

TESTIMONY OF D. GARETH PORTER

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 27, 1978

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1978

21-035

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, *Chairman*

JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas	ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina	HIRAM L. FONG, Hawaii
PHILIP A. HART, Michigan	HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts	STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
BIRCH BAYH, Indiana	MARLOW W. COOK, Kentucky
QUENTIN N. BURDICK, North Dakota	CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, Jr., Maryland
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia	EDWARD J. GURNEY, Florida
JOHN V. TUNNEY, California	

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, *Chairman*

JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas	STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina	MARLOW W. COOK, Kentucky
BIRCH BAYH, Indiana	EDWARD J. GURNEY, Florida

J. G. SOURWINE, *Chief Counsel*
SAMUEL J. SCOTT, *Associate Counsel*
WARREN LYTTMAN, *Associate Counsel*
JOHN R. NORFEL, *Director of Research*
ALFONSO L. TARABOCCA, *Chief Investigator*

RESOLUTION

RESOLVED, by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, that the testimony of D. Gareth Porter taken in executive session on July 27, 1973, be released from the injunction of secrecy, be printed, and made public.

JAMES O. EASTLAND,
Chairman.

Approved: September 28, 1973

TESTIMONY OF D. GARETH PORTER

FRIDAY, JULY 27, 1973

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room 3302, Dirksen Office Building, Senator Strom Thurmond presiding.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel; Samuel J. Scott, associate counsel; and Raymond Sifly, minority counsel.

Senator THURMOND. The committee will come to order. You are here because you have said you consider yourself aggrieved by prior testimony, and you want to answer it in person.*

Just hold up your hand and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you give in this committee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. PORTER. I do.

TESTIMONY OF D. GARETH PORTER, RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF EAST ASIA PROJECT, CORNELL UNIVERSITY

Senator THURMOND. And now what is the length of your statement?

Mr. PORTER. Well, it is a legal-sized document and it goes to 31 pages, 30 pages. Some of the material I can present in the form of memorandum in the record, and I will do that.

Senator THURMOND. I was just thinking we might just put your entire statement in the record.

Mr. PORTER. Yes.

Senator THURMOND. And then would you want to—

Mr. PORTER. Summarize it?

Senator THURMOND [continuing]. Summarize it?

Mr. PORTER. I will do my best to present it.

Senator THURMOND. The whole statement is in the record and will be for everybody to read.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I venture a suggestion?

Senator THURMOND. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Chair might wish to order that the statement be printed as though read.

* Error's Note.—In accordance with longtime subcommittee policy, Mr. Porter's testimony will be given parallel distribution to that of Daniel E. Teodora, January 5, 1973, titled "The Human Cost of Communism in Vietnam—II." Purpose of this policy is, of course, to make this hearing available, so far as possible, to all persons who received the Teodora testimony, which Mr. Porter answers here.

Senator THURMOND. Yes. If there is no objection.

Mr. SOURWINE. And give it the large type.

Senator THURMOND. If there is no objection, we will just order the statement printed as if read, so that will take care of it. That is the main thing; you want to get it in the record.

Mr. PORTER. Right. Right.

Senator THURMOND. And now we can all read this at our convenience as necessary.

Mr. PORTER. This subcommittee has published testimony attacking me personally and seeking to discredit my monograph. "The Myth of the Bloodbath: North Vietnam's Land Reform Reconsidered," published by the International Relations of East Asia Project of Cornell University, in September 1972. Since the subcommittee itself did not see fit to call on me to answer this attack, I have demanded this opportunity to set the record straight.

Before my study was published, I had been warned to expect precisely this kind of attack, using some of the same techniques which Hoang Van Chi used in his book "From Colonialism to Communism." So the falsehoods and distortions which make up the attack are no surprise to me. I will state at the outset that I am going to ignore the sophomoric rhetoric which Mr. Teodoru has used in attacking me personally, because it is not even worthy of a response. I will address myself instead to the substantive allegations and arguments presented by Teodoru and Hoang Van Chi.

First, however, I would like to discuss briefly the more general problem of information and scholarship on the Vietnamese Communist movement. Hoang Van Chi and his books are only part of a larger problem which has loomed in the background of America's long political and military intervention in Vietnam: How a nation which is heavily involved in trying to repress a peasant revolution in a small, distant country can avoid a fundamentally distorted understanding of the character of that revolution. For, on one hand, the U.S. Government, the Saigon Government, and their apologists have been systematically disseminating information—and misinformation—designed to discredit the Vietnamese Communist movement in every way; on the other hand, the journalists and academic specialists on whom the public must rely on the subject have been for the most part heavily dependent for information on the Vietnamese Communist movement on official French, American, or Saigon Government sources—if they have not actually been connected directly or indirectly with those governments.

In effect, therefore, the American public has seen the Vietnamese revolution through the eyes of the sworn enemies of that revolution, and what has emerged from this selective process has been a caricature which in my opinion does not even begin to approximate reality. In inheriting the French colonialist role in Indochina, the United States has also inherited all the rationalizations and justifications for interfering in the Vietnamese revolution that went with it. Thus at various times, the American public has learned that the Vietnamese revolutionaries are controlled by international communism, that they are essentially terrorists with little popular support, that they murder anyone who belongs to the wrong class or is not a Marxist-Leninist—in short, that they are illegitimate, aggressive, cruel, fanatical, and unpatriotic. That they might have been supported by the majority of

the population, or that the revolution's objectives might have been independence from foreign domination and a better life for millions of desperately poor and dispossessed peasants and workers has never been admitted as a possibility by those charged with defeating the revolutionaries.

The tragic result of this process has been not only vast ignorance of the Vietnamese revolution but a great deal of false history. Take for example the notion that the Communist leaders of the Viet Minh movement eliminated all non-Communist nationalists whom they regarded as "dangerous rivals" for the leadership of the anti-French resistance in order to obtain a monopoly over it. This interpretation of the events of 1945-56 is presented in the excerpt from Joseph Buttinger's "Vietnam: The Dragon Embattled" in this subcommittee's compendium "The Human Cost of Communism." In the very first sentence of the excerpt, Buttinger says that the "elimination of their opponents was one of the most common means the Communists used to establish Viet Minh control over the entire nationalist movement."

The first fallacy in this argument is the suggestion that the Viet Minh's popularity and legitimacy were not already far greater than that of any other political group, north or south, at the time of the August revolution, and that other groups were in a position to wrest leadership from the Viet Minh by virtue of mass popular support. It is a well-documented fact that there was no political group in the country which could have rivaled the Viet Minh in popular prestige at any time during the 1945-46 period. This was true for a variety of reasons: It was the only political organization spanning all three regions of the country; it was the only one to appeal directly to peasants and offer them a share in political power at the local level; it was identified with the victorious allies and with real independence rather than with the illusory independence offered by those who had collaborated with the Japanese in setting up a Vietnamese regime in the spring of 1945; perhaps most important of all, the Viet Minh were the only political organization to take concrete steps to alleviate the suffering due to a severe famine which had already killed some 2 million people before March 1945.

The overwhelming popularity and prestige of the Viet Minh at the time was admitted even by their bitterest Vietnamese foes.

One anti-Communist Vietnamese politician, Nguyen Manh Con, who represented the Phuc Quoc Minh Hoi in the D.R.V. national assembly of 1946, later wrote that "the masses believed in them, creating a current opinion strongly welcoming the Viet Minh." So rapidly did this current of opinion develop in 1945, he adds, that "in many places, the party's organizational activities couldn't keep up with the admiration of the masses." Moreover, Nguyen Van Sam, the former imperial delegate to Cochinchina whom Buttinger describes as having been murdered by the Viet Minh as a dangerous nationalist rival, privately told French officials at the end of 1945 that Ho Chi Minh's government had the support of "80 percent of the partisans." And ex-emperor Bao Dai himself told the French virtually the same thing in 1947, according to the most eminent French scholar on Vietnam, Professor Paul Mus.

The second distortion of historical reality is the assertion that those prominent political figures executed by the Viet Minh were resisting the return of the French. Buttinger mentions in the same first para-

graph of the excerpt the names of Bui Quang Chieu, Ho Van Nga, Nguyen Van Sam, Pham Quynh, and Ngo Dinh Khoi, implying that these were anti-French nationalists whose popular following threatened the Communists' control of the independence movement. Nothing could have been further from the truth. Bui Quang Chieu, Pham Quynh, and Ngo Dinh Khoi (Diem's brother) were all dedicated collaborators with the French right up to the Japanese coup, and would certainly have assisted in the reestablishment of French control had they been around to do so. Nor should it be forgotten that Pham Quynh, as Minister of the Interior at the Court of Hue and Ngo Dinh Khoi as governor of Quang Ngai were responsible for counter-revolutionary terror against Communists and non-Communist nationalists alike, for which they were highly decorated by the French colonial regime. It was not only the Communists who had scores to settle with them.

Ho Van Nga and Nguyen Van Sam were the two leading figures in the pro-Japanese political organization in Cochinchina from March to August 1945. Ho Van Nga was killed at the same time as Bui Quang Chieu, following a report—later recounted by an anti-Viet Minh source—that a Provisional Vietnam Nationalist Government had been set up secretly at the end of September 1945 by a close political associate of theirs and that this government planned to negotiate with the French rather than follow the Viet Minh into resistance. Whether or not Ho Van Nga and Bui Quang Chieu were specifically involved in this plan to collaborate with the French, it is clear that they were killed because the Viet Minh feared such an intention on their part. As for Nguyen Van Sam, he was killed only in October 1947, many months after he had openly abandoned the resistance and actively involved himself on behalf of the Hao Dai solution and an accommodation with the French colonial authorities.

The account given by Buttinger of the execution of Hoa Hao sect founder Huynh Phu So is equally misleading. The Viet Minh did not in fact try to eliminate him while the sect forces were fighting in a united front against the French. It was Huynh Phu So who had organized an effort to overturn the Viet Minh-controlled executive committee in September 1945, even after that committee had agreed to accept a representative of the Hoa Hao sect as a member. When an attack by 15,000 Hoa Hao followers against the Viet Minh regional headquarters in Can Tho was repulsed and relatives of So and his top military aide were captured and executed for their role in the attempt, the Hoa Hao took vengeance against Viet Minh supporters wherever they could find them in Cochinchina, committing atrocities which shocked the returning French in late 1945. By April 1947, when Huynh Phu So was arrested and finally executed, the Hoa Hao had long since openly committed themselves to the Hao Dai solution and French-sponsored independence.

