

**In the Eye of Power: China and Xinjiang from
the Qing Conquest to the “New Great Game” for
Central Asia, 1759 - 2004**

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ABSTRACT

The Qing conquest of "Xinjiang" ("New Dominion" or "New Territory") in 1759 proved to be a watershed development in the complex and often ambiguous relation between China and the amorphous *Xiyu* or "Western Regions" that had lay "beyond the pale" of Han Chinese civilisation since the Han (206 BCE-220 CE) and Tang (618-907) dynasties. The Qing destruction of the Mongol Zunghar state in the process of conquering "Xinjiang" brought to a close the era of the dominance of the steppe nomadic-pastoralist world of Inner Asia over sedentary and agricultural China that had existed since at least 300 BCE with the expansion of the Xiongnu. Immediately following the conquest, as chapter two shall demonstrate, the over-arching goal of Qing rule in the region was to segregate Xinjiang from the Chinese regions of the empire. Yet, at the beginning of the 21st century the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) maintains that the "Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region" (XUAR) is, and has been throughout recorded history, an "integral" province of China.

This thesis is thus focused on the evolution of the Chinese state's perception of Xinjiang as a dependent appendage in the late 18th century to that of an "integral" province at the beginning of the 21st century. As such there are two key questions that are the focus of the thesis. First, how - by what processes, means and strategies - did Xinjiang arrive at its contemporary position as a province of the PRC? Second, how has this process impacted on China's "foreign policy" along its western continental frontiers since the Qing conquest? The thesis is therefore not simply focused upon a discrete period or aspect of the historical development of China's interactions with Xinjiang, but rather an encompassing exploration of the processes that have resulted in China's contemporary

dominance in the region. Two encompassing and related themes flow from these questions regarding the Chinese state's response to the dilemmas posed by the rule of Xinjiang. The first stems from the recognition that the present government of China's claims to the "Chinese-ness" of Xinjiang are more than simply a statement of fact or an attempted legitimisation of current political realities. The statement that Xinjiang is an "integral" province of the PRC, although indeed a statement of contemporary political reality, is also a profound statement of intent by the Chinese state. It is in fact one manifestation of an over-arching theme of integration and assimilation within the state's perceptions of Xinjiang across the 1759-2004 period. The second theme stems from the question as to how the processes associated with the first theme of integration and assimilation impacted upon the Chinese state's conception of its relation to those regions beyond its orbit. Xinjiang throughout most of Chinese history has been perceived as a "frontier" region from which non-Chinese influences have entered and at times threatened the North China plain "heartland" of Han civilisation. This is essentially a theme of confrontation between or opposition of "external" to Chinese influences.

The relationship between these two themes across the 1759-2004 period has been one of "permanent provocation" whereby their interaction has produced mutual continuity and contestation. The Chinese state's goal of integration, and the concrete strategies and techniques employed in Xinjiang to attain it, have required the continued operation and vitality of opposing tendencies and dynamics. This process has provided (and continues to provide) both impetus and legitimation, in the perception of the state, for the exercise of state power in Xinjiang. Yet, as will become evident in the proceeding chapters, this interaction has not developed along a constant trajectory. Rather, the process has been

characterised by fluctuations in the state's commitment to the goal of integration and in its ability to implement appropriate strategies with which to achieve integration. The thesis will thus argue that from the early 19th century onward the goal of integration became embedded in the state's perception of the "correct" relation between itself and Xinjiang. Moreover, across the 1759-2004 period the notion of integration has evolved to become *both the end and means of state action* in Xinjiang.

POLITICAL MAP OF CHINA INCLUDING XINJIANG

(Sourced from http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/china_pol96.jpg)

STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY

This work has not previously been submitted for a degree or diploma in any university. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the thesis itself.

Michael Edmund Clarke

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CHAPTER 1

THE EXTENSION OF STATE POWER IN "XINJIANG", 1759-2004: TOWARDS THE "MANAGEMENT OF POSSIBILITIES"?

What we need is a new economy of power relations - the word "economy" being used in its theoretical and practical sense. To put it in other words: since Kant, the role of philosophy is to prevent reason from going beyond the limits of what is given in experience. But from the same moment - that is, since the development of the modern state and the political management of society - the role of philosophy is also to keep watch over the excessive powers of political rationality. This is rather a high expectation. Everybody is aware of such banal facts. But the fact that they're banal does not mean they don't exist. What we have to do with banal facts is to discover - or try to discover - which specific and perhaps original problem is connected with them.

Michel Foucault¹

The Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) is an "integral" province of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Yet as Foucault's admonition warns us, the recognition of such a "banal fact" as Xinjiang's contemporary territorial and political enmeshment in the state of the PRC should not prevent the discovery and exploration of dilemmas intimately connected to this specific reality. The statement that Xinjiang is an "integral" province of the PRC is not as banal and innocuous as it would first appear - it in fact contains a number of key questions or problems that form the core foci of this thesis. The primary question that arises from this statement is how - by what processes, means, methods and strategies - did Xinjiang arrive at its contemporary situation as a province of the PRC? Moreover, how has this process impacted upon the Chinese state's perceptions of its imperatives external to Xinjiang - that is, how has this impacted on its

¹ Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power", in James D. Faubion (ed.), *Michel Foucault - Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, Vol. 3*, (London: Penguin Books, 2001), p.328.

"foreign policy" along its western continental frontiers across the 18th to 21st centuries? Thus, this thesis is not simply focused upon discrete periods, subjects or issues within the historical development of China's interactions with what has become Xinjiang. Rather it is an encompassing exploration of the processes that have resulted in China's contemporary ascendancy in Xinjiang and their implications/significance for the state's "foreign policy" calculus along its western frontier. There have been numerous important, perceptive and insightful scholarly explorations of key facets of this process encompassing distinct historical phases within the 1759-2004 period.² This is, however, the first work to place these many discrete issues within an overall framework that maps out the broad contours of China's interactions with Xinjiang over such a large historical period and explores their impact on China's contemporary position in the region.

Within the context of exploring this broad historical sweep of the Chinese state's interactions and confrontations with what has become Xinjiang, the central task is to identify the contours of a series of specific themes in the state's response to the dilemmas posed by Xinjiang. Two encompassing and related themes can be discerned in the context of China's relations with Xinjiang across the 1759-2004 period. The first stems from the recognition that the present government of China's claims to the "Chinese-ness" of Xinjiang are more than simply a statement of fact or an attempted legitimisation of current political realities. The statement that Xinjiang is an "integral" province of the PRC, although indeed a statement of contemporary political reality, is

² To note but a few prominent examples, Hodong Kim, *Holy War in China: The Muslim Rebellion and State in Chinese Central Asia, 1864-1877*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), Linda Benson, *The Ili Rebellion: The Muslim Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang, 1944-1949*, (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1989), Andrew D. W. Forbes, *Warlords & Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang, 1911-1949*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), Justin Jon Rudelson, *Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism along China's Silk Road*, (New York: Columbia

also a profound statement of intent by the Chinese state. It is in fact one manifestation of an over-arching theme of integration and assimilation within the state's perceptions of Xinjiang across the 1759-2004 period. The manner in which Xinjiang was (and is still being) absorbed into the Chinese state in this period has inexorably influenced the policies pursued by the state in the region. This theme encompasses the processes whereby the various state formations across the 1759-2004 period of Chinese history - Qing, Republican and Communist - have attempted to "make" Xinjiang Chinese. This intent has been reflected in ideological, political, geographic and ethnographic projects undertaken by these state formations geared toward tying Xinjiang more tightly to China proper. All the various strategies and methods which the Chinese state has implemented in Xinjiang have been framed by this over-arching goal of integration and assimilation.

The second theme stems from the question as to how the processes associated with the first theme of integration and assimilation impacted upon the Chinese state's conception of its relation to those regions beyond its orbit. Xinjiang throughout most of Chinese history has been perceived as a "frontier" region from which non-Chinese influences have entered and at times threatened the North China plain "heartland" of Han civilisation. This is essentially a theme of confrontation between or opposition of "external" to Chinese influences. This is not to affirm the problematic "traditional" Sino-centric theme evident in some western scholarship regarding the binary opposition of Chinese civilisation against that of the "barbarian" frontier.³ Rather it is to suggest

University Press, 1997), & Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949-1977*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979).

³ Scholars such as Di Cosmo have in effect cautioned against such a simplistic account of the complex processes, across vast geographical and temporal expanses, encompassed in the interaction of sedentary

that the theme of confrontation between the "interior" and "exterior" was particularly prevalent in the state's perception of the relationship between the Chinese realm and the "Western Regions" (Xiyu). As I will demonstrate, the Qing expansion of the Chinese political and cultural sphere through their conquests of the major constituent parts of the eastern segment of Inner Asia (Xinjiang, Mongolia and Tibet) had an enormous impact on the conception of the relation between these non-Chinese regions and the Chinese state. Moreover, due to this process of expansion new "frontiers" were created with states and peoples with which China had had limited contact prior to the 18th century. The Qing expansion of the 18th century extended and intensified a dynamic that, over the next three centuries, opposed Qing/Chinese political, economic and ideological imperatives to those of the states and peoples of Central Asia and Russia. Importantly, the expansion of Qing power into Xinjiang in the mid-18th century did not move into a vacuum, but displaced a centuries-long history of political, economic, ideological and cultural linkages between the peoples of Xinjiang and the wider Turkic and Mongolian cultural spheres to the west, north and north-west. This confrontation and interaction between Qing/Chinese and Inner Asian power and influences has remained to the present-day a defining feature in the history of the Chinese state's attempts to integrate Xinjiang.

This thesis will demonstrate that these two major themes of integration and confrontation have interacted across the 1759-2004 period to produce a problematic "foreign policy" for the Chinese state in relation to the management and promotion of Chinese imperatives beyond Xinjiang's western frontier. In essence it concerns the

China and pastoral-nomadic Inner Asian societies. See Nicola Di Cosmo, *Ancient China and Its Enemies: The Rise of Nomadic Power in East Asian History*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

interaction of the Chinese state's intent to integrate Xinjiang with those dynamics and processes that would facilitate the contrary development of the region's separation or independence from Chinese power/influence. This process has had (and continues to have) profound implications for not only the course of the Chinese state's strategies and tactics of rule within Xinjiang, but also for the framework through which China's "foreign policy" in Central Asia is understood and given impetus. The key to understanding China's contemporary strategies in both Xinjiang and in Central Asia, within the context of the geo-political competition of the "New Great Game" for influence in the region for example, lies in the continuity of this theme of integration since the Qing era. The development of the theme of integration across the historical period addressed by this thesis has not, however, been constant. Rather there have been fluctuations in the state's commitment to the goal of integration and in its ability to implement appropriate strategies with which to obtain it. Yet, as will be highlighted in chapter two, the goal of integration has been entrenched in the state's discourse regarding Xinjiang since the 19th century. Moreover, even during periods of great weakness, such as the Republican era⁴, when the state had negligible power and influence in Xinjiang, the theme of integration was reinforced and further embedded in the state's vision of the correct relationship between Xinjiang and China. Furthermore, the theme of confrontation also played a complimentary role in intensifying the state's integrationist imperatives and vision in Xinjiang. Throughout the consolidation of the new regime after 1949, as will be demonstrated in chapters five and six, the state's implementation of strategies and tactics to facilitate the integration of Xinjiang was framed by the continuity of opposing external influences. The relationship between

⁴ Dealth with in Chapters 3 and 4 of thesis.

these two themes of integration and confrontation can be best termed, to use Foucault's characterisation of a "power relationship", as one of "permanent provocation".⁵ That is to say, one does not negate or paralyse the other in the process of confrontation, but acts to facilitate mutual continuity and struggle or contestation:

At the very heart of the power relationship, and constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom. Rather than speaking of an essential antagonism, it would be better to speak of an "agonism" - of a relationship that is at the same time mutual incitement and struggle; less of a face-to-face confrontation that paralyzes both sides than a permanent provocation.⁶

Moreover, in the context of the relation between Xinjiang and China, the Chinese state has often attempted to utilise this "permanent provocation" to reinforce both its perceptions of Xinjiang and the complex of strategies and tactics aimed at integration. The rationale of the Chinese state since the 19th century in this regard has been clear and is evident in the contemporary government's claim to the "integral" nature of Xinjiang's attachment to the PRC. The intent to integrate is simultaneously reinforced and legitimated in the state's perception by the very existence of potential alternative political realities both within and external to Xinjiang. That is to say, the themes of integration and confrontation have at certain points worked simultaneously to strengthen the state's perception of the necessity of integration and developed its ability to implement this vision.

A Complex Power Relationship: China and Xinjiang since the Qing Conquest

These processes of transformation of Inner Asian politics and the expansion of the Qing realm, alluded to above, concern manifestations of the development of a modern state in

⁵ Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power", op. cit., pp.341-342.

⁶ Ibid, p. 342.

China. The Qing conquests of the 17th and 18th century not only transformed the geopolitical environment of Inner Asia but also impacted profoundly on the modes and conceptions of rulership within those regions and in the imperial state itself. As will be demonstrated in chapter two, the Qing conquest ushered in a period that witnessed the totalisation or universalisation of state power over the geo-body of the empire, that in many senses was demonstrably "modern".⁷ "Modern" in the sense that the evolution of state power across the Qing period pointed toward the establishment of a form of power which reified the structure of the state above the society or societies that sustained it. Moreover, the development of the two over-arching themes since the Qing conquest of Xinjiang in the mid-18th century noted above are indicative of this process and form of power.

This development in the "order of power" was termed "government rationality" or "governmentality" by Michel Foucault.⁸ Foucault's characterisation of "government" as the "conduct of conduct" is essential to the analytical and descriptive power of the notion of governmentality. This definition relies on a number of meanings or senses of the word "conduct". In the first sense "to conduct" means to lead or direct. In a second, and perhaps more important sense, the moral or ethical dimension is emphasised, such as "to conduct oneself".⁹ This second sense, which implies a self-guidance, refers ultimately to the realm of our behaviours and actions. Moreover, the "conduct of oneself" is generally evaluative, in that one's conduct is measured against a set of norms,

⁷ Issues addressed, for example, in Pamela Kyle Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), James A Millward, "Coming onto the Map: 'Western Regions' Geography and Cartographic Nomenclature in the Making of the Chinese Empire in Xinjiang", *Late Imperial China*, Vol. 20, No. 2, (December 1999), pp.61-98.

⁸ Michel Foucault, "Governmentality", in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon & Peter Miller (eds.), *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp. 87-105.

thereby facilitating a "rational" judgement of actual behaviour.¹⁰ The exercise of power through this "conduct of conduct" thus essentially constitutes a "management of possibilities".¹¹ For Foucault, this understanding of "government" became prevalent from the 16th century onward so that from this point:

"Government" did not refer only to political structures or to the management of states; rather, it designated the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed - the government of children, of souls, of communities of families, of the sick. It covered not only the legitimately constituted forms of political or economic subjection but also modes of action, more or less considered or calculated, that were destined to act upon the possibilities of action of other people. To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action of others.¹²

This "management" of the possible field of action of "others", as will become evident throughout the following chapters, has been central to the Chinese state's integrationist project in Xinjiang. This has been reflected in such variegated realms or fields as cartography, ethnography and the management of religion across the 18th to 21st centuries within the state's discourse and actions in Xinjiang.¹³ For example during the Qianlong era, as I will demonstrate in chapter two, a number of cartographic surveys and ethnographies of the newly conquered region of Xinjiang were conducted. The knowledge obtained from these projects allowed for the greater projection of Qing power into the region by enhancing the state's knowledge of the population and

⁹ Mitchell Dean, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*, (London: Sage Publications, 1999), p.10 & Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power", op. cit., p.341.

¹⁰ Mitchell Dean, op. cit., p.10.

¹¹ Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power", op. cit., p.341.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ For the Qing period see for example, Pamela Kyle Crossley, op. cit, James A. Millward, op. cit, Laura Newby, "Xinjiang: In Search of an Identity", in Tao Tao Liu and David Faure (eds.), *Unity and Diversity: Local Cultures and Identities in China*, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1996). For the Republican and Communist periods see for example, Gardner Bovingdon, "The History of the History of Xinjiang", *Twentieth Century China*, Vol. 26, No. 2, (April 2001) pp.95-139.

geography of the new region, permitting the state's ascription of specific strategies and techniques of rule to the region.¹⁴

This process was also part of the beginnings of a movement within the sphere of "government" from the 18th century onward in China that saw the gradual de-personalisation or universalisation of rulership. From the 18th century onward the focus of state power in the person of the emperor was diffused and became invested or embedded in the many facets of the structure of the state itself. This movement in the realm of rulership during the Qing era has been noted and explored in some depth by Pamela Crossley, who notes that:

The ruler as a person is important (more important, in some instances, than one would grant at first thought), but rulership here includes all instruments that extend the governing personality of the ruler - spiritual, ritual, political, economic, and cultural. Rulership may, as I have written elsewhere, be seen as an ensemble of instruments playing the dynamic role, or the ascribed dynamic role, in the governing process.¹⁵

Furthermore, although power is thus diffused across a complex of "instruments playing the dynamic role", it must not be assumed that power is thus weakened or loses impetus. In fact to the contrary this diffusion enhances this form of power by increasing the possible segments of society upon which it can act. This de-personalisation is crucial to the functioning of this form of power because each segment or individual is unable to identify precisely when and from where this power is exercised upon them; but they are aware that it may be constantly so. The Qing era was replete with examples of the extension of the "governing personality" of the emperor through various mechanisms

¹⁴ For example, James A. Millward, op. cit., Peter Perdue, "Boundaries, Maps and Movement: Chinese, Russian and Mongolian Empires in Early Modern Eurasia", *The International History Review*, Vol. 20, No. 2, (June 1998), pp.263-286 & David Buisseret, *Monarchs, Ministers and Maps: The Emergence of Cartography as a Tool of Government in Early Modern Europe*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992).

that ultimately involved a web of individuals and institutions acting in the ruler's name. The Yongzheng emperor (r.1722-1736), for example, consolidated an "eyes only" system of palace memorials by which he was able to have direct communications with individual provincial officials in order to maintain a watchful eye on provincial officialdom.¹⁶ Fairbank notes that the volume of this "eyes only" correspondence became so great that the emperor assigned high officials to a "Grand Council" to manage it.¹⁷ Governmentality is conventionally conceived of as relating specifically to the techniques and tactics of rule and mechanisms of control/surveillance *within* the bounds of a state. I argue, however, that the utility of Foucault's conception of governmentality should not be limited to the state itself. The key mechanism or metaphor by which one can extend the analytical scope of governmentality to the inter-state level is through this related concept of the Panopticon.

The Panopticon was envisaged by Jeremy Bentham at the close of the 18th century as an architectural device that could be used to administer segments of population such as the sick, prisoners, workers, students and so forth.¹⁸ The structure of this device can be described thus:

It was to be circular or polygonal in shape with the cells around the circumference. At the core would be a central inspection area of galleries and lodge, disjoined from the main building, linked to the outer perimeter only by stairways, none of the floors or ceilings coinciding.¹⁹

¹⁵ Pamela Kyle Crossley, *op. cit.*, p.10.

¹⁶ John King Fairbank, *The Great Chinese Revolution. 1800-1985*, (New York: Harper Perennial, 1986), p.19.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Janet Semple, *Bentham's Prison: A Study of the Panopticon Penitentiary*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.116.

The immediate implication of such a device in terms of the relation between those "inmates" in individual cells and the central inspection area is clear - "authority could exercise a constant surveillance while remaining itself invisible".²⁰ Hence the basis for Foucault's metaphorical usage of the Panopticon to describe the constant and invisible surveillance of the modern state. Foucault's description and examination of the Panopticon, however, explicitly illuminates the major implications of both the architectural qualities of the device and its function in terms of relations of power.²¹ The Panopticon, as described above, was therefore an annular building divided into cells with a tower at the centre, that was perforated with windows facing the inner side of the ring. Each cell had two windows, one facing the inside, corresponding to the windows of the tower, the other facing outside permitting light to illuminate the entire cell.²² The "inmates" are therefore subjected to constant surveillance in isolation from their fellows:

They are like so many cages, so many small theatres, in which each actor is alone, perfectly individualized and constantly visible. The Panoptic mechanism arranges spatial unities that make it possible to see constantly and to recognize immediately.²³

Moreover, this isolation and lateral invisibility ensures order as it prevents the development of relations amongst the "inmates" - be it conspiracies amongst prisoners, transmission of disease amongst the sick and so forth.²⁴ Foucault also highlights that the principles by which power should operate in the Panopticon are that it should be visible and unverifiable. The power of the observing authority is visible in the sense that the

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), pp.200-228 & Michel Foucault, "Truth and Juridical Forms", in James D. Faubion (ed.), *Michel Foucault - Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 Vol. 3*, (London: Penguin Books, 1994), pp.58-59.

²² Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, p.200.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid, p.201.

"inmate" will constantly see the observation tower from which he/she is surveyed. It should, however, be unverifiable in that the "inmate" must never know if he/she is being observed at any one time but must be certain that he/she may always be so.²⁵ This was to be achieved in Bentham's conception by making the observer in the central tower effectively invisible from the "inmates" via a complex series of partitions, walls and blinds.

What then is the applicability of the Panopticon to the case of Xinjiang? The answer lies in Foucault's argument as to the effect of the Panopticon:

Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its application; that the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary; that this architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers.²⁶

Therefore, this form of power is not meant to simply dominate and constrain individuals or segments of population upon which it is exercised. Rather, its ultimate purpose is to produce a "useful" outcome from the exercise of power - to transform individuals or segments of population.²⁷ The Panopticon mechanism, through the punishment and observation of individuals, produces a "moral accounting" that creates a body of knowledge for the exercise of power.²⁸ In this sense the Qing's cartographic and ethnographic projects undertaken during and after the conquest of Xinjiang, noted

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid, p.201.

²⁷ Ibid, p.248.

²⁸ Ibid, p.251.

earlier, were clearly designed to produce just such a functioning of state power. These projects established the Qing state's knowledge of specific aspects of the new region - its geographical parameters and its population - that enabled the definition of a precise "field of action" in which state efforts could be directed. It is instructive at this juncture to note Foucault's exploration of the nature of "delinquency" within his analysis of the purpose and effect of the Panoptic form of power. Through the function of the Panoptic mechanism, in its penitentiary form, the individual "prisoner" becomes the object of knowledge rather than their concrete actions. That is to say it is the "personality" or "soul" of the prisoner that becomes the central object of the exercise of power. The "delinquency" of the prisoner, his/her background, life and so forth, become the key fields upon which this form of power operates.²⁹ The effect of this operation is to transform the "soul" of the prisoner in order to reshape his/her behaviour so as to be defined as "useful" to the state. Thought of in this manner, the Qing ascription of both spatial boundaries and boundaries between the population, through the cartographic and ethnographic projects of the 18th century, can be seen as the beginnings of the exercise of this form of power in China. The ascription of these boundaries clearly represents the transformation of the object of power from physical actions of the "delinquent" to the ideational underpinning of those actions. The policies implemented by the PRC in Xinjiang since 1949, addressed in chapters five to eight, exhibit this focus of state power - with strategies and techniques employed toward discrete aspects of Xinjiang's population, such as language, customs or religion.

²⁹ Ibid.

The question that emerges from this perspective is if the exercise of this Panoptic form of power began during the Qing era, how and why is it still in operation in contemporary Xinjiang? The answer lies in the nature of the relationship between this form of power and its object - "delinquency". For Foucault, the Panopticon both manages and produces "delinquency" through the imposition of forms of existence:

The prison makes possible, even encourages, the organization of a milieu of delinquents, loyal to one another, hierarchized, ready to aid and abet any future criminal act.³⁰

The imposition of this existence as a "delinquent" ascribes the tag of criminality, and thus the necessity of surveillance to the individual, trapping him/her in "delinquency".³¹

The function of the Panopticon mechanism is thus:

...not intended to eliminate offences, but rather *to distinguish them, to distribute them, to use them*; that is not so much that they render docile those who are liable to transgress the law, but that they tend to assimilate the transgression of the laws in a general tactics of subjection.³²

This form of power simultaneously manages and maintains the problem of "delinquency", as the maintenance of the problem is essential to the continued functioning of power. Thus, in the context of Xinjiang, the issue of ethnicity has been (and continues to be) perceived as a "problem" or a "delinquency" for the state. Yet, as will be seen throughout the thesis, the state has sought to manage and maintain this problem, as the continuity of the problem legitimates and ensures the continuity of the exercise of power in Xinjiang. The categorisation and definition of segments of Xinjiang's population by the state as belonging to distinct "ethnic" identities since the Qing conquest (and particularly during the 20th century), for example facilitated the

³⁰ Ibid, p.267.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid, p.272. My emphasis.

creation of the parameters in which ethnic nationalist discourse could be expressed.³³ In essence the continued existence of "ethnic separatism" in Xinjiang serves the Chinese state's purpose, and provides impetus and justification for the continued implementation of a complex of strategies and techniques to "integrate" the region. The continuity of this "delinquency" (the "threat" of separatism) permits the state to enclose and penetrate it, through surveillance and punishment, thus making it instrumental to the functioning of state power in Xinjiang. As such:

It helps to establish an open illegality, irreducible at a certain level and secretly useful, at once refractory and docile; it isolates, outlines, brings out a form of illegality which makes it possible to leave in the shade those that one wishes to - or must - tolerate. This form is strictly speaking, delinquency.³⁴

Thus, "separatists" and "ethnic nationalists" in Xinjiang become a pathogen on the margins or frontiers of society³⁵ that are useful to the state's imperatives in the region.

Governmentality is thus a form of power that Foucault conceptualised as operating, in an ideal form, through the mechanism of the Panopticon. Moreover, as noted previously, this form of power has generally been assumed to operate within the bounds of the state. Yet, there is an aspect of governmentality and the Panopticon that allow for a new perspective on the nature of inter-state relations, particularly within the specific context of Xinjiang. If the exercise of "government" is indeed concerned with structuring the possible field of action of others³⁶, then that aspect of state action defined as "foreign policy" is simply a further possible field of action that must be

³³ A notion explored in Justin Jon Rudelson, *Oasis Identities*, op. cit.

³⁴ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, op. cit., p.277.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power", op. cit., p.341.

managed and structured. The exercise of this form of power requires that the state have knowledge of all aspects of population - its relations with "things" (ie. territory, wealth, disease, etc.). The state requires this knowledge in order to strengthen the state. If all aspects of population are known then the state's strengths, weaknesses and capabilities can be calculated thus enabling the rational and efficient implementation of specific tactics or policies to specific phenomena. Therefore, the aim of governmentality is:

..to develop those elements constitutive of individual's lives in such a way that their development also fosters that of the strength of the state.³⁷

Moreover, governmentality's absorption of the conception of sovereignty into the state, as alluded to above, produces the imperative that government is also about the preservation of the state in its fullest sense. That is the state must not only be secured and strengthened internally, via the knowledge of population, but also externally. Therefore, the state must know or attempt to know population external to it in order to calculate competing states' strengths, weaknesses and capabilities to ensure its own survival and prosperity:

Government is only possible if the strength of the state is known; it can thus be sustained. The state's capacity, and the means to enlarge it, must be known. The strength and capacities of the other states must also be known. Indeed, the governed state must hold out against the others. Government therefore entails more than just implementing general principles of reason, wisdom and prudence. Knowledge is necessary; concrete, precise and measured knowledge as to the state's strength.³⁸

Thus what is generally conceived of as that distinct realm of state action - "foreign policy" -can be seen as an extension of governmentality. The state's internal construction of specific *savoirs* or knowledge regarding discrete aspects of population

³⁷ Michel Foucault, "Politics and Reason", in Lawrence D. Kritzman (ed.), *Michel Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture, Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-1984*, (New York: Routledge, 1988), p.82.

³⁸ *Ibid*, pp.76-77.

(eg. economy) is mirrored by a complimentary construction of a *savoir* of competing/external states. This imperative of the state to know and "see" both internally and externally establishes a further link between governmentality and the Panopticon. Governmentality's extension to "foreign policy" can be best described or structured by reference to the metaphor of the Panopticon. If one conceives of Xinjiang as a "cell" in the Panopticon of the Chinese state, Chinese state action in Xinjiang can be seen as an attempt to perfect the state's "vision" of the "province". In order to perfect this "vision", Xinjiang must be known in all its relations internally and externally - between the population and the "things" within Xinjiang and with Xinjiang's relations with what lies beyond the boundaries of the state. Each "cell" of the Panopticon faces, as noted above, simultaneously the interior and exterior (via windows at each end of the cell) of the Panopticon thus allowing for observation from the central tower and the illumination of the entire cell by sunlight. If Xinjiang is viewed as such a "cell", then it is clear that there is the possibility of observing the cell from some point external to the Panopticon - Central Asia for example. Xinjiang's position in China's foreign policy can be framed by this element of externality present in the conception of the Panopticon.

Viewed from this perspective, "international relations" and "foreign policy", particularly in the 20th and 21st centuries, are but the interactions of governmentalising forms of power. If governmentality is the form of power that characterises modern states it must equally characterise "foreign policy". The modern state has developed particular mechanisms of formulating and implementing policy and the state does not have recourse to auxiliary means to manage "foreign" policy. As I will demonstrate in chapters five to eight, in the specific context of Xinjiang there is little separation, in the

perception of the state, between the goals of the exercise of this form of power within and external to the state. Moreover, as noted above in reference to Foucault's characterisation of "delinquency", this form of power necessarily perpetuates the problem(s) it addresses. Therefore, what is termed "international relations" is the maintenance of variegated problems, confrontations or conflicts that facilitate the extension of state power. "International relations" then is a constructed metaphysical field of action in which the imperatives derived from the exercise of state power intersect and or collide. These intersections and or collisions manifest themselves as the management, and consequently the perpetuation of problems or confrontations within that space. It is important to note here that "management" means to control, handle or direct. Thus the problems that arise within this space are not resolved, but are directed or controlled. These problems are not a threat to the exercise of this form of power, but are on the contrary essential to its functioning.

At this juncture it is pertinent to suggest a number of important imbrications of this perspective for "international relations". Firstly, as "foreign policy" is coextensive with the exercise of governmentality within the bounds of a state, when the power of states intersect the "government" of one becomes an element in that of the other. Therefore, the notion of purely discrete sovereign states is both descriptively inaccurate and analytically deceptive. Rather, it would be best to conceive of states as bound by the force of resistance generated by the extension of their power across the field of "international relations". Secondly, as issues such as ethnic separatism, Islamic "fundamentalism", and "terrorism" may be identified as quandaries of both "international relations" and domestic politics they must be considered essential

elements in the management of international and domestic affairs. They are the resistance to government necessary for the exercise of state power and thus perpetuated. Nevertheless, ethnic separatists, terrorists, whether as individuals or groups, are bearers of power however managed, in "international relations". The situation is not one of sovereign, legitimate power versus non-sovereign, illegitimate forces, but merely a power-relationship.³⁹ Thus the complex and variegated strategies by which the Chinese state has attempted to integrate Xinjiang have as their ultimate objective just such a functioning of state power in Xinjiang. I am arguing that by framing the Chinese state's two centuries-long attempt to attain this objective in such a manner allows for a greater understanding of the relationship between the Chinese state and Xinjiang, on the one hand, and the imperatives that flow from this process for China's "foreign policy".

³⁹ As discussed earlier in relation to Foucault's characterisation of a power relationship. See Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power", *op.cit.*, pp.340-342.

CHAPTER 2

GOVERNMENTALITY & GEOPOLITICS: CHINA & XINJIANG, 1759-1911

Xinjiang at the turn of the twenty-first century appears to be more integrated into the Chinese state than at any time in the last two thousand years of contact between the “Middle Kingdom” and the “Western Regions”. This unprecedented integration of Xinjiang would appear to have completed the Chinese state's quest to control both the territory and peoples of Xinjiang that has preoccupied successive rulers of China since the Qing Empire. The significance of Xinjiang’s gradual absorption into the Chinese state is that China has now assumed a position of strength on its Central Asian frontiers comparable to that of the Qing at the apex of their power and expansion under the Qianlong emperor (1735-1795). Appearances can, however, be deceptive. The Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC), much like the Qing during the 1800s, faces numerous problems not only within Xinjiang but also emanating from across its Central Asian frontiers. Although the PRC has vigorously attempted to incorporate Xinjiang into the Chinese state since 1949, Xinjiang is arguably yet to be secured. The 1991-2002 period has seen resurgence in ethnic minority opposition to Chinese rule of Xinjiang that highlights the historically complex, and often ambiguous, relationship between the two regions. This contemporary period of instability has occurred simultaneously with a decade of political, economic and social turbulence in the neighbouring states of Central Asia and Afghanistan. Moreover, these processes of internal political, economic, and social instability across the region have taken place within a rapidly transforming international environment.

Although the contemporary political reality is that Xinjiang is an 'integral' province of the People's Republic of China, it does not immediately follow that it has always been so. I believe that the present reality must not divert us from addressing the problematic question of how Xinjiang became an 'integral' province of China. This may appear to be an irrelevant question in the context of a thesis concerned with China's contemporary policies in Xinjiang and its role in shaping China's foreign policy in Central Asia. This question does, however, illuminate the central problems of the thesis. First, what processes led to the Chinese state's absorption of Xinjiang whereby it can be considered an "integral" province of the PRC. Second, what is the significance of these processes of integration for China's foreign policy in Central Asia. The purpose of this chapter is to place this problematic into historical context and to identify the nature and consequences of the state's policies/strategies toward Xinjiang since the Qing conquest in the middle of the 18th century.

From the foundation of the Qing empire Inner Asia (ie. Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet and Central Asia) loomed large in successive emperors' military and strategic visions. By the dawning of the nineteenth century the Qing had effectively incorporated or extended their political authority over three of the major constituent parts of Inner Asia - Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet. Yet within a century this political authority would be seriously challenged or removed in each region. Moreover, the nineteenth century also saw the extension of anti-Qing rebellions from the peripheral territories of the empire to the center. These successive challenges to the Qing rulership coupled with the establishment of a significant European presence have been conventionally referred to as manifestations of the empire's 'decline'. Therefore the eighteenth and nineteenth

centuries formed the apex and nadir of the Qing imperial project. Here I think it is important to highlight that it was in fact a Qing 'decline', that is a decline in the ruling house's capabilities to effectively respond to the internal and external pressures on the empire. It was not, as Joseph Fletcher rightly noted, a decline for the Han Chinese majority of the population. Within this context Fletcher asserted that three major developments occurred in the eighteenth century that set the course for China's future development. The first of these was the establishment of a significant European presence in the "Middle Kingdom", the second was the Qing's doubling of the territorial extent of the empire, and the third was the demographic explosion of the Han Chinese.⁴⁰ These three elements of Qing expansion, although significant are symptoms of, an encompassing process that concern the development of a modern state in China. That is to say, I will argue that the policies pursued throughout the Qing period in Xinjiang are a key example of the development or evolution of a "modern" state in China. The Qing period witnessed the initiation of a complex series of processes encompassing all aspects of Qing rulership that concern what Michel Foucault called the "problematic of government"; that is the process of finding answers to the question of what it is to be governed and for a society/population of individuals to be governed or governable.⁴¹

To understand the full importance of this interaction it is necessary to first examine the origins of Qing control of Xinjiang; that is to understand both the Qing motivation in the military conquest and the foundations of Qing administration of Xinjiang.

⁴⁰ Joseph F. Fletcher, "Ch'ing Inner Asia ca.1800", in Denis Twitchett & John K. Fairbank, (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China, Vol.10, Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, Pt. 1*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 35-36.

⁴¹ Colin Gordon, "Government Rationality: An Introduction", in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon & Peter Miller (eds.), *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p.36.

Simultaneous with these processes of the Qing conquest and administration of Xinjiang there was a transformation of the geopolitics of Inner Asia. The Qing conquest of Xinjiang resulted in the confluence of the three greatest empires of the early modern era in Central Asia - the Qing, Tsarist Russia and Britain. As will be demonstrated, the Qing conquest and administration of Xinjiang involved all three major factors highlighted by Fletcher. It is also the contention of this chapter and of the thesis as a whole that Xinjiang has, from the Qing conquest until the present day, played a pivotal role in the foreign policy calculus of successive governments of China. The Qing conquest of Xinjiang and the administrative policies pursued thereafter inexorably impacted upon the future course of Chinese power and foreign policy. This impact is still felt today with the continuity of a number of themes originating in the Qing era that can be discerned in the PRC's contemporary rule of Xinjiang.

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the essential elements of continuity and change in China's foreign policy and administration of Xinjiang from the nineteenth century "Great Game" to the contemporary "New Great Game" for Central Asia. I will argue that Xinjiang has been a constant factor in China's foreign policy calculus since the Qing conquest in the 1750s. The implication of this in the context of the contemporary "New Great Game" is that China cannot be considered a peripheral or minor "player" in Central Asia. Rather China's historical experience in Xinjiang and current sovereignty over it, compel China to be a central "player" in the "New Great Game" with vital strategic interests to advance and protect. Furthermore the major dynamic that drives China's foreign policy in Central Asia and its policies in Xinjiang is the relationship between internal stability-instability and external influence from Central

Asia. To understand both China's importance in the "New Great Game" and the centrality of Xinjiang in the formation of Chinese foreign policy in Central Asia it is necessary to identify the major themes that link China's historical and contemporary experience in Xinjiang. There are two encompassing themes that link these periods of Chinese history. Firstly, the manner in which Xinjiang was and is still being absorbed into the Chinese state has inexorably influenced the policies pursued by the state in Xinjiang. Essentially this is a theme of integration or assimilation of a 'traditional' frontier region with the 'imperial' center. This particular theme concerns the way in which Xinjiang became part of China as it is today. Therefore one must examine the driving forces behind the expansion of the Qing 'frontier' and identify the long-term impact of this process on Chinese administration in Xinjiang. This theme encompasses the processes whereby the Qing, Republican and People's Republic have attempted to "make" Xinjiang Chinese. These processes involve the (attempted?) ideological, geographic and political construction of Xinjiang as Chinese since the Qing conquest. This over-arching quest to integrate Xinjiang and "make" it Qing/Chinese has been reflected in such variegated areas as Qing historiography of Xinjiang, Qianlong-era geographic and ethnographic projects in Xinjiang and the evolution of an imperially-defined classification of Xinjiang's population.⁴² This chapter (and thesis) is attempting to place these processes within the context of their significance for China's foreign policy. Within this theme one can locate all aspects of Chinese policy in Xinjiang over the last two centuries spanning Qing strategies of administration to the PRC's evolving strategies. It is within this theme, for example, that one can locate the process of the

⁴² Pamela Kyle Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), James A. Millward, " 'Coming onto the Map': 'Western Regions' Geography and Cartographic Nomenclature in the Making of the Chinese Empire in Xinjiang", *Late Imperial China*, Vol.20, No.2 (December 1999), pp.61-98.

"ethnicization" of the various peoples of Xinjiang and the origins of ethnic conflict that has regularly challenged Chinese pre-dominance.

The second theme and its associated processes are what connect the first to the major considerations of the thesis. Xinjiang has for most of China's history been a frontier region from which external influences have entered and threatened the North China plain 'heartland' of Han civilisation. This of course has been a two-way process, as evidenced by the Qing conquests of the major frontier regions of Xinjiang, Mongolia and to a lesser extent Tibet. Nonetheless Xinjiang's geopolitical realities have a powerful impact on China. This has been heightened by China's conquest of Xinjiang, whereby the Chinese state has confronted and attempted to assimilate a thoroughly non-Han region. The Qing expansion of the "Chinese" frontier (will discuss later the reason for the qualification), as noted previously, resulted in the ideological imperative to make Xinjiang part of the Qing and later the Chinese state. This expansion of the frontier not only brought the Qing/Chinese state into direct confrontation with the peoples of Xinjiang but also created new frontier states outside of the Qing/Chinese orbit, the khanates of Central Asia and Tsarist Russia. The expansion of the frontier in the mid-eighteenth century therefore created a dynamic that opposed Qing/Chinese ideological, political and economic imperatives to those of the khanates of Central Asia and Russia. Compounding the significance of this was the fact that the Qing/Chinese power and influence did not move into an ideological, political and economic vacuum. Rather, the Qing conquest disrupted the centuries-long history of religious, political and economic linkages between Xinjiang and the contiguous regions of Central Asia. This theme is one of confrontation or the opposition of 'external' to Chinese influences. This chapter

will demonstrate that both of these themes are not only identifiable in Qing/Chinese policy in Xinjiang since the 18/19th centuries but the dynamics unleashed by them have interacted to produce a distinct and problematic "foreign policy". Moreover, this "foreign policy" was (and is) structured and implemented to manage or prevent the interaction of the processes inherent to both themes. The last two centuries of Chinese rule in Xinjiang can thus be seen as an ongoing project of attempting to balance, manage or exclude the interaction of these processes. Therefore China's contemporary control of Xinjiang, and the policies pursued by the PRC, can be seen as vitally important to not only China's foreign policy in Central Asia but also to China's internal political and economic development.

These processes of transformation of Inner Asian politics and the expansion of the Qing realm concern/are manifestations of the development of a modern state in China. "Modern" in this context requires some qualification in that the conception of the "modern state" is the product of a distinctly West European development or experience. The development and consolidation of the modern state as a form of political, economic and social organisation has transcended and expanded beyond the realm of its origins to encompass the globe in the 20th century. What makes the modern state distinct from any previous conceptions of the state is that it has developed from complex processes that Michel Foucault termed "government rationality" or "governmentality".

The development of governmentality as a historical process and as a form of power is not isolated to the West European experience where Foucault first identified it. As I have stated previously, governmentality concerns the development of the modern state - the governmental state - that has been experienced across the majority of the globe. Yet

the specific application of this form of analysis has not been undertaken with respect to any of Europe's imperial contemporaries in Eurasia from the 16th century onward. Some scholars, such as Crossley, Millward, Fletcher, and Cherniavsky, have touched upon many of the broad themes that link or are common to the development of state forms and rulership across the great continental empires of the 16th to 19th centuries, most notably the Qing, Tsarist Russia and the Ottoman empire,⁴³ that is the movement toward more rigorous, regulated and structured rule of imperial states that resulted in changing conceptions of rulership/government. Moreover, this movement is consistent with those themes and processes outlined by Foucault as being constitutive of governmentality. With regard to the Qing state the conquest of Xinjiang and the instruments by which it was subsequently ruled are a manifestation of several processes related to the congruence of the universalist imperial themes evidenced across the 16th to 17th centuries. The following section will begin with the rationale behind the Qing conquest of Xinjiang and move on to an examination of Qing administrative policies thereafter. The aim is to make clear the development of the Qing state's knowledge of Xinjiang, most significantly within the context of geography and its connection to imperial ideology.

The Qing Conquest of Xinjiang and the Expansion of the “Chinese” Frontier

The “New Great Game” for Central Asia, like the 19th century game, has been defined by the quest for economic and political influence in Central Asia in order to further wider geopolitical interests. The 19th century game contested by Tsarist Russia, the British Empire, and the Qing Empire revolved around attempts to gain influence, if not

⁴³ Pamela Kyle Crossley, op.cit, James A. Millward, op. cit., Joseph F. Fletcher, "Turco-Mongolian Tradition in the Ottoman Empire", in Beatrice Manz (ed.), *Studies in Chinese and Islamic Inner Asia*,

control, over Central Asia. Russian and British expansion in the 19th century, in Siberia and on the subcontinent respectively, heightened each empire's interests in the commercial and strategic potential of the heretofore isolated states of Central Asia. The Qing empire was already entrenched in Central Asia after its conquest of Xinjiang in the 1750s. Therefore by the beginning of the 19th century Central Asia became the meeting ground of three vastly different imperial projects. The convergence of three empires in Central Asia and the resulting clash of political, economic and military interests became known in scholarly parlance as the "Great Game" for Central Asia. It is not the intention of this chapter to detail the century-long struggle between Russia and Britain that stretched from the Caucasus to Xinjiang as this has been done elsewhere.⁴⁴ A focus of this chapter will concern the interaction between the "Great Game" and Chinese policy in Xinjiang that was instrumental in compelling the Qing to absorb Xinjiang rather than to simply control it. Before examining this aspect of the problem it is necessary to briefly outline the initial Qing conquest of Xinjiang, the motivations behind it and the long term consequences of Qing expansion for both the non-Han Chinese peoples of Xinjiang and the empire itself.

The recorded history of China's relations with Central Asia, of which Xinjiang formed an integral part, extends to the Han Dynasty (206 BCE - 220CE) during which Chinese military power extended into the region.⁴⁵ Chinese power and influence were not to be reasserted in Central Asia until the Tang Dynasty (618-907). Tang military and

(Aldershot: Variorum, 1995), pp. 236-251 & Michael Cherniavsky, *Tsar and People: Studies in Russian Myths*, (New York: Random House, 1971).

⁴⁴ For example Peter Hopkirk, *The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia*, (New York: Kodansha International, 1992) & O. Edmund Clubb, *The "Great Game": Russia and China*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

⁴⁵ Joseph E. Fletcher, "China and Central Asia, 1368-1884", in John k. Fairbank (ed.), *The Chinese World Orde: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p.207.

economic power dominated Xinjiang from the middle of the seventh to the mid-eighth century. Tang domination of Xinjiang was such that an imperial governor resided in Kucha and the Chinese began to extend their influence to the west, particularly in the direction of the Ferghana Valley and Tashkent.⁴⁶ Tang imperial ambitions in Central Asia brought them into conflict with the expanding Arab Abassid dynasty and the Tang met with a disastrous defeat at the Battle of Talas, in present-day northwestern Kyrgyzstan, in 751.⁴⁷ The impact of this particular defeat was that China never again attempted to extend its influence beyond the territories of Xinjiang. The next period of significant contact and relations between China and Central Asia came under the Mongol Yuan Dynasty (1234-1368) whereby many Central Asians were employed in service of Mongol rule in China. After the expulsion of the alien Mongols in 1368 the Ming sent numerous missions to Central Asia namely to Samarkand, Tashkent, Bukhara, Herat and even Persia.⁴⁸ The goal of such missions remains unclear, but no doubt motives such as prestige, military intelligence and trade at least partly underpinned them. The Ming, however, had neither the political will nor the military might to emulate the Yuan or Tang Dynasties' achievements in Central Asia and the region remained outside of the Ming sphere. Ming relations with Central Asia largely remained of the "tributary" variety, that is the Ming allowed Central Asian merchants or envoys to come to her.⁴⁹ Central Asia, by the time of the Manchu conquest of China and the founding of the Qing in 1644, was no longer the realm of the Timurid and Moghul empires but a collection of small kingdoms and principalities. Politically divided and geographically removed from China, Central Asia and Xinjiang posed no immediate

⁴⁶ Svat Soucek, *A History of Inner Asia*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.67-68.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Joseph F. Fletcher, "China and Central Asia, 1368-1884", op. cit., p.207.

⁴⁹ Ibid, pp.216-217.

threat to the Qing, and relations remained largely the same as during the Ming era.⁵⁰ This was to change, however, with the rise of the Zunghars/Oirats or the Western Mongols on the northwestern periphery of the Qing realm in the late seventeenth century.

Although the Manchus had conquered North China and established the Qing Dynasty in 1644, they still had to subdue Southern China. This process was not completed for another forty years, with the final suppression of the Ming loyalist movement on Taiwan in 1683.⁵¹ At this time the Oyirods or "Western" Mongols (in northern Xinjiang/south-west Mongolia) had begun to infringe on both Russian and Qing territories under Galdan Khan. The other major confederation of Mongols, the Khalkhas or "Eastern" Mongols had had early contact with the Manchus in Nurgaci's time in the late sixteenth century.⁵² From 1660 onward the Khalkhas became increasingly wary of both the growing power and ambition of the Qing under Emperor Kangxi on their southeastern frontier and the reemergence of the Oyirods as a political force. The Qing for their part, for both strategic and ideological reasons, needed to secure their northern frontiers. The vast territory that is now referred to as Mongolia and including the extreme north-east of Manchuria had seen the gradual expansion of Russian influence throughout the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The strategic implications for the Qing of a growing and aggressive Russian presence in this region were extremely worrying. The Russian presence clearly opened the possibility of a strategic anti-Qing alliance between the yet to be subdued Khalkhas or Oyirods and

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Immanuel C. Hsu, *The Rise of Modern China*, (5th ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.109.

⁵² Pamela Kyle Crossley, op. cit., pp.314-315.

the Europeans. The Khalkhas for their part were also wary of an Oyiroid-Russian compact.⁵³ Ideologically, the presence of independent Mongols in the form of either the Khalkhas or Oyiroids clearly challenged the Qing claim of being successors to the Genghisid legacy, which remained an important element in securing the legitimacy of rulers throughout Inner Asia. Particularly disturbing for the Qing was the considerable geographical range and scope of Oyiroid influence that covered most of Mongolia and Tibet, and large parts of Central Asia including Xinjiang.⁵⁴ It was one element of the Oyiroid confederacy, however, which was to become the Qing's major nemesis along its northwestern frontiers.

The Oyiroids referred to themselves as *dorbon oyirad*, the "Four Oyiroids" which were the Oyiroids, Torghuuds/Turgut, Khoshuuds and Zunghars/Dzunghars. The Zunghars (from the Mongol *jegunghar* or "left wing") under a certain Khung Tayiji had been extremely hostile to the Qing in the mid-seventeenth century and had even requested military assistance from the Russians. Khung Tayiji also utilised Tibetan Lamaist Buddhism in order to unify and consolidate his rule, even dispatching his son Galdan to Tibet to become a *lama*.⁵⁵ Galdan returned from Tibet in the 1670s and began a campaign to unify the disparate neighbouring Mongol groups. Between 1671 and 1677 Galdan attempted to play off the Russians and Qing against each other by sending various missions to Russian posts in Siberia, while in 1677 he sent a tribute mission to Peking.⁵⁶ Galdan's quest to unify the Mongols led him to invade present-day Xinjiang, where a number of Oyiroid groups had been based particularly in the north and western

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid, pp.316-317.

⁵⁵ Ibid, pp.317-319.

⁵⁶ O. Edmund Clubb, op. cit., pp.28-29.

regions. In 1678-79 Galdan succeeded in adding Kashgaria (southern Xinjiang) to his expanding realm as well as the northwestern city of Yili, and the eastern cities of Hami and Turfan.⁵⁷ It was in order to guard against such Zunghar expansion that Kangxi concluded an agreement with the Russians regarding their expansion into the Amur River basin in 1689, known as the Treaty of Nerchinsk.⁵⁸ The significance of the Treaty of Nerchinsk was that Kangxi was now able to turn his attention to the undefined and fluid Mongol frontier.

The Zunghars under Galdan Khan's leadership had begun to involve themselves in the civil war amongst the Khalkhas to their east. The Zunghars, in aid of one of the Khalkha protagonists, invaded Outer Mongolia in 1688. By 1690 Galdan was openly at war with the Qing. In the next six years Galdan made two unsuccessful attempts to expand Jungar power to the east into Mongolia, but each time he was thwarted by the Qing. After the Zunghar's defeat in 1696 they were driven westward, with the Qing taking Hami in eastern Xinjiang.⁵⁹ The Qing, however, had not been able to press onwards into the Zunghar heartland and after Galdan's death the Jungars once again became a Central Asian power. Under Tsevan-Rabten leadership (Galdan's nephew) the Zunghars turned their attention towards Tibet. Tsevan-Rabten's interest in Tibet was determined by two inter-related factors. Firstly, the Qing had forcibly prevented Jungar expansion eastward into Mongolia thus thwarting their attempt to revive the Genghissid

⁵⁷ Ibid & Alistair Lamb, "Sinkiang Under the Manchus and the Chinese Republic", in Gavin Hambly (ed.), *Central Asia*, (New York: Delacorte Press, 1969), p.295.

⁵⁸ John King Fairbank, "Introduction: The Old Order", in Denis Twitchett & John K. Fairbank, (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China, Vol.10, Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, Pt. 1*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp.33-34.

⁵⁹ Joseph F. Fletcher, "China and Central Asia, 1368-1884", op. cit., pp.218-219 & Alistair Lamb, "Sinkiang Under the Manchus", op. cit., pp.296-297.

ideal of a unified Mongol realm. Secondly, and perhaps of greater significance, Tsevan-Rabten was aware of the ideological and religious leverage he could gain with the tribes of Mongolia by controlling Tibet. In the late sixteenth century the leader of the temporarily unified Western and Eastern Mongols, Altan Khan, invited the Third Dalai Lama, Sonam Gyatso to Mongolia where in 1578 he converted Altan Khan and the Mongols to Tibetan Buddhism of the Gelugpa or "Yellow Hat" sect.⁶⁰ Altan's motivations for such an act are clear; he wished to revive the Mongol-Tibetan "patron-priest" relationship established and personified by Khubilai Khan and the Lama Phagpa in the thirteenth century.⁶¹ Altan Khan also bestowed Sonam Gyatso with the title of Dalai Lama a Mongol-Tibetan hybrid variously described as meaning "Oceanic Lama" or "Universal Lama", a title that all his Gelugpa successors have been known by.⁶² Moreover, the Mongols conversion to the Gelugpa sect of Tibetan Buddhism and the establishment of the "patron-priest" relationship between the Mongol nobility and the highest religio-political hierarch of the Gelugpas allowed the Dalai Lamas to involve the Mongols in Tibet's internal politics. Therefore whoever could control Tibet and patronize the Tibetan Church would be able to have considerable influence over the various Mongol tribes. The possibility of the Zunghars gaining ascendancy in Tibet, and therefore over the Buddhist Church, would enable the Zunghars to pose a serious threat to Qing pretensions in Mongolia and Central Asia. This aspect of the ongoing Qing-Jungar rivalry was to have long-term implications for not only present-day Xinjiang but also Tibet.

⁶⁰ Dawa Norbu, *China's Tibet Policy*, (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2001), pp.66-67.

⁶¹ Gavin Hambly, "Lamaistic Civilization in Tibet and Mongolia", in G. Hambly (ed.), *Central Asia*, (New York: Delacorte Press, 1969), p.247.

⁶² see Dawa Norbu, *op. cit.*, pp.66-71 & F.W. Mote, *Imperial China, 900-1800*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), p.701. The Mongol word *Dalai* means "oceanic", thus metaphorically conveying the depth of the Lamas knowledge and wisdom.

Tibet by the beginning of the eighteenth century was characterised by the unique position of political and religious authority held by the Gelugpa sect and its head the Dalai Lama. The Fifth Dalai Lama Ngawang Lobzang Gyatso (1617-1682), or "the great fifth" as he is known to Tibetans, had firmly entrenched the Gelugpa as the dominant ecclesiastical and temporal power in Tibet by utilising the Gelugpa-Mongol relationship reestablished by Altan and Sonam Gyatso. The Fifth Dalai Lama, via the military support of the Mongols removed both his secular rivals, in the form of the remnants of the Tibetan monarchy, and his ecclesiastical rival, the Karmapas in the 1650s.⁶³ The Mongols' military power was central to the Fifth Dalai Lama's institution and maintenance of the Lamaist theocracy that was to prevail in various forms in Tibet until the twentieth century. Mongol involvement in the internal politics of Tibet had therefore been well established by the time of the escalation of the Zunghar-Qing confrontation. After the Fifth Dalai Lama died in 1682, his reputed son Sangye Gyatso acting as regent gathered all power into his own hands and he effectively controlled Tibet even after the Sixth Dalai Lama had reached maturity.⁶⁴ The extension of the regent's tenure was the result of the ineptitude, incompetence and debauchery of the Sixth Dalai Lama, Tsang-yang Gyatso, who was more at home composing erotic poems than fulfilling his spiritual and temporal responsibilities.⁶⁵

The Dalai Lama grew up as a gifted but high-living and dissolute youth, who has come down in history as one of the finest poets of Tibet, nay, as the only erotic poet of that country. In 1702 he even formally renounced his spiritual prerogatives, although still maintaining his temporal rights and his suzerainty over Tibet.⁶⁶

⁶³ Gavin Hambly, "Lamaistic Civilization in Tibet and Mongolia", op. cit., p.249.

⁶⁴ Luciano Petech, *China and Tibet in the Early 18th Century: History of the Establishment of a Chinese Protectorate in Tibet*, (Westport: Hyperion Press, 1950), p.222.

⁶⁵ see Gavin Hambly, op. cit., p.250 & Luciano Petech, op. cit., p.9.

⁶⁶ Luciano Petech, op. cit., p.9.

This peculiar situation was to present the Qing, Zunghar and Qosot Mongols with opportunities to interfere in Tibet's internal politics and alter the geopolitical climate of Central Asia. As will be recalled the Qosot Mongol's under Gusri Khan had installed the Fifth Dalai Lama and Gusri had become king of Tibet, and about 1700 a Qosot prince, Labzhan Khan had succeeded to the rights of the ruling house. Labzhan Khan wished to restore the Qosot influence in Tibet and thus sought allies to aid him in this task. The Qosot ruler found very soon that the Qing, under Kangxi, had begun to develop more than a passing interest in Tibetan affairs. As outlined previously, Kangxi's interest in Tibet was not based upon Tibet's strategic or military importance but concerned its ideological influence over the various Mongol tribes. At this juncture Kangxi was increasingly concerned with the reemergence of the Zunghars as a Central Asian power and their expansion toward Tibet. For the Qing it was necessary to prevent the Jungars from either developing a "patron-priest" relationship with the Gelugpa or controlling Tibet. Kangxi was very much aware of the ideological, political and strategic ramifications of such an outcome:

K'ang-hsi, whose politics were then mainly directed against the young and rising kingdom of the Dsungars in the Ili valley, was becoming much interested in Tibetan affairs. This was not so much for strategic reasons (Tibet was, and has always been, a military backwater), but because of the religious relations between the Holy See of Lhasa and the Lamaist monarchy in Ili. The *sde-srid* (regent) had always been notoriously pro-Dsungar, and was known to have entered a compact with dGa'ldan, ruler of the Dsungars from 1676-1697. If the Dsungars succeeded in drawing the Dalai Lama to their side, this would seriously affect the loyalty of the Mongol princes, who occupied an important strategic position and supplied China with a considerable percentage of the troops serving on the western frontier. K'ang-hsi was therefore eager to secure at the earliest opportunity some political influence in Tibet.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ Ibid, pp.9-10.

Kangxi therefore utilized Labzhan's overtures to full effect and backed Labzhan's invasion of Lhasa in 1705. A complicated series of events took place regarding the Sixth Dalai Lama's position, with Kangxi ordering him to be escorted to Peking but ending in his death en-route one year later in 1706.⁶⁸ This Qing interference in Tibet precipitated a surprise Zunghar invasion of Tibet, launched from Kashgaria in 1717 that succeeded in occupying Lhasa and defeating a Qing expeditionary force.⁶⁹ The Qing could not, however, allow the Zunghars to consolidate their control over Tibet and the Tibetan Church lest they acquire great influence over the Mongol princes. Therefore, the Qing sent a considerably stronger force to Lhasa in 1720 that expelled the Zunghars, enthroned a new Dalai Lama under the supervision of two imperial *ambans* (ie. governors) and a Qing garrison.⁷⁰ Tibet thus became a Qing protectorate for the next two centuries.

Simultaneous with these events in Tibet, the Zunghars attempted the re-conquest of the regions of eastern Xinjiang lost by Galdan in the 1690s. The Zunghars to this end attempted to retake Hami in 1615 and led to the dispatch of a Qing force that not only regained Hami but drove the Zunghars westward to defeat them near Urumchi in 1720.⁷¹ The Qing offered the Zunghar khan a peace treaty in 1724 that merely resulted in the postponement of the Qing quest to 'solve' their Jungar problem. For the next twenty years an uneasy status quo was maintained in Xinjiang and Mongolia with the Qing controlling eastern Xinjiang as far as Turfan, the Khalkhas entrenched in central and eastern Mongolia and the Zunghars controlling the remainder of Xinjiang in

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Alistair Lamb, op. cit., p.297.

⁷⁰ Svat Soucek, op. cit., p.171 & Alistair Lamb, op. cit., p.297.

⁷¹ Svat Soucek, op. cit., pp.171-172.

addition to western Mongolia.⁷² This precarious peace was shattered in 1740s with the Qing and their Khalkha vassals taking advantage of a Zunghar succession struggle. One of the Zunghar contenders, Amursana, having failed in his bid to become khan fled to China in 1755 and pledged his willingness to accept Qing suzerainty if he became khan. The Qing now undertook the total conquest of Zungharia and after capturing their capital Kulja in 1755-56 installed Amursana as a Qing vassal. Amursana's allegiance to the Qing proved short-lived however and he cast off the pretence of loyalty to the Qing declaring himself head of the Zunghar state in 1756-57. This of course precipitated a swift and comprehensive Qing military response. The Qing campaign in Zungharia in 1757-58 amounted to the complete destruction of not only the Zunghar state but of the Zunghars as a people that virtually depopulated northern Xinjiang.⁷³ It is estimated by a number of scholars that the Qing campaigns against the Zunghars in 1756-57 resulted in the destruction, by a combination of warfare and disease, of 80% of the variously estimated six hundred thousand to one million strong Zunghar population inhabiting northern Xinjiang.⁷⁴ The military subjugation of the Zunghars, although destroying the existing Zunghar state, was deemed by the Qianlong emperor to have not sufficiently solved the Qing's century-long Zunghar 'problem'. The Qianlong emperor's physical obliteration of the Zunghars was coupled by a thorough ideological cleansing of not only northern Xinjiang but of Mongolia that would ensure that no potential leader could obtain the legitimacy required to unify the Mongols,

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ see Svat Soucek, op. cit., pp. 172-173, Alistair Lamb, op. cit., pp.298-299 & S.C.M. Paine, *Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier*, (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), pp.112-114.

⁷⁴ For example see Pamela Kyle Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, op. cit., p. 326,; Crossley asserts that Qing records claim to have inflicted one million casualties in the suppression of the Zunghars; Wen-Djang Chu, *The Moslem Rebellion in Northwest China 1862-1878: A Study of Government Minority Policy*, (Paris: Mouton & Co., 1966), pp.1-3 & Owen Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia: Sinkiang and the Inner Asian Frontiers of China and Russia*, (Boston: Little & Brown, 1950), p.126.

The Qianlong emperor was convinced that the military suppression of the Dzungars, who since Galdan had had a century of military strife (which meant glory, whether winning or losing) behind them, was insufficient; their name had to be literally destroyed, their peoples dispersed, and any possibility of a new leader finding legitimation for himself obliterated. The current name (but not the historical reference) Dzungar was banned absolutely; only "Oyirod" or "Oyirod Mongol" was permitted.⁷⁵

Moreover, the Qing via their recent installment of the Seventh Dalai Lama and posting of *ambans* and a military force in Lhasa effectively controlled the previously crucial Mongol-Gelugpa relationship. Therefore by the 1760s both Xinjiang and Tibet had come under Qing suzerainty, while Qianlong had finished the destruction of the Zunghars that had begun under Kangxi nearly a century before. Qing dominance over Xinjiang and Tibet in this period took different forms, with Xinjiang coming under direct Qing military rule and with Tibet subsumed by indirect Qing domination.

Within these processes of Qing expansion can be seen the emergence of the construction of a complex of Qing knowledge regarding the newly conquered regions of Inner Asia. The initial manifestation of this was clearly the Qing state's ideological construction of various "constituencies" among the populations of Inner Asia. That is the Qing state's usurpation of guiding or legitimating ideologies of the Inner Asian people's they conquered, most notably those of the Mongols and the Tibetans. Although both Tibet and Mongolia were linked via shared religious affiliation, the political legitimacy of their rulers sprung from different sources. For Tibetans this was from the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the major sects of Tibetan Buddhism. The various Mongol leaders that opposed the Qing, most notably the Zunghars, claimed their legitimacy via the Ghengissid legacy. The Qing in each case challenged the basis of this legitimacy by

⁷⁵ Pamela Kyle Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, op. cit., p.320.

co-opting each guiding ideology as their own. Thus in the case of the Mongols, the Qing emperor claimed to be the direct inheritor of the Ghengissid lineage while in the case of the Tibetans the emperor claimed to be the inheritor of the Mongol-Tibetan patron-priest relationship established under Khubilai and Phagpa in the 13th century. This conception of the Qing emperor was also reinforced by a Buddhist conception of rulership that included and transcended Tibet - the representation of the Qing emperor a *cakravartin/cakravartiraja* or "wheel turning king":

A more powerful, and explicitly imperial, Buddhist concept was that of the "wheel turner" (*cakravartin*) - also "wheel turning king" (*cakravartiraja*). The title does not distinguish between a center (*cakra*) and those concepts to which a center is indispensable: wheels, flowers (the lotus in particular), time and space. All Buddhist rulers of the middle ages and later saw themselves as successors to Asoka, historicized as the first wheel-turning king. This was more than a general understanding that the goal of his regime was to spread Enlightenment. The wheel-turning conceit became locally differentiated, accompanied by various rituals, icons and political patterns.⁷⁶

Although such ideological mechanisms were reinforced and weakened throughout the remainder of the Qing empire, they were important instruments by which the emperorship was able to transmit political messages and justify or legitimate their authority.

In Xinjiang, however, there was no historically founded ideological instrument that the Qing could coopt that strengthened the links between the center of the realm and Xinjiang. This was especially true of the regions south of the Tien Shan (Kashgaria or Altishahr) where political legitimacy prior to the Qing conquest stemmed from both the Genghissid legacy and Islamic credentials. The latter had by the time of the Qing assumed greater importance than the Genghissid legacy, where the Naqshbandi Khojas

⁷⁶ Ibid, p.234.

(a Sufi order whose leaders claimed descent from Muhammad) had dominated and often ruled the Altishahr. This distinction is important, as it framed initial Qing administrative policies in Xinjiang and significantly influenced the mechanisms by which the Qing attempted to legitimate their rule. Moreover, over the course of Qing rule in Xinjiang these two factors developed in two distinct phases or periods. The first, extending from the conquest in 1759 to the early 1800s, was characterised by an administrative approach aimed at keeping Xinjiang segregated from the rest of the empire. This aim was reflected in the form and content of Qing knowledge of Xinjiang that has been addressed by James Millward.⁷⁷ From the 1750s to the early 1800s a number of geographic, ethnographic and cartographic projects were undertaken in Xinjiang that had as their goal the extension of the emperor's "view" of the realm. As such it was in line with a number of similar projects initiated slightly before and after by contemporaneous monarchs, such as Louis XIV. Importantly the geographic nomenclature produced by these projects reflected the imperial aim to firstly establish a link between the Qing and Xinjiang, and secondly to segregate it from China proper. The second phase, from the 1820s through to 1911, encompasses a period of transformation of both administrative approach and the mechanisms of rule or the reevaluation of Qing knowledge of Xinjiang. This period was characterised by regular challenges to both Qing rule of Xinjiang and Qing hegemony in the region. As a result of these consistent challenges, the Qing administrative approach was transformed from one focused on segregation and control to one of assimilation and control. This imperative was subsequently reflected in the construction of Qing knowledge of Xinjiang.

⁷⁷ James A. Millward, " 'Coming onto the Map': 'Western Regions' Geography and Cartographic Nomenclature in the Making of the Chinese Empire in Xinjiang", *Late Imperial China*, Vol.20, No.2

The Qing Period: Colonialism, Rebellion and the Origins of Ethnic Tensions, 1759-1911

The Qing conquest of Xinjiang in 1757-58 resulted in two interconnected processes. Firstly, the Qing conquests radically altered the geopolitics of Inner Asia and completed the institution of a Chinese imperial authority over Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang for the first time in over five hundred years. Secondly, it placed the Qing in “control” of the most ethnologically diverse region of Inner Asia.⁷⁸ This resulted in the origins of a process of assimilation and confrontation between an emerging Chinese (nation)-state and non-Han Chinese populations that has continued to the present day. It is these two aspects or consequences of the Qing conquest of Xinjiang that are the focus of this section. The administrative policies pursued by the Qing in Xinjiang until the dynasty's collapse in 1911 were demonstrably linked to and interacted with the geopolitics of Inner Asia. The geo-political transformation of Inner Asia toward the end of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth centuries, of which the Qing conquest was but one manifestation, was characterised by the incorporation of a multiplicity of politically, culturally and ethnically distinct polities by three continental imperial projects - Britain, Russia and the Qing. This process impacted heavily on the strategic logic and structure of Qing administration in Xinjiang. The Qing conquest of Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang thus brought them into contact and eventually confrontation with European powers before the more celebrated coastal confrontations. The Qing approach to the administration of Xinjiang was not constant. As outlined above there can be discerned two distinct, but interrelated, phases of Qing policy in Xinjiang. Each of these phases of Qing policy was formed in response to not only the

(December 1999), pp.61-98

⁷⁸ Joseph F. Fletcher, "Ch'ing Inner Asia c.1800", op. cit., p.58.

internal imperatives of the empire but also to the external forces exerted on the frontiers of the realm. Xinjiang was a crucible of the processes that came to characterise the challenges confronted by the Qing throughout the nineteenth century. Thus it is necessary to examine the structure of Qing administration in Xinjiang, the strategic logic of these policies, and the relationship between Qing policy and the geopolitics of Central Asia.

The Structure and Techniques of Qing Administration in Xinjiang: Segregation and Control, 1759-1820.

The structure of Qing administration of Xinjiang following Qianlong's final conquest in 1757-58 was illustrative of the perceived position of the region in the empire. Once both Zungharia and Kashgaria had been subdued by Qing troops, Xinjiang became a holding of the Qing imperial household rather than a province of the empire. The Qing, like previous conquest dynasties such as the Yuan, distinguished between China and Inner Asia in both political and administrative terms. For the Qing, China was considered to be the "interior empire" while Inner Asia (especially Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet) was considered the "exterior empire". The Qing regarded China as a subjugated state whereas they treated the various polities of Inner Asia as dependent allies. Thus China was ruled directly by the Qing, while the dependent Inner Asian polities were left under nominal "native" control.⁷⁹ Therefore, the Qing did not view Xinjiang as an integral part of 'China'. To this end Qing administrative policies immediately after the conquest had at their core the goal of segregating Xinjiang from China proper, much like Qing policies regarding Manchuria and Mongolia.⁸⁰ Qing

⁷⁹ Warren W. Smith Jr., *Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), p. 145.

⁸⁰ Joseph F. Fletcher, "Ch'ing Inner Asia c.1800", op. cit., pp. 35-37.

administration of Inner Asia has been seen as demonstrably colonial by a number of scholars, such as Di Cosmo, Perdue and Waley-Cohen.⁸¹ These scholars have rightly argued that not only the vast territorial expansion of the Qing empire in the 18th century but the techniques and structure of the subsequent administration of Inner Asia make the Qing comparable to the great imperial states of Europe.

The administration of the recently conquered regions of Inner Asia was divided in three: the Lifan Yuan at the centre, and the imperial residents and native elites at the periphery.⁸² The Lifan Yuan or “court for the administration of the outer provinces” was the central instrument of Qing military and civil bureaucracy responsible for Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang. The institution of the Lifan Yuan is illustrative of both the different political and cultural conceptions the Manchus had of Inner Asia and China, and the consequently different methods/techniques of rule employed. The Lifan Yuan was initially formed under Hung Taiji in 1638 to manage relations with the Mongols, but its functions expanded with the Qing conquests of Inner Asia so that by 1661 it ranked just below the "six ministries" of civil appointments, revenues, rites, war, justice and works.⁸³ Although the Lifan Yuan was initially formed to deal with the Manchus relations with the Mongols it came to not only manage relations between the Qing and the subject peoples of Inner Asia (ie. Tibetans, Mongols, Kazaks, and Uighurs) but also

⁸¹ See Nicola Di Cosmo, “Qing Colonial Administration in Inner Asia”, *The International History Review*, Vol. 20, No. 2, (June 1998), pp.287-309, Peter C. Perdue, “Boundaries, Maps and Movement; Chinese, Russian and Mongolian Empires in Early Modern Central Eurasia”, *The International History Review*, Vol. 20, No. 2, (June 1998), pp.263-286, & Johanna Waley-Cohen, ‘Religion, War, and Empire Building in Eighteenth-Century China’, *The International History Review*, Vol. 20, No. 2, (June 1998), pp.336-352.

⁸² Nicola Di Cosmo, “Qing Colonial Administration in Inner Asia”, *The International History Review*, Vol. 20, No. 2, (June 1998), p.294.

⁸³ *Ibid*, pp.294-295.

the relations between China and Inner Asia.⁸⁴ That is to say, the Qing recognized the need to culturally and politically mediate or conciliate between the Chinese throne and the peoples of Inner Asia in order to facilitate the recognition of Qing political authority and legitimacy. The Lifan Yuan was thus not simply an administrative tool but an ideological one as well that sought to manage the traditional divide between sedentary/agrarian China and nomadic/pastoral Inner Asia. This function was primarily achieved through the Lifan Yuan's management of three rituals - the pilgrimage to the emperor (*chaojin*), the imperial hunt (*weilie*) and the tribute (*chaogong*) – by which the Qing court redefined the political, cultural and economic connections between China and Inner Asia.⁸⁵ These Inner Asian rituals, distinct from the Chinese rituals practiced at court, facilitated the Qing court's ability to achieve political legitimacy throughout its Inner Asian territories:

The Lifanyuan rituals invented the image of the ruling Manchus as providing both agricultural and nomadic leadership, while they convinced the Inner Asians of their prominent and legitimate place, and of the court's privileged recognition of Inner Asian culture, in an empire culturally dominated by Chinese. All of these efforts fostered Inner Asians' recognition of Qing political authority and, therefore, facilitated the direct imperial administration of Inner Asia.⁸⁶

The three basic instruments of Qing administration - the Lifan Yuan at the centre, imperial residents and native elites at the periphery – served this pluralist goal of achieving political legitimacy within multiple cultural frames by effectively segregating the Inner Asian territories from the political, economic and cultural milieu of China. This Qing imperative to keep their Inner Asian and Chinese territories effectively separated from each other, yet politically and culturally absorb them within an

⁸⁴ Ning Chia, "The Lifanyuan and the Inner Asian Rituals in the Early Qing", *Late Imperial China*, Vol.14, No. 1, (June 1993), pp.60-92.

⁸⁵ *Ibid*, p.61.

encompassing imperial ideology was manifested across administrative policy and in the empire's external relations along its greatly expanded Inner Asian frontiers in the 18th and 19th centuries. This was no more true than in the case of Xinjiang, where Qing administrative policy and its external relations became closely entwined throughout the course of Qing rule of Xinjiang.

The territory was divided into three major administrative 'circuits', the *Tien Shan Bei-lu* (the Tien Shan Northern Circuit), the *Tien Shan Nan-lu* (Tien Shan Southern Circuit), and the *Tien Shan Dong-lu* (Tien Shan Eastern Circuit).⁸⁷ The *bei-lu* encompassed the region north of the Tien Shan Mountains, essentially what was known prior to the Qing conquest as Jungaria. The *nan-lu* encompassed the region south of the Tien Shan or Kashgaria. Together the Qing military administered these regions as the dependency of Xinjiang or the "New Dominion".⁸⁸ Qing administration from the beginning was based on military occupation with an estimated 23 000 to 30 000 troops stationed throughout the territory.⁸⁹ This military garrison was under the command of a military-governor based at Kulja (Ili), who was also the highest authority in Xinjiang.⁹⁰ Under the military-governor at Kulja were a lieutenant governor at Ürümqi who had jurisdiction over the imperial bureaucracy in the *Tien Shan Bei-lu* and in the *Tien Shan Dong-lu*. The major cities of the *dong-lu*, also often referred to as "Uighurstan", Hami and Turfan were ruled by vassal hereditary princes under the supervision of the lieutenant governor

⁸⁶ Ibid., p.63

⁸⁷ Hodong Kim, *Holy War in China: The Muslim Rebellion and State in Chinese Central Asia, 1864-1877*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), p.15.

⁸⁸ Joseph F. Fletcher, op. cit., p.58.

⁸⁹ Ibid, Hodong Kim, *Holy War in China*, op. cit., p.16 & Immanual C. Hsu, *The Ili Crisis: A Study of Sino-Russian Diplomacy, 1871-1881*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), p.19.

⁹⁰ Immanual C. Hsu, op.cit. , p.19.

at Ürümqi.⁹¹ Imperial councillors were also placed at Tarbagatai (Chuguchak) in north-western Xinjiang and at Kashgar. In the *Tien Shan Nan-lu* the imperial councillor at Kashgar had jurisdiction over the imperial bureaucracy in Kashgaria or *Altishahr* (literally "the six cities" in Turki of Kashgar, Khotan, Aksu, Yarkand, Ush Turfan and Kucha).⁹² Xinjiang was also divided into three military districts, northern, eastern and southern. The northern district centred on Kulja, directly under the command of the military governor, garrisoned up to 13 000 troops. The eastern district under the command of the lieutenant governor in Urumchi numbered between 3000 and 5000 troops. The bulk of Qing military forces in Xinjiang, approximately 16 000 to 18 000, were therefore garrisoned north of the Tien Shan.⁹³ The southern district, in contrast to the northern and eastern districts, had no permanent military garrison of its own. The southern district drew its estimated 6000 strong military force primarily from the other two districts, with troops serving five-year 'tours of duty' in the *Altishahr*.⁹⁴ The Qing military forces, particularly in the Kulja region, also established military agricultural colonies to support the occupation that were in the 1760s primarily composed of Xibo, Solon and Chahar bannermen from Manchuria and Mongolia.⁹⁵

The distribution of these military forces was illustrative of the strategic logic of Qing policy in Xinjiang immediately following the conquest. The Qing considered the *Tien Shan Bei-lu* to be the region of most strategic and economic importance in the newly acquired territory, and therefore focused their defence and development capabilities

⁹¹ Nailene J. Chou, *Frontier Studies and Changing Frontier Administration in Late Ch'ing China: The Case of Sinkiang*, (University Microfilms: Ann Arbor, 1976)

⁹² Joseph F. Fletcher, op. cit., p.59.

⁹³ see Joseph F. Fletcher, op. cit., pp.59-60 & Immanuel C. Hsu, op. cit., pp.19-20. Fletcher puts Qing military strength north of the Tien Shan at 18 000 while Hsu puts it at 16 000.

⁹⁴ Joseph F. Fletcher, op. cit., p.60.

north of the Tien Shan. Such an orientation of Qing policy was determined to a large degree by the consequences of the final destruction of the Zunghar state and the Qing's political and ideological imperatives immediately thereafter. The Qing campaigns in Zungharia in 1757-58 depopulated northern Xinjiang to such an extent⁹⁶ that it was necessary for the Qing to encourage Han Chinese and Hui (Chinese Muslims) migration into Jungaria via the offer of four and a half acres of land per family.⁹⁷ Moreover, the Qing authorities also moved Turkic-Muslim tenant farmers (*taranqi*) from the *Altishahr* to the Kulja region to set up Muslim agricultural colonies to help support the civil and military administrations.⁹⁸ The extermination of the Zunghars had not reduced the Qing vigilance against the remaining nomadic populations of Jungaria. The northern and north-western extremities of Zungharia were home to or were traversed by various "leagues" of nomadic Mongol, Kazakh and Kyrgyz pastoralists. The Qing military colonies and settlement of Han, Hui and Uighur agriculturalists throughout Zungharia were undertaken to dilute the power or potential threat of these nomads to the Qing.⁹⁹

The *Altishahr*, in contrast to Zungharia, did not experience direct or overpowering Qing penetration. Although there was a Qing garrison and imperial councillor at Kashgar, the Qing ruled via the established local authorities or *begs*. There were numerous classifications of *begs* all serving specific roles, such as revenue collectors and the

⁹⁵ Nicola Di Cosmo, *op.cit.*, p.298.

⁹⁶ see Pamela Kyle Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, *op. cit.*, p.326, Wen-Djang Chu, *The Moslem Rebellion in Northwest China 1862-1878: A Study of Government Minority Policy*, (Paris: Mouton & Co., 1966), pp.1-3 & Owen Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia: Sinkiang and the Inner Asian Frontiers of China and Russia*, (Boston: Little & Brown, 1950), p.126.

⁹⁷ Joseph F. Fletcher, *op. cit.*, p.65.

⁹⁸ Joseph F. Fletcher, *op. cit.*, pp.64-65 & Dorothy V. Borei, "Ethnic Conflict and Qing Land Policy in Southern Xinjiang, 1760-1840", in Robert J. Antony & Jane Kate Leonard (eds.), *Dragons, Tigers, and Dogs: Qing Crisis Management and the Boundaries of State Power in Late Imperial China*, (Ithaca, NY: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 2002), p.279.

⁹⁹ Alistair Lamb, "Sinkiang Under the Manchus and the Chinese Republic", *op. cit.*, pp.298-299.

judiciary, but the most important was the *hakim beg* or Muslim governor.¹⁰⁰ The *beg* system had existed prior to the Qing conquest, but it had referred to inherited titles and office, in essence a title of nobility.¹⁰¹ Under the Qing, however, *beg* no longer conveyed this meaning. It now became a synonym for an imperial 'official'. Thus the Qing construed the usage of the title to erode the prestige and leadership of the traditional aristocracy of the *Altishahr*. Moreover, it also established the Qing as the only legitimate source of secular authority throughout the *Tien Shan Nan-lu*.¹⁰² This aspect of Qing rule in Xinjiang clearly demonstrates the validity of the comparison with other western colonial powers. The local elite's power or authority was no longer based on traditional conceptions of legitimacy, in *Altishahr's* case Islamic or Genghissid credentials, but based on their appointment or recognition by the colonial power.¹⁰³ The Qing selected local *begs* on the basis of perceived competence, loyalty and specific local authority but selected the highest ranking *begs*, the *hakim begs*, from segments of the local elites that had submitted to the Qing during the Zunghar campaigns.¹⁰⁴ The lower ranking *begs* in contrast had only submitted when the Qing had driven the *Makhdumzada Khojas* from *Altishahr*. Therefore the highest ranking *begs* were less constrained by personal and familial ties in their dealings with the population leading to an exploitative tendency amongst the native governors. In fact Di Cosmo argues that this aspect of Qing rule was responsible for the development of social unrest in the *Altishahr* from the 1790s onward.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, Di Cosmo also notes that the system of taxation employed by the Qing in the *Altishahr* further demonstrated the colonial

¹⁰⁰ Immanuel C. Hsu, op. cit., pp.20-21.

¹⁰¹ Hodong Kim, *Holy War in China*, op. cit., p.11.

¹⁰² Joseph F. Fletcher, op. cit., p.78.

¹⁰³ Nicola Di Cosmo, op. cit., p.300.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid*, p.304.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, pp.304-305.

nature of Qing rule whereby Qing authority was superimposed over existing structures of political and economic control. The Qing began a land survey in 1765 upon which basis two different forms of taxation were formulated – a pre-Qing Muslim grain levy and a poll tax (based on the number of adult males per household) to be paid in cash. The result of this was an increase in grain revenues between the conquest and the 1850s but no increase in cash revenues due to the reluctance of Muslim tax collectors to impose an infidel tax on co-religionists.¹⁰⁶

The administrative structure of Qing rule in Xinjiang was thus comprised of three major divisions, direct military governorship in Zungharia, rule by vassal hereditary princes in Uighurstan (ie. Hami and Turfan) and rule via the *beg* system in the *Altishahr*. This, however, only partly addresses the implementation of the goal of the segregation and control of Xinjiang. The Qing also actively sought to diminish the role of the Islamic religious establishment in Altishahri society and segregate the region from Chinese influence. There were three major groups within the religious establishment, the akhunds, the saintly lineages (sayyids and khojas) and the shayhks or companions of the Sufi *tariqats*. The akhunds exercised religious authority as the result of their competence and training, and were typically judges, muftis, mosque functionaries and madrassah teachers. The akhunds were also the only one of the three constituent groups of the religious establishment to have official status under the Qing.¹⁰⁷ The saintly lineages, the sayyids and khojas, were the most respected and venerated by the population of the Altishahr with the most important of them being the Makhdumzada

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Saguchi Toru, “Kashgaria”, *Acta Asiatica*, Vol.34, (1978), p68.

Naqshbandi. Finally came the shaykhs and companions of the Sufi tariqats who wielded considerable influence throughout Xinjiang.¹⁰⁸ After the Qing conquest the political role of these groups, especially the akhunds and khojas, was severely circumscribed. Akhunds were no longer allowed to be employed by the begs as advisers or functionaries in the administration, while the power of the khojas had been substantially diminished by the flight of the leading Makhdumzada khojas to neighbouring Khoqand upon the Qing conquest. The continued existence of the Makhdumzada khojas in Khoqand would prove to be a thorn in the side of the Qing throughout the remainder of the 18th and 19th centuries, but this will be dealt with in detail later. The Qing wished to minimise the opportunities for the religious establishment, especially the akhunds and khojas, to become politically active and thus sought to keep the penetration of Chinese influences to a minimum.

Consequently, the Qing maintained a strict policy of segregating the Altishahr from Han Chinese merchants or settlers, thus Han Chinese would not be allowed to enter the Altishahr without good reason or properly validated passports.¹⁰⁹ Moreover, although the bulk of Qing troops in Xinjiang and imperial officials until the end of the 19th century were Manchu or Mongol, the Qing extended the policy of segregation to them. As a result Qing troops garrisoned in the Altishahr did so on a rotating basis while imperial personnel in the cities resided in separate and purpose built administrative citadels known variously as *yangi shahr* (new city) or *qal a-yi shahr* (city fortress).¹¹⁰ This concern was also reflected in the methods and goals of land reclamation undertaken by the Qing between 1759 and 1820. Xinjiang had experienced over half a

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. The Makhdumzadas were but one prominent branch of the Naqshbandi Sufi tariqats.

¹⁰⁹ See Joseph F. Fletcher, op. cit., p.76. & Saguchi Toru, op. cit., p.68.

century of war and invasion since the death of Galdan Khan in 1696, and consequently the region's commercial, trade and agricultural prosperity had declined considerably. Following the Qing conquest the region experienced an economic recovery as result of the imposition of a "Pax Manjurica", low commercial taxes and the Qing promotion of agricultural recovery.¹¹¹ The Qing emphasis on stimulating the region's economic recovery initially stemmed from the strategic consideration of ensuring adequate supplies for the Qing garrisons and officials in Xinjiang. Thus the court initially focused on establishing military agricultural colonies to provide the necessary supplies for the Qing occupation of the region, and it was only after Qing military control had been consolidated did the court consider employing Altishahri peasants to reclaim and till the land.¹¹² The Qing thus established an agricultural colony in Aksu, four in Ush and three in Karashahr, manned by Han "Green Standard" troops on a rotating basis, and in 1761 permitted local Muslims to reclaim land in Khotan, Yarkand, Kashgar, Ush, Aksu, Kucha and Karashahr.¹¹³ Yet, it is significant that at no point did the Qing consider the recruitment of Han peasants from Shaanxi and Gansu to undertake these tasks in southern Xinjiang.¹¹⁴

The Qing goal of control and segregation of Xinjiang in the 1759-1820 period was also reflected in the development of a complex of knowledge of Xinjiang's geography and ethnography. The importance of the development of these forms of knowledge is that it enabled the Qing to in effect survey and therefore know Xinjiang in all its relations. Moreover, as James Millward has argued, the conquest of Xinjiang in the 1750s and the

¹¹⁰ Joseph F. Fletcher, *op. cit.*, pp.76-77.

¹¹¹ Dorothy V. Borei, "Ethnic Conflict and Qing Land Policy in Southern Xinjiang", *op. cit.*, p.281.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 282.

development of mapping and research of the region's historical geography was instrumental in making Xinjiang a part of an extended conception of China.¹¹⁵ The most important aspect of this process was the gradually more accurate mapping of Xinjiang from the Zunghar campaigns onward. Knowledge of a region's geography, ethnography, demography, resources and so on translated into power:

Maps are valuable instruments of power. For soldiers, they define strategic locations and efficient routes of march, and for tax collectors, cadastral surveys measure the individual landholders obligation and fix him in place. Maps point to trade routes, useful both for the merchant and for the customs agent, while the ethnographic atlas classifies and situates diverse peoples within a bounded imperial space.¹¹⁶

This may appear to be quite straightforward but such an extension of the state's vision is a central element of governmentality as form of power. The relationship between empire and map making has been dealt with in detail by a number of scholars within the European context and to a lesser degree in the Qing context¹¹⁷. According to these scholars there were two primary uses of maps for centralizing imperial rulers between the 16th and 18th centuries; (1) to conquer and control territory and (2) to provide a totalizing and iconic image of the realm.¹¹⁸ Both of these aspects of the relationship between empire and map making are clearly evident in the Qing context, but what I believe is of greater weight is the manner in which the instruments produced by this relationship were used in specific contexts. The Qing, while wanting to encompass diverse peoples within a defined imperial space, did so with specific goals in mind, namely to control and segregate their Inner Asian territories from the imperial center.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ James A. Millward, "Coming Onto the Map", op. cit., p.62.

¹¹⁶ Peter C. Perdue, "Boundaries, Maps and Movement: Chinese, Russian, and Mongolian Empires in Early Modern Eurasia", *The International History Review*, Vol.20, No.2 (June 1998), p.272.

Thus the mapping and naming of Xinjiang's geography, resources and peoples had to reflect the prevailing pluralist imperial ideology – that is allow for the representation of the empire in multiple cultural frames. The two phases of Qing policy in Xinjiang are reflected in the geographic construction of Xinjiang. That is to say, that as the rationality of Qing administration in Xinjiang was transformed in the opening decades of the 19th century so too was the form and content of Qing knowledge of the region.

This process began before the final extermination of the Zunghars with the completion of the “Kangxi Atlas” in 1718, that was based on surveys conducted by Jesuit priests.¹¹⁹ The atlas' title, *Huangyu Qualan Tu (Map of a Complete View of Imperial Territory)* highlights the emperor's desire to survey his realm in its entirety and as such, “The compilation of the atlas was just one component of a broader project to systematize and rationalize the ruler's knowledge of space and time”.¹²⁰ The content of the *Huangyu Qualan Tu* demonstrated that Qing knowledge of what was to become Xinjiang was minimal, which may be understandable given that the region was still very much in the hands of the Zunghars. The material that it did and did not contain is significant as it reveals the beginning of the construction of Qing knowledge of Xinjiang. The atlas contained extant knowledge regarding administrative boundaries and certain place names (which extended as far as Hami and Turfan) but little cultural or ethnographic information. The atlas thus marked the traditional boundary between China and Inner

¹¹⁷ see for example David Buisseret (ed.), *Monarchs, Ministers and Maps: The Emergence of Cartography as a Tool of Government in Early Modern Europe*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), James A. Millward, op. cit & Peter C. Perdue, op. cit.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ James A. Millward, op. cit., p.68.

¹²⁰ Peter C. Perdue, op. cit., p.277.

Asia, the Great Wall, but little else beyond this ‘cultural’ frontier.¹²¹ With the Qing conquest of Zungharia and the Altishahr in the 1750s, this lack of accurate geographical information required rectification. The Qianlong emperor, after the initial defeat of the Zunghars in 1755, ordered the compilation of three major geographical works of the new territories – large scale maps, a gazetteer and a glossary of names – to commemorate his victories and effectively begin the ideological construction of Xinjiang as a Qing and ultimately Chinese territory.¹²²

The surveys for the maps of Xinjiang took place between 1756 and 1760 and were conducted by a team comprised of two Manchus, two “mathematically adept lamas”, and the two Portuguese Jesuits Felix Da Rocha and Joseph d’Esphina. This team observed and measured in the Altshahr and beyond the Pamir Mountains in the west to Wakhan, Badakshan (present day Afghanistan) and Taskent.¹²³ From this survey the Qing gleaned the first relatively accurate conception of the extent of the region that allowed for the establishment of strategic military posts along the frontier:

In conjunction with the military campaigns themselves, they provided essential information for establishment of *kalun* (guard posts). In the south and southwest the mountains formed a natural frontier and pickets were simply positioned to guard the strategic passes, but in the north, the task was complicated by the nature of the open pastoral lands and the need to position moveable *kalun* to supervise the seasonal movement of nomads. Though by no means determining the border, these *kalun* were recognized as the demarcation of the Western Regions and of Chinese imperial control in the northwest.¹²⁴

¹²¹ James A. Millward, op. cit., p.68 & Peter C. Perdue, op. cit., pp.277-278.

¹²² James A. Millward op. cit., p.69.

¹²³ Laura Newby, “Xinjiang: In Search of an Identity”, in Tao Tao Liu and David Faure (eds.), *Unity and Diversity: Local Cultures and Identities in China*, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1996), pp.67-68.

¹²⁴ Ibid, p.68.

Following these surveys, the Qianlong emperor commissioned another Jesuit missionary, Michel Benoist, to produce new maps of Xinjiang based on the surveys conducted between 1756-1760 and the earlier “Kangxi Atlas.” The maps produced by Benoist, known as the “Qianlong Atlas”, were completed around 1775.¹²⁵ These geographic and cartographic enterprises were conducted contemporaneously with the Cassini survey of France (1788), and before the British Ordnance Survey of Ireland (1824-1846) and the Trigonometric Survey of India (1799-1843).¹²⁶ Moreover, as Millward notes, the Kangxi Atlas and the Qianlong Atlas were “based on the world’s first systematic application of a trigonometric survey, then the cartographic state-of-the-art, to an entire state.”¹²⁷ In concert with the production of imperially commissioned maps, the Qianlong emperor also commissioned a new gazetteer to describe the recently acquired regions of Zungharia and Altishahr, and a language glossary of place names. The first of these projects included chapters of maps and physical description as well as material concerning the geography, history, administration, defense and ethnography of Xinjiang. The second project, the *Xiyu tongwen zhi* (Unified language gazetteer of the Western Regions), was a six-language glossary of place names and genealogies of the preeminent families from Xinjiang, Qinghai and Tibet. The function of this project was to standardize Manchu and Chinese transcriptions of Mongolia, Zunghar, Uighur/Turki and Tibetan to aid in the completion of the descriptive gazetteer of Xinjiang.¹²⁸ The contents of these projects reveal Qing ideological imperatives concerning Xinjiang. These works, taken collectively, had three clear ideological purposes. First, to categorically assert that Xinjiang was part of the empire. Second, by having a hexaglot

¹²⁵ James A. Millward, op. cit., pp.70-72.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

glossary of place names in Xinjiang produced, Qianlong intended to demonstrate the universal legitimacy of the Qing and the pluralist scope of his emperorship.¹²⁹ Third, the gazetteer commemorating the final extermination of the Zunghars and the subjugation of the Altishahr alluded to the achievements of the Han and Tang dynasties implying that the Qing conquest was undertaken to restore the ancient imperial boundaries rather than to demonstrate Qing military power.¹³⁰ Moreover, the three projects – large scale maps, illustrated gazetteer and language glossary – devoted considerable space to historical concerns. The gazetteer, for example, attempted to associate Qianlong-era place names with Chinese names used during the Han and Tang eras and presented an historical atlas of the ‘Western Regions’ organized chronologically by dynasty. This theme also ran through the hexaglot glossary where contemporary place names were “rectified” by association with historical precedents.¹³¹ The point of such an exercise was to establish a link between the Qing’s contemporary hold on Xinjiang and those of past dynasties, most notably the Han and Tang. The linkage of Han and Tang era place names are significant, as these were the last *Chinese* dynasties to establish a foothold in the “Western Regions”. Thus the geographical projects begun under Kangxi and greatly extended by Qianlong, served not only practical functions (supplying accurate geographical data for campaigns etc) but more importantly facilitated consolidation of Qing legitimacy in China *and* Inner Asia.

¹²⁸ see James A. Millward, op. cit., pp.74-75.& Laura Newby, “Xinjiang: In Search of an Identity”, op.cit., pp.67-68.

¹²⁹ See James A. Millward, op. cit., Laura Newby, op. cit., pp.68-69, & Pamela Kyle Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, op. cit., pp,10-52.

¹³⁰ James A. Millward, op. cit., pp.74-75.

¹³¹ Ibid, op. cit., p.77.

The importance of these projects for the Qing was clear enough, the construction of a complex of knowledge of Xinjiang was necessary to enable the Qing to conquer, govern and develop the region. Once again this imperative to measure and gather ‘scientific’ data concerning geographic and ethnographic information to underpin imperial control was analogous to European state-building in the same period. By collecting and systematizing Qing knowledge of Xinjiang, the Qing was asserting that Xinjiang was an integral part of the empire. This has proved to be a powerful and enduring ideological assertion as it has framed successive Chinese government’s conception of Xinjiang’s relation to China. But the scope and importance of this construction of knowledge goes beyond this concern with what lay within the boundaries, no matter how nebulous, of the Qing realm. Although this was and is undoubtedly important, I believe that the relationship between the structure of the administration and the construction of Qing knowledge of Xinjiang is of far greater importance for the subject of this thesis. My key question is how did this relationship interact with or impact on the Qing state’s external relations? As noted previously, the Qing goal in 1759-1820 period in the administration of Xinjiang was to segregate and control it. The geographic/cartographic and ethnographic projects undertaken from the Kangxi to the Qianlong era also reflected this goal. The Qing administrative structure set up in Xinjiang following the conquest also had to deal with forces, phenomena and issues that emanated from regions outside of Qing control. The various cartographic, geographic and ethnographic projects undertaken by the Qing demonstrate the beginnings of a number of key aspects of governmentality. As outlined previously, the purposes of these projects were both practical and ideological. The practical aspects of these projects, ascertaining accurate geographic, ethnographic and demographic data, clearly enabled the Qing state to more

efficiently wield power to conquer, control and rule Xinjiang. In a sense, these themes are the initial formation of tactics or techniques of government in China – that is the formation of an ensemble of institutions, procedures, techniques and tactics that have as their target population.¹³² In this category one could place the Lifan Yuan, as it evidently served practical and ideological purposes, and attempted to facilitate the linkage of the Qing to the diverse peoples of Inner Asia. Yet as argued in the introductory comments of this chapter the ‘internal’ manifestations of these themes are but one side of the coin. The “imperial gaze” was surely not limited or myopic enough to be ignorant of the necessity to survey and construct a complex of knowledge of that which lay outside of the realm? Just as the state needs to “know” and “see” all that lies within its boundaries in order to govern effectively, so too must it develop an understanding of external states’ strengths, weaknesses and capabilities in order to ensure the most basic aim of all states – to exist and survive.¹³³ Therefore, there must be an exploration of the nature and content of Qing external relations with regard to Xinjiang.

There were three major issues or problems concerning external relations for the new Qing administration to address in the 1759-1820 period. These were trade, the Makhdumzada Khojas and the Khanate of Khoqand. Moreover, all three of these problems/issues were connected with varying intensity throughout the 1759-1820 period and interacted to produce a series of pragmatic responses from the Qing authorities in Xinjiang. The consolidation of Qing control over Xinjiang facilitated an increase in

¹³² Michel Foucault, “Governmentality” in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon & Peter Miller (eds.), *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp.102-103.

¹³³ Michel Foucault, “Politics and Reason” in Lawrence D. Kritzman (ed.), *Michael Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture, Interviews & Other Writings, 1977-1984*, (New York: Routledge, 1988), pp.76-82.

foreign merchant activity after the ravages of the extended Zunghar wars from the 1720s-1750s. Thus traders from Khoqand, Bukhara, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Baltistan and Ladakh took advantage of the “Pax Manjurica” and frequented Kashgar, Yarkand and other major cities of the Altishahr.¹³⁴ With this influx of non-Qing subjects it was necessary for the Qing to manage and if possible control these foreign traders and merchants. This was particularly important considering that many of the foreign merchants and traders were from “non-tributary” states. It is important to note that the empire’s official attitude towards trade categorized it as concession granted in order to ensure peace along the frontiers and a properly submissive posture toward the throne.¹³⁵ Yet this official attitude proved to be malleable. Fletcher notes that the Qing administration in Xinjiang made little distinction between the various foreign traders and merchants referring to them as either “Andijanis” (a city in the Ferghana valley under Khoqandi control) or “Kashmiris”. The point of distinction appears to have been that those who traded at Kashgar became “Andijanis” while those who traded in Yarkand became “Kashmiris”. This was perhaps a valid distinction given that the bulk of traders operating in Kashgar were from the Khanate of Khoqand and other parts of western Central Asia while those in Yarkand were generally from India, Tibet, Ladakh and Afghanistan.¹³⁶ The classification of foreign traders in this manner, however, did allow the Qing authorities to permit an influx of non-tributary traders. This interpretation of official policy regarding trade served an important purpose when coupled with Qing regulations regarding the rights and duties of the native Altishahri traders. Moreover, the Qing state’s overall aim to segregate Xinjiang from China proper was also felt. First, the system of taxation and customs placed on the merchants and

¹³⁴ Saguchi Toru, “Kashgaria”, op. cit., p.71.

¹³⁵ Joseph F. Fletcher, “Ch’ing Inner Asia c.1800”, op. cit., p.84.

traders strongly favoured the foreign traders, and in terms of inter-Xinjiang and Xinjiang-China trade official policy discriminated in favour of Han Chinese merchants.¹³⁷ For example, Altishahri traders who sold to traders from China proper were taxed at 10% of the value of goods sold, whereas Han Chinese merchants were taxed as little as 3.5%. Foreign traders in contrast were taxed at a rate of 5%.¹³⁸ Second, movement between the major cities of Xinjiang was severely constrained by the authorities. This was especially true regarding the cities of Ush Turfan and Karashahr where the trade economies of Zungharia, Altishahr and China proper met. In an effort to maintain the policy of segregating not only Xinjiang from China proper but of segregating Zungharia and Altishahr, Altishahri and foreign merchants were not permitted to enter the cities. This was achieved by the institution of the *lu biao* or “travel certificate” system. If a Altishahri wanted to travel between his home town/village and another town he had to obtain from the local authorities a certificate that listed his name, age, sex, address and physical characteristics.¹³⁹ The Altishahri traders were also further handicapped by the restriction of travel abroad for Qing subjects which came into force around 1794.¹⁴⁰ Third, the fact that the Qing authorities classified trade as a concession within the boundaries of a “tributary” relationship afforded the foreign merchants both a measure of autonomy and leverage over the authorities compared to the local traders. In this case the Khoqandi merchants and traders (the “Andijanis”) were in the most favourable position given their close

¹³⁶ Ibid, op. cit., p.84-85.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Morris Rossabi, *China and Inner Asia: From 1368 to the Present Day*, (London: Thames &Hudson, 1975), p.175.

¹³⁹ Lee Fui-Hsiang, *The Turkic Moslem Problem in Sinkiang: A Case Study of the Chinese Communists' Nationality Policy*, (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1973), p.12.

¹⁴⁰ Joseph F. Fletcher, “Ch’ing Inner Asia c.1800”, pp.81-83.

linguistic, cultural and religious affinity with the local population.¹⁴¹ Moreover, the Khoqandi merchants came to dominate the foreign trading community in the Altishahr, particularly in Kashgar where the Kashgar *hakim beg* and the foreign trading community appointed a senior foreign merchant as a “superintendent of trade” to oversee and represent the interests of the foreign traders. The foreign merchants and traders by this arrangement came to enjoy considerable autonomy from Qing officialdom in the Altishahr.¹⁴²

The question arises as to why the Qing administration sought to constrain the Altishahri trading/merchant class and place them in such a disadvantage in relation to their foreign and Han Chinese counterparts? Three major reasons may perhaps be postulated for this active discrimination, all of which derive from the overarching goal of Qing administration between 1759-1820. First, the Qing restricted the right of travel of Altishahri traders abroad, particularly to the territories of Khoqand, due to their fear that the exiled Makhdumzada Khojas would resuscitate links with them. Second, the restriction of movement for Altishahri traders between the major oasis centers, such as Kashgar and Yarkand, via the *lu biao* system was meant to prevent the development of social and political cohesion amongst the Muslim communities of the region. Third, the fact that most Altishahri traders/merchants were economically discriminated against would aid in the effective neutralization in their ability to support the development of Islamic institutions.

¹⁴¹ Ibid, p.84.

¹⁴² Ibid.

These internal measures were also coupled with a pragmatic attitude towards the Khanate of Khoqand. The Qing no doubt assumed this attitude given that the Qing authorities in Xinjiang were aware of Khoqand's harbouring of the Makhdumzada Khojas after their defeat in the late 1750s. The issues of Khoqand and the Makhdumzada Khojas would prove to be the most problematic and enduring for the Qing authorities in Xinjiang. The Makhdumzada Khojas were the descendents of Ahmad Kasani (1461-1542), a Naqshbandi Sufi teacher from Bukhara who was known as the Makhdum-i A'zam ("the Supreme Teacher").¹⁴³ The Makhdum-i A'zam in fact never set foot in Xinjiang, but his second son Muhammad Ishaq Wali (d.1599) journeyed in the region.¹⁴⁴ Muhammad Ishaq Wali's descendents and followers, however, succeeded in developing significant influence amongst the secular rulers of the Altishahr and became known as the Ishaqis or the Qara Taghliqs ("Black Mountaineers"). According to Kim, a generation later the descendents and followers of the Makhdum-i A'zam's eldest son, Muhammad Amin (d.1597/98), also began to move into the Altishahr where they were viewed with suspicion by the Ishaqi's who saw them as rivals.¹⁴⁵ This second lineage of Makhdumzadas established a base of support and power in Yarkand under the leadership of Muhammad Amin's son Khoja Yusuf (d.1652-53) and grandson Khoja Afaq (d. 1693-94). Subsequently they became known as the Afaqis or Ag Taghliqs ("White Mountaineers") and established an intense rivalry with the Ishaqis for influence in the region that played a significant role in its political future.

¹⁴³ Joseph F. Fletcher, "The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China", in Beatrice Manz (ed.), *Studies on Chinese and Islamic Inner Asia*, (Aldershot: Varioum, 1995), p.7.

¹⁴⁴ see Joseph F. Fletcher, "The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China", op. cit., pp.8-11 & Hodong Kim, *Holy War in China*, op. cit., p.8.

The Zunghars and then the Qing preyed upon the existence of two factions of the Makhdumzadas during the late 17th and early 18th centuries. In the mid-17th century the rivalry between the Ishaqis and Afaqis developed into overt violent confrontation and ultimately resulted in the expulsion of Khoja Afaq sometime in the 1670s. Upon his expulsion Khoja Afaq sought aid from the Zunghar ruler, Galdan Khan (d.1696), which precipitated a Zunghar invasion of the Altishahr in 1680 that established Zunghar colonial rule over the region with the Afaqi serving as their representatives. Towards the end of Galdan's rule, however, the Afaqi taking advantage of Galdan's preoccupation with the Qing (noted earlier) led an anti-Zunghar rebellion that over-turned Zunghar power in the Altishahr. This independence proved short-lived with Galdan's successor Tsewang Rabten (d.1727) having consolidated his position amongst the various "leagues" of Zunghars once more invading and subjugating the Altishahr around 1700.¹⁴⁶ Upon the reassertion of Zunghar power the Ishaqi were favored as the local representatives of the victors, while the Afaqi Khojas were held as hostages in the Zunghar capital, Ili.¹⁴⁷ Zunghar rule remained relatively stable in the Altishahr until the death of their last effective khan, Galdan Tsering (r.1727-1745), set off decade-long succession struggle that ultimately resulted in Qing intervention in the 1750s. As noted earlier, a Qing expeditionary force captured Ili in June 1755 and subsequently installed one of the Zunghar contenders, Amursana as khan. In the process the Qing freed the two Afaqi khojas held hostage by the Zunghars, the brothers Burhan al-Din and Khoja-I Jahan, and used them to extend Qing power south of the Tien Shan.¹⁴⁸ At the close of 1755 the Afaqi Khojas, with Zunghar and Qing troops, defeated the Ishaqi and

¹⁴⁵ Hodong Kim, *op. cit.*, pp.8-9.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid*, p.9 & Joseph F. Fletcher, "China and Central Asia, 1368-1884", *op. cit.*, p.218.

¹⁴⁷ Hodong Kim, *op. cit.*, p.9 & Joseph F. Fletcher, "China and Central Asia, 1368-1884", *op. cit.*, p.219.

¹⁴⁸ Joseph F. Fletcher, "China and Central Asia, 1368-1884", *op. cit.*, p. 219.

established Qing rule in the Altishahr. Qing rule was, however, challenged almost simultaneously north and south of the Tien Shan in 1756-57 with Amursana attempting to revive Zunghar power in Ili and the Afaqi khojas, in an act of open defiance, massacring a Qing court mission.¹⁴⁹ A Qing expeditionary force defeated Amursana in 1757 and reinforced from Turfan undertook the subjugation of the Afaqi Khojas challenge in the Altishahr. This force took the Afaqi strongholds of Kashgar and Yarkand by June 1759 and the Elder and Younger Khoja fled to Badakhshan (in contemporary Afghanistan) where they were subsequently killed by the region's ruler, Sultan Shah, and their heads sent to the Qing.¹⁵⁰

As we saw earlier, the Qing having expelled the Afaqi Khojas favoured their rivals the Ishaqis in the post-conquest consolidation of Qing rule. Although the Ishaqi were given official posts in the Qing administration, it was the now Khoqand-exiled Afaqi lineage that held the esteem and loyalty of most of the population.¹⁵¹ Thus a major determining factor in the Qing policy toward Khoqand was to manage and possibly negate the threat of the Afaqi Makhdumzadas. To this end the Qing applied the “traditional” Chinese method of ensuring frontier stability by sending the Khan of Khoqand an annual stipend of 10 000 to 50 000 silver taels.¹⁵² As noted previously the Qing authorities, in line with the official attitude towards trade (ie. a concession granted in return for a peace on the frontiers etc.), also permitted Khoqand quite favourable trading rights in Xinjiang. These measures employed by the Qing to deal with the Afaqi Makhdumzada threat effectively persuaded Khoqand to keep their guests on a relatively tight leash

¹⁴⁹ See Ibid, Alistair Lamb, "Sinkiang Under the Manchus and the Chinese Republic", op. cit., pp.298-299 & Hodong Kim, op. cit., pp.9-10.

¹⁵⁰ Hodong Kim, op. cit., p.10.

¹⁵¹ Joseph F. Fletcher, “The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China”, op. cit., pp.34-35.

initially.¹⁵³ This situation did, however, provide Khoqand with a valuable and tangible bargaining chip with which to gain even greater concessions from the Qing if the need arose. Moreover, the dominance of Khoqandi merchants and traders in the Altishahr, especially in the Afaqi stronghold of Kashgar, permitted the exiled Afaqi Makhdumzadas to maintain contact with their supporters.¹⁵⁴

At the turn of the 19th century Qing rule in Xinjiang appeared to be secure and unchallenged. This situation was to prove illusory with almost constant internal and external challenges against Qing rule throughout the 19th century. The leader of the Afaqi Makhdumzadas, Khoja Burhan ad-Din had been driven into Badakshan by the Qing conquest and with his death soon after, the leadership passed to his son Muhammad Amin, also known as Samsaq. Samsaq had eventually taken refuge in Khoqand where he was kept on a tight leash due to Khoqand's favourable relationship with the Qing in Xinjiang. Upon Samsaq's death in 1798 his three sons Muhammad Yusuf, Jahangir and Baha' ad-Din inherited the Afaqi cause.¹⁵⁵ The eldest, Muhammad Yusuf reinitiated the attempt to regain Altishahr with a raid on Qing positions along the frontier in 1798/99 that was seen off by Qing troops. With this unsuccessful foray the leadership apparently passed to Jahangir who resolved to lead a jihad against the Qing.¹⁵⁶ Jahangir was, however, restrained by Khoqand, which did not wish to unsettle its beneficial relationship with the Qing. Jahangir's quest for jihad was further undermined by the alignment of Khoqand and many of the Altishahri begs, who did not

¹⁵² Joseph F. Fletcher, "Ch'ing Inner Asia c.1800", op. cit., p.88.

¹⁵³ Hodong Kim, op. cit., p.20.

¹⁵⁴ Joseph F. Fletcher, "Ch'ing Inner Asia c.1800", op. cit., pp.87-88.

¹⁵⁵ Saguchi Toru, "Kashgaria", *Acta Asiatica*, Vol 34 (1978), p.74.

¹⁵⁶ Joseph F. Fletcher, "The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China", op.cit., 36.

wish to see it come to fruition as it would be damaging to Khoqand-Altishahr trade.¹⁵⁷ This alignment apparently encouraged the Khan of Khoqand, Muhammad Umar Khan in 1813, to request permission to station an official Khoqandi political agent to replace the “superintendent of trade” at Kashgar who would also assume the role of the *hakim beg* and tax Khoqandi merchants. The Khan’s blatant attempt to gain extraterritoriality and the right to levy taxation on Qing soil predictably provoked a sharp rebuke from the military-governor in Ili.¹⁵⁸ This turn of events prompted the Khan to play the trump card that Khoqand had been holding close to its chest for just such an occasion. In 1814-15 the Khan directly threatened the military-governor that he had been restraining the Afaqi Makhdumzadas and should be rewarded with a reduction in customs duties for Khoqandi merchants. The Qing in response revoked the Khan’s annual silver stipend and privilege of sending tribute missions to Peking. Despite the dispatch of a number of Khoqandi ambassadors to Kashgar no compromise was reached and the Khan made good on his threat to release the Afaqi Makhdumzadas.¹⁵⁹

The Imperial Prospect in Xinjiang 1820-1911: From Inner Asian Dependency to Province

The ensuing “Jahangir jihad” between 1820 and 1828 demonstrated that the Afaqi Makhdumzadas still held enough prestige and support to significantly question Qing legitimacy in the Altishahr. More importantly the jihad induced the genesis of a review of official policy regarding Xinjiang. This reevaluation of the Qing approach encompassed both the “internal” aspects of Xinjiang’s administration and its “external”

¹⁵⁷ Joseph F. Fletcher, “Ch’ing Inner Asia c.1800”, op. cit., p.89.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

aspects. The 1820-1884 period was one of constant challenges to Qing rule in Xinjiang and was characterized by the continued interaction of internal and external forces and dynamics. Although, as demonstrated above, these phenomena were evident during the 1759-1820 period, the point of rupture concerns the Qing response to these forces. What occurred in the intervening sixty-four years between 1820 and 1884 was a gradual transformation of a long-standing complex of tactics and techniques of government. Moreover, the interaction of the internal and external forces referred to above, and a series of pragmatic responses to them on behalf of the Qing brought about this transformation. This is not to argue that Qing policy was formulated on an ad hoc basis but rather the policies that developed over this period were often based upon a fundamental questioning of existing structures, techniques and tactics. In essence this was nothing other than the beginnings of a questioning and reformulation of the rationality of the state, that arguably has yet to be completed in China. Xinjiang over the 1820-1884 period was the crucible of these processes and provides an illuminating case of the transition of the Qing state from an Inner Asian *and* Chinese empire, to a Chinese empire. The consequences and implications of this transition were not minor. The transition called into question both the legitimacy of Qing imperial ideology and consequently the political, economic, social and cultural imperatives that flowed from it. This process can be seen in the breakdown of the Qing goal of Inner Asian segregation not only in Xinjiang but also in Mongolia and Manchuria. In the specific context of Xinjiang, the breakdown of the notion of the veracity of segregation as a goal began as early as 1828 with Nayanceng's proposals regarding Han colonisation, but it wasn't fully comprehended until the end of the Muslim rebellions. This process was

¹⁵⁹ Joseph F. Fletcher, "The Heyday of the Ch'ing Order in Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet", in Denis Twitchett & John K. Fairbank, (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China, Vol.10, Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911*,

also felt concerning the empire's external relations in Xinjiang, whereby as early as 1835 the Qing had acceded to the first "unequal" treaty to a foreign power – Khoqand. Yet it was to culminate in a diplomatic victory of sorts for the Qing during the "Ili crisis" over a European power in 1881. The ramifications of this have impacted and continue to influence the construction of state power in China – that is the government rationality of what has become the People's Republic of China.

Although Jahangir's efforts between 1820 and 1825 resulted in little more than a series of raids on frontier posts that were easily repulsed, his invasion of 1826 was not so easily dealt with. The Khan of Khoqand, who obviously deemed it the most effective way of reestablishing its predominant position in Xinjiang, supported Jahangir's invasion financially and militarily. Jahangir's military success near Kashgar induced the population to rise in his support and this in turn precipitated popular revolts in Yangi Hissar, Yarkand and Khotan.¹⁶⁰ Upon these successes the Khan of Khoqand entered Altishahr at the head of a 10 000 man strong army.¹⁶¹ These initial successes were, however, undermined by the Afaqi-Ishaqi divide and the emergence of suspicion between Jahangir and the Khan of Khoqand. Jahangir and his Afaqi supporters used the opportunity to settle some old scores with the Ishaqi who, due to their collaboration with the Qing, clung to the status quo.¹⁶² The Qing mounted a reconquest of the regions under Jahangir's control in 1827 and successfully expelled his forces from the Altishahr. Moreover, a Qing expedition succeeded in capturing the fugitive Afaqi Khoja

Pt. I, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p.361.

