alternate between singular and plural in referring back to the subject (see Lev 11:32–33; 13:58; Num 5:6–7; 30:3–16; Deut 17:2, 5; 22:1–2). Just as easily, plural subjects, coordinated as here with או ("or"), may be resolved in the grammatical singular, both verbally and pronominally (Exod 22:6; Lev 25:49; Deut 13:2–3; 15:12–14; Jer 23:33–34). Particularly relevant is the case of Deut 15, whose coordinated plural subject (כי ימכר לך אחיך העברי או העבריה, "If your fellow Hebrew, whether male or female, sell himself to you") is resolved by a singular verb (ועבדך, "and serve you") and by singular pronominal suffixes: . . . העניק העניק תעניק לו . . . ובשנה השביעת תשלחנו חפשי מעמך, "And in the seventh year you must send *him* free from you . . . You must certainly give *him* a gift . . . (vv. 12–14). See the valuable study by Jaakov Levi, *Die Inkongruenz im biblischen Hebräisch* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1987), 25–29.

[46] Seitz explicitly rejects the relevance to Deut 13 of the Vassal Treaty of Esarhaddon, while noting the "*überraschend*" similarity of language and theme (*Redaktionsgeschichtliche Studien*, 150–51). He denies any influence of the secular Neo-Assyrian state treaties on the covenant theology of Deuteronomy. Ironically, the very text that Seitz cites to defend the origins of Deut 13 in the Israelite covenant formulary tradition attests the same basic catena—brother + neighbor + kin (Exod 32:17)—whose originality he denies to Deut 13:7 (pp. 144–45).

attested in the Semitic languages. The string occurs as a Ugaritic word pair.[47] Its attestation in Akkadian, in the Neo-Assyrian treaty corpus, bears particular importance, since this corpus dates to within roughly a century of Deuteronomy's composition.[48]

The Semitic Context of the Word Pair

Ugaritic[49]	
Kirta (*CAT* 1.14.I.7–9) *bt / [m]lk. itbd* *dšbʿ/ [a]ḫm. lh.* *ṯmnt. bn um/*	 The house of a king has perished: A house with seven *brothers*, Even eight *mother's sons!*
Baʿal (*KTU* 1.6.VI.10–11, 14–16) *p[h]n.aḫym.ytn.bʿl/spuy.* *bnm.umy.klyy/* . . . . . . *ahym.ytnt.bʿl/spuy.* *bnm.umy.kl/yy*	 So look! Baʿal gave *my brothers* as my food, *My mother's sons* for my consumption! . . . . . . *My brothers*, O Baʿal, you gave as my food, *My mother's sons* for my consumption!
Akkadian: Vassal Treaty of Esarhaddon[50]	
u aḫḫēšu marʾē ummīšu ša Aššur-bāni-apli marʾi šarri rabiʾi (8; line 94)	and *his brothers, sons by the same mother* as Assurbanipal, the great crown prince designate
ša aḫḫēšu marʾē ummīšu karṣēšunu takkalāni (24; line 270)	You shall not slander *his brothers, his mother's sons*
mā karṣē ša aḫḫēšu marʾē ummīšu ina pānēšu aklā mā šamḫiṣā ina bertuššunu mā aḫḫēšu marʾē ummīšu issu pānēšu pursā (29; lines 341–43)	(You shall not) slander *his brothers, sons of his mother*, before him, make it come to a fight between them, and divide *his brothers, sons of his mother*, from him

The string is common also in classical Hebrew, where it is found in a broad range of literary genres, extending from narrative to wisdom and poetry.

The Word Pair "Brother/Son of Mother" in Hebrew

Poetry	
Gen 27:29	הוה גביר לאחיך וישתחוו לך בני אמך Be lord over your *brothers*, and may your *mother's sons* prostrate themselves before you
Ps 50:20	תשב באחיך תדבר בבן אמך תתן דפי You sit and speak against *your own brother*, against *your own mother's son* you set calumny
Ps 69:9	מזר הייתי לאחי ונכרי לבני אמי I have become a stranger to *my own brothers*, an alien to the *sons of my own mother*.
Narrative	
Gen 43:29	וישא עיניו וירא את בנימין אחיו בן אמו When he [Joseph] raised his eyes and saw *his brother* Benjamin, *the son of his own mother* . . .
Judg 8:19	אחי בני אמי הם They were *my brothers*, the *sons of my own mother* (had you allowed them to live, I would not kill you!)[51]
Treaty Law	
Deut 13:7	כי יסיתך אחיך בן אמך Even if *your very own brother*, *the son of your mother*, should incite you

[47] As valuably noted by both Perlitt ("Ein einzig Volk von Brüdern," 53–54) and Tigay (*Deuteronomy*, 367 n. 26). Perlitt shows how Seitz's argument, based on the incongruence of grammatical number between 13:9 and 13:7, fails to take into account the legal logic involved. Nonetheless, Perlitt's alternative solution is untenable. He argues that the fuller list of the LXX and SP represents the original reading, citing as evidence the frequency of the appositional definition of the brother in relation to the parent in Northwest Semitic. In that way, his own evidence confutes his emendation: all of the Hebrew and Ugaritic word pairs he cites provide only the uterine brother as the parallel term. There is not a single reference to the half-brother. Perlitt's analysis thus actually works against his conclusions and demonstrates the inconsistency of the LXX/SP—and the consistency of the MT—with standard Northwest Semitic.

In stark contrast, however, to the excellent Semitic pedigree of אח בן אם, the string that includes the Septuagint plus (אח בן אב + בן אם) has no attestation whatsoever in classical Hebrew.[52] The apposition that defines the brother in relation to both the father and the mother is found only in the Second Temple period literature that specifically marks the reception, translation, and reinterpretation of Deut 13:7a.

[48] Noting the attestation is Weinfeld, *Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School*, 98 n. 5.

[49] The identification of the word pair follows Stanley Gevirtz, who discusses its use in both Ugaritic and Biblical Hebrew (*Patterns in the Early Poetry of Israel* [Studies in Ancient Oriental Civilization 32; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963; 2d ed., 1973] 10, 42-43). Similarly, Loren Fisher, ed., *Ras Shamra Parallels* (3 vols.; AnOr 49–51; Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1972), 1:103. For the Ugaritic texts and translations employed here, see Simon B. Parker, ed., *Ugaritic Narrative Poetry* (SBLWAW 9; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997), 12 (Kirta), 162 (Baʿal). For the scholarly edition of the Kirta text (*CAT*), see M. Dietrich, O. Lorenz, and J. Sanmartín, eds., *The Cuneiform Alphabetic Texts from Ugarit, Ras Ibn Hani, and Other Places* (Münster: Ugarit-Verlag, 1995). For the Baʿal Epic (*KTU*), see M. Dietrich, O. Lorenz, and J. Sanmartín, eds., *Die Keilalphabetischen Texte aus Ugarit*, vol. 1, *Transkription* (AOAT 24.1; Kevelaer: Butzon & Bercker; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1976).

[50] The normalized Akkadian follows Kazuko Watanabe, *Die adê-Vereidigung anlässlich der Thronfolgeregelung Asarhaddons* (Baghdader Mitteilungen 3; Berlin: Gebr. Mann, 1987), 148, 156, 158, 160. For the translation, see Simo Parpola and Kazuko Watanabe, eds., *Neo-Assyrian Treaties and Loyalty Oaths* (State Archives of Assyria 2; Helsinki: Helsinki University Press, 1988), 32, 39, 42–43. This edition uses the title "Esarhaddon's Succession Treaty"; I have retained the more familiar title. I have revised the translation of lines 341–43 to make them more literal and consistent. These citations do not represent all attestations of the string; the complete list would add lines 103, 171–72, 285, 354, 497, 504, and 516. The other treaties in this collection do not attest the word pair.

[51] Gideon's strong statement to the captive kings, Zebah and Zalmunna, shows how the word pair can stress a protective bond of intimacy between uterine brothers. Deuteronomy 13:7-12 deliberately challenges that intimacy with a conflict of loyalty.

[52] There are, however, two cases in Hebrew of the parallelism אח/בן אב, "brother/son of the father" (without continuation). These two attestations (one biblical, one postbiblical) do not seem to preserve an original Semitic word pair, for which I have found attestation neither in Ugaritic nor in Akkadian. Rather, each seems to represent a contextually specific reuse of previous material. Thus, the blessing that Jacob received from his father, "Be lord over *your brothers* (אחיך) / and may *your* mother's *sons* (בני אמך) *prostrate themselves before you*" (Gen 27:29), is adapted to the new situation of Jacob as now both speaker and father: "Judah, *your brothers* (אחיך) shall praise you; / . . . / *your father's sons* (בני אביך) *shall prostrate themselves before you*" (Gen 49:8). The second attestation is in the Qumran Psalms Scroll: "Junior (קטן) was I to my brothers (אחי), / And the youngest of my father's sons (מבני אבי)" (Ps 151A:1; 11Q5, col. XXVIII, line 3; see James A. Sanders, *The Dead Sea Psalms Scroll* [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967], 96–97). The psalm, pseudepigraphically attributed to David, here adapts Gideon's humble protest—"I am the youngest in my father's house" (בבית אבי; Judg 6:15)—to the literary situation of David as "the junior" sibling (הקטן; 1 Sam 17:14). The two variants (Gen 49:8; Ps 151:1) are noted by Yitzhak Avishur, *Stylistic Studies of Word-Pairs in Biblical and Ancient Semitic Literatures* (AOAT 210: Kevelaer: Butzon & Bercker; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1984), 435 n. 3. A third and final variant occurs in the "Plea for Deliverance": "Let my brothers (אחי) rejoice with me / and the house of my father (ובית אבי) . . ." (11Q5, col. XIX, line 17; Sanders, DJD 4 [1965], pl. XII). For the same parallelism (brothers/house of the father), see LXX Ps 151:1.

Attestations of the Two Forms of the Appositional String

	brother, son of mother	brother, son of father or son of mother
Preexilic		
Ugaritic	+	—
Biblical Hebrew	+	—
Neo-Assyrian treaty	+	—
Second Temple		
LXX	+	+
Dead Sea Scrolls	+	+
Samaritan Pentateuch	+	+

The evidence of language becomes even more telling if the analysis shifts from the first term, with its focus on the male sibling (the אח, "brother"), to the problematic string at issue, the double apposition that defines the sibling in relation to both parents:

The Double Apposition < child of father + child of mother > in Biblical Hebrew	
Defining the Brother	—
Defining the Sister	+

Although the double apposition never defines the brother, there is clear attestation for it in relation to the sister—but only in the context of incest. There the ruling that sexual relations with the female sibling are prohibited comprehensively—with the half-sister as well as with the full sister—makes sense. For that reason, the sister is doubly defined in relation to both the male and the female parent (Lev 18:9; 20:17; Deut 27:22; cf. Gen 20:12). The double specification takes a consistent form, naming the male parent before the female parent. That sequence is intentional: it makes the point that all sibling sexual relations—even with the half-sister—are illicit. The more comprehensive ruling seems to react against the assumption that intercourse with the half-sister was originally permitted, as Abraham takes for granted in his self-serving exculpation (Gen 20:12). Thus, the one context for the string—sibling + child of father + child of mother—is incest.

The One Context for the Double Apposition

Lev 18:9	ערות אחותך בת אביך או בת אמך . . . לא תגלה ערותן The nakedness of your *sister, whether the daughter of your father or the daughter of your mother* . . . you must not uncover their nakedness!
Lev 20:17	ואיש אשר יקח את אחתו בת אביו או בת אמו וראה את ערותה . . . ערות אחתו גלה עונו ישא Any man who takes his *sister*, whether *the daughter of his father or the daughter of his mother*, and sees her nakedness, . . .—the nakedness of his sister has he uncovered; the punishment for his iniquity must he bear!
Deut 27:22	ארור שכב עם אחתו בת אביו או בת אמו Cursed be he who sleeps with his *sister*, whether she is the *daughter of his father or the daughter of his mother*!
Gen 20:12	וגם אמנה אחתי בת אבי היא אך לא בת אמי ותהי לי לאשה Besides, she is indeed my *sister—the daughter of my father* but not *the daughter of my mother*—and she became my wife.

These results suggest the following analysis. The Septuagint translator of Deuteronomy frequently follows the model of translations of previous books.[53] That stands to reason, given the extent to which Deuteronomy provides an expansive reprise of prior narrative and legal material of the Tetrateuch. On occasion, much like the redactor of the Samaritan Pentateuch, the translator will fill in perceived gaps. Something like that seems to have taken place here.

In rendering the incest law of Lev 18:9, the Septuagint translator had normalized the formulaic Hebrew double construct into two genitive phrases, while also eliminating the redundant second reference to the daughter:

[53] Aejmelaeus, "Septuaginta," 4.

MT Lev 18:9

ערות אחותך בת אביך או בת אמך	The nakedness of your sister, the daughter of your father or the daughter of your mother

LXX Lev 18:9

ἀσχημοσύνην τῆς ἀδελφῆς σου ἐκ πατρός σου ἢ ἐκ μητρός σου	The nakedness of your sister, from your father or from your mother

That ready-to-hand LXX string, derived from the comprehensive formulation of the incest law, provides the model for the Deuteronomy translator's rendering of the incitement law. Only now it is appended to the male sibling:

MT Deut 13:7

אחיך בן אמך	your brother, the son of your mother

LXX Deut 13:6

ὁ ἀδελφός σου ἐκ πατρός σου ἢ ἐκ μητρός σου	your brother, from your father or from your mother

The Deuteronomy translator's recourse to the model translation provided by the incest law is not simply a matter of convenience. At issue seems something closer to halakic exegesis based on the partial lexical analogy between the two texts. That association triggered the expectation that the sibling relation must automatically include both parents. The perceived genealogical gap of the one text is completed by the symmetry of the other text. The precise conformity of the Septuagint rendering of Deut 13:7(6) to the syntax of LXX Lev 18:9 urges the latter as the direct *Vorlage* of the plus.

The corresponding plus in the Qumran fragment and in the Samaritan Pentateuch seems equally to represent the influence of the incest law (Lev 18:9). On the analogy of its comprehensive application, and following its precise order, whereby the half sibling precedes the full sibling (אחותך בת אביך או בת אמך), so do the Second Temple witnesses to the text "complete" the restrictively formulated law of MT Deut 13:7, so that it no longer excludes the "missing" reference:

SP	אחיך בן אביך או בן אמך
4QDeut^{c}	בן אביך או בן אמך

The symmetrical formulation thus embeds a tradition of legal interpretation of the text into the transmission of the text. The Samaritan Pentateuch is well known for filling in perceived narrative or legal gaps in the biblical text; the document witnesses a sophisticated tradition of legal hermeneutics.[54] Moreover, the exegetical expansion of a restrictively formulated biblical law (here specifying the full brother) to include the expected symmetrical match (the half-brother) represents a type of exegetical move that is well attested at Qumran. Whereas biblical law, for example, includes sexual relations between a nephew and an aunt among its prohibitions (Lev 18:13; 20:19b–20), it remains silent about the converse: relations between niece and uncle. On the logical assumption that a prohibition applied to the male (intercourse with the female sibling of a parent) should symmetrically also apply to a female (intercourse with the male sibling of a parent), such relations were also prohibited at Qumran, despite the absence of biblical warrant: "A man shall not take the daughter of his sister, for this is an abomination" (11QTemple 66:15–17).

Given the literary genre of the *Temple Scroll* as an original divine revelation, spoken in the first person by God, the law here proclaimed needs, of course, no justification. But that the ostensibly "scriptural" law in fact presupposes exegetical elaboration of pentateuchal law is made clear by the presentation of the same law in the *Damascus Document*:[55]

ולוקחים
איש את בת אחיה(ם) ואת בת אחותו ומשה אמר אל
אחות אמך לא תקרב שאר אמך היא ומשפט העריות לזכרים
הוא כתוב וכהם הנשים ואם תגלה בת האח את ערות אחי
אביה והיא שאר

And each man takes in marriage /
the daughter of their brother or the daughter of his sister, although Moses had said, / "The sister of your mother shall you not approach: she is your mother's kin" [cf. Lev 18:13]. Now, although the [biblical] law of incest is written with reference to men, it applies equally to

[54] For the Samaritan Pentateuch's redactional sophistication, see Jeffrey H. Tigay, "Conflation as a Redactional Technique," in *Empirical Models for Biblical Criticism* (ed. Jeffrey H. Tigay; Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), 53–96. For the later period, see S. Lowy, *The Principles of Samaritan Bible Exegesis* (StPB 28; Leiden: Brill, 1977).

[55] CD 5:7b–11 (my translation); I am grateful to Prof. Timothy H. Lim for drawing my attention to this passage. For the text, see Magen Broshi, ed., *The Damascus Document Reconsidered* (Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society/Shrine of the Book, Israel Museum, 1992), 18–19. On the law, see Joseph M. Baumgarten, "The Essene-Qumran Restraints on Marriage," in *Archaeology and History in the Dead Sea Scrolls* (ed. Lawrence H. Schiffman; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1990), 13–24.

women. Thus, if the daughter of the brother uncovers the nakedness of her father's / brother: that should be considered "kin."

The exegete here makes the technical argument that the biblical text, although formulated to address only males (incest with the aunt), should logically also apply to females (incest with the uncle).[56] The argument is based upon meticulous attention to the stylistic norms of biblical law: ומשפט העריות לזכרים הוא כתוב, "the law of incest is written with reference to men." The linguistic analysis points to a sophisticated legal hermeneutic.[57] At that point, by means of a formal analogy[58]—וכהם הנשים—the legal exegete draws the justifiable conclusion. The law must logically be symmetrical in its application: "It applies equally to women" (lit., "women are like them," i.e., like men, subject to the law).[59]

The parallel helps establish the interplay between law and exegesis of law, between implicit and explicit midrash halakah, between the "scriptural" prohibition of niece–uncle relations in the *Temple Scroll* and the explicit exegetical derivation of the same law in the *Damascus Document*. The Second Temple

[56] For the same prohibition, see also 4QHalakhah A (4Q251) and the reconstruction of 4QD[e] 2 ii 16 (Joseph Baumgarten, ed., *Qumran Cave 4, XIII, The Damascus Document [4Q266–273]* [DJD 18; Oxford: Clarendon, 1996], 142–45). Note the discussion by Charlotte Hempel, *The Laws of the Damascus Document: Sources, Tradition and Redaction* (STDJ 29; Leiden: Brill, 1998), 164–68.

[57] The sectarian position is well justified, given biblical law's frequent use of the masculine pronoun as a "common" gender for a mixed male and female antecedent: כי ימצא בקרבך . . . איש או אשה אשר יעשה את הרע . . . וילך ויעבד . . . , "If there be found among you . . . a man or a woman who does evil and who goes and worships . . ." (Deut 17:2–3). Another example is the manumission law of Deut 15:12–18, where the third person masculine singular verb—and even the noun אחיך ("your brother")—refers back to the העברי או העבריה, "male or female Hebrew" (Deut 15:12), who are identified as the law's subject. On the "priority of the masculine," see *IBHS*, 108.

[58] On the technically marked halakic exegesis involved, see Michael Fishbane, "Use, Authority and Interpretation of Mikra at Qumran," in *Mikra: Text, Translation, and Interpretation of the Hebrew Bible in Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity* (ed. Martin J. Mulder; CRINT 2.3; Assen/Maastricht: Van Gorcum; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988), 339–77, at 369.

[59] Pharisaic law took the scriptural silence on the matter in the opposite direction and sanctioned marital relations between uncle and niece (*b. Yebam.* 62b; *y. Yebam.* 13, 13, 3). These rabbinic sanctions may also involve polemics against the prohibitions of CD 5:7b–11 and 11QTemple 66:15–17; so Magen Broshi, "Anti-Qumranic Polemics in the Talmud," in *The Madrid Qumran Congress: Proceedings of the International Congress on the Dead Sea Scrolls* (ed. Julio Trebolle Barrera and Luis Vegas Montaner; 2 vols.; STDJ 11; Leiden: Brill; Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 1992), 2:589–600, at 596. That such relations were a live point of halakic debate between Jewish communities is suggested by the existence of the same prohibition among Samaritans, Falashas, and Karaites; see Elisha Qimron, "The Halakha of the Damascus Document: An Interpretation of *Al Itarav*" (in Hebrew), in *Proceedings of the Ninth World Congress of Jewish Studies*, Division D, Vol. 1 (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1986), 9–15.

versions that include the plus in the incitement law of Deut 13:7 (6), although not formally marking the plus as exegetically derived, nevertheless presuppose similar halakic exegesis. The variant does not preserve a true reading; rather it preserves a record of the exegetical expansion of the law to make it symmetrical and comprehensive in its application.

V. The Evidence of Rabbinic Exegesis

Rabbinic literature confirms that the variant represents an exegetical expansion of the shorter text reflected by the MT. In the Tannaitic halakic midrash on Deuteronomy (second century C.E.) and in one stream of the Palestinian targumic tradition,[60] the plus is formally marked as derived from exegesis:

The Exegetical Origins of the Plus: Midrash Halakah

Sifre[61]
אחיך, זה אחיך מאביך. בן אמך, זה בן אמך "Your brother": this means, the son of your father. "The son of your mother": this means, [your brother], the son of your mother.
Tg. Ps-J. Deut 13:7[62]
אחוך בר אימך כל דכן בר איבך "Your brother, the son of your mother": so much the more so the son of your father!

[60] The Palestinian targumic tradition divides. While *Targum Pseudo-Jonathan* (cited below) adds the reference to the half-brother exegetically, *Targum Neofiti* and the two manuscripts of the *Fragmentary Targum* that attest Deut 13:7 each follow the MT. See Alejandro Díez Macho, *Neophyti 1: Targum Palestinense Ms de la Biblioteca Vaticana* (5 vols.; Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1978), 5:127; Michael L. Klein, *The Fragment-Targums of the Pentateuch* (AnBib 76; 2 vols.; Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1980), 1:214. Onqelos follows the MT; see Alexander Sperber, ed., *The Bible in Aramaic*, vol. 1, *The Pentateuch According to Targum Onkelos* (Leiden: Brill, 1959), 314.

[61] *Sipre Deuteronomy*, *pisqa* 77 (ed. L. Finkelstein; New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1969), 151 (my translation).

[62] Importantly adduced by Dion, "Deuteronomy 13," 153 (see n. 15 above). The text is cited according to *Targum Pseudo-Jonathan of the Pentateuch: Text and Concordance* (ed. E. G. Clarke; Hoboken: Ktav, 1984), 225. The brother reference is the more striking as being the only term in the series so to be rhetorically marked with the exegetical expansion.

In each case, the rabbis assume the apposition to have exegetical significance. The authors of the *Sifre* break up the word pair, in effect denying that the apposition simply amplifies and repeats the first term. Far from being mutually redundant, the two terms are each given independent significance. By means of such conventional "creative philology," whereby perceived redundancies in the biblical text are exegetically exploited, the "missing" symmetrical reference to the half-brother is restored to the text.[63] The Targum achieves the same goal by somewhat different means. Here the appositional formulation of the text is exploited as justification for a classical קל וחומר (*a minore ad maius*) argument.[64] In both cases, therefore, the perceived gap in the text is corrected and the law is specified as comprehensively applying to both the full and the half brother. Similar halakic exegesis marked the traditional interpretation of the biblical text. Rashi (R. Solomon b. Isaac, 1040–1105 C.E.), as he frequently does, closely follows the *Sifre*'s model of exegetical suppletion to "restore" the symmetry: אחיך מאב או בן אמך מאם, "*your brother* from the father; or *the son of your mother* from the mother."[65]

It is only with the Spanish school of exegesis that the text's original meaning is recovered. Abraham ibn Ezra (1089–1164 C.E.) pointedly rejects the conventional halakic midrash that regards the appositional doubling as justifying the extension of the law to include the half-brother.[66] Strikingly, he uses the same expositional form as the *Sifre* and Rashi (separate comments on each term of the word pair) precisely to show that they have the same legal reference. Far from warranting the expansion of the law to include the half-brother,

[63] The apt term "creative philology," used to describe a key technique of rabbinic exegesis, was coined by Joseph Heinemann, *Darkhe ha-Aggadah* (in Hebrew; 3d ed.; Jerusalem: Magnes, 1970), 4–7, 96–107.

[64] On this exegetical technique, see Wilhelm Bacher, *Die exegetische Terminologie der Jüdischen Traditionsliteratur* (2 vols.; Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1899–1905; repr., Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1965), 1:172–74; and H. L. Strack and Günter Stemberger, *Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash* (trans. and ed. Markus Bockmuehl; 2d printing; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996), 18–19.

[65] The most accurate text is provided by A. Berliner, ed., *Raschi: Der Kommentar des Salomo b. Isak über den Pentateuch* (Frankfurt: J. Kauffmann, 1905), 376. The translation is based instead on the popular text of the rabbinic Bibles: Rashi, *Pentateuch with Targum Onkelos, Haphtaroth and Rashi's Commentary* (trans. M. Rosenbaum and A. M. Silbermann; 5 vols.; 1929–34; repr., Jerusalem: Silbermann, 1972/5733), 5:72.

[66] Showing the emergence during the twelfth century of nonhalakic biblical exegesis, see Martin I. Lockshin, "Tradition or Context: Two Exegetes Struggle with Peshat," in *From Ancient Israel to Modern Judaism: Intellect in Quest of Understanding: Essays in Honor of Marvin Fox* (ed. Jacob Neusner, Ernest S. Frerichs, and Nahum M. Sarna; 4 vols.; BJS 159, 173–75; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989), 2:173–86.

the apposition simply provides a means of rhetorical heightening. It engages the affective response of the addressee:[67]

כי יסיתך אחיך: הטעם, אפילו אחיך. וטעם בן אמך, שהייתם בבטן אחת

"If your brother incites you": the reason for this is "*[If] even your own brother.*"
And the reason for "son of your mother": *since you were both in a single womb*.

The rabbinic literature provides a frame of reference from which to assess the variants. That the textual plus is consistently formally marked as derived by means of exegetical logic strongly suggests that the Second Temple witnesses to the longer text (the LXX, the Samaritan Pentateuch, 4QDeut^{c}) preserve—in Greek, Samaritan, and Hebrew—the earliest witnesses to the same school of studied reflection upon the biblical text. They cannot logically be seen as preserving an original reading or a true textual variant. Rather, they testify to the history of interpretation: to traditions of hermeneutics that several textual communities shared and that spanned linguistic and sectarian lines. The only way to understand the variant is as an exegetical expansion whereby the shorter text (witnessed by the MT) has been supplemented in light of the string that originates in the unrelated legal context of the incest prohibitions.

With that conclusion, however, the question remains of how to understand the narrow focus of the MT on the full brother. What is the logic of the shorter text, which has been lost by the more expansive text of the exegetical traditions? Given its originality as a reading, what does it mean? The question is pressing, because some have argued that the MT in fact means the same thing as the expanded text: that the inclusion of the half-brother is implicit.[68] Others reject this approach, maintaining that the MT is intentionally restrictive in its formulation.[69] At this point, several ironies emerge. Conventional disciplinary bound-

[67] Abraham ibn Ezra, *Commentary on the Torah* (in Hebrew; ed. A. Weiser; 3 vols.; Jerusalem: Rav Kook Institute, 1977), 3:253 (my translation). As one of the anonymous *JBL* readers helpfully noted, Ibn Ezra does not here reject the method of midrashic hermeneutics. The issue is thus rather his freedom to interpret the biblical text independent of midrash halakah. Thus, in the continuation of his comment on this lemma, Ibn Ezra maintains that the formulation of the law has philosophical significance. He maintains that the explicit mention of the mother and the nonmention of the father reflect the relation between matter, which is readily visible, and form, which, as never existing independent of matter, is intelligible only to the learned.

[68] August Dillmann, *Die Bücher Numeri, Deuteronomium und Josua* (Kurzgefasstes exegetisches Handbuch zum Alten Testament; 2d ed.; Leipzig: Hirzel, 1886), 301.

[69] Most clearly, König (*Deuteronomium*, 123) rejects the expanded text of the LXX/SP as "eine Trivialität." Similarly, Tigay (*Deuteronomy*, 367 n. 26): "The variant reading . . . misses the point."

aries divide textual criticism and biblical studies, on the one hand, from rabbinics and the history of interpretation, on the other. As a result, an important chapter of the history of scholarship is often not taken into account.[70] This situation triggers something like intellectual amnesia, as the modern critical debate can recapitulate "pre-critical" rabbinic positions nearly verbatim.[71] The additional irony is that Ibn Ezra's analysis of the text's rhetoric receives striking confirmation from cuneiform literature.

VI. The Contribution of Assyriology

That Akkadian also attests the idiom "brother, son of mother" has already been noted. But the larger issue is that the author of Deut 13 works within a specific literary tradition. The loyalty oath (*adê*) imposed by Neo-Assyrian monarchs on their vassals and citizens provides his point of departure.[72] The model's prohibitions against incitement and warnings against disloyalty are reworked by Deuteronomy's authors into laws that prohibit apostasy.[73] The

[70] The only scholar to have done so is Dion, "Deuteronomy 13," 153, citing *Targum Pseudo-Jonathan*.

[71] Representing the harmonistic approach, *Tg. Ps-J.* Deut 13:7 views the law as implicitly comprehensive: אחוך בר אימך כל דכן בר איבך, "'Your brother, the son of your mother': *so much the more so,* 'the son of your father'!" Dillmann employs the same rhetorical technique (in its negative form) to read the plus into the MT. Glossing "Sohn deiner Mutter," he maintains: "wenn sogar dieser nicht zu schonen ist, dann *um so weniger* der Halbbruder; das setzen Sam. LXX . . . ausdrücklich ein" (*Deuteronomium*, 301). Rejecting the midrashic textual expansion, Ibn Ezra argues that the restrictive formulation is intentional. In his gloss on כי יסיתך אחיך, he maintains: הטעם, אפילו אחיך, "The reason for this is, '[If] *even* your own brother' [incite you, you must carry out the summary execution required by the apodosis]." König identically glosses the same lemma, while rejecting the LXX plus as "eine Trivialität": "Wenn [*sogar*] dein Bruder" (*Deuteronomium*, 123).

[72] Contra Seitz, *Studien*, 150–51. Similarly, the Neo-Assyrian material is deemed "unnötig" in a debate on the textual criticism of Deut 13:10 (9) by Aejmelaeus ("Septuaginta," 20 n. 64). Summarily dismissing it as irrelevant denies the critic access to important information on the compositional history of the text that might explain the LXX's rejection of summary execution (so MT Deut 13:10, reflecting the Neo-Assyrian model in cases of extreme threat to the suzerain) in favor of the norm elsewhere in the Bible (Deut 17:2–7) and in Second Temple Judaism that requires due process and witness law (see Levinson, "But You Shall Surely Kill Him!," 37–63).

[73] See R. Frankena, "The Vassal-Treaties of Esarhaddon and the Dating of Deuteronomy," *OTS* 14 (1965): 123–54; Weinfeld, *Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School*, 91–94; idem, "The Loyalty Oath in the Ancient Near East," *UF* 8 (1976): 379–414; Dion, "Deuteronomy 13," 199–205; Levinson, "But You Shall Surely Kill Him!" 54–60; and, comprehensively, Otto, "Treueid und Gesetz," 1–52. Challenging this approach and maintaining instead that the unit belongs to a postexilic redactional layer of Deuteronomy is Timo Veijola, "Wahrheit und Intoleranz nach Deuteronomium 13," *ZTK* 92 (1995): 287–314. For responses to that challenge, see Levinson, *Deuteronomy and the Hermeneutics of Legal Innovation*, 123 n. 65; and the important analysis provided by Otto, *Deuteronomium*, 13–56.

degree of specific similarity between the apostasy provisions of Deut 13 and the Neo-Assyrian material can be accounted for only in terms of the Deuteronomic authors having access to the treaty material, either directly or in Aramaic translation (as in the three treaties from Sefire or the Tel Fekherye bilingual inscription). Indeed, the eighth and the seventh centuries B.C.E. provided ample opportunity for Judean court scribes to have access to this material: forms of worship related to the Assyrian state cult were introduced into the temple (2 Kgs 23:11); Hezekiah had concluded a treaty with Assyria (2 Kgs 18:13–18); and Manasseh's name appears in lists of vassal kings in the inscriptions of both Esarhaddon and Ashurbanipal.[74]

Deuteronomy's authors inverted the loyalty oath by wielding the genre against its imposers and transforming it into an oath of loyalty to Israel's divine sovereign, Yahweh.[75] They placed particular focus on the treaty's requirement that the addressee immediately report the first signs of treason, whatever its source:

Vassal Treaty of Esarhaddon §10[76]

šumma abutu	You shall not hear or conceal
lā ṭabtu lā deʾiqtu	any evil, improper, ugly
lā banītu ša ina muḫḫi Aššur-bāni-	word which is not seemly nor good
apli marʾi šarri rabiʾi ša bēt ridūti	to Ashurbanipal, the great crown
marʾi Aššur-aḫu-iddina šar māt Aššur	prince designate, son of Esarhaddon,
bēlīkunu lā tarṣatūni	king of Assyria, your lord,
lā ṭābatūni lū ina pî nak(i)rīšu	either from the mouth of his enemy
lū ina pî salmīšu	or from the mouth of his ally,

[74] See *ANET*, 291, 294; Mordechai Cogan and Hayim Tadmor, *II Kings* (AB 11; New York: Doubleday, 1988), 265.

[75] Both Hittite (which date to the second millennium) and Neo-Assyrian treaties (of the first millennium) require loyalty by stressing the vassal's obligation not "to conceal" (Hittite *munnai-* and Akkadian *pazzuru* [D-stem]) plotters against the king or his heirs. (See Hans G. Güterbock and Harry A. Hoffner, eds., *The Hittite Dictionary, vol. L–N* [Chicago: The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, 1989], 331, s.v. *munnai-* for the Hittite material; for the Neo-Assyrian attestations, see Parpola and Watanabe, *Neo-Assyrian Treaties*, 98.) But it is specifically the latter texts, with their focus on conspiracy against the sovereign arising either from his own family or that of the addressee, which provide the literary model for the authors of Deuteronomy. That motif almost certainly reflects the controversy over Sennacherib's promotion of Esarhaddon over his older brothers as heir (681 B.C.E.), the civil war that ensued, and the concern of Esarhaddon in that light to secure the succession of Assurbanipal (669 B.C.E.). See Parpola and Watanabe, *Neo-Assyrian Treaties*, xxviii–xxxi.

[76] The Akkadian excerpt of lines 108–22 is cited according to the (eclectic) text in Parpola and Watanabe, *Neo-Assyrian Treaties*, 33. I have also consulted Watanabe, *Die adê-Vereidigung*, 148. While indebted to Parpola and Watanabe for the translation, I substantially depart from their rendering of lines 108, 115–16, 118, 119–20 so as to reflect the Akkadian more exactly.

lū ina pî aḫḫēšu	*or from the mouth of his brothers*,
aḫḫē abbēšu marʾē aḫḫē abbēšu	his uncles, his cousins, his
qinnīšu zarʾi bēt abīšu lū ina pî aḫḫēkunu	family, members of his father's line, *or from the mouth of your brothers*,
marʾēkunu marʾātēkunu lū ina pî rāgimi	*your sons, your daughters*, or from *the mouth of a prophet*, an ecstatic,
maḫḫê mār šāʾili amāt ilī[77]	*an oneiromancer*,[78] or
lū ina (pî) napḫar ṣalmāt qaqqadi mala bašû	from the mouth of any human being who exists;
tašammâni tupazzarāni	
lā tallakānenni ana Aššur-bāni-apli marʾi šarri rabiʾi	you shall come and report (it) to Ashurbanipal, the great crown prince
ša bēt ridūti marʾi Aššur-aḫu-iddina šar māt Aššur	designate, son of Esarhaddon, king of Assyria.
lā taqabbâni	

Such reporting of disloyalty represents only the first stage of a graded sequence. Once the conspiracy becomes grave, the loyal subject is required to take summary action and execute those who pose a threat to the sovereign.[79] The Deuteronomic author redeploys this conspiracy topos, along with its requirement of summary execution. He reuses specific clusters of its language, including both its detailed list of the immediate members of the addressee's family ("brother," "son," "daughter," each inflected with the second person pronominal suffix) and the alternative, religious officials who serve as divine spokesmen ("prophet," "ecstatic," "oneiromancer," each as an indefinite noun).

From this template, the Deuteronomic author creates two consecutive legal paragraphs. The first envisions the incitement to disloyalty against Yahweh as coming from "a prophet or oneiromancer" (in each case an indefinite noun);[80] the second, as arising from the immediate family of the addressee ("brother," "son," "daughter," adding "wife" and "friend," each term with second person pronominal suffix). In each case, the challenge to loyalty thus arises precisely from those whom one is most likely to trust:

[77] In contrast to Watanabe, I have added final length to mark the noun as plural.

[78] "Oneiromancer" is more accurate in context than Parpola and Watanabe's "inquirer of oracles." The latter formula, which is standard for divination, refers to both oneiromancy and necromancy (see *CAD* 17.1 [1989] 111, s.v. *šāʾilu*).

[79] See Vassal Treaty of Esarhaddon §12; and Levinson, "But You Shall Surely Kill Him!" 37–63.

[80] Note that the Hebrew for oneiromancer (lit., "dreamer of dreams") closely represents the grammar of the Akkadian formula *mār šāʾili amāt ilī* (lit., "inquirer of divine oracles"): it employs a masculine singular active participle in construct to a following noun.

> (2) If there should arise in your midst a *prophet or oneiromancer* who provides a sign or portent, (3) and should the sign or portent—concerning which he had spoken to you, saying, "Let us go after other gods (whom you have not known) so that we may worship them"—come true: (4) Do not heed the oracles of that prophet or that oneiromancer . . . . (6) And that prophet or that oneiromancer shall be put to death, for he fomented conspiracy against Yahweh . . .
>
> (7) If *your brother,* the son of your mother, or *your son,* or *your daughter,* or the wife of your bosom, or your friend who is as your own self, entices you secretly, saying, "Let us go and worship other gods"—whom neither you nor your fathers have known . . .— (9) Do not assent to him or give heed to him! Let your eye not pity him nor shall you show compassion nor condone him (10)—but you must surely kill him! . . . (Deut 13:7-10)[81]

The Deuteronomic author has reordered his source. What in the treaty was arranged as a single continuum—royal family (A) + addressee's family (B) + divine spokesmen (C) has been divided into two separate laws, moving from the sphere of public religion (C′) into the sphere of the addressee's private life (B′). In this context, there is of course no reference to threats to the sovereign from within his own family. Accordingly, the citation is exactly chiastic: (A)BC::C′B′.[82] The key elements of the Assyrian source are redeployed almost in a loan translation into Hebrew.[83] At the same time, there are important transformations in the reference to the private sphere of the addressee. In the Neo-Assyrian treaties, the reference to the family provides one variable in a series that climaxes with an all-inclusive formulation: *lū ina (pî) napḫar ṣalmāt qaqqadi mala bašû,* "or from the mouth of any human being who exists" (§10 above). The same is true in the Zakutu treaty (669 B.C.E.):[84]

[81] Verse numbering follows the MT; most English translations follow the different enumeration of the LXX, where this unit would be Deut 13:1–9.

[82] Similarly, Otto, *Deuteronomium*, 58. On textual reuse as formally marked by chiastic citation, see Levinson, *Deuteronomy and the Hermeneutics of Legal Innovation*, 17–20.

[83] The characteristic בקרבך/מקרבך, "in/from your midst" (Deut 13:2, 6, 12, 14, 15) corresponds precisely to Akkadian *ina birtūkunu* in the Zakutu treaty cited below, line 20. The injunction to summary execution כי הרג תהרגנו, "But you shall surely kill him" (Deut 13:10), employed only here in Deuteronomy and whose originality has therefore been challenged (Dion, "Deuteronomy 13," 154) actually precisely represents Akkadian *duāku*, "to kill." That verb is well attested in the Vassal Treaty of Esarhaddon, where, paired with *ṣabatu*, it prescribes the addressee's duty summarily to "seize and kill" traitors (lines 126–27, 138–39, 139–40, 160, 246, 254–55, 305–6, 306–7). For further examples, see Otto, "Treueid und Gesetz," 29–42.

[84] I have prepared the normalization provided here. For the transcription (rev., lines 18–27) on which it is based and the translation, see Parpola and Watanabe, *Neo-Assyrian Treaties*, 64. For a fuller commentary, see the valuable earlier edition by Simo Parpola, "Neo-Assyrian Treaties from the Royal Archives of Nineveh," *JCS* 39 (1987): 161–89, esp. 165–70.

u šumma attunu tašammâni tuddâni	and if you hear and know that
ma ṣābu mušamhiṣūte	there are men instigating armed rebellion
mušadbibūte [[ša]] ina birtūkunu	or fomenting conspiracy in your midst,
lū ina ša ziqni lū ina ša rēši	be they bearded or eunuch
lū ina aḫḫēšu lū ina zarʾi šarri	or his brothers or of royal line
lū ina aḫḫēkunu lū bēl ṭābātēkunu	*or your brothers or friends*
lū ina nīšē māti gabbu	or anyone in the entire nation—
tašammâni [tuddâni	should you hear and [know] (this),
l]ā taṣabbatāni [lā tadukkāni]	then you shall seize and [kill] (them)!

In contrast to his cuneiform sources, the Deuteronomic author has created a separate unit dealing with conspiracy from within the addressee's own family (Deut 13:7–10): it is no longer simply part of an overall continuum extending from the monarch's family through the addressee's family to anyone whatsoever. More important, the Deuteronomic author has deliberately sharpened and extended the family focus of his source so as to deal specifically with intimacy. He specifies that the "brother" is a full brother: אחיך בן אמך, "your brother, son of your mother." The appositional definition stresses the closest possible blood tie to the law's addressee. By contrast, the same apposition in the Vassal Treaty of Esarhaddon is never applied to the siblings of the addressee; it thus never functions as an intimacy term. Quite the opposite: applied instead to the royal family, it seeks to ensure the stability of the dynastic succession by requiring the oath-taker's loyalty to the crown prince designate Ashurbanipal and *aḫḫēšu marʾē ummišu*, "his brothers, the sons of his [same] mother."[85] Conversely, when siblings are considered as possible sources of treason, whether betrayal by Esarhaddon's own brothers or by the brothers of the addressee, the appositional definition is never employed.[86] Moreover, in the entire Neo-Assyrian treaty corpus, comprising fourteen treaties, the formula in question is attested only in the Vassal Treaty of Esarhaddon.[87] The attestation of that formula only in this treaty increases the likelihood of its having been used as a literary model by the author of Deut 13.

The Deuteronomic author further transforms his source by adding to the three terms that he has taken over (brother, son, daughter) an additional two (wife, friend), each of which intensifies the focus on intimacy.[88] In the Neo-

[85] See Vassal Treaty of Esarhaddon, lines 94, 103, 171, 270, 285, 497, 504, 516, 633.

[86] See Vassal Treaty of Esarhaddon, lines 113, 115.

[87] The other treaties refer to Mulliltu, the great mother of the pantheon (1.r.5; 4.r.18′) or to Zakutu, the Queen Mother (8.2; r.6, 11, 16, 26e) but never define the brother, whether of the crown prince designate or of the addressee, as "the son of your mother." This analysis is based on the critical edition of the corpus provided by Parpola and Watanabe, *Neo-Assyrian Treaties*.

[88] The Vassal Treaty of Esarhaddon attests a similar four-term string in its concluding sanc-

Assyrian treaties, the category "wife" is altogether absent as a conceivable source of conspiracy.[89] Here she is not only included but appositionally defined in such a way as to underscore the bond of intimacy: אשת חיקך, "the wife of your bosom" (Deut 13:7). The Deuteronomic author's inclusion of רעך אשר כנפשך, "the friend who is as your own self," while based on the treaty material (see the Zakutu treaty cited above), equally departs from it with the appositional definition that stresses the intimacy of the relation.

The comparative evidence thus establishes how the Deuteronomic author created a test case unprecedented in the available treaty material, one that deals specifically with the conflict between love of family and devotion to God. By every rhetorical means available, the author has made the conflict the more poignant by isolating those for whom the addressee would feel the closest possible ties of blood and love: he defines the brother as the full brother, includes the son and the daughter, adds the wife, and rhetorically employs affective language: "the wife of your bosom or the friend who is as your own self." The author has left behind the objective concern of the Neo-Assyrian treaties with concealment to address the subjective feelings of love and the consequent risk that the addressee will tolerate rather than extirpate the incitement to apostasy. The author has departed from the very cuneiform literary model that he has here redeployed in order to create a distinctive unit whose thematic focus is intimacy.

VII. Conclusions

Even in those cases where the LXX translator may have based his variant on a Hebrew *Vorlage* that can be externally corroborated in the material from Qumran, that does not release the text critic from the burden of assessing the quality and the originality of that variant.[90] The mere existence of the Hebrew *Vorlage* does not in itself grant the variant the status of a reading, let alone a superior reading. What is attested in this case is a vital moment in the history of the reception and transformation of the biblical text in the Second Temple

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tions (your wives, your brothers, your sons, your daughters; lines 586–87, 589–90, 592–93, 596–97, 636 A–B).

[89] In the singular, *ḫīrtu* or *aššatu* designate either Mullissu (the mother goddess and wife of Aššur) or Esarhaddon's wife (in the context of bearing a rightful heir). See Accession Treaty of Esarhaddon, line 18; and Vassal Treaty of Esarhaddon, lines 250, 417; (Parpola and Watanabe, *Neo-Assyrian Treaties*, 22, 38, 45).

[90] For that reason, the argument here is not intended as a general plaidoyer on behalf of the MT or even on behalf of the MT of Deuteronomy, which elsewhere, as in the Song of Moses, is almost certainly much less conservative than the LXX and the evidence from Qumran (i.e., Deut 32:8, 43).

period. The various versions open a window into the rich afterlife of the biblical text. But a weaker reading, even one attested in Hebrew, is still a weaker reading.

The MT of Deut 13:7a offers the superior text, in both text-critical and exegetical terms.[91] The author identifies the closest possible relations of the addressee so as to isolate the conflict between blood and religion, between love and God, as precisely the context where loyalty to God hangs in the breach. The expanded text represented by the LXX, Samaritan Pentateuch, and 4QDeut^{c} harmonizes the specific challenge to loyalty here with the more complete genealogical series found in the incest laws. Whether as halakic midrash or as simple translation model ready at hand, the "missing" sibling relation is thus supplied. But with it is dissolved the precise focus of the original text: the author's isolation of the most intimate relations to stress the necessity, even at the cost of summarily executing the person one most loves, of placing loyalty to Yahweh above all else.

Despite the late date of the MT chronologically, the text of Deut 13:7 that it witnesses is more original, in text-critical terms, than the chronologically much earlier witnesses of the LXX, Samaritan Pentateuch, 4QDeut^{c}, and the *Temple Scroll*. Methodologically similar is the paradox whereby the MT of Isaiah preserves an earlier textual witness than does 1QIsa^{a}, despite the latter scroll's chronologically preceding the former by more than a millennium.[92] In its orientation, the MT fits perfectly within the intellectual frame of reference of the preexilic period and, with its focus on legal sanctions against incitement, conforms to the literary model provided by the Neo-Assyrian state treaties of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C.E. In contrast, the textual plus—which lacks all preexilic attestation—belongs to the reception history of the biblical text. The versions that preserve the plus witness the extent of Second Temple reflection upon and reinterpretation of the biblical text: communities of study

[91] König already saw the issues perfectly, rejecting the expanded text of the LXX/SP as "eine Trivialität" (*Deuteronomium*, 123). He correctly recognized this law as a test-case involving the closest degrees of intimacy, with the uterine brother representing consanguinity. For that reason, he astutely renders the protasis: "Wenn [sogar] dein Bruder . . ."

[92] See Edward Yechezkel Kutscher, *The Language and Linguistic Background of the Isaiah Scroll (1QIsa^{a})* (STDJ 6; Leiden: Brill, 1974 [original Hebrew ed., Jerusalem: Magnes, 1959]), 77. Kutscher accounts for that phenomenon by arguing that "popular" texts used for study, whether at home or in the synagogue, were less carefully protected from "corruption" than were "model" texts, preserved in the temple or synagogue (pp. 78–79). He deems 1QIsa^{a} a "popular" text and contrasts it with 1QIsa^{b}, a "model" text that is practically identical to the MT (p. 85). This explanation, however, involves a *petitio principii*. With both Isaiah scrolls having the same provenance, the criteria for distinguishing which of the two is "popular" and which "model" can only be anachronistic: the degree of conformity to the later, extrinsic standard of the MT.

seeking to systematize and update the text, communities with common traditions of exegesis that bridge Alexandrian Judaism, the Samaritan community, and the Judean Desert community.[93]

[93] I am grateful to Richard Pervo, Sundet Chair of New Testament and Early Christianity, University of Minnesota, for reviewing my analysis of the LXX; to Molly Zahn, Religious Studies undergraduate major, for meticulous proofreading; and to the Old Testament Biblical Colloquium's discussion of the paper at Conception Abbey, Missouri, with the valuable suggestions of Mark S. Smith as respondent.

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OF ALL THE YEARS THE HOPES—OR FEARS? JEHOIACHIN IN BABYLON (2 KINGS 25:27–30)

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I. The Question

The tantalizingly brief account, right at the end of Kings, narrating Evil-merodach's release of Jehoiachin of Judah from close imprisonment in Babylon has become a scholarly crux, at least since Martin Noth famously refused to see it as ameliorating in any significant degree what in his view is the book's pessimistic appraisal of the future of Israel as God's people.[1] Gerhard von Rad's prompt and vigorous rebuttal of Noth's negative reading of Kings is equally well known.[2] Not the least element in that rebuttal was von Rad's conviction that, following hard on the dispiriting account of decline and destruction of the people of YHWH, the ending of Kings intentionally, if very obliquely, invoked the hope of a future for dynasty and people still active in the divine promise of an eternal dynasty to David.[3] Subsequently, independent efforts were made by Dennis J. McCarthy, Frank Moore Cross, and Timo Veijola to set the dynastic

* This article reworks in more detail ideas presented in the first part of a paper delivered at the SBL annual meeting in Boston, November 1999.

[1] Martin Noth, *Überlieferungsgeschichtliche Studien: Die Sammelnden und Bearbeiteten Geschichtswerke im Alten Testament* (1943; Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1957), 107–8; idem, *The Deuteronomistic History* (JSOTSup 15; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1981), 97–99.

[2] Gerhard von Rad, *Deuteronomium-Studien* (FRLANT n.s. 40; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1947), 52–64; idem, *Studies in Deuteronomy* (SBT 9; London: SCM, 1953), 74–91.

[3] In commenting on 2 Kgs 25:27–30 von Rad remarks: "Obviously nothing is said here in strict theological terms, but a carefully measured indication is given: an occurrence is referred to which has immense significance for the deuteronomist, since it provides a basis upon which Yahweh could build further if he so willed. At all events the reader must understand this passage to be

promise to David at the heart of Noth's Deuteronomistic History (at any rate in one of its putative redactions).[4] Concomitantly, the view that the account of Jehoiachin's release was a portent of hope for Davidic restoration has been expounded with assurance by a steady stream of authors, most recently, with notable enthusiasm, by Iain Provan.[5] On the other side there has also recently been a growing number of dissenting voices.[6]

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an indication of the fact that the line of David has not come to an irrevocable end" ("The Deuteronomic Theology of History in *I* and *II Kings*," in *The Problem of the Hexateuch and Other Essays* [Edinburgh/London: Oliver & Boyd, 1966], 220).

[4] Dennis J. McCarthy, "II Samuel 7 and the Structure of the Deuteronomistic History," *JBL* 84 (1965): 131–38; Frank Moore Cross, Jr., *Caananite Myth and Hebrew Epic: Essays in the History of the Religion of Israel* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), 274–89; Timo Veijola, *Die Ewige Dynastie: David und die Entstehung Seiner Dynastie Nach der Deuteronomistischen Darstellung* (Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae 193; Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1975). Although the basic principle of Noth's theory of a Deuteronomistic History has been widely embraced by scholarship, it has been subject to almost endless modification, principally by scholars detecting redactional layers within the work. While McCarthy's cited article made no claims about redaction, Cross's work argued for two redactions, with the dynastic oracle being central to the Josian original, and main, redaction. Veijola worked with three main redactions, all exilic in date, with the dynastic promise operative in the first (DtrG) and third (DtrN). This is not the place to enter into the details of the debate, even had I the desire to do so. Although I acknowledge evidence of some unevenness of outlook within the various books said to comprise this history, I have not been persuaded by any redactional theory I have read that a redactional approach is a particularly fruitful way to read them. Indeed, the more I read these books, the more both their integrity as books and the differences between them suggests to me (as it did differently to von Rad: see *Old Testament Theology* [Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1962], 1:346–47) that some of them at least (notably Judges and Samuel) must have had a history as books independent of their grouping together in a putative "Deuteronomistic History." Hence, in what follows I am principally concerned with 2 Kgs 25:27–30 as the ending of the Kings account of monarchy, but I do occasionally remind readers who embrace a version of the Nothian construct that it is also the ending of the whole Deuteronomistic History. To attempt to explore what differences arise from these two views of context (as suggested by one publisher's reader) is beyond the scope of this article.

[5] Among many others note the following, who are referred to in subsequent discussion: Erich Zenger, "Die Deuteronomistische Interpretation der Rehabilitierung Jojachins," *BZ* n.s. 12 (1968): 16–30; Peter R. Ackroyd, *Exile and Restoration: A Study of Hebrew Thought in the Sixth Century BC* (London: SCM, 1968), 79–81; Joachim Becker, "Das Historische Bild der Messianischen Erwartung im Alten Testament," *Testimonium Veritatis* 8 (1971): 132–33; idem, *Messianic Expectation in the Old Testament* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), 56–57; Jon D. Levenson, "The Last Four Verses in Kings," *JBL* 103 (1984): 353–61; Thomas R. Hobbs, *2 Kings* (WBC; Waco: Word Books, 1985), 368–69; Iain W. Provan, "The Messiah in the Book of Kings," *The Lord's Anointed: Interpretation of Old Testament Messianic Texts* (ed. Philip E. Satterthwaite and Richard S. Hess; Carlisle: Paternoster; Grand Rapids: Baker, 1995), 71–76; idem, *1 & 2 Kings* (OTG; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), 87–93.

[6] The following dissent from the von Radian line, in different degrees and for varying reasons: Richard D. Nelson, *First and Second Kings* (Interpretation; Louisville: John Knox, 1987),

The context within which most of the above-cited accounts have arrived at their reading of 2 Kgs 25:27–30 is the book of Kings as the concluding section of Noth's Deuteronomistic History. Since the passage in question brings Kings and thus Noth's Deuteronomistic History to an end, this is a perfectly legitimate context within which to read it. In being so much engaged with this wider context, however, most of these accounts have given little attention either to how the passage relates to its immediate context in 2 Kgs 25 or to the detailed texture of its own internal rhetoric.[7] In order to redress this balance, what follows will first set 2 Kgs 25:27–30 within the overall structure of this final chapter in Kings. Next it will delineate the episode's own internal structure and examine its language in some detail, noting in particular significant resonances from its immediate context in 2 Kgs 25, as well as from other biblical texts. This perspective discloses the brief vignette on Jehoiachin's experiences in Babylon not as a separate afterword to the doom and gloom of 2 Kgs 25:1–26 but as the final summative episode of this chapter. Finally, after reflecting on the significant silences of the text, the discussion arrives at a view on what this closing word adumbrates about the future of the Davidic monarchy and of vanquished Judah that is more akin to Hans Walter Wolff than to either Noth or von Rad.[8]

265–59; J. Gordon McConville, "Narrative and Meaning in the Books of Kings," *Bib* 70 (1989): 47; Bob Becking, "Jehojachin's Amnesty, Salvation for Israel?" in *Pentateuchal and Deuteronomistic Studies: Papers Read at the XIIIth IOSOT Congress Leuven 1989* (ed. C. Brekelmans and J. Lust; BETL 94; Leuven: Leuven University Press/Peeters, 1990), 283–93; Steven L. McKenzie, *The Trouble with Kings: The Composition of the Book of Kings in the Deuteronomistic History* (VTSup 42; Leiden: Brill, 1991), 137; Yair Hoffmann, "The Deuteronomist and the Exile," in *Pomegranates and Golden Bells: Studies . . . in Honor of Jacob Milgrom* (ed. David P. Wright, David Noel Freedman, and Avi Hurovitz; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1995), 659–75.

[7] Among the works cited above, Nelson's commentary does something of this within the limits of his format, but Zenger's account is exceptional in the amount of detailed discussion given to the language of 2 Kgs 25:27–30, with some attempt also to situate it within the chapter as a whole. These similarities in our treatment of the text, on the one hand, but notable differences, both in detail and in overall reading, on the other, explain the number of references to Zenger's discussion in what follows.

[8] Hans Walter Wolff, "The Kerygma of the Deuteronomic Historical Work," in *The Vitality of the Old Testament Traditions* (Atlanta: John Knox, 1975), 81–100. Wolff only twice brings 2 Kgs 25:27–30 into his discussion, neither time in any detail: once in repudiating both Noth's and von Rad's accounts of this text (pp. 85–86), and once in passing at the end of his discussion (pp. 99–100). The attenuated hope I find implicated in the account of Jehoiachin's release is not entirely dissimilar to that Wolff finds in other texts in Noth's Deuteronomistic History, but differs crucially in that 2 Kgs 25:27-30 says nothing of repentance by Jehoiachin: see section IV below. Among other scholars who have read 2 Kgs 25:27–30 in a Wolffian way, Christopher T. Begg ("The Significance of Jehoiachin's Release: A New Proposal," *JSOT* 36 [1986]: 51) observed this difference; Levenson ("Last Four Verses of Kings," 359–60) did not.

II. Analysis of 2 Kings 25:27–30

2 Kings 25:27–30 within 25:1–30

Several features integrate the short episode about the release of Jehoiachin into a narrative structure with the preceding material, a structure that properly begins at 2 Kgs 25:1.[9] This overall narrative is articulated into episodes by four introductory dating expressions (25:1, 8, 25, 27) that exhibit both parallels and differences in structure and function. Whereas the parallels, it will be argued in this subsection, present 2 Kgs 25:27–30 as the culminating episode in a series depicting the lamentable fate of Judah, the differences also mark it out as something of a new departure.

