How the Russians Turned into the Image of the "National Enemy" of the Estonians

Olaf Mertelsmann

Dr. Olaf Mertelsmann, Centre for the Study of Soviet History, University of Tartu, Lossi 3-409, 50090 Tartu, Estonia, e-mail: omertelsmann@web.de

Historically, the Baltic Germans served as the image of the national enemy. In the 1940s and 1950s, as a result of Stalinist terror and Soviet policy, this did change. The paper explores the process of establishing a new image of a national enemy of Estonians: the Russians. Personal experience with terror and crime and the identification of 'Russian' with 'Soviet' triggered the development, as did in-migration and the fear of Russification. One aspect of the image of the national enemy is the idea of collective guilt and responsibility of ethnic groups.

Keywords: mentality, nationalism, Stalinism, Estonia

Introduction

The relationship between Estonians and Russians inside Estonia appears to be difficult. This is related to every-day and historical experience and also to the construction of the image of a "national enemy" among a certain number of Estonians. When using the expression "national enemy", I am not implying ethnic violence, hatred or open conflict. But in contemporary Estonian society one may find the image of a national enemy, the Russians. This image is not shared by everybody, but prejudice, stereotypes and antipathy are widespread phenomena. Being not a sociologist, but a historian, I will not present data, but refer to media, conversations or online commentaries. Especially in the discussion about entering the European Union and the NATO there occurred a lot of anti-Russian sentiment (e.g. Luik et al. 2003). Of course, after the regaining of independence in 1991, the inter-ethnic relations have improved constantly.

In developing a feeling of national consciousness, Estonians followed the Central European pattern of small nations, described by Miroslav

Hroch (1968). What was called later a "national awakening" happened in the last decades of the 19th century and was supported by the spread of education and mass media (Jansen 2003). In defining one's national identity the image of the "other" national or ethnic group was used to demonstrate to which group one did not belong. Very often, the image of the other was joined by the image of a "national enemy" in the process of nation building and defining ethnic identity. The case of France and Germany serves as a good example. Benedict Anderson and other scholars of nationalism speak about "invented communities", the construction of history and identity, and historical myths (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm, Ranger 1983; Hobsbawm 1990). The European nation state was a product of the 19th century and assisted by national historiography, tracing back the roots of modern nations to the middle-ages and even earlier.

When the Estonian national identity and Estonian nationalism emerged, the country had been ruled for several hundred years by small Baltic German elite, despite the fact that it had belonged, since Peter the Great, to the Russian Empire. German language and culture was omnipresent and for a long time rising in the social hierarchy meant becoming a "German". The society was obviously divided by language. When national aspirations awoke, the Baltic Germans turned into the "other". Estonians defined themselves as not being Germans. In addition, because the social status of Estonians and Baltic Germans was so different, ethnic and social conflict intermingled. The Germans were not only the "other", but they represented the image of the "national enemy", elaborated by Estonian journalists, writers, and the first historians.

For most Estonians, at the beginning of the 20th century, the history of the country was clearly divided. There was an idealized pre-historical period of freedom and independence, then came the German invaders with fire and sword in the 13th century and "700 years of oppression" started. The Baltic Germans, especially the barons, the owners of landed estates, were the "national enemy". They had enserfed the free Estonian peasant nation and took their land away. Officially, serfdom ended with a first agrarian reform at the beginning of the 19th century and after a second reform in the middle of the century a class of independent Estonian smallholders was formed. But Baltic Germans owned the majority of agricultural land until the land reform after the establishment of Estonian independence. The question this paper is addressing is how the Russians, instead of the Baltic-Germans, became the image of the "national enemy". In my opinion, this change happened mainly in the 1940s and 1950s during the time of Stalinist rule.

Beside literature and the archival sources of party and state, ego-documents will be used. There is a vast collection of life stories in the Estonian Literary Museum. Some contemporary diaries have been preserved. The author has conducted oral history interviews and used also those done by others. Other groups of sources are the answers to questionnaires send out regularly to the correspondents of the Estonian National Museum. These sources are not always quoted, but they provided me with the background to write this paper. They bear the "typical" problems of oral history. The sources possess a narrative structure, often changed by retelling the story several times. During Soviet rule, there was a fear to express oneself, only few diaries have thus survived. Memory is selective and we do not memorize everything "correctly". The memory was also formed and remodeled by the media, education, collective attitudes and today's opinion about the past.

