

# A GREAT DIVIDE? Religion and Political Change in U.S. National Elections, 1972–2000

Clem Brooks  
*Indiana University–Bloomington*

Jeff Manza  
*Northwestern University*

Since 1980 most social scientists have found little evidence in support of popular and recurring commentaries that identify religion (and evangelical Protestants, in particular) as a major source of conservative political trends in the United States. But in the past several years a new line of research has reported results suggesting that earlier studies underestimated evidence that partisan change among specific religious groups has contributed to an emerging Republican electoral advantage. We assess this latter body of research, presenting the most comprehensive analysis to date of the effects of religious group memberships on political outcomes in national elections from 1972 through 2000. We address the limitations of past studies by incorporating advances in the measurement of religious denomination, adjudicating competing statistical models of the changing interrelationship of religion and voter alignments and extending previous investigations by simultaneously considering the impact of religion on (1) voting behavior, (2) partisanship, and (3) the representation of religious groups within the Democratic and Republican parties' electoral coalitions. Our results refine and extend past studies of religion and political change, providing evidence of limited changes in group-specific voting coupled with much larger changes in religion-based partisanship and party coalitions.

Religion has increasingly come to be viewed as an important source of partisan political change in the United States in popular and journalistic commentaries during the past three decades. Among the most widely discussed factors are the rise of the Christian Right and the reemergence of conservative evangelical movements as a key ingredient in accounting for growing conservative political strength (Kellstedt 1989; Himmelstein 1990; Kellstedt et al. 1994; Rozell and Wilcox 1995); hypotheses about a growing polarization of public opinion between religious conservatives and both seculars and religious liberals that has led to a "culture war" (Hunter 1991); and more diffusely, changes in the

---

Direct all correspondence to Clem Brooks, Department of Sociology, Indiana University, 1020 E. Kirkwood Ave., Bloomington, IN 47405-7103.

---

*The Sociological Quarterly*, Vol. 45, Issue 3, pp. 421–450, ISSN 0038-0253, electronic ISSN 1533-8525.

© 2004 by The Midwest Sociological Society. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press's Rights and Permissions website, at <http://www.ucpress.edu/journals/rights.htm>.

traditional alignments of other major denominational families such as Catholics (e.g., Kenski and Lockwood 1991) or mainline Protestants (e.g., Wuthnow and Evans 2002).

Empirical evidence that shifts in the alignments of religious voters have contributed to conservative political change has often focused on evangelical Protestants. A large number of scholars have hypothesized the emergence of a trend for evangelical Protestants to support Republican candidates since the 1970s (Green et al. 1998; Fowler, Hertzke, and Olson 1999; Kohut et al. 2001; Sears and Valentino 2002). Although the precise timing and factors driving evangelicals into a Republican alignment differs across studies, the overall conclusion of these studies is similar: evangelicals have moved from a Democratic to a Republican alignment over the past three decades, providing a crucial source of conservative political advantage.

The most comprehensive recent analysis of the impact of religious factors is developed in a book-length study by Layman (2001). Layman's work includes analyses of trends in the impact of religion among both party activists and the mass public. In the case of the latter, he reports new evidence that evangelical Protestants and Catholics have realigned with the Republican Party since the 1970s. Endorsing a version of the culture wars hypothesis, Layman's (2001, chap. 5) subsequent interpretation of growing religious group-based polarization among American voters (and also among party delegates and political officials) and the analyses he develops in his study constitute a bold restatement of the popular view of religious realignment (see Brooks, Manza, and Bolzendahl 2003 for review).

Popular and scholarly assertions that religious factors are behind conservative political trends since the 1970s have not, however, been accepted by all scholars of religious politics. Indeed, in response to the outpouring of research on evangelicals in the wake of the 1980 presidential election, many scholars have argued that the influence of religious group memberships on individual vote choice has been far more stable or possibly even in decline (e.g., Dalton and Wattenberg 1993), especially at the level of religious denominations (Manza and Brooks 1997; Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1999, chap. 4). Investigations of public opinion on issues where religious polarization was thought to be especially high have often found little or quite modest support. The "culture wars" thesis has been challenged by a number of analysts (e.g., Davis and Robinson 1996; Williams 1997); only on abortion is there significant evidence of religious-based polarization (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996). And finally, at the organizational level conservative religious movements appear to have encountered persistent obstacles to achieving national-level policy goals (Bruce 1994; Wilcox 1994).

In this study we develop a series of analyses that permit a wider range of tests of the impact of religion on voter alignments than have previously been attempted.<sup>1</sup> Building from past research and recent methodological and theoretical contributions, our study is buttressed by three key innovations. First, we organize our research questions and analyses to go beyond voting to simultaneously consider religious impacts on partisanship and major party coalitions. It is quite possible that the controversies over religion reflect differences along each of these dimensions, but almost all of the previous literature has focused only on voting (Layman [2001] provides an important exception). Second, we improve over the methodological approaches of past research by comparing models that represent competing hypotheses; this contrasts with the dominant and potentially misleading tendency of much earlier research to present estimates derived from single-model analyses. This leaves analysts with no evidence with which to rule out alternative

models that represent competing hypotheses. Third, we make use of recent innovations in the measurement of U.S. religious denominational families, reducing the measurement error associated with earlier typologies. We also update and extend past studies by presenting results of religious voting, partisanship, and contributions to party coalitions in the 1998 and 2000 elections. Previous studies have generally stopped in the early to mid-1990s.

The paper is organized as follows. In the first section we consider the main points of scholarly disagreement in recent debates, in particular as reflected in debates about three major religious groups (evangelicals, mainline Protestants, and Catholics). Next, we review some of the limitations of past studies and discuss how this study addresses these challenges to develop a more systematic evaluation of relevant hypotheses. In the third section we provide an overview of the data and methods used in the analyses. The fourth section of the paper presents the results of our analyses of the changing impact of religion on partisanship, voting behavior, and party coalitions. In conclusion we draw out implications of our results for understanding how contemporary changes among specific religious groups have—and have not—contributed to larger political transformations.

### THE DEBATE OVER RELIGIOUS-BASED POLITICAL CHANGE

By virtue of unusual levels of organizational diversity and the high levels of commitment it has historically elicited among members, religious identities have long been viewed as a central force in U.S. politics (Wald 1992; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1997; chap. 17; Ladd 1999; Sherkat and Ellison 1999). Religious group memberships were seen as central to voter alignments and the party systems of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as well as to the dramatic partisan realignment of the New Deal era (Kleppner 1979; Gamm 1989; Fowler, Hertzke, and Olson 1999).

At the center of recent debates has been the political alignments of evangelical Protestants and the specific question of whether evangelicals have shifted from an earlier Democratic preference to a strong alignment with the Republican Party. A secondary focus within the recent debates is on Catholics, who have been hypothesized in some recent studies as also moving away from a historic alignment with the Democratic Party toward a more centrist or even weak Republican alignment. The political behavior of a third major denominational group, mainline Protestants, is less widely debated but nevertheless important to consider in light of recent reports of an emerging polarization between mainline and evangelical Protestants. We discuss each of these denominational families in this section.

#### Evangelical Protestants

Have evangelical Protestants experienced a conservative trend in their partisanship or voting behavior? Compared with those in earlier waves of conservative Protestant revival, contemporary evangelicals possess greater social and ideological resources (Woodberry and Smith 1998; Fowler, Hertzke, and Olson 1999). The capacity of evangelical political organizations to reach out to voters is well documented. For instance, drawing from a novel survey conducted in 1996, Regnerus, Sikkink, and Smith (1999) report that 20 percent of all respondents reported receiving and using information provided by Christian Right organizations in deciding whom to support in elections.

A series of recent studies have claimed to find a sweeping conservative political realignment among evangelicals, although disagreeing on some of the regional or histor-

ical details of these hypothesized changes. For instance, some analysts have identified an evangelical shift toward the Republican Party as occurring in tandem with the rise of the electoral activities of the Christian Right since the 1980s (Oldfield 1996), while others have identified the cultural conflicts of the late 1960s and early 1970s as providing the historical origins of this hypothesized shift (Fowler, Hertzke, and Olson 1999). The South has sometimes been viewed as providing more extensive opportunities for the emergence of a Republican realignment among evangelical Protestants (Sears and Valentino 2002), and other scholars have maintained that growing levels of Republican support among evangelicals in the latter region are indicative of more extensive trends applying to the entire United States (Green et al. 1998).

Whereas most recent reports of political changes among evangelicals focus on one or a small number of elections, a recent study by Layman (2001, chap. 5) finds the most comprehensive evidence to date of religious group-specific political trends. Analyzing National Election Studies surveys that span the period from 1960 to 1996, Layman reports that evangelical Protestants have become steadily more Republican in both their partisanship and voting behavior over time. In further analyses of other components of political change, Layman finds that trends in the political alignments of all religious groups have dramatically altered the Democratic and Republican parties' coalitions, resulting in a disproportionate and growing representation of evangelicals within the contemporary Republican Party.

### **Catholics**

Paralleling the recent literature on evangelicals, hypotheses about emerging conservative political trends among Catholics have also been recently advanced. Catholics are widely assumed to have started from higher initial levels of Democratic support, although no research asserts that they have moved as far into a Republican alignment as evangelicals. The historical literature on the social bases of the Democratic Party have identified Catholics as a major source of partisan support for the party from the post-Civil War period on, culminating in support for the New Deal and reconfirmed by the choice of Catholic John Kennedy as its presidential candidate in 1960 (e.g., Dionne 1981).

More recently, however, it has been argued that growing political party-based polarization and the socially liberal policy positions endorsed by the Democratic Party since the 1960s with respect to abortion, family, and homosexuality have resulted in the steady erosion of Catholic support for Democratic candidates (Kenski and Lockwood 1991; Fowler, Hertzke, and Olson 1999). A variant of this hypothesis points to economic factors, arguing that declining levels of Democratic support stem from growing social mobility and affluence among Catholic voters (Pomper 1997). Paralleling his earlier results for evangelical Protestants, Layman (2001) reports evidence consistent with a long-term trend involving higher levels of Republican partisanship and vote choice among Catholics since the 1960s. To be certain, not all scholars have agreed with this portrayal (e.g., Greeley 1985), but it remains widely asserted.

