Portugal

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A narrative exposition of Portugal will require us to explore two outcomes. First, why did Portugal (as an overseas empire) fight three civil wars (in Angola from 1961-75, in Guinea-Bissau from 1962-74, and in Mozambique from 1965-69) to retain control over its sub-Saharan African colonies as compared to the other colonial rulers (Britain, France and Belgium), none of which fought an extended civil war to retain sub-Saharan African colonies. Second, how did Portugal (now referring to the metropole) avoid a civil war amidst instability, anocracy and low-GDP/capita, when its probability nearly tripled from 1974 to 1976, reaching .02, higher than the world mean probability of .0168?

Although these two outcomes demand investigation, our model performed reasonably well for Portugal. For the metropole (Portugal as a state), our measure of lagged GDP/cap increased nearly tenfold during the half-century of our dataset: from $944 in 1945 to $9002 in 2002. This accounts for the near monotonic drop (excepting the period of the revolution from 1974) in the expected probability of civil war from .022 in 1945 to .0017 in 1999. Lack of oil, low population, and low coverage of mountains all stay constant over the period, but all work to lower the probability of civil war even given the early period of low GDP/cap.

Consistent with this assessment of probabilities, the historical record shows a country bordering on insurrection up through 1974 (when the coup of the Armed Forced Movement – the MFA – in fact succeeds), and a political regime not at all threatened by civil war after 1976. In 1926 a military coup overthrew the Portuguese fledgling democracy and the officers installed António de Oliveira Salazar, a law professor, first as its Finance Minister and then as Prime Minister. Although he created an authoritarian state that promised civil peace, it was throughout its thirty-eight years of rule racked by potential insurgency. In 1927, left wing junior officers rebelled in

what became known as the Oporto Revolt. In 1928 and 1931 there were recurrences, led by officers who had been deported in the Oporto uprising. In 1936 there was a mutiny of communists in the navy, who were supported by Spanish Republicans. In 1937 an anarchist nearly succeeded in assassinating Salazar. In 1943 a Movement of Anti-Fascist Unity under the direction of General Norton de Matos, planned a coup d'état. And moving now into the era of our dataset, in 1959, an Independent Military Movement of junior officers attempted a coup. In 1961, the military was humiliated for being overrun by Nehru's troops taking control over Goa. The Generals of the High Command attempted to force Salazar into retirement. Captain Henrique Galvão, once an intimate of Salazar, hijacked an airplane to express opposition to Salazar. But the dictator was able to rally support from the Lisbon-based generals and he staved off a coup. In 1962, there was another coup attempt led by Captain Varela Gomes. In the 1960s, student unrest and urban guerrillas put the country on the brink. In 1971 bombs blew up the NATO Communications Center and the secret police headquarters.[1] In 1973, General Kaulza de Arriaga, once military commander of Mozambique, staged a failed right wing coup to remove Spínola and General Costa Gomes, both of whom supported the Captains in what was to become a successful rebellion in 1974 (Gil Ferreira and Marshall 1986: 29-30). In the period between the successful coups (1926 and 1974), one analyst lists twenty coup attempts, suggesting that in this near half-century of authoritarian control, each year there was a 45% chance of a coup attempt (Wheeler 1979, 210-15). After the restoration of democracy (marked by the coup of November 25, 1975, in which paratroop officers attacked the military police in Lisbon who quickly surrendered), Portugal has experienced a quarter-century of internal peace with no threat of civil war.

In the period 1945 through 1974, when Portugal's susceptibility to civil war was hovering around the world average, there were numerous threats to civil peace; in the period 1975 to 1999, when our model shows Portugal's susceptibility to civil war well below the world average (and declining), there have been no such threats. To be sure civil peace did not appear all at once. In January 1976, left-wing party headquarters were bombed in Braga and Covilhá. Furthermore, the "25th April Association" (of old MFA adherents, in a form of political protest association in support of military role in politics) used threatening language in an attempt to discredit

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[1] . This summary of potentially violent challenges to Salazar's rule is from Gil Ferreira and Marshall (1986), pp. 24-29.

the liberal political order. Several senior officers in the military continued for a decade to demand a say in who becomes the Minister of Defense (Bruneau and MacLeod 1986: 22). However, since 1976 the military has made equally clear that they will not engineer an anti-civilian coup.

Another way to assess our model is to report that it predicts .6 civil wars in metropolitan Portugal over the fifty-five year period, and none occurred. Meanwhile, it predicts 1.3 civil wars in Portugal-as-Empire, and three occurred. We now look more closely at the causes of the three colonial wars and then at the 1974 revolution that did not generate sufficient violence to qualify as a civil war.

Three Colonial Wars

For Salazar's "Estado Novo", maintaining the *ultramar*, a territory twenty-two times the size of the mainland, was a key goal, despite the earlier losses of Brazil and some South and Southeast Asian enclaves. With war in Angola in 1961, much of Salazar's efforts were in retaining the colonies, despite the enormous costs.

Why were there three insurgencies?

Our model takes into account the insurgent potential of non-contiguous territory. Having territory not connected with the mainland on average raises the probability of civil war insurgency by 2.2 times (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 86). The attempt by a regionally based movement to separate from a state whose armies must go overseas or across foreign territory to quell that movement is far more likely to succeed than a movement whose region is accessible to the state. Facing three such movements in Africa gave insurgents a strategic advantage that they -- despite organizational limits -- were able to exploit.

