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Front cover: Scenes in Chile (credit: Liberation News Service)

THANKS TO OUR READERS . . .

Many of you responded to our plea for contributions by adding an extra five, ten or more dollars to your checks when renewing your *Southern Africa* subscriptions for 1975. As subscriptions alone do not cover our expenses, your gifts are very important. For example, they have enabled us to continue sending the magazine free to over 200 prisoners who have requested it and whose many letters to us indicate its importance to them. We are very grateful for your help. Thanks!

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OVERVIEW

Reiteration is no more fun for the writer than it is for the reader. But the steady stream of propaganda on which the current Detente with South Africa is being floated makes it important to re-examine reality.

Given that the only real change, the only change that matters to the people of South Africa, is the extent to which the relative positions of Black and White change in that very oppressive society, let us check the recent record.

It is true that Blacks can now attend certain formerly all-white theaters, have at last been allowed access to such "holy of holies" as the Johannesburg Public Library, can now direct traffic (white as well as black) in some cities, have more skilled jobs on the railways and the building industry. It is also true that Blacks are only inched into more skilled jobs when no white workers are available, that such Blacks move into "redefined" jobs, so that there is still neither equal work nor equal pay, and above all, that no black worker ever supervises a white worker.

It is true that the gold mines are now paying higher wages to black workers—from R1.60 a shift for beginners to a high of R4.35 for "senior team leaders". Black wages rose some 83% on the gold mines in 1974—but working profits rose a spectacular 107%, share-holders received 100% more in profits, and white mine-workers kept on taking home pay packets many times greater than those of their black fellow-workers. Black anger at conditions on the mines has been rising rapidly; it has met with brutal repression. 83 black miners have been killed in the last year, in violent confrontations involving wages and working conditions.

Other black wages have gone up too—as Prime Minister Vorster boasted to President Tolbert when they met in Liberia. But Whites start so far ahead of Blacks that despite proportionately larger black versus white increases, the wage gap between Whites and Blacks is still growing—a fact Vorster forgot to mention. In industry for instance, average monthly wages in 1969 were Whites R273, Africans R48. The gap was R225. In late 1973 the averages were Whites R383, Africans R71. The gap had widened by R87.

In the last 10 years average per capita white and black wages have more than doubled. But the average per White person income is still 16 times greater than that of the average African.

Vorster has appealed to Africa to give his country time . . . but projections into the future indicate simply more

of the same. An obvious example is educational planning—the basis for the future skills of the black population. The gap between per child spending on Whites and Africans is wider than ever—for Whites per capita spending now ranges from R387 a year in the Transvaal to R557 in Natal—for African students in the whole area the average spent per child is R29 a year. There are still fewer than 200,000 African children in Secondary schools. In Soweto, where over half a million Blacks who work in prosperous Johannesburg's factories and homes live in one vast ghetto, under a hundred children completed high school last year.

The picture is the same on all fronts—inevitably the same—because the relationships of recognised power in the society have not changed. South Africa is still the land of white supremacy.

Nowhere is this clearer than on the political front where, as reported in this month's *Update*, arrests, persecution and torture are still the standard operational procedures white society uses to protect itself against any real change. Recognising that fundamental change will come from political mobilization of the broad mass of the people the whites will use the most vicious methods necessary to smash even the most tentative of radical black political organisation. Only the voices of the black collaborators, in city and Bantustan, are to be allowed to reach the people.

In this context, the African leaders who gather at the special OAU meeting in April to discuss their attitudes towards Detente with South Africa, should come to only one conclusion. There can be no dialogue with the white supremacists—they are no more willing to change now than they were in the days when they fought their wars of land dispossession, or established their pass laws, or set up a political system which prevents every Black man and woman from living as a free citizen in the land of their birth. The task for independent Africa is clear—though its costs may be higher than some will like in the short run—unconditional support for the black liberation struggle and absolute hostility to the white supremacists. Any other position inevitably lengthens the lease of life of white supremacy and exploitation in South Africa and raises the price, in blood and pain, that the people of South Africa will have to pay for a free society with justice and equality for all. ■

Note: R1 equals approximately \$1.45

feature

The Kissinger Team for Africa: 'Destabilization' Revisited

by Edgar Lockwood



Nathaniel Davis

The fat is now in the fire.

Secretary Kissinger has told 43 African nations that his choice of Nathaniel Davis to replace Donald Easum as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs is none of their business. He has expressed "dismay" that the Organization of African Unity's Council of Foreign Ministers should have publicly questioned the choice as a possible portent of "destabilization" in Africa on the Chile model, where Davis served as ambassador during the coup that toppled the popularly elected socialist government of Salvador Allende.

Davis will no doubt be confirmed by the Senate notwithstanding African objections. Is this episode then of only passing interest, soon washed away and forgotten? Or are the Africans correctly concerned about the intentions of US national security managers in regard to Africa?

Assessing the motives and intentions of some one as essentially secretive as Henry Kissinger is never easy.

Conventional wisdom in Washington states that Kissinger has never been interested in or taken the time to concern himself with African affairs. In a fifteen minute interview with African ambassadors after Ford became President, Kissinger apologized for his supposed inattention to Africa by pleading preoccupation with Vietnam and the Middle East. African ambassadors rarely see Kissinger, but they were not taken in. "He is very well briefed, very well briefed indeed," one diplomatic veteran of Washington told us.

In fact, a clear picture has recently emerged of how Secretary Kissinger and his fellow managers of national security have approached the problem of relationships with the black and white regimes of Africa during the last five years.

The revelation of the contents of NSSM 39, a Kissinger-ordered study made in 1969 (see *Southern Africa*, February, 1974), demonstrates the new rationale and direction which Kissinger's real-politik brought to Nixon's Africa policy. From the late 1950s, the Defense Department, especially the Navy, had been arguing for a closer relationship with the white regimes of Africa. The State Department's Africa Bureau, on the other hand, had supported the arms embargo against South Africa and Portugal, sanctions against Rhodesia, UN moves to declare South Africa's possession of Namibia illegal and a general posture of rhetorical condemnation of apartheid. Support for sanctions against South Africa or Portugal or expulsion of South Africa from the UN were ruled out, however.

The now famous "Option 2" in NSSM 39 was essentially an attempt by Africa Bureau chief David Newsom to provide a compromise acceptable to State and Defense. By partially relaxing the arms embargoes, creating sanctions exceptions for chrome shipments and lowering our rhetorical profile on Namibia, Newsom hoped to buy off Defense and keep the other elements of policy intact. It is now a little beside the point to argue whether Option 2 was chosen, whether the study was implemented by a decision memorandum or whether policy was shifted in a major way. What is important in NSSM 39 is the rationale and perspective underlying the study. Understanding these premises, we can proceed to a better analysis of new developments.

For the global managers, Africa does not stand alone. Africa policy has always in some sense been subservient to European policy. The US tends to defend the interests of its European partners in NATO and often to take its cue in regard to de-colonization questions from Great Britain, France and Portugal or at least to take their positions as a

point of departure.

NSSM 39 puts Africa in the context of a global struggle for power, in which the Western capitalist countries, led by the United States, compete with the major Communist powers, the Soviet Union and China, for strategic bases, for economic privileges and interests, for scientific and technological advances and for political influence. Morality, human aspirations, justice, or legitimacy do not intervene in such an analysis to disrupt the calculation of interest. Only what is tangible is realistic.

Applying this analysis to Southern Africa, NSSM 39 sees the white ruled countries as areas where the United States has important but not vital tangible interests: profitable investments, strategic and technically important harbors and scientific tracking stations. The United States also has tangible interests in the black states of Southern Africa. A political problem is posed by the threat of black states to support the liberation of the southern white regimes by the use of "violence." Black violence based in friendly black states could threaten our tangible interests in the white states. But if the United States is not seen to be attempting to influence South Africa toward progress in the direction of majority rule, the black states may threaten our interests in those states.

The solution to this dilemma is to promote "detente," to use the Kissingerian phrase that Prime Minister Vorster now uses.

Option 2 builds its hope for stability upon building a sort of Alliance for Progress in Southern Africa using South Africa as the principal managing partner and surrogate for US and European capital interests. Option 2 is built upon acquiescence, welcome, encouragement and promotion of South Africa's economic domination of her black neighbors. Option 3, which was essentially a codification of US policy 1960-68, accepted the principle of resistance to South Africa's domination. (One may well want to argue that the principle was not implemented but the change in position is still significant.)

By urging black states to concentrate on internal economic development, by giving them US aid for economic projects and by encouraging South Africa to do the same, Option 2 envisaged less support of armed struggle as black states come to realize that "peace and prosperity" lie in a closer relationship with South Africa. The authors of the memorandum recognized that such strategy would mean acceptance of gains short of majority rule, political problems for pro-Western leaders in black states who needed to justify relations with the US and a propaganda opportunity for the Communists. But the position provided the best chance to expand trade and investment while at least preserving strategic, economic and scientific interests in the white states.

Even if US perception of its interests in South Africa had remained static since 1969, the unanticipated collapse of Portuguese colonialism alone could well have led to increased support for South Africa in its newly isolated position. But the economic crisis facing the United States has heightened concerns about the cost of energy and the cost of raw materials for US and European industries.

The startling success of Arab nations in imposing a petroleum boycott has demonstrated that Third World producers of oil and other mineral resources have hitherto unsuspected powers to cause inflationary rises in the cost of energy and raw materials. Secretary Kissinger has assumed the role of organizing the response of consumer nations. While gloomily predicting the Decline of the West because other nations are unwilling to allow him free rein for bold actions, Kissinger and the Ford Administration

are arming Iran and Saudi Arabia as well as Israel and are threatening armed intervention to protect oil fields. The Soviet Union is seen as a major rival and potential enemy. Armed conflict cannot be ruled out.

The US Navy now seems certain to have won its battle for expansion of the base at Diego Garcia in the middle of the Indian Ocean in order to match the Soviet naval expansion alleged to have taken place in that area.

The possibility of Middle East conflict and the acquisition of a piece of strategic turf in the Indian Ocean both make it more probable and plausible to argue that South African ports are more strategic than they were in 1969. Conventional US naval warfare in the area would necessarily involve the use of drydock and repair facilities at Simonstown because they are the only such facilities with the technical competence on the continent. The existence of Diego Garcia and the proposed base in the Oman area encourages Congressional acceptance of the proposition that the whole Indian Ocean littoral of Africa is of strategic interest and value. The opening of the Suez Canal does not assure its continued availability and thus the Cape Route to the Middle East needs to be guarded from Soviet submarines. The fact that the Soviet presence is not large and that if the Soviet Union attacked the US oil supply routes, it would be more logical to attack in the North Sea, do not preclude arguments that the Navy prefers: i.e. to make assurance against all contingencies.

The South Africans have been arguing these points for years. The "private" visits of Connie Mulder and Admiral Bierman in 1974 and the 13 day junket of Congressmen Bob Wilson and five Republican colleagues with military interests to South Africa are an indication that South Africa senses that it can win Congressional approval of a closer US military link-up.



Strategic considerations of this kind are re-enforced by new economic developments since 1969. South Africa and Rhodesia have always attracted the attention of European and US capital. The availability of cheap labor, the abundance of ore deposits and the voracious growth of metal use and production in the United States, Europe

and Japan have historically produced profits in white Southern Africa which are not available in manufacturing even in South Africa or elsewhere in Africa. Fears of inflation in turn fuel the search for what will hold its value: precious metals in particular. The collaboration of the oil producers in upping the prices of oil, however, have led to fears that mineral producers would likewise collaborate.

Such fears led to a study by the White House Office on International Economic Affairs, published in November 1974. It studied sixteen minerals which it deemed critical to the survival of the United States and not generally found domestically. South African chromium, platinum and vanadium exports to the United States make it one of three major countries whom we can count on politically not to impose embargoes:

"Canada, Australia, or South Africa would be unlikely to participate in any embargo of exports to the United States, Western Europe, or Japan. Since these countries are the most important sources of raw materials for the United States (and are very important for Western Europe and Japan), any embargo threat for commodities they produce is greatly diminished."

There are thus economic as well as strategic reasons why the United States would see South Africa as more important to US interests than in 1969. At the same time, the collapse of Portuguese colonialism has left South Africa more exposed than ever. For those in the State Department who saw Cuba in the 1960s as "exporting revolution" to such places as Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, the existence of socialist states in Angola and Mozambique, if they were backed by the Soviet Union or China, would be seen as a similar kind of threat to South Africa. More concretely, Angola and Mozambique could provide a base for refugees bent on sabotage, guerilla war or other kinds of armed struggle. But Mozambique is economically vulnerable, a hostage of South Africa. Angola is politically divided.

Given this context, what does the nomination of Nathaniel Davis portend? This is the question the OAU ministers have asked.

Kissinger has defended the Davis appointment by calling the OAU's questioning a "besmirching" of Davis' reputation and unacceptable. Is Kissinger right?

Nathaniel Davis served as ambassador to Chile from 1971-73. He was head of mission while the United States financed and supported Allende's political opposition and used the World Bank, EximBank and the Inter-American Development Bank to bring down the regime of Allende. William Colby, CIA director, has testified that the CIA kept Davis informed fully of CIA activities. As Ambassador, Davis carried on sympathetic and friendly discourse with the socialists and communists while the "Station" did its covert work. Indeed one key Congressional staff person who has had access to Davis' secret testimony before the Senate subcommittee on Latin America confirmed to this author that Davis was "culpable." Congressman Harrington has testified that Davis recommended some of the CIA activities.

Kissinger is known to feel that people who stay too long in one area become advocates of its interests rather than of US interests. Clearly Davis will not be a problem in this regard.

Davis' appointment is in fact part of an emerging pattern of shifting key personnel from fighting Com-



munist in Latin America to fighting Communism in Africa. Diplomats with experience in Chile, Guatemala and Cuba are being or have been posted to key strategic locations: Zaire, South Africa and Malawi.

Deane Hinton, appointed Ambassador to Zaire in June, 1974, served as AID chief in Guatemala 1967-69 during a part of Mr. Davis' tenure there and thereafter as AID chief in Chile. He is widely believed to have been a CIA agent.