Because of this, oral sources need a high degree of source criticism and they do not speak so much about "hard" facts, but about attitudes, mentality and understanding. But Soviet sources are also problematic (Graziosi 1999; Gestwa 2000). While even Moscow admitted a highly anti-Soviet and anti-Russian attitude in Estonia, many reports about the sentiment of the population draw a beautified picture. Despite the problem with sources, I still think it is possible explore the process of switching from one image of the enemy to another and to deal with the topic.

From Baltic Germans to Russians

In the time of national awakening, not only Estonians had a hostile attitude towards the Baltic Germans, but also Russian nationalism saw them as potential enemies. In a first stage, the interests of Estonian and Russian nationalism were nearly identical; both interpreted the Estonian peasants to be oppressed by the Germans, whose influence should be weakened in the future. In the 1880s, Russification started in the Baltic provinces of the Russian Empire (Thaden 1981). At that time, Estonian national consciousness had more or less already been developed. Russification was part of a unification and modernization process of the Empire. On one hand, it supported the use of Russian language in social life and made it compulsory in education and administration at the expense of German and Estonian. Thus, one might imagine that Estonian linguistic aspirations suffered. On the other hand, the Russification was mainly directed against the Baltic German elite, who stayed in power but lost influence. Some city councils were, for the first time in history, run by Estonians. Russification opened new opportunities for education and a career in the entire Empire.

Migration to the East occurred and it is estimated that roughly every fifth Estonian lived, before the outbreak of World War I, outside the country. St Petersburg became, after Tallinn, the second largest urban settlement of Estonians and turned into a "city of hope" (Pullat 2004). Since only few Russians lived inside Estonia, and they never formed a ruling class like the Baltic Germans did, there was obviously no real danger of losing national identity by being Russified. Germanization one generation earlier seemed to be a bigger problem.

So even during the Russification campaign, the Baltic Germans remained the main image of the enemy. In the revolution of 1905, Estonians and Latvians rebelled against the existing political order and demands for autonomy were also expressed, but the main actions were directed against Baltic German landlords. After the burning down of manor houses, punitive expeditions started. In the Duma, the Russian parliament, formed after the revolution, Estonian delegates cooperated with Russian parties. When World War I broke out, the majority of the Estonians were obviously still loyal subjects of the Tsar. There existed even some enthusiasm for the fight against a "historical enemy", the Germans (Raun 2001: 94).

During the war, the state distrusted the Baltic Germans, the public use of German was forbidden and their position weakened further. At that time, the Estonian elite dreamt of autonomy inside the Empire. After the February revolution in 1917, Estonians demonstrated on the streets of St Petersburg for national autonomy and this was granted by the Provisional Government. The Estonian territory, divided into the provinces of Estland and the northern part of Livland, was for the first time in history administratively united. Estonians benefited thus from an anti-German measure of the Provisional Government. The Imperial German army was already occupying parts of Latvia and, in the long run, an attack directed towards the Russian capital St Petersburg was feared.

After the October revolution, Estonia faced a short period of Bolshevik rule, later the country was occupied by Imperial German forces. Shortly before the Germans reached Tallinn, Estonian national circles declared independence. Lenin's policy and the advance of the troops of Wilhelm II, the German Emperor, led to the aspiration of an independent Estonian nation state. During the German occupation, many Baltic Germans were collaborating with them, dreaming of a Baltic satellite state of the German Empire under their rule. In the perspective of Estonians, they represented a much bigger danger than Russians.

After the collapse of Imperial Germany in November 1918, the Estonian war of independence broke out. It was fought against Soviet Russia, but

Russian, Estonian and Latvian units could be found on both sides of the front. Inside Estonia, there was sympathy for the Bolsheviks. It should not be forgotten that the Bolshevik party had cast 40.2 percent of the Estonian votes in the election for the Russian Constituent Assembly in November 1917 (Raun 2001: 103). Later, the war was not remembered as one of Estonians against Russians, but against the "Reds". In addition, during the turbulent year of 1919, German free corps together with some Baltic Germans staged a putsch in Latvia to establish a state dominated by Germans. The Estonian army crushed the German units, the Landeswehr, and the anniversary became later the holiday to commemorate the entire war.

Already during the war, the planning of a radical land reform to break up the estates was started and the legislation passed. This reform would establish a large amount of new farms, owned by Estonian peasants, and end the predominance of German land ownership. The reform was necessary, but it had an anti-German undertone. The compensation for the nationalized land was devalued by inflation and the "barons" lost a large amount of their property.

