




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
Mr. LaRouche is currently involved in international negotiations aimed at the establishment of a new private bank which would serve as the vehicle for creating a new world monetary system replacing the International Monetary Fund. Mr. LaRouche is committed to head such a bank until such time as he is called to serve the United States as President.



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The signing of the Versailles Treaty, June 29, 1919. President Wilson and Colonel House are seated at the head table at the center of the photo.

DEDICATION

This positive defense of the urgent restoration of a Federalist-Whig governing Constitutionalist basis to our coherent determination of our nation's domestic and foreign policy, is primarily dedicated, with a profound sense of the propriety of that dedication, to Benjamin Franklin, the founder of our nation. Of this latter fact, George Washington himself would be the first to agree.

It is also dedicated, in a different manner, to Mexico's past President Luis Echeverria, the United Kingdom's James Callaghan, Italy's Giulio Andreotti, West Germany's Helmut Schmidt, France's Michel Debré, Algeria's H. Boumedienne, and to Cuba's Fidel Castro and the leaders of the CMEA nations. It is in the vital interest of humanity and of the United States that these and other such opponents of the Carter atrocity accurately understand the history and the organic character and interests of the too-silent majority of the American people.

It is also dedicated, in still another important sense, to that part of the American population typified by Stefan Possony and Edward Teller, the writer's former opponents who exhibited the integrity to modify their views on important questions on the basis of a rational perception of the genuine interests of both our nation and humanity in general.



Walter Lippmann

PREFACE

The USA In A Post-Rockefeller World

The following study of U.S. foreign policy was written during a three-week period, preceding April 16, as an urgent contribution to the dialogue then — and still — proceeding within leading circles both in the USA and abroad.

Leading forces representing a majority of the U.S. electorate now, increasingly desire to rid the nation of this monstrosity called the Jimmy Carter Administration. This opposition to Carter is based most visibly on deep anger against the so-called Carter “energy policy.” Among the best informed circles, both inside the U.S. and abroad, checking — and removing — the Carter Administration is also seen as necessary to prevent a general thermonuclear war which no nation desires and from which no nation could benefit.

The weakness among most of Carter’s critics is that — excepting energy policy as such — the critics are not yet agreed on a positive set of foreign and domestic policies which in fact represent a genuine alternative to the policies dictated by the Rockefellers and their allies. As the prophet Isaiah rightly warned: If the trumpet shall sound an uncertain note, who then shall heed the call to battle?


The following study attacks that problem in a two-fold way. The primary task undertaken is to pose a new coherent set of foreign and domestic policies, which are shown to be in the actual interests of a capitalist United States at this juncture. These alternative, positive policies are carefully defined in terms of the clear intent of the American Revolution, our Declaration of Independence, our Constitution and our republic.

The method employed to that purpose is to expose the roots of the current Carter Administration policies. The Carter Administration is exposed as the degenerated phase of a persisting American Tory effort to subvert and overthrow our constitutional republic, a subversion beginning most notably with the fraud-permeated 1828 election of New York bankers’ puppet-President Andrew Jackson, a subversion which has accelerated during the present century under the influence of a Fabian bankers’ policy now called the “Atlanticist” or “American Century” doctrine.

The approach employed for this purpose is to study that “Atlanticist Doctrine” at its mid-point, through Fabian Walter Lippmann’s 1943-1944 articulation of the Roosevelt postwar policy which has dominated our foreign and domestic policies every since.

The undertaking is in three logical parts, the three sections into which the study as a whole is divided. In the first section, the insanity of the Atlanticist foreign policy is exposed. In the third, final section, the positive alternative policy is proposed. The second, middle section is the theoretical portion of the study, in which the historical and organic roots of the American Tory Ideology are rigorously exposed, for the purpose of defining the notions of *natural law* and *constitutional law* upon which our republic was founded and which must be reestablished today as the principle of a “government of law, not men.”

The immediate purpose of this study is to provide the basis on which Whig strata of Republican and Democratic leaderships summon the informed con-



President Woodrow Wilson, right, with Colonel House.

stood as a consciously Hamiltonian sort of early twentieth century Federalist. Beyond that, what he

tion and to a large degree their systematic world outlook was by then deeply tainted with the monetarism

viction to rid our nation of a *treasonous* “American Century” doctrine.

That use of the word *treason* is no metaphor, no hyperbole. The Constitution is explicit: *Article III, Section 3*: “Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.” Although the Founding Fathers did not anticipate the emergence of supranational powers, such as the International Monetary Fund-World Bank-Eurodollar market, as an adversary of the nation, such a force presently exists, and is pursuing its alien interest by using its U.S. agents and agents of influence in the effort to overthrow our republic and destroy our vital industrial and agricultural interests, our nation’s credit, to the same kind of effect as our former adversary Great Britain attempted in the issues of the American Revolution and War of 1812. The Carter Administration’s “energy policy,” a policy introduced in the interest of the cited alien supranational power, is thus an Act of Treason in the strict terms of the Constitution.

Moreover, such an act as President Carter’s April 15 telegram to President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing of France — endorsing French efforts to embroil the United States in a thermonuclear war with the Soviet Union — represents the attempt to use war as a way of shutting off U.S. access to essential primary commodities in Africa and elsewhere. The Carter Administration’s use of the “breakaway ally” scenario for projected Israeli operations against the Gulf oil-exporting states is a similar fostering of war against the vital interests of the United States. This is nothing but *treason* by the Carter Administration.

It is *treason, not mere folly*. President Carter was a member and protégé of David Rockefeller’s Trilateral Commission, a supranational policy-formulating and coordinating body dedicated to imposing these offenses upon the United States. Furthermore, the Carter Administration is composed chiefly of members of the Trilateral Commission and that organization’s allies. President Carter, National Security Council chief Zbigniew Brzezinski, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, and others are variously agents-in-fact or agents of influence of the alien, supranational interest associated with David Rockefeller.

It is indictable treason in the same sense as the indictment of Aaron Burr by the Thomas Jefferson administration.


The secondary function of this study, outside the U.S., is to create the informed view of the United States — variously among leading OECD, developing sector and CMEA circles — which tends to sweep away the most idiotic, but nonetheless strongly held

deep and hostile prejudices against the United States and its people. We must contribute to creating the global political climate in which leading forces acting through the U.S. Congress can effect the appropriate transformations in U.S. domestic and foreign policy without having the congressional effect sabotaged with aid of some idiotic, prejudice-based nonsense from the Soviet leadership, certain developing sector nations and so forth.

More fundamentally, it is past time that the U.S. working person had a direct look at the ugly realities behind the demagogic illusions and delusions which have heretofore, for so long, passed as United States foreign policy interests, and also understand how his follies, abetted by the so-called “socialists,” have contributed to creating and sustaining the domestic configuration of political forces in which an ultimately suicidal foreign policy doctrine has been installed and sustained.

Although the initial and concluding portions of this policy analysis are straightforward attacks on the obvious problems confronting our nation today, the substantial middle section unavoidably gathers together the elements of a rigorous proof and exposition of the correctness and present applications of the constitutional principles of our republic to present world circumstances. In that middle section, the average reader will find recurring interpolations of rigorous argument between the more immediately accessible successive presentations of the factual account of each step of the argument. We do not propose that these interpolated, more rigorous portions can be skipped over. If they were not essential, they would have been edited out of this text for statement in a different publication devoted to such theoretical considerations. However, we appreciate that many readers will get only the purpose and gist of the interpolated more rigorous arguments at first reading. After assimilating this policy analysis as a whole, the more difficult — and necessary — passages of the middle section can be studied again.

Concerning that special, included character of the writing as a whole, the following policy point is properly emphasized. The formulation of the “gut” of United States foreign policy is not to be based on the slick sort of plausible campaign document which Lippmann produced on behalf of President Franklin D. Roosevelt during the 1943-44 onset of the 1944 presidential campaign. The methods of the successful used car salesman, or of the slick journalist and campaign speechwriter, have no morally tolerable place in laying before an electorate the vital issues of national domestic and foreign policy. Any basic feature of policy which is adopted because it was suc-



President Kennedy inspecting the Berlin Wall in the course of his 1961 "Ich bin ein Berliner" adventure.

cessfully sold by such methods, by an appeal to the superficial, mistaken knowledge of issues and policies by a misinformed electorate, is a swindle.

The electorate must go through a forced process of informed reflection — of the sort the same electorate's members wished they had employed before “buying that used car” — or voting for Carter.

A major document proposing a profound correction in domestic and foreign policies — such as the present one — is and must be intended to afford the rigorous statement of policy necessary to a process of broad and intense discussions within the electorate.

According to that principle and foresight, the initial and concluding sections of the document prove at first glance to the reader the nature of the intolerable error in our existing domestic and foreign policies, proving also at first reading that in many respects the present policies of the Carter Administration are outright treason. Those same portions of the document describe and illustrate the contrary policies we should adopt, in consistency with both our vital interests and the institutions and instruments specified by our Constitution. That aspect of the document suffices to place our proposals properly in first place on the nation's agenda for policy discussions and *short-term* decisions.


However, any change in policy, even the proposed

return to constitutional principles set forth here, has long-term implications. The statements we make in the initial and concluding sections are adequate to define our proper national policies for the immediate year or so ahead. The question remains: on what grounds can we be certain that these policies will work to our proper advantage, and that of our immediate posterity over the next decade and the decades to follow?


For that reason, the middle section, with its included more difficult passages, is indispensable. We cannot premise the future existence and condition of our nation — and the effect of our national policies upon the world — on the authority of policies grounded only in the sentiments agreeable to a surface mood of the moment. As we qualify that important distinction within the text, it is impossible to *predict* the future consequences of presently adopted policies, but we can and must *forecast* the range of alternative implications of that policy. That forecast must not be a mere guess, an “intuition.” It must be rigorously grounded, so that we may be certain of what range of consequences of present policies we have bequeathed to ourselves and our immediate posterity.

Respecting that latter aspect of the matter, let the relevant ferment of intense discussion begin. The time is short, and the matter is urgent.


May 10, 1977



The drought-stricken Sahel in Africa, caused by the Rockefellers. The bare policy underlying the Rockefellers' Atlanticist Doctrine is to loot the world's agricultural-industrial base.



The signing of the Versailles Treaty, June 29, 1919. President Wilson and Colonel House are seated at the head table at the center of the photo.



Plato, left, and Aristotle, shown in a detail of The School of Athens by Raphael.

**THE CRISIS
IN U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY**



The Syndics of the Cloth Guild. Rembrandt's portrayal of the face of evil.

The early American poet and novelist Edgar Allan Poe related a tale of a man hypnotized at the moment of his death, whose mind remained active while the dead body to which it was pinioned underwent the progress of decay. The smell of that grisly Poe tale erupts as an association, as one compares the 1944 *U.S. Foreign Policy and U.S. War Aims* of Roosevelt's Fabian propagandist Walter Lippmann to the decay-stricken effluvia of today's Trilateral Commission and its fellow-accomplices.

Beginning shortly after his 1914 screening and indoctrination under the Webbs in England, Lippmann emerged to become for over almost half a century a leading Fabian political propagandist. He was an intimate of both British political intelligence and Woodrow Wilson's confidential circles during the period of the Versailles treaty. An "outsider" during the 1920s Republican administration periods, he regained his semi-official status in relationship to the Roosevelt administration and later drifted into the rank of "elder statesman" of the Anglo-American political intelligence circles.

At the time it was written and published, Lippmann's cited book had an important assigned role in the process of formulating postwar U.S. policy. Although the Rockefellers' Brookings Institution had already articulated the main premises of the proposed policy in the "American Century" doctrine issued some years earlier, that general doctrine had not been elaborated in terms appropriate to the principal strategic relations emerging from the course of World War II developments.

The years 1943 and 1944, the years the material in the book was first published, were the aftermath of a series of policy setting negotiations among Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin, notably including the Teheran agreement. Churchill and Roosevelt were satisfied that they had brought Stalin to terms, to the point that the basic lines of Anglo-American foreign policy could be defined for decades ahead with a large measure of certainty beforehand. Something more substantial than "Wilsonian" swindles, such as the sententious hypocrisy of the so-called "Atlantic Charter," was wanted.

Moreover, President Roosevelt, at the acme of his political influence over the U.S. electorate, was dying. The powers associated with Roosevelt, including notably John D. Rockefeller II and his sons, urgently needed to have Roosevelt run for one more term — which he would not live out — so that they might use the Roosevelt charisma to commit the USA and other nations to a more specific version of that "American Century" doctrine through which the Rockefellers and their associates proposed to establish an indefinite future period of increasing domination over the entire world.


The 1943-1944 period of preparation for Roosevelt's last election campaign was the crucial period of the big selling job — to use that campaign to impose upon the U.S. government and electorate's conscience that policy of intended Rockefeller world rule. Lippmann, then at the peak of his public influence, was the key Fabian publicist in the effort to indoctrinate the nation's editorial writers and others with the new elaboration of the "American Century" doctrine. In that connection, Lippmann contributed more than marginally to the shaping of that policy into the forms deemed politically digestible to the credulous. The book in question thus represents one of the more important pieces of Atlanticist political-campaign literature of the present century.

In most of its crucial features, the version of the "American Century" doctrine set forth in Lippmann's book is the basis for the present-day foreign policies of the U.S. government, the doctrine on which the current, utopian, crisis-management and related schemes of the Rockefellers' Carter puppet-Administration are premised. In some specific features, the strategic alternatives adopted during 1943-1944 were made obsolete even before the final defeat of Nazi Germany, other conditions were superseded by 1953, and still others made obsolete by the developments of the 1961-1973 period. Large, but easily distinguishable chunks of Lippmann's writings were never to be taken seriously — Lippmann only far less than Woodrow Wilson, had a tendency to gush out gobs of sententious hypocrisy. Such cautions noted, the Lippmann book represents the "American Century" doctrine as it was to be passed down, without much modification of its essential kernel, to the present day.

It is that overall significance of Lippmann's book, plus certain advantages provided the critic by the fact that it is of superior reference quality to contemporary Atlanticist effluvia, which has governed the text's selection as the point of reference for the discussion immediately at hand.

Although Lippmann outrageously falsifies entire sweeps of U.S. national and diplomatic history, on some points going so far as baldfaced lying, the intellectual quality of his work nonetheless stands far above the almost incoherent and often babbling output of leading present-day "think-tankers," such as a Lester Brown, Zbigniew Brzezinski, James Schlesinger, and so forth. As was emphasized at the outset, the first broad impression of turning from the 1943-1944 Lippmann to present-day Trilateraloids is an immediate, overall perception of the progress toward advanced intellectual and moral decay, presently to a point resembling the state of the corpse near the end of Poe's tale.

This relative quality of Lippmann's formulation is



Benjamin Franklin, the founder of our country.

best identified as an effort to take the preceding 150 years of world history in its entirety, attempting to show, if merely in a pragmatist's fashion, some ordering principles giving coherence to that totality. In this process, Lippmann adheres to the canonical forms of historical scholarship — however often he is a pious fraud respecting matters of content. Wrong as his view may be, both in fact and in perspective, his is a worldview with a certain kind of relative intellectual coherence. Consequently, as Lippmann uses that worldview as the supposed empirical body of knowledge for the formulation of strategic doctrines, he presents the result in a form that is immediately susceptible of systematic criticism.

We do not unjustly deprecate the comparative qualities of contemporary Atlanticist spokesmen. Put aside for a moment the question of the unfortunate Jimmy Carter. (1)

Too many credulous people, of the sort who imagine that a wealthy individual is necessarily more intelligent, fall prey to the reaction-formation delusion that the minions of the Rockefeller brothers must be "awesomely clever." On the contrary, what cowards frequently mistake for personal qualities in that lot is predominantly their own fear of the vast powers concentrated in the hands of the Rockefeller-led machinery of international finance and political intelligence networks.

This fact has been illustrated by the David-Goliath struggles of the U.S. Labor Party and Labor Committees against the Rockefeller machine during, most notably, the period beginning December 1972. Given the power proportionately at the disposal of the two opposing forces, which is — by far — the more intellectually qualified to deal with crisis-issues on a national and global scale? Beginning October 1976 and continuing over the winter of 1976-1977, a certain perceptible potential parallel to the case of the Tudor fleet against the Hapsburg Armada became noted by an increasing number of observers. The beneficial correlated consequence of observations tending toward that judgment has been to somewhat demystify "Rockefeller power." Given the power at

their disposal, the leading figures of the Trilateraloid orbit are on performance a poor lot.

One of the key personnel problems of the Rockefellers' neo-Fabian and other "utopian" (e.g., Interpol-network) hierarchies is that an effective mind requires a convincing self-image of intellectual coherence and integrity, a consistent rationality and rigorous scope of relevant knowledge in at least the Aristotelian sense. This is the general sort of distinction to be made between the Atlanticist "patricians" of earlier generations, including Lippmann, and the picaresque louts and thugs, such as a Cyrus Vance, a Lester Brown, a lunatic Brzezinski, who typify the Trilateraloid spokesmen of today.


Lippmann is already in his time a degenerate relative to the image of the "Concord" patrician he parodies, already a reflection of the decay which seized Harvard University and similar institutions during the period of the accession of President Eliot. After 1919, the degeneracy accelerated, along lines identified by John Dewey in his *Reconstruction in Philosophy*. The denial of universal practical and moral principles, an immorality which Dewey avowed in the aftermath of Versailles, is also Lippmann's crippling affliction, that moral decay of intellectual culture into babbling, sententious hypocrisy which Princeton's Woodrow Wilson brought to our national institutions through his incumbency in the U.S. Presidency.

That considered, Lippmann is a plausible stage-parody of a patrician, relative to the amoral mercenaries of Vance's strata.

The relevant world-historical point is that the present degeneration of the post-Versailles and post-Bretton Woods monetary orders and associated institutions permits no credible appearance of correspondence between Rockefeller-centered monetary interests and the fundamental self-interests of those OECD and developing nations over which that decaying order desperately exerts its hegemonies.

The credibility of the U.S. role respecting actual U.S. interests in the wars against the Kaiser's and Nazi Germany, gave to the ruling forces of this nation the appearance of representing not only Wall Street interests, but at least coincidentally the self-interests in prosperity and national security of the nation at large. Even those other nations which suffered degradation to satrapy status under lower Manhattan's hegemonies, tended to swallow their anger and extend a certain degree of moral credit to the political instruments of monetarist U.S.-based power. This persuasion was riddled with illusion — even downright delusion — but it was more or less plausible to anyone who was not fastidious respecting matters behind the coincidences and façades.

1. The significance of putting Jimmy Carter in the White House — i.e., thumb on the well-known "button" — is underlined by a Rand Corporation scenario. The "game of chicken" — two lunatic automobilists approaching one another down the center of a highway at high speed, to test which swerves aside, "chickens," first — was suggested as adaptable to psychological warfare techniques, even on the level of thermonuclear confrontations between the White House and the Politburo. The Rand think-tankers posed the query: what if one of the drivers knows that his opponent is a raving lunatic? Would that knowledge intimidate the saner of the two into swerving, and thus "losing the game?" Carter is the appropriate lunatic to place into the White House for a game of "thermonuclear chicken" with the Soviet Politburo.



John Quincy Adams, who articulated the notion of “community of principle” to describe the fundamental tenet of the foreign policy of the United States’ Federalist Founding Fathers.

At the time Lippmann's book was published by Little, Brown, few went behind the surface appearances, the sentimental glosses of the author's style, to assess the actual content of the proposals. The sort of policy Lippmann offered was broadly accepted by public opinion not because the policies involved were understood in any real sense, but chiefly because the rhetorical sentiments offered did not offend prevailing illusions and public tastes at the time. The U.S. electorate never understood the Roosevelt administration in any actually relevant detail; rather, they blindly trusted it, as a child trusts the fact of his particular parents, as more or less "the way things are decreed to be." Nothing yet had developed to disturb the consoling self-delusions of more than a relative handful.



In such a political climate, a Lippmann could stand before his morning shaving mirror and imagine himself to see a man not only honored in the contemporary corridors of power, but regard those honors as the fruits of some genuine intellectual integrity in agreement with a credible public interest. After the events of the Kennedy administration, and the increasingly savage assault upon those institutions and principles which were our nation's heritage and conscience, the Rockefeller-linked and other financier elites represented in the Kennedy administration project stripped much of our nation's youth — and most of all themselves — of the last shards of a credible self-image of intellectual integrity.

A capitalism which deliberately sets out — as early exemplified by the "Triple Revolution" Orwellianism — to systematically undermine and destroy the expan-

sion and maintenance of that technologically advanced industrial and agricultural base which is and has been our nation's most vital self-interest, which tears the Constitution and other vital legal and moral institutions of the republic to shreds, which consciously and deliberately promotes the proliferation of dangerous drugs among our university and high school youth — what possible illusion of integrity remains to the proponents of such hideousness? What man or woman of intellectual integrity could devote personal capacities to such an enterprise; what person, while being in the ranks of the neo-Fabians, the Trilateral Commission, the Brookings Institution, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms unit of the U.S. Treasury, or the Kennedy, Clark, Katzenbach, Levi, or Bell Justice Department, could preserve under such circumstances even the vestiges of morality?

Gifted individuals gripped by cruel neurotic problems have been otherwise creative; moral imbeciles of the Trilateraloid varieties, never. Moral imbecility, by destroying the individual's linking of his or her sense of personal social identity to some sense of a lawful causality in the universal consequences of individual willful practice, destroys the mental processes indispensable to tracing through the connections of isolated strategies and tactical recipes to their universalizing consequences.

Some moral imbeciles prevail as they wield vast powers like a berserker's axe, and as saner men and women manifest the cowardice not to bring such lunatics to cage.



Federalist Tom Paine, author of the 1776 pamphlet Common Sense, was a vigorous advocate of the republican form of government as opposed to Tory "pure democracy."

Three Atlanticist World Wars

Exemplary of the profitable present-day uses of the 1944 Lippmann text is a comparison of his analysis of the policies impelling the United States into two world wars against Germany. What he states, which is in fact a fair if elliptical summary of the actual policies involved, affords an effective basis for identifying the crucial methodological blunder of Atlanticist doctrine presently impelling the Carter Administration — despite its consoling delusions to the contrary — on the track toward a general thermonuclear war as early as 1977.

In a footnote to the text, Lippmann footnotes an excerpt from his own Feb. 17, 1917 *New Republic* editorial, "The Defense of the Atlantic World." To the quotation, he adds a parenthetical: "When I wrote this article I had the opportunity to know what Colonel House and others among Wilson's advisors were thinking." From the footnoted excerpt of the 1917 editorial, we select the following most pertinent passage:

... Had she (Germany) stood on the defensive against France and Britain, had she limited the war to the Balkans and the eastern front, and thrown in her lot with the western nations, she would have had their neutrality and probably their sympathy. But, when she carried the war to the Atlantic by violating Belgium, by invading France, by striking against Britain, and by attempting to disrupt us, neutrality of spirit or action was out of the question.


This compares directly with his summary of the balance of U.S. (Roosevelt administration) policy concerning Nazi Germany prior to May-June 1940. After citing the list of notable preceding Nazi actions in central and eastern Europe, he states:

... The Nazi aggression appeared to be directed toward the east, away from the oceanic world. While the Nazis were generally execrated in the United States, only those who believed that Hitler would eventually turn

west called for practical measures against him. . . . But when Germany breached the western barrier, there was an instant and virtually unanimous recognition that the country was threatened. . . . The new defense program was called for because the Western European barrier had been breached. . . . If the Nazi regime had not been the vile thing it is, would the United States have reacted as it did to the conquest of France? The answer to that question was given in the first German war.

Although Lippmann's account skids over a number of crucial facts known to him — including the manipulation of public opinion in this and related matters — he implicitly and correctly identifies the backers of both the Wilson and Roosevelt administrations as informed of and tending toward concurrence with the British scheme best identified as the "Parvus Plan." Although the USA had certain strong reservations concerning that British policy for an alliance with the Kaiser's Germany, these objections were, in the lesser part, the difficulties of peddling such a diplomatic swindle to the U.S. electorate, and of more importance, a realization that the success of the British venture would put the City of London in a strategic position to resist — perhaps successfully — the lower Manhattan impulse to reduce Britain to junior-partner status. Lippmann alludes to that complication of post-Versailles Anglo-American relations in the section of his text devoted to U.S.-Russian relations. There, he both exaggerates and misrepresents the nature of U.S. blocking of British policies concerning breakup of the Soviet republic, a distortion which is understandable in light of the package the U.S. was attempting to peddle to Stalin during the 1943 period.

The role of Anglo-Dutch agents, including (Alexander Helphand) Parvus in Balkan affairs prior to World War I, and Parvus' peddling of the British eastern European strategy to the Kaiser's general staff in 1916, expressed the City of London's purpose in



The first Cabinet: President Washington with the Secretaries of State [Jefferson], Treasury [Hamilton], War [Knox], and, in background, Attorney General [Randolph], an engraving from a painting by nineteenth century artist Alonzo Chappel.

launching World War I. The *Kaiserreich*, created by Rothschild protégé Bismarck with a helping hand (and other organs) from the ruling Hanoverian House of England, was ordained by City of London and allied Fabian policymakers to perform an indispensable role in the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires. The project stipulated the breakup of the Balkans and what is today called Eastern Europe into a pathetic agglomeration of squabbling separate states, each embodying the consolations of “national self-determination,” which would come under the Anglo-Dutch financiers’ departments of control of global grain and petroleum distribution. The Russian republic would contemplate the beauties of liberalism, while liberally meeting the debt service owing to the Rothschilds, et al. from the Czarist regime.

That same British-concocted Parvus Plan was the strategic policy which Hitler’s British and New York City financier patrons adopted for him in imposing him from abroad on bankrupt Germany of 1933. That Anglo-American backing of Hitler’s *assigned* eastern and Balkan role was the reason that Neville Chamberlain capitulated to Hitler at the 1938 Munich affair, and why the opening months of World War II were a “phony war” on the Anglo-French-Belgian western front. Rudolf Hess’ flight to Scotland was not an individual lunatic’s caprice, but most probably a result of a policy decision by Hitler himself. Hess’ predicaments in England (and his prolonged stay in Spandau prison) are the result of the fact that the notable defect in his adventure was that he had undertaken it months too late.

The broad point to be made for present practical purposes is that the same Anglo-American, “Atlanticist” doctrines and methods which misfired in determining the unexpected course of two world wars against Germany are the doctrine and method being employed around lower Manhattan and Washington to the effect of blindly stumbling headlong into an early World War III. The “concert” method employed by British monetarism generally, the geopolitical reductionism characteristic of all leading Atlanticists, Lippmann included, exemplifies the essential pervasive stupidities of the doctrine and methods involved.

Rothschild thinking, the prototype for all modern monetarist political-economic nostrums, does not recognize the existence of either economic reality or of the lawful political processes which rigorously — if not always simply — reflect real economic processes. Hence, twice, the Rothschilds and others committed the blunder of intending to march Germany eastward, then to discover to their astonishment that the kinds of German state suited to that ordained purpose were unable to resist overpowering intrinsic impulses to march *both* eastward and westward. NATO, under-

neath all the sentimental babbling peddled to credulous North American and Western European publics, was created for the specific strategic purpose of replacing Germany’s former role in a projected third effort at implementing the “Parvus Plan.” After the Soviet development of an operational thermonuclear weapon *before the U.S. itself*, and the abortion of the Kennedy administration, the projected dating for such use of NATO was apparently, at least, relegated to uncertainty until the beginning of the Watergating process against the Nixon administration and the 1973-1974 petrodollar-recycling affair. Despite the vacillation respecting prospects for implementation, the Rockefeller and allied interests’ “American Century” or Atlanticist policy embodies the institutionalization of that same lunatic obsession which produced two preceding world wars, and which governs the behavior of the Trilateraloid madmen presently embarked on blundering into a third.

This time, again, the Atlanticists’ error includes a gross miscalculation of the determining relationship between German industrial self-interests and the most potent independent impulses of German politics. However, this time that repeated miscalculation occupies a secondary place relative to the present principal focus of the thrice-repeated methodological blunder. This time, the Atlanticists have employed the same method of miscalculation formerly applied to Germany to the case of the Soviet leadership.

In the onset of World War I, the raving nominalists of the City of London wishfully consoled themselves that real economics did not exist. By the same utilitarian-Fabian conceits through which the City of London had deluded itself to have refuted Karl Marx, they had also assured themselves they had refuted Hamilton, Carey, Colbert, the *politiques*, and Gresham. Real economy did not exist — *had not well-paid empiricism proven this?* Geography, traditions, corruption, and so forth were — to the Rothschilds and their accomplices — the collection of “factors” which determined the manipulation of history. They had their multiple influences on the *Kaiserreich* which they had — chiefly — created through manipulation of the monetary means for raising and deploying armies, bringing down governments, wrecking currencies of stubborn regimes, and buying in job-lots liberal, conservative, aristocratic, and professed Marxist organizations. Beyond the City of London’s direct influence on the Kaiser government, socialist August Bebel of the German Social Democracy — like Eduard Bernstein — had been a British agent up to the moment of his death, and he was by no means the exception. *Kaiser’s Germany would never break westward — the politicians would overrule the Kaiser’s high command!*



Walter Lippmann

In the second try, the case of Hitler, the City of London and its lower Manhattan accomplices were confident that the problems of 1914 Germany *could not possibly recur*. The internal structure of post-Versailles German political life had been fine-tuned by first the dominant Americans and junior-partner British (and Dutch) agencies directing the Allied Armistice Commission. Although Schacht, by 1940, was in honored retirement, Schacht was still a loyal and politically influential American agent, and similar Wall Street and City of London controls intersected every conceivable point of the *Nazireich*, including the redoubtable Admiral Canaris. In creating Hitler as Atlanticism's disposable "breakaway ally"

— to bleed itself to British terms in services performed in the east, the Atlanticists who created Hitler ignored the fact that the intersection of the self-aggravating German debt structure, and the Schacht method of primitive accumulation against the German economy's economic basis, set forces into lawful motion which could not be checked without destroying the debt structures and the political machine created to serve its imperatives. Again, Germans being as capable of strategic thinking as Rothschilds, Hitler seized the Hitler-Stalin pact, and attacked the astonished and vulnerable western forces, determined thus to build up the necessary looting base for creating his eastward directed war machine.

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THE CASE OF WALTER LIPPMANN

The Case of Walter Lippmann



A Presidential Strategy
 by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

World War III

Today, the Rockefeller faction manically insists that its operational confrontationist policies will not lead to an actual general war. This time, the Tavistock-Rand psychological profile of the Oblomovist Soviet leadership is the crux of their obsessive stupidity: "We have control of a key section of the Soviet leadership," emphasizing that Georgii Arbatov and others are hard-core Rockefeller agents within and around the CPSU Central Committee, and that the supporters of the Brezhnev policy of the moment will continue to perform as the profile specifies. As with the *Kaiserreich*, the Atlanticists of today insist that the political institutions will overrule the military command. (In 1939-1940, it was the delusion that the German military and Canaris would overrule Hitler on the risks of fighting a two-front war.)

They hysterically deny the lawfulness of powerful economic and related processes now as they did before.

Contrary to London's calculations, the economics of the *Kaiserreich* demanded the securing of a looting base in either the east or the west as a precondition for bringing the war against the Triple Entente to a conclusion. Gentlemen's understandings concerning Western Fronts or "zones of conflict" do not operate under conditions of war. The Kaiser's Germany could not commit its forces to an engagement to the east and leave Russia's allies waiting behind its back to invade the Ruhr at some crucial point in the eastern affair. With an occupation of the Ruhr — in either the first or second world wars — Germany's war-fighting capabilities would have evaporated. *Objectively, Germany had no rational choice but to invade France in both wars.*

The Kaiser's Germany came close to winning the First World War at the outset — had the command exploited the peculiar vulnerabilities of French railway networks according to an enterprise then within their military capabilities. It was that vacillation and error in the German command which prevented the French forces from being shattered during the onset

of the war, and thus established the breathing space during which the French command could dig in to transform the war into the hideous meatgrinder attrition which characterized its prolongation.

In the Second World War, Germany's imperatives for invasion of France were even more powerful. From a simple military standpoint, the *Wehrmacht* could not permit itself to be deployed in depth on an eastern front, waiting for the point of mutual Nazi-Soviet attrition at which the Western allies completed their preparations to occupy the Ruhr. *From any objective purely military strategic standpoint, the Wehrmacht had to conquer continental Western Europe before undertaking a thrust to the east of Poland.* That — certainly by 1939-1940 — was any military cadet's ABCs. The fact that the British and French financiers and politicians could suppress elementary strategic competence in their military commands was extended into the double folly of presuming that the Nazi political structure could — or would attempt to — check its military command on that point. The fact was, as London knew, the Hitler regime of 1933-1940 lived on the sufferance of the German military. Military questions as such aside, the bankruptcy of the German monetary system and the depleted condition of German basic industry demanded a substantial source of loot as a precondition for building up the German economy to the point that an eastern thrust was possible.

The difference between 1914 and 1939-1940 was that but for a command failure at the outset of World War I, the Kaiser's Germany would have won the peace by a successful early conquest of France. The conquest of France in June 1940 could not produce the same durable result. The Kaiser's Germany was, relatively speaking, a viable capitalist economy, whose early military victories would have opened up Eastern Europe and Russia to massive German capitalist extended reproduction. The Nazi economy created by the Rockefellers, et al. was of a fundamentally different character. It was an auto-cannibalizing

economy, which subsisted by destroying the economic basis it assimilated, thus destroying the productive forces upon whose expansion and development a durable conquest depended.

If the Nazis had defeated the Soviets, the condition of Europe — and the world — would have been monstrously worse than at the middle of 1945, but then the Nazi economy, by its nature, must collapse of its own effects as it extended itself beyond a certain weighted ratio of Germany proper to looted conquered regions. However, that fact could not alter Hitler's policy any more than the force of reason — showing Rockefeller, et al. the inherent folly of their war aims — could deter the Trilateraloids. Entities such as the Hitler regime and the present-day Atlanticists must be destroyed before they go into full-scale motion, otherwise they will pursue their wretched follies to the end — because, beyond their commitments, they have no alternatives. They have burned the bridges leading back to other alternatives.

There is, admittedly, some weighty conceptual problem incurred by employing the term "objective processes" in connection with the hypergeometries of shifting patterns in lawful transformations being provoked within the Soviet policies and operations. As every Moscow-watcher knows, the canonical epithet for the so-called Brezhnev faction is "objective." Brezhnev's self-appointed sycophants, such as the Arbatovs insist on this, and Brezhnev, et al. seem to relish *such political insults*. The Averell Harrimans and others also insist on the same point, as, in a slightly different form, do the Henry Kissingers, the James Schlesingers, and so forth. It is argued that precisely because the Brezhnev faction is "objective," it will respond to appropriate Mutt-and-Jeff confrontationist games by pragmatically retreating, grumbling bitterly as it nonetheless throws off concession after begrudged concession like so much confetti.

Neither Harriman nor Kissinger — nor Arbatov — use the term "objective" in the historically-rigorous epistemological sense. The cognates for the "objectivity" they attribute to the Brezhnev faction are "pragmatic," "empiricist," "Menshevik (Herzen-Plekhanov) fatalism." However, just as the Soviet command is "Clausewitzian," the Soviet opponents of Arbatov and the Bukharinist tradition are predominantly "objective" in the rigorous epistemological usage of that term. It is that element of the Soviet command structure which the Rockefellers will lawfully render predominantly operative by the sort of confrontation-process now under way. So, the Rockefellers will repeat the same methodological stupidity characterizing the two preceding world wars in triggering a third.

Considering the mass of the twentieth century

evidence on the point, one might ordinarily presume that even a pragmatist would be wiser than in fact the Carter Administration's puppet-masters show themselves. Indeed, such persons emphatically admit the most relevant facts — as they have done so, once again, in recent testimony before Congress. Yet, in that testimony, and repeatedly on the same topic over the three years that we have been directly confronting them and others on the issue, they fall back to the obsessive conviction that the pragmatism of the Brezhnev faction obviates such facts and thus renders the proposed track toward World War III acceptable. Considering the uniformity of such manic hysteria within the Trilateraloid leadership, one must wonder what strange wishful delusions are operating there.

There are two sources of the Atlanticist delusion. At first identification, the two causes may appear to be distinct "factors." Modest critical assessment suffices to show without doubt that the two phenomena are but different facets of the same consideration.

Predominantly, as David Rockefeller's desperate address to the New York City Economics Club symptomizes, they are obsessed by the need to believe that the schemes will succeed. For them, since they have committed themselves to such operational policies, cut themselves factionally off from alternative courses of action, and so forth, the notion that the policy might fail is properly associated with the spectre of an early collapse of Chase Manhattan Bank, and a total loss of their faction's financial and political power.

As with the 1976 disclosures of Soviet physicist L. Rudakov, they prefer to believe that such realities do not exist, and if they are forced to acknowledge their existence, must convince themselves that such considerations will not be efficiently operative. They desperately need to believe that the developing sector governments will indefinitely be the International Monetary Fund's instruments for calculated austerity genocide against their own populations, that Japan and West Germany will willingly preside over the destruction of their industrial economies, and that the Soviets will foolishly trade away the very defensibility of the Warsaw Pact nations for fear of what lunatic Carter might otherwise do — in one of his imbecilic rages — in proximity of the well-known "button." The mere fact that the method by which Atlanticists defend such rationalizations has been massively discredited by two preceding world wars does not dissuade them from repeating the folly.

In such behavior, the Atlanticist cabal is not merely responding with reaction formation to an immediate set of expedients. Since David Hume — and actually earlier — Anglo-Dutch monetarism, its forebears and its lower Manhattan by-products have

denied *the efficient existence of universals*. To the uneducated layman — which is to include most university philosophy professors — such phrases are a purely academic matter. On the contrary, modern *nominalism* is the organic philosophical outlook of the stratum, dating as a correlative from the Guelph and Dominican alliances against humanism and the Hohenstaufens, which has attained world-domination over finance and much politics throughout the OECD and developing nations. Nominalism — the denial that individual acts are causally connected in a lawful and implicitly knowable way to universal consequences — is the ingrained method and character of those monetarist forces and their intellectual hangers-on.

Whenever someone proposes the existence of efficient universal principles underlying social processes (in particular), on condition that such statements are made in a purely literary or academic setting, the Rockefellers' tame pundits emit animal-like groans, registering their shock at such intolerable egregiousness, and if they can muster more than such barnyard forms of expression, profess sneering facial expressions and a few deprecatory slanders against the mental condition of the offender. If the expression of such scientific views goes beyond opinion into some form of practice, the same flock turns downright nasty, looking for guidance to the fourteenth century Dominicans and the immolation of Giordano Bruno.

Hence, when the appropriate Trilateraloids are called to account for high treason, puppet-accomplice Jimmy Carter will be released on the basis of a successful plea of lunacy, while most of the rest will plead stupidity in hope of clemency. Only the "thorough" utopians, like the "technotronic" Zbigniew Brzezinski, and the purported liberals and leftists spinning out fascist Orwellian "egalitarian" orders in the neo-Fabian and other think-tanks, think through the implications of Rockefelleroid hyperinflationary austerity policies to the full extent of their hideous social, political, and material consequences. It is genocidalists such as Lester Brown who dispassionately propose means for wiping out the billions of the earth's "excess population." Otherwise, the average rank-and-file Atlanticist — the ordinary banker, politician, and so forth — simply refuses to make a connection between his practice and such consequences: "Isn't that a bit highly theoretical?"

Granted, in this culture — and in a large proportion of Soviet leading circles — there is abundant evidence to support the judgment that the overwhelming majority of people refuse *ordinarily* to make connections between causes and their lawful effects

further down the line. This involves the fruits of mis-education and non-education. It also involves an essential principle of psychology. The ability to respond to an idea — as Dante Alighieri, among others, emphasized as far back as the early fourteenth century — is delimited by the capacity to transfer conceptions of knowledge into the *sensuous* state of an informing of the will for practice. The ability to think through to consequences depends upon the mental powers to make the consequence *sensuous* reality for thought — to *feel oneself* doing the anticipated willful act involved, to *feel oneself* experiencing the anticipated consequence involved.

Hence, given the fact that layers of the Soviet leadership presently supporting or tolerating the operational Arbatov Doctrine are capable of making the relevant connections between Carter policies and their consequences, the pragmatic, irrational behavior of the moment does not mean that they will not abandon Arbatov for the dictate of their powers of reason. It rather means that they will make *such an abrupt transition* instantly the moment the fuller implications of Carter's policy are made sensuous to them. It is for related reasons that great turns in history occur under conditions of crisis. The relevant feature of crisis is that it renders sensuous to a broad stratum of the population those rational perceptions which are otherwise sensuously real to only a relative few.

Whatever Carter's advisors think Brezhnev thinks, or even what Brezhnev himself thinks he thinks are matters of clinical relevance, but they are not competent "statistical" evidence of what Brezhnev will abruptly find himself thinking under the effects of those confrontations which make Atlanticist policy implications sensuous to him. The principal undecided feature of those changes in Brezhnev's policies is whether Brezhnev et al. will react simply by going to thermonuclear war — ignoring all Rockefeller's proposed deals about "zones," or whether, one hopes, he will rather opt in time to bring down the Rockefeller monetary system before the point of war has been reached.

Has the world ever seen such obsessed lunatics as our Atlanticist monetarists? In the 1943 days of Walter Lippmann — before the successful Los Alamos test of the first nuclear bomb — even the Atlanticists thought somewhat in terms of real political processes. Nowadays, ask Cyrus Vance if he knows politics. The wretch will probably reply, "Sure. Hit the opposition with a club." In the net, they have a poorer political sense than a charging rhinoceros.

The Doctrine of Atlanticism

It is Lippmann's development of a literary defense for the concept of an Atlanticist doctrine which properly next occupies our attention here. What is of most current relevance in this connection is both the way in which he depends upon sweeping falsifications of U.S. history to establish precedents for such a policy, and his reliance upon geopolitical and related reductionist and pragmatist methods in proposing the edifice. In his defects, he is superior, if only relatively speaking, to his present-day successors — descendants who are nonetheless governed by the thrust of the Lippmann conception as almost by a set of axioms.

The gist of Lippmann's Atlanticism is this. He starts from the Pitt-Rothschild-Palmerston-Canning-Russell doctrines identifiable as "concert" and "influence" — but without ever accounting for the development of such innovations. He adds a persisting, thematic truism, to the effect that commitments and means must be kept in proportion. Those — plus geopolitical nostrums — are the axioms upon which he premises the structure for which he argues. He then seeks a legal precedent for modern Atlanticist doctrine in the concurrence of three U.S. Presidents in the adoption of the "Monroe Doctrine." He then makes a twofold argument concerning the 1823-1898 period. First, that the implied Atlanticist doctrine as organically embedded in the "Monroe Doctrine" was consistent U.S. foreign policy throughout that period. Second, that the failure of the U.S. to extend the proto-Atlanticist foreign policy into a global alliance with Britain after 1898 was the failure of U.S. foreign policy during the 1898-1943 period.

The whole argument is characterized by the interweaving of assorted frauds: fallacy of composition (usually willful), turning explicit policy statements of leading figures into an assertion of a point opposite to that actually made, and a generous dose of downright lying. Despite such crippling defects, the result he constructs by such means is essentially Atlanticist doctrine as understood and operational down to the present point in U.S. policy, and the arguments he

uses, while in some particulars peculiar to himself, are broadly identical with the arguments used by most proponents of the same doctrine.

First, Lippmann falsifies the most crucial facts of U.S. history of the period to 1823 and from 1823 to 1898. This error may sometimes involve innocent ignorance or miseducation on Lippmann's part; more often, the text itself shows that Lippmann has consulted relevant sources which must have informed him of such error. Hence, we write not of mistakes, but falsifications. Falsification not of interpretation alone, but falsification also of fact.

Lippmann ignores entirely the issues causing and shaping the American Revolution, employs fallacy of composition to misrepresent Federalist U.S. foreign policy during the 1783-1828 period, and brushes aside the War of 1812. He does not go as far as Charles A. Beard, probably disagreed with Thurman Arnold's wilder distortions of the Constitution, and must have been disgusted by such later revisionist writers as William A. Williams. Even so, he belongs to the spectrum of Fabian revisionism respecting U.S. history.

As we have listed the point above, the point of departure he employs for arguing the case for Atlanticism is the 1823 "Monroe Doctrine." In characterizing that convention, he employs three lies and one further major distortion. He lies in representing the "Monroe Doctrine" as a de facto British-U.S. alliance against Holy Alliance intervention in the Western Hemisphere. He lies in asserting that such a view of the Monroe Doctrine was in U.S. national interests at that time. He lies in accounting for the process by which it was originated. He distorts the views of U.S. leaders, notably John Quincy Adams, governing the reasons for its adoption.

The Holy Alliance was a British creation and a British instrument for governing the European continent and Mediterranean region. It was a British contrivance of the form known as a "concert" — the "concert of Europe." Apart from the British management of the "checks and balances" built into the

arrangement, the actual fine-tuning of internal control of the Holy Alliance was established by the Barings and taken over before 1820 by the House of Rothschild. The Rothschilds effectively controlled the credit of every member of the Holy Alliance and directly controlled their bought-and-paid-for puppet Metternich. By controlling the credit of nations, with the aid of the monstrous debt of the City of London imposed upon Europe under Treaty of Vienna conditions, the City of London determined the ability of the powers to field armies and to undertake other major enterprises. From the British standpoint of its controlling interest in the Holy Alliance, Canning's proposed treaty with the United States was intended in effect to extend the Holy Alliance's "concert of Europe" to the Western Hemisphere.

U.S. hemispheric policy up to 1823 was for the establishment of viable independent republics throughout the hemisphere, republics which would remove the perilous conditions of military and economic insecurity flowing from European powers' controlling presence within the hemisphere. In a broad sense the U.S. had a policy, shared by the Federalists and also largely by Jefferson, of recognizing *viable* or probably viable newly created republics in the hemisphere — analogous to Soviet policies of a similar effect relative to the present developing sector.

The Canning proposal was directly contrary to U.S. policy and interests at that time. Under the almost-"Wilsonian" sentimental hypocrisy of the "Canning-Rush" draft forwarded to Monroe, the U.S. was offered the face-saving formula which has been passed down for the edification of credulous schoolchildren and others to the present day. In fact, the practical content of the draft was to secure U.S. consent to free and virtually exclusive operations of the British fleet in the Western Hemisphere, and to place the struggling republics of Latin America at the mercy of the British fleet and the Baring and Rothschild financial houses.

The demand was so objectionable that President Monroe dared not accept it on his own responsibility, and yet British control of the Holy Alliance had left the U.S. so strategically vulnerable to British naval and economic warfare that Monroe was in no position, in practice, to refuse. Hence, Monroe solicited the counsel and co-responsibility of two former Presidents, Jefferson and Madison, in formulating his response to Canning's veiled threat.

The accuracy of our assessment of the Monroe Doctrine on both these two preceding accounts was conclusively demonstrated during the joint British-French-Spanish military operation which overthrew the legal, Juarez government of Mexico, and placed

the Barings' and Rothschilds' Hapsburg puppet on the throne of that country. The British-instigated combined operation against the Juarez government was taken in behalf of the Barings and Rothschilds, in consequence of Mexico's default on foreign debts.

At that point, the government of the United States was in profound opposition to this British-instigated operation, but for the moment the revolt of the Confederacy, itself a Rothschild effort to destroy the United States, prevented the U.S. from taking effective countermeasures against the hideous methods of debt collection being employed against the Mexican nation by French troops of Paris-based Baron James Rothschild's puppet, Napoleon III. James, at that time, was head of the international Rothschild House. Although August Belmont, the Rothschilds' principal U.S. agent, was connected to the London branch of the House, the policies of the House overall were under the guidance of James. As traitor Belmont's correspondence explicitly states, the Confederacy was a Rothschild project, and the purpose of the overall Rothschild operations of the period (including Mexico and the Confederacy), was to divide the North American continent into a "balkanized" collection of squabbling dictatorships of various sorts, which could thus be managed from London.

Admittedly, British policy on the Mexican operation did change. Lippmann, referring to that affair, uses the change to argue that the British military role in the instigation of the affair was in some way an unintended blunder. On the contrary, the events of 1863 persuaded the British government to gradually disassociate itself from the Rothschilds' North American "black operations."

Returning to the events of 1823, Lippmann twists the significance of a quotation from John Quincy Adams around half-circle, to make Adams signify the opposite of what he in fact states. Lippmann writes: "... at that time, as John Quincy Adams put it ... the naval power of the United States was to that of Great Britain 'as a cockboat in the wake of a British man-of-war.' " This Adams view is properly set in the context of his successful arguments against accepting the "doctrine" in the form of the treaty which Canning proposed. Lippmann, resorting to his "commitments and means" axiom, thus attempts to prove that the proffered treaty's most outspoken opponent was arguing at least implicitly of the necessity for an alliance with British naval power. In fact, as Lippmann is otherwise forced to acknowledge in effect, the proposed treaty problem was solved by a "Solomon's decision," not to accept the treaty, but to adopt the gist of the draft as a U.S. foreign policy convention. Hence, the "Monroe Doctrine," which placated the dangerous British while leaving a loophole for escape.

It is in this context that Lippmann piles lie upon lie in his glosses on the Maximilian affair. Lippmann argues against Adams' opposition to the Canning proposal of a treaty, arguing that the Maximilian intervention was made possible because the U.S. had no operative treaty with the British along Monroe Doctrine lines. As we have noted, Adams was proven correct and Lippmann's argument indefensible by those Mexican developments. Lippmann quotes Adams' objections to the proposed Canning treaty: "... Britain and America . . . would not be bound by 'any permanent community of principle,' " (emphasis in source) because, Adams stipulated, the United States had recognized the independence of the newly formed Latin American republics, where Britain had so far refused to do so.

This Lippmann distortion of the circumstances and implications of the "Monroe Doctrine" is directly connected to the sweeping falsehood of his characterization of U.S. foreign policy during the 1823-1898 period.

His thesis is: "... for nearly fifty years the nation has not had a settled and generally accepted foreign policy." Although the statement was plausible to the credulous at the time it was written, it is in intent a fraud, but we shall return to that point subsequently. He argues that the U.S. "had a secure policy toward the great powers from the decade after the War of 1812 to the end of the war with Spain in 1898 . . . But . . . (since) the election of 1900 . . . it has (not) been possible for any President of the United States to rely upon the united support of the nation in the conduct of foreign affairs." We focus, as we noted, first on the fraudulent assertion that the United States had a secure policy toward the great powers during the 1823-1898 period.

The basis for the foreign policy of the American Revolution and the United States of the 1763-1828 period is amply documented in *The Political Economy of the American Revolution*, (2) as well as the circumstances of sharp shifts in both domestic and foreign policy during the period 1828-1863. It is therefore sufficient to summarize the most general points relevant to the case at hand. From 1763, and especially 1776 until 1828, the United States' foreign policy was overall predominantly a consistent Federalist policy, to whose essential features Jefferson in effect largely subscribed (at least for purposes of considering the 1763-1898 period in the broadest terms). The predominantly Federalist doctrine of the 1776-1828

period was continued as a partisan foreign policy of the Whigs and Republicans up through Lincoln's assassination, while the Baring-Rothschild-controlled national leadership of the Democratic Party from 1828 through 1865 — from Martin van Buren's loutish Andrew Jackson to August Belmont's 1864 presidential candidate McClellan — had a contrary (pro-London) *domestic and foreign* policy.

In effect, from 1776 through 1863, excepting the French affair, Great Britain was continuously the principal adversary of the most fundamental national interests and very existence of the United States. The expression of that fact as foreign policy under Federalist, Whig, and Republican leadership up to 1863 was the effort to avoid war with this powerful adversary, Great Britain, *by every acceptable political means*. Within the balance of means available, this foreign policy in detail meant unpleasant concessions to British demands and interests up to the point that forceful resistance was unavoidable.

The 1815-1863 struggle of the United States against its principal adversary, Great Britain, centered around two points. The first, the most spectacular, was the British (Rothschild) forcing of a reactivation of black slave traffic into the United States, and British operations, conducted chiefly through New York City and New Orleans (e.g., Belmont and Slidell) to build up the system of black plantation slavery. The second, underlined by the naked treason of Andrew Jackson's Presidency, was to destroy the technological progress of U.S. industry, to wreck the United States' national institutions of credit essential to the promotion of industrial progress, and to degrade the U.S. into conformity with the reactionary North American policy enunciated by the vile Adam Smith in his wretched *Wealth of Nations*. Through British control of the national Democratic Party — especially during the 1828-1864 period, not only were these wrecking and treason policies significantly effective on balance, but under puppet-Presidents of Rothschild Democratic Party kingmaker August Belmont, the U.S. government itself was the instrument, during the Buchanan administration, for the treasonous work of preparing the secession of the Rothschild-influenced Confederacy.

After 1863, the British government finally — eighty years after the Treaty of Paris — acknowledged in fact the sovereignty and integrity of the United States as a nation. In typically Rothschild fashion, the City of London financiers did not contribute pioneering venture capital to United States post-1866 development, but they did pour mass amounts of capital investment into *established industrial technologies*, especially those secured by the wealth and credit of the United States government.

2. Nancy B. Spannaus and Christopher White, eds., *The Political Economy of the American Revolution* (New York: Campaigner Publications, Inc., 1977), pp. 29-49, 235 ff.

The effects of this new British policy toward the United States were decisively shaped by the Rothschilds' assassination of Abraham Lincoln.

Lincoln, a Whig of the Carey persuasion in economic policy, was determined to use the victory to transform the defeated South, in effect, into conformity with the mode of technological development emerging in the North and West. Lincoln had an economic development reconstruction policy for the post-bellum southern states. New York City's bankers, controlling the Democratic Party and with a major foothold in the leadership of the Republican Party, had a policy of *looting* the southern states. The policy difference was settled — with the aid of a series of crucial actions by New York City-linked Secretary of War Stanton — by Lincoln's assassination, and pinned down by the "Watergating" of Lincoln's successor.

The carpetbagging policy won, and by 1877 many of the positive features of Reconstruction were undone, to be completely undone by the Democratic Party's Jim Crow policies of the 1890s and first decades of this century. The southern states did not begin to appreciably recover from British-instigated and New York City financier-instigated backwardness and looting until the recent postwar period and the emergence of the "runaway shop." The role of British finance under the politically credulous Grant and his immediate successors prevented Lincoln's revival of Federalist policies from being firmly reestablished. Around the influx of British finance, New York and other centers produced new monetarist-oriented financial powers in imitation of the City of London.

Despite growing monetarist hegemonies of the London-allied financial houses, the Federalist-Whig-Republican *current* expressed by Lincoln fought on stubbornly under conditions of our great agricultural and industrial development leading up to the turn of the century and slightly beyond. As Lippmann knew, but declined to report, the "Whig" impulse for a U.S. war with Great Britain did not ebb away until the middle of the 1920s, although by that time the impulse itself had assumed forms which would have been alien to the British-adversary perceptions of the Federalists and would have disgusted Lincoln.

That is the setting in which the "Monroe Doctrine" was adopted, at the instigation of a menacing Great Britain, at the point of the United States' greatest strategic vulnerability since 1789. It was at a point when Britain had almost conquered the world by the Treaty of Vienna and the banking arrangements involved. The United States could no longer maneuver between Britain and France, and had no strategic alternatives of that sort present or in immediate view. Adams' view of the dismal affair of the "Monroe Doctrine" properly reminds one of Lenin's insistence that the

Soviet republic would have to capitulate to the Germans' Brest-Litovsk peace terms — giving Germany virtually everything but Great Russia — stipulated under the hideous "Parvus Plan." Who would then say that Lenin proposed to make the "Parvus Plan" a Soviet foreign policy convention? The legal standing of the 1823 "Monroe Doctrine" has the same sort of disqualification.

Now, return our attention to Lippmann's complaint about the lack of a consistent U.S. foreign policy during the 1898-1943 period. As we have already indicated, the truth of the matter, directly contrary to Lippmann, is not that the U.S. lacked a foreign policy, but that it was divided by what were ultimately irreconcilable differences over foreign policy. Nor was this merely a foreign policy matter; the differences concerning foreign policy were inseparable from equally irreconcilable differences concerning domestic policy. Although the form had been much distorted by post-1877 developments, the root of the conflict on both domestic and foreign policies was rooted in the same differences which separated Americans and Tories during the American Revolution. It was a difference between a republican policy of industrial and agricultural expansion in terms of technological progress, and a monetarist policy centering around an Anglo-American (Atlanticist) pole of New York City-centered financial interest.

To those who know Lippmann's career in some principal detail, his effort to skid quietly through the role of the elder Senator Henry Cabot Lodge — Wilson's opponent — and the Republican administrations of the 1921-1933 period, evokes a sense of contemptuous amusement at the pettiness of Lippmann on this account.

In 1914, left-liberal, quasi-socialist young Walter Lippmann made a pilgrimage to the great Fabian centers in England. There, screened, indoctrinated, and patted on the head by such old imperialist hands as Sidney Webb and George Bernard Shaw, the duly-processed Lippmann was made acquainted with the innards of the corridors of power, and became in the course of that a celebrated writer for the *New Republic* — which, in those days, was the "posh" association for up-and-coming Fabian *Wunderkinder* of the political intelligence establishment. His status skyrocketed under the Wilson administration. He became a policy-leak and confidant of the great and powerful, revelling in the thieves' and swindlers' orgy that was the Versailles Treaty proceedings. Abruptly, as Wilson broke down in face of defeat, Lippmann, the Fabian *Wunderkind*, abruptly found himself almost an "outsider" to the innards of national political power.

Senator Lodge, in large part the cause of Lippmann's temporary descent in status, is best under-



President Woodrow Wilson, right, with Colonel House.

stood as a consciously Hamiltonian sort of early twentieth century Federalist. Beyond that, what he may or may not have been becomes less important to our present inquiry, except to emphasize that the Whig strain in the pre-1933 Republican Party had a sensibility of those things which violated the interests of the United States as an industrial nation, but lacked a positive, contrary policy to counterpose effectively to the evils they were resisting. Their party organiza-

tion and to a large degree their systematic world outlook was by then deeply tainted with the monetarist corruption of U.S. capitalist thinking. Increasingly, the Whig current maintained a social base among smaller industrialist interests and among a popular constituency of farmers, trade unionists, and black voters. In the financial-political realities of that time, the Whig "patricians" of the Republican Party were caught up in scenarios featuring brawls among the

major financier factions, domestically and internationally.

From approximately 1877 onwards, and especially after 1892-98, the Whig tendency in U.S. outlook and policy did express itself, but not as a major independent political force in its own right. Insofar as industrial development represented an interest which was reflected within the finance capital with which it was associated, that Whig potentiality expressed itself in a deformed way as a vector within various monetarist factions.

This was most sharply expressed in foreign policy in the "Open Door" policy. By the end of the century, it had become the established special feature of the U.S. that our industries could out-produce the old world *quicker, more, better, and cheaper*. The U.S. industrialist and his financier were thus impelled to regard the flag-colony and other colonial institutions of the European powers — and the backward political-economic institutions of the colonial and semi-colonial potential markets themselves, as intolerable, even insufferable obstacles to U.S. national interests. At the same time that U.S. interests dictated a desire for independence of the colonies and semi-colonies, it also required that these markets enjoy stable governments, whose modest governmental credit and similar advantages ensured a solvent purchaser at that end of transactions with the U.S.

To the extent that policy was expressed, it had the following notable implications. The Whig policy, of encouraging stable, republican forms of government in colonial and semi-colonial regions, was expressed not as the consciously humanist political policy of the Federalists and so forth, but as an agreement between republican institutions and the national interests of U.S. trade and investment. In this form, even the "Open Door" and related U.S. challenges to Britain and British policy were a deformed expression of U.S. revolutionary (capitalist-republican) tradition springing from the source of U.S. industrial progress. Its contradiction was that, in its opposition to Rothschilds, Credit Lyonnais, and so forth, American policy was anti-monetarist in respect to its opponents, while already itself expressed in an increasingly monetarist form.

The turning-point was Versailles. The Versailles Treaty's German war-reparations provision was the crucial problem. Either Germany was encouraged to resume industrial development, therefore requiring levels of wages, working conditions, social services, and investment capital adequate to that purpose, or the proposed and adopted war reparations would loot Germany of the variable and constant capital of even its existing, stalled labor force and industry. The former policy, which meant a general capitalist

recovery of the classical type, would have required the U.S. to write off, in one guise or another, portions of the debts of Britain, France, and other allied countries. The choice was either to prop up the Wall Street financiers through the leverage of Germany's impossible war reparations, or to have an economic recovery. *Versailles chose in favor of Rockefeller, et al.* The Allies at Versailles chose in favor of an early general economic collapse, a collapse which the Dawes Plan postponed, but could not prevent.

So, the United States slammed down all but the smallest gates of Ellis Island, instituted such atrocities as the "Palmer Raids," and, after a brief postwar depression, settled in for a period of the 1920s growing dionysiac frenzies.

Objectively, from the Whig standpoint, there were good reasons to go to the point of war with Great Britain during the early 1920s. Bust up the colonial system, rid the world economy of the poison of sterling indebtedness, create elbowroom and a significant further purging of the sick monetary system, scrap the German war reparations, and get a dollar system moving in a way to salvage as much as was viable to provide the basis for significant further industrial expansion.

Friction between the U.S. and Britain on the Soviet issue, which the 1943 Lippmann exaggerates and distorts in behalf of the tentative form of agreement with Stalin being considered *prior to* the successful Los Alamos testing of "The Bomb," intersected such impulses within U.S. policy. From the U.S. standpoint, it was one thing to bust up the Bolshevik Revolution and that sort of thing; it was quite a different matter to turn the real estate over to Britain just at the time that the U.S. was attempting to reduce Britain's status definitively to that of a junior partner — if there was to be a partnership at all. As soon as it became clear that the Soviet republic was a going concern, the same impulses which evoked the Rapallo perspective among German industrialists were experienced in a milder way in the USA.

Broadly, the United States of the 1920s wished to return to the pre-1917 period's industrial-boom times. The industrialists and the population generally hungered for technological progress. Versailles was a failure, and everyone either knew it or sensed it. Europe was dying economically. Wilson had been a fool who had shamed the United States before the world with his sententious hypocritical babblings.

The disgust with the babbling Wilson and Colonel House's schemings was complementary to the shameless fascist enthusiasms of John Dewey and the broadly corporatist utopianism trickling out from the Fabian liberals of the *New Republic* and Progressive Party. The Whigs and many others didn't like it, and

said so by voting Republican — out of hatred for “Wilsonism” and Fabianism, without having much clear idea of what to do but to try to stop things from drifting into the weird condition the Fabians and others were proposing. We knew what we weren’t going to be pulled into — at least on a few salient points, but we had no positive idea of what to do effectively about the downward slide away from the Constitution and the Idea of Progress. (3)

The significance of the 1920s U.S. foreign policy and domestic policy is that it constituted a grudging retreat in face of an encroaching foreign and domestic policy which was in fact both fascist in impulse and treasonous in content. The uncertainties and lack of consistency in foreign policy aims during that period

is not that the U.S. lacked a policy, but that it had two wrong foreign policies in constant contention. The first, the vestiges of a self-interested Federalist-Whig-Republican policy, had been made ineffective except as a rallying-ground for resistance against a Fabian-corporatist monetarist policy that was thoroughly evil.

The breakdown of the monetary order during 1929-1931, and the immediate economic sequelae of that monetary failure broke the will of America to continue to resist the *fascist impulse*. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, beginning in 1933, attempted to exploit the shock-effects of the social crisis to attempt to introduce *consciously fascist policies*, and obtained instead a compromise, a thinly disguised corporatism politely termed the “New Deal.”

3. The indicated crisis among the anti-Wilson Whigs and their allies is exemplified by the shocking toleration of the “pre-revisionist” overthrow of the U.S. Constitution by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. Whereas the founding fathers conceived of “sovereignty” as a positive instrument of a humanist policy of capitalist development, Holmes’ so-called “force” doctrine degrades the instrument into a self-evident principle of sovereignty-in-itself. (The Holmes-Laski correspondence is illuminating on this in more ways than the letters taken by themselves explicitly state.) Thus, Holmes laid the transitional basis for the rampant revisionist corruption undertaken beginning with the Roosevelt administration. Holmes, in the nominalist spirit of Dewey’s vile *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, denies the existence of universals, and in a way which repudiates and thus sets forth to subvert the active principles embedded in the U.S. Constitution. Hence, similarly, the notion of *mens rea* was essentially incomprehensible to Holmes. Referring to Christopher White’s account of *Colbertism* and its humanist roots, in *The Political Economy of the American Revolution*, the case is made in fact and in respect of the intent and content of the Constitution for a flat rejection of not only the revisionist amorality now sweeping the U.S. Department of Justice and federal courts, but also for Holmes’ doctrines and their derivations. The founding fathers were anti-monetarist humanists, committed to *perfection* through the means of the general education and practice of an energetic advancement of productive technologies, and defining the need for a practical universality, the centralized state, as the common instrument indispensable to the enabling of such progress.

The individual is obliged to contribute in practice and through the self-development of his capacities for practice, to the advancement of the society in behalf of its citizens and the posterity. The society, in turn, is obliged by its self-interest to foster and protect such forms of self-development and practice. The right of the state to exist and be preserved is not axiomatic, but flows from the need for the state to fulfill a defined function, and the obligation of the individual to protect that function *efficiently* to the extent of defining the self-interests of such a state as his own self-interests.

The founding fathers believed in the existence of a *natural law*, and a human community, which natural law was man’s right and obligation to perfect his human existence. The state, the particular society within humanity, has the rights of sovereignty insofar as it is the instrument of that natural law. The state, to sacrifice the distinctions for the sake of the summary argument, is the instrument of the society. The distinction between the democratic state — which the founding fathers rightly rejected on the combined basis of historical knowledge and corroborating experience — and the republic, is that the democratic state confuses the immediate majority of a population with the ongoing existence of that population. Hence, Federalist Tom Paine, among others, rightly and vigorously rejected a democracy as being as potentially evil as a monarchy, as tending to the same errors. The republic is constituted to force reflection on *the whole interest* of

the current society and its posterity, to ensure that whole interest against the whims of an episodic majority. The selection of President, of Congress, and Federal Courts was to ensure that the true interest of the whole society and its posterity was enforced, not by any arbitrary standard, *but according to the standard of the humanist Idea of Progress*.

The proper heart of U.S. constitutional law is *truth*. By enforcing a standard of reflective search for truth in the highest institutions of Federal republican government, the decisions reached in smaller matters are supplied a yardstick and method by which their approximate agreeableness to truth is imposed. The sovereignty of a humanist republic is not a mere thing, an entity, but a process; it is the integrity of that process which is the only rightful location of the rights of sovereignty in its momentary aspect as a thing.

The active bearing of the Holmes “force” perversion upon the incapacities of the 1920s Whigs is that, although at each moment those things to be defended have the momentary appearance of something which is or should be a norm for corresponding, indicated practice, these norms are not permanent, self-evident existences. To fail to comprehend that is to fall back into feudal-aristotelianizing or the relatively bestial monotony of a more primitive or degenerated form of society. The distinction of living processes from their corresponding, non-living chemical imitations, is that the living process is essentially characterized by negentropy. This is expressed in the extreme by the creative capabilities of human thought, the fundamental distinction between man and the lower beasts. Human thought, like any lawful negentropic continuum, is causally rigorous respecting the chain leading from the act, through ripples radiating from the act into ultimately universal consequences. However, just because the cumulative effect of successful positive innovation is to change the geometry of efficient relations, the sets of rules of relationship which are properly determining for one epoch of development are different from those of the receding and succeeding epochs. However, the causal lawfulness joining those successive epochs through human practice is coherent throughout. Such lawfulness is properly expressed not in terms of its specific form in any epochal state, but in respect of its determination of the successive ordering of epochs.

Hence, the proper simplicity of the U.S. Constitution. Prudent compromises reflected in the composition passed by, the Constitution defines essentially the Federal State as the sovereign instrument for realizing the principle of the Idea of Progress. Taken in that essence, the Constitution and subsumed development of U.S. law has a fundamental and correct distinction of principle from the notion of a body of common law, from Roman law, and is in absolute opposition to principles of feudal law.

The Whigs’ insensibility of the fact that Holmes, in particular, was tearing the Constitution to shreds, reflected their insensibility of the nature of the practical interest of the nation which was thus and otherwise being placed in peril.

Wilson, Roosevelt, Kennedy, Carter and War

There is a crucial feature of the twentieth century history of the Democratic and Republican parties which must be considered in analyzing the present century's foreign-policy problems. Since the Spanish-American War, it has been the Democratic Party White House which — rightly or wrongly — has sent the nation to war. Wilson got us into World War I and laid the broad preconditions for World War II. Franklin Roosevelt's administration's policies created the immediate conditions under which we were impelled into war against Japan and Germany, and then gained acclaim for fighting the war imposed upon us. A Rockefeller-influenced State Department under Truman set up the Korean War. A Kennedy administration unleashed a wave of horrors — the Congo adventure, the Bay of Pigs, the 1962 missile crisis, the Berlin affair, attempted and actual assassinations of nominal adversaries and allies alike, Vietnam, and had Kennedy lived, a continuing, escalating wave of confrontations leading into a 1957 Kissinger "brinkmanship" doctrine plunge toward World War III.

Going back into the nineteenth century, although Lincoln led the nation in the Civil War, it was the treason of the Rothschild protégé, the Buchanan White House, capping the actions of a series of Democratic Party administrations beginning with Andrew Jackson, which created the Confederacy and the associated British effort to destroy this nation.

The role of Rockefeller protégés — Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, Dean Rusk, Henry Kissinger, and others — in the U.S. State Department, and Rockefeller protégés — Allen Dulles, McGeorge Bundy, and others — in directing the evolution and policies of the intelligence establishment — is most relevant to the problem. The Rockefellers' role in creating the Kennedy administration with the aid of election fraud and in creating the Carter Administration by means of a monstrous election fraud, combined with relevant blackmail threatened against an incumbent President

— sheds most essential light on the connection between the Democratic Party White House and wars.

Globally, in the history of modern European culture going back into the Renaissance period, it has been the vigorous pursuit of a policy-aim governed by what we today describe as a monetarist policy, which has been the predominant cause for nearly every period of warfare and major war in modern history. Nationally, it is the fact that since Andrew Jackson, the so-called "liberal" faction of the national Democratic Party has been the Tory instrument of a purely monetarist policy, which is key to the correlation between that Party in the White House and getting our nation into wars.

It is that connection and the way in which monetarist and pro-industrialist factions and tendencies have conflicted and compromised during this century (most notably), which is key to proving and understanding the lawfulness of that correlation.

Genuine economic development is in the most fundamental self-interest of every nation. Moreover, the genuine economic development of every other nation is in the fundamental interest of each nation and the human race as a whole. Consequently, to the extent that the U.S. or any other dominant power pursues a combined, mutually consistent domestic and foreign policy of global genuine economic development, of technologically vectored expansion of industry and agriculture, in the tradition of Benjamin Franklin and the Federalists, that power's policy is coordinate with the underlying fundamental interests of the people of every other nation, and is thus the basis; and the most effective policy for global peace.

The included problematic feature which cannot be solved by that policy alone is the fact that governments and the actual interests of the governed nations do not necessarily coincide. The difficulty, in the lesser part, is that the wrong perception of national interests by some governments is predominantly a matter of ignorance and delusions. In such cases the

optimal course for avoiding war is to adopt the maximum restraint tolerable in the course of the effort to bring the opinion of erring governments and popular opinion into conformity with reason. In the most important part, the faction which governs a nation is not susceptible of the ordinary means of influence of reason, because the government faction represents a special self-interest fundamentally antagonistic to the fundamental economic interests of its own nation as a whole. *Such governments represent an obstacle which must be removed in the general world interest. In such cases the proper foreign policy of the United States toward such a government is emphatically "Clausewitzian."*

When such obstacles are in the form of the governing faction of a relatively weak power, an aggressive world climate of industrial and agricultural technological progress sets into motion the processes under which the obstacle may be removed efficiently *by force if necessary*. The use of military force may be avoided in such cases if the opponent can be induced to bend to the economic and related forces, be induced to adapt to a pro-development orientation, and so evolve a modified nature and perception of self-interests consistent with both global interests and real national interests.

Such obstacles, such potential adversaries are those factional interests which represent the special interests of either pre-capitalist institutions, or an anti-industrial monetarist impulse. In the case that such a reactionary or monetarist force represents a major power — such as the eighteenth and nineteenth century English monarchy, or Czarist Russia — only internal political transformation or war, or revolutions fostered by the circumstances of war, will ordinarily suffice.

The twentieth century governments of the United States have not, *as a whole*, corresponded to either category. The impulse for national and global technological progress, the heritage of our American Revolution and Constitution, has been centered as an impulse in the industrial-capitalist interests and in traditionalist trade-union forces, with support from those *technologically progressive* agricultural strata oriented to the role of U.S. agricultural exports in the world market. These echoes of our Federalist foundations are pitted against a Tory monetarist force gathered presently around the Rockefeller faction, and supported by that faction's popular base among the liberal and so-called left-radical strata associated with both the Republican and, most emphatically, the liberal wing of the Democratic Party.

The so-called conservatives in both major parties — excepting Rockefeller's own Buckley and Larry McDonald varieties — predominantly represent the

pro-development, or American tradition and *tendency for* perception of self-interests. These conservative industrialist, trade-union, and agricultural strata may be seized by a badly misdirected perception of national interests on many issues, but under appropriate circumstances they are susceptible of correcting such errors through the force of reason. The Tory faction — the Rockefeller-linked liberals of both parties and their lunatic-radical fringes inside and outside the parties — represent a monetarist interest which is not susceptible of the influence of reason.

The further complication is that the *nominal* holdings of the pro-development *capitalist* forces are dependently interlinked in many short-term aspects with the national and international monetary institutions controlled by the Rockefellers and their allies. For this reason, the pro-development capitalist currents are delimited in the scope of their opposition to the Rockefeller-led forces. Their pro-development impulse is usually expressed as resistance to the most outrageous pro-monetarist innovations, especially in domestic policies. This resistance has the character of attempted Whig reforms within the ruling monetarist order, rather than an effort to overturn the monetarist order in favor of American Federalist principles. To the extent that these capitalist strata are imprisoned in fact and in perception by these circumstances, they are reluctantly induced to tolerate and support the monetarist institutions' interests as a matter of defending their own perceived nominal wealth.

Such complications taken into account, the conservative current of the Republican Party tends to represent the bastion and rallying-point for a pro-development interest in both domestic and foreign policy — heretofore, emphatically in respect of domestic policy. To the extent that such conservative Republican policy-thrusts are allied with major sections of the trade-union and related social forces, that actual or de facto alliance provides the basis for a coalition with conservative Democratic Party forces on such issues. That tendency within U.S. political life has been the principal tendency for effective restraint operating against the Tory forces.

Nonetheless, because the capitalist constituent of such pro-development alliances has located its interests otherwise within the terms of the monetarist national and international institutions and policies, the conservative wings of the Republican and Democratic parties have heretofore regarded themselves as compelled, however reluctantly at times, to serve monetarist interests domestically and abroad.

That is the content of what has been euphemistically defined as a "bi-partisan foreign policy." The idea that our nation ought to have a clear domestic majority for the crucial features of its foreign policy

— by itself a commendable aspiration — has been perverted by the Tories into threatening their opponents with charges of at least obstructionist and even potentially treasonous conduct, should they refuse to support those policies which have been often in fact directly contrary to genuine U.S. national interests. One is reminded of the commonly heard, fraudulent argument: an individual, unable to maintain rational defense for the policy he is demanding, accuses his critic: “If you would only stop disagreeing with me, we could both get something done.”

The content of this wretched “bi-partisan foreign policy” doctrine has been that the conservative Congressional opposition is thus deemed obliged to rally behind a Tory White House, or a Republican Presidency is deemed obliged to stay within the constraints of the liberal, Tory faction of the Congress. It also has come to mean that a Republican President may reflect conservative interests on condition that Rockefeller creatures not only occupy such crucial Cabinet offices as Justice, State, and Treasury, maintain a Rockefeller-controlled National Security Council nest within the White House itself, but also consent to the flagrantly unconstitutional practice of according Rockefeller-controlled Executive agencies de facto “Fourth Branch of Government” autonomy with respect to the Presidency itself.

Accordingly, since the Republican and Democratic parties’ pro-development, anti-Tory base comes more immediately into conflict with the atrocities of monetarist policies at home, it has been in domestic policy, through predominantly rearguard opposition to liberal swindles, that the actual interests of the nation have been relatively best defended. Otherwise, although these conservatives oppose the most obvious sorts of liberal swindles in such matters of foreign policy as agricultural exports and obvious efforts to loot the U.S. Treasury to lower Manhattan’s advantage, the conservatives tend otherwise to submit to the most basic aspects of established monetarists’ policies in foreign affairs.

Because of the pro-development thrust of Republican and Democratic conservatives centered within the Republican Party, that party does not function as an efficient *initiator* of the wildest of the monetarists’ innovations and adventures either at home or abroad. Consequently, when the Rockefeller and allied forces, or their predecessors, wished to launch a new sort of major swindle in foreign policy, or launch a series of wild adventures to that effect, the corresponding Wall Street forces concentrated their financial, political, press and related muscle to bring a liberal Democrat into the White House, and attempted to push through correlated adjustments of the

correlations of factional forces in the Congress and federal courts.

Hence, the lawful correlation between a liberal Democrat in the White House and U.S. tendencies for involvement in wars.

The broadest irony of this pattern over, especially, the present century, is that not only does the Tory foreign policy represent a direct violation of the intent of the Constitution and the nation’s most vital interests, but the combination of industrialists, trade-union, farmer and other pro-development currents represents a combination which has always represented the overwhelming majority of the electorate and of mobilizable political forces. This properly directs attention to the historical fact that *the Tory faction’s power has been based upon breaking-up actual and potential alliances between pro-development industrialist and labor-movement forces.*

The central feature of that dividing of pro-development political forces is the role of *primitive accumulation* in driving the industrialists and the labor movement into embittered opposition to one another.

Insofar as this problem is located in inadequate general consciousness of its nature, Karl Marx himself has been partially to blame. Not because Marx proposed the mistaken perceptions which have governed the powerful ideological influence exerted cumulatively by the (admittedly, usually tiny) socialist forces within the labor movement, but because Marx’s notable errors gave tacit consent to policies and influences otherwise directly contrary to his most fundamental strategic-political conceptions.

Out of respect for the usefulness of the concept at issue, we are obliged to correct Marx himself unequivocally on the point at issue.

Although Marx did not go so far as his self-designated epigones usually allege him to have done on this point, Marx did commit the historical blunder of fact in viewing the early nineteenth century English economy as an *approximate, clinical model of critical reference* for adducing lawful principles of capitalist development. This error reflects the fact, pervasively demonstrated throughout Marx’s writings, that he was largely ignorant of the twelfth through seventeenth centuries’ history of the process by which capitalism in fact emerged from the development of Renaissance humanism. For those reasons of ignorance, he credulously accepted the absolutely wrong and misleading view that, at least for purposes of acceptable approximation, the emergence of capitalist development could be traced empirically in terms of beginnings in Holland and England during the last half of the seventeenth century.

Marx would have been compelled to discard such

poisonous misassumptions had he been informed of the principal features and issues of the American Revolution. Although he was appreciative of the early-nineteenth century Whig economist Carey, his general view of the U.S. was limited to both the Civil War period, and the preceding decades during which U.S. foreign and domestic policies were usually and predominantly controlled by British agents controlling the Democratic Party.

For such reasons, Marx's portrait of the thrust of industrial-capitalist impulses is entirely mistaken. He replicates the tendency for *post hoc ergo propter hoc* rationalization of the succession of apparent development which Hegel earlier committed in respect to regarding slave-based economy as a necessary phase in the succession of human social evolution. Although Marx rightly deprecated Hegel for that methodological blunder, he in fact committed an analogous historiographical blunder himself. He did not recognize the fact of the American Revolution: that the dominant forms of the Dutch and English monetarist-ruled economy of Europe were already in their time reactionary forms representing the consequences of the counterrevolutionary victory of an anti-capitalist impulse over the capitalist transformations most centrally focussed in the English Tudors and Colbertian France. By remaining unsensible of such crucial historical facts, Marx tends to draw a smoothed curve of the upward process of capitalist development through a series of points which in themselves represent a grave fallacy of composition.

Although Marx was correct in respect to all his critics and competitors concerning the *systematic* principles of capitalist production, circulation and capital-in-general, he fell into fallacies of composition in respect of those matters which had to be understood in terms of the actual historical process of capitalist development.

For example, if Marx had been informed of the political-economic history of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, or of the actual implications of the fall of the English Commonwealth and Colbert, and had also been confronted with the principal facts of the American Revolution, he would have criticized the despicable Adam Smith from an entirely different standpoint than one reads in Marx's *Theories of Surplus Value*, and would have understood David Ricardo much less naively than *Capital* as a whole reflects.

The immediately relevant point demanding such parenthetical observation is that the characteristics of the early nineteenth century British developments were determined *from the top* by the massive debt

which the Barings, Rothschilds and others held over both England and continental Europe, and by the coordinate monetarist character of the English monarchy. For this reason, the economic relations and related social features of English development (in particular) during the Napoleonic wars and following the Treaty of Vienna were not determined by any oppressive burdens of industrial capitalist development as such, but by the monstrous tax of debt service created outside the internal mechanisms of industrial growth.

This correlated directly with every characteristic feature of continental Europe.

Although France of 1789 included a kernel of gifted thinkers in the tradition of the sixteenth century *politiques* and Colbert, those able republicans were blocked with the complicity of British agents such as Danton and Marat, from affording revolutionary France the kind of sound economic and related republican policies which would have made the French Revolution a success on the lines of the existing model of the American Revolution's experience.

This insight is aided by an honest representation of the relationship and included difficulties of *Federalist* Tom Paine within the French Revolution. Through the political backwardness of France — relative to the higher cultural level of the American workingmen and farmers of 1776, the illiteracy of the sansculottes and the cultural enfeeblement of the French peasantry — the related repetition of the worst blunders of the English Commonwealth to the most extreme degree and the factional victory of a blundering attempt at inappropriate Jacobin democracy effected the consequent emergence of dictatorship. The Napoleonic France which emerged from the chaos fomented by British agents and incompetent revolutionary policies was a mixture of capitalist republican thrusts for technological development — Colbertism, and so forth — combined with a tendency for the same errors which had defeated the English Commonwealth and had caused Louis XIV's undoing of the Colbert effort.