What was the source of the rebellion? Most historians emphasize a grievance-based account. As summarized by van der Waals "Angola was by 1961, a festering pit of socio-economic and political grievances. This was to create a revolutionary climate…" (p. 30). Despite an ideology of "lusotropicalism" (in which Portugal's special role in assimilating with Africans was utopianized), racial cleavages were the source of deep social division (Bender 1977). In the early 20th century, an infusion of whites into Angola and Mozambique created new forms of racism, keeping mestizos at

lower rungs of the colonial bureaucracy. In Mozambique (before World War I) an Organic charter stipulated rules that only truly assimilated natives could get full citizenship. Furthermore, throughout the 20th century, more poor white settlers, including women, began migrating to the cities, and often displacing better-educated *mestizos* from bureaucratic jobs (Ciment 1997, 30). The leading historian of the Angola civil war concurs. He cites (approvingly) Marxist Viriato da Cruz, who saw the rebellion as "the result of the irreversible blow dealt to traditional African structures by the market economy introduced under the Portuguese colonial administration." Da Cruz points to two million Africans torn from their surroundings; 800,000 subject to forced labor; 350,000 faced joblessness in urban areas; and one million Angolans laboring in mines in neighboring countries. "In sum," Marcum concludes, "the disintegration of traditional society and the injustice of colonial society had led to widespread disorientation, despair, and repression, and to preparations for violent protest" (Marcum, vol. I, p. 120). These generalized grievances became specific in early 1961. At this time in Angola there was a depression in coffee with a drop from $20 to $5 per sack. Similarly with cotton. A drop in cotton prices led Portugal's firms to hold back payment to Angolan growers. This engendered protests, strikes, retaliatory beatings and arrests. It was in these northern plantation areas that the real insurgency began (Marcum, vol. I, pp. 123-6).

Several factors helped translate these grievances into actual revolution. First is the fact that neighboring countries were receiving independence. The FLN of Algeria supplied the UPA in Angola with modern weapons.[2] Tunisia and Congo provided training camps. And the newly created Organization of African Unity in 1963 recognized a proto-insurgent group as Angola's government in exile. With Zambia's independence in 1964, the MPLA was able to open up an eastern front and finally achieve some military successes. Related to this, the Afro-Asian and communist bloc pushing for decolonization in the UN, and this gave aid to the rebels. By 1961 (to the shock of Salazar) President Kennedy voted against Portugal in the Security Council on a recommendation concerning Portugal's reprisals against Angolan insurgencies.[3] It is also the case that the US CIA put Holden Roberto, the leader of the UPA/FNLA on its payroll. He

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[2] . This is the União das Populações de Angola, a movement that had the Bacongo people in the north of the country as its principal support base, and Holden Roberto as its leader. This movement would in 1962 become the foundation for the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola).

[3] . By Article 73e in the UN Charter, the General Assembly had the responsibility to monitor the transfer of power in overseas territories to the peoples of those territories. This was how the violence of February, 1961 got a hearing in the UN.

kept the Chinese and Russians at arms length, but worked closely with President Mobuto of Congo/Zaire. Third, the Portuguese reluctantly allowed Protestant missionaries to work in the colonies. The three leading insurgents in Angola were all educated by these Protestant missionaries: Roberto (Baptists), Neto (Methodists), and Savimbi (Congregationalists). Van der Waals suggests that the ideology of liberation was fostered not only by communists and Afro-Asian nationalists, but by Protestant missionaries as well (van der Waals 1993, pp. 30, 43).

Portugal's unpreparedness for an insurgency, and thus its self-defeating tactics at the early stages -- something we see as state weakness -- was key. In early 1961, a religious sect called Maria (after its leader António Mariano) made up mostly of cotton workers, attacked Portuguese-owned property and livestock, forcing the settlers to escape and they sought refuge in Malange. The Maria group protested the system of enforced cotton growing, and many burned their seed, heaped their farm tools at roadsides, and sang hymns to Mariano and to Patrice Lumumba, whose reputation as the liberator of Congo was enormous. They destroyed barges at river crossings, barricaded roads, slaughtered livestock, and looted stores in missions. As the rebellion spread through the Malange district, Portugal's army units strafed the rebel areas, killing an estimated 7,000 Africans. Mariano and an allied chief, Kula-Xingu were captured and killed. Some 10,000 of those who weren't killed took refuge in the Congo. In a quasi-planned set of uprisings a couple of months later, Portuguese bombing (using NATO equipment!) was more indiscriminate. According to one observer, "they even bombed and strafed areas that had not been affected by the nationalist uprising." This strategy, according to Marcum, would "insure that this insurrection would not be localized." About 150,000 Africans took refuge in Congo (Marcum 1969, I: 124-6, 143-44). By these acts (in our definition already a civil war) Portugal seeded a refugee insurgency that could prosper in a neighboring state.

Focusing on Angola, we can now see the inadequacy of the grievance-based story. Marcum reports that the Portuguese government, in seeking to make the claim that all opposition was foreign induced, "insisted that only those northern portions of the territory exposed to external infiltration offered any opposition to continued European rule." They created a myth of the contented Ovimbundu populations in the south. However, Marcum points to the high levels of grievance in the south, but the "rather disorganized, idealistic activities of…helpless young men" turning their

grievances into insurgent action. The Portuguese secret police were able to track them down and execute the leaders of incipient southern organizations in response to their calls for freedom. Hopeless against the police, the early dissidents in the south joined the rebellion in the north, where the terrain was better for insurgency. Many deserting Ovimbundu soldiers escaped to Congo and joined UPA, where Roberto was forming the ELNA (Exército de Libertação Nacional de Angola), with camps in Congo and military counsel from the Algerian FLN. This was the beginning of an insurgent army. Grievance alone was inadequate; the porous border to Congo (and later the porous border to independent Zambia for the MPLA) turned grievance (which was equal throughout the colony) into insurgency (Marcum 1969, I: 154-5).

