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Title of Document: Communism in the Far East

Nature of Document: A 1948 British Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East) report overviews the situations of Communist parties from India and Pakistan through Southeast Asia to China, Japan and Korea.

Source: National Archives of Australia. Sent to Australia's Department of External Affairs by the Australian Commissioner for Malaya in Singapore on 1 December 1948

File series number: A1838

Control symbol: TS383/5/1 PART 1

(electronic page numbers 117-146)

Original report entitled **JIC (FE) (48) 12**. That is, Report 12 of 1948 by the Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East)

Date of Creation of Original Document: October 1948

Original Text or Translation: Original Text

Date Mounted on ARI website: 25 April 2007

Introduction: This study, compiled for the British Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East) by W.M.C. Kennedy, M.J. Evans, T.N. Grazebrook, A.J. Kellar and J.D. Murray, was based on materials available up until 30 September 1948. It is a broad overview of British assessments of threats posed by Communist parties throughout Asia – India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, North Borneo, Sarawak, Siam, French Indo-China, China, Hong Kong, Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. It includes both a “brief description of the position, strength, policy and future trends” of the respective Communist parties, as well as a “note on the co-ordination of Communist policy in the Far East and the methods by which it is secured.” The report notes the increasing Russian interest in East Asia, the importance of Cominform, and the key significance of the Calcutta conference (February/March 1948) in the new militancy of the Southeast Asian parties.

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2-May-07

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COMMUNISM IN THE FAR EAST

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COMMUNISM IN THE FAR EAST

INTRODUCTORY

As requested, we have made in the attached Annexes a survey of Communism in the Far East. Annex I consists of a brief description of the position, strength, policy and future trends of the Communist Parties in India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, North Borneo, Sarawak, Siam, French Indo-China, China, Hong Kong, Korea, Japan and the Philippines. Annex II is a note on the co-ordination of Communist policy in the Far East and the methods by which it is secured.

OBJECT

The object of this paper is to assess the present position and future trends of Communism in the Far East on the basis of information received up to September 30th, 1948.

GENERAL SURVEY

(a) The Post-War Situation

- (i) The end of the war in 1945 found the Far East more vulnerable to communist influence than ever before. Factors favourable to the spread of communism included increasing nationalist feeling (later encouraged by the examples of India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon), the greatly enhanced prestige of the USSR., a loss of European prestige consequent on defeats suffered at the hands of the Japanese, general political instability and disruption of economy. To these may be added the inevitable post-war lawlessness and the fact that communists operating as guerillas had, in many countries, provided the core of anti-Japanese resistance movements; and consequently possessed a reserve of arms of allied origin which rendered them more formidable.
- (ii) The large overseas Chinese communities in territories throughout the Far East were also influenced by the successes of the Chinese communists against the National Government. Chinese expansionism thus aided the spread of communist doctrine.
- (iii) Communist exploitation of this favourable situation was inevitable.

(b) Preparation

- (i) Following the defeat of Japan, the Communists in many countries, and particularly in Hong Kong, Singapore and the Federation of Malaya,

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took the lead in organizing labour, exploiting the difficult post-war labour problems and strengthening their hold on industrial and estate workers.

- (ii) During 1947 there was evidence of Russia's increasing interest in the Far East. Communist propaganda was intensified, large quantities of Marxist literature were exported from Moscow at heavy discount rates and the Chinese Communist propaganda organization was expanded. Another symptom of communist interest was visible in the commissions sent by communist "front" organizations based on Europe. Delegates of such organizations as the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students who toured Asia were invariably communists. They played a leading part by contacting and advising the Asian communist youth organisations such as "PESINDO" in Indonesia and the New Democratic Youth League in Singapore.
- (iii) Throughout 1947 the Asian Communist Parties were working energetically to strengthen their organization and to penetrate other political parties and associations, but until the end of the year there was little or no evidence that their policies and activities were co-ordinated to any appreciable extent.

(c) Strategy

- (i) In September 1947, the Cominform held its inaugural conference and in the following month the first copies of the Cominform paper, carrying ZHDANOV's comprehensive survey of the international situation, arrived in Asia. There is every indication that this document offered the guidance which the Asian communists had lacked since the dissolution of the Comintern and that it provided the theoretical basis for the subsequent re-orientation of communist policy in India, Burma and the Federation of Malaya which has already led to armed insurrection in the two last-named countries. There is also evidence indicating that the same document influenced the external policy of the Chinese Communist Party, bringing it more into line with international communist trends.
- (ii) This ideological guidance was reinforced by personal contacts established during the gathering of international communists in Calcutta during February-March 1948, a large Russian delegation being sent by special aircraft. By the end of March, the Communist Parties in India, Burma and Malaya had formally approved the switch to a policy of militant opposition. The new national governments in India and Burma were denounced as reactionary bourgeois regimes, co-operating with imperialism. The Communist revolt in Burma broke out on March 27th and in June, the campaign of violence opened in the Federation of Malaya. In September the Communist Party of Indonesia launched their attack had upon the return of an experienced revolutionary who had spent 25 years with the Russians.

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- (iii) There can be no doubt that these events are part of a strategic plan with the initial object of forging a militant communist front in the Far East, thus implementing the Marxist theory which advocates the aggravation of the conflict between Imperialism and the "oppressed colonial peoples."

(d) **Tactics**

It appears that the communist tactics in Burma, the Federation of Malaya and Indonesia are broadly based on the Chinese Communist example involving guerilla warfare, the destruction of capitalist economy and the establishment of communist-controlled areas as bases for expansion. In detail, tactics are dictated by expediency.

See amendment 1.