¹⁶⁰ Joseph F. Fletcher, "The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China", *op. cit.*, p.36 & Hodong Kim, *op. cit.*, p.25.

¹⁶¹ Joseph F. Fletcher, "The Heyday of the Ch'ing Order in Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet", *op. cit.*, p.363.

¹⁶² *Ibid*, p.365.

in 1828, who was subsequently sent to Peking and executed by “a thousand cuts”.¹⁶³ Jahangir’s failure and the Qing reconquest of the Altishahr did not, however, solve the problems posed by both the Makhdumzadas and Khoqand for Qing authority.

The invasion produced a reevaluation of Qing policy not only with respect to administrative policies within the boundaries of Xinjiang but also in relation to external affairs. A new governor-general, Nayanceng, was dispatched to Xinjiang by the court and made responsible for a review of Qing policy. The governor-general made a number of wide-reaching recommendations regarding administrative reforms. These recommendations were characterized by an uncompromising stance regarding Khoqand and the Afaqi Makhdumzadas. Regarding the internal administrative reforms the governor-general recommended the confiscation of the land and property of those guilty of rebellion (both foreign merchants and Altishahris) and the establishment of government monopolies that reserved the right to trade with foreigners first. Furthermore, he recommended two proposals that foreshadowed the transformation of the Qing policy of segregation of Inner Asia - the establishment of military farms in the Altishahr and the encouragement of agricultural colonists from China proper to settle Altishahr. His proposals for external affairs were to place an embargo on Khoqand’s trade with the Altishahr until Khoqand delivered the surviving Afaqi Makhdumzadas and the deportation of all Khoqandis.¹⁶⁴ The court accepted all of his proposals except those regarding the establishment of military farms and agricultural colonisation. Therefore, the court balked at the suggestion of radical changes to the structure and techniques of rule established after the conquest. Yet the court did accept the suggested

¹⁶³ Ibid, p.366 & Saguchi Toru, op. cit., p.75.

changes to the management of external affairs, which raises the possibility that the court viewed Jahangir's invasion as stemming entirely from external causes. Perhaps this was true but could it be that the court had begun to perceive that as long as the web of linkages existing between Xinjiang and the neighbouring regions of Central Asia endured, Qing legitimacy and authority would be challenged? I think the validity and influence of this perception regarding Qing policy became greater throughout the rest of the 19th century, consequently transforming Xinjiang's relation to China.

The attempt to nullify the threat of the Afaqi Khojas and Khoqand by cutting all avenues of interaction proved to be counter-productive. The Qing embargo struck at the source of Khoqand's power and strength – Xinjiang-Central Asia trade.¹⁶⁵ Khoqand thus resolved to reestablish its dominance in Xinjiang, especially given it could still play the Afaqi Khoja card. Khoqand invaded Altishahr in 1830 with Jahangir's elder brother, Muhammad Yusuf Khoja, at the head of the army. Yet once again the Afaqi-Ishaqi divide prevented the Khoja's Khoqandi forces from capturing any of the major centers in the Altishahr, and Muhammad Yusuf retreated back to Khoqand before an oncoming Qing relief force.¹⁶⁶ Although the Afaqi cause had again been thwarted, Khoqand's desire to reestablish its commercial predominance in Xinjiang had not. The Qing, in light of a decade of conflict with Khoqand (either indirectly during Jahangir's jihad or directly in 1830), lifted the trade embargo in 1831. Following the resumption of trade a further understanding was reached whereby the Xinjiang authorities allowed the free movement of Khoqandi merchants and religious "medicants" to the Altishahr.

¹⁶⁴ Joseph F. Fletcher, "The Heyday of the Ch'ing Order in Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet", *op. cit.*, 367-369.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.* & Saguchi Toru, *op. cit.*, pp.75-76.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.* & Saguchi Toru, *op. cit.*, pp.75-76.

Additionally the Qing authorities compensated Khoqandi merchants for the property confiscated after Jahangir's jihad and exempted them from customs duties.¹⁶⁷ Such measures represented an over-turning of the uncompromising policies implemented between 1828-1830 and effectively demonstrated Khoqand's geographic and strategic advantage over the Qing in the Altishahr. This state of affairs could not stand if the Qing wanted to ensure an extended period of stability on its Central Asian frontiers. The military capabilities of the Qing authorities were deemed to be insufficient south of the Tien Shan and the southern military district's troop strength was boosted to 15 000 men. An increase in troop strength south of the Tien Shan of this magnitude required additional revenue that the stretched finances of the empire could not sustain indefinitely. Therefore, some initiative was required in order to help make the region's military forces become self-sufficient. Between 1831 and 1834 the Qing broke their long-standing policy of segregating Inner Asia and approved the immigration of Han Chinese civilians to the Altishahr.¹⁶⁸ Thus the Qing began a process of population transfer that has continued in varying intensity into the 21st century. But these measures were not complete without the resolution of the outstanding problem regarding Xinjiang's external relations – Khoqand.

The treaty eventually agreed to by the Qing and Khoqand is regarded as China's first "unequal" treaty by Joseph Fletcher, who also argues that it served as a precedent for Qing dealings with the Europeans on China's coasts.¹⁶⁹ The treaty came about due to the continuation of Khoqand's efforts to force the Qing authorities in Xinjiang to not

¹⁶⁷ Joseph F. Fletcher, "The Heyday of the Ch'ing Order in Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet", *op. cit.*, pp.372-373.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p.374. From 1834 onward the Qing encouraged the migration of poor peasants from China proper to the Altishahr.

only reestablish its preeminent commercial position but to establish a trade monopoly over the Altishahr-Central Asia trade. Once again this revolved around a Khoqandi request to station official political and commercial agents in the major cities of the Altishahr, especially Kashgar and Yarkand, who would be permitted to levy customs duties on all foreign traders.¹⁷⁰ The Qing permitted the reestablishment of the commercial agents, given the precedent of the “superintendent of trade”, but refused the notion of political agents. Khoqand, by a series of military maneuvers along the still ill-defined Pamir frontier in the southwest in 1832 forced the Qing to adopt a more compromising attitude. The treaty of 1835 saw the Qing cede full extraterritoriality to Khoqand allowing:

(1) that Kokand should have the right to station a resident political representative (or *asakal*) at Kashgar and to station commercial agents (also called *asakals*) at Ush Turfan, Aksu, Yangi Hissar, Yarkand and Khotan under the Kashgar resident’s authority; (2) that these *asakals* should have consular powers and judicial and police jurisdiction over the foreigners who came to Altishahr; (3) that these *asakals* should have the right to levy customs duties (*baj*) on all goods imported into Altishahr by foreigners.¹⁷¹

It should be noted, however, that the Khoqand demanded no principle of equality be included in the treaty. Furthermore, the Qing emperor’s claims to universal legitimacy and political primacy meant that the ceding of extraterritoriality was not officially perceived as compromising the sovereignty of the empire.¹⁷² The notion of the treaty as “unequal” may very well be true in terms of the concessions granted by the Qing to Khoqand but the actual effects of it were arguably beneficial to the Qing in the short term. The court now reasoned that it was Nayanceng’s uncompromising policies that were the cause of Khoqand’s continued intransigence. Khoqand in return for the

¹⁶⁹ Ibid, pp.379-384.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid, p.375.

¹⁷¹ Ibid, p.377.

concessions wrung out of the Qing authorities was supposed to respect the peace and restrain the Makhdumzada Khojas. The Qing, by acceding to Khoqand's demands, seemingly bought peace and order along its Central Asian frontier for the next decade.¹⁷³

This would prove to be but a brief respite from the continued efforts of the Khojas, with Khoqandi sponsorship, to instigate anti-Qing jihads from the late 1840s to the 1880s. In the 1835 to mid-1840s the Qing authorities were able to concentrate their endeavours on strengthening their hold on Xinjiang. It will be remembered that the Qing had begun to encourage the settlement of Han Chinese agricultural colonists in the Altishahr in the early 1830s. The Daoguang Emperor decided to allow the establishment of some Han civilian agricultural colonies, and two sites near Kashgar were developed in 1832. Yet, in 1834 the emperor revoked his decision regarding Han civilian agriculture colonies, fearing that it would precipitate ethnic conflict and undermine Qing control.¹⁷⁴ According to Borei, the emperor was convinced to reverse this decision the following year by Brigadier General Tang Feng who persuaded the him of the benefits of agricultural colonies for border defense.¹⁷⁵ The establishment of these colonies after 1835, however, proved to be problematic. Few Han Chinese were attracted to remote Xinjiang and upon their arrival they faced many difficulties, including the construction and maintenance of irrigation channels and salinisation of the soil due to over irrigation.¹⁷⁶ Yet by the mid-1840s the colonies became established mainly due to the waiving of land taxes for newly arrived Han Chinese colonists and a significant land

¹⁷² Ibid, pp.377-378.

¹⁷³ Joseph F. Flether, "China and Central Asia, 1368-1884", pp.222-223.

¹⁷⁴ Dorothy V. Borei, "Ethnic Conflict and Qing Land Policy in Southern Xinjiang", op. cit., p.289.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid, pp.289-291.

reclamation program.¹⁷⁷ Contemporaneously the Qing also established military farming colonies in the Altishahr that were supplemented by the admittance of Han Chinese colonist volunteers. Moreover, after 1845 soldiers who had completed their tour-of-duty were permitted to remain as farmers with their families. These policies once again aimed to help ease population pressures in China proper, strengthen the Qing presence in the Altishahr and integrate the region more fully with the empire.¹⁷⁸

By the late 1840s the Qing had once again consolidated their hold on Xinjiang after the challenges from the Makhdumzadas and Khoqand. The emergence of Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia, however, soon complicated matters. With Britain involved in conflicts with China and Afghanistan, rumours spread in Xinjiang that the British were attempting to contact the Makhdumzadas.¹⁷⁹ While this rumour proved baseless it did foreshadow the changing geopolitical climate of Central Asia and the covert political chicanery that would characterise the “Great Game”.¹⁸⁰ Khoqand, however, once more attempted to intensify its efforts to extract further concessions from the Qing authorities in Xinjiang by sponsoring further Makhdumzada incursions into Qing territory in 1847, 1852, 1857 and 1861.¹⁸¹ After each incursion the Qing fell back on the policy of maintaining Khoqand’s commercial privileges in the hope that Khoqand would eventually find peace and order to its benefit. Internally, the ravages visited upon the Altishahri population during each Makhdumzada incursion began to diminish Afaqi

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Joseph F. Fletcher, “The Heyday of the Ch’ing Order in Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet”, op. cit., pp.385-386; Fletcher argues that between 1845-1848 up to 80 000 acres of land had been reclaimed in the Altishahr.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid, pp.386-387.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, p.387. Britain was in the midst of the first Anglo-Afghan War and the Opium War.

¹⁸⁰ see Peter Hopkirk, *The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia*, (New York: Kodansha International, 1992).

prestige. Consequently the prestige of the Ishaqi increased, as too did their support of Qing rule.¹⁸² Despite this, however, the Naqshbandiyya grew in influence in Xinjiang and both the Afaqi and the Ishaqi maintained their strongholds in Kashgar and Yarkand respectively. The enduring prestige and influence of the Naqshbandiyya in Xinjiang carried with it an underlying and undeniable challenge to Qing rule that would fuel the last Makhdumzada and Khoqandi inspired jihad.¹⁸³

The famous Yaqub Beg rebellion in Xinjiang was the culmination of the three major problems faced by the Qing in their external relations – trade, Khoqand and the Makhdumzadas. The rebellion was touched off as a result of the influence of the Muslim rebellions in Shaanxi and Gansu in the early 1860s. The Qing administration and military forces in Xinjiang were isolated from China proper and as a result anti-Qing forces seized their opportunity to finally oust their overlords. In 1864 six separate jihads were declared in six different regions against Qing rule in Xinjiang. All six jihads were either led or influenced by Naqshbandi masters or initiates yet the diverse ethnic and religious nature of the jihads' participants hindered any possibility of a united effort against the common enemy.¹⁸⁴ On the contrary, several leaders of the jihads actively conspired against one another. The leaders of the Urumchi and Kucha jihads, Toming (a Hui) and Rashidin Khan Khoja, cooperated which prompted the leaders of the Kashgar jihad to appeal to the Khan of Khoqand to dispatch a Makhdumzada Khoja to lead the

¹⁸¹ Joseph Fletcher, "The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China", op. cit., pp.36-37 & Saguchi Toru, "Kasgaria", op. cit., pp.76-77.

¹⁸² Joseph F. Fletcher, "The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China", op. cit., p.37.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ see Ibid & Kwang-Ching Liu and Richard J. Smith, "The Military Challenge: the North-West and the Coast", in John K. Fairbank and Kwang-Ching Liu (eds), *The Cambridge History of China, Vol II, Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, Part 2*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p.224.

rebellion.¹⁸⁵ Khoqand duly responded in 1865-66 by sending Jahangir's son, Buzurg Khan, with a small force led by a certain Khoqandi commander by the name of Yaqub Beg. Yaqub Beg soon proved himself to be a capable military leader and a shrewd political operator. The Khoqandi and Buzurg Khan quickly eliminated the Kashgar leaders who had invited them and defeated Rashidin Khoja. With these successes Yaqub Beg toppled his erstwhile superior, Buzurg Khan and forced him into exile. Thus by 1868 Yaqub Beg controlled all of western Altishahr and established himself as ruler at Kashgar with the title of *Badawlat* (the Fortunate)¹⁸⁶. Yaqub Beg also appropriated the Afaqi prestige and power to bolster his political legitimacy and declared a jihad against not only the Qing but also against the Hui in Urumchi. He made good on this declaration and defeated Toming's Hui forces at Urumchi in 1870, and then took Turfan by November 1870.¹⁸⁷

Yaqub Beg's victories had important repercussions for both the futures of his emirate and Qing foreign relations. The only major region of Xinjiang that lay outside of Yaqub Beg's control by the close of 1870 was the "Ili Sultanate" of A'la Khan at Kulja. The Russian's became convinced that Yaqub Beg was attempting to forge an alliance with A'la Khan when, late in 1870 the Russian envoy Borodin met Yaqub Beg's own envoy en route to Kulja.¹⁸⁸ The Russian's thus determined to prevent the establishment of such a hostile alliance in the strategic Ili region. Between 24 June and 4 July 1871 Russian

¹⁸⁵ Joseph F. Fletcher, "The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China", op. cit., pp.40-41.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid & Kwang-Ching Liu and Richard J. Smith, "The Military Challenge: the North-West and the Coast", p.223.

¹⁸⁷ Hodong Kim, *Holy War in China*, op. cit., p.140.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid, p.141.

troops occupied the Ili region demonstrating that Xinjiang was no longer simply a part of Central Asia but lay at the crossroads of three empires – British, Russian and Qing.¹⁸⁹ Britain was favourably disposed to Yaqub's movement, as the creation of a state independent of both Chinese and Russian influence was seen as enhancing Britain's ability to secure northern India from possible Russian penetration.¹⁹⁰ The Russians on the other hand were wary of Yaqub's largely Muslim rebellion, as it feared the rebellion's possible influence upon the Muslim peoples of Russia's recently acquired possessions west of Xinjiang, and were not prepared to jeopardise the favourable concession previously acquired from the Qing in Xinjiang.¹⁹¹ The Russians therefore initially supported Qing authority in Xinjiang and notified the Qing Court that their occupation of Ili was a temporary measure that would end once China had re-established its control over the region.¹⁹² Russia's wariness of Yaqub Beg did not lead them to provide material support to the Qing, as they feared this would push Yaqub Beg toward Britain. To prevent this particular outcome the Russians endeavoured to play a double game and concluded a commercial treaty with Yaqub Beg in 1872.¹⁹³ Russia's attitude to Yaqub's regime was also not improved by his contacts with the Ottoman empire, whereby in 1873 the sultan-caliph bestowed on him the title of emir, military equipment and advisors.¹⁹⁴ Britain, favourably disposed to the creation of an independent state between its Indian possessions and Russia, made exploratory missions

¹⁸⁹ Kwang-Ching Liu and Richard J. Smith, op. cit., pp.224-225 & Hodong Kim, op. cit., p.141.

¹⁹⁰ Lee Fui-Hsiang, op. cit., pp.46-47.

¹⁹¹ Hodong Kim, op. cit., pp.141-142. Russia took Bukhara in 1868, while Khiva and Khoqand were making a final stand against the Russians throughout Yaqub Beg's rebellion.

¹⁹² Edmund O. Clubb, op. cit., p. 106.

¹⁹³ Lee Fui-Hsiang, op. cit., p.50.

¹⁹⁴ See Hodong Kim, op. cit., pp. 150-155, Louis E. Frechtling, "Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Eastern Turkistan, 1863-1881", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, Vol. 26, Pt. 3 (July 1939), p.479 & Kwang Ching Liu and Richard J. Smith, "The Military Challenge: The North-West and the Coast", op. cit., p.225.

to Yaqub's realm in 1868 and 1870, under R. B. Shaw and Douglas Forsyth.¹⁹⁵ The British enthusiasm for Yaqub Beg's regime was confirmed with Forsyth's presentation of three hundred muskets to the Badawlat in 1873 and the signing of a treaty in 1874 enabling both parties to exchange diplomatic envoys with the status of ambassador.¹⁹⁶ The British also sold arms to Yaqub Beg from 1874 via the "Central Asian Trading Co."¹⁹⁷

Mutual suspicion and the wish to exclude any effective Chinese influence from Central Asia guided the interest and activities of both Russia and Britain in Xinjiang. After 1874 however, these efforts bore little fruit as the Chinese began their reconquest of Xinjiang. This began in 1875 after the Chinese successfully quelled the Muslim rebellions in the neighbouring Shensi and Gansu provinces. The Qing Court's decision to attempt the reconquest of Xinjiang was not a unanimous one, as some argued for the abandonment of Xinjiang in order to focus on blocking foreign penetration from the coastal regions. The Court was swayed however, by General Zuo Zangtang, Imperial Commissioner in Charge of Xinjiang Military Affairs, who argued that if Xinjiang was abandoned it would leave Mongolia vulnerable to Russian expansion and this in turn would leave Peking vulnerable to external threats. General Zuo Zangtang therefore argued that Xinjiang must be retained in order to protect China Proper.¹⁹⁸ Moreover, Zuo Zangtang was influenced by the "statecraft" scholars of the early 19th century who viewed Xinjiang as China's "manifest destiny". These scholars maintained that Qing policy in

¹⁹⁵ See Louis E. Frechtling, "Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Eastern Turkistan, 1863-1881", op. cit., pp.480-482 & Kwang-Ching Liu and Richard J. Smith, op. cit., p.225.

¹⁹⁶ Lee Fui-Hsiang, pp.48-49. & Kwang-Ching Liu and Richard J. Smith, "The Military Challenge: the North-West and the Coast", p.225

¹⁹⁷ Louis E. Frechtling, "Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Eastern Turkistan, 1869-1881", op. cit., p.483.

¹⁹⁸ Kwang-Ching Liu and Richard J. Smith, op. cit., pp.237-238.

Xinjiang must be overhauled in order to secure the frontier. Gong Zizhong, the most famous of these scholars advocated agricultural reclamation, Han settlement, and restructuring of the region's administration on the basis of regular provincial administration. In essence these were advocates of the sinicization of Xinjiang.¹⁹⁹ Zuo Zangtang's troops reasserted Qing control over the bulk of Xinjiang by 1877 due to superior planning, divisions amongst the rebel forces and superior weaponry. In this latter point Zuo's forces were aided by the Russians, who also supplied large quantities of grain to the Qing troops.²⁰⁰ Zuo Zangtang's campaigns against Yaquq Beg's forces were also aided by development of Altishahri disillusionment due to his strict implementation of sharia, heavy taxation to support his army and the dominance of Khoqandis.²⁰¹ The Russians did not, however, readily relinquish their control of the Ili valley, although the Qing had re-established their control over the region. Ili was a strategically important region of Xinjiang for the Qing with its Muzart Pass controlling communications between Zungharia and Altishahr. Control of Ili therefore facilitated control of all of Xinjiang.²⁰²

The Qing dispatched the Manchu official Chonghou in 1878 to Russia charged with negotiating the return of Ili. The resulting 1879 Treaty of Livadia handed Ili back to the Qing in name only with the Qing ceding the Tekes Valley, the Muzart Pass, trade and political privileges in Xinjiang to the Russians and the payment of a five million ruble

¹⁹⁹ James A. Millward, op. cit., pp.82-83.

²⁰⁰ Edmund O. Clubb, op. cit., p.112.

²⁰¹ Laura Newby, "Xinjiang: In Search of an Identity", op. cit., p.76.

²⁰² Immanuel C. Hsu, "Late Ch'ing Foreign Relations, 1866-1905", in John K. Fairbank & Kwang-Ching Liu, *The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 2, Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, Pt.2.*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p.88.

indemnity.²⁰³ Chonghou apparently signed the treaty on 2 October 1879 without the prior approval of the court and when the terms became known and understood in Peking the treaty was repudiated. The subsequent diplomatic crisis almost precipitated a military confrontation between the Qing and the Russians in Xinjiang with Zuo Zangtang bellicosely informing the court of his forces readiness to retake Ili by force. The Russians for their part already had troops deployed in the Ili and for diplomatic effect dispatched twenty-three naval ships to China.²⁰⁴ Military confrontation was averted with the Russians agreeing to the dispatch of a new negotiator, Marquis Zeng Jize, while the hapless Chonguo was sentenced to death on his return to Peking.²⁰⁵ A new treaty, the Treaty of St. Petersburg, was eventually completed in February 1881 and effectively reversed the terms of the Treaty of Livadia. The Qing regained most of the Ili region including the Tekes Valley and Muzart Pass, while the Russian's trade and political privileges in Xinjiang were reduced in return for the increase of the indemnity from five to nine million rubles.²⁰⁶

The Treaty of St. Petersburg has thus been seen as a Qing diplomatic victory, yet its significance is much greater. Throughout the protracted negotiations for both the Livadia and St Petersburg treaties between 1878-1881, the court was divided between those who advocated a conciliatory posture toward the Russians and those who favoured a show of belligerence. This divide essentially followed the same lines as did the debate that occurred after the outbreak of Muslim rebellions in Shaanxi, Gansu and Xinjiang.

²⁰³ Bruce A. Elleman, *Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989*, (London: Routledge, 2001), pp.78-79.

²⁰⁴ See Immanuel Hsu, "Late Ch'ing Foreign Relations, 1866-1905", op. cit., pp.92-95 & Bruce A. Elleman, op. cit., pp.77-78.

²⁰⁵ Chonghou was eventually pardoned as a result of the remonstrations of the Russian and British representatives in Peking see, Immanuel Hsu, "Late Ch'ing Foreign Relations, 1866-1905", op. cit., pp.92-95 op. cit & Bruce A. Elleman, op. cit, pp. 77-78.

Zuo Zangtang, and like-minded officials, once again prevailed in convincing the court of the importance of regaining Xinjiang in its entirety. The convictions of officials such as Zuo Zangtang, as noted previously, regarding Xinjiang's relation to the empire is not surprising given their "statecraft" influences. Moreover, the court's acceptance of the veracity of their arguments regarding Xinjiang's importance to the empire illustrated the transformation of the Qing perception of Xinjiang. Xinjiang was beginning to be no longer perceived as an Inner Asian dependency where concessions to external powers in order to buy peace and stability were feasible. Concessions such as those ceded to Khoqand in the 1830s were no longer possible as they conflicted with the ascendant imperial goals of integrating and assimilating Xinjiang with the rest of the empire.

The scale of Yaqub Beg's "rebellion" convinced the court that decisive measures were needed to finally solve their Xinjiang "problem". Immediately after Zuo Zangtang's reconquest the Qing forces took "bloody reprisals" against those considered guilty of rebellion.²⁰⁷ This initial uncompromising response was coupled with a thorough review of the administration of the region. As noted previously, Zuo Zangtang and other prominent officials were influenced by the 'statecraft' scholars and formulated a characteristically sinicising approach. Zuo recommended to the court that Xinjiang be made a province of the empire and that the administration should thus be based upon the institution of bureaucratic administration identical with that of the interior. The implications of this were that the *beg* system would be dismantled and the administration would be placed in the hands of Han Chinese officials who would preside over a prefectural system. The court approved these plans for Xinjiang and

²⁰⁶ See Edmund O. Clubb, op. cit., p.114, Immanuel Hsu, *The Ili Crisis*, op. cit., & Bruce A. Elleman, op. cit., pp.79-81.

Xinjiang became a province in 1884. The Qing framework of maintaining Inner Asian segregation had thus been categorically ruptured and superceded by the quest to integrate, assimilate and sinicise Xinjiang.²⁰⁸ The goal of Qing rule in Xinjiang had therefore been transformed and this in turn necessitated the reconstruction of Qing knowledge of Xinjiang. The political, cultural and ideological structures created during the Qianlong era were no longer necessary, in fact if left in place they would undermine the new goals of integration, assimilation and sinicisation. This revision of Qing knowledge can be seen in the systematic sinicisation of Turkic-Mongolian place names following the establishment of Xinjiang as a province. It will be recalled that following the initial conquest of Xinjiang in the Qianlong era, Turkic-Mongolian place names were maintained as they upheld Qing imperial ideology – that is they represented the empire’s Inner Asianess and universality – sinicisation was not a goal.²⁰⁹ The representation of the Qing as both Inner Asian and Chinese was no longer desirable. The new sinicised toponyms’ function was to reassert *Chinese* sovereignty over Xinjiang and as such the new toponyms were based on Han Dynasty knowledge.²¹⁰ The implementation of “statecraft” resulted in the beginning of a process of integration and assimilation of Xinjiang and its diverse peoples with an increasingly Han Chinese dominated state that is yet to be completed. Thus the cornerstones of Qing policy from 1884 to 1911 were the encouragement of Han settlement, direct rule by Han Chinese officials and attempts to link Xinjiang with neighbouring provinces. The development of various themes of governmentality were initiated during the Qing Inner Asian “phase” of empire and were continued following the transformation of Qing policy after

²⁰⁷ Joseph F. Fletcher, “The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China”, op. cit., p.42.

²⁰⁸ James A. Millward, op. cit. ,pp.85-87 & Laura Newby, op. cit., p.76.

²⁰⁹ James A. Millward, op. cit., p.89.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

Yaqub Beg's rebellion. The advent of direct rule by an increasingly Han Chinese dominated state ushered in a new phase in the development of governmental techniques but this project was disrupted temporarily by the collapse of the Qing state in 1911.

The Qing and Xinjiang, 1759-1911

The Qing goals regarding Xinjiang between 1759-1820 were to segregate and control the region. Consequently the administrative structure and techniques of rule reflected these goals. Moreover, these imperatives were also reflected in the construction of Qing knowledge of Xinjiang and felt with particular intensity during the Qianlong-era (1735-1795). Key themes of governmentality were initiated and developed in the 1759-1820 period, such as the systematization of Qing knowledge regarding Xinjiang's geography, cartography and ethnography. These projects enabled the Qing to formulate more efficient methods, tactics and techniques for ruling Xinjiang. The quest to "know" or "survey" the new territories not only led to the development of such "internal" measures but also spurred the imperative to develop an understanding or complex of knowledge regarding that which lay outside of the realm. Therefore, the Qing administrative approach within Xinjiang was coupled and interacted with phenomena or dynamics that lay or had their origins outside of Xinjiang – namely the Makhdumzada Khojas, Khoqand and trade. The structure and content of Qing administration in the 1759-1820 period not only reflected the goals of segregation and control, but also the imperatives to control or negate the influence of these three external elements.

The "Jahangir Jihad" from 1820-1828 and Khoqand's subsequent incursions into Xinjiang ca. 1830 effectively called into question the veracity of both Qing

administrative policy and its approach to external affairs. These traumas for Qing rule in Xinjiang initiated an, albeit gradual, reevaluation of the rationality that underpinned the key structures of Qing power in Xinjiang. The results of this reevaluation became felt with varying intensity across the constituent elements of Qing rule in Xinjiang from the mid-1830s onward. The first manifestation of a transformation of Qing techniques/tactics flowed from the “unequal” treaty with Khoqand. Although the treaty itself was an extension of a long-standing pragmatic practice of Qing “diplomacy” in Inner Asia, it provided the motivation and opportunity for the Qing to begin the implementation of a series of reforms regarding the structure and content of “internal” administration. These reforms, most notably those concerning the encouragement of Han Chinese colonisation of the Altishahr, reflected the transformation of the guiding principle of Qing administration of Xinjiang until that time – segregation. Moreover, this point of rupture initiated the movement toward the construction of the Qing as a *Chinese* empire rather than a Chinese *and* Inner Asian empire.

This process was not instantaneous but developed gradually from the 1830s onward and culminated at the end of Yaqub Beg’s “rebellion” with the formation of Xinjiang as a province of the empire. The cornerstone of the new rationality of Qing administration of Xinjiang following Zuo Zangtang’s re-conquest was ultimately integration. The concrete policies that flowed from this new goal were concerned with the extension of a web of political, economic, cultural and ideological linkages from China to Xinjiang. These were important not only in terms of securing the integration of the new province but of negating or minimising the long-standing political, economic, cultural, ethnic, and ideological linkages between Xinjiang and Central Asia. This transformation of the

structure and content of Qing administration was mirrored by a new approach to external affairs. The initial manifestation of this was the Qing stance regarding the Russian occupation of Ili. Although the Treaty of St. Petersburg of 1881 occurred before Xinjiang became a province it demonstrated that the Qing were no longer prepared to “buy off” external powers in Xinjiang with various concessions as had occurred regarding Khoqand in the 1830s. Similar concessions were no longer conceivable given the reevaluation of the structure and tactics of administration of Xinjiang that had begun immediately after Yaqub Beg’s defeat. The focus on integration ultimately flowed through to the conception of how to manage elements of external affairs related to Xinjiang. The major issues confronted by the Qing in Xinjiang regarding external affairs after Yaqub Beg’s defeat were similar in content to those confronted during the 1830s but the form had changed dramatically. The independent states of Central Asia – Khiva, Khoqand and Bukhara – had ceased to exist, incorporated by Russia during the 1870s thus eliminating the troublesome Khoqandi factor. The extinguishing of Khoqand as a factor did not prevent the continuation of the political, economic, religious and cultural links that existed between Xinjiang and Central Asia. The continued existence of these linkages remained a threat to the Qing project in Xinjiang, particularly in light of the transformation of imperial perceptions and goals in Xinjiang.

Qing policy in Xinjiang from 1759 to 1911 could be considered a success as it effectively implanted the notion of Xinjiang as being an integral part of the “Chinese” state into an emerging national consciousness in the early 20th century. The processes initiated directly or indirectly by the Qing over the course of their one hundred and

fifty-year presence in Xinjiang, such as the Qianlong-era geographic and ethnographic projects, established an expanded geographic and political conception of what constituted China. This was demonstrably not the goal of the Qianlong emperor, but the series of challenges confronted by the Qing in Xinjiang throughout the 19th century precipitated the reorientation of techniques and tactics of rule. That Xinjiang did not fall into the hands of an external power or become independent after the collapse of the Qing is a powerful demonstration of the force of the expanded conception of the “geobody” that the Qing had constructed. The end of the Qing-era ushered in a period of fragmentation in China that resulted in the semi-independence of Xinjiang from the Chinese state from 1911 to 1949. Throughout this period Xinjiang experienced the continuation of many of the themes and dynamics that characterised the region in the Qing era. Xinjiang between 1911 and 1949 was characterised by the continued tension between and interaction of forces/dynamics emanating from outside of Xinjiang and from within. Moreover, Xinjiang was ruled throughout this period by Han Chinese elite who were regularly challenged by the convergence of internal and external factors.

CHAPTER 3

XINJIANG AS THE "PAWN AND PIVOT"²¹¹ OF ASIA, 1911-1949: THE ECHOES OF EMPIRE AND WARLORD RULE

The collapse of the Qing in 1911 did not precipitate the "detachment" of what *had become* Xinjiang from the territories inherited and claimed by the new Republic of China. Xinjiang became neither a dependency of an external power (ie. Russia) nor did it become an independent Muslim state. Rather the region entered a period of what many scholars have termed "semi-independence" whereby successive Han Chinese "warlords" ruled the province and exercised effective autonomy from the central government. Simultaneously, however, these "warlords" also theoretically pledged their allegiance to the Republic of China. Yet such a characterisation of the situation of Xinjiang between the collapse of the Qing and foundation of the People's Republic of China also suggests the existence of a point of rupture between the Qing and post-Qing eras in Xinjiang. The conceptualisation of Xinjiang as "semi-independent" during this period, although conveying the tenuous connection between the Republic and the authorities in Xinjiang, does not serve well as a descriptive or analytical guide concerning the complex and fluid dynamics that interacted both within and across Xinjiang (either from Russian/Soviet Central Asia or China proper) in this period. Moreover, such a conceptualisation of the 1911-1949 period ultimately implies that 1949 forms a definitive watershed in the history of Xinjiang's relation to China. This obviously stems from the fact that 1949 witnessed the creation of the avowedly

²¹¹ Owen Lattimore's and Allen S. Whiting's characterisations of Xinjiang. See Owen Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia: Sinkiang and the Inner Asian Frontiers of China and Russia*, (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1950) & Allen S. Whiting and General Sheng Shih-ts'ai, *Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot?*, (Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1958).

communist People's Republic of China. It does not, however, immediately follow that due to this change in China's political order that there was a radical transformation in the framework of Chinese perceptions of Xinjiang that shaped policies toward the region. The transformation of China's political order, via the rise to power of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), resulted in the development of a new (but not necessarily original) complex/series of techniques and tactics of rule, rather than a transformation of Chinese perceptions of Xinjiang. Thus, there was no re-evaluation of the relation between China and Xinjiang - no questioning or reformulation of Chinese political, cultural and ideological representations of Xinjiang. That is to say no change in the overarching goal of Chinese policy in Xinjiang but rather a reformulation of the methods by which to achieve it. Therefore, there are two salient and complimentary developments to consider regarding the utility of 1949 as a dividing line: the continuity of the overarching goal of the state in Xinjiang and the transformation of the methods, structures and strategies by which to achieve this goal. Therefore, in this context 1949 does not serve as a point of discontinuity in the historical development of Xinjiang's relation to China. Yet the very fact that from 1949 onward there emerged a new complex/series of techniques and tactics of rule within Xinjiang, expressed in an "modernist" idiom (Marxism-Leninism), suggests that it is not simply an arbitrary point of discontinuity.

The previous chapter demonstrated the emergence of themes of governmentality in the Qing era and their relationship to Qing external relations. Furthermore, it also demonstrated the interactive dynamic between imperial goals regarding the administration of Xinjiang and those concerning the empire's external relations. As

Qing goals regarding both the administration within Xinjiang and external relations were gradually transformed under various pressures from 1820 onward there emerged a questioning of the existing structures, techniques and tactics of Qing rule. The culmination of these processes was the institution of a series of new techniques and tactics of rule which had as their goal the integration and assimilation of Xinjiang. This chapter will demonstrate the continuation in the development of these themes of governmentality throughout the 1911-1949 period. The secondary focus of this chapter, and one that will be further developed in greater detail in subsequent chapters, will once again be the relationship between these "internal" dynamics and the geo-political dynamics emanating from Central Asia. Xinjiang over the course of the 1911-1949 period became the nexus or compression zone for a multiplicity of geo-political influences. Xinjiang was essentially buffeted by external influences from Russian/Soviet Central Asia, British India, China proper, and Mongolia which significantly impacted upon the provincial authorities' relations with China and their "policies" within Xinjiang. This was not a new development but rather a continuation of a theme evident throughout the Qing period - the permeability of Xinjiang to external political, ideological, economic and cultural influences. Evidently these external forces were opposed to those of the provincial authorities and in a broader sense those of the Republic of China. Thus this represents not a break with the Qing period but a continuation and development of the interaction between external-Chinese influences on the one hand and the existing structures, techniques and tactics of rule within Xinjiang on the other. This theme of Xinjiang as "pawn and pivot" will be alluded to throughout this chapter only insofar as it serves to illustrate the interaction of the Chinese techniques and tactics of rule and external influences. The goal of this chapter is

therefore to examine the development of themes of governmentality within Xinjiang over the 1911-1949 period and construct a detailed picture of the contours of Chinese rule. The theme of Xinjiang as "pawn and pivot" will be thoroughly explored and developed in the following chapter that will place the subjects of this chapter within the broader context of the complex geopolitics and international relations of East Asia between 1911 and 1949.

This chapter is primarily focused upon demonstrating the continuity of a number of themes of governmentality across the Qing and Republican eras in Xinjiang. Thus the emphasis will be placed upon identifying the major themes and developments concerning the techniques and tactics of rule employed by the Han Chinese "warlords" of Republican Xinjiang. The 1911-1991 period, that will be the focus of the subsequent three chapters of the thesis, encapsulate two distinct but interrelated "cycles" with regard to the intensity of the interaction between the structure, techniques and tactics of Chinese rule and the geo-political influences impinging on Xinjiang. The first such cycle or phase is that of 1911-1949. The major characteristic of this cycle was the significant weakening of the structure, techniques and tactics of Chinese rule due to constant external challenges. As throughout the 19th century, Chinese authorities in Xinjiang were faced with constant political, economic, military and ideological challenges emanating primarily from Russian/Soviet Central Asia between 1911 and 1949. The basis of these challenges was the reassertion of Central Asia's geopolitical advantages over the capabilities of China. That is to say, 1911-1949 witnessed the return to an almost predetermined orientation of political, economic and geographical forces whereby the clear geopolitical advantages of Central Asia partially overcame the

effectiveness of the techniques and tactics of rule actively constructed by the Qing, and maintained by their successors, in Xinjiang. Primarily due to the effects of the Qing ideological construction of Xinjiang in the 19th century the successive "warlord" rulers of Xinjiang and the Republic of China continued to claim Xinjiang as a province of China. Thus the successive challenges to this idea of the "Chineseness" of Xinjiang over the 1911-1949 period eventually confronted a renewed willingness and capability to project Chinese power into the region that culminated in the PLA's "peaceful liberation" of Xinjiang in 1949. The second cycle, 1949-1991, was characterised by a resurgence of Chinese power and the re-invigoration of a complex of techniques and tactics of rule that had as their goal the assimilation and integration of Xinjiang to the Chinese state. The various policies pursued by the PRC in Xinjiang, although expressed within a Marxist-Leninist idiom, were an extension (and often derivative of) late Qing era structures, techniques and tactics of rule. The Qing goal from the 1820s onward, as I have demonstrated in the previous chapter, was the assimilation and integration of the "New Dominion" with the rest of the empire. These goals have subsequently formed the core of the PRC's policies in Xinjiang since 1949. As such there has been no transformation in the overall aim/goal of the structures, techniques and tactics of rule employed by the state in Xinjiang since the 19th century. The form and content of these techniques and tactics have, however, varied significantly over time as have the intensity with which they have been implemented or pursued. It will emerge over the course of the following chapters that the external geo-political influences confronted by the state in Xinjiang between 1911-1991 have played a major role in shaping this variation in the intensity of implementation of state policy.

The late Qing project of attempting to integrate and assimilate Xinjiang remained remarkably ingrained within the consciousness of the ruling Han Chinese elite after the collapse of the Qing in 1911. As will be demonstrated, the policies pursued by Yang Zengxin in the administration of Xinjiang were a continuation of the late-Qing era techniques and tactics of rule. Just as the Qing approach was confronted by a series of political, economic and ideological currents emanating from the then independent state of Khoqand in the 19th century, so too was Yang's regime confronted by similar dynamics from Russian Central Asia. That is to say, Yang Zengxin's "policies" did not operate in a vacuum, and much as during the Qing period they were gradually reevaluated under the pressure of external influences. This dynamic of "challenge-and-response" did not cease with the collapse of the Qing. After the collapse of the Qing, Xinjiang's strategic importance to external powers, most importantly Britain and Russia, was to all intents and purposes nullified by the Anglo-Russian frontier agreements in 1895 and 1897, and the Anglo-Russian convention in 1907 which officially ended the so-called "Great Game" for Central Asia. The Russian Revolution of February 1917 and the subsequent Bolshevik Revolution of October/November 1917, however, shattered this status quo and ushered in a period that could be termed a reprise of the "Great Game". The transformation that these events brought about had a profound impact on Xinjiang and once again raised the possibility of the region being drawn into the orbit of a power other than China. The consolidation of Soviet power in Central Asia following the defeat of the "White" and allied intervention forces by 1920/21 directly pressured Yang Zengxin's regime. The collapse of the "White" forces and the retreat of significant numbers of them into Xinjiang forced Yang Zengxin into relations with the new Soviet power. The governor's situation was unenviable given that he was now caught between

a geographically removed central government that had little remit in Xinjiang, but to whom he theoretically pledged allegiance, and an expansionist, militant Soviet regime in close geographic proximity to Xinjiang. Furthermore, Yang Zengxin's relations with the Soviets were clouded by the fact that the Chinese government had not yet recognised the Soviet regime as the inheritor of Russian imperial possessions and prerogatives. Such an orientation would come to characterise Xinjiang throughout the remainder of the "warlord" period with each successive governor endeavouring to achieve the maximum autonomy from the Chinese state while attempting to avoid this strategem's pitfall - the subsequent reliance on an external power. In essence this was perhaps a variation of the "traditional" Chinese "play one barbarian against another" approach to external affairs. All three warlord governors, Yang Zengxin (1912-1928), Jin Shuren (1928-1933) and Sheng Shicai (1933-1944) found themselves in effect sandwiched between the political, economic and strategic imperatives of the Republic of China and the Soviet Union, upon which they increasingly relied to maintain Xinjiang's autonomous status. From 1911 to 1944 Soviet influence gradually became paramount in Xinjiang. Yang Zengxin's handling of the nascent Soviet power on Xinjiang's doorstep in the early 1920s, although arguably ensuring Xinjiang's "Chineseness", ultimately created the necessary political and strategic climate for the Soviet Union to play the central role in Xinjiang's affairs in the coming decades.

During the Qing era the Khanate of Khoqand was the major factor in Qing external relations along Xinjiang's frontier. From the Qing conquest in 1759 onward three major themes in the empire's external relations were paramount in Xinjiang - trade, the Makhdumzada Khojas and Khoqand. The implications of the Makhdumzada Khojas were

not only political but also religious and more importantly ideological. The Makhdumzada Khojas proved to be the avenue through which Qing political and ideological claims to legitimacy in Xinjiang could be challenged. The almost constant Khoja-inspired rebellions in Xinjiang from 1800 onward ultimately played a central role in inducing not only Qing reform of administrative policy but also of the political, ideological and geographic representations of Xinjiang as part of the empire. Thus the confrontation or opposition of Central Asian to Qing/Chinese influences was all encompassing - political, economic, cultural, and ideological. This was also to be the case throughout the 1911-1949 period - with the important exception that Tsarist Russia and then the Soviet Union replaced Khoqand as the driving force behind successive political, economic and ideological challenges to Chinese authority in Xinjiang. Crucially, both Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union, the former by accident and the latter by design, became conduits for the dissemination of "modernist" political ideologies throughout Turkic Central Asia including Xinjiang. Thus in Qing times Khoqand was the source of the ideological challenge to the Qing position in Xinjiang, that was expressed in purely Islamic terms, while in the 20th century Russian/Soviet Central Asia became the source of secular political ideologies, most notably Pan-Turkism, Jadidism and Communism. These "modernist" ideologies played a major role in the development of non-Han Chinese nationalism in Xinjiang under the three warlord governors. It has been argued by a number of western scholars of both Xinjiang and Russian/Soviet Central Asia that the establishment of distinct ethnic identities and associated "nationalisms" were essentially products of the 20th century.²¹² Throughout

²¹² For example Justin Jon Rudelson, *Bones in the Sand: The Struggle to Create Uighur Nationalist Ideologies in Xinjiang, China*, PhD Thesis Harvard University, (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1992), Robert Conquest, *Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice*, (London: Bodley Head, 1967), and

Xinjiang in the 19th and part of the 20th century it has been argued that the non-Han peoples identified themselves by localised criteria rather than by unifying and abstract constructions. For example Rudelson highlighted the strength of these localised identities in late 20th century Xinjiang - whereby Uighurs would first identify themselves with their locality or city. Hence an inhabitant of Turfan may simply identify him/herself first as a *Turfanlik*, second as a Muslim and perhaps third as an Uighur.²¹³ This is a very superficial overview of this aspect of Xinjiang's history, but it does illuminate the point being made - that the definition, usage and naming of distinct ethnicities/nationalities amongst the population of Xinjiang have very much been part of the 20th century. The secular political ideologies noted above played a significant role in "creating" the conception of distinct ethnicities amongst Xinjiang's non-Han population. Perhaps of far greater weight in this respect was the role played by the state, both in Xinjiang and Russian/Soviet Central Asia. In both cases the state was central in shaping the form and content of the ethnicity of various segments of population under their control. The state's imperative in carrying out such an endeavour is clear and flows from the themes of governmentality highlighted in the previous chapter. The construction of distinct ethnicities, particularly in an ethnologically complex frontier region such as Xinjiang, served to heighten the state's power. Although the state, particularly in the Soviet case, claimed to be in effect empowering long oppressed "nationalities" via the "scientific" classification of ethnicities, it was in fact facilitating the state's capabilities to make these segments of population strengthen the state. As we have seen, the Qing ideological construction of Xinjiang was to a large degree successful in terms of

Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Practice*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

²¹³ Justin Jon Rudelson, *Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism along China's Silk Road*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

cementing the notion of an expanded conception of China's "geo-body" that the Qing's Han inheritors have vehemently defended. Another element of late Qing era rule of Xinjiang was also carried into the post-Qing era - the influence of the sinicisation project. This series of techniques and tactics (constructed by Zuo Zoutang et al) aimed to not simply make Xinjiang Chinese by merely controlling it in a military or geographic sense but generate the region's transformation into an inherently Chinese province. The continuity of this aspect of Qing rule in Xinjiang well into the 20th century has been central to successive Chinese attempts to strengthen the state's grip on the region. The manner in which these imperatives have been expressed, formulated and structured have changed over time in the 1911-1991 period. Over this period the complex or series of techniques and tactics of rule have moved from one structured to assimilate the region and its peoples to China to one structured to theoretically maintain each ethnicities' cultural autonomy within the context of a multi-ethnic unitary state. Thus this chapter is focused on the forces that have transformed and shaped the state's techniques and tactics of rule - that is the development of themes of governmentality.

The Hangover of Empire: The Warlord Era, 1911-1949

The late Qing project of integration and assimilation of Xinjiang was disrupted by the empire's disintegration in 1911/1912 but not irrevocably so. Although the collapse of the Qing removed central control, manipulation and implementation of the Qing techniques and tactics of rule, they were appropriated by the largely Han Chinese elite that inherited the administration of Xinjiang. The first warlord governor of Xinjiang, Yang Zengxin, implemented little by way of reform or innovation in the structure of the techniques and tactics of rule inherited from the Qing era. The basic tenets of Yang's

administration were to maintain the geographic, political and economic divisions amongst the non-Han population of Xinjiang. In concert with this "internal" aim of separation and division, Yang Zengxin employed a series of measures to maintain Xinjiang's isolation from the new Republic of China and Russian/Soviet Central Asia. As will be demonstrated, the governor was largely successful in effectively isolating Xinjiang from the Republic of China while his efforts to "protect" the province from Russian and Soviet machinations were ultimately fruitless. Yang's determination to maintain his regime's isolation from the Republic compelled him to seek a *modus operandi* with the Russian and then Soviet governments. Yang Zengxin's legacy in Xinjiang was somewhat contradictory - his cautious handling of the fluid and complex situation following the Bolshevik Revolution in Central Asia arguably "saved" Xinjiang for China but in the process he effectively created the framework through which that Chineseness was challenged in the coming decades.

Yang Zengxin's background as a late Qing bureaucrat undoubtedly influenced his handling of not only Xinjiang's administration but also of the increasing Russian/Soviet power in the region. Born in 1867 in Yunnan Province, Yang passed the metropolitan examinations in 1889 and received his first appointment as a district magistrate in Gansu.²¹⁴ From this position he rose to the directorship of the Gansu Military College in the 1890s and was then transferred to Xinjiang in 1901. Once in Xinjiang Yang rose through various minor positions to become the province's Chief Justice in 1911, although another source asserts he was "Director of Foreign Intercourse".²¹⁵ Upon the

²¹⁴ Lars Erik Nyman, *Great Britain and Chinese, Russian and Japanese Interests in Sinkiang, 1918-1934*, (Lund: Scandinavian University Books, 1977), p.20.

²¹⁵ Ibid. & C.P. Skrine & Pamela Nightingale, *Macartney at Kashgar: New Light on British, Chinese and Russian Activities in Sinkiang, 1890-1918*, (London: Methuen, 1973), p.174.

outbreak of the revolution and collapse of the Qing the last imperial governor of Xinjiang handed over his office to Yang and returned to China proper. In 1912 Yang Zengxin was confirmed by President Yuan Shikai as the Civil and Military Governor of Xinjiang. Yang's position was, however, not unchallenged. A number of disparate rebellions broke out in Xinjiang upon the fall of the Qing and encouraged the Russian's through their consulates in Ili and Kashgar to "fish in troubled waters".²¹⁶ The most troublesome of these for the new civil and military governor were the rebellions amongst Chinese garrison troops in Ili, Urumchi and Kashgar that were inspired by the secret society, *Ge-lao-hui (Older Brother Society)*²¹⁷. Yang also had to confront a number of "native" revolts, most notably a Muslim revolt in Hami and a Kazak/Mongol uprising in the Ili valley.²¹⁸ The revolts at Ili and Kashgar proved to be the most troublesome and enduring of these dispersed rebellions. Both of these revolts shared certain aspects and were linked with a wider strategic competition between the Russians on the one hand and the British on the other. Much as during the Ya qub Beg rebellion of the 1860s and 1870s, Russia endeavoured to take advantage of its pre-eminent position in Central Asia and China's weakness. Britain for its part was constrained by its strategic disadvantages, limited commercial interests and general lack of presence in Xinjiang.

The manner in which Yang dealt with these challenges to his position demonstrated not only his ruthlessness but also his political shrewdness and pragmatism. Yang was able

²¹⁶ C.P. Skrine & Pamela Nightingale, *Macartney at Kashgar*, pp.173-187.

²¹⁷ David D. Wang, *Under the Soviet Shadow: The Yining Incident. Ethnic Conflicts and International Rivalry in Xinjiang, 1944-1949*, (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1999), p.42.

²¹⁸ Ibid & Mark Dickens, *The Soviets in Xinjiang, 1911-1949* on line at <http://www.wlc.com/oxus/sovinxj.htm>, (1999).

to confront and defeat these rebellions in turn via a combination of concessions, negotiation and military force. The first repercussions of the revolution reached Xinjiang in December 1911 with the outbreak of a revolt amongst Chinese troops in Ili. On 25 December Chinese troops mutinied under the command of a Brigadier Yang Tsuan-hsu and stormed the headquarters of the military and civil governor of the Ili district, known as the "Tartar General", killing the "general" and raising the Republican flag. The insurgents successfully consolidated their control of Ili/Kulja and by January 1912 controlled strategic positions along the routes to the provincial capital, Urumchi.²¹⁹ Almost simultaneously attacks on the Governor's *yamen* and military headquarters were undertaken in Urumchi. These were successfully dealt with by the Governor's troops and the instigators, members of the anti-Manchu *Ge-lao-hui*, executed. In Kashgar, however, events took a complex and confusing turn. Yet suffice it to say by April/May 1912 a four hundred strong group of Chinese soldiers and "vagabonds", known as the "New Regiment" and more colloquially as "The Gamblers", controlled the city.²²⁰ Complicating Yang's position was the Russian Consul-General Sokov's tacit support for the "Gamblers" in Kashgar and the mutinous Chinese in Ili. Moreover, the Russians used the chaotic situation in Kashgar and Ili as an expedient to dispatch a 750 man-strong Cossack cavalry and infantry force to Kashgar that arrived in June 1912.²²¹ Thus there emerged by the beginning of 1913 a three way struggle for pre-eminence in Xinjiang between the nominal governor Yang Zengxin, the *Ge-lao-hui* and the Russians.

²¹⁹ C.P.Skrine & Pamela Nightingale, op. cit., p.173.

²²⁰ Ibid, pp.176-182.

²²¹ Ibid, p.184.

The new governor appeared to be the least well equipped to win this struggle - he was geographically removed from the real hub of the struggle at Kashgar, had no support from Peking and was faced with a direct Russian military presence. The details of the ensuing struggle are not central to this chapter, but the overall pattern of the interplay and interaction between external influences and internal dynamics that characterised this episode are illustrative of the position of Xinjiang following the Qing collapse. Yang Zengxin succeeded in effectively neutralising the Russians by co-opting the leaders of the Kashgar and Ili rebellions. He clearly recognised that the longer the disturbances in Kashgar and Ili continued, the less capable he would be in dissuading further Russian encroachments. The governor conferred official titles upon the leaders of the Kashgar and Ili rebellions thus, at least theoretically, making them stakeholders in maintaining order. Moreover, by this manoeuvre he bought a period of relative stability with which to illustrate to the Russian Consul-General Sokov that order was restored and Russian subjects protected. The strategy eventually proved successful with the Cossacks returning to Russian Central Asia in December 1913.²²² Once the Russian threat was at least temporarily dealt with the governor acted against his "officials" in Kashgar and Ili. Yang confronted the Ili rebels with a loyal force of 2000 Hui troops²²³ and was able to secure a negotiated settlement whereby the Ili leader, the aforementioned Brigadier Yang Tsuan-hsu, was made Titai (assistant governor) of Kashgar. Furthermore, the Brigadier's troops, an ethnically mixed (Turkis, Xibos, Hui and Han) 400 strong force, followed him and became the garrison at Kashgar in January 1913.²²⁴ Consul-General

²²² Ibid, p.230-31.

²²³ Yang's experiences in Yunnan and Gansu, both with large Hui populations, undoubtedly aided in his ability to command these troops Svat Soucek, *A History of Inner Asia*, op. cit., p.269, and Yang was in charge of military affairs in Xinjiang ca.1911 with the Urumchi garrison based on Hui troops, see Lars Erik Nyman, op. cit., p.20 and C.P. Skrine & Pamela Nightingale, op. cit., pp.211-212.

²²⁴ C.P. Skrine & Pamela Nightingale, op. cit., p.213.

Sokov was not immediately swayed by Yang's manoeuvre and the activities of the Brigadier in Kashgar exacerbated the relations between the Russians, the British and the Chinese authorities. Most notably the Brigadier approached the British Consul General, Sir George Macartney, to obtain 3000 rifles for his forces and throughout his time in Kashgar allied himself with the "Gamblers". This provoked a swift protest from Sokov, the dispatch in May 1913 of another 300 Cossacks to reinforce their 750 comrades in Kashgar, and Russian and British remonstrations to Governor Yang regarding the actions of his representative.²²⁵ Therefore in July 1913 Governor Yang had the Brigadier removed for these not entirely unanticipated, on Governor Yang's part, troublemaking.²²⁶ Once again the governor relied on his Hui troops to remove the Brigadier and the "Gamblers" from Kashgar. With the departure of the Cossacks in December 1913, Yang Zengxin set about the removal of the remaining challengers to his position. In March 1914 he finally resolved the Ili challenge by assassination of its leaders and forcible incorporation of the region under Urumchi's authority.²²⁷ The "Gamblers" were gradually isolated and destroyed by the new Tital of Kasgar, Ma Fulin and his Hui troops. Thus by 1915 Yang Zengxin had finally overcome all the internal challenges to his position.²²⁸

After this consolidation of power Yang Zengxin set about the administration of his province. The basis of Yang's approach largely rested on the continuation of Qing-era techniques and tactics of rule. The administrative structure re-erected by the Qing after Xinjiang officially became a province of the empire in 1884 following the Ya qub Beg

²²⁵ Ibid, pp.219-220.

²²⁶ Ibid, pp.226-227.

²²⁷ Ibid, p.235.

²²⁸ see Ibid, Lars Erik Nyman, op. cit., pp.20-21,

rebellion was left untouched with the exception that all ties to the Viceroy of Gansu were abolished.²²⁹ The guiding principles of these techniques and tactics of rule were *divide et impera*, the "law of avoidance", separation and isolation. The first of these was perhaps the most basic tool through which a minority may rule a hostile and alien majority. It was in this context that Owen Lattimore compared Xinjiang under Yang with British India.²³⁰ The comparison was fitting, but equally true of Xinjiang under the Qing, that is, it was inherently colonial in nature. Yang Zengxin actively exacerbated the many divisions and animosities between the various non-Han peoples of Xinjiang, the most basic of which were those between the pastoral-nomadic peoples and the sedentary agriculturalists.²³¹ Although these peoples were generally separated from each other geographically, with the nomads in Zungharia and the agriculturalists in the Altishahr, the inherent tensions between them allowed Yang to "play one barbarian against another". The principle of the "law of avoidance" pertained to the appointment of various officials within the provincial administration. Appointees, most notably "natives", were posted to offices geographically removed from their home districts or cities thus theoretically removing the possibility of the creation of personal fiefs or power bases. The latter two principles of Yang's administration, separation and isolation, were arguably the cornerstones of his rule. These not only applied to the non-Han peoples of Xinjiang but also to the Han minority. Much as during the Qing era, freedom of movement for the non-Han population between the various oases and districts of Xinjiang was proscribed. In the case of Han Chinese, travel between

²²⁹ Lars Erik Nyman, *op.cit.*, p.25.

²³⁰ Owen Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia: Sinkiang and the Inner Asian Frontiers of China and Russia*, (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1950).

²³¹ Lee Fu-Hsiang, *The Turkic-Moslem Problem in Sinkiang: A Study of the Chinese Communist's Nationality Policy*, (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1973), pp.15-16.

Xinjiang and China proper and vice versa was controlled and viewed with suspicion by the governor. Many sources cite the example of a number of envoys and officials sent to Xinjiang by the central government who made it as far as Hami or Turfan only to be turned away on Yang's instructions.²³² Moreover, Yang endeavoured to isolate the non-Han population from events and currents in the outside world.²³³ The focus of Yang's fear was not only currents emerging from China but also those emanating from the remainder of Turkic Central Asia. Throughout Russian Central Asia in the late 19th and early 20th century there developed a reformist intellectual current amongst the predominantly Turkic and Islamic subjects of the Tsar. The Jadids (reformers/innovators), as they became known set up numerous schools that focused on the development of secular and "scientific" education, and were imbued with western concepts of nationalism. For Yang, Xinjiang had to be isolated from such influences. To this end no publications in Turkic languages were permitted and those imported from China proper or Russian Central Asia were rigorously censored. This determination to keep the non-Han population largely ignorant of the outside world extended to the governor's attitude toward education. Muslim schools conducted in Turkic languages, the teaching of foreign languages and the employ of foreign teachers were all prohibited.²³⁴ Yang Zengxin also clearly recognised the salience of the historical political influence of Islamic clerics in the leadership of anti-Chinese rebellions. He thus sought to constrain the ability of Islamic clerics to maintain political influence in local communities and connections to foreign Islamic communities. Therefore, Yang constructed a series of regulations prohibiting the practice of Islamic services outside of

²³² Lars Erik Nyman, *op.cit.*

²³³ Justin Jon Rudelson, *op.cit.*, p.91.

²³⁴ Lee Fu-Hsiang, *op. cit.*, pp.17-18 & Justin Jon Rudelson, *op. cit.*, p.92.

the mosque, the movement of *akhunds* beyond their home districts/towns, and the appointment of foreigners as *akhunds* in mosques.²³⁵ The similarity of these regulations, both in form and content, to those implemented after the Qing conquest is striking and serves to illustrate the continuity of a major theme of Chinese administration in Xinjiang - the attempt to control and manage Xinjiang's connections to Central Asia.

The structure of Xinjiang's administration under Yang Zengxin was derivative of Qing-era precedents and consisted of civil, native and military administrations. Under the provincial governor were four subordinate levels of government. The first of these was a council in Urumchi comprised of commissioners for military affairs, foreign affairs, finance, education, industry, transport, justice and police.²³⁶ Second, the province was divided into six circuits - Ürümqi, Chuguchak, Ili, Altai, Aksu and Kasgar - each with a *taoyin* or military governor. Third, these six circuits were divided into forty-seven districts each headed by an *amban* or consul. Fourth, each district was subdivided into regions controlled by a native beg of which there were three levels, Ming Bashi (head of 1000 households), Yuz Bashi (head of 100 households) and On Bashi (head of 10 households).²³⁷ Parallel systems of administration existed for some localities in Ili, Altai and Hami. In Ili an official known as the "Tartar General" was the head of a number of nomadic tribal organisations while in Altai and Hami a "native state" administration existed under a wang or prince.²³⁸ The military administration was divided into two distinct regions corresponding to the geographical division of Xinjiang itself. A *titai* or commander-in-chief was posted at Kashgar and Ili and they were theoretically

²³⁵ Ibid, p.18.

²³⁶ Lars Erik Nyman, op. cit., p.25.

²³⁷ Ibid, pp.25-26.

²³⁸ Ibid, p.27.

responsible for the security and order of the Altishahr and Zungharia respectively.²³⁹ Although this structure would appear to indicate a number of officials that could possibly counter the power of the governor - most notably the military officials in Ili and Kashgar - the reality was quite different. Xinjiang under Yang's tenure was a highly centralised administration with all appointments and policy decisions exercised by the governor himself. Yang Zengxin also constructed what Owen Lattimore termed a "family hierarchy" within the administration by the appointment of family members and loyal fellow Yunnanese to official posts.²⁴⁰ Further strengthening the governor's hold on the province was the creation of a widespread "secret police" network of informants that penetrated all levels of the administration right down to the *beg* level.²⁴¹ The maintenance of these levels of administration under the direct authority of the governor enabled Yang to pay but lip service to official pronouncements from his theoretical superiors in China proper. Yang Zengxin's determination to keep his regime isolated from the Republic as far as possible was illustrated by one notable display of ruthlessness. Yang's reliance on fellow Yunnanese created a serious challenge to his authority in February 1916. Late in 1915 Yunnan had rebelled against Peking and a number of Yunnanese officials in Xinjiang wished to aid the Yunnanese cause by having Yang declare Xinjiang's independence. The governor, having been appraised of this situation by his informants, invited these officials to a banquet and subsequently had them immediately shot.²⁴² Yet it was not from China proper that Yang was to

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ See Fook-Lam Gilbert, "The Road to Power: Sheng Shih-ts'ai's Early Years in Sinkiang, 1930-1934", *Journal of Oriental Studies*, Vol.7, (1969), pp.224-225 & Owen Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia: Sinkiang and the Inner Asian Frontiers of China and Russia*, (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1950), p.53.

²⁴¹ Andrew W. D. Forbes, *Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p.14 & Lars Erik Nyman, op.cit., p.27.

²⁴² C.P.Skrine & Pamela Nightingale, op. cit., p.246

confront his most serious challenge to his goal of isolation for Xinjiang, but from Russia.

The Russian threat to Yang Zengxin's regime was clearly demonstrated by the Russian Consul-General's actions following the collapse of the Qing. Once Yang Zengxin had consolidated his rule in Xinjiang the issue of the penetration of Russian political, economic and ideological influence remained. The basis of Russia's presence in Xinjiang derived from the 1881 Treaty of St. Petersburg that resolved the "Ili Crisis" following the Qing reconquest of Xinjiang. The treaty allowed for the establishment of Russian consulates in Ili and Kashgar, the reduction of customs duties on Russian goods and the protection of Russian subjects in Xinjiang.²⁴³ The Russian Cossack occupation of Kashgar in 1912 was partially connected to the negotiations regarding the renewal of the terms of this treaty. The Russian government demanded new commercial concessions in Xinjiang and used the chaotic situation in Kashgar following the collapse of the Qing to pressure China to acquiesce to its demands.²⁴⁴ Yang Zengxin's handling of the Russian presence in Kashgar, detailed above, and the Republic's refusal to renegotiate the terms of the treaty forced the Russian government to accept the status quo. Official treaties were but one method through which Russia could advance its interests in Xinjiang and in a precedent that was to be followed by the Tsar's Soviet successors, Russia held a political and ideological card in reserve. In October 1912 the British Consul-General Sir George Macartney was introduced to one Mustafa Khan, the

²⁴³ See C.P.Skrine & Pamela Nightingale, op. cit., p.201, O. Edmund Clubb, *China & Russia: The "Great Game"*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p.114 & Bruce A. Elleman, *Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989*, (London: Routledge, 2001), pp.79-81.

²⁴⁴ C.P.Skrine & Pamela Nightingale, op. cit., p.201.

grandson of Yaqub Beg, by his Russian counterpart Sokov in Kashgar.²⁴⁵ That the Russians did not feel compelled to make use of Mustafa Khan as a challenge to Chinese rule was due in equal parts to Yang Zengxin's "playing one barbarian against another" (ie. Russia against Britain) and Russia's overall goal with respect to Xinjiang. Regarding this second point Macartney was apparently informed by Sokov's deputy that it was not to Russia's advantage to annex Xinjiang but it was in her interests to see it become a pliable buffer state, essentially autonomous of China but too weak to resist Russian exploitation.²⁴⁶ Thus with the establishment of Yang's regime Russia to a significant extent achieved this goal without having to play its card. This is not to say that Yang Zengxin was in any sense a puppet of Russia, but his largely successful isolation of Xinjiang from the Republic of China compelled him to come to a *modus operandi* with the Russians. Yang's goal of isolating his province from Russian Central Asia, noted above, could only be partially realised. This was particularly true in terms of Xinjiang's economy. As throughout the Qing era, geography determined the flow of trade in Xinjiang and the richest areas of Xinjiang were along the western frontier with Russian Central Asia where the easiest trade routes were to be found.²⁴⁷ Thus it was not coincidental that the cities that saw the presence of Russian Cossack troops in 1912 were Kashgar and Ili, the two centres of Xinjiang-Central Asia trade on either side of the Tien Shan. In the remaining few years of the Tsar's government the maintenance of Russia's commercial interests, embodied in the Treaty of St.Petersburg, became one of the major issues between Russia and Yang Zengxin's regime. Yang Zengxin's stance

²⁴⁵ Ibid, p.202.

²⁴⁶ Ibid, p.203.

²⁴⁷ Lars Erik Nyman, op. cit., p.29, for Qing era see Joseph F. Fletcher, "Ch'ing Inner Asia c.1800", in Denis Twitchett & John K. Fairbank (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China, Vol.10, Late Ch'ing, Pt.1*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978) & Saguchi Toru, "Kashgaria", *Acta Asiatica*, Vol.34, (1978), pp.61-78.

regarding the flow of Xinjiang-Central Asia trade was cautious given the historical precedent of the Khoqand-Khoja inspired rebellions of the Qing period. There was little alternative to permitting this trade to continue for the governor, as Xinjiang-China or Xinjiang-India trade was severely hampered by geographical factors, namely the long track through the Gansu corridor and the formidable Karakorum Mountains respectively.²⁴⁸

The outbreak of the First World War had little resonance in distant Xinjiang initially, but by 1916 its reverberations created a number of problems for Yang Zengxin. The first of these was the influx of 300 000 Kazakh and Kyrgyz fleeing Russian Central Asia in the aftermath of a failed rebellion against a Russian conscription decree.²⁴⁹ Yang Zengxin, however, managed to negotiate the repatriation of the majority of these refugees with the Russian government by 1917.²⁵⁰ The second problem created for Governor Yang by the European conflagration was the impetus given to pan-Turanian currents throughout Central Asia by Turkey's involvement in the war. As noted previously, Yang Zengxin strove to keep such tendencies out of Xinjiang by various measures including the prohibition of schooling in Turkic languages. The progress of the war in Europe precipitated a further challenge to Yang's cherished goal of isolation from such threats to Chinese rule in 1916. Germany, due to its alliance with Turkey, began to encourage and actively attempt to instigate pan-Turanian movements in Russia and Britain's colonial territories. Xinjiang's geo-political position straddling both Russian Central Asia and the approaches to British India became a target of German

²⁴⁸ Fook-Lam Gilbert, "The Road to Power", op. cit., pp.230-231.

²⁴⁹ Svat Soucek, *A History of Inner Asia*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.269-270.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

intrigues.²⁵¹ A German mission headed by a certain Von Hentig entered Xinjiang in June 1916 and Yang Zengxin found himself under pressure from the Russian and British Consul-Generals to take action against the mission. The governor eventually acted and had Von Hentig detained in Kashgar under heavy guard. Von Hentig and the other Germans escorted by Chinese troops, left for China proper on 17 August 1916.²⁵² The crisis regarding German-inspired pan-Turanian movements did not cease with the removal of Von Hentig from Xinjiang. The purpose of Von Hentig's mission became clear to the Russian and British Consul-Generals in the months following his departure when a number of Afghan and Turki merchants began agitating in Kashgar, Khotan and Aksu against the presence of the Russians and British.²⁵³ The British and Russian consternation over Governor Yang's inaction over such German machinations were finally resolved with China's severing of relations with Germany in May 1917. The provincial authorities thus began to act to neutralise the influence and activities of the Afghan and Turki agents. This effort was intensified with China's declaration of war on Germany in August 1917 and the provincial authorities began to intern suspected German agents.²⁵⁴ The result of this episode was the marked increase of pan-Turanian sentiment in Kashgar with numerous anti-British and anti-Chinese pamphlets in Turki and Arabic circulating the major cities of the Altishahr.²⁵⁵ These problems for Yang Zengxin's regime would soon pale in comparison to those that would engulf the province as a result of the February and October Revolutions in Russia.

²⁵¹ C.P.Skrine & Pamela Nightingale, *op. cit.*, pp.248-249 & Lars Erik Nyman, *op. cit.*, p.48.

²⁵² C.P.Skrine & Pamela Nightingale, *op. cit.*, p.252.

²⁵³ *Ibid*, pp.254-255.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid*, pp..257-258.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid*.

The Bolshevik Revolution in October 1917 had a major impact on Yang Zengxin's regime in Xinjiang. The chaotic situation that followed in Russian Central Asia was almost immediately felt in Xinjiang with Xinjinag-Central Asia trade grinding to a halt in 1918.²⁵⁶ Governor Yang, although undoubtedly pleased to be free of Russian power temporarily, was characteristically cautious in dealing with the situation that was amply demonstrated by his closing of the Xinjiang-Russian border.²⁵⁷ Moreover, the governor endeavoured not to commit himself regarding re-establishing relations with the Russians until the Chinese government did so and perhaps more importantly until he could be certain who would prevail in the civil war. Such a stance clearly guided Yang's responses to the demands and actions of the emergent Soviet power in Tashkent and the remaining Tsarist officials in Xinjiang. For example, in May 1918 the governor received a message from Tashkent to the effect that a Soviet representative was being dispatched to take up the post of consul in Ili. Yang responded that such an arrangement could not be undertaken, as he had received no instructions from Peking.²⁵⁸ From June 1918 Yang Zengxin also had to deal with the remonstrations of the Tsarist Consul at Ili, who requested Yang dispatch troops to aid the White forces in the protection of the Semireche in Kazakhstan.²⁵⁹ Once more the governor refused to become involved but the course of the civil war soon made it impossible for Xinjiang to remain aloof of the conflict. The latter half of 1918 saw the retreat of the first White forces into Xinjiang, who Yang had disarmed and interned in Ili, and the beginnings of the various Allied interventions in support of the White cause. The initial trickle of retreating White troops

²⁵⁶ Martin R. Norins, *Gateway to Asia: Sinkiang, Frontier of the Chinese Far West*, (New York: John Day Company, 1944), p.60.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ O.Edmund Clubb, *China and Russia: The "Great Game"*, op. cit., p.190.

²⁵⁹ Ibid, pp.190-191.

and refugees into Xinjiang in 1918 became a flood in 1919 and 1920 with the collapse of General Kolchak's government. By March 1920 there were approximately 60 000 White Russian refugees in the Ili region, 10 000 to 20 000 of which were former military personnel.²⁶⁰ This situation was made more complicated and far more dangerous for Yang Zengxin by the arrival of a Japanese "investigation team" in late 1918. The Allied powers in the Far East, Britain, US and Japan had launched the so-called "Siberian Intervention" in support of the White forces and the Japanese were apparently assessing the state of the White forces in Ili with the view to the possible extension of the intervention through Xinjiang.²⁶¹ The governor's position was also jeopardised by the Tsarist Consul Lyuba's recruitment of troops in the Ili that only ceased in September 1919. Governor Yang stepped up efforts to constrain the White forces in Xinjiang in the new-year lest their actions precipitate a Soviet military response. Such an undertaking was by March 1920 essential with the Soviets having prevailed in the last major engagements of the civil war in Central Asia and Siberia. Thus Yang attempted to establish relations with the Soviets on a sound basis and it is not coincidental that he dispatched a delegation to attend a Soviet congress in Tashkent in May 1920.²⁶² There on 27 May the Xinjiang delegation and a Soviet commercial representative signed the "Ili Trade Agreement".²⁶³ The agreement was comprised of three major elements, the first allowed for the mutual establishment of commercial and foreign affairs bureaus (Soviets at Ili/Kuldja and Chinese at Alma-Ata), the second re-established and regulated Xinjiang-Soviet trade and the third outlined provisions for the

²⁶⁰ Lars Erik Nyman, *op. cit.*, p.38, O. Edmund Clubb, *op. cit.*, pp.194-196.

²⁶¹ O. Edmund Clubb, *op. cit.*, pp.191-192 & Lars Erik Nyman, *op. cit.*, pp.49-50.

²⁶² O. Edmund Clubb, *op. cit.*, p.195.

²⁶³ Fook-Lam Gilbert, "The Road to Power", *op. cit.*, p.231, O. Edmund Clubb, *op. cit.*, p.195 & David D. Wang, *Under the Soviet Shadow*, *op. cit.*, p.43.

repatriation of White refugees in Xinjiang.²⁶⁴ The continued anti-Soviet activities of White commanders in Xinjiang, notably Annekov and Bachich, threatened Yang's demarche with the Soviets with General Frunze warning the governor of possible unilateral Soviet military action if the problem was not resolved.²⁶⁵ Yang Zengxin prudently acquiesced to Soviet demands and between May and August 1921 Soviet and Chinese troops jointly drove the remaining White troops from Xinjiang.²⁶⁶ Thus Yang Zengxin had managed to keep Xinjiang from becoming embroiled in the whirlwind following the Bolshevik Revolution.

Yet the governor was too shrewd not to recognise that it would be but a short time before the Soviets would have the strength to reclaim Tsarist Russia's position in Xinjiang. Such recognition on behalf of Yang is discernible in the terms of the Ili Trade Agreement, most notably those parts dealing with the location of Soviet commercial and political offices. It is significant Yang's delegation limited the Soviets to Ili/Kuldja. With the actions of the Russian Consul-General in Kashgar from 1912 onward undoubtedly fresh in his mind the governor was determined not to allow their Soviet inheritors to easily reclaim their position south of the Tien Shan. Furthermore, the commercial agreements embodied within the agreement limited the Soviets to activities north of the Tien Shan.²⁶⁷ The governor, aware of the British hostility toward the Soviet Union, once more endeavoured to "play one barbarian against another". With the Soviet government unrepresented south of the Tien Shan a significant amount of anti-Soviet

²⁶⁴ David D. Wang, op. cit., p.43, Martin N. Norins, *Gateway to Asia*, op. cit., pp.61-62 & O. Edmund Clubb, op. cit., p.195.

²⁶⁵ O. Edmund Clubb, op. cit., pp.195-196.

²⁶⁶ Ibid & David D. Wang, op. cit., p.43: Bachich and his men were driven into Outer Mongolia where they were finally eliminated and Bachich executed.

²⁶⁷ Martin N. Norins, op. cit., p.62.

propaganda was disseminated, particularly in the Kashgar region, which was accompanied by a significant diversion of trade from the Kashgar-Osh route (ie. to Soviet Central Asia) to those linking Kashgar and British India (ie. Kashgar-Yarkand-Ladakh).²⁶⁸ A significant contributing factor in this turn of events was the ongoing instability in Soviet Central Asia caused by the *Basmachi*²⁶⁹ resistance that would continue in some regions until 1927. Governor Yang's attitude to such developments could be safely argued to be favourable. Yang's handling of the Soviet and British influence in Xinjiang for the remainder of his tenure demonstrated his desire to balance the return of Russian-Soviet influence in Zungharia with that of Britain in the Altishahr. His ability to do so, however, was constrained by three major factors. First, the Soviets had effectively suppressed the Basmachi movement by 1923 and precipitated a renewal in the flow of Xinjiang-Central Asia trade. Second, Britain's ability to actively counter Soviet political, economic and military influence in Xinjiang was significantly constrained by its geographic disadvantages and its relatively limited economic interests in Xinjiang. Third, the British and Soviet governments came to a number of agreements over the 1921-1924 period that bound both parties to cease any interference in the internal affairs of the other or attempt to disturb the territorial status quo, particularly in Central Asia, Afghanistan and India. Fourth, the Republic of China's official recognition of the Soviet government in 1924 made it increasingly difficult for Yang Zengxin to limit contacts with the Soviets.²⁷⁰ Upon the establishment of formal relations between

²⁶⁸ Ibid, pp.63-64.

²⁶⁹ The Soviets labelled the Turkic-Muslims resisting incorporation into the Soviet Union "basmachi" or "bandits", and the term has come to be applied to the widespread resistance movements in Central Asia up to the late 1920s.

²⁷⁰ Lars Erik Nyman, op. cit., pp.47-49 & p.63. The agreements were the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement (1921) that was adopted at the Genoa Conference in 1922 and formally acceded to by the Soviet Union in 1923.

the Soviet Union and the Republic of China in 1924, Yang Zengxin acceded to Soviet requests for the re-opening of five former Russian consulates in Xinjiang (Ili, Chuguchak, Ashan, Urumchi and Kashgar). In return the provincial authorities were enabled to open five consulates in Soviet Central Asia (Alma-Ata, Tashkent, Andijan, Zaisan and Semipalatinsk).²⁷¹ These connections in concert with increased Xinjiang-Soviet trade spurred on by the stabilisation of Central Asia following the Basmachi resistance resulted in Soviet political and economic dominance in Zungharia. In 1923 Xinjiang-Soviet trade was worth 18 million roubles while by 1927 it stood at 24 million roubles, with 80% of Xinjiang's exports flowing to the Soviet Union.²⁷² This orientation was further consolidated with the construction of the Turkish-Siberian Railway that was completed in 1930 and ran parallel to the north-western frontier of Xinjiang.²⁷³

Politically, Soviet influence gradually penetrated throughout Zungharia and began with the "neutralisation" (via a program of assassination and propaganda) of the remaining White Russian community residing in Ili by 1923-24.²⁷⁴ Moreover, the success of the revolution in Outer Mongolia and establishment of the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) in the same period created another source of Soviet penetration. Thus by 1925 it became impossible for Governor Yang to resist Soviet imperatives throughout Zungharia but particularly in Ili and the Altai (along the Xinjiang-MPR frontier). In Zungharia the situation had returned to the pre-1917 bipolar Sino-Russian rivalry. The situation south of the Tien Shan in the Altishahr, however, saw a triangular struggle

²⁷¹ David D. Wang, *Under the Soviet Shadow*, op. cit., p.43.

²⁷² Ibid, pp.43-44.

²⁷³ Fook-Lam Gilbert, "The Road to Power", op. cit., p.231 & Edward Shou-Tsu Su, *Sino-Russian Relations in Sinkiang: A Comparison of International Relationships Outside and Inside the Communist System*, (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1962), p.180.

²⁷⁴ Lars Erik Nyman, op. cit., p.69.

between Russian/Soviet, British and Chinese power. Given the Soviet's reassertion of Russia's pre-eminence in Zungharia, Yang endeavoured to obstruct the Soviet Consul-General at Kashgar's attempts to inherit the power and influence of his Tsarist predecessor. The governor's watchful attitude regarding the Soviet presence in Kashgar was intensified by the Soviet Consul-General's use of Andijanis to spread Soviet propaganda that resulted in a number of riots in the city in 1926.²⁷⁵ These events ultimately induced the governor to rekindle more friendly relations with the British. Yang's overtures to the British Consul-General in Kashgar revolved around the possible acquisition of British arms for the provincial forces. When it became clear that the British were determined not to disrupt the status quo they had established with the Soviets in 1924 regarding Central Asia, Afghanistan and India, the governor's enthusiasm toward Britain waned.²⁷⁶

Yang Zengxin's goal of balancing Soviet and British influence against each other thus came to be largely impracticable by a combination of localised and international dynamics. Moreover, it could be argued that the Soviet Union had indeed placed itself in the most favourable position to realise the Tsarist goal of Xinjiang as an independent yet pliant buffer state. The consolidation of Soviet power in Central Asia also gave further impetus to secular Turkic nationalist ideologies in the 1920s. Although the elucidators of such political views were ultimately suppressed in Soviet Central Asia during Stalin's purge of "national deviationists" in the 1930s, they did have a significant impact on the intellectual development of the Turkic populations of Xinjiang. Importantly the Soviet "national delimitation" of Central Asia in the 1920s played a

²⁷⁵ Ibid, p.67.

²⁷⁶ Ibid, pp.60-61.

catalytic role in a renewal of Turkic identity in Xinjiang. On 13 July 1920 Lenin and the Politburo instructed the "Turkestan Commission" to organize the preparation of a map that would exhibit the ethnic composition of Central Asia.²⁷⁷ The purpose of such an endeavour was to determine whether "fusion" or delimitation would be the preferable solution in the administrative structure of Central Asia.²⁷⁸ The Soviet project to identify, define and categorise the population of Central Asia was based on the development of ethnographic maps that demonstrated the subdivision of the overwhelmingly Turkic population into Uzbek, Turkmen, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Tajik (the only Iranian/Persian group). Moreover, as Rudelson notes, the "redrawing of the sub-national frontiers in Soviet Central Asia was largely based on language group".²⁷⁹ The climate of political transformation and revolution in Central Asia ultimately impacted on the non-Russian population of the region and a conference of Central Asian Turkic Muslims met in Tashkent in 1921. The importance of this event for Xinjiang derives from the attendance of a number of "East Turkestani" delegates from Soviet Central Asia and Xinjiang. These delegates sought to define and adopt a unifying ethnonym, and ultimately "Uighur" was adopted.²⁸⁰ The basis for the adoption of the ethnonym "Uighur" was and is highly debatable. Although the ethnonym derives from the Turkic Uighur Empire of the 8th and 9th centuries²⁸¹, the cultural and linguistic continuity of those presently identified as Uighur in the PRC is not without controversy.²⁸² Be that as it may these

²⁷⁷ Svat Soucek, op. cit., p.223.

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

²⁷⁹ Justin Jon Rudelson, *Bones in the Sand*, op. cit., p.75.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ For an overview of the political, economic and cultural history of the Uighur Empire see for example, Colin Mackerras, "The Uighurs", in Denis Sinor (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp.317-342.

²⁸² For example Justin Jon Rudelson, op. cit., Gardner Bovingdon, "The History of the History of Xinjiang", *Twentieth Century China*, Vol.26, No.2 (April 2000), pp.95-139.

events in Soviet Central Asia evidently influenced the (re)emergence of Turki nationalism in Xinjiang from the mid-1920s onward.

Yang Zengxin's rule ended with his assassination by his Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, Fan Yaonan, on 7 July 1928.²⁸³ The Japanese educated Fan Yaonan was considered to be a "moderniser" and KMT sympathiser who may have been motivated by a desire to bring Xinjiang more fully within the Republic's embrace. Yet his motives would remain a mystery as Yang's loyal Commissioner of Civil Affairs, Jin Shuren, crushed his embryonic bid for power in Xinjiang. Upon learning of Fan's attempted coup d'état, Jin Shuren had Fan and his supporters arrested. The following day, 8 July, Fan Yaonan and thirteen of his supporters or accomplices were executed while the provincial council chose Jin as governor.²⁸⁴ Jin Shuren, a native of Gansu Province, attempted to continue his predecessor's approach to governing Xinjiang. He would prove, however, to be venal, corrupt and incompetent. Following in the footsteps of Yang Zengxin, Jin constructed a "family hierarchy" within the administration appointing his sons to important positions.²⁸⁵ Moreover, he attempted to monopolise taxes on Xinjiang-Soviet trade and became reliant on the "secret police" established under Yang.²⁸⁶ One aspect of his predecessor's precedent was, however, continued successfully initially. In 1927-28 relations between the Soviet Union and the Republic of China were severed but Jin Shuren neither recalled Xinjiang's representatives from

²⁸³ "His Excellency Yang-Tsen-Hsing: The Late Governor-General of Sinkiang", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society* (hereafter *JRCAS*), Vol. 16, Pt.1, (1929), p.87.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid*, pp.87-88.

²⁸⁵ Martin N. Norins, *Gateway to Asia*, op. cit., p.40, Fook-Lam Gilbert, "The Road to Power", op. cit., p.225.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid* & Linda Benson, *The Ili Rebellion: The Muslim Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang 1944-1949*, (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1989), p.26.

Soviet Central Asia nor agreed to place the five consulates under the direct control of Nanjing although instructed to do so by the central government.²⁸⁷ Like Yang Zengxin, the new governor was also exceedingly wary of Soviet intentions and external influences more generally. A seemingly innocuous event precipitated the demise of the new governor. It will be recalled that following the Qing collapse Yang Zengxin had continued the parallel administration of the "native state" of Hami (Qomul) that had been created following the Qing conquest in 1759. Upon the death of Hami's ruling wang (prince) in March 1930, Jin Shuren abolished the "native state" and made preparations for its absorption into the provincial administration.²⁸⁸ Furthermore, Jin transferred the prince's heir to Ürümqi, ostensibly to take up the position of "Senior Adviser" but in reality it amounted to indefinite detention. The population's ire was further intensified when the new Chinese administrators attempted to tax the locals for the previous year and forced Uighur farmers off the land in favour of Han colonisers from the governor's province of Gansu.²⁸⁹ Soon after a rebellion erupted against the Chinese in Hami (Qomul) under the leadership of Yolbars (a former adviser to the Hami princes) and Khoja Niyaz. The governor dispatched a military force to suppress the rebellion but was repulsed and the rebels appealed to Ma Zhongying, known as the "Big Horse", the Hui warlord of Gansu for assistance.²⁹⁰ Ma reached Hami in May 1931 and for the following two years he was to play a central role in the struggle for Xinjiang.

²⁸⁷ David D. Wang, op. cit., p.44.

²⁸⁸ Fook-Lam Gilbert, "The Road to Power", op. cit., p.234.

²⁸⁹ Ibid, Justin Jon Rudelson, op. cit., p.97, & "Recent Events in Sinkiang", *JRCAS*, Vol.21, Pt.1, (January 1934), p.82.

²⁹⁰ Fook-Lam Gilbert, op.cit., p.235 Lars Erik Nyman, op. cit., p.105. Ma Zhongying became was dubbed the "Big Horse" by the Central Asian explorer/adventurer/anthropologist Sven Hedin as the common Hui surname 'Ma' has the Chinese meaning of 'horse'.

Following the Hami rebellion and Ma's intervention, Jin Shuren mobilised a White Russian force to retrieve the situation. This force of White Russians did not manage to retake Hami, with Ma Zhongying temporarily retreating to Gansu, until August 1931.²⁹¹ By this time, however, the spirit of rebellion had spread throughout Xinjiang with "risings" and "disturbances" flaring at Turfan, Aksu, Khotan, Ili and Kashgar.²⁹² The position of Jin Shuren was under serious threat and significantly he turned to the only external power capable of lending assistance, the Soviet Union. On 1 October 1931 Jin Shuren signed a new agreement with the Soviets that in return for Soviet military aid established the Soviet-Xinjiang Trade Company or *Sovsintorg* (Russian abb.) to further Soviet commercial interests and reduced customs duties on Soviet goods.²⁹³ Significantly the provisions concerning the establishment of the *Sovsintorg* permitted the Soviets to set up trading agencies in Urumqi, Chuguchak, Kashgar, Aksu, Yarkand and Khotan.²⁹⁴ Four out of these six towns lay south of the Tien Shan in the Altishahr where Soviet influence had been minimal under Governor Yang and British interests generally favoured. The agreement thus upset the relative balance established by Yang Zengxin and can be seen as the first "offensive" move in the Soviet Union's drive to reclaim the lost Tsarist privileges in Xinjiang. A number of sources also suggest that Jin's involvement of the White Russians proved to be a decisive event for the Soviets.²⁹⁵ Shortly after the conclusion of the October agreement with the Soviets, Jin Shuren appointed Sheng Shicai as commander-in-chief.²⁹⁶ The following year saw little respite

²⁹¹ Ibid.

²⁹² Lars Erik Nyman, op. cit., p.106.

²⁹³ Fook-Lam Gilbert, "The Road to Power", op. cit., pp.236-237 & Martin N.Norins, op. cit., p.68: in the tradition of Yang Zengxin, Jin Shuren did not seek the approval of the central government regarding this agreement.

²⁹⁴ Martin N. Norins, op. cit., p.68.

²⁹⁵ For example, Lars Erik Nyman, op. cit & David D. Wang op.cit.

²⁹⁶ Fook-Lam Gilbert, op. cit., p.237.

for the besieged provincial authorities with Hui forces under the command of Ma Shih-ming laying siege to Ürümqi in December 1932.²⁹⁷ The White Russians and Sheng Shicai's troops successfully defended Ürümqi and in March 1933 they were bolstered by the arrival of "The Manchurian Salvation Army" via the Soviet Union.²⁹⁸ Following these events Sheng Shicai's prestige grew while that of his erstwhile superior, Jin Shuren, correspondingly declined. The denouement came with a mutiny of the White Russian troops on 12 April 1933 that overthrew Jin, and two days later with the support of the Manchurian troops elevated Sheng Shicai to governor.²⁹⁹ The role of the White Russians in this coup is considered by some sources to have been largely instigated by the Soviet Union with a view to making the new governor, Sheng Shicai, dependent on Soviet support.³⁰⁰ Contemporaneous with these events, the largely Uighur rebels, that had been defeated in Hami and Turfan in 1931, once more captured these cities and the rebellion spread to the south. In May 1933 these forces finally captured Kashgar and in December a Turkish-Islamic Republic of East Turkestan (TIRET) was proclaimed that ended the provincial authorities' grip on the south.³⁰¹ Also in May 1933 Ma Zhongying once again entered Xinjiang at the head of a force of loyal Hui troops. Thus Sheng Shicai's position was far from secure within Xinjiang and the central government in

²⁹⁷ Although Ma Zhongying had retreated to Gansu, Hui troops loyal to him remained in Xinjiang. Andrew D. W. Forbes, *Warlords and Muslims*, op.cit., p.103.

²⁹⁸ This KMT army had retreated into the Soviet Union following the Kwantung Army's invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and were interned there. Their arrival at this juncture via Soviet territory is highly suggestive that the Soviets were increasingly wary of the Islamic nature of the anti-Chinese rebellion. See Ibid, Sir Eric Teichman, "Chinese Turkestan", *JRCAS*, Vol.23, Pt.4, (October 1936), p.565.

²⁹⁹ Andrew D. W. Forbes, op. cit., p.106, David D. Wang, op. cit, pp.203-204, & Allen S. Whiting and General Sheng Shih-ts'ai, *Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot?*, (Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1958), pp.12-13.

³⁰⁰ see Andrew D. W. Forbes, Fook-Lam Gilbert, op. cit., p.240 & especially David D. Wang, op. cit., pp.202-205.

³⁰¹ Andrew D. W. Forbes, op. cit.

Nanjing remained ambiguous in its attitude to the new governor. In fact Chiang Kai-shek's government had in 1932 made Ma the Commander-in-Chief of the 36th Division of the National Army of China thus lending Ma's cause some level of legitimacy. Moreover, on Sheng Shicai's elevation to governor, the central government prevaricated in officially recognising Sheng and confirming his status as governor of Xinjiang. The purpose of the central government in appointing Ma commander of the 36th Division, and therefore expressing tacit support for his actions in Xinjiang, was clearly an attempt to establish KMT authority in Xinjiang, a region until then totally outside of the government's reach.³⁰² Sheng Shicai was thus faced with two clear challengers to his position of governor of Xinjiang - the TIRET in Kashgar and the KMT-supported Ma Zhongying.³⁰³ Sheng Shicai, like his predecessors, had little alternative but to seek Soviet aid. Once again a three-way struggle for power had emerged in Xinjiang with each contender attempting to solicit external political, economic and military support. The external connections, and just as importantly the alleged connections, of the TIRET and Ma Zhongying played a decisive role in determining Soviet and Chinese responses to the struggle for Xinjiang. Moreover, the wider geo-political situation emerging in East Asia from 1930 onward also contributed in forming Soviet and Chinese perceptions of the possible implications of each contender emerging victorious.

The TIRET, as noted previously, was proclaimed in November 1933 led by Khoja Niyaz as titular president and the Khotan Amirs.³⁰⁴ The Kashgar-based TIRET's

³⁰² Fook-Lam Gilbert, *op. cit.*, pp.238-239.

³⁰³ The extent of KMT support is uncertain but according to David D. Wang, Nanjing issued a secret order to Ma Zhongying to defeat Sheng; David D. Wang, *op. cit.*, p.52.

³⁰⁴ see Lee Fui-Hsiang, *The Turkic-Moslem Problem in Sinkiang*, *op. cit.*, p.57 & Lars Erik Nyman, *op. cit.*, p.111. The Khotan Amirs were the leaders of the Khotan rebellion that actually took Kashgar two months previously.

"domestic" policy was aimed at the establishment of an Islamic state based on Shari'a (Islamic law) with a limited program of educational, economic and social reforms.³⁰⁵ The TIRET's stance regarding the various external influences penetrating Xinjiang was largely determined by this largely Islamic and partly pan-Turanian political agenda.³⁰⁶ Thus the leaders of the TIRET espoused a militantly anti-Han, anti-Hui and anti-Soviet "foreign" policy that ultimately diametrically opposed them to the three most powerful forces in Xinjiang - Sheng Shicai, Ma Zhongying and the Soviet Union. Moreover, such an orientation limited TIRET's options, with respect to soliciting external support for their fledgling republic, to Turkey, Afghanistan, and British India. Unfortunately for the TIRET all three of these external powers had neither the political will nor the military/economic capabilities to effectively aid the republic.³⁰⁷ The TIRET had five basic policies:

1. To form an independent Muslim state
2. To seek freedom from the "Soviet stranglehold"
3. To restore peace and put down lawlessness
4. To encourage and restore trade
5. To seek friendly relations with the British Government and to obtain its aid as far as possible.³⁰⁸

Thus it simultaneously opposed itself to not only its internal enemies, Sheng Shicai and Ma Zhongying, but also by explicitly committing to a pro-British "foreign policy", guaranteed Soviet enmity. The commitment, however, of at least part of the TIRET's leadership to points one and two is questionable. Khoja Niyaz and his supporters had in fact had little to do with the establishment of the TIRET and the construction of its political program. The so-called Khotan Amirs and a number of other Uighur leaders in

³⁰⁵ Andrew D. W. Forbes, *Warlords and Muslims*, op. cit., p.113 & Lars Erik Nyman, op.cit., pp.111-112.

³⁰⁶ Lee Fui-Hsiang, op. cit., pp.55-57: The TIRET was almost exclusively an Uighur led and based movement.

³⁰⁷ Ibid, p.57.

³⁰⁸ Andrew D. W. Forbes, op.cit., , p.114.

Kashgar were the principal forces behind the creation of the TIRET that took shape in Kashgar in October-November 1933.³⁰⁹ Khoja Niyaz had not arrived at Kashgar until December, having previously retreated from Hami (Qomul) in the face of Ma Zhongying's invasion. Unbeknownst to the Khotan Amirs, Khoja Niyaz had in June 1933 negotiated an agreement with Sheng Shicai through Soviet good offices whereby Khoja Niyaz disavowed the goal of independence. In return Sheng Shicai offered Khoja Niyaz the vice-chairmanship of the provincial government and increased autonomy, but not independence, for "East Turkestan".³¹⁰ The true importance of this agreement between Khoja Niyaz and Sheng-Soviet Union would not be felt until the following year with the retreat of the "Big Horse" south of the Tien Shan.

Ma Zhongying's sources (or alleged sources) of external support, like all the contenders for Xinjiang, have been vigorously debated by several scholars. The debate centres on the roles played by the Soviet Union and Japan. Several scholars, and Sheng Shicai himself, asserted that Ma had clear Japanese connections. Moreover, the purpose of Japan's penetration of Xinjiang was part of its broader attempt to create an "Asian Co-prosperity Sphere" that in Xinjiang took the form of support for Pan-Islamic causes such as Ma's.³¹¹ Ultimately, from this perspective, Japan's policy was directed at combating Soviet power and influence in continental Asia. The basis of this argument, although clearly plausible with Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931, is largely based upon Sheng Shicai's provincial forces capturing a Japanese agent, Onishi Tadashi, during

³⁰⁹ Lee Fui-Hsiang, *op. cit.*, p.55. The principal leaders were Sabit Mullah & Mohammad Emin, both "Uighurs".

³¹⁰ Andrew D. W. Forbes, *op. cit.*, p.121.

³¹¹ See Owen Lattimore, *op. cit.*, O.Edmund Clubb, *op. cit.*, Allen S. Whiting & Gen. Sheng Shih'tsai, *op. cit.*

fighting with Ma's forces. Ma was also alleged to have a number of Turkish "advisers", including a mysterious "Colonel K" who was variously described as a Japanese agent or Soviet *agent provocateur*.³¹² Thus, Japan throughout this period attempted to enhance its influence in Inner Asia by portraying itself as the supporter of Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turanian movements.³¹³ The Japanese, in contrast to both Britain and the Soviet Union, who both ruled large Muslim populations, looked favourably on the creation of an independent Muslim state between China and the Soviet Union. Yet Japan's ability to actually back up such a political stance with practical material aid to either contender was ultimately severely hampered by the enormous geographic distance between Xinjiang and Japan's furthest point of expansion on continental Asia, Manchuria.³¹⁴ The debate as to the likelihood of Japanese connections with Ma Zhongying or the TIRET is largely irrelevant as it was the *perception* that Japan already had or was seeking connections that conditioned the response of the only external power capable of intervening in Xinjiang, the Soviet Union.

The Soviet influence in Xinjiang prior to the fall of Jin Shuren and the outbreak of the Muslim rebellions was strong and dominant in Zungharia. The fall of Jin and the subsequent Muslim rebellions presented the Soviet Union, despite what some scholars assert, with a difficult series of choices. The fall of Jin Shuren's relatively cooperative regime and its potential replacement by either Ma Zhongying or the TIRET at Kashgar

³¹² Ibid, O. Edmund Clubb, op. cit., p.281, "Central Asia From Within", *JRCAS*, Vol.22, (Jan. 1935), Pt.1, p.106.

³¹³ Lars Erik Nyman, op. cit., p.118. To this end Japan provided sanctuary for the grandson of the last Ottoman Sultan, Abdul Hamid II, at Tokyo as a possible figurehead for a Japanese-sponsored independent Islamic "Greater Turkestan".

³¹⁴ Ibid. The Japanese Ambassador at Kabul, Kitada, was Japan's major source of intelligence regarding the situation in Xinjiang and allegedly the coordinator of Japanese "agents" in Xinjiang and Pan-Islamic/Pan-Turanian propaganda.

would clearly be adverse to the Soviet Union's position not only in Xinjiang but Inner Asia more generally. The establishment of an anti-Soviet and Islamic state in Xinjiang, whether under Ma or the TIRET, had the potential to spread pan-Turanian and pan-Islamic influence into the adjacent regions of Soviet Central Asia. The Soviet fear of such a turn of events was compounded by the possibility of Japanese support for either Ma's or the TIRET's activities. The situation in Xinjiang, combined with the expansion of Japan into Manchuria and Inner Mongolia that culminated in the creation of the puppet-state of Manzhouguo, ultimately compelled the Soviet Union to support Sheng Shicai in 1933. Yet such Soviet actions were not simply aimed at combating real or imagined Japanese expansion and nullifying the potential spread of pan-Islamic or pan-Turanian currents into Soviet Central Asia. Rather the Soviet decision to aid Sheng Shicai was also directed against the KMT government in Nanjing.³¹⁵

Sheng Shicai, confronted by Ma Zhongying's army outside of Urumqi in mid-1933, dispatched a delegation in October to Soviet Central Asia to request assistance. Sheng Shicai claimed later that the delegation was merely following up requests made by Jin Shuren for the delivery of military equipment³¹⁶ but evidently a much more comprehensive agreement had been reached when it returned in December 1933. Sheng's delegation returned accompanied by Garegin Apresoff, who would become the Soviet Consul-General at Urumqi.³¹⁷ Sheng received substantial military aid from the Soviets under this agreement and in return Sheng granted the Soviets wide-reaching political, economic and military concessions. Sheng's secret agreement in December

³¹⁵ Sino-Soviet relations were broken off between 1927 and 1932.

³¹⁶ See Lars Erik Nyman, *op. cit.*, p.118, David D. Wang, *op.cit.*, pp.52-54, & Allen S. Whiting, *op. cit.*: Jin's request was made in 1931.

³¹⁷ Fook-Lam Gilbert, "The Road to Power", *op. cit.*, p.247.

1933 in many respects represented the attainment of the Tsars' goal in Xinjiang. It will be recalled that in 1915 the Russian Consul-General informed Sir George Macartney that it was not to Russia's advantage to annex Xinjiang but it was in her interests to see it become a pliable buffer state, essentially autonomous of China but too weak to resist Russian exploitation. Sheng Shicai agreement with the Soviets achieved, to all intents and purposes, this long-held goal for the Tsar's Soviet heirs. Thus, Soviet penetration and influence in Xinjiang became entrenched from this point on and it was not to be dislodged until 1942. There were four key elements to the Soviet Union's penetration of Xinjiang. These were (1) direct military intervention, (2) economic exploitation, (3) direct involvement of Soviet personnel and (4) ideological domination of the provincial administration.³¹⁸

As Soviet material aid flowed into Urumqi from December 1933 onward so too did Soviet political officers and military advisers. Under the direction of an OGPU³¹⁹ officer, Pogodin, the provincial military forces were immediately purged of "anti-Soviet" personnel; an operation mainly aimed at Sheng's White Russian contingent.³²⁰ Soon thereafter in January 1934, as Ma's forces layed siege to Urumqi, Soviet aeroplanes and two brigades of OGPU troops arrived to rout the Hui forces.³²¹ Ma

³¹⁸ John W. Garver, *Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1937-1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp.154-155.

³¹⁹ OGPU, Unified State Political Administration (**O**biedinyonnoye **G**osudarstvennoye **P**oliticheskoye **U**pravlenyie) Soviet Security Service and forerunner of NKVD, KGB etc. See Pavel Sudoplatov, *Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness - A Soviet Spymaster*, (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1994), p.xxix.

³²⁰ See David J. Dallin, *Soviet Russia and the Far East*, (Hamden: Archon Books, 1971), p.97, David D. Wang, op. cit., pp.52-53, & F.Gilbert Chan, "Regionalism & Central Power: Sheng Shih-ts'ai in Sinkiang, 1933-1944", in F.Gilbert Chan (ed.), *China at the Crossroads: Nationalists and Communists, 1927-1949*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), p.136. Dallin states that Papengut, the commander of the White Russians, was executed along with several officers in the purge.

³²¹ Fook-Lam Gilbert, "The Road to Power", op.cit., p.248, David J. Dallin, op.cit., p.98 & O. Edmund Clubb, op. cit., pp.282-283.

Zhongying subsequently retreated south of the Tien Shan into the region held by the TIRET and extinguished the Turki Republic upon his arrival in Kashgar in March 1934.³²² Khoja Niyaz, the titular head of the TIRET, in February 1934 in the face of Ma Zhongying's assault retreated to the Xinjiang-Soviet border, where his June 1933 negotiations with the Soviets came into play. At the frontier town of Irkeshtam, Khoja Niyaz signed an agreement that dissolved the TIRET and committed him to support of Sheng Shicai's regime.³²³ Thus with the TIRET no longer a political let alone military threat, Soviet forces withdrew from Zungharia contemporaneously and Sheng's strengthened military forces were left to subdue the "Big Horse" on their own. In June/July 1934 Sheng's forces arrived at Kashgar and Ma Zhongying's forces retreated to the southeast toward Khotan and Yarkand, where they would remain "boxed in" until 1937.³²⁴ The "Big Horse's" Hui warriors did so, however, without their commander. In an apparently confounding turn of events Ma Zhongying, the would-be anti-Soviet Islamic ruler of Xinjiang, retreated into Soviet Central Asia via Irkeshtam accompanied by several trusted officers and a certain Konstantinov of the Soviet Consulate-General.³²⁵ Ma Zhongying's motives for undertaking such a manoeuvre remain a mystery, but the Soviet Union's do not. The Soviets, by removing Ma from the picture, would further entrench Sheng Shicai in power and could hope to receive favourable treatment and concessions from the grateful new ruler of Xinjiang. Furthermore, the Soviets by holding Ma Zhongying somewhere in Soviet Central Asia retained a significant card to play if future political developments in Xinjiang did not conform to

³²² O. Edmund Clubb, op. cit., p.285 & Sir Eric Teichman, "Chinese Turkestan", *JRCAS*, Vol.23, (Oct.1936), Pt.4, pp.565-566.

³²³ Andrew D. W. Forbes, op. cit., pp.122-123.

³²⁴ Sir Eric Teichman, op. cit., pp.566, O.Edmund Clubb, op. cit., p.285 & David J. Dallin, op. cit., p.98.

³²⁵ O. Edmund Clubb, op. cit., p.285, David D. Wang, op. cit., p.53, "The Rebellion in Chinese Turkestan", *JRCAS*, Vol.22, (Jan. 1935), Pt.1, p.102.

their strategic interests. That is to say the Soviets could possibly use Ma Zhongying against Sheng Shicai if he attempted to reassert his independence from Moscow or to combat possible Japanese expansion into Xinjiang.³²⁶ Thus Sheng Shicai secured his position of governor of Xinjiang. Throughout the following decade Sheng Shicai, much like his predecessors, would attempt to maintain Xinjiang's autonomy from China. In contrast to Yang Zengxin and Jin Shuren, Sheng would find it increasingly difficult to balance, manage or exclude the strategic, political, economic and military imperatives of the Soviet Union and China.

The extent of Sheng's turn toward the Soviet Union was amply demonstrated in December 1934 when Sheng enunciated a three-point policy of anti-imperialism, peace and alliance with the Soviet Union. These three points were expanded soon after to form the 'Six Great Policies': (1) anti-imperialism, (2) friendship with the Soviet Union, (3) racial and national equality, (4) clean government or "democracy", (5) peace and (6) reconstruction.³²⁷ The most important of these would prove to be "anti-imperialism", "friendship with the Soviet Union" and "racial and national equality". "Anti-imperialism" and "friendship with the Soviet Union" formed the overall political and ideological framework through which Sheng perceived Xinjiang's role in international affairs and constructed his techniques and tactics of rule within Xinjiang. It is through these two major principles or goals that Sheng's policies within Xinjiang can be understood. Thus "racial and national equality" implied, and in practice delivered, a Soviet-inspired (if not directed) "nationalities" policy aimed at mollifying non-Han opposition to Sheng's rule. In conjunction with these policies a number of propaganda

³²⁶ Andrew W. Forbes, *op. cit.*, pp.125-127.

³²⁷ Owen Lattimore, *op. cit.*, pp.72-73.

organs were set up throughout Xinjiang under the aegis of the ‘Anti-Imperialist Association/Society’, which was the only political organisation allowed in Xinjiang. Furthermore,

In 1935 the Anti-Imperialist Association was founded in Dihua (Urumqi) and published the *Anti-Imperialist Front* as its propaganda organ. The association, in fact, acting as a political party and a branch of the Comintern in Xinjiang, played a very active role in propaganda and in the mobilization and organization of the people.³²⁸

Another aspect of the Soviet Union’s ideological domination of Xinjiang’s provincial government was in the foreign affairs stance pursued by Sheng Shicai. As elucidated in Sheng’s ‘Six Great Policies’, the cornerstone of Xinjiang’s foreign affairs ‘policy’ was anti-imperialism. The way in which ‘anti-imperialism’ was understood in relation to Xinjiang was in reality a function of the prevailing Soviet view at that point in time. The Soviet Union and Sheng Shicai in this period viewed Japan and Britain as the principal imperialist threat, not only to Xinjiang but also to Soviet Central Asia:

Sinkiang’s foreign affairs stance was for the most part strongly suggestive of that of the Soviet Union. By Sheng’s interpretation, the imperialists, especially Japan, Britain and Germany, objected strongly to Sinkiang’s pro-Soviet orientation and proposed to conquer the province and occupy it, with two aims: (1) to convert that vast territory into a colony in order to relieve the imperialist home country from the strains suffered as a result of the world economic depression, and (2) to make Sinkiang into the base for an attack on the Soviet Union.³²⁹

The second major element of Soviet penetration of Xinjiang was primarily economic. The Soviet Union wasted little time after Sheng had been ensconced in power in 1934 to take advantage of their strengthened influence in Xinjiang. Moscow granted Sheng a five-year loan of five million gold roubles in order to purchase Soviet industrial and

³²⁸ David D Wang, op. cit., p.54.

³²⁹ Edmund O. Clubb, op. cit., p.286.

military equipment.³³⁰ Furthermore, Stalin sent his brother-in-law A. S. Svanidze, in early 1935, to supervise the formulation of a three-year economic and construction plan for Xinjiang.³³¹ With Soviet aid, agricultural and animal husbandry production increased and Soviet-Xinjiang trade developed apace.³³² Xinjiang's mineral resources were also quickly exploited and developed by the Soviets, beginning with the Dushanbe oil fields in 1935.³³³ Moreover, Sheng Shicai signed an agreement in 1935 committing his government to the employment of Soviet advisers and technicians in governmental departments and construction enterprises.³³⁴ As a result of Sheng's agreement with the Soviets, Xinjiang's provincial government, economic enterprises and agencies of public health were dominated by Soviet personnel,

Soviet advisers and technical experts served in provincial economic enterprises, including agriculture, animal husbandry and mining. They were also employed in fiscal and economic departments of the provincial government. The Soviet Union provided medical workers and hospital supplies for the improvement of hygiene and public health.³³⁵

The result of these developments was the partial integration of Xinjiang's economy with that of Soviet Central Asia.³³⁶

The final element of Soviet penetration of Xinjiang can be termed as ideological. The major manifestation of Sheng Shicai's turn to the Soviet Union was clearly his reform of the provincial authorities approach to the non-Han population of Xinjiang. This ultimately entailed the adoption of a Soviet-inspired "nationalities policy". The guiding

³³⁰ John W. Garver, *op. cit.*, pp. 154-155.

³³¹ David D. Wang, *op. cit.*, p.54.

³³² *Ibid.*

³³³ John W. Garver, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

³³⁴ Edmund O. Clubb, *op. cit.*, p.289.

³³⁵ *Ibid.*

³³⁶ This was most pronounced in Ili in the north-west and "Kashgaria" in the south-west, the two regions that had historically been both the most economically productive regions of Xinjiang and the most westward oriented regions.

principles of this approach were the granting of limited cultural autonomy for the non-Han population of Xinjiang and the cooptation of certain non-Han leaders into Sheng's government. In practice the greater cultural autonomy permitted by Sheng resulted in the establishment of secular Turki-language schools, the revival of madrassas (Islamic schools), the creation of Turki language newspapers and the formation of the Uighur Progress Union.³³⁷ To further appease the Turki population Sheng appointed the erstwhile president of the TIRET, Khoja Niyaz, and the leader of the Hami rebellion of 1931, Yolbars, to prominent positions within his government. The handmaiden of these reformist and "progressive" policies was the institution of a Soviet-style secularisation campaign aimed at undermining the influence of religion in Xinjiang. Moreover, many Uighurs and other non-Hans were sent abroad to study, most notably to Tashkent in Soviet Uzbekistan to the Central Asia University and Central Asia Military Academy. Upon their return to Xinjiang these students found positions as teachers and administrators within Sheng's government.³³⁸ These policies were accompanied by a process similar to that, which took place in Soviet Central Asia during the Soviets' "national delimitation" of the 1920s. Sheng, undoubtedly under Soviet guidance, convened the Second Provincial People's Congress in Urumqi in 1935 to determine the official names of the population of the province.³³⁹ Some scholars claim that the major purpose of this process was to exacerbate and officially sanction the divisions amongst Xinjiang's population in true *divide et impera* fashion.³⁴⁰ Yet much like the Soviet process in the 1920s it produced somewhat contradictory dynamics. Bovingdon rightly

³³⁷ Justin Jon Rudelson, *Bones in the Sand*, op. cit., p.98.

³³⁸ Ibid, p.99. According to Rudelson by 1935 up to 10 000 Uighurs were studying abroad in the Soviet Union, Turkey or Egypt.

³³⁹ Gardner Bovingdon, "The History of the History of Xinjiang", *Twentieth Century China*, Vol.26, No.2 (April 2001), p.103.

³⁴⁰ Ibid, Allen S. Whiting, op. cit

notes that the process in Xinjiang (and Soviet Central Asia for that matter) did not simply identify existing nationalities or *minzu* but "called them into being".³⁴¹ Thus this process recognised and constituted fourteen *minzu* out of a heterogeneous population, which prior to this were not so rigorously divided or grouped.³⁴² The effects of such a process, although serving the ruling elite's purpose by dividing the subject population, ultimately served to provide the ideological and political basis upon which a nationalist program could be built. As noted earlier the adoption of the ethnonym, Uighur for example, was resurrected (or perhaps more accurately resuscitated) in Soviet Central Asia at a Turkic-Muslim conference in Tashkent in 1921.³⁴³ The definition of what and who constituted an Uighur proved to be difficult, with the Soviet definition (largely linguistically determined) eventually based on a *Taranqi* dialect of the Semireche.³⁴⁴ Sheng Shicai's government in 1935 adopted this particular definition. This combined with Sheng's policies of limited cultural autonomy, outlined above, resulted in the emergence of a national intelligentsia, particularly amongst those defined as Uighur (ie. 80% of the population).³⁴⁵ The categorisation of Xinjiang's population into fourteen distinct *minzu* thus strengthened the provincial authorities ability to know, control and manipulate the non-Han majority and simultaneously strengthened the collective identity of those so categorised.

³⁴¹ Gardner Bovingdon, op. cit., p.127.

³⁴² Ibid.

³⁴³ Justin Jon Rudelson, op. cit., p.75.

³⁴⁴ Ibid. It will be recalled from the previous chapter that "*Taranqi*" referred to the Turkic-Muslim agricultural colonists transferred from the Altishahr to the Ili region after the Qing conquest. Some migrated to the Semireche thereafter.

³⁴⁵ Illustrated by the emergence of Uighur language newspapers, schools and political organisations. See Justin Jon Rudelson, op. cit., pp.97-99.

Obviously such a contradictory dynamic, if allowed to continue unfettered, would pose a serious challenge to the existing political order. Unfortunately for the Uighur (and other non-Han peoples), the political and ideological influence of the Soviet Union over the province and Sheng Shicai in particular, resulted in the revision of Sheng's "nationalities" policy from 1937 onward. Stalin's "Great Purge" when it reached Soviet Central Asia in 1937 was ultimately aimed at eliminating the various national intelligentsia or "national communists" created by the Soviet's nationality policies throughout the 1920s. Stalin's campaign in Soviet Central Asia was mirrored in Xinjiang where Sheng Shicai, not wanting to be seen as out of touch or ideologically negligent, initiated his own purge of "fascist" and "Trotskyite" elements throughout the province. Moreover, Sheng eagerly engaged in the macabre political manoeuvring characteristic of the "Great Purge" period by accusing the Soviet Consul-General Apressof of being the mastermind behind a "Trotskyite" conspiracy to topple him.³⁴⁶ Apressof was recalled to Moscow, which was undoubtedly Sheng's purpose, and a province-wide purge of potential opposition to Sheng was undertaken. The result was the arrest and execution of approximately 435 prominent Uighurs, Hui, Mongols and Han Chinese, including Khoja Niyaz.³⁴⁷ Accompanying Sheng's imitation of the Stalinist terror was an increase in censorship (including the closing down of Turkic language newspapers) and a general clamp down on the limited cultural autonomy previously permitted. Thus many landowners, Islamic clerics and minor officials of the government were arrested and imprisoned, eliminating potential challengers to Sheng's rule.³⁴⁸

³⁴⁶ O. Edmund Clubb, *op. cit.*, p.291.

