

Newsletter of the Center for Process Studies



Process Perspectives

a relational worldview for the common good

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Special Hartshorne Edition



HAPPY 100TH BIRTHDAY CHARLES!

Process Perspectives

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The Center for Process Studies

a relational worldview for the common good

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Charles Hartshorne: The First Hundred Years

by Gene Reeves

After agreeing to write this newsletter piece, I struggled for some time with how to do it. I suppose that most of the readers of this newsletter know as much as I about process thought and Hartshorne's thought. So another brief introduction to process philosophy, even if it turned out to be brilliant, would not seem appropriate. And any attempt to summarize Hartshorne's contributions to 20th-century philosophy within this scope would be foolish at best. So, what does one say about someone whose thinking has brought so much understanding and joy to much of a century? I've decided to be autobiographical in the hope that doing so may shed a little light not only on Hartshorne's contributions to my life but on his place in the 20th century.

When I went to Durham to attend the University of New Hampshire almost exactly half way through the century, I had read William James' *Principles of Psychology* several years earlier and no other philosophical works. I brought with me a passion for politics in the broadest sense and, for that reason, a lot of negative philosophical convictions.

I have no idea where the passion for politics came from. Neither my parents nor any of my childhood friends were politically active but it always seemed natural. I participated in political campaigns long before I could vote, once even getting myself arrested for being in the wrong place on election day. That passion for politics was rooted in a kind of love of this world, a deep feeling that what we did in the world was intrinsically important.

So I knew from the first time I encountered them that some philosophical ideas were wrong. And by wrong I do not mean merely mistaken but something much stronger—morally repugnant, something not only to be rejected but to be resisted.

Among ideas I knew were wrong was determinism, and I was appalled equally by mechanistic science and by popular theological notions of divine providence. Mechanistic science I knew to be mistaken not only because it was deterministic but also, perhaps primarily, because I had spent too much time walking the forests and streams of rural New Hampshire to believe that nature was merely dead inert matter.

Also among the then current ideas I took to be wrong was the kind of matter-and-mind dualism and its extension, personal immortality, taught in the churches and widely believed. This dualism, like mechanism, was counter intuitive, at least for me. The doctrine of personal immortality seemed to me then, as to a lesser extent it still does, to be a hankering after what is properly God's and God's alone. (Much later, Unamuno helped me gain a better appreciation of the desire for immortality but not for its appropriateness.) What made it especially objectionable in my

view was that it diverted people's attention and energy from this world to the next, encouraging them to be politically irresponsible. What I learned from the overwhelmingly dominant religious tradition of my home town was that the only thing ultimately important was getting to Sunday mass on time and undergoing certain other sacraments because that was what would get you into heaven. Everything else was easily forgivable and, finally, not very important.

Early in college I became fascinated with Vedanta, perhaps with its simplicity. But I soon decided that any view that makes all human experience fundamentally illusory, whether Vedantist or Thomist, is also ethically flawed.

The trouble with all of these ideas is that by making non-sense of responsibility, they are debilitating to the human spirit. As such I thought they were positively evil, primarily a way of controlling people so that great crime and corruption could be committed without opposition. If God was as Calvin, and my local Episcopalian priest, said, then I wouldn't want to go to heaven to be with such a bloodless monster; much better to go to hell and enjoy the company of sinners.

If I had some very strong feelings about what ideas should not be accepted, so far as I can recall I had virtually no idea of what should replace them. Of course I believed in freedom. I think all Americans did, or thought they did. But I had little idea of what I meant by it and even less idea of what mind-body dualism or personal immortality might be replaced by.

At UNH, a philosophy major was not offered and, after sampling just about everything, I majored in psychology. There I encountered—in addition to the kind of mechanistic determinism I knew previously, now in the form of behaviorism—what was for me a new form of determinism, namely Freudianism.



I took what philosophy courses were offered by the one philosopher there, providing me with the opportunity for the first time to read and think about Plato and Aristotle and to survey the whole history of Western philosophy—to its culmination in the personalistic idealism of E. S. Brightman, an early version of Brightman at that. Lest you don't know or have forgotten, personal immortality was a very important fixture in American personalism. So I went away dissatisfied. But I did more clearly understand from reading Brightman a possible way around the problem of God and evil.

At about the same time I took the only courses in religion at the university. Taught in the history department, one was a kind of survey of primitive religions but from an explicitly naturalistic viewpoint. I was invited to read Henry Nelson Wieman, among others. The course gave me a new way to think about religion and its potential significance for good. But I felt the metaphysics, especially the understanding of God, to be inadequate—not just metaphysically inadequate but ethically inadequate primarily because it did not provide a vision of God with enough unity to function ethically.

I was beginning to find some small hints of positive philosophical directions when, quite without direction from anyone else, I literally stumbled across Whitehead's *Process and Reality* in the university library stacks. It was fascination at first sight, a kind of experience I never had before or since. I didn't understand much of the detail, which is part of what attracted me to it, but I could see in *Process and Reality* a vision of reality that was everything I could want. The last chapter of that book had me trembling with excitement.

In those days there was very little interest in Whitehead. I remember, not long after that first encounter with *Process and Reality*, going through a heap of books in a used book shop in Cambridge, Mass., and being thoroughly delighted in finding a copy of *Religion in the Making* for twenty-five cents. My memory may be wrong but I think, with the possible exception of *Science and the Modern World*, none of Whitehead's books were in print at that time. There was very little secondary literature and much of what there was of it was not very helpful, the major exception being the *Library of Living Philosophers* volume.

By then Charles Hartshorne had published five books and had contributed a part of *Whitehead and the Modern World* with Victor Lowe and A.H. Johnson. That book may well have been my introduction to Hartshorne but what is better remembered occurred two or three years later, when I had become a seminary student at Boston University. It was in the form of *Philosophers Speak of God*. For me that

book did two things: It introduced me to Hartshorne's way of reasoning, about which I will want to say more later, and to a wider range of historical thinking about God than I had previously imagined. It was the first philosophy book I encountered that placed Asian thinkers alongside and within the same history as Western ones. I don't think there have been many since.

Soon I was looking for a place to pursue the Ph.D., especially for a program in which I could develop my interest in Whitehead. There are not so many places one can study Whitehead even today but their number is huge compared with what was available then. After considering a very few options, I settled on going to Emory to study Whitehead under Hartshorne. (It also helped that Martin Luther King, Jr., who had been ahead of me at BU and very interested in Wieman's thought, also encouraged me to come to Atlanta to help him in the then rapidly developing civil rights struggle, which would become the major focus of my political interests for many years.)

At Emory, of course, we did not study Whitehead at all, at least not under Hartshorne. In fact, at that time I learned much more about details of Whitehead's system from William Christian's *An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics* than I did from Hartshorne. What we studied under Hartshorne was metaphysics and epistemology, with Karl Popper's *Logic of Scientific Discovery* looming much larger than any of Whitehead's books. But somehow we thought, at least some of us, that we were studying Whitehead none the less, studying Whitehead not in the sense of analyzing Whitehead's texts or doctrines but in the sense of working within, thinking within, a philosophical framework that was Whitehead's as well as our own. Hartshorne taught us not to think about Whitehead but to think about the kinds of problems with which Whitehead had struggled.

Having decided to go to Emory to study with Hartshorne, naturally I tried to read all that he had written, though I did not get to *The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation* until much later. I think it is somehow characteristic of Hartshorne as a teacher that even though he thought of himself as a philosophical writer he never even suggested, then or since, that I read anything he had written. What he did encourage was thinking about philosophical issues and thinking about them in a certain way.

There was, I think, a certain touch of sadness or disappointment in Hartshorne during those days. With Dorothy, daughter Emilie, and Eloise, the talking Siamese cat, he seemed

At Emory, of course, we did not study Whitehead at all, at least not under Hartshorne.... But somehow we thought, at least some of us, that we were studying Whitehead none the less.

to enjoy a splendid domestic life in a lovely setting. He seemed to enjoy his seminars and he certainly enjoyed all kinds of repartee with colleagues such as Paul Weiss at meetings such as those of the Metaphysical Society. But he was not far from the disappointment with the philosophy department at Chicago, which brought him to Emory, and, more important I think, he was disappointed that he was being given very little attention in larger philosophical circles. It was not that his ideas were criticized. That he would have welcomed. It was rather that this revolutionary way of understanding, something far more illuminating than the world had seen before, was largely being ignored.

But if there was a touch of sadness or even of resentment, it never came to the fore. What was much more evident was Hartshorne's sense of humor. As much as anyone I've met, I think, Hartshorne laughed, usually at situations, sometimes at the mistakes of others, often at himself. And in that laughter and sense of humor, a little hidden perhaps but there, is something that has too often been unremarked about his method. Though not so evident perhaps in his writing, Hartshorne is a very serious philosopher who does not take thinking or his own thinking too seriously.

I do not want to deny that Hartshorne is a rationalist and that for him the way to progress in abstract ideas is through careful, logical analysis, especially careful consideration of rationally possible alternatives. Careful thinking, using the best logical tools we can find or develop, simply is philosophy for Hartshorne. But Hartshorne has never said that philosophy is life or adequate to life. A foundational ingredient of Hartshorne's philosophy is that all that we can know or say or think is rooted in an ocean of inarticulate, unconscious or subconscious, experience and feeling. And it is precisely because of the vast limitations of human perception, reason and language that he holds that divine knowledge is non-discursive.

Perhaps I take Hartshorne more relativistically than he himself does. But it has always seemed to me that the whole process of rational analysis by attempting to set forth the rational alternatives and choosing the best among them was just that, a matter of choosing the best given some set of options. The method does not guarantee that some partially or even wholly different set of options, a different way of looking at the matter, will not produce different results. In this sense, rational analysis is as much about thinking as it is about truth. Hartshorne has never denied Dewey's rejection of "the

quest for certainty." Rather than being a search for certainty in any absolute or final sense, his is a search for what makes the most sense, given our experience, our logic, our language, etc. It is a search for the most plausible and credible. And this is as true of the ontological argument for the existence of God as it is for dual transcendence. But, like Polanyi and any pragmatist, Hartshorne understands that we can believe and have confidence in things that we might conceivably doubt. What we are dealing with in Hartshorne's philosophy is another "likely story" but, largely as a consequence of its rationality, it is a likely story, i.e., one we can live by.

Process thought, or "process-relational thought," certainly has not swept the nation, much less the world. But I suspect those too young to remember cannot appreciate how few we were in 1959. There was, of course, no journal or Center for Process Studies. Even a few years later, when the "Society for the Study of Process Philosophies" was initiated as an adjunct to the meetings of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Society, it was a very tiny club with its entirely "esoteric" vocabulary. In those days one could fairly easily know just about everyone working in process thought and be confident that one knew the entire literature. Until the mid-60s or so, Hartshorne's was a very lonely voice, swimming against the streams of positivism and linguistic analysis in philosophy and against the streams of atheistic humanism and neo-orthodoxy in theology.

John Cobb's *A Christian Natural Theology*, dedicated to "Charles Hartshorne: To whom I owe both my understanding and my love of Whitehead's philosophy," appeared in 1965. Schubert Ogden's *The Reality of God and Other Essays* was published in 1966. In the "Toward a New Theism" section of the opening chapter, Ogden wrote, "Among the most significant intellectual achievements of the twentieth century has been the creation at last of a neoclassical alternative to the metaphysics and philosophical theology of our classical tradition. Especially through the work of Alfred North Whitehead and, in the area usually designated 'natural theology,' of Charles Hartshorne, the ancient problems of philosophy have received a new, thoroughly modern treatment which, in its scope and depth, easily rivals the so-called *philosophia perennis*." (p. 56) And from there, though he started with Whitehead's reformed subjectivist principle, Ogden proceeded to give a Hartshornean view of the world and God. Both Cobb and Ogden had somewhat earlier publications but it was, I think, these two books that launched what would be-

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come known as “process theology.”