The Republic of Estonia was among the successor states of the Tsarist Empire, just like Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Finland. The official language changed, but there was even more continuity with the pre-war times in the social, economical and political sphere than in Russia proper, where the civil war and the Bolsheviks turned everything upside down. The Estonian national elite had been educated in Russian schools and universities and among them were many who had been repatriated from Russia (Medijainen 2005: 207). Many members of the elite held a positive attitude towards Russian language and culture, despising at the same time the Soviet regime. At the beginning of independence, there were hopes of entering the huge Russian market and Estonia functioned as a transit corridor for Soviet trade (Valge 2003). Not everybody thought that the newly established state would have a future.

During Estonian independence, a cultural autonomy for minorities was established and the Baltic Germans remained over-represented among the elite. For the majority of the Estonians they stayed the "national enemy". Meanwhile the attitude towards the Russian minority was more or less neutral or they were regarded with a feeling of superiority. The local Russians, mainly peasants and workers, were poorer and less educated than Estonians. The small Russian elite, often "white emigrants" were respected or even feared, because of the danger of the restoration of the Russian Empire. But generally speaking, there existed prejudice against Germans and Jews, but a neutral attitude towards Russians (Hovi 2003: 214–216).

The rise of Hitler and of a national-socialist movement among the Baltic Germans complicated inter-ethnic relations. A survey conducted by the State Propaganda Administration and the governing party, the Fatherland Union, from April 1939 in an atmosphere of international tension dealt with the attitude of the population. Germany was seen as the bigger danger in nine of eleven of the counties (Ant 1999: 33–35). Kalev writes in his life story: "Among the population there was an understanding that it is better to support the arrival of the Russians than the arrival of the Germans, because it was thought, one could get rid of the Russians more easily." (KM-EKLA 350–998: 22)

According to the secret protocol of the German-Soviet pact of Non-aggression from August 1939, Estonia fell into the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. As a result, Soviet troops were stationed in Estonia after Moscow had given Estonia an ultimatum. The Baltic Germans started to resettle in Germany (see Loeber 1972). In later memory, the Baltic Germans recalled that Estonians were sad and sensed what might happen to them in the future. Some Estonians remembered in a similar way, but contemporary newspapers spoke another language. In fact, Estonians were happy that the Baltic Germans left their country and they did not sense the Soviet danger (Kivimäe 1995). But with the end of the physical presence of Germans in the country, it was hard to keep the image of the enemy alive.

At the beginning, the Soviet soldiers behaved more or less correctly. The military bases reduced local unemployment and were thus even somehow welcomed. The soldiers appeared to be backward, poor and less educated, supporting the prejudice held by Estonians. An Estonian teacher, interviewed by a political officer of the Red Army in September 1944, stated for example: "You do not know how the Estonians smiled when the Russians arrived [in 1939]. They were so poorly dressed. Even our industrial workers laughed about them. And the Russians began to take everything. And life turned worse. Of course the Estonian communists lived well, but our nation suffered desperately. And everybody was angry about the Russians." (ERAF 1-1-885)

During the so-called winter war, Stalin attacked Finland also from his Estonian military bases, but Estonians remained happy to be kept out of the great war in Europe and the government did not protest, even when Stalin let Finland be bombed from his Estonian bases. According to the Soviet-Estonian treaty, the Soviets would not interfere into Estonian internal affairs. In the June of 1940, in the shadow of Hitler's victory in France, the situation changed. Estonia faced another Soviet ultimatum, additional troops were based and a new pro-Soviet puppet government

was installed. In August, the country was incorporated into the USSR. According to memories, people were depressed, but no open resistance was demonstrated when losing independence. The reports on the sentiments of the population spoke, until June of 1941, mainly about discontent with the economic situation (ERAF 1-1-46 – 59). In fact, an economic decline, thanks to Soviet restructuring and a land reform, led to over-all deficits, a decrease of the real incomes by roughly the half and an increase of the crude death rate by one half (Mertelsmann 2005). The Estonian abbreviation, for the Estonian Socialist Soviet Republic, ENSV, was now called "*Enne nälg, siis viletsus*", "First hunger then misery", documented for the first time in November 1940 (ERAF 1-1-57: 18). The first crimes of Red Army soldiers were reported, for example, the rape of a school pupil (ERAF 1-1-77: 14), but the beginning of political arrests was not noted by everybody. This changed with the shock of a mass deportation in June of 1941. When Germany attacked the USSR, Soviet destroyer battalions spread terror in the countryside and the security organs killed prisoners brutally.

