For a healthier foreign policy debate

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu (Photo: İHA, Ahmet Topal)

As Robert Putnam rightly posited, foreign policy is a two-level game played concurrently for domestic and foreign audiences. In Turkey, not unlike other countries, the debate basically focuses on internal dynamics and subsequently that audience starts to think that national exigencies define foreign policy realities. Against this backdrop, my endeavor is to illustrate a broader perspective in order to comprehend the current predispositions in the Middle East that are largely disregarded in domestic debates.

In the post-Cold War era, Turkey made a rather late attempt to carve out a sphere of influence in its neighborhood. It built on security and economic prosperity arguments, which ultimately stood on the “soft power” discourse. Thus, Turkey sought security and prosperity through peaceful and de-securitized policies. Neighbors were now defined as “potential allies” and the Middle East as a zone of cooperation. Besides serving security and economic interests, Turkey's pivot to the region enabled offsetting the regional security outlook and endeavored to avert a possible clash between the West, particularly the unilateralist US and Islamic countries. This, in turn, was supposed to pave the way for an entrenched European and better global role for Turkey. With a few exceptions, this modeling worked quite well and actually contributed to Ankara's strategic agenda until 2011.

Afterwards, the initial euphoria about the Arab Spring notwithstanding, flux and uncertainty has been the order of the day for all actors in the Middle East, including Turkey. On that note, neither the global powers nor regional actors have comparatively been in a better situation to define their interests and control the current chaos and instability.

The US, “the principal actor,” is no less puzzled than others about how to steer the course. After a pause, the Obama administration rather reluctantly gave support to “democratic change.” As the ancien regimes were in peril, Washington cautiously decided to embrace the new actors. But the political change was neither orchestrated nor guided overseas. Washington's much criticized posture against the Egyptian military takeover and the pursuant crackdown is testament to this loss of control. It also lost moral ground by not calling the military coup what it is. But this will not lead to a shift in the two fundamental objectives of the US, i.e. Israel's security and access to Gulf energy resources. Provided that they are in order, the US will continue to focus on its national priority, namely internal reconstruction. This naturally gives regional powers more room to maneuver.

Russia returned to power equation with its ability to stem the tide in Syria. But the ability to resist change does not automatically convert to regional clout. Russia is nowhere near its apogee of power during the Cold War when it stood with the Arab socialists against US-Israeli front. Today, it lacks ideological or emulative clout to reclaim the region into its fold. Even worse, Moscow stood with the region's biggest liability, whose authority is at best squeezed to a small portion of the eastern Mediterranean and now irreconcilably hints at supporting the Egyptian coup.

The EU in general -- former colonial powers Britain and France, in particular -- has regrettably been ineffective. EU High Representative Catherine Ashton's good offices have shown Brussels' limited soft power outside its area of enlargement. On Syria, the urgent need for EU activism unsurprisingly ended in sustained inaction. The East Asian powers, especially China, are merely interested in sustainable energy and commercial ties and do not have the necessary tools to reverse the course in the case of political disruption.

Israel is seen as the main benefactor of the current chaos. The resistance front, i.e. Iran, Syria, Hamas, and Hezbollah suffered irreversible losses. Iran is pondering alternatives to break its political and economic isolation. Hezbollah, if not Hamas, now faces an internal legitimacy problem. Gulf monarchies are no less uncomfortable, given the burgeoning external legitimacy gap after a public confrontation, this time against Sunni brethren. The forthcoming royal succession in Saudi Arabia is especially likely to exacerbate extant domestic schisms among their youth. Egypt opted for predictability rather than sustainability and is now threatened by looming civil strife. Jordan, Lebanon, Bahrain and Iraq are as vulnerable as ever.

As events unfold, regional security gets even more precarious. First, the prevalent zero-sum security outlook hinders the sustainability of the current order. Second, moderates are losing ground and extremists fill in the gap. Al-Qaeda is spinning its network around the whole region from Iraq and Syria to Yemen, Sinai and Libya. Third, as Jennifer Rubin recently wrote in The Washington Post, “The more Egypt [region] descends into chaos, the stronger the case that US can't be pro-Israel and also isolationist or for a strong Israel and a weak US.” In other words, the assumption that the US can support Israel under any circumstances and maintain its power in the Middle East in alignment with Israel is becoming more debatable. Finally, the US has committed itself in risky peace talks with a nine-month deadline. The talks' possible failure could turn the equation in favor of the Palestinian state. Their success, though, is even more precarious given Fatah's inability to represent other Palestinian groups. Therefore, the burgeoning political upheaval does in no way serve any party's interests, except extraterritorial powers who assume that they benefit from keeping the actors involved distracted.

Overall Turkey's main setback would be not the failure of the Arab Spring, but the breakdown of the ongoing Kurdish reconciliation. Ankara, against all odds, acted wisely to deal with the problem in its totality, now accepting its transnational character. If Turkey attracts the Kurds into its orbit, it will emerge less dependent on regional security order. Yet the process itself is intrinsically contingent on regional balances, which entails Turkish involvement.

Back in 1992, Graham Fuller underlined Turkey's possible central role in a newly emerging geography. He warned the European Community against “prevent[ion of] a wall from emerging between ‘Christian' Europe and a Muslim Middle East” and emphasized the vitality of Turkey's constructive role. Today, the Western liberal democracy and market economy are definitive tools for Turkey in extending its clout in the region. Therefore, there is a direct correlation between Turkish influence and the trajectory of East-West relations. In other words, the rising anti-Western tide will in no way serve Turkey's interests.

The current developments, notably in Syria and Egypt, are not indicative of foreign policy success or failure. In an environment where every actor is challenged and puzzled, Turkey is not alone in its predicament. In order not to experience a similar scenario to “the lost decade” of the 1990s when it failed to get involved in the post-Gulf War regional order, Turkey has to contribute to finding a way out of the current crisis. To that end, Turkey's presence in the Middle East should be taken not as a liability, but as a valuable opportunity. To better serve national interests, maybe the domestic debates should take it from there.

All views expressed here solely belong to the author.