### **Mainline Protestants**

The third major religious group identified in recent studies as changing their underlying political alignment is mainline Protestants. In contrast to the conservative trends hypothe-

sized with respect to evangelicals and Catholics, however, mainline Protestants are often viewed as becoming *less* Republican in their preferences and behavior over time (Kivisto 1994), possibly even justifying the label of “swing voters” (Fowler, Hertzke, and Olson 1999). The two most comprehensive past studies of religious group-specific political change report results consistent with this hypothesis, suggesting a steady decline in mainline Protestants’ high levels of Republican support during the past three decades (Manza and Brooks 1997; Layman 2001).

### LIMITS OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Previous research on religious politics is generally characterized by three specific limitations that may call into question the robustness of results (we hasten to add, however, that not all previous studies share the same limitations). The first is that most have presented results derived from estimation of a single statistical model of group-specific interactions with time, rather than presenting results derived from comparison of competing models representing null versus alternative hypotheses. The risk in not adjudicating models is that subsequent inferences provide no evidence with which to rule out alternative, theoretically meaningful hypotheses.<sup>2</sup> This limitation can be observed most recently in the analyses presented by Layman (2001, chap. 5). His estimates of religious group-specific change in party identification and voting behavior are based on a single specification of the interaction between religion and time. In particular, his analyses are based on the assumption that all group-specific political changes are best captured by an unconstrained interaction model in which each group changes at each election. Layman does not, however, evaluate the actual fit to data of this specific interaction model versus such theoretically meaningful alternatives as a linear parameter change model in which all (or only some) religious groups experience a trend in their partisanship or vote choice. In doing so, the wide array of alternative hypotheses that represent more parsimonious interaction models (models assuming the *absence* of trends for specific groups) cannot be ruled out.

A second limitation common in many recent studies relates to their historical scope. The most recent data analyzed in these studies is for the 1996 presidential election, leaving open the possibility that more recent national elections are characterized by an extension or reversal of political trends affecting specific religious groups. Furthermore, it is increasingly clear that limitations in the quality and specificity of survey data prior to the early 1970s (see, e.g., Kellstedt and Green 1993; Leege 1996) make it problematic to develop estimates of changes in the political alignments of mainline and evangelical Protestants in the 1960s. In particular, the key data source in the literature (the National Election Studies surveys) and the one analyzed in the recent studies of Manza and Brooks (1997) and Layman (2001) provide no basis for distinguishing southern Protestants from other Baptist sects prior to 1972.<sup>3</sup> Both groups are large in numbers (and as a proportion of all Protestants), but whereas southern Protestants should be classified as evangelicals, many non-Southern Baptists are more properly identified as members of mainline denominations. The inability to distinguish between these two groups is consequential, risking both random and systematic measurement errors in analyses of the pre-1972 period by conflating (potentially distinct or even divergent) patterns of political change affecting evangelicals versus mainline Protestants.

### Improving on Existing Research

We build from the contributions of recent research, while seeking to overcome their current limitations. Our innovations are fourfold. First, we seek to develop a more comprehensive basis for testing competing hypotheses about religious group-specific patterns of political change by adjudicating a suitable range of competing statistical models, including the models considered in past research. Second, we build from the two most detailed analyses, Layman (2001) and Manza and Brooks (1997), and incorporate data from the 1998 and 2000 elections into our analysis of the NES series. We also avoid potentially biased estimates of main and interactive effects involving religion by restricting analysis to national elections from 1972 through 2000.<sup>4</sup> This restriction has little effect on subsequent findings or inferences because current debates refer to the past three decades, assuming that such hypothesized changes as an evangelical realignment have occurred since the early 1970s.

Our third innovation is to apply a new measure of U.S. religious denominations (Steenland et al. 2000) that builds upon earlier conceptual advances in recent scholarship (Kellstedt and Green 1993; Legee 1993, 1996). Based on a careful categorization grounded in the historical development of American religious traditions, this scheme provides the best current measure of the boundaries demarcating U.S. religious denominations, distinguishing between three Protestant denominational families (evangelical, mainline, and black Protestants), Catholics, Jewish respondents, members of other religious traditions, and secular individuals.<sup>5</sup>

Our final innovation is to separately analyze three distinct components of political change related to groups: partisanship, voting, and the representation of religious groups within the two major parties' coalitions. Each represents an important type of political change, and although they overlap, they are not identical. Partisanship refers to the tendency of voters to identify with a specific political party. Changes in partisanship may reflect long-term shifts in voter alignments, whereas voting represents the actual choice of a candidate in a given election (and hence may be more susceptible to candidate-centered factors). Although group-based differences or trends in the latter are often related to partisanship, absent suitable analysis there is no reason to assume a perfect congruence. Indeed, to anticipate one of our key results, the divergence of trends in partisanship and voting behavior among evangelical Protestants bears on current debates by suggesting the unexpected complexity of religion-based political change.

Of the three components of group-specific political change that we analyze, the effects of religious group memberships on the Democratic and Republican coalitions<sup>6</sup> represent the most complicated and novel contribution of this study, one that has not been developed in most of the existing literature. Our approach builds from the earlier work of Axelrod (1972), Erikson, Lancaster, and Romero (1989), and Stanley and Niemi (1993). The basic question about group-based contributions to party coalition is simply, "Where do the votes come from?" as Axelrod put it in his seminal paper. Both major parties have to assemble electoral coalitions that include contributions from a range of different groups of voters. Large religious groups constitute one of the key sources of inputs into an electoral majority. Investigating the changing contributions of religious groups may thus shed light on larger trends in the American party system.

Whereas religious group-specific trends (or differences) in party identification and voting are independent of their respective rates of political participation and their size,

the representation of religious groups within a specific party's coalition is affected by both group-specific size and rates of voter turnout. Previous studies have, however, focused solely on religious group-specific differences in partisanship or vote choice, ignoring the effects of group size (e.g., Manza and Brooks 1997) and/or turnout (e.g., Layman 2001), thereby failing to rule out the possibility that religion-based political change affects not only partisanship or voting behavior but also the relative presence (or absence) of specific religious groups within major party coalitions.

## **DATA, MEASURES, AND MODELS**

### **Data**

We analyze data from the Center for Political Studies' pre- and postelection National Election Studies (NES) for the eight presidential elections and the seven midterm House elections from 1972 through 2000. Our analyses begin with the 1972 presidential election; we do not attempt to analyze elections prior to 1972 due to the absence of necessary information with which to distinguish southern Protestants from other Baptist sects during that time.

Combining data from individual election surveys into a dataset in which year is itself a variable, we directly estimate religious group-specific political trends in voting behavior, partisanship, and party coalitions. The pooled structure of these repeated survey data enable us to control for the main effects of elections (which affect all voters), while adjudicating between statistical models that represent competing hypotheses about the existence and structure of group-specific political trends (as manifested in significant group-by-time interactions).

### **Measures of Religious Group Memberships**

We analyze seven mutually exclusive and exhaustive religious groups that represent the principal American religious traditions. We make use of conceptual advances in the study of religion (e.g., Kellstedt and Green 1993; Legee 1993) codified in a measure offered by Steensland et al. (2000) to identify the following seven groups: evangelical Protestants, mainline Protestants, black Protestants, Catholics, Jews, members of other religious traditions, and respondents without a religious preference (including atheists and agnostics). We analyze the political effects of religious group memberships using six dummy variables, with the seventh group serving as the reference in the regression models (see Appendix A for coding details).

### **Dependent Variables**

Political trends affecting specific religious groups can occur with respect to voting behavior, partisanship, or party coalitions. For example, although it is possible that evangelical Protestants have come to support and identify with Republican candidates at a higher rate over time (while gaining greater representation within the Republican coalition), it is also possible that evangelicals Protestants have experienced group-specific trends with respect to only one (or none) of the three dimensions of political change. Our analysis provides the necessary results with which to sort out these various scenarios. Virtually no past studies have attempted to simultaneously analyze all three.

As summarized in Table 1, we measure voting behavior using a dichotomous dependent variable coded "1" for the choice of the Democratic candidate and "0" for the choice of the Republican candidate. We measure partisanship using a multicategory variable with contrasts for independent identification versus Republican identification (the reference category) and for Democratic identification versus Republican identification (the reference category). We use a binary logistic regression model to analyze the dichotomous vote choice variable and a multinomial logistic regression model to analyze the three-category partisanship variable.

**TABLE 1. SAMPLE MEANS FOR VARIABLES IN THE ANALYSIS (N = 13,896)**

Variables (coding)	$\bar{X}_{1972-2000}$
Vote choice (reference = Republican candidate choice)	
Democratic candidate choice	.52
Party identification (reference = Republican)	
Independent	.29
Democrat	.41
Religious group (reference = other religion)	
Mainline Protestant	.36
Evangelical Protestant	.19
Black Protestant	.06
Catholic	.26
Jewish	.02
No religion	.07
Church attendance level (1 = don't attend . . . 5 = attend every week)	
5-category scale score	3.16
Gender (reference = men)	
Women	.54
Race (reference = else)	
African-American	.09
Class (reference = non-labor force)	
Professional	.17
Manager	.09
Routine white collar	.10
Self-employed	.07
Skilled worker	.07
Un-/semiskilled worker	.11
Region (reference = Midwest)	
Northeast	.19
South	.30
West	.20
Marital status (reference = else)	
Not married	.33
Household income (1992 \$s)	40,999.62
Age (years)	47.44
Education (years)	13.07

Source: Data are from National Election Study surveys of presidential and midterm elections from 1972 through 2000.