Thus the opponents of the Viet Minh who were eliminated during the 1945-47 period, have been portrayed in much of the western literature as rivals for leadership of the resistance movement when in fact they were past collaborators with the French and Japanese who were prepared to use whatever means were at hand to prevent the Viet Minh revolution from succeeding—including collaborating with the returning French colonialist regime. This is but one of many

misrepresentations of fundamental historical facts concerning the Vietnamese revolution which I have encountered in my research on the subject.

One of the most important falsifications of history regarding the Vietnamese revolution is the portrayal of the North Vietnamese land reform program of 1954-56. After a careful rereading of Hoang Van Chi's book early in 1972, I decided that a full-scale reexamination of that whole episode was in order. And after several months of research, I concluded that a number of assumptions about the D.R.V. land reform, which had long been accepted by scholars as fact were fundamentally wrong. Since my conclusions were not stated anywhere in the testimony published by this subcommittee, I will restate them here.

First, I concluded that the land reform was not merely an excuse for liquidating landlords and rich peasants or political opponents of the Viet Minh, but that there was an immediate economic rationale as well as a long-term social and political one, and that it did substantially benefit the poor peasants from the standpoint of increased rice consumption.

Second, I concluded that the land reform was not aimed at physically liquidating the landlords or the rich peasants, as charged by Chi, but was meant to eliminate the political, economic and social control by the landlord class and to punish only those who were actually guilty of serious crimes.

Third, I concluded that there were no quotas for executions in each village, contrary to Chi's allegation.

Fourth, I concluded that the land reform was neither run by nor carried out under the supervision of Chinese advisers, as Chi asserts.

Fifth, I concluded that the predominant influence on the American interpretation of the land reform has been Hoang Van Chi's book "From Colonialism to Communism," that Chi himself was guilty of intentional falsification and misrepresentation through the use of mis-translation, the creation of imaginary quotations, and the use of fraudulent documents, and that he was only part of a larger effort by American and Diemist political warfare agencies to create a myth about the land reform in North Vietnam.

Now that Hoang Van Chi and his allies have had their opportunity to attempt to discredit my findings, I wish to say categorically that nothing which has been presented to this subcommittee causes me to retreat in the slightest from any of these conclusions. On the contrary, in the 10 months which have passed since the publication of my monograph, I have acquired even more solid evidence of the fraud which was perpetrated on the American public by the Saigon government's propaganda organs with American assistance.

Now I wish to deal individually and in detail with each of the arguments presented in the testimony published by this subcommittee bearing upon my conclusions and the evidence used to support them.

1. CHI'S RELATIONSHIP TO SAIGON AND U.S. POLITICAL WARFARE ORGANS

Chi now self-righteously denies any role in working with or for the psychological warfare agencies of either United States or Saigon governments. He insists on defining the question in terms of whether

or not he was a paid agent of American imperialism—words which bear no resemblance to anything which I said in my monograph. The real question, of course, is not whether he was on the American payroll but whether he was known to the U.S. mission in Saigon not merely as a translator, which is a relatively innocuous role, but as an expert on anti-Communist psychological warfare. The fact is, as I pointed out in the monograph, that Chi was also involved in writing accounts of the horrors of life under the Viet Minh which were being subsidized by his own admission by the Saigon government's Ministry of Information, for whom he had worked for some 8 months in 1955-56. Precisely what relationship Chi had with the Saigon government after early 1956 is still not clear, but we do know that he was actively involved in political warfare for it from 1956 to 1959. For, despite his claim in the letter published by the subcommittee that he had no part in psychological warfare activities during the period in question, he has been less modest with his present employers, the Agency for International Development.

In a training manual published in connection with courses which Chi helped teach for U.S. CORDS personnel going to Vietnam, Chi was described as having "served the government of President Diem with special attention to the psychological vulnerabilities of the Communist forces * * *." In the same publication, Chi even claimed credit for having "created the term 'Viet Cong' for Diem." Moreover, despite his protest to the Washington Post last September that he had come to the United States to get away from politics, we learn from the same document that he was also a consultant to the White House and the Department of Defense. Neither of these institutions is noted for its interests in classical Chinese literature or Confucian philosophy.

Chi's disclaimer of any knowledge of the CIA's role in getting him a grant from the Congress for Cultural Freedom to write the book "From Colonialism to Communism," must be viewed not only in light of his attempt to deny his role as a political warfare specialist for Saigon but also in the light of the decisive role which the U.S. Government played in getting the book published and in promising him a job in the United States when it was finished—of which Chi clearly cannot claim ignorance. There is more to be said, in fact, about the publication of his book. Although the USIA testified in 1966 that Chi's book was subsidized by the agency as part of its book development project, I have now learned from the former director of the project that the book had already been published by Praeger when the USIA decided to buy special editions of it for its own purposes.

This fact, combined with Chi's own silence on the matter, strongly suggests that it was the Central Intelligence Agency which suggested to Praeger that it publish Chi's book and perhaps also secretly funded its publication. Frederick Praeger himself admitted, according to the February 24, 1967, New York Times, that his firm had published 15 or 16 books "at the suggestion of the CIA"—all of them dealing with communism and countries vulnerable to Communist movements. Given the known fact that the CIA had been instrumental in getting the manuscript written, it is logical to assume that the CIA had also insured that it would be published—even to the point of financing it surreptitiously. I have written to Praeger to ask specifically if this was indeed one of the 15 or 16 books which Praeger referred to in 1967 as having been CIA-inspired, if not CIA-financed. I have not yet

received a response from Praeger, and I ask permission to place in the record the response which I do receive. I further suggest that this subcommittee can easily settle the matter by subpoenaing any records from Praeger relevant to who originally suggested the publication of "From Colonialism to Communism."

I wish to repeat here the point which I made in the original monograph: that Chi's implicit claim to have personal, inside knowledge of Communist party policy toward the land reform is simply not borne out by the jobs which he himself claims to have held in the Viet Minh zone. He claims that he was a teacher in a precollege school in Thanh Hoa during the entire period from 1950 to 1955. As such, he had no access to any party or government secrets, despite his allegations about secret party organs from the Central Committee. I wish to add further that I do not believe that the public has the full facts about Chi's background in relation to the Viet Minh and to the anti-Communist governments involved in the struggle from 1946 to 1954.

2. THE NGUYEN MANH TUONG DOCUMENT AND OTHER FABRICATIONS

Chi continues to defend his use of the alleged text of a speech by Nguyen Manh Tuong, the professor at Hanoi University before the Vietnam Fatherland Front in 1956. He argues that there is "indirect proof" that the document which he translated into English in 1957 was authentic in the fact Tuong did make a speech on October 30, 1956 and that the subject of his speech was the need for more emphasis on legality in the government. But the question at issue here is not whether Tuong did or did not make a speech on the subject of legality but whether he did or did not say that the slogan of the land reform had been "Better to kill 10 innocent people than to let one enemy escape." I suggested in the monograph that there was very strong circumstantial evidence that this document was a fake, first, in the fact that the stories about its origin are vague and unconvincing, and, second, in the fact that there was certainly no such slogan in the land reform. On the contrary, a similar bloodthirsty slogan—"Better to kill one hundred innocent people than to allow one Communist to escape"—has been attributed by the Chinese Communists to the Kuomintang Party in its bloody repression of leftists during the 1930's. The responses by Chi and Teodoru on this question contribute absolutely nothing to the case for its authenticity; Teodoru cites the claim of the South Vietnamese Ambassador to the United Nations that the document was actually published by the D.R.V. news service in Burma (without offering any evidence of such publication), while Chi himself again repeats that it was never published anywhere.

Since the publication of my monograph, in any case, conclusive proof of the document's fraudulent character has come to light in the testimony of Colonel Nguyen Van Chau, a northern Catholic and a follower of President Diem, is now in exile in France, and in an interview published in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch on September 24, 1972, he told of a "psychological warfare" campaign waged by the Diem government in 1956 to convince the world that the land reform in North Vietnam was a terrible bloodbath. According to Chau, "Forged documents were distributed to various political groups, and to groups of writers and artists, who used the false documents to carry out the propaganda campaign."

I ask permission to put the full text of this article in the record at this point.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may we receive the newspaper article referred to by the witness?

Senator THURMOND. It will be received.

[The article referred to follows:]

[From the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sept. 24, 1972]

CHARGES SAIGON LIE ON BLOODBATH

(By Diane Johnstone)

ORLEANS, France, Sept. 23—The alleged Communist bloodbath in North Vietnam after the 1954 Geneva Accords was 100 per cent fabricated by intelligence services in Saigon financed by the United States Government according to a Vietnamese Catholic who was head of psychological warfare for the Saigon army during the Presidency of the late Ngo Dinh Diem.

Col. Nguyen Van Chau, director of the Central Psychological War Service of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces from 1956 to 1962, declared in an interview that the Saigon government waged total psychological warfare in 1956 to persuade Vietnamese and world opinion that there was a terrorist bloodbath in North Vietnam. The purpose of the campaign was to justify President Diem's refusal to negotiate with Hanoi on ways to carry out the elections and reunification promise in the 1954 Geneva Accords.

"By a total campaign, I mean that it was ideological, literary and even artistic," said Chau. "Forged documents were distributed to various political groups and to groups of writers and artists, who used the false documents to carry out the propaganda campaign."

British and American intelligence services helped collect authentic documents on which the forged documents were based. The forgeries were so well done that President Diem himself was fooled by them, Chau said. Diem's brother Nhu, was in on the fabrications, but Diem was too innocent to realize what was going on, Chau said.

When Diem was assassinated in 1963, Chau left Washington, where he had been military attache at the Saigon Embassy. He now lives in Orleans with his large family in a suburban apartment decorated with traditional Vietnamese art objects and pictures of Pope Paul VI. Chau is a school teacher.

Chau said that accusations against the North Vietnamese regime in books by Hoang Van Chi were "wholly imaginary and without foundation." Chi's books recently have been denounced by D. Gareth Porter, an Asian scholar from Cornell University, as based on "fraudulent documentation."

The prediction by the bishop of Da Nang, Pham Ngoc Chi, that a Communist takeover in the South would lead to bloody reprisals against 2,000,000 people is ridiculous, said Chau. He said the bishop's statement that 500,000 people died in slave labor camps in North Vietnam is even more ridiculous.

The reason for Bishop Chi's "purely imaginary" accusations, said Chau, is that as bishop of Bui Chu in North Vietnam in the early 1950s he organized his diocese militarily to fight against the Viet Minh, with French backing.