One year of Soviet rule was enough to change the attitude of the population. Of course, this swing did not happen over night and the image of the enemy was established during decades. As a result of Soviet terror, only two years after Estonians had been happy to get rid of the Baltic Germans, Hitler's troops were greeted as liberators (Laar 2005: 7). The citizens of Estonia, except for Gypsies and Jews, were officially treated equally by the Germans, ethnic Russians received, for example, the same rations as did Estonians. As an exception in Eastern Europe, German rule was comparatively "liberal" and less oppressive than Stalinism. Estonians saw now the main danger coming from the East, as was articulated in an announcement for the mobilization into Estonian Self-Defence (Postimees 1941). In the first weeks of the German occupation, revenge was taken. Communists, Soviet activists and sympathizers, or those judged to belong to these categories, were arrested and often killed, not only by the Germans, but also by Estonian units (Birn 2001). Russians were over-represented among the victims of the German occupation (Paavle 2002: 18).

The experience of those citizens, being mobilized into the Red Army or evacuated to the Soviet hinterland, was that Russia was poor and underdeveloped. Later, these people should play an important role in post-war reconstruction and the continuation of the Sovietization process in Estonia.

The fact that Soviet rule was interpreted as Russian rule, and even ethnic Russians used this expression, led to an attitude identifying

Russians entirely with all the problems Stalinism created. In Estonian parlance, the period of Soviet rule is called the Russian time (*vene aeg*), the German occupation the German time (*saksa aeg*) and the period of independence the Estonian time (*eesti aeg*). To the question, how would you define Sovietization, posed in questionnaire no. 215 of the Estonian National Museum, dealing with social change during Soviet rule, many respondents answered simply that this is Russification. Of course, a few of Estonia's Russians welcomed the Soviet troops in 1939 and the annexation of Estonia in 1940 (Boikov, Isakov & Rajasalu 2001: 75).

Before Heinrich, born 1915, writes about the fact that the Germans have killed 14 persons in his region he compares German and Soviet soldiers in the summer of 1941: "We feared the Russians and had not learnt yet to fear the Germans. They are coming in a friendly mood and it is possible to talk with them. The soldiers of the other side hold their weapons the entire time in their hands and look at you like at a mad dog. They do not risk talking with you, maybe the politruk [political officer in the Red Army] sees it. The German puts the weapon away, opens his cloth to take a sun bath and starts to play the harmonica." (KM-EKLA 350-145: 16)

In the first period of German occupation, only volunteers from Estonia entered German units. A male, born in 1924, comments: "I believe, it did not happen often in history that people so enthusiastically volunteered to fight in a war and on the side of their enemies – the Germans. But hating the Communists was stronger …" (KM-EKLA 350-143). Ethnic Russians served also in Estonian units of the Waffen-SS or in the police battalions. Two times more Estonian citizens served in a German uniform than in a Soviet one. The Third Reich was seen as a lesser evil, even when Estonia was not granted any sort of autonomy and remained occupied.

Meanwhile, many Soviet prisoners of war survived, because they worked on Estonian farms. The national enemy must not be a personal one; this forms an important part of the image of the enemy. It is a group, but relations to a single member might be established without great friction. When after the war these farmers were accused of being collaborators with the Germans or kulaks, some former prisoners of war wrote even letters of support for them (Kõll 2003: 145).

Before the Red Army recaptured Estonia in September 1944, a mass flight to the West occurred. In Estonia, there were some hopes of a change of the Stalinist regime. Estonian units also fought in the Red Army. "Now we have a new order. We are and we live in a new state. The first impression is not bad. The Russians behave correctly. There are no signs of turmoil or of a decline of order. The Germans plundered more", wrote

Jaan Roos on 22 September 1944 in his diary (Roos 1997: 86). The diary of Jaan Roos, who hid himself later for nine years to avoid arrest, is an excellent source for the mentality prevailing in those years. Three days later he noted: "The Russian does not kill; he does not deport or rape women. A number of Russian officers said we will free the country from the Germans and then leave. Your country will be left to you to govern it." (Roos 1997: 89)

The hopes were quickly disappointed. Red Army soldiers behaved like on enemy territory, they stole, raped, plundered and murdered. According to a report of the Soviet Estonian people's commissariat of the interior, the majority of registered crimes in the last three months of 1944 were committed by Red Army soldiers (ERAF 1-3-435: 1). A party report from October 1944 stated also that after the end of fighting Red Army soldiers were robbing and stealing on a large scale (ERAF 1-1-819f: 1).