Our third set of dependent variables are for religious group representation within the Democratic versus Republican coalitions. Our measure of party coalitions indicates the extent to which religious groups are over- or underrepresented in the Democratic and Republican party's respective coalitions. If group  $r$  is overrepresented at time  $t$ , then the estimated group-specific effect will exceed the sample mean for that group ( $\bar{X}_{rt}$ ), whereas a party coalition estimate *below* the group-specific mean indicates underrepresentation. As summarized in equation 1 below, the representation of group  $r$  ( $\delta_{rjt}$ ) depends not only on its size at time  $t$  ( $\bar{X}_{rt}$ ) but on group members' average degree of support for party  $j$  at time  $t$  ( $\hat{P}_{rjt}$ ) and also on group members' average rate of voter turnout at time  $t$  ( $\hat{P}_{rkt}$ ).<sup>7</sup>

$$\delta_{rjt} = \bar{X}_{rt} \left( \frac{\hat{P}_{rjt}}{\hat{P}_{jt}} \right) \left( \frac{\hat{P}_{rkt}}{\hat{P}_{kt}} \right) \quad (1)$$

By way of further explication, consider the following scenario in which religious group  $r$  represents 25 percent of the sample in 1972 ( $\bar{X}_{rt} = .25$ ) and has a .20 predicted probability voting for the Democratic candidate ( $\hat{P}_{rjt} = .20$ ) and a predicted turnout probability of .70 ( $\hat{P}_{rkt} = .70$ ) and the electorate-wide probability of predicted Democratic candidate support is .10 ( $\hat{P}_{jt} = .10$ ), while the electorate-wide probability of voter turnout is .60 ( $\hat{P}_{kt} = .60$ ). These quantities yield an estimate of .58, suggesting the extensive *overrepresentation* of group  $r$  in the coalition.<sup>8</sup> Because the  $\delta_{rjt}$  estimates will sum to 1.00 (within the constraints imposed by rounding error and calculation of predicted probabilities), we can subsequently compare the representation of specific religious groups within the Democratic and Republican coalitions, evaluating the evidence that group-specific effects on party coalitions have changed since the early 1970s.

### Statistical Models

Two key innovations in our analysis of statistical models are worthy of note. Our first innovation is to compare the fit of models that incorporate competing hypotheses about the existence or structure of group-specific political trends. Adjudicating models in this way addresses the tendency in previous research to present coefficient estimates without obtaining the necessary evidence with which to conclude that such estimates are preferable to alternatives.

Our second innovation is to estimate interaction effects that reflect theoretically meaningful patterns of group-specific political trends (including some suggested by past studies). One general type of group-by-time interaction we consider is a linear parameter change model (see Firebaugh 1997) in which the rate of change experienced by a specific group is constrained to a linear increase in logits from election to election. A further type of interaction we consider is captured by a year-squared covariate that imposes an exponential rate of change in religious group political trends. Our evaluation of competing models delivers a preferred specification of religious group differences and trends for the three sets of dependent variables.<sup>9</sup>

### An Index for Measuring Group Differences in Voting and Partisanship

In addition to presenting estimated coefficients, we make use of an index that summarizes the effects of covariates measured at the nominal level variables (Hout, Brooks,

and Manza 1995; Brooks and Manza 1997; Manza and Brooks 1999). Calculation of index scores requires two steps. First, we use a zero-sum normalization to derive group-specific scores (measured in logits) for vote choice or partisanship for all seven groups at each election. These normalized coefficients thus reflect the deviation from a fixed mean of 0 for each religious group in the analysis. By observing subsequent changes in scores for each religious group over time, we can evaluate evidence of group-specific trends in vote choice or partisanship.

$$\kappa_t = \left( \frac{\sum_{r=1}^R (\hat{\beta}_{rj} + \hat{\beta}_{rjt})^2}{R} \right)^{1/2} \quad (2)$$

Using equation 2, our second step is to calculate index scores for the average *difference* in vote choice  $j$  or partisanship level  $j$  among the  $R$  religious groups by taking the standard deviation of the normalized scores at election  $t$ . Because it is measured in standard deviations,  $\kappa_t$  enables us to directly compare the magnitude of religion-based differences in vote choice and partisanship across elections. When the voting behavior or partisanship of religious groups differs, the standard deviation of the group-specific coefficients ( $\kappa_t$ ) will increase; conversely, when the voting behavior or partisanship of religious groups converges, the index score will approach zero. By examining whether these scores increase or decrease over time, we test whether a decline (or alternatively, an increase) has occurred in the overall effects of religious group memberships on voting and partisanship.

### Other Independent Variables

Our analyses control for factors measuring compositional differences between religious groups that can confound estimates of their political effects. The first such variable is church attendance level (see Table 1), which we measure as a continuous covariate whose scores range from 1 (for respondents who never attend) through 5 (for respondents who attend every week). The next two variables are dichotomous measures of gender and race, coded "1" for female and "1" for African American respondents.

Religious groups differ in their class and regional composition, and these differences may affect the conclusions drawn. In order to control for these compositional differences, we measure class using dummy variables for professionals, managers, routine white-collar employees, self-employed nonprofessionals, skilled workers, unskilled/semiskilled workers, and non-full-time labor force participants, using the information about respondents' occupation to generate a standard class "map" (cf. Heath, Jowell, and Curtice 1985; Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1995). We control for region using three dummy variables for Northeast, South, and West (with Midwest serving as the reference).

Our final control variables are for marital status, household income, age, and education. Marital status is a dichotomy, coded "1" for not married and "0" otherwise. Household income is a continuous variable (measured in 1992 dollars). Age and education are also continuous (both measured in years).

## RESULTS

## Religious Groups-Specific Trends in Vote Choice

Have religious groups experienced any significant trends in their alignments with U.S. political parties since the critical decade of the 1960s? We address this question by analyzing the interrelationship of religious group memberships and vote choice in national elections from 1972 through 2000. In these analyses the dependent variable is coded "1" for the choice of the Democratic candidate and "0" for the choice of the Republican candidate. The competing models in Table 2 differ with respect to the presence and structure of group-specific trends in vote choice, and we use the summary measures of model fit to evaluate evidence for changes in the underlying alignments of religious groups.

The coefficients in Model 1 are for the main effects of elections and religious group memberships, and this model provides a useful baseline for subsequent comparisons. Starting with mainline Protestants, we evaluate three different models of the structure and over-time development of mainline voter alignments during the past three decades. Both Models 2 and 3 easily improve over the fit of Model 1, providing evidence that corroborates widespread assertions that mainliners have experienced a significant political shift. The direct comparison between these models favors Model 3 (the BIC score for Model 3 is a full three points lower), suggesting that changes in mainline voter alignments have followed an exponential rather than linear pattern since the 1970s. In turn, the failure of Model 4 to improve over the fit of Model 3 provides evidence that the

**TABLE 2. FIT STATISTICS FOR EVALUATING LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS OF MAIN AND INTERACTION EFFECTS OF RELIGIOUS GROUP MEMBERSHIP ON VOTE CHOICE, 1972–2000 (N = 13,896)**

Models	–2 log-likelihood (d.f.)	BIC
1. Year and religious group main effects	17,798.16 (13,875)	–114,560
2. Model 1 + Mainline Protestant × Year(continuous)	17,779.54 (13,874)	–114,569
3. Model 1 + Mainline Protestant × Year(continuous) <sup>2</sup>	17,776.65 (13,874)	–114,572
4. Model 1 + Mainline Protestant × Year(indicator)	17,754.36 (13,861)	–114,471
5. Model 3 + Evangelical Protestant × Year(continuous)	17,760.15 (13,873)	–114,579
6. Model 3 + Evangelical Protestant × Year(continuous) <sup>2</sup>	17,756.26 (13,873)	–114,583
7. Model 3 + Evangelical Protestant × Year <sub>1976–82</sub> (indicator <sup>a</sup> )	17,725.45 (13,873)	–114,614
8. Model 3 + Evangelical Protestant × Year(indicator)	17,697.22 (13,860)	–114,518
9. Model 7 + Catholic × Year(continuous)	17,723.78 (13,872)	–114,606
10. Model 7 + Catholic × Year(continuous) <sup>2</sup>	17,723.05 (13,872)	–114,607
11. Model 7 + Catholic × Year(indicator)	17,710.71 (13,859)	–114,495
12. Model 7 + Controls <sup>b</sup>	16,750.24 (13,855)	–115,418
13. Model 12 + Attendance × Evangelical, attendance × Other religion	16,710.68 (13,853)	–115,438
14. Model 12 + Attendance × All religious groups	16,706.52 (13,849)	–115,404
15. Model 13 + Party identification(indicator)	13,126.01 (13,851)	–119,004

Note: Dependent variable is coded "1" for Democratic candidate choice and "0" for Republican candidate choice.

<sup>a</sup> Covariate is coded "1" for years from 1976 through 1982 and "0" otherwise.

<sup>b</sup> Church attendance, gender, race, class, region, marital status, household income, age, education, woman × woman year(continuous), and south × year(continuous).

specification of change in the latter model is more than sufficient to account for all variability in mainline vote choice since 1972. These results suggest a highly coherent evolution of mainline voters' alignment, in contrast to a scenario in which a fluctuating reaction by mainline Protestants to divergent political events results in their oscillation between the two major parties' candidates.

Models 5 through 8 represent parallel tests for change in evangelical voter alignments. Because past research suggests the existence of a short-term shift in evangelical political behavior associated with the presidential candidacies of Southern Baptist Democrat Jimmy Carter, we also consider models that seek to take this effect into account. Both Model 5 and Model 6 improve over the fit of Model 3. However, Model 7, which includes a coefficient that restricts evangelical group-specific voting trends to elections during the historical era of the Carter candidacies,<sup>10</sup> represents a larger improvement in fit, while also being preferred in the direct comparisons with Models 5 and 6. We thus select Model 7 as our preferred model of evangelical vote choice, given evidence from the BIC test comparing this model with the unconstrained interaction model (Model 8).<sup>11</sup> Evangelicals thus appear to have responded temporarily to a particularly appealing candidate without otherwise changing their stable voter alignment.

In comparison with those for mainline and evangelical Protestants, the results for Catholics suggest little evidence of any group-specific changes in vote choice. Neither a linear specification of trends in Catholic voter alignments (Model 9) nor an exponential specification (Model 10) yields an improvement in fit. Allowing the vote choice of Catholics to vary from election to election yields a poor fit to data in Model 11, thereby implying a pattern of relative stability. We further investigated the possibility that Catholic voters experienced a recent shift in alignment by estimating an additional model limiting trends among Catholics to the 1990s, but the poor fit of this model (BIC = -114,608) provides evidence against this hypothesis.<sup>12</sup>

Adding the control variables in Model 12 predictably improves the fit of Model 7, and the subsequent improvement of Model 13 over Model 12 provides evidence for two significant interactions between specific religious groups and the level of church attendance. In turn, the poor fit of Model 14 in comparison with Model 13 implies that all religion-by-attendance interactions are limited to the two interactions in Model 13.<sup>13</sup> Additional analyses provide evidence that further interactions involving the religion covariates are limited to these two group-by-attendance effects. Given that some recent commentary has suggested the possibility of interactions involving evangelicals and region or race (Sears and Valentino 2002), we also evaluated models with coefficients for such effects, but neither a race-by-evangelical interaction model (BIC = -115,430) nor a South-by-evangelical model (BIC = -115,429) improved over the fit of Model 13. Model 13 is thus our preferred model of vote choice, and we add variables for party identification to yield Model 15. We use the comparison between Models 13 and 15 to analyze the extent to which ongoing changes in partisanship mediate the main and interaction effects of religious groups on vote choice.