The most obvious parallel between the episode openings is in their syntactical-narrative structure: each dating expression heads a *qāṭal* verb clause whose named grammatical subject specifies a new actant in the narrative and continues with a *wayyiqṭōl* verb clause with pronominal anaphora to the same subject. Thus these four actants, respectively Nebuchadnezzar (25:1), Nebuzaradan (25:8), Ishmael (25:25), and Evil-merodach (25:27), are clearly presented as the effective agents of all the action that is narrated in 2 Kgs 25.[10]

The second feature parallel in all four episodes is not so immediately apparent: the opening focus on the respective actant in each soon gives way to a focus on the patient/recipient. This consistent change of focus within the episodes, achieved by varying means, is sustained in the main through the rest of each episode. In 25:2–4 there are several different grammatical subjects, but all concentrate attention onto how the Judeans suffer from Nebuchadnezzar's siege.[11] Although, in 25:11–15, Nebuzaradan and/or his forces remain the grammatical subject of verbs throughout, sustained object–verb inversion similarly effects concentration on the devastation suffered by the Judeans. In episodes 3 and 4, the grammatical subject of the verbs changes to the respective patient/s (25:26,[12] 29). Thus, what 2 Kgs 25 is really about is not Nebu-

[9] The narrative begun in 2 Kgs 25:1 is itself prefaced by the introductory rubric for Zedekiah's reign, 2 Kgs 24:17, 18–20, and in particular by the appended assertion "Zedekiah rebelled against the king of Babylon" (וימרד צדקיהו במלך בבל, 24:20b). But 25:1ff. is about the wider ramifications of Zedekiah's rebellion, within which that king's fate is just one, almost incidental, feature (25:5–6).

[10] Divine agency is absent not just from 2 Kgs 25:27–30 but from all four episodes in the chapter. Moreover, the very last action directly attributed to YHWH in Kings is עד השלכו אתם מעל פניו, "until he expelled them from his presence" (24:20a).

[11] Although in episode 1 there is a subsequent switch of focus back to the Babylonian actants (25:5–6,7bβ), two significant instances of object–verb inversion (ואת בני צדקיהו שחטו לעיניו ואת צדקיהו עור, 25:7a,bα) restore the focus onto the patients. For this use of object–verb inversion, cf. 25:11–15.

[12] וימת in 25:25aβ is supplemental to the main verb, ויכו.

chadnezzar or any of the other actants as such, but what their actions bring upon the Judeans as patients/recipients.

But within this overall paralleling of the episodes, and in particular their openings, there are points that differentiate them. First, three of the four open with ויהי, "it happened, came to pass," prefacing the dating expression. The odd one out here is 25:8, where the conjunction ו alone precedes the dating expression. Thus the openings in 25:1, 25:25, and 25:27 are more disjunctive than that in 25:8. This accords with the fact that in those three episodes the action attributed to Nebuchadnezzar, Ishmael, and Evil-merodach respectively is more discontinuous with the preceding than is that attributed to Nebuzaradan in the second episode.

Second, only in the first and last of the four, 25:1 and 25:27, is ויהי followed by a full year-month-day dating expression. In fact, the second and third dating expressions (25:8, 25) are dependently linked to the first (25:1), in that their month(-day) dates presuppose the year references given by the first full year-month-day expression (25:1) and its follow-on year dating (25:2b), both dated to the reign of Zedekiah (in 25:1 by anaphora of למלכו to צדקיהו, 24:30b).[13] In contrast, the fourth (25:27) gives another full year-month-day expression, but one now defined in terms of the years of Jehoiachin's exile.[14] This sets the final episode in 2 Kgs 25 in closer parallel with the first, as a significantly similar departure within the action here narrated. But, unlike the coming of Nebuchadnezzar against Zedekiah (25:1ff.), whose narrative consequences are rather fully spelled out in further dependent episodes (25:8ff. and 25:25f.), those of Evil-merodach's release of Jehoiachin remain latent within this one brief episode (25:27–30). This reticence of the concluding episode of 2 Kgs 25 has been an inducement to scholars who want a clear final indication of an overall message from Kings to supply elements that the text itself does not warrant. But of this more below.

Third, and consonant with the second point, the opening of the fourth episode is differentiated from those of the preceding three in that their dating expressions each head a clause deploying the same *qāṭal* verb (**בא**) used in a

[13] Thus the four episode-initial dating expressions are distinct from two other, subsidiary, dating expressions: the year-date in 25:2b that is a postpositional followup to 25:1, and the dependent pre-positional month date in 25:3a that prefaces a *wayyiqṭōl* verb clause with a new grammatical subject (ויחזק הרעב בעיר), but not one that specifies a new actant.

[14] While this change in dating era, from Zedekiah's reign to Jehoiachin's exile, is noteworthy, it is just one element in an episode that tells about the fate of Jehoiachin, not that of Zedekiah. According to 25:7bγ, Zedekiah was taken captive to Babylon, but the text of Kings gives no further indication of his fate. In the parallel account in Jer 52, an extra clause (ויתנהו בבית הפקדת עד יום מותו, 52:11bβ) notes Zedekiah's lifelong incarceration in Babylon, which resonates with Jehoiachin's pensioned detention in Babylon, similarly lifelong (עד יום מותו, Jer 52:34a).

hostile sense.[15] Moreover, the ensuing *wayyiqṭōl* verbs in each, though different ([ויחן [עליה], 25:1; וישׂרף, 25:9; ויכו, 25:25), are all verbs of hostile action. But in the opening of the fourth episode both the corresponding *qāṭal* [נשׂא ראשׁ] and the ensuing *wayyiqṭōl* [וידבר אתו טבות] are verbs of ostensibly friendly action.

Let us summarize here the conclusions germane to our discussion that may be drawn from the preceding observations. The overall structure of 2 Kgs 25 can be seen to present Evil-merodach's release of Jehoiachin as the culminating act in a series that began with his Babylonian predecessor's attack on a rebellious Zedekiah, a series that details the fate of Judah and its monarchy at the hands of the Babylonians. Yet the finer detail of the structure indicates that, as a fresh departure after the lapse of a considerable period of time, this last in the series is more comparable to the first (the stronger parallel made by the full dating formula), than to the intervening two episodes, which develop much more closely out of the first (the dependent dating expressions; the parallel use of בא). Then further, precisely within a strikingly similar syntactical-narrative form in the opening of each episode, there is a significant semantic contrast between the *qāṭal* and *wayyiqṭōl* verbs used in the opening of the fourth (verbs of ostensibly friendly action) and those used in the preceding three (verbs of hostile action). Thus 2 Kgs 25:27–30 is presented on the one hand as the last in a series of devastating events for Judah, all initiated and effected by human agents, but on the other hand as also something of a new departure within that series.

Structure, Language, and Meaning in 2 Kings 25:27–30

From the detailed reading of 2 Kgs 25:27–30 in this section will emerge a view that both in structure and in language this episode sets Evil-merodach's acts toward Jehoiachin (2 Kgs 25:27–28), with their apparent high promise for the future, against Jehoiachin's actual experience of release from prison (2 Kgs 25:29–30), with its dispiriting limitation of that future. I say "apparent high promise" advisedly, since the discussion below of Evil-merodach as actant will reveal some ambiguity in several of the expressions used in 2 Kgs 25:27–28.

Discourse Structure in 2 Kings 25:27–30

The focus on Evil-merodach as actant and Jehoiachin as recipient, begun with the *qāṭal* (נשׂא) in 25:27, continues through two *wayyiqṭōl* verbs (וידבר . . . ויתן) in 25:28. Thereafter, however, the verbal syntax changes, in 25:29 to two

[15] This threefold parallel occurrence of בא in 2 Kgs 25 is noteworthy, in that the verb is not otherwise frequent in this sense in Kings. For 25:1 compare 2 Kgs 24:11 (בא על); for 25:8 compare 2 Kgs 14:13 (בא ירושׁלים); in addition 2 Kgs 6:23b, 15:19, 29.

w^{e}*qāṭal* forms (וְשִׁנֵּא and וְאָכַל), and finally, in 25:30, to a passive *qāṭal* (נִתְּנָה). Discourse logic makes clear that the grammatical subject of the second *w*^{e}*qāṭal* verb (ואכל) must be Jehoiachin, and the תמיד ("continually") that is adverbial to it indicates construction of the *w*^{e}*qāṭal* form as frequentative: "he used to eat."[16] The intended construction of the first *w*^{e}*qāṭal* (ושנא) is, however, not immediately evident. Although normal consistency of subject anaphora with the preceding verbs favors Evil-merodach as continuing subject, other discourse indicators point rather to a change to Jehoiachin as subject.

First, not only is Jehoiachin the otherwise unsignaled anaphoric subject of the next verb (ואכל, 25:29b); he is also clearly the referent of the pronominal suffix in כלאו (25:29a). But, second, more decisive indicators are two related difficulties in processing 25:29a as an utterance referring to Evil-merodach as subject: (1) dischronologization, and (2) change of verb form. If presented as an action of Evil-merodach, 25:29a could have taken its expected place, immediately before 25:28b, as another *wayyiqṭōl* verb clause in a temporally consecutive series (וידבר . . . וישנא . . . ויתן). As it stands, however, the assertion in 25:29a is made more salient in the discourse than that in 25:28b, both in being dischronologized and in being marked by a change of verb form. But if one takes Evil-merodach as the grammatical subject in 25:29a, it is difficult to see why the assertion that he changed Jehoiachin's prison clothes (25:29a) merits greater discourse salience than the preceding assertion that he exalted Jehoiachin over the other captive kings (25:28b).

If, however, with ושנא there is a change of subject to Jehoiachin, these problems for discourse logic disappear. What the dischronologization and syntactical change make salient in the discourse is precisely this change of narrative focus from actant to patient. The dischronologized action is both consistent with and contributory to this shift in point of view, and the change of verb form is necessitated by the dischronologization: "so he changed out of his prison-clothes, and used to eat . . . ." Hence, this first *w*^{e}*qaṭal* form (ושנא) is to be taken as a preterite disjunctively coordinated with the previous *wayyiqṭōl* preterites: coordinated, in that there is no major change in scenic locale or participants, but disjunctive in that, by changing grammatical subject and backtracking temporally, it effects a shift in perspective on the scene.[17] Moreover, the passive *qāṭal* (נתנה) in 25:30 maintains the shift in point of view, precisely by its avoid-

[16] Contra Zenger, who, in order to take ואכל as a simple preterite, arbitrarily deletes both תמיד and כל ימי חייו from 25:29 ("Rehabilitierung Jojachins," 26–27): see further n. 34 below. Note that the LXX both here and in Jer 52:33b renders ואכל with the imperfect ἤσθιεν, not the aorist ἔφαγεν.

[17] Thus this use of a *w*^{e}*qāṭal* preterite needs to be added to the usages documented by Bruce K. Waltke and M. O'Connor, *IBHS,* 519–42; see also Alviero Niccacci, *The Syntax of the Verb in Classical Hebrew Prose* (JSOTSup 86; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1990), 183–85.

ance of a change back to Evil-merodach as directly acting subject. It also allows the foregrounding of another element as subject of the passive verb, a point whose significance we shall come to below.

The foregoing observations indicate that the discourse structure of 25:27–30 falls into two main parts: 25:27–28, with verbal focus on Evil-merodach as actant, and 25:29–30, with verbal focus on Jehoiachin as recipient. But another structural feature should also be observed. In the episode's opening, the ponderous chronological synchronism (Jehoiachin's thirty-seventh year of exile = Evil-merodach's sole regnal year) and the repetitively formal specifications (twice "Jehoiachin king of Judah," 25:27aα, b; once "Evil-merodach king of Babylon," 25:27b) break up the narrated action (נשׂא . . . את ראשׁ . . . מבית כלא) in order to specify this chronological relation between the two kings.[18] Then through 25:28–29a a much more succinct and direct narrative style prevails, where active verbs are juxtaposed with their direct objects and circumstantial detail is spare. But starting in 25:29b and increasing in the final verse, the narrated action is once again heavily interlarded with chronological expressions that connect the two kings: the knell-like repetition in 25:30 of תמיד and כל ימי חיו from 25:29, and the tautologous דבר יום ביומו alongside תמיד in 25:30. This insistent return of temporal parameters sets into final relief what this fateful conjunction of Jehoiachin's thirty-seventh year of exile with Evil-merodach's sole year of reign entailed for Jehoiachin's future.

The Focus on Evil-merodach as Actant in 2 Kings 25:27–28

Evil-merodach is here reported as taking three actions concerning King Jehoiachin: (1) "to raise his head from prison" (נשׂא אויל מרדך . . . את ראשׁ יהויכין . . . מבית הכלא, 25:27b);[19] (2) "to speak good things to him" (וידבר אתו טבות, 25:28a); and (3) "to give him a seat/throne above the kings with him in Babylon" (ויתן את כסאו מעל כסא המלכים אשׁר אתו בבבל, 25:28b). On the face of it these appear to be three very positive actions that manifest a great deal of good will by Evil-merodach toward Jehoiachin. By looking more closely, however, at the semantic and pragmatic implications of each expression as evidenced in

[18] A similar synchronism is given for the fateful arrival of Nebuzaradan in 25:8, the beginning of the episode narrating the final destruction of Jerusalem and exile of Judah (25:8–21).

[19] The parallel text in Jer 52:31 (MT and LXX) reads נשׂא אויל מרדך . . . את ראשׁ יהויכן . . . ויצא ותו מבית הכלוא, "Evil-merodach graciously raised Jehoiachin . . . *and released him* from prison." This suggests the possibility of accidental omission of the emphasized words from 2 Kgs 25:27, but on the other hand the zeugma of נשׂא in 2 Kgs 25:27, with both ראשׁ and מבית כלא, does not seem impossible.

similar contexts elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible, we shall see that the first two of these expressions are at least susceptible to negative connotations.[20]

The first, the combination נשׂא ראשׁ, occurs some eighteen times in the Hebrew Bible outside this text and its parallel Jer 52:31.[21] Most relevant to the present usage are the three figurative instances in Gen 40, since their context most closely resembles our present text, in that there, as here, the expression is used in connection with the release of prisoners by a sovereign.[22] But whereas in the case of one of the prisoners, the pharaoh's cupbearer, the expression speaks of his gracious restoration to service (Gen 40:13, 20), in the case of the other, the pharaoh's baker, the expression (ישׂא פרעה ראשׁך מעליך, Gen 40:19aα) makes a macabre wordplay between this positive figurative sense already acti-

[20] In response to a question of method raised by one of the anonymous *JBL* readers, let me explain that the ensuing discussion presupposes the following: (1) the fact that each of the three expressions singled out for discussion here has close analogues elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible is prima facie evidence that they are conventional; (2) accordingly, besides their present context of usage, the contexts in which the analogues occur provide additional evidence about how the expressions may be read; (3) contexts that share significant features in common with 2 Kgs 25:27–30 provide evidence of particular relevance to assessing how to read them in the latter context; (4) but as relevant, if not more so, is the immediately given context of 2 Kgs 25:1–26. So while, on the one hand, my discussion does not assert or assume that any of the non-Kings biblical passages were being played upon by the author of 2 Kgs 25:27-30, nor even that they were necessarily known to him, it does not ignore, on the other, the fact that such intertextual resonances are an ineluctable element in a modern biblical scholar's reading of the passage.

[21] Genesis 40:13, 19, 20; Exod 30:12; Num 1:2, 49; 4:2, 22; 26:2; 31:26, 49; Judg 8:28; Zech 2:4 [Eng. 1:21]; Pss 24:7, 9; 83:3; Job 10:15; 1 Chr 10:9. Of these only the last instance is fully literal, referring to the Philistines' removing the head of the dead Saul (וישׂאו את ראשׁו, 1 Chr 10:9a). The metaphorical basis of the expression would appear to lie in associating a bowed head with humility/humiliation and dejection and a raised head with confident hope and triumph (see Job 10:15). Accordingly, I take the basic social location of "to raise another's head" to be that of a great man raising the bowed head of a humble supplicant as a sign of favor. The reflexive form "to raise one's own head" as a metaphor for exultant triumph probably has its basic social location in situations of conflict, especially warfare and litigation: see Pss 24:7, 9; 83:3; negatively Judg 8:28; Zech 2:4 [1:21]; Job 10:13–17. I take the eight instances in Exodus and Numbers, all of which refer to counting heads in censuses, to be based on another military use of the expression, where counting warriors is facilitated by their bowed heads being raised as each is numbered. Zenger, deprecating the usual rendering, "begnadigen" ("grant amnesty to"), in 2 Kgs 25:27, argues instead for "vorladen, zitieren" ("summon") on analogy with Akkadian *našû rēša* ("Rehabilitierung Jojachins," 22–23; note also 18 n. 11), but, if the above analysis is along the right lines, "grant favor to" is to be preferred.

[22] Zenger draws on the same parallel to argue that, just as the officials' cases came up for review on the pharaoh's "birthday" (Gen 40:20: i.e., the anniversary of his accession [?]), so the fate of Jehoiachin and other captive kings came up for review on Evil-merodach's initial accession to power ("Rehabilitierung Jojachins," 22–23). However plausible this piece of historical argumentation may be, my discussion is premised on thematic and discourse parallels between the two contexts, not historical ones.

vated in the context (Gen 40:13) and a negative literal sense that points to the actual destiny of the baker: execution by hanging (ותלה ותך על עץ, Gen 40:19aβ). Thus the expression נשׂא ראשׁ, though mostly positive in connotation, is by no means univocally so in biblical texts: two instances refer to the death of the referent in question, and one of these plays knowingly on a positive/negative ambiguity in the expression.

The next expression, "he spoke with him good things" (וידבר אתו טבות, 2 Kgs 25:28a), occurs but this once in the Hebrew Bible in this precise form, though there are examples of related expressions.[23] One close parallel, found in David's prayer of response to YHWH's enunciation of the dynastic promise, "you have spoken to your subject this promise of good" (ותדבר אל עבדך את הטובה הזאת, 2 Sam 7:28b), is as unarguably positive as one can expect to meet. David has just specified that this "good" is the future dynastic house promised by YHWH (7:27a) and has also affirmed the total reliability of YHWH's words (7:28a). Thus the context fully warrants the pragmatic inference that, in using the expression here, David intends to evince certainty about YHWH's gracious intention.[24]

But there is another parallel that, in its use of the plural טובות, is in fact linguistically closer to the expression in our text: "do not trust them when they speak to you good things" (אל תאמן בם כי ידברו אליך טובות, Jer 12:6b).[25] The pragmatic inference YHWH intends Jeremiah to draw from the expression here, however, is diametrically opposite to that intended by David in 2 Sam 7:28b. For precisely in warning Jeremiah not to trust himself to those (his closest kin!) who are speaking to him words of gracious intent, he deconstructs their overt intention by implicating a covert one. Hence, in our present context, merely to

[23] Again Zenger takes the historical turn, alleging that the Hebrew here is equivalent to an Akkadian expression found in the Amarna Letters, *ṭābūta dabābu itti,* "to establish friendly relations with," and thus concluding that Evil-merodach offered Jehoiachin "a form of rehabilitation" through "official recognition as a royal vassal" ("Rehabilitierung Jojachins," 24–25); similary Levenson, with reference to other discussion ("Last Four Verses in Kings," 357–58). Zenger refers to the Hebrew Bible passages I expound here only in passing in a note ("Rehabilitierung Jojachins," 24 n. 62); Levenson not at all. Zenger's list includes לדבר עליהם טובה (Jer 18:20), but this text is not really parallel since it refers not to promises of good made to/with someone but to good representations made on behalf of someone. Even if one allows that דבר טוב/ה/ות את/ל in the Hebrew Bible may sometimes refer to the establishment of formal relations, what is clear is that this technical sense is a pragmatically defined specialization of the more general sense of "speak kindly/graciously with" someone.

[24] On the strategy of 2 Sam 7:28 as part of David's prayer, see Donald F. Murray, *Divine Prerogative and Royal Pretension: Pragmatics, Polemics, and Poetics in a Narrative Sequence About David (2 Sam 5:17–7:29)* (JSOTSup 264; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), 210, 225; for arguments against reading 2 Sam 7 in treaty terms, see pp. 274–76.

[25] Begg refers to this text in arguing against the claim that 2 Kgs 25:28a refers to a vassal treaty ("Jehoiachin's Release," 53).

report that Evil-merodach spoke graciously with Jehoiachin is not necessarily to guarantee either that the intention behind the words is as gracious as their ostensible import, or that, even if it is, their promise will in the event be realized. After all, it is not YHWH who is uttering here!

Moreover, in the close context of 2 Kgs 25:27–30 there are two other expressions that, because they resonate strongly with וידבר אִתּו טבות (25:28a), bear on the reading of that expression here. The first is the clause "they pronounced sentence upon him" (וידברו אִתּו מִשׁפט, lit., "they spoke with him justice," 25:6b).[26] This clause closely resembles our expression not only in its syntactical shape and verbal content but also because it summarizes the treatment of Jehoiachin's replacement, Zedekiah, at the hands of the Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar. Rhetorically, this interlocking of verbal and motival similarities between the two expressions sets טובת in 25:28 in opposition to מִשׁפט in 25:6. The sentence carried out on Zedekiah was to blind him immediately after he had witnessed the execution of his sons, and then to exile him to Babylon (25:7). By contrast with this מִשׁפט, "spoken with" Zedekiah, then, Evil-merodach's טבות, "spoken with" Jehoiachin would seem to promise much better things, to be detailed in what follows.[27] On the one hand, then, the expression appears to carry the same assurance of good evinced by David in 2 Sam 7:28.

On the other hand, however, the second expression contextually resonant with 2 Kgs 25:28a belies this surface assurance. For in its context the relevant phrase (ויטב לכם, 25:24b) sets the reliability of an assurance of good at issue, if in a way different from YHWH's words to Jeremiah (Jer 12:6b). The Judean governor Gedaliah has given a sworn undertaking to those who remain in Judah, motivating his directive to stay put and serve the Babylonian king with the promise that *it will bring you good* (שׁבו בארץ ועבדו את מלך בבל ויטב לכם, 25:24b).[28] This promise is, however, hardly uttered before it is rendered void when Ishmael assassinates Gedaliah, forcing "all the people" to flee to Egypt in mortal fear of the Babylonians (25:25–26). Though verbally less parallel to 25:28a than 25:6b, being closer to hand this utterance is more immediately in the reader's mind. Moreover, motivally it is strikingly anticipatory of 25:28a.

[26] Beside the close parallels Jer 39:5; 52:9 (both משׁפטים), cf. also Jer 1:16; 4:12.

[27] Zenger, who does not adduce my second parallel, argues that through this contrast the Deuteronomist indicates that the threatened punishment instigated against Zedekiah is now to be overtaken by a counterhistory of salvation ("Rehabilitierung Jojachins," 25). But, given that the only agent here is the pagan monarch, not YHWH, to present what happens here in such grand terms seems unwarranted.

[28] As pointed, ושׁב לכם is in the impersonal form, "so that it may go well with you" (so also Jer 40:9b), a common enough idiom (BDB, s.v. Qal 3, cites sixteen instances, all with לְ). The verb could equally well, however, be vocalized ויטֵב (similarly Jer 40:9b), yielding "so that [the king of Babylon] may treat you well," also a common construction (BDB, s.v. Hiph. 2, cites nine instances with לְ). The latter reading would somewhat increase the parallel with 25:28a.

Thus, the last thing narrated before our episode concerning Evil-merodach's release of Jehoiachin is how the sworn promise of a vice-gerent of the Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar, for all that it is genuinely intended and apparently underwritten by his position of authority, falls to the ground with its human utterer. Now, at the start of our episode, 25:27b has mentioned a single, unnumbered regnal year for Evil-merodach, the successor to Nebuchadnezzar. This form of expression (בשנת מלכו) implies that this is his sole year of reign.[29] Given the uncertainty for the future that that suggests, the juxtaposition of Evil-merodach's promises to Jehoiachin with the abortive promise of Gedaliah poses to the reader the ominous question: Will those promises, assuming they are genuinely meant, prove to be any more certain than that of Gedaliah? After all, it is not YHWH who is uttering here either!

If both ambiguity of expression in 25:27–28a and contextual resonances of 25:28a raise doubt about just how promising Jehoiachin's future is, Evil-merodach's third recorded action (25:28b) tends to exclude uncertainty: "he set his seat above the seat of the kings who were with him in Babylon" (ויתן את כסאו מעל כסא המלכים אשר אתו בבבל, 25:28b).[30] For, unlike Jeremiah's relatives (Jer 12:6), Evil-merodach authenticates the good intention of his fine words with an appropriate deed. So Evil-merodach "raises Jehoiachin's head" in a literal sense, that is, above those of the other kings, and thus gives substance to its figurative meaning in 25:27. Indeed, in terms of the similar story in Gen 40–41, the rise of Jehoiachin here bids fair to outstrip that of the cupbearer there, perhaps even promising to emulate that of Joseph himself, raised above all others in the Egyptian kingdom except the pharaoh (Gen 41:40–44)!

The Focus on Jehoiachin as Patient/Recipient in 2 Kings 25:29–30

In the event, however, as narrated in 25:29–30 Jehoiachin's experience as patient/recipient of Evil-merodach's actions does not fulfill this high promise. First the narrative, after the buildup of expectation by the actions of Evil-merodach in 25:27–28, backtracks in 25:29a to a comparatively nugatory ele-

[29] Similarly also Zenger ("Rehabilitierung Jojachins," 19–20). The lack of a numeral appears to be significant in this regard. I have found no biblical parallel to this instance of שנת מלכו[ב] without numeral, but there are several instances of the use of a numeral to designate the first regnal year of kings with longer reigns. Daniel 9:2 (בשנת אחת למלכו) in particular is otherwise a close parallel to 2 Kgs 25:27b, and also 2 Chr 29:3 (בשנה הראשנה למלכו), but cf. also Dan 9:1; 11:1; Ezra 1:1, all of which have בשנת אחת followed by ל + PN, and Dan 1:21, עד שנת אחת followed by ל + PN.

[30] The referent of אתו is ambiguous, but the clear anaphora to Jehoiachin of the preceding third singular masculine suffix in כסאו makes Jehoiachin the most likely referent for אתו also. In that case one may infer that the kings in question are fellow captives of the Babylonians. On the less likely, but still possible, pronominal anaphora of אתו to Evil-merodach, the kings in question would presumably be loyal vassals of the Babylonians.

ment in the process of his purported exaltation, as comparison with Gen 40–41 shows.[31] At the very moment of focusing onto Jehoiachin's actual experience, merely to report that Jehoiachin changed out of his prison rags (ויחלף את בגדי כלאו, 25:29a) is both bald and anticlimactic. Even taking full cognizance of the spareness of the narrative style here, it must be conceded that but few words more could have depicted Jehoiachin donning splendid throne array in place of his drab prisoner's garb.[32] That they are not said is thus itself a rhetoric to deflate high expectations.

Next we are apparently told that "[Jehoiachin] used always to eat in [Evil-merodach's] presence" (ואכל לחם תמיד לפניו, 25:29b).[33] At first sight this translates Jehoiachin to a position of continual high honor, although the past aspect of the verb already betrays that this bright new beginning has reached a known end. We will return to this point at the end of this subsection. Material for further readerly reflection on Evil-merodach's provision for Jehoiachin is provided by the more detailed explication given in 25:30,[34] where it is succinctly characterized by a technical term, ארחה. Moreover, the term is given quite notable discourse salience: (1) noun–verb inversion puts it into the stressed first position in its utterance; (2) it is given further emphasis by immediate repetition

[31] In the Genesis narrative the reader is told that Joseph changed out of his prison clothes (Gen 41:14) long before his exaltation by the pharaoh (Gen 41:40). Granted, that story is related with vastly more circumstantiality than is Jehoiachin's release here, but note also that Joseph's exaltation merited not merely this first change of clothes, but a subsequent exchange of that first change for far more splendid garments in keeping with his new position of high honor (Gen 41:42).

[32] See the remarks in the previous note regarding Gen 40–41, and contrast also the famous liberation from prison passage Isa 61:1–3, where a series of three brief oppositions dramatize the difference between before and after: פאר תחת אפר שמן ששון תחת אבל מעטה תהלה תחת רוח כהה (61:3a); cf. further 61:10. Zenger's exposition supplies precisely what our text does not say: "[w]enn Dtr hier so in der Änderung der Kleidung insistiert, wäre es möglich, daß Jojachin wieder königliche Tracht zurückerhalten hat" ("Rehabilitierung Jojachins," 26).

[33] As the text appears at first sight to be saying, but on the sense of לפניו in 25:29b, see the penultimate paragraph in this subsection. The expression אכל לחם תמיד is used twice by David to Mephibosheth (2 Sam 9:7, 10; cf. also v. 13), where the locative specification "at my table" (על שלחני) corresponds to לפניו here. Although not in prison as such, for his own safety Mephibosheth has previously secreted himself from David in a self-imposed exile. David insistently represents his invitation to Mephibosheth to dine continually at his table as an act of gracious kindness "for Jonathan's sake" (2 Sam 9:1, 3, 7). There, however, David's protestations and explications fuel doubt about how genuine this show of kindness to Mephibosheth is, and about what "to always eat at my table" really means.

[34] Zenger takes ואכל in 25:29b as a preterite, reads לפניו literally as "in his presence," and, arguing that historically Jehoiachin could not constantly have dined with Evil-merodach, claims that 25:29b refers to a one-off meal following Jehoiachin's release ("Rehabilitierung Jojachins," 26–27). He thus denies any parallel between 25:29b and 25:30, an assertion he can sustain only by gratuitously excising both תמיד and כל ימי חייו from 25:29b, as having been imported from 25:30 on a false construction of 25:29b!

(ואֲרֻחָתוֹ אֲרֻחַת תָּמִיד);[35] (3) through passivization of the verb it is made the grammatical subject of this final sentence in the episode.[36] This last grammatical subject in the text of Kings thus encapsulates the final point toward which the whole history of monarchy in the book has led.

Outside of this text and its parallel, Jer 52:34, the term אֲרֻחָה occurs in the Hebrew Bible only in Jer 40:5 and Prov 15:17.[37] The former text has some interesting analogues with our present passage. In Jer 40:1-6 the Babylonian general Nebuzaradan first releases Jeremiah from captivity at Ramah (40:1). Then, when Jeremiah elects to join Gedaliah at Mizpah, Nebuzaradan gives him, at the last moment before Jeremiah's departure and apparently as an afterthought, an אֲרֻחָה to take with him on his journey (40:5). Accordingly, the context indicates that this אֲרֻחָה comprised provisions such as were to hand and that Jeremiah could manage to take with him, presumably on foot.[38] Jeremiah's אֲרֻחָה, then, was perforce a relatively modest, one-off, provision of food.

The other occurrence of the term, in Prov 15:17 (טוֹב אֲרֻחַת יָרָק וְאַהֲבָה שָׁם מִשּׁוֹר אָבוּס וְשִׂנְאָה בּוֹ, "better a ration of greens accompanied by love than a fatted calf full of hatred"), also has a particular pertinence to 2 Kgs 25:30, in that here אֲרֻחָה is used in reference to food being provided at table. In this palpable opposition of modest to sumptuous fare, יָרָק is contrasted with שׁוֹר and אֲרֻחָה with אָבוּס. Hence אֲרֻחָה is being used here to characterize the יָרָק as mea-

[35] The first three words of 25:30 (ואֲרֻחָתוֹ אֲרֻחַת תָּמִיד) may be taken as a nominal clause, with the following clause then being asyndetic, thus: "now his food ration was a standing ration; it was granted to him from the king, day in and day out, all the days of his life." Alternatively, אֲרֻחָתוֹ may be treated as a *casus pendens* within a single verbal clause, thus: "as for his food ration, a standing ration was granted to him from the king, day in and day out, all the days of his life." I prefer the first construction.

[36] The passivization avoids reverting to Evil-merodach as the grammatical subject and thereby diluting the narrative concentration here on Jehoiachin as recipient. But since the latter could have been avoided in other ways, for example, by saying ויקח אֲרֻחַת תָּמִיד מֵאֵת הַמֶּלֶךְ, the fact that אֲרֻחָה is made the grammatical subject in itself has rhetorical impact.

[37] LXX ^{A,B} Jer 47:5 (= MT Jer 40:5) has no equivalent to אֲרֻחָה. In 4 Kgdms 25:30 אֲרֻחָה is translated by ἐστιατορ(ε)ία, a term apparently unique to this context, in Jer 52:34 by σύνταξις, and in Prov 15:17 by ξενισμός.

[38] At any rate there is no mention of his being provided with any other means of transport. Nor is there any clear contextual indication of what the אֲרֻחָה was for: Was it simply to sustain him on his journey, or was it also to provide for him when he reached Mizpah? If the term is related to אָרַח ("to journey"), then a basic sense of "something pertaining to a journey, journey provisions" would tend to indicate the former rather than the latter here. Cf. Zenger's suggested comparison of אֲרֻחָה with Akkadian *akal ḫarrāni* ("Wegzehr") ("Rehabilitierung Jojachins," 18 n. 11). Derivation from the Hebrew root ארח seems more likely than the suggested connection with any of the Akkadian terms, *iaraḫtu* ("portion of corn?"), *(w)arḫītu* ("monthly installment"), *iaraḫḫu* ("fine quality barley") (J. Gray, *I & II Kings* [OTL; London: SCM, 1970], 774 ad loc; M. Cogan and H. Tadmor, *II Kings* [AB 11; New York: Doubleday, 1988], 329 ad loc). The Akkadian terms are all of rare occurrence, and in any case the vocalization אֲרֻחָה indicates a straightforward Hebrew *qᵉṭullâ* formation.

ger fare and in the context is most likely to indicate a small serving, or ration. Thus, despite this restriction of our term to just two other contexts, their evidence converges persuasively to indicate that ארחה denotes limited rations.

Returning, then, to 2 Kgs 25:30, we can now see how this text, in giving particular salience in the discourse to ארחה, very pointedly characterizes the food allowance granted to Jehoiachin as far from sumptuous. Moreover, "a standing ration, granted to him daily *from the king*" (ארחת תמיד נתנה לו מאת המלך דבר יום ביומו),[39] does not necessarily imply that Jehoiachin was honored as the king's constant table companion, merely that he was made his dependent pensioner.[40] Accordingly, this explication makes it clear retrospectively that לפניו in 25:29b, as the parallel term to מאת המלך in 25:30a, does not signify "in his presence," but has the looser sense of "under his superintendance, at his direction."[41] Hence this highly repetitive account of exactly what Evil-merodach's disposition for Jehoiachin amounted to, in terms of the latter's experience day in and day out, serves to underline just how utterly dependent on a pagan monarch (המלך *tout court*, 25:30a) Jehoiachin was for the very wherewithal of life.[42] If Jehoiachin had become a client favored above others (25:28b), yet he remained completely beholden to a foreign patron, who kept him with a measured generosity (25:30) as a detainee in Babylon (בבבל, 25:28bβ).[43]

Finally, the last and most emphatic point our text makes about Jehoiachin's experience of release at the hands of Evil-merodach is that this modestly pensioned detention would endure for the rest of his life span. The phrase כל ימי חייו, "all the days of his life,"[44] is repeated in successive sentences, and more-

[39] The expression דבר יום ביומו, lit. "the matter of a day on its day," is used in connection with the daily provision of manna (Exod 16:4), the requirement of daily sacrifices (Lev 23:37; Ezra 3:4), and the daily distribution of tithed food (Neh 12:47). It is also used, in a context more closely resembling our own, of the daily ration of food from the king's table assigned by Nebuchadnezzar to Daniel and his friends (Dan 1:5), a ration Daniel refused (Dan 1:8). Thus the expression clearly connotes a regulation of quantity, and in our present context the expression reinforces the idea of "ration" inherent in ארחה.

[40] In the case of Mephibosheth, David's instruction to Ziba makes it clear that David's "generosity" does not even extend as far as this, since Mephibosheth is to be maintained "at my table"—from the produce of his family estate (2 Sam 9:10 MT)!

[41] This is a meaning לפניו also has in 1 Sam 3:1; Gen 17:18; and Hos 6:2.

[42] Zenger's failure to appreciate this rhetoric of repetition leads to his misconceived surgery in 2 Kgs 25:29 (see "Rehabilitierung Jojachins," 26 n. 75); see n. 34 above.

[43] Note that some stress accrues to בבבל from its final position in its sentence. Hence, in addition to its referential function in 25:28b of defining the kings above whom Jehoiachin is exalted, בבבל serves rhetorically to remind the reader where Jehoiachin is in this his thirty-seventh year, and where he will be detained "all the days of his life" (25:29b, 30b). Similarly, under the cover of the invitation to dine at the king's table, David detained Mephibosheth in Jerusalem.

[44] In texts such as Deut 17:19; 1 Sam 1:11; 1 Kgs 11:34; and Ps 27:4 the same phrase indicates a desire and/or intention that a particular state of affairs continue throughout the lifetime of the person(s) in question.

over both times it occurs in the stressed final slot of each sentence (25:29b, 30b). Further, precisely this stressed phrase forms the concluding words not only of our episode but also of the whole book, and thus of Noth's Deuteronomistic History. Most tellingly of all, within the temporal perspective of the accompanying verbs this repeated phrase encompasses all that there was of Jehoiachin's life following his release from prison.[45] The past frequentative ואכל ("he used to eat," 25:29b) and the preterite נתנה ("was given him," 25:30a) betray that from the writer's point of view this durative event was one that was already past and gone.[46] Simple everyday pragmatics therefore lead the reader to infer that "all the days of his [Jehoiachin's] life" had filled their full tale within the still melancholy circumstances prevailing at the conclusion of the book.[47]

III. What the Text Does Not Say

Since 2 Kgs 25:29–30 clearly implies Jehoiachin's death while detained at the pleasure of his Babylonian masters, in order justifiably to read the text as

[45] For other examples of כל ימי חייו referring to an already closed span of time in the past, compare Josh 4:14 (contrast 1:5); 1 Sam 7:15 (contrast 1:11); 1 Kgs 5:1 [English 4:21]; 15:5, 6.

[46] The LXX rendering of עד יום מותו in Jer 52:34 (ἕως ἡμέρας ἧς ἀπέθανεν, "until the day he died") by past actual, not by future potential (ἕως ἂν ἡμέρας ἧς ἀποθανῇ, "until the day he dies"), shows that the translator drew the same inference from the temporal aspect of the same verbs in Jer 52:34 as I do here in 2 Kgs 25:29-30. Jeremiah 52:34 MT reads עד יום מותו before כל ימי חייו, whereas LXX^{A,B} reads ἕως ἡμέρας ἧς ἀπέθανεν in place of כל ימי חייו. Ackroyd notes that, of the main textual readings in 2 Kgs 25:30 and Jer 52:34, only the MT and *Targum* Jer 52:34 read both phrases; hence he considers, with Talmon, the one phrase to be a "duplicate reading" of the other (*Exile and Restoration,* 80 n. 79). So far as the textual issue is concerned, the graphic similarity of the two phrases עד יום מותו and דבר יום ביומו raises the possibility that the former could have fallen out of the text of 2 Kgs 25:30 by a form of phrasal haplography with the latter. But in any case, to define the issue only in terms of textual reading ignores the fact that rhetorically the two phrases כל ימי חייו and עד יום מותו are not simply equivalent: while each entails both duration and termination, the former headlines the durative, the latter the terminal, aspect.

[47] Thus I can agree neither with Levinson ("[t]he last four verses of Kings announce . . . that a scion of David, king of Israel, is yet alive and well," in "Last Four Verses in Kings," 361) nor with Hobbs ("[i]t is fair to conclude that Jehoiachin was still alive when 2 Kgs 25 was written," in 2 *Kings*, 368). Although, with Begg, I do see "a positive development" of a limited kind in 2 Kgs 25:27–30 (see section IV below), I cannot concur with him that it ends "on a cheery note" ("Jehoiachin's Release," 49). To take a historical turn for the moment, and assume that Jehoiachin's release was a historical event, on the information supplied in 2 Kgs 24:8 and 25:27 it is in any case relatively unlikely that Jehoiachin could have lived for very many years after his release, since he was already in the fifty-fifth year of his life in his thirty-seventh year of exile, the highest indication for him that we have. But my argument here does not rest on such historical projections from our text, but rather on establishing the discourse implicatures of the text, a task that is in any case a prerequisite to an adequate attempt at historical projection.

offering its original readers hope for the restoration of the Davidic monarchy, some indication within the text that this ray of hope is not extinguished in Jehoiachin's death is surely necessary.[48] Any such ray discernible in the apparent auspiciousness with which Evil-merodach first released Jehoiachin from close confinement (25:27–28) shines at best fitfully in the harsher light of Jehoiachin's actual experience of release (25:29–30). But even that fitful ray dies away in the deep shade that falls with the final extinction of its source (25:29b, 30). Only if our text has given some palpable indication that what it has narrated need not end with Jehoiachin's death could this ray of hope keep on shining. Hence, taking cognizance of the wider context of the story of Israel's kings narrated in the book as a whole—the story that precisely our present episode concludes—the reader would at least need evidence that the royal line will not cease with Jehoiachin, coupled with some optimistic invocation of YHWH's promise to David of an enduring dynasty.[49]

But of neither of these requisites is there commensurate evidence. With regard first of all to the promise to David, such elements in 2 Kgs 25:27–30 as distantly reflect its language do not engender hope of its fulfillment.[50] Thus in 25:28b (ויתן את כסאו מעל כסא המלכים) one may see a last dying gleam from the *lō' yikārēt* form of the promise (לא יכרת לך איש מעל כסא ישׂראל, 1 Kgs 2:4b; 9:5bβ; see also 8:25aβ), which shows how far from fulfillment that promise is here. For the throne now given Jehoiachin is granted not by the gracious favor of YHWH, but by that of a Babylonian king beholden to the Babylonian god Marduk (Hebrew אֱוִיל מְרֹדַךְ = Akkadian *Awīl/Amēl-Mardūk,* i.e. "man of Mar-

[48] This is, in my view, the Achilles' heel in the reading of this text offered by von Rad and his scholarly heirs. Indeed, the following quotation from von Rad, which immediately precedes his account of 2 Kgs 25:27–30 as "a carefully measured indication . . . of the fact that the line of David has not come to an irrevocable end" ("Deuteronomic Theology of History," 220), betrays the absence of real evidence for this claim: "[o]n the one hand, none was less in a position than [the Deuteronomist] to minimise the terrible severity of the judgement; on the other hand *he could not, indeed must not, believe* that the promise of Yahweh might fail, and that the lamp of David would be finally extinguished, for no word of Yahweh pronounced over history can ever fall to the ground" ("Deuteronomic Theology of History," 219, my emphasis). Note that "the hope" I am discounting in this section of my discussion is specifically that of future restoration of the Davidic monarchy. On a more general, but far more modest, element of hope, see the final section of this article.

[49] Wolff had long ago pointed to the absence of explicit reference to the Davidic promise as counting against the von Radian view ("Deuteronomic Kerygma," 86), and, more recently, both Begg ("Jehoiachin's Release," 52) and Hoffmann ("Deuteronomist and the Exile," 668) note that the nonmention of Jehoiachin's offspring is against interpreting the text as nourishing eschatological hope.

[50] Whereas von Rad did not claim any specific allusion to the promise in our text, asserting only that the writer presumed the efficacy of the promise in a general way ("Deuteronomic Theology of History," 219–20), Zenger suggested that כסא in 2 Kgs 25:28 deliberately alluded to a key term of the promise ("Rehabilitierung Jojachins," 26). But on this, see the ensuing remarks.

duk"). Nor is it a throne of power and authority, the throne of Israel, that he is given, but merely a seat higher than other client kings, themselves detained in Babylon at the Babylonian monarch's pleasure. More faint still, but also more grotesquely parodying, are shadows of the *nîr* form of the dynastic promise (למען היות ניר לדוד עבדי כל הימים לפני בירושלים, 1 Kgs 11:36bα; cf. 15:4a) cast by לפניו (2 Kgs 25:29b) and כל ימי חייו (25:29b, 30b) in conjunction with בבבל (25:28bβ). For לפניו here projects the beholdenness of the Davidic scion, not to YHWH, as does לפני there, but to the Babylonian monarch and his god; כל ימי חייו here projects, not, as כל הימים there, the perpetuity of a Davidic dynasty under YHWH's faithful protection, but the temporality of a lone Davidide under fickle human patronage; and בבבל here projects, not, as בירושלים there, the security of that kingship in "the city where YHWH chose to set his name" (1 Kgs 11:36bβ), but the precariousness of clientship in an alien city—and that the seat of Jerusalem's destroyer.

How feeble, then, in 2 Kgs 25:27–30 are these dying glimmers of the dynastic promise, whose flickering light projects through the deep gloom of 2 Kgs 25:1–26 a mocking phantasm of YHWH's solemn undertaking to David. Still, these dying embers of the promise might yet have had life in them, if only our text had provided more fuel, in the form of reference to a son for Jehoiachin who, living on, might have reignited the promise's sputtering flame. But there is, *pace* Provan and others, not the faintest trace in our text of such a son and potential successor.[51] That we are told elsewhere that Jehoiachin did indeed have such sons,[52] and that they, or some of them, were in exile with

[51] Provan, in maintaining that Kings intentionally contrasts the fate of Jehoiachin's family with that of his "successor," Zedekiah, gratuitously introduces descendants for Jehoiachin never mentioned anywhere in Kings ("Messiah in Kings," 72 = *1 & 2 Kings*, 90). Granted, 2 Kgs 24:15 has related that besides the queen mother (את המלך) the king's wives were taken into exile with Jehoiachin, but there was no mention of any sons. Still, on this basis a reader might be led to conjecture about sons being born in exile. But in that case, given that Jehoiachin, according to 2 Kgs 25:27, was held in prison until released by Evil-merodach, our text excludes the possibility de facto for those thirty-six years, and is therefore more likely to give explicit mention here to any believed to have been born after Jehoiachin's release. Moreover, to be cogent, the analogy Provan elaborates ("Messiah in Kings," 75-76 = *1 & 2 Kings*, 92–93) between the situation in our episode and that in the account of the restoration of Joash in 2 Kgs 11 demands explicit mention here of such progeny. For just as in 2 Kgs 11 the restoration of the Davidic line was possible only because Joash was shown, conspicuously to the reader, to have survived Athaliah's purge, so here an analogous hope of Davidic restoration would be possible only if a potential successor had been shown to survive Jehoiachin's death in Babylon. To be fair, Provan is by no means alone in smuggling progeny for Jehoiachin into his account of 2 Kgs 25:27–30; see, e.g., Zenger, "Rehabilitierung Jojachins," 27; Becker, *Messianic Expectation*, 56–57; Levenson, "Last Four Verses of Kings," 358.

[52] 1 Chronicles 3:17–18 in fact lists eight sons for Jehoiachin, but this is the only explicit reference to sons of Jehoiachin in the Hebrew Bible. Further, that Jehoiachin had (male!) offspring is a pragmatic presupposition of זרעו in Jer 22:28–30. But the intent of this passage is precisely to deny any future to both father and offspring.

him,[53] simply sets the absence of any such reference in our text into starker relief.[54] But irrespective of that intertextual comparison, the textual context of 2 Kgs 25:27–30 offers its own pointed comparison, in that a descendant of the royal line has just figured prominently in the immediately preceding episode. The Ishmael who, we were explicitly informed, was "of the royal progeny" (מזרע המלוכה, 25:25aα),[55] assassinated both Gedaliah, the Judean governor appointed by Babylon, and his Judean-Babylonian entourage (25:25aβ). In so doing, however, he exacerbated the plight of Judah, portentously forcing the very remnant who might have revived her fortunes to flee to Egypt (25:26; cf. Deut 17:16). With the only royal progeny explicitly mentioned in the context thus acting so inimically to Judah's future, the absence from our episode of any royal progeny for Jehoiachin who might yet live to undo the mischief wreaked by Ishmael is the bleaker. This silence of 25:27–30 should not recklessly be filled with talk of sons for Jehoiachin imported from other contexts.

IV. Summary Conclusions and Consequences

Manifestly, my reading of 2 Kgs 25:27–30 within the foregoing perspective has not led me to a von Radian view of it. Babylonian favor toward Jehoiachin, albeit that it exalts him above other captive kings, has its limit, namely, that of his remaining a modestly pensioned client in perpetual detention in Babylon. Crucially, this is a limit that in our text the Davidic monarchic line never promises to transcend, either in the person of Jehoiachin, who dies while still in this state, or in the person of a son and heir, who might have lived to see restoration. For of such a son and heir to Jehoiachin our text knows nothing. It is therefore difficult, *pace* von Rad and his successors, to see how this text could have been intended to foster hope of the restoration of the Davidic monarchy.[56]

[53] It is a reasonable inference from Babylonian administrative documents published by Weidner, which record provisions assigned to dependents of Nebuchadnezzar, that they refer to five such sons of Jehoiachin: for an English translation of relevant excerpts, see *ANET*, 308b.

[54] Begg's discussion is not sufficiently strong on this, to my mind crucial, point, since merely to say that the text does not mention any provision by Evil-merodach for Jehoiachin's sons is open to the inference that such sons are mentioned or implied in the text of 2 Kgs 25:27–30 ("Jehoiachin's Release," 52–53).

[55] Besides the "parallel" passage Jer 41:1, the expression is used as an oblique referent to Zedekiah, otherwise unnamed, in Ezek 17:13, and in Dan 1:3 to characterize some of the group of exiled Judeans selected for grooming by Nebuchadnezzar. The parallel form זרע המלכה is used in 2 Kgs 11:1 of Davidides who had survived the massacre of Jehu (2 Kgs 10:13–14) only to be assassinated at Athaliah's instigation. Thus both expressions probably can encompass a kin set wider than the direct line of descent, but a set that is still distinctly royal.

[56] It is worth pondering the degree to which this hopeful reading of the text is interdepen-

Does that then vindicate a pessimistic reading of 2 Kgs 25:27–30? In answer to that question let me rehearse salient points from the preceding discussion. The place of 2 Kgs 25:27–30 within the structure of 2 Kgs 25, as the last episode in a series of acts that determine the fate of the Davidic monarchy and Judean people, is ambivalent. For it is at once coordinated with the destructive acts that precede this final episode, yet also distinguished from them as a fresh departure of some kind. Moreover, that new departure is also portrayed in ambivalent terms. Focused on the actions of Evil-merodach (25:27–28), the new departure seems to promise much. Focused on the experience of Jehoiachin (25:29–30), however, it delivers considerably less: at best a very attenuated form of rehabilitation for Jehoiachin that endures for the rest of his life.[57]

But, that said on the one side, on the other side it must also nonetheless be recognized that Jehoiachin's experience of Babylonian captivity was significantly ameliorated. To express it in terms drawn from 1 Kgs 8:50, his captors have (eventually!) treated Jehoiachin with compassion (ונתתם לרחמים לפני שביהם ורחמום, 1 Kgs 8:50b). But, since 2 Kgs 25:27–30 says nothing about Jehoiachin praying in heartfelt repentance toward the site of the temple in the way 1 Kgs 8:47–48 elaborately details, nor is there the slightest hint that what has happened to him is due to YHWH's intervention as 1 Kgs 8:49–50 petition, clearly 2 Kgs 25:27–30 can hardly be proffering Jehoiachin's release as an explicit fulfillment of 1 Kgs 8:46–50.

All the same, in portraying an instance of the victor's mercifully alleviating the suffering of the vanquished, this final episode of Kings exemplifies the substance of Solomon's petition in 1 Kgs 8:50b. Latent within the dispiriting limitations of events in this final episode is some positive movement that is

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dent with a (prevailing) assumption of a date of composition for the text in close proximity to this last recorded episode, indeed a date often presumed to be before Jehoiachin's death (see, e.g., the comments of Levinson and Hobbs quoted in n. 47 above). It is unlikely that an author writing even soon after Jehoiachin's death would have said no more than is in our text, if his intention was to foster hope in the restoration of the Davidic monarchy. For on this reading the knowledge of Jehoiachin's death changes everything and makes reference to living royal progeny a *sine qua non* (see also n. 51 above). Moreover, to see just how precarious is this assumption about the dating of Kings, consider how, by a similar argument, the Gospel of Mark in its "shorter ending" form would have to be dated to immediately following the day of Jesus' resurrection, before his subsequent resurrection appearances! On the dating of Kings, see further James Linville, "Rethinking the 'Exilic' Book of Kings," *JSOT* 75 (1997): 21–42.

[57] In historical terms (but not in textual; see n. 23 above), and if historical, Evil-merodach's actions in 25:27–28 may have presaged his intention to reinstall Jehoiachin as vassal ruler in Jerusalem, as a number of scholars conjecture, an intention perhaps baulked of fulfillment by Evil-merodach's assassination so soon after these initial steps. But, however that may have been, the point is that so far as our text is concerned neither this nor anything further of political-religious significance materialized for Jehoiachin, and knowledge of that failure shapes 25:29–30.

incompatible with a totally pessimistic reading of the text. If there is here an attenuated allusion to 1 Kgs 8:50b, it serves as a token presaging not a hopeful future for an heir to the Davidic promise but a more tolerable future for all vanquished Judeans.[58] In contrast to the relentless devastation depicted in the preceding episodes in 2 Kgs 25, that is a hope not to be despised. But, since at the end of 2 Kgs 25:27–30 all power continues in the hands of their conqueror, and any promise of amelioration latent in Jehoiachin's release is not attributed to the agency of YHWH, it is also a hope not to be exaggerated.[59]

[58] It is their future, not that of the Davidic monarch, that is the concern of Solomon's petition in 1 Kgs 8:50b. Becking, also noting both the absence of acceptance of judgment and repentance in 2 Kgs 25:27–30, and that YHWH is not the instigator of Jehoiachin's release, argues that the release is presented as a false dawn ("Jehojachin's Amnesty," 292–93). But to stigmatize something as a false dawn implies a view about what will be the real dawn. If the intended message was as defined as this, a Deuteronomistic writer would not have been so coy about expressing it.

[59] The difference between this ending and that of Chronicles points up just how measured is the element of hope implied here. Kings closes with no end to Babylonian sovereignty or to Judean captivity in sight. Chronicles closes with a determinate end to captivity set for seventy years, coinciding with a change of sovereignty to the Persians (2 Chr 36:20–21). Moreover, with its implication of Jehoiachin's death in Babylonian captivity and no mention of issue to sustain the Davidic line, Kings ends on a rather melancholy note. Chronicles, however, ends on a more optimistic note, in that, ignoring the ultimate fate of the Judean monarch, whether Zedekiah or Jehoiachin, it concentrates on that of the people in general, set to change for the better at the end of the seventy years. But most of all, both the devastation of Judah and its future end in 2 Chr 36 are, unlike 2 Kgs 25, attributed to the agency of YHWH. In a nutshell, in 2 Chr 36 there is an express divine "until" (עד מלך מלכות פרס, 36:20bβ; למלאות שבעים שנה, 36:21bβ) that is missing from 2 Kgs 25.

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THE "NOBLE SHEPHERD" IN JOHN 10: CULTURAL AND RHETORICAL BACKGROUND

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Interpretation of the death of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel has proved fragmentary and elusive. Some interpreters contrast it with the interpretation of Paul,[1] while others focus on different motifs, such as glorification,[2] sacrificial references,[3] ascent and lifting up,[4] or cosmic war.[5] This article adds still another study of a select cultural motif, namely, the death of the "noble" shepherd in John 10:11–18.

Some translate the adjective that describes the shepherd in 10:11 and 14 as "noble,"[6] "ideal,"[7] "model,"[8] "true"[9] or "good." The Greek adjective is καλός, not ἀγαθός; and these two words refer to quite different semantic domains,[10]

[1] Rudolf Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament* (2 vols.; New York: Scribner, 1955), 2:52–53.

[2] Rudolf Bultmann, *The Gospel of John: A Commentary* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1971), 632–33.

[3] See B. Grigsby, "The Cross as an Expiatory Sacrifice in the Fourth Gospel," *JSNT* 13 (1982): 51–80; G. Carey, "The Lamb of God and Atonement Theories," *TynBul* 32 (1981): 97–122.

[4] See Godfrey C. Nicholson, *Death as Departure: The Johannine Descent-Ascent Schema* (SBLDS 63; Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1983).

[5] See Judith Kovacs, "'Now Shall the Ruler of This World Be Driven Out': Jesus' Death as Cosmic Battle in John 12:20–36," *JBL* 114 (1995): 227–47.

[6] D. A. Carson, *The Gospel According to John* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 386.

[7] Raymond E. Brown, *The Gospel According to John I-XII* (AB 29; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966), 386, 395–96; Barnabas Lindars, *The Gospel of John* (London: Oliphants, 1972), 361.

[8] Brown, *Gospel According to John,* 395–96.

[9] See Bultmann, *Gospel of John,* 364; George R. Beasley-Murray, *John* (Waco: Word Books, 1987), 170; and John Painter, *The Quest for the Messiah* (2d ed.; Nashville: Abingdon, 1993), 349, 353.

[10] See Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1.3.6. But the ancient rhetorical distinction between καλός and ἀγαθός is blurred by commentators. Some argue that καλός expresses "the highest moral beauty" (Frédéric Godet, *Commentaire sur L'Évangile de Saint Jean* [Neuchâtel: L.-A. Momnier, 1970], 3:89) or the

although they were linked together in certain instances.[11] The opposite of καλός is shame (αἰσχρός), while the opposite of ἀγαθός is evil (πονηρός). Καλός is best understood in terms of the cultural value of honor and shame, which is not the same as the sphere of good and evil. The evangelist, moreover, labels the shepherd "noble" for two reasons, because (1) he lays down his life for the sheep[12] and (2) he knows his sheep (10:14). Commentators add one more reason from 10:17–18, which refers to the "voluntary" character of the death of the shepherd,[13] a traditional criterion of a "noble" death.

We suggest that καλός rightly belongs to the cultural world of honor and shame; it labels behavior generally recognized as excellent, and so worthy of public praise. We propose to examine Greek rhetorical literature on "noble death" to discover the rich complex of terminology and reasons whereby the ancients labeled a death as "noble." Our hypothesis is that the labeling of the shepherd as "noble" reflects the rhetorical topos of "noble death" in the rhetoric of praise in the Hellenistic world. When John 10:11–18 is compared with this topos, we shall see that it is carefully structured according to the topos of noble death.

I. An Honorable Death

Our argument that the shepherd dies a "noble death" begins with an analysis of Greek funeral rhetoric. This consists of (1) anecdotal mention of "noble death" to establish that the concept truly existed in ancient Greece, (2) the topos of a "noble death" found in Athenian funeral orations which honored the city's fallen soldiers, (3) the criteria for praise in epideictic rhetoric, and (4) the rules in the progymnastic encomium on how to draw praise from death.[14]

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perfection of living out the role of shepherd (J. H. Bernard, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According to St. John* [New York: Scribner's, 1929], 2:357).

[11] See Georg Bertram, "Καλός," *TDNT* 3:538–40, esp. 544. See also Walter Dolan, "The Origin of Καλὸς κἀγαθός," *AJP* 94 (1973): 365–74.