Insurgencies in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique followed in the footsteps of the 1961 events in northern Angola. In Guinea-Bissau the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) was founded by assimilado and mulatto townsmen. They organized a dockers' strike in 1959 in which Portuguese police massacred 50 of the strikers. Recognizing their vulnerability, its leader Amilcar Cabral went into the jungles to organize the rural folk. Following the outbreak of violence in Angola in 1961, Lisbon immediately shored up its troops in Guinea, and the Portuguese secret police began a program to root out the PAIGC instigators in the countryside. With Portuguese troops exposed, the PAIGC launched a series of ambushes and raids of roads and farms.

In Mozambique, several exile organizations were activated once they got the news of the rebellion in Angola. To stem any tide, Portuguese authorities increased substantially their force level in Mozambique and had organized a voluntary force, riot police units, and intelligence services. By September 1992 the newly formed FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front) began sending volunteers, in the model of the UPA, to Algeria for training (Marcum 1969, I: 193-99; 282-4). While many of the same arguments could be deployed to account for the insurgencies in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique as were applicable to Angola, in terms of our statistical models, these two cases show the independent causal impact of one insurgency in a country on the likelihood of additional insurgencies. Portugal's susceptibility to insurgent action, made clear to political organizations in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique in 1961, emboldened them to up the ante in their anti-colonial struggles.

But why would the Portuguese state fight; why did it not withdraw as did the Belgians from Congo? The usual story given is ideological. Consider Salazar's "Declaration on Overseas Policy" officially published in 1963, where he declares "The concept of Nation is inseparable, in the Portuguese case, from the idea of civilizing mission…Angola is a Portuguese creation and does not exist without Portugal. The only national conscience rooted in the Province is not Angolan, it is Portuguese…" (Marcum 1978, II: 284). And this ideology pervaded the corporatist coalition that he led. Its supporters in the military high command therefore opposed the appointment of Caetano for a suggestion he made in the early 1960s that Portugal pursue a federal arrangement with the colonies. But Admiral Américo Tomas as president made it clear to Caetano that his appointment to succeed Salazar depended on his commitment to defend the overseas territories. Without your (Caetano's) assurance, "the armed forces will intervene" (Maxwell 1986, 112). Caetano was thus conditioning his behavior in support of the ideological mission of the New State to avoid a right-wing military coup.

Rebel leader in Angola, Holden Roberto, confirms this ideological blinding of the Portuguese leadership. He claimed to have been a partisan of nonviolence, but commenting in retrospect, he wrote that to ceaseless requests (from his guerilla organization, the UPA) that it "enter into negotiations for the decolonization of Angola" the Portuguese government only repeated "the dogma of Portuguese Angola" and responded to protest "with massive executions, deportations and intensified repression" (Marcum 1969, vol. I, pp. 139-40). Indeed, Marcum suggests that one reason for a level of violence that shocked Roberto was his miscalculation about Portuguese resolve. He suspected that the Portuguese would give up their colonies as did the French in Tunisia or the Belgians in Congo (Marcum 1969, I: 146).

Another story points to Salazar's domestic support base. Five families controlled the extractive industries in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau, and their activities were key to Salazar's economic strategy, a strategy that banked on traditional economic enterprise that would not integrate Portugal into the social world of Europe (Gil Ferreira and Marshall 1986, 8-16). Salazar in fighting to retain the colonies may well have been a tool of his own domestic survival strategy. This isn't entirely convincing however, as the cost of paying off these families was certainly far lower than the expected cost of three civil wars.

Probably the most important element to this equation is the presence of settlers in Angola and Mozambique. Portugal in the 19th century settled exiled prisoners (*degregados*) into Angola and Mozambique. By the turn of the 20th century, there were already 10,000 Europeans in Angola, mostly around Luanda. In Mozambique by World War II, there were 27,000 Europeans in Mozambique most of them farming along the Zambezi valley (Ciment 1997, 25). Due to its neutrality, Portugal thrived in World War II, and the agricultural economies of Angola and Mozambique became quite profitable. This created a vast in-migration of whites. From 1950-74, white settlers in Mozambique went from 50,000 to 200,000; in Angola from 78,000 to 335,000 (Ciment 1997, 33-34). While Portuguese armed forces were not entirely indiscriminate in their retaliation to the early UPA insurgency – Rev. Malcolm McVeigh reported that the Portuguese military went systematically against the better educated, professional, church members (both Protestant and Catholic), trying "to wipe out" African leadership (Marcum 1969, vol. I, p. 150) -- the settlers brazenly took on a vigilante role in terrorizing African communities.

In terms of our model, it does well in emphasizing the importance of good terrain for insurgency as a complement to grievances, and that grievances alone are not sufficient to sustain an insurgency. The one factor that played an important role and could be included in our model is the degree to which settlers from the dominant group live in a peripheral region of the state. Under colonial rule as with Angola and Mozambique, the settler interest in stemming decolonization has a parallel structure to what we have identified as "sons of the soil" within metropolitan states. There is a similar dynamic, where the state must protect either the settlers or the autochthonous; to the extent that it protects the former, it easily can get drawn into a cycle of violence leading to an insurgency. The cases of Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique also show the importance of one successful insurgency in a country on the likelihood of additional insurgencies. Finally, there is the factor of miscalculation, by the Angolans of the resolve of the Portuguese, and the Portuguese of the seriousness of the Africans. Miscalculation might help explain why the wars lasted so long; but not in explaining the onset. For onset, we see the importance of strategic terrain and the settlers.