"Bishop Chi is a good bishop and I like him personally, but because of his past he feels there is no hope for him to cooperate with the Communists. He has no good source of information about North Vietnam; he is not at all well informed," Chau said.

Between 1945 and 1956 up to 500 Catholics were killed for political reasons in North Vietnam, said Chau, adding that that figure was probably too high. Since 1956, the regime has been liberal toward Catholics.

"If in 1945 the anti-Communist nationalist parties and not the Viet Minh had taken power, just as many Catholics would have been killed, because the population regarded the Catholics as instruments of colonialism—not without reason," said Chau, who noted that his own family was one of the first to be converted to Catholicism in the seventeenth century. French missionaries and bishops manipulated Vietnamese Catholics to serve French interests, he said.

Chau recounted that as a militant Catholic in North Vietnam, he himself was frightened by the first wave of American-financed anti-Communist propaganda that in 1954 persuaded hundreds of thousands of Catholics to flee to the South.

"In early 1954, in preparation for the worst—that is, a Viet Minh takeover—the Americans trained and sent Vietnamese special agents under various covers to penetrate the population in the North. After the Geneva Accords, those agents prepared the 'black propaganda' that frightened the refugees into leaving."

"Black propaganda" is the technical term which describes written or radio messages disseminated in such a way that readers or listeners feel the content is coming from an official or friendly source, when in fact, it is not.

The black propaganda consisted primarily of fake Communist tracts announcing bloody reprisals against Catholics and others who had collaborated with the French. One effective form of such propaganda was staged photographs supposedly showing revolutionaries committing atrocities and sacrileges. Chau said he later learned that such photographs were faked.

Later, black propaganda was used extensively to discredit Communists in South Vietnam. In 1961, British, American and Vietnamese intelligence services co-operated in putting together a collection of "captured Communist documents" that were put on exhibit in the Saigon City Hall, drawing huge crowds. The project was financed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and the documents were all forgeries, said Chau.

Chau said that the Saigon regime used to, and probably still does, run a clandestine radio which pretended to be Liberation Radio in order to diffuse such propaganda. The broadcasts were patterned on authentic Liberation Radio broadcasts, with just a few slight changes in detail, designed, for example, to give the impression that the Communists were massacring innocent civilians.

Even cabinet ministers in the Diem regime thought the broadcasts were authentic and would call up Diem, "who was frightened too," and ask him to order the intelligence services to track down the transmitter which was in the outskirts of Saigon. Information services carefully monitored the fake radio and gave translations of broadcasts to journalists, who accepted them as authentic.

Chau said that such propaganda operations certainly still must be going on, "only on an even larger scale."

Col. Chau said he has come to realize that the Catholics' intransigent anti-Communism has been a main obstacle to peace and national unity in Vietnam.

"In this isolated corner of France," he said, "as a Catholic I pray that our bishops in South Vietnam will change their attitude before it is too late, so that the Church can fulfill its proper apostolic role to end the killing and bring peace and reconciliation to Vietnam."

Mr. PORTER. I wrote Colonel Chau after the appearance of this article asking him specifically about the Nguyen Manh Tuong document published in Vietnamese in a book edited by Hoang Van Chi. In a reply dated November 25, 1972, Colonel Chau said:

I affirm solemnly, as I affirmed to Miss Johnstone, regarding the speech by Lawyer Manh Tuong on 30 June (sic) 1956, criticizing the errors of the North Vietnamese regime and above all those of the agrarian reform * * * published by the Service of Historical and Social Studies of Dr. Tran Kim Tuyen towards the end of 1956 * * * and taken up again by Mr. Hoang Van Tri (sic) as a theme in his propaganda and defamation against the North Vietnamese leaders on behalf of the American services, is nothing but a false document. It is certain that at that time, Mr. Nguyen Manh Tuong did in fact read a speech, but this one was falsified by American, British and Vietnamese services at the time to sow fear among the people in order to support the refusal of the Diem government in 1956 to participate in negotiations to be held on reunification of South Vietnam with the North. Thus it was nothing but a black propaganda maneuver led jointly by the Americans and Vietnamese, no more, no less, which in my position as Director General of Psychological Warfare of the South Vietnamese Army at the time, I refused to distribute publicly in the army * * *

I have here a Xerox of the original note from Colonel Chau, in French, which I will submit to the subcommittee for its own files.

I think it is appropriate to note at this point the fact that the forging of documents for political warfare purposes was a very well established practice by the South Vietnamese Government from 1954 onward. Several known cases of such forging of captured documents are worth mentioning.

The first example is not a single document but an entire set of documents which was made public by the Ministry of Information of the Diem government in 1956 in English translation. The purpose of the documents was to show that the military resistance of the Hoa Hao sect to the Diem regime in 1956 was orchestrated and supported by the Viet Minh movement, and that the Viet Minh were organizing a military campaign against the government in violation of the Geneva Agreement of 1954. These documents were released in a package entitled "Communist Subversive Activities Contrary to the Spirit of the Geneva Agreements," and a full set now resides in the Bernard B. Fall collection at the Howard University Library.

In this case, it is easy to determine that the documents were forgeries, because they contain so many statements which are contradicted by firmly established and documentable facts. For example, an alleged "circular" from the Vietnam Workers Party, signed by Truong Chinh and dated January 9, 1955, announces that "from today Comrade Pham Ngoc Thach, alias Minh Tan, is designated to carry out the duties of secretary general of the central committee of the party in South Vietnam." The crude and slipshod manner in which this particular document was fabricated may be judged from the fact that Dr. Pham Ngoc Thach was probably not even a party member and was certainly never a high-ranking party leader. Moreover, it is easily ascertainable that he never went to the South, for he accompanied Ho Chi Minh to Peking in June and July 1955. The same document urges the "preparation of the ground (in) order to enable our armies to enter the South with speed"—this at a time when we know from both internal and published DRV documents that the party leadership was concentrating on insuring that there would be general elections in July 1956 as called for by the Geneva agreement and when military action was the furthest thing from their intention.

Even more ludicrous is another alleged order, also signed by Truong Chinh on behalf of the party, dated December 12, 1954, which begins with the words, "Having assessed the various troubles in South Vietnam, we are about to realize the final phase of our general offensive." Again, we know from various kinds of documentary evidence that the party was then planning a major diplomatic campaign to attempt to persuade the Diem regime to normalize relations, beginning with a mutual reduction of military forces.

Another document, under the heading "Hoa Hao Armed Forces, West Cochinchina Zone, High Command," and supposedly signed by "Commander Tran Van Be," has a North Vietnamese Brig. Gen. Van Tien Dung presiding over an "oath of allegiance ceremony" of the religious sects in January 1956. The document is obviously an effort to link the sects' opposition to Diem with the Communists in order to discredit both, and especially to accuse the Viet Minh of violating the Geneva agreement. It purports to quote Brigadier General Dung as saying that "only 30 percent of the Viet Minh forces were evacuated to the North"—an absurd statement, since U.S. intelligence concluded that 90 or 95 percent of the Viet Minh forces were regrouped by the deadline. It further quotes him as ordering those who remained in the South to reorganize them to "reinforce the sects' armed forces." Yet another such "captured document" portrays the party as launching a "military enlistment campaign to recruit soldiers for the sects."

It should be pointed out that it is highly unlikely that General Dung was ever in South Vietnam at all during this period, given what we know about the People's Army command. In any case, no such campaign of military enlistment ever took place during this period, nor did the small remnants of armed Viet Minh units collaborate with the sects. If they had, they might have been able to prevent the destruction by Diem of most of the party apparatus which occurred in Tay Ninh Province. Instead, these remnants did everything possible to hide their very existence, living deep in the jungle and never venturing into populated areas.

Not only in their content, but in their form, these forged documents bear little resemblance to genuine party documents, which are available to scholars in large numbers in the Jeffrey Race and Douglas Pike collections. For example, there has never been a captured document to my knowledge bearing the signature of the Secretary-General of the party, despite the two such alleged documents offered by the Ministry of Information. In short, the entire collection of documents put out by the Saigon government in 1956 were frauds which betrayed their counterfeit nature to even the casual reader.

Although the Diem government's technique in forging "captured documents" presumably improved over time, some 6 years later Saigon's experts at fabricating such documents came out with another obvious fake. Yet it was destined to be used over and over again by both Saigon and Washington for political warfare purposes. This was the document allegedly captured by the army in Ba Xuyen Province in May 1962, and sent to the International Control Commission. It was allegedly "top secret" instructions from the party to its cadres in the South, explaining the establishment of the People's Revolutionary Party in South Vietnam.

As translated by the Diem government in its July 1962 publication "Communist Viet Minh Aggressive Policy," the document said, in part "Within the party, it is necessary to explain that the founding of the People [sic] Revolutionary Party aims at isolating more the Americans and the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem, and at rejecting their accusations of invasion of the South by the North. That is a point d'appui which will enable us to sabotage the Geneva Accords, to accelerate the plan of invasion of the South * * *"

Now anyone who has taken the trouble to read any Communist documents of this period regarding the situation in the South would know that the party never spoke in terms of "sabotaging the Geneva Agreement" or of a "plan of invasion of the South." These were propaganda terms used by the South Vietnamese Government itself regarding North Vietnam and unconvincingly put into the mouths of the Communists. Nor was this merely a matter of bad translation, since the Saigon publication exhibits a photostat of the original alleged Communist order, carefully written out in longhand.

Despite the crudeness of this forgery, however, the U.S. State Department and Central Intelligence Agency seized upon the document as a major piece of documentary evidence about North Vietnamese policy in South Vietnam. The February, 1965 State Department White Paper, entitled "Aggression from the North," quoted excerpts from the document, including the above-mentioned sentences, as appendix G. George Carver, of the CIA, who wrote on the Com-

unist movement in Foreign Affairs, April 1966, quoted a brief excerpt from the alleged document. Douglas Pike, of the U.S. Information Agency, also quoted from it in Vietcong, but interestingly enough, excised by means of ellipses the passages which clearly indicated its fraudulent character.

Ten years after the Saigon Government put forward this document, Dr. Tran Kim Tuyen, the director of Diem's "Office of Social and Political Research," which not only ran the secret police but was deeply involved in the fabrication of documents, admitted in an interview with a graduate student from Australian National University, Carl Thayer, that the document had been forged in his office—and that it was not even a very good forgery. The CIA's Carver also admitted to Thayer that the document was now known to be a fake. I have written a letter to the Intelligence and Research Branch of the Department of State asking them to confirm the fact that the document in question is now considered not to be authentic, and I ask permission to put the State Department answer in the record at this point.