During the period 1967-71 when Davis and Hinton were serving in Guatemala, the United States vigorously supported a counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism campaign which left 20,000 persons dead.

Hinton is an economist and served as deputy chief of staff in the office in the White House which produced the minerals survey above mentioned. He went to Zaire, a major copper producer, right after a meeting of the major copper producers which considered the possible collaborative steps to improve price conditions.

Zaire's central location, and contiguous borders with Angola, Zambia and Tanzania, make it the northern arm of the US nutcracker on the region. Its recent history of US intervention and assistance make its politics more accessible. The Southern arm is, of course, South Africa.

A veteran of the Davis years in Guatemala and Chile has already arrived in South Africa. Jeffrey Davidow, now political officer in Pretoria, arrived in summer 1974.

Davidow's new boss will be William G. Bowdler, now awaiting Senate confirmation as US ambassador. Bowdler served as Political Officer in Havana in the years when the Castro-led revolution occurred. He was the Cuba expert at State and National Security Council when the US was fighting the alleged export of revolution. He served in El Salvador, 1968-71, and then in Guatemala after Davis left.

Since June, 1974, the US ambassador to Malawi has been Robert A. Stevenson, who succeeded Bowdler as co-ordinator of Cuban affairs in the State Department.

None of these appointees have any significant diplomatic experience in Africa. Their Latin American exper-

the year. The major issues to be discussed were job opportunities for Blacks, and more adequate representation for black labor. (*Star* Johannesburg, Jan. 18, 25, Feb. 1, 1975; *Guardian*, London, Jan. 16, 1975)

A group of Swedish trade unionists went to South Africa in late January to study the wages and benefits received by the 2,150 black employees of Swedish firms. There are seven Swedish subsidiaries in South Africa, and on the whole they offer better benefits, such as sick pay and pension schemes, than do most South African firms. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Feb. 1, 1975)

What was clearly missing from both the British conference and the report of the Swedish trade unionists was the fundamental question of who, ultimately, benefits from the presence of foreign companies in South Africa. Only 2,150 Blacks work for Swedish firms, thus making Swedish labor practices in South Africa largely irrelevant. Of greater significance is the role played by these firms in strengthening the total economy, and thus helping to perpetuate the present political regime.

Will the introduction of works committees or even black trade unions, be a step towards the creation of a black political force that will eventually rule the country? Or will the introduction of better working conditions for Blacks simply subvert energies and lessen the likelihood of the growth of a movement for fundamental change in the political structure? These questions must be answered before a valid assessment of the new developments on the labor scene can be made.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

"DETENTE" IN AFRICA?

The South African Government is continuing to pursue its "outward-looking" policy of seeking friendly relations with the governments of Black Africa. On February 17, 1975, Prime Minister Vorster announced in Parliament that he, his Foreign Minister, Dr. Hilgard Muller, plus 16 other South African officials had visited Liberia for two days and held talks with the Liberian President, Mr. William R. Tolbert Jr. The talks centered upon the status




Vorster (left) and Liberian President Tolbert meet in Liberia

of Blacks in South Africa (South Africa's "Bantustan" policies, and the economic standard of living of black South Africans), South African relations with its neighbors, South African policy on Namibia, and the future of the Rhodesian regime. With regard to Namibia, Prime Minister Vorster reported that he told President Tolbert that he will not recognize Sam Nujoma, the SWAPO president in-exile, as the "natural or elected leader of Namibia, but that South Africa will be willing at its own expense to fly 'legitimate' leaders [that is those Namibians who collaborate with the South African oppression of their people] to confer with President Tolbert." Additionally Vorster stated that the South African Government would be happy to send the heads of the "Bantustan" governments to talk with President Tolbert. It is interesting to note that Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of the KwaZulu "Bantustan" had visited Liberia in January. Although Vorster claimed that the initiative for his visit had come from President Tolbert, press reports indicate that the actual initiative had been from Vorster. (*Africa News*, Durham, Feb. 18, 1975; *Washington Post*, Feb. 18, 1975; *New York Times*, Feb. 17, 18, 1975; *Star*, Johannesburg, Feb. 18, 1975)

During February a trade delegation of six Nigerian businessmen was in South Africa at the invitation of a few South African companies which want to expand their trade with Nigeria. Reports indicate that there might, in the future, be an exchange of South African gold for Nigerian oil and that the Nigerians were asked to convey to their government South Africa's views on "detente" in Africa. In addition Prime Minister Vorster and Foreign Minister Muller met with an official delegation from the Central African Republic which included two Cabinet Ministers. An agreement signed by the two parties provided for a \$6 million South African Government loan to the Central African Republic Government, and for the arrangement of a \$9 million contract with a South African private company for the construction of prefabricated housing in Bangui (the Central African Republic's capital). (*Star*, Johannesburg, Feb. 8, 1975; *Washington Post*, Feb. 18, 1975)

The *Washington Post*, (Feb. 18, 1975) notes that "some political observers believe that the United States, Britain, and France are playing behind-the-scenes roles in support of South Africa's search for detente with black Africa. The view is that all three Western powers wish to avoid a major racial conflagration [that is the spread of the actual liberation struggle] in southern Africa. The United States enjoys considerable influence in Liberia, as does France in its former African colonies."

South Africa has an economic and political reason for pursuing this policy of "detente" in Africa. Economically, South Africa considers black Africa as a potential market for South Africa's goods—in particular its manufactured goods. Because apartheid, with its low wages for black South Africans, restricts the domestic consumption of South African produced goods—the African population numbering 70 per cent of the total population, only receives about 17 to 18 per cent of the national income—South Africa must seek foreign markets for its domestic production. Traditionally, South Africa has had an unfavorable balance of trade with the industrialized countries, and South African exports to these countries consists primarily of agricultural and mineral products. In order for South Africa to sell its manufactured goods it needs a market in a "developing" country. The black African states, being geographically close and having the status of "developing" countries, are the best potential



Jet set?

markets for South African economic expansion. Politically, South Africa seeks to use its growing economic influence to undermine the support by the various black African governments of the liberation movements which challenge the Apartheid regime. South Africa hopes to achieve the following: one, the African governments would stop aiding the liberation movements financially via the OAU; two, the sowing of dissension within the ranks of these governments; by encouraging some of them to adopt a policy of "dialogue" toward South Africa. It must be noted that South Africa was excluded from the UN General Assembly in Fall 1974, because of the unity of the black African governments. Disunity among these states would be part of South Africa's strategy to maintain her illegitimate seat in the UN, and for prolonging the existence of its apartheid system.

TIES WITH THE RHODESIAN SMITH REGIME

The South African regime is still attempting to exert its influence to effect an agreement between the Smith regime and the African National Council which would produce a facade of African political control while maintaining South Africa's dominance in the region. In early February, the South African Foreign Minister, Dr. Hilgard Muller, held talks in Lusaka with the Foreign Ministers of Tanzania, Zambia, and Botswana. Additionally the *Star* (Johannesburg, Jan. 18, 1975) reports that in January, Mr. Mark Chona, President Kaunda's political advisor, had a secret meeting in South Africa with Prime Minister Vorster. Although South Africa is active in diplomatic circles, it has not withdrawn its military support of the Smith regime. The 2000 South African "security police" remain in Rhodesia. Foreign Minister Muller stated in BBC interview (London, January 21, 1975) that "South Africa would not forsake Rhodesia or apply sanctions against it should the present initiative to implement a settlement there come to nought. . . . South Africa had not deemed it necessary to impose sanctions against Rhodesia for the past nine years because it is not

its policy to twist the arm of any country." (*Star*, Johannesburg, Jan. 25, 1975; *Comment and Opinion*, Pretoria, Jan. 17, 31, 1975)

If anyone mistakes the current South African policy on the Rhodesian question for a policy in the interest of the Africans the following statement from *Die Transvaler* (Johannesburg, Jan. 18, 1975) should correct that false impression. "To advocate the retention of the status quo [in Rhodesia] as the last remaining buffer to Black aggression against South Africa is a fallacy. Precisely the retention of the existing situation in Rhodesia is the inducement to aggression. Detente—of which the consequence is peaceful coexistence—is the most realistic to ensure White survival in the entire Southern Africa." In other words, the motive behind all South African policies—domestic or foreign—is the survival of the Apartheid system.

SOUTH AFRICAN-ISRAELI TRADE RELATIONS

Between 1973 and 1974 there has been a sharp increase in trade between South Africa and Israel. The trade volume between these two countries had increased from \$9.6 million in 1973 to \$24.0 million in 1974, and it is expected that the increase in world gold prices will turn "the Republic into a most lucrative market" for Israeli business interests. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Feb. 8, 1975). This South African-Israeli trade tie is coupled with the expansion of the Israeli Government defense of South African political interests in various international organizations.

WHITE POLITICS

The United Party Split

Since the middle of January there has been much debate over the future of the United Party. It has been out of power since 1948 and since that time, internal dissension has weakened its political effectiveness and its national public image.

The United Party was traditionally white South Africa's largest opposition party, with a program opposed more to National Party administration than the whole system of apartheid. It has less than one third of the Parliamentary seats.

The factional fighting has revolved mainly around the conservatives vs. the reformists: apartheid vs. some long range scheme for a controlled sharing of power with some Blacks.

Central to the current crisis is the opinion poll of Opposition voters in South Africa's major metropolitan areas, which was commissioned by *The Star*, and conducted by the Pegasus Market Research organization. Only registered voters, selected at random, who said they would vote for one of the Opposition groups were questioned.

Asked whether or not they would support the "Young Turk" reformists or the "Traditional UP" should it split, 45% of the Durban voters said they would support the traditional Party, 23% would support the reformists and 28% would support neither. Five percent did not know. The reformist-traditional split on the Witwatersrand was 41-28% and in the Peninsula 35-28%. About one third of the Opposition voters believe that the United Party is not an effective opposition.

After the results of the poll came out, Prof. Willem Kleynhaus, a professor of political science at the University of South Africa, was asked to "audit" the poll. Its validity had been questioned by Dr. G.F. Jacobs, member of Parliament for Hillbrow and chairman of the United Party's Division of Information and Research. Kleynhaus reported that he was "... completely satisfied that Pegasus Market Research had reported the results of its field interviews with impeccable accuracy."

United Party internal problems were further aggravated by the expulsion of Dick Enthoven, a member of Parliament who had taken part in the Pegasus Poll.

The United Party leader, Sir de Villiers Graaf said, "This was a disciplining decision taken because of disloyalty to colleagues which the caucus considered indefensible. It had nothing to do with difference over aims and principles." The February 8 *Star* reported that

conservatives who had led the campaign to oust the reformists believe that the Enthoven expulsion brought an end to the reformist plan to take the party over from within.

According to the February 17 *Africa News*, 15 legislators left the United Party to form their own Party. Ten of them are provincial councillors and five are members of Parliament. Their major reason for taking such action was their dissatisfaction "... with the slow pace of racial reform advocated by the United Party." They subsequently announced the formation of the New Reform Party.

The day after the New Reform Party came into being, several members of the United Party including Harry Schwartz, (former provincial leader of the party in the Transvaal) were expelled for not supporting the Party line. This split in the United Party is the most serious internal issue since 1959 when 12 members resigned to form the so-called anti-apartheid Progressive Party.

There has been some speculation that the Reform Party will merge with the Progressive Party. If such a union occurs, South Africa's white opposition movement could pick up steam and become a force to be reckoned with. (*Africa News* Feb. 17, 1975). However, Harry Schwartz has rejected the idea of such a merger because of "fundamental differences" between the Reform Party and the Progressive Party.

Schwartz said that a "new party must be a 'middle-of-the-road-party' ... I think the survival of whites is as important to me as the uplifting of blacks, because we are all in South Africa together and we've all got to be here together, but I don't believe you must create a situation in which you in fact depend purely on the good will of people for your survival. This is fundamental to my thinking. I don't want the whites to dominate anyone in South Africa, but I don't want anybody to dominate the whites." (*Africa News*, Feb. 17, 1975; *BBC Focus*, Feb. 11, 1975; *BBC News*, Feb. 12, 1975; *BBC Morning Show*, Feb. 14, 1975; *Republic of South Africa Panorama*; *Christian Science Monitor*, Feb. 13, 1975; *Star*, Jan. 18, Jan. 25, Feb. 1, Feb. 8, 1975; *Washington Post* Feb. 12, 1975.)



BLACK POLITICS

PETTY APARTHEID In Sports

As has been mentioned earlier, the international boycott is resulting in some liberalization in the field of sports. Recent examples in this direction include the removal of racial restrictions from two important sport events, namely the Comrades Marathon and the Canoe Marathon and a proposed match between New Zealand rugby teams and a Coloured team.

The introduction of mixed cricket at all levels is currently under consideration by Transvaal and Natal cricket authorities. This last move has been severely criticised in the Afrikaans press, although the English press has welcomed it.

Social and Cultural

In continued efforts towards window dressing the Government and several civic authorities have decided in favor of partial liberalization of apartheid in several important cultural centers. Among them are, Johannesburg Civic Theater, which will now be opened to Coloureds and Indians (although, for separate shows); Nico Malan theater complex in Cape Town, which will now be opened to "population groups other than White", (whether than includes Africans and Indians remains unclear) and the East London city council reference library now to be opened to Coloureds and Indians. South Africa's two premier express trains, Blue Train and Drakensberg dining car and bar facilities will now be opened to Coloureds.