France's foreign policy under Napoleon, rather than fostering independent capitalist republics, rather than destroying bucolic obscenities — such as the Hapsburgs — and outlawing monarchy and aristocracy, created the means for its own destruction in the form of an effectively monetarist foreign policy, and an insane realpolitiking approach to alliances with these bucolic obscenities which had to be destroyed if France's self-interests were to prevail against British monetarist policies.

In consequence, the Hanoverian obscenity and the City of London prevailed over the European continent, turning the political clock of history backwards in the

form of the British “agent of influence,” the Holy Alliance. As we have noted above, this control of continental Europe included not only the political and related military “checks and balances” of the “concert of Europe,” but those means, which could not otherwise have succeeded as long as they did, were regulated by the system of debts which the City of London imposed upon post-1815 Europe, and the manipulation of the debt-strapped regimes of Europe through, principally, Rothschild control of the availability of credit in respect to the various enterprises of political and economic policy.

It was these conditions which produced the specific pattern of primitive accumulation in Great Britain and on the continent during the early nineteenth century.

The potato crises of the 1840s in Ireland and Germany are a direct reflection of that monetarist-dictated policy, and had nothing to do with industrial-capitalist development as such. The British monetarists’ primitive accumulation policy for Ireland, the germ-model for the “deindustrialization” and related policies of Rockefeller’s Carter Administration today, involved stripping Ireland of its relatively higher-technology form of agricultural production through substituting the intensive use of the potato. The same policy was introduced into parts of Germany. Through the potato monoculture practice in Ireland, and similar effects in Germany, the natural results developed. The attempt to use a “natural,” “lower energy” mode of cheaper nutrition of the population through the degradation of much of the population to “potato-eaters,” had inevitable effects upon the soil and also created the forcing-conditions under which the potato disease exploded — as the Rothschilds’ fostering of the slave-plantation methods of “low energy” cotton production produced the boll weevil plague and the destruction of the preconditions for successful agriculture in those regions of the U.S. southern states. Hence, the monstrous genocide among the Irish population of the 1840s and correlated, if relatively more buffered conditions in Germany.

The potato crisis symptomizes the entire spectrum of the effects of the British monetarists’ *consciously Malthusian* economic and social policy of the nineteenth century.

This set of primitive-accumulation correlatives was not in any respect an expression of industrial-capitalist development.

Capitalist development originated in Tudor England, was on the verge of being consciously introduced to sixteenth century France, was attempted under Colbert in seventeenth century France, and was

developed by the followers and collaborators of Benjamin Franklin in the course of the American Revolution. This development of capitalism was a *consciously humanist conception*. (Humanism has nothing to do with, but is absolutely the enemy of the *bestialist* policies professed in the misappropriated name of “humanism” by the pragmatist wretches of the Humanist Society and the Ethical Union.) From the outset, capitalist development was *consciously anti-primitive-accumulation*. This policy was not an accidentally positive feature of the Tudor initiation of capitalist development, but reflected their appropriate, if preliminary, insight into the fundamental laws and self-interests of national economies. The persistence of primitive accumulation practices in modern history has consistently originated with anti-industrial-capitalist interests.

Gresham and others recognized immediately and absolutely that the advancement of the material conditions of life and the aggressive technological education of the labor force as a whole was an indispensable precondition both for capitalist development and for the sustained augmentation of real national wealth. The same thrust predominated among the Franklin-instigated Federalist movement in the USA. The notion of augmenting capitalist incomes at the expense of the necessary material and cultural conditions of life of the labor force is as alien to industrial-capitalist *self-interest as a whole* as smashing the machinery of production in order thereby to augment the annual profits of corporations from the sale of the resulting scrap.

It was as the monetarist factions gained power, first in Holland, then, especially after 1688, in England, and then first in 1828 and, again, most notably after 1877 in the United States, that the policy of squeezing of the industrial capitalists by monetarist debt policies produced not only exacerbated looting of primary resources, but, worse, the squeezing of additional margins of capitalist income from the necessary material and cultural conditions of life of the labor force.

To put the issue of primitive accumulation against primary resources out of the way, the following should be noted before resuming concentration on the problem of the industrial-labor political alliance.

As we have repeatedly developed this crucial point in numerous published locations, including the author’s textbook on political economy, (4) primary resources are not a permanently preordained set of

4. Lyn Marcus (a.k.a. Lyndon H. LaRouche), *Dialectical Economics* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co., 1975), pp. 133-5, 144-5, 186 ff., *passim*.

forms of “natural wealth.” Primary resources as such are always defined by the technology of production of a culture for a relatively limited span of its development. In each case, any specific primary resource so defined is necessarily relatively finite in respect of the effective social cost of its procurement. This relative finiteness may or may not be expressed as the phenomenon of relative depletion of such a resource as development proceeds. In any case, the problem is solved by technological progress to modes of production which are thermodynamically negentropic relative to preceding modes. It is by increasing the negentropy of the mode of production, that the increased energy thus applied to production and consumption per capita constantly enlarges the total primary resources available, while qualitatively and quantitatively redefining the spectrum of primary resources as a whole.

For example, again, Tudor England. The most serious obstacle to crawling out of the conditions of the England of the fifteenth century was that England had to supersede a de facto policy of “solar energy” and “biomass” as its energy policy. To solve this, the Tudors introduced the large scale use of a new energy source, fossil fuel — coal, thus avoiding the catastrophes which must have resulted from continuation of a medieval culture’s reliance upon “solar” and “biomass” (wood and charcoal) energy policies.

Similarly, in contrast to the efforts of the Rockefellers and their neo-Fabian henchmen, the Tudors initiated the efforts to develop the steam engine — freeing basic economy from dependence upon such outdated contrivances as windmills.

To return to the main focus of our concern here, although the precise measurement of the “equilibrium-value” separating primitive accumulation from redistribution of proper profit as wages, is presently beyond the means of existing institutions in practice, the maintenance of household income, social services, leisure (e.g., education) at levels consonant with the developing of a labor force suited to *tomorrow’s more-advanced technology* effects a corresponding tendency for “social equilibration” in the relations between industrial capital and labor. That was the gist of the approach to this problem by Gresham et al., and the thrust of policy of Franklin’s collaborators. Such an incomes policy does not preclude strikes and so forth. It does provide the circumstances of perceived respective self-interests and corresponding practices in which the settlement of strikes and other industrialist-labor negotiations become the “molecular process” of arriving at the properly adjusted trends in wages, working conditions and social services.

Otherwise, when the element of primitive accumulation is introduced to industrialist-labor relations, through a massive debt burden directly and indirectly imposed upon industries, agriculture and government agencies, the conflict between industrialists and labor must tend to become a profound political crisis.

That point is key to the Roosevelt administration.

The Roosevelt administration became a possibility through a process of monetary decay in the internal U.S. economy over the period 1925-1932. The effects of that monetary decay were transmitted through debt overhangs, as a primitive-accumulation policy imposed upon industrialists, to exacerbating of management-labor relations, unemployment, and associated matters. In consequence, the Republican Party, which had maintained the White House during the 1920-1928 period through support of black voters and large portions of the labor movement, lost its traditional labor-black social base to the Democratic Party during 1932-1936.

Roosevelt, by using corporatist methods — e.g., the NRA — and by emulating the Hitler regime’s *Arbeitsdienst* in forms such as the WPA, CCC, and so forth, took credit for the autocannibalistic process of modest recovery of 1933-1937, and called the whole unwholesome mass the “New Deal.”

It is a wretched delusion to imagine that Roosevelt’s policies in any significant way contributed to an economic recovery during the middle of the 1930s. Once the process of liquidating some of the weakest financial paper and other bankrupt property titles had been effected by approximately 1933, and especially beginning 1934, the shattered economy made an automatic upturn in levels of *numerical* employment. The marginal source of the wealth for this semi-recovery was the looting of stored-up real value carried forward from the pre-1929 period. Physical plant and inventories were run down, and, as in Nazi Germany, levels of wages and working conditions were pushed substantially below those of the earlier period. Both the productive capacities of industries and the potential productivity of the labor force were savagely depleted during the 1931-1939 period. This was demonstrated by the mass of complaints in reports on the war mobilization begun in late 1939 and during 1940. The production potential of plant and labor was far below the levels of 1929. This decline represented a looting of industry and labor force, of operating 1929-1939 plant and labor force overall at levels of maintenance below that needed to maintain them at pre-existing levels of productive potential. It was that margin of looting of the pre-1929 build-up of productive forces which provided the thin margins of *primitive-accumulation profits* on which the de-

pressed U.S. economy stumbled miserably through the economic autocannibalization of the 1933-1939 period.

The Roosevelt administration's corporatist policies of primitive accumulation intensified the bitterness between labor and industry, an industry popularly identified with Morgan and the Republican Party. Roosevelt, chiefly with the aid of Fabian operative Sidney Hillman, kept the emerging organized labor movement within the Democratic Party. Organized labor — egged on beginning in 1936 by the Communist Party — supported Roosevelt's diluted fascist primitive-accumulation policies of government and finance, and viewed the results of their support of such policies as all the more reason to hate the Republicans. By and large, the Republicans fell into the same scenario-trap, as did the industrialists.

The political principles involved are by no means a peculiarity of the 1920-1940 period. The American Revolution was based upon an alliance forged by Franklin, Adams, Tom Paine and others, between pro-development capitalist forces and urban labor, dragging farmers along behind. The Lincoln government was based on an alliance among industrialists, urban labor, and the new farm strata emerging around the growing international role of U.S. grain production. The 1877-1886 conflicts — and the conditions preceding those eruptions — were the result of a massive debt-accumulation, which broke apart the Lincoln social base of the Federalist-Whig-Republican current.

The same principle underlay the coalition of political and social forces which characterized the period of the reign of Tudor Elizabeth I up through 1589.

Such political coalitions of capitalists and labor can exist and function effectively only under the condition that the industrialist alliance is based on a consciousness of the principles involved, and *when constituted as an anti-monetarist force*. The Tudor development of capitalism was based upon an alliance of English forces for a conscious policy of forced technological progress, against the well-defined monetarist enemy (Fugger-Hapsburg) and monetarist policies. The American Revolution was an alliance forged by Benjamin Franklin and his collaborators, an alliance of pro-development capitalist and urban labor forces against the Hanoverian monetarist enemy, and against the hated monetarist policies otherwise set forth in Adam Smith's despicable *Wealth of Nations*. The Lincoln administration was built upon a rearticulation of Federalist anti-monetarist policies, a Lincoln policy immediately incorporating the converging features of Henry Clay and Carey. *Whenever*

such a consciously anti-monetarist policy is lost or otherwise abandoned, the coalition must tend to disperse, and monetarism and monetarist policy easily insinuates itself and then prevails.

This principle is obviously not something we have just now uncovered. If more persons would seriously read Karl Marx's *Communist Manifesto*, and waste less energy professing to be frightened by its popular misrepresentation, they would discover that Marx proposed there the establishment of a German national capitalist republic. Indeed, the German capitalists' earlier choice of Karl Marx, over the alternate candidate, Friedrich List, to edit their *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, was not a reflection of any misunderstanding of one another's commitments. The *Communist Manifesto* not only proposes the establishment of a German national capitalist republic, but sets forth a conscious policy under which the German working class was to be mobilized *as an independent political force* as an indispensable agency to secure capitalist success. Marx's policy toward the United States during the 1850s and 1860s is identical in strategic principle to the policy of the *Communist Manifesto*. As leader of the International Workingmen's Association (IWMA), he performed a significant catalytic role in contributing toward the victory of the U.S. against the Rothschild-directed forces then attempting to destroy our nation. (5)

The viable independent political role of the labor movement develops, as Marx specified correctly in the *Communist Manifesto*, through the conscious struggle to realize the political and economic potentialities of capitalist development. That policy is correctly rooted in the fact that the form of extended reproduction proper to industrial capitalism and to socialism is identical in every respect but the heteronomic political form of capitalist ownership of the basic means of production and distribution.

As long as industrial capitalism fulfills its self-interested function of technologically advancing enlargement of the productive forces, with the private

5. Marx's role in connection with the U.S. Civil War was at least sufficiently effective that the injured Rothschilds — Lincoln's victory was their first major defeat in history — expended large sums and the coordinated efforts of their entire House, including their creation of the Bakuninist anarchist movement, in the effort to wreck the IWMA and place Marx himself under a virtually total containment, from which Marx personally virtually never escaped throughout the remainder of his life. As for Lincoln himself, they assassinated him. Once the truth is recognized concerning the German and Austrian social democratic leaderships of the nineteenth century, the true extent of the containment against Marx *funded* and most prominently coordinated by, first, the Rothschilds and then the Rothschild-spawned Fabian Society begins to be appreciated. Rockefeller practice of buying up and even sometimes creating "leftist" organizations in job-lot quantities is by no means a twentieth century innovation.

ownership feature included, a socialist transformation is unfeasible. *The socialist transformation properly occurs* either because the capitalists abort industrial capitalist development, or because the general progress of culture under capitalist development reaches the point that capitalist heteronomic forms are broadly regarded as obsolete and impediments to some specific and urgent task of further extended reproduction.

The question of whether a socialist transformation actually occurs at such appropriate junctures is a *subjective, political question*, a question of whether appropriately developed leading institutions of the political labor movement are qualified to undertake the successful continuation of those economic and related duties which the capitalists have, for one reason or another, abandoned. The fragmented working class as such could not conceivably assemble itself to competently direct a modern economy. Hence, socialism becomes a possibility only if the political labor movement develops the universalizing qualities of consciousness and culture needed to assume such a task. The school for such potentialities' development is the proper role of the political labor movement in allying politically with the industrial capitalists against monetarist and other abysmal political forces opposing technological progress and economic growth.

Meanwhile, pending the challenge of assuming sole responsibility for continued technological progress, the political labor movement best defends its own interests most fundamentally by allying with industrial capitalism against monetarism (e.g., against Keynesian, Schachtian, Friedmanite obscenities), and using its position as an ally of the industrial capitalists as the setting for preventing primitive-accumulation policies from developing.

Prevailing incompetent contrary opinion concerning this principle arises notably from such included causes as the predominance of lunatic socialism among even self-styled Marxian socialist organizations, and the teaching of lunatic socialism as Marxism in our university survey courses and texts in this connection. The anti-Marx socialists — the utopians, the anarchists, the anarchosyndicalists, and by-products of Fabianism generally — are epistemologically *bestialists*, who therefore deny the primary importance of economic growth, technological progress, and creative scientific knowledge in respect to both society and individual human qualities. Their standpoint is, like that of the authors of the Norman Domesday Book, to regard existing modes and scales of production as if admissibly or properly fixed, and to reduce everything to conflicts

over the shares of "goodies" in terms of the existing scale and mode of production of wealth. Therefore, the very existence of profit; as the necessary basis for expansion and technological progress, is at best a matter of indifference to them, as it was to the most feudal-minded among the French eighteenth century, anti-Colbertian Physiocrats. Accordingly, interpreting the world and economic processes in terms of the most reactionary among eighteenth century notions of ground rent, their "ground-rent" socialism is premised essentially and axiomatically upon the bestialists' presumption that the very existence of profit is the central issue of conflict between the capitalists and labor.

Out of that anti-humanist variety of lunatic or "ground-rent" socialism, for which anarchism is the purest lunacy, the "ground-rent" socialists variously propose, according to their degrees of "radicalness," the partial or total "redistribution" of profit for personal household income.

Marx's view and method are totally opposite to such "ground-rent" or "egalitarian" pseudo-socialism. Marx's view demands a maximization of the mass and rate of profit — not its elimination. However, Marx adds the stipulation that this profit, as capitalist income, must not be derived from *relative* surplus value (primitive accumulation), and that the profit produced must be predominantly invested to effect enlargement of the scale of production on a technologically more advanced level.

For such reasons, the Rothschilds, hating Karl Marx, created the anarchist movement of wild lunatics and terrorist bombers. For such reasons the same Rothschilds and their allies created the Fabian Society as the principal global political intelligence arm of the British Foreign Office. For such reasons, Rothschild protégé Cecil Rhodes bequeathed his estate to found a Rhodes scholarship program, with the included testamentary proviso that the purpose of the program was in part to subvert the United States. The Rothschilds may have been evil, but they were not therefore lacking in feral qualities of cleverness. They understood that their fundamental self-interest was to prevent the political labor movement from entering into a conscious, anti-monetarist alliance with industrial capitalists. It was not immediately because Marx was a socialist that the Rothschilds set out to destroy him and his influence; it was because Marx had launched an international campaign for political labor movement support of Abraham Lincoln's government. For the same reasons those monetarist forces hated Karl Marx, they have funded and otherwise aided and fostered lunatic socialist and terrorist organizations by the scores in every part of the world.

From the standpoint we have just developed, the nature of the conflicts and confusion in U.S. foreign policy during the 1900-1943 period — and later — can be competently appreciated. To regard the 1900-1943 period as in some sense merely a state of confusion, as Lippmann tends to do, is sweeping incompetence or outright historical fraud — or, as in Lippmann's case, a varying proportioning of both.

A brief survey of U.S. wars and related matters from 1898 to date pins down this point to the ultimate end we have in view in this paper as a whole — of defining an alternative foreign policy consistent with real U.S. national interests, to replace the bankrupt "American Century" or "Atlanticist" doctrine.

The War with Spain expressed two U.S. impulses. Although it did embark the United States upon an imperialist course of development, it also involved an element which was consistent with U.S. vital interests. Broadly, such contradictoriness is historically typical of most of post-1828 U.S. foreign and domestic policy, that a proper and a deplorable impulse are embedded in the same action.

It has been and is presently in the interest of the United States *that the development of viable republics* — whether capitalist or socialist — *replace colonial and semi-colonial vestiges*. To the same effect, the interests of the United States require the eradication of de facto semi-colonial forms of rule, as represented by a foreign nation's submission to determination of its domestic and foreign policies by foreign debt-holders, whether those debt-holders are the London and allied bankers of the Maximilian affair in Mexico, or U.S. citizens with places of business in lower Manhattan.

U.S. policy was originally and correctly based on that impulse. To the extent that our nation had the means to effect such a policy in practice, our national foreign policy was based on the principle of *viable and truly sovereign republics*, and most emphatically so respecting our hemispheric neighbors. Hence, John Quincy Adams' cited point. In former times, that meant capitalist republics; today it means either socialist or capitalist *republics*. From the standpoint of U.S. interests as a sovereign nation, our foreign policy is properly indifferent to the distinction between socialist and capitalist republics. Our national foreign policy interest respecting the *quality* of such foreign governments is our concern that such republics be *economically viable*, whether capitalist or socialist. Our exports are, to put the point of self-interest most narrowly, delimited by their growth. Our need for imports from such nations is similarly constrained. Otherwise, broadly, economically shaky governments are generally a menace to their own people and their neighbors.

In the War with Spain, unfortunately we did not leave matters at the point of fulfilling our national interests. We assimilated Puerto Rico — which was consistent with our own interests and that of the Puerto Rican people. We assimilated the Philippines, which need not have been contrary to our interests or that of the Filipinos, but we conducted the matter badly and not without third-party interference to make bad matters worse. *What we did that was evil and wrong was to bring the Spanish ex-colonies under a monetarist interest's imperialist policy.*

The best proof of that is our policy toward the principal Spanish colony involved which we did not formally assimilate, Cuba.

Let us glance for a moment at the background to Cuba's turn to the Soviet Union, after completing an earlier political revolution (sometimes called "the lawyer's revolution") under encouragement of high-level forces within the United States. Since this writer had an opportunity to gain a glance into the situation behind-the-scenes in Cuba during the 1956-1958 period, there are corresponding special advantages to considering that example of the problem under consideration.

Prior to Castro, as the current saying goes, U.S. policy for Cuba fit within the spectrum of standard Wilsonian twentieth-century U.S. policy for all smaller Caribbean countries. In the interest of some particular investment group — one used to speak of United Fruit and Grace — a gang of petty swindlers was elected to maintain the formalities of the local government. The government in fact was essentially an extension of the principle of the Pinkertons and similar corporate security agencies of the last half of the nineteenth century. This arrangement had the disturbing correlative that the government bureaucracy so ensconced would acquire the tendency to line its own private purse to the extent that this corruption, originally licensed on a relatively petty scale, became more than a substantial annoyance to the foreign investors. Between that intrinsic problem and fights among various financial interests in the same nation, from time to time a representative of the U.S. State Department would hold a discreet discussion of the problem of "appalling corruption" with the patriotic colonel of some regiment barracked proximate to the small country's national capital. Not too long after that discreet chat, the patriotic colonel would march on the capital, shoot or hang a few of the overturned government's exemplary thieves, exile the rest, and settle down to establish a new government, beginning the "yin-yang" cycle of Caribbean despotism all over again.

At least, that is the aspect of the "yin-yang" or "yo-yo" pattern of U.S. Caribbean policy which is

most pertinent to the problem of the Batista regime of the late 1950s. A half-million unemployed around Havana alone, a tourist trap, pimps on every street and in every taxicab, every imaginable vice, and a national economy going bankrupt while the Batista bureaucracy stole left and right. At a certain point in the endemic tumult these conditions engendered within Cuba, the Castro-led force, having "proven itself" chiefly on its own merits, was assimilated into the amalgam of organizations which represented U.S. policy for eliminating the Batista problem.

The difficulty was that once in power, Castro et al. proceeded toward delivering on the promises they had made in the course of campaigning for office. Then Castro did what any other sensible capitalist government would have done in such a fix — took over the sugar mills and demanded a scheduling of debt and debt-payments consistent with permitting Cuba's economic recovery from Batista's reign. Certain lower Manhattan interests howled, placing their nominal, short-term private interest above the national interest, and various forms of warfare were unleashed against Cuba. Under conditions of de facto economic blockade, Castro turned (the details of the process are secondary for present purposes) to the only source of aid adequate to defend his national economy against U.S. economic warfare.

Putting the matter thus, in terms which could not be competently disputed by any honest anti-Communist conservative in the U.S., what would you expect from such a U.S. foreign policy? The ABC of the principles we have outlined above operated, precisely as they operated in the case of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. When the industrial-capitalist forces fail to undertake the tasks of extended reproduction, or, worse, ally themselves with the monetarists against economic growth and technological development, the socialist movement has the duty, if it is able, to make a socialist transformation. We are not suggesting that socialist transformations are merely remedies for forms of illness which occur from grievous mistakes. On the contrary, provided they are viable, they are to be esteemed. The point is that any capitalist who complains about socialist transformations in Russia or Cuba is unintentionally or not a hypocrite. In both cases, the socialist transformation occurred because industrial-capitalist forces, rather than attending to their own real interests, were playing lackey to the monetarists.

That is the gist of the wrong and evil things the U.S. did in the conclusion of the Spanish-American War, and the gist of every wrong thing, actually contrary to our vital national interests, we have permitted our government to undertake or tolerate since.

To kick away any lunatic-socialists or sick liberals

who might be tempted to attach themselves to our political coattails on this point, we shall be very blunt concerning the U.S. assimilation of Puerto Rico.

The mere fact that the U.S. "gobbled up" Puerto Rico was no offense against proper international law, nor was it a crime or offense in any other rational respect. Only a sentimental babbler in the Wilsonian tradition of hypocrisy would argue to the contrary. Puerto Rico was a wretched little Spanish colony, with no visible economic viability as an independent nation. Under the circumstances, the best practicable alternative for the Puerto Ricans themselves was to become part of the United States. Whether we conducted the assimilation badly or well is a different matter. This is not to suggest that today we should enlarge the territorial United States by such practices; for those past circumstances and at that time, the mere fact of appropriation was consistent with U.S. and Puerto Rican interests, and represented no offense in fact against the Puerto Ricans.

The First World War is not to be directly compared with the Second World War, except, as Lippmann emphasizes, that the same monetarists' policies governed U.S. conduct in both affairs. A few observations, more in the form of moot points than proposed, retrospective alternatives, serve the function of showing that there is reason to challenge the argument that we should have gone to war against the Kaiser's Germany — where no such doubt can be posed for the Nazi case. What we should have done, as we shall indicate the dimensions of the difficulty here, is open to discovery, but, otherwise, we absolutely should not have done what Wilson did, either in the way he got us into the war or the way he purported to extricate us from it.

It was consistent with U.S. interests as an industrial-capitalist republic that Czarist Russia and the Austro-Hungarian obscenity should be terminated. However, it was also in our vital interest that British monetarist control of the world market be ended, and, hence, that under no circumstances should Britain be permitted to gobble up elements of Russia or the Balkans. It was contrary to our interest that the defeat of Britain, which was eminently desirable, should be contingent upon the Kaiser's looting of France. However, it was not in our national interest that the corrupt and stagnating form of policy represented by the Third Republic be perpetuated by our sacrifices. It was in our urgent interest that the British Empire be dismantled, both as a political system of colonies and semi-colonies and as a monetary entity. We could not welcome a Kaiser Germany takeover of those British roles. Furthermore, although the preponderance of our national interests recommended the destruction of Czarism and British imperial and monetary rule, the

anti-republican Kaiser's government was to a lesser degree also an obscenity contrary to our national interests.

The overall character of the problem was that we had not made the mess, and lacked immediately the degree of power wanted to sort it out to coincide with all our principal policy-interests. Obviously, *we had to maneuver strategically to ensure that the balance of the outcome was in our interests*. This would have required building up our naval and military forces, especially our naval forces, prior to 1914, in preparation for the difficulties awaiting us.

No doubt, some of the softer-skulled critics will find in this basis to expose me as a raving jingoist-militarist or something of that sort. Brushing such potential Wilsons to one side, and continuing on the presumption that a political force representing industrial-capitalist interests could have shaped U.S. policy, the fact of the matter was that, for reasons beyond our control, we were doomed to fight war somewhere in some context in the immediate future. If we did not apply our capabilities, including our military potential, at the proper place, the condition of the world was going to become intolerably much worse. Fighting the right war at the right time during that period was the least costly of all alternatives.

Out of those complexities, it is clear that our industrial-capitalist interest prescribed a set of basic clear policy-guidelines. (1) Ending monetarist world-monetary control of world credit and markets; (2) Fostering independent, truly sovereign, and viable republics; (3) Pressing the "Open Door" policy to the effect of ending colonialism and semi-colonialism; (4) Build a naval power able to control Britain's; (5) Seek and make whatever compromises were necessary to improve the balance of world developments in the directions stipulated by such a policy.

Such tendencies did exist, as *tendencies toward policy perceptions* during that and the immediate postwar period, but those tendencies did nothing more, unfortunately, than to color and constrain, rather than positively characterize our policies.

The fact that the writer otherwise proposes no specific, retrospective policy for the 1905-1917 United States does not reflect the writer's methodological disposition for vacillation on the problem of strategic choices presented. Beyond the formulating of firm policies, the execution and further detailing of that set of policies is primarily a responsibility assigned to the statecraft of the executive branch. The actual choice of policies which the United States should have followed in pursuit of the policies we have listed had to be determined through an organic global political process of negotiations among the forces in motion.

When a power such as the United States was even at that time, effectively deploys in behalf of its committed interest, diplomatically and otherwise, such interventions in the course of events readily and substantially alter the strategic configuration to define a combination from which a concrete course of commitment to action is then elected.

For example, it was in the interest of the U.S. to attempt to break France out of the entente with Britain and Czarist Russia, and to make that feasible through a navy adequate to the anti-colonialist, anti-monetarist policy that involved. It was in U.S. interest *to attempt to secure with the government of Germany an agreement on questions of both Russian and colonial policy, to stipulate an independent Russian republic to undergo massive industrializing development, and a similar anti-colonialist, industrialist policy for the region below the Tropic of Cancer*. It was our proper course to make our interests and objectives clear, to the point that the commitment of a credible amount of mobilized U.S. power added to or placed opposite to the policies and actions of any nation or combination of nations would have represented a significant, probably decisive margin in determining the perceivable consequences of alternative policies and projects among other nations.

The problem of the Wilson administration was not that it was fumbling and incompetent (as it was), but that it could not have conceivably developed a policy consistent with U.S. interests. This was not a problem located so much in the unstable Wilson himself, but is a problem better brought to consciousness by referring to Colonel House.

There are two crucial features of Colonel House's role preceding and during the Wilson administration which adequately prove the case. The first was the establishment of the U.S. Federal Reserve System on a predominantly monetarist basis. The second is the monetarist-imperialist innovations in U.S. foreign policy exemplified by Wilson's conduct in the Mexican affair. The Mexican affair underscores the pure hypocrisy overall of Wilson and the "Wilson tradition."

The United States had undergone a major and protracted crisis during the 1870s and 1880s, a new crisis early during the 1890s, and joined the world in the ominous crisis of the 1905-1907 period. All of these crises were essentially global in cause, rather than autochthonous problems of our national economy. These were crises of the British monetary system. The sterling ruled the world's credit and trade markets, the internal convulsions of sterling were necessarily global monetary convulsions. However, in global crises, the effects proportionately experienced in each

nation, the tendency of one or another nation to exhibit the crisis earlier or later, and the prolongation of the crisis in each national sector, represent differential features of the national sector's relative global position — degree of illiquidity, economic development, and so forth — and internal weaknesses and strengths of the national economy and its domestic monetary system.

In fact, the succession of crises from the early 1870s through 1911-1912 were overall a ratchet-process of decline of the sterling system as a whole. Sterling — the sterling system — founded most immediately upon the crushing debt imposed upon Britain and Europe during the Napoleonic wars and immediately following the Treaty of Vienna, was a sick system from the outset and becoming no healthier. The sterling system survived, first, because bankrupt England of 1815-1819 was able to impose a major portion of its national illiquidity (as credit) upon the defeated Europe of the Holy Alliance, because it was able to impose that self-aggravating mass of nominal wealth, British sterling bankruptcy, in the form of primitive accumulation and related forced backwardness policies upon the colonies and other sectors of the world.

The U.S. use of British credit for development of our rails system and other projects obliged our national economy to employ such credit on terms determined by the sick sterling system. By adapting our national credit system and national monetary policies to the margin of national financial balance-of-payments represented by sterling credit, our economy became increasingly enslaved to and increasingly sensitive to fluctuations in sterling credit markets.

These pulsations of bankrupt sterling's world domination are the direct cause for the crucial points in the history of the labor movement.

Although the Paris Commune is plausibly explained by the Franco-Prussian War, in fact the crisis of French institutions produced by Napoleon III's defeat took the lid off the potential eruption which had already been developed through the domestic consequences of France's indebtedness to consortia of sterling-bloc bankers led by the then-dominant House of Rothschild. Indeed, France of that period had been ruled by two monarchs, Napoleon III and Paris-based Baron James Rothschild, the functioning head of the Rothschild House. The 1877-1886 wave of mass strikes in the USA, predominantly associated with railway workers and the Knights of Labor — the strikes which created the organizations within the Knights of Labor later forming the American Federation of Labor, were coordinate with the general strikes of the 1880s in England, and the wave of strikes in Germany, from the late 1880s through 1890, which overthrew Bismarck.

The rise of populism, and the Coxey's army and Debs-linked strikes of the 1890s are also incomprehensible social eruptions apart from the effects of the primitive-accumulation practices extended into various countries by the decline of bankrupt sterling. The Russian Revolution of 1905, and coordinate eruptions of that period, including the symptomatic rise of the IWW in the USA, are also directly reflections of the deepening crisis of the sterling monetary system.

From approximately 1892 through 1917, the United States was confronted by a fundamental crisis flowing from our imprisonment within the dying sterling monetary order.

Beginning with President Theodore Roosevelt, we preponderantly committed our nation to the wrong response to this crisis. We turned away from the industrial-capitalist thrust represented somewhat by Andrew Carnegie and others, to the inflated nominal capitalization of our industries, centering around the so-called "trusts." The inevitable effect of the "trust-building" process, which came to a head about the middle of the first decade of this century, was to capitalize U.S. production in such a way as to drive U.S. prices up, skyrocketing toward levels which were non-competitive on the world market, and which permanently damaged our vital interests by aborting the commitment to expansion and technological progress. Roosevelt's administration used the fact of this scandalous development to admittedly check the most extreme heteronomic outrages being perpetrated, but approached the problem in such a selective fashion as to strengthen the position of financial capital as such at the expense of the power of industrial capital as such.

The effect of the way in which the trust-busting was done was to break up the concentration of power in industries in a way which concentrated power predominantly in lower Manhattan.

Colonel House's role in the establishment of the Federal Reserve System was coordinate with the selective approach to trust-busting associated with the Roosevelt administration.

The proper, self-interested policy of the United States in response to the 1907 panic was to revert to a Hamiltonian policy, of establishing a national bank. Instead, House and others established a central bank modeled upon the British monetarist conception, a bank effectively controlled by the major, lower Manhattan financial interests. By committing the United States to define the nominal value of its wealth in a way determined by lower Manhattan's control of the major conduits of credit, and by placing the monetary power of the United States government at the disposal of those banking interests, the Federal Reserve

System created the false appearance that the special monetarist interests of lower Manhattan were the determining feature of national-capitalist self-interests.

Wilson's policy toward Mexico was a direct extension of the pro-monetarist counterrevolution against the U.S. Constitution and associated policies which had been prepared most notably by the preceding actions of the Roosevelt administration and Rockefeller-linked Taft administration. Directly contrary to John Quincy Adams, in particular, contrary to Lincoln, Wilson overthrew the U.S. principled self-interest in the sovereignty of Latin American republics.

Wilson's wretched hypocrisy in connection with Mexico is the proper source of insight into the moralizing of his "Fourteen Points."

What of such precedents as the Texas affair and the Mexican-American War? Taking the character of the 1828-1860 period as a whole into account, there is a double aspect to both affairs. Some will not be pleased by what we must properly say on this account, but truth is truth, however it may offend liberals' prejudices.

The founding perceptions upon which this nation was established were those of the *Idea of Progress*. That means, in practice, that the nature and rights of nations and cultures are not "culturally relativist." *We do not regard all cultures and nations as equally deserving of sovereignty or survival. That is not an imperialist policy: it does not specify a policy of U.S. acquisitions of the areas occupied by more backward nations and cultures.* It is rather a statement of U.S. national self-interest in the realization of *the proper rule of the Idea of Progress as a universal, natural law governing the entirety of the human species.* Any one who does not recognize such a clear statement of principles in the Declaration of Independence and U.S. Constitution — written, predominantly, by the same set of authors approximately two decades apart in time, must be indeed an illiterate.

Was it then correct for the American branch of European humanist culture to absorb the territories occupied by a miserable, relatively bestial culture of indigenous Americans? *Absolutely.* Was it correct to absorb Texas and the areas taken in the Mexican-American War? Historically, yes — for the same reason. The only legitimate moral and related policy question in such affairs is how we treated the human beings we were obliged to bring quickly into a successful participation in our more appropriately human levels of culture.

These actions of the pre-1860 period were not only permissible (at least as actions overall) but imperative, because of our adversary relationship, in fact, to


a British power determined to subvert and crush us. The affair of the British agent and U.S. traitor, Aaron Burr, in itself justifies entirely Jefferson's Louisiana Purchase — a point on which Lippmann's analysis is predominantly correct as far as it goes. We had to develop the United States, territorially, as well as in respect of its internal life in areas existing at any time. We could not tolerate the relinquishing of those areas of development contiguous to our existing borders by either colonial powers or by weak, unreliable, nominally-independent states which were inherently the instruments for British-coordinated actions against our vital interests.

However, to the extent that hemispheric neighbors were truly sovereign and viable republics, or struggling against British-controlled forces to become such, it was our duty, as we had means of force or maneuver to accomplish this, to defend the sovereignty of those republics *even against factions which might temporarily gain governmental power in our own nation.*

Neither the policies of the founding fathers nor our own vital national interests to the present day can be separated — as Lippmann attempts to do — from questions of political economy.

Humanism, the body of epistemological development and associated natural law counterposed to both feudalist scholasticism and nominalism, is rooted in the scientific perception of the nature of the absolute difference which separates man from the lower beasts. This humanism subsumes both industrial-capitalist society and socialist modes of extending the capitalist form of extended reproduction. Humanism is rooted in the principle that it is the duty of society to *perfect* itself, to bring its ideas and willful practice into conformity with universal law. Humanism breaks with scholasticism axiomatically concerning the content of natural law. Scholasticism assumes the natural order to be essentially fixed respecting appropriate knowledge and individual and general conduct. Hence, respecting law, scholasticism sees Roman law, feudal law, common law, and so forth as being properly convergent upon a common set of underlying determining principles. Humanism defines development, society's progress through the realization of scientific discoveries mediated through the creative mental processes of individuals, as the kernel of natural law, and defines the progress of societies to higher orders of technology as the indispensable material complement of providing the cultural conditions for advancing the qualities of the individual.

Although our argument for those principles is significantly better informed than that of the founding fathers, in respect to all essential conclusions for policy what we argue is explicitly stipulated in the Declaration of Independence and Constitution, and



President Kennedy inspecting the Berlin Wall in the course of his 1961 "Ich bin ein Berliner" adventure.

conforms to the thrust of the practice of the American Revolution during, notably, the 1763-1828 period, and the overall outcome of the 1763-1863 period.

We deny that any people are inferior as people, but insist that many governments and cultures are. Our humanist policy is to free the people from the oppressions of a backward culture so that they may fulfill the human potentials we defend. The nominalists (the leading Democrats of 1828-64) argued that slavery was justified on the empirical evidence that enslaved blacks and the cultures from which they and their ancestors had been stolen were inferior. So far, the statement of fact was absolutely correct. However, the enslaved blacks were modally culturally inferior because slavery made them so. Furthermore, as the humanist Whig abolitionists of the Carey-Lincoln current properly argued, the holding of a black section of the U.S. labor force in a condition of servitude was a source of degradation of the labor force as a whole and thus otherwise a vital threat to the most fundamental national interests of the nation.

The notion of national interests, proper international law, and foreign policy is not admissibly based on the nominalist (empiricist) form of reductionist assumption that the law properly pertains to formal categories of cultures, nations, and so forth. It is based on the Idea of Progress, understanding of the necessity of republican over democratic forms of government *for the human condition to date*, and the principled sacredness of the development of the creative potentials of the individual, not as an abstract personality, but as a repository for the potentiality of development to effect contributions in the universal interest.

Today, the United States and the Soviet Union are the dominant world powers. Potentially, since *both governments have a vital self-interest not only in accelerating economic progress in their own nations, but throughout the world*, the complexities of maneuvers imposed upon our founding fathers, upon Lincoln, and upon our nation during the first decades of this century no longer need exist. In fact, although the governing party of the Soviet Union is committed to the perspective of socialist republics, and the United States parties' predominantly committed to capitalist republics by strong preference, the question whether a *viable* republic is capitalist or socialist is properly a matter of indifference to either power *insofar as it is a state power with state interests*. This possibility is conditional upon the commitment of the United States to an industrial-capitalist perception of self-interests and policies. In that case, on that condition, no concert of nations could develop a monetarist form of monetary system which could endure

the combined economic counterforce of a pro-industrial-development monetary system jointly supported by the two major powers. Under those conditions, consistent with the intent and specifications of the U.S. Constitution, the problem of *ordering the world according to the Idea of Progress, on the basis of sovereignty of viable republics*, requires none of the complex adjustments to policy which were the unavoidable circumstance of former periods of our republic.

The institutionalization of monetarist policies during the period of the Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson administrations created a thrust in U.S. domestic and foreign policy, which was to ally with the City of London in perpetuating a joint Anglo-American monetarist world order while reducing Britain to junior-partner status within that alliance. In brief, to maintain the continuity of the City of London's monetarist world order while subjugating the City of London.

Excepting thrusts such as those most clearly expressed by Wilson's opponent, Senator Lodge, the rearguard resistance of Whig currents to the extreme innovations posited by the Tories, that consistently contradictory monetarist policy consolidated under Wilson has been the trend in U.S. foreign policy doctrines to date. This is to be qualified in the most important respect that the alleged "isolationist" tendencies of Senator Lodge and the 1921-1932 Republican administrations and Congress were not isolationism in fact, but a rearguard expression of negativity against the kind of foreign involvements the Tory faction demanded. This Whig tendency emerged in a modified form under the Eisenhower administrations, especially the second Eisenhower administration, and was an important background tendency within the Nixon and Ford administrations — as the Rumsfeld-led "Hallowe'en Massacre" of 1975 most visibly reflects.

What Lippmann of 1943-1944 was demagogically misrepresenting as a kind of foreign policy vacuum, was essentially the determination of the Franklin Roosevelt-led Tory faction to extirpate the last vestiges of a constitutional, Whig element in U.S. foreign policy. Lippmann's foreign policy thesis on this point is complementary to Thurman Arnold's defense of Roosevelt's effort to speed up the overthrow of the U.S. Constitution, in FDR's aborted effort to pack the U.S. Supreme Court.

Colonel House's (which is to say Rockefeller's) World War I policy was to commit the U.S. to the British cause, while using U.S. power to cut Britain off from any substantial, net gains by which she might resist a process of takeover by U.S. monetarist in-

terests. In that policy everything from getting the U.S. into war, through the pack of swindles called the Versailles Treaty, and the ostensible internal contradictions of U.S. anti-Soviet policy are comprehensively subsumed.

The complement to Wilson's administration itself was the private intelligence establishment and policy-formulating and implementation network represented most prominently by the National Civic Federation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Russell Sage Foundation. The Rockefeller Foundation was already emerging as a major vehicle for coordinating and catalyzing the shaping of U.S. foreign and domestic policies. The Russell Sage Foundation complemented and overlapped the Settlement House movement as the pioneering and coordinating institution for domestic and foreign political intelligence and "black operations" in the Fabian mode. The operations of this Rockefeller-linked (later, Rockefeller-dominated) Fabian private intelligence network were both directly overlapped with the British Fabian private intelligence networks and were also developed as a competitor to the British Fabians. These policy and intelligence operations reflected the same U.S. Atlanticists' contradictory consistency as Colonel House's government policies. The National Civic Federation ebbed out its last dominant role under that name, as the vehicle, in large part, for the policies which were increasingly Rockefeller-determined.

The Russell Sage Foundation is so crucial in the affairs of the 1917-1933 period that no competent discussion of U.S. foreign policy and doctrines dating from that period can be accomplished without spotlighting the evil conduited through that presumably small but monstrously significant "social work" institution. The Foundation was coopted to direction of overall U.S. intelligence during the First World War and continued a related role at Versailles and in various "black" and related operations in Europe (and elsewhere) during the 1920s. That nasty little Foundation has not ceased to perform an innovative role of similar implications down to the present day, but at the moment it is the period leading into Roosevelt's administration that concerns us.

It was the Russell Sage Foundation, for example, which drafted the element of the Versailles agreements under which Admiral Canaris' career under Weimar and Hitler was founded. The marine transport unit (that unit had been the element of the Kaiser's military-political intelligence most immediately involved in the Parvus operation), was exempted from the drastic reductions applied to other German military and related elements, and soon placed under the direction of a Canaris who had

already served (1916-1918) as a part of Colonel Nikolai's Anglo-American agent network inside the German military intelligence. (6)

It was the Russell Sage Foundation which served as an instrument for Rockefeller's establishing of Interpol during the 1920s, an organization which was later headed by Nazi intelligence chiefs Heydrich and Kaltenbrunner during the 1930s, down to 1943, which was headed by avowed Nazis while still based in Vienna, and which was "reorganized" (i.e. laundered) under the direction of former top Nazi officials by Rockefeller's Allen Dulles and others at the end of the war.

It is the same network, deeply overlapping present-day Interpol, which conduited the "Law Enforcement Assistance Administration" into the U.S. Justice Department, principally via the Ford Foundation conduit, which today conducts the majority of illegal arms and drug smuggling internationally, which today performs an integral function in the deploying of all notable forms of international terrorist acts, which is integral to most of the assassinations and related horrors which a credulous Congress and public too quickly axiomatically presume to be the work of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency as such.

Although, broadly, such covert activities of the Rockefellers and their allies are not an explicit feature of stipulated U.S. foreign policy conventions, these covert and related operations have become today an element of U.S. government de facto practice almost approaching the significance of our national military posture and deployments and our financial and economic postures. Even though such Rockefeller-linked covert-operations networks and forces may not be Congress's perception of official U.S. foreign policy, they are very much de facto U.S. foreign policy instruments — to the effect that official statements not taking these into account amount to "Wilsonian" hypocrisy. Furthermore, any analysis of foreign policy which does not take these into account in assessing the 1917-1977 period is for that reason essentially an incompetent appraisal.

Wilson's policies, especially Versailles itself, established the fateful preconditions for *World War II*.

6. This Nikolai-Canaris element in 1914-1944 Anglo-American intelligence networks inside Germany was based in part on British and Rockefeller agreements with "Farben" representatives concerning Chilean nitrates and related matters. Colonel Nikolai was a key part of the "Farben" firm's private intelligence network and operations, as well as part of the Kaiser's official intelligence organization. It was through the Rockefeller-British-Nikolai network collaborations in Chile that Canaris was smuggled out of internment in Chile during World War I, and conduited, through the interventions of the British Foreign Office, back into Germany, via Anglo-Dutch accomplices of the Anglo-American interests involved.

The U.S. was headed for war with Japan, and most probably Germany as well, from the day Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected. By 1936, this was apparent to and openly stated by various well-informed circles. The foundations had been laid by the Wilson administration. It was the initially pro-fascist foreign policy of the Roosevelt administration, and the manner in which that administration dealt with the monetary crisis, which by no later than 1934 predetermined the inevitability of the war.

Whatever their factional differences on matters of detail, the City of London and lower Manhattan were agreed on installing the fascist rule of Benito Mussolini in Italy and Hitler's rule in Germany. Furthermore, the leading liberals in the United States — such as John Dewey and his associates — were largely unashamedly pro-fascist during the 1920s and into the earliest part of the Roosevelt administration period.

It was immediately British intelligence which had moved Mussolini into power in Italy — with the aid of such British agents as the fathers of present-day Italian Communist Party leaders Enrico Berlinguer and Giorgio Amendola. During the 1920s, Mussolini was Winston Churchill's personal acquaintance and protégé. Roosevelt's administration maintained a special relationship to the Mussolini regime up to the Fall of France.

Hjalmar Schacht, a prominent lower Manhattan agent of influence in Germany since the World War I armistice, placed Hitler in power through clearing the project with key forces in the City of London and New York City, including the consent of the publishers of the New York Times, whose diluted Jewish consciences required Schacht's assurances on this project. It was lower Manhattan interests, not German industrialists, who directed and spearheaded the funding of Hitler's accession to the Chancellorship — and induced the German industrialists to go along with the project under the dictates of a joint lower Manhattan and City of London de facto "Atlanticist" directive to this effect. Roosevelt's principal backers, as well as some of his chief Republican opponents, were among those included in that Atlanticist project of installing and supporting Hitler as *Schachtian monetary policy's indispensable tool*.

The *military side* of the Hitler project involved factional complications among the Atlanticists. All factions agreed broadly on the objective of using a Hitler Germany to overturn the Soviet republic. They were not agreed on the explicit approach to such a result, or how the loot from such an enterprise should be distributed. Despite factional misgivings and differences, the thrust of the military perspective fatefully converged upon some form of adaptation of the "Parvus Plan."

On the monetary and economic side, there was no significant overall disagreement concerning the Atlanticists' pro-Hitler policy. Assurances had been given to the Rothschilds, Sulzbergers, and others that the Nazi Jewish policy was not to go beyond an irritant. Otherwise the Hitler project meant the following. It meant, first of all, saving the shards of the bankrupt sterling-dollar monetary system, providing *political credibility* for the existing international debt structures. It meant that the "Rapallo" tendency among German industrialists and trade unionists for breaking out of the dollar-sterling orbit, for massive economic cooperation with the Soviet east, was blocked — with the aid of the "termination" of Gregor Strasser, Schleicher, and so forth. It meant that the capability of using Germany as a "breakaway ally" "marcher lord" force against the Soviet Union was being established.

To grasp the sense of the relevant opinion of the times, it must be understood that Atlanticist attitudes and practices in imposing the Hitler regime in Germany, in behalf of Schacht's fascist monetary policies, were broadly identical with the thinking and public toleration of the David Rockefeller-led operation establishing the Pinochet regime in Chile in behalf of Milton Friedman's fascist monetary policies.

Although Roosevelt attitudes toward the two Atlanticist-created fascist regimes of Mussolini and Hitler were significantly differentiated from the outside, and this predominantly for strategic reasons, Roosevelt's administration was pro-fascist from the outset.

Not only was Roosevelt's administration pro-fascist in foreign policy, but also in domestic policy. General Hugh Johnson and the National Recovery Act left no doubt of that. With the defeat of the NRA and Congressional and Supreme Court resistance and foot-dragging on other legislation, executive actions, and labor struggles to the same effect, Roosevelt's administration was compelled politically to retreat to a compromise, semi-fascist policy, called the "New Deal." Such direct imitations of the Hitler regime's labor-intensive *Arbeitsdienst* measures and *BdM* institutions as the Works Project Administration (WPA), Public Works Administration (PWA), and Civilian Conservation Corps were not only imitations of the Nazi regime, but consciously so. The Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) was another fascist "zero growth"-oriented atrocity of the same genre.

From the contrary standpoint, of vital U.S. national interests, the Nazi regime was from inception an unredeemable adversary in the Clausewitzian sense as we have outlined that sense above. Just as the collapse of German industrial development imposed by Ver-

sailles not only created the preconditions for a new general war but destroyed the potential for world-market recovery, the Hitler regime was a more profound economic threat to our most vital national interests on that same account. By its nature, its organic constitution as a “command economy” dedicated to maintaining inflationary, already bankrupt debt structures by increasingly savage primitive accumulation against its own economic base, the persistence of the regime meant a nation which had no alternative but to prevent the otherwise inevitable, total internal collapse of its internal economy by soon launching wars of looting against its neighbors. This irrepressible military impulse, and the infectious consequences of such primitive-accumulation policies on the world economy, represented an intolerable condition.

It must be emphasized that the Wall Street backing of Roosevelt’s first election and the installation of Hitler were complementary efforts.

Hitler could have been pulled down — probably without war — by the United States at any time prior to the 1938 Munich agreements. The U.S. could have sent the French army — two or three divisions would have sufficed — into the Rhineland in 1936, and Hitler would have collapsed. The economic and monetary power of the United States respecting Britain and France would have sufficed to prevent the 1938 Munich agreement, and could also have induced the French to accept the Tukachevsky Plan if we had wished. Although the U.S. capacity for political and related action was admittedly delimited by the internal political situation inside the U.S., it is obscenely false to profess that a Roosevelt administration either helplessly watched the growth of the Nazi problem in Europe, or that the Roosevelt administration did not consciously refrain from employing those preventive measures within the existing discretionary capabilities of the government. Shattered as the U.S. was by the Depression, we had the power to determine, marginally but crucially, the policies of England and France in such respects, if the Roosevelt administration had chosen to exercise such power to that effect.

Nor can Roosevelt defenders argue that he was either uninformed of the implications of the Nazi regime, or profess that public opinion prevented him from taking preventive actions otherwise within his means. As Lippmann most intimately knew, the Roosevelt administration largely molded public opinion in the U.S. during the 1934-1945 period — after all, Lippmann was part of the project of refining the use of the press as a “brainwashing” tool against the U.S. population, and Roosevelt himself was the “confidence man’s confidence man.”

Central to the overall policy-configuration of the

Roosevelt administration was the “bank holiday.” The definitions of nominal wealth embedded in the chosen form of financial reorganization delimited and otherwise determined domestic and foreign policy options overall thereafter.

It was objectively unnecessary for the United States to go through the prolonged depression of 1933-1939. With the collapse of sterling and the appropriate bankruptcy procedures against worthless debt structures in the U.S. itself, the proper task was to resort to a “Hamiltonian” National Bank policy, putting the credit of the government into such a bank, and placing Colonel House’s ruined Federal Reserve System into a “holding corporation” status for sorting-out at leisure.

Provided that government-issued credit was restricted to restoring viable industrial and agricultural capacities — and not to refinancing of old paper or non-tangible-wealth-regenerative forms, the lawful reproductive operation of the profitable productive process, raised above the real-economic break-even point, would have sufficed to convert the credit issued into an appropriate margin of profit in the form of tangible commodities. Under any circumstances of crisis, such use of mobilized government powers to create production credit can promptly reverse any depression, provided that the credit issued is efficiently directed to a “hard commodity” policy of delimiting loans to cranking up and expanding existing productive capacities to, first, an approximate full-production level and then beyond.

Such measures require intermediate-term draconian financial measures, but not exotic or “utopian” measures. Debt moratoria against financial debt service for industry, agriculture, and government are not a *repudiation* of debt obligations, but an ordinary bankruptcy’s financial-reorganization practice. To apply them on a much larger scale than that of a corporation requires supplementary procedures to prevent the echoing collapse of essential institutions of credit and deposit, but the procedure is eminently well known and practicable, and gives everyone an opportunity to sort out the blocked debt-service demands at political-economic leisure. We have already specified the necessary measures in other published locations, so we need not restate them in full here. (7)

The point is, once a viable economy (i.e., the production and circulation of tangible forms of wealth) has been cranked up well above its real-economic

7. Lyndon LaRouche, “How the International Development Bank Will Work,” in *How the International Development Bank Will Work* (New York: Campaigner Publications, Inc., 1976), issued by the U.S. Labor Party, pp. 8-27; Lyndon LaRouche, “The Emergency Employment Act of 1976” in *The Emergency Employment Act of 1976* (New York: Campaigner Publications, Inc., 1976), issued by the U.S. Labor Party, pp. 5-24.

break-even point (above the tangible costs of production, including maintenance of productive forces), alternative feasible solutions of various political preferences are realistically available. Below the economic break-even point, no solution exists but one form of horror or another.

That "Hamiltonian" approach to domestic economic problems would have required a complementary foreign policy. Since the full-production level operation of the U.S. productive economy depended (and depends) upon a significant and ever-growing volume and ratio of exports and imports, national interest would have required organizing a new, dollar-centered block of countries going through the same sort of internal financial reorganization. These countries would serve as our primary trading partners. Such action would have brought down sterling entirely, and quickly brought a financially reorganized British industry and agriculture into a new, gold-reserve-based dollar monetary system — which shock-treatment would have been the greatest boon the U.S. could have given to Britain at that time.

Roosevelt took the opposite direction in his administration's approach to the unavoidable "bank holiday." Although he "triaged" the most vulnerable fringe portions of the financial debt structure, he did so in order to reduce the margin of debt overhang only to the proportions which probably could be maintained through primitive accumulation against the U.S. productive forces operating near or below a break-even point. His approach paralleled Schacht's reorganization of the Nazi economy in method if not in detailed form.

Instead of freeing industry and agriculture of immediate debt and related financial requirements outside circulating capital flow, and pushing in credits into industry and agriculture directly, he resorted to "pump-priming" methods, principally through the Federal Reserve System and through make-work projects. Even at interest rates in the range of 2 percent, credit refused to move *through* the Federal Reserve System into industry. The various "make-work projects amounted to inducing the unemployed to "work off welfare checks." Relative to restarting the economy, the make-work itself was predominantly relatively useless or done at such a primitive level of technology as to be abysmally uneconomical on that account. The "pump-priming" approach, even if well-intended, could have accomplished nothing toward genuine recovery under such circumstances. What it did was serve as a manipulative social-work palliative and a buffering of total purchasing power of the internal economy, but buffered at levels which were intrinsically still way below the levels of purchasing power which would have been required to bring pro-

duction levels above a true economic break-even point and self-feeding recovery.

The 1940-1945 war economy illustrated the right principles in the wrong way. Once credit was poured directly into industrial and agricultural production, the depressed economy, despite the worn bearings of the machinery and the gray-faced depletion of the labor force, began to crank up into a war-production boom. The problems of the 1940-1945 war economy were twofold. First, the substitution of military production for consumable capital and consumer goods is inherently *economically* inflationary (as distinct from purely monetary inflation). Second, under the tainted Federal Reserve System, the economic-inflationary impulse was cancerously multiplied into a monetary inflation which threatened to explode during the 1946-1948 period. On the first account, when government credit is used to generate useful production of capital goods and consumer goods, rather than military hardware, the products become additional plant and the employment of labor operating such plants. In that case, the scale of wealth is expanding, if modern technology is emphasized, more rapidly than the credit expansion is generating debt service demands.

In short, the problem of the post-1934 period was that then, as now, the monetarist approach must divert such large portions of credit created into refinancing old debt structures and related paper, that the infusion of sufficient credit into an illiquid monetary system, to resume production on an overall profitable level, cannot be approached without generating a hyperinflationary spiral. The war-economy approach, because it *simulates* genuine economic recovery at the outset, temporarily succeeds where the "New Deal" could not, for that reason. However, the war-economy approach to a sick monetary system inherently produces an economic-inflationary crisis, and when war economy is used as a "permanent" approach to propping up such an already bankrupt monetary system, as was done in 1933-1945 Nazi Germany, the fires of Hell are about to descend upon us — relatively sooner or somewhat later.

It must be emphasized again — although we have already stipulated the point in this connection just above — that such a domestic "Hamiltonian" approach to recovery could not have succeeded unless it was accompanied by a corresponding foreign policy, a policy of wrecking and replacing the sterling-centered monetary system.

The overall monetary and economic history of the Roosevelt administration shows where we must distinguish between conscious wickedness and mere ignorance and incompetence. From the administration's practice and from study of the writings of key New Deal braintrusts, both their work of the 1930s

and later, it is clear that on economic matters they were worse than incompetent. As we noted in assessing the Atlanticists' present repetition of the same strategic follies they committed during two preceding world wars, their behavior is not only regulated by the pressures of expediency-driven hysteria, but by their traditional, organic organization of their sense of intellectual identity around the nominalist world outlook and methodologies. With them, Keynesian, Schachtian, Friedmanite monetarist (nominalist) doctrines are not merely expediencies; *the Atlanticists broadly, seriously believe that such quackery represents a competent economic theory and doctrine!*

Roosevelt's fascist-flavored monetarist approach to the "bank holiday," and other features of his administration are clear instances of evil motivations serving special interests at the expense of the vital interests of the United States. Otherwise, especially in respect of Roosevelt's persistence with an economic recovery program whose preordained failure would be ABC to any competent economist, the Roosevelt administration was predominantly, sincerely stupid.

This is underlined by the predictable conditional success of the war economy, and Roosevelt's inability even to conceive of a war economy's "civilian" equivalent earlier.

The U.S. drive to a war economy as the anticipated solution to the depression was based most broadly upon 1920s and 1930s study of the war economy of the wartime Kaiser Germany. The theory of a war economy was first outlined by Rosa Luxemburg in the conclusion of her 1912 draft of *The Accumulation of Capital*, and the outline expanded in terms of the empirical features of wartime Germany's actual war economy in her later *Introduction to National Economy*. It was the 1914-1918 German war economy experience which served immediately as the model used by other analysts for the Nazi Germany "recovery" of 1933-1936, and which, together with study of the 1933-1938 Nazi Germany experience, provided the background against which the Roosevelt administration's conception of a war-economy policy was posed. This appreciation was glued onto, so to speak, the U.S. war-mobilization experience during World War I.

Although the U.S. has lived under a war economy and semi-war economy since 1940, to date no notable Atlanticist economist has been able competently to connect the notion of war economy to a "peace economy" recovery using somewhat analogous mechanisms, or to account for the way in which the U.S. defense budget actually operates in respect to the U.S. postwar economy. On this count, they are sincerely incompetent.

On World War II itself, earlier here we have covered

all but two of the essential points to be reviewed. Immediately above, we identified U.S. vital interests defining Nazi Germany as an adversary from the inception; earlier we summarized the Atlanticist policy toward Nazi Germany and how it misfired. The principal overlapping issues of the emerging, post-1943 relations with the Soviet Union must be treated. Here, we must also clear away the illusion implied by Lippmann's argument, that the U.S. would not have gone to war against Nazi Germany if Germany had not broken the "western barrier."

As Lippmann thus far correctly states, Chamberlain's 1938 Munich agreement, coming after Anglo-French rejection of the "Tukachevsky Plan," left Stalin with no strategic option but to attempt to secure a treaty with Nazi Germany. This treaty was feasible and adopted because it coincided with Germany's most vital strategic problem. At the point that Germany became deeply enmired, suffering heavy military attrition in a war inside the Soviet Union, the allied Anglo-French-Belgian forces could *and would* move into the Ruhr, forcing Germany to make peace essentially on allied terms. Thus, the Atlanticists would have *both Germany and Russia*. This required Hitler, if at all possible, to crush the Belgians, British and French *before* launching war to the east. Stalin's treaty-improvisation fitted into that strategic problem like a hand into a glove.

The problems of the Stalin leadership we have adequately covered in an edition of the *Campaigner* devoted to that subject. (8) It is clear apart from other unsettled matters, that Stalin refused to believe that "Barbarossa" was in progress until it was already substantially under way. This was a failure of Soviet political intelligence more than military intelligence, a failure to comprehend the crucial internal dynamics of the Nazi economy and regime. Otherwise, Stalin's pre-Barbarossa offers of concessions to Nazi economic needs were generous, and Britain was still left in Hitler's rear for an eastward thrust — such considerations, plus Soviet wishful conviction that more time for Soviet military preparations was available, left the Red Army badly deployed for the attack — with well-known consequences.

By 1943 — and until the successful test of "The Bomb" at Los Alamos — Soviet postwar power was so foreseeably potent that — other considerations acknowledged — Churchill and Roosevelt were committed to affording Stalin significant concessions in order to contain the "Soviet problem." The considerations included not only Soviet postwar strength, but *the impossibility of depending upon support of U.S.*,

8. Lyndon LaRouche, "The Question of Stalinism Today," *The Campaigner*, Vol. VIII, No. 9 (Nov. 1975).

British and other populations for an abrupt turning against the wartime Soviet ally. Although there was a strong opposition to the proposed policy from within Atlanticist ranks, the notion of rallying the shards of the Nazi Waffen SS for a joint Allied-Germany late-1944, 1945 or 1946 assault against the Red Army was the utopian conception of a relative few narrowly focused, and hence politically incompetent anti-Communist zealots.

Zealots then — and later — proposed that U.S. possession of “The Bomb” invalidated the Soviet approach embedded in the 1944 Lippmann draft. Such commentators overlooked the number of “The Bombs” the U.S. had at the end of World War II, and also the problem of producing them quickly in numbers which could significantly offset both Soviet military strength and the political countervailing considerations operating at that time.

“The Bomb” — although only an exotic, limited operational capability consideration of the 1945-1946 period — did shift the dynamics of policy, and became the fetish-object deluding worshippers of the anti-Clausewitzian doctrine of “air power” and its wild-eyed “utopian” sequelae. This combined effect did produce the Rockefeller hard-liners’ (unsuccessful) “preventive war” campaign of the immediate post-war period, contributed to the way in which the “Cold War” and Red-hunt psychological conditioning of the larger population was fostered, and was influential in guiding Rockefeller State Department and other agents within the Truman administration to set up the Korean War. However, with the discovery — among other, related points — that the Soviets had gained priority in developing an *operational* thermonuclear weapon, the “preventive war” and associated political impulses were diverted into new directions. The development of “brinkmanship” — leading into the Kennedy administration’s efforts to carry out Henry (“Strangelove”) Kissinger’s policy — became the new form of military thrust. The latter “brinkmanship” form of utopian strategic doctrine has persisted down to the present day, with only subsumed, increasingly exotic utopian improvisations rather than anything qualitatively new.

The military variants for Atlanticist doctrine are auxiliary elements, such that various military alternatives can be substituted from time to time without altering the basic features of the doctrine itself. Vis-a-vis the Soviets, the doctrine specified a flexible containment policy to replace the old, relatively inflexible version and to use this increased flexibility as a way of lowering the threshold for Atlanticist economic and political penetration of the war-ravaged Soviet Union. This penetration was to be enhanced with the aid of Anglo-American political

intelligence networks planted in the Eastern European countries. By agreements cutting the Soviets off from China, and constructing a semi-penetrable barrier on the Soviet west in central Europe, the conditions for reducing the Soviets to a condition of conquerability would be fostered (1943-1944) in the due course of preparations to this effect in the “Atlanticist world.”

In short, the predominant Atlanticist policy of 1943-1944 toward the Soviet Union was a Fabian policy.

Even without the 1940 invasion of France, Roosevelt would have led the U.S. to war, certainly against a Japan manipulated and insulted into the required adversary posture, and directly or indirectly — as required — the U.S. forces would have been deployed in the Anglo-French-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr — which would have been the “scenario” had Hitler gone only eastward.

Overall, Roosevelt, like Wilson before him, led the U.S. into a war — which, this time, the U.S. could have prevented by appropriate actions before 1938 — and he established a policy which brought us out of the war with an Atlanticist policy aimed in fact, at World War III as its embedded, fateful implication.

As we have indicated, *the Korean War was a set-up* in the spirit of the bloody escapades the Kennedy and Carter administrations were committed to unleashing under a modified policy later on. We were building up our arsenal of “The Bomb,” on the way to developing an operational hydrogen bomb, and believed we had the correlation of forces to accelerate the Atlanticist doctrine’s Soviet policy substantially ahead of the schedule implied by Lippmann’s (Roosevelt’s) 1943-1944 Fabian perspective. So, North Korea was outrageously provoked by operations conducted within and based upon South Korea, while a (Rockefeller) Acheson State Department nominally under Truman advertised that the U.S. did not consider South Korea’s defense in strategic U.S. interests. Naturally, with this public assurance, and provoked still further, the North Korean army moved south. We moved in with a counterassault, and we were on the way to our test showdown with both China and the Soviet Union. Then, we discovered such things as that the Soviets had developed an operational hydrogen bomb, and the war — by then close to a major war with China — no longer had the strategic appeal it had been deemed to have at the outset of the bloody affair.

The pullback from the 1946-1953 policy took the form of the Eisenhower administration, the scuttling of the included psychological-warfare tool, the astonished Senator Joseph McCarthy, and concentration on a domestic, Japanese and European credit expansion. The Eisenhower administration was *partially* a Rockefeller administration. For excellent reasons on former Senator and President Harry

Truman's side, Truman and Nelson Rockefeller were not on the most amiable of terms. A piqued Nelson had left government shortly after the end of the war. Along with much of the New York City downtown establishment, Nelson Rockefeller scuttled back in under Eisenhower, busied himself setting up the Fabian horrors-nest known as the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and took a hand developing the National Security Council. Otherwise, the emphasis on domestic credit expansion of industrial production, rising toward Korean War heights of industrial employment under peacetime conditions was a climate more favorable to Whig moods and influences in Washington, an Eisenhower era which continued with general national approbation until the 1957 recession. *Relative to the 1960s* and the Korean War period, it was a time of peace and prosperity.

Unfortunately, the Eisenhower prosperity was predominantly a monetarist prosperity. To defend inflated mortgages, instead of rebuilding our cities, we built around them and left the old hulks to rot. Bowing to the appetites of an inflated financial structure, we reached toward our productive output capacity levels then in existence, but we did not launch a genuine wave of net real capital expansion. To make stagnation palatable, the children of suburbia were given too many toys and too much of the Dr. Spock treatment, instead of goals and parental examples of a commitment to the Idea of Progress. The monetarist-contained Whig tendencies of the Eisenhower period were predominantly just that, outside relatively small circles. *What was not done* permitted and thus contributed to the further moral erosion of the nation.

Apart from the 1960 vote fraud and the irritant of Richard Nixon's carried-forward reputation from the pre-1952 period, it was the 1957 recession which made possible the election of John F. Kennedy, for reasons mimicking the 1932 Roosevelt victory through the Republican-linked 1929-1931 monetary crisis. Exemplary was the concert of forces, including major steel companies, which reacted to the monetary pressures of 1957-1958 by setting up an attempted decisive showdown with the steelworkers' union. It was a mere parody of 1932, but it served Rockefeller forces' purposes.

The bloody crisis in the Congo was the first such feature of the Kennedy administration, set into motion even before Kennedy was decently inaugurated. *It was a Rockefeller operation*, as scrutiny of the accounts of Union Miniere and assorted mining and rail holdings of Katanga and Rhodesia indicates most strikingly, and as the movement of Rockefeller-connected finance into (what became) Zaire after the death of Lumumba and defeat of Gizenga illustrates to the same effect. It was also Rockefeller operatives and witting accomplices of such known Rockefeller

operatives, who conducted and supervised the operation.

The Bay of Pigs' defeat was covered quickly with mythology. Kennedy was not as misled as he professed. He had powerful reasons to abort the planned U.S. direct intervention into Cuba, planned to follow the cosmetic "beach-head" deployment. Those compelling reasons were concealed to be used in aid of subsequent shennanigans.

The Kennedy, "Ich bin ein Berliner" Crisis represented a reheating of Berlin which had been adopted almost as standard procedure for destabilizing international relations ever since post-operations audit of the first, real crisis of the "Berlin Airlift" period.

The connection between the Kennedy discussions with Khrushchev at Vienna and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis is well-recognized, although the disingenuousness of Kennedy administration propaganda concerning Cuban missiles, and certain of the connections to the Bay of Pigs affair are not so widely recognized.

It is sometimes wishfully imagined that the 1962 Missile Crisis was the high-point and turning-point of Rockefeller brinkmanship under Kennedy. From approximately the period of the Missile Crisis until Kennedy's death, the antics of the administration were building up to a crescendo on all fronts.

Rockefeller interests were enraged against Charles de Gaulle generally, and regarded his successful economic-cooperation and related agreements with the BRD's Konrad Adenauer as portending a fundamental threat to Atlanticist strategic interests. The use of the rigged *Der Spiegel* affair to begin the "Watergating" of the Adenauer government, especially respecting the selection and policies of Adenauer's successor, was by no means the only expression of Rockefeller's displeasure. In the same overall operation for which a planned *simulated* "Castro-inspired" assassination of Kennedy himself was projected by forces associated with the Kennedy administration, Italian industrialist Mattei was murdered, there was an attempted assassination against de Gaulle, and a series of attempted assassinations were deployed against Fidel Castro.

What still remains unknown to us concerning the Kennedy assassination is the question of *who*, working from the inside of the planned *simulated* "Castro-inspired" assassination project, turned the intended simulation into an actual assassination? What is known is that the occurrence of the assassination coincided with a planned simulation of a "Castro-inspired" assassination attempt. We also have an excellent estimation of what John F. Kennedy, Bobby Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy and others would have done had the simulation occurred as projected. We also deduce from such background facts why the

actual assassination was not used to carry through the new confrontation with Cuba and the Soviet Union, and why the massive cover-up of the more relevant facts was effected from that time to the present date.

Apart from such most-notable developments of the 1960-1963 period, and the institutionalization of the Vietnam War and "Berkeley" coup of 1965 in Indonesia — to be completed under President Johnson — the global pattern of the Kennedy administration period is waves of destabilizations, tampering in foreign elections, and other *typically Rockefeller* antics, directed not only against nominal opponents and adversaries, but against governments and parties that were nominally U.S. allies.

The further notable, foreign-policy and related heritages of the Kennedy administration include the following. (1) A sweeping reorganization of the Atlanticists' global intelligence establishment, deemphasizing the role of intelligence agencies under government control, in favor of neo-Fabian and linked Interpol private political intelligence and intelligence operations capabilities. McGeorge Bundy is among those traditional Rockefeller associates key in that process. (2) An acceleration of drastic policy changes within the U.S. Justice Department. Bobby Kennedy was at the center of this, but McGeorge Bundy, both in the administration and later through a Ford Foundation base, is of more substantial importance, as are the Russell Sage Foundation and its networks, plus the Fabian law firms associated with the liberal wings of the Democratic and Republican parties' "Eastern Establishment" bases in Washington and New York City. (3) An upgrading of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare as a base of neo-Fabian "destabilization" and related intelligence-style operations against both foreign allies and U.S. institutions and the U.S. population. The same hierarchy of foundations, law firms and key individuals involved in the Justice Department operation are prominent in this connection. (4) The institutionalizing of a future policy of "deindustrializing" the United States and our allies (e.g., "Triple Revolution").

The Kennedy administration represents a first attempt to launch the kind of intentionally-decisive successive confrontations with the Soviet leadership, along lines outlined in Henry Kissinger's earlier brinkmanship doctrinal piece, for which the present Carter Administration is an inflated parody, down to Jimmy Carter's cultivation of a "Kennedy coiffure."

As to the overall character of the Rockefellers' Kennedy administration, the following intersecting considerations are causal and on the surface.

As Henry Kissinger's famous 1957 paper attests — the document which associated him with the fictional "Dr. Strangelove" — the development of what U.S. Atlanticists viewed as a credible Soviet strategic de-

terrent capability, combined with the implications of a *projected* development of intercontinental ballistic missiles during the "Sputnik" period, pushed the Atlanticists' *utopians* toward a strategic policy of employing psychological warfare on a strategic scale.

This required a series of adventurous bluffs. In each bluff the U.S. political command must appear to have become sufficiently lunatic to launch thermonuclear war if the Soviets did not yield some significant concession. The rational, horrified Soviets, confronted with such lunacy, were supposed to make some significant concession in the direction of the confrontationists' demand. Next, using various concocted pretexts, the operation would be repeated, either with open thermocuclear confrontation, or the hint of such confrontation lurking visibly in the background. By a succession of such bluffs, it was proposed that the Soviets could be induced to retreat each time to a relatively more-weakened strategic posture, so that the ratio of potential resistance-effectiveness to the next would be reduced.

By such a succession of confrontations, the Soviet defense capability would be eroded, converging toward a level representing an acceptable risk of penalty for war from the Atlanticist standpoint. As a by-product of this process against the Soviet leadership, the other governments of the OECD and developing sectors would be left exposed and terrified, and thus malleable in face of Rockefellers' immediate austerity demands against them.

The *future* potential of Soviet economic and defense capabilities, the emergence of centrifugal tendencies on economic and monetary issues away from lower Manhattan among Europeans, and the 1957 recession, represented a configuration of developments and portents recommending some early draconian measures of counteraction by the Atlanticists. An implementation of the successive-confrontation-scenario against the Soviet leadership was the obvious keystone element for a broad range of measures and institutional changes.

The background to the Missile Crisis and related Kennedy capers is identified sufficiently by two noteworthy facts. The first is the fraudulent "missile gap" theme of the 1960 Kennedy campaign trail. The second is New York State Governor Nelson Rockefeller's campaign for building air-raid shelters. (9)

Someone, shall we say, had induced Khrushchev et al. to go against Soviet military doctrine, to opt for a reduction of the "conventional" war-fighting capa-

9. In a war, air-raid shelters around target cities would simply be tombs for the incinerated and suffocated dead, but the duping of the population into relying upon such useless objects convinces an adversary government that the U.S. population is to that degree politically conditioned — however credulously — to permit its government to make a confrontation.

bility in preference for a shift to a missile-centered "mutual strategic deterrence" capability. In fact, contrary to the fraudulent "missile gap" propaganda of the 1960 Kennedy campaign trail, the Soviets had so far developed only a token missile force relative to the U.S. capabilities. This Khrushchev period policy blunder left the Soviets for the intermediate-term in a relatively weakened strategic position, which Atlanticists might exploit in the near-term or probably never.

Ironically, the consequence of the 1961-1963 Kennedy capers was to discredit forever the proposal of a "mutual strategic deterrence" posture and U.S.-Soviet agreements within Soviet leading circles. The Soviet return to a Clausewitzian posture is associated — somewhat ironically — with the abrupt fall of N.S. Khrushchev. As one ought to know, Soviet agriculture has been a weak point in the political position of Soviet officials of Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's career history, such that it is difficult to assess from the outside how the combination of unsuccessful agricultural adventurism, unsuccessful posturing, the context of a suicidal military posture, and other special considerations — not all to Khrushchev's discredit — were proportioned in contributing to Khrushchev's dismissal. Nonetheless, the consequence of the Kennedy administration has been the Soviet and Warsaw Pact commitment to a thermonuclear war-winning capa-

bility — a development important to cite as illustration of the lawful tendencies which override the Atlanticists' estimations of the strategic process.

Since Kennedy, and since Senator Barry Goldwater's 1964 election campaign, excepting the forces behind the "Hallowe'en Massacre," no credibly large political force in the U.S. has mustered the gumption until now to seriously oppose directly the Rockefellers and their allies. Since President Gerald Ford backed down in face of a monstrous election fraud on the morning of November 3, 1976, amid blackmailing rumors from Rockefeller circles concerning Ford's alleged "KCIA taint," and since others predominantly, wishfully refused to believe up through Dec. 13, 1976 U.S. Labor Party warnings of what a Carter administration and its policies would be, we have the worst Democratic Party administration in a chain of horror-stories going back through Kennedy, Roosevelt, Wilson, Buchanan, Van Buren, and Andrew Jackson — with Republicans Theodore Roosevelt and Taft properly thrown into the collection. Unless forces are mustered adequate to change U.S. nominal policy now, the result may well be the physical extinction of our nation this year or next.

Monetarism leads to war, Atlanticism is its political doctrine, the doctrine of war, and Atlanticist "liberals" are its principal social base.



The drought-stricken Sahel in Africa, caused by the Rockefellers. The bare policy underlying the Rockefellers' Atlanticist Doctrine is to loot the world's agricultural-industrial base.

THE GEOPOLITICS OF ATLANTICISM

Thus far we have considered two sets of foreign-policy outlooks and practices, one Anglo-American monetarist and the other admissibly termed either "Constitutionalist" or "Whig." Now, to understand the fuller practical implications of the problem, we must consider the special feature of the "American Century" doctrine which warrants its self-characterization as an "Atlanticist Doctrine."

Taken at face value, as Walter Lippmann and others set forth their explanations of it, the "Atlantic Doctrine" is the most radical version of the *geopolitical* teachings associated inclusively with the name of Nazi Rudolf Hess's teacher, *Haushofer*. (10) On the surface, Lippmann's (Roosevelt's) conception of U.S. foreign policy is entirely a reductionist metaphysical structure derived from the most radical and most obsessively-seized axioms of the *Haushofer* school. This metaphysical concoction serves ostensibly as a purportedly plausible rationalization for the special self-interests of the lower Manhattan-based monetarists.

The fact that the metaphysical doctrine serves as a rationalization for monetarist interests, and that Fabian Lippmann is essentially a monetarist's hired intellectual thug in the tradition of James Mill and Jeremy Bentham, might suggest that this form of doctrine itself is merely a deliberate hoax. If one signifies by that that all the rationalization involved is therefore entirely hypocrisy on the part of the perpetrators, that conclusion would be mistaken.

Granted, wherever a Roosevelt (Lippmann) and other notable proponents of the document wish to press a policy which is in their faction's own naked self-interest and also visibly contrary to the vital interests of the United States, they consciously prefer to state the argument for the proposal or action in its geopolitical or other metaphysical disguises. Such conscious fraud, such hypocrisy is what we properly signify as exemplifying "the Wilsonian tradition." Such hypocrisy taken into account, for the rest of the matter they are, unfortunately, sincere. At its core, the Atlanticists' geopolitical doctrine is not merely false, but it is that special kind of false notion properly, rigorously defined as an *ideology*.

The metaphysical reductionism represented by the geopolitical Atlanticist Doctrine is the *guise for the ruling ideology of the combined force of the ruling monetarists and their broader liberal-to-radical social base*.

Strict epistemological distinctions are imperative if the problems involved are to be effectively understood for practical remedies. The Atlanticist Doctrine is *not in-and-of-itself* the ruling *core* ideology of that faction, but an appropriate reflection of the core ideology

respecting the configuration of problems the faction's leadership confronts in the domain of foreign policy. Other expressions of the same core ideology are Keynesian economics, pragmatism, behaviorism, and the mentality of a slum-landlord's overdressed attorney pleading the axiomatic sanctity of rent before a session of New York City Landlord-Tenant Court. Epistemologically, *the core ideology is the contemporary form of the nominalist world outlook*, in opposition both to the scholastic version of humanist *rationalism* and to the historically "neo-platonic" outlook of strict humanism which we, together variously with Thomas Gresham, Jean Bodin, John Milton, René Descartes, Benedict Spinoza, Benjamin Franklin, Hegel and Marx represent.

The rigorous epistemological approach is indispensable to comprehending how Atlanticist politics functions.

Such functions involve, most immediately, the processes governing the way leading Atlanticists think. This enables us to predict within a reasonable range of accuracy how the Atlanticist faction will behave. The Atlanticists are not governed by reason, not by a perception of actual cause-and-effect connections in the real world; they are governed by a false interpretation of the real world, a delusion, through which they mis-select and misdefine appearances as purported facts according to a mode which conforms to their nominalist ideology.

Hence, to predict the lawful trends in their behavior, we must be able to conceptualize models of the world which show how Atlanticists misperceive the real world.

This requires a method which must appear conceptually difficult to the novice at first encounter. It is the mastery of precisely this methodology, applied to the practical work of political intelligence, which has earned our organization its presently growing authority in matters of global political and related strategy, that cumulative if begrudged credibility we have secured in many fields of inquiry.

The problem demanding this method is in fact elementary, once the significance of a ruling ideology is recognized. On the one side, there is the real world. This is a world which, without the efficient, willful, ruling interventions of the Atlanticists, would tend to evolve patterns according to rational, universalizing principles of cause and effect. *We can imagine* such a world governed by forces more or less correctly committed to the discovery of those rational principles, and in which such ruling forces more or less correctly interpret both the consequences of actions as such, and the causal relationship between those consequences and preceding acts of deed or omission. However, under Atlanticists' domination of a highly influential aspect of the global process of development

10. The British authorship of the doctrine is, in fact, equally important, but less recognized popularly than *Haushofer's*.

in the real world, the course of events in the real world cannot proceed as would be the case in which the ruling forces were governed by self-improving “negative feedback” tendencies toward rationality.

To the extent that the ruling forces of the world are in significant part axiomatically irrational, we have the following rigorous form of problem in attempting to reduce the course of development to a lawful ordering.

Let E stand for *event*, and P for *perception* of the event, the *judgment* of the significance of the event. The perception of the nature of the event as such is inseparable in fact from an *implied anticipation* of the subsequent occurrence by the perceiving agency. Hence, E_1 leads to P_1 , such that P_1 leads to actions on the real domain, which actions lead to E_2 . P_1 has a real content (actually or potentially — virtually — distinct from its *subjective-error* content), such that the *real* content of the action taken on account of P_1 can be identified as *distinct from the imagined intent of the act*, and this real content designated by E_1' . Now E_1 , E_1' , and E_2 form a causal sequence of actions in a lawful, rational perception of the ordering of events. However, where P_1 is governed by an ideology, the rational implications of E_1 do not appropriately determine E_1' . Hence, although E_1' lawfully (causally) generates E_2 , E_2 is not the event generated by the alternative interpretation of E_1 from the standpoint of human self-interests.

Hence, analysis of an ideologically driven system of misperception produces a sequence of events which is not in correspondence with implications of a lawful perception of reality from the standpoint of real human interests. Nonetheless, the ideologically, irrationally driven sequence of interventions can always, and must be interpreted from the standpoint of rational knowledge of the lawful ordering processes in the real world.