[The letter referred to will be found on p. 27.]

I have gone into the evidence of South Vietnamese forgery of documents on a wide scale in order to show the atmosphere within which Hoang Van Chi operated as a specialist in psychological warfare for the Diem regime and began writing his account of the land reform in the North. It was an atmosphere in which the natural response to a given propaganda problem was to manufacture a document. It should be noted, furthermore, that, in comparison with the difficulties involved in fabricating a "captured Communist Party document," the fabrication of a document purporting to be a speech by a French educated intellectual who was not a party member was a simple task.

3. HOANG VAN CHI'S MISTRANSLATIONS OF GIAP'S SPEECH AND OTHER DOCUMENTS

The most important mistranslation by Chi, because of its use by so many other authors, is his translation of General Vo Nguyen Giap's October 29, 1956 speech on errors in the land reform. Chi and his apologist have now attempted in a variety of ways to obfuscate the problem of the accuracy or inaccuracy of Chi's translation; they assert that the Communists created an "entirely new vocabulary" which "someone not familiar with them" would not be able to understand; that the Communists used "euphemisms," that they were intentionally "vague."

These obfuscations cannot change the fact, however, that Chi has carefully altered the whole significance of Giap's speech by not just one but a long series of distortions of the original. I wish to introduce at this point in the record the text of a page from my published monograph entitled "Giap Speech on Land Reform Errors, Mistranslations of Key Passages." I have noted eight separate mistranslations in the two key sentences, which have the cumulative effect of conveying the impression that deliberate terror against innocent people was tolerated, if not encouraged, by party leaders and only opposed because it became "too widespread." I wish to go over these mistranslations individually and comment on Chi's response or lack of such.

GIAP'S SPEECH ON LAND REFORM ERRORS
MISTRANSLATIONS OF KEY PASSAGES

Vietnamese text ¹	Accurate translation	Chi's translation
"(d) . . . đã phòng lệch lạc . . ."	"committed deviations . . ."	"we committed too many deviations . . ."
" . . . không nhấn mạnh phải thận trọng, tránh . . ."	" . . . in not emphasizing the necessity for caution and for avoiding . . ."	(Omitted.)
" . . . xử trí oan những người ngay . . ." (Not in original) . . .	" . . . the unjust disciplining of innocent people . . ." (Not in original) . . .	"and executed too many honest people . . ." " . . . seeing enemies everywhere . . ."
" . . . dùng những biện pháp trấn áp quá đáng . . ."	" . . . used excessive repressive measures . . ."	" . . . resorted to terror . . ."
" . . . một cách phổ biến."	" . . . on a wide scale."	" . . . which became far too widespread."
"(h) . . . tham chỉ dùng phương pháp truy bức . . ."	" . . . even coercive measures . . ."	" . . . worse still, torture . . ."
" . . . để làm công tác chính đôn."	" . . . were used to carry out party reorganization."	" . . . came to be regarded as normal practice during party reorganization."

¹ From *Nhan Dan*, Oct. 31, 1956.

First, there is the phrase which Chi has translated as "We committed too many deviations," and which I translated simply as "committed deviations." Now, Chi points out correctly that the original Vietnamese text uses the word "de phong," rather than "da phong" as shown in my chart. The spelling was incorrect because of the Vietnamese text on microfilm, which blurred the one letter. I have since had a Xerox copy made from the microfilm, which I will submit to the subcommittee for its files. I also made the mistake of assuming that Chi's translation of the Vietnamese as "committed deviations" was correct. As he now points out, however, it should have been translated "to take precautions to avoid deviations." I noticed immediately that he had falsely inserted the phrase "too many" into his translation which was completely absent from the original, but it did not occur to me that he had also mistranslated in using the words "committed * * * deviations." While my failure to challenge his translation of this phrase was due to my own negligence, I find it strange indeed that Chi should attack me for following his mistranslation. I have corrected this mistake in a revised and edited version of the monograph, but I still await Chi's own admission of the inaccuracy of his translation.

In the second translated portion, I did notice Chi's mistranslation, and I supplied an important phrase which Chi's text omitted, completely changing the meaning of the third translated phrase. For just as the first Vietnamese portion referred not to committing deviations but to the failure to "pay attention to the prevention of deviations," the third portion refers not to the commission of a particular kind of mistake but to the insufficient emphasis on the "necessity for * * * avoiding" those mistakes. Chi fails to explain why he omitted this phrase, without which the meaning of the following phrase is totally incorrect.

Next we come to the word "xu tri," which Chi translates as to "execute," and which I pointed out should have been translated as "discipline"—a term which is obviously much broader and includes various forms of punishment, from loss of party membership to

confinement or membership in the peasants association to the locality, to imprisonment to corporal punishment. Despite Chi's assertion that, as far as he could investigate, "no Chinese, Vietnamese or Japanese dictionary ever define "xu tri" as "to discipline," the standard Vietnamese language dictionary used in North Vietnam (Tu Dien Tieng Viet, edited by Van Tan), defines "xu tri" on page 1167 with the words "Thi hanh ky luat," which means "to carry out discipline" against an individual. Since Chi was caught in a flat, unambiguous falsehood, he did a fast shuffle in his letter to explain how the meaning of the term allegedly suddenly changed on him during the last period of the land reform—at a time, it should be remembered, when he was not even in North Vietnam. We are asked to believe that a word which had previously been used to mean "execute" was now suddenly decreed to mean "punish" or "discipline." This is, of course, utter nonsense.

But the document in question is dated October 29, 1956, after Chi alleges this change in meaning took place. Yet Chi translated it as "to execute" anyway. So there is no way for him to deny that he is guilty of a deliberate deception.

In fact, it is not necessary to go to dictionaries to discover that "xu tri" could not possibly mean "to execute." Even a superficial check of Nhan Dan reveals three cases in which the context rules out any such meaning. And one of them is found in the very speech by Giap which Chi was supposed to have read. In the first column, page 2 of the October 31 issue of Nhan Dan, Giap says, "Cadres and people who were strongly disciplined (bi xu tri) are all rehabilitated; politically, they are restored to citizenship, honor, and official function; these who were wrongly arrested must all be released to freedom. Economically, they will be appropriately compensated." In July 10, 1956, issue of Nhan Dan, an article referred to a village in which "a few people who were previously party members and village cadres and who were wrongly punished (bi xu tri) in the land reform are still complaining." (It should be evident that those who have been executed do not continue to complain.) Finally, there is the case of Comrade Ngon of To Hieu village, who was mentioned in my monograph. In the Nhan Dan article of August 24, 1956, Ngon was described as having been "disciplined, (bi xu tri), convicted and jailed." Later, as I pointed out, he was released from jail.

The point of these examples, to which many others could be added, is simply that the "xu tri" cannot be translated as "to execute," no matter how badly Chi would like to. This egregious mistranslation is very important, because Chi compounds the distortion by again adding the words "too many," which is simply not in the original Vietnamese text, in order to give the impression that some executions of innocent people were permissible under party policy, but not "too many" such executions.

Next, there is Chi's phrase, "seeing enemies everywhere," which also is not found anywhere in the Vietnamese original. Teodoru attempts to come to his assistance by claiming that the phrase was found in the "official French translation of Giap's speech," which he says Hanoi's information service released. If this is true—and I have no way of knowing that it is—it indicates that Chi did not even use the original Vietnamese texts of Nhan Dan in researching his book, while claiming to have done so—a deception of which Chi accuses me.

Whether Chi used a French language source or simply made it up I leave for him to explain.

The next mistranslation is Chi's "resorted to terror," a translation which gives an entirely different meaning from the one intended by Giap. "Repressive measures" are not the same as "terror," since they imply completely different intentions on the part of the government. If Chi believes the Communists did use terror, he should express it as his own opinion and not put the words into Giap's mouth.

Next, Chi adds for the third time the words "far too widespread" in reference to the scale of the measures referred to in the previous phrase, once again attempting to convey the false impression that the party was concerned about the "terror" only because it was "far too widespread."

Then, we come to the phrase "phuong phap truy buc," which Chi translates as "torture," which again goes far beyond the term's real meaning, "coercive measures" in the Vietnamese text. Once again, if Giap had meant to say "torture," he would have used the Vietnamese term which means precisely that "tra tan." Chi argues that "if 'coercive measures' are too painful, then they are quite close to 'torture.'" That is precisely true, and it is not up to the translator to take a more inclusive term and transform it into a more restrictive one. As in the other similar cases, it is nothing but a form of hidden editorializing. And again, it is even more significant in the context of the final mistranslated portion, in which Chi adds the phrase "came to be regarded as normal practice," which is completely unrelated to anything in the Vietnamese text. Once again, the clear intention of this fabricated phrase was to convey the idea that the party had found the practice acceptable until the correction of errors campaign began.

To summarize this question of Chi's translation, it is not simply a matter of the complexity of the language or of confusing Communist terminology; it is a question of a fundamental abuse of scholarship for a political purpose. These mistranslations, taken together so completely alter the meaning of the sentences as to border on the fabrication of a document. There is, moreover, another alleged quotation from Nhan Dan which Chi includes on page 225 of his manuscript, but which I am unable to find anywhere. As I point out in my monograph, there is an article in the Nhan Dan 1 day after the date he cites, whose first sentence makes reference to party branches in Nghe An established in 1930. But the rest of the article bears no resemblance to his quotation. I therefore repeat what I wrote in the original monograph: The quotation appears to be fraudulent. It is worth noting that Chi failed to respond in any way to my challenge to the authenticity of this quotation. I further challenge the quotation which is found on page 178 of his book. I have checked the issue of Thoi Moi which he cites as well as others that same month, but I find no such document or anything resembling it.

4. MISTRANSLATED DOCUMENTS USED BY OTHER AUTHORS

In my monograph, I made reference to the use of mistranslated or otherwise distorted documents by other authors on the land reform such as Bernard Fall and J. Price Gittinger. I noted, for example, that Fall cited in "The Two Vietnams," an article in Nhan Dan which he

said "openly admitted that loyal party members, including UBKC (resistance committee) chairmen, had been executed and besmirched." As I pointed out, this was a misrepresentation of the article because, although Ngon was convicted of being a "dishonest and cruel notable" and of having led an "organization of saboteurs," he was not executed. I have already pointed out that this article provides proof that the term "xu tri" meant to "discipline" and not to "execute." Comrade Ngon was "disciplined, arrested and imprisoned," until the error was discovered and he was released and restored to his old position. Now, incidental to making this point, I also noted that Ngon was not referred to in the article as former chairman of the resistance committee, as stated by Fall. In his letter Chi carefully evades the whole question of the mistranslation of documents of this period.