Perhaps it was only great good luck that Hartshorne had these two students at Chicago. In any case, he did, and in that fact is one of his most important contributions to contemporary process thought. Historically he was the main link between Whitehead and the subsequent development of process theology. There are other links of course. One thinks immediately of Daniel Day Williams, Bernard Loomer and Bernard Meland, all, like Hartshorne, Cobb and Ogden, associated with the University of Chicago for a significant portion of their lives. But it was Hartshorne’s students, using both Whitehead’s and Hartshorne’s views and arguments, and therefore Hartshorne much more than anyone else, who made process thought a living, viable alternative for contemporary women and men. Hartshorne accurately thinks of himself as more of a writer than a teacher, but had he not been a teacher it is very unlikely that we would be writing and reading about him today, or even that so much of what he has written would have seen the light of day.

Process Christian theology has been largely successful in providing a credible and useful reinterpretation of Christian tradition and doctrine sometimes, as in John Cobb’s Christology, well beyond but consistent with what Hartshorne has taught. Meanwhile, I have become more Buddhist. I first encountered Buddhism at about the same time that I first encountered Whitehead, but turned away from it in the face of what I took to be the ethical inadequacies of both the Theravadin and the Zen interpretations of the Buddhist tradition. It is only in recent years that I have rediscovered Buddhism in a form that is both much more important historically and much more ethically and politically relevant to and involved in contemporary issues. Hartshorne too might have been a Buddhist, or more of one, had he known a more adequate version of that tradition. But the loss is mostly Buddhism’s, as most of what is most important and vital in that tradition Hartshorne gained elsewhere.

There is so much in Hartshorne’s philosophy for which I am truly grateful it is embarrassing. Here I only list in no particular order:

- the synthesis of realism and idealism through the idea of asymmetrical relations;
- the realistic emphasis on the given in experience along with the idealistic emphasis that to be is to be perceived;
- the togetherness of ultimate contrasts;
- the togetherness of all of nature in panpsychism or psychicalism;
- the togetherness of God and the world in panentheism;
- the understanding of freedom as being within a causal matrix, giving importance both to the past and to what is contributed to the future;
- the affirmation of the interdependence of the world and God;

- an explication of the Great Commandment such that it makes logical sense fully to love God, the neighbor, and oneself;

- the taking of time, and therefore history and human struggle for the good, seriously;

- the recognition that if temporal life is truly significant it is not enough for Jesus or Mary to suffer, but that in the very heart of God there is suffering and compassion;

- an almost Buddhist emphasis on interdependence over against the Greek celebration of utter independence and unilateral power over others.

All of these and many more, no doubt, are philosophical ideas that, while not unique to Hartshorne, are matters on which he has shed a great deal of light, for which I am extremely grateful. Holding these various ideas together is the central insight of the Lotus Sutra, if not of all of Buddhism, that the many and the one belong together in a way that affirms the ultimate reality of both.

Thus all of these ideas are related by Hartshorne to the idea of God. Though this is not the place to argue for it, I believe that some notion of God, or Buddha or the Whole is needed for an adequate ethics or politics, that narrow self-interest, racism, and nationalism are best overcome through some sense of an encompassing set of interests. This ethical ground is certainly not the only reason for maintaining the reality of God but for me it is one of the most important. The human race may not long survive in any case, but it certainly will not long survive unless the widest range of political issues, of how to live together in peace, can somehow be addressed. And it seems unlikely to me that this can be done without reference to an encompassing whole to which we are contributors. But this can only be so if our understanding of God is at once both credible and not inimical to human freedom and responsibility. Hartshorne’s contribution to our understanding of God is very important, but equally important and integral with it in my view is the development of a system of values in which it is not absolute power that is to be pursued, but the beauty of the common good.

It is one of Charles Hartshorne’s contributions to the 21st century that we enter it with hope of such a conversion. I pray that what he has contributed to the 20th century becomes a sacred legacy for the 21st, the next one hundred years, enabling human beings everywhere to live more fulfilling lives.

Gene Reeves, having just retired from the University of Tsukuba, has become a Guest Researcher at Rikkyo University in Tokyo in order to complete writing projects related to the Lotus Sutra and process thought.



Hartshorne Publishes Again

by John B. Cobb, Jr.



A new book by Charles Hartshorne is always an important event for readers of this newsletter. But there is something special about *The Zero Fallacy and Other Essays in Neoclassical Philosophy*. It is being published in Hartshorne's hundredth year!

If it were simply a collection of essays written in earlier years, there would be nothing remarkable about this. An editor can gather and publish one's writings at any age—even more easily, perhaps, when one has died. This book is in fact edited and introduced by Mohammad Valady, and it contains many older writings of Hartshorne, some published, some not.

But the book is far from merely a collection of old Hartshorne writings by a new editor. It is the result of close collaboration between Valady and Hartshorne. It contains a quite recent article, "Democracy and Religion" and, more important, forty-three pages of new answers by Hartshorne to judicious questions posed by Valady. This volume is not simply a collection of older material, valuable as that also is. It gives voice to Charles Hartshorne, philosopher, in his hundredth year of life!

This must be a new record in the history of philosophy! Has any other philosopher continued to philosophize in his hundredth year? Hartshorne himself comments on how he has benefited from advances in medical theory and practice. It is because they, along with his own good sense and moderation, have kept him alive and in good health, that he has been able to profit from critical studies of his work. In his sixties he complained that his work was not receiving critical attention, but now he expresses satisfaction that the situation has changed. It is satisfying to his admirers as well that he seems content.

His writings have a secure place in the history of thought, even if they continue to be neglected in the mainstream of American philosophy. There are many now who can explain and defend his ideas and are disposed to do so. But none of us can do so with his astonishing erudition in the history of thought. Once again in this new volume he cites with confidence major and minor figures from the history of philosophy East and West and from science, theology, and literature as well, pointing out their contributions and their mistakes.

We all owe a debt to the editor. Dr. Valady has recognized Hartshorne's importance and originality, and he has selflessly devoted time and acumen to engaging him and drawing him out. Clearly he hopes to present Hartshorne in a way that will enable mainstream philosophers to appreciate his distinctive

contributions. In the process he is helpful to Hartshorne's existing admirers as well. Hartshorne gratefully acknowledges Dr. Valady's contribution in his Preface to the volume.

Like a number of Hartshorne's early writings, this book is published by Open Court. It was published before his hundredth birthday on June 5. We celebrate with him this further capstone to his life's work.



The Zero Fallacy and Other Essays in Neoclassical Metaphysics

by Charles Hartshorne

Edited with an introduction by Mohammad Valady
Open Court Publishing Company

This collection of Charles Hartshorne's writings—many never before published—is an indispensable introduction to his rich and indelible contribution to contemporary philosophy. It covers the extraordinary range of Hartshorne's thought, including his reflections on the history of philosophy, philosophical psychology, philosophy of science, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, literature, ornithology, and, above all, theology and metaphysics.

Charles Hartshorne, Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at the University of Texas at Austin, has written twenty books and published over 500 articles. He is the subject of Volume XX of the Library of Living Philosophers Series. Mohammad Valady received his Ph.D. from the University of Texas at Austin and has been a lecturer at both the University of Texas and Southwest Texas State University.

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Reminiscences of Charles Hartshorne

excerpted from an unpublished paper: "Importance, Families, Religions, Darwin: A Case Study From the Inside"

Written in 1994

by Charles Hartshorne

From the outset I've been fortunate indeed. My mother wrote in her diary, "Charles is a merry child." That I had a mother who wrote like this is part of the reason I would act as she says. By responding joyfully to my joy she increased and had already done much to create it. One of Oscar Wilde's wisest sayings—alas, he made some foolish ones—was, "Would you like to make your children good? Try making them happy." To really do right things well one must *enjoy* doing them. If the first months and years of life are unhappy, goodness will be hard to come by. Mother wrote about another son, "He is such a comical baby." It was, I think, the second born identical twin. (Eventually he did not do well and died young, but the mother was not directly the reason for that. His was a complicated case.)

We six Hartshorne children came from two families which were Darwinian evolutionists before we six were born. Our four grandparents began this way of thinking only a few years after Darwin's death in 1882. They were all religious people but of three unusual kinds. The supposed dilemma, evolution without religion or religion without evolution, never existed for them, or us, as it also had not for evolution's co-discoverer Alfred Wallace.

My father, the Rev. Francis Cope Hartshorne, was not just a clergyman, he was one of the best educated people I have known. He had studied not only evolution at Haverford College, he studied chemistry there because, as he said, it deals with the foundation of life. He was a scholar in Hebrew but did not know Greek well enough to be a scholar in the New Testament and was aware of this limitation. He, like three distinguished people I could name, thought the "Book of Revelation" was hopelessly un-Christian and should not have been in the New Testament. In the two Pennsylvania towns I grew up in, he stood out; he was far indeed from a fundamentalist in religion and was able to prevent the founding of a KKK group in the second town, Phoenixville. At the request of his father, he had himself trained as a lawyer, but decided to be a clergyman and yet, like his father, a Darwinian. He made vigorous efforts to see to the education of his daughter, the oldest of his children, and the five sons, of whom I was the first born and the natural leader. He knew women could be highly intelligent. He had some prejudice against "Negroes," did not like the idea of their being neighbors and

was somewhat anti-Semitic.

As a parent, however, he had the admirable trait that when he criticized one of his offspring for some plan of theirs, if they defended themselves vigorously he would listen to them, or read their letters, and then usually withdraw his objection. When I wrote about my intention of becoming a philosopher he wrote about how in philosophy there was "not one certainty." I wrote back energetically. His reply began, "An excellent apologia for philosophy." Note, he was then financing my education, except for such scholarships or fellowships as I obtained. I did not "work my way" through any of my education, including my two years of post-doctoral studies, the last financed by Harvard.

All this financial assistance did not mean I never worked for daily wages at various humble forms of unskilled labor. I spent a very interesting summer working on farms, several of them; had two years as an orderly, with rank of private, in a USA army medical corps base hospital in France in WW1. Washing dishes and serving though not cooking meals were the principal occupations. In spare time I read philosophical books of which, in small size editions, I had brought with me an entire extra case. I spent part of the summer after WW1 as a student in the University of California, and part of it working in a saw mill. I also tried, in another part of the state, picking up plums to be used for dried prunes. Rates then were five dollars a day. During WW2 when there was a shortage of laborers I did some pruning of grape vines in the Saroyian country of California where one could look up from low altitude in warm, dry weather to the snowy Sierra Mountains which were usually in plain sight.

My mother could talk to people simply as people, whether male or female, rich or poor, black (so-called) or white (so-called, really pink or gray-brownish) but intelligent, polite, friendly, worth-talking-to people. She talked neither up nor down, to such people. They were just fellow humans. Our mother had not even a trace of racism. That prejudice has never seemed respectable to her children. The problem has always been to see anything but ignorance or stupidity in that. We do not think with our skins, and in all racial groups there are some outright idiots and some brilliantly intelligent persons, and everything between these extremes. Mother seemed to realize all this and acted accordingly. This is merely one of

many examples of a lady who, in crisis after crisis, saw what the important issues were.

Once I was fussing about a girl I had as a classmate in a logic class who, after being pleasant to me for some weeks, suddenly started being unpleasant and talking harshly against my opinions. I was not in the least in love with the girl or she with me, and as I soon found out her abrupt change in talking to me meant only that she had fallen in love with another man, intended to marry him, and wanted to make sure I would remove myself from her special group of people. My vanity was upset by this way of dealing with the problem and I was trying, in vain, to find a dignified way in a letter to rebuke her for her rather rude way of getting me out of her life. There seemed no dignified way to do this. What did Mother say when she learned about this problem?

Four words, "Charles, life is big." Immediately I saw her point. I was making a mountain out of a mole hill. In my autobiographical *The Darkness and the Light*, I've given other examples of Mother's wisdom. She had a reliable sense of humor and saw the joke, even when it was on her. She was not conceited. I recall her exclaiming, "How *stupid* of me!" She liked to sing the witty Gilbert and Sullivan song about Oscar Wilde as the "very very clever young man." Her claim was not to be clever, but to be sensible. Usually that's what she was.