The special feature next to be considered is that the cumulative effect of an ideologically driven set of P 's leads to E_n 's which are not in correspondence with the implied ideologically-anticipated consequences, P_n . However, still worse, actual E_n is then interpreted in the ideologically driven system of perceptions as P_{n+1} .

In the instance of a rational ruling force, the discrepancy between P_n and E_n , insofar as it is taken properly as evidence of some error in previously employed policy or method, causes a correction in the defective method. This is not necessarily the correct adjustment at each point, but the “negative feedback” action implied (to speak with admissible crudeness for this immediate purpose) is operative and thus more broadly characterizes the evolution of ruling policies and methods. In the case of the system

of perceptions driven by an ideology of an obsessive form, the implied “negative feedback” connection almost never causes a correction in the axiomatic features of policy and method, but leads to a (“positive feedback”) discarding of every collateral principle not axiomatic to the ideology, in the effort to save the ideology itself.

Fascist economy is the best available, most concentrated modern example of this behavior. The Felix Rohatyn-led approach to fascist *economic* methods of debt-rollover against New York City illustrates the same principle. Rather than correcting the immediate error of New York City's 1975 finances — that its economic base's capability for revenue-production had been not only stagnant, but actually eroded by pyramiding of debt, Rohatyn et al. proceeded to savagely destroy the economic base of the local economy in order to pyramid the unpayable debt still further.

At each point in the 1975-1977 process during which Rohatyn and his accomplices made a fresh innovation governed by the same depraved conceptions, the utter economic incompetence and inevitable consequences of each fresh innovation were properly blatantly obvious to any rational observer. Yet, the financiers, New York State's Governor Hugh Carey, the pathetic Mayor Beame administration, the cowardly City Council, and trade-union spokesman Victor Gotbaum plundered trade-union trust funds and looted the vital services of the city, plunging ever-ahead to new innovations more depraved and incompetent than the preceding atrocities. The mess, inevitably, is now monstrously worse as a result of the “remedies” than the original “disease” could ever have caused. *Obsessional “positive feedback.”*

This is identical to the logic leading from the Hitler-Schacht Mefo-Bill and “labor-intensive” *Arbeitsdienst* policies of 1933-1936 into World War II, and into the intensified application of the same labor-intensive methods in the slave-labor-death-camp system of approximately 1943-1945.

Like Felix Rohatyn et al., in the New York ugliness, the Nazis and their backers did not set out with a conscious perception of a consequent, subsumed policy which (inclusively) slaughtered six million Jews. Rather, clinging to the same (“positive feedback”) policy now being employed by Austrian Jewish refugee Felix Rohatyn to New York City, the Nazis were impelled, lawfully, step-by-step, to drive Rohatyn (to safety) out of Austria — he, thus, one of the fortunate ones — and to slaughter six million of the European Jews the safe-and-sound Rohatyn left behind.

The Nazi regime which accomplished those deeds was not only the creation inclusive of some of the same

financial interests with which Rohatyn is today associated as adopted representative, but the Nazi policy those financial powers built into Hitler's Germany is the same policy — the same monetarists' political doctrine — which Rohatyn is applying on their behalf to New York City. In principle, Rohatyn is implicitly, retroactively endorsing the murder of the six million European Jews he left behind to be slaughtered. *That is obsessive ideology.*

The associated process of moral degradation of the Nazis, exactly like that being exhibited by Rohatyn and his present associates in New York City, is elementary. At each point the axiomatic imperatives of the ideology come into practical conflict with some practical or moral principle representing the genuine self-interest of the nation or humanity, that principle is discarded, in order to maintain the obsessional practical imperatives demanded at that juncture by the ideology itself. *Hence, the "positive feedback" syndrome.*

The same method of analysis is mandatory for comprehending the policies of the Trilateral Commission and its puppet, Carter Administration.

Apply to the world and national economy the exact same principles Felix Rohatyn et al. have illustrated for the case of New York City. The ratio of the debt-service requirements of Chase Manhattan et al. to the absolute profit of the global and national economic basis has grown so monstrously large that this bankrupt mass of debt cannot be rolled over without looting wages, working conditions, essential social services, and also the circulating capital of agricultural and industrial production. The alternative, monetarists' methods of rollover through credit expansion can no longer be simply applied, since the ratio of debt-service requirements to the economic base has grown so monstrous that such credit expansion would immediately trigger an uncontrollable hyperinflationary spiral. The time span for the collapse of the monetary system through the latter option has become so short relative to the time span for deflationary collapse through successfully looting the economic base that the latter course, although itself totally insane, represents to the lower Manhattan and allied interests involved the best option for briefly prolonging their financial and political power in the world. *The same "positive feedback."*

Among the many features of the overall Trilateral package, properly first singled out for attention is the economic program itself. All the other features of the package are political and related derivatives of the economic policy.

The bare policy of the Rockefeller-led forces is that of looting the industrial-agricultural base of the national and global economy, a form of economic

auto-cannibalization of the stored-up productive potential represented in the form of existing plant, farms, mines, labor force. Through this they attempt to give a semblance of liquidity to U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve System (and IMF, Eurodollar) issuance of credit to the account of bankrupt, overextended paper, to the effect of postponing the reckoning of David Rockefeller's already insoluble and worsening condition of bankruptcy.

All the weird, lewd legislative and other packages, all the covert-operations gimmickry featuring elements such as terrorism and drug-decriminalization, all the permutations on the S-1 bill, all the corruption of our Federal courts, are merely tactical efforts to implement that hard-core economic package. Similarly, as we have shown, the Rockefeller impulsion toward World War III, the confrontationist adventures of the unstable Carter and his "mentor" Zbigniew Brzezinski, are ultimately nothing but a reflection of the same bare economic policy.

The principal political packaging of the bare economic policy takes the form of fostering political movements which *demand* the evil consequences of a Rockefellers' fascist economic policy as a matter of variously liberal and radical demands for improvement in the "quality of life." The prototype for such packages is the "Triple Revolution" *post-industrial society* thesis of the Ford Foundation's Fund for the Republic. The process of creating a semblance of a mass social base for the Rockefellers' fascist economic policies to this effect involves grafting *post-industrial* "quality of life" demands, as purported liberal and "radical" demands, upon a neo-Fabian-coordinated, "egalitarian" movement developed through Fabian manipulation of the Civil Rights ferment, and developed similarly through the relevant political-intelligence agencies' design and fostering of the so-called New Left ferment and its "scenario-molded" offshoots.

The germs of the "new radical" ferment were developed, in a coordinated way, out of the old Fabian political-intelligence networks in Western Europe and North America (principally), including Fabian nests in and around the old Americans for Democratic Action, the Socialist Party of America, the old *New Republic* orbit, with an overlapping hard-core of law firms and other networks springing chiefly from the Roosevelt administration. These contributed the seeds of the "grand scenario" through which the social ferment among university students and ghetto youth, the social by-product of the 1957 recession and its aftermath, were channelled through various, successive, variously programmed and almost-programmed scenarios into creating a New Left.

This scenario began, as any effective psychological manipulation of populations must do to be successful, with a relatively credible focal issue, civil rights for blacks in the southern states. (11) Once the southern civil rights movement had been developed among university youth strata in the northern centers, the doctrine of "Up South" was introduced (beginning with the judo tactic of the Woolworth picketing campaign), to deploy the white university-youth civil rights activists and their indispensable core-seeding of radical organizations into the ghettos of the northern cities.

By maintaining a climate of confrontation throughout, first in the southern states, and then in the northern ghetto activities, the liberal attorneys, the Rockefeller- and Rothschild- denominated funding and policy conduits intervened as the "good guy" allies of the duped and manipulated activists, against the "bad guys," the also-manipulated conservatives. On the latter count, the important counter-gang role of William Buckley and his nests becomes clear.

The actual, root problem of the northern ghettos and so forth was chiefly a stagnation of the nation's industrial growth, a monetarist system of real estate finance implanted in the U.S. through importation of British and Dutch influences, and a correlated degradation of the northern cities notably as economic entities. By diverting the issue focus away from the American principles of industrial progress to the Fabian proposition of equitable "redistribution" of existing economic decay, the white liberal and radical youth associated (most prominently) with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Ford Foundation and Russell Sage Foundation projects, were *sensuously conditioned* in a climate of low-grade confrontation into an anti-industrial, *actually proto-fascist* mass of white radicals and lumpen youth — in the image of the 1920s Weimar Germany counter-cultural ferment on which the Nazi *Jugendbewegung* ("youth movement") was based.

The attempts to crush — and later assassinate — Reverend Martin Luther King, the issuance of the "Triple Revolution" *post-industrial society* thesis, the role of Fabian operative Stokely Carmichael in the "Rap" Brown "Black Power" turn, the killing of Malcolm X, and the first introductions of the Nazi *Volksgemeinschaft* policy and related doctrines of "community control" and "cultural nationalism," were all exemplary, coordinate expressions of the degree and form of molding of "new radical" outlooks in a proto-fascist direction by the middle of the 1960s.

In this process, the Kennedy administration was crucial. It was the Rockefellers' "Kennedy Mafia" which provided the essential circumstances and much of the impetus for this hideous "attitudinal conditioning" of much of our nation's youth, both before and after Kennedy's decease.

The internal social convulsions produced by the prolongation of the Vietnam War provided the energizing climate, through which, around the catalyst of the "Anti-War Movement," broader layers of liberals were directly infused with the ideologies planted among the mid-1960s ghetto-oriented radical activists. The role of the Socialist Workers Party is one of the most accessible paradigms for this process.

The 1968 New York City teachers' strike, and related convulsions throughout the nation at that time — including the provocateur-steeped, orchestrated affair at the 1968 Chicago Democratic Convention — are crucial to understanding this process.

The fact that the hard-core of the developing proto-fascist movement included such traditionally "Marxist" organizations as the Communist Party (after 1966) and the Socialist Workers Party (throughout), prompts special attention to the fact that the traditional socialist outlook is toward the organized labor movement, and to the organization of the unorganized into trade-union formations affiliated or allied with other trade unions generally. Yet, the characteristic impulse of the "Up South" movement from the beginning was bitterly anti-labor.

The Socialist Workers Party, which no longer had a significant practical interest within the trade-union organizations, quickly adapted to this anti-labor impulse. The Communist Party, whose gate-receipts still significantly depended upon a proportionately significant base in trade unions, could not make such a transition toward an anti-labor impulse credible to its membership until approximately 1966-1967. In 1968, every nominal socialist organization left over from the 1930s and 1940s but the Socialist Party of America openly and consciously *led* an effort dedicated to breaking up the largest single municipal trade-union in the U.S. (It happened also to be a major trade-union base of the New York SP of A organization.) Furthermore, those nominal socialists and their accomplices were consciously dedicated already to breaking up municipal unions and construction unions throughout the U.S. in behalf of the same "community control" policy of union-busting.

Excepting the 1970 Cambodia affair, the Nixon election of 1968 took the steam out of the anti-war movement and corresponded to a sharp ebbing away from the various radicalisms characteristic of the Johnson administration. The mass youth activism of the pre-1969 period was frustrated, worn out. This

11. We have analyzed the civil rights movement in an issue of *The Campaigner* devoted to that subject ("What Happened to Integration?", Vol. VIII, No. 8, Aug. 1975, pp. 5-40).

ebbing of a social force in motion did not, however, frustrate the manipulators working from behind the scenes. On the contrary, such a development represents the optimal circumstance for diverting the duped, frustrated strata formerly engaged in "mass action" into zealots for the broadest assortment of exotic absurdities.

Around the 1968 presidential nomination campaigns of Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy, these frustrated layers were diverted toward such new focal issues as "environmentalism." The demoralization was used, for example, to feed the 1969 development of the "feminist movement," repeating the civil-rights syndrome of using a legitimate reformist issue as a "judo tactic" of social manipulation, to infuse (and proceed to re-direct) the "feminist movement" with assorted neo-Fabian's utopian imbecilities. The imbecilities, at first broadly rejected as obscene by most among women's rights forces, grew less alien to their perception with constant contact, and even became defended as a matter of defending "a part of the women's movement" against a common "male" outsider. Meanwhile, by 1968, the fostering of the use of marijuana, launched among the "Up South" strata during the earlier 1960s, had begun to become part of the tenets of the liberal-radical "sub-culture," and the foot-in-the-door for promoting LSD.

With the aid of influential law firms and powerful foundations and other allied forces, this youth "sub-culture," although a minority force, was transformed into the labile, manipulable, mobile battering ram used to spread its poisonous ideology not only among liberal and ghetto populations, but into the industrial unions. This social force, now organically fascist in world outlook, has been the indispensable auxiliary through which the National Environmental Policy Act has been turned, with the growing complicity of the courts, into an instrument both for sabotaging our industrial and agricultural production, and for creating a climate in which this treason against our nation's most vital interests is hegemonic in the present Carter Administration.

It will probably be objected by some that our account of this aspect of national history is too coherent, too rational, "too theoretical." It will be objected by some that we imply (as, in fact we do not), a power and capacity for systematic thinking to Rockefeller and associated circles which is visibly far beyond the capabilities of a Nelson, David or John D. III (we have not profiled Laurance). Some will make the further objection, since such forces were incapable of such coherent *intent*, it could not have happened in quite that way. *This involves precisely the issue of method we outlined above.*

When a member of one's family is ill, does one seek

account of the disease from the victim or the medical profession? Does the fact that the person afflicted with the illness *lacks the knowledge* to undergo *willfully* the lawful sequence of biological processes involved signify that the disease has not developed, or has not developed in at least approximately the way medical professional knowledge stipulates? Does one assay a rock by asking the rock its opinion, or by employing a geologist?

In fact, the way in which the transformation of liberal and radical youth into today's proto-fascist "environmentalists" and drug-decriminalizers occurred was a mixture of *overall* Fabian-utopian social planning, and *in detail* largely successive improvisations of the moment by those neo-Fabian operatives immediately involved. Our direct knowledge, documentation from relevant archives, highly-placed informants, and published sources of each period more or less accurately defines that mixture. Insofar as the isolated features of the process appeared to have a "hit-or-miss" character *from the standpoint of the consciousness of the controllers involved, the set of underlying ideological axioms governing their judgment delimited the range of "hit-or-miss" choices made at a net predominance of points*, and thus had an overall "positive feedback" effect of a corresponding "Markov process." The net effect of *the overall process, deployed on a large scale*, had a predictable *overall* evolution in terms of the method of analysis we summarized above. (12)

One applies something like the same approach proper to study of the behavior of lower forms of animal life. The *conceptions of choice or future* as we know it do not exist for lower animals. Yet, their choices and chains of behavior over time are essentially predictable — by the hunter, ethologist, and so forth, *but not the animal itself*. One must think, for emphasis, of the Rockefeller-Fabian *beast*, and of the problem of analyzing the lawful features and predictable behavior of that *beast*; then one has the broad notion of the method applicable.

Would the same emphasis be appropriate to ruling rational human institutions? As we have described the method, no. As we shall see, there are the most powerful epistemological reasons for applying the methods

12. Carol LaRouche and L. Marcus, "The New Left, Local Control and Fascism," *The Campaigner*, Vol. I, No. 4 (Sept. 1968), pp. 10-33, repr. in *Strategy for Socialism Volume I* (New York: Campaigner Publications, Inc., 1973), pp. 72-82; "SDS Beyond the Grave," *The Campaigner*, Vol. II, No. 3 (Sept.-Oct. 1969), pp. 2-16; *The Third American Revolution* (New York: Campaigner Publications, Inc., 1969), p. 15 ff., 21-22; "'Police Socialism' in NYC," *The Campaigner*, Vol. I, No. 5 (Dec. 1968), pp. 15-26; L. Marcus, "The Mass Strike," *The Campaigner*, Vol. I, No. 3, May-June 1968, pp. 3-11, 31-35.

of ethology, rather than proper anthropology, to the neo-Fabian *beast*. (13)

Today, the *economic* policy of the proto-fascist liberal-radical “left” centers around the topics of “environmental protection,” zero growth, and “small is better.” *These explicitly represent fascist economic ideology*. Once the direct relationship of such fascist liberal-radical hoodlumism to David Rockefeller’s interests is recognized, one is not astonished that the Rockefellers and their allies have funded, coddled and otherwise fostered the inspiring and molding of the neo-Fabians’ fascist liberal-radical upsurge which presently confronts us.

The Rockefellers’ energy policy has a double aspect. The traditional standpoint of the petroleum *marketing* monopolies’ financial backers and controllers has been to hold back production in order to increase the rate of profit on the marketing of each barrel, both by monopolistically jacking up the price at which the marketing monopoly delivers petroleum, and, whenever possible, by keeping their purchase-price down by creating a condition of actual or potential competitive oversupply at the point of constricted production. (“gas wars) aside.) In this and equivalent ways, the financier forces associated with a hegemonic position in world marketing of petroleum squeeze marginal profits from *both* the consumer *and* the producer. Insofar as the Rockefellers represent both petroleum-marketing interests (although they incidentally control major producers, they do not represent a producer-interest overall), and also monetarist financier interests, their decades-old approach to energy policy has this traditional double aspect.

This double aspect concentrates at a middle point best illustrated by the 1973-1974 petroleum hoax. The net flow of funds as dollar-denominated deposits into the accounts of Rockefeller and allied institutions represented income not *immediately* consumed by the exporting economies, and hence was in the form of deposits to strengthen the otherwise indefensibly overextended position of the Rockefeller and allied finan-

cial interests. What was most significant financially was the abrupt *enlargement* of this flow of dollar-denominated deposits through such institutions. This enlargement was crucial, since the preceding flows were part of the insufficiency which represented the instability of the base of the financial institutions involved. The other economic side of the price increase was that the added income came from savagely depleting the circulating capital of industry and agriculture in the non-oil-exporting, or net-consuming nations. Since the global economic base involved was already in a depression *taken as a whole*, a purely temporary rollover of the Rockefellers’ and others’ overextended positions slashed further — often deeply — in its destruction of circulating capital. This reduced the overall ability of the debtors to pay, making the subsequently expanded mass of refinanced paper vastly more overextended. “*Positive feedback*.”

From any rational standpoint, it represents a hopeless, hopelessly insane spiral, but each time the Rockefellers and their allies go to that well they bring back a moment or so of further postponement of their ultimately inevitable financial collapse. *Again*, “*positive feedback*.”

The present Rockefeller-Ford Foundation-Schlesinger energy proposal projects the policy-implications of such Rockefeller looting of the United States in an obvious way. In order to roll over the Rockefellers’ and others’ worthless paper yet once again — for a short time — they require a massive refinancing of the International Monetary Fund — so that the IMF may in turn loot the contributing governments’ treasuries with hyperinflationary consequences, to finance various nations’ unpayable debt service to Chase Manhattan Bank.

It requires more. It requires also a massive augmentation of the deposits put through bankrupt financial institutions. Hence, we have witnessed the Rockefellers’ effort to get through the International Resources Bank swindle (a direct imitation of Hjalmar Schacht’s Mefo Bill swindle), and such token “foot-in-

13. That, as we have reported it, is the way it happened. That is not a surmise, an inference. *This writer was there, a direct observer of many of the principal events and personalities involved at each turn*. It was merely necessary to enrich one’s knowledge of the significance of McGeorge Bundy’s and other visible controllers’ roles and connections by research after the fact, to uncover the connections which accounted for the way they behaved in practice at each point. The archives of Eric Gerlach, exposing certain relevant leaders of the American “left” as long-standing Fabian agents dating back to World War II, are illustrative of the kind of background research involved. This writer has lived through the 1920s as a child, aware of that era’s values, the 1930s as a youth, and from the end of World War II went through such relevant experiences as the American Veterans Committee, the campus Americans for Democratic Action, parts of the labor movement experience, the 1940s through 1970s socialist

movement, and was himself an increasingly active participant, and opponent of neo-Fabianism in key related developments of the 1960s, experiencing and fighting against what then most often first appeared to be inexplicably irrational sudden turns to new firm convictions among those varying grades of influential figures with whom he was acquainted. Since 1966, he has been the founder and leader of a growing organization at the center of struggles against the neo-Fabians of our liberal and radical strata, leading an organization of limited physical but extraordinary and expanding research and related capabilities, which itself has experienced the most relevant experiences of the 1960s. Although the account we have presented is condensed for obvious reasons here, every aspect of it is authoritatively based on a massive, accumulated detailed record of combined direct observation and authoritative documentation. That is the way it happened.

the-door" efforts to the same effect as the so-called "Common Fund." Hence, the Rockefellers' energy policy — the Carter-Schlesinger energy policy prepared with the aid of McGeorge Bundy's Ford Foundation: to force a massive rise in internal U.S. petroleum and natural gas prices, much larger than the 1973-1974 leap, and hope to do the same with Third World and other primary commodities, to repeat the refinancing swindle of 1973-1974 on a broader scale.

This same package has an auxiliary, devilish implication. Since the per capita energy-throughput of industry correlates with the level of productive technology overall, by driving up energy prices to parity with the price of uneconomical solar power, and by simultaneously blocking fission energy and other augmentation of energy availability, the Carter Administration creates a climate (if that is allowed) in which maintenance of modern technology becomes increasingly impossible. If Carter can push his energy program through the Congress, the combined forces of industry, trade unions, and farmers will have thereby lost meaningful legal power to resist a policy of deindustrialization and driving back of agriculture toward more primitive forms of production.

Rockefeller has demanded the same policy for Western Europe, for Japan, and throughout the developing sector. If that combined energy policy and IMF-refinancing were to go through, the combined OECD and developing nations (or, most of them), including the United States itself, *would soon be under firm fascist-economic rule by the Rockefellers and allied interests.*

The other principal features of the Trilateral package are, as we have stipulated above, political and social derivatives of the Rockefellers' fascist economic policy.

The most prominent, and broadest feature of the Trilateral program is the proposal that the present economic situation precludes the toleration of continued forms of republican and parliamentary rule. The Trilateraloids' demand "command economies" — e.g., regimes paralleling David Rockefeller's Chilean Pinochet regime, with its fascist policies as specified by Milton Friedman.

The reason for Rockefellers' proposal of a reign of dictatorships throughout the OECD and developing sectors — including the USA — is that *no form of representative government can implement the protracted process of the policy of hyperinflationary austerity to the point of deliberate genocide against major portions of its population and destruction of its industrial and agricultural productive capabilities in the service of an alien (Rockefeller) interest.*

This coincides with John D. Rockefeller III's zero

growth movement— *the final solution to the over-population question.*

It is a policy to reduce the population of the United States to the order of 100 million persons, and to reduce the global population to the order of not exceeding two billion persons — within more or less the relatively near term. There are only two ways to effect such a policy. One is by wars and mass murder directly. The other is by unleashing biological catastrophe in the form of famine and associated waves of epidemics.

Rockefeller interests are not proposing to wipe out a couple of billion human beings because the Pocantico Estate in New York is itself becoming oppressively overcrowded. They are proposing genocide because their economic policies — their global hyperinflationary austerity policies — have the inevitable consequence of producing the conditions of famine and epidemics in which that result must occur. *Zero growth — the fraudulent "overpopulation" doctrine — is a political movement designed to make the genocidal consequences of hyperinflationary austerity acceptable to a sufficient force within the population that the imminence of such consequences will not evoke an effective revolt against the hyperinflationary-austerity policies.*

The "small is better" and the allied "local community control" movements are of the same form. These fascist social movements are not developed by Rockefeller and allied forces because the Rockefellers themselves have, necessarily, some compelling desire to enjoy fascism, but because a population which tolerates such fascist social policies is a population which cannot effectively resist, and will probably tolerate the effects of deindustrialization and other forced breakdown of the nation's productive forces.

Otherwise, prompted by memories of Franklin Roosevelt's blocked efforts to pack the Supreme Court, the Fabians have systematically corrupted the Federal and other courts, and large segments of the legal profession. The advantage of this is obvious. The U.S. Constitution has the most powerful explicit and associated authority empowering any honest federal court system to act as a defense of last resort against the fascist criminality which Rockefeller's Carter Administration is attempting to impose. In the event that the Congress, as well as the executive, capitulated to Rockefeller's treason, the Supreme Court has the authority to block fascism. However, if the Supreme Court is itself sufficiently corrupted, that bastion is removed, *and as in Weimar, becomes an instrument for treason.*

How, then, is it possible that a government of the United States — the Executive Branch and part of the

U.S. Congress, as well as sections of the federal courts up to the Supreme Court itself — could implement or even condone *such treason against the United States and such monstrous repudiation of the clearest and most fundamental specifications of natural law?*

The answer to such questions will be made clearer as we turn now, directly to the specifications of the Atlanticist Doctrine as a geopolitical metaphysics.

In the preceding major topical sections, we considered predominantly the *real* content of Atlanticist doctrine, as a monetarist self-interest which developed into an alliance of the monetarist forces based principally in the City of London and lower Manhattan, and which established its political dominance over the government of the United States. The Atlanticist system and its policies have been examined thus as a consistent but internally contradictory Anglo-American monetarists' alliance, in behalf of the attempt at world domination by their monetarist power, but accompanied by factional struggles between (growing) Manhattan and (weakening) City of London forces for hegemony within that monetarist world order.

Now, that monetarists' alliance, in its form as a political alliance between the monetarists of the United States and the United Kingdom as a nation, is at the point of breaking apart. The looting of the economy of the United Kingdom and of the City of London's Commonwealth-sterling base by lower Manhattan-based forces has reached the point at which the looted British forces are coming to view themselves as suffering relative to lower Manhattan today, the position inverting that of the rebelling North American English colonies and United States during 1763-1863. In contemporary political-science usages, one says that today's United Kingdom is among those nations of Western Europe (plus Japan) which are moving toward "Gaullist" opposition to the Rockefellers' Carter Administration.

It is illustrative of that circumstance that during the first half of last year, one leading executive of a major London bank observed to this writer that lower Manhattan was blindly repeating the past mistakes of the London bankers. It is also illustrative of the same point, that at about the same time we received that cited comment, a leading British parliamentarian observed that the point of crisis had not yet quite been reached — at that moment — at which new forces fermenting within the British labor movement would manifest themselves in defense against the monetarist-imposed hyperinflationary austerity. We see how matters have progressed since then.

Since that time, the Giulio Andreotti government and its international role of the June 1976 through

January 1977 period have triggered the chain of events which is tending to turn most of Western Europe to "Gaullist" opposition to Rockefellers' monetary and austerity policies, and correlated opposition to Carter Administration strategic and covert-operations adventures.

At this juncture, were this writer the President of the United States, he would be developing a transatlantic alliance — not because of, but despite Lippmann's doctrine — and would be in intimate collaborative discussions with Messrs. Callaghan, Schmidt, Andreotti and others to this effect. Our past enemy has not been the United Kingdom as such, the competitor to our present vital economic self-interests is not England as such — nor continental Western Europe nor Japan. The thrust of emerging "Gaullist" tendencies in Western Europe and Japan converge on coincidence with our own nation's most vital, immediate interests. (Unfortunately, at the moment of writing, the "Gaullist" thrust is only a tendency, and not yet a consolidated set of institutions appropriate to its implied goals.)

Even the old Fabians of Western Europe, without yet freeing themselves of ingrained nominalist habits, are tending to become almost semi-Gaullists, in opposition on many practical issues and corresponding overall self-perception to the lunatic neo-Fabians based in the United States. Among British Fabians, since especially 1975, their growing perception of the Rockefellers' neo-Fabianism is that the traditions of Rothschild, Palmerston, the Russells and the Webbs have been extrapolated far beyond toleration.

England, to single out the feature of the present situation most relevant to the immediate discussion, has come around, *albeit two hundred years late*, toward recognizing the merits of Benjamin Franklin's persisting advice to the British parliamentarians during the decades preceding 1776. In southern Africa, for example, the Callaghan government, in healthy tendency towards repudiation in fact both of the vile precepts of Adam Smith and of the Carter Administration's policies, shows an impulse toward Franklin's proposed, urgent English reforms of the mid-eighteenth century.

England, in concert with other leading forces in Western Europe, and in parallel to powerful thrusts emanating from industrialist interests in Japan, is edging — if ever-cautiously, uncertainly — toward the financial and economic policies of Alexander Hamilton. In sum, *the United States, as a nation, now has the opportunity to secure finally the foreign policy objectives of the American Revolution and its Constitution.*

Lippmann's (Roosevelt's) Atlanticist Doctrine predominantly denies that such a lawful development

would be possible. From the standpoint of the real processes and interests operating, the history of the rise of monetarism in the United States and the Anglo-American monetarists' alliance of the two governments they controlled is explicitly comprehensible in the main from the standpoint of perceiving as central the *real* aspect of the special self-interests of the monetarist factions based in lower Manhattan and the City of London. However, as the current tendency of the United Kingdom to break away from such a policy illustrates, the continuation of the Atlanticist Doctrine is in no one's *objective* net interests — even the Rockefellers' — over the clearly-defined relatively near-term.

At that point, we encounter that feature of Atlanticism which is pure irrationality, the metaphysics of the Doctrine itself.

It is in this respect that the geopolitical metaphysics and its root, core ideology must be brought into focus.

Although this analysis demands formal criticism of the geopolitical doctrine itself, such criticism is inadequate to our practical purpose by itself. The fact that a few lunatics in ruling positions adhere to such a special doctrine fails to account for the ability of such creatures to mobilize substantial political forces of a nation's people to *support* such monstrous nonsense (the liberals and radical fringe) or to *tolerate* it (a large, vacillating if grumbling portion of the Republican and Democratic conservatives). We are obliged to examine the connection between the geopolitical doctrine and susceptibility represented by the more widely diffused core ideology upon which the effectiveness of the geopolitical doctrine depends.

The direct connection between the geopolitical doctrine and the core ideology was developed and is to be best comprehended historically in terms of the drastic shift in world outlook which caused a profound philosophical differentiation between England and the American English colonies over the (predominantly)

1660-1776 period. That differentiation was replicated in the United States, beginning with the Jacksonian period, and was consolidated to the extent it presently prevails from, most notably, the last decade of the past century.

The thrust underlying the rise of capitalism during the sixteenth century was a conscious, *neo-platonic humanism* concentrated at that time in England, France and the low countries. It was predominantly *Erasmian humanism*, but Erasmianism incorporated under its broader basis for included factional coalitions, more vigorous — more rigorous — currents of epistemology leading through Ficino and others into Descartes and Spinoza. Advancing beyond the relatively prudent representation of Ghibelline humanism in Dante Alighieri's *De Monarchia* — which World Federalists and kindred cranks have attempted to coopt groundlessly into their hagiolatry — the leading English, French, and Dutch humanists envisaged not semi-autarkical national economies, but nations within a world order based essentially on neo-platonic principles. The content of their perception of the impulse toward proper natural law appropriate to such a world order must be understood as distinct from the scholastic (Aristotelian) or *rationalist* notion of natural law and universal order based on such law.

In undertaking this course of inquiry here, we cannot be rebuked for going far beyond the ostensible range of topics and related arguments on which Lippmann and others explicitly depend in articulating their Atlanticist Doctrine's geopolitical axioms. If we expose these issues here in an admittedly rigorous fashion, Lippman and his co-factioneers insist on explicitly preempting the same topical areas ignorantly. The distinction between a rigorous consideration of these topics and Lippmann's superficial skidding through the same areas, with a grease of simple-minded and false "truisms," is crucial to understanding the practical side of the dynamics of Atlanticist and relevant irrational political behavior.

Humanism and Aristotelianism

As we have noted above, and have developed the point in other published locations, the past eight centuries of Mediterranean-European culture — the present world culture — are rigorously characterized by the contention among three principal epistemological currents.

The implicit outlook of the first, the *scholastic or Aristotelian outlook*, was already embedded in feudal relations, as exemplified by Charlemagne's inventory of the realm and the Norman Domesday Book. This presumed an essentially fixed mode of technology of production and consumption (beast-likeness), in which the *humanist* distinction between man and the lower beasts was dependent principally on the religious concept of the metaphysical *rationality* of man, the institutionalized religious aspect of feudal relations which Thomas Aquinas and others made conscious as the premise for the *scholastic doctrine of humanism*.

Medieval Scholasticism or Aristotelianism developed as a *conscious* outlook *after* the emergence of its immediate opponent, the neo-platonic or Averroean or Avicennian (Ibn Sina) influence, as a major intellectual force in Europe. Avicenna identified the creative processes of scientific discovery and informed practice as both the fundamental distinction between man and the lower beasts, and also a reflection, in his explicit argument to that effect, of the fundamental ordering-principle of the universe. As typified most early by the case of Franciscan Roger Bacon (not the wretched, later *Francis* Bacon), the

Avicennian or neo-platonic outlook, *true humanism*, constituted an immediate practical threat to the feudal order. Thus, the feudal Inquisition was launched against the Avicennians, including Roger Bacon, and, in the course of attempting to develop an intellectual defense, an intellectual inoculation against the experienced power of neo-platonic humanism, Thomas Aquinas, ironically a creative intellect of unusual power in his own right, became the doctrinal rallying-point for the ideological defense of the Inquisition. (14) This Inquisition was politically predominantly a feudal counterrevolution against the emerging capitalist *implications* of neo-platonism.

Despite the feudal basis of the Inquisition, the powerful, objective impulses of technological development were already under way at the point of the launching of that Inquisition. The thirteenth century and later institutions of Edwardian reforms in England, and the accompanying influx to England of the so-called "Lombard" mercantile bankers, typify the organic undermining of feudalism and the power of the feudal church in the emergence of the proto-capitalist doctrine of alienable property-forms.

The counterrevolutionary or feudal reaction of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was thus not

14. Criton Zoakos, "Western Civilization's Debt to the Arab Renaissance," delivered at the National Convention of the U.S. Labor Party in New York City, Dec. 8, 1976; Helga Zepp, "European-Arab Cooperation from Avicenna to the Nationalization of Aramco," delivered at the European Conference of the European Labor Party in Wiesbaden, West Germany, Jan. 8, 1977.

purely feudal, but embodied an alliance between those feudal forces and monetarist bankers typified by the dominant financial houses, the Bardi and Peruzzi.

The Bardi, official bankers to the papacy, put England and France — as well as Italy and other feudal powers — under monstrously accelerating indebtedness. The catapulting debt-burdens, as in the process leading to the English foreign-debt repudiation of the fourteenth century, were maintained throughout Europe through spiralling rates of primitive accumulation against the feudal productive basis. The inevitable genocidal consequences of the Inquisition's defeat of the Hohenstaufen and other humanist-influenced factions on behalf of the feudal-banker faction, were the developing of the conditions of famine and serf-lumpenization which led to the mid-fourteenth century Black Death.

Out of the Black Death breakdown (wiping out one-third to one-half of the population of central Europe) emerged the broader influence of *nominalism*. To understand the subsequent spread of the doctrine of nominalism from the relatively isolated intellectual influences such as muddleheaded William of Ockham, one must look at fourteenth-century Europe more deeply, and consider such phenomena as the "flagellants" and other broad evidence of the crisis-breakdown of belief in rationality.

We restate and develop these and related points here, because it is indispensable to build up the conceptual instruments required to master the clinical-historiographical point immediately at hand.

The lawfulness and deeper implications of the contention and interplay among these three distinct epistemological currents is demonstrated by situating the specific developments of Europe's thirteenth through sixteenth century cultural development in its broader, determining context, the approximate 2,500 years of Mediterranean-littoral and European culture since Thales. In that overall span of the development of present world culture, there are the same three epistemological currents reflected as dominant intellectual forces throughout. The case of art, since art is the mode by which the people of a culture celebrate their sense of identity, is not only the most accessible form of overall, historical illustration of the point, but is in fact an epistemologically rigorous approach to the questions immediately involved.

All of the major art forms of that 2,500 years of our cultural heritage are analytically incomprehensible except as we view them as the contention and interplay of three distinct "moods" and epistemological outlooks precisely corresponding in characteristic features to the Aristotelian, humanist and nominalist outlooks. These are, to employ the appropriate classical archetypes, the *apollonian* (Aristotelian), *promethean* (humanist) and *dionysian* (nominalist)

moods. The immediate correspondence between each of these artistic moods and the corresponding epistemological outlook is formally and historically lawful.

The same epistemological problem is key and relevant to the present crisis within the physical sciences. The prevailing institutionalized scientific view has been predominantly shifted until recently from the relativist thrust behind the nineteenth century's development of the notion of a relativistic physics around a "theory of functions" (e.g., Fourier, Gauss, Weierstrass, Riemann, Cantor, Klein, Pasteur, et al.), toward a reactionary notion whose factional position was temporarily consolidated around the Rockefeller and Rothschild protégés of the Copenhagen school and the wretched Solvay conference. Recent Soviet announcements have begun to reverse that trend globally.

Experimental and related theoretical work of the nineteenth century had produced the germinal notions of *relativism* (e.g., Gauss, Weierstrass, Riemann, Cantor, Pasteur, et al.), and the confrontation with the fundamental crisis-ridden paradox of Lagrangian and Maxwellian physics in the ambiguous guise of both Boltzmann's work (15) and the epistemologically-cognate Planck definition of the quantum.

Although Planck's discovery is popularly misrepresented in most educated circles as upholding the Copenhagen and related empiricist and positivist doctrines, in fact it has exactly the opposite implication. Planck's discovery of an additional arbitrary element necessary to import to the old physics to "glue it together" despite contradictory evidence, the quantum, was a crucial-experimental proof of the bankruptcy of the old physics, and worse bankruptcy of the wretched epistemological Frankenstein-monster which Niels Bohr and others constructed — with a bit of thuggery against critics such as Erwin Schrödinger thrown in — in the effort to mobilize a counterrevolution (inquisition) against the relativist thrust within existing advanced physics.

From the standpoint of microphysics, the attack on the crisis presented to physics by Planck's work was obliged to proceed toward one, and only one intermediate objective. To make short of identifying the point, that intermediate task is identified by Schrödinger's and related work concerning the so-called psi-function.

This is no mere illustration of a point, but, as we shall show, bears directly on the underlying problem of the scholastic-humanist-nominalist outlooks in the most direct, practical and rigorous way.

15. Morris Levitt, "Linearity and Entropy: Ludwig Boltzmann and the Second Law of Thermodynamics," *Fusion Energy Foundation Newsletter*, Vol. II, No. 2 (Sept. 1976), pp. 3-18.

The negentropic quality of living processes, and most notably the crucially-demonstrated relationship of human creative (negentropic) synthesis of new knowledge to man's historical mastery of material processes, demonstrates that there must be an additional magnitude of energy of some kind in material processes above and beyond the magnitude implied by notions such as the "conservation of energy." The Aristotelian or apollonian outlook denies this in respect to physical processes, and explains away the crucial evidence contrary to such asserted denials by relegating the unexplained aspect of reality to the metaphysical realm. The best comprehension of universal reality, of a universal lawful ordering of physical processes possible to the Aristotelian or apollonian view, is that of pre-ordained (epistemologically) fixed universal fields and also fixed, self-evident particles existing within such fields.

The Planck discovery situated the empirical location (at least, the empirical location properly next-to-be-explored) of the field-particle absurdities of Maxwellian physics in respect to these internal field aspects of particles themselves, which supplied an additional source of energy beyond that ostensibly existent in the thermodynamic assembly-relationships of what may be regarded as more or less "classical" Lagrangian and also Maxwellian physics.

This is the same problem which determined the inevitable bankruptcy of the Einstein-Weyl program for developing a solution to the unified-field problem. On the astronomical scale, as Parpart has developed the point, (16) the "big bang" doctrine flowing rigorously from presently most-accredited methods of interpreting the crucial evidence leads to a related demonstration of the relevant absurdity within the axiomatic features of the *Aristotelian* method itself.

By taking only the simplest (and crudest) included variant-case within the broader whole of Riemannian physics, the Gaussian affine or "tiling" approximation in the microphysical domain of, ostensibly, an otherwise relativistic macro- and astronomical ordering, Einstein-Weyl ignorantly represented themselves as having developed a relativistic conception of physics, being equally wrong in their conceit that Einstein's relativistic physics was in fact Riemannian, as Parpart outlines that point. The microphysical structure of the Einstein-Weyl program is epistemologically a degenerate, hypothesized condition, which condition is explicitly Aristotelian (anti-relativistic), and which implicitly determines that the Einstein-Weyl macro and astronomical programs are also permeated with the same, most devastating, "hereditary" fallacy.

Unless we experimentally and theoretically comprehend the microphysical interpenetration of field and particle as both coherent and negentropic, physics falls apart epistemologically whenever a corresponding experimental or related practical condition is encountered. Hence, Schrödinger's and related work, focusing on topics centering around the psi-function, represented the crucial, intermediate experimental-theoretical nexus at which the further progress of science respecting physics fundamentals was inescapably determined.

It is agreed that neither the pre-Descartes scientific investigators nor the founders of our republic based their political and philosophical conceptions on such explicit forms of contemplation of physical science as such (although Benjamin Franklin himself verges upon being an exception to this). However, as we are emphasizing here, just as crucial evidence concerning living processes and the historical crucial-experimental evidence of man's secularly-increasing dominion over nature is the mandatory practical and theoretical basis for guiding the investigations of physics, our forefathers were essentially neo-platonic humanists who approached politics in terms of a method which is today most relevantly illustrated by resort to the same method of approach to the epistemological side of physical science fundamentals. The issue is the nature of man and of the physical universe, and the interconnection of these two interpenetrating aspects in a truly coherent way, thus uniquely providing the rigorous basis for certainty in the determination for knowledge of what is *natural law*.

The epistemological argument concerning physics has recently been demonstrated experimentally most clearly in connection with negentropic categories of "non-linear effects" in plasma physics and related work. Applying these newly developed plasma-physics methods to the recent shift in global weather patterns, we and our collaborators have been driven, as a by-product of that concern, to effect the beginnings of an overturning of the prevailing doctrines of meteorology, showing how the overlooked element of the determination of stable vortex-systems in the atmosphere makes the existence of weather patterns dependent upon the negentropic "added energy" supplied by living ecologies, ecologies which man can regulate to produce the desired weather-patterns. (17)

As various, recently-accumulated evidence concerning plasma vortices, "solitons," and coherent-particle beams at higher energy concentrations shows, under these conditions the energy-field within

16. Uwe Parpart, "The Concept of the Transfinite," *The Campaigner*, Vol. IX, Nos. 1-2 (Jan.-Feb. 1976), pp. 6-66.

17. (Eric Lerner), "The Real Causes of the Winter's Weather," *Executive Intelligence Review*, Vol. IV, No. 6 (Feb. 8, 1977), pp. 23-29.

the particle interreacts on an enlarged scale with the concentrated "external" field, such that this "additional supply of energy" in respect to the experimental field itself makes the system negentropic and generates self-organizing activities as "entities."

Thus, in the negentropic space of the higher-energy domain, we have inclusively the particles and so forth which are also existent in the lower order of physical space, but in addition, particles share the experimentally-defined position of being *determinate* entities with other metastable configurations, and under new sets of special laws such that the perceived as determining "field-particle" relations of the lower order of space are not experimentally appropriate to the higher order of space.

Looking backward from this to the work of Schrödinger and others on the problems associated with the psi-function, a new world of physics begins to open up to our consciousness. Moreover, the special laws of the higher-order physical space — even as we are now only beginning to explore them — conform to the kinds of notions of negentropy we are compelled to adduce by regarding the very existence of living processes, and the realized creative impulses of the history of human creative (synthetic) thought as crucial evidence respecting the necessary fundamental lawful ordering of our universe.

More narrowly considered, this does more than expose the significance of the thuggery done against the progress of science by Rothschild and Rockefeller protégés such as Niels Bohr, and by John von Neumann and others. It has a coherent, ironic bearing on the emerging potential hegemony of basic Soviet science over relatively stagnating overall scientific progress in the OECD countries.

Following Versailles, during the period the Rothschilds and Rockefellers were directly and deliberately attempting to wreck the foundations of fundamental scientific progress in the capitalist sector, a tiny kernel surviving from the greatest nineteenth century scientific traditions was providing the kernel of the future development of Soviet physics. The emphatically distinctive advantages in impulse of Soviet basic physics work over the capitalist sector today, are not only, as General George Brown observed, the proportionately greater emphasis on scientific progress and development of cadres in the Soviet Union, (18) but, respecting their internal, epistemological features, the most notable Soviet physics breakthroughs known to us are crucially traceable to

the specific epistemological approach transmitted and amplified by academician Vernadsky.

It is certainly relevant — if not all decisive — to the fact that Soviet physics is so excellent, while Soviet psychology is a reactionary shambles, that the leading figures the Soviets inherited from the previous regime in developing these two fields were Vernadsky for physics, and the pathetically reductionist, bestialist I.P. Pavlov for psychology.

Vernadsky, whom Rand think-tankers' memoranda correctly described once as one of the greatest internal Soviet threats to the Atlanticists' interests, was a student of Curie within the subsuming outlook of Louis Pasteur. It was this same current which provoked the famous 1920s origin of life thesis of Oparin. Moreover, Vernadsky correctly adduced the implications of Riemannian physics — the real Riemann, not the Einstein-Weyl program's caricature-Riemann — for a coordinated breakthrough in biology and physics. In classical epistemological terms, Vernadsky's view was *hylozoic* in the true sense, rather than in that modified-Aristotelian reductionists' notion of "materialism" regrettably predominant in "official Marxist-Leninist" literature. Indeed, ironically, like Lenin himself, Vernadsky's Russian philosophical roots are best traced (at least implicitly) in terms of Chernyshevsky's voluntarist (hence, also hylozoic) precedent. Accessible writings of Vernadsky (19) show that he consciously and competently applied this Riemannian-hylozoic overview simultaneously to biology and physics, and to the exploration of the interconnection between the two. It is also established that Soviet efforts to develop nuclear fission as a basic energy source were already embryonically under way as a state policy-commitment *during the middle 1920s(!)*, and that Vernadsky was key in this at that time.

Hence, despite the other accomplishments of physicists within the capitalist sector since the 1925-1927 crisis in science, in respect of the most crucial frontiers of basic physics research capitalist-sector funding of progress was virtually stopped *to the extent that* existing Rothschild and Rockefeller policy dared and could effect this. Whereas, starting with the most considerable relative disadvantages in respect of numbers of scientists and objective material circumstances of development, Soviet physics around Vernadsky launched itself forward with an ongoing, included methodological focus upon the very crucial problems whose solving was predominantly "forbidden" in the capitalist sector. The epistemological

18. George S. Brown, *United States Military Posture for Fiscal Year 1978: Statement by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Congress on the Defense Posture of the United States* (n.p., Jan. 20, 1977), pp. 103 ff.; cf. Lyndon H. LaRouche, "The Political Economy of Military Posture," *Executive Intelligence Review*, Vol. IV, No 7 (Feb. 15, 1977), pp. 39-46.

19 It has been reported to us that only recently Vernadsky's work has begun to be republished in Soviet collections — but we do not, unfortunately, yet have direct access to that larger body of information on this subject.

implications of the now-famous 1976 disclosures of L. Rudakov in the U.S., taken in the context of predecessors such as Vlasov, are in no respect a fortunate accident, but predominantly a lawfully determined outgrowth of the bias Vernadsky built into the foundations of Soviet physics — a bias which happily persisted despite the relative obscurity to which his reputation was relegated during part of the period following his death.

The direct correlation between these crucial aspects of physics and politics is ironically, and devastatingly illustrated by the case of a failed doctrine known as “information theory.” Overview of this bankrupt doctrine and its derivatives points toward the rigorous apparatus of formal analysis appropriate to understanding the profound distinctions among the three epistemological currents, and hence to establish a rigorous analysis of that nominalist outlook which is the essential feature of Atlanticism’s core ideology today.

The doctrine known as information theory developed ostensibly as an effort to reduce to systems of linear equations the processes of negative feedback used in control devices in military and other technological applications typified in the form of self-correcting aiming-control. The mathematical approach was essentially standard on principle since the work of Gauss and Fourier during the early nineteenth century. Provided a non-linear function, even of some complexity, *is pre-defined*, it is in principle feasible, by curve-fitting methods, using systems of linear equations, to approximate any ordinary sort of non-linear function to as fine a degree of approximation as considerations of cost and other effort permit. From this Weaver and Shannon, leaning heavily on the work of those such as MIT’s Norbert Wiener, abstracted a linearized doctrine of *information theory*.

Norbert Wiener, during the same immediate period, published a now-famous work, first abroad and then in the U.S., *Cybernetics*. This kernel was intermeshed with the reductionist methods known as “operations research,” first tentatively developed during the period of World War I and extended considerably by first the British and then U.S. teams during World War II. Collaboration between the twentieth century’s most rabid well-known positivist, John Von Neumann, and Vienna-School economist Oskar Morgenstern, produced during the same approximate period the notorious *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*. Out of such various ingredients, all soon centering for practice around the doctrine of information theory, the postwar Atlanticist utopians’ doctrine of “systems analysis” was evolved.

Relative to processes which conform epistemologically to the “curve-fitting” applications of Gauss, Fourier, et al., systems analysis works. Relative to

either, notably, human behavior (except of special psychotic varieties), or to negentropic non-linear plasma processes and related subject-matters, the methods of systems analysis are inherently bankrupt. The root of the inherent bankruptcy of the application of “systems analysis” to characteristically non-linear processes is rooted in the rabid metaphysical absurdity of information theory itself.

Through methods first defined chiefly through the work of Karl Weierstrass and Georg Cantor, it is possible to reduce any system of linear equations to a system of denumerations, such that the location of any element in a “universe” determined by such sets of equations can be uniquely “mapped” by treating arrays of numbers and the sequences within such arrays as “mapping codes.” Insofar as the elements and occurrences within a “domain” analyzed are inclusively determinable by an appropriate set of linear equations, the mapping-system developed can establish a correspondence between every possible such element and occurrence and configurations of the coding system. No matter how elaborate the mapping system so developed, the basic epistemological principles remain the same, and no amount of added sophistication or complexity within the mapping system can exceed those “hereditary” epistemological limits.

Information theory attempted to extend this capability beyond its original practical basis in hydraulic and electronic networks, *to reduce human communication to the same regime*. This effort was not predominantly the crankish inspiration of some few reckless electronics specialists, but represented an attempt to further a project, now commonly known as “linguistics,” by Bertrand Russell, Karl Korsch, Kurt Lewin, Rudolf Carnap and others, notably during the 1930s. (20)

Linguistics, whose computer simulation not accidentally corresponds only to special types of schizophrenic behavior in actual human beings (21), is the abstracted feature of systems analysis in its attempted direct application to human communications. Hence, scrutiny of the embedded fundamental

20. This Russell-Korsch linguistics project was nested at a number of thus-poisoned American universities, including the Cambridge, Mass., area, where Korsch was principally based during that period, and around the University of Pennsylvania. (If Benjamin Franklin had lived to see Bertrand Russell and Russell’s project polluting the University of Pennsylvania — which Franklin founded — old Ben would have vomited, or, better, taken prompt remedial action.) It is notable that one of the Rand Corporation’s associated systems analysts, Noam Chomsky, of linguistics and the “Pentagon Papers” Nixon-destabilization-hoax notoriety, was educated in linguistics at the University of Pennsylvania, and is a rabidly Korschite, neo-Fabian MIT professor and political intelligence operative, based in the Cambridge, Mass. area.

21. R. Gallagher, “Artificial Intelligence,” *The Campaigner*, Vol. VIII, No. 7 (July 1975), pp. 37-55.

epistemological absurdities of linguistics exposes the pervasive fallacies embedded in the entire Rand Corporation and related institutions' "systems-analysis" approach to questions of U.S. strategic posture and other topics involving human and other negentropic subject-matters. (22)

Contrary to "systems analysis," the effect of technological innovations on the development of societies is to transform those societies in a manner analogous to the kinds of concepts associated with the emergence of negentropic non-linear phenomena in plasma regimes. (23)

The process of social evolution — technological progress — readily admits of a rigorously descriptive thermodynamical interpretation, such that progress is coherently described as negentropy, an increasing per capita "reducing power" of society relative to the universe around it, with a necessary concomitant of rising energy flux per capita in both production and consumption. Hence, the inventions which are the basis for this progress represent the crucial content of human communication, and have an implied (negentropic) thermodynamical significance.

However, and this is crucial, the effect of progress in technological development is to shift the characteristic features of the economy — and social correlatives — in such a way that successive epochs of technological progress correspond analytically to successive, different "geometries." This means that the system of linear equations which could implicitly map the events within the "geometry" of the society at a preceding epoch does not determine the consequent events in the society for such a succeeding epoch. However, the two societies are *causally* interconnected by the process of extending new inventions into the form of extended willful practice. Moreover, although general scientific-technological breakthroughs most prominently characterize the process of transition, the processes include a cumulative constant, endemic ferment of less-influential scientific-technological and analogous discoveries, communications and practices to the same effect.

It is the aspect of human communication relevant to

22. Lyndon H. LaRouche, "Linguistics: A Tool of the CIA's Global Terrorism," *New Solidarity*, Vol. VII, No. 21 (May 21, 1976), p. 4

23. This fact was first recognized by the present writer during the 1950s, in connection, predominantly, with the application of concepts adduced in respect of the leading work of Riemann and Cantor to correct the principal included fallacies and inapplicabilities in Karl Marx's *Capital*, and thus achieve a method of analysis which has been subsequently overwhelmingly validated empirically by the 1957-1977 detailed course of developments under the collapsing Bretton Woods monetary system. Reciprocally, that conceptual overview of both economic and physical processes was the germ for the U.S. Labor Party's work in developing an "energy doctrine" and establishing a new approach to problems of controlled plasmas.

that process of development which is characteristic of human behavior, *as distinct from animal behavior*. This is the distinction of human behavior, and the distinction of human communication.

Applying this to the model provided by the information theorist, the unit of information as he misdefines it contains in all forms of characteristically human communication *more energy* and in a different way than the information theorists' doctrine permits to be attributed to it.

Analogously, in meteorology, the same error of fallacy of composition is committed by most meteorologists: they see the energy in the atmospheric system, but do not see the existence of the organization of the system beyond that. They have ignored the crucial fact of stable weather patterns (vortices), that the added energy which controls the determination of the stable vortex system and its development is supplied by the biological systems, themselves characteristically negentropic, which contribute a small, but crucial margin of negentropy to the vortex-system over and above its apparent content. In ordinary microphysical space, the system contains, similarly, more potentially-available energy than the field-particle ordering defines. Similarly, the paradox of the "big bang" hypothesis crucially demonstrates that a quantum of energy in the universe represents more energy than is attributed to it according to conservation of energy doctrines.

It is not simply a matter of "more energy," but the fact that the concept of energy as we associate it with systems of linear equations is only a distorted aspect of actual energy, which crucial empirical evidence has shown to exist in a qualitatively different, negentropic form.

What is otherwise principally involved is a different notion of rigorous causality than is acknowledged by either scholastic or nominalist doctrines.

Using, first, the example of the different kinds of physical space involved in "ordinary" and negentropic plasma regimes: the particles — electrons, neutrons, protons, and so forth — which exist within a negentropic regime also exist as particles in a lower order of physical space ("ordinary" physical space). However, in the former, these particles behave differently than they do in the latter, and are included as determinate entities together with other kinds of determinate entities which do not exist to the same effect in the conceptions of ordinary space.

Hence, between the two regimes, each regime is governed by a respectively different set of laws determining behavior within the regime. Yet, the two regimes are connected causally, since we have experimentally produced the former by actions taken in the latter.

Hence, the ordinary notion of causality is unacceptable. We can no longer think of cause as subsumed within a specific aprioristic or physical space, but must think of cause bridging two different kinds of physical space. Yet, we cannot discard the fact that the same cause which bridges two different forms of physical space experimentally, also operates as cause within the specific terms of reference of each of the included spaces. *The primary nature of cause* is therefore adduced from its efficient role as the transforming of one, lower, order of physical space to a higher, and at the same time that the primary quality of cause is defined as the negentropic ordering of physical space, its efficiency within each subsumed space of the ordering-sequence is retained as a subsumed aspect of its primary quality.

That is precisely what occurs in the social effects of technological progress. Hence, although the principles involved have a necessary reflection in the fundamentals of physics, we need not wait upon their discovery within the realm of physics to already ascertain their lawfulness. The "thermodynamic" description of the histories of both human society and of the biosphere itself demonstrate in the most conclusive, unique way, that these are the fundamental laws of our universe — *because we exist in that universe*.

It is that latter rigor which was the formal basis for the articulation of the "neo-platonic" humanist or *Promethean* outlook by Ibn Sina (Avicenna), and which was explicitly employed on a more modest level by the great Ionian thinkers of the pre-Athenian period. The recurrence of the neo-platonic or Promethean humanist view correlates, not by accident, with those periods of human development and with individuals and groups of collaborators which represent the relatively greatest ferment in human intellectual and technological progress. It is a rapidly developing culture, or a great creative intellect, which finds in the sensuous reality of its own immediate creative experience the most overwhelming demonstration of *the primary role of creative innovation in advancing human existence*.

As a culture — for one reason or another — merely consolidates or "coasts upon" the stock of fundamental innovations contributed from outside or its own past, the existing hegemonic body of ideas and related established forms of practice predominate as the essentially fixed ordering of social experience. Here, the task of reason is sensuously focused on bringing order into established standards of practice, rather than solving problems through profound innovations in concepts of general, informed, willful impulses for practice. Hence, in this condition, the dominant ideas and institutions exist as "givens," as axiomatically self-evident entities and norms of

relationship. In such circumstances, the Aristotelian or apollonian outlook predominates as most agreeable to prevailing experience, and to the prevailing value put upon both experience and the individual sense of identity.

In periods of breakdown, of general degradation, in which the human interests and standards of a preceding period are violated in circumstance and in prevailing informed impulses for practice, under circumstances of moral anarchy, the nominalist, or dionysian, outlook and mood tend to predominate. (24)

For reasons related to these considerations, the Aristotelian or apollonian view leads fatally to the theologian's "ontological paradox." To the extent that the existing rational ordering of affairs is viewed as properly pre-ordained as converging upon some pre-existing perfect, fixed form, God exists relative to that order only as the Creator and as the agent of miracles. The Creator's power as orator cannot be regarded as *efficiently present in the created world*. Hence, the form of the "ontological paradox" which stipulates that if God the Creator is omniscient and perfect, he gave up his omnipotence respecting the further determination of the universe once he perfectly created it.

The medieval literary neo-platonic view, out of prudent regard for the inquisitional limits of existing authority, accepted the outer shell of the scholastic doctrine of the ontological paradox, but did not submit to its dictum respecting the *internal features* of the process between the Creation and the attainment of Perfection. Where the Aristotelian empowered man only with reason (rationality), but not the power to create qualitatively higher orders of human reason, the neo-platonic recognized the human capacity for creative synthesis of qualitatively new powers of reason — scientific knowledge, for example — as the primary, active human quality.

This was not merely a theological difference, nor was it the principal line of division between the Catholic and protestant factions in the sixteenth century schism. There were Aristotelians (Thomists, Calvinists) and humanists within both the Catholic and protestant denominations. The difference between the two currents, Aristotelianism and humanism, centered around the practical issues of political economy. *The humanist current, the English Tudor Erasmians, the founders of capitalism*, and their co-thinkers abroad were committed to technological progress, not merely as the necessary basis for economic progress, but as *the natural moral condi-*

24. As Holmes refused to understand, the nominalist or dionysian outlook and mood and the actual, rigorously definable *mens rea* are one and the same thing.

tion of man. Ficino's conception of *man's creative activity* as the location of the way in which man was cast in the *image of the Creator* efficiently identifies the Promethean impulse of the high points of the Tudor period.

The same problem is reflected in the qualitatively differing conceptions of *freedom* among the three outlooks.

To the neo-platonic humanist, man's behavior was absolutely lawfully bound to natural law: no deviation was morally permissible to the will. *Freedom* was the right and moral duty of the individual to exercise creative activity *in behalf of the advancement of the fruitfulness of his own practice to the purpose of advancing the universal interest of his society, and the obligation of the state to protect and nurture that freedom through technological and other education, cultural enrichment, and through licensing the unchecked advancement of those forms of creative innovation beneficial to the society as a whole.*

To the Aristotelian, freedom was essentially the latitude to choose between good and evil, and discovery was limited to a more conscious, more profound familiarity with a *preordained, fixed* rationality.

Whereas humanism located freedom in man's power of lawful creative innovation for the general good, the Aristotelian located freedom as the canonically tolerable margin of choice within an existing order. Both the revolutionary neo-platonism and the pro-feudal Aristotelianism were humanist *relative to their common enemy, nominalism.* Both the neo-platonic and the scholastic accepted in principle the absolute moral and practical rule of natural law, except that they defined it differently.

The nominalist denied the objective existence of natural law, and reduced practical law to a matter of customs, denying both absolute rationality and the existence of a universalizing lawful creative principle.

What we humanists properly mean by freedom today is rigorously described as the lawful causality which ultimately determines the successive "geometries" of negentropically advancing orders of technological practice, as we describe that above and below. *The principle of freedom itself does not change, even though the successive, immediate conditions of life under its rule are negentropically altered.*

As is demonstrated sufficiently by the documentation and accompanying historical accounts in *The Political Economy of the American Revolution*, the humanist outlook which we are describing here is the same humanist outlook characteristic of our republic's founding fathers, and is the determining feature of our nation's Constitution. We have laid out the case in more modern terms of reference, but the kernel of our approach and theirs is identical.

Ours was founded as a nation committed to *freedom* in the humanist sense of that term. The founders of this nation did, indeed adopt the capitalist form of ownership of the means of production and distribution, as the policy then deemed appropriate to the fulfillment of that policy. However, as Hamilton himself emphasizes, the right of property was conditional upon the fulfillment of the humanist perception of the national interest. They also adopted the republican form of government, a decision made through a process of rigorous reflection on the deadly defects of either the monarchical or democratic form. *The state must be led by men (and women) of exceptional enlightenment* — rather than accidents of birth, or demagogues — who must be selected for those offices with prudence and reflection upon the candidates' humanist qualities of perception and conduct concerning the combined interest of the present nation *and its posterity.*

These policies did not spring miraculously from our nation's soil, but were the direct heritage of the Tudor Renaissance and the English Commonwealth which the English settlers brought with them to this continent, a humanist tradition enriched by our leading figures' informed concern with the fruits of the Enlightenment. Moreover, contrary to those dupes of Charles A. Beard, Thurman Arnold and William A. Williams, who seem to forget that our forefathers fought a revolution for five years of most difficult and perilous struggle for these policies, fought *against those very monetarist policies which the late Thurman Arnold and William A. Williams espouse;* these American policies were not some whim, some passing fad — some mythology.

The interests for which our forefathers fought in behalf of these policies were substantial, real, tangible interests — as we see most clearly by comparing our nation's development with those nations which remained colonies and semi-colonies of British monetarist power, or for a time under the Holy Alliance and its successors, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

These policies were not merely a preference in philosophy, but a philosophy which was demonstrated in relatively world-wide experience to be scientifically valid against its scholastic and nominalist contraries. Whenever our national government has abandoned or substantially violated these founding humanist policies, our nation's credit has been undermined, our national development impeded or even eroded. Moreover, we see in the successes, but also the more frequent misery and setbacks of those other nations ruled either by scholastic conservatism or nominalist radicalism (monetarism), that the principles embedded in the intent of the founding fathers have been universally, practically demonstrated

empirically in the past two centuries of world history — and, in fact, over longer centuries.

Within the bounds of what the founding fathers of this nation adopted as humanist principles, there is legitimate range for disagreement on the best implementation of those principles. Beyond that foundation, we may progress — but not sideways or backwards to technological stagnation or nominalism; we may have compassion for the poor dupes who espouse nominalism, but their opinions themselves we must hold in juridical contempt as discredited nonsense.

These humanist principles, insofar as the principle of the Idea of Progress in its neo-platonic humanist form is a principle taken as the essence of the Constitution's drafting, *were intended as expressions of a universal natural law*. Our forefathers were not so miserably humble in either their intellectual powers or conceptions, to propose that this form was a local peculiarity of our special national character. Although they themselves were most sensible of the aspect of approximation within the institutions adopted as our national instruments of government, they viewed such approximations as adopted under the governance of principles they properly deemed universal.

Those principles, as they touch upon foreign policy, do not define our nation as one competing for its existence against other nations as such, but as a nation embodying humanist principles, which is menaced only by powerful nations espousing contrary principles. If those other nations adopt humanist policies based on the Idea of Progress, both respecting their domestic order and the world as a whole, then there can be no real conflict of fundamental interest among such nations sharing neo-platonic humanist principles.

The Federalists' conflict with the French Revolution did not arise because monetarist England had become less our principal adversary, but because the French Revolution, by resorting to an anarchical, democratic form which must be, as Tom Paine had argued and Milton before him, incompetent and dictatorial in content, and because *anarchy rather than progress* was the character of that regime, had, in respect to the later words of John Quincy Adams concerning the England of 1823, adopted no adequate basis for the proposed alliance with France on the basis of a *community of principle*. Worse, failing to base its relations to us on a community of principle in fact, France irresponsibly attempted to place our nation in jeopardy vis-a-vis our principal adversary, England, and failing to offer us the military means to secure us from the imperiled strategic position they demanded, instead attempted to force us into alliance by destabilizing our internal order and harassing our foreign commerce.

Although the mere fact of historical precedents in

foreign policy does not bind a nation's subsequent policies — in any competent understanding of affairs — it happens that the thrust of Federalist hostility toward France in this matter was no blunder, but correct, both respecting our nation's most immediate practical interests and the notion of a humanist *community of principle* which was the ultimately underlying principle of our foreign policy.

If France had pursued effectively a policy in its revolution which paralleled our own humanist conceptions of progress and republican institutions, we would have been obliged to ally ourselves with France in principle, although in fact we would have been able to pursue that alliance only as means permitted. Indeed, if France had pursued a sound domestic policy, it did not require our modest assistance for its battles against England on the continent. Napoleon's degeneration, the Napoleonic policies which made inevitable his downfall, show that the potential community of principle we shared with the French Revolution was precisely as abortive in actuality as the Revolution's abortive reception of Tom Paine.

Our Federalists' foreign policy was not a policy based on "Wilsonian" notions of geopolitical concerts among rag-tag assortments of monetarist obscenities, petty tyrannies, and struggling republics. Our Federalists' foreign policy was on the surface an expedient policy prescribed by our weakness, but whose objective, to the extent we had the power to express that, was for a world order among nations based on their practice and self-conscious perception of self-interests upon those same humanist notions of universal natural law we had adopted for our own.

These were also the leading thrusts of the Tudor renaissance, of the upsurge of the English Commonwealth. These were not merely the precedents for the hegemonic ideas and outlooks of our revolution, not something Franklin et al. had somehow picked up from books or gossip, but the sensuous traditions of humanism our forefathers, in the main, brought to the shores.

We did not break with England so much because we had changed. We broke with England because its government had repudiated in form, and practice toward us, the principles on which its own Tudor and Commonwealth development had been premised. If England, notably beginning with the Stuart Restoration of 1660, and worse, after the 1688 accession of the House of Orange, had not repudiated an impulse for humanist policy in favor of a monetarist policy, our forefathers would not have gone to war with the mother country. That break, as we have emphasized just above, was not caused merely by a difference in fundamental philosophical outlook, but because those differences in outlook were inevitably

intolerable to us respecting our most vital practical interests.

Who cares to make a great fuss because the poor babbling fool down the street espouses Keynes, or, even worse, Friedman? But when that same fool down the street pursues his follies to loot our wages, plunge us into unemployment, eliminate our vital social services, and impose dictatorial rule over us to enforce those conditions, then his babbling becomes occasion for forceful remedies.

Since at least the time of Charlemagne, European culture has been dominated successively by two ruling conceptions of a universal natural law and also by a third view, which denies the existence of such universality. These are, as we have developed the notions thus far, Aristotelianism, neo-platonic humanism and nominalism. As we have already shown, these differences in conception are not merely differences of ruling opinion — the doctrine of *pluralism*, in which these could be regarded merely juridically equal before law, as differing opinions, is peculiar to *nominalism*. In both scholasticism (specifically) and neo-platonic views, opinion, *insofar as it expresses outlook and method*, is either right or wrong, and when two bodies of opinion clash on such points not more than one can be properly, relatively right.

The history of the succession of Aristotelianism and neo-platonic outlooks, as articulated reflections of social policy, social practice, correspond to the succession of two great lawful orders of human society. The first was feudal, its law best identified in terms of the principles embedded in Charlemagne's inventory and the Norman Domesday Book. The second was capitalist industrial development, for which socialist development is a special case, the latter a different political instrument for realizing the essential functions otherwise embedded in capitalist industrial development. Nominalism arises in opposition to both great forms of lawful ordering, both universalities, as either a breakdown of lawful societies or as a subjective failure of the practice of those societies.

The crucial proof of the unique correctness of the neo-platonic humanist conception of a universal lawful ordering was historically demonstrated by the way in which the preceding, feudal order collapsed in the processes of the Crusades and the Black Death.

The reactionary element of Thomism, the degradation of *man in the practical world* to the condition of a preordained, fixed rationality, is an expression of the characteristics of Charlemagne's inventory of the realm and the Norman Domesday Book. The point is not the ideas reflected by such documents as such, but that those ideas corresponded to ruling ideas governing social practice. Feudal law degraded the serf to a *beast-like condition in the practical world*. Not

because the serf was badly treated and so forth, not for the maudlin reasons usually offered by muddle-headed romantics. Feudal man was *epistemologically* degraded to a beast-likeness because he was substantially denied that which is most characteristically human, the exercise of his creative mental powers to effect, transmit, assimilate, and commit to impulses of willful practice those new technologies, that new scientific comprehension, which process uniquely distinguishes man self-consciously from the lower beasts.

Relatively speaking, the conditions of the feudal serf were not so oppressive — nor, so idyllic — in *successful* estates as is — variously — usually portrayed. It is the practice of the successful estates which represents the practical reference for feudalism's ideal of itself, and hence the key to the scholastic's efforts to define a practicable form of universal law *appropriate to feudalism*.

Materially, the number of religious holidays specified for the serf (in particular), and the increase in the number of the canonical holidays reflects at one phase of feudalism a growing tendency for leisure, and cultural development within successful feudal orders. Crucial to this is the fact that those holidays principally were *religious* celebrations. It was only through the Catholic religion that feudal man essentially distinguished himself in social practice from mere beasts. This Catholic order was also humanist in stipulating and, according to law, supervising the obligation of the feudal order to the serf, as well as other aspects of rights and obligations within the feudal order as a whole.

Hence, the spread of the Catholic religion to the heathen barbarians was in that respect a magnificent (in effect) political and moral revolution in the affairs of heathen Europe. It created, imperfectly in practice, that universal order of perceived natural law which was essential to preserving the very humanity which feudal forms of social practice otherwise denied.

Hence, lest some nitwit in the tradition of revisionists Thurman Arnold or William A. Williams should arise to pollute the public consciousness with the allegation that Catholicism was merely a folklore, a mythology, we must emphasize that feudal Catholicism was a genuine system of universal law, rooted in a corresponding body of social practice, and eminently practical and necessary in the most vital interests of humanity under those feudal conditions in which it developed. Moreover, although it was relatively anti-humanist on account of the basic mode of social practice, the basic constitution of the social order to which it was allied, and which it condoned and perpetuated, it was humanist in respect to maintaining the conscience of the individual above that of a

mere beast — *in the religious side of feudal practice* — and through Catholicism's role in imposing the rights and obligations of a human identity within the practice of feudal social relations.

The old feudal Catholicism failed because the social order to which it had integrated itself failed, and a new Catholicism persisted, through a neo-platonic humanist transformation effected most emphatically within the ranks of the regular clergy and associated institutions of feudal intellectual life. Thomas Aquinas has the double role in this process of being at once the rationalizer of the feudal Inquisition and also the most thorough articulator of those rationalist premises through whose correction Catholicism developed a humanism adapted to the social practice of emerging capitalist society.

That is not merely an historical fact respecting Catholicism itself, but is crucial to European culture as a whole.

For lawful reasons, the development of the neo-platonic humanist notion of universal natural law defined itself by adducing the epistemological characteristics of the feudal Catholic law and social practice, and by stating Catholic universal law in that form, made a deliberate and fundamental epistemological revolution in the axiomatic premises of that law, to arrive at a new body of universal natural law. That is not merely a formal description of the intellectual process as such, but *is an historical fact of the practical way in which Tudor England willfully initiated capitalist industrial development and industrial-capitalist national economy*. The neo-platonic humanist conceptions of the Erasmians associated with Thomas More were the knowledge, transformed into the impulses of willful practice through, most prominently, the instrument of those circles, which deliberately prescribed and instituted in practice the conceptions upon which the Tudor institutions of industrial-capitalist development were premised.

The failure of feudalism was lawful. The lawful failure of feudalism begged recognition of the fundamental, axiomatic fallacy of the notions of universal natural law embedded within the ideal of feudal practice.

The descriptive, approximately-defined basis for the collapse of feudalism is a principle which has ruled human existence practically since our species first crawled significantly above baboon-like modes of existence of Pleistocene man. Once man ascends, through advancement of his deliberate power over nature, above the condition in which he appeared as but another form of animal life, man's continued existence on the basis of so-called "natural ecology" ceases to be possible. Lifting himself above the condition of beasts, he can no longer survive as a species by depending, as beasts do, upon so-called "natural

ecological" relations. Man's existence then fatefully depends upon man-made conditions, upon positively transforming the ecology in conformity with the requirements of his continued existence. (25)

Since the ecology man encounters at each point in his existence involves an essential relationship to geophysical and other ecological conditions which *by themselves* afford only the preconditions for the existence of lower beasts, man *mistakenly appears* thus to be in desperate conflict with his environment.

This problem takes the essential form of the relative finiteness of what each mode of human technology defines as primary resources. Man must supersede these *technological* limitations, or the attempt to maintain human existence at some fixed level of technological progress must lead to exhaustion of relatively-finite primary resources, and the genocidal collapse of society through the exhaustion of the essential conditions for maintaining mankind in that fixed mode.

As we have stipulated above, this technological progress takes the form of a negentropic progress in man's (descriptively) thermodynamic relationship to nature, for which the active source of such technological advances is that creative (synthesizing) mental activity associated with the discovery, transmission, assimilation, and transference to impulses of willful social practice of those discoveries which conform to increasing comprehension of the universal lawful ordering of that material universe which we must "thermodynamically" master.

The bounding of European feudalism, both in respect of extent, and in respect of possibilities for more intensive utilization of relatively local primary resources for agricultural development in the existing modes, meant that feudalism doomed itself to a threatened genocidal collapse of European culture — as old Rome had collapsed before it — by virtue of its organic social constitution and explicit law. Although the role of the Bardi banking houses and others accelerated, mediated that genocidal collapse in a special way in creating the preconditions in which the Black Death was inevitable, the Black Death of the fourteenth century is properly seen as crucial, absolute disproof of the kind of notion of universal natural law advanced on behalf of feudal relations by the thirteenth and fourteenth century scholastics (Aristotelians).

The development of the rudiments of proto-capitalist culture, neo-platonic humanism, did not occur simply because some bright fellows scratched about concocting hypothetical alternatives to a failed hege-

25. Hence, the Naderite radical "environmentalist" has precisely the morality of a lower beast, a parody of our baboon-like, humanoid Pleistocene ancestors!

monic conception of universal law. The same notion of *causality* we stipulated as required by such evidence as the special, higher-order physical space of plasmas, applies precisely to this problem.

Although feudal society was nominally fixed in its technology, this should not be understood as an *absolute* fixing. Even under feudalism man is not in fact a beast, even though he is by and large juridically relatively degraded to a *beast-like* condition.

The characteristic feature of all living systems is negentropy. This feature of living processes is carried over in human development — *hylozoically* — in the form of the characteristic ordering principle of human willful behavior. This involves not only the potential negentropy embodied in abstract conceptions of technological innovations, but the tendency of each successful mode of human practice to produce a characteristic social surplus, a smaller or larger margin of product above what is required to replace the means of production and consumption consumed (as actual or imputable costs) in the course of producing the whole output. As Rosa Luxemburg correctly emphasized, in correcting Lenin's essential, characteristic blunder in economic analysis, without social surplus, man would not have progressed beyond the stage of the paleolithic scraper. All viable forms of human culture (technology) are characterized by thermodynamic negentropy in respect of the existence of a characteristic tendency for social surplus, in the positive, self-subsisting process of self-expansion of that process involving the relationship of useful output to these inputs imputable as social costs of the production of that output.

In other terminology, applying the notion of capitalist profit (industrial-capitalist profit) retrospectively as an aid in preliminary description of previous modes of production, the existence of some form of "profit" as characteristic of the mode of production is the indispensable, characteristic feature of all successful human modes of production and existence.

The "thermodynamic" problem — which also exists in the more-explicitly biological form in the necessarily negentropic ordering of the biosphere — is that the limits of a successful relatively-fixed mode of production are not defined by an absolutely-fixed mode of "zero-profit" production, but by the fact that the rate of increase of the characteristic rate of "profit" becomes manifestly insufficient to keep pace with the increasing social costs of production arising from relative depletion of the existing set of technologically defined primary resources.

The limiting feature of societies is not that they fail to make some technological progress, but that the rate of technological progress fails to keep pace with the

social cost effects of the depletion of the primary resources defined by existing technology.

What therefore is required constantly is a higher rate of technological progress, to the effect that the extent of defined primary resources is increasing more rapidly than it is being depleted in terms of previously dominant technology. The rate of "profit — used in the specified way as a term of description — is the margin of "energy" available to the society to advance beyond practice in the existing technological forms.

Provided we employ technology in its broadest implications, as proper to and demanded by the case, the basis for defining the general principles required is established.

The most apparent problem faced by societies is the problem of direction of utilization of this profit. If the profit is directed in its realization toward those forms of technological change which converge on a *world-line* of increasing rates of negentropy in productive relations, then the problem of human existence can be solved within the framework of the institutions of that society. However, if the profit is diverted away from convergence upon that world-line, the institutions which effect such a diversion thus direct the society toward its collapse.

To the extent that one can approximate actual human history by the hypothetical case, the progress of humanity is represented by a special kind of *world-line*.

The first-order characteristic of this world-line is that it represents an optimal "path" of rising negentropy, in respect to advancement of technology at an optimal, more rapid rate than mankind is exhausting "primary resources" and other preestablished productive resources as defined by previous technology.

This world-line does not depict something which happens miraculously. The *mediating* source of technological progress is the discovery, transmission, assimilation, and informing of the general impulses of willful social practice of both new scientific discoveries and the supplementary innovative potentialities subsumed by such discoveries. This *mediation* in all cases occurs *through* the creative mental powers and activity of *human individuals*. Hence, it is individual creativity (*freedom*) which is the active, *immediate* "driving force" represented by the world-line. Yet, the possibility of individual contributions depends upon education, and also upon those other material and social circumstances which foster in individuals the power to create and to assimilate new conceptions going beyond the range of previously existing knowledge and related practice. Hence, the potential material and cultural conditions generated by technological progress represent the necessary pre-

conditions for the individual creative initiatives which must be realized as the immediate “ground-source” of technological progress.

Thus, that hypothetical simplification of the actual ordering of our species history and pre-history represents in fact a *self-subsisting positive, universalizing principle*.

This principle is the unchanging principle, *the characteristic causality* in the succession of human technological and associated social progress. The principle itself is never altered — *the principle of causality is unchanging*.

However, the successive societies determined by the action of this unchanging principle, unchanging causality, have different “geometries” — just as feudal and capitalist society have different primary self-ordering *characteristics* in their appropriate geometric interpretation. It is possible, without exaggerating the argument by such resorts, to describe feudal society’s imputable internal political-economic geometry as epistemologically equivalent to the ordinary notions of field-particle relationships in Lagrangian or Maxwellian physics. Whereas, a society based on the humanist principles of industrial capitalism shared among Gresham, Bodin, Colbert, Franklin, Hamilton, Carey, Marx, is properly comparable to the contrary features of higher-order physical space as confronted in negentropic aspects of non-linear plasma behaviors, as we shall show below.

In the instance of Aristotelian or scholastic epistemology, we have the Euclidean form of Lagrangian physics’ implied “geometry” of society (and technology) embedded. For these cases, we have a *priori* notions of a linear metaphysical basis for space, time, and matter (Euclidean space, time, and matter relationships).

The most prominent feature, and crucial empirical-theoretical disqualification of Euclidean-Aristotelian systems is that they deny the relevance of negentropic characteristics of reality, either by relegating the category of negentropic phenomena to the metaphysical or merely by obsessively denying the evidence. The religious Aristotelian sets the negentropic evidence considered into the category of the metaphysical, *outside the determined system*. Thus, by such physical-metaphysical dualism, the appearance of internal coherence of the physical system is defended. The notion of *élan vital* (although associated historically with degenerate nominalism’s positivist variant), parodies scholastic doctrine on this point. The evasion of the problem of scientific discovery’s creative (synthetic) content is similarly attempted by the doctrine of “intuition.” Radical, atheistic Euclidean-Aristotelians evade the problem by the pathetic formulation: “That hypothesis is not

necessary,” saving the appearance of what they choose to regard as science by the shyster’s ruse of canonically outlawing all disagreeable empirical evidence from consideration within science.

There is a direct correlation between the emergence of German critical philosophy during the 1780-1848 period and the French and German development of the preconditions for a relativistic physics during the first half of the nineteenth century. The most prominent single intellectual influence for both currents of correlated development was Immanuel Kant. Kant, thus situated, serves as the most efficient reference point for interrelating the empirical and formal aspects of the notion of a negentropic, relativistic *physical space* as it applies both to physics as such and to the distinct internal geometry of industrial-capitalist and socialist development. (Although industrial-capitalist and socialist development have different geometries in respect to one another, they have coherent geometries, and for the moment can be treated as subsumed within a common, distinct class of geometries.)

Contrary to the various professedly “neo-Kantian” empiricists emerging inclusively around influences such as Friedrich Lange, Eduard Bernstein and others at the conclusion of the past century, the conceptual breakthrough which defines Kant as *the Kant* was his sweeping refutation of British empiricism, with immediate focus upon the provocative, objectionable “indifferentist” thesis of David Hume. Kant’s starting point for his comprehensive discrediting of British empiricism was the Aristotelian standpoint as inclusively formally typified by the physics of Lagrange, also the standpoint of Leibniz, and the new view characteristic of the Enlightenment — up to the point of rejecting categorically the standpoint exemplified by Descartes and Spinoza. That is Kant’s formal source of intellectual power, and also his crippling defeat.