Anocracy, Instability but No Civil War (1974-75)

On April 25, 1974 tanks of the Armed Services Movement (MFA) rolled into Lisbon at dawn. Junior officers who had spawned this movement sought to dismantle an authoritarian regime that had been in power for nearly a half-century. This was not a mere coup d'état, however, as it drew masses of people into the streets in its support. The reigning dictator, Marcello Caetano, handed over power to a charismatic general Antonio Spínola, who could not contain the revolutionary impulses of the Portuguese people or the young officers who staged the coup. In September 1974 the young officers forced him to resign, and they managed to extricate Portugal from its colonial wars against the dreams of Spínola, who hoped to create a broad confederation of Portugal and its overseas colonies. In March 1975, outraged at the decolonization, Spínola staged a counter-coup in which his forces took over the Lisbon airport and the Republican National Guard barracks at Carmo. His forces also bombed and surrounded the barracks of the left-wing light artillery regiment. Spínola's coup nonetheless failed for lack of popular support. In fact, when troops supporting Spínola surrounded army barracks, they were nearly attacked by a hostile crowd (Gil Ferreira and Marshall 1986: 190). Spínola's team also lacked any support of the military high command. The failed coup sent him into exile. Still he was active. In Paris, Spínola set up the MDLP – Democratic Movement for the liberation of Portugal -- and a military force in the north of Portugal. He did his best to militarize for his own factional interests what had up till then been a peaceful revolution.

In the summer of 1975 – described locally as the "hot summer" – the MFA allied with radical forces in society and pushed land reform and nationalizations, rapidly undermining the near-feudal agrarian structures of the society. This precipitated yet another coup, led by officers constituting themselves as the Group of Nine, in the hope of sustaining the revolution but winning the support of the middle classes, who were becoming fearful of the excesses of the MFA. Its leader, Lt.-Col. Ramalho Eanes, did not precisely carry out this agenda. He quickly made peace with the political parties, and facilitated the rapid democratization of the country. Elections were held peacefully, and the military quietly receded from the political scene. The number of battle deaths associated with this revolution is miniscule. Although a major social and political revolution, it does not qualify as a civil war by our definition.

It might be argued that coups are contained (with low levels of violence) under conditions in which the military is unified. But if it becomes

fractionalized, intra-faction conflicts spill over into the streets and bring violence in their wake. To be sure, fractionalized coup violence is usually short-term, but tends to spill over our 1,000 threshold in deaths. In 1974-75, the Portuguese coup-makers were highly fractionalized, and did not share a common vision of where the revolution should go. First there was the conflict between the old guard of reformers (Spínola) against the young and more radical captains. The young officers in the colonies were exposed to things quite new to them: conscripted university graduates; white settlers; black Africans; Marxist ideas; ordinary soldiers; all this had a politicizing effect on them, especially because in general the young officers were of lower social orders than the aristocratic senior officers (Gil Ferreira and Marshall 1986: 14-15). Also separating the young officers of the MFA from Spínola was the impression made upon the young officers in seeing for themselves in April 1974 that masses of people poured into the streets, both in cities and small towns. The coup had induced mass celebration, with ordinary citizens throwing flowers in the air. This scene had a profound affect on the young officers, who had planned in their MFA program a regime change "without internal social upheaval" but found themselves giddily riding a wave of social upheaval (Gil Ferreira and Marshall 1986: 182).

But even after the Spínola/MFA conflict was resolved (in a military campaign), the divisions among the MFA leaders were profound.[4] Graham delineates four separate factions vying for power. First there was the group behind Vasco Gonçalves, who was premier from the summer 1974. He led the largest faction, and his group favored a left alliance with the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and the pro-Communist MDP/CDE (the Movimento Democrático Português/Comissão Democrática Eleitoral, an electoral alliance from the Salazar years, mostly effective at the local level). Vice-Admiral Rosa Coutinho, a leader in Gonçalves' faction, played a key role in turning over power to Agostinho Neto in Angola, in collaboration with his MPLA. The second faction was led by Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho. His faction wanted the military to retain the upper hand in its collaboration with the left parties, more-or-less like Peru in its left-corporatism stage. Otelo controlled COPCON (the continental military force, centered in Lisbon), and this gave to him the resources to organize the Comissões

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[4] . A list of the 17 interviewees in Gil Ferreira and Marshall (1986: 192) among the "captains" who staged the April 1974 coup shows great diversity in social background (father's occupation) and the degree to which ex ante these men disapproved of the Caetano regime. Their views about the future were equally diverse.

Dinamizadoras. His faction was linked to the Maoist MRPP (Movimento Revolucionário Popular Português) and the violent Marxist group PRP-BR (Movimento Revolucionário do Proletariado-Brigadas Revolucionárias). Otelo tried to keep at arms length from the more violent elements, but did not break from them until fall 1975. However, he supplied arms to them through his control over COPCON, and helped seed a guerrilla force, called FP25 (Forces of April 25th) and it was created to disrupt the conservative move of the Group of Nine after it had succeeded in capturing the state in November 1975. The third faction was led by Major Ernesto de Melo Antunes and Brigadier General Vasco Lourenço. They were social democrats, and felt the future should be determined by the ballot box. They were associated with the Socialist Party. However, they expressed sympathy with the Third World movement, in part to show their revolutionary credentials when their domestic position was so moderate. The fourth faction was residual, and made up of those MFA members uncomfortable with the other three (Graham 1993: 26-29). With these deep factional differences, it is a wonder that violence did not escalate.