"They [the Russians] behave very rudely and they are stealing and plundering without keeping any limits. […] The Russians have gone beyond any limits. But the Germans have not been much better", noted Jaan Roos on 12 October 1944 (Roos 1997: 103). A thirteen year old girl wrote, in February 1945, in her diary: "I still remember the Republic of Estonia and dislike Communism; it brought us death and destruction. Maybe Communism is very good and justified, but in the hands of those men … it is filled with killings and robberies." (KM-EKLA 350-1094: 5). In September 1945, the party secretary of Viru County wrote to the first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party about the behaviour of an army unit in his district: "[…] all the time soldiers, sergeants and even officers take part in plundering, clashes, robbing from the peasants, raping women and hooliganism." (ERAF 1-3-436: 78). A wave of political mass arrests started, reached the highest point ever, and disrupted the population (on the scale of the arrests see Õispuu 1998: D5).

According to a report written by the political commander of the Third Baltic Front, about the situation in Estonia and Latvia in September 1944, the Soviet soldiers asked themselves several questions: Why are they not welcomed by the population? Why is the attitude of Estonians and Latvians so negative towards the Red Army? Why there is so little destruction visible? Where do they find poverty and workers? Does the local population consist only of kulaks and exploiters? Where are the males, did they flee with the Germans? Because of this the soldiers behaved often like on foreign and not on Soviet territory he concluded (ERAF 1-1-885).

This report helps in fact to understand the attitude of Soviet soldiers. Compared to Russian territory occupied by the Germans, destruction was really small. People did not greet the Red Army as liberator, because they feared the Soviets more than the Germans. Because of the higher standard of living even during wartime, Estonians did not look so exhausted and poor like the normal Soviet citizens. Being exposed for a long time to Communist propaganda, the normal soldier really thought that the Estonians were "bourgeois" and rich; this meant they were class enemies. The lack of males was clearly related to German and Soviet mobilizations. Having fought sometimes for months against Estonian units in German uniforms, the conclusion for many Soviet soldiers seemed to be clear: Estonians were fascists and belonged to an enemy nation. Their behaviour was according to this idea.

In 1946–47, refugees from starving areas in Russia, the so-called bag people appeared in the Baltic republics. Now they committed a large number of crimes. A report from the ministry of the interior of the ESSR stated, for example, that two-thirds of criminal offenders from March to May 1947 were Russians, Belorussians or Ukrainians and most of the criminals were coming from outside the republic (ERAF 1-5-36: 64). The widespread appearance of beggars, refugees from starving regions and the impact of criminality must have influenced the attitude of many Estonians towards Russians.

Anna, an Estonian born in Russia 1922 and married to a Russian, remembered: "Even when our family was half-Russian, my husband said what the Russians brought to Estonia was theft, drinking, and swearing." (ERM-KV 988: 297). Urve, born in 1931, described: "The image from the Soviet time is the following, on the street or from behind a window or a door there is coming a Russian soldier with an automatic gun. Everywhere on the island of Saaremaa you could meet them. Sometimes you heard that they killed or raped, robbed or stole somewhere. The entire time you have to be careful not to say anything against the order of the state." (ERM-KV 983: 64). In an anonymous letter from October 1945 to Nikolai Karotamm, the first party secretary, the author made clear who he saw responsible for poverty, misery and suppression: Communist and Russian "parasites". (ERAF 1-3-481: 200–201).

The *svodki* are another source dealing with public sentiment. They were secretly compiled by the security organs and party instructors to keep the upper echelons of the party informed about the sentiment of the population. Some questions asked at public meetings after the war are striking:

- "How many five year plans are necessary that Estonians look so hungry and wornout like the Russians?"
- "Why are the Russians robbing and stealing so much?" (ERA R-1-5-154: 153)
- "Why there is no action taken against the hooliganism and banditry of the soldiers?" (ERAF 1-1/4-243: 11)
- "Why has the discipline fallen in some army units and the soldiers are raping girls and are stealing bicycles?" (ERAF 1-3-115: 26)
- "Please answer the question, why are the Russians killing people and are stealing? What is this, the culture of the Soviet Union?" (ERAF 1-1/4-276: 36)
- "Will the Russians leave the country after the end of war?" (ERAF 1-3-115: 2)
- "When will the Russian units leave the country and only our troops will stay?" (ERAF 1-1/4-276: 32)

Since those questions were posed by the population at public meetings – of course some in a written and anonymous way –, there must have been reasons to demonstrate such an attitude.