Kant’s achievement and power, relative to most of his acknowledged principal predecessors, was that he incorporated actively or virtually all of the most relevant empirical evidence. His defeat was that he attempted — and was the last competent epistemological thinker to originate this approach — to fit all the evidence, including acknowledgement of the reality of man’s creative (synthetic) powers respecting the realm of causally-situated social practice, within the ultimately-stretched limits of the Aristotelian-Euclidean world outlook. Thus, excepting his correlated, crippling, categorical rejection of the alternative approach conveyed through Spinoza, Kant assembled and posed all of the principal immediate epistemological problems, and thus described the fundamental problem of knowledge in the compre-

hensive form it could then be fruitfully attacked by his notable successors.

The central, and for present purposes also most relevant feature of Kant's *Critiques* is that he acknowledged the formal existence of a continuous principle of creative (synthetic) power in man, in human behavior, as characteristic of human behavior. This was his stroke of genius relative to that time, the crux of his entire refutation of the British nominalist degeneracy typified by Hume. Furthermore, Kant formally acknowledged the role of this characteristic feature of human thought as an efficient cause in the real universe, through the instrument of informed impulses for willful practice.

However, this central fact, which properly led to the formal repudiation of the entire Euclidean-Aristotelian system, was then arbitrarily confined within the general Aristotelian-Euclidean epistemological basis with aid of two complementary ruses. First, Kant fitted the creative principle into the system he was attempting to repair and save by locating the origin of the creative (synthetic) principle as an additional *a priori* quality of the Aristotelian-Euclidean basis. Second, he attempted to save the notion of Aristotelian-Euclidean *determinism* ultimately by a re-directing of the same ruse employed in the late fifteenth century Marsilio Ficino's *Five Questions*.

Acknowledging that the efficiency of creative knowledge for practice invalidated axiomatically the Aristotelian-Euclidean ontology, Kant created the *empty construct* of an unknowable *thing-in-itself* as the ultimate reality underlying the relatively false, knowable, phenomenal thing. Thus, he saved the Aristotelian-Euclidean system in respect to the *knowable*. Then, on the basis of this metaphysical trick — albeit an epistemologically rigorous trick of almost unprecedented intellectual force — Kant proved, formally by means of the postulated unknowable domain of the thing-in-itself, a constant state of *non-aesthetic space-time*, in which unknowable infinity, the universalizing ultimate implications of efficient creative practice were resolved, in an incomprehensible state which must be conceived of aesthetically as comparable to a state of the universe *as if* at rest.

The first major intellect to attempt to solve this fallacy of Kant directly with respect to physics as such was Riemann. Riemann makes this explicit through his purportedly "metaphysical commentaries" on the Kantian Herbart. It is traditional among commentators on Riemann to pretend they are unfamiliar with those "metaphysical commentaries" or to pretend that such material has no direct relevance for Riemann's "other work" as a mathematical physicist. However, as a rigorous consideration of the notion of a

self-expanding n-dimensional manifold requires, especially with the aid of light retrospectively contributed by Cantor, these "metaphysical" gropings of Riemann's are coherent with and key to the underpinnings of the greatest single physicist's discovery of the past two centuries.

The Sunday-supplement representation of so-called non-Euclidean geometries centers around a discussion of the "parallel axiom" and hereditary features of the Euclidean system, and compares Gauss, Lobachevski, Bolyai, and Riemann from that standpoint. If such discussion is intended to imply that a relativistic physics involves a non-Euclidean geometry in that sense, then the discussion is nonsensical. Any non-Euclidean geometry based upon such simple, formal alterations of the axiomatic premises of Euclidean geometry carries forward all the "hereditary" defects which prevent the Euclidean system itself from providing the conceptual-formal basis for a truly relativistic physics, or from successfully delineating the characteristics of the geometry of an actual Riemannian relativistic physics.

It makes no difference that the formal problem so posed has not yet been explicitly solved, but only implicitly solved. The defect of the Aristotelian-Euclidean system and its non-Euclidean derivatives is that it cannot satisfy the specifications set forth, for example, in the famous Cologne lecture of Hermann Minkowski. To the extent that time, space, matter are conceptually defined apart from the internal reality of the physical process, are defined in any respect in an axiomatic *aprioristic* way, the effort to use a non-Euclidean geometry to describe a relativistic physics is simply an extension of inherently linearized Aristotelian-Euclidean methods of "curve-fitting." As, for example, the Einstein-Weyl program.

The conceptions of space, time, and matter in any aprioristic system of qualitatively independent degrees of freedom (self-evidence) for an arbitrary geometrical (including ultra-exotic topological) model require that the notions of "dimensionality" or any equivalent notion one might wish to substitute in their place, are intrinsically linearized. Hence, such a space carries forward the crucial, "hereditary" axiomatic fallacy of the Aristotelian-Euclidean system. It cannot, inherently, for this given reason, "carry" the causality associated with negentropically "determined" physical processes.

The practical solution to the difficulty involved is presently provided only through direct applications of the notion of *primary causality* we have set forth above. Although this involves a kind of sophistication which stands formally outside the formal arguments of a Benjamin Franklin et al., it must be emphasized again, and understood that what we are analyzing in a

relatively more sophisticated frame of reference is identical as a working principle to the humanist notions of freedom, universal natural law, and the interconnections of the two, which were not only the guiding conceptions of our American Revolution, but conceptions then and since validated in practice.

In a true relativistic conception, the only "axiomatic" principle of the conceptual system as such is the kind of notion of negentropy we associated with the notion of the world-line. We compare the rate of increase of negentropy with the required rate of increase of negentropy to maintain the process as "simply" self-subsisting. The relationship between these two rates of change of the rate of negentropy is the only "axiomatic" conceptual feature of the analytical apparatus applied. It is not measured with respect to *a priori* determinations of (e.g., clock) time, of space, of mass, or anything else of that sort. Rather the employed notions of time, space, mass, and so forth are defined relative to the process represented by the interrelationship between the two rates.

In economic analysis, each set of values defined by that single base-parameter corresponds in fact to a qualitative form of society. The necessary characteristic rate of increase in the rate of negentropy defines the society, and the rate of effective negentropy associated with that society transforms the notion into the required notion of primary form of cause.

The initial application of that notion to actual processes, such as societies, biosphere, and so forth, is the process of mapping the subject matter in terms of that conceptual approach concerning causality to "measurement" of the qualitative characteristics of lawful relationship within the whole of the domain and epoch being explored empirically. The elaboration effected through such approaches to empirical investigation of the characteristics of that physical space defines a "geometry" in the sense required.

The further, indispensable effort involves the similar mapping of the successor epoch of development in that domain, and requires the resolution of the two defined geometries in such a way as to show how the impulses interpreted according to the terms of the notion of the world-line accomplish the transformation of the domain from one epoch to another.

This method of analysis is, in historical retrospect, applicable to every epoch of human history and pre-history, and also to the "history" of the biosphere in general. It is also, obviously, appropriate to solution of the kinds of problems confronted by the cited problems of physics.

However, respecting society, until the neo-platonic humanists' conscious establishment of the principles and policies for the initiation of what became in-

dustrial-capitalist development, no form of society existed in which *the operation of the society depended upon the included governance of development by a consciousness of the constant imperative of successive technological progress*. The society does not operate successfully on the basis of "blind" laws governing "field-particle" relationships, but upon laws which depend upon the included feature of the "particles' consciousness" of the constant necessity to willfully determine their behavior to a predetermined effect. *Hence, the actively-negentropic "geometry" of capitalist development!*

The notion of "freedom" peculiar to neo-platonic humanism, and the emerging principle of the notion of the republican form as the society's necessary instrument, are both direct reflections of that role of consciousness.

To the extent our American culture has subsided, to the effect that large portions of our population have become either relatively apollonians or dionysians in outlook and mood, it must indeed seem incredible to such relatively-unfortunate persons that our Constitution, our American Revolution were determined *in fact* by broad majority commitment to fight for such humanist principles, such humanist outlooks and moods. The appollonian (Aristotelian) and dionysian (nominalist) each regard their moods and outlooks as self-evident, innate, "common sense." Hence, they find it incredible that the contrary to (their own) connotations of terms, facts, and so forth guided our Federalists, as persons of a humanist outlook.

Fortunately, humanist impulses — if not broadly developed for consciousness — are deeply embedded as impulses in our trade unionists (to the extent they think as skilled or semi-skilled working people) and our industrialists, scientists, engineers (to the extent their perception of vital national interests corresponds to that experience). Thus, although the policies which governed the establishment of our nation have substantially lost the degree of conscious hegemony they enjoyed at that time, the vital self-interests of our nation are more emphatically those of an industrial-capitalist nation than at that past time. Hence, although the impulses corresponding to our nation's vital interests are embedded chiefly in such social strata as our industrialists, farmers, and working people, and even only in a fragmented, half-conscious way, that sensuous perception of self-interests in such a fragmented form waits only to be made conscious to become again the efficient and hegemonic force consciously shaping our nation's policies and practices.

To neo-platonic humanists, to our nation's founding fathers — despite vacillations on this point by Jefferson and others — freedom never meant freedom in the anarchist's glosses on that term. Nor did it mean

freedom of rational choice in the scholastic's sense of choice. On both points, the concepts of *freedom* and *toleration* have been so often confused that the strict epistemological distinctions between the two distinct conceptions has almost been forgotten.

Toleration of violations of universal law and its proper derivatives is not generated as a positive expression of freedom. Exactly the opposite. Freedom, positively understood, is the abhorrence of such error.

We properly *tolerate* on two principal premises. We tolerate what we rightly know to be error in belief and in respects of practice, because the root of the power for freedom in the individual is not obedience, but self-development; for that reason, a society which is dedicated to developing the powers and moral perceptions of freedom within its individual members is advised to be as tolerant as its overall vital self-interests allow. We also tolerate because we fear to encroach on areas of ostensible deviation which may be, despite our momentary misjudgment to the contrary, a kind of deviation — e.g., “unorthodox” but positive scientific discovery — which represents the advancement of our culture's freedom.

What we do not tolerate in proper policy and law is a direct violation of humanist outlook and methods which threatens vital interests as defined from the humanist standpoint.

The possibility of ordering a political domain of freedom (in the proper, humanist perception of that term) has been demonstrated to be inseparable from the policy of ordering our affairs as a republic, and not a monarchy or democracy. In principle, without restating here fully what has been identified earlier on this point, the possibility of ordering an entire society according to an efficient notion of the necessary technological progress of its overall development demands human agencies whose consciousness of practical affairs is not only focused on the technological progress of the society as a whole, but which, situated in that position of responsibilities, have the qualifications of outlook, method, and efficient moral commitment to those criteria, to consciously lead the overall practice of the society from moment to moment with approximate effectiveness.

The republican form is not and was *not* adopted as a form of government which must be superior to democracy *for all time to come*. John Milton is better than Tom Paine in including that consideration in argument against the adoption of the democratic form. The fact that an anti-humanist incompetent such as Jimmy Carter or, earlier an Andrew Jackson, could be President of the United States (by means of both hook and crook), is not an argument against perpetuating the republican form today, but a warning of what horrors may await us if we imagine that

the time has come when the proper purposes of a republican form could be superseded by “pure political democracy.”

The principle of our republic — its proper principle, without whose enforcement it does not function according to the intent of our Constitution — is that all persons elected to principal offices of our national government ought to be selected by the parties and the mass of the electorate *as competent representatives of the humanist outlook*. They ought to be persons deeply committed to the principle of technological progress, both respecting production as such, and those features of the education and associated conditions of life of the general population essential to realizing the furtherance of industrial and agricultural technological progress. They ought to be not only committed to such outlooks and methods of judgment, but be efficient both in perceiving the expression of such interests in practice and in the moral qualities which tend to preclude violations of that obligation by deed of act or omission in the duties for which they were elected. Such persons express the vital interests of our nation, the interests of the nation which otherwise impinge in a fragmentary form upon the individual citizen's immediate and future circumstances. The people, the electorate, must reflectively select suitable representatives by processes of careful deliberation, and must judge and check those elected on performance by the same processes and criteria.

When such a centralized deliberative process, based in the humanist perception of the crucial role of technological progress, is the reflective judgment of our government and electorate, as institutions of a republican *process*, that process, that sovereign instrument of *humanist* self-government, is the means by which the juridical and related questions determining the notion of freedom for practice are removed from the realm of anarchic conflicts of contending opinion. Without those humanist principles, our republic's institutions are turned into an empty garbage can, into which any government force, chosen without consideration of Constitutional principles, may deposit its peculiar refuse, and in the name of sovereignty, recommend such ordure as our national interest.

Our republic, our Constitution, were established under the certain conviction of the existence of a truth, the truth of universal natural law as prescribed by humanism. It was on the authority of that perception of truth that the majority of the people of the North American English colonies adopted the Declaration of Independence, and later adopted a Constitution based upon that same, freshly tested principle of truth. Remove that truth — that humanist principle of technologically-focused progress — from the Consti-

tution and its institutions, and the republic is turned into a sham, a pluralist's ideological refuse-dump. (26)

This humanist freedom — distinct from mere toleration — which we properly prize is identical in effect and intent with the more sophisticated representation of it we have given here in connection with the notion of the primary form of causality in human affairs.

Necessity, as most broadly determined by the rate of technological and related progress we require to maintain our current condition into the foreseeable future, demands realized scientific discoveries and subsumed innovations in detail which enable us to exceed the appetites of that necessity. To survive, we depend upon the creative mental powers of the individual member of society — to make discoveries, to communicate new conceptions, to assimilate more advanced conceptions, and to convey that more advanced knowledge into the governing impulses of willful social practice.

That form of exercise of individual mental creative potentials for knowledge and practice is the only *essential* meaning of freedom.

Freedom is thus emphasized in respect of what the individual gives to the society. What the individual sees as freedom in what the society affords to him, is education, appropriate conditions of life for his cultural progress, latitude to develop and test new powers of creative judgment, the right to innovate in directions consistent with the purpose of progress, and to enjoy the right to attempt to persuade others concerning such enterprises.

It is both points of viewing freedom combined into a single notion which represents freedom in its most essential and comprehensive form. The society — e.g., the state — does not “concede” freedom to the individual, but *demand*s that he or she partake of it in the general interest of the state (society). The individual

does not rightly regard the “constriction” on outlook and method of the humanist state as oppressive. For without general progress, the state (the society) cannot afford the individual members the means for increasing their capacity and expression of freedom.

The latter is most poignantly expressed usually in connection with religious belief. Each individual has so much life to live. When it is finished, what has it meant? If that individual can but contribute during life a succession of contributions to the general technological and related advancement of society — creating, transmitting, practicing new technologies — then his or her life stands as one of immortal importance to the society. His or her contributions represent the added building of the foundation of future progress, an addition which will remain as long as the society progresses. *Without freedom in the humanist sense*, the individual in society has no consciously defensible premise on which to say to his fellows: “I have a right to live as a free man, because the advancement of our society would be less without my creative contributions.”

Hence, consider the poor young raving, homosexual marijuana addict protesting against a fission-power plant in behalf of this or that obscure, tiny lower form of life, who declares, “I have the right to do my own thing. My opinion is just as good as yours!” He is not a human being in the active, moral sense, but only a poor, wretched sinner who has consented to reduce himself to a beast-like moral condition. His passing would perhaps cause some to weep, not because he was in any moral sense a human being, but because his potential to have become one was so obscenely wasted.

Against this background, we turn our attention now to the disease, nominalism. We shall see in this connection, and in respect to certain crucial matters of foreign policy, the areas we have covered in the preceding epistemological outline have an indispensable use for most efficiently resolving not only the most critical and dangerous problems imposed upon us by Atlanticist Doctrine, but for solving the urgent questions otherwise placed before us.

26. A Federal Court system which abandons its obligation to measure judgments according to that truth, which bows before the empty fact of sovereignty or expedient arbitration, has in fact opened the doors to high treason against this nation and its Constitution.

Monetarism and Nominalism

At this point, we interpolate an observation which is not only important to mastering all of the conceptions and included problem-subjects set forth in this policy paper as a whole, but also of probably considerable importance in guiding the reader to focus more surely the highly practical importance of the preceding, unavoidably extended epistemological review, in respect to grounding the more obviously, more visibly practical-political focus to which this is directed.

Not only the proverbial man-in-the-street, but also the overwhelming majority of the world's principal and other national political figures, do not understand what are in fact the ABCs of "how politics really works." Respecting the *arts* of statecraft, certain aspects of the techniques of the politician's *craft*, the writer could benefit from the knowledge, experience and counsel to that effect from many professional political figures. Nonetheless, insofar as the processes underlying crucial political developments are concerned, the typical leading strata of national political figures and parties have yet no rigorous insight into the determining internal features of the overall political process.

This may be momentarily resented by some, as what they regard for a moment as an insufferably arrogant statement of the matter. Even so, they dare not permanently brush our statement aside. Increasingly, most notably during the recent three years to date, key political strata of various factions of nations which presently include most of these of this

world, have, although for the most part begrudgingly, recognized some special quality, some active principle of unusual intellectual power, behind the effectiveness of the special approach to major topics of strategy and policy employed by the writer's associates. Notably, respecting the most crucial issues of strategy and policy during the past decade, we have been overwhelmingly correct with respect to the contrary perceptions of leading forces of all notable factions within the United States, Western Europe, the developing sector, and the CMEA nations.

This political situation is the typical problem of scientific progress.

The growing curiosity this reluctantly perceived fact of our competence has evoked among various leading circles, has in turn impelled significant portions of such strata, both here and abroad, into proposing or briefly adopting various, wrong explanations concerning the nature of our political method and suspected special external sources of our unusual competencies. The following among those mistaken opinions are relevant to the broader practical point at hand here.

The notion that an organization of such limited physical means could manifest, repeatedly, such striking competence concerning vital issues of U.S. domestic and foreign policy was so insufferable in its implications to many leading strata, that they more credulously accepted at one time or another the calculated slanders circulated chiefly through neo-Fabian networks, to the effect that our organization

was a front for variously the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, some groups of Chicago industrialists, the Soviet KGB, a group of Third World governments, or at one point — among some Europeans — the Papacy. The toleration of such disinformational “explanations” was principally governed by their consoling features, that they appeared to explain away the disturbing fear that our competencies might be rooted in special internal qualities of our organization itself.

The notion that a small force of “outsiders,” an organization with no official, significantly institutionalized mandate to meddle in “grand politics,” could intrude hubristically into the world’s ruling circles and demonstrate that in the main those circles lacked some important competence, was the crux of this matter.

However, even the disinformational “explanations” could not and did not eliminate the persisting view that our organization was advantaged to know a few things of some importance. Consequently, increasingly since January 1974, there has been an overall increase in interest among various leading circles of the USA and abroad in acquainting themselves with our information on various matters of that sort. Such interest has ebbed and flowed repeatedly during the shorter term, but the fluctuations were only an included feature of a widening and otherwise significantly increasing overall tendency. The focus of such interest evolved over time, away from random patterns respecting specific topics and kinds of topics, to emphasize specific foci of information, including the varieties of background facts, analyses, and forecasts. The methodological error predominant, most emphatically, in the attempt to appraise our forecasts, is the most efficient characterization of the wrong way our organization’s qualities and its methods of work were generally appraised among leading and other circles.

A *forecast* involves, in customary and mistaken opinion, a *prediction*. When what is offered is seen as a mere *prediction*, the recipient of such intelligence tends to assume that the source has either obtained vital information concerning the *operational intent* of the relevant agencies involved in shaping the event, or that the projected conditions are *deductively determined*. Such appreciations, applied to the writer’s organization’s intelligence output, ultimately involve precisely the same kind of error otherwise prompting credulous acceptance of the sort of disinformation cited above.

In the matter of accepting consoling disinformation, the credulous observer has denied, in effect, that the subject organization’s notable competencies arise autonomously from some special internal quality. In the misinterpretation of the quality of the intelligence

output we represent, the misinterpreter demands, in effect, that an unusual quality of competence be causally attributed to an ordinary sort of methodological practice.

It is the methodological blunders commonly made in effort to interpret and assess our forecasts which is most to be singled out here, for sake of the urgent governing, practical point under consideration in this policy paper as a whole. The exposure of what is badly mistaken in the cited two forms of misappreciation of our forecasts points directly to that practical point.

First, the included case in which our forecast is attributed to knowledge of an operational commitment of intent by the relevant influential agency involved in the subject matter of the forecast.

From the outside, it is a standard ABC of military intelligence competence that documentary or other “hard” knowledge of an adversary’s or ally’s *intent* is of no conclusive value respecting a forecast of the behavior such institutions will pursue in practice. Evidence of such intent is merely a *clinical fact* of greater or lesser importance in forecasting, independently of the subject’s own foreknowledge of his behavior, how his capacities and shifting perceptions of self-interests will cause him to behave under circumstances we or others variously will in part shape.

In respect of an adversary’s or ally’s adopted policy concerning *intent* (provided the intelligence is not disinformation), the strongest value to be attributed to it as a clinical fact is that (even in the case of disinformation) it reflects his deliberate processes and, more immediately, represents a consciously-identified and institutionalized policy option. Since the intent is a conscious effort to articulate practical realization of an adduced self-interest, it tends to have greater influence on the subject’s behavior than equally admissible expression of the same self-interest which he has not made conscious to that same effect. However, the intent — operational commitment or otherwise — remains no less merely a clinical fact, an intent whose realization and influence will be shaped by considerations of shifting alternative capabilities and shifting immediate expressions of self-interest.

In our organization’s work, that appreciation of the quality of evidence respecting intent is carried to what might be seen by the outside military-intelligence and related specialists as a radical extreme. The writer’s organization projects no *inherent* trust into evidence of conscious intent, operational or otherwise. We would not tolerate basing our policies — including our strategical and tactical forecasts — on an amateurish misinterpretation of perceived conscious intent.

In the second aspect of the commonplace misappreciations of our *forecasts*, our attention is confronted directly with the root-problem of the Aristotelian

method. In identifying it as Aristotelian for this purpose, we are subsuming the nominalist method as a special case, the degenerate form, of the Aristotelian.

Our immediately preceding epistemological discussion is most directly relevant. The notion that political and certain related forms of forecasts can be competently developed by methods of *prediction* is the core of the misappreciation to be analyzed.

First, in respect of underlying reality, the world is presently governed in fact by two systems, capitalist and socialist. The lawful processes determining economic relations of those systems, the lawful processes governing material interests, are immediately of the negentropic form we contrasted to the Aristotelian, linearized political geometry of pre-capitalist systems. In a world governed by capitalist and socialist economies, the forecastable real consequences of actions taken in this epoch for the succeeding interval cannot be determined by methods modeled upon those employed for mapping according to a deterministic system of linear equations.

To the extent that one might consider it epistemologically feasible to use Rand Corporation "gaming-simulation," computerized methods for matters of political, economic, military strategies, the methods one might employ for such practices are inherently incompetent.

There are, of course, instances for which Rand-type methods of prediction appear to succeed. This occurs only when the prediction is of the epistemologically-computerizable form of "curve-fitting," or belongs to the degenerate case of non-linear systems, which apparently coincide with the linearizable form. In the "curve-fitting" case of such exceptions, the effectiveness of the prediction depends upon appropriate pre-determination of the "function" to be fitted, a pre-determination which occurs entirely outside the "curve-fitting" activity itself.

Those exceptions noted, the statement that deductive-determinist and related inductive ("borrowed deduction") methods of *prediction* are inherently incompetent stands as a clearly-defined, rigorous statement of fact.

This points to and reflects the larger fact to be considered, that the intrinsic epistemological form of the problem confronting us at this juncture is that the dominant institutions of the world, including some currents within the Soviet leadership, function on the adopted basis of a variously Aristotelian or nominalist set of rules, methods which are intrinsically not in correspondence with the lawful, "geometric," negentropic ordering of reality immediately intrinsic to an industrial-capitalist or industrial-socialist basis. We shall come quickly to that point.

In the terms of reference we have cited for this analysis, all perceptions and judgments, most notably

those pertaining to institutionalized policies and customs of general practice, are either *forecasts* — as this writer judges conditions and events — or *predictions*. They may be either explicitly forecasts or predictions, or merely implicitly so. For the latter case, it must be recognized that the processes of perception are inseparable from a judgment-forming consulting of the willful impulses for practice. No judgment can exist without an included, determining consideration of an anticipated disposition for a definable range of implied practical responses to the event or condition prompting the judgment itself. Thus, all thought actually or potentially anticipates practice — we are considering here practices bearing on fundamental interests, and has the implied significance of being either a forecast or a prediction.

If the notion of *forecast* is associated properly with both the methods of analyzing the irrational ruling behavior we summarized at the outset of this general section, and with the prescriptions for study of negentropic societal geometries, which we developed in the preceding epistemological subsection, the rigorous distinction to be made between a *forecast* and a *prediction* ought to become correspondingly clear.

It is precisely the effort to impose a degenerate Aristotelian method ("geometry") upon the reality of a negentropic "geometry" of industrial-capitalist forms of lawful generation of the material conditions of human existence — and, hence capitalism and its real interests — which is the casual element generating such derived discrepancies within those geometries as depressions, monetary breakdown crisis, global forced underdevelopment, the Rockefeller-Carter energy and de-industrialization policies, the decisions of financier interests to impose the Versailles reparations and later Hitler upon Germany, and so forth. To attempt to solve the policy-problems created in that way by application of the same methods of prediction which characterize the cause of those problems, *predictably* leads to nothing but a worsening of the discrepancies being considered.

This brings us back to the point we introduced at the outset of this sub-section, and to the basis for then directly attacking the next two, interconnected problems successively next to be considered in this section as a whole.

The two geometries involved in (immediately) the present directing of the capitalist system represent the causally efficient, but not *predictable* interreaction of two distinct "universes." In the one, the "underlying" negentropic geometry, the real or objective causal relationships generating the practical consequences of practical actions in respect to nature are lawfully ordered. In the other, presently a degenerated form of Aristotelian-Euclidean geometry, the judgments and policies informing practice are *deter-*



Plato, left, and Aristotle, shown in a detail of The School of Athens by Raphael.

mined. This is the problem to be solved, and *the combined comprehension of this problem and its principal practical implications is real politics*.

Insofar as the writer and his organization develop forecasts, as in the form of strategic analyses and so forth, this contribution in itself *half-satisfies* the problem of real politics. We have thus examined, as from the outside, the combined result of the interreacting two geometries. Such forecasting properly defines the problem not only with respect to its immediate analytical aspect, but also the lawful implications of *the range of alternatives* which best typify the delimited range of consequences which must lawfully ensue from *not* altering the present form of interconnection of the two geometries forming the present system of events.

Having stated the problem in that forecast form, the practical question, whose solution must be derived by the same conceptual method used in forecasting, is how to alter the dualistic configuration to shift the delimiting, forecastable "path" of world developments to an effect within the range of acceptable real interests of our nation.

This is the thrust of our organization's strategic analyses, including the present, admittedly and necessarily rather thorough thesis statement respecting a reconstruction of our nation's policy postures.

A competent forecast is, first of all, a forecast in the sense we have so far prescribed. To be a competent and completely political forecast, it must inclusively identify those points of intervention in the immediately-developing spectrum of events at which actions within both the *real* capabilities and the present or imminent *subjective* capabilities of actual forces can, variously, intervene to more or less "catalytically" shift the interactions of the two geometries away from the pathways leading toward the worst variants specifiable within the forecast. These interventions may effect merely slightly shifted pathways, which represent a slower approach to preconditions of irreversible catastrophe, which "buy time" or which, preferably represent a pathway leading out of the pathological track altogether. The principles remain broadly the same for all cases.

Since the generative feature of the problem confronting us is properly regarded as a monetarists' subversion of the U.S. Constitution and of the intended content of our nation's republican institutions, if it were feasible to restore the essential, active features of that Federalist-Whig humanist outlook and method to the dominant institutions consciously so shaping our nation's policies, that alteration would put our nation and the world on a track in which all of the problems foreseeable during the next two to three decades would be implicitly soluble in practice throughout that period.

That is not merely a satisfactory formal solution to the present and looming horrors, but the overwhelming majority of the nation's working people, farmers, industrialists, scientists, and so forth have Whiggish interests and Whiggish impulses. However, these impulses are aborted in overall effect for lack of substantial political institutions committed to transforming such impulses efficiently into their corresponding expressions as conscious national policies. Relative to the liberal and radical minority, and also the tiny monetarist cabal running part of the Republican Party and the White House and certain Congressional top elements of the Democratic Party, the Whiggish forces of our nation (conservative Republicans and Democrats, farmers, traditionalist trade unions, and the U.S. Labor Party) represent the vital interests and corresponding impulses of the overwhelming majority of the electorate *in fact*. The headlong efforts of the Tories to destroy — with wild foreign adventures and attacks on our most vital national domestic self-interests — those material and cultural conditions which represent the most urgent immediate self-interests of the majority, create the conditions respecting "thresholds" under which the old Tory pattern can be broken, to constitute a "Whiggish" humanist coalition of labor, farmers, and industrialists as the governing institutionalized form of national domestic and foreign policy.

Those derived strategic principles, which have implications to the same general effect in most nations of the world today, represent real politics.

In order to implement such a crucial strategic policy, *we must know our enemy* — immediately the Tory alliance of monetarists, liberals and radicals — and must understand how degenerative influences have created our Tories from top to bottom of that unwholesome formation. We must understand the development of their poisonous core ideology, and how the insidious influence of the same ideological and related forces has induced our nation's fundamentally Whiggish majority to tolerate, for so long up to this time, the growing rule of such an unwholesome minority force.

Thus the direct attack on the problem identified at the outset of this section requires two interconnected steps, both indispensably advantaged by the epistemological apparatus we have interpolated for that purpose. We must account for the development of the nominalist core ideology of today's U.S. liberals and radicals as the characteristic outlook and method of monetarism. We must then demonstrate, rigorously rather than merely descriptively, how the geopolitics-centered Atlanticist Doctrine has developed those obsessional, irrational features through which it now hysterically pushes the United States toward the brink of national suicide.

From the outside, as Western Europeans and others view the United States so credulously — through our official postures, our major Eastern Seaboard newspapers and leading national newsweeklies, our movies, our television production, and so forth — what we are exposing for correction is what such Western Europeans and others would tend to term “the American ideology.” It is more correctly that special, United States’ adaptation of the same monetarist-linked nominalism which, in different adaptations, has been a ruling ideology in Europe itself. In consequence of the conflicts of vital interests, now in full flood, between the Carter Administration and Western Europe, Western Europeans are advantaged to see such faults in our apparent official ideology much more clearly than they detect kindred ideological disorders within their own national characters.

The operative phrase to be stressed in that connection is “from the outside.”

The “American ideology” in that sense is admittedly the characteristic ideology of our liberals and radicals — what Karl Marx distinguished as the liberal *petit-bourgeois* and the radical *declassé* and *lumpenproletarian* social strata. Admittedly these strata, the popular base-forces of lower Manhattan monetarism, have run amok for decades polluting our national institutions with *their ideology*. Admittedly, they have thus compelled the working class, industrialist and other *innately Whiggish*, “Idea of Progress”-defined strata of our nation to endure such pollution of their own and their children’s moralities. Nominalism — empiricism, pragmatism, positivism, behaviorism, cultural relativism, “egalitarianism,” and so forth — is politically hegemonic in those institutions which the monetarists, with aid of their liberal and radical shock-troops have been able to take over and corrupt. However, at root, with our organic traditions and impulses for technologically-vectored industrial and agricultural progress, those inner qualities which made us the richest nation of the world, we are American Whigs. If this were not true, if liberal nominalism were not but a disease imposed upon a national character which itself represents a contrary organic world outlook, thermonuclear war and other horrors would be the incurable Fate written into our national character.

We, as a majority of our nation, are predominantly Whigs to the core today not simply because we bear the habits and imprint of our great technological achievements of the past. We are American Whigs because of the institutions, including our founding Constitution and its initial Bill of Rights, which defined our national character in such an ongoing way that even the plague of Toryism introduced by the reign of loutish Andrew Jackson could not root out

those traditions. Even Tory Franklin Delano Roosevelt could not fully root out those Whiggish traditions. Even the frenetic Tory subversion launched with the inauguration of John F. Kennedy has not yet rooted it out of the majority of our people. It was admittedly the organic experience of our technological progress which immediately nourished and sustained our Whiggish impulses, but that form and scope of technological progress itself was made possible by the embodiment of the neo-platonic humanist intent of the Federalists and their closest collaborators, in giving approximate shape to that humanist outlook and method through the adopted instruments of our republican form of government.

Although it is practically indispensable to emphasize that the *impulse* of the majority of our people is committed to the Idea of Progress in at least an implicitly-humanist form, monetarism and nominalism have been the hegemonic core ideology of the English-speaking institutions as a whole for at least two centuries, and increasingly so during the past century. There is no aspect of culture which has not been significantly corrupted or even wholly taken over by this pernicious influence.

For example, our universities:

American sociology — predominantly an outgrowth of the coordinate settlement house and Fabian “social work” charitable activities originated among the thus card-indexed and manipulated, labile poor of London, New York and so forth — is worse than worthless as an academic subject of our universities and secondary schools. It is worse than bunk; it is nothing but a vicious form of nominalist indoctrination of prospective “social-work” shock-troop recruits to the neo-Fabian political intelligence apparatus.

American psychology has almost entirely subjugated the thrusts toward a competent psychological study such as those within psychoanalysis. Under the impulse of behaviorism, the Fabian and neo-Fabian political-intelligence networks have subverted our institutions through such coordinating centers as the Rockefeller-fostered London Tavistock Institute, the Rothschilds’ and Rockefellers’ so-called Frankfurt School and its attached (Frankfurt, BRD) Sigmund Freud Institute, and the Tavistock-spawned, Rockefeller fostered UNO World Federation of Mental Health. Excepting hold-out honest practitioners, American psychiatry and psychological instruction are today becoming the most vicious form of quackery, downright Tory ideological subversion weapons of nominalism.

American anthropology’s degeneration from a former level of tolerable competence is typified by the unjustifiable prominent status of figures such as Margaret Mead. Using the yardstick of those several

debatable but nonetheless serious efforts to establish anthropological competence which still existed significantly around some universities until the beginning of the 1960s, it is instructive to note the way in which such decent currents have been extirpated from graduate departments of anthropology in universities, in favor of the worst features imported from sociology, without even an effort to disguise the significance of the thuggery (albeit of an academic form) employed to this purpose.

Imagine the sheer idiocy of the “cultural relativist” doctrine forced thus upon anthropology. We, an advanced culture, whose very existence is historically the product of progress from feudal and ultimately primitive social forms, having reached the benefits of such culture, in all purported seriousness consider a professed anthropologist a quite sane and authoritative person on that topic, when he bases his doctrine on the axiomatic assertion that the whole course of history which brought us up from barbarism *might have been a mistake*. That we authorize universities to give advanced professional degrees to such nitwits is truly exemplary of the corruption of our institutions.

American and world history — to the extent that such frauds as William A. Williams are taken seriously, history is in hideous condition for the same reasons, as is political science generally.

Political Economy — The granting of the Nobel Prize to the rabidly-incompetent Milton Friedman exemplifies both the intellectual and moral bankruptcy of most of the profession of economists. Not only does Friedman’s scheme demand the overthrow of our Constitution to institute a fascist economy — of the type presently prevailing in collapsing Chile, which is criminal, but a fascist economy doesn’t work. Moreover the specific “contribution” for which Friedman was cited in connection with the Nobel award is exemplary of both the fascist principles embedded in his economic doctrine, and represents a purportedly recent “discovery” of a form of hyperinflationary-austerity which was discredited in fact most emphatically by Nazi occupation policies and slave-labor-death-camp program of the 1943-1945 period. Even a number of the leading monetarist economists had earlier demonstrated that Friedman, except as a kind of historical “accountant,” is incompetent even by ordinary monetarist professional standards. Otherwise, barring a few stubborn holdouts, what is taught in the name of economics in our universities today *is not economics at all*, but pure, anti-economic monetarism.

English language studies have not been left politically untainted by nominalism.

Up through the nineteenth century, the notion of a rigorous approach to English-language disciplines was in the condition of a conflict between a “Latin”-

Aristotelian method developed in English-language culture’s educational programs as a post-1589 process of perversion of earlier Erasmian educational reforms. The latter, the philological approach, was based on a study of the way words change in form and usages within a language and language-group. Philology attempted to abstract this *evolutionary* process from the succession of given configuration of usages at any time. It set out to discover a set of principles by which we could both open up new dimensions of historiography, and apply these same principles to consciously ordering our approach more finely to ongoing transformations occurring within the living language.

The philological approach replaced the bankrupt methods adopted by the radically Aristotelian approach corrupting “Latin”-focused classicism. The meaning of words and syntactical forms are not properly *fixed* according to some set of preordained rules to be dug out. As society develops, language lawfully undergoes transformations. The essence of those changes in word-meanings and syntactical forms is *punning*.

One communicates a new idea by resorting to *ironical* use of language. This irony is dictated by the problematic fact that words and syntactical forms, the available medium of communication, have established customary significances (not a precisely-determined meaning, despite the efforts of the nominalists to legislate through dictionaries, but a range of associated potential meanings, each alternative enhanced or repressed according to context and form of usage). Hence, to go *beyond* calling forth one of those established potential significances, to express a conception that is genuinely new to the speaker or listener, *a new meaning — however subtle — must be added to the existing medium*. This effort depends principally upon the uses of irony (metaphor, simile, hyperbole, etc.) both respecting the usage of words and syntactical forms.

This defines the need to have junked the radically-Aristotelian “Latin”-classical approach to language studies, to free the mind of the stultification of thought-deadening grammatical canons and nominalist-tending dictionaries. This is seen by philologists in the fact that all *intelligent* communication (excepting ordinary uses of “Hello,” “How do you like the weather?” “Go to the store,” and so forth), all *intelligent* use of language depends upon *an ultimately lawful approach to breaking established rules and customs of speech*.

The proto-philological thrust was in fact a characteristic of early and high Renaissance humanism. The case of Erasmus’ work in transforming existing language-uses through the weapon of Latin and Greek literature — and so forth — is merely exemplary. All the great humanist writers, including Rabelais and

Arabic-enriched Cervantes, are “notorious” for this predominant feature of their great writings. Shakespeare and Milton are magnificent illustrations of the indispensable role of word and grammatical punning and related forms of irony in *intelligent* communication. Poetry is properly the most concentrated expression of this principle of intelligent use of language.

It is not accidental that English language poetry died, beginning with romanticist-existentialist general death-agony, from about the middle of the last century.

There are no great poets or musicians, as poets, or musicians per se. There are rather *great intellects* who express this through their mastery of the media of poetry and music.

Philology as such developed in Germany significantly through the influence of the mystic Jakob Boehme, and was advanced into a deliberate discipline by the brothers Grimm, G.W.F. Hegel (perhaps history’s *greatest punner*), and others of the German-Scandinavian anthropological-philological school. Inevitably, because of its essential evolutionist content, its intrinsic emphasis upon the humanist principle of the Idea of Progress, philology attracted the adverse attention of the British empiricists, notably their Mill-Bentham-Webb “utilitarianism,” Fabian faction. A countermeasure was launched, aimed at stamping out the influence of philology. This was notably, inclusively centered around the orbit of Fabian nests in old Vienna.

Approximately 1931, Fabian political-intelligence operative Karl Korsch abruptly abandoned his explicitly political activities in Germany, and began a close collaboration with the circles of Rudolf Carnap, Kurt Lewin and others of that radical-nominalist persuasion, concentrating on the subject of language. Direct collaboration among the Korsch, Lewin and other circles with Bertrand Russell in the United States effected a concerted thrust in behalf of *linguistics* here. The Russell-Lewin-Carnap-Korsch aspect of this campaign is of exemplary significance.

Russell, otherwise an evil Fabian operative embracing wickedness of sometimes the most devious sort undertaken in several fields, exemplified for the purposes of the linguistics project the thrust of *mathematical logic*. The wicked Lewin represented a leader in the field of sociopsychological reductionist methods we today properly term “brainwashing.” Carnap and others were radical (nominalists)

positivists, who contributed the systematic foundations for the effort. Korsch was a proven master-manipulator of liberal and left strata. In point of fact *linguistics* is the central *language* aspect of neo-Fabian, “utopian” techniques of social manipulation, brainwashing, and allied black arts today, and operates chiefly on the basis of an environment otherwise formed by Lewinite “small group” methods, using “mathematical logic” as the common ordering tool for coordinating such “multidisciplinary” operations.

Out of this came directly not only linguistics itself, the effort to destroy music entirely through such methods (e.g., Princeton’s Babbitt), information theory, and programmed instruction. It is neither metaphor, hyperbole, nor simile to identify the entire unwholesome mess as explicitly fascist. One should also note a direct relationship to the way in which the computer-related methods of mass manipulation and population-information data-banks are developed and used today.

The Frankfurt School extension of this same linguistics project to such wartime, Office of War Information-related nastiness as the “Radio Research Project,” was crucial in extending this to the ranks of journalists. Neo-Fabian networks, intersecting the journalism schools of our major universities, and coordinated through agencies associated in part with the Russell Sage Foundation, are the production line for today’s corrupt journalist liberal-to-radical shock troops. It is these Fabian journalists who do the detail-work in creating a coordinated atmosphere of lies and twisted fact — which has become recently such a monstrous feature of the role of certain leading printed and electronic media in corrupting our institutions. These are notable instruments in disrupting the Constitutional processes of government by means of scenario-coordinated hoaxes, in which such despicable “journalists” perform a key role.

So, even such a purportedly “apolitical” domain of academic life as English language instruction (and language-instruction generally) is thus and in other ways permeated with the influence of the linguistics doctrine. Linguistics, and such gimmicks as “speed-reading,” cultivate the emphasis on an in-fact-schizophrenic approach to the use of language. By such ruses, the *intelligent* use of language — its cognitive essentials — is either outlawed (in the most radical approaches) or merely tolerated.

The Macro Approach

We turn to the state of the *mathematical physical* sciences last in this series, because our relevant observations on that area lead us directly to formulating the principal point to be made for tracing the history of nominalist influences systematically.

Neo-Fabian subversion is confronted with an insoluble problem in the case of the physical sciences. Since experimentally linked methods tie doctrine immediately to the impact of universally lawful processes, it is impossible to sustain basic scientific *development* of industrially employable technologies under the direct rule of the sweeping epistemological fraud feasible in the so-called “social sciences” and “arts.” Here, granting purely hypothetical extensions of “pure mathematics” along lines of “mathematical logic,” and including the schizophrenic fantasy life of certain branches of “pure topology,” the Rockefellers have failed thus far in their dogged efforts to brainwash the Creator.

Although the nominal subjects of the corrupted “social sciences” and “arts” — i.e., people — are also real, human beings are capable of being induced, under appropriate circumstances, to regulate their behavior according to the dictates of a delusion. Non-living processes, lacking the power of consciousness, are deprived of such advantages of mental aberration. Hence, people can be induced, within limits, to defy a lawfully self-interested ordering of their behavior in favor of a delusion-linked arbitrary set of artificial rules of behavior. This does not invalidate the violated real laws of the processes involved. Rather, depressions, wars, famines, biological catastrophes of extreme forms, assert the operation of the violated laws even to the remedy of the extinction of the violators. Within the range of tolerated absurdity so defined by law, absurdity can characterize behavior to the extent required to make today’s rampant delusions called university liberal arts plausible to their perpetrators and to a significant number of dupes.

Mathematicians — pure mathematicians — under conditions of isolation from physics can be driven

insane rather readily. Physicists, collectively, cannot — *as long as they pursue the practice of physics as a scientific activity oriented to lawfully-demonstrated workable results in the real universe*. Hence the Copenhagen School, the Solvay Conference, and similar ironical phenomena. Niels Bohr could be a thug against Erwin Schrödinger and others, but to the extent he was a physicist, he had to be a practicing physicist. Hence, on the one side, Bohr served his financial backers as a credible spokesman in the effort to halt the progress of basic science at its most crucial point. However, within the bounds which thug-Bohr and his associates helped to impose upon general scientific progress, physicist-Bohr, working within such bounds, had to remain in large the physicist he remained — if in morally reduced degree.

For such delimiting reasons, the introduction of nominalist ideology to the domain of the physical sciences involves the halting of scientific progress in some direction, and the reification of the pretext for that halting into the form of a “positive” doctrine of the nominalist form. Nominalism can function within the house of practiced physical science only as a statement concerning those aspects of the universe into which the rigorous activity of basic scientific work has been prohibited.

The “indeterminacy doctrine” associated with Werner Heisenberg exemplifies this. Epistemologically, Heisenberg’s autobiographical allusion to the intellectual influence of Fries is relevant.

Fries, whom Hegel honors with extreme generosity by giving Fries one-half of a short sentence within his three-volume *History of Philosophy*, was among those collateral professional frauds who set themselves up as explicators and correctors of Kant. These were persons justly held in obscurity beside such more notable Kantian *epigoni* as Fichte, Herbart, and beside even retailers of the diluted varieties of Kantianism which trickled into early-nineteenth century Concord, Massachusetts. Fries, who would not be notable at all, if part-time pro-fascist activists of 1919-1920 such as Heisenberg had not picked him out of his

well-deserved obscurity, is regrettably notable as one of the many “angle-trisectors” who sought to “complete” the Kantian system by shysters’ tricks, purporting to show that *within the stretched-Aristotelian Kantian system* they had found a clever way to reify the gap between the phenomenon and thing-in-itself into a causal principle. In this way, they claimed to themselves the miracle of having known the unknowable.

This shyster’s trick is epistemologically identical with the content of the Heisenberg “indeterminacy principle.” A mere practical difficulty (albeit a large one) of then-existing approaches to experimental physics, was reified into a permanently positive existence. Rather than leaving the matter to the discovery of a completely fresh approach to experimental access — as high-energy-domain coherent ion-beams suggest today — Heisenberg’s “principle” professed to reduce to ridicule (and an aborting of funding and other means to practice science) anyone who dared to propose to cross that borderline.

That is a classic case of the way in which radical nominalism (e.g., positivism) is introduced within the house of physical science. Close off an avenue of vital experimental work, and arbitrarily introduce an ideology to defend that barrier, imposing nominalist ideology directly on the corpus of science for this purpose.

The further provocative feature of pseudo-Kantian Heisenberg’s trick is that already Immanuel Kant had defined the problem in a way which proved, at least, the idiocy of Heisenberg’s methodological argument.

The classical problem of micro-physics, in particular, is a direct and obvious carry-over of the Aristotelian method into these investigations. Seen, and properly so, in that aspect, the connection between this feature of physics and the problem key to the rise of nominalism in ruling institutions is most usefully situated.

The continuing central crisis of physics — and political theory—has been the paradoxical notion of the particle-field relationship. First, the case for physics.

This is not a difficulty which cropped up for physics only in connection with the work of Maxwell during the nineteenth century. Isaac Newton was explicit in emphasizing the epistemological-physical absurdity of the problem he introduced as the heuristic ruse of “action-at-a-distance.” At the time Newton resorted to that ruse, *in the effort to articulate the evidence in terms of the Aristotelian-Euclidean system*, the physical reality of the field-particle problem had been firmly established by the work of William Gilbert, Johannes Kepler and others. Later, Maxwell himself explicitly referred to the prevailing conceptions of physical science as *so-called physical science*, emphasizing the epistemological problem of the method

of abstracting the “internal relations” of an isolated aspect of the overall process for analysis.

This is emphatically *not* to suggest that the crisis in science might have been avoided if, perhaps, *two apples* had dropped on Isaac Newton’s head at a certain moment. *Newton himself did the right thing under the circumstances*. It was those damnable *Newtonians*, Newton’s empiricist *epigoni*, who more or less suppressed Newton’s own warning concerning the inherent flaws of his system, who are chiefly to be blamed for the problems allegedly contributed by the persisting authority of Newtonian-Lagrangian physics.

There are two immediately relevant aspects to Newton’s epistemological problem. First, the Aristotelian-Euclidean system of representation (linear determinism) was the only *formal* approach culturally available at that time. Secondly, the attempt to supersede this linearized formalism *through experimental physics approaches* is categorically delimited by principle to experimental work mediated through breakthroughs respecting the (“infinitesimal”) microphysical and (“infinite”) astronomical scale of physical phenomena. Granted, the epistemological solution to that class of conceptual problem existed empirically at that time, but only with respect to the measurable consequences of human creative syntheses on the thermodynamical transformations of entire economies, not for biology otherwise, and not for the practice or theory of physics *qua* physics.

Now that we have taken Isaac Newton himself off the hook in this matter, we can, in good conscience, develop the approach we require to the problem of nominalism, by turning the observation just made in defense of Newton about one-hundred-eighty degrees.

In physical science, *it is man who conducts experimental investigations*. *Not abstract man*, but men and women who, as experimenters, are also culturally representative of particular societies. This is to emphasize that a “purely objective knowledge” of physical processes, a knowledge independent of the subjectivity of human knowers and experimenters, is an absurdity. This does not mean, as shallow intellects might object, that science is therefore capable only of subjective guesses concerning universal laws. The empiricists and other varieties of nominalists who insist on holding to such objections merely demonstrate that they have missed the whole point concerning science itself.

The human race was engaged in technological progress long, long before Thales. Under those relatively primitive, lower forms of social life which represent the course of human progress prior to the Ionian period, technological progress happened because people are human, and thus create new knowledge

which is extended to practice. The fact that such innovations represent new knowledge was undoubtedly known *in that sense* to more primitive cultures — not to confuse genuinely primitive cultures in the line of social evolution with those nooks and crannies of nineteenth and twentieth century anthropology which mistook *degenerated* forms of societies for modern examples of primitive ones. We stress that until the period of about the seventh through fifth centuries B.C., science did not exist *as science*. Granted, we can look back upon the development of abstract forms of technical knowledge among earlier Egyptian and Mesopotamian cultures, and call such artifacts elements of scientific progress; we are entitled to do so only if we recognize that it is our *modern* analysis of those artifacts which brings them within the body of *our science*.

Science, as the case of the Ionian philosophers underlines, *is a consciousness of science* as a principled, lawfully ordered form of creative activity, directed to effecting technological advances in specific aspects of knowledge *as by-products* of a principal effort directed toward discovering the fundamental ordering principles of *man's universe*. Not the universe without man, but the universe in which man's lawful mastery of its domain is the point of reference for determining the notion of order. If we can scientifically look back to pre-human, pre-biological eras of earth and the galaxies, that is possible only on the presumption of the coherence and continuity of past existence with man's *present* intervention in the same universe today.

Science is therefore essentially *neo-platonic humanist epistemology*. Science is a matter of discovering the ordering principles generating *the succession of creative human discovery of the laws of the universe in general*.

Science is indeed concerned in particular with the appropriateness of a formulation as a prediction or at least a forecast of experimental behavior of some aspect of its work. It is also indeed concerned to establish consistency among such formulations, to the effect that the entirety of domains of overlapping experimental subjects provides for consistent predictions and forecasts. Those are included activities of scientific work, but *they are not science*.

No number of isolated experiments *as such* could prove a single principle of scientific knowledge. Science is not the abstraction of practical experience in any such sense of "common law" aggregates of localized behavior. *The essential feature of all scientific work is the rigorous formulation of hypotheses*, most notably those hypotheses we associate with so-called crucial experiments. It is the disciplining of the scientific mind to arrive at the posing of such crucial-experimental hypotheses, with a forecastable,

directed positive advance of scientific knowledge as a result of *either* positive or negative experimental results, which is the core of science, which is epistemology.

Every scientist knows — but most laymen do not — that it is a rigorously demonstrated principle that no amount of statistical knowledge gained from ordinary experiments can, in itself, disprove or prove a single hypothesis. Any person who imagines that science is statistical-experimental method is, relative to the professional practice of science, a raving imbecile.

This does not mean that highly significant statistical results of a properly defined experiment or observation do not have authority for science. They do, but that authority is situated outside any cocktail-hour doctrine of "science is statistics." The authority is embedded *mediately* in the theory of experiments itself. The governing principle of all the useful and authoritative features of the theory of experiments is that these restrictions concerning the design of experiments and observations *are a direct reflection of established fundamental principles of science*. We tend to accept significant experimental results on condition that the experiment has been "structured" to conform to standards of coherence and consistency with "background" laws of the universe.

The point emphasized is that science-in-general is not a summation or other sort of abstraction of some common features adduced on the authority of a brick-laying architecture, based in isolated experimental findings concerning local evidence. Exactly the reverse. An experiment is not better than the appropriateness to the actual laws of the universe — as universal laws — of the conceptions which govern the design of the experiment.

If aggregations of local experiments cannot possibly add up to science, where do we obtain the empirical evidence on which to base the notion of science? This, as we shall show, explains the reason the particle-field paradox of science exists, and why that same fact is crucially symptomatic of the lawful processes governing the historical process of development of the nominalist form of core ideology.

The question we have just posed concerning science is implicitly answered by stating that Kepler, not Galileo, is the "father" of modern physical science.

The significance of Kepler's approach — without which the *useful* physics work of Galileo would have proven nothing for science — is that Kepler based his empirical-theoretical investigations on a crucial-experimental study of a relatively-universal subject matter, the lawful ordering of man's observations of the relationships among the known bodies of the solar system. Without Kepler, Galileo's physics work could not have contributed anything notably meaningful to the main body of science. By proving the universality

of an ordering principle within that aspect of man's study of the solar system, Kepler established the basis on which Newton and others, by directly inverting Kepler's (and other) principles into the corresponding form of Newton's principles, could incorporate otherwise inconclusive findings of a Galileo to produce the hypothesis, based on Kepler's universal principles, through which Galileo's useful work could be re-examined in terms of experimental hypotheses approximating a crucial experiment.

The case of Kepler is heuristically intermediate between the matter of the localized experiment and the more fundamental problem it symbolizes.

The proof and empirical source of the authority of science is that the progress of a society, effected through a relatively deliberate ordering of its productive and related technologies, effects *the basis for* an increase in the population at a higher per capita standard of gross output, and moreover establishes *the preconditions for* an acceleration of the further rate of such advances. It is the embodiment of the *universality* of a mode of technological and related advances, in the relative universality represented by that society's mastery of nature, which is fundamental. What is crucially proven is *not* that the existing mode of production and correlated practices are sound — that may also be proven, but that is not the vital point. What is proven is that the characteristic way in which the society, overall, orders *increases* in its thermodynamic mastery of nature is effective, and that therefore *the way in which new knowledge is being ordered is in correspondence with the lawful ordering of the material processes the society is mastering*.

That is the only proper implication of the truism that *the fundamental proof of human knowledge is the continued existence of man*.

The development of science in the specific form it erupted from neo-platonic high Renaissance humanism, during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and the fact that it was a product of neo-platonic humanism and its radiations, is a matter of the conditions under which precisely those humanists located *the creative process of mind as directly embodying the primary ordering-principle in human existence and progress*. They thus created the conditions under which Aristotelians and others contributed to scientific knowledge, but science is nonetheless entirely a creation of neo-platonic humanism. *Science is the deliberate epistemological mastery of the ordering principles characteristic of the synthesis of those hypotheses, notably crucial hypotheses, which, extended appropriately to experimental form, generate an overall accelerating progress in a society's knowledgeable, deliberate mastery of the universe and its included processes*.

It is hypothesis, not experiment, which is the essence of science. The content of science is not that experiments succeed in producing useful results. The content is the successive ordering of hypotheses and corresponding experiments — essentially the universal-empirical ordering of hypotheses — to the effect that the progress of scientific knowledge has a positively *directed* quality toward increasing society's productive and related powers over nature.

The Aristotelian or nominalist, because he is factually and epistemologically anti-humanist on this point, cannot acknowledge that essential feature of science, because to do so would be to overthrow the most fundamental, characteristic axioms of his adopted outlook and method. Hence, to the extent an Aristotelian or nominalist may be in fact a useful scientist, he is epistemologically a bastard — he exists, but without acknowledged parentage.

The historical principle most emphatically to be adduced from these considerations is that the only authority for empirical knowledge existing in any society is delimited to those alternative characteristic forms of the apollonian, promethean and dionysian outlook specific to the society in whose context the empirical investigation is made.

This restriction is most fundamentally defined in terms of the characteristic ordering of social practice within that society (its geometry), and further delimited in particular, subsumed respects by the kinds of experimental practice accessible to the forms of technology existing and coming into existence in that society. All human knowledge, just as the special case of science reflects necessarily the most fundamental and broadly applicable ordering principles of all human thought, is historically specific to the universalizing circumstances (geometry) under which it comes into being.

One cannot, as a hypothetical gifted individual, leap out of one's society, and "scientifically" study the universe *deus ex machina*.

Although this historical restriction delimits the quality of human knowledge in any society relative to other societies, the characteristic world outlook of any successfully developing form of society is an adequate basis for real, universal knowledge *in terms of the kinds of knowledge appropriate to that society*.

If we, today, can appear to leap above that restriction relative to preceding societies, that is because of those circumstances of modern development which enable us to make the kind of approach to problems of knowledge and society we represent here. Because of the development of industrial capitalism, with the included, integral lawful feature of a *conscious ordering of advancing technology*, and because of the breakthroughs which biology and physical science have made *toward* achieving a coherent body

of *hylozoic* scientific knowledge, we today can adduce the causal principle we set forth earlier in this section, that is, the notion of a permanent principle of nengotropic causality generating both the events within two successive geometries and the development of a successor geometry out of actions originating in the former.

The paradox of the Bardi and Peruzzi — the Italian bankers who, as the Rockefellers and Fuggers of yore, most directly caused the genocidal Black Death of the mid-fourteenth century — is exemplary of the implications of the particle-field paradox within social processes as such. It is the same particle-field paradox we confront in physics: *the two analogous patterns have a common origin in the geometry of the societies which create both such paradoxes.*

The lewd irony of the Bardi and Peruzzi is that their emergence was a reflection of the development of proto-capitalist conditions within feudal Europe, during the great feudal breakdown-crisis popularly known as the Crusades. Those Italian bankers, expressing the proto-capitalist shift toward alienable property forms linked to embryonic growth of technological progress in urban centers, were the most powerful accomplices of the anti-capitalist faction. The subsequent cases of the Fuggers, of the Amsterdam bankers from the middle of the seventeenth century, of the British East India Company, the Barings, the Rothschilds, and the Rockefellers, all express the persistence of the same principle of degeneracy expressed by the Bardi-Peruzzi case.

The classical name for this specific degeneracy is *heteronomy*. The same heteronomy, which is systematically defined as the essential feature of *evil* in rigorous Aristotelian argument, and defined to the same categorical effect by neo-platonic humanism, is the characteristic, axiomatic premise of nominalism, and the axiomatic premise of monetarist practice and doctrine. Hence, epistemologically, what both Christian currents of humanism define as *evil*, *nominalism*, and *monetarism* are respectively only different facets of the same degeneracy.

There are three now classical attacks on the problem of heteronomy in modern thought. The first convincing attempt at a coherent analysis of the problem was accomplished in the Netherlands: Benedict Spinoza, notably in his *Ethics*, and the great humanist painter, Rembrandt, by showing the face of evil in his "Syndics of the Cloth Guild." The second is the systematic analysis of heteronomy from a stretched Aristotelian standpoint by Immanuel Kant, most notably in the concluding section of his *Critique of Practical Reason*. The third, resolving the approaches contributed by both Spinoza and Kant, is the rigorous notion of *alienation* as actually developed successively by G.W.F. Hegel and Karl Marx.

It is to be emphasized that Hegel's and Marx's rigorous conception of *alienation* has no cognitive connections to the uses of that term by Frankfurt School and other Fabian and neo-Fabian corruptors of its usage.

Since Kant situates the problem within the stretched framework of Aristotelian geometries, it is his term and his analysis which afford the preferred point of departure for an *historical* analysis of the problem. Hence, Kant's notion of *heteronomy* is the point of reference we have introduced here.

The Cartesian humanist, Spinoza, located the problem of heteronomy in respect to what he termed "fictitious knowledge." The significance Spinoza gave to the *formal* aspect of the problem is that localized knowledge is inherently wrong; and also that the attempt to bring thought into agreement with ordering principles governing such localized misapprehension of reality forms the lawful basis for generating evil, behavior contrary to the prescriptions immanent in a universal, lawful ordering. Because Spinoza's method was hylozoic, his notion of "fictitious knowledge" also meant an insight into a lawful generation of a continuum of "fictitious" or *evil practice* in the succession of human affairs.

The crucial formal defect in Spinoza's effort to advance neo-platonic humanism was that he attempted to resolve the problem in terms of reference of an Aristotelian-Euclidean epistemology. His causal principle was not Aristotelian-Euclidean, but he attempted to use his principle to make a revolution within the stretched formal premises of the Aristotelian system. Hence, the formal result was a linearized attempt to represent a model for the kind of nengotropic continuum which he demanded.

That was not an idiosyncrasy of Spinoza's. The Erasmian Thomas More exhibits the identical problem in the conceptual ordering of his *Utopia*. Any effort which adopts the notion of an Aristotelian-like *a priori* ordering of the preordained formal lawful framework of ordering, as Ficino typifies such neo-platonic humanists' errors in his *Five Questions*, must lead to a *utopian* ethical method of the type best exemplified by Ficino, More, and Spinoza. The proper judgment of this problem does not lead to discarding of Ficino, More, Spinoza, et al., but to adducing the generative principle ordering their creative thought, by examining the implications of their efforts under the condition that the crucial, Aristotelian restriction on the *formal representation* of their hypotheses is removed.

That is by no allowable view merely a problem of humanist philosophers. It is also the approach uniquely demanded for understanding the pre-1589 Tudor Renaissance and the character of the founding American institutions associated with the Declaration

of Independence and Constitution. In each case, with respect to a self-consciousness of the necessity and form of the generative policy outlook and method they represented, the authors of the Tudor and American revolutions were characteristically neo-platonic humanists, and self-consciously so regarding those features of the humanist outlook we have defined as crucial. However, in the course of the effort to translate these self-conscious impulses of outlook and method into the *formal* specifications of institutions, they were confronted with the obstacle of a culturally determined, carried-forward Aristotelian doctrine.

This epistemological contradiction within the framing of, for example, our Constitution, does not warrant the outrageously fraudulent conclusion that the Constitution is therefore so ambiguous respecting outlook and method that the question of the cited intent can be relegated to mere mootness. On the contrary, the founding fathers explicitly precluded such outrages with such key phrases as "In order ... that ... to ..." in every aspect of their definition of the controlling purpose which must govern the application of each formally specified feature. The essential feature of the frauds perpetrated by such Fabian and neo-Fabian revisionists as Thurman Arnold and William A. Williams is to demand a comprehensive discounting of just such crucial Constitutional specifications of outlook, method and empirical criteria of appropriateness.

It is relevant to proof of our principal point to interpolate here an observation of the reflection of this same problem in the philosophy of constitutional and subsumed law. Constitutional law, whether literally so or otherwise, is merely the institutionalized expression of the practical impulse of a governing epistemological outlook, and is itself an integral feature of the characteristic geometry of societies. The notion of Law as a subject unto itself is poisonous nonsense — as the methodology of nominalist evolution of law under Weimar led directly and consistently into the irrationalist nightmare of Nazi judicial and related practices.

Accordingly, it is an included characteristic fraud of the Aristotelian scholastic doctrinaires that they attempt in the main to define an internally consistent continuity of evolution of law from Roman through feudal through medieval into modern law. Similarly, the preparatory background for empirical arguments in behalf of revisionist subversion of our Constitution is the attempt to similarly fuse English Common Law into the corpus of U.S. law. The outrageous fraud embedded in any such fallacy of composition in legal doctrine and practice, is that the successive bodies of law which they so recklessly portray as the process of practical perfection of a supra-historical spirit of purely abstract law, represent successive societies

which are separated from one another by sweeping revolutions respecting precisely the most fundamental ordering principles of constitutional and subsumed law.

Roman and feudal law have fundamentally different generative axiomatic premises in the law as a whole. The thirteenth century Edwardian reforms represent a breaking point, separating the generative principles of preceding feudal from those of subsequent medieval law. Tudor law represents, similarly, an axiomatic break with the most essential features of pre-Tudor law. Although the generative law embedded in the American Revolution is most significantly rooted in Tudor and Commonwealth legal revolutions before it, the reason for the American revolution was that the post-1688 degeneration of English law in its axiomatic features had produced an irreconcilable separation between the fundamental generative conceptions of law between the separating political bodies.

There is of course a different sort of genuine continuity in law than is recklessly proposed by radical scholastics and revisionists. The most efficient method of accounting for this is provided by our conception of the causality bridging successive geometries. A revolution in respect of the "axiomatic" or characteristic ordering principles of social practice does not abruptly dissolve the old world and create another *de novo*. It rather seizes upon the salvageable and useful institutions of the old order as it, in a parallel, if epistemologically dissimilar fashion, appropriates the material domain it has inherited from the old.

Karl Marx's classical analysis of this fact respecting his professional background as German doctor of law is his treatment of the effects of the transformation from feudal to capitalist law on estates which continued a feudal form of local relationships within the context of a capitalist ordering of law. The introduction of the principle of alienable property, prohibited in that form by feudal law, broke asunder the rights of the serf with respect to the obligations of the lord, and transformed both the practical and legal relationship of the estate itself to the society as a whole. During the process from the early medieval introduction of the proto-capitalist principle of alienable property forms, to the recent obliteration of all notable feudal relics but the transformed vestige of "rent," at each point feudal vestiges of law have existed in statute and custom, but the constitutional principle governing the settlement of conflicts between capitalist and feudal interests has determined the capitalist interest (predominantly) as the ordering principle governing the evolution of the law in general.

Under feudal law, the governances of the relations of production and persons were complementary, and

essentially concentrated, within the relative autarky of the estate. The estate was bound to regularly deliver a fixed portion of its product as detailed to the overlord, and to supply from the estate's surplus production military and other services. With the introduction of lawful usury, and an increased demand of the estates for commodities produced outside the estate, notably for military technology, and the increased dependence upon permanent bodies of hired armed men, the maintenance of the estates depended increasingly upon funding enterprises through debts to bankers. Although this had been endemic under feudalism, including Charlemagne's institutionalized use of the Jews for this function, the process of expulsion of the privileged Jewish usurers in behalf of the Lombard bankers characterizes the breaking point at which the integrity of feudal law was qualitatively overthrown. The dependency upon financing of feudal debts to Lombard bankers and similar finances, transformed the ordering principle of the economy of the feudal estate from a fixed system of the feudal type into an estate governed by the principle of profit, profit in the disguise of (principally) military enterprises and the debt service obligations placed upon the estate by such practices.

This was the general circumstance in which the heteronomic phenomenon of the Bardi and Peruzzi occurred.

Restricting our view of feudalism to those characteristic features which are generative both with respect to its breakdown-crisis and the contrasting circumstances of capitalist development, the significant points are summarily these. The feudal social surplus product was characteristically embodied in the role of a surplus population of estates in military and associated enterprises establishing new estates.

This was not a potentiality of the feudal system, but its driving characteristic. The technology of feudal production essential to maintaining that system, to maintaining feudal estates, was a mode of production which produced and required a characteristic surplus product for its continuance even on a relatively fixed scale. This surplus product was embodied significantly in an enlarged feudal population.

Economically, an eighth century "Club of Rome" would have prescribed, the way to avoid growth of the feudal system would have been to keep the feudal population at a fixed level by eating up the surplus portion as meat. The feudal system was not only an economic system, but a form of *human* society — which could not tolerate such inhuman practices or their equivalent within Christendom without first proscribing the victim as a heretic or other "felonious" lawbreaker.

The fixed range of rates of technological advancement allowed within feudalism, combined with the relatively finite external and internal boundaries for expansion of the European feudal system represented historical boundaries which, when closely approached, inevitably precipitated a breakdown of feudal society itself. The Crusades were the form of this breakdown. Although the puerile, romantic literature and anecdotes covering that period emphasize the Palestine Question, the Crusades, as an institution, represented the degeneration of the feudal process of expansion into an orgy of economic cannibalism and autocannibalism.

The Albigensian Crusade, not trips toward Jerusalem, is the proper prototype for the Crusades as a whole.

The growing new source of wealth during that period was the "proto-capitalist" urban development associated with the Hohenstaufen policy of such deliberate development in various parts of the Holy Roman Empire, including parts of present-day Germany as notable examples of this building of urban centers. This Hohenstaufen policy's conflict with the old feudal order — made famous by the setback to human progress compacted at Canossa — was the basis for the emergence of those margins of new kinds of wealth on which creatures such as the Bardi and Peruzzi founded the beginnings of their financial power.

Through the emergence of small but marginally decisive commerce around the developing urban centers of Europe, Europe-wide banking emerged through a symbiotic relationship to the papal treasury and the collection of papal revenues (Peter's Pence) from all regions of Europe. The small margin of actual capital advanced to the indebted feudal nobility for their monstrously usurious and more usuriously refinanced debts, focused upon the products of the urban center's trade and production. Hence, the issue of credit by an Italian banker to a potentate in some distant locality of Europe took the form of credit against means of payment required in large part for delivery to relatively local urban centers. Excepting the refinancing of old debts — which was essentially the same fictitious swindle then as the Eurodollar market is today — this arrangement provided the basis on which pieces of paper coordinated by the Bardi could control the flow of critical margins of wealth throughout most of Europe.

With its profitable association with the papal treasury, the character of the Bardi shifted from an original basis in productive aspects of proto-capitalist production and trade, into a basis in the extraction of the surplus — and much of the basic capital — of feudal estates. The more this debt system ate into both

surplus and the basic “capital” of feudal estates, the more savage became the cannibalistic crusading against one’s neighbors.

In consequence, much of the feudal nobility were turned into raving Friedmanites. To increase the profitability of the estates, holidays were slashed, ratios of work on the serf’s plot were reduced in favor of work on the lord’s plots, while the exactions from the serf’s plot were increased. This labor-intensive driving-down of the biological and cultural conditions of life of the serf was complemented by a phenomenon modally unlawful to feudalism — “unemployment!” A growing ratio of the serf and other peasant populations was driven into vagabondage. The attempt to refinance old debts still further, the increased impulse for feudal cannibalism, produced the preconditions for the Black Death.

The mode of feudal production characteristically involved a significant, determining margin of social surplus. However, the primitiveness of the agricultural mode and the fragmentation of the feudal society economically into estates meant that ebbs and flows in the conditions of agricultural production led to famines, which occurred periodically over much of feudalism, and local famines erupted frequently under conditions in which surpluses existed in reasonably adjoining regions. The overall driving down of the biological and cultural conditions of life of the serfs and other peasants, the growth of vagabondage, and the intensified looting of the basic “capital” of the estates, produced a condition of breakdown in the system at many points. This breakdown is analogous to what erupted later in the jacqueries, peasant wars and so forth during the period from approximately 1525-1650 under conditions produced predominantly by the Bardi’s most notable successor bankers, the Fuggers. Under such biological and economic conditions combined, one additional blow to a political-economic system (to apply the term in an inclusively retroactive fashion) suffices to set off a general biological catastrophe. The Black Death was the principal feature of just such a general biological catastrophe.

This process of crisis-linked degeneration of the feudal order represented in practice the most ugly and profound violation of the Christian ordering of a universal feudal law. Every human right, every established vital interest prescribed by law was successively violated and then made a dead letter or repudiated in the effort to save the system of feudal estates under conditions of maintaining debt obligations to the Lombard bankers.

This overthrown system of Christian universal law, the law which Thomas Aquinas (principally) made rational (conscious) *at the point the breakdown was*

already in progress, was in fact in correspondence with the universal interest of humanity *under feudalism*. Feudalism lacked a consciousness of the *causal principles* which determined that to be the case, but in the form of feudal Christendom, it attempted to define those norms of general (lawful) practice and individual conduct and method of willful practice which *coincided* empirically with the universal self-interest of the society and its individual members — under the constitutional principle embedded in such notions as Charlemagne’s inventory of the realm.

The deliberate violation of such principles of universal law, the denial of the properly efficient authority of universal law, was and is *nominalism*. That is the essence of the issue between Thomas Aquinas and the regrettable William of Ockham.

The form of the breakdown in respect to universal law was that the feudal lords, the papal treasury, and the Bardi and Peruzzi defined their apparent short-term special interests as the primary interest of society. Wherever that perception of special primary self-interest conflicted with a contrary principle of universal self-interest, universal law, they denied and crushed that aspect of the law. This is the essence of *heteronomy*.

By extending that empirical observation from the exemplary case of the Bardi and papal treasury to the isolated individual in the most obvious way, the generality of the problem of heteronomy is properly posed in the terms Kant considered it. The individual, governed by a narrow, “fictitious” misperception of immediate self-interest, sets himself into opposition to the general (universal) interest. Behaving in such a “rugged individualistic” way — as recommended by Atlanticists from Theodore Roosevelt onwards — he inevitably not only defies but subverts the general interest, with ultimately disastrous real consequences even in respect to his misperceived “fictitious” self-interest.

From this consideration it ought to be amply clear that the problem of heteronomy embodies the crucial problem of law in general.

Leading institutions, seminal intellectual influences, can perceive and define the policies which, in turn, define the vital self-interests of a society. Thomas Aquinas attempted to do so, if in fact retrospectively, for feudal society. Benjamin Franklin positively nurtured the emergence of the association of the men who composed our nation’s Declaration of Independence and Constitution. Such perceptions and policies, on condition that they are appropriate to what *natural law* prescribes for *that form of society*, represent the basis for *the primary function of law: to inform the willful impulses for practice of the society and its individual members, concerning those*

outlooks, methods and actions which correspond to the interest of the society.

More must be done, because of heteronomy. Those heteronomic impulses of individuals contrary in effect to vital interests must be prevented from significantly damaging that general interest. These problems must be categorically defined, to the effect of informing willful impulses against such individual or "special-interest group" actions. Where such informing by itself fails to prevent heteronomic violation of essential policies, the heteronomic action itself must be efficiently checked. Where heteronomic action has damaged the general interest, society must act to prevent *consequent damage* through the already-triggered consequences of such action (not to "repair" the past).

Once the problem of heteronomy is defined as we have outlined it above, such a *description* of the tasks of law is almost a deductive truism. The problem left unsolved by the mere description is that the description, if taken by itself, tends to leave the door open to "social contract" perversions of the notion of general interest.

Historically, for the case of the founding of our republic, it might be imagined that the potentiality of perversion was left open, if only in a formal sense, by the ambiguous significance of John Locke's literary influence. Locke, from a different standpoint than the radical Hobbes, represented for eighteenth century, English-speaking culture the classic reference on the problem of heteronomy. From their reading and discussion of Locke, our eighteenth century founding fathers had two, opposite ways to proceed in taking Locke's perception of heteronomy into account. They could proceed as they did; they defined the general interest from a neo-platonic humanist standpoint, and treated heteronomy as a subsumed problem within law. Alternately, they might have — as they did not — started from the basis of Locke's treatment of the problem of heteronomy toward a "social contract" notion of constitutional government.

We have demonstrated that the standpoint of the founding fathers, and of the majority of the population which supported them, was derived from that of the Tudor Renaissance: technological progress in respect to both production and popular education. We have shown that this central, generative principle of our republic, *the principle for which we fought a revolution against Great Britain*, was rigorously related to corresponding conscious conceptions of *natural law*. The generative principle of the Constitution and our republic was the recognition that the neo-platonic humanist perception of man's nature and his necessary relationship to the lawful ordering of

universal natural processes were in lawful agreement. The fulfillment of that principle by our nation as a whole was therefore recognized to be the essence of our nation's universal self-interest, and the basis for determining the proper concepts of and fulfillment of the proper interests of the individual citizen.

Our Constitution does not have a social-contract or "pluralist" approach to constitutional law. The argument that our nation is a constitutionally "pluralist society" is nothing but outright fraud and swindle.

As Justice Holmes observed to his correspondent Laski, the eccentricity called "pluralism" was at that time (correctly) attributed to the pragmatist William James. Holmes emphasized that (even from his own relatively great distance from the constitutional outlook and method of the founding fathers) he couldn't swallow the novelty of James's "pluralism" doctrine.

The deeper notion behind James's eccentric doctrine of "pluralism" was not of course overwhelmingly original to James. James's was a new effort to re-disguise and to smuggle in the same shopworn, rabid-Tory underlying doctrine which characterized the administration of Andrew Jackson.

The early broad social basis for Jacksonism, as Nancy Spannaus emphasizes in her introduction to *The Political Economy of the American Revolution*, the weakest large social base of the American Revolution, was the farmer situation. Excluding those mercantile and financial interests which were outright Tory pro-monetarists, the *marginal* farmer was the chief internal political (heteronomic) problem of our electorate itself for as long as our electorate was predominantly rural. Later, this changed. As American agriculture progressed, the technologically advanced farmer producing for market developed an individualized outlook approximating that of the small industrialist. It was the more primitive farmer, eking out an asocially "independent" existence scratching at the dirt, the meanness of his circumstances dominating his social outlook and behavior, who was the embodiment of Jacksonian heteronomy and anti-humanist currents within larger sections of the electorate. In the establishment of our republic, as Spannaus outlines, a strenuous educational-political campaign was launched by Franklin and others to bring the majority of American farmers of that period into support of the urban "Whig" alliance of industrialist and labor forces. It was that sort of marginal farmer, plus lumpenized, hence more viciously heteronomic, strata of our urban population who have represented the potential

broader base for Toryism in the electorate. (27)

For millions of potential readers who are in their middle fifties or older at this time, it is possible to pin down the political image of the American farmer and related matters by drawing upon the writer's own autobiographical resources in a way which directly echoes knowledge to the same general effect among millions of mature citizens throughout the nation today.

Those of us with this source of knowledge from within family and related experiences, to the extent that we leap above the fictitiously defined prejudices and so forth of more narrowly perceived family outlooks as such by comparing the inside knowledge of family experiences with source materials and relevant knowledge of the political history outside the family experience, have a potential special advantage in directly accounting for the way in which the Whig impulse was embedded in our own generation, and thus, implicitly also of the way in which our generation variously did and did not transmit that same organic outlook to the next generation coming after us.

Although the writer rightly abhors the methods employed in the "oral history" efforts — because the CBS and other applications of that method are heteronomic and in fact anti-historical in the mode of prompting recollections — it is one of the uncompleted duties of our mature generations to our posterity to capture and convey their special access to the inside of the life of the American population during the period from the middle of the nineteenth century into the 1920s and 1930s.

The following remarks are directly to the point of the above paragraph of the text in that way, and illustrate the more general point implied by this autobiographical footnote.

Like many now mature Americans born during approximately 1922 or earlier, the writer's internal family experiences as a child and youth immediately, consciously reached back into approximately the 1830s and 1840s — to our grandparents' grandparents. Although memories transmitted of great-great-grandparents are inevitably colored within the accounts embedded in family policies and related considerations, on condition that such transmitted information was checked by some objective research of a source-material sort (letters, daguerreotypes, an alertness concerning the existence of official and semi-official records from statistical records, newspaper files and so forth bearing upon the period

of the 1840s forward), and this combined, cross-checked material with some rigorous historical knowledge otherwise, what is transmitted within the family provides the sensuous element which makes that portion of our history real to those who maintain the habit of situating it in the context of broader sources of knowledge.

One of the dominant figures in the writer's childhood and early youth was a paternal grandfather, Joseph LaRouche, who had left the oppressive hinterlands of rural Quebec during his own youth to become a moderately significant inventor and technician principally occupied in the development of our shoe manufacturing industry, and a well-traveled technical representative of the United Shoe Machinery Corporation in Latin America. This grandfather represented the technological traditions within the writer's household, exemplified by the often-cited fact that this grandfather had built one of the first radio receiving sets in home use in the city of Lynn, Massachusetts. The maternal grandfather, the Reverend George Weir, had immigrated to Fall River, Massachusetts from Scotland, at the age of two, a migration which aided his own father, a professional Scots dragoon by family tradition, to volunteer with the First Rhode Island Cavalry. The brother of this dragoon, Captain William Weir, also a part of the family tradition, captained one of the first New England-built steamship voyages to make the South America run.

The Reverend Weir had been won to the ministry during his youth, had moved to Columbus, Ohio, initially to assume a skid row ministry, and then to become — until his death after World War II — an active and retired minister of the United Brethren denomination in many localities in Ohio. The family's deepest penetration into American history came through this writer's maternal grandmother, Martha Wood Weir, of a Delaware County Ohio Quaker family whose conscious inner-family traditions went immediately back to her father (an active figure in the Ohio "underground railway" movement) and her grandfather, the Reverend Daniel Wood, a John Woolman Quaker from the Carolinas and an acquaintance and strong admirer of Henry Clay.

If millions of Americans of the writer's own and the preceding generation look into their own experience, a similar sort of knowledge to similar effect is located.

The writer's childhood (spent mainly in his Rochester, New Hampshire birthplace) and youth (spent mainly in Lynn, Massachusetts) centered about these two grandparents and the related trips to Ohio and Massachusetts where were the high points of family life and consciousness during his first ten

27. Nancy B. Spannaus, "Uncovering the Treason School of American History," in Spannaus and White, eds., *The Political Economy of the American Revolution*, pp. 1-49.

years, and only less dominant a feature during the 1930s. For this period, the writer's surviving recollections of relevant considerations are presently vivid (although in retrospectively diminishing number) back to the age of five.

The Reverend Weir in particular was a most intellectually active representative of what it meant to be a minister in many parts of Ohio during his active ministry over approximately the 1880-1940 period. To be such a minister during that period was to be a kind of local political figure in the present sense of the term, intimately concerned with the crises and other deeper features of the internal lives of parishioners, drawn into every crisis affecting communities at the social interface of the farmers and the industries. The dominant feature of the Reverend Weir reflected to a child and youth was his blending of history, firsthand historical source knowledge, and broad contemporary experience into the conscious shaping of practical moral outlooks and decisions. *

This imprint of the two grandfathers determined characteristics of the writer's more immediate family life, such that the moral continuity and associated historical method encountered separately in the parental and grandparents' homes made the latter — especially to a child — a bright enrichment of the former.

To have merely experienced how one's parents have raised one is to assimilate blind prejudice. To see through one's grandparents how the values of one's home have been shaped, determined, is to become conscious of those values as something created, rather than simply existent. It is to become conscious of a process creating the values according to which one's life is immediately governed, to become conscious of the process through which those values were adopted as a *de facto* body of family "constitutional law."

To also have the advantage of grandparents who in turn emphasize their consciousness of the way in which their own values were determined, is to begin to become *self-conscious* of one's existence, rather than continuing to view it in the infantile, Aristotelian way as nothing but the order of things as they mysteriously are. The infantile Aristotelian view accepts the "way things are," and, at most, attempts to find some rational explanation of why that "system" is either entirely right (apollonianism-Aristotelianism) or irrationally rejects it as "all wrong" (dionysian). The self-conscious outlook, most efficiently acquired by the child through grandparents who manifest a self-disciplined sense of the developmental features of their own history, becomes an awareness of how the ordering of the individual's immediate life was historically generated.