It must be kept in mind that in spite of these minor changes, the apartheid system remains harsh. A leading Johannesburg paper, the *Star*, cited a few astonishing examples in a recent editorial, including a case of several Black seamen who saved the life of a white officer from a blazing ship and were then refused access to certain facilities after reaching the shore.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

a) Africans

As is well known, very severe and harsh restrictions exist for Africans outside their respective homelands. Outside the homelands, an African cannot own land, cannot engage in business other than the provision of essential services and commodities, is liable to be thrown out of a particular area on losing a job and in many cases is even forced under law to live separated from his or her family. The Government's reasons for such restrictions had been that these Africans are only "temporary sojourners" and in the long run the place of Africans is in their homelands. The Government maintains this position in spite of the fact that about half of South Africa's African population live outside the homelands. However, there is a growing realization among the whites of South Africa that the presence of large number of Africans outside the homelands, has to be regarded as permanent. As a corollary, whites with somewhat "liberal" views and even some of the "conservatives" are urging the removal of some of these restrictions. Bantustan leaders have also been pushing along these lines for some time. This was highlighted in a recent "summit" meeting between Prime Minister Vorster and the homeland leaders. Although the homeland leaders demanded considerable relaxation of the policy, Mr. Vorster was prepared to offer only one concession, namely, "leasehold" right to land for Africans outside their homelands. This has considerably frustrated



Vorster (center) meets with Bantustan leaders

KwaZulu Chief Buthelezi, who has threatened the possibility of civil disruption, although it remains unclear what exactly his next step is going to be. Other Bantustan leaders continue to think in terms of cooperation with the Government.

b) Coloureds

A meeting between Mr. Vorster and the leaders of the Coloured Council was also arranged. Of the two major parties, the leaders of the Labour party boycotted the meeting and those of the Federal party attended it. In the meeting the Federal party leaders urged full citizenship for Coloureds. (Government policy promises Africans eventual "full citizenship" in the homelands, but only second class citizenship to Coloureds and Indians even in any distant future.) Although the specific outcome of the meeting remains unclear, the leaders of the Federal party claimed the talks to be "more than a success". Mr. Sonny Leon, the Labour party leader, however, dismissed the meeting as a "stunt" to generate acceptance of the upcoming elections for the Coloured Council.

It may be recalled that in the two elections to the Coloured Council held so far, the Labour party won the majority of the elected seats. The Federal party however obtained the majority in the Council with the help of Government nominated members.

c) Indians

Leaders of the semi-elected Indian Council also met Mr. Vorster and urged full citizenship for Indians. Obviously, Mr. Vorster did not agree, but proposed instead a wholly elected Indian Council.

d) Whites living in Bantustans

It now appears that the Government may grant nominal independence to the Transkei and perhaps one or two more Bantustans. This has brought into focus the question of the future status of whites living in these Bantustans. Leaders of the Transkei and Lebowa homelands have issued assurances that there will be no discrimination against the whites after "independence". It is of course another question whether such "independent" Governments will really have the power to discriminate against whites.

(*Star*, Johannesburg; Jan. 25, Feb. 1, 8, '75. *Comment and Opinion*, Pretoria; Jan. 24, 31, Feb. 7, '75. *Guardian*, London, Jan. 24 '75)

Namibia

NEW ATTEMPTS AT UNITY

The Windhoek *Advertiser* of February 24, 1975, reports that Namibia's black political coalition, the National Convention, has collapsed and that a new entity, the Namibia National Convention (NNC) has emerged.

The new grouping includes the South West Africa People's Organization of Namibia (SWAPO), the South West Africa National Union (SWANU), the Damara Tribal Executive, the Rehoboth Volksparty, the Namibia People's Democratic Organization (NAPDO); the *Advertiser* on February 25 adds the Democratic Cooperative Development Party (DEMKOP) to the new alignment.

The remains of the old Convention include the Herero Chiefs' Council and the National Unity Democratic Organization (NUDO), both headed by Chief Clemens Kapuuo, and the Nama Chiefs' Council.

These developments follow a bitter two-day conference in Katutura township, Windhoek, on February 22/23.

The February 25 *Advertiser* quotes the leadership of the NNC as declaring: "The aim is one Namibia as a whole, the unity of the Black people—eradication of federalism, multi-nationalism, separate development or any form of differentiation. The aim is one man, one vote, in an undivided country." NNC served notice of unrelenting opposition to the two white parties, the National and the United Party. NNC spokesman Jephta Tjongarero said of National Party leader Dirk Mudge: "We will not talk to him on an ethnic basis and at this stage not even on a party political basis."

BREAKING UNITY

The chief minister of the Owambo Bantustan, Chief

Filemon Elifas, announced in Oshakati that he "would, as soon as possible, negotiate with the South African Prime Minister for more powers that would lead to the eventual independence of Ovamboland." (*Advertiser*, Windhoek, Feb. 26, 1975) Elifas stated that "his government" would be "squarely behind the Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, in his attempts at detente in Africa".

FLOGGINGS AND ARRESTS STOPPED

SWAPO official Thomas Kamati, Lutheran Bishop Leonard Auafa and Anglican Bishop Richard Wood have won a year and a half long legal battle to stop public floggings of opponents of South Africa's occupation in northern Namibia. (*Advertiser*, Windhoek, Feb. 25, 1975)

South Africa's highest court, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, ruled in Bloemfontein on February 24 that the Ovamboland Tribal Authority was interdicted from arresting, detaining or inflicting punishment on any ground that a person is or is suspected of having carried out the lawful activities of SWAPO and DEMKOP. The 50-page opinion by Chief Justice Rumpff—concurrent in by the other four members of the court—upheld the standing of the three applicants. "The right to litigate for particular relief is not necessarily reserved to one particular person."

The two bishops had stated that members of their churches were in fear of arrest and Mr. Kamati had declared that he was bringing the application on behalf of members of SWAPO. The court ruled that any person of a society or body has an interest in the personal liberty of a co-member.



Apartheid in evidence: Segregated school for Africans in Namibia

NEW PRINTING PRESS TO OPEN

The Lutheran Church's new printing press at Oniipa is to open with a thanksgiving service on May 11. Bishop Auala said that he has several times confronted government officials with the claim that police had been responsible for the fire bombing of the original press on May 11, 1973. (*Advertiser*, Windhoek, Feb. 24, 1975) Clive Cowley, Namibia correspondent for the South Africa Argus newspapers, said in a paper read at a seminar at the University of Cape Town that Namibians in the Owamboland region openly speak of the police being guilty of the bombing. (*Advertiser*, Windhoek, Feb. 11, 1975)

SWAPO PRESSES ON BANTUSTAN ELECTION

In London, SWAPO representative Peter Katjivivi said that his organization was collecting evidence for prosecution of South African police and officials for allegedly forcing people to vote in the January Owambo Bantustan elections. (*Advertiser*, Windhoek, Feb. 25, 1975) A report has been issued to international bodies such as the Lawyers Committee in America, Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists.

IN JAPAN

Opposition political parties in Japan are to raise the question in the current session of parliament in Toyko about a contract for supplying Japanese electric power companies with about 8,000 tons of uranium ore from Namibia. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Feb. 1, 1975)

Ms. Yoko Kitazawa, a research journalist, has prepared a detailed report covering the entire field of Japanese-South African business ties indicating massive trade and industrial relations between the two countries. (Japanese are accorded an 'honorary white' status in the apartheid state.) The uranium ore is due to come from the Rossing mine near Namibia's seaside town of Swakopmund, an

operation of Rio Tinto Zinc, a United Kingdom based multi-national corporation, scheduled to come into production in 1976. Ms. Kitazawa states that the purchase of Namibian uranium ore "provides profits from Namibia for South Africa, increases South Africa's vested interest in staying in Namibia and increases South Africa's nuclear power. It is also robbing Namibia's natural resources without the participation of the African people or consultation with them."

(FROM TOKYO TO JOHANNESBURG, Ms. Kitazawa's report, is available from the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility (ICCR), Room 566, 475 Riverside Drive, New York, N.Y. 10027, at \$1.00 each.)

BRITISH OFFER OF COMMONWEALTH STATUS?

The British Foreign Office in London said that Foreign Secretary James Callaghan at a meeting in Lusaks with SWAPO officials stated that the British government would look sympathetically should a request for Commonwealth membership come from Namibia when it became independent. (*Advertiser*, Windhoek, Jan. 28, 1975)

AT THE UNITED NATIONS

UN Commissioner for Namibia Sean MacBride said that he had assurances from several governments that they would cooperate in impounding cargoes from Namibia. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Feb. 15, 1975) The Commissioner had previously stated that, backed by a Council decree of 1974, Namibian cargoes "could be treated as stolen property and seized on behalf of the people of Namibia". He did not foresee any attempts at seizure until after the Security Council had met to consider South Africa's reply to the December 17, 1974 resolution which carries a May 30 deadline. "I hope by that time it will not be necessary to effect any seizures", the Commissioner stated. "But if there is no clear-cut acceptances by South Africa of the UN decisions, I would have no alternative but to



Apartheid in evidence: the African township of Katutura, four miles from Windhoek

implement the provisions of the decree."

The *Star* report goes on to say: "The kind of hypothetical situation that Mr. MacBride appears to envisage would be something like this: a consignment of, say, copper from the Tsumeb Mine is being shipped to the United States when the vessel calls at a port in another country to take on cargo there. Alerted by an international surveillance system set up to keep track of cargoes from South West Africa, the UN Council for Namibia immediately seeks an order in the courts of that country for the seizure of the copper."

Commissioner MacBride spent part of February in Europe speaking to trade union, religious and human rights associations. He and Council for Namibia President Rujiah Banda held a discussion in Paris with officials of the French Foreign Office.

AMERICAN COMPANIES WITHDRAW FROM NAMIBIA

The last of five American oil companies has withdrawn from offshore explorations in Namibia. (*Times*, New York, Feb. 19, 1975) H.L. Severance, secretary of Standard Oil of California, notified the Church Project on U.S. Investments in Southern Africa, a coalition of several Protestant national church boards and Roman Catholic religious orders, of the decision.

Timothy Smith, director of the project said: "We are exhilarated that this is the last US oil company to withdraw from Namibia. We fought this campaign for three years and it has born fruit. SoCal seemed to us to be unaware of the social implications of being in Namibia until we raised the question."

The five companies are Getty Oil, Phillips Petroleum, Continental Oil, Texaco and Standard of California.

Generally, the initial decisions by these 5 oil companies to explore for oil offshore Namibia happened without even a sketchy study of the political situation. Geological data had been the determining factor in deciding to look for oil in the area. The contracts for exploration were provided by the South African Government, the illegal occupying power.

However, the question of who legally governed Namibia did seem to affect the corporations' decisions to withdraw. The United Nations has established the Council for Namibia as the legal governing power for Namibia. The Security Council has called upon States to cease any acts which would legitimize South Africa's occupation. The churches argued in proxy statements that investment by these oil companies was just such an act.

In explaining its withdrawal, Phillips Petroleum wrote to national church boards that filed a stockholder resolution for the 1975 annual meeting:

"... seismic exploration had been completed in the area and the next step would ordinarily be to select a promising location and begin drilling. This step would involve the commitment of large additional sums of money. Since, in our view, the United Nations mandate to South Africa increased the uncertainties regarding the sovereignty of South West Africa, our management felt that ... the commitment of large additional liability the expenditures would involve were not in the best interest of our shareholders."

Texaco also mentioned the question of "title". A representative of Standard Oil of California speculated that South Africa might soon give Namibia independence. One wonders if the companies felt they would be unwelcome after independence, if they stuck to their contracts with the South African Government?

Another important factor in the companies' decision making seemed to be the US government's official position, discouraging new investment in Namibia. Church critics were able to argue that these investments "flouted" US government policy as well as the UN position. SoCal's representative specifically mentioned the stronger US government's position on Namibia when interpreting the company's withdrawal. He also speculated that the South African government couldn't do the drilling job itself, that other oil companies were unlikely to move in to take SoCal's place and that SoCal wouldn't return until the political situation was clarified.

Further pressure against continued US investment was generated by the Decree on Natural Resources of the UN Council for Namibia which declared that investment there without the Council's okay was illegal, and that the exploitation of Namibian resources was virtual "theft". A number of companies also used standard business logic in arguing that there were other higher priority places to spend exploration money. However, it is noteworthy that all of the companies admitted the signs of oil were good off-shore Namibia.

Not mentioned by any of the companies was the sizeable shareholder vote received by the Church resolutions urging withdrawal. The beauty of a shareholder resolution is that it is sent to all shareholders at company expense for a vote. Investors such as the Ford and Carnegie Foundation, Aetna Life Insurance, Princeton, Harvard and Yale Universities, all supported the proposal. At Continental Oil, 1 vote in 10 went against management and at Phillips the vote was close to 6% in favor, in 1974. While these may not seem large absolute numbers, in the world of shareholder resolutions, they verge on a minor stockholder revolt since a 3% vote from a largely uncritical shareholder public is considered significant.

The case of Texaco deserves careful scrutiny. In June 1974, a number of Protestant and Roman Catholic shareholders working through their coalition, the Church Project on US Investments in Southern Africa, first raised the issue with Texaco. Management's first response was that this was a political issue and that Texaco was a company which did not mix business and politics. The quick response of the churches was that Texaco, by investing without the consent of the Namibian people and against the wishes of the UN and US State Department, was already deeply involved in politics.

A number of meetings with management followed. Texaco seemed unaware of the complex of legal and political issues involved, but was eager to learn of the UN position, the stand of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) and that Conoco had just withdrawn. Finally, the church representatives explained that eight church bodies with over \$1 million in Texaco stock were planning to file a stockholder resolution, asking the company to withdraw until a government acceptable to the United Nations was elected.

Texaco's response was unusual to say the least. They asked the churches to postpone filing the resolution since the highest management level was reviewing the issue. They offered, instead, that the 8 church stockholders could file the resolution one month after the legal deadline if they were not satisfied with the results of the review. Apparently, management did not want to be seen to be caving in to stockholder pressure. Of course, Texaco's withdrawal from Namibia made the filing of the resolution unnecessary.

It is virtually impossible to analyze what effect three years of religious campaigning had. However, it is clear

that the major issues the churches raised: the illegal occupation; the negative State Department policy; the position of the I.C.J. and the United Nations; the

changing situation in Southern Africa—became fresh factors which these 5 oil companies had to consider in deciding whether to stay in Namibia. ■

Zimbabwe

THE SETTLEMENT QUESTION

Leaders of the African National Council and the Rhodesian Front met twice in early February, but both sides refused to say anything about the conversations, which appeared not to be very cordial. The Rev. Sithole, Mr. Nkomo, Bishop Muzorewa and Doctors Gabelleh and Chavanduka represented the ANC. Ian Smith, Mr. Lardner-Burke and Sutton Price spoke for the Front. The talks were intended to fix conditions for a full-scale constitutional conference.