³⁴⁷ Justin Jon Rudelson, *op. cit.*, p.99 & O. Edmund Clubb, *op. cit.*, pp.291-292. Apressof, obviously caught up in the purge, was trialed and executed shortly after his return to Moscow.

³⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

The Soviet Union via the four strategies outlined above effectively excluded China's KMT government from having any influence over Xinjiang politically, economically and militarily. Furthermore, as early as 1935 the Soviet Union had consolidated its position in Xinjiang to be able to thoroughly orient the region's economic and political life to serve its strategic interests:

Sinkiang was soon a Soviet colony in all but name. The Soviet Government had guaranteed her currency with a huge loan of silver, dominated her trade, and was directing her politics. Although nominally a part of China, Sinkiang sent her own consuls to Russia, and the Chinese ambassador, understanding the situation, raised no questions.³⁴⁹

The extent to which Xinjiang and Sheng Shicai were captives of Soviet power and influence in the 1934-1942 period was illustrated by two developments in the 1938-1940 period. The first of these was Sheng Shicai becoming a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). This was the result of Sheng's request to CCP members Wang Ming and Ren Bishi, on their way to Yanan, in Urumqi for membership in the CCP.³⁵⁰ The significance of Sheng's request for membership in the CCP was that Sheng was ultimately pledging allegiance to Yanan, rather than Chongqing. The confirmation of Sheng Shicai and Xinjiang into the CCP fold would greatly enhance Yanan's position in the coming CCP-KMT conflagration,

It meant that Sheng was willing to pledge ultimate loyalty to Yan'nan rather than to Chongqing. The CCP Politburo's approval of Sheng's request is equally significant; it implies that Mao hoped for an ultimate merging of the revolutionary forces of Xinjiang and north-west China. Both regions would contribute toward the construction of a revolutionary China.³⁵¹

This outcome however, did not coincide with the Soviet Union's strategic interests at this stage, and as a result Stalin intervened to prevent Sheng's imminent CCP

³⁴⁹ A. Barmine, *One Who Survived*, (London: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1945), p. 231.

³⁵⁰ John W. Garver, *op. cit.*, p.160.

³⁵¹ *Ibid.*

membership. Stalin's decision to prevent such a development was intimately connected to Sino-Soviet relations, Yenan-Moscow relations and the prevailing international situation, particularly the Sino-Japanese War. That is to say Stalin had two major reasons not to allow Sheng Shicai to join the CCP. Firstly, Stalin wished to minimise Chinese influence in Xinjiang, be it KMT or CCP influence, as this would lessen Soviet influence over the region. Furthermore, Xinjiang needed to maintain its autonomy from China by balancing the CCP against the KMT, while maintaining relations with both. This in turn would prevent Xinjiang from becoming a CCP base against the KMT.³⁵² Secondly, Sheng's memberships in the CCP would undoubtedly antagonise Chongqing and possibly jeopardise the Sino-Soviet united front against Japan. Such a development was obviously not in the Soviet Union's interest at this stage and Stalin intervened to offer Sheng membership in the CPSU instead, on Sheng's visit to Moscow in October 1938, which he duly accepted.³⁵³ As a result, Sheng Shicai, although a Chinese national, joined the CPSU rather than the CCP.

The second major development was the 1940 'Tin Mines Agreement' which further illustrated the Soviet Union's overwhelming influences over Xinjiang's economy and politics. This agreement, more than any other between Sheng and the Soviets, further violated China's de jure sovereignty over Xinjiang. The agreement granted the Soviet Union the exclusive rights for the prospecting, investigation and exploitation of tin and ancillary minerals within Xinjiang.³⁵⁴ Furthermore, with this monopoly the Soviet's gained control over power supply, road transport, telegraph and radio communications

³⁵² Ibid.

³⁵³ Andrew D. W. Forbes, op. cit., p.152.

³⁵⁴ Tien-fong Cheng, *A History of Sino-Russian Relations*, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1957), p.177.

in all areas under 'Xin-Tin' management. The economic benefits accruing to Xinjiang in return for these conditions were minimal as all export of 'Sin-Tin' materials were to be duty-free and no share in net profits were to be accorded to the Xinjiang government.³⁵⁵ Comrade Stalin, Sheng was informed by the Soviet Consul General Bakulin, had formulated these terms, and he had instructed Bakulin that not a single word of the agreement could be changed.³⁵⁶ Sheng could do little to change the terms of the agreement, as he was now bound by Party discipline to obey orders from Comrade Stalin and perhaps more importantly he realised the futility of opposition in the face of overwhelming Soviet power.

The Soviet Union's power and influence in Xinjiang thus reached its peak in 1940 with the signing of the Tin Mines Agreement, but this success was the result of the Soviet Union's wider strategic gains in the 1939-1941 period. The Soviet Union's position in Xinjiang in 1940 was coupled with strategic and diplomatic success in both Europe and North Asia. The Soviet-Nazi Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939 served two major purposes for the Soviet Union; firstly, it at least temporarily prevented the outbreak of a Soviet-German war in Europe, and secondly, it left a belligerent Japan without its major ally against the Soviets. The pact therefore had repercussions for the Soviet Union's position in East Asia. The pact allowed the Soviets to focus upon combating Japanese incursions along the Soviet-Manzhouguo-MPR border areas. As a result of the Soviet's ability to temporarily ignore the situation in Europe, it was able to divert men and materiel to the Far East and engage Japanese forces at Nomonhan. The Soviet Union's victory at Nomonhan resulted in a rapprochement with Japan over the Soviet-

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

³⁵⁶ John W. Garver, *op. cit.*, p.162.

Manzhouguo border and led to the signing of a Soviet-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact in April 1941.³⁵⁷ The strategic value of both these pacts to the Soviet Union was enormous. The pacts enabled the Soviets to consolidate their position in East Asia via direct military resistance to Japanese aggression and diplomacy. Furthermore, the two non-aggression pacts prevented the two-front war scenario that the Soviet leaders dreaded and bought them time to prepare for the inevitable European conflict. The most important development of 1939-1941 period for the Soviet Union was their resistance to Japanese expansion at Nomonhan. The Soviets' stubborn resistance at the Battle of Nomonhan deterred the Japanese military faction that favoured war against the Soviet Union and subsequently gave rise to those in the Japan, who favoured a confrontation with the sea powers,

The big war between the Soviet Union and Japan did not, as envisaged by some Japanese, begin in the Mongolian People's Republic. The battle of Nomonhan proved to be one of those critical turning points in history. Coupled with the coincident signature of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact, it led directly to the defeat of the Japanese faction that gave priority to war with the Soviet Union, and the consequent rise to predominance in the Japanese government of those who favored a grand strategy built around a plan for collision with the sea powers.³⁵⁸

With the subsequent signing of the Soviet-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact in April 1941, the Soviet Union had guaranteed that it would not have to fight a two-front war, and when Germany invaded in June 1941, it did so without its anti-Comintern ally. The significance of the two non-aggression pacts for the Soviet's position in Xinjiang was that it enabled them to pressure Sheng Shicai with the prospect of overwhelming military and economic power if he did not accommodate their demands. The Soviets, via their strategic, military and diplomatic successes vis-a`-vis Germany and Japan were

³⁵⁷ Edmund O. Clubb, op. cit., p.318.

³⁵⁸ Ibid.

able to further consolidate Xinjiang as a virtual satellite, similar to the status of the MPR. Two events in 1941, however, were to impact heavily upon both the Soviet-Xinjiang and Xinjiang-KMT relationships.

The year 1941 witnessed a reversal in the power configuration of the Soviet-Xinjiang-KMT axis due to two events. First, in June 1941 Germany launched its invasion of the Soviet Union and thereby threatened the very existence of the Soviet state. By November 1941 the *Wermacht* were within thirty miles of Moscow and had driven deep into the Ukraine. The Red Army's failure to halt the onslaught quickly eroded Soviet prestige and power in Xinjiang. The Soviets could no longer project their previously unoccupied military and economic resources into Xinjiang to control Sheng Shicai's regime. Understandably Sheng began to doubt the Soviet Union's ability to aid his government and began to explore the possibility of a rapprochement with Chongqing. A second event undoubtedly swayed Sheng's wavering dependence on the Soviet Union. On December 7, 1941, the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour and Chiang Kai-shek's KMT government gained a new ally - and a new source of military and economic aid - the United States.³⁵⁹ Furthermore, Chiang Kai-shek realised that if the KMT were to overcome the CCP within China, they needed to gain control of Xinjiang as a means of isolating Yenan from the Soviet Union and for its natural resources.³⁶⁰ The coincidence of these events not only severely weakened the Soviet Union's power and influence in Xinjiang, but also its influence over Chongqing. Sheng Shicai was not only faced with the withdrawal of the Soviets militarily and economically from Xinjiang but also with growing Turkic-Muslim discontent throughout the region. Sheng Shicai,

³⁵⁹ Ibid.

³⁶⁰ Andrew D. W. Forbes, *op.cit.*, p.158.

being the complete political opportunist that he was, hedged his bets with the US supported KMT regime in Chongqing. Sheng signalled his switch of allegiance in April 1942, when he ceased the publication of the *Anti-Imperialist Front* newspaper and began his purge of pro-Soviet and CCP elements in his administration.³⁶¹ Throughout 1942 Soviet influence was systematically excluded from Xinjiang, including the withdrawal of all Soviet personnel, military or otherwise, previously employed by Sheng's administration. Furthermore, Soviet trade agencies throughout Xinjiang were closed and trade with the Soviet Union virtually ceased.³⁶² The Soviet Union's position in Xinjiang was gradually taken over by the KMT as they began to send troops and administrators to Xinjiang throughout 1942-43. Sheng Shicai's position became progressively weaker as the KMT personnel replaced his appointees and attempted to strengthen Chongqing's grip on Xinjiang. Sheng Shicai's split with the Soviets can be seen as the beginning of the deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations during the war, the consequences of which would have serious repercussions for future of Xinjiang after 1945. The tensions created by Sheng's betrayal of his erstwhile ally threatened to rupture Sino-Soviet cooperation against Japan. In 1942-43, however, the Soviet Union could do little to combat the KMT's growing power in Xinjiang but it was determined to reassert itself once the Germans were defeated in Europe

In the years 1941 and 1942 Sheng Shicai's rule in Xinjiang witnessed a reversal in the orientation of his regime from pro-Soviet to pro-KMT. This shift was accompanied by a willingness on Sheng's behalf to cooperate with the KMT more widely. This is illustrated by Sheng's arrest of CCP agents and supporters in Xinjiang, including Mao

³⁶¹ Ibid, p.159.

³⁶² David D. Wang, op. cit., p.56.

Zemin, Mao Zedong's brother in April 1942.³⁶³ In the same year the Soviet border with Xinjiang was closed, by the Soviet Union, and remained closed until the end of the war. This was to have severe repercussions for Xinjiang's economy in the following two years, as the bulk of Xinjiang's trade was oriented toward the Soviet Union.³⁶⁴ Furthermore, in November 1942 Sheng agreed to an arrangement for the linking of Xinjiang's currency to that of the KMT government at an exchange rate that overvalued the KMT currency. As a result the inflation ridden KMT currency flooded into Xinjiang and Xinjiang's valuable commodities flowed out in exchange. This coupled with the closure of the Soviet-Xinjiang border meant that Sheng Shicai's decision to re-orient Xinjiang toward the KMT would cost him dearly in both political and economic terms.³⁶⁵ This year can also be seen as the beginning of the end for Sheng Shicai's power in Xinjiang. The KMT government in Chongqing steadily undermined Sheng Shicai's power base from this point onward, which had been Soviet support, control of the regions military and co-opted local officials. The KMT began to send troops and officials to Xinjiang throughout 1943 and these officials began to replace the Sheng Shicai appointed officials throughout the region. As a result of these men's loyalty to Chongqing rather than to Sheng, his power declined considerably.³⁶⁶

Sheng Shicai attempted to return Xinjiang to its pro-Soviet orientation by 1944 as his power and position in Xinjiang became severely undermined by the KMT administration. This particular change in strategy was based upon Sheng's perception that the KMT were weakening in the face of the CCP challenge in China Proper and

³⁶³ Allen S. Whiting and General Sheng Shih-ts'ai, *op. cit.*, p.83.

³⁶⁴ Linda Benson, *The Ili Rebellion*, *op. cit.*, p.36.

³⁶⁵ Edmund O. Clubb, *op. cit.*, p.327.

³⁶⁶ Donald H. McMillen, *op. cit.*, p.21.

with the regeneration of the Soviet Union, he foresaw increasing communist pressure (CCP and Soviet) on the KMT government.³⁶⁷ Furthermore, Sheng in August 1944, as his position became increasingly untenable, requested Soviet military intervention to limit or exclude KMT power and influence from Xinjiang and offered the Altai gold mines, petroleum fields and 450 000 head of sheep in return for Soviet assistance.³⁶⁸ The Soviets, for their part, no longer trusted Sheng and rebuffed his offer. Sheng Shicai was left virtually powerless in the face of the KMT's superior power and was removed from Xinjiang to a post in the KMT administration in Chongqing.

The historical pattern of external powers harnessing internal political and economic developments in Xinjiang to their advantage continued after the removal of Sheng Shicai. By 1944 the Soviet Union was on the offensive against Nazi Germany along the Eastern Front and the tide was turning in favour of the Soviets. This turn of events enabled the Soviet Union to reinvigorate its interest in Xinjiang, which had been dormant since the Soviets economic and military withdrawal from the region in 1942. The KMT for its part had eagerly taken advantage of the Soviet Union's inability to influence events in Xinjiang to any significant degree after 1942. That is to say the KMT gradually out manoeuvred Sheng Shicai so as to leave him with no other option but to cooperate with the KMT government and simultaneously excluded Soviet influence from the region. With the removal of Sheng Shicai in 1944, a Chinese central government had finally gained control of Xinjiang after thirty-three years of semi-independence. The KMT now faced severe economic and political problems in Xinjiang. The economic problems created by Sheng's reorientation of Xinjiang to

³⁶⁷ Allen S. Whiting and General Sheng Shih-ts'ai, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

³⁶⁸ Edmund O. Clubb, *op. cit.*, pp.329-330.

Chongqing combined with increasing inter-ethnic tension resulted in a widespread Muslim rebellion in the Ili region. Furthermore, it was also confronted by a regenerated Soviet Union that was now capable of taking the opportunities provided by Xinjiang's internal problems to further its own objectives in the region.

The revolt was a coalition of Uighur, Kazakh, and other non-Chinese ethnic groups and their leaders proclaimed the East Turkestan Republic in November 1944.³⁶⁹ The causes of this rebellion did not directly originate from the KMT's policies in Xinjiang but from the policies pursued during Sheng Shicai's decade of control. Having said this however, it must be stated that the institution of KMT rule did little to improve the situation. The region's economy was severely dislocated by a number of factors under KMT rule. First, the closure of the Soviet border in 1942 severely hampered local trade and commercial transactions and this problem had reached crisis point by 1944:

Another economic factor affecting Xinjiang in the summer of 1944 was the fact that the border with the USSR had been closed in 1942. American Consul Ward, in Urumqi, noted that this alone would have been cause enough for rebellion since the majority of business enterprises in the Ili area were still oriented to the USSR, the major market for Xinjiang raw materials and the source of manufactured goods not made locally.³⁷⁰

The KMT administration could do little to remedy this situation as the reopening of the border required Soviet agreement, which in the 1944/45 period seemed unlikely due to the deterioration in relations between Chongqing and Moscow.³⁷¹ Second, the region's economy had also been set back by Sheng's agreement with the KMT government to link the inflation ridden KMT currency with that of Xinjiang in November 1942. Third, Sheng Shicai's order to requisition 10 000 horses from the regions ten districts in March

³⁶⁹ Linda Benson, *op. cit.*, p.3.

³⁷⁰ Linda Benson, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

³⁷¹ *Ibid.*

1944, to aid the KMT war effort, placed a further strain on the region's economy.³⁷² Furthermore, if a district could not provide the allocated number of horses, 750 Xinjiang dollars had to be paid for each non-delivered horse.³⁷³ This set price of 750 Xinjiang dollars was also substantially higher than the market value and aroused further opposition to Han rule amongst Xinjiang's non-Han population.³⁷⁴ Sheng had a number of motivations for issuing such an order,

Sheng's intention in issuing such an order may have been to please the Goumindang with a sizeable contribution to the war effort; but given the logistical problems of delivering such a number of animals to China Proper, another motive seems more likely: to increase the coffers of the provincial government and its chief. Certainly the order netted far more money than horses. Thus, the requisition appears to have been a ploy to accumulate capital, possibly to pave the way for Sheng's reentrance into the Nationalist fold.³⁷⁵

Sheng's motivation to issue such an order mattered little to the outcome of pursuing such a policy and it only served to increase the pressure on the deteriorating local economy and arouse further minority opposition.

The internal problems created by Sheng Shicai's policies provided the Soviet Union with an opportunity to harness the discontent of the local population to serve its own objectives in Xinjiang. The Soviets were unwilling to accept their exclusion from the region and as 1944 drew to a close their ability to reassert their interests in Xinjiang increased. The Soviet strategy at this point was to initiate a covert operation to support minority groups opposed to Chinese rule of Xinjiang by supplying weapons and Soviet

³⁷² Ibid, pp.36-37.

³⁷³ Linda Benson and Ingvar Svanberg, *China's Last Nomads: The History and Culture of China's Kazaks*, (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), p. 76.

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

³⁷⁵ Ibid, pp. 76-77.

military advisors.³⁷⁶ This approach reversed the Soviet's approach to Muslim rebellions in Xinjiang. In the 1933-1942 period the Soviets actively supported Sheng Shicai's predominantly Han Chinese government in the suppression of Muslim movements, as they feared the spread of such movements to the ethnically akin regions of Soviet Central Asia. Furthermore, these rebellions threatened the then cooperative Sheng Shicai regime through which the Soviet's created Xinjiang as a virtual satellite.³⁷⁷ However, now that Sheng had openly repudiated support for the Soviet Union in favour of the KMT, it was prepared to support any group willing to undermine Sheng Shicai's and then the KMT's control of Xinjiang.

The East Turkestan Republic (ETR) was proclaimed in November 1944 when a rebel force composed of Uighurs, Kazakhs, White Russians, and other non-Chinese ethnic groups captured KMT positions in Kulja the major city of the Ili region.³⁷⁸ The rebellion, although appearing to be a spontaneous and local Turkic-Muslim anti-Chinese uprising created by warlord and KMT rule, soon developed into a confrontation between Moscow and Chongqing. The degree of Soviet involvement in the Ili Rebellion and the establishment of the ETR is a contentious issue, but it is clear that if the Soviets did not initially instigate the rebellion, they certainly became heavily involved in supporting the ETR both militarily and politically once it had begun. The Ili Rebellion and the establishment of the ETR, whether Soviet instigated or not, would further weaken the KMT government's control of Xinjiang and effectively separated Xinjiang into Soviet and Chinese regions of control and influence.

³⁷⁶ David J. Dallin, *Soviet Russia and the Far East*, (Hamden: Archon Books, 1971), p.363.

³⁷⁷ Ibid, pp.363-364.

³⁷⁸ Linda Benson, op. cit, pp.3-5.

The Soviet Union's support of the Ili Rebellion and the ETR resulted in the Xinjiang issue becoming an international confrontation between China's KMT government and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, this confrontation took place within the rapidly changing international political climate of the immediate post-war period. The Ili Rebellion and the establishment of the ETR, although undoubtedly the product of decades of Chinese misrule, was also the product of the emerging Cold War in East Asia, particularly after 1945. Therefore the development of the ETR-KMT conflict must be seen in light of this international situation. That is to say the internal ethnic, religious and political dimensions of the ETR-KMT conflict must be seen in light of the impact of a number of external actors. The three major external actors impacting upon the internal ethnic, religious and political dimensions of the ETR-KMT conflict were the KMT (US supported) national government, the CCP, and perhaps most importantly the Soviet Union.

The eruption of the Ili Rebellion in November 1944 was not an isolated incidence of Turkic-Muslim opposition to Chinese rule. In fact Sheng Shicai had been in almost constant conflict with the Kazakhs of Zungharia in northern Xinjiang since 1940.³⁷⁹ As a result of this conflict with the Kazakhs, Sheng's control of the regions of Ili, Chuguchak and Shara Sume was nominal by late 1940 and was not restored until 1942 with Soviet assistance.³⁸⁰ The Kazakhs involved in this conflict were led by a chieftain by the name of Osman Batur/Uthman Batur. Although Osman's forces were driven back toward the disputed Sino-Mongolian border by Sheng Shicai's forces in 1942, he was to play a large part in the coming conflict in Xinjiang. By the winter of 1942/43

³⁷⁹ Andrew D. W. Forbes, *Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia*, op. cit., p.170.

³⁸⁰ Ibid.

Sheng, increasingly wary of Soviet intentions in Xinjiang, realigned his regime with the government of Chiang Kai-shek. This decision was to have repercussions for both Sheng Shicai and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, for its part, was now effectively excluded from exercising any economic or political influence in Xinjiang and its wartime economy was threatened, as Xinjiang provided many food and mineral resources to the Soviets.³⁸¹ Therefore, the Soviets now had to adopt a new strategy to influence events in Xinjiang and as it was excluded from contact with the provincial authorities, it was now politically expedient to harness the Turkic-Muslim populations discontent with Chinese rule to maintain Soviet influence in the region. The initial manifestation of this new Soviet strategy was the Soviets supply of weapons and economic assistance to Osman Batur's Kazakhs via the intermediary of the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR). This approach enabled the Soviets to weaken Sheng's control of Xinjiang by encouraging Osman's activities, while not damaging its official ties with the KMT government in Chongqing.³⁸² Therefore Sheng Shicai's decision to turn his back on the Soviet Union in favour of the KMT resulted in the deterioration of Xinjiang's Soviet oriented economy and increasing Turkic-Muslim opposition to Chinese rule, particularly after 1943. This combined with the Soviet Union's new strategy of covert support of Turkic-Muslim opposition resulted in the gradual erosion of Sheng Shicai's control of Xinjiang.

Soviet influence amongst Xinjiang's Turkic-Muslim population began with the Soviet Union developing economic and political relations with Yang Zengxin's regime in 1924 and reached its peak during Sheng Shicai's rule. Soviet influence was particularly

³⁸¹ Linda Benson and Ingvar Svanberg, *op. cit.*, pp.74-75.

³⁸² *Ibid.*

pronounced in the Ili region that bordered the Soviet Union. This influence was not a recent development as Ili had developed a special relationship with its Russian neighbour, beginning with the Russian occupation of the region between 1871-1881.³⁸³ This relationship had involved the region's economy becoming increasingly aligned to the Russian and then Soviet economies and the region also absorbed many White Russian refugees in the early 1920s. Furthermore, Ili's relationship with the Soviet Union had insulated the region to a certain degree from the rest of Xinjiang's economic and political problems throughout the Republican period,

Throughout the Republican period, Ili had remained unaffected by the Muslim revolts which swept through Zungharia and the Tarim Basin, and because of its close economic links with the USSR (which remained largely uninterrupted under both Yang Tseng-hsin and Chin Shu-jen, as well as Sheng's 'progressive' years), the region enjoyed a prosperity beyond any other in Sinkiang.³⁸⁴

However, with Sheng's split from the Soviet Union the Ili region suffered greatly in both economic and political terms. As a result of Sheng Shicai's decision the Soviets actively pursued contacts with discontented Turkic-Muslim minorities in Xinjiang. The Soviet Union's support for Osman Batur's Kazakhs in Zungharia in the 1942/43 period, via the intermediary of the MPR, was an alliance of necessity for both the Soviets and Osman. The Soviets wished to create as much trouble for their former ally as possible and influence events in Xinjiang, while Osman needed Soviet military aid to continue his anti-Chinese activities in Xinjiang,

In 1942, the new situation in Xinjiang meant that it was now in the Soviet's interest to supply men like Osman with weapons – as a counter to Sheng's change in allegiance and to forestall a possible decline in Xinjiang-Soviet trade. Although they could not approach Osman directly, the Soviets could

³⁸³ Andrew W. Forbes, *op. cit.*, p.172.

³⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

use an intermediary like the Mongols to offer Osman arms he desperately needed to oppose Sheng.³⁸⁵

The Soviets did not limit their options to Osman's Kazakhs however, and they actively sought to influence an emerging Turkic-Muslim movement in the Ili region, known as the Ili Rebellion.

The revolt of the nomadic Kazakhs in Zungharia in the 1940-44 period, while a threat to Chinese control of the region, was not as troubling for the Chinese as the emergence of a widespread pan-ethnic rebellion in the Ili region in November 1944. The Ili Rebellion and the ETR that the rebels proclaimed was made even more troubling for the Chinese authorities as it appeared to be Soviet influenced and supported. The extent to which the rebellion was supported or instigated by the Soviet Union (as the Chinese claimed) is debatable, but it is clear that the Soviets not only supported the ETR militarily and economically once it had begun but also had a degree of influence over some of the ETR's key leaders. This Soviet influence was due to a number of factors. Firstly, a number of the ETR's leaders had been educated in Soviet Central Asia and held Soviet citizenship. Secondly, many Turkic-Muslims with pro-Soviet or anti-Chinese political views sought refuge in the Soviet Union during Sheng Shicai's anti-Soviet purges of the early 1940s.³⁸⁶ Furthermore, some of the Turkic-Muslim leaders who fled to the Soviet Central Asia formed the pro-Soviet "Xinjiang Turkic People's National Liberation Committee" (XTPNLC) in 1943 in Soviet Kazakhstan.³⁸⁷ It is suggested by Forbes that it was via the XTPNLC that the Soviets exercised their influence over the direction of the rebellion and the ETR, particularly through the Uighur leader known by either his

³⁸⁵ Linda Benson and Ingvar Svanberg, *op. cit.*, p.75.

³⁸⁶ Andrew W. Forbes, *op. cit.*, pp.172-173.

³⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

Russified name of Ahmet Jan Kasimov or the Turkic Ahmet Jan Qasimi.³⁸⁸ Many of the ETR's leaders however, were not as pro-Soviet as the XTPNLC and in fact were as anti-Soviet as they were anti-Chinese. The non-XTPNLC elements of the ETR were more numerous than the XTPNLC supporters but they did not have any well organised political organisation through which they could take full advantage of their numerical superiority. This group can be seen as a conservative Turkic-Muslim group whose major goals were the establishment of an unified, independent Islamic republic in Xinjiang. This group was led by an Islamic scholar, Ali Han Tore. The Ili Rebellion and the ETR was therefore established and led by an essentially divided leadership, consisting of the pro-Soviet XTPNLC and the Islamic-Conservative faction. These two groups were divided over three major issues. Firstly, they disagreed as to the level of Soviet influence that should be allowed in Xinjiang, with the STPNLC wishing to establish a secular state with close political and economic ties with the Soviet Union at the expense of China. The Islamic-Conservative group on the other hand wanted to establish an Islamic state, independent of Soviet and Chinese influence. Secondly the XTPNLC was not explicitly anti-Han and focused upon the removal of the KMT government from Xinjiang. Furthermore the XTPNLC wished to replace the KMT government with a broad based pan-ethnic coalition, including Han Chinese.³⁸⁹ The Islamic – Conservative group led by Ali Han Tore was however explicitly anti-Han, anti-KMT and anti-Soviet and was therefore unwilling to accept any Han Chinese involvement in Xinjiang's future government.

³⁸⁸ Ibid, p. 174.

³⁸⁹ Ibid, p. 178.

Before discussing the two major factions within the Ili group, it is necessary to examine the question of Soviet involvement during the initial stages of the rebellion. This particular aspect of the Ili Rebellion is perhaps one of the most contentious issues raised by the military and political activities of the ETR. That is to say the Ili Rebellion has been viewed by other scholars in two distinctly different ways; (1) an essentially locally led Islamic and nationalist rebellion against Han Chinese rule and (2) that the entire affair was instigated and orchestrated by the Soviet Union. The first position, argued by Linda Benson and others, views the rebellion as the direct result of Han Chinese misrule and oppression of the Turkic-Muslim peoples of Xinjiang.³⁹⁰ Furthermore, the primary causes of the revolt are seen as being essentially ethnic and religious in nature and the role of external actors, such as the Soviet Union and the KMT government, are relegated to secondary causes of the rebellion. That is to say the actions of the Soviet Union and the KMT, only added to the existing ethnic and religious tensions which fuelled the conflict and both (especially the Soviet Union) attempted to utilise the conflict for their own advantage. As a result of this view, Soviet involvement in the ETR is not denied, rather it is seen as becoming involved once the rebellion had begun. The Soviets, according to this argument, were merely taking advantage of an opportunity presented to it rather than created by it. The second argument, as expressed by some Chinese and western scholars, such as David Wang and Andrew Forbes, is that the Soviet Union was deeply involved in the instigation and direction of the rebellion and the ETR.³⁹¹ The Soviet Union, according to this view, simply used the allure of

³⁹⁰ See Linda Benson, *The Ili Rebellion: The Muslim Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang 1944-1949*, op. cit & Owen Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia.*, op. cit.

³⁹¹ See David W. Wang, *Clouds Over Tianshan: Essays on Social Disturbance in Xinjiang in the 1940s*, (Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, NIAS Report, No. 36), pp.1-122 & Andrew D. W. Forbes, *Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia*, op. cit.

Islamic rhetoric and propaganda to gain the rebellion the local populations support. Once they had gained this support, particularly in the Ili region, they ensconced pro-Soviet Turkic-Muslim leaders within the embryonic ETR administration in order to control the nascent republic.

The implications of these views for the subsequent analysis of Xinjiang, Chinese policy toward Xinjiang (both KMT and CCP) and foreign influence, are starkly different. If the first position is argued, then the KMT's policy (and the CCP) and subsequent approaches to Xinjiang's non-Han peoples are seen as being primarily responsible for the regions inter-ethnic tensions and Soviet influence. Therefore this view, in essence, places all the responsibility for Xinjiang's political, economic, social and cultural situation at the end of the 1940s squarely upon the KMT government's shoulders. Furthermore, the Soviet Union's strategy of using Turkic-Muslim dissent to serve its own ends in Xinjiang is argued to be the product of Chinese misrule and mismanagement of Xinjiang, rather than the cause of it. The second argument in contrast, places Xinjiang's internal political situation at the end of the 1940s within the context of the Soviet Union's meddling in China's internal affairs. Therefore the inter-ethnic tensions between Han Chinese and Turkic-Muslims, and within the Turkic-Muslim peoples, are argued to be the result of Soviet manipulation of nationalist sentiment. The implication for the ethnic problems in Xinjiang is that they have been the direct result of the Soviet Union's disruptive influence rather than Chinese mismanagement. Within the discussion of the Ili Rebellion, there must be an examination of the various political agendas of the Soviet Union, the KMT and most importantly the Turkic-Muslim nationalists. This is essential as the Turkic-Muslim

peoples were far from sharing a united political agenda for the future development of Xinjiang. The political agendas of the external elements involved in Xinjiang, the Soviet Union, KMT and the CCP must be discussed within the context of the emerging Cold War. That is to say the Soviet-CCP and KMT-USA relationships were an important element in determining the strategic and political approaches the Soviets and the KMT utilised toward Xinjiang. The Ili Rebellion, the ETR and subsequent coalition governments in Xinjiang were influenced and often sacrificed to wider strategic and political concerns by the Soviet Union and the KMT.

The Turkic-Muslim rebellion against Han Chinese rule of Xinjiang began with a small scale uprising in the town of Nilka, east of Kulja, on October 8 1944.³⁹² This uprising was reputedly led by an Uighur and an Uzbek, one of which was said to have brought weapons into Xinjiang from the Soviet Union.³⁹³ The Soviet Union's and the XTPNLC's involvement in the uprising at Nilka, according to Forbes, would appear to have been minimal,

On balance, it seems probable that the Nilka rising was a spontaneous and purely local affair, in which both the USSR and its 'progressive' front organisation, the STPNLC, played no direct part, but which both were subsequently quick to exploit for their own ends.³⁹⁴

Furthermore the lack of Soviet involvement in the Nilka rising and partial confirmation of the uprising's Islamic and ethnic nature was that the green flag of Islam was raised and a general anti-Han pogrom took place thereafter.³⁹⁵ The anti-Han pogroms that characterised the Nilka and subsequent Kulja uprising appears to have been contrary to

³⁹² Linda Benson, *op. cit.*, p.43.

³⁹³ Lee Fui-Hsiang, *op. cit.*, p.66.

³⁹⁴ Andrew D. W. Forbes, *op. cit.*, p.173.

³⁹⁵ *Ibid*, pp.173-174.

the XTPNLC's political and strategic approach, in that the STPNLC was not explicitly anti-Han but anti-KMT. An explanation for the 'progressive' XTPNLC's inaction in this regard is that it was relatively weak outside of the urban areas and the Islamic-Conservative elements of the Turkic-Muslim peoples were both more numerous and had greater support in the countryside. However, a more Machiavellian view would suggest that these pogroms were politically expedient for the XTPNLC as the main targets of these pogroms, KMT officials and recent Han settlers, were the elements which the XTPNLC wanted removed. Furthermore, these pogroms would not be blamed on the XTPNLC.³⁹⁶ The assault on Kulja on November 7, is perhaps more problematic in terms of determining Soviet involvement. The Chinese authorities claimed that the attack was directed from the Soviet Consulate in Kulja,

According to an eyewitness report relayed to British Consul Turrall in Urumqi by Chinese sources, the signal for the attack came from the Soviet Consulate, as did the first machine gun fire of the battles, being aimed at the Nationalist Air Force Headquarters some sixty metres down the street.³⁹⁷

However, there is no independent verification of this Chinese claim of direct Soviet involvement in the early stages of the attack on Kulja.³⁹⁸ Although there are conflicting reports as to the strength of the insurgents (Benson claims four to five hundred men)³⁹⁹, it is clear that they must have at least been led by Soviet trained personnel to overcome two well equipped KMT battalions. This particular aspect of the Kulja rising is confirmed by Forbes who asserts that,

The involvement of Russian soldiers in the early stages of the rebellion is confirmed by the Soviet historian N. N. Mingulov, who describes them as 'settlers living in Sinkiang, having migrated there from Semirech'ye in the 19th century'; he identifies their leaders as F. Leskin and A. Polinov.⁴⁰⁰

³⁹⁶ Ibid, p.179.

³⁹⁷ Linda Benson, *op. cit.*, p.45.

³⁹⁸ Andrew D. W. Forbes, pp.174-175.

³⁹⁹ Linda Benson, *op. cit.*, p.45.

⁴⁰⁰ Andrew D. W. Forbes, p.178.

The composition of the rebel fighting force is also disputed, but it is relatively certain it was composed of Uighur, Kazak, and White Russians.⁴⁰¹ However, Owen Lattimore asserts that the insurgents were not equipped with Soviet weapons, rather the Uighur troops “were armed only with hand grenades”.⁴⁰² Lattimore and Benson’s positions are also corroborated by Frank Robertson’s more contemporaneous claim that “ There has been no evidence to support Chinese charges that the Ili troops are armed with modern Russian equipment.”⁴⁰³ Although the question of the rebels using modern Soviet weaponry and direct Soviet involvement in the form of personnel is disputed, it is reasonable to suspect some form of Soviet aid to the rebels, given their seemingly easy success against two KMT battalions.

The question as to the leadership and direction of the attack on Kulja is perhaps more important than the question of Soviet military aid to the insurgents. It is important in terms of the internal political developments within the rebel ranks, that is to say the tension between the XTPNLC and the Islamic-Conservative elements. Forbes suggests that the XTPNLC in fact led and organised the attack on Kulja, with the primary objective of ‘liberating’ the city before the rural, and in their view ‘conservative’, insurgents who had taken Nilka and surrounding areas,

As soon as news of the events at Nilka reached Kulja, the STPNLC began to prepare an armed uprising designed both to oust KMT forces from the city and to pre-empt its ‘liberation’ by rural partisans whom the urban ‘progressives’ suspected of anti-Soviet Islamic fundamentalism and anti-Han chauvinism.⁴⁰⁴

⁴⁰¹ Ibid.

⁴⁰² Owen Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia*, op.cit., p.87.

⁴⁰³ Frank Robertson, (Dispatch to the New York Times) “Sinkiang is Moving Closer to Russia”, *New York Times*, Feb. 1, 1948.

⁴⁰⁴ Andrew D. W. Forbes, op. cit., p.175.

This objective was achieved to a substantial degree by November 12 to 15, for the rebels to be confident of their position to declare the establishment of the East Turkestan Republic, under the presidency of the Uzbek religious scholar, Ali Han Ture. The rebels then extended their control to the Chuguchak region in the north by September 1945 and then drove east toward Manass and took the town of Wusu.⁴⁰⁵ The rebels' victories throughout this period, November 1944 to September 1945, were characterised by anti-Han pogroms,

The capture of towns by the rebels was often followed by a massacre of the Chinese inhabitants in which the Qazaks carried out horrible atrocities in true Central Asian style.⁴⁰⁶

McClellan also notes that the rebels were armed with rifles, machine-guns and mortars, and were dressed in 'Russian' style uniforms.⁴⁰⁷ Furthermore, he confirms Chinese claims of a rebel aerial bombardment of Wusu, yet he does not state that they were definitely Soviet planes.⁴⁰⁸ Both these examples support claims of direct Soviet involvement, but they are also disputed by Benson. Benson argues that while planes may have been involved in the attack on Wusu, they need not have been Soviet in origin,

Chinese claims that Soviet planes were involved in the initial attack on Wusu, which began on September 5, remain unconfirmed. It should be remembered, however, that there were planes available to the ETR forces, since they had taken the airfield of the Nationalist air force in Yining(Kulja) early in the fighting.⁴⁰⁹

What is certain, however, is that the rebel forces took Wusu on September 7 and continued to push eastward and met KMT resistance at the banks of the Manass River,

⁴⁰⁵ Owen Lattimore, *op. cit.*, p.87.

⁴⁰⁶ Major N. L. D. McClellan, D.S.O., "The New Dominion" in *JRCAS*, Vol. 35 (1948), p.134.

⁴⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁹ Linda Benson, *op. cit.*, p.52.

seventy miles from Urumqi.⁴¹⁰ The rebel advance to Manass threatened the provincial capital and the KMT sent crack troops, under General Hu Tsung-nan who had been tying down the CCP in North China, to Xinjiang but they also failed to halt the rebels.⁴¹¹ The rebel victory over the KMT forces at Manass now left the road to the capital open and the rebels reportedly had 40 000 men under arms.⁴¹² It was at this point that the wider strategic and political considerations of the Soviet Union and the KMT government came into play to change the course of the rebellion.

The KMT government in Chongqing clearly realised that Xinjiang was slipping from its grasp and endeavoured to halt this seemingly inevitable process. In order to maintain at least nominal KMT control of Xinjiang, Chiang Kai-shek decided to negotiate with the Kulja rebels. In conjunction with this decision Chiang Kai-shek it would seem endeavoured to utilise the growing tension between the Soviet Union and the US to his advantage. To this end he dispatched General Zhang Zhizhong, Commander of the KMT's North-Western Headquarters at Lanzhou, to aid the beleaguered Wu Zhongxin in Urumqi.⁴¹³ The Chinese authorities obviously apportioned a great deal of the blame for the situation in Xinjiang to the Soviet Union, as General Zhang Zhizhong went immediately to the Soviet Consulate in Urumqi on September 13 to inform the Soviets that unless a cease-fire was effected immediately, China would make an 'international affair' of the matter.⁴¹⁴ This was undoubtedly a threat to involve the US in the affair in order to check Soviet ambitions in the region. Two days later the Soviets transmitted to

⁴¹⁰ Andrew D. W. Forbes, p. 189.

⁴¹¹ Owen Lattimore, *op. cit.*, p.87.

⁴¹² Frank Robertson, *op. cit.*.

⁴¹³ Andrew D. W. Forbes, *op. cit.*, p.190.

⁴¹⁴ Edmund O. Clubb, *op. cit.*, p.367.

Chongqing an ETR request that the conflict be mediated and the Soviets added their willingness to act in such a mediatory capacity.⁴¹⁵ The swiftness of the ETR's request that the conflict be mediated, with the road to Urumqi open suggests that in the final analysis it was the Soviet Union, and not the ETR's leaders, who directed and controlled the course of the rebellion. Perhaps more importantly, in the context of this thesis, are the circumstances that compelled the Soviet Union to restrain the military activities of the ETR at this particular juncture. This is the task and focus of the following chapter that will provide a "big picture" perspective of the role or position of Xinjiang in the geopolitics and international relations of East Asia between 1911 and 1949. It will be made clear in this chapter that the Soviet Union's decision to cease the ETR's activities was intimately linked to the political manoeuvring and negotiations surrounding the Yalta Agreement and the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. It is sufficient within the context of this chapter, focused as it is on the development of Chinese techniques and tactics of rule in Xinjiang over the 1911-1949 period, to state that the Soviet "mediation" of the conflict effectively "saved" Xinjiang for the Chinese state. Undoubtedly, as will be seen, this was not necessarily a Soviet intention. The course of events over the following 1945-1949 period, however, demonstrated that Xinjiang's dual role as "pawn and pivot" of Asia was just as descriptive of the geopolitical manoeuvring surrounding the region in the post-war period as it was of the 1930s or even of the "Great Game" of the 19th century.

The result of the Zhang Zhizyong instigated Soviet-ETR-KMT negotiations were to essentially divide Xinjiang into ETR and KMT control regions. The direct military

⁴¹⁵ Andrew D. W. Forbes, *op. cit.*, p.190.

conflict and Soviet "mediation" between the ETR and the KMT in 1945-1946 led to the establishment of uneasy coalition government. The subsequent 1946-1949 period in Xinjiang witnessed the KMT and ETR govern their regions in increasingly divergent ways, although they were ostensibly coalition partners. The Soviet Union continued, despite the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty, to support economically and militarily the ETR's political and economic agenda within the context of the ETR-KMT 'coalition'.⁴¹⁶ The region experienced three coalition governments between 1946 and 1949, under the chairmanship of KMT General Zhang Zhizhong (1945-46), the anti-Ili Masud Sabri (1947-48) and the pro-Ili Burhan (1949) respectively. Each change in the titular head of the coalition administration reflected the essential divisions within the province between the KMT, Pan-Turkic and anti-Soviet Uighurs and pro-Soviet Turkic and Mongol groups. Moreover, the wider geopolitical and strategic situation also played a key role in influencing the Soviet Union and China's actions and responses to the coalition government. The unstable political situation that this created was only resolved by the defeat of the KMT in the civil war and the arrival of the PLA in September 1949. Therefore when the PLA entered Xinjiang in 1949,

Xinjiang was an underdeveloped, divided, Muslim and ethnically and attitudinally non-Han 'province' of China. Under these conditions the CPC was to 'peacefully liberate' the province and set about the enormous task of establishing a socialist 'new order'.⁴¹⁷

⁴¹⁶ see David D. Wang, *Under the Soviet Shadow*, op. cit., 315-336.

⁴¹⁷ Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and the Production and Construction Corps: A Han Organisation in a Non-Han Region", *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, no. 6, (July 1981), p.67.

CHAPTER 4

BEYOND THE PANOPTICON?: XINJIANG & CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY, 1911-1949

The preceding two chapters have dwelt at length on the development and evolution of Chinese techniques and tactics of rule, and their interaction with and relation to external influences. It is necessary, however, to pause at this juncture to reflect on the deeper meaning and impact of the detailed analysis of the preceding two chapters with respect to the two major foci of the thesis - the development of governmentality and Xinjiang's position in China's foreign policy. Moreover, this chapter will highlight the major aspects of continuity between and across the Qing and Republican eras with a view to providing an evaluation of the meaning of these themes of continuity for contemporary China. Thus this chapter is simultaneously a way station between the major eras of China's 20th century history in Xinjiang, and an interpretative and integrating chapter concerned with illuminating the over-arching linkages between China's long-term imperial project in Xinjiang and its foreign policy. As will be evident from the preceding chapter, the key continuity linking the Qing, Republican and PRC eras in Xinjiang has been the implantation or consolidation of the Qing ideological construction of Xinjiang as Chinese. That is to say that China's assertion of the "Chineseness" of Xinjiang has served to frame or underpin Chinese perceptions of Xinjiang. The initiation of themes of governmentality during the Qing era, such as the geographic construction of "Xinjiang", were successful in implanting not only the notion of Xinjiang as "Chinese" but also of the conception of an expanded "China" - one encompassing all the Inner Asian regions conquered by the Qing in the 18th century. This expanded conception of what constituted China was inherited, claimed and

defended by the Qing's successors not only with respect to Xinjiang, but also regarding Tibet, Mongolia, Manchuria and Taiwan. Yet the specific case of Xinjiang, I argue, is exemplary with respect to the interaction of themes of governmentality and external influences and what it can tell us about the formation of China's foreign policy. Throughout the periods dealt with in the preceding chapters the force of this conceptualization of Xinjiang as Chinese has been clearly evident. The purpose of the present chapter is to not simply reiterate the arguments pursued thus far but to relate the detailed, particular and specific material concerning the techniques and tactics of rule examined previously to the major consideration of this thesis - Xinjiang's place/role in China's foreign policy. This chapter will draw out the major implications of the development of themes of governmentality in Xinjiang across the Qing and Republican periods for China's foreign policy. As such it will argue that, as during the late Qing period, the conception that Xinjiang *was* and *should* be Chinese framed and underpinned perceptions of the dilemmas posed by ongoing Chinese rule of Xinjiang. Furthermore, these perceptions ultimately proved to be the basis or starting point for policy prescription regarding Xinjiang. The implications of these processes for China's foreign policy are clear. The embedding of both the notion of Xinjiang as Chinese and the expanded conception of what constituted "China" conditioned the state's response to specific external pressures in Xinjiang. More bluntly, the initiation of themes of governmentality during the Qing era and ironically their erosion under the Republic prescribed a series of state responses to Russian and Soviet interference, influence and power in Xinjiang. This requires a further discussion and extrapolation of a number of major arguments highlighted in the introductory comments of chapter two. Most

important is the reintroduction of Foucault's Panopticon metaphor as a means of conceptualising the relation between China and Xinjiang.

Thus the key tasks of this chapter are to interrogate China's foreign policy, with particular reference to the 1911-1949 period, and explicitly link the broad contours of this to the development and erosion of the themes of governmentality identified in the previous two chapters. What is intended here is not an account of China's foreign policy in general, but one specifically concerned with the relationship that is central to the position of Xinjiang - that is the Sino-Soviet relationship. Although China was assailed by a multiplicity of foreign pressures and dilemmas during the Republican period, the lodestar of China's geopolitical and foreign policy problems was Russia and subsequently the Soviet Union. Russian and Soviet pressure and imperatives were intimately linked to all of the challenges posed to China in this period, especially under Chiang Kai-shek's KMT government (1928-1949). Moreover, the majority of these challenges threatened the expanded conception of China inherited from the Qing. Chiang's government faced four major issues after the consolidation of the KMT regime in 1928: (1) Manchuria, (2) Mongolia, (3) Xinjiang and (4) the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). With respect to Manchuria, Mongolia and Xinjiang, Chiang's government faced the "loss" of these regions to Russia, the Soviet Union or Japan, while the question of the CCP was intimately connected to the Soviet Union. All four of these issues would plague Chiang's government throughout its tenure on the mainland. The issues of Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang and the CCP converged between 1944 and 1949 to form an entwined and encompassing existential challenge to Chiang Kai-shek's government. Moreover, Xinjiang assumed pivotal importance in the manoeuvres

through which China and the Soviet Union attempted to resolve their conflicting imperatives regarding Manchuria, Mongolia and the CCP.

Earlier in the thesis I used the conception of the Panopticon in tandem with governmentality in order to characterize the relation between China and Xinjiang. If one conceives of Xinjiang as a "cell" in the Panopticon of the Chinese state, Chinese policy in Xinjiang can be seen as an attempt to perfect the state's "vision" of the province. Each "cell" of the Panopticon faces, as noted above, simultaneously the interior and exterior (via windows at each end of the cell) of the Panopticon thus allowing for observation from the central tower and the illumination of the entire cell by sunlight. If Xinjiang is viewed as such a "cell" then it is clear that there is the possibility of observing the cell from some point external to the Panopticon - Russian/Soviet Central Asia for example. Xinjiang's position in China's foreign policy can be framed by this element of externality present in the conception of the Panopticon. The historical period that has been the focus of the preceding two chapters, roughly 1700 to 1949, corresponds to a period of vast imperial expansion for both China (in its Qing and Republican guise) and Russia (in its Tsarist and Soviet guise) that contemporaneously brought them into direct competition or opposition in Xinjiang, Mongolia and Manchuria. Therefore, the Russian/Soviet and Qing/Chinese states can be seen as two distinct and expanding Panopticons competing over specific and contestable "cells" along their frontiers. In the previous chapter I argued that a weakening and erosion of the existing structure, techniques and tactics of Chinese rule in the face of constant external pressures/challenges characterized the 1911-1949 period. Furthermore, these processes generated a reactive Chinese foreign policy in the sense that it could neither reinforce

nor regenerate the existing techniques and tactics of rule "on the ground" in Xinjiang. Consequently "Xinjiang" became a strategic and tactical dilemma to be resolved or confronted outside of the "cell" in the international system/inter-state system

The course of the interaction and relation between the structure, techniques and tactics of rule implemented by both the Qing and Chinese states and external influences/pressures has been charted throughout the previous two chapters. The predominant dynamic in this process was that Qing goals in Xinjiang greatly influenced the Qing handling of approaches to external relations. Throughout the Qing era in Xinjiang the Qing had one core goal that remained constant - to maintain and strengthen its control over the region. The means, strategies and techniques with which to achieve this end, however, were gradually transformed under both internal and external pressures. Chapter two demonstrated that two distinct phases of Qing policy were implemented over the course of the 1759-1911 period. The ultimate goal of maintaining and strengthening Qing control of the region was served during the first phase, 1759 to 1830, by a series of techniques and tactics of rule that strove to isolate Xinjiang from China proper and maintain the existing political, economic and geographic divisions within the territory. The rationality of this approach stemmed from the prevailing imperial ideology that primarily perceived Xinjiang as a constituent part of the Qing *Inner Asian* realm. This required a series of political and ideological "bridges", expressed within specific cultural frames (eg. Lifan Yuan rituals), that not only legitimated Qing rule but also provided the "space" for the representation of the variegated non-Han peoples of the empire. That is to say, the Qing during this phase was an universalist imperial project attempting to encompass multiple political and

cultural forms. The form and content of the techniques and tactics of rule employed by the Qing in Xinjiang clearly reflected these imperatives of segregation, control and legitimacy. Moreover, the internal measures undertaken by the Qing were also mirrored and reinforced by the stance assumed with respect to the handling of external relations. In the context of what would become "Xinjiang" this entailed the appropriation of existing politico-ideological structures and the construction of alternative modes of rule. North of the Tien Shan (ie. Zungharia) the Qing appropriated, during and after the destruction of the Zunghars, the long-standing Genghissid and Buddhist conceptions of political legitimacy and rule. South of the Tien Shan (ie. Kashgaria/Altishahr) the existing politico-ideological structures of rule were predominantly Islamic and thus not reconcilable to the infidel Qing imperial ideology. Therefore, in the Altishahr after the Qing defeat and exile of the Afaqi Khojas, the Qing constructed an alternative structure of rule known as the *beg* system that established the Qing as the only legitimate source of secular authority. The geographic and ethnographic divisions of Xinjiang essentially formed the contours through which the Qing administration was framed following the conquest. Thus the pastoral-nomadic Zungharia was placed under direct military governorship and, apart from the depopulated Ili valley, witnessed minimal agricultural colonisation. The agricultural and sedentary Altishahr in contrast was ruled indirectly through the *beg* system and also saw minimal Manchu or Han settlement. Within each division of the new territory the Qing constructed a series of techniques and tactics of rule encompassing political, social and economic realms designed to isolate them from each other and China proper.⁴¹⁸ The external affairs of the Qing in Xinjiang also contributed or complemented these internal measures in their task of segregation. The

⁴¹⁸ For example the *lu biao* or "travel certificate" system restricting travel between the major oases of Xinjiang, restriction of travel abroad for Qing subjects, the restriction of the freedom of movement of

Qing handling of the three major issues in its external affairs in Xinjiang, the Makhdumzada Khojas, Khoqand and trade, demonstrated this alignment with internal policy. Throughout the 1759 to 1830 period the Qing's external relations were reflective of the complex of techniques and tactics of rule within Xinjiang. Therefore, in this period the strategy of segregation served the preeminent or core goal of maintaining and strengthening control over Xinjiang.

The "Jahangir Jihads" from 1820-1828 and the Khoqandi incursions of 1830-31 effectively called into question the veracity of the existing techniques and tactics of rule in Xinjiang. These challenges to Qing rule initiated a re-evaluation of the rationality that underpinned the key structures of Qing power in Xinjiang. The result of this re-evaluation was not a questioning of the preeminent goal - to control Xinjiang - but rather of the means by which to achieve it. The initial manifestations of the transformation of the techniques and tactics of rule employed by the Qing flowed from the fall-out of the Khoqandi invasions of 1830-31. A series of reforms were proposed to the Qing court regarding the form and content of the territories' administration. These included a call for the establishment of both military and civilian agricultural colonies in the Altishahr, and a more uncompromising stance toward Khoqand. The implementation of such policies was partial and gradual but culminated after the Yaqub Beg Rebellion of the 1860s and 1870s in a transformation of the rationality of Qing rule in Xinjiang. The emergent rationality was one of integration and as such concerned the extension of political, economic, cultural and ideological linkages between Xinjiang and China. The most overt expression of this was the creation of Xinjiang as a province of

Islamic clergy, and the heavy taxation on Altishahri merchants trading with China proper.

the empire in 1884. The external relations of the Qing in Xinjiang also came to reflect this new imperative to control and integrate the new province. Thus Russian pressure following the defeat of Yaqub Beg was met with belligerence rather than concessions (as had been the case with Khoqand in the 1830s) as concessions were no longer tenable under the new rationality of Qing rule. Thus during the Qing period in Xinjiang the core goal of strengthening and maintaining control of the region had remained constant. The means and strategies by which to achieve it had, however, been gradually transformed from a complex based upon segregation to one based upon integration. Moreover, the Qing approach to external relations also gradually changed and reflected the internal imperatives of Qing rule.

The complex internal developments concerning the Chinese techniques and tactics of rule within Xinjiang during the 1911-1949 period, that were the focus of the previous chapter, did not occur in a vacuum. Rather these developments were intimately linked to external political, economic and ideological influences emanating primarily from Russian/Soviet Central Asia but also from China proper, Japan, British India and Mongolia. The collapse of the Qing presented new opportunities to the Qing's imperial rivals in East Asia to develop greater "spheres of influence" if not territorial aggrandizement from the territories of the defunct empire. These imperatives were no more intense or dynamic than in the empire's "frontier" regions - Xinjiang, Manchuria, Mongolia and Tibet. Foreign interference in China proper was mainly concerned with acquiring economic and commercial concessions, but on the frontiers foreign imperatives were oriented toward drawing these regions away from the orbit of China proper. That is to say, foreign manoeuvres regarding Xinjiang, Manchuria, Mongolia

and Tibet had far greater geopolitical implications for the Qing's inheritors. As demonstrated within the context of Xinjiang, the late Qing approach to its Inner Asian territories was transformed due to a combination of internal and external pressures. This transformation manifested itself in the form a new imperial project in these Inner Asian territories - the political, economic, cultural and ideological assimilation and integration of these regions with China proper. With the collapse of the Qing state, however, this project was challenged simultaneously from within by the former subject peoples and without by the various foreign imperial powers impinging upon these frontier regions.

A key element in the development of this unstable geopolitical climate was the political fragmentation of the Republic of China. The political fragmentation of China throughout this period (especially between 1911-1928) enhanced the ability of these powers to gain concessions from both the central government in Peking and the existing authorities along the frontiers. This duality of relatively weak political authority at the centre and periphery resulted in a number of contradictory dynamics in the case of Xinjiang. The inability of the central government to reassert its authority in Xinjiang was both a bane and a boon for the first post-Qing ruler of the province - Yang Zengxin. Almost immediately upon the collapse of the Qing the Russians made several manoeuvres in Kashgaria that were ultimately designed to compel the new Republic to uphold the obligations entered into by their imperial predecessors - namely the renewal of the Sino-Russian Treaty of St. Petersburg.⁴¹⁹ Throughout the remaining years of Tsarist Russia, Russian aims were twofold - the neutralization of British influence in

⁴¹⁹ See C.P.Skrine & Pamela Nightingale, *Macartney at Kashgar: New Light on British, Chinese and Russian Activities in Sinkiang, 1890-1918*, (London: Meuthen, 1973), pp.180-202, Lars Erik Nyman, *Great Britain and Chinese, Russian and Japanese Interests in Sinkiang, 1918-1934*, (Lund: Scandinavian University Books, 1977)

Kashgaria and the extraction of maximum commercial and political concessions from the provincial authorities. Due to the Republic's weakness in Xinjiang and Yang Zengxin's success in isolating the region from China proper, Russia achieved these twin objectives without forcibly annexing Kashgaria. Yang Zengxin thus found that the erosion and overturning of central governmental influence in Xinjiang entailed not only great autonomy for his regime but a corresponding increase in the scope for external influence.⁴²⁰ This tendency or dynamic was intensified with the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution and subsequent civil war, whereby Yang found his province assailed by not only Russian revolutionary and monarchist pressures but also international pressures arising from the Allied "Siberian Intervention". Yang's handling of these pressures further highlights the contradictory nature of warlord rule in Xinjiang - on the one hand an innate pragmatic willingness to accommodate external pressure and on the other an underlying tendency to "protect" the "Chineseness" of Xinjiang. Yang's tenuous allegiance to the Republic, for example, did not prevent him from remaining in correspondence with Peking concerning the actions of not only Red and White forces but also the penetration of Japanese military "observers" into Xinjiang.⁴²¹ Moreover, the governor paid little heed to central prerogatives when his representatives cemented a political and commercial agreement with the Soviet authorities in Tashkent in May 1920.⁴²² Yang therefore established a *modus operandi* with the Soviet Union well before the Peking government that did not establish relations until 1924. Yang

⁴²⁰ See C.P.Skrine & Pamela Nightingale, op.cit, Lars Erik Nyman, op. cit, Owen Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia: Sinkiang and the Inner Asian Frontiers of China and Russia*, (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1950), and Andrew D. W. Forbes, *Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

⁴²¹ See O. Edmund Clubb, *China & Russia: The "Great Game"*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p.190-196 & Lars Erik Nyman, op. cit., pp.49-50.

⁴²² See Fook-Lam Gilbert, "The Road to Power: Sheng Shih-ts'ai's Early Years in Sinkiang, 1930-1934", *Journal of Oriental Studies*, Vol.7 (1969), p.231 & David D. Wang, *Under the Soviet Shadow: The Ying*

Zengxin's administration of Xinjiang was largely derived from Qing-era precedents and as demonstrated in chapter two the basic tenets of which were isolation and segregation. Thus in a sense there was a return to the approach of the first phase of Qing rule (1759-1830) but with an important distinction - the absence of central control or direction. The rationality behind Yang's rule of Xinjiang followed the same logic as that of the Qing precedent - segregation served to control Xinjiang. Yet this did not have the same effect in terms of external relations as Yang strove to maintain the existing frontiers, minimize foreign penetration and strengthen Chinese control of the region. Under Yang therefore, a contradictory situation emerged where the governor almost returned to the Qing 18th century model of rule in Xinjiang that was coupled with an approach to external relations that was highly suggestive of the late Qing integrationist and sinicizing project.

The end of Yang Zengxin's rule in 1928 (upon his assassination) coincided with the establishment of the KMT national government after the culmination of the "Northern Expedition". The formation of Chiang Kai-shek's government in Nanjing ushered in a new phase in Sino-Soviet relations that would have important repercussions for Xinjiang. The close revolutionary alliance between Sun Yat-sen's KMT and the Soviet Union had soured considerably by 1928 largely as a result of Soviet links with and encouragement of the CCP. Following Chiang's suppression of the CCP in Shanghai in 1927 and the abortive CCP uprising in Guangzhou (Canton), relations with the Soviet Union were broken. The new governor of Xinjiang, Jin Shuren, did not however follow Nanjing's instructions to sever ties with the Soviet Union. The following years, between 1928-1932, were ones of overt Sino-Soviet confrontation and military conflict largely

Incident, Ethnic Conflicts and International Rivalry in Xinjiang, 1944-1949, (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1999), p.43.

centered on the status of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER).⁴²³ As noted previously Jin's administration continued Yang Zengxin's basic strategies of rule in Xinjiang with the exception of his attempt to absorb the semi-autonomous "native state" of Hami which ultimately brought about his downfall in 1932-33. Soviet penetration of Xinjiang increased significantly during Jin's brief reign, most notably illustrated by the signing of the 1931 Xinjiang-Soviet agreement that officially established Soviet political and economic influence south of the Tien Shan for the first time.⁴²⁴ This was no coincidence and was directly related to the ongoing freeze in Sino-Soviet relations that had not even been regenerated with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. The spectre of Japanese expansion did, however, compel Soviet and Chinese action regarding the outbreak of Muslim rebellion in Xinjiang in the following year. The fall of Jin Shuren, precipitated by Turki rebellion and the invasion of Ma Zhongying, was followed by the first "test of strength" between China and the Soviet Union over Xinjiang. Throughout the ensuing triangular struggle in Xinjiang between Sheng Shicai, Ma Zhongying and the TIRET, the Nanjing government attempted to reestablish central influence in Xinjiang through support for Ma Zhongying. In contrast the Soviet Union, aware that it required an autonomous but dependent Xinjiang to safeguard its position in the region, supported the isolated Sheng Shicai.⁴²⁵ The various reports of Ma Zhongying's and the TIRET's possible connections to Japan were undoubtedly overstated by both the Soviet Union and Nanjing in order to cover their own manoeuvres regarding the Xinjiang power struggle.

⁴²³ See Edmund O. Clubb, *China & Russia: The "Great Game"*, (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1971), p.271 & David J. Dallin, *Soviet Russia in the Far East*, (Hamden: Archer Books, 1971), p.61.

⁴²⁴ See Fook-Lam Gilbert, op. cit., pp.266-267 & Martin N Norins, *Gateway to Asia: Sinkiang, Frontier of the Chinese Far West*, (New York: John Day Company, 1944), pp.67-68.

⁴²⁵ See David D. Wang, op.cit, Andrew D. W. Forbes, op. cit.

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Soviet dominance was cemented by substantial military aid to Sheng in his struggle against the TIRET and Ma Zhongying. In return for this timely military aid Sheng provided the Soviet Union with wide-reaching political, economic and military concessions in Xinjiang that were embodied in the secret December 1933 Soviet-Xinjiang agreement.⁴²⁶ Moreover, Sheng Shicai's turn to the Soviet Union resulted in the penetration of Soviet techniques and tactics of rule into those of the provincial authorities. The most overt sign of this dynamic was Sheng's elucidation of his "Six Great Policies" in December 1934 that proved to be the prism through which Xinjiang's "domestic" and "foreign" policies would be framed.⁴²⁷ From this flowed a series of policies, such as the institution of a Soviet-funded three-year economic plan, which directly contributed to the strengthening of both Sheng Shicai's grip on power and the Soviet Union's preeminent position in Xinjiang. Furthermore, Sheng's Soviet orientation was not simply reflected in the administration of the province itself but also in the position Xinjiang assumed regarding international affairs. Sheng's "foreign" policy was but a reflection of the contemporary view from Moscow, and as such determined Sheng's threat perceptions regarding external powers other than the Soviet Union.⁴²⁸

The following five-year period (1933-1937) saw the consolidation of the Soviet Union and Sheng Shicai's power to the exclusion any meaningful KMT presence from the "province". Once again, as during Yang Zengxin's era, the duality of weak central and peripheral power resulted in the strengthening and intensification of external influence

⁴²⁶ See Fook-Lam Gilbert, *op.cit.*, pp.267-268, David D. Wang, *op. cit.*

⁴²⁷ See Owen Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia*, *op. cit.*, pp.72-73, & John W. Garver, *op. cit.*, pp.154-156.

⁴²⁸ See O. Edmund Clubb, *op. cit.*, pp.286-287 and John W. Garver, *op. cit.*, pp.154-155

in Xinjiang. Although the chaotic power struggle that engulfed Xinjiang following Jin Shuren's fall in April 1933 proved to be a major impetus to the intensification of the Soviet drive into Xinjiang, it was also connected to the wider imperatives of Soviet foreign policy and the emergent geopolitical situation in East Asia. This period of the almost "sovietization" of Xinjiang coincided with a gradual rapprochement between the Soviet Union and China in the face of continued Japanese expansion. As noted previously the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the creation of the puppet-state of Manzhouguo failed to precipitate the regeneration of the Sino-Soviet relationship, although official relations were reestablished on June 6 1932. The major reasons behind this were the residual effects of the Sino-Soviet CER conflict of 1929, Soviet penetration of Xinjiang and, in Chinese perceptions, Soviet appeasement of Japan in 1932-1933. With respect to this latter point China considered that the Soviet proposal of a Soviet-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact and negotiations over the sale of the CER to Japan in 1932 and June 1933 respectively amounted to appeasement.⁴²⁹ This notably resulted in the stalling of Sino-Soviet diplomatic discussions regarding the possibility of a Sino-Soviet mutual assistance pact.⁴³⁰ The sale of the CER to Japan, however, went ahead in March 1935 regardless of Chinese protests, and further strained the tenuous Sino-Soviet relationship. Such Soviet attempts to placate and stall Japanese expansion came to naught, however, with Japanese-Manzhouguo military forces testing the puppet-state's frontier with the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) which resulted in several clashes in February 1936. The Soviet response to these incidents was to invoke its protocol of "mutual assistance" with the MPR and resulted in a further thaw

⁴²⁹ See David J. Dallin, *op. cit.*, p.63 & O. Edmund Clubb, *op. cit.*, pp.269-275. By entering negotiations regarding the CER with Japan the Soviets were violating the 1924 Sino-Soviet treaty which committed the Soviets to make no arrangements concerning the CER without China's consent.

⁴³⁰ John W. Garver, *op.cit.*, p.18.

in Moscow's attitude to Nanjing.⁴³¹ Contemporaneously, the Soviet Union through Sheng Shicai intensified their drive into southern Xinjiang where Soviet influence remained comparatively weak.⁴³² In March and April of the following year Sheng Shicai's removal of Kashgar's Uighur governor touched off another Turkic-Muslim rebellion below the Tien Shan, that spread from Kashgar in the south-west to Hami (Qomul) in the east. His position threatened, Sheng once more turned to the Soviets for assistance and in May five thousand Red Army troops⁴³³ with air and armoured support crossed the Soviet-Xinjiang frontier. Significantly, Sheng was informed by the Soviet Consul-General at Urumqi, these Soviet troops would remain in Xinjiang "indefinitely" and would be stationed at the strategic oases of Hami (Qomul) on the main trunk road linking Xinjiang and China proper. By October these Red Army troops had effectively crushed Muslim resistance below the Tien Shan and had finally established Sheng as the master of Xinjiang.⁴³⁴

The Soviet Union's penetration of Xinjiang over the 1920 to 1937 period thus proved to be a major stumbling block to an improvement in Sino-Soviet co-operation against Japan. The Soviet Union's primary interests lay in consolidating the MPR as a buffer between itself and Japan, whilst attempting to reassert Russia's historical influence in Xinjiang. An important factor in precipitating the Soviet Union's penetration of Xinjiang and consolidation of its control of the MPR was the gradual erosion of its position in North Asia, particularly Manchuria and Inner Mongolia:

⁴³¹ See O. Edmund Clubb, *op. cit.*, p.296 & David J. Dallin, *op.cit.*, p.65.

⁴³² 1936 saw the intensification of pro-Soviet propaganda below the Tien Shan, and extension of Soviet political & commercial interests; See Andrew D. W. Forbes, *Warlords and Muslims*, *op. cit.*, pp.140-141.

⁴³³ The Red Army "8th Regiment"

⁴³⁴ *Ibid*, pp.142-144.

...Japan's advance dislodged Russia from the eastern part of her sphere; but to some extent her losses were compensated by the acquisition of a new sphere in western China. Japan's activity resulted in the withdrawal of Soviet Russia from Manchuria; in the strengthening of her control over Outer Mongolia; and a new and systematic drive into Chinese Sinkiang.⁴³⁵

The Soviet Union's drive into Xinjiang during the 1930s was very much a strategic manoeuvre to compensate for its loss of influence and position in North China. Furthermore, it sought to create Xinjiang as a pro-Soviet buffer region between itself and Japan's newly acquired spheres of influence in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. With the Japanese occupation of Manchuria and creation of Manzhouguo in 1933, the ability of Japan to project its military capabilities deep into Xinjiang, to dislodge Soviet influence, became a very real threat. Therefore, Xinjiang over the course of the 1930s emerged as a pivotal strategic dilemma within the uneasy Sino-Soviet relationship.⁴³⁶

The common threat posed by Japan did not result in a regeneration of the Sino-Soviet relationship. Thus although both China and the Soviet Union were threatened by Japanese expansion/militarism, there was no convergence of strategy or approach with which to confront this common threat. Throughout the 1933-1937 period both China and the Soviet Union had attempted to avoid war with Japan by concessions that directly and adversely impacted upon the security or strategic interests of each other, such as the Soviet sale of the CER. The failure of Chinese and Soviet attempts to construct a collective response and the Japanese invasion of China proper in July 1937 drove the Soviet Union and China into alliance. The form that this alliance took was embodied in the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 1937. This treaty created

⁴³⁵ David J. Dallin, *op. cit.*, p.77.

⁴³⁶ David D. Wang, *Under the Soviet Shadow*, *op.cit.*, pp.50-51.

the basis for the close alignment of and cooperation between the Soviet Union and China in the 1937-1939 period. Importantly the treaty accomplished two key tasks - it provided the political basis for Soviet military sales and aid to China and stipulated that neither of the signatories would conclude a separate agreement with the Japanese for the duration of hostilities.⁴³⁷ The treaty thus stopped short of committing Soviet entry into the Sino-Japanese conflict and its terms clearly reflected the uneasy decade of relations between the two signatories. Moreover, the Sino-Soviet treaty was a second-best option for both the Soviets and the Chinese, and both continued to strive for the formation of "United Front" (ie. collective Soviet-western response) to combat Japanese aggression. The likelihood of such a strategy bearing fruit was finally scuttled after the Nine Power Conference in Brussels in November 1937 where Soviet attempts to persuade the major powers of the necessity for collective action against Japan in China fell on deaf ears.⁴³⁸ Therefore, the only major power that was willing, and in fact compelled, to support Chiang Kai-shek's government against the Japanese was the Soviet Union. Between 1937 and 1939 the Soviet Union contributed US\$250 million in loans, 1000 planes, 2000 pilots and 500 military advisers to Chiang's war effort.⁴³⁹ The issue of Soviet penetration of Xinjiang under Sheng Shicai in this context now became a benefit to Nanjing. The Soviet Union's position in Xinjiang and Sheng Shicai's close alignment with the Soviets allowed Stalin to funnel substantial quantities of war materiel to Nanjing through Xinjiang. The bulk of Soviet aircraft supplied to Chiang Kai-shek's government also flew via Xinjiang and the Soviet Union agreed to provide a complete aeroplane assembly plant on Chinese soil to maintain them. Chiang Kai-shek requested

⁴³⁷ John W. Garver, *op. cit.*, pp.19-23.

⁴³⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴³⁹ Immanuel C. Hsu, *The Rise of Modern China, 5th ed.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.600.; Military advisers included such illustrious figures as Gen. Zhukov and Gen. Chuikov.

the plant be built in Gansu but the Kremlin determined that Xinjiang was a more amenable site and duly constructed it near Urumqi.⁴⁴⁰ Chiang Kai-shek's government, hard-pressed by the inexorable advance of the Japanese military, was in no position to dictate the means by which the Soviets would deliver aid to China and acquiesced to Soviet plans. In a sense Soviet and Chinese interests coincided with respect to Xinjiang in this context. For Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet influence in Xinjiang guaranteed a secure route for the delivery of Soviet war materiel. For Stalin, the Soviet position in Xinjiang performed two key tasks regarding Soviet foreign policy in the East - it allowed for the supply of Chiang's armies without provoking Japan and proved critical in keeping the majority of Japan's military strength occupied far from the Soviet's Far Eastern frontiers.⁴⁴¹

The strong convergence in Sino-Soviet relations with respect to Japan and Xinjiang was however short-lived. The rapidly changing international situation from 1939 onward ultimately resulted in the rupture of the Sino-Soviet alliance as each state developed divergent goals and strategies in response to the new international environment. The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939 precipitated the divergence of Soviet and Chinese imperatives. The Soviet fear of a two-front war scenario was a major factor in the Nazi-Soviet Pact and, as the Soviet-Japanese confrontations in Mongolia demonstrated, was a justifiable one. The Soviet-Nazi Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939 served two major purposes for the Soviet Union; firstly, it at least temporarily prevented the outbreak of a Soviet-German war in Europe, and secondly, it left a belligerent Japan without its major ally against the Soviets. The pact therefore had

⁴⁴⁰ Andrew D. W. Forbes, *op. cit.*, pp.145-146 & John Garver, *op. cit.*, pp.155-156.

repercussions for the Soviet Union's position in East Asia. The pact allowed the Soviets to focus upon combating Japanese incursions along the Soviet-Manzhuoguo-MPR border areas. As a result of the Soviet's ability to temporarily ignore the situation in Europe, it was able to divert men and materiel to the Far East and engage Japanese forces at Nomonhan. The Soviet Union's victory at Nomonhan resulted in a rapprochement with Japan over the Soviet-Manchukuo border and led to the signing of a Soviet-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact in April 1941.⁴⁴² The strategic value of both these pacts to the Soviet Union was enormous. The pacts enabled the Soviets to consolidate their position in East Asia via direct military resistance to Japanese aggression and diplomacy. Furthermore, the two non-aggression pacts prevented the two-front war scenario that the Soviet leaders dreaded and bought them time to prepare for the inevitable European conflict. The most important development of 1939-1941 period for the Soviet Union was their resistance to Japanese expansion at Nomonhan. The Soviets' stubborn resistance at the Battle of Nomonhan deterred the Japanese military faction that favoured war against the Soviet Union and subsequently gave rise to those in the Japan, who favoured a confrontation with the sea powers,

The big war between the Soviet Union and Japan did not, as envisaged by some Japanese, begin in the Mongolian People's Republic. The battle of Nomonhan proved to be one of those critical turning points in history. Coupled with the coincident signature of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact, it led directly to the defeat of the Japanese faction that gave priority to war with the Soviet Union, and the consequent rise to predominance in the Japanese government of those who favored a grand strategy built around a plan for collision with the sea powers.⁴⁴³

⁴⁴¹ This proved to be critical in the Soviet's border confrontations with Japanese forces in the MPR in 1938-1939 that culminated in the Battle of Nomonhan. See John W. Garver, *op. cit.*, pp.35-49.

⁴⁴² Edmund O. Clubb, *op. cit.*, p.318.

⁴⁴³ *Ibid.*

With the subsequent signing of the Soviet-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact in April 1941, the Soviet Union had guaranteed that it would not have to fight a two-front war, and when Germany invaded in June 1941, it did so without its anti-Comintern ally.

The significance of the two non-aggression pacts for the Soviet's position in Xinjiang was that it enabled them to pressure Sheng Shicai with the prospect of overwhelming military and economic power if he did not accommodate their demands. Thus the years 1939 to 1941 witnessed the height of Soviet power in Xinjiang. As the previous chapter demonstrated, this dominance was expressed in Sheng Shicai becoming a member of the CPSU and Sheng's acquiescence to the onerous "Xin-Tin" mining agreement. The Soviets, via their strategic, military and diplomatic successes vis-a`-vis Germany and Japan were able to further consolidate Xinjiang as a virtual satellite, similar to the status of the MPR. Two events in 1941, however, were to impact heavily upon both the Soviet-Xinjiang and Xinjiang-KMT relationships. The first was the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, which by November had driven to within thirty miles of Moscow threatening the existence of the Soviet state. Consequently the Soviet presence and activities in Xinjiang declined considerably by late 1941. The second event was the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941 that precipitated the entry of the United States into the Pacific War. These two events combined to have a crucial impact upon the Sino-Soviet relationship and the position of Xinjiang within that relationship. From the perspective of Sheng Shicai in Urumqi, the series of military debacles that befell the Red Army not only diminished Soviet prestige in Xinjiang but called into question the ability of the Soviets to continue the military, political and economic support upon which he had become dependent. From Chongqing, however, the Japanese

attack on Pearl Harbour signified a turning point in China's fortunes as it gained a new ally - and new source of military and economic aid – the United States. Moreover, the combined impact of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union and the US entry into the war was to provide the impetus for a determined Chinese effort to reestablish central control over Xinjiang. Thus there was a convergence of interest between Chongqing and Urumqi. Sheng Shicai's wavering faith in the Soviet Union drove him to reconcile with Chiang's government simultaneous with Chongqing's decision to reassert control over Xinjiang.

In July 1942 Chiang Kai-shek convened a top-level meeting in Chongqing to decide on the government's approach to Xinjiang. The Minister of War, He Yingqin, presented Chiang with a strategy for the "recovery" of Xinjiang. According to He, China must take advantage of the current Sino-Soviet alliance to recover Xinjiang but do so cautiously. Thus He proposed a two-stage strategy by which to recover Xinjiang. This strategy illustrated not only the political will of the Chinese government to reestablish control over Xinjiang but also the perceived importance of Xinjiang as part of China. The first phase was to remove Soviet influence in Xinjiang through "stratagem" rather than force, as Chongqing could neither afford to divert the necessary manpower nor alienate the Soviet Union entirely. The second phase was, once Soviet influence had been removed from Xinjiang, to begin the institution of KMT political and military control "on the ground". The first phase required the KMT to work through Sheng Shicai to create pressure on the Soviets in Xinjiang that would create tensions in Xinjiang-Soviet relations. Chongqing would then intercede to resolve these tensions thus redirecting Soviet concerns regarding Xinjiang to the central government and

demonstrating the reorientation of the province. Thus through a number of secret contacts between Urumqi and Chongqing over the March to August period⁴⁴⁴ Sheng agreed to begin a purge of Soviet political influence and place a series of demands on the Soviet government regarding the “Xin-Tin” agreement and the Red Army “8th Regiment” at Hami.⁴⁴⁵ Sheng’s actions and his hard-bargaining in the negotiations concerning Soviet military and commercial interests produced a series of protests from Moscow to Chongqing regarding the “anti-Soviet” activities in Xinjiang.⁴⁴⁶ The response of the Chinese government was that although the timing of these activities was unfortunate, the problems were between Xinjiang and the Soviet Union and should not be allowed to disrupt the Sino-Soviet relationship. Moreover, Chiang Kai-shek stressed to Soviet representatives that in order to resolve the problems concerning Xinjiang the Soviets in future should direct their efforts through the central government not through Sheng Shicai.⁴⁴⁷ Sheng Shicai's *volte-face* was completed in 5 October 1942 when Xinjiang was officially "reincorporated" into the Chinese state. Simultaneously Sheng demanded through the Soviet Consul-General in Urumqi that the Soviet Union withdraw all personnel within three months.⁴⁴⁸ The Soviets, hard pressed by the German invasion prevaricated, and opened negotiations (as Chiang had hoped and He Dequan

⁴⁴⁴ See Andrew D. W. Forbes, op. cit., pp.158-162 & John W. Garver, op. cit., pp.165-166. A wide range of issues concerning Xinjiang’s re-incorporation must have been discussed in this period with Gen. Zhu Shaoliang (KMT Commander of the 8th Military District), who was dispatched in March 1942 joined by Economics Minister, Wang Wenhao, in May 1942.

⁴⁴⁵ Sheng stopped the publication of the “Anti-Imperialist Front” newspaper in April 1942 and followed this by a systematic purge of pro-Soviet elements (including CCP members); See Andrew D. W. Forbes, op. cit., pp.158-159 & David D. Wang op. cit., pp.56-57.

⁴⁴⁶ These included attempts to show Chongqing how disloyal Sheng had been to the Republic by forwarding incriminating details of Sheng’s political, military and economic arrangements with the Soviet Union over the 1934-1942 period. See John W. Garver, op. cit., pp.166-169.

⁴⁴⁷ John W. Garver, op. cit., pp.190-196

⁴⁴⁸ Andrew D. W. Forbes, op. cit., p.159.

planned for) with Chongqing.⁴⁴⁹ Despite Sheng's three-month ultimatum, the Soviet Union notified Sheng and Chongqing in March-April 1943 that it would withdraw all Soviet personnel connected to the Urumqi aeroplane plant, "Xin-Tin" installations and the "8th Regiment" at Hami and that the Soviet trading agency (Sovsintorg) would scale back its activities. These measures were not completed until October 1943 and would have adverse consequences for Xinjiang's economy.⁴⁵⁰ In line with He Dequan's strategy, as Soviet influence was gradually removed, KMT representatives and personnel followed. In June 1943 four divisions of the KMT's New 2nd Army under General Zhu Shaoliang were transferred to Xinjiang from Gansu. Therefore, through He's strategy the KMT, over the April 1942 to October 1943 period, effectively removed Soviet influence in Xinjiang and initiated the institution of KMT political and military authority in the province for the first time.

Once more international events intervened to change the course of developments in Xinjiang in the latter half of 1943. At this stage the tide of the war on the Eastern Front had turned in favour of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union could now contemplate strategies by which to reassert itself in Xinjiang and this inexorably brought it into conflict with the KMT government in Chongqing. Before the Soviets gained sufficient strength to challenge the KMT in Xinjiang, there took place two tripartite conferences between the wartime allies in Cairo and Teheran at the end of 1943. The very fact that two tripartite conferences were held, rather than one four-power conference, illustrated

⁴⁴⁹ John W. Garver, *op. cit.*, pp.172-173. The major reason behind the Soviet's prevarication stemmed from their need to maintain access to the Dushanze oil field in Xinjiang, as the German's made concerted efforts to drive to Baku to cut Soviet supplies of crude in 1942-43.

⁴⁵⁰ *Ibid* & Andrew W. Forbes, *op. cit.*, pp.159-160.

the growing discord between China and the Soviet Union.⁴⁵¹ The causes of the deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations in 1943 were numerous, but they stemmed from manoeuvring by both states concerning the power configuration in the post war period in East Asia. The key to understanding Chiang Kai-shek's Soviet policy from 1943 onward was that it was primarily aimed at securing Great Power status for China. For China to achieve such status, Chiang Kai-shek believed, it needed to regain the territories lost in the previous fifty years. These included Chinese claims to Taiwan, Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, Xinjiang and to a lesser extent Tibet. If China was to regain these territories and achieve Great Power status it required the cooperation and endorsement of the US, Britain and the Soviet Union. The key power in this scenario was of course the Soviet Union. All but one of Chiang's key claims touched upon Soviet interests in the region and the confrontation between China and the Soviets on these issues gradually became clearer and more marked after 1943. The Great Power conferences at Cairo and Teheran in 1943, and the Yalta conference in 1945 determined whether the Soviet Union's or China's interests would prevail in these areas in the post-war era.

Xinjiang's role in Sino-Soviet manoeuvring became of pivotal importance after the Cairo and Teheran conferences when it became clear to Chiang Kai-shek that the US and Britain were willing to make concessions to the Soviets, at China's expense, in order to achieve Soviet involvement in the final prosecution of the war against Japan. At the Cairo conference of November 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill and Chiang agreed that China's claims to territories lost to Japan should be upheld. President Roosevelt

⁴⁵¹ John W Garver, *op.cit.*, p.196.

also promised Chiang that within a few months of the conference there would be an amphibious operation in the Bay of Bengal to support Chinese actions in Burma.⁴⁵² The outcome of the subsequent Teheran conference between Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt however, brought into question the deals struck at Cairo. At the Teheran conference the 'Big Three' entered upon an understanding that scotched the projected action in the Bay of Bengal. Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed that the military action of first priority was the cross-channel invasion of Nazi-occupied Western Europe.⁴⁵³ Furthermore, Stalin categorically stated that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany. This development consequently diminished the value of China in the final prosecution of the war against Japan, and China was effectively relegated as a power behind the Soviet Union in the allied coalition.⁴⁵⁴

There was also deterioration in Sino-US relations at this stage which further undermined the possibility of continued cooperation between the 'Big Four' and threatened to reduce the coalition to a 'Big Three'. Furthermore, the advent of such a situation would leave China and its territorial and political claims prisoner of the 'Big Three's' post-war vision. The tensions in Sino-US relations were created by the KMT-CCP division in Chinese domestic politics and the question of continued US aid to Chiang's forces and government alone. The US attempted to address this problem via three approaches.⁴⁵⁵ The first approach arose in July 1944 when the US sent an observation mission to Yenan. The mission was reportedly impressed with what they

⁴⁵² Edmund O. Clubb, op. cit., p.332.

⁴⁵³ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁵ Akira Iriye, "Japanese Aggression and China's International Position 1931-1949", in John K. Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 13, Republican China 1912-1949, Pt.2*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p.536.

saw in Yanan and were convinced that if China were to make a significant contribution to both the defeat of Japan and the shape of the post-war world, the KMT needed to share political power.⁴⁵⁶ The first step in this process was deemed to be the unification of all armed forces in China,

But for power to be more evenly distributed and for China to be militarily and politically less divided, there would have to be a coalition of the various factions and, most important, the unification of all armed forces - a colossal undertaking, especially if it were to be brought about without a civil war.⁴⁵⁷

Furthermore, President Roosevelt asked Chiang Kai-shek to appoint General Stillwell as the commander of all Chinese forces in July 1944. The creation of a unified command would pave the way for the cooperation of the KMT-CCP and ensure that China emerged from the war as a fully developed Great Power.⁴⁵⁸ This manoeuvre was snuffed out when Chiang categorically refused to appoint Stillwell to such a position. The result of the Stillwell episode was the appointment of General Hurley as special envoy to Chongqing. Hurley's appointment precipitated the second US approach, which was to revert to supporting the KMT as the sole government of China. Although not a new approach it was coupled with renewed efforts to create a coalition government. As a result of Hurley's resolute support of the KMT government, however, the CCP was gradually alienated from the US approach.⁴⁵⁹ The third US approach was initiated as a result of Stillwell's recall from China at the end of 1944 and his replacement by General Wedemeyer. The appointment of Wedemeyer signalled the end of Washington's attempts to develop close collaboration between China and the other allied powers. The US began to give diminishing importance to China as an ally, not only in the war but

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid, p.537.

also in the post-war reconstruction.⁴⁶⁰ These developments in Sino-US relations coupled with the outcomes of the Cairo and Teheran conferences severely damaged China's hopes of achieving 'great power' status and diminished its importance in relation to the war against Japan. China's territorial and political claims in Mongolia, Manchuria and Xinjiang moreover, were now consequently effected as China's bargaining power had been brought into question. China's diminishing importance to the 'Big Three', particularly the US, toward the end of 1944 made it possible for the Soviet Union to demand greater political conditions for its entry into the war against Japan.

China's position in relation to the 'Big Three' had been significantly weakened by the end of 1944, as a result of the deterioration in Sino-US relations, and the outcomes of the Cairo and Teheran conferences. Furthermore, after the Teheran conference the Soviet Union began to formulate strategies to regain its position and privileges in East Asia after the war. The goals of Soviet Far East policy at this stage were:

- (1) Re-acquiring all the diplomatic and territorial assets previously possessed on mainland Asia by Russia under the Czars
- (2) Domination of Chinese provinces contiguous to the Soviet border
- (3) Domination of all areas of north China under Japanese control.⁴⁶¹

It was with these strategic goals in mind that the Soviet Union went to Yalta in February 1945. Between the 1943 Teheran conference and the Yalta conference in 1945 the Soviet Union began to reorient its Far East policy and began to implement strategies to achieve the three goals listed above. Xinjiang was the region that witnessed the first reassertion of Soviet power in East Asia. The Soviet Union initiated their renewed

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁶¹ US Department of State, *United States' Relations with China*, (Washington DC: 1949), p.97.

drive into Xinjiang with the support of Osman Batur's Kazaks along the Xinjiang-MPR border in March 1944.⁴⁶² The KMT government claimed that Soviet and MPR troops were acting in concert with the Kazaks and officially protested to Moscow.⁴⁶³ The Soviets responded with a flat denial but announced in April 1944 that as China had moved troops into the Xinjiang-MPR border region it was obliged by its mutual assistance pact with the MPR to render assistance.⁴⁶⁴ Stalin therefore wished that Osman's activities continue and that his haven in the MPR should remain inviolate. By June-July 1944 Osman's Soviet supported revolt in northern Xinjiang began to spread and the XTPNLC began to step up its activities in the Ili region.⁴⁶⁵ Furthermore, in October Stalin promised Churchill and US Ambassador Harriman that the Soviets would enter the war in the Pacific three months after the defeat of Germany. Stalin also began to elucidate the political conditions for the Soviet's entry into the war. Barely one month after this, in November 1944, the Ili (Yining/Yili) Rebellion occurred and the ETR was proclaimed. The Soviet Union's active support of the ETR can be seen as a means by which to pressure the US, and China, to accept Stalin's political conditions for the entry into the war,

It can hardly have been a coincidence. In late 1944 and early 1945, the Eastern Turkestan Republic was set up in Yining, and a large quantity of Soviet ammunition and many military personnel arrived in Yili. The guerilla forces of the ETR, under the command of Soviet military officers, launched heavy attacks on the last positions of the GMD troops in Yining. In December Harriman told Stalin that President Roosevelt wanted to know more about his political demands. Stalin responded: (1) return the Kurile Islands and southern Sakhalin to the Soviet Union; (2) lease of the ports of Lushun and Dalian; (3) lease of the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian Railways and (4) maintenance of the status quo in Outer Mongolia.⁴⁶⁶

⁴⁶² David D. Wang, *op. cit.*, p.60.

⁴⁶³ Andrew D. W. Forbes, *op. cit.*, p.170.

⁴⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁵ David D. Wang, *op. cit.*, p.60.

⁴⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p.61.

At the February 1945 Yalta conference Stalin succeeded in gaining the guarantees of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill that the Soviet Union would regain all the interests and privileges of Czarist Russia in East Asia.⁴⁶⁷ These concessions formalised the impending re-establishment of the Soviet power and influence in North East Asia at the expense of China.⁴⁶⁸ All of these concessions, except the first, had to be accepted by Chiang Kai-shek's government as they directly impacted upon China's own political and territorial claims in the region. The Soviet Union's renewed drive into Xinjiang was therefore highly significant in relation to China's acceptance of the 'Big Three's' *fait accompli*. The Soviet Union undoubtedly foresaw Chinese opposition to the concessions granted to the Soviets at Yalta and therefore determined to enhance their bargaining power by calling into question Chinese claims to Xinjiang. By February 1945, the ETR had effectively destroyed the KMT's military and civil administration of the Ili, Ashan and Tacheng districts and Stalin was then able to use the problems in Xinjiang and the CCP to his advantage in the negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek on the terms of the Yalta Agreement.⁴⁶⁹

The emergence of the Ili Rebellion and the ETR served to emphasize further the four basic problems facing Chiang Kai-shek's government - the CCP, Mongolia, Manchuria and Xinjiang. Furthermore, all four of these problems were intimately connected to the Soviet Union's strategic and political role in East Asia. The rise of the ETR, with Soviet assistance, was the first manifestation of renewed Soviet vigour and purpose in the region. Each of these domestic problems also had external element for Chiang to consider - the Soviet Union. The issue of the CCP and its possible role in post-war

⁴⁶⁷ Akira Iriye, op. cit., p.538.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid.

China was, and had been, a constant source of tension in the Sino-Soviet relationship. This enduring problem in the Sino-Soviet relations took on new significance with the forthcoming entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan. If and when the Soviets entered the war they would do so via Manchuria and this presented Chiang's government with a number of inter-connected problems. The advent of a Soviet invasion of Manchuria would place the Soviets into close proximity to the CCP's base areas in North-East China. Consequently, this would make it possible for the CCP to expand its political and military control throughout Manchuria. Manchuria, as the only base of large-scale heavy industry, would prove invaluable to the CCP or the KMT in their coming conflict. Furthermore, the arrival of the Red Army in Manchuria would further weaken Chiang's ability to reassert Chinese control and deplete his nationalist credentials. Therefore the issues of the CCP and Manchuria were inextricably linked to the Soviet Union's activities and if Chiang wished to avoid the possibility of a CCP-Soviet dominated Manchuria, he would have to accommodate the Soviet Union's position vis-à-vis the Yalta Agreement.

The problem of Mongolia was also linked to Soviet machinations. The major issue concerned the status of the MPR (Outer Mongolia) and China's claim to sovereignty over Outer Mongolia. The Soviet Union officially recognised the MPR when it proclaimed independence in 1921 but the Chinese had continually maintained that Outer Mongolia was part of China. The Soviet Union, while regarding the MPR as an independent state, realised that the only way that this would be accepted internationally was if the Chinese government officially recognised that status. Finally, the issue of

⁴⁶⁹ David D. Wang, *op. cit.*, p.61.

Xinjiang, perhaps more so than the other problems, was tied to the Soviet Union's renewed power in East Asia in 1944-45. The Soviet Union's covert support of Turkic-Muslim insurgents in the Ili region brought the KMT's nascent control of Xinjiang into question and threatened to precipitate the KMT's decline in the region. The KMT-Soviet conflict in Xinjiang when combined with the problems of Manchuria and Mongolia had the potential to severely weaken the KMT's grip on power. The worst case scenario for Chiang, was if his government did not respond effectively to each of these issues, his government could lose three of China's four traditional frontiers, Manchuria, Mongolia and Xinjiang.⁴⁷⁰ The implications of such a turn of events for Chiang's struggle with the CCP could endanger the very existence of his regime. In order to prevent this catastrophe the KMT needed first and foremost to neutralise the Soviet Union's role in each of these regions.

Chiang Kai-shek, as a result of the pressures placed upon his government by the problems of Xinjiang, the CCP, Mongolia and Manchuria, realised that he must accommodate the Soviet Union's interests in certain areas. While the deal done by the US, Britain and the Soviet Union at Yalta, was concealed from the Chinese, Chiang Kai-shek undoubtedly recognised the US willingness to pay the political and territorial price for the Soviet's entrance into the war against Japan. China's standing amongst the 'Big Three', particularly with the US and the Soviets, had been gradually diminishing since the Cairo and Teheran conferences, where it became clear that China's own political and strategic value to the allies was of secondary importance to that of the Soviet Union. As a result Chiang planned to send his foreign minister Song Ziwen in

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid.

March 1945 to Moscow to discuss these four problems and Sino-Soviet relations in general.⁴⁷¹ This proposed meeting was postponed, however, at Soviet request, probably due to the fact that China had not yet been informed of the Yalta Agreement, and Stalin only wished to negotiate once they had been informed of the terms of the agreement.⁴⁷² The terms of the Yalta Agreement delivered Stalin's political conditions to the Soviets. Roosevelt and Churchill conceded that the Soviets should gain South Sakhalin, the Kurile Islands, maintenance of the status quo with regards to the MPR and control of the Manchurian ports and railways.⁴⁷³ Therefore after February 11 Stalin had valid and logical reasons to actively seek a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. That is to say Stalin recognised that in order to guarantee the concessions granted to the Soviets at Yalta, he needed Chiang's government, the only recognised government of China, to accede to those concessions.⁴⁷⁴ Furthermore, he realised that the US government also relied upon Chiang to pay the price for Soviet involvement in the final stages of the war against Japan, and consequently that Chiang had little room in which to manoeuvre.⁴⁷⁵

The ETR-KMT conflict in Xinjiang escalated with renewed ETR attacks on KMT positions throughout the June to November 1945 period, which culminated in the rebel's taking Mannas close to Urumqi.⁴⁷⁶ The significance of the conflict in Xinjiang for Chiang Kai-shek's government was that it was the initial sign of a resurgent Soviet presence in East Asia. Furthermore, the timing of the Soviet-ETR manoeuvres in Xinjiang, coinciding with the Sino-Soviet negotiations for the Treaty of Friendship and

⁴⁷¹ Ibid, p.63.

⁴⁷² Ibid.

⁴⁷³ R. K. I. Quested, *Sino-Russian Relations: A Short History*, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1984), p.107.

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁶ Andrew D. W. Forbes, op. cit., pp.189-195.

Alliance from 30 June to 14 August, were in effect a warning to Chiang's government as to the Soviet's renewed ability to pursue their strategic goals in East Asia. The Sino-Soviet negotiations throughout this period were focused upon the terms of the Yalta Agreement and under what conditions China would accept those terms. The proposed Sino-Soviet Treaty was, according to the Soviet Ambassador Petrov, only possible if China accepted the terms of the Yalta Agreement.⁴⁷⁷ That is to say the Soviets made it clear that the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance was only possible if the Chinese accepted the independence of the MPR, Soviet control of South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, and Soviet control of the Manchurian ports and railways.⁴⁷⁸ The problems these conditions posed to Chiang's government have been outlined above and the acceptance of these terms would in effect question the regime's *raison d'etre*. The KMT government was faced with a troubling dilemma, if it accepted Soviet terms, it would ultimately secure its northern frontiers but would be charged with selling out China's national interests. The decision to accede to the Soviet-US diktat could accelerate the KMT's decline in China and correspondingly enhance the CCP's standing domestically. The aim of Chiang Kai-shek under these circumstances was first and foremost to prevent such a turn of events.

The Sino-Soviet negotiations in Moscow centred upon the terms of the Yalta Agreement and the subjects for discussion were primarily focused upon the CCP, Manchuria, the MPR and Xinjiang. The Soviet's major concerns were focused on resecuring Czarist Russia's rights and privileges in Manchuria and acknowledgment on China's behalf of Outer Mongolia's independence. It was these two issues that neither

⁴⁷⁷ John W. Garver, *op. cit.*, p.212.

⁴⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

party wished to compromise on. The issues of the CCP and Xinjiang therefore became bargaining chips with which to achieve an understanding. The securing of Outer Mongolia's independence for the Soviets would enhance their strategic position in the Far East, as a Mongolia independent of Chinese influence would provide a buffer between itself and Japan or the US. The regaining of Tsarist Russia's rights in Manchuria would also further enhance the Soviet's ability to reassert itself as a Pacific power. The negotiations regarding these two issues were protracted, as the Soviet position was untenable for the Chinese and vice versa. The Yalta Agreement stipulated that the 'status quo' should be preserved.⁴⁷⁹ The Soviet interpretation of the 'status quo' was that the MPR was an independent state. The Chinese contradicted this position by stating that while Outer Mongolia may have declared independence in 1921, the Chinese government had never recognised this.⁴⁸⁰ Each party's position on the Mongolian issue appeared insurmountable and Song Ziwen suggested that the discussion of this particular issue be suspended. Stalin however, insisted that recognition of the MPR's independence was a precondition for a Sino-Soviet Treaty.⁴⁸¹ Furthermore, Soviet demands for concessions and rights on the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) and on the ports of Lushun and Dalian had surpassed the terms of the Yalta Agreement.⁴⁸² The Soviet terms for a Sino-Soviet treaty were not conducive to Chiang's domestic political considerations, but failure to come to an agreement with the Soviets could place China in uncharted waters, in terms of Soviet actions in regard to Xinjiang, the CCP and Manchuria. Chiang Kai-shek was therefore determined to

⁴⁷⁹ David D. Wang, op. cit., p.63.

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁸¹ Ibid.

⁴⁸² Lyman Van Slyke, "The Chinese Communist Movement During the Sino-Japanese War 1937-1945", in Denis Twitchett & John K. Fairbank (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China, vol. 13, Republican China 1912-1949, Pt. 2*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p.720.

commit the Soviet Union to an agreement that would ensure a peaceful post-war Sino-Soviet relationship and could be used to judge the Soviet's observance of their obligations.⁴⁸³ To these particular ends he instructed Song Ziwen that Chinese recognition of the MPR's independence would be forthcoming if the Soviets accepted two basic demands; (1) to safeguard China's territorial, political and administrative sovereignty in Manchuria and (2) to not again support the CCP and the rebellion in Xinjiang.⁴⁸⁴ After deliberation of Chinese and Soviet demands, deals were struck on the MPR's borders, the CER and the Manchurian ports, and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance was signed on 14 August, 1945.⁴⁸⁵ The signing of the treaty meant that China had sacrificed its sovereignty claims over the MPR, the administrative rights over the CER and the ports of Lushun and Dalian. The Soviets, in return, had undertaken to acknowledge Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria, not to support the CCP and not to intervene in Xinjiang's affairs.⁴⁸⁶ Chiang Kai-shek had, in theory, gained Soviet guarantees to prevent the two most troubling issues (the CCP and the ETR in Xinjiang,) confronting his government gaining further Soviet support or encouragement. Furthermore, by signing the treaty he had ensured firm legal guarantees of China's sovereignty over Manchuria and secured a peaceful post-war Sino-Soviet relationship.⁴⁸⁷

The eventual Soviet acceptance of these demands suggests that the cessation of Soviet-ETR actions in Xinjiang was contingent upon the Chinese acceptance of the MPR's

⁴⁸³ Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, *The Rise of Modern China* (5th ed.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.610.

⁴⁸⁴ David D. Wang, op. cit., p.64.

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid, p.65.

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁷ John W. Garver, op. cit., p.228.

independence and the Soviet position with regards to the Manchurian railways and ports. The events in Xinjiang throughout the duration of the negotiations and the months immediately after the conclusion of the treaty appear to confirm the argument that Soviet activities in Xinjiang were primarily aimed at achieving Chinese acquiescence to Soviet demands in Manchuria. During the negotiations, 30 June to 14 August, the ETR renewed its offensive against the KMT in July 1945.⁴⁸⁸ The renewed ETR offensive culminated in the capture of Mannas, close to the capital Ürümqi, in early September.⁴⁸⁹ Under the terms of the recently signed treaty, the Soviets were expected to cease intervention in Xinjiang's affairs. This, however, was obviously not the case, as reports of Soviet air support for the ETR forces at the battles of Wusu and Mannas reached Nanjing in September. In order to stabilise the situation and halt the KMT's deteriorating position in Xinjiang, Chiang dispatched General Zhang Zhizyong to Urumqi. Furthermore, Zhang Zhizyong went to what the KMT government believed to be the source of the problem and informed the Soviet Consul in Urumqi on 13 September that if there was not an immediate cessation of hostilities, China would make an 'international affair' of the matter.⁴⁹⁰ The result of this implicit threat to involve the US in the affair appeared to have the desired effect, as the Soviet Ambassador Petrov informed the Chinese government on 15 September of the Soviet government's wish to mediate the ETR-KMT conflict.⁴⁹¹ The Soviet Union's decision to effectively halt the ETR's advance, with the road to Ürümqi open, was undertaken as it had achieved its strategic goals with regard to Xinjiang and East Asia more generally. That is to say Soviet policy in Xinjiang was simply used as a tool by which to extract concessions

⁴⁸⁸ Andrew D. W. Forbes, *op. cit.*, p.188.

⁴⁸⁹ *Ibid*, pp.188-189.

⁴⁹⁰ Edmund O. Clubb, *op. cit.*, p.367.

⁴⁹¹ David D. Wang, *op. cit.*, p.70.

from Chiang's government in relation to the MPR and Manchuria. Once these goals were achieved, in the form of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, it was no longer necessary for the Soviets to continue their support of the ETR's armed rebellion against the Chinese. Furthermore, the Soviet Union via the ETR had regained their 'special' position in the Ili region and therefore did not wish to relinquish this position via further anti-KMT actions in Xinjiang. In effect the Soviet Union had achieved their major goals in relation to Xinjiang: reassertion of their position vis-à-vis the Ili region, the removal of any Western influence and ensured that China acceded to their demands in regard to Mongolia and Manchuria.⁴⁹²

With the Soviet Union achieving its Far Eastern strategic goals with the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, their support for the ETR insurgency in Xinjiang gradually waned over the 1945-1949 period. The result of the Zhang Zhizhong instigated Soviet-ETR-KMT negotiations were to essentially divide Xinjiang into ETR and KMT control regions. The direct military conflict and Soviet 'mediation' between the ETR and the KMT in 1945-1946 led to the establishment of uneasy coalition government. The subsequent 1946-1949 period in Xinjiang witnessed the KMT and ETR govern their regions in increasingly divergent ways, although they were ostensibly coalition partners. The Soviet Union continued, despite the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty, to support economically and militarily the ETR's political and economic agenda within the context of the ETR-KMT 'coalition'. The unstable political situation that this created was only resolved by the defeat of the KMT in the civil war and the arrival of the PLA in September 1949.

⁴⁹² Ibid, pp.70-71.

Xinjiang over the 1911-1949 was clearly and intimately linked to both the foreign policy of the Republic of China (especially the Sino-Soviet relationship) and the geopolitical environment of Central Asia. The actions of Chinese warlords, such as Yang Zengxin, although often responding to external pressure in a purely pragmatic fashion ultimately illustrated their belief or assumption that Xinjiang was part of China. As we have seen, however, each Chinese warlord had to balance the great autonomy bestowed upon Xinjiang due to weak central power with a corresponding strengthening and intensification of external influence. The implications of this for the central government, particular from 1928 to 1942, were that Chinese claims to Xinjiang had to be furthered through purely strategic measures within the context of the Republic's overall foreign policy. Hence Chiang's manoeuvres regarding Ma Zhongying in the early 1930s and his government's acceptance of Soviet power in Xinjiang during the critical Sino-Soviet alliance of 1937-1939. Obviously the KMT government over the 1928-1942 period was operating from a position of weakness in terms of Sino-Soviet and Sino-Xinjiang relations, yet this weakness did not essentially erode Chinese claims to Xinjiang or the maintenance of the political will to do so. The efficaciousness with which the opportunity to re-assert Chinese control of the region was seized in 1942 under the strategy of He Dequan clearly demonstrates the continuity of the notion that Xinjiang was Chinese. Moreover, the importance of the re-assertion of Chinese control did not simply derive from the perception that it had been "lost" after the collapse of the Qing. It also derived from the related perception that Xinjiang *had* to be part of a unified China in order to safeguard the security of China. This was a calculus that evidently bore the mark of Zuo Zangtang and the "statecraft" scholars' view of Xinjiang's importance to China. Therefore, although the clear erosion of Soviet strength

drove Chiang's actions in Xinjiang in 1942-43, the decision was justified beyond pure *realpolitik*. The urgency and determination with which Soviet weakness was seized upon by Chiang and high-level advisors, such as He Dequan, illustrates the deep entrenchment of the notion that Xinjiang not only *was* Chinese but also *should be* Chinese. Chiang Kai-shek's perception of both Xinjiang's importance and relation to China was quite clearly stated:

Sinkiang is part of China's territory. *It has long been one of the Chinese provinces.* As a strategic base in the heartland of Asia, it can contribute toward peace and security in Asia and elsewhere in the world *only when it remains under the complete jurisdiction of the Republic of China.*⁴⁹³

The notion that Xinjiang had long been a *Chinese* province is quite clearly a spurious historical claim, in light of the material examined in chapter two, where it was demonstrated that what became Xinjiang in the late 19th century had been very much a Qing *Inner Asian* dependency. Furthermore, Xinjiang officially became a province of the empire in 1884, a mere sixty years before Chiang's claims to the historicity of the Chinese-ness of Xinjiang.

The political and ideological implications of these claims are clear and impacted heavily on both the policies pursued in Xinjiang under the KMT and the perception of the region's importance. These imperatives, as we have seen, played a significant role in determining both Chiang's approach to Sino-Soviet relations and to the administration of Xinjiang from 1942 to 1949. Importantly, the Chinese claim that Xinjiang both was and should be part of the Chinese state required, in fact determined, a series of policies both externally and internally. Thus upon the KMT's establishment of control and

⁴⁹³ Chiang Kai-shek, *Soviet Russia in China: A Summing up at Seventy*, (London: Harrap & Co, 1957), p.100. My emphasis.

ultimate removal of Sheng Shicai in 1944 there was implemented a series of policies that echoed those of the late Qing period. The policies that flowed from this goal were to introduce a major KMT military force (or perhaps garrison would be more descriptively accurate), encourage Han Chinese settlement and reorient the region's economy toward China proper. General Zhu Shaoliang's KMT troops that entered Xinjiang in June 1943 were but the beginning of an enormous deployment of Chinese troops across the province. By 1944-45 the KMT were maintaining an estimated 100 000 troops in Xinjiang, the bulk of which were Han Chinese and Hui, that became perceived as an army of occupation by the Turkic-Muslim population. The official encouragement of Han Chinese settlement was initiated soon after Chiang Kai-shek's announcement of a "North-West Development Movement" and the finalisation of Sheng's agreements with Chongqing in late 1942. The "North-West Development Movement" amounted to the transfer of 10 000 KMT officials and their families to Xinjiang and the beginning of a campaign to encourage Han peasant farmers into the north-west.⁴⁹⁴ The political growth of KMT influence after 1943 was also coupled with a corresponding increase in KMT economic and commercial interests. Much as during the Qing-era, the regulation of trade highly favoured merchants from China proper, encouraged trade with China proper and actively discriminated against Turkic-Muslim Xinjiang-based trading companies.⁴⁹⁵ Thus there was a return to the sinicizing and integrating rationality that had characterised and underpinned Qing rule after the 1830s.

⁴⁹⁴ See Owen Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia*, op. cit., pp.178-179, Cheng Tien-fong, *A History of Sino-Soviet Relations*, p.178 & Andrew D. W. Forbes, op. cit., p.168.

⁴⁹⁵ Andrew D. W. Forbes, op. cit., p.167. Forbes states that " At the same time, economic pressures were brought to bear against indigenous trading companies operating within Sinkiang; thus the passport fee for a merchant leaving the province was at first trebled, and then multiplied by ten."

Given the political and ideological program of the KMT it could not but be so. Especially important in this respect were Chiang Kai-shek's view of China's frontier regions and the related perception of the non-Han peoples that populated them. As noted above, one of the major facets of Chiang Kai-shek's foreign policy between 1927 and 1949 was to have China recognised as one of the Great Powers. This could only be achieved, in Chiang's estimation, by the unification of the country under his government and the regaining of China's "lost" territories - Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet, Taiwan, and Xinjiang.⁴⁹⁶ This stance ultimately determined a series of responses to the dilemmas posed by non-Han territories and people's claims to independence or autonomy.

Theoretically the KMT's approach to the nationality issue was based upon Sun Yatsen's "Three Principles of the People". Sun's approach to the "nationality issue" was quite assimilationist, whereby he hoped for an united China where all nationalities were integrated as part of the state. Under Soviet influence Sun adopted the idea of self-determination for China's minorities, and the principles of self-determination and autonomy for ethnic minorities became part of the KMT's political platform in 1924.⁴⁹⁷ Upon Chiang Kai-shek's succession to the leadership of the KMT these principles were swiftly jettisoned and replaced with the assertion that all ethnic groups were one part of the "greater Chinese race". Therefore, if all China's peoples were of the same stock there could be no basis for the granting of autonomy, let alone independence, to any minority ethnic group.⁴⁹⁸ This was of course a function of the firmly held conviction of both Sun and Chiang that the KMT must restore China's "national grandeur" that required not

⁴⁹⁶ John W. Garver, *op. cit.*, pp.7-8.

⁴⁹⁷ Linda Benson, *The Ili Rebellion*, *op. cit.*, pp.11-12.

⁴⁹⁸ *Ibid*

only the regaining of the "lost" regions of Mongolia, Manchuria, Tibet and Xinjiang but the expansion of the state to those peripheries. Thus the expansion of the state required the contraction of local or peripheral autonomy:

The Nationalist movement conceived of national unification in terms of the expansion of the central state and the penetration of local society. Sun Yatsen made frequent reference to a saying that the Chinese people resembled a "loose sheet of sand"...Sun proposed an unprecedented reorientation of state activity toward each grain of sand, to infuse the cement that he thought lacking in the old imperial state and from contemporary society. The state was to expand its reach at the expense of local autonomy, customary liberties and new political freedoms.⁴⁹⁹

As we have seen Chiang's views with respect to Xinjiang clearly reflected this centralising and uncompromising stance.

The continuity of this theme of state centralisation and the related assimilationist approach to non-Han groups between the late Qing and Republican periods is evident in Chiang Kai-shek's approach to Xinjiang. The overall goal of integrating Xinjiang with China remained ingrained in the ruling elite's consciousness regardless of the vicissitudes of the state's power and capabilities to actually achieve it throughout the Republican period. The conduct of KMT administration in Xinjiang and the handling of the "Ili Rebellion-East Turkestan Republic" from 1944 to 1949 is highly illustrative of the continuity of both goals and strategies across the Qing and Republican periods. As demonstrated above, the policies pursued in Xinjiang on the establishment of central control in 1943-44 were based upon Qing precedents. This was due to no lack of originality on the behalf of the KMT administration but rather due to the overall goal of the state in Xinjiang – to make it part of China. The perception that Xinjiang was and

⁴⁹⁹ John Fitzgerald, *Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), p.163.

should be part of China, coupled with the KMT's assertion that only the restoration of all China's "lost" territories could ensure the security of the Chinese state prescribed a series of techniques and tactics of rule within Xinjiang and a specific foreign policy approach. Thus in contrast to Gardner Bovingdon, for example, who argues that until the establishment of the PRC "there had been a discourse of long standing that questioned 'China's' relationship with the contentious region, even contemplating the possibility of its eventual independence"⁵⁰⁰, I argue that given the maintenance and intensity of the notion of Xinjiang's Chineseness within the vision of the state there was no other course of action but to sinicize/integrate. Bovingdon makes much of General Zhang Zhizhong's address, in his capacity as Chairman of the coalition government in Xinjiang in May 1947, to a conference of delegates from the ETR and KMT controlled regions. In this address General Zhang compared China's relation to Xinjiang with that of the US to the Philippines or Britain to India.⁵⁰¹ The implications were that China too was an imperial power and moreover, given the granting of independence to the Philippines and India, China should also consider the granting of independence to Xinjiang. Yet, as Bovingdon notes, General Zhang simultaneously stressed that the central government would grant Xinjiang independence on the condition that it would not be detrimental to the state:

The Central government is willing to surrender all political power to the people of Sinkiang on the condition that the territory and sovereignty of the nation suffer no impairment thereby. The Central government will not tolerate anything possibly detrimental to the territorial integrity or sovereignty of the state – even at the cost of war.⁵⁰²

⁵⁰⁰ Gardner Bovingdon, "The History of the History of Xinjiang", op. cit., p.97.

⁵⁰¹ Ibid & General Chang Chih-chung (Zhang Zhizhong), "Dilemma in Sinkiang", *Pacific Affairs*, (1947), p.425.

⁵⁰² General Chang Chih-chung, op. cit., p.426.

General Zhang went on to weigh the costs and benefits to China of maintaining or relinquishing Xinjiang. He came to the conclusion that if Xinjiang could become truly independent it would relieve the central government fiscally and provide a buffer between China and the Soviet Union. This of course required Xinjiang to be free of external influences (ie. Soviet), a reality that in the contemporary circumstance was highly unlikely. This was a line of strategic thinking that echoed Zuo Zongtang's "domino" theory – Xinjiang protected Mongolia, Mongolia protected the interior provinces and so forth. Therefore Xinjiang must not and could not become independent.⁵⁰³ Bovingdon's argument that General Zhang's rationale for the maintenance of Xinjiang was pure *realpolitik* is flawed and misses the central point. The only reason that this *realpolitik* existed was due to the political will to make Xinjiang Chinese. The accretion of Chinese techniques and tactics of rule in Xinjiang since the Qing period required concrete expression of the Chineseness of the region both internally and externally. Thus throughout the Republican period the KMT government intensely and regularly claimed Xinjiang as a Chinese province within the context of the Sino-Soviet relationship. Moreover, upon the establishment of KMT authority in Xinjiang in 1943-44 a series of techniques and tactics of rule aimed at the integration of the province with the state were implemented immediately. As will be seen in the following chapters this Qing-originating legacy would be bequeathed to the PRC and pursued with vigour.

⁵⁰³ Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

XINJIANG IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949-1978: THE RESURGENCE OF THE STATE'S INTEGRATIONIST PROJECT

"At present, several million troops of the field armies of the People's Liberation Army are already striking at areas close to Taiwan, Guangxi, Guizhou, Sichuan, and Xinjiang, and the majority of the Chinese people have already been liberated...*For over a century our forbears have never stopped waging tenacious struggles against domestic and foreign oppressors, including the revolution of 1911 led by Mr. Sun Yat-sen, the great forerunner of the Chinese revolution. Our forbears have instructed us to fulfill their behest, and we have now done so accordingly.* We have united and have overthrown both domestic and foreign oppressors through the People's War of Liberation and the people's great revolution, and now proclaim the establishment of the People's Republic of China".⁵⁰⁴

Mao Zedong, September 21, 1949.