In American history, it is the nineteenth century which is distinguished as that part of our national life

which is thus both sensuously accessible to our mature generations, and that accessible part of our sensuous knowledge which encompasses our nation in an aspect of that process of development during which its organic values were further embedded in the core of our population.

The writer's specific form of advantage on this account respecting the overall social-political history of our people is that the blending of the experience of the American immigrant families and of the Quaker settler families of the late seventeenth century, was the background of reference in which this self-conscious outlook on the history behind the eyes of others was early developed as the governing method of social experience.

Respecting childhood first insights into the farmer question, between New Hampshire and Ohio, most of the Quaker, United Brethren and many of the Baptist families known to the writer during childhood were farmers, as were most of the writer's own maternal forebears. At the same time, the contrasting social experience was the writer's immediate identification in experience and outlook with the more immigrant side, the industrial, the technological. From the still conscious experience of childhood onwards, this interface between the farmer and the immigrant-emphasizing urban aspects of our culture was a sharply defined intersection of two distinct varieties of American world outlook, both respecting the overall outlooks as such and the notable differentiations within each. This was the conceptual basis for the writer's mature experiences with farm and rural strata during the 1950s.

Hence, to this writer, as to any other person similarly advantaged, the historical differentiation among rural populations of America between the individualism of the technological oriented, proudly competent farmer and the wretched heteronomy characteristic of the "poor farmer" is a clear and incontestable political or otherwise protopolitical fact. We understand the *lumpen* social basis of Jacksonian Toryism.

Situating that approach to understanding the American farmer historically — using the materials and methods of history to understand how people come variously to view the world as they do in fact — also immediately defines a broader, more important point of immediate pertinency.

To be an American in any morally acceptable understanding of that profession, is to be self-conscious, along the lines we have set forth, of the process by which the present United States was generated. The method for attaining that profession competently is to rigorously check the most intensive searching of the sensuous knowledge of one's immediate family life and grandparents along the exemplified lines, against

so-called objective historical evidence outside the immediate family experience and family interpretation of its experiences in the larger society. By extending that empirical approach to the most immediately accessible materials, to the study of our American Revolution, its European roots and its aftermath, one becomes what an "American" properly is, in the only useful and acceptable sense of that term.

That rigorous form of historically rooted self-consciousness within our electorate is the only secure foundation for reproducing a general electorate appropriate to coherent perception of our proper domestic and foreign policies.

The political and related organic potentialities of the American people are not genetic — we represent in origins every important race, nationality and culture on earth. They are not geographic — South America, for example, had equal geographical potentialities. Our geography was assimilated into the process that was America as emphatically as our population assimilated so many kinds of immigrants. It is not an "Anglo-Saxon tradition" — in our Revolution we founded a nation by rejecting the axiomatic features of the then-dominant Anglo-Saxon outlook.

To be an American is to be a part of that historical process, first brought to our shores by neo-platonic humanist currents from England, the Netherlands and France, which Benjamin Franklin and his collaborators made self-conscious to our political forebears, during especially the periods from approximately 1740 through the adoption of our republic.

The work of Franklin and others, seizing upon the appropriate impulses embedded in principally the urban population of the North American English colonies, but also impulses more weakly developed among most of our farmers, work conducted over half a century of political and related education and organizing efforts, generated among our political forebears a new and more advanced political world outlook.

Organically, the development of this self-conscious outlook was premised in the potentiality represented by the humanist impulses transmitted to our shores from Tudor and Commonwealth sources. However, the Federalist — and Whig — political outlook was not merely the conscious simple affirmation of such impulses, in no sense a "social contract" agreeable to the immediate, heteronomic expression of such impulses. Those impulses were the potentiality through which Franklin's original conception of a political outlook was embedded in those same thus-transformed impulses, transforming those impulses into a new quality of universally-oriented national willful impulses for practice.

The characteristic feature of the work of Franklin, the Federalists, the Whigs, and Lincoln's Republicans

was the combating of the wrong, heteronomic ideas which the people would have "naturally" developed under the condition their judgments were shaped heteronomically, on the "fictitious" basis of local circumstances. The characteristic feature of the educational process leading into our Revolution and the establishment of our republic was the success of Franklin and others in showing how a heteronomic interpretation of impulses was in reality in practical opposition to the fulfillment of individualized goals in terms of consequences for the colonies and nation as a *whole*. The need for unity of action and purpose of the colonies, the need for unity of action and purpose by the nation, in opposition to the localized, heteronomic interpretation of the imperatives of those same impulses, was the characteristic method by which Franklin and his collaborators convinced, first, the industrialists, then the urban labor movement, and, lastly, the majority of the farmers, to reject their individualistic blunders, in favor of understanding that the actual fulfillment of their proper individual interests depended upon subordinating those "fictitiously" misdirected impulses to those impulses' proper expression in terms of the universal interest.

It was that process which won the majority of the electorate to adopting the notion of *the universal as primary*. It was that alteration of the informed willful impulses for practice of the majority of the American electorate during the decades-prolonged process leading to the establishing of this nation, to that effect — to the adoption of the universalist outlook on the impulse for technological progress and self-development of the individual within technological progress, which became thus the embedded national character, transmitted through such impulses into the molding of our early institutions.

To understand that, and to coordinate that knowledge sensuously in respect of one's self-consciousness of the origins of one's personal history, is to be an American in the proper, meaningful sense of the term. It was the persistence of that universalist perception of national and subsumed individual interest embedded in our nation's founding institutions, whose persisting influence — even in face of Tory subversion — accounts both for all our successes as a nation and the Whig outlook still organically embedded in the impulses of the majority of our people.

America succeeded as it did during the last quarter of the eighteenth century, because the forces centered around the high Renaissance-like genius of Benjamin Franklin represented by far the most advanced political thinkers in any part of the world — as the contrasting failures of the French Revolution aptly illustrate. Because that, the most advanced political conception existing in the world, was made conscious, and in turn, embedded consciously in the willful im-

pulses of the founding electorate, those conceptions and impulses generated institutions and instruments which governed the American Revolution and the Constitution's founding of our republic.

It is in that light that we may understand more exactly the significance of pragmatist John Dewey's assertive repudiation of universal values at the end of World War I, and of the same consistent expression of American Toryism in Beard, Arnold, Williams, Roosevelt, Kennedy, and the Carter Administration. These persons are not Americans, but the grotesque reflections of an alien social disease of heteronomy which has poisoned the body politic.

It is within that same context that the philosophically fascist film *Roots* is to be appreciated. The black American is not an epiphenomenon of Africa or of his black skin (except as our culture has bestialized the black American by distinguishing him *politically* as black). He is not an heir to the degenerating forms of the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries' African cultures, already in collapse, an African collapse and degeneration toward bestiality aggravated by the disruptive effects of the Arab slave traders *even before* the importation of slaves into this continent. The black American is an American by right and his historically determined American character. The fascist character of the film *Roots* is not accidentally associated with the fact that the leading neo-Fabians (e.g., Marcus Raskin) are professedly "philosophical fascists," and their associate Professor Noam Chomsky is thoroughly a philosophical fascist of precisely the genre Marcus Raskin has professed.

As Spannaus emphasizes Turner's part, it was this same feature of American life which Theodore Roosevelt brought into the White House, in the form of his open admiration for the wretched Jacksonian heteronomic romanticism of Frederick Jackson Turner.

James' "pluralism," the liberal's parlor parody of the "rugged frontier individualism" of Frederick Jackson Turner, of Charles A. Beard's fraudulent *The Economic Interpretation of the Constitution*, are elements of the same period in which monetarist interests, working chiefly through the cover of the Democratic Party, broke up the vulnerably individualistic populist-labor alliance at its poor farmer base in the southern states, with the heteronomic "Jim Crow" doctrine and policy. The Tory traditions of Martin Van Buren and Andrew Jackson were built upon thus with Fabian guile from about the turn of the century, to the purpose of cultivating a popular base in the less humanist portions of the electorate, for the effort to discredit and subvert the U.S. Constitution by various means. The emphasis was on denying the gen-

erative intent embodied in the Constitution, to allow for the insertion of a contrary, "social contract" interpretation.

There is no credible escape from the clear constitutional fact of natural law for our Tory opponents. Both the scholastics and the neo-platonic humanists, and their continuations of the seventeenth and eighteenth century Enlightenment, were in agreement on the principle that the proper policies and self-interests of societies were prescribed from the standpoint of *natural law*. Excepting the nominalist currents converging upon British empiricism, this conception of the essential unity of political law and natural law in terms of a unifying epistemology was the hegemonic conception of European culture's capitalist development from the Tudors and *politiques* through approximately the middle of the nineteenth century. One can profess that the U.S. Constitution does not rest upon the generative principles we have identified, only by either outrightly lying, or by resorting to the kind of lying employed by Thurman Arnold et al., by deprecating what are in fact the governing principle of U.S. constitutional law as mere folklore and myth.

Strip constitutional law of that kind of generative principle, and the law immediately becomes degraded "by reaction formation" to the "force of sovereignty" amorality of the Holmes tradition. Having emptied U.S. constitutional law of its essential content, as Holmes' method does, the emptied Constitution is left waiting for some scalawag to fill the void with whatever political refuse a credulous majority of the electorate might be manipulated into tolerating.

The subversion of constitutional law epitomized by the succession of the Holmes and Arnold doctrines was not original to the experience of the United States. It was, as we shall see, an indispensable corollary of the geopolitical metaphysics at the basis of Atlanticist Doctrine, which in turn was an outgrowth of British foreign policy developments from the eighteenth century onward. The "concert" method employed by the British in fighting the Napoleonic Wars and in establishing British hegemony over all Europe at the Treaty of Vienna, the "Atlantic Community" and concert of regional geopolitical blocs proposed by Roosevelt (Lippmann), are a direct expression into foreign policy of the same amoral social contract doctrine.

The sociology of heteronomy involves two distinct categories of problems. At the top of society, the problem is those heteronomic institutions which enforce the primacy of some special (heteronomic) self-interest at the expense of a universal interest as defined in conformity with natural law. At the bottom of society — and often, literally the case — there are those social strata which are disassociated from a

positive connection to those aspects of productive development which express the society's development according to natural law's determination of its universal self-interest.

In capitalist society, those strata which are positively situated include skilled and semi-skilled workers, technologically advanced farmers, scientists and related technicians, and industrial capitalists. The relatively disassociated broad strata are variously the lumpenized and semi-lumpenized strata lacking a positive sense of personal social identity in connection with the productive process, non-technology-oriented petit-bourgeois strata, and enraged declassé strata of various social origins. It is not accidental but strictly lawful that the latter strata represent the natural constituency of fascist movements.

Hence a republic must be *in effect* a political rule by those social strata which represent the closest association with the positive universalizing activities of society, through representatives who represent the institutionalized intellectual representatives of such strata.

A proper republic has inevitably many features which appear to lend credence to its opponents' description of it as constitutional "dictatorship by an elite." It is by constitutional prescription the *chosen* elite, predominantly spokesmen for those social strata which identify themselves practically and most immediately with the universal form of national interest, who in fact best govern. They rule by using government and law to check the heteronomic tendencies of the less moral strata, and by governing in the universal interest of the society as a whole. However, they are not an elite *in the heteronomic sense* of a special interest which sets itself into opposition to the general interest. On this, John Milton is clear and correct in his form of presenting the argument. Tom Paine is clear to mainly the same effect, as are all the notable Federalists and, in the balance of his presidential practice, Thomas Jefferson.

The more general and fundamental rule of law is that in whatever form is most appropriate to both natural law and the form of society, those must govern who are relatively the most efficiently sensible of the universal form of the national interest in respect to the nation as a part of the natural law-ordered process of human society. What must be governed *for* is the developing and informing of the general willful impulse for practice of those policies which serve the interest of the nation and humanity *according to natural law*. What must be governed *against* is the anarchy and treason of heteronomy.

We are not in any sense justifying enlightened constitutional dictatorship — although that would be preferable to "social contract" forms of fascist

"democracy" our neo-Fabians would establish. We are engaged, at this point in our building a conception in this section, in looking backward to the European roots of the American Revolution. In such an undertaking, it is not permissible to impose the political notions appropriate to modern (post-Renaissance) capitalist (or, socialist) society on earlier forms of society with different characteristic "geometries." To establish a valid conception of causal relations connecting our American Revolution and its sequelae to its predecessors, we must respect the reality of the specific "geometry" of each. For this work, a causal conception of the sort we have defined earlier is indispensable. That causal conception must at once account for the internal relationships in successor societies of different "geometries," and also comprehend the generation of the one out of the other.

The concept of *political freedom* appropriate to capitalist (and socialist) development uses an old word, freedom, but imparts a qualitatively new political meaning to it. Political freedom in the modern sense of its proper usage assigns to the individual member of capitalist (or, socialist) society a *hubristic quality of world historical responsibility and influence* over the course of events previously peculiar at best to ruling strata of society.

This freedom is not "freedom" in the sense of the *moral autarky* of isolated individuals — not heteronomy. It is freedom to change the entire world *through the specific means of contributing to universalizing forms of progress* in its technological and related forms of characteristic practice.

In capitalist and socialist society, that form of *political freedom is not something the state reluctantly surrenders to the individual* — freedom is not toleration. On the contrary, it is something the state demands from the individual in the perceived general interest of both the immediate society and humanity in general. The power of capitalist (or, socialist) society is delimited by the quality and proportion of its individual citizens who approach those distinctions epitomized in the extreme by the idea of the great scientific discovery.

The related political problem confronting the state is that it cannot *predict* what specific positive innovations in knowledge for practice are to be fostered before the time those innovations are discovered and established as valid, a process effected through the initiatives of individuals. The state can only promote the conditions of developing and realizing creative discoveries, and foster the political and related conditions under which such initiatives will flourish.

Hence, as we have noted earlier, the difficulty of the uneducated observer in distinguishing between genuine political freedom and mere political toleration.

This notion of political freedom developed by neo-

platonian humanism is unique to the modern era, erupting as the impulse for a form of government within the policies of the Tudors, and uniquely consolidated as the entire policy of government with the American Revolution and the processes leading to the adoption of the republican form under the Constitution. We justly prize it today, because it is lawfully essential to the internal "geometry" of modern society.

Such a modern notion can be projected randomly upon the past only in cheap historical novels, not in serious inquiry.

That essential qualification made, a capitalist republic is essentially, properly, a *class* dictatorship-in-fact of policymaking by the industrialist and labor strata, in the respect that the immediate interests of these two classes *taken as a whole* are the primary generative basis for evolving policies and practices which are consistent with such a Constitution as ours. *This, as we shall see in the concluding section, is an indispensable view of our own republic as we turn, in particular, to defining sound foreign policies respecting our relationship to a Soviet republic which is constitutionally a class dictatorship of its labor movement.* "Dictatorship" in this sense does not mean "dictatorship" in the commonplace understanding of "totalitarian regimes." It means a determination of which *class interests* dictate the evolving policies and practices of the nation in terms of the intent and forms specified as the republic's constitutional principles.

An industrial-capitalist republic is the *dictating* of those policies by representatives of the conscious interest of industrial-capitalist development as a whole, in which the interests of the labor movement are the partners and immediate broader social base of the leading role of industrial capitalists as such. However, a capitalist republic, because it depends upon political freedom, as we have defined it, as the source of the strength of the republic, provides the same categorical *individual* political freedoms it affords to its dictating class interest to the members of the other social classes. The question of dictatorship, used in this proper way, is not a matter of *individual* "freedom" (toleration) or non-"freedom" in and of itself; it is a matter of the *instruments* and *institutions* through which the constitutional commitment of the republic is upheld in the formulating and implementing of policies affecting the republic's vital interests.

A reader might object, "But that is not 'dictatorship' as I understand the word at all. Why confront a popular prejudice concerning a word in this unnecessary way?"

First, looking backwards, it is impossible to trace


the succession of societies and their included political varieties of representation without locating the generative implications of the fact that every society's policies are dictated, under various governments, by specific interests which are predominantly the agencies and interests of specific classes, groups of classes or factions of classes. Immediately, we cannot competently comprehend the internal problems of the United States today unless we recognize that the republic has been usurped by a dictatorship of monetarist interests, to the disadvantage of variously industrial capitalist, agriculturalist, and labor's interests. For the immediate future, we cannot establish an effective foreign policy toward the Soviet Union or any other foreign government unless we base the proper criteria of our foreign policy — *viable, sovereign republics* — on a more rigorous understanding of the content of the institutions and instruments of government than current general opinion has so far acknowledged.

A deservedly classic case of heteronomy is provided by Wallenstein's army of the Thirty Years War.

The Hapsburg degeneration of most of Europe — mediated through the refinanced debts to the Fuggers, Netherlands bankers and their kind — had already returned Europe, following a period of late fourteenth and fifteenth century recovery and growth following the Black Death, into the kinds of conditions tending toward those which had created the Black Death. The previously cited peasant upsurges (*jacqueries*) in France, the Martin Luther-fostered mass-slaughter of rebelling peasants in Germany, illustrate how far this process had proceeded by the first and second quarters of the sixteenth century. It was under the more aggravated conditions created by the continuation of European economic decay that a routine sort of Hapsburg dynastic swindle erupted into the general, genocidal war which raged in central Europe for thirty years from 1618 to 1648.

The character of Wallenstein's army is key to that phenomenon.

Although the protestant leaders who defended and led the German peasants of the early sixteenth century were honest protestants, at that point Martin Luther himself was not primarily a religious leader, but a religious *figure* who had become also a conscious pawn and political agent of the Fugger and related interests. Hence, Luther could earlier oppose the papacy for looting Germany, and yet, consistently, support the destruction of entire sections of the German economy by the Fuggers. In that respect, Martin Luther of the period following the Diet of Worms was consciously a "political intelligence" agent, of a monetarist-feudal faction, whose crimes in that respect rank in principle with those of Joseph Goebbels.



The Syndics of the Cloth Guild: Rembrandt's portrayal of the face of evil.

As Christopher White demonstrates in his groundbreaking study of Colbert in *The Political Economy of the American Revolution*, (28) the fairy tale told to credulous schoolchildren, of “religious” wars between Catholic and protestant “ideologies” is fraud. Within the process of political differentiation of factional forces, alliances with or against the *political power* of the papacy or with respect to a national Catholic *political* faction of the moment, there was an important undercurrent of actual protestant development which asserted itself under the conditions provided by the fact of the schisms, but the formal split within Christendom was *political*, occurring for reasons as varied as the complexities of labile sixteenth and seventeenth century politics determined. Fundamentally, overall, the schism in Christendom was immediately prompted by the circumstances of Hapsburg accession of Charles V, and the bloody fashion in which Hapsburg looting brought the humbled papacy to its knees in a vile parody of Canossa in reverse.

For political reasons, at the outset of what became the Thirty Years War, the Austrian financial situation of that moment did not favor the creating and deploying of the sort of regular military forces required to win the battle over succession to the Kingdom of Bavaria against the forces of the protestant German princes led by the Count of Palatine (modern Pfalz). The principal credible force allied with the Hapsburgs was Bavaria, which had an acceptable military establishment by the standards of the time, but which forces the prudent Bavarian ruling house declined to deploy to places remote from the defense of Bavaria itself. In such circumstances the Hapsburgs commissioned the adventurer Wallenstein.

Wallenstein’s attempted solution to the problem represented by limited regular forces was to recruit a rabble of economic decay’s vagabonds as an auxiliary force of irregulars to take their pay principally in the form of loot from subjugated areas. This Wallenstein swarm of looting vagabonds had the military effect of destroying the logistical bases from which regular military forces could be ordinarily deployed. The fragile equilibrium of the German economy, under conditions developed by over a century of Fugger and related debt service looting, collapsed wherever the Wallenstein’s swarm of human locusts overran it. They butchered the livestock, gobbled up the seed grain, and raped and murdered with dionysiac abandon — exhibiting thus the inherent potentialities of our contemporary North American and European Maoists and similar neo-Fabian human refuse. The

survivors of such depredations themselves became looters, and all the armies in the field soon relied upon similar tactical and logistical policies. In the destruction of society, the swarms of cannibals multiplied. Once that process was initiated, it was self-perpetuating until portions of the “excessed” population were reduced, and France’s Richelieu then intervened to bring the obscene Hapsburg mess to a halt.

That sort of bestial degradation is what people are ultimately capable of — then, earlier, and again — whenever the principle of governance by a universal positive principle of natural law is overthrown in favor of the ultra-democratic “do your own thing” institutions of a political Wallenstein. That is what law properly means by the *mens rea*, the *intrinsically criminal mind*. Weather-terrorist Mark Rudd, for example, is intrinsically a criminal mentality by that standard, as is the Weather-terrorist group’s original patron and mentor, Marcus Raskin of the Rockefeller-Kennedy machine’s neo-Fabian Institute for Policy Studies. That is also the significance of recognizing the slum as the breeding-place of the *criminal mind*. Although the slum has no exclusive claims to that function — as the cases of Mark Rudd and Marcus Raskin illustrate at first glance — it is the fact that the slums are intrinsically seedbeds of rabid heteronomy, which explains the phenomenon and illustrates how this principle of *mens rea* is to be applied to criminals of other historical social origins.

Referring to what often at first appears as inexplicable irony to the naive observer — that Rockefeller and associated interests have wittingly created terrorism and slum riot-potentials by various covert and semi-covert operations — as we summarized earlier, the most efficient, rule-of-thumb overview of that phenomenon is that in this way the Rockefeller forces have followed the precedent of Wallenstein, in attempting to mobilize a horde of social decay’s vagabonds as the battering ram of chaos and terror, to undermine opposing forces which might not otherwise be successfully confronted by straightforward deliberative (e.g., parliamentary) confrontation of opposing policies.

More commonly, as in the case of the lawless frontiersman who is the Turneresque hero or anti-hero of our “westerns” and our “feudal,” “Roman” and “prohibition gangster” parodies of those “westerns,” the pervasive, endemic problem of heteronomy is an intermediate condition “this side of the law,” or just slightly outside the bounds of lawful outlooks. The relevant movies and TV dramas rarely attempt to portray the criminal as he was and is in real life. At the most, he is portrayed as a “mad dog” with no inner personality. More commonly, among the principal *dramatis personae*, he is a “sympathetic character,” engaged in reconciling his deeper goodness with an in-

28. Christopher White, “Jean-Baptiste Colbert and the Origins of Industrial Capitalism,” in Spannaus and White, eds., *The Political Economy of the American Revolution*, pp. 57-120.

actuality-unexplained propensity (“weakness”) for perpetrating “bad deeds” and “keeping bad company.” The significance of such “entertainments” lies not in the fictional characters of the drama — who never did nor could have existed as represented — but in the heteronomy of those outwardly peaceful, law-abiding folk who are purportedly being entertained. *Their criminal impulses* are being afforded a fantasy-expression, a safety valve. What they patronize as entertainment reveals their inner selves.

The problem of the criminal’s mind is that he does not efficiently know *right from wrong*. He may know of a proscription, but this proscription he sees only in its penal implications (if that), and not in respect of such knowledge being connected in a meaningful way to his willful impulses for practice. The problem is more exactly illustrated by referring to those neo-Fabian “social work” programs of “prison reform,” in which “radicals” working in “in-prison” or “out-patient” halfway house “sensitivity group” programs, “liberate” the felonious personality by conditioning him to an “attitudinal change” in outlook. Through such “reform,” the felon sees his problem as one of “struggle against oppression.” Since the neo-Fabian “radicals” steering this work, either as policy-makers, administrators of programs, or operatives, are themselves advocates of philosophically fascist radical advocacy of heteronomy, the only possible effect of such — to use plain words — “brainwashing” of the criminal’s mind is to weaken the last categorical form of moral restraint which has heretofore checked his behavior.

The same neo-Fabian doctrine has been deployed through the psychological and social work professions concerning analogous reforms of our “mental health” programs. Since insanity (psychosis) and acute neurosis are a special expression of heteronomy, the effect of the neo-Fabian radical’s “reform,” — stop “oppressing” the insane by telling them that they are insane — has the effect of reinforcing the mental disorder in the manner demonstrated by the case of Heidelberg Mental Patients’ Collective. In that experimental program, the hard core of about two hundred ordinarily afflicted young mental patients were turned into a “liberation movement” — modeled upon the “lesbian feminist movement” lines. This lawfully produced the hard-core psychotics who made up the initiating bulk of “expendables” of the Baader-Meinhof terrorist gang, and some of the worst criminal elements within the West German Maoist organizations (KPD, KBW). The effect of such “reforms,” as in the cited case of penal reforms — and also “halfway house sensitivity conditioning” of drug addicts — by making heteronomy a positive political principle through fostered “reaction formation,” destroys those residual, fragile resources on which the

psychotic and acute neurotic depend for their potential recovery.

It may be true in an important sense that society creates its criminals, its lunatics, and its drug addicts. However, to be a criminal, a lunatic, a drug addict — including a heavy marijuana user — is to step morally outside human society. These acts are not *immoral* because of existing laws. Laws do not in and of themselves make behavior immoral, but only illegal. The criminal and lunatic are immoral persons, because they have disassociated themselves morally from the human race. The drug addict, the heavy marijuana user, have willfully rejected the very essence of humanity respecting themselves — the sacred integrity of their mental creative potentialities. They have stepped outside society into heteronomy. They have *permitted* themselves to be degraded into the inhuman condition of *moral* outlaws. It is not only insufficient, but hideously immoral to leave the matter of criminality, lunacy and drug addiction at the point of accounting for “how social conditions made me so.” It is important *for society* to understand and correct such problematic processes, to the extent of its ability to do so. However, if the individual criminal, lunatic or drug addict uses that same analysis to argue, “therefore, I am a..., and that is my fate,” such argument amounts to moral suicide. Such an individual is morally dead.

It is only another step to reaction formation, to step beyond the immorality of such indifferentism, to propose that “since society has made me this way, society must accord to my determined nature the same degree of rights of self-expression as everyone else’s.” That is the criminal mind made conscious, the true *mens rea*.

Insofar as efficient law and morality coincide, the political approach to such cases of the criminal mind is obvious in principle. The broader problem, the more difficult problem confronts us in those cases in which the same reaction formation in behalf of heteronomy is made lawful through vicious discrepancies between the law and morality. Once a heteronomic impulse contrary to the nation’s and humanity’s most vital interests is placed within the body of efficiently lawful practice or, worse, allowed to dictate the formulation and implementation of governmental and related policies, then the full political hell of heteronomy confronts us. It is the legalizing of such immoral (heteronomic) reaction-formation impulses which is the key to the topical problem of this section as a whole.

In the case of the degeneration leading into the Black Death of the mid-fourteenth century, the stretching of the tolerated, relatively small margin of Jewish usury to its replacement, rampant Lombard usury, is the most obvious aspect of the breakdown of the morality of the feudal order.

First, to understand this point, one must acknowledge the truth about the European Jew. The European Jew was not a product of some, in fact, half-mythical religious society associated with what is called Palestine. Such notions are historically pure bunk. The European Jew *was created by Christendom*. Since by law a Christian could not engage in usury, but since feudalism required the occasional employment of the usurer, the feudal Jew was created by Christendom from out of the ranks of that strata of Levantine small merchants and peddlers which featured the followers of Philo et al. as the social element of that commerce most notable to an observing Christendom. It was in this way that Christendom, having a small but definite need for services outlawed within the internal, feudal order of Christendom, seized upon the strata most appropriate to that function and defined the Jew *by law* (e.g., Charlemagne's laws concerning his Jews) as having a special right to exist juridically *outside* Christendom. It is not only famous rabbis who fabricate real howlers of a *pilpul*; Christendom's creation of the feudal Jew was itself one of the fabulous *pilpuls* of European history.

The existence of the practice of usury by feudal Europe's Jewry did not represent a tolerant violation of the lawful prohibition against usury, but exactly the opposite. It was a ruse to make that principle of law ironclad *within Christendom itself*.

It is only necessary to refer, additionally, to such other relevant features of feudal law as the regulation of the preconditions and conditions for wars within Christendom.

From our outline of the feudal economy as a system, it is immediately clear enough why those two aspects of law — concerning usury and wars within Christendom — were indispensable to the vital interests of the feudal order as a whole. Loosen those laws widely enough and the resulting outbreak of heteronomy would itself be sufficient to bring the feudal order into the sort of collapse we have summarized. It is also clear that the duty of the papacy and the associated princes of the Church was not merely to enforce these laws with respect to form, but *also with respect to the purpose of the law*.

In that respect, the problem of law is immediately analogous to that for the case of the Tories' monetarist subversion of the U.S. government.

This is not to imply that the preservation of the laws of Christendom could have saved the feudal order. That would have been neither possible nor desirable. The point is that it was the wrong specific aspects of the law of Christendom which gave way to developments. Rather than abandoning feudalism to save the law, the core of the law was sacrificed in the attempt to save a decaying feudalism. The consequence of this abandonment of the principle of universal natural

law in ordering the social and economic transformation was the rule of heteronomy, in the form of the cited alliances and de facto *political dictatorship* of bankers and feudal forces. It was the reaction formation to the violation of law, the Inquisition, which destroyed the Church of feudal Christendom from within, and accelerated those tendencies for schism which reflected at the outset the defense of the principle of universal law within the law of Christendom, against the deepening nominalist corruption of the papacy and princes of the Church. The morally empty doctrine of the principle of papal sovereignty (papal infallibility) was crucial to this process.

That granted, we are not concerned to explore further in this location the question of precisely how Christendom might have avoided the genocidal path it took from the thirteenth century onward, but to define the relevant principled features which shaped the subsequent course of history. The political dictatorship of the feudal reaction and the papal bankers of that period established the twofold pattern, which simmered throughout the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and erupted in the same essential form in the Fugger-Hapsburg institutions of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. As White outlines in his cited dissertation on Colbert, the ideological and political institutions embodied in the Fugger-Hapsburg alliance were continued in a new adaptation by the Amsterdam bankers of the seventeenth century, and took over control of the British monarchy and government during and following 1688. (29)

It was that current against which our political forebears fought the American Revolution, and in opposition to that that our Constitution and republic were instituted.

It was the political dictatorship of that same institution of nominalism over Great Britain and later our government which made most of the world a hell during the late eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, as the ideological predecessors of the British monetarist-nominalist faction had made Europe a hell since the twelfth century. It was that same Tory poison of monetarist nominalism which has subverted our institutions and threatens to plunge us into a new "low-energy," "deindustrialized" hyper-inflationary austerity grand parody of the biological catastrophe of the mid-fourteenth century, and which impels us to the brink of an early general thermonuclear war for whose war-aims no nation has in fact an objective positive interest.

Next, finishing two critical subsidiary points, we will have assembled the apparatus to directly attack

29. White, *op. cit.*, pp. 65 ff., 75 ff., 97 ff.

the implications of Roosevelt's geopolitical metaphysics. These two points are: *by what weird process does a Rockefeller become a capitalist, and what is the way in which this heteronomic monetarist current both unconsciously and consciously arrives at its perception of its vital self-interest in propagating empiricism as the ideology of monetarist brainwashing of the ruled?*

Although the Rockefeller monetarist interests, like the Rothschilds, Barings, Fuggers, and Bardi before them, are not an outgrowth of industrial capitalist impulses, the cuckoo's egg, the Rockefeller current, is for the moment politically and economically a part of the capitalist *political* class nest. The monetarists represent a lawful, anti-capitalist tendency established within the capitalist political class. This paradox is not an outgrowth of the principles of industrial capitalist development, but an outgrowth of the way in which capitalism has in fact developed *through monetarist dictatorship over the credit and the governments of the dominant capitalist nations.*

This problem has two interdependent features. Accounting for the exact location of that interdependence resolves the apparent problem.

In the first aspect, monetarism emerged in European history as a *pre-capitalist* institution, with all its independently characteristic practical and ideological features formed prior to capitalist development. Furthermore, there is an unbroken continuity of institutional development of monetarism from the thirteenth century through the present time. Hence, monetarism, both in principle and in institutional fact cannot have emerged out of natural forms of industrial capitalist development. (30)

However, in its governance of proto-capitalist and capitalist economies, monetarism as a form of political subversion and dictatorship has seized upon an internal feature of industrial capitalist forms of accumulation as the major added source of monetarist wealth and power. That connection is the intersection and interdependence of the two distinct processes under conditions of monetarist forms of capitalist society.

As we have emphasized earlier, above and in other published locations, the characteristic standpoint of monetarism is *not profit* in the industrial capitalist sense, but *rent* in the sense of the alienation of feudal wealth — ground rent. The action of monetarist institutions upon the capitalist system is to convert capitalist income into that feudal-decay form of rent.

The principal means by which this transformation

of profit into ground rent occurs is through a *major aspect of debt service.*

The formal problem initially confronting most readers is that two functionally distinct kinds of debt service occur in fact in the same apparent and lawfully institutionalized form.

Industrial capitalist finance extends credit and equity capital as "venture capital" for the development of the productive forces. In the industrial capitalist form of capitalist economy, the combined repayments of that advanced credit and distribution of profits originate from the gross profits of newly produced real wealth. Excepting that portion of interest and "dividends" absorbed as personal consumption of the capitalists, the repaid loans and profit-distributions are normally recirculated by capitalists as new venture-capital loans and equity investments. In this aspect of the matter, there is no determined conversion of wealth into ground rent.

However, the same ostensible juridical features of capitalist law protect that further aspect of total debt service and related payments which are a conversion of wealth into ground rent forms.

The feudal, or ground rent moment of debt service and nominal rent as such, is epistemologically and analytically associated with the creation of *fictitious capitalizations*. For this purpose, the usage of "fictitious" in Spinozan ethics and the usage of the term in monetary-economic analysis are epistemologically identical. This usage of "fictitious" is rigorous, and by no means merely descriptive, or approximate.

To define the concepts used in a preliminary way, we now first consider the problem of fictitious capital in its localized aspect. The preliminary definitions we reach in this first step are rigorous in principle, but the notion of the scope of the conception of fictitious capital so attained is merely an approximation of what we then must define comprehensively.

Fictitious capital most narrowly and immediately signifies that the magnitude of a capitalist society's total *nominal* wealth has been enlarged by a margin for which there exists no corresponding proportional value of *real* wealth in the form of existing or *consequent* tangible commodities of capitalist and household and related consumption. For example, it is properly axiomatic that a venture-capital advance of loan or equity capital which fails to mediate the expansion of production of tangible commodity wealth is destroyed in value by that failure. It must be written off. To retain such capital "on the books" is to create *fictitious capital*.

Our investigation verges closer to the most relevant feature of the problem for the case of resale markets in real estate. In the industrial capitalist form of rental (and equivalent) income from produced and

30. *E.g.*, the historical fallacy of the conventional doctrines concerning capitalism as growing into imperialism.

developed real property, the rental and equivalent income is properly bounded in its outer dimensions by the inclusion of an "average rate of profit" in incomes otherwise applicable to the production and maintenance costs of creating and maintaining that real property. In the resale and related, speculative real estate practices, rental and equivalent forms of revenues are based on an included fictitious appreciation of the real property involved. High rental incomes and monstrous capitalizations of decayed rental properties are the typification of this problem. This is analyzed in some historical detail for New York City and related cases in the writer's textbook. (31)

In such cases of applying an "average rate of profit" to a combined real and fictitious capitalization of an "investment," the discrepancy between the net of total rental (and equivalent) income and the "average rate of profit" on the real portion of the capitalization is pure ground rent. It is the same principle, applied to analogous forms of fictitious capitalization of the total mass of nominal wealth in a capitalist economy, which is the location of the problem in general.

The general form of that same problem enables us to locate the point at which the monetarist interests loot ground rent massively from the economy as a whole.

That identifies the phenomenon, but not yet the key to the way in which this monetarist cancer seizes upon and operates within a capitalist economy as a whole. We now identify that crucial feature of the matter in two steps of successive approximation.

The first point to be understood is the indispensable role of the state in providing a monetary system for capitalist development. Without a credit system (and associated monetary system) created and maintained by the government, no capitalist economy did or can function. Correspondingly, a faction which seizes control of the government's fiscal and monetary role has thus gained the power to determine the economic course of capitalist development and, through that power, to seize overall political control to an increasing degree.

Capitalist production (industry and agriculture combined) has two primary economic components. The first are the prime costs associated with plant, materials, and labor. The second is the profit portion of commodity real output remaining after these costs have been deducted. Considering capitalism from the standpoint of the circulation of its production, and viewing this in terms of the capitalist production and circulation process of *an economy as a whole*, the

following apparent problem of circulation is immediately presented.

The purchasing power put into circulation is *apparently* limited to the value of the prime costs of production (and administration) advanced for that production. On premise of this presumed fact, sundry lunatics have insisted that capitalism has an inherent "buy-back problem" concerning the portion of total produced wealth represented as profit. Some of these lunatics have proposed, persistently over the past century and a half or so, that the solution to this (non-existent) "buy-back problem" is to have the state print a supply of money equal to the troublesome margin represented by profit, and distribute such "funny money" through the population. More "radical" lunatics have proclaimed: "Eureka! Aha! Don't you see! This proves that we must eliminate profits!" The problem does not exist in reality; moreover, any effort to "solve" such a non-existent problem has the same sort of merit as a "remedy" as surgically removing healthy organs successively from a patient in stubborn treatment of a non-existent disease.

What is wanted to prevent such a kind of problem from tending to arise is the extension of credit by some agency, an agency with such credit resources, as loan-capital to the capitalists against the margin of real commodity-wealth corresponding to profit.

The classical procedure for accomplishing this is the issuance of government bonds, or, preferably, the issuance of government bank notes deposited with national and, through it, other major banks as the basis for loans to industries and agriculture for the circulation of the margin of real wealth involved. There is nothing equivalent to "funny money" or anything of that sort in the latter alternative — provided appropriate policies govern the distribution of such loans. The money has been issued against viable security. That security is first of all the productively invested real wealth against which the loans will be made. Secondly, that security is implicitly endorsed by the fiscal power of the government.

The propriety of such credit issuance is based on the economic principle that the real-commodities margin corresponding to the absolute profit in the economy represents useful margins of capital goods and household-and-related consumption. The consumption of capital goods expands the scale and quality of household commodities by productive labor's households (principally as wages) produces extension of the quantity and quality of productive labor. By applying extended productive labor to extended productive capacities, the amount of wealth represented by profit is *more than reproduced*. The

31. Marcus, *Dialectical Economics*, pp. 39-41, 346-47.

repayment of credit advanced out of the expanded income thus generated secures the credit issued through the mediation of government, including the margins of debt service to the credit system returned out of the profit margins of expanded production.

Of the additional money put into circulation by the government's "intervention," the portion of currency actually added to general circulation, through realization of the profitable margin of commodity wealth as investment in the enlargement of production, becomes the margin of expanded monetary base required by the expanded margin of prime costs, an expansion effected by enlargement of the scale and quality of total production.

As long as the margin of waste and non-optimal use of real total national income tolerated within the process is absorbed within the margin of actual, absolute (national) profit, the effect of such diversions of wealth is to correspondingly slow the rate of growth below its potential. However, *as long as this waste, "shrinkage" of absolute profit, is not capitalized as fictitious wealth*, no other problem results. No inflationary tendency results from such government monetary activity.

On the contrary, *the tendency of such credit expansion is deflationary*. A healthy monetary system of a capitalist economy is always associated with a secular decline in price indices. This aspect of the matter leads directly into the second approximation of the immediate inquiry.

As long as capitalist development is governed by the principles of technological progress, the realization of profit as extension of the productive forces includes substantial realization of more advanced productive technologies. The increased average energy flux per capita in production and household-and-related consumption signifies a relative cheapening per capita rate of total output by measure of the values of the per capita rate of total output of the preceding period.

This has a twofold consequence.

In respect to the capitalist economy *taken as a whole*, this deflationary tendency is nothing but pure advantage. Not only does it provide the indispensable basis for raising the material and cultural conditions of life of the population, but, relative to current *real* replacement values of capital formation, it contributes to the acceleration of the rate of absolute profit for the economy *as a whole*.

However, relative to the nominal, back-capitalized valuations of held-over portions of fixed capital and inventories, the margin of deflation represents a shrinking (discounting) of such held-over values. As the ratio of such capitalized, held-over nominal values becomes large in respect to the capitalization of the

value of current real output (rising "organic composition" of capitals), the *real* gain in the rate of profit from new technologies tends to appear as the cause for a larger loss in *nominal* capital than such profit increases represent.

The attempt to evade discountings of overvalued "bad" capital transforms the margin of nominal overvaluation into *fictitious capital*. The continued accumulation of fictitious capitalizations leads to a turning point, at which the apparent effects of technological progress represent a threat to large portions of total nominal holdings. This leads to a decline in the ratio of real investment, in favor of speculative movements of incomes from one part of the economy to another. Even without other complications, that process, introducing increasing tendencies toward relative stagnation into the process of real investment, causes a corresponding degree of apparent "overproduction" in the economy as a whole — and the other phenomena of a capitalist cyclical crisis.

It is to be stressed, as a corollary of this immediately preceding discussion, that *under the conditions in which the orderly deflationary discounting of inflated nominal capital holdings occurs*, as well as *the process of technologically vectored realization of the largest portion of absolute profit as extended reproduction in balanced development of the productive forces*, it is impossible for the capitalist system to experience any form of devastating internal problems in its economy.

It was Karl Marx's systematic estimation, in his four-volume *Capital*, that the capitalist economy was incapable of disciplining itself *politically* to meet those two conditions. Marx's specification of the necessity for socialist transformation is that the *vital interest of a capitalist society* required such a transformation at the point that capitalist *political* refusal to meet such requirements represented a major threat to that *vital interest*. That vital interest is represented by the conditions of extended investment of real absolute profit we have just specified above. Although, as we have already shown earlier, Marx was incorrect historically in analyzing the totality of the causes for this *political* difficulty within capitalist society, his location of the industrial capitalists' susceptibility to such a *political incompetence* is directly relevant to understanding the Rockefeller problem.

The key word is heteronomy, or what Marx terms the "anarchy" of capitalist accumulation.

Insofar as the capitalist political class defines its policies in terms of the national economy *taken as a whole*, in terms of increasing the rate of absolute *real* profit through technologically vectored extended reproduction, the capitalist system has *no immediate*

internal flaw relative to the mode of production or to the republican form of capitalist society. However, insofar as *individual* capitalist interest is fictitiously defined as that of defending the fictitious *nominal* values of fragmented private holdings (capital), this *heteronomic* impulse directly conflicts cumulatively with the vital interests both of the society and of the vital class interest of industrial capitalists *as a whole*. Excluding for the moment the aggravation of the problem by monetarists' forces, *it is that heteronomic impulse which is the direct and sole cause for the existence of an ordered depression-cycle within industrial-capitalist economy.*

Although the Federalists did not understand the systematic implications of this problem, they clearly perceived the phenomenon itself, and proposed positive provisions for coping with such a threat to the vital national interests. This recognition of the phenomenon was not accidental; as economists, the leading Federalists were in principle far advanced beyond a dishonest Adam Smith or muddled David Ricardo, and had studied the danger in connection with the American struggle against the form of the problem represented by British monetarism. As Spannaus reports, Thomas Jefferson proposed a periodic repudiation of debts as national policy; Jefferson was clearly sensible of the problem in fact, but clearly not of its proper remedy. Alexander Hamilton moved in the direction of the approximate solution on several counts. This writer and his party embodied the thrust of that "Hamiltonian" solution within the programmatic materials advanced during the 1975-1976 course of the 1976 Presidential campaign, and have amplified on that since in respect to the proposal for establishing a Third National Bank.

Provided the instrument of national fiscal and monetary roles is in the form of a national bank along "Hamiltonian" lines, the heteronomic impulses of individual capitalist ownerships can be rigorously countered by the combination of the national bank's categorical credit policies and government tax and related fiscal policies. As a practical matter, such a government policy is the means for efficiently dealing with all of the major aspects of the problem in the terms we have defined it.

Individually, many capitalists would tend to howl heteronomically; collectively, they would merrily cheer. That irony, that difficulty, properly recalls our discussion of Federalist approaches to heteronomy during the last half of the eighteenth century. It is not adequate to attempt to use simply the power of government to enforce a policy in the vital interests of the nation as a whole. This is politically essential to transform the viable mere individual impulses of the viable political strata into a conscious form of individ-

ual correspondence with the proper, universal form of expression of such impulses — just as Franklin, Adams, Paine, Hamilton, and Madison did in their campaigns for unity of interest and action by the colonies, against the heteronomic evils of the Confederation, and for the Constitution and the republic. The proper expression of the real universal interest corresponding to the viable individual impulse *must be made conscious*, so that that willful impulse for practice is transformed from its heteronomic to universal form *in the individual*.

Once that essential *political* task is completed, the "repressive" cast of government action in behalf of that principle exists only in respect to the intolerably stubborn heteronomic exception.

That is not merely an illustration of a principle. It is a statement of a proposed approach to forming immediate policy, appropriately to be implemented as soon as the Congress impeaches the Carter Administration — which it will find acceleratingly strong and numerous motives to accomplish — and the nation secures thus the return of its most precious stolen property, the Executive Branch of government. This approach outlines what we must do to get out of the present deadly mess.

The systematic monetarist corruption of an industrial capitalist economy can now be described. First, the monetarist institutions establish a foothold of institutionalized legality for their practices of extracting ground rent massively from the economy. This focuses historically upon the capitalization of ground rent in agriculture, and in urban and other real estate speculation. It also focuses historically upon government debt. It buys into the government debt, and creates a discount market for such debt instruments. By seizing control of a government's direct and implicit dependency upon international financial markets, and a national economy's dependency upon international credit, monetarist financial power is concentrated at those two intersecting points of vulnerability of a national economy's fiscal and credit system, which enables those monetarist forces to manipulate government fiscal and credit policies, degrading the government to a mere partner — usually a junior partner in fact — of the monetarist forces which have established control over the spigot of national credit.

By controlling the "wholesale" credit markets, reducing local credit institutions increasingly to mere correspondents of major financial centers in their loans to government, industry and agriculture, and by creating controlled markets in investment banking and the secondary equity and bond markets, the monetarist octopus reaches into the gut of industry and agriculture. The monetarist money centers are en-

abled to force accelerated fictitious capitalization of industrial and agricultural assets — through such levers as loan-asset-ratio policies. By oligopoly in the operations of investment banking, by controlling the flows of capital on which investment banking depends, and by controlling the financial policies of mortgage, equity and bond markets, the monetarists force a self-feeding growth in ratios of debt-linked fictitious capitalization throughout industry and agriculture.

By such means, the debt-equity ratios in industry and agriculture are accelerated. *This increases the rate of monetarist extraction of ground rent from the economy in the form of debt service from industry and agriculture.* By extracting growing ratios of the total absolute profit of industry and agriculture in this way, they strip industry and agriculture of the margin of power decisive in controlling the flows of capital generated — the capital goes out increasingly to the monetary forces, from whom the industrialist and farmer must then beg use of that same production-generated capital in the form of a loan, through which to increase the ratio of ground rent extraction.

This aspect of the matter is crucial to understanding the “anti-capitalist” policies of the Rockefeller-allied Roosevelt administration.

To make the point clear, we should briefly consider how the writer, as President of the United States would regard revenues from taxation of production and personal incomes. The revenues would circulate through the national bank (e.g., The Third National Bank), and would be the reserve basis for a corresponding mass of loans at prime interest rates in the order of a prime rate of two percent to industry, construction, transportation, and agriculture. Although the writer does not anticipate that he, as President, would increase the effective tax rates, he does intend as detailed in earlier publications, to consolidate the federal, state, and local tax practices on a vastly more simplified basis, and to use a uniform policy of federal distributions to state and local governments, together with using the national bank to get state and local governments — at last — out of the private market’s security-issuing business. One of the associated functions of such a fiscal reform would be to concentrate the flow of tax-related debits through the national bank, to make the national bank the major credit and monetary power — inclusively preventing a fresh, usurpation of government fiscal and monetary powers by a syndicate of monetarist interests.

Roosevelt, monstrously compounding Colonel House’s offenses, did the exact opposite. His fiscal and monetary measures weakened the economic power of industry, agriculture and the local income-recipient, in order to increase the financial power of the lower Manhattan-centered monetarists. What may have

been, in one respect, an increasing of the tax bite for federal income purposes, was conducted in the manner to use these increased revenues to increase the power of the monetarists with sums extracted as taxes from industries, agriculture and personal incomes. The taxpayers’ own money was used, as bank debits, to buy the heavier chains the monetarists put upon them.

By imprisoning the individual industrial capitalist interest within this arrangement — which, in fact, Roosevelt merely exacerbated — the already existing heteronomic impulses of industrial and agricultural capital were later intensified in the extreme. The relationship between corporate finance — for production, marketing, and refinancing — was so effectively regulated by the controlling influence of the powerful monetarists, that the nominal valuations of corporate interests later skyrocketed toward the heights of fictitious capitalization and, soaring still higher, became the immediate nominal interest of the corporate entity, a *heteronomic* interest contrary to its vital real interest.

An individual corporation has no available remedy for this situation. Government does. Were I President, with a sensible Congress and appropriate support from industrial and trade-union forces, I could solve the problem of the present crisis *figuratively* overnight. Let the values of equities subside to correspondence with “seeking” their real valuations, and convert the honorable portion of the financial debts into nonvoting equity so that it may join the floating to reach ultimately whatever levels are established by general economic recovery.

There are other forms of this approach. *Which alternative form would in fact be used will be decided by a political process of arriving through negotiation at the variant most agreeable.*

Who is to say it can’t be done? Provided the industrial, labor, and agricultural interests are sufficiently agreed, and the President and Congress do their duty, there is no efficient legal obstacle in the Constitution or in the political body of the nation which cannot be overcome. As Hamilton and others make clear, it was the clear intent of the authors of the Constitution — including Jefferson — that the government has precisely *such constitutional powers respecting the nation’s vital interests.*

A few years ago, even given the Constitution as it is, such a proposal would have been impossible to project except as a hypothetical measure.

Admittedly, today, there is a minority of those who will howl for a while as such things are proposed, “What about the value of my investment?”

The writer has heard or is otherwise familiar with exactly the same objections from stockholders and

creditors in numbers of cases of vastly overripened corporate bankruptcies. In such cases, a certain amount of time and effort is required to convince the howlers that the debatable issue is not whether they are going to get a hundred cents on the dollar — “Buddy, from this financial shambles, you couldn’t get a hundred cents on the dollar in a million years!” — that the only practical question is whether to go for “closing the joint down,” and getting two cents on the dollar from the liquidation, if that, or choosing a financial reorganization and settling for postponed payments to the order of twenty cents on the dollar.

On past performance, it will require some time and effort to get those facts into the mental processes of a number, representing a minority, of most-affected groups and individuals, but the facts to be faced will only get nastier with delay, as in all such bankruptcy cases, and the stubborn ones will come around as soon as they have “abreacted out” their agony of anticipation over the book losses. To put the same point summarily: in matters such as these, *many people refuse to face reality until reality clouts them over the head, in the form of a massive crisis-outbreak.*

In the case of a bankrupt economy, such as the present financial condition of the U.S. economy, one might hypothetically liquidate to pay the creditors. That is, sell off real estate, machinery, equipment, inventories, and sell the people into slavery for what the market will bring. So far, even the Rockefellers haven’t quite proposed that openly. Alternately, as is sometimes done in financial reorganization, one can run the plant into the ground as the way to squeeze the maximum payment out of a firm being destroyed in that way. That latter is more or less what the Rockefellers have demanded of the world.

What David Rockefeller proposes for the USA, in particular, is in practice what Hitler did to Europe — loot it, including, globally, “liquidating” the “useless eaters” as an economy measure, all to keep up the nominal values of the bankrupt *Rentenmark* and *Mefo-bills*. We have already outlined the implications of David Rockefeller’s scheme. Such ultimate violations of natural law are not possible in moral law or under our Constitution — *only hangable traitors would persist in the attempt to put Rockefeller’s program into effect.*

We cannot close down the world’s economy. Nor can we run it down in the sort of process of low-energy de-industrialization the Carter Administration is committed to attempting. The world’s economy — the “corporation” in question — is potentially an economically sound proposition, provided we run it up toward full capacity levels, with a heavy emphasis upon real capital expansion and technological advancement.

We cannot have economic recovery and try to maintain the “integrity” of the present monetary structure.

The proper short-term nominal value of the U.S. economy is whatever level of float of nominal equity values at which low-interest government credit directed to industry and agriculture *will automatically set into motion the industrial capitalist mechanisms of self-feeding economic growth and prosperity.* What the subsequent values of various present capital holdings will be two, three, five years from now will be determined by which sections of production and finance best adapt to the climate of general economic recovery.

These illustrations of the matter have been introduced for a double purpose. This is the proper place in the writing to place these observations on needed changes in policies. In certain respects, the proposals and associated analysis usefully provoke an array of objections. In the main, those objections aggregate to a spectrum of fears, suspicions and resentments, which taken as a whole is eminently predictable. All of the notable objections of that spectrum involve a significant fallacy on the part of the objector. By stirring up such emotionally charged views we have established the appropriate preconditions of consciousness for resolving those vital issues of policy-making. This is the point of the writing to provoke them; each of them involves the cited problem of heteronomy directly or in respect of one of its principal byproducts. Thus, *“to the extent that that objection seizes you, it can be demonstrated to your consciousness in such sensuous terms of reference how Rockefeller has seized you in his psychological grip.”*

The grip of monetarism and its nominalist core ideology upon industrial capitalist societies is not some mere abstraction, to be pleasantly explained away. People do not act viciously, persistingly against their own vital interests by influence of a mere casual misperception of facts. *Only when heteronomic impulses have been transformed into corresponding reaction formations can such phenomena persist on a broad scale of obsessive behavior over extended periods, in the fashion of the history of the duration of the present, 1966-1977 monetary breakdown-crisis process.*

For the victims of such obsessions, it is unavoidably painful to confront the truth, even at the point that the nature of the crisis permits them no alternative. Circumlocution — trying to talk one’s way pleasantly around the problem, diplomatically avoiding the “loaded issues” — could not succeed, by virtue of the character of the situation. The hard truth has to be

posed directly by responsible leaders, and without equivocation, which means evoking and hitting directly at painful topics which are by no means merely tender corns.

Among capitalists and trade unionists alike, the most prominent issue — expressed with somewhat different emphasis, of course — is, “What about my savings?” Although the objection so identified appears plausible at first glance, everything important behind the question is sheer indefensible fallacy.

We have already dealt, just above, with the overall fallacy of the assumption that the “savings” can be saved *as a whole* at current nominal values. As a matter of policy — a combined consideration of national economic interests and relevant political considerations — we must defend the institutional integrity of industries, farms, and of those financial institutions of credit and deposit which the industrial capitalist economy requires. We must also certainly protect individuals’ savings up to a certain ceiling level. This was comprehensively covered in the writer’s widely-circulated draft of the proposed *Emergency Employment Act*.

Otherwise, two points directly settle the remaining factual issues involved in the objection.

The significance of “your savings” is: *what do they represent for your future?* Would you prefer to “get every nickel” of such nominal holdings secured for the moment, and go through — at minimum — an unprecedented economic collapse, or would you accept whatever financial reorganization procedure is necessary, on condition that these mean an immediate and extended future in what in fact will be the greatest economic boom in history?

The second point to be emphasized is that any losses reflected in a financial settlement negotiation today do not represent anything “taken away” *now*. Rockefeller and Company have already robbed these amounts; the apparent losses involved in financial reorganization merely confront the objection with the present reality of that past looting and deceptions. The only way anyone is going to defend today’s “hundred cents on the dollar” is by continuing to be among a very few at the head of the line when the general panic strikes. “If you insist on your ‘hundred cents on the

dollar,’ that panic — or far worse — is what you are getting for ‘your money.’ ”

More broadly, more significantly, the objection reflects the more or less conscious and more obnoxious perception that, while nearly everyone else would have to suffer monstrously to make that possible, that is permissible as long as “I get mine first.” This is precisely the kind of objection the founders of the republic faced in the breakdown of the economy of the Confederation. It should not be difficult for the objector to discover rationally — as his political forebears, the electorate that adopted the Constitution and republic did — that *the idea that his individual interest is something that can be served despite and at the expense of the general interest is a delusion*.

The fear of “big government” is a less intense and less broadly posed objection than the agony of anticipation over “my savings.” Most notably, “big government” is equated with “regimentation.” The writer covered most of this in major papers widely circulated during the 1976 election campaign. Those aspects of the matter, concerning the elimination of the properly objectionable oppressive features of the present government organization need not be elaborated again here. What is notable and ironical is that those same much-looted persons who endure every imaginable degree of brutally oppressive centralized authority through the Federal Reserve System and its controlling monetarist powers in private hands beyond their control, so often object to transferring that power from a few hands to *the control of their own elected representatives*.

Broadly, the argument against financial reorganization or a National Bank today is identical to the argument made against the republic, the Constitution, and the National Bank two hundred years ago.

This is aptly illustrative of the way in which the monetarists intersect the heteronomic potentialities of private ownership, to make fictitious, nominal wealth the object of perceived heteronomic self-interest, succeeding to the point that those *thus-seized persons act persistently, viciously directly against their most vital individual interests by acting against that universal interest on which their real individual interest depends*.

The Micro Approach

So far, in developing this point, we have considered the matter of political impulses from the standpoint of the universal, of overall causes and overall consequences, situating the particular individual and his heteronomic tendencies as anti-universalist impulses, as included exceptions to the rule of reason in respect of the whole taken as primary. Now, we must reverse the approach. We must momentarily put aside the telescope for the microscope.

As we shift the point of empirical focus to the "molecular" aspect of internal United States political and proto-political life during recent decades, we are properly confronted with two interconnected conceptions respecting the way the proto-Whig and proto-Tory differentiation in social-political tendencies is expressed. In respect of the first, we can rigorously distinguish two characteristic classes of individual impulse, a distinction which broadly accounts for the associated tendencies. In respect of the second, we discover that the quality of the two impulses is not only different in sense of political implications, but in a more profound respect. It is as if the proto-Whig quality of impulse were appropriately measured in "grams" and the proto-Tory in "acres." In fact, the qualitative distinction of the impulses is epistemologically more profound than that first illustration implies.

The Whig impulse is, as we have emphasized repeatedly before, empirically found to be relatively predominant among skilled and semi-skilled working people, technology-proud farmers, scientists, engineers, and industrialists. It is recognized as converging upon a sense of personal moral identity involving a commitment to contribute to the achievement of "newer, better, and more" by the society as a *whole*. It is ontologically a proto-humanist impulse. *Developing new powers of problem-solving* which are demonstrably in direct or effectively implicit agreement with a broader comprehension of the laws of natural processes, is the adducible practical implication of that impulsion.

To contrast this impulse with its opposite, *the proto-Tory*, it is not possible at first to do other than extend the analysis of the proto-Whig impulse another step. This, as we shall show, reflects the "ontological" differences in quality of the two opposing tendencies. The superficial aspect of the matter is that they are functionally contrasting as diverging tendencies, causing different consequences in the same "internal configuration" of political behavior. That first glance suggests that causes which so act in an opposite manner must be therefore different forms of the same "ontological" quality of causation. This judgment is proven to be entirely wrong.

The relatively raw, *proto-Whig* impulse has in itself no "rationally"-associated practical notions of a corresponding universality. *That is its tactical weakness, but also, as we shall demonstrate, its potentiality for merit.* The proto-Whig does not "rationally" pre-define a corresponding universal order beyond the axiomatic prescription that that order must be in agreement with circumstances of the more fruitful expression of the bare impulse itself.

The proto-Tory impulse is *immediately* characterized by implicit goals for generating a "utopian" kind of universality. This is the characteristic feature of the liberal and corresponding radical impulse. This gives the liberal and radical proto-Tory a certain immediate potential for tactical advantage over the proto-Whig, in the respect that the proto-Tory can more readily adopt policies based on *what appear to him* to represent "universalizing" goals. It would be a profound error to imagine that therefore the proto-Tory has an epistemological advantage, in the sense of being more immediately susceptible to a universalist outlook. His universalities are always, and lawfully so, convergent upon "utopias" of the degenerate-Aristotelian or nominalist form: *they are paradises of historically purposeless heteronomy.*

These "paradises" are usefully compared to certain types of *children's games*.

"Let's play cowboys and Indians."

"Okay. I'll be the captain who brings the soldiers."

“No, you be the Indian chief.”

“What’ll you be?” Sourly.

“The boss of the cowboys.”

“It’s your turn to be Indian.” Morally indignant.

Mother intervenes: “I think it is your turn to be the Indian,” addressing her hosting son; “Freddie was the Indian yesterday.”

Although the child’s development, just because it is development of mental and related powers for comprehending the “outside world” and natural processes, contains a tendency for associating an inner, preconscious sense of identity with that activity of self-development — hence, making him a potential American Whig in that respect, he is also still a child. As a child, he carries forward the need for *infantile security*.

He must have “recreation” — *relief from creative mental life*, relief from being a useful, productive person in the “outside world.” This need for recreation is not the same as a true adult’s recreations, in which the monotony of relatively routine productive work is left briefly for the freedom to exercise one’s mental-creative processes in a more concentrated way — as we shall emphasize. It is not merely recreation in the more inclusive sense that governs the phenomena of childish recreation such as those games. *Toryism is the desire to leave the world of reason for the comforts of an infantile way of living.*

In this, we are confronting real politics at its “molecular” roots.

The infant and child are properly diminishing degrees of dependency on the infantile condition, a thrust of progress toward becoming morally a part of the “outside world.” The infant exists as the family provides, and controls his or her family environment by propitiating — principally — the parents, who are the providers. Food, and so forth, are not needs realized in consequence of the infant’s and young child’s rationally willful actions on the real world. These childish needs are met typically through the parents. Furthermore, the child projects its own infantile, propitiatory comprehension of internal family relations upon the parents’ relationship to the larger, “outside” world.

As the child matures, the developing individual assimilates increasingly a rational sense of cause-and-effect as being the universal, lawful ordering of events in the “outside world.” This necessarily focuses on non-social aspects of his experience: *making things work*. It is by turning his focus away from social interrelationships to objects and processes which are not governed by opinions, *which cannot be propitiated*, that the child is able to apply his powers of pre-conscious, concept-generating insight to the

notion of lawful processes operating independently of the heteronomic wills of interacting individuals.

The dichotomies involved in the child’s mental life on this account are exhibited by inappropriately propitiatory behavior toward objects. The child breaks the toy that “stubbornly refuses” to “obey” his desires. *The frustrated child within the adult machinist* breaks a tool against the machine, out of frustration. *The enraged child within an adult* smashes the public telephone “because” the telephone connection “refused” to function as desired, or because none of the coins were returned from the incompleting long-distance call. We say, noting such aberrations, that *the person has behaved irrationally*.

Such *irrational behavior in adults* emphasizes the point that one enters adulthood either because one has *grown* into it, or because one has been *thrown* into it, or because one has been thrown into it at the point that the process of growing into adulthood has not yet been completed. It is the epistemological dichotomy between the propitiatory, false notion of “universal causation” by the infant and by the infantile aspect of the personality, and the opposite real notion of a universal lawful ordering of causal relationships, which rigorously accounts for the characteristic irrationality-rationality dualism of the overall behavior of the growing child, adolescent and adult. This is the root-molecular issue of real politics.

The corresponding feature of this dichotomy is the way in which these two impulses — *infantile-propitiatory* and *adult-rational* — are linked to correspondingly opposite tendencies in the individual’s location of a sense of identity. The infantile aspect of the personality locates identity in terms of the propitiatory dependency sense of being “my mother’s child.” “That is the real me,” is exemplary of this world outlook and correlated notion of sense of identity. The individual who is *thrown* into adulthood usually accepts the painful obligation to function in the “outside world,” according to rules whose actual or implied rationality conflict with the propitiatory outlook of the infantile personality, his or her “real me,” which he or she locates as “behind” and “underneath.” The “outer-world” or quasi-rational or rational aspect of personal behavior is essentially a *persona*, a *living mask*, the practical interface between the “inner me” and the adolescent or adult functioning in the “outside world.”

The relatively true adult is not-accidentally typified by the person who has an untaintedly adult-rational relationship to parents and siblings, uncluttered by “background noise” representing the propitiatory tendencies and conflicts of childhood. Although surface appearances to this effect are not infallible

guides, what they imply is sufficient for our purposes here. The inner change which makes such an adult transformation possible is the individual's locating *in the experience and awareness of the power of creative insight of his (pre-conscious) mental processes*, his real sense of social identity.

This required qualitative change in the personality is dependent upon not only an experience of such creative powers, but a twofold *confidence* in those powers. He must be confident that those creative mental powers are an *ordered, reliable* instrument for mastering comprehension *for practice* of a universally-lawful ordering of the world, and must also be confident that this quality in himself is what makes him properly useful and important to his society.

It is inevitable that this adult potentiality is most readily associated with creative accomplishment in the physical sciences. The normal case of *the developing child* applies. The physical sciences are a more accessible focus for *psychologically tolerating* the notion of a universally lawful ordering in nature. The focus does not yet require *abandonment* of the infantile sense of identity, but rather permits the exercise of a rational-creative capacity, without immediately bringing the actual or potential scientist's infantile identity heritages into direct conflict with the inquiry. Similarly, creative promise among mathematicians tends to show early, chess masters usually begin as prodigies, as do gifted musicians, and so forth. A person otherwise a monstrously infantile personality can be a famous chess master or a pure mathematician and so forth.

Rationality with respect to social processes normally develops later, with the power to accept the rationality of physical processes otherwise holding an intermediate position. This normal pattern is lawful.

The characteristic identity crisis of the creative mathematician and physicist is the most relevant. "Will my mind stop producing new conceptual breakthroughs — will I 'go dead,' are my creative days over?" As the late Dr. Lawrence Kubie and others have demonstrated, as far as they have progressed in this respect, a once-creative individual in the sciences and so forth loses that developed, active creative power only as neurotic-infantile aspects of the identity overwhelm the creative moment. The powerful need to gratify a threatened sense of the "real me's" infantile sense of propitiatory identity becomes so insistent that it subordinates the creative (pre-conscious) moments.

For example, as peer-relationships among scientific workers become irrationally "competitive," the sibling-conflict "mechanisms" predominate in relations with one's peers and subordinates, and propitiatory behavior toward (surrogate parents),

superiors, patrons, and so forth takes over increasingly. Scientific investigation, rather than being problem-solving-directed in reality, becomes goal-directed to solving the problem of sibling-rivalries and propitiation.

In such and analogous circumstances, the infantile aspect takes over the personality even in its creative efforts, effecting a pre-conscious recurring nightmare of oedipal "noise," and interruptions which preclude that sort of sustained concentration-span upon which the pre-conscious synthesis of rigorously defined hypothesis-concepts depends. The former promising scientific worker seems to have lost the old power to "think through" problems in a sustained way, of building a concentrated focus on all the implications in the broadest terms.

The shortening of the concentration-span limits his powers of insight to conceptions, hypotheses dependent upon building systems of implication in terms of a narrower range of focus on the "internal relations" surrounding the topical area of the defined problem. He loses the power to leap outside the problem as formally defined, to "outflank" it, with "brilliances," to solve the problem by redefining the entire set of "internal-relations" implications in a broader way than the problem has been viewed before. He is, as he fears, "going dead," his creative days are over.

Such breakdowns among creative scientific intellects have been almost the rule, rather than the exception. The external causes are numerous, but are generally, as external or circumstantial causes, of the general principled sort we have identified by the foregoing illustrative discussion. *The real cause is not those circumstances which bring on the collapse of creative powers, but the vulnerability upon which those circumstances act to produce such an effect.*

The true, matured scientists are those who tend to immediately agree, on the basis of their experience as creative scientists, with the rigorous epistemological definition of science we set forth earlier, above. *They have developed a self-consciousness of the reliable principles of ordering governing their rigorous approach to the formulating of crucial hypotheses.*

They may not have "gotten inside" their pre-conscious processes, in the sense of making those processes accessible to consciousness *directly*. Rather, in the usual case of the (relatively rare) true scientist, they have mastered the "black box" which is their mental creative power as they consciously know it. They have demonstrated the lawful approach through which to set those processes into motion to produce the forecastable required sort of result.

They have also gone further than that in itself; they have conceptualized the proven "rules" for "operating the black box" of mental creativity.

Rather than merely accepting those rules as “knacks,” “rules of thumb,” sets of procedures, *they have conceptualized that array of “procedures” as they would any other topic of empirical scientific inquiry.* They have applied the methods of creative physics discovery, to develop a creative insight into the empirical evidence of the functioning of their own creative mental processes. This evidence readily admits of the methods of crucial hypothesis — on condition that the crucial hypothesis is tested in the appropriate empirical way — in the production of “more powerful” crucial hypotheses and proven experiment concerning the subject matter of physics or analogous practice as such.

That process, of making the “deployment” of mental creative powers for scientific work a subject of scientifically ordered conscious deliberation, is *epistemology*, the basic ordering tool of creative scientific work.

It is that epistemological view of one’s creative powers, and a state of mind converging upon such a view, which establishes the basis for confidence in the reality and importance of one’s pre-conscious creative powers as the *active* principle of one’s personal social identity, one’s proper moral identity in the world. This *sensuously grounded* demonstration of the proper nature of one’s identity is the highest expression of and paradigm for the individual who has entirely *grown* into becoming an adult — rather than being either merely *thrown* into, or *half-grown, half-thrown* into that condition.

The infantile identity is a “particle” identity. The infantile identity does not see itself as an *active process*, but as ultimately a fixed, self-evident particle, of preordained, fixed axiomatic kinds of needs.

This difference between the particle-identity and process-identity of the infantile and adult personality has two most relevant implications for the problem of understanding the Whig and Tory impulses. First, the different way *recreation* functions for the relatively infantile and relatively adult individual. Second, the epistemological implications. These aspects are resolved through understanding their underlying identity.

To the individual who remains infantile at core, the rational behavior demanded by practical functioning in the “outside world,” is essentially a *persona*: “It is not the real me; it is my profession, my occupation — merely my social self.”

The *persona* is like the child’s father, *another person*; it is the person the child (infantile “me”) must propitiate in order to obtain goodies from the outside world. Thus, the adult father of the household (*persona*), puts on the other personality “at home” — being, alternately both in the *father-role* (*persona*)

and the role of the *father’s child* (infantile “me”) *with respect to himself.* Hence, the ordering of marriages around this duality of complementary and reciprocal *father-child* and *child-mother* roles. The father, in his outer-world functions, is “father” to both his children and his child-wife; the mother is “daughter” to her husband respecting his outer-world role, and is “mother” to him and their children in all matters of “family life” (inside the house, family affairs, social events of a family overtone, etc.). Relative to family life, the wife is the connection to the “outer world” for both her husband and her children. (Hence, for such cases, the crisis of the unemployed adult man, whose wife assumes the role of “breadwinner,” i.e. father.)

Popular forms of recreation function for the needs of the infantile “real me” as an escape from the strain of being the *persona*. The child *plays* after school. This carries over into school, university and adult-spectator sports. Entertainment is attuned to the “geometry” of the *heteronomic* infantile self. The infantile self requires escape from the lawfulness of the “outside world” into a parody of the outside world, in which the lawful ordering is determined as a fantasy world *as it might be* if the universe were ordered according to the propitiatory “geometry” of the infantile sense of “real me.”

Recreation of *this sort*, by assuaging the anxiety of the infantile self, by allowing a “safe” social area of expression for the desire of the infantile self to take over the personality, to order its thoughts and so forth according to the “geometry” of infantile outlooks and “needs,” *relieves the tension*, and thus quite literally *re-creates* the person’s capacity to “throw himself” once again into effectively concentrated service of the *persona*-role.

Insofar as infantile *recreations* perform that function, they perform an unavoidable social function. Recreation of that sort permits society to perform its day-to-day functions. As adults perform their *personas* of fathers and mothers, the world is fed, housed, clothed, and battles for defense of the national community’s interest are fought.

As long as infantilism is socially tolerated *only within the prescribed bounds of such recreation*, and as long as that *moral distinction* between recreation and reality is rigorously enforced by the society, the appropriate degree of such “safety-valve” fantasy-activity helps society to accomplish the *persona*-associated functions on which the perpetuation of society depends.

The problem is not that the *persona*-associated activities are not *real*. The problem is that except to the extent that the infantile identity “within” locates its *persona* qualities as in its essential self-interest — which is what we properly mean *juridically* by the

designation of a *moral adult* person, a *rational adult*, otherwise the individual does not believe in the reality of that identity as his or her "real self." The loss of the persona — loss of profession, protracted unemployment, or the standard "ego-stripping" practices of a behaviorist "group therapy" brainwashing session — degrade the individual into conditions of infantilism (heteronomy) known as the *professions, personae* of the criminal mind, the lunatic, the fascist, the Maoist, and so forth.

For the true adult, the opposite sort of recreation is required. The *narrowness* of a specific function in the world is intrinsically disagreeable to the proper, fullsome exercise of the creative mental processes. Even though the occupation, the profession, may directly, positively express creative powers in a most appropriate particular fashion, to the greatest positive consequences, and so forth, the unavoidable narrowness of focus of task-oriented efforts within society's division of labor in all fields is in conflict with the relatively far-ranging overviews on which the creative process depends. The limitation of a defined problem to the equivalent of a narrowly defined set of practical internal relations — most frequently unavoidable, even necessary in the productive process and related matters — is ultimately abortive in effects on the mental powers' capacities unless some relief is afforded. The normal chief recreation characteristic of the skilled worker, the scientist, the engineer, the skilled farmer, the industrialist, *is therefore science, or a different aspect of science.*

The distinction between the two forms of recreation becomes a hideous moral problem in those forms of purported entertainment which attempt to bring a scientific-recreational topic within the terms of infantile-ordered recreational forms. Science as recreation — and we are obviously speaking not merely of what is ordinarily narrowly called physical science — is "outer world"-directed in its practical implications; ordinary, popular entertainment *must not be*. Thus, *when real issues of the present and future* are made the content of recreations adapted to the norms of popular entertainment, the effect upon children and other more "suggestible" audiences and participants is — as is sometimes complained to be the case — to foster heteronomic, even criminal behavior by those strata in the outside-world behavior. "Only mature audiences" is a prescription in the right direction on this account, excepting that it overlooks the proportion of raving infantile identities evoked in the context of "recreation"-identified audiences among those over 21 years of age.

The epistemological implication of this immediate same point is best brought into view by resuming our synthetic case history of the developing adult who has

reached the point of maturation of becoming a physical scientist. At that point, he has the basis for using his accomplishments, his sense of identity as having become epistemologically a scientist, to serve as a "fixed base" of strategic deployments to attack the core of his identity problems. He now has the sense of adult identity, and the epistemological apparatus with which to competently attack the problem of social processes, to bring his comprehension of social processes within the conceptual scope of natural law.

Positivism and associated forms of radical behaviorism have purported to do just that, but they do so under the barbaric banner and rallying-cry of "science is statistics." The problem of the positivist "Wallenstein" and his vagabond swarm of behaviorist "statisticians" is that he and his execrable horde of computerized hoodlums represent a viciously anti-scientific, in fact infantile epistemological point of view.

The relevant issues of distinction have already been settled conclusively enough in building up the concepts to this point through preceding successions of sub-topics. We have already defined the principal internal features of the process by which an actual scientist competently attacks the empirical domain of social phenomena. We mean that approach and nothing else. Moreover, not only is the approach we have defined the only admissible approach to social processes, but as we have shown, this is the approach represented in the entire sweep of development of the scientific and neo-platonic humanist outlook from Thales, through Ibn Sina, through Roger Bacon, Ficino, Kepler, and so forth to the present time.

What we have added, in the more immediate probing of the inner development of the adult personality, is to bring to the surface the actual kinds of processes within the great intellects which have produced their discoveries and related achievements. Moreover, just as the outlook of Benjamin Franklin not-at-all accidentally coincides in crucial features of policy outlook with our own, so in the entire sweep of the development of great human thought, the internal features of the conscious articulation of the arguments of such intellects overwhelmingly corroborate the picture we have just rounded out — respecting the formal and psychological essentials of creative, scientific insight and outlook.

The successive progress of European humanist thought, through the scholastic (Aristotelian) and neo-platonic, represent successive phases, successive epochs in the upward progress toward adulthood by humanity as a whole. Both represent — putting aside for the moment the reactionary aspect of the great Thomas Aquinas — the struggle to lift the individual and society out of the bestiality of the infantile,

heteronomic self, and not merely to make the *persona* more efficiently rational, but to make such a perfected *persona* the entirety of the human sense of identity.

This is otherwise vividly underlined by the ongoing struggle of Christendom as a whole. Putting aside the misdirections, the rubbish, and so forth, the Christian effort respecting the war of *good* against *evil* has always and properly premised its combat on the certainty that the evil within the world was also the extension of the evil within the individual. The good was properly defined, at least in respect of the overall working approach, as the agreement (atonement) of the individual's informed willful impulses for practice with the necessities of universal law in respect to the real world. The enemy, evil, was always the susceptibility of the rationally informed human will, informed of universal interests and necessities, to heteronomic impulses (desires). These are rightly associated with the fictitious imperatives of a misinterpreted, *because localized*, immediate, sensuous self-interest. It was the animal-likeness of the baser aspect of man, his propensity to behave as an animal does, to see nothing but some *local* sensuous self-interest of the moment, or to place that heteronomic imperative above the consciousness of universal imperatives. Hence, Christendom located the "flesh" as the mediation of evil, because its *locality* was the ostensible lure of heteronomy by which *the evil one (heteronomy) within the individual* took control.

Such religious notions of Christendom, however inadequate the systematic insight involved, persisted because the argument was efficiently grounded in empirical evidence. Christendom's evolution, from what Aquinas (most notably) adduced as scholasticism (Aristotelianism), to neo-platonic humanism, does not alter that focus, but represents rather a qualitative advance both in understanding of natural law, and in respect of moving away from the reductionist, Aristotelian "geometry" — from what we today properly describe as the field-particle paradoxical notion — to a non-Aristotelian, neo-platonic "geometry" based on recognition that the human identity was not a self-evident *particle*, but an individuated *process*. Implicitly, with respect to social practice, Ficino's *Five Questions* already rigorously solved the field-particle paradox, by defining the efficient causal relationship between the individual (as a process) and the "field," the development (perfection) of the society as a whole.

From what we have already developed, converging on this point, in this writing so far, the case is made clear and conclusively so. There is no admissible degree of mystery why those conceptions appropriate to physics today were first developed in thrust and pre-

liminary conception in epistemology and neo-platonic political movements, or why the process by which this occurred and the initiation of physical science was accomplished by the same neo-platonic currents. The fusion of the epistemology, which is the "transfinite" reality of the subsumed details of what is naively regarded as science per se, to the empirical reality of the social process, is the (hylozoic) scientific world outlook as a whole. The development of this outlook is originated only, ever freshly, by those individuals who have developed in themselves that epistemological outlook on their own fruitful creative processes which we described above. It is not sufficient that such individuals know this epistemology *empirically*, as we prescribed such conditions for knowledge. That knowledge must also be employed as the basis on which they "wrench" the notion of their deepest personal identity away from the infantile particle-thing the immature person regards as "the real me," to locate their sense of fundamental personal identity in the creative process, and its ongoing powers, which is the core of their creatively directed activity in society.

What we had already detailed respecting the epistemological-ontological distinctions between the Aristotelian and neo-platonic conceptions of the universe becomes obvious, once the crucial additional point we have just developed has been placed in that focus. The method of Thomas Aquinas attempted to inform the infantile "monad" self — the infantile self — and defined his notion of natural law according to the geometry of the field-particle outlook, an outlook rooted in the axiomatic presumption of the self-evidence of the pre-ordained, self-evident "particle-self." Both the formal-epistemological and the historical-practical aspects of the problem, as we have already developed those points, account for every other derived feature of the problem as a whole.

Within this framework, the problem of understanding the lawful implications of the epistemologically ("ontologically") asymmetric Whig and Tory impulses is solved. *These impulses are respectively tendencies toward and away from mature humanity.* The first, the Whig impulse, centers upon the effects of emphasizing the practical, creative side of human technological progress as the quality of the *persona*, and hence of the values reflected into private mental life as the qualities of the self's development to be emphasized. The second, the Tory impulse, is correlated with those *personae* which emphasize the non-productive side of life, in which the infantile fantasy-life spills over more easily into the form of that "outer world" social practice.

The power upon which productive practice depends from within the individual is the mental-creative pro-

cesses of problem-solving in terms of empirical problems which do not submit to the neurotic forms of social persuasion, do not submit to the influence of infantile opinion and propitiatory tricks. (Hence, the *manic* elation of the infantile self when the television is induced to resume proper functioning in the aftermath of a kick.) The practical circumstances of social life of the productive person, the person who counts success as solving the *technological* problems of production, are a favorable, forcing circumstance for cultivating not only the use, but the personal-identity importance of the mental-creative powers called into use.

The corollary of this principle goes directly to the perjorative connotations of "womanish." The woman, as a person *cultured* to become a housewife, is conditioned to assimilate "feminine" qualities, qualities which coincide with the "daughter-mother" identity-relationship of the wife to the "father-child" of a husband who goes into the outer world to earn the family's bread. Even if she acquired mechanical and related skills — traditionally, at best, suspiciously unfeminine — her controlling sense of social identity is that of housewife or potential housewife. Thus, it appears that women do not have the inclination for scientific work and so forth that men do. As women have moved increasingly into the outer world, it has been predominantly into professional and other occupations which are relatively more agreeable to the kind of infantile world outlook otherwise culturally imposed as "femininity." They are either, as unskilled employees, channeled into the most routine production work, or into surrogate mother roles in teaching, babysitting, social work, and so forth, or into administrative occupations and those liberal arts professions which are steeped in agreeable features of prevailing present circumstances and content with the infantile, or propitiatory social outlook.

This problem, that women in general have been prevented culturally from developing the relative maturity more accessible to so-called "male roles," represents a monstrous form of oppression within the culture, and at the same time a monstrous political problem. The fact that we deny to half of our electorate the circumstances of opportunity for social maturity we afford relatively speaking to the male half, is a poison in our republic analogous to, if by no means so severe, as was holding our black labor force in chattel slavery. Hold women in relative cultural backwardness, as we still do, and the nation's vital interests will tend to suffer as a result whenever the consequences of this oppression are "paid back to us" by, for example, reactionary, infantile impulsions from within the woman electorate.

The election tallies are by no means the only im-

portant place in which the vital interests of the nation are potentially — and sometimes actually — threatened by the marginal effects of the cultural backwardness relatively imposed upon women. The problem of the relatively greater backwardness of "the wife in the family" is a matter of notoriety in the history of the labor movement, and by no means confined to that sphere.