Father learned about an Episcopal School primarily for high school students, though it took a few less advanced ones. A boarding school for many, it was also open to day students taking the hourly trolleys from and to nearby Lancaster, Pennsylvania. The school, with only fifty pupils in all, taught evolution, or Father would not have sent any of us there. Since the boarding school, called Yeates, took only boys, sister Frances went to some Southern school for girls (slavery having been abolished long before), but then she went to Vassar where also only girls were taught. She learned about men perhaps a bit late in her life, part of the trouble being that young men were in the war or, in summer in our vacation mountain resort, scarce. We, her young brothers and our associates, were not in her age group. I think my chances to understand women early in my life were better than hers to understand men. Frances did have a somewhat distinguished double career, partly as dancer and teacher of dancing, and as (mostly administrative) psychiatric social worker, all this in three quite different parts of the world. Eventually she made a stable marriage, but too

late to have children.

Father decided that Richard and I would go to Yeates but not probably the twins, James and Henry, or the youngest one, Alfred. Alfred was always on his own, being too young to play the games, go on the fishing or camping trips, or play the baseball the older ones of us did. The two twins got the lowest grades and Father had this in mind in not strongly favoring their going to Yeates. I seem to recall their being eventually consulted about this and their deciding against Yeates. Anyhow it was an important asset that Richard and I, by far the most successful of the six of us, alone had. Alfred, whose mind was on being an engineer, would go to Lehigh College, which was strong in engineering, but for school he would stay in Phoenixville. I do not know how far these ar-

rangements were for financial reasons, or so that Mother would have some of her children all year round instead of only summers, (during part of which we all went to Eagles Mere in the mountains), or perhaps still other reasons.

Sir Karl Popper says, and I agree, that worldly successes or achievements are "mostly matters of luck." But if I have not been lucky, who has? Whitehead certainly, his wife could help him to the end, whereas mine is now almost mindless in a retirement and nursing center. But I have many helpful and interesting friends and my work is not yet at an end. Unlucky I still do not call myself. My wife, stimulated by our first trip to Japan, began to study the history of Buddhist art in Japan



and conceived the scholarly goal of writing the life and achievements of the Prince Regent Shotoku-Taishi. Unfortunately the distractions of a trip to Belgium, a dismal viral pneumonia, and a year or two afterwards Alzheimer's stopped her in the middle of the writing. She taught me a lot about Japan, and some Japanese admire her work, but her ambition as a scholar failed tragically. In many other ways, however, her life for many decades was a series of successes, as musician, actress, opera singer, editor of five schoolbooks (no misprints) and of my writings. Also in Japan for many months several kinds of teaching, and, before marriage, teaching in a private school in this country. Orson Welles once called her his best teacher.

Richard Hartshorne, internationally known geographer, lived long enough to accomplish what he wanted in his profession. But he had serious frustrations in his life, and several years ago died of cancer, for which he sensibly rejected che-


motherly. His first wife died prematurely of a partly paralyzing disease, his three children had serious misfortunes. Brother Richard in one or two respects lived more than I have as most Americans do. He had a car and so did not automatically get regular exercise. He said too that he did not deliberately take exercise for its health benefits. Much of the time I was without a car and I used bicycles a great deal until a few years ago. On the good side I've been shown the memorial to Richard Hartshorne written by a geographer which shows him to have been fully as good, kind, considerate, and generous a person as he was competent in his subject. He had his mother's virtues as well as a good deal of his father's intellectual qualities. He had a more difficult mother-in-law in his first marriage than I did in my only one, he also had a not very appreciative chairman in his first academic position for quite a few years. The second marriage came after some lonely years and there were difficulties in it.

Richard Hartshorne was a political geographer basically, and I, Charles Hartshorne, like Wallace, co-discoverer of evolution, am a zoogeographer, to some extent a biogeographer. I have knowledge of how animals and with them forests and grasslands vary around the world. Richard Hartshorne had no conceit; he told Mother, who told me, "Charles is more brilliant than I am." He knew I had contributed to several sciences as well as philosophy. Perhaps another way in which Richard had worse frustrations (which may have caused his cancer) than I did was the fact that early in his successful career an emotionally disturbed rival attacked him more savagely than any rival attacked me. Richard fully appreciated Dorothy; when he first saw her he exclaimed, "My, she's beautiful!" To have had such a completely admirable person as close relative and friend for so much of my long life was surely an honor and a privilege.

Grandfather Hartshorne featured in my life as he did not in that of anyone else of us when, in the second year of my life, he was a substitute father for me as Aunt Amy Hartshorne (then living in her father's mansion in the middle of their considerable estate, called Holmhurst, in Merion, suburb of Philadelphia) took me in charge to relieve mother who, because of the twins, had too many children in diapers. As substitute father I cannot recall grandfather but believe he was excellent. There were helpful pictures. I'm told of his saying to me, "Charles, say *Nebuchadnezzar*," which I would then say. Aunt Amy was the ideal substitute mother. She

forced me to memorize, "Charles must *mind* Aunt Amy." I feel confident this frank approach did not offend me. It meant that the absence of my mother did not mean no one had taken her place. And after all I had been one of four, including sister Frances and the twins that Mother had to attend to. Now I was the only one needing or getting such close attention.

I have never had a mother fixation and only poorly understand those who do have it. Aunt Amy is surely a part of the explanation for this. She and I never quarreled that I can recall, though we once as adults at her expense traveled together, with her live-in companion Lillie Zietz, with whom also I never quarreled. This does not mean they never criticized me, but they did so as friends trying to be fair and helpful. I've gone through life looking for friends not enemies. I recommend this strategy. Enemies, at least a few, will turn up but why search for them?



James and Henry (in photos scarcely distinguishable) had quite different careers; both made serious mistakes early in their adult lives, but James never despaired and always kept on doing his best, whereas Henry was horrified by the results of his mistake, which was giving up a college degree by leaving Princeton for an art school and then for a few years painting pictures which, in his own judgment (I do not know whether in the judgments of some others') were not good

enough to justify his having staked everything on this one type of ability. The frustration of this apparently complete failure I believe produced cancer at the age of 23-24, this being only one of several other cases I have observed of frustration resulting in that painful disease.

James's first marriage failed. His "wife" was incapable of being that. However, James did not give up hope and eventually achieved a good marriage with a sensible southern lady. He tried being a stockbroker, in the Great Depression lost money at that, somehow became manager of a hotel in a Southern town for military officers; the hotel burned down, taking with it all his material possessions and clothes other than those he was wearing. Finally, with some inherited money he acquired a large apartment building in (I guess) the same southern town and spent the rest of his life managing that. It was also the town in which his second wife grew up. He was valued there as a capable, generous person. He died of a heart attack while serving the town as a volunteer who helped in directing the parking of cars in which people came to wit-

ness horse races, financially important undertakings of the town. After his death his widow, with an also widowed sister and a capable brother, managed the apartment until her death. James's qualities were summed up by his father, who knew him well, by the remarkable tribute, "James is refined clear through," in other words, a complete gentleman. One thing more, like his second but not his first wife, James had a pleasant sense of the comic. One could expect an occasional good-humored joke.

Those two boys were my chief playmates in boyhood and youth, except when I was at Yeates, or Haverford or in WWI. Never once did I quarrel, even momentarily, with either of them. The one time they disagreed with me, concerning the way back to our town, then Kittanning, it soon pleasantly turned out they were right. When Henry suffered from his fatal depression, I did not return to our parents' home (Phoenixville) where he then was to see if I could help him. At the time I was writing my doctoral dissertation at Harvard and I felt it was probably too late to help Henry. I had been out of touch with him for some years. These were, Lilly Zietz thought, excuses rather than justifications for my inaction. I cannot refute, but am not completely convinced by her criticisms. Henry was the only one of the six of us for whom life in early adulthood was difficult. However another brother, Alfred, eventually also died of cancer. He had a barely tolerable first wife, Helen. By her opposition, she prevented Alfred from leaving his engineering firm and setting up his own business as he wanted to do. Finally he left her as the children were about grown up. His second marriage was to a greatly superior German-American lady. Chemotherapy was tried for Alfred's cancer but failed. This and Henry's collapse were the two grimmest tragedies in our family.

That sister Frances and my Dorothy never much cared for each other was only a trifle by comparison. They did not need to see much of each other, living mostly in very different parts of the world, and having very different primary interests.

Frances did one thing for the family; she saw to it that Mother was taken care of after Father's death, in a small retirement and nursing home (it was also a farm) near the revised farmhouse in Connecticut in which Frances lived. The daughter reported how completely Mother retained her kindness and unselfishness, even after she became mildly senile. Never once did she complain about what was done or not done for her, always expressed pleasure and gratitude for what was done. Her goodness was saint-like. Her entire life was virtually faultless. When a son came to visit her she would pay his traveling expenses, saying with a happy smile, "My money is for my pleasure and I like to see you." While Father was alive he always paid our expenses when we came to visit, so Mother, to whom he left nearly everything (though while he was alive he gave her only a small allowance and

went himself to buy things when they were needed), could easily think of doing as he did, now that only she was left and at last had the money. She soon asked Alfred, named in Father's will as her counsel in financial matters, how much of her money was needed for herself and how much could she give to the rest of us? He made some calculations, she followed his advice, and we all received some helpful additions to our capital. Frances had decided on her own to keep Father's Chrysler car, in good condition; none of us objected, though Mother expressed mild surprise to me. In our family, quarreling about money was not done. Dorothy and I never did it to each other, nor did we with any of her family. Of course this would have been difficult had any of us been really poor. We are none of us quite that.



Thanks to Hartshorne Members

The co-directors and staff of the Center for Process Studies would like to recognize members who have honored Charles Hartshorne by purchasing a lifetime Hartshorne Membership. With gratitude, we give thanks to our Hartshorne members:

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See page 30 for more information.

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
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Process Perspectives

Robert Doud

Whitehead and Poetry

Seminar reviewed by Alan Deffenderfer



On October 16, Robert Doud, professor at Pasadena City College, spoke on Whitehead and poetry. Professor Doud invited comments during his presentation. He was very personal in his presentation; he spoke of the importance of poetry in his own life, how hard it was to see loved ones die, and the importance of poetry in expressing, or its inability at times to express, our deepest sorrows and joys. He began by reading some of his own poetry along with poetry from T.S. Eliot, Marianne Moore and CPS's own Mary Elizabeth Moore. He described his task as making correlations between key concepts of Whitehead and some of the basic intuitions and ideas of various poets. The importance of his work, Doud explained, lies in its attempt to enrich both philosophy and literature/poetry. These two disciplines need to interact and be transformed by the other. Such dialogue is possible because they share a common universe of discourse. Both of these modes of discourse contain primordial or elemental intuitions into the nature of reality (Doud's notion of elementality is closely related to Heidegger's notion of primordiality). One of the driving questions for the poet and philosopher is, "What is the most primordial level of experience?" Doud thinks that the search for elementality is one of the things that makes Whitehead a poet, despite his heavily philosophical description of those elemental intuitions. His own poem, *Concrescence*, which he read for those in attendance, shows Doud's own attempt to express this elementality:

Concrescence

Faceless, pulsing stuff
 Matter on the gracious move
 Evident in fickle traces
 Sporadic, spontic actuations
 Instances of livingness
 And mysteries of self-containment
 Blushing, mostly undetected
 In satories of satisfaction

Principle becoming real
 As many selves in quest
 of private, quiet meaning

Effervescence caught in drips
 Fast evaporating drops
 Containing her and losing
 Matter borrowed momentwise
 Dynamic shared alive
 Shaped by divinity
 In a constancy relentless
 With better aimed intentions
 In every new attempt

Sensible stuff she is
 A soul creating bodies
 Hostess to a deeper soul
 Who persuades unto concretion
 Sheer she-ness godly veil
 A mother, womb and ocean
 In waves and comely atoms
 Circulating, returning
 Embracing, generating
 Constant in her perishing

One can see in Doud's own poem many of the elements he described in the poems of others throughout his presentation: datum, process, satisfaction, anticipation, and decision. Doud distributed a handout that placed these Whiteheadian categories in vertical columns with important ideas and passages from fourteen poets in horizontal columns. His presentation focused on how these process notions were present in a wide variety of poets, ranging from the English romantics (Keats/Wordsworth/Coleridge), to various American poets (Stevens/Merton), from women (Moore/Snyder/Rilke) to German writers (Holderin).