The question of timing, venue and chairmanship of any constitutional conference is still undecided, and there is some disagreement among the Zimbabwean leaders as to the minimum acceptable timing for the hand-over to majority rule. One ANC executive said that the only conceivable compromise would involve a transitional government with the key ministries—finance, defense and justice—in the hands of the ANC. But, she said, the ANC would consider such a gradual plan only if it were coupled with a firm guarantee of eventual universal franchise. (*Africa News*, Durham, Feb. 10, 1975)

Ndabaningi Sithole has said that a one year transition to black majority rule would be acceptable as long as the Africans were in control of the interim government. "You cannot expect the whites to legislate themselves out of power," he said. (*Washington Post*, Feb. 2, 1975) Another ZANU leader, Edison Zvogbo, now in the United States, explained that ZANU is not willing to work within the framework of the present government, but wants a socialist government, dramatic land reforms and other radical changes. "We do not want to just replace white faces with black faces. The system itself is unjust and needs to be changed." (*Christian Science Monitor*, Jan. 30, 1975)

African sources in Salisbury said that the ANC officials in Lusaka met South African Foreign Minister Hilgard Muller when he was conferring with the foreign ministers of Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana. The sources said that the ANC demanded the withdrawal of the South African police and military forces now in Rhodesia. Vorster has maintained that his men are in Rhodesia to protect South Africa and that they will be recalled when he has assurance that South Africa will be safe from guerrilla incursions. Later that week, an announcement was made that "some elements of the South African police are in the process of withdrawing from certain positions on the Zambesi River." This does not mean that the troops will leave Rhodesia. (*New York Times*, Feb. 13, 1975; *Guardian*, London, Feb. 5, 6, 1975) The *Washington Post* (Feb. 12, 1975) reports that this troop withdrawal follows assurances from the Zambian Government that it will do what it can to stop the guerrilla infiltration across the Zambesi River into Rhodesia.

THE LUSAKA DECLARATION

Some of the questions raised about negotiations are reflected in the interpretations given by the movements which joined the ANC united front and made the Lusaka Declaration. President Kaunda is one of many African leaders who hope that the unity agreed to in Lusaka will last. In a recent interview, President Kaunda said "... I hope and pray that it (unity) will last. It's the one thing that will shake Smith and his colleagues because if they know that they can divide the majority side in Zimbabwe, then certainly they will play that game. They are old masters at the game of divide and rule. Again, I must say very very seriously that unless our brothers and sisters in Zimbabwe hold on to this unity, they cannot expect real help from the rest of Africa..." (*Africa*, London, Feb. 1975)

The principal question for the movements is the nature of the unity described in the Lusaka statement. Is it a merger of the parties into a single structure as the statement says, or is it an alliance in unity with each party maintaining its own identity? The Zimbabwe Peoples Revolutionary Council of ZAPU issued a statement in January which "endorses the re-establishment of national unity of the Zimbabwe people in the African National Council through the Lusaka Declaration and calls upon the Zimbabwe people to be vigilant and guard this unity



Bishop Abel T. Muzorewa

against manipulations by enemies that seek to divide our people again." The statement also reaffirms ZAPU's commitment to armed struggle, to majority rule and independence and the policy of "one man one vote". The statement says that the basic problem in Zimbabwe is one of British colonialism and "does not distinguish between successive British governments and their settler agents in Rhodesia." (*Zimbabwe Review*, Lusaka, Jan. 11, 1975)

Kumbirai Kangai, Secretary of Labor, Social Services and Welfare for ZANU said recently that ... "our understanding of a united front is that each organization maintains its own independence, its own identity and can carry out its own program beyond the common platform—and our program is armed struggle." (*International Bulletin*, Berkeley, Cal, Feb. 14, 1975) The official publication of ZANU analyzed the Lusaka Declaration in its recent issue. "The people of Zimbabwe want unity. Africa wants unity in Zimbabwe... The Lusaka Declaration... was a move in the right direction. We support it because we accept its necessity. What we in ZANU would have preferred is a united front, in the crucial days ahead. But as a revolutionary party we had to make a compromise. . . . ZANU made compromises in the unity talks in order to serve the revolution. First, we wanted our military operations to continue. Secondly, we had to think of the thousands of our fighters in the field and in training camps and hundreds crippled, maimed and

injured and old men, women and children under our care. Why does ZANU prefer a united front to a fusion? Fusion means the merger of all parties and party organs and structures into one single organization. Ideally, this would be the greatest development that would happen in Zimbabwe. But in revolution, one does not deal with ideals or abstract sentiments, but with concrete things or matter. Complete fusion of the liberation movements in Zimbabwe would have disastrous consequences on armed struggle in the country." (*Zimbabwe News*, Lusaka, Dec., 1974) The statement gives evidence of the ideological differences among the parties, the history of willingness on the part of the old ANC to accept a situation of parity of representation with the whites in the government, and underlines ZANU'S commitment to majority rule.

LEGAL ACTION ON TORTURE CASE

Eight Zimbabweans have filed suit against the Rhodesian Minister of Justice and Law and Order, alleging torture and harassment by the white regime. They contend that the white government continues to seize and torture noncombatant farmers and villagers in an effort to secure information about guerrillas. The cases cited involve allegations of assault by shackling, blindfolding and whipping and the use of electric shock on a school teacher and on village men, women and children—people who have never been charged or subsequently detained. (*Washington Post*, Feb. 14, 1975)

ANGOLA

PORTUGUESE LOWER FLAG OVER ANGOLA— INDEPENDENCE DUE NOVEMBER 11, 1975

On Jan. 30, 1975 at sunset five Portuguese soldiers and a sergeant presided while the Portuguese flag was lowered for the last time at San Miguel Fortress in Luanda. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Feb. 1, 1975) The next day the predominantly African Transitional Government was sworn in amidst openly jubilant demonstrations in the capital. Fourteen years of guerrilla struggle by the Angolan people against Portuguese colonialism thus came to an end. The new-found independence and freedom which both the Angolans and Portuguese are enjoying is directly attributable to the many years of struggle by the African peoples in the Portuguese colonies and to progressive forces inside Portugal.


The date scheduled for Angolan independence is November 11, 1975. Until this time Angola will be ruled by a Transitional Government composed of a three-man Presidential Council (one representative each from the three liberation movements) and a 12 member Cabinet (three members each from the liberation movements and three representatives from the Portuguese). A Portuguese-appointed High Commissioner oversees the entire Transitional Government. The newly appointed High Commissioner, replacing Admiral Rosa Coutinho, is Brigadier Antonio Silva Cardoso. (*New York Times*, Jan. 28, 1975) Elections will be held prior to independence for a Constituent Assembly to choose a president and write a constitution. (*Africa News*, Feb. 3, 1975)

The details of the transition to independence were

hammered out during the January meetings in Portugal where MPLA, FNLA and UNITA representatives held negotiations with Portuguese officials. Selected white Angolans were invited to the conference as observers, including representatives from the business, labor and educational communities. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Jan. 11, 1975) Apparently one of the most difficult areas in which to conclude agreement during the six days of talks was over the formation of the national army from the forces of the separate liberation groups. There was likewise some divergence of opinion over the elections. The Portuguese would like to hold elections before independence, while Portuguese troops are still present, perhaps in an effort to quell potential violence which might arise between supporters of the three movements. The Angolan leaders are reported to favor elections after the Portuguese have left. (*New York Times*, Jan. 12, 1975) All political parties, other than the three African-led liberation movements, are banned under the agreement. This means that the many white-led parties which emerged after April 25 will be effectively eliminated from a formal political role in Angolan independence. This includes the FUA, led by businessman Fernando Falcao, which enjoyed some recognition by the provisional regime which has been ruling in Angola since the coup in Portugal. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Jan. 18, 1975) The Christian Democratic Party, a non-racial party organized after April, dissolved itself after the details of the agreement were announced. (VOA, Jan. 28, 1975)

The point on which there was certain and unanimous agreement was that the territorial integrity of Angola

must be maintained, i.e. that Cabinda remains integrated with Angola. While there was considerable relief in neighboring African countries and in Portugal that a common political program had finally been worked out among the liberation movements, criticism of the Angolan movements was also made. An editorial in the *Zambia Daily Mail* (Lusaka, Jan. 16, 1975) noted that the blame for the five month delay between Mozambican and Angolan independence rests "squarely on the African nationalists". They go on to say that "this is the price for not realizing the importance of unity early enough".



OUTLINE OF THE AGREEMENT FORMING THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT

Agreement was reached between Portugal and the Angolan liberation movements at Alor Algarve between Jan. 10 and Jan. 15 to "negotiate the procedure and schedule the access of Angola to independence". (*Sasport*, Feb. 7, 1975)

The lengthy agreement includes 11 chapters; it was drafted in the Portuguese language and was signed on Jan. 15, 1975. The following is an outline of the topics dealt with in the agreement with a brief summary of some of the salient points considered in each chapter.

Chapter 1—Independence of Angola

- a) Portugal acknowledges the right of the Angolan people to independence and recognizes MPLA, FNLA and UNITA as the sole, legitimate representatives of the Angolan people
- b) Cabinda is an integral part of Angola
- c) a general cease-fire is observed and any use of force not sanctioned by the Transitional Government is illegal

Chapter 2—The High Commissioner

- a) during the transitional period a Portuguese-appointed High Commissioner shall preside over the process of decolonization
- b) the High Commissioner acts with the

consultation and advice of the Presidential Council

Chapter 3—The Transitional Government

- a) shall be presided over by the Presidential Council of three, one representative from each liberation movement; chairmanship rotates
- b) "The High Commissioner and the Presidential Council shall attempt to decide in a spirit of friendship and reciprocal consultation all differences arising from the governing action".

Chapter 4—National Defense Committee

- a) to be composed of the High Commissioner, the Presidential Council and the unified General Staff
- b) armed forces of the three liberation movements to be integrated with the Portuguese armed forces—8000 from MPLA, 8000 from FNLA, 8000 from UNITA and 24,000 from the Portuguese

Chapter 5—Refugees and Regrouped Persons

- a) joint committees shall be set up to aid the Transitional Government to find means of resettling and integrating Angolan refugees into the economic and social life of the country

Chapter 6—General Election for the Constituent Assembly

- a) elections to be held within nine months of Jan. 31, 1975
- b) candidates must come exclusively from the three recognized liberation movements

Chapter 7—Angolan Citizenship

- a) MPLA, FNLA and UNITA reaffirm their joint policy of non-discrimination according to which Angolan citizenship belongs to anyone born in Angola or anyone domiciled in Angola



Negotiating in Portugal: Neto, Roberto and Savimbi (left to right) with Soares, Portugal's Foreign Minister (second from right)

who identifies with the genuine aspirations of the Angolan nation

Chapter 8—Financial Matters

- a) Portugal agrees to the transfer of property owned in Portugal but belonging to the territory of Angola
- b) MPLA, FNLA and UNITA agree to assume financial responsibility for commitments made by Portugal, provided they were assumed in the interest of the Angolan people
- c) MPLA, FNLA and UNITA promise to respect the property and legitimate interests of Portuguese domiciled in Angola


Chapter 9—Cooperation Between Angola and Portugal

- a) Portugal and the liberation movements agree to establish bonds of constructive and lasting cooperation in all fields, including cultural, technical, scientific, economic, financial and military

Chapter 10—Joint Committees

- a) joint committees will be set up to study the problems of decolonization in 1) cultural, technical and scientific

Thousands of jubilant Angolans demonstrate in Luanda after independence date is announced.



- 2) economic and commercial
- 3) monetary and finance
- 4) military
- 5) acquisition of Angolan citizenship by Portuguese citizens

Chapter 11—Generalities

- a) any question or doubts concerning the interpretation and implementation of the agreement shall be solved through joint negotiations between the Portuguese government and the liberation movements
(taken from *Sasport*, Feb. 7, 1975)

The Transitional Government has not worked especially well in the first few weeks of its operation, according to Portuguese sources, apparently because of rivalries and suspicions between the liberation groups. However the Portuguese remain optimistic about the positive application of the agreement. (*New York Times*, Feb. 24, 1975)

ANGOLA IN THE IMMEDIATE POST-TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT PERIOD

Despite considerable success in achieving the Transitional Government settlement, tensions remain within Angola between Europeans and Africans and among the supporters of the various liberation movements. The situation inside Angola is as complicated as ever, and the periodic outbursts of violence which are reported indicate that these conflicts are very much unresolved at the local level.

On the 31st of January the Transitional Government was installed. On Feb. 3 trouble broke out in Luanda between Angolan whites and blacks in a fury of accusations and counter-accusations concerning violence between them. Reportedly a crowd of black Angolans set fire to a store owned by a white who was charged with killing four Africans the day before. Portuguese and nationalist forces moved in quickly to control the situation, but more violence erupted and two Portuguese officers were killed and five others in the crowd were killed. (*New York Times*, Feb. 4, 1975; VOA, Feb. 4, 1975)

Prior to the installing of the Transitional Government, FNLA disrupted programming at Luanda radio station charging that the station was favoring the MPLA in its broadcasts. The radio station refused a demand to go off the air and refused to admit its "guilt" and FNLA then arrested an elected MPLA member. The radio workers went out on strike to protest this action and the conflict over the broadcasts was resolved in mutual apologies between MPLA and FNLA. Apparently FNLA and UNITA believe that the Portuguese are favoring the MPLA. (BBC, Jan. 28, 1975)

Far more serious threats to a peaceful transition to independence in Angola have come from the Chipenda-led group which has provoked a number of disturbances. Chipenda and his supporters have been expelled from MPLA and he was not included in the talks in Portugal nor does he have any formal role in the Transitional Government. Since his expulsion from MPLA, Chipenda has been based in Kinshasa where he is reported to have the diplomatic and military backing of Mobutu. The only other African leader who has publicly backed Chipenda is Uganda's Idi Amin. (*Washington Post*, Jan. 29, 1975) After the agreement was signed in Portugal, Chipenda

announced that Angola could not achieve independence without the full support of his group. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Feb. 8, 1975)

Once Chipenda became established within Zaire he declared that he would like his group, estimated to be 3000, to join with UNITA or FNLA. His army is reported to be camped outside of Luso in East Central Angola where apparently contingents from the armies of FNLA, MPLA, UNITA and the Portuguese are also camped. (*Washington Post*, Jan. 29, 1975) In this five-way "tug o' war," political-military clashes appear as a real possibility.