This problem was illuminated most sharply by the post-1968 mobilization of the present "feminist movement." Apart from the obvious reforms rightly, even belatedly demanded by this ferment, the "radical feminist" element poisoning that movement as a whole showed exactly how the backwardness imposed upon women leads inexorably, under appropriate influences and conditions, to a hideously fascist world outlook among the *déclassé* strata. The "Id rampant" of the "radical feminists," especially a hard core of proselytizing lesbians, denounced "male intellectual aggressiveness," in preference for the irrational existentialist impulses purported to be the morally superior "feminine" qualities.

The distinction between the Whig and Tory impulse is demonstrated to be lawful, and not properly mysterious.

The Whig impulse, associated with the practical side of contributing to technological progress, is epistemologically a positive impulse because it draws upon and sets into practical motion the individual's mental creative potentialities. It is those mental-creative potentialities which are the *driving element* of the impulse. We see directly not the driving element itself, but its predicates, or, to use psychological terms, the developed *cathexes* of developed willful impulses for practice. Although the driving element is thus empirically *transfinite* with respect to the behavioral dispositions it orders, it is nonetheless the characteristic feature of the phenomenon as a whole.

The Tory impulse is ostensibly "goal-determined" because the goal is the pre-existing infantile fantasy life of the Tory. The goal is to impose that fantasy upon reality. The model for the fantasy is family relations among parents, siblings and others within the family, neighborhood and school life of the infant and young child, shading into the cathexes of infantilism acquired in that period of adolescence which precedes being *thrown* into the outside world. Hence, the characteristic feature of the Tory impulse is "concert," "pluralism," and "egalitarianism," all accommodations to the central axiom of the whole affair, "*that's mine!*"

By pointing, as we are doing here, to the "molecular" root of the proto-Tory impulse, we expose the psychodynamics of a wide range of political and proto-political phenomena. In this specific consideration, we

have emphasized the accessible direct evidence from the United States during recent decades, using that evidence not to effect a “localized” inductive generalization, but to aid us, that evidence considered together with other appropriate evidence, in developing a crucial point. The included result of such an approach is to afford us an enriched method of approach to all comparable features of the history of our European-and-Mediterranean-littoral 2,500 years of culture.

Although the rigors employed in our approach are representative of the crucial method appropriate to such resulting positive knowledge concerning broader areas of history, the immediate empirical applicability of the result is best defined for the narrower area of investigation emphasized within the evidence employed. Consequently, we can make rigorous statements concerning broad features of other aspects of the history of our European cultural development, but we are still limited in respect of the most detailed, specific applications, to the narrower range of empirical evidence we have emphasized. Hence, we are emphasizing the proto-Tory impulse as it has occurred in or affected the United States’ history, most emphatically the recent decades to date.

For the moment, as we describe the characteristics of the proto-Tory impulse, our statements are directed in purpose to the most recent generations in particular, even though they have more or less analogous implications for other historical aspects of the same European culture viewed more broadly.

Our generations of proto-Tories desire, at bottom, a society characterized by models of those *fantasy* family and family-orbiting relations the proto-Tory liberal or radical wishes his infantile, childhood and adolescent family, neighborhood, and school life might have been. Hence, *Toryism (liberalism, radicalism) is essentially pornographic, incestuous, and pederastic*. This “goal” is the only purpose embedded in the impulse. The active element of the impulse itself borrows from neurotic dreaming, and from pornographic fantasy life generally, those kinds of changes of “scenario” details through which the neurotic (or psychotic) mind searches recurrently for a “scenario” in which the dream — he hopes — finally becomes “satisfying.”

This underlying impulse of the proto-Tory and Tory takes a specific political form by the same sort of “mechanisms” the individual neurotic employs in building fantasy scenarios. The neurotic mind interprets the scenarios of movies, TV dramas, “soap operas,” and journalists’ work as fantasy scenarios created by script writers and by news editors and news writers.

The contemporary prevailing standards of “news-

worthiness” in most United States’ leading news publications’ practice is the *conscious* exploitation of the principle of the audience’s fantasy-building activities, to mold “public opinion” in Tory directions. In general, contrary to common perceptions, this manipulation of our popular entertainment and “news” institutions does not operate effectively by a *single* distorted “story” or article, or even a few lying news reports. It operates through broad, cumulative effect, through the biases represented by overall selection of topics and treatments according to overall editorial formulas. It is guided to the effect of creating an ideological environment of fantasy, to the effect that “public opinion” in the main is “steered” into certain directions in collective overall trends in private fantasy-building.

The suggestible mind uses the scenarios supplied to it as models for rebuilding its own private fantasies. This has two, interconnected features of importance here. Respecting the internal mechanics of private fantasy-building, the entertainment and “news” stimuli represent “suggestions” — like the suggestions of a new boy in the neighborhood for a “stimulating” improvement in a become-boring mode of playing “cowboys and Indians.” The fact that the individual knows that *a massive audience is being similarly stimulated with such neurotic suggestions* makes the fantasy credible to him as the kind of infantile game which society as a whole might consent to play.

Even if our mass entertainment and most influential TV news, news magazine, metropolitan press, and wire-service agencies did not have a conscious policy concerning such methods of molding “public opinion,” the same mechanisms would nonetheless *tend* to operate. Beginning with Fabian Sidney Webb’s enthusiasm for the potentialities of utilitarian doctrine as a powerful means for mass brainwashing of public opinion, through the inter-war Lippmann — *New Republic*-centered — dominant modes of “public opinion”-shaping, through the “Radio Research” project, the combined outgrowths of World War II strategic psychological warfare methods, and the Tavistock-Roper-Gallup-Harris methods of manipulating “public opinion,” the now-Rockefeller-centered neo-Fabian faction has *pragmatically* shaped the neurotic, heteronomic potentialities of entertainment and news production into a coordinated deliberate instrument of mass brainwashing, whose coordination itself is effected by the “scenario principle.”

The credulous person imagines that a journalist, editor or TV productions official who is uncovered as a “CIA agent” must therefore be engaged in spying, assassination operations, and such particular offenses against popular sensibilities. Such activities may

occur as a subsumed feature of the "tainted connection." However, the most significant act the "CIA agent" in the media does as such an "agent," is nothing more than what Walter Cronkite, MCA, and Katharine Graham *do to you publicly every day of the week*. They shape entertainment and news reporting, to the effect of cumulatively building a total environment of fantasy, through which the directed evolution of the population's private fantasy-building molds the "sub-structure" of a majority of "public opinion."

Within such a broader background-context in general patterns of mass entertainment and news policies' effects, explicitly "political scenarios" of the same "formula"-quality are introduced to targeted portions of the broadly conditioned population. The result is converging sets of shared fantasy models, models converging upon the genre typified by Orwell's *Animal Farm, 1984*, or the Orwellian *Clockwork Orange*. The groups of persons gathered around convergence upon such a specific political fantasy come to represent an organized political tendency, which operates according to debated scenarios variously recommended as the means to bring the dream-condition into effect in reality.

The Atlanticist Doctrine is the form of the fantasy adopted among the leading political and associated strata of the monetarist faction. Although these circles coordinate the indoctrination of "public opinion" with malignant deliberateness, they extend to the broader public nothing but the same kind of victimization which operates upon themselves. *The "dream merchants" are themselves living in a nightmare.*

We can now identify one of the most crucial aspects of the Atlanticist Doctrine. *The proto-Tory impulse is a flight from reality.* It flees in search of a dream, to superimpose upon and thus drive away the hated reality. The transformation of such private tendencies into a shared political fantasy, into the socialized institution of the commitment to such common efforts, is in the strictest sense of the psychological discipline a *reaction formation*. *Toryism* — from the Atlanticist Doctrine at the top to the liberalism and radicalism of the supporting core ideology — *is essentially a reaction formation against reality.*

As we have summarized the connections involved so far, we have the following.

Through catastrophes and related acute crises, the human race's viable strains of culture have formed governments (or the equivalent) governed by the positive perceptions contributed by an initiating few, of the implications of natural law which account for such monstrous cumulative failures of general human practice. Through catastrophe, through related grave crises, the broader mass of the population establishing

such viable forms of government have (in fortunate outcomes) recognized both the follies of their heteronomic conduct, and the propriety of the positive perceptions of natural law advanced by the initiating intellectual-political forces.

The most broad and conspicuous evidence of this process is provided by the history of Christendom as *Christendom*. It is the anguished recognition in the general population of the hideous consequences of collective *sin* (heteronomic behavior), which has caused (among other variants) those positive explosions of religious revolutions through which the population brings itself willfully under the constraints of *moral law in its religious expression*.

The products of great religious upsurges of the history of European Christendom all fall exclusively into one of three categories: Apollonian, Promethean, and Dionysian. They are correspondingly *conservative, creative, or heteronomic*. It is the first two which are the law-building currents, and the third which represents a society reacting to crisis by going morally insane. In modern European Christendom's history, we know these three respective currents of outlook and method as *scholasticism* (Aristotelianism), *neo-platonic humanism*, and *nominalism* (empiricism-pragmatism-monetarism).

The characteristic of the first two is the persuasion that the heteronomic impulses of the individual will must be driven out of efficient social practice generally, to within the supervised bounds of "molecular" family and private-mental life. Heteronomy is thus bounded within internally ordered local areas of human activity, areas defined as localized areas of *toleration*; hence, the scholastic doctrines pertaining to the canonical ordering of internal features of the designated areas of relatively "privatized" toleration.

The instruments by which the governance of recognized universal natural law are effected have been the church and the state.

As a consequence of the kinds of corruption of the church characteristic of the period approximately 1200 A.D. through the mid-seventeenth century defeat of the Hapsburgs, and that period's division of the church into factions deployed against government and natural law, the principle of the separation of church and state was rightfully established as a spreading policy, depriving the church *in particular* of any secular authority, either parallel to government or in respect of direct representation in either government or the delegation of the functions of government. Despite that proper outlawing of the secular authority of the church in concrete, the useful principles behind the earlier ordering of Christendom *were preserved through the instrumentality of constitutional republic*.

The churches themselves were retained as *protected* institutions of constitutional republics, to the purpose of retaining their contributing moral influence on behalf of universal law against the *sin* (heteronomy) which was the common enemy of the church and state.

The cited decisive focus of Franklin and others in combating heteronomy (*sin*) within the colonies and nation exemplifies the principle we have cited.

Governments based upon conservative or humanist political revolutions in morality and law represent in effect an instrument by which people collectively enforces upon itself behavior in conformity with reality, imposed upon the heteronomic impulses of the individual and parochialized, localized "self-interest" (*sin*).

As governments oppress *sin* (heteronomy), they are *oppressive* to the heteronomic (infantile) sense of personal identity. They are *properly* oppressive in the sense that government properly "oppresses" burglary, murder, drug-peddling, arson, and "oppresses" lunatics by submitting them to custodial supervision. The powers of sovereignty properly given to the instruments of government unfortunately are also abused to oppress *non-sinful* tendencies, as the participation of the feudal *conservatives* in supporting the Inquisition attests.

Radical conservatism, as in the feudal example, ultimately brings about the preconditions for the catastrophes and crises which are the consequence of the failure to continue the course of technological progress.

In consequence, the term "oppression" acquires two meanings with respectively opposite and irreconcilable implications. When a crisis brings about the collapse of an old order, the self-discredit of the old law so accomplished also brings about — one hopes — a new positive thrust in behalf of universal natural law, to reestablish the rule of lawful government. Unfortunately, the breakdown of the old law also weakens, the established checks against the potentialities of rampant heteronomy. Since the excessively conservative government oppresses both humanist (abuse) and degraded impulses (lawfully) through the same instruments, the oppressive character of the instruments is commonly *misattributed* as the common quality of oppression.

A direct comparison of the successful American Revolution with the failed French Revolution for the 1750-1815 period, and again, the 1828-1863 periods of American and French crises, ably illustrates the principles involved.

The Hapsburg Disease

The great danger to a society ordered according to principles of universal natural law is that the checks against heteronomy will erode. Under such erosion and breakdown of the active principles of universality embedded in proper constitutional law, the “oppressed” forces of heteronomy are aided to *revolt against reality*. The present treason of neo-Fabianism, with all its characteristic “countercultural,” “local control,” and anti-technology features, is a moral breakdown paralleling that underlying both the Wallenstein phenomenon and the processes of Germany during the 1918-1945 period.

The degradation of law itself, typified by the evil work of the radical nominalist Carl Schmitt under both Weimar and the Nazi regime, poisoned the German judiciary in a way which made the 1933 “Hitler Revolution’s” rapid evolution into the Nazi regime possible — a tradition which, unfortunately, persists as an uninterrupted strong current in the BRD judiciary and legal profession presently. The same process has been occurring in the U.S. law through the successive Holmes “force of sovereignty” and the Thurman Arnold Fabian-and-neo-Fabian phases. The Weimar-Nazi and U.S. degeneration of the rule of constitutional principles of law are common predicates of the rule of lower Manhattan-centered monetarism.

The corruption of the constitutional institutions of the republic *at the top* has corrupted the law and unleashed the forces of the “Id” in the base of society. This degeneration of the U.S. electorate was accelerated by the climate of moral anarchy of prohibition and the 1930s, and accelerated willfully in the extreme with the inauguration of John F. Kennedy. The mentally unstable Jimmy Carter, with the related bestiality of his Administration generally, expresses the “revolt of the Id,” the threatened imminence of a new, global unleashing of the “Wallenstein syndrome.”

This hideous outcome expresses the essential principle of all nominalism. Nominalism is, as we have said, epistemologically a degenerate form of the Aristotelian outlook and method. The mere forms of

Aristotelian “geometry” — the field-particle paradox — persist, as a decaying human body retains the formal distinctions of the living person. The life has been taken out of the Aristotelian order, the human quality of the Aristotelian order, *the rule by rational governance in terms of universal natural law*, the governance by the principle of submission of the heteronomic impulses to the universally lawful exigencies of reality.

The degenerate John Dewey, repudiating “universals” in his *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, expresses that characteristic distinction of nominalism which lawfully leads toward fascism and equivalent horrors of the “Id rampant.”

Nominalism, by virtue of the way in which the infantile mind builds successive “scenarios,” begins — epistemologically — by clinging to certain of the forms the morally dead have inherited from the living. It retains the outward *habits* of rationality. Eighteenth century *Humean empiricism* self-consciously typifies that initial phase of moral degeneration. As long as a monetarist-ruled capitalist society is unable to rid itself of the imperatives for technological progress, that exigency of reality checks the progressive decay of nominalism, forcing nominalists to be contained within the formalities of rationality to a corresponding degree. As monetarism is able to force society to break away from technological progress, in preference for other things (the primacy of ground rent, “quality of life”), and to thus take on a boldly “countercultural revolution” aspect, the moral decay accelerates in the direction of irrationalist fantasies typified by the film *Clockwork Orange*.

We did not exaggerate in the least, earlier, in classifying the Copenhagen doctrine in physics as epistemologically *fascist*. Until approximately the middle of the nineteenth century, no intelligent body of leading scientific opinion would have tolerated the presumption that there was an axiomatic distinction, or even an approximation of such a distinction, between politics and the so-called physical sciences. The Carter Administration’s “environmentalist” and “energy” policies have reminded us of the truth, if

that were necessary. The exploitation of a conceptual difficulty at a crucial point in experimental physics' progress was the basis for hauling into physics — from *external* nominalist philosophy and method — a doctrine which established a foothold for overthrowing the most fundamental principle of physical science as a whole: *the principle of coherence in the universal ordering of nature.* (32)

In respect of Werner Heisenberg's association with this development, the relevant point is not that he was either *persona grata* under the Nazi regime or that his associations with the fascist movement in Germany dated from the end of World War I. The significant thing — for which Heisenberg is epistemologically less offensive than the contemporary von Weizsäcker — is that Heisenberg, as he himself emphasizes in his autobiographical writings, employed the same philosophical conceptions impelling him toward the post-war fascists as the rationalization for his defense of the kernel issue of the Copenhagen doctrine. Heisenberg's significance is not that he was the cause of the corruption of physics in this way — Niels Bohr was much more culpable — but that his postwar writings afford us invaluable insight into the Copenhagen doctrine as seen by a leading insider.

Logical positivism was not merely an extension of British empiricism into physics — that sort of corruption had been long in progress before the 1920s. The Copenhagen doctrine represented something beyond mere empiricism; it was a *reaction-formation* assault, in principle and associated efficient practice, against the very kernel of scientific method.

The case of the Copenhagen doctrine illustrates the qualitative distinctions within nominalism between classic British empiricism and its outgrowth, fascism. The typification of philosophical fascism is that variant of nominalism called *logical positivism*.

It is not accidental that Old Vienna of the pre-1945 period should have special notoriety in this connection, nor that the philosophical fascism of so many notable Nazi refugees from Old Vienna (into the United States' universities and so forth) should have been complemented by the fact that Nazi Austria was in the main *more Nazi* than the other parts of Hitler's Germany. The qualitative distinction between British empiricism of the classic type and fascist logical positivism is that it is the specific distinction of logical positivism to represent the qualitative transformation of the nominalist's irrationality into its corresponding *reaction formation*. The fascist implications of Rudolf Carnap, Kurt Lewin, Bertrand Russell and other *radical empiricists* generally, illustrate the principle

for which Vienna-flavored varieties of logical positivism were a special case.

If many of these philosophical fascists objected to *Hitler's* Nazism, that objection reflects predominantly the consideration that Hitler's fascism was to the Kurt Lewin's: "somebody else's fascism, not *mine*." It was not a hostility of philosophical outlooks, but a difference premised in narrow interests of proprietorship.

It is cruel, but necessarily cruel to emphasize that Hitler's Nazism did not accommodate itself to the important role of Jewish fascists. The native Romanian fascists of the 1930s were explicitly and emphatically Zionists in both domestic and foreign policy. The indigenous Hungarian fascists of the 1930s were not specifically anti-Semitic in either domestic or foreign policy. Italian fascism was not anti-Semitic. Although anti-Semitism is endemic to backward peasant and urban lumpen social strata in all countries with a perceptible Jewish small business and landlord population, the cases of the right-wing Israeli and the U.S. Jewish Defense League forces only underline that there is nothing "genetically" anti-Jewish in fascism as such. It was merely a proprietary peculiarity of Nazism that a German philosophical fascist such as Dr. Kurt Lewin was compelled to pursue his profession in another country, the United States. The fundamental distinction between the philosophical fascists who remained with the Nazis, and those who left Germany and Austria among the ranks of the refugees, was essentially a matter of the distribution of job opportunities within the fascist philosophical profession globally.

The case of Old Vienna of the late nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth is that no great former center of European culture epitomized so hideously the conditions of national moral decay. Thus, it provided all the ingredients — to the extent that Berlin, for example, did not, nor Frankfurt — favorable to the most execrable intellectual productions.

As Rosa Luxemburg indicated, the Czarist Russian Empire was a paragon of humanist vitality by comparison with the rotting carcasses of the Austrian and Ottoman engrossments. The worst features of British colonial policies were embedded in the Austro-Hungarian Empire's cultural-relativist doctrine of the "concert of nationalities."

Historically, Austria had developed as the southern parallel to Brandenburg and Prussia within the old Holy Roman Empire. It was the *Ostmark* — one of the "marcher lord" duchies, areas of military and colonization operations of the German population against non-German cultures to the east. Later, together with the kingdom of Hungary, it had become the marcher lord bastion against the Ottoman Em-

32. By placing an exclamation point where a question mark was required.

pire's encroachments. As Germany proceeded to collapse and fragment overall, as a result of the erosion and defeat of the Hohenstaufens' role and power, the *Ostmark* emerged from the shambles as the *Österreich* — Austria — and in course of time came under the merged Burgundian-Hapsburg-Castilian house of Hapsburg, and the Hapsburg's patrons, the Fugger-dominated system of powerful monetarist bankers.

In the course of the combined feudal collapse and struggling proto-capitalist emergences of the period from the end of the thirteenth through middle of the seventeenth centuries, and especially from the fifteenth century, this historical freak known as Austria became a major aspect of the growing power of monetarist forces — Italian bankers, the German bankers typified by the south-German Fugger power, the Netherlands bankers, and — following 1688 — growing City of London influences. From the close of the fifteenth century through the middle of the seventeenth, these monetarist powers and their political partners, the bucolic obscenities known as Castile and Hapsburg Austria, were the horror and shame of all European culture, the principal mediating source of every monstrosity European culture endured during that period and has inherited from that time down to the present day.

The Hapsburgs were originally products of that area of south German culture from which they as well as the Hohenzollern and Hohenstaufen houses had originated, an historical curiosity — but not an historical *accident* — which aids the historian in focusing on the divergencies expressed by the histories of the evolution of those houses as they shifted their base of power away from their locations of origin. The sixteenth century Hapsburgs incorporated three ruling houses under the Hapsburg name: the Austrian Hapsburgs, the blight formerly known as the fifteenth century House of Burgundy (Charles the Bold), and the social cancer which the fifteenth century house of Castile-Aragon had become under the evil guidance of Ferdinand. Those latter two added elements of the Hapsburgs played a key part in shaping the history of Europe.

The notable features acquired from Castile-Aragon and Burgundy persist as outstanding characteristics of the Austrian Hapsburgs and Old Vienna down to the days of the Adlers, von Mises, the "energeticists" around Ernest Mach, Rudolf Hilferding, and Parvus sub-agents N. Bukharin and Riazanov. They account, on the one side for the presence of such positive features of Vienna as Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert, and Hugo Wolf. They account for such fruitful personalities as Ludwig Boltzmann and Erwin Schrödinger. They account for the moral tragedy of the gifted but

intellectually aborted Gustav Mahler. They account for the evil represented by Arnold Schönberg, the Vienna Circle, and the appropriateness of Old Vienna of the 1920s and early 1930s as the headquarters for the Rockefeller-created and always fascist-headed Interpol organization.

Charles V, the first Hapsburg monarch of Spain and the poor fool the Fugger's finance put into the post of Holy Roman Emperor, was a creature pathetically ruled by his conceptually petty (if grandiose) dynastic delusions. He was intellectually only slightly above a modern scion of John D. Rockefeller II. He was therefore more easily ruled by the cabal of monetarist bankers, led by his patron, the Fugger house, who controlled the skyrocketing Hapsburg debt, and the spigot of credit through which Charles's dynastic enterprises were molded.

It is the Burgundian and Castilian features of the Hapsburg character which are notably relevant, as *differentia specifica*, to the Hapsburg side of Hapsburg policy in general and in Austria in particular.

The fifteenth century House of Burgundy controlled the portions of (principally) France and Switzerland then known as Burgundy proper, and also had dynastic control over Alsace-Lorraine and parts of the Netherlands. The special character of the Burgundian palace was its sharp contrast between the bestiality of its nobility and the magnificence of the predominantly Flemish paintings and musical culture, which decorated the palace in accompaniment to the swinish gustatory festivities of the anachronistic Burgundian nobility and knighthood. The military and political characteristics of the fifteenth century Burgundian rule were a monstrous parody of the worst heritages from the feudal order at the beginning of the millenium. Under Charles the Bold — so known for the hideous aroma of his morality — the most precious cultural accomplishments of humanist Europe were "patronized" not as art, but as some mere Rockefeller of today patronizes and exhibits an art for whose value — apart from market-price — he has neither knowledge nor capacity of perception.

The hideous things done to and by Spain during the sixteenth century were not the inventions of Charles V or his psychologically unbalanced son, Philip II. They were the resulting Fuggery of the Hapsburg inheritance of the Castilian institutions molded by the wily Ferdinand of Aragon — the grandson of a converted Jew who launched the Spanish inquisition against the Jews.

Prior to Ferdinand's successful manipulation of his own marriage to Isabella — and the systematic elimination of Isabella's siblings from succession to the throne of Castile — Spain's ruling social strata were roughly assorted into cultured merchant and



Dionysos, ancient god of wine, and modern symbol of the nominalist and Tory world outlook, shown with female worshippers on an Attic vase of the fifth century BC.

noble families, reflecting the positive influences of Moorish and humanist culture and thought, and a backward, anachronistic assortment of bestial creatures who formed the hard core of the Castilian *Reconquista*. Under Ferdinand, not only were the existing agricultural and proto-industrial-capitalist achievements of Spain looted, principally to meet the debt-service obligations on funding the *Reconquista*, but this disgusting atavistic parody of feudalism known as the *Reconquista* was built into the savage force which, complemented by the intensification of the bestial Inquisition, destroyed the internal economy and culture of Spain and many other countries under Spanish control, to the point that the healing of those wounds has not yet been completed in many of the areas to the present day. *Ferdinand of Aragon ranks as perhaps more evil than Adolf Hitler*

in the properly written annals of modern history. It was the Castilian institutions assembled and set into motion by the evil Ferdinand which made the name of Hapsburg Spain so justly, so profoundly despised by every informed person of conscience from that day to the present . . . especially those of Spanish cultural descent.

Charles V, the focus of a kind of animal cross-breeding of the pedigrees of Austria, Burgundy, and Castile, bequeathed to his house's immediate posterity the institutional qualities thus dragged in with the dynastic bedroom antics. This was the dynastic self-image which settled upon Vienna, and remained there even after Richelieu and Mazarin undertook to resume remedial actions left undone by Louis XI.

As Christopher White details the crucial problems

involved, Richelieu and Mazarin moved in the right direction, as did Colbert more emphatically and with profoundly better understanding after them. Unfortunately, the subsidence of the Fuggers and the collapse of Antwerp, while eminently deserved and useful in itself, merely produced the continuation of the monetarist problem in the personages of the Amsterdam bankers. The plague of monetarism undermined the English Commonwealth — attacking from Cromwell's blind side — eroded England under the Restoration Stuarts, and directly took over the British throne with the accession of the morally decayed House of Orange. The continuity of Austria's relationships to European monetarist power persisted throughout these institutional adjustments.

In the "x-rated" intimate relations between the monetarists and ducal and royal bucolics, the titled obscenities depended upon the monetarist financiers for their debts and the additional credit for dynastic enterprises. The financiers depended, in turn on the "patents" and analogous privileges through which to pursue their interests within sundry domains, and upon the functions of the debtor potentate as an armed debt-service collector. This arrangement interlocked the two weirdly-mated creatures in a special sort of political-economic symbiosis. The atavistic political and social features of the dynastic order became the internalized self-interest of the financiers.

The case of Hapsburg Austria epitomizes the political basis for the emergence of what later became the geopolitical doctrine. The heritage of Hapsburg rule led, subsequently, to the lawfully developed pre-conditions most favorable to the special form of philosophical fascism suppurating from within the ranks and peripheral orbit of the "Vienna Circle."

Economically and politically, the alliance of bucolic relics and monetarist financiers reduced the definition of nations to the same "geometry" confronted in the infantile mind's heteronomic fantasy-perception of family and family-orbited relationships. (33) Nations, to this infantile outlook, have no acknowledged significant internal qualities but those required for the fantasy scenario. The mental outlook of the monetarist financier is comparable to pre-adolescent girls playing with a set of dolls, building a doll-play scenario. The result is broadly analogous to a kind of "pluralist" or "social contract" image of nations, in which the monetarist-aristocratic agreement is the underlying active element of the "contract" involved. Heteronomic nations' qualities are deemed those of

agreeableness or disagreeableness to the purposes of the "contract." Once the active principle — the ground rent principle — is put out of view, and one then attempts to account for the order determined by the ground-rent-generated policies, the reductionist approach to describing that abstracted order is the *geopolitical doctrine*.

The lawful complement to the metaphysical doctrine of geopolitics is *cultural relativism*. Formally, cultural relativism is pure empiricism: it is moral indifference respecting the internal qualities of cultures as modes of attempted realization of vital human interests. The practice of British foreign policy, most emphatically beginning with William Pitt the Younger, was defined in the reactionary Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* — a feature of that book which luridly exposes the dishonest motives governing its overall elaboration of contents. The conflict between the institutions of industrial progress and semi-republicanism which the British urban classes predominantly prized for England and Scotland, were totally out of correspondence with the conscious foreign policies of the British government. The stench of Pitt's adopting the potentate of Zanzibar as the "British agent of influence" for the East African littoral, the restoration of collapsing relics of barbarism throughout the colonies and semi-colonies, are exemplary of the immorality of British foreign policy. The attempted justification of propping up such hideous relics with aid of British naval and other forces is the practical basis for the doctrine of "cultural relativism."

The odious foreign policies practiced by Pitt and defended by Adam Smith — the foreign policies against which we fought our American Revolution — were turned, by reaction formation, into the doctrine of cultural relativism in the same way that nominalist heteronomy is transformed into fascism. It is not surprising that all fascist philosophy and political doctrines are axiomatically cultural relativist — doctrines of the axiomatically genetic or cultural-traditional determination of "national characteristics" and "racial characteristics."

The ground-rent outlook projects into the view of nations a quality which the reductionist metaphysician purports to discover in that nation once the fact of the ground-rent determination has been ignored.

Since the monetarist denies *in governing policy* that technological progress is the source of wealth, he interprets all aspects of economy from the standpoint of ground rent.

This point of view was systematically articulated by the rabidly pro-feudalist current among the eighteenth century French Physiocrats, who interpreted *absolute profit* as ground rent and attributed it to metaphysical qualities in nature taken as a fixed domain of

33. A clinical study of the Rockefeller family meetings during the lifetime of John D. II, including the kinds of clinically significant influences contributed by the boys' mother. Abby, would be instructive to similar effect.

fixed categories of primary resources. This is also the same rabidly pro-feudalist outline expressed by the Club of Rome's "Limits of Growth" quackery, and the axiomatic thesis upon which the ill-conceived National Environmental Policy Act has been transformed by complicit courts into a systematic destruction of the United States' most vital internal interests.

The concept of ground rent is characterized by a correspondingly feudal-throwback definition of primary resources. The economic approach of monetarists to industry and agriculture, as well as to the development of the labor force, is also brought under the same *consistent* ground-rent interpretations. The economic quality and material interests of nations are, *consistently*, defined according to the "economic geography" of a ground-rent interpretation of primary and analogously defined resources.

British colonialism thus produced and required the following notable ideological characteristics: (1) a broad, categorical denial that the Idea of Progress reflected any necessary or proper positive principle; (2) the doctrine of cultural relativism; (3) the projection of the doctrine of ground rent to the conceptions of the determining interests represented by "economic geography." This was complementary to the little girls' doll-playing approach to the principles of foreign policy, the notion of a "concert of powers." The powers were defined as embodying a heteronomic combination of political (national cultural peculiarities) and material (economic geographical) essential points of self-interest, and an *inductively-defined* common interest in the perpetuation of the "game" defined in the doll-playing scenario termed the "concert of forces."

This same hideous, infantile geopolitical-concert doctrine, which is the essence of Roosevelt's (Lippmann's) Atlantic Doctrine, was otherwise the internal doctrine of the Hapsburg Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Hapsburg monarchy, and its immediate bureaucracy, was the reified instrument, the political "concert" made flesh. Vienna, otherwise part of the Austrian nation, was at the same time predominantly something superimposed upon Austria, the nesting place of the supra-Austrian Hapsburg imbecility. Otherwise, the Empire was not a nation, but was predominantly anti-assimilationist in its political, cultural, and economic policies. The only commonality of this Hapsburg Imperial bestiary of nationalities on exhibit was the Hapsburg "concert of power" itself: the concert of ground rent, the concert of the Imperial Army, the concert of the superimposed Imperial bureaucracy.

A lapsed-time movement of consciousness from the fifteenth century stench of the gustatory revels of Burgundian Charles the Bold's court, to end of the

eighteenth century Vienna must evoke a cry of "Déjà vu!" On the walls of the Burgundian palace hung many of the greatest humanist paintings of that time; the great Orlando di Lasso and his peers were obliged to perform for this miserably boorish audience. In Vienna, around the Hapsburg imbecility, one hears Mozart — whom the city fathers of Vienna consciously and systematically murdered by economic measures — Beethoven from Bonn, the looted artistic treasures of Italy, and so forth and so on. The Hapsburg bestiality collected living art the way a pathetic Nelson Rockefeller collects pre-Columbian relics, a John D. Rockefeller III oriental art, and a David Rockefeller beetles.

Stupid Napoleon Bonaparte, who had the power to do better, omitted eradication of the Hapsburg obscenity during his conquest of Vienna. Napoleon urinated upon the imperatives of history; he established thus a policy which led fatefully to the crushing of not only Napoleonic France, but the potentialities of both the French nation and of all of continental Europe. Napoleon had learned nothing essential from Gresham, Bodin, Richelieu, Mazarin, and Colbert, nothing from the rich, crucial-experimental experience of the American Revolution. Napoleon's stupidity, and London's power and guile, enabled the propped-up Hapsburg corpse to lurch on throughout the nineteenth century.

The end of this Hapsburg cancer of European political life became visible in the wake of 1848. By then, the House of Rothschild was fully in charge of the history of continental Europe, a point of no minor importance in the subsequent course of internal Austrian and Viennese history.

Baron James Rothschild, to whose despicable person we have had occasion to allude earlier, cannot be said to have overlooked the pseudo-feudal cultural tradition acquired with his branch's acquisition of an aristocratic title. It may be emphasized without exaggeration that the entire Rothschild crew were obsessive freaks on the subject of acquiring aristocratic titles. Nathan's branch in Great Britain placed the gaining of a title (through Lord John Russell, the wicked grandfather of the evil Bertrand) only second to looting the British economy of ground rent. Having bought and paid for Austria's Metternich (and a Metternich mistress provided by the Rothschilds), they had no difficulty in satisfying such desires for the Austrian branch. The German (Frankfurt am Main) branch gained a sort of aristocratic dignity through Rothschild protégé Bismarck — although some *gründlich* Prussian bureaucrat "tainted" the honor by omitting the standard cross, creating a special *Hofjuden* branch of the order in question.

The conduct of Baron James in the case of Heinrich

Heine affords a foretaste of the Rothschild, and later Rockefeller practices toward talented scientists and other intellectuals in Europe (and elsewhere) generally. The Rothschilds and Rockefellers collected people the way a *nouveau riche* Mrs. Malaprop collects art objects. This is most relevant to the cases of the Frankfurt School's founding, and the influences of financial and related patronage operating in decaying Old Vienna.

Heinrich Heine, one of Germany's greatest intellects, and its greatest poet, was born to a well-to-do Jewish family of Hamburg, incidentally notable for its association with the London-connected Hamburg House of Salomon Heine. Living in exile in Paris, Heine attracted the lust of Baron James, who was obviously determined to have the great poet by hook or crook — employing both deplorable methods to secure this goal.

Heine was entitled to a legacy, which, had he received it as was his due, would have enabled him to function independent of corrupting influences of patronage. Baron James, sensible of this potential obstacle to his desire, used his influence with the management of Salomon Heine to block Heinrich's receipt of such sums, and added the influence of the Hamburg Heine family to push Heinrich into the patronage of Baron James. Even Heine's ironical insults of Baron James before other guests in the Baron's house, did not enable Heinrich to escape the desire of the unwanted patron.

Hence, permitting himself to be snared by this Rothschild scenario, the great Heinrich Heine ebbed inevitably into the moral decay and self-repudiation which characterized his miserable last years of life.

Some foretaste of the nature of the moral decay of nineteenth century Old Vienna was exhibited in London circles of the beginning of that century, in the degeneration of English poets — and poetry, and the reception given to Beethoven's music during the period of its initial presentations there.

England has — not accidentally — not produced a decent composer since the deaths of Purcell and William Byrd, subsisting thereafter by importing (principally) German musicians. (34) During the period Monteverdi, Buxtehude, Schütz, and Bach were effecting a sweeping revolution in music — never to be superseded significantly in fundamentals except by Beethoven himself, English music and poetry, which had been the cream of European culture during the Tudor period, briefly resurging during the seventeenth century, plunged into decay. Dryden, Pope, and

their logical outcome, David Hume's Hannoverian Scottish empiricism, were on the order of the day. English poetry recovered slightly, once again, in an outburst of what was then a kind of neo-classicism typified by Keats and Shelley, but excepting that aborted episode in English literature, the British culture was overall on the way downhill.

The literary code for the decay in British cultural morality was a radical interpretation of a widely circulated sixteenth-century Italian booklet entitled "The Courtier." In opposition to the profoundly impassioned "conception of man and nature" which Shelley properly attributed to the periods of the Tudors and Milton, the British "uppah clawsses" affected a rabidly amoral diffidence — a stiff upper lip, presumably as compensation for lack of function in other aspects of the person. The flatulent stench of dilettantism respecting everything but power and collection of ground rent, became the preferred posture of an eminently respectable personage. Art should be "clever," "witty" (in the deplorable sense of that term), "amusing," and broadly achieve approval as a "nice little effort" — but it must not violate the principle of psychological distance which rabid dilettantism prescribed. One is therefore not astonished by the banality of the published criticisms of Beethoven's works by the London press of the early nineteenth century.

Granted, even the aristocratic dilettante often had strong concealed passions concerning power and ground-rent matters, but even in those few intense, bestial preoccupations, it was preferred form to pretend to be bored even by one's own obsessive ambitions. There is happily a lawfully determined undercurrent of "American Whiggery" in the British people — as the Rockefellers have lately noted with dismay — but it was formerly considered obligatory to suppress such tendencies as "lower class" egregiousness.

The influence of City of London-centered finance in reinforcing the already bestial impulses radiating from the Hapsburg relic were accelerated by the circumstances following 1848.

After the 1848-1850 period, the influential, rich intellectual life of pre-1848 German culture overall almost collapsed. Intellectual life retreated from all areas of inquiry but production and the physical sciences. It was this, which was not only a German phenomenon, which produced the now century-old myth of the dichotomy between science and politics. As we have noted, the monetarist faction never adopted such a distinction. The monetarists rightly regarded science as the political enemy of monetarism, because of its crucial function in promoting the Idea of Progress. Just as the rabid Carter Administration so recently attempted to negotiate a halt to fur-

34. Just as English painting looted Italy.

ther necessity for internal scientific progress in the USA and Western Europe, by demanding that the Soviets agree to halt militarily relevant scientific progress, the Rothschilds and Rockefellers have attempted to check science by various means, including cooptation and control of leading scientists through the sort of patronage Baron James Rothschild imposed upon Heinrich Heine. The credulous victims of the monetarists, however, submitted to the delusion that science and philosophy had been somehow separated on proper grounds of principle.

The efforts of the Ernst Mach-linked "energeticists" to demoralize Ludwig Boltzmann, and the hideous campaign against Boltzmann's student Erwin Schrödinger by the foul pack of scientist-mercenary consciences led by Niels Bohr, are exemplary of what was in progress in late-nineteenth century and early twentieth century Old Vienna.

The intellectual belongs sociologically to the petit-bourgeois stratum. A descendant of the feudal intellectual, the intellectual in capitalist society functions (exists) modally as a house servant of either the state, the industries, finance, commerce, or the labor movement. The exemplary intellectual institutions, the universities and research foundations, typify that "house servant" status.

The contrasting great potential of the intellectual — unlike the ordinary petit-bourgeois — is that, at best, his circumstances and requirements of training oblige him properly to tend to develop an overview of society in its totality, both in extent and historically. Occasionally, in exercising such qualifications, he or she may rise to positions of great executive power or related influence in industry, government or other institutions, and may otherwise develop a practical independent basis for personal identity in scientific work. Historically, as with the intellectuals who created the American Revolution and established the Constitution and republic, the essential interdependency between science and practical political-economic affairs are blended into a practical expression of their proper commonality, as the epistemological outlook of humanism.


Without such practical qualifications, the petit-bourgeois qualities of Uriah-Heepish house servants of patrons and employers predominate. Without experiencing scientific development in ideas and practice, the petit-bourgeois exists under the most contemptible of psycho-social circumstances, relative to the skilled worker, technology-proud farmer, or industrialist.

Short of outright fascism, Old Vienna epitomizes the worst of all possible moral influences for intellectual life. The prevailing Hapsburg culture embodied in the extreme: *antipathy to Progress; ground-rent-determined forms of reductionism in respect of political and social relations; rabid cultural relativism; and the infantile fantasy-life outlook* lawfully reflected in the banality of Viennese Operettas. There was no belief in universal law, but only degenerate-Aristotelian habits, habits themselves in aggravated moral decay. With the eruption of "energeticism," science was being turned into an immoral parody of itself. Musicians struggled to perpetuate a culture without the moral outlook indispensable either to fruitful original composition, or even a competent performer's insight into existing musical compositions from a more fruitful past. As Boltzmann, Schrödinger, and the musicologist Schenker epitomize, as the abortive efforts of Gustav Mahler and Sigmund Freud epitomize, the people of Vienna were not yet uniformly morally dead overall, but the advanced decay of a culture that had lost all purpose for existing was sweeping over the majority like a moral bubonic epidemic.

In the effort to rationalize this stink of the moral graveyard into Voltaire-Candide's "best of all possible worlds," decayed British-Viennese nominalism performed the act of reaction formation which pronounced moral imbecility a virtue, and thus established logical positivism and its cognates as a doctrine of philosophical fascism.

It was the effluvia of this rotting intellectual culture of Old Vienna which the Rockefellers transplanted, one nesting pair of Vienna and Vienna-oriented emigres into each crucially situated university in the United States, there to act like cholera cultures, to spread their specific forms of philosophical fascism into every branch of liberal arts and even into the physical sciences themselves. This intellectual pus from Old Vienna, abetted by similar moral refuse from the pre-1933 Rothschild-founded and Rockefeller-funded Frankfurt School of Karl Korsch circles, is presently the hegemonic current throughout academic and other institutionalized aspects of the liberal arts professions in the United States.

It is through the positive infection with this vile doctrine and its derivatives that an increasing proportion of our nation's professionals, and the liberals they influence, have been transformed into shock-troops for fascist ideologies throughout the pores of our leading institutions.



Benjamin Franklin, the founder of our country.

**THE NEW
FEDERALIST
FOREIGN POLICY**

At the outset of this policy analysis, we employed the Lippmann 1943-1944 *U.S. Foreign Policy and U.S. War Aims* as a most appropriate axis of reference for examining the implication of the Atlanticist Doctrine, and for identifying the fraud upon which the enunciation and rationalization of that doctrine have been necessarily premised throughout the present century since the reign of Colonel House and his mouthpiece Woodrow Wilson.

We illustrated, in terms of the strongest practical relevance, the fact that the point has been reached at which it is no longer permissible to regard the Atlanticist Doctrine merely as a grave error. The Atlanticist Doctrine is, as we have demonstrated, the imposition of the special interest of a relatively tiny cabal of lower Manhattan-centered financier interests upon our nation, an imposition contrary to our nation's most vital interests, and which is in treasonous subversion of the constitutional principles upon which our republic was founded.

Yet, despite that wicked subversion of our vital interests and institutions, it might have appeared in earlier times that we could have tolerated this usurpation as England so long tolerated the similar subversion of its institutions from the 1660-1688 period onwards.

We have shown that the outer limits of toleration have been far surpassed. The spokesmen for the Atlanticist faction, who have stolen our nation's Executive Branch and subverted our federal courts, are committed to keeping our nation on a collision course toward early, suicidal catastrophes. The most obvious of those catastrophes is the growing imminence of a general thermonuclear war with the Warsaw Pact nations, a war in which the first day's extinction of between 160 and 180 million estimated citizens epitomizes a virtual extinction of the United States as a functioning nation. That war danger is by no means the only principal catastrophe to be considered. The interests grouped for the moment around David Rockefeller are committed to the effort to attempt to secure a relatively short period of postponement of their insoluble bankruptcy, by putting both the United States and the entirety of the "non-Communist world" through a hideous form of bankruptcy-liquidation proceedings — systematically grinding down and scraping our productive capabilities, reducing the majority of the human race to a brutalized rubble, in the effort to afford David Rockefeller and his associates the proceeds of the sale of scrap.

The Rockefeller "environmentalist" policy — a policy of slashing energy consumption and general closing down of the world's industrial and agricultural potential — can only create in a relatively short time conditions on a global scale analogous to those which produced the genocidal famine and epidemics of

fourteenth century central Europe — a global biological catastrophe during the course of the 1980s whose consequences would be far, far worse than even those of a general thermonuclear war. If we unleash the destruction of industrial development potentialities, and at the same time impose a hyperinflationary austerity upon the savaged general populations of the OECD and developing nations, the conditions of biological depletion of human and livestock populations, the low-technology depletion of agriculture, will produce successive waves of famines, epidemics and sylvatic diseases which, in the absence of massive industrial production to correct this, will probably lead to the early extinction of most of the human species and generate irreversible biospherical conditions ending the possibility of future human life on this planet.

These facts are so obvious, as facts, to persons and circles advantaged to know as the Rockefellers are, that we can no longer tolerate either the Rockefeller-centered Atlanticists, or the illusion that they represent merely another wicked oppressor of the sort our race has known and tolerated too often during the past. The policies which the Rockefellers and their allies are pursuing obsessively are contrary even to the most vital human interests of the Rockefellers and their immediate allies, not only for the long run, but for the immediate future. *It is no longer admissible to regard the Atlanticists merely as wicked; they are collectively insane.*

That latter fact obliged us to go behind the immediate facts compelling such a conclusion. In light of the decades over which the majority of this nation — including forces adequate to have stopped the Atlanticists long before this — tolerated Atlanticist rule, we must account both for the obsessive irrationality of the Atlanticists and the processes which impelled the rest of us to tolerate Atlanticist rule for so long. It has been indispensable to locate those vicious weaknesses in ourselves which account for the perpetuation of Atlanticist rule; unless we recognize and remove those chains upon our will, we, our nation, will soon die.

Since our urgent objective is to bring an end to Atlanticist policy, the rule by the Atlanticists must be ended to accomplish that. *Who, then, shall rule?* A new policy, a new governing political force must be promptly instituted.

The same background considerations which exposed the reasons for the Atlanticists' collective insanity and the nature of our self-degrading toleration established the firm basis for positing the alternative policies and the specifications of the new ruling political forces we urgently require at this immediate juncture.

In such an undertaking, it would have been contemptible to presume that the solution to those pro-

found issues which have perplexed so many for so long might be solved with the addition of a few popular platitudes to an array of superficially interpreted facts. Nor could the required analysis be accomplished even by well-meaning, dedicated and intelligent people on a moment's notice. It could be done only in the tradition of Benjamin Franklin, who dedicated decades of self-development respecting the vital issues of that age, decades of constant political and scientific efforts in that committed direction, to bring forth the coherent set of principles and collaborators through which the American Revolution was undertaken and fought, and our Constitution and republic established.

That observation is indispensable to a proper political insight into the propriety of our preceding coherent interweaving of science, constitutional law, theology, and historical evidence, to expose the roots of the impulses which divide our population between a Whig majority centered around industrialists, trade unionists and technology-proud farmers on the one side, and a wicked and insane Tory minority of monetarists, liberals and radicals on the other. (35)

It is proper to state, in the same connection, that humble Uriah Heeps make successful embezzlers, but they could never amount to anything useful in political crises. The unique position of advantage enjoyed by the present writer in this indispensable present undertaking is indeed unique and that special competence is not accidental.

This writer has been enabled to supply the vitally needed contributions included in this policy study because he has consciously prepared himself and his immediate associates for this kind of task over a period of twenty years, and because he was advantaged to make such an undertaking by the special benefits contributed to him by both an American family and the Whiggish influences imparted to him by the American refraction of European culture in general. (36)

In the tradition of — yes! — Thomas Aquinas, Roger Bacon, Marsilio Ficino, Thomas Gresham, Johannes Kepler, Jean Bodin, René Descartes, and Benjamin Franklin, *this writer* — drawing upon the massive

augmentation of resources contributed by his associates — *is defining what United States policy and its ruling political force must be.*

He is doing what a competent President of the United States ought to be doing under the present circumstances. The obligation of national leaders — whether as President or in the alternate position presently occupied by this writer — *is to lead, as Benjamin Franklin led.* That is the essence of the institutions and instruments of a constitutional republic.

To lead is not to cultivate cheap and easy popular agreement through demagogic posturing according to the winds of superficial currents of popular opinion. A President whose addresses and policies are shaped by Gallup or Harris polls, the contrived public opinion of the *Washington Post*, *New York Times* or *Newsweek*, or last night's television news broadcasts, is unfit for election to the honorable office of dogcatcher. To lead is to fulfill the vital interests of a nation with respect to the most rigorously shaped foresight into the immediate and longer-term consequences of policies, actions, and inactions. A leader must be, in that sense, a "philosopher king" — with the qualification that we Whigs abhor anything smelling of monarchy.

For the obligations of leadership, the knowledge that is required is not properly defined by what accidents of current opinion portray as sufficient knowledge. The required knowledge is that knowledge indispensable for effectively forecasting the consequences of alternate approaches to the characteristic problems of that nation and the world in that time. Heretofore, over this century, the standard of required knowledge has been defined in terms of de facto acquiescence to the national and world order resulting from the consolidation of Atlanticist rule over this nation. The accepted standards of knowledge have correlated with a toleration of treason, and a fateful downhill slide into our present national and global predicaments.

During the preceding two decades, this writer was of a different persuasion in elaborated outlook than most of our nation's leading circles. He foresaw the lawful course of a developing disaster, and forecast that process of crisis in terms which have been entirely vindicated by the subsequent two decades' developments. Although the writer's starting-point was that commitment to the Idea of Progress which he shared, as a governing impulse, with a majority of his fellow citizens, the unfolding disaster and the further experience of its lawful developments demonstrated that such fellow Whigs were not employing, and to a significant degree, did not possess, the perception of kinds of knowledge indispensable to seeing through and correcting a process leading to disaster. Hence, the divergence between the fact that his actions were

35. It is not the writer's disposition to be such a weak-livered opportunist that he would avoid giving public credit to Vice-President Spiro Agnew for adopting the "silent majority" outlook. Agnew may have been wrong in various things, but not in that perception.

36. It is the correct, but too often misunderstood corollary of that same point that *what* is said is inseparable from *who* is saying it, and that the relationship is reciprocal: *who* determines *what* is said, but *what* is said defines the *who*. Everything stated to an important point expresses an autobiography, but the practical implications of what is stated is the meaning of the autobiographical content. Everything significant has a history which caused it; to understand the causal processes expressed by history means to understand the significance of its outcome.

premised upon the same Whig impulses and implicit goals as a majority of his fellow citizens and the separation between his policy opinions and those of the overwhelming majority.

Fortunately, in consequence of an appropriate fusion of the religious and scientific commitments transmitted into his early development, his sense of personal identity was premised in the moral certainties of knowledge rather than the heteronomic seductions of prevailing opinions. Consequently, the commitment to develop the necessary knowledge through which to realize the Whig impulse became for him a governing and impassioned commitment.

In the course of this past two decades, approximately a decade ago, this personal effort was extended into the development of an association built predominantly of gifted young people who typified the intellectual cream of our nation's young adults of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Since 1973, the extraordinary qualities of personal character and creative intellectual achievement embodied in that broader association brought the writer and his associates into increasing contiguity and later collaborative discussions with leading circles in our nation and abroad. This latter process, paralleling and interrelated with our deepening influence with broad layers of our nation's working people, farmers, and accomplished scientists, shaped the U.S. Labor Party and its associated activities into a significant political institution both in our nation and abroad.

During the period from the spring of 1975, and especially during the last months of 1976, the U.S. Labor Party became in fact an integral part of an imminent Whig coalition of anti-Atlanticist majority forces within the United States. That coalition, now approximately at the threshold of coming into being, represents the identifiable characteristic strata we have already noted to this effect: conservative Republican and Democratic parties' Whigs, political Whigs outside those parties, the major trade-union forces, technology-proud farmers, the black and hispanic working Americans who justly aspire to full participation in a new wave of accelerated technological progress, scientists and engineers who wish to be scientists and engineers in fact, industrialists committed to rebuilding the nation and the world with the instrument of the "high technology" which we, the other OECD nations, and the CMEA nations jointly represent.

The special historic obligation of the U.S. Labor Party at this juncture is to provide those conceptions which afford appropriate unity of policy and effort to the Whig coalition which must become the *new Federalist movement*, the ruling political force of our republic. The U.S. Labor Party, like Benjamin Franklin, like the initiating founders of our nation, must

unite the Whigs by connecting the purpose embedded in Whig impulses to that national policy which represents a conscious and efficient realization of such a common implicit purpose.

That historic obligation has become a reality — rather than only a potentiality — through the experience of the months from August of last year to the present time. Those various Republican, Democrat, trade-union, industrialist and other American Whigs, who as late as last December still regarded the U.S. Labor Party's evaluation of the Carter danger as exaggerated, have increasingly professed themselves astonished by the precision with which the Labor Party forecast the monstrosity now emanating from the Rockefeller's captive Carter Administration and the federal courts. This, combined with the impulsion of a desperately bankrupt David Rockefeller to violate the thresholds of countervailing reaction to his evil demands, has situated the Labor Party in circumstances of whose precedents in our nation's history we are so visibly sensible.

The long-simmering renewed battle between American Whig and American Tory now verges upon the threshold of an irrepressible conflict. The quality of crisis which breaks through the lag in historical developments, the crisis which makes the knowledge of irrepressible conflict sensuous to broader forces, is now upon us. Unless we defeat the Carter energy, hyperinflationary austerity, and related foreign policies, our nation will die — either by thermonuclear holocaust or biological catastrophe. The trip-wire of fateful, irreversible decision has been struck. Now we must move — or die.

The nation must move with the U.S. Labor Party — or die mewling in its own cowardice.

The writer does not know in advance what exact consequences that will have for the future status of the Labor Party itself. He does not know, for example, whether the Whig coalition will elect him to the Presidency, or on what precise basis that possibility might occur if it were to occur. What is certain is that the Whig coalition must quickly become the ruling political force — and that that includes a congressional action modeled in a legal sense upon the inelegant precedent of the Tories' own "Watergate" caper. The powers of the Congress are the vital constitutional bastion remaining to us to save the nation, a Congress which in turn must be moved in adequate proportions by a mobilized Whig electorate. In this course of events, respecting the Labor Party we only know with certainty that we are a key initiating intellectual political force in catalyzing the necessary policies and instruments into being.

The key to that present, vital historic obligation of the U.S. Labor Party is the developed body of ap-

appropriate knowledge represented in the preceding sections of this present policy study. That conceptual overview — or, at least the essence of it — represents the necessary fresh and freshly enlarged expression of our humanist, American Whig heritage, which is in turn the indispensable foundation in knowledge for the criticism and shaping of our policies and instruments. It is for this present crisis-point that that body of knowledge was developed, and it is in the process of developing that knowledge — principally through the mediating role of the writer and his associates — that that knowledge has been shaped into the form appropriate to the specific needs of this crisis as this crisis has in fact developed.

That is nothing but a fresh illustration of the principles of scientific progress in general, and an illustration of the proper course of real politics. It is *the understanding and exercise of true, lawful freedom by the creative individual, through the broadening of concerted efforts of creative personalities, that the discovery, transmission, and assimilation for informed willful practice of necessary enlargement of the body of knowledge is accomplished.*

The foreign and domestic policies of the United States have only one admissible axiomatic basis: *the fundamental interest of humanity is expressed by technological progress as the common policy of a world composed of sovereign, viable republics.*

The practical expression of that single axiomatic premise is those measures which are appropriate to a twofold resolution to, *first, positively, foster the fulfillment of that principle, and, second, to contain and check the contrary impulses of persons and nations insofar as such wrong impulses threaten the fulfillment of that policy in our nation or globally.*

Those coherent precepts of principle and practice must be established as policy and understood as the governing interpretation and original intent of our constitutional law.

That policy and law is elaborated in two respects. First, our people, our institutions, and other nations must be informed of the proper implications of our usage of the terms “technological progress” and “sovereign, viable republics.” Second, we must situate that outlook, that method, that policy, that fundamental principle of law, in respect of the present and forecastable national and global circumstances to which that policy, that law is to be presently applied.

The central feature commonly underlying the notions of “technological progress” and “sovereign, viable republics,” is the notion of *political freedom* peculiar to the neo-platonic humanist tradition inclusively embedded in the establishment of our own republic. Although this rigorous notion of *freedom* governs our conduct respecting those liberties proper-

ly associated with *toleration*, our notions of *freedom* and *toleration* are respectively distinct, in no sense interchangeable notions in the application of policy and law.

Freedom is rigorously defined as that process of self-development and expression of the kinds of creative potentialities within each human individual which are popularly typified by great scientific discoveries. It is the discovery, transmission, and assimilation of willful impulses of useful practice of new knowledge on the initiative of creative individuals, which is the positive expression and content of freedom, and it is that power of creative advancement which the law must foster and for whose expression it must provide appropriate liberties.

The complement of the notion of freedom is *science*. From the standpoint of law, new *knowledge* is not any sort of novelty which may erupt from this or that individual. There are rigorous, accessible, empirical proofs which absolutely distinguish nonsensical or destructive novelties from fruitful advances in the direction of human knowledge for practice.

These methods of proof, although rigorous and certain, involve the difficulty of principle that it is not possible for a nation and its relevant institutions to predetermine in every case the soundness or unsoundness of a novelty at the point of its first presentation. Although scientific knowledge enables us to pre-locate the *areas* for new, fruitful conceptions for practice in such a way as to exclude obvious nonsense and evil, within those pre-locatable areas of fruitful new developments, *the law does not and must not intrude*. Hence, in respect of novel ideas and practices, the law defines areas of *toleration*, which become the domain of corresponding individual and related *liberties*.

Toleration has two proper objectives. Since the basis for the positive expression of freedom by the individual is self-development, and not obedience, individual and related behavior known to be wrong and even potentially intolerable if broadly extended, is tolerated *within limits*. The guiding principle is the same one appropriate to the rearing of infants, children and adolescents. We tolerate as much as the public interest can practically endure. This does not signify that we withhold efficient criticisms, or that we do not express preferences in practical ways. This extends to our discrimination among crimes, misdemeanors, and civil offenses.

Whereas we tolerate, concerning immature citizens and erring adults, to allow for implied opportunities for self-development, our toleration (liberties) respecting ideas and practices representing new knowledge concerning forms of behavior and policy has a different view. Society is obliged, in its own vital interest, to discover which innovations have merit. This

requires not only communication of new ideas as ideas, but explorations of ideas in terms of practice. Hence, while society tolerates *negatively* a certain amount of *known sin*, it tolerates *positively* in those areas of innovative activity, *new ideas*, set aside for the initiation and initial testing of discoveries. The positive content of this aspect of toleration is exemplified by the propriety of funding scientific and analogous researches whose specific practical outcome is yet unknown. The indicated competence of the effort is the basis for defining the scope of the area of toleration and privilege.

The lawful definition of technological progress cannot be blind to the thermodynamic interpretation of the secular trends of human technological progress from the Pleistocene to date. We know, and the law would be morally imbecilic if it professed to evade the authority of such facts, that human progress depends upon the following interdependent thermodynamically described conditions.

It is an established historical fact that the notion of an existing spectrum of essential primary and related resources, including man-made improvements in nature, is determined by the mode of productive and related technology prevailing in each immediate epoch of society's development. If the technological mode is fixed at any preestablished level, the mere continued existence of a society in that fixed or approximately fixed mode must lead to a relative depletion of primary and man-made resources, leading toward the material and social decay of that society.

The immediate, overall feature of human progress is therefore necessarily those advances in the prevailing mode of technology which, in effect, increase what is conventionally termed the "reducing power" of the society with respect to the existing condition of nature as a whole. This is expressed by an increase in the average per capita energy flux through both production and household and related forms of consumption.

This increase in what is conventionally understood to be the relative negentropy of a society relative to its preceding, lower average technological level, increases the required rate of negentropic further development.

This rate of potential increase in negentropy is expressed in capitalist and socialist political forms of industrialized development in terms of the *absolute profit* of national and global industrial and agricultural production.

This profitable portion of industrial and agricultural production is represented by the comparison of the industrial and agricultural tangible and productive-labor cost-inputs of production with the mass of product resulting, as output, from production, on con-

dition that the produced product is consumed in turn as inputs to the same effect for new production of at least the same negentropic efficiency. The balance of input-costs and output-product in those terms, measured in respect to national and global economies taken as a whole, is the absolute profit.

It is the "investment" of at least the major portion of that absolute profit in the enlargement and technological advancement of the productive process which transforms potential increases in negentropy into realized increases in negentropy.

The indispensable negentropic results are achieved chiefly in two interconnected ways. The allocation of absolute profit, and maintenance and materials costs to emphasize relatively more advanced, established technologies increases the resulting average technological level of production. The replenishment of the stock of existing more-advanced technologies by still more-advanced technologies, contributed through science and engineering, is the indispensable basis for the continuation and advancement of the process of realization of absolute profit to effect sustained technological progress.

This demonstrates the thermodynamical implication of effective new forms of scientific and engineering contributions. The thermodynamic content of advances in fundamental and applied scientific knowledge is the increased negentropy they represent in respect to their universalizing effects in the development of the productive process.

This historically demonstrated fact concerning the necessity and implications of technological progress defines its own lawful bounding conditions. Since the creative potentialities of the individual human mind are the primary cause and driving force of human progress, progress depends upon the ordered development of these advancing powers in the individual. The role of education directed to that effect is most obvious. Less obvious at first glance, but fundamental, it is the general material conditions of life, work, and leisure, the culture of the population, which represent the indispensable preconditions for progress. As a society advances technologically in respect to production as such, the source of future progress would tend to evaporate unless the constantly rising material costs per capita of producing, nurturing, and maintaining individuals were met.

That set of irrefutable facts is the basis for the notion of a body of *universal natural law*, both with respect to science and technology as such, and with respect to social processes and governing ideas and laws concerning both society as a whole and its integral function of accomplishing technological progress.

The historical facts so identified, respecting our species' upward progress from the baboon-like culture

of the Pleistocene period, define man, our species, as expressing a *self-subsisting and universalizing positive principle*. Man's deliberate development of his powers is the means by which he deliberately provides the potential basis for the increase of his powers to progress still further.

That is the unique and fundamental distinction between man and the lower forms of life. That is the ordering principle which distinguishes rigorously between higher and lower forms of human society.

It is also the unique principle on which the sacredness of the individual human being is established on a practical basis. Every individual represents the *potential* to initiate, transmit, and assimilate for practice new technological and other indispensable new knowledge. That knowledge, added to society through the efforts of such individuals, represents a potential and permanent advancement in the development of the human species as a whole — an immortal and universal contribution.

It is a corollary principle of universal natural law that a society which repudiates progress degrades its members to the moral condition of a lower beast. It has repudiated and suppressed that quality which uniquely distinguishes man morally and practically from the lower beasts.

This view of man, its crucial proof arising from the study of that productive practice upon which his existence and culture depend, establishes the *epistemological outlook which is the body of universal natural law in its broader aspect*, that aspect which is immediately the proper ordering of knowledge respecting man in all respects, and which is the only proper basis for laws of nations.

The existence of man, which is the result of the labors of generations over millions of years, and of a secular upward sweep of technological progress during the most recent ten thousand years, is in itself a universal proof of the epistemological quality of the ordering of the laws of the universe. The *directed* outcome of human innovation, viewed in the indicated thermodynamic frame of reference, has proven the appropriateness of that *directedness* of creative scientific and equivalent discovery to increasing mastery of the universal ordering of the universe. By abstracting from the interdependent conceptual and practical aspects of that overall progress, we are enabled, with increasing effectiveness through further progress, to define the aspects of the ordering of scientific hypotheses created by individuals with respect to the ordering of that technological and related practice which in turn represents a rising rate of negentropy in man's overall relationship to nature, effected through the universalizing connection of the entire society to nature as a whole.

We are thus enabled to probe into our own individual natures, to the corresponding qualities of institutions, and to discriminate between those directed principles of thought which lead to increasing human perfection — *which we call good*, and those traits of mental and social life which abort progress or worse — *which we call evil*. That is theology, but it is also science, and it is the only tolerable perception of the ordering principle of law. *The law which does not recognize that as its governing truth is a morally imbecilic practice of law.*

With nations which consciously and efficiently govern themselves by such principles, the United States has a *community of principle*. With nations which practice laws and policies to such effect without consciousness of the principles involved, the United States must cooperate on the basis of *agreement in practice*. With nations which lack either degree of qualification the United States has a policy of *toleration* or *abhorrence*, as practical considerations of national and global vital interests determine.

The same principles govern United States domestic policies. Among the identified, clearly demarcated conditions, there are intermediate degrees, each defined by a kind of resolution of complex practical arrangements; for such cases the interpolations of United States foreign and domestic policy, law, and practice appropriate to such intermediate conditions ought to be sufficiently clear for needs of application to concrete cases as confronted.

Natural law, the proper governing law of the law of the United States, does not regard nations or individuals as equal in respect of equal rights to express their ostensibly characteristic impulses. Law properly gives to each nation and individual the potential right to enjoy equal rights, but *the nature of those rights is defined for the advantage of the moral individual*. The immoral nation or individual has the right to behave in the way afforded for a moral individual. We define the rights and liberties of freedom and toleration for moral persons, and then extend those same rights *insofar as vital interests permit* to all other individuals. That is the long and the short of the principle involved.

If evil — for example, a Ralph Nader demanding destruction of our nation's vital interests — demands that it has equal rights to realize its desires and perceived self-interest with the scientist, engineer, trade unionist concerned to develop our productive forces, then we say to Ralph Nader: *Evil is not equal to good before the law*. The same rule applies to foreign policy.

For example. The nation of Mexico, like Brazil, has a substantial foreign financial debt outstanding. Some of this indebtedness represents useful goods delivered

to Mexico in good faith on fair terms. Another portion of the debt represents the fictitious capitalization of old debts, and similar questionable origins. Shall we, as the United States drawn into U.S. citizens' claims against Mexico, declare simply that a "debt is a debt?" *That would be moral imbecility.* Should the credit of a National Bank of the United States be deployed to guarantee a U.S. exporter's delivery of capital goods and related installation services to a foreign nation for a viable development purpose? Absolutely. Should the credit of the United States be hypothecated to the International Monetary Fund or some like institutions to bail out the fictitious capitalizations some U.S. citizen has piled up through the Cayman-Bermuda off-shore Eurodollar swindle? Absolutely not. *Not to make such lawful distinctions would be moral imbecility.* The law must not be based on the mere formalities of fictions, in either national or foreign matters, but on the content of the issue, the morally defensible aspect of intent reflected in the fictions of law.

For example. Federal court decisions respecting enforcement of the National Environmental Policy Act. It is a fact that the session of the U.S. Congress which passed that particular abomination was insensible in the main of the intent and implications of the legislation itself. That, unfortunately, has been commonly the case. Nonetheless, it is admissible in law to consider *the negative intent of Congress.* By any stretch of the imagination, can it be construed to have been the will of Congress that our vital national interests in productive development, employment, and so forth should be systematically savaged through court actions, in the way we have witnessed through the cumulative effect of patterns of federal and other court decisions?

Either the courts perpetrating such a construction of the legislative intent are perpetrating a fraud respecting any reasonable construction of intent in fact, or they are violating the Constitution by arrogating the powers reserved to the legislative branch. It is the plain duty of the other constitutional branches of government to nullify such violations of the Constitu-

tion by the courts, and to remove those judges who manifest a pattern of such potentially impeachable offenses. (37)

The principles of policy and law just summarized are *eternal.* They are the expression of the primary driving force of natural law, the primary causal force in human development which generates the proper ordering of successive evolutionary developments within society.

The principle of *sovereign, viable republics* is also a universal principle of present natural law, but is historically specific to the modern period of European culture's development up to the present time. A feudal republic is an absurd contradiction in terms; the present cultural development of the general population in the most advanced nations neither warrants a pure democratic form nor would an existing population be capable of effectively adapting — through a reasonable period of trial-and error — to a pure democratic form if it were bestowed upon them. The arguments of John Milton and Federalist Tom Paine against the follies of democracy are appropriate in principle to the present circumstances. For the present, the republic form agrees with the universal *practical* requirements of natural law; but, it is not an eternal principle, rather a specific form bounded before-and-after by preceding and future developments.

Naturally, numerous liberals and radicals will howl, shriek and stamp their feet in objections to this. Respecting their objections, it is most emphatically the fact that their sort continues to exist in excessive proportions that absolutely prohibit a workable pure democracy. Hence, in principle, their objections have no competent standing before the law. In practice, we Whigs are the overwhelming majority, who must and who will govern. We shall keep the U.S. Constitution, follow it in accordance with its original intent, and we shall keep the republic — and, so, for the immediately foreseeable future, any Tory's objections to this policy must remain moot. That settled, the liberals and radicals should stop their noisemaking, the better to follow a lesson they sorely require.

37. We do not deny that the Supreme Court and federal courts have a specific power of de facto law-making authority. However that authority is delimited to and generated by the specifications and clear intent of the Constitution. This is categorically delimited to matters in which legislators or executives have overstepped a constitutional boundary in form or practical effect, or in which matters directly affecting the intent of the Constitution for practice must be decided in the absence of subordinate positive law for that category of practical issue. The federal courts, acting under the clear intent of the Constitution obviously must be equally sensitive to the omissions of law in

important matters placed before them as to the improprieties of enactment and application of law.

There is no such proper use of powers in the kinds of decisions we have denounced. Not only was there no competent premise in the attributable intent of Congress to enable *the consequences against our vital interests those decisions involve*, but the "legislative initiative" of the court action was on the same point in direct violation of the intent of the Constitution. Whether on grounds of folly or a revisionist's malice against the Constitution, such a pattern of decisions contrary to our vital national interests is the clearest basis for removal of such judges.

Sovereign Republics

The specific notion of *sovereign, viable republic* we most urgently require for immediate practice is most efficiently defined by proceeding immediately at this point to the crucial point of United States foreign policy, our relations with the Soviet Union. We shall proceed by first examining those relations from the standpoint of the notion of a republic, and then continue into the principal practical topics of our foreign policy. That latter accomplished, we shall then focus, in conclusion, on the urgent alterations in the organization and functioning of the U.S. Executive Branch required by considerations of policy and law in the foreign-policy context.

For reasons of simplifying the discussion, United States foreign policy will be treated as if the writer were President of the United States. His temperament does not generate any personal ambitions of that sort as a matter of *private* ambition. For the moment, the writer simply knows of no one else with the special personal qualifications that office requires at this juncture. (38) This approach simplifies the discussion, in the respect that it is much simpler to state the policy and law in the way the writer would serve it than to construct a general case for a "Mr. X" of unknown special style.

The broadest point to be made concerning the Soviet Union ought to be clear enough — to the point that a Walter Lippmann, were he alive, would agree that far. On condition that we remove the lunatics' hands from the Executive Branch of our government, the actions and inactions of the United States and Soviet Union are going to shape the global political and economic environment of other nations for decades to come. As these two powers act to common purpose or in opposition, so the fate of people throughout the world will be largely determined.

At that point, we immediately part company with

the non-hypothetical Mr. Lippmann of his writings and even the most amiable among his fellow-Atlanticists. We are not nominalists. We will not spin out geopolitical schemas of *Atlantic communities, China-Japan spheres, Asian blocs, Soviet orbits*, or other such childish doll-playing. Our foreign policy proceeds from the standpoint of reference of *community of principle*, not customs, geography or any such alternate metaphysical droolings. *It is the internal character of the Soviet state that mainly shapes our Soviet foreign policy.*

From the standpoint of fundamental United States policy and law, as we have specified it, we have a fundamental community of principle with the Soviet republic in respect of *both national and global policies of technological progress*. The sticky points are primarily questions concerning the internal character of the Soviet republic, and secondarily, the implications of the internal character of the Soviet state for the political content — and intent — of Soviet foreign policy. Concerning the secondary issue, we shall say for the moment that the spectre of a Communist bogeyman sneaking out from Moscow by night to take over the world is just that — a point we shall return to, but which we put aside for the moment in order to focus entirely for the moment on the issue of the Soviet republic itself.

First, let us say a number of very unpleasant things about the Soviet Union's internal life. Let us not fear to risk exaggerating here and there in estimating the degree of awfulness which formerly prevailed or presently exists. By taking such things at their possible worst, we have put the point in the discussion-framework suited to a rigorous foreign-policy consideration.

The 1917 Bolshevik, or "October" Russian Revolution seized the centers of urban political power of a war-wrecked and chaotic relic of Czarist power. Even under the best of circumstances — for example the 1912-1914 period of Czarist Russia — the Bolshevik inheritance would scarcely represent a socialist trans-

38. About three years in office, to complete an impeached incumbent's term, would probably be about the minimum-maximum range of tenure before this writer desired to advance to the comforts and leadership duties of a sixtyish elder statesman.

formation leaping upward from the apex of European civilization. The cultural level of the general population, the broader social infrastructure, were hideous. What the Bolsheviks inherited in 1917 was worse.

The irony of Czarist Russia was that its then fairly recent position as a focus of major industrialist capital investments had bestowed upon a few centers some of the greatest industrial plants in Europe. Yet, the majority of the workers employed — like the Russian army — were former peasants. Socially, otherwise, Russian urban culture was top-heavy with cosmopolitan or semi-cosmopolitan intellectuals and pseudo-intellectuals — of which a majority were attached to the Liberal, Menshevik and other political opponents of the Bolsheviks. Under the stress of the interventions of the post-October period, the Bolsheviks were reduced — at the top — to a handful of left-Menshevik and Populist offshoots and themselves, immediately supported by a cadre and semi-cadre of skilled and semi-skilled workers and non-commissioned officers (primarily), and beyond, the brutalized Russian masses of worker semi-peasants and the gray, brutalized mass of the peasantry itself. The agriculture of 1917 was already suffering the effects of levies of peasant conscripts into the meatgrinder of the Czarist and Kerenskiad's infantry. The Brest-Litovsk peace and other calamities made the agricultural crisis acute. Without Poland, the economy of Great Russia's industry was surgically cut in two. The already war-weary industries of 1917 were exhausted by lack of maintenance supplies by 1920-1921 and the war mobilizations. Most of the best cadres of the soldiery and plants died exemplary deaths of military leadership on the Red Army's battlefields. Within the highest ranks of the Bolsheviks themselves there were the Karl Radeks, the N. Bukharins, the Riazanovs and numerous others with long-standing pedigrees as Parvus sub-agents or otherwise involved in various ways with the Anglo-Dutch-headed intelligence networks.

Significantly through the influence of Karl Radek and others, the Communist International was reduced to a shambles by 1923. The sapped Soviet republic was doubly isolated, mooting seriously the looming probabilities of its early extinction by combinations of internal shortages and various external interventions. Through the influence of the Bukharins and others, the delay of vital industrial development, industrialization which should have been begun by no later than 1923-1924, almost ruined Soviet internal and potential foreign credit, unleashing an internal inflation — creating the basis for the draconian bitterness of the subsequent collectivization process. From the end of 1932 and beginning of 1933, the Soviet leadership prepared for the invasion from Nazi Germany it knew to

be inevitable, and rightly estimated would be launched probably with the overt or covert aid and insistence of the British-led Western powers.

From the outset to the present — without further listing the principal relevant, horror-ridden points of background — the Soviet republic has been a garrison economy, struggling to balance the obligations of a modern great power's military establishment against the thrice-repeated (post-1917, post-1927, post-1945) effort to build a modern industrial economy from the combined catastrophes of inherited backwardness and war-caused rubble. This economic development — plus the proportionally monstrous burdens of the military on capital-goods production — was accomplished by the most stringent means to which a modern economy can resort: *savage primitive accumulation*.

To make matters worse, although the leading Bolsheviks were dedicated and increasingly practical, they were, after Lenin's death political amateurs by Marx's or even Rosa Luxemburg's standards, and excepting the gifted Preobrazhensky, not a single known leading figure possessed any genuinely original theoretical-economic competence.

Although Soviet experience and technological and cultural development have created a broad, even impressive basis for government and industry, the Soviet institutions of "official Marxism-Leninism" are predominantly a bad joke which the CPSU has perpetrated upon itself and credulous admirers from abroad. This contrast between Soviet military strategic excellence and the emerging world hegemony of the Soviets in basic physics, on the one side, and the political amateurism of the majority of the Soviet Politburo, on the other, are present expressions of the irony which has characterized Soviet development from the beginning. This political ingenuousness, aggravated by pretenses of Kremlin "doctrinal infallibility" on those same topics, has caused the Soviets to pursue even otherwise correct and commendable efforts of internal development often in the crudest political fashion.

Although significant circles within the Soviet leadership and the CMEA countries have moved way beyond the blundering Oblomovism which spoils Soviet leadership perceptions overall, the dismal heritage of the past is to this day an important — and, at this moment, a potentially most dangerous element in the situation. It is that aspect of Soviet life which the Atlanticists have so recklessly miscalculated in their wishful appraisals of the Soviet leadership. Oblomov will retreat and retreat, as pragmatically as Henry Kissinger might reasonably desire, until a threshold is crossed. Then, Oblomov, a Russian romanticist who knows only retreat and attack in the realm of politics,

attacks, loading the attack with all the savagery of pent-up resentments accumulated during the preceding retreat.

When a people is to be called upon to make sacrifices to the extent of heavy burdens of primitive accumulation or equal weight of constraints upon the exercise of individual liberties, the critical political consideration is that the resulting conflicts with the real self-interests of those who sacrifice must not be pushed into an alliance with the heteronomic anti-social impulses formerly contained under the acceptance and institutions of law. The role of the founders of our own nation in the conduct of the American Revolution is exemplary. The only effective, positive political force to which government can appeal under such circumstances, is to make the universal interest a sensuous complement of the informed willful impulses for practice of those who must make the sacrifices.

This principle does not admit of frauds. A republic must not demand sacrifices which are not in the universal interest in fact. The lack of correspondence with the "explanation" and the reality of the measures must tend to be expressed in outbreaks of heteronomy. Either this heteronomy is deflected against an adopted adversary — to divert it away from the government policy, as in the Nazi and other notorious cases — or the heteronomy must erupt against the government itself. Either leadership calls forth the "Whig impulse," by proposing policies constrained by competent agreement with humanist principles, or what one gets is the "Tory impulse."

The epitome of Soviet leadership violation of that principle of politics is the disgusting doctrinal assertion, "We have reached Socialism and are now on the way to Communism." What utter rubbish! What utter fraud! Unfortunately, a fault not peculiar to the Soviet institutions, once such proprietary imbecility becomes anointed with the authority and glosses of canonized precedent, all the forces of Hell must come down before the relevant piece of lunacy is unstuck from official policy.

It is one thing to propose that the Soviet Union is constitutionally a socialist republic, and an altogether different proposition to say that the Soviet Union is qualitatively a socialist society. When Soviet officials use such demagogic sleight-of-hand as a lever of attempted inspiration of the Soviet worker, the lawfully cumulative result is incredulousness, and, if the utterance is believed, developing contempt for the idea of socialism itself. "If this deprivation and sacrifice is socialism, what in hell do I care about the CPSU leadership!" Whereas, if the truth were told plainly, and if the description of accomplishments represented those accomplishments for what they represent in

fact, the reaction is, "We're making impressive progress, but it's turning out to be a long way to get there." Whipping up the troops by spouting the dumb official line, ultimately — or sooner — estranges the troops, and makes a rotten, muddle-headed hack out of the political organizer.

The collectivization case is notoriously exemplary.

Any self-respecting farmer can be induced to "save." Build a livestock, secure improved fertilizers, machinery, develop improved grains, and so forth. Farmers will tend to plant higher-yield 120-day corn in regions with a safe 90-day growing season, and such understandable stubbornnesses, but the principle of "saving" every competent farmer understands, and will respond to, given the proper approach and proper performance by those responsible for the campaign. If the farmer remains somewhat stubbornly slow in coming around to a proper policy — it is such problems that define the profession of competent leaders.

Granted the circumstances of 1928-1932 Russia, the head-on collision with the peasantry was broadly understandable. The Bukharin policy (not-accidentally coinciding with the grain and petroleum interests of Anglo-Dutch financier interests in particular), by frittering away the precious time needed to effect a competent agricultural reform aimed at qualitative technological progress, was most significant in causing the subsequent collectivization to proceed as it did. However, on the basis of Soviet official reports, one adduces that to this day the agricultural sections of the CPSU and state have still not learned the political ABCs of an agricultural program.

Those who have knowledge of the way in which Anglo-American political intelligence operations have targeted "potential dissidents" within the CMEA countries know empirically, without really understanding why, how these political blunders of the Soviet leadership (in particular) foster the political conditions in which such an incidence of potential political-intelligence targets occurs. But for the political incompetences to which we have referred, those political-intelligence operations would have found the CMEA countries an unprofitable target for building Mr. Brzezinski's networks. The political class-for-itself principle is the ABC of Karl Marx's method, but from the visible aspects of predominant Soviet practice and the awful nonsense officially issued in the name of "Marxism-Leninism," the Politburo as a whole hasn't the barest sense of the term's implications for practice.

The higher incidence of heteronomic ferment produced by this combination of circumstances naturally attracts the attentions of Soviet internal political security forces. Part of the problem, the most significant part overall, is the product of the garrison-

economy circumstances under which the Soviet republic and other CMEA nations have existed since their establishment. The rest is the significant aggravation of the "objective" roots of the problem by Communist leaderships' political blundering. All things taken into account, the Soviet republic is qualitatively a garrison economy with, to this writer's knowledge, an unknown degree of corresponding internal political security practices to match the garrison economy.

To the extent that a greater or lesser want of republican liberties exists within the Soviet republic for these reasons, the wretchedness, like the material deprivations incurred, is unquestionably deplorable. As President, I would be concerned with improving these internal Soviet conditions to the extent improvement is required. The lesser question, which shall we review first, is *What should we do about it?* The more significant question, respecting the basis for United States foreign policy toward the Soviet Union, is how this affects the character of the Soviet Union as a *republic*.

Even acknowledging the genuine atrocities the United States has to its credit — notably including Chile — it is proper and obligatory of a U.S. President to *truthfully* report on such matters to the Soviet leadership and to the people of the United States. At present, the only non-hypocritical way of stating such opinions is to emphasize *the Soviets, too, have a few nasty features of their internal life*. It is obscene to compare an Eastern European government to the horror of Chile. It is a matter of stating relevant political facts, not running a bogeyman competition.

By stating such things — which we are obliged to do, whatever we may have waiting to be exposed in our own closets — the matter is placed on the table. Facts are facts. Beyond that, the question is what do we do about it?

The Soviet Politburo will immediately respond with a few suggestions concerning Mr. Brzezinski and similar creatures, whose activities are by no means irrelevant to any intensifying of the activities of the internal political security institutions of the CMEA countries. The Soviets might, in the same vein, offer a few pertinent suggestions to the same effect concerning blacker aspects of the editorial policies of Radio Free Europe. (39)

39. We must, in that connection, appreciate that the technological stagnation and the degeneration of the military establishments of the OECD countries under "utopian" strategic policies has reduced the importance of Soviet spies in the "West," while increasing the premium on NATO spying and related activities in the CMEA nations. We have diminishing little worth the effort of a spy to attempt to steal. The Atlanticist bunch hasn't had a genuinely original strategic idea — good or bad — since Henry Kissinger's 1957 articulation of the doctrine of "brinkmanship."