The coefficients from Models 13 and 15 are presented in Table 3. The primary coefficients of interest are for the main effects of religious group memberships and interactions involving these groups with time or church attendance level. Initially, mainline Protestants are the most loyally Republican group in the analysis, yet as indicated by the positive sign of the interaction effect, mainliners have moved steadily away from

**TABLE 3. LOGISTIC REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (S.E. IN PARENTHESES) FOR PREFERRED MODELS OF EFFECTS OF RELIGIOUS GROUP MEMBERSHIP ON VOTE CHOICE, 1972–2000 (N = 13,896)**


Independent Variables	Model 13	Model 15
Constant	1.55 (.30)*	-1.12 (.35)*
Year (reference = 1972)		
1974	1.35 (.10)*	1.71 (.12)*
1976	.57 (.09)*	.78 (.10)*
1978	.98 (.08)*	1.23 (.10)*
1980	.14 (.10)	.28 (.12)*
1982	.90 (.11)*	1.06 (.13)*
1984	.18 (.10)	.36 (.11)*
1986	1.07 (.10)*	1.41 (.12)*
1988	.48 (.11)*	.92 (.13)*
1990	1.22 (.12)*	1.65 (.14)*
1992	.91 (.11)*	1.34 (.12)*
1994	.45 (.14)*	.98 (.16)*
1996	.92 (.12)*	1.46 (.14)*
1998	.41 (.14)*	.74 (.16)*
2000	.69 (.13)*	1.12 (.15)*
Religious group (reference = other religion)		
Mainline Protestant	-1.61 (.26)*	-1.20 (.32)*
Evangelical Protestant	-1.28 (.28)*	-1.19 (.30)*
Black Protestant	-1.33 (.33)*	-1.02 (.37)*
Catholic	-.80 (.06)*	-1.02 (.30)*
Jewish	.30 (.29)	-.17 (.33)
No religion	-.79 (.26)*	-.78 (.30)*
Church attendance level (1–5)	-.11 (.02)*	-.09 (.02)*
Women (reference = men)	.02 (.08)	-.01 (.09)
African-American (reference = else)	2.37 (.16)*	1.54 (.17)*
Class category (reference = non-labor force)		
Professionals	.26 (.06)*	.06 (.07)
Managers	-.14 (.08)	-.23 (.09)*
Routine white collar	.05 (.06)	-.12 (.08)
Self-employed	-.29 (.08)*	-.27 (.10)*
Skilled workers	-.02 (.08)	-.18 (.10)*
Un-/semiskilled workers	.16 (.07)	.01 (.09)
Region (reference = else)		
Northeast	-.09 (.06)	-.02 (.06)
South	.52 (.09)*	.17 (.10)
West	-.02 (.05)	-.08 (.06)
Marital status (reference = else)		
Not married	.04 (.0)	.14 (.05)*
Household income (1992 dollars) × 10,000	-.10 (<.01)*	-.06 (<.01)*
Age (years)	<.01 (<.01)	<.01 (<.01)
Education (years)	-.04 (.01)*	.01 (.01)
Interactions		
Mainline Protestant × Year(continuous) <sup>2</sup> × 10	.02 (<.01)*	<.01 (<.01)
Evangelical Protestant × Year <sub>1976–82</sub>	.66 (.11)*	.68 (.12)*
Women × Year(continuous)	.02 (.01)*	.02 (.01)*
South × Year(continuous)	-.05 (.01)*	-.04 (.01)*
Evangelical × Church attendance level	-.13 (.03)*	-.12 (.04)*
Other religion × Church attendance level	-.37 (.07)*	-.32 (.08)*
Party identification (reference = strong Republican)		
Independent	—	1.63 (.06)*
Democrat	—	3.21 (.06)

Note: Dependent variable is coded “1” for Democratic candidate choice and “0” for Republican candidate choice.  
\* Significant at the .05 level (2-tailed test).

this early alignment. For their part evangelical Protestants experienced a temporarily higher level of Democratic support during the Carter era while remaining in a Republican alignment. The negatively signed coefficients for interactions between church attendance and evangelicals/other religion imply that higher levels of religious participation are associated with disproportionately higher levels of support for Republican candidates among members of these two groups.

We use the calculations in Figure 1 to gauge the magnitude of, and trends in, the voting behavior of religious groups. Recall that the normalization used to identify all seven coefficients means that group-specific scores are *relative* to an overall mean of zero. Positive scores thus indicate a Democratic voter alignment, and negative scores indicate a Republican alignment.<sup>14</sup>

Extending the results of our comparison of competing models of vote choice, the estimates in Figure 1 provide evidence that both evangelical and mainline Protestants have experienced significant changes in their voting behavior relative to the overall mean. Evangelicals' voter alignments shifted temporarily to higher levels of Democratic support between 1976 and 1982 without modifying their otherwise strong alignment with the Republican Party between 1972 and 2000. By contrast, voting changes affecting mainline Protestants represent an approximately linear trend from relatively high levels of Republican candidate support to considerably lower levels in the 1990s.



Note: Estimates in first seven panels (triangles) measure a group's divergence from a mean of 0; estimates in eighth panel (circles) measure the magnitude of the overall religion cleavage in voting.

**FIGURE 1. VOTING BEHAVIOR OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS IN U.S. NATIONAL ELECTIONS, 1972-2000**

The voting behavior of the five remaining religious groups reveals some variability over time without any indication of a net change in their underlying alignments. Catholics and the nonreligious remain in a weak Democratic alignment, while the Democratic alignment of Jewish voters is exceptionally strong and the fluctuating voting behavior of members of other religious traditions places them in a weakly Democratic alignment. Controlling for the otherwise Democratically inclining factor of African American status, black Protestants are in a weak Republican alignment, suggesting that, *net* of race, location within a black Protestant church propels voters toward Republican support relative to other African American voters.<sup>15</sup>

How have these group-specific patterns of change versus stability affected the overall religion cleavage during the past three decades? The last panel in Figure 1 provides an answer to this question, presenting index scores that measure the magnitude of the average religious group-based difference in vote choice. These scores suggest that the religion cleavage shrunk during the six-year period in which evangelicals experienced a temporarily higher level of Democratic support. Nevertheless, the overall pattern of change in these scores reveals a modest net decline in the religion cleavage, moving from a score of .81 in 1972 to .69 in 2000. This net 15 percent decline in the magnitude of religious group-differences in voting behavior is attributable to the changing voter alignments of mainline Protestants and, in particular, their growing similarity to the average U.S. voter.

### Religious Group-Specific Trends in Partisanship

Have religious groups experienced any significant trends in their patterns of party identification since 1972? We begin to address this question by first considering coefficient estimates for our preferred models of vote choice from Table 2 that include (Model 15) versus do *not* include (Model 13) controls for party identification. The ratio of coefficients from these models provides estimates of the extent to which changes in partisanship mediate the effects on vote choice of religion and other covariates measured in the models. We focus on estimates of these indirect effects for religious group memberships and also for any interactions involving religion. Estimates of 100 or more indicate that the inclusion of covariates for party identification results in the religion effects shrinking to nil and thus that religious group-specific effects involving voting and partisanship are perfectly congruent. By contrast, estimates approaching (or less than) 0 indicate that group-specific voting and partisanship effects diverge substantially from one another.

The estimates in Table 4 provide evidence that, with the two exceptions of Jewish voters and mainline Protestants' *changing* voter alignments, the main effects of religion on vote choice (and interaction effects with other variables) are largely unchanged when party identification is controlled in the same model. This result can be observed by contrasting the mediation estimate of 157 percent for Jewish voters with the corresponding estimate of 7 percent among evangelical Protestants. Whereas the larger-than-100-percent figure for Jewish voters indicates that their group-specific level of party identification *exceeds* their actual voting behavior (i.e., Jewish voters are stronger Democratic *identifiers* than Democratic *voters*), the 7 percent estimate for evangelicals indicates that evangelicals' high levels of Republican candidate choice are imperfectly related to their (lower) levels of Republican partisanship.

**TABLE 4. INDIRECT EFFECTS OF  
RELIGIOUS GROUP MEMBERSHIPS ON VOTE CHOICE**

Independent Variables	
Religious group	
Mainline Protestant	25
Evangelical Protestant	7
Black Protestant	23
Catholic	-28
Jewish	157 <sup>a</sup>
No religion	1
Religion-related interactions	
Mainline Protestant × Year(continuous) <sup>2</sup>	~100
Evangelical Protestant × Year <sub>1976-82</sub>	-3
Evangelical × Church attendance level	8
Other religion × Church attendance level	14

Note: Estimates are the indirect effects of religion-related factors (controlling for partisanship), computed as one minus the ratio of a coefficient in Models 15 versus 13 (estimates for remaining coefficients are not presented). Negative sign of estimate indicates that Model 15's coefficient is *larger* than Model 13's coefficient.

<sup>a</sup> Estimate exceeds 100 percent because sign of coefficient for Jewish voters is *negative* for Model 15 (in comparison to the positively signed coefficient in Model 13).

Taken together, the mediation estimates suggest that in many cases religious group-specific patterns of partisanship (and trends in partisanship) can diverge from the actual voting behavior of members, the implications of which we will consider in greater detail in the conclusion. Here we turn to the analysis of party identification as a dependent variable, following closely the logic of the earlier analyses of vote choice. In Table 5 we analyze partisanship using multinomial logistic regression models that predict the log-odds of Democratic versus independent identification and the log-odds of Republican versus independent identification.

Using the election and religious group main effects model (Model 1) as our baseline for comparison, the preferred model of partisanship trends for mainline Protestants is Model 3. This model assumes that trends in party identification among mainliners are best captured with an interaction term in which election year is squared. Model 3 is thus identical in structure to the preferred specification of mainline Protestants' voting trends, and it suggests a growing movement of mainliners away from their earlier partisan orientations.