(e) **Future Trends**

- (i) It appears certain that those Communist Parties which have adopted a policy of violence will voluntarily abandon it only when Russian policy or strategy undergoes a change. It also appears probable that the Communist Parties in other territories will adopt a more militant policy as soon as they have gathered strength or a favourable opportunity presents itself.
- (ii) There are indications that the Chinese Communist Party covets the Communist leadership in the Far East and that it will, in future, co-operate more closely with the national Communist Parties through the communists amongst the overseas Chinese. The impending formation in the "Liberated Areas" of a Coalition Government for China under Communist leadership will probably further strengthen the overseas branches of the Chinese Communist Party.
See amendment 2
- (iii) The Communists will oppose any attempt to form a "Third Bloc" of Asian countries which would attempt to remain neutral in any conflict between Russia and the Western Powers.
- (iv) As in India and Burma, any nationalist government which may emerge in the Far East will be subjected to communist attack unless it decisively enters the communist camp.
- (v) The communists will make every effort to sever the remaining ties between Britain in on the one hand and Pakistan, India, Burma and Ceylon on the other. They will also endeavour to secure the confiscation and nationalisation of British assets in those countries.

7th October, 1948.

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ANNEX I
APPENDIX I
India

1. **INDIA**

(a) Constitutional position and strength at end of 1947

At the end of 1947 the Communist Party of India (CPI) was legal throughout the Union (but not within Hyderabad State). The CPI membership was believed to be about 50,000, the bulk of its strength being concentrated in the Provinces of Bombay, Bengal and Madras. The Party commanded powerful support amongst organized labour in the industrial areas and dominated the All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC), but its leadership was being seriously challenged by the Congress Party and the Socialists. CPI influence was also strong in many agricultural areas, exercised through the All India Kisan Sabha (Peasants' Congress) and in student circles, where it dominated the All India Students' Federation. The Party's strength in government and local government legislatures was negligible. Immediately after the British withdrawal, the CPI followed a policy of limited co-operation with the Union Government but by November – December 1947 it is now known that this policy was being seriously questioned.

(b) Change in Party policy.

The initial steps to secure a re-orientation of party policy were taken at a Central Committee meeting on December 7th – 17th 1947, when a paper entitled "On the Present Policy and Tasks of the CPI" was adopted despite the opposition of a faction led by P.C. Josli, General Secretary of the CPI. This document contained great deal of self-criticism, castigating the right-reformist deviations which had led the party to follow an opportunist policy of collaboration with a "bourgeois national government". The Indian Government was described as a reactionary regime allied with vested interests and the "Anglo-American Imperialists". These proposals were subsequently ratified at the 2nd Party Congress of the CPI in Calcutta during March 1948, the ground having been duly prepared by an intensive propaganda campaign. Numerous fraternal delegates from European Communist parties attended this congress and representatives from Russia and the satellite states are known to have played an important role in the secret discussions on CPI policy.

(c) Results of Change in Policy

The immediate result of the CPI's change in policy was the decision of the West Bengal Government to declare the CPI an illegal organisation in that Province and to arrest a number of CPI members. Other provincial governments likewise carried out arrests and searches although they did not ban the Party, but as these measures were not co-ordinated by the Central Government, the majority of the communist leaders succeeded in escaping underground. Labour agitation followed but the situation was stabilised with fair success in West Bengal and Bombay. In Madras during April-May 1948 the communists clashed with the police,

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and communists in that part of Hyderabad State bordering on Andhra stepped up their activities which already caused virtual anarchy over a considerable area. The Communist campaign in Hyderabad has been one of the main planks in CPI propoganda for some months and the Party paper "Peoples Age" asserts that one-sixth of the area of Hyderabad State is in the hands of the peasants. Despite the Nizam's conciliatory gesture in withdrawing the ban against the CPI, there have been several clashes with State troops. The appointment of Indian administrators and police personnel to Hyderabad will now bring Indian security forces into direct conflict with the communist-held "Peoples' Free Areas". It is also possible that the communists will receive some reinforcements from the defeated Razarkars.

(d) Present Position

The CPI leaders are still underground but the party is illegal only in West Bengal Province. Party headquarters formerly in Bombay, are reported to have been shifted to Calcutta. Meanwhile the Indian National T.U.C., launched by the Nehru Government as a counter to the communist-controlled AITUC has made considerable headway and may be expected to weaken the communist held over organised labour. The CFI's influence in the agrarian field is, as yet, substantially unchallenged.

(e) Future Trends

There can be no doubt that the very able communist leaders, who have thus far avoided arrest, are concerting plans for the prosecution of their campaign against the administration. Although there were reports that the CPI was preparing for an armed unrising in September, there is no definite information to indicate what form the CPI campaign will eventually take. It may very possibly include sabotage of communications, fomenting of industrial unrest and a "no-tax campaign" by agriculturists. In areas where conditions are favourable armed uprisings are probable, particularly if government forces are diverted from internal security duties to external commitments.

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ANNEX I
APPENDIX 2
Pakistan

PAKISTAN

In February 1948 the communists of Sind, Baluchistan and West Punjab announced the formation of a separate Communist Party for Pakistan. It was claimed that the CPI had failed to adapt its policy and organisation to the new situation following the establishment of the two dominions. At the end of February, the new Pakistan Communist Party held its first convention. The resolutions passed by this body appear to have been conventional demands for a truly democratic constitution, nationalization of key industries and the repeal of repressive laws.

[W]est Pakistan is essentially an agricultural area and the inhabitants are small peasant proprietors who would not normally hold any brief for communism. In Lahore and Karachi, however, where there are considerable groups of organised labour operating through the communist President of the Pakistan Trade Union Federation and the North West Railway Workers' Union, the communists are capable of creating considerable unrest.

In Eastern Pakistan also there have been signs of communists fomenting discontent in Police and other Government departments but so far as is known this has reached no serious proportions.

It is still too early to make any predictions on the future development of communism in Pakistan. There is no doubt that Islam provides a less fertile soil for communist ideology than does Hinduism (although it would be unwise to over estimate this factor), but diplomatic relations with Russia have been established and Pakistan leaders are apt to follow opportunist tactics.

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ANNEX I
APPENDIX 3
Ceylon

CEYLON

CEYLON COMMUNIST PARTY

(a) Constitutional Position and Policy at end of 1947

The position of communism in Ceylon is extremely complex. Apart from the orthodox Ceylon Communist Party, formed in 1944, and headed by Dr. S.A. WICKRAMASTNGHE, there are two Trotskyist parties – the LANKA SAMA SAMAJ Party and the BOLSHEVIK-LENINIST Party of India (Ceylon).