As even the White House basement's Tories running the "human rights" campaign themselves know fully, it is the United States government's turning up the screws of the "Cold War" which is the most important variable slowing down the expansion of liberties within the CMEA countries. (40) It would be through the creating for the Soviet Union — *to the extent that our interests and policies permit this* — of a non-aversive outward climate, especially in respect to Western Europe and the United States, that the areas of *toleration* we call liberties would be increased in the relevant nations. To the extent that the United States government conducts or tolerates aversive external and penetration-disruption operations within the CMEA nations launched from within the NATO countries, it is hypocrisy for the government and leading press of the United States to lie *to the citizens of the United States* concerning the causal connections involved.

On the outside, for the credulous, duped U.S. conservatives, such as former Representative and President Gerald Ford, and also for the majority of the duped U.S. citizens and residents of recent Eastern European extraction involved, the "captive nations" *front-organization* is essentially what such a front-organization is prescribed to be — a political cover and a trick to be played upon the credulous dupes who don't know by whom or why they are being used. On the inside, underneath and behind the layers of dupes, the "captive nations" network is an international fascist organization, coordinated through Interpol, and composed of first and second-generation operatives of the Nazi SS and Canaris Abwehr Second Division (the so-called "Brandenburger Division"). These include the Canada-based Ukrainian Nazi network, composed of Nazi Waffen SS and Brandenburger Division war-criminals and their immediate descendants. These include the Buenos Aires-based international Nazis' Ustashi network, including leaders, some resident in the United States, who are wanted in Yugoslavia for war crimes which rank in deeds perpetrated by individuals as the most hideous of the World War II period.

This inside aspect of the "captive nations" operation is directly affiliated to Interpol under the "cover" of Interpol's fictive authority for processing international searches for wanted Nazi war criminals.

That is standard operating procedure. To run massive international drug-smuggling networks, the networks are run through the agencies which have nominal prime authority for investigating drug net-

40. Cf. "How the White House Manufactures 'Soviet Dissenters'" and accompanying case studies in *Executive Intelligence Review*, Vol. IV, No. 6 (Feb. 8, 1977), pp. 32-39.

works. The “under investigation” fiction is then used to ward regular, unwitting police agencies off interference with the drug-network operations. To run an international network led by wanted Nazi war criminals, the network is run through the organization which has the delegated authority to investigate such persons and groups. To run massive arms-smuggling operations across borders in small private planes, unmarked C-47’s and so forth, from Hartford, Connecticut through various parts of the United States, through Mexico, into Guatemala, and points south, the cooperation by the National Security Agency and Interpol is vital.

This inside operation of the “captive nations” racket intermeshes with other aspects of the Nazi and the Nazis’ Vichy fascist networks, including the South American-Spain network coordinated by Hjalmar Schacht’s son-in-law, the recently deceased Colonel Otto Skorzeny, and the Vichy French fascist network known as the OAS, plus major elements of Israeli intelligence. This network overall interfaces official government interior and other ministries in various nations, chiefly through those sub-departments of government which coordinate with Paris Interpol headquarters. It is relevant to the predominantly fascist pedigrees of the Interpol base network that the Rockefeller-created Interpol organization was headed by Austrian fascists at the outset, then by Nazi SD chiefs Heydrich and Kaltenbrunner, and at the end of the war was “reconstituted” under the direction of the Rockefellers’ attorney, Allen Dulles, placing the interpol organization under the direction of some of the same Nazi officials who had inclusively participated in such wartime Interpol operations as the Nazi round-ups of Hungarian Jews and gypsies for extermination.

This Interpol network is the “hard” or “wetwork” side of the international network which runs not only illegal drug and arms smuggling operations, mercenary armies’ activities, but also the bloody side of every terrorist operation and many assassinations throughout the world. In terrorist operations, Interpol, with its immediately associated elements within government agencies, deploys the terrorist action itself and also manipulates the police agencies deployed against the terrorists.

This operation is presently run with computer-coordinated assistance. The criminal and non-criminal investigatory operations of many national governments are modernized through the development of central, semi-“real time” computer files. By virtue of the Interpol-linked agencies’ direct access to such computer files, Interpol has a degree of barely visible control over local law enforcement conditions in two ways. It represents intelligence of a sort invaluable to the deployment of terrorist operations,

and affords Interpol and its collaborators means to screw up the anti-terrorist activities of both local police agencies and even the principal internal security and intelligence forces of national governments. This computer network is international, interfacing not only under the control of Paris-based Interpol, but also with such relevant organizations as the Rockefellers’ Worldwatch Institute, which not only computer-monitors population control and hunger-and-famine information globally, but also engages in coordination of international terrorist information.

This network operates, obviously, in such a way that vast operations can be more or less efficiently deployed with a relatively minimum degree of “need to know” by the responsible executives and other employees of the sub-elements making up the network as a whole.

Complementary to the “captive nations” and other nominally right-wing covers, the principal cover and an additional operations interface of the Interpol networks is represented by the neo-Fabian octopus, most efficiently identified by McGeorge Bundy’s old Kennedy days sidekicks, Marcus Raskin and Richard Barnet. Here is an aspect of the matter where official gross political imbecility by certain leading Soviet Politburo strata comes into sharp focus.

As a consequence of a very successful intelligence operation run against top Soviet strata during the Kennedy period, as noted by published accounts of the writer’s associates, the majority line of the Politburo switched away from the correct political intelligence estimate of the Soviet military intelligence — that the Rockefellers were the main source of the war danger — to the imbecilic doctrine that the Rockefeller-Fabian lower Manhattan interests were the “realists,” and that the U.S. internal war danger emanated from the vaguely defined, so-called “military-industrial complex.” The Rockefeller-controlled key unit in and around the leadership of the Communist Party USA is inclusively relevant, as is also some of the background of the 1962 Missile Crisis and the Kennedy assassination preparations within various parts of North America. This change of Politburo majority line coincided with the development of an ongoing direct line of semi-official liaison between elements of the Politburo and David Rockefeller and Richard Barnet.

The termination of the Richard Löwenthal-sponsored, Eric Gerlach-directed *Sozialistische Politik* “editorial board” during the 1962-63 period — an editorial board including notably Trotskyist leaders Ernest Mandel and Pierre Frank — coincided symptomatically with a sweeping Kennedy reorganization of the Anglo-American international political intelligence, establishing the neo-Fabian network

created by the Rockefellers' Kennedy machine as the central coordinating agency globally for those aspects of operations run under variously liberal and "left" covers.

Principals in this drastic reorganization were McGeorge Bundy, Robert Kennedy, and revisionist Thurman Arnold of the law firm of Arnold and Porter. The key operatives assigned to head up the new international "liberal" structure included, most prominently, Marcus Raskin and Richard Barnet of the Institute for Policy Studies! Abruptly, a number of old right-wing social democrats were transformed through "miraculous conversions" into raving liberals or spokesmen of newly born left-wing social democratic currents — the case of old Allen Dulles protégé, Riccardo Lombardi of the Socialist Party of Italy is exemplary. An assassination effort was launched against General de Gaulle — by the reorganized network. The same international deployment was the wave of "wetwork" which killed Italy's "Gaullist" industrialist Mattei — a Rockefeller foe on the petroleum issue — and which same deployment ironically set up the circumstances of the death of John F. Kennedy himself.

These actions of that period, plus such affairs as the attempted destabilization of the Konrad Adenauer faction within the West German government, marked a qualitative shift in overall strategic profile by the Rockefeller-centered forces, including, notably, their operations against the Soviet Union and CMEA countries.

This included a reorientation of intelligence and related capabilities in the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, premised on the overall effort of building up David Rockefeller's "Trojan Horse" within the CPSU Central Committee and Politburo. Georgii Arbatov's relationship to David Rockefeller and Richard Barnet during the recent years is the visible interface of what is at present a short fuse leading into general thermonuclear war.

The overall effects of this post-1962, Interpol-IPS-centered operation against the CMEA countries was ultimately to force the Soviet and allied internal security forces to intensify their surveillance and associated actions. Soviet leadership political stupidity concerning the neo-Fabian "realist good-guys" and the "industrial-military-complex baddies" aggravated the CMEA countries' internal political security problems through the added feature of chaos and confusion contributed by the bungling Soviet leadership itself. This feature was aggravated by increased ability of the neo-Fabians to "launder" black operations through Eastern European capitals and Havana — notably the Prague-Havana run, and to spin off this successful deception of the Soviets and

Cubans into numerous developing-sector countries with a friendly political relationship to the Soviets and Cubans (e.g. Eldridge Cleaver in Algeria).

This latter arrangement went to the point that nearly every neo-Fabian left-fascist creep who later gained a publicity image as an anarchist or Maoist youth-movement spokesman during the 1960s and early 1970s had his "left" credentials "laundered" in significant part through the "Venceremos" and related pilgrimages to Cuba. The "trip to Cuba" was the cover for various "miraculous conversions" into a "left heavy" posture. This IPS-focused operation against the Soviet Union and other targeted socialist countries was the principal cover for the "underground railroad" networks operating to develop the Jewish and other "dissidents" ferment in the Eastern European nations, using the old Parvus-trodden "Northern Route" through Olof Palme's Sweden.

This is by no means to argue that all dissidents in the Soviet Union are products of this Interpol-IPS-Rockefeller operation.

First, there are endemic anti-socialist dissidents — based principally in sections of the farmer population and the so-called professionals. If the IPS-Interpol and complementary operations also feature such professionals, the operation has thus capitalized, lawfully, on the sociological area of greatest endemic potential for developing agents. The political stupidity of influential sections of Communist leaderships generates several kinds of dissidence by itself and aggravates that which would otherwise tend to exist.

There are also various sorts of pro-Marxist dissidents. Some are not fictively dissidents, because they are among alternate factions within the Communist parties, and thus are either dominant factions, notably as part of the "hard line" currents or their allies against the Oblomovist currents, or in the opposition within the leadership. Others are fictively dissidents because their opposition to the leadership — critics for correct or wrong reasons, or a mixture of both — has put them outside the party's "family" orbit. This is aggravated by bitternesses from the 1930s and post-war Stalin purges, and complicated by the political eccentricities endemic to a de facto controlled social-intellectual environment.

From the standpoint of republican notions of universal law, we are obliged to examine the endemic dissidence from within the Soviet Union in particular by the same methodological standards we properly apply to our own internal constitutional law's application. The sovereign and auxiliary institutions of a republic properly check heteronomic impulses at the point of a practical threat to either vital interests as such or a credible practical threat to the integrity of

the constitutional law and its institutions. The same institutions may otherwise abuse their lawful powers to deprive individuals and groups of the proper liberty to develop and express innovations. In United States policy proper we distinguish qualitatively between the two kinds of ostensible oppression both domestically and in our foreign policy.

In respect to lawfully proper containment of the liberties of criminal elements, and other heteronomic elements, we will not object to the fact of such oppression by other republics. Our potential criticism in such matters is delimited by concern for the *humaneness* of the methods and practices employed. The object of the proper oppressive applications of law is to check the heteronomy while preserving to the practical extent possible the potentialities for good within the person. *We prosecute the sin, not the sinner* — to the extent that such distinctions are possible in practice. The obligatory objective of the penal law is *correction, to save the sinner if possible*.

In respect to the abuses of the law, insofar as the Soviet Union violates those liberties implicit in its *proper constitution as a republic*, we abhor such abuses — *no matter how many kindred or even far worse abuses exist in our own backyard*. On this, we oblige ourselves afresh to focus on the key issue: *the character of the Soviet republic*.

However, our standpoint in this matter is not the merely positive law in and of itself. We reject absolutely the doctrine of “force of sovereignty” associated with Justice Holmes. Rather, we judge positive law from the standpoint of the proper higher authority of natural law — as is prescribed, in fact, in the explicit intent set forth by the authors of our U.S. Constitution. It is not the constitutional law of the Soviet republic as it is, but what it must be from the standpoint of rigorous application of natural law that is our constant point of reference for policy.

Our foreign policy toward the Soviet Union concerning matters of its citizens’ liberties is twofold. We recognize, first of all, the connection between the aversive conditions fostered by agencies which it is our responsibility to control, and the effects of this aversive condition upon the internal life of the Soviet Union. Some of these aversive conditions involve activities whose combined character and objectives are abhorrent to us *in any case*. These we categorically check *under any circumstance*. These aversive conditions also include elements which are determined by the form and content of relations between our two countries. These vary according to the distinguishable degrees of the spectrum from *adversary, potential adversary*, to agreement based on *community of principle*. We adopt the consequences of such aversive conditions created and or

maintained by agencies properly under our control as peculiarly *our lawful responsibility*. In these matters, the relevant actions of the United States are direct and autonomous.

In the second category, the issues of *humanity* and of categorical abuses of *proper* Soviet law are among those *internal affairs* of the Soviet republic which properly lie within the province of the United States’ foreign policy. To the extent that they bear upon the assessment of the internal quality of the Soviet republic as a republic, such considerations properly color the determination of our foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. How we approach such internal aspects of the Soviet republic *in practice* is determined by those broader, subsuming considerations which arise immediately in the effort to determine whether or not either a potential or present basis for agreement to *community of principle* is to thus define the generative outlook of the United States’ Soviet foreign policy.

In any case, there are certain things we will not do. We will not tolerate actions by agencies under our control or by private agencies of U.S. citizens or residents whose methods, purposes and consequences are abhorrent to us. Otherwise, the fact that the principle of *sovereign, viable republics* is an associated fundamental principle of U.S. foreign policy, does not mean that we adopt the nominalist absurdities of a Walter Lippmann (Roosevelt), by demanding an establishment of capitalist political institutions within the Soviet Union, or the scrapping of the proper constitutional principles and institutions of the Soviet republic — to the extent we regard it as a republic in fact — in favor of that anti-republican, “pluralist” obscenity which our own rabid Tories demagogically herald as “pure democracy!” We are, under no circumstances, going to propose to the Soviet leadership that it transform itself into a Tory freak show merely to gratify the lunatic’s sensibilities of our neo-Fabian liberal-radical minority.

In approaching the overall question of the United States’ Soviet foreign policy, we begin, we have noted, with the truism that the United States and the Soviet Union are the “two great powers,” whose respective influences and mutual relations will determine the fate of every other nation for decades yet to come. Contrary to the revisionist Tory Walter Lippmann (Franklin Roosevelt), we cannot approach this crucial, central question of United States domestic and foreign policy by those childish doll-playing methods which spill out the various speculative scenarios corresponding to various hypothesized forms of role-playing among the two great powers. We start from the applicable conceptions of natural law, as exemplified by John Quincy Adams’ stress on the

doctrine of *community of principle*. We would not make binding alliances or “concerts” with evil powers simply because they are powerful.

We do not ignore such realities of power. As our founding fathers attempted to do, when principle is frustrated by want of means, we *maneuver* within the framework of operating power, to effect those results which on balance shift the correlation of global forces to the advantage of a subsequent realization of principle. Our method of maneuver under the governance of principle is “Clausewitzian.”

Consequently, as we approach the problem of United States Soviet policy within the framework of the implications of the cited truisms, we are forewarned at the start that the inquiry involves the indicated distinctions of *governing principle* and *maneuver*. First, we do what the Atlanticist Doctrine refuses to permit in U.S. foreign-policy determinations, we start not from the question of power, but principle. Our fundamental policy toward the Soviet Union is based entirely upon what that nation is shown to be from the standard of natural law. Any alternate approach is immoral, childish doll-playing with the fate of humanity.

The central conceptual difficulty confronting the U.S. electorate — who must adopt our foreign policies through their representatives — is that the Soviet government employs the terms “republic” and “dictatorship” interchangeably. In an earlier section of this policy study, we identified the semantic confusion surrounding the two opposite meanings attributed to the term “dictatorship,” advising that the notion of the U.S. Constitution as establishing a “dictatorship” — i.e., a *democratic republic!* — was indispensable to the effort to establish rigorously grounded common denominators in international law for defining U.S. Soviet foreign policy. Now, that point in the study has been reached. We must now define what the Soviets invoke by their use of “dictatorship.” We shall do that by passing beyond the formalities of legalistic abstraction, to ground each point made in a point-by-point comparison of the United States and Soviet republican *norms*.

Before plunging into that aspect of our inquiry, two preliminary observations must be made, so that those considerations can be kept in the back of the mind, contributing their guidance to the appreciation of the points being developed.

First, *the separation of the electorate and the legal professionals respecting the governing concepts of basic law is an intolerable state of affairs in a viable republic*. Although legal professionals are required, their proper function is to elaborate the principles of law into a body of scientifically ordered practice respecting the complexities of the law’s application.

The attorneys and courts, through deep familiarity with both the governing principles of law and with the complexities of its positive elaboration and application in detail, perform an indispensable function in maintaining coherence between the case in point and the law as a whole. Extensive knowledge of the law and conceptual outlooks matured through legal practice are indispensable to accomplishing this *in practice*.

The related, aggravating problem is that popular outlooks mistakenly view the law in the infantile terms associated with the worst conceptions of “case law” or “common law.” The notions of law are degraded into *pragmatic* — e.g., morally imbecilic — approaches toward an axiomatic doctrine of “social contract,” rather than the intent and subsumed specifications of constitutional principle *under natural law*. Under such influences, the general electorate’s popularized misconception of the law as an evolving “case-law” body of “common law” represents a toleration of sweeping subversion of the fundamental principles of our Constitutional republic. We are not a nation of common law, but a constitutional republic — our political forebears fought an American Revolution, and a number of other important and hazardous struggles, to establish such a fundamental distinction between United States and British law.

To the extent that we did, indeed, carry forward chunks of English law into our legislation and practised law, this does not warrant the misjudgment that such historical facts justify the conclusion that our law is *permissibly* defined as a kind of “pluralistic” cohabitation of both constitutional and common law traditions. Just as the thirteenth century Edwardian reforms in basic English law in principle transformed the content of all previously existing feudal law according to the principle of *alienation* introduced, so the function of the legal profession under our Constitution is to sort out those aspects of customary law, and so forth, which respectively do and do not conform to constitutional principles. This sorting-out process properly affects not only the formality of the customary law, but transforms the governing internal intent of those aspects of the customary law which survive the sorting process. Even though the formal, outward aspect of the fictions of retained customary law may appear to be preserved, the governing principle of intent embodied in the fiction is either transformed into agreement (coherence) with constitutional intent, or the perpetuated law must be an abhorrence from the constitutional standpoint.

The Constitution’s clearly defined intent, and the shaping of the institutions of our republic, prohibit the modification of the intent of the Constitution through evasions by way of the molecular processes of evolu-

tions in popular opinions and customs. The principled distinction of a constitutional republic, such as our own was founded to be, is that no qualitative change in the governing institutions and law may occur except through a preceding, forced process of reflection upon the implications of the change respecting the body of natural law upon which our Constitution and its intent were themselves premised. The Constitution, taken by itself and in the context of the process of its authorship, adoption and initial implementations, provides avenues for profound alterations in respect of subsumed institutions and instruments, but it prohibits such changes except by referring the question back to rigorous and specified forms of deliberation modeled upon the processes by which the Constitution and republic were themselves established.

This difference was, in significant part, the reason why our republic succeeded whereas the earlier Cromwellian Commonwealth collapsed. John Milton is the best source of insight into that problem. This is the same Milton whose account of the reasons for the failure of the Commonwealth profoundly influenced the informed strata of our American Revolution, and which influence was replicated through them into the broader electorate. The English Commonwealth failed through a combination of attributable problems, but those problems proved the efficient mediation of its destruction because the notion of a republican, constitutional form was not accepted by Oliver Cromwell et al. when forcefully and correctly proposed (principally) by Milton. The collapse of the English Commonwealth — paralleling in principle the Tory subversion of our own law and related institutions — is a forceful empirical demonstration of the horrors which await modern nations when the principle of constitutional law is ignored or subverted by the pragmatic-evolutionary “constitutional” interpretation of case law.

By attributing the governing principles of law to the merely-positive law and pragmatic perceptions of case law, the chaos which is then regarded as law becomes an incomprehensible and disorderly complexity to the general electorate. Such a state of affairs is an abomination — and must be rigorously terminated.

It is necessary for the competent functioning of a *democratic* republic, such as the United States was established to be, that the principles of universal natural law be efficiently, consciously perceived by the general electorate. This is our own view, and the emphasized outlook of the founders of our republic, both the Federalists and Thomas Jefferson. Beyond the indispensable role of education to technological progress, those who wrote our Constitution, those who won the electorate to adopt our Constitution and

republic, emphasized that the electorate cannot be competent electors — and would become a menace to the republic and their own vital interests — unless they are educated to the condition of competence to comprehend the implications of those principles of natural law.

Our republic and the adoption of its Constitution were accomplished by communicating the notions of natural law to the electorate, effected in terms of the empirical correlatives of natural-lawful principles respecting both the implications for the nation as a whole and the way in which the vital interests of the nation determined the fulfillment of the vital interests perceivable as self-interests of *the individual and his posterity*. *The Constitution and the founding institutions and instruments of our republic were adopted by the electorate because their empirical appropriateness to the application of natural law had been demonstrated by the nation's leaders.*

In a democratic republic, those same principles and methods must be ever-maintained. The electorate must know the formal, literary terms to be used in common as the principles of natural law and their derived institutional forms of application. However, those words would remain merely vague ideas unless the meaning of the words were grounded empirically.

It is not permissible for a present generation to revere an institution merely as traditional. Ingenuous respect for tradition is merely blind prejudice, not comprehension. Obedience to traditional forms is the parent's and law's oppression of the evil potentialities of infantile behavior in the immature and in the instance of the erring adult. Each present generation of the electorate must be enabled to prove, from the standpoint of natural law, that the rule of universal natural law is necessary *today*, and must understand both the history of institutions, and their presently continued or outlived appropriateness from the standpoint of the same outlook and methods employed by our nation's founders. To this end, an informed will is not represented merely by a person who has learned to recite approved formulas in a canonical way. An informed will — the informed will of the electorate of a democratic republic — requires that knowledge be made *sensuous* for the will.

As we compare the institutions respectively appropriate to the United States and Soviet republics, our included concern is to make the principles of our own institutions *sensuously* comprehensible to the electorate, and to those leaders, at all levels, who have the duty to inform the electorate respecting the lawful determination of its vital interests.

The second point to be kept prominently in the back of the mind is our use of *norm*.

We are not using that term in its empiricist's or

pragmatist's sense — not in the behaviorist's sense. A constitutional republic — which, as we shall see, both the United States and the Soviet Union are — is not a fixed state of perfection, but an embodiment of a governing intent, an intent projected into institutions and instruments, which are directed in turn toward the ongoing realization of successive resulting improvements in the quality of human existence, *human perfection*. The *intended effect* of the adopted institutions and instruments represents the appropriate content of “norm” as we employ that term here. The norm is not properly a *fixed state* upon which to converge as the goal of some utopian perfection. It represents the mode in which the institutions and instruments are intended to affect in turn the way in which new conditions of the society are deliberately evolved.

At this juncture, neither the Soviet republic nor the United States conforms entirely in practice to its respective constitutional norms. Hence, it would be fruitless to attempt to base United States Soviet foreign policy upon a merely-descriptive comparison of their internal features at this juncture or even to date. For this purpose, we must define the United States in terms of what *is becoming* in the course of *resuming* its constitutional republican development. We must compare that process of *becoming* with a twofold approach to what the Soviet Union is *efficiently* in the process of becoming. To put the first point most crudely — as Walter Lippmann did, in effect, in 1943-1944 — is the Soviet constitution a fraud or an efficient intent? We must examine this, first, by comparing the Soviet constitutional intent as it is with the corresponding norms proper to our constitutional republic. We must then qualitatively refine that perception of the Soviet Union as it will change under the influence of the self-interested policies which the United States, as a capitalist constitutional republic, will be obliged to develop and pursue in the foreseeable course of present world developments.

We shall now proceed by taking up first the Soviet use of the term “dictatorship of the proletariat.” In view of the wretched quality of the output circulated in the name of “official Marxism-Leninism,” we shall not take the Soviets literally on the point. From the standpoint of their own relevant literature, they do not in fact know the meaning of the term in question. They have merely borrowed the term from Karl Marx, by way of V.I. Lenin (principally), and have attempted, without much perceptible success, to explain the associated significance of the institutions and instruments which Lenin (most notably) embedded into Soviet organic practice. Respecting the conception itself, we must turn directly to Marx, and then judge on that

basis how Soviet *organic* practice does or does not correspond to the proper significance of the term.

The further, broader appropriateness of the term “dictatorship,” as Karl Marx employed it, is that it is a most useful conceptual tool through which to develop a fresh, richer insight into the principled features of our own republic. In this connection, it must not be imagined that, because Marx's usage offends contemporary popular prejudices concerning the term itself, that Marx's usage was either inappropriate in general or an exaggeration. Although that usage of the term appears to be merely metaphorical and hyperbolic from the standpoint of today's ill-educated dictionary writers, Marx approached this from the standpoint of his professional qualifications as a qualified doctor of law.

The notion of a *republic*, notably from Dante Alighieri's *De Monarchia*, through John Milton, through the founders of our republic, is premised on knowledge of the conflict between universal and heteronomic perceptions of the vital self-interests of both humanity in general and nations in particular. The object of a republic is not to establish the rule of the few wise over the many ignorant — although that appearance will tend to arise. *The object of the republic is to mobilize the good within the individual citizen to rule over the evil within himself*. Hence, and correctly so, the same founding fathers who rigorously separated the church and state, appealed to the wisdom of the neo-platonic currents of (then) protestantism as the inspiration and authoritative wellspring of the notions of a republic. Not that Christian neo-platonic humanism was originally anything but a Catholic force: the American colonies and young republic were protestant, and appropriately seized upon the specific communality of wellsprings presently at hand.

The good, as we have developed that point in some detail, is evoked within the individual in respect of locating the agreement between his true self-interest and the universal self-interest of his society. That lawful self-interest is the necessity of technologically centered progress and the development and exercise of that political freedom within himself, which is the source of the power of society to fulfill its need for technologically centered progress. It is by connecting such universal knowledge to the individual's informed willful impulses, and by creating common institutions which are the active embodiment of that relationship, *institutions shaped according to that governing intent*, that the good within the individual is embodied within those institutions, and returned to him as the benefits generated by such a universal ordering of the domain of his private affairs.

That is the essence of our republic and our Constitution.

The specific feature of our republic — a democratic republic — was made possible for the same reasons that our American Revolution succeeded where the French Revolution failed. The special qualities of the American people of that time were that they were by far the most literate population of any nation of the world, and that, beyond the centerpiece of literacy, the family Bible, John Milton, John Bunyan, Shakespeare and so forth, were the typically humanist sources of their informed outlook. This would not have sufficed but for the leading role of newspaper publisher, scientist, and political organizer Benjamin Franklin. The Franklin and Franklin-influenced press of the American colonies — morally opposite to most of the dominant national news media of the United States today — represented the most vigorous expression of the humanist outlook with respect to the empirical conditions of life of our political forebears. It was this informed electorate which made possible the establishment of a *democratic* republic. *The people could be trusted to constitute themselves as a general electorate.*

The cruelest heritage of colonialism and semi-colonialism in many parts of the developing sector today is not that the majority of the population has been denied the habituated experience of democracy, but rather that it has been denied the development of the competence to rule themselves in their own vital self-interests. It is impossible to establish a viable *democratic* form of republic on the basis of an electorate steeped predominantly in the most marginal forms of agriculture, barbaric-like tribalist atavisms, and massive vagabondage and unassimilated urban lumpen populations.

The relationship of our largely-corrupted major national press to the seething Tory minority, the masses of liberals and radicals and the included lumpenized constituencies, illustrates the same principle. Their vicious heteronomy acts at the moment as a large degree of imperviousness to the influence of reason. "I don't understand that; I only know what I must immediately get for myself." Such heteronomic Tory fools are morally and intellectually far beneath the American general electorate of the late eighteenth century. They are functionally illiterate respecting natural law, and easy prey for any wicked demagogue who chooses to tug them — first this way, then that — by their foolish noses.

In notable historical precedents — some appropriate, some not — notably from Greek and Roman republican history, the rallying of a pre-capitalist population in behalf of a vital general interest was

embodied in the form of a *dictatorship* — a *popularly-established* dictatorship. That notion of a *popularly-established* dictatorship is in an important sense a kind of historical precedent for a capitalist republic.

A republic is a kind of lawfully ordered process by which a designated general electorate periodically selects — and impeaches! — its dictatorship. For modern purposes, the case of the Cromwell dictatorship within the English Commonwealth is the model clinical case of reference for the principal reasons a popularly-constituted dictatorship can go wrong. The Cromwell case of a *failed intent* shows how that *intent* must be developed to a degree beyond Cromwell's limited, one-sided *farmer's* perception, and what indispensable checks must be built into the powers and regulation of the dictatorship.

Hence, the form of the notion embedded in our republic, the usually misunderstood notion that ours is a *government of law, not men.*

The ingenuous and miseducated individual perceives that slogan to signify a government by *laws*, rather than *Law*. The misperception leads to the degraded notions of sovereignty associated with Justice Holmes. Positive law is man-made, and represents a government by men. Natural law is *man-discovered*. The perception of natural law properly determines its appropriate practical expression as *constitutional law*. Although constitutional law is man-made in one respect, it is not man-made in the same sense as ordinary legislative forms of positive law. The authority of legislative, or ordinary positive law in general, is properly specific *within the bounds of constitutional law*. It has in and of itself *no intrinsic moral authority*. By contrast, insofar as constitutional law is an efficient instrument of man-discovered natural law, that ostensibly man-made creation carries forward consciously the corresponding degree of moral authority from natural law.

It is constitutional law, *insofar as the constitutional law is actively conceptualized in respect of intent and content from the standpoint of natural law*, that represents *The Law for purposes of the republican conception of a government of law, not men.*

Only valid discovery bearing either upon the inappropriateness of constitutional law to natural law, or a valid discovery of qualitative significance concerning universal natural law, have the admissible moral authority to alter constitutional law. (41)

The additional general problem of dictatorship,

41. It is possible on principle for man to alter lawfully natural law itself. However, that involves the most advanced conceptions, which do not invalidate, in any case, the intent of the point as we make it above.

beyond what we have developed to this point, is that different social classes and factions of classes have characteristic self-interests which are out of correspondence with, or alternately in relatively greater agreement with the vital interests of whole societies. By one means or another, in one specific political form or another, these broad constituent forces within a society, either individually or in combinations, establish the rule of their perceived self-interest as the determining influence (dictatorship) on policies and practices of government. *That is, in itself, neither good nor bad.*

All modern forms of government are class dictatorships in that sense.

In the United States at this moment, we are mainly under the executive dictatorship of the monetarist faction associated with David Rockefeller. We ought to be, instead, under the dictatorship of an alliance of industrialist, trade-union and farmer political interests — *otherwise our government cannot be in correspondence with the intent of our Constitution.*

The Soviet Union is under the dictatorship of the Communist Party, a party sociologically based on the industrialist and labor strata, plus an agricultural component. The fact that this Communist Party is made up of elements which correspond to industrialists, labor, and farmers in the United States distinguishes the Soviet from the U.S. constitutional republic primarily only in the essential feature of public ownership of the principal means of production and distribution.

We shall shortly turn to examine that distinction more sharply from the standpoint of law. First, we shall round out the discussion of dictatorship.

Avoiding the fuller discussion the subject of dictatorship subsumes, no fallacy of composition arises if we now delimit our attention to the notion of dictatorship as applicable to *democratic forms* of republican government.

At the one extreme, a democratic republic involves the rule of government by a sociologically determined perception of the interest of the nation as a whole. Relative to contrary impulses within the general electorate, this social bias in governmental policy and related matters represents the dictatorship. At the other extreme, we have the protection of the individual rights and liberties of all citizens, and within that area, the smaller, subsumed area of the suffrage rights of a defined general electorate. Overall, the powers of the dictatorship and the principled nature of the rights and liberties of the citizenry are properly defined by constitutional law. Within the same constitutional framework, the rights and liberties of the electorate include *a defined process of deliberation in*


the selection of governing representatives by the individual acts of the electorate.

The corollary topic for this set of facts is the widespread delusion that a democracy is *less dictatorial* than a republic. This was fought out for the cause of the republic by John Milton (unsuccessfully), and was fought out (successfully) by Federalist Tom Paine on behalf of the authors of the Constitution as a whole. Milton and Paine were absolutely correct in recognizing that a democracy's flaws were inherently injurious to the vital interests of the nation and the individual liberties of the citizens. Because of the immaturity of the development of the population (as the large minority vote for Jimmy Carter attests), and the inadequacy of that population for the institutions and instruments of a direct election of government entirely by local interest, a democratic form of government must degenerate into an *unprincipled* government of demagogues. The ebbs and flows in government de facto "constitutional" policy inherent in such a heteronomic arrangement are contrary to the service of a persisting self-interest of the nation as a whole, and thus develop the basis for the most vicious dictatorship, by powerful demagogic self-interests playing upon and cultivating the very heteronomic impulses within the electorate which it is the essential function of government to check.

It is a fraud to suggest that a democratic republic deprives the citizen of any rights or liberties he or she would properly enjoy under a democracy. Rather, a constitutional republic compels the citizen to go through the reflective processes of reason respecting the general interest before he is permitted to exert his will effectively to alter important institutions and instruments of the republic. The proper view of the so-called "checks and balances" within our own constitutional forms is absolutely *not* that they act to balance off conflicting heteronomic tendencies; their intent and proper employment is to force a rational and knowledgeable reflection upon the general interest *in terms defined by the essential connection between natural law and constitutional law.*

In all respects, the intent of constitutional law — and the subsumed question of the efficiency of institutions and instruments with respect to that intent — is the only competent basis for comprehension and application of constitutional law. It is on precisely that vital point that the Tory subversion of our government and law is revealed in its sharpest focus.

The question of the weighting of influence over institutions by various classes and factions of classes (and we are continuing to speak of a democratic republic) is the location of the expression of dictatorship. The commitment of our Constitution and



John Quincy Adams, who articulated the notion of "community of principle" to describe the fundamental tenet of the foreign policy of the United States' Federalist Founding Fathers.

republic from the inception to the principle of technologically centered progress is the most essential of those aspects of our constitutional law which properly give precedence of weight (today) to the influence of industrialists and the labor movement. The quality of the Constitution and republic in this respect is not embedded merely in the Constitution's formalities as such, but in the circumstances of the American Revolution in which these institutions and instruments were established. It is the commitment to the Idea of Progress by the founding electorate — not only the

authors of the Constitution — which had itself been shaped in its outlook by the issues and course of the American Revolution, which is decisive.

The political dictatorship of industrialists and labor (coinciding with that of the smaller population of technology-proud farmers), is not effected by placing industrial capitalists and labor leaders in government positions. That may occur, but that is not the point to consider. A democratic republic is characteristically (best) led by the predominance of a certain type of intellectual *cast in the tradition of the founding*

fathers. These were and should be intellectuals who have made a profession of organizing the opinions and persons of forces of the general electorate, in behalf of a principled demonstration of a positive connection in consequences between a general national interest and the immediate, proper self-interests of the individual citizen. In a republic in which technological progress in industrial development is the characteristic realization of the general interest, as in the case of the American Revolution and the founding of the republic, the general interest is most immediately expressed in terms of the interests of industry, industrial labor, and technologically-progressive farmers. Today, as scientists and engineers tend toward becoming, and must become an increasing proportion of the general electorate, that aspect of the sociology of the electorate develops a new quality of importance. It is the concerted expression of the more immediate perception of self-interest by industrialists and labor which acts — properly — like a political battering ram in shaping the opinions and determining the preponderance of forces (under fortunate circumstances) throughout the electorate. The heteronomic tendencies more characteristic of the non-technologically-oriented petit-bourgeois and lumpenized strata are made to become relatively impotent before the concerted forces represented by the mobilization of the two pro-development classes' forces and their allies. That is the way dictatorship properly functions under the constitutional law of our democratic republic. It is the so-determined perception of national self-interest, represented as the preponderant (not the only) elected force within institutions of government, which is the essence of the proper functioning of our constitutional law.

As should already be implicitly clear, the conceptual problem most often encountered, the source of the loss of intellectual capacity to understand our constitutional law and institutions, is the reductionist point of view which (heteronomically) mislocates the self-interests of the electorate "pluralistically."

In such wretched, anti-humanistic outlooks — most common to our disoriented liberals and radicals — the nation is conceived as a Tory freak show.

If you are black-skinned, or have a hispanic background, or are a woman, or live in a slum, and so forth — ad nauseam — it is the perception of neo-Fabian doctrine that your membership in any such categories defines your self-interest in an axiomatically different way than that of any other persons not sharing the precise set of distinctions which are thus defined as intersecting your condition to be embodied in your person. In that specific respect, the neo-Fabian doctrine is identical with the Nazi doctrine of *Volksgemeinschaft* and its corollaries. It was nothing

but that neo-Fabian's *fascist* doctrinal definition of "democracy" which the unfortunate Representative Barbara Jordan presented in her principal address to the 1976 New York City Democratic Party Convention.

Contrary to Barbara Jordan and her mentors, neither the human race, nor the population of the United States, is a carnival freak show or a zoo.

Many of the conditions upon which the neo-Fabians premise their zoological specifications of micro-constituencies' self-interests represent conditions which — while existing — are abhorrent to us. Shall we keep slum dwellers in slums, so as to defend the integrity of that constituency? Do black-skinned citizens, then, desire a separate black drinking fountain, a separate black lavatory, a black section set aside in the rear of the bus, so that the separate needs of blacks can be thus celebrated? What sort of bestial swill was duped Barbara Jordan — however thoughtlessly — proposing in fact? She was proposing, in one respect, to turn the White House itself into a freak show — but let that pass without further comment once the lawful connection is noted.

The point of considering Barbara Jordan's cited, pro-fascist aberrations is that the bestial implications of her formulation express in hideous detail exactly why Tom Paine defended the constitutional republic against the obscenities inherent in the ill-advised contemplations of a democracy. It is not possible to identify the rights and liberties of a nation's human beings in the form of political institutions better adapted to the perpetuation of a political freak show. The law of the republic respecting the rights, privileges and fundamental self-interests of its citizens is hostile to those kinds of distinctions among human beings which would be proper to the classification of varieties of monkeys and baboons.

On behalf of law, we recognize the industrialist interest. Similarly, we recognize the farmer interest. So, we recognize the interest of labor. So, we recognize the rights and interests of our geographic political sub-entities, as institutions indispensable to our economy and our citizens as a whole. So, we recognize the obligation to right injustices, to moderate inequities of privilege — *insofar as such distinctions taint the essential rights and liberties of the citizen as a citizen*. These are the essential, derived expressions of our general national interest. We do not recognize these "special interests" because they are special interests. We recognize special interests only as they are a meaningful refraction of our national interest according to natural law and its constitutional expression. No other sort of special interest has any rightful standing before law, and it is incompetence and fraud to profess the contrary.

U.S. Soviet Policy

Our interest, thus, to summarize again as background to the Soviet corollaries, is what we have set forth before. Our only primary interest according to natural law is that notion of progress for which technological progress is the most characteristic and determining feature. The only specific interest which we acknowledge as fundamental within that context is the principle of the constitutional republic as the only efficient instrument for the positive expression of political freedom and for the regulation of toleration as agreeable to the practical circumstances of our nation and the world at this point in the progress of self-development of our species.

The primary distinction in constitutional law between the United States and the Soviet Union is that U.S. law defines private ownership of the basic means of production and distribution as an area of *positive forms of political toleration*, whereas the Soviet constitution brings those same areas entirely *within the direct administration of positive law*. All the other proper aspects of essential distinction between the two republics are historically determined corollaries of that central distinction.

Not only is that the *primary* distinction within the constitutional law of the two, respective republics. It is the feature of constitutional distinctions on which all important political differences between those nations have been — rightly or wrongly — premised. Conversely, hypothetically or actually, under the conditions in which the Soviet constitution defends capitalist liberties within the United States, and the United States Constitution directs our nation to defend self-interestedly the alternate political form in the Soviet republic, all the organic premises for adversary or potential-adversary relationship between the two nations evaporate.

Furthermore, if that acceptance of the specific, subsumed constitutional distinctions between the two states is mutually accepted, and also the United States and Soviet Union are constitutional republics in

presently efficient intent, under such conditions the Soviet foreign policy of the United States is based on a community of principle.

Our immediate objective, in this sub-portion of our inquiry, is to determine, as a matter of principle and fact, whether the reestablishment of constitutional government in the United States subsumes the conditions and preconditions under which such a community of principle might be directly established or approached.

What we have just stated concerning the kernel of the problem — *in the way in which we have stated that — implicitly* solves all of the principled, generative problematics of our nation's Soviet foreign policy.

The problem immediately associated with that implication is that up to this point, neither a majority of the representatives and electorate of the United States nor the corresponding forces of the Soviet Union have properly comprehended the facts upon which such formulations must be premised. In this the writer is not speaking of the United States under Tory rule — in which case war between the two powers is irrepressibly imminent; he is writing as a spokesman for the "new Federalist" or Whig majority forces of our nation. Even after eliminating Tory control of our government, neither the Whig majority of the representatives and electorate of our nation, nor the corresponding forces in the Soviet Union have yet assimilated the form and degree of rigorous insight into this problem to act efficiently according to the proper implications. This we must promptly correct.

The most prominent of the associated difficulties is that the representatives of the indicated forces in both republics have committed, in the main, the recurring fallacy of prejudice which we have systematically defined in several locations above. That is to emphasize, they have viewed the existence of the distinguishing constitutional institutions of their nation more or less *as self-evidently traditional*. They have not understood the inner, active content of those institutions as

(primarily) lawfully determined. They view those institutions as if they were to be defined as self-evident particles.

To describe those prejudices in their worst expression on both sides:

In the United States, there persists a strong tendency among the ingenuous to regard the institutions of capitalist ownership in terms of the progress of primeval capitalist germs dated more or less from the Creation. They know neither the fact, nor the significance of the fact that modern industrial capitalist forms were established by choice during the sixteenth century. Although that choice of capitalism had, in some part, the effect of bringing order out of chaotic proto-capitalist eruptions on a small scale beginning approximately the thirteenth century in England, the roots of an order of law appropriate to creating industrial capitalist political forms of ownership date from sixteenth century Tudor England. The layman does not know, or at best does not understand the implications of the fact, that the establishment of the Constitution and republic of the United States represented the first time in history that the institutions of industrial capitalist political forms of ownership were secured in terms of a coherent body of constitutional law — that, which cannot be overemphasied, the American Revolution was an industrial capitalist revolution against British “pseudo-feudal” monetarism.

Not understanding that the industrial capitalist forms of ownership were willfully established for a universal, lawful purpose, it follows that ignorant pro-capitalist prejudice, viewing capitalist political forms as merely traditional, attributes the good within those forms to be derived from an axiomatic capitalist form of “intrinsic goodness,” and thus foolishly regards the absence of such special political institutions as necessarily evil.

Ignorant Communists’ prejudice returns the compliment, so to speak. Although such Communists genuflect before Marx’s stipulation that industrial capitalist development has been a great step forward in human development — because this statement is attributed variously to Karl Marx and V.I. Lenin — *they do not believe it.*

We are not speaking of Communists as a whole. The rule-of-thumb dividing line between intelligent Communists and Soviet and leading fools calling themselves “Communists” is represented by the ongoing factional difference of approximately two decades to date, between those Soviet and Eastern European forces which regard the Rockefellers as exemplifying the Soviets’ adversary within the United States, and those poor fools who support *agreement for practice* alliances with the “realist” Rockefellers against the “military-industrial complex.”

The Soviet “Tories” associated with the Arbatov Doctrine regard what Marx and Lenin defined as the progressive force within capitalist development as the adversary, and ally themselves with those anti-industrialist forces whose hegemony is the immediate cause and proper motive for socialist transformations.

What monstrous fools they are, those Soviet “Tories.” Seized by their abominable stupidity, they profess themselves to be pursuing peace, when in practice they are contributing, from their side, to the preconditions for irreversible impulses leading directly and early into general thermonuclear holocaust.

To account for the insanity of Communists who support the lunatic Arbatov Doctrine, one has to recognize principally the carry-forward of pseudo-feudal Physiocratic attitudes of peasant hostility against industrial development. The stinking political mess of Soviet agriculture, and those Communist Party strata who defend such bungling or who ally with the bunglers, is the centerpiece of the problem.

The agricultural budget for the projected new Soviet plan exemplifies the way in which issues of Soviet domestic and foreign policy are intermixed. Granted, the lag in the technological development of Soviet agriculture is a crucial internal problem, the principal internal bottleneck of the Soviet economy. In that respect, the agricultural budget within the projected Soviet Plan appears to concur with what this writer has proposed to the Soviets and others as a point of emphasis *under the terms made possible by a new monetary system.* However, there is a stratum within the Soviet leadership which foolishly views this same remedy in a way directly opposite to the analysis and proposals made by this writer.

Oblomov denies reality — because Oblomov, a Russian *kulak* in his sociological heart, is Oblomov. Oblomov says: “Forget all these political-economic realities of the outside world — which, since I do not choose to understand them, cannot be of much practical importance for Great Mother Russia’s internal affairs.” Oblomov insists: “We must ignore such matters — which are above my head — to the extent possible. Great Mother Russia must deal with the agricultural problem as a purely internal matter.” It is essential to smell the stink of the kulak mentality in this, to thus comprehend how deeply this streak of narrow, heteronomic kulak “shrewdness” penetrates into certain Soviet strata.

How, then, does “shrewd,” fantasy-ridden Oblomov see the problem of the projected Soviet plan?

Kulak-Oblomov sees the agricultural problem as a matter of competition against the Soviet industrial development programs. Since Soviet industrial development has been enslaved not only to military impera-

tives, but also the associated economic-strategic circumstances of Soviet life, it is these two aspects of Soviet development which Oblomov sees as his factional obstacles within Great Mother Russia. These military programs and the stress upon technological progress of industry are what “shrewd,” stubborn, foolish, heteronomic Oblomov views — oh, so kulak-shrewdly! — as his factional problems.

Oblomov is all the more deeply embittered by the complaints which the military and industrial forces say — most uncharitably — concerning the administration of the agricultural sector.

The industrialist point of view says: “What good is it to simply increase your allocation under the plan? We agree with the objectives and the imperatives; there is no issue on that part of the matter. It is your bungling political maladministration of the problem to which we object. You have made your incompetence a bottomless sinkhole into which we pour tens of billions of rubles — and what do we get?”

“We give you tractors. We have spent billions developing tractors with the same technology we use for Soviet tanks, which tanks are the best in the world. What then is the fate of these tractors, once we deliver them to you? It is the same thing with everything else.

“Do not instruct us that the peasant is stubborn. We know the Soviet peasant better than you do; from where do you imagine that Soviet industry recruited its labor force — perhaps from the pages of *Das Kapital*?”

“And what do you do? How do you attempt to induce the peasant to improve his production on the state farms? You turn him into a NEPman! You transform the cooperatives and collective farms into a grotesque parody of feudalism — you direct the peasant to work so many hours on the collective’s “estate,” and so retain so many hours for his own, private, NEPman’s patch. Is the tractor maintained then? No, our peasants, who you in your idiocy have turned back into a caricature of feudal agricultural relations, flee from the state sector as quickly as possible, to save their time and energy for their little serfs’ patches. What do you know of socialist production? You have not yet reached the level of capitalist production!”

The military spokesman echoes this! “The same peasant who can not maintain a tractor under your direction is an excellent tank operator and maintenance specialist, and does many similar duties very well in the Red Army.”

Oblomov seethes with bitterness. He is enraged, not because such justified insults are often said publicly, but because he knows that the industrialist and military spokesmen are thinking such cruel things.

Oblomov is a Bukharinite. Not necessarily, in the main, because he is a conscious descendant of the

1924-1929 Bukharin-Tomsky-Rykov faction, but because his sociological outlook makes him a spiritual heir to that tradition.

This is relevant to that fact that Soviet “hard-liners” are self-identified as *Stalinists*. The thematic key to that self-identification is the Stalin-Bukharin split over the First Five Year Plan. Sociologically, from a “Western” standpoint, Stalinism is viewed mainly in terms of the hypostasized resultant of the intermixture of conflicting sociological tendencies within the Soviet leadership as a whole. Throughout the shifting patterns of correlations of social tendencies within the Soviet leadership, what the foreign observer tends to see is not the process, but its expression in the shifting patterns of a kind of overall Soviet “bi-partisan foreign policy.” To the shallow-thinking observer of the “Western” world, the significance of today’s Stalinism is locatable in the Stalin-Trotsky fight. To understand the reality of the matter from the inside of the Soviet Union, one must see the issue in terms of the underlying fight between E. Preobrazhensky and N. Bukharin. The methodological blunder we are exposing in this connection is the blunder of taking a determined phenomenon as if it were a distinct thing-in-itself, and making the result an attributed consequence of a corresponding, fictive homogeneous causal impulse.

It is that duality within Soviet leadership which has determined to date the lawful recurrence of patterns. In this respect, the Bukharinite 1924-1927 period’s succession by the ferocity of collectivization, and the succession of wishful confidence (that Hitler was not yet ready to attack) by the 1942-1943 launching of the Red Army’s juggernaut counteroffensive, typify the same pattern which lawfully operates today. It is the wishful stupidity of the overconfident Atlanticists, who imagine that David Rockefeller and Richard Barnet have the Soviet Politburo permanently by the nose, that will inevitably repeat the old pattern as World War III.

Oblomov’s essential characteristic is *to attempt to deny the existence of interconnections between Mother Russia’s relationship to the “outside world,” and what are foolishly defined as the relatively autarkical internal relations of Great Mother Russia’s family household.* When it is made sensuously apparent to him that the “outsider” is directly engaged in attempting to rape Mother Russia, the same, ordinarily withdrawn Oblomov flies into an uncontrollable nationalist rage.

It is the dependency of the industrialist sociological current on political blocs with the Oblomovist-centered, more backward strata within the Soviet party and state apparatus which brings a duality into the determination of Soviet foreign and domestic postures,

and into the propaganda posture which the leadership presents as the "line" to both the foreign and domestic populations.

Neither Stalin nor Trotsky are clear-cut examples of either social current — hence the absurdity of those influential strands of U.S. Soviet foreign policy analysis which attempt to shape the facts to fit the Stalin-Trotsky fiction.

L.D. Trotsky was the son of a relatively well-to-do Russian Jewish peasant family. This was a personal basis in experience which aided Trotsky in shaping strategic policy for the Civil War period of the Red Army's development, and which aided him in adding a valuable element to the "scissors" theses otherwise developed by E. Preobrazhensky. (42) That contribution was Trotsky's valid political insight into the duality of the political composition of tendencies of the Russian peasantry, and the necessity of winning the peasantry to a performance-credible policy of "saving."

The broader significance of this same point is that although Trotsky was a brilliant political thinker, these were the accomplishments of his *persona* — to the extent that he could never overcome the persisting nightmare of his conflicting heteronomic peasant outlook. For similar reasons, he could never independently master the essential features of theoretical economics or science generally — although his brilliant *persona*-side enabled him to rationally acknowledge and assimilate such contributions *by others*.

For psychologically lawful reasons, Trotsky's psychological weaknesses reduced his potentialities to that of at best a "number two man." Although his *critical* standpoint, insofar as he was not thinking from the standpoint of assuming *primary* responsibility for *implementing* a policy, appears — because of its frequent brilliance — to be the competence of a potential successor to Lenin, Trotsky could no more be a leader of that sort than a goldfish can prevent itself from continuing to swim in tight circles when dumped from its customary bowl into a bathtub. Trotsky fought heroically and stubbornly against the heteronomic impulses of his peasant soul, but he only contained it; he never freed himself fully from its Oblomovist control. Trotsky was thus one of those brilliant individuals who cannot function without a patron. (43)

Stalin, with all his complexities, was a Bolshevik version of Machiavelli's Prince, the master of power from the standpoint of combinatorial politics and the

plotting intrinsic to such arts. In embracing the combination as a whole, his identity and self-image became that of a popular dictator embodying in himself the primary self-interest as represented by the combination itself. That institutionalization of himself became his controlling self-image — a Soviet Oliver Cromwell. (44)

What today's professed Stalinist sees predominantly is not the contradictions embodied in Stalin, but Stalin belatedly seizing Preobrazhensky's analysis, and continuing that as the guiding perception of the characteristic self-interest of *the combination* thereafter. The Soviet Stalinist abstracts that moment from Stalin's leadership, that moment in its *resultant* form, and reflexively attributes that adduced aspect as the homogeneously-characteristic Stalin impulse.

The Stalin constitution of the Soviet republic has the intent of transferring the personalized role of Stalin the dictator to the lawful organic democratic-republican institutions of a republic *after him*. That constitution and associated constitutional tradition is viable as it embodies the "Preobrazhenskian" *moment*; it is corrupted by its implicit denial of the problems associated with the principle of combination.

Both the positive and flawed features of that constitutional tradition — as an organic, embedded tradition of willful practice — carry forward directly into the problems presently focused internally around the projected agricultural component of the five-year plan. It is also in this specific respect that the curtailments of *political freedom* within the Soviet republic — as we have defined freedom — are causally mediated. The abuses of law within the Soviet republic are generated by the constraints placed upon those proper expressions of freedom which are checked and oppressed to the extent that they are viewed as leading, in turn, toward provoking a decisive open resolution of the essentially irrepressible conflicts between the two principal social tendencies embodied within the combination.

This is generatively causal of the persisting stupidity which characterizes most of "official Marxism-Leninism." Just as the ignorant, tradition-oriented perception of capitalist political forms of ownership within the United States contributes to stupidities within the U.S. Soviet foreign policy, so the stupidities we have just located within Soviet thinking are the principal, internal-Soviet obstacle to establishing a *community of principle* in fact.

To resume, now, our complementary focus, on the significance of industrial-capitalist political forms of

42. Evgeny Preobrazhensky, *The New Economics*, trans. by Brian Pearce (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1965), 330 pp.

43. L. Marcus (Lyndon LaRouche) and K. Gandhi, "The Passion and Second Coming of L.D. Trotsky," *The Campaigner*, Vol. VII, No. 8 (Summer, 1974), pp. 34-68.

44. Lyndon LaRouche, "The Question of Stalinism Today," *The Campaigner*, Vol. VIII, No. 9 (Nov. 1975).

ownership under the intent of our Constitution and republic:

The standpoint of the intent of our Constitutional republic is not that of *axiomatically* adopting capitalist political forms of ownership as a pre-given element of law. Hamilton and Jefferson, among others, are emphatic respecting the *conditional* right of any specific capitalist ownership to exist only to the extent that it does not conflict in practice with the vital interests of the nation *as might be defined without respect to capitalist forms*.

For example. When the demands of the New York City debt-holders could be met only at the expense of the vital interests of the people of New York City, it was unconstitutional and implicitly treasonous for New York State Governor Hugh Carey and other judicial, executive, and legislative bodies to perpetuate the interests of debt-ownership at the expense of the vital interests of the City and State population and nation as a whole. Such actions represent in themselves sufficient grounds in constitutional law for prompt impeachment actions against all the officials responsible.

This does not mean that mere summary repudiation of debts was the axiomatic constitutional remedy. The state is obliged to consider the chain-reaction repercussions of partially or entirely suspending New York City debt service payments. *It must protect the vital interests of the nation* respecting technological progress and the maintenance of institutions of credit indispensable to the economy as a whole. This does not prescribe saving Chase Manhattan Bank by government "bailout." It means that *if* Chase Manhattan Bank and other institutions *must* be pushed into bankruptcy because of vital interests of the nation, any essential function performed by such bankrupt institutions must be either perpetuated under conditions of financial reorganization in bankruptcy, or alternate means of serving the affected vital national interests be efficiently, promptly provided.

Where, otherwise, contractual rights conflict with the vital national interests as defined by the intent of our Constitutional republic, the rights of contract are axiomatically to be nullified in behalf of the national interest. Every Federal court is obliged to strictly apply that rule in all relevant instances. The court must either itself directly nullify the contractual obligations as required by national interest, or must suspend that right while directing the resolution of the procedures of financial reorganization to the action of executive and legislative branches of government.

Under the content and clear intent of the Constitution and republic's founding, there exists no axiomatically "sacred" right to capitalist political forms of

ownership — no more than personal incomes are exempt from taxation, or the persons of our citizens exempt from military conscription. Rather the rights delegated to agencies and persons by constitutional law are protected from all invasions, except those intrusions which fall under appropriate due process within the intent of constitutional law. The rights respecting the political freedoms of citizens represent the highest priority of categorical right. Although the right to develop capitalist forms of ownership is a principal right *added* to the right of personality under a capitalist form of democratic republic — hence, its great power under law — it is not a categorically inalienable right, but a right created by constitutional law to the advantage of the vital interests of the republic.

It is a corollary of this to emphasize afresh that the constitutional government is not established primarily to enforce a system of explicit and implicit contractual agreements among the constituent persons and agencies of the society. Rather, constitutional law delimits contractual forms of relationship to those forms and methods deemed consistent with the national interest as a whole. Nor does the legality of a contract once-existing exist in perpetuity because it was formerly lawful. Such rights are as much defined in respect to the circumstances in which their perpetuation is attempted as the circumstances under which they are initially exercised.

The constitutional right to capitalist forms of property in the means of production and distribution was adopted because no alternate, efficient means existed in practice for the application of the principle of freedom to the tasks of technologically centered general progress. The inability of the society to competently *predetermine* what technological innovations and applications would be most fruitful for progress, and in what manner of development and use, warranted — and required — the establishment of the area of development of technological innovations as *an area of positive toleration*. Since the testing of germ forms of such innovations could not be efficiently completed apart from basic forms of production and commerce, this and economic considerations required the application of the essential fictions of positive toleration to the corresponding areas of production and commerce.

For related reasons, the notion of the liberties and rights of capitalist ownership is inseparable from the notion of the stated or implicit *intent* of the articles of incorporation of a capitalist firm. The same principle is implicitly applicable to the privately held firm. This must not properly delimit the existence of such an entity to its initial intent. The *intent* undergoes proper evolutionary shifts. However, the currently adducible

intent associated with capitalist political forms of ownership for production and commerce is properly the key complementary feature of the ownership itself for lawfully defining the rights of ownership.

It is pure nonsense and reckless mythology to imagine that government placed itself therefore at a distance from production, commerce and so forth. Our government came into being as a federal republic in significant part because the Confederation failed, among its other incompetencies, to develop canals. The railroads were built — in chief — on the initiative and through the grants and aid provided by government. Wherever the need for a form of production and commerce — or services — is clearly predefined — *predeterminable* — the basis for delegating that to capitalist political forms tends to evaporate. Historically, either government has undertaken that economic activity independently, has acted as “prime contractor” for a joint effort of government and capitalist firms, or has donated the fruits of government production to continued development and operation under capitalist forms of ownership.

Broadly, capitalist political forms exist because they suited our purposes, and most specifically because they represented the only efficient instrument of the republic for accomplishing those aspects of the tasks of freedom most directly associated with technological progress. As long as the republic is persuaded that equally efficient alternative instruments are not readily available in practice, we shall preserve the capitalist political forms as rights and liberties — rights and liberties circumscribed by vital national interests.

Granted, our constitutional republic did not create capitalist forms *de novo* — they did not leap as original creations from the Constitution as Minervas from the brow of Jove. They represented an existing alternative, a heritage, principally, of the Tudor and Commonwealth revolutions. They had been developed to a certain extent and tested. We adopted them as proven instruments of national interest. Moreover, we fought for such institutions against Britain — we fought for industrial capitalism against the embodied anti-capitalist British doctrines of Adam Smith. It was American working men who provided the core of the hard fighting in that cause.

Conversely, although the maintenance even of existing modes of productive technology is always in our immediately most vital national interest, if the principle of development of technology is repudiated by a capitalist corporation, and so forth, then the principle of freedom has been virtually extinguished by such a capitalist. According to the intent of constitutional law, such a capitalist has to that extent in fact nullified the validity of his property rights.

For example, the maintenance of ownership rights of a slumlord is properly seen as an abhorrence from the standpoint of capitalist constitutional law. Those others who are directly complicit in perpetuating the slumlord practice have similarly nullified their constitutionally derived rights of ownership to a corresponding degree.

That is not merely a rigorous principle derived from constitutional law. It is an historical fact of capitalist development. This is a point concerning which Karl Marx confronted the greatest conceptual difficulties, because of his error in attempting to employ early nineteenth century British capitalist development as a clinical model of reference for analysis of capitalism in general. The struggle between industrial capitalism and the opposing ground-rent interests has been historically the centerpiece of capitalist development. Correspondingly, the worst horrors incurred in the course of capitalist development have been causally correlated with industrial-capitalist retreats of accommodation to or subordination to the ground-rent interest. It is the rigorously derived application of the intent of our Constitutional law and the supporting evidence of practice that the rights of ground rent are at most a negatively tolerated liberty within the strict reading of that law.

The proper approach to defining the distinctions of the Soviet constitution respecting political forms of ownership is within the framework of the notions of constitutional law we have applied to the capitalist property forms. Only by such approaches can we obtain the coherence of conception necessary for purposes of lawfully defining a community of principle.

The method of law for that case, as for our own, is the historical method as we have presented and illustrated it in this policy study.

There is no other approach to consider as a possible alternative. The pretense that there exists a body of *international law* comparable to our own constitutional law is utter rubbish. Such international law exists presently neither in fact nor implicit principle.

Among the nations of the world, there exist to date only four viable original currents of constitutional law: The United States, France, Mexico, and the Soviet Union. Otherwise, the only formulated doctrine of constitutional law available is that doctrine of *feudal law* associated most prominently with the work of Thomas Aquinas.

The only notable effort to establish the kernel of an articulated body of international law was the effort of Justice Jackson and others respecting the so-called Nuremberg Law. That effort had two defects. Jackson's method was intrinsically scholastic and not an expression of modern constitutional law as typified

by the character of intent within both the United States and Soviet constitutional law. The humanist doctrines peculiar to scholasticism are the content of each of the determinations of indictable offenses adopted. That was a shortcoming, not a crippling defect of Justice Jackson's contribution (in particular). If the Nuremberg Code had been made an efficient kernel for establishing a body of international law, we might have advanced to more modern conceptions from that first step. Unfortunately, principally because the application of the Law was delimited in application to selected notable and token-exemplary cases within the scope of Nazi and Nazi occupation practices — thus, inclusively, letting the Rockefeller interests off scot-free — the Nuremberg Law was made a hideous travesty.

Constitutional law exists in existing original forms, as we have just noted, for the cases of the United States (Franklin et al.), France (de Gaulle et al.), Mexico (Obregon et al.), and the Soviet Union (Lenin, Stalin). These original forms have, in two notable cases, been replicated in other nation's constitutions: the models of the United States and the Soviet Union. These replications are not efficient except in cases of socialist countries, including Yugoslavia. Most of the constitutions otherwise adopted by nations are showcase pieces pasted onto national positive and customary law, constitutions which do not efficiently order the law as a whole, and whose shallow-minded, eclectic character renders them essentially worthless as instruments for the purpose of generating constitutional coherence in the law as a whole. In the four cases cited, the constitutional law was developed through a painful experience of revolutionary and comparable struggles. During those struggles, the need for governance by a single coherent principle of law, a law empirically determined in approximate appropriateness to natural law, was defined in conception and practice, and made the conscious commitment adopted by the majority of that electorate which established the law.

The United States' vital interests prescribe its commitment to premise its domestic and foreign policies upon conceptions of natural law appropriately expressed as coherent constitutional law. In defining our foreign policy, we do not proceed from what other nations may regard as law, but from what we know to be the necessary constitutional character of national and international law.

We respect the fact that the capacity of national leaders and electorates to reach a competent perception of natural and constitutional law has been developed heretofore only under conditions of extended crises of the sort associated with prolonged revolutions and wars. Consequently, we have

toleration for the lack of competent perception of law in other nations, but our relations with such nations are nonetheless positively generated according to our neo-platonic humanist notions of natural and constitutional law.

The Soviet republic was created as an extension of the leadership of V.I. Lenin. That is the indispensable key to a lawful determination of its constitutional character.

The political mobilization initiated and led by Lenin was initially defined according to the policies set forth by Karl Marx in the Communist Manifesto, and as exemplified by Marx's active support of the U.S. government of Abraham Lincoln. Lenin's commitment, and the commitment around which the Bolshevik cadre and its following were developed, was to mobilize an independent political labor movement as an indispensable included instrument for establishing a Russian capitalist republic.

This perspective was abandoned because the Russian capitalists refused to break with those foreign financier forces, centered in the City of London, which directly and indirectly looted a major amount of ground rent from Russian agriculture and primary commodity extraction. For that reason, the Russian capitalists refused to proceed with the establishment of capitalist political reforms in Russian agricultural production, a refusal which made Russian industrial capitalist development impossible under capitalist political forms.

For this reason, under Lenin's leadership, the Bolsheviks and their allies, acting through the ruling institutions of the existing government, the Soviets, to become the government, undertook the industrial development of Russia without the capitalists.

From the standpoint of natural and associated constitutional law, the Russian Revolution of October 1917 is identical before such law with the American Revolution. It was a revolt against a Tory regime — the pawn of (principally) the City of London — for the purpose of establishing the national political institutions necessary to industrial capitalist economic forms of development.

The characteristic internal distinction between the American and Russian October revolutions is the opposite role performed by the national capitalists in the two cases. In the American Revolution, the capitalists, in support of Benjamin Franklin et al., led the revolution. In the October Revolution, the national capitalists joined the foreign colonial forces' "Tory" opposition.

That, we insist, is the standing of the October revolution before the law, and is exemplary of the principle governing the occurrence of socialist

transformations within a world order under the rule of appropriate constitutional notions of natural law. That, we insist is the generating principle of law within U.S. foreign policy directing our relationships to both capitalist and socialist republics, and also concerning the occurrence of socialist transformations within a previously capitalist nation.

As a corollary, we repudiate the Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt doctrines respecting the notion of conditional sovereignty as exemplified in their practice for the cases of Mexico and the Soviet Union.

Current Soviet doctrine conforms imperfectly to the policy conceptions we have just prescribed. At the outset of the Soviet republic, Lenin, Trotsky and others correctly accounted for the ruling necessity of the political transformation to a dictatorship of the political labor movement. To that extent, that conscious statement of policy and the prescribed conception concur in a most essential aspect. However, their historical analysis of the origins of the necessity thus cited is imperfect, in that it attributes the conditions produced by monetarism to the intrinsic character of industrial capitalist development. That error is flagrantly developed as an included element in Lenin's *Imperialism* and Trotsky's deviant but complementary special doctrine of "permanent revolution." The perpetuation and aggravation of that included flaw as present Soviet doctrine is an obstacle to establishing a positive formulation of a community of principle.

If the Soviet republic abandons the erroneous and disorienting doctrine to which we have referred, and adopts, instead, the constitutional doctrine for lawful socialist transformations we have enunciated, then the basis for a positive treaty based on community of principle exists between the Soviet republic and a "new Federalist" government of the United States.

The remaining internal Soviet problems of our nation's Soviet foreign policy are the residual difficulties we must clarify here respecting the internal features of the Soviet republic as a republic.

We must accept, *according to the rule of natural and subsumed constitutional law*, both the absence of political institutions and practices peculiar to capitalist political forms of ownership of basic means of production and distribution. We will be obliged also to accept the present absence of provision for existence of political parties and related instruments whose purpose would be that citizens of the Soviet republic attempt to establish capitalist political forms of ownership. Neither of these restrictive features of Soviet internal life represents in fact, according to natural and properly associated constitutional law, a lack of positive political freedom within the Soviet

republic. We agree to accept those and associated features of the Soviet republic as a dictatorship of the political labor movement according to the specifications for a republic we have developed earlier in this policy study. *These are necessary treaty specifications of any efficient, positive agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union pursuant to establishing or approaching relations based upon community of principle.*

The second of the two points will tend to stick in some craws: "What about Communist parties in the United States?" In this connection — and we concede the difficulties the problem presents to some bodies of opinion — *it is necessary to understand clearly what we are saying*, what we are agreeing to *in fact*, and not to be stuck in some scholastic nightmare of *quid pro quo* among empty political-legal fictions.

We are not stipulating by law that the United States — a capitalist republic by law — has "traded away" the aspirations of pro-capitalist U.S. citizens for the possibility of a capitalist transformation within the USSR. No President or Congress of the United States has the power to make *that sort of stipulation*, either in principle or in fact. What we are doing — and must do — is to break off those pre-existing connections of United States policy *to internal Soviet affairs* which are historically derivative of the varying degrees of adversary and potential-adversary relationships between the two powers and their respective allies during a period of sixty years. *What we are doing is to repeal Zbigniew Brzezinski and his ilk*, and in the appropriately definitive way. The point is to get a clean slate in these matters.

The answer to the objection is clearer, from the standpoint of fact, once we review the history of the Communist organizations in the industrialized capitalist nations, and set the implications of that history in the special context of the circumstance in which the present writer is either President of the United States or is otherwise a leading influence in national policy.

The immediate point of historical fact to be made concerning the Communist parties in the OECD countries is: *it doesn't function*. At the most — meaning the Communist parties of Italy and France — those parties are reformist parties of the social democratic type, for better or worse. With few exceptions, the small Communist parties are owned top-down, lock, stock and barrel by the Rockefellers or allied monetarists' political-intelligence networks, networks which also own large segments of the leadership of the French (Kanapa, Marchais, et al.) and Italian (Amendola, Berlinguer, Segre et al.) parties. This state of affairs is not in fact a recent

development. Beginning with the foundation of the Communist International at the end of World War I, and by qualitative stages at successive points thereafter, the leadership of the Communist International outside the Soviet Union was effectively taken over *from the inside* by Anglo-American and related political-intelligence networks.

Under conditions in which the first phases of a community of principle are established between the United States and the Soviet Union, and with the corresponding intellectual hegemony of the writer and his associates in the political labor movement of the OECD and other nations, what, then, is the reality of the situation? What then is the practical implication of the troublesome stipulation?

Otherwise, it is to be emphasized again — out of respect for the identified general sort of objections — that the sort of stipulation proposed has two distinct motivations. First, respecting the Soviet republic, it is necessary for us to repeal Zbigniew Brzezinski — which most of us have excellent other reasons to do, in any case. To wipe that off the slate. Second, *respecting ourselves*, we must clarify our own perception of the lawful nature of a republic. We must clarify that most sharply, not “to sacrifice liberty” for the sake of clarity, but to develop clarity so that we may launch a fresh assault for the cause of freedom. If we desire an increase in political freedom within the Soviet Union (in particular), we must act in such a way as to generate the preconditions under which that will develop. To act to that effect, we must commit ourselves to clear perceptions of what we ought to desire, rather than encumbering our purpose with the baggage of at-best ambiguous habituated postures.

The real problems of political freedom within the Soviet Union lie not in the lack of free expression of capitalist political tendencies, but in the political derivatives of the stupidity to which we referred earlier — discounting the problems directly attributable to the aversive conditions we (chiefly) have imposed upon the Soviet Union and its internal life.

The proper conceptual vantage-point from which to locate the direct links between Oblomovist stupidities and actual abuses is Karl Marx’s notion of the *political class-for-itself*. The absence of a systematic approach to implementing that conception is the continuing wellspring for actual or potential internally generated abuses against political freedom within the Soviet republic. That is the only significant *internally situated* cause for the significant flaws of the Soviet Union as a republic.

The characteristic flaw of the political labor movement, the flaw which prevents it from competently independently knowing its own real interest, is the heteronomic relationship of the individualized

working person to the productive process. The individualized worker has a positive impulse (a Whig impulse) because of his self-identification with the development of improved productive and related problem-solving mental skills. However, his individualization sets him into heteronomic opposition to profit — and thus makes him sometimes a potential dupe of lunatic varieties of “socialism.” As a heteronomic individual, he is unable to define the positive connection of profit to his self-interests, except his desire that his own immediate employer enjoy sufficient profit to keep him employed with the prospect of income and related improvements trickling down to him as an employee.

He does not view profit in its active function as a part of the national and global absolute profit. He does not see directly and positively the problem of maintaining and effectively realizing that profit as the way of effecting a universal improvement in the technological progress of his national and the global economy. That is not the entirety of his outlook as a human being who is a skilled or semi-skilled worker, but *that is the heteronomic component of his outlook*.

It is only when the methods employed by Benjamin Franklin et al. to create the electorate of the American Revolution are applied to the conscious political organization of the labor movement, that labor looks at itself consciously as a whole labor force with a unified general interest in the efficient increase and appropriate investment of profit as a whole. Thus, as Franklin et al. transformed the individualized impulses of the electorate into informed impulses concerning the determining relationship of the general interest for the individual interest, as the worker not only understands the general interest, but how it concretely determines the satisfaction of his individual interest, his world outlook is educated, transformed.

This developed perception of the universal standpoint as the *primary* basis, is a transformation in the individual worker which Marx identifies as the transformed standpoint of the political class-for-itself.

In the heteronomic case, the individual defines his interests *primarily* in terms of localized circumstances. He does not think through the consequences of alternative actions to the effects on the general circumstance and, in turn, the consequences of the general circumstance in determining his local situation. Thus to the extent that the worker sees his individual relationship to an employer as *primary*, or a group of trade unionists see their localized relationship as *primary*, their impulses are heteronomic in tendency and consequence.

In the alternate case, embodied within the notion of the political class-for-itself, the worker locates the

solution to his immediate-interest problems, by first satisfying himself as to the problems of the national and global economy as a whole, and extending that economic approach to other, related areas. Through such means he redefines his local problems as subsumed features of a national and global policy problem, and informs his actions concerning the local problems accordingly.

Under these altered circumstances, his government — to the extent it more or less consciously and efficiently represents the general interest — ceases to become his oppressor, and becomes his common instrument of self-rule. His government becomes the general instrumentality through which he accomplishes those generalized actions necessary to create the climate indispensable for solving his immediate problems of self-interest.

When the character of the Soviet republic is viewed by those criteria, the principal flaw stands out clearly, well defined.

Obviously, the problem — the defect — is not that there is not what self-styled “Trotskyists” idiotically define as a lack of “workers democracy” in the Soviet Union. Proposing to toss the franchise and so forth about among a heteronomically defined population, and calling that sort of nonsense a “republic,” has no place in study of the Soviet Union. This is not to say that we do not desire to have the Soviet Union achieve the fullest realization of a *democratic* republic, but mere democracy per se is not the solution.

The first fact to be acknowledged is that the leading strata of the Communist Party continue to *substitute themselves* for the working class as a class-for-itself. That is not in itself good or bad. It is not the desired form of a republic, but if conditions require such *substitution* for the time being, the arrangement is problematic while not abhorrent in principle.

What is abhorrent is that aspect of substitution which contributes to fostering heteronomic stupidity within the electorate, and thus perpetuating in that aggravated way the necessity for garrison-economy substitution.

At the outset, under the conditions of foreign invasion and foreign-sponsored civil wars, during the following period of war-wrecked industries and *cordon sanitaire*, and so forth, the Bolsheviks had no option but to substitute themselves for a then-nonexistent class-for-itself. This has been aggravated by the already-cited varieties of perpetuated and overlapping developments which have maintained the Soviet republic in the condition of a garrison economy.

The practical question is properly reduced to the proposition: in what *significant* ways, what viciously persisting blunders of policy and general practice, has the leadership of the Communist Party unnecessarily

aggravated the conditions fostering substitution? We are clearly not concerned with such petty issues as Khrushchev's or Brezhnev's sneezing in the wrong direction at a certain turn in affairs. We are concerned with the efficiency of the institutions and instruments of a republic. It is not a matter of errors as such, but of policies. We are concerned with vicious errors in policy which obstruct a process of self-improvement in the development of a democratic republic.

Let it be fairly emphasized that as the case of Cromwell illustrates, the principle of substitution expresses the use of the oppressive powers of sovereignty to check the heteronomic impulses of a *politically incompetent* potential electorate — as well as other forces. For this reason, substitution is politically dangerous, politically unviable *except as a temporary expedient*. When does the electorate cease to be politically incompetent? How long do the conditions fostering requirement of internal political security measures persist?

Respecting a republican dictatorship by the political labor movement, the principle of the Soviet republic's constitutional law, when, in fact, does the Soviet working class become a political class-for-itself? In fact, of course, the answer is neither all the one way or the other. Since the writer is not directly acquainted with the internal life in the Soviet Union, he can offer only those conclusions which are based on crucial evidence externally available. Certain decisive conclusions are nonetheless reached with absolute certainty.

First, one does not develop an electorate by lying to it persistently concerning the circumstances which govern its government's major elements of domestic and foreign policy. For example, recently, especially since February of this present year, the preponderance of the leading articles of note appearing in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* concerning the United States have been downright sweeping lies to the knowledge of the authors and editors, and also known to be lies by most members of the CPSU Central Committee, according to other information previously published in such leading sources as *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, and *Krasnaya Zvezda*. This is the worst case of the lying issued by such leading sources, but such practices on leading foreign and domestic policy matters are by no means lacking precedents.

Why — by what reason and policies — do the rest of the Politburo and CPSU CC members tolerate such dangerous filth as the edification of the Soviet electorate? The name of the game is called “party discipline.” Although each faction employs its associated political apparatus down through the pores of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe's institutions to worry away at building up a correlation of forces for its line, in principle the issues are fought out within the leadership without the conscious involvement of the

electorate — even as spectators — until after the fight is settled and someone trots out to explain the horrors which have been covered up pending the conclusion of the factional proceedings at the top.

This sort of nonsense is not peculiar to the Soviet Union. We have our own lying national press institutions, and even when the truth is known to leading circles in the USA, that truth is seldom disclosed to the electorate then *or later*. We are not proposing a bogeyman competition between our clowns and theirs. We are concerned with the way in which such practices systematically impair the Soviet republic.

This problem is not a product of the mere fact that the Soviet leadership is substitutionist. If substitution had been the only causal element in the situation, the problem would have been significantly corrected before this time. The problem is that — all Soviet denials to the contrary — the political class struggle continues to rage quite hotly in the Soviet state and its leadership. The key to the temporary prominence of the Arbatov Doctrine, the long-standing “realist” Rockefeller garbage, and the lying in the Soviet press are all part of the same generative problem.

The key to the problem, the generative element, is that the Soviet leadership operates still on the basis of the Machiavellian principle of “combination.” The industrialists and military are on the one side, and the Oblomovists and their allies on the other. It is the effort to maintain “party discipline” under these circumstances, and the policy of presenting a patched-up, unprincipled agreement negotiated within the combination, representing such horse trades as the product of nothing but “pure Marxist-Leninist science,” which is the active element behind both the lying in the Soviet press and the political ignorance fostered within the electorate.

Although this is the principal *internal* flaw within the Soviet republic, it is also obvious that the basis for the maintenance and aggravation of this unprincipled combination within the Soviet leadership is the perpetuation of the garrison-economy state of affairs.

As an individual, as leader of the U.S. Labor Party, the writer takes sides morally and in suitable practical ways concerning the course of affairs inside the Soviet Union. As President of the United States — or, in proposing the policies of a “new Federalist” Presi-

dent — the duty of the U.S. President is to know which levers of U.S. policy to employ, to give a properly directed evolution to the *external circumstances of the Soviet republic* affecting these and related problems. The President also had the duty to cause the actual nature of the internal situation in the Soviet republic to be known to the U.S. electorate and its representatives.

Under the conditions generated by that approach, a “new Federalist” President of the United States has the immediate prospect for establishing first steps of positive agreements *toward* a community of principle with the Soviet republic.

In such matters, and others, it must always be emphasized that the foreign and domestic policies of the United States are not properly defined in terms of simple responses to things as they are. The duty of the Presidency is to act to shape the course of events to reach the conditions favorable to the implementation of proper policy.

It is that principle which the new “new Federalist” President must follow, and which competencies must govern his selection by the Congress — in the course of the impeachment of the intolerable Tory usurper. Eyeing the Presidency, and engaged, increasingly over recent years in catalytically influencing the course of events from a position of relatively maximum disadvantage to significantly beneficial effect, this writer knows what can and must be done by placing those methods at the disposal of the Presidency. *Provided our policy conforms to the application of natural law to the problems of the world at hand*, the President of the United States has at his disposal the power to shape the course of global development into conformity with the vital interests of the United States. Such gains will be obtained with the enthusiastic support and partnership of most of the world’s presently leading political forces. We need only resume our constitutional government according to the intent of the founding of our republic, appropriately applying that to the world at hand, and with the establishment of a community of principle with the Soviet Union, the adulthood of humanity will have begun.

That is what the “new Federalist” President and the Congress together must set out immediately to accomplish.

Foreign Economic Policy

The central and chief duty of the new President of the United States is to effect a general solution to the current world depression and the effects of that depression upon the internal life of the nation. He faces the most profound crisis the nation has ever confronted — respecting the hazards involved — and must quickly extricate the nation from that deadly predicament.

The basis for the principal actions the President and Congress must take — and promptly — is the authority explicitly embedded in the intent of our Constitution and the founding institutions and instruments of our republic. On the basis of that authority, *it is the duty of the President and the Congress to promptly re-establish the nation as an industrial capitalist republic committed to the Idea of Progress as centered about the policy of technological progress.* It is also the duty of the President and the Congress to restore to efficient functioning the essential principle of our republic, the selection of representatives and the adoption of laws and policies according to the principle of a properly informed general electorate.

The two central tasks before the President and the Congress are *the establishment of a National Bank*, and the actions taken by the United States to terminate the bankrupt vestiges of the Bretton Woods system and act in concert with other nations to establish a new world monetary system, *a gold-reserve-based International Development Bank*, to serve as the common rediscount facility of member national banks like our own, representing various nations and regions of the world.

Within this framework, the President and the Congress must take emergency measures to prevent the present bankruptcy of major private financial institutions from precipitating a chain reaction impairing the functions of essential institutions of deposit and credit. These measures and related necessary measures have been developed adequately in the

Emergency Employment Act and related draft legislation published by the U.S. Labor Party.

Within the framework of these indispensable institutional and emergency measures, the President and Congress must direct the process of rapid economic recovery within the nation. The principal instrument for effecting that recovery will be the National Bank. The method employed will be principally to issue credit through existing banks acting as correspondents of the National Bank for financing those payroll, materials, and capital expenditures of basic industry, transportation, construction, extraction and agriculture required to bring the utilization of existing capacities up to full or approximately full productive potential.

The same method will be employed for the issuance of credit for purposes of capital expansion. The methods of ordinary sound *industrial* banking practices will be applied to the National Bank for this purpose. Wherever, by virtue of national policy for domestic priorities or foreign programs, the capitalization of expansion and improvements is known to be in correspondence with forecastable requirements, and on the basis of other standard estimates of merit, the National Bank shall be a participating prime lender.