The fact that someone in Saigon was engaged in deliberate distortion of Communist documents by mistranslation and in purveying those doctored documents to the press is further confirmed by another document which I have discovered since the publication of the monograph. It is a leaflet entitled "Discontent in North Vietnam," published by the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in Bangkok in 1957 and 1958. On page 2 of the leaflet, there is a translated excerpt from the August 24, 1956, Nhan Dan article referred to above. The excerpt includes the statements that Comrade Ngon was "denounced as a 'cruel landlord' and executed," and that "Other Party members were considered members of Ngon's gang, and were executed one after another . . ." Both of these translations were of course false, and it would appear that both SEATO and Bernard Fall were taken in by the same unknown source of this translation.

I also challenged the statement made by Gittinger, on the basis of an article in Nhan Dan, August 12, 1957, that "30 percent of the persons convicted as landlords were erroneously condemned." The statement had been repeated by William Kaye, who wrote in 1962, "Some years later it was admitted by the D.R.V. that nearly one-third of the persons tried and convicted as landlords had been condemned in error." I interpreted the language of the original Nhan Dan article as referring neither to the number of erroneous classifications nor to the number of convictions but to the percentage of corrections of classifications completed. Chi says that the article did refer to the percentage of mistaken classifications. I have reread the article again carefully several times, and while I fail to find any statement that "all known errors had been corrected," as Chi asserts, I concede that in the context of the entire article, the language in question can be interpreted to mean that the 30 percent refers to those mistakenly classified as landlords.

This does not mean, however, that Gittinger and William Kaye were right, as Chi claims. For the more important point which I made about the article is that it had nothing to do with mistaken "convictions" or "condemnations," as these authors allege. The implication of this language was that 30 percent of those who were executed or otherwise sentenced were found to be convicted wrongly—an allegation completely unsupported by this article.

Moreover, there are other documents quoted or cited in Gittinger's article which were misrepresented, presumably because of mistranslation. For example, Gittinger quotes Truong Chinh as saying that

there was a "tendency of * * * peasants toward spontaneous action," suggesting that this was an indication of violent peasant opposition to the Government because of the land reform program. In fact, the quotation from Nhan Dan, January 15, 1957, was a reference to the problem of poor peasants who had carried out actions on their own against wealthier strata of the population in violation of the party's "class line." The full quotation makes this clear: it states the party "must control the tendency of a number of poor peasants toward spontaneous struggle and teach them to realize unity with middle peasants."

Another document apparently distorted by the translator is an article in the January 27, 1957 Nhan Dan, which tells of incidents in which those wrongly classified as landowners went to the homes of those who received their land and demanded it back. In Gittinger's article, these incidents are mysteriously transformed into acts of local officials "openly supporting the dissidents in their complaints against the Government." In sum, the evidence is clear of a systematic distortion of the documentary evidence by certain translators in Saigon.

5. VIETNAMESE SOURCES USED IN THE LAND REFORM MONOGRAPH

Chi and his apologist Teodoru make a rather feeble effort to discredit my study by suggesting, on one hand, that the source used were merely D.R.V. propaganda and therefore could not be relied upon as primary sources, and on the other hand, that I did not really read them in the original Vietnamese. These allegations reflect both their ignorance and their dishonesty.

It is amusing that Chi should feel knowledgeable enough about D.R.V. sources to criticize my use of them in the monograph, since he knows nothing about them. He erroneously refers to one of the publications which I used as Toan Quoc Khang Chien (Whole-Nation Resistance), but if he had known anything about North Vietnamese historical materials, he would have recognized the publication as Cuoc Khang Chien Thun Thanh cua Nhan Dan Viet Nam (The Magnificent Resistance War of the Vietnamese People). Moreover, the source was so identified on page 11 of the monograph.

Chi also makes the ridiculous assertion that the Vietnamese publications which I cite and quote from are "booklets, all of them written by a propaganda team in Hanoi," and that Hanoi "has put out official translations of these documents in English, French and other languages." The three primary D.R.V. sources on which I relied in writing the piece were the official party newspaper, Nhan Dan, The Magnificent Resistance War of the Vietnamese People, and Agrarian Revolution in Vietnam. The Magnificent Resistance War is a four-volume compendium of original documents from party periodicals of the period. Agrarian Revolution in Vietnam is a voluminous, detailed, self-critical study of land reform which includes a mass of documentation. Neither of these publications is a "booklet" written for a foreign audience nor is either of them translated into foreign language by Hanoi. Chi obviously has never read either of them, so he is hardly in a position to comment on their content.

Teodoru's comment that he saw the book Agrarian Revolution in the home of a big landlord in Can Tho, even if true, is irrelevant to

the question of the book's content and its value as a source of documentation. The fact remains that it was written for careful study by party members and cadres of the experiences—both good and bad—and the lessons to be learned from the land reform program. It is simply not the kind of material which the party uses to attract the support of southern landowners for a coalition government.

As for Chi's allegation that I used FBIS translations of articles from Nhan Dan which were themselves mistranslated, I can only say that it is absurd. I would have no reason to hide the use of any such translations anyway. The reader of my monograph will note that the one time I quoted from an FBIS translation in footnote 2 on page 38, I made it clear by noting the fact that the Nhan Dan editorial was carried by Vietnam News Agency on Hanoi radio, October 30, 1956. Had I used any other material from radio broadcasts I would have noted the fact, as I did there. I don't believe in fact that the FBIS translation of the Nhan Dan articles alleged by Chi even exist. Certainly there are no such translations in the FBIS collection at Cornell.

6. THE ECONOMIC BENEFIT OF THE LAND REFORM

Teodoru takes up the old argument that the peasants really derived no economic benefit whatsoever from the land reform, and attempts to support the argument with a mathematical operation which is false and misleading. He takes official figures on the number of hectares confiscated and distributed to poor peasants, figures how much paddy could be produced per person and subtracts 28 percent of that, and comes out with 107 kilograms of rice per person per year, or 293 grams per day. Then he compares the 293 with the figure of 264 per person given by a French source for the average rice consumption of the Tonkin peasant in the 1930's and concludes that the reform was designed to give the average peasant only 29 more grams of rice per day.

But Teodoru neglects the fact we are dealing with the average poor peasant, and that average peasant had a small, inadequate plot of land, whose output must be added to the output of the newly redistributed land in order to arrive at the new average total after the distribution of land. If he does so, he will find that difference between the new total and the old approximation is substantial enough that it must be considered an economic benefit. His methodology, in short, is deficient, having left out the last and most important step in the calculation.

He further complains that I fail to understand that the problem of overpopulation in the Tonkin Delta could not be solved through breaking up the already small holdings, and he quotes Tran Phuoc, the author of "The Agrarian Revolution," as saying that the peasants would voluntarily turn to collective ownership of land as the solution. But I never asserted that redistribution was a solution to North Vietnam's agricultural problem. Clearly, it was not, and Truong Chinh himself explained in some detail why the immediate benefits of the redistribution would be shortlived for millions of poor peasants. They lived too close to the margin, without anything to carry them through a bad harvest, natural disaster or personal misfortune. Within 2 years of the completion of the land reform, many peasants were already

in debt and had to give up ownership of the land. The cycle of poverty, indebtedness and landlord-tenant exploitation was beginning all over again. That is why the D.R.V. leaders felt in 1958 that collectivization of land was an urgent necessity for North Vietnam, and also why they felt that most peasants would see the necessity of it as well, despite their well-known attachment to private ownership of land.

But this is separate from the question of whether the land reform did indeed bring immediate benefit, in the form of increased rice consumption to the majority of the peasants of North Vietnam. The evidence which I presented in my study supports the conclusion that it did. Moreover, the leaders of the party and government clearly felt that it would before the program was launched. It was precisely for that reason that they began the land reform campaign just before the start of what they believed would be the decisive Viet Minh counter-offensive—one that would require heavy sacrifices from the peasants and for which the leaders felt they had to be given some immediate economic benefit in return. In short, the effort to portray the land reform as having no economic significance for the poor peasant simply will not hold up historically.

7. THE ALLEGED CHINESE LAND REFORM ADVISERS

One of the officially purveyed myths about the land reform in North Vietnam is that it was carried out under the supervision of Chinese advisers. As I pointed out in my study, the Diem regime launched an intensive campaign beginning in mid-1954 to create the image of a North Vietnamese Government being run by Chinese advisers. These stories were first circulated at a time when Saigon—along with American CIA operatives in the North—was using both “white” and “black” propaganda to persuade as many North Vietnamese as possible to move to the South. So, while referring to the Chinese advisers, including land reform cadre, who were allegedly taking over the D.R.V. Government, it also put out stories of as many as 50,000 Chinese troops in the North. I pointed out, therefore, that Hoang Van Chi’s claim of Chinese advisers running the land reform program in North Vietnam was only part of a much larger political warfare program.

Now Teodoru asserts that I cannot deny that Chinese advisers directed the land reform cadres, “because there is too much evidence for this.” He goes on to cite a speech by Ho Chi Minh before the National Congress of Combatants of the Agricultural Emulation Movement on March 1, 1956, which he claims “praised the Chinese advisers in North Vietnam. . . .”

This all is utter nonsense. What Ho Chi Minh said on that occasion had nothing to do with any alleged Chinese land reform advisers. The Chinese to whom Ho Chi Minh referred were the “delegation of Chinese Agricultural Emulation Fighters”—not land reform advisers. Referring to their participation in the conference, he said that the Chinese Agricultural Emulation Fighters were sharing their experiences in progress. He said, “We study the experiences of the Chinese, just as our Chinese brothers study the experiences of the Soviet Union.” The experiences to which he was referring were experiences in raising production, rather than in classifying farmers or denouncing

landlords, since the purpose of the Agricultural Emulation Conference was to increase agricultural production. So there was no reference in the speech, direct or indirect, implicit or explicit, to Chinese land reform advisers or supervisors, as Teodoru claims.