[12] Brown, *Gospel According to John,* 395; Lindars, *Gospel of John,* 361; Carson, *Gospel of John,* 386.

[13] See Leon Morris, *The Gospel of John* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1971), 510; Painter, *Quest for the Messiah,* 356; Brown, *Gospel According to John,* 399–400.

[14] Other sources of information about "noble death" include: (1) the epitaph; see Richard Lattimore, *Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1942), esp. 237–40; (2) the death of the philosopher-hero resisting the tyrant; see Herbert A. Musurillo, *The Acts of the Pagan Martyrs* (New York: Arno Press, 1979), 236–46; (3) the aretalogies studied by Moses Hadas and Morton Smith in their *Heroes and Gods: Spiritual Biographies in Antiquity* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965); (4) Hellenistic τελεύται and Roman *exitus illustrium virorum;* see A. Ronconi, "Exitus Illustrium Virorum," *RAC* 6 (1996): 1258–68, who is the primary source for

Anecdotal Mention of a "Noble" Death

Athenian oratory and history expressed the idea of a "noble death" in a variety of ways.[15] Death may be "easy," "good," "noble," or "famous"; or a life might "end well."

1. *An Easy Death* (εὐθανασία). Anecdotes about the deaths of public figures mention that so-and-so died a "good death" (εὐθανασία).[16]

2. *Noble Death* (καλῶς, εὐγενῶς, εὐκλεῶς ἀποθανεῖν). More commonly orators qualified the verb "to die" with an adverb such as "nobly" or "honorably," often indicating why they judged a particular death "noble." For example, Isocrates urges soldiers facing battle to act nobly, even if this means death: ". . . if ever it falls to your lot to face the dangers of battle, seek to preserve your life, but with honour and not with disgrace; for death is the sentence of all mankind, but to die nobly [καλῶς ἀποθανεῖν] is the special honour which nature has reserved for the good" (*Demonicus* 43).[17] He reflects the common perspective that courage to fight and die brings honor, while cowardly flight merits shame. Because such battles were fought in defense of Athens, the soldiers' deaths benefited the city, another mark of a noble death. Isocrates provides a variant of this expression: "For we shall find that men of ambition and greatness of soul not only are desirous of praise, but prefer a glorious death [εὐκλεῶς ἀποθνήσκειν] to life, zealously seeking glory rather than existence" (*Evag.* 3). This sparkles with terms celebrated in the rhetoric of praise: those who "die nobly" are "lovers of honor" (φιλότιμοι) and "great souled" (μεγαλόψυχοι); they seek "glory," which can be found even in death.[18]

Adela Y. Collins, "The Genre of the Passion Narrative," *ST* 47 (1993): 3–38; and (5) miscellaneous references found in the *Rhetoric to Herennius* 3.7.14 and Horace, *The Art of Poetry* 469.

[15] Two books include the phrase "noble death" in their titles: David Seeley, *The Noble Death: Graeco-Roman Martyrology and Paul's Concept of Salvation* (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1990); and Arthur J. Droge and James D. Tabor, *A Noble Death: Suicide and Martyrdom among Christians and Jews in Antiquity* (San Francisco: Harper, 1992). Both employ the phrase "noble death" but do not tell their readers whence it comes. Droge and Tabor concern themselves with suicide, while Seeley focuses on vicarious expiation as the background for Paul's doctrine of salvation.

[16] See Polybius 32.4.3; Philo, *Sac.* 100; and Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 5.11.68. The term could also be used of persons who escaped the sickness and diminishment of old age.

[17] Texts and translations come from the Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). Texts from editions other than Loeb will be noted when they appear.

[18] For other examples, see Lycurgus, *Leocrates* 48–49; Xenophon, *Anabasis* 3.1.43–44; Plato, *Menexenus* 246d; Demosthenes, *Funeral Speech* 37; Aristotle, *Virtues and Vices* 4.4 and 6.5; Polybius, *Histories* 18.53.3; Dionysius of Halicarnassus 10.45.4–5 ; 2 Macc 14:42; 6:28; 4 Macc 6:22 and 30; Plutarch, *Alex.* 64.5; Cato *Min.* 15.4; *Otho* 15.4, 6; Diodor of Sicily 14.52.1–2; Josephus, *Ant.* 6.368; *J.W.* 7.380–83; Aelius Aristides, *Panathen.* 132.10; Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 6.4.38.

3. *Ending Well.* Orators labeled a death noble by declaring that it "ended well" (καλῶς τελευτᾶν). Herodotus records that when Croesus asked Solon if he knew of someone truly blest, Solon told him about Tellus of Athens, whose glory was to die a noble death:

> [h]e crowned his life with a most glorious death [τελευτὴ τοῦ βίου λαμπροτάτη]: for in a battle between the Athenians and their neighbours at Eleusis, he attacked and routed the enemy and most nobly died [ἀπέθανε κάλλιστα]; and the Athenians gave him public burial where he fell and paid him great honour. (*Hist.* 1.30)

He "ended" his life in a superlative manner ("most glorious," "most nobly"), that is, as a warrior in the city's army where military prowess translated into honor and praise. His courage, moreover, benefited Athens and so led to posthumous honors, such as "public burial" and special forms of praise ("great honor").

Funeral Orations and Noble Death

The ancients quibbled over who invented the funeral speech, the Greeks or the Romans.[19] But the evidence from antiquity about the funeral speech (ἐπιτάφιος λόγος) comes from Greek orators living between 450 and 300 B.C.E. who delivered annual orations to honor the dead of Athens' various wars.[20] These authors explicitly state that the task of a funeral oration is to "praise the dead "[21] and to declare an encomium for their lives (i.e., ἐγκωμιάζειν[22]).

[19] See Dionysius of Halicarnassus 5.17. Peter L. Schmidt remarks that, whereas the Greek funeral oration was a civic event, sponsored by the *polis* to support civic virtues, the Roman *laudatio funebris* was a family ceremony that honored the dead for virtues other than military courage ("Laudatio Funebris," *KlPauly* 3:518). The Roman funeral ceremony often consisted of the public wearing of the clay images of both the deceased and ancestors of the household; see Polybius, *Hist.* 6.53–54. Thus, two different social institutions are in view (*polis* and family), and two different sets of social values are praised. On the Roman funeral oration, see Fredericus Vollmar, "Laudatio Funebrum Romanorum Historia et Reliquia Editio," *Jahrbuch für Classische Philologie,* Supp. 18 (1892): 445–528; Marcel Drury, "*Laudatio Funebris* et Rhétorique," *Revue de Philologie et Littérateur* ser. 3 16 (1942): 105–14; and John M. McManamon, *Funeral Oratory and the Cultural Ideas of Humanism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989).

[20] Cicero states that an annual funeral oration was delivered in Athens: ". . . in that public oration which it was customary to deliver at Athens in an assembly in honour of those fallen in battle; which was so popular that it had to be read aloud every year, as you know, on that day" (*Orator* 44.151).

[21] Isocrates regards his speech as but part of the honor shown to the dead: "In gratitude we honored [ἐτιμήσαμεν] them with the highest honors and set up their statues" (*Evagoras* 57). To "pay the highest honors" to the fallen, Lycurgus says, is the formal aim of the funeral speeches (*Leocrates* 51). Demosthenes is most explicit in his grant of praise: "For knowing that among good men the acquisition of wealth and the enjoyment of the pleasures that go with living are scorned,

Funeral orations, then, share the same formal aim as epideictic rhetoric, that is, honor and praise.

All of the extant examples of Athenian funeral orations contain a topos of "noble death," a pattern of topics that are the sources of praise.[23] The content of praise was even then remarkably constant, as evidenced by the manner in which conventional sources of honor are developed. Men are praised for their *ascribed honor:* (1) origin in Greece and descent from ancient and noble ancestors; and (2) nurture, education, and training in the value codes of Athens. They are likewise praised for their *achieved honor:* excellence of body, soul, and fortune. Furthermore, they might also be compared to famous heroes.[24] This range of topics and their contents were eventually codified in the encomium genre in progymnastic literature. The reasons for honor and praise remained constant over many centuries, including the common appreciation of what constituted a noble death.

Just as orators structured their funeral orations according to commonplace topics from a shared sense of what constituted a praiseworthy life, so also they praised the death of military heroes according to a common set of canons for a noble death. The data yield seven major reasons for declaring a death "noble."

1. The death of Athens' soldiers benefited the city. Hyperides, for example, regularly touts the gift of freedom given Athens and Greece by its fallen soldiers: "Their courage in arms . . . reveals them as the authors of many benefits conferred upon their country and the rest of Greece" (*Funeral Speech* 9; see 15–16, 19, 20–22). Later he says that these soldiers "sacrificed their lives that others might live well" (*Funeral Speech* 26). We find similar remarks in the

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and that their whole desire is for virtue and words of praise, the citizens were of the opinion that we ought to honour them with such eulogies as would most certainly secure them in death the glory they had won while living" (*Funeral Speech* 2).

[22] For example, Isocrates states that his difficult task is "to eulogize [ἐγκωμιάζειν] in prose the virtues of a man" (*Evagoras* 8; see 11). Hyperides too describes his task as ἐγκωμιάζειν (*Funeral Speech* 7–8, 15). Many centuries later, Menander Rhetor described the funeral speech as pure encomium: ἐπιτάφιος καθαρόν ἐστὶν ἐγκωμιοῦ (2.419.2); see D. A. Russell and N. G. Wilson, *Menander Rhetor* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981), 172. And Ps.-Dionysius said: "In a word, the *epitaphios* is a praise of the departed. This being so, it is clear that it must be based on the same topics as encomia, viz. country, family, nature, upbringing, actions" (Russell and Wilson, *Menander Rhetor,* 374). See Theodore Burgess, *Epideictic Literature* (New York: Garland, 1987), 146–57.

[23] On the Greek funeral oration, see Burgess, *Epideictic Literature,* 146–56; John E. Ziolkowski, *Thucydides and the Tradition of Funeral Speeches at Athens* (Salem, NH: Ayer Company, 1985); Nicole Loraux, *The Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).

[24] On the encomium, see Jerome H. Neyrey, "Josephus' *Vita* and the Encomium: A Native Model of Personality," *JSJ* 25, no. 2 (1994): 177–206; idem, *Honor and Shame in the Gospel of Matthew* (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1998).

writings of Thucydides, Plato, and Demosthenes.[25] Indeed, many of those who fell in defense of Athens were called "saviors."[26]

2. In a variation of this, orators argue that Athens' fallen heroes displayed exceptional justice toward the *polis* by their deaths. According to ancient theory of virtue, justice is one of the four cardinal virtues, the one according to which duties are paid. Ps.-Aristotle says: "To righteousness (δικαιοσύνη) it belongs to be ready to distribute according to desert, and to preserve ancestral customs and institutions and the established laws . . . and to keep agreements." To whom does one owe anything? "First among the claims of righteousness are our duties to the gods, then our duties to the spirits, then those to country and parents, then those to the departed" (Ps.-Aristotle, *Virtues and Vices* 5.2–3).[27] The premier aspect of justice celebrated in regard to Athens' fallen soldiers was the duty they paid to the *polis* and its institutions. When orators rehearsed the history of Athens, they praised in particular its struggles to be free of tyranny and its willingness to fight to preserve the ancestral way of life. The fallen who died were duty bound to be faithful to that political history at the cost of their lives. Demosthenes said: "The considerations that actuated these men one and all to choose to die nobly have now been enumerated: birth, education, habituation to high standards of conduct, and *the underlying principles of our form of government in general*" (*Funeral Speech* 27, emphasis added). Their death, then, is noble not only because it benefited *polis* and family,[28] but because it demonstrated the virtue of justice as completely as possible.[29]

3. Athens, which reveled in its political freedom, despised the world of slaves and the rule of tyrants. Its orators expressed this civic value in another

[25] Thucydides, *History* 2.42.3; Plato, *Menexenus* 237a, 242a–b, 246; Demosthenes, *Oration 38* 8, 23 and *Funeral Speech 60* 8, 10, 29; see also Lycurgus, *Leocrates* 46.

[26] Demosthenes, *Oration 37* 8, 23. Iphigenia consoled her mother in a final speech where she catalogues the benefits to Hellas by her death: "The whole might of Hellas depends on me. Upon me depends the passage of the ships over the sea, and the overthrow of the Phrygians. With me it rests to prevent the barbarians from carrying our women off from happy Hellas in the future. . . . All these things I shall achieve by my death, and my name, as the liberator of Hellas, shall be blessed. Indeed, it behooves me not to be too fond of life; you bore me for the common good of all the Hellenes, not for yourself alone" (Euripides, *Iphigenia at Aulis* 1368ff.).

[27] Closer in time to the NT is Cicero's definition: "Duty is the feeling which renders kind offices and loving service to one's kin and country. Gratitude embraces the memory of friendships and of services rendered by another, and the desire to requite these benefits (*Inv.* 2.160–61).

[28] Antigone provides one of the clearest examples of death resulting from duty to family; she performed the sacred burial rites for her brother in violation of the decree of her uncle that he not be buried, thus preferring family loyalty to civic obedience.

[29] Other examples include Lycurgus, *Leocrates* 50; Lysias, *Funeral Oration* 33, 61, 68, 70; Demosthenes, *Funeral Speech* 11, 18, 19, 23, 27, 36; Isocrates, *Evagoras* 8, 23, 35, 38, 42–44, 52, 66; Hyperides, *Funeral Speech* 11, 16, 19, 24, 26.

criterion for a noble death, its voluntary character.[30] Fallen soldiers were often said to "prefer noble death to a life of servitude" or to "choose" their death. This tradition of a voluntary death[31] is found already in Plato's *Menexenus,* where the speaker's remarks contain most of the conventions of a noble death voluntarily undergone: "We, who might have ignobly lived *choose* [αἱρουμεθα] rather to die nobly [καλῶς τελευτᾶν] before we bring you and those after you to disgrace or before we shame you with our fathers and all our earlier forebearers" (*Menex.* 246d). Honor, moreover, comes from voluntary death, that is, from *choosing* one way rather than another; thus those who perish in battle are *not victims* whose fate is decided by others, but courageous soldiers who take fate in their own hands.

Pericles' oration over the war dead contains two versions of this motif, one that celebrates the *preference* of death with honor to life with shame and another which emphasizes the *choice* made in taking up the fight. As regards the first expression Thucydides records: "[W]hen the moment of combat came, *thinking* it better to defend themselves and suffer death rather than to yield and save their lives . . . at the crowning moment not of fear but glory, they passed away" (*Hist.* 2.43.4, emphasis added). The author claims that the fallen soldiers were formally "thinking" about the honor code of elite Athenians, that is, the code of civic honor: "better to die than yield." Hence their preference was clear: whereas flight, saving one's life, and fear are dishonorable and disgraceful, fighting, faithfulness, and death are glorious and honorable.[32]

Thucydides demonstrates a second aspect of the voluntary character of a noble death by noting that the deceased formally *chose* their fate: ". . . deeming

[30] It was also important that animals about to be sacrificed "give their consent"; for this purpose cold water and/or grain were suddenly thrown on the head and face of the animal so that it would wag its head from side to side, which motion was interpreted as its voluntary consent to die. See Marcel Detienne, "Culinary Practices and the Spirit of Sacrifice," in *The Cuisine of Sacrifice among the Greeks* (ed. M. Detienne and P. Vernant; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 9.

[31] There is notable Roman evidence for the same topos. Seneca, for example, contrasts the ignoble and unfree death of gladiators with the noble death of a wise man who dies voluntarily: "From the men who hire out their strength for the arena, who eat and drink what they must pay for with their blood, security is taken that they will endure such trials even though they be unwilling; from you, that you will endure them willingly and with alacrity [*volens libensque*]. The gladiator may lower his weapon and test the pity of the people; but you will neither lower your weapon nor beg for life. You must die erect and unyielding [*invictoque*]" (*Ep.* 37.2–3). Indeed, Nero is reported to have inquired whether Seneca himself, when faced with extreme royal displeasure, was preparing for a "voluntary death" (*voluntariam mortem* [Tacitus, *Ann.* 15.61]).

[32] Socrates recounts the conversation between Achilles and his mother, Thetis, on death: "He [Achilles] made light of danger in comparison with incurring dishonor when his goddess mother warned him, eager as he was, to kill Hector, in some such words as these, I fancy. 'My son, if you avenge your comrade Patroclus' death and kill Hector, you will die yourself. Next after Hector is thy fate prepared.' When he heard this warning, he made light of his death and danger, being much

the punishment of the foe to be more desirable than these things (wealth, escape), and at the same time regarding such a hazard as the most glorious of all, they *chose* [ἐβουλήθησαν]" (*Hist.* 2.42.4, emphasis added). Unlike slaves and captured troops whose lives are taken from them; these willingly chose their death.[33]

4. Orators occasionally declare that in the logic of honor and glory, a fallen soldier can be said to be undefeated by his foe or to have conquered him by his dying. Lycurgus writes:

> *Unconquered* [οὐχ ἡττηθέντες], they fell in the defense of freedom, and if I may use a paradox, they *triumphed* [νικῶντες] in their death . . . neither can we say that they have been defeated whose spirits did not flinch at the aggressor's threat . . . since by the choosing of a noble death they are escaping slavery. (*Leocrates* 48–49, emphasis added)

A military death, where manly courage is displayed ("did not flinch") and which was endured for the benefit of Athens ("defense of freedom"), means that in the world of honor and shame the fallen have "triumphed" and "have not been defeated."[34] This small excerpt from Lycurgus contains almost the complete inventory of reasons why a death is called "noble."[35]

5. Several funeral orations declare a death "noble" because of some uniqueness: "no one" else has ever been able to perform this deed and achieve this honor. Hyperides demonstrates this when he praises certain warriors in this manner: "Never before [οὐδενες γὰρ πώποτε] did men strive for a nobler cause, either against stronger adversaries or with fewer friends, convinced that valour gave strength and courage superiority as no mere numbers could" (*Funeral Speech* 19).[36] He argues uniqueness in two ways. First, "no one" before them had a more noble cause for which to fight. Then by a series of

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more afraid of an ignoble life and of failing to avenge his friends. 'Let me die forthwith,' said he, 'when I have requited the villain, rather than remain here by the beaked ships to be mocked, a burden on the ground'" (Plato, *Apology* 28c–d).

[33] Isocrates, *Evagoras 9* 3; see also Plato, *Menexenus* 246d; Demosthenes *Oration 37* 1, 8, 26.

[34] Centuries later Plutarch writes: "For the best thing is that a general should be victorious and keep his life, 'but if he must die,' he should conclude his life with valour [ἀρετήν], as Euripides says; for then he does not suffer death, but rather achieves it" (*Pelopidas and Marcellus* 3.2).

[35] See Demosthenes, *Funeral Speech 19*; *18* 192, 207–8.

[36] Isocrates says in praise of Evagoras: "I would say that no one [οὐδείς], whether mortal, demigod, or immortal, will be found to have obtained his throne more nobly, more splendidly, or more piously" (*Evagoras* 39). Other instances of uniqueness include Hyperides, *Funeral Speech* 19; Lycurgus, *Leocrates* 15; Demosthenes states in regard to the dead: "How, then, since the whole country unites in according them a public burial, and they alone [μόνοι] receive the words of universal praise . . . how can we do otherwise than consider them blessed of fortune" (*Funeral Oration* 60, 33).

comparisons he dramatizes their excellence: they faced a foe "stronger than" had ever been faced and they advanced with "fewer" allies than anyone else. Since they are in a class by themselves, their death is unique and worthy of praise.

6. A death could be declared "noble" by calling attention to the posthumous honors paid to the deceased, which include the public honoring of the dead by the *polis* with games or monuments.[37] The funeral orations themselves were one such posthumous honor; they served to give glory to the dead, first by a public evaluation of their worth and later by annual remembrance of their deaths.[38]

7. Immortality on occasion was seen as the aim and result of a noble death. We find the claim that those being celebrated are in one sense like the gods, because their glory too is now deathless and everlasting. Demosthenes states it tidily: "It is a proud privilege to behold them possessors of deathless [ἀθανάτων] honours and a memorial of their valour erected by the State, and deemed deserving of sacrifices and games for all future time" (*Funeral Oration* 36).[39] A type of immortality has been achieved by glory that will never fade.

This survey of extant Athenian funeral oratory yields the following points: (1) Their formal aim was the praise and honor[40] of the fallen. Thus the various meanings of "noble death" must be understood in light of this pivotal value. (2) Noteworthy is the utter conventionality of the topics from which praise is drawn. (3) Seven reasons for labeling a death "noble" emerge from the speeches: a death is noble that (a) benefits others, (b) displays justice to the

[37] On posthumous honors, Dionysius of Halicarnassus writes: "These writers [Greeks] have given accounts of funeral games, both gymnastic and equestrian, held in honour of famous men by their friends, as by Achilles for Patroclus and, before that, by Herakles for Pelops" (*History* 5.17.4). Isocrates lists the following: ". . . numerous and beautiful offerings, but also with dances, music, and athletic contests, and furthermore, with races of horses and triremes" (*Evagoras* 1).

[38] A public decree, read aloud at the tomb of a certain Theophilos and subsequently carved in white marble, honors the deceased by the public declaration of his worth: ". . . of very noble ancestral stock, having contributed all good-will towards his country, having lived his life as master of his family, providing many things for his country through his generalship and tenure as agoranomos and his embassies as far as Rome and Germany, being amicable to the citizens and in concord with his wife Apphia, now it is resolved that Theophilos be honoured with a painted portrait and a gold bust and a marble statue" (*NewDocs* 2:58–60).

[39] For examples of posthumous glory, see Ziolkowski, *Thucydides and the Tradition of Funeral Speeches at Athens*, 126–28.

[40] Part of the honor of the fallen was the arousal of envy and emulation in those who heard the funeral speech. Lysias honors Athens' fallen heroes: "Thus the struggles at the Peiraeus have earned for those men the envy of all mankind" (*Funeral Oration* 66; see also 68–73). See also Isocrates, *Evagoras* 6, 70; Hyperides, *Funeral Speech* 31–32; Demosthenes, *Funeral Speech* 60. On the relationship of envy and honor, see Anselm Hagedorn and Jerome Neyrey, "'It Was Out of Envy that They Handed Jesus Over' (Mark 15,10): The Anatomy of Envy and the Gospel of Mark," *JSNT* 69 (1998): esp. 15–38.

fatherland, (c) is voluntarily accepted, (d) proves that the fallen died unvanquished and undefeated, (e) is unique, (f) produces posthumous honors, and (g) produces immortal fame and glory.

Amplification in the Rhetoric of Praise

Although Athens developed the genre of the funeral speech, Aristotle had nothing to say about a noble death. Yet his catalogue of reasons for amplifying praise strikingly resembles the items mentioned frequently in the funeral speeches examined above. Funeral orators and Aristotle's treatment of epideictic oratory both contain a similar set of reasons for honor, whether a noble death or a noble life.

Aristotle begins his discussion of the rhetoric of praise and blame with a focus on "virtue and vice": "Let us speak of virtue and vice and honorable and shameful [καλοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ]; for these are the points of reference for one praising and blaming [ἐπαινοῦντι καὶ ψέγοντι]" (*Rhet.* 1.9.1). Then when discussing "virtue," he lists its parts: "justice, manly courage, self-control, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, prudence, and wisdom" (1.9.5), with a focus primarily on courage and justice. Accordingly, Aristotle lists reasons whereby an orator might find grounds for praise. The relevant part of his directives goes as follows:

> 16. And things for which the *rewards are an honor* are *kala,* especially those that bring honor rather than money; and whatever someone does, *by choice,* not for his own sake; 17. . . . whatever someone has *done for his country,* overlooking his own interest. . . . 19. and whatever works are done *for the sake of others* (for they have less of the self); and successes gained *for others,* but not for the self and for those who have *conferred benefits* (for that is just); and *acts of kindness* (for they are not directed to oneself). . . . 23. And those that give *pleasure to others* more than to oneself; thus, *the just and justice* are honorable. 24. . . . *not to be defeated* is characteristic of a brave man. 25. And *victory and glory* are among honorable things; for they are to be chosen even if they are fruitless, and they make clear a preeminence of virtue. And things that will be *remembered* [are honorable]; and the more so, the more [honorable]. And what *follows a person when no longer alive* (and glory does follow) and things extraordinary and things *in the power of only one person* are more honorable, for [they are] more memorable. (*Rhet.* 1.9.16–25)[41]

Thus Aristotle labels an action honorable or praiseworthy if it:

1. benefits others (17, 19, 23), and is not done for self-interest (16, 17, 18)
2. is just or demonstrates justice (19, 23)

[41] This translation of Aristotle is by George A. Kennedy, *Aristotle on Rhetoric: A Theory of Civil Discourse* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 81–82.

3. produces honor (16) and glory (25), or advances one's reputation (21), especially after death (18), and causes one to be remembered (25)
4. was done voluntarily, by choice (16, 17, 25)
5. ended in victory; the actor was not defeated (24)
6. is unique to this particular person or distinctive of a special class of persons (25)
7. yielded posthumous honors (25)

These seven ways of amplifying honor are identical with the seven reasons found in the funeral orations for labeling a death "noble." Aristotle, then, stands as a witness to the same tradition.

The Encomium: Death as a Source of Honor

Second-level students in the educational process common to the Greco-Roman world learned to compose a series of genres that equipped them for further studies in rhetoric. Their grammatical handbooks, called *progymnasmata,* codified various genres to be learned. We focus on the rules for the encomium, which instructed students how to construct a speech of praise.

Theon's remarks below were not said specifically about a noble death. Rather, they are a composite instruction on the ways that an orator may "amplify" praise, such as we saw above with Aristotle.[42] This list is of importance to us for several reasons. It closely resembles the reasons used in classical funeral orations to argue that a certain death was noble. It also attests to the conventionality and continuity of motifs from the time of Lysias and Isocrates to that of Theon. Of "noble" actions Theon says:

> Noble [καλαί] actions are those which we do *for the sake of others,* and not ourselves; and *in behalf of what is noble,* rather than on account of what is advantageous or pleasant; and on account of which *most people also receive great benefits.* . . . Praiseworthy [ἐπαίνεται] actions are also those occurring in a timely manner, and if one acted alone [μόνος], or *first* [πρῶτος], or when *no one* [οὐδείς] acted, or *more than others,* or *with a few,* or beyond one's age, or exceeding expectation, or with hard work, or what was done most easily and quickly. (9.25–38, emphasis added; see Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1.9.38)

What makes an action "praiseworthy" are the same reasons we have observed already in Greek oratory: (1) actions "done for the sake of others" and "on account of which most people receive great benefits," (2) actions that are "noble," that is, virtuous, and not advantageous, and (3) unique actions, where

[42] For the text of Theon, see James Butts, "The 'Progymnasmata' of Theon" (diss., Claremont, 1994).

the actor acted "alone or first." Thus, the conventional reasons found in funeral orations about a "noble" death continue as the general criteria for praise of the living.

In summary, from the sources examined, we find the following consistent criteria for a "noble" death. A death is noble if (1) it benefitted others; (2) it was either voluntarily accepted or chosen; (3) the deceased died unvanquished or not as a victim; (4) the manner of death manifested both courage and justice; (5) there was something unique about the death of this soldier; (6) death produced posthumous honors; and (7) the fallen enjoy immortality in deathless praise and glory by the *polis*.

II. The Noble Death Tradition and the Greek Literature of Israel

Did the Greek tradition of noble death become part of the rhetorical world of Israelite literature written in Greek?[43] Did Jerusalem learn anything from Athens besides its alphabet? The books of Maccabees indicate that, in addition to the Greek language, Israel also adopted the Greek topos of honoring a death as "noble."[44]

In general, 1, 2, and 4 Maccabees contain ample evidence of the presence of the Hellenistic understanding of a noble death in both terminology and logic. The Maccabean literature frequently speaks of "dying nobly" (γενναίως ἀπευθανατίζειν [2 Macc 6:28; see 1 Macc 4:35; 9:10; 2 Macc 6:28, 31; 4 Macc 6:30]) or "ending nobly" (γενναίως τελευτᾶν [2 Macc 7:5; see 4 Macc 6:22]). Death might also be "glorious" (ἀοίδιμον θάνατον [4 Macc 10:1]) or "honorable" (μακάριον θάνατον).[45] They cite the same reasons as Greek rhetoric for declaring a death "noble"; namely, it benefits the nation or is suffered on its

[43] Both Seeley (*Noble Death,* 83–112) and Droge and Tabor (*Noble Death,* 53–84, 86–96) discuss the Maccabean literature, the latter with an eye to suicide and the former focusing on the background for Paul's soteriology. None of these authors brings to the task data from Greek rhetoric. A new survey of 1, 2, and 4 Maccabees is warranted not only because they were written in Greek, but because they reflect Greek popular understanding of what constitutes a noble death.

[44] For the fullest treatment of noble death in 2 and 4 Maccabees, see Jan Willem Van Henten, *The Maccabean Martyrs as Saviours of the Jewish People* (Leiden: Brill, 1997). He focuses on the importance of "voluntary" death and death as benefit, and appreciates the Judean dependence on motifs long ago made sacred in Greek literature (see esp. pp. 140–50, 157–59, 213–25).

[45] 4 Maccabees 10:15; on the translation of μακάριος as "honorable," see K. C. Hanson, "'How Honorable! How Shameful!' A Cultural Analysis of Matthew's Makarisms and Reproaches," *Semeia* 68 (1994): 81–112.

behalf or saves it.[46] For example, Eleazar, called Aravan, speared an elephant he thought was carrying the king; unfortunately the king was not aboard and the elephant crushed him as it fell. Nevertheless, the author says of him, "So he gave up his life *to save his people* and to win for himself an everlasting name" (1 Macc 6:43–44).

The voluntary character of a noble death is expressed in several ways.[47] It may be formally stated that the dying person chose or accepted death or willingly went to it. In regard to Eleazar's death, the author of 2 Maccabees twice states that "[he] *welcoming* death with honor rather than a life with pollutions, *went* to the rack *of his own accord* [αὐθαιρέτως]" (2 Macc 6:19). Shortly after he records Eleazar saying, "I will leave to the young a noble example[48] of how to die a good death nobly *and willingly*" (2 Macc 6:28; 7:14, 29; 4 Macc 5:23). An alternate expression of the voluntary character of a noble death consists of the calculus made by the dying person that noble death is preferable to a shameful escape. Consider 1 Maccabees: "It is better for us to die in battle than to see the misfortunes of our nature and of the sanctuary" (3:59; see 2 Macc 6:19; 2 Macc 7:14; 4 Macc 9:1 and 4).

Dying unconquered or conquering in death is found abundantly in 4 Maccabees. Of the martyrs the author says, "By their endurance they conquered the tyrant" (1:11). Eleazar won a victory over his torturers: "Although his sacred life was consumed by tortures and racks, he conquered the besiegers with the shield of his devout reason" (7:4).[49]

The manner of death conforms to the canons of honor accepted by the audience and so elicits from both observers and hearers the essence of honor: acknowledgment, glory, fame, honor, an everlasting name, renown, and the like. For example, 1 Maccabees says of Eleazar, "So he gave his life to save his people and *to win* for himself *an everlasting name*" (6:44; see 1 Macc 9:10; 2 Macc 7:5–6, 29). Thus, both Eleazar and Judas are credited with noble motives for dying, namely, benefit to others ("save his people" and "for our kindred") and quest for immortal honor ("everlasting name" and "unquestionable honor").

Noble deaths regularly contain mention of the virtue of those who died, either courage and/or justice. Courage, the manly virtue of endurance of hard-

[46] Van Henten argues that the author describes the death in 2 Macc 7:33–39 as benefiting the people because it is an atonement sacrifice (*Maccabean Martyrs as Saviours,* 140–56), and he notes the important Greco-Roman parallels to this on pp. 156–61. Yet see Seeley, *Noble Death,* 97–98.

[47] For a more detailed examination of this, see van Henten, *Maccabean Martyrs as Saviours,* 58, 95–98.

[48] On the martyrs as exemplary figures, see van Henten, *Maccabean Martyrs as Saviours,* 210–43.

ships, is often claimed on behalf of the characters in the Maccabean literature. For example, Judas exhorted his army before battle with the remark, "If our time has come, let us die bravely [ἐν ἀνδρείᾳ] for our kindred" (1 Macc 9:10). Similarly Eleazar eulogized the Israelite law by claiming that "it trains us in courage [ἀνδρείαν] so that we endure any suffering willingly" (4 Macc 5:23).[50] But justice emerges as the paramount virtue that warrants our praise of Eleazar and the seven sons (4 Macc 1:8, 10). Inasmuch as justice refers to one's duty to God, family, fatherland, and ancestors, the story about the old man and the seven brothers regularly calls attention to the fact that they explicitly died in fulfillment of their duty to one of the four objects of duty mentioned above. One author acknowledges the duty shown to God by death as evidence of the virtue of justice: "They by nobly dying *fulfilled their service to God*" (4 Macc 12:14; see 4 Macc 6:22 and 11:20–21). Eleazar boasts that he will leave a noble example to others of how to die a good death "willingly and nobly for the *revered and holy laws*" (2 Macc 6:28).[51] This refers of course to God, the author of the laws, but also to the fatherland or *ethnos,* which collectively keeps those laws rather than Greek ones (see 2 Macc 8:21; 4 Macc 6:22, 27–28; 9:1). Judas's exhortation made his army ready "to die for their laws and their country" (2 Macc 8:21). Finally, the Maccabean heroes fulfill their duty toward their kin: "Let us bravely die for our kindred" (1 Macc 9:10). All of the Maccabean literature, therefore, acknowledges two virtues as constitutive of a noble death: (1) courage to die a painful death and (2) justice or loyalty to God, the laws of the *ethnos,* the *ethnos* itself, and one's kindred.[52]

The Maccabean literature argues that not only did many Israelites know the Greek language (since the works were composed in Greek for a Greek-speaking Israelite audience), but that their authors learned as well the Hellenistic canons of honor which earn public praise (e.g., Josephus, *Ant.* 17.152–54). As we turn to John 10, we are aware that Greek-speaking audiences are quite likely to know and appreciate the value code of the dominant culture. What now of the death of the "noble shepherd"?

III. The Noble Death of Jesus

Our examination of the "noble death" of Jesus focuses on two passages in John, namely, 10:11–18 and 11:46–53.

[49] See also 4 Macc 7:14; 10:7; 11:20–21; 18:22. The same thing is said of Jesus' death in Heb 2:14–15.

[50] See also 2 Macc 6:28 and 31; the mother of the seven sons is praised for her display of "manliness," otherwise known as courage: 2 Macc 7:20–21; 4 Macc 1:8.

[51] 4 Maccabees 9:29 reads: "How sweet is any kind of death *for the religion of our ancestors.*"

[52] Again, van Henten, *Maccabean Martyrs as Saviours,* 270–88.

John 10:11–18

Because of the rich tradition about a "noble" death in the rhetoric of praise, we argue that the adjective qualifying the "shepherd" be translated as "noble" (καλός) and not simply "good." The author immediately tells us that the shepherd is labeled "noble" because his death benefits the flock: "the 'noble' shepherd lays down his life for his sheep." On this point, then, the author employs the same criteria that orators used to declared the deaths of fallen soldiers as "noble." Compare the passage in John 10 with Hyperides' remark about the general and soldiers of Athens:

John 10:11 ὁ ποιμὴν ὁ καλός τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ τίθησιν ὑπὲρ τῶν προβάτων

Hyperides, *Funeral Speech* 16
οἳ τὰς ἑαυτῶν ψυχὰς ἔδωκαν ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας.

In praising the soldiers who died in Athens' defense, Hyperides cites the fact that they "died in battle for her," the clearest proof of their benefaction to the homeland. John cites the same behavior of Jesus-the-shepherd ("lay down his life for his flock") as the grounds for labeling him the "noble" shepherd. The rhetoric of praise we examined above provides an adequate background to interpret culturally John's honor claim for the shepherd. There is no question but that the qualifying remark, "lay down his life," refers to death.[53]

Part of the argument that the shepherd is "noble" consists in the typical comparison found in funeral orations between heroes and cowards. In John, if the "noble" shepherd lays down his life for his sheep, by comparison the "hireling" flees when the wolf attacks. Like comparisons in the rhetoric of praise, two options are compared: (1) manly courage versus cowardice, (2) fight versus flight, (3) death versus life, and finally (4) honor/glory versus shame/disgrace. In this light we read the contrast between the hireling and the noble shepherd as follows. The noble shepherd displays *courage, decides* to fight the enemy and thus dies *for the flock.* Therefore, he receives the *acknowledgment* of being "noble" for his honorable deeds. In comparison, the hireling *cowardly flees* from the conflict; by *opting* to save *his life* he earns only *contempt and disgrace.*[54] We argue that any audience in the world of the fourth evangelist would understand the cultural implications of "courage" and "cowardice" in this comparison and thus honor the virtuous deed but cast shame on its opposite.

[53] Brown, *Gospel According to John,* 386–87. He notes that the expression occurs also in 13:37; 15:13; 1 John 3:16.

[54] John 10:1–17 contain other comparisons: true and false shepherds (10:1–5), as well as true provider of the sheep and "thieves and bandits" (10:8–10).

It is sometimes argued that the wolf stands for Satan or the Ruler of the World.[55] If accurate, we note that in Hermogenes' rules for an encomium, he prescribed that honor may be drawn "from the one who slew him, as that Achilles died at the hands of the god Apollo."[56] The cosmic identification of Jesus' foe as "Ruler of the World," then, serves as grounds for even greater praise of Jesus because he dies fighting the ultimate foe.[57] Similarly, we read later that the Jerusalem elite gathered in counsel to destroy Jesus—an unbalanced fight in which elites with military might rallied to kill a mere Galilean peasant. They may not be a "noble" foe, but their collective, powerful action against Jesus elevates the conflict between them and Jesus as a battle between the best.

In 10:14 the shepherd is once again declared "noble" because he "knows his own" [sheep]. We suggest that this phrase describes Jesus' *just duty* to them, and so is an act of virtue of justice. All "virtuous" actions are noble and worthy of praise, especially courage and justice. A prominent virtue of Athens' soldiers who fell in combat is courage (ἀνδρεία),[58] which we saw credited to Jesus in the comparison of shepherd with hireling. The shepherd, however, displays another mark of nobility, the virtue of justice (δικαιοσύνη). Representing a long tradition, one progymnastic writer defined justice as the virtue whereby people honor their basic obligations. "The parts of justice [δικαιοσύνη] are piety, fair dealing, and reverence: piety toward the gods, fair dealing towards men, reverence toward the departed."[59] We suggest that in 10:11–18 the evangelist highlights two aspects of justice: piety to God and fair dealing toward the

[55] Judith Kovacs points out three clusters of material (12:20–36; 14:30–31; and 16:8–11), which indicate that the author of the Fourth Gospel elevated Jesus' death by seeing it as combat with the world's most powerful figure, thus giving increased significance to his death ("'Now Shall the Ruler'"). A long tradition exists that identifies the wolf as Satan; vicious wolves, moreover, are often predicted as attacking the fold (Matt 7:15; Acts 20:29–30; *Did.* 16:3; Ignatius *Phil.* 2.2; *2 Clement* 5.2–4).

[56] See Baldwin, *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic,* 32.

[57] A comparable remark is made in Heb 2:14–15, that "through death he might destroy him who has the power of death, that is, the devil, and deliver all those who through fear of death were subject to lifelong bondage." See Harold Attridge, *Hebrews* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1989), 92.

[58] All Athenian funeral speeches praise the courage of the fallen: Thucydides, *Histories* 2.42; Isocrates, *Evagoras* 29, 42–44; Plato, *Menexenus* 237–46; Hyperides, *Funeral Speech* 8–19; Demosthenes, *Funeral Speech* 6, 17; and Lysias, *Funeral Oration* 68.

[59] Menander Rhetor I.361.17–25. Similarly, another ancient definition of justice states: "First among the claims of righteousness are our *duties to the gods, then our duties to the spirits, then those to country and parents, then those to the departed;* among these claims is piety, which is either a part of righteousness or a concomitant of it. Righteousness is also accompanied by holiness and truth and loyalty and hatred of wickedness" (Ps. Aristotle, *Virtues and Vices* 5.2–3, emphasis added). See also Cicero, *Inv.* 2.160–61.

disciples/sheep.[60] Beginning with the latter, we note that the hireling has no duty to the sheep; they are not his, but belong to another. In no way is he obliged in justice to face the wolf on their behalf; the owner should, but not the hireling. In contrast, the shepherd proclaims that he "knows his sheep"; that is, he owns them as his own and assumes responsibility for them. His sheep, moreover, "know" him, thus assuring the reader that duties are understood on both sides. "Knowing" has the sense of acknowledging, being loyal to, and feeling responsibility toward.[61] The sheep manifest their relationship to the shepherd by the fact that they "hear his voice, he calls them by name . . . and the sheep follow him" (10:3–4). The duty in justice which the shepherd owes the sheep is then expressed in the declaration that "I lay down my life for my sheep" (10:15). Thus, when Jesus the shepherd says, "I know mine and mine know me" (10:14), he declares his loyalty to the sheep and thus acknowledges his duty in justice to "his own."

The justice of the shepherd points in another direction, *piety* to Jesus' Father, who is God. Paralleling the remark made about the reciprocal "knowing" between shepherd and sheep, Jesus declares a similar relationship with the Father: "the Father knows me and I know the Father" (10:15). In addition to what we learned about "knowing" above, we are reminded of Bultmann's remark about the verb "to know," that one of its basic meanings is "acknowledgment," as when the scriptures talk about "knowing God" or "knowing God's name."[62] Although "to know" forms an important part of the way John's Gospel distinguishes insiders from outsiders and ranks the insiders in terms of what they know, the present meaning of "to know" has to do with social relationships, which entail reciprocal duties. Some form no relationship with Jesus: they do not know him (1:10; 16:3; 17:25), whereas God, Jesus, and his disciples "know" each other and so indicate intimate levels of loyalty and commitment (6:69; 10:38; 13:31; 17:3, 23). All of this aids in our appreciation of 10:15 as expressing a relationship in which duties are fulfilled, God and Jesus as well as Jesus and his disciples. This encodes what was meant by the virtue of justice. Thus, two

[60] John Ashton makes the same point in terms of Israelite religious language: "The Father's 'knowing' the Son is in the Old Testament and Judaic tradition of election, while knowing on the Son's part means acknowledgment: the Son accepts the Father's revelation and his will" (*The Understanding of the Fourth Gospel* [Oxford: Clarendon, 1992], 328).

[61] Commentators are unsure how to translate "know" here; Brown wisely links 10:14 with the original parable in 10:3–5. Hence, "knowledge" is not simply information or recognition, but accepting a relationship (*Gospel According to John,* 396). In Brown's special note on "know" (p. 514) he lists as illustration of the personal meaning of "know" texts that tell of the world or sinners not knowing the Father or Jesus: 1:10; 16:3; 17:25; 1 John 3:1, 6. "Not knowing" God or Jesus means not accepting them or not becoming their disciples.

[62] Rudolf Bultmann, "Γινώσκω," *TDNT* 1:698.

virtues, justice and courage, mark the behavior of the "noble" shepherd, just as they did for Athenian soldiers who died noble deaths. These virtues, moreover, are articulated in the context of the death of the noble shepherd, thus giving further significance to the "noble" shepherd's death.

In 10:16 Jesus states that he has "other sheep, not of this fold" and so there will be "one flock and one shepherd."[63] This remark too becomes more accessible when seen in terms of "noble death." First, it surely benefits the sheep to be safely gathered into one, that is, into close association with the shepherd, who can pasture and protect them. This represents another example of the duty of the shepherd, that is, his virtue of justice toward the sheep. Second, when or how is this achieved? Comparable remarks in 11:52; 12:23–24, and 32 indicate that Jesus' death occasions these benefits. Caiaphas's prophecy, we are told, really meant "that Jesus would die . . . not for the nation only, but to gather into one the scattered children of God" (11:52). Jesus' death, then, benefits both the sheep currently around him and those "scattered." Similarly, in an unmistakable reference to his death Jesus says: "When I am lifted up from the earth, I will draw all to myself" (12:32). His death ("lifted up") benefits others by "drawing all to myself." Thus, 10:16, especially when seen in relationship to similar remarks in chs. 10–12, reflects the argument that a death is "noble" because it benefits others and displays the virtue of justice.

The relationship of Jesus with God is further illumined when we are told, "For this reason my Father loves me, because I lay down my life in order to take it up again" (10:17). Examining this in the light of the rhetoric of noble death, we saw earlier that "love" was considered a part of justice in antiquity. In the cultural world of the NT, "love" basically referred to group bonds or group glue that held persons together, especially kinship groups.[64] The Father's "love" contains a strong element of approval, which suggests the pride of God in Jesus. Obedient sons, moreover, show justice to their fathers and so honor them. The reason for this "love" is the complex statement that Jesus both lays down his life and takes it back. We have already seen that "laying down one's life" for another marks a death as "noble" and so worthy of honor. But the second part, "in order that I may take it again," has no parallel in funeral oratory. No one in the history of humankind has ever come back from the dead. In fact we are called "mortals," that is, those who die, to distinguish us from God or the gods who are the "immortals." Is Jesus crossing a boundary line here? For a mere mortal to claim such would be ludicrous and thus shameful (see John 8:52, 56–58). In fact such a claim would violate justice, for it would constitute blasphemy toward God,

[63] See Brown, *Gospel According to John,* 396; Rudolf Schnackenburg, *The Gospel According to John* (New York: Crossroad, 1982), 2:299.

[64] John Pilch and Bruce Malina, eds., *Handbook of Biblical Social Values* (updated ed.; Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1998), 127–28.

not piety (see 10:33). How are Jesus' remarks just and so honorable? Jesus claims authorization from God for his speech and actions: "I have received this command from my Father" (10:18). A son who obeys his father honors him; he fulfills the basic justice that offspring owe their parents.

Looking more closely at 10:17–18, we recall how in funeral rhetoric a death was labeled "noble" because it was voluntary. Both v. 17 and v. 18 affirm the voluntary nature of Jesus' death. For the third and fourth times, Jesus states that he lays down his own life.[65]

10:11 The good shepherd *lays down his life* for his sheep.
10:15 *I lay down my life* for my sheep.
10:17 The Father loves me because *I lay down my life.*
10:18 I have power *to lay it down.*

He may well declare that his death is God's will or that he goes as it was written of him and other such remarks. But the substance is the same: he chooses, he agrees, he "lays down his life *willingly*" (ἀπ᾽ ἐμαυτοῦ).[66]

But 10:17–18 states more, for Jesus proudly declares, "No one takes it from me." We saw above in the gloss on the "wolf" that Jesus confronts a very powerful foe. But this foe has no power over Jesus (14:30); in fact, as Jesus faces his death, he declares, "I have overcome the world" (16:33). Thus, the remarks in 10:17–18 assert two things: first, as we saw in the funeral orations, Jesus is no victim—he dies unconquered; he is not mastered by anyone (see 18:4–6).[67] Second, the reason for Jesus' death lies entirely in his own hands: he can both "lay it down" and "take it up." It would be fair to say that he dies voluntarily and is unvanquished and unconquered, which are marks of a noble death.

Finally, Jesus claims "power" (ἐξουσία) to lay down his life and to take it

[65] C. K. Barrett made two useful observations on this phrase (*The Gospel According to John* [2d ed.; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1978], 374–75). First, it is peculiar to John and 1 John (10:11, 15, 17f.; 13:37f.; 15:13; 1 John 3:16); second, in John ὑπέρ always carries the significance of death (in addition to the citations above, see 6:51; 18:14).

[66] Scholars indeed call attention to the voluntary character of 10:17–18; but to my knowledge no one has suggested any Hellenistic parallels to this. Rather they refer to parallels in the Hebrew Scriptures such as David facing the bear and lion in 1 Sam 17:34–35. Thus Brown states: "The similarity [with OT materials] suggests that we need not go outside the OT for the background of this particular aspect of the Johannine picture of the shepherd: it is a combination of elements from the OT descriptions of the shepherd and of the Suffering Servant" (*Gospel According to John,* 398).

[67] Helen C. Orchard argues just the opposite in her study (*Courting Betrayal: Jesus as Victim in the Gospel of John* [JSNTSup 161; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998]). While on the one hand one must agree with Orchard that the entire narrative in John describes incessant and increasing hostility to Jesus, on the other hand she brings to the discussion no mention whatsoever of the rhetoric of death in the ancient world. Where I talk of "noble" death, which is articulated in a clear body of ancient rhetorical materials, Orchard speaks of the "victimization" of Jesus in terms of liberation theology and anecdotes of current political martyrs.

back (v. 18). In light of the rhetoric of a noble death, this expresses for the fourth time that his death is voluntary, namely, "I lay it down." Voluntary deaths, we know, are always "noble." The claim to have "power," moreover, belongs to the world of praise and honor. People with "power" are, as we say, movers and shakers. They control their own destiny; they accomplish what they set out to do. This suggests, then, that Jesus stands very high on the scale of people who do difficult deeds and who are masters of their fate. Whence comes this power? "I have received this command [ἐντολή] from my Father" (v. 18b). At the very least, v. 18 states that it is God's will that Jesus lay down his life, thus referring to his "obedient death."[68] Hence Jesus claims to be fulfilling the dutiful relationship between himself and the Father, a virtuous or just thing to do. His claim to have such "power" argues that he is no victim whose life is taken from him; he is in total command.

But the claim to have power "to take it [my life] again" does not register with anything in the Hebrew Bible or the Greek rhetoric of praise. This is nothing other than a claim to have one of the exclusive powers of God.[69] Jesus claims that even though he dies ("I lay down my life"), he will likewise conquer (". . . take it back again"). This remark remains but a claim until evidence is provided. But as a claim, it lays hold of the greatest power in the cosmos of which humans could conceive. If the claim is true, then exalted honor should be accorded Jesus, for he will have done what no one else can do, except God. Thus, his death is noble for three reasons: (a) he claims the greatest of all powers, namely, to conquer death; (b) his empowerment is unique: no one but his donor has or will have this power; and (c) his death is voluntary and he dies unconquered.

What, then, does consideration of John 10:11–18 in the light of the rhetorical tradition of a noble death tell us? There seems to be a close affinity on a number of points (see the chart on the next page). The presence of so many and such important motifs in one Johannine passage warrants comment. First, we trust that the similarities noted in the chart are correct. This amplification of the nobility of certain kinds of death is regularly found scattered throughout Greek rhetorical theory and praxis, but is clustered in John 10:11–18. This amplification of praise suggests that one of the formal strategies in the telling of John 10 is to claim and demonstrate the nobleness of Jesus precisely by his death.[70]

[68] See Brown, *Gospel According to John*, 398.

[69] See Jerome H. Neyrey, *An Ideology of Revolt: John's Christology in Social-Science Perspective* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988), 22–29, 59–74.

[70] Outside of the context of David or Israel's king as shepherd-ruler, shepherd carried with it base and shameful connotations. It is listed among the "despised trades" documented by Joachim Jeremias from mishnaic and talmudic texts (*Jerusalem in the Time of Jesus* [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1969], 303–12). On the double meaning of the term shepherd, see Bruce Malina and Richard Rohrbaugh, *Social-Science Commentary on the Gospel of John* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1998), 179.

Rhetorical Tradition about "Noble Death"	John's Discourse on the Noble Shepherd
1. Death benefited others, especially fellow citizens.	1. Death benefits the sheep, who enjoy a special relationship with the shepherd.
2. Comparison between courage/cowardice fight/flight, death/life, honor/shame	2. Comparison between shepherd/hireling: courage/cowardice, fight/flight, death/life, honor/shame
3. Manly courage displayed by soldiers who fight and die	3. Manly courage displayed by shepherd who battles wolf
4. Uniqueness of deeds and death	4. Unique power over death and return to life
5. Voluntary death is praised	5. Voluntary death repeatedly claimed: "I lay it down of my own accord."
6. Unconquered in death; victory in dying nobly	6. Not a victim: "No one takes it from me . . ." "I lay it down; I take it up again."
7. Justice: soldiers uphold the honor of their families and serve the interests of the fatherland; duties served	7. Justice: the shepherd manifests loyalty to his sheep and his Father; he has a command from God; duties served

John 11:45–53

The evangelist talks again about Jesus' death in 11:45–53, a passage that has received only cursory treatment in commentaries and articles.[71] Bringing our knowledge of the "noble death" tradition to bear, let us examine what is said of Jesus' demise. The narrative describes a situation caused by Jesus' raising of Lazarus, which is an act of justice or loyalty to a "beloved" friend and which occasions a surge of Jesus' reputation and honor (11:45–46). Hence the Pharisees express envy of Jesus' success, because they understand that Jesus' honor means their corresponding loss of prestige (11:47–48).[72] The situation is one of intense conflict, which the opponents magnify by claiming that, unless Jesus is cut down to size, a war with Rome will occur and they will lose their high status.

[71] Most scholarship has focused on two issues: (1) the background of the prophecy of the high priest (Brown, *Gospel According to John,* 442–43; Lindars, *Gospel of John,* 406–7) and (2) irony (Paul Duke, *Irony in the Fourth Gospel* [Atlanta: John Knox, 1985], 86–90).

[72] On the topic of envy and honor, see Hagedorn and Neyrey, "'It Was Out of Envy,'" 15–65. In terms of Greek funeral orations, see Ziolkowsky, *Thucydides and the Tradition of Funeral Speeches in Athens,* 128.

While their envy provides no solution to the conflict, it makes salient the issue at stake: honor—Jesus' or theirs.

After shaming them ("You know nothing . . . you do not understand"), the high priest proclaimed, "It is expedient that one man should die for the people and that the whole nation should not perish" (11:50). The evangelist immediately tells us that this is a prophecy uttered unwittingly, so that the readership should examine it for important, ironic information.[73] First, the verb "expedient" indicates achieving profit or advantage.[74] But, as we saw above in Aristotle's exposition of grounds for praise, honorable actions are not done for one's own sake (*Rhet.* 1.9.16–17), have "less of the self" (1.9.19) and are not for one's own advantage (1.9.18). Yet the implications of envy and the actions that follow this conference are indeed to the self-advantage of the elite. Yet according to the irony of the scene, Jesus' death will yield a noble result that benefits others but not Jesus himself. In contrast to Caiaphas's remark to the Pharisees, profit or advantage truly comes if one man *dies for the nation.* As the death of Athenian soldiers benefited their homeland, Jesus' death too will ironically benefit the *ethnos* of Israel. It will be a noble death because, as Aristotle said, "[that is noble] whatever someone has done for his country" (*Rhet.* 1.9.17) and "whatever works are done for the sake of others" (1.9.19). Third, actions are noble that benefit others, but nobler actions benefit many more. Hence the editorial comment in 11:52 boosts the effect of Jesus' death, thus calling for even greater honor: ". . . and not for the nation only, but to gather into one the children of God who are scattered abroad." The expansion of Caiaphas's prophecy echoes what Jesus said earlier in his role of noble shepherd about achieving "one flock and one shepherd" (10:16; see 12:32). As Raymond Brown has argued, we are touching here the evangelist's sense of a universal membership,[75] implying that Jesus' death benefits the whole world, which would make it unspeakably honorable.

IV. Conclusions and Further Questions

What have we learned? First, the data from funeral orations, epideictic rhetoric, and encomiums attest the existence of a clear topos of "noble death."

[73] Roger David Aus argues that the appropriate background for this narrative is the midrash describing the surrender of Jehoiakim and his son Jehoiachin and also of Sheba, the son of Bichri; he identifies six motifs in the midrash that correspond to John 11:46–53: (1) a gathering of the Great Sanhedrin, (2) the destruction of the temple, (3) rebellion and judgment, (4) one life for others, (5) "what shall we do?" (6) scattering ("The Death of One for All in John 11:45–54 in Light of Judaic Traditions," in *Barabbas and Esther and other Studies in the Judaic Illumination of Early Christianity* [Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1992], 29–63).

[74] See Konrad Weiss, "συμφέρω," *TDNT* 9:69–78.

[75] Brown, *Gospel According to John,* 442–43.

The ancients indeed articulated the concept and provided the rationale for assessing a death as noble. Second, the extant literary tradition about "noble death" extends from Thucydides' record of Pericles' funeral speech, through Greek funeral orators, Aristotle, and to the school exercises called the *progymnasmata,* which were taught even in the first century. This tradition, moreover, was remarkably constant and highly conventional. Third, the Johannine discourse about the shepherd contains a cluster of seven of the classical criteria for a noble death: (1) death that benefits the sheep, (2) comparison between shepherd and hireling, (3) manly courage displayed by the shepherd who battles the wolf, (4) uniqueness of power over death and return to life, (5) voluntary character of his death , (6) dying *not* as a victim, and (7) manifestation of shepherd's duties in justice *for* his sheep and *to* his Father/God. Both the clustering of so many classical criteria and their patently Hellenistic character persuade us to consider Greek oratory and the rhetoric of praise as the appropriate cultural background of John's shepherd discourse.

Fourth, how did the author of the Fourth Gospel come to know this material? We claim that for a person to write Greek as well as the author of the Fourth Gospel, he would most likely have been trained in progymnastic exercises. The Johannine treatment of the "noble" shepherd would be entirely plausible from his mastery of learning to write Greek through the medium of the progymnastic encomium.

Fifth, it is not our intention to assault the solid argument about the Judean background of the Fourth Gospel.[76] Rather, we see no conflict in the assertion that in addition to the Johannine use of Israelite traditions we find compelling evidence of Hellenistic influence through the specific topic of "noble death."

Sixth, one learned not simply a genre but also a code of values and a grammar of worth, which was the formal aim of both encomium and epideictic rhetoric. One learned "honor and shame" in terms that would be appreciated by an audience who shared this value. When we recall how Paul combated an assessment of the death of Jesus as "folly" and "scandal" (1 Cor 1:18–25) and how the author of Hebrews declared that Jesus "despised the shame of the cross" (12:2), John, like other NT authors, emphasizes the ironic honor and status elevation Jesus experienced through the cross.