On the night of February 12 shooting broke out in Luanda where several people were killed and wounded in clashes between the legitimate, recognized MPLA and the Chipenda group. (*New York Times*, Feb. 14, 1975) Chipenda's group did not gain ground and this incident perhaps led him to the decision to join with FNLA. The announcement came on February 23 in Kinshasa when Chipenda declared that the insurgent faction of the MPLA would be "integrated" into the FNLA. (*New York Times*, Feb. 24, 1975)

The merger of 3000 former MPLA supporters and veterans of many years of armed struggle definitely

strengthens the FNLA. It also strengthens the hand of Mobutu who is widely believed to have his eye on oil-rich Cabinda. Chipenda was the only movement leader who openly supported Cabinda's right to "self-determination" and autonomy. The Portuguese have repeatedly warned Zaire to keep "hands off" Angola, referring specifically to the enclave of Cabinda. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Jan. 4, 1975) Late in January FLEC (the Cabindan "liberation movement" allegedly backed by Gulf Oil) accused nationalist soldiers of murdering Cabindan civilians. (RSA, Jan. 27, 1975)

As if the divisions in the Angolan political scene were not enough, the unloading of ships at the ports of Luanda and Lobito have slowed and delays of 80-90 days have been reported. The congestion at the ports has begun to cause shortages. (*New York Times*, Feb. 24, 1975)

White Angolans continue to leave the country for Lisbon at a rate of about 5000 per week. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Jan. 11, 1975) Meanwhile South African news reports are full of dire predictions for the future of Angola and South Africa seems to be the only party taking pleasure and rejoicing at the difficulties accompanying each painful step Angola takes toward independence.

MOZAMBIQUE

RECONSTRUCTION IS THE THEME

After ten years of armed struggle FRELIMO is actively implementing its plans for decolonization and reconstruction. Following the agreement reached on September 7, 1974 in Lusaka, Zambia, FRELIMO officials and the Mozambican people are dismantling old structures and institutions and are building a new society. The white population must wage a profound internal struggle, said FRELIMO President Samora Machel, against ideas of white superiority while the black population must fight against the inferiority complexes brought with colonialism. Such steps are being taken as the government moves toward full independence on June 25, 1975 (*Daily World*, New York, Jan. 24, 1975)

Machel recently addressed the Liberation Committee of the OAU. He described many lessons learned from the struggle in Mozambique by saying "our struggle showed once again that, when united by a correct political line, when motivated by their fundamental interests, the people are able to crush any aggressor, however powerful he may be." Machel also pointed out that "for the continuity and consolidation of unity, the political line must be constantly defended against ideological aggression and subversion. This defense is assured by discipline and vigilance" (*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Jan. 10, 1975)

Machel noted that the Liberation Committee "has been a precious instrument for international mobilization in favor of our cause ... an essential instrument for channeling to us the resources of African solidarity". He cautioned FRELIMO supporters by remarking that "a new battle appears before us: the battle against imperialism which continues at present through economic and political domination, even with military bases, and militarily occupying portions of our continent, such as the UAR" (*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Jan. 13, 1975)

Inside Mozambique

Mozambique's Prime Minister Chissano and Portuguese Admiral Crespo have broadcast appeals to Whites to remain in Mozambique. Crespo commented that they left only because they feared loss of privilege, and such privileges were no longer available in Portugal. Machel broadcast a similar plea from Dar es Salaam to aid all efforts to build a multi-racial state. The departure of Whites means the loss of important skills and has resulted in the closing of some factories which has caused an upturn in Mozambican unemployment. The bloody incidents in September and October 1974 are now past history. The provocateurs and the members of the abortive MFM ("Free Mozambique Movement") have all been exiled or jailed. All white fascist and colonialist resistance has ceased and rumors of a mercenary invasion are no longer taken seriously. Indeed, there are serious penalties for rumor-mongering. All told about 30,000 Whites (out of a population of 200,000) have actually left. Portugal has agreed to a program in which a portion of a salary to a White Mozambican may be paid in Portugal if they agree to stay in Mozambique but want their families out (*Guardian*, London, Jan. 1, 10, 1975)

ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT

The export of machinery and equipment has been banned to put an end to economic sabotage of the new nation. Reports from South Africa have sought to describe FRELIMO's economic consolidation in alarmist terms saying that Lourenco Marques is chaotic and businessmen are being arrested. Such accounts have been designed to mask the smuggling and economic subversion on the part of certain South Africans (*Star*, Johannesburg, Jan. 4, 25, 28, 1975) More objective reporters have mentioned certain shortages in Beira, for example, but



Prime Minister, Joaquin Chissano of Frelimo (left) talking to Admiral Crespo

have described the transition as remarkably "easy" and "painless." (*Guardian*, London, Feb. 1, 1975)

South Africa has ordered a "drastic reduction" in its financial commitment to the Cabora Bassa hydroelectric project although FRELIMO is still prepared to sell power to the land of apartheid (*Noticias de Mocambique*, Lourenco Marques, Jan. 4, 1975) South African economic manipulation may also be seen in the situation in which FRELIMO imposed a 30% freight surcharge on goods passing through Beira and Lourenco Marques ports. Within weeks a large South African shipper announced that he was going to discontinue using Beira port for reasons of "fuel economy." (*Star*, Johannesburg, Jan. 18, Feb. 8, 1975)

CONSOLIDATION OF RESOURCES

FRELIMO has been energetically advancing the mass literacy program it had begun in the liberated zones during wartime. The appointment of Professor Fernando Ganhao, a white member of FRELIMO, to the position of Rector of the University of Lourenco Marques should help to curb the flow of Portuguese emigration (*Guardian*, New York, Feb. 19, 1975; AFP, Paris, Jan. 7, 1975) FRELIMO troops continue to occupy former Portuguese facilities including the large Boane barracks near the capital. Gold mining is to be stepped up in the Manica fields and new explorations are anticipated for disused mines (*Star*, Johannesburg, Feb. 8, 1975) Finally FRELIMO will soon take over the Voz de Mocambique and Radio Clube de Mocambique radio stations to establish a new national broadcast system (*Noticias*, Lourenco Marques, Dec. 14, 1974)

ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT

The Minister of Labor of the transitional government, Mariano Matsinhe arrived in Dar es Salaam for talks with FRELIMO officials. A short while later Machel left for a three-week tour of China and North Korea with a FRELIMO delegation. Another FRELIMO delegation reached Lisbon for talks on the transfer of banking control (*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Jan. 11, 1975; *Radio South Africa*, Feb. 17, 1975; *Star*, Johannesburg, Feb. 1, 1975)

Teams from Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, and Rumania have visited Mozambique upon invitation. Included in these teams are specialists in agriculture, health, industry, and education. Rumania has promised a year's supply of wheat to Mozambique (AFP, Paris, Jan. 7, 1975) A twenty-person delegation from West Germany's Solidarity Commission for Africa has also arrived for consultation in political and economic matters (*Star*, Johannesburg, Feb. 8, 1975) A trade mission from India has contracted the export of cashews from Mozambique, and Japan has signed agreements to receive three million tons of Mozambican coal every year. (*Noticias*, Lourenco Marques, Dec. 20, 1974; *Zambia Daily Mail*, Lusaka, Dec. 20, 1974)

REPUBLIC of GUINEA BISSAU

ON THE DOMESTIC SCENE

Agriculture is the basis for the economy of Guinea-Bissau. Crops such as rice, palm oil, peanuts, coconuts, and timber are among some of the most important. Samba Mane, Minister of Agriculture has stated that cultivation of sugar cane and cashews will be stepped up, and an agricultural school for 90 students is to be established at Boe Oriental. Already several countries have sent relief supplies of seeds and tools; agricultural missions from Algeria and a Dutch-British company have been studying agricultural questions (*O Seculo*, Lisbon, Jan. 25, 1975)

In the past few months the PAIGC has consolidated its control over the nation in various areas. Reminders of the colonial past have been removed and some streets and buildings have been renamed. More significant was the nationalization of the Banco Nacional Ultramarino, the center of the colonial economy. In addition, no Guinean is currently allowed to transfer funds to a foreign bank. These moves were required in order to stabilize the new economy. Today the streets in the capital city of 80,000 people are swept clean and certain key points are carefully guarded. Shops are filled with goods and many white settlers have returned. Some of these returnees fled earlier but realized the sincerity of the PAIGC and had little desire to face the political uncertainties back in Portugal (*Christian Science Monitor*, Jan. 31, 1975)

The establishment of internal security has also required the arrest of a handful of former PIDE/DGS agents. President Cabral said the arrests were made because these people had been posing as nationalists when they had, in fact, collaborated with the Portuguese. Eight of the arrested agents were immediately sent back to Portugal. Two others, Pipi Pereira and Rafael Barbosa, are still believed to be held in Bissau; both of these men have been directly implicated in the assassination of Amilcar Cabral, late PAIGC Secretary General (*Diario de Noticias*, Lisbon, Jan. 20, 1975)

Guinea-Bissau, a participant at the Law of the Sea Conference in Venezuela, has declared that fishing within 150 miles of its coast is banned (*Africa News*, Jan. 16, 1975)

FOREIGN RELATIONS

After years of solidarity, the new nation of Guinea-Bissau has concluded a friendship treaty with neighboring Guinea (Conakry.) A delegation from Guinea-Bissau has also traveled to Lisbon to negotiate on various aspects of economic cooperation. Already a shipment of eight tons of books and educational materials has been sent from Lisbon to Bissau. (*Diario de Noticias*, Lisbon, Jan. 20, 22, 1975; *Washington Post*, Jan. 2, 1975)

Humanitarian aid from West Germany has been sent through the offices of UNESCO. Some \$200,000 is expected for health and educational needs (*Frankfurter Rundschau*, Jan. 8, 1975)

In Africa, Guinea-Bissau's representative Dr. Corsino Antonio Fortes has traveled to Luanda, Angola to look after the interests of the Cape Verdeans living in that country. It is estimated that some 30-40,000 Cape Verdeans have made their homes in Angola (*Diario de*

Noticias, Lisbon, Jan. 17, 1975). PAIGC's Silvino da Luz was recently received by President Senghor of Senegal during the first leg of a trip appealing for aid to the Cape Verde Islands. Da Luz specifically asked for Cape Verdeans living in America to come to the aid of their drought-stricken country (*Diario de Noticias*, Lisbon, Jan. 20, 1975) Senghor indicated that any enemies of the PAIGC are to be considered enemies of Senegal; this comment was initiated because of unconfirmed rumors saying that anti-PAIGC commandos were planning operations against Guinea from southern Senegal (*O Seculo*, Lisbon, Jan. 23, 1975)

THE CAPE VERDE ISLANDS

The situation in the Cape Verde Islands continues to be very serious and is expected to worsen without immediate aid. To this point there has been only minimal finance for relief except a \$2 million grant from the United Nations. This grant is for emergency supplies but these will not reach the Islands for about four months (*AFP*, Paris, Jan. 21, 1975) The PAIGC has already sent one thousand tons of wheat to the archipelago which will be independent in July of this year, following elections (*Daily World*, New York, Feb. 15, 1975)

On December 9, 1974 Radio Barlavento in the Cape Verde Islands was occupied by PAIGC supporters. A farm in Sao Tiago was also taken over by farm workers once the owner had been arrested by Portuguese police on December 16. A committee of seven workers is now in charge of farm management (*O Seculo*, Lisbon, Jan. 4, 1975) Elsewhere, in the Porto Novo Municipality, the luxurious residence of the Municipal Council Chairman has been taken over and was then given to the Cape Verdean Solidarity Institute to establish a badly needed children's home (*O Seculo*, Lisbon, Jan. 8, 1975)



Rice Fields in Guinea-Bissau

In New England, an area of great Cape Verdean concentration, an organization called Tchuba (meaning rain in the Creole language) has been formed to help coordinate relief efforts. Tchuba, the American Committee for Cape Verde, may be reached at P.O. Box 436, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 02139. Meanwhile, in Boston, a group of wealthy Cape Verdean lawyers and landowners has sought to block the unity between Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau. The lawyers and several hundreds of supporters held a two-day meeting at the expensive Sheraton Hotel. Aside from banquets and cocktail parties, members of this group called for an invasion of the Islands while denouncing the PAIGC as "communitic". The lawyers also called for democracy although their meeting was by invitation only and many Cape Verdeans were either barred from entering or actually ejected from the

meeting. This group was unknown until the past few months, long after the 1974 coup in Lisbon. Supporters of the PAIGC position of unity rallied outside the hotel.

AMILCAR CABRAL LIVES


Throughout the world numerous commemorations were held on January 20, to note the assassination of Amilcar Cabral killed on that day in 1973 by a traitorous conspiracy of Portuguese agents and self-serving Africans. In France, a two volume collection of Cabral's writing has been published by Maspero. Volume one of "Unity and Struggle" deals with the theory of armed struggle, while volume two of the same title is concerned with revolutionary practice. (*Afrique-Asie*, Paris, Jan. 27, 1975; *O Seculo*, Lisbon, Jan. 31, 1975)

neighbors

TROUBLES IN LESOTHO

Lesotho legislation which transfers sixty percent of the pay of miners in South Africa to the Lesotho National Bank pending the miners' return went into effect in January 1975 and has sparked protest among workers and from political opponents of Prime Minister, Chief Jonathan. In early January thousands of miners rioted in the Transvaal, resulting in ten deaths. Lesotho Government representatives attempting to explain the statute were stoned. (See *Southern Africa*, March, 1975 for details) Thousands of miners have already been repatriated to Lesotho at their own request.