His presentation explored how Whitehead's phases of concrescence can be found in each of these poets. Though not all phases were present, Doud described a general movement present throughout where the author adds a creative contribution to a largely determined perception of reality. He spoke at length about the biography of several poets on the handout to provide a context, a place from which the poets were drawing the data for their experience. He then went on to show parallels between their poetry and Whitehead's notion of becoming.



Theodore Walker

Neoclassical Thought and Social Ethical Analysis

Seminar reviewed by June Watkins



November 13, 1996, Theodore Walker, Jr., Assistant Professor of Ethics and Society at Perkins School of Theology, Southern Methodist University, delivered a talk entitled "Neoclassical Thought and Social Ethics." The Center for Process Studies co-sponsored the seminar with the Pan-African Seminarians and Religious Studies from Claremont School of Theology.

Walker, continually challenged to show how metaphysics benefits social ethical analysis, stated that the connection between metaphysics and social science is not always obvious. In many instances the connection is explicitly denied. Walker, utilizing Peirce, Hartshorne, Ogden, Whitehead and others, discussed how theology illuminates ethics and how social analysis is helped by metaphysics. Peirce's classic essay "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" draws attention to the conditional and predictive content of scientifically meaningful terms. Hartshorne contributes the idea that temporal distinctions must be emphasized. Whitehead teaches us that the future inherits the past. Ogden adds the notion that empirical historical assertions are also existential historical assertions. From Native-American scholars, Walker developed an increased attention to vision.

The Peirce/Whiteheadian/Hartshornean lesson calls attention to important temporal distinctions: the present is partly determined by the past and the future is partly determinative of the present. Given this truth, any social historical description of the past is understood to have partly determinative implications for the present and any sociological description of the present is understood to have partly determinative implications for the future. Hence all social scientific description has at least implicit predictive power.

Walker outlined six distinct elements essential to social ethical analysis: interpretive themes, circles of concern, descriptions, predictions, visions (which are alternative predictions) and prescriptions. Each of these overlapping elements is permeated by values and value judgments. Interpretive themes are selected based upon value judgments about what is impor-

tant, good, or worthy of attention. Social scientific descriptions are descriptions of present circumstances or very recent circumstances and those contributing to recent and present circumstances. When social ethics reaches beyond social science, public policy prescriptions may be formulated. Social ethical prescriptions are what ought to be done to make favorable differences to the probable future. Social ethical prescriptions are often guided by heavily value-laden visions of an alternative and more righteous future. All social ethical reflection is founded on the metaphysical presupposition that being/becoming/doing differently makes at least some enduring difference and upon the meta-ethical presupposition that we ought to prefer some differences over others. We ought to prefer to make righteous differences that contribute to shared well-being of all.

The second way that Walker is helped by metaphysics is with Charles Hartshorne's conception of love. Hartshorne defines the concept of love as being positively related to the ups and downs of the other. When person A loves person B, person A is so related to B that what is good to person B is uplifting for person A and what is depressing to person B is depressing to person A. If they are inversely related, we would call that relationship "hate." In that case, the suffering of B would cause A to rejoice. It would also be possible to conceive of total indifference within this model. This idea, according to Walker, is a potent resource to social ethical analysis, especially for those forms that employ the concept of love as a central interpretive theme. One vitally important question we must ask ourselves: Are we positively related to the ups and downs of others? To whom are we positively related? Are we negatively related to the ups and downs of others? This applies to both individuals and groups and becomes a powerful tool for interpreting critical judgments about the ethics of social location. If we profit from the suffering of others, then, regardless of our personal motivation, we exist in a hateful and morally unrighteous relation to others. The bottom line for Walker is this: "Attention to metaphysics can and does benefit social scientific and social ethical analysis."


Attention to metaphysics can and does benefit social scientific and social ethical analysis.



Alan Wittbecker

Ecoforestry

Seminar reviewed by John Quiring



Does a tree falling in the forest make a sound? “Of course it does,” says ecoforester Alan Wittbecker. “All kinds of creatures are there to hear it —owls, deer, bear. Don’t be so anthropocentric!” A Center seminar on the topic of ecoforestry was given by Alan Wittbecker on November 19, 1996. Wittbecker came to his work in ecological and community forest practices from a science background that includes astronomy and human ecology. He is a longtime associate with the George Perkins Marsh Institute in Idaho and a Director of the Ecoforestry Institute with offices in Oregon and Idaho.

The Ecoforestry Institute was founded in 1993 by Alan Drengson and Gary Coates. The field is influenced by the work of Chris Maser. The process thought of A. N. Whitehead and John Cobb are influential in the worldview Wittbecker brings to his project of ecological forest and community design. “And you can’t just throw a forest together,” says Wittbecker, paraphrasing Gary Larson. The Ecoforestry Institute offers courses and consults with land owners on design of sustainable forest use. It participates in the certification process of both forests and foresters. Its experience is that small, non-industrial land owners are more receptive to ecoforestry than industrial foresters. But it hopes eventually to influence public policy as well. It has worked with a wide range of organizations—from the Bureau of Land Management, Oregon State University and the Nature Conservancy to the Sustainable Forestry Institute, Forestry Stewardship, Smart Wood, Greenpeace and Earth First!

Different worldviews make a difference in economics and forestry, says Wittbecker. The history of forest practices ranges from the premodern Kwakiutl, who cut only one side of a tree, to scientific-industrial forestry, with its clearcutting, to postmodern ecoforestry. Most government, corporation, and research forestry work, for example, presumes a mechanistic worldview, which generates the scientific-industrial approach. It sees itself as a separate discipline that exists for the sake of resource extraction and commodities. Growth

Economics is also a driving force behind this view of forests. Industrial forestry doesn’t know how to deal with uncertainty in nature. It engages more in measurements of “stumpage” than with the living, breathing plants of the forest.

Ecoforestry, however, actually seeks to create a framework large enough to *include* industrial forestry as a legitimate part, though only a part. Ecoforestry is a “crisis science,” an ecological science. It is context-based, community-based. Ecoforestry is backed by a holistic cosmology that includes such ordering principles as change, organism, field, continuity, historicity, indeterminacy, novelty, and intrinsic value. Ecoforestry seeks to consider the whole frame-

work of the forest. The goal is sustainability, caring for trees so that both trees and people can be there indefinitely, and not only trees, but all the species of a forest system. Some species become so adapted that they die when their tree dies or disappears. Favoring ecological economics, ecoforestry presumes constraints on growth. It favors restoration forestry and selection logging, that is, reforestation and harvesting without clearcutting. Its idea of harvest focuses on the beginning and intermediate cut, not on the “end cut.” It can, however, ask the question, “When does clearcutting increase the health of the forest?”

That the Wise Use movement considers ecoforestry *too preservationist* and Greenpeace sees it as *not preservationist enough* points to its idea of integrated management as a *middle way*. Again, it favors *optimum diversity*, considering that speciation could become “too diverse” as well as insufficiently diverse. This comes out in its differentiation between global (total) diversity and local diversity. Optimum diversity appears in the latter. A parallel emphasis is on ecosystem culture (local) rather than biosphere culture (global). If you would like technical information on ecoforest and community design, contact Alan Wittbecker at the Ecoforestry Institute, PO Box 41, Viola, Idaho 83872, at (208) 883-0626, or witt731@uidaho.edu

The goal is sustainability, caring for trees so that both trees and people can be there indefinitely, and not only trees, but all the species of a forest system.



Nancy Howell

A Feminist Cosmology

Seminar reviewed by Judy Casanova



Nancy Howell of Pacific Lutheran University spoke in Claremont on February 6. Her topic, "A Feminist Cosmology," is also the title of her new book, due to be released next November. The stance is Whiteheadian—the language comes from looking comprehensively at the nature of relationships and seeing knowledge as situated in relationships. Communities must intersect and have relationships with each other. These intersections are the focus of Howell's work. The book covers three areas: ecology, solidarity, and metaphysics, but the seminar focused on solidarity.

Howell stated that feminist cosmology rests on nine commitments: (1) it is a relational and organic way of thinking; (2) it deals with a wide range of experience, data; (3) it recognizes subjectivity, that knowledge is perspectival; (4) it advocates moving beyond theory to action; (5) it is interested not in dualism or polarity, but in multiplicity; (6) it has a *becoming* ontology—reality is processive; (7) it reflects internal relations—real identity is constituted by events and relationships; (8) it sees nature as also consisting of internal relationships; (9) it is interested in alternative theisms or how we describe God.

Howell looked at the work of three feminists to exemplify various ways women relate to one another: Mary Daly, *Gynecology*; Janice Raymond, *The Passion for Friends*; and Mary Hunt, *Fierce Tenderness*. Daly called for radical separation to regain identity and spoke of gynophilic relationships for the metamorphosis of the entire being. Raymond also emphasized separation, but more so that women could be empowered by other women instead of being constantly defined by heterosexual relationships. Hunt wrote of female friendship as justice seeking.

After her analysis of white feminists, Howell turned to the work of women of color, where she discovered the concepts of "other mothers," a support network for women and children, and "mothering the mind" or mentoring. She found that women of color are critical of a white sisterhood that does not extend to them, charging it with a racism that generalizes from

white experience to all women or situates its thought in the white community. Further, the woman of color sees the whole of white feminism as separating from men. Because the woman of color experiences multiple oppression, she is often in solidarity with men. A "womanist" seeks the well-being of her entire community and loves men both sexually and non-sexually. Lastly, women of color recognize the issue of class and insist that any wisdom must begin with the poor.

Howell uses Whiteheadian analysis to respond to these criticisms. She argued against one-dimensional analysis, or analyzing everything in male/female terms. Both are situated, making

imperative discussions of race, class, disability, sexuality, etc. White feminists need to recognize the tension that has resulted from preoccupation with separatism which, in fact, has resulted in white feminists separating from other women. Howell takes the Whiteheadian notions of proposition, internal relations, causal efficacy and contrast as being particularly helpful. Female friendship is a proposition—a lure for feeling, a beckoning to a response. Even the early lesbian feminists saw separatism as giving alternative possibilities—a lure to genuine self away from female gender stereotypes. Women of color add to this. Delores Williams sees God as a way maker—the one who shows how to make a way out of no way. The concept

of "other mothers" allows women to be visionary about children, and the locus of change. The Whiteheadian notions of internal relations and causal efficacy say that we are not wholly determined by our past but have freedom in the way we respond. Some relations can be trivialized. The stories of black women tell us we are agents of our own identities, not victims. Female friendship can be seen in terms of Whiteheadian contrast. By living in contrasts, one can have a more intense experience. What does this mean for all women? Women can come together in coalition—over child care or tenure. Differences can make us more creative.

And if you want to know any more, wait until November and read the book!

Communities must intersect and have relationships with each other. These intersections are the focus of Howell's work.



Daniel Dombrowski

Babies and Beasts: Process Thought and the Rights of Marginal Humans and Animals

Seminar reviewed by Olav Bryant Smith

The Center for Process Studies was pleased to host an afternoon seminar given by Daniel Dombrowski, Professor of Philosophy at Seattle University. Professor Dombrowski is author of a number of books, including three that are forthcoming: *Analytic Theism, Hartshorne, and the Concept of God* (SUNY Press); *Kazantzakis and God* (SUNY Press); and *Babies and Beasts: The Argument from Marginal Cases* (University of Illinois Press). In this seminar, we were presented the latter argument, from marginal cases. The question at hand was the problem of moral patiency.