Other passages in the Fourth Gospel seem to connect with John 10 and the noble death of the shepherd. Let us briefly mention some. First, the exhortation in 15:13 declares: "Greater love than this has no one, than that *one lay*

[76] See Hugo Odeberg, *The Fourth Gospel* (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1929); Wayne A. Meeks, *The Prophet-King* (Leiden: Brill, 1967). I myself have argued this repeatedly in a series of articles: "Jacob Traditions and the Interpretation of John 4:10–26," *CBQ* 41 (1979): 419–37; "'I Said: You are God': Psalm 82:6 and John 10," *JBL* 108 (1989): 647–63; "Jesus the Judge: Forensic Process in John 8, 21–59," *Bib* 68 (1987): 509–41.

down one's life for one's friend." This remark to the disciples echoes Jesus' noble death in 10:11 and 15, and thereby canonizes "laying down one's life for one's friends" as honorable. The comparative here ("greater" love) suggests that such behavior is the highest form of love, thus claiming for it uniqueness and maximum worth. A disciple's "laying down his life for his friends" models the death of the Noble Shepherd in these terms: (1) benefit for others, (2) uniqueness, (3) the virtue of justice, i.e., duty and devotion to one's own.[77]

In a series of remarks Jesus declares that in his death he will be glorified: "The hour has come for the Son of man to be glorified" (12:23; see 13:31 and 17:1). It is generally agreed that "glory" in these remarks refers to a form of posthumous vindication by God (see Acts 2:23–24; 3:14–15; 4:10; 10:39–40) or to Jesus' enthronement with a status and role greater than he enjoyed on earth (see Acts 2:36; Phil 2:6–11).[78] In John the posthumous glory of Jesus is a direct grant of honor from God, which students of honor and shame call "ascribed honor." Nevertheless, in the context of this study we consider it posthumous glory, not unlike that bestowed on soldiers who died a noble death.

We should compare the remarks about the Noble Shepherd in John 10 with what is said about other "shepherds" of the group. Peter boasts that he would "lay down my life for you" (13:37), an action which this Gospel considers noble and associates with another shepherd, Jesus (10:11, 15). But Peter lacks sufficient courage and nobility.[79] Although Jesus shames him for his vain claim (13:38), yet the issue of nobility if not the role of shepherd remains accessible to him as Jesus says: "Where I am going you cannot follow me now; but you will follow afterwards" (13:36). In contrast, the Beloved Disciple acts like a shepherd in 18:15–16 when he persuades the maid who kept the door to admit Peter.[80] This closely resembles the parable in 10:1–5, in which the shepherd enters by the door, the gatekeeper opens the door for him, his sheep hear his voice, and he either leads them in or out. The very fact that the Beloved Disciple and Peter enter the dwelling of Jesus' enemy, the high priest, tells us that this is a life-risking scene (i.e., "lay down my life"). But Peter's subsequent cowardice (18:17–18, 25–27) demonstrates his disqualification to be a noble shepherd at this time.

[77] On the relationship of the parables of the shepherd and the vine, see John F. O'Grady, "Good Shepherd and the Vine and the Branches," *BTB* 8 (1978): 86–96. See also Martin Dibelius, *Botschaft und Geschichte* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1953), 1:204–10.

[78] See G. B. Caird, "The Glory of God in the Fourth Gospel: An Exercise in Biblical Semantics," *NTS* 15 (1969): 265–77; Brown, *Gospel According to John*, 470–71; Barrett, *Gospel According to John*, 450.

[79] See my article "The Footwashing in John 13:6–11: Transformation Ritual or Ceremony?" in *The Social World of the First Christians* (ed. L. Michael White and Larry Yarborough; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 206–13.

[80] See ibid., 210–11.

The Gospel concludes with the investiture of Peter with the role of shepherd (21:15–17). In conjunction with this, Jesus predicts the death of Peter (v. 18), by which he would "glorify" God (v. 19). We ask again: What constitutes a worthy shepherd? Is Peter, who once failed in courage and loyalty toward Jesus, now a "noble" shepherd? The text would suggest that we now reappraise Peter as a person willing to lay down his life, either in imitation of Jesus or to benefit the flock in some way. His triple declaration that he "loves" Jesus qualifies him according to 15:13 as one whose "greater" love leads him to "lay down his life for his friend." This much is clear: worthy shepherds are they who die in service of their flocks, thus highlighting a death which benefits others, is voluntarily accepted, and manifests justice toward a group in one's care. Thus, Peter will ultimately enjoy the honor of being another "noble" shepherd in the Fourth Gospel.

Finally, the scene of Jesus' arrest in 18:1–11 contains many dramatizations of the reasons for a noble death. Throughout the episode, Jesus stands between his disciples and those who would apprehend him, that is, he boldly comes forward like a shepherd who positions himself between the flock and the wolf (18:4–7). Second, by coming forward (18:4) and taking control of the conversation (18:5), Jesus voluntarily enters into the process of his arrest. He is not captured, but allows himself to be taken. Like a good shepherd, he benefits his flock by commanding his captors, "Let these men go" (18:8). The evangelist interprets his remark as the fulfillment of a prophecy, which means that the shepherd has benefited the flock by preserving all of those so destined (see John 6:39; 10:28; 17:12). And at the end of the episode, when the disciples act to protect Jesus, he claims that their zeal is misplaced. Jesus' arrest and death are "the cup which the Father has given me" (18:11); that is, Jesus obeys the will of God here, voluntarily choosing to do this and in it to demonstrate justice by paying his duty to Father and God.[81] This scene, then, contains many of the criteria for a noble death and seems to be a dramatization of the same materials claimed in John 10:11–18.

Therefore, in addition to our reading of John 10:11–18 and 11:45–52 in light of the rhetoric of a noble death, other passages and themes in the Gospel seem to contain either direct references to the noble shepherd material or to illustrate one or another of the criteria that serve to qualify a death as noble. "Noble death" emerges as one of the more significant articulations of Jesus' death in the Fourth Gospel.

[81] An analysis of this passage in terms of honor and shame can be found in my article "Despising the Shame of the Cross: Honor and Shame in the Johannine Passion Narrative," *Semeia* 68 (1994): 119–20.

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FROM ἀδελφοί TO οἶκος θεοῦ: SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN PAULINE CHRISTIANITY

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> *Unser Leben geht hin mit Verwandlung*, Rilke says: Our life passes in transformation. This is what I seek to grasp in the theory of structuration.
> —Anthony Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory*

> The purpose of our journey is to attempt to construct a kind of ethnography of Christian beginnings.
> —Wayne Meeks, *The Origins of Christian Morality*

I. Introduction

One of the aspects of social structure commonly investigated by anthropologists is that of kinship.[1] This is true not only of anthropological studies based on the traditional method of "participant observation" but also of those based on the study of particular literary or historical texts: the Anglo-Saxon epic

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[1] See, e.g., R. M. Keesing, *Cultural Anthropology: A Contemporary Perspective* (2d ed.; New York: CBS College Publishing; Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1981), 212–50; T. H. Eriksen, *Small Places, Large Issues: An Introduction to Social and Cultural Anthropology* (London: Pluto, 1995), 82–94. A brief introduction related to NT studies is given by K. C. Hanson, "Kinship," in *The Social*

Beowulf or the novels of Jane Austen, for example.[2] Investigation of the language used to describe kinship patterns and family relationships is important not just because it enables a picture to be sketched of who relates to whom and how, but also because the specific language used both reflects and shapes patterns of social relationships. In the process of what Anthony Giddens calls "structuration"—the "structuring of social relations across time and space," with structure as both "the medium and outcome of the conduct it recursively organizes"—kinship language shapes social relationships and is simultaneously reproduced in the context of those relationships.[3] Over time, both language and patterns of relationships may evolve and change. The fact that sons in Jane Austen's novels always address their father as "Sir," for example, reveals something about the moral ideals of deference and obedience expected among children in that author's era.[4] Contemporary British terms of address are generally different, and both reflect and construct correspondingly different patterns of social and moral interaction.

In this essay I want to consider how some aspects of kinship and household language contribute to the shaping of social relationships within the Pauline churches, and how, if at all, the patterns of language and relationships change over time in the NT period. In line with general, though by no means unanimous, scholarly judgment, I shall include as genuine epistles of Paul: Romans, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Galatians, Philippians, 1 Thessalonians and Philemon.[5] Colossians and Ephesians will be taken as early and closely related

Sciences and New Testament Interpretation (ed. Richard L. Rohrbaugh; Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1996), 62–79.

[2] J. M. Hill, *The Cultural World in Beowulf* (Anthropological Horizons; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995); I. Schapera, *Kinship Terminology in Jane Austen's Novels* (Royal Anthropological Institute Occasional Paper 33; London: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, 1977). S. R. Barrett notes the recent upsurge in archival and historical research in anthropology in his *Anthropology: A Student's Guide to Theory and Method* (Toronto/Buffalo/London: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 194 n. 4.

[3] See A. Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration* (Cambridge: Polity, 1984), 374, 376, also xiii–xxxvii, 1–40; idem, *Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory* (London/Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1982), 28–39. For further references, and an introduction to Giddens's structuration theory in relation to NT studies, see D. G. Horrell, *The Social Ethos of the Corinthian Correspondence* (Studies of the New Testament and Its World; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1996), 45–59, 313; idem, "The Development of Theological Ideology in Pauline Christianity: A Structuration Theory Perspective," in *Modelling Early Christianity* (ed. P. F. Esler; London/New York: Routledge, 1995), 224–36.

[4] See Schapera, *Kinship Terminology*, 2.

[5] 2 Thessalonians, the authenticity of which is often doubted, is not taken directly into consideration, though the relevant statistics are included for information on the table in the appendix. Ἀδελφός-terminology appears somewhat more frequently in 2 Thessalonians than in what I have counted as pseudo-Pauline epistles, but if 2 Thessalonians is pseudonymous, as seems to me most

examples of post-Pauline pseudepigraphy, the Pastoral Epistles as somewhat later additions to the Pauline corpus, written probably around the end of the first century.

There are many familial and household terms used in the Pauline correspondence, and while a number are mentioned briefly in the discussion below my main focus is on the language of brother- or sisterhood (ἀδελφός, ἀδελφή, etc.)[6] and of house or household (οἶκος, οἰκία, οἰκεῖος, etc.).[7] My particular interest in this paper is in the metaphorical uses of these terms to describe and to construct the Christian community and the relationships between its members. In other words, the focus is on what has often been termed "fictive kinship" language and on the designation of the church community as a household (of God), and not on the relations between natural siblings or within actual households. While the language of brother/sisterhood and that of house/household are clearly closely related and overlap in terms of that which they generally describe, they should not simply be treated together as varied forms of familial terminology.[8] We need to consider how the distribution of sibling and house-

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likely, it is in a somewhat unique position, being clearly based on 1 Thessalonians. That would make the reduction in references to believers as ἀδελφοί (nineteen times in 1 Thessalonians, eight times in 2 Thessalonians) notable, an observation that coheres with the overall argument of this paper.

[6] I have wrestled with the problem of inclusive terminology in this paper, though I am conscious that—lacking in imagination perhaps—I have not satisfactorily solved it. What is clear is that a strategy such as that adopted by the NRSV, where ἀδελφός and אָח are regularly translated "neighbor," "member of the community" (e.g., Deut 15:2–3, 7–11), "believer" (e.g., 1 Cor 6:6–8; 7:12; 8:11; etc.), would be entirely inappropriate for this paper. As Scott Bartchy points out, this leads to the original terminology being obscured such that modern readers miss seeing the extent to which sibling-like bonds are being encouraged among the communities addressed by the biblical writers (S. S. Bartchy, "Undermining Ancient Patriarchy: The Apostle Paul's Vision of a Society of Siblings," *BTB* 29 [1999]: 68–78, here p. 70). Since the masculine terms ἀδελφός and ἀδελφοί are those most often used (generically) by Paul, I have also written them frequently. Leaving the terms untranslated may perhaps help to stress that this is ancient (patriarchal!) language which raises problems for modern inclusive translation. To some extent I have followed Bartchy and Aasgaard in using the term "sibling," though I am conscious that this term is much less common in contemporary English than "brother" or "sister."

[7] On the familial terms in particular, see D. von Allmen, *La Famille de Dieu: La Symbolique familiale dans le Paulinisme* (OBO 41; Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1981).

[8] As (understandably) in the brief survey by R. Banks, *Paul's Idea of Community* (rev. ed.; Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1994), 50–51; and in P. F. Esler, "Family Imagery and Christian Identity in Gal 5:13 to 6:10," in *Constructing Early Christian Families* (ed. H. Moxnes; London/New York: Routledge, 1997), 122–23. Note the comments of K. O. Sandnes, "Equality within Patriarchal Structures: Some New Testament Perspectives on the Christian Fellowship as a Brother- or Sisterhood and a Family," in *Constructing Early Christian Families,* ed. Moxnes, 150; and K. Schäfer, *Gemeinde als »Bruderschaft«: Ein Beitrag zum Kirchenverständnis des Paulus* (Europäische Hochschulschriften 23/333; Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1989), 18–19.

hold language varies within the Pauline corpus and to take account of the ways in which the different terms may reflect different ideals with regard to the construction of social relationships in the Christian communities.

II. The Meaning of the Terms ἀδελφός/אָח and οἶκος/בַּיִת

The term ἀδελφός,[9] like its Hebrew equivalent, אח, first of all signifies "a person's own blood brother,"[10] but was also used of various relationships where there was some emotional and social bond:[11] between spouses,[12] kinsfolk (see n. 15), tribe members, colleagues, fellow members of an association,[13] and even between a king and a hoped-for ally.[14] In view of the frequent description of the members of the Christian community as ἀδελφοί in the NT, it is important to note that the Hebrew Bible often uses the term אח, rendered ἀδελφός in the LXX, for kinsfolk and fellow Israelites (members of an extended kin group).[15] This usage in Judaism is continued into NT times and beyond.[16] Despite the widely varied uses of the term, its basic meaning throughout remains that of "brother" (and likewise for ἀδελφή, "sister"). Thus, in its varied contexts, it reflects the existence of, or the desire for, a sibling-like bond between speaker

[9] Similar things could be said about the term ἀδελφή, "sister," but because masculine language was used generically, occurrences of ἀδελφός (often plural) are much more common in the NT and elsewhere. Cf., e.g., Job 42:11 (LXX); n. 11 below.

[10] H. Ringgren, in *TDOT* 1:188; cf. LSJ, 20: "son of the same mother."

[11] For more detailed investigation of the diversity of usage sketched here, see K. H. Schelkle, "Bruder," *RAC* 2:631–40; Aasgaard, "'My Beloved Brothers and Sisters!'" 119–27.

[12] E.g., *P.Lond*. 42; and for the term ἀδελφή used by a husband of his wife, see *P.Oxy*. 120, 528, 744. See also G. H. R. Horsley, who notes that "[l]etters in the papyri containing ἀδελφός as an address between spouses are commonplace" (*NewDocs* 1:58). Sometimes, however, it is impossible to tell whether it is a spouse or a sibling who is being addressed (letters are also frequently exchanged between siblings), and, given the practice of intersibling marriage in Egypt, it is possible that spouses are sometimes literally a brother or sister (see C. K. Barrett, *The New Testament Background: Selected Documents* [rev. ed.; London: SPCK, 1987], 29).

[13] On the use of ἀδελφός terminology in associations, see LSJ, 20 (ἀδελφός §3); Horsley, *NewDocs* 2:49–50; D. C. Duling, "The Matthean Brotherhood and Marginal Scribal Leadership," in *Modelling Early Christianity*, ed. Esler, 159–82. On the terminology in Greco-Roman religious contexts, see Schelkle, "Bruder," 632–34.

[14] Josephus, *Ant.* 13.45; cf. 1 Kgs 9:13; Jdt 7:30 (LXX). See further LSJ, 20; Ringgren, *TDOT* 1:188–93; H. F. von Soden, *TDNT* 1:144–46.

[15] E.g., Gen 13:8; Exod 2:11; Lev 25:35f.; Deut 15:7, 9, 11–12; 22:1–4. Cf. 2 Macc 1:1; Philo, *De Virt.* 82; Ringgren, *TDOT* 1:188–93; von Soden, *TDNT* 1:145: "There can be no doubt, however, that ἀδελφός is one of the titles of the people of Israel taken over by the Christian community."

[16] See, e.g., Josephus, *J.W.* 2.122 (on the Essenes); 1QS 6:10; 6:22; CD 6:20; 7:2; Str-B 1:276; Aasgaard, "'My Beloved Brothers and Sisters!'" 125–26.

and addressee(s).[17] The term itself conveys no sense of hierarchy or superiority, though that may of course be assumed or stated elsewhere in the context where it appears.[18]

The Greek terms οἶκος/οἰκία[19] and the Hebrew term בית are even more wide-ranging in meaning and use. In both languages the terms are used for both the building (part or whole) in which people live and the human members or material contents that make up the household.[20] בית and οἶκος may thus designate physical locations such as house, palace, and temple, or rooms or halls within these,[21] and also human groups ranging in scope from the immediate or extended family to the clan, dynasty, tribe, or tribal league.[22] Hence the frequent Hebrew Bible expression "house of Israel" (בֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל).[23] A particularly

[17] Bartchy seems to overlook the extent to which sibling language was widely used outside of family contexts and in the extended kinship group of an *ethnos* like Israel, thus ignoring the extent to which this sibling-like bond was meant to characterize a wide range of relationships. Bartchy suggests that in ancient Mediterranean culture, in relationships outside the family, "both boys and girls were socialized to expect . . . that every male should seek to dominate as many other men as possible . . . traditional male socialization produced human beings who were programmed to pursue a never-ending quest for greater honor and influence" ("Undermining Ancient Patriarchy," 68). Both the widespread use of ἀδελφός terminology and the qualities ascribed to friendship suggest that extra-family relationships were frequently characterized by more than an agonistic contest for honor. Indeed, authors who describe fraternal relations often draw parallels with the qualities and characteristics of friendship. See, e.g., Terence, *Adelphoe* 707–8: *si frater aut sodalis esset, qui magis morem gereret?* ("If he were a brother or a friend, how could he do more to gratify me?"); the well-known saying κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων (Plato, *Phaedrus* 279C; Terence, *Adelphoe* 803–4; Plutarch, Περὶ Φιλαδελφίας 490E). For a comparison between Paul and Plutarch on "brotherhood," see R. Aasgaard, "Brotherhood in Plutarch and Paul: Its Role and Character," in *Constructing Early Christian Families*, ed. Moxnes, 166–82, and further idem, "'My Beloved Brothers and Sisters!'"

[18] See Sandnes, "Equality within Patriarchal Structures," 150; Schäfer, *Gemeinde als »Bruderschaft«*, 37.

[19] The distinction between these two Greek terms (e.g. in Attic law οἶκος designated the whole of a deceased person's estate, οἰκία simply his residence; Xenophon, *Oeconomicus* 1.5) is largely lost in the NT (cf. 1 Cor 1:16; 16:15). See O. Michel, "οἶκος κτλ.," *TDNT* 5:131; LSJ, 1203. Note, however, C. S. de Vos, "The Significance of the Change from οἶκος to οἰκία in Luke's Account of the Philippian Gaoler (Acts 16.30–4)," *NTS* 41 (1995): 292–96, where the different nuances of the two words in that specific Lukan context are explored.

[20] See C. Osiek and D. L. Balch, *Families in the New Testament World: Households and House Churches* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1997), 6: "The Greek *oikos, oikia*, Hebrew *bayit*, and Latin *domus* can all refer to the physical building but can all just as well, and more often do, mean: household, including material goods and slaves; immediate blood family; or family lineage."

[21] E.g., H. A. Hoffner points out that בית can designate a building or part of a building, including house, palace, temple, or room or hall within these ("בַּיִת," *TDOT* 2:107–16). Michel mentions house, cave, temple, treasure-house, dwelling etc. as meanings of οἰκός (*TDNT* 5:119–20); see also LSJ, 1204–5.

[22] See, e.g., Gen 17:12, 27; 24:27, 38; 34:19; Exod 6:14; Num 2:34, Josh 17:17; 22:14; etc.

[23] E.g., Exod 16:31; Lev 10:6; Num 20:29; Josh 21:45; Isa 5:7; Jer 2:4; etc. The phrase is often

interesting and relevant example of the use of οἶκος is in the late-second- or early-first-century B.C.E. inscription from Philadelphia in Lydia, discussed by Stephen Barton and G. H. R. Horsley. The inscription sets out the regulations for members of a private Hellenistic cultic association and uses the word οἶκος to denote both the (private) meeting room or building and the association (of people) itself.[24]

A number of other related Greek terms also need to be considered along with οἶκος/οἰκία in a consideration of the use of household language to describe the Christian community in the Pauline letters. Some of these relate more to the notion of the οἶκος as a building—οἰκοδομή and οἰκοδομέω, for example—and others to οἶκος as household, such as οἰκεῖος and οἰκέτης. When and where these words are relevant to a metaphorical description of the Christian community as a household has to be decided according to context.

Since there is a range of potentially relevant terms and a basic distinction between οἶκος used of physical locations and the same word used of human groupings, it is more difficult than in the case of ἀδελφός to say something basic about what the term or terms convey and imply. However, it would seem fair to say that when οἶκος is used to describe the human household it often denotes some kind of structured and stratified group.[25] Despite the diversity of real family structures at the time,[26] which often deviated from the "ideal" of an extensive household headed by a κύριος or *paterfamilias*, there are clearly distinctions between husbands and wives, parents and children, owners and slaves.[27] Precisely what size or kind of οἶκος is in view, however, can be determined only from the context of each particular reference. Indeed, it is most important to stress that an assessment of the implications of sibling and house-

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rendered οἶκος Ισραηλ in the LXX (e.g., Lev 10:6; Num 20:29; Ruth 4:11), though sometimes υἱοὶ Ισραηλ, etc. (e.g., Exod 16:31; Josh 21:45).

[24] S. C. Barton and G. H. R. Horsley, "A Hellenistic Cult Group and the New Testament Churches," *JAC* 24 (1981): 7–41, esp. 15–16, 31–32.

[25] See again Sandnes, "Equality within Patriarchal Structures," 150.

[26] See the important article by D. B. Martin, "The Construction of the Ancient Family: Methodological Considerations," *JRS* 86 (1996): 40–60. On household structures around the time of Christian origins, see D. C. Verner, *The Household of God: The Social World of the Pastoral Epistles* (SBLDS 71; Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1983), 27–81; more generally, Osiek and Balch, *Families in the New Testament World*; S. Dixon, *The Roman Family* (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992).

[27] Verner, *Household of God*, 79: "in both [Greek and Roman] societies the household was conceived of as a patriarchal institution, whose male head (κύριος, *paterfamilias*) exercised sweeping, although not entirely unrestricted authority over the other members. These members fell into three main categories, namely, wife, children, and slaves." Hoffner (*TDOT* 2:111) outlines the similar structure of the οἶκος/בית in ancient Greek, Semitic, and Hittite tradition; it comprised "a father, his wife, his own and adopted children, dependent relatives, clients, and domestic servants (i.e. male and female slaves)."

hold language for the structuring of social relationships can be undertaken only by examining the context of specific occurrences, the discourse in which the terms are embedded.

III. The Language of Kinship and Household and the Structuring of Social Relationships

The Authentic Pauline Letters

Let us then turn to a survey of the occurrences of sibling and household language in the authentic Pauline letters, first to the use of the terms ἀδελφός/ἀδελφή to denote fictive kinship relations between fellow Christians (see appendix).[28] As is well known, Paul uses the term ἀδελφοί frequently in addressing the congregations to which he writes; and he refers to individual believers, specific or nonspecific, as ἀδελφός or ἀδελφή.[29] Robert Banks rightly observes that the designation ἀδελφοί "is far and away Paul's favorite way of referring to the members of the communities to whom he is writing."[30] Leaving aside the uses of ἀδελφός or ἀδελφή to refer to biological kinship relations or to the people of Israel (Rom 9:3), Paul uses ἀδελφοί (and, less frequently, the singular form, both masculine and feminine) to refer to Christian believers 112 times in the seven authentic letters; that is, on average fractionally over once per page of Nestle-Aland Greek text (26th ed.). The prominence of this kinship description would seem to imply that Paul both assumes and promotes the relationship between himself and his addressees, and among the addressees themselves, as one between equal siblings, who share a sense of affection, mutual responsibility, and solidarity. In most of these places, the term ἀδελφοί appears

[28] The figures given for the Pauline epistles here differ slightly from those given by Bartchy ("Undermining Ancient Patriarchy," 70) for "Paul's Use of Surrogate Kinship Language." This appears to be due to the fact that Bartchy has wrongly included all appearances of the term ἀδελφός/ἀδελφή, even when they clearly describe a biological kinship relation and not the surrogate kinship of Christian believers (i.e., Gal 1:19; 1 Cor 9:5; and probably Rom 16:15). I have also excluded Rom 9:3, where ἀδελφοί is used by Paul of Israel rather than of the Christian community. See also the table provided by von Allmen, *La Famille de Dieu*, xxvii; discussion on pp.156–65.

[29] Unsurprisingly, Paul uses ἀδελφός much more frequently than ἀδελφή. The lack of parallel in 1 Cor 7:12–13 is striking (εἴ τις ἀδελφὸς . . . καὶ γυνὴ εἴ τις . . .) but no great significance can be attached to this, given the phrase ὁ ἀδελφὸς ἢ ἡ ἀδελφή in v. 15.

[30] Banks, *Paul's Idea of Community*, 50–51. Despite this, the notion of the church as "family" is seen as only one of a number of descriptions of the church in Paul, and not as a significant model of the church, by H. Doohan, *Paul's Vision of Church* (GNS 32; Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1989), 137–69. She privileges the more theological models of the church—"new creation," "body of Christ," etc.—thus bearing out Bartchy's point that the importance of sibling language in Paul has generally been neglected ("Undermining Ancient Patriarchy," 69–70).

simply as an apparently standard and common—though not for that reason insignificant—designation of the Christians Paul is addressing: "I do not want you to be ignorant, ἀδελφοί . . ." (Rom 1:13; 11:25); "I appeal to you, ἀδελφοί . . ." (Rom 15:30; 1 Cor 1:10; 16:15; cf. 1 Thess 5:14) etc. That ἀδελφός is a basic identity-designation of those who are members of the Christian communities is indicated also in 1 Cor 5:11, where Paul warns the Corinthians against association with any so-called brothers (ἀδελφὸς ὀνομαζόμενος) who are shown by their immorality not to be truly ἀδελφοί, like the sexually immoral man who is to be shunned and expelled from the church (5:1–8). While the various nuances and variations among these many instances could profitably be explored,[31] the texts that seem especially significant for our purposes are those where sibling language is used with an apparently deliberate and repeated emphasis and where it expresses a particularly ethical concern. The passages most worthy of note in this regard are Rom 14:10–21 (where there are five occurrences in eleven verses); 1 Cor 6:5–8 (four occurrences in four verses); and 1 Cor 8:11–13 (four occurrences in three verses).[32]

In each of these places Paul is challenging his readers to give to their fellow Christians a degree of consideration, respect, and care which is currently lacking but which should follow from their identity as ἀδελφοί—hence the reason for the emphatic use of sibling language. In 1 Cor 6:1–8 Paul criticizes those among the Corinthian community who are taking their fellow believers to court; indeed, he explicitly aims to put them to shame (6:5). For Paul their behavior shows a scandalous lack of appreciation both of their status as ἅγιοι amidst the "unrighteous" of the world (6:1–3), and also of the fact that those whom they accuse in court are ἀδελφοί (6:5–8). An emphasis on the identity of their opponents as ἀδελφοί is especially clear in v. 8: "But you yourselves wrong and defraud, and brothers and sisters at that" (καὶ τοῦτο ἀδελφούς).

[31] For a comprehensive study, see Schäfer, *Gemeinde als »Bruderschaft«*, 330–52. It is notable, for example, that 1 Thessalonians—addressed to a community with which Paul is pleased and on good terms (1 Thess 1:2–10; 4:9–12)—has the highest incidence of ἀδελφός-language among the genuine Paulines, 2 Corinthians the lowest, reflecting perhaps the difficult relationship between Paul and the Corinthians after the painful visit (2 Cor 2:1). However, the variations between Paul's letters in their uses of ἀδελφός-language cannot be consistently explained on this basis alone, and other factors would have to be explored in any attempt to explain the variations. See further J. M. G. Barclay, "Thessalonica and Corinth: Social Contrasts in Pauline Christianity," *JSNT* 47 (1992): 49–74; C. S. de Vos, *Church and Community Conflicts: The Relationships of the Thessalonian, Corinthian, and Philippian Churches with their Wider Civic Communities* (SBLDS 168; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1999).

[32] See further the detailed discussions in Aasgaard, "'My Beloved Brothers and Sisters!'" 129–332. The list of passages worthy of consideration could be expanded considerably. Note, e.g., 1 Cor 7:12–15, where the marital relationship between an ἀδελφός or ἀδελφή and a non-Christian spouse is the matter of concern, and 1 Thess 4:6, where, as in 1 Cor 6:1–8, Paul's concern is that no one should wrong or exploit an ἀδελφός. On Phlm 16, see below.

In 1 Cor 8:1–13 Paul begins his discussion of food sacrificed to idols by seeking to change the basis on which "the strong" make their ethical decision on this matter. Rather than base their decision—which is currently an assertion of their right to eat without restriction—on their theological knowledge ("there is no idol in the world" [v. 4]), Paul wants them to base it on love, on a concern for the other who may be offended or damaged through their conduct (vv. 1–3, 7–13).[33] He warns them against "destroying" one of "the weak" (v. 11), and strongly insists on the consideration that should be shown toward even these "weak" members of the community. Here, as elsewhere, the ethical appeal of the sibling language is intensified by using the singular form:[34] each single individual is "ὁ ἀδελφός for whom Christ died" (8:11). In that concise phrase both sibling language and the central Christian confession concerning Christ's self-giving death serve as ethical foundations for an "other-regarding" morality, which gives equal value to each member of the community (cf. 1 Cor 12:25–26).[35] Both aspects of that ethical appeal are intensified further in the following verses (vv. 12–13): sinning against οἱ ἀδελφοί, is a "sin against Christ"—this is the only time Paul ever uses this stern and serious phrase. Finally, Paul illustrates the lengths to which he would go in order not to cause a sibling to stumble: he would never eat meat again rather than cause such offense. Notable for our investigation here is his twice-repeated description of such a person as ὁ ἀδελφός μου.[36]

The pattern of ethical argument Paul developed in 1 Cor 8:1–11:1 is drawn on again in the related but different context addressed in Rom 14:1–15:13. Here too Paul wants to persuade Christians with different convictions regarding prohibited foods and special days not to judge but to accept and welcome one another (προσλαμβάνεσθε ἀλλήλους—Rom 15:7).[37] Again there is a repeated insistence that those who are judged and despised are ἀδελφοί: this in itself should apparently reveal such antagonism as utterly inappropriate. Also

[33] For a detailed consideration of Paul's ethical argument in these chapters, see D. G. Horrell, "Theological Principle or Christological Praxis? Pauline Ethics in 1 Corinthians 8.1–11.1," *JSNT* 67 (1997): 83–114.

[34] See esp. Rom 14:10–21; also 1 Cor 6:5–6; 1 Thess 4:6.

[35] On this christologically based pattern of "other-regarding" morality in Pauline ethics, see D. G. Horrell, "Restructuring Human Relationships: Habermas's Discourse Ethics and Paul's Corinthian Letters," *ExpTim* 110 (1999): 321–25.

[36] Note the singular; see n. 34 above.

[37] On the context addressed here, see J. M. G. Barclay, "'Do We Undermine the Law?' A Study of Romans 14:1–15:6," in *Paul and the Mosaic Law* (ed. J. D. G. Dunn; Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1996), 287–308; and most recently M. Reasoner, *The Strong and the Weak: Romans 14.1–15.13 in Context* (SNTSMS 103; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). However, I am not always convinced that the parallels Reasoner finds in Roman literature are very close to the concerns of Paul and his addressees.

notable once again is the use of the singular form of the noun to focus and personalize the appeal: all five occurrences of ἀδελφός in Rom 14:10–21 are singular, four of them followed by σου—ὁ ἀδελφός σου, "*your* brother or sister." One of Paul's very rare references to Christian believers as members of a metaphorical household appears here in support of the same ethical argument: judgment of a fellow believer is inappropriate not only because he or she is an ἀδελφός, but also because he or she is an οἰκέτης (again, Paul uses the singular form) belonging to the κύριος, and the right to judge them is therefore his alone (14:4). Moreover, alongside the emphatic use of sibling language and this one example of "household" language, in both the passage from Romans and that from 1 Corinthians, Paul also uses the language of building as part of his appeal for mutual regard and solidarity among the ἀδελφοί of the congregation.[38]

One final example deserves to be considered, not least because of the comparison it facilitates with a significant passage in 1 Timothy: Paul's letter to Philemon. Paul strengthens the emotional intensity of his appeal to Philemon by twice addressing him directly as ἀδελφέ (vv. 7, 20). Equally significant is Paul's direct appeal that Philemon receive back his slave, without regard for any wrong he may have committed (v. 18), "no longer as a slave, but more than a slave, a beloved brother" (v. 16).[39] That this is meant to imply a real change in the social relationship between slave and owner, and not merely a spiritual revaluation in the sight of God, is strongly suggested by Paul's declaration that their brotherhood exists "both in the flesh and in the Lord" (v. 16).[40]

In all these instances it would seem right to conclude that Paul uses sibling language to promote the solidarity and mutual regard among members of the congregations.[41] His emphatic use of such language when confronting situations in which there is currently a lack of such concern indicates that he sees

[38] οἰκοδομέω: 1 Cor 8:1, 10 (used ironically); cf. 10:23. οἰκοδομή: Rom 14:19; 15:2. For the same terms elsewhere in Paul, see Rom 15:20; 1 Cor 14:3–5, 12, 17, 26; 2 Cor 5:1; 10:8; 12:19; 13:10; Gal 2:18; 1 Thess 5:11.

[39] On the implications of this, see further N. Petersen, *Rediscovering Paul: Philemon and the Sociology of Paul's Narrative World* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985), 266–70, 288–89. A. D. Callahan rightly notes: "Fraternal love is a leitmotiv of the epistle" (*Embassy of Onesimos: The Letter of Paul to Philemon* [Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1997], 49). I find less convincing Callahan's argument that Onesimus was not actually a slave (see pp. 4–19, 44, 47, 69, etc.). See also C. Frilingos, "'For My Child, Onesimus': Paul and Domestic Power in Philemon," *JBL* 119 (2000): 91–104.

[40] It is the phrase καὶ ἐν σαρκί that is especially noteworthy: it seems intended to oppose explicitly any notion that this "brotherhood" applied only to some nonworldly realm in the sight of God. For comparable uses of ἐν κυρίῳ, see 1 Cor 7:22, 39; 11:11.

[41] Also significant are Paul's appeals for φιλαδελφία and ἀγάπη among members of the congregations (e.g., Rom 12:9–10; 13:8–10; 1 Cor 13:1–13; 1 Thess 4:9). See further Schäfer, *Gemeinde als »Bruderschaft«*; Sandnes, "Equality within Patriarchal Structures," 150–65; Aasgaard, "Brotherhood in Plutarch and Paul."

sibling bonds as implying precisely that mutualism which he seeks to foster. In Scott Bartchy's words, "his readers were challenged to practice the general reciprocity and mutual support that characterized the relations among siblings at their best."[42]

However, that should not be taken to imply that Paul's vision is unambiguously that of an egalitarian community. It seems to me that that *is* essentially what Paul implies with the designation ἀδελφοί, but that is not the only designation Paul uses, either of himself or of his congregations.[43] For example, Paul describes the Corinthians as his beloved children (ὡς τέκνα μου ἀγαπητά) and himself as their father (πατήρ), a position from which he can threaten them with the rod (1 Cor 4:14–15, 21).[44] His calling by God to proclaim the gospel to the Gentiles and his role as "founding father" give him (he believes) some power and authority over his churches (cf. 2 Cor 10:8; 13:10).[45] What seems clear, nonetheless, is that the frequent use of ἀδελφός language reflects both an established designation for the members of the Christian assemblies and Paul's efforts to ensure that social relationships ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ are structured in a manner appropriate to their description as groups of equal siblings. Yet distinctions can be, and are, made among the ἀδελφοί (cf. Gal 6:6; 1 Thess 5:12), and Paul certainly does not restrict himself to a role as an ἀδελφός among equal siblings.

The use of οἶκος/οἰκία language in Paul's letters is hard to assess in any meaningful way with statistics, since there is a range of relevant terms that may or may not be used in a manner pertinent to our present concern. As indicated above, the terms and their uses fall into two broad groups (not always clearly distinguishable), according to whether they are describing the act or object of

[42] Bartchy, "Undermining Ancient Patriarchy," 77. Bartchy, however, strongly disagrees with the labeling of such relations as "egalitarian," largely because sibling language belongs within the sphere of kinship whereas the term egalitarian belongs within the sphere of politics. However, given the use of kinship language in various social and political settings (see above, with nn. 11–17) this distinction in the spheres to which the two respective sets of terminology belong seems to me hard to sustain. Cf. also Plutarch, Περὶ Φιλαδελφίας 484B–E.

[43] The status differentiations that might be introduced between elder and younger brothers and between brothers and sisters are largely excluded because Christ is himself the firstborn son (Rom 8:29) and both male and female believers acquire the status of υἱοὶ θεοῦ (Rom 8:14; Gal 3:26).

[44] See also 2 Cor 12:14; Gal 4:19; 1 Thess 2:11. His juxtaposed descriptions of Onesimus as his child (Phlm 10) and as a brother (Phlm 16) show that these labels are not a fixed description of a certain pattern of relations but a field of metaphors, used to shape relationships in various ways. Nonpatriarchal images are also found, such as when Paul describes himself as the Thessalonians' wet-nurse (τροφός, 1 Thess 2:7; cf. 1 Cor 3:2).

[45] E. Best raises some important questions concerning the common assumption that Paul's authority is basically to be understood as apostolic authority. Best argues that "Paul claimed to be an apostle. . . . But he only used the title when others disputed it or might dispute it. Basically he considered himself the parent of those to whom he wrote." A better term than parent, Best suggests, is "founding father" ("Paul's Apostolic Authority —?" *JSNT* 27 [1986]: 3–25, here p. 17).

building, on the one hand, or the human beings who comprise a household on the other. Paul not infrequently urges the "building up" of the members of the congregation (e.g., Rom 14:19; 15:2; 1 Cor 14:3–5, 26; 1 Thess 5:11) and refers to the community as a building or a temple (1 Cor 3:9, 16–17; 2 Cor 6:16).[46] However, none of these references conveys the image of the church as a human household. There are a number of references to actual households (1 Cor 1:16; 16:15) or to the assembly that meets in so-and-so's house (Rom 16:5; 1 Cor 16:19; Phlm 2), but the terms οἶκος and οἰκία are never used by Paul to describe the Christian community.[47] Despite the appearance of the word οἰκία, 2 Cor 5:1–2 does not seem strictly relevant, since Paul is there describing the contrast between an earthly home (i.e., the human body) in which we dwell and a heavenly home not made with hands; he indicates the longing he has to inhabit the latter. The concern is with death and the transformation that then occurs and with the assurance that despite the body's death, the Christian will not be naked or homeless. The image of believers as members of a spiritual or fictive household is glimpsed briefly on two occasions, one of which we have already mentioned: in Rom 14:4 a Christian is portrayed as an οἰκέτης belonging to the Lord, and in Gal 6:10 Paul describes fellow believers as οἰκεῖοι τῆς πίστεως. There is, then, little evidence of the household image providing a structuring model for relationships ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ.[48] That is not to deny, however, that there were people in positions of leadership and power, both resident members of the congregations and itinerant leaders such as Paul himself.[49]

Colossians and Ephesians

The frequency of sibling language is strikingly low in Colossians and Ephesians compared with the authentic Pauline epistles: ἀδελφός terminology

[46] On this imagery in the Corinthian letters, see J. R. Lanci, *A New Temple for Corinth: Rhetorical and Archaeological Approaches to Pauline Imagery* (Studies in Biblical Literature 1; New York: Peter Lang, 1997).

[47] See G. Schöllgen, "Hausgemeinden, οἶκος-Ekklesiologie und monarchischer Episkopat," *JAC* 31 (1988): 82. The distinction between assemblies meeting in houses and the church as modeled on the household is too frequently blurred, as Schöllgen makes clear (pp. 77–84). See, e.g., H.-J. Klauck, *Hausgemeinde und Hauskirche im frühen Christentum* (SBS 103; Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1981), 12, 21: "die sich hausweise konstituierende Kirche" (cf. pp. 101–2 etc.); Barton and Horsley, "Hellenistic Cult Group," 31 with n. 112.

[48] See Schöllgen, "Hausgemeinden," 82.

[49] On leadership patterns, see D. G. Horrell, "Leadership Patterns and the Development of Ideology in Early Christianity," in *Social-Scientific Approaches to New Testament Interpretation* (ed. D. G. Horrell; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1999), 309–37. Schäfer is rather too concerned to downplay the evidence concerning the exercise of power and authority (*Gemeinde als »Bruderschaft«*, 335, 369–85, 407–18, etc.): in his thorough investigation of the brotherhood language and concept, he overstresses the extent to which "brotherly" equality characterized the Pauline congregations.

appears only seven times in Colossians and Ephesians (that is, on average 0.36 times per N-A[26] page). Every one of the seven letters of Paul, including Philemon, has more uses of fictive-sibling language applied to Christians than either Colossians or Ephesians. Indeed, leaving aside the references to named and prominent believers as ἀδελφοί—Timothy, Tychicus, and Onesimus[50]—the members of Christian congregations are described as ἀδελφοί only three times in the two epistles (Col 1:2; 4:15; Eph 6:23). No particular ethical implications are drawn from the sibling language.

Language connected with the image of building appears once in Colossians (ἐποικοδομούμενοι ἐν αὐτῷ [2:7]) and a number of times in Ephesians (2:20–21; 4:12, 16, 29), almost always connected with the depiction of the Christian community as a body or building in which Christ is central—either as head or as cornerstone (Eph 4:15–16; 2:20–22). The image of the congregation as a household appears only once, in Eph 2:19, where the image is used to give the addressees a real sense of belonging: instead of being strangers and aliens (πάροικοι) they are now citizens (συμπολῖται) with the saints and members of the household of God (οἰκεῖοι τοῦ θεοῦ; cf. Gal 6:10: . . . πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους τῆς πίστεως).[51]

An important and relevant feature of Colossians and Ephesians is their interest in the proper structuring of the household, an interest expressed in the so-called household codes (Col 3:18–4:1; Eph 5:21–6:9). While these codes are concerned with relations in actual individual households and not with the church itself as a household,[52] their explicit concern with the management of relations between parents and children, masters and slaves, is a significant innovation for which there is little precedent in Paul. Paul is certainly concerned with sexual morality, and therefore with the issues of sexual relations in and outside of marriage, divorce, betrothal, remarriage, and so on (see 1 Thess 4:1–8; 1 Cor 5:1–13; 6:12–20; 7:1–40), and also with issues concerning the identity and relations of men and women (1 Cor 11:2–16).[53] However, he seldom, if ever, gives any direct instruction concerning the appropriate behavior required from other social groups within the household (slaves–masters, fathers–children), as is clear in the household codes.[54] Paul's ethical concern is with rela-

[50] See Col 1:1; 4:7, 9. The reference to Tychicus in Col 4:7 reappears verbatim in Eph 6:21.

[51] Cf. also 1 Pet 1:17; 2:5; 2:11; 4:17. On this theme in 1 Peter, see J. H. Elliott, *A Home for the Homeless: A Sociological Exegesis of 1 Peter, Its Situation and Strategy* (London: SCM, 1982)—though note the criticisms raised by Schöllgen, "Hausgemeinden," 83–84.

[52] So Schöllgen, "Hausgemeinden," 83.

[53] I take 1 Cor 14:34–35 to be an interpolation; for detailed argument, see Horrell, *Social Ethos*, 184–95.

[54] 1 Corinthians 14:34–35, if authentic, would be the only place where Paul calls for the subordination of one social group (women or wives to men or husbands), though a secondary place in a created hierarchy may well be implied for women in 1 Cor 11:2–9. In 1 Cor 7:17–24, Paul gives his

tions among ἀδελφοί, and between ἀδελφοί and outsiders (e.g., 1 Cor 6:1–8; 7:12–15; Rom 13:1–7); it is fundamentally as relations among ἀδελφοί that he seems to envisage the relationships among the members of the congregations. Colossians and Ephesians, however, demonstrate a concern to give ethical instruction to these ἀδελφοί (as they are still occasionally called) according to their social position within the human household.

The Pastoral Epistles

As in Colossians and Ephesians, so too in the Pastoral Epistles, the use of sibling terminology to describe the members of the Christian community is comparatively rare: there are five such occurrences in the three epistles (that is, on average 0.28 times per N-A[26] page), of which three represent a general description of all believers as ἀδελφοί (see 1 Tim 4:6; 6:2; 2 Tim 4:21). In the case of the Pastoral Epistles, this might be thought to be attributable to the fact that these letters are, at least ostensibly, addressed to individual church leaders —Timothy and Titus—rather than to whole congregations. However, comparison with Paul's short letter to Philemon, which has more uses of ἀδελφός terminology than all three Pastoral Epistles added together, indicates that this is not a complete or satisfactory explanation. Nevertheless, statistics can provide only a crude and cursory overview of the picture, and examination of the ways in which such language is used in context is most important for determining its significance for the structuring of Christian social relationships.

Of particular note are the places in 1 Timothy where some qualification of the basic designation of all believers as ἀδελφοί is evident. In 1 Tim 5:1–2, Timothy is urged, presumably because of his young age (1 Tim 4:12) to exhort an elder man as a father, younger men as ἀδελφοί, elder women as mothers, and younger women as ἀδελφαί.[55] The elder figures in the community—senior in faith as well as age and perhaps social standing[56]—are set above those whose junior status enables Timothy to address them as ἀδελφοί. In terms of familial terminology, these elders, like Paul before them, are in the position of fathers and mothers within the congregations.

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general advice that people should stay as they are; they do not need to change their social position (an argument that relates to the wider discussion of being married or single). In the case of slaves, however, they are urged to take the opportunity of freedom if it comes their way (for this interpretation of 7:21, see Horrell, *Social Ethos,* 162–66). On all these passages and the wider issues, see Horrell, *Social Ethos*, 158–98. In Philemon, Paul gives instruction to a slave owner (though not to any slaves), but this is a specific and personal request.

[55] Even if—as seems to me likely—the address to Timothy is part of the device of pseudepigraphy, the pattern of relationships according to seniority within the church is nonetheless presented as exemplary.

[56] See further R. A. Campbell, *The Elders: Seniority within Earliest Christianity* (Studies of the New Testament and Its World; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1994).

A clear acknowledgment of the fact that Christian slaves and Christian masters are ἀδελφοί is found in 1 Tim 6:2, but, in contrast to the appeal Paul made to Philemon on behalf of Onesimus (see above), here slaves are warned *against* drawing from this fact any ideas about the restructuring of the social relationship between slaves and masters (δεσποταί).[57] They are not to "despise" (μὴ καταφρονείτωσαν) their masters "because they are ἀδελφοί" but rather to serve them all the more (ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δουλευέτωσαν) because they are beloved fellow believers. The verb καταφρονέω here clearly expresses a view from above, from the perspective of the slave owners: what Christian slaves are likely to do specifically on the basis that their masters are ἀδελφοί (ὅτι ἀδελφοί εἰσιν) is not exactly to despise them, but rather to act in a way subversive of the master–slave relationship, treating them more like equal siblings, as ἀδελφοί. For the author of the Pastorals this is in effect to treat them —or rather, their social position—with contempt: it is the opposite of serving them well. The contrast with Paul's use of ἀδελφός language should be clear. Paul on several occasions, not least in his letter to Philemon, urges Christians to consider the fact that they and their fellow believers are ἀδελφοί, to draw from this fact appropriate conclusions, and to restructure their social relationships accordingly. The author of the Pastoral Epistles does not (and could hardly) deny the firmly established belief that fellow Christians are ἀδελφοί. But he does warn slaves *not* to draw social consequences from this. On the contrary, he adds Christian legitimation to the notion that slaves should serve Christian owners willingly and well (ὅτι πιστοί εἰσιν καὶ ἀγαπητοί).

This concern for the "proper" and traditional structuring of social relations between household members—the concern central to the household codes of Colossians and Ephesians—appears elsewhere in the Pastoral Epistles, though nowhere is there a concise and complete domestic code comparable to those found in Col 3:18–4:1 and Eph 5:21–6:9. Notable in the Pastoral Epistles is the emphasis on teaching directed toward the subordinate social parties—women and slaves—that urges these people to remain quietly and submissively in their place (1 Tim 2:9–15; 6:1–2; Titus 2:1–10). The male heads of households are urged to govern their households well—keeping their children submissive, and so on—and thus to qualify as potential leaders over the church itself (1 Tim 3:4–5, 12–13).

The imagery of building does not appear prominently in the Pastoral Epis-

[57] Clearly some of the differences may be explicable on the grounds of the different situations and addressees. Nevertheless, it remains significant that in Philemon Paul does not make any comments (or promises) about Onesimus's return as an obedient and submissive slave (and Phlm 16 may imply quite the opposite), whereas the author of 1 Timothy makes no comments about the obligations of slave owners (e.g., to treat their slaves decently; see Col 4:1; Eph 6:9).

tles,[58] but the image of the church as a household clearly does. It is true that the description of the church as an οἶκος, specifically the οἶκος θεοῦ, appears only once (1 Tim 3:15). But the context in which that statement is made reveals that the hierarchical household model has become an important one for the structuring of church life.[59] The preceding verses have discussed the qualifications necessary for leadership in the church and have repeatedly made it clear that those who seek to be ἐπίσκοποι and διάκονοι must be male heads of households who manage their own households well (see 1 Tim 3:4–5, 12).[60] Women are permitted a leadership role only in relation to other women (1 Tim 2:11–15; cf. Titus 2:3–5).[61] Competent leadership of the human household is an essential prerequisite for competent leadership of God's household, and only those who are in a position to do the former can legitimately undertake the latter. The image of the church as a household appears also in 2 Tim 2:20–21. Urging his readers to rid themselves of wickedness, the author speaks of a μεγάλη οἰκία in which there are various kinds of vessels for various uses, some honorable, some dishonorable. Applying this metaphor to the church, the author assures his readers that those who cleanse themselves from evil will become honorable vessels, useful to the master (δεσπότης). The οἶκος θεοῦ is an οἶκος that, like its earthly counterparts, is hierarchically ordered and stratified, with God as its supreme δεσπότης.[62]

Thus, while the designation of believers as ἀδελφοί is represented in the Pastoral Epistles, the model of the household has become significantly more important as a model for the structuring of social relationships within the

[58] Οἰκοδομέω and οἰκοδομή do not appear. Note, however, στῦλος and ἑδραίωμα in 1 Tim 3:15, which show that the οἶκος image in that verse contains the idea of the house-building as well as of the household members. Cf. also 2 Tim 2:20.

[59] N. Brox describes 1 Tim 3:15 as "[D]ie zentrale ekklesiologische Stelle der drei Briefe" (*Die Pastoralbriefe* [RNT 7; Regensburg: Pustet, 1969], 157). Quoted with approval by Klauck, *Hausgemeinde und Hauskirche,* 67 (see 66–68). See further Verner, *Household of God,* 147, 186 et passim.

[60] See also Titus 1:7, where it is said that the ἐπίσκοπος must be ὡς θεοῦ οἰκονόμον. Since the term οἰκονόμος originally designated a person with responsibility for household management, this passage may also reflect the model of the church as household. However, the term οἰκονόμος has a wider meaning in NT times and cannot by itself be said to convey a specific link with a household: see Rom 16:23; 1 Cor 9:17; Gal 4:2; BAGD, 560; C. Spicq, *Theological Lexicon of the New Testament* (3 vols.; Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1994), 2:568–75.

[61] The exhortation to younger widows οἰκοδεσποτεῖν (1 Tim 5:14) seems, in context, to be an instruction that they should take up their proper place in the household structure ("bear children etc.") rather than gadding about as idle gossips (5:13). They should "manage their own households," or "keep house" (cf. Titus 2:5 [οἰκουργός]; I. H. Marshall, *The Pastoral Epistles* [ICC; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1999], 604).

[62] Notably, in his desire to strengthen the position of the bishop, Ignatius declares that the bishop is the "type" of God the Father, the earthly embodiment of divine leadership (see Ignatius *Eph.* 6.1; *Magn.* 6.1). See further Schöllgen, "Hausgemeinden," 87–88. The term δεσπότης does not appear in the genuine Pauline epistles, nor in Colossians and Ephesians.

church.[63] The socially subordinate are specifically warned against expecting their identity as ἀδελφοί to have an impact on conventional social relations. The church is a stratified and hierarchical community led by those men who lead their human households well. The hierarchy of social relations found in the human household is presented as the structuring ideal for the church too: slaves should serve their masters well, especially if they are believers (1 Tim 6:1–2; Titus 2:9–10); women should be submissive to their husbands and good workers in the home (Titus 2:5).

IV. Conclusion

What conclusions can we draw from this investigation? First, it is clear, both from the relative frequency with which the designation ἀδελφός appears and from the ways in which this terminology is used, that the prominence of sibling language as a model for social relationships in the churches decreases notably in the pseudo-Pauline epistles compared with those by Paul himself.[64] Paul on a number of occasions stresses repeatedly the believers' identity as ἀδελφοί in order to appeal for a degree of solidarity and mutual care that is currently lacking. None of the pseudo-Pauline letters contains anything comparable; indeed, almost the opposite is found in 1 Tim 6:2, where slaves are warned against drawing social consequences from the fact that all believers are ἀδελφοί.

Second, alongside the decreased emphasis on the reality and consequences of being ἀδελφοί, the model of the hierarchically structured household becomes increasingly significant as the structuring pattern for the church community. An important moment in this ongoing process of the structuration of the early Christian communities would seem to be the introduction of the

[63] Both Georg Schöllgen and Ulrike Wagener argue convincingly "daß der οἶκος als ekklesiologisches Leitmodell weder bei Paulus noch in den Deuteropaulinen Kolosser- und Epheserbrief eine entscheidende Rolle spielt. Die Pastoralbriefe erweisen sich so als das älteste Zeugnis für die Erhebung des οἶκος zu ekklesiologischen Leitmetapher" (U. Wagener, *Die Ordnung des "Hauses Gottes": Der Ort von Frauen in der Ekklesiologie und Ethik der Pastoralbriefe* [WUNT 2.65; Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1994], 236; cf. Schöllgen, "Hausgemeinden," 82–85).

[64] Von Allmen ignores the significant variations among the Pauline epistles when he writes: "le sens 'figuré' de ces mots [sc. ἀδελφός/ἀδελφή] est extrêmement fréquent, et son usage est assez régulièrement réparti sur l'ensemble des épîtres, à l'exception de Tite" (*La Famille de Dieu,* 156). This conclusion also raises some questions about Bartchy's suggestion (drawing on the work in a dissertation by Joe Hellerman) that "both the brother-sister rhetoric and sibling values continued to characterize a wide variety of Christian groups throughout the Roman empire for more than 250 years" and that it was Constantine who was essentially responsible for introducing "a virulent form of hierarchy and patriarchy" into Christianity ("Undermining Ancient Patriarchy," 76–77). The significant changes evidenced within the Pauline corpus indicate that, in at least some strands of early Christianity, moves in this direction should be traced back into the NT period.

household codes in Colossians and Ephesians. These codes do not reflect a model of the *church* as household, but are an important step in enabling that model to emerge; they formalize a concern for the proper ordering of the human household, which in the Pastorals becomes a model for the proper ordering of the church itself.[65]

We might then broadly characterize this change as one from the model of an egalitarian community of ἀδελφοί toward the model of a hierarchical household-community, a community with masters and subordinates, structured according to the relative positions of different social groups. It would be misleading, however, not to qualify that conclusion somewhat, for the genuine Pauline letters both assume and urge the recognition of certain people—primarily Paul himself—as being in positions of power and authority. If the Pauline churches develop, as they seem to do, from a loosely organized sectarian-type movement where the language of brotherhood predominates, into one that is more structured and "churchlike," which mirrors the conventional household hierarchy in its own internal organization, then we should perhaps speak of changes in the *form* of authority and power, rather than implying that we simply move from egalitarianism to authoritarianism. In Weberian terms, we move from a charismatic form of domination toward a traditional form.[66] Nevertheless, this transformation implies both that the Pauline churches become more hierarchically structured over time and—crucially—that this structure increasingly mirrors the established and conventional social order, following the stratified household model.

Giddens's structuration theory requires, however, that we appreciate the intertwining of continuity and change, rather than simply emphasizing one or the other:

> Every act which contributes to the reproduction of a structure is also an act of production, a novel enterprise, and as such may initiate change by altering that structure at the same time as it reproduces it—as the meaning of words change in and through their use.[67]

Continuity is evident in the fact that the designation ἀδελφοί is used of Christian believers in all of the Pauline epistles, and also that the image of believers

[65] On this, see further Horrell, "Development of Theological Ideology," 230–35.

[66] The language of sect and church here owes much to the typology formulated by Ernst Troeltsch (see *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches,* vol. 1 [London: Allen & Unwin, 1931], 331–43). On these broader perspectives and their implications, see M. Y. MacDonald, *The Pauline Churches: A Socio-Historical Study of Institutionalization in the Pauline and Deutero-Pauline Writings* (SNTSMS 60; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Horrell, "Leadership Patterns."

[67] A. Giddens, *New Rules of Sociological Method* (London: Hutchinson, 1976), 128; see also idem, *Central Problems in Social Theory* (London/Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1979), 210: "with a conception of structuration, the possibility of change is recognised as inherent in every circumstance of social reproduction."

as members of a household appears occasionally throughout. However, as this language and imagery are taken up and reproduced in new contexts, significant changes are also apparent that have considerable implications for the structuring of social relationships among the members of the Pauline congregations. Without forgetting, then, that believers are described both as siblings and as household members throughout the Pauline corpus, the character of this significant degree of transformation may nevertheless be epitomized in the phrase "from ἀδελφοί to οἶκος θεοῦ."

Appendix

ʾΑδελφός/ἀδελφή as Fictive Kinship Terms Referring to Fellow Christians

Letter	*Plural, or Nonspecific*	*Concerning a Specific (Usually Named) Believer*	*Total*
1 Thess	18	1	19
Gal	10	0	10
1 Cor	37	2	39
2 Cor	4	8	12
Rom	16	2	18
Phil	8	1	9
Phlm	0	5	5
Totals	**93**	**19**	**112**
Col	2	3	5
Eph	1	1	2
Totals	**3**	**4**	**7**
1 Tim	4	0	4
2 Tim	1	0	1
Titus	0	0	0
Totals	**5**	**0**	**5**
2 Thess (see n. 5 above)	7	1	8

Frequency of Fictive Sibling Terminology
(*Given as Average Number of Occurrences per Page of Nestle-Aland [26th ed.] Text*)

Paul's letters	1.00
Colossians/Ephesians	0.36
Pastoral Epistles	0.28

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THE LIST OF LEADERS IN 5 EZRA 1:39–40

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5 Ezra 1:38–40 provides a dramatic climax to the book's first chapter, in which Ezra, assuming a prophetic role, has announced God's intention to replace God's stubborn and recalcitrant former people with "another nation," which "will certainly keep [God's] statutes" (1:24). In 1:38, Ezra, addressed by God as "father," is instructed to "look with glory and see the people coming from the east." Verses 39–40, translated here from the more original "Spanish" recension,[1] enumerate the leaders of the coming people:

> I [God] will lead (*dabo ducatum*) them, (I) together with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, Elijah and Enoch, Zachariah and Hosea, Amos, Joel, Micah, Obadiah, Zephaniah, Nahum, Jonah, Malachi [or: Mattathias], Habakkuk, and twelve angels with flowers (*angelos duodecim cum floribus*).