The division between the governing MFA in the fall of 1975 and the Group of Nine had an equally incendiary tone. A study of the "Document of the Nine" dated August 6, 1975)" and "The COPCON Document (working proposal for a political programme" written on August 12, 1975 illustrates the deep ideological divisions within the MFA – the former seeking to retain support of the small bourgeoisie in reestablishing state structures; the latter seeking to ride the wave of radical social change. This is about as divided as a military can get, with language that suggests irreconcilable differences.[5]

The alliance between the MFA and the Communists was sending sparks throughout the society that awaited ignition. According to Maxwell (1986, 126-8), the communists in 1975 were alienating virtually all groups outside of their core. Owners of small property (who in August 1975 burned many of the PCP offices in Central and Northern Portugal) feared that they would be subject to expropriation. Liberals were aghast at Communist sympathy for the attack on the newspaper *República*, and Secretary-General of the PCP Alvaro Cunhal's promise to ignore the results of the election ("I promise you [he told Oriana Fallacci] there will be no parliament in Portugal.") Catholics were appalled on the takeover of the church's radio station (*Renascença*). Finally, many elements in the army, especially the

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[5] . These two documents are published as Appendices in Gil Ferreira and Marshall (1986), pp. 269-82.

"operationals" [i.e. those who reflected professional interests of the officer corps] were appalled at the chaotic nature of the PCP/MFA administration.

On August 29, 1975 the Communist's ally in the military Vasco Gonçalves was forced out of office, and a 6th provisional government brought in the Socialists, the Popular Democrats, and some of the MFA (led by Melo Antunes and Capt. Vasco Lourenço) who led the anti-communist struggle over the summer. The communists allied with the radical left in a United Revolutionary Front. They believed time was against them, and that it was better to act decisively soon, especially inasmuch as the government was attempting to create an elite military intervention force (AMI) loyal to it, threatening to bypass the remnants of the COPCON under Otelo. From the vantage point of the hot summer of 1975, it looked as if the PCP was inviting a violent counter-revolution, and would take arms against the 6th provisional government before it could establish itself in power.

To add oil to the fire, there was the incendiary problem of some 600,000 *retornados* (returnees from the colonies) that added to the social disruption in Portugal proper, and these retornados, without jobs, homes or hopes, were easily recruitable into insurgent bands for anti-MFA right-wing movements. As pointed out by Gil Ferreira and Marshall 1986: 204) the retornados resented the MFA, and felt betrayed. They were placed into refugee camps under conditions of high unemployment. The authors are amazed that they did not form into an anti-revolutionary political force.

Finally, with a world economic recession in the mid 1970s, Portugal faced hard times. A factionalized army, a society in revolution, and a mass of recruitable insurgents put Portugal on the brink of civil war. Yet the revolution was peaceful. Why? There are many explanations offered for the peacefulness of the Portuguese revolution, and we now review them.

General Peacefulness of Society, as Shown in Earlier Periods

The 1926 coup that overthrew a democracy and brought to power a right-wing military government was, "like most Portuguese revolutions, bloodless" (Ferreira and Marshall 1986: 5-6). In fact, a census of attempted coups from 1927 through 1974 in Portugal identified twenty-one coup attempts with a total of 344 deaths. This amounts to an average of 16 deaths per coup attempt! (Wheeler 1979: 210-15).

The successful one of April 25, 1974 was below the mean of casualties. Gil Ferreira and Marshall report that in that coup, when the tanks rolled towards the city center, "an old lady setting up her flower stall tossed a red carnation at the commander of the lead tank – this became the emblem of the revolution" (p. 5). The principal coup of April 1974 was responsible for five deaths (Wheeler 1986: 215).

High militarization of dissent along with low death rates suggest a particular "repertoire of contention" (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001, 16) rather unique to Portugal, in which coups mostly fail, but neither side is willing to risk lives for success.

Societal Homogeneity

Cultural homogeneity is often pointed to (despite its statistical insignificance) as a reason for lower probability of civil war outbreaks. Portugal is usually considered the model of a homogeneous state. All citizens speak Portuguese and nearly all are Catholic. But however small, ethnically homogeneous, and centralized in administrative structure, there is a foundation for regional differentiation. Geographically, there are three distinct regions: North Atlantic; North interior; and South. The Northwest looks to the Ocean and has limited connection to the interior of the country; in the south, it is Mediterranean, with low elevations and connections to the Roman and Muslim civilizations in history. The Northeast is not well connected to the West, and it has a more continental climate. Administratively, going back to the 13th century, there have been six comarcas (later provinces). These provinces were given legal meaning in the three monarchical constitutions (1822, 1826, 1838) (Medeiros 1991: 36-38). Though certainly not strong identity markers, and weakened by the progressive north to south migration of peoples, these regional identities could well have been activated.

But they are a basis for social differentiation. In 1974 in particular, the differences between the north and the south were stunning. Brettell reports that in 1975 there were no land seizures in the north as there were in the south. Instead, there were massive pro-Church demonstrations and attacks on communist headquarters. She accounts for this by noting that the south was organized in latifundias, and its day laborers filtered slowly into the urban proletariat within Portugal. In the north, yeoman farmers living on minifundias tended to move into the proletariat of other western European

economies. It was easier for northerners to emigrate, because emigration required some initial capital, and small farmers were able to raise necessary funds by selling some land. In the south, in contrast, penniless day laborers could only move to Portugal's cities (Brettell 1979, fn. 18, p. 296).