The issue of patiency is in contrast to the more familiar problem of moral agency. Dombrowski says that nearly everyone admits that the criterion for moral agency, which is the ability to make moral decisions, is rationality. There are problem cases even here, typified perhaps by a character such as Lenny in Steinbeck's *Of Mice and Men* who, as Dombrowski put it, has one foot in rationality and one foot outside of it. Moral patiency, on the other hand, is the capacity to receive a moral or immoral action. For instance, it would be widely agreed that we would not call immoral anything done to a piece of metal. It may be a misuse of the metal, based on some functional criterion, or even based on a morality *concerning* use of this material, but we cannot really commit an immoral act against an inanimate object. The question is, along the chain of being, where do we draw the line? Many people would say that *rationality*, the criterion for moral agency, is also the criterion for moral patiency. The problem with this criterion is seen when we look at marginal cases of rationality, such as babies and beasts. The *argument from marginal cases* points explicitly at the problem that not even all human beings will be moral patients on this criterion. The mentally retarded and the senile, as well as children up to a certain age, would, on this criterion of rationality, *not* be worthy of moral respect. Dombrowski considers this criterion, therefore, to involve a *reductio* position that is clearly morally insufficient to account for moral patiency. An alternative criterion that some people

offer is that of *potential for rationality*. This may broaden the scope to cover most babies but is far from a criteria that would cover all human beings. Some human beings, by virtue of their mental handicap, do not possess any potential for rationality. This being the case, some people go to what Dombrowski considers the other extreme, lowering the criterion for moral patiency to include *all life*. The problem with this position is that it is impracticable. The Jains of India have perhaps come closest to living out this ideal by wearing masks over their faces to protect little insects from being breathed in and thereby killed, and by carrying brooms

to sweep their paths and seats clean, so as not to crush any insects. Still, this only deals with the visible world. On a *micro* level, the problem is not solved even by these extreme measures. Every time we breathe, microorganisms are dying. Furthermore, on this extreme view, we should morally respect even the right of cancer cells to live, therefore not doing anything to treat the diseased. Clearly, Dombrowski argues, we must find a criterion for moral patiency that is between these extremes.

Perhaps the most significant point of Dombrowski's argument is that there is no way, so far as he can tell, of covering marginal human cases without also spreading the umbrella wide enough to cover many members of the animal kingdom. Being a vegetarian and an animal rights activist, this suits Dombrowski just fine, but gives many non-vegetarians pause for thought. His own criterion is *sentiency*, meaning the ability to feel pleasure or pain, though he warns that he is not anxious to have this tied to some kind of utilitarian calculus. Further, sentiency is the ability to have one's interests advanced or harmed, or the ability to have one's life go well or ill. Clearly, this protects all human beings, but also includes many animals, specifically those with central nervous systems. Ultimately, this becomes central to arguments against eating animals, wearing animal products, experimenting on animals, and all animal rights issues.



Leemon McHenry

Descriptive and Revisionary Theories of Events:

Author of *Whitehead and Bradley: A Comparative Analysis* (1992), Professor Leemon McHenry is a Visiting Scholar at UCLA and one of the Review Editors of *Process Studies*. On February 19, 1997, we had the privilege of hearing him on a hotly debated issue in contemporary philosophy, namely, the status of events in relation to objects in our understanding of reality. McHenry's main interest lies in two contemporary theories of events, the one descriptive and methodologically based on linguistic analysis, and the other revisionary, being based on ontological realism. As McHenry puts it: "As opposed to the conceptual self-understanding of the descriptive metaphysicians, the aim of the revisionary metaphysician is to understand the way the world is quite apart from how we talk about it." While descriptive metaphysics takes ordinary language as the criterion by which to determine ontological matters, including what events are, revisionary metaphysics is a kind of superscience that seeks to give a comprehensive view of reality with adequate and coherent explanations of its events.

In his presentation, McHenry focused on four philosophers. Two of them, P.F. Strawson and Donald Davidson, belong to the analytic tradition and can be considered descriptive metaphysicians. Despite the major differences between them, both see linguistic analysis as the only means of finding out what events are. The two other philosophers discussed are A. N. Whitehead and W. V. Quine, who are revisionary metaphysicians believing that event ontologies must be compatible with the natural sciences, especially Einstein's theory of relativity. Events are seen by the latter philosophers as spatio-temporal concrete particulars that form the ultimate units of reality. But as there are similarities and differences between Strawson and Davidson, so there are similarities and differences between Whitehead and Quine. McHenry acknowledges the contrariety between Whitehead's and Quine's projects—the former pushes toward a panpsychic, or organismic, vision of reality whereas the latter limits himself to a behavioristic-physicalist vision—yet this is a minor issue for McHenry, because he is inter-

ested in showing, on the basis of the new revisionary ontology, that we can do without substances, and that without a substance ontology we can offer a solution to such thorny problems as the mind-body relation, self-identity, and the dualism of nature and humanity, problems that were of interest to both mainstream American philosophers (e.g. William James, George Santayana, Josiah Royce), and contemporary analytic philosophers.

McHenry said that his paper "has to do with a theme that was brought to life by Donald Davidson," an analytic philosopher who sought to show that both events and objects are conceptually dependent on each other, so that objects, or substances, do not take priority over events in our understanding of reality. The latter issue, which is one of Whitehead's main

The aim of the revisionary metaphysician is to understand the way the world is quite apart from how we talk

themes is something that McHenry defends with zeal. McHenry is glad that Davidson took issue with the priority of substances over events argued by Strawson, who took the subject-object distinction as elementary for our understanding of reality, arguing that events are not particulars because they do not appear in our language as subjects. Saying that events must be identified in relation to substances, Strawson took substances as prior to events because the latter are conveyed in our grammar in verbs and adverbs. For example, events, such as

"births" and "deaths," are parasitic in language on there being subjects consisting of the concrete individual substances designated by "father" and "mother."

Davidson took issue with such an understanding of events because he thought our language (its grammatical structures and logical forms) does demonstrate event structures by identity and individuation. For example, events are particulars that could be named by gerunds ("the crashing of the jet at Los Angeles") or by verb-nominalization ("the crash of the jet at Los Angeles"). Both examples show how events could be particulars and function as subjects in our grammar. Davidson acknowledges the individuation of substances in our language and, therefore, argues that both events and objects are conceptually dependent on each other. Thus when

Whitehead and Quine

Seminar reviewed by Randy Ramal



we say, “Sebastian walked slowly and aimlessly through the streets of Bologna at 2:00 p.m.,” we are clearly talking about an event that is not independent of Sebastian.

Sympathizing more with Davidson than with Strawson, McHenry says that it was a mere historical accident that our language is filled with substance language, i. e., that the subject-predicate division of our propositional language makes events appear to be parasitic substances. Yet McHenry thinks Davidson shares a basic mistake with Strawson, namely, seeing grammar as the only guide to understanding reality. McHenry does not think we should look to ordinary language, but to sensory phenomena, in order to find a reliable source to understanding the eventful nature of reality. We need to go beyond a mere linguistic description of our world to an extra-linguistic, scientifically-based metaphysics that shows reality as eventful or processual. McHenry draws on findings in contemporary science—quantum and relativity theories—to substantiate his argument for event ontology. He believes that Whitehead’s event ontology is similarly substantiated.

From those in the analytic tradition, McHenry sees the philosopher Quine, who was a student of Whitehead at Harvard and who wrote his dissertation on *Principia Mathematica*, as coming closer to this vision of event ontology. Quine acknowledged the four-dimensionality of what we normally call “physical objects,” and thus their eventful nature in the space-time continuum. McHenry quotes with approval the following from Quine’s *Word and Object*: “Physical objects, conceived thus four-dimensionally in space-time, are not to be distinguished from events or, in the concrete sense of the term, processes.” Still, McHenry thinks that, ultimately, Whitehead’s event ontology is better equipped than any other ontology to solve such philosophical problems as the ultimate nature of reality, the mind-body relation, personal identity, and the dualism of nature and humanity. He sees Whitehead’s importance, and his advantage over analytic philosophers, in his proposal of an event ontology that is both compatible with contemporary science and independent of our grammar. In fact, McHenry finds a passage in Whitehead’s *Modes of Thought* (1968, p. 173) in which he anticipates Strawson’s famous distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics and in which he suggests

how to modify the relation between them:

The fallacy of the perfect dictionary divides philosophers into two schools, namely, the ‘Critical School,’ which repudiates speculative philosophy, and the ‘Speculative School’ which includes it. The critical school confines itself to verbal analysis within the limits of the dictionary. The speculative school appeals to direct insight, and endeavours to indicate its meanings by further appeal to situations which promote such specific insights. It then enlarges the dictionary.

Like Whitehead, McHenry wants to enlarge the dictionary and, since contemporary science offers a possibility for such enlargement, he thinks Whitehead’s project is on the right track. Ultimately, if we must relinquish either the event or the substance ontology, it is the latter that must be abandoned. McHenry’s sympathy with Whitehead’s project is further illustrated in his saying that he aimed at two things in his presentation: (1) to make a strong case for a coherent and adequate event ontology on the basis of Whitehead’s philosophy and, thus, (2) to integrate Whitehead into contemporary American and analytic philosophies. Indeed, McHenry’s paper speaks to the general audience of philosophers as well as to those familiar with process philosophy. With the publication of his paper in the forthcoming issue of *Process Studies*, at least the second aim will be fulfilled.



Send Us Your Published Material!

The CPS library collects works that make reference to the Whitehead/Hartshorne tradition. Send us advance information about your published material. Book information will be forwarded to the *Process Studies* review editors. Please consider donating a copy of your book or published articles to our library. Please call Randy Ramal at (800) 626-7821, ext. 224 or e-mail John Quiring at johnq@ctr4process.org or mail to CPS, Attn: Library, 1325 North College Ave., Claremont, CA, 91711-3154.

Conference: Women in Process Works in Progress



by Marjorie Suchocki


The “Women in Process/Works in Progress” conference held in Claremont, February 1-2, 1997, was just a bit spectacular. In fine feminist fashion, the conference addressed mind, spirit, and body. We had conversation about each woman’s current work that sparked our imaginations, gathering and meditation rituals that centered us, and good food and drink that refreshed us. There were also various opportunities for “play”—brisk walks, oil painting, candle making. However, energized by the stimulation of our discussions, we passed up the Saturday night painting and candle making (but not brisk walking) in favor of continuing our presentations and discussions of current projects. The combined wisdom of the group should come to good fruition in publications to come.

The gathering took place in Marjorie Suchocki’s home, with sleeping places provided for all out-of-towners on various beds and ingeniously placed cushions. Mary Elizabeth Moore prepared the opening ritual; Gwen Miller led the Sunday morning meditation. In addition to Marjorie, Mary Elizabeth, and Gwen, participants were Carolyn Bohler, Kathi Breazeale, Judy Casanova, Tess Cowen, Helen Goggin, Nancy Howell, Marit Trelstad, and June Watkins, with guest cameos by Claremont faculty Kathy Black, Kathleen Greider, and Ann Taves.

The conference was so satisfying that we decided we must do it again next year. Who knows, if more Women in Process decide to join us we may have to do it twice (Marjorie’s home not being a castle save in the metaphoric sense). We’re up for it....are you?



Templeton Science and Religion Course Winners



Friends of the Center for Process Studies were among the 1997 Templeton Foundation Science and Religion Course Winners. **William D. Dean** won for his course *Science, Religion, and American Culture* in the Theology Dept., Iliff School of Theology, Denver, Colorado. **Andrew Sung Park** of the Theology Department, United Theological Seminary, Dayton, Ohio, co-taught a course on *Christian Mystics and Science*. **George W. Shields** won for his course on *Religion and Science: Issues at the Interface* at the Kentucky State University, Integrative Studies Program, Frankfort, Kentucky.