The idea of a glorified group of individuals "coming from the east" to Israel or Jerusalem, besides being present here in 5 Ezra (and in its immediate literary models, Bar 4:36–37 and 5:5), is something of a leitmotif in biblical and early Jewish literature. In an article entitled "The 'People Coming from the East' in 5 Ezra 1:38,"[2] the present author noted that the evidence for this motif

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[1] For the "Spanish" recension of 5 Ezra as more original in this and most other passages, see Theodore A. Bergren, *Fifth Ezra: The Text, Origin and Early History* (SBLSCS 25; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990), ch. 4. The secondary "French" recension, which by virtue of tradition is still printed in the NRSV and most other modern translations, clearly betrays its derivative character in 1:39–40: the missing minor prophet Haggai is restored, the twelve minor prophets are rearranged in their traditional Septuagintal order, and the strange "twelve angels with flowers" at the end of the list are removed. See further below.

[2] Theodore A. Bergren, "The 'People Coming from the East' in 5 Ezra 1:38," *JBL* 108 (1989): 675–83.

comprises mainly descriptions of various groups of Jews returning from an "exile" of some kind in an eastern land. These exiled groups range from the ten northern tribes of Israel, exiled by the Assyrians, through the Judeans exiled to Babylonia in the sixth century B.C.E. (the point of reference of the passages in Baruch), to what seem to have been exiled groups in the past history of the Dead Sea Scrolls community. The main point of the article is that the author of 5 Ezra, an early Christian ideologue, has appropriated this widespread Jewish leitmotif and applied it to the Christians as another idealized, glorified "coming" people, this time coming to Israel to displace the allegedly dispossessed Jews. The facts that these Christians had never actually been in exile and that few, if any, actually came "from the east" are insignificant compared to the substantial mythopoetic power of the leitmotif, or myth, of glorified, returning exiles that was so widespread in Jewish tradition. By "borrowing" this motif and incorporating it in this verse, the author of 5 Ezra enables his audience to share in the power of that myth.

If 5 Ezra 1:38 clearly evokes a context of return from exile of a group of ideal persons, the origin and function of the list of their leaders in 1:39–40 are less obvious. From where did the author of 5 Ezra get this list, and why does it contain the individuals it does? Furthermore, what function were these individuals expected to serve in the context of a return from exile? Although the group of leaders listed is no doubt distinguished, it is rather large and heterogeneous, and one wonders why such a gaggle of worthies would be required as guides in the first place. After all, God is expected to provide primary leadership for the returnees;[3] and most of the descriptions of return from exile surveyed in the article mentioned above pay little attention to who, beyond the assumption of divine guidance, will help the returnees get where they are going. Thus, the source and function of the lengthy list of leaders in 5 Ezra 1:39–40 remain something of a mystery. This article attempts to explicate these issues.

I. The Individual Elements of the List in 5 Ezra 1:39–40

It is widely assumed in the Jewish accounts of exiles returning from the east discussed above that God will lead them. Baruch 5:9 states as much: "For God will lead Israel with joy" (see also Bar 5:6: "God will bring them back to you"). The Christian poet Commodian, who draws on Jewish sources to describe the return of the ten northern tribes to Israel, states that they are accompanied directly by God (or the "angel" of God) on their journey.[4] Accord-

[3] See Bar 5:6, 9; and the discussion below.

[4] *Instr.* 1.42.31–32; *Carm. ap.* 961–62. *Carm. ap.* 969, which states that "the angel of the

ing to *4 Ezra* 13:47, God stops the channels of the Euphrates so that the ten tribes can pass over dryshod on their return. Isaiah 40:1–11, the first section of Second Isaiah, which inspired the accounts in Bar 4–5 and the parallel text *Psalm of Solomon* 11, is also germane here (esp. Isa 40:3). Other relevant biblical pericopes are Exod 6:6; Isa 65:9; and Ezek 20:38. Accounts of God's "angel" leading the people and of God drying up rivers to facilitate their return remind us that many of these later descriptions of return from exile drew inspiration in part from the story of the exodus journey.

The three leading biblical patriarchs—Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob—are of course seminal figures in any account of Jewish history. Elijah and Enoch are renowned as the two biblical figures who ascended into heaven or were "taken" by God, supposedly without dying (2 Kgs 2:11; Gen 5:24). These two are linked or mentioned together in a plethora of early Jewish and Christian sources,[5] and their paired appearance here is not surprising, especially since in certain Christian circles they were viewed as being the "two witnesses" of Rev 11.[6] There are also various early Jewish and Christian sources that, like 5 Ezra 1:39–40, link the three patriarchs with Elijah and Enoch[7] or, alternatively, with "the prophets" or "all the prophets."[8]

The list of what seem to be eleven of the twelve minor prophets presents several difficulties. First, why is Haggai omitted? Second, the generally more reliable "Spanish" text of 5 Ezra also leaves out Malachi but adds in the penultimate position "Mattathias" (not surprisingly, this name is emended to "Malachi" by most editors). Finally—and this is not a "difficulty" strictly speaking—the list is presented in a seemingly random order.

Regarding the omission of Haggai, F. Strickert argues that the absence of Haggai here and of Ezekiel in the list in 5 Ezra 2:18 (this list—which contains

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(Most) High" will provide leadership for the tribes, is especially interesting in view of the reference to "twelve angels with flowers" in 5 Ezra 1:40.

[5] See *Apoc. Zeph.* 9:4; *Gk. Apoc. Ezra* 5:22; *Apoc. Elijah* 4:7–19; 5:32; *Apoc. Paul* 20, 51; and *Apos. Constit.* 5.7.8; 8.41.4. W. Bousset assembled a large number of Christian texts dealing with the return of Elijah and Enoch (*The Antichrist Legend* [London: Hutchinson, 1896], 27, 203–11), e.g., Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* 5.5.1; Hippolytus 43.21.8; Ps.-Methodius, 7, 99; Ephrem Syrus, chs. 11–12; *Ethiopic Apocalypse of Peter;* Ps.-Ephrem 9; *Ps.-Johannine Apocalypse* 8; *Syriac Apocalypse of Peter* (fragment); *Syriac Apocalypse of Ezra* 14; and Tertullian, *De anima.* Cf. *Apoc. Dan.* 14:1–10. See R. Bauckham, "Enoch and Elijah in the Coptic Apocalypse of Elijah," *Studia patristica* 16, no. 2 (1985): 69–76.

[6] See, e.g., *Apoc. Elijah* 4:7–19, and the various texts collected by Bousset that are listed in the preceding note. Cf. also *Apoc. Dan.* 14:1–10.

[7] *Apoc. Zeph.* 9:4 (here are also present Zephaniah, in the form of an angel, and many other angels) and *Apoc. Paul* 47–51. These texts are discussed further below.

[8] Luke 13:28; *Sib. Or.* 2:245–48; *Apoc. Paul* 25–27, 47–49. These texts are treated further below.

Jeremiah, Isaiah, and Daniel—in combination with 1:39–40 completes the roster of biblical writing prophets, according to the Greek reckoning) reflects an anti-temple bias on the part of the author.[9] Given the evidence, this theory is difficult to dispute. Although overall there is little other pointed evidence of anti-temple bias in 5 Ezra, 1:31 reflects a distaste for temple sacrifice, and 1:33 ("Your house is desolate!") is sometimes taken (as in Matt 23:38 and Luke 13:35, the NT models for the verse) as a reference to the temple. Indeed, in few Christian authors after 70 C.E. does one find explicitly positive statements about the Jerusalem temple.

The Mattathias/Malachi situation is a conundrum. The book of Malachi does exhibit a strong concern for temple protocol, which, if our argument concerning Haggai and Ezekiel is correct, would make Malachi a candidate for omission. But then what place does "Mattathias" have in the list? Strickert theorizes that this may be a reference to the evangelist Matthew, who is a favorite of 5 Ezra, and that our author is here dramatizing a conviction that the modern Christian "prophets" are now taking their place among the ancient Jewish ones.[10] This argument would be more forceful if "Mattathias" were last in the list of "minor prophets," but he is followed by Habakkuk. The theory that this is a reference to Mattathias the patriarch of the Maccabee clan likewise lacks force, again since the name is set squarely among the minor prophets. It seems most reasonable for the present to emend the "Spanish" reading Mattathias to Malachi, recognizing nonetheless that this would be a surprising scribal error and that there exist other solutions to the problem.

The seemingly random order of the list of eleven minor prophets in 1:39–40 is brought to our attention mainly by the secondary "French" recension, which adds Haggai and Malachi, omits Mattathias, and lists the twelve neatly in their Septuagintal order. There is, however, no compelling reason why the twelve should be listed in a particular or "canonical" order in a text like 5 Ezra. A similarly "random" list of the twelve is found in *Asc. Isa.* 4:22.[11]

Last in 5 Ezra's list of leaders are "twelve angels with flowers." This reference has generally confounded commentators. Most point to a reference in *3 (Greek) Bar.* 12:1–5, where Baruch, touring the fifth heaven, saw that "angels came carrying baskets filled with flowers," which they presented to the arch-

[9] F. Strickert, "The Destruction of Bethsaida: The Evidence of 2 Esdras 1:11," in *Bethsaida: A City by the North Shore of the Sea of Galilee*, vol. 2 (ed. R. Arav and R. Freund; Kirksville, MO: Truman State University Press, 1999), 347–72, here 352.

[10] Ibid., 364.

[11] For the order of the "Twelve" in ancient manuscripts and canon lists, see H. B. Swete, *An Introduction to the Old Testament in Greek* (repr. ed.; New York: Ktav, 1968), 201–14, 227. The issue is discussed *in extenso* in B. A. Jones, *The Formation of the Book of the Twelve: A Study in Text and Canon* (SBLDS 149; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995), esp. 2–13.

angel Michael. The flowers are "the prayers of men" or "the virtues of the righteous and the good works which they do," which Michael will in turn present to God.[12] Besides these angels with full baskets, however, there are others whose baskets are half full (12:5–8) or who come apparently carrying nothing (ch. 13). The former category of angels are "dejected" or "distressed" because of their shortcoming; the latter complain that they have been "handed over" to evil humans and ask to be "withdrawn from them." Apparently, then, each of the angels has been assigned to a particular human being, and the measure of the "basket" that they bring to offer to God is proportional to that person's virtue.

II. Formal Analogues to 5 Ezra 1:39–40 in Early Jewish and Christian Sources

Having surveyed the individual elements of the list in 5 Ezra 1:39–40, we turn to the nature and purpose of the list as a whole. First, in purely formal terms, this list of worthies bears a strikingly close resemblance to various lists found in early Jewish and Christian sources of OT worthies resident in a glorified, post-mortem context. In many cases, it is expected that righteous believers can hope to encounter these individuals after death.

Perhaps the closest parallels in content to the list in 5 Ezra 1:39–40 are two groups of worthies encountered by Paul in his two tours of paradise in *Apoc. Paul* 20–30 and 45–51. These tours are separate and distinct literary entities and are usually regarded as having been derived by the author from different sources.[13] In the first, Paul encounters first Enoch and Elijah; then the three major prophets; then Amos, Micah, and Zechariah; Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; Lot, Job, "and other saints," and finally David. The list of those encountered by Paul in the second tour is even more wide-ranging; it includes, among others, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; Enoch and Elijah; two groups of "twelve," one of which is the twelve sons of Jacob (ch. 47) and the other unidentified (ch. 49);[14]

[12] In this section, as in *3 Baruch* in general, the Slavonic and Greek versions differ in detail. Note the similarity of Michael's role here with that attributed to him in *Apoc. Paul* 43, discussed below.

[13] This is the case whether one follows the early suggestion of M. R. James (*The Apocryphal New Testament* [Oxford: Clarendon, 1924], 555) that chs. 45–51 are a later addition, or the more recent opinion of P. Piovanelli ("Les origines de l'Apocalypse de Paul reconsidérées," *Apocrypha* 4 [1993]: 25–64, esp. 55) that the work is to be read as a whole but as having multiple sources.

[14] A case can be made that this second group of twelve either comprised, or at least included some of, the twelve minor prophets. The present form of the text, while it specifies the number twelve, gives only the three major prophets by name, providing an account of the "martyrdom" of each. Thus, while these "twelve" either were, or included, prophets, little more can be said about them with confidence.

and numerous "angels." In each list, it is clear that at least some of the worthies encountered are mentioned because they have experienced martyrdom.[15]

The roles of "angels" in the *Apocalypse of Paul* are especially interesting in light of our discussion of *3 Bar.* 12–13 and its relation to 5 Ezra 1:40. In the early part of the *Apocalypse of Paul* (before his first tour of paradise in chs. 20–30), Paul sees and learns of numerous angels, which, much like the angels of *3 Baruch,* appear before the higher powers to inform them of the good or evil deeds of human beings. Every human has a familiar, indwelling angel which "protect[s] and preserve[s]" him or her (ch. 7) and reports the person's good or evil actions to God every day at sunset and sunrise (chs. 7–10, 16–17). "And one angel goes forth rejoicing from the man he indwells but another goes with sad face" (ch. 7). This is close to the description in *3 Baruch,* so close that it may well be dependent on that book or on a common source.[16]

Later in the text of the *Apocalypse of Paul,* Michael states, "It is I who stand in the presence of God every hour. . . . For one day or one night I do not cease from praying continually for the human race, and I pray for those who are still on earth" (ch. 43).[17] In Paul's first tour of paradise (chs. 20–30), however, no mention is made of these angels who indwell humans and report their deeds to God.

The second tour, in chs. 45–51, is different from that described in chs. 20–30 in that several of the worthies are described as being accompanied by their own personal angel. Moses and Job, in fact, are described as having multiple "angels" (chs. 48, 49). In the narrative of this tour Paul asks his interpreting angel, "Does then each of the righteous have an angel as his companion?" The reply: "Each of the saints has his own angel who helps him and sings a hymn, and the one does not leave the other" (ch. 49).[18] The angelology expressed here is distinctly different from that enunciated in *3 Baruch* and in the earlier part of the *Apocalypse of Paul,* in that the angels are companion counterparts of saints who are already in a glorified state; these angels are entirely positive in func-

[15] In the first list, six of the prophets (Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Amos, Micah, Zechariah; ch. 25) who are mentioned together have in common the fact that, according to the *Vitae Prophetarum,* they are the six who were martyrs (see D. Satran, *Biblical Prophets in Byzantine Palestine: Reassessing the Lives of the Prophets* [SVTP 11; Leiden: Brill, 1995], 52–55). The accounts of martyrdom of the three major prophets in the second list (ch. 49) are mentioned above.

[16] Note also Matt 18:10: "See that you do not despise one of these little ones; for I tell you that in heaven their angels always behold the face of my Father who is in heaven." The *Apocalypse of Paul* has an interesting reverse counterpart in *T. Asher* 6:4-6, where a person's demeanor when he dies reflects the peaceful or tormenting quality of the angel whom he will meet after death.

[17] Compare Michael's role in *3 (Greek) Bar.* 12:1–5, discussed above.

[18] In *T. Isaac* 2, similarly, the chief angel, Michael, when he is sent to Isaac, who is about to die, looks so much like Abraham that Isaac questions him about the resemblance. Michael's reply: "I am not your Father Abraham, but I am the one who ministers to your father Abraham" (2:11).

tion, rather than "reporting upon" the good or evil actions of the individuals to whom they are assigned. It seems plausible that the type of angels described in *Apoc. Paul* 45–51 could have given rise to a description of "twelve angels with flowers" as part of a group of worthies who lead the righteous in a return from exile, as in 5 Ezra 1:39–40. More will be said about this possibility below.

Several other texts containing lists of patriarchs and prophets similar to that in 5 Ezra 1:39–40 also depict these OT worthies as resident in a glorified, post-mortem setting. Luke 13:28, for example, speaks of "Abraham and Isaac and Jacob and all the prophets in the kingdom of God" (the Q parallel in Matt 8:11 lacks "and all the prophets"). In both Luke and Matthew, this passage is associated with an ingathering of righteous individuals from the cardinal directions and an eschatological banquet in "the kingdom of God/heaven." The event of ingathering portrayed here ("Many shall come from the east and west and sit down to eat . . ." [Matt 8:11]) could even be construed as a "return from exile" such as that envisioned in 5 Ezra 1:38.[19]

Several passages in 4 Maccabees employ similar terminology in a like context. In 13:17, one of the soon-to-be martyred brothers proclaims that "if we so die, Abraham and Isaac and Jacob will welcome us, and all the fathers [πάντες οἱ πατέρες] will praise us." In 16:25, "those who die for the sake of God live to God, as do Abraham and Isaac and Jacob and all the patriarchs [πάντες οἱ πατριάρχαι]" (compare Luke 20:37–38). 4 Maccabees 7:19 likewise speaks of "they who believe that to God they do not die; for like our patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, they live to God."

In *Apoc. Zeph.* 8–9, Zephaniah, in the company of "myriads of myriads of angels" (8:2), first puts on an angelic garment and himself participates in a newly "angelized" state. Then, accompanied by a "great angel," he crosses over from Hades to the domain of the righteous dead and sees there Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Enoch, Elijah, and David. In ch. 11, he again sees Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, together with the "great angel" and all the righteous, all of whom are in a glorified, post-mortem state, praying to God daily for those who are in torment. This is not unlike the role assigned to Michael in *Apoc. Paul* 43, discussed above.

The Christian *Greek Apocalypse of Ezra* features a brief passage in which Ezra, taken on a tour of paradise before he is about to die, sees there "Enoch and Elijah and Moses and Peter and Paul and Luke and Matthew and all the righteous and the patriarchs" (5:22). No further information is given about the activities of these worthies.

Finally, there are several other texts that focus on the continuing presence

[19] See G. W. E. Nickelsburg, *Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life in Intertestamental Judaism* (HTS 26; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 35 and n. 119.

of the three patriarchs in an after-death context. According to *T. Ab.* 20:14 [A], the "mansions" of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and the "tents of [God's] righteous ones" are situated in paradise. *Testament of Isaac* 2:5–7 states that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob all possess a "throne" in heaven, where they dwell with "all the saints." Again in *Apoc. Paul* 48, Moses states that at the death of Jesus, God, Michael, "all the angels and archangels," and "Abraham and Isaac and Jacob and all the righteous" wept for him as he hung on the cross.

Clearly, then, it is not uncommon, in texts that are roughly contemporary with 5 Ezra, for groups of patriarchs, prophets, and angels similar to those mentioned in 5 Ezra 1:39–40 to be depicted as residing in a glorified, post-mortem state. Here, commonly, their main purpose is to greet, succor, inspire, and generally provide guidance for the righteous dead. They also occasionally, as in *Apoc. Zeph.* 11 and *Apoc. Paul* 43, intercede with God for (unrighteous) humans.

III. Functional Analogues of 5 Ezra 1:39–40 in Texts Describing Resurrection

Although we have located here one of the possible points of origin for lists such as that in 5 Ezra 1:39–40, we have yet adequately to account for the function of this list. First, the leaders in 5 Ezra are not in a removed, post-mortem state of being; they exist in a more physical, earthly context, providing leadership for living, breathing human beings. Second—and this is a significant point—the function of the leaders in 5 Ezra 1:39–40 depends on *movement.* They do not subsist in a static state of glory, but are active in a process of leading a band of returning exiles. Thus, the activity, or functional dimension, of the leaders in 5 Ezra 1:39–40 is rather different from the examples we have cited thus far and still requires explication.

The solution to this problem, I believe, lies in a group of texts that, like those considered above, depict groups of OT patriarchs and prophets in an exalted, after-life setting, but provide one additional feature: that of resurrection. In this context, the worthies retain their glorified existence, their status as individuals who are worthy to live "with God" in perpetuity, and their roles of aiding and succoring the righteous dead, but they are accorded one additional feature—they lead, or are the first to participate in, the process of resurrection. In this state, not only does their activity become more directly connected with earthly existence, but they also acquire characteristics of purposeful activity, or movement.

One text of this nature is *Sib. Or.* 2:238–51. In this passage, normally

understood as a Christian addition to an originally Jewish oracle,[20] God raises the dead and then sits on a heavenly throne. There first arrives Christ, who comes in glory with the angels and sits on God's right side as a judge. Then come Moses, "having put on flesh"; Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; Joshua, Daniel, Elijah, Habakkuk, and Jonah; "and those whom the Hebrews killed" (presumably prophets).[21] "He [probably Christ] will destroy all the Hebrews after Jeremiah" (v. 249). There follow the separation and judgment of the righteous and the wicked.

In this important passage, as in 5 Ezra 1:39–40, the various patriarchs and prophets who are enumerated could be understood as "leaders" of the people, in the sense that they, because of their exalted status, are the first to attain the state of resurrection and thus provide guidance for others. *Sibylline Oracle* 2 differs from 5 Ezra 1:39–40 in that both righteous and wicked are involved in the eschatological scenario.

The *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs* feature two intriguing eschatological passages in which Jacob's twelve sons "rise," together with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, to lead their respective tribes in the eschatological era. In *T. Jud.* 25, in the eschatological scenario at the end of the testament, "Abraham and Isaac and Jacob will rise to life [ἀναστήσεται . . . εἰς ζωήν] again, and my brothers and I will be chiefs of our tribes in Israel" (25:1), each in his own order. The "angels of the presence" will especially bless Judah (25:2). Here, as in 5 Ezra, the event that is presided over by the patriarchs is an entirely positive affair; there is little or no mention of judgment or the fates of sinners.

In *T. Benj.* 10:6–8, the eschaton is envisioned as follows:

> Then you will see Enoch, Noah, and Shem, and Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, rising on the right hand in gladness. Then shall we [the twelve sons of Jacob] also rise, each one over our tribe, and worship (Jesus); and all those who believed him on earth will rejoice with him. Then, too, all men will rise, some to glory and some to disgrace.

The judgment follows.[22]

[20] J. J. Collins, in *OTP* 1:330. Collins dates the Christian redaction of this oracle between 95 and 150 C.E. (p. 332).

[21] For Christian accusations of Jews' having "killed the prophets," see esp. Matt 23:30–38 and its parallels in Luke 11:47–51 and 13:33–35. See further n. 15 above.

[22] In *T. Jud.* 25, *T. Benj.* 10:6–8, and 5 Ezra 1:39–40, several groups of worthies are cited, including Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and ending with a group of twelve. In *T. Zeb.* 10:2, likewise, Zebulon will rise from the dead to head his tribe at the last judgment.

Prof. G. W. E. Nickelsburg, in a private communication, noted the relevance to these passages of what is apparently the last pericope in Q, Matt 19:28//Luke 22:30. Here Jesus assigns his followers an eschatological role that would normally be ascribed to the twelve patriarchs: "you will . . . sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel."

This description parallels that in 5 Ezra in that the patriarchs are again "leaders" of the "coming people" in the sense that they are the first to appear in the resurrection. Note also the themes of rejoicing and glory, consonant with 5 Ezra 1:37–40. Like *Sib. Or.* 2, the passage is explicitly Christian. Also like *Sib. Or.* 2, but unlike *T. Jud.* 25, the resurrection and judgment scenarios include both the righteous and the wicked.

The *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs* includes one further passage relevant to our theme. In *T. Levi* 18:14, again situated in an eschatological passage at the end of the testament, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob "shout in exultation" at the eschatological presence of Jesus, the "new priest," who binds Beliar and puts an end to sin.

Another text bearing on the idea of OT worthies in a resurrection context is Justin's *Dialogue with Trypho.* In 45.2–4, Trypho asks whether "those who lived according to the law given by Moses" would "live in the same manner with Jacob, Enoch, and Noah in the resurrection of the dead." Justin answers in the affirmative: "Since those who did what is universally . . . good are pleasing to God, they will be saved through this Christ in the resurrection equally with those righteous persons who were before them, namely, Noah, and Enoch, and Jacob. . . ." Again, in 80.1, 5, Justin maintains that "there will be a resurrection of the dead, and a thousand years in Jerusalem," where "[the] people [will] be gathered together, and made joyful with Christ and the patriarchs, and the prophets." Finally, in 113.3–4, Justin holds that "Jesus the Christ will turn again the dispersion of the people [τὴν διασπορὰν τοῦ λαοῦ ἐπιστρέψει] . . . after the holy resurrection, [he] will give us the eternal possession."

These references from Justin are significant in several regards. First, as in both *Sib. Or.* 2 and the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs,* the "patriarchs and prophets" serve as leaders of the people in the resurrection. As in *Sib. Or.* 2 and the *Testament of Benjamin,* Jesus plays an important role in the proceedings. Justin, like 5 Ezra and the *Testament of Judah,* focuses on the positive dimensions of the process, viz., the rewards enjoyed by the righteous. Finally, in an extremely significant associative move, Justin in 113.3–4 explicitly connects the resurrection with a return from dispersion, or a return from exile. According to him, this process will be led by Jesus. This passage provides an important conceptual link between texts such as those considered above, which speak of leaders of the resurrection, and 5 Ezra 1:39–40, which does not mention resurrection explicitly but has a similar group of worthies leading a return from exile.

The strong thematic connection of the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob with the resurrection motif that we noted in *Sib. Or.* 2 and the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs* appears also in Mark 12:18–27 and its Synoptic parallels, wherein Jesus uses Exod 3:6 to support the idea of resurrection: "And as for the dead being raised [ἐγείρονται], have you not read in the book of Moses . . . how God said to him, 'I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and

the God of Jacob'? He is not God of the dead, but of the living" (Mark 12:26–27). This pericope, especially in its Lukan form (Luke 20:27–38, esp. v. 38: "for all live to [God]"), recalls the statements cited above in 4 Macc 7:19 and 16:25 that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob "live to God."

Finally, the idea of resurrection may even be implicit in some of the "post-mortem" texts discussed above, for example, the Q pericope Luke 13:28//Matt 8:11.[23] Note that both passages speak of the glorified Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob in the context of an ingathering of righteous individuals from the cardinal points in order to participate in an eschatological banquet. Such an ingathering could easily be connected with the process of resurrection, as does Justin in *Dialogue* 113.

There is one further text in which the twelve minor prophets in particular, so dominant in the list in 5 Ezra 1:39–40, could be interpreted as being connected with resurrection—Sir 49:10: "May the bones of the Twelve Prophets send forth[24] new life from where they lie, for they comforted the people of Jacob and delivered them with confident hope." Most modern commentators argue that this passage is not a reference to resurrection and that Ben Sira himself did not have a developed ideology of resurrection.[25] Nevertheless, the passage (like Ezek 37:1–14, the allegory of the "dry bones"[26]) uses language that is strongly evocative of the concept of resurrection, and it is possible that later interpreters, including perhaps tradents like the author of 5 Ezra, read Sir 49:10 as a reference to resurrection and developed from there an association between the twelve minor prophets and resurrection.[27]

[23] See n. 19.

[24] The Greek word here, ἀναθάλοι (from ἀναθάλλω), means "to sprout afresh, (make to) flourish, revive." The Hebrew text is partially preserved in MS B; it has been restored to [פר]חות, from the root פרח, "to sprout, send forth buds or shoots." Interestingly, this Hebrew word is also used of bones in Isa 66:14: "Your bones shall flourish (תפרחנה) like the grass." It seems most likely that Ben Sira's usage depends on the passage in Third Isaiah.

G. W. E. Nickelsburg (in a private communication) also noted *T. Sim.* 6:2: "My bones will flourish as a rose in Israel, and my flesh as a lily in Jacob," and its similarity to Ben Sira 50:8, a description of the high priest Simon ben Onias.

[25] E.g., P. W. Skehan and A. A. Di Lella , *The Wisdom of Ben Sira* (AB 39; New York: Doubleday, 1987), 84–87. F. Saracino ("Risurrezione in Ben Sira?" *Henoch* 4 [1982]: 185–203) does, however, argue that Sir 46:12; 48:11, 13; and 49:10 evince a belief in resurrection (see Skehan and Di Lella, *Wisdom of Ben Sira,* 86 n. 14).

[26] 4QPseudo-Ezekiel seems to interpret Ezek 37 as referring to individual rather than national resurrection: see B. G. Wright, "Talking with God and Losing his Head: Extrabiblical Traditions about the Prophet Ezekiel," in *Biblical Figures Outside the Bible* (ed. M. E. Stone and T. A. Bergren; Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1998), 296–303.

[27] Note that the same phraseology is used earlier in Ben Sira 46:12 with reference to the biblical judges. Skehan and DiLella argue that both passages derive from 2 Kgs 13:20–21, a story that also has ties to resurrection (*Wisdom of Ben Sira,* 517). Note also the reference to Isa 66:14 in n. 24 above.

In the passages discussed above, it becomes clear that lists of OT worthies such as that found in 5 Ezra 1:39–40 occur not only in general in contexts describing a glorified, post-mortem state of existence, but also specifically in texts concerned with the process of resurrection, that is, "return" from a post-mortem state to a more physical, worldly state. It is this latter context, I would argue, the so-called resurrection parade, that furnishes the more immediate background, or "setting in life," for the list of worthies in 5 Ezra 1:39–40. First, in both cases, in the resurrection texts and in 5 Ezra, the worthies provide leadership, going first and setting an example for a larger group of righteous humans. Second, in both cases, the role of the worthies is set in a process of movement. Third, in both cases the worthies do not reside in an abstract, idealized setting, but are leading followers in a process that involves physical, worldly existence. In each of these ways, 5 Ezra is closer to the "resurrection" texts than to those that simply list OT worthies residing in a glorified, post-mortem setting.

If the list in 5 Ezra 1:39–40 finds its most immediate literary and ideological setting in traditional Jewish and Christian lists of OT worthies leading a process of resurrection, the fact remains that 5 Ezra 1:39–40 does not mention or even imply the idea of resurrection.[28] Rather, the context here is that of a return from exile, or an ingathering of the dispersion. Is it possible to draw any connections between these two apparently rather disparate ideological contexts?

The answer may lie in a text like Justin's *Dialogue* 113.3–4, which does in fact draw a functional equivalence between the ingathering of the dispersion and the process of resurrection. 5 Ezra, in conjoining to its description of return from exile a list of biblical leaders who probably would have been recognized by its readers as typical of post-mortem or resurrection contexts, seems to be making the same kind of hermeneutical manuever. This is a mode of interpretation that understands death metaphorically as a form of exile, or "dispersion," and therefore interprets resurrection as a reversal of that state—a return from exile, or an ingathering of the dispersion. The use of this hermeneutic by Justin in the mid-second century suggests that the author of 5 Ezra, writing probably between 130 and 250 C.E., was not innovative in making this connection.[29]

[28] This is not true, however, for 5 Ezra as a whole, in which the concept of resurrection is absolutely central (see 2:16, 23, 26, 31).

[29] G. W. E. Nickelsburg has pointed out that perhaps the first text to draw a correspondence between return from exile and resurrection is 2 Macc 7, in which traditional language from Second and Third Isaiah describing the exile and expected return of the sons of Mother Zion (see also Bar 4–5) is appropriated to articulate a hope for the resurrection of the mother's seven sons (*Resurrec-*

As to the theological "location" of this tradition, it is striking how many of the texts that we have examined, although drawing ultimately on Jewish sources, are themselves Christian in provenance. We may hypothesize that, whereas lists of OT patriarchs and prophets residing as "alive" in a post-mortem setting are clearly Jewish in origin, the use of such lists in a resurrection context seems to be most characteristic of Christian tradents in the first three centuries C.E. This seems to be the case especially in texts wherein explicitly Jewish traditions are being commented on (Justin), developed (the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*), or expanded (*Sib. Or.* 2) by Christian authors. 5 Ezra, which develops and reformulates Jewish traditions in many other places, fits firmly within this Christian exegetical tradition.[30]

IV. The "Twelve Angels with Flowers" in 5 Ezra 1:40

There remains the question of the "twelve angels with flowers" that conclude the list in 5 Ezra 1:39–40. Our investigations above strongly suggest that these "angels" are concerned or connected with the fates of humans. It seems possible that their "flowers," as in *3 (Greek) Bar.* 12:1–5, represent either the righteous deeds or prayers of these humans. However, there are other explanations for the angels and their flowers, and the designation of twelve such figures remains enigmatic.[31]

One possibility is that these angels somehow symbolize or represent a twelvefold group of human beings—perhaps the twelve patriarchs, the twelve minor prophets, or even the twelve Christian apostles/disciples. This possibility is made more concrete by a text such as *Apoc. Paul* 45–51, in which each OT patriarch or prophet residing in paradise has a familiar, companion angel, "the one [of which] does not leave the other" (ch. 49). Although most of 5 Ezra's list

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tion, Immortality, and Eternal Life, 106–8). Nickelsburg attributes this connection to "the Hasidic apocalyptic exegesis of Third Isaiah" (p. 107).

Ezekiel 37, cited above, is another text in which language appropriate to both national restoration and individual resurrection occurs in the same context. Note also Bar 3:10–11.

[30] For another striking example of this process in 5 Ezra, see T. A. Bergren, "5 Ezra, Dayyenu, and Improperia: The Tradition History of the Exodus-Review in 5 Ezra 1," in *A Multiform Heritage: Studies on Early Judaism and Christianity in Honor of Robert A. Kraft* (ed. B. G. Wright; Scholars Press Homage Series 24; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1999) 109–22.

[31] The Armenian and Georgian versions of *Life of Adam and Eve* 33:1–2 state that Adam and Eve each had twelve guardian angels who would accompany them in the garden until dawn, at which time the angels would ascend to heaven to worship God. This could well be related to the fact that the twelve angels in 5 Ezra 1:40 have "flowers" (cf. *3 [Greek] Bar.* 12:1–5, discussed above).

comprises human worthies who are identified as humans, it is possible that this final body of twelve angels represents or symbolizes a specific group of humans who are being portrayed in an other-worldly, glorified context. Indeed, it is not uncommon in early Jewish and Christian literature for the righteous dead, or righteous heroes assumed into heaven, to be characterized as "angels."[32]

How might the three possibilities suggested above work themselves out? Regarding the idea that these "twelve" refer to the twelve Christian apostles/disciples, this text could well reflect F. Strickert's thesis that our author might wish to place "modern" Christian leaders in the context of more ancient Jewish ones (see above). This theory is supported by 5 Ezra 1:37: "the apostles bear witness to the coming people with joy." However, there do not seem to be other contexts in which the twelve Christian apostles/disciples are represented as angels, not to mention angels bearing flowers.[33]

With reference to the twelve sons of Jacob or the twelve tribes of Israel, the main evidence that the "twelve angels" represent these groups seems to be the two passages from the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs* discussed above (*T. Benj.* 10:6–7 and *T. Jud.* 25). On the basis of these passages, this possibility seems at least plausible.

If the twelve angels of 5 Ezra 1:40 represent the twelve minor prophets, this would constitute a "doublet" tradition, since (most of) the minor prophets have already been listed by name directly before this in 5 Ezra 1:39–40. Still, such a doublet is not impossible. In support of this possibility we refer again to Sir 49:10, quoted above: "May the bones of the Twelve Prophets send forth new life from where they lie, for they comforted the people of Jacob and delivered

[32] In Qumran literature, see 1QS 4:6–8, 11–13; 1QM 12:1–7. *2 (Syriac) Baruch* states that the righteous dead will be "changed . . . into the splendor of angels" (51:5) and "will be like the angels" (51:10) (cf. *1 Enoch* 62:13–16). In *2 Enoch* 22:8–10 Enoch, taken on high, becomes an angel; the same happens to Zephaniah in *Apoc. Zeph.* 8–12 and to Isaiah in *Asc. Isa.* 9:30. For extended discussion of this theme, see M. Himmelfarb, *Ascent to Heaven in Jewish and Christian Apocalypses* (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), esp. chs. 2–3.

Compare Mark 12:25 (and its Synoptic parallels): "For when [people] rise from the dead, they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are like angels in heaven." Note, again, the connection with resurrection. The latter part of this pericope, Mark 12:26–27, is quoted and commented on above.

For a textual connection between "angels" and "prophets," see *Gos. Thom.* 88: "The angels and the prophets will come to you and give to you those things you (already) have. . . ."

[33] Note, however, the Q pericope discussed in n. 22. Also, Prof. G. W. E. Nickelsburg, in a private communication, pointed out that the twelve minor prophets, who are literally the last group in the Greek Bible, would make a neat transition to the "new" twelve, the Christian apostles. Furthermore, the word *angelos*, as "messenger," would be appropriate to the twelve Christian apostles, who were sent out, according to tradition, not only during Jesus' ministry but also in postresurrection appearances.

them with confident hope." A reference such as this, or traditions analogous to it, might have spawned an idea of the twelve prophets being like "angels," who have somehow attained a "new life" beyond the grave, and who are once again in a position to "comfort" and "deliver" their followers, perhaps even by bearing flowers in a manner similar to that envisioned in *3 (Greek) Bar.* 12:1–5.[34] Indeed, as noted above (n. 24), the Hebrew word for "send forth" that seems to have stood in the original is פרח, which literally means "to sprout, send forth buds or shoots."

Another consideration that might lead us to connect the "twelve angels with flowers" with the twelve minor prophets is the fact that the word "angel," in both Hebrew (מלאך) and Greek (ἄγγελος), literally means "messenger." This is also the meaning of the name Malachi (מלאכי, "my messenger/angel"), one of the two minor prophets missing from the "Spanish" text of 5 Ezra 1:39–40. Indeed, the Old Greek (LXX) text of Mal 1:1, where the MT has מלאכי, reads ἀγγέλου αὐτοῦ, "his [God's] messenger." Although the textual possibilities become convoluted, it is conceivable that there might have been an interchange, intentional or unintentional, at some point in the tradition history of 5 Ezra that led to a confusion between "twelve angels/messengers," the reading of the present Spanish text, and "Malachi/my messenger, one of the twelve," which is inexplicably missing from the Spanish text.[35]

Although it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to choose between the possibilities, I would suggest that the "twelve angels" in 5 Ezra 1:40 do indeed represent glorified or idealized versions of some such group of human beings, or perhaps, in a more straightforward way, are the angels who accompany them in their post-mortem state, as in *Apoc. Paul* 45–51. As for their "flowers," it is worth noting that these plants, which periodically return from the dead, are an appropriate symbol of resurrection—even in modern-day festivals that celebrate the resurrection of Jesus.

[34] In *Apoc. Zeph.* 8–12, Zephaniah, one of the twelve, is translated to heaven, puts on an angelic garment, and becomes like an angel (see the discussion above).

[35] Haggai, also missing from 5 Ezra's list of the twelve, is in Hag 1:13 also called "the angel/messenger of the Lord" (cf. *Vit. Proph.* 14:1).

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CRITICAL NOTES

THE ENTHYMEME AS AN ELEMENT OF STYLE IN PAUL

Ancient rhetorical theorists valued the enthymeme, Aristotle's so-called ῥητορικὸς συλλογισμός, not only for the logical contribution that it made to a speech, but for its aesthetic and stylistic qualities as well.[1] Indeed, by the early Roman period the enthymeme had become one of the most highly prized verbal ornaments. Cicero said that it was to other expressions what Homer was to other poets.[2] Quintilian went one better: *ut Homerus "poeta," "urbs" Roma* (*Inst.* 8.5.9). In this short study I wish to examine Paul's use of this popular figure.[3] I begin with a brief history of the discussion of the enthymeme as an element of style, paying particular attention to its evolution from a type of proof to a figure of speech in the late Hellenistic and early Roman periods. I then discuss the figure as it occurs in the letters of Paul, especially in the so-called *Hauptbriefe,* where it is employed with some frequency and, I think, considerable skill.

The application of ancient rhetorical theory to Paul's letters has been abused in the past and is often viewed with suspicion by many NT scholars.[4] I hope that this study, in

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[1] For the ancient handbook evidence, see Josef Martin, *Antike Rhetorik: Technik und Methode* (Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft 2.3; Munich: Beck, 1974), 102–5; Heinrich Lausberg, *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik* (Munich: Huebner, 1973), §371.

[2] *Top.* 13.55: *ut Homerus propter excellentiam commune poetarum nomen efficit apud Graecos suum, sic, cum omnis sententia* ἐνθύμημα *dicatur, quia videtur ea quae ex contrariis conficitur acutissima, sola proprie nomen commune possedit.*

[3] Previous studies by NT scholars have focused on the enthymeme as a mode of rhetorical proof: David Hellholm, "Enthymemic Argumentation in Paul: The Case of Romans 6," in *Paul in His Hellenistic Context* (ed. Troels Engberg-Pedersen; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 119–79; John D. Moores, *Wrestling with Rationality in Paul: Romans 1-8 in a New Perspective* (SNTSMS 82; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Folker Siegert, *Argumentation bei Paulus* (WUNT 34; Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1985), index, s.v. Enthymem; see also R. B. Vinson, "A Comparative Study of the Use of Enthymemes in the Synoptic Gospels," in *Persuasive Artistry: Studies in NT Rhetoric* (ed. D. F. Watson; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1991), 119–41; William S. Kurz, "Hellenistic Rhetoric in the Christological Proof of Luke-Acts," *CBQ* 42 (1980): 171–95.

[4] See R. Dean Anderson, *Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Paul* (CBET 18; Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1996), but see the review by Margaret M. Mitchell, *CBQ* 60 (1998): 356–58.

addition to casting light on Paul's use of the enthymeme, suggests a more widely acceptable approach to Paul's rhetoric based on (1) a cautious diachronic use of the ancient sources and (2) initially less ambitious goals focused primarily on Paul's textual rhetoric. In many ways this approach picks up where nineteenth-century scholars such as Johannes Weiss and Georg Heinrici left off.[5]

I. The Enthymeme as an Element of Style in Hellenistic and Roman Rhetoric

Aristotle's discussion of the enthymeme as the mode of deductive reasoning most appropriate to public discourse is well known.[6] However, at least twice in the *Ars rhetorica* he calls attention to the enthymeme's aesthetic possibilities.[7] At *Ars rhet.* 3.10.1410b 6–28 he includes the enthymeme in his discussion of "urbane and well-liked sayings" (τὰ ἀστεῖα καὶ τὰ εὐδοκιμοῦντα).[8] At *Ars rhet.* 2.21.1394b 20–26 he identifies one "especially well-liked" type, the γνώμη ἐνθυμηματική, or "enthymematic maxim."[9] This latter saying is distinguished by the fact that its supporting reason (αἴτιον) is not appended in a separate clause or ἐπίλογος but is directly incorporated into the saying itself.[10] Aristotle offers two examples that show how this works: ἀθάνατον ὀργὴν μὴ φύλασσε θνητὸς ὤν, "As a mortal do not harbor immortal anger,"[11] and θνατὰ χρὴ τὸν

[5] Johannes Weiss, "Beiträge zur Paulinischen Rhetorik," in *Theologische Studien, Bernhard Weiss zu seinem 70. Geburtstag dargebracht* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1897), 165–247; C. F. Georg Heinrici, "Zum Hellenismus des Paulus," in idem, *Der zweite Brief an die Korinther* (MeyerK 6/8; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1900); idem, *Der literarische Charakter der neutestamentlichen Schriften* (Leipzig: Durr, 1908). See also my earlier efforts in "Paul's Pointed Prose: The *Sententia* in Roman Rhetoric and Paul," *NovT* 40 (1998): 32–53.

[6] See especially Myles Burnyeat, "The Enthymeme: Aristotle on the Logic of Persuasion," in *Aristotle's Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays* (ed. David J. Furley and Alexander Nehamas; Proceedings of the Twelfth Symposium Aristotelicum; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 3–55.

[7] Isocrates had already conceived of the "enthymeme" as an element of style: τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι . . . ὅλον τὸν λόγον καταποικῖλαι (13.16). However, there is no consensus on what he meant by this term.

[8] According to Aristotle, the enthymeme owed its popularity to the fact that it imparted knowledge quickly and easily: ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ λέξιν καὶ ἐνθυμήματα ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι ἀστεῖα ὅσα ποιεῖ ἡμῖν μάθησιν ταχεῖαν (3.10.1410b 20–21), on which see William M. A. Grimaldi, *Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle's Rhetoric* (Hermes Einzelschriften, Heft 25; Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1972), 88–91.

[9] One should not quibble over whether this saying is properly an enthymeme or a maxim; for Aristotle it is obviously something of both. Cf. Quint., *Inst.* 8.9–10, where enthymemes used for the sake of ornament (*ad ornatum*) are classified as *sententiae*.

[10] *Ars rhet.* 2.21.1394b 21–22: εἰσὶ δ᾽ αὗται ἐν ὅσαις ἐμφαίνεται τοῦ λεγομένου τὸ αἴτιον.

[11] *Ars rhet.* 2.21.1394b 23 (= Adespota frag. 79 TrGF²); cf. Eur., frag. 799 TrGF² (= Stob., *Flor.* 20.17): ὥσπερ δὲ θνητὸν καὶ τὸ σῶμ᾽ ἡμῶν ἔφυ, οὕτω προσήκει μηδὲ τὴν ὀργὴν ἔχειν ἀθάνατον, ὅστις σωφρονεῖν ἐπίσταται; Men., *Mon.* 5 (Jaekel = 4 Meineke): ἀθάνατον ἔχθραν μὴ φύλαττε θνητὸς ὤν; Dion. Hal., *Ant. Rom.* 5.4.3: μηδὲ ἀθανάτους ἔχειν τὰς ὀργὰς ἐν θνητοῖς σώμασιν; Phalar., *Ep.* 51: θνητοὺς γὰρ ὄντας ἀθάνατον ὀργὴν ἔχειν, ὡς φασί τινες, οὐ προσήκει.

θνατόν, οὐκ ἀθάνατα τὸν θνατὸν φρονεῖν, "A mortal ought to think mortal not immortal things."[12] Though not explicitly stated by Aristotle, it is clear from these examples that the enthymematic maxim acquires both its logical force and its aesthetic appeal from a striking juxtaposition of contraries.[13] This same feature also accounts for the popularity of what Aristotle terms the "refutative enthymeme" (ἐνθύμημα ἐλεγκτικόν), which, unlike the simple demonstrative enthymeme (ἐνθύμημα ἀποδεικτικόν), "brings together [an opponent's] inconsistencies in a short space . . . side by side."[14]

Writing at approximately the same time as Aristotle, the author of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* also recognizes the stylistic value of the enthymeme, which may be added to one's discourse for primarily aesthetic reasons (τοῦ ἀστείου ἕνεκεν).[15] He discusses the enthymeme as a type of direct proof at 1430a 23–39, but defines it more narrowly than Aristotle as an argument constructed from any of a variety of contraries: Ἐνθυμήματα δ' ἐστὶν οὐ μόνον τὰ τῷ λογῷ καὶ τῇ πράξει ἐναντιούμενα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν.[16] He considers enthymemes particularly useful in legal debate, especially in attacking one's adversary, and he recommends that those who wish to introduce enthymemes into their discourse look for logical contradictions and personal inconsistencies in their opponents.[17] He allows that enthymemes may also be used in self-defense when they show that one's words or deeds are the opposite of what is unjust or

[12] *Ars rhet.* 2.21.1394b 26 (= Epich., frag. 239 Olivieri; frag. 263 Kaibel; Diels and Kranz, 23 B 20); cf. Pind., *Isthm.* 5.16; Eur. *Alc* 799: ὄντας δὲ θνητοὺς θνητὰ καὶ φρονεῖν χρεών; *Bacch.* 395–96: τὸ σοφὸν δ' οὐ σοφία | τό τε μὴ θνητὰ φρονεῖν; frag. 76: φρονεῖν δὲ θνητὸν ὄντ' οὐ χρὴ, μέγα; Ps.-Isocr., *Ad Demon.* 32: ἀθάνατα μὲν φρόνει τῷ μεγαλόψυχος εἶναι, θνητὰ δὲ τῷ συμμέτρως τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀπολαύειν; Arist., *EN* 10.7.1177b 31–34: οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν (cf. 9.11.1171b 18); Men., *Mon.* 1: Ἄνθρωπον ὄντα δεῖ φρονεῖν τἀνθρώπινα; cf. *Vit. Aesop.* 101.31 Perry; Hor., *Od.* 2.11.11–12.

[13] See *Ars rhet.* 2.24.1401a 4–5: τὸ συνεστραμμένως καὶ ἀντικειμένως εἰπεῖν φαίνεται ἐνθύμημα· ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη λέξις χώρα ἐστὶν ἐνθυμήματος; also 3.10.1410b 27–31.

[14] *Ars rhet.* 2.23.1400b 26–29: εὐδοκιμεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τὰ ἐλεγκτικὰ τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν διὰ τὸ συγαγωγὴν μὲν ἐναντίων εἶναι ἐν μικρῷ τὸ ἐλεγκτικὸν ἐνθύμημα, παρ' ἄλληλα δὲ φανερὰ εἶναι τῷ ἀκροατῇ μᾶλλον; 3.17.1418b 1–4: τῶν δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων τὰ ἐλεγκτικὰ μᾶλλον εὐδοκιμεῖ τῶν δεικτικῶν, ὅτι ὅσα ἔλεγχον ποιεῖ, μᾶλλον δῆλον ὅτι συλλελόγισται· παρ' ἄλληλα γὰρ μᾶλλον τἀναντία γνωρίζεται; cf. 2.22.1396b 22-27. Quintilian reconceptualizes these as the *enthymema ex repugnatibus* and the *enthymema ex consequentibus* (see below). Later theorists seem to have preferred Aristotle's terminology: Fortunat., *Artis rhet. libri III* 2.29 (118.34–35. H): δεικτικόν, ἐλεγκτικόν; Jul. Vict., *Ars rhet.* 11 (412.22–24 H): *elencticon*, *dicticon*; cf. Cass., *De rhet.* 13 (499.18–32 H): *convincibile*, *ostentabile*; Isid., *De rhet.* 9.9 (511 H): *convincibile*, *ostentabile*.

[15] E.g., *Rhet. ad Alex.* 1431b 25–26: ἐὰν μὴ βούλῃ γνώμην ἢ ἐνθύμημα συντόμως εἰπεῖν τοῦ ἀστείου ἕνεκεν; cf. 1434a 35–37: ἀστεῖα μὲν οὖν λέγειν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ τρόπου ἔστιν, οἷον τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγοντας.

[16] *Rhet. ad Alex.* 1430a 23–24; cf. 1431a 31–32. See the discussion in Jürgen Sprute, *Die Enthymemtheorie der aristotelischen Rhetorik* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982), 140–42; cf. Grimaldi, *Studies*, 80. According to Quintilian, 5.10.2, Cornificius termed the figure *contrarium*, the term used at *Rhet. ad Her.* 4.18.25; cf. Quintillian's *sententia ex contrariis* (8.5.9–10).

[17] *Rhet. ad Alex.* 1427b 12–30; cf. Cic., *Top.* 14.56; Dion. Hal., *Lys.* 15.3.

inexpedient.[18] For maximum effect, he recommends that enthymemes be kept as short and to the point as possible.[19]

The next theoretical discussion of the enthymeme to come down to us is in the anonymous Latin handbook *Rhetorica ad Herennium,* which dates from the early first century B.C.E. and builds on Hellenistic developments subsequent to Aristotle. Unlike Aristotle and the *auctor ad Alexandrum*, the *auctor ad Herennium* treats the enthymeme (Lat. *contrarium*) not as a type of proof but as a element of style (*elocutio*), and more specifically as a figure of speech (*exornatio verborum*).[20] He defines enthymeme as an argument from contraries that makes its point quickly and with ease: *Contrarium est quod ex rebus diversis duabus alteram breviter et facile confirmat*.[21] He is emphatic about the need for brevity, holding that the figure is most effective when executed in a single sentence: *Hoc orationis genus breviter et continuatis verbis perfectum debet esse*.[22] He is also impressed by the forcefulness of the well-crafted enthymeme in which form and function coalesce: *et cum commodum est auditu propter brevem et absolutam conclusionem, tum vero vehementer id quod opus est oratori conprobat contraria re*.[23]

The *auctor ad Herennium* includes in his account of the enthymeme an instructive set of examples:[24]

[18] *Rhet. ad Alex.* 1430a 31–35: ἀποφαίνοντας τὰς πράξεις τὰς ἡμετέρας καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐναντιουμένους τοῖς ἀδίκοις καὶ τοῖς ἀνόμοις καὶ τοῖς ἀσυμφόροις.

[19] *Rhet. ad Alex.* 1430a 35–37: δεῖ δὲ τούτων ἕκαστα συνάγειν ὡς εἰς βραχύτατα καὶ φράζειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἐν ὀλίγοις τοῖς ὀνόμασι.

[20] *Rhet. ad Her.* 4.18.25–26. This development may find some precedent as early as Theophrastus, who according to the *Epitome Laurentiana* 17, recognized the aesthetic value (κατασκευή) of the maxim (γνώμη), which, like the enthymeme, was also a mode of proof in Aristotle and in the *Ad Alexandrum*; see August Mayer, *Theophrasti περὶ λέξεως libri fragmenta* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1910), 143–44; J. Cousin, *Études sur Quintilien* (2 vols.; Paris: Boivin, 1935; reprint, Amsterdam: Schippers, 1967), 1:427. Diog. Laer. 5.47 attributes a Περὶ ἐνθυμημάτων to Theophrastus. According to Quint. 9.2.106, Gorgias of Athens (first century B.C.E.) and his translator, the Augustan rhetorican Rutilius Lupus, along with Visellius (first century C.E.), classified the enthymeme as an element of style, although this figure does not appear in Rutilius's *Schemata lexeos* (Halm 3–21).

[21] Recalling Aristotle's observation (n. 7 above) that enthymemes impart knowledge quickly.

[22] Cf. *Rhet. ad Her.* 4.19.27; also Ps.-Dem., Περὶ ἑρμηνείας 30–33, where care is taken to distinguish the enthymeme from the period (περίοδος), enthymemes typically being cast in a single well-formed sentence; he denies, however, that the enthymeme is for ornamentation (οὐ γὰρ κόσμου ἕνεκεν, 109); cf. Pierre Chiron, *Démétrios: Du Style* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1993), 92–93.

[23] A point that will not escape Juvenal either: *Non habeat matrona, tibi quae iuncta recumbit, dicendi genus aut curvum sermone rotato torqueat enthymema* (6.449); Gell., *N.A.* 6.3.27. Cf. Pliny, *Ep.* 2.3: *Crebra* ἐνθυμήματα *crebri syllogismi, circumscripti et effecti, quod stilo quoque adsequi magnum est* (of the Syrian declaimer Isaeus; cf. Philostr., *VS* 513).

[24] *"Nam, qui suis rationibus inimicus fuerit semper, eum quomodo alienis rebus amicum fore speres?" Item: "Nam quem in amicitia perfidiosum cognoveris, eum quare putes inimicitias cum fide habere posse? Aut qui privatus intolerabili superbia fuerit, eum commodum et cogniscentem sui fore in potestate qui speres et qui in sermonibus et conventu amicorum verum dixerit numquam, eum sibi in contionibus a mendacio temperaturum?" Item: "Quos ex collibus deiecimus, cum his in campo metuimus dimicare? Qui cum plures erant, paris nobis esse non poterant, hi, postquam pauciores sunt, metuimus, ne sint superiores?"*

> [1] For how do you expect him who has always been inimical to his own interests to be friendly to the interests of another?[25]
>
> Again: [2] For why should you imagine that he whom you have known to be dishonest as a friend would be trustworthy as an enemy? [3] Or how can you expect him who was intolerably arrogant as a private citizen to remember himself and be affable when in power, [4] and him who never spoke the truth in his daily conversation and association with friends to restrain himself from lying in public assemblies?
>
> Again: [5] Do we fear to fight on level ground these whom we have hurled down from the hills? [6] Are we now afraid that they will conquer us who were not our equals even when they outnumbered us, who are now outnumbered by us?

The first thing to note about this list is that all six of these sample enthymemes are formulated as questions. This feature, which more fully exploits the inherent logical force of the figure, will become characteristic of Latin rhetoric, as we shall see below.[26] The second thing to note is that enthymemes 2, 3, and 4 are grouped together, as are also enthymemes 5 and 6.[27] Aristotle warned against employing enthymemes in series on the grounds that it muddles the argument.[28] Here, however, the procedure is endorsed, as it will be later in Quintilian.[29] Presumably, this is because the enthymeme is no longer conceived of primarily as a mode of argument but as an element of style. Finally, it is clear from this list that the contrariety that had come to characterize the enthymeme has been extended to include arguments from the lesser to the greater (enthymemes 2–4), and vice versa (enthymemes 5–6).[30]

[25] Cf. Isocr., *Contra Callim.* 56: ἢ ὅστις ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις πράγμασιν οὕτω πονηρός ἐστιν, τί οὐκ ἂν ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῦ τολμήσειεν.

[26] This is not to say that Greek rhetoric did not also make use of rhetorical question in formulating enthymemes. On the whole, however, Greek rhetoric seems to have remained rather conservative in its treatment of the enthymeme; see Ps.-Demetr., Περὶ ἑρμηνείας 30–33, 109 (contrast Cic., *Top.* 13.55–56; Quint. 8.5.11); [Hermog.], *De inv.* 3.8 (150–54 Rabe); cf. Quint. 5.14.4. The material has been collected by Gustavus Gebauer, *De hypotacticis et paratacticis argumenti ex contrario formis quae reperiunter apud oratores Atticos* (Zwickau: Thost, 1877).

[27] In one case (enthymemes 3 and 4) they are combined as coordinate clauses in a single sentence.

[28] *Ars rhet.* 3.17.1418a 7–8: οὐ δεῖ δὲ ἐφεξῆς λέγειν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, ἀλλ᾽ ἀναμιγνύναι· εἰ δὲ μή, καταβλάπτει ἄλληλα; cf. *Ad Alex.* 1434a 38–40.

[29] See n. 39 below.