Lesotho's principal export is its labor, with 76,000 workers in the South African gold and coal mines and another 150,000 in other positions across the frontier. A former cabinet minister, Mr. Anthony Vangheli, accused the government of corruption, harassment of the church and press and a lack of support from its own party. Stating that the regime had gone from bad to worse since his resignation in 1972, Mr. Vangheli also claimed that it had been infiltrated by a group called the Popular Front which seeks changes from within through "communitic tactics." A few days later the leader of the opposition Marimakloe Freedom Party, Edmund Maianya, called on Prime Minister Jonathan to set a date for general elections and criticized him for stirring up enmity between workers from Lesotho and other miners. He expressed fears for the thousands of returned Basutos who are now unemployed and urged the establishment of ambassadorial relations with South Africa to handle such problems in the future. In response, Prime Minister Jonathan said that he would open talks with South Africa about the whole migratory mine worker system and would demand that wages be tied to the price of gold. (BBC broadcasts, Jan. 18 and 23, 1975; *Africa News*, Durham, N.C., Jan. 27, 1975; *Christian Science Monitor*, Boston, Feb. 6, 1975.)



UNITED STATES and SOUTHERN AFRICA

STRONG OPPOSITION AGAINST DAVIS NOMINATION SPARKS CONTROVERSY

In an unprecedented move, the Organization of African Unity formally expressed its concern over the nomination of Nathaniel Davis, former US Ambassador to Chile during the anti-Allende coup, as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. The council of ministers questioned what the selection portended for US policy in Africa, and said they would "most vehemently condemn and resist any move by any country to import into Africa the odious practice of 'political destabilization' which brought untold harm to our brothers in Latin America."

The *New York Times* reported on the same day that radio broadcasters "who usually reflect the [South African] government's point of view" said that President Ford's nomination of Davis indicated that "the purpose of the American Administration [is] to strengthen forces for stability in this part of the world." Some opponents fear that the US may work through Davis and other diplomats to collaborate with South Africa to increase its economic hegemony in southern Africa, to the benefit of both South African and US business interests.

Although press reports on the OAU resolution characterized it as "relatively mild in its extremely diplomatic wording," Secretary Kissinger responded on February 25 with a scathing letter to the OAU Secretary General: "To suggest that [Davis] has a mission to 'destabilize' Africa . . . is unacceptable and offensive." He said that "principles of international decency" should have deterred the African leaders from communicating publicly on the appointment of a public official of a sovereign government.

Even before Kissinger's letter chastising the OAU, members of the African diplomatic community in Washington requested an appointment with Mr. Kissinger. But Kissinger, who reportedly added the strong language to the letter to the OAU himself, still had not responded four days later.

On February 26, the Congressional Black Caucus said they "deeply deplore and renounce the position taken by Secretary of State Kissinger" and reiterated their position that Davis should be withdrawn. They found Kissinger's statement that the US government would never interfere with diplomatic appointments of other countries extraordinary, saying "Are we to forget the Diem regime and the Thieu regime in Vietnam, the overthrow of President Allende in Chile, and untold other episodes of US 'hands-off' policy?"

In the midst of this controversy, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on Davis' appointment, at which six witnesses testified in opposition. Representative Michael Harrington expressed concern about Mr. Davis' activities as Ambassador to Chile from 1971-73, saying that, according to testimony of CIA Director William Colby on April 22, 1974, "American embassy officials were fully informed of CIA operations in Chile and participated in the decision making process."

Representative Andrew Young, speaking on behalf of the Congressional Black Caucus, said "I would hate to see the albatros of American policy [in Latin America, especially in Chile] brought to the African continent." Sister Janice McLaughlin who lives in East Africa explained that the Maryknoll Sisters' opposition was "prompted by a concern for the indignation and frustration it has aroused in Africa." Father Robert Powell of the Africa Working Group of the National Council of Churches asked why a person with Mr. Davis' particular skills and expertise was being assigned to Africa.

Peter Weiss, of the American Committee on Africa, and Ted Lockwood, of the Washington Office on Africa, voiced concern about what policy Mr. Davis might participate in in southern Africa. Mr. Lockwood said, "Mr. Davis should not be confirmed unless African countries could be assured that the US would not 'destabilize popular government in southern Africa' and would not 'support white racist minorities in southern Africa in their domination of neighboring states . . . on the model of our support for dictatorships in Latin America.'"

Other groups which sent letters to the Committee opposing the Davis nomination included the Church of the Brethren, the United Presbyterian Church, the Center for Social Action of the United Church of Christ, the National Newspaper Publishers Association (a group of black journalists and publishers), the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists, and the United Auto Workers.



Michael Harrington, one of the opposition witnesses criticizes U.S. policy and Davis' role there



Salvador Allende, slain President of Chile

To date, a few Senators have expressed some concern that the opposition of the African states to the Davis nomination has not been taken seriously. At the February 19 hearing, Senator Biden (a new member of the African Subcommittee) said, "If we had the expression of rejection from European countries that we have from African countries, I don't think we would go ahead. This concerns me very much." Senator Clark, new Africa Subcommittee Chairman, concurred.

For the most part, however, Senators on the Foreign Relations Committee either avoided the Davis controversy or tried to mask the issues it raised. None of the more senior liberals on the Committee listened to the testimony delivered or stayed to ask any probing questions of Davis. All Committee members had made an agreement with the Chairman not to ask any questions about Chile; on the ground that CIA activities fall under the jurisdiction of the just-constituted Select Committee on Intelligence Gathering Activities. The only specific question asked about US policy toward Africa was whether Davis favored continued arms sales to Ethiopia, which Davis declined to answer.

Chairman Sparkman claimed that Davis' Peace Corps responsibilities including projects in Africa and his civil rights record answered the concern of the witnesses. Senator Pell, a former foreign service officer, agreed with Thomas Boyatt, President of the American Foreign Service Association, who testified in support of Davis,

saying that "foreign service officers serving in the field cannot and should not be made scapegoats for unpopular policies."

Davis himself further obfuscated the issues, saying that the opposition to his nomination resulted from lack of knowledge of his record on the part of Africans and Americans. He went on to incorrectly state that "the thrust of the criticism" offered by the witnesses was "less opposition" to US policy toward southern Africa than questioning of "US depth of commitment."

The chances of Kissinger's withdrawal of the nomination in response to the growing opposition disappeared when he condemned the OAU statement. As the likelihood of amassing 51 votes against Davis in the Senate is small despite widespread public opposition, it is likely that Davis will be confirmed in his new position by mid-March. (*Washington Post*, Feb. 18, 20, 21, 22, 23. *New York Times*, Jan. 31. Feb. 20, 21, 22, 26. *Washington Star-News*, Feb. 19, 21, 23.)

RHODESIAN SANCTIONS BILL BEGINS BATTLE IN HOUSE

The bill to reinstate US sanctions against Rhodesia (HR 1287) is finally starting its renewed course through the House of Representatives, with hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Organizations set for February 26. Witnesses will include Senator Gale McGee, E.F. Andrews for the stainless steel industry (who recently returned from three weeks in Rhodesia), a spokesman for the State Department, and Canaan Banana, Deputy President of the African National Council of Zimbabwe.

Meanwhile, the small, tightly-knit group of conservative opponents of sanctions have renewed their tactics of obstruction and delay. On February 4, the Armed Services Committee directed its chairman to ask the Speaker of the House to refer the sanctions bill to it for "concurrent" jurisdiction with the Foreign Affairs Committee or for "sequential" consideration after the Foreign Affairs Committee has acted. The latter formula would have a time limit, so the Armed Services Committee could not kill the bill by inaction. The Speaker made a commitment to Representative Fraser, the main sponsor of the bill, to allow no delays, but any type of consideration by the conservative Armed Services Committee will probably complicate the sanctions bill with amendments which will severely cripple it on the floor. The Speaker has put off his decision until after the bill is reported out of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

In March, the first focus will be on lobbying members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, some of whom voted for the bill last year but with strong reservations. Committee members Morgan and Yatron (Pa.), Zablocki (Wis.), Broomfield (Mich.), Steele (Conn.), du Pont (Del.), Gilman (N.Y.), and Guyer (Ohio) can be considered swing votes this year.

It is likely that arguments on both sides of the issue will focus on conditions in Rhodesia. Industry representatives appear to be moving away from their former argument that a renewed chrome embargo will damage the US stainless steel industry, now that the demand and price, for both specialty steel and ferrochrome are falling due to the recession. They have focused their attention

instead on the so-called humanitarian policies of the current Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia, claiming that there are "no suspensions of basic human rights" and "no discrimination based on race for the voting franchise" in Rhodesia. The recent civil charges against the Minister of Justice by eight black Rhodesians alleging torture and systematic harassment reveal but one instance of the actual inequality and repression engendered by the minority Rhodesia regime. (*Washington Post*, Feb. 14, 1975)

CONGRESSIONAL REORGANIZATION WEAKENS POSITION OF AFRICA

On February 3, the Democratic members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee voted to scrap all regional Subcommittees in favor of an expanded functional organization. The vote was unanimous among those present. Congressman Diggs was alone in his stated opposition to the move which means the end of the Subcommittee on Africa. Diggs telegraphed from Africa where he was on a one-month study mission.

The shuffle produced ten Subcommittees on functional topics including International Organizations, International Political and Military Affairs, Economic Policy, Trade and Investigation. Diggs, the sixth-ranking Democratic Committee member, became Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Resources, Food, and Energy.

Mr. Diggs said at a press conference on February 25, "In my new role as Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Resources, Food and Energy, I will identify and work on issues in these categories now facing African countries. These developmental concerns were considerably highlighted by my recent study mission." Specifically, he plans to hold hearings on food aid to African

countries, including Mozambique, and to sponsor a seminar on March 21 entitled "Changing Vistas in US-African Economic Relations."

While Mr. Diggs stated that the reorganization will result in a sentimental rather than real loss, it probably will mean a weakening of his ability to investigate and expose US policy toward southern Africa which he and his Subcommittee on Africa have provided during the last five years.

The Foreign Affairs Committee re-organization re-enforces a trend in the Administration to consider foreign affairs in terms of global strategy and world-wide economic relationships based on the primacy of US interests.

In the Senate, the chairmanship of the Subcommittee on Africa of the Foreign Relations Committee has found its traditional place at the bottom of the seniority totem pole. The new Subcommittee Chairman is Senator Richard Clark of Iowa, a Senator since 1972 who joined the Committee in 1974. Clark won his Senate seat after serving as Administrative Assistant to liberal Iowa Congressman John Culver (who joined him in the Senate this year). He has been a vocal opponent of the Republican Administration on many occasions, including the International Food Conference in Rome last year. Having a relatively junior Senator chairing the Africa Subcommittee will not necessarily be a liability; Senator Clark may bring more seriousness and energy to this responsibility than some of his more prominent predecessors. However, the fact remains that Africa policy is made almost entirely by the Executive branch, so it is yet to be seen what exposure of or initiative toward US-Africa policy the reorganized Senate Africa Subcommittee will make.

Other members of the Senate Africa Subcommittee are: Humphrey (D-Minn.), Biden (D-Del.), Pearson (R-Kansas), Griffin (R-Mich.), and Baker (R-Tenn.). ■





CHAIRMAN OF APARTHEID COMMITTEE MEETS WITH NATO, EEC

The Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid, Ambassador Ogbu of Nigeria, has met with top officials of NATO and the European Economic Community (EEC) to discuss the position of these two organizations vis-a-vis South Africa and Southern Africa as a whole. The Committee had expressed concern in the past over reports of NATO strategic interest in the area and possible involvement there following the British pullout from the Simonstown base, and over growing trade and business links between South Africa and the European Community. In his report to the Committee, Ambassador Ogbu stated that the Secretary-General of NATO had assured him that NATO had "no political, military or technical contacts or understandings with South Africa which would give comfort to South Africa in its implementation of the apartheid policy or give it respectability." The NATO official also denied that NATO was studying any alternative arrangements for the use of the Simonstown base, and declared that the NATO strategic study relating to protection of the sea lanes around the Cape "concerned only the sea lanes and only protection in time of war."

The Director-General for External Affairs of the EEC assured Ambassador Ogbu that the Community "had concluded no special agreement with South Africa and had granted no special benefits to South Africa." He denied that recent tariff reductions granted to South Africa for the export of citrus fruit to the Community and the import of surplus beef from the Community, and the presence of a South African Ambassador to the Community in Brussels, represented any "special" concessions to South Africa. According to the Director-General, the EEC intends to comply fully with all the obligations involved in the observer status it received from the General Assembly last year.

Given the vagueness of the assurances given to Ambassador Ogbu by the two officials, and the fact that both NATO and the EEC claim to have no jurisdiction over bilateral agreements between any of their members and South Africa, the effectiveness of consultations of this sort between the Apartheid Committee and South Africa's friends is debatable. The Committee, and the United Nations as a whole, has often condemned the Western powers for their political, military, economic and other links with South Africa. Ambassador Ogbu did not assess the actual results of his meetings, except by saying "I believe we have obtained information which will enable us to avoid any misunderstandings in dealing with the issues concerned." The Committee embarked on this policy of consultations last year, on the premise that even small steps taken by South Africa's friends to condemn apartheid would contribute to the international isolation of the Vorster regime. (United Nations press release GA/AP/435; summary record of the 298th meeting of the Special Committee against Apartheid).



Ambassador Ogbu, Chairman of the Apartheid Committee (left) with Ambassador Salim of Tanzania

NEW ANTI-APARTHEID ACTIVITIES AND CAMPAIGNS PROMOTED

The Special Committee against Apartheid issued its annual appeal to all governments, organizations and individuals to commemorate Sharpeville Day (called by the United Nations "International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination") on March 21. In the appeal, the Committee urged support for the international campaigns against apartheid approved by the General Assembly at the last session, with the following aims:

(a) a total embargo on the supply of arms to South Africa and the cessation of any form of military cooperation with South Africa;

(b) ending of collaboration by banks, national and transnational companies with the apartheid regime and with companies registered in South Africa;

(c) cessation of emigration to South Africa;

(d) release of political prisoners in South Africa, as well as those subjected to restrictions for their opposition to apartheid;

(e) ending of all cultural, educational, scientific, sporting and other contacts with the racist regime, and with organizations or institutions in South Africa which practice apartheid.