The picture of partisanship trends among evangelical Protestants diverges from our earlier analysis of their voting behavior. In contrast to a temporary change in voting amidst a larger pattern of stable Republican alignment, the current results suggest a growing and nonlinear trend in the party identification of evangelicals. More specifically, the exponential partisan growth model (Model 6) is easily preferred over the unconstrained change model (Model 8) and the "Carter effect" model (Model 7), while edging out the linear change model (Model 5) by a single point using the BIC index. This result thus suggests that partisanship changes among evangelicals have been far more extensive than with respect to their voting behavior.



**TABLE 5. FIT STATISTICS FOR EVALUATING MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS OF MAIN AND INTERACTION EFFECTS OF RELIGIOUS GROUP MEMBERSHIP ON PARTISANSHIP, 1972–2000 (N = 13,896)**

Models	–2 log-likelihood (d.f.)	BIC
1. Year and religious group main effects	28,751.86 (13,854)	103,406
2. Model 1 + Mainline Protestant × Year(continuous)	28,706.90 (13,852)	–103,432
3. Model 1 + Mainline Protestant × Year(continuous) <sup>2</sup>	28,704.36 (13,852)	–103,435
4. Model 1 + Mainline Protestant × Year(indicator)	28,672.82 (13,826)	–103,220
5. Model 3 + Evangelical Protestant × Year(continuous)	28,686.66 (13,850)	–103,433
6. Model 3 + Evangelical Protestant × Year(continuous) <sup>2</sup>	28,685.96 (13,850)	–103,434
7. Model 3 + Evangelical Protestant × Year <sub>1976–82</sub> (indicator <sup>a</sup> )	28,692.11 (13,850)	–103,428
8. Model 3 + Evangelical Protestant × Year(indicator)	28,646.86 (13,824)	–103,305
9. Model 6 + Catholic × Year(continuous)	28,665.41 (13,848)	–103,436
10. Model 6 + Catholic × Year(continuous) <sup>2</sup>	28,665.44 (13,848)	–103,436
11. Model 6 + Catholic × Year(indicator)	28,644.45 (13,822)	–103,209
12. Model 9 + Controls <sup>b</sup>	27,141.73 (13,812)	–104,616
13. Model 12 + Attendance × Evangelical/Catholic/other religion <sup>c</sup>	27,102.26 (13,809)	–104,627
14. Model 12 + Attendance × All religious groups	27,088.10 (13,800)	–104,555

Note: Dependent variable coded “1” for Republican, “2” for Independent, and “3” for Democratic identification.

<sup>a</sup> Covariate is coded “1” for years from 1976 through 1982 and “0” otherwise.

<sup>b</sup> Church attendance, gender, race, class, region, marital status, household income, age, education, woman × year(continuous), and south × year(continuous).

<sup>c</sup> Evangelical interaction constrained to 0 for log-odds of Dem. vs. GOP; Catholic interaction constrained to 0 for log-odds of Indep. vs. GOP; Other religion interactions constrained to be equal for both logit contrasts.

Turning to the results for Catholics, both the linear and exponential growth models are preferred over the unconstrained Catholic-by-election interaction model. Models 9 and 10 have statistically indistinguishable fit statistics, and further analyses did not unearth a third model whose fit represented a further improvement. In the absence of any decisive empirical criterion, we favor Model 9 over Model 10, selecting the interaction model having the simpler functional form.<sup>16</sup>

Model 12 improves the fit of Model 9, providing evidence for the effects of the control variables, including a pair of well-known (and potentially confounding) trends in the partisanship of women and also southern voters (see, e.g., Mueller 1988; Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1999, chap. 5). Model 13 improves the fit of Model 12 by including three religious group-specific interactions with church attendance for evangelicals, Catholics, and members of other religious traditions. Model 14 provides a worse fit to data in comparison with Model 13, indicating that the three specific interactions in Model 13 are sufficient to capture all interactions between religious group memberships and church attendance level. Model 13 is thus our preferred model of religious group-specific trends in partisanship, and we present the coefficients of this model in Table 6 below.


We summarize trends in the overall religion cleavage in partisanship and also for specific religious groups, normalizing the predicted logits for each group in the analysis to derive the estimates presented in Figure 2. Because of the normalization we employ, positive values for a specific group indicate a *relative* tendency toward Democratic

**TABLE 6. MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR PREFERRED MODEL OF EFFECTS OF RELIGIOUS GROUP MEMBERSHIP ON PARTISANSHIP, 1972–2000 (N = 13,896)**

Independent Variables	Independent vs. Republican	Democrat vs. Republican
Constant	2.53 (.36)*	-2.65 (.36)*
Year (reference = 1972)		
1974	.12 (.12)	.19 (.12)
1976	.13 (.10)	.06 (.11)
1978	.21 (.10)*	.24 (.10)*
1980	-.17 (.13)	-.03 (.12)
1982	-.28 (.15)	.41 (.14)*
1984	-.32 (.12)*	-.07 (.10)
1986	-.01 (.14)	.24 (.14)
1988	-.31 (.15)*	-.20 (.15)
1990	-.12 (.17)	.28 (.17)
1992	-.05 (.16)	.14 (.16)
1994	-.32 (.20)	-.18 (.20)
1996	-.41 (.19)*	.14 (.19)
1998	-.16 (.22)	.23 (.22)
2000	.05 (.22)	.37 (.03)
Religious group (reference = other religion)		
Mainline Protestant	-.60 (.34)	-1.43 (.30)*
Evangelical Protestant	-1.36 (.30)*	-.66 (.31)*
Black Protestant	-1.88 (.47)*	-1.60 (.45)*
Catholic	-.47 (.33)	.01 (.34)
Jewish	.09 (.35)	1.17 (.35)*
No religion	-.51 (.31)	-.57 (.31)
Church attendance level (1–5)	-.12 (.02)*	-.18 (.02)*
Women (reference = men)	-.49 (.09)*	-.02 (.09)
African-American (reference = else)	2.06 (.31)*	3.34 (.30)*
Class category (reference = non-labor force)		
Professionals	.20 (.08)*	.50 (.08)*
Managers	-.17 (.09)	.03 (.09)
Routine white collar	.13 (.08)	.28 (.08)*
Self-employed	-.24 (.10)*	-.20 (.10)*
Skilled workers	.18 (.10)	.34 (.11)*
Un-/semiskilled workers	<.01 (.09)	.33 (.09)*
Region (reference = else)		
Northeast	.11 (.07)	-.17 (.07)*
South	.20 (.11)	.93 (.11)*
West	-.33 (.07)*	.06 (.06)
Marital status (reference = else)		
Not married	-.05 (.06)	-.16 (.05)*
Household income (1992 dollars) × 10,000	-.07 (<.01)*	-.10 (<.01)*
Age (years)	-.01 (<.01)*	<.01 (<.01)
Education (years)	-.01 (.01)	-.08 (.01)
Interactions		
Mainline Protestant × Year(continuous) <sup>2</sup> × 100	-.04 (<.01)	.11 (<.01)
Evangelical Protestant × Year(continuous) <sup>2</sup> × 100	-.37 (<.01)*	-.52 (<.01)*
Catholic × Year(continuous)	-.03 (.02)	-.07 (.02)*
Women × Year(continuous)	.05 (.01)*	.03 (.01)*
South × Year(continuous)	-.01 (.01)	-.05 (.01)*
Evangelical × Church attendance level	-.07 (.03)*	—
Catholic × Church attendance level	—	.14 (.03)*
Other religion × Church attendance level	-.28 (.07)*	-.28 (.07)

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Dependent variable is coded “1” for Republican identification, “2” for Independent identification, and “3” for Democratic identification.

\* Significant at the .05 level (2-tailed test).



Note: Estimates in first seven panels (triangles) measure a group's divergence from a mean of 0; estimates in eighth panel (circles) measure the magnitude of the overall religion cleavage in partisanship.

**FIGURE 2. PARTISANSHIP OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS IN U.S. NATIONAL ELECTIONS, 1972-2000**

identification, while negative values indicate a tendency toward Republican identification. As before, the first seven panels display results for the religious groups in the analysis, and the eighth panel presents the standard deviation of group-specific scores that we use to measure the magnitude of the religious cleavage.

Our primary interest is in the three religious groups experiencing partisanship trends. Paralleling changes in their voting behavior, mainline Protestants have moved steadily away from earlier levels of Republican identification. By contrast, evangelical Protestants have moved from low to very high levels of Republican identification since the early 1970s. The direction of trends in party identification is similar for Catholics, but they have moved from initially high levels of Democratic identification toward considerably lower levels in recent elections (a trend not paralleled by their voting behavior). Taken together, these group-specific changes have largely cancelled one another out, leading to a pattern of aggregate stability in the overall religion cleavage in party identification. The magnitude of religion-based differences in partisanship is quite substantial, with the average index score of approximately .90 translating into a .42 difference in the probability of Democratic identification between two religious groups (using a baseline probability of .50).

### Religious Groups and Party Coalitions

How have religious group-specific changes in voting, turnout, *and* size affected their overall representation within the Democratic and Republican coalitions? Are there subsequent trends in the representation of specific religious groups within these coalitions? To develop answers to these questions, we need information about three quantities: the probability that group members will select the Democratic versus Republican candidate during a given election, the turnout rate of group members, and the relative size of a religious group during this time.

We obtain the predicted probability of Democratic versus Republican support during the fifteen elections between 1972 and 2000 from the coefficients of Model 13 from Table 3.<sup>17</sup> We calculate these probabilities for the seven religious groups at each election, using fixed levels for other covariates and sample means. To obtain the corresponding probabilities of voter turnout among specific religious groups, we first estimated a model of religion and voter turnout, following the same steps of model evaluation undertaken in our earlier analyses. After considering evidence for interactions involving the religious group variables, we arrive at a preferred specification (see Appendix B), and we use coefficient estimates to obtain the year and group-specific turnout probabilities for each election.