I certainly can and do deny that there were Chinese land reform advisers in North Vietnam, for the following reasons: First, there is no evidence aside from the propaganda output of the Saigon Government and its political warfare specialists that there were any such advisers; the French psychological warfare bureau in a secret March 1955 publication in my possession which discusses the land reform from a psychological warfare viewpoint, makes no mention of any such issue, despite the fact that the knowledge of such advisers would have been regarded as a political warfare opportunity too good to miss. Second, there was no need for Chinese advisers on the part of the Lao Dong Party. The party leaders had studied the Chinese experiences in detail, and knew what they could borrow from the Chinese and what they could not. They knew that Vietnam's situation was still quite distinct from that of China in terms of the relationship between anti-feudal and anti-imperialist tasks. There would have been no point in putting Chinese in charge of Vietnamese land reform teams, since the Chinese could not have known as much about the application of general policies to specific situations as the Vietnamese themselves. Finally, the D.R.V. leaders were acutely sensitive to any suggestion of Vietnamese subordination to any foreigners, let alone the Chinese. It is well known that foreign technicians who have come to North Vietnam to teach the Vietnamese how to operate sophisticated new military equipment have found them unwilling to take any more advice than is absolutely necessary to carry on by themselves.

It is worth noting that the same kind of charges were made during the anti-French resistance regarding Chinese military advisers with Viet Minh units. The response to this charge by officers of the People's Army indicated their extreme sensitivity to the very idea of having advisers, and what it connoted to them. French journalist Jules Roy recalls that every time he put this question to officers of the North Vietnamese army, indignation transformed every face. And the officers replied,

It is inconceivable that we should ever take orders from foreign officers, even Chinese ones. We regard your question as deplorable. Nobody in the People's Army ever prepared baths for the Chinese; nobody ever walked beside their horses.

Until more reliable evidence comes to light, therefore, to support the charge that there were Chinese advisers either in military units or on the land reform teams, it must be considered as yet another propaganda ploy by the enemies of the D.R.V.

8. THE PHASES OF LAND REFORM

The testimony before this committee attempts to discredit the data presented in my monograph on the period of the land reform from August 1953 to April 1954, which showed that an average of only 2.1 landlords per village were brought before people's tribunals, on the ground that landlords were not targeted and the campaign was de-emphasized for the sake of national unity while the resistance war was still going on. This represents, in effect, an effort to concoct a new

myth about the land reform, which is that Communist Party policy toward landlords was discriminating only while the war was going on, and that, after the war, the party undertook the physical liquidation of the landlord class.

As I noted in my study, there was in fact no change in the basic "class line" of the party after the end of the war against the French, nor was there any difference in that policy between the land rent reduction campaign and the land redistribution phase of land reform. It is now claimed that there is a "gaping hole" in my data between the pre-Geneva period and the correction of errors campaign. But before constructing a new bloodbath myth, Teodoru should have had someone check the record. For there is no lack of documentary evidence concerning the continuity of policy toward the landlord class. For example, on January 23, 1956, long before the correction of errors campaign and just at the time when the most intensive period of land redistribution was beginning, Nhan Dan published an article which again outlined the distinction between overthrowing the landlord class as a whole and the punishment of those who were guilty of serious crimes—a distinction which certain propagandists continue to try to obscure. The article said:

The land reform policy aims at overthrowing the whole landlord class, and punishing those who are wicked and cruel notables, but it doesn't end the life of landowners. In the land reform, the ordinary landlord and the landowner convicted of less serious crimes are still given a piece of land to make a living on and due to that he can still become a person contributing to the nation.

I will repeat here what I wrote in the monograph: the essential difference between the last phase of the land reform and the previous phases was that it was being carried out primarily in newly liberated areas of the Tonkin Delta, and the exaggerated fear of organized opposition to the D.R.V. and the land reform, backed by French and American agents, caused the land reform to be combined with a search for counterrevolutionary organizations. This in turn exacerbated the tendency for poor peasants to abuse their new-found power, both within and outside the party, resulting in many mistaken arrests, even of party members, on suspicion of links with such organizations.

There is no doubt, as I wrote earlier, that during this period the policy of the party was violated more seriously than at any other time during the land reform, and that the leadership's own decision in August 1955 to launch a campaign of "repression of counterrevolutionaries," primarily in newly liberated areas, was a major contributing factor. But this fact is distinct from the now revised myth that the party suddenly shifted after Geneva to a policy of physically liquidating landlords who were innocent of any crime. I repeat that there is no evidence except for Hoang Van Chi's personal opinions that there was ever any such policy.

9. THE RELEASE OF THE 12,000 PRISONERS

Hoang Van Chi claims in his book that General Giap referred in his October 1956 speech to 12,000 party members wrongly imprisoned in the course of the land reform, who would be released, and CIA author George Carver repeated the statement in 1966. I discovered upon carefully reading Giap's speech, however, that he made no reference to prisoners at all. I was also unable to find any other reference in

official documents to the release of 12,000 party members. I did find, however, an article in the Hanoi newspaper *Thoi Moi* in which Truong Chinh referred to the release of 12,000 persons—not party members—and explained that these included all those who had been wrongly arrested during the land reform and the party organization, all these prisoners over 60 years of age, all those who had committed crimes not considered serious enough to warrant imprisonment, and those who had committed serious crimes which could be commuted. In short, it turned out that the figure included all those who were released from prison for whatever reason, after the completion of the land reform. Chi had not only asserted the existence of a nonexistent reference to the 12,000 figure but had totally misrepresented the significance of the one which did exist. Now, Teodoru attacks an earlier unpublished draft of the monograph for its statement about the 12,000 figure, which I had been unable to find in the place cited by Chi. Then Teodoru quotes the *Thoi Moi* article which I cite in the published monograph but misrepresents its substance in order to conceal Chi's falsification of evidence.

10. THE ALLEGED "ISOLATION" POLICY

One of Hoang Van Chi's major contentions is that the North Vietnamese Government condemned hundreds of thousands of innocent people, mostly children, to death by starvation, by preventing the families of landlords from receiving any assistance in order to live. He charges that there was an "isolation policy," which applied to all landowners, and which resulted in "ten times" more deaths than were ordered by the people's courts. He describes that policy as follows:

As soon as a man had been labeled as "landlord," he and his family were boycotted and shunned by their fellow human beings * * * Nobody was permitted to talk to them or have any contact with them. For more than a year, from the beginning of the first campaign to the beginning of the second, members of landlords' families were prevented from working. In consequence the majority of them died of starvation, children and old people first, and eventually the others.

Again, apart from Hoang Van Chi's own word, there is no evidence to substantiate the existence of such a policy. In my monograph, I quoted from the one document which I have been able to find which is relevant to party policy on the treatment of the families of landowners. This is the document to which Teodoru refers on page 27 of the testimony. He does his best to twist the meaning of the document, but it still supports my conclusion that the party never had a "policy of isolation" or of starving the families of landlords to death. He quotes a sentence from the article which says that people were discouraged from visiting landlord families "during the period of mobilization." What this means is that during the period of a few weeks after the classification had taken place and the power of the landlords in the village was being eliminated, there was to be no fraternization with the landlords. The purpose of this policy was clearly not to starve the landlords to death but to clearly demarcate the lines between peasants and landlords during this brief period for the purpose of raising peasant class consciousness.

But the sentence which I quoted in the monograph pertains to the party's policy once the period of mobilization is finished. It says that visits to the families of landlords were permitted and that "if the family is one of a dishonest and wicked notable, who has been sen-

tenced to imprisonment, there should be no contact with the person imprisoned, but there can be visits with the other members of the family." The next sentence in the text, quoted by Teodoru, refers to those who were confined to their village so that their actions could be watched—the precise meaning of the Vietnamese term "Quan che" which he translates as "under house arrest." Such families, it should be noted, were not forbidden to work their remaining land. (See Gerard Chaliand, the "Peasants of North Vietnam," p. 160.) In such cases, the article suggests, relatives should write to them and ask for news instead of visiting in person.

But there is more to the Nhan Dan article which Teodoru does not quote, but which makes it clear beyond any doubt that there was no policy of isolating landlord families in order to prevent them from receiving assistance from relatives: "If the parents, husband or wife (of the landlord family) are aged or seriously ill, and there is no relative in the village to help them, they can be sent money and medicine." And it concluded that the decision to maintain relations with landlords was a matter of free choice, and that the purpose of the land reform was to "eliminate feudal relations of production and not to exterminate the landowner himself." As I pointed out in the monograph, the well documented policy of the party was to provide all ex-landlords with enough land for subsistence, except those who had been sentenced to 5 years or more imprisonment—and even then, the families of the landlord were to receive their own land. In sum, the evidence is that the party had no intention of causing the death, directly or indirectly, of the families of landlords, regardless of the crimes committed by any particular landlord.

The D.R.V. leaders admitted publicly that landlords and their families were mistreated during the land reform and Giap himself called for an end to such mistreatment, urging that those from landlord families who were in need should be taken care of. There is no doubt that the policy outlined by the party was violated in practice and that landlords and their families were given inadequate land to support the family in many cases. But Giap's remarks on the subject make it clear that these were violations of the party's policy and not the misguided policy of an extremist faction of the party, as some have tried to suggest. I have discussed earlier in this statement how Hoang Van Chi attempted to make it appear to the American reader that Giap was admitting that the party leadership not only tolerated but encouraged the abuses and injustices which occurred during the land reform. But, on this matter, as on many others, his allegation is a serious misrepresentation of the historical record.

In conclusion, I repeat that my conclusions regarding the North Vietnamese land reform and Hoang Van Chi's account of it are all supported by documentary evidence which Chi and his mouthpiece, Teodoru, have made only the feeblest and most unsuccessful effort to discredit. I attempted to do no more in my monograph than to correct the worst falsehoods and exaggerations about the agrarian revolution in North Vietnam—falsehoods and exaggerations which had unfortunately become accepted as historical fact in the American public arena. There are many aspects of the episode which we will not understand adequately until someone has the opportunity to pursue a detailed study based on extensive interviews with the people

of North Vietnam. But until that time comes, we would do well not to rely on those whose personal and professional interest has always been to portray the Vietnamese revolution and its leaders in the most unfavorable light possible.