[30] It is possible to construe the first four example enthymemes as arguing from the lesser to the greater (e.g., number 2: "If he was dishonest as a friend [less likely], how much more will he be dishonest as an enemy [more likely]?"), and the last two enthymemes as arguing from the greater to the lesser (e.g., number 6: "If we defeated them when they outnumbered us [a greater feat], how much more will we defeat them now that we outnumber them [a lesser feat]?"). Cf. C. Gracchus, frag. 27 Malcovati (= A. Gell., *N.A.* 15.12): *Cum a servis eorum tam caste me habuerim, inde poteritis existimare quomodo me putetis cum liberis vestris vixisse*; Cato, frag. 165 Malcovati (= A. Gell., *N.A.* 6.3): *Quod illos dicimus voluisse facere, id nos priores facere occupabimus?*; Crassus *apud* Quint. 8.3.89: *Ego te consulem putem, cum tu me non putes senatorem?*

According to the elder Seneca, whose *Oratorum et rhetorum sententiae divisiones colores* dates from the reign of Tiberius,[31] the Spanish declaimer Porcius Latro devoted whole days to writing *enthymemata* in advance of his performances (*Contr.* 1 pr. 22–23).[32] At *Contr.* 1.1.2 he preserves what must have been one of Latro's better enthymemes. The theme is a young man previously disowned by his father for feeding his destitute uncle, now disowned by his uncle for feeding his father. Latro has the young man ask his adoptive father: *Imitationem alienae culpae innocentiam vocas?* "Do you call the imitation of another's guilt innocence?"[33] A few lines later Seneca records a similarly pointed question on the same theme by Arellius Fuscus Senior: *Ergo aliquis peribit fame qui filium suum optat superstitem?* "Shall then he die of hunger who prays that his son might outlive him?" At *Contr.* 1.2.3 Publius Vinicius asks a woman seeking a priesthood after having been the prisoner of pirates: *Castam te putas quia invita meretrix es?* "Do you think yourself chaste simply because you are an unwilling whore?" It should be noted that each of these enthymemes, and there are many more, is a pointed argument from contraries formulated as a question.

Quintilian treats the enthymeme at several points in his *Institutio oratoria*.[34] At 5.10.2 and again at 5.14.1–2 he defines it as a conclusion drawn either from the denial of consequents or from the juxtaposition of contraries: *argumenti conclusio vel ex consequentibus vel ex repugnatibus*.[35] He notes, however, that contemporary use stipulates the latter,[36] and he adheres to this for the most part throughout the *Institutio*. He treats the enthymeme as an element of style in his discussion of the *sententia* in 8.5.[37] He offers as an example Cicero's pointed question to Caesar at *Pro Ligario* 4.10: *Quorum igitur impunitas, Caesar, tuae clementiae laus est, eorum te ipsorum ad crudelitatem*

[31] The classic study is Henri Bornecque, *Les déclamations et les déclamateurs d'après Sénèque le père* (Travaux et Mémoires de l'univ., 1902); more recently, Janet Fairweather, *Seneca the Elder* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). The best general introduction to Roman declamation is Stanley Bonner, *Early Roman Declamation* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1949).

[32] *Solebat autem* [*Latro*] *et hoc genere exercitationis uti, ut aliquo die nihil praeter epiphonemata scriberet, aliquo die nihil praeter enthymemata, aliquo die nihil praeter has translaticias quas proprie sententias dicimus*; see Fairweather, *Seneca the Elder,* 203–7. Cf. Cic., *De or.* 2.27.118; *Brut.* 105 (of the declamatory exercises of C. Papirius Carbo) and 249 (M. Claudius Marcellus); Cousin, *Études sur Quintilien,* 1:273.

[33] This is a impressive sentence. In addition to its compelling logic, it is extremely brief, the juxtaposed terms (*culpae* and *innocentiam*) are placed in immediate proximity, and there is a complex assonance of case ending (*ae*, *em/am*) and initial syllable (*in-*, *im-*).

[34] *Inst.* 1.10.38; 5.10.1; 14.1–4, 24–25; 8.5.4, 9; 9.2.106; 4.57; 11.1.52; 3.102; 12.10.51.

[35] He offers examples of these two forms at 5.14.25–26. The *enthymema ex consequentibus*: *Bonum est virtus, qua nemo male uti potest.* The *enthymema ex repugnatibus*: *An bonum est pecunia, qua quis male uti potest?* It is noteworthy that while the example of the *enthymema ex consequentibus* is a declarative statement, the example of the *enthymema ex repugnatibus*, which is what most people by Quintilian's day meant by enthymeme, is a question.

[36] *Inst.* 5.10.2; 14.2; 8.5.9.

[37] 8.5.9–10: *sententia ex contrariis*. Quintilian's *sententia ex contrariis* should not be confused with Aristotle's γνώμη ἐνθυμηματική, since in the early empire the *sententia* was typically not a general moral sentiment. For Quintilian, the γνώμη is merely one type of *sententia* (8.5.3–8).

acuet oratio? "Shall then the speech of the very ones whose pardon is the praise of your clemency arouse you, Caesar, to severity?" Those who are urging Caesar to show harshness (*crudelitas*) to Ligarius are themselves recipients of his clemency. Quintilian points out that this *enthymema* was added by Cicero after he had already proven his case, not as an additional proof, but as a kind of parting insult underlining the hypocrisy of his opponents' position: *et addita in clausula est, epiphonematis modo, non tam probatio quam extrema quasi insultatio*.[38] This squares with Cicero's own comments on the enthymeme at *Top.* 13.55-6: *ex hoc illa rhetorum ex contrariis conclusa, quae ipsi* ἐνθυμήματα *appellant*.[39] At 5.14.3 Quintilian suggests that enthymemes may be employed seriatim, as we have already noted.[40]

On the basis of the above survey we may describe the figure of enthymeme as it took shape in the late Hellenistic and early Roman periods as a brief and pointed argument drawn from contraries.[41] Ideally, it was no longer than a single sentence. By the late Republic it had come to be viewed primarily as a figure of speech and was almost always expressed in the form of a question.[42] For further effect, enthymemes were sometimes employed in series. Enthymemes were considered particularly appropriate to courtroom rhetoric, where they were used to attack or even ridicule an opponent by exposing logical or personal inconsistencies, though they could also be used, *mutatis mutandis*, for self-defense.

II. The Enthymeme as an Element of Style in Paul

Paul employs the figure of enthymeme at least three times in his letter to the Galatians. The first occurs in 2:14, where it forms the thesis of his famous indictment of Peter at Antioch. Peter had joined Paul and Barnabas in eating with Gentile Christians until "certain ones from James" arrived, at which point he separated himself.[43] Paul saw

[38] *Inst.* 8.5.11. To which may be contrasted Ps.-Demetr., *Eloc.* 109: δόξειεν δ' ἂν καὶ τὸ ἐνθύμημα ἐπιφωνήματος εἶδός τι εἶναι, οὐκ ὂν μέν, οὐ γὰρ κόσμου ἕνεκεν, ἀλλὰ ἀποδείξεως παραλαμβάνεται. See A. D. Leeman, *Orationis Ratio: The Stylistic Theories and Practices of the Roman Orators, Historians and Philosophers* (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1963), 302.

[39] The author of the *De inventione* attributed to the second century prodigy Hermogenes of Tarsus (cf. Philostr., *Vit. soph.* 2.7) stipulates a similar use of enthymeme as the striking (δριμύτης) conclusion to a refutative argument, consisting of λύσις (counterclaim), ἐπιχείρημα (supporting argument), ἐργασία (the development or "working" of the argument), and ἐνθύμημα (Rabe 150–51). Indeed, he allows not only for an enthymeme, but for an "epenthymeme" (ἐπενθύμημα), a second terse argument from contraries added for further effect (Rabe 152–53).

[40] *Multiplicari solet*; citing as an example Cic., *Pro Mil.* 16.41.

[41] Contrariety here being broadly defined to include arguments from the lesser to the greater and the greater to the lesser.

[42] There were, of course, brilliant exceptions to this rule: cf. Sen., *Ep.* 85.4: *Non est bona valitudo mediocritas morbi* (which is perhaps best classified as an "enthymematic proverb").

[43] Presumably for reasons of cultic purity; see *BAG,* s.v. ἀφορίζω; Karl Ludwig Schmidt, *TDNT* 5:455; Hans Dieter Betz, "2 Cor 6:14–7:1: An Anti-Pauline Fragment?" *JBL* 92 (1973): 96.

in this retraction a perversion of the gospel, and he confronted Peter with the following question: εἰ σὺ Ἰουδαῖος ὑπάρχων ἐθνικῶς καὶ οὐχὶ Ἰουδαϊκῶς ζῇς, πῶς τὰ ἔθνη ἀναγκάζεις ἰουδαΐζειν?[44] In this complex enthymeme Paul alleges as many as three contradictions in Peter's behavior: first, he is compelling Gentiles to live as Jews (τὰ ἔθνη ἀναγκάζεις ἰουδαΐζειν); second, he is enforcing a standard from which he himself has just recently departed (σὺ . . . οὐχὶ Ἰουδαϊκῶς ζῇς); and third, he has not held to this standard even though he is himself a Jew (Ἰουδαῖος ὑπάρχων).[45]

Paul uses the figure of enthymeme a second time in Gal 3:3.[46] Here he indicts the Galatians themselves for a contradiction in their own behavior. The Galatians had been converted to Christianity by Paul's gospel and had therefore begun their Christian experience "in the Spirit." However, they have recently become law-observant, which, according to Paul, constitutes a reversion to the "flesh" (σάρξ). Paul thus asks: ἐναρξάμενοι πνεύματι νῦν σαρκὶ ἐπιτελεῖσθε? This is one of Paul's most elegant enthymemes. Its extreme brevity (five words) rivals Latro's impressive *Imitationem alienae culpae innocentiam vocas?* In addition, it employs a twofold contrast: between beginning a process and bringing that process to completion (ἐναρξάμενοι . . . ἐπιτελεῖσθε), and between the Spirit and the flesh (πνεύματι . . . σαρκί). It is made even more striking by its use of chiasmus that hinges on νῦν.

Paul uses enthymeme a third time in Gal 4:16. As Betz has rightly pointed out, Gal 4:12–20 is a string of *topoi* on the theme of friendship.[47] Paul skillfully exploits this theme in 4:16 when he pointedly asks, ὥστε ἐχθρὸς ὑμῶν γέγονα ἀληθεύων ὑμῖν? According to ancient friendship theory, speaking the truth was a hallmark of genuine friendship. In particular, it distinguished the true friend from the "flatterer" (κόλαξ).[48] By speaking the truth, therefore, Paul has been a friend to the Galatians, not an enemy.[49] Paul's question is thus in effect: "Have I become your enemy by acting your friend?" The Galatians had been alienated by an act that should have drawn them even closer to Paul.

Paul frequently uses the figure of enthymeme in his correspondence with the urban centers of Corinth and Rome. In 1 Cor 6:1–3 he uses a series of three enthymemes to introduce his indictment of the Corinthians for suing one another in court

[44] Hans Dieter Betz (*Galatians: A Commentary on Paul's Letter to the Churches in Galatia* [Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979], 111 and 62 n. 66) classifies this as an instance of *complexio* (dilemma) citing Cicero, *De inv.* 1.29.45, and Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §393. But *complexio* is defined (by Cicero) as "a form of argument in which you are refuted, which ever alternative you grant." There are no such alternatives in 2:14 where Paul confronts Peter with a simple self-contradiction: "You require a Jewishness of Gentiles which you do not even require of yourself, a Jew." For enthymeme based on dilemma, see Asp., *Rhet.* 8.11 (288 Spengel), citing Demosth. 26.14.

[45] By beginning the apodosis with πῶς, Paul underscores that his question is an indictment.

[46] Betz also classifies this as an instance of *complexio* (dilemma). However, in his more detailed comments he goes on to speak (correctly) of "several opposites" that "characterize the inconsistency of the Galatians: beginning and end, imperfect beginning and climactic perfection, Spirit and flesh." (*Galatians*, 133). A more involved enthymeme may be found in 4:9.

[47] Betz, *Galatians*, 220–37.

[48] The major texts are collected in Betz, *Galatians*, 228–29.

[49] By simple metonymy ἀληθεύων ὑμῖν = φιλῶν ὑμᾶς.

(6:1–11). To begin with, the Corinthians are seeking justice before the unjust (v. 1): τολμᾷ τις ὑμῶν πρᾶγμα ἔχων πρὸς τὸν ἕτερον κρίνεσθαι ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ οὐχὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἁγίων?[50] Second, they are acting as though they were incapable of judging daily disputes when they are in fact those who will someday judge the world (v. 2b): καὶ εἰ ἐν ὑμῖν κρίνεται ὁ κόσμος, ἀνάξιοί ἐστε κριτηρίων ἐλαχίστων?[51] Finally, and somewhat redundantly,[52] they are refusing to render a judgment on the things of this life though they will someday sit in judgment of the angels (v. 3): οὐκ οἴδατε ὅτι ἀγγέλους κρινοῦμεν, μήτι γε βιωτικά? Paul employs enthymeme again in 1 Cor 6:15, where he argues that the sexual ethics of some Corinthians are also grossly self-contradictory: ἆρας οὖν τὰ μέλη τοῦ Χριστοῦ ποιήσω πόρνης μέλη?[53] In 2 Cor 2:2 Paul uses enthymeme not to indict the Corinthians but to defend himself: εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼ λυπῶ ὑμᾶς, καὶ τίς ὁ εὐφραίνων με εἰ μὴ ὁ λυπούμενος ἐξ ἐμοῦ?[54]

The diatribal rhetoric of Rom 6–7 readily lends itself to the use of enthymeme. In Rom 6:1 Paul imagines an enthymeme directed against his own position: τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν; ἐπιμένωμεν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, ἵνα ἡ χάρις πλεονάσῃ?[55] He responds in kind (6:2): μὴ γένοιτο. οἵτινες ἀπεθάνομεν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, πῶς ἔτι ζήσομεν ἐν αὐτῇ? He puts an enthymeme into the mouth of an imaginary objector again in 7:1: ὁ νόμος ἁμαρτία; and at 7:13: τὸ οὖν ἀγαθὸν ἐμοὶ ἐγένετο θάνατος? In Rom 8:31–32 Paul joins two enthymemes, both of which argue from the greater to the lesser, to introduce the conclusion of vv. 31–39:

> τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν πρὸς ταῦτα; εἰ ὁ θεὸς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, τίς καθ᾽ ἡμῶν; ὅς γε τοῦ ἰδίου υἱοῦ οὐκ ἐφείσατο ἀλλὰ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν πάντων παρέδωκεν αὐτόν, πῶς οὐχὶ καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα ἡμῖν χαρίσεται; (8:31–32)

Twice in Rom 14 Paul uses an "enthymematic maxim" to highlight the inverted values that are leading some to place their liberty before the welfare of others: first in v. 15: μὴ τῷ βρώματί σου ἐκεῖνον ἀπόλλυε ὑπὲρ οὗ Χριστὸς ἀπέθανεν, and second in v. 20: μὴ

[50] Hans Conzelmann perceptively calls this a question that "already contains the verdict" (*I Corinthians* [Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975], 104); cf. Chrys., *In 1 Epist. ad Cor.*, hom. 16.4; C. F. Georg Heinrici, *Der erste Brief an die Korinther* (MeyerK 5/8; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1896), 188: "contradictio in adjecto."

[51] The argument here and in v. 3 is *a maiore ad minus*. For the notion that the saints shall judge the world, see Dan 7:22; 1QpHab 5.4: "But God will judge all the nations by the hand of his elect"; Wis 3:8: κρινοῦσιν [οἱ δικαιοὶ] ἔθνη καὶ κρατήσουσιν λαῶν.

[52] Redundant in terms of the argument but not in terms of Paul's rhetoric; cf. Quint. 8.5.11.

[53] Cf. 1 Cor 10:21: οὐ δύνασθε ποτήριον κυρίου πίνειν καὶ ποτήριον δαιμονίων, οὐ δύνασθε τραπέζης κυρίου μετέχειν καὶ τραπέζης δαιμονίων. In 9:11 Paul uses enthymeme to argue that those who have conferred spiritual benefits have a right to financial support: εἰ ἡμεῖς ὑμῖν τὰ πνευματικὰ ἐσπείραμεν μέγα εἰ ἡμεῖς ὑμῶν τὰ σαρκικὰ θερίσομεν? In 1 Cor 10:30 Paul asks the Corinthians why they have allowed that for which they thank God to mar their reputation as Christians: εἰ ἐγὼ χάριτι μετέχω, τί βλασφημοῦμαι ὑπὲρ οὗ ἐγὼ εὐχαριστῶ? He states this idea even more pointedly in Rom 14:16: μὴ βλασφημείσθω οὖν ὑμῶν τὸ ἀγαθόν.

[54] For the use of enthymemes in self-defense, see *Rhet. ad Alex.* 1430a31–35.

[55] Note again the use of πῶς to introduce the apodosis. Chrysostom calls it "an incontrovertible argument" (λογισμὸν ἀναντίρρητον) (*In Epist. ad Rom.*, hom. 10 [*PG* 60:479.44]).

ἕνεκεν βρώματος κατάλυε τὸ ἔργον τοῦ θεοῦ.[56] A third enthymematic maxim describes the absurd result of this behavior: μὴ βλασφημείσθω οὖν ὑμῶν τὸ ἀγαθόν.

We have already seen Paul use enthymemes in series in 1 Cor 6:1–3 and Rom 8:31–32. He does this again in 2 Cor 6:14–16—if indeed 2 Cor 6:14–7:1 is an authentic Pauline text[57]—and in Rom 2:21–23. In 2 Cor 6:14–16 he rejects being "unequally yoked with unbelievers" with a series of five enthymemes formulated as questions and linked together with five roughly synonymous terms (μετοχή, κοινωνία, συμφώνησις, μερίς, συγκατάθεσις):[58]

> τίς γὰρ μετοχὴ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ἀνομίᾳ,
> ἢ τίς κοινωνία φωτὶ πρὸς σκότος;
> τίς δὲ συμφώνησις Χριστοῦ πρὸς Βελιάρ,
> ἢ τίς μερὶς πιστῷ μετὰ ἀπίστου;
> τίς δὲ συγκατάθεσις ναῷ θεοῦ μετὰ εἰδώλων;

In Rom 2:21–23 he employs a similar string of questions to indict the Jew who imagines he has escaped the wrath of God through Torah:[59]

> ὁ οὖν διδάσκων ἕτερον σεαυτὸν οὐ διδάσκεις;
> ὁ κηρύσσων μὴ κλέπτειν κλέπεις;
> ὁ λέγων μὴ μοιχεύειν μοιχεύεις;
> ὁ βδελυσσόμενος τὰ εἴδωλα ἱεροσυλεῖς;
> ὃς ἐν νόμῳ καυχᾶσαι, διὰ τῆς παραβάσεως τοῦ νόμου τὸν θεὸν ἀτιμάζεις;

It is noteworthy that in commenting on the first of these texts (2 Cor 6:14–16), Chrysostom praises Paul not only for his use of rhetorical question, "which is fitting when one is delineating things that are obvious and commonly held" (ὅπερ τῶν σαφῶν καὶ ὁμολογουμένων ἐστίν) but also for the fact that he employs these questions "in quick succession" (τῇ πυκνότητι).[60]

[56] The contrariety in both of these enthymemes is effected by means of metonymy (βρῶμα). Neither of these enthymemes, which occur as members of a list of *sententiae*, is formulated as a question.

[57] The view that 2 Cor 6:14–7:1 is a non-Pauline fragment rests in large part on the argument that the list of antitheses in 6:14–16 contains a number of Pauline *hapax legomena* (μετοχή, συμφώνησις, συγκατάθεσις, Βελιάρ) as well as the un-Pauline contrast between light and darkness and was therefore not composed by Paul. This argument is significantly weakened, however, if these antitheses are understood as Paul's effort to generate a series of five enthymemes, since in producing such a list Paul would be forced to move beyond his normal word choice and complexes of ideas. Cf. Rom 2:22: ὁ βδελυσσόμενος τὰ εἴδωλα ἱεροσυλεῖς, which occurs in a similar list of five enthymemes (see below).

[58] Chrysostom notes that Paul proceeds by way of questions that turn his opponent against himself: ἀλλὰ κατ᾽ ἐρώτησιν προάγει τὸν λόγον, ἐντρέπων καὶ λέγων . . . (*In Epist. ad Rom.*, hom. 6.1 [*PG* 60:443.35–37]).

[59] Cf. Chrys., *In Epist. ad Rom.*, hom. 6.1 (*PG* 60:443.35–37): ἀλλὰ κατ᾽ ἐρώτησιν προάγει τὸν λόγον, ἐντρέπων (= "turning his opponent against himself"?) καὶ λέγων. . . .

[60] *In 2 Epist. ad Cor.*, hom. 13 (*PG* 61:493.36–38).

III. Conclusion

In the late Hellenistic and early Roman periods the enthymeme evolved from a type of proof to a popular and well-defined figure of speech. By attending to this development we have been able to identify a number of enthymemes in Paul's letters, especially in the tightly reasoned arguments of Galatians, 1 and 2 Corinthians, and Romans. Paul's enthymemes typically argue from strict contrariety, but at least twice (1 Cor 6:2–3) they argue from the greater to the lesser.[61] Paul's enthymemes are always brief, often impressively so, and can be quite striking, even by contemporary standards. Three times Paul employs enthymemes in a series, a practice eschewed by Aristotle, for whom the enthymeme was primarily a mode of argument, but cultivated in Latin oratory, where the enthymeme was admired for the aesthetic contribution it made to one's discourse. The fact that Paul's enthymemes are almost without exception formulated as questions also finds its nearest parallel in contemporary Latin rhetoric.[62] The fact that Paul's enthymemes typically occur in indictments and counterindictments reflects the enthymeme's background in legal repartee.

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[61] Closely related to the enthymeme with its argument *ex contrariis* is the tautology, with its argument from identity; cf. Eur., *Alc.* 799; Men., *Mon.* 1 (cited in n. 12 above). Galatians 4:18 is an example of tautology: καλὸν δὲ ζηλοῦσθαι ἐν καλῷ πάντοτε, for which see further, Graydon F. Snyder, "The *Tobspruch* in the New Testament," *NTS* 23 (1976): 117–20.

[62] For further parallels between Paul's prose style and contemporary Latin rhetoric, see Holloway, "Paul's Pointed Prose."

THE REFUSAL OF A CONCLUSION IN THE BOOK OF LAMENTATIONS

In an article from 1974, "The Conclusion of the Book of Lamentations (5:22)," Robert Gordis noted that "the closing verse in Lamentations is crucial for the meaning and spirit of the entire poem. In spite of the simplicity of its style and the familiarity of its vocabulary, it has long been a crux."[1] Gordis is certainly correct on both counts: the verse is indeed important for the final impact of the book on the reader, but it has confounded translators and commentators no end. In a recent book, I mentioned briefly a new way of translating and interpreting this problematic line, and in this article I want to refine that argument and give it more support.[2]

I

The crux primarily consists in how to construe the function of the opening particles of the verse: כי אם־מאס מאסתנו קצפת עלינו עד־מאד. A number of ways of understanding and rendering כי אם have been offered.

1. The old JPSV simply inserted a negative into the verse, giving it essentially the opposite meaning of what one would expect: "Thou canst not have utterly rejected us, and be exceedingly wroth against us!" There is no support for such a reading, however, and the new JPSV has dropped it.

2. The RSV turns the statement into a question: "Or hast thou utterly rejected us? Art thou exceedingly angry with us?" But there is no evidence in the Hebrew Bible for taking כי אם as introducing a question, nor is there any support for taking the introductory particles to mean "or." Though this reading is not followed by the NRSV, it is the tack taken by the current liturgical edition of the Five Megilloth produced by the Central Conference of American Rabbis and is also followed by no less an authority than Claus Westermann in his recent book on Lamentations.[3]

[1] R. Gordis, "The Conclusion of the Book of Lamentations (5:22)," *JBL* 93 (1974): 289.

[2] T. Linafelt, *Surviving Lamentations: Catastrophe, Lament, and Protest in the Afterlife of a Biblical Book* (Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 58–61.

[3] *The Five Scrolls: Hebrew Texts, English Translations, Introductions, and New Liturgies* (New York: CCAR Press, 1984/5744), 315; C. Westermann, *Lamentations: Issues and Interpretation* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1994), 210. This rendering became common after it was advocated by M. Löhr, *Der Klagelieder des Jeremias* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1906), 31–32.

3. Another option is suggested by Wilhelm Rudolph, who takes כי אם to mean "unless," thus construing the relationship between v. 21 and v. 22 as, "Turn us to yourself O Lord . . . unless you have rejected us."[4] Rudolph cites as a parallel Gen 32:27: לא אשלחך כי אם־ברכתני, "I will not let you go unless you bless me." But as many commentators since have pointed out, כי אם is used in this way only when preceded by a negative statement, a condition that does not obtain in the present case.[5] A slightly different spin is given to this approach by Johan Renkema, who translates v. 22 as, "Or do you prefer to reject us forever, to rage against us without measure?"[6] Renkema looks to Deut 10:12 and Mic 6:8 for analogous uses of כי אם without a preceding negative, but an important element in both of those cases is the clear use of a preceding interrogative:

מה יהוה אלהיך שאל מעמך (Deut 10:12)

מה יהוה דורש ממך (Mic 6:8)

Our present case lacks such an interrogative, and thus it is hard to see how these examples might help us to read Lam 5:22.[7]

4. Delbert Hillers, following the Vg, Luther, and the KJV, translates the opening particles as adversative: "But you have utterly rejected us. . . ."[8] Again however, כי אם is used as an adversative conjunction only when preceded by a negative, either explicit or implied, which is not the case with v. 21.

5. Gordis's own solution is to take the verbs in v. 22 as pluperfects, translate כי אם as "even though," and put the whole verse in a subordinate relationship to v. 21: "Turn us to yourself, O Lord . . . even though you had despised us greatly and were very angry with us."[9] But Westermann's twofold objection to such a rendering seems cogent. In the first place, it is difficult to see how the verbs could be understood as pluperfects here, since from the perspective of the lamenters YHWH's wrath is not a past event but "is still working itself out in their midst." In the second place, the syntax suggested by Gordis, in which a subordinate clause states the attendant circumstances to the petition of a main

[4] W. Rudolph, "Der Text der Klagelieder," *ZAW* 51 (1933): 120. So also *BDB,* 474.

[5] Against Rudolph, see B. Albrektson, *Studies in the Text and Theology of the Book of Lamentations* (Lund: Gleerup, 1963); Gordis, "Conclusion of Lamentations," 290; D. Hillers, *Lamentations* (AB 7A; 2d ed.; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1992), 160.

[6] J. Renkema, *Lamentations* (Historical Commentary on the Old Testament; Leuven: Peeters, 1998), 630–32.

[7] Renkema writes: "While it is true that 5:21 lacks an interrogative, nevertheless it clearly refers to what YHWH wants or desires. In the context of this prayer there are two possibilities: either YHWH will give ear to their prayerful imperative חדש and renew their days or such renewal is not what he wants" (p. 631). I must admit that the logic is not totally clear to me. What ties the three examples (Deut 10:12; Mic 6:8; Lam 5:22) together for Renkema is the issue of what YHWH "desires" or "prefers"; but I do not think that this issue is at all clear in Lam 5:22, which is after all a petition on the part of the people rather than an address to them by a prophetic representative of YHWH.

[8] Hillers, *Lamentations,* 160–61.

[9] Gordis, "Conclusion of Lamentations," 292–93.

clause, "is without parallel in the psalms of lamentation and is questionable on stylistic grounds."[10]

6. There remains the option of simply deleting or ignoring אם, which yields a translation such as "For truly, you have rejected us" (JPSV). This is apparently the solution taken by the LXX and the Peshitta, and it is reflected in a few medieval Hebrew manuscripts. But without further manuscript evidence one must certainly defer here to the principle of *lectio difficilior* and accept the MT.

II

My own proposal for addressing the crux of Lam 5:22 begins with the observation, often made by commentators, that one might expect כי אם to introduce a conditional statement.[11] This is the logic behind the NEB, for example: "If thou hast utterly rejected us, then great has been thy anger against us." The first colon of the verse is understood as the protasis, and the second colon as the apodosis.[12] However, the common objection to this rendering is correct—that the relationship between the two cola is one not of condition and consequence, or protasis and apodosis, but rather of poetic parallelism. But what has been overlooked in the literature on this verse is that this objection does not rule out the possibility of understanding כי אם as introducing only the protasis of a conditional sentence, since there exists a class of conditionals with ellipsis in the apodosis. I would argue that this is what we find in Lam 5:22, *a protasis without an apodosis*, or, in other words, an "if" with the "then" left unstated.

The reason this has been overlooked, it seems, is because most examples of this class of conditionals occur as oaths or curses.[13] But the fact that this same syntactical arrangement occurs in non-oath formulas has been largely unacknowledged. Of the major treatments of Biblical Hebrew syntax, only Paul Joüon notes in his treatment of conditional clauses that there are non-oath examples of understood (rather than stated) apodoses. The examples that Joüon gives include Gen 38:17, Num 5:20, and Exod 32:32 (as well as Luke 13:9 from the NT).[14] I would add to this list now Lam 5:22. We may note, in support of including Lam 5:22 in this category, that in conditional clauses begin-

[10] Westermann, *Lamentations,* 218.

[11] For example, Exod 8:17: כי אם־אינך משלח את־עמי הנני משלח בך . . . את־הערב, "For if you do not send forth my people, then I will send a swarm against you."

[12] This logic is followed by A. Ehrlich, *Randglossen zür hebräischen Bibel* (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1914), 7:854; and by T. Meek, *IB* 6:38.

[13] Thus, for example, in the exchange with YHWH over the fate of Job, *haśśāṭān* utters just this sort of truncated curse: אם־לא על־פניך יברכך, "If he does not bless you to your face—" (Job 1:11; 2:5). On these statements as curses, see E. Good, *In Turns of Tempest: A Reading of Job with a Translation* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 194; and further, though in a different vein, T. Linafelt, "The Undecidability of ברך in the Prologue to Job and Beyond," *BibInt* 4, no. 2 (1996): 154–72.

[14] P. Joüon, *Grammaire de l'hébreu biblique* (Rome: Institute Biblique Pontifical, 1923) §167r.

ning with אם (as opposed to the contrary-to-fact conditions that are generally introduced by לו or לולא), one finds quite frequently that the infinitive absolute follows immediately after אם.[15] This is, of course, what we have in the opening of v. 22, כי אם־מאס מאסתנו.

It is quite possible then to take כי אם in the most natural sense of "for if . . . ," and to understand all of v. 22 as the protasis of a conditional sentence in which the apodosis is understood rather than stated. If this is correct, a literal translation of Lam 5:20–22 would look something like the following:

> Why have you forgotten us utterly,
> forsaken us for so long?
> Take us back, O LORD, to yourself, and we will come back.
> Renew our days as of old.
> For if truly you have rejected us,
> raging bitterly against us—

Rendered thus, the final line of v. 22 is a poignantly appropriate way to end the book of Lamentations, indicating by its very incompleteness a refusal to move—in the face of YHWH's lack of response—beyond lament to praise, but also a refusal to conclude at all. The ending of the book is, then, a willful *non*ending. The poetry is left opening out into the emptiness of God's nonresponse.[16] By leaving a conditional statement dangling, the final verse leaves open the future of the ones lamenting. It is hardly a hopeful ending, for the missing but implied apodosis is surely negative; yet it does nevertheless defer that apodosis.[17] By arresting the movement from an "if" to a "then," the incomplete clause allows the reader, for a moment, to imagine the possibility of a different "then," and therefore a different future.

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[15] So GKC §113o (2).

[16] As an anonymous reader for *JBL* pointed out to me, a partially analogous example of "an isolated protasis uttered at the edge of despair" is Ps 27:13, although in that case one finds לולא used to introduce the statement rather than כי אם, indicating a contrary-to-fact condition that tends to vitiate the despair.

[17] It is possible, as Jeremy Schipper of Princeton Theological Seminary has suggested to me, that the ending of the book is a conscious allusion to Lam 3:32, כי אם־הוגה ורחם כרב חסדו, which could perhaps be translated also as a conditional sentence ("for if he afflicts, he will then show compassion according to his abundant kindness"). On this reading the implied apodosis of 5:22 would be more positive than I have argued. But it seems likely that the כי אם of 3:32, since it is preceded by a negative statement (לא יונח), functions as an adversative conjunction. Thus, the sense of 3:31–32 would be, "For the Lord does not reject forever, but rather (כי אם) having afflicted he will show compassion according to his abundant kindness."

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BOOK REVIEWS

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On the Way to Canon: Creative Tradition History in the Old Testament, by Magne Sæbø. JSOTSup 191. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998. Pp. 401. $57.50/£35.00.

This volume consists of twenty short studies by Prof. Sæbø published over the past forty years, plus a new introductory essay. Two-thirds of those included appear here for the first time in English. The studies are grouped into five parts. The two essays in part 1 illustrate how text-critical analysis can contribute to this approach; six studies of the tradition history of selected passages comprise part 2; five studies on the history of selected themes in part 3 lead into three examples of tradition history applied to extended biblical texts in part 4, along with a discussion of tradition history and canonical criticism; surveys of the contributions of three scholars (J. P. Gabler, W. R. Smith, and S. Mowinckel) to the field of tradition history round out the collection in part 5.

The introductory essay sets out the authors overarching goal: to explain the transition from flexible traditions to canonized Scripture. Sæbø's studies follow two tracks. One traces the literary evolution of the traditions up to the emergence of the canonical form of a book; the other traces the evolution of theological ideas within literary traditions. Sæbø's investigations show how the two tracks cannot truly be separated, nor can diachronic and synchronic questions be fully answered in isolation from one another. The transition from fluid tradition to fixed canon was a gradual one, and pinpointing when one has left tradition and entered canon is almost impossible to determine (although Sæbø tries to do so).

Consideration of a few examples from these studies illustrates the difficulties one faces. The text-critical studies (chs. 2–3) show that opposing traditions could be preserved in different manuscripts, essentially yielding different canons. An analysis of the Song of Songs (ch. 17) leads Sæbø to conclude that the early stages of the canonization of the book . . . were interwoven with the late stages of the tradition and redaction history of the Song" (p. 284). In spite of this interweaving, he feels confident in concluding that allegorical interpretations of the book arose after it had reached its canonical shape. On the other hand, he argues elsewhere that Solomonic authorship of the Song and

Ecclesiastes must have been "peculiar to the pre-canonical final stage of the tradition history" (p. 304).

It is in another study ("From 'Unifying Reflections' to the Canon" [ch. 18]) that Sæbø best illustrates the methodological dilemma he faces. He juxtaposes three stages in the development of biblical books—evolving traditions influenced by "unifying reflections," the fixing of a canon, and "post-canonical exegesis." He draws his primary examples from Proverbs and Ecclesiastes. Regarding the latter, he speaks of the second epilogue (Eccl 12:12–14) as a revision or addition that has been "appended at the end of the book." This addition reflects a different tradition history than the rest of the book, producing a different interpretation of the entire book. Then he says, "Here one is dealing with a book which has attained its final form or is at least regarded as being complete" (p. 304).

This seems to be the crux of the matter. How does one know when a text is to be "regarded as being complete"? The author of Ecclesiastes who did not include the "second epilogue" would have considered his work to be "complete"; yet a subsequent editor felt compelled (and free) to alter the work. Sæbø's explanation for this seems to be that "the canon 'intervened'" (p. 307), but he does not clarify what this means. Perhaps it means that an alteration was necessary so that the book could be included in the canon. But why was it necessary to include this document? Perhaps it means that the epilogue was appended postcanonically, when someone realized that its message contradicted other books in the canon. But that seems to undermine the meaning of canon.

The ambiguity over what is "tradition history" and what is "canonization" prevents the precise sort of conclusions that Sæbø reaches. Did allegorical interpretations of the Song of Songs arise *because* the Song was in the canon, or *in order to* get it included in the canon? Did Solomonic authorship become an issue *because* certain writings were considered canonical, or *in order to* attain that status? In both instances, the former options suggest that the criteria for canonicity were changing, while the latter imply that there must have been other reasons necessitating the inclusion of these writings. Apparently, canonization is little more than the final stage of a complex tradition history.

Sæbø's proposals on the development of theological themes yield similar results. For example, he argues that the identification of "the servant" in Deutero-Isaiah evolved from an individual figure to a collective representation (ch. 16). He shows how rhetoric regarding the national authority of the Davidic king could have been universally applied (ch. 8), and how messianism probably was broadened in tandem with evolving eschatological themes (ch. 13). Similarly, his comments on the relationships between law and narrative in P (ch. 10) and between prophecy and wisdom in apocalyptic (ch. 14) help advance the scholarly conversations in those areas. But Sæbø's explanation of the relationship between the development of a theological theme and canonization is rather ambiguous. For example, he argues that the merging of law ethics and wisdom ethics into a common "ethos of the Old Testament" accompanies canonization because of "the faith in Yahweh, the God of Israel" (p. 179). However, it seems that this "faith in Yahweh" permeates not only the canonical writings but also the traditions out of which they emerged, as well as apocryphal and pseudepigraphic writings. There must have been other factors involved in the phenomenon of canonization. One possibly significant piece that is missing is the identification of those who made the decisions about what was canonical. It could be that the power and permanence of those who promoted cer-

tain texts should be regarded as just as significant as the content of the texts ("the faith in Yahweh") in the phenomenon of canonization.

Unlike the Bible itself, there is now no canonical interpretation of the Bible. The history of interpretation is still being written. An important consideration in that ongoing process is knowledge of how it has been done in the past. Prof. Sæbø provides a helpful voice in this conversation. His proposals are thought-provoking and reasonable. We are fortunate to have this collection at our disposal, as it should stimulate further reflection on this important and often neglected area. But his is not the final word.

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A Grammar of Epigraphic Hebrew, by Sandra Landis Gogel. SBL Resources for Biblical Study 23. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998. Pp. xx + 522. $44.95.

This volume is a well-planned, finely written description and analysis of what is knowable in light of available, conventional methodologies about the grammar of Iron Age Hebrew attested in ancient epigraphs. The author's corpus includes (almost) all inscriptions and graffiti, 102 ostraca from Samaria, 112 inscriptions from Arad, and over 600 seal and bullae impressions. The author was unable to include those published in R. Deutsch, *Messages from the Past: Hebrew Bullae from the Time of Isaiah Through the Destruction of the First Temple. Shlomo Moussaieff Collection and an Up to Date Corpus* (in Hebrew, 1997), which appeared after her work was complete. This omission is more than understandable.

Chapter 1 describes the discovery and background of major Hebrew inscriptions and provides a table listing their dates according to major earlier scholars. Where scholars disagreed, the author provides more than one date. For her purposes, it was unnecessary to assume a particular position on the dating of any particular inscription since the differences between scholars are too slight to bear significantly on her conclusions about grammatical features considered in later chapters.

One strength of this book is Gogel's thorough summary of relevant discussions bearing on the topics discussed. For example, in ch. 2 ("Phonology"), she discusses the use of Akkadian, Greek, and Latin in determining ancient Hebrew phonology, particularly how transcriptions in these languages bear on discussions of the *shewa,* sibilants, and other consonants. Gogel summarizes, analyzes, and critiques earlier discussions deftly. Her discussion of *matres lectionis* in this chapter moves the discussion beyond the views of F. M. Cross and D. N. Freedman in their published 1952 dissertation *Early Hebrew Orthography,* as well as of this reviewer in his *Matres Lectionis in Ancient Hebrew Epigraphs* (1980). I do not consider all of her positions correct and plan to take issue with some in another forum, but the clarity and fairness of her exposition are noteworthy. Throughout these and following discussions, the influence of her mentor in this field, Dennis Pardee of the University of Chicago, is clear through citation and a general deference to his interpretations.

Chapter 3 ("Morphology") maintains the standard of ch. 2, examining all matters bearing on the morphological analysis thoroughly. In ch. 4 ("Syntax"), Gogel first studies morphosyntax, emphasizing rules of agreement and sequence according to W. Richter's

Grundlagen einer althebräischen Grammatik (1980); nominal sentences according to F. I. Andersen's *The Hebrew Verbless Clause in the Pentateuch* (1970); and verbal sentences and phrases. Chapter 5 provides a concorded lexicon arranged traditionally according to root rather than form that provides a transcription of each word reflecting its orthography in the various texts, indicates the part of speech in each context, and supplies a translation. Chapter 6 presents transliterations and English translations of her corpus. The book concludes with a selected bibliography.

Gogel's inclusion of chs. 5 and 6 and her constant cross-referencing to them make this an eminently useful book. Since grammars describe formally how meaning is encoded and decoded, their presence saves readers the great inconvenience of always having to have a handbook of inscriptions available when working with the grammar. The inconvenience could have been considerable because there is no conventional ordering of inscriptions within handbooks, and not all the handbooks have all the texts covered in this book. In addition, since Gogel's comprehension of what inscriptions mean is reflected in her translations, the translations ultimately determined how she would formally classify grammatical phenomena. Readers disagreeing with her grammatical analyses will undoubtedly disagree also with her translations and will be able to trace matters of contention to their sources with ease. Her thoughtfulness along with the largesse of Scholars Press about this matter is a boon for scholarly dialogue.

Gogel's research and thorough combing of critical literature demonstrate that the grammar of epigraphic Hebrew differs little from that of most Biblical Hebrew; therein lies a surprise conclusion from this study not developed by the author.

The grammar of preexilic Hebrew inscriptions does not differ from that of preexilic Biblical Hebrew. Hebrew epigraphs do not reveal any "tricks" or "peculiarities," telltale signs characteristic of the living literary language at the time of their inscription that were eliminated in a later stage of the language. Insofar as preexilic Hebrew in the Bible can be differentiated from postexilic Hebrew in the Bible (Persian period) by means of vocabulary and some syntax, and the latter differentiated unmistakably from Hebrew written in the Hellenistic and Roman periods by means of vocabulary, semantics, morphology, and syntax, Gogel's work provides additional confirmation for the dating of pentateuchal sources and the Deueronomistic History (and its sources) to the same broad period as that of the inscriptions treated in her book.

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The Pentateuch in the Twentieth Century: The Legacy of Julius Wellhausen, by Ernest Nicholson. Oxford: Clarendon, 1998. Pp. ix + 294. $75.00.

Ernest Nicholson here reviews discussions of the composition of the Pentateuch over the last two centuries. This book is far from being simply a history of critical interpretation, however. Nicholson employs the review of research as a tool for defending the Documentary Hypothesis against rival theories, especially those that have appeared in the last thirty years. The first three chapters survey critical investigations into the Pentateuch's composition from the early nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century, highlighting the contributions of Julius Wellhausen, Gerhard von Rad, and

Martin Noth (the works of the latter two represent "the climax of pentateuchal research this century" [p. 60]). Nicholson concentrates on each scholar's conclusions and the influence they had on subsequent research. He gives virtually no attention to the wider intellectual and social contexts within which pentateuchal criticism developed.

The remaining six chapters evaluate theories about the composition of the Pentateuch published in the last thirty years. Nicholson first reviews the redactional theories proposed by Rolf Rendtorff and Erhard Blum. He cogently criticizes as overly speculative Rendtorff's reconstruction of the stages by which formulas of promise to the ancestors developed to unite ever-larger complexes of traditions. He has greater respect for Blum's more detailed analysis of the entire Pentateuch as the product of two successive authorial/redactional layers, the first Deuteronomistic, the second Priestly. Nicholson concludes, however, that the texts credited by Blum to the Deuteronomistic redactor (K^D) in fact derive from different layers and periods and so cannot be ascribed to a single redactional school working throughout the Pentateuch. Nevertheless, he clearly believes that Blum casts the longest shadow of the recent critics and keeps returning to his work throughout the following chapters. Thus his discussion of P focuses on redactional theories leading up to and culminating in Blum's work.

Nicholson also reviews and critiques John Van Seters's depiction of J as an antiquarian, his and H. H. Schmidt's dating of J to the exilic period, and other suggested revisions of the theory about the four sources and their origins. But a literature review is not the best way to argue the case for one or another theory of the Pentateuch's composition. It requires Nicholson to focus primarily on scholars' conclusions, isolating only an occasional argument for more detailed analysis, and passes over much too briefly their criticisms of the methods and conclusions of the Documentary Hypothesis. Pointing out weaknesses in various contemporary theories does not in and of itself show that the Documentary Hypothesis provides a better alternative. Nor is Nicholson always even-handed in deploying his arguments: for example, he argues that contradictions within the Pentateuch weigh against the possibility of P being redactional (p. 210) without noting that exactly the same criticism can be made of the Documentary Hypothesis's supposition of a final redactor. Indeed, the readiness with which he deploys the theory's various redactors (following Wellhausen) makes me wonder whether, in the analysis of particular texts, labeling one's approach a "source" theory rather than a "redactional" theory is more a matter of emphasis than a real distinction in method.

Nicholson does provide a positive presentation of the Documentary Hypothesis in his eighth chapter. Using R. N. Whybray's methodological critique as a foil, he defends in turn the usefulness of each of the three classical criteria for distinguishing the sources, more successfully in the case of the first two (style, divine names) than of the last (doublets) in my judgment. The result, however, is a summary presentation of the best test cases for the Documentary Hypothesis in contrast to the previous discussion of the most difficult cases for other theories—the most one can expect from this kind of book perhaps, but still not an optimal way of investigating the composition of the Pentateuch.

On a few issues Nicholson fails to uphold the high standards of summary and critique found through most of the book. His survey of attempts to date P earlier than the exile (pp. 218–20) is dismissive in tone and abrupt in its judgments. He also ignores the considerable methodological challenge posed by synchronic literary analysis to all forms

of historical criticism. He deals with it under the heading of "the final form of the Pentateuch" in a discussion that moves from von Rad to Brevard Childs and concludes with Blum, with a brief and tendentious review of the works of D. J. A. Clines and Whybray along the way, the only purely synchronic analyses that he covers.

That brings up a larger point: this book's title, *The Pentateuch in the Twentieth Century*, is misleading. The book addresses the Documentary Hypothesis of the composition of the Pentateuch in the (nineteenth and) twentieth century, but completely ignores many of the issues that have shaped research on this literature in the last one hundred years. Nicholson does not mention debates over the influence of treaty forms on covenant texts, the history of Israel's laws and their relationship to other ancient legal traditions, studies of the archaic poetry in the Pentateuch and elsewhere, and most of the synchronic literary studies of pentateuchal narratives, all of which have characterized pentateuchal studies during the century as much as have compositional debates. Absent from his bibliography and index are names such as G. Mendenhall, D. J. McCarthy, S. Paul, R. Alter, D. Daube, C. Carmichael, M. Fishbane, R. Westbrook, I. Knohl, T. L. Thompson, W. F. Albright, D. N. Freedman, T. W. Mann, and many others who have contributed insights on these issues.

The subtitle, *The Legacy of Julius Wellhausen,* is more accurate, but even on this theme one should point out that twentieth-century compositional debates largely failed to deploy their arguments within the context of theories of Israel's legal and religious history in the way that Wellhausen did. Thus Nicholson's narrower focus on compositional theories of the Pentateuch accurately reflects the restricted range of most of those theories in the last one hundred years, and as a result his analysis shares the same limitations. I suspect that Wellhausen's legacy will be fully realized and, perhaps, surpassed only when the insights of legal history, narrative analysis, comparative literatures of the ancient world, and other disciplines are harnessed along with inductive compositional analysis to create a broader analytical framework for understanding the Pentateuch.

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Reading Law: The Rhetorical Shape of the Pentateuch, by James W. Watts. The Biblical Seminar 59. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999. Pp. 189. $19.95 (paper).

The baffling arrangement of literary genres in the Pentateuch has elicited many attempts to understand its significance. This monograph by James Watts (associate professor of Hebrew Bible at Syracuse University, New York) is notable among recent applications of rhetorical methodologies to the pentateuchal legal texts. Watts, who has also written several articles on this subject, argues that the key to the puzzle is found in the ancient convention of public readings of the law, suggesting that "public reading established the literary forms of Israel's law in the monarchic period and those forms remained unchanged long after public reading had become a rarity and perhaps an anachronism" (p. 31). The primary indication of this convention's influence on the Pentateuch, in Watts's view, is the Torah's characteristic juxtaposition of narratives, lists, and divine sanctions (that is, blessings and curses). Although the Pentateuch did not

reach its final form until the Persian period, its final redactors shaped the text in conformity with conventions arising from more ancient customs. Most scholars have treated pentateuchal narratives and law in isolation, not appreciating the rhetorical effect of their union. Watts proposes to remedy these weaknesses by applying a select portion of ancient rhetorical theory to the problem.

He begins by noting that pentateuchal law, by virtue of the narrative framework in which it appears, is apparently to be read sequentially, rather than in the piecemeal approach that best suits most legal codes. In his first chapter, Watts surveys the accounts of public law readings in the times of Moses, Joshua, Josiah,and Ezra. He concludes that the biblical witness ought to be taken seriously as a testament to ancient practice and finds supporting evidence in similar customs in ancient Greece and medieval Iceland. Modern assumptions about speaking and reading are no reliable guide to ancient customs. Having established this foundation, he concludes that one may profitably examine the Pentateuch with a view to seeing how its present structure (on small and large scales alike) may have been shaped by the conventions of public reading.

In the second chapter, he brings ancient rhetorical theory to bear on the pentateuchal combinations of list, story, and divine sanctions. Watts notes that stories and lists are commonly combined in ancient literature, as has been demonstrated by J. D. O'Banion, who drew upon Cicero and Quintilian. A text is most persuasive when both elements are present, and there is no shortage of ancient Near Eastern examples: Hittite legal codes, commemorative inscriptions, narratives with appended lists of divine names, and the like. This persuasive combination is further buttressed when divine sanctions are also present. Watts then considers the form of pentateuchal legal codes, which he divides into three major sections: the Sinai covenant, Leviticus, and Deuteronomy. In each case he finds the rhetorical pattern described above.The same pattern is also discerned in the Pentateuch as a whole: a narrative introduction (Genesis–Exodus 19) is followed by a legislative list (Exodus 20–Numbers) and sanctions (Deuteronomy).

The remainder of the book is devoted to exploring the Pentateuch's didactic and persuasive goals in light of this rhetorical principle. The third chapter explores the formal and persuasive effect of this rhetorical form on the pentateuchal instruction of its hearer or reader, with particular interest in address in the second person, motivational clauses, repetition, and variation. Of these sections, Watts's treatment of variation is perhaps the most interesting; it examines several ways of handling occasional legal contradictions, including the novel proposal of self-contradiction as a deliberate political strategy (cf. modern political practice). The nature of the speaker of law is the focus of Watts's attention in the fourth chapter, in which he studies character development in legal texts. This may seem an unlikely literary strategy in comparison with character development in narrative, but the content and form of the laws do illuminate the natures of YHWH (the primary source of law), Moses (who speaks the law in a secondary but authoritative capacity), and to a lesser degree even the narrator, in whose words everything is cast.

The final chapter of the book briefly sketches the implications of Watts's rhetorical approach for understanding the historical development of the Pentateuch and its literary genre *(sui generis).* Here he argues that the social conditions necessary for the apparent compromises between P and D parties could well have occurred during the

Persian period. Watts concludes the study with a brief postscript on rhetorical strategies and ethics.

This monograph is praiseworthy in many respects. It addresses a real problem in pentateuchal studies: the lack of integrated readings of these challenging texts. In dealing with the problem, Watts takes his cues for reading from details of the text itself and rhetorical theory from the ancient world, rather than a program arising from entirely outside or modern concerns. This approach helps one avoid the extremes of (a) reading the text exclusively through the lens of a particular theory of composition and (b) facilely explaining away textual features that do suggest that some complicated process of transmission lies beneath the final text. Watts makes a good case for the influence of the rhetorical structure that he studies, at least at the level of the legal subsections of the Pentateuch. His judicious use of ancient rhetorical theory is also to be welcomed; he recognizes the relevance of ancient perspectives without overapplying Greco-Roman thought where it does not belong. Even though the ancient Israelites left no works on rhetorical theory, they clearly did argue in order to persuade, and therefore rhetorical theory in the classical sense is *prima facie* of some relevance. His treatment of pentateuchal stylistics and rhetoric is theoretically insightful while also remaining faithful to the text's internal features and concerns. Watts's cautiously optimistic evaluation of the historical worth of the Pentateuch and the memories preserved therein will doubtless earn the censure of those who require more historical proof than is currently available, but his historical perspective seems even-handed in my view, although further engagement with the current historiographical debate might have strengthened his case.

Despite the good quality of this study, a couple of concerns may be raised. Watts's combination of rhetorical approaches and source-critical perspectives is sometimes puzzling. Before addressing the historical background of the Pentateuch's final redaction, he correctly notes that a sympathetic, final-form reading must precede source analysis. It is not clear, however, whether the implications of his rhetorical proposals do not at least partially undercut some of the traditional source divisions. Watts does examine some of his argument's source-critical implications about the nature of P, but his approach probably has farther-reaching ramifications than these. To be fair, one might well need another monograph, or a set of monographs, to deal adequately with those.

The second area concerns Watts's proposal that the form of the entire Pentateuch may depend on the rhetorical structure of the story/list/sanction model. This is a suggestive idea, given the strength of Watts's case for the model's influence in lesser textual landscapes, but one would have to marshal further evidence and offer defense against counterproposals before the case for the entire Pentateuch could be properly made.

Watts presents his arguments clearly, readably, and with refreshingly few typographical errors. A good bibliography and indices of scriptural citations, authors, and subjects make the reader's rediscovery of half-remembered fragments a relatively easy matter. This monograph is a very worthwhile study and will doubtless be consulted with profit by those interested in Hebrew style and rhetoric, especially with respect to the Law, and also by those interested in the more general subject of pentateuchal composition.

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The Tragedy in History: Herodotus and the Deuteronomistic History, by Flemming A. J. Nielsen. JSOTSup 251. Copenhagen International Seminar 4. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997. Pp. 192. $45.00/£27.50.

The objective of this book is to compare Herodotus's history of ancient Greece and the hypothetical "Deuteronomistic History" (DtrH) of ancient Israel, paying special attention to the "tragic mode of presentation" (pp. 18, 161) in both. Nielsen does this in two chapters bracketed by a brief introduction and conclusion, in dialogue with S. Mandell and D. N. Freedman, *The Relationship between Herodotus' History and the Primary History* (1993), and informed by the predispositions of N. P. Lemche's "Copenhagen School" (not surprising in a revised *speciale* delivered at Copenhagen University in 1994). Herodotus's work, placed in the context of Ionic natural philosophy, the epic tradition, and fifth-century Attic tragedy (especially Aeschylus's *Persae* [pp. 49–59]), is found to combine elements of all three to constitute something completely new: whereas the works of antecedent Greek historiographers amounted to "the systematic collection and dissemination of the greatest possible amount of facts and stories concerning the past" (p. 26), Herodotus created "an historical account that is corporate, causal, and didactic" (p. 162). The DtrH is then compared to the historiographic texts from the ancient Near East and to Herodotus's work and found to have more in common with the latter than the former: it is "a theological commentary to the course of history" (pp. 112, 113). That the commonalities include "the tragic ornamentation of the course of history" warrants "the assumption that the Hellenic literary tradition, which Herodotus was part of, influenced the Deuteronomistic history" and thus it is "probable that DtrH was written at a time and in a milieu where the Hellenistic influence was important in the Israelite or more correctly, the Jewish tradition" (p. 164). These conclusions are logical enough (if not entirely convincing, since other relevant factors are not taken into account): few would deny that the books of Deuteronomy and the Former Prophets as they exist today in all detail are postexilic compositions and thus chronologically proximate to the Hellenic works in question. In view of Nielsen's disdain for attempting to reconstruct the compositional prehistory of the DtrH (pp. 91–97, echoing B. O. Long) and his rejection of the source citations in both works as literary fictions (pp. 36–44, following classicist D. Fehling for Herodotus; pp. 112–14, following Egyptologist D. B. Redford for the DtrH), it could be inferred that these compositions have little value as source material for earlier periods. These postulates are deeply controversial, however, and they would carry more weight if espoused by a scholar not inclined to favor them—from, say, Harvard or Tübingen.

The "diametrically opposed" understandings of Saul's rejection in 1 Sam 15 by D. M. Gunn and J. P. Fokkelman, as sketched by Nielsen (pp. 127–29), illustrate the inherent subjectivity of "literary" readings of this or any literature: the only *real* meaning may be in the mind of the reader, but some meanings are more "real" than others, and here he prefers Gunn over Fokkelman, who is "inclined to read a little too much between the lines so that his results become subjective" (p. 129). No objective criteria are presented for this essentially aesthetic appraisal. It is rather disingenuous to then dismiss attempts to discern the compositional history of the DtrH because they "necessarily rest upon subjective criteria" (p. 162). By so doing Nielsen ducks the very relevant question whether the "tragic ornamentation" he finds in the DtrH can be found in any

of its compositionally earlier incarnations or components, which surely antedate Herodotus by several centuries.

Tragedy in Herodotus is triggered by *hybris* characterized by the overstepping of metaphysical, geographic, or moral boundaries, whether by one's own free will or instigated by a god: for example, Croesus crosses the boundary of measured self-adulation, and an equally overconfident Xerxes seeks to expand Persia beyond its ordained borders across the Hellespont; divine *nemesis* destroys them both and the Greeks profit from their downfall. This tragic cause-and-effect pattern undergirds the entire work, tying its disparate parts into a thematic continuum. Turning to the DtrH, Nielsen finds the tragic element in the presentation of certain individual characters (Jephthah, Saul, David, Solomon, Rehoboam, and Josiah) and in Israel's loss of the promised land. Some of his readings seem strained to make his case: Jephthah, Saul, and perhaps even Josiah (cf. 2 Kgs 23:26–27) can fairly be seen as tragic figures to one degree or another; but Solomon is at best "an ambiguous figure" (p. 141), and to credit Rehoboam's disastrous performance at Shechem to his having been tragically "blinded by the deity" (p. 159) is to read too much between the lines (as Nielsen seems to realize on p. 163). On the macrocosmic level, Nielsen sees Israel's loss of the land as a tragic inevitability: "in order to remain in the land, the people would have to show a degree of obedience to Yahweh far above the abilities of human beings" (p. 122). Finding this rather unsavory theological position to be the unifying theme of the DtrH (making Moses' invitation to "choose life, that you and your descendants may live" [Deut 30:15–20] a perverse Catch-22) is another product of overly creative exegesis and something of a *reductio ad absurdum* of Nielsen's hypothesis.

The target audience of this book is not self-evident. My guess is that the chapter on Herodotus is aimed more at the nonclassicist and that the chapter on the DtrH is aimed more at the nonspecialist in biblical studies. If so, Nielsen has succeeded admirably, for both chapters are very informative, accessible, and provocative for their respective readerships. (By contrast, Mandell and Freedman's presentation is overloaded with irritating jargon and stilted expression.) Specialists may find little new in the treatment of their material, but the synergy Nielsen creates is valuable and at times insightful. There are a number of obvious typos (e.g., "bible" [p. 18], "exten*d*" [p.150], "Euseb" [p. 155]) and translational infelicities, indicating a need for more careful copy-editing before going to press. The book is too costly to be recommended for the classroom, but it would be very useful for clergy and teachers at all levels of biblical studies and comparative literature in the preparation of sermons and classroom presentations.