This difference had great consequences for political orientation. In her field site in Viana do Castelo, Brettell reckoned that from a fifth to a third of the population in 1973 was away during the year, most in France, but in other industrial countries as well. Villagers were anti-communist and said they were worried about ownership of small plots of land that had been in their families for generations. Also, in emigrating, they idealized "self-improvement", and communism they insisted stands against such strategies. She reports that "One of the greatest fears among emigrants in France is that their new houses, built with the French francs they have spent years accumulating, will be taken over by the Communists or inhabited by Angolan refugees."

The emigrants in the North supported the Church, which was well grounded in the villages, controlling the local press, and defending "reactionary" politics. (One article in the local church press was headlined "I'm a Reactionary" and was a defense of church and religion). Emigrants paid to restore the Churches and to fund extravagantly its *festas*. These emigrants, she found through interviews, most often were not members of French labor unions and not exposed to social democratic ideology of those workers. They told Brettell that unions are for those who don't want to succeed for themselves.

Thus, Brettell concludes, there has been a far greater "revolutionary potential" in the south; and conservatism in the north. Indeed, since 1975, the north votes PPD; the south, socialist and communist. In her village, the vote in 1975 was 2% communist. In fact she found in 1975 that there was nostalgia for the "peace" of the Salazar period, and fear that freedom would undermine it (Brettell, 1979).

While the north and south were all Portuguese speakers, and Catholic, regional differences were profound, such that if a north/south civil war *did* break out, it would have easily been interpreted as a natural outgrowth of two radically different cultures and political economies.

Grievances Alleviated

The grievances in the military in light of the colonial wars were the reasons given by MFA plotters for their revolution; meanwhile the remedy of those grievances (and the rapid negotiation for independence in the wake of the MFA victory) partially ameliorated those grievances. Thus it could be argued that levels of anger were lowered by the time the events of April 25 got under way.

Although Salazar's New State incorporated the high military command into its ruling group, there were constant tensions. At least until 1945, however, military officers had a wide immunity against arrest; in recognition of the army's historical role that Salazar insisted they merited. But in 1945 the secret police was given the power to detain and arrest without legal proceedings for forty-five days, and this included army officers. After this decree, the military were often harassed by secret police, a constant source of grievance (Wheeler 1979, 200).

The African wars were the real drain on the military. It had already been humiliated in the ignominious retreat from Goa against a third world army. But in Africa itself, there were some 25,000 desertions from the colonial war (Gil Ferreira and Marshall 1986: 27).

Furthermore, with the new professional opportunities in Portugal, by the early 1970s fewer men sought military careers. Career officers were aggrieved that the easy promotion of enlisted men into the officer corps was weakening the esprit de corps. In light of a decline in professional soldiers, the government enticed conscripts (the *milicianos*) to turn professional. By Decree-Law 353-73, the government organized an accelerated professional course to conscript captains, and counted all their previous service to assess their seniority, thereby jumping them ahead of professional officers who had previously been their superiors. It was from the protests of this system that the MFA, whose backbone was regular captains and majors, formed. This decree was rescinded in December 1973, somewhat taking the wind out of MFA sails (Maxwell 1986, 110-14).

Spínola as Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of Guinea brought together the best officers to run the war, but quickly saw it as unwinnable, and sought to negotiate with the rebels. Caetano refused, and the officers – several of whom were to be leaders in the MFA -- were furious that they would become the scapegoat for a failed policy. Spínola

popularized an alternative future, and was sacked (Ferreira and Marshall 1986: 13). However, shortly after the revolution, once Spínola had been deposed, the MFA quickly negotiated full independence for the African colonies, thereby eliminating the grievance that was the source of the original insurrection.

Wheeler (1979) in his comparison of the two successful military coups of this century in Portugal finds that the "master grievance" was "professional discontent based upon the belief that the 'honor of the army'…had been severely compromised by its role as a defender of the now-discredited regime…" The master grievance, he notes, was professional, and allowed for officers of all political stripes to participate in the *jacquerie*. Yet the regime, at least in 1974, had tried to respond to those grievances in a way to defuse golpofilia.

The other big grievance -- and this in society -- was the continued near feudal economy in Portugal's south, a situation that many described as having "revolutionary potential" (Brettell 1979, 281). But, in the first year after the coup, about 1.2 million hectares of land in the Alentejo had been expropriated mostly from absentee landlords, with no resistance. Nationalization of industries took place with equal ease. The enemies of the communists disappeared, and there was no ruling class to fight (Maxwell 1986, 126). Grievances, military and societal, were alleviated before the cycles of violence were unleashed.

Sense of Legality in the Armed Forces

The MFA officers were obsessed with the notion of 'legality'. The Junta of National Salvation immediately decreed that Salazar's 1933 Constitution remained in force. Law and order were given priority over program (Gil Ferreira and Marshall 1986: 185).

The sense of legal propriety had a powerful influence on army behavior. At dawn on April 25th revolution the MFA under Otelo had already secured center Lisbon. Prime Minister Caetano peacefully trekked to the headquarters of the Republican National Guard at Carmo (in a fashionable downtown neighborhood). He adamantly refused to surrender the government to an army captain there, saying he did not want "the power of the state to fall into the street." He asked for Spínola, and this request was granted. Caetano surrendered to Spínola. This meant symbolically a legal

transfer of power to a new holder, and not to rebel officers or to mobs (Machado 1991, 164).[6]

A key test for the military was the November 25, 1975 coup that displaced the MFA. Once the Group of Nine moved, they found the senior officers behind them, something the MFA never received (Graham 1993: 30). Basically Graham's story is that the very senior officers played a quiet nonpolitical role through Spínola, through the MFA, and then through the Group of Nine. But when the latter showed an inclination for de-militarization of the polity as well as order in society (ending the occupations of farms and factories), the senior officers started acting positively, and stood fully behind Eanes. It was the sobriety of the senior officers that checked open rebellion.