Finally, we obtain the year-specific sample means for the seven religious groups using the raw NES data. The biggest changes in the size of the seven groups are (1) a large decline in the relative size of mainline Protestants (from 44 percent to 24 percent between 1972 and 2000); (2) an increase in the size of the no religion group (from 4 percent to 12 percent); and (3) an increase among evangelical Protestants (from 15 percent to 23 percent).<sup>18</sup> Other groups remain roughly similar in size over the three decades, moving within a narrow band around the mean for the entire period: Catholics are approximately 26 percent, black Protestants 6 percent, other religion 3.5 percent, and Jews 2.5 percent.<sup>19</sup>

In Table 7 we present estimates for the changing representation of major religious groups within the Republican Party; Table 8 presents the corresponding estimates for the Democratic Party. Within the Republican coalition there has been a dramatic fall-off in the representation of mainline Protestants during the 1972–2000 period. Mainline voters represented fully half of all Republican voters at the beginning of the series but just a quarter at the end. This massive (26 percent) decline reflects *both* their declining relative size in the electorate as a whole and their declining support for Republican candidates. Evangelicals (+11) and seculars (+9) have correspondingly increased their representation within the Republican coalition, changes that primarily reflect increases in size for evangelicals and seculars, coupled with the defection of mainline voters. We should emphasize that evangelicals' growing representation within the Republican coalition is *not* due to a shift in voting, given our earlier findings about their relatively stable levels of Republican alignment since 1984.

Among Democrats the biggest change is for mainline Protestants (–12 percent), a figure attributable to both their changing relative size and to their changing voting behavior. Seculars significantly increased their representation in the Democratic coalition (+10 percent) due to their increasing size. In contrast to the Republican case, the religious bases of the Democratic coalition are distinctive for their greater stability over time. Only the large changes in the relative size of two groups (seculars and mainline Protestants) have produced notable changes over the past 30 years.

**TABLE 7. THE CHANGING REPRESENTATION OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS WITHIN THE REPUBLICAN COALITION, 1972-2000**

Religious Group	1972	1974	1976	1978	1980	1982	1984	1986	1988	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	$\Delta_{Net}$
Mainline Protestants	50	52	52	49	44	47	42	43	42	27	28	27	28	27	24	-26
Evangelical Protestants	17	18	13	13	14	16	19	17	25	24	29	28	26	22	28	+11
Black Protestants	7	8	7	8	9	9	7	11	6	12	11	10	8	7	7	0
Catholics	20	16	21	20	21	21	23	21	19	21	20	21	25	26	24	+4
Jewish	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	0
No religion	4	4	5	6	7	5	7	6	6	12	10	12	10	13	13	+9
Other religion	2	1	2	3	3	2	1	2	1	1	1	2	2	3	2	0

Note: Numbers in columns are the predicted proportion of members of a row-specific group among all Republican voters during a specific election year; these proportions do not all sum to 100 due to rounding error.

**TABLE 8. THE CHANGING REPRESENTATION OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS WITHIN THE DEMOCRATIC COALITION, 1972-2000**

Religious Group	1972	1974	1976	1978	1980	1982	1984	1986	1988	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	$\Delta_{Net}$
Mainline Protestants	33	36	31	29	27	30	29	29	31	20	21	19	21	21	21	-12
Evangelical Protestants	15	18	20	19	21	23	14	17	22	23	24	23	25	16	20	+5
Black Protestants	5	7	5	6	7	7	6	9	5	9	8	7	7	6	6	+1
Catholics	31	26	28	25	27	26	33	28	28	27	26	26	27	31	29	-2
Jewish	4	3	3	5	4	3	4	2	3	2	3	3	3	4	4	0
No religion	5	5	7	9	9	6	9	8	8	17	14	14	12	14	15	+10
Other religion	5	4	6	7	5	5	4	5	3	3	4	8	5	9	6	+1

Note: Numbers in columns are the predicted proportion of members of a row-specific group among all Democratic voters during a specific election year; these proportions do not all sum to 100 due to rounding error.

## DISCUSSION

The results of this study provide new insights into the denominational sources of political change. Of relevance to a series of recent studies of religious politics, we find no evidence that evangelical Protestants have experienced a group-specific shift in their pattern of voting behavior, with the exception of the elections (1976 through 1982) during which Jimmy Carter's presidential campaigns boosted, but only temporarily, their support for the Democratic Party and its candidates. Similarly, Catholic voters have not undergone a conservative group-specific shift in their voting behavior over the past three decades.

Key to these findings is our use of a relative measure of vote choice, one which separates out trends that affect all voters from those that impact specific religious groups. Earlier research on religious voting has, almost without exception, failed to employ models employing a relative measure and has thus confounded these two types of changes. With regard to voting behavior, in particular, it appears that much of the popular and scholarly literature asserting that changes in religious group voting are behind a growing Republican electoral advantage is at best premature.

However, by considering a more complex set of outcomes, we have unearthed processes through which religious factors may have contributed to the broader conservative trend in American politics during the past three decades. Both partisanship and group-based contributions to the major party coalitions provide important sources of information about religion's impacts. Consistent with the spirit of earlier research claiming to find evidence of religion-based political realignment, we find that the *partisanship* of evangelical Protestants and Catholics has shifted, relative to all other religious groups, toward the Republican Party. Whereas evangelicals have deepened their relatively Republican pattern of identification, Catholics have moved from strong relative identification with the Democratic Party to a more independent orientation.

Our results for voting versus party identification suggest that because Catholics have experienced a reduction in relative Democratic identification without yet producing a shift in actual voting behavior, partisanship change may ultimately lead to further political-behavioral changes. In the case of evangelicals, their preexisting and relatively high levels of Republican candidate support *preceded* their emerging trend in identification with the Republican Party. In the post-1960s era the long-expected realignment of evangelicals thus appears to have first unfolded with respect to candidate support and then in relation to partisanship.

But these results appear to provide little evidence for an *emerging* "great divide" in American politics that is grounded in changes in religion-based political behavior or orientations among the mass public. This is because our estimates of the overall religious cleavage in vote choice show no increase (and a modest decrease) over time. Likewise, our estimates of group-based partisanship find that changes in the relative party identification of some groups have largely offset one another, leaving the overall pattern of religion-based partisanship unchanged since the 1970s. To express these findings another way: neither the average difference between religious groups in their partisanship nor voting has increased since 1972. To date, then, the ideas of a "culture war" (or more simply, growing religion-based electoral differences) offers limited analytical leverage for understanding the political effects of religious group memberships. Indeed, the complexity of group-based differences in voting and partisanship (and also group-

specific trends) suggests that future research on these topics may benefit from moving beyond unilinear theories of religious politics.<sup>20</sup>

Our analyses uncover more dramatic changes, however, in the religious group bases of the major party *coalitions*. Declines in both the relative size of the mainline Protestants and their level of support for Republican candidates have produced a very large drop in their contribution to the Republican coalition.<sup>21</sup> Coupled with growth in the size (but not the voting behavior) of evangelical Protestants, the social bases of the Republican Party have evolved significantly. More specifically, since the early 1970s the Republican Party has received a much lower proportion of its votes from mainline Protestants and a much higher proportion from evangelical Protestants. The shifting balance within the party has likely contributed to the adoption of conservative policy ideas and their implementation in recent years, especially when combined with further evidence of the shifting profile of party activists (Layman 2001, chap. 3). Though not itself equivalent to a group-based polarization, such demographic changes may thus be consequential for understanding the processes through which religion influences the behavior of political candidates in elections, as well as, possibly, the activities of elected officials.

Taken as a whole, these results suggest the importance of considering multiple dimensions of the relationship between religion and politics. By expanding the scope of investigation to include partisanship and religious group contributions to major party coalitions, we obtain a more thorough and nuanced picture of the underlying dynamics. It shows, for example, that Catholic voters are becoming less Democratic in their partisanship but not (yet) in their voting behavior, while evangelicals' partisanship has now become as Republican as their voting behavior (even though their voting behavior has not changed significantly in the period we have investigated). Attention to the further nuances of group size and turnout allows us to understand the extraordinary decline in the political influence of mainline Protestants relative to that of evangelical Protestants in the Republican Party, a fact that could not be predicted solely on the basis of changing voting alignment of the two groups.

#### ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We would like to thank Katie Bolzendahl, Alex Hicks and Brad Wilcox for many helpful comments and suggestions.

## APPENDIX A. RELIGIOUS GROUP CODING SCHEME<sup>a</sup>

---

### Mainline Protestants

American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A.;<sup>b</sup> American Lutheran Church; American Reformed; Baptist (Northern); Christian Disciples; Congregationalist; First Congregationalist; Disciples of Christ; Episcopal Church; Evangelical Lutheran; Evangelical Reformed; First Christian Disciples of Christ; First Church; First Reformed; Friends; Grace Reformed; Hungarian Reformed; Lutheran Church in America; Latvian Lutheran; Lutheran, Don't Know Which; Methodist, Don't Know Which;<sup>b</sup> Moravian; Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.; Presbyterian, Don't Know Which; Quaker; Reformed; Reformed Church of Christ; Reformed United Church of Christ; Schwenfelder; United Brethren; United Brethren in Christ; United Church of Christ; United Church of Christianity; United Methodist Church; United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.