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Der Mosesegen im Deuteronomium: Eine text-, kompositions- und formkritische Studie zu Deuteronomium 33, by Stefan Beyerle. BZAW 250. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1997. Pp. x + 345. DM 178.00.

This book is a revised and shortened version of a doctoral dissertation supervised by H. Seebass at the University of Bonn, Germany. Since H.-J. Kittels, *Die Stammesspruche Israels* (Berlin: unpublished manuscript, 1959), no monograph has

been devoted to the so-called tribal sentences in the Pentateuch. For Beyerle it is necessary to take up the task again, since OT scholarship is nowadays much less confident of the possibility of reconstructing premonarchic Israel on the basis of Gen 49 and Deut 33. Contrary to Kittel, who worked on both chapters, Beyerle limits himself to Deut 33. He argues that Gen 49, or at least its frame, seems to belong to the Priestly source (p. 9). This argument is quite puzzling, because P-edited texts can theoretically contain as much old material as Deuteronomistic-edited texts.

Beyerle offers a very cautious and scrupulous treatment of Deut 33. Considerable attention is given to text-critical issues, but he is not interested in reconstructing the original form of the text. Beyerle is clearly influenced by the work of E. Tov when he claims that the different textual witnesses are not simply *versions* but texts, each of which has its own meaning (p. 273). This statement contributes to a tension of a sort. On the one hand, Beyerle is much interested in diachronic investigation; on the other hand, he does not try to reconstruct the possibly oldest textual witness.

The book is organized quite simply. After some methodological considerations, Beyerle starts analyzing the framing psalm. He concludes that this was an independent hymn that focused on theophanic issues and presents YHWH as a warrior. This hymn was used by a Deuteronomistic collector (*Sammler*) to frame the edition of the tribal sentences (Deut 33:1-2aα). A "late Deuteronomistic redactor," who knew Deuteronomy in an almost canonical form (p. 62), inserted vv. 4–5 and 26 (allusions to Torah and monarchy). Beyerle applies the same three stages (*Grundschrift, dtr Sammler, dtr Redaktor*) to the formation of the tribal sentences. For each poem textual, compositional, and genre issues are treated. The oldest collection is to be found in vv. 6a, 8abβ, 9aα, 10b, 11, 13abβ, 14–17a, 18abβ, 19, 20abβ, 21abα, 22abβ, 23abβ, 12abβ, 25. This *Grundschrift* contains sentences about Reuben, Levi, Joseph, Zebulun and Issachar, Gad, Dan, Naphtali, and Asher. Beyerle is very cautious about the form of this "source." He leaves the question open whether it is written or oral, but is quite confident that it might be dated in the first half of the eleventh century B.C.E. (pp. 279–80). The theological intention of this collection is to assert divine election and the people's answer to this election by sacrifice (p. 278). This does not sound very premonarchic to me. Beyerle denies that there exists a "tribal sentence genre." Therefore he sees no possibility to indicate any *Sitz im Leben* for his original source. This may be due to intellectual honesty, but the reader is quite frustrated since it is very difficult then to imagine where and why this collection came to life.

Beyerle is not much more explicit in presenting the intentions of the "collector" and the redactor. The *Sammler* split the psalm into a frame, created the stereotyped introductions to the sentences, and transformed a verse from the psalm into a poem about Benjamin (v. 12, pp. 149–50). This allows Beyerle to conclude that the "collector" is more southern oriented. But why did he not insert a sentence about Judah? Beyerle is tempted to explain this absence by the fact that during the exilic period Judah did not really exist, since it was under Babylonian occupation (p. 283). But was the situation different for Benjamin and the Northern tribes?

According to Beyerle, the sentence about Judah (v. 7) was added by the late Deuteronomistic redactor. The content of this oracle could allow for a quite precise dating, shortly after 538 B.C.E. (the possibility of return exists, but Judah has not yet returned from Babylon). But the real restoration of Judah did not come to an end before

the end of the fifth century B.C.E. (p. 285). The late Deuteronomistic redactor revised the text in order to present a view of a united Israel. He darkens also the presentation of some tribes, focusing on the Deuteronomistic topic of election without any merits. Beyerle concludes with a few hermeneutical considerations and a helpful summary of the diachronic analysis (pp. 295–97).

This is a very carefully written book (I have not detected a lot of mistakes: p. 120 the reference is Num 27:21, and in n. 331 on p. 195 the word should be *kritisch*). Beyerle's presentation of the textual diversity of Deut 33 is helpful. But I remain somewhat unsatisfied with his diachronic results, which sometimes appear to be non-results. If there is no "tribal sentences genre," why did anyone put together all these poems? And what is their function? Beyerle argues for an eleventh-century B.C.E. origin, but is that really plausible? Which institution might be interested in such a collection?

There are also problems concerning the Deuteronomistic character of Deuteronomy (32 and) 33. Why, for instance, should a Deuteronomistic redactor use in this text terms such as "Jeschurun," which he never uses elsewhere? It might be an alternative to consider Deut 33 (in its final form) as a production of the final redaction of the Torah. This means that we should reconsider Deut 33 together with Gen 49. So there is still room for further dissertations on the topic.

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Studies in Hebrew Narrative and Poetry, by David Jobling. Berit Olam. Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1998. Pp. x + 330. $34.95.

In this contribution to a fascinating commentary series, Jobling examines 1 Samuel according to T. Eagleton's triptych of class, race, and gender, exploring the tension between 1 Samuel as a book in itself and as a part of a larger whole. Jobling's approach to 1 Samuel as Israel's national autobiography is a summation of the course of his own academic career. The 1970s saw him engage structuralism and feminism, while poststructuralism and ideological criticism marked his 1980s work. In the 1990s, he turned to new historicism and psychoanalysis. All of these methods come together in an analysis that affords Jobling personal reflection on his own career in a seminary with a high percentage of female students.

Jobling denies that ideological criticism can be divorced from the fight for equality for the disempowered. He complains of the "travesty" and "narrowtology" of the new literary "orthodoxy," naming specifically R. Alter, F. Kermode, M. Sternberg, L. Eslinger and especially R. Polzin (e.g., pp. 25, 144, 166–69, 308–9). Jobling replaces these scholars' concern for identifying literary artistry and narratorial omniscience in 1 Samuel with a program of uncovering points at which the text reveals uncertainty over the meaning of the past, and of recovering incompletely suppressed expressions of Israel's premonarchic egalitarian ideals.

In ch. 2 Jobling divides 1 Samuel according to book divisions presumably original to the DtrH (following M. Noth and D. J. McCarthy): Judg 2:11–1 Sam 12 is labeled the "Extended Book of Judges" (hereafter EBJ) and 1 Sam 13–2 Sam 7 becomes the "Book of the Everlasting Covenant" (hereafter BEC). Jobling cogently argues that the later

synthesis of the canonical book of 1 Samuel from the DtrH has a great influence on how the text is now interpreted, especially in terms of separating Hannah's story from those of the women in Judges, and of changing the emphasis in the closing episodes.

Class is discussed in part 2 (chs. 3–5) under the guise of a critique of the transition from judgeship to kingship in the EBJ and the BEC and then in the canonical 1 Samuel. Jobling himself regards any form of kingship as a disaster and Israel's experience of it as a "tragedy" (p. 65). He asserts that 1 Samuel has no effective class analysis because it upholds one monarchic ideal as distinct from others, without realizing that all monarchies have "specific social effects" (p. 104). The canonical 1 Samuel develops the idea of a "surrogate fatherhood" system of succession (Eli/Samuel, Samuel/Saul, and Saul /David) that avoids the pitfalls of both judgeship and monarchy, although Jobling gives insufficient reasons why such a system was not also expressed by the EBJ and the BEC, both of which are components of a greater historical work.

Part 3 (chs. 6–8) treats gender issues. Hannah is viewed according to a recuperative feminist paradigm. She is portrayed as a decisive character who makes connections between her unhappy life and the national situation, especially regarding the abuse of women at the shrine. Attention is also drawn to the cooption of Hannah by Deuteronomists, canonizers, and modern scholars. Jobling complains of "perverse" royalist interpretations of Hannah's song that emphasize the favorable mention of God's king in the last verse (1 Sam 2:10) (p. 166). These interpretations reverse "the plain meaning" of the song and trivialize it, the character Hannah, and feminist biblical scholarship as a whole. Such interpreters also "become complicit in the Bible's destructive cultural effects" (p. 169). This is certainly an unreasonable accusation, and, in any case, appeals to the "plain meaning" of a text are not easily compatible with a deconstructive analysis. Jobling's own solution recalls a time-honored strategy of historical critics. He does not excise the offending 1 Sam 2:10, but he does write that the song "has been *made* into a celebration of kingship" (p. 168, emphasis original).

The rest of Jobling's analysis of the women in 1 Samuel is far less controversial and more convincing, especially concerning the Medium of Endor' s importance to the story and the lack of condemnation for her occult practices. Abigail's motives also receive an interesting treatment that emphasizes her selfishness. Jonathan's role is perceptively seen as analogous to the roles of David's wives. That Saul's rage stems from a homophobic reaction to a consummate gay relationship between Jonathan and David is plausible, but it is not clear why the reader must believe the same things about the young men that Saul may believe.

The two chapters of part 4 take a highly intertextual look at race. The portrayal of the Philistines in the Bible is illuminated by a discussion of the use of the name "Philistine" in the Western world over the past few centuries. Jobling attributes his own access to higher education to the work of his "Philistine" predecessors. Similarly, he shows how Israel used the Philistines to fantasize about its own situations, although more realistic portrayals are also discovered.

The final part of the book (chs. 11–12) first presents 1 Samuel as the heart of Israel's tragic vision because it tells of the greatest tragedy of all, the rise of monarchy and the abandonment of the premonarchic ideal. The traces of guilt, failure, and cooption that are found in 1 Samuel are then illuminated by four modern intertexts. These include novels by H. R. Haggard and D. Barthélemy and scholarly works by M. Bal and

J. Derrida. Jobling argues that even if the DtrH preserves a faint and conflicting view of a lost egalitarian ideal, it can still inspire modern social revolutions. The closing chapter contests the view that the Bible determines the methods that ought to be used to interpret it. Rather, its openness allows that a diversity of methods can legitimize themselves, a system of influence Jobling labels "transference." He concludes with reflections on the theological need for freedom of interpretation and on the incremental overturning of patriarchal interpretations.

Jobling's overt political motives raise important questions to which a short review cannot do justice. This book fully deserves (and will probably receive) lengthier published responses. A few points can be briefly mentioned here. First, Jobling can hardly be called a historical literalist, although his discussion of the historical shift of Israel's mode of production from a premonarchic egalitarian model to a native tributary model is too hastily related to the depiction of the shift in 1 Samuel itself. He ignores the numerous objections to academic constructs such as the "standard historical model" of the rise of Israel's monarchy and the "period of the judges." Jobling also makes too little distinction between the producers' conception of Israel's lost monarchy and their postmonarchic situation of enduring foreign imperialism, writing off any pro-monarchic statements as offensive propaganda. Still, this is a very valuable contribution with many well thought out and fascinating insights on 1 Samuel itself and on its canonical formation as an interpretative process. Perhaps most significantly, Jobling achieves much in advancing methodological pluralism as not only viable but necessary in biblical studies.

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Jonapsalm und Jonabuch: Sprachgestalt, Entstehungsgeschichte und Kontextbedeutung von Jona 2, by Hermann J. Opgen-Rhein. SBB 38. Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1997. Pp. 252. DM 89.00 (paper).

The relationship of Jonah 2 to the rest of the book has long been debated. The uniqueness of the poetry of Jonah 2 in the context of the book's prose and the continuity of the prose when this poetry is set aside have led many to view the chapter as a later addition to the book. Others, less inclined to see the poetry as intrusive, have focused on thematic, linguistic, and structural interrelationships as a means of demonstrating the strong ties of the poetry to the rest of the book. Opgen-Rhein fits into the latter category of scholars, arguing that the psalm is well integrated into the structure of Jonah. Indeed, not only does he dismiss arguments that the episode concerning the fish is peripheral to the book; he even reverses that argument and declares that Jonah's deliverance from the belly of the fish and the psalm that anticipates this deliverance stand as the central point in the book (pp. 105–6).

Opgen-Rhein supports his argument with an extensive analysis, complete with detailed diagrams, of the relationships between the various sections of the book (pp. 74–106), focusing especially on parallel and chiastic arrangements. He identifies two smaller sections, 1:1–3 and 3:1–3a, which he views as tightly focused scenes that open the two main parts of the book, and four major sections: 1:4–16; 2:1–11; 3:3b–10, and 4:1–11. His diagrams develop in detail several different arguments showing the tight

structure that bonds 2:1–11 with the other portions of Jonah. In a time when the recognition of a multiplicity of structures, especially in larger texts, is becoming common, it is important that he provides a variety of perspectives for discussing the structure of the psalm in ch. 2 and its relationship to other major portions of the book.

While Opgen-Rhein does not provide a detailed discussion of the entire book, he does devote considerable space to a thorough, verse-by-verse discussion of Jonah 2 (pp. 34–73). It is here that he does some of his best work, discussing extensively the numerous structures that he finds in the text of the psalm, with special attention to intricate patterns that may be found within the various verses. The frequent use of diagrams is once again quite helpful. His analysis of ch. 2 needs to be challenged, however, on one significant point. He assumes that the psalm *anticipates* the subsequent deliverance of Jonah, in which Jonah is vomited up on the shore by the fish. One might just as well argue that the fish is the *means* of deliverance, saving Jonah from drowning in the depths of the sea, rather than the prison from which he needs to be delivered (see esp. 2:4, 6–7 [Heb.]). From this perspective, the psalm would then be a hymn of praise spoken *after* Jonah's deliverance by the fish from the depths of the sea. This would fit more naturally with the psalm's tone, which appears to presume that the deliverance has already taken place. The fish's vomiting Jonah onto the dry land would then be merely a plot element necessary to move the story forward to the second half of the book.

Opgen-Rhein's close attention to the literary microstructure of the psalm and the literary macrostructure of the book is augmented by a substantial discussion of two features he sees to be important for understanding the book—irony and satire (pp. 107–28). His discussion of irony focuses on the two units that come at the end of the two major halves of the book—the Jonah psalm and the scene concerning the castor oil plant. His discussion of satire focuses on the book as a whole.

Especially interesting is the treatment of the various motifs and traditions in Jonah 2 (pp. 155–212). Using the Hebrew terms from Jonah 2 as a base, Opgen-Rhein discusses these motifs and traditions in the broader context of their usage in the Hebrew Bible. Whatever position one takes in regard to the main argument of this monograph about the centrality of Jonah 2 to the focus and purpose of the book, these discussions are interesting and informative.

One of the most useful features of the book is his ongoing dialogue with the work of other scholars as he articulates his own positions. The book is extensively referenced throughout, and his bibliography runs to fourteen pages. Yet, while this points to both the intense scholarly interest in the book of Jonah in recent years and to the author's extensive researching of his topic, there are quite a few recent publications that are not mentioned in his bibliography, including a number that share his strong interest in the literary aspects of the book: K. Craig's *A Poetics of Jonah: Art in the Service of Ideology,* J. Limburg's *Jonah,* R. Person's *In Conversation with Jonah: Conversation Analysis, Literary Criticism, and the Book of Jonah,* and P. Trible's *Rhetorical Criticism: Context, Method, and the Book of Jonah,* as well as a considerable number of recent articles. His bibliography is heavier in scholarship before 1990 than it is in recent scholarship, and it is heavier in German scholarship than in work done in other languages, which means that it contains only very sparse references to articles in languages other than German that were published in 1990 or later. Yet it is precisely in this scholarly context that a large number of works were published with which Opgen-Rhein, given the focus of his

topic, needs to be in dialogue. For an update on recent scholarship, see K. Craig's "Jonah in Recent Research," in *Currents in Research: Biblical Studies* 7 (1999).

No doubt scholars will continue to disagree about the relationship of the psalm of Jonah to the other three chapters of the book. Such discussions, however, will need to take serious account of his work and of the strong case Opgen-Rhein makes for understanding the book as a work focused around the psalm. Even those who disagree with his central thesis will find much in his work that is useful and interesting, as his discussions are carefully argued with meticulous attention to detail. His work will take its rightful place as a valuable contribution to the study of the book of Jonah.

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A Time to Tell: Narrative Strategies in Ecclesiastes, by Eric S. Christianson. JSOTSup 280. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998. Pp. 299. $82.00/£49.00.

Christianson's book (a revision of his Sheffield dissertation) begins with the premise that since Ecclesiastes tells a "story," it can be studied with the tools of narrative criticism. He sets out to legitimate Ecclesiastes as a narrative and demonstrate that it is productive to read the book as such. The result is an innovative and illuminating analysis of both the form and content of Ecclesiastes.

In the introduction, Christianson anticipates and addresses the question that his program will inevitably raise: How can one justify a narrative-critical approach to a text that is not commonly regarded as a narrative? (p. 11). Although few would dispute the claim that Ecclesiastes contains *elements* of narrativity, it is another matter altogether to assert that the book as a whole may be characterized as narrative. Christianson appeals to Prince's definition of narrative as "the representation of real or fictive events or situations in a time sequence" (pp. 21, 49), arguing that a proleptic plot is set in motion in 1:12–13a. Moreover, the autobiographical form and the presence of motifs add to the cohesive unity and storylike quality of the book. Christianson gives sufficient warrant for a narrative reading, although he addresses the non-narrative material only peripherally (pp. 47, 256–57).

Following this programmatic introduction, Christianson undertakes his analysis of the narrative strategies in Ecclesiastes under two main headings: Part 1, "The Frame Narrator's Strategy" (chs. 1–5); and Part 2, "The Narrative Strategy of Qoheleth" (chs. 6–8). After a brief conclusion, he adds a "Postscript" with his reflections on some thematic parallels between Qohelet's narrative and "the existential legacy of the Holocaust."

Ecclesiastes not only tells a story, according to Christianson; it tells the story of someone telling a story. It therefore displays a complex interplay of voices. Taking his cue from Michael Fox, Christianson isolates the frame narrator (1:1–2; 7:27; 12:8–14) and explicates his narrative strategy. The frame allows the reader to suspend disbelief concerning the framed narrative; it also leaves room for the reader to evaluate the inner story on its own terms (p. 60). He adds an insightful discussion on framing as an artistic and literary device that further highlights the interpretive potential of any kind of framing.

His observations in part 1 are largely premised on an alleged radical incongruity between the frame narrator and Qohelet, which Christianson repeatedly highlights. He maintains that the two "clash at the level of ideology" (p. 121), and can be construed as "polarized opposites" (p. 120). Yet one wonders if the summary *hebel* statements (1:2; 12:8) really betray an antidialectical approach that is at odds with Qohelet's epistemology (pp. 98–99). Are not summaries by nature comprehensive and simplified? Do the references to the "goad" and the "implanted nail" in 12:11 really create an imagery of fixing and framing, and thus betray a conservatizing inclination (p. 112)? Or is the verse commenting on the fact that the words of the wise sometimes inflict pain as they prod us along the right paths? Christianson is right to caution against adopting the frame narrator's summary acritically as an apt summary, or as the final word that overrides the unorthodox views of a disillusioned and contrary sage. The epilogue does display a somewhat different tone and emphasis. However, in setting up such a sharp contrast between frame and body, Christianson actually ends up downplaying the genuine dialectic within Qohelet's narrative. For him, Qohelet expresses "conservative" sentiments only to subvert them (p. 116). Indeed, Qohelet's words are often critical of traditional views; nevertheless, they also contain wisdom of a more traditional cloth. And this tension is reflected in *both* his own narrative and the frame narrative, albeit with divergent emphases.

In part 2, Christianson begins his analysis of Qohelet's narrative strategy with his reflections on the Solomonic guise. Departing from the scholarly consensus, he argues that the fictional autobiography is sustained *throughout* the book. He is somewhat successful in challenging the notion that texts which display a critical attitude toward the monarchy necessarily rule out a royal persona. He is less convincing, however, in his attempts to explicate how the guise is actively and purposively engaged beyond Eccl 1–2.

The chapter entitled "Qoheleth and the Self" claims that Qohelet's narrative employs a literary strategy that elevates "the self" as its primary subject. As evidence, he notes that readers often have the experience of somehow "sensing a self" when reading Ecclesiastes (p. 177). Yet, apart from a brief discussion on first-person narration, Christianson makes no effort to elucidate the literary strategy at work. The bulk of the chapter is a comparison of the postmodern "deconstructed subject" and the Hebraic notion of the self, which centers on his exposition of the terms *lēb, nepeš,* and *rû(a)ḥ.* In the end, this chapter is more concerned with demonstrating Qohelet's (in)compatibility with the postmodern view of the self, and it is not clear how this discussion fits in with his analysis of Qohelet' s narrative strategy.

The chapter entitled "Qoheleth's Quest" contains some of his best literary/narrative analysis. He applies T. Todorov's "actantial model" to delineate the dynamics of Qohelet's quest. He charts the shift from first-person narration to second-person exhortation to identify the narrative stances of the younger and older Qohelet. He appeals, too, to the function of autobiography to argue that the final outcome of his quest is the redemption of his youth.

Finally, one notes a few infelicities in the book: Qohelet's thematic word is consistently transliterated as *hebbel* (except when other scholars are quoted); Hebrew citations sometimes appear jumbled (e.g., p. 75*);* and secondary sources are sometimes cited inaccurately (e.g., pp. 62, 282). These criticisms aside, Christianson's book fixes

our attention on an important and often neglected dimension of Ecclesiastes: the artful means that are employed to relay the "story" of Qohelet. It will be valuable reading for anyone who is interested in literary approaches to Ecclesiastes.

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Chronicles and Exodus: An Analogy and Its Application, by William Johnstone. JSOTSup 275. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998. Pp. 331. $75.00/£46.00.

William Johnstone's recent contribution to the expanding JSOT Supplement Series has something for all biblical and theological scholars, especially those interested in the Pentateuch, the Deuteronomic History, Chronicles, tradition and redaction criticism, but also NT and Christian theological studies.

Johnstone has drawn together into one volume a series of articles originally delivered at various conferences or published elsewhere in various journals and books. The genesis and compilation of these articles echo Johnstone's theory on Chronicles as he draws together divergent materials into one volume with an overarching final purpose.

Johnstone argues that biblical scholarship should take its lead for the redaction history of the book of Exodus from one of the latest contributions to the Hebrew canon, the book of Chronicles. The redaction history of Chronicles is laid bare to the reader because of direct access to its primary *Vorlage,* the Deuteronomic History. Thus, trends seen in Chronicles reveal redactional methodology in the ancient context and should inform the critic as the redaction history of Exodus is investigated. This is further bolstered by the intimate relationship between Chronicles and the Priestly tradition in the Pentateuch. Through a series of articles, Chronicles is identified as a Priestly revision of a Deuteronomic presentation of the history of Israel. When applied to the book of Exodus, a similar trend is seen—a priestly revision and supplement to a Deuteronomic presentation of the exodus and Sinai traditions.

The book begins with an extended introduction that attempts to draw the collection together as a compact unit. After a quick orientation to his personal journey into pentateuchal studies and a short overview of the content of the articles, Johnstone presents an extended dialogue with and criticism of recent contributors to the field of the redaction of the book of Exodus, namely, E. Blum and G. I. Davies.

In the initial section ("The Proposal: Chronicles as Gateway to Pentateuchal Criticism"), Johnstone presents his foundational proposal that Chronicles should be used as a case study for pentateuchal redaction criticism. Here he criticizes the tradition-historical approach to the exodus that strips the text of its intention to legitimize Israel's religious institutions.

In the second section ("Looking at the Gateway: Chronicles in Itself and in its Relation to the Pentateuch"), Johnstone moves to a study of the book of Chronicles, tracing the way that it employs the Pentateuch. He sees Chronicles not as an introduction to Ezra-Nehemiah, but rather as a post Ezra-Nehemiah work that interprets the present predicament of the community as an exile for which God will bring restoration. Priestly vocabulary is employed in order to identify the cause of exile and hope of return. Israel is guilty and needs atonement from this guilt. Johnstone traces this in both narra-

tive and genealogical sections, not only by the use of *mʿl* and *ʾšm* but also in the placement and role of the Levites and use of Benjamin as a redeemed tribe.

Johnstone then moves on to a dialogue with S. Japhet's commentary on Chronicles. He disagrees with her distancing of Leviticus and Chronicles and sees a precedent in Leviticus for the Chronicler's view of guilt. He attacks her view of Israel's relation to the land and especially her assertion that the exile is played down in Chronicles. He claims in the end that the book of Chronicles is "a midrash on a theme of Leviticus." Johnstone's final contribution in this second section bolsters his argument that Chronicles is deeply indebted to the Priestly presentation of the Pentateuch as he argues for the influence of Exod 30:11–16 on David's census in Chr 21.

In the third section ("Looking through the Gateway: Applying the Analogy to the Pentateuch"), Johnstone moves into pentateuchal redaction theory. He first provides a transitional chapter in which he justifies his use of Chronicles as an analogy for pentateuchal redactional theory. His premise is that, because the Chronicler uses a source to which we have direct access (DtrH), we can use it as a case study to form principles for Hebrew Bible criticism, both on the synchronic and diachronic levels. The old literary-critical approach used Chronicles as evidence for the use of sources but more in a "cut 'n' paste" fashion. Chronicles shows us that although a source document is being used, it is not "cut 'n' paste," but rather a reformulation of tradition. He sees a double redaction process in both DtrH/Chronicles and the Pentateuch: in both cases there is a "covenant" redaction (Deuteronomic) and a "holiness" redaction (Priestly).

In the following chapters within this section, Johnstone applies his hypothesis to the various sections of Exodus, focusing attention on paradigmatic pericopae: first the Decalogue (Exod 20), then the Passover pericope (Exod 12–13), the plague cycle (Exod 7–12), the wilderness journey from the Sea to Sinai (Exod 15:22–19:2), and the journey from Sinai to Kadesh (Exod 32–34).

With the third section we leave the main argument of the book, but Johnstone is not finished. He adds a fourth section ("The View Beyond") comprised of two essays. The initial essay is a superb apologetic for authorial intention using 2 Chr 6 (and the book of Chronicles as a whole) as an example. Then Johnstone applies his findings in redactional criticism to Christian theology, revealing links between his two levels of Exodus and the Christian doctrines of justification and sanctification, Johnstone provides for Hebrew Bible scholarship an interesting hypothesis for pentateuchal studies. His work straddles two increasingly distanced Hebrew Bible disciplines (Pentateuch and Chronicles studies) and Hebrew Bible hermeneutical approaches (diachronic and synchronic). In this he attempts a daring feat and will be attacked on all sides.

In terms of style and format, at times the book is difficult to follow in its overall flow because it is a conglomeration of previous sources with various "intentions." Transition notes and summaries placed at the end of the sections or chapters would have been helpful guides for the reader. But Johnstone's work is a welcome addition to the ongoing debate over the origins and message of the Pentateuch. It joins several works over the past two decades that have challenged the traditional source-critical proposals of J. Wellhausen, G. von Rad, and M. Noth (J. Van Seters, R. Rendtorff, R. N. Whybray). In a discipline with such a long history and voluminous bibliography, Johnstone is wise to provide a new hypothesis and to illustrate it in the book of Exodus. This approach will

not satisfy all scholars, for it does not attempt to take into account the various theories throughout the history of the discipline.

Some will not be convinced of Johnstone's view of "P" as a supplement/revision layer rather than an independent source. Not only is this left unproven within Exodus, but will cause difficulties for many who see within Genesis clear evidence of a "P" level in, for example, the flood narrative. Of course, if "P" is not merely a supplement/revision layer then Chronicles cannot be used as a paradigm.

In addition, there is a question of whether the supposed "D" layer Johnstone has excavated in Exodus is assuredly "Deuteronomistic" in character. Some will remain unconvinced that the presence of "covenant" tradition is the litmus test for "D," especially as the theology of "covenant" certainly preceded "Deuteronomism" in any account of the origins of this movement and, in any case, the covenant in Exodus is not identical to that in Deuteronomy.

Johnstone's evaluation of the theme of Chronicles is extremely helpful as he fills out further the Priestly vocabulary and themes of the book. This, however, is not balanced with interaction with some of the classic themes and categories associated with the Chronistic History, especially the "retribution" theme, the portrayal of David-Solomon, and the use of recapitulative historiography. Johnstone's commentary on Chronicles does reveal more of this interaction, but its absence in this volume does make one wonder if Johnstone is limiting himself to cover up non-priestly elements.

Johnstone has provided an interesting redaction theory for pentateuchal studies and convincing work on several Priestly themes in Chronicles. Although he will not satisfy many, his contribution will have to be taken into account as scholars in these fields continue to refine their theories.

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Die Familie in der Nachexilszeit: Untersuchungen zur Bedeutung der Verwandtschaft in ausgewählten Texten des Alten Testaments, by Friedrich Fechter. BZAW 264. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1998. Pp. x + 377. DM 192.00.

The starting point of this Erlangen habilitation is the contemporary discussion about the value and significance of the family in modern society amidst the constant change of social values. The author wants to contribute to this discussion by analyzing the growing significance of family and kinship structures within Israelite society in early postexilic time.

After some preliminary remarks (e.g., on terminological issues) the author first gives a brief survey of the scholarly discussion on the topic of the family in the OT (pp. 12–31). The main part of his work contains a detailed historical-critical exegesis of four selected passages (Josh 7; Lev 18; Ruth; Mic 7:1–7), which he has chosen for practical and form-critical reasons (pp. 34–305). His method is characterized by frequent references to issues and the results of cross-cultural, ethno-sociological research; his own approach, however, focuses on a more traditional historico-critical methodology (esp. literary-criticism).

The result of his investigation is that all texts examined date from the exilic or post-

exilic period and have to be interpreted first as historical and sociological witnesses to their own time. Accordingly, neither Josh 7 nor Lev 18 could help to reconstruct the social structure of early Israel as scholars have done recently.

The passages treated rather bear witness to a deliberate reconstitution of Israelite society in terms of kinship structures in the early postexilic period, after the loss of the central political and religious institutions in Jerusalem. Indeed, this reconstitution refers to older traditions within Israelite society; according to Fechter, however, this is the first time kinship was deliberately taken into account as the basic sociological model of Israelite society.

According to Josh 7 and 1 Sam 10:17–25, which in Fechter's judgment both belong to the exilic DtrH, Israelite society is divided into three levels that form a concentric structure: the (extended) family (בית אב), the clan (משפחה), and the tribe (שבט). Following the incest catalogue in Lev 18:7–16*, the בית אב as the basic unit of society can be defined as an "extended family" consisting of four generations at most. The next level, the clan structure, has been replaced by the category of the בית אבות in the early postexilic period. This compound noun the author understands as a proper plural with a collective meaning ("lineage"). Characteristic of the בית אבות is its genealogical structure, which serves to prove an individual's descent on the one hand and to mark off an ethnic entity from its surrounding groups (cf. Josh 7:1, 18 DtrN) on the other.

Within Lev 18 the author distinguishes three redactional layers. An originally independent series of different sexual proscriptions (vv. 19–23*) was secondarily framed and incorporated into the Sinaitic pericope of the Priestly source ("Redaktion I"; the author joins K. Elliger and others in disputing the existence of an independent holiness code). Later on in the postexilic period, a second redaction took place ("Redaktion II"), reworking the older composition and inserting an originally independent list of incest regulations (vv. 7–16*). In a final revision of the text vv. 17–18 were inserted. Behind this recensional development of the text the author assumes a sociological shift leading toward an increasing esteem of motherhood (and marriage) in postexilic Judaism.

In another respect the book of Ruth, which the author dates to the early postexilic period, shares this high esteem of family and kinship. The family or kinship group helps to fulfill the individual's need for identity in a time of social and economic distress. As the basic principle of acting in a kinship group, the book stresses חסד ("solidarity"), exemplified by the institution of the גאולה. According to Fechter, "deliverance" is the central theme of the book realized on three different but interwoven levels: (1) in the legal act of גאולה, (2) in the preservation of the lineage group (by the birth of the גאל), and (3) on a theological level that identifies YHWH as the גאל (pp. 282–85). The nearly unlimited confidence in the social ability of the kinship group present in the book makes it the climax of the outlined ideological development.

During the fifth century B.C.E., social changes and an increasing economic pressure lead toward a crisis in the sociological system based on kinship. The constitution of different social classes and the growing gap between poor and rich resulted in a dissolution of family structures and a loss of חסד as the principle of acting in Israelite society. Against this background the author interprets the woe oracle in Mic 7:1–7*: for the prophetic speaker kinship is no longer a social value but something deceptive. As the author points out, the reason for the absence of חסד in everyday life is seen in the decay of family structures. According to Fechter, Mic 7:1–7 testifies that the postexilic model

of a society based on kinship structures has failed. What remains is the hope that YHWH will restore justice and righteousness in the coming Day of the Lord (cf. vv. 4b, 7, which Fechter assigns to a secondary layer).

The author has rightly pointed out the necessity of considering the literary and historical background of the biblical texts before using them to reconstruct the social structure of Israel in a distinct period. But in spite of many interesting details (e.g., on the different theological concepts present in Lev 18), there still remain some problems regarding his main thesis. First, with regard to Josh 7 it seems questionable whether the social structure represented in this text really gives testimony to a reconceptualization of Israelite society after the exile (even in the way of a deliberate reflection on older traditions). Probably, it just represents the traditional structure of society, because it seems that these issues are presupposed in Josh 7. They are not emphasized in the text at all (as they are, for instance, in Num 1–4 or 1 Chr 1–9). The question would arise more generally if the loss of the political and religious hierarchy of Jerusalem in 587 B.C.E. really implied a thorough revision of the social structure as Fechter supposes, or if the existing social systems—especially outside Jerusalem (e.g., the עם הארץ)—could guarantee a greater continuity with regard to both ethnic and religious identity in Judah from pre- to postexilic times. A similar question arises regarding the end of the supposed ideological development. First, it seems problematic to ground such a thesis on Mic 7:1–7 alone, leaving aside the genealogical systems of an "ideal Israel" in Num 1–4 and 1 Chr 1–9. But also with regard to the social and economic changes during the fifth century B.C.E., which cause the breakdown of this system (here the author seems to underestimate the importance of the return of parts of the Golah in the sixth/fifth century B.C.E.), it is at least remarkable that similar conditions are already present in the exilic era (cf., e.g., Lam 5).

Leaving aside the discussion of distinct literary-critical issues (e.g., on Josh 7 and Mic 7), the thesis of a postexilic reconstitution of Israelite society according to kinship structures that broke down under the Persian rule in the fifth century B.C.E., seems to me not clearly provable after all, neither at the beginning nor at the end.

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Die aramäischen Inschriften aus Assur, Hatra und dem übrigen Ostmesopotamien (datiert 44 v.Chr. bis 238 n.Chr.), by Klaus Beyer. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998. Pp. 191. DM 83.00 (paper).

Beyer's book is a continuation of his important collection of Aramaic texts from the Dead Sea (and surroundings) and its supplementary volume (*Die aramäischen Texte vom Toten Meer* [1984], *Ergänzungsband* [1994]). This is the first systematic presentation of the east-Mesopotamian dialect of Aramaic, which became the official administrative language of the eastern part of Mesopotamia (p. 7), beginning from the first century C.E. onwards. Its development is parallel to the standardization of Syriac as the official chancellery language in the northwestern corner of Mesopotamia/Syria around Edessa. Beyer does not provide the *editio princeps* of these texts, but rather has tried to bring together all the texts pertaining to this new written language in a systematic manner. The approximately six hundred inscriptions are to be dated between 44 B.C.E. and 238

C.E. and have been recovered from thirteen different locations, including Assur, Dura-Europos, Hatra, and Saʿadiya. Beyer follows the original numbering system in order to avoid confusion with yet another numbering system—a phenomenon which is, for example, visible in Ugaritic studies and which requires double (or even triple) indexing. However, this sometimes results in puzzlement when one looks at inscription A1 (coming from Assur), which is followed by A3b. The reader has no indication what happened to A2 or A3a, and given that the original publications are not readily available and mostly written in Italian, a language to which not every scholar has easy access, some comments on the numbering system would have been in order. Beyer does mention that he is following the original numbering system (p. 6), but this indication is buried in his section on signs and abbreviations.

Each text presentation includes three sections. After the name, numbering, and a possible date (based upon inner-textual evidence), Beyer provides the original text in an especially designed font (digitized by U. Seeger and designed by Beyer himself [p. 121]). This is followed by the transcription and the German translation. It is interesting to see that the transcriptions reproduce the standard Aramaic phonology (p. 9) without taking into account any possible historical developments of the language. I think this decision a wise one, since vocalic/consonantal changes are increasingly difficult to document, especially in a limited body of texts from distinct locations. Furthermore, it is clear that both Syriac and east-Mesopotamian are dialects of Aramaic and thus closely related to their "mother tongue." While we know quite a bit about Aramaic (in all its stages), knowledge about the east-Mesopotamian dialect is scarce and limited.

In the translations Beyer opts to translate the onomastica as well and includes an indication of their origin (if not Aramaic). In order to distinguish the translation (which often includes an entire sentence, when understood as a nominal sentence), small capitals are utilized, thus differentiating between the regular text of the inscription and the translation of the name. The reader should be aware of this distinction in order to avoid confusion.

Beyer has divided the inscriptions into nine subdivisions according to geography and provenance (pp. 11–119). Most of the inscriptions originate from Hatra (pp. 28–114), with Assur a far second (pp. 11–25). A concise but very useful section on the grammar of the east-Mesopotamian inscriptions is included (pp. 121–40), containing the regular phonology and orthography section (pp. 121–28), followed by their morphology (pp. 129–39) and a brief description of the syntax (p. 140). It is clear that short inscriptions will not allow for a more developed description of the syntax of east-Mesopotamian Aramaic. Finally, the volume contains nine indices and lists, which enhance the usefulness and accessibility of Beyer's work tremendously. The first index involves genre decisions (pp. 141–42), dividing the inscriptions into about twenty different *Gattungen.* Again, the fragmentary or abbreviated nature of the texts does not always make these decisions easy, but generally Beyer has shown good judgment and also defines genres broadly enough. Most of the texts are dedicatory building inscriptions or relief inscriptions. There are also six inscriptions containing legal texts and several others involving blessings, maledictions, lists of people, and other items. The second index includes all the dated inscriptions with their specific date and their genre (pp. 142–43). Historical research into this time period will be grateful for this tool. The third index contains the references to months in the texts (p. 144), which is followed by the more substantial

indices of male (pp. 144–51) and female deities (pp. 151–53). Each entry contains the textual references as well as translations of the names and (where possible) their ethnic origin. The following index involves all the personal names in transcription and translation (pp. 153–67). This is a good starting point for onomastic studies of east-Mesopotamian Aramaic although—as Beyer observes correctly (p. 8)—ethnicity cannot easily be assigned on the basis of mere onomastics, since members of the same family sometimes carried names of distinct (linguistic) origin. Beyer suggests that the main population groups of eastern Mesopotamia of this period included Arameans and Arabs, with the occasional Greek and Persian name popping up. This section is followed by an index containing the geographical references of the texts, presented in alphabetical order (p. 168). The final two important indices involve Aramaic-German (pp. 169–85) and German-Aramaic (pp. 186–90) glossaries with references to where the words appear and additional markers if a term should be understood as a title or a professional description.

Beyer has provided a very important collection of texts that will be of interest to general historians, linguists, and early church historians. I am not too sure if his choice of presenting the texts in their (digitized) original script was a good one since this makes the final product less user-friendly for the nonspecialists. Another option would have been to present texts in the familiar Aramaic square script with a separate section on the paleography of the east-Mesopotamian Aramaic texts. Since Beyer only sought to provide a text corpus, he did not include a comprehensive historical evaluation of the textual data—a project which should be taken up in future studies. Notwithstanding these minor critical remarks, both the author and the publisher should be congratulated for providing mainstream access to an important body of texts.

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Religion in Roman Egypt: Assimilation and Resistance, by David Frankfurter. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998. Pp. xvi + 315. $49.50.

Late antique Egypt has usually served as a backdrop against which other things could be charted: the emergence of Christianity or the nature of Roman imperialism, for example. Frankfurter takes what is still a relatively untrodden path and instead studies late antique Egypt from the inside out, so to speak. By focusing on changes in practices between about 100 and 600 C.E. Frankfurter examines how Egyptian religion responded to the changing circumstances—political, cultural, economic, and clerical—in which it found itself. The resulting book is rich in information that has been largely overlooked by historians of late antique Mediterranean religions and provocative in its use of theoretical models drawn from cultures as distant from the shores of the Nile as rural South America.

The theoretical model to which Frankfurter returns most often is Robert Redfield's "great tradition-little tradition," which Redfield first developed to study the ways in which Christianity (a "great tradition," i.e., one espoused by the educated and more urbanized populace) and pre-Christian, indigenous practices of the Yucatan (which constituted a "little tradition," i.e., one found predominantly in rural areas) affected one

another. Similarly, Frankfurter is interested in the tensions between Christianity and pre-Christian Egyptian practices. Although he examines both the centrifugal forces, which drew people away from the urban centers where Christianity could be found, and the centripetal forces, which drove them away from villages toward urban centers, he is particularly interested in the former, and over the course of the book portrays late antique Egypt religion as centered in the individual, the family, or the small group—a portrayal by which I am persuaded, and which, moreover, I think holds true for many other cultures. To be niggling for a moment, I wish that Frankfurter had done more comparing of late antique Egypt to its Mediterranean neighbors in this respect. Contrary to his statement that "Egypt itself was different from other Mediterranean cultures that underwent great social and political changes in the Roman period" (p. 7), he could have extended his analyses by placing, for instance, the Egyptian rejection of nationally integrated worship of a deity and tendency toward multiple regional shrines alongside of our evidence for regional shrines in ancient Greece.

Another thesis to which Frankfurter returns throughout is that "religion in ancient and peasant societies is nothing if not the active negotiation of life" (p. 9), and some of the most interesting parts of the book demonstrate this. A good example is his discussion of the metamorphosis of the god Bes from a rather humble tutelary deity of pregnant women and babies to a postmortem protector of dead infants, thence to a protector of the dead Osiris and finally, from there, into a famous oracular god, replacing Osiris himself at Abydos's Memnonion (pp. 124ff. and pp. 169ff.). The chain of logic uniting these evolutionary steps is not altogether clear, as Frankfurter acknowledges, but the fact that it happened is fascinating nonetheless. Bes, an omnipresent but not terribly grand god, familiar to all Egyptian households, could be rearticulated into something quite different when need arose—so effectively that Constantius II demanded the closure of the Memnonion, and Apa Moses tried to exorcize it of its "demon."

In the space of this brief review, I cannot treat all the chapters in the book, but will discuss one that is likely to draw a lot of reaction, ch. 5, "From Priest to Magician: Evolving Modes of Religious Authority." Frankfurter portrays the "lector priest" (*ḥry ḥb*) of the temple as virtually the sole spiritual helper of the average Egyptian, providing ritual expertise in everything from gynecology to divination. Even after the political infrastructure that had supported the priests began to crumble, he suggests, they could have used their charismatic authority to retain these positions of spiritual power within their communities. Frankfurter then argues that it was just these lector priests who produced and used the Greek and Demotic magical grimoires that have been unearthed in Egypt (the most famous being the so-called Great Paris Magical Papyrus, now residing in the Bibliothèque Nationale). A few other scholars have advanced similar arguments in recent years, but Frankfurter's exploration of the idea is especially detailed both in the evidence he adduces in support and in its implications. I remain unconvinced of the thesis in its entirety—to focus on one of its planks, for example, I disagree that the literacy necessary to produce the grimoires would be found only at temples (some of the Greek curse tablets were produced by itinerant ritual experts, to take an ancient Mediterranean example of literate magic that is not tied to a specific place of worship)—but this is not to suggest that Frankfurter's argument should not have been made. On the contrary, the detailed treatment it receives here will advance the debate by moving it into new channels. One of the points that he introduces is particularly intriguing: he suggests

that some of these lector priests enjoyed "stereotype appropriation." That is, they caught on to the fact that outsiders such as the Romans viewed Egypt as the mysterious land of magic and its priests as the exotic wizards who purveyed it, and so they studied up on their roles, purposefully becoming weirder to win new clients (pp. 224ff.). Frankfurter adduces such things as the "Native American powwows" that are offered at contemporary tourist traps as modern analogies. It is an intriguing idea that I would like to test on other ancient Mediterranean ritual experts.

Religion in Roman Egypt is, in sum, stimulating in the very best sense of that word: its thickly packed details and formulations reward readers not only with the insights of its author, but with material that often prompts them to travel down new paths of thought themselves. Scholars of ancient Mediterranean religions should certainly read it.

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Qumrân Grotte 4 (XVIII) Textes Hébreux (4Q521–4Q528, 4Q576–579), ed. Émile Puech. DJD 25. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. Pp. xviii + 259 + 16 plates. $105.00.

Puech publishes here the Hebrew texts that he inherited from J. Starcky. In a brief introduction, he recounts the story of his early association with Starcky and how he came by the manuscripts, as the latter grew unable to continue his work. Puech also explains how he rearranged some of Starcky's manuscript assignments, making sure always to give Starcky due credit for his pioneering work with these difficult manuscripts.

True to his reputation for meticulously describing the scrolls, Puech provides for each of those covered in this volume a physical description of the surviving material, a survey of the scroll's contents, and a discussion of the preserved and reconstructed columns and their sizes. He also treats the manuscript's paleography and date, its orthography, and, where necessary, marginal signs in the manuscript. The result for the patient reader is a remarkable familiarity with these scrolls' sheer physicality. And as usual, Puech's paleographical observations are unparalleled in their acuity.

Several of the manuscripts included in this volume are so small as to defy classification, although that hardly deters Puech. 4Q526 is but a single fragment, yet Puech deems it likely to be the remains of a testament because it preserves in one line the words אדני לאבי לו תעשה, " . . . the Lord to my father, 'You will not . . .'" (reading לא for לו). Likewise, he deems the single-fragment manuscripts of 4Q527 and 4Q528, and the three-fragment 4Q579, to be liturgical works because of their peculiar language. 4Q576 is from Genesis because its two fragments bear words from Gen 34:7–10; 50:3. 4Q577, consisting of eight fragments that seem to reflect an account of the flood, is called a "Texte mentionnant le déluge." And 4Q578, another single-fragment work, Puech thinks was a historical composition because it likely bears the name of Ptolemy in three of its four lines. From almost any other scrolls scholar such genre claims on the basis of so little evidence might seem imprudent, but from Puech, with his encyclopedic knowledge of the scrolls' language and contents, they attain credibility hardly possible otherwise.

The real interest of this DJD volume, though, lies elsewhere. Five manuscripts, 4Q521–525, provide insight into the Qumran group's attitudes toward resurrection, bib-

lical interpretation, and the Maccabees, as well as about the relationships between their texts and early Christian literature. In addition, one of these manuscripts deepens interest in the connections between the community's ideas and those of the *Temple Scroll.*

Chiefly because it avoids using the divine name Puech thinks 4Q521, dubbed an "Apocalypse messianique," is probably a sectarian scroll. Consisting of sixteen fragments, it touches on a variety of topics. But most interesting to the majority of readers are its messianism and references to resurrection. In frg. 2 ii + 4 it uses the word משיחו, which Puech says can either be read as a plural, "messiahs," with a masculine singular possessive suffix, or as the singular with the same suffix. Only the larger context, not preserved, would solve this mystery, although the latter option seems most likely. In addition, lines 11–13 of the same column refer to the resurrection of the dead and seem to link that event with the appearance of God's messiah(s).

4Q522, a "Prophétie de Josué," apparently places in Joshua's mouth a prophecy regarding David and about Solomon and the construction of the temple on Mt. Zion. Not surprisingly, the text includes a reminiscence of Ps 122. Assuming 4Q522 is Essene, as Puech suggests, this Joshua text raises questions about just how inventive the community's exegetical imagination could be. Also quite intriguing, but still equally unclear, is the purpose of this particular exegetical development.

4Q523, or 4QJonathan, raises again (see already 4Q448) the question of the group's relationship with the Maccabees. According to Puech, it is possible that the reference to a Jonathan in this poorly preserved text is to Jonathan Maccabee. But little more can be said on this because so little of the work remains.

Puech identifies 4Q524, a fragmentary and difficult manuscript, as an exemplar of the *Temple Scroll.* The identification is significant because the *Temple Scroll*, found otherwise only in Cave 11 (but see also 4Q365 in DJD 13), is occasionally at odds with legal notions typical of the community's outlook. If Puech is correct—and much in the reconstructed manuscript speaks in his favor—the evidence for the community's appreciation and use of the *Temple Scroll* is strengthened by the existence of an additional manuscript located in the more central Cave 4.

Finally there is 4Q525, dubbed 4QBéatitudes by Puech because frg. 2 ii gives macarisms like those in Matt 5:3–10. The text probably deserves a different name. In addition to frg. 2 ii, there are forty-nine other fragments, the largest of which clearly echo the sapiential material in the book of Proverbs. Puech is right to relate the ideas in the sapiential section to ideas found in 1QS, 1QM, and $1QH^a$ and to say that such material is best studied in conjunction with other Cave 4 sapiential texts. More uncertain is his view that such a comparison of ideas permits one to date the manuscript around 150 B.C.E. and to suggest that it has some bearing on early community ideas.

Altogether the manuscripts published in this volume, although known for some time already through various preliminary publications, are a very welcome addition to the DJD series. Thanks to Puech's paleographic skills and ambitious reconstructions, we have as full a picture of the original manuscripts' contents as we are ever likely to see. Consequently, anyone wanting to tackle the significance of these enigmatic scrolls for understanding Qumran and its inhabitants has in this volume everything necessary for the project.

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Beyond the Essene Hypothesis: The Parting of the Ways between Qumran and Enochic Judaism, by Gabriele Boccaccini. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998. Pp. xxii + 230. $25.00.

Boccaccini attempts to provide an answer to the question of the identity of the Essene movement and its relationship with the Qumran community; he traces texts that represent an "Enochic Judaism," which played a crucial role in the formation of Essene theology at Qumran (p. xv).

Part 1 offers a "Historiographical Analysis" of "The Essenes in Ancient Historiography" (ch. 2, pp. 19–49) and reviews the evidence provided by first-century authors. Philo and Josephus describe a network of Essene communities in Palestine, highlighting what was theologically and sociologically more important; the non-Jewish authors Pliny the Elder and Dio of Prusa describe a single Essene settlement near the Dead Sea, focusing on the more exotic. Boccaccini concludes that "the community of the Dead Sea, described by Pliny and Dio, was a radical and minority group within the larger Essene movement, described by Philo and Josephus," for whom the Dead Sea community was "much less important . . . than for ancient non-Jewish historians and modern archaeologists" (p. 49).

Part 2 presents a "Systemic Analysis" that discusses "The Prehistory of the Sect" (ch. 3, pp. 53–79), "The Formative Age" (ch. 4, pp. 81–117), and "The Schism between Qumran and Enochic Judaism" (ch. 5, pp. 119–62). Boccaccini follows those who posit a schism within the Judean priesthood between Zadokites and a nonconformist priestly tradition that argued for a particular concept of the origin of evil and based its claims on conformity with the revelations of Enoch. He suggests that the copies and fragments of the "Enochic chain of documents" that were found at Qumran tell us the history of this particular priestly movement from its roots in Enochic Judaism (Book of the Watchers, Aramaic Levi, Astronomical Book, Dream Visions) to the gradual organization of the movement in communities after the Maccabean crisis (*Jubilees, Temple Scroll* [11QTemple], Proto-Epistle of Enoch, 4QMMT) and the emergence of a distinct group that was led by the Teacher of Righteousness (*Damascus Document*), which eventually settled at Qumran (sectarian). Boccaccini comes to the same conclusion as in his historiographical analysis: "the community of the Dead Sea Scrolls was a radical and minority group within Enochic Judaism" (p. 162). In other words, the Enochians were the (non-Qumran) Essenes. Part 3 offers as "Comparative Analysis" the "Conclusion: The Enochic/Essene Hypothesis" (ch. 6, pp. 165–96).

Boccaccini's historical reconstruction may be right, or it may be wrong. The fact that the author operates largely with indicatives and dispenses with cautionary terms such as "perhaps" or "possibly" must not obscure the fact that what he offers is indeed a hypothesis (see p. xv) rather than a circumspect and cautious reconstruction within the confines of the historical and literary evidence that is available. It seems an exaggeration to say that "we do not know *exactly* who the Enochians were" (p. 78, my emphasis): the fact is that the Enochic literature contains no "detailed reference to the communal life of the Enochians," which Boccaccini acknowledges to be a "major problem" (p. 166). In other words, the evidence that we need to reconstruct a social movement of "Enochians" is entirely circumstantial: we do not know whether "Enochians" existed as an "established movement" (p. 75) or whether the Enoch corpus reflects the views of more apocalyptically oriented leaders of a broader reform movement.

The boldness of Boccaccini's presentation may be merely rhetorical, or it may point to a deeper problem. While it is commonplace today to recognize the problem of superimposing anachronistic criteria on the study of the Second Temple period, I doubt whether the history of *philosophy* can provide an effective model for inferring a "taxonomy of competing systems of thought based on the extant documents" (p. xiv). While "intellectual historians" study philosophical positions which, if they display variations from other positions, are almost by definition "competing," extreme care must be taken when describing social and religious history—here, nothing is "obvious." Nobody concludes from the "competing systems" of, for example, fourth-century Greek philosophers "a plurality of autonomous groups" (p. 198) or "Greeces." Why should we describe "Judaisms" on the basis of "forming chains of ideologically and chronologically connected documents" (p. 9)? While everybody agrees that there were distinctive movements in early (or "middle") Jewish society, we need a much firmer basis than the model that "the history of philosophy" can provide if we want to go beyond the evidence provided by the ancient historians by adding socially distinct movements with differing worldviews and distinctive values. And we should not forget the fact that the texts that are used to identify "a Judaism" distinct from other "Judaisms" do not constitute large corpora. As we seek to avoid anachronistic projections, we must be careful to avoid the projection of postmodern Western pluralism on Second Temple Judaism, and recognize the difference between the importance of modern intellectual urban elites and their texts for Western, secular societies and an essentially agrarian, deeply religious society. The variation in Jewish society of the Second Temple period may be much more limited than Boccaccini thinks.

While the presentation of a working hypothesis that deconstructs traditional approaches and constructs new suggestions is fashionable and may promote progress in scholarly discourse, postmodern historians may need to be reminded that humility is not just a human virtue but an elementary requirement in the analysis and description of past historical reality: we have to be content with what we have more often than we would wish. Of course Boccaccini knows all this (pp. 10–11). But I wonder whether the historiographical analysis is not relegated to the sidelines while "systemic analysis" is chosen MVP. Some may regard historical reconstruction as a game that is played in different ways by different people in different times. Boccaccini, I think, would not want to be regarded as a wide receiver in a mere ball game, as he protests against the strategy of Christians disinheriting Jews (p. xvi). Historians will not disinherit the ancient record: they are prepared to speculate but they are also willing to accept gaps in the record and a lack of final answers.

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Academic Constraints in Rhetorical Criticism of the New Testament: An Introduction to a Rhetoric of Power, by J. David Hester Amador. JSNTSup 174. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999. Pp. 354. $85.00 (cloth).

This book, representing an intervention in NT rhetorical criticism, features a trenchant critique of the subdiscipline itself and the elusive promise of new interpretive

practices. Close scrutiny of the institutional contexts and conventions of biblical criticism characterizes Amador's vision.

In ch. 1 Amador develops two primary arguments and offers his own methodological perspective. First, rhetorical criticism as currently practiced is "rhetoric restrained." With too much emphasis on style and arrangement, scholars miss out on the persuasive dimension of biblical discourse. And with the assumption that texts provide a window to the past and with a commitment to the text's "original meaning," scholars exclude the rhetorical practices of interpretation, appropriation, and institutionalization. Second, while style, arrangement, and historical context may be legitimate interests (Amador is skeptical about reconstructing history), even the most daring NT rhetorical critics fail to challenge the institutional frameworks and constraints of biblical interpretation. Amador promises an alternative perspective—a rhetoric of power that recognizes the materiality of text and interpretation, even a rhetoric of rhetorical criticism itself.

In ch. 2 Amador argues that while rhetorical criticism in the broader academy features a variety of practices, inside biblical criticism a few characteristics dominate. The discipline is antiquarian (relying on ancient sources such as the rhetorical handbooks and progymnasmata), synthesist (ignoring the diversity among ancient rhetorical practices and tending toward taxonomic analysis), causalist (assuming that situations produce rhetoric and thus may be reconstructed through it), and historicist (looking only to original meaning as valid interpretation).

In contrast to the "rhetoric restrained" that limits contemporary rhetorical criticism, Amador sketches three characteristics of his rhetoric of power in ch. 3. It is *symbiotic,* recognizing the complexity of rhetorical action, including the histories and material conditions of reading, the media of communication, and other dimensions. It is *symphonic,* recognizing a multiplicity of critical approaches and perspectives that may result in cacophony (p. 55). And it is *museful,* emphasizing the ongoing inventive power of words as opposed to static meaning grounded in "an ontology of truth" (p. 55). Amador's rhetoric of power involves "the explicit commitment to search out and question the 'powerful' within the presumptions, values, judgments, 'truths,' 'facts' and beliefs at work in every rhetorical a(rtifa)ct; the systems perpetuating and legitimating the 'powerful'; and, finally, the 'powerful' as given form in the a(rtifa)ct itself" (pp. 58–59). One wonders whether and how this perspective moves beyond what has come to be known as cultural studies. Three sources nourish Amador's model. First, the new rhetoric of Chaim Perelman and Luce Olbrechts-Tyteca recognizes that all argumentation depends on its audience. Rhetoric, then, is not just a way of analyzing ancient texts; it provides a potential vehicle for public deliberation concerning the Bible's significance (p. 83). Second, the work of Wilhelm Wuellner moves beyond style and arrangement to larger practices of persuasion and the recognition of varieties of argumentative situations in which the Bible functions. Wuellner is a rare rhetorical critic dedicated to bringing the Bible into conversation with modern readers. And third, literary theorist Stephen Mailloux foregrounds the institutional argumentative context of scholarship, including its rhetorical strategies and assumptions. Mailloux rejects any grand theory of reading, instead considering how rhetorical practices address specific institutional concerns and values in specific historical contexts.