The governing consideration in National Bank policies will be the maintenance of a "hard dollar." For every dollar of credit issued to the private sector, there must be a reasonably forecastable regenerative expansion of tangible wealth in a form of capital and consumer commodities themselves representing the raw materials of further expansion of the output of tangible wealth. Hence, the direct participation of the National Bank in the private sector will be restricted to industry, transportation, extraction, agriculture (in the broad definition), and construction. The special added case will be those categories of scientific and engineering research and development which are

designated for this purpose according to the President and the specified related powers of the President to that effect.

The necessary new credit additionally required for non-productive commerce and private services must originate as a by-product of the expansion of the money supply and deposits through the income and credits received directly by industry, transportation, extraction, agriculture and construction.

The correlated objective of this policy is to effect a persisting shift of emphasis in employment, away, in net effect, from unemployment, governmental employment, services and clerical occupations into the industrial labor force and increases in the labor-force ratio of scientists and engineers. Within this overall directedness of government fiscal and monetary policies, certain categories of services should be numerically expanded, notably medical and related professions, and certain shifts within the teaching profession should be fostered to increase the emphasis upon science and engineering within the developing labor force.

The principal means to accomplish this are a hard-dollar monetary policy of the National Bank, and the streamlining and reorienting of tax and other fiscal aspects of government to create an economic environment in which the desired shifts toward a high-productivity, higher-technology economy will automatically occur through natural processes principally within the private sector.

The slogan expressing the economic policy of government must be "Let's get it built! Built right — and newer, and more, and better." Not more with our backs, but more with our brains.

The means for generating this rapid industrial expansion will be a massive increase in high-technology exports. These exports, insofar as they are directed in large part toward the developing sector, will involve very low-interest long-term (ten-to-twenty-five year) loans through the mechanisms of the National Bank and the International Development Bank. By discounting these loans through the International Development Bank we shall obtain the credits through which to purchase needed increased primary materials from the developing sector and obtain imports from OECD and CMEA countries. However, the net long-term credit extended to the developing sector must come from a portion of our own national absolute profit. This must be above the portion of our absolute profit required for expanding and technologically improving our domestic productive capacities. Therefore, we must proceed rapidly to levels significantly above present productive capacities.

We must effect early and then persisting rates of improvement in the modal real incomes and leisure of

our population. That added wealth must come from putting the unemployed and misemployed into productive jobs, and otherwise from capital expansion and improvements utilizing new technologies.



Three components of national tangible output must increase each year: (1) The modal level of real incomes and leisure of the population, (2) The rate of capital investment in our industry and agriculture, and (3) The rate of high-technology exports. These gains must come not through intensifying the physical labor of our workforce, but through increasing the ratio of productively employed adults and through rapid increases in technological advancement.

The centerpiece of this program of technological progress will be science and energy policies. For the short to intermediate term, the emphasis will be on high-energy forms of combustion of coal (including steel production) and rapid expansion of fission power programs. For the period beginning approximately the middle 1980s, we must begin the transition to fusion energy as the world's new basic energy source, while continuing with fission programs. This shift involves much more than a new energy source. The derivations of plasma physics research associated with developing fusion energy sources will produce a qualitative transformation in productive technologies, of a type we may broadly term high-energy production methods. Once we have begun that transition, which we project as a matter of policy for the middle 1980s, all the various environmental and other threats now confronting us for the end of this century with old, stagnating technology, will, in principle, forever disappear.

The program of high-technology inputs into the industrial and agricultural development of the so-called developing nations has the proper overall objective: *to establish the preconditions required within that sector for a worldwide "takeoff" into a new technological revolution, an emergence which shall begin on a smaller scale during the 1985-1995 period.* That is the task and the joy of living we give to ourselves, the gift we bequeath to our posterity.

The overall basis for the shaping of the nation's foreign policy is the development and functioning of the proposed International Development Bank (IDB). In this matter, *the United States must have a clear and "hard-nosed" policy: The IDB will not issue grants or credit for the funding of waste and swindles.* Our nation, once painfully ridding itself of the bankrupt institutions and habits of a monetarists' domestic and international financial order, will not promote or tolerate the erosive insinuations of the beginning of the same old crap all over again in some new form.

Our domestic and foreign policy are mutually con-



Federalist Tom Paine, author of the 1776 pamphlet Common Sense, was a vigorous advocate of the republican form of government as opposed to Tory "pure democracy."

tinuous and coherent on this point. The following key points of domestic fiscal policy foreshadow the generative corresponding features of our foreign policy.

- (1) The notions of negative and positive forms of toleration are properly governing in the determination of the way in which the revenues of the nation are disbursed and in the categorical distinctions of relatively *punitive* and offsetting reduced rates of application of an average rate of taxation.

For example: Speculative gains and undesirable practices which the law otherwise *negatively tolerated* must be taxed at relatively "punitive" rates. This must, in approximation of the fictions of law, offset the compensating, relatively reduced rates of taxation on income which is directed toward reinvestment in real economic expansion and technological progress.

A federal tax on *illegal* gambling is one of those all-too-clever perversions of positive law which any competent federal court action should have denounced and nullified as an abhorrence in the eyes of constitutional law. However, for activities and entities which exist within the bounds of toleration of the law, federal tax policy is obliged, for example, to use the taxing

powers of the government in such a way as, for example, to make slum-like rental property highly unprofitable relative to maintaining quality real property investments and quality new construction.

- (2) (The presently existing tax and related fiscal policies and practices of the nation are immoral overall, and in some aspects clearly obscene, respecting the clutter and complexity they represent.) There are two categorical aspects of the design of national tax policy: (a) the analysis of the principal, categorical components of national income, (b) the application of discrimination respecting positive and negative toleration, as the means for determining the relative weight of taxation upon equal amounts of income within the areas of income so defined. This should be applied as a national taxation policy, with the federal government acting in partnership with state and local government according to a uniform tax policy for all aspects of government. The relationship among the federal, state and local governments should be a division of labor among those political entities respecting the categories of taxation delegated to each, within the bounds of a uniform national tax policy. The tax methods and procedures should

be simplified and directly aimed at their objectives in the simplest way.

For example: A domestic sales tax is an economic abhorrence, principally employed by governments which variously lack the perception, the political courage, or the authority to attack the revenue problem in a competent manner.

Import duties and related applications of excise have had a legitimate economic function of enabling the government to "reach" indirectly those foreign influences affecting our nation's vital interests which are beyond our direct means of control. The same principle erupts in the gray areas of U.S., state and local law, in response to discrepancies of law among political sub-units of the nation. The right of local government to employ those and related methods and procedures is an area of toleration — within limits determined by the national interest — from the standpoint of proper positive federal law.

What are inadmissible on principle are the following enterprises in petty deception and useless complexities:

The demagogic trick of peddling a sales tax to a credulous electorate by creating it fictively as an "old age tax." (The hideous implication is that somebody's grandmother may suffer if one misses a customary Wednesday dinner-out at "Joe's Chinese Southern Fried Chicken Palace.")

Various political entities variously spooning into corporate and personal income — where such categories of taxation ought to be reserved to the federal government, with associated revenue-sharing formulas applied to order distribution to budgets of local government.

Taxes which significantly, unnecessarily increase the administrative costs of both government, quasi-governmental, corporate and personal life, thus contrary to the nation's interest in developing a high social productivity within the labor force as a whole.

(3) The clearing of all tax and related revenues and disbursements of government through the National Bank, to the effect that the "multiplier" effects of reserve balances may be concentrated in the credit-issuing power of the National Bank. This is essential, both to give the nation efficient control in fact over the preponderance of its own monetary system, and to provide the means for freeing the federal, state and local governments from dependency upon private financial markets.

The point which will want to be emphasized and reemphasized, until the electorate and its representatives have efficiently assimilated that point, is

that the printing of money by the U.S. Treasury (U.S. notes) as the instrument of securing credit inclusively for the federal government's uses is not in and of itself an issuance of "funny money" or otherwise inflationary. This "Hamiltonian" method and procedure is the proper measure employed by a capitalist republic.

The problems potentially associated with such procedures are all derivative of a failure to regulate that practice according to sound national-banking principles. The revenues of government (government aggregately) are properly attributed to a portion of the lawfully defined national absolute profit. This is the balance of total national income, as measured in *real* terms, after the current prime costs of production of that income are deducted.

The elements of real national income are potentially "regenerative" forms of tangible output, including the productive labor force in the quantity and quality affected with the means of education, associated forms of leisure, household consumption, and essential social services of the national infrastructure. The residue, absolute profit, is represented by tangible products and productive labor, whose usefulness is qualitatively determined by their potentially "economic-regenerative" effects through appropriate forms of capital and household consumption. This absolute profit, so defined, has four principal, categorical applications: administration and services of the private sector; governmental consumption; foreign intermediate- and long-term credit against U.S. exports; and domestic capital expansion. As long as the revenues and expenditures of government are defined within an efficient forecast-determination of the total absolute profit and the proper government proportion of that absolute profit, the mediating, short- and intermediate-term circulation of U.S. notes within those confines, if accomplished through a National Bank, is an integral part of a "hard currency" policy.

This prescribes, also, that there are only two categorical areas in which the government should go outside a notes-only policy to issue bonds representing a long-term national (or, other governmental) debt:

First, in respect to foreign long-term credit balances.

The principal occasion for this under the new world monetary system will be the investment of U.S. domestic capital abroad. The investment of U.S. domestic capital into areas of the world which have or may probably adopt socialist constitutions must be balanced against the degree of risk national (and international) policy deems it necessary and proper to perpetuate (as "performance incentives"), and the complementary imperative of separating the legi-

timate interests of domestic capital from the predicaments of internal policies of foreign nations. In general, wherever efficient performance has been accomplished for economic results consistent with the objectives of U.S. foreign policy, the fact of such efficient performance warrants the use of the credit of the United States as a kind of "national insurance fund" in behalf of such aggregate U.S. domestic capital extended. The methods employed for such determinations of performance are broadly identical to those governing the transformation of construction loans into permanent mortgages.

This will involve not merely the credit of the United States, but these obligations will be collectively discounted through the credit of the International Development Bank. *That is the indispensable, principled method by which we maintain the interface between U.S. domestic capital export and — most notably, but not exclusively — those nations which have socialist constitutions.*

Second, as was done *badly* during World War II, whenever the nation is obliged to secure capital from those categories of total national income representing modal levels of prime-cost (e.g., wage-incomes), this sacrifice (primitive accumulation) can be regarded as "borrowing" in whole or part — if forecastable later rates of national economic growth and other considerations of national interest warrant this as practicable. The principled purpose of such measures is to defend the integrity, in principle and in fact, of the modal levels of income which have been temporarily reduced. How and when this is done is for each occasion a practical question, but the proposition to be practically so considered is admissible for deliberation according to the proper intent of the constitutional law of a capitalist republic.

These same principles of "hard currency" policy apply to the International Development Bank, and represent the included feature of foreign policy of the United States concerning the IDB and all related and comparable relationships with other nations.

The scare word which immediately arises as observers note the practical implications of such foreign and domestic policies is "dirigism."

The case of that abomination which has become the National Environmental Policy Act in practice, is perhaps the most efficient starting point for getting into the core issues of policies affecting the fear of "dirigism."

Granted, the condition of the biosphere ("ecology") is a matter of principled concern, and related vital interest to the nation. However, the NEPA, as an implicitly and efficiently zero-growth approach to both the definition and treatment of such matters, is contrary to natural law and to the intent of our con-

stitutional law, and is therefore abhorrent and most fundamentally unconstitutional. The problem of NEPA is not merely that it represents a "dirigist" intrusion into a privileged area, but that it represents an incompetent and destructive intrusion, both in intent and method employed.

The cases of the steel and automotive industries adequately illustrate the general problem.

The problem of industrial and related forms of pollutant emissions is in the main categorically a by-product of insufficiently advanced technology. As the efficiency of combustion is increased, the ratio of thermal and other waste by-products is correspondingly reduced. That is *step one*. Such thermal efficiency is characteristically effected by operating those productive processes at correspondingly higher temperatures. This higher temperature not only enables thermal efficiency (step one), but brings new physical chemistries within the range of efficient, economical employment. This enables us to deploy secondary, integral features of the productive (or other) process to direct the shaping of the net by-product into forms which are either new products (consumable by-products), or harmless forms of waste. That is *step two*.

The application of NEPA has attacked the problem of emissions by violating our fundamental national interests directly (reducing the production of wealth) and by mis-direction (diverting limited and diminishing supplies of capital to costly after-the-fact emissions control, away from the productive investments which would have followed the two-step approach toward a real solution, as we summarized.)

The remedies broadly indicated for steel are these. Environmental concerns properly dictate accelerated infusions of capital into steel and related processes for fulfilling the two conditions stipulated as a subsumed characteristic feature of such capital investment. For the automobile itself, the solution is not costly emission control devices and other attached gadgetry, but accelerated flows of capital toward more technologically advanced and better maintained motive devices, and more human-safe forms of automotive design.

The problem associated with steel capitalization has been that the available capital has been insufficient (and that existent entirely diverted to NEPA-misdirected nonsense), and that the capitalizations for higher technology imply a demand for steel 50 to 100 percent above the currently prevailing and previously forecastable levels of recent periods. However, both of these economic problems are principally by-products of monetarists' dictatorship over our government and economy, and the correlated lack of a competent positive national domestic and foreign policy.

The problem of the automobile is not the auto in and of itself, but as with the crisis situation generated in commercial air traffic by proliferating 250-mile-range short hauls, includes the failure to establish efficiently modern forms of interurban and metropolitan-area mass transit systems, all of which is aggravated by the monetarist-determined decay and autarchy of our transport and urban areas.

There is only one approach to the "environment" which is not intrinsically incompetent or downright insane. The time has come at which we must regard the biosphere as a whole as an intelligent, modern American farmer and his agronomist-advisor regard the farm. *Nature itself must be defined for policy and practice as man-made.* For purposes of national domestic and foreign policy, we must extend the notion of fixed capital (as industrial capital) from the particular farm, the particular plant, to nature as a whole.

For that reason environmental scientific *policy-making* belongs in the Department of Agriculture, with the obvious aspects of domestic fiduciary functions delegated to the Department of the Interior.

It is impossible — and insane, at this time — to attempt to "defend nature against man." The Nader-environmentalist outlook is reflective of the mentality of a lower beast, not a human being. The necessary consequence of the mere continued existence of the human species is the depletion of any *fixed* order of nature. *To "defend" nature is to propose genocide against man.* Looking at nature as a whole with the characteristic outlook already embedded in our Department of Agriculture, looking at the entirety of nature as "our great farm," we must develop its fertile fields, its woodlots, its streams, its living and recreation areas, its livestock, as an intelligent modern farmer does in transforming a former dustland into, once again, a rich grain-producing area.

By placing the knowledge of modern plasma physics and its by-products at the disposal of our Department of Agriculture, and empowering that Department to look at the nation *and world* as the "greater farm" from which human needs must be annually extracted in increasing amounts, we arrive at the kernel of a positive ecological policy in conformity with natural and constitutional law.

The instrument of government for implementing the positive policies generated around the focal, coordinating point of our Department of Agriculture is principally national economic-development policy. The principal subsumed instruments for that policy are the credit policies of the National Bank and our federal fiscal institutions.

Those instruments shape the overall economic environment.

We must add instruments for checking specific heteronomical problems not efficiently controlled by the principal instruments. This is the area of *direct enforcement*. The principal form of enforcement should be congruent with the principle of minimum-wage law and working-conditions law. We establish standards, defining in terms specified by legislative law — and not some casual administrative or judicial procedure extending the law — precisely what those standards are: what explicitly represents an intolerable condition, and what methods shall be used to determine *qualitative* non-conformity with the practical intent of the principal instruments of national economic policy for this area?

We need steel. We cannot stop steel production, bringing it below required levels of output and capacity because of a short-term, localized "environmental problem." The head-on opposition of two elements of national interest, which may appear to exist in such a case, does not exist in fact under proper conditions of a national, economic-policy-determined environment. These most troublesome points of the interface between production and the ecology merely shape the peripheral features of our technological development policies.

The object of the overall approach is to minimize all direct intrusion into the internal ordering of the internal, privileged domain of liberties of the citizen and the firm. This is not a noble sentiment, a truism, but a *practical* policy imperative.

There are two indispensable primary instruments for the government of a democratic capitalist republic: the political instrument of properly inferred willful impulses for practice of the firm and individual citizen, and the establishment of a practical environment of national policy practice which enables the desired result to occur "molecularly" by means of individual initiative. The associated object of these measures is to reduce to the possible minimum the number of heteronomic and other exceptions which require direct enforcement or other direct governmental interventions.

The real problem of "dirigism" is that leading agencies and others variously do not understand the lawful features of the processes involved, or refuse to acknowledge the implications of such knowledge. Hence, when political stupidity attempts to mobilize a society to conformity with some specified result, it too quickly, foolishly substitutes methods converging ultimately or sooner upon "totalitarian" methods of dirigism. The knowledgeable approach, based in consciousness of natural law, is premised upon a comprehension of the lawful determination of the environment in which individualized action selects its choices.

This same distinction defines the two distinct no-

tions of political power. One notion of power, the notion of *force*, is associated with military and police measures. The other notion of power, the power of natural law, is the writer's characteristic method and policy. The former's use is not excluded, but is properly delimited to those exceptional cases in which heteronomy sets itself fixedly into opposition to natural law and the force of reason. It is the second kind of power, the conscious application of natural law to simultaneously informing individual willful practice, and creating a practical policy environment appropriate to that informing, which is the potentially mighty power of the United States government, which this writer proposes to awaken to exert itself.

The overwhelming majority of the people of this nation and of other nations will regard the dictates of natural law as their primary individual self-interest, on condition that their willful impulses are so informed, and that the ordering of the environment of individual practice by great powers is coherent with such informed impulses. That is the proper essence — the intrinsic might — of a "new Federalist" government of the United States at home and abroad.

The social basis for that policy is the "Whig impulses" more notably characteristic of our trade unionists, modern farmers, scientists, engineers, and industrialists. This, as an informed population and a political force unified to that purpose, is the leading force of the majority of our people, the majority which must rule our policymaking and government.

The Tories, here and abroad, won't like that arrangement, but it is nonetheless in their real interest and that of their posterity, and the only course through which their own individual liberties will be maintained and enriched.

The technological characteristic of United States foreign policy is the establishment of a division of labor in export-oriented, high-technology production and development among the combined OECD and CMEA nations. It is capital goods that these nations are going to export in the main, and with increasing emphasis. While competition among firms and particular specifications of capital-commodity types will and must persist in this process, that competition does not represent a competition of vital economic interests within the ranks of the OECD and CMEA nations.

The days in which industrialized national semi-autarkies conducted international trade wars are past in any sane ordering of global economic affairs. The necessary base required by any specific form of relatively high-technology capital-goods production has become so broad, in terms of subsumed total-economy process-sheet analyses, that no one nation — even the United States or Soviet Union — could *economically*

develop a full spectrum of modern high-technology capital goods production.

The proposal offered by Soviet physicist L. Rudakov, to the effect that U.S. high-technology firms should produce advanced ion-beam devices developed by the Soviet Union, points to several interconnected points of policy-shaping importance.

First, Soviet basic physics is, overall, presently years ahead of that of the United States. This is the conclusion advanced by numbers of U.S. high-technology firms deeply engaged in Soviet projects. This is the conclusion to be reached from proceedings at the 1976 Berchtesgaden and recent Trieste conferences. The reasons for this overall discrepancy have already been sufficiently developed for our immediate purposes above. Although in certain specific features of plasma physics research, groups of U.S. scientists, such as the writer's immediate associates, may be theoretically advanced beyond the Soviets in some important theoretical or experimental feature of the work, Soviet physics at this point is at the point of becoming hegemonic world-wide.

Second, Rudakov delivered the proposal that certain relevant very-high-technology creations of Soviet physics would be more efficiently produced for world needs in the USA. The Rudakov case is not a fluke. It typifies the broader conclusion offered by some leading U.S. high-technology industrialists over the recent winter.

We are not proposing that this Soviet physics hegemony is a permanent arrangement. Beginning with the Kennedy administration and accelerating since approximately 1966, the Tory social and political policies shaping our nation's practices and the outlooks of our youth have savaged the ranks of science and engineering professionals to produce a monstrous discrepancy between the modal levels of our high-technology base and the basic research and research-and-development superstructure that base requires and warrants. This miserable state of affairs we shall promptly and profoundly change. We are not citing Soviet scientific physics hegemony as a projected permanent state of affairs, but as a typification of kinds of policy problems which must inclusively shape our policies.

The development of new technologies begins properly in an educational process which is simultaneously intrinsically epistemological and intermeshed with an environment of experimental practice. The scientist, engineer, and technician-specialist developed by that educational process is employed at several distinguishable points of the process of initiating new technologies and transforming them into the developed forms appropriate to generalized productive practice.

The first stage is basic research — scientific discovery.

The second stage is research and development: the transformation of new discoveries into potential forms of productive application.

The third stage is the transformation of the products of the second into experimental forms of devices to be produced.

The fourth stage is the pilot or trial, limited production of a “de-bugged” experimental form into a product which can be transferred from the ownership of the maker to another user.

The fifth stage is the shift of an established product in a slightly altered, mass-production or analogous “final” form.

At any point among those stages, the further development of high technology may involve transfer of responsibility for the continuation to a different institution, or a different national economy.

Admittedly this has been emerging as the characteristic feature of technological development since the sixteenth century. Modern developments have now altered the implications of that process. Without turning yet to the developing sector problem, limiting ourselves for yet another moment to the relations among OECD and CMEA economies, the following broad observations apply.

First, the negentropy of modern high-technology production is so great, and the required rate of new technological progress consequently so intensified, that the ordering of the process of technological development becomes a major area of national and global economic policy.

Second, the human input into this process, epitomized by the education and employment of both professional specialists and the labor force generally, has implications directly corresponding to the process-determinations of productive development itself. The proper ratio of scientists and engineers per thousand productive workers employed represents a qualitative component of the total labor force — and one whose increase must tend to accelerate.

In this configuration, we can no longer speak of science and engineering in broad generalities. Although the governing conceptual and related skills of scientists and engineers may be approximately common in form of application at all points of the process, the process of development of technology has a lawful “structure.” We cannot simply propose to put more into science — although that would be far better than what has recently prevailed. We must understand the internal features of the process, and balance our science, technology, production and capital investment policies accordingly.

We must understand — as a matter of policy — what the term *basic scientific research* signifies from the standpoint of that process. We must eliminate the considerations of narrowly defined, cost-benefit analysis in budgeting basic scientific research, understand how a totality of basic scientific research generates a *forecastable* degree of total benefit, which benefit cannot be pre-defined through aggregating predicted line-by-line budgetary projections. We cannot apply the cost-benefit cost-analysis methods of mass production to the programming of the fostering of scientific work.

In that same connection, *we must place the notion of the epistemological characteristics of basic scientific work within the specifications of policy*, both for fostering basic science and for shaping the policies of education to cohere with the desired objectives.

We must, in the same vein, terminate the confusion which prevails in the formulation and interpretation of law, the confusion of basic scientific research with scientific research and development. Even though the two kinds of efforts may often be performed on the same premises and by the same group of persons, there is a fundamental epistemological distinction of practical emphasis between basic scientific research and what heretofore has been understood for U.S. executive and legislative practice as scientific research and development.

The crucial policy problem reflected in that distinction is that we must be concerned with the generation of discoveries respecting *scientific principles, the transformation of the previously existing body of scientific knowledge*, without which the application of the existing body of scientific knowledge to development must, ultimately or sooner, stagnate for want of fresh inputs to science itself. Basic scientific research is the positive transformation of scientific knowledge itself. From that origin, onwards in the process outlined, the emphasis is increasingly on the application of the already existing body of scientific knowledge.

The economic objective of this process is to increase the average negentropy of national and global production by successive waves of new technologies spreading out to supercede the old. Basic scientific research is the wellspring of that process, a process on which the successful existence of the human species now immediately depends.

As we implement that process of incorporating new technologies into practice we are confronted by the fact that no matter how large the absolute profit available, it is never sufficient. That is expressed for practice in these terms. If we expend capital to develop competing new industries simultaneously in several nations, that redundancy in application of

capital diminishes the supply of capital available for other purposes. *Some* redundancy is necessary and useful, as a competitive hedge against the misdirection or poorer performance implicitly risked by putting all of technology's eggs in one basket.

The proper balance between the two desiderata is potentially a theoretical nightmare to some, but from our national experience with the electronics-aerospace development, we have learned some basic, tough lessons which enable us to approach the proper balance with reasonably good results. In brief, the approach to the solution is to balance off desirable competitiveness in the molecular aspect of technological development against the blunder of redundancy — and resulting bottlenecks — in major allocations of capital resources.

The basic policy approach has two moments; the first moment is the high-technology capital exports of the combined OECD and CMEA countries, and the second moment the somewhat contrary impulses associated with the localized national interest of the nations involved.

Respecting the final-stage export capabilities of the combined sector, we require at least two or three regionalized centers of capability, with a more numerous back-up in the corresponding, smaller-scale pilot-production phases of technological development, and a tendency toward homogeneity of capabilities in experimental practice. We must work *toward* establishing a global scientific community in respect of basic scientific research.

Respecting U.S. internal interests, as long as any potential threat to national-economic security exists in respect of foreign relations, we must not be intrinsically vulnerable — we must be able to rapidly develop a high-technology *productive* capability in any needed direction. Hence, both for local, internal capital-goods market requirements not efficiently met through the world market, and for reasons of national economic security, we must keep every basic type of productive capability “simmering” within the ranks of professionals, the labor force and industry.

The overall foreign economic policy toward the developing sector as a whole is premised on a set of well-defined targets of industrial, agricultural, and infrastructural projects throughout the developing sector taken as a whole.

These projects are typified by such major cases as three, highest priority development projects: (1) a Rio de la Plata industrial-agricultural complex in South America — one of the greatest and most rapidly fruitful potentials for effecting a major increment in global economic development; (2) the longer-term effort required to transform the Sahel into a great grain belt;

(3) the massive benefits to the world through a comprehensive development of the Ganges-Brahmaputra region. These appropriately reflect the emphasis on increasing present and future food production within the developing sector as a whole — on a sector-wide basis — as a self-evident imperative, and as the indispensable basis for viable, sustainable industrial and infrastructural development throughout the sector.

Although the development of capital goods industries within the developing sector should become increasingly a part of the international division of labor in capital goods production, the wretched infrastructure and poor average quality of the labor force will persist, even optimistically, as an obstacle to high-technology production methods for approximately a generation. The relative emphasis will be on establishing consumer goods production, wherever the combinations of regional consumption requirements and capabilities of the labor force available permit the employment of technologies which are competitive with those existing for the same kinds of industries in the industrialized sector.

This will be associated with development of primary commodities production, emphasizing more modern technologies of extraction and agronomy. These commodities are to be priced at equitable prices, which shall be determined as world-market competitive with necessary prices prevailing for the same categories of commodities in the productive output of OECD-CMEA nations. We shall not fear depletion of mineral deposits in this process, so long as that depletion will not occur as a cumulative world-wide problem within 2 to 2.5 decades. *This is premised on the commitment to establishing new technologies associated with fusion energy development.*

This primary commodities aspect of foreign relations with developing nations will be for an undetermined period an endemic area of policy conflict, a source of potential disruptions of global development, which threats we must efficiently check.

For principally two reasons, parts of the developing-sector populations and their political institutions are infected with the ignorant and barbaric delusion that primary commodities as presently defined for their knowledge, represent intrinsically *natural wealth*.

This idea was impressed upon such governmental factions by the character of their long-standing economic relations with the British Empire and other monetarist colonial and semi-colonial powers. The monetarists' policy degraded these regions to the crudest forms of ground-rent looting, emphasizing the export of primary mineral and agricultural commodities from these regions — mines and plantations. In the historical practice of their nations' economic relations

with the world market, such bestialized ground-rent economics is, in the main, the only economic doctrine they have been taught by general experience.

This same source of infection with dangerously nonsensical ideas was aggravated by the circumstance that the educated strata of these countries were miseducated in significant part at such cesspools of raving monetarism as the London School of Economics, Vienna and our own Cornell, Princeton, Berkeley, Columbia, Johns Hopkins and Harvard have not represented exactly happy alternatives to the notorious LSE. The victims of such miseducation, in turn, provided the core of the faculties of educational institutions established back in the home country.

This disorientation among leading political and intellectual strata is aggravated and reenforced by convergent native ideologies.

Not only were the characteristic pre-capitalist social relations in those countries in the main broadly describable as semi-feudal, feudal, barbaric and so forth, but in numbers of cases the worst features of those backward cultures were selectively cultivated by Anglo-American "cultural relativist" administrative and counterinsurgency doctrines.

The British pattern is exemplary.

The happier effects of contact with modern technology have been, by way of various contributing channels, to develop a pro-capitalist hardcore of intellectuals and urban and semi-urbanized labor in these countries. This force, which formerly represented a tendency for national capitalist, anti-colonial revolutions, has shifted in recent times to tend to act as the leading pro-socialist force.

Most consistently from the time of William Pitt the Younger, British policy, informed by both the American Revolution and Latin American revolts against Spain (notably), was consciously determined to check and abort such infectious potentials for new "American Revolutions." Hence, notably beginning with Pitt the Younger, the barbaric policy of Adam Smith's fraudulent *Wealth of Nations* was enforced through a British Foreign Office policy of using social relics (barbaric potentates, tribal chiefs, and so forth) as local "agents of influence" and political instruments and institutions of colonial and semi-colonial rule. Obscene relics and British-remodeled caricatures of "native culture" were propped up and deployed against the "modernizing," urban-oriented intellectual and labor movements.

Hence, the imposition of the British colonialists' doctrine of "cultural relativism."

Under our lower Manhattan monetarists, the United States was exploited by those monetarists to enforce the British colonial and semi-colonial policies in a

slightly altered outward political form. Instead of flag colonies, lower Manhattan ruled through geo-political "zones of influence," smeared over with attorney John Foster Dulles' legal-fiction ungent of regional treaty organizations. This was not original to Dulles himself; it was prescribed as a new doctrine by Roosevelt (Lippmann) in 1942-1944. Colonial rule by foreign debt accomplished the replacement of the Union Jack by the Dollar Sign. Underneath these cosmetic alterations in colonialism, the duped government and people of the United States permitted the Rockefellers et al. to freely deploy our nation's power to perpetrate the same bestial, "cultural relativist" policy which the British had established before us.

There was once hardly a week in which some babbling, brutal semiliterate from an African, Latin American or other parody of a Viennese operetta was not paraded through Washington and generally patted and coddled, while being heralded in the U.S. press as a bastion of the "Free World" and its noble culture. Among those of us so rudely incredulous as to examine more closely the paradise of liberty the visiting dignitary was supposed to represent, we saw a savage dictatorship veering toward the perfection of Rockefeller's model, "Papa Doc" Duvalier. A gaggle of mostly confused colonels and junior officers leading a semi-disciplined, uniformed and armed rabble gathered from the brutalized peasantry and urban slums. And, what did we find was the heroic act for freedom they had accomplished with such instruments? — the suppression of the same sort of political-social ferment which our own American Revolution typified for emulation!

That was before the Kennedy administration — before David Rockefeller, Rockefeller's Cyrus Vance, and the lunatic Milton Friedman "improved" upon Banana Republic traditions with a large dose of Nazi-occupation economic policies of the sort exhibited in the auto-cannibalistic collapse of post-1973 Chile.

Contrary to Rockefeller's collaborator, J. Paul Austin, a Coca-Cola bottle does not represent adequately the enlightening touch of modern civilization.

Although the "Whig impulse" persists as an impulse among the industrialists, urban labor and some intellectuals of the developing sector, this positive potentiality is frequently precariously balanced against dominant or powerful-minority currents whose ideological outlook erupts from some of the most stagnant bowels of humanity. That stink is in part historically rooted in the wretchedness Europeans first encountered in such regions, a wretchedness which "cultural relativist" colonialist policies and looting have often exacerbated into a form of degeneracy of the cultural vestiges first encountered.

In too many cases, the peasantry is not a productive peasantry in the main. He miserably scratches at the earth. He does not produce a surplus, and even what miserable little he produces is looted in large part from him by local chieftains, landlords, and other petty, thieving tyrants and swindlers. The peasantry shades into burgeoning masses of urban and semi-urban vagabonds — a vagabondage produced by the same sort of monetarist-generated processes which caused the mid-fourteenth century Black Death. As in the case of the present collapse of the Sahel, in the effort to squeeze more out of poor peasants and nomads, local governments foster grazing and cropping policies — under ruinous tax pressure — destroying their own nation in the effort to pay debt service to lower Manhattan. Without fertilizers and related modern techniques, the ecological collapse of the Sahel caused by the Rockefellers and their allies was inevitable. (Just as the Congo at the beginning of the 1960s and Zaire today have no mystery for those who know the history of Rockefeller investment movements into Rhodesia and Congo during the 1950s and the larger influx after the elimination of Lumumba.)

Large masses of the populations of such countries live at the edge of dionysiac frenzy — if they have, indeed, the energy to do much at all. The tendency to identify with lower forms of life — lower beasts and plants — intrinsic to the precarious humanity of heteronomized barbaric cultures — merely has been smashed, its apollonian order scattered into a nominalist *schwärmerei*. The embryonic Rothschild mentality of the “buy cheap, sell dearer” petty trader, the infantile nepotism of the petty official and clerk, intersect the dionysian despair of the brutalized impoverished — the endemic “Tory” potential “in the people” upon which some ambitious swindler premises his political career.

What do they know of development? When did they experience it as empirical reality? These poor people only know “what is there” to be taken, and to be sold for as much as can be gained.

That summary depicts the internal problems of the developing sector in its worst extremes, admittedly. That extreme defines the conceptual point of reference for understanding the intermediate, less glaring approximations of the same problem, and how those problems lawfully influence the outlooks and policies of factions of the developing sector nations.

The most efficient model for understanding the positive thrusts within the developing sector in general is the case of “Arab nationalism.”

No doubt the *epigonoï* of the late Walter Lippmann have more than once cited this “phenomenon” as crucial clinical evidence in support of the Atlanticists’ regional-bloc doctrines. That is irrelevant, except as it

once again exposes more efficiently how stupid the corresponding features of our past foreign policy have been.

The secret of “Arab nationalism” is not geographic, but rather the Arab religion. What about the Arab tongue? How, dear questioner, do you imagine that the Arab dialects from the Atlantic to the Euphrates are mutually comprehensible — approximately as much as local Italian dialects are mutually comprehensible in today’s Italy — except through the commonality of the Koran? Once the Arab tongue was rooted in the population, with the aid of the Koran, it was the mediation of the Koran which preserved that influence.

Does this fact favor the views of any variety of “cultural relativists”? They would look at the outside of the Koran, and say, “Aha, a religion. Don’t you see what that explains?” The Koran is not just a mediation of a “religion;” it is the central axis of a body of knowledge which has very specific internal, epistemological characteristics. It is not a member of a “class of religion;” it is not a member of the “set of religions” which includes Zen Buddhism — and who-knows-what-else the Fabians and neo-Fabians might have dredged up or synthesized in the way of fake cults lately.

From the period of approximately the seventh through twelfth centuries, A.D., the Arab Caliphates were the mainstream of modern civilization. It was upon that foundation, mediated to Europe chiefly by the Mediterranean Caliphates — from the Fatimids of Egypt to Cordova — that the intellectual foundations of modern European culture were contributed. Its greatest intellects, best known to us as Al-Farrabi, Ibn Sina, Averroes, and Omar Khayyam, were intellectually qualitatively above the Hellenic and Roman culture in respect of science and epistemology. That is simple historical fact, whatever wishful fraudulent mythology says to the contrary.

This great culture, which built upon the salvageable intellectual relics of the decaying Hellenic-Roman order which had preceded it, was the great civilizing force of the period of its dominance. It is that achievement which remained embedded in Arab culture, even after the combination of Mongol invasions, Turkish conquest, and the European crusades had broken the back of Arab civilization, and, one by one, plunged the parts of that Arab world into atavistic parodies.

When an Arab is awakened to the hope of becoming a part of a process of the onward development of civilization, it is not the miserable circumstances of the fellahin and bedouin that provide the wellsprings of a renaissance. It is certainly not the miseducation doled out to the “little brown brothers” at LSE, Cornell, or Berkeley which provides that basis. What, then, can

he seize upon in himself and in his fellow Arab to make that renaissance? There is only one common well-spring available to that purpose, the humanist traditions of the Caliphates.

The commonality of language permeating the Arab dialects is an important practical consideration. It is that humanism, which developed to its fiercest and to its greatest heights in the struggle against the Mongols and their Turkish component (Ibn Sina) and the Ottoman Turks (Averroes' *Destruction of the Destruction*), upon which they legitimately and usefully draw in the struggle against heathen monetarist barbarians of today.

The commonality of language as language is of practical significance — especially for purposes of economic development, and — with some mentionable degree of efficiency — for unified political action. The wellspring of that unity is the commonality of the humanist heritage, without which — in every empirical instance — “Arab nationalism” degenerates into a bad diplomatic joke. People are not what they are, but what they are efficiently dedicated to becoming. A nation constituted on any other basis today is only some degree doomed toward becoming a totalitarian swindle.

In the course of the first phases of the period before us, the United States must face the potential problem, that this or that developing sector nation or group of nations will return to us one of the noisome packages circulated among their ranks by such U.S. monetarist creatures as C. Fred Bergsten. Some vestiges of the Kissinger (Brookings Institution) “International Resources Bank,” the “Common Swindle,” or kindred feudal-Physiocratic nonsense may crop up.

With one eye toward the lessons of the Soviet agricultural mess, we are forewarned that such noisome eruptions will tend to occur whenever a developing sector government faces acute internal political-economic problems arising either from its own bungling or its inability, for one reason or another, to advance a remedy it deems performance-credible for the problem at hand. Under such circumstances, many governments are known to turn, in their desperation, to seek some gimmick, some single act that will somehow “miraculously” offset the internal pressures. Their borders with this or that neighbor tend to acquire uglier hues, and so forth. Frequently, some grand gesture — or what natural law regards as a swindle — is then militantly, self-righteously proposed by the desperate government in question. Given the psychological-political profile of some traditionally primary-commodities-exporting countries and the seeds of folly distributed by Bergsten and Kissinger, one or another primary-commodity oligopoly may crop up.

How then shall the United States respond? Let us presume the case in which a cabal of such foolish governments attempts to skyrocket the world-market price of a primary commodity, what shall we do?

Very simply: “Gentlemen, since you have imposed fictitious price levels on this commodity, we shall deduct from your international credit, to the advantage of your customer, the exact amount of the difference between your fictitious price and the world-market price. You see, we do not deprive your nation of a penny of its rightful net benefits, but we shall not bow before a swindle which threatens to disrupt the economy of the world as a whole.”

The implications of that example for how the United States will deal with analogous expressions of intolerable heteronomy among nations ought to be sufficiently defined by the example itself.

As a “new Federalist” government assumes the Presidency, it is confronted with a pattern of ugly to hideous regimes in various nations. The majority of these obscenities, such as the present regime in Chile, were created by such as Mr. David Rockefeller and his associates. Hence, these represent a double responsibility for the government of the United States: we are a great power and they are evil, and during the past our government has in various ways fostered their creation and perpetuation.

In one way or another, the United States is going to shape the global environment so that such atrocities are soon terminated.

In a number of cases, such governments will evaporate without any necessary specific action but the installation of the new U.S. President. (The relevant slogan covering this is, “Scram, guys, the jig is up!”) The principal deterrent to such flights will be the want of suitable host countries to which such tyrants might wish to seek asylum. (45)

Let us consider a sufficient range of possible variants so as to define the policy involved.

Let us take the nasty one first. Should the United States employ military force? Let us consider a clear-cut case in which we should.

Pinochet's Chile invades Peru. Do we take a spectator role for the imbroglia? By no means. With all its recently developed faults (dictated directly by David Rockefeller et al.), the United States has a principled position concerning the tattered but still real viability of Peru as a sovereign republic. Prior alliance with Peru or not, if Peru wishes our alliance at this point,

45. Perhaps we should do the generous thing, since they are in a sense our property, and take them in, thus establishing in some suitably managed “living museum,” a place where social scientists from around the world can study these exotic relics of a bygone time. Perhaps Pocantico is the appropriate location.

we deliver appropriate force to clean the mess up as quickly and “surgically” as possible.

It is not possible to foresee what other configurations might exist among Peru’s and Chile’s neighbors at that point of a hypothetical war. If the conditions in any way approximated those presently and recently existing, we would not only have the right to offer Peru a military alliance, but strategic imperatives for desiring this. If such a war can be settled before it precipitates a chain reaction among other states, we are obliged to pursue our interests in the matter in a Clausewitzian way, and settle the war at the inception.

Having engaged in the hypothetical war beside our ally Peru, we would not stop our action at Chile’s borders. In the improbable hypothetical case Peru and Mexico foolishly were involved in wars on opposite sides, our action would be bounded by our self-interest in preserving the entire sovereignty of both the belligerents. In the case of an outlaw regime, such as today’s Chilean regime, we pursue the matter of belligerency until the offensive cabal has been rooted out of its control of the institutions of government. There, our military objectives end. We may assist the Chileans to establish their own government, but their constitution of a government is their sovereign affair.

Let us consider the different case of Brazil. Brazil has acquired hideous included features, dating notably from the operations of David Rockefeller’s Cyrus Vance in the course and wake of the Kennedy administration. However, there are viable active and potential impulses within the Brazilian government, which in any reasonable estimation would come to the fore within the existing government if United States’ foreign policy toward Brazil came into efficient correspondence with vital Brazilian national interests.

Let us be more specific on the latter. Brazil has developed a monstrosity deadly to both its national interests and the effects of global weather-pattern shifts in the destruction of the Amazon rain forest’s viability. Under any circumstances, without regard to any foreseeable coloration of the Brazilian government, it is the dictate of U.S. foreign policy interests in general and the matter in particular that we seek to reach agreement with Brazil enabling whatever external assistance is required to correct that Amazon problem, and to provide the Brazilian government and economy with whatever other such assistance is causally relevant to correcting the causes of the creation and perpetuation of the problem. Such other measures prominently include consummation of the fission power agreements between the BRD and Brazil, which it is in our urgent national interest to foster.

It is, similarly, in the vital interests of the United States that Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay should

prosper in the development of the agricultural and industrial potentials of the Rio de la Plata region. We must offer direct cooperation to that specific purpose and must act to foster an economic environment in which such developments will be efficiently pursued through the sovereign choice of those governments.

By citing these two cases, one emphatically more hypothetically, the other representing a current state of affairs, we are emphasizing that there are distinguishable specific routes within the United States’ self-rule of its foreign policy by its perception of natural law, in which routes exist along which United States military force will be employed to accomplish the termination of a foreign government. Such an example as that we have given for the Chile case should be understood as a model and warning of the corresponding — even sudden — potentialities of a “new Federalist” foreign policy.

We are also emphasizing on the contrary, by taking Brazil — a nation which also operates significantly in terms of a U.S.-dictated Friedmanite internal policy — that adversary posture is not to be used generally for problematic cases. Most of the problematic cases emphatically do not lean toward becoming potential-adversary cases, if the United States is able to secure a degree of *agreement for practice* through which we may create an economic environment favorable to the expression of the most desirable impulses within the governing forces. Assistance and persuasion are the normal best means for conducting foreign policy.

Moreover, we wish to emphasize by these examples, that there is no admissible condition under imputable principles of constitutional forms of international law corresponding to a doctrine of “limited sovereignty.” Either a nation is sovereign or it is not. The mere fact that a nation may have become an adversary of the United States does not in itself impair that nation’s sovereignty in the foreign policy of the United States. Ordinarily, unlike the Chile case, we seek the defeat of an adversary, not the violation of his sovereignty one inch beyond what may be properly required to effect that defeat. Even in the exception, as in the hypothetical case we cited for Chile, the fact that we repudiate the sovereignty of a government does not mean that we do not accept axiomatically the sovereignty of a replacement government for the same nation.

Consider a not-so-hypothetical example which may be mooted concerning the “Republic of South Africa.” If that government acts to promote general war in the region, not only is the sovereignty of the government lawfully open to nullification by its adversaries, in our view of international law, that *opens the door for* the dissolution of the nation itself as now constituted. Even then, whether as an ally of that government’s

adversaries or not, we have a vital interest of principle and associated practical considerations in securing the rights of (for emphasis) the white population of that nation to a viable sovereignty. If the Soviet Union were to ally itself to the offending government's adversaries under those conditions, we could not object rightly to the implications of that. However, we would have a quarrel with the Soviet Union and its African allies if the rights of humanity and right to exist under a *viable sovereign government, sovereignly determined*, were denied to any section of the defeated nation's general population.

By implication of natural law, the right of sovereignty must be a very tough principle, otherwise it has no efficient meaning. We must adhere to the principled differences John Quincy Adams posed against British foreign minister Canning's government on this point. We do not follow British precedents in this matter; in international law we follow our own Federalist-originated notions of constitutional law.

It is impossible to get past the topic of foreign policy toward the southern hemisphere without — alas! — stumbling over the United Nations Organization. Generically, that organization is history's most flatulent living monument to parliamentary cretinism, of which for the present we are obliged to make the best.

As for practical authority, that institution has none but as much as either or both of the two great powers choose to lend to it.

From the standpoint of any reasonable approximation of constitutional forms of international law, the United Nations' Charter is a nominalist abomination — whose coincidence with the corresponding proposals of Walter Lippmann's 1943-1944 book is in no degree accidental.

Otherwise, to a "new Federalist" administration, the fact that other, credulous governments have a certain emotional attachment to the thing obliges us to respect their sensibilities as far as tolerable. To us, the UNO is like some abominable gift from a lovable Aunt. For her sake, we have to keep it, but what, within the outer limits of our imagination, are we going to do with the blasted thing?

It does have included special potentialities for an administration which wants to honor a contributor or a contributor's protégé, but at the same time wishes to keep the problematic appointee at a maximum distance from serious matters of government. (That is, of course, already almost a U.S. tradition, now being utilized.) Broadly, the entity has its uses as a forum, some of the administrative functions are useful, and if some serious matter arises, a responsible representative of the government can step over to New York City and take over the matter from the primarily-

decorative official UNO Ambassador. Nothing really good could be developed out of the UNO proceedings as that agency is constituted, but it can serve a collateral role while we wait out the emergence of some competent institution of international law.

The usefulness of the UNO is not its formal arrangements, but those qualities typified by its dining room and lounges. It has the same principled sort of utility as the famous old U.S. neighborhood corner drug store. The issue was not whether the store's ice-cream-and-soda cuisine was good or not; it was a convenient location at which one might run into a relevant person during a wide range of odd hours. As a place — rather than as a political institution — it serves as a useful meeting place for discussions which might lead to some useful result. Even aspects of the formal festivities occasionally might collaterally contribute to that same effect.

This is to emphasize that the UNO is not in fact or in proper principle a principal feature of United States foreign policy. During the past, a number of charades have been staged which might suggest the contrary to the credulous — but credulities, while facts in themselves, do not represent the sort of facts which presently occupy our practical concern.

While the United States will be suitably respectful of its incurred relationship to the UNO, United States foreign policy must pursue a course independent of that institution's more objectionable pretenses to authority in fact or law. We are properly bound in all aspects of foreign policy by the governance of those principles of natural law which were embodied in the original intent of our nation's constitutional law. This signifies that our foreign policy reflects what we implicitly regard as the proper constitutional form of international law. It is that implicit international law which governs our approach to establishing the institutions and instruments of our foreign policy.

By establishing approaches to a community of principle with other nations, inclusive of the Soviet Union, we will thus set into motion those processes through which an actual body of competently constitutional international law will emerge to brush aside the intolerable hodge-podge currently deemed prevailing. We will, in that course, assimilate those aspects of customary policy and law which are consistent with purposes and requirements of proper international law, and, in the interim will be tolerant of the emotional attachment of other nations to whichever outstanding fictions we can in fact tolerate. The emerging instrument, around whose activities such a proper body of international law is catalyzed into being will be the International Development Bank. That perspective is the guiding practical orientation of the United States toward the establishment of a body

of international-law practices consistent with the notions of natural law.

This same problem of international law coheres with our proper foreign policy distinctions of *community of principle*, *agreement for practice*, *toleration*, and *abhorrence*, and the application of those distinctions to *nations* and their *incumbent governments* respectively — and somewhat distinctly.

Some will quibble at the distinction. Radical nominalists will naturally profess — in criticizing us — that if we regard the sovereignty of a state as a tough principle, then the policy toward a sovereign state must be extended in principle of logic toward a sovereignly determined incumbent government of that state. Such specious syllogisms are only empty constructs — wild paralogisms. At what time in modern history has it not been practice in fact to propose on one or another pretext determining distinctions between a policy toward a state and its incumbent government? We do not endorse the implied perceptions of law usually expressed in such past practice. We are merely emphasizing a distinction in fact, a distinction which we appreciate according to different criteria than those generally applied up to this time.

The notion of *community of principle* must be understood to carry the broad implication, that those nations with which we have the present basis for relations determined as those of community of principle, are nations with which we have the existing premises of agreement concerning notions of natural and constitutional law appropriate, in turn, to constitute a community of either implicit or explicit constitutional international law according to the original, generative intent of our Constitution and republic.

Thus, we do not have presently a basis for community of principle with the United Kingdom, although we have the emerging basis for working toward such agreement in distinguishing features of the Callaghan government. We do have a basis for a community of principle with the Fifth Republic of France, but not with the government of Giscard d'Estaing. Excepting such notably abhorrent internal features of the Federal Republic of Germany as its prominent Interpol-interlinked institutions and the carry forward of radical-nominalist traditions associated with Carl Schmitt in its judiciary and legal practice, that nation embodies a strong industrialist-labor thrust which portends convergence upon community of principle. At the moment of writing we have an emphatic community of principle with our own constitutional republic, but the Carter Executive Branch of government is an abhorrence.

The notion of community of principle is not defined by formalities. We know that those modern nations which rule themselves according to an informed

impulse for industrialized technological development cannot accomplish that in fact unless social forces most closely associated with that domestic self-interest are, in effect, the ruling party. Without that internal feature, a republic may be viable in form, but that viability is not durable in respect of content. On condition that the hegemony of such social forces is the efficient content of the law and the government, and that the institutions and instruments of the nation are a properly informed expression of that content, that nation and its government represent a sovereign, viable republic with which the United States has a basis for community of principle. This applies both with respect to immediate relations between our nations, and in respect to the common basis for arriving jointly at a body of constitutional international law acceptable to the generative intent embodied in the establishment of our own Constitution and republic.

The industrial and labor social forces of the United Kingdom thus represent the active content of the basis for developing a community of principle between our nations. Unfortunately, the past anti-humanistic domestic and foreign practices of that nation are not merely past offenses against natural law, but persist in institutions and instruments of the nation and its laws. It is the moral imbecility embedded in the ruling law of the United Kingdom, a defect which is not yet merely a “dead letter,” which is the vicious defect.

Our relationship with the United Kingdom is not based on an effort to balance those contrary considerations, as if they were fixed abstractions. Precisely because the evil content embedded within the customary law and institutions of the United Kingdom became the characteristic of an alien force, the lower Manhattan monetarist faction, the United Kingdom has itself experienced the impact of such evil traditions adopted by what is for it an alien oppressor. As that nation struggles to defend its very existence against the alien oppressor, it is impelled to repudiate the same oppression in its own internal order. It cannot do that unless it repudiates that same evil embedded within its own institutions.

Respecting those principles which characterize the two nations, there is the basis for community of principle between a “new Federalist” United States and the Soviet Union. The taint, the principal obstacle to such a relationship in fact is that efficient consciousness of that potentiality has not heretofore been established. It is not sufficient that the basis for community of principle exists; the parties must supersede their mutually heteronomic impulses to efficiently inform their willful impulses for practice to that desirable effect.

Respecting the nations of the world in general, we must start not from abstracted formalities concerning

the present, but according to the determining content of developing relations. Most emphatically, the character of governments throughout the world is shifted significantly, and quite abruptly, according to the shifts in character of the government of the United States. This means most prominently, the Presidency and its policy outlook for actual practice, and also, most significantly, the relationship between the Presidency and Congress on these matters. The application of the foreign policy of the United States under a "new Federalist" government is determined thus by the qualitative changes in governments and government postures throughout the world which the mere existence of such a "new Federalist" administration represents.

It has been demonstrated beyond doubt, by the experience of this writer and his associates, that a United States government committed to the establishment of its own National Bank and an International Development Bank will gain virtually immediate *agreement for practice* with, at the very least, nearly every nation of the world. Excepting a few stubborn cases of remaining governments, which can be merely tolerated or are abhorrent, a significant proportion among the presently abhorrent regimes will flee or be ousted from their ensconements in power at the mere perception that a "new Federalist" government has been installed.

What governments currently proffer as their policy postures on a number of leading issues are in the main a reflection of the aversive influences created by David Rockefeller and his allies. Beginning with the Kennedy administration, and more notably as a result of the "Mutt-and-Jeff" manipulations associated most prominently with Messrs. Henry Kissinger, Cyrus Vance, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, a majority of the world's governments have been "attitudinally conditioned" in principal features of their current foreign and domestic policies, frequently adopting policies and postures directly contrary to their own nation's most vital interests.

Take away from the world the pressure of a monetarist United States foreign policy, and replace the perception of the might of the United States as embodied in its industrial and associated technological power, and an entirely new global political geometry is brought into being. If the nations of the world also understand that the United States' people and government, in turn, understand the might our nation represents in the world, and that the United States is committed to deploying that might in behalf of its well-defined national and global self-interests — immediately, a substantial number and variety of very desirable changes in governments and policies will spontaneously erupt around the globe.

On the further condition that that government of the United States proceeds *toward* a community of principle with the Soviet republic, a subject to which we have devoted appropriately larger attention here, the world's affairs are brought overall under control of the forceful rule of reason, and on the way to rule by consciously defined constitutional international law.

Within that fortunate overall state of global affairs, the next two decades will be nonetheless characterized by many localized troubles. The ugly vestiges of the past will be reflected repeatedly in difficulties confronting the conduct of our foreign relations. The might of the United States, a might linked to an emerging, strong community of principle with other nations, will moderate the heteronomic impulses of the erring. Hence, we do not anticipate the need for military undertakings, but that risk can be minimized only if it is clear that our policy has a fist within it, a fist we will use only if necessary, but which we will use if necessary. If our economic fist is used intelligently, our military power will remain probably only a visible potentiality.

If we take these steps — before our Tory traitors have taken us past the point of no return toward general war and biological catastrophe — then we may be certain that by approximately 1990-1995 man's only further conquests will be in science and outer space.

The Federalist Presidency

These coherent foreign and domestic policies cannot be efficiently served under those conditions of constitutional and functional degeneracy which extended Tory rule has brought to the organization and functions of the Executive Branch of government. It would be a utopian dream to assign to the Presidency certain duties if that branch of government is not a competent employee for the performances of the duties assigned to it.

The Presidency is not a dutiful errand boy, merely to apply to the letter the law and policy given to it. This is understood *negatively* by the Congress, in terms of those notable cases in which a Presidency makes a travesty of a law according to the methods of the "Good Soldier Schweik" — just as erring federal courts have acted to transform the NEPA into the abominable horror that statute has become in practice. It is understood *positively* by Congress, or in a different negative sense, in the failure of the Executive to submit competently defined proposed legislation to the legislative branch.

This same problem to which we refer in that way, is also cumulatively reflected in an excess of legislative law at this time. Instead of a body of legislative law developed to make efficient a coherent policy shared by the President and the majority of the Congress, a narrow facet of national life becomes a semi-autarkical policy domain unto itself. Even within the fiefdoms so narrowly defined, there is no actual principle of policy, but a tumult of conflicting and short-term impulses, with methods and practices defined which are

more or less inappropriate to an acceptable expression of the stated legislative purpose.

This chaos and incompetence has become institutionalized in the heteronomy within the Executive Branch itself. The "positive feedback" heuristic is most appropriate.

The heteronomy imparted to the Executive Branch in turn imparts itself to the overall body of legislation proposed to the Congress by the Executive as a whole. The Congress, in turn, struggling to make its intent efficient with respect to the Executive's functioning, is impelled to patch into the existing Executive new features of responsibilities, which, in turn, foster new bureaucratic fiefdoms or sub-fiefdoms, whose heteronomic independence from control by the Presidency has been given to it by legislative specification, executive order pursuant to or in attempted deflection of legislative intent, or in associated fashions. This aggravation of the bureaucratic heteronomy becomes the new reality affecting executive functioning and legislative proposals. This becomes, in turn, the more awful mess with which the Congress is confronted.

It is clear that the "Gordian Knot" cannot be patiently untied. How is it to be cut?

Some new, sweeping Executive reorganization? On the basis of past performance, we know that such methods may temporarily check the growth of the bureaucracy, expunge a few dead cats from the filing drawers — and generally turn up all sorts of curious little things to astonish and titillate popular opinion. When it is done, the same old crap resumes afresh —

and not accidentally. Rather than attacking the causal, generative feature of the problem, the symptoms are attacked. Worse, too often, essential built-in checks against the real disease are debrided in the purported interest of "efficiency."

The characteristic problem of recent decades' efforts at government reorganization is that they have been conducted under Tory influences. The subversion of the intent of the Constitution and republic according to revisionist and allied nominalist doctrines has been the policy-context in which the proposed reorganization was shaped. Hence, the nominalist methods of William of Ockham characterized the reorganization. *Essential principles were shaved away* by "Ockham's Razor" in the intent to make government conform more efficiently to the revisionist Tory's nominalist principles.

This is the notable reason that the effort of pro-Constitutionalist forces in the Executive and Congress have predominantly failed to date. By rearguard — *Fabian?* — tactics, the conservative-led resistors of Toryism have adapted themselves to their enemy's Fabian game. They have selected specific symptomatic aspects of the problem as target issues, rather than selecting a focused point of counterattack which directed their efforts to the vital point. Consequently, conservatives' Fabian guerrilla tactics have aimed at building in impediments to Tory encroachments within the bureaucracy and law: abetting thus the very heteronomy upon which both bureaucracy and nominalist Tory policies feed.

It is no use pretending that all of us close to government do not know this to be the fact. This writer knows it, and knows that every experienced Congressman and many others know better than he precisely how this process develops: save at least this viable little bastion of constitutionalism in the bureaucracy and the statutes — and so forth.

Nelson Rockefeller and his family's associates considered (with IBM's Watson and others) the possibility of establishing the Central Intelligence Agency as a private corporation — as was done in transforming the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey into the Rand Corporation. It was better to have the CIA under government control — of course — as the case of the hideous international Interpol network warns us. However, the CIA was attached to the government in the worst possible fashion, outside the Constitution's prescriptions and intent concerning augmentations of the Executive. The bogeyman, the fear that this agency would be too intimately attached to the Presidential powers, was used to foster the worst arrangement.

Nelson Rockefeller promoted the establishment of the National Security Council — about as unlawful an

entity as might have been tolerated at that time. What right does such a body have to exist without congressional advice-and-consent checks of the same sort applicable to Cabinet and related high appointments?

The National Security Agency is another constitutional crisis-point.

Nelson Rockefeller created the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, which has evolved according to the Tory faction's guiding impulses ever since, to become one of the most unwholesome entities of government. With this, the postwar wave of bureaucratic cancer was launched in full sweep, making Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration appear relatively almost one of Doric simplicity.

The Department of Housing and Urban Development was added later, according to the same bastard logic as that for HEW, and so on to Transportation.

The General Accounting Office (GAO) evolved into a kind of fourth branch of government, moving away from any competent limits of defined original intent, and out of the domain of constitutional legitimacy.

It was, retrospectively, a mistake to place the Federal Bureau of Investigation under the Department of Justice in the first place. Like any competent district attorney's office, Justice requires its own investigatory instruments. However, the FBI evolved in fact into a national police force by implications, not an investigative agency with auxiliary law-enforcement powers, but the foot-in-the-door for a national police force. The same separation of law enforcement and prosecuting attorney we prescribe properly for municipalities and state governments was mandatory if the FBI and Justice were not to develop a mutually corrupting relationship.

This was aggravated by linking the FBI to the Rockefeller-created private organization, Interpol, an organization under fascist direction during its Vienna period, under outright Nazi direction well into the war, and under direction of "laundered" Nazis at the end of the war and thereafter. Admittedly, the links between the Nazi Interpol and FBI became so painful to the public conscience that the Interpol connection was discreetly transferred from Justice to Treasury, where the Treasury-Interpol interface within the Treasury Department proceeded to corrupt the drug- and arms-traffic functions of that department.

The Omnibus Crime Bill, developed by Rockefeller-associated agencies, the Russell Sage Foundation, Ford Foundation and others, was credulously passed by the Congress and Executive. This created a new agency within the Justice Department, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, it created new agencies within state and local governments, and launched functions — as in the area of drug-main-

tenance programs — which inevitably subverted regular law enforcement almost nationwide, and fostered conditions within which monstrous horrors grew. It is not irrelevant that certain categories of crime have zoomed since — and significantly in consequence of — the passage and implementation of the Omnibus (i.e., More) Crime Act. The S-1, and its thinly disguised variants, originates with the same authorships and is inherently designed to aggravate the matter in the direction of a “Clockwork Orange” sort of “utopia.”

This cancer within our midst, the LEAA and related developments, has promoted an interface among Interpol, major private detective agencies and services, the LEAA network, the neo-Fabian networks, the Glynn County, Georgia freak show, and certain irregular offshoots of government foreign military and intelligence operations, which, currently, under the coordination of *de facto* President Zbigniew Brzezinski, exploit the fact of an unstable and easily confused President Carter to deploy wholesale covert-operations assassinations and similar hideous deeds even against officials and other prominent citizens of governments to which the United States is allied. Private forces, exploiting their unconstitutional access to various unconstitutional or quasi-constitutional elements of government itself, are in fact in a state of armed insurrection against the Constitution, government and people of the United States.

This mess, and all its major implications, must be cleared away.

There is only one principled approach consistent with our Constitution and its intent to resolve this. Within that delimitation by principle, there are debatable specific remedies which might be deemed acceptable alternatives.

Our Constitution itself was authored and adopted as an imperfect instrument. Although our political forebears were unified in the broad conceptions of intent respecting the rule of natural law, they were divided among themselves respecting the specific, detailed means through which to pursue that agreed intent into all significant areas of practice. Therefore, the Constitution was authored and adopted to define the range within which detailed elaborations would be subsequently evolved.

We, today, face an analogous problem. Therefore, let us now distinguish between essential matters of principle and the specific recommendations which this writer offers as what appears to him at this juncture as the most appropriate approach to implementing those principles.

As a matter of principle, we start from agreement that the institutions of President, Congress, Supreme Court, and the electoral processes of a republic as

established by our political forebears are the appropriate institutions and instruments which define our task with respect to law.


If someone were to propose an alternative, however sound in conception that proposal might be, we would reject it. The proven constitutional institutions and instruments, employed according to the generative principles of their original intent, are amply adequate to the tasks before our nation. Therefore we reject alternatives categorically as unnecessary innovations, a dangerous deflection of our energies from the urgent and essential tasks to be performed.

Our second, less weighty but powerful limitation is the fact that our government has incurred functions and duties which cannot be swept away in the manner of contemplatively designing the institutions and instruments of our republic *de novo*. We must effect the maximum benefit with the least effort, the least potential disruption.

Respecting the Congress itself, although the Congress has created within itself institutions and practices which are unsuited to our nation's presently proper policies, the Congress has the autonomous power to dissolve and constitute its committees and associated sub-functions with a greater freedom than the other two main branches of government. The problems associated with the internal structure of the Congress are therefore in no sense of the quality or magnitude confronted in either the federal courts or the Executive. In general, on condition that the Executive's dysfunctional features are corrected, the Congress will more or less automatically adjust its committee and related sub-functions to the requirements of its interface with the Executive Branch.

The characteristic problem of the federal courts is the cumulative effect of Tory influences. The key to this problem is of course the composition of the Supreme Court and, to a lesser extent, the lower federal courts. Except in those instances where a Supreme Court justice or federal court judge is guilty of clearly impeachable conduct or conduct verging upon that, the other two main branches of government must be concerned to avoid the errors of zeal in remedying the overall problem.

While we work, according to the prescriptions of the Constitution and subsumed laws, to effect a composition of our federal courts agreeable to the intent of the Constitution, we have several principal remedies available to the other two branches of government. We can pass laws which nullify intolerable rulings derived from the courts' reading of the intent of statutes. We can pass Constitutional Amendments. Such use of the “Amendment route” is a direct means not only for amending the Constitution but for



The first Cabinet: President Washington with the Secretaries of State [Jefferson], Treasury [Hamilton], War [Knox], and, in background, Attorney General [Randolph], an engraving from a painting by nineteenth century artist Alonzo Chappel.

affirming its intent in explicit terms. Also, we can create a political climate in the nation, in which context we will be better able to exert the force of reason upon erring justices and to give support to those justices which are already persuaded of or inclined toward the actual intent of the Constitution.

With these means, and with the chain-reaction consequences of a few crucial laws and court decisions upon the application of the outstanding body of law and precedent, the federal court system and other areas of legal practice can be shifted back onto the track of constitutional law.

It is the Executive which remains the monstrous problem.

All proper reforms center around the principle that the President of the United States embodies in his personal office all the responsibilities, authorities and duties of the Executive Branch. The President cannot be responsible in fact unless all subordinate functions of the Executive Branch are efficiently accountable to the President. *No "fourth branch of government," whether so in law or in fact, can be tolerated.*

The proper instrument through which the President fulfills the responsibilities of his office, excepting his personal staff, is the Cabinet, composed of heads of regular Departments. These Departments are established by law, and the heads of these Departments are appointed with the advice and consent of the Congress. *No other chain of command within the Executive Branch may be tolerated.*

Every other function and sub-function of the Executive Branch is assigned to a regular Department, and is uniquely accountable, according to the lawful execution of its function, to the Cabinet Department head and the President. *No other functions of the Executive Branch will be tolerated.*

Although crucial appointments to executive positions are either presently filled as permanent positions with the explicit advice and consent of the Congress, or otherwise should be filled with aid of efficient informal consultation with the Congress, the President has independent authority to summarily discharge any member of the Executive Branch *within the limits of the procedures defined by law for this purpose.* Without this authority, the responsibilities of the President are not matched by subordinate's accountability.

Similarly, the President delegates the power of discharge through his Cabinet members respecting their Departments.

This prescribes relatively great centralized authority and responsibility to the President and his Cabinet members. The Tories and their liberal and radical camp followers have made a great, self-righteous howling concerning this fact in itself. This

pressure of Tory opinion — this thrust toward overthrowing our Constitution and the institutions of our republic — has been the background pressure fostering various efforts toward decentralizing the executive authority. It is that subversion of the Constitution's intent and prescriptions which is key to the degeneration of the Executive Branch which we must remedy.

The founders of this nation were by no means blind to the potential problems incurred by the effort to implement the Constitution and direct institutions of our republic. Three principal constraints upon the Executive were provided as sufficient to this purpose: (1) the imperative of suitable quality of the President and legislators; (2) the duty of the Congress to exert its power of advice and consent, and to make laws defining the policies and methods of government; and (3) the constitutional-law duties of the Supreme Court. The last is clear without further discussion here; it is sufficient to consider the relevant implications of the first two of the three points.

There is no remedy but impeachment or resignation for a person unsuited to continue to occupy the office of President. A "bum in the White House" is in itself a violation of the intent of constitutional law.

The republican form of government was adopted inclusively to put efficient impediments in the way of the efforts to place a "bum" in either of the three principal branches of federal government, with special emphasis upon the need for the highest personal qualifications of the President himself. The Electoral College was originally a most important such constitutional hurdle.

The original function of the Electoral College's Electors was to interpose an intermediate step of about four months' duration between a general election and the installation of a new President. The function of the Electoral College was to serve as a reflective process through which *duly elected representatives* of the general electorate enabled that general electorate to "change its mind" from the heat-of-the-moment results of a *preference* election, to make that selection which corresponded in deliberated fact to the combined intent and constitutionally defined interests of the electorate as a whole. Hence, the constitutional power of lawful selection by the electorate was embodied in the Electoral College, and it was the qualifications of those Electors to deliberate such a selection which was focused as the principal proper concern of the individual member of the electorate in casting his preference ballot.

This arrangement also provided a safeguard against the use of massive election fraud in parts of the nation to attempt the election of an undesirable candidate to the Presidency.

Reviewing the consequences of the recent November through January proceedings overall, including the massive vote-fraud (probably between 5 to 7 millions fraudulent Carter votes) and associated outrages, and contemplating the manifest result, we are now more firmly convinced of the wisdom of our political forebears in this matter.

Especially following the 1828 general election, the Electoral College hurdle tended to become a very low hurdle indeed, and was gradually transformed by custom and erosion almost into a mere accounting procedure for transforming a popular vote into its constitutional electoral projection, so that the Electors were unconstitutionally degraded in fact to mere bearers of a predetermined mandate. Under the Roosevelt administration, the constitutional potentialities of the Electoral College were substantially nullified by accelerating the inaugural date. The Kennedy administration gutted the constitutional provision still further. In principle, the Electoral College vote for James E. Carter was conducted in total violation of the intent of the Constitution — and we now see in part, at least, what we paid for that violation.

Admittedly, the Electoral College is not an axiomatic feature of a viable form of democratic republic in general. It was a choice made by our political forebears. However, although this feature of the Constitution was in particular a practical choice, *the intent governing that choice represents in no sense an optional feature of constitutional law*. One cannot alter the Electoral College procedure without replacing it with means equally efficient *to the same purpose*. To do otherwise is not to amend the Constitution, but to overthrow it in respect of its most vital, generative principle — the principle of the democratic republic.

The *quality* of the person elected to the Presidency is one of the principled cornerstones of a democratic republic. The electorate does not have the inherent right to commit national suicide. It does not have the right to place a donkey, a baboon or a James E. Carter in the White House. Happily, at this juncture, the majority of the electorate has probably refreshed its faith in that constitutional principle.

This nation does not belong to the electorate of any moment. The nation belongs *in part* to them, but also to their forebears and to their posterity. *The electorate is bound by that condition of trusteeship, a trusteeship which obliges it to secure the benefits of progress to its posterity, and to effect that continuation through the instruments of a democratic republic. That is the law, that is the condition of trusteeship which binds and delimits the powers of choice of the general electorate.*

A dog does not know *tomorrow*. A baboon does not

know *tomorrow*. That is the form of difference between lower beasts and human beings. If a person says, "I know only 'now,' I know only what I perceive to be my immediate needs and preferences," that person is politically a moral imbecile, politically only a little more qualified to vote than a dog, a horse, or a baboon. Since a certain portion of the electorate is, from time to time, caught up in the dog-like, heteronomic state in which its powers of reason do not reach beyond a very small 'now' and a very narrow 'here,' *our political forebears placed bounds of trusteeship upon the powers of the general electorate, binding it to the consequences of its actions of today in the world of tomorrow.*

We are not a Tory "democracy;" we are not a troop of baboons. It is the competence of the President to internalize unto himself, in his person, both the whole interest of the nation, and the competent judgment of the consequences for the whole posterity, which is the absolute, indispensable mental and moral qualification for the holder of that office. It is also required that a person of such qualities of knowledge and perception also be efficient in corresponding executive action. The President must, more than any other single elected official, embody in himself the best-informed willful impulses respecting the general interest of the nation as a whole both for today and tomorrow.

We might, therefore, lawfully amend the Constitution, to replace the Electoral College with some other instrumentality to the same purpose. *We may not amend that purpose itself out of the Constitution* without declaring that we have repudiated the principle of a democratic republic and have chosen to repudiate our trusteeship to posterity, in favor of the heteronomic frivolities of a baboon-like "utopia." *We must not abandon the constitutional hurdles to the Presidency without providing something equally efficient to that same intent.*

If one is nonetheless still frightened by the fact that the Presidency of the United States represents great power, there are only two principal remedies: the quality of the President, and the power of the Congress (principally) to define the laws which circumscribe the powers of the Executive Branch as a whole.

However, the Congress may not *decentralize* the Executive Branch without thereby invalidating the letter and intent of the Constitution.

The relationship of the Congress to the Presidency is primarily a relationship of the Congress to the Office of the President itself. "The President shall..." and "The President shall not..." are the only principled form in which the Congress may properly exert its constitutional powers concerning the Executive Branch as a whole.

Among the things a President may not do is to delegate his responsibilities to a quasi-lawful body such as the National Security Council. He is accountable to Congress and law to be *efficiently responsible* for the Executive Branch. He may not pass out pieces of Executive power like confetti every time a Rockefeller comes sniffing about the White House. He may not evolve the Executive Branch into a bureaucratic nightmare, to the effect of thus preventing himself or his successor from competently fulfilling his Constitutional and other lawful responsibilities. He may not infest subordinate executive positions or other posts of high trust with scoundrels. It is the responsibility of the Congress (principally) to employ its powers of advice and consent and lawmaking authority to circumscribe the policies of the President and the elaboration of the Executive Branch according to the standards of constitutional law *appropriate to a qualified President*.

If the President is not qualified, he must be impeached. One does not structure the Executive in unconstitutional ways to the purpose of constraining an incompetent President — one impeaches the incompetent President.

The following are the proposed measures of Executive Branch reorganization.

Create three new Cabinet posts and Departments:

*A Secretary for Political Intelligence;

*A Secretary for the National Bank;

*A Secretary for Domestic Security;

and:

*Eliminate DHEW, HUD, Transportation.

*Dissolve the National Security Council.

Establish the Cabinet as the sole executive body within the Executive for all questions of policy, including national security. Establish a position of Under-Secretary for each Department, who is the permanent sitting representative of the Department in the Cabinet as a continuously functioning body.

All functions of the Executive Branch are assigned to their most appropriate Department, with a direct chain-of-command within the Department determining accountability of each section and function to the Secretary, the Cabinet and the Office of the President.

The Cabinet — plus the Vice-President — functions, together with the President, as the direct interface between the Executive and the Congress. All legislative and related proposals developed within the Executive pass through this channel-interface, except for functions of congressional inquiry into the conduct of government operations, and into matters pertinent to other normal and special activities of inquiry initiated properly by the Congress.

On condition that the Vice-President is selected

according to his proper qualifications as a potential President, the Vice-President and his personal office is the most direct special interface between the Cabinet and the Senate, and should be responsible for coordinating especially respecting matters pertaining to the Senate's special powers and duties of advice and consent.

The following subsumed features of that reorganization concerning detail and policy-directions are recommended as those presently seen as most appropriate. First, the details, and then the policy-directions.

Secretary of Political Intelligence: Perhaps there is a better choice of name, but the suggested name given here emphasizes the relevant points:

Through the history of the writer's experience in the development of his own organization's political-intelligence functions, beginning Autumn, 1971, he argues this matter with unusual competence, both concerning the practice of political intelligence and the indispensable role it properly performs within government as a whole.

Most notably, beginning mid-January 1974, when the writer and his associates first solved the basic riddle of the "Watergate" proceedings against President Richard Nixon, there has been an ongoing, growing interface between the writer's organization and leading political and related forces in the United States and other parts of the world. This culminated in the September-December discussions between the U.S. Labor Party and Republican, Democratic, trade-union, industrialist leading circles concerning our forecast of the implications of a Carter inauguration. The same mistaken doubts and reservations expressed toward the Labor Party analysis by a majority of these domestic U.S. leading circles were experienced among developing sector and Western European circles. It is now clear that the Labor Party was correct and the doubts mistaken. That latter experience is consistent with the pattern during the 1974-1976 period as a whole.

Although the reality of the matter has not yet become the perception of the man-in-the-street, every significant factional current in world and various national political frameworks today is hitched to political-intelligence circles to the extent that each has a definable intelligence-network "pedigree." There are several principal pedigrees — including two principal Soviet-linked varieties — governing politics behind the scenes in every part of the world today. At this moment, you cannot walk into a Masonic circle in Western Europe, for example, without being in the midst of a hot brawl between "American" (pro-terrorism tactics) and "British" (anti-terrorist) factions... a curious fact which, incidentally, requires some insight

into the history of the Scottish Rite. The picture of global and national political life peddled to the credulous in the "civics lesson" and the principal news media has no correspondence with the governing reality which actually operates. (46)

Granted, many influential politicians included in various factions, either simply profess slyly not to know this, or even genuinely do not know that they are in fact a part of an intelligence network. That is of no great relevance in itself; the briefings they receive from leaders of their faction, the flow of background information across luncheon tables, and so forth, is generated as "perceptions" in one or another circle operating just behind the scenes in an explicitly political-intelligence mode, and interfacing with one or more explicitly political-intelligence and other police and intelligence governmental and private agencies.

Consequently, the responses to Labor Party briefings have been determined, predominantly not merely by the way in which corrupt major national press and polling organizations shape the intellectual environment. Each circle has its "sources," which are, mainly, either direct or indirect "pipelines" to a political-intelligence network. (These, amusingly, have been often the same influential individuals who complain against "conspiracy theories!") Consequently, in large part, the conflicts between our estimations and those of others have been conflicts in methods of political-intelligence evaluations — in which the writer and his associates have, on balance, been predominantly correct, despite the relatively more massive resources available to the other political-intelligence networks participating in these eerie shadowboxings.

Two broad conclusions of direct relevance to government reorganization arise from this background knowledge. First, the competent functioning of government — especially of the Executive and Congress — requires the highest quality of regular political intelligence. Second, the notable advantage of the writer's political intelligence over competing "brands" was essentially a matter of method. That method has been essentially represented in this policy study. The correlative judgment is that such methods should be incorporated in governmental political-intelligence functions.

In consequence of this, the writer proposes that the time has been reached and passed at which the proper political-intelligence functions of the Executive ought to "come out into the open," and be placed directly at the disposal of the Executive and Congress as a whole.

The redirected Central Intelligence Agency should obviously be the only branch of the Executive engaged in this function, and freed, meanwhile, from "special operations" and related deflections from its responsibilities.

This function must be controlled at the Cabinet level, with Cabinet-level accountability. It must be an information agency in form, with an included and growing responsibility for basic scientific research and research and development. *It must also be employed, under Cabinet-level control, as a special capability for auditing the performance of the internal functions of the Executive as a whole.*

The military and related intelligence functions should be consolidated in the Defense Intelligence Agency, the domestic security functions of enforcement prescribed by law should be consolidated under the Secretary for Domestic Security (if that is the proper choice of title), and "everything else closed down," except for the restricted investigative functions of the Attorney General, Treasury, and National Bank, immediately pursuant to their specific duties and responsibilities.

Things which should be respectively at some degree of arm's length must be placed at arm's length, and brought together only according to courses of action prescribed by law or through the functions of the Office of the President and Cabinet. This government's Executive Branch must be brought under control and made efficiently accountable to the President and Congress.

The *Secretary of the National Bank's* functions are obvious, as it is obvious that this aspect of policy must be responsible and accountable at the Cabinet level. It is also clear that the National Bank and Treasury must be kept at arm's length, so that the specific accountabilities of each are respectively balanced.

The *Secretary for Domestic Security* should take over and reorganize the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service, and other enforcement and security agencies of the Executive Branch. *Within the limits placed upon such constituent agencies by law,* the Department must function as a law-enforcement agency, within the limits appropriate to a law-enforcement agency. It must be accountable at the Cabinet level, and must operate in an environment in which it is balanced by the Justice Department and the audit functions of the Secretary for Political Intelligence.

Otherwise, strict, coherent definitions of Cabinet areas of responsibility should rule, by agreement between the President and Congress and appropriate stipulations of law to this effect. State is foreign policy; Agriculture is biosphere; Interior is custody of real assets of the federal government; Commerce is every aspect of science, industry, transportation, construc-

46. Not to single out the Federal Republic of Germany in what is a widespread fact, it is notable that some wag, referring to the "spook connections" involved, proposed that the *Bundestag* ought to be renamed the *Bundesnacht!*

tion and commerce, excepting those functions assigned to Agriculture and the National Bank; Labor is the labor force in all respects bearing upon the well-being and development of the population which produces the labor force. Defense is defense. *The areas of conflict among the Departments are areas in which we desire conflict to be expressed for purposes of policy deliberation.*

In addition to these rearrangements within the Executive, the Executive must respond to the realities of the modern world by establishing an official government press agency, functioning under the direction of the Secretary for Political Intelligence. Government has been too long manipulated by the abuse of the de facto power of a core of national media to create an environment of disinformation and distortion around the processes of government. If we are to have a *free press in fact*, the government must provide the radio station and newspaper in the proverbial "East Podunk" with an alternative source of information, against which to compare the packaged output of the national TV, wire-service and major newsweekly and metropolitan news sources. What the editor in "East Podunk" does with government information is a matter of his choice, but he and his community have the right to be given that choice.

The obscene situation, in which officials and elected representatives of government — in the Executive and Congress — are pressed into propitiating the Washington Post, the New York Times, and so forth, for fear of what disinformation may otherwise "get back home," must end. Insofar as a government news service accounts the issues mooted within the Congress, Congress should prescribe what it deems acceptable standards — since in this aspect of the matter, the Executive must properly reflect the intent of the government as a whole. With that sort of restriction, the government has the right and obligation to

defend itself by its own independent means against disinformation.

To aid the Executive and Congress in developing policies and in efficiently informing the willful impulses of the electorate, the federal government should foster seminars and conferences in Washington on topics pertinent to policy matters and implementation problems currently before the Executive and Congress. Lobbying performs a useful role, but it lacks the kind of 'cross-fire of counterposed views more advantageous to the needs of Congress and the Executive in deliberating policies. Such a climate around the seat of government — if, one hopes, bacchanalia are not dragged in as a major auxiliary feature of the effort — is necessary to the effective processes of government in a high-technology climate of policymaking and executive action. We need to know that we are right, and the electorate must know that we have competently deliberated with aid of the best auxiliary channels of deliberation available.

An efficient, responsible, accountable Executive, closely interfaced with a well informed Congress, and an informed electorate are the institutions and instruments of the science of government. With proper use of those instruments, the task of enforcement is reduced, and the amount of law required during each session of Congress is correspondingly reduced, increasingly limited to laws which define and enable policy and policy objectives.

The principle of government to be emphasized for this period is that we are a democratic republic committed by our Constitution to rapid advancements in technology, and to the correlated conditions of life which that prescribes. We as a nation must be dedicated to the mastery and application of scientific knowledge, as the central feature of our efforts to overcome the problems of our nation and the world. Now, we must begin.

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