Standing (left to right): Mary Elizabeth Moore, Gwen Miller, Carolyn Bohler, Kathi Breazeale, June Watkins.

Sitting (left to right): Helen Goggin, Marit Trelstad, Nancy Howell, Tess Cowan.

Front Row (left to right): Marjorie Suchocki, Judy Casanova.

Conference: The Future of ProcessThought in Europe

By Aliman Sears

The European Society for Process Thought, directed by Jan Van der Veken in Leuven, in conjunction with the Groupe de Recherche sur l'Actualit et la Crativit, directed by J.M. Breuvert of Universit Catholique, Lille, France, held a conference on March 31st through April 2nd, 1997, in Kortrijk, Belgium and Lille, France. The three-day conference was distinctive in itself, being an inter-cultural affair conducted in two European cities. With tours of each Town Hall, this cultural experience added tremendously to the value of the meeting.

A few of the presentations inspired contemplation and deliberation, and a few generated intense debate. However, the piquant sessions ended with the combatants agreeing that the approach under deliberation was deserving of further study, because each was simply an attempt "to sound the depths in the nature of things."

Lewis Ford gave his "Compositional Analysis of *Process and Reality: An Update*" in a series of open discussion presentations. Ford and the participants went into great detail concerning the issues: Should we interpret *Process and Reality* systematically and/or genetically? Does systematic interpretation cover up how Whitehead arrived at his ideas, thus robbing us of valuable insight? Given that the epochal theory of time was an insertion into the Lowell Lectures, does this mean that there is a strain that runs through a portion of *Science and the Modern World* that assumes events and a continuous theory of time consonant with *Concept of Nature* and *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge*? Can the "early" theory of prehension (the relation between two events in virtue of a common eternal object) account for causation? Should the answers to these and other questions change our strategy in reading Whitehead? Can we go beyond Whitehead and clear up some problems by positing the future as active? The responses to Professor Ford's ideas varied, but were always animated.

The next morning the participants were shuttled to the Universit Catholique in Lille, France, only some 25 kilometers away, but a whole world away. J.M. Breuvert gave a presentation on Kant and Whitehead entitled, "Kant et Whitehead: Entre Creativit et Libert." Santiago Sia, Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, gave a presentation entitled "Concretising Concrete Experience: A Discussion Paper on a Possible Task for Process Thought in Europe." Professor Sia made three suggestions: First, philosophy should be more inclusive of poetic insights as the foundation for abstract philosophical reflection. This is not a simple quoting of poetry, nor a juxtaposition of the two endeavors, nor an anti-rational movement. It is a "genuine listening to what poets are 'delivering' in the way that Heidegger 'listened' in his

What are Poets For." This gives poets their own space. Second, develop a specifically process philosophical hermeneutics. Design it (after Gadamer) to "reconnect the objective world of technology with the fundamental orders of our being" and to show how to mediate human cognitive capacities with the totality of our experience. Third, we should complement the strictly rational modes of communicating process philosophy with an increase of more literary modes. This is not a watering-down nor popularization of process philosophy, but a wider dissemination of it via poetry, novels, plays, and dialogues. It is an effort to reach the minds and hearts of the public. Along these lines, Professor Sia and his wife have written a novel available this October (ISBN: 1 85776 256 8), called *The Fountain Arethuse*. Set in the university town of Leuven, Belgium, it makes use of process insights to deal with the concreteness of life, and to make sense of our choices in life.

Isabelle Stengers gave a presentation titled "L' actualit de Whitehead." We are in a state of war with a destructive modernism and a deconstructive postmodernism. Invention of scientific fact suits the abstractions of modern science. Facts about ultimate reality constructed in laboratories only demonstrate the conditions extant in the lab. Further, the modality of 'fact that can demonstrate' is the sole arbiter of reality; but facts taken only as demonstration may not address the full scope of reality. Philosophy kills itself if it permits itself to be defined by science and demonstration. From a Whiteheadian view, however, there is no opposition between philosophy and science. There can be no opposition of fact and value, because without values there are no facts. Whitehead's philosophy may produce an atmosphere beyond fact as pure demonstration, and propel us into the realm where we can construct facts that embrace our full experience: both science and philosophy.

During the last part of the conference, Jan Van der Veken opened a discussion about the future of process thought in Europe. This conference may be a hub for discussions about process thought, and ways to start other centers for process thought in Europe and throughout the world. There will be a large-scale conference on Philosophy, Science, and Religion in November 1998, and all are encouraged to submit papers. Professor Van der Veken will retire in one year from the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. Thus, the Society needs someone driven by process philosophy to lead the way into the 21st century. Suggestions for such a person are welcome.

Lastly, all the participants paid homage to Charles Hartshorne for his 100th birthday by signing a giant-sized birthday card that will be mailed to Austin, Texas. Thank-you, Charles Hartshorne, from your friends and colleagues in Europe and around the globe.



Special

What Process

Mutual Transformation and Integration

by John Quiring

To me, process thought has always held out hope for the possibility of integration. By integration I mean balancing and harmonizing the diversity of experiences and interpretations in life and education. This essay seeks to explain that hope in terms of a simple three-tier structure: a First Order of multiple experience bases, a Second Order of interpretations, and a Third Order of integrations, involving mutual transformation of the Second Order interpretations.

I have always tried to discuss process theology in terms of process philosophy, and process philosophy in terms of its perennial agenda as explicitly inter-departmental, trans-disciplinary, constructive thought. Whereas everyone copes with multiple experience bases, one function of philosophy is to help us move beyond compartmentalization toward integration. This is my interpretation of Whitehead's *The Function of Reason* (chapter 3) and the practice of the Center for Process Studies. Additionally, I seek to discuss the place of process theologies in terms of their relation to the various parts or dimensions of a religion.

Process philosophy is a philosophy of Change, of Becoming. It has arisen perennially since the time of Heraclitus to counterbalance a preoccupation with Substance and Being and the search for foundations—beginnings and ends. While process thought is realist, in the sense of acknowledging Being independent of our minds, it focuses on Becoming, the changes in and development of Being. Process thought is interested in events. It focuses on things-as-constituted-by-their-relations rather than things-in-themselves.

While the inner core of philosophy deals with the most general questions about the nature of reality, the good, meaning and truth, and the rules of inference; many parts of the outer circle of philosophy address basic questions about major human enterprises—like science, religion, politics—and their relations to each other. Another level of inquiry arises from the conflict between traditions of philosophy or alternative concepts of the nature of philosophy itself, or different styles and agendas of philosophy. Process philosophy is one strand running through all these difficult issues.

Process theology comes into existence in the context of

concern about relations between large-scale human enterprises, between academic disciplines, between cultures, and between institutions. It arises at the interfaces of these great social phenomena. It is about what sense to make of the relation between religion and what is not religion (say, science, mathematics, politics, business, art, etc.).

The tendency toward abstractness in process theology is due to its relation to philosophy, and the kind of philosophy to which it relates. Yet philosophy is trying to answer the simplest of questions, like “What is ultimate?” “What is most important?” or “What is importance?” That is what got me started. Part of the difficulty of these structurally simple questions is due to the fact that they are often asked in conditions of crisis or stress, or situations of high achievement, development, or complexity where the boundaries of disciplines or paradigms, if not of human faculties, are approached.

The post-Renaissance world has forced upon everyone's attention the brute fact of human diversity: the plurality of civilizations, cultures, religions, artistic styles, worldviews, behaviors, etiquettes, and lifestyles. In the crush of awareness of difference, we may feel our own identities challenged. An initial response can be denial, trying to harden ourselves against differences. But this freezes our growth in awareness, or limits our perception. Another, perhaps more typical, reaction is dismissal of difference as trivial, or even contempt of all difference as inferior or wrong.

Sometimes, however, circumstances break us out of the security of inherited interpretations and we actually get our faces rubbed in radical differences of belief and behavior. We are forced to consider alternative interpretations of the other, of difference in general. This calls for transformation and re-integration of our interpretations. Henry Nelson Wieman even preaches that “We must be broken”—to allow the emergence of greater goods.

The Center for Process Studies facilitates dialogues between representatives of various disciplines and institutions. The traditional agenda of process theology addressed conflicts within Christianity, between Christianity and other religions, between religion and philosophy, religion and science, and between moral and aesthetic perspectives. The work of the Center for Process Studies has extended that agenda to include conflicts in the areas of economic, political, gender,

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sexuality, race, class, and human ecological theory. My own work seeks to further extend the agenda, employing process thought to address the clash of ideologies—conservative, liberal, radical, and green.

I have discussed process thought first as a way of making sense of the relation between conflicting interpretations of major human experience bases. Process theologies, I suggest, arise as we find ourselves forced to reinterpret particular strands of religious experience in terms of our understanding of other experience bases. While I am suggesting that what is mutually transformed are interpretations, not the primal experience bases, I do not wish to deny the role of faith, reason, and interpretation in experience, or experiencing as.

The power of religion, I suggest, lies in our experiences of transformation from depravity to spiritual liberty and morality. They can't take that away from us, so to speak. Salvation is indelibly real, or it is not salvation—deliverance from all forms of false-centeredness and the disorders they cause. Conflicts arise at two interfaces: (1) between interpretations of religious experience and interpretations of non-religious experience, and (2) between traditional and contemporary interpretations of religious and non-religious experience. The first clash is due to different domains of experience, the latter is due to the growth of the total context of interpretation.

I begin by differentiating between the parts of a religion—between the experiential, the scriptural, the mythic and ritual, the doctrinal, the ethical, and the institutional. I call the experiential the spiritual and salvific dimension and label it First Order. Then the expressions of this First Order are all Second Order and variable—institution and worship, behavior and belief. I further suggest that every human institution and discipline has a similar multi-dimensional framework of First Order Experience and Second Order Expression. A Third Order of discourse is devoted to Integration of the major experience bases—religion, art, science, technology, ideology, self, race, class, gender, etc.—their self-interpretations, and re-interpretations from the standpoints of other experience bases and from the total context.

Integrative, trans-disciplinary process thought operates at the level of the Third Order. Third Order attempts at “total” integration have implications for each of the Second Order expressions and interpretations. While First Order expe-

riences are given, internal and external interpretations of them may differ, and are subject to revision. For total interpretation of the Third Order, each Second Order interpretation of First Order experience is exposed to the process of mutual modification. For example, religious experience is interpreted differently after the experience bases of the sciences are examined and interpreted. Scientific explanation of disciplined experiences of nature approaches limits. Religious experience and its interpretations contribute to the total metaphysical context of integration. In the process, a religious person's interpretation of the current scientific story will modify the otherwise-“total science” interpretation. Process thought is thereby able to point beyond fundamentalisms of all kinds: of religion, philosophy, science, technology, economy, state, ideology and identity.

But this process of mutual transformation of, say, religion and science is prevented from being an automatic, mechanical revision by the diversity and magnitude of religious and scientific experience. It is also complicated by the availability of philosophical options for ultimate explanation: dualism, monism, non-dualism, idealism, materialism, etc. Further transformations are occurring as we become conscious of the identity paradigms—race, class, gender, species—and the ideological paradigms—conservative, liberal, and progressive.

While defense of experience bases is appropriately conservative, resistance to integration and reinterpretation of experience bases, I suggest, can result in conflicting reductionistic interpretations. Where liberalism seeks to prevent conflict through mutual tolerance, it tends to remain satisfied with compartmentalized interests. While the Process search for integration and reinterpretation tends to be characterized as progressive, I have shown how it can be appreciated as conservative with regard to its honoring of the basic modes of experience, religious as well as scientific. As a form of *constructive* postmodernism, it is not dismissive of the premodern, but integrates it with the modern. First Order experiences remain, basic identities are not violated. But Second Order interpretations are mutually transformed through encounter and dialogue. Their meanings are enriched when seen in the wider context of Third Order integration.