In ch. 4 Amador takes on the work of four prominent rhetorical critics—Burton Mack, Vernon Robbins, Antoinette Clark Wire, and Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza—to

demonstrate that their work, while claiming to challenge the discipline and democratize biblical interpretation, both returns to historicizing and shores up the institutional authority of scholar-as-historian. In Amador's view, Schüssler Fiorenza comes closest to fulfilling the promise of rhetorical criticism, as she explicitly develops "rhetoric as ideology critique of interpretive practices" (p. 239), including institutional relations in biblical interpretation (pp. 239–40) and the persuasive dimension of interpretation itself (p. 251). Yet all four authors seek to find a liberating voice for the present through what amounts to historical excavation. Rhetoric becomes simply another historical tool.

The book is grounded in Amador's 1995 Graduate Theological Union dissertation under the supervision of Herman Waetjen. One wishes Amador could have addressed the development represented in Robbins's and Schüssler Fiorenza's most recent works (Robbins, *The Tapestry of Early Christian Discourse: Rhetoric, Society and Ideology* [London: Routledge, 1996]; *Exploring the Texture of Texts: A Guide to Socio-Rhetorical Interpretation* [Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1996]; and Schüssler Fiorenza, *Rhetoric and Ethic: The Politics of Biblical Studies* [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1999]). Moreover, by investigating only those who *call themselves* rhetorical critics, Amador seems unaware that others—such as Fernando F. Segovia and Mary Ann Tolbert—have been reading the Bible much in the way he envisions, including explicit awareness of the rhetorical dimension of interpretation and the need for institutional and material analysis.

"Non-Chapter 4e" asks, "Why is the historical paradigm so dominant?" Amador charges that it wrestles authority from dogma and tradition (p. 280), it enables biblical scholarship to define its contribution to the modern university (p. 281), and it combats populist interpretation (p. 284). But there are losses as well. In particular, the historical paradigm restricts biblical scholarship to an antiquarian interest, isolating it from any popular or cultural relevance. (Given the constant queries this reviewer hears about the Jesus Seminar and the book of Revelation, I remain only partly convinced, though concerned, that we might be so irrelevant.) In its place Amador wonders, "what would be the result if (new) rhetorical criticism(s) were given the chance to transform biblical studies according to a paradigm of power that focuses upon the ways in which the Bible is used (through argumentation, cultural values, specific discourse forms, by means of ideological infiltration of specific values and world-views) rhetorically?" (p. 293). In other words, *What if we did cultural studies with a new rhetorical awareness?*

Chapter 5 is somewhat puzzling. Amador qualifies his argument as an attempt to "fragment and disrupt" (p. 294) current practices. Yet one wonders whether the expansion of rhetorical criticism to include interpretations and interpreters of the Bible (p. 295) and institutional analyses (p. 298) has not already been started. Here Amador could have spelled out how the rhetorical tradition as he understands it could enrich such critical work. Moreover, Amador fails to argue why the effect of power upon the body of the individual must be the "next necessary step" for a rhetoric of power—or to explain what it might involve (p. 305).

Important as it is, this book could be even more effective. Amador's attempt to be subversive through stylistic creativity ("text" in quotation marks, neologisms such as "academented," "acadamnia," "non-Chapter 4e") and the occasional resort to hyperbole (Amador is not the only rhetorical critic whose analysis transcends the ancient past [p. 22], and the [albeit qualified] association of fascism with Robbins's grappling with ulti-

macy [p. 203] is both facile and extremely inappropriate) tends to be more distraction than effective strategy. On the other hand, the book includes perhaps the funniest piece of academic writing I have encountered in a while. Denying the need to apologize for Paul, Amador writes, "Paul can be painted purple, dressed in drag and sacrificed to volcanoes, as far as that goes" (p. 231).

Most seriously, Amador is strongest at critiquing others' rhetorical work, but quite vague when it comes to demonstrating the potential of his larger rhetorical vision. It is unclear whether Amador thinks historical criticism is worthwhile, hopelessly compromised, or the enemy. One may admit that historically grounded inquiry has limitations, but one would expect to encounter a more concrete proposal. Moreover, Amador never considers that all rhetorical analysis is historical—it is simply a matter of the point in history on which one wishes to focus. This is a point admirably modeled by Mailloux.

Despite these drawbacks, this is a substantial contribution. Among Amador's most valuable interventions is his injection of contemporary rhetorical theory from the larger academy, complemented by an extensive bibliography. The consideration of Mailloux's work is particularly welcome. Most importantly, this book represents a challenge. Rhetoric can be more than simply a tool for describing how ancient texts were invented and arranged; it can be a perspective that enables us to assess the Bible's role in human struggle and self-definition. Whereas most rhetorical critics use rhetoric as a tool for antiquarian exposition, Amador is one of the few who have internalized the rhetorical tradition.

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A New Vision for Israel: The Teachings of Jesus in National Context, by Scot McKnight. Studying the Historical Jesus. Grand Rapids/Cambridge U.K.: Eerdmans, 1999. Pp. xiv + 263. $21.00.

This book appears in the Studying the Historical Jesus series edited by B. Chilton and C. A. Evans. McKnight seeks to "present how the teachings of Jesus are to be understood in light of his mission to Israel" (p. viii). McKnight's earlier book, *A Light Among the Gentiles: Jewish Missionary Activity in the Second Temple Period* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), provides a significant springboard for the present study, which highlights the national political context of early Judaism for understanding Jesus' ministry.

McKnight divides his study into six major chapters: (l) The Vision of Jesus: A Preliminary Sketch; (2) The God of Jesus; (3) The Kingdom Now Present; (4) The Kingdom Yet to Come; (5) The Ethic of Jesus: Conversion and Cost; and (6) The Ethic of Jesus: Morality. The "vision of Jesus" is cast primarily in political terms revolving around the restoration of Israel. McKnight asserts as the basis for his study "that Jesus thought of himself as in some sense king, messiah, and prophet" (p. 6). He also uncritically asserts the historicity of the Markan passion predictions, namely, that Jesus saw himself as the Son of Man called to suffer and die as a "national sacrifice," whom God would vindicate by raising him from the dead. Nowhere does McKnight seriously entertain the possibility/probability that such notions most likely resulted from early Christian theologizing

about the death of Jesus after the fact, rather than coming as such fully developed theological constructs out of the very mouth of the historical Jesus himself.

Much better is McKnight's description of "the God of Jesus." Here he focuses on two themes in the teaching of Jesus: (1) God as inflexibly holy, and (2) God as relationally loving. The holiness of God can be seen in Jesus' call to revere God, in the manner of Jesus' speech about God, in his call to surrender, his warnings of judgment, and his final words from the cross. The image of God as relationally loving can be demonstrated from Jesus' table-fellowship with sinners, his use of "Abba" as an address to God, and from Jesus' compassionate deeds.

McKnight rightly emphasizes that "Jesus taught no new thing about God, and his experience of God was consonant with what other Jews . . . had already experienced or were experiencing" (p. 21). This is where McKnight is at his best, in highlighting the first-century national context in Judaism as providing the best social and theological setting for understanding Jesus. Still, it is disheartening to see the kind of special pleading to which McKnight resorts when he seeks to make historical claims: "a nuanced understanding of the Jesus traditions will show that, while some of the evidence for God as Father has been inserted by the Evangelists in their redactional activity, such evidence is not to be construed as 'creative' or 'unhistorical'" (p. 55). So McKnight will allow a tinge of "redactional activity" on the part of the Gospel writers (authors?), but not much. Indeed, he seems to exclude in principle the broad scholarly consensus that the faith commitments of the Gospel writers shaped the Gospels in very important ways. If anything, McKnight's book shows how the faith commitments of a modern scholar can dramatically shape the "historical" image of the Jesus he seeks to "reconstruct," as Albert Schweitzer demonstrated so long ago. Apparently, faith in the historically reliable character of the Gospels needs to be preserved and defended at virtually all costs.

The third chapter presents a standard overview of the "kingdom of God" in twentieth-century scholarship (Schweitzer, C. H. Dodd, R. H. Fuller, W. G. Kümmel, B. Chilton, N. T. Wright, and others). Again, McKnight situates the kingdom of God discussion in the context of early Judaism. For Jesus, according to McKnight, the kingdom of God represents the fulfillment of Jewish hope, is operative only through himself, is inauspicious to say the least (seen most concretely in Jesus' death), and yet is displayed in strength through Jesus' powerful actions. Jesus' kingdom message also calls for covenant faithfulness, picking up on long-established traditions in Israel, and is actualized in Jesus' suffering and death. As McKnight puts it, Jesus "offered himself as a sacrificial victim to God so that God would forgive the sins of Israel and restore the nation" (p. 117). McKnight simply accepts at face value the historicity of various sayings attributed to Jesus. The notion that such heavily laden christological statements make more sense as later *Christian* redactional retrojections onto Jesus' lips never enters the discussion (e.g., McKnight accepts Jesus' saying from Matt 8:15–20 about giving the keys of the kingdom to Peter as the very words of Jesus rather than reflecting Matthean redaction [p. 92]).

Regarding the "Kingdom Yet to Come," McKnight stresses continuity of the future with the present, the uncertain but imminent coming of the kingdom, the judgment of God, and the fellowship of Jesus with the Father. The "Ethic of Jesus" revolves around conversion to Jesus (repentance and faith) and counting the cost of following Jesus (subordinating vocation, family, and possessions to Jesus as acts of faithful self-denial). The

morality of Jesus emphasizes relation to God (righteousness and love), relation to self (humility, trust, transformation of self, self-love), and relation to others (love of enemy, forgiveness, mercy, peace). Obedience to God will be rewarded in the future kingdom. This is what Jesus stood for as a messianic prophet. In general these sections are well developed and thoughtful expositions of important themes in the ministry of Jesus and in early Christianity.

In sum, then, there are several things to commend this book, but also significant limitations in terms of historical method. In my view a serious flaw in McKnight's book is the uncritical assumption that as historians we can enter into the self-consciousness of Jesus with as much self-confidence as McKnight displays. While I applaud McKnight's determination to present Jesus as a real first-century (non-Christian?) *Jew*, he ends up undermining his case by making Jesus appear as little more than a mouthpiece for classical *Christian* doctrine. Would McKnight concede any kind of retrojection of early Christian beliefs back into the retelling of Jesus' ministry? It appears not. For example, when Jesus made his final entry into Jerusalem, according to McKnight, he "realized the utter gravity of Israel's situation, and knew that he had to offer himself consciously and intentionally to God as vicarious sacrifice for Israel in order to avert the national disaster, and he did so as an atoning substitutionary sacrifice" (p. 13). If historical Jesus research has shown anything over the last century, has it not warned precisely against the assumptions of such facile retrojections of orthodox Christian doctrine? Mind you I am not advocating the radical skepticism of those on the other side of the fence (with equally questionable assumptions), but surely we have to be more careful than this.

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Anti-Judaism and the Gospels, ed. William R. Farmer. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1999. Pp. viii + 311. $24.00.

This collection of essays, together with responses, is the fruit of a three-year research project sponsored by the University of Dallas on the subject of anti-Judaism and the Gospels. It focuses on three questions: (1) When and under what circumstances did the Gospels begin to serve anti-Jewish ends? (2) Can it be said that the evangelists were anti-Jewish? (3) Are there texts in the Gospels originally intended to injure the Jewish people or their religion?

Farmer, in his introduction, correctly emphasizes that the term "anti-Judaism" in his own title is not only anachronistic but historically incorrect, since it identifies certain Jewish individuals and groups who were contemporary with Jesus with all of Judaism at his time and excludes him and his followers from the Jewish people.

Amy-Jill Levine, in her essay on Matthew, distinguishing prophetic polemic, Jewish-Christian anti-Judaism, and Gentilizing anti-Judaism, does not accept the view that Matthew's Jesus is simply following current rhetorical practice, and asserts, as does Elaine Pagels, that "philosophers did not engage, as Matthew does here [ch. 23], in demonic vilification of their opponents." But, we may comment, when Cicero, in book 3 of his *De Natura Deorum,* speaks of his Stoic opponent as "regaling us with the vaporings of old harridans," this is pretty close to vilification. And if we view Matthew as, in

effect, a lawyer or a politician, he is not more vitriolic than Cicero in the latter's abusive attacks on Verres, Catiline, and Antony. While not seeing Matthew as condemning Jews as a people or a race, since they are still part of the missionary purview, Levine says that she is forced, though with great reluctance, to conclude that Matthew is anti-Jewish.

In his response Philip Shiner says that if anti-Judaism is defined as "antipathy toward Jews based upon a perceived inferiority of Jewish ways and manners," Matt 1 is not anti-Jewish since, far from denigrating the central figure of its narrative, Jesus, it traces Jesus' genealogy back to Abraham and David. But, we may reply, Matthew's point may well be that this is what must most be stressed, that the Jews, coming from such a glorious beginning, should have turned against the ideals of their own founders and consequently are to be condemned.

Warren Carter, in his response, suggests that "parts of Matthew can be construed as anti-some-forms of Judaism by some readers at some times, but not all parts, not all Judaisms, and not by all readers." Objecting to Levine's text-centered approach, he emphasizes the roles and locations of readers in formulating anti-Jewish readings. To this we may respond that if Matthew were read in its entirety, as the Torah is read in its entirety in the course of every year by Jews, readers or listeners might form more nuanced views; but in a society in which few people were literate enough to read a document in its entirety, their views were often derived from very selected readings and sermons and, in particular, the readings on Good Friday.

Daryl Schmidt, in his essay on Luke, focusing on the image of the implied readers, whom he identifies with the "G-d-fearers," quotes Lloyd Gaston's conclusion that Luke-Acts is one of the most pro-Jewish and one of the most anti-Jewish writings in the NT and remarks that rather than simply being a paradox, it is also an unresolved tension. Schmidt concludes that it is unlikely that the "G-d-fearers," reassured by Paul's rhetoric that loyalty to Judaism includes messianic claims about Jesus, would join in condemnation of Jews. We may, however, argue that these Gentiles who are "half-way Jews" might, indeed, feel guilty about their failure to be fully consistent in their attitude toward Judaism and thus might be drawn to condemn Judaism altogether, once they had found a kind of Judaism consonant with what some might call their "compromised Judaism."

In his response David Balch asks whether the Gospels are more anti-Jewish than the writings of pagan Greek and Roman intellectuals. But, we may remark, if an Apion has a story about Jews fattening up a Greek and then sacrificing him, this is really quite different from a charge that Jews bear responsibility for the death of one who is so central in the beliefs of his followers, since no sect was built around the Greek who allegedly was sacrificed by Jews.

In his response Allan McNicol rightly stresses that since Luke considered the early Christian movement to be a legitimate form of Judaism, he did not, by definition, regard Judaism as debased. However, the conclusion that Luke is not an expression of anti-Judaism seems unwarranted, since classical Christianity, as seen, for example, in Jerome, regarded itself as *verus Israel;* and yet Jerome has some very negative comments about the Judaism that he regarded as a false Judaism.

David Rensberger, in his essay on John, explains John's violent condemnation of "the Jews" as arising from the persecution of some Jewish-born Christians, a Jewish Johannine community, by local synagogue authorities. He accounts for John's ambiva-

lent attitude toward "the Jews" by suggesting that he is still Jewish enough for his language to be viewed as sectarian protest, but no longer Jewish enough to remain such for long. Yet it is hard to believe that at such a juncture an author would risk condemning his opponents within Judaism as "the Jews" (seventy-one times) and much less often as "Pharisees" (nineteen times), when the other evangelists referred to them far more often as Pharisees and far less often as "the Jews."

In his response Mark Goodwin, questioning the existence of a separate Johannine community, notes that in several instances John's Jesus refers to the Torah as "your law" or "their law," implying an actual breach with Jewish identity. But in view of John's insistence on the Jewishness of Jesus (4:9), what John may mean is "your interpretation of the law" or "the interpretation of the law on the part of those who have the nerve to call themselves good Jews."

In his response Thomas Lea, while agreeing enthusiastically with Rensberger's conclusion that John is not anti-Jewish, does so for a different reason: John, he says, gives a historically reliable picture of the opposition to Jesus. John, he insists, has portrayed accurately that various groups of Jews disagreed with the teaching of Jesus. Yet the question remains why John, apparently a Jew, who identified with Jesus, a Jew, would heap such opprobrium upon "the Jews" without further qualification.

Joseph Tyson, in "Anti-Judaism in the Critical Study of the Gospels," surveying the history of Christian studies on Judaism until 1947, notably such scholars as F. Weber, J. Wellhausen, P. Billerbeck, W. Bousset, E. Schürer, R. Bultmann, and A. Harnack, concludes that with the major exceptions of A. F. Gförer and G. F. Moore (we would add Travers Herford and James Parkes), Judaism was viewed negatively. Harnack, commenting, in particular, on Luke's ambivalent attitude toward the Jews, explains it as evidence of Luke's impartiality. According to Harnack, because Luke was not Jewish and hence did not have the experience of Paul, he held a higher view of the Jewish religion. Here one is reminded of the view of some nineteenth-century German scholars who explained the favorable view of Judaism held by the earliest pagan intellectuals such as Aristotle, Theophrastus, Megasthenes, and Hecataeus, in contrast to the negative view of their successors such as Manetho, Lysimachus, Apion, and Chaeremon, as due to the fact that earlier writers had not had much contact with the Jews. Even H. Conzelmann, whose writings span the period from before Hitler to 1989, in his book on Luke (1954), inexplicably almost entirely omits any discussion of the opening chapters of Luke, which describe so fully and so positively Jewish religious life prior to Jesus, and can say in his last book (1981) that the continuing history of the Jewish people has no theological significance for Christians.

James Duke, in his response, returns to the thesis that anti-Judaism rests not so much in the critical study of the Gospels as in the Gospels themselves. It would seem that the *adversus Judaeos* bias of scholars is not likely to be eradicated *in toto* so long as those texts remain.

Ellen Charry, in her response, explains the anti-Judaism in the earlier Christian scholars by stressing that their Christian beliefs shaped their historiography. She remarks, rather sadly, that now that theology is in decline and the theological training of NT scholars is also in decline the tenor of the times may contribute to the resolution of the problem.

Robert Wilken, in "Something Greater than the Temple," surveys the attitude

toward Judaism of church fathers in the second and third centuries and makes the significant comment that the words "his blood be on us and on our children" spoken by the Jews in Matthew (27:25) are seldom cited in the second century, and that when cited, the interpretation is not consistent. Wilken does not explain why this is so, but we may suggest that a major factor is that the Christian community during this period was relatively small and weak, while the Jews continued to have the protection of the Roman imperial government. Indeed, Origen interprets Matt 23:13–14 ("Woe to you scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites!") as referring to all people, in particular, Christian clergy, who conduct themselves in evil ways. The one major exception to the avoidance of venom against Jews is Melito of Sardis, and even he does not refer to Judaism or Jews but rather Israel; and Israel loses any sense of historical reality, existing only as an archetype of the unfaithful. Moreover, his rhetoric probably betrays his desperation at the continuing presence in Sardis of a large and flourishing Jewish community.

In the concluding essay, "Reflections on Anti-Judaism in the New Testament and in Christianity," E. P. Sanders insists that Paul is not at all anti-Jewish, as we see notably from his statement (Rom 11:26–29) that "the gifts and the calling of G-d are irrevocable." But he is forced to explain that the exclusion of many Jews from the elect in Gal 3, Rom 4, and Rom 9 is a by-product of his desire to include Gentile Christians rather than of hostility toward the Jews, though one may wonder why there was not room for both Jews and non-Jews among the elect. He regards only 1 Thess 2:14–16, which speaks of "the Jews, who killed both the Lord Jesus and the prophets, and drove us out," as anti-Jewish. But, as Sanders notes, some scholars have suggested that this entire passage has been interpolated. Nevertheless, Sanders convincingly suggests that Christian anti-Judaism probably helped to solidify the Christian communities, since by criticizing both Jews and pagans they were better able to define who they were.

In summary, these essays approach a truly painful topic not only with exemplary, careful, honest, critical scholarship, but with real sensitivity.

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Jesus als Lebensspender: Untersuchungen zu einer Geschichte der johanneischen Tradition anhand ihrer Wundergeschichten, by Michael Labahn. BZNW 98. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1999. Pp. x + 559. DM 258.00.

This revised Göttingen dissertation distinguishes between *Formkritik*, which describes literary forms in their present context, and *Formgeschichte*, which reconstructs the history of the transmission of the materials. In order to enrich our understanding of John's Gospel, Labahn proposes to do both types of analysis. Although some form-critical and literary-critical studies have argued that John worked primarily with literary sources, Labahn maintains that the Fourth Evangelist relied on various oral and written sources. He rightly cautions that we cannot assume that forms remained fluid in the oral stage of transmission and then became fixed when they were written down. Stories can be handed down verbally in a stable form, while written texts can remain fluid through multiple stages of editing.

Labahn maintains that John's Gospel was completed in the early second century,

and that John presupposes the Synoptic Gospels. His understanding of John's relationship to the Synoptics is helpfully complex, as is evident in his discussion of Jesus feeding the five thousand and walking on the sea (John 6:1–21). Although these stories are paired in Matthew, Mark, and John, Labahn does not think that John drew his material directly from the Synoptics. Instead, John may have used oral traditions that were spawned by the Synoptics. In other words, John's oral sources may have been partially inspired by older written sources.

Although conflict between John's Christian circle and members of the Jewish community has often been taken to be the primary context in which the Gospel was shaped, Labahn argues that this is only partially true. In its early stages, the story of the miraculous gift of wine at Cana (John 2:1–11) recounted an epiphany of divine power that has affinities with the Greco-Roman accounts of miracles associated with Dionysus. When the story was written down, the emphasis probably changed from Jesus' divinity to his unity with the Father through the revelation of his glory. In the earlier stage the story may have been used for missionary proclamation, and in its later stage it was used to build up the Johannine community. The account of the healing of the royal official's son was shaped in a similar way. Initially, the episode identifies Jesus as the giver of life, focusing the official's faith on Jesus and making clear that it was not simple fascination with the miraculous. In a manner suitable for missionary proclamation, the story concludes with the man and his household forming a community of faith. When the story was written down, it was linked to the wine miracle, and its final literary form stresses how the official's faith was grounded in Jesus' word, thereby connecting the episode to the Johannine theme of word-based faith (4:50).

Conflict with the synagogue is more evident in the healing stories in John 5 and 9. The earliest phase of the story of the healing of the lame man in John 5 probably emphasized Jesus' ability to bring a new quality of life by freeing people from sickness. It is not clear whether the text was used for missionary proclamation in its early phase. Later, the story became an incident of conflict with representatives of the synagogue over Sabbath regulations. In his response, Jesus stresses his unity with God, a point that is developed in the final shaping of the text. Jesus thus is presented as the fulfillment of the Jewish Scriptures. In a similar way, the earliest phase of the story of the man born blind in John 9 focused on the way that Jesus met the man's need by providing healing, while the next phase shows developments that occurred in response to challenges leveled against the faith and liberalized Sabbath practices of the Christian community. The final stage of transmission reflects the intensity of the Christian community's debates with representatives from the synagogue and eventually the separation of the groups.

The story of the raising of Lazarus probably functioned early as a missionary story. The emphasis on Jesus' life-giving power would have been understood even before Easter with the help of Hellenistic accounts of the dead being revived. This was later combined with the post-Easter hopes of the Christian community, so that the story was linked to the power that Jesus displayed in previous miracles, as well as to his own resurrection and return to the Father.

Theologically, the Fourth Gospel is sometimes critical of those who base their faith on miracles, but the evangelist does not seem to have been reluctant to recount the miracles. These stories are well integrated into his narrative, and the process of transmission shows a tendency to magnify the greatness of the signs. For example, late additions

stress the quantity of the wine that Jesus provided, and the great length of time that those whom Jesus healed in John 5 and 9 had suffered from their maladies. Miracles can and do awaken legitimate faith, not just inadequate "signs faith," although seeing miracles is not essential for faith. A sharp distinction between docetic and anti-docetic cannot be drawn, since the miracles present Jesus as the earthly revealer of divine glory.

This monograph is thorough and carefully done. Labahn's comments about the complex ways in which oral and written materials are transmitted are well taken. His attention to both the Jewish and Greco-Roman dimensions of the context in which John was composed is helpful. The most significant questions that arise from this work pertain to its basic conception. Given the general stylistic and conceptual unity of the Fourth Gospel, it is not clear that the process of transmission that lies behind the text can be reconstructed with the precision that Labahn proposes. Nevertheless, those who are interested in pursuing this line of inquiry will find a valuable resource in this study.

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The Shining Garment of the Text: Gendered Readings of John's Prologue, by Alison Jasper. JSNTSup 165; Gender, Culture, Theory 6. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998. Pp. 266. $14.95.

Alison Jasper has chosen the prologue of John's Gospel as a case study in feminist biblical criticism. Her aim is to challenge what she names the "phallogocentric" approach that has determined the process of biblical interpretation. According to Jasper, this approach insists on a singular definitive understanding of the text that is linked with a transcendent, typically masculine, notion of truth.

Mieke Bal and Julia Kristeva provide Jasper a theoretical base for her challenge to phallogocentric readings. In Bal, Jasper finds an interpretive model that acknowledges exclusionary reading practices but also discovers textual traces of disruptive female presence. Kristeva's theory of intertextuality—with its suggestion of multiple levels of the reading subject intersecting with the text and producing fragmented, heterogeneous results—offers Jasper an alternative to univocal reading. Thus, in the first part of the book, the author aims to clarify the patterns of interpretation in a "pre-feminist, patriarchal context" through close analysis of five historical readings of the prologue. In the second part, she attempts to resist the notion of a monolithic interpretation by means of her own multiple readings.

Jasper begins her investigation into past readings of the prologue with Augustine (ch. 1), then moves to Hildegard of Bingen (ch. 2), Luther (ch. 3), Bultmann (ch. 4), and concludes with Adrienne von Speyr, a Swiss mystic who published reflections on the prologue in 1953 (ch. 5). Jasper searches each of these readings for the presence and/or absence of feminine images and symbolism especially in Wisdom imagery and the mother of Jesus. However, her primary concern is the way these commentators deal with the "uncomfortably polyvalent" implications of the Word becoming flesh. "Flesh" is the keyword here, given its history of negative associations with carnality, sin, death, and especially the feminine.

In Augustine, for example, Jasper notes a metaphorical spiritualizing of the flesh

that dissociates the Word from the disturbing and contaminating symbols of the feminine. With Hildegard, Jasper finds that despite a strong affirmation of the human form as a model of the incarnation, she still reads within the Augustinian framework in which flesh is viewed as a subjection to uncontrolled desires. Indeed, in each case, the author shows how the notion of the flesh is ultimately devalued or eliminated. All prove to be uncomfortable with a positive reading of the body and desire and thus "collapse all traces of woman or the feminine within the Prologue into either descriptions of emptiness and absence, or evil and moral failure" (p. 162).

In the second part of the book, Jasper introduces three of her own readings of the prologue. She identifies the first two as deconstructive readings designed to resist predetermined hierarchies such as masculine/feminine or divine/human. Thus, in her first reading, Jasper shifts the focus from the Word, or Jesus, as the subject of interpretation to the figure of John the Baptist. She offers an interpretation in which John presents an ironic challenge to divine self-sufficiency evident in the totalitarian system of John 1:1–5. The Word is dependent on human witness. The "desiring and inarticulate" God needs the materiality represented by John to enter into relationship with humankind (p. 177).

Jasper's second reading confronts the complexity and contradictions of the Word becoming flesh, particularly when "flesh" in John 1:13 is read in conjunction with "flesh" in John 1:14. The entry of the Word into a realm already negatively constructed, she argues, points to the multiplicity of human existence that belies the hierarchical structures of spirit/flesh and male/female. On this point, Jasper also introduces John 6, suggesting that its contradictory associations of flesh push against a spiritualizing reading of flesh. Instead, the physical, bodily, paradoxical existence of the Word made flesh is held before the reader.

By her own description, Jasper's final reading is more constructive in nature. Drawing on Kristeva's theory of the emergence of human subjectivity, she traces a narrative in which the Word moves through the maternal, atemporal, prelinguistic sphere (John 1:1) through abjection (John 1:9–11) toward a heterogeneous subjectivity characterized by "transgressive, boundary-crossing tensions and irresolutions" (p. 231).

Jasper's book is more compelling in the details than in its larger aims. One is hardly surprised to learn that the five historical readings she examines are determined and contained by their patriarchal context. Nevertheless, her close analysis of the variety of interpretive moves that reflect this containment proves illuminating. Similarly, one would hope that at this point in the history of biblical scholarship the notion of a singular definitive interpretation of a text has passed. Moreover, for readers who persist in this assumption, Jasper's multiple readings of the prologue are not likely to convince them otherwise. Nevertheless, the second part of the book offers what sometimes has been lacking in feminist biblical criticism—adventurous creativity that goes beyond handwringing over the dominant patriarchal discourse.

To be sure, aspects of her readings raise questions. For instance, focusing on John the Baptist, a figure who defines himself primarily through negation and unworthiness, in order to move outside of gender hierarchical structures is not ultimately persuasive. Although he is arguably constructed as a feminine figure, it is only by embodying those qualities that Jasper wants to dissociate from the feminine. In general, however, these

three readings are truly alternative and provocative and that in itself is a significant contribution.

As a whole, the study also raises larger interpretive questions. While Jasper clearly recognizes the five "phallogocentric" readings as culture-bound, she never deals with the idea that the prologue itself was constructed in a patriarchal culture. The prologue appears to be immune to this contamination, naked, free-floating, and full of potential, waiting to be clothed in various interpretative garments. While I would not want to deny such interpretive potential, I am leery of leaving a text's own cultural context unaddressed. Indeed, such a move may inadvertently contribute to the notion of transcendence that Jasper wants to avoid.

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Eloquence and the Proclamation of the Gospel in Corinth, by Brian K. Peterson. SBLDS 163. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998. Pp. xiv + 209. $29.95.

Within the complexity and potential of the Corinthian correspondence for producing a longitudinal study of the relationship between Paul and one of his congregations, Peterson is concerned with the cohesiveness of Paul's various arguments in 2 Cor 10–13. His work begins with the seeming tension between the positions Paul takes in 1 Cor 1–4 and 2 Cor 10–13 regarding the relationship of the Corinthian congregation to their spiritual leaders, particularly himself, and the possibility of their evaluating apostolic ministry (p. 2). In the former Paul argues that such evaluation and judgment are for the Lord to make (1 Cor 4:5), while in 2 Cor 10–13, he wants them to make such a judgment and reject the false apostles as apostles of Satan (2 Cor 11:12–13). This comparison raises other questions: Is Paul erratic? Is he abandoning his principles in a desperate effort to gain control of the situation at Corinth? An important question for Peterson concerns the way in which Paul makes the shifts in his argument.

The method used to investigate these questions is rhetorical criticism. Beginning with the debate over the use of modern or ancient rhetorical analysis, Peterson emphasizes a historical approach. He aligns himself with G. Kennedy, M. Mitchell, F. Danker, and B. Witherington in arguing that an appropriate understanding of Paul's use of rhetoric demands that his letters be evaluated in light of ancient Greco-Roman rhetoric. Peterson is indebted to the work of Kennedy, whose methodology provides the larger organizational frame for the entire work (p. 24). After an initial chapter that lays out the methodological framework, Peterson in chs. 2 and 3 situates 2 Cor 10–13 as a rhetorical unit and analyzes the rhetorical situation, paying particular attention to the "exigence" that has prompted Paul's response and to the guidelines of Hellenistic rhetorical handbooks. Chapter 4, the heart of Peterson's work, provides insights into the species and *stases* of this unit of text. Here Peterson has reordered Kennedy's method, reversing chs. 3 and 4.

Peterson argues that the key to understanding Paul's rhetorical strategy is to focus on the *stasis* of his argument. *Stasis* theory, given scant attention in the modern revival of rhetorical analysis, is the point on which the whole matter turns; it is the point that the

orator sees as the most important to make (p. 33). Acknowledging the work of Hermagoras of Temnos that has survived through the writings of Cicero, Quintilian, and Hermogenes, Peterson identifies four possible *stases* on which an argument can be based: denial, definition, quality, and jurisdiction. Each one of these bases for defense is subordinate to the one before it, with the first two providing by far the strongest argument. Hermagoras most developed his theory in the area of quality, breaking it down into two major divisions: justification and defense. The latter is then broken down into four subtypes: counter-charge, counter-plea, shifting blame, plea for leniency.

A discussion of the species of rhetoric precedes that of *stasis.* Peterson concludes that deliberative and judicial rhetoric are bound together. As Paul works with his primary concern, that is, decisions made by the Corinthians, he uses judicial rhetoric since the Corinthians' decisions are tied to their judgment concerning him. Paul thus clarifies his deliberative goals at the beginning and end of the letter, with a defense of his apostolic practice in between. Peterson argues that a similar alternation occurs as the *stasis* of Paul's argument progresses.

The various categories of *stasis* are used to situate the coherence of Paul's argument both in 2 Cor 10–13 and in 1 Cor 1–4. These discussions focus Peterson's contribution to the study of the Corinthian correspondence. Having already identified three passages (10:1–6; 10:17–18; 12:19) and three aspects of Paul's relationship with the Corinthians (Paul's deliberate choice not to engage in the kind of rhetorical activity valued by society and expected by the Corinthians; Paul's insistence on being self-supporting financially; the comparison between Paul and his rivals) as central to the rhetorical situation of 2 Cor 10–13, Peterson proceeds to establish jurisdiction and quality as the primary *stases* of the rhetorical unit. His analysis discusses the move in *stasis* from jurisdiction to quality and a return to jurisdiction. First he focuses on Paul's argument that the Corinthians have no authority to stand judgment over his apostolic ministry in order to reject it in favor of another that they would prefer. He then traces Paul's move to the *stasis* of quality, a move not unexpected in light of the limited rhetorical effectiveness of an argument from jurisdiction.

This discussion emphasizes the relationship between Paul's argument concerning apostolic authority and that concerning the cross, with its emphasis on divine power working through weakness. Peterson argues that, for Paul, the Corinthians' failure to understand that the life of the church and the apostolic ministry should be shaped by the eschatological event of the cross struck at the heart of the gospel. At stake is the place of the cross in the ongoing life of the church and its understanding of how God chose to be known in the midst of suffering and death (p. 165). This emphasis provides Peterson's work with the additional benefit of demonstrating a consistency between what Paul is combating in 1 Cor 1–4 and 2 Cor 10–13.

Peterson's work serves to show ancient rhetorical practice as helpful in an investigation of the Corinthian correspondence. It also demonstrates the ways in which this kind of analysis assists the reader to notice argumentative strategy and to differentiate the various steps Paul uses to move his audience to adopt a new position. While these conclusions are noteworthy, his discussion on *stasis* raises the expectation of a more detailed analysis than actually materialized.

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An Philemon, An die Kolosser, An die Epheser, by Hans Hübner. HNT 12. Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1997. Pp. xii + 277. DM 59.00 (paper).

Rather than revising the well-known volume by H. Dibelius and H. Greeven, Hübner has written a completely new commentary. Still, he conscientiously enters into conversation with Dibelius/Greeven, especially when discussing matters that they dealt with in some distinctive way. As one expects from this series, Hübner gives constant and careful attention to the Hellenistic background of ideas, images, and concepts found in the letters, although he breaks no new ground here. His search for the background of these letters is not limited to *religionsgeschichte* research. In fact, he explicitly orders the importance of types of background material so that one looks first to the Pauline letters, then to the LXX, and then the *religionsgeschichte* parallels. In the case of Ephesians, he also looks to Colossians early on. To incorporate these investigations the author has included many excursuses. But these are not limited to background research; some are on theological topics as well as a wide range of other subjects, including such matters as the worldview of the author of Ephesians and whether the devil exists (given in conjunction with the Ephesians passage on the armor with which the Christian resists the devil).

Hübner sees these three letters as a set with each being dependent on the others for its preservation and inclusion in the Pauline corpus, with the references to the same characters establishing the ties. Hübner mostly assumes rather than argues that Colossians is deutero-Pauline and Ephesians is trito-Pauline. The consistency with which he interprets Colossians and Ephesians within this framework is one of the distinctive characteristics of this commentary. When dealing with Colossians he often comments on how he sees it building on and being different from the undisputed Paulines (see, e.g., his discussion of faith and hope, pp. 45–47). His methodology for interpreting Ephesians is that he looks first to Colossians, then the undisputed Paulines, and then the LXX. But this does not mean Hübner thinks that Ephesians only approaches Paul through Colossians, as we see in the case of pneumatology (p. 147), where Ephesians returns to Paul without going through Colossians. The excursus on the differences between Paul, Colossians, and Ephesians with which the commentary ends summarizes the differences in outlook he sees in the three. He finds the greatest development in ecclesiology, with Ephesians developing an ecclesiology that requires a more realized eschatology than that found in Paul.

Hübner is extremely skeptical about the use of rhetorical analysis when interpreting Colossians and Ephesians because they are dependent on Paul's letters for their structure. Thus, by his accounting, the whole of the structure of both these letters is determined more by their reception and application of Pauline elements than by techniques of rhetorical invention. Thus, no elements of rhetorical criticism are employed in this commentary. While there is good reason to doubt that any NT writer felt bound to comply with rules found in handbooks about rhetorical invention, Hübner's view may unduly minimize the influence of the rhetorical tradition. It is not clear to this reader that the reliance of these letters on Paul's letters for some elements makes it less probable that they were also influenced by other examples of successful argumentation, perhaps even as those successes were analyzed by those who taught rhetoric. Thus, some attention to rhetorical matters might have proven helpful. Similarly, the function of literary features sometimes receives less attention than one might expect. So Hübner

identifies the mentioning of Paul's imprisonment in Eph 4:1 and 6:20 as an *inclusio,* but then makes no comment about how this might shape the intervening material.

Hübner takes great care, especially in Colossians, to trace the ways various themes or language reappear throughout the letter. He is careful to distinguish between polemical uses of a statement and other nonpolemical uses of the same expression that often set the stage for the later polemical use. His comments on the ways that the polemical sections of Colossians (2:6ff.) use elements of the hymn of ch. 1 are a good example of the way that he draws out a sense of the unity of the argument of the letter.

Hübner argues that the whole of Ephesians is determined by parenesis, a contention that he supports within the recognized hortatory sections of the latter. Rather than relegating the household code of 5:21–33 to a place of insignificance, he argues that its instructions are of theological importance for the whole letter. He asserts that, in this place, the parenesis is there in the service of the theology rather than being an outgrowth of the theology. The theological point being made, he argues, is that existence in all realities except that within the body of Christ is secondary. This argument is another good example of the thoughtful ways Hübner ties together the various parts of these letters to show the coherence of their arguments.

This commentary fits quite well within the tradition of the HNT series and is a good contribution to it. It has the strengths for which the series is known, as well as interesting comments on theological concepts while it traces various themes through the letters.

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Christ and Community: A Socio-Historical Study of the Christology of Revelation, by Thomas B. Slater. JSNTSup 178. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999. Pp. 281. $75.00/£46.00.

This revised doctoral dissertation at King's College London, University of London (under Graham N. Stanton) uses historical criticism and sociology of knowledge to examine the three major christological images in the Apocalypse: one like a son of man, the Lamb, and the Divine Warrior. The aim of Slater's study is "(1) to ascertain the role and function of Christ within Revelation's symbolic universe through its use of the 'one like a son of man,' the Lamb and the Divine Warrior images; (2) to understand how these images affected the life of the Christian communities in Asia in the first century C.E." (p. 63).

In the introduction, Slater describes the characteristics of apocalyptic literature and situates the book of Revelation in the mid-nineties, when Asian Christians were enduring limited oppression for their religious beliefs and for their refusal to participate in the imperial cult. He reviews several major studies of the Christology of the Apocalypse (F. Büchsel, J. Comblin, and T. Holtz) and then describes the benefits of a sociological and historical approach to Revelation. According to Slater, the primary benefit of a sociology-of-knowledge approach is that it identifies the social function of a tradition in Revelation and then demonstrates how this tradition has influenced the imagery of Christ in the book. Slater, however, is aware of the limitations of the method. It is diffi-

cult to determine whether the relationship between symbol and community is symmetrical or asymmetrical; whether it denies or intensifies an empirical experience; and whether religious symbols reflect a real situation in a community or an ideal situation for which the author hopes.

Chapter 2 reviews the Jewish background for one-like-a-son-of man tradition from Ezekiel to apocalyptic Jewish writings in the early decades of the second century C.E. and concludes with a detailed exegesis of the tradition in Revelation. Chapter 3 demonstrates the similarities between the presentation of the Messiah in Rev 1:1–20 and the messianic figures in the Similitudes of Enoch and *4 Ezra* 13. In ch. 4 Slater constructs the social profile of the seven churches: six of the seven letters address internal problems within the churches, and the seventh, the letter to Smyrna, speaks to Jewish oppression of Christians.

The second major image of Christ in the Apocalypse, the Lamb, is the subject of ch. 5. Slater concludes that the Lamb's "most important christological function involves leading an eschatological Christian community whose destination is the New Jerusalem" (p. 200). The Lamb "gathers, leads, provides . . . and protects" the eschatological Christian community on a new exodus through danger, trial, and oppression to the New Jerusalem (p. 201). Further, the Lamb imagery functions as part of a "maintenance strategy" to encourage the Asian Christians to remain faithful as they confront regional repression and oppression.

The final image of Christ in the Apocalypse is the Rider on a white horse in 19:11–21, which is the subject of ch. 6. The function of the Divine Warrior imagery is to vindicate the Christians who had experienced oppression by the dominant culture. Thus the imagery is part of the writer's "nihilation" strategy, "a maintenance technique that exhorts its readers by providing a vision of the elimination of their opponents" (p. 209). Slater concludes that the bloodstained garment of the rider in 19:13 symbolizes the blood of the opponents in 19:15, 17–21. However, if he had considered the role of clothing in Revelation, his conclusion might have been different. Outer garments in Revelation represent the inner nature of the person who wears the garment, and thus the bloodstained robe of 19:13 is almost certainly an allusion to the way Christ conquers: by his death on the cross.

Slater's approach is uneven in the way he develops the christological imagery of Revelation. Ninety-five pages are devoted to a study of the "one like a son of man," while only forty-seven pages develop the Lamb imagery and merely twenty-seven pages discuss the Divine Warrior of ch. 19. This imbalance is puzzling since he acknowledges that "the Lamb is the most comprehensive christological image in Revelation" (p. 200) and that Rev 19:11–21 "contains the most complete christological statement in Revelation" (p. 211). Adding to the unevenness is Slater's propensity to draw conclusions based on scant evidence. Several times he notes that "the data are too sparse to make a definitive statement" (p. 131; cf. pp. 117, 124), and yet, somewhat surprisingly, he goes on to develop a social profile of the seven churches in Asia Minor based on this meager evidence. Furthermore, the use of "it is possible" (pp. 128, 134) or "it is quite possible" (pp. 131, 134) to ameliorate statements or conclusions is maddening, and far too many times Slater agrees with a particular commentator's arguments only to offer little or no explanation as to why that scholar's position is superior to another's (pp. 104, 121, 132, 142, 143). Despite these shortcomings, Slater's work is of value for those interested in the

Christology of Revelation or in the social profile of the Asian churches in the first century C.E.

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Die Ethik der Johannes-Apokalypse im Vergleich mit der des 4. Esra: Ein Beitrag zum Verhältnis von Apokalyptik und Ethik, by Jürgen Kerner. BZNW 94. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1998. Pp. xii + 316. DM 188.00.

Since the days of A. Schweitzer, who held that there is no interface (to use a modern term) between law and eschatology, and M. Dibelius, who was convinced that the expectation of an imminent parousia is incompatible with parenesis, many *Neutestamentler* have contended that ancient apocalyptic authors and their texts have no "ethics." This has been especially true for German-speaking scholars, as a blunt assertion of W. Schmithals shows ("Apokalyptiker wie Gnostiker kennen keine Ethik, in *Die Apokalyptik* [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973], 82). Apart from some smaller studies and C. Münchow's investigation of "ethics and eschatology" in early Jewish texts (*Ethik und Eschatologie* [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1981]), no major work has been devoted to the relationship between early Christian apocalyptic and ethics. In particular, Revelation has never been studied against the background of this question, as indeed many studies on the ethics of Revelation focus on chs. 3–4 or on the political perspectives articulated by the author. The dissertation of J. Kerner, written under the supervision of O. Böcher at the University of Mainz (1995/96), seeks to fill this gap.

The author analyzes the ethics of Revelation (pp. 13–162) and the ethics of *4 Ezra* (pp. 162–285) and then offers a brief comparison of the ethical emphases of these two texts (pp. 286–302). The methodological discussion about what constitutes ethics is meticulous, particularly as it relates to the study of material in apocalyptic texts. The main reason for comparing Revelation with *4 Ezra* is that very little work has been done on the ethics of *4 Ezra,* and the two texts were written at about the same time. The survey of introductory questions for the two texts adopts traditional historical-critical positions: both texts were written during the time of Domitian ca. 95 C.E. by anonymous authors.

The analysis of the ethical material in Revelation and *4 Ezra* proceeds in three stages. Kerner first studies ethical motifs, which he distinguishes as follows: (a) the dominant motif—in Revelation the faithfulness of the believer in the context of persecution; in *4 Ezra* the faithfulness of the believer as obedience to the law/Torah; (b) ethical motifs that derive from the Decalogue—investigation of the explicit or implicit presence of each of the Ten Commandments; (c) motifs of social ethics—in Revelation poverty and wealth, critique of social realities in the Roman Empire, and specific issues relating to slavery, the status of women, and the view of creation; in *4 Ezra* mostly implicit; (d) motifs of political ethics—the present situation; the expectations for the immediate future and encouragement of the readers as basic support in difficult times; (e) other ethical motifs—in Revelation courage, consolation, humility; in *4 Ezra* courage, consolation, humility, industriousness, admonition. Second, Kerner discusses the ethical notions in the context of basic theological positions, with the focus on Christology/messianology and eschatology (and, for Revelation, on the Torah, which is discussed for

4 Ezra in an earlier section). In a third section Kerner discusses complex theological issues that affect the ethics of the texts—for both Revelation and *4 Ezra* sin, forgiveness, repentance, "works," and the indicative/imperative of salvation.

Kerner concludes that Revelation and *4 Ezra* share both a basic ethical position and many specific ethical motifs. The main commandment (*Hauptgebot*) of both texts is the exhortation to be faithful to God. Both use the Decalogue for specific admonitions (in Revelation more explicitly than in *4 Ezra*). As regards "political ethics," both texts seek to promote confidence despite impending doom (with Revelation's specific admonitions being more active than the advice given in *4 Ezra*). Both texts integrate the law into their ethical conceptions. The main difference is that in Revelation Christology plays a crucial role for the ethical beliefs and exhortations. Thus, Kerner speaks of a common apocalyptic ethic of the two texts and concludes that, contrary to the views of Schweitzer and Dibelius, apocalyptic thinking and ethical concerns are indeed compatible.

It is somewhat unfortunate that Kerner limits his conversation partners often to German authors, where a broader perspective would have helped refine arguments and provide depth. For example, he ignores the discussion of apocalyptic in *Semeia* 14 (1979) and 36 (1986) and in other major studies, and he ignores the work of several authors on early Jewish apocalyptic and ethics (including the Decalogue) and on Revelation. As regards the genre of Revelation, it does not seem to be necessary to insist on apocalyptic, to the exclusion of epistolary and prophetic features. As Kerner does not consider the possibility of a mixed genre, he does not discuss the hermeneutical significance of the specific recipients of a letter and of prophecies for the actualizations of ethical injunctions in Revelation. Further, it is unfortunate that in contrast to his review of what we may surmise about the life of Christians in the cities of Revelation, the author refrains from describing the intended Jewish readers of *4 Ezra* (in Palestine, around 95 C.E.). Many will miss a hermeneutical discussion of the use of the OT by NT authors, a discussion about the role of the law for the early Christians, or, more generally, a discussion of early Jewish-Christian relationships at the end of the first century. On the other hand, the lack of attention to these scholarly debates allows the author to concentrate on the texts themselves.

Notwithstanding these caveats, this study is certainly a helpful contribution to the study of early Jewish and early Christian ethics. Even though the analysis of the two texts lacks exegetical depth (which an exclusive focus on either text would have made possible), we learn much about both *4 Ezra* and Revelation. Old prejudices of the sort that assume that Revelation has no value for the Christian church and for practical Christian living, or that early Christian and early Jewish ethics differ fundamentally, will have to be laid to rest.

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The Metaphor of Slavery in the Writings of the Early Church: From the New Testament to the Beginning of the Fifth Century, by I. A. H. Combes. JSNTSup 156. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998. Pp. 210. $57.50.

Commenting on Rom 1:1, Origen speculates on the reasons behind Paul's self-description as a slave in light of his insistence elsewhere that those who live in Christ

have received not a spirit of slavery but rather a spirit of adoption as sons. The problem is one of logical inconsistency, and Origen explores a number of possibilities for reconciling the disparity. His ingenious solution is to infer that Paul understands marriage as a form of slavery, and that Rom 1:1 is evidence that when Paul received his call he had a wife. This solution has *not* been influential in the history of interpretation. Nonetheless, Origen identifies a conundrum with important theological ramifications: the seemingly incommensurable uses of tropes of slavery in the NT and other early Christian writings. *The Metaphor of Slavery in the Writings of the Early Church,* a revision of a 1991 University of Cambridge dissertation, offers a thorough introduction to the complexities that inform early Christian reliance on metaphors rooted in the discourse of slavery.

Combes approaches Christian appropriation of the language of slavery as a case study in religious metaphor. Problems arise when those who deploy religious metaphors confuse them with literal descriptions of the world: "The area in which this problem probably causes the most consternation today is that of the use of 'social relationship' terms in speaking of God" (p. 11). Can a society that has rejected monarchy still rely on the metaphor of God as King, for example? Combes sets out to examine early Christian permutations of the metaphor of the human being as the slave of God or Christ. Combes concedes that the social structure of slavery in the ancient world influences the development of Christian metaphors of slavery, but argues that "the theology which makes sense of the use of such a metaphor creates its own dynamic which results in this metaphor unfolding at a completely different pace from any discernible change in the relevant culture" (p. 15). More strongly, Combes suggests that the results of the case study supply "a reason for the disentanglement of religious language from contemporary society, freeing it from the need to seek social relevance and understanding" (p. 171).

The first chapter offers an overview of slavery in antiquity, drawing on recent scholarship to provide background for the argument of the volume. As Combes rightly acknowledges, "the ancient world" is not itself a coherent entity for study, but consists of a number of societies geographically and chronologically distant from one another. In light of this acknowledgment, emphasis on classical Greece in the section on the Greco-Roman world seems peculiar. The section on slavery in the ancient Near East draws largely on the OT, but the relevance of the OT representation of slavery for understanding the practice and ideology of slavery in the early Christian era is not articulated. More helpful is a section offering a brief survey of metaphoric uses of slavery in the ancient world. Combes also devotes a chapter to the early church's treatment and perception of actual (rather than metaphoric) slaves. The earliest sources take for granted that the gospel reaches out to slave as to free. Later sources, however, document some of the obstacles that slaves encountered in their pursuit of a Christian life, including restrictions on the baptism or ordination of slaves in the absence of the owner's consent.

The heart of Combes's argument lies in chapters on metaphors of slavery in the NT and patristic writings. A single chapter treats the NT. Only two pages deal with the Synoptic Gospels; treatment of metaphors of slavery in the parables is thus compromised. By contrast, sixteen pages cover metaphors of slavery in Paul. Combes finds that the NT introduces the varieties of metaphors of slavery that will continue to be significant in patristic writings. Most important are references (often self-references) to individuals as slaves of God or of Christ. We also see references to individuals enslaved to sin or the world, although this metaphor participates in a variety of implicit-narratives. A

slave to sin may become a slave to God or Christ; a slave to sin may be freed from slavery through Christ; or a slave to sin may be adopted as a son of God.

In the patristic writings Combes finds great flexibility in the metaphoric use of slavery. Baptism, for example, can be described "in terms of manumission . . . and of the slave market" (p. 160). Origen develops most extensively the image of a spiritual movement that begins in slavery to sin, moves to a stage of slavery to God, and ultimately reaches the status of sonship. Chrysostom, by contrast, emphasizes the glory in being identified as a willing and obedient slave of God, which is construed as a position of true freedom. These chapters on patristic writings are the most useful in the volume. They provide broad insights into the rich variety of contexts in which early Christians found slavery to be invaluable as grounds for theological reflection. Particularly interesting is the chapter on patristic liturgy, which includes analysis of cultic actions likely to have been associated with the postures and activities of slaves.

This volume is a helpful overview of invocations of slavery in the theological discourse of the early churches. It is clear and readable, and thus potentially useful to students who have some minimal familiarity with Greek. I have two central reservations about its conclusions. First, Combes initially claims that "[t]he metaphor addressed is that of slavery—the idea of a human being as a slave of God" (p. 13) and, indeed, this metaphor receives attention throughout the volume. Combes extends the thesis to include *other* metaphors of slavery, most significantly, the metaphor of the human being as slave to sin. However, these are presented not as additional metaphors rooted in the language of slavery, but as variations of a single metaphor. Combes argues that *the metaphor* of slavery evolves over the first Christian centuries; I would argue rather that a church that existed in the midst of a slave-owning society continued to generate metaphors based on the experiences of daily life.

Finally, Combes claims that the evolution of the metaphor of slavery is increasingly separable from the relations of slavery in late antiquity. However, the treatment of slavery from the early empire to late antiquity extends for no more than two paragraphs, hardly a sufficient backdrop for making any serious claims about the complex relationship between social relations and religious language. Moreover, Combes argues against the position that society *controls* the form of metaphor to the extent that one might predict linguistic changes on the basis of underlying social changes. One might more plausibly argue for the deep embeddedness of religious language in cultural realities without assuming such a simplistic correlation.

Neither of these objections mitigates the essential usefulness of the work as a compendium of references to metaphors of slavery in early Christian writings; the volume will prove helpful to many.

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The Bible and the Comic Vision, by J. William Whedbee. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. xii + 315. $69.95.

The search for humor in the Bible is not an entirely new quest. Several scholars, including the author of the monograph under review, have undertaken such work, but typically their foci have been on brief pericopes believed to have comic import. More-

over, such studies usually have proceeded without defining what is meant by "humor" and how one might spot it in an ancient text, whose cultural and social matrices are so removed from our own.

This work is distinctive. It sets out to establish research parameters by shifting the discussion of humor away from definitions and toward an anatomy of general characteristics: "I will not offer a definition or reductive formula; rather I want to draw out certain recurrent features of comedy, features which appear throughout the ages in classic comic works and thus tie disparate comic forms together in a kind of 'family of resemblance'" (p. 6).

After grounding his conception of humor in contemporary literary criticism, Whedbee looks anew at biblical texts and sees in them a series of conditions that, when combined, demonstrate the presence of humor. These conditions include a context of central themes, textual or thematic incongruity, and an ironic central theme or U-shaped plot. "Thus whatever trials and threats the hero must endure, comedy usually ascends from any momentary darkness and concludes with celebration, joy, and at least the promise of new life" (p. 7).

Whedbee's study further divides comedy into types (e.g., tricksters, buffoons, rogues), linguistic and stylistic strategies (e.g., wordplay, parody, redundancy), and functions and intentions, by which he means both transformative (subversive) and restorative (conservative) aims. A careful study of these types reveals the comic programs of biblical authors: "the Holy Book we call the Bible revels in a profoundly ambivalent laughter, a divine and human laughter that by turns is both mocking and joyous, subversive and celebrative, and finally a laughter that results in an exuberant and transformative comic vision" (p. 5). Thus, Whedbee's agenda is restorative in nature, aiming to reveal what "centuries of liturgical and theological use of the Bible have helped to obscure," namely, "a vital role for comedy and humor in biblical literature and religion" (p. 2).

To demonstrate his thesis, Whedbee examines six biblical texts for the various comedic types they contain (Genesis, Exodus, Jonah, Job, Esther, and the Song of Songs). Thus, in Genesis, "Parody enters the narrative at virtually every level, whether in the characterizations of God, the serpent, man or woman, or in strategic plays on language and theme" (p. 34). Such parody alleviates "the sometimes deadly serious tone of the primeval narratives, injecting the power of humor at key points and infusing the energy of fresh life in the midst of death and dying" (p. 61).

Jacob's manipulation of flocks (Gen 30) demonstrates a trickster-type comedic form, yet "knows suffering and death even in the midst of the coming of new life" (p. 107). These forms of humor are punctuated and defined in part by the presence of tragedy with which they interact, and which they embrace to create "the concrete forms of the biblical heritage" (p. 5).

Given this expanded understanding of humor, it is easy to understand how Job and Jonah are comedies since they both subvert "traditional ideas of patriarchal and prophetic existence" (p. 279). Esther and the Song of Songs too brandish "a satirical knife against the royal protagonist, the poet of the Song against the Israelite Solomon and the narrator of Esther against the Persian Ahasuerus, in order to deflate royal pretension" (p 279). Nor does God escape the comic. "Hence from Genesis and Exodus to Job and Jonah, God reveals his conflict-ridden sides: Is he omnipotent creator or

bungler, tyrant or friend, warrior or healer? The various narrators display all these dimensions and more in their parodied descriptions of a multi-faceted deity" (p. 280).

Thus, for Whedbee, humor is "a serious strategy for dealing with the most profound problems of human existence" (p. 283). Indeed, in this book comedy is a far more complex device: "The subversive and celebrative sides of comedy often appear in the same biblical book, with the polarized, 'comic attitude' set within a dynamic interplay and tension, thus unveiling a comic vision that oscillates between attack and affirmation, corrective and celebration, ridicule and revel" (p. 278). Such a characterization leads Whedbee to see the Hebrew Bible as a divine-human comedy.

As thought-provoking as this book is, its conclusions are based primarily on a theoretical model that derives its general characteristics of humor from later Western literature. While Whedbee notes that "caution must be exercised against the threat of anachronistic and alien readings" (p. 6), no comparison is made to Mesopotamian and Egyptian literatures, especially those with so-called "comic" features. Comparisons with such texts would perhaps better help determine what is considered humorous in an ancient Near Eastern context.

Employing a primarily Western theoretical model involves assumptions concerning comedic strategies. A poignant example is punning, which the author uses to demonstrate the presence of comedy. The ubiquitous presence of wordplay in prophetic texts and ancient Near Eastern magic, ritual, and cultic texts suggests a purpose very different from comedy. This does not mean that puns cannot serve humorous ends, or that Whedbee has not rediscovered comedy buried in the text. It only suggests that the biblical data must be checked against the wider range of ancient Near Eastern literature to assure greater confidence in the results.

Nevertheless, this is a bold and refreshing book and a wonderful read. It provides a fresh perspective on biblical narrative generally, while more subtly offering a new and meaningful paradigm into which readers can place numerous biblical incongruities, theological problems, and redundancies. It doubtless will inspire discussion and research.

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