### Evangelical Protestants

Advent Christian; American Baptist Association;<sup>b</sup> Amish; Apostolic Christian; Apostolic Church; Baptist, Don't Know Which;<sup>b</sup> Assembly of God; Bible Missionary; Brethren Church; Brethren, Plymouth; Brother of Christ; Calvary Bible; Chapel of Faith; Charismatic; Chinese Gospel Church; Christ Cathedral of Truth; Christ Church Unity; Christian and Missionary Alliance; Christian Calvary Chapel; Christian Catholic; Christian, Central Christian; Christian Reformed; Christ in Christian Union; Christ in God; Churches of God; Church of Christ; Church of Christ, Evangelical; Church of Daniel's Band; Church of Prophecy; Church of the First Born; Church of the Living God; Community Church; Covenant; Dutch Reformed; Evangelical Congregational; Evangelical Covenant; Evangelical, Evangelist; Evangelical Free Church; Evangelical Methodist; Evangelical United Brethren; Faith Christian; Faith Gospel Tabernacle; First Christian; Four Square Gospel; Free Methodist; Free Will Baptist; Full Gospel; Grace Brethren; Holiness Church of God; Holiness (Nazarene); Holy Roller; Independent; Independent Bible, Bible, Bible Fellowship; Independent Fundamental Church of American; Laotian Christian; Living Word; Macedonia; Mennonite; Mennonite Brethren; Missionary Baptist;<sup>b</sup> Missionary Church; Mission Convent; Missouri Synod Lutheran; Nazarene; New Testament Christian; No Denomination or Nondenominational; Open Bible; Other Baptist Churches;<sup>b</sup> Other Fundamentalist; Other Lutheran Churches; Other Methodist Churches;<sup>b</sup> Other Presbyterian Churches; Pentecostal; Pentecostal Assembly of God; Peoples' Church; Pilgrim Holiness; Primitive Baptist; Plymouth Brethren; Salvation Army; Seventh Day Adventist; Southern Baptist Convention;<sup>b</sup> Swedish Mission; Triumph Church of God; Way Ministry; Wesleyan; Wesleyan Methodist-Pilgrim

### Black Protestants

African Methodist; African Methodist Episcopal Church; African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church; American Baptist Association;<sup>c</sup> American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A.;<sup>c</sup> Apostolic Faith; Baptist, Don't Know Which;<sup>c</sup> Christian Tabernacle; Church of God in Christ; Church of God in Christ Holiness; Church of God, Saint, & Christ; Disciples of God; Federated Church; Holiness; House of Prayer; Methodist, Don't Know Which;<sup>c</sup> Missionary Baptist;<sup>c</sup> National Baptist Convention of America; National Baptist Convention, U.S.A., Inc.; Other Baptist Churches;<sup>c</sup> Other Methodist Churches;<sup>c</sup> Pentecostal Apostolic; Primitive Baptist; Sanctified; Southern Baptist Convention;<sup>c</sup> United Holiness; Witness Holiness; Zion Union Apostolic; Zion Union Apostolic-Reformed

### Catholics

Greek Rite Catholic; Roman Catholic

### Jewish

Jewish, no preference; Orthodox; Conservative; Reformed

### No Religion

Agnostic; Atheist; No Preference

### Other

Christ Unity Church; Christadelphians; Christian Scientist; Church of Jesus Christ of the Restoration; Church Universal and Triumphant; Eden Evangelist; Jehovah's Witnesses; Jesus LDS; LDS; LDS-Mormon; LDS-Reorganized; Mind Science; Mormon; New Age Spirituality; New Birth Christian; Religious Science; Spiritualist; True Light Church of Christ; Worldwide Church of God; Unitarian; Universalist; United Church; Unity Church; Unity

---

<sup>a</sup> See Steensland et al. (2000, Appendix) for additional coding details.

<sup>b</sup> Included only if race of respondent is not black.

<sup>c</sup> Included only if race of respondent is black.



**APPENDIX B. LOGISTIC REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR PREFERRED MODEL  
OF THE EFFECTS OF RELIGIOUS GROUP MEMBERSHIP ON TURNOUT,  
1972–2000 (N = 22,513)**

Independent Variables	Model <sup>a</sup>
Constant	–3.38 (.28)*
Year (reference = 1972)	
1974	–.99 (.08)*
1976	–.05 (.08)
1978	–1.21 (.07)*
1980	–.21 (.09)*
1982	–1.06 (.09)*
1984	<.01 (.08)
1986	–1.39 (.08)*
1988	–.26 (.10)*
1990	–1.69 (.08)*
1992	–.21 (.08)*
1994	–1.26 (.09)*
1996	–.32 (.09)*
1998	–1.65 (.09)*
2000	–.32 (.09)*
Religious group (reference = other religion)	
Mainline Protestant	–.24 (.20)
Evangelical Protestant	–.43 (.20)*
Black Protestant	–.10 (.22)
Catholic	–.31 (.20)
Jewish	–.09 (.23)
No religion	–.38 (.20)
Church attendance level (1–5)	.26 (.01)*
Women (reference = men)	–.15 (.04)*
African American (reference = else)	.06 (.08)
Class category (reference = non-labor force)	
Professionals	.36 (.06)*
Managers	.33 (.07)*
Routine white collar	.37 (.05)*
Self-employed	.40 (.07)*
Skilled workers	.23 (.07)*
Un-/semiskilled workers	–.05 (.05)
Region (reference = else)	
Northeast	–.20 (.05)*
South	–.52 (.04)*
West	.02 (.05)
Marital status (reference = else)	
Not married	–.27 (.04)*
Household income (1992 dollars) × 10,000	.08 (<.01)
Age (years)	.04 (<.01)*
Education (years)	.20 (.01)*
Interactions	
Other religion × church attendance level	–.19 (.05)*

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Dependent variable is coded “1” if a respondent voted for a major party candidate and “0” for not voting.

<sup>a</sup> –2 log-likelihood for the model is 24,255.85 (d.f. = 22,475), BIC = –200,985; estimating additional coefficients for interactions between all other religious groups and church attendance level yields an inferior model with –2 log-likelihood = 24,246.63 (d.f. = 22,470), BIC = –200,944.

\* Significant at the .05 level (2-tailed test).

## NOTES

1. Our analysis focuses on the denominational divide in American society, reflecting the focus of major scholarly debates, yet we note other cleavages based on religious doctrines or congregational-level processes are also deserving of further attention.

2. We emphasize that the risks of not comparing models in this fashion are substantial. More specifically, if a new model is found to fit the data better than an earlier model (that was analyzed in isolation of other models), then the coefficients from the single-model analysis will tend to represent biased estimates.

3. Both these studies nevertheless seek to derive estimates of the political alignments of religious groups from 1960 through either 1992 or 1996.

4. Some further instrumentation changes since the 1990 NES may introduce additional measurement error, yet patterns of change in the marginal distribution of the religion measure suggest these are likely to be relatively minor. We note that dropping all data for earlier elections would significantly limit any evaluation of hypotheses involving long-term trends in religion-based voter alignments since the 1960s.

5. In line with the majority of the work considered in this study, we assume that the direction of causal influence flows from religious group memberships to political preferences and behavior. Given the likelihood that religious group memberships are embedded in institutions that structure preferences and identities over the life course (Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988; Manza and Brooks 1999), this assumption seems reasonable, yet politically motivated denominational switching should not be entirely ruled out (Hout and Fischer 2002).

6. Following the literature discussed below, the concept of party coalitions used in this study refers to the level of representation of groups within the electorate rather than to convention delegates or interest group organizations.

7. See Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (1989) and Stanley and Niemi (1993) for further relevant discussion of the measurement of social group effects on party coalitions.

8. Given the nonlinearity of predicted probabilities in the binary and multinomial logistic regression models, we calculate the relevant group-specific and electorate-wide probabilities by holding constant other covariates at their sample means.

9. We choose our preferred models using the  $-2$  log-likelihood statistic ( $-2LL$ ) and Raftery's (1995) Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), which is calculated for logistic regression models as  $D - (df)\log(N)$ , where  $D$  is the residual deviance ( $-2LL$ ) for the model under consideration,  $df$  is its degrees of freedom,  $\log$  is the natural logarithm, and  $N$  is the sample size.

10. The Carter effect shaped evangelical political behavior in elections adjacent to the actual 1976 and 1980 campaigns by evidently creating a temporarily more favorable evaluation of Democratic congressional candidates, and we further evaluated the scope of this effect by analyzing alternative models that restricted this effect to the 1976 through 1980 elections (BIC =  $-114,602$ ) and to *only* the 1976 and 1980 presidential elections (BIC =  $-114,567$ ), both of which were rejected in favor of Model 7 (BIC =  $-114,614$ ). See Ribuffo (1989) for further details about Carter's appeal to evangelicals.

11. The comparison between Models 7 and 8 represents the single instance in which the  $p$  value associated with the  $-2$  log-likelihood statistic suggests a different inference than BIC's. The  $-96$  BIC difference between these two models is very large, representing decisive evidence in Raftery's (1995) formulation, and given the likelihood of thus substantially overfitting the data (a Type I error), we select Model 7 over Model 8. We note further that, although the fit of Model 7 is superior to the linear evangelical trend parameterization used in Model 5, estimating an additional linear trend parameter in Model 7 does not improve the fit of that model, providing additional evidence that any further evangelical-by-time changes are largely random in nature.

12. While our primary theoretical focus is on mainline Protestants, evangelicals, and Catholics, we conducted additional analyses that find the evidence for trends in the voting behavior of the

four additional religious groups extremely limited (available upon request). In particular, further group-by-time interactions were restricted to three specific combinations of years and groups: Jewish voters in 1986 and 1996 and black Protestants in 1998. Including these coefficients in our preferred models had virtually no effect on the coefficient estimates for religious variables that represent our primary focus.

13. Additional analyses provide evidence that further interactions involving the religion covariates are limited to these two group-by-attendance effects. Note that, although our interest is with the main effects of religious group memberships (and any interactions involving time), the inclusion of any further significant interactions with the religious group variables is important in correctly estimating the political effects of religion for evangelical Protestants.

14. The predicted vote choice of evangelical Protestants and members of other religious traditions involve interactions with church attendance, and our estimates take these into account by first calculating for these two groups their predicted log-odds of Democratic vote choice at each level of church attendance and then weighting these predicted logits by the sample distribution of church attendance for evangelicals and other religious traditions.

15. Note again that the normalization used for estimating the coefficients in Figure 1 constrains the sum of these estimates to zero for each election, thereby delivering estimates of the voter alignments of religious groups *relative* to the overall electorate-wide mean. Aggregate changes between elections, including, for instance, the Republican electoral advantage for most of the 1990s, thus affected all religious groups equally without changing their underlying voter alignments (see again the main effects estimates for election in Table 2).

16. In similar fashion to our analysis of group-specific trends in voting behavior, we evaluated additional models with coefficients for trends in party identification involving the four other religious groups (analysis available upon request), finding no evidence of further trends.

17. Our analysis of party coalitions focuses on religious group representation among the actual voters who supported a specific party's candidates, given that it is the actual outcome of elections that potentially translates the preferences of individuals or groups into subsequent patterns of policy making.

18. As a check on the robustness of these survey estimates of the size of major religious groups in the NES using the Steensland et al. (2000) scheme, we compared the same groups in the 1972–2000 General Social Surveys. We find a similar, albeit somewhat different, picture: in the GSS the drop among mainline Protestants in this period is 12 percent rather than 20 percent, although for other groups it is very similar (e.g., evangelicals increase by 7 percent, seculars by 12 percent).