I do not need to be told that Vietnam's agrarian revolution had its human cost, as does every revolution. But that human cost should not be distorted and exaggerated in the interest of self-justification. Nor should we ignore the human cost of social, economic, and political system which the Vietnamese Communist movement was struggling to overthrow. It was a system which had condemned the majority of peasants to economic misery and exploitation, as well as social and political oppression. It was a system in which violence was endemic—violence by landowners against tenants and notables against peasants. It was a society in which it was accepted as normal that children should die at birth or in infancy and that adults should be afflicted with hunger and disease during much of their lives. No one has ever attempted to measure the human cost of this social system over 1 year, or 10, or a generation. But I would suggest that it was responsible for far more suffering and far greater loss of life than was the revolution which overthrew it. So it seems to me far more reasonable to assume that the driving force behind the land reform in Vietnam was the desire to put an end to that old system and not simply the malice and ideological fanaticism which has been suggested by Hoang Van Chi, George Carver, and others.

Finally, it is the worst hypocrisy when considering the human cost of the Communist revolution in Vietnam to fail to consider as well the human cost of the foreign intervention and domination—by the French, the Japanese, the French again, and finally the Americans—which has been the greatest cause of human misery for the Vietnamese people in this century. Do not forget that it was the combination of French colonialism, Japanese military occupation, and American bombing in Vietnam which caused some 2 million people to die of starvation in Tonkin and Northern Annam in 1944 and 1945. And in the past two decades the American political, economic, and military intervention in Vietnam has destroyed Vietnamese lives as though we considered them to have no value whatsoever—not for the sake of the Vietnamese but for an imagined global strategic American interest. This, I submit, is the only proper context in which to weigh the human cost of communism in Vietnam.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, unless the witness has something to add, I have no questions.

Senator THURMOND. Unless you want to add something to that then, this will all go in the record just as if read.

Mr. PORTER. That is agreeable to me, yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. All right. If that is agreeable, then it will not be necessary to go any further, and we can save your time.

Mr. PORTER. All right. I will be glad to answer any questions you might have at this point about the study.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, Mr. Chairman, I have no questions. I think the witness' statement speaks for itself on the matter. I think the record is complete. I hope it is complete to the satisfaction of Mr. Porter.

Mr. PORTER. There is one point I might mention, and that is at a couple of points in my statement I have pointed out that I have sent

letters of inquiry, one to Praeger Publishers, the publisher of the book by Hoang Van Chi, "From Colonialism to Communism," and one to the Department of State, Research and Intelligence Branch, concerning points of substance at issue, tangential to the issue I should say. And I have not yet received answers from them, and I would like to place in the record any answers I do receive before the publication.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you like to have this record held open until you have supplied those answers, and then have them inserted in the record?

Mr. PORTER. Yes, that would be my desire.

Mr. SOURWINE. May that be the order, Mr. Chairman?

Senator THURMOND. Without objection, that will be done.

(The following material subsequently was supplied by the witness for inclusion in the record under the above order.)

WASHINGTON, D.C., July 19, 1973.

Mr. DAVID U. HERRMANN,
Executive Vice-President,
Praeger Publishers, Inc.,
New York, N.Y.

DEAR MR. HERRMANN: Thank you for your letter of July 5, in which you request further information about the purpose of my request for information regarding the Hoang Van Chi book. I will try to summarize as briefly as possible the situation which prompts me to ask for information about the publishing background of the book in question. As Research Associate at Cornell's International Relations of East Asia Project last year, I wrote a monograph on land reform in North Vietnam, in which I examined in some detail the book *From Colonialism to Communism* as it relates to the problem of North Vietnamese land reform. I pointed out that in several places, Hoang Van Chi has seriously mistranslated key passages in order to distort their actual meaning in the original Vietnamese text, and in one case, he actually fabricated a quotation from a Vietnamese newspaper. Furthermore, one of key documents in the book was an apparent fraud—and has since been verified as a fake by the former chief of the psychological warfare office of the South Vietnamese Army.

In this context, I also raised questions about how the book came to be published, since press reports indicated that it had been subsidized by USIA as part of their book development project. Since coming to Washington a few weeks ago, I have had the occasion to talk with the former chief of the book development project at the USIA, and he asserted that Chi's book was *not* in fact part of the book development project, having been published by Praeger before the agency got involved. However, I have also learned since writing the previous letter to Mr. Aldor that Mr. Praeger admitted publicly in 1967 that Praeger published "15 or 16" books on communism at the suggestion of the CIA. The suspicion obviously arises that Hoang Van Chi's book was one of them, especially given the evidence of his past close association with psychological warfare activities for the Saigon government.

I am going to testify before a subcommittee of the Senate (the Eastland Subcommittee) later this month concerning the accuracy of the Hoang Van Chi book and other documents which have been used by scholars on North Vietnam. I will present evidence concerning fraudulent practices by the author in the book and about his background in relation to the Diem government's political warfare activities. And in this context, I will raise the question of whether this book was published at the suggestion of the CIA, of which there is certainly strong circumstantial evidence.

In short, the book has already become a matter of controversy. It is a matter about which the Congress and public has a right to know. If Praeger continues to maintain that it does not wish to release the information, I will suggest to the subcommittee that it subpoena the relevant records of the corporation in order to find out the truth. This, then, is the rationale behind my request for information. If, in fact, the book was published at the suggestion of the CIA, I suggest that you say so now rather than making an even larger issue of it later.

I look forward to hearing from you soon about this matter.

Sincerely yours,

D. GARETH PORTER,
Research Associate, Cornell University.

PRAEGER PUBLISHERS, INC.,
New York, N.Y., July 27, 1973.

Mr. D. GARETH PORTER,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PORTER: Thank you for the further rationale behind your request as to data relating to Praeger Publishers, Inc. publication of FROM COLONIALISM TO COMMUNISM by Hoang Van Chi.

As I should think you would understand from my prior letter, we have not been attempting to withhold any information on this book. Your original request to us, however, as "a specialist in Vietnamese affairs" would hardly, as I pointed out, be sufficient reason for us to release information to you as to our business operations. I still believe that a request from the pertinent Senate sub-committee before whom you say you will be testifying would have been more in order. Nonetheless I shall accept your statement that testifying is the reason behind your original request and, since, as I have noted above, we do not feel that there was anything unusual in our publication of this title, note, for your information, the following:

Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. contracted with Hoang Van Chi for this book on June 21, 1962. There is nothing in our files to show if we approached Mr. Hoang or he us. Either would have been normal.

The book appears to have been published on April 23, 1964.

Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. contracted with the USIA, on September 14, 1964, under contract 1A-10352, to sell to the USIA 1000 copies of this title. Under this contract, the USIA also received the right to translate and publish in foreign languages with the proviso that they would consider the release of such rights, on a country-by-country basis, at the publisher's request.

I trust the above clarifies the matter in question.

Sincerely yours,

DAVID U. HERRMANN,
Executive Vice President.

PRAEGER PUBLISHERS, INC.,
New York, N.Y., August 9, 1973.

Mr. D. GARETH PORTER,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PORTER: Since writing to you on July 27, I have heard from Mr. Hoang Van Chi who has been able to add some additional information to what I told you.

Mr. Hoang states that his first contact with Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. was through Mr. Arthur Cox, who was then Praeger's representative in Geneva, Switzerland, the time being late 1962. He does not state whether Mr. Cox approached him or he Mr. Cox, but we do have a letter in our files from Mr. Cox to Mr. Hoang, dated November 30, 1961 which starts out by saying "Thank you for sending me your manuscript, FROM COLONIALISM TO COMMUNISM."

Mr. Hoang has further asked us to inform you as to the total amount of money he has made from this book since publication to the present time so that you will see how little he earned from a book which took him six years of research and two years of full-time writing. This amount was \$2,848.82.

I hope the above is of further value to you.

Sincerely yours,

DAVID U. HERRMANN,
Executive Vice President.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY,
PROJECT ON THE
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF EAST ASIA,
Washington, D.C., July 20, 1973.

Mr. RAY CLINE,
Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CLINE: I am writing to you about the question of the authenticity of one of the documents cited by the Department of State in its February 1965 White Paper "Aggression from the North", which is now said by a former high Saigon Government official to be a fake. I am referring to document on page 57 of that publication, under the title "The People's Revolutionary Party (South) and the Lao Dong Party (North) are One Communist Party", as Appendix G to the White

Paper. This is a document allegedly captured in May 1962 by GVN troops in Ba Xuyen province and then allegedly turned over to the International Control Commission.

I am informed by an acquaintance who has interviewed Dr. Tran Kim Tuyen, who was then in charge of the Saigon secret police and counterintelligence services, that Dr. Tuyen has now admitted that this was a fake document, written in his own office—and not a very good one at that. The language of the document itself certainly supports such a conclusion, and the document has long been suspect in the eyes of some Vietnamese specialists. I am further informed that Mr. George Carver also now admits privately that this was indeed a fake.

Since I am now writing a study on "captured Communist documents" and the problem of authentication, I would like to have official confirmation of this apparent forgery. If in fact the U.S. government now knows that one of the documents it has put forward as historical evidence is false, it has the responsibility for admitting the original mistake publicly, so that scholars are not misled any longer on the matter. I would appreciate, therefore, a reply at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely yours,

D. GARETH PORTER,
Research Associate.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH,
Washington, D.C., August 29, 1973.

Mr. D. GARETH PORTER,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PORTER: I regret the delay in responding to your letter of July 20, 1973. We are in the height of the summer vacation period and my senior Vietnam analyst was not available to look into the questions raised in your letter.

I asked the Vietnam analysts to focus on two questions raised by your letter: *first*, was there any new evidence or any other reason causing us now to question the accuracy of the assertions made on page 23 of the 1965 "White Paper" regarding the relationship of the Peoples Revolutionary Party (PRP) in South Vietnam to the Lao Dong Party in North Vietnam (e.g., Hanoi's control of the PRP); and, *second*, what was the analysts' current judgment about the authenticity of the document cited on page 57 of the annex in support of those same assertions?

On the first question, the analysts believe the evidence is—and has always been—overwhelming that Hanoi controls the PRP. One could cite numerous pieces of evidence in support of this view:

- General Nguyen Chi Thanh's speech of November 20, 1964;
- COSVN Resolution 2 of late 1963 or early 1964;
- COSVN Resolution 3 of January 1965;
- COSVN Resolution 4 of March 1966;
- The PRP Central Committee statement broadcast in March 1970;
- Truong Chinh's interview with an *Akhata* correspondent in September 1967;
- The draft resolution of the first COSVN conference in October 1961;
- The PRP status report on revolutionary progress in South Vietnam for 1954 to 1963;
- The COSVN Standing Committee directive on important tasks for the last six months of 1963;
- The Lao Dong Party Central Committee resolution of early November 1963;
- The Lao Dong Party Central Committee 9th plenum resolution of December 1963;
- The COSVN Standing Committee account of the situation from 1961 to early 1964;

The draft report presented at the third COSVN conference of January 1965. All these documents reveal in various ways the direct relationship between the PRP and the leadership of Lao Dong party in Hanoi. In fact, as you are no doubt aware, Hanoi has never really tried to disguise the existence or nature of this relationship.