Despite numerous attempts at unity, all three parties remain chronically disunited and expend much of their time and energy in attacks upon each other. It is fortunate that this dissension is so bitter, as at the General Elections in September 1947 the three parties between them succeeded in returning no less than 20 members to Parliament (Lanka Sama Samaj 10; Bolshevik-Leninists 5; and Ceylon Communist Party 5) – potentially a fairly strong opposition.

As the Ceylon Communist Party is the only one of the three which is likely to follow the Russian line, the dissident Trotskyist parties will not be dealt with in this note. According to the latest available information (May 1948) the prospect of united action by the three parties remains as remoted as ever.

In matters of policy the Ceylon Communist Party in 1947 took the orthodox line that Dominion Status fell far short of real freedom. The General Secretary, Pieter KEUNEMAN, announced that his party would work for the withdrawal of all British forces and the handing back of naval and air bases to the Ceylon Parliament. The party also stood for nationalization of foreign assets, banks, mines and large plantations. On the political level they would co-operate with the United Nationalist Party in order to obtain the greatest possible measure of independence.

(b) Change in Party Policy.

At the 2nd Party Congress of the Communist Party of India (CPI) in March 1948, Dr. WICKRAMASINGHE, who was present as a fraternal delegate, stated that his party had made the same mistakes as the CPI – they had been guilty of opportunism in that they had given a measure of co-operation to the bougeois nationalist government. He again emphasised that the Ceylon communists would do their utmost to prevent bases in Ceylon being used against the “freedom-struggle” of any people.

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(c) Results of Change in Policy.

So far as is known the Ceylon Communist Party has made little or no attempt to re-orient its policy, despite WICKRAMASINGHE's Calcutta declaration. WICKRAMASINGHE himself has been greatly preoccupied with WFTU (World Federation of Trade Union), discussions – at which he represented Indian as well as Ceylonese labour, because the Indian communist labour leader (S.A. DANGE) was under detention in Bombay.

(d) Present Position and Future Trends.

The Ceylon Communist Party is legal and may be expected to pursue an orthodox policy, closely following the central party line. At the moment there appears to be little likelihood of a union with the two Trotskyist Parties and every probability that the main party preoccupation will remain its struggle against the very considerable influence exerted by these dissidents. All three parties agitate strongly for the withdrawal of British forces, but whether they will present a united front, even on this question, remains problematical.

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ANNEX I
APPENDIX 4
Burma

BURMA

BURMA COMMUNIST PARTY

(a) Constitutional Position and Strength at end of 1947

At the end of 1947 the Burma Communist Party (BCP) was believed to have a membership of approximately 4,000. Despite attempts to extend its influence through the All Burma T.U.C., the Party could claim little control over labour, with the exception of the works in the Burma Oil Company's Depot and refineries at Bunneedaw and Syriam. In the agricultural field the BCP wielded considerable influence through the All Burma Peasants' Union (ABPU) which made communist influence predominant in the areas lying East of the Irrawaddy between Pegu and Mandalay and, to a much smaller extent, in Central Burma and the Delta. The BCP also had a considerable hold over youth organisations through the Democratic People's Youth League, which was the former semi-militant Red Guard organisation under a new title. In all these fields the BCP was encountering strong opposition from various associations sponsored by the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League – a somewhat loose political coalition which formed the Government party. There were seven communist members in the Constituent Assembly.

(b) Change in Party Policy.

In December 1947 H.N. GHOSAL, an Indian communist holding high rank in the BCP visited Calcutta and is known to have had discussing with CPI leaders in Bengal. There can be no doubt that the CPI's proposed change of policy was discussed. Shortly after GHOSAL's return to Burma in January, a lengthy political treatise entitled "On the Present Political Situation in Burma and our Tasks" was written, almost certainly by GHOSAL himself. This document followed the line adopted by the CPI. The BCP criticized its own failure to realize that the Thakin Nu Government was incapable of reformation and would have to be destroyed. The AFPFL leadership was accused of collaborating with capitalists and imperialists and the economic and defence clauses of the Anglo-Burmese Treaty were violently denounced. The paper demanded a revision of BCP policy and the forging of "a united front from below" which would by a mass struggle overthrow the "reformist national bourgeois leadership" of the Thakin Nu administration.

In March 1948, practically the entire BCP hierarchy was present at the Second Party Congress of the CPI in Calcutta and the BCP Leader, THAN TUN, is known to have delivered extremist speeches advocating close co-operation between the colonial and semi-colonial peoples and the Chinese Communist Army.

Final plans for the insurrection were laid at the All Burma Peasants' Union Conference in the second week of March. Meanwhile the campaign

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had already opened with the strike of oil workers in Rangoon. Following a last minute attempt at negotiation, the Burma Government on March, 27th, 1948 ordered the arrest of the BCP leaders, but they had already gone underground. The BCP was not banned.

(c) Results of Change in Policy.

This change in policy found its logical culmination in the BCP insurrection which is still in progress. A section of the BCP disapproved of the re-orientation, and THEIN PE, one of the three Politbureau members, resigned from that body. He is now believed to be regarded by the Burma Government as an important factor in their attempts to build a Leftist Unity Party which will rally the dissident elements in AFPFL and possibly attract some of the BCP rank and file. There is no evidence to indicate that THEIN PE's defection has materially weakened the BCP. (He still claims to be a communist.)

A secondary result of the insurrection is the weakening of the already-strained unity within AFPFL and the revolt of sections of the armed police and the Army following the split in the PYA at the end of July, 1948.

(d) Present Position

The situation is changing so rapidly that any appreciation of the present position is likely to be overtaken by events. By August 20th, 1948 the BCP insurgents had succeeded in setting up a parallel government in the Pegu area which is one of the main communist centers. THAN TUN and GHOSAL were in Pinyinmana while THAN PE (the third member of the Politbureau) directed the armed forces. In other areas communist activity was, in fact, large scale dacoity. The communist propaganda machine was functioning with considerable efficiency.