Following a resolution adopted at the last session of the General Assembly, the United Nations has set up a new Trust Fund to finance expanded information activities of the Unit on Apartheid. One of the purposes of the Fund will be to provide grants to non-governmental organizations and institutions for the production of audio-visual materials on apartheid and for the reprinting



Sharpeville massacre which was commemorated by the United Nations

and redissemination of UN information material on apartheid.

The Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid, Ambassador Ogbu of Nigeria, has appealed to all governments and organizations to condemn the current trial of 12 young Africans under the Terrorism Act. The statement urges governments and organizations to demand an immediate end to the trial and the release of all detainees, to contribute for assistance to the prisoners and their families, and to join in an international campaign for the liberation of all persons imprisoned or restricted for their opposition to apartheid. Previously, the Chairman of the Committee had launched an appeal for the release of Bram Fischer, the former Communist Party leader who is dying of cancer in a South African prison hospital. This year, the Committee is planning an all-out campaign for the release of political prisoners, which it sees as the first step toward a solution of the situation in South Africa. (United Nations press releases GA/AP/432, WS/698).

RHODESIAN SANCTIONS-BUSTING SCHEME EXPOSED

The United Nations Security Council Committee on Southern Rhodesia has issued a special report on a sanctions-busting scheme for the expansion of the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Company, involving major foreign interests, which was first disclosed in April 1974. The Committee concluded that the scheme "was the most serious case to come before it of violation of the sanctions established by the Security Council against the illegal regime of Southern Rhodesia in terms of both the money and the number and importance of the financial institutions and industrial corporations involved." The Committee gave a list of companies and banks involved in the scheme, which includes some of the biggest names of German, Austrian and Swiss finance and industry, as well as the notorious European-American Bank, which recently provided major loans to the South African Government.

In another report, the Committee has urged increased efforts in 1975 to ensure stricter observance of the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. (United Nations documents S/11594 and S/11597).

COUNCIL FOR NAMIBIA OPENS 1975 SESSION

The Council for Namibia opened its 1975 session on 11 February, with an appeal by Theo Ben Gurirab, SWAPO representative in New York, to the Namibian people to maintain their unity in the face of South Africa's attempts to balkanize the country through its "bantustan" policy. R.B. Banda, Ambassador of Zambia, elected Chairman of the Council this year, declared that the main task of the Council in 1975 will be to attempt to establish its presence in the territory itself. He also emphasized the importance of breaking the wall of silence around Namibia and to publicize as much as possible the repression of the African people and the instances of police brutality which take place daily in Namibia. Sean McBride, Commissioner for Namibia, proposed that the SWAPO radio programs on the "voice of Namibia" should be given wider diffusion, with broadcasts from Kinshasa, Brazzaville, Algiers and Cairo. McBride also declared that his office intends to put every conceivable pressure on South Africa to force it to abide by the UN decisions on Namibia. (United Nations weekly review, No. 6, February 14, 1975).

FORMER PORTUGUESE TERRITORIES TO RECEIVE RELIEF AID

Guinea-Bissau and the territories still under Portuguese domination are to receive United Nations aid to help them deal with the grave disruptions in their economies caused by centuries of colonial rule and protracted armed struggle. Two resolutions concerning economic, financial and technical assistance were adopted at the last session of the General Assembly, with particular attention to Frelimo's need for assistance in view of the difficulties faced by Mozambique in the pre-independence period. In December, Marcelino dos Santos, Vice-President of the Transitional Government of Mozambique, met with World Food Programme officials in Rome to discuss food aid for about a million Mozambicans displaced by the war in central and northern areas of the country, as well as some 130,000 refugees who are expected to return to Mozambique from Southern Rhodesia, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia.

UNICEF, the United Nations Children's Fund, is to assist health and education projects in Guinea-Bissau. A special contribution of \$200,000 given by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany will be used for this purpose.

Two special United Nations missions have visited the Cape Verde Islands recently. The first mission, consisting of representatives of several UN specialized agencies, was dispatched by the Secretary-General at the urgent request of the Transitional Government to assess the critical food situation in the territory resulting from prolonged drought and adverse financial and economic conditions. The Special Committee of 24 also sent a mission to the territory at the invitation of the PAIGC and the Government of Portugal. In a communiqué issued on the subject, the Chairman of the Special Committee stated that the visit would enable the Committee "to put forward constructive suggestions and recommendations concerning the situation prevailing in the territory, with particular emphasis on the provision of all possible assistance to the people." (United Nations press releases WFP/366; ICEF/1232; SG/1783; GA/COL/1578). ■

action news and notes



LIBERATION SUPPORT ACTIONS

CABRAL COMMEMORATIONS

Several memorial programs were held throughout the United States for Amilcar Cabral, heroic leader of the people of Guinea-Bissau who was assassinated on January 20, 1973. In Minneapolis-St. Paul a series of events was held January 17 and 18 including slide shows, the film on South Africa, "Last Grave at Dimbaza," and speakers. More than 140 people attended the events which were sponsored by the African Liberation Support Committee, Young Workers Liberation League and Inner City Youth League. (*Daily World*, New York, Jan. 31, 1974)



Amilcar Cabral, assassinated leader of PAIGC

ANGOLAN STRUGGLE HAILED

The film, "Sambizanga," which dramatizes the beginning of the armed struggle in Luanda, Angola on February 4, 1961 as led by forces of MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), was shown in commemoration of that historic occasion in Chicago at the New World Resource Center. The program was organized by the Chicago Committee for the Liberation of Angola, Mozambique and Guine (CCLAMG). They recently sent \$400 worth of transistor radios to FRELIMO, in memory of the late FRELIMO President, Eduardo Mondlane, who was assassinated on February 3, 1969.

The New World Resource Center (2546 N. Halsted, Chicago, Illinois 60614) is celebrating its third anniversary by sponsoring a series of seminars and workshops including film showings; discussions of revolutionary art, poetry, and music; political meetings and dramatic presentations.

CCLAMG is also distributing a leaflet entitled "New Faces of U.S. Imperialism" in which there are short biographies of three new State Department appointees (Davis, Hinton and Carlucci). Finally CCLAMG is advertising a collection of materials (posters, booklets, buttons) in support of the victories of the African liberation movements. See advertisement in the Resource Section.

ECONOMIC ACTIONS

PHILADELPHIA GROUP ACTS ON LOANS TO SOUTH AFRICA

The First Pennsylvania Bank in Philadelphia is the focus of a campaign by the Interdenominational Task Force on South Africa. The bank loans some \$16 million, mainly to companies, for projects in apartheid South Africa. The Task Force has been speaking with bank officials since the spring of 1974 and initially received a commitment that no new loans would be made. But the group has objected to the latest bank statement that it must honor its present loan commitments, some of which last until 1982. The chairperson of the Task Force is Father Paul Washington of the Episcopal Church of the Advocate in north Philadelphia. He commented that if he were having dealings with First Pennsy it would be a case of benefitting from "the exploitation of my people in South Africa." The Task Force has called for total divestment. Chairman of the Bank's Board, John Bunting, has said that transferring the loans to other banks (the way to divest) would only be a "cheap trick." But the Task Force has said that it is the only moral

stance which the Bank must take to end its involvement with racist South Africa. (*The Evening Bulletin*, Philadelphia, Feb. 4, 1975; *Philadelphia Tribune*, Feb. 5, 1975)

ITT AGREES TO REVIEW BOARD ON SOUTH AFRICA POLICY

The United Presbyterian Church (USA) has recently withdrawn a resolution it filed with ITT, because the multi-national corporation has agreed to establish a Public Affairs Committee to review its position in South Africa and to make recommendations about its policy there. "This is in keeping with what the church was seeking, and we commend the company for it," said the Rev. Donald Wilson. ITT is the first company to have accepted a review board resolution. In the past some companies have agreed to resolutions calling for disclosure of information about their South Africa policies and practices, and most recently four oil companies which were to have received resolutions calling for withdrawal from Namibia have pulled out of that country.

The UPUISA issued a report on ITT in South Africa in November, 1974 which was critical of the company's links with the South African Government, its involvement in the military and its encouragement of white immigration to South Africa. (Press Release, Presbyterian Office of Information, New York, Feb. 12, 1975)

CONFERENCE TO STOP SOUTH AFRICAN COAL

Over two hundred persons, representing radical groups from across the South, gathered in Atlanta February 1st and 2nd to hammer out the basis for working in coalition to stop the importation of South African coal by The Southern Company. Last year, 6500 men from United Mineworkers and District 20 struck for one day, and longshoremen in Mobile honored a mineworkers' picket of the docks where the coal arrives. The picket ended only when the company (a combine of electric utilities headquartered in Atlanta) obtained a court order.

The groups represented included the African Liberation Support Committee (ALSC) from Atlanta, Durham and other parts of the South; the October League (OL), mainly from Georgia; the Revolutionary Union (RU), mainly from the Birmingham area; as well as a contingent from the Philadelphia Coalition to Stop Rhodesian and South African Imports.

The conference was sponsored by the Southern Conference Educational Fund, headquartered in Louisville. The major groups prepared position papers in advance of the conference, outlining their understanding of the issue and proposing tactics and slogans for a campaign to stop the coal importation before the end of the three-year contract.

There was tight security at the meeting because the local John Birch society issued a statement on the "secret Maoist meeting" which received attention in the press and on television, and the YWCA, whose auditorium was being used, was pressured to call it off.

The meeting began on a high note of unity, as Tapson Mawere, representative of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), addressed the audience on the critical stage of the struggle of the liberation movements of southern Africa and the importance of actions in support of that struggle.

Next, the position papers of the different organizations were read. Significant differences arose over "racism and imperialism" (whether one takes precedence over the other as the prime issue, how the issue is interpreted to



South African miners

workers); cooperation with the United Mine Workers (whether inroads can be made to the rank and file through progressive elements in the union, or whether the Mineworkers' real position seeks only "protection" from all foreign imports, without international solidarity for the conditions of African miners); and the slogans and tactics that evolve from these differences. Debate of these questions went on for hours, with an amended version of the ALSC paper finally being adopted.

The next day, workshops focused on "support for ZANU," the practical questions of working against The Southern Company, and building bases across the South. The groups adopted the various reports of the workshop groups, and elected a steering committee, which was charged with coordinating the information sharing activities and calling a mass demonstration in the spring. The ZANU support group concluded its meetings by arranging a six-week tour for Mr. Mawere, including stops in Louisville, Birmingham, Mississippi, Norfolk, the Carolinas and parts of the Midwest.

POLITICAL ACTION

EPISCOPAL GROUP CALLS FOR PROTESTS AGAINST SA SEIZURES

In December, the South African Government expropriated the property of the ecumenical black Federal Theological Seminary in Alice, Cape Province. Together with the seizure of the passports of six Christian Institute members and attempts to undermine the black movement through arrests and detentions, the closing of Federal

Theological marks the continued extension of internal repression in South Africa.

Protests have been organized by international church bodies, the World Council of Churches, the South African Council of Churches and others. The Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa (14 West 11th St., New York, NY 10011) has asked for individuals and church groups to add their voices. South African church leaders are asking their friends overseas to bring maximum direct pressure upon the South African government to revoke the expropriation order.

PROTEST TO: URGE YOUR CHURCH REPRESENTATIVES TO DO SO:

Ambassador J. S. F. Botha
South African Embassy
3051 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008

Call upon your Senators and Representatives to raise this issue in the Congress and with the Department of State.

Organize phone, letter-writing and petition campaigns addressed to the South African ambassador.

Write messages of support for the students and staff at Alice.

Send these to ECSA and we will forward them.

INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS

SPORTS

Despite campaigns and protests from anti-apartheid groups in various countries around the world, the area of

sports continues to be the one of continuous exchange between South Africa and other countries. American golfer, Bill Brask, recently participated in the Vavasour international golf tournament at the Durban Country Club in South Africa. French rugby people are looking forward to the Tricolors touring South Africa this year. The New Zealand Bowling Association is planning to participate in the world championships in Johannesburg in March. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Jan. 11, 1975) One good note comes, however, in the reports that South Africa's hopes of staging the North American zone Davis Cup final against the United States in Johannesburg in March have taken a sharp nose-dive. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Jan. 11, 1975)

NEW COMMITTEE FORMED

A "Free Southern Africa Committee" has been formed in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. The Committee's aims are to "educate the public at large about oppression of . . . rights in Southern Africa . . . ; to apply pressure to the Canadian and Alberta governments to adopt policies which will aid independence movements and other groups . . . struggling for an end to oppression in Southern Africa and other African countries . . . ; to apply pressure to Canadian corporations to adopt policies which will result in ending their participation in activities which negate the freedom and democratic rights of Black people in Southern Africa and in other African countries, and to maintain contact with and raise funds for liberation movements and other groups supporting liberation in Southern Africa." For more information, write the Free Southern Africa Committee, P.O. Box 7689, Station A, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. ■

reviews

Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, October, 1974. 2 issues per year, \$13.00. Oxford Journals, Press Road, Neasden, London NW 10, ODD, U.K.

Those seeking a deeper understanding of the Southern African scene than is possible just by following current events will find the new *Journal of Southern African Studies* quite useful, as far as one can judge from the first issue. Intended as a forum for high quality scholarship on Southern Africa, the approach is interdisciplinary and "objective." It recognizes that scholarship is not value free, but expects to accept articles reflecting different commitments. It is international, it says, but judging by the editorial board and the authors, it is really an organ for current scholarship from Great Britain.

The first issue has a substantial concentration on political economy, with an opening article by Martin Legassick on "Legislation, Ideology and Economy in Post-1948 South Africa." In it, Legassick explores the variants of apartheid and South African "liberalism" as policies aimed at reproducing the conditions for capital accumulation in South Africa, thus dealing another blow to the "apartheid is economically irrational" argument. Similar concerns are explored in articles by Charles

Harvey on "British Investment in Southern Africa," by I.R. Phimister on the interrelationship of Rhodes' financial interests in Rhodesia and in South African gold mines, and by Sholto Cross on recent books dealing with the direction of Zambian politics. A number of reviews provide a useful guide to further reading.

