The daring German airborne operations in Norway and the Low Countries in the spring of 1940 forcibly introduced the world to a new form of warfare. They also altered the widely held prewar conceptions of many senior Allied leaders that parachute operations were little more than just a stunt. In the aftermath of the German aerial onslaught, the Allies began to consider a paratroop arm, largely at the behest of fiery British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. However, even his influence was initially muted.

Churchill’s military commanders resisted vehemently, in part due to their conservatism but also because they were facing the immediate crisis of defending England and rebuilding a British army capable of fighting a modern war. Most of the commanders felt that airborne forces would be of little use in the war against Germany. As a result, Churchill initially agreed to a parachute corps of five hundred men instead of the five thousand he had originally envisioned. The Americans were also content with establishing a test platoon.

The startling success of German paratroopers in the conquest of Crete in May 1941 enraged Churchill. On May 27, he declared, “We ought to have 5,000 parachutists and one Airborne Division on the German model.” Four days later, the British general and air staffs agreed to press forward as quickly as possible with the airborne program. A brigade of twenty-five hundred fully trained parachutists was to be formed by July 1, 1941. Even before this was achieved, army staff began to plan for a division-sized organization. On an almost parallel track, the Americans also ramped up their efforts on the same scale, converting their 82nd Motorized Infantry Division to an airborne role on June 26, 1942.

Although the German success in Crete was clearly a catalyst in changing the Allied philosophy toward airborne forces, there were other factors, including public perception. By the summer of 1942, the tide of the war was beginning to shift, and the public demanded heroes. Tough, fearless paratroopers could satisfy that need. “It builds our morale, it stiffens the spine and braces the backbone of the public to hear talk about the independent type airborne operation,” said Lt. Gen. E.M. Flanagan. After years of Allied defeats, the public hungered for options to strike back, as Flanagan elaborated, with a force able “to deal a lethal blow to the enemy, deep in his backyard.”

It wasn’t long until Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery could say, “When the maroon beret [signifying a paratrooper] is seen on the battlefield, it at once inspires confidence, as it is well known that its wearers are good men and true and have the highest standards in all things.”
The public appeal of the paratrooper was an unexpected benefit of a revolutionary form of warfare. The stunning German victories in the Low Countries in 1940 gave the public a weapon that was perceived as transcending the stifling death, futility, and lethargy of World War I’s trench warfare. The paratrooper was portrayed as the leading edge, the “tip of the spear” of modern war. Airborne forces were seen as special troops with a highly hazardous mission. Senior military leaders described the embryonic British Parachute Corps as an elite unit fulfilling the toughest job in the British army. Moreover, the senior military officers described paratroopers as “super-soldiers.” Their task was defined as nothing short of facilitating the general advance of the army by seizing key installations and terrain on the enemy’s flanks and in his rear. Furthermore, the paratroopers were to create “alarm and despondency” as well as confusion in the enemy’s safe areas at the most critical moments of attack. Justified or not, paratroopers came to be considered a necessary prerequisite for military success.

The media assisted in defining the modern paratrooper’s role. Numerous newspaper articles described the parachute volunteers as “hard as nails,” the toughest and smartest soldiers in a country’s army. “They are good, possibly great soldiers,” wrote one journalist, “hard, keen, fast-thinking and eager for battle.” According to Larry Gough in the American magazine Liberty, “In the first place, [parachutists] are perfect specimens. They have to be, because their work is rough, tough, and full of excellent opportunities to get hurt. Mentally they’re quick on the trigger, again because their job demands it, because split seconds can make the difference between instant death or a successfully completed job.” Yet another writer insisted they were the most “daring and rugged soldiers…daring because they’ll be training as paratroops: rugged because paratroops do the toughest jobs in hornet nests behind enemy lines.” Soon it would have been impossible for military leaders to ignore this advancement in modern warfare.

Although conservative military staff officers and commanders were not as easily convinced, directives from their seniors, as well as an evolution in the conceptualization of possible airborne roles, also prompted the change in Allied thought. Until 1941, conventional thinking gave parachute troops two rudimentary primary functions. First were major operations that employed paratroopers to capture a specific target of vital importance. The second function entailed dropping small numbers of airborne soldiers to conduct raids against headquarters, infrastructure, or small targets of tactical, operational, or strategic value. In many circles, airborne operations were considered almost suicide missions.

By 1942, the emphasis on airborne operations as a tactical-level instrument disappeared. In fact, the pendulum had swung to the opposite extreme. The U.S. War Department’s 1942 book of strategy clearly stated “…one cannot possibly hope to succeed in landing operations unless one can be assured of the cooperation of parachutists on a scale hitherto undreamed of.” Paratroopers were now regarded “as the pivot of success of the entire operation.”

By 1943, the Allies assigned paratroopers three major functions. The first emphasized ousting the Axis from occupied territory. Airborne troops were responsible for assisting conventional forces in joint operations by attacking the enemy rear and assisting with the breakthrough of the main forces. In this capacity, they were also expected to delay enemy reserves by holding defiles between them and the bridgeheads, or conversely to destroy any enemy attempting to withdraw. In addition, paratroops were also assigned the possible tasks of capturing enemy airfields, creating diversions, and capturing or destroying belligerent headquarters, to paralyze the enemy’s capability of providing a cohesive defense.

“In almost every case,” explained Maj. Gen. Richard Gale, while commanding the British 6th Airborne Division, “Airborne Forces will lead the way and be the spearhead of the attack.” Elaborating, he explained, “The sort of tasks you may have to do are: capture a position in the rear of the enemy, cut his communications, and isolate him from his reinforcements; attack the enemy in the rear, while our main forces attack his front; capture airfields in enemy country; assist sea or river crossings by making a bridgehead; [and/or] raid special objectives.”

The second major function assigned to paratroopers was to work independently. Borrowing from the German model, strategists envisioned airborne forces capturing islands or areas either not strongly defended or not capable of being reinforced, as well as positions that could undermine the enemy’s stature internationally and domestically and possibly destroy public morale. Moreover, this could tie down enemy reserves that might be used elsewhere. In addition, paratroopers working independently might seize vital installations, such as oil refineries and centers of government. Paratroopers were also given the possible task of assisting guerrilla forces by providing a nucleus of trained soldiers. In essence, paratroop units were to act independently to pin down enemy resources or require the enemy to invest a large amount of equipment and manpower to ensure the security of his rear areas.

The third paratrooper function was harassment. Strategists envisioned airborne troops operating in small numbers, often at a great distance from the area of major operations. Paratroopers within this function would be assigned the tasks of harassing communications and destroying aircraft, transport, signal stations, railway trains, locks, bridges, and factories. In addition, they would also be responsible for destroying enemy fuel, supplies, and equipment, as well as causing panic among civilians.

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