The dissident "white Band" section of the PYA had split away over the question of Thakin Nu's Leftist Unity programme and certain units of the Special Police Reserve, the Union Military Police and the Burma Rifles were in active revolt. With few exceptions the White Band PYA have not joined the BCP insurgents, although both bodies are in action against government forces.

(e) Future Trends

The situation is so confused as to render difficult any appreciation of future events pending the outcome of the present struggle. The popularity of the Socialist Party, which now forms the backbone of the Government, has steadily decreased. It is certain that any attempt to strengthen the Government by a compromise with the Communists, as advocated by the White Band PYA, would meet with firm opposition from the Karens, Mons and frontier tribes, all of whom are violently anti-Communist. In any case it is unlikely that the communists would call off their insurrection unless the Government repudiated the economic and defence clauses of the Anglo-Burmese Treaty. The government offer of an amnesty has met

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with no response and may be taken as an indication of the BCP's intention to continue the struggle.

(f) Communist Party (Burma) CP(B).

The CP(B) is the dissident communist faction led by Thakin See which broke away from the BCP and has always followed a policy of open revolt. Its leader is in jail and its forces lack co-ordination, but are adding to the general confusion by operating as large dacoit hands in Bassein, Maubin and Pyapon districts. It has so far maintained its separate identity. In contradistinction to the BCP, and the CP(B) or Red Flag Communists have been declared illegal almost from their inception. (sic)

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ANNEX I
APPENDIX 5
Malaya

MALAYA

(a) Constitutional Position and Strength at end of 1947

The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was legal throughout the Federation of Malaya and Singapore. Party membership, according to information received early in 1947, was in the neighbourhood of 12,500, the great majority being Chinese, the Indian section numbered about 2,000 and the Malay section was negligible. MCP strength lay in its control over organised labour, exercised through the Singapore Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU) and the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trades Unions (PMFTU). Through the SFTU the communists controlled 81 of the 150 Trade Unions in Singapore, with an approximate membership of 72,758 out of a total of 100,145 Union members. In the peninsula the MCP controlled, through the PMFTU, 131 of the 303 trade unions, with an approximate membership of 98,432 out of a total 170,096 union members. The subsequent communist insurrection showed that the labour masses had not been deeply infected by communism. With the disappearance of the communists who controlled the Trade Unions, agitation virtually ceased.

MCP policy was to create a United Front against the Government, employing the AMCJA/FUTERA (All Malaya Council for Joint Action) for this purpose. Apart from labour agitation, frequently backed up by violent intimidation, the MCP made every effort to stimulate the left wing Malay nationalist organisations and to build up strong youth and women's associations under effective communist control. It was the leading opponent of the new constitution for the Federation of Malaya and had already announced its intention of boycotting the elections in Singapore.

The party also had a potential weapon in the shape of the MPAJA (Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army) ex-Servicemen's Association composed of personnel of former guerilla and Force 136 units, virtually all of whom were Chinese Communists.

(b) Change in Party Policy

The change in party policy was finally approved at a Central Executive Committee meeting held on 17th – 21st March. This meeting approved a paper entitled "The Existing Situation" which is divided into two sections: (a) "The Present Aspect of the International Situation" and (b) "The Present Aspect of the Malayan Situation". This document is clearly based on ZDHANOV's review of the international situation and emphasises the division of the world into two camps, the part to be played by the colonial peoples in the struggle against imperialism and the danger that the labouring classes may underestimate their own strength. It also lays stress on the significance of "the armed struggle". In April an article written by a member

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of the Central Executive Committee, severely criticised the MCP's former policy of compromise another example of communist self-criticism as advocated by Lenin.

(c) Results of Change in Policy.

As in Burma, the change in policy was rapidly followed by an armed uprising. This has to date been confined to the Federation of Malaya where communist guerillas have been responsible for attacks on police stations and rubber estates, arson of estate buildings and the murder of European planters, mining officials and KMT Chinese. Operations against the terrorists are still in progress.

On the labour front, the situation both in Singapore and the Federation of Malaya is quieter than it has been since the liberation, apparently because the known communists who controlled the unions have gone underground with the remainder of the MCP leaders.

On July 23rd the MCP, the MPAJA, the New Democratic Youth League (NDYL) and the Malaya Youth League (PETA) were proscribed as subversive organisations by both the Federation and Singapore Governments.

(d) Future Trends.

It appears probable that the MCP will continue their present policy of violent opposition. Certainly it would be unwise to conclude that the suppression of the present insurrection will spell the end of trouble. So far as can at present be foreseen, it is unlikely that any great measure of support for the terrorists will be forthcoming from left-wing Malaya Nationalists or from dissident Chinese elements such as the China Democratic League. It will also be difficult for the MCP to abandon its present policy for one of constitutional agitation. It is believed that amongst high ranking members there may be a small faction who disagree with the present policy of violence, but it is most unlikely that they have either the will or the courage to split the MCP following.

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ANNEX I
APPENDIX 6
Indonesia

INDONESIA

(a) Constitutional Position and Strength at end, of 1947.

At the end of 1947 the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) was legal in Republican territory, but not within areas controlled by the Dutch. Membership of all Communist Parties in the NEI was estimated at about 80,000, including Chinese Communists, the latter only forming a separate national party in Dutch areas. Geographically the PKI had its greatest influence in Java; there were estimated to be at most only some 5,000 communists in Sumatra. The Party dominated the strong workers' and peasants' organisations of SOBSI and SARBOEPRT. It also controlled the militant Socialist youth organisation (PESINDO) and had successfully penetrated the remaining two youth organisations. Participation of the Republican Armed Forces (TNI) was being effected, but it is not known with what success. No success had been obtained in efforts to penetrate the Police and Military Police. The Party's sympathisers held important positions in the Presidential Cabinet and the PKI had been allotted 35 seats in the Working Committee (KNIP). The general Party line was moderate, co-operation being sought with all parties that supported the Republic.

(b) Changes in Party Policy.