Paul Winterton, working for the BBC in Moscow during and after the war, wrote about his impression of Tallinn after the "liberation": "I discovered that the bulk of the people of Tallinn were extremely hostile to the Soviet Union, had no desire to be part of it, feared that the Russians would deport large numbers of them into the interior of Russia as was done in 1940, and had been if anything rather relieved by the German occupation. I tried to write a part of this, but of course the censor stopped it all – even though I put the whole thing in an objective setting and emphasized the strategic importance of the Baltic States to Russia's security." (Miner 2003: 290)

The post-war years saw the biggest in-migration in Estonian history; roughly 20,000 Russian speakers per year migrated to Estonia (Tammaru 1999: 15) and raised fears of Russification. In 1949, a mass deportation prepared the forced collectivization of agriculture, which ended independent farming and led to a decline of the standard of living of the rural population (ERAF 1-114-57: 38). The security organs and the party were manned with Russian speakers, who formed a majority (e. g. Kommunisticheskaya 1983: 108–109). Those factors supported the image of the enemy. Old stereotypes found an equivalent in everyday experience and new stereotypes were generated. A number of Russians appeared to be criminal, uneducated, poor, filthy and lazy. Again, the image was dealing with a group and not with single individuals. Ilme, born in 1932, wrote in 1953 in her diary while spending time in a sanatorium: "Ivanov is an

interesting man here. Maybe not all Russians are 'murderers'. There are others, too. He is honest, straight and polite" (ERM-EKLA 350-1094: 25). Even Moscow realizes a very strong anti-Russian attitude in the Baltic republics, which was the reason for many Russians to leave the country (Zubkova 2001: 92).

A song from the 1940s sums up some stereotypes:

Olen vaene Venemaa kolhoosnik,
täiu täis ja ilma püksata.
Võtaks naise, et saaks kohvipiima,
lehma ei viitsi pidada.

I'm a poor Russian kolkhoznik,
lice-ridden and without trousers.
Should take a wife to get coffee cream,
'cause don't care to keep a cow.
(After the melody of Katyusha.)

An anonymous letter to Nikolai Karotamm, first party secretary, from January 1950 offers the opportunity to imagine what many people thought at that time: "Lenin's teachings, which are rotten and sick have already led the former rich Russia and states raped by her into incredible poverty, misery, founded camps for slave labor, where 20,000,000 (read 20 million) innocent people suffer. Research this. Go into the homes of the workers and into the factories and compare, go into the slave camps (the kolkhozes) and compare this life with the pre-war period. Go at least to the Estonian-Russian border and look at the wonderful human creatures coming from Russia – the representatives of a social world and think, are those starved, poor creatures happy and enjoy the new order? The intellectual state of the Russians is mirrored in their misery. […] And the culture! This Asian culture makes Aryan cultured nations suffer and they have to thank the "Great" leader for it. Of course, this is uncomfortable for them and the bad feeling hurts their hearts. Everything is now stolen and destroyed. Only ruins remain and a herd of starving naked human beings […] But in some years (maybe even earlier) this Communist snakes' nest will be destroyed. Then it will take decades, when everything will be reconstructed, and at least Russia reaches again the level of development of the Tsarist period." (ERAF 1-46-84: 10-11)

Elena Zubkova comes to the conclusion that the anti-Russian attitude in Estonia was fostered by the experience of the first Soviet year, the stationing of Soviet troops, the migration, the promotion of ethnic

Russians, people who were fleeing from starvation and drunken soldiers. "This created the opinion that Russians are uneducated and uncultured, people who have no clean hands." (Zubkova 2000: 203)

Some migrants had their own patterns of prejudice or developed them after facing the cold attitude of Estonians. Estonians were called fascists, *nemtsy* (Germans) or *tshudy* (a prerogative of Finno-Ugrians). The Great Russian propaganda, called "National Bolshevism" by David Brandenberger (2002), added further problems. The Russian nation was interpreted to be the bigger brother of all nations of the USSR. The pressure on Estonian culture, the forced learning of Russian at school and the migration raised fears of losing the national identity. And, many thought that maybe all Estonians would be collectively deported. When the situation in the 1950s normalized many Russians left the country again, but in-migration remained a reality of every-day life. Ethnic tension sometimes ending in fights, which occurred in places like Narva, as Arvi, born 1934, remembered (KM-EKLA 350-1: 29). Librarian Urve, born 1929, writes: "Directly after the war, there was a negative attitude towards everything Russian. This was the feeling of the majority of school pupil and influenced them. Studying at university this changed especially among those, who did their practical work in Russia" (ERM-KV 987: 378–379). When characterizing the Soviet period, Juhan, born 1921, notes: "Other nations were avoided, especially the Russians" (ERM-KV 985: 244). "The best Russian is a dead Russian", writes Leo, born 1926, in his life story (KM-EKLA 350-858).