These words, uttered by Mao Zedong a mere nine days before the formal establishment of the PRC, serve as a pertinent starting point for the examination of Xinjiang under the PRC. As he spoke the field armies of the PLA were indeed on the cusp of fulfilling Mao and the CCP's quest for the total control, bar Taiwan, of the Chinese state. Importantly, the most remote and anti-Han (let alone anti-communist) "province" of the Republic of China was effectively presented to the CCP within a matter of days after Mao's statement. The commander of the KMT's Xinjiang Garrison and civilian governor, General Tao Zhiyue and Burhan Shahidi respectively, severed all connections to the KMT government (now in Guangzhou) and declared their allegiance to the PRC on 25

⁵⁰⁴ Mao Zedong, "Opening Speech at the First Plenary Session of the CPPCC," (September 21, 1949) in Michael Y. M. Kau & John K. Leung (eds.), *The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976: Vol. I, September 1949-December 1955*, (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1986), pp. 3-5. (My emphasis)

and 26 September 1949.⁵⁰⁵ Their position was acknowledged in a telegram from Mao and Zhu De on 28 September. General Tao and Burhan were also instructed to await further orders and informed of the imminent movement of the PLA into Xinjiang.⁵⁰⁶ The haste of the new authorities to establish a presence in the far north-western "province" while there were arguably many other pressing, and perhaps "easier", political and military tasks to accomplish raises a number of questions that highlight the importance of Xinjiang and its relation to the Chinese state. Between January and May 1949 Mao and the Central Military Committee of the CCP had determined that the liberation of Xinjiang would not be undertaken until the spring of 1950.⁵⁰⁷ Yet within the space of three months, Mao was ordering his armies into the north-west. What factors prompted the CCP to accelerate their liberation of Xinjiang? Moreover, what did the CCP hope to achieve by the precipitant advance into this hitherto *terra incognita* for the Chinese communists? The dynamics of the PLA's liberation of Xinjiang in September and October 1949 illuminate a number of major themes that developed throughout the 1949-1991 period - specifically the developing tensions in the Sino-Soviet relationship, the pre-eminence of the PLA in Xinjiang, and the overwhelming integrationist character of communist administration.

It will be recalled that since November 1944 Xinjiang had essentially remained divided between the Soviet-inspired "East Turkestan Republic" (the three north-western districts

⁵⁰⁵ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, vol.IX, The Far East: China*. 839.00/9-2549 A Telegram from Vice Consul [Mackiernan] in Tihwa [Urumqi] to the Secretary of State, (September 25, 1949), p. 1062.

⁵⁰⁶ Mao Zedong, "Telegram to Xinjiang Political and Military Authorities", (September 28, 1949), op. cit., p.8.

⁵⁰⁷ David D. Wang, *Under the Soviet Shadow: The Yining Incident, Ethnic Conflicts and International Rivalry in Xinjiang, 1944-1949*, (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1999), p.362 & Michael M. Sheng, *Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin and the United States*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p.170.

of Ili, Tancheng and Ashan) and the KMT provincial authorities in Ürümqi. The existence of these two distinct and antagonistic political regimes in Xinjiang upon the victory of the CCP in the civil war should have presented the new authorities in Beijing with serious problems regarding the ETR-KMT recognition of the new political situation. The ETR regime and its leaders by and large were decidedly anti-Han. Moreover, although a significant faction of the ETR leadership was in fact communist, they were not necessarily familiar with or supportive of the CCP. This was primarily due to the ETR leadership's ethnic composition and relationship to the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union).⁵⁰⁸ The new authority's influence upon the ETR leadership was therefore limited. The KMT military and civilian authorities were, however, split between those willing to acknowledge the new balance of power and obstinate "hard-liners" determined to resist. In June 1949 Mao dispatched a delegation headed by Liu Shaoqi to Moscow to ascertain the Soviet position regarding the imminent victory of the CCP in China proper. Stalin advised the Chinese to accelerate their liberation of Xinjiang, warning them of a US and British "plot" to encourage the "Five Ma's"⁵⁰⁹ to retreat toward Xinjiang and establish an independent Muslim state⁵¹⁰. This claim had some basis, with the US Consul in Urumqi, Paxton, requesting Washington's guidance regarding the possibility of supplying Ma Bufang (KMT allied Hui warlord of Gansu) with material aid if he retreated to Xinjiang.⁵¹¹ Moreover, Stalin

⁵⁰⁸ The majority of ETR leaders, such as Ahmetjan Qasimi and Saifudin, were in fact members of the "Communist Party of the Soviet Union" and were ethnically Turki (Uighur, Kazakh etc) or Russian. See David D. Wang, *Under the Soviet Shadow: The Yining Incident, Ethnic Conflicts and International Rivalry in Xinjiang, 1944-1949*, (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1999). Wang also states that Ahmetjan had not even heard of Mao Zedong.

⁵⁰⁹ "Five Ma's" referred to the Hui warlords of Gansu and Qinghai who were allied with the KMT government.

⁵¹⁰ David D. Wang, op. cit., p.362 & Michael M. Sheng, op. cit., p.170.

⁵¹¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, vol.IX, The Far East: China..* 693.0031/7-849, Telegram. "The Consul at Tihwa (Paxton) to the Secretary of State", (July 8, 1949), p.1058.

also suggested that the Chinese make use of the ETR in Xinjiang and establish communications with them.⁵¹² Consequently Deng Liqun, a political secretary in Liu's delegation, was dispatched from Moscow to Ili with a radio communications team to establish contact between the ETR leadership and the CCP.⁵¹³ Soon thereafter the Central Military Committee of the CCP endeavoured to expedite the PLA's drive through Gansu and Qinghai provinces.

The newly designated First Field Army (hereafter First FA), under the command of Peng Dehuai, was charged with leading the assault on the north-west. The next three months saw Peng's First FA make an inexorable advance into the north-west, taking Baoji in Shaanxi on 14 July, Lanzhou in Gansu on 25 August and Xining in Qinghai on 5 September.⁵¹⁴ Meanwhile Deng Liqun arrived in Ili on 14 August to begin the task of establishing links with the ETR leadership. To this end Deng met with the ETR's major leaders, Ahmetjan, Ishag Beg and Abasoff, three days later. At this meeting, according to Wang, Deng presented the three ETR leaders with a letter from Mao Zedong that praised the ETR and acclaimed their rebellion as being part of China's "democratic revolutionary movement".⁵¹⁵ Importantly, Deng also invited the ETR to send a delegation to the inaugural Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) that was to be held on 21 September.⁵¹⁶ Subsequently an ETR delegation comprised of Ahmetjan, Ishag Beg, Abasoff, and Delilhan, and complemented by a representative of the KMT held region Luo Zhi, left via the Soviet Union for Beijing on

⁵¹² David D. Wang, op. cit., p.362.

⁵¹³ Michael M. Sheng, op. cit., p.170.

⁵¹⁴ William W. Whitson & Chen-hsia Huang, *The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-71*, (London: MacMillan, 1973), p.113.

⁵¹⁵ David D. Wang, op. cit., p.379.

⁵¹⁶ Ibid

22 August.⁵¹⁷ This ETR delegation, however, never made it to Beijing with their plane crashing somewhere in the Soviet Union around 27 August. The Soviet Consulate in Ili informed Saifudin (the ETR-KMT coalition government's education minister) of the accident on 3 September and Deng Liqun relayed this news to Beijing. A new ETR delegation headed by Saifudin left for Beijing on 7 September.⁵¹⁸ Meanwhile by July-August the two most senior KMT officials in Xinjiang, General Tao Zhiyue and Burhan, had apparently already decided to surrender peacefully upon the arrival of the PLA.⁵¹⁹ Moreover, General Tao Zhiyue endeavoured to persuade the remaining hard-line KMT commanders (Ma Chengxiang, Luo Shuren and Ye Cheng) in Xinjiang of the futility of resistance. The capture of Lanzhou by Peng Dehuai's First FA on 25 August apparently convinced them of this, and they prepared to hand over command of their troops to General Tao.⁵²⁰ In the following weeks Deng Liqun, with the aid of the Soviet Consulates in Ili and Urumqi, arranged a meeting with General Tao Zhiyue and Burhan. Deng arrived in Urumqi on 15 September and had his first meeting with them on the following day.⁵²¹ In the meeting Deng presented the two officials with letters from Zhang Zhizhong that promoted the peaceful settlement of the "Xinjiang question". General Tao and Burhan's response to Zhang Zhizhong's message was given to Deng on 17 September. The two KMT officials stated that they would immediately surrender upon the departure of the remaining KMT hard-liners - Ma Chengxiang, Luo Shuren and Ye Cheng.⁵²² By 22 August the PLA had control of Ningxia, Gansu and Qinghai,

⁵¹⁷ Ibid & Michael S. Sheng, op. cit., p.170. The delegates left Ili on 22 August and boarded a flight in Alma-Ata in Soviet Kazakhstan on 24 August for Beijing.

⁵¹⁸ David D. Wang, op. cit., p.380.

⁵¹⁹ Ibid, pp.374-378 & *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, vol.IX, The Far East: China*. 661.9331/8-849 Airgram. "The Minister Counsellor of Embassy in China (Clark) to the Secretary of State", (August 8, 1949), p.1060.

⁵²⁰ David D. Wang, op. cit., p.378.

⁵²¹ Ibid, p.382 & Michael S. Sheng, op. cit., p.171.

⁵²² David D. Wang, op. cit., p.382.

with Peng Dehuai's First FA firmly ensconced at Lanzhou.⁵²³ The following day General Tao dispatched his logistics commander, Zeng Zhenwu, as a representative of the Xinjiang Garrison to Lanzhou to meet with Peng Dehuai. Soon thereafter, on 25 September, the KMT hard-liners Ma Chengxiang, Luo Shuren and Ye Cheng departed Xinjiang for Taiwan via India.⁵²⁴ As noted previously, 25 and 26 September saw General Tao Zhiyue and Governor Burhan officially announce their surrender to the CCP.⁵²⁵ The first troops of Peng Dehuai's First FA, however, did not begin their advance into Xinjiang until early October 1949. The exact date of these movements is difficult to determine. One source claims that the first PLA troops began their advance on 12 October under the command of Wang Zhen and Wang Enmao, who reached Hami (Turfan) the following night.⁵²⁶ Another source asserts that the Soviets airlifted 14 000 of Peng Dehuai's PLA troops into Ürümqi early in October, whereas McMillen states that the first units of the PLA reached the provincial capital on 20 October.⁵²⁷ Whichever account is correct it is clear that by mid-October the provincial capital was controlled by the PLA.

This series of developments thus led to a curious resolution of the "Xinjiang question" - the KMT civilian and military authorities declared their surrender to the CCP before a single PLA unit entered Xinjiang. This has led a number of scholars, most notably

⁵²³ William W. Whitson & Chen-hsia Huang, *The Chinese High Command*, op. cit., p.113.

⁵²⁴ David D. Wang, op. cit., p.382.

⁵²⁵ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, vol.IX, The Far East: China*. 839.00/9-2549 A Telegram from Vice Consul [Mackiernan] in Tihwa [Urumqi] to the Secretary of State, September 25, 1949 & Mao Zedong, "Telegram to Xinjiang Political and Military Authorities", (September 28, 1949), op. cit., p.8.

⁵²⁶ Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949-1977*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979), p.24.

⁵²⁷ David D. Wang, op. cit., p.383. Wang cites CCP Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region Committee and Department of Politics of the PLA Xinjiang Military Region documents & Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power*, op. cit., p.25.

David Wang and Michael Sheng, to emphasise the role of the Soviet Union in the CCP's "peaceful liberation" of Xinjiang. According to these scholars the involvement of the Soviet Consulates in Ili and Ürümqi were instrumental in facilitating the establishment of contact between the CCP, in the person of Deng Liqun, and the leadership of the ETR and the KMT provincial authorities. The historical record undoubtedly corroborates this argument. Yet these scholars also maintain that the alignment of Soviet and CCP imperatives went far beyond the resolution of the "Xinjiang question". That is to say both extrapolate from the developments of this period a close Soviet-CCP relationship that was characterised by a synchronicity in foreign policy and approach to resolving the existence of the ETR regime. For example, Sheng argues that the developments in Xinjiang between June and September 1949 that led to the CCP's "peaceful liberation" demonstrated that "The Mao-Stalin solidarity on the eve of the CCP nationwide victory was self-evident".⁵²⁸ Wang on the other hand, although more or less sharing Sheng's view as to the instrumentality of the Soviet role⁵²⁹, ultimately does not go so far as him regarding the supposed "Mao-Stalin solidarity". The Soviet Union's most crucial role was perhaps the part it played in resolving the status of the ETR and its armed forces, the "Ili National Army" (INA), in relation to the CCP and the PLA. The Soviet Consul in Ili apparently suggested to Deng Liqun that the INA be absorbed into the PLA and that the remaining leaders of the ETR be given roles in the new CCP administration.⁵³⁰ Moreover, the Soviets placed pressure on the most senior living member of the ETR, Saifudin, to transfer his party membership from the CPSU to the CCP. Saifudin, after extended negotiations with Peng Dehuai and Wang Enmao, agreed

⁵²⁸ Michael S. Sheng, *Battling Western Imperialism*, op. cit., pp.170-171.

⁵²⁹ See Wang's assertion of the Soviet airlift of PLA troops to Urumqi in October 1949, pp.382-384.

⁵³⁰ David D. Wang, op. cit., p.383.

to the transfer of membership and the absorption of the units of the INA into Peng's First FA in December 1949 as the new 5th Corps.⁵³¹ The composition of the First FA 5th Corps leadership - Rheskan Jan as commander and Saifudin as political commissar - certainly corroborates the absorption of the INA units.⁵³²

The fact that the CCP did indeed find it expedient to absorb the bulk of the ETR's civilian and military personnel was not necessarily an exceptional occurrence that implied subservience to Moscow. Throughout the Sino-Japanese and civil wars the CCP had demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with elements opposed to its major adversary at specific times that was generally consistent with its conception of the "United Front" strategy. This particular aspect of CCP strategy was duly extended to Xinjiang upon its liberation by the PLA. This is clearly demonstrated in a letter from Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai in his capacity as deputy commander-in-chief of the PLA and first secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the Central Committee. Mao's instructions to Peng clearly illustrate the CCP's acknowledgment that in order to secure Chinese control of Xinjiang it needed to develop some level of support or acquiescence from the predominantly non-Han population:

In the present period they should organize, across the board, coalition governments, ie., united front governments. Within [the framework of] such cooperation, minority nationality cadres will be nurtured in large numbers. Furthermore, the provincial [Party] committees of Qinghai, Gansu, Xinjiang, Ningxia and Shaanxi, and the [special] district [Party] committees of all places where there are minority nationalities ought to form training classes for minority nationality cadres, or cadre training schools. *Please give this a good deal of attention. It is impossible to thoroughly resolve the problem of the minority nationalities and to totally isolate the nationalistic*

⁵³¹ Jürgen Domes, *Peng Te-huai: The Man and the Image*, (London: C.Hurst & Company, 1985), p.59.

⁵³² William W. Whitson & Chen-hsia Huang, "Chart B: First Field Army Order of Battle, July-December, 1949" in *The Chinese High Command*, op.cit., p.114.

*reactionaries without a large number of Communist cadres who are from minority nationality backgrounds.*⁵³³

Therefore, it is clear that regardless of Soviet advice the CCP evidently recognised the importance of establishing some, albeit limited and party-controlled, linkages to Xinjiang's society. The CCP's intention was to create an element within Xinjiang's population that would have a stake in the coming CCP-constructed new order. Such a strategy had a long history in Xinjiang, stretching back to the Qing conquest of the region in the 1750s. The Qing, it will be recalled, initially framed the co-option of local elites by an encompassing universalist imperial ideology that sought to provide the requisite "space" for the representation of the multiplicity of ethnic identities present in the empire's population. The extension of this strategy under the CCP was, however, expressed within the context of ostensibly Marxist-Leninist ideology. Yet it can be argued that both the mechanism and purpose were identical - to encompass a diverse population within a centralised political order and facilitate state control over the conduct of specific segments of the population. The argument that regards the CCP's actions in Xinjiang in late 1949 as the result of Soviet "advice", I believe, fails to distinguish the inherently divergent underlying imperatives of both the Soviet Union and the CCP in the region that will become apparent in the forthcoming analysis of the 1949-1955 period.

I have begun the present chapter with this rather lengthy examination of the brief "peaceful liberation" of Xinjiang by the CCP-PLA as it serves as a preview of the multiplicity of both internal and external challenges that the PRC would face throughout

⁵³³ Mao Zedong, "Letter to Peng Dehuai and the Northwest Bureau", (November 14, 1949), in Michael Y. M. Kau & John K. Leung (eds.), *The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976: Vol. I, September 1949-*

the 1949-1978 period. Moreover, this episode serves to highlight the further development or even strengthening of Chinese perceptions of Xinjiang's relation to China. Mao and the CCP's actions in the June-October 1949 period, and more so between 1949 and 1955, were very much underpinned by the assertion of historical and ideological precedents. That is to say the CCP inherited a series of perceptions regarding Xinjiang from their imperial and republican predecessors, chief among which was the belief not only that Xinjiang *was* "Chinese", but that it *should* be. The CCP perceived itself as completing and fulfilling the promise of the nationalist revolution of Sun Yatsen and, as noted at the very beginning of this chapter, Mao explicitly stated so upon the victory of the CCP. As Mao expounded upon the advance of the PLA toward Taiwan, Guangxi, Guizhou, Sichuan and Xinjiang, he also unequivocally portrayed this grand undertaking as the culmination of the revolutionary process initiated in the late Qing period:

For over a century our forbears have never stopped waging tenacious struggles against domestic and foreign oppressors, including the revolution of 1911 led by Mr. Sun Yat-sen, the great forerunner of the Chinese revolution. *Our forbears have instructed us to fulfill their behest, and we have now done so accordingly.*⁵³⁴

Thus the CCP and PLA's task was not only a revolutionary one but also a historical and nationalist one. The "behest" was in fact the maintenance of the unitary state that had come to be understood in both its political and geographic sense. This process is arguably yet to be completed.

December 1955, op. cit., pp.33-34. (My emphasis)

⁵³⁴ Mao Zedong, "Opening Speech at the First Plenary Session of the CPPCC," (September 21, 1949), op. cit., pp.3-5. (My emphasis)

As will be demonstrated, the continuity of specific techniques and strategies of rule was not due to any ideological or intellectual stasis on behalf of the CCP leadership. Rather, CCP policy could not but manifest specific continuities in its various techniques and strategies of rule as the pre-eminent goals of the state in Xinjiang had essentially remained intact since the Qing era. This is not to suggest for a moment that Qing, KMT and CCP actions/policies in Xinjiang were identical. That pre-eminent statesmen or intellectuals of each particular period ultimately shared the same goals with respect to Xinjiang does not imply that they shared similar perceptions of the means by which these goals could be achieved. Thus, as the previous chapters have highlighted, there is in fact two "levels" or "layers" of historical development concerning the ends and means of state action in relation to Xinjiang. The first "layer", that of means, is essentially shallow, broadly spread and fluid. That is, the strategies, techniques and tactics by which the state sought to reach its goals in Xinjiang over the Qing to PRC eras have changed, been transformed and pursued with varying degrees of intensity and determination. But within this layer can be found a corpus of historical knowledge and precedent that has been developed through state action over the centuries, in essence a repository of experience and perceptions regarding Xinjiang's relation to the state. The second "layer", in contrast, runs deep and lies below the turbulence that characterises the first. If the first layer is characterised by turbulence and discontinuity, the second is characterised by an embedded continuity regarding the ultimate goals of state policy in Xinjiang. The embedding of these key goals of state policy was not isolated to one specific "moment" but rather, as chapter two demonstrated, was the product of two centuries of development in the state's perceptions of the dilemmas posed by the rule of Xinjiang. This development or process culminated in the 1870s and 1880s with the

construction of Xinjiang as a province of the empire that was ultimately underpinned by the rationality of Zuo Zongtang and the "statecraft" scholars. Thus the major task of this chapter is to analyse the development of the strategies, techniques and tactics of rule pursued by the CCP in Xinjiang in the 1949-1978 period and identify their relation to the development of the deeper, embedded perceptions of state goals in Xinjiang.

Within the 1949-1991 period (1978 – 1991 is dealt with in Chapter 6) there can be discerned four major phases of Chinese policy in relation to both the internal administration of Xinjiang and the PRC's foreign relations. The contours of the strategies, techniques and tactics of rule employed in each period correlate to a distinct approach to foreign relations. In the first period, 1949-1955, government policy was characterised by strategies and techniques primarily aimed at consolidating and establishing Communist rule in Xinjiang. Parallel to this the PRC's foreign relations were, in the context of Xinjiang, structured around a similarly cautious and tentative approach to relations with the Soviet Union. This period will be dealt with in substantial detail, as the dynamics that developed both within Chinese administrative policy and the PRC's foreign policy regarding Xinjiang in this period illuminate the continuity of major techniques and strategies of rule established in the Qing and Republican eras. The second period, 1956-1961/62, saw the reorientation of the CCP's strategies, techniques and tactics of rule away from the cautious approach of the immediate post-liberation years. This period was characterised by a concerted effort to accelerate the political, economic, and social integration of Xinjiang with the rest of the country. This entailed the implementation of a series of policies aimed at achieving the assimilation of the ethnic nationalities with the Han and establishing the total orientation of the region

toward China. The foreign relations of the PRC in this period, in the context of Xinjiang, witnessed a related assertion of Chinese control. The authorities sought the nullification of the influence of the Soviet Union in Xinjiang's affairs - a dynamic that manifested itself across a range of specific areas including economic, nationality and military affairs. The following 1966-1976 period encapsulates the era of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) in the PRC. The general contours of this movement or phase in the PRC's history are generally well known and it is not my intention to detail them here. The GPCR in Xinjiang was characterised by the development of conflict between the entrenched political and military authorities and Beijing-appointedees and Red Guards. As such the GPCR in the context of Xinjiang could be seen as an attempt by Beijing to reassert central control over the region's political and military authorities that it accused of creating "an independent kingdom". Furthermore, this process was clearly linked to Beijing's perceptions of the strategic importance of Xinjiang. Throughout the various fluctuations of the GPCR in Xinjiang, Beijing intervened at key moments to restrain the movement in the region when it perceived it to be on the brink of jeopardising "national security". Moreover, the GPCR coincided with the height of the PRC's ideological split and overt military conflict with the Soviet Union, the impact of which was acutely felt in Xinjiang. The final phase, 1977-1991⁵³⁵, saw the gradual assertion of a reformist and moderate approach to Xinjiang that flowed from the re-emergence of Deng Xiaoping to a position of dominance in the CCP. The dynamics of this "reform era", however, were to prove contradictory. The decentralisation of economic and, to some degree, political decision-making encouraged economic recovery and growth but simultaneously weakened the ability of the

⁵³⁵ Dealt with in Chapter 6.

government to control societal forces to the same extent as in the Mao-era. In the specific context of Xinjiang, Deng Xiaoping's ascendancy produced yet another re-evaluation of the state's strategies, techniques and tactics of rule. The CCP's repudiation of the Maoist political, economic and ideological programme resulted in the retrenchment of GPCR policies geared toward the violent and accelerated assimilation of ethnic minorities. This reformist agenda within Xinjiang was coupled with a gradual reorientation of foreign policy that culminated in the Soviet-Chinese-US "strategic triangle" of the 1980s. The following section will identify and analyse the key facets of the CCP's strategies, techniques and tactics of rule over the 1949-1991 period, and their relation to foreign relations. Once the nature and character of the means of Chinese rule over this period have been identified, there will be an investigation of the goals or ends of Chinese policy in Xinjiang. Although one scholar has argued that Chinese policy in Xinjiang should be seen as a function of the state-wide political and ideological campaigns initiated from Beijing in this period, I will argue that these processes were but manifestations of an embedded complex of perceptions regarding Xinjiang (and other ethnic minority-dominated regions).⁵³⁶

The Consolidation and Entrenchment of Chinese Rule, 1949-1955

Upon the entry of Peng Dehuai's First FA into Xinjiang in October 1949 the PLA-CCP's task was, as we have seen, far from complete. The CCP, much like the Qing before them, faced three major problems in the consolidation of their power in Xinjiang - how to establish ideological/political legitimacy, structure their administration and handle external influences. Moreover, the CCP's responses to these problems were also

⁵³⁶ Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Practice*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p.408.

suggestive of Qing precedents, particularly of the structure, techniques and tactics of rule constructed by the Qing in the first decades after the conquest of Xinjiang in 1759. The key instrument of CCP rule in Xinjiang during the consolidatory period (1949-1955) was the PLA First FA, particularly its political departments. The utilisation of the PLA to establish CCP control and rule over Xinjiang was due to two major factors. First, prior to 1949 the CCP had had a limited presence in Xinjiang under the auspices of Sheng Shicai between 1936 and 1942. As we saw in chapter three, however, Sheng Shicai's anti-Soviet purges of the early 1940s effectively destroyed the embryonic CCP organisation in Xinjiang. Consequently, the CCP had no existing regional organisation or presence upon which to base its political legitimacy. Second, the CCP faced a number of political opponents in the region. The remaining KMT officials and troops, regardless of their surrender in October 1949, still remained an unknown quantity in terms of their political loyalties. Amongst former KMT provincial authorities, both civilian and military, were significant ethnic minority leaders that remained committed to opposing the communist takeover of Xinjiang. Moreover, a number of KMT units had rebelled against General Tao Zhiyue's capitulation to the PLA and offered resistance, notably at Hami. Second, the CCP had to deal with a less overt threat to Chinese power in Xinjiang in the form of the ETR and its armed forces, the INA.

The resolution of these problems was achieved through a combination of force and persuasion, in which the PLA played a crucial role. Connected to this process of consolidation was the CCP's drive to establish itself as the sole source of political authority in Xinjiang - a task that had eluded the communists' KMT predecessors. Thus the CCP through the PLA First FA attempted to encompass the existing ethnic minority

leaders and ex-KMT authorities within the political and ideological milieu of the communist new order. Recalcitrant ex-KMT, ETR and ethnic minority elements were, however, ruthlessly suppressed by the PLA.⁵³⁷ The co-option of ethnic minority leaders and elites into the embryonic party organs, much like the Qing restructuring of the *beg* system, sought to persuade these elites of their stake in the new order. Even before the full PLA occupation of Xinjiang was completed this task of securing the CCP's political legitimacy was begun with rapidity. As noted previously, the pro-communist ETR regime's most senior leaders were killed in an air crash en route to Beijing via the Soviet Union in August 1949. This "accident" had somewhat contradictory consequences for the CCP regarding its task of establishing and consolidating its power in Xinjiang. Although these ETR leaders were pro-communist, they displayed a keen pro-Soviet alignment and due to their ethnicity harboured strong misgivings regarding the Han-dominated CCP. Yet it would appear that they, and their Soviet backers, were prepared to cooperate to some extent with the CCP, hence their agreement to meet the CCP leadership in Beijing. The motivation of the Soviets in this respect is clear. By encouraging the ETR leadership and the CCP to establish an agreement incorporating the three districts into a CCP-controlled Xinjiang, the Soviets would safeguard Xinjiang as their exclusive sphere of influence. Moreover, the absorption of the ETR leadership and INA into the CCP and PLA would create a significant pro-Soviet element within both the civilian and military authorities in Xinjiang. This was hardly comradely conduct on the part of the Soviets, but it was very much in keeping with Stalin's general mistrust of Mao that would become only too apparent with the CCP leader's visit to Moscow in 1950. For the CCP, however, the deaths of the most senior and pro-Soviet

⁵³⁷ Jurgen Domes, *Peng De-huai: The Man and the Image*, op. cit., p.59.

ETR leaders presented a somewhat mixed blessing. The CCP would no longer have to establish an agreement with the ETR regarding its incorporation into the PRC or tolerate a pro-Soviet clique within its administration. Yet simultaneously these same leaders, by virtue of their ethnicity and political prestige, would have undoubtedly proved to be extremely useful in establishing CCP authority in Xinjiang. Nonetheless this contradictory dynamic was extended to the CCP's handling of the remaining ETR leaders and supporters. As noted earlier in this chapter, the remaining most senior ETR leader, Saifudin, was pressured by the Soviets and the CCP to transfer his party membership from the CPSU to that of the Chinese party in December 1949.

Xinjiang from the surrender of General Tao Zhiyue and Burhan in September 1949 to 1955 was ruled by and through the PLA First FA.⁵³⁸ The political leadership of Xinjiang in this period was primarily drawn from amongst the First FA's leadership and political commissars. As previously noted, the commander of the First FA was Peng Dehuai and upon Xinjiang's liberation he assumed the titles of commander and political commissar of the Xinjiang Military District (XJMD). But given his concurrent positions as the First Secretary of the North-West CCP Bureau and North-West Military and Administrative Committee, his authority was mostly delegated to the vice-commander of the XJMD, Wang Zhen.⁵³⁹ The other major figure to assume major political-military authority during this period was Wang Enmao, the political commissar of the First FA. In late 1949 Wang Enmao became the chairman of the Kashgar Military Control Commission thereby becoming the highest-ranking PLA-CCP official south of

⁵³⁸ Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949-1977*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979), p.29.

⁵³⁹ Ibid, pp.30-31 & William W. Whitson and Chen-hsia Huang, *The Chinese High Command*, op. cit., p.114.

the Tien Shan.⁵⁴⁰ In this role Wang between November 1950 and May 1951 carried out the suppression of some 7500 former KMT and ethnic minority "counter-revolutionaries" and "bandits", including the Uighur leader Masud Sabri.⁵⁴¹ Contemporaneously Wang Zhen succeeded Peng Dehuai as the commander and political commissar of the XJMD upon Peng's appointment as the commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) in Korea, with Wang Enmao as his chief subordinate.⁵⁴² The PLA First FA, under Wang Zhen and Wang Enmao's leadership directly administered the region through military control committees and began the building of party organisation and local autonomous units for the ethnic minorities.⁵⁴³ A major facet of this endeavour was the integration of acceptable pre-liberation Xinjiang leaders into the emerging power structure. The key manifestations of this process, as previously noted, were the transfer of party membership of Saifudin and the retention of the former KMT governor Burhan Shahidi.⁵⁴⁴ Importantly, Saifudin's entry into the Chinese party facilitated the absorption of the ETR's armed forces, the INA, into the PLA. Symptomatic of the CCP's tentative approach regarding the members of the ETR was the manner in which the INA were integrated into the PLA First FA. A substantial part of the INA became the PLA 5th Corps and retained its previous leadership with Saifudin as its political commissar, while some elements were regrouped into units with Han troops.⁵⁴⁵ Moreover, these INA troops and leaders were the only significant non-

⁵⁴⁰ Donald H McMillen, op. cit., p.32.

⁵⁴¹ Jurgen Domes, *Peng De-huai*, op. cit., p.59.

⁵⁴² Ibid & Donald H. McMillen, op., cit., pp.31-32.

⁵⁴³ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁴ See David D. Wang, *Under the Soviet Shadow*, op. cit., pp.381-383 & William W. Whitson and Chen-hsia Huang, op. cit., pp.113-114.

⁵⁴⁵ Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and the Production and Construction Corps: A Han Organisation in a Non-Han Region", *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, No. 6 (July 1981), p.68 & June Teufel Dreyer, "The PLA and Regionalism in Xinjiang", *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 7, no. 1 (1994), p.42.

Han unit in the PLA First FA.⁵⁴⁶ Meanwhile General Tao Zhiyue was appointed commander of the former KMT garrison, which were incorporated into the PLA First FA as the 22nd Corps.⁵⁴⁷ Burhan Shahidi, on the other hand was retained by the party as provincial chairman, but significantly in a power structure where political power derived from the PLA, did not hold any concurrent position within the provincial party or military hierarchy.⁵⁴⁸ This was symptomatic of the structure and nature of the CCP's attempts to integrate ethnic minorities at all levels of provincial military and civil authority. A Han colleague of similar or directly subordinate standing from the top down generally shadowed ethnic minority cadres and functionaries.⁵⁴⁹

It was, however, significant that ethnic minority leaders (both former KMT and ETR) were integrated, albeit with limited power, into the new provincial power structure during the 1949-1955 period. This significance stems from the fact that this period of moderate and considered handling of the pre-liberation generation ethnic minority elite coincided with the era of the closest "fraternal" Sino-Soviet relations. The correlation was no coincidence, as the CCP displayed a keen awareness of the necessity for tact and caution with respect to the Soviet Union's former proteges in the "Three Districts". That the CCP recognised the significance of the Soviet Union's influence and interests in the three districts that comprised the ETR is evident from a number of developments in this period: first, and as detailed above, the integration almost en masse of the INA into the PLA and Saifudin's CCP membership in 1949-50; second, the fact that Saifudin led a Xinjiang delegation to Moscow for the Sino-Soviet negotiations of February-March

⁵⁴⁶ William W. Whitson and Chen-hsia Huang, op. cit., p.114.

⁵⁴⁷ Ibid & June Teufel Dreyer, op. cit., p.42.

⁵⁴⁸ Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power*, op. cit., pp.33-34.

⁵⁴⁹ Ibid, pp.38-39.

1950 which culminated in the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet "Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance" and two economic agreements regarding Soviet-Xinjiang trade;⁵⁵⁰ finally, the CCP also retained, with limited reorganisation, the structure and personnel of the pro-Soviet ETR authorities in the Ili, Tacheng and Altai districts into the mid-1950s.⁵⁵¹

Another key element of the CCP's ability to consolidate its control of the region was the creation of the Production and Construction Corps (PCC). The PCC was, as the name suggests, a utilisation of military manpower for economic and infrastructural development. In this respect it was highly suggestive of the military agricultural colonies (*tuntian*) established by the Qing in Zungharia (ie. north of the Tien Shan) following their conquest of Xinjiang. As we saw in chapter two, the Qing limited the establishment of their military agricultural colonies to Zungharia until the mid-19th century. The CCP, however, would utilise their variant of the military agricultural colonies to far greater effect and establish them throughout the entire province. Although the economic and politico-military functions of the Qing-era military-agricultural colonies were at the core of the PCC, the communist organisation assumed another function that their imperial predecessors never fully established in their administration of Xinjiang. Under the CCP, the PCC organisation would assume another function that proved to be instrumental in consolidating the re-establishment of Chinese power in Xinjiang - institutionalising the in-migration of Han settlers. Although the emphasis officially placed upon this specific function of the PCC fluctuated

⁵⁵⁰ Oleh S. Fedyshyn, "Soviet Retreat in Sinkiang? Sino-Soviet Rivalry and Cooperation, 1950-1955", *The American Slavic and East European Review*, Vol. 16 (1957), p.128.

⁵⁵¹ Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power*, op. cit., p.39.

according to the phases of ideological debate within the CCP over the 1949-1991 period, it nonetheless remained central to the PCC's role in Xinjiang. The composition and distribution of PCC units in Xinjiang also reflected the new regimes primary goals of control and integration. The Xinjiang PCC, when its was formed in 1954, was distributed throughout Xinjiang at strategic points south and north of the Tien Shan, with noteworthy concentrations in the south-west and north-west.⁵⁵² The concentration of the PCC in the districts around Kashgar in the south-west and Ili, Tacheng and the Altai in the north-west were not coincidental. These two distinct regions posed two inter-related problems and possible challenges for the establishment of Chinese power in Xinjiang. The three districts of Ili, Tacheng and Altai comprised the former lands of the ETR where anti-Han and pro-Soviet sentiment was well established. The regions surrounding Kashgar on the other hand, although sharing the north-west's anti-Han sentiment, had a long established record as the most Islamic and conservative region of Xinjiang. Although posing their challenges to Chinese rule in different politico-ideological guises the two regions were linked in one important respect – the potential for external encouragement. As we have seen, the Soviet Union had extensive links to the ETR-INA and the CCP displayed considerable caution in the handling of the three districts that comprised the ETR. Moreover, the Soviets had also proved themselves to be not averse to the harnessing of conservative, Islamic elements when politically expedient as demonstrated by their actions during the TIRET of the 1930s and the early stages of the ETR rebellion in 1944.⁵⁵³ The composition of the first elements of the PLA First FA to be designated into production units were the former INA and KMT troops absorbed into the PLA upon the “peaceful liberation” of Xinjiang in 1949. Although the

⁵⁵²Ibid, “Figure 4.3: Location of Xinjiang PCC Units Compared to Agricultural Areas”, op. cit., p.64.

⁵⁵³ See Chapters 3& 4.

PCC would develop into a predominantly Han organisation, the initial demobilisation of these elements suggests that their political loyalty to the new regime was considered to be significantly doubtful for them to be removed from direct national defence and security tasks.

The forerunner of the PCC, the "Xinjiang Wilderness Reclamation Army", was established in early 1952 under the direction of Wang Zhen that combined Hans, Uighurs and Kazakhs.⁵⁵⁴ This organisation also established the first collective farms, initiated limited land reform and in late 1952 developed a number of state farms.⁵⁵⁵ The rationale underpinning the "Reclamation Army" and its successor (PCC) was illustrative of the CCP's position in Xinjiang as the inheritors of an imperial legacy. The approximately 250 000 PLA troops in Xinjiang in 1949-50 were not only to secure "national security", but to facilitate the integration of the region into the state. Such a task was clearly set out in Mao's directive of 5 December 1949 that called for the PLA to be "not only an army of national defense but also an army of production".⁵⁵⁶ Moreover, Mao's directive also emphasised that the PLA's role in production and construction would not be simply a temporary expedient to consolidate CCP power. Rather, the leadership of each military region was instructed to begin the formulation and implementation of a long-term plan to govern the PLA's economic activities within the confines of agriculture, animal husbandry, land reclamation and infrastructure

⁵⁵⁴ Lynn T. White III, "The Road to Urumchi: Approved Institutions in Search of Attainable Goals During Pre-1968 Rustication from Shanghai", *The China Quarterly*, No. 79 (1979), p.488.

⁵⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵⁶ Mao Zedong, "Instruction on the Army's Participation in Production and Construction Work", (December 5, 1949), in Michael Y. M. Kau & John K. Leung (eds.), *The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976, Vol. 1, September 1949-December 1955*, op. cit., p.48.

development.⁵⁵⁷ The reorganisation of the PRC's administrative units in 1954 was coupled, in Xinjiang, with the expansion and redesignation of the "Xinjiang Wilderness Reclamation Army" as the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (PCC). By late 1954 the PCC had eight agricultural construction divisions, two industrial construction divisions and one irrigation division dispersed throughout Xinjiang.⁵⁵⁸ As noted above, the former INA and KMT garrison troops became the first to be demobilised and assigned to production work, and significantly Xinjiang's former KMT garrison commander, General Tao Zhiyue, became the titular head of the PCC.⁵⁵⁹ Moreover, despite the presence of the Saifudin-led former INA personnel of the 5th Corps in the PCC and Tao's 22nd Army, the organisation was primarily a Han institution. The PCC, particularly after 1954, became a central conduit for the transfer of Han settlers into Xinjiang. The PCC thus had a dual function whereby it was to simultaneously facilitate the economic development of the region and ensure its integration with the state via the establishment of Han settlement.⁵⁶⁰ The PCC also retained some of its former military functions and served as a significant reservoir of manpower for the PLA in Xinjiang.⁵⁶¹ The PCC was also bolstered in 1952-53 with the transfer of demobilised PLA units to Xinjiang following the Korean War.⁵⁶² The colonising element of this strategy ultimately served to increase tension between the Turkic-Muslim population and the immigrating Han Chinese. By the time of the creation of the Xinjiang Uighur

⁵⁵⁷ Ibid, p.49.

⁵⁵⁸ Lynn T. White III, "The Road to Urumchi", op. cit., p.489.

⁵⁵⁹ See Wu Chao, "A Study of the Chinese Buildup of 'Production and Construction Corps' Along the Sino-Soviet Frontier", *Issues and Studies*, (November 1969), p.57 & Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and the Production Corps", op. cit., p.71.

⁵⁶⁰ June Teufel Dreyer, "The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region at Thirty: A Report Card", *Asian Survey*, vol.26, No.7, (July 1986), pp.722-723.

⁵⁶¹ Ibid & Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and the Production and Construction Corps", op. cit., p.75.

⁵⁶² Lynn T. White III, op.cit., p.489 & Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and the Production and Construction Corps", op. cit., p.75.

Autonomous Region (XUAR) in 1955 the PCC numbered some 200 000 to 250 000 personnel.⁵⁶³ As a result of this approach the PLA, Han in-migrants (often in the PCC) and the ethnic minorities themselves rapidly became the major political actors in Xinjiang. Furthermore, the political, economic and social situation of Xinjiang was generally determined by how each of these groups responded to policies formulated by the central government.⁵⁶⁴ The central government therefore attempted not to exacerbate the inherent tensions between these three principal actors by pursuing a relatively cautious and moderate approach until the mid-1950s. In October 1955 the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region was created with two ethnic minority leaders, the former KMT governor Burhan Shahidi and former ETR leader Saifudin (Seypidin Aziz), as heads of the regional government. The real power holders, however, were the PLA's regional commander Wang Zhen and Xinjiang CCP Secretary Wang Enmao.⁵⁶⁵

The establishment of the Xinjiang PCC was coupled with a concerted effort to clearly establish the CCP as the sole legitimate source of political authority in the region. The series of techniques and tactics of rule implemented to this end were framed by the party's "united front" strategy that sought to initiate gradual and generally non-coercive political, economic and social "reform" amongst the ethnic minorities. Mao explicitly elucidated this cautious and moderate approach to the introduction of "reform" in ethnic minority regions in June 1950 at the Third Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee:

Social reform in the regions occupied by the minority nationalities is a very important thing and must be handled carefully. Under no circumstances should we be impatient, because impatience will lead to mistakes. Where conditions are not ripe, we cannot carry out reform...Of course, this does not mean that we mustn't have any reform. According to the provisions of

⁵⁶³ See Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and the Production and Construction Corps", *op. cit.*, p.75,

⁵⁶⁴ June Teufel Dreyer, *op. cit.*, p.723.

⁵⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

the Common Program, the customs and habits of the areas inhabited by the minority nationalities can be reformed. However, such reforms must be handled by the minority nationalities themselves.⁵⁶⁶

The co-option of “acceptable” ethnic minority leaders such as Burhan and Saifudin was but one aspect of this process. Significantly, Mao’s directive clearly demonstrated that the CCP’s goal remained the “reform” of ethnic minority regions, regardless of the “softly-softly” approach deemed politically expedient. On a broader level the CCP strove to not only cultivate a dependent and compromised ethnic minority elite but also to weaken and dilute the institutions and personages from which political authority traditionally/historically flowed. A key target in this respect were the variegated Islamic institutions that had prior to Xinjiang’s “peaceful liberation” been a major source of political and ideological authority. Thus upon the extension of PLA control over the entire region, that was achieved officially in late 1951, the CCP began to infiltrate into societal organisations and attempted to bring them under party guidance and control. Moreover, the position of the Islamic clergy was gradually co-opted and controlled by the CCP through the China Islamic Association.⁵⁶⁷ The gradual undermining of key Islamic institutions began with a limited program of land reform, including the confiscation and redistribution of *waqf* lands (property of mosques)⁵⁶⁸, and the “People’s Courts” began to assume the judicial functions of the *qadi* or Islamic courts.⁵⁶⁹ This subverting of the traditional sources of politico-ideological authority was coupled with a concerted CCP effort to eliminate “Great Han chauvinism” or the continuation of a Han cultural superiority complex in its rule of Xinjiang. The key

⁵⁶⁶ Mao Zedong, “Don’t Attack on All Fronts”, (June 6, 1950), in Michael Y. M. Kau & John K. Leung (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp.105-106.

⁵⁶⁷ Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power*, *op. cit.*, p.114.

⁵⁶⁸ Michael Dillon, *Xinjiang: Ethnicity, Separatism and Control in Chinese Central Asia*, (University of Durham, Dept. of East Asian Studies: Durham East Asian Papers 1, 1996), pp.2-3.

⁵⁶⁹ Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power*, *op. cit.*, p.114.

tenets of this “anti-Great Hanism” were that Han cadres needed to respect the cultural peculiarities of the ethnic minorities and avoid “commandism” or the dogmatic application of party policy without due reference to local conditions.⁵⁷⁰ Such a cautious and moderate approach was entirely consistent with Mao’s directive to Peng Dehuai concerning the establishment of CCP rule in the north-west that was quoted earlier.⁵⁷¹ The party leadership’s concern with “Han chauvinism” in ethnic minority regions remained constant throughout the 1949-1955 period. On a number of important occasions Mao exhorted his comrades to earnestly combat all manifestations of Han chauvinism and to avoid implementing party policy without proper investigation of local conditions, or as he put it “looking at the flowers while riding on horseback”.⁵⁷² It must be noted, however, that this emphasis on wooing the ethnic minorities by demonstration of moderation within the confines of religious, cultural and even economic parameters did not translate into a tolerance of divergent political attitudes amongst the minorities. The PLA’s ongoing suppression of “counter-revolutionaries” and “bandits” well into 1954⁵⁷³ demonstrates that the CCP would brook no political activity amongst the minorities that occurred outside of party-controlled and sanctioned parameters of political expression. That the party did not feel fully secure in Xinjiang during this period, in terms of adequately entrenching party and governmental apparatuses, is amply demonstrated by the expansion of the PCC (outlined above) and the initiation of a sustained anti-religious campaign in 1954.⁵⁷⁴

⁵⁷⁰ Ibid, p.115.

⁵⁷¹ Mao Zedong, “Letter to Peng Dehuai and the Northwest Bureau”, (November 14, 1949), op. cit., pp.33-34.

⁵⁷² See Mao Zedong, “Criticize Han Chauvinism”, (March 16, 1953) & Mao Zedong, “A Speech at the Enlarged Sixth Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee”, (October 11, 1955), in Michael Y. M. Kau & John K. Leung (eds.), op. cit., pp.33-334 & pp.665-666.

⁵⁷³ See Oleh S. Fedshyn, “Soviet Retreat in Sinkiang?”, op. cit., pp.129-130.

⁵⁷⁴ Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power*, op.cit., p.115.

The CCP's approach to the dilemmas posed by China's multi-ethnic population was, of course, framed by an ostensibly Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the "national question". This particular aspect of rule or government by communist parties has generally been referred to as "nationalities" or "minority" policy, implying that this particular segment of population, defined by the party as such, requires a specific series or complex of customised techniques and tactics of rule. Throughout this consolidation of Chinese power in Xinjiang, the PLA-CCP gradually implemented a political framework that would theoretically permit ethnic minority participation in the region's administration. This framework became known as the system of "national regional autonomy". The concept of "national regional autonomy" was the product of the party's historical development from a marginal, bit part player for political power in the 1920s to its capture of state power in 1949. That is to say the party's formulation of a "nationality policy", and ultimately of "national regional autonomy", was shaped not only by its Marxist-Leninist ideology but also by the vicissitudes of the party's political and geographic circumstances. The CCP's development of minority policy in the 1919-1949 period can be divided into two distinct phases; 1919-1935 and 1936-1949. The first period corresponds with the CCP's early domination by the Soviet Union and the Comintern in relation to the formulation of minority policy. The second period witnessed the undisputed leadership of Mao Zedong and the beginnings of an independent CCP minority policy. The CCP's early declarations concerning their stance on the minority issue in China were influenced by federalists concepts, and at the 2nd Congress of the CCP in 1922 the CCP proposed that China was to be a democratic republic and the regions of Mongolia, Tibet, and Turkestan (Xinjiang) were to be autonomous, self governing regions. Furthermore, China, Mongolia, Tibet and

Turkestan would unite, of their volition, to form a Chinese federal republic.⁵⁷⁵ This basic model formed the core of the CCP's approach in the 1920s and after the Comintern inspired alliance with the KMT in 1925, the CCP refrained from making separate policy statements.⁵⁷⁶ After the 1927 split with the KMT the CCP began to radicalise their approach to minority policy, particularly after 1930. In 1931, in the CCP soviet base area of Ruijin in Jiangxi province, the CCP adopted Leninist policies promising the minorities self-determination, and even secession, to gain their support against the KMT.⁵⁷⁷ The impact of the CCP's Leninist approach had little effect in the 1930-1935 period as the CCP did not have the power to implement these policies. Furthermore the CCP controlled regions of China in this period had no significant minority populations and the party had no immediate political reasons to formulate their own approach.

The KMT's campaigns against these base areas, which culminated in the Long March, forced the CCP to formulate their own approach to minority policy. This was coupled with the ascendancy of Mao Zedong as the party's leader in 1935 and led to the development of an original minority policy. Once the CCP were established in Yanan they had to deal with a significant Mongol population and attempt to form a practical political alliance with them. In this context the CCP reiterated its commitment to self-

⁵⁷⁵ See Harold Bockman, "Brewing Ethnic Conflicts in China and Their Historical Background", in K. Rupesinghe, P. King and O. Vorkunova (eds.), *Ethnicity and Conflict in a Post-Communist World: The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), p.186 & Walker Connor, *op. cit.*, p.68.

⁵⁷⁶ Harold Bockman, "Brewing Ethnic Conflicts in China and Their Historical Background", in K. Rupesinghe, P. King and O. Vorkunova (eds.), *Ethnicity and Conflict in a Post-Communist World: The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), pp.186-187.

⁵⁷⁷ Walker Connor, *op. cit.*, p.74 & Yash Ghai, "Autonomy Regimes in China: Coping with Ethnic and Economic Diversity", in Yash Ghai (ed.), *Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-Ethnic States*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.80.

determination for minorities and their freedom to secede from or join China.⁵⁷⁸ With specific reference to the regions of Ningxia, Gansu and Xinjiang in May 1936 Mao declared that:

Based on the principle of national self-determination, we advocate that the affairs of the Muslim people be handled entirely by the Muslim people themselves. In all areas of Muslim peoples, *independent and autonomous regimes* are to be established by the Muslim people themselves to manage all matters of politics, economics, religion, customs, morality, education, and all other affairs. *As for areas in which Muslim people are in the minority, taking the district or village as a unit and based on the principle of national equality, the Muslim people are to handle their own affairs and establish autonomous governments of the Muslim people.*⁵⁷⁹

Thus it was a "self determination" that was conditional, as demonstrated by Mao's advocacy of "independent and autonomous regimes". Therefore, for Mao autonomy did not necessarily imply separation and independence. Moreover, the final sentence that refers to regions where Muslim peoples were in the minority explicitly denies the prospect of independence. This statement, although made when the CCP was both geographically and politically removed from these regions, was somewhat prophetic regarding the party's approach to ethnic minority regions. The CCP's commitment to the principles of autonomy and self-determination for the ethnic minorities was largely a function of the party's political and military strength at specific moments in time. The period of the CCP's most overt advocacy of ethnic minority rights to autonomy and self-determination came at the nadir of its political fortunes - from the beginning of Chiang Kai-shek's "bandit suppression" campaigns in 1931 to the establishment of the CCP at

⁵⁷⁸ Walker Connor, op. cit., p. 82-83.

⁵⁷⁹ Mao Zedong, "Declaration to the People of the Muslim Nationalities by the Central Soviet Government", (May 25, 1936), in Stuart R. Schram (ed.), *Mao's Road to Power: Revolutionary Writings, 1912-1949, Vol. V, Toward the Second United Front, January 1935-July 1937*, (New York: M E. Sharpe, 1999), p.202. (My emphasis)

Yenan in 1936.⁵⁸⁰ It is no coincidence that the party throughout this period appealed to ethnic minority sensibilities, as the regions traversed to reach Yanan were largely dominated by non-Han peoples. With the establishment of the second "United Front" with the KMT in 1937, however, the CCP's emphasis on the rights of the ethnic minorities considerably lessened and Mao actively strove to "cloak his party in the ethnonational garb of the country's dominant element".⁵⁸¹ The logic of CCP policy throughout the subsequent Sino-Japanese War was to appeal directly to the nationalist sentiment of some 90% of the population - that is the Han. As the party's position and support amongst this majority increased, the significance of the ethnic minorities decreased considerably within the party's political strategy.⁵⁸² Moreover, having chosen the path of Han nationalism the CCP must also have been loath to publicise material that could be construed as advocating or acquiescing in the separation of territory from the "motherland". Thus after 1936-37 the CCP accorded far less attention and publicity to its "nationality policy", and the party's position of rights to autonomy and self-determination for ethnic minorities.⁵⁸³ The ambiguity of the party's line regarding the "national question", however, would remain until the CCP's capture of state power in October 1949.

This was amply illustrated by Mao's approach to minority policy during the Sino-Japanese war. Throughout the 1937-1945 period the CCP began to experiment with local autonomous units for minorities in their regions of control and these became the basic models for the development of 'national regional autonomy' after 1949. The

⁵⁸⁰ Walker Connor, *op. cit.*, p.84.

⁵⁸¹ *Ibid*, p.91.

⁵⁸² *Ibid*, pp.84-85.

⁵⁸³ *Ibid*, pp.86-87.

autonomous units were formed in areas that had compact minority populations and had the right to elect local governments. The strategy of creating local autonomous regions was further refined with the creation of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region in 1947. The Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region had the status of a province and exercised more legislative and administrative power than the CCP's previous local autonomous units and became the model for future autonomous regions. Yet as late as 1948 Liu Shaoqi maintained that the CCP advocated the "complete equality of all nations both at home and in the family of nations, and its also advocates the voluntary association and voluntary separation of all nations".⁵⁸⁴ Therefore, on the cusp of the party's victory in the civil war the rights of "all nations" to not only autonomy but also secession from China were maintained. The resolution of the party's ambiguous approach to the issues of ethnic minority autonomy and self-determination came in the form of the Common Program that was adopted at the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) on 29 September 1949. The Common Program served as a provisional constitution and five of its numerous articles addressed China's ethnic minorities. First, no region would be permitted to secede from the PRC. Second, both "Han chauvinism" and "local nationalism" should be opposed. Third, the establishment of autonomous organs of government in predominantly minority regions was proposed. Fourth, equality between nationalities, freedom of religion, and the preservation and development of minority languages and customs was guaranteed. Finally, the central government pledged to aid in the development of ethnic minority regions.⁵⁸⁵ The CCP's break with the principles of federalism and self-determination

⁵⁸⁴ Cited in Walker Connor, *op.cit.*, p.83.

⁵⁸⁵ See Henry Guenter Schwarz, *Policies and Administration of Minority Areas in Northwest China and Inner Mongolia, 1949-1959*, (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1962), pp.100-101 & Linda Benson &

were further emphasised by the proclamation of the PRC on October 1 1949, as a *unified, multinational state*.⁵⁸⁶ The framework of the CCP's approach to the "national question" had thus come full circle from its advocacy of secession and self-determination in 1922.

The institution of “national regional autonomy” in Xinjiang was begun in early 1951 and culminated in the establishment of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) on 20 September 1955. Before addressing the process of the institution of this political framework it is necessary to pause to highlight the rationality behind it, as this has been an abiding focus of this thesis. Chapter two of this thesis highlighted the Qing historiographic, geographic and ethnographic projects of the 18th and 19th centuries in Xinjiang and their implications for both the structure of imperial rule and Chinese perceptions of Xinjiang. Chapter three developed these themes in the context of the “warlord”-era and noted that the imperial precedent was repeated and developed. It will be recalled that Xinjiang’s warlord ruler, Sheng Shicai, embarked upon a Soviet-inspired and advised project to classify and define the region’s population in the mid-1930s. This culminated in the “official” recognition of thirteen ethnic minorities and led to the implementation of Soviet-style “nationality policies” in Xinjiang. The rationality behind this process was undoubtedly to facilitate greater control over the region’s diverse population and enhance the authorities' management of ethnic relations. This function of ethnic classification retained its veracity under the CCP. In contrast to Sheng Shicai, however, the CCP were able expand the scope of this process in the form of “national regional autonomy”. The CCP in effect adopted the thirteen “nationalities”

Ingvar Svanberg, *China's Last Nomads: The History and Culture of China's Kazaks*, (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), p.89

of the Sheng era in 1953, thus dividing the region's population into Uighur, Kyrgyz, Kazakh, Uzbek, Tajik, Hui, Mongol, Manchu, Xibo, Solon, Russian, Tartar and Han.⁵⁸⁷ The power that accrues to the state via this strategem was highlighted in chapters two and three, but it serves to be reiterated in the present context. By dividing segments of population into discrete and theoretically clearly distinct categories the state's panoptic power is enhanced. That is to say, if a specific segment of population of the state is delineated from others into distinct "cells" through state-defined criteria (economic, linguistic, etc) it allows the state to view, observe, know and therefore control that segment of population. Yet the division of population into distinct "cells", such as nationality/ethnicity, is not un-problematic for the state. As a number of scholars have noted regarding ethnic identity in Xinjiang, and the PRC more generally, the state cannot necessarily assume that the communities thus created will develop along a predictable or preferred (for the state) trajectory.⁵⁸⁸ The CCP's purpose with respect to Xinjiang certainly displays key elements of such a process.

The institution of "national regional autonomy" was based upon a number of key principles that flowed from the Common Program of the CPPCC. As we have seen, however, the CCP's position regarding the issues of self-determination and autonomy for ethnic minorities was far from consistent. Upon the foundation of the PRC the party repudiated its commitment, that it had maintained until 1948, to rights of self-determination and secession for its ethnic minorities. Instead the party borrowed

⁵⁸⁶ Harold Bockman, op. cit., p.187.

⁵⁸⁷ Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power*, op. cit., p.10 & Linda Benson & Ingvar Svanberg, op. cit., pp.99-100.

⁵⁸⁸ For example see Dru C. Gladney, *Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People's Republic*, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), Justin Jon Rudelson, *Bones in the Sand: The Struggle to Create Uighur Nationalist Ideologies in Xinjiang, China*, PhD Thesis, Harvard University, (Ann

administrative structure from the Soviet Union in the form of “autonomous regions”. In contrast to the Soviet system whereby its “national minorities” were granted a federal system of government, the CCP permitted the PRC’s nationalities a system of limited territorial autonomy. The cornerstones of the PRC’s system of regional autonomy, and the true signifiers of its purpose, were stated in the “General Program of the PRC for the Implementation of Regional Autonomy for Nationalities” that was promulgated in August 1952. According to this document any autonomous regions established were to be considered integral parts of the territory of the PRC and regional organs of government established therein were to be “under the unified leadership of the Central People’s Government”.⁵⁸⁹ Moreover, the following articles pertaining to “Rights to Autonomy” clearly demonstrated that such autonomy would be exercised within extremely limited parameters. Article 19, for example, stated that autonomous organs “may administer the region’s finances within a sphere prescribed by the Central People’s Government”. The major responsibilities and functions of local or regional government were directly subordinate to higher levels of government and ultimately to the state. Thus in effect any modicum of such “autonomy” granted to any specific region was essentially formal.⁵⁹⁰

Three levels of autonomous government were established after 1952. The highest level was the “autonomous region” which was the administrative equivalent of one of the PRC’s twenty-one provinces. Below this followed the “autonomous district” and the

Arbor: University Microfilms, 1992), & Gardner Bovington, "The History of the History of Xinjiang", *Twentieth Century China*, Vol. 26, No. 2, (April 2001), pp. 95-139.

⁵⁸⁹ “General Program of the PRC for the Implementation of Regional Autonomy for Nationalities”, (August 9, 1952), cited in Henry Guenter Schwarz, op. cit., p.630 & “Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities” in *National Minorities Policy and its Practice in China*, (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, September 1999), online at <http://english.peopledaily.com>

“autonomous county”. According to the “General Program of the PRC for the Implementation of Regional Autonomy for Nationalities” three types of autonomous region could be established:

(1) when inhabited by one national minority, (2) when inhabited by one large national minority including certain areas inhabited by other smaller nationalities and (3) when jointly established by two or more areas, each inhabited by a different national minority.⁵⁹¹

The first designation was in effect irrelevant as no one region within the PRC was populated exclusively by one single national minority. The second designation was, however, applicable to Xinjiang given the authorities’ recognition of thirteen official ethnic minorities. The population of Xinjiang in 1949-50 has been variously estimated at some four to four and a half million, some 70-75% of which was accounted for by the Uighur.⁵⁹² Therefore, in Xinjiang power and representation within the proposed autonomous government was to be divided amongst the thirteen constituent “minority nationalities”, even though the Uighur population was evidently in the majority.

Autonomous organs were established through a system of local “People’s Representative Conferences”, also known as Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conferences (CPPCC) at the *xian* or county level in late 1950.⁵⁹³ These conferences then elected representatives to corresponding “People’s Governments” in early 1951. Subsequently, in April and May 1951 the first Xinjiang CPPCC was assembled with 524 delegates of which approximately 210 or 40% were Uighur and 130 or 25% were

⁵⁹⁰ Walker Connor, *op. cit.*, p.234.

⁵⁹¹ “General Program of the PRC for the Implementation of Regional Autonomy for Nationalities”, (August 9, 1952), cited in Henry Guenter Schwarz, *op. cit.*, p.630.

⁵⁹² See Donald H. McMillen, “Xinjiang and the Production and Construction Corps”, *op. cit.*, p.66,

⁵⁹³ Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power*, *op. cit.*, p.43.

Han.⁵⁹⁴ Thus, although the Uighur constituted some three-quarters of Xinjiang's population they only held a little over a third of the positions in the Xinjiang CPPCC in 1951 and the Han representing around 5% of the population held a quarter. The following year a "Preparatory Committee for Local Nationality Autonomy" was established to oversee the institution of the autonomous organs of government. The implementation of autonomy was begun in 1953 from the bottom up, proceeding from the county to provincial level.⁵⁹⁵ By 1954 up to thirty-six autonomous areas at or below the district level had been established.⁵⁹⁶ "People's Congresses" were convened throughout Xinjiang by mid-1954 and they elected representatives to the "Provincial People's Congress" that was held in Ürümqi in July. Of the 353 delegates attending the provincial congress 231 or 65% were Uighurs and 45 or around 13% were Han. This somewhat more accurately conformed to each nationality's proportion of Xinjiang's population.⁵⁹⁷ The congress duly elected Burhan as chairman and Saifudin vice-chairman of the Xinjiang People's Council and also elected twenty-one deputies to represent Xinjiang at the National People's Congress in Beijing including Burhan, Saifudin and Wang Enmao.⁵⁹⁸ The Xinjiang People's Council officially decided upon the organisation of the XUAR on 2 August 1955 and this decision was approved and ratified by the NPC on 13 September. The XUAR was not officially proclaimed, however, until 1 October 1955 after the election of the new XUAR People's Council with Saifudin replacing Burhan as chairman.⁵⁹⁹

⁵⁹⁴ Ibid & Henry Guenter Schwarz, op. cit., p.155.

⁵⁹⁵ Ibid, pp.43-44 & Henry Guenter Schwarz, op. cit., p.140.

⁵⁹⁶ Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power*, op. cit., p.44.

⁵⁹⁷ Ibid, p.45 & Henry Guenter Schwarz, op. cit., p.156.

⁵⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁹ Ibid, p.46.

Upon the establishment of the XUAR the region was divided into fourteen administrative units reflecting the dominant ethnic profile of each locality, for example the Kizilsu Kyrgyz Autonomous Zhou. Significantly, the exception to this was the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Zhou which encompassed two sub-ordinate special districts, Altai and Tacheng. These three regions were, it will be recalled, the basis of the separatist ETR regime over the 1944-1949 period. This suggests that the CCP were consonant of the connections between these regions and were perhaps attempting to blunt accusations of divide *et impera*. The ethnicity of officials and the structure of political authority within each autonomous area were, however, instructive regarding the actual functionality and scope of “national regional autonomy”. In accordance with the 1952 “General Program of the PRC for the Implementation of Regional Autonomy for Nationalities” the chairmen of an autonomous region, prefect of an autonomous prefecture or the governor of an autonomous district were members of the “ethnic minority exercising autonomy” – that is a member of the dominant ethnic group in each locality.⁶⁰⁰ Yet as McMillen notes, such ethnic minority officials were invariably shadowed by a directly subordinate Han CCP member.⁶⁰¹ The number of ethnic minority cadres and CCP activists and their proportion of the total number of cadres in Xinjiang between 1949 and 1955 are also illustrative of the relative political legitimacy of the party and the progress of the institution of Han in-migration. A major article of the “General Program of the PRC for the Implementation of Regional Autonomy for Nationalities” outlined that the party would endeavour to train ethnic minority cadres who “have a highly developed sense of patriotism and close contact with the local

⁶⁰⁰ See *White Paper on the History and Development of Xinjiang*, (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, May 2003) online at <http://www.english.peopledaily.com.cn> & *The System of Self-Government of Ethnic Autonomous Areas*, online at <http://www.china.org.cn/english>.

⁶⁰¹ Donald H. McMillen, op. cit., p.44.

population”.⁶⁰² In 1950 there were approximately 3500 minority cadres in Xinjiang out of a total of 13 000.⁶⁰³ By March the following year there were some 17 000 minority cadres amongst a total cadre force of around 23 000.⁶⁰⁴ Meanwhile in 1955 the number of minority cadres had increased to approximately 45 000-51 000 out of a total of 92 000.⁶⁰⁵ Thus over the 1950-1955 period the ethnic minority share of the total number of cadres in Xinjiang declined constantly from 74% in 1951 to 55% in 1955.

This would appear to be in contradiction with CCP policy given the CCP leaderships’ emphasis on training and developing a large core of ethnic minority cadres throughout this period.⁶⁰⁶ A number of developments since 1950 may help to explain this incongruity between stated policy and practice. First, the Common Program of 1949 had called for the governments of ethnic minority regions to be composed of “principally” ethnic minorities themselves. In contrast the 1954 constitution stated that governments of ethnic minority regions were to be composed of an “appropriate” number of ethnic minority representatives.⁶⁰⁷ This, it could be argued, was the result of a less than successful recruitment of ethnic minorities in regions such as Xinjiang where the CCP was seen as a predominantly Han organisation. If recruitment of ethnic minorities had indeed failed to generate a significant basis for the party within ethnic

⁶⁰² Henry Guenter Schwarz, op. cit., p.631.

⁶⁰³ See *White Paper on the History and Development of Xinjiang*, op. cit., Henry Guenter Schwarz, op. cit., p.249& Donald H. McMillen, op. cit., p.43.

⁶⁰⁴ Henry Guenter Schwarz, op. cit., p.249& Donald H. McMillen, op. cit., p.43.

⁶⁰⁵ See *White Paper on the History and Development of Xinjiang*, op. cit., Henry Guenter Schwarz, op. cit., p.249

⁶⁰⁶ For example see Mao Zedong, "Letter to Peng Dehuai and the Northwest Bureau", (November 14, 1949), Mao Zedong, "Criticize Han Chauvinism", (March 16, 1953), in Michael Y. M. Kau & John K. Leung (eds.), *The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976: Vol. I, September 1949-December 1955*, op. cit., pp.33-34, & pp.333-334 & Mao Zedong, "Main Points of the Resolution Adopted at the Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP", (February 18, 1951), *Selected Works of Mao Tsetung, Vol. 5*, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), p.48,

⁶⁰⁷ *The Constitution of the People's Republic of China*, art.68, sec. 5. (Beijing: 1954) & Linda Benson & Ingvar Svanberg, op. cit., p.93.

minority regions, it is entirely logical that an import of sufficiently trained Han cadres was deemed necessary to carry out the party's "reform" agenda. Yet the near total absence of CCP presence in Xinjiang at the time of "liberation" undoubtedly prompted the party to focus on the quantity rather than the quality of ethnic minority recruits in the early post-liberation years. This sense of urgency can perhaps account for the dramatic rise in ethnic minority cadres from 3000 in 1950 to some 17 000 out of a total of 23 000 in 1951.⁶⁰⁸ Significantly, the remaining ETR political activists accounted for a significant proportion of this ethnic minority "intake".⁶⁰⁹ The ideological quality and political loyalty of these recruits was undoubtedly dubious, given the ETR's overwhelmingly anti-Han stance between 1944 and 1949. This precipitated a "rectification" campaign in Xinjiang late in 1951 that focused on the "screening and dismissal" of a large segment of those cadres recruited immediately following "liberation".⁶¹⁰ If there was any doubt as to the target of the campaign it was stated that a large number of "opportunists and saboteurs" had infiltrated the party.⁶¹¹ Those retained after the campaign were subject to significant ideological remoulding and indoctrination, with a particular emphasis on propagation of "nationalities unity"⁶¹² that further suggests the presence of "local nationalist" sentiment amongst the minority cadres. Another factor that may have contributed to the dilution of ethnic minority cadres was the establishment of the "Xinjiang Wilderness Reclamation Army" in 1952 and this organisation's expansion following the Korean War in 1953.⁶¹³ Moreover, a

⁶⁰⁸ Henry Guenter Schwarz, op. cit., p.249& Donald H. McMillen, op. cit., p.43.

⁶⁰⁹ Henry Guenter Schwarz, op. cit., pp.248-249.

⁶¹⁰ Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power*, op. cit., p.87.

⁶¹¹ Henry G. Schwarz, op. cit., p.180.

⁶¹² Donald H. McMillen, op. cit., pp.86-87.

⁶¹³ Lynn T. White III, "The Road to Urumchi: Approved Institutions in Search of Attainable Goals During Pre-1968 Rustication from Shanghai", op. cit., pp.488-489 & Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and the Production and Construction Corps", op. cit., pp.69-70.

few months before the “reclamation army” was reorganised to form the Xinjiang PCC around 12 500 cadres from the various production and construction units were sent to rural and pastoral areas to participate in political and socio-economic reform movements.⁶¹⁴ As noted earlier, Han in-migration was stepped up with the establishment of the PCC and by the end of 1954 the PCC was composed of approximately 200 000 predominantly Han members.⁶¹⁵ Even though the CCP’s stated emphasis during this period was upon the eradication of Han chauvinism and the development of greater equality between nationalities, the actual practice of CCP rule was somewhat contradictory. Over the 1949-1955 period the CCP had instituted a complex of techniques and tactics of rule that attempted to bring the region’s non-Han population into the socialist new order by a combination of outright suppression, coercion and politico-ideological persuasion. Much like the Qing before them the CCP’s consolidation of power in Xinjiang was focused on undermining or destroying the existing structures of politico-ideological legitimacy and authority, and its replacement with a politico-ideological framework constructed and ultimately controlled by itself. For such a strategy to succeed the party had to allow for the representation and expression of the non-Han population within that framework. Through the recruitment of cadres and the system of “national regional autonomy” implemented in Xinjiang between 1949 and 1955 the party could be said to have partially succeeded. It had created a coopted ethnic minority elite, represented by figures such as Burhan and Saifudin, and lower level ethnic cadres that now had a stake in the new political order. Moreover, within the limited parameters of the autonomous local governments it had in theory created an arena through which ethnic minority

⁶¹⁴ Donald H. McMillen, “Xinjiang and the Production and Construction Corps”, op. cit., p.70.

⁶¹⁵ Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power*, op. cit., p.61.

grievances could be aired without explicitly challenging the established order. Within the space of a few short years, however, even this limited and controlled avenue of expression would be deemed to be pandering to “local nationalism”.

Significantly, the closest “fraternal relations” between the PRC and the Soviet Union accompanied these consolidatory policies within Xinjiang. In the context of Xinjiang, Sino-Soviet cooperation was essentially limited to economic and cultural affairs. As noted previously, a Xinjiang delegation headed by Saifudin accompanied Mao Zedong to Moscow in January 1950 and concluded two Soviet-Xinjiang economic agreements in concert with the Sino-Soviet “Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance”.⁶¹⁶ The two Soviet-Xinjiang agreements established two Sino-Soviet “joint-stock” companies concerning oil and “rare and non-ferrous metals”.⁶¹⁷ The latter of these agreements allegedly had a secret provision for Soviet exploration and exploitation of uranium in Xinjiang; a motivation that the KMT had charged was partially behind Soviet support for the ETR rebellion.⁶¹⁸ Both agreements were, however, far from “fraternal” with the Soviets demanding one half of Xinjiang’s oil and rare and non-ferrous metals in return for their economic and technical assistance.⁶¹⁹ Soviet assistance apparently did not extend to providing aid to the PLA in their suppression of KMT and ethnic minority “reactionaries and bandits”. Even after the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty and the two Soviet-Xinjiang agreements the CCP was unable to quell armed ethnic minority resistance until late 1954 and early 1955. The

⁶¹⁶ Oleh S. Fedyshyn, “Soviet Retreat in Sinkiang?”, op. cit., p.128 & Henry Guenter Schwarz, op. cit., pp. 630-631.

⁶¹⁷ Ibid. & Amar Lahiri, “Communist New Deal in Sinkiang”, *United Asia*, Vol 3, no.3., (1950), p.142.

⁶¹⁸ Oleh S. Fedyshyn, op. cit., p.129.

⁶¹⁹ Amar Lahiri, op. cit., pp.142-143 & Oleh S. Fedyshyn, op.cit., p.128. Fedyshyn asserts that Soviet aid and equipment was far below the worth of the share of oil and metals demanded by the Soviets.

scale of opposition to the re-establishment of Chinese rule can be gauged from a number of examples. Wang Enmao's suppression of 7500 "reactionaries" and "bandits" in the south-west that ended in January 1951 was officially deemed to have completed the elimination of opposition to the CCP.⁶²⁰ This was evidently not the case with Urumqi radio stating that there were one hundred and twenty attacks on government forces in 1950 alone, and in March 1954 more than 33 000 men and 880 units of the PLA were recognised for their efforts in combating the "bandits".⁶²¹ The lack of Soviet assistance in this respect is not surprising given the Soviets' role in the ETR and their ongoing influence in Xinjiang, especially in the north-west. Yet the absence of Soviet military aid in the PLA's suppression of anti-Han and anti-communist elements is perhaps symptomatic of a wider tendency in the Sino-Soviet relationship.

The presence of a significant pro-Soviet ethnic minority elite in the PLA and CCP, in the form of the INA and ETR, undoubtedly made the Chinese aware that the Soviet Union had a potential ethnic minority constituency embedded within the emergent provincial civil and military authorities to whom they could appeal if politically expedient. The influence of the Soviet Union was especially prevalent in the former ETR districts where over the 1949-1955 period many Soviet teachers, advisers and "cultural workers" were active. The Soviets also exported up to 250 000 books, journals and magazines in the Uighur language to Xinjiang in the same period via a branch of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association.⁶²² Evidently the Xinjiang authorities and central government found the terms of the oil and mineral agreements less than

⁶²⁰ Jurgen Domes, *Peng De-huai*, op. cit., p.59.

⁶²¹ Oleh S. Fedyshyn, op. cit., pp.129-130.

⁶²² Rasma Silde-Karklins, "The Uighurs Between China and the USSR", *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, Vol 17 (1975), pp. 353-354.

favourable for accelerating Xinjiang's development. The joint-stock companies were terminated on 12 October 1954 in a joint statement wherein the Chinese declared that they had acquired sufficient technical knowledge to assume managerial responsibility themselves.⁶²³ An important corollary of the initial phase of Sino-Soviet economic "cooperation" in Xinjiang was the development of a number of important infrastructural projects. The first, and most straightforward was the establishment a Alma-Ata-Urumqi-Beijing air link, although significantly the Alma-Ata-Urumqi section was operated by the Soviets and "served almost exclusively the Soviet technical experts coming into the province"⁶²⁴ The construction of the Lanzhou-Urumqi-Alma-Ata Railway was in contrast a much more difficult and important project. Construction began on the proposed 2800km long line (2500km of which was on the Chinese side) in October 1952 with only limited Soviet technical aid and advice, and the first 303km section was completed in February 1955.⁶²⁵

The 1949-1955 period in Xinjiang was thus characterised by a series of techniques and tactics of rule structured to establish the CCP as the sole source of political authority, weaken pre-liberation ethnic minority elites, initiate the region's integration and ensure the region's territorial security. These pre-eminent goals during this phase of Chinese rule were in part achieved by the application of the "united front" strategy of gradual reform of the existing political, economic and social order. The lodestars of CCP policy in Xinjiang during this period were "anti-Great Hanism" and "anti-local nationalism", that in practice translated to the outright suppression of anti-CCP activities and an effort

⁶²³ Oleh S. Fedyshyn, *op. cit.*, p.132. The transfer of stocks and management took place on 30 December 1954.

⁶²⁴ *Ibid*, p.128.

⁶²⁵ *Ibid*, pp.136-137.

to accommodate the cultural diversity of the ethnic minorities. The most instrumental factor in the consolidation of CCP power in Xinjiang was, however, the activities of the PLA First FA and the Xinjiang PCC. The rapid absorption of the former KMT garrison and pro-Soviet INA into the PLA, and later into the PCC, removed the most overt and potentially dangerous obstacles to the establishment of CCP rule. The (re)introduction of the Qing-era military-agricultural colonies, albeit on a much greater scale, also demonstrated the CCP's intention to not only physically control Xinjiang but to firmly establish it as an "integral" province of the PRC. The Xinjiang PCC, unlike the Qing colonies, were established simultaneously north and south of the Tien Shan and, significantly, acted as a conduit and receptacle for Han colonisation. Consequently the three main internal "actors" in Xinjiang became the PLA (including the PCC), Han settlers and the ethnic minorities. The influence of the Soviet Union throughout this period remained considerable. The CCP's handling of their neighbour's political and economic imperatives in Xinjiang clearly demonstrated the Chinese determination to make Xinjiang not only an "integral" province of the PRC but to do so to the exclusion of any other external influences. Soon after the institution of "national regional autonomy" for Xinjiang in October 1955, the CCP's strategies, tactics and techniques of rule underwent a significant re-evaluation largely due to ongoing ideological and political confrontations within the central leadership. The vicissitudes of internal political and ideological debates within the CCP had important ramifications for Chinese policy in Xinjiang and its foreign relations. The essence of the CCP's debates beginning in 1956, as it pertained to ethnic minorities and the conceptualisation of "national regional autonomy", was the question as to the required speed and intensity of assimilation and integration of ethnic minorities. As will emerge in the following

section, the debate was entirely focused on the means by which the state's goals in Xinjiang could be best achieved rather than on the veracity of the goals themselves.

Towards the Re-evaluation and Intensification of Chinese Techniques and Tactics of Rule, 1956-1966

In essence the approach of the CCP regarding the ethnic minorities throughout the 1949-1955 period in Xinjiang was to encourage assimilation without undue coercion, with the exception of the outright suppression of organised opposition during the “bandit suppression” campaign noted earlier. The Common Program of the CPPCC of September 1949, as noted above, outlined the five basic principles that would govern the CCP's policies toward ethnic minority regions. The most central of these principles was that any ethnic minority claims to secession would not be tolerated. The other four defined the conditions by which the party intended to administer and govern non-Han populated regions of the PRC. These five principles were, as I have demonstrated, clearly evident in the CCP's administration of Xinjiang over the 1949-1955 period. Yet within this same period there were a number of contradictory statements that presaged a re-evaluation and reorientation of the party's priorities concerning the ethnic minorities. First, an official review into the party's nationalities policy in June 1953 undertaken by the Third Enlarged Conference of the Nationalities Affairs Commission, although maintaining the familiar mantra of anti-Han chauvinism, contained a number of statements that pointed to a turn in the party's “line”. For example, the report advocated the authorities should provide active assistance to those ethnic minorities wishing to learn Chinese rather than their own language. Moreover, it pointedly warned those that thought the implementation of “national regional autonomy” would result in the

cessation of the in-migration of Han cadres and settlers into ethnic minority regions to think again.⁶²⁶ Second, the 1954 constitution did not identify “Han chauvinism” as the principal threat to the party’s nationality policy but highlighted that the party would oppose both “Han chauvinism” and “local nationalism”.⁶²⁷ This went against the CCP’s position in Xinjiang with Wang Enmao stating in 1954 that the biggest threat to the consolidation of Chinese power in the region remained “Han chauvinism”.⁶²⁸

As we have seen, however, simultaneous with such assurances the authorities expanded and intensified the application of certain strategies that ultimately undermined such moderation, such as the establishment of the PCC. This was perhaps a sign, as Connor has noted, that the party had moved to a position whereby it would encourage assimilation but not enforce assimilation.⁶²⁹ This slight, yet significant, change in policy was somewhat revised by Mao in his 25 April 1956 address “On the Ten Great Relationships”, one of which he identified as “the relationship between the Han nationality and the minority nationalities.”⁶³⁰ Mao maintained that “our policy regarding this issue is sound” and in contrast to the 1954 constitution once more highlighted the need for opposition to Han chauvinism:

We emphasize opposing Han chauvinism. There is of course local nationalism, but its is not where our emphasis lies. Our emphasis lies in opposing Han chauvinism. The Han people make up the overwhelming majority of the population. It would be very bad if they practiced Han chauvinism and ostracized the minority nationalities.⁶³¹

⁶²⁶ Walker Connor, *op. cit.*, p.409.

⁶²⁷ Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Practice*, *op. cit.*, p.410.

⁶²⁸ Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power*, *op. cit.*, pp.114-115.

⁶²⁹ Walker Connor, *op. cit.*, p.409.

⁶³⁰ Mao Zedong, “On the Ten Great Relationships”, (April 25, 1956), in Michael Y. M. Kau & John K. Leung (eds.), *The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976: Vol. II, January 1956--December 1957*, *op. cit.*, pp.43-61.

⁶³¹ *Ibid*, p.55.

Another section of Mao's address, "the relationship between the centre and the regions", was also pertinent to the issue of the party's approach to ethnic minority regions. In this section Mao called for greater decision-making at the local level but explicitly warned that such decentralisation must not be allowed to encourage separatism or the development of "an independent kingdom".⁶³² Thus, although Mao was reaffirming the party's moderate approach to ethnic minorities and ethnic minority regions, he in the same breath warned that this autonomy was conditional:

We must have both unity and particularity. To bring the initiative of the localities into full play, each locality must have the particularities of its local conditions...but particularities that are *necessary for the interest of the whole and for the strengthening of national unity*.⁶³³

Therefore Mao was reaffirming the CCP's basic principles governing its application of autonomy for the PRC's ethnic minorities which were essentially articles 9, 50, 51, 52 and 53 of the 1949 "Common Program of the CPPCC".

Contemporaneously, Mao expounded his famous slogan "to let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend", that invited the masses to engage in criticism of the party.⁶³⁴ This unprecedented call to disavow party discipline and ideological conformity generally required by "democratic centralism" provoked widespread skepticism. The "blooming and contending" did not eventuate until Mao reiterated his encouragement first at a conference of provincial and autonomous region party secretaries in January 1957⁶³⁵ and in his more famous speech to the Supreme State

⁶³² Ibid, p.53.

⁶³³ Ibid. (My emphasis)

⁶³⁴ Mao Zedong, "Talk at Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau", (April, 1956), in Michael Y. M. Kau & John K. Leung (eds.), op. cit., p.70.

⁶³⁵ Mao Zedong, "Speech at the Conference of Provincial, Municipal, and Autonomous Region Party Secretaries", (January 27, 1957), in in Michael Y. M. Kau & John K. Leung (eds.), op. cit, pp.246-266.

Conference on 27 February 1957 entitled “On Correctly Handling Contradictions Among the People”.⁶³⁶ Mao began this major and controversial speech by stating that there were “two types of social contradictions, namely those between the enemy and ourselves, and those among the people”.⁶³⁷ The contradictions amongst the people were deemed to be non-antagonistic, in contrast to those “between the enemy and ourselves”. Importantly, Mao argued acknowledging contradictions among people would in fact be beneficial to the construction of the new China.⁶³⁸ One of the important contradictions among the people that Mao identified as being open to public criticism was that between the Han and the ethnic minorities. Specifically, Mao asserted that both Han chauvinism and local nationalism were types of contradictions, thereby explicitly including them amongst the issues open to criticism.⁶³⁹ Mao’s call resulted in a torrent of criticism directed towards both the party and Mao himself, and the criticism was no more vociferous than from the ethnic minorities. As will be seen in the specific context of Xinjiang the “Hundred Flowers Movement” and its fallout precipitated a total reorientation of the CCP’s “nationality policy”. Moreover, this process provided the impetus for the radicalisation of the CCP’s agenda across economic, ideological, minority and foreign policy. Mao’s exhortations to discuss the various non-antagonistic “contradictions among the people”, however, contained an explicit threat that many should have taken greater heed of:

At the same time that fragrant flowers are blooming, there will inevitably be poisonous weeds blooming too. This is nothing to fear, and, under certain conditions, it may even be beneficial. For a period of time, some phenomena

⁶³⁶ Mao Zedong, “On Correctly Handling Contradictions Among the People”, (February, 1957), in Michael Y. M. Kau & John K. Leung (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp.308-340 & Walker Connor, *op. cit.*, 411.

⁶³⁷ Mao Zedong, “On Correctly Handling Contradictions Among the People”, *op. cit.*, p.311.

⁶³⁸ Walker Connor, *op. cit.*, p.411.

⁶³⁹ *Ibid*, pp.411-412.

will be unavoidable. But after they spring up, there will always be ways [of dealing with them].⁶⁴⁰

Thus Mao himself explicitly presaged the “rectification” campaign that followed on the heels of the “Hundred Flowers” movement. In the ethnic minority region’s this state-wide campaign took the form of an “anti-local nationalist” campaign.

The “Hundred Flowers” movement provoked sharp criticism of the party in Xinjiang. The regional party committee called a conference of “democratic personalities of minorities” to discuss the “relationship between the Han nationality and the minority nationalities” on 31 May, 1957.⁶⁴¹ The importance the party attached to this meeting was demonstrated by the attendance of Saifudin and Wang Enmao, the two top leaders of the Xinjiang CCP and government. Both leaders encouraged the delegates to criticise the party. This precipitated a torrent of criticism that largely focused on three major issues; (1) the lack of real autonomy, (2) the dominance of Han cadres and (3) the immigration of Han.⁶⁴² Perhaps most galling to the party was the unfavourable comparisons made by the minorities between the situation in Xinjiang and that in the Soviet Central Asian Republics. In direct reference to the Soviet system, some ethnic minority cadres called for the creation of separate communist parties for each nationality and the replacement of “national regional autonomy” with a federal system based on national “soviet republics”.⁶⁴³ In an even more overt threat to the party, there

⁶⁴⁰ Mao Zedong, “Speech at the Conference of Provincial, Municipal, and Autonomous Region Party Secretaries”, (January 27, 1957), op. cit., p. 255.

⁶⁴¹ Henry G. Schwarz, op. cit., p.197.

⁶⁴² See Henry G. Schwarz, op. cit., p.197, Linda Benson & Ingvar Svanberg, op. cit., p.102, & Rasma Silde-Karklins, "The Uighurs Between China and the USSR", *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, vol. 17, (1975), p.361.

⁶⁴³ Linda Benson & Ingvar Svanberg, op. cit., pp.102-103 & Rasma Silde-Karklins, op. cit., p.361.

were renewed calls for the separation of Xinjiang from the PRC and the establishment of an independent “East Turkestan Republic” or “Uighurstan”.⁶⁴⁴ In May 1957 an intra-party directive was circulated by Mao to party cadres that was the first sign of a critical change in his thought regarding the course of the revolution and the ‘Hundred Flowers’ movement.⁶⁴⁵ The major new point elucidated in this directive was that Mao now viewed “revisionism” as the primary danger to the party and the revolution. Moreover, Mao explicitly linked the “rightist” criticism of the party during the ‘Hundred Flowers’ to “revisionism” – “There are Communist Party members – Marxists, and there are so-called Communist Party members, that is, rightist elements within the Communist Party – revisionists”.⁶⁴⁶ Thus at this initial stage Mao was clearly focused on the manifestations of “revisionism” within the party and was determined to struggle against such phenomena. Significantly, the directive also revealed that Mao was now on the verge of repudiating the concept of the “united front”:

The characteristic of the Rightists is that their political attitudes are Rightist. They have a certain kind of cooperation with us, a cooperation in form, but in reality they do not cooperate...At ordinary times they cooperate, but as soon as there is an opening they can exploit, such as the present opportunity, then in reality they would not want to cooperate any longer. *They have broken their promise that they are ready to accept the leadership of the Communist Party*; they attempt to shake off this leadership, and, the fact is, without this type of leadership, it will be impossible for the building of socialism to be accomplished, and our people will suffer an extremely great catastrophe.⁶⁴⁷

Therefore, Mao had lost patience with the strategy of the gradual persuasion and cooptation of those outside the party that had been consistently implemented, especially

⁶⁴⁴ June Teufel Dreyer, *China's Forty Millions: Minority Nationalities and the National Integration in the People's Republic of China*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), p.150), Rasma Silde-Karklins, op. cit., p.361, & Linda Benson & Ingvar Svanberg, op. cit., pp.102-103.

⁶⁴⁵ Mao Zedong, “The Situation is Changing”, (May 15, 1957), in Michael Y. M. Kau & John K. Leung (eds.), op. cit., pp.546-552.

⁶⁴⁶ Ibid, p.548.

⁶⁴⁷ Ibid, p.550. (My emphasis)

in ethnic minority regions, since 1949. Moreover, Mao was confident that the “rightist” and “revisionist” opposition would in the course of the “Hundred Flowers” thoroughly expose themselves and in the process “they will dig their own graves.”⁶⁴⁸ This critical change in Mao’s thought began to be felt almost immediately. This is clearly demonstrated by the addition of six criteria by which to measure whether criticism was “right or wrong” when Mao’s “On Correctly Handling Contradictions Among the People” speech was formally published on 19 June, 1957:

- (1) [Whether something] helps to unite, not split, the people of all different nationalities across the country
- (2) [Whether something] is beneficial, not harmful, to socialist transformation and socialist construction
- (3) [Whether something] facilitates the consolidation of, and does not undermine or weaken, the people’s democratic dictatorship
- (4) [Whether something] facilitates the consolidation of, and does not undermine or weaken, the system of democratic centralism
- (5) [Whether something] facilitates the consolidation of, and does not cut loose from or weaken, the Communist Party’s leadership
- (6) [Whether something] is beneficial, not harmful, to the international unity of socialism and the international unity of the peace-loving people in all the world.⁶⁴⁹

That the criteria to top the list concerned the ethnic minorities and their relation to the state is both remarkable and indicative of the level of ethnic minority discontent. Moreover, the direct reference to the “splitting” of nationalities also highlights the level of threat felt by the state in such frontier and non-Han regions as Xinjiang. This episode served to sharpen the perceptions of a segment of the party’s leadership regarding the necessity for the intensification of the state’s integrationist project in Xinjiang. The party’s response to this vituperative outburst was swift, and in the context of Xinjiang clearly illustrated the connection between internal and external policy.

⁶⁴⁸ Ibid, p.551.

⁶⁴⁹ Mao Zedong, “On Correctly Handling Contradictions Among the People”, (February, 1957), in Michael Y. M. Kau & John K. Leung (eds.), op. cit., p. 333 & Walker Connor, op. cit., ,p. 412.

The CCP's changing policy direction from 1955 onwards is generally regarded as the result of an emergent divide within the party largely focused on the question of the rapidity and intensity of the implementation of socialism. Moreover, it is also conceived of as being bound up with Mao's dissatisfaction with Soviet aid, the Soviet "model" of socialist development, and the Soviet interpretation of the international system. Thus there has been a tendency to view the CCP's fluctuating approach to the PRC's ethnic minorities through the prism of state-wide political and socio-economic campaigns and transformations:

Thus the two most radical shifts in Chinese national policy are better understood as the application of the country-wide Great Leap Forward (1958-59) and the Cultural Revolution (ca. 1966-71) to the national minorities *than they are as responses to developments in the national problem itself*.⁶⁵⁰

Yet the dynamics of the "Hundred Flowers" movement and the "anti-local nationalist" campaign that followed it in Xinjiang suggest that the CCP was in fact responding to developments in the "national problem". As noted above, the nature of the ethnic minorities' criticisms of the party evidently illustrated the tenuous political legitimacy of the Chinese state. Moreover, the explicit references to the situation in the Soviet Central Asian Republics also highlighted the continuity of the politico-ideological threat or challenge to the Chinese state in Xinjiang, that had been evident since the Qing conquest. In turn the nature of the party's response to the criticism from the ethnic minorities demonstrated a keen perception of the failure of its moderate "united front" policies to adequately confront this challenge to the reassertion of Chinese state power in Xinjiang. Ethnic minority calls for the institution of a Soviet style federation of

⁶⁵⁰ Walker Connor, op. cit., p.408. (My emphasis)

national soviet republics or secession from the PRC directly challenged and questioned the political legitimacy of both the party and the Chinese state itself. Such a challenge could not but provoke a rapid and uncompromising response from a party and state that had been bent on the total integration of Xinjiang since the founding of the PRC.

Prior to the “Hundred Flowers” movement there had been subtle signs of a shifting emphasis in the CCP’s policy towards ethnic minorities. The CCP’s emphasis for the need to combat Han chauvinism had decreased since 1954, as illustrated by the 1954 constitution and 1953 report by the Nationalities Affairs Commission. Within Xinjiang the first indication of the reorientation of minority policies was the 'reform' of the ethnic minorities' alphabetic script. The CCP in August 1956, under Soviet advice, had adopted a Cyrillic script for the minority languages.⁶⁵¹ It was argued that this would enable the ethnic minorities to learn 'modern' science more effectively and, perhaps more importantly, to erode the influence of traditional Islamic teachings which were written in Arabic.⁶⁵² Before this could be implemented, however, the fallout from the “Hundred Flowers” movement obviously convinced the Chinese that such a measure would not be conducive to their integrationist project. The CCP announced in 1957-58 that they would abandon the planned adoption of Cyrillic script for the ethnic minorities' languages in favour of Latinised scripts.⁶⁵³ The ethnic minorities' unfavourable comparison of the Chinese system with that of the Soviet Union clearly illustrated that Soviet influence remained strong in Xinjiang. The political implications of the reform of ethnic minority alphabets in Xinjiang into Cyrillic become clear when

⁶⁵¹ Rasma Silde-Karklins, op. cit., p.356 & Henry G. Schwarz, op. cit., p.393.

⁶⁵² Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power*, op. cit., pp116-117.

⁶⁵³ Rasma Silde-Karklins, op. cit., p.357.

the situation in the Soviet Union regarding ethnic minority scripts is noted. Of particular interest in this respect was the Soviet policy regarding Soviet Uighurs, given that some 70% of Xinjiang's population in the 1950s were Uighur. In 1959 there were some 95 000 Uighur in the Soviet Union, mostly residing in the Fergana valley of the Uzbek SSR and in the vicinity of Alam-Ata in the Kazakh SSR.⁶⁵⁴ Soviet Uighur was written in the traditional Arabic script prior to 1930, in the Latin script between 1930 and 1946 and in the Cyrillic after 1946.⁶⁵⁵ Xinjiang's Uighurs, in contrast, had in the main used the Arabic script until the 1956 decision to adopt a Cyrillic script. It will be recalled that under Xinjiang's warlord governor, Sheng Shicai, a Soviet style nationalities policy had been implemented in the mid-1930s. The introduction of a Latin Uighur script in the Soviet Union between 1930-1946 had been paralleled in certain regions in Xinjiang. Moreover, there had also been a similar phenomenon with the Soviet switch to a Cyrillic script after 1946.⁶⁵⁶ Significantly, the Soviets continued to publish Uighur and Kazakh literature in Arabic until the late 1950s. Given that the Soviets had abandoned the Arabic script for Soviet Uighurs in 1930, it can only be surmised that these publications were exclusively for export purposes.⁶⁵⁷ Therefore, their destination could only have been Xinjiang, the only other region of concentrated Uighur population. The adoption of a Cyrillic script for Xinjiang's Uighurs by the CCP would have facilitated increased communication across the Sino-Soviet frontier and strengthened Soviet influence in Xinjiang. That the CCP should strive to sever such connections after the pro-Soviet sentiment demonstrated by some of the ethnic minorities during the

⁶⁵⁴ Ibid, p.343.

⁶⁵⁵ Ibid, p. 35

⁶⁵⁶ Ibid, pp.355-356 & Allen S. Whiting and Gen. Sheng Shih-t'sai, *Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot?*, (Ann Arbor: Michigan State University Press, 1958), p.36.

⁶⁵⁷ Ram Silde-Karklins, op. cit., pp.355-356.

“Hundred Flowers” movement by adopting a Latin rather than Cyrillic script should come as little surprise.

The party also received substantial criticism from Han cadres and settlers. In fact McMillen notes that in the first few months following the regional party committee met to initiate the ‘Hundred Flowers’ in Xinjiang, under the leadership of Saifudin and Wang Enmao, the party’s rectification focused largely on the criticism from Han cadres, party members, and functionaries.⁶⁵⁸ The result of this process became apparent in September and October 1957 with the regional party committee deciding to *xiafang* or “send down” 2700 cadres to rural areas. Moreover, the Xinjiang PCC in the same period “sent down” up to 80% of its officials to work at the lowest levels.⁶⁵⁹ Significantly, in the following month the party announced that it had uncovered a “counter-revolutionary organisation”, the “China Peasant Party”, among the predominantly Han “reform through labour” camps.⁶⁶⁰ Contemporaneously, the focus of the party’s “anti-rightist” campaign switched to the manifestations of “local nationalism” that had been implicit in the ethnic minorities’ criticism of the party. An Enlarged Conference of the XUAR CCP Committee was convened at Urumqi to deal with the “anti-Rightist” campaign, wherein Saifudin disclosed that “local nationalism” had re-emerged amongst the region’s ethnic minorities and declared that it was the most dangerous ideological trend.⁶⁶¹ Moreover, Saifudin’s speech further echoed the spirit of Mao’s 15 May intra-party directive and the six criteria attached to Mao’s “On Correctly Handling Contradictions Among the People”. First, he reiterated that Xinjiang was an “integral” part of the PRC and that any

⁶⁵⁸ Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power*, op. cit., p.90.

⁶⁵⁹ See Ibid, p.91 & Lynn T. White III, “The Road to Urumchi”, op. cit., p.500.

⁶⁶⁰ See Ibid & Linda Benson & Ingvar Svanberg, op. cit., p.102.

⁶⁶¹ Donald H. McMillen, op. cit., p.92.

calls for secession and independence were reactionary. Second, those who opposed the socialist development of Xinjiang with the aid of the Han people were pursuing a nationalistic and therefore counter-revolutionary line. Third, those who charged that the party was not taking adequate account of Xinjiang's and the ethnic minorities characteristics, were reminded that although the party was indeed cognisant of these particularities they would not be allowed to obstruct the course of socialist development and construction.⁶⁶² Therefore, Saifudin had clearly outlined the party's change of tack with respect to ethnic minorities and pre-empted the further radicalisation of CCP techniques and tactics of rule. At the close of this enlarged conference in June 1958 there was a further reiteration of these basic points and Wang Enmao admitted that there remained support for the ETR amongst Xinjiang's ethnic minorities.⁶⁶³ Probably as a result of the proceedings of the enlarged conference a significant number of prominent ethnic minority cadres were charged with "local nationalism" and either expelled from the CCP or rigorously criticised in late June and May 1958. Those expelled from the CCP were Abdurahim Aissa, (alternate member of the XUAR Party Committee and head of the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Zhou), Abduraim Saidi (mayor of Urumqi), Zhya (chairman of the XUAR Writers Association), while those criticised included M. Iminov, Aishihaiti, Jiaheda and A. Bitungbayefu.⁶⁶⁴ Importantly the majority of these figures were known supporters and associates of the ETR leadership.⁶⁶⁵ Thus the "anti-rightist/anti-local nationalist" campaign had targeted and eliminated the residual elements of the pro-Soviet ETR regime and those ethnic minority leaders who had not

⁶⁶² Ibid, pp.92-93.

⁶⁶³ Ibid, pp.93-94.

⁶⁶⁴ See Ibid, p.94, *Communist China 1949-1959, Vol. I*, (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1961), p.45 & June Teufel Dreyer, *China's Forty Millions*, op. cit., p.152.

⁶⁶⁵ Ibid.

been sufficiently “persuaded” by the 1949-1955 “united front” policies of the CCP. It would appear, given Mao’s various statements during the “Hundred Flowers” and the subsequent “anti-rightist” campaign, that the CCP (or at least a powerful faction of it) had indeed lost patience with the strategem of gradual reform. Moreover, this “clearing of the decks” arguably made way for the intensification of the state’s integrationist project in Xinjiang, that in the following 1958-1960 period came in the form of the state-wide “Great Leap Forward” (GLF) movement.

The GLF was a state wide socio-economic intervention into Chinese society aiming to address a number of problems that had emerged in the 1949-1957 period. The GLF is viewed as the CCP’s, and more specifically Mao’s attempt to create an alternative path toward communism to that of the Soviet model of development. Specifically, the Soviet model’s emphasis on the development of and state-investment in the urban-industrial sector at the expense of the rural-agricultural sector clearly posed problems for a country where the population was overwhelmingly rural. The Soviet Stalinist model of economic development required that two fundamental conditions be met. First, that a planning mechanism channel resources into the development of heavy industry and second, that the rural-agricultural sector be starved of state investment and exploited to provide the resources necessary for the growth of the urban-industrial sector.⁶⁶⁶ This had been achieved in the Soviet case by the violent extraction of surplus products from the rural-agricultural sector, particularly in the 1930s.⁶⁶⁷ These two conditions had been

⁶⁶⁶ Kenneth Lieberthal, “The Great Leap Forward & the Split in the Yenan Leadership”, in Roderick MacFarquhar & John K. Fairbank (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 14, The People’s Republic, Pt 1: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1949-1965*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p.299.

⁶⁶⁷ For example see Robert Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine*, (London: Pimlico, 1986).

central to the PRC's First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957), whereby the Chinese devoted around 48% of their public capital investment to industrial development. The Soviet model assumed, however, that there was in fact a rural-agricultural surplus to be procured. Yet in China the rural-agricultural situation was far from conforming to such conditions. The per capita output in grain production in 1957 for example was only 290kg. Therefore, the Chinese had to first develop a means by which to create and enhance a rural-agricultural surplus, and then to establish control over its distribution.⁶⁶⁸ The social composition of Chinese society and the CCP itself, around 70% rural or peasant, as Lieberthal notes undoubtedly played a role in dissuading the party from adopting the Soviet method that relied on the violent extraction of a surplus from the countryside.⁶⁶⁹ This fundamental problem was one major factor behind Mao's questioning of the Soviet model. Another factor was that the First Five-Year Plan's emphasis on the establishment of planning mechanisms to channel resources into industrial development had resulted in the expansion of government bureaucracy. The expansion of government bureaucracy and the corresponding increase in power and functions of central ministries emphasised technical expertise and competence. Moreover, the PRC had within the rubric of the First Five-Year Plan adopted the Soviet system of material and status differentials across the spectrum of government sectors – industry, commerce, agriculture, education and so forth.⁶⁷⁰ In Mao's view such emphasis on technical quality rather than political commitment or loyalty weakened the party's control while the stratification inherent in the system of differential material incentives encouraged the development of a privileged "managerial" class. These

⁶⁶⁸ Kenneth Lieberthal, *op. cit.*, pp.299-300.

⁶⁶⁹ *Ibid*, p.300.

⁶⁷⁰ *Ibid*, p.303.

developments were of course anathema to Mao's revolutionary vision, and as we have seen, he had begun during the "Hundred Flowers" and "anti-rightist" campaign to identify "revisionism" within the PRC and in the international system as the greatest threat to socialism. The critique of the Soviet model along these general lines gradually emerged over the course of the GLF and culminated in Mao's open attacks on the Soviets in 1960.⁶⁷¹ I have already dwelt on the impact and consequences of the "Hundred Flowers" and "anti-rightist" campaign in Xinjiang and will now address the problematic issues as to the purpose underpinning the implementation of the "Great Leap Forward" and its consequences in Xinjiang.

The "Hundred Flowers" and "anti-rightist" campaigns in Xinjiang had effectively removed the ethnic minority elite "inherited" from the ETR and weakened the ethnic minority leaders assiduously cultivated by the CCP during the "united front" policies of the early 1950s. Moreover, the CCP by mid-1958 had executed an about-face regarding its approach to the PRC's ethnic minorities. Toward the end of 1957 the Nationalities Affairs Commission met and determined that the contradictions between "local nationalists" and the people were contradictions between "the enemy and ourselves".⁶⁷² Moreover, "fusion" of the ethnic minorities with the Han was now explicitly deemed desirable and would receive the party's encouragement.⁶⁷³ This was in accordance with Mao's exhortations at the close of the Third Plenum of the 8th Central Committee on 9 October 1957 that the party's guiding principles were now "doing things with greater,

⁶⁷¹ See Ibid & Allen S. Whiting, "The Sino-Soviet Split", in Roderick MacFarquhar & John K. Fairbank (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 14*, op. cit., pp.501-519.

⁶⁷² Walker Connor, op. cit., p.413.

⁶⁷³ Ibid.

faster, better and more economical results”.⁶⁷⁴ This in turn became a key slogan of the “Great Leap Forward” and clearly signified that the party would no longer permit the ethnic minorities to progress along the “road of socialist development” as their “special characteristics” determined.

Therefore, the party preceded to reverse the gradualist and moderate policies pursued in regions such as Xinjiang since ‘liberation’ in 1949. Economically, the party had pursued a limited program of land reform and rent reduction in the agricultural areas - primarily concentrated around the oases of the Tarim Basin – and encouraged the peasants to form “Mutual Aid Teams”(MATs).⁶⁷⁵ This was to be the first step in what the party envisioned to be a three-step process towards cooperativisation. In the MATs labour was pooled but the individual peasant retained ownership rights and control over other productive factors, such as farm implements. After this Agricultural Producers Cooperatives (APCs) were to be established where productive property was now controlled by the collective and individual peasants received a dividend according to their contribution of land, tools and animals. Finally, the “higher stage” APCs were to be established where the dividend to individuals was to be abolished and payment based solely upon labour.⁶⁷⁶ The first stage of this process in Xinjiang was begun in 1951, but it was not until 1954 that it was announced that 30% of peasants in rural areas had been organised into MATs.⁶⁷⁷ The pace of cooperativisation in Xinjiang was deemed to be

⁶⁷⁴ Mao Zedong, “Be Activists in Promoting the Revolution”, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, Vol. V*, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), p.491.

⁶⁷⁵ Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power*, op. cit., pp.131-132.& June Teufel Dreyer, op. cit., p.128.

⁶⁷⁶ Frederick W. Tiewes, “Establishment of the New Regime”, in *The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 14*, op. cit pp.110-111.

⁶⁷⁷ Donald H. McMillen, op. cit., pp.133-134.

lagging behind the rest of the PRC in 1955, and the central government urged the provincial authorities to speed up the process. Thus in late 1955 over 63% of Xinjiang's peasants had been organized into MATs and only 5% had been organized into the lower level APCs.⁶⁷⁸ The following year Wang Enmao, at the First XUAR CCP Congress, called for the "steady advance and consolidation" or cooperativisation process so as to achieve the higher stage APCs by 1957. Yet simultaneously he stated in the implementation of this the party needed to take into account the "special problems and unique conditions" of Xinjiang.⁶⁷⁹ Within the pastoral regions of Xinjiang very little by way of land reform and cooperativisation occurred prior to 1955 due to the difficulty in establishing party authority amongst the nomadic peoples. The party's policy in these regions was one of "no struggle, no division, no classification of classes" and largely remained in effect until 1956 when only 30% of pastoralists had formed MATs.⁶⁸⁰ Thus on the eve of the "Great Leap Forward" the cooperativisation movement had not been completed, largely due to the provincial authorities cognisance of the region's "special characteristics".

The initiation of the GLF in Xinjiang came in June 1958 with Wang Enmao and Saifudin publicising the CCP Central Committee's decision on the "general line for socialist construction in China" that had been adopted at the 8th Party Congress in May.⁶⁸¹ In the GLF emphasis was to be placed on mass participation, ideological

⁶⁷⁸ Ibid, p.136.

⁶⁷⁹ Ibid, p.137 & Linda Benson & Ingvar Svanberg, *op. cit.*, p.134.

⁶⁸⁰ Ibid, pp.151-155.

⁶⁸¹ Ibid, pp.138-139 & Kenneth Lieberthal, "The Great Leap Forward & the Split in the Yenan Leadership", *op. cit.*, p.305.

incentives and self-reliance.⁶⁸² Moreover, in March 1958 the Central Committee endorsed the mergers of APCs into much larger “Peoples Communes” that were to have an average 5500 households per commune.⁶⁸³ In Xinjiang the establishment of such “Peoples Communes” was preceded by a renewed attack on religion, ‘conservative’ thinking and the attitude that Xinjiang was “special”.⁶⁸⁴ In August 1958 the CCP initiated the drive to establish “Peoples Communes” throughout the PRC, except Tibet.⁶⁸⁵ The establishment of communes in Xinjiang met with considerable ethnic minority opposition that the party blamed on “recalcitrant” landlords and “local nationalist capitalists”. Importantly, this prompted the party to emphasise the need for class struggle amongst the ethnic minorities.⁶⁸⁶ This was in accordance with the party’s reappraisal of the ‘national question’ following the “Hundred Flowers”. The “nationalities question” was now deemed to be primarily a class issue, and as such it could only be resolved by rigorous class struggle amongst the ethnic minorities. The contradiction was not between the Han and non-Han nationalities but between classes. Therefore, if the exploiting classes within each nationality were eradicated the “national question’ would be resolved.⁶⁸⁷ This logic had, as noted above, been a major justification behind the removal of the traditional ethnic minority leaders coopted by the party during the “anti-rightist/anti-local nationalist” campaign. During the GLF the “class nature” of the “nationalities question” was emphasised, particularly in regions where opposition to communisation was strongest. Thus in Xinjiang the party targeted

⁶⁸² Ibid & Nicholas R. Lardy, “The Chinese Economy Under Stress, 1958-1965”, in Roderick MacFarquhar & John K. Fairbank (eds.) *The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 14*, op. cit., pp.360-365.

⁶⁸³ Nicholas R. Lardy, op. cit., p.365.

⁶⁸⁴ Donald H. McMillen, op. cit., p.139.

⁶⁸⁵ June Teufel Dreyer, *China’s Forty Millions*, op. cit., p.163.

⁶⁸⁶ Ibid & Donald H. McMillen, op. cit., p.139.

⁶⁸⁷ Walker Connor, op. cit., p.415.

those remaining manifestations of “national bourgeois” sentiment – that notably resulted in the closure of the bazaars in the oases of the Tarim Basin and further attacks on religion and mosques.⁶⁸⁸

As a corollary of the commune movement and the renewed emphasis on “class struggle” in ethnic minority regions Han in-migration was intensified. The party maintained that the only means by which the ethnic minority regions could “catch up” with the more developed Han areas was through the aid of the Han “big brother”.⁶⁸⁹ Thus the *xiafang* or “send down” movement was expanded in late 1958, with large numbers of urban, educated Han youth mobilised to aid in the progress of the GLF in ethnic minority regions such as Xinjiang, Qinghai, Ningxia, Gansu and Inner Mongolia.⁶⁹⁰ The numbers of *xiafang* youth to reach Xinjiang over the September 1958 to October 1959 period are unclear but various estimates place the figure around the 100 000 mark.⁶⁹¹ The effect of this was to intensify the resentment of the ethnic minority population, especially in urban areas such as Kashgar where the local population referred to the newcomers as “locusts”.⁶⁹² An important factor in the rapidity of Han in-migration was the completion of the Urumqi-Lanzhou Railway in 1959.⁶⁹³ The XUAR CCP resolved to further implement the policies of the GLF and the party’s new approach to the “nationality question” by the formation of multi-ethnic communes. The purpose behind the establishment of multi-ethnic communes was twofold - to dilute the

⁶⁸⁸ Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and Wang Enmao: New Directions in Power, Policy and Integration?", *The China Quarterly*, no.99, (September 1984), p.570.

⁶⁸⁹ June Teufel Dreyer, op. cit., p.163.

⁶⁹⁰ Ibid, p.164.

⁶⁹¹ Henry G. Schwarz, “Chinese Migration to North-West China and Inner Mongolia”, *The China Quarterly*, No.16, (October-December 1963), p.73 & Linda Benson & Ingvar Svanberg, op. cit., p.138.

⁶⁹² Henry G. Schwarz, “Chinese Migration”, op. cit., p.73.

⁶⁹³ Linda Benson & Ingvar Svanberg, op. cit., p.138.

concentration of ethnic minority sentiment and absorb the influx of *xiaofang* Han. Moreover, multi-ethnic communes conformed to the party's desire to eliminate the idea (that it had fostered) that Xinjiang was distinct from the rest of China. The communes with their communal mess halls, for example, forced different ethnic groups to eat identical food regardless of customary or religiously prescribed dietary requirements.⁶⁹⁴ By the end of 1958 there were 451 communes in Xinjiang containing 93% of the peasants in the rural areas and 70% of the herdsmen in the pastoral areas.⁶⁹⁵ The communes established in Xinjiang were modelled on and were expected to carry out similar functions as the PCC farms that had been in operation since 1954. As noted earlier, the PCC had undertaken large-scale land reclamation, water conservancy and irrigation construction, building and transportation construction and animal husbandry. Moreover, the communes were exhorted to emulate the PCC's example of "hard struggle and self sacrifice" in collective labour.⁶⁹⁶ Such undertakings were generally beyond the technological capabilities of the communes, and combined with the ethnic minorities continued opposition to communisation resulted in the failure to achieve the goals of increased production set by the GLF policies. The emerging failure of the GLF and the commune system became apparent, as in the rest of the PRC, in 1960. The authorities response was a limited retrenchment of the "all-out" communisation policies. This saw the decentralisation of the organisation of the communes, whereby the production brigades and production teams were made the basic units of accounting.⁶⁹⁷

⁶⁹⁴ June Teufel Dreyer, "Minority Nationalities in the Cultural Revolution", *The China Quarterly*, No.35, (July-September 1968), p.99.

⁶⁹⁵ Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power*, op. cit., p.140.

⁶⁹⁶ Ibid, pp.143-144 & Nicholas R. Lardy, "The Chinese Economy Under Stress", op.cit., pp.363-364.

⁶⁹⁷ Xizhe Peng, *Demographic Consequences of the Great Leap Forward in China's Provinces*, (Chinese Centre for Rural Studies, 1987), on line at <http://www.ccrs.org.cn> & Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power*, op.cit., 142.

This retrenchment was expanded in 1961 with the Central Committee promulgating new regulations regarding the communes that banned the use of coercion, discouraged “mass line” industrial projects in the communes (such as the infamous “backyard furnaces”), permitted the suspension of communal mess halls, officially sanctioned private plots and removed restrictions on private household subsidiary production.⁶⁹⁸ These concessions did not, however, mollify ethnic minority resentment and opposition in Xinjiang. The result of the government's implementation of these universalist and 'fusionist' policies was increasing ethnic minority opposition and unrest, which culminated in the exodus of between 60 000-100 000 Kazaks and Uighurs from the Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture to Soviet Kazakhstan in 1962.⁶⁹⁹

It is perhaps no coincidence that the GLF period witnessed growing tensions between the Soviet Union and the PRC that finally culminated in an overt break in the Sino-Soviet “alliance” in 1960. The Sino-Soviet split was in many ways a manifestation of a divergence of principles paralleled by a divergence of interests. A defining characteristic of Sino-Soviet enmity was the inter-connection of domestic and foreign policy, whereby developments in domestic policy ultimately impacted upon foreign policy and vice versa. The emergence of this dynamic in Sino-Soviet relations had been evident since the founding of the PRC, but a number of important developments from 1956 to 1960, both within the domestic and foreign policy realms of each state, that intensified the latent contradictions between the two. We have seen, for example, that

⁶⁹⁸ Nicholas R. Lardy, “The Chinese Economy Under Stress”, *op. cit.*, pp.388-389 & Donald H. McMillen, *op. cit.*, p.143.

⁶⁹⁹ See Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and Wang Enmao", *op. cit.*, pp.570-571, Linda Benson & Ingvar Svanberg, *op. cit.*, p.138, & Rasma Silde-Karklins, “The Uighurs Between China and the USSR”, *op. cit.*, p.362.

the PRC's and the Soviet Union's interests rarely coincided in the context of Xinjiang. From the CCP's problematic "peaceful liberation" in 1949 and the less than "fraternal" Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance in 1950 to the dissolving of the Sino-Soviet joint stock companies in 1955. Yet the first open divergence of principle and ideology, was largely a consequence of Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in his "secret speech" to the 20th CPSU Congress in February 1956.⁷⁰⁰ For the Chinese, and Mao in particular, the Soviet leader's criticism of Stalin and the Stalinist era contained somewhat contradictory implications. On the one hand Mao undoubtedly welcomed the criticism of Stalin given his considerable disagreements with the late Soviet leader. Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin's "cult of personality", however, raised questions regarding Mao's own position in the PRC.⁷⁰¹ Beyond questions of personal leadership, Khrushchev's speech also introduced a revision of Leninist doctrine regarding the inevitability of violent confrontation between socialism and imperialism. Moreover, the Soviet leader now maintained that communist parties could come to power through parliamentary means thus de-legitimising violent revolutionary struggles. These points formed the basis of Khrushchev's argument for the "peaceful coexistence" of the socialist and capitalist worlds.⁷⁰²

Mao and the CCP's divergence with the Soviet leader's speech gradually came to light in the remaining months of 1956. Mao, in a talk before the Politburo in March 1956, presaged his more systematic response to Soviet's "de-Stalinisation" program contained

⁷⁰⁰ Mineo Nakajima, "Foreign Relations: From the Korean War to the Bandung Line", in Roderick MacFarquhar & John K. Fairbank, *The Cambridge History of China Vol. 14, The People's Republic, Pt 1: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1949-1965*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p.284.