The formation in January 1948 of a Cabinet from which the PKI was excluded forced the overt adoption of a policy more in line with international communist thought. First evidence was the substitution of a communist controlled bloc for the earlier Popular Front of left-wing parties and organisations. Until August – September, 1948, the PKI guided by Alimin continued to follow a policy of modified opportunism aimed at achieving power through constitutional methods. Propaganda and penetration were stepped up in an effort to overturn the Cabinet and replace it by one dominated by the FDR (Front Demokrasi Rajat). Acting through the FDR, which included the PKI, "Posindo", the Labour Party, the Socialist Party and the Trades Union Federation (SOBSI), the party took the initiative in the formulating and obtaining acceptance by all Parties (except the right-wing Socialists) of a nationalist programme including clauses unacceptable to right wing parties, even though the latter formally endorsed them. The training of cadres went on together with a stepping up of communists influence over youth and labour organisations and the attempted penetration of the armed forces. In June and July strikes were organised as a warning to the cabinet and an education to the workers.

It appears clear that this policy was not sufficiently militant to suit international communist plans. Accordingly MOESO, a veteran Indonesian revolutionary who had spent over 20 years with the Russians, was sent to Indonesia at the beginning of August. Following his condemnation of the "defensive" policy adopted by the Republicans, the parties comprising the FDR merged with the PKI. The Socialist leader Shariffuddin announced that he had been a communist since

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1935 and the entire communist machine, led by MOESO, switched over to a policy of violent revolution designed to overthrow the Hatta government by force.

(c) Results of Change in Policy.

By the third week of September, the Communists and the Republican forces were in armed conflict in East Java, where most of the PKI strength is concentrated. The communists had seized the industrial town of Madioen and it was reported that they also controlled a number of smaller towns. They set up a National Front Government at Madioen. The Republican Government announced its determination to stamp out the communist revolt without assistance from the Dutch, and by the end of September had re-occupied Madioen from which NOESO and the other leaders had retired.

(d) Present Position

The FDR welded into a single communist machine led by the communists is now attempting to overthrow the moderate Republican Government by force but its initial impetus has been severely checked and it is now on the defensive. The Dutch are at present pursuing a waiting policy, with one of armed intervention in reserve. The armed youth organisation Pesindo probably provides the bulk of the PKI's fighting strength but it is always possible that communist gains will encourage the defection of TNI units, although to date it appears that the vast bulk of the Army remains loyal to the Republic; the Commander-in-Chief, Lt. General Soedirman has broadcast an appeal for loyalty to the Government who are confident of restoring law and order, though they estimate this may take as long as three months.

(e) Future Trends

Developments have been too rapid to permit of any long term appreciation of future trends at the present moment. In spite of the reverse they have sustained the PKI will probably persist in their policy of armed opposition. At the moment one can only state with confidence that a period of chaos is inevitable, with the future attitude of the TNI doubtful, and that eventually the PKI must come into direct conflict with the Dutch, who, as the "imperialist power" constitute the main enemy of the communists.

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ANNEX I
APPENDIX 7
North Borneo

NORTH BORNEO

To date Communist activities and influences are practically non-existent in N. Borneo. The native population is disinterested and so far no external influence has attempted to stimulate their interest. The Chinese population have a stake in the country and as many of them are prosperous farmers, albeit on a small scale, they are not suitable material for Marxist propaganda.

The mainspring of such leftist activity as exists is the Chinese Labour Union which has branches in a number of places. There is little inter-branch activity and the Union officials are more concerned with furthering their own prosperity than promoting the interests of the Union.

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SARAWAK

Interest in communism is confined almost entirely to the Chinese population and generally takes the form of anti-K.M.T. activity. At present the majority of Chinese wish to avoid committing themselves in the K.M.T.-Chinese communist struggle, but K.M.T. influence is at present predominant and increasing.

Communist influence was in the past exerted chiefly through Chinese schools, but has been diverted to the formation of communist cells within Trade Unions. There is no indication that this at present constitutes a serious threat.

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Annex 1
Appendix 9
Siam

SIAM

(a) Constitutional position and strength at end of 1947.

Although a Manifesto by the Executive Committee of the Siamese Communist Party (SCP), dated 20th January 1948, has been seen, there is little evidence that the Party amounted to much. Such support as it had came chiefly from a small group of Siamese intellectuals mostly in Bangkok or the services. Unsubstantiated reports mentioned a membership of 3,000 in the provinces, but this seems exaggerated and improbable. Communism in Siam is legal.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Siam was estimated to have 2,000 full members with another 3,000 adherents. Since October, 1946, it has been a legal party with its main strength in the urban areas. It has successfully penetrated the Central Labour Union and had considerable influence among Chinese students. Its interests were primarily with the struggle in China, although after the November 1947 Coup it is reported to have offered the Free Thais 900 armed men to help in staging a counter-coup.

(b) Change in Party policy.

No change.

(c) Results of Change in policy.

Not applicable.

(d) Present position and future trends.

So long as Pibul remains in power indigenous Siamese Communism is unlikely to make much headway, except perhaps in association with the Free Thais and other groups in opposition to Pibul, if these can pull together long enough to stage a revolution. Alternatively, if Pibul were to use the communist bogey as an excuse for repressive action against the Free Thais, the two parties would be driven into closer alliance, to the benefit of the communists. Nai Pridi and his followers would find it difficult to attain power without the support of both Siamese and Chinese communists in Siam, which might prove a source of embarrassment to them once they were in the saddle, and would afford opportunity for greater communist activity, particularly on the part of the CCP, who have been virtually driven underground by the current repressive measures. Also, with the presence of a strong Russian mission in Bangkok, Pridi's Russophile tendencies would have wider scope than in the past. Any native communist party that might develop would almost certainly be restricted to Siamese intellectuals with, possibly, slight support from artisans in the Bangkok area.

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Annex I
Appendix 10
French Indo-China

FRENCH INDO-CHINA

(a) Constitutional position and strength at end of 1947.