Conclusion

Russians became, instead of Baltic Germans, the image of the "national enemy" of Estonians. Under the circumstances of a cultural Russification, it was highly important to distinguish ones-self from Russians. Concrete historical events and personal experience like terror, crime, violence and poverty triggered this image. Mass migration and historical myths were additional factors. Since Soviet was perceived as identical to Russian, the meaning of both words intermingled. There existed a clear-cut image that Estonians were victims and Russians perpetrators. To a certain extent, Estonians were ignorant of the fact that Russians also suffered from the same Stalinist dictatorship. Behind those images of an enemy we find ideas of collective guilt and collective responsibility of ethnic groups.

Sources & References

Archival Sources

ERA (Estonian State Archives)
R-1-5-154: 153 Report No. 5 on anti-Soviet expressions, 6 February 1947.
ERAF (Branch of the Estonian State Archives)
1-1-46 – 59 Reports on the sentiment of the Estonian population 1940–41.
1-1-57: 18 Report from Viljandi, 4 November 1940.
1-1-77: 14 Report from Läänemaa, 10 May 1941.
1-1-819f: 1 Sentiment of the population in the ESSR, 10 – 20 October 1944.
1-1-885 Report of the political department of the 3. Baltic Front about the situation in Estonia and Latvia, Major General A. Lobachev, 7 September 1944, no page numbers.
1-1/4-243: 11 Questions asked in Läänemaa, 26 January 1946.
1-1/4-276: 32, 36 *Svodka* No. 5, 26 July 1946.
1-3-115: 2 *Svodka* No. 2, 25 May 1945.
1-3-115: 26 *Svodka* No. 7, 20 September 1945.
1-3-435: 1 Report on the work of the *militsiya*, 6 January 1945.
1-3-436: 78 Letter from Janson to Karotamm, 17 September 1945.
1-3-481: 200-201 Anonymous letter to Nikolai Karotamm, October 1945.
1-5-36: 64 Report on the work of the department of "dangerous crimes" of the ministry of the interior, 7 July 1947.
1-46-84: 10-1 Anonymous letter to Nikolai Karotamm, January 1950.
1-114-57: 38 Budget survey of Estonian kolkhoz households conducted 1952.
ERM-KV (Estonian National Museum, Archive of Correspondents).
KM-EKLA (Estonian Literary Museum, Estonian Cultural History Archives) Fund 350.

References

Anderson, Benedict 1983. *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism.* London: Verso.

Ant, Jüri 1999. *Eesti 1939–1941: rahvast, valitsemisest, saatusest.* Tallinn: [Riiklik Eksami- ja Kvalifikatsioonikeskus].

Birn, Ruth Bettina 2001. Collaboration with Nazi Germany in Eastern Europe: The Case of the Estonian Security Police. – *Contemporary European History.* Vol. 10: 181–198.

Boikov, Isakov & Rajasalu 2001 = Бойков В., Исаков С., Раясалу И. Политическая жизнь. – Русское национальное меньшинство в Эстонской республике (1918–1940). Под ред. С. Г. Исакова. Тарту, Санкт-Петербург: Крипта.

Brandenberger, David 2002. *National Bolshevism. Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931–1956.* Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press.

Gellner, Ernest 1983. *Nations and Nationalism.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Gestwa, Klaus 2000. Reflektierte Archivarbeit – der "Königsweg" osteuropäischer Zeitgeschichte. Die übersichtliche „Welt der Modelle" und die „konstitutive Widersprüchlichkeit" des Sowjetsystems. – *Osteuropa.* Vol. 50: 549–561.

Graziosi, Andrea 1999. The New Soviet Archival Sources: Hypotheses for a critical assessment. – *Cahiers du Monde russe.* Vol. 40, No. 1–2: 13–64.

Hobsbawm, Eric J. 1990. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality.* Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hobsbawm, Eric J., Terence Ranger (eds.) 1983. *The Invention of Tradition.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hovi, Kalervo 2003. *Kuld Lõwi ja Kultase ajal: Tallinna restoranikultuuri ajalugu 1918–1940.* Tallinn: Varrak.

Hroch, Miroslav 1968. *Die Vorkämpfer der nationalen Bewegung bei den kleinen Völkern Europas. Eine vergleichende Analyse zur gesellschaftlichen Schichtung der patriotischen Gruppen.* Acta Universitatis Carolinae: Philosophica et Historica 24. Praha: Univerzita Karlova.