Special

What Process

Integrity in Faith and Inquiry

By Edgar A. Towne

Having held both pastorates and professorships, I am grateful that process philosophy and theology, as methods of inquiry into a background frame of understanding, have helped me witness to biblical faith in God with integrity. By “integrity” I mean that this witness is made fully conscious of the severe limits of human knowing here, and that it is a freely-chosen witness that must be owned as such.

While uniting the metaphysical with the empirical in a rigorous philosophical method, the process vision of reality is not without its problems as the enormous literature and the work of CPS testify. The path to integrity through this vision for me has been in particular through Whitehead's “reformed subjectivist principle” and Hartshorne's use of analogy in his treatment of God as the “personally-ordered society” whose life is the unity of reality. Of course, such a path also wends its way amid events in one's own life.

Not long after I left my first pastorate in 1958 to take up doctoral study at the Divinity School of the University of Chicago, I encountered what was passed around there something like a rumor. This was that Charles Hartshorne taught that the world is God's Body. Since my own theology, as well as my life, was in disarray at the time, I set out to read Whitehead and Hartshorne (and Weiman as well). I discovered this *organic* body analogy was the mainspring of Hartshorne's view that reality is both one and many, and that its unity can be construed to be personal through a *social* analogy. God *has* the world's experience as God's own, overcoming the “monopolar bias” of classical theism in which God is construed only to act as cause, not to respond as effect.

This made sense to me, undoubtedly because I had already been resisting in my pastoral work the popular view that God had *caused* those untimely tragedies and unexplainable accidents that claimed the lives of the men, women, and children whose funerals I was conducting in two mining camps of West Virginia. At that time also my wife and I were dealing with the new knowledge that our six-year-old daughter was in some way mentally impaired. Her teachers in the special classes she attended in Chicago were wonderful, and she made progress in her learning during my graduate residency.

In an essay entitled, “Whitehead's Novel Intuition,”

Hartshorne defined his panentheistic conception of God and the world in contrast to Whitehead's view that God is a concreting-concrescent “actual occasion” in which the “many become one and are increased by one.” Analogously with our own experience of selfhood as embodied, Hartshorne conceived of a divine knowledge of us as subjects and agents because we and the world comprise God's experience. Hartshorne's point was that his view of God performed the same philosophical work as Whitehead's actual occasion. Of course, analogy is not a strong or conclusive argument in itself, and no divine mystery or philosophical skepticism is dispelled here. By analogy, which is a device of practical reason, an inquirer—if he or she choose—may imaginatively construe what is less well-known by means of what is more well-known, distinguishing a human-intuited and imperfect knowledge from a divine eminent and perfect knowledge. Some writers quite rightly have noticed the mystical quality in Hartshorne's treatment of intuition.

It is well known that there are unsolved antinomies in the process vision. No clear empirical evidence supports the cosmic simultaneity that Hartshorne's intuition seems to entail. In the way it is construed prehension (knowing and having) requires objectification of that which precedes and contributes to an occasion. How subjects are known *as subjects* without losing their subjectivity is treated by Hartshorne as a “reciprocal” social relation that is neither internal nor external; but it may be doubted that it successfully construes his intuition. (These matters are treated fully in my *Two Types of New Theism: Knowledge of God in the Thought of Paul Tillich and Charles Hartshorne* forthcoming from Peter Lang). Some thinkers, but not Hartshorne, hold that subjective as well as objective immortality is conceivable in the process vision.

Our daughter at age 25 was killed along with three other mentally-challenged young adults who were pursuing their G.E.D. studies. In a dense winter fog their school bus, on its first trip after purchase by the parents who previously carpooled in several groups, was hit by a train at a rural grade crossing. I'm grateful to Charles Hartshorne for helping me trust the God who takes tragedies like this into the divine life, and to repudiate the god, who alone in omnipotent transcendence is thought to cause such events. Whatever may be said about subjective immortality, it is sufficient now in faith to choose to trust the God with whom we are all together in the

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divine life.

To his credit as a philosopher, Hartshorne candidly concedes the lack of full coherence in his process vision. So long as this candor can be retained, the process vision affords a background frame of reference for a faith in God that itself requires integrity.



Surprise and Celebration

by Judy Casanova

It's often said that Process thought is difficult to understand or explain, and if one listens very long to those engaged in debates in this field, the criticism seems, at least to me, fairly valid. The most basic concepts of process thought, however, are fairly simple, even though they go contrary to much of popular wisdom. These simple ideas are: 1) that the whole of everything is not made up of things, but of events—becoming, as opposed to being—and 2) that every event, however small, affects every other—that events are related. These are not terribly new ideas, but they are central to process thinking, and if taken seriously, change just about everything. Here, very simply, are some of the changes for me:

Process thinking means that I can't put labels on things—they're not things, they're happenings, and they're not finished yet. It means I can't put a label on myself. I can't call myself a good—or a no-good—person because to put that kind of label on myself would blind me to who I am in each moment. I can't put labels on you, for at any moment, you have the right and the ability to surprise me, and I don't want to miss the surprise. Every day is filled with newness—sometimes delightful sometimes not, but fresh. Maybe I can see something that I couldn't see yesterday; maybe there is something within my experience that never was before. I am a Christian, so I carry this labeling thing further. Process thinking means to me that I can't put labels on God—not even nice ones. I can only know God as I know you—partially, as I can see, in the moment. What God is growing into, and what I and you are growing into is not yet. That doesn't mean that God doesn't exist any more than it means you and I don't exist. I can say, "This is what I've experienced of God," but never "This is what God is and if you don't confirm me in my belief you are wrong!"

Process thinking requires that I live in the present, cel-

ebrating what is. I may or I may not win the lottery, meet the perfect man, balance my checkbook, grow the perfect rose; although I allow these in my consciousness as possibilities and as such they enrich my life. But where I live is here and now, in all the wonderful grubbiness of the present, and little miracles happen all around me. I don't need a future to validate me. Heaven may happen, but it's this world and my body that is my home, my place to become. I'm going to do just that, taking the best care of what I have that I possibly can. As my body, my environment, my relationships prospers, I prosper. There is no getting mine if it means that I have to take it from someone else—not because I am so altruistic, but because that is not the way reality works. I can't despoil what is right in front of me (animal, vegetable or mineral) for some imaginary goal somewhere down the road; for every choice I make is a making of myself and of my world and of my God.

Process thinking allows me to walk among "those who seem to be something" (St. Paul's phrase) without being over impressed and among those of no repute without writing them off. It means that I can never write off any series of events—anyone or anything. Not only is that series (person) part of me and I a part of that person, but what I become through knowing another and what that other becomes by knowing me goes on and on through all time and influences everything that is to come. There is no us and them, no sheep and goats. We are all becoming, and the final chapter isn't written on any of us. I don't have to become what I'm not to impress somebody or win their approval. Process thinking means that I can rejoice in my particularity—I'm glad I'm not you and I'm glad you're not me. We are, each of us, unique in all the universe, in all that is.

Process thinking means that I'm responsible to try to be the best that I can become—not that some judge somewhere will tot up my poor efforts and declare me saved or damned, but because I am response-able. I am capable of responding and therefore responsible for my response. I want to be the fullest, most thoughtful, strongest, most loving series of happenings that I possibly can be. I want that possibility for me and for every human, every animal, every flower, every blade of grass, for every atom and mitochondria—and if I can help, in my own small way with whatever resources I have, I will. Shall we dance?



Translating Process Thought Into Chinese

by Wenyu Xie

A few years ago when I first translated into Chinese and published an article written by David Griffin, "Postmodern Spirituality and Society," I never thought that it would be the beginning of a much larger project of translating works in process thought into Chinese. I mentioned to Dr. Griffin that Chinese scholarship knew nothing about process thought and suggested that we could do something to change the situation. We discussed the task of introducing process thought systematically to Chinese scholarship.

At that time, the main problem was lack of funds for translating and publishing. Thanks to Dr. Griffin's efforts, we collected \$2,500 for the first book, *The Reenchantment of Science: Postmodern proposals*, which was published in the winter of 1995.

It has been available for a year. Does it provide a new resource for Chinese thinking? Friends in Claremont often asked me: How many copies have you sold? Have you attracted any readers yet? What I could say was: "I don't know." And I conveyed these questions to the editor of the project in China and found out that he did not know either.

Then my vision of the destiny of the project was completely changed when I received a letter from the editor, Mr. Zhihe Wang. The letter tells this story: In October, the annual conference (nation-wide) of the Association of the Philosophy of Nature was held in Guangdong, China. To his surprise, Mr. Wang was invited to the conference as a speaker precisely because he was the editor of the Chinese version of *The Reenchantment of Science*. His impression upon arrival was that almost all the participants had read the book. Two professors, respectively from Wuhan University and Hangzhou University, told Mr. Wang that they assigned the book to their graduate students on their "must-read" list. And when the conference began, the book was mentioned in every speech, accompanied by a compliment that it may provide new thinking for

philosophy of science. By the end of the conference, a highly regarded journal in China, *The Journal of Natural Dialectic*, had decided to invite about ten scholars to write comments on the book which it will publish in their January issue.

Readers also are anticipating forthcoming publications of the series. At this stage, we have selected three more books for the series from the SUNY series in constructive postmodern thought, edited by Griffin:

- *Spirituality and Society: Postmodern Visions* (just published).
- *God and Religion in the Postmodern World: Essays in Postmodern Theology* (in process of translation and scheduled to be published by the end of 1997).
- *Founders of Constructive Postmodern Philosophy* (in process of translation and scheduled to be published by the end of 1997).

We have also decided to publish *Process Theology* by John Cobb and David Griffin (Westminster Press, 1976), which, too, is in the process of translation and scheduled to be published by the end of 1997).

Thanks to Mr. David Stowe's generosity, we have another \$2,500. With this fund we are able to add a sixth book to the series, which will likely be a book written either by Whitehead or John Cobb. Indeed, we are thinking of making the project bigger, provided that we can receive more financial support. According to my knowledge, Whitehead's books do not have Chinese versions so far. We also hope to collect enough money to sponsor a Chinese scholar to do research and translation on Whitehead's works. I would like to have this opportunity to call for your moral and financial support. Come and join us in the project!

All contacts may go to Dr. Griffin, at the Center for Process Studies (or davraygrif@aol.com) or to me through my email address (xiew@cgs.edu).



Membership Corner

by Jeff Sanders

We recently announced our program to provide \$500 grants for seed money to members who want to hold CPS type conferences in their own institutions. The program was launched in response to suggestions of our Advisory Board that CPS should seek to promote process conferences outside of Claremont. Two \$500 grants will be offered each year.

We are happy to announce the gift of \$500 to the Australasian Association for Process Thought, directed by Peter Farleigh. According to Peter, "Our organization for the conference is going well with a total of about 50 people indicating that they will be attending." The AAPT conference will focus on "The Contemporary Relevance of Process Thought." You may contact the Center for more information on this conference, or submit an application for seed money to start your own process conference.

In addition, the Center for Process Studies now accepts credit cards (Mastercard and Visa) for payments of CPS memberships, services, and donations. Over the last few years we have had several requests particularly from our international members for the convenience of credit card payments. After several months of working through the requirements of the Claremont School of Theology, we are able to begin accepting credit cards.

As a final note, I would like to remind everyone that we are still working on updating and providing information through our Web Site. Visit our site at <http://www.ctr4process.org>

Journal Update

by Judy Casanova



Volume 25 of *Process Studies* is nearly together and will be in our readers hands in July. This issue is dedicated to Charles Hartshorne on the occasion of his 100th birthday. It will contain a dedication by our editor, Barry Whitney, as well as two articles by Dr. Hartshorne, "Freedom as Universal" (written in the author's ninety-eighth year) and "The Meaning of Life." Volume 25 also will include "Hartshorne on Heidegger" by Dr. Daniel Dombrowski, and a Special Focus Section on Process and Analytic Philosophy, edited by Dr. George Shields.