Under pressure from the Chinese Government, then occupying Northern French Indo-China, the Communist Party of Indo-China voluntarily dissolved in November 1945 and was absorbed into the nationalist Viet Minh party. This dissolution was only nominal and the Communist Party appears to have carried on as an independent but concealed entity, whose strength is unknown. It rapidly assumed a preponderating influence within the Viet Minh through its domination of the Central Committee. By the end of 1947 administration labour, youth, police and armed forces in rebel areas were communist controlled and important Cabinet posts in Ho Chi Minh's Government were held by Communist Party members: In French controlled territory an extensive communist underground organisation also existed. Relations between the Communist Party of Indo-China and the local Chinese Communist Party were close and cordial, but the latter remained a separate entity, which, like the Viet Minh, was legal only in territory outside French control. Geographically the main communist strength is in Tonkin and Annam and the urban area of Saigon/Cholon.

(b) Change in Party policy.

No change.

(c) Results of Change in Policy.

Not applicable.

(d) Present position and Future Trends.

Strong anti-communist elements exist within Viet Nam but are silent and ineffectual since they are anxious not to split resistance to the French. French Military weakness too is no doubt a factor which depresses the morale of the actual or potential anti-communists throughout the country. The agreement with Bao Dai, initialed on 5th June, 1948, failed to attract support from Viet Nam and to that extent has strengthened the position of the communist leaders of the Republic. However, the French High Commissioner, M. Ballaert, has had some success in persuading Indo-Chinese opinion that the action of the French Parliament amounted to a ratification of the agreement of 5th June, 1948. If a treaty were concluded which has some practical effect in establishing the independence of Viet Nam within the French Union, and in rallying the non-communist supporters of Ho Chi Minh to the Central Government, the influence of the communists in the country should be considerably reduced.

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Annex 1
Appendix 11
China

CHINA

(a) Constitutional position and strength at end of 1947.

The Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.) claimed at the end of 1947 a strength of 2,700,000 backed by an Army of 2,000,000. Illegal in K.M.T. controlled areas, its main strength lay in the liberated areas and Manchuria. In such areas the administration was communist-controlled; communist workers' unions had also been created together with most of the other thought-control weapons familiar in communist countries. Within Nationalist-held China support for the C.C.P. existed among students and other intellectuals, but the paternalistic government-run trades unions were not apparently penetrated to any extent. Hong Kong was used as a base for liaison with C.C.P. groups overseas, particularly in South East Asia, for enlisting support among non-communist minority parties and for attracting aid from European and American "liberals". The policy of the Party was one of peasant reform, little attention being paid to the needs or interests of the urban proletariat; this policy had been formally accepted in 1934 after a long internal struggle.

(b) Change in Party Policy.

A speech made on 25th December 1947 by MAO Tse-tung, leader of the C.C.P., aligned the Party with the new international communist trend. This attitude was made even clearer in an apparently genuine secret directive of the Central Executive Committee dated 1st January 1948. This affirmed that international communist foreign policy was no longer one of indulgence and weakness, but one of revolution; the C.C.P. was to do its utmost to develop strong communist parties though-out South East Asia. Although adopting this new "activist" policy abroad, the C.C.P. maintained internally its old 'reformism'. Motivated largely by the need for increased production both in agriculture and industry, it restrained still further its left wing element; only in Manchuria, under the guidance of LI Li-san, an old opponent of 'opportunism', were radical measures favoured.

(c) Results of Change of Policy.

Internally, the intensification of the former 'opportunism' led to small businesses and land ownership by individual small peasants being temporarily encouraged; at the same time overtures were made to non-communist but anti-K.M.T. parties for a United Front. Externally, the main effect of the new policy was most obvious in the North East, where Chinese Soviet Republics are believed to have been formed in Manchuria and Mongolia; both are stated to be in close association with other Communist Parties in that area through a regional 'Cominform'. From Hong Kong more intense efforts were made for the control and direction of C.C.P. activities overseas. A Southern Bureau of the C.C.P. in or near Hong Kong was

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reported to direct this activity but considerable use was made of the C.C.P. Hsin Hwa New Agency.

(d) Present Policy.

The C.C.P. position is militarily and economically strong but not strong enough to win the war outright; nor are trained administrative staff available with which to run large cities. Negotiations with the left-wing anti-K.M.T. parties, such as the C.D.L. and the anti-K.M.T. Revolutionary Committee, are under way in Hong Kong for the formation of an All-China Democratic Government, but this has more a political and propaganda than a practical value. Negotiations are also reported regionally, particularly in North and North West China, for joint National-Communist regional administrations; the penetration value of such local compromises is obvious. Externally, the Party, through its denunciation of Yugoslavia, has re-affirmed its alignment with international communism. That it has a connection with current events in South East Asia is suspected, but there is no confirmatory evidence.

(e) Future Trends

Further attempts on the part of the C.C.P. to assume the leadership of communism in South East Asia are probable. Internally the Party can be expected to maintain its right-wing policy. In Manchuria and Mongolia the development of semi-autonomous republics are likely to proceed; elsewhere regional arrangements with the local Nationalists can be expected or even a compromise with the Central Government. Such a compromise might lead to the establishment of exclusive Communist control over a large area of North China or a consolidation of Communist influence in South China, or both. The possible results of such a compromise are to form the subject of a separate paper.

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Annex 1
Appendix 12
Hong Kong

HONG KONG

(a) Constitutional Position and strength at the end of 1947.

At the end of 1947 there was no Communist Party in Hong Kong nor was there in the Colony a branch of any other communist party, registered as such with details of its regulations, committee and membership on record. There was, however, a number of C.C.P. members in the Colony furthering their party's interests on instructions received from Red China. There were grounds for believing that the C.C.P. members were controlled by a directing committee but conclusive evidence of this was lacking. No estimate of the number of C.C.P. members was possible but their strength lay in the influence they were gaining in the Trade Unions, especially those controlling public utilities, amongst the schools and students, and in their contacts with guerilla bands, descended from the former East River Column across the frontier.

Communism itself was not illegal in the Colony, but, while the known C.C.P. members openly admitted their allegiance to the Party, there were grounds for supposing that there were still others who were secret members.

The policy of the C.C.P. members in the Colony was to do nothing to antagonise the authorities so long as Hong Kong was of value, by virtue of its communications being superior to those of North China, as an advanced base for keeping in touch with and disseminating propaganda to C.C.P. members in South East Asia, Europe and America. Party members also took advantage of the facilities Hong Kong provided for liaising with, and penetrating where possible, the anti-CHIANG Kai-Shek groups taking refuge in the Colony and for underground activity in Southern China. They also indulged in overt press attacks against the Nanking regime.