Jansen, Ea 2003. Sotsiaalne mobiilsus ja rahvuslik identiteet. – *Acta Historica Tallinnensia.* Vol 7: 15–28.

Kivimäe, Jüri 1995. "Aus der Heimat ins Vaterland". Die Umsiedlung der Deutschbalten aus dem Blickwinkel estnischer nationaler Kreise. – *Nordost-Archiv. Zeitschrift für Regionalgeschichte* (Lüneburg) Vol. 4, No. 2: 501–520.

Kõll, Anu Mai 2003. Tender Wolves. Identification and Persecution of Kulaks in Viljandimaa 1940–1949. – *The Sovietization of the Baltic States, 1940–1956.* Edited by Olaf Mertelsmann. Tartu: Kleio, 127–149.

Kommunisticheskaya 1983 = Коммунистическая партия Эстонии в цифрах, 1920–1980: сборник статей. Таллин : Ээсти раамат.

Laar, Mart 2005. *Emajõgi 1944. II maailmasõja lahingud Lõuna-Eestis.* [Tallinn]: Varrak.

Loeber, Dietrich A. 1972. *Diktierte Option. Die Umsiedlung der Deutsch-Balten aus Estland und Lettland 1939–1941.* Neumünster: Wachholtz.

Luik, Viivi et al. 2003. Eestlaseks saab jääda vaid eurooplasena. – *Postimees,* 8 August 2003.

Medijainen, Eero 2005. Optieren für Estland – eine erzwungene oder eine freiwillige Migration 1920–1923? – *Estland und Russland. Aspekte der Beziehungen beider Länder.* Hamburger Beiträge zur Geschichte des östlichen Europa, Bd. 11. Ed. by Olaf Mertelsmann. Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovač, 193–211.

Mertelsmann, Olaf 2005. *Der stalinistische Umbau in Estland. Von der Markt- zur Kommandowirtschaft.* Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovač, forthcoming.

Miner, Steven Merrit 2003. *Stalin's Holy War. Religion, Nationalism, and Alliance Politics, 1941–1945.* Chapel Hill, NC, London: University of North Carolina Press.

Õispuu, Leo (Ed.) 1998. Nõukogude okupatsioonivõimu poliitilised arreteerimised Eestis. *Political Arrests in Estonia under Soviet Occupation. Vol. 2.* Represseeritud isikute registrid (RIR) ; raamat 2 = Repressed persons records (RPR) ; book 2 Tallinn: Eesti Represseeritute Registri Büroo / Estonian Repressed Persons Records Bureau.

Paavle, Indrek (ed.) 2002. Eesti rahvastikukaotused. II/1, Saksa okupatsioon 1941–1944: hukatud ja vangistuses hukkunud = *Population Losses in Estonia II/1. German Occupation 1941–1944:* executed and died in prison. Tartu: Okupatsioonide Repressiivpoliitika Uurimise Riiklik Komisjon / Estonian State Commission on the Examination of the Politics of Repression.

Postimees 1941. 23 August.

Pullat, Raimo 2004. *Lootuste linn Peterburi ja eesti haritlaskonna kujunemine kuni 1917.* Tallinn: Estopol.

Raun, Toivo U. 2001. *Estonia and the Estonians.* (Upd. 2nd ed.) Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University.

Roos, Jaan 1997. *Läbi punase öö. 1. osa, 1944. ja 1945. aasta päevik.* Tartu: Eesti Kirjanduse Selts.

Tammaru, Tiit 1999. *Venelased Eestis. Ränne ja kohanemine.* Tallinn: Sisekaitseakadeemia.

Thaden, Edward C. (ed.) 1981. *Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855–1914.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Valge, Jaak 2003. *Lahtirakendamine. Eesti Vabariigi majanduse stabiliseerimine 1918–1924*. Tallinn: Rahvusarhiiv.

Zubkova 2000 = Зубкова Елена Юрьевна. Советский фактор в бальтийском регионе: кадровая политика как механизм советизации (1944–1947 гг). – *Сталин. Сталинизм. Советское общество: Сборник статей к 70-летию доктора исторических наук, проф. В. С. Лельчука.* Российская академия наук. Институт российской истории. Москва: Звездопад, 194–211.

Zubkova 2001 = Зубкова Елена Юрьевна, Феномен "местного национализма": "эстонское дело" 1949–1952 гг. в контексте советизации Балтии – *Отечественная история.* Vol. 10, No. 3: 89–102.