⁷⁰¹ Ibid.

⁷⁰² Ibid

in the 25 April "On the Ten Major Relationships". Before the Politburo Mao bluntly stated:

We should not follow blindly but should analyze. A fart can be fragrant or can stink. We can't say that all the Soviet Union's farts are fragrant. At this time, when other people say that something stinks, we have been following them and also say that it stinks.⁷⁰³

It will also be recalled that it was in this speech that Mao exhorted the party "to let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend". The import of Khrushchev's "de-Stalinisation" program and the wave of anti-party criticism it had unleashed in the Soviet Union had obviously convinced Mao that a modicum of politico-ideological debate was needed to "let off some steam" in the PRC. Mao reinforced such a stance in his following speech of 25 April 1954, "On the Ten Major Relationships", which he opened by stating that the party's basic policy was to mobilise all positive factors to serve the cause of socialism.⁷⁰⁴ Within "On the Ten Major Relationships" Mao also affirmed some of the criticisms levelled against Stalin at the 20th CPSU Congress but also questioned the outright denunciation of the former Soviet leader. With respect to the defects of Stalin's rule he specifically questioned the Stalinist method of economic development that, as noted above, was based upon the extraction of a surplus from the agricultural sector:

The Soviet Union has adopted measures which squeeze the peasants very hard...This method of capital accumulation has seriously dampened the peasants enthusiasm for production. You want the hen to lay more eggs and yet you don't feed it, you want the horse to run fast and yet you don't let it graze. What kind of logic is that!⁷⁰⁵

⁷⁰³ Mao Zedong, "Talk at Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau", (April 1956), in Michael Y. M. Kau & John K. Leung (eds.), op. cit., p. 71.

⁷⁰⁴ Mao Zedong, "On the Ten Major Relationships", in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. V*, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), p.284.

⁷⁰⁵ Ibid, p.291.

Moreover, Mao encouraged the CCP to learn "critically" from the Soviet experience and admonished those in the party that slavishly followed the Soviet model or as he put it "simply follow the wind."⁷⁰⁶ In connection with these points he also highlighted the need for a more balanced or "objective" assessment of Stalin's record and stated that Stalin's mistakes and achievements were in the order of 30% and 70% in favour of his achievements.⁷⁰⁷ Thus Mao's outlook immediately after Khrushchev's "secret speech" exhibited two contradictory impulses. Mao's introduction of the "Hundred Flowers" in April 1956 reflected his desire to prevent the build-up of anti-party sentiment and part of his speech of 25 April clearly acceded to parts of Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin. Simultaneously he reaffirmed the standing and authority of Stalin.

External events, in the form of the Polish and Hungarian revolts of June and October 1956, intervened to sharpen Mao's perceptions of the impact and implications of Khrushchev's speech for both domestic and international affairs.⁷⁰⁸ The CCP had initially been supportive of the East European parties seeking greater autonomy from Moscow. After the Hungarian uprising and the Soviet military intervention to quell it, however, the CCP strongly supported the Soviets and attempted to rally other communist parties behind the CPSU.⁷⁰⁹ Yet Chinese support was not purely magnanimous or uncritical of the Soviet leadership. At the Second Plenum of the 8th Central Committee on 15 November 1956 Mao openly questioned whether the Soviet

⁷⁰⁶ Ibid, pp.303-304.

⁷⁰⁷ Ibid, p.304.

⁷⁰⁸ Frederick C. Tiewes, "Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime", op. cit., p.134 & Stuart R. Schram, "Mao Tse-tung's Thought From 1949-1976", in Roderick MacFarquhar & John K. Fairbank (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Modern China Vol. 15, The People's Republic, Pt.2: Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution, 1966-1982*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp.54-59.

⁷⁰⁹ Mineo Nakajima, "Foreign Relations: From the Korean War to the Bandung Line", op. cit., p.285 & Stuart R. Schram, "Mao Tse-tung's Thought From 1949-1976", op. cit., p.59.

Union had degenerated in light of Khrushchev's "de-Stalinisation". Mao remarked that he thought there were two "swords", that of Lenin and Stalin. In Mao's estimation the "sword of Stalin" should not simply be discarded - an open rebuke of Khrushchev's speech at the 20th CPSU Congress. In reference to the "sword of Lenin" - that is the insistence on the model of the Bolshevik revolution rather than the parliamentary road - Mao argued that it should never be discarded. Moreover, in direct reference to the 20th CPSU Congress he explicitly charged the Soviet leadership with the betrayal of Leninism:

As for the sword of Lenin, hasn't it too been discarded to a certain extent by some Soviet leaders? In my view, it has been discarded to a considerable extent. Is the October Revolution still valid? Can it still serve as an example for all countries? Khrushchev's report at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union says it is possible to seize state power by the parliamentary road, that is to say, it is no longer necessary for all countries to learn from the October Revolution. Once this gate is opened, by and large Leninism is thrown away.⁷¹⁰

Thus Mao argued that the Soviets had brought the Polish and Hungarian incidents upon themselves by discarding "the two swords" of Lenin and Stalin.⁷¹¹ But more importantly for Sino-Soviet relations Mao, by affirming the CCP's fidelity to Leninist doctrine, was clearly placing the CCP and the PRC in a position to become an alternative socialist model for the world's communist parties. Furthermore, with respect to domestic political developments - particularly the "Hundred Flowers" movement - these statements signalled that the party's "vanguard" role was unconditional. Moreover, the convergence of external events, such as the Polish and Hungarian revolts, and internal political developments in the form of the "Hundred Flowers", apparently convinced Mao of the

⁷¹⁰ Mao Zedong, "Speech at the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the CCP", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. V*, op. cit., p.341.

⁷¹¹ Mao Zedong, "Speech at the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the CCP", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. V*, op. cit., p.341.

need to address "contradictions among the people".⁷¹² Mao's 27 February 1957 "On Correctly Handling Contradictions Among the People" duly set out his views regarding Stalin and the related theoretical and practical issues that arose from them.⁷¹³ In this further evaluation of Stalin, Mao maintained that he had two aspects, one negative and the other positive. For Mao, Stalin's abuse of "revolutionary violence" in the elimination of not only "counter revolutionaries" but also political opponents within the party was the result of Stalin's failure to discern between antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions among the people.⁷¹⁴ Moreover, Mao claimed ideological and philosophical originality compared to Marx and Lenin, let alone Stalin, by recognising that contradictions among the people existed within socialist societies.⁷¹⁵

Mao's criticism of Stalin and Khrushchev's handling of "de-Stalinisation" grew throughout the remainder of 1957. In regard to Stalin, Mao focused on his less than "fraternal" treatment of the CCP and PRC. For example, on 20 July Mao told the Qingdao Conference that Stalin had refused to sign the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance until the PRC had conceded "four companies and two colonies" in the north-east and Xinjiang to the Soviets.⁷¹⁶ In the same talk he reiterated that the CCP's basic divergence of principle with the CPSU:

⁷¹² Frederick C. Tiewes, "Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime", op. cit., p.134.

⁷¹³ Stuart R. Schram, "Mao's Thought", op. cit., p.59.

⁷¹⁴ Ibid, pp.59-60 & Mao Zedong, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People", (February 27, 1957), *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol. V*, op. cit., pp.392-393. In the *Selected Works* version, Mao does not refer specifically to the Soviet experience or Stalin, but states that Lenin understood the theory of contradictions - in an obvious allusion to his successors failures in this department.

⁷¹⁵ Stuart R. Schram, op. cit., p.60

⁷¹⁶ Mao Zedong, "Interjections at a Meeting During the Qingdao Conference" (July 20, 1957), in Michael Y. M. Kau & John K. Leung (eds.), op. cit., p.647.

Our contradiction with Khrushchev is [over] the problem of Stalin's supporters and [over] the ways in which we view contradictions among the people.⁷¹⁷

In October the fissures in the Sino-Soviet relationship were papered over somewhat with the conclusion of an agreement by which the Soviet Union undertook to assist the PRC's nuclear program.⁷¹⁸ On Mao's second visit to Moscow in November and December 1957, however, to attend the conference of communist and workers' parties he continued to publicly express criticisms of both Stalin and the contemporary Soviet leadership. He asserted that he had "a bellyful" of things to complain about in terms of Sino-Soviet relations but these mainly concerned Stalin and:

I have come to Moscow twice; the first time it was unpleasant. The phrase "fraternal party" sounded good, but in fact there was no equality.⁷¹⁹

Moreover, during Mao's final speech at the conference on 18 November, in which he made his famous statement that "the East wind prevails over the West wind", Mao clearly set out what he saw as the "correct" future direction of the international communism. Mao's address had two key themes that were both related to the domestic developments within the Soviet Union and the PRC over 1957 and their impact on Sino-Soviet relations. First, in the context of hailing the Soviet's technological triumph of launching Sputnik and trialing an ICBM, he encouraged his audience to continue the fight for socialism. This could only be achieved if communist parties refrained from compromising with non-communist tendencies.⁷²⁰ This, in light of Mao's position throughout 1957, was an explicit exhortation to the communist world (the CPSU and

⁷¹⁷ Ibid, p.648.

⁷¹⁸ Allen S. Whiting, "The Sino-Soviet Split", in Roderick MacFarquhar & John K. Fairbank (eds.) *The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 14*, op. cit., pp.482-483.

⁷¹⁹ Mao Zedong, "Speech at the Congress of Communist Parties and Workers Parties in Socialist Countries" (November 14, 1957), in Michael Y. M. Kau & John K. Leung (eds.), op. cit., p.769.

⁷²⁰ Mao Zedong, "Speech at the Congress of Communist Parties and Workers Parties in Socialist Countries", (November 18, 1957), in Michael Y. M. Kau & John K. Leung (eds.), op. cit., pp.781-792. See pp.784-789.

CCP in particular) that they must not discard the "swords" of Lenin and Stalin. Second, Mao focused on the need for "solidarity", stating that the world's communist parties "must have a head, and that head is the Soviet Union".⁷²¹ Yet such support for the Soviet Union was not unproblematic, with Mao continually making reference to the equality of the assembled parties thus intimating that the Soviets were but *primus inter pares*.⁷²² In effect Mao asserted that this implied that although responsibility for leadership of the communist world lay in Moscow, definition of "bloc" policy required the concurrence of other parties, not least of which the CCP's.⁷²³ Thus what would become an enormous divergence of both principle and interest began as a subtle, but portentously different analysis and shift of emphasis regarding both domestic and international affairs.

Domestically the GLF explicitly questioned the veracity of the Soviet model of development while it reverberated internationally to question the Soviet Union's monopoly on the leadership of the socialist world. As we have seen in 1957 Mao clearly questioned the direction of the Soviet Union, both domestically and internationally, under Nikita Khrushchev's de-Stalinisation program. The CCP, and perhaps more importantly, Mao's increasingly divergent ideological and political views gradually came to the fore through a number of important events including the 1958 Middle East and Quemoy crises and the multi-party Communist conferences in Bucharest and Moscow in 1960.⁷²⁴ From March to June 1958 Mao, in a series of talks, continued to develop the theme originally outlined the previous year concerning the need for China

⁷²¹ Ibid, p.790.

⁷²² Ibid, pp. 783-791 & also see speech of 14 November, 1957.

⁷²³ Allen S. Whiting, "The Sino-Soviet Split", op. cit, pp.482-483.

⁷²⁴ Ibid, p.478.

to develop its own path to socialism.⁷²⁵ As such these talks were peppered with exhortations to free China of its "slavish mentality", to not "follow blindly" and to develop "self reliance".⁷²⁶ The Middle East crisis of June-July 1958, whereby US and British troops were deployed in Lebanon and Jordan respectively, provoked sharp Chinese criticism of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's call for an immediate summit conference between the Soviet Union, US, Britain, France and India to resolve these incidents galled the Chinese on two counts. First, this was clearly the type of compromise towards the imperialists that Mao, at the November 1957 conference in Moscow, had specifically told his international comrades to avoid. Moreover, Khrushchev's omission of the PRC in his proposed summit meeting was a blow to Chinese prestige. Khrushchev amplified Chinese irritation when he accepted a US counter-proposal to discuss the issues within the UN Security Council, thus including Taiwan's representative while excluding the PRC.⁷²⁷ Such actions provided further evidence for Mao and the CCP of Moscow's increasingly "revisionist" deviation. The increasingly overt tensions between the two prompted Khrushchev to journey to Beijing for a "secret" summit with Mao in late July and early August 1958. If Khrushchev's intention was to ease the growing tensions in the relationship, he failed to do so, with the summit apparently breaking down over Soviet requests for shared military facilities in the PRC.⁷²⁸ The subsequent bombardment of the KMT held islands of Quemoy and Matsu in August produced further complications in the bilateral relationship. Although

⁷²⁵ "Talks at the Chengtu Conference" (10, 20 & 22 March, 1958) & "Speech at the Group Leaders' Forum of the Enlarged Meeting of the Military Affairs Committee" (28 June, 1958) in Stuart R. Schram (ed.), *Mao Tse-Tung Unrehearsed: Talks and Letters, 1956-71*, (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1974), pp. 96-130.

⁷²⁶ Ibid.

⁷²⁷ Ibid, pp.489-490 & Stuart R. Schram, op. cit., p.63.

⁷²⁸ Ibid & Immanuel C. Hsu, *The Rise of Modern China, 5th Edt.*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.676-677.

publicly the Soviets backed the PRC's position and pledged military support in the event of a US response, Khrushchev after the crisis had passed was highly critical of Mao's recklessness. Moreover, China's actions prompted the Soviet leader to reconsider the previous year's nuclear agreement.⁷²⁹ These primarily external events once more intersected with domestic developments stemming from the GLF to compound the divergence of national interest with an outright divergence of ideological imperatives.

The internal political developments that arose from the failure of the GLF in 1958-59, whereby criticism of the GLF and ultimately of Mao's position itself gradually coalesced within the leadership of the CCP, became entangled with this divergence in Sino-Soviet relations. Marshal Peng Dehuai's criticism of the GLF, and Mao himself, at the Lushan Conference (delivered in what Peng intended be a private letter to the chairman) on 14 July 1959 brought to the fore, in Mao's perception at least, the connection between internal opposition and Soviet "revisionism". Two months prior to the Lushan Conference Peng, in his capacity of Minister of Defence, had travelled to several Warsaw Pact countries where he had met Nikita Khrushchev twice. Mao's counter attack on Peng at Lushan, delivered on 23 July, intimated that Peng had colluded with Khrushchev in a strategy whereby the Soviets would criticise and place pressure on the Chinese over the GLF simultaneous with Peng's critique at Lushan.⁷³⁰ Khrushchev had in fact openly criticised the Chinese commune movement in Eastern Europe on 18 July and more importantly the Soviets cancelled their assistance to the PRC's nuclear program. Thus opening Peng to accusations that he had aired his concerns regarding the GLF to the Soviet leader before making them known to his

⁷²⁹ Allen S. Whiting, *op. cit.*, p.499.

⁷³⁰ Kenneth Lieberthal, "The Great Leap Forward and the Split in the Yenan Leadership", *op. cit.*, p.312.

Politburo colleagues.⁷³¹ The consequences of the Mao-Peng confrontation at Lushan were multifaceted and impacted heavily on both domestic political and international developments. Most immediately it resulted in the dismissal of Peng Dehuai and his replacement as Minister of Defence by Lin Biao, and the initiation of a campaign against “right opportunism” that obscured the continuing economic disaster caused by the GLF. Moreover, Mao’s vituperative attack on Peng for his criticism broke the party’s long-standing tradition of open debate amongst the top leadership that would have major consequences in the coming decade:

Before Lushan, it was accepted that any leader could freely voice his opinions at a Party gathering, and debate could be heated. Nobody would be taken to task subsequently for what he said, as long as he formally accepted and acted in accord with the final decision reached. But Mao’s actions at Lushan can be interpreted as having changed all that. First, Mao labelled internal criticism by a top colleague “unprincipled factional activity”. He then demanded that others choose between himself and his adversary, and that the loser be punished.⁷³²

For Mao the implications of the Lushan confrontation for Sino-Soviet relations were clear. The Soviet leadership’s attacks on the CCP and Mao’s ideological direction since 1958, perceived interference in China's domestic affairs in the form of Soviet reactions to the Quemoy crisis and "collusion" with Peng Dehuai, combined to provoke the public airing of Chinese grievances the following year. The Rumanian Party Congress in June 1960 saw the first exchange of what would be many polemics between Soviet and Chinese representatives, with Khrushchev criticising the PRC's domestic and foreign policies while comparing Mao with Stalin. The Chinese rejoinder focused on Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership's betrayal of Lenin and Stalin.⁷³³ This provoked

⁷³¹ Ibid, pp.313-314.

⁷³² Ibid, pp.316-317.

⁷³³ Allen S. Whiting, op. cit., pp.516-517.

the Soviets to withdraw Soviet technical advisers from the PRC the following month. The following multi-party conference held in Moscow from 30 September to 22 October 1960, however, witnessed a more systematic presentation of each protagonist's disagreements and grievances with the other. For example, the Chinese representatives, chiefly Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi, presented China's chief disputes with Moscow from 1956. In the process they highlighted the Soviet Union's demands for military facilities in China, interference in China's internal affairs in the form of criticism of the GLF and "collusion" against a "fraternal party", the withdrawal of Soviet advisers and the Soviet leadership's "revisionist" tendencies.⁷³⁴ The following two years saw an escalation of Sino-Soviet enmity that was compounded by the PRC's domestic GLF-derived socio-economic tribulations.

Thus 1961-1962 witnessed the convergence of the Sino-Soviet split and the fallout of the GLF movement. Mao illuminated the extent of the Sino-Soviet split before the "Seven Thousand Cadres" conference on 30 January 1962:

The Soviet Union was the first socialist country, and the Soviet Communist Party was the party created by Lenin. Although the party and the state leadership of the Soviet Union have now been usurped by the revisionists, I advise our comrades to believe firmly that the broad masses, the numerous party members and cadres of the Soviet Union are good; that they want revolution, and that the rule of the revisionist won't last long.⁷³⁵

Therefore, in Mao's estimation there was now little doubt that the Soviet Union had degenerated into revisionism. As a corollary of this development he intimated that the present Soviet leadership needed to be overthrown by the "broad masses" of the Soviet

⁷³⁴ Ibid, p.518.

⁷³⁵ "Talk at an Enlarged Central Work Conference", (30 January, 1962), in Stuart R. Schram (ed.), *Mao Tse-Tung Unrehearsed: Talks and Letters, 1956-71*, op. cit., p.181.

Union.⁷³⁶ This statement had implications for not only Sino-Soviet relations but also for the course of China's domestic policy. By stating that the Soviet Union had indeed been the world's first socialist state and juxtaposing this to the revisionism of the contemporary Soviet leadership, Mao was explicitly suggesting to his audience that a similar fate could befall the Chinese revolution. Moreover, his emphasis on the revisionism of the Soviet leadership rather than the whole of the CPSU and Soviet society served as a further illustration of the continuity of classes in socialist society and the necessity for continued class struggle. Both prior to and following the above statement, Mao continually emphasised that class struggle had to be the CCP's guiding principle both domestically and internationally.⁷³⁷ This was but the latest instalment in a long line of statements that elucidated Mao's major preoccupations since the 1957-58 "Anti-Rightist" campaign. That is to say Mao increasingly perceived the PRC, and not least of all the revolution, to be under threat from "revisionism" both internationally, in the form of the Soviet Union, and domestically in the form of various "rightists" and "bourgeois nationalists".⁷³⁸

As noted above, 1962 saw the exodus of an enormous number of ethnic minorities across the Sino-Soviet border to the Kazak SSR. The PRC later claimed that 60 000 people from the Ili Kazak Autonomous Zhou, with Soviet instigation, crossed the frontier after a series of anti-government protests in Ili between May and July.⁷³⁹ Chao's

⁷³⁶ Ibid & Stuart R. Schram, "Mao Tse-tung's Thought from 1949 to 1976", op. cit., p.65.

⁷³⁷ For example see "Talk at an Enlarged Central Work Conference", op. cit., pp.169-170 & pp.182-187.

⁷³⁸ See Ibid, " Speech at the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee", in Stuart R. Schram (ed.), *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed*, op. cit., pp.188-196.

⁷³⁹ See Linda Benson & Ingvar Svanberg, op. cit., p.104, Rasma Silde-Karklins, op. cit, p.362, Wu Chao, "A Study of the Buildup of 'Production and Construction Corps' Along the Sino-Soviet Frontiers", *Issues & Studies* (November 1969), p.58. Benson claims that the figure of 100 000 people is more accurate.

claim that the refugees were of the "Ili nationality", although they were in the majority Kazaks⁷⁴⁰, and the mention of one Zunin Taipov lead to the conclusion that a significant element of this group were ex-INA fighters. A number of sources claim that the bulk of the refugees were from a production and construction unit and that they were led by Zunin Taipov, who had been a major-general in the PLA 5th Corps and a "deputy chief of staff" of the Xinjiang Military Region.⁷⁴¹ Moreover, it will be recalled that the PLA 5th Corps was created out of the INA after the PLA's "peaceful liberation" of Xinjiang. The Soviet authorities encouraged the ethnic minority exodus by issuing Soviet passports at the Soviet Consulate in Ili or validating antedated Soviet passports held by Xinjiang residents since the 1930s.⁷⁴² In the context of Xinjiang this convergence of domestic and external factors posed a serious challenge to the Chinese position. That the major impetus for this movement of people derived from the adverse results of the GLF in Xinjiang was not publicly acknowledge by the Chinese authorities. Rather, Soviet subversion and interference was excoriated as the major source of unrest in Xinjiang. At the Tenth Plenum of the 8th Central Committee on 24 September Mao reiterated the CCP's opposition to "revisionism" and the Soviet Union's history of antagonistic actions since the foundation of the PRC.⁷⁴³ Furthermore, in direct reference to the divergence within the "socialists camp" (primarily a function of the Sino-Soviet split) Mao elucidated the CCP's guiding principle:

So the socialist camp is internally highly complicated too. It is, in fact, also very simple. There is only one principle involved: that is the problem of the class struggle - the problem of the struggle between the proletariat and the

⁷⁴⁰ See Linda Benson & Ingvar Svanberg, op. cit., pp.104-105.

⁷⁴¹ Wu Chao, op. cit., p.58, Geoffery Wheeler, "On the Frontiers: Sinkiang and the Soviet Union", *The China Quarterly*, no. 16, (October-December 1963), p.59 & Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power*, op. cit., p.124.

⁷⁴² Ibid, p.137 & Allen S. Whiting, op. cit., pp.520-521, Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power*, op. cit., pp.122-123.

⁷⁴³ "Speech at the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee", (24 September 1962), op. cit., pp.190-191.

bourgeoisie, the problem of the struggle between Marxism-Leninism and anti-Marxism-Leninism, the problem of the struggle between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism.⁷⁴⁴

In reference to the various incidents in Xinjiang over the May-July period the same plenum charged the "modern revisionists" (ie. the Soviet Union) with fomenting dissension amongst the ethnic minorities and attempting to "detach" Xinjiang from the PRC.⁷⁴⁵ This continued a theme long evident in Chinese perceptions of Xinjiang, whereby internal disorders were blamed almost exclusively on external influences. Yet the veracity of such an argument was belied by the Chinese response. In concert with the closure of all Soviet consulates in Xinjiang and the creation of a *cordon sanitaire* along the Sino-Soviet frontier, the GLF policies and the associated "fusionist" approach to ethnic minorities were partially retrenched in Xinjiang.⁷⁴⁶

Once again a contradictory dynamic was created between the stance taken by the central authorities toward ethnic minority regions and the actual practice of the regime's representatives along the frontiers. Given Mao's emphasis on the primary importance of "class struggle" noted above, one would expect that there would have been an associated intensification of the assimilative policies of the GLF period. In Xinjiang the authorities now asserted, however, that although "fusion" and assimilation of ethnic minorities remained the ultimate goal, it was to be achieved gradually over a long period of time.⁷⁴⁷ This may have been symptomatic, as Connor notes, of the sharpening

⁷⁴⁴ Ibid, p.191.

⁷⁴⁵ June Teufel Dreyer, *China's Forty Millions*, op. cit., p.192 & Allen S. Whiting, op. cit., p. 521.

⁷⁴⁶ See Allen S. Whiting, "The Sino-Soviet Split", op. cit., pp.520-521, Wu Chao, op. cit., p.58, & Linda Benson & Ingvar Svanberg, op. cit., p.137.

⁷⁴⁷ Donald H. McMillen, op. cit., pp.124-125 & June Teufel Dreyer, *China's Forty Millions*, op. cit., pp.189-190.

of the dispute within the party's top leadership regarding the form, direction and intensity of the party's policies in the wake of the GLF.⁷⁴⁸ Moreover, contemporaneous with the meeting of the Tenth Plenum a conference on the "nationalities question" was held in Beijing and was attended by Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Deng Xiaoping. While these leaders lent their support to a gradualist approach to the "national question", Mao was notably silent on the issue.⁷⁴⁹ Undoubtedly the perceptions of these leaders and the provincial authorities had been greatly influenced by the disorders in Xinjiang and the potential for "revisionist" meddling. The contradictory imperatives flowing from the central authorities were further illustrated in 1963 when the Xinjiang CCP simultaneously attempted to reassure the ethnic minorities that their "special characteristics" would be taken into account while exhorting them to heighten their "political consciousness".⁷⁵⁰ As such the authorities were to permit the usage of ethnic minorities' spoken and written languages and respect their "customs and habits". Illustrative of this renewed tolerance was the resumption of the celebration of Muslim festivals that had been curtailed since 1958.⁷⁵¹ Concurrently, the ethnic minorities were urged to adopt a resolute position of "class struggle" to combat internal enemies and external "modern revisionists".⁷⁵² These contradictory imperatives were largely the function of Chinese threat perceptions regarding the Soviet Union, and the need to combat Soviet propaganda. The exodus of 60 000 to 100 000 Kazaks and Uighurs the previous year prompted the Soviets to intensify their anti-Chinese propaganda in Xinjiang from 1963 onward. This was mainly achieved through the operation of Uighur

⁷⁴⁸ Walker Connor, *The Nationalities Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Practice*, op. cit., pp.417-419.

⁷⁴⁹ Ibid & June Teufel Dreyer, op. cit., pp.190-191.

⁷⁵⁰ Donald H. McMillen, op. cit., p.124.

⁷⁵¹ Linda Benson & Ingvar Svanberg, op. cit., p.138-139.

⁷⁵² Ibid.

language radio broadcasts emanating from Tashkent and Alma-Ata in Soviet Central Asia.⁷⁵³ Soviet broadcasts were often made in the name of well known Uighur or Kazak emigres, such as Zunin Taipov, while their content was focused on contrasting conditions in Xinjiang with those of the ethnic minorities' "brothers" in Soviet Central Asia.⁷⁵⁴ Thus due to the exigencies of the situation the Chinese were compelled to reconcile two conflicting imperatives that impacted upon their ability to control Xinjiang. That is to say at time of intensified Soviet threat (at least in Chinese perceptions) to their position in Xinjiang, the Chinese had to implement policies within Xinjiang that had the potential to reinforce the detrimental effects of Soviet influence.

The lessening of the party's radical and "fusionist" approach toward the ethnic minorities proved to be but a brief respite. That there was division within the party's leadership concerning the "national question", amongst other things, was a contributing factor to the somewhat indecisive handling of this issue in Xinjiang from 1962-1964. We have also seen, however, that the questions of external influence and national security played no small part in complicating the imperatives of the CCP in Xinjiang. The central leadership developed a more wide-reaching response to the issues of Soviet "subversion" and ethnic minority unrest in Xinjiang in 1963 that reflected the conflicting imperatives generated by the Xinjiang incident. In September 1963 Mao put before the Politburo a "Directive on opposing revisionism in Sinkiang" although reflecting the preference of leaders such as Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping for continued moderation in "nationalities" policy, significantly also placed heavy emphasis

⁷⁵³ See Rasma Silde-Karklins, op. cit., pp.358-359, June Teufel Dreyer, "The PLA and Regionalism in Xinjiang", *Pacific Review*, Vol. 7, no. 1 (1994), p.43, & Donald H. McMillen, "The Urumqi Military Region: Defense and Security in China's West", *Asian Survey*, vol. 22, no.8, (August 1982), p..710.

⁷⁵⁴ Rasma Silde-Karklins, op. cit., p.359 & Donald H. McMillen, op. cit., p.124.

on Mao's national struggle-as-class struggle formulation.⁷⁵⁵ It will be recalled that Mao had placed great emphasis on this formulation during the GLF⁷⁵⁶, and his decision to resuscitate it at this juncture is illustrative of his perception of the major dilemmas posed by Chinese rule of Xinjiang. That Mao deemed the implementation of the "class line" as the major stratagem required to secure Xinjiang suggests that he desired to intensify and accelerate the integration of not only the region, but also its people into the politico-ideological and socio-economic milieu of China proper. That this was indeed the case was confirmed by the course of Chinese techniques and tactics of rule in Xinjiang throughout the remainder of the Maoist period. Thus according to this directive of 27 September 1963, the party needed to address the economic situation in Xinjiang in order to combat Soviet propaganda. The economic situation was to be stabilised by lessening grain requisitioning and ensuring greater access to basic commodities. The rest of Mao's directive was, however, focused on the "correct" handling of the national question. The general tenor of which was summed up by Mao's statement that "We must put politics in command".⁷⁵⁷ Although within this exposition on the handling of the national question Mao noted that it was necessary to educate Han cadres in minority languages and respect of minority customs, his major point was for cadres to "uphold a class viewpoint, and to implement a class line".⁷⁵⁸ The final points of his directive exhorted the regional party and PLA to remain vigilant against Soviet subversion and intensify the "anti-revisionist struggle at the border".⁷⁵⁹

⁷⁵⁵ Stuart R. Schram, "Mao Tse-tung's Thought from 1949 to 1976", op. cit., p.66.

⁷⁵⁶ Walker Connor, op. cit., p.419.

⁷⁵⁷ Stuart R. Schram, "Mao Tse-tung's Thought from 1949 to 1976", op. cit., p.66.

⁷⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁹ Ibid.

In this context the authorities' decision to reinvigorate the *xiafang* movement to Xinjiang a month before this directive⁷⁶⁰ could be seen as a counter-weight to the limited moderation of the party's economic, social and cultural policies toward the ethnic minorities. In fact over the course of the 1963-1966 period resettlement of Han youths, the majority of whom came from Shanghai, to Xinjiang was "sharply increased".⁷⁶¹ As noted previously, the *xiafang* movement in the context of Xinjiang was primarily concerned with three major goals that could be termed "ethical", "developmental" and "demographic". The reinvigorated *xiafang* or "rustication" movement to Xinjiang, in contrast to the movement in the 1950s that focused on settling demobilised PLA soldiers and technical personnel, was focused on the "sending down" of educated urban youth.⁷⁶² The "ethical" goal of rustication now appeared to be ascendant, as little by way of material incentives was offered to potential *xiafang* youth. Rather, the emphasis was placed on the ideological virtues of aiding in the "development" of Xinjiang.⁷⁶³ Upon their arrival in Xinjiang rusticates were generally absorbed into the Xinjiang PCC, in order to be ideologically "tempered" by the corps experienced quasi-military cadres.⁷⁶⁴ By 1966 some 100 000-*xiafang* youth were reported to be serving in the Xinjiang PCC.⁷⁶⁵

⁷⁶⁰ Lynn T. White III, "The Road to Urumchi", op. cit., pp.501-503.

⁷⁶¹ Ibid & Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and the Production and Construction Corps", op. cit., p.77.

⁷⁶² Lynn T. White III, op. cit., pp.501-502.

⁷⁶³ Ibid, pp.502-503.

⁷⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁵ Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and the Production and Construction Corps", op. cit., p.77 & Lynn T. White III, op. cit., pp.505-506.

It is necessary to note that during this period the military under the direction of Marshal Lin Biao had begun to assume a role and function beyond those purely concerned with national defence. The PLA under Lin Biao expanded its organisational responsibilities, often obfuscating the division between the party and "the gun", while its control over the civilian population was enhanced via the formation of civilian militias under military leadership in 1962.⁷⁶⁶ Moreover, Lin Biao placed great emphasis on increasing political education and mobilisation in the PLA for which purpose he oversaw a compilation of quotations of Mao Zedong.⁷⁶⁷ The importance of the PLA's revolutionary élan as a model for civilian sectors of society began to be heavily emphasised from late 1963 onward, with Mao in December calling on the people to "learn from the PLA".⁷⁶⁸ The PLA, in Mao's perception, was the only organisation capable of successfully integrating politics and expertise - that is to be both "red" and "expert".⁷⁶⁹ Thus Mao saw the PLA as the only organisation capable of achieving the correct balance between politico-ideological virtue and technical prowess that he deemed vital to the development of the PRC. The success of the PLA in the brief Sino-Indian War of 1962 and the successful explosion of the PRC's first atomic device in 1964 apparently reinforced such notions as to the ability of the military under Lin Biao to achieve greater ideological mobilisation without detriment to its operational activities.⁷⁷⁰

⁷⁶⁶ Kenneth Lieberthal, "The Great Leap Forward and the Split in the Yenan Leadership", op. cit. p.337.

⁷⁶⁷ Harry Harding, "The Chinese State in Crisis", in Denis Twitchett & John K Fairbank (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China Vol.15, The People's Republic, Pt.2: Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution, 1966-1982*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.116.

⁷⁶⁸ Ibid, pp.336-338.

⁷⁶⁹ Ibid, p.338.

⁷⁷⁰ Harry Harding, op. cit., p.117.

Therefore, that the bulk of rusticated youths in Xinjiang should be absorbed by the military-controlled PCC was therefore no coincidence. Importantly the influx of urban Han youth into the PCC had the effect of diluting the veteran element of the corps - a development that would take on great significance during the Cultural Revolution period.⁷⁷¹ The overall impact of the *xiafang* movement up to 1966 was such that the Xinjiang PCC's membership swelled to 600 000, approximately double that of its size in 1957.⁷⁷² The CCP's approach toward Xinjiang and its ethnic minorities were therefore delicately balanced between the imperatives of national security and the state's integrationist project, and those of the "national question". The former required the authorities to expand those key instruments of security and integration that had been instituted in the region since 1949. Thus the function and scope of the PLA and the Xinjiang PCC were expanded, while the PCC's role as conduit for Han settlement in Xinjiang was also reinvigorated. A corollary of this approach was the great emphasis placed on the need for the extension of state-wide politico-ideological and socio-economic movements to Xinjiang. The latter, however, in light of the 1961-1962 disturbances required the at least tactical retreat from the blanket application of just such state-wide policies as represented by the GLF. This delicate balance was soon to be disturbed in Xinjiang, however, with the development of a renewed attempt to forcibly accelerate the integration of the region that took place under the rubric of the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution". The following 1966-1976 period once more witnessed the convergence of external pressures, specifically within the parameters of the Sino-Soviet relationship, with the domestic integrationist techniques and tactics of rule.

⁷⁷¹ Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and the Production and Construction Corps", op.cit., p.78.

⁷⁷² Ibid.

The "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" & Hua Guofeng Interregnum in Xinjiang, 1966-1978

The Cultural Revolution (hereafter CR), officially initiated at the Eleventh Plenum of the Central Committee in August 1966, was in effect equal parts a conflict over the ideological direction of the PRC and a personal power struggle amongst the party's elite.⁷⁷³ The origins of the CR were of course not derived from the problematic question of the party's approach to the "national question", yet the major themes of the movement nonetheless heavily impacted upon this specific segment of party rule. As noted above, it is not my intention to undertake a "blow-by-blow" analysis of the development of the CR as others have addressed the general contours of the movement in detail. Moreover, such an undertaking would not be particularly germane to the focus of the chapter. Rather, the focus will be on the specific dynamics created by the movement in Xinjiang. The course of the CR in Xinjiang was essentially determined by the factional conflict between the entrenched regional PLA and CCP officials such as Wang Enmao, and the new appointees in the Regional Revolutionary Committees, PLA elements connected to Lin Biao's 4th Field Army and the Red Guards.⁷⁷⁴ The vicissitudes of the CR on a state-wide basis, although important, are only such in relation to their impact on the major components of the state's integrationist project in Xinjiang. That is to say, what is of interest in the context of this thesis is the dynamics specific to Xinjiang that were created by or interacted with the imperatives of Beijing. The conflict between the entrenched administrative and military authorities, represented by Wang Enmao and the

⁷⁷³ See for example Harry Harding, "The Chinese State in Crisis", op. cit., pp.107-200 & Stuart R. Schram, "Introduction: The Cultural Revolution in Historical Perspective" in Stuart R. Schram (ed.), *Authority, Participation and Cultural Change in China*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp.1-108.

⁷⁷⁴ Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power*, op. cit, p.181 & June Teufel Dreyer, "The PLA and Regionalism in Xinjiang", op. cit., p.44.

leaders of the First FA, and Beijing appointees and radical Red Guards generated unintended consequences in the context of the state's ultimate goal of integration. Although all these factions were primarily Han in composition, the consequences and "policies" that resulted from the factional conflict ultimately impacted heavily upon Xinjiang's ethnic minorities. The dislocation generated by the movement in Xinjiang once again provided the opportunity for the Soviet Union to place pressure on the PRC. The nature and scope of the Soviet threat to Xinjiang, although an expression of the wider Sino-Soviet split in international affairs, was enhanced due to the historical legacy of Russian/Soviet influence in the region and by the existence of cross-border ethnic affinities. Thus the nature of the threat was not simply perceived as exclusively emanating from the actions of the Soviet state itself but also as potentially inherent to the non-Han peoples of Xinjiang.

The months leading up to the official invocation of the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" on 8 August, saw Mao and key supporters such as Lin Biao develop and intensify the major ideological themes of the previous four years. Central to these ideological trends were Mao's perceptions of the impact and existence of "revisionism" within the party that, as we have seen, had increasingly preoccupied him since the late 1950s. Mao had increasingly determined that the only means by which to purify the party, state and society of such tendencies was to return in part to the mass mobilisation strategy of the GLF period but with a far greater emphasis on "class struggle". Moreover, Mao now did not perceive certain individuals or segments of society as principally expressing "revisionist" or "bourgeois" tendencies but rather the party as a whole degenerating into "bureaucratism" and tolerating or encouraging the re-

emergence of "traditional" or "bourgeois" thought and practices. The areas of concern for Mao were thus multi-faceted and encompassed the spectrum of economic, social and cultural policies of the party.⁷⁷⁵ When the CR was officially initiated at the Eleventh Plenum of the Central Committee on 8 August 1966 it adopted a "Sixteen Point Decision" that laid out Mao's vision for the movement. The purpose of Mao's "second revolution" was to:

struggle against and overthrow those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road, to criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois academic "authorities" and the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes and to transform education, literature and art, and *all other parts of the superstructure not in correspondence with the socialist economic base.*⁷⁷⁶

Ethnic minority regions and the ethnic minorities themselves, by virtue of their "special" treatment since 1949, naturally expressed tendencies/practices that were not "in correspondence with the socialist economic base" and therefore became key targets of the movement. Moreover, a key slogan and exhortation of the movement was to attack "the Four Olds" which were identified as old customs, ideas, culture and habits. Although this was indeed a state-wide theme of the CR, the call for an assault on traditional customs and culture was rather more portentous for the ethnic minorities than it was for the Han. As during the GLF, the concept of national regional autonomy, the tolerance of national distinctions, cooperation with traditional elites and differing tempos for achieving socialism for ethnic minorities were again excoriated.⁷⁷⁷ The policies now deemed to be "correct" regarding the issue of the ethnic minorities were

⁷⁷⁵ Harry Harding, "The Chinese State in Crisis", op. cit., pp.113-115 & pp. 138-142, & Stuart R. Schram, "Mao's Thought from 1949-1976", op. cit., pp. 73-82.

⁷⁷⁶ *Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution*, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966). (My emphasis)

⁷⁷⁷ Walker Connor, op. cit., pp.421-422, June Teufel Dreyer, "The PLA and Regionalism in Xinjiang", op. cit., p.44, & Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power*, op. cit., p.186.

characterised by three major elements:

- (1) The PRC was deemed to have 'settled' the minority question and therefore no longer required minority policies
- (2) Minority areas were no longer considered to require 'special' or preferential political, economic or cultural policies,
- (3) The policy of 'national regional autonomy' was condemned as creating independent regions and encouraging separatism.⁷⁷⁸

Yet the force of such radical and "fusionist" prescriptions for ethnic minorities was not immediately felt in Xinjiang, primarily due to the actions of the entrenched political and military leadership. The movement began officially in the region with the broadcast of Zhou Enlai over Radio Urumqi calling for the support of the people of Xinjiang for the CR on 3 August 1966.⁷⁷⁹ Moreover, Mao's famous 18 August review of a mass rally of a million Red Guards in Tiananman Square was celebrated with a mass rally in Urumqi attended by Wang Enmao and other party and military leaders in Xinjiang.⁷⁸⁰ Beijing's calls to identify and attack "those in the party taking the capitalist road" was implemented selectively by Wang Enmao, with those individuals purged apparently "sacrificial lambs" to convince the radicals of the region's conformity with the rest of the country.⁷⁸¹ Wang Enmao's association with the more "moderate" interpretation of the party's minority policies undoubtedly played a instrumental role in determining his cautious response to the Cultural Revolution, as perhaps did the lessons drawn from the consequences of similarly radical policies during the GLF.⁷⁸² Thus when the first batch of some 400 Red Guards arrived in Urumqi in late August and early September, the

⁷⁷⁸ Thomas Heberer, *China and its National Minorities: Autonomy or Assimilation?*, (New York, M. E. Sharpe, 1989), pp.25-27.

⁷⁷⁹ Linda Benson & Ingvar Svanberg, *China's Last Nomads*, op. cit., p.106.

⁷⁸⁰ Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power*, op. cit., p.187 & June Teufel Dreyer, *China's Forty Millions*, op. cit., p.206.

⁷⁸¹ Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power*, op. cit., p.188.

⁷⁸² Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and Production and Construction Corps", pp.79-80.

authorities closely monitored their activities. Soon thereafter an "incident" between the Han Red Guards and local Muslims occurred.⁷⁸³ The extension of the CR, in the form of the young Han Red Guards had thus introduced another political actor into the volatile border region. Over the course of the following month another 5000 Red Guards arrived in Ürümqi from Beijing and began to attack the established political authorities. In the process they accused Wang of being a "native emperor" presiding over an "independent kingdom" and attacked the head of the PCC, Tao Zhiyue, as a "reactionary".⁷⁸⁴ Wang responded, however, by utilising the key components of his power base in Xinjiang - units of the PCC, PLA and the Xinjiang CCP organisation - to combat the radicals. The Red Guard's influence, however, impacted heavily on some PCC units, particularly amongst the rusticated youth. As a result factions were formed within PCC units that generally pitted rusticates against the pro-Wang Enmao veterans. This process culminated in a series of violent clashes between the Red Guard factions and the pro-Wang elements between December 1966 and January 1967.⁷⁸⁵ Contemporaneously Wang Enmao journeyed to Beijing where he apparently used the violent clashes to convince the central authorities of the need for the movement to be controlled in Xinjiang. If that was indeed his purpose he succeeded, with the central committee's military affairs commission issuing a directive on 28 January calling for the temporary suspension of the CR in regions that constituted the "first line" of defence against "modern revisionism".⁷⁸⁶

⁷⁸³ Linda Benson & Ingvar Svanberg, *op. cit.*, p.106.

⁷⁸⁴ Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power*, *op. cit.*, pp.189-192, June Teufel Dreyer, "The PLA and Regionalism", *op. cit.*, p.44 & Lynn T. White III, *op. cit.*, p.507.

⁷⁸⁵ Lynn T. White III, *op. cit.*, p.507, Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and the Production and Construction Corps", *op. cit.*, p.80 & June Teufel Dreyer, *China's Forty Millions*, *op. cit.*, p.214.

⁷⁸⁶ June Teufel Dreyer, *China's Forty Millions*, *op. cit.*, p.214 & Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and the Production and Construction Corps", *op. cit.*, p.80.

The suspension of the CR in Xinjiang did not, however, prevent further violence on the ground nor prevent the erosion of Wang Enmao's position. Wang's position was in fact demoted in 1968 to vice-chairman of the new "Revolutionary Committee" and removed from the region the following year. Moreover, those associated with his tenure in Xinjiang, such as Tao Zhiyue, were also replaced by radical sympathisers or by individuals from Lin Biao's Fourth FA.⁷⁸⁷ Between 1969 and 1971 the new regional leadership under Long Shujin attempted to reinvigorate the radical ideological agenda of the initial stages of the CR that reiterated the necessity for "class struggle". Moreover, the regional authorities attempted to establish "Revolutionary Committees" at all levels and oversaw the entrenchment of officials directly connected to Lin Biao's Fourth FA or supportive of the Mao-Lin faction in Beijing.⁷⁸⁸ Long Shujin's radicalisation of the party's economic agenda in the region that was based on the logic of the GLF policies, ultimately produced few results other than a general stagnation of the economy.⁷⁸⁹ Following the "Lin Biao Affair" in 1972, however, the regional leadership was once again overhauled by the central authorities to remove those connected with the disgraced former Minister of Defence. Significantly, Saifudin replaced Long Shujin as revolutionary committee chairman and first party secretary intimating a possible relaxation of radical policies.⁷⁹⁰ Such a eventuality, however, was not to take place until the death of Mao and the subsequent fall of his most radical supporters, the "Gang of Four", in 1976.

⁷⁸⁷ Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and the Production and Construction Corps", op. cit., p.81.

⁷⁸⁸ See Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power*, op. cit., pp.254-269.

⁷⁸⁹ Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and Wang Enmao", op. cit., p.571, Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and the Production and Construction Corps", op. cit, p.82 & June Teufel Dreyer, "The PLA and Regionalism", op.cit., p.45.

⁷⁹⁰ June Teufel Dreyer, *China's Forty Millions*, op. cit., p.239.

Throughout this largely Han power struggle in Xinjiang a number of dynamics emerged regarding the major components of the state's integrationist project, Soviet pressure, and ethnic minority unrest. As noted in detail earlier, a major component of the state's integrationist project was the *xiafang* of large numbers of urban Han youth to Xinjiang. The fortune of such rusticates and the PCC into which they were absorbed over the 1966-1976 period is illustrative of the unintended consequences generated by the CR in Xinjiang. Especially within the most militant 1966-1969 phase of the CR, the Maoist call to "exchange revolutionary experiences" actually worked against a major instrument of the state's integrationist project - the settlement of Han in Xinjiang. Furthermore, this period also saw the weakening of the PCC due to the violent confrontation between pro-Maoist and pro-Wang factions. The CR in Xinjiang can be seen as an attempt to achieve the total integration of the region with the rest of the PRC. The primary targets of the Maoists in the context of Xinjiang were the manifestations of "otherness" or "separateness" inherent to the ethnic minorities and those within the regional party and military apparatus that had perpetuated them since 1949. Furthermore, the periods of the most dramatic weakening of the series of techniques and tactics of rule implemented by the party since 1949 coincided with the most serious manifestations of Sino-Soviet conflict. Perhaps not coincidental was the almost simultaneous development of ethnic minority unrest and opposition to the Chinese authorities. The CR's questioning and erosion of the party's legitimacy and authority clearly played a significant role in stimulating adverse ethnic minority responses. It seems, with the benefit of historical hindsight, that such a dynamic could not but generate or invite Soviet interference. The central authorities, although thoroughly absorbed in the political struggle of the CR, were not unaware of the potential

detrimental effects of the CR in such strategic frontier regions. As will be demonstrated, no matter the intensity of the internal dynamics of the CR, both the central and provincial authorities were extremely cognisant of the potential harm to be done to the ultimate goal of integration if the convergence of external and internal "threats" were left unchecked.

The CR in Xinjiang heavily impacted on the Han rusticates that had been encouraged to aid in the "development" of the north-west since the early 1960s. As noted above, the total number of Han rusticates in Xinjiang by 1966 was in the order of 70 000.⁷⁹¹ Moreover, three quarters of these youths were absorbed into units of the PCC where they were to experience ideological and practical "tempering" at the hands of PCC veterans. Upon the initiation of the CR, however, the Maoist injunctions to struggle against the entrenched political leadership, encapsulated in the dictum "bombard the headquarters", questioned such subordination to established authorities. With the arrival of Red Guards from Beijing, as noted above, rusticates were encouraged to forcibly remedy their situation. This resulted in the division of much of the PCC into opposing factions that often engaged in open armed conflict in major centres such as Shihezi, Dushanzi and even the provincial capital Urumqi.⁷⁹² The development of such conflict within the predominantly Han organisation charged with major security and developmental responsibilities considerably weakened the control of the authorities. Moreover, another common exhortation to Han youth during this period, "to exchange

⁷⁹¹ See June Teufel Dreyer, *China's Forty Millions*, op. cit., p.253 & Lynn T. White III, op. cit., pp.505-506.

⁷⁹² Lynn T. White III, op. cit., p.507 & Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and the Production and Construction Corps", op. cit., p.80. The 25 January Shihezi fighting had to be suppressed by regular PLA units and open street-fighting occurred in Ürümqi.

revolutionary experiences", also served to undermine the integrationist goals of the CR. The turmoil within Xinjiang and the PCC compelled many rusticates from 1967 onward to return to their places of origin in intramural China.⁷⁹³ The numbers of Han youth to make their way back to intramural China must have been significant, with Shanghai authorities urging them to "fight their way back" to Xinjiang in 1967.⁷⁹⁴ Further confirmation that the disorder within Xinjiang was primarily responsible for the return of rusticates can be discerned in the fact that the *xiafang* movement was conspicuously scaled back by 1968.⁷⁹⁵ Toward the end of that year, however, Mao reasserted the Leninist vanguard role of the party in order to bring the mass movement under control, thus the Red Guard movement gradually lost its utility in the chairman's visions for the CR.⁷⁹⁶ The consequence of Mao's effort to re-establish some form of party control over the CR was the disbanding of many mass youth organisations. This was accompanied by an effort through 1968-69 to reinvigorate the *xiafang* movement to frontier regions such as Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Tibet.⁷⁹⁷ To this effect Mao made a number statements to the effect that it many urban youths should be sent down to the countryside to be "educated by the peasants". By 1970 up to 5.4 million youths had been transferred to rural areas, often to frontier regions such as Xinjiang.⁷⁹⁸ Hence the integrationist instrument of population transfer to frontier regions was eventually reinforced after the initial phase of the CR had produced contradictory effects. This is but one example that suggests that despite the questioning and dismantling of

⁷⁹³ Lynn T. White III, op. cit., pp.505-507 & Donald H. McMillen, op. cit., p.81.

⁷⁹⁴ Lynn T. White III, op. cit., p.508.

⁷⁹⁵ Ibid, p.509.

⁷⁹⁶ June Teufel Dreyer, *China's Forty Millions*, op. cit., p.232 & Harry Harding, "The Chinese State in Crisis", op. cit, pp.187-189.

⁷⁹⁷ June Teufel Dreyer, *China's Forty Millions*, op. cit., p.232.

⁷⁹⁸ Harry Harding, op.cit., pp.188-189.

entrenched state policy and institutions brought on by the CR, the state's goal of integration in regions such as Xinjiang was in effect beyond question.

The issues of Soviet pressure and the development of unrest and opposition amongst Xinjiang's ethnic minorities were in many respects complimentary. As the exodus of Kazakhs and Uighurs in 1962 demonstrated, the cross-border ethnic affinities and historical influence of Russia/Soviet Union in Xinjiang could very rapidly converge with internal unrest to pose significant challenges to Chinese rule. Such a dynamic continued during the CR period. The turmoil created by factional conflict within the PCC in 1966-67, for example, compelled Beijing to temporarily suspend the CR in Xinjiang lest it pave the way for revisionist intrigues. The dislocation created by the CR in 1966-67 also had an impact on the orientation of some elements of the ethnic minority population. Toward the end of 1967 and into January 1969 there were a number of incidents of "savage fighting" between heavily armed Uighurs and PLA troops.⁷⁹⁹ Yet the apex in the convergence of internal unrest and external pressures took place over the years 1968-1972, and more so than in the GLF involved the wider scope of the Sino-Soviet conflict. The 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, accompanied as it was by the Soviet leadership's declaration that it reserved the right to intervene anywhere in the socialist world in order to preserve communist rule, had clear implications for the PRC.⁸⁰⁰ If further notice was required, the Soviets also began to

⁷⁹⁹ June Teufel Dreyer, *China's Forty Millions*, op. cit., p.216 & Wu Chao, "A Study of the Chinese Communist Buildup", op cit., p.58.

⁸⁰⁰ Thomas Robinson, "China Confronts the Soviet Union: Warfare and Diplomacy on China's Inner Asian Frontiers", in Roderick MacFarquhar & John K. Fairbank (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China Vol. 15, The People's Republic, Pt. 2: Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution, 1966-1982*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 249-250.

publicly state that they no longer considered the PRC to be a Marxist-Leninist state.⁸⁰¹ Chinese threat perceptions were therefore substantially sharpened by the Soviets' actions and posturing, and this certainly contributed to the gradual escalation of the Sino-Soviet confrontation. Late in December 1968 there were clashes between PLA and Soviet troops in the vicinity of Tacheng close to the border with the Kazakh SSR.⁸⁰² In March the following year serious clashes between Soviet and Chinese troops along the Ussuri River heightened Sino-Soviet tensions still further pushing the prospect of war between the two from the realm of the possible to that of the probable.⁸⁰³ That June also saw Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev deliver an address before the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties (which China did not attend) in Moscow that was highly critical of and hostile toward the PRC.⁸⁰⁴ In the wake of the violent clashes along the Ussuri and the Soviet's renewed rhetorical attacks on Beijing, a number of incidents or "border provocations" continued along the Soviet-Xinjiang frontier. The most serious took place in the north-west along the Kazakh SSR-Xinjiang border. Contemporaneously, reports of the formation of a "Free Turkestan Movement" in the Kazakh SSR complete with a Soviet-equipped 50 000 to 60 000 strong military force was circulated.⁸⁰⁵ Moreover, through Soviet radio broadcasts into Xinjiang this "Free Turkestan Movement" was said to be led by none other than Zunin Taipov, the ex-PLA major-general.⁸⁰⁶

⁸⁰¹ Ibid.

⁸⁰² Linda Benson & Ingvar Svanberg, *op. cit.*, p.107.

⁸⁰³ Ibid, pp.254-265.

⁸⁰⁴ Ibid, p.269.

⁸⁰⁵ Ibid, p.277, June Teufel Dreyer, "The PLA and Regionalism", *op. cit.*, pp.44-45,

⁸⁰⁶ Donald H. McMillen, "The Urumqi Military Regions", *op. cit.*, p.710, Thomas Robinson, "China Confronts the Soviet Union", *op. cit.*, p.277.

Thus, the perennial fear of a foreign power utilising internal opposition as its cat's paw in Xinjiang once more returned to the forefront of Chinese perceptions. The response of Beijing to these events in Xinjiang, as noted above, was indicative of the entrenchment of the goal of integration. Although there was a partial relaxation in at least the "fusionist" rhetoric regarding ethnic minorities, it was paralleled by a strengthening of the major instruments of integration in Xinjiang - Han settlement, the PCC and the PLA. As we have seen, the disbanding of many mass youth organisations in 1968-69 resulted in the re-invigoration of the *xiafang* movement to Xinjiang. Moreover, during the height of Sino-Soviet tensions along the Soviet-Xinjiang frontier these *xiafang* youths were organised into ad hoc PCC units, while the PLA's politico-economic tasks were scaled back in order to devote more attention to national defence functions.⁸⁰⁷ Furthermore, under the regional leadership of Long Shujin an extended purge of ethnic minority cadres and officials took place over 1970-71, with the focus on those that had maintained "illicit relations" with the revisionists or had exhibited "national splittist tendencies".⁸⁰⁸ The direction of CCP policy remained the same in Xinjiang following the "Lin Biao Affair" and removal of provincial personnel connected with him in 1972, although the intensity with which it was pursued lessened somewhat. As previously noted, Long Shujin's removal and replacement by Saifudin signalled a relative moderation, with Saifudin in 1972 calling for the CR in Xinjiang to be linked to the "realities" of the region.⁸⁰⁹ The re-emergence in official pronouncements of such themes evidently presaged a retrenchment of the more radical policies of the CR, echoing as they did the "united front" slogans of the 1950s. That the central authorities remained

⁸⁰⁷ Thomas Robinson, op. cit., p.296.

⁸⁰⁸ Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power*, op. cit., p.268.

⁸⁰⁹ Ibid, p.274.

concerned regarding the security of the region at this juncture was demonstrated by the appointment of Gen. Yang Yong as second secretary of the Xinjiang CCP and Commander of the XJMR in 1973.⁸¹⁰ These measures did not immediately remedy the tense internal and security situation with further incidents of Soviet "provocations" along the frontier and ethnic minority unrest punctuating the remaining years of the CR. This period was characterised by the continued deterioration of Xinjiang's economic and security situation. The deterioration of the region's security situation was highlighted by a potentially dangerous border incident in 1973 when the PLA seized a Soviet helicopter that had strayed into Xinjiang and the region's troops were placed on alert.⁸¹¹ The region's economic and social situation was also characterised by increasing inter-ethnic tension, and was punctuated with oil workers' strikes in 1974 and ethnic unrest caused by an order to work on Fridays in 1975. These two developments led to a decline in oil production (a largely Han occupation) and a shortage of agricultural and animal husbandry products, as these were largely ethnic minority occupations.⁸¹² Saifudin was removed from his post of first secretary of the CCP in Xinjiang, accused of collaborating with the Soviet Union and replaced by a Han Chinese in 1978.⁸¹³ The ascendancy of the Deng Xiaoping-led reform faction within the CCP by 1978 led to an approach to minority affairs focused upon encouraging stability and economic development while allowing a partial revival of religious and cultural traditions.⁸¹⁴ The limited liberalisation of CCP minority policy in Xinjiang that allowed for the revival of ethnic minority religious and cultural traditions in this period was based upon the

⁸¹⁰ June Teufel Dreyer, "The Xinjiang Autonomous Region at Thirty", op. cit., p.727

⁸¹¹ June Teufel Dreyer, "The PLA and Regionalism in Xinjiang", *The Pacific Review*, Vol.7, no.1 (1994), p.45.

⁸¹² Ibid.

⁸¹³ Ibid, pp.45-46.

⁸¹⁴ Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and Wang Enmao", op. cit., p.579.

assumption that the minorities would be content with being culturally distinct but not politically distinct.⁸¹⁵ The developments of the next decade would prove this assumption to be highly optimistic.

Xinjiang 1949-1978: Integration Inviolable?

The CCP's policies in Xinjiang over the 1949-1978 period were essentially focused upon the integration of the region into the PRC's political and economic system and the assimilation of the ethnic minorities. The methods by which these objectives were pursued varied according to the three distinct phases of minority policy in Xinjiang. The first phase, 1949-1956, was characterised by the 'united front' strategy of gradual reform of the existing political, economic and cultural order via the co-optation of ethnic elites. A key element in the CCP's consolidation of its position in Xinjiang were the activities of the Production and Construction Corps (PCC) which was primarily composed of demobilised PLA soldiers. The PCC served a dual function for the CCP as it not only secured Xinjiang militarily but also absorbed large numbers of Han immigrants. This latter function was important as the Turkic Muslim population's loyalty to the new regime was highly suspect, as they were neither pro-Chinese nor pro-Communist. The second phase, the Great Leap Forward policies of 1957-1962, attempted to accelerate the process of assimilation or 'fusion' of Xinjiang's ethnic minorities with the Han via the implementation of the political and economic programs underway in non-minority regions. The Great Leap policies were generally implemented without regard for local conditions and were characterised by a campaign against the influence of Islam, the systematic elimination of pro-Soviet cadres and

⁸¹⁵ Ibid., pp.579-580.

Soviet influence throughout the region. The final phase of the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1976, witnessed a reassertion of the assimilationist policies of the Great Leap period and coincided with the height of Sino-Soviet tensions. During each particular phase of minority policy in Xinjiang the CCP's objectives of integrating the region into the PRC, isolating the region from Soviet influence and the assimilation of the ethnic minorities remained constant. The central problem for the Chinese authorities in Xinjiang throughout the 1949-1978 period was how to reconcile the contradiction created by the policy directives from Beijing and what was actually practicable in Xinjiang's conditions.

CHAPTER 6

XINJIANG IN THE "REFORM" ERA, 1978-1991: INTEGRATION WITH "CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS"?

The status of the Chinese state's integrationist project in Xinjiang upon the resurrection of Deng Xiaoping within the CCP in 1978 exhibited numerous contradictory dynamics. The maelstrom unleashed during the Cultural Revolution (CR) in Xinjiang had undermined the legitimacy and authority of the CCP, stimulated overt ethnic minority resistance to the "fusionist" policies pursued, and once again proved catalytic in the stimulation of external pressure along the frontiers. The response of the CCP over the 1976-78 Hua Guofeng "interregnum", as we have seen, was to couple the strengthening of its key instruments of integration and control - the PLA and Han in-migration - with a partial return to the rhetoric of the "gradualist" era of party policy concerning ethnic minorities. Moreover, within this period the potential Soviet threat to Xinjiang once more contributed to this coupling of "moderation" and strengthened integration. The position of the ultimate goal of integration, as the previous chapter has demonstrated, was very much intact despite the turbulent vicissitudes of the Maoist era. Yet the key contradiction within the CCP leadership both during and after the Maoist period did not concern the goal of integration but rather the strategies, and the intensity with which they were to be pursued, by which this end could be reached. The emerging Dengist era would prove to be no different in regard to the internal techniques and tactics of rule within Xinjiang. The re-evaluation and restructuring of the CCP's socio-economic priorities in the wake of the fall of the "Gang of Four" and Hua Guofeng, and the ideological innovations that followed thereafter, produced contradictory dynamics in

Xinjiang that reinvigorated the potential for the convergence of internal unrest and external interference by the close of the 1980s. The impact of Deng's gradual "reformist" agenda on the CCP's approach to the PRC's ethnic minorities was significant, as the general questioning of the Maoist legacy ultimately led to a reappraisal of the party's record in relation to the "nationalities question". The progress of the reform of ethnic minority policy, however, was not unidirectional but experienced a number of fluctuations. These fluctuations in policy, much as during the Maoist period, were the product of a complex interaction between the differing tempos of reform deemed necessary by the central and regional authorities, and the perceived impact of specific policies on the security of this strategic region. The convergence of internal unrest and external interference remained in Chinese perceptions the single greatest possible threat to the state's integrationist goal in Xinjiang throughout the 1978-1991 period. Importantly, Deng Xiaoping's ascendancy within the CCP also produced a reassessment and reorientation of the PRC's foreign policy that had a significant impact on the potential for the convergence of these dynamics. In this period the PRC's foreign policy became characterised by the interaction of domestic imperatives and the dynamics generated by the Soviet-US-PRC "strategic triangle" initiated by Mao's limited rapprochement with the US in 1972. Within the context of Xinjiang, China's relations with the Soviet Union remained of primary importance.

Chinese rule of Xinjiang over the 1978-1991 period was in many ways characterised by both continuity and transformation. The preceding introductory comments have alluded to elements of both continuity and transformation in Chinese rule of Xinjiang across the spectrum of specific policy areas that have been the focus of this thesis. It will be

recalled that in the preceding chapter I outlined a two "layer" analysis of the historical development of the ends and means of state action in Xinjiang. The first layer, that of means, was argued to be shallow and fluid, thus conveying the relative turbulence in the state's strategies, techniques and tactics of rule over the course of the historical period covered in this thesis. It is to this layer that the basic dynamics of the "reform" of the party's politico-ideological and socio-economic policies belong. Moreover, the "transformation" referred to above concerns the party's fluctuating approaches and strategies to the dilemmas posed by Chinese control of Xinjiang. As such, the transformations of this period in Xinjiang were but another, albeit extremely instrumental, re-evaluation of state techniques and tactics of rule that had occurred since the 18th century. As this chapter shall demonstrate, however, even within the realms of this turbulent layer there were elements of continuity within specific techniques and tactics of rule that linked the Maoist and Dengist periods in Xinjiang. Furthermore, this chapter will illustrate the continuity of the ultimate goals of state action in Xinjiang through these fluctuating and often contradictory imperatives generated by the application of varying techniques and tactics of rule. The major tasks of this chapter, similar to those of the preceding chapter, are to identify and analyse the changing imperatives underpinning the state's techniques and tactics of rule and their relation to the ultimate goals of the state in Xinjiang. Moreover, this chapter will also continue to highlight the relation of both ends and means to the state's perceptions of Xinjiang and the implications of these perceptions for the PRC's foreign policy calculus.

Xinjiang, 1978-1991: Reform, Repression, Integration and the Central Asian Islamic Revival.

Although Deng Xiaoping's return to power and leadership of the CCP was not confirmed until the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of 18-22 December 1978⁸¹⁶, a trend toward the moderation of party policy in Xinjiang was already manifest at the beginning of that year. In January 1978 Wang Feng replaced Saifudin as chairman of the XUAR, amidst contradictory allegations that he had collaborated with the "Gang of Four" and the Soviet Union during the CR.⁸¹⁷ Saifudin's removal was notable in the context of continuing Sino-Soviet tensions along China's Inner Asian frontiers, given his status as one of the CCP's examples of a successful ethnic minority leader. The extent of his connection to the "Gang of Four" appears to have been that his most recent tenure as head of the XUAR happened to coincide with the height of the Gang's influence, rather than any concrete political alliance. The charges concerning collaboration with the Soviet Union during the CR could perhaps be seen as a metaphorical device intimating his implementation of an erroneous "line" in relation to the ethnic minority issue.⁸¹⁸ Moreover, his replacement by Wang Feng, a trusted Han cadre, would suggest that the central authorities deemed the region too strategically important to be entrusted to an ethnic minority leader.⁸¹⁹ Be that as it may, further signals as to the possible relaxation of party policy toward ethnic minorities were forthcoming over the course of the next few months. Hua Guofeng's speech before

⁸¹⁶ Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja & Graham Young, *China Since 1978: Reform, Modernisation and "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics"*, (Melbourne: Longman, 1994), p.18.

⁸¹⁷ June Teufel Dreyer, "The Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region at Thirty: A Report Card", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 26, No. 7, (July 1986), p. 730.

⁸¹⁸ Ibid.

⁸¹⁹ Ibid, Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949-1977*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979), p.307 & Felix K. Chang, "China's Central Asian Power and Problems", *Orbis*, Vol. 41, No. 3, (Summer 1997), p.408.

the 5th NPC in March contained a number of statements that presaged a return to the moderate policies of the 1950s. As such Hua re-established "great nationality chauvinism" as the major threat to Han-minority relations, and emphasised the principles of regional autonomy and equality between nationalities.⁸²⁰ Moreover, within the Xinjiang CCP that August there was intense "inner party struggle" aimed at persons obstructing the growing emphasis on economic production.⁸²¹ This struggle within the regional party between those emphasising the need for political and economic reform and those wanting to uphold the CR's "class struggle" line, was of course a reflection of the ongoing power struggle within the central leadership of the party in Beijing.

The power struggle within the top leadership of the CCP was largely the result of three years of debate as to the direction of the CCP in the post-Mao era. The primary protagonists in the debate were the "whatever" faction led by Mao's "annointed" successor, Hua Guofeng, and the "practice" faction represented by Deng Xiaoping and other veteran revolutionaries such as Chen Yun and Li Xiannian. The ideological position of Hua Guofeng's faction primarily derived from the formula "Whatever policy Chairman Mao decided upon, we shall resolutely defend; whatever directives Chairman Mao issued, we shall steadfastly obey".⁸²² The "whatever" faction thus portrayed itself as upholding and protecting the Maoist legacy. Perhaps more important in determining their stance in the intra-party struggle was the fact that Hua Guofeng and his supporters

⁸²⁰ Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), p.426 & Colin Mackerras, *China's Ethnic Minorities and Globalisation*, (London: Routledge, 2003), p.25.

⁸²¹ See June Teufel Dreyer, "The PLA and Regionalism in Xinjiang", *Pacific Review*, Vol.7, No.1, (1994), p.45 & Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and Wang Enmao: New Directions in Power, Policy and Integration?", *The China Quarterly*, no.99, (September 1984), p.572.

⁸²² Roderick MacFarquhar, "The Succession to Mao and the End of Maoism, 1969-82", in Roderick MacFarquhar (ed.), *The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng (2nd ed.)*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.312.

were generally beneficiaries of the CR and therefore had the most to lose in any re-evaluation of Mao's career.⁸²³ The faction that gradually formed around Deng Xiaoping on the other hand was largely composed of the surviving senior leadership that had been purged at various stages during the CR. This faction became known as the "practice" faction, after Mao's dictums of "seeking truth from facts" and taking "practice as the sole criterion of truth". The "practice" faction thus emphasised the need to construct policies based on the "concrete realities" of China rather than on abstract ideological formulations.⁸²⁴

Integration in the Balance: The Restoration of "Gradualism" and the Renewed Soviet Threat, 1978-1981.

The details of the final struggle between these two factions over the course of 1978 need not concern us here. The resolution of this intra-party struggle in favour of Deng Xiaoping at the Third Plenum of the 11th CC in December 1978, however, was to have an enormous impact on the direction of CCP policy toward ethnic minorities. The Third Plenum, amongst other things, repudiated the "two whatevers" espoused by Hua Guofeng *et al* and determined that the "four modernisations"⁸²⁵ were to take precedence, thus marking a decisive turn away from the policies of the late Mao era.⁸²⁶ Important elements of the Third Plenum's departures with the Maoist legacy/model were the initiation of the "household responsibility system" in agriculture, that effectively began

⁸²³ Ibid, pp.312-320.

⁸²⁴ Yan Sun, *The Chinese Reassessment of Socialism, 1976-1992*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp.22-23.

⁸²⁵ The "four modernisations" ; the new national developmental goals were to be the modernisation of agriculture, industry, defence, science and technology.

⁸²⁶ See Roderick MacFarquhar, *op. cit.*, p.320 & Lowell Dittmer, "Chinese Reform Socialism Under Deng Xiaoping: Theory and Practice", in Michael Ying-Mao Kau & Susan H. Marsh (eds.), *China in the Era of Deng Xiaoping: A Decade of Reform*, (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), pp.9-14.

the de-collectivisation of China's agricultural sector, the elimination of the commune system and an undertaking to "open" the PRC's economy to the outside world.⁸²⁷ Moreover, and perhaps most significantly for China's ethnic minorities, the plenum also determined that "class struggle" was no longer the "key link" in the development of party policy.⁸²⁸ It will be recalled from the previous chapter that from the GLF onwards the CCP's approach to the ethnic minorities had been guided by Mao's position that in the final analysis "national struggle" was a question of "class struggle". Throughout 1979 party leaders made a number of important statements regarding the ethnic minority issue, building upon the initial relaxation proposed after the Third Plenum. On the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the PRC in late September 1979, party leaders stated that Mao's 1956 speech "On the Ten Major Relationships", the program of the 1956 Party Congress and Mao's 1957 "On Correctly Handling Contradictions Among the People" provided the guiding principles for the socialist revolution.⁸²⁹ It should be recalled that Mao, in the two cited speeches of 1956-57, had both stressed that opposition to "Han chauvinism" was the "cornerstone" of nationalities policy and generally upheld the "gradualist" approach to the ethnic minorities.⁸³⁰ Subsequently the Nationalities Commission of the NPC, abolished during the CR, was reconvened the following month.⁸³¹ At this meeting Ulanhu, a Mongol leader of long-standing within the CCP, criticised the policies of the CR as "coercive assimilation", called for the strengthening of autonomy and greater government expenditure on ethnic

⁸²⁷ Lowell Dittmer, "Chinese Reform Socialism Under Deng Xiaoping", op. cit., p.10.

⁸²⁸ His-sheng Ch'i, *Politics of Disillusionment: The Chinese Communist Party Under Deng Xiaoping, 1978-1989*, (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1991), p.15 & Roderick MacFarquhar, op. cit., p.320.

⁸²⁹ Walker Connor, op. cit., p.427.

⁸³⁰ See Mao Zedong, "On the Ten Major Relationships", (April 25, 1956) & "On Correctly Handling Contradictions Among the People", (February 27, 1957), in Michael Y. M. Kau & John K. Leung (eds.), *The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976: Vol. II, January 1956-December 1957*, (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1986), pp.43-61 & 308-340.

⁸³¹ Walker Connor, op. cit., p.427.

minority regions.⁸³² Therefore, by the close of 1979 the return to a more "gradualist" approach to ethnic minorities appeared to be assured.

The dynamics created by the emergence of Deng Xiaoping's reformist agenda in Xinjiang over this period illustrate the continuity of the contradiction between the prerogatives of the central leadership and the imperatives of the regional authorities. As the previous chapter illustrated, this contradiction was often a function of the responses or reactions of the major political actors in the region - the PLA, PCC, Han immigrants and the ethnic minorities - to the directives of the central government. There was often a great deal of difference between what the central government wanted to do and what the regional government could actually implement. This particular theme was evident in Wang Feng's 1979-1981 tenure as chairman of the XUAR, as his prerogatives to implement the reformist agenda of Beijing met with varying degrees of opposition from the major political actors in the region. Wang's attempts to rectify the Xinjiang CCP, reorient cadres toward the new reformist line and rehabilitate cadres purged during the CR resulted in the development of intense inner party struggle.⁸³³ Over the 1979-1980 period Wang Feng implemented an eight-point plan for agricultural policy and initiated a review of the officially disbanded PCC. The agricultural policy instituted the new "household responsibility" system, permitted the restoration of private plots, and permitted commune members to raise livestock for their own use. De-collectivisation was not, however, equivalent to privatisation as land was not returned to private ownership. Rather the collective retained land ownership and villagers leased land as

⁸³² Ibid & Colin Mackerras, *China's Ethnic Minorities and Globalisation*, (London: Routledge, 2003), p.25. Ulanhu had been a member of the CCP since 1925, and in 1977 became a member of the Politburo.

⁸³³ Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and Wang Enmao", op. cit., p.572.

household units, thus creating peasants as de facto tenants with the state acting as landlord.⁸³⁴ This "de-centralisation" to the household unit "signalled the state's decision to change the terms of the struggle over the harvest."⁸³⁵ The peasant households now had the first claim, as it were, to their individual harvest and could define the surplus after it had turned over a set amount to the state in taxes and sales (ie. procurements).⁸³⁶ Significantly, although the peasant could now define and dispose of their surplus as they saw fit, the state still remained a "claimant" for the peasant's harvest.⁸³⁷ The "responsibility system" thus contained economic "channels" through which the state could exert and extend its power over villages. This aspect of the reform of agriculture would assume significance in the coming decade in Xinjiang, particularly in the mid-1980s, as the state attempted to re-assert its control over rural areas.⁸³⁸ The review of the PCC focused on the rehabilitation of cadres purged during the CR and the restoration of differential material incentives.⁸³⁹ Importantly, under Wang's leadership, the Xinjiang CCP also attempted to encourage and promote more ethnic minority cadres to positions of authority. Yet the imperative to dismantle the key instruments of the Maoist model in Xinjiang embodied in Wang's agenda provoked residual opposition amongst both Han and ethnic minority cadres. A major factor in this reticence to adopt

⁸³⁴ For state-wide policy of decollectivisation see Richard Masden, "The Countryside Under Communism", in Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China Vol.15, The People's Republic, Pt.2: Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution, 1966-1982*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.669, Nicholas R. Lardy, "Recasting of the Economic System: Structural Reform of Agriculture and Industry, in Michael Ying-Mao Kau & Susan H. Marsh (eds.), *China in the Era of Deng Xiaoping: A Decade of Reform*, (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), p.105 and for its implications in Xinjiang, Ildiko Beller-Hann, "The Peasant Condition in Xinjiang", *Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol.25, no.1 (1997), pp.90-91.

⁸³⁵ Jean C. Oi, *State and Peasant in Contemporary China: The Political Economy of Village Government*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), p.155.

⁸³⁶ *Ibid*, pp.155-156.

⁸³⁷ *Ibid*.

⁸³⁸ See Ildiko Beller-Hann, "The Peasant Condition in Xinjiang", *Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol.25, no.1 (1997), pp.87-112.

⁸³⁹ June Teufel Dreyer, "The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region at Thirty", *op. cit.*, p.732.

the new line in party policy undoubtedly came from a sense of self-preservation, as many were cognisant that today's "correct" ideological line could rapidly become tomorrow's "deviationism" or worse. Moreover, a total denunciation of Maoist policies that had ostensibly underpinned Chinese rule in Xinjiang since 1949 could also pose serious problems for the party's legitimacy.⁸⁴⁰

The 1978-1980 period also saw major changes in the PRC's foreign policy orientation that was largely determined by the new leadership's renewed attempts to achieve a meaningful rapprochement with the US to counter the perceived Soviet "encirclement" of the PRC. Two particular worrisome developments for Beijing throughout 1978 was the Soviet Union's manoeuvres and overtures to two key Chinese neighbours, Vietnam and Afghanistan. The escalation of Soviet activities and interests in both these states, if successful, would achieve the Kremlin's objective of strategically encircling the PRC with pro-Soviet states from China's Inner Asian frontiers in the west to Indo-China in the east. Moreover, two key external events in 1979 served to reinforce China's anti-Soviet imperatives and complicate its rule of Xinjiang. The first event, the Islamic Revolution in Iran of February 1979, derived its significance for the PRC in terms of its example as a dynamic revival of Islam as a political force.⁸⁴¹ The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, however, posed a far more proximate threat to China's Central Asian frontiers. These events compounded the sense of urgency within the provincial and central authorities to stabilise and improve the situation in Xinjiang.

⁸⁴⁰ Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and Wang Enmao", op. cit., pp.572-573.

⁸⁴¹ Ahmad Lufti, "Blowback: China and the Afghan Arabs", *Issues and Studies*, Vol.37, no. 1, (January/February 2001), p.172.

Sino-Vietnamese relations had in fact been deteriorating since China's initial moves, begun under Mao in 1972, toward establishing relations with the US but appreciably accelerated after Hanoi had achieved total victory in 1975.⁸⁴² The vacuum left by the withdrawal of US forces in 1972 and the defeat of its surrogate regime in Saigon in 1975 resulted in a struggle between the erstwhile allies, Beijing and Hanoi, for strategic predominance in South East Asia. The crux of this struggle was Cambodia, where the Khmer Rouge had emerged victorious in that country's civil war in 1975. The Khmer Rouge's radical and utopian vision of agricultural communism combined with its aggressive anti-Vietnamese stance to attract military and economic aid from China that would continue into the 1980s. In the meantime the Vietnamese increasingly turned to the Soviet Union for support in buttressing its position in South East Asia which culminated in the establishment of a Soviet-Vietnamese "treaty of peace and friendship" in November 1978. This development further intensified Chinese perceptions regarding the Soviet Union's attempts to "encircle" and contain the PRC, and was an important factor in increasing efforts to reach an understanding with the US. The final months of 1978 thus saw an escalation in Sino-Vietnamese tensions with Vietnam expelling Hoa (Vietnamese citizens of Chinese descent) and Beijing increasingly intimating that it would teach Hanoi a "lesson". China's announcement of its agreement with the US to normalise their relations on 15 December can be seen as an attempt to forestall a Soviet response to any "lesson" handed out by the Chinese. The subsequent Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia on 25 December 1978 to remove the Chinese-aligned Khmer Rouge confirmed Beijing's long-held belief of the Soviet's intentions to contain China. Moreover, the Vietnamese invasion precipitated the doling out of the often threatened

⁸⁴² Jonathan D. Pollack, "The Opening to America", in Roderick MacFarquhar & John K. Fairbank (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 15, The People's Republic, Pt.2: Revolutions within the Chinese*

"lesson" in the form of the PLA's "defensive counter-attack" (ie. invasion) against Vietnam on 17 February.⁸⁴³

The Chinese action in Vietnam had significant security and strategic implications that were felt almost immediately in distant Xinjiang. The Chinese anticipated that their attack on Vietnam would precipitate a Soviet manoeuvre in Xinjiang and placed Tacheng prefecture, near the border with the Kazakh SSR, under direct PLA control in the final months of 1978. The level of threat felt by Chinese authorities in Xinjiang was further illustrated on the eve of the attack on Vietnam, with the evacuation of the civilian population of the three districts of Tacheng, Altai and Ili.⁸⁴⁴ Although the foreseen Soviet retaliation did not materialise during the course of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict that ended on 5 March 1979, the heightened state of alert in Xinjiang remained. In light of the renewed Sino-Soviet tensions, the East Xinjiang Military Region was created to strengthen the defence of the PRC's nuclear installation at Lop Nor and a defensive perimeter around Urumqi was also established.⁸⁴⁵ Significantly, this episode once more illustrated that in Chinese perceptions the Soviet threat was not unidirectional but also potentially emanated from the region's ethnic minorities. The evacuation of the population of the three districts of Ili, Tacheng and Altai, noted above,

Revolution, 1966-1982, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.444.

⁸⁴³ See Harold C. Hinton, "Reorienting China's Foreign Policy: China and the World", in in Michael Ying-Mao Kau & Susan H. Marsh (eds.), *China in the Era of Deng Xiaoping: A Decade of Reform*, (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), p.385-386, Jonathan D. Pollack, "The Opening to America", in Roderick MacFarquhar & John K. Fairbank (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 15, The People's Republic, Pt.2: Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution, 1966-1982*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp.443-445 & Jonathan D. Pollack, "China Between the Superpowers: In Search of a Security Strategy", in Michael Ying-Mao Kau & Susan H. Marsh (eds.), *China in the Era of Deng Xiaoping: A Decade of Reform*, (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 358-362.

⁸⁴⁴ June Teufel Dreyer, "The PLA and Regionalism", op. cit., p.46,

⁸⁴⁵ June Teufel Dreyer, "The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region at Thirty", op. cit., pp.733-734 & Donald H. McMillen, "The Urumqi Military Region: Defense and Security in China's West", *Asian Survey*, Vol.22, no.8, (August 1982), pp.717-718.

was coupled with renewed attempts to strengthen "nationalities unity" and combat "bad elements" within Xinjiang.⁸⁴⁶ Tensions along the Sino-Soviet frontier, however, remained with Soviet and Chinese troops clashing in the vicinity of Tacheng in July 1979.⁸⁴⁷

The Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan late in 1979, largely as a result of intensified Soviet and US manoeuvring regarding the regional alignment of the Persian Gulf⁸⁴⁸, reinforced China's rapprochement with the US and significantly increased the strategic importance of Xinjiang. Soviet involvement in Afghanistan reignited, at least in Chinese perceptions, the Soviet's expansionist agenda and added further weight to the thesis that the Kremlin was intent on making Afghanistan part of its inchoate system of anti-China alliances in Asia.⁸⁴⁹ More importantly Soviet activities in Afghanistan since the mid-1970s had attracted the attention of Washington, and regional powers Pakistan, Iran and China, who determined to combat any Soviet attempt to develop a client regime in Kabul. In September 1978 the deputy of Chinese intelligence, Qiao Shi, met with the Shah in Teheran to propose an alliance to combat Soviet expansion and apparently reached an agreement to begin covert operations in Afghanistan independent of the US.⁸⁵⁰ The Islamic Revolution of February 1979 in Iran obviously scuttled this nascent Sino-Iranian cooperation. The US, however, began covert aid to anti-Soviet elements in Afghanistan six months before the Soviet invasion. On 3 July 1979

⁸⁴⁶ June Teufel Dreyer, "The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region", op. cit., p.734.

⁸⁴⁷ Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and Wang Enmao", op. cit., p.579.

⁸⁴⁸ For example see, Steven A. Yetiv, *America and the Persian Gulf: The Third Party Dimension in World Politics*, (Westport: Praeger, 1995), pp.45-65 & John Cooley, *Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism* (3rd ed.), (London: Pluto Press, 2002), pp.1-19.

⁸⁴⁹ Chi Su, "US-China Relations: Soviet Views and Policies", *Asian Survey*, Vol.23, no.5, (1983), p.576.

⁸⁵⁰ John Cooley, op.cit., p.55.

President Carter, under the persuasion of National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, signed a secret directive for the CIA to begin the channelling of covert aid to anti-Soviet elements in Afghanistan.⁸⁵¹ Moreover, the US determined that the anti-Soviet effort in Afghanistan was to be undertaken by proxy whereby US military aid and training would be supplemented by a coterie of anti-Soviet governments, such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and China.⁸⁵² China's determination to respond to events in Afghanistan without the cooperation of the other superpower was already established. The development of China's involvement in the US-inspired regional response to Soviet expansion in Afghanistan was therefore based on a mutuality of interests. Moreover, even when it appeared that a US response would be forthcoming, the Chinese nonetheless attempted to resuscitate the deal made with the Shah with the Islamic regime of Ayatollah Khomeiny regarding possible joint response to the Soviet invasion in January 1980.⁸⁵³ Within the short period of time between Qiao Shi's visit in September 1978 and the Shah's overthrow in February 1979, the Sino-Iranian plan had obviously already been activated. The Soviets were to claim that Chinese armaments began appearing in Afghanistan as early as June 1979 thus preceding the development of the US-organised anti-Soviet "coalition".⁸⁵⁴ The region of most concern, however, to the PRC following the Soviet invasion was the unresolved border dispute in the Pamir Mountains in the far south-west corner of Xinjiang. The Chinese reiterated claims initially made at the height of the Sino-Soviet conflict in 1969 that the Soviets had occupied 20 000 square kilometres of Chinese territory at the intersection of the

⁸⁵¹ Ibid, pp. 9-10

⁸⁵² Ibid. Pakistan was to serve as the primary "staging ground" and site of training and deployment, such governments as Saudi Arabia would supply financial backing, and China would supply weaponry.

⁸⁵³ Ibid, pp.54-55. The vice-president of the Chinese Islamic Association met with the Iranian leadership in Jan. 1980.

⁸⁵⁴ John Cooley, op. cit., p.57.

Afghan, Soviet and Chinese borders in the Pamirs.⁸⁵⁵ Soviet control of this region threatened China's over-land linkage via the Kashgar-Gilgit highway to Pakistan, with whom China had been developing a substantial strategic and military relationship since the late 1960s.⁸⁵⁶ The Soviet's offensives in early 1980 targeted the Wakhan corridor that separated the Soviet Union and Pakistan, and whose "finger" or the eastern end, creates an 80km Sino-Afghan border. The Soviet annexation of this territory thus limited the utility of the over-land route from China to Pakistan as a conduit for arms.⁸⁵⁷ Significantly China, as the Soviet entanglement in Afghanistan developed, became involved to a much greater extent than simply as a source of military hardware⁸⁵⁸ that precipitated a greater alignment with Washington. The visit to Beijing of US Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, in January 1980 initiated a series of high-level visits by US and Chinese military or defence officials to the respective capitals between January and September 1980.⁸⁵⁹ These contacts resulted in increased arms sales and technology transfers to China, and the development of joint intelligence operations and intelligence sharing.⁸⁶⁰ With respect to this latter development, a visit to Beijing by the then CIA director, Stansfield Turner, late in 1980, resulted in the adoption of a plan to construct two secret US monitoring installations in Xinjiang at Qitai and Korla.⁸⁶¹ In addition to these closer Sino-US contacts was Chinese agreement to cooperate in training Muslim

⁸⁵⁵ John W. Garver, "The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute in the Pamir Mountains Region", *The China Quarterly*, no.85, (March 1981), p.107.

⁸⁵⁶ Rasul B. Rais, "Pakistan in the Regional and Global Power Structure", *Asian Survey*, Vol.31, no.4, (April 1991), p.391 & Donald H. McMillen, "The Urumqi Military Region", op. cit., p.717.

⁸⁵⁷ John Cooley, op. cit., p.57 & John W. Garver, "The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute", op. cit., p.118.

⁸⁵⁸ In fact up to 1984 China was the major, and most reliable, source of arms and ammunition for the *mujahideen*. John Cooley, op. cit., p.58.

⁸⁵⁹ Chi Su, "US-China Relations", op. cit., p.566. These included PRC Defence Minister Geng Biao (May 1980), PRC Deputy Defence Minister Zhang Wenjin (August 1980) and US Under Secretary of Defence William Perry (September 1980).

⁸⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁸⁶¹ John Cooley, op. cit., p.55 & Chi Su, op. cit., p.566.

volunteers in Pakistan and the recruitment of prospective *mujahideen* from amongst Xinjiang's ethnic minorities. These activities were expanded in 1985 with the establishment of training camps on Chinese soil near Kashgar and Khotan.⁸⁶² Chinese support for the development of an international Islamic force would prove to be a double-edged sword for Beijing in the coming decade. Although the multi-state supported mujahideen would effectively combat Soviet expansion, a major goal of Beijing, these states' policies simultaneously created the basis for the diffusion of militant Islamic ideology into their own states.⁸⁶³

Contemporaneous with these external developments, Wang Feng continued to encounter difficulties in implementing Beijing's reformist program. This was particularly centred on the progress of reforms of the state farms and PCC units, while increased liberalisation of regulations governing agriculture and animal husbandry did not produce immediate results.⁸⁶⁴ The implementation of the new party leadership's program in both economic and political spheres produced contradictory dynamics in Xinjiang as the various grievances of Han immigrants, the ethnic minorities and PCC personnel converged in 1980. Particularly instrumental in this was the responses of the ethnic minorities and the large number of *xiafang* Han youth in Xinjiang to the progress of the new reformist line. It would appear that it was the pace and scope of "reform" that provoked ethnic minority and Han immigrant ire. For the ethnic minorities, the limited

⁸⁶² John Cooley, *op. cit.*, pp.55-59. Cooley asserts that Uighurs were trained by the Military Intelligence Department of the PLA, also known as the *Er Bu* or "Second Department".

⁸⁶³ This was particularly accurate for some of the major participants such as Pakistan and the PRC. In the PRC's case the scope of infiltration of former *mujahideen* into Xinjiang remains a moot point, but the least that could be said is that the success of the *mujahideen* in Afghanistan would serve as a powerful example for China's Muslim minorities.

⁸⁶⁴ June Teufel Dreyer, "The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region", *op. cit.*, pp.733-734.

liberalisation implemented by the party since 1976 promised much but in practice delivered little. This state of affairs was mostly due to Wang Feng's limited success in purging the Xinjiang CCP of residual Maoist cadres and influence. Importantly, Deng Xiaoping had also halted the *xiafang* movement and had permitted significant numbers of Han youths rusticated during the CR to return to their home provinces, prompting those rusticates in Xinjiang to expect similar treatment. In April 1980 this frustration boiled over in Aksu, where the beating of an Uighur youth by two Han set off an inter-ethnic riot that lasted for two days.⁸⁶⁵ This outbreak prompted senior Xinjiang CCP leaders to embark on "inspection tours" to Aksu and other major centres south of the Tian Shan.⁸⁶⁶ Hu Yaobang's May 1980 tour of Tibet and the six-point program he outlined to redress the situation there, raised expectations among the ethnic minorities that a similar program would soon be extended to Xinjiang.⁸⁶⁷ Hu's program proposed the institution of genuine autonomy for Tibet, economic policies consistent with local conditions, investment in agriculture and animal husbandry, the revival of culture and education, and the phased transfer of Han officials out of the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR).⁸⁶⁸ Within Xinjiang the two key points that resonated with the ethnic minorities and the Han immigrants were those referring to the question of substantive autonomy and the transfer of Han officials. Hu's proposition to withdraw Han from Tibet combined with Deng's cessation and criticism of the *xiafang* of Han youth to

⁸⁶⁵ Michael Dillon, *Xinjiang: Ethnicity, Separatism and Control in Chinese Central Asia*, (Durham East Asian Papers 1, University of Durham, Dept. of East Asian Studies, 1996), p.18 & June Teufel Dreyer, "The PLA and Regionalism", op. cit., p.47.

⁸⁶⁶ Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and Wang Enmao", op.cit., p.575.

⁸⁶⁷ Lilian Craig Harris, "Xinjiang, Central Asia and the Implications for China's Policy in the Islamic World", *The China Quarterly*, No.133, (March 1993), p.117 & Michael Dillon, *Xinjiang: Ethnicity, Separatism and Control in Chinese Central Asia*, op. cit., p4

⁸⁶⁸ Michael Dillon, *Xinjiang: Ethnicity, Separatism and Control in Chinese Central Asia*, op. cit., p4 & Colin Mackerras, *China's Ethnic Minorities*, op. cit., p.28.

provoke demonstrations by both ethnic minorities and Han immigrants in Xinjiang over the subsequent months.

The centres of ethnic minority unrest were once more south of the Tian Shan in Aksu and Kashgar, where ethnic minority demonstrators demanded greater autonomy for Xinjiang and the removal of Han immigrants. These disturbances prompted Beijing to dispatch politburo member, Wang Zhen⁸⁶⁹ to Xinjiang in October to assess the situation and exhort the Xinjiang authorities to maintain "nationalities unity".⁸⁷⁰ Barely a month after Wang Zhen's visit significant numbers of Han youth petitioned local authorities for permission to return to intra-mural China, generally to Shanghai, but to little effect. Demonstrations subsequently broke out in Aksu, Kashgar and Korla, and the local authorities relented and transferred the protestors' residence permits. Shanghai authorities, however, with Beijing's backing refused to recognise this unilateral measure further exacerbating the tensions between the Xinjiang authorities and Han immigrants.⁸⁷¹ The issue of the transfer of *xiafang* Han out of Xinjiang was further complicated by the latent support of local CCP cadres and PLA units for their cause, as both realised that the *xiafang's* continued presence would make its exceedingly difficult to stabilise the situation.⁸⁷² Beijing obviously viewed such tendencies with alarm and dispatched PLA units from Lanzhou to disperse demonstrations and prevent the unauthorised return of Han to China proper.⁸⁷³ This situation once more prompted a

⁸⁶⁹ It will be recalled from the previous chapter that Wang Zhen was the top CCP and PLA figure in Xinjiang from 1949 to 1955.

⁸⁷⁰ Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and Wang Enmao", op. cit., p.575.

⁸⁷¹ See June Teufel Dreyer, "The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region", op.cit., pp.737-738 & June Teufel Dreyer, "The PLA and Regionalism", op. cit., p.47.

⁸⁷² Ibid.

⁸⁷³ June Teufel Dreyer, "The PLA and Regionalism", op. cit., p.47.

visit from Wang Zhen in November-December, who ordered that "strict measures" were to be implemented to deal with the unrest. Moreover, regional authorities reiterated to rusticates "Soviet revisionism's" designs on Xinjiang and maintained that they should remain to defend and develop the region.⁸⁷⁴ In light of the recent events in China's foreign relations, detailed above, Wang Zhen's warning could be taken as more than mere rhetoric and illustrative of the Chinese perception that such regions south of the Tian Shan were susceptible to emergent Islamic revival initiated by Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

The response of Xinjiang's authorities to these manifestations of unrest was to address the socio-economic conditions of the region and permit the revival of ethnic minority cultural and religious practices. In effect the Chinese perceived that the ability of external forces or dynamics to infiltrate and encourage ethnic minority unrest was a function of internal political and socio-economic conditions. A number of symbolic compromises to ethnic minority sentiment were implemented in the latter half of 1980. First, the authorities reinstated the Xinjiang Islamic Association in June. The association was charged with the organisation and conduct of Islamic education, enhancing "unity" between Muslim and non-Muslim, and establishing contacts with Muslims abroad.⁸⁷⁵ Simultaneously, the association was warned to be patriotic and not to use religion to foment the undermining of "nationalities unity". Second, the use of the Arabic script for the Uighur and Kazakh languages was also reinstated in place of the Latinised script introduced in 1958. These two measures could be seen as finalising the party's turn

⁸⁷⁴ Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and Wang Enmao", op. cit., p.576.

⁸⁷⁵ Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and Wang Enmao", op. cit., p.577, Gaye Christofferson, "Xinjiang and the Great Islamic Circle: The Impact of Transnational Forces on Chinese Regional Economic Planning", *The China Quarterly*, No.133, (1993), p.136.

away from the policies of the CR in Xinjiang and a means of reassurance to the ethnic minorities as to the longevity of the party's new reformist agenda. Third, the Xinjiang CCP endeavoured to expedite the rehabilitation of ethnic minority cadres purged during the CR and accelerate the training of new ethnic cadres. Fourth, the party determined to alleviate the economic malaise of southern Xinjiang via the allocation of a US\$4.3 million state aid package. Moreover, agricultural and pastoral taxes were also reduced and the availability of commodities targeted at minorities was increased. As a corollary of this effort to alleviate the economic situation in the south, major infrastructure projects were undertaken to facilitate the linkage of the south with the rest of Xinjiang. These included the upgrading of the main highway linking Urumqi and the Tarim Basin, and the resumption in the construction of the southern spur of the Lanzhou-Xinjiang railway from Turfan to Korla.⁸⁷⁶ Of course these infrastructure developments not only facilitated the transport of produce and commodities but the movement of Han in-migrants and PLA troops.

The overall strategy encapsulated in these developments was the coupling of a limited and controlled revival of ethnic minority religious and cultural practices with renewed emphasis on instruments of integration. In a sense it was a return to the major themes of the 1949-1955 period that was extensively covered in the preceding chapter. That the CCP in Xinjiang had to "retreat" to such a position is indicative of the similarity between the challenges confronting Chinese rule in the early 1980s and those immediately following "liberation" in 1949. After the dislocations of the CR in Xinjiang, Chinese authority and legitimacy had to be re-established to some extent. This

⁸⁷⁶ Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and Wang Enmao", *op. cit.*, pp.576-578.

imperative was clearly evident, for example, in the authorities attempts to rehabilitate ethnic minority victims of the CR and revive the toleration of ethnic minority religious and cultural practices. Moreover, the emphasis placed upon the de-collectivisation of agriculture and the regeneration of private ownership and local markets echoed the general contours of the party's economic policies during the consolidation of Chinese power in the early 1950s. The key divergence between the strategy of the post-liberation and early post-Mao period was the decreased importance of ideology in terms of both determining and justifying party policy. The development of this tendency throughout the remainder of the decade, as in the rest of China, increasingly determined that the party's legitimacy rested primarily on its ability to ensure and promote economic development. Within the context of Xinjiang, however, the inherent tensions created by the two key imperatives of Chinese policy - economic reform/growth and political control - combined with China's foreign policy in Central Asia to facilitate challenges to Chinese rule which these same policies were implemented to prevent.

Xinjiang 1981-1985: The Return of Wang Enmao and the Management of Emergent Problems.

The progress of the reformist program in Xinjiang had, as noted above, provoked some significant opposition from Han immigrants, the PCC/PLA and the ethnic minorities over the 1979-1980 period. The uneasy situation created by the episodes of unrest throughout 1980, despite the efforts of the provincial government, contributed to the poor performance of the region's economy.⁸⁷⁷ Moreover, 1981 also saw the continued manifestation of problems within the Xinjiang CCP, including residual factionalism and

⁸⁷⁷ June Teufel Dreyer, "The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region", op. cit., p.738.

Han-ethnic minority conflict. The ongoing inability of Wang Feng to deal with the situation in Xinjiang prompted a visit by no less an individual than Deng Xiaoping in August 1981.⁸⁷⁸ Deng's visit obviously prompted a re-organisation of the Xinjiang CCP, with Wang Feng being removed as head of the XUAR the following month.⁸⁷⁹ The man who replaced him as First Secretary of the CCP and First Political Commissar of the Urumqi Military Region suggested that the central leadership in Beijing wanted to press on with the reform agenda in Xinjiang while simultaneously maintaining tight party control. Thus October 1981 saw the return of no less a figure in Xinjiang's post-1949 history than Wang Enmao.⁸⁸⁰ As the previous chapter highlighted, Wang Enmao had often selectively implemented central policy directives when he perceived them to be potentially counter-productive to the major goals of control and integration. That is to say he was aware of and receptive to the complex internal conditions of the region, and in effect attempted to reconcile the imperatives flowing from the ethnic minorities, Han immigrants and the PLA with those of Beijing.

It was this previous and relatively successful handling of this balancing act from 1955 to 1969 that the central authorities perceived to be necessary in the Xinjiang of the 1980s. The need for such a handling of Xinjiang was underlined by the outbreak of further ethnic minority unrest in Kashgar in October 1981.⁸⁸¹ Not surprisingly the major tasks identified as requiring Wang's immediate attention reflected the major dilemmas confronted by his predecessor - Han-ethnic minority relations, economic stagnation,

⁸⁷⁸ Ibid, p.739 & Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and Wang Enmao", op. cit., p.581.

⁸⁷⁹ Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and Wang Enmao", op. cit., pp.581-582.

⁸⁸⁰ Michael Dillon, *Xinjiang: Ethnicity, Separatism and Control in Chinese Central Asia*, op. cit., p.27.

⁸⁸¹ Michael Dillon, op. cit., p.18 & June Teufel Dreyer, "The PLA and Regionalism in Xinjiang", op. cit., p.47.

factionalism within the CCP and the continued Soviet threat. Thus Wang's focus at the beginning of his second period as top party and PLA man in Xinjiang were fourfold: to strengthen "unity", economic stabilisation and construction, rectification of the Xinjiang CCP's organisation and "work style" and the consolidation of border defence.⁸⁸² In April 1982 Wang oversaw the reorganisation and consolidation of CCP control at all levels throughout Xinjiang. The focus of this effort was to entrench the Dengist line in the regional party and root out any remaining "ultra-leftist" tendencies. As a corollary of this process, 1982 also saw the return to positions of authority of senior cadres purged during the CR.⁸⁸³ In rhetoric reminiscent of the 1950s, Wang asserted that the key to strengthening "unity" (ie. Han-ethnic minority relations) was respect for the ethnic minorities and to rigorously apply the party's "nationalities policy".⁸⁸⁴ This was of course in line with the entrenchment of the gradualist approach since the return of Deng Xiaoping. In 1980-81 the CCP had, in the context of "nationalities policy", returned to the major themes outlined by Mao in 1956-57 that maintained that Han chauvinism was more dangerous than local nationalism. Overall it returned to the theme of affirming the "correctness" of differential tempos to achieve socialism for China's ethnic minorities.⁸⁸⁵ A major component of this approach was the toleration and encouragement of ethnic minority cultural and religious practices which, as we saw earlier, Wang Feng had implemented in Xinjiang. Although under Wang Enmao's leadership these measures were affirmed, it was emphasised that there was a clear delineation in the party's view between "legal" and "illegal" religious activities.⁸⁸⁶ Thus

⁸⁸² Ibid, p.582.

⁸⁸³ Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and Wang Enmao", op. cit., p.587.

⁸⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁸⁵ Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*, op. cit., p.427

⁸⁸⁶ Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and Wang Enmao", op. cit., pp.582-583.

the party effectively warned Xinjiang's ethnic minorities that the "revival" of cultural and religious practices, and the content therein, would occur within party-defined parameters. This distinction between "legal" and "illegal" religious activities would come to be increasingly proffered in official pronouncements regarding developments in Xinjiang well into the 1990s.

Therefore the major problems confronted by Wang Feng on his appointment to Xinjiang - Han-ethnic minority tensions, factionalism within the Xinjiang CCP, economic stagnation, and a renewed Soviet threat - largely remained un-diminished upon Wang Enmao's return to Xinjiang. Wang Enmao's leadership, however, did not witness any major alteration in the general contours of Chinese policy. As noted above, Wang Enmao pursued the continued "rectification" of the regional party organisation, extended the liberalisation of agricultural policy and maintained the moderation of the party's approach to religious and cultural practices. The one major departure from his predecessor's policies during Wang Enmao's October 1981-1985 tenure, and one that had important consequences for the future of the region, was the reconstitution of the Xinjiang PCC on 1 June 1982. The decision to reconstitute the PCC, which had been disbanded due to the factional conflict of the CR in 1975, was determined by a number of considerations that primarily concerned the efficaciousness of integration. The decision to reconstitute the Xinjiang PCC derived from Deng Xiaoping's August 1981 tour of the region and was finalised by the CCP Central Committee and Military Affairs Commission.⁸⁸⁷ Wang Enmao's elucidation of the PCC's tasks upon its reconstitution suggests that Deng and other senior leaders perceived that the state's integrationist

⁸⁸⁷ Ibid, p.585.

project in Xinjiang was in the balance. According to Wang the PCC's tasks circa 1982 were fourfold: to implement the party's nationality policy and strengthen unity, manage socialist economic enterprises, defend the frontiers, and reinforce party leadership.⁸⁸⁸

These functions were essentially identical to those assumed by the PCC upon its institution in Xinjiang following liberation in 1949. Importantly another central function of the PCC, that the authorities neglected to note, was as a conduit and instrument for the absorption of Han in-migration. That Wang failed to note this particular function did not imply that it was no longer considered central to the organisation. In fact from its reconstitution the authorities determined that this function was once more of major importance. The necessity to re-establish the PCC's Han-absorbing function was due to a number of considerations. A key element in generating unrest in the region in 1980-81, it will be recalled, had been the dissatisfaction of Han in-migrants that had been rusticated during the CR. The authorities had attempted to prevent the return of such rusticates to intra-mural China where problems of surplus labour and over-crowding were already established problems. Despite this, significant numbers of Han rusticates managed to return to their home regions, such as Shanghai.⁸⁸⁹ Upon the re-emergence of the PCC the Xinjiang authorities actually sought to attract not only new Han settlers but persuade those who had already left to return.⁸⁹⁰ Moreover, Beijing saw the corps, with its administrative organisation and quasi-military discipline, as the ideal institution to absorb new Han in-migrants and substantial numbers of Han rusticates who remained in

⁸⁸⁸ Ibid, p.586 & Michael Dillon, op. cit., p.27.

⁸⁸⁹ Alan P. L. Liu, "Economic Reform, Mobility Strategies, and National Integration in China", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 31, No. 4, (April 1991), p.406-407 & Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and Wang Enmao", op. cit., p.586.

⁸⁹⁰ June Teufel Dreyer, "The PLA and Regionalism in Xinjiang", op. cit., p.48 & Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and Wang Enmao", op. cit., p.586.

Xinjiang. Thus the corps would not only contribute to the economic development and security of the region but also stabilise inter-ethnic relations that had been tense since the late 1970s.⁸⁹¹ The PCC's economic functions were also expanded so that by 1983 the regional government claimed that the corps had reclaimed 937 500 hectares of land, constructed 691 factories and managed 170 state farms.⁸⁹² Moreover, a year later the PCC accounted for a quarter of the value of the region's total production.⁸⁹³

The remaining three-year period of Wang Enmao's second tenure as First Secretary of the Xinjiang CCP and First Political Commissar of the XJMR witnessed the recovery of the regional economy and the stabilisation of Chinese control. The government's reform of agricultural and pastoral policies had a positive effect with a substantial increase in grain production and livestock by 1985. Progress in the industrial sector was not as successful with many state enterprises characterised as inefficient, unprofitable and plagued by industrial accidents.⁸⁹⁴ A major contributing factor in Xinjiang's modest economic performance between 1981-1985 was the place of the region in Beijing's state-wide economic strategy. The Sixth Five-Year Plan (1981-1985), generally associated with Zhao Zhiyang, channelled government investment into China's eastern coastal provinces that were proximate to the successful economies of East Asia.⁸⁹⁵ This strategy began the process, which was accelerated by the 7th Five-Year Plan (1986-1990), whereby the Chinese economy became spatially differentiated between the

⁸⁹¹ June Teufel Dreyer, "The PLA and Regionalism", op. cit., p.48.

⁸⁹² Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and Wang Enmao", op. cit., p.586.

⁸⁹³ Justin Jon Rudelson, *Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism along China's Silk Road*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p.37.

⁸⁹⁴ June Teufel Dreyer, "The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region at Thirty", op. cit., pp.741-742.

⁸⁹⁵ Gaye Christofferson, "Xinjiang and the Great Islamic Circle: The Impact of Transnational Forces on Chinese Regional Economic Planning", *The China Quarterly*, No.133 (1993), pp.132-133 & Yueyao Zhao, "Pivot or Periphery? Xinjiang's Regional Development", *Asian Ethnicity*, Vol. 2, no.2, (September 2001), p.200.

eastern, central and western regions with a respective differentiation of economic "specialisation".⁸⁹⁶ Thus Xinjiang received minimal government investment and the region's role in this coastal strategy was to be as a source of primary resources. This strategy was bluntly pointed out to the region's authorities by CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang and Premier Zhao Zhiyang upon their respective tours of Xinjiang in May and August 1983.⁸⁹⁷ A major consequence of this coastal-oriented economic development strategy was a growing economic disparity between the eastern and western regions of the country. As highlighted by a number of scholars this produced a "disintegrative effect" on the national economy that prompted the regions that were left "out of the loop", such as Xinjiang, to consider and develop their own economic strategies.⁸⁹⁸

Contemporaneous with the visits of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Zhiyang noted above, cross-border trade was resumed with the Soviet Union and facilitated between southern Xinjiang and Pakistan and Afghanistan via the opening of the Karakorum Highway.⁸⁹⁹ The following year Wang Enmao appealed for foreign investment in Xinjiang, noting China's historical relations with the Muslim lands to the west, and China's first Muslim stock company was also founded in Urumqi.⁹⁰⁰ According to Christofferson, this can be seen as the beginning of the development in Xinjiang of what Chinese economists referred to as "Great International Circles" that were initially planned within the context

⁸⁹⁶ See Yueyao Zhao, op. cit., pp.200-201 & Philip H. Loughlin and Clifton W. Pannell, "Growing Economic Links and Regional Development in the Central Asian Republics and Xinjiang, China", *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics*, Vol. 42, no. 7, (2001), pp.476-477.

⁸⁹⁷ Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and Wang Enmao", op. cit., p.592.

⁸⁹⁸ For Xinjiang see Gaye Christofferson, "Xinjiang and the Great Islamic Circle", op. cit., pp.132-133, Yueyao Zhao, op. cit., pp.200-201, & Philip H. Loughlin and Clifton W. Pannell, op. cit., pp.476-477.

⁸⁹⁹ June Teufel Dreyer, "The PLA and Regionalism", op. cit., p.48 & Gaye Christofferson, op. cit., p.142.

⁹⁰⁰ June Teufel Dreyer, op. cit., p.48. The Muslim stock company planned to accept funds from both domestic and foreign Muslim sources.

of the coastal strategy.⁹⁰¹ An "economic circle" is defined as "a regional bloc linking a border region with contiguous states for the purpose of trade and economic development" and Beijing's coastal strategy prompted the "defensive" development of a regional economic circle involving Xinjiang.⁹⁰² That the "Great Islamic Circle", as this was dubbed, was developing is alluded to by the fact that two-way trade between Xinjiang and the Soviet Union by 1985 was worth in the vicinity of \$US1800 million.⁹⁰³ The coastal-oriented strategy of economic development central to the 6th and 7th Five-Year Plans thus played a major role in generating Xinjiang's, albeit fledgling, turn toward Central Asia. Moreover, this development was also critical in the emergence of the "double-opening" economic strategy that evolved over the remaining years of the decade that sought to simultaneously integrate Xinjiang with the domestic and Central Asian economies.⁹⁰⁴

"Stepping from Stone to Stone in a Stream": The Dynamics of Reform and the Ethnic Minority Response to Dengist Integration, 1985-1991.

Upon Wang Enmao's replacement as First Secretary of the Xinjiang CCP and First Political Commissar of the XJMR by Song Hanliang in October 1985, the region's economic, inter-ethnic relations and security situation had effectively been stabilised. Yet the region's integration with China remained incomplete and the policies pursued under the rubric of Deng Xiaoping's "reform" agenda held potentially contradictory dynamics. The Chinese cooperation and active involvement in the US-sponsored covert war against the Soviets in Afghanistan held the potential to realise the government's

⁹⁰¹ Gaye Christofferson, "Xinjiang and the Great Islamic Circle", op. cit., p.133.

⁹⁰² Ibid.

⁹⁰³ June Teufel Dreyer, "The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region at Thirty", op. cit., p.740.

⁹⁰⁴ Gaye Christofferson, "Xinjiang and the Great Islamic Circle", op. cit., pp.136-137.

long-held fear of the development of cross-border linkages between Xinjiang's ethnic minorities and ethnically akin peoples in Central Asia. Moreover, the recruitment and training of some uncertain number of Xinjiang's ethnic minorities (mainly Uighurs) to fight against the Soviets also portended deleterious consequences for future Chinese administrators in the region. In concert with this foreign policy entanglement, Deng Xiaoping's economic reform agenda had also prompted the development of a dynamic seemingly at odds with the goal of integration. The implementation of the coastal-oriented economic development strategy, that required Xinjiang's economy (and other western and central provinces) be subordinated to the exigencies of the eastern provinces, had led to the initiation of an out-ward oriented economic strategy. Moreover, the development of cross-border trade and economic links also entailed contradictory implications for the state. Although these links would contribute to the economic development of the region, they would also bring Xinjiang's ethnic minorities into closer contacts with the largely Muslim societies of Soviet Central Asia. With respect to the "nationality question" the party had returned to the toleration and encouragement of the ethnic minorities' religious and cultural practices. Simultaneously, however, the ethnic minorities were warned that the party would clearly delineate between "legal" and "illegal" religious activities. Although these contradictions were perhaps not fully developed by 1985 they nonetheless contained latent threats to not only the region's security (as perceived from Beijing) but also to the progress of Xinjiang's political and economic integration. Yet it must be stated that the state's instruments of integration in Xinjiang - primarily the PCC and Han in-migration - had been strengthened and reinforced in the same period. It would appear that the party had embarked upon a mixed strategy characterised by the granting of certain socio-

economic privileges to Xinjiang's population underpinned by an unrelenting determination to integrate. In essence this was a return to the basic rationality of the consolidatory techniques and tactics of rule pursued in the immediate post-liberation era. The inherent contradiction between the state's goal of integration and the manifestations of socio-economic externality resulting from the state's new economic development strategy would play an instrumental role in the development of ethnic minority opposition over the coming 1985-1991 period.

The new provincial administration continued to implement the reform-oriented socio-economic policies that had aided Wang Enmao to stabilise the region between 1981 and 1985. As outlined above, however, the greater freedoms in the economic and cultural spheres held latent threats to the state's goal of integration for the region. In essence these potential threats to the integrationist project stemmed from the reforms' impact on the orientation of both specific localities and the region as a whole. As Rudelson for example has rightly pointed out, the establishment of Chinese rule, particularly in the communist era, has focused upon isolating Xinjiang from external influences and orienting the region "inward" toward China proper.⁹⁰⁵ Moreover, he argues "Xinjiang's geographic template produced axes of outside cultural influence that penetrated the region" that determined that the major oases of Xinjiang were not oriented "inward" toward each other but "outward" toward the proximate external civilisations, be they Indian, Central Asian or Chinese.⁹⁰⁶ Certainly, as the earlier chapters of this thesis demonstrated, the Qing attempted to combat and negate this condition of "externality" of the various regions of Xinjiang. Such an imperative was of course entirely consistent

⁹⁰⁵ Justin Jon Rudelson, *Oasis Identities*, op. cit., pp.39-41.

⁹⁰⁶ Ibid, p.41.

with the pre-eminent state goal of integration. The history of Xinjiang under the PRC, as we have seen, manifests the continuity of this theme of the Chinese state's struggle to firmly, and ultimately permanently, re-orient Xinjiang toward China proper. Yet the policies pursued, either under the initiative of Beijing or the provincial authorities, during the 1981-1985 period clearly had the consequence of re-orienting the region "outward" to the neighbouring regions of Soviet Central Asia and South Asia. Although the intent of these policies was undoubtedly to confine such external orientations to economic and trade relations, the "spin-off" of increased contact carried the possibility of an increase in the political and cultural orientation of Xinjiang towards external influences. Such an outcome had many precedents in Xinjiang's history - from the political and religious influence of the Khanate of Khoqand during the Qing to the Soviet domination of the "Three Districts" in the 1940s. As the remainder of the decade and the 1990s would demonstrate, these precedents would be reaffirmed in Xinjiang to make Chinese rule highly problematic.