(b) Change in Party Policy.

During 1948 there has been no change in the Party's policy though a recent report that the direction of C.C.P. activities in the U.K. (mainly propaganda) would in future come from North China and not from Hong Kong may indicate that, with the hardening of feeling against communism generally, the C.C.P. intend to ensure that there is no loss of continuity in the programme of their followers overseas. So far, however, there have been no reports of the supervision over other C.C.P. activities abroad being transferred from Hong Kong.

(c) Effect of Change of Policy.

Nil.

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(d) Present Position.

The C.C.P. members in Hong Kong have made such good progress in their local infiltration policy that they are now in a position to disrupt the everyday life of the Colony at will. The dissident groups look to the C.C.P. for leadership in the anti-CHIANG Kai-Shek campaign and, were action against the Hong Kong Government considered desirable, the local authorities would find arrayed against them the left-wing Trades Unions (as opposed to those controlled by the K.M.T.) and a large number of schools (students and teachers) especially in the New Territories, supported by the armed strength of well-organised guerilla bands from across the frontier numbering perhaps five or six thousand men.

(e) Future Trends.

As long as Hong Kong continues to be of value to the C.C.P. no major change in policy is likely. If, however, either through successes of C.C.P. forces south of the Yangtze or through a policy of repression by the Hong Kong Government, the Colony loses for the C.C.P. its special value, an aggressive policy against the administration must be expected. The long term aim of the C.C.P. regarding Hong Kong is undoubtedly to secure its attachment to Communist China.

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Annex 1
Appendix 13
Korea

KOREA COMMUNIST PARTY

(a) Constitutional Position and Strength at end of 1947.

Not applicable to North Korea, where the Russians have been able to educate the people 'up' to the Soviet Republic standard.

In South Korea the Communist Party is called South Korea Labour Party, strength not known. It appears to be run and controlled from North Korea. It has a Central Political Committee and a Control Executive Committee which usually, and in all big things, take their orders from the Soviet Army H.Q. Political Department in PHYONGYANG. We have, however, very little information, and none of recent date on the position in South Korea.

(b) Policy.

Policy is that of the Soviet occupying forces. Openly, the Soviet-controlled radio, after the announcement of the setting up of a Democratic People's Republic in North Korea, called on the Northern Korean People's Council to adopt a constitution which will be used to govern South Korea when that area comes under the new republic.

According to a recent report, as yet unconfirmed, a pact of mutual assistance was signed in March this year between the North Korean Communists and the Chinese Communists.

(c) Future Trends.

North Korea has a large armed force trained and equipped by the Russians, and it is expected that, on the departure of the Americans from South Korea, the latter area will be straightway annexed to complete the Korean Soviet Republic.

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Annex 1
Appendix 14
Japan

JAPAN

(a) Constitutional position and strength at end of 1947.

The registered membership of the Japanese Communist Party (J.C.P.) at the end of 1947 was 16,200. Of these 70% were thought to be town working classes, 15% intellectuals, and 10% agrarian workers. Influence on labour was exerted through the National Congress of Industrial Organisations (N.C.I.O.), 12 of whose 19 leaders were communists, and most of whose member Trade Unions were communist dominated. In April 1947 four J.C.P. members were elected to the House of Representatives and four to the House of Councillors; vociferous in speech, their influence suffered however from the ruling that parties in the Diet with less than 20 seats might not sit on committees. The Party policy under the influence of NOSAKA Sanzo was one of right-wing gradualism; efforts for a United Front with the Socialists had not however, met with any success.

(b) Change in Party policy.

The struggle between the reformist and revolutionary factions of the party came to a head at the National Convention in December 1947. The left-wing, under the secretary-general TOKUDA Kyuichi, maintained its hold on the Political Bureau, 7 of the 9 members supporting him. The policy laid down by the Convention was one of widening and intensifying the struggle; of opposing Socialist and Liberal-Democrat parties; of increasing political consciousness; and of tightening Party organization and discipline.

(c) Results of Change of policy.

The chief result of this new policy was that the J.C.P. gave up its efforts to form a Popular Front composed of all left-wing parties. Instead a Front was envisaged that would be tightly controlled by the Party. Agitation was increased and propaganda to make all classes of Japanese politically conscious was stepped up. Efforts to intensify labour struggles were also made but were thwarted by SCAP directives.

(d) J.C.P. efforts to create a "Democratic Racial Front" are continuing, mainly as a pre-election manoeuvre. Penetration of labour remains extensive, despite the efforts of Socialists who have created the anti-communist N.C.I.O. Democratisation League. At best this has only succeeded in slowing up further penetration. Propaganda among youth, women and peasants is also being continued with some success.

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(e) Future trends.

The J.C.P. can be expected to continue its present policy in the hope of increasing its representation in the Diet and increasing support throughout all classes of Japanese. Despite its exploitation of genuine and justified labour unrest, revolutionary tactics are unlikely so long as occupation forces remain in the country.

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Annex 1
Appendix 15
Philippines

PHILIPPINES COMMUNIST PARTY (PKP)

(a) Constitutional Position and Strength at end of 1947.

The Communists manifest themselves through various organizations. The primary component is the military arm – the Hukbalahap, which was about 150,000 strong at the end of 1946. By no means all of these were communists, but rather a discontented peasantry exploited and dominated by a relatively small communist group. The agrarian side is represented by the National Peasants' Union (PKM) also about 150,000 strong of whom many are also members of the Hukbalahap; labour by the Congress of Labour Organisation (CLO), 80,000 strong; and politics by the Democratic Alliance (DA).

We know very little about the PKP itself, except that it is probably largely sided, financially and in other ways, by the Chinese Communists in the Philippines.

(b) Policy.

The Hukbalahap continues to follow a policy of armed revolution, interpreted by the rank and file into simple banditry. The D.A. is working for constitutional reform. We have no reports of recent activity by the P.K.M. or the C.L.O.