On the second question, I am told that almost from the moment of publishing of the "White Paper" some analysts inside the government and a few scholars outside were uncertain about the authenticity of the specific document cited on page 57 of the annex. Several analysts apparently believed that some of the phraseology used in the document was highly unusual for what purported to be a Communist instruction. This view generally prevails at present.

It should be noted, however, that no one in 1965—or at the present, to my knowledge—questioned the basic judgment expressed in the “White Paper” about Hanoi’s control of the PRP. It was widely recognized that this judgment was supported by numerous other documents. It also should be noted that there was originally apparently no consensus about the authenticity of the document—we were, after all, then just beginning our major efforts at independent document collection and analysis and the South Vietnamese Government had provided the document and vouched for its authenticity. Nevertheless, I understand various analysts informally did express, on the basis of their own personal judgments, their suspicions to interested scholars.

We have no way of knowing whether Dr. Tran Kim Tuyen in fact fabricated the cited document “in his own office.” The document originally surfaced in a 1962 “White Paper” published by the South Vietnamese government.

Sincerely,

RAY S. CLINE.

Mr. SOURWINE. You realize that if you do not get the answers in that it might mean that this record will be held up a long time further?

Mr. PORTER. Well, could we perhaps then put a time limit on it, a reasonable time, perhaps 1 month?

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, if the Chair wishes to modify his order, we can hold it until you either supply this missing correspondence in both instances, or indicate that you want the transcript to go without it.

Mr. PORTER. That would be fine.

Senator THURMOND. How long do you think it will take?

Mr. PORTER. Well, I would think that they—would respond within a matter of a couple of weeks. If not, I would suspect that they are not going to respond.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I say something off the record?

Senator THURMOND. Yes. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator THURMOND. On the record.

You will let us hear from you, then?

Mr. PORTER. Yes. Yes; I will.

One other point. I have noted in my statement that I would like to supply for the committee’s own files a Xerox copy of a document which was sent to me which is referred to in this statement, and I will give that to the subcommittee at this time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Very good.

I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman.

Senator THURMOND. Well, thank you very much.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 2:35 p.m., the hearing was concluded.]

INDEX

(NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or organization in this index.)

A

	Page
Agency for International Development.....	6
"Aggression from the North" (State Department White Paper)....	11, 26, 27, 28
Agricultural Emulation Conference.....	20
Agrarian Revolution in Vietnam (book).....	17, 18
Akhata (publication).....	27
Aldor, Mr.....	25
Australian National University.....	12

B

Bangkok.....	16
Bao Dai, ex-emperor.....	3
Ba Xuyen Province.....	11, 27
Bui Chu.....	8
Bui Quang Chieu.....	4
Burma.....	7
Buttinger, Joseph.....	3, 4

C

Can Tho.....	4, 17
Carver, G. George.....	11, 12, 21, 24, 27
Catholic.....	7-9
Central Committee.....	7
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).....	6, 9, 11, 12, 19, 21, 25
Central Psychological War Service.....	8
Challiant, Gerard.....	23
"Charges Saigon Lie on Bloodbath" (article).....	8
China.....	20
Chinese advisers.....	5, 19, 20
Chinese Agricultural Emulation Fighters.....	19
Chinese Communists.....	7
Chinese troops.....	19
Cline, Ray.....	26, 28
Cochinchina.....	3, 4
Communist.....	3, 6-9, 16
Communist Party.....	7, 12, 21
Communist revolution in Vietnam.....	24
Communists.....	4, 10, 12, 15, 27
"Communist Subversive Activities Contrary to the Spirit of the Geneva "Agreements" (package of documents).....	10
"Communist Viet Minh Aggressive Policy" (publication).....	11
Congress for Cultural Freedom.....	6
Cornell University.....	8, 18
International Relations of East Asia Project.....	1, 2, 25, 26
COSVN.....	27
Cuoc Khang Chien Than Thanh cau Nhan Dan Vietnam (The Magnifi- cent Resistance War of the Vietnamese People) (publication).....	17
Cox, Arthur.....	26

	Page
D	
Da Nang.....	8
Department of Defense.....	6
Department of State, Intelligence and Research Branch.....	12, 25-27
Diem government.....	9-11
Diem, President.....	6-9, 11
Diem regime.....	9, 12, 19
"Discontent in North Vietnam" (leaflet).....	16
D.R.V. (Democratic Republic of Vietnam).....	3, 5, 7, 10, 16, 17, 19-21, 23
F	
Fall, Bernard B.....	10, 15, 16
FBIS.....	18
Foreign Affairs (publication).....	12
France.....	7, 9
French Government.....	2
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc.....	26
"From Colonialism to Communism" (book).....	2, 5-7, 25, 26
G	
Geneva Accords.....	8, 9, 11
Geneva Agreement of 1954.....	10, 11
Geneva, Switzerland.....	21, 26
"Giap's Speech on Land Reform Errors, Mistranslations of Key Passages" (monograph).....	12, 13
Gittinger, J. Price.....	15-17
GVN.....	27
H	
Hanoi.....	8, 14, 16-19, 22, 27
Hanoi University.....	7
Hao Dai.....	4
Herrmann, David U.....	25, 26
Hoang Van Chi.....	2, 5-9, 12-19, 21-26
"Hoa Hao Armed Forces, West Cochinchina Zone, High Command" (document).....	10
Hoa Hao sect.....	4, 10
Hoang Van Tri.....	9
Ho Chi Minh.....	3, 10, 19
Ho Van Nga.....	4
Howard University Library.....	10
"Human Cost of Communism, The" (compendium).....	3
"Human Cost of Communism in Vietnam—II" (publication).....	1
Huynh Phu So.....	4
I	
Indochina.....	2
International Control Commission.....	11, 27
J	
Johnstone, Diane.....	8, 9
K	
Kaye, William.....	16
Kuomintang Party.....	7
L	
Lao Dong Party.....	20, 27
Liberation Radio.....	9
M	
Marxist Leninist.....	2
Ministry of Information.....	10, 11
Mus, Paul, Prof.....	3
"Myth of No Bloodbath, The: North Vietnam's Land Reform Reconsidered" (monograph).....	2

N

National Congress of Combatants of the Agricultural Emulation Movement.....	Page
New York Times (newspaper).....	19
Nghe An.....	6
Nghe An.....	15
Ngo Dinh Diem.....	8, 11
Ngo Dinh Khoi.....	4
Ngon, Comrade.....	14, 16
Nguyen Chi Thanh, Gen.....	27
Nguyen Manh Con.....	3
Nguyen Manh Tuong.....	7, 9
Nguyen Van Chau, Colonel.....	7-9
Nguyen Van Sam.....	3, 4
Nhan Dan (newspaper).....	14-18, 21, 23
Nhu (Diem's brother).....	8
North Vietnam.....	5, 7, 8, 11, 14, 18-20, 23-25, 27
North Vietnamese army.....	20
North Vietnamese Government.....	19, 22
North Vietnamese land reform.....	5, 23

O

Office of Social and Political Research.....	12
Orleans, France.....	8

P

"Peasants of North Vietnam" (book).....	23
Peking.....	10
People's Army.....	11
People's Revolutionary Party.....	27, 28
People's Revolutionary Party in South Vietnam.....	11
"People's Revolutionary Party (South), The, and the Lao Dong Party (North) are One Communist Party" (document).....	26
Pham Ngoc Chi.....	8
Pham Ngoc Thach, alias Minh Tan.....	10
Pham Quynh.....	4
Phuc Quoc Minh Hoi.....	3
Pike, Douglas.....	11, 12
Pope Paul VI.....	8
Porter, D. Gareth, testimony of.....	1-28
Praeger, Frederick.....	6, 25
Praeger Publishers, Inc.....	6, 7, 25, 26
Provisional Vietnam Nationalist Government.....	4

Q

Quang Ngai.....	4
-----------------	---

R

Race, Jeffrey.....	11
Roy, Jules.....	20

S

Saigon.....	6, 8, 9, 11, 17
Saigon Embassy.....	8
Government.....	2, 5, 8, 11, 20, 25, 26
Ministry of Information.....	6
Scott, Samuel J.....	1
Service of Historical and Social Studies.....	9
Sifty, Raymond.....	1
Sourwine, J. G.....	1-28
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.....	16
South Vietnam.....	9-11, 27
South Vietnamese Ambassador.....	7
South Vietnamese Armed Forces.....	8
South Vietnamese Army.....	9
South Vietnamese Government.....	9, 28
Soviet Union.....	19
St. Louis Post-Dispatch (newspaper).....	7, 8

T

	Page
Tay Ninh Province.....	11
Teodoru, Daniel E.....	1, 2, 7, 14, 17-20, 22, 23
Thanh Hoa.....	7
Thoi Moi (Hanoi newspaper).....	15, 22
Thurmond, Senator Strom.....	1-28
To Hieu Village.....	14
Toan Quoc Khang Chien (Whole-Nation Resistance) (publication).....	17
Tonkin Delta.....	18, 21
Tran Kim Tuyen, Dr.....	9, 12, 27, 28
Tran Phuong.....	18
Truong Chinh.....	10, 16, 18, 22, 27
Tu Dien Tieng Viet (dictionary).....	14
"Two Vietnams, The" (book).....	15

U

UBKC (resistance committee).....	16
USIA (U.S. Information Agency).....	6, 12, 25, 26
United Nations.....	7
United States.....	2, 5, 6
CORDS.....	6
Government.....	2, 6, 8, 27
Mission in Saigon.....	6
State Department.....	11, 12

V

Vo Nguyen Giap, Gen.....	12, 14, 15, 21, 23
Vietnam.....	2, 6, 27
Vietnamese revolution.....	2, 3, 5
Vietminh.....	3-11, 19, 20
Vietnam News Agency.....	18
Van Tan.....	14
Vietcong.....	6, 12
Van Tien Dung, Brig. Gen.....	10, 11
Vietnam Workers Party.....	10
Vietnam Fatherland Front.....	7
"Vietnam: The Dragon Embattled" (book).....	3
Vietnamese Communist movement.....	2

W

Washington.....	8, 11, 25
Washington Post (newspaper).....	6
White House, the.....	6