The retirement of Wang Enmao in 1985 was also coupled with further significant personnel changes in the regional administration and a restructuring of the XJMR. As previously noted, Song Hanliang assumed Wang's posts and the Uighur governor, Ismail Aymat, was transferred to Beijing to head the Nationalities Affairs Commission and replaced by Tomor Dawamat.⁹⁰⁷ The XJMR was also downgraded to a "military district" within the Lanzhou Military Region in a move in equal parts influenced by the stabilisation of security within Xinjiang (and along the Sino-Soviet frontier) and Deng

⁹⁰⁷ June Teufel Dreyer, "The PLA and Regionalism", op. cit., p.48. Tomor Dawamat was also a Uighur.

Xiaoping's ongoing efforts to reform the PLA.⁹⁰⁸ With respect to this latter point, Deng and his key supporters in Beijing moved decisively in 1985 to expunge the PLA of its traditional Maoist thinking via reorganisation and retirement of senior personnel. Moreover, the government implemented substantial cutbacks to both the PLA's budget and manpower between January and June 1985.⁹⁰⁹ In Xinjiang the new military commander Liu Haiqing's task was to oversee the continued reform of the PLA in Xinjiang and to instil a sense of frugality in the PLA's activities.⁹¹⁰ PLA morale subsequently became an ongoing problem throughout the country, no more so than in Xinjiang where the exigencies of the belt-tightening were compounded by the perceived hardships of serving in the "frontier". To counter such sentiments the authorities began to urge PLA troops not to view service as a hardship but as a virtuous and "glorious duty", thus ironically returning to a key theme of the Maoist era.⁹¹¹ Song Hanliang, however, continued the policy direction of the early 1980s with border trade expanded and the religious and cultural practices of the ethnic minorities respected and encouraged. The Karakorum Highway that opened in 1982 had, for example, by 1985 developed as an important conduit for trade between southern Xinjiang and Pakistan. With respect to the handling of religious and cultural practices two examples indicate that the party's more moderate position had continued, with the provincial authorities attempting to encourage foreign investment and cross-border trade links through the activities of the Xinjiang Islamic Association. Moreover, the authorities began to permit

⁹⁰⁸ Ibid & Richard Baum, "The Road to Tiananmen: Chinese Politics in the 1980s", in Roderick MacFarquhar (ed.), *The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng (2nd ed.)*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.376-377.

⁹⁰⁹ Ibid, pp.377-378.

⁹¹⁰ June Teufel Dreyer, "The PLA and Regionalism", pp.48-49.

⁹¹¹ Ibid & for the effects of Deng's reforms on PLA morale see June Teufel Dreyer, "Reorganizing and Modernizing the Chinese Military", in Michael Ying-Mao Kau & Susan H. Marsh (eds.), *China in the Era of Deng Xiaoping: A Decade of Reform*, (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 347-349.

Xinjiang residents to travel more freely to Soviet Central Asia (mostly for trade purposes) and in order to perform the *hajj* to Mecca.⁹¹²

Toward the close of 1985 China experienced a wave of reform-related stresses that were manifested in the form of two major trends. First, since the removal of the conservative Deng Liqun as party propaganda chief in July 1985 there had been a resurgence in intellectual philosophical debate concerning such issues as "socialist alienation" and the relevance of Marxist economic theory. A corollary of this was the proliferation of new academic and professional societies, a revival in literary and artistic works and the development of "liberal" newspapers.⁹¹³ The second trend to develop during 1985 was an increase in social mobilisation among a variety of generally urban social groups. The most prominent of these were Chinese students, who began what developed into a series of protests in Beijing between September and December. The protests of September to November largely aired student grievances regarding what they perceived as the negative aspects of reform, such as rising living costs, profiteering and corruption.⁹¹⁴ In December, however, a group of Uighur students at the Central Nationalities University in Beijing protested against the use of Xinjiang as the base and testing ground for China's nuclear program.⁹¹⁵ Students demonstrating in Urumqi meanwhile demanded the replacement of Han officials with elected ethnic minority candidates, greater autonomy for Xinjiang, an end to coercive family planning, an end to the sending of criminals to Xinjiang's "reform-through-labour" camps, and the replacement of

⁹¹² Justin Jon Rudelson, *Oasis Identities*, op. cit., & Felix K. Chang, "China's Central Asian Power and Problems", op. cit., p.408.

⁹¹³ Richard Baum, "The Road to Tiananmen", op. cit., pp.381-383.

⁹¹⁴ Ibid, p.383.

⁹¹⁵ Ibid, p.384, June Teufel Dreyer, "The PLA and Regionalism", op. cit., p.49, & Michael Dillon, *Xinjiang: Ethnicity, Separatism and Control in Chinese Central Asia*, op. cit., p.19.

governor Tomor Dawamat by Ismail Aymat.⁹¹⁶ The Xinjiang authorities did not make any concessions to these demands, but simply reiterated that the international situation required the continued nuclear tests at Lop Nor. Moreover, the party had appropriately relaxed family planning for ethnic minorities and pointed out that it had trained numerous minority cadres.⁹¹⁷

The unrest of late 1986 did, however, play a key role in the strengthening the conservative elements of the central leadership in Beijing against the reformist General Secretary of the CCP, Hu Yaobang. At an enlarged Politburo meeting in January 1987, Hu Yaobang was relieved of all his posts and a document promulgated that outlined his "misdeeds" since 1980.⁹¹⁸ In essence these criticisms of the General Secretary charged him with an ideological laxity that had fostered "bourgeois liberalisation", thus precipitating the student "turmoil" of September-December 1986.⁹¹⁹ The reaction of the central leadership thus served to re-illustrate the delicate balance between the contradictory elements of Deng's reform strategy that predicated continued economic reform and development on the continued political pre-eminence of the CCP. Early the following year the Xinjiang authorities, however, made an ostensibly trivial but highly symbolic compromise regarding regional sentiments. Since the founding of the PRC in 1949, the CCP had determined that the country should constitute one Beijing-indexed time zone. The authorities decreed that from February 1986, however, Xinjiang would observe Urumqi time - two hours behind Beijing.⁹²⁰ The importance of such a

⁹¹⁶ June Teufel Dreyer, *op. cit.*, p.49.

⁹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹¹⁸ Richard Baum, "The Road to Tiananmen", *op. cit.*, pp.399-401.

⁹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹²⁰ *Ibid.*

compromise should not be underestimated, as it clearly established a symbolic boundary between Xinjiang, as a region, and the rest of China. Moreover, as examined in recent scholarship, this created a symbolic boundary between the various ethnic minorities of the region, who observed "Xinjiang time", and the Han in the region who regard Beijing time as the standard time for all of the PRC.⁹²¹

Thus although the incidence of social unrest/protest in Xinjiang took place within a period of state-wide social foment, the protests in Xinjiang had purely regional grievances and implications. The demands of protestors focused upon some major elements of the state's integrationist program in Xinjiang. The demand to replace Han officials with ethnic minority cadres, for example, echoed the expectations of the early 1980s that the government would transfer significant numbers of Han out of the region. Moreover, the questioning of Tomor Dawamat's governorship reflected a challenge to the coopted ethnic minority elites that the party relied upon to help legitimise its rule in the region. The government's response to these challenges was to basically ignore those demands focusing on the state's pre-eminent strategic and security prerogatives (ie. Lop Nor nuclear site), and the political domination of the provincial administration by Han. Yet with respect to those demands which were deemed not to directly threaten these security and political imperatives, certain degrees of compromise were considered to be permissible - such as manifestations of cultural identity or representation. For example, the authorities permitted the development and expansion of Uighur language journals and newspapers so that by 1986 there were 12 published in Urumqi alone.⁹²²

⁹²¹ Joanne N. Smith, " 'Making Culture Matter': Symbolic, Spatial and Social Boundaries between Uyghurs and Han Chinese", *Asian Ethnicity*, Vol.3, no.2, (September 2002), p.161.

⁹²² Ibid, p. 160 & Justin Jon Rudelson, op. cit., p.

Economically, 1985-86 saw the re-assertion of state control over the economic activities of the region's agricultural population. The implementation of the "household responsibility" system in Xinjiang, as elsewhere in China, produced major increases in agricultural production but by 1985-86 it had also regenerated some problems that socialism had partially alleviated.⁹²³ Between 1978 and 1984, for example, the value of farm output grew at three times the rate achieved over the 1957-1978 period.⁹²⁴ The success of the reform of agricultural policy could also be seen in Xinjiang where the average per capita peasant income by 1984 was 363 yuan as compared to the 1978 figure of 198 yuan.⁹²⁵ Yet along with this spectacular response to the reform policies came emergent problems. Throughout China a growing economic disparity between peasants, with references to "new rich peasants" with incomes of 10 000 yuan a year, held the possibility of a return to the pre-1949 stratification of China's agricultural population. The "new rich peasants", however, unlike the pre-1949 landlords did not generate income through land rents but from side-line commercial activities.⁹²⁶ The situation in Xinjiang was congruent with this general trend, with peasants not generating additional income through agricultural activities but through handicrafts and other "household specialisation" encouraged by the government.⁹²⁷ In fact Beller-Hann argues peasants in southern Xinjiang did not view agriculture as an income generating activity.⁹²⁸ Moreover, by 1985-86 agricultural production began to plateau, suggesting that the state-wide gains in agricultural productivity over the 1978-1984 period were "one-off"

⁹²³ Richard Masden, "The Countryside Under Communism", op. cit., p.670.

⁹²⁴ Nicholas R. Lardy, "Recasting of the Economic System: Structural Reform of Agriculture and Industry", op. cit., p.106.

⁹²⁵ Peter Nolan, *The Political Economy of Collective Farms: An Analysis of China's Post-Mao Rural Reforms*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), pp.164-165.

⁹²⁶ Ibid.

⁹²⁷ Ildiko Beller-Hann, "The Peasant Condition in Xinjiang", op. cit., pp.91-92.

⁹²⁸ Ibid.

gains and not harbingers of a transition to a higher trend of growth.⁹²⁹ The combination of a plateau in agricultural growth and the emergent issue of greater economic disparities amongst the peasantry played a role in what Kelliher terms the state's agrarian "backlash" of 1985.⁹³⁰ Although the state had theoretically "freed" peasant households from collective and state control⁹³¹ with the reforms initiated under Deng Xiaoping's leadership, the "responsibility system" by the mid-1980s entailed a number of significant obligations owed to the state by the peasants. Nolan, for example, notes that the party at the local level was far from separated from economics by the mid-1980s.⁹³² The party still possessed a number of important economic channels through which it could exercise power at the village level - the allocation of grain purchase quotas, administration of family planning policies, allocation of business licenses, and provision of technological inputs such as fertilisers and petroleum.⁹³³ In the context of Xinjiang, Beller-Hann identified six peasant obligations to the state that reflected the general reassertion of party influence and control over the peasantry:

- (1) They are tied to their place of residence and therefore to their land
- (2) They are obliged to grow an industrial crop (cotton) and sell this to the state which holds a monopoly over it
- (3) They are subject to compulsory grain procurement by the state
- (4) They are required to practise methods of cultivation imposed upon them from above
- (5) They must contribute to communal work, according to the size of their plots
- (6) They must observe compulsory family planning policies.⁹³⁴

⁹²⁹ Nicholas R. Lardy, "Recasting of the Economic System", op. cit., p.107 & Dwight H. Perkins, "China's Economic Policy and Performance", in Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank (eds.), *CHOC Vol.15, The People's Republic Pt.2: Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution, 1966-1982*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.529.

⁹³⁰ D. Kelliher, *Peasant Power in China: The Era of Rural Reform*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), pp.132-133.

⁹³¹ See Mark Selden, *The Political Economy of Chinese Development*, (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), pp.26-38 & Jean C. Oi, *State and Peasant in Contemporary China*, op. cit., pp.155-157.

⁹³² Peter Nolan, *The Political Economy of Collective Farms*, op. cit., p.85.

⁹³³ Ibid.

⁹³⁴ Ildiko Beller-Hann, "The Peasant Condition in Xinjiang", op. cit., pp.92-93.

Therefore, although the reforms had aided economic development in Xinjiang and initially relaxed the state's control over the economic activities of the peasantry, the years 1985-87 saw a reassertion of the state's prerogatives in the rural sector. The political ferment of the same period, both across China and in Xinjiang, undoubtedly contributed to the state's imperative to narrow the opportunities for independent economic decision-making and political mobilisation.

This period also witnessed further development in Xinjiang's industrial sector and an increase in foreign trade and investment. An important part of this was the exploration and development of Xinjiang's hydrocarbon resources that prior to the reform period had been under-utilised. These efforts focused on the Tarim Basin that yielded results with the discovery of the Yakela oil field in October 1984, and an oil and gas field 100km south of Korla in September 1987.⁹³⁵ These discoveries took on greater significance with the State Planning Commission's admission late in 1986 that China would no longer be self-sufficient in oil. The focus of China's energy policy was now to be on the simultaneous development of domestic reserves and diversification of foreign sources.⁹³⁶ The continued development of a gap between energy demand and production in the coming decade, as we shall see, would play a major role in the orientation of China's foreign policy in Central Asia and economic strategy in Xinjiang. Sino-Soviet trade was facilitated by negotiations between the Xinjiang Import-Export Trading Company and Vostok Xinjiangintor, which resulted in annual trade fairs alternating between Urumqi and Soviet Central Asia.⁹³⁷ Improved relations with the Soviet Union

⁹³⁵ Felix K. Chang, "Chinese Energy and Asian Security", *Orbis*, (Spring 2001), p.220.

⁹³⁶ Gaye Christofferson, "China's Intentions for Russian and Central Asian Oil and Gas", *National Bureau of Asian Research*, (1998), p.6.

⁹³⁷ Gaye Christofferson, "Xinjiang and the Great Islamic Circle", *op. cit.*, p.143.

were also evident with the re-opening of Soviet consulates in Xinjiang and the establishment of Chinese consulates in the contiguous Soviet Central Asian republics.⁹³⁸ Tensions along the Sino-Soviet frontier, however, continued with an isolated incident between Soviet and PLA troops in "a remote Xinjiang border area" in 1986.⁹³⁹ Yet such incidents were not permitted to derail the further development of closer Sino-Soviet economic relations. The Kazak Foreign Minister, on a visit to Xinjiang in August 1987, proposed a further expansion of economic cooperation between Xinjiang and Central Asia. Moreover, in October 1987 Soviet and Xinjiang authorities began negotiations regarding the joint development of 29 agricultural and industrial projects in Xinjiang.⁹⁴⁰ The growth in Xinjiang's foreign trade that resulted from these developments can be seen in the fact that the total value of foreign trade, mainly with Soviet Central Asia, had by 1987 grown to around \$250 million from a figure of \$17.1 million in 1980.⁹⁴¹

The subsequent 1988-1991 period in Xinjiang was characterised by economic crisis and growing social and political unrest that was the product of the convergence of the contradictory dynamics inherent in the government's economic development strategy and approach to the region's ethnic minorities. Moreover, this period also saw the increasing impact of external influence and developments in Xinjiang, mainly emanating from Soviet Central Asia. The 6th and 7th Five-Year Plans, it will be recalled, essentially relegated Xinjiang to providing primary resources for the coastal regions and this in turn had played an instrumental role in prompting the regional authorities to re-

⁹³⁸ June Teufel Dreyer, "The PLA and Regionalism", *op. cit.*, p.49.

⁹³⁹ Keith Martin, "China and Central Asia: Between Seduction and Suspicion", *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 3, no.25, (24 June, 1994), p.27.

⁹⁴⁰ Gaye Christofferson, *op. cit.*, p.143.

⁹⁴¹ "Progress Seen in Xinjiang's Foreign Trade", *Beijing GUOJI SHANGBAO*, 19 April 1990, p.2, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service-China* (hereafter FBIS-CHI) 90-091, 10 May 1990, p.92.

orient Xinjiang's economy "outward" to a certain degree. By 1988 this trend, manifested across a number of peripheral provinces such as Xinjiang, had resulted in the "regionalisation" of the national economy. This prompted the central government to implore regional authorities to have the "nation's interests in mind" when implementing the government's macro-economic policies.⁹⁴² Compounding this problem, and particularly detrimental given the focus on advanced industries in the coastal provinces, was the gap between energy demand and production. China's industrial growth between 1980 and 1988 averaged between 12-14 per cent, while the expansion of energy supply averaged just 4 per cent thus precipitating an energy crisis.⁹⁴³ The extent of this problem is illustrated by the fact that in the latter half of 1988 numerous state enterprises had to operate with only a two-day supply of energy.⁹⁴⁴ Moreover, the Chinese economy had become plagued by wage-price inflation, surging consumer demand, and official corruption and over investment in capital construction.⁹⁴⁵ Therefore, in September 1988 the central government initiated retrenchment policies re-centralising economic authority to reign in demand, stabilise growth and inflation and re-establish the centre's regulatory imperatives.⁹⁴⁶ The impact of these policies was greatest in western and inland border provinces such as Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, Gansu, Ningxia, Yunnan and Xinjiang, that under the coastal strategy assumed the role of primary resource suppliers. By January 1989, for example, the central government had reduced its investment in fixed assets in Xinjiang by 37.3 per cent on the 1988 level.⁹⁴⁷

⁹⁴² For example see Nicholas R. Lardy, "Recasting of the Economic System: Structural Reform of Agriculture and Industry", op. cit., p.113 & Gaye Chrsitofferson, op.cit., p.144.

⁹⁴³ Chris Bramall, *Sources of Chinese Economic Growth, 1978-1996*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 29-33 & Gaye Chrsitofferson, "Xinjiang and the Great Islamic Circle", op. cit., p.144.

⁹⁴⁴ Gaye Christofferson, "Xinjiang and the Great Islamic Circle", op. cit., pp.144-145.

⁹⁴⁵ Richard Baum, "The Road to Tiananmen", op. cit., pp.415-417.

⁹⁴⁶ Gaye Christofferson, "Xinjiang and the Great Islamic Circle", op. cit., pp.144-145.

⁹⁴⁷ Ibid.

In line with the central government's imperative to reassert macro-economic control it also granted other provinces, beside those contiguous with the Soviet border, to trade with the Soviet Union thereby creating three levels of trade - government-to-government, border trade and regional trade. The opening of Soviet trade to all provinces can be seen as an attempt to extend China's "Open Door" policy to the economy as a whole. The importance of this measure for the central government's integrationist imperatives is clear when it is recalled that Xinjiang, for example, had begun to integrate with the Soviet Union to become part of the "Great Islamic Circle" without generating similar integration toward the domestic economy:

It was important for Beijing to further economic integration of the country as a whole, as the domestic economy, even without foreign influence, tended towards regionalization during the 1980s. For the north-west to become part of the Great Islamic Circle while the north-east joined the Great North-east Asian Circle and the coastal areas entered the Asia-Pacific Economic Circle with the East Asian NICs and Japan, could only undermine the unity of national markets, with further regionalization, "economic warlordism" and disintegration of the national economy.⁹⁴⁸

The central government's emphasis on reasserting control of macro-economic policy was further progressed in 1989 through the formulation of the 8th Five-Year Plan (1990-1994), whereby the economic development of Xinjiang was given priority. The central government subsequently announced that it would construct a \$600 million petrochemical plant in Xinjiang's Dushanze oil field, intimating that Xinjiang's role in the economic development strategy had been "upgraded" from a supplier of primary resources.⁹⁴⁹ This undoubtedly had a lot to do with the further discoveries of oil in the Tarim Basin some 400km south of Korla in mid-1989.⁹⁵⁰ Soon thereafter the Chinese

⁹⁴⁸ Ibid, p.145.

⁹⁴⁹ Ibid, p.147.

⁹⁵⁰ Felix K. Chang, "Chinese Energy and Asian Security", op. cit., p.220.

National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) had some 10 000 workers dispatched to Xinjiang to develop the Tarim's potential energy reserves.⁹⁵¹ The following year also saw an increase in state investment and aid to Xinjiang. Notable projects included the construction of a power plant at Manas, the development of a polyester production capability at the Urumqi petrochemical plant, and the "Dushanze Ethyl Project" with a total investment of 2.575 billion yuan.⁹⁵²

Xinjiang experienced renewed social and political unrest over the 1988-1991 period that reflected the growing nationalist sentiment of the region's ethnic minorities. Uighurs and Kazaks demonstrated in Urumqi in June 1988 against the publication of a book, *The White House in the Distance*, which they argued contained racial slurs against them and after racist graffiti had been found in the toilets at Xinjiang University.⁹⁵³ The region's largest incident of ethnic minority unrest of the 1980s took place between May and June 1989, that occurred simultaneously with the student protests in Beijing. The incident began when approximately 3000 students from Xinjiang University marched to party headquarters in Urumqi on 17-18 May to demonstrate their support of the Beijing protestors.⁹⁵⁴ "Fundamentalists" from the Urumqi Koranic Studies Institute and "several thousand" of their supporters apparently joined these demonstrators the following day. This group's agenda differed from that of the university students, to protest the publication of a book, *Sexual Customs* which allegedly asserted amongst other things

⁹⁵¹ Ibid, p. 221 & "Tarim Basin Oil Reserves in Xinjiang Exploited", *Beijing XINHUA*, 27 June in FBIS-CHI 89-124, 29 June 1989, p.58.

⁹⁵² "State Aid Boosts Xinjiang Economic Development", *Beijing Xinhua*, 8 March in FBIS-CHI 90-047, 9 March 1990, p.53.

⁹⁵³ Michael Dillion, "Central Asia: the View from Beijing, Urumqi and Kashgar", in Mehdi Mozzafari (ed.), *Security Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States: The Southern Belt*, (London: MacMillan, 1997), p.137.

⁹⁵⁴ June Teufel Dreyer, "The PLA and Regionalism in Xinjiang", op. cit., p.50.

that Muslims perform the *hajj* to Mecca for sexual indulgence.⁹⁵⁵ The situation degenerated into a riot as public security personnel attempted to disperse the demonstrators. The official account avers that:

The very small number of plotters of the 19 May incident took advantage of the confusion to incite people who did not know the truth to storm the party and government organs, and beat, smash and loot in a big way.⁹⁵⁶

Moreover, according to the official account more than 150 soldiers, police and cadres were injured and over 40 vehicles destroyed in what was termed "political rioting".⁹⁵⁷ That the authorities viewed this incident as an outburst of ethnic nationalist "splittism" and the product of heightened religious fervour is apparent from official statements and responses in the following months. At a regional party committee meeting on 16 June Song Hanliang, for example, demanded that the party at "all levels" crack down on "illegal organizations" and deal with those spreading rumours "designed to damage nationality solidarity and advocate separatism".⁹⁵⁸

The remainder of 1989 in Xinjiang was, according to XUAR chairman, Tomor Dawamat, characterised by "an extremely difficult political fight" against those advocating "separatism".⁹⁵⁹ The authorities increasingly linked calls for greater political or cultural autonomy with what they defined as "illegal" religious activities, that is activities that took place beyond state-constructed and legitimated parameters. Thus in

⁹⁵⁵ Ibid & Michael Dillon, "Central Asia: the View from Beijing, Urumqi and Kashgar", op. cit., p.137.

⁹⁵⁶ "Xinjiang Newspaper Cited on Ethnic Problems", *Urumqi Xinjiang Regional Service*, 15 June in FBIS-CHI 89-116, 19 June 1989, pp.61-62.

⁹⁵⁷ "Seven Held for 'Political Rioting' in Xinjiang", *Hong Kong AFP*, 25 June 1989 in FBIS-CHI 88-112, 27 June 1989, p.79.

⁹⁵⁸ "Xinjiang Leaders Discuss Deng Speech, Tasks", *Urumqi Xinjiang Regional Service*, 16 June 1989 in FBIS-CHI 89-119, 22 June 1989, pp.61-62.

⁹⁵⁹ "Xinjiang Prepares for Crackdown on Separatists, Leaders' View", *Hong Kong AFP*, 13 March 1990 in FBIS-CHI 90-049, 13 March 1990, p.50.

March 1990 the deputy secretary of the regional party committee, Amudun Niyaz, exhorted "religious personages" to "correctly implement" the party's religious policy.⁹⁶⁰ Moreover, he reminded his audience that "no one is allowed" to use religion to disrupt the social order, obstruct administrative and judicial functions of the state, undermine the unity of the nationalities or encourage separatism or place religion above the state.⁹⁶¹ The general tenor of the regional authorities had substantially changed from that of the mid-1980s with the party now emphasising the need to "deal strongly" with manifestations of "disunity". Such an orientation did not bode well for further progress toward the moderation of "nationality" policy in Xinjiang in the coming year. Perhaps just as significant in this regard was the authorities' perception of the impact of external influences on Xinjiang's internal situation. By 1990 ethnic nationalist movements were under way in various parts of the Soviet Union, including the neighbouring Central Asian republics, and the victory of the *mujahideen* in Afghanistan posed the possibility of the infiltration of similar politico-ideological dynamics into Xinjiang. Indeed it would appear that this consideration played an instrumental role in prompting the authorities' crack down on "illegal" religious and political activities in Xinjiang. Tomor Dawamat, in an interview with Chinese and foreign journalists on 25 March 1990, made a number of explicit references to "some antagonistic forces from abroad" in answering questions concerning the separatist threat in the region.⁹⁶² Moreover, after noting the potential threat from Central Asia the chairman also explicitly accused Ai Sha, former secretary-general of the KMT Xinjiang government, of rallying "social scum" to the

⁹⁶⁰ "Forum Held", *Urumqi Xinjiang Regional Service*, 10 March 1990 in FBIS-CHI 90-049, 13 March 1990, p.50.

⁹⁶¹ *Ibid*, p.51.

⁹⁶² "Xinjiang Chairman Views Secessionism, Stability Cited", *Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao*, 25 March in FBIS-CHI 90-058, 26 March 1990, pp.49-50.

separatist cause from his base in Turkey.⁹⁶³ The convergence of internal and external instability thus prompted the regional authorities to not only tighten Chinese control in Xinjiang but to increasingly perceive the external challenge to this control as deriving from hitherto dormant sources. That is to say the threat was no longer perceived as emanating from the Soviet state but rather from the revival of Islam as a political force in Central Asia. Yet it is interesting to note Tomor Dawamat's reference to Uighur exiles in Turkey as it suggests the Chinese authorities' acknowledgment that the ethnic nationalist challenge need not derive from religious imperatives alone, but from cultural ones as well. That is to say the possibility of a pan-Turkist renewal in Central Asia and Xinjiang had begun to be perceived as by the Chinese as a comparable threat to its position in Xinjiang as a "fundamentalist" Islamic movement.

The 1990s did not begin auspiciously for Xinjiang's provincial government. As we have seen the regional authorities increasingly linked internal unrest with external influences after the unrest of 1989. The government's March 1990 crack down on "illegal" religious and political activities, however, combined with the instability in the neighbouring regions of Soviet Central Asia to precipitate the largest outbreak of ethnic minority and anti-Han unrest in Xinjiang since the Cultural Revolution. Once again the epicentre of unrest was south of the Tian Shan, around the major oases of Kashgar, Khotan, Artux and Aksu, although it was to spread north to Urumqi.⁹⁶⁴ The largest incident, and apparent catalyst for the wave of unrest, occurred in the town of Baren in the Kizilsu Kyrgyz Autonomous Region approximately 50 kilometres north of

⁹⁶³ Ibid.

⁹⁶⁴ Robert MacPherson, "AFP Reports Ethnic Rioting", *Hong Kong AFP*, 11 April 1990 in FBIS-CHI 90-071, 12 April 1990 June, pp.47-48 & Teufel Dreyer, "The PLA and Regionalism in Xinjiang", op. cit., p.50.

Kashgar.⁹⁶⁵ Although this town was situated in what was designated a Kyrgyz autonomous area, the settlement was reported to be dominated by Uighurs.⁹⁶⁶ A group of Uighur and Kyrgyz men allegedly led a mass protest on 5-6 April 1990 that called for the removal of the Chinese from Xinjiang and the formation of an independent East Turkestan state.⁹⁶⁷ Just days beforehand it was reported that a group of masked Uighurs raided a military base near Kashgar, stealing an unspecified quantity of weaponry.⁹⁶⁸ According to the official account of this incident, "a very small number of reactionary elements" had formed an "Islamic Party of East Turkistan" that then assembled 200 people before the township government building and recited "sacred war oaths...and made deliberate efforts to create trouble".⁹⁶⁹ Apparently the authorities then dispatched two Han cadres to the township to negotiate with the demonstrators, but when negotiations broke down the two Han cadres were killed.⁹⁷⁰ Thereafter armed police and public security personnel were dispatched to the township, where they fared little better than the unfortunate negotiators, and were besieged in the environs of the government building by the insurgents. The following morning of 6 April, the police and public security personnel came under fire from automatic weapons and grenades, causing serious damage to the government building and injuring a number of police.⁹⁷¹ The

⁹⁶⁵ Nicolas Becquelin, "Xinjiang in the Nineties", *The China Journal*, Vol. 44 (July 2000), p.69 & "Killings Reported in Riot Suppression", *Hong Kong South China Morning Post*, 11 April 1990 in FBIS-CHI 90-070, 11 April 1990, p.48.

⁹⁶⁶ Robert MacPherson, "Xinjiang Paper Says Muslims Open, Close School", *Hong Kong AFP*, 18 April 1990 in FBIS-CHI 90-075, 18 April 1990, p.49.

⁹⁶⁷ Michael Dillon, "Central Asia: The View from Beijing, Urumqi and Kashgar", op. cit., p.137.

⁹⁶⁸ See Robert MacPherson, "Traveller Reports Unrest in Xinjiang Region", *Hong Kong AFP*, 20 April 1990 in FBIS-CHI 90-077, 20 April 1990, p.52.

⁹⁶⁹ "'Rebellion' Quelling Detailed", *Urumqi Xinjiang Television Network*, 22 April 1990 in FBIS-CHI 90-078, 23 April 1990, pp.62-65.

⁹⁷⁰ See "Foreign Travel Banned", *Tokyo Kyodo*, April 10 1990 in FBIS-CHI 90-070, 11 April 1990, p.47 & David Chen, "Killings Reported in Riot Suppression", *Hong Kong South China Morning Post*, 11 April 1990 in FBIS-CHI 90-070, 11 April 1990, p.48.

⁹⁷¹ "'Rebellion' Quelling Detailed", *Urumqi Xinjiang Television Network*, 22 April 1990 in FBIS-CHI 90-078, 23 April 1990, pp.62-65.

besieged security personnel "counter-attacked in a restrained manner" and were reinforced by up to one thousand PLA troops that afternoon.⁹⁷² The counter-attack was successful and the authorities reported that they killed 10 insurgents, including the "commander" of the rebels, Zahideen Yusuf.⁹⁷³ Foreign press reports, however, placed the number of casualties in the vicinity of 60 "civilian" and 8 police deaths.⁹⁷⁴ Nonetheless ethnic minority unrest quickly spread from here to the nearby oases of Kashgar and Khotan, and in the subsequent week to the regional capital Urumqi where ethnic minorities protested in front of the city's mosque against the reports of violence in the major southern centres.⁹⁷⁵ Following the suppression of the Baren unrest it was reported that the authorities airlifted up to 100 000 PLA troops from Lanzhou to the effected areas south of the Tian Shan, especially Kashgar and Khotan.⁹⁷⁶

The reasons behind this widespread, and often violent, unrest appear from available sources to have been based upon two major factors: the government crack down on religion since March 1990 and the penetration of external influences from Central Asia. Amongst the various press sources cited above, the government's continued attempts to shut down or prevent the construction of "illegal" mosques and Islamic schools in early 1990 are often cited as a major source of ethnic minority grievances.⁹⁷⁷ In fact, the

⁹⁷² Ibid and Ahmad Lufti, "Blowback: China and the Afghan Arabs", op. cit., p.193.

⁹⁷³ "'Rebellion' Quelling Detailed", *Urumqi Xinjiang Television Network*, 22 April 1990 in FBIS-CHI 90-078, 23 April 1990, pp.64 & Michael Winchester, "China Vs Islam", *Asiaweek*, vol. 23, no.42, (24 October, 1997), p.31.

⁹⁷⁴ For example Robert MacPherson, "Traveller Reports Unrest in Xinjiang Region", *Hong Kong AFP*, 20 April 1990 in FBIS-CHI 90-077, 20 April 1990, p.52 & David Chen, "Killings Reported in Riot Suppression", *Hong Kong South China Morning Post*, 11 April 1990 in FBIS-CHI 90-070, 11 April 1990, p.48.

⁹⁷⁵ "Protest Spreads to Urumqi", *Hong Kong AFP*, 11 April 1990, in FBIS-CHI 90-070, 11 April 1990, p.47.

⁹⁷⁶ David Chen, "Killings Reported in Riot Suppression", *Hong Kong South China Morning Post*, 11 April 1990 in FBIS-CHI 90-070, 11 April 1990, p.48.

⁹⁷⁷ For example see Robert MacPherson, "Xinjiang Paper Says Muslims Open, Close School", *Hong Kong AFP*, 18 April 1990 in FBIS-CHI 90-075, 18 April 1990, p.49 & Robert MacPherson, "Traveller

authorities had stepped up their attempts to reassert party control over both religious institutions and practices in the major oases below the Tian Shan early in March 1990. In Khotan County, for example, the authorities launched a campaign to "encourage people to become patriotic religious figures", "oppose separatism", and "accept the supervision of the masses".⁹⁷⁸ The major targets of this, and analogous campaigns throughout the region, were imams that established Islamic schools without state approval and imams involved in political mobilisation of ethnic minorities.⁹⁷⁹ The fact that the leader of the rebellion at Baren, Zahideen Yusuf is reported to have declared a *jihad* or holy war against the Chinese state with the express purpose of establishing an independent "East Turkestan Republic" suggests that the incident was at least partially influenced by the Islamic revival in Soviet Central Asia⁹⁸⁰ and Afghanistan. That ethnic minorities were calling for an "East Turkestan Republic" should not have been any surprise given the precedent of two such self-styled "republics" in the region's 20th century history.⁹⁸¹ What was perhaps more threatening for the Chinese was the explicit call for a *jihad* against continued Chinese rule of Xinjiang, as this had no precedent in Xinjiang's 20th century history with the TIRET of 1933 and ETR of 1944-49 largely dominated by pan-Turkist and nationalist tendencies. It is pertinent at this juncture to recall that although a fully formed *jihad* against Chinese rule had never been generated entirely *within* Xinjiang, several had indeed been mounted from *outside* the region with support from elements within Xinjiang. I am referring here to the Makhdumzada Khoja

Reports Unrest in Xinjiang Region", *Hong Kong AFP*, 20 April 1990 in FBIS-CHI 90-077, 20 April 1990, p.52.

⁹⁷⁸ "Xinjiang Conducts Clergy 'Discipline' Campaign", *Urumqi Xinjiang Television Network*, 12 April 1990 in FBIS-CHI 90-074, 17 April 1990, p.50.

⁹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸⁰ See Mehrdad Haghayeghi, *Islam and Politics in Central Asia*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp.62-70.

inspired "Jahangir Jihads" of the early 19th century, that were discussed in chapter two of this thesis. It will be recalled that these "jihads" were mounted from the territories of the Khanate of Khoqand, centred on the Ferghana Valley and shared by the present states of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Moreover, these jihads explicitly challenged the ideological legitimacy of the Qing state by propagating the Islamic credentials of the Makhdumzada Khojas. That is to say the challenge to Qing rule was not simply a military one but also an ideological one.⁹⁸² Clearly the unrest initiated in Baren was also a direct political and ideological challenge to the Chinese state. The Chinese reported that they had captured a dossier of documents written in Uighur during the Baren unrest that was entitled "Sacred War Law and Regulations", which allegedly detailed the purpose of the "Islamic Party of East Turkistan"'s jihad. According to this report this document stated:

The purpose of the sacred war is to kill the heathens, oppose the heathens, and use our hands and language to rebuff them. For the sake of struggling against your enemy, we should use weapons and horses to deal with Allah's and your enemy.⁹⁸³

Thus the implications of the unrest and the political rhetoric that accompanied it were extremely serious due to the scale and evident organisation of the insurgents,

The conjunction of organizational sophistication, radical Muslim ideology and the weaponry used by the insurgents was far beyond the expectations of the security apparatus, suggesting foreign support from across the borders.

⁹⁸¹ The two are the 1933 "Turkish-Islamic Republic of East Turkestan" (TIRET) established in Kashgar and the 1944-1949 "East Turkestan Republic" established in Ili, the history of which was extensively dealt with in previous chapters.

⁹⁸² For the details of this period see for example Joseph F. Fletcher, *The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China*, in Beatrice Manz (ed.), *Studies on Chinese and Islamic Inner Asia*, (Aldershot: Variorum, 1995), pp.30-38, Joseph F. Fletcher, "The Heyday of the Ch'ing in Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet", in Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China Vol.10, Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, Pt. 1*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp.361-369 & Saguchi Toru, "Kashgaria", *Acta Asiatica*, Vol. 34 (1978), pp.74-76.

⁹⁸³ "'Rebellion' Quelling Detailed", *Urumqi Xinjiang Television Network*, 22 April 1990 in FBIS-CHI 90-078, 23 April 1990, pp.62-65.

The uprising took three days to quell and resulted in more than thirty deaths and numerous casualties.⁹⁸⁴

The Chinese government's greatest fear in Xinjiang, the convergence of internal unrest and external influences had, at least in its perception, come to pass with the events of April 1990. That the regional authorities perceived the unrest as emanating from political and ideological influence from abroad was borne out in a number of official statements made in the weeks following the 5-6 April incident. Song Hanliang, while reiterating that the insurgents had called for a jihad to "wipe out Chinese rule", stressed the "political nature" of the struggle against separatists and asserted that this struggle was "not a problem of nationalism or region".⁹⁸⁵ This rather oblique statement raises an important question that if it was not a question of "nationalism or region" what then, in the authorities' view, was behind these events? Ismail Aymat, Chairman of the Nationalities Affairs Commission, provided the answer in an interview with Turkish journalists, in which he asserted:

Certain elements are using religion as an instrument to create regional discord. Meanwhile, a number of foreigners are engaged in provocative activities.⁹⁸⁶

Moreover, a Uighur official addressing 70 000 people at the Iddah Mosque in Kashgar during Friday prayers called on his audience to ignore the separatist movement and intimated that trouble had been stirred up by the infiltration of armed groups into Xinjiang from Pakistan and Kyrgyz SSR.⁹⁸⁷ Further reports also suggested that the

⁹⁸⁴ Nicolas Becquelin, "Xinjiang in the Nineties", op. cit., p.69.

⁹⁸⁵ "Song Hanliang Blames 'Separatists'", *Hong Kong AFP*, 25 April 1990 in FBIS-CHI 90-080, 25 April 1990, p.67.

⁹⁸⁶ "Turkish Press on Developments", *Istanbul Milliyet*, 21 April 1990 in FBIS-CHI 90-080, 25 April 1990, pp.69-70.

⁹⁸⁷ "Eyewitness Accounts of Xinjiang Riots Cited", *Hong Kong AFP*, 3 May 1990 in FBIS-CHI 90-086, 3 May 1990, p.88.

insurgents around Baren had been supplied with weapons by *mujahideen* units in neighboring Afghanistan.⁹⁸⁸ It should be recalled in this context that the Chinese government had in fact recruited and trained an unspecified number of Uighurs to fight with the *mujahideen* in Afghanistan. The possibility therefore existed that some elements of this group had returned to Xinjiang to extend the jihad against Soviet "Marxism-Leninism" to its Chinese variant.⁹⁸⁹ Therefore, in the authorities' perception, the "separatists" had in effect hijacked the party's moderate stance regarding the ethnic minorities' cultural and religious practices to politically mobilise dissent. Moreover, this dynamic had been aided and abetted by the infiltration of hostile elements from Central Asia. The government's response following the events of April would suggest that this indeed was the conclusion reached by the Chinese. Immediately following the unrest the authorities implemented a "three no's" policy toward "national splittists" - no concessions, no compromises and no mercy.⁹⁹⁰ The PLA presence in the region was also significantly stepped up, with the PRC Vice-President Wang Zhen rumoured to have been dispatched to Xinjiang to oversee the suppression of rebellion and tightening of the region's borders.⁹⁹¹ In relation to the party's approach to the ethnic minorities' cultural and religious practices, the party's pre-eminent position was reinforced by the initiation of a thorough "rectification and screening" of religious institutions. By December 1990 it was clear that the party had instituted a hard-line stance against possible manifestations of ethnic minority unrest with Song Hanliang declaring that the

⁹⁸⁸ He Pin, "Why do Rebellions Occur So Frequently in Xinjiang", *Nanbeiji*, (Hong Kong, 18 November), cited in *China Report JPRS-CAR-92-011*, (18 December 1991)

⁹⁸⁹ Michael Winchester, "China Vs Islam", *Asiaweek*, Vol. 23, No.42, (24 October, 1997), p.31. Winchester asserts that the leader of the Baren unrest, Zahideen Yusuf, was inspired by the victory of the Afghan *jihad* against the Soviets.

⁹⁹⁰ Chang Chuan, "CPC Criticizes Regional Leadership", *Hong Kong Cheng Ming*, 1 May 1990 in FBIS-CHI 90-084 1 May 1990, p.50.

⁹⁹¹ *Ibid*, pp.50-51.

PLA was a "great wall of steel and iron safeguarding the motherland".⁹⁹² Furthermore, according to Song the greatest contemporary threat to Xinjiang was "national splittism" and this would remain the case for the foreseeable future.⁹⁹³ Contemporaneously, the authorities maintained their efforts to reassert state control over the practice of religion in the region. For example, *Xinjiang Ribao* reported that in Akto County the authorities had halted the construction of 153 mosques, shut down 50 "religious facilities" and undertaken a "full-scale rectification and screening of religious facilities".⁹⁹⁴

The unrest of April 1990 had therefore served to reinforce the state's basic perceptions as to the major threats to continued Chinese rule of the region - the politicisation of Islam within Xinjiang and the penetration of external influences. The overall strategy implemented to combat the development of these tendencies was in effect a variation of the policies pursued in the immediate post-liberation period, albeit with a greater emphasis on the state supervision of religion. The greater emphasis on state control, however, was coupled with further undertakings to facilitate the economic development of the region. Yet this in turn created further dilemmas for the regional authorities in the management of the delicate relations between the ethnic minorities and Han in Xinjiang. The months following the Baren uprising also saw an increase in Han in-migration to Xinjiang with the government's increased investment in various developmental projects in the region attracting an influx of Han, both officially sanctioned and illegal.⁹⁹⁵

⁹⁹² "Song Hanliang on Unity of Nationalities", *Urumqi Xinjiang Ribao*, 29 November 1990 in FBIS-CHI 90-241, 14 December 1990, p.55.

⁹⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁹⁴ "Akto County Screens Religious Activities", *Urumqi Xinjiang Ribao*, 25 November 1990 in FBIS-CHI 90-241, 14 December 1990, p.56.

⁹⁹⁵ June Teufel Dreyer, "The PLA and Regionalism", op. cit., p.51 & Alan P. Liu, "Economic Reform, Mobility Strategies, and National Integration in China", *Asian Survey*, Vol.31, No.4 (April 1991), pp.406-407.

According to the 1990 census figures there were 5, 695 626 Han compared to 7, 194 675 Uighur representing 37.5 percent and 47 per cent respectively of the region's total population.⁹⁹⁶ Once these figures are broken down by prefecture, however, it is clear that Han dominated the population of key industrial centres such as Urumqi, Hami, and the oil towns of Karamay and Shihezi.⁹⁹⁷ This trend would continue in the coming decade prompting charges from the ethnic minorities that the government's economic strategy only benefited the Han. This trend would be generated more by virtue of the economic opportunities created by increased government investment in Xinjiang than by state ideological campaigns, as during the Maoist era. The state's integrationist project had by the beginning of the 1990s been reinforced by the challenges precipitated from the Soviet Union in the 1980s and the emergence of greater ethnic minority unrest. Yet the task was incomplete and fraught with contradictions as the authorities attempted to balance the economic imperatives of the reform era with the security implications that flowed from greater openness to Central Asia. Moreover, as we have seen, the state's attempts to placate ethnic minority sentiment throughout the 1980s by allowing greater freedom in the sphere of religious and cultural expression, had in the state's perception "backfired" in April 1990. Those events intensified Chinese perceptions as to the level of threat to ongoing control of the region by the congruence of internal instability and external influences. Although the origin of these external influences remained the same as during the Maoist period, that is from across the western frontier, the form had changed dramatically. The Soviet state was no longer a threat to Xinjiang but the rising tide of ethnic nationalism within its constituent republics, including the Central Asian

⁹⁹⁶ "Xinjiang Bureau Issues Statistics on 1990 Census", *Urumqi Xinjiang Ribao*, 17 November 1990 in FBIS-CHI 90-250, 28 December 1990, pp.52-55.

⁹⁹⁷ See *Ibid*, p.55.

republics, posed an emergent threat to the region. In fact 1990 saw the emergence and proliferation of pan-Turkic and Islamic political parties and organisations in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.⁹⁹⁸ With the disintegration of the Soviet Union between August and October 1991, and the subsequent independence of the Central Asian Republics, these dynamics gathered momentum that threatened to spill over into Xinjiang. The Chinese response to the complex and problematic situation generated by these events in Xinjiang and Central Asia in the subsequent decade is the subject of the following chapter.

Xinjiang 1978-1991: The Re-evaluation of Chinese Strategies, Techniques and Tactics of Rule and the Problematic Progress of Integration.

Chinese rule of Xinjiang over the 1978-1991 period thus exhibited a number of key elements or themes of continuity and transformation regarding the strategies, techniques and tactics of rule employed by the state to achieve its central goal of integration. The central dilemma for the CCP since the "peaceful liberation" of Xinjiang in 1949 had been how best to facilitate the integration of the region into the Chinese state. This question, as we have seen, had not been resolved by the close of the Maoist era. In fact the various fluctuations and turbulence that characterised Chinese policy in Xinjiang during the Maoist era had, by the dawn of Deng Xiaoping's ascendancy, resulted in a questioning of the rationality that had underpinned Chinese rule. The state's goal of integration, however, regardless of the turbulence of the Maoist era remained firmly entrenched within the perceptions of the post-Mao leadership as not only the correct normative course of action but the only possible direction of Chinese rule in Xinjiang.

⁹⁹⁸ See Mehrdad Haghayeghi, *Islam and Politics in Central Asia*, op. cit., pp. 85-95.

Although the CCP leadership following the death of Mao and the fall of the "Gang of Four" ultimately re-evaluated the central tenets of the Maoist political, economic and social order, it in practice reaffirmed the state's imperative to integrate Xinjiang.

As we have seen, the Dengist program of reform in Xinjiang, especially during the 1978-1982 period, generated social unrest as the major political "actors" in the region - the ethnic minorities, Han settlers, the PCC and PLA - responded to the new dynamics emanating from Beijing. This period of unrest in Xinjiang was an explicit challenge to the new central leadership in Beijing in many respects, not least as the key pillars of Chinese rule in the region - the Xinjiang CCP and the PLA - responded adversely to the quest to negate Maoist influence. Moreover, the authorities by explicitly criticising the policies pursued during the late Maoist period ultimately raised questions regarding the legitimacy of Chinese rule in Xinjiang in the perception of the ethnic minorities. The policies implemented during the 1978-1982 period questioned the rationality that had underpinned Chinese rule, that is, it explicitly questioned and undermined the Maoist techniques and tactics of rule upon which Chinese political power had been based since the PLA 1st FA entered the region in October 1949. This dynamic must have been evident to the central authorities, as the policies implemented after the unrest of 1981-82 under the regional leadership of Wang Enmao returned to the general themes and contours of the consolidatory policies implemented during the early 1950s. As noted earlier, this return to the basic techniques and tactics of rule of the 1950s was no coincidence but was determined by the nature of the challenges posed to the continuation of Chinese rule in Xinjiang in the immediate post-Mao period. The tasks confronting the authorities in the early 1980s were mainly concerned with re-

establishing the CCP's political legitimacy. As such, this required the authorities to re-create or revive specific techniques and tactics of rule that permitted the representation and expression of ethnic minority political, socio-economic and cultural diversity. That is to say it aimed to provide the requisite politico-ideological "space" in which the region's non-Han population could be represented in order to facilitate their integration into the Chinese state. Under Wang Enmao's leadership the CCP in Xinjiang implemented policies reminiscent of the "united front" era, whereby emphasis was placed upon training and development of ethnic minority cadres and the toleration and encouragement of ethnic minority religious and cultural practices. Moreover, under Wang's 1981-85 tenure renewed emphasis was also placed upon reviving the region's economy through the implementation of de-collectivisation in agriculture and increased regional government investment. The place of Xinjiang within the Chinese economy also underwent an important transformation due to the priorities of the central government in this period. Under the rubric of the 6th Five-Year Plan (1981-1985) central government investment was channelled toward China's eastern coastal provinces, thus accelerating the spatial differentiation of China's economy between eastern, central and western regions. This economic development strategy prompted neglected regions such as Xinjiang to develop their own economic development strategy. By 1985 Xinjiang had embarked on a tentative opening to the economies of Soviet Central Asia that was somewhat at odds with the state's integrationist imperatives.

This divergence from the themes of the Maoist era was, however, coupled with a re-invigoration of two key instruments of Chinese rule in Xinjiang - the Xinjiang PCC and

Han in-migration - that had been emblematic of the Maoist period. Thus the re-evaluation of the techniques and tactics of rule, and the subsequent "moderation" of policy that flowed from this, was paralleled by a renewed emphasis on the major instruments of integration. During the 1985-1991 period, however, the coupling of this strategic "retreat" from the Maoist model with reinforced instruments of integration produced a number of contradictory dynamics in the region that ultimately came to a head at the beginning of the 1990s. The development of greater contacts between Xinjiang and the contiguous regions of Soviet Central Asia, that were the consequence of the authorities' out-ward oriented economic strategy and relaxation of religious and cultural restraints, held the potential to counteract the state's integrationist imperatives. This process threatened to reinvigorate the historical linkages between Xinjiang and Central Asia that had in the past seen specific regions of Xinjiang become oriented "out-ward" toward the proximate external civilisations. The party's moderation of its restrictions on ethnic minority religious and cultural practices combined with the greater contacts across the Sino-Soviet frontier to generate a revival of religious practices which often took place outside of state-prescribed parameters. As the latter sections of this chapter have demonstrated, these dynamics converged from 1986 onward and resulted in the more forceful expression of ethnic minority identity than had been seen in Xinjiang since its "peaceful liberation" in 1949. The major dilemma for the Chinese authorities from 1986 onward was to maintain the delicate balance between the greater religious and cultural freedoms, which they perceived as contributing to social stability, and the major instruments of integration - Han in-migration, the PCC and economic development - that underpinned continued Han dominance of Xinjiang. The social unrest of the late 1980s and the explosion of violent ethnic minority opposition to

Chinese rule in April 1990 suggested that the authorities had not foreseen the inherent contradictions between the two major aspects of their strategy in the region. Moreover, the unrest of April 1990 also highlighted the re-emergence of cross-border linkages that had been dormant or negated during the Maoist period. Chinese rule of Xinjiang at the beginning of the new decade was thus precariously balanced. This situation was to be further complicated late in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet state that was to have wide-reaching implications for Chinese rule of Xinjiang. Thus the integrationist imperatives of the state would in the coming decade continue to be buffeted by external and internal dynamics that, as in the past, often converged to form an encompassing politico-ideological challenge to the legitimacy of Chinese rule in Xinjiang.

CHAPTER 7

CHINA AND XINJIANG, 1991-1995: INTEGRATION, ETHNIC SEPARATISM AND RESURGENT GEOPOLITICS

In January 1991 Xinjiang entered its fifth decade as an "integral" province of the People's Republic of China. The status of the state's integrationist project at the beginning of the 1990s was, as the previous chapter demonstrated, characterised by the confluence of a number of contradictory external and internal dynamics. Internally, the implementation of the economic reform program was coupled with a relaxation of the party's restrictions on ethnic minority religious and cultural practices, the basic contours of which resembled the consolidatory policies of the early 1950s. Moreover, the state-wide economic development strategy pursued by the central government, whereby investment and resources were channelled to the eastern coastal provinces, prompted peripheral regions such as Xinjiang to develop their own regional economic strategy. This process resulted in Xinjiang becoming more "outward" oriented toward the economies of Soviet Central Asia and south Asia by the close of the 1980s. The increased cross-border contacts that this generated, coupled with the greater religious and cultural freedoms tolerated by the authorities contributed to the development of an Islamic revival in Xinjiang. Another important factor in this regard was the increase in Han in-migration to Xinjiang, particularly in the latter half of the 1980s. The state's encouragement of renewed Han in-migration to the region was largely a function of the central government's perception that the economic strategy of the 6th Five-Year Plan (1981-1985) had counter-acted to a certain extent the integrationist policies of the Maoist era. The various socio-economic problems created by Deng's reform program,

that became evident throughout the PRC from 1986 onward, were in Xinjiang increasingly framed by reassertion of ethnic minority identity that directly challenged the integrationist goals of the state. Externally, the 1980s witnessed a gradual rapprochement in Sino-Soviet relations that permitted the regional authorities to partially orient Xinjiang's economy toward Soviet Central Asia. Yet prior to the easing of Sino-Soviet relations in 1985-86, the PRC had actively participated in the anti-Soviet proxy war in Afghanistan, that had important implications for the future development of Chinese rule in Xinjiang. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, although contributing to an easing of tensions along the Sino-Soviet frontier, also contributed to the growing instability of Soviet Central Asia.

The rapid disintegration of the Soviet Union over the course of 1990-91 and the growing ethnic and religious revival that it strengthened in Central Asia had significant consequences for Xinjiang. The preceding two chapters have dealt at length upon a forty-two year period (1949-1991) in which Chinese techniques and tactics of rule in Xinjiang underwent a series of transformations simultaneous with the entrenchment of the goal of integration. Importantly, the various fluctuations in the content of these techniques and tactics of rule were largely the consequence of internal political and economic developments that then interacted with specific imperatives within the context of Sino-Soviet relations. The CCP-PLA's successful "peaceful liberation" of Xinjiang in 1949 and subsequent effective extension of state power into the region by the mid-1950s enabled the Chinese to negate or exclude incumbent external influences. Undoubtedly the PRC's close alignment with the Soviet Union in this period reduced Chinese fears of an overt external threat to their rule of the region. Yet, as chapter five

demonstrated, the Soviet influence was far from benign and this state of affairs was highlighted upon the divergence of Chinese and Soviet imperatives by the late 1950s. From this point onward the primary external threat to Xinjiang was thus perceived to be the Soviet Union, and this was increasingly reflected in the state's techniques and tactics of rule within Xinjiang. Throughout the course of the 1949-1991 period therefore the source of threat to the Chinese position in Xinjiang remained constant and singular. That is to say regardless of how the challenge to Chinese rule or legitimacy was framed - for example as in the case of the "Free Turkestan Movement" during the 1960s - it ultimately derived from the Soviet state. Moreover, such anti-Chinese influences or movements and their potential threat to Xinjiang were framed by reference to the perceived strategic imperatives of the Soviet Union regarding the PRC.

The creation of five independent states in Central Asia simultaneously removed the long-feared Soviet threat to Xinjiang while creating new and diversified sources of potential threats to the Chinese position. Perhaps of equal significance was that the new states of Central Asia were to be assailed by a multiplicity of external forces over the course of the next decade. That is to say the removal of Soviet/Russian dominance returned Central Asia in a geo-political sense to a situation comparable to that experienced by the region up to the Russian conquests of the late 19th century. Central Asia under the Soviet Union had been isolated and "sealed off" from the contiguous regions of South Asia (such as Iran and the subcontinent) and East Asia (Mongolia and Xinjiang) to which it had had geographical, historical and cultural linkages. Such a process, as we have seen, had also been undertaken in Xinjiang since the founding of the PRC in 1949. Following the Soviet collapse, however, the various geographical,

historical and cultural linkages were revived that, in concert with the West's "discovery" of the region's largely untapped hydrocarbon resources generated a multifarious geopolitical scramble for influence in Central Asia. This "New Great Game" for Central Asia, as it has been described, would over the course of the 1991-2004 period result in the development of multi-state competition amongst the world's remaining superpower and hegemon, the USA, and the major regional powers - Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan, India and Turkey - for influence in and access to the resources of the five republics. This competition would encompass the political, economic, security and cultural interests of the contending states. Thus Chinese rule of Xinjiang at the beginning of the 1990s was confronted with a rapidly changing external environment. In parallel with this systemic transformation in the international political environment, the means of state action in Xinjiang throughout this period were to exhibit manifestations of continuity with and change from the corpus of techniques and tactics of rule developed since 1949. As the previous chapters have demonstrated, however, the ongoing turbulence or fluctuation within the sphere of the means of state action in Xinjiang since the establishment of the PRC had never compromised the over-arching goal of Chinese rule in the region - integration. The various internal and external challenges confronted by the state over the course of the PRC's history, however, did result in the re-evaluation - varying in intensity from period to period - of the rationality that underpinned the various techniques and tactics of rule employed. The 1991-2004 period would prove to be little different in this regard.

The Independence of Central Asia and its Implications for China's Integrationist Project in Xinjiang, 1991-2004

The years 1991-2004 have been a thirteen-year period of transformation for Xinjiang and Central Asia in security, economic, ethnic and political terms. The transformation began with the wave of internal unrest throughout China and Xinjiang in 1989-90 and the momentous event of the collapse of the Soviet Union in September-October 1991. The collapse of the Soviet Union had a dramatic impact upon the international political system and China's foreign and Xinjiang policies. The systemic transformation of the international environment from one of tight bi-polarity to multi-polarity which the Soviet Union's demise initiated, resulted in a fundamental re-evaluation of Chinese foreign policy objectives. The transformation of Central Asia from being a component of a superpower, and hence part of the international system, to the constituent parts of a emerging regional order has had profound implications, for not only the states of Central Asia, but also for China. The focus of this section will concern the fragmenting or localising dynamics that this systemic transformation has unleashed in Central Asia and their implications for Xinjiang and China. These fragmenting dynamics do not exclusively originate in Central Asia, rather there is a complementarity developing between fragmenting dynamics across state boundaries. That is to say, fragmentation in economic, political and ethnic terms in Central Asia are reinforced by similar developments in Xinjiang and vice versa. China's increasing economic integration with Central Asia has provided it with significant economic, political and security returns but it has also made Xinjiang increasingly vulnerable to the currents of ethnic and religious resurgence emerging in Central Asia.

Xinjiang occupies a geo-strategic position at the crossroads of five cultural and geographic regions: Russia, Central Asia (bordering Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), the sub-continent (India-Pakistan via Kashmir), Tibet and China proper. This geo-strategic position, that made Xinjiang a pawn in the 'Great Game' for Central Asia in the nineteenth century, has again made it a key strategic frontier for China. The sensitivity of the Chinese government to developing ethnic nationalism in Xinjiang in the last decade, although a product of China's historical experience, has been reinforced by ongoing regional political, economic and ethnic conflicts. The 1991-2004 period has witnessed five major, and potentially destabilizing, regional conflicts or crises:

- (1) The Sino-Indian territorial dispute
- (2) The Indian-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir
- (3) The decade-long civil crisis in Tajikistan (civil war 1992-1995),
- (4) The volatile situation in the Ferghana Valley (bordering Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan)
- (5) The Afghan conflict.⁹⁹⁹

The impact of ethnic nationalism and militant Islam upon the majority of these conflicts has been significant and this has not been lost on the Chinese government. The potential for these destabilizing influences to transverse China's borders and threaten its control of the predominantly non-Han and Islamic Xinjiang is China's major fear. Xinjiang's proximity and susceptibility to these external influences, although undoubtedly a threat to Chinese control, provides China with an historical opportunity to become the hegemonic power in the region at the expense of its historical rival,

⁹⁹⁹ Nicolas Becquelin, "Xinjiang in the Nineties", *The China Journal*, No.44, (July 2000), p.65.

Russia. Xinjiang's geo-strategic position coupled with China's continued economic reforms place Xinjiang in a prime position to become China's gateway, in economic and political terms, to Central Asia. This strategic value has also been recently enhanced by the discovery of oil deposits in the Zhungar, Turfan and Tarim Basins¹⁰⁰⁰, which is of great significance, as China becomes a net oil importer.¹⁰⁰¹ Moreover, Xinjiang is viewed by the Chinese government as having a crucial role to play as an economic corridor from Central Asia to China's developed coastal regions. This is particularly the case in relation to planned construction of oil and gas pipelines from Kazakhstan to coastal China and Japan via Xinjiang.¹⁰⁰² All of Xinjiang's potential to contribute to China's continued economic development will come to naught, however, without the resolution of outstanding regional conflicts and regional security issues. The potential for the fragmenting forces of ethnic nationalism and Islamic militancy to undermine China's position in Xinjiang is also coupled with the possibility of inter-state competition for the economic resources of the Central Asian states. The challenges to China's control of Xinjiang therefore come from not only non-state actors, such as ethnic groups or Islamicist political groups, but also from the various regional states who have a stake in the "New Great Game" for Central Asia.

The events in Xinjiang of April 1990 presaged in many respects the multiple challenges that would be confronted by the Chinese state in the region over the course of the subsequent twelve years as a consequence of the disintegration of the Soviet state. The

¹⁰⁰⁰ Gaye Christoffersen, "Xinjiang and the Graet Islamic Circle: The Impact of Transnational Forces on Chinese Regional Economic Planning", *The China Quarterly*, No.133, (1993), p.137.

¹⁰⁰¹ Gaye Christoffersen, "China's Intentions for Russian and Central Asian Oil and Gas", *National Bureau of Asian Research*, (1998), pp.6-8.

¹⁰⁰² Ibid.

convergence of internal political and social instability with external influences at this juncture served to highlight, in the authorities' perception, the continuity of the threat posed to the maintenance of Chinese rule in the region. Yet simultaneously the events in Baren augured a transformation in terms of the nature and scope of that threat to Chinese rule. The confluence of radical Islamic ideology and relatively sophisticated weaponry in the uprising suggested that the external threat to Xinjiang had changed from that of the Soviet state *per se* to that of movements within the territories of the Soviet Union itself. Contemporary reports abounded with references to or assertions of connections between Uighur militants and *mujahideen* units in Afghanistan or sympathisers in the Soviet Central Asian states. The veracity of such claims, however, remains unclear but, at the least, they demonstrated to the authorities the exemplary force of the anti-Soviet *jihād* in Afghanistan. The retreat of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1989 and the rapid disintegration of the Soviet state in 1991 resulted in the independence of Central Asia from Russia for the first time in approximately 150 years. The significance of this for the Chinese position in Xinjiang should not be underestimated. The collapse of the Soviet Union not only initiated a systemic transformation in the international political environment but also prompted a transformation in the geo-political situation along China's Central Asian frontiers. Although, as previous chapters of this thesis have noted, the Soviets did encourage or support Uighur exile groups in Central Asia, it was for the express advancement of Soviet political and strategic imperatives.

In a sense this movement of the source of threat from that of a state to non-state movements or organisations presented the Chinese state with a "back to the future"

scenario. What the at least temporary removal of Russian dominance in Central Asia portended for China was that such ethnically based opponents of Xinjiang's status as an "integral" province of the PRC were now free to work entirely toward their own political goals. Moreover, the creation of five independent states in Central Asia diversified the geo-political structure of the region. It will be recalled that in chapter two - dealing with the Qing era in Xinjiang - I highlighted the political, ideological and economic influence of the Khanate of Khoqand in Xinjiang. The threats posed by Khoqand to Qing rule in Xinjiang were many and prompted numerous rebellions against the Qing over the 1800 to 1880 period. Throughout this period the Makhdumzada Khojas played a major role in generating Khoqand's ideological and religious challenge to the Qing in Xinjiang. Moreover, as detailed in chapter two, the successive ideological, religious and military challenges emanating from the territories of Khoqand prompted the Qing to question the rationality that underpinned their techniques and tactics of rule in Xinjiang, and ultimately proved instrumental in committing the Qing to the goal of integration. Contemporaneously the expansion of imperial Russia and Britain converged to make the region the object of the so-called "Great Game" for Central Asia, which also impinged upon Qing imperatives in Xinjiang. With the collapse of the Soviet Union the Chinese state faced a similar reorientation of the regional geo-political order, whereby Central Asia, although now independent, was buffeted by a multiplicity of external state and non-state forces. The removal of Soviet power from the region, at an instant made possible the extension or revival of long suppressed political, economic and cultural linkages across the region. The PRC's place in this "New Great Game" has in fact been determined by the historical process of integration, as expressed in the complex of techniques and tactics of rule

developed across the historical period addressed in this thesis. That is to say the entrenchment of the goal of integration since the 1800s compelled the Chinese state to become an important "player" in this geo-political competition for influence in Central Asia. Yet the PRC's perceptions of the importance of the "New Great Game" are seen through the prism of Xinjiang - that is with the pre-eminent concern focused upon the maintenance and strengthening of the state's control over the region.

This and the following chapter will demonstrate that China's foreign policy in Central Asia over the 1991-2004 period has been designed to enhance the Chinese state's control of Xinjiang. Moreover, the conduct of its relations with the various Central Asian republics exhibit China's pre-eminent concern with the stability and development of Xinjiang. The internal parallel of this goal of China's foreign policy has been the reinforcement of the complex of integrationist techniques and tactics of rule over the corresponding period. An important over-arching theme within the context of this process has been the state's attempts to reconcile the perceived need for strengthened integration and security of the province with the recognition of the economic and political opportunities presented by the retreat of Russian power from Central Asia. Two major factors have driven Chinese policy in relation to the political and economic opportunities in Central Asia - to secure China's frontiers with the Central Asian Republics and to gain access to Central Asia's hydrocarbon resources. The establishment of the "Group of Five" in January 1992 and its gradual evolution into the "Shanghai Five" and finally the "Shanghai Cooperation Organisation" (SCO) in 2001 have in a number of respects exhibited China's concerns and interests with respect to these two issues. Yet the opportunities presented to the PRC by the removal of Russian

influence in Central Asia are not entirely benign. The collapse of the Soviet state in 1991 created five independent but politically, economically and socially unstable states on China's "backdoor". Thus a major theme in the development of China's reinforcement of its integrationist techniques and tactics of rule in Xinjiang and the conduct of its foreign policy in Central Asia has been an over-riding concern to isolate the region from perceived negative dynamics emanating from Central Asia. Over the course of the 1991-2004 period there has been one major dynamic in Central Asia that China has been determined to isolate Xinjiang from - the revival of Islam as a political force, and its "associated" processes of "terrorism", weapons and drug trafficking.

Within this period there can be distinguished three phases of development with regard to the state's techniques and tactics of rule and their interaction with China's foreign policy in Central Asia. The first phase between 1991-1996, which will be the focus of this chapter, witnessed a re-evaluation of the state's techniques and tactics of rule in Xinjiang. This was prompted by the wave of internal unrest during and immediately after the Baren Uprising in April 1990 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in September-October 1991. This phase was characterised by the reassertion of key elements of integration, such as Han in-migration, and the development of a new economic strategy that attempted to utilise Xinjiang's geo-strategic position as a trade "corridor" to simultaneously integrate the region with China proper and Central Asia. In relation to China's foreign policy this re-evaluation of the techniques and tactics of rule proved to be a decisive factor in generating China's greater engagement with the states of Central Asia. This period also witnessed increasing incidences of ethnic minority opposition to Chinese rule in Xinjiang. Moreover, this coincided with the initial stages

of the "New Great Game" for Central Asia that in many respects aggravated a number of regional conflicts and generated fragmenting dynamics within the constituent states of Central Asia. The 1991-1996 period can therefore best be described as a transitory period for China's strategy in Xinjiang and Central Asia as it adapted to the new situation created by the Soviet Union's fall. The second phase between 1997-2001, that will be the focus of the following chapter, saw the intensification of themes of both integration and fragmentation in Xinjiang and Central Asia. The internal political, economic and social problems of the Central Asian Republics intensified simultaneous with an increase in the inter-state competition of the "New Great Game". China's re-evaluated strategy to develop and integrate Xinjiang was reinforced by these external dynamics as it underlined for the authorities that to secure their control, China's foreign policy calculus had to be aligned with the state's overall goals in Xinjiang. The third phase, 2001-2004 has been defined by the implications of the events of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent projection of US military and political influence into Central Asia for China's strategy in Xinjiang.

The impact of this process has been somewhat contradictory for China's position in Xinjiang and Central Asia. In a regional sense, the projection of US political and military influence into four of the five Central Asian states is perceived to be a negative consequence of the "War on Terror". This is the case as US involvement has undermined to a degree China's foreign policy efforts in Central Asia since 1991, whereby it had played a key role in establishing and determining the function of the SCO. Moreover, US involvement in the region has impacted on China's bi-lateral relations with the states of Central Asia, as the Central Asian states are compelled to

choose between emphasising their US or Chinese relationship. Within Xinjiang, however, the US government's focus on combating Islamic "extremism" and "terrorism" in Chinese perceptions strengthens their efforts against separatist ethnic minorities in the province. This has been illustrated by China's contemporary framing of its struggle against ethnic separatists by reference to the goals of US "War on Terror". Yet the projection of US power also threatens the Chinese state's long term strategy for the economic development and integration of Xinjiang. As will be demonstrated over the course of this and the subsequent chapter, China's strategy in Xinjiang over the course of the 1991-2004 period has focused on a "double integration" - that is the simultaneous economic integration of Xinjiang with Central Asia and China proper. Moreover, this has been both an economic and political project. The state's major assumption over this period has been that increased economic development and prosperity for the various ethnic minorities will diminish ethnic separatism. Simultaneously, the state has reinvigorated key instruments of integration, such as Han in-migration, that have arguably exacerbated inter-ethnic tensions in the region. The overall strategy could be characterised as the state "hedging its bets", as policies ostensibly aimed at economic goals have also had implicit political consequences.

Xinjiang and Central Asia, 1991-1995: Internal Re-evaluation and External Transformation

The scale and nature of the events at Baren, as detailed in the previous chapter, combined with reports of external connections between the insurgents and elements in Afghanistan or Central Asia to bring to the forefront of Chinese perceptions that the causes of the unrest in Xinjiang were primarily external. Significantly, a connection was

made between the state's relatively moderate approach to manifestations of ethnic minority religious and cultural identity and the relaxation of major methods of integration throughout the 1980s and this external threat to Xinjiang. Important in this regard was the impact of the state's economic development strategy that focused on state-investment in China's eastern coastal provinces. Over the course of the 6th and 7th Five-Year Plans (1981-1990) this strategy generated a "disintegrative effect" on the national economy, with growing economic disparities between the coastal, central and western provinces.¹⁰⁰³ As a result regional/provincial authorities in the central and western regions gradually formulated their own economic development strategy to make up for the lack of central government attention and/or investment. In the case of Xinjiang the authorities began by the mid-1980s to re-orient Xinjiang's economy toward Central Asia. This was ultimately contrary to the integrationist aims of Chinese policy in Xinjiang.

Therefore, the following twelve months (ie. 1991) saw a reassertion of state control over ethnic minority religious and cultural practices. Over the course of December 1990 to January 1991 the authorities implemented regulations on the "management of religious activities and regulations on management of clergymen".¹⁰⁰⁴ Notably the region's where these regulations were assiduously emphasised were those that had been the centres of unrest in April 1990, such as the Kizilsu Kyrgyz Autonomous Prefecture, Kashgar and Khotan.¹⁰⁰⁵ The role or function of these "Two Regulations" was to provide guidelines

¹⁰⁰³ Yueyao Zhao, "Pivot or Periphery? Xinjiang's Regional Development", *Asian Ethnicity*, Vol.2, No.2, (September 2001), pp.200-201.

¹⁰⁰⁴ "Xinjiang Official on the Management of Religion", *Urumqi Xinjiang Ribao* 11 December 1990 in FBIS-CHI-91-007, 10 January 1991, p.57.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Ibid.

for the management of religious affairs and to strengthen the "means to exercise administrative control over religion". Moreover, the goals of these regulations were to oppose "national splittism" and prevent religious interference in administrative and judicial matters, such as marriage, education and family planning.¹⁰⁰⁶ The scale of religious influence prior to the implementation of these regulations must have been significant with an official of the Religious Affairs Bureau stating that:

The situation has improved in places where *religious affairs were out of control*...Religion's interference in administrative and judicial matters, marriage, education and planned parenthood has markedly reduced. *Acute problems in these areas have been dealt with severely.*¹⁰⁰⁷

The means by which the authorities dealt with these "acute problems" was also explicitly outlined by the same official:

Many places have stopped the indiscriminate building and expansion of mosques. Unauthorized private schools, classes, and sites for teaching scripture have also been basically banned. In some places, Islamic associations have started to train young patriotic religious personnel in a planned manner.¹⁰⁰⁸

This was also coupled with the penetration of party cadres more fully into rural and pastoral areas of the region to combat the twin evils of "national splittism" and "illegal religious activities". At the "XUAR Mobilization Meeting for 1991 Rural Work" Song Hanliang announced that the provincial party and government had decided to organise 18 000 cadres into "rural working groups". The major tasks of these "rural working groups" were to "stabilize" the situation, develop "grass roots party organisation", promote "socialist education", "deepen" rural reform and build irrigation works.¹⁰⁰⁹

¹⁰⁰⁶ Ibid, p.58.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Ibid. My emphasis.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰⁹ "Song Hanliang on Xinjiang's 1991 Rural Work", *Urumqi Xinjiang Ribao* 16 December 1990 in FBIS-CHI-91-015, 23 January 1991, pp.78-79

Song Hanliang, commenting on the major tasks of the "rural working groups", stated that they must uphold the party's "ideological and cultural" position in the countryside that had been recently "recaptured and fortified" after the events of April 1990.¹⁰¹⁰ Within this context the cadres had five major tasks to accomplish in the first half of 1991, (1) launch socialist education, (2) party-building at the basic level, (3) guide and promote rural reform, (4) promote agricultural and livestock production and (5) improve rural elementary and middle schools.¹⁰¹¹ In the realm of "socialist education" the cadres were to educate the masses on the party's "basic lines" concerning patriotism, socialism, maintenance of motherland unification, opposing national splittism and national unity. Party-building at the basic level was to focus on re-establishing the leading role of the village party branches and step up the training of cadres in rural regions. Moreover, the cadres were also directed that in their guidance and promotion of continued rural reform they were to stress the "household responsibility system" and strengthen the functions of collectives. Cadres were to promote agricultural and pastoral production through the mobilisation and encouragement of rural/pastoral communities. Finally, Song stressed that over the past decade the party and government had neglected educational work, particularly in rural areas, and that "religion had seized the opportunity" to "affect and corrupt students' ideology". The significance of this admission cannot be overemphasised, as it was noted that over 70% of XUAR's 9,250 elementary and middle schools were in rural or pastoral areas. Thus the authorities clearly linked the issue of a resurgence of ethnic minority identity and "separatist" tendencies with the influence of Islam. Moreover, Song explicitly stated that the authorities had recognised that the party

¹⁰¹⁰ Ibid, p.80.

¹⁰¹¹ Ibid, p.81.

and state were in fact competing with Islam over the future ideological and political direction of Xinjiang:

In Xinjiang, it is necessary to pay special attention to strengthening education on national unity and on the need to safeguard national unification. Unity and love among various nationalities should be taught at an early age. *It is necessary to strictly ban religion from interfering in education and prevent it from competing with us in winning over young people.*¹⁰¹²

In concert with these efforts to negate or contain the influence of religion in Xinjiang, the authorities also made it abundantly clear as to where the impetus for this religious resurgence originated. Throughout January and February 1991 there were constant references to the "infiltration" of hostile external forces and their collusion with "nationalist splittists" in Xinjiang¹⁰¹³, with Song Hanliang going so far as to say that this had "always" been and would continue to be the "principal threat" to Xinjiang.¹⁰¹⁴

The reinforcement of the party's control over the practice and influence of religion in Xinjiang occurred simultaneous with the re-orientation of economic development strategy. The 8th Five-Year Plan (1991-1995) partially re-oriented the central government's priorities regarding its economic development strategy. The state's active toleration of the uneven economic development of the provinces throughout the 1980s was re-evaluated following the outbreak of unrest throughout the country in 1989-90. Key to this re-evaluation was the central government's recognition of adverse consequences of the spatially differentiated rates of economic development fostered by

¹⁰¹² Ibid, p.81. My emphasis.

¹⁰¹³ For example see, "Song Hanliang Applauds Xinjiang Production Corps", *Urumqi Xinjiang Ribao*, 16 January 1991 in FBIS-CHI-91-022 1 February 1991, p.50, "Regional CPPCC Committee Urges Political Unity", *Urumqi Xinjiang Ribao* in FBIS-CHI-91-028 11 February 1991, p.70 & "Song Hanliang Urges Vigilance Against Infiltration", *Urumqi Xinjiang Ribao* in FBIS-CHI-91-031 14 February 1991, p.64.

¹⁰¹⁴ "Song Hanliang Attends Xinjiang Party Meeting", *Urumqi Xinjiang Ribao* 21 January 1991 in FBIS-CHI-91-023, 4 February 1991, p.59.

the coastal-oriented economic strategy. In the case of Xinjiang, as we have seen, the development of economic disparities was doubly dangerous to the state's control of the region. The failure of the state to deliver increased economic prosperity to ethnic minority regions such as Xinjiang and the regionalisation of economic strategies that led to the outward orientation of Xinjiang's economy facilitated the development of currents at variance with the integrationist imperatives of the state. Therefore, the state needed to address what was perceived as the elements of the economic strategy that had contributed to such currents over the previous decade. Thus the 8th Five-Year Plan sought to alleviate the disintegrative effects of the government's economic development strategy that had been embodied in the 6th and 7th Five-Year Plans. Song Hanliang¹⁰¹⁵, for example, at the 16th Plenum of the XUAR Party Committee in January 1991 noted that the central government had decided on a policy of "actively helping nationality regions promote economic development" as part of a drive to coordinate economic development throughout the country.¹⁰¹⁶ The changed priorities of the central government and their implications for Xinjiang were further outlined by Wang Enmao, at this time chairman of the "Advisory Committee of the XUAR CCP Committee", at the 16th Plenum of the XUAR Central Committee on 22 February 1991.¹⁰¹⁷ Significantly, in his address Wang admitted that for "historical reasons there is a wide gap between the level of Xinjiang's economic development and that of the nation".¹⁰¹⁸ Thus a major goal of the CCP Central Committee's "10-Year Program and 8th Five-Year

¹⁰¹⁵ Song Hanliang was then the secretary of the autonomous regional party committee and first secretary of the XJMD party committee.

¹⁰¹⁶ "Song Hanliang Attends Xinjiang Party Meeting", *Urumqi Xinjiang Ribao* 21 January 1991 in FBIS-CHI-91-023, 4 February 1991, p.59.

¹⁰¹⁷ "Wang Enmao Addresses 16th Xinjiang Party Session", *Urumqi Xinjiang Ribao* in FBIS-CHI-91-050 14 March 1991, pp.55-63.

¹⁰¹⁸ *Ibid*, p.56.

Plan for National Economic and Social Development" was to redress this imbalance. Wang stated that annual growth of GNP was targeted at 6% for the 8th Five-Year Plan, yet he suggested that Xinjiang should strive for 7 to 8% growth in the same period to narrow the gap between the national and provincial economy. Moreover, the key factors in achieving this goal according to Wang were the role of the PCC, the opening and operation of the "Eurasian Continental Bridge" connecting Xinjiang's economy with those of Central Asia, increased central government investment in the prospecting for and development of Xinjiang's hydrocarbon resources, and emphasis on the development of infrastructure.¹⁰¹⁹

What the central government and the regional authorities were aiming at was the development, over the course of the 8th Five-Year Plan (1991-1995), of "pillar industries" in Xinjiang that would elevate the region's economy from one based on primary industries to one based on tertiary industries. Wang Enmao identified five such "pillar industries" - basic agricultural and pastoral commodity industries based on cotton, sugar beets and livestock, and petrochemical and mineral industries to exploit the region's natural resources.¹⁰²⁰ The central government was in fact attempting to extend the strategy employed in the eastern coastal provinces during the 1980s that was based on regional specialisation and division of labour. This "growth pole" strategy results in an initial increase in regional economic inequality and gradual regional convergence. During the 1980s the government focused on creating "growth poles" in the eastern coastal provinces through the establishment of the "Special Economic Zones" (SEZs) that were designed to produce export goods and import foreign

¹⁰¹⁹ Ibid, pp.56-57.

¹⁰²⁰ Ibid, pp.58-59.

investment. The SEZs were characterised by the implementation of preferential policies to facilitate foreign investment, such as tax exemptions and favourable foreign exchange rates.¹⁰²¹ Moreover, as we saw in the previous chapter, the central government actively promoted the formal development of a temporal and geographic economic differentiation between the eastern, central and western regions. The elucidation by Wang Enmao of the effective extension of this strategy to Xinjiang can be seen as an admission on behalf of the central government as to the possible contribution of economic factors in aggravating ethnic minority opposition to the state. The prerequisites for realising this economic strategy, however, rested on maintaining "stability and unity". Furthermore, the guarantor of "stability and unity" was the strengthening of the "people's democratic dictatorship" - that is the continued rule of the CCP.¹⁰²² Simultaneous with exhortations for the authorities to remain vigilant against external "infiltration" and maintain the party's monopoly on power, Wang also highlighted the necessity of the continued opening of Xinjiang to the "outside world" economically. Yet he also emphasised the need for the state to continue to provide overall guidance in the development of Xinjiang-foreign trade.¹⁰²³

Therefore, in 1991 the central government had undertaken to utilise the "outward" oriented economic development strategy advocated by the regional authorities since the mid-1980s in tandem with the channelling of increased state-investment to Xinjiang. This approach developed over the course of the 1991-1996 period into a fully-fledged "double-opening" strategy whereby the authorities attempted to simultaneously integrate

¹⁰²¹ Yueyao Zhao, "Pivot or Periphery?", *op. cit.*, p.200.

¹⁰²² *Ibid*, p.57.

¹⁰²³ *Ibid*, pp.60-61.

Xinjiang economically with Central Asia and China proper. The key to this strategy was to complement Xinjiang's role as a supplier of raw materials for China's coastal regions with efforts to develop the region as a transshipment zone along the nexus of a "Silk Road" economy.¹⁰²⁴ As noted above, this entailed a greater emphasis on state-investment in infrastructure development and the identification and development of "pillar" industries, such as the petrochemical industry. Moreover, this strategy also entailed the facilitation and management of increased cross-border linkages with Central Asia - a task that in the wake of the Baren Uprising in 1990 and the developing instability in the Soviet Union was not without potentially detrimental consequences for the maintenance of Chinese rule. Such considerations, as we have seen from Song Hanliang's comments, were at the forefront of the authorities' perceptions of the situation in Xinjiang entering the 1990s. As illustrated in the previous chapter, the gradual thaw in Sino-Soviet relations was manifested in reduced tensions along the Xinjiang-Soviet frontier and the gradual re-invigoration of economic linkages. Xinjiang-Central Asia trade was re-established at the state-level tentatively in 1983, was significantly expanded in 1986 to include local border trade, and given further impetus with the conclusion of agreements in 1988-89 regarding technological and economic cooperation between the five Central Asian republics and Xinjiang.¹⁰²⁵

This base was built upon in July 1991 with the visit of Kazakh SSR President, Nursultan Nazarbayev to Urumqi to explore the potential for an expansion in trade

¹⁰²⁴ Gaye Christofferson, "Xinjiang and the Great Islamic Circle: The Impact of Transnational Forces on Chinese Regional Economic Planning", *China Quarterly*, No.133, (1993), p.136.

¹⁰²⁵ Clifton Pannell and Laurence J. C. Ma, "Urban Transition and Interstate Relations in a Dynamic Post-Soviet Borderland: The Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of China", *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (1997), p.209.

relations.¹⁰²⁶ This resulted in the conclusion of a five-year trade agreement between China and Kazakhstan in December 1991, whereby each state granted "most-favoured-nation" status to the other that involved a reduction in customs duties and a favourable import/export taxation framework.¹⁰²⁷ Moreover, there was also a joint Sino-Kazakh undertaking to improve the road transport and border crossing procedures, particularly in the Druzhba-Alatau-Shankou "corridor" (often referred to as the "Zhungarian Gate") that links the Ili region of Xinjiang to Kazakhstan.¹⁰²⁸ Also in December 1991, Foreign Trade Minister Li Lanqing led a government delegation to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to explore the potential for the development of trade relations.¹⁰²⁹ The first half of 1992 also saw the high level visits to Beijing of Uzbek President Islam Karimov in March and Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev in May.¹⁰³⁰ The overall focus of these meetings concerned the possibilities for trade and the necessity to enhance the infrastructure networks linking Xinjiang and Central Asia.¹⁰³¹ These efforts paid off quickly for China, especially regarding its relationship with Kazakhstan, with Sino-Kazakh trade worth US\$433 million making China Kazakhstan's leading non-CIS trading partner.¹⁰³² Instrumental in generating growth in Xinjiang's trade with Central Asia was the central government's decision in June 1992 to extend preferential policies, similar to those implemented in the SEZs to areas of Xinjiang, such "tax-sharing" between the central and regional government.¹⁰³³ The infrastructure linking Xinjiang

¹⁰²⁶ Ibid, p.223 & Gaye Christofferson, "China's Intentions for Russian and Central Asian Oil and Gas", *National Bureau of Asian Research*, (1998), p.24.

¹⁰²⁷ Clifton Pannell & Laurence J. C. Ma, op. cit., p.223.

¹⁰²⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰²⁹ Lilian Craig Harris, "Xinjiang, Central Asia and the Implications for China's Policy in the Islamic World", *China Quarterly*, No. 133 (1993), p.123.

¹⁰³⁰ Keith Martin, "China and Central Asia: Between Seduction and Suspicion", *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 3, No.25, (24 June 1994), pp.30-32.

¹⁰³¹ Ibid.

¹⁰³² Ibid & Clifton Pannell & Laurence J. C. Ma, op. cit., p.224.

¹⁰³³ Nicolas Bequelin, "Xinjiang in the Nineties", *The China Journal*, no.44 (July 2000), p.71.

and Central Asia was also expanded in 1992, the most significant being the completion of the Urumqi-Almaty rail line.¹⁰³⁴

The impact of Deng Xiaoping's famous "Southern Tour" early in 1992, where he forcefully advocated continued economic reform and "opening" to the outside world, was also felt in Xinjiang.¹⁰³⁵ It will be recalled that such figures in Xinjiang's government as Song Hanliang and Wang Enmao had, early in 1991, called for "stability" and vigilance against external "infiltration" in the region. Moreover, even within Wang Enmao's address to the Xinjiang CCP Central Committee cited above, where he called for continued "opening" to Central Asia, he also qualified it by stating that ultimately the basic orientation was to be on "self-reliance". Such a cautious handling of the issue of greater economic links with Central Asia was apparently made untenable in the aftermath of Deng's tour. In August 1992 an article in *Xinhua* reproached leaders in Xinjiang for permitting their emphasis on "stability" and "fear and chaos" to block the implementation of more aggressive and "outward" oriented economic and trade policies.¹⁰³⁶ Moreover, the authors asserted that these comrades would be able to "boldly lay down a new strategy" only after "studying the talks of Comrade Deng Xiaoping during his southern tour".¹⁰³⁷ The implications of the paramount leader's ongoing commitment to continued economic reform and "opening", and the central government's undertaking to increase investment in Xinjiang had, it

¹⁰³⁴ Mark Burles, *Chinese Policy Toward Russia and the Central Asian Republics*, (RAND Corporation, 1999), No. MR-1045-AF. Online at <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1045>, p.15.

¹⁰³⁵ Calla Wiemer, "The Economy of Xinjiang", in S. Frederick Starr (ed.), *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland*, (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2004), p172.

¹⁰³⁶ Shen Zunjing & Song Zhenghou, "Xinjiang as Gateway to Central Asia Promoted", *Beijing Xinhua* 27 August 1992, in FBIS-CHI-92, 3 September, 1992, p.37.

¹⁰³⁷ Ibid.

would appear, the desired effect. By the close of 1992, the central government had extended to major cities in Xinjiang, such as Urumqi, Shihezi, and Bole the same privileges as those enjoyed by “open” cities on the east coast.¹⁰³⁸ As noted previously, the state was extending the economic strategy employed in the eastern coastal provinces, whereby ‘growth poles’ were created in proximity to border regions to facilitate the linkage of local economies to transnational trade flows.¹⁰³⁹ An example of this strategy was the formation of a Sino-Kazakh Joint Development Zone focused on the delta of Xinjiang’s Ili River valley and Kazakhstan’s Lake Balkash-Lake Alakol basin in 1993.¹⁰⁴⁰ By the close of 1993 the extension of this strategy to Xinjiang was in full swing, with the formation of economic zones along the border with Central Asia:

In 1993 Xinjiang developed its own policy to open its borders with Central Asia, specifically, to open economic zones supported with appropriate transport links; to open major cities combined with economic zones and other cities in order to produce a spread effect for the region; and to promote trade and economic ties with the Central Asian states. All 33 border counties and cities (together with the border airports) in Xinjiang are now open, and cities such as Yining, Tacheng, Bole and Kashi enjoy the same preferential policies as open cities on China's east coast.¹⁰⁴¹

Another major element in the central government's developmental plans, as noted above, for Xinjiang concerned the exploitation of the region's oil and gas resources. This particular aspect of Xinjiang's economic development would have significant implications for not only China's internal economic development but also for its foreign policy and foreign relations. China's increasing energy consumption, which domestic

¹⁰³⁸ Philip H. Loughlin and Clifton W. Pannell, “Growing Economic Links and Regional Development in the Central Asian Republics and Xinjiang, China”, *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics*, Vol.42, no. 7 (2001), p.480.

¹⁰³⁹ See Ibid, Yueyao Zhao, “Pivot or Periphery?” op. cit., pp.200-202.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Li Dehua & Cui Zhong, “Xinjiang. Kazakhstan to Establish Development Zone”, *Zhongguo Xinwen She*, 19 July 1993, in FBIS-CHI-93-147 19 July 1993, p.5.

¹⁰⁴¹ Clifton W. Pannell & Laurence C. J. Ma, "Urban Transition and Interstate Relations", op. cit., p.223.

production was not able to keep pace with by 1993-94, made China dependent upon the Middle East for crude oil imports and this prompted the realization that this could be detrimental for China's foreign policy.¹⁰⁴² In fact China became a net oil importer in 1993 and this increasing dependence on Middle East oil resulted in a thorough restructuring of China's domestic oil production and state oil corporations, with the overall objectives identified as the diversification of oil supply and achievement of international competitiveness.¹⁰⁴³ Dependence on Middle East sources of oil would of course make China's energy supply strategically vulnerable. The US' strategic domination over the Middle East and the shipping lanes through the strait of Hormuz, for example, would make China's energy supply extremely vulnerable in the event of Sino-US conflict or tensions.¹⁰⁴⁴ Thus the conclusion reached by the Chinese in regard to this issue was that the key to limiting this strategic vulnerability was to reorient its oil strategy towards Central Asia and Russia. China was not the only state in Asia interested in the development of a continental energy network that would limit dependence on Middle Eastern oil and the strategic vulnerability that flows from it. Japan and Korea had also become increasingly dependent upon Middle East sources for their energy requirements and this shared vulnerability has to a degree underpinned the development of shared interests of Japan, Korea and China's energy strategies.¹⁰⁴⁵

The first indications of Xinjiang's role in China's quest to diversify oil production and supply came in 1991, when China offered Japan National Oil Corporation (JNOC)

¹⁰⁴² Gaye Christoffersen, "China's Intentions for Russian and Central Asian Oil and Gas", op.cit.,pp. 9-10.

¹⁰⁴³ Amy Myers Jaffe & Steven W. Lewis "Beijing's Oil Diplomacy", *Survival*, Vol.44, No.1, (Spring 2002), p.115 and Sergei Trough, "China's Changing Oil Strategy and its Foreign Policy Implications", *CNAPS Working Paper*, (Fall 1999), pp.10-12.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Ibid.

geophysical prospecting rights for the Tarim Basin.¹⁰⁴⁶ This initial attempt to open its far-western frontier was part of emerging competition between China and Russia for foreign investment in their energy industries:

China's generous offer to Japan laid the ground for invisible competition between China and Russia to attract foreign, mainly Japanese investment...Nevertheless, one thing that is very clear is that China's decision to open its western and offshore frontier will distract foreign, especially Japanese and South Korean, interests from the Russian Far East.¹⁰⁴⁷

China's focus with regards to its energy strategy was soon reoriented toward Central Asia, primarily as an attempt to make Xinjiang's petrochemical industry a 'pillar' industry within the government's "double-opening" strategy for Xinjiang. The major goal was to transform Xinjiang into a transit route, and possible refinery zone, for eastward flowing Central Asian oil and gas. This reorientation of China's energy policy was yet another factor that began to enmesh it in the wider geo-political competition for not only access to Central Asia's oil and gas, but for greater political and economic influence in the region. The government's reorientation of its energy strategy toward Russia and Central Asia in the early 1990s was very much a strategic manoeuvre rather than a 'market' approach to energy security.¹⁰⁴⁸ Moreover, it illustrated the "strategic" logic of China's policy in Xinjiang and Central Asia, in that it was clearly designed to strengthen the state's grip on the region by facilitating not only its economic development but also integration with the rest of China.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Keun-Wook Paik, "Energy Cooperation in Sino-Russian Relations: The Importance of Oil and Gas", *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 9, No. 1, (1996), p.89.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Philip Andrews-Speed, Xuanli Liao and Roland Dannruther, *The Strategic Implications of China's Energy Needs*, (International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford University Press, July 2002), pp.42-43.

That the “double opening” strategy noted above was ascendant in Xinjiang by 1993 was underlined by the tenor of major statements from the regional leadership. Late in December 1992 Song Hanliang exhorted the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (PCC) to “make new and greater contributions toward accelerating Xinjiang’s development”.¹⁰⁴⁹ The PCC, according to Song, needed to “emancipate their minds and renew their concepts” in order to contribute to the region’s economic development. The key to this change in mentality was to “cherish the guiding ideology that stresses economic work” and the PCC was reminded that:

All preferential state policies for Xinjiang are applicable to the Production and Construction Corps, as are the reform and open policies enacted by the autonomous region.¹⁰⁵⁰

To this end Song announced that the central and regional authorities had granted 240 PCC-related units the right to engage in border trade and opined that:

This policy is very favorable to the effort of the Production and Construction Corps to open wider to the outside world. We must apply it well and help more divisional (bureau) and regimental farms and enterprises, as well as collectively and individually run enterprises, *make inroads into domestic and foreign markets*.¹⁰⁵¹

Thus the strategy to simultaneously integrate Xinjiang economically with Central Asia and China proper was deemed by the Secretary of the Xinjiang CCP to be central to the function of the PCC. As we saw in previous chapters, the PCC had been used throughout the CCP’s rule of Xinjiang as an instrument of integration, but integration in the direction of China proper. Song Hanliang’s statement that the PCC should make “inroads” into domestic and foreign markets could be seen to have marked a significant

¹⁰⁴⁹ “Xinjiang’s Song Hanliang Addresses Production”, *Urumqi Xinjiang Ribao* 24 December 1992, in FBIS-CHI-93-004, 7 January 1993, p.54.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵¹ Ibid, p.55. My emphasis.

turning point in both the function of the PCC, until this point a strictly “internal” instrument, and in the ascendancy of the “double opening” strategy. The leaderships’ emphasis on and commitment to the continued economic development was further underlined by the secretary’s comments to the Xinjiang CPPCC. Song Hanliang, addressing the Standing Committee of the Xinjiang CPPCC, commended its members for dedicating themselves “to serving the central task, namely economic construction”.¹⁰⁵² Moreover, Song highlighted that economic construction could only be strengthened by continued “opening up” which required these comrades to “emancipate your minds, change your mindsets”.¹⁰⁵³ One can postulate from such comments that there was perhaps residual cautiousness amongst certain sections of the regional leadership regarding the efficaciousness of continued economic reform and “opening” for the stability of the region. Yet such “opening up” to the economies of Central Asia was not undertaken without due consideration of the development of relations with the governments of the region.

The economic sphere was but one, albeit important, aspect of China's relations with the states of Central Asia. China's concerns regarding the integrity and security of its Central Asian frontiers after the collapse of the Soviet Union were also a pre-eminent spur to its engagement with the successor states of the Soviet territories in the region. Symptomatic of this overriding concern was China's role in initiating joint meetings between the foreign ministries of the states with which it shared borders in Central Asia - Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan - in December 1992 to discuss border

¹⁰⁵² Song Hanliang Addresses Xinjiang CPPCC Session”, *Urumqi Xinjiang Television Network* 31 December 1992, in FBIS-CHI-93-003, 6 January 1993, p.46.

¹⁰⁵³ Ibid.

demarcation, border security and troop reductions.¹⁰⁵⁴ In many respects China's economic and security concerns regarding its frontiers with the new states of Central Asia were complementary. The development of bilateral relations, spurred on by the burgeoning economic linkages of 1991-93 outlined above, was further strengthened by the identification of common interests in the security sphere. Further joint meetings between China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan took place in Moscow in March 1993, where the issue of border arms reduction was highlighted.¹⁰⁵⁵ In the context of its relations with individual states in Central Asia, China from the outset explicitly highlighted its concern that these governments not support activities of a third country or tolerate activities within their territories that were aimed at "splitting China". This was manifested in high-level meetings between Chinese representatives and the Presidents of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 1992.¹⁰⁵⁶ In March 1993, for example, Chinese President Yang Shangkun and Tajik President Imamali Raikhmanov issued a joint statement regarding the basic principles for "mutual relations", following the Tajik leader's visit to Beijing. A central principle elucidated in this statement was that "the two sides should not engage in any hostile actions against the opposite side, and neither side should allow a third country to use its territory to impinge upon the sovereignty and security of the other".¹⁰⁵⁷ The existence of significant Uighur minorities in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and the presence of Kazak and Kyrgyz minorities in Xinjiang, however, complicated China's relations with these states.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Michael Dillon, "Central Asia: The View from Beijing, Urumqi and Kashgar", in Mehdi Mozaffari (ed.), *Security Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States: The Southern Belt*, (London: MacMillan, 1997), p. 136.

¹⁰⁵⁵ "'Progress' in Arms Talks with CIS States", *Beijing Xinhua* 16 March 1993 in FBIS-CHI-93-049, 6 March 1993, p.9.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Keith Martin, "China and Central Asia: Between Seduction and Suspicion", op. cit., pp.30-31.

¹⁰⁵⁷ "China-Tajikistan Statement", *Beijing Xinhua* 11 March 1993 in FBIS-CHI-046, 11 March 1993, p.10.

The relaxation of control and eventual collapse of the Soviet state witnessed a proliferation of Uighur political organisations in Central Asia, particularly in Kazakhstan. In April 1991, the “Uyghur Liberation Organisation” was formed as a legal political party in Kazakhstan to represent the estimated 150 000 Uighurs residing there. This was followed in June 1992 with the formation of a political party, “For a Free Uygurstan”, by Uighurs in Kyrgyzstan. Moreover, a “International Uyghur Union” was inaugurated at a meeting attended by Uighur delegates from the five Central Asian republics in the Kazak capital, Almaty in January 1992.¹⁰⁵⁸ Significantly for China, these groups stated that they were working for democracy, human rights and self-determination for Uighurs in Xinjiang. Thus the activities of Uighurs residing in Central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, have been of interest to the Chinese government. This, it should be noted, was not a new development in terms of the nature of the external threat to continued Chinese rule of Xinjiang. It will be recalled that throughout the 1949-1978 period, the Soviet Union had at various stages attempted to manipulate the existence of cross-border ethnic linkages to serve its own strategic purposes, especially during the 1960s. These linkages, in the context of the new situation in Central Asia and to a certain degree in a Xinjiang characterised by greater openness to Central Asia, had the potential to once again challenge Chinese rule. Events in 1992 appeared, in the Chinese government’s perception at least, to conform to this. On 5 February 1992 six people were killed and twenty injured in a bus bombing in Urumqi¹⁰⁵⁹, while bombings were also reported the same month in Yining (Kulja), and in Khotan, Kashgar, Kucha, Korla and Bortala in March.¹⁰⁶⁰ Although no group

¹⁰⁵⁸ Michael Dillon, “Central Asia: The View from Beijing, Urumqi and Kashgar”, op. cit., p.140.

¹⁰⁵⁹ John Kohut, “Xinjiang Separatist Organization’s Extent Examined”, *Hong Kong South China Sunday Morning Post*, 23 February 1992 in FBIS-CHI-92-036, 24 February 1992, p.67.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Michael Dillon, ‘Central Asia: The View from Beijing, Urumqi and Kashgar’, op. cit., p.141.

claimed responsibility for these attacks, the authorities blamed separatist and ‘splittist’ forces within and outside Xinjiang for them. Later in 1992 a “Front for the Liberation of Uyghurstan” based in Kazakhstan declared that it would carry out guerilla warfare operations in Xinjiang.¹⁰⁶¹ Government buildings in Kashgar were also the targets of bombings in June 1993¹⁰⁶² and émigré sources reported that there were other bomb attacks throughout southern Xinjiang during 1993. A émigré source also reported that the Chinese nuclear facility at Lop Nor was attacked in mid-March 1993. According to this report:

Almost one thousand East Turkestanis gathered in front of the test site demanding its closure. When units of the People’s Liberation Army opened fire to disperse the demonstrators, fighting broke out between the army units and the demonstrators. Demonstrators then broke into the complex damaging equipment and setting fire to military vehicles, tanks and airplanes. Three and a half kilometres of electrical wiring put up to protect the complex was totally torn down. Chinese authorities rushed reinforcements to the area to put down the clashes which resulted in several casualties, including deaths, and the arrests of hundreds.¹⁰⁶³

These internal manifestations of unrest in 1992-93 were also accompanied by complications in Sino-Central Asian relations, due in part to the issue of Uighur émigré communities and their political activities. Prior to Premier Li Peng’s proposed visits to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan in April-May 1993 this situation generated problems for China’s efforts in Central Asia. On 28 April five thousand Uighurs protested outside of the Chinese embassy in the Kazak capital Almaty, apparently without an adverse response from the Kazak authorities.¹⁰⁶⁴ Li’s

¹⁰⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶² Michael Dillon, “Central Asia”, op. cit., p.141.

¹⁰⁶³ “Nuclear Test Site Attacked”, *Eastern Turkestan Information Bulletin*, Vol. 3, no. 3, (June 1993), online at <http://www.taklamakan.org/>

¹⁰⁶⁴ “Demonstration in Kazakhstan”, *ETIB*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (June 1993), online at <http://www.taklamakan.org>

tour of Central Asia was postponed soon after for unknown reasons. At a conference regarding Kyrgyz foreign policy in Bishkek, Nurmammed Kenjiev, chairman of Ittifak (Unity of Uighur Society in Kyrgyzstan) warned the Kyrgyz government about China's intentions in Central Asia and criticised the continued nuclear tests at Lop Nor in Xinjiang.¹⁰⁶⁵ Regarding this latter issue, the Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, had in August 1993 called on the Chinese government to cease nuclear testing in Xinjiang. The Kazakh government's concerns were brushed aside by the Chinese, however, as they claimed that they had observed a test moratorium longer than any other country, implying that this justified resumption of nuclear testing.¹⁰⁶⁶ Moreover, it was reported that the Chinese conducted an underground nuclear test on 5 October 1993, constituting China's 39th test.¹⁰⁶⁷ These potentially troublesome developments were not, however, permitted by China or the Central Asian states concerned to obstruct the development of greater political and economic links. The domestic political benefits for the leaders of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan of tolerating or supporting Uighur groups in their countries was clearly outweighed by the political and economic benefits to be gained from strengthening relations with China. In August 1993 Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Ednan Karabaev met his Chinese counterpart, Qian Qichen in Beijing, to discuss the progress of bilateral relations.¹⁰⁶⁸ At this meeting Karabaev and Qian expressed the two countries' opposition to "national splittism in all its forms" and Kyrgyzstan affirmed its position that it would not tolerate any activities within its

¹⁰⁶⁵ "Uighur Warns Kyrgyzstan", *ETIB*, Vol. 3, no.5, (October 1993), online at <http://www.taklamakan.org/>

¹⁰⁶⁶ *Ibid* & Keith Martin, "China and Central Asia", *op. cit.*, p.30.

¹⁰⁶⁷ "Nuclear Tests Despite Protests", *ETIB*, Vol. 3, no. 5, (October 1993), *op. cit.*

¹⁰⁶⁸ "Qian Qichen Meets with Kyrgyz Foreign Minister", *Beijing Xinhua* 30 August 1993, in FBIS-CHI-93-167, 31 August 1993, pp.6-7.

territory detrimental to China.¹⁰⁶⁹ Moreover, Karabaev stated that Kyrgyzstan and China held common views on opposing “splittism” and “religious fanaticism”.¹⁰⁷⁰ Perhaps not coincidentally the meeting also focused on “deepening and broadening” bilateral economic and trade relations, with the Kyrgyz officials conferring with officials from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation.¹⁰⁷¹ The resultant extension of US\$5 million in commodity credits to Kyrgyzstan and the opening of Aksu in Xinjiang to foreign trade (primarily with Kyrgyzstan) led Uighur émigré sources to accuse Kyrgyzstan of accepting a Chinese “bribe” to muzzle Uighur activities in the region.¹⁰⁷²

The following April Premier Li Peng made his previously postponed tour of Central Asia, visiting Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. A major theme of Li’s engagements in each of these states concerned the dawning of a “new era’ in Sino-Central Asian relations.¹⁰⁷³ This new era, according to Li, was characterised by stable political relationships, economic cooperation and non-interference in the domestic affairs of each state.¹⁰⁷⁴ Trade and economic issues were high on Li’s agenda and he was notably accompanied by a large group of Chinese entrepreneurs on his twelve-day tour of Central Asia¹⁰⁷⁵. In his meeting with Uzbek President Islam Karimov and speech before the Uzbek parliament, Li focused on the theme of developing a “New Silk Road” between China and Central Asia based on modern infrastructure and stated

¹⁰⁶⁹ Ibid, p.6.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷¹ Ibid, p.7.

¹⁰⁷² “Chinese Bribes to Kyrgyzstan?”, *ETIB*, Vol. 3, No. 5, (October 1993), op. cit.

¹⁰⁷³ Michael Dillon, “Central Asia: The View from Beijing, Urumqi and Kashgar”, op. cit., p.142.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Ibid & Keith Martin, ‘China and Central Asia’, op. cit., pp.30-31.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Mark Burles, *Chinese Policy Toward Russia and the Central Asian Republics*, op. cit., pp.15-16.

that China's primary goal in Central Asia was to improve economic cooperation.¹⁰⁷⁶ Moreover, he pointedly stated that China's interests in Central Asia were not aimed at any third party – referring to Russia.¹⁰⁷⁷ The Chinese and Uzbek government also signed a series of specific agreements regarding economic cooperation, aviation and air traffic control, and technical aid.¹⁰⁷⁸ The most significant outcome of Li's visit to Turkmenistan was a Chinese undertaking to investigate the feasibility of constructing a gas pipeline to connect Turkmen gas fields with China.¹⁰⁷⁹ Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov had apparently promoted such a pipeline in his earlier visits to Beijing in 1992 and 1993. The implications of the project, if undertaken, for China's position in Central Asia were significant. Niyazov's motivations for promoting such project derived from Turkmenistan's inability to export its enormous reserves of natural gas (the third largest in the world) due to geo-political considerations and lack of infrastructure.¹⁰⁸⁰ Geo-politically, Turkmenistan found itself captive of the strategic agendas of both Russia and the US. Both Russia and the US had distinct preferences regarding the possible pipeline routes that would enable Turkmenistan to export its major resource. Turkmenistan's existing oil/gas infrastructure, as a result of its history in the Soviet Union, was linked to and controlled by Russia and consequently Russia did not wish to relinquish the political and economic influence that this generated by permitting the development of alternative export routes. Given Turkmenistan's geographic position the most efficient not to mention effective route by which to

¹⁰⁷⁶ Li Peng, "China's Basic Policy Towards Central Asia", *Beijing Review*, Vol.37, No.18, (2-8 May 1994), p.18.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Keith Martin, *op. cit.*, p.31.

¹⁰⁷⁸ *Ibid* & Michael Dillon, *op. cit.*, p.142.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Philip Andrews-Speed, Xuanli Liao and Roland Dannruther, *op. cit.*, p.58.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Charles Fairbank, S. Frederick Starr, C. Richard Nelson & Kenneth Weisbrode, *Strategic Assessment of Central Eurasia*, (The Atlantic Council of the United States & Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, SAIS, January 2001), p.47. On line at <http://www.acus.org>.

transport Turkmen gas to international markets is via Iran. During the mid-1990s Turkmen and Iranian efforts to construct such a pipeline were consistently blocked by the US "dual containment" policy towards Iran and Iraq.¹⁰⁸¹ Thus China's ascent in the development of a potential Turkmen-China pipeline placed it at odds with the preferences of both Russia and the US. Moreover, the proposed pipeline would have to traverse both Uzbek and Kazak territory.¹⁰⁸²

Li's visit to Kyrgyzstan was, however, largely focused on issues of regional stability. Of primary importance to China in this regard was the Kyrgyz position regarding the activities of pro-independence Uighur political organisations in Kyrgyzstan. As noted previously, China had in 1993 praised Kyrgyzstan for its position regarding "national splittists" and Kyrgyzstan apparently reaffirmed this stance during Li's visit.¹⁰⁸³ Another important focus of Li's visit to Kyrgyzstan concerned the demarcation of the Sino-Kyrgyz border. The two sides reported substantial progress on this issue and Li and Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev stated that a treaty would be signed in the near future.¹⁰⁸⁴ Trade and economic relations were also addressed, with China seeking to purchase Kyrgyz electricity for Xinjiang and providing Kyrgyzstan with a US\$6.2 million credit in order to stimulate bilateral trade.¹⁰⁸⁵ The premier's final port-of-call on his Central Asian tour – Kazakhstan – was also perhaps the most important. The issues

¹⁰⁸¹ For strategic imperatives of Russia and the US, and their implications for Turkmenistan see Ibid, Ranjan Menon, "After Empire: Russia and the Southern 'Near Abroad'", in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.), *The New Russian Foreign Policy*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1998), pp.66-100, R. Freitag-Wirringhaus, "Turkmenistan's Place in Central Asia and the World", in Mehdi Mozaffari (ed.), *Security Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States: The Southern Belt*, (London: MacMillan, 1997), pp.66-88.

¹⁰⁸² Charles Fairbank, S. Frederick Starr, C. Richard Nelson & Kenneth Weisbrode, op. cit., p.47.

¹⁰⁸³ Keith Martin, op. cit., p.31.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Ibid, p.32.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Ibid.

discussed in Li's meetings with President Nursultan Nazarbayev covered not only bilateral economic cooperation but border demarcation, border security, China's nuclear facility at Lop Nor, the Kazakh minority in Xinjiang and the Uighur minority in Kazakhstan. The two sides signed an agreement settling the border dispute, whereby both parties acknowledged the existing boundaries as permanent. Moreover, both undertook to continue confidence-building measures along their common 1700km frontier, including troop reductions.¹⁰⁸⁶ Regarding the issue of China's ongoing nuclear tests at Lop Nor, Nazarbayev reiterated his government's concerns about the detrimental effects of nuclear tests for not only Kazakhstan's environment but also Xinjiang's. Kazakhstani opposition parties and newspapers also called on China to halt nuclear tests and respect the human rights of Kazaks, Uighurs and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang. Li Peng, however, maintained China's position that these tests posed no threat to Kazakhstan or Xinjiang.¹⁰⁸⁷ Determining Kazakhstan's position regarding the issue of the political activities of the estimated 200 000 Uighurs residing there was also high on Li Peng's agenda. Significantly, Li Peng stated that China was appreciative of Kazakhstan's "general opposition" to national separatism and efforts to prevent the development of organisations engaging in "subversive, anti-China activities" on Kazak territory. President Nursultan Nazarbayev, however, failed to mention this issue at the joint press conference on 27 April, suggesting that he was perhaps attempting to use the Uighur issue as a bargaining chip in relations with China. It should not be discounted that the Kazak president was also attempting to placate the significant and politically active

¹⁰⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Ibid & "Li Peng Trip Arouses Protest", *ETIB*, Vol. 4, no.2, (June 1994), online at <http://www.taklamakan.org>

Uighur minority.¹⁰⁸⁸ China's concerns regarding the activities of the Uighur population in Kazakhstan was, on the eve of Li Peng's visit, heightened with another Uighur group based in Kazakhstan, the "East Turkestan Liberation Front" (ETLF) calling for "democracy and self determination" for East Turkestan.¹⁰⁸⁹ Moreover, the ETLF, claiming a membership of 50 000, stated that although they wished to achieve their goals through "peaceful means" it may "become necessary to resort to arms to resist cultural genocide".¹⁰⁹⁰ The outcome of Li's visit to Kazakhtsan regarding this issue was somewhat indecisive with Nazarbayev's government making no statement on the issue or taking direct action against active Uighur political organisations. Overall Li's tour demonstrated that China's primary interests in Central Asia were focused on facilitating greater economic and trade opportunities and border demarcation and border security. This in turn was reflective of China's major goals in Xinjiang - security, integration and economic development.

The granting of preferential policies to Xinjiang by the central government and decentralisation of aspects of economic decision-making, outlined above, were coupled with a number of important measures that strengthened the state's control over the direction of policy in the region. In 1994 the central government initiated a process of national fiscal reform that was presented as a strategy that would aid in the redistribution of revenue among the provinces to address regional economic disparities.¹⁰⁹¹ The central element of this fiscal reform was focused on the rate of tax

¹⁰⁸⁸ Dru C. Gladney, "The Muslim Face of China", *Current History*, (September 1993), pp.275-280 & Keith Martin, *op. cit.*, p.33.

¹⁰⁸⁹ "ETLF Calls for Help", *ETIB*, Vol. 4, no.1 (April 1994), online at <http://www.taklamakan.org>

¹⁰⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹¹ Nicolas Bequelin, "Xinjiang in the Nineties", *op. cit.*, p.72.

placed upon various products, whereby taxes on manufactured goods were reduced and those on raw materials increased. This placed Xinjiang at an immediate disadvantage given that the major "pillar" industries of the region were based upon the extraction and supply of raw materials - for example oil and gas, animal husbandry and agriculture.¹⁰⁹² Moreover, the national fiscal reform also reaffirmed central government control over provincial revenue and the destiny of subsidies and state investment.¹⁰⁹³ This was a significant step, as it will be recalled that in 1992 the central government (by virtue of the application of preferential policies to Xinjiang) had implemented "tax sharing" arrangements between itself and the provincial government. Moreover, although provincial revenue was increasing, so too was its expenditure. In 1994, for example, Xinjiang's budgeted financial revenue was 7.604 billion yuan while its expenditure was 9.09 billion yuan, thus resulting in a deficit of 1.5 billion yuan.¹⁰⁹⁴ The report cited above also candidly stated that, although according to the "Budget Law" of 1994 local governments were no longer permitted to compile deficit budgets, Xinjiang would in fact do so:

But judging from the actual financial strength of the autonomous region and from the expense demand in the region in 1995, it is difficult to strike a balance when arranging the financial budget; differences will remain after attempting to balance budget revenues and expenses. We will constantly keep the central government informed of this difference and *ask the central government to make up the difference*.¹⁰⁹⁵

¹⁰⁹² Ibid.

¹⁰⁹³ Ibid, pp.72-73.

¹⁰⁹⁴ "Report on 1994 Xinjiang Budget Execution", *Urumqi Xinjiang Ribao*, 27 February 1995 in FBIS-CHI-95-067, 7 April 1995, p.88.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Ibid, p.90. My emphasis.

The cause of this gap between revenue and expenditure was a combination of the region's economic growth and the central government's fiscal and tax reform of 1993-94. That is to say the central government was able to extract more revenue from Xinjiang by virtue of the increased taxes on the region's pre-eminent commodities - raw materials and agricultural products. Such measures would suggest that Beijing had determined to reassert central control over key aspects of the "double opening" strategy, notably by making the provincial authorities financially dependent on Beijing.