There was evidence early this year that members of the P.K.P. were in contact with leading communists in Hong Kong.

(c) Future Trends.

Information is insufficient to enable any estimate to be made.

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ANNEX II

I. CO-ORDINATION OF COMMUNIST PARTY POLICY.

A study of the circumstances surrounding the recent reorientation of communist policy in South East Asia shows clearly that co-ordination is loose but effective. The evidence can be briefly summarized as follows: -

- (a) The communist parties in India, Burma and Malaya all decided to embark on a policy of militant opposition to their respective governments. In each case the final decision was taken in March 1948.
- (b) The Communist Party of India (C.P.I.) the Burma Communist Party (B.C.P.) and the Malayan Communist Party (M.C.P.) all prepared for the re-orientation of policy by drawing up political theses. These theses all bear a close resemblance to each other and to ZHDANOV's review of the international situation presented to the Cominform in September 1947.
- (c) In each case the communist party concerned indulged in considerable self-criticism and denounced its former policy as being "opportunist right-wing deviation".
- (d) In all three cases there is strong reason to believe that the change in policy was prompted by consideration of the international situation rather than by internal conditions.
- (e) On December 25th 1947, MAO Tse-tung in his report to the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party called on "all anti-imperialist forces of the various eastern countries to oppose the oppression of the imperialists and reactionaries within each country, taking as the objective of their struggle the liberation of more than a billion oppressed people of the East".
- (e) The various communist parties in South East Asia consistently adopt the Russian propaganda line on all international disputes.

Some of the main ways in which co-ordination is effected are described in the following section. It is necessary to emphasise that in the majority of cases no specific directive is received from Moscow, the communist parties being considered sufficiently advanced to be able to interpret the central party line. In select cases of importance it is, nevertheless, possible that policy directives are furnished through trusted emissaries. It is very probable that S.A. DANGE, the veteran Indian communist who returned to India in the late summer of 1947 after a visit to Moscow and MOESO, the old Indonesian revolutionary who has recently returned to his country after an absence of over 20 years within the Russians, are examples of this type.

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With the exception of one unverified case reported from India in 1947, and a possible case more recently in Indonesia, there are no indications that any of the communist parties in the Far East receive direct financial assistance from Russia.

II. METHODS OF SECURING CO-ORDINATION.

(a) Russian Embassies.

Russian Embassies have been established in China, Siam, India, Japan (Mission) and diplomatic relations with Burma and Pakistan will probably lead to the location of Embassies in those countries at an early date.

There is reason to believe that the Bangkok Embassy has established contact with the communists in Siam. The Nanking Embassy is not, of course, cast for a liaison role as contact with the Chinese Communists is direct from the U.S.S.R.

(b) News Agencies.

Tass has correspondents in India, Indonesia, China and Japan. They fulfil a double function in that they transmit to Moscow reports of developments in their own area and provide, for local consumption, the Russian propaganda line. It is believed that the Tass correspondent in China is also responsible for furnishing news to the editorial board of the Cominform paper "For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy" now published in Prague.

The Hsin Hwa (New China) News Agency is the official Chinese Communist Agency. Its headquarters, believed to be located in Yenan, is an integral part of the C.C.P. propaganda machine. The main branch in Hong Kong covers South East Asia and offices or representatives are maintained in London, Europe and, till recently, in Singapore. The Singapore office is at present quiescent. The Agency provides the C.C.P. line for overseas Chinese communities. Both the Vietnam News Service and the Indonesian Information Service have contacts with communists and they frequently assist in the dissemination of communist propaganda.

(c) Student and Youth Organisation.

The communist dominated World Federation of Democratic Youth and its affiliate the International Union of Students, with headquarters in Paris and Prague respectively, have established close contact with communist controlled youth or student organizations in India, China, Hong Kong, Pakistan, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, Siam, French Indo-China and Korea. W.F.D.Y./I.U.S. Commissions or representatives have visited all these countries since January 1947 and some Asian youth and student organisations have permanent representatives at the Paris and Prague headquarters. The

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W.F.D.Y./I.U.S. also organised the South East Asia Youth and Student Conference at Calcutta in February 1948.

(d) Women's Organisations.

The Women's International Democratic Federation (W.I.D.F.) which is also communist-dominated, has made contact with similar local associations in India, Pakistan, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and China and representatives visited the four first-named countries in 1948. A South East Asia Women's Conference under W.I.D.F. sponsorship is scheduled to be held in Calcutta in October 1948.

(e) World Federation of Trade Unions (W.F.T.U.)

The W.F.T.U., which is subject to strong communist influence, is in contact with Trade Union organisations throughout Asia and Communist Trade Union leaders attend W.F.T.U. council meetings in Europe.

(f) Exchange of Newsletters.

This form of contact, largely inspired by the Empire Communist Conference in 1947, has been established between various communist parties throughout the Commonwealth. In the case of Malaya, exchange of newsletters with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia is known to have been arranged.

(g) Communist Literature and Publications.

Communist literature is sent from Moscow to most countries in Asia frequently at discount rates. Much of it is reprinted by the People's Publishing House organization, run by the Communist Party of India, and again disseminated abroad. In addition, such papers as the Cominform organ "For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy", "New Times" and "Soviet Weekly" give the central "party line". The Indian Communist paper "People's Age" and the Chinese communist "China Digest" furnish the party lines adopted by those organisations.

(h) International Conferences etc.

Conferences such as the South East Asia Youth and Student Conference (February 1948), the World Youth Festival at Prague (1947), the Empire Communist Conference (1947), the International Youth Labourers' Convention at Warsaw (August 1948), the Second Party Congress of the Communist Party of India (March 1948), and the 6th All China Labour Congress at Harbin in August 1948 provide excellent opportunities for the establishment of links and exchange of information. Top-ranking communists are frequently present and they

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also make contacts while en route to and from these gatherings. In addition, highly privileged communists visiting W.F.T.U. council meetings, etc., occasionally visit Moscow (S.A. DANGE of the Communist Party of India is an example).

Through this network of contacts, co-ordination is obtained and uniformity of policy insured.