There is need for solid analysis of the particular structures of capitalist exploitation in Africa, and the consequences for revolutionary strategy. Whereas the *Review of African Political Economy* (see review) promises to make its contribution to this effort explicitly, the *Journal of Southern African Studies* will do so by including good scholarship, some of which is also radical in orientation.

Review of African Political Economy, Merlin Press, Suffrance Wharf, 2-4 Westferry Road, London E 14, England. Publ. three times a year. Subscriptions: \$5.00 per year, \$2.50 per copy.

For many, the appearance of this new journal will be greeted with relief. Serious studies of African political economy on a continuous basis are indispensable in the present conjuncture of international capital and the

development of sub-imperialist powers. Which country or countries in Africa will play this role? What does this imply on the political level? Will there be a development of a certain region with the necessary economic infra-structure and politico-military clout to implement the policies needed to keep international capital dominate, and so continue the exploitation of Africa's resources, both human and natural?

The first issue seems to indicate that the editors will indeed be serious. Nevertheless, for those of us who have eagerly awaited it for almost a year now, the articles and materials presented in this issue warrant an enthusiasm that is, however unwillingly, tempered by questions and some disappointment. The editors inform us in their editorial that they intend to examine the roots of Africa's present condition. "In simple terms we propose to ask: why is Africa's productive potential not realised? Why are most of its people still poor? Why is the continent still dependent, its future controlled by outside forces?" They go on to suggest that "merely providing an alternative analysis could be . . . emptily 'academic,'" and to express the hope that contributors "will also address themselves to those issues concerned with the actions needed if Africa is to develop its potential."

The lead article, Samir Amin's "Accumulation and Development: A Theoretical Model" directs our attention to a theorist whose work deserves the recognition and study it is now commanding. But it also raises the issue of whether questions asked "in simple terms" shouldn't be answered in readily understandable language, so that the journal can be *used* and supported by all progressive forces in Africa as well as outside. The fact is that Amin is extremely difficult to read and even more difficult to understand. His language is dense, each sentence laden with complex concepts and terminology. Even if there are some of us who know that we can and must struggle to comprehend him, it seems fair to observe that Amin speaks primarily to the 'converted'—and even then, to that small segment of the converted called academics. If this is true, it is also fair to ask whether the editors, through this journal, intend to talk primarily to each other and to academics of like persuasion. And if *this* is true, some of us will be disappointed. If it is not true, should it not be a function of this journal to interpret and popularize, if you will, Amin's ideas for a wider audience that needs and can use them?

The article that most clearly provides hope in the direction of applying theory to a concrete situation in language that is readily understandable is Lionel Cliffe's "Famine in Ethiopia." It is informative and excellent. In contrast, Claude Meillassoux on "The Sahel Famine" gives us broad theory and manages, remarkably, to avoid mention of the specific situation as if it were a plague rather than a famine! Moreover, for those of us who don't accept Meillassoux on faith alone, the absence of any reference to sources doesn't help matters. Both of these articles focus our attention on the fact that natural catastrophes alone do not explain famine. They also confront us with the stark possibility of certain countries and peoples being 'written-off' in the name of capitalistic 'development' and 'financial expediency.'

At the moment the back-bone of Africa is the peasant population. John Saul's "African Peasants and Revolution," introduced as a discussion of the "Methods and circumstances which transform peasantries into the mass base of revolutions," is undoubtedly useful; but if one has

read his contributions on this subject elsewhere, it must be said that this particular article doesn't advance the topic appreciably. Furthermore, one wonders if it might not have been possible to update the contents at various points, given the fact that it hasn't been appropriate to refer to Mozambique as a "Portuguese colony" for several months now.

As for the "briefings" section, the extracts from Spinola's book and the FRELIMO statement have long since been available elsewhere, so that their interest value and usefulness must be questioned. On the other hand, Chris Allen's "Radical Africana: A Bibliography," is, we think, an addition that will be greatly appreciated by readers.

In conclusion, a personal confession: While it is easy to be critical of books and journals about Africa written from a perspective that does not accord with 'reality' as we have come to know and understand it, it is difficult—almost painful—to do so when we identify wholeheartedly with the intent and thrust of the work under consideration. We think that the *Review of African Political Economy* is an extremely necessary and significant undertaking. If we expect too much, it is because we want very badly for it to be a razor-sharp tool. Anything less may fail to cut through the centuries of accumulated crap written about Africa. ■

John Dugard, *The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California, University of California Press (1973), \$8.95, (paperback)

1975 may well be the year of Namibia at the United Nations. The Security Council has challenged South Africa to withdraw from the territory by the end of May, and there is, in UN Commissioner of Namibia Sean McBride's view, every reason to hope that 1975 will see Namibia free. We shall see.

The Namibia question is old hat at the United Nations. It has regularly been on the General Assembly agenda since 1948, has been considered annually since 1968 by the Security Council, and has been argued before the International Court of Justice no less than six times.

For a territory with a population about the size of that of the District of Columbia, it is internationally notorious out of all proportion to the number of people involved.

If you want to know why, you can do no better than to repair to this useful compendium of documents on the political and legal issues arising out of the struggle to liberate this arid, mineral-rich territory, which was colonized by Germany in the late 19th century.

John Dugard, professor of law at the University of Witwatersrand, has kept his commentary and text to a minimum. His aim has been to present an historical perspective on the dispute as it arose in the United Nations and at the International Court of Justice after 1945.

He begins with a fascinating description of the territory as South Africa described it to the World Court in 1966, presents a history as the Odendaal report constructed it in 1962-63, and describes how Wilson, Lloyd George and Smuts perceived the Mandates System through extensive quotations from an article on the origins of "the Sacred Trust."

The bulk of the book, however, is devoted to a

consideration of the complex international legal questions involved in the Namibia dispute since World War II.

Dugard speaks mostly through his choice of materials. He is not a believer in coercion; rather he believes that South Africa can permanently extricate itself from international pressures by negotiation. He painstakingly lays out a rational and thoughtful consideration of the controversy in terms of the principles embodied in the original mandate and a liberal and modern view of its application. He ends by endorsing the sort of accommodation which Japie Basson of the United Party and Colin Eglin of the Progressives are proposing: removal of racial discrimination, consultation with the leaders of all "peoples" and a plebiscite.

Such a course comes close to what the South African nationalists will probably propose this spring. But it is too little and too late for such an accommodation.

Nevertheless, we should be most grateful for this fascinating collection of materials not readily come by except through the files of a handful of specialists who hoard such things. The price is stiff for a paperback (\$8.95). It is not easy reading, but for any one determined to understand history as well as to make it, it is vital stuff and well worth the price.

Books and Pamphlets Received:

Newell M. Stultz, *Afrikaner Politics In South Africa, 1934-1948*. Berkeley: Univ. of Cal. Press, 1975. \$8.00.

Glenn Moss (ed.), *South Africa's Transkei*. NUSAS, 202 Film Centre, 17 Jamieson St., Cape Town, South Africa.

Elisa Andrade, *The Cape Verde Islands: From Slavery to Modern Times*. Eugene, Oregon: Coalition Press, 1974. (Available through PAIGC-USA Committee, P.O. Box M365, New Bedford, Mass. 02744.)

Bruno Da Ponte, *The Last To Leave: Portuguese Colonialism in Africa*. London: International Defence and Aid Fund, 1974. \$1.10.

Breaking Contract, The Story of Vinnia Ndadi. Life Histories from the Revolution. Namibia, SWAPO 1. LSM Press, 1974. (Available from LSM Information Center, P.O. Box 94338, Richmond, B.C., Canada V6Y 2A8.)

Zimbabwe: Prose and Poetry. Washington D.C.: Three Continents Press. 1974. Hard, \$14.50; soft, \$6.00.

From the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, P.O. Box 2126, S-750 02 Uppsala, Sweden, and available from Almqvist & Wiksell International, Box 62, S-101 20 Stockholm, Sweden:

James R. Finucane, *Rural Development and Bureaucracy in Tanzania: The Case of Mwanza Region*. 1974.

Lars Rudebeck, *Guinea-Bissau: A Study of Political Mobilization*. 1974.

Robert Chambers, *Managing Rural Development: Ideas and Experience from East Africa*. 1974.

Law and Development: The Future of Law and Development Research. International Legal Center, N.Y. 1974.

resources

FROM TOKYO TO JOHANNESBURG: A Study of Japan's Growing Economic Links with the Republic of South Africa.

A 47 page report by YOKO KITAZAWA (see Southern African interview with Ms. Kitazawa, March, 1975) which has five major sections on Japan's involvement in huge South African industrial projects; Japan and South African uranium; Japanese manufacturing in South Africa (company lists included); Japanese imports from South Africa (metals, agricultural products); and Financing and Banking Relations. Order for \$1.00 (also bulk rates) from the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility, Room 566, 475 Riverside Drive, New York, NY 10027, or from the World Council of Churches, Program to Combat Racism, 150 route de Ferney, 1211 Geneva, Switzerland.

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UPDATE

Rhodesia Recaptures McIntosh After Escape to Mozambique

Rhodesian police have recaptured British banker

Kenneth McIntosh after he escaped from a Salisbury prison and fled into Mozambique.

Formerly a highly-placed Rhodesian bank official, McIntosh was serving a 14-year jail sentence, for revealing

the methods by which the Smith regime evades United Nations sanctions.

In the incident that first led to his prosecution by Rhodesian authorities last year, McIntosh entered neighboring Malawi, but was turned over to Rhodesian police by Malawi's Special Branch. This time around, he was able to get inside Mozambican territory, but was handed over to the Rhodesians by Mozambican police who said they had been tricked by Rhodesian policemen.

British authorities have protested that McIntosh's rights were violated, and have demanded an investigation into the affair—something that Mozambican officials say will soon be undertaken.

Pretoria's Overtures Stir African Controversy

Liberian President William Tolbert has been the butt of stinging African press criticism for hosting South African Prime Minister Vorster in February.

Among the critics are Ghana's *Daily Graphic* newspaper, which describes the South African initiatives as an attempt to buy time, and the Voice of Nigeria, which called the Liberian attempt at dialogue with South Africa a failure. "The majority of Africans," said Nigerian radio, "are still opposed to the idea of talking to South Africa."

The question of African contact with the white Pretoria government sparked tense debate at the recent OAU Ministerial Meeting, after Zambia bristled over accusations that it had relaxed its opposition to racism. At the suggestion of Algeria, a special OAU meeting will be held in April to discuss the issue.

South Africa frees Ex-C.P. Leader

The South African government has bowed to international pressure and agreed to release from prison the former head of the South African Communist Party, Abraham Fischer. Sentenced to life imprisonment in 1966 under the Suppression of Communism Act, Fischer now suffers from three kinds of cancer, and is given only a short time to live.

In January of this year South Africa turned down a family request for Fischer's release, on grounds that the former Communist leader was still a threat to national security.

Senate Approves Controversial Diplomats for African Posts

The Senate has confirmed Nathaniel Davis, former American ambassador to Chile in the Allende years, as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

The appointment brought African government officials into direct confrontation with Secretary of State Kissinger. Davis was ambassador to Chile at the time of the coup that toppled the Allende government, and the Organization of African Unity passed a resolution expressing fears that "the odious policy of destabilization" might be employed in Africa. Secretary Kissinger responded by warning the Africans not to meddle in internal U.S. affairs.

Also confirmed by the Senate last month was the new U.S. ambassador to South Africa, William Bowdler, a veteran diplomat with considerable experience in Latin America.

(Pretoria, meanwhile, selected Bowdler's counterpart, Roelof Botha, formerly South Africa's ambassador to the United Nations, has been chosen as the country's new ambassador to the United States.)

African Leaders Face Terrorism Charges in South Africa

Thirteen leaders in the South African Students' Organization (SASO) and the Black People's Convention (BCP) have gone on trial for violations of the Terrorism Act, in connection with a pro-Frelimo rally last September.

An 81-page government indictment accuses the defendants of conspiring to transform the State by unconstitutional, revolutionary and/or violent means, and of stirring up racial hatred against whites.

The mid-March opening of the trial was brief but tumultuous, marked by chants of "black power" and a courtroom scuffle as police ejected SASO and BCP supporters. Further hearings have been postponed until April 23rd.

The delay may prove to be a difficulty for the prosecution, when it attempts to subpoena witnesses. *Africa News* has learned that the State is putting friends of the detainees through intensive interrogations in an attempt to obtain incriminating testimony. As a result, many are fleeing the country in what one source describes as a "mass exodus."

Jailed COREMO Head Cites CIA Link

The leader of the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (Coremo)—now held prisoner by Frelimo—claims his organization received money from the CIA and the Portuguese secret police. Addressing a specially-arranged press conference in Tanzania, President Paulo Gumane said also that Coremo was party to an ill-fated attempt to overturn the Frelimo transitional government last year—a plot that Gumane says had the backing of South Africa, Rhodesia, and Swaziland.

Another prisoner at the press conference, one-time Frelimo Vice President Urua Simango, also admitted involvement in the coup attempt against the transitional government. Simango said that part of his financial backing had been a \$16,000 gift from the Rhodesian government, which was channeled through a Portuguese company.


Sithole Arrest, Chitepo Murder Make Zimbabwe Settlement Remote

The mysterious Lusaka murder of prominent ZANU officer Herbert Chitepo and the arrest by Rhodesian police of ZANU President Ndabaningi Sithole have further widened the gap between the Smith government and Zimbabwean nationalists. Zambian President Kaunda called Chitepo's slaying "brutal and cowardly," and vowed to launch an all-out manhunt for the culprits. ZANU, meanwhile, renewed its pledge to intensify the armed struggle until majority rule is won.

Talks between the African National Council and the Smith government were broken off indefinitely two weeks prior to the Chitepo murder, when Rhodesian authorities arrested Sithole on charges of plotting to assassinate other nationalist leaders.

Sithole's trial, scheduled to begin in late March, has been assailed as a travesty of justice, since Sithole's lawyers will be denied the right to cross-examine witnesses, and the prosecution can withhold any evidence it wants from the defendant. The trial will be held *in camera*, and Prime Minister Smith has the prerogative of overturning whatever verdict is handed down.

Usually reliable sources have told *Africa News* that a high official of the ANC will testify for the government against Sithole. ■



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