Strength of State

One factor that our theory has highlighted in diminishing the probability of civil war is strength of state, especially in the control over society by the military. Here, despite a relatively low GDP/cap. in 1974, the strength of the army in operational terms was impressive. Based on now-published secret government documents on counter-subversion, we learn that in 1967, six years into the war in Angola, the Portuguese army showed awareness of the needs of counter insurgency, and were trained by the Americans in its use. Lt.-Col Alvaro Rogado Quintino was trained by the US in counter-subversion and psychological warfare in 1964 at the School for Special Operations at Fort Bragg (North Carolina). In 1967, Portugal instituted a program in counter-subversion in Angola.

The documents showed recognition of the need for information advantages over the opposition; they saw the need for remedying the injustices that are a rallying cry of the insurgents; they saw the need for propaganda and leaving a strong impression in the population that it was inevitable that Portugal would win. The Portuguese had resource advantages as well. In fact, most military analyses conclude that the Portuguese army had won the war in Angola and sustained a booming economy. Mozambique was less successful from a military standpoint, but not a failure. Only in Guinea-Bissau was the military situation hopeless (Graham 1993: 17-18).

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[6] . By treaty, Spain was obligated to march into Lisbon to aid Caetano against any rebel military force. Since Caetano did not fall to such a force (legally), the Spanish army was not so obligated. The fiction of legal transfer therefore reduced the pressure to internationalize the coup.

Yet despite the tactical victories, the military leadership recognized that the tide was against them – that self-rule was a powerful idea. In this sense, capturing the deep aspirations of organic leaders of the society is the battle the Portuguese lost, but this isn't mapped well by GDP, or military effectiveness.[7]

From the viewpoint of 1974-75, the military (however powerful) was probably not an exemplification of a strong state able to stave off insurgency. Perhaps more important were the fiscal reserves of the state, able to buy off opposition. Salazar had kept enormous gold and foreign-currency reserves, and this proved consequential to the MFA. Having money to distribute, worker's real income increased in the first year after the coup, and this gave the regime about a year without worrying about a fiscal crisis, and gave the government a resource advantage over potential rivals (Maxwell 1986, 125).

Foreign Support

Crucial in this period was pressure from the US, the EC, the World Bank, and the German Social Democratic Party, all to support a liberal democratic result (Bruneau and MacLeod 1986: 4). Under the leadership of Joseph Carlucci, the US Ambassador to Portugal, the US and the EEC granted Portugal $272 million to shore up the 6th provisional government in 1975. The CIA had been sending money to the PS for months before. To be sure, the USSR was sending money to support the PCP (Maxwell 1986, 130). But the rewards for the moderate parties gave them a powerful advantage in redirecting the 1974-75 revolution.

New Middle Class Society

In part the answer to the peaceful transition was the fact after the April 25 coup there occurred "the rapid emergence of a new generation of political party leaders, without ties to the New State and with a strong commitment to the creation of a new society" (Graham 1993: 22).

It should be emphasized, and consistent with our theory, in 1974 there were no economic crises -- the GDP was growing and economic prospects

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[7] . Angola: Secret Government Documents on Counter-Subversion, translated and edited by Caroline Reuver-Cohen and William Jerman (Rome: Idoc, 1974)

were favorable for the society. We should therefore expect fewer potential recruits into rebel militias, as the opportunity costs for insurgency were in this decade quite high.

Perhaps of fundamental importance, the massive Portuguese seasonal employment in Western Europe in the 1960s-70s "produced unrest and dissatisfaction with the Salazar/Caetano regime" (Ciment 1997, 35). The unrest and dissatisfaction had little to do with the causes of the rebellion, but much to do with a new urban society with savings and experience living in democratic countries. They were quick to march in the streets in support of the coup, but came onto the streets with flowers and not machine guns. Most (from the north) were completely apolitical, but voted in large numbers against the radical programs of the PCP. The high centrist and socialist votes took some steam from an increasingly radicalized ruling junta.

1974-75 -- An Overview

There is hardly any doubt that the anocracy and instability of the period from 1974-75 put Portugal on the verge of insurgency. And there were many sparks. If Caetano had ordered his Republican Guard to protect his coterie from the April 25th insurgents, a short civil war might have resulted. If Spínola had been willing to defend his regime, or to raise the ante in his attempt to return to power, 1,000 deaths could easily have been induced. If the latifundia owners had appealed to the military to support them against the land invasion of their laborers, a civil war would have ensued. If overzealous peasant militias tried to replicate in the north what they had accomplished in the south, by liberating minifundias, a regional war might have ensued. If the MFA (or the PCP) were unwilling to accept the electoral reality of mild socialism, they might have spurred a civil war. With all these sparks, it is no wonder that country experts such as Maxwell could write, "Violence and the threat of violence were integral to both [the revolutionary and the electoral] processes. The conflict remained below the threshold of large-scale armed struggle and internal war…" (1986, 124).