We are also richer by the addition of a new staff member, Dr. Leemon McHenry. He is no stranger to our readers, having written several articles for *Process Studies* over the years and being the author of *Whitehead and Bradley, A Comparative Analysis*. Joining Dr. Nancy Howell as a second book review editor, Dr. McHenry will deal primarily with philosophical books. We take this opportunity to formally welcome Dr. Leemon B. McHenry to our team. You may contact him through his e-mail: mchenry@humnet.ucla.edu.

Grants Available

by John Cobb

The Center for Process Studies is initiating a program of offering seed money to members who want to hold process-oriented conferences in their own institutions. Grants will be for a maximum of \$500.

On the first go-round, they will be only for major conferences that are clearly and extensively informed by Process Thought.

This program is launched in response to suggestions that were made at the meeting of the Advisory Board last February. It was pointed out that although the Center for Process Studies has co-sponsored conferences in other parts of the country, most of its activities are located in Claremont, being thereby inaccessible to many of its members. The Center for Process Studies should encourage the holding of conferences elsewhere.

\$500 will certainly not cover the costs of a significant conference. Sometimes, however, having some money up front makes it possible to get other, larger commitments. We hope some of you will find it so.

We are not at the point of having formal application procedures. Requests should be in writing addressed to David Ray Griffin at the address below. Tell us about your ideas and how you think a small grant might help you realize them. If we agree that the idea is worthwhile and practical, we will cooperate as long as our small budget lasts.

David Ray Griffin
The Center for Process Studies
1325 North College Avenue
Claremont, CA 91711
e-mail: DavRayGrif@aol.com

CENTER FOR PROCESS STUDIES
announces the

SILVER ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION
 and
Third International Whitehead Conference
 August 4-9, 1998
 Claremont, CA

Watch for further announcements, call for papers, and attendance information.

**THIRD INTERNATIONAL WHITEHEAD
 CONFERENCE
 SILVER ANNIVERSARY OF THE CENTER FOR
 PROCESS STUDIES**

by David Griffin

Plans are now being finalized for the Third International Whitehead Conference, which will also be the celebration of the 25th Anniversary of the Center for Process Studies. The conference, which will be held in Claremont, will begin on the afternoon of Tuesday, August 4, and conclude with lunch on Sunday, August 9, 1998. (The timing will allow participants to attend the World Philosophy Congress, which begins in Boston on August 10.) The theme will be "Process Thought and the Common Good." The purpose is to ask how we can employ process thought more effectively to contribute to the good of the world.

Invited lectures will be given by George Allan, Ian Barbour, John Bennett, Charles Birch, John Cobb, William Dean, Strachan Donnelley, Nancy Frankenberry, Franklin Gamwell, Arran Gare, David Griffin, William R. Jones, Catherine Keller, Yong Ok Kim, Jay McDaniel, Mary Elizabeth Moore, Jorge Nobo, Steve Odin, David Pailin, Martin Prozesky, Kevin Sharpe, Isabelle Stengers, Douglas Sturm, Marjorie Suchocki, Ryusei Takeda, Thandeka, Jan van der Veken, Reiner Wiehl, and Seisaku Yamamoto, among others.


There will be sections for papers relating Whiteheadian process thought to Aesthetics and the Arts, Anthropology, Buddhism, Business & Environmental Ethics East and West, Chaos and Complexity Theory, Chinese Culture, Christian Thought, Ecology and Environmental Ethics, Education for the Good of the World, Ethics, Evangelical Theology, Existentialist Philosophy, Feminism, Hegel, Interreligious Dialogue, Jewish Thought, Jurisprudence, Korean Culture, Liberation and Political Theology, Mathematics, Medicine, Metaphysical Cosmology, New Age Spirituality, Nishida's Philosophy, Phenomenology and Analytical Philosophy, Philosophical Sociology, Philosophy of Civilization, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Science, Political Economy, Process Theology, Psychology, Roman Catholic Theology, Science and Religion, Sexuality, Social-Political Thought, Systems Theory, Technology, Thomism, and Transpersonal Psychology. There will also be meetings of the Association for Process Philosophy of Education, Foundation for the Philosophy of Creativity, the Society for the Study of Process Philosophy, and working groups on Process Hermeneutics, Process Psychotherapy, and Textual Analysis.

An announcement, including a Call for Papers and information about registration and lodging, will be mailed to all members soon. The present announcement is to encourage you to set aside the dates and travel funds.



Interconnections

News from friends around the world



Denmark—A conference is scheduled for September 8-11th, 1997, at the University of Aarhus entitled, “Time, Heat and Order.” Niels Viggo Hansen, a member of the Center, is the organizer. He believes that process thought has a contribution to make to this topic. The conference will consider interpretations of thermodynamics scientifically, historically, and philosophically. Contributors will be Isabelle Stengers, Ilya Prigogine, Matthew Norton Wise, Uffe Juul Jensen, Niels Viggo Hansen, Ole Knudsen, Simon Schaffer, Andrew Pickering, John B. Cobb, Jr., Jesper Hoffmeyer, Mary Midgley, and Bruno Latour. The conference is arranged by the Dept. of Philosophy, University of Aarhus, Denmark, and the Research Centre of Health, Humanity and Culture. For more information contact: Ndr. Ringgade, DK-8000 Aarhus C, Denmark. Fax: (+45) 8942-2223. Email: Thermo-hist-97@hum.aau.dk

Boston—On November 14-17, 1997, The Marion Foundation is presenting a conference on “The Mythology of Growth.” The conference is a gathering of leading thinkers to articulate a vision of the emerging sustainable world economic community. Speakers include Donella Meadows, author of *The Limits of Growth* and *Beyond the Limits of Growth*; John Mack, Founding Director for the Center for Psychological Studies in the Nuclear Age at Harvard; Herman Daly, Professor at the University of Maryland and co-author with John Cobb of *For the Common Good*; Vicki Robin, author of *Your Money or Your Life*. Other leaders include Ray Anderson, John Quiring, Alan Atkisson, Paul Hawken and James Thornton. For more information contact: The Marion Foundation, 3 Barnabas Road, Marion, MA 02738. (508) 748-0816.

Australia—There will be an Inaugural Conference on May 23-25th, 1997 in Sydney, “The Contemporary Relevance of Process Thought.” David Ray Griffin is the keynote speaker. His topic is “Religion and Scientific Naturalism: How Whitehead Overcomes the Conflict.” Professor Jan van der Veken from the European Society for Process Thought in Leuven, Belgium, will also deliver a paper.

The Australasian Association for Process Thought has a new postal address and new web site address: Box 23 Wentworth Building, University of Sydney, N.S.W. 2006, Australia.

<http://www.ozemail.com.au/~farleigh/aapthome.html>

Fresno—Soulful Psychotherapy, founded by David Roy, has ventured out onto the Web. Please visit its new address: <http://www.soulfulpsy.com>. If you have an article you’d like to submit, please do. If you have others with whom you can share this site, please do. If you have feedback, please share.

Fall River, Massachusetts—Dr. William E. Kaufman’s book, *The Evolving God in Jewish Process Theology*, has been published by the Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, N.Y. Dr. Kaufman is Rabbi of Temple Beth El, Fall River, Massachusetts and Adjunct Professor of Philosophy, Rhode Island College. The book is the first systematic examination of process themes in contemporary Jewish theology.

Canada—Eldon Hay’s book *The Chignecto Covenanters: A Regional History of Reformed Presbyterianism in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, 1827-1905* has been published by McGill-Queen’s University Press (1996). The list of underlying assumptions in the acknowledgements includes the following: “The past is not dead, but can enlarge our past and allow us to move creatively into the future. As Northrop Frye remarked, ‘We are not alone: we live not only in God’s world but in a community with a tradition behind it. Preserving the inner vitality of that tradition is what the churches are for.’ This notion owes much to the thinking of Alfred North Whitehead, which was mediated to me personally by John B. Cobb, Jr.”

Please send any announcements to:


Editor: *Process Perspectives*
Center For Process Studies
1325 North College Ave.
Claremont, CA 91711

Email: junew@ctr4process.org

CALENDAR



Thursday, June 5, 1997
Happy 100th Birthday!
Charles Hartshorne



Tentative for October, 10-11, 1997
Living Together with Others:
The Challenges of a Multicultural Society
Claremont School of Theology

November, 1997
AAR/SBL
Look for us in San Francisco!

MEMBER PAPERS

Upon request, the following papers are available free of charge to center members (\$3 each for non-members). Or visit the CPS WEB site at <http://www.ctr4process.org> in the *Members Only* section.

Helen Goggin

Religious Education in a Postmodern World

Leemon McHenry

*Descriptive & Revisionary Event Theory:
 Whitehead & Quine*

Linda Handelman

*Knowledge Fragmentation and Integrative Studies:
 Can Whitehead Help?*

Alan Wittbecker

*The Philosophical Foundations of Ecoforestry
 or Adventures in Questioning*


HIGHLANDS INSTITUTE

ANNOUNCES UPCOMING PROGRAMS

Highlands, NC—Highlands Institute for American Religious Thought (HIART) announces the Women's Dialogue Seminar to be held in Highlands on June 22 and 23, 1997. Marjorie Suchocki will be the speaker for the seminar. The seminar will focus on "How do we respond to tragic evil?" The dialogue presents the convergence of three worlds as the question is explored. The world of art gives us the award-winning film, *Dead Man Walking*, with the challenge of one woman's faithful response to evil. The world of theology parallels the film in Wendy Farley's book, *Tragic Vision and Divine Compassion*. One's own world is the meeting place where the film and theology will be woven together, and dialogue about our intellectual/experiential responses to tragic evil will take place. Preparation for the seminar includes reading and bringing the book with you. The film will be watched together during the dialogue. Registration is required: Contact Women's Dialogue, P.O. Box 2009, High-

lands, NC, 28741 or call (704) 562-4038.

HIART will also present a free public lecture/seminar series in Highlands. The lectures will be given on Monday nights and a seminar will follow each Tuesday afternoon. The series begins on June 9 and concludes on July 15. Persons to lecture are Edward Barret, Frederick Ferré, Marjorie Suchocki, Donald Crosby, Mary Brown Bullock, and Langdon Gilkey. For information, contact HIART, P.O. Box 2009, Highlands, NC 28741.

Highlands Institute is an international community of 70+ productive scholars whose work emphasizes (1) the interface between theology and philosophy, especially where theological efforts have utilized the American philosophical tradition; (2) the history and development of liberal religious thought in America; (3) themes pertinent to the "Chicago School" of theology; and (4) naturalism in American theology and philosophy. It sponsors scholarly seminars and conferences, which are by invitation only. They also sponsor the *American Journal of Theology and Philosophy*, a book series with Peter Lang on American Liberal religious thought, and a collection of essays and book series on American philosophy and liberal religious thought with Edwin Mellen Press. 

Make Checks payable to CPS and mail to: Center for Process Studies, 1325 North College Avenue, Claremont, CA 91711. U.S. Dollars Only, and drawn on a U.S. bank, please.

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I would like a copy of the brochure "How to Make a Will that Works"

I am considering a bequest to the Center for Process Studies and would appreciate receiving additional information.

I have already included a bequest in my will or living trust for the Center for Process Studies.

ORDER FORM

SECURE THE FUTURE OF PROCESS THOUGHT

Announcing the Helios Foundation's Silver Anniversary Matching Challenge Grant

We have received a matching \$50,000 grant from the Helios Foundation in honor of the Center for Process Studies' Silver Anniversary. We must raise \$50,000 by the International Whitehead Conference in August 1998, which is in celebration of our Silver Anniversary. The Helios Foundation will match the money we raise with an additional \$50,000 grant! To make this program even more exciting, all Hartshorne Memberships and Gift Annuities qualify. Hartshorne Memberships are \$1,000 each and provide lifetime membership to CPS with no renewals. A Gift Annuity provides guaranteed income for life that is partly tax-free. Use the form to send your pledge or donation or to request more information.

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