During the 8th Five-Year Plan (1991-1995) the central government also vigorously promoted measures that were to strengthen the economic linkages between the region and the national economy. Under the 8th Five-Year Plan (1991-1995) the central government invested over 33 billion yuan in 78 major projects aimed at creating "growth poles" within the regional economy and facilitating greater integration with the national economy.¹⁰⁹⁶ Many of these projects were concerned with the development of modern infrastructure - such as the double-track construction of the Lanzhou-Urumqi railroad, the Xi'an-Lanzhou-Urumqi-Ili optical fibre cable and the Taklamakan Highway.¹⁰⁹⁷ Xinjiang's industrial capacity was also expanded with the development of Hongyanchi power plant, Dushanzi ethylene plant and second phase of the Urumqi petrochemical project.¹⁰⁹⁸ Along with such major infrastructure and industrial projects, the government also divided Xinjiang into development zones designed to attract foreign investment and develop linkages between "growth poles" within Xinjiang. The first of these was the Urumqi Economic and Technological Development Zone, initiated

¹⁰⁹⁶ Yueyao Zhao, "Pivot or Periphery?", op. cit., p.210.

¹⁰⁹⁷ "Xinjiang Publishes Government Work Report", *Urumqi Xinjiang Ribao* 25 February 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-071, 13 April 1995, p.50.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Ibid.

in 1994, that encompassed the cluster of major cities north of the Tian Shan - Urumqi, Changji, Shihezi, Kuitun, Dushanzi, Bole, Yining and Karamay.¹⁰⁹⁹ The central government's attempts to ensure the integration of the region with the domestic economy was also reinforced with the opening on 4 October 1995 of the Taklamakan Highway, a 522 kilometre north-south transportation axis¹¹⁰⁰ and the beginning of the extension of the rail link between Korla and Kashgar.¹¹⁰¹ These two projects, although increasing the economic integration of the Tarim Basin with the Zunghar Basin, also reinforced the authorities' ability to control, politically and militarily the non-Han dominated region. The opening to Central Asia was thus not undertaken to the detriment of establishing greater linkages between both discrete regions of Xinjiang and China proper.

Despite the authorities' efforts to strengthen the state's hold on the region over the preceding four years - which we have seen encompassed combined internal and external strategies - unrest broke out once again in early 1995. A China-watching Hong Kong magazine *Dongxiang* ("Trend Magazine") reported on 15 June 1995 that armed rebellion and demonstrations involving up to 100 000 Uighurs and Kazaks had taken place between 22 and 26 April in six cities in the Ili Prefecture near the Sino-Kazakh

¹⁰⁹⁹ Ibid, p.216.

¹¹⁰⁰ "'Important' Xinjiang Desert Road Opens 4 Oct", *Beijing Xinhua* 4 October 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-193, 5 October 1995, p.57.

¹¹⁰¹ Nicolas Becquelin, op.cit., p.74 & "Key Projects Put Into Action in Xinjiang", *Beijing Xinhua* 8 October 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-195, 10 October 1995, p.87.

border.¹¹⁰² Although the Chinese government subsequently denied these events¹¹⁰³, the detail of the report and the similar contours of the unrest with previous episodes of anti-Chinese disturbances in Xinjiang make it nonetheless plausible. According to this report around 50 000 Uighurs and Kazaks had staged anti-government rallies and handed petitions to local government officials on 22 April. Two days later the unrest expanded with strikes of workers, teachers and shopkeepers raising the number of people involved to 100 000. Significantly, the demonstrators called for the end of Chinese rule in Xinjiang and the establishment of a Kazak and Uighur state while others demanded the "merging" of the Ili Prefecture with Kazakhstan.¹¹⁰⁴ Open armed rebellion against the authorities was reported to have broken out on 24 April and lasted until 26 April throughout the six cities in the Ili Prefecture. In the cities of Zhaosu and Gongliu a battle broke out, resulting in the killing or wounding of 220 people, when public security personnel used armoured cars to disperse demonstrators surrounding government buildings. On 25 April around "500 armed residents" fought locally stationed PLA units in Tekes city causing over one hundred and sixty casualties including thirty-two soldiers.¹¹⁰⁵ Meanwhile the cities of Nilka and Qapqal witnessed the most serious unrest:

On the morning of 25 April, the masses surrounded the urban government buildings and in the afternoon broke into and occupied them. Around evening time, they broke into local public security and Armed Police offices. The police opened fire to dispel them. About 3000 people

¹¹⁰² Yue Shan, "Armed Rebellion Reported in Xinjiang", *Hong Kong Tung Hsiang*, 15 June 1995, no.118 in FBIS-CHI-95-119, 21 June 1995, pp.92-93 & "Reportage Covers 'Uprising' in Xinjiang", *Hong Kong AFP* 16 June 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-116, 16 June 1995, p.88. The six cities were cited as Mongolkure (Zhaosu), Tekes, Gongliu, (Kunes) Xinyuan, Nilka and Qapqal. These events also dealt with in Michael Dillon, "Central Asia: The View from Beijing, Urumqi and Kashgar", op. cit, pp.138-139.

¹¹⁰³ "Official Denies Report", *Hong Kong AFP* 16 June 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-116, 16 June 1995, p.88-89.

¹¹⁰⁴ Yue Shan, "Armed Rebellion Reported in Xinjiang", op. cit., p.92.

¹¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

surrounded local barracks, demanding that "the Han people" quit Xinjiang and that a Uygurstan state be established.¹¹⁰⁶

The situation was apparently so grave that the Lanzhou and Xinjiang Military Regions dispatched the 20 000-strong 33rd and 41st divisions of the PLA by rail and air to Ili Prefecture "as speedily as war were imminent".¹¹⁰⁷ Significantly, the authorities once more connected internal unrest with hostile external forces. The report stated that the CCP State Council and Central Military Commission had issued emergency directives to the XUAR CCP, and the Lanzhou and Xinjiang Military regions:

...to resolutely, thoroughly, and rapidly put down armed rebellion organized by splittists and to resolutely crack down upon those *organizations attempting dismemberment* and those *organizations masterminded and supported by foreign forces* according to the law.¹¹⁰⁸

Two senior figures from Beijing, Luo Gang, Secretary General of the State Council and Li Jing, Deputy Chief of Staff, were also said to have been dispatched to Xinjiang to command the quelling of the unrest.¹¹⁰⁹

The presence of such figures in Xinjiang would suggest that the authorities regarded the events as of far greater import for the stability of Chinese control in Xinjiang than mere demonstrations or "riots". The demands of the Uighurs and Kazaks during this unrest - that the "Han people" quit Xinjiang, that Ili "merge" with Kazakhstan and that Xinjiang become an independent state - presented the Chinese with a complex dilemma. The ethnic specificity of the first demand, for example, illustrated that ethnic minority demands for independence were generated by the perceived dominance of the Han over

¹¹⁰⁶ Ibid, p.93.

¹¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁰⁸ Ibid. My emphasis.

¹¹⁰⁹ Ibid & Michael Dillon, "Central Asia", op. cit., p.139.

all ethnic groups in Xinjiang. The second demand, that Ili be "merged" with Kazakhstan, was perhaps the most troublesome for the Chinese authorities as it demonstrated that many Kazaks in the "Ili Autonomous Zhou" had clearly identified the independent state of Kazakhstan as the legitimate focus of their loyalty rather than the PRC. What this episode of unrest illustrated was that regardless of the state's efforts to generate ethnic minority support through economic development, many minorities remained unreconciled to continued Chinese rule. Another important factor in this regard was the exemplary force of the recently independent states of Central Asia, with whom the major ethnic groups of Xinjiang shared Turkic cultural roots. Moreover, it had become apparent by 1995 that a historically important instrument of integration in Xinjiang, Han in-migration, had been reinvigorated by a combination of government encouragement and economic opportunity. This process generated charges from Uighur émigrés that the Chinese government was intent on "swamping" the minority populations of Xinjiang with a tide of Han in order to dilute the ethnic minority proportion of the population and thus control the region. As we have seen in previous chapters this was hardly a new development, but rather an extension of historical precedent. Moreover, many Uighurs and external observers also charge that the economic development strategy in Xinjiang disproportionately benefits the Han.¹¹¹⁰

The violent outburst of ethnic minority opposition to Chinese rule in Ili did not, however, result in any alteration in the broad contours of state action in Xinjiang. In fact the state's response was to strengthen and intensify the major elements of its strategy in Xinjiang. Notably, provincial officials stressed the need for continued economic

¹¹¹⁰ For an example of the Uighur émigré view see, "Alarming News from Eastern Turkestan", *ETIB*, Vol.5, No. 2 (April 1995), online at <http://www.taklamakan.org/>. For examples of external observers

development and integration with the national and Central Asian economies.¹¹¹¹

Moreover, it was stated that Xinjiang's economic development could only take place if "stability" was maintained:

A stable social environment is the foundation for all tasks. Nothing can be achieved without stability. To bring about stability, we must strengthen unity between nationalities; between cadres and people; between the Army and the people; and between the Army and government...We must resolutely strike at a handful of scoundrels who sabotage the motherland's reunification and national unity.¹¹¹²

Once more the authorities connected ethnic minority unrest to the influence of Islam and external "anti-China forces". It will be recalled from the previous chapter that the government had begun by the mid-1980s to demonstrate an increasingly tolerant approach to ethnic minority religious and cultural expression and practices. With respect to Islam the state relaxed its controls over worshippers wishing to perform the hajj to Mecca, permitted the construction of new mosques and provided funds to repair existing mosques, and encouraged Muslims to develop connections with their co-religionists in Central Asia. Yet by the early 1990s the state had become far more wary of the potential threat to its position in Xinjiang that could arise from such policies. In fact by 1994-95 the state had begun to implement policies aimed at undermining the influence and perceived authority of religion in Xinjiang:

By the early 1990s, mosque construction and renovation was severely curtailed, public broadcasting of sermons outside mosques was banned, religious education was proscribed, only religious materials published by the state Religious Affairs Bureau was allowed, religious activists were

views see, Nicolas Becquelin, op. cit., Dru C. Gladney, "Rumblings from the Uyghur", *Current History*

¹¹¹¹ For example see "Tomur Dawamat Inspects Xinjiang's Hotan Prefecture", *Urumqi Xinjiang Television Network*, 1330 GMT, 6 June 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-113, 13 June 1995, p.72 & "Xinjiang Acting Secretary on Chemical Projects", *Urumqi Xinjiang Ribao*, 2 August 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-170, 1 September 1995, pp.59-60.

¹¹¹² Tomur Dawamat Inspects Xinjiang's Hotan Prefecture", op. cit., p.72.

purged from state positions and Haj pilgrimages were tightly controlled and limited to participants over 50 years of age.¹¹¹³

Ethnic minority unrest also erupted later in the year, this time in the Altishahr in the southern oasis of Khotan, that was arguably the result of the authorities' return to a more heavy-handed approach to religion.¹¹¹⁴ The cause of the disturbance in Khotan was apparently centred on incident at the town's main mosque:

A large crowd of worshippers at the main mosque spilled into the street, blocking traffic. Uyghurs mistook police efforts to open the street as the arrest of their mullah. A massive revolt against police and troops ensued, during which hundreds were killed and many more imprisoned.¹¹¹⁵

Another contributing factor in the resurgence of ethnic minority opposition concerned the issue of Han in-migration to Xinjiang. The extension of the economic reform program to Xinjiang under the 7th Five-Year Plan (1986-1990), as noted in the previous chapter, had resulted in the beginning of a non-state sponsored influx of Han into Xinjiang.¹¹¹⁶ Much of this influx consisted of temporary migrants from China proper or "self-drifter" population travelling to the region simply to find employment. In fact one scholar asserted that from 1987 onwards up to 250 000 Han "poured into Xinjiang each year to look for work".¹¹¹⁷ Uighur émigré sources also maintained in the mid-1990s that 250 000 to 300 000 Han were settling in Xinjiang each year.¹¹¹⁸ As we have seen in

¹¹¹³ Paul George, "Islamic Unrest in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region", *Canadian Security Intelligence Service*, Commentary No. 37 (1998), on line at <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/com73e.html>

¹¹¹⁴ Justin Rudelson & William Jankowiak, "Acculturation and Resistance: Xinjiang Identities in Flux", in S. Frederick Starr (ed.), *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland*, (Armonk, NY: M.E.Sharpe, 2004), p.317.

¹¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹¹⁶ For example see June Teufel Dreyer, "The PLA and Regionalism in Xinjiang", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 7, No.1, (1994), p.51 & Alan P. Liu, "Economic Reform, Mobility Strategies and National Integration in China", *Asian Survey*, Vol.31, no.4 (April 1991), pp.406-407.

¹¹¹⁷ Justin Ben-Adam, "China", in David Westerlund and Ingvar Svanberg (eds.), *Islam Outside the Arab World*, (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1999), p.206.

¹¹¹⁸ "Alarming News From Eastern Turkestan", op. cit. This report states that, "It was estimated that until recently 250 to 300 thousand Chinese were settling in Eastern Turkestan each year, but the latest reports claim that this figure has doubled".

previous chapters, since 1949 there had been very significant Han in-migration to Xinjiang. Importantly, this process had been encouraged throughout the Maoist era via a combination of ideological appeals and coercion. Moreover, as we have seen, many of these Han in-migrants were absorbed into the Xinjiang PCC. By the close of the Maoist era the Han population of Xinjiang stood at 5.13 million out of a total of 12.33 million people or 41.6 per cent of the total¹¹¹⁹ with the Xinjiang PCC accounting for some 2 million of these.¹¹²⁰ Over the course of the 1980s the Han population steadily increased from 5.32 million in 1982 to 5.7 million in 1990, representing an annual rate of increase of 0.89 per cent. Meanwhile the Uighur population had grown from 5.99 million in 1982 to 7.19 million in 1990 with an annual rate of increase of 2.5 per cent.¹¹²¹ By 1997, however, the Han population stood at 6.6 million, an increase of just under 1 million in seven years representing an average growth of 2.12 per cent between 1990 and 1997.¹¹²² The Uighur population in the same year was 8.02 million, representing an average growth of 1.53 per cent over the same period.¹¹²³ Moreover, the Han proportion of Xinjiang's total population although having declined between 1982 and 1990, subsequently increased between 1990 and 1997. The Han constituted 40.45 per cent and 37.58 per cent of the population in 1982 and 1990 respectively, while by 1997 the Han proportion had increased to 38.42 per cent of Xinjiang's population.¹¹²⁴

¹¹¹⁹ Colin Mackerras, "Xinjiang at the turn of the century: the causes of separatism", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.20, No. 3, (2001), p.293.

¹¹²⁰ I will address later the importance of the Xinjiang PCC in the 1990s in terms of its political, economic and security functions.

¹¹²¹ Ibid, p.293 & "Xinjiang Bureau Issues Statistics on 1990 Census", *Urumqi Xinjiang Ribao*, 17 November 1990 in FBIS-CHI-90-250, 28 December 1990, pp.52-55. Mackerras cites official statistical reports, Sun Jinxin et al., *Kua shiji de Zhongguo renkou, Xinjiang juan (The Population of China Towards the 21st Century, Xinjiang Volume)* (Beijing: China Statistical Press, 1994) & XUAR Regional Gazetteer Compilation Committee, comp., *Xinjiang nianjin 1998 (Xinjiang Yearbook)* (Urumqi: Xinjiang Yearbook Press and Xinjiang People's Press, 1998).

¹¹²² Colin Mackerras, "Xinjiang at the turn of the century", op. cit., Table 1, p.292.

¹¹²³ Ibid.

¹¹²⁴ Ibid, Table 2, p.293.

On the basis of official figures for the 1990-1997 period the average number of Han to in-migrate to Xinjiang each year would be 129 381.¹¹²⁵ Such a figure is thus substantially lower than that given by Uighur and other observers, yet it must be taken into account that the Chinese census figures used do not include the substantial "floating" Han population in Xinjiang. The existence of this problem in Xinjiang is well attested not just through foreign accounts but occasionally in the Chinese media. An article in 1995, for example, highlighted that Korla had seen the arrival of a 100 000-strong floating population.¹¹²⁶ The state's "double opening" strategy had created many economic opportunities in Xinjiang and labour demand in Xinjiang that attracted large numbers of Han from China's poor central provinces. The difficulty in determining the scope of this problem in Xinjiang, as elsewhere in China, derives from the fact that many of these Han do not remain in Xinjiang for extended periods - often just long enough to earn some money.¹¹²⁷ Such a dynamic thus produces a fluctuating or perhaps "tidal" flow of Han in and out of the region that impacts significantly on inter-ethnic relations in Xinjiang. That this portion of in-migrating Han is not necessarily permanent is of little consequence to the ethnic minority population in terms of their perceptions of the ethnic and power balance in the region. That is to say the phenomena of a fluctuating and perhaps temporary in-migration of Han will, in the ethnic minorities' perceptions, contribute further to the notion or felling of Xinjiang being swamped by Han. We have seen that the Uighur and Kazakh protestors in the unrest of April 1995 explicitly expressed such a sentiment.

¹¹²⁵ Calculated from the statistics given in Colin Mackerras, *op. cit.*, pp.292-293.

¹¹²⁶ "Article Views Xinjiang's Economic Progress", *Liaowang Beijing* 2 October 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-229, 29 November 1995, p.87.

¹¹²⁷ Colin Mackerras, "Ethnicity in China: The Case of Xinjiang", *Harvard Asia Quarterly*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Winter 2004), p.9.

This voluntary movement of Han to Xinjiang in the 1990s has also been bolstered by state-sponsored or promoted in-migration. Becquelin, for example, cites a State Council policy report of 1996 focused on the settlement of desert regions that explicitly advocated a new resettlement strategy aimed at attracting a young rural workforce from the impoverished central provinces.¹¹²⁸ This document asserted that to accelerate the development of the "arid and poverty stricken western region" the government needed to implement "a new channelling system, designed to establish migrant settlements, to manage and open the desert and build China's desert agriculture".¹¹²⁹ Another important facet and spin-off of the government's economic development strategy was the increasing urbanisation of Xinjiang that it promoted. The urban population of Xinjiang in 1990 had been 3.6 million people out of a total population of 15.16 million, yet by 1997 the urban population stood at 5.12 million out of a total population of 17.18 million. Therefore, the region experienced a net increase in its urban population of 1.52 million in seven years, changing the rural-urban balance of the population from 76.26 per cent and 23.74 per cent in 1990 to 70.2 per cent and 29.8 per cent in 1997.¹¹³⁰ Thus in 1997 the proportion of Xinjiang's population living in urban areas was greater than the national average of 28 per cent.¹¹³¹ This process of urbanisation has implications for the ability of the state to strengthen its control over the region. The urbanisation of Xinjiang's cities and towns serves to enhance Chinese control of the region, as continued urban growth entails the development of greater administrative and

¹¹²⁸ Nicolas Becquelin, "Xinjiang in the Nineties", op. cit., p.75.

¹¹²⁹ Wang Xiyu & Chan Jianpo, "Yinru yimin, jianli huangmo nongye" (Channel the Migrants and Establish Agriculture in the Desert) in Ma Hong & Sun Shangqing (eds.), *Zhongguo fazhan yanjiu, 1996 ban* (*Studies on the Development of China, 1996 edition*) (Beijing: Zhongguo Fazhan, Chubanshe, 1996), p.439 cited in Nicolas Becquelin, op. cit., p.75.

¹¹³⁰ See Nicolas Becquelin, op. cit., p.75 & Clifton W. Pannell and Laurence J. C. Ma, "Urban Transition and Interstate Relations in a Dynamic Post-Soviet Borderland: The Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of China", *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics*, Vol. 38, No.4 (1997), pp.214-216.

¹¹³¹ Clifton W. Pannell & Laurence J. C. Ma, op. cit., p.215.

commercial functions for the cities themselves and greater authority over surrounding areas.¹¹³²

The major instrument of state-sponsored Han in-migration during the Maosit era, as we saw in previous chapters, was the Xinjiang PCC. In the 1990s, as Han in-migration was reinvigorated, so too not incoincidentally was the PCC. The promotion of Han in-migration, however, was but one aspect of the PCC's functions in Xinjiang. As noted earlier in the chapter, the government by the close of 1992 granted 240 units of the PCC preferential economic policies and the right to engage in border trade.¹¹³³ Song Hanliang also explicitly elucidated the PCC's economic role in the government's development strategy:

The economic sector run by the Production and Construction Corps plays a decisive role in the autonomous region; it has a direct impact on the autonomous region's economic growth rate. Faster growth in this sector can give powerful impetus to the autonomous region's economic development.¹¹³⁴

Therefore, it had been determined that the PCC was to be a significant instrument through which the government would attempt to simultaneously integrate the region with the national economy and that of Central Asia. Simultaneously, the PCC's function as a conduit for Han settlement was also reinvigorated and this was reflected by a reversal, beginning in 1991, of a post-1982 decline in the PCC's membership.¹¹³⁵ In the past the PCC had played a key role in the development of agriculture in Xinjiang

¹¹³² see Nicolas Becquelin, op. cit., p.75 and Clifton W. Pannell & Laurence J. C. Ma, op. cit., pp.217-219.

¹¹³³ Page 25 of this chapter, and see "Xinjiang's Song Hanliang Addresses Production", *Urumqi Xinjiang Ribao* 24 December 1992, in FBIS-CHI-93-004, 7 January 1993, pp.54-55.

¹¹³⁴ "Xinjiang's Song Hanliang Addresses Production", op. cit., p.54.

¹¹³⁵ Nicolas Becquelin, op. cit., p.77.

through the reclamation of wasteland and establishment of agricultural colonies.¹¹³⁶ The PCC's economic activities also encompassed processing of agricultural commodities, steel production, mining, and scientific research and development.¹¹³⁷

This role continued in the 1990s with the PCC having jurisdiction over 740 000 hectares of land in Xinjiang by the mid-1990s, representing 48 per cent of the area of the province and 30 per cent of all arable land.¹¹³⁸ With PCC farms in 1994 accounting for 24.67 per cent of Xinjiang's grain output.¹¹³⁹ The PCC also played a role in attracting Han migrants to rural and pastoral regions of Xinjiang by contracting land to in-migrating Han. In a *Xinjiang Ribao* article of early 1996, for example, it was admitted that "more than 20 000" migrant peasants had begun farming land contracted from the "Xinjiang Tianshan Nanbei Military Corps" over the previous twelve months.¹¹⁴⁰ The article went on to report that most of the in-migrating Han came from Henan, Gansu and Sichuan and were attracted to the agricultural sector in Xinjiang "where the land is vast and underpopulated".¹¹⁴¹ Significantly, the article also noted that successful Han peasants acted as "magnets" for further in-migrants generally in the form of relatives and friends.¹¹⁴² The implications of such a process for inter-ethnic relations in Xinjiang were far from benign. The growing Han in-migration, already dwelt upon above, was not simply a demographic threat to the region's ethnic minorities but also an economic

¹¹³⁶ See Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang and the Production and Construction Corps: A Han Organization in a Non-Han Region", *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, No. 6 (July 1981), pp.65-96. The PCC's role in the Maoist period was also covered extensively in Chapter 5.

¹¹³⁷ Calla Wiemer, "The Economy of Xinjiang", op. cit., p.169.

¹¹³⁸ Nicolas Becquelin, op. cit., p.78.

¹¹³⁹ "Xinjiang Publishes Development Plan Report", *Urumqi Xinjiang Ribao* 26 February 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-067, 7 April 1995, p.83.

¹¹⁴⁰ "Migrant Workers Seek Better Life in Xinjiang", *Urumqi Xinjiang Ribao* 13 February 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-060, 27 March 1996, p.76.

¹¹⁴¹ Ibid, pp.76-77.

¹¹⁴² Ibid.

one. The influx of Han peasants from the central provinces placed further pressure on the scarce arable land available for cultivation and served to be another source of anti-Han sentiment amongst Xinjiang's ethnic minorities.¹¹⁴³ Yet the PCC was financially unprofitable and was underpinned by financial subsidies from the central government. In 1994 81 per cent of the PCC's 1.19 billion yuan budget was supplied by the central government, while in 1995 the central government supplied 89 per cent of its 1.146 billion yuan budget.¹¹⁴⁴ Therefore, it appeared that the central government was prepared to shoulder the financial costs of the PCC's activities in order to continue the primary function of absorbing and facilitating Han in-migration.

The state's approach to Xinjiang over the 1991-1995 period, as we have seen, was framed by the extension of the "reform and opening" policies to the region. This entailed the vigorous implementation of the "double opening" strategy that aimed to simultaneously integrate Xinjiang with China proper and Central Asia. We have seen, however, that the central elements of this strategy - "opening" to Central Asia, central government investment in Xinjiang, increased Han in-migration, and limited toleration of ethnic minority religious and cultural practices - in many respects produced dynamics at variance to the state's integrationist goal. The "opening" to Central Asia was conceived of by the state during this phase as focusing on primarily the economic sphere. This was amply illustrated by the Chinese government's application of the "growth pole" strategy in Xinjiang and the related emphasis on establishing "open" border cities to facilitate cross-border trade and the expansion of infrastructure. Moreover, China's diplomacy in Central Asia, particularly between 1991 and 1994,

¹¹⁴³ Nicolas Becquelin, *op. cit.*, p.76.

¹¹⁴⁴ *Ibid*, *op. cit.*, p.80.

exhibited a strong concern with the development of trade and economic relationships with the Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Contemporaneously, a number of developments in China's energy sector prompted a re-orientation of its energy strategy and helped to reinforce or underscore the importance of consolidating relations with Central Asia. As noted earlier, the government's stress on the creation of "pillar industries" in Xinjiang - notably agriculture and petrochemical - spurred greater investment in the region's existing oil/gas resources and further exploration. Moreover, as China became a net oil importer in 1993, the maximisation of domestic production and the diversification of foreign sources assumed great importance. The state's strategic considerations in relation to both Xinjiang and the nation's energy needs thus coalesced.

China's emerging relations with the states of Central Asia also had important political implications for its position in Xinjiang. The pre-eminent concern of both the central and provincial governments following the collapse of the Soviet Union and independence of the Central Asian states was to minimise the political and economic impact of these events on Xinjiang. The revival of Islam as a political force in both Central Asia and Afghanistan and the wider Turkic cultural renewal in Central Asia that was central to these events represented potential threats to the Chinese state's integrationist program in Xinjiang. A major element of China's overtures to the newly independent states of Central Asia, as highlighted above, was thus concerned with the prevention of Uighur émigré "anti-China" activities in Central Asia. China's attempts in this respect had been relatively successful, in that by 1994 China had obtained undertakings from the Central Asian states (particularly Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan)

that anti-Chinese activities would not be permitted. But it must be noted that throughout the 1991-1995 period no Central Asian state implemented legal sanctions against or surveillance of Uighur émigré organisations. Nevertheless, throughout China's diplomacy in Central Asia the issue of Uighur separatism remained a pre-eminent issue, as demonstrated during Li Peng's tour of Central Asia in 1994. This theme in China's diplomacy was once again manifested during a number of important bi-lateral meetings late in 1995. Between 23 and 24 October 1995 Premier Li Peng met with visiting Kyrgyz Prime Minister Apas Dzhumagulov in Beijing to discuss the resolution of the Sino-Kyrgyz border issue and bi-lateral economic cooperation.¹¹⁴⁵ Central to discussions was the methods by which the dispute over the 1000km Sino-Kyrgyz border could be settled, with both parties expressing the hope that once resolved the Sino-Kyrgyz border could become a "boundary of peace and friendly co-operation"¹¹⁴⁶. The issue of separatism in Xinjiang, however, was also raised with Li Peng stating that China appreciated Kyrgyzstan's "stand on opposing national splittism" while his Kyrgyz counterpart reiterated Kyrgyzstan's commitment to oppose "any form of national splittism".¹¹⁴⁷ A few days later Hu Jintao, then member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, made short visits to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.¹¹⁴⁸ Much like Li Peng's talks in Beijing these visits focused on consolidating bi-lateral economic cooperation. The Uzbek President, Islam Karimov, in his meeting with Hu stated that Uzbekistan adhered to a policy of opposing "any form of national separatism" against

¹¹⁴⁵ "Li, Kyrgyz Officials View Border Settlement", *Beijing Xinhua* 23 October 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-206, 25 October 1995, p.20.

¹¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁴⁷ Ibid, pp.20-21.

¹¹⁴⁸ "Hu Jintao Begins Visit to Uzbekistan 28 Oct", *Beijing Xinhua* 28 October 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-211, 1 November 1995, p.3.

China.¹¹⁴⁹ China's efforts in Central Asia were also aided by the continuation of the inter-governmental discussions¹¹⁵⁰, begun in 1992, concerning the resolution and demarcation of borders and military confidence building measures along the Sino-Central Asian frontier. This would in fact serve as the basis for the development of a multilateral organisation in April 1996 that would expand its remit to encompass regional security and economic issues, of which there would be no shortage in the region in the coming years.

¹¹⁴⁹ "Meets Uzbek President", *Beijing Xinhua* 31 October 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-211, 1 November 1995, p.4.

¹¹⁵⁰ Between China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

CHAPTER 8

INTEGRATION UNDER THREAT: RENEWED ETHNIC MINORITY OPPOSITION AND THE GEOPOLITICAL CHALLENGE OF CENTRAL ASIA, 1996-2004

China's strategy in Xinjiang, and in its relations with the states of Central Asia, had been only a partial success over the 1991-1995 period. Undoubtedly the province, largely due to the government's extension of "reform and opening", experienced economic growth and development that had begun to facilitate Xinjiang's integration with the national and Central Asian economies. As noted in the previous chapter, the government undertook numerous large-scale infrastructure projects to link Xinjiang more effectively with China proper and Central Asia. The relative economic success of Xinjiang, however, was underpinned to a significant extent to the central government's provision of substantial financial support. The combination of increased central government investment in Xinjiang and the extension of greater economic freedoms to the province attracted increased Han in-migration. Moreover, this process was also directly encouraged between 1991 and 1995 by the central government through the Xinjiang PCC. The increased cross-border linkages generated by the state's "double opening" strategy and the inter-ethnic tension created by greater Han in-migration played a major role in stimulating ethnic minority opposition. Moreover, the state's connection of internal unrest with the influence of Islam and external forces resulted in the implementation of a more hard-line approach toward religion in the region. The ethnic minority grievances and demands during the disturbances in Ili in April 1995 dealt with in detail in the previous chapter, for example, certainly illustrated that the ethnic minorities perceived the government's economic development strategy as benefiting

only the Han and encouraging Han in-migration. The following unrest in Khotan, however, was perhaps more closely linked to the government's renewed supervision of religion.

Within the subsequent 1996-2001 period China built upon the basic elements of the strategy in regard to both Xinjiang and Central Asia embarked upon during the late 1980s. As we have seen over the course of the present and previous chapters, this was built on a "double opening" strategy that sought to utilise Xinjiang's geo-political position to facilitate the simultaneous integration of the region with China proper and Central Asia. This "double opening" was a major reorientation of Chinese strategy in Xinjiang and Central Asia. During the Maoist period (1949-1976) China sought to systematically isolate Xinjiang from all non-Chinese influences be they political, economic, cultural or ideological. As such this approach actively "cut off" Xinjiang from contiguous regions of Central Asia, South Asia and Mongolia to which it had historically had linkages. The complex of specific techniques and tactics of rule employed to achieve this goal were dealt with extensively in chapter five, but it should be noted that a major element of this complex was directed toward eliminating the political, economic, cultural and ideological influence of Soviet Central Asia. Central Asia, in this context, was perceived of as the primary source of threat to the Chinese integrationist project in Xinjiang.

Following the death of Mao, and the subsequent fall of the "Gang of Four" and the resurgence of Deng Xiaoping, the state's strategy in Xinjiang was re-evaluated. Through this process the core goal of integration was once more reaffirmed. But it was now to be

achieved via a reconceived complex of techniques and tactics of rule that emphasised the potential strategic, political and economic advantages for China's position in Xinjiang by harnessing the region's linkages with Central Asia. Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 presented China with an unprecedented opportunity to capitalise on Xinjiang's historical linkages to Central Asia in order to extend its influence into the now independent region. Yet although this removed the long-feared Soviet threat to Xinjiang, it simultaneously diversified the potential sources of external threat to the region. Over the course of the 1991-1995 period, the Chinese government had attempted to balance these two elements of the changed external geo-political environment with the internal imperatives of economic development, integration and control. As we have seen, this balancing act was only partially successful. The level of China's concern regarding these perceived external threats was manifested in its relations with the states of Central Asia, whereby the issue of possible external support for ethnic separatism in Xinjiang became a major element of China's bilateral relations. That China's endeavours in this respect had not been as successful as desired was reflected in the central role China played in the creation of a multilateral regional forum - the "Shanghai Five" - in April 1996. This diplomatic initiative was coupled with an intensification of the core elements of the state's integrationist techniques and tactics of rule within Xinjiang - notably increased government investment, Han in-migration, and continued supervision of ethnic minority religious and cultural practices. The state's approach to both its strategy in Xinjiang and Central Asia was also influenced by the intensification of the "New Great Game" for Central Asia. The geo-political competition and cooperation amongst the states of Central Asia, Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan and the US for the region's oil and gas developed

simultaneously with the emergence of cross-border phenomena of weapons and drugs trafficking and trans-national Islamic movements. The state's strategy in Xinjiang thus opened the region to the possible infiltration of external dynamics directly opposed to China's integrationist project.

The direction of the state's strategy in Xinjiang can be discerned from an important address by the XUAR CCP Committee Chairman Wang Lequan in March 1996. Wang's address outlined the central government's commitment to the continued implementation of the "double opening" strategy in Xinjiang. Moreover, the content of the 9th Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) demonstrated Beijing's intensification of the major internal elements of this strategy. As such it reaffirmed the core goals of the state's strategy in the region - integration and control. With respect to this latter goal, it appeared that the state perceived that a major element in securing the region depended on demonstrating to the ethnic minorities the economic benefits of remaining citizens of the PRC. During his address to the 4th Session of the 7th XUAR Committee of the CPPCC on 27 March 1996,¹¹⁵¹ Wang stated that the 9th Five Year Plan (1996-2000) for National and Social Development:

...embodied the strategic guiding principles of the party and state for narrowing the gaps between regions in economic development, promoting coordinated regional economic development, giving priority to the development of the central and western regions, and particularly focusing the development of the western regions on Xinjiang.¹¹⁵²

Moreover, like the preceding 8th Five-Year Plan (1991-1995) the 9th Five-Year Plan stressed the continued development of "pillar industries" in regions "rich in natural

¹¹⁵¹ "Wang Lequan Addresses Xinjiang CPPCC Session", *Urumqi Xinjiang Ribao* 28 March 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-079, 23 April 1996, pp.80-85.

¹¹⁵² *Ibid*, p.80.

resources".¹¹⁵³ In the case of Xinjiang, Wang stated, the central government placed priority on the development of the cotton and petrochemical industries with the goal of making the region:

...into a most strategically important petroleum - and natural gas - producing area, a state-level, comprehensive modern chemical industry base, and the largest competitive textile-industry base in the northwest.¹¹⁵⁴

As we saw earlier, a complementary element of this process in the 8th Five-Year Plan was to develop these "pillar industries" to facilitate economic linkages with Central Asia. This remained central to the 9th Five-Year Plan:

Obvious favorable geographical conditions make it possible for us not only to further expand economic and trade relations with central Asian countries but to develop such relations with countries in western Asia, Eastern and Western Europe, and the Middle East. This will accelerate the transformation of the traditional landlocked economy into an export-oriented economy in our region.¹¹⁵⁵

This more ambitious goal regarding the region's "pillar industry" export capabilities would be complemented by further state investment in developing major infrastructure projects in Xinjiang in such areas as water conservancy, telecommunications, transportation, and energy. Infrastructure projects given priority by the central government in Xinjiang during the 9th Five-Year Plan were identified as the extension of the Lanzhou-Urumqi railway to southern Xinjiang, extension and upgrading of national highways, extension of optical fibre communication networks, expansion of chemical-industry bases and airports.¹¹⁵⁶

¹¹⁵³ Ibid, p.82.

¹¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

Within the same address, however, Wang made a number of frank statements regarding the challenges faced by the state in implementing this strategy in Xinjiang that echoed in some respects the rhetoric of the late 1950s. Although Wang made a familiar link between the resurgence of ethnic minority opposition and external forces, he also noted that internal dilemmas played a significant role in this process:

*Maintaining social and political stability is a very arduous task in Xinjiang. On the one hand, with support from the Western hostile forces, ethnic separatists at home and abroad have intensified their separatist activities against Xinjiang, which have become the main danger to the stability of the region. On the other hand, Xinjiang lags behind in economic development, and some new situations, new contradictions, and new problems have occurred with the intensified efforts to carry out reforms and with continued adjustments of interests. As a result, contradictions among the people have become salient.*¹¹⁵⁷

Thus there was a clear acknowledgment by the authorities that the state's policies in Xinjiang did indeed play a major role, albeit a complimentary one in their perceptions, in generating ethnic minority opposition. Although Wang Lequan identified the continued economic disparity between Xinjiang and other regions of China as constituting a source of "contradictions amongst the people", he also admitted, "new problems have occurred with the intensified efforts to carry out reform". There are two salient points that should be noted from Wang's statement. First, he explicitly defined the increasing occurrence of ethnic minority opposition as a "contradiction amongst the people". It will be recalled from earlier chapters that the application of such a perjorative label to ethnic minority dissent had not been used in Xinjiang since the Maoist period. Second, not only did Wang acknowledge the economic gap between regions but noted that this had been exacerbated by the state's development strategy in Xinjiang and contributed to the development of "contradictions amongst the people".

¹¹⁵⁷ Ibid, p.83. My emphasis.

Thus the authorities had appeared to recognise the problems that could arise from a reliance on economic development as a curative for political and social instability. That is to say the various strategies employed to facilitate economic development could in fact exacerbate existing political and social tensions.¹¹⁵⁸ The state held an essentially contradictory perception regarding the relationship between economic development and social stability, as highlighted by XUAR Chairman Abdulahat Abdurixit's statement on the issue:

...we must correctly handle the relationship between development and stability...we must use economic development to maintain stability, and on the other hand, we must use political stability to guarantee economic development and ensure that people of various ethnic groups can become prosperous and advance toward a comfortable life.¹¹⁵⁹

According to this argument then economic development could facilitate the maintenance of social stability, but simultaneously only the maintenance of this condition (ie. stability) could guarantee economic development.

The central and provincial governments' economic agenda, as we have seen, was focused on the creation of "pillar industries", encouragement of Han in-migration, and developing greater links with Central Asia all of which had created contradictory dynamics over the 1991-1995 period. The focus on the creation of Xinjiang as a petrochemical and cotton "base" within the national economy certainly produced effects (which will be dealt with shortly) that exacerbated existing economic, political and social tensions in the region. The state's response to the twin threats of "ethnic separatism" within Xinjiang and "hostile" external influences appeared, from Wang

¹¹⁵⁸ See for example, Greg Alling, "Economic Liberalization and Separatist Nationalism: The Cases of Sri Lanka and Tibet", *Journal of International Affairs*, (Summer 1997).

Lequan's address, to be twofold. First, in the context of the 9th Five-Year Plan, the state would increase its investment in major infrastructure projects, continue the opening to Central Asia, and seek to expand the petrochemical and cotton industries. Second, the state would endeavour to increase its efforts both persuade and coerce the ethnic minorities into acquiescence.¹¹⁶⁰ Moreover, Wang also quoted a statement by President Jiang Zemin that highlighted the central government's awareness of the possible detrimental effects of its strategy in Xinjiang:

The more we deepen reform, the wider we open the country to the outside world, and the more we carry out economic construction, the more we need to strengthen our unity, develop democracy, and step up the work of the united front and CPPCC organizations.¹¹⁶¹

According to Wang the key to ensuring that continued economic construction and "opening" to the world would not come at the expense of state control over Xinjiang lay in the correct management of external influences and religion within Xinjiang. In order to achieve this he exhorted CPPCC organizations that:

They should conscientiously resist the Western hostile forces' attempt to "Westernize" our country with the parliamentary system and the multiparty system. Second, on the question of nationalities and religion, they should uphold the Marxist concept of nationalities and the party's policies toward nationalities and religion and *support and assist the government in strengthening the administration of religious affairs* according to law; they should conscientiously resist erroneous ideas, statements, and acts regarding the questions of nationalities and religion; they should maintain sharp vigilance against and conscientiously resist the Western hostile forces' attempt to use issues of nationality or religion to divide or undermine our country; *they should oppose illegal religious activities and take a clear-cut stand in waging a resolute struggle against the splitting and sabotage activities by ethnic separatist forces at home and abroad.*¹¹⁶²

¹¹⁵⁹ "Xinjiang Chairman Cautions against Ethnic Splittism", *Urumqi Xinjiang Ribao*, 21 April 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-097, 17 May 1996, p.57.

¹¹⁶⁰ "Wang Lequan Addresses Xinjiang CPPCC Session", op. cit. , p.83.

¹¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹¹⁶² Ibid, p.84. My emphasis.

Thus Wang gave a clear indication that the authorities were about to reassert state control over what was perceived as the core internal threat to the state - "illegal religious activities" - and simultaneously intensify efforts to negate the threat if "ethnic separatists at home and abroad".

These themes, as we have seen, were not new in relation to the state's perceptions of the key threats to its integrationist project in Xinjiang. The year 1996, however, proved to be a turning point in relation to the strategies by which China would attempt to secure the region from internal and external threats. Almost simultaneously with Wang's address in Xinjiang, preparations were already well advanced for the summit of the presidents of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan in Shanghai on 26 April.¹¹⁶³ This meeting would inaugurate a regional forum, known as the "Shanghai Five", that would come to play a major role in China's foreign policy in Central Asia over the course of the next eight years. As we have seen, a major element of China's bilateral relations with the states of Central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, concerned the issue of émigré Uighur activities and possible support for ethnic separatists in Xinjiang. This would in turn become a key factor in China's activities within the context of the multilateral "Shanghai Five".

The economic strategy to rely on the two "pillars" of petrochemicals and cotton that had been highlighted in the 8th Five-Year Plan (1991-1995) and reinforced in the 9th Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) to drive Xinjiang's economic development did indeed result in the creation of "new situations, new contradictions, and new problems". The state's

¹¹⁶³ "Special Article Previews Yeltsin Visit, Part 1", *Hong Kong Wen Wei Po*, 23 April 1996 in FBIS-CHI-96-079, 23 April 1996, pp.7-9.

investment in the petrochemical industry alone would not achieve the goal of persuading the ethnic minorities of the economic benefits of remaining citizens of the PRC, as they were largely agriculturalists. Thus the emphasis on the development of a cotton industry which would in theory directly benefit the region's non-Han agriculturalist population:

In the minds of the central planners, as the oil and petrochemical industry develops, it will provide considerable revenues for the province and pull all industries in Xinjiang forward. Cotton cultivation, complementarily, is supposed to boost agricultural revenue and "bring prosperity to all nationalities".¹¹⁶⁴

Significantly, the cotton strategy actually contributed to the further deterioration in Han-minority relations and further weakened the state's legitimacy in the eyes of many of the ethnic minorities. A number of observers have highlighted that as cotton cultivation has high costs of production and is only profitable if undertaken on a large scale, the implementation of this strategy in Xinjiang served the broader integrationist goals of the state.¹¹⁶⁵ This was borne out by the fact that it was PCC units that took the lead in cotton cultivation, with the corps accounting for around 40 per cent of the region's total cotton production by 1997.¹¹⁶⁶ This followed a certain logic as the PCC controlled up to 30 per cent of Xinjiang's arable land and was capable of mobilising and managing the large labour force required in cotton cultivation. Moreover, the PCC operated farms attracted an influx of Han as seasonal workers to pick the cotton. The central government also undertook to strengthen Xinjiang's textile industry by transferring textile production

¹¹⁶⁴ Nicolas Becquelin, "Xinjiang in the Nineties", *The China Journal*, Vol. 44, (July 2000), pp.80-81.

¹¹⁶⁵ Ibid, Ildiko Beller-Hann, "The Peasant Condition in Xinjiang", *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol.25, No.1 (1997), pp.94-95 & Scott Fogden, "Writing Insecurity: The PRC's Push to Modernize China and the Politics of Uighur Identity", *Issues & Studies*, Vol.39, No. 3 (September 2003), pp.56-57.

¹¹⁶⁶ "Xinjiang Military District Expands Land Cultivation", *Urumqi Xinjiang Ribao* 23 January 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-060, 27 March 1996, p.76 & Nicolas Becquelin, op. cit., p.81.

from eastern China to the region.¹¹⁶⁷ Government claims that cotton cultivation was the best way for farmers to achieve economic prosperity were, however, belied by the Uighur peasantry's perception of the state's motives for encouraging cotton cultivation. It should be noted that the state required Uighur peasants to plant cotton instead of grain via the imposition of quotas for cotton production. Moreover, peasants could only sell their cotton to state owned cooperatives at fixed prices.¹¹⁶⁸ Uighur peasants thus perceived the cotton strategy as means by which the state can squeeze tax revenue from the agricultural sector of Xinjiang's economy:

Officials claim that the centrally planned compulsory cotton cultivation is in the peasants' own best interests, whatever they themselves say, since for many families with no sideline production or commercial activities cotton provides the only source of cash income. Peasants, however, insist that the various inputs (chemicals, fertiliser and plastic film) for cotton plus its labour intensity mean that there is no real profit in growing. They believe that the state insists on it to ensure that peasants will have enough cash in hand in late autumn to pay tax and land rent (which neither they nor the authorities distinguish clearly) and other bills. Individual farmers calculate that the cash they receive from the sale of cotton to the state owned cotton factory does not cover their labour and cash investment in cotton growing, which makes the whole enterprise unprofitable.¹¹⁶⁹

The general tenor of Uighur scepticism toward the cotton strategy was reflected in the lines of an Uighur poem entitled "The Peasant Cries" from the mid-1990s (which was subsequently banned by the authorities), "The white gold fattens others but we still remain poor, Instead we get into debt".¹¹⁷⁰

The unprofitable nature of small-scale cotton farming, as would be undertaken by Uighur peasants, raises an important question as to why the state would simultaneously

¹¹⁶⁷ Nicolas Becquelin, *op. cit.*, p.81.

¹¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶⁹ Ildiko Beller-Hann, "The Peasant Condition in Xinjiang", *op. cit.* p.95.

¹¹⁷⁰ Cited in *Ibid.*, p.94.

encourage (via subsidies) and coerce the peasantry into planting cotton? The answer, it would appear, lies once more in the state's core goal in relation to Xinjiang - integration and control. Moreover, that historical tool of integration - the PCC - also figures prominently, as I have previously noted, within the underpinning rationale of the state's "cotton strategy". The enormous land holdings and land reclamation function of PCC units thus made it a logical candidate to spearhead the state's attempt to make Xinjiang a national cotton base. According to Xinjiang's land bureau, between 1991 and 1996-97 approximately 3.3 million mu of land was reclaimed, with nearly 2 million of that total achieved by the PCC.¹¹⁷¹ The promotion of cotton cultivation also has well known effects on the environment in such fragile ecosystems as Xinjiang:

According to reports from China's Department of Environmental Protection, "the desertification has progressed in 53 of the 87 districts of Xinjiang...Many lakes are drying up, especially around the Tarim river". Another study noted that whereas some 40 000 square kilometres of desert were converted into cultivable land, during the same period the desert area increased by 50 000 square kilometres.¹¹⁷²

A scenario not unlike that in neighbouring Central Asia could, if the "cotton strategy" was vigorously implemented, beckon Xinjiang in the future. During the Soviet era central planners determined to make Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan into the Soviet Union's cotton production base, most especially in the 1960s after Khrushchev's "Virgin Lands" campaign.¹¹⁷³ In order to provide the necessary irrigation the region's two major rivers, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, were diverted which resulted in an enormous ecological disaster including the desiccation of the Aral Sea, salinization and erosion.¹¹⁷⁴ Given

¹¹⁷¹ Cited in Nicolas Becquelin, *op. cit.*, p.83.

¹¹⁷² *Ibid.*, p.84.

¹¹⁷³ Svat Soucek, *A History of Inner Asia*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 235.

¹¹⁷⁴ Boris Rumer, *Soviet Central Asia*, (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1999), p.65.

these factors it is clear that the strategy to make Xinjiang a national cotton production base proceeds from the rationale of the integrationist project.

A complementary development to the intensification of the state's internal integrationist strategies was the transformation of China's relations with the states of Central Asia. As noted earlier, China's relations with these states over the 1991-1995 period had largely taken place within the confines of bilateral relationships. The exception to this had been the formation of a "group of five" regional forum with the limited aim of enhancing military confidence building measures along shared borders. The initial inter-governmental discussions began in 1992 with a joint delegation from Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia meeting with their Chinese counterparts.¹¹⁷⁵ This dialogue continued for the next four years and culminated in the signing of a five-nation "Agreement on Confidence-Building in the Military Sphere in the Border Areas" on 26 April 1996 in Shanghai.¹¹⁷⁶ The agreement was wide-reaching and emphasised the need to maintain the multilateral nature of inter-state military and security dialogue:

The agreement rules out conducting military exercises aimed against each other. The agreement specified the scale, scope and number of military exercises, and concerned sides should inform each other of any major military activities taking place in any area within 100km of the borderline. The accord stipulated that the concerned sides will invite each other to observe their military exercises...Friendly exchanges will be strengthened between the military forces and frontier guards of both sides.¹¹⁷⁷

¹¹⁷⁵ Michael Dillon, "Central Asia: The View from Beijing, Urumqi and Kashgar", in Mehdi Mozzafari (ed.), *Security Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States: The Southern Belt*, (London: MacMillan, 1997), p.136.

¹¹⁷⁶ "PRC: 5-Nation Military Agreement Signed in Shanghai", *Beijing XINHUA*, cited in *China Daily Report*, FBIS-CHI-96-082, (26 April 1996), p.22 & Robert M. Cutler, "Did Putin Shanghai Bush", *Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst* (July 4, 2001), online at <http://www.cacianalyst.org/>

¹¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

The transformation of the "five party" border/security talks into a regional multilateral forum with the signing of this agreement on 26 April 1996 represented a significant milestone in China's efforts to establish itself as a power in Central Asia. Although the content of the agreement primarily concerned military confidence-building measures, the statements made during and after the conclusion of the summit suggested that the five states viewed it as an important stepping-stone toward greater regional cooperation.¹¹⁷⁸ This was especially true of China and Russia, who had by the mid-1990s come to hold a similar perception of the contemporary international system as being dominated by the US.¹¹⁷⁹

A day prior to the Shanghai meeting Presidents Jiang Zemin and Boris Yeltsin had issued a joint Sino-Russian statement announcing the two parties' intention to establish a "strategic partnership".¹¹⁸⁰ The text of this joint statement bore the imprint of this shared Sino-Russian perception of the threats posed to their national interests by continued US hegemonism. Simultaneously, the statement also illustrated the Sino-Russian preference for the development of a multipolar international system:

Hegemonism, power politics and repeated imposition of pressures on other countries have continued to occur. Bloc politics has taken up new manifestations. World peace and development still face serious challenges...The two sides call upon all peace-loving countries and peoples throughout the world to cooperate closely and work together to establish a just and equitable international political and economic order and promote regional and global peace, stability, development and prosperity on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each others internal affairs,

¹¹⁷⁸ See for example "Jiang Zemin Meets Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik Presidents", *Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service* 26 April 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-083, 29 April 1996, p.15 & "Sino-Russian Relations as Viewed in Moscow", *Hong Kong Wen Wei Po*, 28 April 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-083, 29 April 1996, pp.11-13.

¹¹⁷⁹ Mark Burles, *Chinese Policy Toward Russia and the Central Asian Republics*, (RAND Corporation, 1999), No. MR-1045-AF. Online at <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1045>, pp.27-37.

¹¹⁸⁰ "'Text' of PRC-Russia Statement Released", *Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service* 25 April 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-081, 25 April 1996, pp.14-17.

equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence, as well as of the accepted norms governing international relations.¹¹⁸¹

This aspect of China's foreign policy has been described by James Hsiung as "an attempt to operationalize the idea of a 'collegial sharing of power among nations' to counter the threat of a unipolar world".¹¹⁸² That is to say China was attempting to combat the threat of a monopolar world order by the development and consolidation of multiple regional and global relationships. The rationale underpinning such a strategy is clear. The development of this "network" of regional and global relationships, although not necessarily capable of neutralising US economic, political and military power, would provide China with alternative sources of trade, investment, technology and international political support in the event of a deterioration in Sino-US relations.¹¹⁸³ China's development of a 'strategic relationship' with Russia and the consolidation of its relations with the states of Central Asia can thus be seen as an integral part of this overall foreign policy strategy. Although the Sino-Russian and Shanghai Five agreements explicitly maintained that they were not "directed against any third country"¹¹⁸⁴, they were congruent with China's goal to develop broad regional and global relationships to counter the US-dominated order. Simultaneously, however, the development of relations with Central Asia was also central to China's strategy in Xinjiang. As we saw earlier in this chapter, China's cultivation of relations with the independent states of Central Asia was generated by the dynamics of its overall strategy

¹¹⁸¹ Ibid, p.15.

¹¹⁸² James Hsiung, "China's Omni-Directional Diplomacy: Realignment to Cope with Monopolar US Power", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 35, No. 6, (June 1995), p. 577.

¹¹⁸³ Ibid & Mark Burles, op. it., p.34

¹¹⁸⁴ See for example "Spokesman Says 5-Nation Accord Not 'Military Alliance'", *Beijing Central Television Program One Network*, 1100 GMT 26 April 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-083, 29 April 1996, p.7 & "'Text' of PRC-Russia Statement Released", *Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service*, op. cit., pp.14-17.

for the integration of Xinjiang. The construction of China's "double opening" strategy compelled it to seek the development of relations with the Central Asian republics. As such China's bilateral relations with the states of Central Asia exhibited an overwhelming concern with three major issues - facilitation of trade and economic cooperation, border demarcation and military CBMs, and external aid to Uighur "separatists" or "splittists". These issues were also evident during the summit in Shanghai and the statements made after the agreement was concluded. The presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, for example, in separate meetings with President Jiang Zemin maintained that their countries were "opposed to any form of splittist activities".¹¹⁸⁵ This clearly referred to their guarantees to China that they would not permit "splittist" activities by Uighur émigré organisations within their countries or allow such Uighur "splittists" to traverse their common borders with China. Such undertakings by these Central Asian states, as we have seen, were not a new development but a reaffirmation of positions elucidated within their bilateral relations with China. Their reiteration within the context of the multilateral Shanghai Five, however, suggested that China's concerns were pre-eminent. Perhaps not inconsequentially the Sino-Russian agreement concluded the day prior to the Shanghai meeting contained a number of statements that highlighted the convergence of the two states' interests in the region, particularly regarding the issues of state sovereignty and ethnic minorities. First, the agreement stated that "China supports the measures and actions adopted by the Russian Federation in safeguarding its national unity and holds

¹¹⁸⁵ "Jiang Zemin Meets Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik Presidents", *Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service*, 26 April 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-083, 29 April 1996, pp.15-16.

that the question of Chechnya is a domestic affair of Russia", while "Russia always recognizes Tibet as an inseparable part of China".¹¹⁸⁶ Second:

The two sides maintain that they will strike resolutely against acts of terror or organized transnational crimes of any description and shall exchange experience and strengthen co-operation regularly on bilateral and multilateral basis.¹¹⁸⁷

China's support of Russia's position regarding Chechnya was largely reflective of its threat perceptions regarding Xinjiang. Therefore, both the Sino-Russian and Shanghai Five agreements bore the imprint of China's Xinjiang-centric strategic interests and concerns. This has led one observer to argue that:

Beijing has based its approach to regional affairs on internal preoccupations, rather than perceptions of other powers' ambitions, or a presumption that their gains must come at China's expense.¹¹⁸⁸

The relationship between China's strategy in Xinjiang and its foreign policy in Central Asia was underlined the following month, with provincial authorities instituting on 1 May 1996 a "Strike Hard" campaign in the region.¹¹⁸⁹ The institution of such a campaign, that was explicitly targeted at "national splittist forces", barely one month after Wang Lequan's admission of the existence of "contradictions among the people"¹¹⁹⁰ and four days after the conclusion of the Shanghai Five agreement could not have been a coincidence.¹¹⁹¹ In fact the central government's perception of the scope of the threat to China's position in Xinjiang was highlighted in a confidential document

¹¹⁸⁶ "Text' of PRC-Russia Statement Released", op. cit., p.14.

¹¹⁸⁷ Ibid, p.16.

¹¹⁸⁸ Kenneth Weisbrode, "Central Eurasia, Prize or Quicksand? Contending Views of Instability in Karabakh, Ferghana and Afghanistan", *Aldelphi Papers*, No. 338, (2001), p.21.

¹¹⁸⁹ "Xinjiang Targets 'Splittists' in Anticrime Drive", *Urumqi Xinjiang Ribao*, 1 May 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-097, 17 May 1996, pp.58-59.

¹¹⁹⁰ "Wang Lequan Addresses Xinjiang CPPCC Session", *Urumqi Xinjiang Ribao* 28 March 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-079, 23 April 1996, pp.80-85.

¹¹⁹¹ Justin Rudelson & William Jankowiak, "Acculturation and Resistance: Xinjiang Identities in Flux", op. cit., p.317.

received by the Xinjiang CCP in March 1996. This document, referred to as "Document No.7", outlined the CCP Central Committee's concerns regarding the prevalence of "illegal religious activities" and the activities of external "hostile" forces in Xinjiang:

The separatist organizations abroad have reinforced their collaboration, reinforcing day after day their efforts to infiltrate and carry out sabotage in Xinjiang. Within Xinjiang, illegal religious movements are rampant. Groups are fomenting trouble, assaulting Party and government structures, bombing and committing terrorist attacks. Some organizations have already turned from underground to semi-public, to the point of openly confronting the government...There is also a possibility that this as yet limited chaos and turmoil may influence Xinjiang's and the whole country's stability.¹¹⁹²

The "Strike Hard" campaign that followed in Xinjiang certainly reflected the core concerns emphasised in "Document No. 7". Moreover, the campaign highlighted the confluence of a number of themes in the authorities perceptions of the threat posed to Xinjiang and their relation to the state's strategy in the region. In particular it once more highlighted the contradictory conception of the relationship between economic development and social stability adhered to by the authorities as noted earlier.¹¹⁹³ Moreover, it also demonstrated the continuity of the authorities' characterisation of "national splittists" as being "beyond the pale" of societal norms and as being inherently opposed to society as a whole. Thus regional CCP Secretary Wang Lequan, for example, stated that:

This drive is aimed at further maintaining social security and at enhancing the people's sense of security. It is part of the important steps to lay the foundation for a stable social environment for the smooth implementation of the Ninth Five-Year Plan For National Economic and Social Development and the Long-Term Targets For the Year 2010. The region's first battle in enforcing the central government's instructions on the "serious crackdown"

¹¹⁹² "Guanyu weihu Xinjiang wending de huiyi jiyao, zhongyang zhengzhiju weiyuan hui" (Records of the Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CCP: Regarding the Protection of Xinjiang's Stability), Zhongguo zhongyang (1996) 7 hao wenjian (Party Central Committee, 1996, Document No. 7), 19 March 1996 (confidential document), cited in Nicolas Becquelin, op. cit., pp.87-88.

¹¹⁹³ 'Xinjiang Chairman Cautions against Ethnic Splittism', *Urumqi Xinjiang Ribao*, 21 April, 1996, op. cit., p.57.

has been successful. ...*Utmost importance in the current "serious crackdown" should be attached to violent and Mafia-type terrorist incidents organized and directed by national splittist forces. All signs indicate that national splittists collude with violent criminal elements. Their reactionary arrogance has become more inflated. Their sabotage activities have become more savage.* This has seriously threatened the safety of the people's lives and property and the social stability and the smooth progress of the modernization construction in Xinjiang.¹¹⁹⁴

From 3 to 6 May the XUAR CCP Committee held a "work conference" to discuss and implement the central government's "important instructions on preserving Xinjiang's stability"¹¹⁹⁵ - clearly a reference to the confidential document cited above. As well as reiterating the central government's assessment that the major threat to Xinjiang's stability derived from "national separatism and illegal religious activities", the conference also outlined a number of concrete measures to be implemented to combat these twin evils. The conference identified "political power" as a "key link" in ensuring Xinjiang's stability. Therefore, the immediate focus was to be on the rectification of party organisations at the lowest levels in order to negate the influence of religious forces that had infiltrated the party:

In particular, we must rectify village organizations manipulated by religious forces, and select and assign secretaries to village party branches as well as directors to village committees...Cadres with serious political, economic, and ideological problems must be promptly adjusted and replaced without tolerance to ensure that all levels of leadership will always remain in the hands of people who love the Communist Party and the socialist motherland and who safeguard the motherland's unification and nationality solidarity, and to ensure the implementation of all measures on reform, development and stability at the grass roots.¹¹⁹⁶

¹¹⁹⁴ "Xinjiang Targets 'Splittists' in Anticrime Drive", *Urumqi Xinjiang Ribao*, 1 May 1996, op. cit., pp.58-59. My emphasis.

¹¹⁹⁵ "Xinjiang Conference on Separatism, Religious Activities", *Urumqi Xinjiang Ribao* 7 May 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-100, 22 May 1996, pp. 72-74.

¹¹⁹⁶ Ibid, pp.72-73.

Such lax party discipline and organisation that had permitted the ideological deterioration of cadres and their usurpation by "religious forces" was also held responsible for the failure to correctly manage religious affairs. "Religious forces" had thus been able to exercise an influence over the implementation of state policies in such areas as judicial affairs, education and family planning. Moreover, this religious influence had also resulted in the encouragement of "splittist" activities:

There have been instances in which state regulations and policies on religion have been openly violated and in which some less knowledgeable people who are unaware of the truth and who are naïve about religion have been hoodwinked and coerced into engaging in splittist and sabotage activities.¹¹⁹⁷

Significantly, the conference also resolved to "make religion adapt to socialist society", "resolutely put a stop to illegal religious activities" and ensure that CCP members refrain from participating in religious activities.¹¹⁹⁸ In order to achieve these goals the conference decided on the implementation of three measures - the strengthening of "propaganda and education" amongst the ethnic minorities, elimination of religious influence in education and increased censorship of the "cultural and publication market".¹¹⁹⁹ A commentary on "ethnic separatism" published a day after the conference in *Xinjiang Ribao* continued to outline the authorities hard-line stance toward "illegal religious activities" and ethnic minority opposition, which was perceived to be intimately linked.¹²⁰⁰ A striking feature of this commentary was its assertion that even religious activities not defined by the state as "illegal" were in fact "allied forces of ethnic separatist forces".¹²⁰¹ Furthermore, ethnic separatism was characterised as "a

¹¹⁹⁷ Ibid, p.73.

¹¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰⁰ "Commentary on Ethnic Separatism, Religious Activities", *Urumqi Xinjiang Ribao*, 7 May 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-100, 22 May 1996, pp.74-75.

¹²⁰¹ Ibid, p.75.

reactionary political stand" and the state's struggle against it was termed "a life-and-death class struggle" in which there could be "no compromise or concession whatsoever."¹²⁰² Such a vehement denunciation of ethnic minority opposition and religious practices harked back to policies pursued during the "Anti-Rightist" campaign in 1957-58 and the Cultural Revolution whereby the "nationality issue" had been defined by Mao as being in the final analysis a "class issue". The adoption of this hard-line stance did not bode well for the region's ethnic minorities and it further illustrated the raised threat perceptions of the provincial and central governments.

The initial phase of the "Strike Hard" campaign resulted in the arrest of 1700 "criminals and pro-independence activists" and the imprisonment of a certain Abduwayiti Aihemaiti for the writing and distribution of "reactionary articles" advocating independence.¹²⁰³ The authorities also reported that they seized over 1.1 tonnes of explosives, 92 guns, 696 grams of heroin, more than 60 kilograms of marijuana and more than 7.7 million yuan (approximately US \$927 000) of "illicit money".¹²⁰⁴ Moreover, one report claimed that "several thousand separatist militants" took refuge across the Sino-Central Asian border, resulting in Chinese "warnings".¹²⁰⁵ Although most government statements during this period asserted that the "splittists" constituted a tiny minority of the population, a Uighur émigré source in Kazakhstan was reported to have claimed that there were up to twenty-seven secret pro-independence organizations

¹²⁰² Ibid.

¹²⁰³ "Results of Xinjiang Anticrime Raids Reported", *Hong Kong AFP*, 13 May 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-097, 17 May 1996, p.59 & "Xinjiang Separatist Said Jailed for 3 Years", *Hong Kong AFP*, 20 May 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-100, 22 May 1996, p.77.

¹²⁰⁴ "Xinjiang Conference Examines Crackdown Victories", *Urumqi Xinjiang Ribao*, 8 May 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-100, 22 May 1996, p. 78 & "Results of Xinjiang Anticrime Raids Reported", *Hong Kong AFP*, 13 May 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-097, 17 May 1996, p.59

¹²⁰⁵ "Xinjiang Separatist Said Jailed for 3 Years", *Hong Kong AFP*, 20 May 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-100, 22 May 1996, p.77.

with up to one million supporters in Xinjiang.¹²⁰⁶ Given the authorities zealous clampdown on ethnic minority opposition and the conflicting accounts as to the actual level and manifestation of that opposition poses a number of questions. First, were there any violent incidents of an "ethnic separatist" nature during the first half of 1996 and second, was there any evidence of external support for the separatists? On 29 April it was reported that police killed nine people "armed with guns and home-made bombs" during a violent clash in Kuqa district.¹²⁰⁷ Sometime between 12 and 21 May Mullah Urup Khaji, vice-chairman of the XUAR CPPCC committee and imam of Kashgar's famous Idkah mosque, was assassinated.¹²⁰⁸ Significantly, the leader of an Uighur émigré organisation the "United National Revolutionary Front" (UNRF) based in Almaty (Kazakhstan), Yusupbek Mukhlissi, claimed that the imam had been assassinated by "radical Uighur nationalists" due to his pro-Chinese stance.¹²⁰⁹ Moreover, the UNRF leader also claimed two other incidents occurred in July. The first, and perhaps most significant, was that a group of Uighur militants had attacked Chinese border guards, killing twenty in the Kundjerab Pass, on the Sino-Pakistani border on 4 July. The second incident concerned the arrest of "several" Uighur activists in Kuqa between 6 and 7 July.¹²¹⁰ The incident on the Sino-Pakistani border perhaps lends greater weight to contemporaneous Chinese claims about the infiltration of "weapons, splittists and reactionary pamphlets" into Xinjiang from across its western frontier.¹²¹¹

¹²⁰⁶ "Results of Xinjiang Anticrime Raids Reported", *Hong Kong AFP*, 13 May 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-097, 17 May 1996, p.59

¹²⁰⁷ "Xinjiang Forms 'Quick Reaction Forces' to Fight Separatists", *Hong Kong AFP*, 29 May 1996, FBIS-CHI-96-104, 29 May 1996, p.76.

¹²⁰⁸ "Uygur Rebels Claim More Attacks on Forces in Xinjiang", *Hong Kong AFP*, 10 July 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-139, 18 July 1996, p.65 & "Xinjiang Public Security Official on Splittism", *Urumqi Xinjiang Television Network* 1330 GMT 16 July 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-139, 18 July 1996, p.66.

¹²⁰⁹ "Uygur Rebels Claim More Attacks on Forces in Xinjiang", *Hong Kong AFP*, 10 July 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-139, 18 July 1996, p.65

¹²¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹²¹¹ "Xinjiang Forms 'Quick Reaction Forces' to Fight Separatists", *op. cit.*, p.76.

The UNRF leader also named Abdullah Kassim and Shakh Niaz as the leaders of a political movement called "Spark of the Motherland" and Ghapar Shakhjar as the leader of the movement's military arm, the "Tigers of Lop Nor".¹²¹² According to this report the UNRF claimed that although it did not receive aid from abroad, it acknowledged that "at least 100" Uighurs were fighting for the Taliban in Afghanistan.¹²¹³

Just as important to the Chinese authorities as neutralising such linkages between "separatists" within Xinjiang and external support was to eradicate "splittist" tendencies within its own structure of authority in the region. This had indeed been identified by the provincial authorities as a major facet of the "Strike Hard" campaign, with the region's CCP disciplinary committee calling for the dispensation of harsh punishments for those officials found guilty of actions "detrimental to the stability of Xinjiang".¹²¹⁴ In a case that could be seen as symptomatic of the state's dilemma in Xinjiang regarding this issue, a "local parliamentary deputy" was arrested for "engaging in illegal religious activities".¹²¹⁵ The deputy, Aisha Awazi, had appointed himself imam in Aksu in 1992 and subsequently organised a group of "120 Moslem activists who criticised Communist Party policies and denounced party officials as 'pagans'".¹²¹⁶ According to this report Awazi, although formally rebuked at the beginning of the "Strike Hard" campaign in May, continued to mobilise Muslim ire against the authorities until he was arrested in June.¹²¹⁷ It is pertinent here to recall that in the previous chapter I highlighted that by

¹²¹² "Uygur Rebels Claim More Attacks on Forces in Xinjiang", op. cit., p.65.

¹²¹³ Ibid.

¹²¹⁴ "Authorities Call for Harsh Punishment of Separatist Cadres", *Hong Kong AFP*, 27 May 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-104, 29 May 1996, pp.73-74.

¹²¹⁵ "Uygur Rebels Claim More Attacks on Forces in Xinjiang", op. cit., p.65.

¹²¹⁶ Ibid.

¹²¹⁷ Ibid.

the end of the 1980s the Chinese had begun to perceive that the relatively "liberal" policies toward ethnic minority cultural and religious practices had ultimately worked against the state's integrationist project. This was particularly the case after the unrest throughout Xinjiang in May-June 1989, and was reinforced with the eruption of the Baren incident of April 1990 in which the insurgents made an explicit call for a *jihad* against the Chinese state. After the unrest of May-June 1989 the authorities in Xinjiang began to refer in official statements to the connection between "illegal religious activities" and "separatism".¹²¹⁸ Moreover, the opening months of 1990 saw the implementation of a campaign to bring religion "to heel" in Xinjiang. The focus of this campaign was upon the closure of "illegal" mosques (ie. mosques built without official approval), halting the construction of new mosques, greater supervision of *madrassahs* (Islamic schools), and the reeducation and reform of imams.¹²¹⁹ The state's approach to the issue of "illegal religious activities" in 1996 was very much in a similar vein. In a sense there was a cycle of repression-reform-repression regarding the authorities' conception and implementation of policy toward religious and cultural practices. In the state's perception each occasion it permitted greater freedoms and expansion of limits in this sphere, it led to a resurgence in Islam's influence in the region but produced little of positive value to the state. That is to say such a "liberal" approach did not appear to generate greater support, or even acquiescence, amongst the ethnic minorities. However, when the state veered toward greater restriction and outright repression of such practices it ultimately generated widespread discontent and opposition to the state. Such a process

¹²¹⁸ See for example, "Xinjiang Prepares for Crackdown on Separatism, Leaders' View", *Hong Kong AFP*, 13 March 1990, in FBIS-CHI 90-049, 13 March 1990, p.50 & "Forum Held", *Urumqi Xinjiang Regional Service*, 10 March 1990, in FBIS-CHI 90-049, 13 March 1990, pp.50-51.

¹²¹⁹ For example see, Ahmad Lufti, "Blowback: China and the Afghan Arabs", *Issues & Studies*, Vol.37, No. 1, (January/February 2001), p.192-193, Robert MacPherson, "Traveller Reports Unrest in Xinjiang Region", *Hong Kong AFP*, 20 April 1990, in FBIS-CHI 90-077, 20 April 1990, p.52 & David Chen,

has been noted by a number of scholars and suggests that the state's policy toward religious and cultural practices, regardless of the extreme, place it in a no-win situation.¹²²⁰ Moreover, such cycles of policy, as noted by Rudelson, produce effects that work against the state's goal of integration:

The growth of Islamic tradition at the local level is extremely significant because it encourages a variety of responses to Chinese attempts at acculturation, ranging from overt resistance to outright indifference. Uyghur reactions to Islam also vary greatly according to oasis. But in the oases where Islamic culture tends to deepen the sense of separation many Uyghurs feel from Chinese society and cultural influence, Islam is reinforced. It is this relationship that the Chinese seem not to understand in their attempts to limit or control Islam. Government religious reforms were intended to quell Uyghur disaffection with Chinese rule and cause Uyghurs to develop more harmonious sentiments for the Han Chinese. However, the Chinese are caught in a dilemma: when they suppress Islam, most Uyghurs feel oppressed and oppose the government; when they allow or encourage it, Uyghurs become more content with the government but their strengthened Islamic practice leads them to feel more separate from and apathetic towards Chinese society.¹²²¹

Yet there was now a major, and significant, difference between the state's perception of the challenge or threat posed to the region's integration by the re-emergence of "illegal religious activities" from 1989-90 and 1996. As we have seen, although the Chinese authorities had often charged that ethnic minority unrest in Xinjiang was influenced or actively supported by "hostile external forces", the rhetoric of the "Strike Hard" campaign was especially strident in this regard. The limited evidence regarding external support for ethnic separatists in Xinjiang, noted above, was not the sole contributor to the state's heightened threat perceptions. A number of external developments in Russia,

"Killings Reported in Riot Suppression", *Hong Kong South China Morning Post*, 11 April 1990, in FBIS-CHI 90-070, 11 April 1990, p.48.

¹²²⁰ For example, Colin Mackerras, "Xinjiang at the turn of the century: the causes of separatism", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 20, No. 3, (2001), pp.295-297, Justin Rudelson & William Jankowiak, "Acculturation and Resistance: Xinjiang Identities in Flux", in Frederick S. Starr, (ed.), *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland*, (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2004), p.301.

¹²²¹ Justin Jon Rudelson, *Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism along China's Silk Road*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp.47-48.

Afghanistan and Central Asia between 1993 and 1996 reinforced the state's fear of ethnic separatism and "Islamic fundamentalism" in Xinjiang. Moreover, events in Russia, Afghanistan and Central Asia manifested key elements that had begun to characterise the arena of the "New Great Game" – a confluence of inter-state geopolitical competition, "pipeline politics" and transnational ethno-religious movements.

By 1996 Russia was embarking upon a second war in the secessionist republic of Chechnya that had come in part to be portrayed by Moscow as a struggle against "Islamic fundamentalism". Russia's wars in Chechnya were, however, also intimately connected to its attempts to consolidate its dominance in the Caucasus, especially through the control of existing oil/gas pipelines and the projection of its relative military power.¹²²² Russia's, and indeed other external powers, perceptions of the threat posed by an Islamic revival in Central Asia was also reinforced by the outbreak of civil war in Tajikistan in 1992. The challenge posed to the essentially ex-communist secular elite in Tajikistan by the Islamic Revival Party (IRP) resulted in a brutal and protracted conflict that lasted until 1996. During the war up to 40 000 Tajiks were killed and an estimated 600 000 fled across the Pamir mountains into northern Afghanistan.¹²²³ The leaders of the other Central Asian states and Russia perceived the brutal and destabilising nature of

¹²²² For the "pipeline politics" involved see Jerome D. Weltsch, *Turkmen Oil and Natural Gas: The Viability of Delivering Prosperity to Global Markets*, on line at <http://www.american.edu/projects/mandala/TED/TURKMEN.HTM>, for the strategic & military issues see Rajan Menon, "After Empire: Russia and the Southern 'Near Abroad'", in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.), *The New Russian Foreign Policy*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1998), pp. 66-100.

¹²²³ See Charles Fairbanks, S. Frederick Starr, C. Richard Nelson and Kenneth Weisbrode, *Strategic Assessment of Central Eurasia*, op.cit, p.41, Muriel Atkin, "Tajikistan: Reform, Reaction and Civil War", in Ian Bremmer & Ray Taras (eds.), *New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.614-621 & Barnett Rubin, "The Fragmentation of Tajikistan", *Survival*, Vol.35, No.5 (Winter 1993), pp.86-87.

the conflict to be the direct consequence of the politicisation of Islam.¹²²⁴ Moreover, these states - especially Russia and Uzbekistan - viewed the revival of Islam as a political force as a direct threat to the stability of the secular-oriented states of the region and feared the linkage of this dynamic with analogous forces emerging from the ongoing conflict in neighbouring Afghanistan.¹²²⁵ The IRP's challenge was an encompassing threat to the existing regimes of Central Asia as it rejected distinctions based on nationalism or ethnicity as a threat to Islam. Thus it advocated that "Muslim unity should be based solely on the greater community of believers, the *Ummah*".¹²²⁶ Driven by these strategic concerns Russia and Uzbekistan militarily and economically supported the ex-communist government of President Immomali Rakhmonov in its struggle with the IRP.

The geo-political competition for access to Central Eurasian sources of oil/gas also impacted significantly on the festering Afghan conflict between the fall of the ex-Soviet supported Najibullah regime in 1992 and 1996. As is well known, various foreign powers supported different parties/factions of the Afghan *mujahideen* after the Soviet retreat in 1989 and along with tribal and ethnic divisions facilitated a virulent warlordism in the country.¹²²⁷ The strategic imperatives of the various foreign powers involved most notably the US, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia on the one hand and Iran and

¹²²⁴ See for example Mehrdad Haghayeghi, *Islam and Politics in Central Asia*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp.142-148 & Muriel Atkin, "Thwarted Democratisation in Tajikistan", in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (eds.), *Conflict, Cleavage and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.277-278.

¹²²⁵ Anthony Hyman, "Russia, Central Asia and the Taliban", in William Maley (ed.), *Fundamentalism Reborn?: Afghanistan and the Taliban*, (London: Hurst & Co., 1998), pp.103-105 & M. Eshan Ahrari, "China, Pakistan and the 'Taliban Syndrome'", *Asian Survey*, Vol.40, No.4, (July/August 2000), p.667.

¹²²⁶ M. Eshan Ahrari, op. cit. , p.667.

¹²²⁷ See for example, Michael Griffin, *Reaping the Whirlwind: The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan*, (London: Pluto Press, 2001), Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia*, (London: I. B. Taurus, 2001).

Russia on the other largely dictated the recipient of their support or influence. The US to a great extent lost interest in Afghanistan after the retreat of the Soviets in 1989 and especially after the fall its client Najibullah in 1992. The travails of Turkmenistan to establish export routes for its substantial natural gas resources, independent of Russia, directly reignited US interest in Afghanistan. Turkmenistan began to make overtures to Iran (with which it shares a 1500km border) in 1993-94 regarding the possible export of Turkmen gas through Iran via the Persian Gulf port of Mashad.¹²²⁸ Moreover, an Argentine oil company, Bridas that had been granted a concession in eastern Turkmenistan near the Afghan border in 1992, persuaded the Turkmen government to float the idea of a Turkmen-Afghan-Pakistan gas pipeline with Pakistani government and a feasibility study was commenced in March 1995.¹²²⁹ Iran had, like other external powers impinging on the region, seized upon the collapse of the Soviet Union to reinvigorate historical political, economic and cultural links with Central Asia.¹²³⁰ Another major goal of Iranian foreign policy, and one that was well served by engagement with Central Asia, was to break out of its US-imposed isolation. The US since the Iranian Revolution in 1979 has considered Iran and its radical politico-religious agenda as one of the greatest threats to its strategic interests and allies in the region. Thus the last development Washington wished to see was for Iran to break out of its isolation and possibly spread its radical political agenda into oil and gas rich Central Asia.¹²³¹ With invigoration of Iranian and Pakistani competition for access to

¹²²⁸ R. Freitag-Wirringhaus, "Turkmenistan's Place in Central Asia and the World", in Mehdi Mozaffari (ed.), *Security Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States: The Southern Belt*, (London: MacMillan, 1997), pp.76-77.

¹²²⁹ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia*, op. cit., pp.158-159.

¹²³⁰ Anwar-ul-haq Ahady, "Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Conflict in Afghanistan", in William Maley (ed.), *Fundamentalism Reborn?: Afghanistan and the Taliban*, (London: Hurst & Co., 1998), p.128.

¹²³¹ Ibid & Carolyn Miles, "The Caspian Pipeline Debate Continues: Why Not Iran?", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.53, (Fall 1999).

Turkmen gas between 1992 and 1995, Washington determined to support Pakistan's imperatives in the region and thus maintain Iranian isolation. Pakistan was determined to compete for the Central Asian "prize" as it perceived that it was "losing out" to Iran and Turkey in the region and its was spending approximately US\$1.5 billion annually in energy imports.¹²³² The viability of the Turkmenistan-to-Pakistan gas pipeline of course hinged upon Pakistan's ability to ensure an open and secure transportation corridor between Pakistan and Central Asia via Kandahar and Herat.¹²³³ These considerations played a central role in Pakistan's growing support for the Taliban movement in Afghanistan that emerged in 1994 in the southern city of Kandahar.

US interest in this competition for Turkmenistan's natural gas was further heightened with the involvement of US-based oil corporation UNOCAL. UNOCAL, although originally undertaking a joint venture in Turkmenistan with Bidas in 1993, had by 1995 begun negotiations with the Turkmen government for sole access to the eastern gas fields along the Turkmen-Afghan border.¹²³⁴ From this point onwards UNOCAL, the Clinton Administration's and Niyazov's interests coincided: Niyazov needed to engage the US in the development of Turkmenistan with UNOCAL as a conduit and the Clinton Administration, if it wanted to prevent Iranian influence in Ashgabat, had to support Niyazov.¹²³⁵ The US government (particular the US State Department) from 1991 to 1995 had deliberately supported Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as the most pro-western and democratic states in the region. Simultaneously it had considered

¹²³² Ahmed Rasid, op. cit, p.159 & Micheal Griffin, op. cit., p.116.

¹²³³ Ahmed Rashid, op. cit., pp.158-160

¹²³⁴ Peter Marsden, *The Taliban: War, Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan*, (London; Zed Books, 1998), pp.139-140 & Jerome D. Weltsch, "Turkmen Oil and Natural Gas", op. cit.

¹²³⁵ Ahmed Rashid, op. cit., p.160.

the authoritarian governments of Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan and Sapuramad Niyazov in Turkmenistan as automatically ineligible for US aid. The development of common interests between Turkmenistan, the US and UNOCAL beginning in 1994/95 was no coincidence; it was part of the Clinton Administrations changing strategic interests and perception with regard to the ongoing competition for the Caspian. As outlined previously the US was concerned about Russia's ongoing interventions in Chechnya, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh and sought to prevent Russia controlling the Caspian's oil and gas riches. Furthermore, US oil companies formed a private Foreign Oil Companies group in Washington and UNOCAL immediately began to hire former Bush/Reagan and Carter Administration personnel to lobby the Clinton Administration.¹²³⁶ When UNOCAL, in partnership with Saudi Arabia's Delta Oil Company, signed a deal with Turkmenistan to build a gas pipeline to Pakistan through Afghanistan in October 1995 the US government's strategy towards Afghanistan was essentially determined by UNOCAL's agenda.¹²³⁷

The US' strategic interest in Afghanistan diminished significantly after the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989 and the US effectively abandoned Afghanistan to the machinations of its allies Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The complete failure of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan's attempts, with tacit US support, to bring mujahideen leader and Islamic hard-liner Gulbuddin Hikmetyar to power in Kabul between 1992-1994 apparently did not raise serious questions as to their allies judgement in Washington. Undeterred by repeated failures, the US once again deferred to Pakistan and Saudi

¹²³⁶ Ahmed Rashid, op.cit., p.162 & Richard Mackenzie, "The United States and the Taliban", in William Maley (ed.), *Fundamentalism Reborn?: Afghanistan and the Taliban*, (London: Hurst & Company, 1998), pp.97-98.

¹²³⁷ Ibid.

Arabia's choice of proteges in Afghanistan between 1994 and 1996.¹²³⁸ This time, however, the US approach was based upon a number of interconnected interests and strategic goals. UNOCAL and the US government's agenda was also substantially influenced by Pakistan's manoeuvres in Afghanistan. By mid-1994 Pakistan, via the ISI, was actively encouraging if not directly supporting the Taliban with the goal of opening a trade corridor across southern Afghanistan to Central Asia. Therefore Pakistan, UNOCAL and the US government's interests coincided to such an extent for each to play a role in tacitly backing the Taliban. UNOCAL's motivation was obvious, the security and viability of the pipeline could be achieved if the Taliban spread its control over southern Afghanistan. The US government also had numerous reasons to back the Taliban: (1) they thought the Taliban would aid in halting Afghanistan's burgeoning opium trade, (2) the Taliban would be a suitably anti-Iranian and anti-Russian bulwark in the region, (3) provide their ally, Pakistan, with access to Central Asia, (4) the Taliban would shut down terrorist training camps and (5) possibly unify the whole country.¹²³⁹

While the US, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan were backing the Taliban between 1994-1996 other regional states, most notably Russia, Iran, India and Uzbekistan stepped up their funding and arming of the opposing forces in the north of Ahmad Shah Massoud, Rashid Dostam and Ismail Khan.¹²⁴⁰ The emergence of the Taliban, a radical Sunni and predominantly Pashtun movement, posed an immediate threat to Shi'a Iran and threatened to ignite the Islamic revival in Central Asia. Moreover, Russia and Iran's

¹²³⁸ Ahmed Rashid, "Afghanistan: Ending the Policy Quagmire", *Journal of International Affairs*, (Spring 2001)

¹²³⁹ Richard Mackenzie, "The United States and the Taliban", op. cit., p.96 & Ahmed Rashid, "Afghanistan: Ending the Policy Quagmire", op. cit.

support of the anti-Taliban forces was not only based upon Moscow and Tehran's fear (for different reasons) of the radical Islamic movement's influence in Central Asia but the threat posed by the possibility of a trans-Afghan pipeline,

A trans-Afghan pipeline would undermine Russia's control over energy prices from Central Asia, while Iran risked seeing its eastern rival, Pakistan, regain the rapport it had enjoyed with Washington during the Cold War, this time in the defence of US energy interests.¹²⁴¹

The impact of the competition for pipelines although significant, on the Iranian and Russian response was enhanced by the historical and religious antagonisms that had developed over centuries between the various ethnic groups in Afghanistan. Iran, as a result of the 1979 Soviet invasion hosted around 3 million refugees, and from this population it crafted a Shi'a *mujahideen* party, Hizb-e-Wahdat based amongst Afghanistan's Hazara Shi'a community.¹²⁴² The Hazara, a distinct ethnic minority in Afghanistan had historically been persecuted due to their profession of Shi'a Islam and had suffered repeated attempts to subject them to the control of the generally Pashtun-dominated central government.¹²⁴³ The UNOCAL-Delta agreement with Turkmenistan and Pakistan in October 1995, coupled with the Taliban's capture of Herat a month before, only served to reinforce Tehran's perception that the *jihad*-era anti-Iranian alignment of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the US had been regenerated with the Taliban as their proxy in Afghanistan.¹²⁴⁴ The Russian, Iranian and Uzbek perception of the US' qualified backing of the Taliban was also confirmed in the eyes of Moscow-Tehran by US State Department and UNOCAL statements when the Taliban captured Kabul in September 1996. The US State Department, within hours of Kabul's fall to the Taliban,

¹²⁴⁰ Michael Griffin, *Reaping the Whirlwind*, op. cit., p.126

¹²⁴¹ Ibid.

¹²⁴² Adam Garfinkle, "Afghanstanding", *Orbis*, Vol.43, No.3, (Summer 1999), p.407.

¹²⁴³ Asta Olesen, *Islam and Politics in Afghanistan*, (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1995), p.54.

¹²⁴⁴ Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady, "Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Conflict in Afghanistan", op. cit., pp.127-128.

made statements that it would establish diplomatic relations with the Taliban and that the US found “nothing objectionable” about its attempts to impose Sharia law.¹²⁴⁵ UNOCAL for their part issued a statement that in their view the Taliban’s capture of the capital was a “positive development” and also spoke with enthusiasm about the prospects of doing business with them.¹²⁴⁶ Meanwhile Russia, Iran, India and Uzbekistan increased their military aid to the Tajik commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, the Uzbek General Rashid Dostum and the Hazara Hizb-e-Wahdat militia¹²⁴⁷

The fall of Kabul to the Taliban in September 1996 compounded the fears of Russia, the Central Asian republics and China regarding the possible spread of extremism and "Islamic fundamentalism" into Central Asia.¹²⁴⁸ China's response to such perceived external threats was, as we have seen, based on efforts to reassert state control over ethnic minority cultural and religious practices under the rubric of the "Strike Hard" campaign. From the initiation of the "Strike Hard" campaign in March 1996 to the beginning of 1997 the authorities arrested 2 773 "terrorist" suspects and seized 6 000 pounds of explosives and 31 000 rounds of ammunition.¹²⁴⁹ Émigré Uighur groups, however, claimed that this phase of the "Strike Hard" campaign resulted in the arrest of 57 000 Uighurs.¹²⁵⁰ This zero-tolerance approach was allied to a further emphasis on state's economic development strategies for Xinjiang. Just months after the initiation of

¹²⁴⁵ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia*, op. cit., p.167.

¹²⁴⁶ Ibid & Richard Mackenzie, “The United States and the Taliban”, op. cit., p.97.

¹²⁴⁷ Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady, “Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Conflict in Afghanistan”, op. cit., p.131.

¹²⁴⁸ Dewardric L. McNeal, *China's Relations with Central Asian States and Problems with Terrorism*, (U.S. Department of State, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, December 17, 2001) available online at <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/7945.pdf>, p.2.

¹²⁴⁹ Dru C. Gladney, "Responses to Chinese Rule: Patterns of Cooperation and Opposition", in S. Frederick Starr, *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland*, (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2004), p. 379.

¹²⁵⁰ "Declaration of Protest Against Policies of the Government of the People's Republic of China in Eastern Turkistan", *Eastern Turkistan Information Center*, (15 February 1997) online at <http://www.geocities.com/capitolHill/1730/us1.html>

the "Strike Hard" campaign, for example, the provincial government announced that the state would invest RMB 37.4 billion in various infrastructure and construction projects in the region over the course of the 9th Five-Year Plan (1996-2000).¹²⁵¹ These projects included the completion of the Urumqi Petrochemical Plant, the Turpan-Urumqi-Dahuangshan highway, the extension of the railway from Kuqa to Kasghar, further land reclamation and irrigation projects.¹²⁵² Be that as it may, much of the ethnic minority population continued to perceive these projects, and the state's economic development strategy more generally, as inequitably benefiting the Han population of the region. As we have seen, the state's "cotton strategy" for example was primarily a political project rather than an economic one, designed to promote further Han in-migration and integration with China proper. Ethnic minority sentiment toward the state was hardly improved by the implementation of a series of measures to limit the influence of Islam on ethnic minority society that followed in the wake of the "Strike Hard" campaign. These included the "rectification" of "religious personages" in the major urban mosques who were state employees, an increased emphasis on "nationalities unity and socialist education", closure of unapproved *madrassahs* and restriction of religious observance to those 18 years of age and over.¹²⁵³ The extent of the state's efforts in this respect was illustrated by the its clampdown on Uighur *mäshräp* or traditional cultural meetings.¹²⁵⁴ According to a number of sources *mäshräp* meetings often took the form of

¹²⁵¹ "Xinjiang to Launch Infrastructure, Construction Projects", *Beijing Zhongguo Xinwen She*, 1 July 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-139, 18 July 1996, p.78.

¹²⁵² Ibid.

¹²⁵³ Colin Mackerras, "Ethnicity in China: The Case of Xinjiang", *Harvard Asian Quarterly*, Vol.8, No.1 (Winter 2004), p.9.

¹²⁵⁴ Ibid & Justin Rudelson and William Jankowiak, "Acculturation and Resistance", op. cit., p.317.

"community youth advocacy groups" that were an informal mechanism through which local communities discussed contemporary societal problems such as alcohol abuse.¹²⁵⁵

These policies played a central role in contributing to a further outbreak of unrest amongst Xinjiang's ethnic minorities in 1997. February 1997 witnessed the largest incidence of unrest since the Baren incident in April 1990. On this occasion, however, the centre of unrest was in the north-west of Xinjiang, particularly in the city of Kulja (known to Chinese as Yining).¹²⁵⁶ The unrest in Kulja occurred between 2 and 12 February and saw a number of days of rioting, the deaths of up to 120 people and the arrest of over 2000 people.¹²⁵⁷ The authorities had apparently stepped up police presence in the city for the holy month of Ramadan in order to maintain a watchful eye on "illegal religious activities". According to a number of observers the unrest was sparked by a police raid on a *mäshräp* meeting at a Kulja mosque on 5 February, where a number of "talibs"(religious students) were arrested.¹²⁵⁸ A confrontation then took place between police and demonstrators seeking the release of the arrested students that deteriorated into a riot that lasted for a number of days. According to Amnesty International's April 1999 Country Report:

By 6 February, a large number of anti-riot squads and troops had been brought into the city. They reportedly went through the streets arresting and beating people, including children. In some areas, protesters reportedly attacked police or Chinese residents and shops and set fire to some vehicles,

¹²⁵⁵ Justin Rudelson and William Jankowiak, "Acculturation and Resistance", op. cit., p.317 & Scott Fogden, "Writing Insecurity: The PRC's Push to Modernize China and the Politics of Uighur Identity", op. cit., p.60.

¹²⁵⁶ Colin Mackerras, "Xinjiang at the turn of the century", op. cit., p.291.

¹²⁵⁷ Dru C. Gladney, "Responses to Chinese Rule", op. cit., p.379 & Scott Fogden, "Writing Insecurity", op. cit., p.60.

¹²⁵⁸ Dru C. Gladney, "Responses to Chinese Rule", op. cit., p.379, Scott Fogden, "Writing Insecurity", op. cit., p.60, & "Declaration of Protest Against Policies of the Government of the People's Republic of China in Eastern Turkistan", *Eastern Turkistan Information Center*, (15 February 1997), On line at <http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/1730/usl.html>.

while the security forces reportedly opened fire on protesters and bystanders.¹²⁵⁹

Émigré Uighur sources, however, claimed that in the two days of rioting 400 Uighurs were killed and soon thereafter a 30 000 strong PLA combat unit was dispatched to Kulja to enforce a strict curfew.¹²⁶⁰ Although this unrest in Kulja was suppressed by the authorities further violent incidents took place in its wake, including a report that a train had been bombed and derailed on 12 February that the government claimed was the work of the "United National Revolutionary Front" (UNRF) based in Kazakhstan.¹²⁶¹ On 25 February, as memorial services were being held for Deng Xiaoping across the PRC, three buses in Urumqi were bombed killing nine and injuring seventy-four people.¹²⁶² This was followed by the bombing of two buses in Beijing on 7 March and the explosion of a further bomb in a Beijing park on 13 May that were blamed on Uighur separatists.¹²⁶³ Subsequently, three Uighurs were executed in April, eight on 29 May and a further nine on 27 July all for alleged involvement in this series of bombings in Xinjiang and Beijing.¹²⁶⁴ Finally, in June it was reported that five Uighurs were executed after hanging the banned flag of the "East Turkestan Republic" from the statue of Mao Zedong in Kashgar's main square.¹²⁶⁵

¹²⁵⁹ *Amnesty International 1999 Country Report: "People's Republic of China: Gross Violations of Human Rights in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region"*, online at <http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engASA170181999>

¹²⁶⁰ "Yining (Kulja) massacre, an eyewitness record", *Eastern Turkistan Information Network*, (March 9, 1997), online at <http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/1730/usl.html>.

¹²⁶¹ Dru C. Gladney, "Responses to Chinese Rule", op. cit., p.379.

¹²⁶² See Colin Mackerras, "Xinjiang at the turn of the century", op. cit., p.291, Dru C. Gladney, "Rumblings from the Uyghur", *Current History*, (September 1997), p.287 & Judstin Rudelson and William Jankowiak, "Acculturation and Resistance", op. cit., p.317.

¹²⁶³ Dru C. Galdney, "Rumblings from the Uyghur", op. cit., p.287 & Riz Khan, "China's policy of tolerance questioned in Xinjiang", (November 16, 1997), *CNN Interactive* online at <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9711/16/china.unrest/>

¹²⁶⁴ Dru C. Gladney, "Rumblings from the Uyghur", op.cit., p.287.

¹²⁶⁵ Riz Khan, "China's policy of tolerance questioned in Xinjiang", op. cit.

Although the authorities blamed this spate of separatist activity on collusion between internal and external "splittist" forces no Uighur organisation, within or outside of China, took responsibility for these actions.¹²⁶⁶ This did not necessarily imply, however, that no linkages existed between such internal manifestations of ethnic minority opposition and external influences or forces in neighbouring regions of Central Asia. Moreover, the lack of an organised centre of resistance perhaps reflected the multiplicity of external influences bearing on Xinjiang and the divergent goals of the various Uighur organisations. The aforementioned UNRF, for example, had advocated "peaceful resistance" to Chinese rule but disavowed this policy in March 1997 and issued a declaration stating that they would be "taking up arms" against "Chinese oppression".¹²⁶⁷ The Chinese perhaps feared more the infiltration of Islamic political movements from Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan that have been variously characterised as "jihadist".¹²⁶⁸ Of particular concern to the Chinese were the Pakistan-based groups such as *Jamaat-e-Islami* and *Tableeghi Jamaat* that had developed an influence in the neighbouring Central Asian states of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.¹²⁶⁹ Both of these organisations were explicitly militant and missionary in terms of their political agendas, encouraging the observance of Islamic "orthodoxy" and advocating that Muslim's undertake *jihad*, especially if ruled by a non-Muslim state.¹²⁷⁰ The threat implicit in this agenda for such a secular-oriented regime as China was clear

¹²⁶⁶ Justin Rudelson & William Jankowiak, op. cit., p.317.

¹²⁶⁷ Dewardric L. McNeal, *China's Relations with Central Asian States and Problems with Terrorism*, op. cit., p.8.

¹²⁶⁸ M. Eshan Ahrari, "China, Pakistan and the 'Taliban Syndrome'", *Asian Survey*, Vol.40, No.4, (July/August 2000), pp.666-668 & M. Eshan Ahrari, *Jihadi Groups, Nuclear Pakistan and the New Great Game*, Strategic Studies Institute(SSI), (August 2001), online at <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/welcome.htm>, p.31.

¹²⁶⁹ M. Eshan Ahrari, *Jihadi Groups, Nuclear Pakistan and the New Great Game*, p.16 & Dewardric L. McNeal, *China's Relations with Central Asian States and Problems with Terrorism*, op. cit., p.10.

¹²⁷⁰ M. Eshan Ahrari, *Jihadi Groups, Nuclear Pakistan and the New Great Game*, op. cit., pp.1-2 & M. Eshan Ahrari, "China, Pakistan and the 'Taliban Syndrome'", op. cit., pp.658-659.

and made even more salient by the existence of linkages between Xinjiang and Pakistan. The opening of the Karakoram Highway to trade between Xinjiang and Pakistan in the late 1980s had facilitated the generation of cultural flows that worked against the state's integrationist project in the region.¹²⁷¹ Pakistani traders played a role in generating an Islamic revival in Xinjiang by providing a link for Xinjiang's Muslims to the wider Islamic world:

Pakistani traders in Xinjiang, especially during the early years of the cross-border trade in the late 1980s and early 1990s, often saw it as their duty to provide information about Islam to the local Muslims. For this reason, included among the goods they brought to Xinjiang were women's veils, jewelry with Muslim symbols, posters of Muslim holy sites, copies of the Qur'an, and so on. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, such items found markets in Xinjiang's shops, stands adjoining mosques and bazaars. Women began wearing veils in areas of southern Xinjiang where nineteenth-century travellers had once remarked on the absence of veils, religious schools were established throughout the region, and many young aspiring imams went to Pakistan to study.¹²⁷²

A significant impact was also made on those Xinjiang Muslims travelling to Pakistan for trade or, as the source cited above noted, for education who returned with a greater knowledge of the political trends or dynamics developing in the wider Islamic world. Significantly, the effects of such linkages were felt more in the major southern cities of Kashgar and Khotan than in northern Xinjiang.¹²⁷³ These linkages were to a large degree the result of the state's relatively more tolerant approach to religion in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the extension of the "reform and opening" economic policies to Xinjiang. In fact, as noted in the previous chapter, the state had encouraged Xinjiang Muslims to develop links and relations with Muslims in Central Asia and Pakistan in

¹²⁷¹ Sean R. Roberts, "A 'Land of Borderlands': Implications of Xinjiang's Trans-border Interactions", in S. Frederick Starr (ed.), *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland*, (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2004), p.226.

¹²⁷² Ibid.

¹²⁷³ Ibid, pp.226-227.

order to facilitate greater trade benefits for the region. This was encouraged by the relaxation of travel restrictions and controls over religion in Xinjiang, which included state approval for the education of Xinjiang mullahs and imams in foreign *madrassahs*. Moreover, due to Pakistan's geographic proximity many of these religious students went to Pakistani *madrassahs*, some of which were run by such "jihadist" organisations as *Jamaat-i-Islami* and *Tableegh Jamaat*.¹²⁷⁴ According to Indian intelligence gathered from captured Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) personnel in Kashmir, the Pakistani military had trained Uighurs in camps near Mirpur across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) from India. Moreover, Pakistani groups such as *Jamaat-i-Islami* and *Tableegh Jamaat* were also reportedly involved in training Uighurs in camps in Baluchistan Province and actively supported Uighur militants in southern Xinjiang from the Al-Badr camp at Ooji on the Afghan-Pakistani border.¹²⁷⁵

The measures implemented by the authorities in Xinjiang following the various incidents of ethnic minority opposition between February and June 1997 clearly reflected the state's desire to negate such trans-national linkages and firmly re-establish state control over religion in Xinjiang. It was reported, for example, that in August 1997 the Chinese erected a fence along its 750-kilometre border with Pakistan in order to reduce the possibility of external assistance to Uighur militants in Xinjiang.¹²⁷⁶ Furthermore, China aired its concerns with the Pakistani government regarding what it perceived as linkages between Uighur separatists and Pakistani based "jihadist"

¹²⁷⁴ Ibid & M. Eshan Ahrari, "China, Pakistan and the 'Taliban Syndrome'", op. cit.,

¹²⁷⁵ Yitzhak Shichor, "The Great Wall of Steel: Military & Strategy in Xinjiang", in S. Frederick Starr, (ed.), *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderlands*, (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2004), pp.144-145.

¹²⁷⁶ Mark Burles, *Chinese Policy Toward Russia and the Central Asian Republics*, op. cit., p.18 & Yitzhak Shichor, op. cit., p. 145.

organisations.¹²⁷⁷ The authorities also began from mid-1997 onward to place greater restrictions on travel, particularly to Pakistan and Central Asia, with a focus on halting the education of Xinjiang Muslims in foreign *madrassahs*.¹²⁷⁸ Chinese authorities also suspected that some of the Chinese-made weapons and explosives used by separatists in Xinjiang had arrived via a circuitous China-Pakistan-Afghanistan-Xinjiang route.¹²⁷⁹ Within Xinjiang the authorities once more focused on a clampdown on "illegal religious activities" and the "rectification and re-education" of cadres and Muslim clergy.¹²⁸⁰ This process involved the closure of mosques and "Koranic" schools, the disciplining of religious leaders perceived to be too "independent" or "subversive" and a general discrimination against the practice of religion.¹²⁸¹ An example of the general policy to discourage ethnic minorities from observance of religious practices is the occurrence of Muslim state employees being offered meals during the days of Ramadan, when observant Muslims fast from sunrise to sunset.¹²⁸² Significantly, according to Amnesty International many state officials and employees were either arrested, demoted or sacked due to participation in or connection to "illegal religious activities" including nineteen village mayors and thirty-five CCP village and township leaders.¹²⁸³ Another reason for the emphasis upon the "rectification" or party and state officials in Xinjiang may have stemmed from the central government's renewed fears of growing regionalism within the provincial government. According to one report the March 1997 National People's Congress (NPC) session was dominated by issues concerning the relationship

¹²⁷⁷ Ahmad Faruqi, "China-Pakistan: Fraying Ties?", *Far Eastern Economic Review* (hereafter *FEER*) (January 18, 2001), online at <http://www.feer.com>

¹²⁷⁸ Sean R. Roberts, *op. cit.*, p.227 & Yitzhak Shichor, *op. cit.*, p.145.

¹²⁷⁹ Yitzhak Shichor, *op. cit.*, p.144.

¹²⁸⁰ Scott Fogden, *op. cit.*, p.66.

¹²⁸¹ Amnesty International 1999 Country Report: "People's Republic of China", *op. cit.*, pp.10-11.

¹²⁸² Graham E. Fuller & Jonathan N. Lipman, "Islam in Xinjiang", *op. cit.*, pp.337-338.

¹²⁸³ Amnesty International, 1999 *Country Report: "People's Republic of China"*, *op. cit.*, pp.10-11.

between the centre and the regions.¹²⁸⁴ Representatives from Xinjiang reportedly made proposals demanding more autonomy for Xinjiang, citing the example of Beijing's plans for Hong Kong, claiming that only greater autonomy could achieve the central government's cherished goal of "stability" in Xinjiang.¹²⁸⁵ Moreover, regional cadres demanded that ethnic minorities be appointed heads of CCP committees.¹²⁸⁶ As we have seen in earlier chapters, the heads of party committees and regional party secretaries had with few exceptions remained in Han hands since the establishment of the XUAR in 1955.

Such demands, coming hot on the heels of the major unrest just a month previously, could not have been received well in Beijing. The central government's response to this resurgence in ethnic minority opposition and the regionalist rumblings from within the provincial government was, as we have seen, based upon two central principles that reflected the state's contradictory conception of the relationship between economic development and social stability. The first response of the state to manifestations of ethnic minority opposition was simply to implement a program of explicitly coercive tactics under the guise of the "Strike Hard" campaign. The second, however, focused on intensifying the region's economic development through further state investment in construction and infrastructure projects, and subsidies for key industries (such as petrochemicals and cotton). The rationale behind this course of action had been elucidated a number of times by both the central and provincial governments - only continued social "stability" would guarantee Xinjiang's economic development and

¹²⁸⁴ Willy Wo-lap Lam, "Warlords Make Their Play", *South China Morning Post*, (hereafter *SCMP*) (Wednesday March 19, 1997), online at <http://www.scmp.com>

¹²⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁸⁶ Ibid.

economic development in turn would guarantee "stability".¹²⁸⁷ The authorities, it would seem, were blind to (or unwilling to see) the fact that its emphasis on maintaining social stability and the means by which it attempted to achieve this were often major factors in contributing to ethnic minority opposition, thus jeopardising the goal of economic development. Furthermore, as demonstrated earlier, the major facets of the state's economic development strategy produced effects that were at odds with the stated goal of ensuring increased living standards for the region's population, the purpose of which was to generate ethnic minority support for the state's integrationist project.

This "carrot and stick" approach had also oscillated since 1978, in terms of the intensity and proportion of coercion to persuasion that was evident in the state's techniques and tactics of rule. Although this latest episode of unrest inevitably resulted in an oscillation toward the state's coercive capabilities, a slight re-orientation of strategy could be discerned after the initial onslaught of the "Strike Hard" campaign. The authorities, although having almost reflexively fallen back upon the full repertoire of coercive measures available, simultaneously pressed on with the basic elements of its economic development strategy. The central government's willingness to underpin the economic development of Xinjiang can be seen in the amount of state investment poured into the region between 1992 and 1997. Over this five-year period the central government injected approximately 170.8 billion yuan into major construction and infrastructure projects in the region alone.¹²⁸⁸ Moreover, between 1990 and 1998 the provincial

¹²⁸⁷ See for example "Wang Enmao Addresses 16th Xinjiang Party Session", *Urumqi Xinjiang Ribao* in FBIS-CHI-91-050 14 March 1991, pp.55-63. & "Xinjiang Chairman Cautions Against Ethnic Splittism", *Urumqi Xinjiang Ribao*, 21 April 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-097, 17 May 1996, p.57.

¹²⁸⁸ Mark O'Neill, "Pressure Rises in Xinjiang's Melting Pot", *SCMP*, (Saturday May 23, 1998), online at <http://www.scmp.com>.

government's revenue tripled to 6.54 billion yuan while its expenditures over the corresponding period amounted to 14.6 billion yuan.¹²⁸⁹ The central government, perhaps prompted by the unrest and the demands of regional leaders, also apparently began to recognise that its economic development strategy had exacerbated regional and ethnic disparities in Xinjiang. Significantly, of the 1.43 million people living in impoverished conditions in Xinjiang in 1997 the majority resided in the predominantly ethnic minority populated south.¹²⁹⁰ It thus stepped up poverty alleviation programs in the region, with the 9th Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) having set aside 3.5 billion yuan for the provincial government's efforts in this field.¹²⁹¹

Similarly, the strategy to economically integrate Xinjiang with Central Asia was also reaffirmed, despite the perception that the establishment of linkages with Central Asia had facilitated politico-cultural flows that reinforced ethnic minorities' notions of "separateness" from the Han-dominated state.¹²⁹² That is to say the state viewed the continued development of economic linkages between Xinjiang and Central Asia as contributing to its goals of generating economic development and ethnic minority support for continued Chinese rule in Xinjiang. The state's efforts in this respect were somewhat mixed due to a combination of internal and external factors. The total value of Sino-Central Asia trade was \$US772 million in 1997 representing only 3.4 per cent of Central Asia's total trade, with Sino-Kazakh trade, standing at \$US489 million,

¹²⁸⁹ Nicolas Becquelin, *op. cit.*, pp.71-72.

¹²⁹⁰ Yueyao Zhao, "Pivot or Periphery? Xinjiang's Regional Development", *Asian Ethnicity*, Vol. 2, No.2, (September 2001), p.217.

¹²⁹¹ *Ibid.*

¹²⁹² Dru C. Gladney, "The Chinese Program of Development and Control, 1978-2001", in S. Frederick Starr (ed.), *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland*, (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2004), p.114.

accounting for over half.¹²⁹³ This was, according to a number of scholars, below the full potential of Sino-Central Asia trade due to the lack of coherent and stable customs policies, particularly in Kazakhstan, rather than a lack of political will.¹²⁹⁴ Moreover, the reorientation of the five Central Asian republics toward China (through Xinjiang) was counteracted by the fact that these states remained tied closely to Russia (especially in infrastructural terms) and the competing economic opportunities present to the south and west of the region (Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and Afghanistan).¹²⁹⁵ The dominant position of Sino-Kazakh trade within the overall Sino-Central Asian trade relationship was determined by a long shared border, more developed infrastructural links with Xinjiang's more developed Zhungar Basin, and Kazakhstan's rich oil and gas resources.¹²⁹⁶ Xinjiang's open cities and border ports in the north-western corner close to the Sino-Kazakh border, such as Kulja (Yining), Bole, and Tacheng were served by good quality transport corridors.¹²⁹⁷ China's linkages with the other two Central Asian states with which it shared common borders - Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan - were in contrast far less developed. Sino-Kyrgyz trade in 1997, for example, stood at \$US64 million and was generally inhibited by poor infrastructural links to Xinjiang's less developed southern Tarim Basin.¹²⁹⁸ Thus a major goal of the central government's investment in Xinjiang was to extend existing infrastructure to facilitate the flow of

¹²⁹³ Philip H. Loughlin & Clifton W. Pannell, "Growing Economic Links and Regional Development in the Central Asian Republics and Xinjiang, China", *Post-Soviet Geography & Economics*, Vol.42, No. 7, (2001), p.482.

¹²⁹⁴ Ibid & Calla Weimer, "The Economy of Xinjiang", in S. Frederick Starr (ed.), *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland*, (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2004), pp. 181-188.

¹²⁹⁵ Philip H. Loughlin & Clifton W. Pannell, op. cit., pp.485-486.

¹²⁹⁶ Ibid & Clifton W. Pannell and Laurence J. C. Ma, "Urban Transition and Interstate Relations in a Dynamic Post-Soviet Borderland: The Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of China", *Post-Soviet Geography & Economics*, Vol.38, No. 4, (1997), pp.222-224.

¹²⁹⁷ Yueyao Zhao, "Pivot or Periphery?", op. cit., p.216 & Philip C. Loughlin and Clifton W. Pannell, op. cit., pp.485-487.

¹²⁹⁸ Philip C. Loughlin and Clifton W. Pannell, op. cit., pp.485-487.

Sino-Central Asian trade. It should also be noted that Sino-Central Asian trade had suffered over the 1992-1997 period due to internal crises within a number of the Central Asian republics. These included the protracted civil war in Tajikistan and recurring financial and inflation crises in China's major Central Asian trading partners, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.¹²⁹⁹

The establishment of Chinese political and economic influence in Central Asia was also seen to be conducive to the strengthening of China's position in Xinjiang and its wider strategic interests. One of the key strategic imperatives behind China's drive to integrate Xinjiang with Central Asia stemmed from its growing energy needs. As noted previously, China had re-oriented its energy strategy toward Russia and Central Asia in order to diminish its dependency on Middle East sources. The pre-eminent focus of this attention concerned ensuring access to Kazakh oil and gas due to its geographic proximity and potential flow on benefits for Xinjiang's economy. In 1996 China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) together with Exxon and Mitsubishi completed a feasibility study regarding the construction of a pipeline to connect Turkmenistan's gas fields with China. The projected US\$12 billion construction cost and security risks entailed, however, resulted in little progress.¹³⁰⁰ China's enthusiasm for this ultimately unfeasible project, simultaneous with growing US interest in the energy resources of the Caspian, demonstrated that political and strategic imperatives overrode purely economic concerns in driving China's energy strategy.¹³⁰¹ This political

¹²⁹⁹ Ibid, pp.472-474.

¹³⁰⁰ Philip Andrews-Speed, Xuanli Liao & Roland Dannruther, *The Strategic Implications of China's Energy Needs*, (International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford University Press, July 2002), p.58.

¹³⁰¹ See, Ibid, Martha Brill Olcott, "Pipelines and Pipe Dreams: Energy Development and Caspian Society", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 53, No. 1, (Fall 1999), pp.305-324, "Hopes of an Uighur Homeland Fade", *SCMP*, (Monday June 21, 1999), online at <http://www.scmp.com> & Ariel Cohen,

calculus was further demonstrated in 1997 when CNPC won the right to develop two oil fields in Aqtöbe and an oil field in Uzen (both in Kazakhstan), outbidding such competitors as Amoco and Texaco by pledging to invest \$US 4.3 billion over twenty years.¹³⁰² Moreover, this was part of a broader \$US9.5 billion Sino-Kazakh investment package which included a Chinese commitment to construct a 3000km pipeline between Kazakhstan and eastern China.¹³⁰³ China's strategy in Central Asia was also further bolstered in 1997 by the conclusion of a second "Shanghai Five" agreement on "Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in Border Areas" and undertakings to establish annual forum meetings.¹³⁰⁴

The intensification of China's internal and external strategies to secure Xinjiang did not, however, appear to reduce the incidence of ethnic minority opposition in the following years. Throughout late 1997 and 1998 violence was reported to be widespread in the region including assassinations of government officials, bomb blasts in some cities of the Tarim Basin and an attack in August 1998 on a military base by the "East Turkestan People's Liberation Front".¹³⁰⁵ In the same year it was also reported that in two separate incidents in Kulja (Yining) up to four police and paramilitary personnel were killed attempting to arrest "terrorists".¹³⁰⁶ Moreover, in May 1998 Zhang Zhou, a vice-

"China's Quest for Eurasia's Natural Resources", *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst* (February 26, 2003), online at http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=1103.

¹³⁰² Philip Andrews-Speed, Xuanli Liao & Roland Dannruther, *op. cit.*, p.59.

¹³⁰³ Claes Levinsson & Ingvar Svanberg, "Kazakhstan-China Border Trade Thrives After Demarcation Treaty", *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, (February 16, 2000), online at http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=194.

¹³⁰⁴ Robert M. Cutler, "Did Putin Shanghai Bush?", *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, (July 4, 2001), online at http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=87.

¹³⁰⁵ Dru C. Gladney, "Responses to Chinese Rule", *op. cit.*, p.380 & Scott Fogden, "Writing Insecurity", *op. cit.*, p.60.

¹³⁰⁶ Susan V. Lawrence, "Where Beijing Fears Kosovo", *FEER*, (September 7, 2000), online at <http://www.feer.com>

chairman of the XUAR, admitted that the region had been plagued by violence and explicitly placed the blame on "separatists" and external forces:

They have killed Han, they have killed their own people, they have killed the highest clergy, because they supported the Communist Party. The terrorists use weapons that they make themselves or are smuggled from abroad...We cannot say that we have solved the problem. They are using real guns and bullets and threaten social stability.¹³⁰⁷

The vice-chairman's comment that the authorities had not solved the problem appeared to be an accurate assessment with more violent incidents occurring throughout the remainder of 1998 and into 1999. According to a government report regarding "East Turkistan Terrorists" (released in 2002), there were eight major violent "separatist" related incidents between January 1998 and October 1999.¹³⁰⁸ These included the assassination of an imam, Abliz Haji in Yecheng county, six explosions in Yecheng County (in the Kashgar Prefecture) between 22 February and 30 March, attacks in April 1998 on the home of the director of the Yecheng Public Security Bureau, and an attack on a police station in Saili township.¹³⁰⁹

The authorities responded to these incidents by implementing another "Strike Hard" campaign between 1997 and 1999 which, according to Amnesty International, resulted in the execution of 210 Uighurs but did little to stem ethnic minority opposition to Chinese rule.¹³¹⁰ As with the preceding 1996 "Strike Hard" campaign a crackdown on "illegal religious activities" was a key focus of the authorities efforts throughout this

¹³⁰⁷ Mark O'Niell, "Pressure Rises in Xinjiang's Melting Pot", *SCMP*, (May 23, 1998), online at <http://www.scmp.com>

¹³⁰⁸ "East Turkistan Terrorists Exposed", *China Daily*, (21 January, 2002), online at <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn>.