19. The changing size of the secular group merits one additional comment. Because of a change in question wording about religious identity after 1988 (see Legee and Kellstedt 1993), the proportion of secular voters in the sample increased significantly beginning in 1990, potentially distorting the overall (margin-dependent) estimates of group contributions. However, evidence from the General Social Survey also shows a startling growth in the proportion of seculars around this time (doubling from 7 percent to 14 percent in the 1990s) and a very similar overall trend between 1972 and 2000 (see Hout and Fischer 2002).

20. It is appropriate to emphasize that, although we have focused on denominational group-based processes in light of the focus of much recent research and debate, emerging work on religiosity and also doctrinal belief processes (e.g., Legee 1993; Layman 1997) represent avenues for further study, as does the possibility of further cleavages involving religious movement influence or politically relevant trends involving the meaning of religious ideas and affiliation (e.g., Sherkat and Ellison 1997; Regnerus, Sikkink, and Smith 1999; Brooks 2002; Hout and Fischer 2002).

21. In this context we note that changes in the relative size of mainline Protestants could, in principle, be produced by a movement of conservative mainliners to evangelical churches. Recently, Hout, Greeley, and Wilde (2001) have presented evidence suggesting instead that differential fertility rather than defection explains relative size changes among U.S. religious groups, including with reference to evangelical versus mainline Protestants. Although the preceding evidence appears com-

elling, we believe the implicit debate between differential fertility versus defection interpretations has not been conclusively resolved and would benefit by further investigation.

## REFERENCES

- Abramson, Paul, John Aldrich, and David Rohde. 1999. *Change and Continuity in the 1996 and 1998 Elections*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Axelrod, Robert. 1972. "Where the Votes Come From: An Analysis of Electoral Coalitions." *American Political Science Review* 66:11–20.
- Brooks, Clem. 2002. "Religious Influence and the Politics of Family Decline Concern: Trends, Sources, and U.S. Political Behavior." *American Sociological Review* 67:191–211.
- Brooks, Clem, and Jeff Manza. 1997. "Social Cleavages and Political Alignments: U.S. Presidential Elections, 1960–1992." *American Sociological Review* 62:937–946.
- Brooks, Clem, Jeff Manza, and Catherine Bolzendahl. 2003. "Voting Behavior and Political Sociology: Theories, Debates, and Future Directions." *Research in Political Sociology* 12:137–173.
- Bruce, Steve. 1994. "The Inevitable Failure of the New Christian Right." *Sociology of Religion* 55:229–242.
- Dalton, Russell, and Martin Wattenberg. 1993. "The Not So Simple Act of Voting." Pp. 193–218 in *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, edited by Ada Finifter. Washington, DC: American Political Science Association.
- Davis, Nancy, and Robert Robinson. 1996. "Are the Rumors of War Exaggerated? Religious Orthodoxy and Moral Progressivism in America." *American Journal of Sociology* 102:756–787.
- DiMaggio, Paul, John Evans, and Bethany Bryson. 1996. "Have Americans' Social Attitudes Become More Polarized?" *American Journal of Sociology* 102:690–755.
- Dionne, E. J. 1981. "Catholics and the Democrats: Estrangement But Not Desertion." Pp. 307–325 in *Party Coalitions in the 1980s*, edited by Seymour Martin Lipset. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies.
- Erikson, Robert S., Thomas Lancaster, and David W. Romero. 1989. "Group Components of the Presidential Vote, 1952–84." *Journal of Politics* 51:337–346.
- Erikson, Robert S., Michael B. MacKuen, and James A. Stimson. 2002. *The Macro Polity*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Firebaugh, Glenn. 1997. *Analyzing Repeated Surveys*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Fowler, Robert, Allen Hertzke, and Laura Olson. 1999. *Religion and Politics in America: Faith, Culture, and Strategic Choices*. 2nd ed. New York: Westview Press.
- Gamm, Gerald. 1989. *The Making of New Deal Democrats*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Greeley, Andrew. 1985. *American Catholics Since the Council: An Unauthorized Report*. Chicago: Thomas More.
- Green, John, Lyman Kellstedt, Corwin Smidt, and James Guth. 1998. "The Soul of the South: Religion and the New Electoral Order." Pp. 261–276 in *The New Politics of the Old South: An Introduction to Southern Politics*, edited by Charles Bullock and Mark Rozell. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Heath, Anthony, Roger Jowell, and John Curtice. 1985. *How Britain Votes*. London: Pergamon.
- Himmelstein, Jerome. 1990. *To The Right: The Transformation of American Conservatism*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Hout, Michael, Clem Brooks, and Jeff Manza. 1995. "The Democratic Class Struggle in the United States, 1948–1992." *American Sociological Review* 60:805–828.
- Hout, Michael, and Claude Fischer. 2002. "Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference: Politics and Generations." *American Sociological Review* 67:165–190.
- Hout, Michael, Andrew Greeley, and Melissa J. Wilde. 2001. "The Demographic Imperative in Religious Change in the United States." *American Journal of Sociology* 107:468–500.

- Hunter, James D. 1991. *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America*. New York: Basic Books.
- Kellstedt, Lyman A. 1989. "Evangelicals and Political Realignment." Pp. 99–117 in *Contemporary Evangelical Political Evolvement*, edited by Corwin Schmidt. Lanham, MD: University Presses of America.
- Kellstedt, Lyman A., and John C. Green. 1993. "Knowing God's Many People: Denominational Preference and Political Behavior." Pp. 53–71 in *Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American Politics*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Kellstedt, Lyman A., John C. Green, James L. Guth, and Corwin E. Schmidt. 1994. "Religious Voting Blocs in the 1992 Election: Year of the Evangelical?" *Sociology of Religion* 55:307–326.
- Kenski, Henry C., and William Lockwood. 1991. "Catholic Voting Behavior in 1988: A Critical Swing Vote." Pp. 173–187 in *The Bible and the Ballot Box*, edited by James L. Guth and John C. Green. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Kivisto, Peter. 1994. "The Rise or Fall of the Christian Right? Conflicting Reports from the Frontline." *Sociology of Religion* 55:223–228.
- Kleppner, Paul. 1979. *The Third Electoral System, 1853–1892: Parties, Voters, and Political Culture*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- Kohut, Andrew, John C. Green, Scott Keeter, and Robert C. Toth. 2001. *The Diminishing Divide: Religion's Changing Role in American Politics*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute.
- Ladd, Evertt C. 1999. *The Ladd Report*. New York: The Free Press.
- Layman, Geoffrey C. 1997. "Religion and Political Behavior in the United States: The Impact of Beliefs, Affiliations, and Commitment from 1980 to 1994." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 61:288–316.
- . 2001. *The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Leege, David. 1993. "Religion and Politics in Theoretical Perspective." Pp. 3–25 in *Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American Politics*, edited by David Leege and Lyman Kellstedt. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- . 1996. "Religiosity Measures in the National Election Studies: A Guide to Their Use, Part 2." *Votes & Opinions* 2:6–9, 33–36.
- Leege, David, and Lyman Kellstedt, eds. 1993. *Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American Politics*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Manza, Jeff, and Clem Brooks. 1997. "The Religious Factor in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1960–1992." *American Journal of Sociology* 103:38–81.
- . 1999. *Social Cleavages and Political Change: Voter Alignments and U.S. Party Coalitions*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Manza, Jeff, Michael Hout, and Clem Brooks. 1995. "Class Voting in Capitalist Democracies Since World War II: Dealignment, Realignment, or Trendless Fluctuation?" *Annual Review of Sociology* 21:137–163.
- Mueller, Carol M., ed. 1988. *The Politics of the Gender Gap*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
- Oldfield, Duane. 1996. *The Right and the Righteous: The Christian Right Confronts the Republican Party*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Pomper, Gerald. 1997. "The Presidential Election." Pp. 173–204 in *The Election of 1996: Reports and Interpretation*, edited by Gerald Pomper. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, Inc.
- Raftery, Adrian. 1995. "Bayesian Model Selection in Sociology." *Sociological Methodology* 25:111–163.
- Regnerus, Mark, David Sikkink, and Christian Smith. 1999. "Voting with the Christian Right: Contextual and Individual Patterns of Electoral Influence." *Social Forces* 77:1375–1401.
- Ribuffo, Leo. 1989. "God and Jimmy Carter." Pp. 141–160 in *Transforming Faith*, edited by M. L. Bradbury and James B. Gilbert. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Rozell, Mark J., and Clyde Wilcox. 1995. *God at the Grass Roots: The Christian Right in the 1994 Elections*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

- Sears, David, and Nicholas Valentino. 2002. "Race, Religion, and Sectional Conflict in Contemporary Partisanship." Unpublished manuscript, Department of Political Science, UCLA.
- Sherkat, Darren, and Christopher Ellison. 1997. "The Cognitive Structure of a Moral Crusade: Conservative Protestantism and Opposition to Pornography." *Social Forces* 75:957-982.
- . 1999. "Recent Developments and Current Controversies in the Sociology of Religion." *Annual Review of Sociology* 25:363-394.
- Stanley, Harold and Richard Niemi. 1993. "Partisanship and Group Support Over Time." Pp. 350-367. In *Controversies in Voting Behavior*, edited by Richard Niemi. Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Steensland, Brian, Jerry Park, Mark Regnerus, Lynn Robinson, Bradford Wilcox, and Robert Woodberry. 2000. "The Measure of American Religion: Toward Improving the State of the Art." *Social Forces* 79:291-318.
- Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1997. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Wald, Kenneth. 1992. *Religion and Politics in the United States*. 2nd ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Wald, Kenneth, Dennis Owen, and Samuel Hill Jr. 1988. "Churches as Political Communities." *American Political Science Review* 82:531-548.
- Wilcox, Clyde. 1994. "Premillennialists at the Millennium: Some Reflections on the Christian Right." *Sociology of Religion* 55:243-262.
- Williams, Rhys, ed. 1997. *Culture Wars in American Politics: Critical Reviews of a Popular Myth*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Woodberry, Robert, and Christian Smith. 1998. "Fundamentalism et al.: Conservative Protestants in America." *Annual Review of Sociology* 24:25-56.
- Wuthnow, Robert, and John H. Evans. 2002. *The Quiet Hand of God: The Public Role of Mainline Protestantism*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.