Three factors lowered that probability. First, the increasing wealth of the country made popular insurgency a poor investment. With a large percentage of the young males living abroad, or returned from (relatively) high wage labor, the recruitment base for an insurgency was quite limited. Second, despite the factions within the army over leadership, the senior military officers remained apolitical, and the senior bureaucracy remained

intact. Therefore, those who captured the state had far more resources and sources of control than insurgent bands. Third, for over a century the military had developed its own "repertoires of contention." They modeled their contention in a tradition of frequent coups without serious violence. Neither side in the various counter coups from 1974-76 expected to be violently attacked by the other -- based on common knowledge about what Portuguese officers do under conditions of mounting a coup. This common knowledge reduced the probability that an attack on a barracks required a quick and massive military response. This was indeed a quite different expectation than that held by Portuguese settlers viv-a-vis attacks by African insurgents -- and with a very different outcome.

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Predicted Probabilities for Portugal-as-Empire

——— Pr(onset) for PORTUGAL

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PORTUGAL	1946	.0383074	.9847178	26008	6.746212	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1947	.0383044	.986823	26080	6.746212	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1948	.0373993	1.067431	26152	6.746212	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1949	.0375335	1.05834	26223	6.746212	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1950	.0377573	1.041504	26295	6.746212	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1951	.0374747	1.06858	26336	6.746212	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1952	.0370674	1.105678	26377	6.746212	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1953	.0368721	1.124356	26418	6.746212	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1954	.0366256	1.147672	26459	6.746212	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1955	.0364732	1.162716	26500	6.746212	0	0	0
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PORTUGAL	1957	.0361169	1.197674	26586	6.746212	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1958	.0358482	1.223511	26629	6.746212	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1959	.0358352	1.226212	26673	6.746212	0	0	0
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PORTUGAL	1961	.035199	1.291676	26827	6.746212	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1962	.0347255	1.335521	26910	6.746212	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1963	.0344884	1.360701	26971	6.746212	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1964	.0340607	1.403382	27013	6.746212	0	0	0
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PORTUGAL	1972	.0291312	1.894687	26521	6.746212	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1973	.0283994	1.976445	26523	6.746212	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1974	.0271437	2.12795	26047	6.835186	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1975	.0693579	2.230077	9093	5.800001	0	1	1

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          pop |      55     18800.2    8704.544           0       27019
       mtnest |      55    6.317733    .4771278    5.800001    6.835186
          Oil |      55           0           0           0           0
       instab |      55    .0909091    .2901294           0           1
        anocl |      54     .037037    .1906259           0           1
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    Variable |     Obs        Mean   Std. Dev.        Min        Max
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------
          pr |      54    .0237975    .0154322    .0024851    .0693579
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Predicted Probabilities of Portugal as State

——— Pr(onset) for PORTUGAL

start year of war/conflict

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PORTUGAL	1947	.0217882	.951	8190	5.800001	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1948	.0201054	1.208	8262	5.800001	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1949	.0203491	1.178	8333	5.800001	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1950	.0207546	1.124	8405	5.800001	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1951	.0202476	1.208	8446	5.800001	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1952	.0195364	1.323	8487	5.800001	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1953	.0192057	1.38	8528	5.800001	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1954	.0187953	1.451	8569	5.800001	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1955	.0185484	1.496	8610	5.800001	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1956	.0183165	1.539	8653	5.800001	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1957	.0179835	1.6	8696	5.800001	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1958	.0175653	1.677	8739	5.800001	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1959	.0175548	1.683	8783	5.800001	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1960	.0170858	1.771	8943	5.800001	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1961	.0166345	1.869	8937	5.800001	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1962	.0159359	2.001	9020	5.800001	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1963	.0156233	2.07	9081	5.800001	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1964	.0150455	2.192	9123	5.800001	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1965	.0148128	2.244	9129	5.800001	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1966	.0140528	2.407	9108	5.800001	0	0	0
PORTUGAL	1967	.0137642	2.469	9103	5.800001	0	0	0
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PORTUGAL	1974	.007094	4.459	8754	5.800001	0	0	0
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PORTUGAL	1976	.0202678	4.31	9355	5.800001	0	1	1
PORTUGAL	1977	.0124184	4.461	9455	5.800001	0	1	0

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PORTUGAL   1995   .002365    7.928    9927   5.800001   0   0   0
PORTUGAL   1996   .0022127   8.133    9930   5.800001   0   0   0
PORTUGAL   1997   .0020132   8.421    9945   5.800001   0   0   0
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PORTUGAL   1999   .0016645   9.002       .   5.800001   0   0   0

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      pop |        54    9220.519    653.2181        8067       10287
   mtnest |        55    5.800001           0    5.800001    5.800001
      Oil |        55           0           0           0           0
----------+----------------------------------------------------------
    instab |        55    .0909091    .2901294           0           1
     anocl |        55    .0363636    .1889186           0           1

 Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.        Min         Max
----------+----------------------------------------------------------
       pr |      1135    .0047233    .0080905    .0000736    .0731739
   gdpenl |      1139    8.721369    4.182463        .704      20.613
      pop |      1121    32326.97     48112.3        1688      270029
   mtnest |      1155    15.44143    18.13401           0    66.90001
      Oil |      1155    .0190476    .1367516           0           1
----------+----------------------------------------------------------
    instab |      1153    .0346921    .1830782           0           1
     anocl |      1142    .0367776    .1882977           0           1

 Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.        Min         Max
----------+----------------------------------------------------------
       pr |      6327    .0167543    .0228494    2.45e-10    .488229
   gdpenl |      6373    3.651117    4.536645        .048      66.735
      pop |      6433    31786.92    102560.8         222     1238599
   mtnest |      6610    18.08833    20.96648           0        94.3
      Oil |      6610    .1295008    .3357787           0           1
----------+----------------------------------------------------------
    instab |      6596    .1464524     .353586           0           1
     anocl |      6541    .2256536     .418044           0           1
```

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