¹³⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹³¹⁰ Justin Rudelson and William Jankowiak, "Acculturation and Resistance", op. cit., p.317, Susan V. Lawrence, "Where Beijing Fears Kosovo", op. cit., & Antoine Blua, "Kyrgyz Rights Activists Call for an

period. This Chinese focus on religion as a *source* of ethnic minority opposition, according to a number of scholars, back-fired to a degree and strengthened particularly Uighur identification of Islamic practice as an intrinsic marker of Uighur identity and "separateness" from China.¹³¹¹ Moreover, these scholars argue that ethnic identity is relational and contextual in that "ethnic distinctions cannot exist within a vacuum of contact and information, but rather entail social processes of exclusion and incorporation embodied in the construction and maintenance of ethnic boundaries".¹³¹² Thus a major factor in the strengthening of Uighur identity (of which Islam is assumed to be a key component) throughout the 1990s stemmed from the integrationist techniques and tactics of rule employed by the state. Of particular import in this respect was the state's indirect encouragement of Han in-migration to Xinjiang. It is perhaps not coincidental that ethnic minority unrest increased in the 1990s as the Han population rose from 5.7 million in 1990 to 6.6 million in 1997.¹³¹³ Thus Smith argues that the traditional regional/oasis identities and rivalries in Xinjiang have been neutralised by an encompassing "religio-cultural and socio-economic threat: Xinjiang's Han Chinese immigrant population".¹³¹⁴ The state's policies in Xinjiang can in part be seen as generating the very thing that it feared the most - the strengthening of ethnic minority feelings of "separateness" from the Chinese state and society:

End to Deportation of Uighurs to China", *Eurasianet*, (1 January, 2004), online at <http://www.eurasianet.org>

¹³¹¹ For example, Justin Rudelson, "Uyghur 'Separatism': China's Policies in Xinjiang Fuel Dissent", *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, (February 16, 2000), online at http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=191, Graham E. Fuller and Jonathan N. Lipman, "Islam in Xinjiang", *op. cit.*, pp.338-339, Joanne N. Smith, "'Making Culture Matter': Symbolic, Spatial and Social Boundaries between Uyghurs and Han Chinese", *Asian Ethnicity*, Vol.3, No. 2 (September 2002), pp.153-174.

¹³¹² Joanne N. Smith, "'Making Culture Matter': Symbolic, Spatial and Social Boundaries between Uyghurs and Han Chinese", *op. cit.*, p.155.

¹³¹³ These are official government figures, cited in Colin Mackerras, "Xinjiang at the turn of the century", *op. cit.*, p.293.

¹³¹⁴ Joanne N. Smith, *op. cit.*, p.156.

To meet this challenge, they aim to strengthen their own national identity by emphasizing those ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and religious characteristics that distinguish them from the Han Chinese. Mosque attendance on Friday, for example, is consciously recognized as a means of reinforcing the distinctiveness of the Uyghur community from the dominant Han population and Chinese state.¹³¹⁵

Simultaneously, however, external dynamics in Central Asia and Afghanistan reinforced the state's negative perception of Islam's influence on society.

The geopolitical competition and cooperation amongst the Central Asian states, Russia, China, Iran and the US for Central Asia's oil and gas, as previously noted, developed simultaneously with the emergence of cross-border phenomena of weapons and drugs trafficking, and Islamic insurgency. The epicentre of these phenomena was Afghanistan which had, since the Taliban's capture of Kabul in 1996 and subsequent offensive against the Northern Alliance the following year, become a haven for political opponents of the regions' secular (and often authoritarian) regimes.¹³¹⁶ By 1997 the regimes of the Central Asian presidents Islam Karimov (Uzbekistan), Sapuramat Niyazov (Turkmenistan), Immomali Rahkmonov (Tajikistan), Askar Akaev (Kyrgyzstan) and Nursultan Nazarbayev (Kazakhstan) had systematically silenced secular and moderate political opposition.¹³¹⁷ The generally parlous socio-economic conditions in the region combined with this political climate to create conditions

¹³¹⁵ Graham E. Fuller and Jonathan N. Lipman, "Islam in Xinjiang", op. cit., p.339.

¹³¹⁶ See Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia*, (London: Pluto Press, 2001)

¹³¹⁷ See for example, Muriel Atkin, "Thwarted Democratization in Tajikistan", in Karen Dawisha & Bruce Parrott (eds.), *Conflict, Cleavage and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 277-311, William Fierman, "Political Development in Uzbekistan: Democratization?", in Karen Dawisha & Bruce Parrott (eds.), *Conflict, Cleavage and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.379-381, Gregory Gleason, *The Central Asian States: Discovering Independence*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), pp.85-91, Michael Ochs, "Turkmenistan: The Quest for Stability and Control", in Karen Dawisha & Bruce Parrott (eds.), *Conflict, Cleavage and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 312-359.

conducive to the spread of radical or “fundamentalist” Islamic movements. By the late 1990s living standards throughout the region remained below pre-1991 levels, with the majority of the population living in relative poverty. This socio-economic situation was exacerbated by endemic governmental corruption, lack of economic and political reform.¹³¹⁸ This was particularly the case in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan who shared the strategic Ferghana valley, the historic “heartland” of Central Asia.¹³¹⁹ These states were also affected by the fall-out from the recently concluded civil war in Tajikistan. Two organisations emerged in this period, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), to make the nightmare scenario of the region’s leaders of trans-national Islamic movements a reality over the 1998-2001 period.

The IMU emerged in 1998 primarily composed of Uzbeks who had fought with the Islamic Revival Party (IRP) in the Tajik civil war and was led militarily by an ex-Soviet paratrooper and ex-IRP commander, Juma Namangani, and politically by Tahir Yuldashev, both Uzbeks from the Ferghana valley.¹³²⁰ The IMU’s stated goal was the overthrow of Uzbek President Islam Karimov and the establishment of an Islamic state in Uzbekistan. The goal of HT in contrast was, at least initially, more ambitious with the organisation committed to the implementation of strict Shari’a (Islamic law) and the

¹³¹⁸ Regine A. Spector, "Central Asia: More than Islamic Extremists", *The Washington Quarterly*, (Winter 2002), pp. 8-9.

¹³¹⁹ Ahmed Rashid, "Central Asia Summary: Recent Developments in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan", *Eurasianet*, (September 4, 2001), <http://www.eurasianet.org>

¹³²⁰ For a detailed account of the IMU's history see Ahmed Rashid, *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), pp.137-156, Ahmed Rashid, "Mountain Launchpad", *FEER*, (19 April, 2001), on line at <http://www.feer.com>, & Daniel Kimmage, "The Growth of Radical Islam in Central Asia", *Asia Times*, (March 31, 2004), online at <http://www.atimes.com>

establishment of a supranational Islamic caliphate in Central Asia.¹³²¹ Namangani, Yuldashev and other Islamist Uzbeks had fled from Uzbekistan to Tajikistan after Karimov launched a crackdown on Islamic political organisations in 1992-93 where they subsequently fought with the Islamic opposition in the Tajik civil war between 1992 and 1997.¹³²² With the conclusion of a peace agreement between the belligerents in the Tajik civil war in 1997, members of the IRP gained positions in the new government that in combination with the new government's weakness, enabled the IMU to operate within Tajikistan with "relative freedom".¹³²³ Importantly, the future IMU leaders involvement in the Tajik civil war facilitated the linkages that would see it become a pan-Central Asian threat:

Despite Tajik government assertions to the contrary, the IMU now operates in Tajikistan because of its involvement in Tajikistan's civil war. During the course of that war, these fighters also came into contact with Afghan groups and received military training in Afghanistan. Thus the IMU forged relationships with various and sometimes opposing Afghan groups, including the Taliban and the Northern Alliance.¹³²⁴

This permitted the IMU to use Tajik territory as a base for incursions into Uzbek, and later Kyrgyz, portions of the Ferghana valley. In the summer of 1999 the IMU launched its first offensive in the Ferghana valley from a base in Tajikistan's Tavildera valley. Although there were also reports that the IMU had bases in Mazar-e-Sharif and Konduz in northern Afghanistan, which were used as training camps.¹³²⁵ This foray alarmed both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, whose territory the IMU traversed to reach Uzbekistan,

¹³²¹ Ahmed Rashid, *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia*, op. cit., Daniel Kimmage, "The Growth of Radical Islam in Central Asia", *Asia Times*, (March 31, 2004), online at <http://www.atimes.com> & Ahmed Rashid, "Asking for Holy War", *FEER*, (November 9, 2000), online at <http://www.feer.com>

¹³²² Regine A. Spector, op. cit.

¹³²³ Ibid & Ahmed Rashid, "Mountain Launch Pad", *FEER*, op. cit.

¹³²⁴ Regine A. Spector, op. cit.

¹³²⁵ Ibid & Ahmed Rashid, "'Afghanistan: Heart of Darkness", *FEER*, (5 August, 1999), on line at <http://www.feer.com>.

and provided a major irritant to these states' relations with Uzbekistan. The IMU's activities were not limited to raids in the Ferghana valley, with the group apparently carrying out an assassination attempt against Karimov in Tashkent in February 1999.¹³²⁶ The activities of the IMU were also unsettling for the major powers in the region, Russia and China, with reports abounding regarding the IMU's recruitment of all the major ethnic groups of Central Asia, including Uighurs, and connections with Chechnya.¹³²⁷

These developments were thus a major factor in the development of a broader agenda for the 'Shanghai Five' forum which, as of its 1998 meeting, undertook to have annual meetings. This move toward greater regional cooperation in military and security terms was the result of a convergence of interests of the organisations members. China's motivation for greater regional action on the issue of trans-national Islamic movements was both obvious and pressing, in light of the ongoing incidents of ethnic minority opposition to Chinese rule in Xinjiang. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were jolted into action after the IMU's offensive in 1999 and the assassination attempt on Uzbek President Islam Karimov. Meanwhile, Russia although alarmed by reports of connections between the IMU, secessionist Chechnya and the Taliban, saw the spectre of "Islamic fundamentalism" as an opportunity to draw the Central Asian governments

¹³²⁶ Didar Amantay, Saidazim Gaziev and Konstantin Parshin, "On the Front Lines", *Eurasianet.org*, (18 Sept., 2001) On line at <http://www.eurasianet.org>.

¹³²⁷ For example see, Ahmed Rashid, "'Afghanistan: Heart of Darkness'", *FEER*, (5 August, 1999), on line at <http://www.feer.com>, M. Eshan Ahrari, "China, Pakistan and the 'Taliban Syndrome'", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 40, No. 4, (July/August 2000), p.668, "The Taliban's Dangerous Liasons Represent a Menace to Asia", *FEER*, (28 July, 1999), online at <http://www.feer.com>, & Kenneth Weisbrode, *Central Eurasia, Prize or Quicksand? Contending Views of Instability in Karabakh, Ferghana and Afghanistan*, (Aldelphi Papers, No.338, 2001), pp.48-49.

back into its orbit.¹³²⁸ The agenda of the August 1999 meeting of the "Shanghai Five" in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek thus dramatically shifted focus from issues of border demarcation and economic cooperation (which had characterised previous meetings) to establishing a regional response to the inter-connected issues of trans-national Islamic movements, drugs and weapons trafficking and border security.¹³²⁹ The need for a common regional response to these issues was undoubtedly further impressed upon the meetings attendants by the simultaneous incursion of 1000 IMU fighters into south-west Kyrgyzstan.¹³³⁰ These IMU fighters seized a number of villages in the Bakten and Chon-Alai *raions* and caused further consternation for the Kyrgyz government by capturing the interior ministry commander and taking a number of Japanese geologists hostage in the process.¹³³¹ The militants then demanded the release of 5000 prisoners from Uzbek jails and declared their intent to launch a jihad against Karimov's regime in Uzbekistan from the Tajik-populated enclave of Sokh in the Kyrgyz portion of the Ferghana valley.¹³³² The crisis was resolved in October 1999 when the Japanese government provided the estimated \$US 50 000 ransom for the release of the Japanese geologists to the Kyrgyz government. Thereafter the IMU militants returned to Tajikistan and thence to a base near Konduz in Taliban-controlled northern Afghanistan.¹³³³ Despite the rhetoric of the Bishkek meeting, this latest incursion by the IMU resulted in little cooperation particularly between the three most effected states,

¹³²⁸ See for example, Sally N. Cummings, "Happier Bedfellows", op. cit., pp.146-147, Charles Fairbanks, S. Frederick Starr, C. Richard Nelson & Kenneth Weisbrode, *Strategic Assessment of Central Eurasia*, op. cit., pp.77-82, & Kenneth Weisbrode, *Central Eurasia, Prize or Quicksand?*, op. cit., pp.58-59.

¹³²⁹ Anthony Davis, "A Marriage of Convenience: Why China is Cozying Up to Central Asia", *Asiaweek*, vol.25, no.36 (Sept. 10 1999), on line at <http://www.asiaweek.com>

¹³³⁰ Ibid, Regine A. Spector, op. cit., Kenneth Weisbrode, op. cit., p.49 & Morgan Y. Liu, "Evaluating the Appeal of Islam in the Ferghana Valley", *Eurasianet*, (January 8, 2000), online at <http://www.eurasianet.org>.

¹³³¹ Kenneth Weisbrode, op. cit., p.49.

¹³³² Ibid, p.50.

¹³³³ Ibid & Ahmed Rashid, "Mountain Launchpad", *FEER*, (19 April, 2001), op. cit.

Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The "Batken Incident", as it has since been referred to, in fact brought to the fore regional rivalries. Following the incident Uzbekistan's Islam Karimov was particularly vociferous in condemning the Tajik and Kyrgyz governments for not doing enough to combat the IMU threat. Moreover, Karimov accused Tajikistan of tolerating the presence of the IMU and excoriated Kyrgyzstan's weak response to the incident.¹³³⁴ Uzbekistan's airforce also bombed Tajik and Kyrgyz territory in its attempts to destroy retreating IMU militants in the wake of the incident.¹³³⁵

In the wake of these events in Central Asia and ongoing incidents of low-level violence in Xinjiang, the two major external powers in the region, Russia and China, stepped up their efforts to facilitate a common response to perceived common problems. With the ascent of Vladimir Putin as President of Russia in December 1999, Russia's foreign policy in Central Asia shifted. Putin renewed Russian interest in Central Asia almost immediately by personally visiting Turkmenistan (May 2000) and perhaps most significantly Uzbekistan (December 1999 and May 2000).¹³³⁶ The Russo-Uzbek relationship had been strained under President Yeltsin, as Uzbekistan sought to assert strategic independence from Moscow and remain aloof from CIS related economic and security structures.¹³³⁷ Under Putin's leadership, however, Russia recognised the opportunity to improve its relations with Uzbekistan, particularly in the security sphere,

¹³³⁴ Kenneth Weisbrode, op. cit., p.50 & Charles Fairbanks, S. Frederick Starr, C. Richard Nelson & Kenneth Weisbrode, *Strategic Assessment of Central Eurasia*, op. cit., p.53.

¹³³⁵ Kenneth Weisbrode, op. cit., p.50.

¹³³⁶ Sally N. Cummings, "Happier Bedfellows?: Russia and Central Asia Under Putin", *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 32, Pt.2, (June 2001), p.147.

¹³³⁷ Charles Fairbanks, S. Frederick Starr, C. Richard Nelson & Kenneth Weisbrode, *Strategic Assessment of Central Eurasia*, op. cit., pp.51-52. For example Uzbekistan joined every possible international organisation/forum that would counter the CIS, such as the Central Asia Community, the Economic Cooperation Council, and Partnership for Peace.

in the aftermath of the Bakten incident. Putin's efforts paid dividends with Uzbekistan ratifying a treaty on defence cooperation with Russia in February 2000.¹³³⁸ Putin's re-orientation of Russian policy in Central Asia also extended to its relations with Tajikistan, which became more dependent on Russia than ever. At the CIS summit in June 2000 it was announced that while the CIS peace-keeping force would be withdrawn from Tajikistan, Russian military bases would be established there instead.¹³³⁹ Russia also played a key role in coaxing Uzbekistan's Islam Karimov to attend the newly christened "Shanghai Forum" meeting in July in the Tajik capital Dushanbe¹³⁴⁰, where Russia and China attempted to forge a practical response to the perceived threat of Islamic insurgency. At the meeting leaders of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed a joint declaration condemning the Taliban for supporting terrorism, agreed to the establishment of an anti-terrorist security centre in the Kyrgyz capital, Bishkek, and declared a commitment to increase collective efforts to counter the "three evils" of "separatism, terrorism and extremism".¹³⁴¹ Yet even after such efforts to secure greater cooperation between the Central Asian states, regional tensions continued to come to the fore. A month after the Dushanbe meeting, the IMU launched another series of forays into the Ferghana valley with attacks reported in Surkhandaria in southern Uzbekistan, in the Izboskan district of Andijan close to the Kyrgyz border and at Bostanlyk, 80k kilometres from the Uzbek capital, Tashkent.¹³⁴² This provoked a new round of Uzbek unilateralist action to

¹³³⁸ Ibid, p.55.

¹³³⁹ Sally N. Cummings, "Happier Bedfellows?", op. cit., p.147.

¹³⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹³⁴¹ Ibid, Ahmed Rashid, "Afghanistan: Ending the Policy Quagmire", *Journal of International Affairs*, (Spring 2001), & Robert M. Cutler, "Did Putin Shanghai Bush?", *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, (July 4, 2001), op.cit.

¹³⁴² Kenneth Weisbrode, op. cit., p.50 & Charles Fairbanks, S. Frederick Starr, C. Richard Nelson & Kenneth Weisbrode, *Strategic Assessment of Central Eurasia*, op. cit., p.56.

combat the IMU, with Uzbekistan increasing border patrols and mining its borders with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.¹³⁴³ This latest incursion also prompted the US to pay greater attention to the region, with the US State Department officially listed the IMU as a terrorist organisation in September. Moreover, in January 2001 Karimov's government engaged in more attempted arm-twisting in order to compel Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to clamp down on the IMU by cutting off Uzbek gas supplies to its neighbours.¹³⁴⁴

The overall impact of the IMU's activities and Uzbekistan's subsequent unilateral actions were to drive Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan toward closer relations with the major external powers, Russia and China. As we have seen, the major determinants of China's foreign policy in Central Asia stemmed from its strategy in Xinjiang. Hence China's pre-eminent concerns within its relations with the Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, had revolved around access to energy resources, facilitation of trade and infrastructural links, border control and demarcation and the issue of Uighur separatism. After the emergence of the IMU in Central Asia in 1998 and China's intensification of its "Strike Hard" campaign between 1997 and 1999 in Xinjiang, China's interests in Central Asia appeared to converge with those of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In the wake of the IMU's incursions in 1998, 1999 and 2000 these states became more receptive to Chinese requests for greater cooperation regarding what Beijing defined as Uighur "separatist" organisations in

¹³⁴³ Kenneth Weisbrode, op. cit., pp.50-51, Marat Mamadshoyev, "The Central Asian Insurgency Raises Questions About Civilian Sympathies and Military Capabilities", *Eurasianet*, (25 August, 2000), online at <http://www.eurasianet.org>

& Umed Babakhanov, "Anti-Terrorism Campaign Brings Dushanbe and Tashkent Together", *Eurasianet*, (15 January, 2002), online at <http://www.eurasianet.org>

¹³⁴⁴ Ahmed Rashid, "IMU Gradually Developing into a Pan-Central Asian Movement", *Eurasianet*, (3 April, 2001), online at <http://www.eurasianet.org>.

Central Asia. Russia, as noted previously, also increased its efforts to strengthen its presence, particular in a security or military sense, in the region. These efforts appeared to be rewarded with all the Central Asian states, for example, participating in the "Southern Shield" CIS military exercises in April 2000.¹³⁴⁵ Over this period the Kazakh and Kyrgyz governments concluded a number of border and extradition agreements with China. In 1998, after five years of negotiations the Chinese and Kazakh presidents signed an agreement demarcating their common 1700 kilometre border, thus settling a border dispute that had begun in the Tsarist and Qing eras.¹³⁴⁶ After the signing of this agreement Kazakh Foreign Minister Tokayev stated that the agreement was favourable to Kazakhstan, with the agreement assigning 57 per cent of the 944 square kilometres of disputed territory to Kazakhstan and 43 per cent to China.¹³⁴⁷ The Kazakh government also gave a commitment that it would not shelter Uighur separatists.¹³⁴⁸ The effect of these agreements became apparent quickly with Kazakhstan deporting four Uighur "guerillas" that had fled Xinjiang to Kazakhstan back to China in the same year.¹³⁴⁹ The following year it was also reported that three more Uighurs refugees were deported from Kazakhstan to China.¹³⁵⁰ In May 1999 CNPC also began to push forward with the construction of the 4300-kilometre Kazakh-China oil pipeline, announcing that it had completed the 482-kilometre Korla-Shanshan section within Xinjiang.¹³⁵¹ Similar

¹³⁴⁵ Stephen Blank, "The New Russo-Chinese 'Partnership' and Central Asia", *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, (August 16, 2000), http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=141.

¹³⁴⁶ Claes Levinsson & Ingvar Svanberg, "Kazakhstan-China Border Trade Thrives After Demarcation Treaty", *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, (February 16, 2000), online at http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=194.

¹³⁴⁷ Yitzhak Shichor, "The Great Wall of Steel", *op. cit.*, p.155.

¹³⁴⁸ Claes Levinsson & Ingvar Svanberg, *op. cit.*

¹³⁴⁹ "Hopes Fade for an Uighur Homeland", *SCMP*, (21 June, 1999), online at <http://www.scmp.com>

¹³⁵⁰ Antoine Blua, "Kyrgyz Rights Activists Call for End to Deportation of Uighurs to China", *Eurasianet*, (25 January, 2004), online at <http://www.eurasianet.org> & Sean R. Roberts, "A 'Land of Borderlands'", *op. cit.*, p.234.

¹³⁵¹ "\$2.3bn West China-Kazakhstan Pipeline on the Fast Track", *Asia Times*, (May 22, 1999), online at <http://www.atimes.com>

arrangements were also made with the Kyrgyz government. In April 1998 Kyrgyzstan secured a \$US 8 million Chinese investment package.¹³⁵² Meanwhile, President Askar Akayev also enlisted Chinese support and finance for the development of a Kyrgyz-Xinjiang rail link through the Torugart Pass in 1998, while the Kyrgyz government gave assurances that it would increase its efforts to control Uighur "separatists" in their country.¹³⁵³ China and Kyrgyzstan also apparently settled their border dispute in August 1999, with the conclusion of an agreement that assigned 30 per cent of the disputed territory to China.¹³⁵⁴ Prior to the June 2000 "Shanghai Forum" meeting in Dushanbe, President Jiang Zemin travelled to Tajikistan to drum up similar Tajik assurances regarding cooperation with China to limit Uighur "separatism".¹³⁵⁵ During this visit China and Tajikistan agreed to speed up their negotiations regarding the resolution of their border dispute in the Pamir Mountains, while China agreed to supply Tajikistan with military aid to the value of 5 million yuan.¹³⁵⁶

These efforts to involve its Central Asian neighbours in its crackdown on Uighur "separatists" appeared to generate unwanted domestic consequences for these states. Kyrgyzstan experienced a wave of Uighur and China related violence in 1999 and the opening months of 2000. On 31 May, 1999 an explosion on bus in Osh (Kyrgyzstan) killed three people and another bomb was detonated on 1 June killing one person.¹³⁵⁷

¹³⁵² Charles Fairbanks, S. Frederick Starr, C. Richard Nelson & Kenneth Weisbrode, *Strategic Assessment of Central Eurasia*, op. cit., p. 37.

¹³⁵³ Kenneth Weisbrode, op. cit., p.56 & Bakyt Ibraimov, "Uighurs: Beijing to Blame for Kyrgyz Crackdown", *Eurasianet*, (28 January, 2004), online at <http://www.eurasianet.org>.

¹³⁵⁴ Yitzhak Shichor, "The Great Wall of Steel", op. cit., p.156.

¹³⁵⁵ Ahmed Rashid, "China Forced to Expand its Role in Central Asia", *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, (July 19, 2000), online at http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=151.

¹³⁵⁶ Yitzhak Shichor, "The Great Wall of Steel", op. cit., p.155.

¹³⁵⁷ Aziz Soltobaev, "International Terrorists Bomb Osh, Kyrgyzstan", *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, (August 16, 2000), online at http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_articlephp?articleid=324.

Kyrgyz police subsequently arrested five foreign citizens in connection with the blasts - three Uighurs, one Turk and a Russian.¹³⁵⁸ Kyrgyz officials claimed that the Uighurs were members of the "Free Turkestan" organisation and had illegally crossed the Sino-Kyrgyz border using falsified documents.¹³⁵⁹ In March the following year Nigmat Bazakov, a leader of Uighur émigrés in Kyrgyzstan, was assassinated. According to Kyrgyz police Bazakov was killed because he had refused to cooperate with the "Uighur Liberation Organisation" and advocated non-interference in China's domestic affairs.¹³⁶⁰ On 29 June Wang Jianping, Chinese ambassador to Kyrgyzstan, and his Uighur driver were shot dead in Bishkek. Kyrgyz investigators arrested two Uighurs in connection with the incident and claimed that they were members of the aforementioned "Uighur Liberation Organisation".¹³⁶¹

The perceived growth of the threat of "radical" Islamic movements to the states of Central Asia, Russia and China over the 1997-2000 resulted in the expansion and reorientation of the "Shanghai Forum" in June 2001 to become the "Shanghai Cooperation Organisation" (SCO). The meeting in Shanghai on 14 June transformed the organisation into a fully-fledged international institution complete with secretariat and inter-ministerial committees, while increasing its membership by one with the formal ascension of Uzbekistan to the organisation.¹³⁶² Two major documents were adopted at the meeting, "Declaration of the Establishment of the 'Shanghai Cooperation

¹³⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁶⁰ Aziz Soltobaev, "Uyghur Liberation Organization Strikes Against 'Collaborators'", *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, (August 2, 2000), online at http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=328.

¹³⁶¹ Ibid & Ibragim Alibekov, "Violence in Kyrgyzstan Hints at Uighurs' Woes", *Eurasianet*, (July 11, 2002), online at <http://www.eurasianet.org>

¹³⁶² Robert M. Cutler, "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Moves into First Gear", *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, (March 24, 2004), online at

Organization" and most significantly, the "Shanghai Covenant on the Suppression of Terrorism, Separatism and Religious Extremism".¹³⁶³ Clearly the issue of forming a regional response to the perceived threat of radical Islam to member states was a central concern of the new organisation and the meeting also discussed the possibility of expansion to include South Asian powers, with India, Pakistan and Iran touted as potential future members.¹³⁶⁴ The development of the SCO's agenda, as we have seen, was the result of a gradual convergence in the interests of Russia, China and the Central Asian states in the face of what was perceived to be a trans-national radical Islamic threat to the region:

Indeed, the precise danger of Islamism is what binds the regional security policies of the SCO countries together. All its members share growing unease with Islamist-styled militancy or separatist movements: China faces its perennial Uighur problem in Xinjiang; Russia uneasily conducts its war in Chechnya while also tightly clutching the restless Muslim provinces of its underbelly; and Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan struggle with violent groups fermenting in the volatile Ferghana Valley, like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Islamic Freedom Party).¹³⁶⁵

It should be noted, however, that the nature of these threats was far from uniform across the member states of the SCO. Although all the member states attempted to portray their own Islamist "problem" as but a constituent part of a broader trans-national Islamic conspiracy against secular and "modernising" governments, each had equally plausible internal causes or conditions that facilitated the growth of violent opposition that were largely the consequence of government policy. The situation in the Ferghana Valley,

http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=2226 & "Shanghai Five Mulls Expansion in Search of Regional Stability", *Eurasianet*, (June 14, 2001), online at <http://www.eurasianet.org>

¹³⁶³ Robert M. Cutler, "Did Putin Shanghai Bush?", *op. cit.*

¹³⁶⁴ "Shanghai Five Mulls Expansion in Search of Regional Stability", *op. cit.* & Sean R. Roberts, "A 'Land of Borderlands'", *op. cit.*, p.236.

¹³⁶⁵ Sean Yom, "Russian-Chinese pact a 'great game' victim", *Asia Times*, (July 30, 2002), online at <http://www.atimes.com>

although undoubtedly connected to events in Afghanistan, was not an outgrowth of that conflict but a consequence of the Tajik civil war and Uzbekistan's authoritarianism. Despite the Chinese government's claims, for instance, regarding the external "causes" of violent ethnic minority opposition in Xinjiang, China's integrationist project in the region clearly contributed to it. This is not to say that there were no connections between Uighur separatists and radical Islamic groups such as the IMU and the Taliban. This chapter has cited numerous reports regarding the involvement of Uighurs in events in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Further reports in 2000, for example, suggested that Uighurs had been fighting with the Taliban in northern Afghanistan, as well as being actively recruited by the IMU.¹³⁶⁶ Moreover, it was also reported that in June 2001 the IMU had changed its name to the "Islamic Party of Turkestan", perhaps reflecting the organisations intent to become a pan-Central Asian movement and its alleged connections to Hizb-ut-Tahrir.¹³⁶⁷ Such a development would thus impact on China's position in Xinjiang or Eastern Turkestan. Yet it must be noted that these have involved very small numbers of people which belied China's assertion of a widespread network of violent "separatists and terrorists" operating in Xinjiang.

Therefore, on the eve of the al-Qaida attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, China's strategy in Xinjiang and Central Asia had been relatively successful. Despite ongoing reports of low-level violence in Xinjiang between 1998 and 2001, the state's integrationist agenda proceeded apace internally, while China's imperatives in Central Asia appeared to have been secured with the consolidation of its

¹³⁶⁶ Ahmed Rashid & Susan V. Lawrence, "Joining Foreign Jihad", *FEER*, (7 Sept. 2000) & Ahmed Rashid, "Afghanistan: Epicentre of Terror", *FEER*, (11 May, 2000), On line at <http://www.feer.com>

¹³⁶⁷ Regine A. Spector, "Central Asia: More Than Islamic Extremists", *op. cit.*, p.20.

bilateral relations with the Central Asian states and the formation of the SCO. The development of a convergence in Sino-Russian interests in Central Asia also reflected a broad theme in both states' foreign policy since 1991 - a desire to see the development of a multipolar world order rather than the perceived unipolar US-dominated paradigm of the post-Cold War era. The development of the SCO was thus in line with China's overall foreign policy goal of improving relations with a wide number of states in order to facilitate the operationalisation of "collegial sharing of power among nations".¹³⁶⁸ By 2001 China and Russia's influence in the region was ascendant with the formation of the SCO, with the United States' strategic imperatives in the region limited to concerns over Caspian hydrocarbon resources and "pipeline politics" in general.¹³⁶⁹ Except for Washington's sporadic efforts regarding the activities of Osama bin Laden toward the end of the 1990s, witness the US cruise missile assault on alleged "terrorist" training camps in Afghanistan in August 1998, it was not thoroughly engaged in the region nor particularly cognisant of regional politics.¹³⁷⁰ Moreover, the US was seemingly prepared to adopt a wait-and-see approach to Russia and China's attempts at forging a regional response to the issues of "separatism, terrorism, and religious extremism" in Central Asia. Therefore, on the eve of the attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, Russia and China had extended their political, economic and security/military influence across the Central Asian states. Within Xinjiang, China's "double-opening" strategy proceeded apace although continued low-level violence

¹³⁶⁸ See for example, James Hsiung, "China's Omni-Directional Diplomacy: Realignment to Cope Monopolar US Power", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 35, No.6, (June 1995) & Yongnian Zheng, *Discovering Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity and International Relations*, (Hong Kong: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

¹³⁶⁹ Carolyn Miles, "The Caspian Debate Continues: Why Not Iran?", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 53, (Fall 1999), pp.325-347.

¹³⁷⁰ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia*, op. cit., p.138.

throughout the province remained a not insignificant irritation to the authorities. The events of 11 September 2001 would, however, generate developments that not only challenged China's foreign policy framework in Central Asia but also key elements of its integrationist techniques and tactics of rule in Xinjiang. It is to this complex and fluid process that we now turn.

China's Strategy in Xinjiang and Central Asia Post-11 September 2001: The Dynamics of Reinforced Integration?

Since 11 September 2001, and the subsequent US politico-military penetration of Central Asia and Afghanistan, there has been much speculation regarding China's perceived strategic "defeat" in Central Asia. Moreover, this "defeat" is said to have compromised China's long-term plans regarding the integration of Xinjiang. The strategic implications of US penetration of Central Asia, however, have in fact resulted in the re-invigoration and reinforcement of both the state's goal and instruments of integration in Xinjiang. This dynamic has been expressed within Xinjiang, in the form of the strengthening of the major instruments of internal control and development, and externally in the form of China's foreign policy calculus in the context of its relations with the states of Central Asia. Although the immediate post-11 September 2001 period did in fact see a convergence in the interests of the major regional powers - Russia and China - with those of the US, it was in fact a temporary "marriage of convenience". In this period China, and particularly Russia, acquiesced to US imperatives in Central Asia - which concerned the establishment of military bases in the Central Asian republics contiguous or in close proximity to Afghanistan - Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Moreover, both Russia and China for their own specific reasons (which I

shall address shortly) shared intelligence with the US and pledged support, moral and material, for the Bush Administration's "War on Terrorism" in Afghanistan.

Yet the inherent tensions between the strategic imperatives of the US, Russia and China re-emerged rapidly after this initial period of consensus. China's response to the "War on Terrorism" in Afghanistan, and its consequences for the international politics of the region can only be understood with reference to its strategy in Xinjiang. The core of this strategy since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 has, as we have seen, rested on the goal of simultaneously integrating Xinjiang with Central Asia and China proper. This agenda had been expressed within Xinjiang through increased central government investment, particularly regarding construction and infrastructure projects (especially energy related), and increased government control and management of ethnic minority religious and cultural practices. Meanwhile, China's foreign policy in Central Asia reflected the pre-eminence of this goal of integration for Xinjiang, with an emphasis placed upon the establishment of political, economic and infrastructural links with the Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. An important overarching theme within the context of this process has been the state's attempts to reconcile the perceived need for strengthened integration and security of the province with the recognition of the economic and political opportunities presented by the relative retreat of Russian power from Central Asia over the 1991-2001 period.

The collapse of the Soviet Union had presented China with an opportunity to fully exploit Xinjiang's geo-political position to increase China's political and economic influence in the region. The fall of the Soviet Union, however, also stimulated a

resurgence of ethnic minority opposition to Chinese rule in Xinjiang. As demonstrated earlier, the causes of the resurgence in ethnic minority opposition to Chinese rule were not solely the result of external developments. Rather the Soviet Union's collapse coincided with China's ongoing economic reform program, which had a major impact on the state's overall strategy for Xinjiang. The basis of this strategy was the implementation of political and economic measures that simultaneously attempted to integrate Xinjiang with the domestic economy and Central Asia. As I have demonstrated over the course of chapter seven and this chapter, this "double opening" strategy, as of 2001, had only been partially successful due to the fact that such opening is in fact a two-way street. China's attempt to integrate Xinjiang with Central Asia had increased the linkages between the two regions thus increasing the opportunities for the spread of radical movements or ideologies such as the IMU or the Taliban into Xinjiang. This process was in turn exacerbated by inter-state competition amongst external states for strategic advantage and the hydrocarbon resources of Central Asia, and ongoing political, economic and social instability within the Central Asian republics.

As argued in earlier sections of this chapter, the economic policies encompassed in the state's strategy - such as the "cotton" strategy and infrastructure development - also played an instrumental role in generating ethnic minority opposition in Xinjiang. Particularly important in this regard were the waves of Han in-migration facilitated by these policies. The state's strategy in Xinjiang was also underpinned by continued control of the parameters of ethnic minority cultural and religious practices. From 1991 onward these internal and external pressures converged, with varying intensity at

specific periods, to strengthen the state's perception of a causal link between manifestations of internal ethnic minority unrest and trans-national political, ideological and cultural flows from Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The management or control of the relationship between these external developments in Central Asia and developments within Xinjiang was thus a major dilemma confronted by the Chinese government over the 1991-2001 period. Moreover, as we have seen, China's response to this complex dilemma was complicated by the rationale that underpinned its complex of integrationist techniques and tactics of rule in Xinjiang. The establishment of political, economic and cultural linkages with Central Asia was seen as vital to the success of the state's goal of integration for Xinjiang, yet was simultaneously viewed with suspicion as a potential source of threat to this very process. The contradictory nature of this position compelled China to seek a broader regional approach to issues of regional economic cooperation, ethnic separatism, drugs and weapons trafficking, radical Islam and border security that culminated in the creation of the "Shanghai Five" in 1996 and its eventual transformation into the "Shanghai Cooperation Organisation" (SCO) in June 2001.

Simultaneously, however, the establishment of such forums as the SCO that were ostensibly aimed at developing regional cooperation on mutually defined common issues occurred in parallel with the continuation, and even intensification, of regional rivalries. This process, as alluded to above, was the result of the combined pressures of the dynamics created by the "New Great Game" and the internal dilemmas of the Central Asian states, China and Russia. Of particular import, for example, in deterring the establishment of effective regional cooperation regarding the supposedly mutual threat of radical Islamic movements was the fact that each state's perceptions as to the

nature of the threat and the most efficacious response was necessarily filtered through a prism of domestic peculiarities. Russia and China viewed the growth and expansion of the Taliban and the IMU, for example, by reference to their own "internal" problems with restive ethnic groups in Chechnya and Xinjiang. The Central Asian states most effected by radical Islam - Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan -although portraying the threat posed by groups such as HT and the IMU (and the associated phenomena of weapons and drugs trafficking) as emanating from external causes they were in fact symptomatic of an interlinked regional dynamic. The development, growth and activities of such groups demonstrates that they were products of intra-regional conflicts and crises, such as the Tajik civil war and the authoritarian regime of Uzbekistan's Islam Karimov, than simply "exported" phenomena of external states. The alleged connections and linkages between the IMU and HT on the one hand and Afghanistan, the Taliban and al-Qaida on the other appear to have been formed during and after conflicts and crises within specific Central Asian states. In effect Afghanistan, from 1991 onward, became a haven for Central Asian Islamists who had already run afoul of the existing governments of the region. This process was intensified with the rise of the Taliban after 1994 and the cessation of the Tajik civil war in 1997. Moreover, as demonstrated earlier, the pan-regional problems of the IMU and drugs and weapons trafficking as often prompted regional suspicion and rivalry than cooperation.

The Strategic Implications of US Penetration of Central Asia Post-11 September 2001 and China's Response, 2001-2004

The events of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent "War on Terrorism" in Afghanistan, far from solidifying a relatively united regional response to these issues and tempering regional rivalries, exacerbated and intensified the geo-political

competition in the region. The rapid and comprehensive entrance of the US onto the Central Asian stage after the attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 created a degree of regional cooperation regarding US aims in Afghanistan. Russia, China and the Central Asian republics committed to and supported in varying degrees the US invasion of Afghanistan. Moreover, both China and Russia backed in principle the US position to confront and contain "international terrorism" - due in large measure to their own preoccupation with restive ethnic groups in Xinjiang and Chechnya, but also to their interests in seeing a stable Central Asia. The penetration of US political, military and economic power into Central Asia since 2001 has generated four major strategic implications for China's position in Xinjiang and Central Asia:

1. Generated limited regional cooperation on the part of the US, Russia, China and the Central Asian republics
2. Initially weakened the influence and role of the SCO in Central Asia & has fostered regional competition and rivalry
3. The rationale of the "War on Terrorism" has served to justify China's "zero tolerance" approach to ethnic minority opposition in Xinjiang
4. Reinforced China's goal and instruments of integration in Xinjiang

Points one and two directly relate to China's foreign policy framework in Central Asia, while three and four address the impact of the changed regional environment for China's position in Xinjiang. I will now address each point in more depth in order to demonstrate the determining factor of China's integrationist goal for Xinjiang in its foreign policy calculus in Central Asia.

Immediately after 11 September, Russian president Vladimir Putin moved quickly to provide not only moral support but also practical support for the US "War on

Terrorism" in Afghanistan. Putin authorised intelligence sharing with the US, granted US access to Russian airspace and stepped up military aid to the Northern Alliance. Moreover, Putin also publicly endorsed the legitimacy of the US campaign in Afghanistan and actively encouraged the Central Asian republics to accede to US requests for access to military bases and opening of airspace in the region.¹³⁷¹ China in contrast to Russia's rapid acquiescence to immediate US military imperatives in Central Asia and Afghanistan following the terrorist attacks was far more cautious in extending its moral and practical support. Importantly, this support was also granted with significant caveats that illustrated China's Xinjiang-centric perspective on the emergent "War on Terrorism" in Afghanistan. On 18 September 2001 a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman made an interesting statement that clearly linked the US agenda against "international terrorism" to China's domestic separatist dilemmas:

The United States has asked China to provide assistance in the fight against terrorism. China, by the same token has reasons to ask the United States to give support and understanding in the fight against terrorism and separatists. We should not have double standards.¹³⁷²

This was clearly a reference to what China perceived as its ongoing fight against terrorists and separatists in Xinjiang. The US did not, however, provide any statement of such "understanding", but China like Russia extended its support for the US effort in Afghanistan by promising to supply the US with any relevant intelligence and avoided any direct criticism of US "interventionism". This in itself was a significant development, given China's vociferous protests against NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999. The US intervention in Kosovo was deemed from Beijing's perspective to be a

¹³⁷¹ Aaron L. Friedberg, "11 September and the Future of Sino-American Relations", *Survival*, Vol. 44, No. 1, (Spring 2002), p.41.

¹³⁷² Cited in *Ibid*, p.34.

further example of US determination to enforce its vision of "global order" on the world, even if this entailed the violation of state sovereignty through the use of armed force.¹³⁷³ The change was undoubtedly due China's perception that although having US military forces engaged close to its frontiers was not a welcome development, the removal of the Taliban and hence the cessation of their support for Central Asian and Xinjiang terrorists was of value to its agenda in Xinjiang.

China's efforts to convince the US, and to a lesser extent its Central Asian neighbours, of the connection between Uighur separatists and such groups as the IMU, al Qaida or the Taliban did bear fruit. China claimed in December 2001 that up to 1000 Uighurs had been trained in Afghanistan in IMU or al Qaida camps, and that 300 Uighurs had been captured by US forces in Afghanistan. In the government report "East Turkestan Terrorists Exposed" released in January 2002, the Chinese, while documenting the hundreds of alleged "terrorist" incidents in Xinjiang since 1990 also charged that the "East Turkestan Islamic Movement" (ETIM), led by Hasan Mashum, was directly financed and supported by bin Laden's al Qaida.¹³⁷⁴ In August-September 2002, the US State Department placed ETIM on its list of international terrorist organisations and claimed that it had evidence of a planned ETIM attack on the US embassy in Kyrgyzstan.¹³⁷⁵ A number of observers suggested that this was in fact a "trade off" between the US and China in order to secure China's support for the "War on Terrorism" and part of a broader effort to stabilise a bilateral relationship that had been

¹³⁷³ June Teufel Dreyer, *The PLA & the Kosovo Conflict*, (Carlisle: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, May 2000), pp.2-3 available online at <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/welcome.htm>

¹³⁷⁴ "East Turkistan Terrorists Exposed", *China Daily*, (21 January 2002), online at <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn>, pp.1-15.

¹³⁷⁵ Seva Gunitskiy, "In the Spotlight: East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM)", *Center for Defense Information (CDI)*, (December 9, 2002), online at <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/etim-pr.cfm>, Graham E.

shaky since advent of the Bush Administration.¹³⁷⁶ It has also been claimed that US moves in this direction were a strategic manoeuvre by the Bush Administration to appease China during UN Security Council negotiations regarding a resolution on Iraq.¹³⁷⁷

Of the Central Asian states Uzbekistan was the quickest to extend its support and cooperation to the US military effort in Afghanistan in mid-September 2001. Uzbekistan also signalled that it placed greater weight on bilateral cooperation with the US than with the multilateral SCO when it failed to attend the SCO's emergency 11 October 2001 meeting.¹³⁷⁸ By the same month Uzbekistan was already hosting some 1000 US troops.¹³⁷⁹ Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan followed the Uzbek lead in December 2001 agreeing to allow US and other international troops use military facilities in their territory.¹³⁸⁰ These states had a number of motivations to sign on to the US military action in Afghanistan that were not altruistic. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan had, as noted earlier, been the most effected by the IMU insurgency in the late 1990s and they obviously saw this as an opportunity to rid the region of the IMU threat and reinforce their own position regarding internal political opposition. Moreover, cooperation with Washington promised wider political, economic and security benefits for these states. Since September 2001 the Central Asian states, particularly Uzbekistan,

Fuller & Jonathan N. Lipman, "Islam in Xinjiang", op. cit. & Erkin Dolat, "Washington Betrays China's Uighurs", *Asia Times*, (September 5, 2002), online at <http://www.atimes.com>

¹³⁷⁶ Erkin Dolat, "Washington Betrays China's Uighurs", *Asia Times*, (September 5, 2002), op. cit. & Aaron L. Friedberg, "11 September and the Future of Sino-American Relations", op. cit.

¹³⁷⁷ Seva Gunitskiy, "In the Spotlight: East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM)", *Center for Defense Information (CDI)*, (December 9, 2002), op. cit.

¹³⁷⁸ Boris Rumer, "The Powers in Central Asia", *Survival*, Vol. 44, No. 3, (Autumn 2002), p. 64.

¹³⁷⁹ Bruce Pannier, "Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan Balancing Relations with West, Russia", *Eurasianet*, (December 8, 2001), online at <http://www.eurasianet.org/>

¹³⁸⁰ Ibid.

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, have received greater attention from the US. Late in 2001, Uzbekistan received promises of \$US 150 million in aid from Washington due to its commitment to the "War on Terrorism" and assurances that international lending agencies such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) would now grant loans to Uzbekistan.¹³⁸¹ Furthermore in November and December 2001 the Kyrgyz and Uzbek governments agreed to the establishment of US airbases near Bishkek and Khanabad-Karsi respectively.¹³⁸² On 9 January 2002, Kyrgyzstan followed Uzbekistan's lead and agreed to host 3000 US troops at bases at Manas and Bishkek.¹³⁸³ Thus within the space of five months the US had effectively established a political and military presence in the three "front line" states of Central Asia.

The rapidity of Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan's military/security cooperation with the US was thus a blow to China's vision of the SCO as a viable regional security organisation. Despite the pre-11 September SCO rhetoric about forming regional responses to the three evils of "terrorism, separatism and religious extremism" noted earlier, when the opportunity came to demonstrate the organisation's capabilities in this field four out of the six member states decided to rely on bilateral arrangements with the US. That the US penetration of the region was indeed perceived to have weakened the SCO was illustrated by the organisation's next meeting in January 2002. At the SCO foreign ministers meeting in Beijing on 7 January 2002 the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers put forward proposals to improve the SCO's anti-

¹³⁸¹ Ibid & "Karimov Moves to Bolster Authoritarian Rule in Uzbekistan", *Eurasianet*, (December 7, 2001), online at <http://www.eurasianet.org/>

¹³⁸² Martha Brill Olcott, "Taking Stock of Central Asia. (Assessing the Central Asian Republics)", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 56, No. 2, (Spring 2003), p.3.

¹³⁸³ Michael Denison, "Central Asia's New Romance with the West: A Match Made in Heaven?", *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, (January 16, 2002), online at

terrorism and security capabilities. Moreover, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov maintained that the SCO should assume responsibility for regional security, suggesting that China and Russia were already wary of the direction of the US involvement in the region.¹³⁸⁴ Such a statement of intent was not, however, evidently immediately followed by practical action, although Russia and China intensified their efforts to counter US inroads in Central Asia through their bilateral relations with the region. The first half of 2002, however, witnessed the consolidation of Washington's new relationships with the Central Asian republics. Uzbekistan emerged as Washington's preferred regional partner, with a "United States-Uzbekistan Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework" signed on 12 March 2002.¹³⁸⁵ The emergence of Tashkent as the US favourite in Central Asia would in turn have significant consequences for regional politics that will be dealt with shortly. The US also further cemented its position in Tajikistan with Dushanbe receiving a \$US 140.5 million humanitarian aid and security package, and an agreement to train Tajik border guards from Washington in 2002.¹³⁸⁶ Tajikistan in apparent reciprocation, and much to the detriment of Russia's imperatives, joined NATO's "Partnership for Peace" program.¹³⁸⁷ The US-Tajik relationship was apparently further consolidated late in 2003 with the conclusion of a number of agreements. In a meeting with President Rakhmanov on 13 November US Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia Elizabeth Jones declared

http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=49 & Sergei Blagov, "Kyrgyzstan Muscles Up But for Whom?", *Asia Times* (August 7, 2002), online at <http://www.atimes.com>

¹³⁸⁴ "Shanghai Cooperation Organization Seeks to Strengthen Anti-Terrorism Component", *Eurasianet*, (January 8, 2002), online at <http://www.eurasianet.org/>

¹³⁸⁵ "United States-Uzbekistan Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework", (12 March, 2002), at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/8736pf.htm>.

¹³⁸⁶ Antoine Blua, "Central Asia: Militarization Could Come at a Cost of Regional Stability", *RFE/RL*, (3 September, 2002), online at <http://www.rferl.org>

¹³⁸⁷ Zafar Abdullayev, "Washington Pushes Economic and Strategic Cooperation with Tajikistan", *Eurasianet*, (April 12, 2004), online at <http://www.eurasianet.org/>

Washington's support for the Tajik bid for membership in the WTO. While on 9 October Tajikistan ratified an accord with the US granting US military personnel immunity from prosecution at the International Criminal Court (ICC), whose jurisdiction the Bush Administration does not recognise.¹³⁸⁸ Moreover, US influence also penetrated Central Asian states not directly effected by events in Afghanistan with the US agreeing to grant military aid to Kazakhstan in August 2002.¹³⁸⁹

Russia and China intensified their efforts to consolidate their bilateral relations with the Central Asian republics over the 2002-2004 period as well gradual initiatives to reinvigorate the SCO to facilitate greater regional cooperation and thus counter US influence in the region. These efforts were aided to a degree by the emergence of Uzbekistan as the favoured US partner in the region. The significant military and economic aid granted to Islam Karimov's government regenerated regional misgivings toward Uzbekistan, particularly on the part of its weaker neighbours Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. These states feared that Uzbekistan's relations with its newfound superpower benefactor would bolster Uzbek pretensions to regional leadership and embolden Karimov to further belligerent unilateral actions to resolve regional disputes or problems.¹³⁹⁰ Uzbekistan had, as highlighted earlier in this chapter, a well-established track record of unilateral and often belligerent behaviour toward its neighbours prior to 11 September 2001, particularly Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.¹³⁹¹ In order to balance the

¹³⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁸⁹ Antoine Blua, "Central Asia: Militarization Could Come at a Cost of Regional Stability", op. cit.

¹³⁹⁰ Boris Rumer, "The Powers in Central Asia", op. cit., p.64.

¹³⁹¹ For example Uzbekistan's unilateral mining of its borders with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in 1999-2000, bombing of Tajik and Kyrgyz territory in 2000, and threats to cut off gas supplies to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in 2000-2001. See, Kenneth Weisbrode, op. cit, pp. 50-51, Marat Mamadshoyev, "The Central Asian Insurgency Raises Questions About Civilian Sympathies and Military Capabilities", Eurasianet, (25 August, 2000), online at <http://www.eurasianet.org>, Ahmed Rashid, "IMU Gradually Developing into a Pan-Central Asian Movement", *Eurasianet*, (3 April, 2001), online at

influence of the US, and its regional client Uzbekistan, the other Central Asian states sought to re-engage with the dominant pre-11 September external powers - Russia and China. Most significantly in the post-11 September 2001 environment, Russian and Chinese efforts focused on measures that would present them as creditable and viable security partners for the Central Asian republics both in a bilateral and multilateral sense.

This was attempted through a variety of direct military and economic aid, and the acceleration of measures to establish the SCO's security and military credentials. In March 2002 Russian president Vladimir Putin held talks with Uzbek, Tajik and Kyrgyz leaders about the possible rescheduling or waiving of their debt to Russia. This was seen by some as a signal of Russian dissatisfaction with the US displacement of its position as the pre-eminent regional economic and security partner. In an attempt to demonstrate to Uzbekistan Russia's continued security commitment to Central Asia the Collective Security Treaty (CST) (involving Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Belarus and Armenia) that had once also included Uzbekistan was re-invigorated with joint military exercises outside of Moscow in May 2002.¹³⁹² Russia also signalled to the US that it was not simply grandstanding in Central Asia by increasing military cooperation with Kyrgyzstan, through the establishment of a Russian air base at Kant in Kyrgyzstan and Kyrgyz agreement to host CST troops in December 2002.¹³⁹³ The close US relationship with Tajikistan in 2002-2003, noted above, subsequently provoked Russian

<http://www.eurasianet.org> & Umed Babakhanov, "Anti-Terrorism Campaign Brings Dushanbe and Tashkent Together", *Eurasianet*, (15 January, 2002), online at <http://www.eurasianet.org>

¹³⁹² Sergei Blagov, "Russia Probes to Bolster Its Authority in Central Asia", op. cit.

¹³⁹³ Martha Brill Olcott, "Taking Stock of Central Asia", op. cit., p.5 & "Tashkent's New Balancing Act After the SCO Summit", *RFE/RL Analytical Reports*, Vol. 3, No. 31, (12 September 2003), online at <http://www.rferl.org>

counter moves and damaged Russo-Tajik relations in the same period. An episode that demonstrated Moscow and Dushanbe's tense relations were Russian threats to deport the large number of Tajik migrant workers in Russia back to Tajikistan in early 2003.¹³⁹⁴ In fact by early 2004, it appeared that the US had eclipsed Russia's pre-eminent position in Tajikistan, particularly in a military sense, with Tajik president Emomali Rakhmanov announcing in April that Russian troops would soon depart the country.¹³⁹⁵ Russo-Tajik relations were also further weakened by wrangling over leasing arrangements for proposed new Russian military facilities in Tajikistan.¹³⁹⁶ A 4 June 2004 summit between Presidents Putin and Rakhmanov, however, produced an agreement that secured Russia's dominant economic and military position in Tajikistan. Russia agreed to waive \$US 300 million of Tajikistan's debt in return for the rights to the Nurek space surveillance centre, Russian corporate participation and investment in Tajik hydro-electric projects and extension of the Russian military presence to 2006.¹³⁹⁷

China also re-invigorated its position in Central Asia by forging new bilateral security agreements and cooperation with the region. China's strategy, much like that of Russia, was to present itself as a real and reliable security partner for the states of Central Asia and thus provide them with a viable alternative to closer security and military relations with the US. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, perhaps not coincidentally due to their common borders with China and significant Uighur populations, were the focus of such Chinese efforts in 2002. In March 2002, the PLA's Deputy Chief of Staff met with

¹³⁹⁴ Zafar Abdullayev, "Washington Pushes Economic and Strategic Cooperation with Tajikistan", op. cit.

¹³⁹⁵ Kambiz Arman, "Tajikistan Shuns United States, Tilts Toward Russia", *Eurasianet*, (14 June, 2004), online at <http://www.eurasianet.org/>

¹³⁹⁶ Stephen Blank, "Russian Forces in Tajikistan: A Permanent Presence?", *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, (June 16, 2004), online at http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=2451

¹³⁹⁷ Kambiz Arman, "Tajikistan Shuns United States, Tilts Toward Russia", op.cit.

Kazakh president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, and on 18 March the Chinese government extended a \$US 3 million military aid package to the Kazakhstani army.¹³⁹⁸ That summer (July 2002) China conducted joint-military exercises with Kyrgyzstan, its first with a Central Asian state, thus signalling its commitment to wider security-military cooperation in the region.¹³⁹⁹ While on 23 December 2002 a Sino-Kazakh "Mutual Cooperation Agreement" was concluded that pledged the parties to cooperate militarily to combat "terrorism, separatism and extremism", and to develop trade relations.¹⁴⁰⁰ The following year China moved to extend this strategy toward its relations with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan that culminated in Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing's visits to Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan between 1-6 September 2003.¹⁴⁰¹ These visits resulted in the conclusion of inter-governmental agreements on bilateral cooperation against "terrorism, separatism and extremism" with each state.¹⁴⁰² Moreover, in October 2003 China supplied Kyrgyzstan with over \$US 1 million in direct security/military related assistance.¹⁴⁰³ Simultaneously, the government moved to ban four groups branded as terrorist and extremist organisations, three of which – Organisation for the Liberation of Turkestan, Islamic Party of Turkestan and ETIM – according to China were involved in incidents in Xinjiang.¹⁴⁰⁴ Moreover, in 2002 and

¹³⁹⁸ Sergei Blagov, "Russia Probes to Bolster Its Authority in Central Asia", *Eurasianet*, (March 27, 2002)

¹³⁹⁹ Charles Carlson, "Central Asia: Shanghai Cooperation Organization Makes Military Debut", *RFE/RL*, (August 5, 2003) & "Central Asians Perform Military Maneuvers, Training Against Terrorists", *RFE/RL Analytical Reports*, Vol. 3, No. 26, (3 August, 2003)

¹⁴⁰⁰ Antoine Blua, "Kazakhstan: President Nazarbaev Signs Mutual Cooperation Agreement with China", *RFE/RL* (27 December, 2002), online at <http://www.rferl.org>

¹⁴⁰¹ "China's Great Game in Central Asia", *RFE/RL Analytical Reports*, Vol. 3, No. 31, (12 September, 2003)

¹⁴⁰² Ibid & "Transcaucasia and Central Asia: Chinese Foreign Minister Signs Anti-Terrorism Agreements with Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan", *RFE/RL Newslines*, Vol. 7, No. 170, (8 September, 2003), online at <http://www.rferl.org/newslines>

¹⁴⁰³ Bakyt Ibraimov, "Uighurs: Beijing to Blame for Kyrgyz Crackdown", *Eurasianet*, (28 January, 2004), online at <http://www.eurasianet.org/>

¹⁴⁰⁴ Antoine Blue, "Central Asia: Kyrgyz Rights Activists Call For End to Deportation of Uighurs to China", *RFE/RL*, (21 January 2004), online at <http://www.rferl.org>

2003 China, by virtue of bilateral security agreements and police cooperation, deported alleged Uighur "separatists and terrorists" from neighbouring Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and from as far afield as Nepal.¹⁴⁰⁵

Such bilateral agreements, however, also developed in parallel to China and Russia's re-energization of the SCO over the 2001-2004 period. These efforts made limited headway in 2002 due to the wide array of US agreements and cooperation with the Central Asian states noted above. The SCO-related initiatives in 2002 were very much focused on establishing the organisation's operational framework, rather than active, "on the ground" military and security activities. Thus the heads of SCO states' border guards meet in Almaty (Kazakhstan) to coordinate responses to border security, illegal migration, and drug trafficking on 24 April 2002.¹⁴⁰⁶ Furthermore, the SCO's official charter was adopted at its 7 June 2002 meeting in St. Petersburg and agreement reached regarding the establishment of the SCO secretariat in Beijing and the "Regional Anti-Terrorism" (RAT) centre in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan).¹⁴⁰⁷ The lack of concrete practical action to make good on SCO rhetoric regarding regional military and security cooperation in 2002 led some observers to consider the SCO a "still born" organisation and a regional talk fest made irrelevant by the penetration of US power into Central Asia.¹⁴⁰⁸ Yet, China and Russia's intent to make the SCO an important regional player

¹⁴⁰⁵ Ibid, Rustam Mukhamedov, "Uyghurs in Kyrgyzstan Under Careful Government Supervision", *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, (January 28, 2004), online at http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=2108. For the Nepal case see Amnesty International, *China: Country Report 2004*, online at <http://web.amnesty.org/report2004>

¹⁴⁰⁶ Sergei Blagov, "Shanghai Cooperation Organization Prepares for New Role", *Eurasianet*, (April 29, 2002)

¹⁴⁰⁷ Sergei Blagov, "SCO Continues to Search for Operational Framework", *Eurasianet*, (June 11, 2002),

¹⁴⁰⁸ For example see, Sean Yom, "Russian-Chinese Pact a 'Great Game' Victim", *Asia Times*, (July 30, 2002), online at <http://www.atimes.com>, Stephen Blank, "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Its Future", *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, (May 22, 2002), online at http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=1150,

was further underlined at a 30 November 2002 summit between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Jiang Zemin in Beijing that focused on promoting the role of the SCO and declared the continuation of the Sino-Russian “strategic partnership”.¹⁴⁰⁹ This Sino-Russian commitment was borne out in the following year. Between 6-11 August 2003, the SCO states except Uzbekistan conducted “Cooperation –2003” joint military exercises on Kazakh and Chinese soil.¹⁴¹⁰ The absence of Uzbekistan illustrated Tashkent's half-hearted commitment to the SCO and served to strengthen Russian and Chinese perceptions that Karimov's government was yet to be convinced of the benefits that the SCO could contribute to Uzbek security. The 8 September 2003 SCO meeting in Tashkent (Uzbekistan) thus assumed great significance for the strategic imperatives of China and Russia in Central Asia. At this summit it was announced that the SCO secretariat would begin its functions on 1 January 2004 in Beijing and the executive committee of the RAT centre would open on 1 November 2003 in Tashkent and not Bishkek as previously announced.¹⁴¹¹ The transfer of the RAT to Uzbekistan from Kyrgyzstan was symptomatic of Russia and China's desire to see Uzbekistan drawn away from the US orbit. This pandering to Karimov's regional leadership pretensions appeared to be accepted by the other SCO states, particularly Kyrgyzstan, as a necessary concession to actively encourage Tashkent into wider involvement in the organisation.¹⁴¹² Therefore, by the beginning of 2004 Russia and China through their

¹⁴⁰⁹ Sergei Blagov, “Russia Seeking to Strengthen Regional Organizations to Counterbalance Western Influence”, *Eurasianet*, (December 4, 2002)

¹⁴¹⁰ Charles Carlson, “Central Asia: Shanghai Cooperation Organization Makes Military Debut”, *RFE/RL*, (August 5, 2003) & “Central Asians Perform Military Maneuvers, Training Against Terrorists”, *RFE/RL Analytical Reports*, Vol. 3, No. 26, (3 August, 2003), online at <http://www.rferl.org>

¹⁴¹¹ “Tashkent's New Balancing Act After the SCO Summit”, *RFE/RL Analytical Reports*, Vol. 3, No. 31, (12 September, 2003), online at <https://www.rferl.org>

¹⁴¹² *Ibid.*

bilateral relations with the Central Asian republics and the SCO had achieved a measure of success in re-establishing their pre-11 September positions in the region. For China this was particularly accurate with respect to its relations with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

The events of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent US political, economic and military penetration of Afghanistan and Central Asia also had important implications for China's position and strategy in Xinjiang. The most immediate impact of these developments was to reinforce the state's long-held perception of a causal linkage between ethnic minority opposition to continued Chinese rule and external, Central Asian and "international terrorist forces". One month after the 11 September attacks in October 2001 China implemented another "Strike Hard" campaign in Xinjiang aimed at "ethnic separatist and terrorist forces". According to Amnesty International this involved further restrictions on the religious and cultural rights of Xinjiang's Muslims between October 2001 and March 2002 similar to those instituted during the "Strike Hard" campaigns of the late 1990s that were detailed earlier.¹⁴¹³ This report estimated that over the October 2001 to March 2002 period up to 3000 people had been arrested or detained in Xinjiang in connection to "illegal religious activities" or "ethnic separatism and terrorism".¹⁴¹⁴ As in the past these measures not only targeted those deemed to be actively opposing the state but were also applied to religious and cultural practices that, in the state's perception, reinforced ethnic minority separateness from the Chinese state. Thus, Muslim clerics and students were arrested or detained for participation in "illegal

¹⁴¹³ Amnesty International, *People's Republic of China: China's Anti-Terrorism Legislation and Repression in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region*, (22 March, 2002), online at <http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGASA170102002>

¹⁴¹⁴ Ibid, This figure is based on Uighur émigré sources.

religious activities", "illegal religious centres" closed, and imams compelled to attend "political education" sessions.¹⁴¹⁵ Religious worship, education or instruction was also restricted to those 18 years of age and above, and a general discrimination against religious observance implemented. A pertinent example of the latter, and one that had been prevalent prior to 11 September 2001, were restrictions on the practice of fasting during the holy month of Ramadan - particularly for employees of state institutions such as schools, hospitals and government offices. The authorities also identified increased censorship of cultural and media circles as a key area of "struggle" in the fight against "separatist" tendencies.¹⁴¹⁶ The extent of the state's connection of "separatism" with any overt sign of ethnic minority identity was further reinforced with the provincial government's decision in May 2002 that instruction of the majority of courses at Xinjiang University were to be conducted in Chinese, rather than Uighur and Chinese as previously.¹⁴¹⁷ Moreover, the following month also saw the authorities begin to confiscate Uighur language books dealing with political or cultural history from schools and colleges throughout Xinjiang.¹⁴¹⁸ The Chinese government's all-encompassing campaign to negate ethnic minority opposition under the guise of the "War on Terrorism" was carried into 2003 with Amnesty International's Country Report on China for the period January - December 2003 asserting that China's "zero tolerance" approach in Xinjiang continued unabated.¹⁴¹⁹ Thus it argued that:

The authorities continued to use the international "war on terrorism" to justify harsh repression in Xinjiang, which continued to result in serious human rights violations against the ethnic Uighur community. The

¹⁴¹⁵ Ibid, p.5.

¹⁴¹⁶ Ibid, pp.5-6.

¹⁴¹⁷ Michael Dillon, "Uyghur Language and Culture Under Threat in Xinjiang", *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, (August 14, 2002), online at http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=23

¹⁴¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴¹⁹ Amnesty International, *Country Report: People's Republic of China, 2004*, online at <http://web.amnesty.org/report2004/chn-summary-eng>, p.7.

authorities continued to make little distinction between acts of violence and acts of passive resistance. Repression was often manifested through assaults on Uighur culture, such as the closure of several mosques, restrictions on the use of the Uighur language and the banning of certain Uighur books and journals.¹⁴²⁰

The Chinese government's linkage of Xinjiang separatists to the Taliban, al Qaida and the IMU, however, gained a measure of legitimacy over the same period. In March 2002 the US Department of Defence acknowledged for the first time that they had captured an undisclosed number of Uighurs in US military operations in Afghanistan and that the Northern Alliance held up to twenty others.¹⁴²¹ The true number of Uighurs that fought (or perhaps are still fighting) with the Taliban, al Qaida or the IMU remains something of a mystery. China for its part claimed in May 2002 that over 1000 Uighurs had been trained in camps in Afghanistan and many had returned to Xinjiang to carry out *jihad*.¹⁴²² The existence and scope of Uighur "separatist" groups operating within Xinjiang is also a matter of debate. The Chinese government on 14 November 2001, for example, presented to its SCO partners a list of ten separatist or "terrorist" organisations that it claimed were based in Afghanistan, Central Asia and Xinjiang.¹⁴²³ According to a US government report in December 2001, there were six major identifiable Uighur separatist organisations in Xinjiang and Central Asia:

- 1) United Revolutionary Front of Eastern Turkestan (URFET) - based in Kazakhstan. Originally the United National Revolutionary Front (UNRF) but changed its name in 1997 and switched to a policy of armed resistance to Chinese "oppression".

¹⁴²⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴²¹ Matthew Forney, "One Nation Divided: Since September 11, Beijing Has Been Cracking Down in Xinjiang", *Time International*, Vol. 159, (25 March, 2002), pp.38-39.

¹⁴²² Graham E. Fuller & Jonathan N. Lipman, "Islam in Xinjiang", *op. cit.*, p.342.

¹⁴²³ Ibid.

- (2) Organization for the Liberation of Uighurstan (OLU) - This organisation is reported to be internally divided but committed to armed struggle.
- (3) Wolves of Lop Nor - The Wolves have claimed responsibility for bombings and assassinations in Xinjiang over the 1991-2004 period.
- (4) Xinjiang Liberation Organization and Uighur Liberation Organization (ULO) - This organisation is reported to be active in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and thought to be responsible for the assassination of Uighurs viewed as "collaborators".
- (5) Home of East Turkestan Youth - This radical group is compared to Hamas and is reported to have over 2000 members, some of whom were trained in Afghanistan.
- (6) Free Turkistan Movement - The organisation held responsible for the Baren incident in April 1990.¹⁴²⁴

It is significant that this report does not mention ETIM, the group subsequently listed by the Bush Administration as an "international terrorist organisation" the following year. This report also suggests that some of these organisations may have links, not necessarily strong ones, to Central Asian and South Asian Islamic movements. The most incidental links appear to be with the Pakistani organisations Tableeghi Jamaat and Jamaat-i-Islami. The former is largely a missionary organisation that the Chinese government has blamed for the dissemination of "religious materials" in Xinjiang.¹⁴²⁵ The latter, however, is Pakistan's largest Islamic political party and is regarded as having been intimately involved in recruiting for the Afghan mujahideen and then the Taliban.¹⁴²⁶ The strongest links between Uighur separatists and external organisations appear to be with Central Asian based groups. Most notable in this regard are the IMU

¹⁴²⁴ Adapted from Dewardric L. McNeal, *China's Relations with Central Asian States and Problems with Terrorism*, (Congressional Research Service, December 17, 2001), op. cit at , p.7-9.

¹⁴²⁵ Ibid, pp.10-11.

¹⁴²⁶ For example see, Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia*, (London: I. B. Taurus, 2000) & M. Eshan Ahrari, *Jihadi Groups, Nuclear Pakistan and the New Great*

or the IPT as they have reportedly become since June 2001 and Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Islamic Revival) the history of which were addressed earlier. The Kyrgyz government on 8 October 2002 also claimed that there were linkages between the IMU/IPT, HT and Uighur separatists. The head of the Kyrgyz National Security Service, Kalyk Imankulov, announced that he had obtained information indicating that the IMU/IPT, HT, Uighur separatists and other Central Asian "Islamists" were uniting to form an "Islamic Movement of Central Asia".¹⁴²⁷ Moreover, he claimed that this new amalgam of "Islamists" aimed to establish an Islamic caliphate across Central Asia, including Xinjiang.¹⁴²⁸ Perhaps more importantly for China than its SCO partners acknowledging the "terrorist" threat in Xinjiang was the position of the Bush Administration. As noted earlier, the US State Department listed ETIM in September 2002 as an "international terrorist organization" and froze the group's finances.¹⁴²⁹ Many observers questioned the veracity of the Bush Administration's listing of ETIM on a number of grounds including the fact that neither Uighur émigré organisations nor Xinjiang and Central Asian scholars had any knowledge of the groups existence prior to the Chinese government's claims in January 2001.¹⁴³⁰

Game, (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, August 2001), online at <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/welcome.htm>.

¹⁴²⁷ Zamira Eshanova, "Central Asia: Are Radical Groups Joining Forces?", *RFE/RL*, (8 October, 2002), online at <http://www.rferl.org>

¹⁴²⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁴²⁹ Graham E. Fuller & Jonathan N. Lipman, "Islam in Xinjiang", *op. cit.*, pp.342-343.

¹⁴³⁰ For example, Erkin Dolat, "Washington Betrays China's Uighurs", *Asia Times*, (September 5, 2002), *op. cit.*, Seva Gunitskiy, "In the Spotlight: East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM)", *Center for Defense Information (CDI)*, (December 9, 2002), *op. cit.* & Chinese government report, "East Turkistan Terrorists Exposed", *China Daily*, (21 January 2002), online at <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn>, pp.1-15.

As noted previously, China has pursued a strategy in Xinjiang and Central Asia since 1991 that has reflected its strategic concepts and goals for the integration of Xinjiang into the PRC. The events of 11 September 2001 and its aftermath in Afghanistan-Central Asia have done little to weaken China's commitment to this goal. As I demonstrated earlier regarding the generation of regional competition/rivalry following 11 September 2001, China has continued to express the external modalities of its Xinjiang strategy - to achieve greater regional security cooperation, greater regional economic cooperation and development of infrastructural links with Central Asia. Moreover, I have just outlined the reinforced policies of control within Xinjiang and the acceptance, on the part of key powers in Central Asia - Russia and the US - of the "terrorist" threat to China in the region. The internal expression of this process has followed a similar pattern, with China intensifying its integrationist policies in Xinjiang. The "Great Western Development" (2000-2010), in which the government has arguably placed much political and economic capital, aims to make China's western provinces into an industrial and agricultural base and a trade and energy corridor for the national economy. Due to two related reasons Xinjiang is central to this long-term strategy - its geo-strategic position at the crossroads of Central Asia and due to the logic of its political strategy for Xinjiang. What I mean by this second aspect is that the Chinese government has viewed economic development and prosperity for Xinjiang's ethnic minority populations as a cure-all for "ethnic separatist" tendencies. Therefore, the economic development of Xinjiang is perceived to be central to the state's ability to secure the region and ensure its integration. This strategy has in fact been intensified since 11 September 2001 and as of June 2004 appears to have consolidated China's

control over Xinjiang and contributed to the re-invigoration of its position in Central Asia.

The re-invigoration of the state's development strategy in Xinjiang over the 2001-2004 period has, as during the 1991-2001 period, focused on the development of economic and infrastructural linkages between Central Asia and Xinjiang. Significantly, the expansion of US power into Central Asia appears to have reinforced China's perception of the necessity for it to diversify its energy strategy in order to safeguard China's energy security. This has been reflected in a number of developments since 2001. In May 2002 the long talked about Kazakhstan-China pipeline, a joint venture of CNPC and the Kazak state oil corporation KazMunayGaz, began construction. Moreover, the 1300km Atasu-Alatau Pass section (on the Kazakh-Xinjiang border) of this pipeline was begun in June 2004, while CNPC reportedly began construction of a 400km section from Alatau to its Dushanzi (Xinjiang) refinery in May 2004.¹⁴³¹ These pipelines are to be linked by 2006 to the estimated \$US18 billion 2600km Xinjiang-Shanghai pipeline, of which the Shanghai-Changqing oilfield (in Shaanxi Province) section began construction in 2000.¹⁴³² In an important development that signalled China's commitment to the diversification of its energy supplies Chinese and Kazakh presidents Hu Jintao and Nursultan Nazarbayev signed an agreement on 20 May 2004 for joint exploration and development of oil and gas resources in the Caspian Sea.¹⁴³³

¹⁴³¹ Antoine Blua, "China: Beijing Keen to Pursue Oil Projects with Neighbours", *RFE/RL*, (26 May, 2004), online at <http://www.rferl.org>

¹⁴³² Felix K. Chang, "Chinese Energy and Asian Security", *Orbis*, Vol.45, No.2, (Spring 2001), pp.222-223 & Ariel Cohen, "China's Quest for Eurasia's Natural Resources", *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, (February 26, 2003), online at http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=1103

¹⁴³³ Antoine Blua, "China: Beijing Keen to Pursue Oil Projects with Neighbours", *RFE/RL*, (26 May, 2004), online at <http://www.rferl.org>

Other non-energy related infrastructure projects and developments between Xinjiang and Central Asia also expanded after 2001, such as the opening of international bus routes between Osh (Kyrgyzstan) and Kashgar (Xinjiang) in May 2002.¹⁴³⁴ In May 2003 China pledged \$US15 million for the construction of highway linking Xinjiang and Lake Issyk-Kul in Kyrgyzstan and in September 2003 agreed to establish a highway link between Xinjiang and Tajikistan.¹⁴³⁵ Furthermore, in December 2003 Kyrgyzstan announced a deal to sell hydro-electric power to Xinjiang, while Chinese officials subsequently announced a \$US 2.5 million feasibility study to construct a Kyrgyz-Xinjiang rail link.¹⁴³⁶ In parallel with these measures to expand the infrastructure links between Xinjiang and Central Asia, the Chinese government has also intensified the major elements of its economic development strategy within Xinjiang. The government's White Paper on Xinjiang of May 2003, for example, called for the continuation and intensification of the "Great Western Development" launched in 2000. This has involved the expansion of two "pillar" industries in Xinjiang - cotton cultivation and energy exploitation that have been dealt with in detail earlier in the present chapter. The scope of the cotton strategy, regardless of the political, economic, social and environmental implications, appears to have been intensified with 40% of Xinjiang's arable land under cotton cultivation by 2003.¹⁴³⁷ The focus on the exploitation of the region's energy sources also proceeds apace with CNPC investing 2.1bn yuan or \$US 250 million in energy projects throughout Xinjiang in 2002-

¹⁴³⁴ Michael Dillon, "Bus Attack Highlights Problems in China-Kyrgyzstan Relations", (April 23, 2003), online at http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=1347.

¹⁴³⁵ "China's Great Game in Central Asia", *RFE/RL Analytical Reports*, Vol. 3, No. 31, (12 September, 2003), online at <http://www.rferl.org>

¹⁴³⁶ Bakyt Ibraimov, "Uighurs: Beijing to Blame for Kyrgyz Crackdown", Eurasianet, (January 1, 2004), online at <http://www.eurasianet.org>

¹⁴³⁷ Eric Hagt, "China's Water Policies: Implications for Xinjiang and Kazakhstan", *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, (30 July, 2003), online at http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=1615.

2003.¹⁴³⁸ These policies, however, have the potential to generate problems for China not only within Xinjiang but also in its relations with the neighbouring Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The cultivation of cotton of course requires vast quantities of water that in Central Asia and Xinjiang is a precious and limited commodity. China's need for water in Xinjiang has led to the development of plans to divert water from the Ili and Irtysh Rivers, which subsequently flow into Kazakhstan and Russia. The completion of this would have possibly disastrous environmental consequences, such as salinization and desertification that has occurred in the Aral Sea, as well as negative implications for regional security.¹⁴³⁹

The events of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent penetration of US power into Central Asia have thus not so much transformed the geo-political environment in the region as introduced another variable into an already complex equation. The Central Asian states before 11 September 2001 were, as I have demonstrated, eventually compelled into greater cooperation both in a bilateral and multilateral sense (ie. SCO) with the dominant external powers - Russia and China. Post 11 September, however, the Central Asian states rapidly aligned themselves with the US due to the political, economic and military benefits (that were detailed earlier) on offer during the prosecution of the Afghan invasion. Largely due to the internal considerations of Xinjiang and Chechnya, and their overall relations with the US, both China and Russia acquiesced to the subsequent expansion of US influence in Central Asia. This convergence of interest proved to be simply a "marriage of convenience" both in relation to the US-Russia-China configuration and the US-Central Asian relationships.

¹⁴³⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴³⁹ Martha Brill Olcott, "Taking Stock of Central Asia", op. cit., p. 9.

For China US penetration of Central Asia was a contradictory development. The removal of the Taliban and the rationale of the "War on Terrorism" were viewed as contributing to China's strategic interests by removing an alleged sanctuary for Islamic militants from across Central Asia, including Xinjiang, and providing a further justification for its approach to ethnic minority opposition in Xinjiang. This was, however, the extent of the benefits accruing to China as a result of the US presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia.

It emerged quite rapidly that the US emphasis on military and security relations with the Central Asian states weakened a key element of China's strategy in the region - the SCO. By March 2002, however, both Russia and China moved to re-invigorate the organisation and make it a viable option as a regional security mechanism. These efforts, as we have seen, were aided to a degree by Uzbekistan's emergence as the Bush Administration's favoured regional partner, with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan particularly wary of the possible spur to Karimov's regional leadership pretensions that this could generate. The close alignment of the US with Uzbekistan thus prompted the other Central Asian republics to seek greater alignment with Russia and China, both as a counter measure against Uzbekistan and as compensation for a relative "missing out" regarding US military and economic largesse. In a sense the expansion of US power into Central Asia facilitated the development of "multi-vectored" foreign policies on the part of the Central Asian republics as they sought to diversify their foreign relations and generate greater strategic benefits from the competing external powers - Russia, China and the US. That is to say the dynamics of the "New Great Game" have not been negated but sustained by the entry of US power on the Central Asian stage. The Central

Asian states to varying degrees have all sought to use the "War on Terrorism" to clampdown on existing political opposition within their own states and bolster their regional standing. The most obvious example of this has been Uzbekistan, but all the republics have indulged in similar tactics against domestic political opponents. In effect the US presence has emboldened some of the regional regimes that prior to 11 September led a fragile existence and according to a respected Central Asian scholar:

Rather than being frightened of the United States, the Central Asian leaders generally see their role in the war on terrorism as making themselves less rather than more vulnerable to US criticism. Each leader seems to have convinced himself that his role is vital, whether the contribution is in the form of airbases (in Kyrgyzstan and in Uzbekistan), or of overflight and limited landing rights (in Tajikistan and Kazakhstan) or of facilitating the transfer of humanitarian assistance (in Turkmenistan). This message has been reinforced by the treatment that many of them have received during official visits to the United States in the past year.¹⁴⁴⁰

This state of affairs is startlingly reminiscent of the course of US foreign policy in the developing world during the Cold War, where the propping up of authoritarian or dictatorial regimes so long as they opposed the omnipresent "communist" threat was par for the course. The course of the "War on Terrorism", at least in Central Asia, appears to be following the same path with authoritarian regimes pledging loyalty to the fight against the supposedly encompassing (and conveniently ambiguous) threat of "terrorism". The key problem for the present US administration and its "allies" in Central Asia (such as Uzbekistan), and Russia and China for that matter is that the "enemies" are not other states but loosely organised Islamic or ethnic separatist revolutionaries. In essence the US "led" "international coalition" against terrorism is nothing more than an alignment of states for the protection of states, and as such it is

¹⁴⁴⁰ Martha Brill Olcott, "Taking Stock of Central Asia", op. cit., p.12.

inherently fragile as it is "first and foremost a policeman's association".¹⁴⁴¹ Moreover, as I have demonstrated, China and Russia's strategic goals in the region, beyond the limited goal of destroying the Taliban, diverged significantly from those of the US. Lieven's categorisation of the "international coalition" as a "policeman's association" is apt and has proven to be accurate. The various measures instituted by the US in its relations with the Central Asian states and similar measures undertaken by China and Russia in the region have all reflected the "policeman's" imperative to suppress overt manifestations of threat rather than construct coherent responses to the cause of that threat. Thus throughout Central Asia the existing regimes have been able to clamp down with greater force on domestic political opposition than possible before 11 September 2001. As of March 2004 Uzbekistan's jails, for example, held somewhere in the order of 5000 political prisoners, the majority of which were suspected of membership of the banned Hizb-ut-Tahrir organisation, while similar campaigns against state-defined "Islamists" have also occurred in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan since 2001.¹⁴⁴² China, as we have seen, has also utilised the events of 11 September 2001 to further reinforce its "zero-tolerance" approach to ethnic minority opposition in Xinjiang.

It is now clear that US involvement in Central Asia has played a significant role in intensifying elements of the "New Great Game", with the Central Asian states pursuing a multi-vectored foreign policy triangulating between the pre-eminent external powers of the US, China and Russia. An important aspect of this process has been the fate of

¹⁴⁴¹ These issues are dealt with, for example, in a perceptive article by Anatol Lieven. Anatol Lieven, "The Secret Policeman's Ball: The United States, Russia and the International Order After 11 September", *International Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 2, (2002), pp.245-259.

¹⁴⁴² Daniel Kimmage, "The Growth of Radical Islam in Central Asia", *Asia Times*, (March 31, 2004), online at <http://www.atime.com>

the SCO since 11 September 2001. The close cooperation of Russia and the Central Asian states with the US in late 2001 and early 2002 weakened the viability of the SCO, challenging a key element of China's strategy in the region. The subsequent US courtship of Central Asia, particularly Uzbekistan, compelled the remaining Central Asian republics to seek further engagement with China and Russia. China and Russia for their part, although clearly responding differently to the immediate US expansion into the region, gradually moved closer together as their wariness of long-term US imperatives in the region grew. This process was reflected in Chinese and Russian initiatives to re-establish the SCO as a regional security mechanism throughout 2002-2004, as well as renewed bilateral initiatives with the Central Asian states. The relative success of these efforts could be seen in the SCO joint military exercises in 2003 and the establishment of the SCO RAT centre in Tashkent in November 2003. Thus China's position in Xinjiang and Central Asia as of June 2004 is perhaps stronger than it was in 2001. Moreover, I have demonstrated over the course of this chapter that assertions of China's "strategic defeat" in Central Asia are not only premature, but fails to recognise that China's strategy in Central Asia is intimately linked to the progress of its integrationist goal in Xinjiang.

CHAPTER 9

THE "PERMANENT PROVOCATION": XINJIANG'S INTEGRATION WITH CHINA, 1759-2004

At the beginning of the 21st century Xinjiang remains an "integral" province of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Yet, as elucidated in the introduction to this thesis, this is not a statement of fact implying the triumphant completion of a historical goal. Rather, as this thesis has amply demonstrated, it signifies an ongoing process in the development of the power relationship between the Chinese state and Xinjiang. This thesis has explored the development of this relationship from the Qing conquest in the mid-18th century to the ongoing "New Great Game" era of Central Eurasian politics. I have argued that this relationship has been framed and characterised by the development of two encompassing themes - one of integration and assimilation, and the other, one of confrontation or opposition of Chinese to "external" influences. The relationship between these two themes across the 1759-2004 period has been one of "permanent provocation" whereby their interaction has produced mutual continuity and contestation. The Chinese state's goal of integration, and the concrete strategies and techniques employed in Xinjiang to attain it, have required the continued operation and vitality of opposing tendencies and dynamics. This process has provided (and continues to provide) both impetus and legitimation, in the perception of the state, for the exercise of state power in Xinjiang. Yet, as will be evident from the preceding chapters, this interaction has not proceeded along a constant trajectory. Rather, the process has been characterised by fluctuations in the state's commitment to the goal of integration and in its ability to implement appropriate strategies with which to achieve integration.

The thesis has charted the evolution and interaction of these processes across three state formations in China - imperial, republican and communist - and identified distinct phases within these "macro-periods" that have highlighted the embedding of the goal of integration and the continuity of specific "policies" in Xinjiang. Chapters three and four, for example, dealing with the "warlord" period of 1911-1949, demonstrated that even at this nadir of Chinese state power in Xinjiang the imperative of integration was pre-eminent. This was not only reflected in the Republican government's claims to the region but also within Sino-Soviet relations and in the actions of the largely autonomous, but Han Chinese, "warlords". Moreover, these chapters highlighted, perhaps most explicitly of any in the thesis, that the existence of and potential establishment of alternative political realities other than Chinese rule in Xinjiang were crucial to the reinforcement of the state's will to integrate. As such this thesis has adopted an encompassing historical perspective on the Chinese state's project of integration in Xinjiang. This perspective has permitted the excavation of the broad contours of this process and the exploration of their implications for China's contemporary position in Xinjiang and Central Asia. The content and conduct of China's "foreign policy" in Central Asia since 1991 (addressed in chapters seven and eight), for example, has reflected the state's core imperatives in Xinjiang - control, economic development and integration. Moreover, it cannot be otherwise, as this thesis has demonstrated that the development of the Chinese state's "governmentalising" power distinguishes little between the "internal" and "external". It will be recalled that in the introduction I outlined that the key to the Foucauldian concept of governmentality is to conceive of "government" as the "conduct of conduct". The purpose of the exercise of this form of power is to manage the possible field of action of others. This thesis has

demonstrated that the exercise of state power in Xinjiang has been characterised by this over-arching goal to manage - that is to conduct, control and direct - that which constitute the region. Therefore, Chinese "policy" has not, for example, attempted to "solve" the ostensibly threatening continuity of ethnic minority identities in Xinjiang. Rather it has, through the identification, categorisation and legitimisation of these identities over a long historical period, utilised and ultimately controlled their existence to underpin the continuity of the extension of state action in the region.

Throughout I have identified the overwhelming theme of integration in the Chinese state's perception of the region and explored the implications of the continuity of this goal for both the state's actions in Xinjiang and along its western frontiers. Ultimately this thesis has demonstrated that, since the early years of the 19th century, the goal of integration has been embedded in the state's perception of the correct relationship between Xinjiang and itself. This process has also inexorably impacted upon the various methods, strategies and tactics implemented by the state across this historical period to achieve this over-arching goal. As we have seen, the goal of the state in Xinjiang evolved through various phases and moved from a commitment to the region's segregation in the immediate post-conquest Qing era (1759-1820) to a total re-orientation towards integration by the Republican era (1911-1949). A focus of the thesis has therefore, in part, been upon how this goal of segregation was transformed into one of integration.

The Course of the Integrationist Project in Xinjiang, 1759-2004

The goal of integration was not the initial imperative of Qing rule in Xinjiang following the destruction of the Zunghars and exile of the Makhdumzada Khojas in Xinjiang circa 1759-60. The pre-eminent goal of Qing rule over the 1759-1820 period was in fact to segregate and isolate Xinjiang from China. Consequently the administrative structure and techniques of rule reflected these goals, as illustrated by the establishment of Qing authority through the indirect mechanism of the *beg* system. Moreover, these imperatives were also reflected in the construction of Qing knowledge of Xinjiang, and felt with particular intensity during the Qianlong-era (1735-1795). Key themes of governmentality were initiated and developed in the 1759-1820 period, such as the systematization of Qing knowledge regarding Xinjiang's geography, cartography and ethnography. Importantly, these projects ultimately reflected the prevailing universalistic imperial ideology, whereby the emperorship was portrayed and expressed across multiple cultural frames. These projects, however, also enabled the Qing to formulate more efficient methods, tactics and techniques for ruling Xinjiang. The quest to "know" or "survey" the new territories not only led to the development of such "internal" measures but also spurred the imperative to develop an understanding or complex of knowledge regarding that which lay outside of the realm. Therefore, the Qing administrative approach within Xinjiang was coupled and interacted with phenomena or dynamics that lay or had their origins outside of Xinjiang – namely the Makhdumzada Khojas, the Central Asian Khanate of Khoqand and trade. The structure and content of Qing administration in the 1759-1820 period not only reflected the goals of segregation and control, but also the imperatives to control or negate the influence of these three external elements.

The “Jahangir Jihad” from 1820-1828 and Khoqand’s subsequent incursions into Xinjiang circa 1830 effectively called into question the veracity of both Qing administrative policy and its approach to external affairs. These traumas for Qing rule in Xinjiang initiated an, albeit gradual, re-evaluation of the rationality that underpinned the key structures of Qing power in Xinjiang. The results of this re-evaluation became felt with varying intensity across the constituent elements of Qing rule in Xinjiang from the mid-1830s onward. The first manifestation of a transformation of Qing techniques/tactics flowed from the “unequal” treaty with Khoqand. Although the treaty itself was an extension of a long-standing pragmatic practice of Qing “diplomacy” in Inner Asia, it provided the motivation and opportunity for the Qing to begin the implementation of a series of reforms regarding the structure and content of “internal” administration. These reforms, most notably those concerning the encouragement of Han Chinese colonisation of the Altishahr, reflected the transformation of the guiding principle of Qing administration of Xinjiang until that time – segregation. Moreover, this point of rupture initiated the movement toward the construction of the Qing as a *Chinese* empire rather than a Chinese *and* Inner Asian empire.

This process was not instantaneous but developed gradually from the 1830s onward and culminated at the end of Yaqub Beg’s “rebellion” with the formation of Xinjiang as a province of the empire. The cornerstone of the new rationality of Qing administration of Xinjiang following Zuo Zangtang’s re-conquest was ultimately integration. The concrete policies that flowed from this new goal were concerned with the extension of a web of political, economic, cultural and ideological linkages from China to Xinjiang. These were important not only in terms of securing the integration of the new province

but of negating or minimising the long-standing political, economic, cultural, ethnic, and ideological linkages between Xinjiang and Central Asia. This transformation of the structure and content of Qing administration was mirrored by a new approach to external affairs. The initial manifestation of this was the Qing stance regarding the Russian occupation of Ili. Although the Treaty of St. Petersburg of 1881 occurred before Xinjiang became a province, it demonstrated that the Qing were no longer prepared to “buy off” external powers in Xinjiang with various concessions as had occurred regarding Khoqand in the 1830s. Similar concessions were no longer conceivable given the re-evaluation of the structure and goal of the administration of Xinjiang that had begun immediately after Yaqub Beg’s defeat. The focus on integration ultimately flowed through to the conception of how to manage elements of external affairs related to Xinjiang. The major issues confronted by the Qing in Xinjiang regarding external affairs after Yaqub Beg’s defeat were similar in content to those confronted during the 1830s, but the form had changed dramatically. The independent states of Central Asia – Khiva, Khoqand and Bukhara – had ceased to exist, incorporated by Russia during the 1870s, thus eliminating the troublesome Khoqandi factor. The extinguishing of Khoqand as a factor did not prevent the continuation of the political, economic, religious and cultural links that existed between Xinjiang and Central Asia. The continued existence of these linkages remained a threat to the Qing project in Xinjiang, particularly in light of the transformation of imperial perceptions and goals in Xinjiang. Qing policy in Xinjiang from 1759 to 1911 could be considered a success as it effectively implanted the notion of Xinjiang as being an integral part of the “Chinese” state into an emerging national consciousness in the early 20th century. The processes initiated directly or indirectly by the Qing over the course of their one

hundred and fifty-year presence in Xinjiang, such as the Qianlong-era geographic and ethnographic projects, established an expanded geographic and political conception of what constituted China. This was demonstrably not the goal of the Qianlong emperor, but the series of challenges confronted by the Qing in Xinjiang throughout the 19th century precipitated the reorientation of techniques and tactics of rule. That Xinjiang did not fall into the hands of an external power or become independent after the collapse of the Qing is a powerful demonstration of the force of the expanded conception of the “geo-body” that the Qing had constructed.

The end of the Qing-era ushered in a period of fragmentation in China that resulted in the "semi-independence" of Xinjiang from the Chinese state from 1911 to 1949. Throughout this period Xinjiang experienced the continuation of many of the themes and dynamics that characterised the region in the Qing era. Xinjiang between 1911 and 1949 was characterised by the continued tension between and interaction of forces/dynamics emanating from outside of Xinjiang and from within. The collapse of the Qing resulted in increased external or foreign pressure on the defunct empire's frontiers - Mongolia, Tibet, Manchuria and Xinjiang - while political authority and power in China proper was fragmented, particularly during the 1911-1928 period. The duality of weak political authority at the centre and along the frontiers facilitated the development of a dynamic that permitted Han elites, such as that in Xinjiang, to have almost total autonomy from the Republic, albeit in the face of strong external challenges. As I demonstrated in chapters three and four, such a situation pertained in Xinjiang under "warlord" rule. Moreover, this situation determined Xinjiang's position between 1911 and 1949 as both the "pawn" and "pivot" of Asia, whereby it formed the

point of intersection of the geo-political imperatives of Russia/Soviet Union, China, Japan, and towards the end of this period, the US. The administrations of the successive "warlord" administrations of Yang Zengxin, Jin Shuren and Sheng Shicai exhibited large measures of continuity with the Qing period regarding the strategies and methods of rule employed, while they all experienced the vicissitudes of Xinjiang's ambiguous position between China and the Soviet Union.

Yang Zengxin's period of rule in fact exhibited continuity with both major phases of Qing rule in Xinjiang. The structure of Yang's administration within Xinjiang was based on the Qing model established after the region became a province in 1884. Thus, the system of *taoyin* or military governors within the six administrative circuits in Xinjiang were paralleled by the continuation of the *beg* system at the district level. Yang, however, in the spirit of the Qing segregation-era (1759-1820) strove to maintain the geographic and ethnic divisions within Xinjiang by a number of measures, such as perpetuating the administrative division between Zungharia and the Alishahr, restricting intra and inter-provincial travel and pitting the sedentary population against the nomads/pastoralists. As such it shared the same logic or rationale as the first phase of Qing rule - segregation and division served to control. Yet, the theme of integration was also evident in other facets of Yang's rule, most notably with respect to his perception of and response to "external" threats to "Chinese" rule. Throughout his tenure Yang sought to isolate Xinjiang from not only China but from Russian and then Soviet Central Asia. The potential threat to Xinjiang emanating from Central Asia was primarily an ideological one. As during the Qing, where the Makhdumzada Khojas (supported by Khoqand) questioned the legitimacy of Qing rule, the emerging reformist currents of

Jadidism and then secular nationalism (circa World War I) provided alternative models for Xinjiang's predominantly non-Han and Islamic population. Thus, Yang prevented the circulation of Turkic language newspapers, restricted Islamic education and prevented the employ of foreign teachers or Islamic clerics. Moreover, as demonstrated by his actions regarding Russian manoeuvres in Kashgar (1911-12) and the handling of the fallout from the Bolshevik Revolution (1917-1922), Yang exhibited an inclination to protect Xinjiang's "Chinese-ness" against potential external threats.

Although Yang succeeded in isolating Xinjiang from China and limited the expansion of Soviet influence, his successors found it exceedingly difficult to balance the competing imperatives of the Soviet Union and China. The tenures of both Jin Shuren (1928-1932) and Sheng Shicai (1933-1943) witnessed the apex of external influence in Xinjiang's affairs, particularly that of the Soviet Union. The implications of this for Chiang Kai-shek's KMT government over the 1928-1942 period, given its inability to project military, political or economic power into Xinjiang, were that Chinese claims to the region had to be promoted through purely strategic measures within the context of the Republic's "foreign policy". Hence Chiang's manoeuvres regarding Ma Zhongying during the Turkic-Muslim rebellion between 1931 and 1933 and his government's acceptance of Soviet penetration of Xinjiang during the Sino-Soviet anti-Japanese cooperation of 1937-1939. This position of Chinese weakness in the face of Soviet power in Xinjiang did not, however, undermine the state's intent to re-establish Chinese power in the region. As chapters three and four demonstrated, the intensification of non-Chinese power in Xinjiang played a crucial role in re-affirming the integrationist logic of the late Qing era in the Chinese state's perception of the correct nature of the

relationship between itself and Xinjiang. This was borne out by the rapidity of the KMT government's projection of its military, political and economic power into Xinjiang following the nadir of Soviet fortunes along the Eastern front in 1942. The KMT's commitment to the goal of integration for Xinjiang was further illustrated by its conduct after the outbreak of the "Ili Rebellion" and establishment of the "East Turkestan Republic" (ETR) in November 1944. As we have seen, the issue of the ETR and the future of Xinjiang were of pivotal importance during the Sino-Soviet negotiations for their "Treaty of Friendship and Alliance" of 14 August 1945. In essence these negotiations concerned China's acceptance of the terms of the Yalta Agreement and the Soviet interests in East Asia affirmed therein. In return for forgoing China's claims to Outer Mongolia/ Mongolian People's Republic, Soviet leasing of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) and the Manchurian ports of Lushan and Dalian, Chiang Kai-shek's government obtained two major undertakings from the Soviet Union. First, the Soviet Union would "safeguard" China's sovereignty in Manchuria and second, cease to support the CCP and the ETR in Xinjiang. Thus, Chiang forfeited the Republic's long-held claims to the MPR (which it had not recognised despite its declaration of independence in 1921), and granted concessions to a foreign power in Manchuria in order to secure Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria and Xinjiang.

Throughout the Sheng Shicai and KMT periods of rule in Xinjiang (1933-1949) there were also important elements of continuity within the sphere of the techniques and tactics of rule implemented. Sheng for instance, under Soviet influence, further developed the categorisation and definition of Xinjiang's non-Han population into thirteen distinct "nationalities" or minzu. The implications of this process, as dealt with

in chapters two and three, were that while the division of the non-Han subject population served to enhance the authorities' abilities to control Xinjiang it also established the parameters in which a "modern" secular nationalist discourse could evolve amongst the non-Han ethnic groups. This is not to intimate that such methods of rule "created" these nationalities or ethnic groups, but rather that it provided impetus for the generation of notions and conceptions of identity that transcended specific geographic localities within Xinjiang. The advent of KMT rule in Xinjiang in 1942-43 also brought with it a regeneration of Qing integration-era (1820-1911) policies, including the establishment of a large military presence or garrison force and the encouragement of Han in-migration. This regeneration of the goal of integration was, as we have seen, also reflected in the conduct of the Republic's relations with the Soviet Union. The stated strategic rationale or logic of Chiang's government regarding its approach to Xinjiang, as noted in chapter four, was identical to that of Zuo Zongtang and the "statecraft scholars" who convinced the Qing court to undertake the reconquest of Xinjiang following the Yaqub Beg rebellion. The essence of this position was that Xinjiang must be retained as it guarded the "backdoor" to China. Thus, the KMT government's position, as enunciated by General Zhang Zhiyong in May 1947, was that China could only contemplate permitting Xinjiang's independence if it was not detrimental to the "territorial integrity or sovereignty of the state".

The "peaceful liberation" of Xinjiang by the PLA in September-October 1949 initiated the renewal of Chinese state power in Xinjiang and the reassertion of a series of techniques and tactics of rule that echoed those of the CCP's imperial and republican predecessors. The Maoist era (1949-1976), as detailed in chapter five, encapsulated

three distinct phases regarding the CCP's approach to strategies and techniques by which it attempted to integrate Xinjiang. Moreover, changing Chinese perceptions of Soviet influence in Xinjiang paralleled each phase in this process. The 1949-1955 period in Xinjiang was thus characterised by a series of techniques and tactics of rule structured to establish the CCP as the sole source of political authority, weaken pre-liberation ethnic minority elites, initiate the region's integration and ensure the region's territorial security. These pre-eminent goals during this phase of Chinese rule were in part achieved by the application of the "united front" strategy of gradual reform of the existing political, economic and social order. The lodestars of CCP policy in Xinjiang during this period were "anti-Great Hanism" and "anti-local nationalism", that in practice translated to the outright suppression of anti-CCP activities and an effort to accommodate the cultural diversity of the ethnic minorities. The most instrumental factors in the consolidation of CCP power in Xinjiang was, however, the activities of the PLA First FA and the re-emergence of the military-agricultural colony in the form of the "Production and Construction Corps" (PCC). The rapid absorption of the former KMT garrison and pro-Soviet ETR military forces into the PLA, and later into the PCC, removed the most overt and potentially dangerous obstacles to the establishment of CCP rule. This reintroduction of the Qing-era military-agricultural colonies, albeit on a much greater scale, also demonstrated the CCP's intention to not only physically control Xinjiang but to firmly establish it as an "integral" province of the PRC. The Xinjiang PCC, unlike the Qing colonies, were established simultaneously north and south of the Tien Shan and, significantly, acted as a conduit and receptacle for Han colonisation. Consequently the three main internal "actors" in Xinjiang became the PLA (including the PCC), Han settlers and the ethnic minorities. The influence of the Soviet Union

throughout this period remained considerable. The CCP's handling of their neighbour's political and economic imperatives in Xinjiang clearly demonstrated the Chinese determination to make Xinjiang not only an "integral" province of the PRC but to do so to the exclusion of any other external influences. This was demonstrated, for example, through the isolation of pro-Soviet groups among the ethnic minorities and the PRC's revocation of Soviet-Xinjiang economic cooperation agreements in 1954.

Soon after the institution of "national regional autonomy" for Xinjiang in October 1955, the CCP's strategies, tactics and techniques of rule underwent a significant re-evaluation largely due to ongoing ideological and political confrontations within the central leadership. The vicissitudes of internal political and ideological debates within the CCP had important ramifications for Chinese policy in Xinjiang and its foreign relations. The essence of the CCP's debates beginning in 1956, as it pertained to ethnic minorities and the conceptualisation of "national regional autonomy", was the question as to the required speed and intensity of assimilation and integration of ethnic minorities. This debate was entirely focused on the means by which the state's goals in Xinjiang could be best achieved rather than on the veracity of the goals themselves. The logic and impact of the subsequent "100 Flowers" campaign and the "Anti-Rightist" campaign of 1956-57 reflected the "permanent provocation" inherent in the relation between Xinjiang and the Chinese state. The criticism of the CCP in Xinjiang that emerged was used, as elsewhere in the PRC, to justify a tightening of party control and discipline. Yet, in the specific context of Xinjiang, the continuity of "local nationalism" in the perception of the state prescribed a series of responses, the pillar of which was the necessity for integration - either via encouragement or coercion. In essence this "lesson"

was applied throughout the remainder of the Maoist period and reached its peak of intensity during the Cultural Revolution. Importantly, throughout this period (1955-1976) the continuity of "local nationalism" in Xinjiang was paralleled by an intensification of the state's perception of external threat emanating from the Soviet Union. These processes, similar to those of the mid-Qing era in Xinjiang (1800-1880), served to reinforce the basic underpinning or rationale of Chinese rule in Xinjiang during the Maoist period. The existence of alternative political realities external to Xinjiang and their associated political and ideological challenges to Chinese imperatives (in the form of Soviet Central Asia) determined an uncompromising response both in the context of the techniques and tactics of rule implemented in Xinjiang and in the management of its relation to the Soviet Union. Thus, the Cultural Revolution witnessed, for example, increased Han in-migration and the outright suppression of manifestations of ethnic minority cultural and religious practices and overt military conflict with the Soviet Union along the frontier.

The turbulence that characterised Xinjiang in the latter stages of the Maoist era resulted, as elsewhere in the PRC, in the re-evaluation of the strategies and methods of state action. In Xinjiang the intense and often coercive pursuance of integration (political, economic, cultural etc) had backfired and produced overt ethnic minority resistance and opposition to the Chinese state. Thus, beginning tentatively during the Hua Guofeng interregnum (1976-78) and gathering impetus after the ascendancy of Deng Xiaoping in 1978, there emerged a re-evaluation of the strategies and techniques through which the state attempted to achieve integration. In effect the state under Deng's leadership faced the dilemma of once more re-establishing the legitimacy of Chinese rule in Xinjiang. As

demonstrated in chapter six, this process entailed a return to a series of techniques and tactics of rule that combined certain precedents from the Qing and Maoist eras. The regional CCP, under the leadership of the veteran Wang Enmao, initiated a return to the basic contours of the "united front" policies of the 1949-1955 period whereby emphasis was placed on the training and development of ethnic minority cadres and the toleration and encouragement of ethnic minority cultural practices. Moreover, in the realm of the state's economic development program, although framed within the rubric of Deng's "reform and opening" strategy, Xinjiang was to undergo a "double opening", that is the simultaneous orientation of the region's economy toward China and Soviet Central Asia. As chapter two highlighted, the Qing permitted trade between Xinjiang and Central Asia and attempted to generate linkages between the region and China proper, but did not do so simultaneously. The PRC under Deng thus attempted to link these approaches in order to utilise Xinjiang's historical linkages with Central Asia to facilitate economic development. This process was also given further impetus by the spatial differentiation of the PRC's economy due to the channelling of central government investment to the eastern coastal provinces during the 1980s. Yet, the re-invigoration of two key instruments of the Chinese integrationist project - the Xinjiang PCC and Han immigration - paralleled this element of innovation in the state's approach to Xinjiang. This was particularly prevalent in the latter half of this period (ie. 1985-1991) as the state attempted to counter the re-generation of greater political, economic, and cultural linkages between Xinjiang and Central Asia. The contradictions inherent in these policies ultimately came to a head at the beginning of the 1990s with the more forceful expression of ethnic minority identity and perceptions of "separateness" from China.

The convergence of the re-assertion of ethnic minority opposition to Chinese rule, such as the Baren incident in April 1990, and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, resolved some of the dilemmas confronted by China in Xinjiang but created a multiplicity of others. The removal of the long-feared Soviet threat in effect diffused the potential sources of external threat to Xinjiang. At the most obvious level the emergence of five independent Central Asian republics altered the regional political environment and returned Central Asia to a situation comparable to that of the 19th century "Great Game" for influence in the region. The new states of Central Asia and Xinjiang shared similar experiences in that their imperial states (ie. Russia/Soviet Union and China) had attempted to isolate them from contiguous regions of Inner Asia with which they had had long histories of political, economic and cultural linkages. The removal of the Soviet state and the "reform" of the PRC thus promised possibility of the re-establishment of these linkages. For the PRC this presented both an historic opportunity to project Chinese power and influence beyond Xinjiang and a potential threat to the long-term project of integration for Xinjiang. Chapters seven and eight demonstrated the complex dilemmas confronted by China in both Xinjiang and independent Central Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Throughout the 1991-2004 period, however, the state's strategies and techniques of rule and its management of "foreign relations" underwent significant re-evaluation and transformation under both internal and external pressures. In effect the combination of the explosion of overt ethnic minority unrest in 1989-1990 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 served to question the rationale of the state's approach to the rule of Xinjiang and its management of its "foreign relations". As highlighted in chapter seven, the state continued to blame "hostile external influences" for the re-emergence of ethnic minority

opposition, and for the revival of Islam as a political force in particular. Although these claims were not entirely without basis, the exploration of the state's techniques and tactics of rule between 1978-1991 suggested that state action in Xinjiang played an instrumental role in facilitating not only the revival of Islam but also re-establishing linkages with contiguous regions of Central and South Asia. The state's response over the 1991-2004 period to renewed ethnic minority expressions of opposition to and separateness from the Chinese state has followed a familiar pattern combining outright repression, co-optation, Han in-migration and economic development. Yet, the state had to reconcile the perceived need for strengthened integration and security in Xinjiang with the recognition of the political and economic opportunities presented by the retreat of Russian power in Central Asia.

Within this period there were three phases of development with regard to the state's techniques and tactics of rule and their interaction with China's "foreign policy" in Central Asia. The first phase between 1991-1996 witnessed a re-evaluation of the state's techniques and tactics of rule in Xinjiang. This was prompted by the wave of internal unrest during and immediately after the Baren Uprising in April 1990 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in September-October 1991. This phase was characterised by the reassertion of key elements of integration, such as Han in-migration, and the development of a new economic strategy that attempted to utilise Xinjiang's geo-strategic position as a trade "corridor" to simultaneously integrate the region with China proper and Central Asia. In relation to China's "foreign policy" this re-evaluation of the techniques and tactics of rule proved to be a decisive factor in generating China's greater engagement with the states of Central Asia. This period also witnessed

increasing incidences of ethnic minority opposition to Chinese rule in Xinjiang. Moreover, this coincided with the initial stages of the "New Great Game" for Central Asia that in many respects aggravated a number of regional conflicts and generated fragmenting dynamics within the constituent states of Central Asia. The 1991-1995 period can therefore best be described as a transitory period for China's strategy in Xinjiang and Central Asia as it adapted to the new situation created by the Soviet Union's fall. The second phase between 1996-2001, addressed in chapter eight, saw the intensification of themes of both integration and fragmentation in Xinjiang and Central Asia. The internal political, economic and social problems of the Central Asian Republics intensified simultaneous with an increase in the inter-state competition of the "New Great Game". China's re-evaluated strategy to develop and integrate Xinjiang was reinforced by these external dynamics as it underlined for the authorities that to secure their control, China's foreign policy calculus had to be aligned with the state's overall goals in Xinjiang. Thus, China's "foreign policy" exhibited an identifiable tendency to engage regional states in order to not only further China's strategic interests in the region (such as energy security issues) but also to draw these state's into the mutual management of what were perceived to be threats to China's position in Xinjiang. The establishment and goals of the "Shanghai Five" and ultimately the SCO, as demonstrated in chapter eight, clearly illustrated such a projection of China's overwhelming concern for the integration and security of Xinjiang. Moreover, China's relations with individual Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, emphasised issues intimately connected to China's integrationist project in Xinjiang, such as control of Uighur émigré organisations, development of infrastructure links, or water policy.

The third phase, 2001-2004 has been defined by the implications of the events of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent projection of US military and political influence into Central Asia for China's strategy in Xinjiang. The impact of this process has been somewhat contradictory for China's position in Xinjiang and Central Asia. In a regional sense, the projection of US political and military influence into four of the five Central Asian states is perceived to be a negative consequence of the "War on Terror". This is the case as US involvement has undermined to a degree China's foreign policy efforts in Central Asia since 1991, whereby it had played a key role in establishing and determining the function of the SCO. Moreover, US involvement in the region has impacted on China's bi-lateral relations with the states of Central Asia, as the Central Asian states are compelled to choose between emphasising their US or Chinese relationship. However, the US government's focus on combating Islamic "extremism" and "terrorism" in Chinese perceptions strengthens their efforts against separatist ethnic minorities in Xinjiang. This has been illustrated by China's contemporary framing of its struggle against ethnic separatists by reference to the goals of US "War on Terror". Yet the projection of US power also threatens the Chinese state's long term strategy for the economic development and integration of Xinjiang. As demonstrated over the course of chapters seven and eight, China's strategy in Xinjiang over the course of the 1991-2004 period has focused on a "double integration" - that is the simultaneous economic integration of Xinjiang with Central Asia and China proper. Moreover, this has been both an economic and political project. The state's major assumption over this period has been that increased economic development and prosperity for the various ethnic minorities will diminish ethnic separatism. Simultaneously, the state has reinvigorated

key instruments of integration, such as Han in-migration, that have exacerbated inter-ethnic tensions in the region.

The Integration of Xinjiang: Forever Delayed?

Thus, this thesis has demonstrated that not only has there been continuity between the imperial, republican and communist states' pursuance of the goal of integration but also an identifiable continuity in the series or complex of techniques and tactics of rule implemented to achieve it. The theme of integration has also developed in parallel with a theme of confrontation between Chinese and "external" influences across the same period. As the latter chapters highlighted, the continuity of this opposition of Chinese to "external" imperatives in Xinjiang continues unabated into the 21st century. This reality is not, however, a symptom of the Chinese state's "failure" in Xinjiang. Quite to the contrary, as the thesis has highlighted, the exercise of the Chinese state's evolving governmentalising power required (and still requires) the continuity and expression of alternative political realities to those authored by the state in order to function.

The key to understanding the Chinese state's exercise of this form of power since the Qing era in Xinjiang is that it has primarily concerned the *management* of the possible field of action of others. Thus, the continued manifestation of ethnic minority opposition to Chinese rule - whether it be overt violent resistance or passive "everyday" resistance - has been utilised by the state to legitimate the continued exercise of state power in Xinjiang. The issue of the alleged connections between Afghanistan, the Taliban, the IMU and al Qaida and "ethnic separatists" in Xinjiang after 11 September 2001, for example, has been used to justify domestically and internationally the

intensification of the China's outright suppression of dissidence within Xinjiang. Simultaneously, however, the state has also apparently seized on this "moment" to intensify the key pillars of its complex of integrationist strategies - continued engagement and integration (security, economic, infrastructure) with the states of Central Asia and intensified the internal mechanisms of integration. As the latter chapters of the thesis have argued, these parallel strategies have in fact contributed to the re-emergence of violent ethnic minority opposition, the revival of Islam as a political force, and contributed to the continuity of forms of "everyday" passive resistance. According to the Chinese state, the causes of continued ethnic minority opposition has been due to the infiltration of "Islamic fundamentalist" and "separatist" tendencies or influences from Central Asia and Afghanistan. Yet, the state has not only maintained its linkages with these very regions, but also actually sought to increase them in the post-11 September 2001 period.

In light of the thesis' exploration of the evolution and development of "integration" across three distinct state formations (Qing, Republican/KMT and Communist), this apparent contradiction in fact dovetails neatly within the rationale of the function of state power in Xinjiang. It will be recalled that in the introduction I approached the issue of China's "foreign policy" through the extension of the Foucauldian concept of governmentality. As such "foreign policy" is but another constituent element in the state's exercise of this "technology of power", whereby it attempts to extend its "management of possibilities" to that which lies beyond the bounds of the state. Therefore, in order for the Chinese state to effectively *manage* external "threats" to its position in Xinjiang it must expand its connections and linkages with Central Asia. The

implications for the contemporary situation in Central Asia of this process are therefore clear. Due to the evolution and development of "integration" as both the goal and determinant of Chinese state action in Xinjiang, China cannot but seek to extend its power and influence beyond Xinjiang. Thus, it would be foolhardy to assume that the projection of US power into Central Asia following 11 September 2001, for example, amounts to a "strategic defeat" for China. As I argued and demonstrated in chapter eight, the emergence of this particular threat to its strategy and goal of integration in Xinjiang has in fact served to reinforce and intensify the state's perception of the necessity for its continued control of the region. Moreover, the long-term historical perspective of this thesis suggests that the goal of integration may not in fact be reached by the state, and that this is in fact perhaps the ultimate goal of the exercise of state power in Xinjiang. In effect the goal of "integration" is "forever delayed" by design, through the very nature of the exercise of state power.

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